k FEDERAL EQUITY SUIT 
 
 SIMKINS 
 
QJornpll Slam ^rlyool Slibtarg 
 
irc oocir <J°r"f" University Library 
 
 KF8855.S58 1916 
 
 A federal equity suit 
 
 3 1924 020 098 707 
 
The original of tliis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924020098707 
 
A FEDERAL 
 
 EQUITY SUIT 
 
 A 
 
 w. s. 
 
 Professor of Liaw in the University of Texas 
 Austin, Texas. 
 
 THIRD EDITION 
 
 ROCHESTER, N. Y. 
 
 The Lawyers Co-opekative Publishing Company. 
 
 1916 
 
Copyright 1918 
 
 by 
 W. S. SIMK1N3 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 IN LOVING MEMORY OF MY BROTHER 
 JUDGE E. J. SIMKINS 
 
PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION. 
 
 The entire change of the rules of practice in the equity courts 
 of the United States, which went into effect February 1, 1913, 
 has made it necessary to issue a new edition of this work. I 
 have endeavored to explain the nature and purpose of the 
 radical changes made by the Supreme Court, and where with- 
 out any court construction of any particular rule, I have sought 
 to give such construction as would tend to conform it to the 
 stated purpose of the changes made; to wit, to expedite the 
 trial of causes in equity in the Federal courts. 
 
 I am not sure that abolishing the verification of pleadings 
 except in very special causes, and permitting the defendant 
 to state as many defenses, regardless of consistency, as he 
 deems essential, or to set up any set-off or counterclaim without 
 reference to the subject-matter of the original bill, will promote 
 the purpose or have the desired effect sought by the changes 
 made. It seems to tend to reducing equity pleading to a writ- 
 ten wrangle, and obscuring the purpose and issues of the original 
 bill, thereby delaying instead of expediting the trial of the cause. 
 ISTo important changes have been made in the jurisdiction of 
 the courts, or the removal of causes, or in appeals, so no changes 
 of importance have been made necessary in the original text, 
 other than bringing the authorities down to date. 
 
 I must acknowledge my indebtedness to Dr. G. C. Butte, of 
 the University of Texas, and to the official staff of the Lawyers 
 Co-operative Publishing Company, for valuable aid in preparing 
 the edition for publication. 
 
 I send the book forth, hoping it will aid the courts and the 
 Bar in reaching a construction of the new rules that will make 
 them efficient instruments in securing speedy trials in equity. 
 
 Tour obedient servant, 
 
 W. S. SlMKINS, 
 
 Professor of Law in the University of Texas. 
 
PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION. 
 
 It is provided by an act of Congress that the practice, plead- 
 ings, and forms and modes of proceeding existing at the time 
 in like causes other than equity, and admiralty causes in the 
 Circuit and District Courts of the United States, shall conform, 
 as near as may be, to the practice, forms and modes of proceed- 
 ing existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of 
 the State within which such United States Circuit and District 
 Courts are being held, any rule of the court to the contrary not- 
 withstanding. On the law side of the Federal courts, then, it 
 is presumed that the profession in each State would be reason- 
 ably familiar with the practice, forms, and modes of proceeding 
 required by this act. 
 
 On the equity side, however, the practice, forms, and mode of 
 procedure are governed, first, by acts of Congress; second, by 
 rules promulgated by the Supreme Court in subordination to 
 the acts of Congress ; and third, by such local rules as may be 
 promulgated by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Circuit 
 and District Courts, in subordination to the acts of Congress and 
 rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. 
 
 Whatever may be one's familiarity with the practice on the 
 law side of the Circuit Court of the United States, he can de- 
 rive very little aid or assistance if called upon to prosecute a 
 suit on the equity side of this court. 
 
 It was to meet this condition that I prepared a series of lec- 
 tures "On a Suit in Equity in the Federal Courts" for the 
 instruction of the Senior Classes in the Law Department of the 
 University of Texas. 
 
 I have been induced to publish them in book form, because, I 
 believe, in these lectures may be found a reasonable solution of 
 any doubt one may have as to any question of practice or pro- 
 cedure in the prosecution of an equity suit in the Federal courts. 
 
 I have sought to show, as briefly as possible, not only what 
 should be done, but how to do it; that is, I have not only dis- 
 
 vii 
 
Vlll PEEFACE. 
 
 cussed each step to be taken in a suit in equity, from iiling the 
 bill until it reaches the Supreme Court of the United States, 
 but I have indicated forms which may be used in the successive 
 steps to be taken in its progress. 
 
 Much that has been written is the result of my personal ex- 
 perience and observation in a practice of many years in the 
 equity courts of the Federal system. 
 
 In many instances it has been exceedingly diificult to extract 
 the true rule to be applied, because of conflicting opinions of 
 Federal judges, sometimes based on grounds reasonably calcu- 
 lated to create dissent; while in many other cases conflict has 
 been created by the refusal of the judges to follow the rules, or 
 recognize any limitation to their discretion. 
 
 In such cases doubt has been created as to the true rule, and 
 it has tended to emphasize a ^omewhat prevalent idea that what 
 you may or may not do in a Federal court of equity depends on 
 the condition of the judge's conscience, and not on rule. 
 
 However, in every instance when rules have been set aside 
 to reach a conclusion, I have considered the decision as only 
 the law of that particular case, and not as precedent; and, in 
 such cases, I have exercised my best judgment in reaching the 
 correct rule of practice. 
 
 In presenting this book to my brethren of the Bar, let it be 
 borne in mind that it has no pretensions to cover the field of 
 Federal practice, except in so far as the jurisdiction of the 
 Federal courts may be involved, but it is sent forth only as a 
 modest guide through the intricacies of a suit in equity in the 
 Federal courts, and any fair criticism that will correct my 
 errors will be sincerely appreciated by 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 W. S. SiMKINS, 
 
 Professor of Law in the University of Texas. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 The Fedeeal System 1 
 
 CHAPTEE II. 
 Maxims of Equity 9 
 
 CHAPTEE III, 
 
 Remedy at Law 15 
 
 Federal Common Law 1!) 
 
 CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 Eemedy "Plaii7, Adequate, Complete" 22 
 
 CHAPTEE V. 
 
 Whew a Court of Equity Will Eistforce a Purely 
 
 Legal Eemedy 27 
 
 CHAPTEE VI. 
 
 When Sec. 723 Must Be Set Up as a Defettse to Be 
 
 Effective 32 
 
 When the Court Will Act though not Set Up as a 
 
 Defense 34 
 
 ix 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTEE VII. 
 
 JUEISDICTION OF THE DiSTEICT CoUET IN EqUITT .... 3Y 
 
 What Courts Were Created 40 
 
 Courts Established by Congress 41 
 
 A "Suit in Law or Equity" Defined 43 
 
 Jurisdiction of the District Court of the United 
 
 States 43 
 
 Court of Equity Deal only with Property Rights . . 44 
 
 Presumption of Jurisdiction 45 
 
 CHAPTEE VIII. 
 Limits of Tbeeitobial Jueisdiction 48 
 
 CHAPTEE IX. 
 
 Diveesity of Citizenship 51 
 
 Word "Citizen" Used Collectively 57 
 
 Citizenship of Eepresentative Parties 57 
 
 Exceptions to the Eule 58 
 
 By Next Friend 59 
 
 For the Use of 59 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 Effect of Change of Citizenship Pending Suit 60 
 
 Transfer of Property to Create Diversity _. . 62 
 
 Suit by Assignee 63 
 
 Who Are not Citizens 63 
 
 CHAPTEE XL 
 
 Shifting Paetibs to Create Diversity 65 
 
 Identity of Interests 67 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. XI 
 
 CHAPTEE XII. 
 
 Sepaeable Conteoveesy YO 
 
 Joint and Several Liability 74 
 
 CPTAPTER XIIL 
 
 Citizenship of Coepoeatioi^s Y6 
 
 Citizenship of Alien Corporations 84 
 
 CHAPTEE XIV. 
 
 Joint Stock Companies 85 
 
 Partnerships 86 
 
 National Banks 86 
 
 Citizenship of Married Women 87 
 
 Aliens 88 
 
 Alien and Citizen Uniting 90 
 
 Alien Suing Alien 90 
 
 As to Allegation of Alienage 91 
 
 CHAPTEE XV. 
 
 Tereitoeiax Jubisdiotion 92 
 
 Venue when Jurisdiction Depends on Both Diversity 
 
 and Federal Question 94 
 
 Exceptions to the Eule 95 
 
 Inhabitant Defined 96 
 
 District of Suit when Two or More Plaintiffs and 
 
 Defendants ^"^ 
 
 CHAPTEE XVI. 
 Eule of Venue undee Other Pro\isioxs of Section 
 
 1, AND Exceptions 
 
 100 
 
Xll TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTEE XVII. 
 
 Section Eight Applied 103 
 
 Section 740 U. S. Rev. Stat 105 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 Where a Coepoeation Mat Be Sued 109 
 
 What District Is the Domicil of a Corporation .... 115 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 Doing Business 116 
 
 Alien Corporations 119 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 Waivee of Jurisdiction 121 
 
 Acts of Waiver 121 
 
 Taking of Depositions as Waiver 123 
 
 Who May Object for Want of Parties 123 
 
 CHAPTEE XXI. 
 
 How Issue of Citizenship Raised and Proof Theeeon 124 
 
 Burden of Proof 125 
 
 Raising by Motion in Nature of Demurrer 126 
 
 Eaising Issue by Plea 127 
 
 Eaising Issue in Answer . 128 
 
 Setting Issue Down for Hearing 129 
 
 Burden of Proof 129 
 
 How Tried 129 
 
 CHAPTEE XXII. 
 Want of JSTecessaey Citizenship Appearing in Trial 130 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xiii 
 
 CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 Issue as to District of Suit oe Venue 133 
 
 CHAPTER XXIV. 
 
 Federal Question 136 
 
 What Is a Federal Question 138 
 
 Direct and Primary 140 
 
 Corporations Chartered by Congress 144 
 
 National Banks 144 
 
 CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 Impairing Obligation 146 
 
 Privileges and Immunities 147 
 
 Due Process of Law 148 
 
 Equal Protection of the Laws 148 
 
 CHAPTER XXVL 
 
 Section 709, H. S. Rev. Stat. Applied 151 
 
 Where the Federal Question Must Appear 151 
 
 Remedies if Federal Question Is not Raised in the 
 
 Bill 152 
 
 Section 709, U. S. Rev. Stat 153 
 
 CHAPTER XXVIL 
 
 How THE Federal Question Must Appear 157 
 
 Receivers 161 
 
XIV TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CH'APTEE XXVIII. 
 
 Anticipatin(j Federal Question . . . '. 163 
 
 Citizenship and Venue When Jurisdiction Rests on a 
 
 Federal Question 165 
 
 How Eaised 165 
 
 CHAPTEE XXIX. 
 
 Amount 168 
 
 Matter in Dispute 169 
 
 Cases Classified iTl 
 
 When a Specific Amount is Sued for 171 
 
 CHAPTEE XXX. 
 
 Aggregating Amounts 175 
 
 What May Be Included in Amount to Give Jurisdic- 
 tion 177 
 
 Foreclosure of Mortgage 179 
 
 Creditors' Suits 179 
 
 CHAPTEE XXXI. 
 By and Against Federal Eeceivees 181 
 
 CHAPTEE XXXII. 
 Amount in Injunctions 185 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. XV 
 
 CHAPTEE XXXIII. 
 
 Valtje of Subject-Mattee or Right in Issue in 
 
 Specific Remedies 192 
 
 Specific Performance 192 
 
 Caneellation and Rescission 192 
 
 Quieting Title or Removing Cloud 193 
 
 Dissolution of Partnerships or Corporations 194 
 
 Partition Suits 194 
 
 Suits for an Office 195 
 
 Amounts in Cases Sounding in Damages 195 
 
 How Amount Alleged in Bill 196 
 
 Affidavits to Show Amount 197 
 
 CHAPTER XXXIV. 
 
 How Issue Is Raised 199 
 
 By Motion or Answer 201 
 
 CHAPTER XXXV. 
 
 How Issue Is Tried 204 
 
 By Affidavits 205 
 
 Burden of Proof 206 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVI. 
 
 Amending to Show Jurisdiction 207 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVII. 
 
 Jttkisdiction bt Assignment 209 
 
 Effect of Reassignment 211 
 
 What are Choses in Action Within the Statute .... 211 
 
 Illustrations 212 
 
XVI TABLE OF COJTTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTEE XXXVIII. 
 
 Peomissoet Notes Payable to Beaeee ^Iade by Coe- 
 
 poeations 215 
 
 History of the- Assignment Clause in Act of 1S88 .. 217 
 
 How Assignments Alleged in Bill 221 
 
 Subsequent Changes 222 
 
 Assignment Must Be Genuine 222 
 
 How the Issue Is Raised 222 
 
 CHAPTER XXXIX. 
 
 Paeties 224 
 
 Joint and Several Demands 229 
 
 To Execute Trusts of Will : Parties 229 
 
 Suits by Trustees 229 
 
 Suits by and against Incompetents 229 
 
 CHAPTER XL. 
 
 Theee Classes of Paeties . . . .' 230 
 
 Unknown Parties 236 
 
 CHAPTER XLI. 
 
 When Paeties aee ISTumeeous 238 
 
 CHAPTER XLII. 
 
 Paeties iw Paeticulae Cases 240 
 
 Married Women as Parties 240 
 
 Joint and Several Parties 240 
 
 Stockholders as Parties 240 
 
 Partnership : Parties 245 
 
 Representative Parties 246 
 
 Guardians ad Litem 246 
 
 Executors and Administrators as Parties 246 
 
 When Fraud Intervenes 251 
 
TABLE OF C0NTE>;TS. Xvli 
 
 CHAPTEE XLIII. 
 
 Trustees as Parities 252 
 
 Beneficiaries as Parties 254 
 
 Receivers as Parties 256 
 
 Power to Sue in a Foreign Jurisdiction 258 
 
 CHAPTEE XLIV. 
 
 Parties 127 Eemoviktg Cloud and Quieting Title .... 259 
 
 CHAPTER XLV. 
 
 Defect of Parties and Issue 261 
 
 Making ^ew Parties by Amendment 265 
 
 CHAPTEE XLVI. 
 
 The Bill 267 
 
 Citizenship not Eesidence 272 
 
 Federal District of Suit 273 
 
 Xecessity of Accuracy 273 
 
 Statement of the Case 275 
 
 Joinder of Causes of Action 278 
 
 Allegation of the Federal Question 279 
 
 Allegation of Amount 280 
 
 Allegation of Fraud 2S0 
 
 Laches 2Si 
 
 CHAPTEE XLYIL 
 
 The Prayer 283 
 
 'Ne Exeat 2S4 
 
 Prayer for Process 285 
 
 Amendment of Prayer 286 
 
XVlll TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Signing Bills 286 
 
 Verifying Bill 287 
 
 Ferm of Verification 287 
 
 CHAPTEK XLVIII. 
 
 Bills With Double Aspect 288 
 
 CHAPTEK XLIX. 
 
 DiSCOVEEY 291 
 
 CHAPTER L. 
 
 MuLTIFAEIOUSNESS AND MISJOINDER 295 
 
 How Multifariousness Should Be Set Up 301 
 
 Form of Motion 301 
 
 CHAPTER LI. 
 
 Equity Rules and Motion Days 303 
 
 How Time Prescribed by the Rules Must Be Com- 
 puted 305 
 
 District Court Always Open for Certain Purposes 305 
 
 Rule Days Abolished 306 
 
 Orders Grantable of Course 306 
 
 Orders not Grantable of Course 306 
 
 CHAPTER LII. 
 
 Filing Motions and Practice Governing 308 
 
 Entry as ISTotice 309 
 
 Orders in Chambers 309 
 
 Motions 310 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xix 
 
 CHAPTER LIIL 
 
 Filing the Bill and Serving Peocess 312 
 
 Subpoena 313 
 
 Office of Subpoena 313 
 
 Delivery to Marshal 314 
 
 Service of Subpoena 315 
 
 Service: How Made 315 
 
 Service; Where Made 316 
 
 Service on Attorney 317 
 
 Service on Agent 317 
 
 Service on Executor or Guardian 317 
 
 SeiTice on a State 317 
 
 When Subpoena Cannot Be Served 318 
 
 Service before Return Day 318 
 
 Eifect of Valid Service 319 
 
 Return of Subpcena 319 
 
 Motion to Quash 320 
 
 Amendment of Process 321 
 
 When not Allowed to Amend 321 
 
 CHAPTER LIV. 
 
 Service of Process on Corporations 322 
 
 Doing Business 327 
 
 CHAPTER LV. 
 
 Appearance 330 
 
 Proper Practice in Such Cases 331 
 
 When Defendant not Sued in His District 333 
 
 Substituted Service 335 
 
 CHAPTER LVI. 
 
 Section 8, Act of 1875 336 
 
 Warning Order 338 
 
XX TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 How Served 341 
 
 Publication, Service by 341 
 
 Title to Stock 344 
 
 Suit to Cancel for Fraud 344 
 
 Specific Performance 344 
 
 Suit to Eemove Cloud 344 
 
 Foreclosure of Liens 344 
 
 Trying Title 344 
 
 Unknown Heirs 344 
 
 CHAPTEE LVII. 
 
 SOAKDAL AND ImPEETINENCB 348 
 
 CHAPTEE LVIII. 
 
 Dismissal of Bill by Plaintiff 350 
 
 CHAPTEE LIX. 
 
 Amending Bill 354 
 
 Office of Amendment 354 
 
 When the Bill Can Be Amended 354 
 
 Amendments not of Course 355 
 
 Amendments at and after Trial 357 
 
 Amendment after Decree 360 
 
 Amendment to Cure Jurisdiction 360 
 
 Amendment as to Amount 361 
 
 Effect of Amendment 361 
 
 Motion to Amend 362 
 
 Eorm of Motion 363 
 
 Stating the Amendment 363 
 
 When Amendment to Be Piled 364 
 
 Amendment after Appeal 364 
 
 Not Affected by State Statutes 365 
 
TABLE or CONTENTS. XXI 
 
 CHAPTEK LX. 
 
 Supplemental Bill 366 
 
 When no Cause in Original Bill 369 
 
 ISTotice of Motion 371 
 
 Parties 372 
 
 Process 372 
 
 CHAPTER LXI. 
 
 Relation of Supplemental to Original Bill 374 
 
 Eorm of Supplemental Bill 374 
 
 CHAPTER LXII. 
 
 Bill in the !N"atuee of Supplemental Bill 376 
 
 CHAPTER LXIII. 
 
 Motion to Revive 379 
 
 Xature of the Motion 380 
 
 Parties 880 
 
 When Sole Plaintiff Dies 380 
 
 When Several Plaintiffs and One Dies 381 
 
 One of Several Defendants Dies 381 
 
 Motion to Revive Filed by Any Other Party 382 
 
 Other. Causes for Revival 382 
 
 What Must Be Alleged to Revive Suit 383 
 
 Form of Motion 383 
 
 Revival after Decree 384 
 
 CHAPTER LXIV. 
 
 Decebe Peo Oonfesso 385 
 
 When Pro Confesso Can Be Taken 385 
 
 Order to Take Bill as Confessed 387 
 
XXll TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Serving ISTotice of the Decree 388 
 
 Is Proof Necessary before Entering Final Decree ? . . 388 
 
 Effect of the Final Decree 389 
 
 Can Defendant Offer Proof 889 
 
 Final Decree not Matter of Course 390 
 
 Compelling to Answer 390 
 
 Eights of Defendant after Default, 390 
 
 Grounds for Setting Aside the Order or Decree pro 
 
 confesso 391 
 
 Form of Motion to Set Aside 392 
 
 CHAPTEE LXV. 
 
 Defenses 394 
 
 Defenses Which Can Be Eaised by Motion 396 
 
 As to Jurisdiction 396 
 
 Defect of Parties 397 
 
 Sufficiency of Substance of Bill 397 
 
 CHAPTEE LXVI. 
 
 Motions in the ISTatueb of a Dbmubebe 399 
 
 Effect of Motion to Dismiss under Eule 29 399 
 
 Form of Motion in Nature of a Demurrer 401 
 
 Setting Down for Hearing 402 
 
 Allowing the Motion 403 
 
 Overruling the Motion 403 
 
 CHAPTEE LXVI-A. 
 
 Motion oe Answer in the Natuee of a Plea 405 
 
 Filing the Answer in the Nature of a Plea 406 
 
 Office of an Answer in the Nature of a Plea in Abate- 
 ment 406 
 
 Answers in Abatement 407 
 
TABLE OF COKTENTS. Xxiij 
 
 CHAPTEE LXVII. 
 
 Answer in the Nature op a Plea in Bae 410 
 
 Perm of Answer in the Nature of a Plea in Bar . . 411 
 The Answer in the Nature of a Plea in Bar Must Be 
 
 Single 412 
 
 Averments in Answer in Nature of a Plea 412 
 
 CHAPTER LXVIII. 
 
 Setting Down the Answer in the Nature of a Plea 
 
 FOR Hearing 414 
 
 Effect of Setting Down an Answer in the Nature of a 
 
 Plea for Hearing 415 
 
 Overrxiling for Insufficiency 416 
 
 Sustaining the Legal Sufficiency of the Answer on 
 
 Motion 416 
 
 When the Plea is Set Down for Hearing as an Issue 
 
 of Fact 417 
 
 When the Answer in the Nature of a Plea is Proven 417 
 When not Proven 419 
 
 CHAPTEE LXIX. 
 
 The Answer 421 
 
 Framing the Answer 421 
 
 Scandal and Impertinence 423 
 
 Inconsistent Matter 423 
 
 Affirmative Matter 424 
 
 When Answer Cures Bill 424 
 
 Form of Answer 425 
 
 Verifying Answer 425 
 
 When Need not Answer Fully 426 
 
 May Object to Parties in Answer 426 
 
XXIV TABLE OF CONTEJS'TS. 
 
 CHAPTEE LXX. 
 
 Effect of Awswbe 428 
 
 First, as a Pleading 428 
 
 The Answer as Evidence 429 
 
 ISTew Matter in Answer ; Effect 429 
 
 Answer of Corporations 430 
 
 Officers as Parties 430 
 
 Effect of Answer in Putting the Bill in Issue .... 430 
 
 Affirmative Eelief in Answer 431 
 
 Filing Answer and Procedure after 431 
 
 Testing Legal Sufficiency of Answer 431 
 
 Form of Motion to Strike Out Allegations of Answer 433 
 
 Scandal and Impertinence in Answer 434 
 
 When Motion Must Be Filed 434 
 
 When Motion Is Sustained 435 
 
 When Motion Overruled 435 
 
 CHAPTEE LXXI. 
 
 Amending Answee 436 
 
 Notice of Motion 437 
 
 When Amendment Conflicts with Other Allegations 438 
 
 Amendment after Cause Eeady for Hearing 439 
 
 Supplemental Answer 439 
 
 CHAPTEE LXXII. 
 Eeplicatiom" 440 
 
 CHAPTEE LXXIII. 
 
 Dismissal of a Case in Equity 442 
 
 By the Defendant 442 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXV 
 
 CHAPTEE LXXIV. 
 
 Ceoss Suits 443 
 
 The Scope of the Cross Suit under the Wew Eules . . 445 
 As to the Nature of the Causes of Action that May 
 
 Be Set Fp in the Answer under Eule 30 448 
 
 To Settle Matters between Defendants 451 
 
 An Independent Cause of Action May Be Set Up 
 
 in the Answer 452 
 
 Form of the Cross Suit 453 
 
 Parties to Cross Suits 453 
 
 Filing the Cross Suit 454 
 
 Amending the Cross Suit 454 
 
 Putting the Cross Suit in Issue 454 
 
 Service of the Counterclaim 455 
 
 Hearing the Cross Suit 455 
 
 Effect of Dismissing the Original BiU 455 
 
 CHAPTER LXXY. 
 
 Iwteeveittiow 457 
 
 What Is 457 
 
 Two Kinds 457 
 
 Procedure 459 
 
 Form of Application 459 
 
 Contesting Application 460 
 
 Order When Application Granted 460 
 
 Waiving Order of Intervention 461 
 
 Notice of Intervention 461 
 
 Making Defendant by Intervention 462 
 
 Pro suo interesse 464 
 
 When Intervention Will not Lie 465 
 
 Form of Intervention When Ees in Court's Possession 466 
 Citizenship and Amount as Affecting Jurisdiction of 
 
 Federal Courts in Interventions pro suo interesse 467 
 
 ISTor is Amount Important 468 
 
 Amendment of 468 
 
 Denial of, not Appealable 469 
 
XXVl TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTEK LXXVI. 
 
 Interlocutoey Proceedings 470 
 
 Interlocutory Orders 470 
 
 Injunctions 471 
 
 By Whom Granted 471 
 
 Security on Issuing Eestraining Order 473 
 
 What Order Shall Set Forth 473 
 
 Eestraining Orders between Employers and Em- 
 ployees 473 
 
 Notice of Motion 474 
 
 Enjoining Proceedings in State Courts 475 
 
 What Are Proceedings 476 
 
 When Section 265 of the Jur. Code Does not Apply 476 
 
 When Jurisdiction Attaches 478 
 
 ISTe exeat 480 
 
 CHAPTEE LXXVII. 
 
 Auxiliary Suits 482 
 
 Substituted Service 485 
 
 On Agents 485 
 
 Character of Attorney on Whom Service Made .... 486 
 
 How Substituted Service Obtained 487 
 
 Motions to Vacate 488 
 
 Interpleader 488 
 
 Bill in Nature of Interpleader 489 
 
 CHAPTEE LXXVIII. 
 
 Evidence in Equity Suits 490 
 
 Statutes and Eules Controlling the Taking of Evi- 
 dence in Equity Suits 490 
 
 Who May Be Examined as Witnesses 492 
 
 Who to Issue the Commission 492 
 
 Before Whom Taken 493 
 
 How Witnesses Are Brought Before a Commissioner, 
 
 Examiner or Master, and Made to Testify 494 
 
 SubpcBuas for Witnesses in Equity Suits 496 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXvii 
 
 OHAPTEK LXXIX. 
 
 Evidence in Equity Suits (Continued) 497 
 
 The Time to Begin 497 
 
 Depositions Taken before Issue Joined 498 
 
 De bene esse 499 
 
 Notice of Taking de bene esse 500 
 
 Form of Notice 501 
 
 Service of Notice 501 
 
 Taking the Testimony de bene esse 501 
 
 CHAPTEE LXXX. 
 
 Ceetificate oe Officer When Taken de bene esse 503 
 
 Informality in Certificate 505 
 
 Effect of the Act of March 9, 1892, on Taking 
 
 Depositions in Mode Prescribed by State Laws . . 506 
 
 Procedure in Issuing 509 
 
 CHAPTEE LXXXI. 
 
 Depositions in eei peepetuam 510 
 
 Dedimus potestatem 512 
 
 Certificate to a dedimus 514 
 
 Procedure 514 
 
 Form of Order 515 
 
 CHAPTEE LXXXII. 
 
 Depositions aftee Issue Joined 517 
 
 Time in Which Evidence Must Be Taken 517 
 
 Counsel May Agree Upon the Time within Which 
 
 Depositions May Be Taken 519 
 
 How Witnesses Examined 520 
 
 In Open Court 520 
 
 Before Examiner or Commissioner 521 
 
 Order Appointing the Examiner 521 
 
XXVlll TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Examiners Beyond the Limits of the Court's Juris- 
 diction 522 
 
 JSTotice of Examination 522 
 
 Examination of Witnesses 523 
 
 Who Is to Pass on Materiality of Evidence Taken 
 
 by Examiners Out of the District 526 
 
 Subpoena duces tecum 526 
 
 Application for and Description of Instrument. . . . 52Y 
 
 Exceptions to Rule 528 
 
 When Issued in Equity Cases 528 
 
 Penalty for Refusal 530 
 
 CHAPTER LXXXIII. 
 
 How Examination to Be Conducted 531 
 
 Examination to Be Reduced to Writing 532 
 
 How Authenticated and Transmitted 533 
 
 CHAPTER LXXXIV. 
 
 Retttbning and Piling Depositions 534 
 
 Returning by Mail 534 
 
 Publication of Depositions 534 
 
 Exhibits 534 
 
 Depositions in Foreign Counties 535 
 
 Before Whom Taken 536 
 
 Letters Rogatory 536 
 
 CHAPTER LXXXV. 
 
 SuppEESsiNG Depositions 538 
 
 Reasonable Notice 539 
 
 When Defectively Taken 539 
 
 Witness Adopting Previous Answers 540 
 
 Defective Certificate 540 
 
 Will Be Suppressed 541 
 
 Motion to Suppress 542 
 
 Effect of Death 543 
 
 When Destroyed 5-13 
 
 Evidence in a Former Case , . . . 543 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. Xxix 
 
 CHAPTEK LXXXYI. 
 
 Depositions on Law Side 54.4. 
 
 Special Federal Statutes Controlling Evidence. . . . 546 
 
 Who May Use the Deposition 547 
 
 Cost Allowed in Taking and Eeading 547 
 
 CHAPTER LXXXVII. 
 
 Dismissal by the Cotjet 548 
 
 For Want of Paxties 551 
 
 Want o£ Equity 551 
 
 When CoUusively Obtained 553 
 
 Effect of Dismissal 554 
 
 For Want of Prosecution 555 
 
 Costs on Dismissal 555 
 
 Continuances of Case by Parties — Effect 555 
 
 Final Hearing 556 
 
 Effect on Previous Orders 656 
 
 CHAPTEE LXXXVIII. 
 
 Mastees in Chanceet 557 
 
 Nature of the Office 55'7 
 
 Who to Be Appointed 557 
 
 Object and Effect of the Appointment and When 
 
 Eeference Can Be Made 558 
 
 Eeference of the Whole Case by Consent 559 
 
 Form of Eeference 559 
 
 Action to Be Taken after Eeference Made 561 
 
 Duty of Master on Eeceiving Order of Eeference . . 5(ii' 
 
 Authority of the Master 5fii' 
 
 Beyond Territorial Jurisdiction 562 
 
 Procedure before Master 50.'! 
 
 Taking Evidence 56^ 
 
 Eeport of Master 564 
 
 Exceptions to the Eeport 56r) 
 
 When to Be Heard 56 
 
 Form of Exceptions 56 
 
 .J 
 
XXX TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTEE LXXXIX. 
 
 ExcEPTiows TO Be Specific 567 
 
 Effect of Withdrawal of Exceptions 568 
 
 Waiving Exceptions not Taken before Master 568 
 
 Costs ia Exceptions to Master's Eeport 573 
 
 CHAPTER XO. 
 
 Effect of the Master's Report 574 
 
 Findings in Matters of Account 576 
 
 Effect When Reference by Consent 576 
 
 Re-reference to a Master 578 
 
 Compensation of the Master 579 
 
 Costs in Equity 580 
 
 CHAPTER XOI. 
 
 Decree 581 
 
 Definition 581 
 
 Classified 581 
 
 Final Decree 582 
 
 Framing the Decree 583 
 
 Who to Prepare 583 
 
 Rules Referring to Drawing Decrees 584 
 
 Recording the Decree 585 
 
 Correcting Errors 585 
 
 Amending Decree 586 
 
 Force of the Decree 587 
 
 Presumed to Be Right 588 
 
 Acting on the Person 588 
 
 Extra Territorial Effect 588 
 
 Lien of a Decree 589 
 
 Enforcement of the Decree 590 
 
 Delivery of Possession 592 
 
 Execution of Decree in Foreclosure 592 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXXI 
 
 CHAPTER XCII. 
 
 Sales under Deckee 594 
 
 Sale by Master 594 
 
 Motion to Confirm 595 
 
 Exceptions to Sale 595 
 
 Effect of Bid 596 
 
 Purchaser under 596 
 
 Notice of Proceedings after Decree 597 
 
 CHAPTER XCIII. 
 
 Rehearing 598 
 
 Time of Filing 599 
 
 Order to Show Cause 599 
 
 Grounds of Application 599 
 
 Xewly Discovered Evidence 600 
 
 Must be material 600 
 
 On Error in Law 601 
 
 On Ground Defendant not Represented 601 
 
 Effect of Granting 601 
 
 On Interlocutory Orders 601 
 
 Time for Appeal not Included 601 
 
 Hearing Application After the Term 602 
 
 Form of Petition for Rehearing 602 
 
 CHAPTER XCIV. 
 
 Bill of Review ' 604 
 
 Distinction between Bill of Review and Rehearing . . 604 
 
 For What Bill of Review Lies 605 
 
 For Error Apparent 605 
 
 For JSTew Matter Arising Since Decree 606 
 
 For JSTewly Discovered Evidence After the Term . . 606 
 
 For Fraud in Procuring the Decree 607 
 
 For Accident, Mistake or Surprise 608 
 
XXXll TABLE OF COlfTEirTS. 
 
 Bill Must Show Why Decree not Performed 608 
 
 Time of Filing Bill of Eeview 608 
 
 Leave of Court to File 610 
 
 Not Appealable 611 
 
 Form to Be Used 611 
 
 Parties to Bills of Review 612 
 
 Who May Attack Decree 612 
 
 Bill of Review After Appeal 613 
 
 Who to Determine Application •. . . . 614 
 
 CHAPTER XCV. 
 
 Vacating Decree 615 
 
 Setting Aside Decree for Fraud 616 
 
 Bill to Impeach Consent Decree 617 
 
 On Ground of Mistake or Accident 61*7 
 
 Third Party Impeaching Decree 618 
 
 CHAPTER XCVI. 
 
 Appeal 619 
 
 Two Methods 619 
 
 Acts Governing Appeals 620 
 
 Appeal from State Courts 621 
 
 Circuit Court of Appeals 621 
 
 Final Appellate Jurisdiction of Circuit Court of 
 
 Appeals 621 
 
 Appeal from Circuit Court of Appeals to Supreme 
 
 Court 622 
 
 Appeal from Interlocutory Order 622 
 
 Time Within Which to Take an Appeal 623 
 
 Appeals to the Supreme Court 623 
 
 From Circuit Court of Appeals to Supreme Court . . 623 
 
 From Highest State Court to Suprom« Court j623 
 
 Appeals to the Circuit Court of Appeals 624 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXXlll 
 
 CHAPTEE XCVII. 
 
 Practice as to Appeals 625 
 
 As to Appeals from Interlocntory Decrees 625 
 
 Acts Governing Appeals 62G 
 
 Appeal How Limited 627 
 
 Time of Appeal 628 
 
 Bond in Interlocntory Appeals 62s 
 
 Effect of Appeal on Injunction 629 
 
 Eiile Governing the Conrt of Appeals in Considering 
 
 Interlocutory Appeals 630 
 
 Entering Decree on Merits 630 
 
 Appeal from Decree Appointing Eeceiver 632 
 
 CHAPTEE XCVIII. 
 
 Final Deceees as a Basis for Appeals 633 
 
 What is a Final Decree 634 
 
 Judgments not Final and Appealable 637 
 
 Judgments for Costs 639 
 
 Judgments by Consent 639 
 
 CHAPTEE XCIX. 
 
 Appeals Where Taken 640 
 
 From Circuit Court to Supreme Court Direct .... 640 
 
 Grounds of Certification 644 
 
 Conditions under Which the Issue Is Presented and 
 
 Decided 645 
 
 Can Same Party Sue out Two Appeals 647 
 
 Certificate a Prerequisite 648 
 
 Form It May Assume 649 
 
 Granted in Term 650 
 
 Form of Certificate 651 
 
XXXIV TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTEE 0. 
 
 Appeals Under Clauses 4, 5 and 6, of Section 5, of 
 
 THE Act of 1891 652 
 
 May the Circuit Court of Appeals Determine Ques- 
 tions of Jurisdiction 654 
 
 Jurisdiction of Circuit Court of Appeals Wlien Case 
 Based on Clauses 4, 5, and 6 656 
 
 CHAPTER CI. 
 
 JUEISDICTION . 660 
 
 Practice in Appeals and Forms to Be Used 661 
 
 Time for Appealing 662 
 
 When Is Appeal Said to Be Taken 664 
 
 Notice of Appeal 664 
 
 Petition for Appeal 666 
 
 Motion for Supersedeas 667 
 
 CHAPTER CII. 
 
 Assignment of Eeeoes 670 
 
 Cross Errors 671 
 
 Must Be Specific 671 
 
 Time of Piling 673 
 
 Confined to the Issues 673 
 
 Consent Decree 674 
 
 To the Admission or Rejection of Evidence 674 
 
 CHAPTER cm. 
 
 Allowance of Appeal 676 
 
 Allowance in Forma Pauperis 677 
 
 When Jurisdiction of the Appellate Court Attaches 678 
 
 Bond 679 
 
 Amount of Bond 679 
 
 Form of Bond on Appeal 680 
 
TABLE OS CONTENTS. XXXV 
 
 To Whom Payable 681 
 
 Conditions , 681 
 
 By Whom Signed 682 
 
 Approved by the Judge 682 
 
 Effect of Irregailarities in Giving Bond 683 
 
 Amendment of Bond 684 
 
 W^hen Becomes InsuiScient After Appeal 684 
 
 CHAPTER CIV. 
 
 SUPEESEDE-AS BoND 685 
 
 Power to Grant 685 
 
 Effect of Supersedeas Bond 686 
 
 Liability on Supersedeas Bond 687 
 
 Damages Covered By 688 
 
 Eailure to Prosecute 688 
 
 Sureties 689 
 
 Motion to Vacate Supersedeas 689 
 
 CHAPTER CV. 
 
 Citation- in Appeal 691 
 
 When Necessary 691 
 
 May Be Waived 692 
 
 When Issued and Returnable 694 
 
 How Served 695 
 
 Alias Citation 696 
 
 CHAPTER CVI. 
 
 Who Mat Appeal 697 
 
 Summons and Severance in Appeal 698 
 
 Appeals by Parties JSTot Parties to the Original Pro- 
 ceedings Below 699 
 
 Parties Dying After Decree 701 
 
 Party ISTot Appealing YOl 
 
 An Appeal from a Fictitious Case 701 
 
XXXVl TABLE OF COWTENTS. 
 
 As to Appeals by Interveners Y02 
 
 As to Appeals By and against Receivers 702 
 
 Appeal by Partners 703 
 
 Cross Appeals 703 
 
 "Who Made Parties to Appeal 704 
 
 CHAPTER CVII. 
 
 Teanscbipt 706 
 
 What Transcript to Contain 707 
 
 How Evidence to Be Stated in the Transcript 708 
 
 Facts in the Clerk's Office 709 
 
 Presenting the Statement to the Court 709 
 
 What Transcript to Contain, on Agreed Statement . . 710 
 
 Certificate of Transcript 711 
 
 Eorm of Certificate 712 
 
 Bill of Exceptions 713 
 
 CHAPTER CVIII. 
 
 PEOCEEDI]srGS AFTER TeAITSCEIPT DeLIVEEED 715 
 
 Waiver of Irregularity in Filing Transcript 716 
 
 Docketing Case 716 
 
 Certificate of Clerk Necessary to Dismiss Appeal . . 717 
 
 Printing Record 717 
 
 Diminution of the Record 718 
 
 CHAPTER CIX. 
 
 DiSMissiiTG Appeals 720 
 
 Motion to Dismiss 722 
 
 Form of Motion 723 
 
 Effect of Death on the Appeal 723 
 
 Costs on Appeal 726 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXXvii 
 
 CHAPTEE ex. 
 
 Sttbmittiwg the Case to the Appellate Oouet 727 
 
 Briefs 727 
 
 Form and Size 72,s 
 
 Not Filed 70s 
 
 Oral Argument 729 
 
 Eules Applied When Cause Called for Hearing .... 729 
 
 Amendments Allowed in Appellate Court 729 
 
 Defective Procedure 730 
 
 Rules Applied in Considering Cases on Appeal .... 731 
 
 Eehearing 733 
 
 Filing as to Time 733 
 
 CHAPTEE CXI. 
 
 Appeal feom Cibcfit Cotjet of Appeals to Supebme 
 
 CotTBT 734 
 
 Eeview by Certifying Questions to Supreme Court 735 
 
 May Order Up Entire Eecord 736 
 
 By Certiorari 737 
 
 Petition for 738 
 
 Notice of the Application Must be Given 739 
 
 Time ■ 740 
 
 Effect of Granting the Writ 740 
 
 CHAPTEE CXII. 
 
 Appellate Power of Supreme Court in Cases Not 
 
 FnsTAL IN CiBCtriT Court of Appeals 741 
 
 Petition for Appeal or Writ of Error 744 
 
 Assignment of Errors 745 
 
 CHAPTEE CXIII. 
 
 Appeal from State Courts to the United States 
 
 Supreme Court 746 
 
 Time within Which to Sue Out Writ 755 
 
XXXVlll TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Amount Involved 755 
 
 Effect of Amount on Appellate Jurisdiction of Su- 
 preme Court . .''^■V .'; 755 
 
 Practice in Appeals 757 
 
 Petition for Writ 757 
 
 By Whom Citation Signed and Appeal Allowed . . . 758 
 
 Order of Allowance 759 
 
 ' Effect of Allowance 761 
 
 Citation 762 
 
 Bond 763 
 
 When Writ of Error a Supersedeas 763 
 
 Time 764 
 
 After Sixty Days Cannot Obtain Supersedeas .... 765 
 
 Act Must Be Followed 765 
 
 When Supersedeas Bond Becomes Impaired 766 
 
 CHAPTER CXIV. 
 
 Mandate 767 
 
 How Issued 767 
 
 When Issued 767 
 
 Executing It 768 
 
 Effect of Mandate 769 
 
 Issuing Execution 771 
 
 Eemedy if Mandate JSTot Enforced 771 
 
 When by Appeal 771 
 
 When by Mandamus 772 
 
 Can Court Recall Mandate after Term 772 
 
 Stay of Mandate 773 
 
 Second Appeals 773 
 
 CHAPTER CXV. 
 
 Removals 774 
 
 Local Influence 777 
 
 Agreements Not to Remove Suits 777 
 
TABLE OF CONT35NTS. XXXIX 
 
 CHAPTER CXVI. 
 
 Pbooeedincjs rsr State Courts 118 
 
 Time of Filing Petition 118 
 
 Bond '119 
 
 Effect of Filing Petition and Bond 780 
 
 Notice of Filing Petition for Removal 782 
 
 Power of State Court 782 
 
 Issue of Fact as to Removability Tried in the Federal 
 
 Court 783 
 
 Should Be Presented to State Court 784 
 
 Order of Removal 784 
 
 Power of Federal Court between Filing of Petition 
 
 and Filing of Record 786 
 
 Cannot Enjoin 787 
 
 Cannot Tate Depositions 787 
 
 Filing Transcript 788 
 
 CHAPTER CXVII, 
 
 Status after Removal 789 
 
 Defenses to Be Heard in Federal Court 790 
 
 "When Plaintiff Dismisses after Removal 790 
 
 CHAPTER CXVIII. 
 
 Remanding- '91 
 
 Statutes Controlling Remanding of Causes 792 
 
 Causes for Remanding '''93 
 
 When ISTot Removed in Time 793 
 
 When Motions to Remand Made 795 
 
 Effect of Extension of Time to Answer 795 
 
 When Right of Removal Arises after the Time Fixed 
 
 by Statute 'i'97 
 
 Effect of Filing Answer in State Court 798 
 
 Where Action Joint '''99 
 
 To What Term of the Federal Court Case Should Be 
 
 Removed '99 
 
xl TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Transmitting the Eecord 800 
 
 Want of Jurisdiction as a Ground to Remand 800 
 
 When Case JSTot Within the Jurisdictional Act .... 801 
 
 When Question Doubtful Should Eemand 803 
 
 Costs on Eemand 803 
 
 CHAPTEE CXIX. 
 
 Diversity oe Citizenship 804 
 
 Indispensable Parties Alone Considered 805 
 
 Fraudulent Joinder to Prevent Eemoval 806 
 
 Fraudulent Joinder to Eemove 806 
 
 Where Issue Determined 807 
 
 What Must Be Alleged and Shown in Trial of Issue SOY 
 
 How Issue Eaised as to Diversity of Citizenship . . 808 
 
 Eemoval by Aliens 808 
 
 Eemoval by Corporations 811 
 
 Who Can Eemove for Diversity of Citizenship . . . 812 
 
 Joinder of Defendants ISlot Served 813 
 
 Misjoinder 814 
 
 ISTominal Parties 814 
 
 When Controversy Separable 815 
 
 Eemoval in Cross Suits- 817 
 
 Tort Feasors .• 817 
 
 The Whole Case Is Eemoved 819 
 
 Substance of Petition to Eemove 820 
 
 CHAPTEE CXX.' 
 
 Ebmoving on Geound of Federal Question 822 
 
 Who May Eemove on Ground of Federal Question 823 
 
 CHAPTEE CXXI. 
 
 Amount as Ground for Motion to Eemove 824 
 
 Effect of Counterclaim 826 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. Xli 
 
 CHAPTEE CXXII. 
 
 Must Be Suit of a Civil Natuee 827 
 
 Must Be One That Could Be Originally Brought in 
 
 the Federal Court 828 
 
 Eemoval Must Be to "Proper District" 833 
 
 CHAPTEE CXXIII. 
 
 Amending Petition foe Eemoval 836 
 
 CHAPTEE CXXIV. 
 
 Seevice of Peocess in a State Court Affecting Re- 
 moval 838 
 
 Amending Service after Eemoval 841 
 
 CHAPTEE CXXV. 
 
 Removal on Ground of Local Peejudioe 842 
 
 Must Defendants All Join ? 844 
 
 Petition for Eemoval 844 
 
 What to State 845 
 
 Where and When Application to Be Made 845 
 
 The Affidavit 845 
 
 Notice 846 
 
 How Issue Tried 846 
 
 Nature of Proof 847 
 
 Order of Eemoval 847 
 
 Motion to Eemand 848 
 
 Burden of Proof 84'8 
 
 Eemedy When Eemand Eefused 848 
 
 Mandamus as Eemedy When Eemand Eefused .... 849 
 
 Effect of Order Eemanding 850 
 
Xlii TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 OHAPTEK CXXVI. 
 
 Removal by Reoeivees 851 
 
 JSTational Banks 853 
 
 Intervention for Removal 853 
 
 Interpleader 855 
 
 Cross Suit 855 
 
 CHAPTER CXXVII. 
 
 Motion to Remand 856 
 
 By Whom Made 856 
 
 Effect of 856 
 
 Time to Be Made 857 
 
 What Acts May Waive Right to Remand 857 
 
 Form of Motion to Remand 858 
 
 How Issue Joined and Tried 860 
 
 Fraudulent Joinder 860 
 
 Nature of Proof 862 
 
 Costs in Remanding 863 
 
 CHAPTER CXXVIII. 
 
 Recasting Pleadings 864 
 
 APPEITDIX. 
 
 Judicial Coee 869 
 
 Pages Where Code Sections are Construed in Text 886 
 
 Rules in Equity 887 
 
 Index to Equity Rules 911 
 
 Pages Where Rules Are Construed in Text 929 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 A. 
 
 Abbey v. Nott, 111 U. S. 476, 28 
 L. ed. 492, 4 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 495 790 
 
 Abbey Press, Re, 67 C. C. A. 161, 
 
 134 Fed. 55 658 
 
 Abel V. Book, 120 Fed. 47 . .799, 814 
 Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 524, 
 
 16 L. ed. 176 3U 
 
 Abraham v. North German F. 
 Ins. Co. 3 L.R.A. 188, 
 
 37 Fed. 731 486 
 
 Acme Acetylene Appliance Co. v. 
 Commercial Acetylene 
 Co. 112 C. C. A. 573, 
 
 192 Fed. 321 630 
 
 Acme Flexible Clasp Co. v. Cary 
 
 Mfg. Co. 99 Fed. 500 600 
 Acord V. Western Pocohontas 
 
 Corp. 156 Fed. 989 ... 25 
 29, 32, 605, 606, 609, 610 
 Adams v. Bridgewater Iron Co. 6 
 
 Fed. 179 424 
 
 V. Heckscher, 83 Fed. 281 . . 345 
 V. Heckscher, 80 Fed. 742.. 105 
 
 345 
 
 V. House, 61 Tex. 639 16 
 
 V. Howard, 20 Blatchf. 38, 9 
 
 Fed. 347 428 
 
 V. Murphy, 91 C. C. A. 272, 
 
 165 Fed. 305 23 
 
 T. Puget Sound Traction, 
 Light & Power Co. 207 
 
 Fed. 205 779 
 
 V. Republic County, 23 Fed. 
 
 212 197, 218 
 
 V. Shirk, 44 C. C. A. 653, 
 
 105 Fed. 659 213, 672 
 
 V. Shirk, 55 C. C. A. 25, 117 
 
 Fed. 801 125, 129 
 
 V. Woburn, 174 Fed. 194 . , 231 
 Adams Exp. Co. v. Adams, 159 
 
 Fed. 62 274 
 
 Adamson v. Shaler, 208 Fed. 566 446 
 
 454 
 Adderson v. Southern R. Co. 177 
 
 Fed. 571 819 
 
 Adee v. J. L. Mott Iron Works, 
 
 46 Fed. 39 714 
 
 Adelbert College v. Toledo W. & 
 
 W. R. Co. 47 Fed. 844 453 
 805 
 Adoue V. Straban, 97 Fed. 692 . . 260 
 Adriance, P. & Co. v. MoCormick 
 
 Harvesting Mach. Co. 55 
 
 Fed. 287 . ..94, 95, 111, 119 
 Mtna. Indemnity Co. v. J. R. 
 
 Crowe Coal & Min. Co. 
 
 83 C. C. A. 431, 154 
 
 Fed. 558 671, 703, 728 
 
 ^tna L. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton 
 
 County, 54 C. C. A. 468, 
 
 117 Fed. 84 587 
 
 Ahlhauser v. Butler, 50 Fed. 705 841 
 Aiken v. Smith, 4 C. C. A. 654, 2 
 
 U. S. App. 618, 54 Fed. 
 
 896 697, 700 
 
 A. J. Phillips Co. V. Grand 
 
 Trunk Western R. Co. 
 
 115 C. C. A. 94, 195 
 
 Fed. ]2 641 
 
 Alabama v. Burr, 115 U. S. 413, 
 
 29 L. ■ ed. 435, 6 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 81 38 
 
 Alabama & G. Mfg. Co. v. River- 
 dale Cotton Mills, 62 C. 
 
 C. A. 295, 127 Fed. 497 8] 
 Alabama & N. 0. Transp. Co. v. 
 
 Doyle, 210 Fed. 178 . . 148 
 Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Carroll, 
 
 28 C. C. A. 207, 52 U. 
 
 S. App. 442, 84 Fed. 
 
 780 61, 125 
 
 V. Thompson, 200 U. S. 206, 
 
 50 L. ed. 441, 26 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 161, 4 Ann. 
 
 Cas. 1147 .. ..143, 804, 806 
 817, 862 
 Albright v. Oyster, 9 C. C. A. 
 
 173, 19 U. S. App. 651, 
 
 60 Fed. 644 639 
 
 v. Teas, 106 U. S. 617, 27 L. 
 
 ed. 297, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 550 160 
 
 Alden-Electric Co., Re, 59 C. C. 
 
 A. 509, 123 Fed. 415.. 706 
 715, 716 
 Alderson v. Dole, 20 C. C. A. 280, 
 
 33 U. S. App. 460, 74 
 
 Fed. 30 15 
 
xliv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Aldrich v. ^tna Ins. Co. 8 Wall. 
 
 495, 19 L. ed. 475 
 
 V. Campbell, 38 C. C. A. 
 
 347, 97 Fed. 663 .. .11, 
 
 Alexander v. Fidelity Trust Co. 
 
 214 Fed. 497 414, 
 
 V. Fidelity Trust Co. 215 
 
 Fed. 79 124, 261, 
 
 394, 398, 
 
 V. United States, 6 C. C. A. 
 
 602, 15 U. S. App. 158, 
 
 57 Fed. 828 
 
 Alexandra, The, 104 Fed. 904 . . 
 
 Alexandria Nat. Bank v. Willis 
 
 C. Bates Co. 87 C. C. A. 
 
 643, 160 Fed. 841 
 
 779, 780, 802, 804, 
 
 Alger V. Anderson, 78 Fed. 729 . . 
 
 V. Anderson, 92 Fed. 708 . . 
 
 6, 12, 14-16, 23, 26, 28, 
 
 Alkire Grocery Co. v. Eichesin, 
 91 Fed. 84 ... ,62, 172, 
 
 Allen V. Arguimban, 198 U. S. 
 149, 49 L. ed. 990, 25 
 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 622 
 
 V. Fairbanks, 40 Fed. 188 . . 
 
 V. Georgia, 166 U. S. 140, 
 41 L. ed. 949, 17 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Eep. 525 553, 
 
 V. Luke, 141 Fed. 694 
 
 V. New York, 18 Blatehf. 
 
 239, 7 Fed. 483... 303, 
 
 389, 
 V. O'Donald, 23 Fed. 576 . . 
 V. O'Donald, 28 Fed. 17 . . 
 V. Pullman's Palace Car Co. 
 
 139 U. S. 658, 35 L. ed. 
 
 303, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 
 682 25, 
 
 V. Southern P. E. Co. 173 U. 
 
 S. 489. 43 L. ed. 778, 39 
 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 518 .... 
 
 V. Wilson, 21 Fed. 884.. 391, 
 
 615, 
 
 Allen B. Eisley Co. v. George E. 
 
 Eouse Soap Co. 32 C. C. 
 
 A. 496, 62 U. S. App. 
 
 240, 90 Fed. 6 
 
 Allen-West Commission Co. v. 
 
 Brashear, 176 Fed. 119 
 
 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 
 
 592, 41 L. ed. 836, 17 
 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 427.. 118, 
 Alliance, The, 17 C. C. A. 124, 44 
 
 U. S. App. 52, 70 Fed. 
 
 274 
 
 Allis, Ee, 44 Fed. 217 . . 524, 525, 
 
 758 
 
 485 
 
 419 
 
 269 
 401 
 
 663 
 535 
 
 778 
 820 
 236 
 4 
 35 
 552 
 
 179 
 
 761 
 379 
 382 
 
 721 
 299 
 
 304 
 600 
 
 277 
 429 
 
 34 
 
 748 
 605 
 733 
 
 272 
 
 68 
 252 
 
 147 
 
 645 
 526 
 
 Allis V. Stowell, 85 Fed. 481 ... 599 
 
 600 
 Allmark v. Platte S. S. Co. 76 
 
 Fed. 615 789, 841 
 
 A. L. Eobertshaw Mfg. Co., Ee, 
 
 135 Fed. 221 705, 70S 
 
 Altenberg v. Grant, 28 C. C. A. 
 
 244, 54 U. S. App. 312, 
 
 83 Fed. 980 . . 663, 664, 696 
 715, 716 
 V. Grant, 137 U. S. 710, 28 
 
 C. C. A. 224, 54 U. S. 
 
 App. 312, 83 Fed. 981 694 
 Alton Water Co. v. Brown, 92 C. 
 
 C. A. 598, 166 Fed. 840 590 
 592. 643, 657 
 Ambler v. Choteau, 107 U. S. 
 
 586, 27 L. ed. 322, 1 
 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 556 26 
 
 V. Eppinger, 137 U. S. 482, 
 
 34 L. ed. 766, 11 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 173 212 
 
 Amelia Mill Co. v. Tennessee 
 
 Coal, Iron & E. Co. 123 
 
 Fed. 811 189, 825 
 
 American Asso. v. Hurst, 7 C. C. 
 
 A. 598, 16 U. S. App. 
 
 325, 59 Fed. 1 476 
 
 American Bell Teleph. Co. v. 
 
 Cnited States, 15 C. C. 
 
 A. 569, 33 U. S. App. 
 
 236, 68 Fed. 570 ..364, 730 
 V. Western U. Teleg. Co. 16 
 
 C. C. A. 367, 21 U. S. 
 
 App. 627, 69 Fed. 666 351 
 American Bonding Co. v. Mills, 
 
 81 C. C. A. 325, 152 
 
 Fed. 107 793 
 
 American Book Co. v. Kansas, 
 
 193 U. S. 52, 48 L. ed. 
 
 614, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 
 397 732 
 
 American Box Mach. Co. v. Cros- 
 
 man, 57 Fed. 1025. .288, 289 
 American Bridge Co. v. Hunt, 64 
 
 C. C. A. 548, 130 Fed. 
 
 303 815, 817, 857 
 
 American Car & Foundry Co. v. 
 
 Merchants' Despatch 
 
 Transp. Co. 216 Fed. 
 
 911 29 
 
 American Cereal Co. v. Eli Pet- 
 
 tijohn Cereal Co. 70 
 
 Fed. 276 320, 331, 332 
 
 American Constr. Co. v. Jackson- 
 ville, T. & K. W. E. Co. 
 
 148 U. S. 372, 37 L. ed. 
 
 486, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 
 758 719, 735, 737, 738 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 xlv 
 
 American Exch. Nat. Bank v. 
 First Nat. Bank, 27 C. 
 C. A. 274, 48 U. S. App. 
 
 633, 82 Fed. 961 500 
 
 505, 522, 539 
 
 American Fislieries v. Lennen, 
 
 lis Fed. 872 189 
 
 American F. L. M. Co. v. Benson, 
 
 33 .Fed. 45li 102, 336 
 
 V. Thomas, 18 C. C. A. 327, 
 30 U. S. App. 690, 71 
 Fed. 782 392 
 
 American Grain Separator Co. v. 
 Twin City Separator Co. 
 120 C. C. A. 644, 202 
 Fed. 202 627 
 
 American Graphophone Co. v. Ed- 
 ison Plionograph Worlcs, 
 
 68 Fed. 451 418 
 
 V. Leeds & C. Co. 140 Fed. 
 
 981 417, 419 
 
 American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. 
 Xancv Hanlts Hay Press 
 & Foundry Co. 224 Fed. 
 .324 ' 600 
 
 American Lithographic Co. v. 
 Werckmeister, 91 C. C. 
 A. 376, 165 Fed. 426 . . 529 
 
 American Loan & T. Co. v. Cen- 
 tral Vermont R. Co. 86 
 
 Fed. 390 183 
 
 V. Clark, 27 C. C. A. 522, 49 
 U. S. App. 571, 83 Fed. 
 230 704 
 
 American Locomotive Co. v. 
 Dickson Mfg. Co. 117 
 Fed. 972 04 
 
 American Nat. Bank v. National 
 Ben. & Casualty Co. 70 
 
 Fed. 420 855 
 
 T. Tappan, 174 Fed. 431 ... 86 
 
 American Nicholson Pav. Co. v. 
 Elizabeth, 1 Bann. & 
 Ard. 439, Fed. Cas. No. 
 309 569 
 
 American Smelting & Eef. Co. v. 
 Colorado, 204 U. S, 103, 
 51 L. ed. 393, 27 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 198, 9 Ann. 
 
 Cas. 978 147 
 
 V. Godfrey, 89 C. C. A. 139, 
 158 Fed. 225, 14 A. & 
 E. Ann. Cas. 8 189 
 
 American Steel & Wire Co. v. 
 Wire Drawers & D. M. 
 Unions Nos. 1 & 3, 00 
 Fed. 608.. 189, 228, 229, 238 
 356, 362, 386 
 
 American Strawboard Co. v. In- 
 dianapolis Water Go. 26 
 C. C. A, 470, 46 U. S. 
 App. 526, 81 Fed. 423.. 029 
 American Sugar Ref. Co. v. John- 
 son, 9 C. C. A. 110, 13 
 U. S. App. 681, 60 Fed. 
 
 504 270, 055 
 
 V. New Orleans, 43 C. C. A. 
 
 393, 104 Fed. 2 058 
 
 V. New Orleans, 181 U. S. 
 280, 45 L. cd. 861, 21 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 646 641 
 
 652, 657, 6.58, 742, 744 
 American Sulphite Pulp Co. v. 
 Babless Pulp & Paper 
 
 Co. 163 Fed. 845 415 
 
 American Surety Co. v. Choctaw 
 Constr. Co. 68 C. C. A. 
 
 199, 135 Fed. 487 554 
 
 V. Lawrenceville Cement Co. 
 
 96 Fed. 25 484 
 
 V. North Packing & Provi- 
 sion Co. 102 C. C. A. 
 258, 178 Fed. 810 . .687, 688 
 American Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. 
 New Decatur, 176 Fed. 
 
 133 146, 147 
 
 American Waterworks & Guaran- 
 tee Co. V. Home Water 
 
 Co. 115 Fed. 171 221 
 
 American Wooden-Ware Co. v. 
 
 Stem, 63 Fed. 676 117 
 
 American Wringer Co. v. Ionia, 
 
 76 Fed. 7 170, 200 
 
 Ames V. Chicago, S. F. & C. R. 
 
 Co. 39 Fed. 881 . ..813, 838 
 V. Holderbaum, 42 Fed. 341 55 
 57, 104, 345 
 V. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449, 28 
 L. ed. 482, 4 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 437 40, 63, 138 
 
 Ames Realty Co. v. Big Indian 
 
 Min. Co. 146 Fed. 169 449 
 451, 485 
 Amsden v. Norwich Union F. 
 
 Ins. Soo. 44 Fed. 517 109 
 Amy V. -Manninjr, 38 Fed. 868.. 845 
 
 847 
 V. Watertown, 130 U. S. 
 301, 32 L. ed. 946, 9 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 530 323 
 
 327, 586, 615 
 Anderson v. Bassman, 140 Fed. 
 
 10 40, 45, 52 
 
 54, 187, 549, 550 
 V. Sharp, 189 Fed. 247 ... 829 
 V. Watt, 138 U. S. 694, 34 
 L. ed. 1078, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 449 4.5, 51, 54 
 
 60, 65, 69, 125, 126 
 
xlvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Anderson Land & Stock Co. v. 
 
 McConnell, 171 Fed. 475 600 
 Andes v. Millard, 70 Fed. 517 . . 617 
 Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 
 14, 47 L. ed. 366, 23 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 237 161 
 
 V. Cole, 22 Blatchf. 184, 20 
 
 Fed. 410 390 
 
 v. Connolly, 145 Fed. 43 . . 583 
 
 V. National Foundry & Pipe 
 Works, 19 C. C. A. 548, 
 34 U. S. App. 632, 73 
 Fed. 518 582, 635 
 
 V. National Foundry & Pipe 
 Works, 10 C. C. A. 60, 
 18 U. S. App. 458, 24 
 U. S. App. 81, 61 Fed. 
 790 629 
 
 v. National Foundry & Pipe 
 Works, 36 L.R.A. 139, 
 
 22 C. C. -A. 110, 46 U. 
 
 S. App 281, 76 Fed 166 671 
 672, 700 
 V. National Foundry & Pipe 
 Works, 36 L.R.A. 153, 
 
 23 C. C. A. 454, 46 U. 
 
 S. App. 619, 77 Fed. 774 692 
 693, 695, 736 
 V. Thum, 18 C. C. A. 566, 33 
 
 U. S. App. 430, 72 Fed. 
 
 290 663 
 
 V. Thum, 12 C. C. A. 77, 21 
 
 U. S. App. 459. 64 Fed. 
 
 152 663, 694, 707, 716 
 
 Andrevs Bros. Co. v. Youngs- 
 town Coke Co. 30 C. C. 
 
 A. 293, 58 U. S. App. 
 
 444, 86 Fed. 585 85 
 
 Angle V. Chicago, St. P. M, & O. 
 
 R. Co. 151 U. S. 10, 38 
 
 L. ed. 59, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 240 400 
 
 Anglo American Provision Co. v. 
 
 Davis Provision Co. 105 
 
 Fed. 536 148, 161 
 
 V. Davis Provision Co. 191 
 
 U. S. 376, 48 L. ed. 228, 
 
 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 93 .. 641 
 
 643 
 Anglo-Florida Phosphate Co. v. 
 
 McKibben, 13 C. C. A. 
 
 36, 23 U. S. App. 675, 
 
 65 Fed. 529 368, 483 
 
 Animarium Co. v. Neiman, 98 
 
 Fed. 15 295, 296 
 
 Anniston v. Safe Deposit & T. 
 
 Co. 29 C. C. A. 457, 52 
 
 U. S. App. 510, 85 Fed. 
 
 856 672 
 
 Ansbro v. United States, 159 U. 
 S. 695, 40 L. ed. 310, 16 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 187 .... 648 
 
 Anson Co. v. Blue Ridge R. Co. 
 23 How. 2, 16 L. ed. 
 518 682, 683 
 
 Anthony v. Campbell, 50 C. C. A. 
 
 195, 112 Fed. 217 ..359, 468 
 
 Appel, Re, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 76, 
 90 C. C. A. 172, 163 
 Fed. 1002 285 
 
 Appleton V. Marx, 10 C. C. A. 
 555, 23 U. S. App. 420, 
 62 Fed. 644 ... 417, 418, 419 
 
 Appleton Waterworks Co. v. Cen- 
 tral Trust Co. 35 C. C. 
 A. 302, 93 Fed. 289 ... 477 
 480 
 
 Arbuckle v. Blackburn, 191 U. S. 
 405, 48 L. ed. 239, 24 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148 743 
 
 Argonaut Min. Co. v. Kennedy 
 Min. & Mill. Co. 84 Fed. 
 1 159 
 
 Arkansas v. Choctaw & M. R. 
 
 Co. 134 Fed. 107 . . 157, 822 
 V. Kansas & T. Coal Co. 183 
 U. S. 185, 46 L. ed. 144, 
 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 47 . . . 151 
 164 
 V. Kansas & T, Coal Co. 96 
 
 Fed. 355 63, 138, 139 
 
 152, 160 
 V. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. 
 
 173 Fed. 574 828 
 
 V. Schilerholz, 179 U. S. 600, 
 45 L. ed. 336, 21 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 229 . . 641, 643, 650 
 
 Arkansas Southeastern R. Co. v. 
 Union Sawmill Co. 83 
 C. C. A. 224, 154 Fed. 
 304 224 
 
 Armengaud v. Coudert, 23 
 Blatchf. 424, 27 Fed. 
 247 410 
 
 Armstrong v. Kansas City South- 
 ern R. Co. 192 Fed. 608 806 
 818, 842, 844 
 
 Armstrong Cork Co. v. Mer- 
 chants' Refrigerating 
 Co. 171 Fed. 778 ..285, 313 
 
 Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 
 33 L. ed. 918, 10 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 557 102, 104 
 
 345, 346 
 V. Griggs, 134 U. S. 327, 33 
 L. ed. 921, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 557 102, 104 
 
TABLE OIT CASES. 
 
 xlvii 
 
 Arnold v. Woolsey, 4 C. C. A. 
 319, 12 U. S. App. 157, 
 
 54 Fed. 269 701 
 
 Arrowsmith v. Gleason, 129 U. 
 S. 99, 32 L. ed. 635, 9 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 237 . .251, 478 
 V. Gleason, 46 Fed. 250 .... 2.51 
 V. Nashville & D. E. Co. 57 
 
 Fed. 170 807, 861 
 
 Arthur v. Maryland Casualty Co. 
 
 216 Fed. 386 " 782 
 
 Ashe V. Union Cent. L. Ins. Co. 
 
 115 Fed. 236 780, 782 
 
 Ashley v. Presque Isle County, 8 
 C. C. A. 455, 16 U. S. 
 App. 656, 60 Fed. 55 . . 204 
 554 
 V. Presque Isle County, 27 
 C. C. A. 585. 54 U. S. 
 App. 450, 83 Fed. 534.. 62 
 201 
 
 Ask, The. 156 Fed. 681 358 
 
 Aspen jUin. & Smelting Co. v. 
 Billings, 150 U. S. 36, 
 37 L. ed. 988, 14 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Eep. 4 601, 602 
 
 638, 663, 737, 768 
 Aspinwall, Ee, 83 Fed. 851 . .248, 827 
 Atchison v. Morris, 11 Biss. 191, 
 
 11 Fed. 582 318, 841 
 
 Atchison T. & S. F. E. Co. v. Gil- 
 liland, 113 C. C. A. 476 
 
 193 Fed. 608 361 
 
 V. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55, 53 
 L. ed. 695, 29 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 397 746, 752 
 
 Atlanta Coast Line E. Co. v. 
 
 Bailey, 151 Fed. 892 . . 780 
 783, 818 
 Atlanta K. & X. E. Co. v. Hoop- 
 er, 44 C. C. A. 586, 105 
 
 Fed. 550 769 
 
 V. Southern E. Co. 66 C. C. 
 
 A. 601, 131 Fed. 661 . . 790 
 795 
 T. Southern E. Co. 82 C. C. 
 A. 256, 153 Fed. ]22, 11 
 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 766 778 
 820 
 Atlantic & P. E. Co. v. Laird, 
 164 U. S. 396, 41 L. ed. 
 486, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 
 120 74, 75 
 
 Atlantic & V. Fertilizing Co. v. 
 
 Carter, 88 Fed. 708 ... 820 
 Atlantic Coast Line E. Co. v. 
 
 Bailey, 151 Fed. 893 . . 781 
 V. Daniels, 175 Fed. 302 . . 861 
 
 Atlantic Coast Line E. Co, v. 
 North Carolina Corp. 
 Commission, 206 U. S. 1, 
 51 L. ed. 933, 27 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 585, 11 A. & E. 
 
 Ann. Cas. 398 754 
 
 V. Whildeii, 115 C. C. A. 
 
 254, 195 Fed, 263 269 
 
 270, 273 
 Atlas Glass Co. v. Ball Bros. 
 Glass Mfg. Co. 87 Fed. 
 
 418 327 
 
 Atlas Underwear Co. v. Copper 
 Underwear Co. 210 Fed. 
 
 355 225, 452, 454, 457 
 
 Attleboro ilfg. Co. v, Frankford 
 Marine, Acci. & Plate 
 Glass Ins. Co. 202 Fed. 
 
 293 810 
 
 Audenreid v. East Coast Mill Co. 
 
 124 Fed. 697 112 
 
 Auracher v, Omaha & St. L. E. 
 
 Co. 102 Fed. 1 801, 840 
 
 Austin V. Cahill, 99 Tex. 172, 88 
 
 S. W. 548, 89 S. W. 552 252 
 253 
 V. Gagan, 5 L.E.A. 476, 39 
 
 Fed. 626 139 
 
 778, 779, 780, 795 
 
 V. Eiley, 55 Fed. 833 388 
 
 391, 615 
 Avery v. Popper, 179 U. S. 305, 
 45 L. ed. 203, 21 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Eep. 94 154, 155 
 
 158, 754 
 Axline v. Toledo W. V. & 0. E. 
 
 Co. 138 Fed. 169 806 
 
 Ayres v. Carver, 17 How. 591, 
 
 15 L. ed. 179 238 
 
 V. Chicago, 101 U. S. 187, 25 
 
 L. ed. 840 443 
 
 V. Polsdorfer, 187 U. S. 595, 
 47 L. ed. 318, 23 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 196 . . 640, 653, 740 
 742 
 V. Polsdorfer, 45 C. C. A. 24, 
 
 105 Fed. 737 698, 699 
 
 V. Watson, 113 U. S. 598, 28 
 L. ed, 1094, 5 Sup, Ct. 
 
 Eep. 641 795 
 
 V. Watson, 137 U. S. 584, 34 
 ■ L. ed. 803, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 201 837 
 
 V. Wiswall, 13 2 U. S. 192, 
 28 L. ed. 695, 5 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 90 67, 71, 72, 803 
 
 B. 
 
 Babbitt v. Finn, 101 U. S. 7, 25 
 
 L. ed. 820 ..681, 682, 689 
 695 
 
xlviii 
 
 TABLE OB CASES. 
 
 Babbitt v. Shields. See Babbitt 
 
 V. Finn. 
 Babcook v. De Mott, 88 C. C. A. 
 
 64, 160 Fed. 882... 558, 574 
 Bache v. Hunt, 193 U. S. 523, 
 48 L. ed. 774, 24 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 547 643 
 
 Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U. S. 36, 
 51 L. ed. 357, 27 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 243 748 
 
 Backrack v. Norton, 132 U. S. 
 338, 33 L. ed. 377, 10 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 106 140 
 
 Backus V. Brooks, 115 0. C. A. 
 
 364, 195 Fed. 452 243 
 
 Bacon v. Felt, 38 Fed. 870 72 
 
 V. Texas, 163 U. S. 227, 41 
 L. ed. 139, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 1023 146, 147 
 
 150, 153, 161, 747, 750 
 Badger Gold Min. & Mill. Co. v. 
 Stockton Gold & Copper 
 Co. 139 Fed. 838 ..453, 455 
 ?er Silver Min. Co. v. Drake, 
 31 C. C. A. 378, 58 U. 
 S. App. 129, 88 Fed. 52 262 
 Bagenas v. Southern P. R. Co. 
 
 180 Fed. 888 811 
 
 Baggs V. Martin, 179 U. S. 206, 
 45 L. ed. 155, 21 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 109 831 
 
 Bailey v. Mosher, 95 Fed. 223 . . 160 
 
 797, 798 
 V. Mosher, 11 C. C. A. 304, 
 27 U. S. App. 330, 63 
 
 Fed. 488 141, 160 
 
 V. Tillinghast, 40 C. C. A. 
 
 93, 99 Fed. 801 ...226, 239 
 V. Willeford, 126 Fed. 806 478 
 
 617 
 V. Willeford, 69 C. C. A. 
 
 226, 136 Fed. 382 617 
 
 Baiz, Re, 135 U. S. 417, 34 L. 
 ed. 226, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 854 40 
 
 Baker v. Baldwin, 187 U. S. 61, 
 47 L. ed. 75, 23 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 19 749 
 
 V. Cummings, 181 U. S. 125, 
 45 L. ed. 780, 21 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 578 551, 554 
 
 V. Duwamish Mill Co. 149 
 
 Fed. 612 827 
 
 V. Old Nat. Bank, 33 C. C. 
 A. 570, 63 U. S. App. 
 34, 91 Fed. 450 ...637, 638 
 Baloh V. Haas, 20 C. C. A. 151, 
 36 U. S. App. 693, 73 
 Fed. 976 770 
 
 Baldwin v. Chicago & N. W. R. 
 
 Co. 86 Fed. 167.. 82, 83, 84 
 V. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. 
 Co. 59 C. C. A. 660, 124 
 
 Fed. 206 581, 583 
 
 V. Pacific Power & Light Co. 
 
 199 Fed. 291 112, 813 
 
 829, 832 
 Balfour v. San Joaquin Valley 
 
 Bank, 156 Fed. 600 ... 292 
 Ball V. Tompkins, 41 Fed. 486 . . 247 
 
 248 
 Balliet v. United States, 64 C. C. 
 
 A. 201, 129 Fed. 693 . . 727 
 Baltimore v. Maryland, 92 C. A. 
 
 A. 335, 166 Fed. 645 . . 671 
 672 
 V. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. 62 
 
 Fed. 500 824 
 
 Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Adams 
 
 Exp. Co. 22 Fed. 404 . . 85 
 v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 370, 37 
 L. ed. 773, 13 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 914 20 
 
 V. Doty, 67 C. C. A. 38, 133 
 
 Fed. 869 121 
 
 v. Ford, 35 Fed. 170 ...795, 781 
 v. Harris, 7 Wall. 574, 19 L. 
 
 ed. 100 669, 764, 765 
 
 V. Harris, 12 Wall. 81, 20 L. 
 
 ed. 358 112, 118 
 
 V. Koontz, 104 U. S. 12, 26 
 
 L. ed. 645 77, 84, 109 
 
 112, 786, 788, 800 
 V. Meyers, 10 C. C. A. 48.5, 
 18 U. S. App. 569, 62 
 
 Fed. 371 655 
 
 V. Wabash R. Co. 57 C. C. 
 
 A. 322, 119 Fed. 679.. 477 
 478, 479 
 Baltimore BIdg. & L. Asso. v. Al- 
 derson, 32 C. C. A. 542, 
 61 U. S. App. 636, 90 
 
 Fed. 146 589 
 
 Baltimore Trust & Guarantee 
 Co. V. Hofstetter, 29 C. 
 C. A. 35, 56 U. S. App. 
 122, 85 Fed. 75 .. ..416, 700 
 Ban V. Columbia Southern Co. 
 54 C. C. A. 407, 117 
 
 Fed. 21 212, 221 
 
 V. Columbia Southern Co. 
 
 109 Fed. 499 221 
 
 Bane v. Keefer, 66 Fed. 612 .... 821 
 Bangs V. Loveridge, 60 Fed. 963 57 
 
 59, 281 
 Bankers' ilut. Casualty Co. v. 
 Minneapolis, St. P. & S. 
 Ste M. R. Co. 192 U. S. 
 384, 48 L. ed. 490, 24 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 325 . . 162, 182 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 xlix 
 
 Bankers' Surety Co. v. Holly, 134 
 
 C. C. A. 536, 219 Fed. 
 
 101 
 
 Bank of Arapahoe v. David Brad- 
 lev & Co. 19 C. C. A. 
 
 200, 36 U. S. App. 519, 
 
 72 Fed. 870 . .167, 169, 
 
 171, 173, 174, 195, 
 
 199, 
 
 Bank of Bethel v. Pahquioque 
 
 Bank, 14 Wall. 3S4, 20 
 
 L. ed. 840 
 
 Bank of British X. A. v. Bar- 
 ling, 46 Fed. 357 
 
 Bank of Commerce v. Stone, 88 
 
 Fed. 398 
 
 V. Tennessee, 163 U. S. 416, 
 
 41 L. ed. 211, 16 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Eep. 1113 
 
 Bank of Kentucky v. Stone, 88 
 
 Fed. 383 22, 
 
 Bank of Lewisburg v. Sheffey, 
 
 140 U. S. 451, 35 L. ed. 
 
 496, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 755 602, 
 
 Bank of ilavsville v. Claypool, 
 
 320 U. S. 270, 30 L. ed. 
 
 633, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 545 
 Bank of United States v. Ritchie, 
 
 8 Pet. 144, 8 L. ed. 897 
 V. White, 8 Pet. 269, 8 L. ed. 
 
 941 
 
 Bank of Winona v. Avery, 34 
 
 Fed. 81 93, 
 
 Banks Law Pub. Co, v. Lawyers' 
 
 Co-op. Pub. Co. 139 Fed. 
 
 702 
 
 332 
 
 170 
 196 
 201 
 
 Barber v. Boston & M. E. Co. 145 
 
 Fed. 52 
 
 Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. 
 
 Morris, 67 L.R.A. 761, 
 
 66 C. C. A. 55, 132 Fed. 
 
 945 18, 46, 408, 
 
 Barcus v. Gates, 32 C. C. A. 337, 
 
 61 U. S. App. 596, 89 
 
 Fed. 783 
 
 V. Sherwood, 69 C. C. A, 200, 
 
 136 Fed. 184 
 
 Bardon v. Land & River Improv. 
 
 Co. 357 U. S. 330, 39 L. 
 
 ed. 720, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 650 19, 
 
 Barling v. Bank of British N. A. 
 
 3 C. C. A. 510, 7 U. S. 
 
 App. 194, 50 Fed. 263 . . 
 
 644, 647, 
 
 Barlow v. Chicago & N. W. E. 
 
 Co. 164 Fed. 765 
 
 89, 119, 780, 
 
 258 
 214 
 408 
 
 772 
 24 
 
 635 
 
 790 
 246 
 303 
 
 271 
 
 367 
 
 797 
 
 835 
 
 300 
 628 
 
 259 
 
 633 
 
 655 
 
 811 
 
 Barlow v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 
 
 172 Fed. 515 88, 89, 95 
 
 811 
 Barnes v. Berry, 156 Fed. 73 . . . 238 
 V. \Aestern U. Telcg. Co. 120 
 
 Fed. 550 112, 315, 330 
 
 Barnesville & il. R. Co., Re, 2 
 McCrary, 216, 4 Fed. 
 
 10 780 
 
 Barney v. Baltimore, 6 Wall. 
 
 284, 18 L. ed. 825 . .10], 227 
 230, 233, 234, 127 
 V. Latham, 103 U. S. 205, 
 
 26 L. ed. 514 70, 71 
 
 301, 820 
 V. New York, 193 U. S. 430, 
 48 L. ed. 737, 24 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 502 148 
 
 Barnhard Bros. & Spindler v. 
 Morrison, — Tex. Civ. 
 App. — , 87 S. W. 376. . 46 
 Barr v. New Brunswick, 19 C. C. 
 A. 71, 39 U. S. App. 
 187, 72 Fed. 689 ..658, 659 
 Barrel v. Western Transp. Co. 3 
 
 Wall. 424, 38 L. ed. 168 676 
 Barren v. The Mohawk. See 
 Barrel v. Western 
 Transp. Co. 
 Barrett v. Twin City Power Co. 
 
 Ill Fed. 45 423 
 
 Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 
 
 200, 30 L. ed. 919, 1 
 
 Inters. Com. Rep. 295, 7 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 931 ..112, 113 
 
 V. The Mt. Eden, 87 Fed. 
 
 483 55() 
 
 Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U. S. 80, 
 
 25 L. ed. 407 604 
 
 Barrows S. S. Co. v. Kane, 170 
 U. S. 103, 42 L. ed. 965, 
 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526 . . 77 
 78, 88, 89, 113, 110, 320 
 323, 32!) 
 
 Barry, Re, 42 Fed. 113 50 
 
 v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 561, 
 29 L. ed. 732, 6 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 501 ..170, 172, 174 
 178, 195, 3 96, 550 
 v. Missouri, K. & T. E. Co. 
 
 22 Fed. 631 253 
 
 Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 34 Wall. 28, 
 
 20 L. ed. 792 . . 75S, 759, 761 
 Barth v. Coler, 9 C. C. A. 83, 39 
 U. S. App. 646, 00 Fed. 
 
 468 73, 821 
 
 Bartlett v. Gates, 117 Fed. 362 842 
 
 847, 848 
 V. Sultan of Turkey, 19 Fed. 
 
 346 486 
 
TABLE OF CASES, 
 
 Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 
 
 128, 26 L. ed. 674 181 
 
 Basey v. Gallagher, 20 Wall. 679, 
 
 22 L. ed. 453, 1 Mor. 
 
 Min. Rep. 683 404 
 
 Basket v. Hassell, 107. U. S. 608, 
 
 27 L. ed. .501, 2 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 415 697 
 
 Bass V. Christian Feigenspan, 82 
 
 Fed. 261 .. .286, 357-9, 436 
 Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Gil- 
 lette, 28 Fed. 673 ..537, 563 
 Bates V. Carpentier, 98 Fed. 452 71 
 72, 193, 194, 812, 815 
 Batey v. Nashville, C. & St. L. 
 
 R. Go. 95 Fed. 368 . . 75, 815 
 
 Batt V. Proctor, 45 Fed. 515 . . 102 
 
 337 338 342 
 
 Battle V. Atkinson, 115 Fed. 385' 170 
 
 173 
 Baum V. Longwell, 200 Fed. 454 199 
 
 548, 792 
 Bauman v. Chambers, 91 Tex. 
 
 Ill, 41 S. W. 471 424 
 
 Baumgardner v. Bono Fertilizer 
 
 Co. 58 Fed. 4 331 
 
 Baumgarten v. Alliance Assur. 
 
 Co. 153 Fed. 301 809 
 
 Bausman v. Denny, 73 Fed. 69 . . 30 
 '245, 257, 449, 483 
 V. Dixon, 173 U. S. 113, 43 
 - L. ed. 633, 19 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 316 182, 852 
 
 Baxter v. Bevil Phillips & Co. 
 
 219 Fed. 309 582, 624 
 
 Baxter, S. & S. Const. Co. v. 
 
 Hammond Mfg. Co. 154 
 
 Fed. 992 548, 776, 829 
 
 Bay City Iron Works v. Reeves 
 
 & Co. 43 Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 254, 95 S. W. 739 . . 324, 325 
 Bayne v. Brewer Pottery Co. 90 
 
 Fed. 623 596 
 
 Bayonne, The, 159 U. S. 693, 40 
 
 L. ed. 309, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 185 650 
 
 Beach v. Mosgrove, 4 McCrary, 
 
 50, 16 Fed. 305 392 
 
 Seals v. Cone, 188 U. S. 184, 47 
 
 L. ed. 435, 23 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 275 748 
 
 Beamer v. Werner, 86 C. C. A. 
 
 289, 159 Fed. 99 ..334, 634 
 
 Bean v. Clark, 30 Fed. 225 419 
 
 V. Smith, 2 Mason, 270, Fed. 
 
 Cas. No. 1,174 14 
 
 Beard v. Burts, 95 U. S. 436, 24 
 
 L. ed. 486 606 
 
 Beardsley v. Arkansas & L. R. 
 Co. 158 U. S. 127, 39 
 
 L. ed. 921, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 786.. 677, 683, 684, 699 
 Beattie v. Wilkinson, 36 Fed. 649 342 
 Beck & P. Lithographing Co. v. 
 
 Wacker & B. Brewing & 
 
 Malting Co. 26 C. C. A. 
 11, 46 U. S. App. 486, 
 
 76 Fed. 10 637 
 
 Bedford Quarries Co. v. Tomlin- 
 
 son, 36 C. C. A. 272, 95 
 
 Fed. 210 247, 250 
 
 V. Welch, 100 Fed. 513 .... 172 
 Beebe v. Louisville, N. 0. & T. R. 
 
 Co. 39 Fed. 481 451 
 
 v. Russell, 19 How. 283, 15 
 
 L. ed. 668 582 
 
 Beers v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. 
 
 Co. 73 C. C. A. 273, 141 
 
 Fed. 959 28 
 
 Bein v. Heath, 12 How. 178, 13 
 
 L. ed. 943 304 
 
 Bell V. Donohoe, 8 Sawy. 435, 17 
 
 Fed. 711 234, 236 
 
 V. Morrison, 1 Pet. 356, 7 L. 
 
 ed. 176 505, 538 
 
 Bellaire v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. 
 
 146 U. S. 118, 36 L. ed. 
 
 911, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 16 847 
 Belmont Nail Co. v. Columbia 
 
 Iron & Steel Co. 46 Fed. 
 
 337 180 
 
 Beloit V. Morgan, 7 Wall. 619, 
 
 17 L. ed. 205 24 
 
 Bender v. Pennsylvania Co. 148 
 
 U. S. 502, 37 L. ed. 537, 
 
 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 640 . . 638 
 Benedict v. Moore, 76 Fed. 472 . . 403 
 V. Williams, 20 Blatchf. 276, 
 
 10 Fed. 208 864 
 
 Benjamin v. New Orleans, 169 U. 
 
 S. 163, 42 L. ed. 702, 18 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 298 221 
 
 V. New Orleans, 20 C. C. A. 
 
 591, 41 U. S. App. 178, 
 
 74 Fed. 417, 71 Fed. 758 221 
 Banner v. Hayes, 26 C. C. A. 271, 
 
 53 U. S. App. 376, 80 
 
 Fed. 953 701, 721 
 
 Bennett v. Butterworth, 8 How. 
 
 128, 12 L. ed. 1015 ... 170 
 185 
 V. Butterworth, 11 How. 
 
 669, 13 L. ed. 859 ..5, 8 
 16, 17, 864 
 
 V. Devine, 45 Fed. 705 826 
 
 V. Fenton, 10 L.R.A. 500, 41 
 
 Fed. 283 104, 345 
 
 Benoist v. Smith, 191 Fed. 514. . 479 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Bensiek v. Thomas, 13 C. C. A. 
 451, 27 U. S. App. 765, 
 66 Fed. 106 701 
 
 Bensinger Self-Adding Cash Reg- 
 ister Co. V. National 
 Cash Register Co. 42 
 Fed. 81 56, 98 
 
 Bent V. Hall, 56 C. C. A. 246, 
 
 119 Fed. 342 277 
 
 Benton v. Mcintosh, 96 Fed. 132 320 
 
 331 
 
 Bergman v. Inman, 91 Fed. 294 177 
 
 178 
 
 Berkeley, Re, 121 C. C. A. 35ty, 
 
 203 Fed. 7 579 
 
 Berkey v. Cornell, 90 Fed. 717 . . 
 
 5, 864 
 
 Berliner Gramophone Co. v. Sea- 
 man, 47 C. C. A. 630, 
 
 108 Fed. 715 692 
 
 V. Seaman, 49 C. C. A. 99, 
 
 110 Fed. 33 631 
 
 V. Seaman, 51 C. C. A. 440, 
 
 113 Fed. 750. .355, 356, 367 
 371, 484, 626 
 
 Bernard v. Abel, 84 C. C. A. 361, 
 
 156 Fed. 652 586 
 
 V. Lee, 127 C. C. A. 219, 210 
 
 Fed. 583 673 
 
 Bernards Twp. v. Stebbins, 109 
 U. S. 355, 27 L. ed. 961, 
 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252 .. 62 
 217 
 
 Bemheim v. Birnbaum, 30 Fed. 
 
 885 217 
 
 Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U. 
 S. 516, 51 L. ed. 1163, 
 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 755 . . 258 
 
 Berry v. Knights Templars' & M. 
 Life Indemnity Co. 46 
 
 Fed. 441 112 
 
 V. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. 
 
 118 Fed. 911 839 
 
 Bertha Zinc & Mineral Co. v. 
 
 Vaughan, 88 Fed. 569 212 
 213 
 
 Berthold v. Hoskins, 38 Fed. 772 193 
 
 Berwind v. Canadian P. R. Co. 
 
 98 Fed. 158 ..244, 277, 403 
 
 Betzoldt V. American Ins. Co. 47 
 
 Fed. 707 ..88, 90, 207, 361 
 
 Beutlif V. London & C. Finance 
 
 Corp. 44 Fed. 667 840 
 
 Bibb V. Allen, 149 U. S. 481, 37 
 L. ed. 819, 13 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 950 539, 542 
 
 Bicycle Stepladder Co. v. Gor- 
 don, 57 Fed. 529 96 
 
 Bien v. Robinson, 208 U. S. 423, 
 52 L. ed. 556, 28 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 379 640 
 
 Big Creek Gap Coal & I. Co. v. 
 
 American Loan & T. Co. 
 
 62 C. C. A. 351, 127 
 
 Fed. 627 449 
 
 Bigler v. Waller, 12 Wall. 147, 
 
 20 L. ed. 261 695, 763 
 
 Big Six Development Co. v. Mit- 
 chell, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 
 
 332, 70 C. C. A. 569, 138 
 
 Fed. 280 588 
 
 Bill'v. Donohoe, 17 Fed. 711 ... 245 
 V. Western U. Teleg. Co. 16 
 
 Fed. 14 241 
 
 Bimber v. Calivada Colonization 
 
 Co. 110 Fed. 58 242 
 
 Bingham v. Morris, 7 Cranoh, 99, 
 
 3 L. ed. 281 716 
 
 Binney v. Cumberland Ely Cop- 
 per Co. 183 Fed. 651.. . 242 
 Bird V. Halsy, 87 Fed. 672 493 
 
 503, 525, 535, 539, 541, 542 
 544 
 Birdsboro Steel Foundry & Mach. 
 
 Co. v. Kelley Bros. 78 
 
 C. C. A. 101, 147 Fed. 
 
 713 606 
 
 Birdseye v. Heilner, 26 Fed. 147 417 
 Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. 
 
 Birmingham, 211 Fed. 
 
 497 473 
 
 Bischoffsheim v. Baltzer, 20 
 
 Blatchf. 229, 10 Fed. 4 513 
 516, 535, 536 
 Bishop v. Averill, 76 Fed. 387 272 
 v. Boston & M. R. Co. 117 
 
 Fed. 771 59 
 
 V. York, 118 Fed. 352 277 
 
 Bissell Carpet-Sweeper Co. v. 
 
 Goshen Sweeper Co. 19 
 
 C. C. A. 25, 43 U. S. 
 
 App. 47, 72 Fed. 552 . . 615 
 631, 685, 768, 771 
 Black v. Caldwell, 83 Fed. 884.. 587 
 V. Henry 6. Allen Co. 9 
 
 L.R.A. 433, 42 Fed. 622 287 
 Blackburn v. Blackburn, 142 Fed. 
 
 901 812, 816 
 
 V. Crawford, 3 Wall. 191, 18 
 
 L. ed. 192 539, 540 
 
 V. Portland Gold Min. Co. 
 
 175 U. S. 571, 44 L. ed. 
 
 276, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 222, 20 Mor. Min. Rep. 
 
 358 158 
 
 V. Selma, M. & M. R. Co. 3 
 
 Fed. 692 4 
 
 Blacklook v. Small, 127 U. S. 96, 
 
 32 L. ed. 70, 8 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 1096 67 
 
lii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Blaffer v. New. Orleans Water 
 
 Supply Co. 87 C. C. A. 
 
 341, 160 Fed. 390.. 459, 662 
 663, 676, 681, 683, 684 
 Blair v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 400, 
 
 50 L. ed. 801, 26 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 427 217 
 
 V. Silver Peak Mines, 93 
 
 Fed. 332 601 
 
 Blake, Re, 175 U. S. 117, 44 L. 
 
 ed. 95, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 42 . 772 
 
 V. Foreman Bros. Bkg. Co. 
 
 218 Fed. 264 337 
 
 V. McKim, 103 U. S. 336, 26 
 
 L. ed. 563 . . . 66 
 
 Blalock V. Equitable Life Assur. 
 
 Soc. 21 C. C. A. 208, 41 
 
 U. S. App. 761, 75 Fed. 
 
 4t 357 
 
 Blanchard v. Bigelow, 109 Fed. 
 
 275 123 
 
 Bland v. Fleeman, 29 Fed. 672 65 
 68, 224, 225, 233, 236 
 Blanks v. Klein, 1 C. C. A. 254, 
 
 2 U. S. App. 155, 49 
 
 Fed. 1 708, 718 
 
 Blanton v. Chalmers, 158 Fed. 
 
 907 423, 433 
 
 Blassengame v. Boyd, 101 C. C. 
 
 A. 129, 178 Fed. 5 ..577 
 639 
 Blast Furnace Appliances Co. v. 
 
 Worth Bros. Co. 221 
 
 Fed. 430 294 
 
 Bleaae v. Garlington, 92 U. S. 7, 
 
 23 L. ed. 523 495, 520 
 
 526, 531, 563, 714 
 Bliss V. Anaconda Copper Min. 
 
 Co. 156 Fed. 309 ..567, 572 
 V. Anaconda Copper Min. 
 
 Co. 167 Fed. 342 ..565, 574 
 Block V. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. 
 
 Co. 21 Fed. 531 327 
 
 Blodgett V. Lanyon Zinc Co. 58 
 
 C. C. A. 79,. 120 Fed. 
 
 894 113 
 
 Blood V. Morrin, 140 Fed. 919 . . 507 
 Bloomingdale v. Watson, 62 C. C. 
 
 A. 600, 128 Fed. 269 . , 696 
 704 
 Blossom V. Milwaukee & C. R. 
 
 Co. 1 Wall. 656, 17 L. 
 
 ed. 673 637 
 
 V. Milwaukee & C. R. Co. 3 
 
 Wall. 196, 18 L. ed. 43 596 
 Blueflelds S. C. Co. v. Steele, 112 
 
 C. C. A. 411, 192 Fed. 
 
 23 244 
 
 Blue Stone Bros., Re, 174 Fed. 
 
 54 475 
 
 Blumenthal v. Craig, 26 C. C. A. 
 
 427, 55 U. S. App. 8, 
 
 81 Fed. 320 59 
 
 Blunt V. Southern R. Co. 155 
 
 Fed. 499 . . 54, 776, 816, 817 
 829 
 Blythe v. Hinckley, 173 U. S. 
 
 501, 43 L. ed. 783, 19 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 497 645 
 
 V. Hinckley, 84 Fed. 244 . . 316 
 
 319, 362, 392, 470, 582, 585 
 V. Hinckley, 84 Fed. 256 .. 260 
 Blythe Co. v. Hinckley, 49 C. C. 
 
 A. 647, 111 Fed. 827 . . 609 
 610, 613 
 Boardman v. S. S. McClure Co. 
 
 123 Fed. 614 112, 116 
 
 Board of Trade v. Cella Commis- 
 sion Co. 76 C. C. A. 28, 
 
 145 Fed. 28 ...187, 188, 190 
 V. Hammond Elevator Co. 
 
 198 U. S. 424, 49 L. ed. 
 
 1111, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 740 322, 643, 644 
 
 V. National Bd. of Trade, 
 
 154 Fed. 239 275, 434 
 
 Boatmen's Bank v. Fritzlen, 66 
 
 C. C. A. 288, 135 Fed. 
 
 650 231, 408, 782, 783 
 
 803, 808, 842 
 Boatner v. American Exp. Co. 
 
 122 Fed. 714 . . 806, 808, 861 
 Bock V. Perkins, 139 U. S. 630, 
 
 35 L. ed. 315, 11 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 677 139, 140 
 
 Boeshore, Re, 125 Fed. 652 525 
 
 Bogert V. Southern P. Co. 211 
 
 Fed. 776 32, 394 
 
 Bogue V. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 
 
 193 Fed. 728.-48, 51, 59, 776 
 Bohlander v. Heikes, 94 C. C. A. 
 
 298, 168 Fed. 886 547 
 
 Boise Artesian Hot & Cold Water 
 
 Co. V. Boise City, 213 U. 
 
 S. 276, 53 L. ed. 796, 29 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 426 ..26, 31 
 Boise County v. Gorman, 19 
 
 Wa:ll. 661, 22 L. ed. 226 764 
 Bolin V. St. Louis Southwestern 
 
 R. Co Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 — , 61 S. W. 444 489 
 
 Bolles V. Lehigh Valley R. Co. 
 
 127 Fed. 884 209 
 
 Bonner v. Miekle, 77 Fed. 485 . . 844 
 
 846 
 Book V. Justice Min. Co. 58 Fed. 
 
 828 260, 431, 443, 449 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 liii 
 
 Boone v. Chiles, 10 Pet. 177, 9 
 
 L. ed. 388 10 
 
 Booth V. Clark, 17 How. 328, 15 
 
 L. ed. 166 258 
 
 V. St. Louis Fire Engine 
 
 Mfg. Co. 40 Fed. 1 114 
 
 Borgmeyer v. Idler, 159 U. S. 
 
 408, 40 L. ed. 199, 16 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 34 159 
 
 Born V. Schneider, 128 Fed. 179 459 
 
 662 
 Bors V. Preston, 111 U. S. 252, 
 
 28 L. ed. 419, 4 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 407 40 
 
 Boston & A. R. Co. v. Parr, 44 
 
 C. C. A. 139, 104 Fed. 
 
 695 277 
 
 V. Parr, 98 Fed. 484.-356, 362 
 
 403 
 Boston & M. Consol. Copper & S. 
 
 Jlin. Co. V. Montana Ore 
 
 Purchasing Co. 188 U. 
 
 S. 632, 47 L. ed. 626, 
 
 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 434 . . 31 
 163, 165, 259, 828 
 Boston & M. R. Co. v. Gokey, 79 
 
 C. C. A. 64, 149 Fed. 44, 
 
 9 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 384 643 
 644, 653 
 V. Gokey, 210 U. S. 155, 52 
 
 L. ed. 1002, 28 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 657 655 
 
 V. Hurd, 56 L.R.A. 193, 47 
 
 C. C. A. 615, 108 Fed. 
 
 116 82 
 
 Boston Consol. Copper & S. Min. 
 
 Co. V. Montana Ore Pur- 
 chasing Co. 188 U. S. 
 
 639, 47 L. ed. 631, 23 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 434 164 
 
 Boston Safe Deposit & T. Co. v. 
 
 Racine, 97 Fed. 817 . . 68 
 126 
 Bostwick V. American Finance 
 
 Co. 43 Fed. 897 .. ..93, 331 
 Boswell V. Otis, 9 How. 350, 13 
 
 L. ed. 170 485 
 
 Bosworth V. Hook, 23 C. C. A. 
 
 404, 46 U. S. App. 598, 
 
 77 Fed. 680 574, 576 
 
 V. St. Louis Terminal R. 
 
 Asso. 174 U. S. 182, 43 
 
 L. ed. 941, 19 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 625 703 
 
 Botter V. Beal, 2 C. C. A. 60, 5 
 
 U. S. App. 49, 50 Fed. 
 
 860 582 
 
 Bottom V. National R. Bldg. & 
 
 L. Asso. 123 Fed. 744.. 183 
 258 
 
 Bottoms V. St. Louis & S. F. R. 
 
 Co. 179 Fed. 319 ..832, 833 
 Bound V. South Carolina R. Co. 
 
 55 Fed. 186 592, 669 
 
 Bowden v. Burnham, 8 C. C. A. 
 248, 19 U. S. App. 448, 
 
 59 Fed. 754 177, 198 
 
 207, 357 
 Bowdoin College v. Merritt, 63 
 
 Fed. 213 58, 68, 255 
 
 V. Merritt, 59 Fed. 7 781 
 
 Bowen v. Christian, 16 Fed. 729 
 
 317, 486, 487 
 Bowens v. Chicago, M. & St. P. 
 
 R. Co. 215 Fed. 287 . . 792 
 803, 863 
 Bower Barflf Rustless Iron Co. v. 
 Wells Rustless Iron Co. 
 
 43 Fed. 391 424, 433 
 
 Bowers v. Atlantic, G. & P. Co. 
 
 104 Fed. 887 95 
 
 V. First Nat. Bank, 190 Fed. 
 
 677 822 
 
 V. New York L. Ins. Co. 68 
 
 Fed. 785 274 
 
 Bowker v. United States, 186 U. 
 S. 138, 46 L. ed. 1091, 
 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 802 . . 633 
 640, 643, 645 
 Bowling Green Trust Co. v. Vir- 
 ginia Pass. & P. Co. 132 
 
 Fed. 921 252, 450 
 
 V. Virginia Pass. & Power 
 
 Co. 164 Fed. 753 450 
 
 Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. 
 Co. 115 U. S. 614, 29 L. 
 ed. 503, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 192 170, 178 
 
 X. Harris, 95 Fed. 917 183 
 
 257 
 Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210, 7 
 
 L. ed. 655 13, 22 
 
 Boyd, Ex parte, 105 U. S. 657, 
 
 26 L. ed. 1204 . .. .292, 432 
 V. Gill, 21 Blatchf. 543, 19 
 
 Fed. 145 253, 255 
 
 V. Nebraska, 143 U. S. 180, 
 36 L. ed. 116, 12 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 375 400 
 
 V. New York & H. R. Co. 
 
 220 Fed. 174 ..289, 395, 421 
 V. Schneider, 65 C. C. A. 
 
 209, 131 Fed. 223 299> 
 
 Boyer v. Keller, 113 Fed. 580 . . 292 
 Boyle V. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 658, 8 
 
 L. ed. 536 . 12 
 
 Bracken v. Neill, 15 Tex. 110 . . 583 
 V. Union P. R. Co. 5 C. C. 
 A. 548, 12 U. S. App. 
 421, 56 Fed. 449 ..337, 343 
 347 
 
liv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Braddock v. Louchheim, 87 Fed. 
 
 287 281 
 
 Bradford, Re, 71 C. C. A. 334, 
 
 139 Jed. 518 678 
 
 V. Southern E. Co. 195 U. 
 
 S. 243, 49 L. ed. 178, 
 
 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 55 . . . 678 
 V. Union Bank, 13 How. 69, 
 
 14 L. ed. 54 450 
 
 Bradley v. Ohio River & C. R. 
 
 Co. 119 N. C. 918, 78 
 
 Fed. 387 162 
 
 Bradshaw v. Miners' Bank, 26 C. 
 
 C. A. 673, 53 U. S. App. 
 
 399, 81 Fed. 902 483 
 
 Bragdon v. Perkins-Campbell Co. 
 
 82 Fed. 338 789 
 
 Brande v. Gilchrist, 18 Fed. 465 443 
 
 448 
 Brandies v. Cochrane, 105 U. S. 
 
 262, 26 L. ed. 989 677 
 
 Brawner v. Irvin, 169 Fed. 964 146 
 Braxton v. Rich, 47 Fed. 178 . . 478 
 Braxton County Ct. v. West Vir- 
 ginia, 208 U. S. 192, 52 
 
 L. ed. 450, 28 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 275 749 
 
 Bray v. Staples, 103 C. C. A. 
 
 451, 180 Fed. 330 635 
 
 Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co. 71 
 
 C. C. A. 213, 140 Fed. 
 
 816 23 
 
 Brickill v. New York, 55 Fed. 
 
 565 579 
 
 Bridge Proprs. v. Hoboken. Land 
 
 & Improv. Co. 1 Wall. 
 
 116, 17 L. ed. 571 139 
 
 Bridges v. Sheldon, 18 Blatchf. 
 
 295, 7 Fed. 19 .. ..318, 573 
 Brigel v. Tug River Coal & Salt 
 
 Co. 73 Fed. 13, 30 C. C. 
 
 A. 415, 58 U. S. App. 
 
 320, 86 Fed. 818 60 
 
 Briggs V. Neal, 56 C. C. A. 572, 
 
 120 Fed. 224 557, 558 
 
 V Stroud, 58 Fed. 717 248 
 
 405, 408, 409, 412, 418 
 V. Traders Co. 145 Fed. 254 548 
 Brigham City v. Toltec Ranch 
 
 Co. 41 C. C. A. 222, 101 
 
 Fed. 85 613 
 
 Brigham-Hopkins Co. v. Gross, 
 
 107 Fed. 769 177, 214 
 
 Brinckerhoff v. Holland Trust 
 
 Co. 146 Fed. 203 458 
 
 Brinkley v. Louisville & N. R. 
 
 Co. 95 Fed. 349 ..286, 667 
 676 
 Bristol v. United States, 63 C. 
 
 C. A. 529, 129 Fed. 88 678 
 
 Broadis v. Broadis, 86 Fed. 951 87 
 
 483 
 Broadmoor Land Co. v. Curr, 73 
 C. C. A. 537, 142 Fed. 
 
 421 835 
 
 Broadway Ins. Co. v. Chicago G. 
 
 W. R. Co. 101 Fed. 508 802 
 803, 822, 857, 860 
 Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 520, 
 
 22 L. ed. 605 17, 248 
 
 Bronson v. Keokuk, 2 Dill. 498, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 1,928 ... 338 
 V. Schulten, 104 U. S. 415, 
 
 26 L. ed. 799 391, 586 
 
 598, 615. 733 
 Brookfield v. Hecker, 118 Fed. 
 
 942 483 
 
 Brooks V. Bailey, 20 Blatchf. 85, 
 
 9 Fed. 438 53 
 
 V. Burlington & S. W. R. Co. 
 102 U. S. 107, 26 L. ed. 
 
 92 733 
 
 V. Clark, 119 U. S. 513, 30 
 
 L. ed. 485, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 301 ..73, 814, 820, 838 
 
 V. Farwell, 1 McCrary, 132, 
 
 2 McCrary, 220, 4 Fed. 
 
 166 318 
 
 V. Laurent, 39 C. C. A. 201, 
 
 98 Fed. 655 ..212, 289, 482 
 484, 830 
 
 V. O'Hara, 8 Fed. 533 617 
 
 Brown, Re, 213 Fed. 701 606 
 
 V. Allebach,. 156 Fed. 697 . . 183 
 
 482 
 V. Arnold, 67 C. C. A. 125, 
 
 131 Fed. 723 22 
 
 V. Arnold, 127 Fed. 390 . . 487 
 V. Beacon, 174 Fed. 814 .... 212 
 V. Buena Vista County, 95 
 
 U. S. 157, 24 L. ed. 422 618 
 V. Coxe Bros. & Co. 75 Fed. 
 
 689 74 
 
 V. Denver, 186 U. S. 480, 46 
 L. ed. 1259, 22 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 943 175 
 
 V. Ellis, 103 Fed. 837 ..505, 506 
 532, 534, 539, 540, 541 
 V. Evans, 8 Sawy. 502, 18 
 
 Fed. 56 686, 689, 765 
 
 V. Fletcher, 140 Fed. 642 . . 380 
 
 551 
 V. Grove, 25 C. C. A. 644, 42 
 U. S. App. 508, 80 Fed. 
 
 564 558 
 
 V. Guarantee Trust & S. D. 
 Co. 128 U. S. 415, 32 L. 
 ed. 471, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 127 225, 296, 298 
 
 V. Huey, 166 Fed. 483 .... 294 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Iv 
 
 Brown v. King, 10 C. C. A. 541, 
 23 U. S. App. 524, 62 
 
 Fed. 529 579 
 
 V. Lanyon Zinc. Co. 102 C. 
 
 C. A. 497, 179 Fed. 311 770 
 V. ilcConnell, 124 U. S. 491, 
 31 L. ed. 496, 8 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 559 665, 667, 677 
 
 683, 684 
 V. McDonald, 130 Fed. 969 292 
 V. llcDonald, 68 L.R.A. 462, 
 67 C. C. A. 59, 133 Fed. 
 
 898 291, 294 
 
 V. Murray Nelson & Co. 43 
 
 Fed. 614 230, 784, 840 
 
 y. Northwestern Mut. L. 
 Ins. Co. 55 C. C. A. 654, 
 
 119 Fed. 149 682, 688 
 
 V. Palmer, 157 Fed. 797 . . 294 
 V. Pegram, 143 Fed. 701 .. . 345 
 V. Pierce, 7 Wall. 205, 19 L. 
 
 ed. 134 422 
 
 V. Pond, 5 Fed. 34 321 
 
 V. Sclileier, 194 V. S. 18, 48 
 L. ed. 857, 25 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 558 356 
 
 V. Smith, 88 Fed. 565 160 
 
 V. Trousdale, 138 U. S. 396, 
 34 L. ed. 990, 11 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 308 71 
 
 V. Wheelock, 75 Tex. 385, 12 
 
 S. W. Ill 323 
 
 V. Worster, 113 Fed. 20 . . 517 
 
 531 
 Brown & B. Co. v. Lake Superior 
 Iron Co. 134 U. S. 530, 
 33 L. ed. 1021, 10 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 604 ... 10, 33, 34 
 Broyles v. Buck, 37 Fed. 137 . . 547 
 Bruce v. Manchester & K. R. Co. 
 117 U. S. 514, 29 L. ed. 
 990, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 849 169 
 Brun V. Mann, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
 1.54, 80 C. C. A. 513, 
 151 Fed. 154 .. .23, 24, 249 
 Brush Creek Coal & Min. Co. v. 
 Morgan-Gardner Elec- 
 tric Co. 136 Fed. 505. . 318 
 Bryant v. Thompson, 27 Fed. 881 789 
 Bryant Bros. Co. v. Robinson, 79 
 C. C. A. 259, 149 Fed. 
 
 329 140, 428, 304 
 
 779, 863, 864 
 Bryce v. Southern R. Co. 322 
 
 Fed. 709 75, 808, 862 
 
 Buchanan v. Adkins, 99 C. C. A. 
 
 246, 175 Fed. 692 ,,26, 31 
 V. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co. 
 126 C. C. A. 058, 210 
 Fed. 144 818 
 
 Bucher v. Cheshire R. Co. 125 U. 
 S. 582, 31 L. ed. 798, 8 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 974 17 
 
 Buck V. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, 18 
 
 L. ed. 257 140, 479 
 
 V. Felder, 190 Fed 421 . . 815 
 
 Buckgaher \-. iloore, 104 Fed. 
 
 947 87 
 
 Buckhannon & N. R. Co. v. 
 Davis, 68 C. C. A. 345, 
 135 Fed. 707 183, 256 
 
 Buckley v. Crane, 59 C. C. A. 
 
 109, 123 Fed. 29 6SS 
 
 Buckstaff V. Russell & Co. 151 
 U. S. 626, 38 L. ed. 292, 
 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 448 . . 757 
 
 Bucyrus Co. v. McArthur, 219 
 
 Fed. 267 279 
 
 Buddicum v. Kirk, 3 Craneh, 
 
 295, 2 L. ed. 444 513 
 
 Budzisz V. Illinois Steel Co. 170 
 U. S. 41, 42 L. ed. 941, 
 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503 . . 159 
 
 Buel V. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 
 44 C. 0. A. 213, 104 Fed. 
 839 638, 702 
 
 Buerk v. Imhaeuser, 8 Fed. 457 285 
 
 Buffalo Glass Co. v. Manufac- 
 turers' Glass Co. 142 
 Fed. 273 328 
 
 Buffalo Sandstone Brick Co. v. 
 American Sandstone 
 Brick Machinery Co. 141 
 Fed. 211 329 
 
 Buffalo Specialty Co. v. Van- 
 
 cleff, 217 Fed. 91. .423, 446 
 452 
 
 BufEngton v. Harvey, 95 U. S. 
 
 99, 24 L. ed. 381 605 
 
 Building & L. Asso. v. Logan, 14 
 C. C. A. 133, 30 U. S. 
 App. 163, 66 Fed. 827 703 
 
 Bunel V. O'Day, 125 Fed. 304 . . 443 
 
 444, 453 
 
 Bunker Hill & S. Min. & Concen- 
 trating Co. V. Oberder, 
 25 C. C. A. 171, 48 U. 
 S. App. 339, 79 Fed. 
 
 726 674 
 
 V. Shoshone Min. Co. 47 C. 
 
 C. A. 200, 109 Fed. 500 412 
 
 Burch V. Southern P. Co. 130 
 
 Fed. 350 121, 831 
 
 Burdell v. Comstock, 15 Fed. 395 29 
 
 Burden v. Burden, 124 Fed. 255 348 
 
 Bureau of National Literature 
 
 V. Sells, 211 Fed. 383 198 
 361 
 Burger v. Grand Rapids & I. R. 
 
 Co. 22 Fed. 563 lOD 
 
Ivi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Burgess v. Grd,ffam, 10 Fed. 219 357 
 Burget V. Robinson, 59 C. C. A. 
 
 260, 123 Fed. 262.. 614, 733 
 773 
 Burgunder v. Browne, 59 Fed. 
 
 498 788 
 
 Burk V. McCafifery, 136 Fed. 696 408 
 Burke v. Davis, 26 C. C. A. 675, 
 
 53 U. S. App. 414, 81 
 
 Fed. 907 ....568, 570, 592 
 V. Mountain Timber Co. 224 
 
 Fed. 591 54, 100 
 
 Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co. v. 
 
 Dunn, 122 U. S. 513, 30 
 
 L. ed. 1159, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 1262 780, 791, 802 
 
 V. Simmons, 123 U. S. 56, 
 
 31 L. ed. 74, 8 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 58 636 
 
 Burlington Sav. Bank v. Clinton, 
 
 106 Fed. 270 300 
 
 Burnett v. Spokane, P. & S. R. 
 
 Co. 210 Fed. 94 776 
 
 Burnham v. First Nat. Bank, 3 
 
 C. C. A. 486, 10 U. S. 
 
 App. 485, 53 Fed. 163 853 
 V. North Chicago Street R. 
 
 Co. 30 C. C. A. 594, 59 
 
 U. S. App. 274, 87 Fed. 
 
 168 712, 719 
 
 V. North Chicago Street R. 
 
 Co. 32 C. C. A. 64, 60 
 
 U. S. App. 225, 88 Fed. 
 
 627 770 
 
 Burns v. Rosenstein, 135 U. S. 
 
 456, 34 L. ed. 195, 10 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 817 639 
 
 Burrell v. Hackley, 35 Fed. 833 415 
 Burr Mfg. & Supply Co. Re, 217 
 
 Fed. 16 473 
 
 Burt V. Smith, 203 U. S. 129, 51 
 
 L. ed. 121, 27 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 37 751 
 
 Burton v. Driggs, 20 Wall. 133, 
 
 22 L. ed. 301 568 
 
 V. Huma, 37 Fed. 738 587 
 
 V. Smith, 13 Pet. 472, 10 L. 
 
 ed. 252 228 
 
 Busey v. Smith, 67 Fed. 15. .177, 195 
 Bush V. Pioneer Min. Co. 102 C. 
 
 C. A. 372, 179 Fed. 78 366 
 
 Bushnell v. Crooke Min. & Smelt- 
 ing Co. 148 U. S. 683, 
 37 L. ed. 611, 13 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 771 
 
 V. Crooke Min. & Smelt. Co. 
 150 U. S. 83, 37 L. ed. 
 1007, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2 
 
 367 
 
 159 
 
 602 
 733 
 
 Bushnell v. Kennedy, 9 Wall. 
 
 387, 19 L. ed. 736 .... 212 
 V. Park Bros. 46 Fed. 209 . . 85 
 Butchers' & D. Stock- Yards Co. 
 
 V. Louisville & N. R. Co. 
 
 14 C. C. A. 290, 31 U. S. 
 
 App. 252, 67 Fed. 35... 190 
 Butler V. Gage, 138 U. S. 56, 34 
 
 L. ed. 871, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 235 758, 759 
 
 V. National Home, 144 U. S. 
 
 74, 36 L. ed. 352, 12 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581 .... 276 
 V. Shafer, 67 Fed. 161 .... 159 
 Butler Bros. Shoe Co. v. United 
 
 States Rubber Co. 84 C. 
 
 C. A. 167, 156 Fed. 1.. 113 
 812 
 Butt V. United States, 126 Fed. 
 
 794 662, 678 
 
 Butte & B. Consol. Min. Co. v. 
 
 Montana Ore Purchas- 
 ing Co. 139 Fed. 844 . . 495 
 525, 526 
 Butters v. Carney, 127 Fed. 623 185 
 201, 204, 206 
 Butterworth v. Hill, 114 U. S. 
 
 133, 29 L. ed. 120, 5 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 796., 332, 333 
 Buzard v. Houston, 119 U. S. 
 
 352, 30 L. ed. 453, 7 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249.. 23, 26 
 28 
 Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 615, 
 
 37 L. ed. 871, 13 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 906 ..44, 45, 247 
 248, 249, 250 
 Byrce v. Southern R. Co. 122 
 
 Fed. 710 862 
 
 Byrne v. Jones, 90 C. C. A. 101, 
 
 159 Fed. 321 595 
 
 C. 
 
 Cabaniss v. Reco Min. Co. 54 C. 
 
 C. A. 190, 116 Fed. 319 456 
 Cable V. Ellis, 110 U. S. 389, 28 
 
 L. ed. 186, 4 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 85 853, 854 
 
 Cady V. Associated Colonies, 119 
 
 Fed. 424 .... 795, 840, 841 
 Caesar v. Capell, 83 Fed. 412.. 117 
 
 118 
 Caffall V. Bandera Teleph. Co. — 
 
 Tex. Civ. App. — , 136 
 
 S. W. 105 242 
 
 Calderhead v. Downing, 103 
 
 Fed. 29 794, 797, 799 
 
 814, 840 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ivii 
 
 Caldwell v. Firth, 33 C. C. A. 
 439, 62 U. S. App. 594, 
 
 91 Fed. 177 129, 288 
 
 Caledonian Coal Co. v. Baker, 
 196 U. S. 444, 49 L. ed. 
 o45, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 375 315 
 
 California v. San Pablo & T. E. 
 Co. 149 U. S. 314, 37 
 L. ed. 748, 13 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 876 701 
 
 V. Southern P. Co. 157 U. S. 
 249, 39 L. ed. 690, 691, 
 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 591.. 40 
 229, 230 
 California Nat. Bank v. Stateler, 
 171 U. S. 449, 43 L. ed. 
 234, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 6 581, 636 
 
 California Oil & Gas Co. v. Mil- 
 ler, 96 Fed. 12 ..139, 158 
 159, 822 
 Califoriiia Powder Works v. 
 Davis, 151 U. S. 393, 38 
 L. ed. 207, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 350 137, 152, 753 
 
 Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U. S. 
 619, 32 L. ed. 550, 9 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 177 576 
 
 Callahan v-. Hicks, 90 Fed. 539 . . 334 
 
 351, 352 
 Calloway v. Dobson, 1 Brook. 
 
 119, Fed. Cas. No. 2,325 359 
 360 
 Camden v. Mayhew, 129 U. S. 
 73, 32 L. ed. 608, 9 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 246 596 
 
 V. Stuart, 144 U. S. 118, 
 36 L. ed. 368, 12 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 585 576 
 
 Cameron v. McRoberts, 3 Wheat. 
 
 594, 4 L. ed. 467 .... 227 
 V. W. M. Jones & B. Mach. 
 Works, 41 Tex. Civ. 
 App. 4, 90 S. W. 1129 324 
 Cammeyer v. Durham House 
 
 Drainage Co. 35 Fed. 52 391 
 Camors-McConnell Co. v. Mc- 
 Connell, 140 Fed. 412, 
 72 C. C. A. 681, 140 
 
 Fed. 987 10, 
 
 Campbell v. Duluth, S. S. & A. 
 R. Co. 50 Fed. 242.. 
 
 109, 119 
 T. Golden Cycle Min. Co. 73 
 C. C. A. 260, 141 Fed. 
 610.. 482, 483, 645, 655, 657 
 
 V. James, 31 Fed. 526 586 
 
 V. Milliken, 119 Fed. 982 . . 844 
 
 46 
 
 89 
 
 Campbell v. New York, 35 Fed. 
 
 14 368, 376, 551 
 
 Campbell Printing-Press & Mfg. 
 Co. V. Manhattan Elev. 
 
 R. Co. 48 Fed. 344 432 
 
 Camp Mfg. Co. v. Parker, 121 
 
 Fed. 195 606, 608, 609 
 
 610, 613 
 Canadian P. R. Co. v. Wenham, 
 
 146 Fed. 207 129 
 
 Canadian Southern R. C. v. Geb- 
 hard, 109 U. S. 527, 27 
 L. ed. 1020, 3 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 363 78, 79 
 
 Canal & C. Streets R. Co. v. 
 Hart, 114 U. S. 660, 20 
 L. ed. 228, 5 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 1127 778 
 
 Canary Oil Co. v. Standard As- 
 phalt & Rubber Co. 182 
 
 Fed. 664 829 
 
 Cannon v. United States, 116 U. 
 S. 55, 29 L. ed. 561, 6 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. '278 773 
 
 Can Pon, Re, 93 C. C. A. 635, 
 
 168 Fed. 479, 482 .... 657 
 Capital Nat. Bank v. First Nat. 
 Bank, 172 U. S. 425, 43 
 L. ed. 502, 19 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 202 153 
 
 Caples V. Texas & P. R. Co. 67 
 
 Fed. 9 822 
 
 Carey v. Brown, 92 U. S. 171, 
 
 23 L. ed. 469 . . 58, 252, 253 
 264, 426 
 V. Houston & T. C. R. Co. 
 150 U. S. 171, 37 L. ed. 
 1042, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 63 . .650, 652, 654, 655, 722 
 723 
 T. Houston & T. C. R. Co. 
 161 U. S. 133, 40 L. ed. 
 644, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 537 482, 483 
 
 V. Houston & T. C. R. Co. 
 
 52 Fed. 674 465 
 
 Carino v. Insular Governinent, 
 212 U. S. 449, 53 L. ed. 
 594, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 . ■ 334 619 
 
 Carlisle v. Smith, 224 Fed. 231 350 
 V. Sunset Teleph. & Teleg. 
 
 Co. 116 Fed. 896 ..779, 807 
 
 814, 839, 847, 860 
 
 Carlsbad v. Tibbetts, 51 Fed. 852 285 
 
 549 
 Carnegie v. Hurlbert, 3 C. C. A. 
 391, 10 U. S. App. 454, 
 53 Fed. 11 85 
 
Iviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Carnegie, P. & Co. v. Hulbert, 
 16 C. C. A. 498, 36 U. 
 S. App. 81, 70 Fed. 218 207 
 Carnochan v. Christie, 11 Wheat. 
 
 446, 6 L. ed. 516 448 
 
 Carothers v. McKinley, Min. & 
 Smelting Co. 122 Fed. 
 
 305 859 
 
 V. McKinley Min. & Smelt- 
 ing Co. 116 Fed. 951.. 71 
 194 
 Carp V. Queen Ins. Co. 168 Fed. 
 
 782 820, 829 
 
 Carpenter v. Chicago, M. & St. 
 
 P. E. Co. 47 Fed. 535 847 
 V. Knollwood Cemetery, 198 
 
 Fed. 297 176 
 
 V. Northern P. R. Co. 75 
 
 Fed. 850 162, 181, 182 
 
 258, 483 
 V. Strange, 141 U. S. 103, 
 35 L. ed. 646, 11 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 960 161, 589 
 
 V. Talbot, 33 Fed. 538.. 102, 104 
 Carr v. Fife, 156 U. S. 494, 39 L. 
 ed. 508, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 427 197, 205 
 
 V. Kansas City, 87 Fed. 1 . . 74 
 Carrara Paint Agency Co. v. Car- 
 rara Paint Co. 137 Fed. 
 
 319 492 
 
 Carrau v. O'Calligan, 60 C. C. A. 
 
 347, 125 Fed. 657 248 
 
 Carrick v. Landman, 20 Fed. 209 825 
 Carroll v. Chesapeake & 0. Coal 
 Agency Co. 61 C. C. A. 
 
 4 9, 124 Fed. 309 67 
 
 Carson v. Combe, 29 C. C. A. 660, 
 52 U. S. App. 622, 86 
 
 Fed. 210 631, 732 
 
 v. Dunham, 121 U. S. 428, 
 30 L. ed. 994, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 1030 ...138, 139, 154 
 155, 275, 782, 802, 837, 847 
 848 
 V. Hyatt, 118 U. S. 287, 30 
 L. ed. 169, 6 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 1050 802 
 
 Carson & R. Lumber Co. v. 
 
 Holtzclaw, 39 Fed. 578 846 
 Carter v. New Orleans, 19 Fed. 
 
 659 462, 464 
 
 V. Roberts, 177 U. S. 496, 
 44 L. ed. 861, 20 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 713 ..646, 647, 652 
 656, 658 
 V. Texas, 177 U. S. 442, 44 
 L. ed. 839, 20 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 687 3 
 
 Carter v. Thompson, 65 Fed. 329, 
 
 18 Mor. Min. Rep. 134 260 
 Carter-Crume Co. v. Peurrung, 
 30 C. C. A. 174, 58 U. 
 S. App. 388, 86 Fed. 442 122 
 
 Carver, Re, 113 Fed. 138 568 
 
 V. Jarvis-Conklin Mortg. 
 
 Trust Co. 73 Fed. 9 815 
 
 Cary Mfg. Co. v. Acme Flexible 
 Clasp Co. 187 U. S. 427, 
 47 L. ed. 244, 23 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 211.. 621, 734, 743, 
 744 
 Case V. Olney, 106 Fed. 433 .... 799 
 V. Smith L. & Co. 152 Fed. 
 
 730 840, 841 
 
 Casey v. Baker, 212 Fed. 247 68 
 
 776, 815 
 V. Cavaroc, 96 U. S. 467, 
 
 24 L. ed. 779 10 
 
 Cass County v. Gibson, 46 C. C. 
 
 A. 341, 107 Fed. 363.. 675 
 Cassidy v. Atlanta & C. Air Line 
 
 R. Co. 109 Fed. 673 . . 859 
 Castello V. Castello, 4 McCrary, 
 
 543, 14 Fed. 207 344 
 
 Castillo V. McConnico, 168 U. S. 
 679, 42 L. ed. 624, 18 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229 748 
 
 Cates V. Allen, 349 U. S. 451, 
 37 L. ed. 804, 13 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 883 5, 18, 19 
 
 860, 868 
 V. Producers &, C. Oil Co. 96 
 
 Fed. 8 159 
 
 Cavanagh v. Manhattan Transit 
 
 Co. 133 Fed. 818 318 
 
 Cavender v. Cavender, 114 U. S. 
 471, 29 L. ed. 214, 5 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 955 424 
 
 Cay V. Vereen, 75 C. C. A. 667, 
 
 144 Fed. 839 637 
 
 Caylor v. Cooper, 165 Fed. 758 68 
 230, 233, 252 
 Cedar Valley Land & Cattle Co. 
 
 V. Coburn, 29 Fed. 586 368 
 Cella V. Brown, 75 C. C. A. 608, 
 
 144 Fed. 765 ..72, 280, 289 
 
 296, 735-737, 802, 814, 822 
 
 V. Brown, 136 Fed. 439 . . 790 
 
 798, 805 
 
 Celluloid Mfg. Co. v. Cellonite 
 
 Mfg. Co. 40 Fed. 476 . . 568 
 
 569, 572 
 
 Cely V. GriflSn, 113 Fed. 981 .. 106 
 
 316, 336 
 Central Appalachian Co. v. Buch- , 
 anan, 33 C. C. A. 598, 
 62 U. S. App. 195, 90 
 Fed. 454 44!) 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 lix 
 
 Central Grain & Stock Exchange 
 
 V. Board of Trade, 60 C. 
 
 C. A. 299, 125 Fed. 463 328 
 
 329, 732 
 
 Central Improv. Co. v. Cambria 
 
 Steel Co. 120 C. C. A. 
 
 121, 201 Fed. 811 619 
 
 V. Cambria Steel Co. 127 C. 
 
 C. A. 184, 210 Fed. 696 424 
 425, 570 
 Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 
 U. S. 103, 40 L. ed. 91, 
 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 80 . . 747 
 Central Nat. Bank v. Fitzgerald, 
 
 94 Fed. 16 ..250, 251, 298 
 V. Stevens, 169 U. S. 463, 42 
 L. ed. 818, 18 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 403 478 
 
 Central E. Co. v. McLendon, 157 
 
 Fed. 961 150 
 
 V. Macon, 110 Fed. 865 ... 148 
 V. Railroad Commission, 161 
 
 Fed. 925 150 
 
 Central Trust Co. v. Benedict, 
 
 24 C. C. A. 56, 49 U. S. 
 
 App. 35, 78 Fed. 202 . . 235 
 
 V. Bridges, 6 C. C. A. 539, 
 
 16 U. S. App. 115, 57 
 
 Fed. 753 484 
 
 v. Carter, 24 C. C. A. 73, 41 
 U. S. App. 663, 78 Fed. 
 
 233 465 
 
 T. Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co. 
 
 134 C. C. A. 144, 218 
 Fed. 336 458, 459 
 
 V. Cincinnati H. & D. R. Co. 
 
 169 Fed. 470 453, 459 
 
 v. Continental Trust Co. 30 
 
 C. C. A. 235, 58 U. S. 
 
 App. 604, 86 Fed. 524 665 
 692 
 T. East Tennessee Land Co. 
 
 79 Fed. 19 575 
 
 T. East Tennessee, V. & G. 
 
 R. Co. 59 Fed. 523.. 181 
 851 
 T. Evans, 19 C. C. A. 563, 
 
 43 U. S. App. 214, 73 
 
 Fed. 562 613 
 
 T. Georgia P. R. Co. 30 C. 
 
 C. A. 648, 58 U. S. App. 
 
 120, 87 Fed. 293 700 
 
 V. Georgia P. R. Co. 83 Fed. 
 
 386 578, 579 
 
 V. Georgia P. R. Co. 81 Fed. 
 
 281 578 
 
 V. Grant Locomotive Works, 
 
 135 U. S. 222, 34 L. ed 
 103, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 736 609, 610, 700 
 
 Central Trust Co. v. Lueders, 
 137 C. C. A. 387, 21 
 
 Fed. 829 149 
 
 V. McGeorge, 151 U. S. 129, 
 
 38 L. ed. 98, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 286 .,54, 119, 121, 409 
 
 V. Madden, 17 C. C. A. 236, 
 
 25 U. S. App. 430, 70 
 
 Fed. 453 461 
 
 v. Marietta & N. G. R. Co. 
 
 75 Fed. 41 579 
 
 V. Richmond & D. R. Co. 69 
 
 Fed. 762 579 
 
 V. United States Flour Mill. 
 
 Co. 112 Fed. 371 466 
 
 V. Virginia T. & C. Steel & 
 
 I. Co. 55 Fed. 774 ..53, 110 
 119, 334 
 V. Western North Carolina 
 
 R. Co. 112 Fed. 475.. 475 
 478 
 V. Western North Carolina 
 
 R. Co. 89 Fed. 24 ..366, 477 
 V. Wheeling & L. B. R. Co. 
 
 189 Fed. 82 . . 181 
 
 V. Worcester Cycle Mfg. Co. 
 
 91 Fed. 212 600 
 
 Cerri v. Akron People's Teleph. 
 
 Co. 219 Fed. 285 ...... 792 
 
 Chadbourne v. Coe, 2 C. C. A. 
 327, 10 U. S. App. 78, 
 
 51 Fed. 481 231, 233 
 
 Chadeloid Chemical Co. v. Chi- 
 cago Wood Finishing 
 
 Co. 173 Fed. 797 563 
 
 Chadwick, Ex parte, 159 Fed. 576 759 
 V. Kelley, 187 U. S. 540, 47 
 L. ed. 293, 23 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Ren. 175 754 
 
 Chaffin v. Hull, 39 Fed. 891 . . 288 
 V. Taylor, 116 U. S. 567, 29 
 L. ed. 727, 6 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 518 769, 770 
 
 Chamberlain v. Bittersohn, 48 
 
 Fed. 40 321 
 
 V. Mensing, 47 Fed. 436 .. 313 
 Chamberlain Tranap. Co. v. 
 South Pier Coal Co. 61 
 C. C. A. 109, 126 Fed. 
 
 165 677, 694, 706 
 
 Cliamberlin v. Peoria, D. & E. 
 R. Co. 55 C. C. A. 54, 
 118 Fed. 33 ..605, 609, 610 
 650 
 Chambers v. Baltimore & 0. R. 
 Co. 207 U. S. 142, 52 L. 
 ed. 143, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 34 451 
 
 V. Cannon, 62 Tex. 293 28 
 
 V. McDougal, 42 Fed. 694 . . 825 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Chambers v. Prince, 75 Fed. 177 97 
 
 125, 129 
 Champlain Constr. Co. v. 
 
 O'Brien, 104 Fed. 930.. 789 
 790, 796, 798, 799 
 Chandler v. Pomeroy, 87 Fed. 
 
 267 567, 575 
 
 Chapin v. Fye, 179 U. S. 127, 
 45 L. ed. 119, 21 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 71 748, 751 
 
 V. Walker, 2 McCrary, 175 
 
 6 Fed. 794 449 
 
 Chapman v. Atlantic Trust Co. 56 
 C. C. A. 61, 119 Fed. 
 
 266 703 
 
 V. Barney, 129 U. S. 677, 32 
 L. ed. 800, 9 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 426 85, 356 
 
 v. Brewer, 114 U. S. 170, 
 29 L. ed. 87, 5 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 799 19 
 
 V. Crane. See Chapman v. 
 
 Goodnow. 
 V. Goodnow, 123 U. S. 548, 
 
 31 L. ed. 238, 8 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 211 156 
 
 V. Yellow Poplar Lumber Co. 
 
 32 C. C. A. 402, 61 U. 
 S. App. 499, 89 Fed. 
 904 768 
 
 V. Yellow Poplar Lumber 
 Co. 74 C. C. A. 331, 
 
 143 Fed. 201 367, 631 
 
 Chappell V. United States, 160 
 U. S. 507, 40 L. ed. 512, 
 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 397.. 640 
 643, 648, 650, 654, 718, 719 
 V. Waterworth, 155 U. S. 
 102, 39 L. ed. 85, 15 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 34 ..142, 151 
 152, 280, 802, 859 
 Charman v. Lake Erie & W. R. 
 
 Co. 105 Fed. 449 806 
 
 819, 862 
 Chase v. Beech Creek R. Co. 144 
 
 Fed. 572 855 
 
 V. Driver, 34 C. C. A. 668, 
 
 92 Fed. 785 635, 636 
 
 V. Erliardt, 198 Fed. 305 . . 779 
 
 782 
 v. Sheldon Roller Mills Co. 
 
 56 Fed. 625 177, 214 
 
 Chase Electric Constr. Co. v. Colum- 
 bia Constr. Co. 136 Fed. 
 
 699 287 
 
 Chatfield v. Bogle, 105 U. S. 233, 
 
 26 L. ed. 945 176 
 
 Chaunoey v. Dyke Bros. 55 C. C. 
 
 A. 579, 119 Fed. 21 . . 577 
 Chavent v. Schefer, 59 Fed. 232 587 
 
 Cheney v. Bacon, 1 C. C. A. 244, 
 
 4 U. S. App. 207, 49 
 
 Fed. 305 674 
 
 Cherokee Nation v. Blackfeather, 
 
 155 U. S. App. 218, 39 
 
 L. ed. 126, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 63 701 
 
 V. Southern Kansas R. Co. 
 
 33 Fed. 915 28, 552 
 
 Chesapeake & D. Canal Co. v. 
 
 Gring, 86 C. C. A. 539, 
 
 159 Fed. 662 187 
 
 Chesapeake & 0. Coal Agency Co. 
 
 V. Fire Creek Coal & 
 
 Coke Co. 119 Fed. 948 188 
 Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. v. Cock- 
 
 rell, 232 U. S. 146, 58 L. 
 
 ed. 544, 34 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 278 476- 
 
 V. Dixon, 179 U. S. 131, 45 
 
 L. ed. 121, 21 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 67 75, 817, 819 
 
 T. McCabe, 213 U. S. 208, 53 
 
 L. ed. 766, 29 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 430 783 
 
 V. McDonald, 214 U. S. 193, 
 
 53 L. ed. 964, 29 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Eep. 546 749, 760 
 
 V. Stojanski, 112 C. C. A. 
 
 310, 191 Fed. 720 .... 118 
 V. White, 111 U. S. 137, 28 
 
 L. ed. 378, 4 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 353 781 
 
 Chesapeake, 0. & S. W. R. Co. v. 
 
 Smith, 101 Ky. 707, 42 
 
 S. W. 538 851 
 
 Chester v. Life Asso. of America, 
 
 4 Fed. 487 .. .366, 377, 380 
 462, 463 
 Chetwood, Re, 165 U. S. 443, 41 
 
 L. ed. 782, 17 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 385 477, 738 
 
 Chiatovich v. Hanchett, 78 Fed. 
 
 193 796 
 
 Chicago, Re, 64 Fed. 899 828 
 
 V. Bigelow, 131 U. S. xciii. 
 
 appx.-, 19 L. ed. 257 .. 731 
 V. Mills, 204 U. S. 321, 51 
 
 L. ed. 504, 27 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 286 649, 553 
 
 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Union 
 
 Rolling Mill Co. 109 U. 
 
 S. 702, 27 L. ed. 1081, 3 
 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 594 .. 350 
 351 
 Chicago & Bridge Co. v. Anglo- 
 American Packing & 
 
 Provision Co. 46 '<'ed. 
 
 590 789 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixi 
 
 Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Whit- 
 ton, 13 Wall. 283, 20 L. 
 ed. 575 78, 82, 83 
 
 Chicago & 0. River R. Co. v. 
 McCammon, 10 C. C. A. 
 50, 18 U. S. App. 628, 
 61 Fed. 776 583 
 
 Chicago & P. R. Co. v. Blair, 100 
 
 U. S. 662, 25 L. ed. 587 692 
 
 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chi- 
 cago, 166 U. S. 226, 41 
 L. ed. 979, 17 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 581 ..3, 148, 149, 
 
 152,' 156, 619 
 V. Oglesby, 198 Fed. 153 . . 472 
 V. Williams, 205 U. S. 444, 
 51 L. ed. 875, 27 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 559 735, 736 
 
 Chicago Dollar Directory Co. v. 
 Chicago Directory Co. 
 13 C. C. A. 8, 24 U. S. 
 App. 525, 65 Fed. 463 683 
 684, 707 
 
 Chicago Grain Door Co. v. Chi- 
 cago B. & Q. R. Co. 137 
 Fed. 103 367 
 
 Chicago G. W. R. Co. v. Egan, 
 86 C. C. A. 230, 159 
 Fed. 46 728 
 
 Chicago L. Ins. Co. v. Needles, 
 113 U. S. 579, 28 L. ed. 
 1086, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 681 156, 166 
 
 Chicago Lumber Co. v. Corn- 
 stock, 18 C. C. A. 207, 
 34 U. S. App. 414, 71 
 Fed. 480 270 
 
 Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. 
 Clark, 35 C. C. A. 120, 
 
 92 Fed. 983 575 
 
 V. Evans, 7 C. C. A. 290, 
 19 U. 8. App. 233, 58 
 
 Fed. 433 658 
 
 V. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 
 33 L. ed. 970, 3 Inters. 
 Com. Rep. 209, 10 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 462, 702 149 
 
 V. Third Nat. Bank, 134 U. 
 S. 288, 33 L. ed. 904, 
 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 550 . . 448 
 450 
 V. Westby, 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 
 97, 102 C. C. A. 65, 178 
 Fed. 619 149 
 
 Chicago K. Co. v. Chicago, 142 
 
 Fed. 845 148 
 
 Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. 
 
 Ludwig, 156 Fed. 152 . . 149 
 
 Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. 
 Martin, 178 U. S. 245, 
 44 L. ed. 1055, 20 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 854. .70, 143, 162 
 182, 256, 621, 812, 815, 823 
 V. Stephens, 134 C. C. A. 
 
 263, 218 Fed. 535 361 
 
 V. Stepp, 151 Fed. 909 .. 818 
 
 781, 785 
 
 V. Swanger, 157 Fed. 789 . . 746 
 
 Chicago, St. L. & N. 0. R. Co. 
 
 V. Macomb, 2 Fed. 19 283 
 401 
 
 Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. R. Co. v. 
 Roberts, 141 U. S. 694, 
 35 L. ed. 905, 12 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 123 638 
 
 Chickaming v. Carpenter, 106 U. 
 S. 666, 27 L. ed. 308, 1 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 620 .... 218 
 
 Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 
 U. S. 536, 37 L. ed. 549, 
 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 695 . . 400 
 
 Childs V. Ferguson, 181 Fed. 795 381 
 
 Chin V. Foster-Milburn Co. 195 
 
 Fed. 158 325 
 
 Chisholm v. Johnson, 106 Fed. 
 
 191 300 
 
 V. Johnson, 84 Fed. 384 . . 411 
 413, 416 
 
 Chisolm V. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 
 
 1 L. ed. 440 39 
 
 C. H. Nichols Lumber Co. v. 
 Franson, 203 U. S. 282, 
 51 L. ed. 183, 27 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 102 273, 648 
 
 Choctaw 0. & G. R. Co. v. Hollo- 
 way, 52 C. C. A. 260, 
 114 Fed. 458 732 
 
 Christian v. Atlantic & N. C. R. 
 Co. 133 U. S. 241, 33 
 L. ed. 592, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 260 233 
 
 Christie v. Davis, Coal & Coke 
 
 Co. 92 Fed. 4 326, 327 
 
 Church V. Citizens' Street R. Co. 
 
 78 Fed. 529 ..243, 295, 297 
 
 Church of Jesus Christ of L. D. 
 S. V. United States, 136 
 U. S. 3, 34 L. ed. 478, 
 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 792 S28 
 
 Cilley, Re, 58 Fed. 977 ....248, 801 
 
 827, 829 
 
 V. Patten, 62 Fed. 500 . . 58 
 
 66, 68, 248, 553 
 
 Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v. Ameri- 
 can Fur. Ref. Co. 93 
 C. C. A. 546, 168 Fed. 
 529 575 
 
Ixii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Cimiottl Unhairing Co. v. 
 
 American Fur. Ref. Co. 
 
 158 Fed. 171 575 
 
 V. Bowsky, 113 Fed. 699 . . 578 
 Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. 
 
 Orr, 215 Fed. 262 210 
 
 211, 834 
 V. Tliiebaud, 177 U. S. 619, 
 
 44 L. ed. 912, 20 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 822 652, 653 
 
 Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R. Co. 
 
 V. Bohon, 200 U. S. 221, 
 
 50 L. ed. 448, 26 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 166, 4 A. & E. 
 
 Ann. Cas. 1152 862 
 
 Cincinnati Street R. Co. v. Snell, 
 
 193 U. S. 30, 48 L. ed. 
 604, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 319 148 
 
 Citizens' Bank v. Cannon, 164 U. 
 
 S. 319, 41 L. ed. 451, 
 
 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 89 .. 175 
 177, 186, 189, 555 
 Citizens' Sav. & T. Co. v. Belle- 
 ville & S. I. R. Co. 84 
 
 C. C. A. 577, 157 Fed. 
 
 73 11 
 
 V. Illinois Central R. Co. 105 
 
 C. C. A. 145, 182 Fed. 
 
 608 243 
 
 Citizens' Sav. Bank v. Newbury- 
 
 port, 95 C. C. A. 232, 
 
 169 Fed. 766 215 
 
 City Nat. Bank, Re, 153 U. S. 
 
 246, 38 L. ed. 705, 14 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 804 772 
 
 V. Hunter, 152 U. S. r)12, 38 
 
 L. ed. 534, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 675 772 
 
 City of Augusta, The, 25 C. C. A. 
 
 430, 50 U. S. App. 39, 
 
 80 Fed. 304 639 
 
 City R. Go. V. Citizens' Street R. 
 
 Co. 166 U. S. 557, 41 L. 
 
 ed. 1114, 17 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 653 138, 146, 166 
 
 Claasen, Re, 140 U. S. 200, 35 
 
 L. ed. 409, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 735 685 
 
 Claiborne v. Waddell, 50 Fed. 
 
 368 66, 232 
 
 Clark V. Arizona Mut. Sav. & L. 
 
 Asso. 217 Fed. 640 . . 469 
 V. Barnard, 108 U. S. 452, 
 
 27 L. ed. 786, 2 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 878 84 
 
 V. Bernhard Mattress Co. 82 
 
 Fed. 340 352 
 
 V. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 
 
 194 Fed. 505 806 
 
 Clark V. Guy, 114 Fed. 783. .248, 779 
 
 780 
 V. Iowa Fruit Co. 185 Fed. 
 
 604 595 
 
 V. Keith, 106 U. S. 465, 27 
 L. ed. 302, 1 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 568 773 
 
 V. McGhee, 31 C. C. A. 321, 
 59 U. S. App. 69, 87 
 
 Fed. 789 631 
 
 V. Patton, 93 Fed. 342 680 
 
 V. Smith, 13 Pet. 195, 10 
 
 L. ed. 123 19 
 
 V. Southern P. Co. 175 Fed. 
 
 122 832 
 
 V. Van Riensdyke, 9 Cranch, 
 
 160, 3 L. ed. 690 429 
 
 V. Wells, 203 U. S. 164, 51 
 L. ed. 138, 27 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 43 841 
 
 V. Wooster, 119 U. S. 326, 
 30 L. ed. 393, 7 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 217 ..25, 28, 29 
 Clarke v. Eastern Bldg. & L. 
 
 Asso. 89 Fed. 781 .... 243 
 V. Eureka County Bank, 116 
 
 Fed. 534 461, 462, 463 
 
 466, 468 
 V. Eureka County Bank, 131 
 
 Fed. 145 684 
 
 V. McDade, 165 U. S. 173, 
 41 L. ed. 674, 17 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 284 749 
 
 V. Mathewson, 12 Pet. 171, 
 
 9 L. ed. 1043 381 
 
 Clark-Herri-Campbell Co. v. H. 
 B. Claflin Co. 134 C. C. 
 A. 229, 218 Fed. 429 .. 122 
 Clarkson v. Manson, 18 Blatchf. 
 
 443, 4 Fed. 257 . . 798, 826 
 Clason V. Morris, 10 Johns. 524 388 
 Clausen v. American Ice Co. 144 
 
 Fed. 723 51, 272 
 
 Clay v. Field, 138 U. S. 479, 34 
 L. ed. 1049, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 419 175, 176, 187 
 
 189, 194 
 Clearwater v. Meredith, 21 How. 
 
 489, 16 L. ed. 201 .... 227 
 Cleaver v. Trader Ins. Co. 40 
 
 Fed. 713 789 
 
 Clement v. Louisville R. Co. 153 
 
 Fed. 979 196 
 
 Cleveland v. Cleveland, C. C. & 
 St. L. R. Co. 77 C. C. 
 A. 467, 147 Fed. 171 73 
 74, 816, 843 
 V. Cleveland City R. Co. 194 
 U. S. 517, 48 L. ed. 
 1102, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 756 147 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixiii 
 
 Cleveland v. United States, 62 C. 
 
 C. A. 393, 127 Fed. 670 559 
 560 
 Cleveland Tel. Co. v. Stone, 105 
 
 Fed. 794 225 
 
 Clews V. Woodstock Iron Co. 44 
 
 Fed. 31 118, 333 
 
 Cloud V. Sumas, 52 Fed. 177 . . 215 
 Clyde V. Richmond & D. R. Co. 
 
 65 Fed. 338 466 
 
 V. Richmond & D. R. Co. 59 
 
 Fed. 394 579 
 
 V. Richmond & D. R. Co. 55 
 
 Fed. 448 255 
 
 Coburn \-. Cedar Valley Land & 
 
 Cattle Co. 138 U. S. 221, 
 
 34 L. ed. 886, 11 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 258 ..378, 431, 449 
 V. Cedar Valley Land & 
 
 Cattle Co. 25 Fed. 791 780 
 Cochran v. Montgomery County, 
 
 199 U. S. 260, 50 L. ed. 
 
 182, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 58, 4 Ann. Cas. 451 .. 829 
 842, 843, 844 
 Cockcroft, Ex parte, 104 U. S. 
 
 578, 26 L. ed. 856 700 
 
 Cocke V. Copenhaver, 61 C. C. A. 
 
 211, 126 Fed. 145 605 
 
 609, 662 
 Codey Motors Co. v. Warren 
 
 Motor Car Co. 196 Fed. 
 
 254 328 
 
 Coe V. East & W. R. Co. 29 C. 
 
 C. A. 292, 52 U. S. App. 
 
 532, 85 Fed. 489 662 
 
 Coeur D'Alene R. & Nav. Co. v. 
 
 Spalding, 35 C. C. A. 
 
 302, 93 Fed. 280 ..781, 786 
 787 
 Coffin V. Haggin, 7 Savi'y. 509, 11 
 
 Fed. 224 62, S53 
 
 V. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. 
 
 Co. 118 Fed. 688 ..82.3, 826 
 
 Cohen, Re, 136 Fed. 999 481 
 
 V. Portland L^i :•, No. 142, 
 
 B. P. 0. 140 Fed. 
 
 775 
 
 V. Virginia, Wheat. 264, 
 
 5 L. ed. 257 ..39, 136, 
 Coiron v. Millaudon, 19 How. 
 
 115, 15 L. ed. 575 
 
 Coit V. Sullivan-Kelly Co. 84 
 Fed. 724 
 
 Coker v. Monaghan Mills, 110 
 
 Fed. 806 780, 782, 
 
 785, 791, 
 
 320 
 
 139 
 
 233 
 235 
 
 296 
 
 783 
 818 
 
 Colburn v. Hill, 41 C. C. A. 467, 
 101 Fed. 500 . .72, 73, 
 
 Colby V. Cleaver, 169 Fed. 206 . . 
 Cole V. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 
 
 116, 33 L. ed. 543, 10 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269 
 
 Coler V. Grainger County, 20 C. 
 
 C. A. 267, 43 U. S. App. 
 
 252, 74 Fed. 21 
 
 V. Stanley County, 89 Fed. 
 
 260 16, 
 
 Colgate V. Compagnie Francaise 
 
 du Telegraphe, 23 
 
 Blatchf. 86, 23 Fed. 84 
 
 292, 
 
 V. Western U. Teleg. Co. 22 
 
 Blatchf. 118, 19 Fed. 
 
 828 
 
 Colley V. McArthur, 35 Fed. 372 
 
 Collier, Re, 93 Fed. 191 
 
 V. Mutual Reserve Fund Life 
 
 Asso. 119 Fed. 619 
 
 Collin County Nat. Bank v. 
 
 Hughes, 83 C. C. A. 661, 
 
 155 Fed. 390 
 
 Collins V. American Spirit Mfg. 
 
 Co. 96 Fed. 133 ..327, 
 
 V. Ashland, 112 Fed. 175 . 
 
 125, 
 
 V. Campbell, 62 Fed. 850 . . 
 
 V. Stott, 76 Fed. 613 .... 
 
 794, 795, 796, 857, 
 
 Collins Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 54 
 
 Fed. 721 234, 
 
 Collinson v. Jackson, 8 Sawy. N. 
 Y. 357, 14 Fed. 309 . . 
 
 Colorado Cent. Consol. Min. Co. 
 V. Turck, 150 U. S. 142, 
 37 L. ed. 1031, 14 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 35 ..137, 164, 
 
 Colorado Midland R. Co. v. 
 
 Jones, 29 Fed. 193 
 
 Colston V. Southern Home Bldg. 
 
 & L. Asso. 99 Fed. 305 
 
 815 
 860 
 113 
 
 589 
 
 212 
 24 
 
 291 
 430 
 
 600 
 
 809 
 678 
 
 323 
 
 590 
 
 333 
 
 840 
 60 
 129 
 845 
 846 
 122 
 858 
 
 427 
 
 180 
 357 
 
 280 
 742 
 
 835 
 
 176 
 479 
 
 Colt V. Colt, 111 U. S. 566, 28 
 L. ed. 520, 4 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 553 250 
 
 Coltrane v. Baltimore Bldg. & L. 
 
 Asso. 126 'Fed. 839 ... 595 
 
 Columb V. Webster Mfg. Co. 76 
 
 Fed. 198 677 
 
 Columbia, The, 15 C. C. A. 91, 
 29 U. S. App. 647, 67 
 Fed. 944 698 
 
Ixiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Columbia Digger Co. v. Eector, 
 
 215 Fed. 622 86 
 
 Columbian Equipment Co. v. Mer- 
 cantile Trust & D. Co. 
 113 Fed. 23 559 
 
 Columbia Real Estate Co. Ee, 50 
 C. C. A. 406, 112 Fed. 
 645 702 
 
 Columbia Valley E. Co. v. Port- 
 land & S. R. Co. 89 C. 
 C. A. 361, 162 Fed. 609 361 
 362 
 
 Columbia Water Power Co. v. 
 Columbia Electric Street 
 E. Light & P. Co. 172 
 U. S. 475, 43 L. ed. 521, 
 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 247 . . 154 
 155, 748, 749 
 
 Columbia Wire Co. v. Boyee, 44 
 C. C. A. 588, 104 Fed. 
 172 626, 627 
 
 Columbus Chain Co. v. Standard 
 Chain Co. 76 C. C. A. 
 164, 145 Fed. 186 . .664, 665 
 666, 678 
 
 Columbus Constr. Co. v. Crane 
 Co. 174 U. S. 601, 43 L. 
 ed. 1103, 19 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 721 648 
 
 Columbus E. Co. v. Patterson, 
 73 C. C. A. 603, 143 
 Fed. 248 533, 541 
 
 Columbus Safe Deposit Co. v. 
 Burke, 32 C. C. A. 67, 
 60 U. S. App. 253, 88 
 Fed. 630 674, 675 
 
 Columbus, S. & H. E. Co.'s Ap- 
 peal, 48 C. C. A. 275, 
 109 Fed. 180 567, 575 
 
 Columbus Watch Co. v. Eobbins, 
 148 U. S. 266, 37 L. ed. 
 445, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 594 736 
 
 Colvin V. Jacksonville, 158 U. S. 
 456, 39 L. ed. 1053, 15 
 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 866 186 
 
 648, 650, 651 
 V. Jacksonville, 157 U. S. 
 368, 39 L. ed. 736, 15 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 634 648 
 
 Comer v. Felton, 10 C. C. A. 28, 
 22 U. S. App. 313, 61 
 Fed. 737 160, 257 
 
 Comforts, The, 23 Blatchf. 371, 
 
 32 Fed. 327 733 
 
 Comitis v. Parkerson, 22 L.E.A. 
 
 148, 56 Fed. 561 87 
 
 Commercial & E. Bank v. Slo- 
 comb, 14 Pet. 60, 10 L. 
 ed. 254 70 
 
 Commercial Bank v. Sandford, 
 
 103 Fed. 99 443, 451 
 
 v. Sandford, 99 Fed. 154 .. 297 
 Commercial Mut. Acci. Co. v. 
 
 Davis, 213 U. S. 256, 53 
 
 L. ed. 787, 29 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 445 116, 644 
 
 Commonwealth Title Ins. & T. 
 
 Co. V. Cummings, 83 
 
 Fed. 767 448, 449, 450 
 
 Compania Azucarera Cubana v. 
 
 Ingraham, 180 Fed. 517 513 
 516, 518, 544 
 Compton V. Jesup, 15 C. C. A. 
 
 397, 31 U. S. App. 486, 
 
 68 Fed. 263 ..102, 105, 183 
 257, 343, 451, 452, 464 
 465, 468, 482, 483, 700 
 Computing Scale Co. v. Moore, 
 
 139 Fed. 197 413 
 
 Comstock V. Herron, 45 Fed. 660 434 
 Conaway v. Third Nat. Bank, 
 
 92 C. C. A. 488, 167 
 
 Fed. 26 701 
 
 Concord Coal Co. v. Haley, 76 
 
 Fed. 882 803, 854 
 
 Condon v. Central Loan & T. Co. 
 
 20 C. C. A. 110, 36 U. 
 
 S. App. 579, 73 Fed. 907 662 
 663 
 Cone V. Tuscaloosa Mfg. Co. 76 
 
 Fed. 891 117 
 
 Confectioners' Machinery & Mfg. 
 
 Co. v. Eacine Engine & 
 
 Maeh. Co. 163 Fed. 915 358 
 587 
 Conley v. Mathieson Alkali 
 
 Works, 110 Fed. 730 .. 328 
 840 
 V. Mathieson Alkali Works, 
 
 190 U. S. 411, 27 L. ed. 
 
 1115, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 
 728 840 
 
 Conly V. Buchanan, 81 Fed. 58 392 
 Conn V. Chicago, B. & Q. E. Co. 
 
 48 Fed. 177 212, 213 
 
 Connecticut ex rel. New York & 
 
 N. E. E. Co. V. Wood- 
 
 rufr, 153 U. S. 689, 38 
 
 L. ed. 869, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 976 748, 750 
 
 Connecticut F. Ins. Co. v. Oldenorff, 
 
 19 C. C. A. 379, 44 U. S. 
 
 App. 487, 73 Fed. 89.. 662 
 678 
 Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. 
 
 Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 
 
 43 L. ed. 569, 19 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Eep: 308 . .112, 116, 117 
 322, 325, 328, 329 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixv 
 
 CoBnell V. Smilev, 156 U. S. 339, 
 39 L. ed. 444, 15 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 353 . .72, 583, 794 
 Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe 
 Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 
 L. ed. 679, 22 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 431 641 
 
 V. Wells, 33 Fed. 205 233 
 
 Connor v. Alligator Lumber Co. 
 
 98 Fed. 155 257, 483 
 
 V. Tennessee C. R. Co. 54 
 L.R.A. 687, 48 C. C. A. 
 
 730, 109 Fed. 936 346 
 
 V. United States, 131 C. C. 
 
 A. 68, 214 Fed. 527 . . 559 
 574, 578 
 Conolly V. Taylor, 2 Pet. 556, 7 
 
 L. ed. 518 90 
 
 V. Wells, 33 Fed. 204 . .227, 250 
 
 261 
 Conqueror, The, 166 U. S. 113, 41 
 L. ed. 939, 17 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 510 737, 740 
 
 Consolidated Fastener Co. v. Co- 
 lumbus Button & Fast- 
 ener Co. 85 Fed. 54 .. 563 
 Consolidated Rubber Tire Co. v. 
 Ferguson, 106 C. C. A. 
 
 330, 183 Fed. 758 56 
 
 Consolidated Store-Service Co. v. 
 Lamson Consol. Store- 
 Service Co. 41 Fed. 834 79 
 Consolidated Water Co. v. Bab- 
 cock, 76 Fed. 243 . . 52, 54 
 66, 225 
 V. San Diego, 35 C. C. A. 
 
 631, 93 Fed. 849 . . 148, 225 
 V. San Diego, 89 Fed. 272 243 
 V. San Diego, 92 Fed. 759.. 255 
 Consumers' Cotton Oil Co. v. 
 Nichol, 57 C. C. A. 321, 
 
 120 Fed. 818 699 
 
 Consumers Gas Co. v. Quinby, 
 70 C. C. A. 220, 137 
 
 Fed. 882 243 
 
 Continental Adjustment Co. v. 
 
 Cook, 152 Fed. 652 .. 123 
 244 
 Continental & Commercial Trust 
 & Sav. Bank v. Allis- 
 Chambers Co. 200 Fed. 
 
 601 458 
 
 v. Corey Bros. Constr. Co. 
 126 C. C. A. 664, 208 
 
 Fed. 982 237 
 
 Continental L. Ins. Co. v. Rhoads, 
 119 U. S. 239, 30 L. ed. 
 380, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 193 59 
 126, 197 
 
 Continental Nat. Bank v. Buford, 
 191 U. S. 119, 48 L. ed. 
 119, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 54 87 
 731 
 V. Heilman, 66 Fed. 184 . . 430 
 
 V. Heilman, 81 Fed. 42 250 
 
 Continental Securities Co. v. Tn- 
 terborough Rapid Tran- 
 sit Co. 165 Fed. 945 . . 402 
 Continental Trust Co. v. Toledo, 
 St. L. & K. C. R. Co. 
 
 82 Fed. 642 258, 468 
 
 482-484 
 V. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R. 
 
 Co. 86 Fed. 950 444 
 
 V. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. 
 
 R. Co. 99 Fed. 171 ..612 
 613, 615, 714, 770 
 Converse v. Michigan Dairy Co. 
 
 45 Fed. 18 301 
 
 Cook v. Burnley, 11 Wall. 659, 
 
 20 L. ed. 29 . . 505, 532, 541 
 V. Lasher, 19 C. C. A. 654, 
 42 U. S. App. 42, 73 
 
 Fed. 704 700 
 
 V. Sterling Electric Co. 118 
 
 Fed. 45 415 
 
 Cooke V. Avery, 147 U. S. 375, 
 37 L. ed. 209, 13 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 340 . . 138, 139, 147 
 154, 155, 1.58 
 Cooley V. Luco, 76 Fed. 146 . . 40 
 
 Coon V. Abbott, 37 Fed. 98 518 
 
 Cooper V. Brazelton, 68 C. C. A. 
 
 188, 135 Fed. 476 117 
 
 V. Newell, 173 U. S. 556, 43 
 L. ed. 808, 19 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 506 478 
 
 V. Newton, 160 Fed. 190 . . 482 
 V. Preston, 105 Fed. 403 . . 193 
 194, 413 
 V. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 317, 
 
 19 L. ed. 932 479 
 
 Co-operating Merchants' Co. v. 
 Hallock, 64 C. C. A. 104, 
 
 128 Fed. 596 631 
 
 Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 
 U. S. 734, 28 L. ed. 
 1139, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 739 118 
 
 Coosan Min. Co. v. Farmers' 
 
 Min. Co. 67 Fed. 32 . . . 518 
 V. South Carolina, 144 U. S. 
 550, 36 L. ed. 537, 12 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 689 864 
 
 Copeland v. Bruning, 72 Fed. 5. . 248 
 
 827 
 
 r. Bruning, 104 Fed. 169 . . 604 
 
 609, 610 
 
Ixvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Copeland v. Waldron, 66 C. C. A. 
 
 271, 133 Fed. 217.. 698, 699 
 731 
 Copies V. Texas & P. R. Co. 67 
 
 Fed. 9 837 
 
 Copper River Min. Co. v. McClel- 
 
 lan, 70 C. C. A. 623, 138 
 
 Fed. 333 667, 670 
 
 Coram v. Davis, 182 Fed. 939 . . 816 
 Corbin v. Black Hawk County, 
 
 105 U. S. 659, 26 L. ed. 
 
 1136 212, 213 
 
 V. Taussig, 137 Fed. 153 ... 28 
 Corbus V. Alaska Treadwell Gold 
 
 Min. Co. 187 U. S. 459, 
 
 47 L. ed. 258, 23 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 157 241 
 
 Corcoran v. Chesapeake & 0. 
 
 Canal Co. 94 U.S. 744, 
 
 24 L. ed. 191 451 
 
 Corkran Oil & Development Co. 
 
 V. Arnaudet, 199 U. S. 
 
 193, , 50 L. ed. 149, 26 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 41 752 
 
 Cornell v. Green, 43 Fed. 105 . . 276 
 
 400 
 v. Green, 37 C. C. A. 85, 95 
 
 Fed. 334 317, 320 
 
 V. Green, 163 U. S. 80, 41 
 
 L. ed. 78, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 969 673 
 
 Cornett v. Williams, 20 Wall. 
 
 226, 22 L. ed. 254 .... 546 
 Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Chica- 
 go Real Estate Loan & 
 
 T. Co. 107 C. C. A. 283, 
 
 185 Fed. 63 639 
 
 Corsicana Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 
 
 134 C. C. A. 510, 218 
 
 Fed. 822 35 
 
 Cortes Co. v. Thannhauser, 20 
 
 Blatchf. 59, 9 Fed. 227 317 
 486, 487 
 V. Thannhauser, 21 Blatchf. 
 
 552, 18 Fed. 667 ..535, 536 
 Corwin Mfg. Co. v. Henriei 
 
 Washer Co. 151 Fed. 938 858 
 Cosmopolitan Min. Co. v. Walsh, 
 
 193 U. S. 468, 48 L. ed. 
 
 752, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 489 641, 643 
 
 Cosmos Exploration Co. v. Gray 
 
 Eagle Oil Co. 61 L.R.A. 
 
 230, 50 C. C. A. 79, 112 
 
 Fed. 10, 21 Mor. Min. 
 
 Rep. 633 25, 29 
 
 Coster V. Parkersburg Branch R. 
 
 Co. 131 Fed. 115 182 
 
 Gotten V. Fidelity & C. Co. 41 
 
 Fed. 510 359 
 
 Cottlng V. Kansas City Stock 
 
 Yards Co. 183 U. S. 79, 
 
 46 L. ed. 92, 22 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 30 149 
 
 Cottle V. Krementz, 25 Fed. 494 417 
 Coulliette v. Thomason, 1 C. C. 
 
 A. 675, 2 U. S. App. 
 
 221, 50 Fed. 787 ..663, 671 
 678 
 Coulston V. Franke Steel Range 
 
 Co. 221 Fed. 670 282 
 
 Coulter V. Fargo, 62 C. C. A. 444, 
 
 127 Fed. 912 186 
 
 Cound v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. 
 
 Co. 173 Fed. 527 ...94, 743 
 Courtney v. Pradt, 196 U. S. 89, 
 
 49 L. ed. 398, 25 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 208 643 
 
 Covel V. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. 
 
 Co. 123 Fed. 452 129 
 
 Covert V. Waldron, 33 Fed. 312 67 
 
 Covington, Re, 110 Fed. 143 ... 567 
 
 V. First Nat. Bank, 185 U. 
 
 S. 270, 46 L. ed. 906, 
 
 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 645 . . 582 
 743 
 Covington Stock Yards Co. v. 
 
 Keith, 121 U. S. 250, 30 
 
 L. ed. 914, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 881 685 
 
 Cowell V. City Water-Supply Co. 
 
 96 Fed. 769 ...97, 104, 830 
 831 
 V. City Water Supply Co. 57 
 
 C. C. A. 393, 121 Fed. 
 
 53, reversing 96 Fed. 
 
 770 169, 175, 176, 186 
 
 192 193 
 V. McMillin, 100 C. C. a! 
 
 443, 177 Fed. 25 242 
 
 Cowley V. Northern P. R. Co. 159 
 
 U. S. 569, 40 L. ed. 263, 
 
 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 127 . . 18 
 19, 801, 856 
 
 Cox V. Gilmer, 88 Fed. 346 163 
 
 Crabtree V. McCurtain, 10 C. C. 
 
 A. 86, 19 U. ' S. App. 
 
 660, 61 Fed. 808 673 
 
 V. Madden, 4 C. C. A. 408, 
 
 12 U. S. App. 159, 54 
 
 Fed. 426 655 
 
 Craig V. Dorr, 76 C. C. A. 559, 
 
 145 Fed. 310.. 451, 455, 485 
 V. Smith, 100 U. S. 234, 25 
 
 L. ed. 580 607 
 
 Craighead v. Wilson, 18 How. 
 
 201, 15 L. ed. 333 . . 633, 636 
 Cramer v. Singer Mfg. Co. 59 
 
 Fed. 74 94, 111 
 
TABLE OP CASES. 
 
 Ixvii 
 
 Crane v. Buckley, 70 C. C. A. 
 
 452, 138 Fed. 22 ..688, 689 
 V. Buckley, 150 Fed. 402 ... 688 
 Crane Co. v. Guanica Centrale, 
 
 132 Fed. 713 803 
 
 Craven v. Canadian P. E. Co. 62 
 
 Fed. 171 615, 617 
 
 Crawford v. Foster, 28 C. C. A. 
 576, 56 U. S. App. 231, 
 
 84 Fed. 939 331, 332 
 
 V. Illinois C. K. Co. 130 Fed. 
 
 395 806 
 
 V. McCarthy, 78 C. C. A. 
 
 356, 148 Fed. 198 . .640, 643 
 
 V. Moore, 28 Fed. 824 284 
 
 V. Neal, 144 U. S. 585, 36 
 L. ed. 552, 12 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 759 ..62, 179, 222, 575 
 577 
 Creagh v. Equitable Life Assur. 
 
 Soc. 83 Fed. 849 ... 89, 122 
 831 
 v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. 
 
 88 Fed. 1 ...74, 88, 89, 129 
 810 
 Creath v. Sims, 5 How. 204, 12 
 
 L. ed. 117 10 
 
 Credit Co. v. Arkansas C. R. Co. 
 128 U. S. 259, 32 L. ed. 
 449, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 107 664 
 678 
 Credits Commutation Co. v. 
 United States, 34 C. C. 
 A. 12, 62 U. S. App. 728, 
 
 91 Fed. 573 458, 702 
 
 V. United States, 177 U. S. 
 315, 44 L. ed. 785, 20 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 636 . .458, 469 
 702, 855 
 Crehore v. Ohio & M. R. Co. 131 
 U. S. 240, 33 L. ed. 144, 
 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 692 ... 221 
 275, 780, 783, 836 
 Creighton r. Kerr, 20 Wall. 8, 22 
 
 L. ed. 309 330, 334 
 
 Crescent Specialty Co. v. Nation- 
 al Fireworks Distribut- 
 ing Co. 135 C. C. A. 28, 
 
 219 Fed. 130 630 
 
 Crocker-Wheeler Co. v. Bullock, 
 
 • 134 Fed. 241 ..495, 526-529 
 Crocket v. Lee, 7 Wheat. 522, 5 
 
 L. ed. 513 584, 585 
 
 Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U. 
 
 S. 351, 24 L. ed. 195 . . 587 
 Crosby v. Cuba R. Co. 1.58 Fed. 
 
 145 272 
 
 Cross V. Allen, 141 U. S. 528, 35 
 
 L. ed. 843, 12 Sup. Ct. ] 
 
 Rep. 67 62 
 
 Cross V. DeValle, 1 Wall. 5, 17 
 
 L. ed. 515 443 
 
 V. Evans, 167 U. S. 60, 42 
 
 L. ed. 77, 17 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 733 736 
 
 V. Evans, 29 C. C. A. 523, 
 
 52 U. S. App. 720, 86 
 
 Fed. 4 60 
 
 V. Morgan, 6 Fed. 244 .... 438 
 Crotts V. Southern R. Co. 90 
 
 Fed. 1 777, 845-847 
 
 Crowley v. Southern R. Co. 139 
 
 Fed. 863 801 
 
 Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Stand- 
 ard Brewery, 174 Fed. 
 
 252 127 
 
 V. Standard Stopper Co. 69 
 
 C. C. A. 200, 136 Fed. 
 
 184 629 
 
 Crump V. Thurber, 115 U. S. 56, 
 
 29 L. ed. 328, 5 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 1154 235 
 
 Crystal Springs Land & Water 
 
 Co. V. Los Angeles, 76 
 
 Fed. 148 161, 164 
 
 V. Los Angeles, 82 Fed. 114, 
 
 177 U. S. 169, 44 L. ed. 
 
 720, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 573, 159, 10.5 
 
 Cubbins v. Mississippi River 
 
 Commission, 204 Fed. 
 
 308 27, 35, 302 
 
 Cudahy v. McGeoch, 37 Fed. 1.. 89 
 
 808 
 Cudahy Packing Co. v. Sioux 
 
 Nat. Bank, 21 C. C. A. 
 
 428, 40 U. S. App. 142, 
 
 75 Fed. 475 575 
 
 Cumberland Gaslight Co. v. West 
 
 Virginia & M. Gas Co. 
 
 110 C. C. A. 383, 188 
 
 Fed. 586 148 
 
 Cumberland Lumber Co. v. Tunis 
 
 Lumber Co. 96 C. C. A. 
 
 244, 171 Fed. 352 ..590, 594 
 Cumberland Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 
 
 V. Memphis, 198 Fed. 
 
 956 472, 473 
 
 Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U. S. 
 
 410, 47 L. ed. 525, 23 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 472 . . 641, 642 
 753 
 Cummins v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. 
 
 Co. 193 Fed. 240 80 
 
 Cunningham v. Cleveland, 39 C. 
 
 C. A. 211, 98 Fed. 657 482 
 484 
 V. German Ins. Bank, 43 C. 
 
 C. A. 377, 103 Fed. 932 718 
 
Ixviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Curnow v. Phoenix Ins. Co. 44 
 
 Fed. 305 845 
 
 Curran v. Campion, 29 C. C. A. 
 
 26, 56 U. S. App. 383, 
 
 85 Fed. 67 226, 298 
 
 Curry v. McCauley, 11 Fed. 370 34 
 Curtis V. Phelps, 209 Fed. 263 . . 508 
 Curtis Davis & Co. v. Smith, 105 
 
 Fed. 949 366, 376 
 
 Cutter V. Iowa Water Co. 96 
 
 Fed. 777 284, 288, 289 
 
 296, 297, 618 
 Cutting, Ex parte, 94 U. S. 14, 
 
 24 L. ed. 49 ..459, 700, 702 
 V. Florida R. & Nav. Co. 43 
 
 Fed. 743 568 
 
 V. Tavares 0. & A. R. Co. 9 
 
 C. C. A. 401, 23 U. S. 
 
 App. 363, 61 Fed. 150 602 
 712, 713 
 Cuyler v. Atlantic & N. C. R. 
 
 Co. 132 Fed. 568 630 
 
 Cyclone Min. Co. v. Baker Light 
 
 & P. Co. 165 Fed. 996.. 116 
 
 D. 
 
 Dago, The, 63 Fed. 182 733 
 
 Dainese v. Kendall, 119 U. S. 54, 
 
 30 L. ed. 305, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 65 583 
 
 Dakin v. Union P. R. Co. 5 Fed. 
 
 665 28, 428 
 
 Dakota County v. Glidden, 113 
 
 U. S. 226, 28 L. ed. 982, 
 
 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 428 ... 701 
 Dale V. Smith, 182 Fed. 360 . . 162 
 
 183 
 Dalton V. Germania Ins. Co. 118 
 
 Fed. 936 836 
 
 V. Milwaukee Mechanics' 
 
 Ins. Co. 118 Fed. 876 . . 270 
 836 
 Dana v. Morgan, 219 Fed. 313 . . 242 
 Danahy v. National Bank, 12 C. 
 
 C. A. 75, 24 U. S. App. 
 
 351, 64 Fed. 148 87 
 
 Dancel v. Goodyear Shoe Ma- 
 chinery Co. 106 Fed. 
 
 551 796 
 
 V. Goodyear Shoe Machinery 
 
 Co. 128 Fed. 754 ..527-529 
 V. Goodyear Shoe Machinery 
 
 Co. 137 Fed. 157 583 
 
 V. United States Shoe Ma- 
 chinery Co. 120 Fed. 
 
 839 321, 865 
 
 Daneiger v. Wells, F. & Co. 154 
 
 Fed. 379 94 
 
 Daniels v. Benedict, 50 Fed. 354 251 
 V. Benedict, 38 C. C. A. 592, 
 
 97 Fed. 374 418 
 
 V. Chicago & R. I. R. Co. 3 
 
 Wall. 254, 18 L. ed. 225 40 
 Danielson v. Northwestern Fuel 
 
 Co. 55 Fed. 50 763 
 
 Danville v. Brown, 128 U. S. 503, 
 
 32 L. ed. 507, 9 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 149 623, 763 
 
 Darragh v. li. Wetter Mfg. Co. 
 
 23 C. C. A. 609, 49 U. 
 
 S. App. 1, 78 Fed. 14 . . 19 
 Dartmouth College v. Interna- 
 tional Paper Co. 132 
 
 Fed. 89 560, 564 
 
 Dashiel v. Grosvenor, 27 L.R.A. 
 67, 13 C. C. A. 593, 25 
 U. S. App. 227, 66 Fed. 
 
 334 281 
 
 Dastervignes v. United States, 58 
 C. C. A. 346, 122 Fed. 
 
 36 226 
 
 D. A. Tompkins Co. v. Catawba 
 
 Mills, 82 Fed. 782 ..18, 58 
 255 
 Daugherty v. Bogy, 44 C. C. A. 
 
 266, 104 Fed. 938 732 
 
 v. Sharp, 171 Fed. 466. .824, 828 
 V. Western U. Teleg. Co. 61 
 
 Fed. 138 794 
 
 d'Auxy V. Porter, 41 Fed. 68 . . . 101 
 Davenport v. Dowa, 18 Wall. 626, 
 
 21 L. ed. 938 .. 242 
 
 V. Fletcher, 16 How. 142, 14 
 
 L. ed. 879 681 
 
 V. Prince, 41 Fed. 323 255 
 
 v. Southern R. Co. 68 C. C. 
 
 A. 444, 135 Fed. 962 . . 817 
 818, 819, 820 
 Davey v. Yolo Water & Power 
 
 Co. 211 Fed. 345 836 
 
 Davidson v. Calkins, 92 Fed. 231 260 
 V. Lanier, 4 Wall. 454, 18 L. 
 
 ed. 379 683, 695 
 
 V. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 
 
 24 L. ed. 616 2 
 
 Davidson Bros. Marble Co. v. 
 
 United States, 213 U. S. 
 
 10, 53 L. ed. 67$, 29 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324 95 
 
 Davie v. Heyward, 33 Fed. 95 . . 205 
 Davies v. Corbin, 112 U. S. 36, 
 
 28 L. ed. 627, 5 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 4 194 
 
 Davis V. Berry, 108 Fed. 761 ... 288 
 V. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. 
 
 R. Co. 84 C. C. A. 453, 
 
 156 Fed. 776 640, 644 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixix 
 
 Davis V. Cleveland, C. C. & St. 
 
 L. E. Co. 217 U. S. 157, 
 
 54 L. ed. 708, 27 L.E.A. 
 (N.S.) 823, 30 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 463 644, 649 
 
 V. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. 
 
 R. Co. 146 Fed. 403 ... 840 
 V. Davis, 90 Fed. 792 . . 522, 525 
 527, 528 
 V. Davis, 18 C. C. A. 438, 30 
 
 U. S. App. 723, 72 Fed. 
 
 81 17, 864 
 
 V. Davis, 89 Fed. 538 ..232, 249 
 
 250 
 V. Geissler, 162 U. S. 291, 
 
 40 L. ed. 972, 16 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Eep. 796 643, 648 
 
 V. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 21 L. 
 
 ed. 447 18 
 
 V. Harris, 124 Fed. 713 ... 794 
 V. Kansas City, S. & M. E. 
 
 Co. 32 Fed. 863 207 
 
 V. Mercantile Trust Co. 152 
 
 U. S. 594, 38 L. ed. 565, 
 
 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 693 . . 235 
 
 596, 697, 700, 704 
 
 V. Mills, 99 Fed. 40 . . . 177, 209 
 
 221 
 V. Patrick, 6 C. C. A. 632, 
 
 12 U. S. App. 629, 57 
 
 Fed. 909 688, 689 
 
 V. St. Louis & S. F. E. Co. 
 
 25 Fed. 786 789 
 
 V. Schwartz, 155 U. S. 631, 
 
 39 L. ed. 289, 15 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Eep. 237 575, 577 
 
 V. South Carolina, 107 U. S. 
 
 600, 27 L. ed. 575, 2 
 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 636 143 
 
 V. Speiden, 104 U. S. 84, 26 
 
 L. ed. 660 608 
 
 V. Wakelee, 156 U. S. 685, 
 
 39 L. ed. 583, 15 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Eep. .555 ..683, 684, 695 
 
 V. Wells, 134 Fed. 139 824 
 
 Davis & F. Mfg. Co. v. Los An- 
 geles, 189 U. S. 207, 47 
 
 L. ed. 778, 23 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 498 147, 642, 653 
 
 654, 658, 659 
 Davis & E. Bldg. & Mfg. Co. v. 
 
 Barber, 157 U. S. 673, 
 
 39 L. ed. 853, 15 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 719 648 
 
 V. Barber, 9 C. C. A. 79, 18 
 
 U. S. App. 476, 60 Fed. 
 
 465 633, 640, 645, 058 
 
 Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Sav. 
 
 Fund, S. D. Title & T. 
 
 Co. 197 U. S. 178, 49 L. 
 
 ed. 713, 25 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 420 65, 67 
 
 V. Poston, 28 Fed. 606 540 
 
 Day V. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 
 
 14 L. ed. 181 196 
 
 Dayton v. Lash, 94 U. S. 112, 24 
 
 L. ed. 33 695, 762 
 
 Dean v. Nelson. See Thompson 
 
 V. Dean. 
 D. E. Castro v. Compagnie Fran- 
 
 caise du Telegraphe, 76 
 
 Fed. 426 329 
 
 Deck V. Whitman, 96 Fed. 890 . . 104 
 
 345 
 
 Decker v. Smith, 225 Fed. 777 . . 505 
 
 V. Williams, 73 Fed. 310 .. 100 
 
 Dederick v. Fox, 56 Fed. 714 ... 33 
 
 Deepwater E. Co. v. Western 
 
 Pocohontas Coal & Lum- 
 ber Co. 152 Fed. 830 . . 820 
 Deere v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. 
 
 Co. 85 Fed. 876 75 
 
 Deering Harvester Co. v. Kelly, 
 
 43 C. C. A. 225, 103 
 
 Fed. 261 672 
 
 Defer v. DeMay, 168 U. S. 704, 
 
 42 L. ed. 1211, 18 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Eep. 941 634 
 
 Defiance Water Co. v. Defiance, 
 
 191 U. S. 191, 48 L. ed. 
 
 143, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 63 147 
 
 199, 222, 731 
 
 v. Defiance, 100 Fed. 178 . . 408 
 
 Deford v. Mehaflfy, 13 Fed. 487 . . 780 
 
 De Forest v. Thompson, 40 Fed. 
 
 375 31, 59, 288, 36S 
 
 De Hierapolis v. Lawrence, 99 
 
 Fed. 321 89, 104 
 
 Deitch V. Staub, 53 C. C. A. 137, 
 
 115 Fed. 317 581, 601 
 
 De Kuyper v. Witteman, 23 Fed. 
 
 871 191 
 
 De Lamar's Nevada Gold Min. 
 
 Co. v. Nesbitt, 177 U. S. 
 
 523, 44 L. ed; 872, 20 
 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 715 158 
 
 De La Montanya v. De La Mon- 
 
 .tanya, 158 Fed. 117 ... 836 
 Delaware & H. Co. 'v. Albany & 
 
 S. E. Co. 213 U. S. 435, 
 
 53 L. ed. 862, 29 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 540 24.1 
 
 Delaware City S. & P. S. B. Nav. 
 
 Co. V. Eeybold, 142 U. 
 
 S. 637, 35 L. ed. 1142, 
 
 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 290 . . 153 
 750 
 
Ixx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Delaware County v. Alleghany 
 
 Oil Co. 85 Fed. 872.. 63, 151 
 
 Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. 
 
 Frank, 110 Fed. 694.. . 3D 
 65, 187, 188, 300, 815 
 
 DeLay v. Travelers Ins. Co. 59 
 
 Fed. 319 270 
 
 Delbanco v. Singletary, 40 Fed. 
 
 181 786, 794 
 
 Delmar Jockey Club v. Missouri, 
 210 U. S. 324, 52 L. ed. 
 1080, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 732 754 
 
 Oel Monte Min. & Mill. Co. v. 
 Last Chance Min. & 
 Mill. Co. 171 U. S. 55, 
 43 L. ed. 72, 18 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 895, 19 Mor. Min. 
 Rep. 370 736 
 
 De Neufville v. New York & N. 
 R. Co. 26 C. C. A. 306, 
 51 U. S. App. 374, 81 
 Fed. 10 244 
 
 Denison v. Shawmut Min. Co. 
 
 124 Fed. 860 789 
 
 Dennison v. Brown, 38 Fed. 535 846 
 
 Dennison Co. v. Thomas Mfg. Co. 
 
 94 Fed. 654 400 
 
 Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Scharf Tag, 
 Label & Box Co. 121 
 
 Fed. 313 403 
 
 V. Thomas Mfg. Co. 94 Fed. 
 
 651 300 
 
 Denny v. Pironi, 141 U. S. 123, 
 35 L. ed. 657, 11 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 966 272, 273 
 
 Densmore v. Tliree Rivers Mfg. 
 
 Co. 38 Fed. 750 160 
 
 Denton v. Baker, 24 C. C. A. 476, 
 48 U. S. App. 235, 79 
 
 Fed. 189 258 
 
 V. International Co. 36 Fed. 
 
 3 89, 119 
 
 Denver v. New York Trust Co. 
 no C. C. A. 24, 187 
 
 Fed. 890 252 
 
 V. Sherrett, 31 C. C. A. 499, 
 60 U. S. App. 104, 88 
 Fed. 226 129 
 
 Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Ristine, 
 23 C. C. A. 13, 40 U. S. 
 App. 579, 77 Fed. 59 . . 575 
 v. Roller, 49 L.R.A. 77, 41 
 C. C. A. 22, 100 Fed. 
 741 323, 325, 327 
 
 Denver City Tramway Co. v. Nor- 
 ton, 73 C. C. A. 1, 141 
 Fed. 599 171 
 
 Deprez v. Thomson-Houston Elec- 
 tric Co. 66 Fed. 23 303 
 
 Deputron v. Young, 134 U. S. 
 252, 33 L. ed. 929, 10 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 539 
 
 Derk P. Youkerman Co. v. 
 Charles H. Fuller's Ad- 
 vertising Agency, 135 
 Fed. 613 
 
 De Roux V. Girard, 90 Fed. 537 
 
 Desert King Min. Co. v. Wede- 
 kind, 110 Fed. 873 
 
 Deshler v. Dodge, 16 How. 631, 
 14 L. ed. 1088 
 
 Despeaux v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 
 81 Fed. 897 ..491, 507, 
 
 Destructor Co. v. Atlanta, 219 
 
 Fed. 1001 29, 
 
 Detroit v. Dean, 106 U. S. 541, 
 
 27 L. ed. 302, 1 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 500.. .58, 241, 243, 
 
 V. Detroit City R. Co. 54 
 
 Fed. 5 825, 
 
 V. Detroit City R. Co. 55 
 Fed. 569 350, 351, 
 
 650 
 
 532 
 563 
 
 410 
 
 218 
 
 508 
 545 
 
 402 
 
 553 
 
 847 
 
 864 
 866 
 
 V. Guaranty Trust Co. 93 C. 
 
 C. A. 604, 168 Fed. 610 698 
 699, 704 
 
 Detroit, Ft. W. & B. I. R. Co. v. 
 Osborn, 189 U. S. 383, 
 47 L. ed. 860, 23 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 540 753 
 
 Detweiler v. Holderbaum, 42 Fed. 
 
 338 101 
 
 De Valle De Costa v. Southern 
 
 P. Co. 160 Fed. 217 ... 832 
 
 Devere v. Delaware, L. & W. R. 
 
 Co. 60 Fed. 886 323 
 
 Devine v. Los Angeles, 202 U. S. 
 313, 50 L. ed. 1046, 26 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652 . . 158, 15» 
 165 
 
 Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 
 199, 43 L. ed. 666, 19 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 379 . . 153, 155 
 156 
 v. Stratton, 52 C. C. A. 135, 
 
 114 Fed. 179 617 
 
 Dewey Min. Co. v. Miller, 96 
 
 Fed. 2 138, 822 
 
 Dexter H. & Co. v. Sayward, 84 
 
 Fed. 300 220, 221 
 
 Dial V. Reynolds, 96 U. S. 340, 
 
 24 L. ed. 644 298 
 
 Diamond Coal & Coke Co. v. Al- 
 len, 71 C. C. A. 107, 13*1 
 Fed. 706 543, 544 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxi 
 
 Diamond Drill & Maoh. Co. v. 
 
 Kelly Bros. 120 Fed. 
 
 282 532 
 
 Diamond Glue Co. v. United 
 
 States Glue Co. 187 U. 
 
 S. 611, 47 L. ed. 328, 23 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 206 118 
 
 Dibble v. Bellingbam Bay Land 
 
 Co. 163 U. S. 69, 41 L. 
 
 ed. 74, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 939 451 
 
 Dick V. Foraker, 155 U. S. 404, 
 
 39 L. ed. 201, 15 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 124 .. .57, 104, 342 
 Dickerman v. Northern Trust Co. 
 
 176 U. S. 181, 44 L. ed. 
 
 423, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 311 217 
 
 Dickinson v. Consolidated Trac- 
 tion Co. 114 Fed. 242 . . 208 
 244, 36J 
 V. Union Mortgage Bkg. & 
 
 T. Co. 64 Fed. 895 192 
 
 V. United States, 98 C. C. 
 
 A. 516, 174 Fed. 808 . . 734 
 736 
 Diday v. New York, P. & 0. R. 
 
 Co. 107 Fed. 569 ..797, 814 
 839 
 Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U. 
 
 S. 498, 26 L. ed. 498 . . 781 
 785 
 Dillard v. Central Virginia Iron 
 
 Co. 125 Fed. 158 379 
 
 /Dillingham v. Hawk, 23 L.R.A. 
 
 517, 9 C. C. A. 101, 23 
 
 U. S. App. 273, 60 Fed. 
 
 496 13, 256, 257 
 
 Dillon V. Barnard, 21 Wall. 437, 
 
 22 L. ed. 676 276, 400 
 
 Dinet v. Delavan, 117 Fed. 978 . . 836 
 Dinsmore v. Central R. Co. 19 
 
 Fed. 153 410 
 
 V. Southern Exp. Co. 92 Fed. 
 
 714 30 
 
 Dinzy v. Illinois C. R. Co. 61 
 
 Fed. 50.... 94, 111, 112, 118 
 322, 326 
 Dishon v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. 
 
 P. R. Co. 66 C. C. A. 
 
 345, 133 Fed. 471 ..814, 819 
 Dishong v. Finkbiner, 46 Fed. 17 276 
 Dixon V. Western U. Teleg. Co. 
 
 38 Fed. 377 795 
 
 Doan V. American Book Co. 45 
 
 C. C. A. 42, 105 Fed. 
 
 772 672 
 
 Doane v. Gletin, 21 Wall. 35, 22 
 
 L. ed. 476 506, 542 
 
 Doctor V. Harrington, 196 U. S. 
 579, 49 L. ed. 606, 25 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 355 241 
 
 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Snellen- 
 
 burg, 152 Fed. 662 434 
 
 Dodd V. Ghiselin, 27 Fed. 405 . . 59 
 
 250, 251 
 V. Louisville Bridge Co. 130 
 
 Fed. 195 81, 82 
 
 Dodge V. Knowles, 114 U. S. 430, 
 29 L. ed. 144, 5 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 1108 665, 691 
 
 V. Norlin, 66 C. C. A. 425, 
 
 133 Fed. 363 022, 714 
 
 V. Tullays, 144 U. S. 451, 36 
 L. ed. 501, 12 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 728 253 
 
 Dodson V. Fletcher, 24 C. C. A. 
 69, 49 U. S. App. 61, 78 
 
 Fed. 214 697 
 
 Doe V. Waterloo Min. Co. 60 Fed. 
 
 643 586, 615 
 
 V. Waterloo Min. Co. 17 C. 
 C. A. 190, 44 U. S. App. 
 204, 70 Fed. 455, 18 
 Mor. Min. Rep. 265 ... 672 
 Dolan V. Jennings, 139 U. S. 387, 
 35 L. ed. 217, 11 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 584 ..698, 701, 724 
 Dominion Nat. Bank v. Olympia 
 Cotton Mills, 128 Fed. 
 
 182 56, 123 
 
 Donahue v. Calumet Fire Clay 
 
 Co. 94 Fed. 27 ....331, 333 
 
 793 799 
 
 V. Roberts, 19 Fed. 863 . . .' 504 
 
 505 
 Donallan v. Tannage Patent Co. 
 24 C. C. A. 647, 50 U. 
 S. App. 1, 79 Fed. 385 720 
 Donnelly v. United States Cord- 
 age Co. 66 Fed. 613 ... 271 
 Donovan v. Campion, 29 C. C. A. 
 30, 56 U. S. App. 388, 
 85 Fed. 72, 19 Mor. Min; 
 
 Rep. 247 230, 231, 232 
 
 V. Dixieland Amusement Co. 
 
 152 Fed. 661 826 
 
 V. Salem & P. Nev. Co. 134 
 
 Fed. 316 678 
 
 V. Wells, F. & Co. 22 L.R.A. 
 (X.S.) 12.50, 94 C. C. 
 A. 609, 169 Fed. 366 . . 778 
 783, 836 
 Doremus v. Root, 04 Fed. 760 . . 74 
 75, 806, 839 
 Dormitzer v. Illinois & St. L. 
 
 Bridge Co. 6 Fed. 217 . . 67 
 Doscher v. United States Pipe 
 
 Line Co. 185 Fed. 959 . . 108 
 
Ixxii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Doss V. Tyack, 14 How. 312, 14 
 
 L. ed. 435 598 
 
 Dougherty v. Atchison, T. & S. 
 
 F. R. Co. 126 Fed. 240 817 
 V. Western U. Teleg. Co. 61 
 
 Fed. 138 793 
 
 V. Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. 
 
 58 C. C. A. 651, 122 Fed. 
 
 205 72 
 
 Douglas V. Butler, 6 Fed. 228 .. . 240 
 V. Stone, 110 Fed. 812 .... 186 
 V. Wallace, 161 U. S. 348, 40 
 
 L. ed. 728, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 485 553 
 
 Douglas Co. V. Stone, 110 Fed. 
 
 814 193 
 
 Dover v. Greenwood, 177 Fed. 947 543 
 Dow V. Bradstreet Co. 46 Fed. 
 
 824 783, 791, 806 
 
 Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Brennan, 
 
 156 Fed. 213 710 
 
 V. Lochren, 74 C. C. A. 341, 
 
 143 Fed. 211, 6 A. & E. 
 
 Ann. Cas. 573 .. ..526, 557 
 V. McSherry Mfg. Co. 84 C. 
 
 C. A. 38, 155 Fed. 524 604 
 607 
 Dowell V. Applegate, 7. Sawy. 
 
 232, 8 Fed. 698 403 
 
 V. Applegate, 152 U. S. 327, 
 
 38 L. ed. 463, 14 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 611 46 
 
 V. Mitchell, 105 U. S. 432, 
 
 26 L. ed. 1143 28, 34 
 
 Dower v. Richards, 151 U. S. 
 
 666, 38 L. ed. 308, 14 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 452, 17 
 
 Mor. Min. Rep. 704 ... 137 
 619 
 Dows V. Chicago, 11 Wall. 112, 
 
 20 L. ed. 67 456 
 
 Doyle V. Wisconsin, 94 U. S. 50, 
 
 24 L. ed. 64 764 
 
 Drainage Dist. v. Chicago, M. & 
 
 St. P. R. Co. 198 Fed. 
 
 264 803 
 
 Draper v. Davis, 102 U. S. 371, 
 
 26 L. ed. 122 684, 765 
 
 V. Skcrrett, 116 Fed. 206 . . 190 
 Dubuque & P. R. Co., Ex parte, 
 
 1 Wall. 69, 17 L. ed. 
 
 514 768, 770 
 
 Duchesse d'Auxy v. Porter, 41 
 
 Fed. 69 233, 234 
 
 Dudgeon v. Watson, 23 Blatchf. 
 
 161, 23 Fed. 161 ,.265, 413 
 Dudley v. Lake County, 43 C. C. 
 
 A. 184, 103 Fed. 209 . . 651 
 Duff V. Hopkins, 33 Fed. 609 ... 10 
 
 Dufour V. Lang, 4 C. C. A. 663, 
 
 ,2 U. S. App. 477, 54 
 
 Fed. 916 639, 664, 671 
 
 673 
 Dull V. Blackman, 169 U. S. 247, 
 42 L. ed. 734, 18 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 333 589 
 
 Dulles V. H. D. Crippen Mfg. Co. 
 
 156 Fed. 708 209, 211 
 
 Duncan v. Associated Press, 81 
 
 Fed. 418 89, 97, 334, 831 
 
 V. Atlantic M. & 0. R. Co. 
 4 Hughes 125, 88 Fed. 
 
 840 595, 609, 663 
 
 V. Gegan, 101 U. S. 810, 25 
 
 L. ed. 875 789 
 
 Dundee Mortg. & T. Invest. Co. 
 
 V. Cooper, 26 Fed. 670 535 
 Dunlevy v. Dunlevy, 38 Fed. 462 609 
 Dunn, Re, 212 U. S. 375, 53 L. 
 ed. 558, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 299 ...\ 108, 115, 849 
 
 Duplex Printing-Press Co. ^. 
 Campbell-Printing Press 
 & Mfg. Co. 16- C. C. A. 
 220, 37 U. S. App. 250, 
 
 69 Fed. 250 630 
 
 DuPont V. Abel, 81 Fed. 535 .. 29 
 345, 841, 868 
 Dupree v. Frank, — Tex. Civ. 
 
 App. — , 39 S. W. 994.. 16 
 V. Leggette, 124 Fed. 700 . . 197 
 V. Leggette, 140 Fed. 776 . . 197 
 V. Mansur, 214 U. S. 161, 53 
 L. ed. 950, 29 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 548 161 
 
 Durant v. Essex Co. 7 Wall. 109, 
 
 19 L. ed. 156 352, 554 
 
 V. Essex Co. 101 U. S. 555, 
 
 25 L. ed. 901.. 613, 768, 771 
 V. Storrow. See Durant v. 
 Essex Co. 
 Durkee v. Illinois C. R. Co. 81 
 
 Fed. 1 807, 857 
 
 Dwight V. Central Vermont R. 
 Co. 20 Blatchf. 200, 9 
 
 Fed. 788 261, 413 
 
 V. Merritt, 18 Blatchf. 305, 
 
 4 Fed. 616 321 
 
 E. 
 
 Eachus V. Hartwell, 112 Fed. 564 186 
 
 190 
 
 Eagle Oil Co. v. Vacuum Oil Co. 
 89 C. C. A. 463, 162 
 Fed. 671 420 
 
 E. A. Holmes & Co. v. United 
 States F. Ins. Co. 142 
 Fed. 863 825 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxiii 
 
 Earl V. Southern P. Co. 75 Fed. 
 
 610 95 
 
 Earle v. Art Library Pub. Co. 
 
 95 Fed. 544 429 
 
 V. Chesapeake & 0. E. Co. 
 
 127 Fed. 237 . 328 
 
 V. McCartney, 109 Fed. 13 183 
 V. ilcCartnev, 112 Fed. 372 587 
 V. iIcVeigh,"91 U. S. 508, 23 
 
 L. ed. 400 316, 320 
 
 Earll V. Metropolitan Street R. 
 
 Co. 87 Fed. 528 ...418, 420 
 Eastern BIdg. & L. Asso. v. Den- 
 ton, 13 C. C. A. 44, 31 
 U. S. App. 187, 65 Fed. 
 
 570 295, 297 
 
 T. Welling, 181 U. S. 47, 45 
 L. ed. 739, 21 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 531 752 
 
 East Lake Land Co. v. Brown, 
 15.3 U. S. 488, 39 L. ed. 
 233, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 357 142, 280 
 
 Easton v. Houston & T. C. R. Co. 
 
 44 Fed. 9 582, 586, 598 
 
 599 
 East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. 
 Atlanta & F. R. Co. 15 
 L.R.A. 109, 49 Fed. 608 106 
 V. Southern Teleg. Co. 125 
 U. S. 695, 31 L. ed. 853, 
 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1391 . . 701 
 Eaton T. Hoge, 72 C. C. A. 74, 
 141 Fed. 66, 5 A. & E. 
 
 Ann. Cas. 487 175 
 
 Eau Claire v. Payson, 46 C. C. 
 
 A. 466, 107 Fed. 552, 48 
 
 C. C. A. 608, 109 Fed. 
 
 676 ..221, 582, 634, 635, 637 
 
 Ebell V. Bursinger, 70 Tex. 122, 
 
 8 S. W. 77 254 
 
 Ebner v. Zimmerly, 55 C. C. A. 
 
 430, 118 Fed. 818 350 
 
 Eeaubert v. Appleton, 15 C. C. A. 
 73, 35 U. S. App. 221, 
 
 67 Fed. 917 543 
 
 Eddy T. Casas, 118 Fed. 363 ... 809 
 
 829 
 V. Eddy, 93 C. C. A. 586, 168 
 
 Fed. 591 249, 250 
 
 V. Lafayette, 1 C. C. A. 441, 
 4 U. S. App. 247, 49 
 
 Fed. 809 122, 334 
 
 Edgell V. Felder, 28 C. C. A. 382, 
 52 U. S. App. 417, 84 
 Fed. 69 ..234, 245, 331, 332 
 T. Felder, 39 C. C. A. 540, 
 
 99 Fed. 324 ..560, 579, 637 
 703 
 
 Edison v. Thomas A. Edison Jr. 
 Chemical Co. 128 ' Fed. 
 
 957 399, 400 
 
 Edison Electric Co. v. Westing- 
 house,' C. K. Co. 138 
 
 Fed. 460 535 
 
 Edison Electric Light Co. v. 
 
 United States Electric 
 
 Lighting Co. 45 Fed. 55 528 
 
 V. United States Electric 
 
 Lighting Co. 44 Fed. 
 
 297 528 
 
 Edmonson v. Bloomshire, 7 Wall. 
 
 307, 19 L. ed. 91 ..318, 677 
 683, 706, 726 
 Edmunds v. Illinois R. Co. SO 
 
 Fed. 78 46, 96, 213 
 
 Edward P. Allis Co. v. Withla- 
 coochee Lumber Co. 44 
 C. C. A. 673, 105 Fed. 
 
 680 403, 418 
 
 Edwards v. Bates County, 163 U. 
 S. 269, 41 L. ed. 15.5, 16 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 967 . .179, 216 
 V. Bay State Gas Co. 91 Fed. 
 
 946 398, 402 
 
 V. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. 
 
 Co. 20 Fed. 452 856 
 
 V. Mercantile Trust Co. 124 
 
 Fed. 381 241 
 
 V. National Window Glass 
 Jobbers Asso. 139 Fed. 
 
 797 258 
 
 V. United States, 102 U. S. 
 
 576, 26 L. ed. 293 683 
 
 Edward Thompson Co. v. Amer- 
 ican Law Book Co. 62 
 L.R.A. 607, 59 C. C. A. 
 
 148, 122 Fed. 922 10 
 
 Egan V. Chicago G. W. R. Co. 163 
 
 Fed. 350 688 689 
 
 Egbert v. Citizens Ins. Co. 2 Mc- 
 
 Crary, 386, 7 Fed. 47. . 534 
 Einstein v. Georgia S. & F. R. 
 
 Co. 120 Fed. 1009 58 
 
 V. Schnebly, 89 Fed. 540 ... 277 
 
 398 
 Eirich v. Donnelly Contracting 
 
 Co. 104 Fed. 1 329 
 
 Eisele v. Oddie, 128 Fed. 942 . . 125 
 
 196 
 Eisenmann v. Delemar's Nevada 
 Gold-Min. Co. 87 Fed. 
 
 248 780, 788, 800 
 
 Elder v. Colorado, 204 U. S. 85, 
 51 L. ed. 381, 27 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 223 754 
 
 V. Wood, 208 U. S. 226, 52 
 L. ed. 464, 28 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 263 754 
 
Ixxiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Eldred v., American Palace Car 
 Co. 44 C. C. A. 554, 105 
 
 Fed. 458 242 
 
 V. American Palace Car Co. 
 45 C. C. A. i, 105 Fed. 
 
 455 328, 344 
 
 V. American Palace Car Co. 
 
 99 Fed. 168 243 
 
 V. American Palace Cr Co. 
 
 103 Fed. 209 343, 392 
 
 Electrical Accumulator Co. v. 
 Brush Electric Co. 44 
 
 Fed. 604 289, 350, 351 
 
 367, 374, 377 
 
 Electrical Supply Co. v. Put-in- 
 Bay Waterworks, LigM 
 & R. Co. 84 Fed. 740 . . 465 
 
 Electric Boat Co. v. Lake Tor- 
 pedo Boat Co. 215 Fed. 
 378 . .279, 440, 443, 445, 447 
 
 Electric Goods Mfg. Co. v. Kil- 
 
 tonski, 171 Fed. 550 . . 276 
 288, 289 
 
 Electrolibration Co. v. Jackson, 
 
 52 Fed. 776 348 
 
 Elgin Wind Power & Pump Co. 
 V. Nichols, 12 C. C. A. 
 578, 24 U. S. App. 543, 
 65 Fed. 215 ..417, 418, 420 
 
 Elgutter V. Northwestern Mut. 
 L. Ins. Co. 30 C. C. A. 
 218, 58 U. S. App. 643, 
 86 Fed. 500 558 
 
 Elk Fork Oil & Gas Co. v. Jen- 
 nings, 84 Fed. 839 260 
 
 Elk Garden Co. v. T. W. Thayer 
 
 Co. 179 Fed. 556 .. .43, 341 
 827 
 
 Elkhart Nat. Bank v. North- 
 western Guaranty Loan 
 Co. 30 C. O. A. 632, 58 
 U. S. App. 83, 87 Fed. 
 
 252, 84 Fed. 76 55, 98 
 
 123, 244, 245, 261, 283 554 
 
 Elkin V. Denver Engineering 
 Works Co. 105 C. C. A. 
 1, 181 Fed. 684 ...572, 577 
 
 Elkins V. Chicago, 119 Fed. 957 242 
 T.Howell, 140 Fed. 157.. 816 
 
 820 
 
 Ellis V. Davis, 109 U. S. 485, 27 
 L. ed. 1006, 3 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 327 248 
 
 Ellison V. Louisville & N. R. Co. 
 50 C. C. A. 530, 112 Fed. 
 805 846, 848 
 
 Ells V. St. Louis, K. & N. W. R. 
 
 Co. 52 Fed. 903 20 
 
 Ellsworth Trust Co. v. Parra- 
 more, 48 C. C. A. 132, 
 
 108 Fed. 906 330, 333 
 
 Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 
 
 168, 6 L. ed. 294 225 
 
 El Paso Water Co. v. El Paso, 
 152 U. S. 157, 38 L. ed. 
 396, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 494 186 
 
 Elton, The, 31 C. C. A. 496, 42 
 U. S. App. 666, 83 Fed. 
 
 520 575 
 
 Elwell V. Fosdiek, 134 U. S. 513, 
 
 33 L. ed. 1002, 10 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 598 700 
 
 Embry v. Palmer, 107 U. S. 3, 27 
 
 L. ed. 346, 2 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 25 546 
 
 Emerson Co. v. Nimocks, 88 Fed. 
 
 280 518 
 
 Emil Kiewert Co. v. Juneau, 24 
 
 C. C. A. 294, 47 U. S. 
 
 App. 394, 78 Fed. 712.. 575 
 Emmons v. National Mut. Bldg. 
 
 & L. Asso. 68 C. C. A. 
 
 327, 135 Fed. 689 ..295, 301 
 Empire Circuit Co. v. Sullivan, 
 
 169 Fed. 1009 15 
 
 Empire Coal & Transp. Co. v. 
 
 Empire Coal & Min. Co, 
 
 150 U. S. 163, 37 L. ed. 
 
 1038, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 66 53, 110 
 
 Enipire Distilling Co. v. McNul- 
 
 ta, 23 C. C. A. 415, 46 
 
 U. S. App. 578, 77 Fed. 
 
 701 460 
 
 Empire Min. Co. v. Propeller 
 
 Tow-Boat Co. 108 Fed. 
 
 903 55, 56, 97, 831, 840 
 
 856 
 Empire Shipbuilding Co., Re, 136 
 
 C. C. A. 633, 221 Fed. 
 
 223 35 
 
 Empire State-Idaho Min. & De- 
 veloping Co. V. Hanley, 
 
 198 U. S. 292, 49 L. ed, 
 
 1053, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 691 743 
 
 V. Henley, 205 U. S. 225, 51 
 
 L. ed. 779, 27 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 476 641 
 
 Empire Trust Co. v. Egypt R. 
 
 Co. 182 Fed. 100 578 
 
 Emsheimer v. New Orleans, 186 
 
 U. Si 42, 46 L. ed. 1046, 
 
 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770 . . 209 
 210, 220, 222, 735, 736 
 V. New Orleans, 56 C. C. A. 
 
 189, 119 Fed. 1019 209 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxv 
 
 Emsheimer v. New Orleans, 116 
 
 Fed. 893 220 
 
 Encyclopfedia Britannica Co. v. 
 
 Werner Co. 138 Fed. 461 513 
 535, 563 
 Enders v. Lake Erie R. Co. 101 
 
 Fed. 203 797 
 
 Eng V. Southern P. Co. 210 Fed. 
 
 92 776 
 
 English V. Foxall, 2 Pet. 612, 7 
 
 L. ed. 537 284 
 
 Enos V. Kentucky Distillers & 
 
 Warehouse Co. Ill C. 
 
 C. A. 74, 189 Fed. 342 806 
 Ensminger v. Powers, 108 U. S. 
 
 302, 27 L. ed. 736, 2 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 643 613 
 
 Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. 
 
 Brown, 213 U. S. 25, 53 
 
 L. ed. 682, 29 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 404 26 
 
 V. Tolbert, 76 C. C. A. 212, 
 
 145 Fed. 339 716 
 
 Equity Rule 75, Re, 138 C. C. A. 
 
 574, 222 Fed. 885 709 
 
 Erb V. Morasch, 177 U. S. 585, 
 
 44 L. ed. 898, 20 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 819 256 
 
 Erie R. Co. v. Purdy, 185 U. S. 
 
 148, 46 L. ed. 848, 22 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 605 ..751, 753 
 Ernst v. American Spirits Mfg. 
 
 Co. 114 Fed. 981 859 
 
 Erskine v. Forrest Oil Co. 80 
 
 Fed. 586, 18 Mor. Min. 
 
 Rep. 297 35 
 
 Estes V. Gunter, 121 U. S. 183, 
 
 30 L. ed. 884, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 854 .• 176 
 
 Estia V. Trabue, 128 U. S. 230, 32 
 
 L. ed. 438, 9 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 58 ..682, 698, 703, 731 
 E. T. Kenney Co., Re, 136 Fed. 
 
 455 252 
 
 Eureka & K. R. Co. v. California 
 
 & N. R. Co. 103 Fed. 
 
 897 789 
 
 Eureka Consol. Min. Co. v. Rich- 
 mond Consol. Min. Co. 
 
 2 Fed. 830 53 
 
 Eustis V. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361, 
 
 37 L. ed. 1111, 14 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 131 ..137, 153, 155 
 749, 750, 752 
 V. Henrietta, 20 C. C. A. 537, 
 
 41 U. S. App. 182, 74 
 
 Fed. 578 639, 826 
 
 Evans v. Charles Scribner's Sons, 
 
 58 Fed. 303 . .105, 344, 345 
 V. Dillingham, 43 Fed. 177 798 
 
 Evans v. Felton, 96 Fed. 176 . 
 
 V. Gorman, 115 Fed. 401 . 
 
 v. State Nat. Bank, 134 U. 
 S. 330, 33 L. ed. 917, 10 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493 . . 617, 
 
 V. Suess Ornamental Glass 
 
 Co. 28 C. C. A. 24, 53 
 
 U. S. App. 567, 83 Fed. 
 
 706 
 
 Evansberg v. Insurance Stove, 
 
 Range & Foundry Co. 
 
 168 Fed. 1001 
 
 Evans-Snider-Buel Co. v. McCas- 
 
 kill, 41 C. C. A. 577, 101 
 
 Fed. 658 ..643, 645, 646, 
 Evanston v. Gunn, 99 U. S. 665, 
 
 25 L. ed. 307 
 
 Evansville Courier Co. v. United 
 
 Press, 74 Fed. 918 .... 
 Eveleth v. Southern California 
 
 R. Co. 123 Fed. 836 . . 
 
 417, 
 
 Evenson v. Spaulding, 9 L.R.A. 
 
 (N.S.) 904, 82 C. C. A. 
 
 263, 150 Fed. 517 ..187, 
 Everette v. Independent School 
 
 Dist. 102 Fed. 530 
 
 Evers v. Watson, 156 U. S. 527, 
 
 39 L. ed. 520, 15 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 430 . . .46, 65, 
 
 Ewing V. Seaboard Air Line R. 
 
 Co. 175 Fed. 517 
 
 Excelsior Pebble Phosphate Co. 
 
 V. Brown, 20 C. C. A. 
 
 428, 42 U. S. App. 55, 
 
 74 Fed. 323 . . 52, 54, 56, 
 
 Excelsior Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pa- 
 cific Bridge Co. 185 U. 
 S. 282, 46 L. ed. 910, 22 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681 ..645, 
 649, 
 
 Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 
 
 177 Fed. 604 688, 726 
 
 P. 
 
 Failey v. Talbee, 55 Fed. 892 . . 403 
 Fair Haven & W. R. Co. v. New 
 
 Haven, 203 U. S. 379, 
 
 51 L. ed. 237, 27 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 74 754 
 
 Fairview Fluor Spar & Lead Co. 
 
 V. Ulrich, 113 C. C. A. 
 
 372, 192 Fed. 897 258 
 
 74 
 803 
 475 
 476 
 
 707 
 713 
 
 674 
 
 807 
 
 658 
 567 
 117 
 
 411 
 
 418 
 
 190 
 
 482 
 
 66 
 856 
 
 449 
 
 57 
 243 
 
 648 
 650 
 
Ixxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Fales V. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. 
 
 Co. 32 Fed. 673 334 
 
 Falls Wire Mfg. Co. v. Broderiek, 
 
 2 McCrary, 489, 6 Fed. 
 
 654 826 
 
 Farley v. Kittson, 120 U. S. 303, 
 
 30 L. ed. 684, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 534 396, 399, 405 
 
 406, 411, 412, 415, 417, 419 
 420 
 Farmers' & M. Nat. Bank v. 
 
 Schuster, 29 C. C. A. 
 
 649, 52 U. S. App. 612, 
 
 86 Fed. 161 ..844, 845, 854 
 Farmers' Bank v. Wright, 158 
 
 Fed. 841 250 
 
 Farmers' Loan & T. Co., Be, 129 
 
 U. S. 213, 32 L. ed. 657, 
 
 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265 ... 635 
 T. Cape Fear & Y. Valley 
 
 R. Co. 71 Fed. 39 464 
 
 V. Chicago & N. P. R. Co. 
 
 118 Fed. 204 181, 256 
 
 V. Chicago & N. P. R. Co. 19 
 
 C. C. A. 477, 34 U. S. 
 
 App. 626, 73 Fed. 314... 677 
 684, 692, 707, 715, 762 
 V. Denver, L. & G. R. Co. 
 
 60 C. C. A. 588, 126 
 
 Fed. 46 449, 583 
 
 V. Eaton, 51 C. C. A. 640, 
 
 114 Fed. 18 712 
 
 V. Houston & T. C. R. Co. 
 
 44 Fed. 115 465, 468 
 
 Y. Iowa Water Co. 80 Fed. 
 
 467 615 
 
 V. Kansas City W. & N. W. 
 
 E. Co. 53 Fed. 182 464 
 
 V. Lake Street Elev. R. Co. 
 
 122 Fed. 921 68, 253 
 
 V. Lake Street Elev. R. Co. 
 
 177 U. S. 61, 44 L. .ed. 
 
 671, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 564 312, 477, 479, 480 
 
 V. Longworth, 22 C. C. A. 
 
 420, 48 U. S. App. 71, 
 
 76 Fed. 610 704 
 
 V. McClure, 24 C. C. A. 66, 
 
 49 U. S. App. 46; 78 
 
 Fed. 211 699 
 
 V. Northern P. R. Co. 72 
 
 Fed. 26 466 
 
 V. Northern P. R. Co. 76 
 
 Fed. 15 424 
 
 V. San Diego Street-Car Co. 
 
 40 Fed. 110 451 
 
 V. Waterman, 106 U. S. 269, 
 
 27 L. ed. 116, 1 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 131 697 
 
 Farmers' Oil & Guano Co. v. 
 
 Duckworth Co. 133 C. 
 
 C. A. 278, 217 Fed. 363 270 
 Farmington v. Pillsbury, 114 U. 
 
 S. 144, 29 L. ed. 116, 5 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 807 ..62, 130 
 199, 222, 243, 548, 553 
 Farr v. Hobe-Peters Land Co. 
 
 110 C. C. A. 160, 188 
 
 Fed. 10 212 
 
 Farrand v. Land & River Im- 
 
 prov. Co. 30 C. C. A. 
 
 128, 58 U. S. App. 559, 
 
 86 Fed. 393 410 
 
 Farrar v. Bernheim, 21 C. C. A. 
 
 264, 75 Fed. 136.. 568, 577 
 V. Bernheim, 20 C. C. A. 
 
 496, 41 U. S. App. 172, 
 
 74 Fed. 438 568, 577 
 
 V. Churchill, 135 U. S. 609, 
 
 34 L. ed. 246, 10 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 771 711 
 
 Farrell v. O'Brien, 199 U. S. 
 
 110, 50 L. ed. Ill, 25 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 727 ..247-249 
 
 750 
 
 Farson v. Chicago, 138 Fed. 186 138 
 
 V. Sioux City, 106 Fed. 278 296 
 
 298 
 Farwell v. Colonial Trust Co. 
 
 78 C. C. A. 22, 147 Fed. 
 
 480 22, 28 
 
 Faulk V. Gray, . 120 Fed. 157 . . 831 
 Faulkner v. Hutchins, 61 C. C. 
 
 A. 425, 126 Fed. 363 698 
 705 
 Fawkes v. American Motor Car 
 
 Sales Co, 176 Fed. 1010 118 
 Fayerweather v. Hamilton Col- 
 lege, 103 Fed. 547 .... 412 
 V. Rilich, 195 U. S. 299, 49 
 
 L. ed. 210, 25 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 58 749 
 
 V. Pitch, 89 Fed. 529 . . 526, 714 
 Fearing v. Glenn, 19 C. C. A. 
 
 388, 38 U. S. App. 424, 
 
 73 Fed. 116 326 
 
 Feibelman v. Packard, 109 U. S. 
 
 421, 27 L. ed. 984, 3 
 
 ■Sup. Ct. Rep. 289.. 140, 141 
 Felch V. Travis, 92 Fed. 210 ... 193 
 Felix V. Scharnweber, 125 U. S. 
 
 59, 31 L. ed. 688, 8 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 759 758, 761 
 
 Fellows V. Borden's Condensed 
 
 Milk Co. 188 Fed. 863 768 
 Felsenheld v. United States, 186 
 
 U. S. 134, 46 L. ed. 
 
 1089, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 740 735 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxvii 
 
 Fenn v. Holme, 21 How. 484, 16 
 L. ed. 199 5, 
 
 Fenno v. Primrose, 56 C. C. A. 
 313, 119 Fed. 801 .... 
 
 Fergus Falls v. Fergus Falls 
 Water Co. 19 C. C. A. 
 212, 36 U. S. App. 480, 
 
 72 Fed. 877 143, 
 
 163-16G, 
 
 Ferguson v. Consolidated Rubber 
 Tire Co. 169 Fed. 888 
 
 16 
 
 560 
 
 151 
 279 
 
 209 
 211 
 
 Fex-guson Contracting Co. v. 
 Manhattan Trust Co. 55 
 C. C. A. 529, 118 Fed. 
 
 791 575, 577 
 
 F. G. Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler 
 County, 166 U. S. 658, 
 41 L. ed. 1152, 17 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 709 . . 155, 272, 749 
 751 
 Fidelity & C. Co. v. Carter, 23 
 Tex. Civ. App. 359, 57 
 
 S. W. 316 360 
 
 V. Hubbard, 117 Fed. 952 . . 793 
 V. St. ilatthe-ws Sav. Bank, 
 44 C. C. A. 225, 104 
 
 Fed. 861 577 
 
 Fidelity & D. Co. v. Moshier, 
 
 151 Fed. 807 192 
 
 Fidelity Ins. & S. D. Co. v. Shen- 
 andoah Iron Co. 42 Fed. 
 
 372 569-571 
 
 Fidelity Ins. Trust & S. D. Co. v. 
 Dickson, 24 C. C. A. 60, 
 46 U. S. App. 691, 78 
 
 Fed. 207 353 
 
 V. Huntington, 117 U. S. 
 281, 29 L. ed. 899, 6 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 733.. 73, 815 
 Fidelity ilut. Life Asso. v. Met- 
 tler, 185 U. S. 315, 46 
 L. ed. 925, 22 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 662 743 
 
 Fidelity Trust & S. D. Co. v. 
 
 Archer, 179 Fed. 32 .. 245 
 Fidelity Trust & S. V. Co. v. 
 ilobile Street R. Co. 53 
 Fed. 850 ....443, 450, 463 
 486, 487 
 V. Mobile Street R. Co. 54 
 
 Fed. 26 687 
 
 V. Newport News & M. "Val- 
 ley Co. 70 Fed. 403 793 
 
 796 
 Fidelity Trust Co. v. D. T. Mc- 
 Keithan Lumber Co. 212 
 
 Fed. 231 455 
 
 V. Gill Car Co. 25 Fed. 737 801 
 
 Fiechtl, Re, 46 C. C. A. 497, 107 
 
 Fed. 618 677, 692 
 
 Field V. Barber Asphalt Paving 
 Co. 194 U. S. 618, 48 L. 
 ed. 1]42, 24 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 784 641, 653 
 
 V. Hastings & B. Co. 65 Fed. 
 
 279 281, 292, 422, 432 
 
 V. Western Life Indemnity 
 
 Co. 166 Fed. 607 299 
 
 Fife V. ^A'hittell, 102 Fed. 537 . . 221 
 805, 836, 837 
 Files v. Brown, 59 C. C. A. 403, 
 
 124 Fed. 133 . .403, 416, 419 
 590, 019 
 V. Davis, 118 Fed. 465.. 141, 157 
 Filhiol V. Maurice, 185 U. S. 108, 
 46 L. ed. 827, 22 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 560 142 
 
 V. Torney, 119 Fed. 974 . . 152 
 159, 163 
 V. Torney, 194 U. S. 356, 
 48 L. ed. 1014, 24 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 698 142, 163 
 
 Filli V. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 
 
 37 Fed. 66 89, 109, 110 
 
 114, 119 
 Finance Committee v. Warren, 
 
 27 C. C. A. 472, 53 U. 
 
 S. App. 472, 82 Fed. 525 558 
 561, 579 
 
 Findlay v. Pertz, 20 C. C. A. 662, 
 43 U. S. App. 383, 74 
 Fed. 681 671, 672 
 
 Finegan v. Read, 8 Tex. Civ. 
 
 App. 36, 27 S. W. 261 225 
 
 Finney v. Guy, 189 U. S. 335, 47 
 L. ed. 839, 23 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 558 151 
 
 First Littleton Bridge Corp. v. 
 Connecticut River Lum- 
 ber Co. 71 Fed. 225 . . 793 
 794 
 
 First Nat. Bank, Ex parte, 207 
 U. S. 66, 52 L. ed. 106, 
 
 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 23 . . 768 
 V. Appleyard, 138 Fed. 939 793 
 
 794 
 V. Bridgeport Trust Co. 117 
 
 Fed. 969 812, 815, 855 
 
 V. Cunningham, 48 Fed. 517 335 
 V. Forest, 44 Fed. 246 . . 532, 534 
 
 V. Forrest, 40 Fed. 705 86 
 
 V. Merchants' Bank, 2 L.R.A. 
 
 469, 37 Fed. 658 235 
 
 V. Omaha, 96 U. S. 738, 24 
 
 L. ed. 881 665, 682 
 
 V. Peavey, 69 Fed. 457 19 
 
 V. Peavey, 75 Fed. 155 297 
 
Ixxviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 First Nat. Bank v. Prager, 34 
 C. C. A. 51, 63 U. S. 
 
 703, 91 Fed. 689 
 
 V. Radford Trust Co. 26 C. 
 C. A. 1, 47 U. S. App. 
 692, 80 Fed. 569 ... 66, 
 
 V. Rush, 29 C. C. A. 333, 56 
 U. S. App. 556, 85 Fed. 
 541 
 
 V. Salem Capital Flour-Mills 
 Co. 31 Fed. 580 ..450, 
 
 778 
 
 234 
 255 
 
 542 
 
 451 
 
 484 
 
 V. Selden, 62 L.R.A. 559, 56 
 C. C. A. 532, 120 Fed. 
 
 2]2 87 
 
 V. Woodrum, 86 Fed. 1004 . . 283 
 598, 599, 602 
 First State Bank v. Shallenberg- 
 
 er, 172 Fed. 1000 147 
 
 V. Spencer, 135 C. C. A. 253, 
 
 219 Fed. 503 294 
 
 Fischer v. Hayes, 19 Blatchf. 13, 
 
 6 Fed. 76 517, 518 
 
 V. Haves, 16 Fed. 469 578 
 
 V. Neil, 6 Fed. 90 567 
 
 Fish V. Ogdensburgh & L. C. E. 
 
 Co. 79 Fed. 131 465 
 
 Fishback v. Western U. Teleg. 
 Co. 161 U. S. 99, 40 L. 
 ed. 631, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 506 168, 170 
 
 Fisher v. Moog, 39 Fed. 665 . . 288 
 Fisheries Co. v. Lennen, 65 C. C. 
 
 A. 79, 130 Fed. 533.. 640 
 656, 658 
 Fisk V. Henarie, 32 Fed. 417 . . 843 
 V. Henarie, 142 U. S. 468, 
 35 L. ed. 1082, 12 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 207.. 624, 642, 777 
 842, 844, 845, 847, 848 
 Fiske, Ex parte, 113 U. S. 713, 
 28 L. ed. 1117, 5 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 724 491, 507 
 
 Fiteh V. Creighton, 24 How. 159, 
 
 16 L. ed. 596 179 
 
 , V. Richardson, 77 C. C. A. 
 
 422, 147 Fed. 196 ..722, 729 
 Fitchburg R. Co. v. Nichols, 29 
 C. C. A. 464, 50 U. S. 
 App. 280, 85 Fed. 869 45 
 364 
 
 Fitchett V. Blows, 20 C. C. A. 
 
 
 286, 36 U. S. App. 597, 
 
 
 74 Fed. 49 
 
 179 
 
 Fitts V. McGhee, 172 U. S. 524, 
 
 
 43 L. ed. 539, 19 Sup. 
 
 
 Ct. Rep. 269 
 
 39 
 
 Fitzgerald v. Missouri P. Co. 45 
 
 Fed. 812 ..82, 83, 139, 802 
 836 
 Fitzgerald & M. Constr. Co. v. 
 
 Fitzgerald, 137 U. S. 99 
 
 34 L. ed. 608, 11 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 36 318, 329 
 
 Fitzpatrick v. Domingo, 4 Woods, 
 
 163, 14 Fed. 216 380 
 
 V. Graham, 56 C. C. A. 95, 
 
 119 Fed. 353 .. ..698, 722 
 FitzSimmons v. Ogden, 7 Cranoh, 
 
 2, 3 L. ed. 249 10 
 
 Flagler v. Kidd, 24 C. C. A. 123, 
 
 45 U. S. App. 461, 78 
 
 Fed. 341 672 
 
 Flahrity v. Union P. R. Co. 6 
 
 C. C. A. 167, 12 U. S. 
 
 App. 532, 56 Fed. 908.. 673 
 Fleming v. Laws, 112 C. C. A. 
 
 27, 191 Fed. 283 .... 125 
 Fletcher v. Ann Arbor, 53 C. 
 
 C. A. 647, 116 Fed. 481 252 
 464 
 V. Burt, 63 C. C. A. 201, 126 
 
 Fed. 619 864 
 
 V. Hamlet, 116 U. S. 410, 29 
 
 L. ed. 679, 6 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 426 799, 814 
 
 Flint V. Coffin, 100 C. C. A. 342, 
 
 176 Fed. 872 785 
 
 Flippen v. Kimball, 31 C. C. A. 
 
 282, 59 U. S. App. 1, 
 
 87 Fed. 258 13, 574 
 
 Florida v. Charlotte Harbor 
 
 Phosphate Co. 17 C. C. 
 
 A. 472, 30 U. S. App. 
 
 535, 70 Fed. 883 715 
 
 V. Charlotte Harbor Phos- 
 phate Co. 20 C. C. A.' 
 
 538, 41 U. S. App. 405, 
 
 74 Fed. 578 164, 783 
 
 V. Georgia, 11 How. 293, 13 
 
 L. ed. 702 39, 317 
 
 Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Bell, 
 
 176 U. S. 321, 44 L. ed. 
 
 486, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 399 158, 163 
 
 V. Bell, 31 C. C. A. 9, 59 
 
 U. S. App. 189, 87 Fed. 
 
 369 158, 265 
 
 V. Cutting, 15 C. C. A. 597, 
 
 30 U. S. App. 428, 68 
 
 Fed. 586 671 
 
 Florida Constr. Co. v. Young, 8 
 
 C. C. A. 231, 11 U. S. 
 
 App. 683, 59 Fed. 722.. 639 
 Florida C. R. Co. v. Schutte, 100 
 
 U. S. 644, 25 L. ed. 605 680 
 683, 690, 718 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxix 
 
 Flour Inspectors v. Glover, 160 
 
 U. S. 170, 40 L. ed. 382, 
 
 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 321 . . 721 
 V. Glover, 161 U. S. 103, 40 
 
 L. ed. 632, 16 Sup. Ct, 
 
 Rep. 492 ' 721 
 
 Flower v. ilacGinniss, 50 C. C. 
 
 A. 291, 112 Fed. 377. . 498 
 499, 508, 514 
 Flynn v. Fidelity & C. Co. 145 
 
 Fed. 265 836 
 
 Fogarty v. Southern P. Co. 123 
 
 Fed. 973 . .74, 75, 816, 818 
 Fogg V. Blair, 139 U. S. 127, 35 
 
 L. ed. 107, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 476 276, 400 
 
 Foley, Ee, 76 Fed. 390 864 
 
 Re, 80 Fed. 949 ..247, 248, 827 
 
 V. Hartley, 72 Fed. 570 408 
 
 Foltz V. St. Louis & S. F. E. Co. 
 
 8 C. C. A. 635, 19 U. S. 
 
 App. 576, 60 Fed. 318 . . 33 
 37 
 Fondley v. Lavender, 21 Wall. 
 
 276, 22 L. ed. 536 .... 250 
 Fontain v. Ravenel, 17 How. 369, 
 
 15 L. ed. 80 828 
 
 Forbes v. State Council, 216 U. 
 
 S. 396, 54 L. ed. 534, 30 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 295 .... 752 
 Fordham v. Hicks, 224 Fed. 810 400 
 Fordyce v. Omaha, K. C. & E. R. 
 
 Co. 145 Fed. 544.. 567, 574 
 V. Trigg, 175 U. S. 723, 44 
 
 L. ed. 337, 20 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 1024 697 
 
 Forest Oil Co. v. Crawford, 42 
 
 C. C. A. 54, 101 Fed. 
 
 849 463, 468 
 
 Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 204, 12 
 
 L. ed. 405 635 
 
 Forrest v. Pittsburgh Bridge Co. 
 
 53 C. C. A. 577, 116 Fed. 
 
 357 329, 331 
 
 v. Union P. R. Co. 47 Fed. 
 
 2 332 
 
 Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U. S. 
 
 514, 41 L. ed. 1098, 17 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 665 735 
 
 737, 738 
 
 V. Pierson, 9 Fed. 801 102 
 
 338, 339, 341, 485 
 Fortney v. Carter, 121 C. C. A. 
 
 514, 203 Fed. 4.54 491 
 
 492, 519 
 Fosdick V. Schall, 99 U. S. 235, 
 
 25 L. ed. 339 10 
 
 Fosha v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 
 
 114 Fed. 702 334 
 
 Foster v. Bank of Abingdon, 88 
 
 Fed. 604-607 243 
 
 V. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. 
 
 R. Co. 56 Fed. 436 .... 125 
 y. Kansas, 112 U. S. 204, 28 
 L. ed. 630, 5 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 897 764, 765 
 
 V. Lebanon Springs R. Co. 
 
 100 Fed. 543 477 
 
 V. Mansfield C. & L. M. R. 
 
 Co. 36 Fed. 628.. 241, 244 
 V. Paragould Southeastern 
 
 R. Co. 74 Fed. 273 .... 783 
 
 Fougeres v. Jones, 66 Fed. 316 551 
 
 Foulk V. Gray, 120 Fed. 156.. 775 
 
 829, 831, 858 
 
 Fountain v. Angelica, 20 Blatchf. 
 
 448, 12 Fed. 8 63, 553 
 
 Fourth Nat. Bank v. New Or- 
 leans & C. R. Co. 11 
 Wall. 624, 20 L. ed. 82 233 
 234, 427, 551 
 Fouvergne v. Municipality No. 2, 
 18 How. 470, 15 L. ed. 
 
 399 248 
 
 Fowler v. Davenport, 21 Tex. 
 
 633 424 
 
 T. Hamill, 139 U. S. 550, 35 
 L. ed. 266, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 663 678 
 
 V. Lamson, 164 U. S. 255, 41 
 L. ed. 424, 17 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 112 748, 752 
 
 V. Osgood, 4 L.R.A.(N.S.) 
 824, 72 C. C. A. 276, 
 141 Fed. 20 . .258, 403, 554 
 V. Palmer, 87 C. C. A. 157, 
 
 160 Fed. 1 299 
 
 V. Stebbins, 69 C. C. A. 209, 
 
 136 Fed. 365 410 
 
 Fox V. Southern R. Co. 80 Fed. 
 
 945 778, 783 
 
 Foye V. Guardian Printing & 
 
 Pub. Co. 109 Fed. 368 321 
 Frame v. Portland Gold Min. Co. 
 47 C. C. A. 664, 108 
 
 Fed. 751 673 
 
 Frank v. Leopold & F. Co. 169 
 
 Fed. 922 139, 142 
 
 V. Union Cent. L. Ins. Co. 
 
 130 Fed. 225 321 
 
 Frankfort v. Deposit Bank, 120 ' 
 
 Fed. 165 612, 613 
 
 V. Deposit Bank, 59 C. C. A. 
 
 539, 124 Fed. 18 614 
 
 V. Deposit Bank, 62 C. C. A. 
 
 492, 127 Fed. 814 619 
 
 Franklin Sav. Bank v. Taylor, 4 
 C. C. A. 44, 9 U. S. 
 App. 406, 53 Fed. 866... 613 
 705 
 
Ixxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Frank Parmelee Co. v. Mtna, L. 
 Ins. Co. 92 0. C. A. 430, 
 
 166 Fed. 743 320 
 
 Franz v. Wahl, 81 Fed. 9 845 
 
 Fraser v. Jennison, 106 U. S. 
 191, 27 L. ed. 131, 1 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 171 71 
 
 Frawley v. Pennsylvania Casual- 
 ty Co. 124 Fed. 259 .. 112 
 116, 118, 325, 328 
 Fred Macey Co. v. Macey, 68 C. 
 
 C. A. 363, 135 Fed. 727 86 
 730-732, 836 
 Free v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 122 
 
 Fed. 311 800 
 
 Freeman v. American Surety Co. 
 
 116 Fed. 550 ..55, 56, 78 
 98 
 V. Butler, 39 Fed. 1 . . . . 804, 821 
 V. Clay, 2 C. C. A. 587, 2 
 U. S. App. 254, 52 Fed. 
 
 7 605 
 
 V. Clay, 1 C. C. A. 115, 2 
 U. S. App. 151, 48 Fed. 
 849.. 682, 691, 716, 722, 762 
 V. Howe, 24 How. 460, 16 
 
 L. ed. 752 483, 484 
 
 French, Ex parte, 100 U. S. 5, 
 
 25 L. ed. 530 680, 682 
 
 V. Gapen, 105 U. S. 525, 26 
 
 L. ed. 956 461 
 
 V. Hay, 22 Wall. 238, 22 L. 
 
 ed. 801. ..361, 369, 373, 390 
 781, 785, 794 
 V. Shoemaker, 12 Wall. 98, 
 
 20 L. ed. 271 582, 634 
 
 669, 686 
 V. Stewart. See French v. 
 Hay. 
 Fretz V. Stover, 22 Wall. 198, 
 
 22 L. ed. 769 382 
 
 Frick Co. v. Wright, 23 Tex. Civ. 
 
 App. 340, 55 S. W. 608 324 
 Friedman v. Empire L. Ins. Co. 
 
 101 Fed. 535 329 
 
 Frisbie v. Chesapeake & 0. E. 
 
 Co. 57 Fed. 1 858 
 
 Frishman v. Insurance Cos. 41 
 
 Fed. 449 781 
 
 Froment v. Duclos, 30 Fed. 385 40 
 Frost v. Barber, 173 Fed. 847.. 498 
 
 500, 544 
 v. Spitley, 121 U. S. 556, 30 
 L. ed. 1012, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 1129 259, 260 
 
 Frow v. De La Vega, 15 Wall. 
 
 552, 21 L. ed. 60 ..387-391 
 637 
 
 Fuller V. Aylesworth, 21 C. C. 
 A. 505, 43 U. S. App. 
 657, 75 Fed. 694 . . 685, 686 
 
 V. Knapp, 24 Fed. 100 404 
 
 433 
 V. Montague, 53 Fed. 206 . . 677 
 V. Montague, 8 C. C. A. 100, 
 16 U. S. App. 391, 59 
 
 Fed. 215 276, 398 
 
 Fulton Invest. Co. v. Dorsey, 136 
 C. C. A. 108, 220 Fed. 
 
 298 698 
 
 Furnald v. Glenn, 12 C. C. A. 27, 
 26 U. S. App. 202, 64 
 
 Fed. 49 244 
 
 Furrer v. Ferris, 145 U. S. 134, 
 36 L. ed. 651,- 12 Sup. 
 Ct. Kep. 821 575 
 
 G. 
 
 Gableman v. Peoria, D. & E. R. 
 Co. 179 U. S. 335, 45 
 L. ed. 220, 21 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 171 1G2, 182, 256 
 
 812, 851, 852 
 v. Peoria, D. & E. E. Co. 41 
 C. C. A. 160, 101 Fed. 
 
 6 162, 182, 851 
 
 Gaddie v. Mann, 147 Fed. 955 . . 68 
 97, 128, 129 
 Gage V. J. F. Smyth Mercantile 
 Co. 87 C. C. A. 377, 160 
 
 Fed. 426 583 
 
 V. Kaufman, 133 U. S. 471, 
 33 L. ed. 725, 10 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Eep. 406 268 
 
 V. Eiverside Trust Co. 156 
 
 Fed. 1002 ..52, 68, 90, 91 
 241, 337, 487 
 V. Eiverside Trust Co. 86 
 
 Fed. 998 589 
 
 Gagnon v. United States, 193 U. 
 S. 456, 48 L. ed. 747, 
 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 510 586 
 Gaines v. Agnelly, 1 Woods, 238, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 5,173 426 
 
 V. Chew, 2 How. 619, 11 L. 
 
 ed. 402 297 
 
 V. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10, 23 
 
 L. ed. 524 40, 43, 169 
 
 V. Miller, 111 U. S. 398, 28 
 L. ed. 467, 4 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 426 25 
 
 V. New Orleans, 27 Fed. 411 304 
 V. New Orleans, 1 Woods, 
 
 104, Fed. Cas. No. 5,177 568 
 569 
 V. Eelf, 15 Pet. 9, 10 L. ed. 
 
 642 303 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxxi 
 
 Gaines v. Rock Spring Distilling 
 
 Co. 179 Fed. 544 415 
 
 V. Rugg, 14S U. S. 243, 37 
 
 L. ed. 437, 13 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 611 768, 772 
 
 Gale V. Southern Bldg. & L. Asso. 
 
 117 Fed. 732 ..94, 272, 273 
 323 
 Galesburg & K. Electric R. Co. 
 
 V. Hart, 136 C. C. A. 
 
 533, 221 Fed. 12 358 
 
 Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U. S. 
 
 368, 36 L. ed. 738, 12 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 873 10 
 
 Gallot V. United States, 31 C. C. 
 
 A. 44, 58 U. S. App. 243, 
 
 87 Fed. 446 675 
 
 Gallotti V. Diamond Match Co. 
 
 178 Fed. 127 816 
 
 Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 368, 21 
 
 L. ed. 963 314 
 
 Galveston H. & H. R. Co. v. Cow- 
 drey, 11 Wall. 459, 20 
 
 L. ed. 199 463 
 
 Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. 
 
 Gonzales, 151 U. S. 497, 
 
 38 L. ed. 248, 14 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 401 . . 89, 94, 96 
 110, 111, 115, 120 
 v. Texas, 170 U. S. 235, 42 
 
 L. ed. 1020, 18 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 603 823 
 
 Gambee v. Rural Independent 
 
 School Dist. 132 Fed. 
 
 514 215 
 
 Gamble v. San Diego, 79 Fed. 
 
 487 '. 408 
 
 Gamewell Fire-Alarm Teleg. Co. 
 
 Re, 20 C. C. A. Ill, 33 
 
 U. S. App. 452, 73 Fed. 
 
 908 ....614, 615, 730, 733 
 769, 770 
 V. Laporte, 42 C. C. A. 405, 
 
 102 Fed. 420 11 
 
 V. Municipal Signal Co. 23 
 
 C. C. A. 250, 33 U. S. 
 
 App. 714, 77 Fed. 492 . . 721 
 V. New York, 31 Fed. 312 430 
 Gardner v. Brown, 21 Wall. 36, 
 
 22 L. ed. 527 68 
 
 V. Goodyear Vulcanite Co. 
 
 131 U. S. ciii. appx., 21 
 
 L. ed. 141 772 
 
 Garinger v. Palmer, 61 C. C. A. 
 
 436, 126 Fed. 910 .... 559 
 Garneau v. Dozier, 100 U. S. 7, 
 
 25 L. ed. 536 713 
 
 Garner v. Second Xat. Bank. 16 
 
 C. C. A. 86, 33 U. S. 
 
 App. 91, 67 Fed. 833 . . 477 
 
 Garner v. Second Nat. Bank, 89 
 
 Fed. 636 352, 587 
 
 V. Southern Mut. Bldg. & L. 
 Asso. 28 C. C. A. 381, 
 52 U. S. App. 344, 84 
 Fed. 3 45 
 
 Garrard v. Silver Peak Mines, 76 
 
 Fed. 1 815 
 
 Garrett v. Boling, 15 C. C. A. 
 209, 37 U. S. App. 42, 
 68 Fed. 56 248 
 
 Gartaide Coal Co. v. Maxwell, 20 
 
 Fed. 187 504-506, 538 
 
 Gasquet v. Crescent City Brew- 
 ing Co. 49 Fed. 493.. 565 
 568 
 V. Fidelity Trust & S. V. 
 Co. (J C. C. A. 253, 13 
 U. S. App. 564, 57 Fed. 
 80 450, 463, 485 
 
 Gass v. Stinson, 2 Sumn. 605, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 5,261 . . 569 
 
 Gassman v. Jarvis, 100 Fed. 146 841 
 
 Gastonia Cotton Mfg. Co. v. W. 
 L. Wells Co. 63 C. C. 
 A. Ill, 128 Fed. 369.. 84 
 V. W. L. Wells Co. 198 U. S. 
 177, 49 L. ed. 1003, 25 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 640 84 
 
 Gates V. Bueki, 4 C. C. A. 116, 
 12 U. S. App. 69, 53 
 
 Fed. 961 408, 479, 633 
 
 646, 658 
 V. Jones Nat. Bank, 206 U. 
 S. 158, 51 L. ed. 1002, 
 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638.. 160 
 
 Gates Iron Works v. James E. 
 Pepper & Co. 98 Fed. 
 449 823 
 
 Gay V. Parpart, 101 U. S. 392, 
 
 25 L. ed. 841 681 
 
 Gay Mfg. Co. v. Camp, 13 C. C. 
 A. 137, 25 U. S. App. 
 134, 65 Fed. 794 . , 569, 570 
 575 
 V. Camp, 15 C. C. A. 226, 25 
 U. S. App. 376, 68 Fed. 
 67 559, 568, 570 
 
 Geepfert v. Compagnie Generale 
 Transatlantique, 156 
 Fed. 199 840 
 
 Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 
 190 U. S. 428, 47 L. 
 ed. 1122, 23 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 807 70, 116, 430 
 
 805, 815, 816 
 
 General Electric Co. v. Bullock 
 Electric Mfg. Co. 13fi 
 
 Fed. 412 415 
 
 V. Hurd, 171 Fed. 984 590 
 
Ixxxii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 General Electric Co. v. New Eng- 
 land Electric Mfg. Co. 
 
 123 Fed. 310 415 
 
 V. New England Electric 
 
 Mfg. Co. 63 C. C. A. 
 
 448, 128 Fed. 738 415 
 
 V. Westinghouse Electric & 
 
 Mfg. Co. 144 Fed. 467 30 
 400 
 General Equity Rule 75, Ee, (o) 
 
 138 C. C. A. 574, 222 
 
 Fed. 884 708 
 
 General Fire Extinguislier Co. v. 
 
 Lamar, 72 C. C. A. 501, 
 
 141 Fed. 353 567 
 
 George v. Tennessee, Coal, Iron & 
 
 R. Co. 184 Fed. 951 ... 832 
 V. Wallace, 68 C. C. A. 40, 
 
 135 Fed. 286 86, 87 
 
 Gerling v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. 
 
 See Martin v. Balti- 
 more & 0. R. Co. 
 Germain v. Wilgus, 14 C. C. A. 
 
 561, 29 U. S. App. 564, 
 
 67 Fed. 600 28 
 
 Germania F. Ins. Co. v. Francis, 
 
 11 Wall. 216, 20 L. ed. 
 
 78 78, 84 
 
 Germania Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 
 
 119 U. S. 473, 30 L. ed. 
 
 461, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 260 63 
 German Ins. Co. v. Hearne, 55 C. 
 
 C. A. 84, 118 Fed. 134 735 
 736 
 German Nat. Bank v. Speckert, 
 
 181 U. S. 407, 45 L. ed. 
 
 926, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 688 849 
 German Sav. & L. Soc. v. Dor- 
 
 mitzer, 192 U. S. 125, 
 
 48 L. ed. 373, 24 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 221 156, 160 
 
 748, 751 
 V. Dormitzer, 53 C. C. A. 
 
 639, 116 Fed. 471 .. 804 
 812, 816 
 Gest V. Packwood, 39 Fed. 536 461 
 Giant Powder Co. v. California 
 
 Vigorit Powder Co. 6 
 
 Sawy. 527, 5 Fed. 197 598 
 602 
 Gibbins v. Laughtenschlager, 75 
 
 Fed. 616 357, 361 
 
 Gibbs V. Crandall, 120 U. S. 106, 
 
 30 L. ed. 590, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 497 139 
 
 Gibson v. Bellingham & N. R Co. 
 
 213 Fed. 488 776 
 
 V. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. 
 
 131 C. C. A. 332, 215 
 
 Fed. 24 806 
 
 Gibson v. Oppenheimer, — Tex. 
 Civ. App. — . 154 S. W. 
 
 695 346 
 
 V. Shufeldt, 122 U. S. 27, 
 30 L. ed. 1083, 7 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 1066 17.5-177 
 
 179, 756 
 Gilbert v. Murphy, 100 Fed. 161 412 
 V. South Carolina Interstate 
 & W. I. Exposition Co. 
 
 113 Fed. 524 321 
 
 Gilchrist v. Helena, H. S. & S. 
 
 R. Co. 47 Fed. 593 ..117 
 118 
 Giles V. Harris, 189 U. S. 490, 
 47 L. ed. 913, 23 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 639 643 
 
 V. Little, 134 U. S. 645, 33 
 L. ed. 1062, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 623 161, 749 
 
 V. Paxson, 36 Fed. 882 . . 514 
 516, 541 
 V. Teasley, 193 U. S. 146, 48 
 L. ed. 655, 24 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 359 152, 153, 731 
 
 Gilfillan v. McKee, 159 U. S. 312, 
 40 L. ed. 163, 16 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. a 697 
 
 Gillespie v. Pocahontas Coal & 
 
 Coke Co. 162 Fed. 742 778 
 779, 802 
 Gillette v. Bate Refrigerating 
 
 Co. 12 Fed. 108 601 
 
 Gillis V. Downey, 29 C. C. A. 286, 
 56 U. S. App. 567, 85 
 Fed. 483, 19 Mor. Min. 
 
 Rep. 253 104, 259, 260 
 
 V. Stinchfield, 159 U. S. 658, 
 40 L. ed. 295, 16 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 131 159 
 
 Oilman v. Fernald, 72 C. C. A. 
 
 666, 141 Fed. 940 707 
 
 Gilmer v. Grand Rapids, 16 Fed. 
 
 708 586 
 
 Gilmore v. Bort, 134 Fed. 658 . . 350 
 
 443, 451 
 V. Herrick, 93 Fed. 526 . . 162, 
 181, 183, 257 
 Gimbel Bros. v. Adams Exp. Co. 
 
 217 Fed. 318 275, 359 
 
 Girard Life Ins. Annunity & T. 
 Co. V. Cooper, 162 U. S. 
 538, 40 L. ed. 1065, 16 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 879 57.5 
 
 Glass, Re, 119 Fed. 511 356, 360 
 
 V. Concordia Parish, 176 U. 
 S. 209, 44 L. ed. 437, 20 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 346 210 
 
 V. Woodman, 223 Fed. 621 457 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxxiii 
 
 Gleason v. Florida, 9 Wall. 779, 
 
 19 L. ed. 730 758, 759 
 
 761 
 Glendale Elastic Fabrics Co. v. 
 
 Smith, 100 U. S. 112, 
 
 25 L. ed. 5-17 639 
 
 Glover v. Patten, 165 U. S. 394, 
 
 41 L. ed. 760, 17 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 411 10 
 
 V. Sliepperd, 11 Biss. 572, 
 
 15 Fed. 833 207, 275 
 
 Godchaux v. ilorris, 57 C. C. A. 
 
 434, 121 Fed. 482 590 
 
 Goddard v. Mailler, 80 Fed. 422 04 
 97, 106, 336 
 v. Ordway, 94 U. S. 673, 24 
 
 L. ed. 238 765 
 
 V. Ordway, 101 U. S. 745, 25 
 
 L. ed. 1040 . . 586, 598, 602 
 Goebel v. American R. Supply 
 
 Co. 55 Fed. 826 285 
 
 Goeppert v. Compagnie Generale 
 
 Transatlantique, 156 
 
 Fed. 196 117, 274 
 
 Goff V. Kelly, 74 Fed. 327 444 
 
 Goins V. Southern P. Co. 198 
 
 Fed. 432 782 
 
 Goldberg v. German Ins. Co. 152 
 
 Fed. 831 793 
 
 Goldberg B. & Co. v. German Ins. 
 
 Co. 152 Fed. 831 ..786-788 
 
 829, 863 
 
 Golden v. Bruning, 72 Fed. 4 . . 224 
 
 225 
 Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. 
 
 S. 518, 39 L. ed. 517, 15 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 559 ..326, 328 
 329, 333, 793, 840, 841 
 Goldschmidt Thermit Co. v. Pri- 
 
 mos Chemical Co. 216 
 
 Fed. 382, 225 Fed. 769 27 
 29, 35, 36, 302 
 Goldsmith v. Gilliland, 10 Sawy. 
 
 606, 24 Fed. 154 413 
 
 Gombert v. Lyon, 80 Fed. 305 . . 260 
 
 860, 868 
 Gonzalez, Re, 118 Fed. 941 ... . 64 
 Re, 192 U. S. 1, 48 L. ed. 
 
 317, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 177 64 
 
 Goode V. Colorado Springs, 200 
 
 Fed. 99 74 
 
 Good Hope Co. v. Railway Barb 
 
 Fencing Co. 23 Blatchf. 
 
 43, 22 Fed. 637 .. .117, 118 
 Gooding v. Eeid, M. & Co. 101 
 
 C. C. A. 310, 177 Fed. 
 
 684 481 
 
 Goodlett V. Louisville & N. R. 
 Co. 122 U. S. 404, 30 L. 
 ed. 1232, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 1254 
 
 Goodman, Re, 42 C. C. A. 85, 
 
 101 Fed. 920 
 
 V. Niblack, 102 U. S. 556, 
 
 26 L. ed. 229 101, 
 
 345, 
 
 Goodnow V. Dolliver, 26 Fed. 470 
 
 Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U. S. 71, 
 
 53 L. ed. 914, 29 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 580 
 
 Goodwin v. Boston & M. R. Co. 
 
 127 Fed. ,986 ..79, 82, 
 
 v. Fox, 120 U. S. 775, 30 L. 
 
 ed. 815, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 779 
 
 V. Fox, 129 U. S. 630, 32 
 L. ed. 815, 9 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 567 
 
 V. New York, N. H. & H. E. 
 Co. 124 Fed. 358 ..82, 
 
 Gordan v. Jackson, 72 Fed. 89 . . 
 
 V. Smith, 10 C. C. A. 516, 23 
 
 U. S. App. 451, 62 Fed. 
 
 503 
 
 V. Third Nat. Bank, 6 C. C. 
 
 A. 125, 13 U. S. App. 
 
 554, 56 Fed. 792 
 
 Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Emery-Bird- 
 
 Thayer Dry Goods Co. 
 
 43 C. C. A. 511, 104 
 
 Fed. 243 ....571, 674, 
 
 Gorman v. Havird, 141 U. S. 208, 
 35 L. ed. 718, 11 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 943 169, 
 
 Gorman-Wright Co. v. Wright, 
 67 C. C. A. 345, 134 
 Fed. 363 209, 212, 
 
 Gormley v. Bunyan, 138' U. S. 
 
 632, 34 L. ed. 1089, 11 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 453 
 
 v. Clark, 134 U. S. 338, 33 
 
 L. ed. 909, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 554 15, 18, 
 
 Gormully & J. Mfg. Co. v. Pope 
 
 Mfg. Co. 34 Fed. 818 . . 
 
 115, 
 
 Goss Printing Press Co. v. Scott, 
 
 119 Fed. 941 
 
 Gottschalk Co. v. Distilling & 
 
 Cattle Feeding Co. 50 
 
 Fed. 681 
 
 80 
 677 
 
 265 
 
 427 
 854 
 
 749 
 109 
 
 693 
 
 714 
 
 83 
 109 
 259 
 260 
 
 192 
 
 689 
 
 714 
 732 
 
 757 
 
 722 
 732 
 
 539 
 
 259 
 
 96 
 119 
 
 562 
 
 327 
 
IXXXJY 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Gould V. Evansville & 0. E. Co. 
 91 U. S. 536, 23 L. ed. 
 
 419 276, 400 
 
 Grace v. American Cent. Ins. Co. 
 109 U. S. 284, 27 L. ed. 
 935, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 207 45, 197, 271, 732 
 
 Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 
 194, 29 L. ed. 843, 6 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 686 286 
 
 359, 360 
 Graham v. Boston, H. & E. E. 
 
 Co. 14 Fed. 754 90 
 
 V. Boston, H. & B. R. Co. 
 118 U. S. 169, 30 L. ed. 
 196, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 1009 82, 84 
 
 V. Chamberlain, 3 Wall. 710, 
 
 18 L. ed. 251 585 
 
 V. Coolidge, 30 Tex. Civ. 
 
 App. 273, 70 S. W. 231 587 
 593 
 V. La Crosse & M. R. Co. 3 
 
 Wall. 710, 16 L. ed. 251 583 
 V. Spencer, 14 Fed. 605. .332-335 
 V. Swayne, 48 C. C. A. 411, 
 
 109 Fed. 366 602, 615 
 
 Grainger v. Douglas Park Jockey 
 Club, 78 C. C. A. 199, 
 148 Fed. 513, 8 A. & E. 
 Ann. Cas. 997 .... 627, 628 
 Grand County v. King, 14 C. C. 
 A. 421, 32 U. S. App. 
 
 402, 67 Fed. 945 713 
 
 Grand Island & W. C. R. Co. v. 
 Sweeney, 37 C. C. A. 
 
 127, 95 Fed. 396 704 
 
 V. Sweeney, 43 C. C. A. 255, 
 
 103 Fed. 342- .....697, 704 
 Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Ives, 144 
 U. S. 408, 36 L. ed. 485, 
 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 679 . . 671 
 V. Twitchell, 8 C. C. A. 237, 
 21 U. S. App. 45, 59 
 
 Fed. 727 548, 837, 854 
 
 Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. 
 Chicago & E. I. R. Co. 
 73 C. C. A. 43, 141 Fed. 
 
 795 30 
 
 V. Reddick, 88 C. C. A. 80, 
 
 160 Fed. 898 647, 657 
 
 734 
 Grant v. East & West R. Co. 1 
 C. C. A. 681, 2 U. S. 
 App. 182, 50 Fed. 797 636 
 v. PhcEnix Mut. L. Ins. Co. 
 106 U. S. 431, 27 L. ed. 
 238, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 414 634 
 V. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. 
 121 U. S. 115, 30 L. ed. 
 908, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 841 518 
 
 Grant v. Spokane Nat. Bank, 47 
 
 Fed. 673 140 
 
 Grant Powder Co. v. California 
 Works, 98 U. S. 140, 25 
 
 L. ed. 83 402 
 
 Grape Creek Coal Co. v. Farm- 
 ers' Loan & T. Co. 12 
 C. C. A. 350, 24 U. S. 
 App. 38, 63 Fed. 891.. 671 
 672 
 Gravenberg v. Laws, 40 C. C. A. 
 
 240, 100 Fed. 5 ....5, 466 
 Graver v. Faurot, 64 Fed. 241, 352 
 554, 607, 616 
 V. Faurot, 162 U. S. 435, 40 
 L. ed. 1030, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 799 ....616, 735, 736 
 v. Faurot, 22 C. C. A. 156, 
 46 U. S. App. 268, 76 
 
 Fed. 262 607, 614, 617 
 
 Graves v. City & Suburban Teleg. 
 
 AsBO. 132 Fed. 389.. 74, 75 
 v. Corbin, 132 U. S. 585, 33 
 L. ed. 467, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 196 ..72, 73, 130, 221 
 815, 816 
 Gray v. Blanchard, 97 U. S. 565, 
 
 24 L. ed. 1109 171 
 
 V. Grand Forks Mercantile 
 Co. 70 C. C. A. 634, 138 
 
 Fed. 346 692 
 
 V. Havemeyer, 3 C. C. A. 
 497, 10 U. S. App. 456, 
 
 53 Fed. 178 233 
 
 V. New York Nat. Bldg. & 
 
 L. Asso. 125 Fed. 512 568 
 569, 571, 572 
 V. Schneider, 119 Fed. 474.. 292 
 Grayson v. Lynch, 163 U. S. 473, 
 41 L. ed. 232, 16 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 1064 . : 577 
 
 Great Northern R. Co. v. West- 
 ern U. Teleg. Co. 98 C. 
 C. A. 193, 174 Fed. 321 768 
 769 
 Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel 
 Co. V. Jones, 177 U. S. 
 449, 44 L. ed. 842, 20 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 690 ..85, 86 
 245, 722, 730, 731 
 V. Jones, 193 U. S. 540, 48 
 L. ed. 784, 24 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 576 361 
 
 Great Western Min. & Mfg. Co. 
 V. Harris, 198 U. S. 561, 
 49 L. ed. 1163, 25 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 770 258 
 
 Great Western Teleg. Co. v. Pur- 
 dy, 162 U. S. 334, 40 
 L. ed. 989, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 810 161, 597, 754 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxxv 
 
 Greeley v. Lowe, 155 U. S. 58, 74, 
 
 39 L. ed. 69, 75, 15 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 24 . . 19, 55-57, 102 
 104-106, 343, 346 
 Green v. Bogue, 158 U. S. 500, 39 
 
 L. ed. 1069, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 975 418, 419, 568 
 
 T. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 
 
 147 Fed. 767 116 
 
 V. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 
 
 205 U. S. 530, 51 L. ed. 
 
 916, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 595 117, 326, 328 
 
 V. Compagnia Generale Itali- 
 
 ana Di Navigation, 82 
 
 Fed. 494 510, 511 
 
 513 515 
 V. Custard, 23 How. 484, 16 
 
 L. ed. 471 7 
 
 V. Elbert, 137 U. S. 615, 34 
 
 L. ed. 792, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 188 728 
 
 V. Fisk, 103 U. S. 519, 26 L. 
 
 ed. 486 633 
 
 V. Lynn, 31 C. C. A. 248, 
 
 50 U. S. App. 380, 87 
 
 Fed. 840 662, 676, 677 
 
 703 
 V. Mills, 30 L.R.A. 90, 16 C. 
 
 C. A. 516, 25 U. S. App. 
 
 383, 69 Fed. 852 5, 
 
 V. Oemler, 151 Fed. 936 ... 
 V. Turner, 98 Fed. 756 ..15, 
 
 V. Turner, 30 C. C. A. 427, 
 49 U. S. App. 252, 86 
 Fed. 837 277, 
 
 T. Underwood, 30 C. C. A. 
 162, 57 U. S. App. 535, 
 86 Fed. 429 .. 408, 
 
 V. Valley, 101 Fed. 882 . . 
 
 V. Van Buskirk, 3 Wall. 448, 
 
 18 L. ed. 245 
 
 Green Bay & M. Canal Co. v. 
 
 Norrie, 118 Fed. 923 . . 
 
 687, 
 
 V. Patten Paper Co. 172 U. 
 
 S. 58, 43 L. ed. 364, 19 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 97 
 
 155, 156, 
 Greene v. Aurora Co. 158 Fed. 
 
 908 433, 
 
 v; United Shoe Machinery 
 Co. 60 C. C. A. 93, 124 
 Fed. 961 551, 554, 
 
 Greene County v. Kortrecht, 26 
 C. C. A. 381, 52 U. S. 
 App. 250, 81 Fed. 241 . . 
 
 655 
 
 146 
 
 16 
 
 32 
 
 426 
 
 455 
 
 797 
 798 
 
 764 I 
 
 629 
 
 153 
 
 748 
 
 434 
 
 630 
 720 
 
 178 
 
 Greene County Bank v. J. H. 
 Teasdale Commission 
 Co. 112 Fed. 801 ...169-171 
 205 
 Greenfield v. United States 
 
 Mortg. Co. 133 Fed. 785 193 
 Greenwalt v. Duncan, 5 Mc- 
 
 Crary, 132, 16 Fed. 36 449 
 v; Tucker, 3 McCrary, 450, 
 
 10 Fed. 884 63, 553 
 
 Greer, M. & Co. v. Stoller, 77 
 
 Fed. 5 233 
 
 Gregg V. Sanford, 12 C. C. A. 
 525, 28 U. S. App. 313, 
 
 65 Fed. 153 85 
 
 Gregory v. Boston Safe Deposit 
 
 & T. Co. 88 Fed. 3 .... 793 
 794 
 V. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. • 
 Co. 3 McCrary, 374, 10 
 
 Fed. 529 529 
 
 V. liartley, 113 U. S. 742, 
 28 L. ed. 1150, 5 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 743 790 
 
 V. Pike, 12 C. C. A. 202, 21 
 U. S. App. 474, 64 Fed. 
 
 415 71J 
 
 V. Pike, 25 C. C. A. 48, 50 
 U. S. App. 4, 36 C. C. 
 A. 299, 94 Fed. 373, 79 
 
 Fed. 520 485, 486 
 
 V. Pike, 15 C. C. A. 33, 21 
 U. S. App. 658, 33 U. 
 S. App. 76, 67 Fed. 839 121 
 351, 462-464, 489, 733, 831 
 V. Stetson, 133 U. S. 579, 33 
 L. ed. 792, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 422 225, 233, 234 
 
 V. Swift, 39 Fed. 708 101 
 
 233, 236 
 V. Van Ee, 160 U. S. 646, 
 40 L. ed. 567, 16 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 431 465 
 
 Grether v. Wright, 23 C. C. A. 
 498, 43 U. S. App. 770, 
 
 75 Fed. 742 12, 14, 19 
 
 Greutter, Ex parte, 217 U. S. 
 586, 54 L. ed. 892, 30 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 690 849 
 
 Griesa v. Mutui^l L. Ins. Co. 94 
 C. C. A. 635, 169 Fed. 
 
 509 26 
 
 Griffith V. Shaw, 89 Fed. 313 . . 532 
 
 542 
 Griswold v. Bacheller, 77 Fed. 
 
 857 408 
 
 V. Bacheller, 21 C. C. A. 
 428, 40 U. S. App. 142, 
 75 Fed. 473 58, 253 
 
Ixxxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Griswold v. Hazard, 141 U. S. 
 
 260, 35 L. ed. 678, 11 
 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 972 ..284, 285 
 480, 481 
 V. Hilton, 87 Fed. 257 . . . . 28 
 Groel V. United Electric Co. 132 
 
 Fed. 252 242, 243 
 
 803-805 
 Gross V. George W. Scott Mfg. 
 
 Co. 48 Fed. 39 227 
 
 V. Palmer, 105 Fed. 833 ... 536 
 Grosseup v. German Sav. Bank, 
 
 162 Fed. 951 257 
 
 Grossmayer, Re, 177 U. S. 50, 
 
 44 L. ed. 666, 20 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 535 315 
 
 Groton Bridge & Mfg. Co. v. 
 
 American Bridge Co. 
 
 137 Fed. 284 779, 784 
 
 785, 796 
 V. American Bridge Co. 151 
 
 Fed. 874 113 
 
 Grove v. Grove, 93 Fed. 865 . . 104 
 207, 208, 345 
 Grover & B. Sevping-Mach. Co. 
 
 V. Florence Sewing- 
 
 Mach. Co. See Sewing 
 
 Mach. Co.'s Case. 
 Oroves v. Sentell, 153 U. S. 485, 
 
 38 L. ed. 785, 14 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 898 489 
 
 Grvietter v. Cumberland Teleph. 
 
 & Teleg. Co. 181 Fed. 
 
 249 827, S29, 834 
 
 Guarantee Co. v. Hanway, 44 C. 
 
 C. A. 312, 104 Fed. 369 140 
 145, 795, 797, 798, 853 
 v. Mechanics Sav. Bank & T. 
 
 Co. 26 C. C. A. 146, 47 
 
 U. S. App. 91, 80 Fed. 
 
 766 814 
 
 Guarantee Co. of N. A. v. Phenix 
 
 Ins. Co. 59 C. C. A. 
 
 376, 124 Fed. 170 671 
 
 704, 773 
 Guarantee Gold Bond Loan & 
 
 Sav. Co. v. Edwards, 90 
 
 C. C. A. 585, 164 Fed. 
 
 809 574-576 
 
 Guaranty Trust & S. D. Co. v. 
 
 Green Cove Springs & 
 
 M. R. Co. 139 U. S. 137, 
 
 35 L. ed. 116, 11 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 512 342, 346 
 
 Guardian Trust Co. v. White- 
 cliffs Portland Cement 
 
 & Chalk Co. 109 Fed. 
 
 527 253 
 
 Gubbins v. Laughtenschalager, 
 
 75 Fed. 615 355, 356 
 
 359, 360, 436, 438, 550 
 Guernsey v. Cross, 153 Fed. 827 789 
 Guggenheim v. Kirchhofer, 14 C. 
 
 C. A. 72, 26 U. S. App. 
 
 664, 66 Fed. 755 071 
 
 Guion V. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. 
 
 Co. 109 U. S. 173, -i: 
 
 L. ed. 895, 3 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 108 699 
 
 Gulf & B. Valley R. Co. v. Win- 
 der, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 263, 63 S. W. 1046 .... o63 
 Gulf & S. I. R. Co. V. Hewes, 183 
 
 U. S. 66, 46 L. ed. 86, 
 
 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 26 .. 748 
 753, 761 
 Gulf, C. & S. P. R. Co. V. James, 
 
 1 C. C. A. 53, 4 U. S. 
 
 App. 19, 48 Fed. 150 . . 321 
 V. Moore, 98 Tex. 302, 83 
 
 S. W. 362, 4 Ann. Cas. 
 
 770 46 
 
 V. Rawlins, 80 Tex. 580, 16 
 
 S. W. 430 324 
 
 Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U. S. 132, 
 
 31 L. ed. 374, 8 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 379 468 
 
 Gunby v. Armstrong, 66 C. C. A. 
 
 627, 133 Fed. 417 .... 183 
 Gunn V. Black, 8 C. C. A. 542, 
 
 19 U. S. App. 489, 60 
 
 Fed. 159, 582, 669, 686 
 
 V. Brinkley Car Works & 
 
 Mfg. Co. 13 C. C. A. 529, 
 
 27 U. S. App. 779, 66 
 
 Fed. 383 559, 560 
 
 Gunnell v. Bird, 10 Wall. 308, 
 
 19 L. ed. 915 423 
 
 Gunning System v. Buffalo, 157 
 
 Fed. 251 416 
 
 Gustafson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. 
 
 R. Co. 128 Fed. 85 . . 74 
 75, 806-808, 817-819 
 
 Gutman, Re, 114 Fed. 1009 475 
 
 Gwin V. Breedlove, 15 Pet. 285, 
 
 10 L. ed. 741 715 
 
 H. 
 
 Habana, The, 175 U. S. 684, 44 
 L. ed. 322, 20 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 290 624, 642, 661 
 
 75g, 756 
 
 Haberman Mfg. Co., Re, 147 U. 
 
 S. 530, 37 L. ed. 266, 
 
 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 527 . . 628 
 
 629 
 
 Hackett v. Kuhne, 157 Fed. 317 810 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxxvii 
 
 Haddock v. Taylor, 74 Tex. 216, 
 
 11 S. VV. 1093 173 
 
 Hadfield v. Northwestern Life 
 
 Assur. Co. 105 Fed. 530 779 
 836 
 Hagan v. Walker, 14 How. 29, 14 
 
 L. ed. 312 227, 228 
 
 233 
 Hager v. Thomson, 1 Black, 94, 
 
 17 L. ed. 45 10 
 
 Hagerla v. Mississippi River 
 
 Power Co. 202 Fed. 773 147 
 776, 817, 855 
 Huggart V. Wilczinski, 74 C. C. 
 
 A. 176, 143 Fed. 22 284 
 
 Hagge V. Kansas City, S. R. Co. 
 
 104 Fed. 391 175, 189 
 
 197 
 Hagstoz V. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 
 
 179 Fed. 570 325 
 
 Haight & F. Co. v. Weiss, 84 C. 
 
 C. A. 224, 156 Fed. 328 111 
 Haire v. Rome R. Co. 57 Fed. 
 
 321 843 
 
 Hakes v. Burns, 40 Fed. 33 ... 846 
 Haldane v. United States, 16 C. 
 
 C. A. 447, 32 U. S. 
 
 App. 607, 69 Fed. 819.. 675 
 727 
 Hale V. Allison, 188 U. S. 56, 47 
 
 L. ed. 380, 23 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 244 245, 258 
 
 V. Anderson, 188 U. S. 77, 
 
 47 L. ed. 392, 23 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 244 30 
 
 V Coffin, 114 Fed. 568 235 
 
 247, 248, 249, 250 
 V. Continental Ins. Co. 16 
 
 Fed. 718 430 
 
 V. Hardon, 80 Fed. 283 .... 258 
 
 V. Tyler, 115 Fed. 835 247 
 
 248, 249, 251 
 V. Wharton, 73 Fed. 741 . . 318 
 Haley \. Breeze, 144 U. S. 130, 
 36 L. ed. 373, 12 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 836 137, 153 
 
 Hall V. Bridgeport Trust Co. 122 
 
 Fed. 163 349 
 
 V. Chattanooga Agri. Works, 
 
 48 Fed. 602 845 
 
 V. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. 
 
 Co. 149 Fed. 564 822 
 
 V. Gambrill, 34 C. C. A. 190, 
 
 63 U. S. App. 740, 92 
 
 Fed. 32 697 
 
 V. Great Northern R. Co. 197 
 
 Fed. 488 89, 809 
 
 V. Harris, 11 Tex. 303 . .254, 255 
 V. Lanning, 91 U. S. 160, 23 
 
 L. ed. 271 245 
 
 Halpin v. Ameriman, 70 C. C. A. 
 
 462, 138 Fed. 548 ..643, 653 
 Halsey v. Goddard, 8G Fed. 25 288 
 
 297 
 Halstead v. Manning, 34 Fed. 565 261 
 Halsted v. Buster, 119 U. S. 341, 
 30 L. ed. 462, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 276 197 
 
 V. Forest Hill Co. 48 C. C. 
 
 A. 681, 109 Fed. 820 . . 599 
 602, 609 
 HambletoTn v. Duham, 10 Sawy. 
 
 489, 22 Fed. 465 274 
 
 Hamblin v. Western Land Co. 
 
 ' 147 U. S. 531, 37 L. ed. 
 
 267, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 353 138, 130, 158, 160 
 
 166, 553, 750 
 Hamilton v. Brown, 3 C. C. A. 
 639, 2 U. S. App. 540, 
 
 53 Fed. 753 658, 663 
 
 V. Fowler, 83 Fed. 321 .... 780 
 786, 787, 795 
 V. Levison, 198 Fed. 444 . . 244 
 V. Savannah, F. & W. R. Co. 
 
 49 Fed. 417 230, 232 
 
 V. Southern Nevada Gold & 
 S. Min. Co. 13 Sawy. 
 113, 33 Fed. 568, 15 
 Mor. Min. Rep. 314 ... 357 
 439, 567, 571 
 Hamilton Gaslight & Coke Co. 
 V. Hamilton, 146 U. S. 
 258, 36 L. ed. 963, 13 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90 .... 164 
 Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Massa- 
 chusetts, 6 Wall. 632, 
 
 18 L. ed. 904 156 
 
 Hamilton Trust Co. v. Cornuco- 
 pia Mines Co. 1 C. C. A. 
 
 — , 223 Fed. 494 698 
 
 Hamlin v. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. 
 R. Co. 36 L.R.A. 826, 
 24 C. C. A. 271, 47 V. 
 8. App. 422, 78 Fed. 
 
 667 423, 462, 638, 702 
 
 Hamm v. J. Stone & Sons Live 
 Stock Co. 18 Tex. Civ. 
 App. 241, 45 S. W. 330 568 
 Hammerstein v. Lyne, 200 Fed. 
 
 165 124 
 
 Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U. S. 
 251, 36 L. ed. 145, 12 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418 281 
 
 V. Johnston, 142 U. S. 73, 
 35 L. ed. 941, 12 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 141 ..137, 749, 750 
 T. Whittredge, 204 U. S. 
 538, 51 L. ed. 606, 27 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 396 .... 753 
 
Ixxxviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Hampton Roads R. & Electric 
 
 Co. V. Newport News & 
 
 0. P. R. & Electric Co. 
 
 131 Fed. 534 181 
 
 Hampton Stave Co. v. Gardner, 
 
 83 C. C. A. 521, 154 Fed. 
 
 806 170, 171 
 
 Hanchett v. Blair, 41 C. 0. A. 
 
 76, 100 Fed. 817 129 
 
 397, 429 
 Hancock v. Holbrook, 112 U. S. 
 
 231, 28 L. ed. 715, 5 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 115 274 
 
 Handley v. Stutz, 137 U. S. 366, 
 ■ 34 L. ed. 706, 11 Supi 
 
 Ct. Rep. 117 176, 194 
 
 Hanford v. Davies, 163 U. S. 
 
 273, 41 -L. ed. 157, 16 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1051 . . 45 
 50, 146, 151, 159, 161, 197 
 Hanks Dental Asso. v. Interna- 
 tional Tooth Crown Co. 
 
 194 U. S. 309, 48 L. ed. 
 
 991, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 700 506, 507, 508, 512 
 
 790 
 Hanover Nat. Bank v. Credits 
 
 Commutation Co. 118 
 
 Fed. 110 816 
 
 Hanrick v. Hanrick, 153 U. S. 
 
 196, 38 L. ed. 687, 14 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 835 ..71, 844 
 V. Patrick, 119 U. S. 164, 30 
 
 L. ed. 402, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 147 697, 698 
 
 Hans V. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 9, 
 
 33 L. ed. 845, 10 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 504 ... 39, 63 
 
 Hansford v. Stone-Ordean-Wells 
 
 Co. 201 Fed. 185 782 
 
 Hapgood v. Berry, 85 C. C. A. 
 
 171, 157 Fed. 807 32 
 
 Haracovic v. Standard Oil Co. ' 
 
 105 Fed. 785 859 
 
 Hardee v. Wilson, 146 U. S. 179, 
 
 36 L. ed. 933, 13 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 34 697, 705 
 
 Hardeman v. Harris, 7 How. 728, 
 
 12 L. ed. 889 433 
 
 Hardenberg v. Ray, 33 Fed. 814 314 
 Hardenbergh v. Ray, 151 U. S. 
 
 112, 38 L. ed. 93, 14 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 305 . .60, 236 
 Hardin v. Boyd, 113 U. S. 756, 
 
 28 L. ed. 1141, 5 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 771 284, 288 
 
 289, 355, 356, 359, 361 
 V. Cass County, 42 Fed. 652 173 
 
 Harding, Ex parte, 219 U. S. 363, 
 55 L. ed. 252, 37 L.R.A. 
 (N.S.) 392, 31 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 324 849 
 
 v. Corn Products Mfg. Co. 
 117 C. C. A. 332, 198 
 
 Fed. 628 849 
 
 V. Corn Products Ref. Co. 94 
 C. C. A. 144, 168 Fed. 
 
 659 480 
 
 V. Guice, 25 C. C. A. 352, 
 42 U. S. App. 411, 80 
 
 Fed. 164 19, 259, 260 
 
 V. Hart, 187 U. S. 638, 47 
 L. ed. 344, 23 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 846 621, 742 
 
 V. Illinois, 196 U. S. 78, 49 
 L. ed. 394, 25 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 176 751 
 
 V. Standard Oil Co. 182 
 
 Fed. 421 51, 97, 125 
 
 V. Standard Oil Co. 170 Fed. 
 
 651 815, 834 
 
 Hardt v. Heidmeyer, 152 U. S. 
 560, 38 L. ed. 552, 14 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 671 ..281, 401 
 Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U. S. 476, 
 
 25 L. ed. 237 122, 330 
 
 332 
 Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U. S. 
 148, 43 L. ed. 399, 19 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119 .... 477 
 Harley v. Home Ins. Co. 125 Fed. 
 
 792 821 
 
 Harman v. Lewis, 24 Fed. 530 . . 598 
 
 599 
 Harper v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. 
 
 36 Fed. 103 59 
 
 Harriman v. Northern Securities 
 Co. 197 U. S. 244, 49 
 L. ed. 739, 25 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 493 631, 737 
 
 Harrington v. Great Northern 
 
 R. Co. 169 Fed. 714 .. 801 
 808 
 Harris v. Hardeman, 14 How. 
 
 334, 14 L. ed. 444 .... 
 
 319 
 
 
 346 
 
 v. Rosenberger, 13 L.R.A. 
 
 
 . (N.S.) 762, 76 C. C. A. 
 
 
 225, 145 Fed. 449 .... 
 
 158 
 
 641, 646, 657, 
 
 659 
 
 Harrison v. Clarke, 105 C. C. A. 
 
 
 197, 182 Fed. 768 .... 
 
 769 
 
 V. Clarke, 90 C. C. A. 413, 
 
 
 164 Fed. 539 
 
 582 
 
 V. Lokey, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 
 404, 63 S. W. 1030 .... 
 
 478 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Lxxxix 
 
 Harrison v. Morton, 171 U. S. 47, 
 
 43 L. eJ. 66, 18 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 742. .153, 156, 753 
 V. Perea, 168 U. S. 318, 42 
 
 L. ed. 481, 18 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 129 348 
 
 V. Remington Paper Co. 3 
 
 L.R.A.{N.S.) 954, 72 C. 
 
 C. A. 405, 140 Fed. 399, 
 
 5 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 
 
 314 17, 146, 410 
 
 V. Rowan, 4 Wash. 0. C. 202, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 6143 250 
 
 V. Stewart, 93 U. S. 160, 
 
 23 L. ed. 845 252 
 
 Harry Bros. Co. v. Yaryan Naval 
 
 Stores Co. 135 C. C. A. 
 
 454, 219 Fed. 884 619 
 
 Hart V. Bowen, 31 C. C. A. 31, 
 
 58 U. S. App. 184, 86 
 
 Fed. 877 672 
 
 V. Sansom, 110 U. S. 154, 
 
 28 L. ed. 103, 3 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 586 589 
 
 Hartel v. Tilghman, 99 U. S. 
 
 555, 25 L. ed. 360 160 
 
 Harter Twp. v. Kernociian, 103 
 
 U. S. 566, 26 L. ed. 412 66 
 805 
 Hartford & C. W. R. Co. v. Mon- 
 tague, 94 Fed. 227 787 
 
 Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Bonner 
 Mercantile Co. 11 L.R.A. 
 
 623, 44 Fed. 155 11 
 
 T. Erie R. Co. 172 Fed. 899 175 
 
 217 
 V. Perkins, 125 Fed. 502 . . 322 
 Hartman v. Feenaughty, 139 Fed. 
 
 887 500, 544 
 
 Hartog V. Memory, 23 Fed. 835 91 
 V. Memory, 116 U. S. 588, 
 
 29 L. ed. 725, 6 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 521 199, 200 
 
 549, 550, 554 
 Harton v. Hawley, 155 Fed. 493 125 
 Hartz V. Cleveland Block Co. 37 
 C. C. A. 227, 95 Fed. 
 
 682 417 
 
 Harv^ V. Raleigh & G. R. Co. 
 
 89 Fed. 115 176, 197 
 
 243 
 V. Richmond & M. R. Co. 64 
 
 Fed. 20 207, 264 
 
 Haskins v. St. Louis & S. E. R. 
 Co. 109 U. S. 107, 27 L. 
 ed. 873, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 72 665, 682, 692 
 
 Hastings v. Ames, 15 C. C. A. 
 628, 32 U. S. App. 485, 
 
 68 Fed. 728 148, 652 
 
 653, 659 
 Hatch V. Bancroft-Thompson Co. 
 
 67 Fed. 805 426 
 
 V. Indianapolis & S. E. Co. 
 
 11 Biss. 138, 9 Fed. 856 558 
 
 569, 571 
 
 Hatcher v. Hendrie & B. Mfg. & 
 
 Supply Co. 68 C. C. A. 
 
 19, 133 Fed. 267 ..789, 864 
 
 v. Wadley, 84 Fed. 913 . . 788 
 
 80D 
 Hat-Sweat Mfg. Co. v. Waring, 
 
 46 Fed. 87 351 
 
 Havnor v. New York, 170 U. S. 
 411, 42 L. ed. 1088, 18 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 631 758 
 
 759, 761 
 Hawes v. Contra Costa Water 
 Co. See Hawes v. Oak- 
 land. 
 V. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450, 
 
 26 L. ed. 827 241, 242 
 
 Hawkeye Gold Dredging Co. v. 
 
 State Bank, 157 Fed. 
 
 253 32 
 
 Hawkins v. Cleveland C. C. & St. 
 
 L. R. Co. 39 C. C. A. 
 
 538, 99 Fed. 324 ..769, 770 
 V. Peirce, 79 Fed. 452 ..321, 841 
 Hayden v. Androscoggin Mills, 1 
 
 Fed. 93 110 
 
 V. Brown, 94 Fed. 15 160 
 
 V. Manning, 106 U. S. 589, 
 
 27 L. ed. 307, 1 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 617 62, 553 
 
 V. Thompson, 67 Fed. 273 . . 295 
 
 298 
 Hayes v. Pratt, 147 U. S. 570, 
 37 L. ed. 284, 13 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 503 . .249, 250, 252 
 Hayne v. Old Dominion Co. 204 
 
 Fed. 682 208 
 
 Haynes v. Brewster, 46 Fed. 473 400 
 Hayward v. Andrews, 106 U. S. 
 675, 27 L. ed. 272, 1 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 544 25 
 
 V. McDonald, 113 C. C. A. 
 
 368, 192 Fed. 891 284 
 
 489 
 V. Nordberg Mfg. Co. 29 C. 
 C. A. 438, 54 U. S. App. 
 
 639, 85 Fed. 9 169, 170 
 
 172, 174, 178, 185, 550, 824 
 
 825 
 
 Hazard v. Durant, 25 Fed. 26.. 413 
 
 V. Durant, 19 Fed. 476 .. 101 
 
 253 
 
xc 
 
 TABLE OF OASES. 
 
 Hazeltine v. Mississippi Valley 
 
 F. Ins. Co. 55 Fed. 749 117 
 118 
 Hazelton Tripod Boiler Co. v. 
 
 Citizens' Street K. Co. 
 
 72 Fed. 325 366, 368 
 
 373, 377, 378, 551 
 H. B. Claflin Co. v. Furtick, 119 
 
 Fed. 433 15 
 
 Head v. Selleck, 110 Fed. 786 . . 794 
 Headrick v. Larson, 81 C. C. A. 
 
 378, 152 Fed. 93 31 
 
 Healy v. McCormick, 157 Fed. 
 
 318 836 
 
 Hecker v. Fowler, 2 Wall. 132, 
 
 17 L. ed. 761 564 
 
 Hedges v. Seibert Cylinder Oil 
 
 Cup Co. 1 C. C. A. 594, 
 
 3 U. S. App. 25, 50 Fed. 
 
 643 697, 698 
 
 Heffelfinger v. Choctaw, A. & G. 
 
 K. Co. 140 Fed. 75 .. 816 
 817, 823 
 Hefner v. Northwestern Mut. L. 
 
 Ins. Co. 123 U. S. 756, 
 
 31 L. ed. 313, 8 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 337 389 
 
 Heidritter v. Elizabeth Oil Cloth 
 
 Co. 112 U. S. 294, 28 L. 
 
 ed. 729, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 135 480 
 
 Heinze v. Butte & B. Consol. 
 
 Min. Co. 46 C. C. A. 
 
 219, 107 Fed. 167 . .626, 632 
 V. Butte & B. Consol. Min. 
 
 Co. 61 C. C. A. 63, 126 
 
 Fed. 6 455 
 
 Hekking v. Pfafif, 43 L.E.A. 618, 
 
 33 C. C. A. 328, 50 U. 
 
 S. App. 484, 91 Fed. 
 
 60 478 
 
 Helena v. Helena Waterworks 
 
 Co. 97 C. C. A. 320, 173 
 
 Fed. 18 186 
 
 Helena Power Transmission Co. 
 
 V. Spratt, 146 Fed. 311 802 
 816, 859, 863 
 Heller v. Ilwaco Mill & Lumber 
 
 Co. 178 Fed. 112 778 
 
 Helms V. Northern P. R. Co. 120 
 
 Fed. 395 814, 818, 819 
 
 Henderson v. Cabell, 43 Fed. 257 812 
 
 839 
 V. Carbondale Coal & Coke 
 
 Co. 140 U. S. 25, 35 L. 
 
 ed. 332, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 
 691 175, 585, 598 
 
 V. Goode, 49 Fed. 887 468 
 
 V. 300 Tons of Iron Ore, 38 
 
 Fed. 40 369 
 
 Henderson v. Wadsworth, 115 U. 
 
 S. 276, 29 L. ed. 379, 6 
 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 140 177 
 
 Hendrickson v. Bradley, 29 C. 
 
 C. A. 303, 55 U. S. App. 
 
 715, 85 Fed. 508 242 
 
 Hendryx v. Perkins, 59 C. C. A. 
 
 266, 123 Fed. 268 732 
 
 V. Perkins, 52 C. C. A. 435, 
 
 114 Fed. 809 478, 607 
 
 609, 610, 611, 613, 618, 733 
 Hennessy v. Herrmann, 89 Fed. 
 
 669 191 
 
 V. Eichardson Drug Co. 189 
 
 U. S. 34, 47 L. ed. 698, 
 
 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. '532 . . 88 
 91, 272, 640, 643, 645 
 V. Tacoma Smelting & Eef. 
 
 Co. 129 Fed. 40 408 
 
 Henning v. Boyle, 112 Fed. 397 544 
 Henningsen v. United States 
 
 Fidelity & G. Co. 208 
 
 U. S. 404, 52 L. ed. 547, 
 
 28 Sup. Ct. Eep. 389 . . 734 
 Henrie v. Henderson, 76 C. C. 
 
 A. 196, 145 Fed. 316 .. 45 
 Henrietta Min. & Mill. Co. v. 
 
 Johnson, 173 U. S. 221, 
 
 43 L. ed. 675, 19 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 402 327 
 
 Henry v. Alabama & V. E. Co. 
 
 164 U. S. 701, 41 L. ed. 
 
 1180, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 
 994 694 
 
 V. Travelers' Ins. Co. 45 Fed. 
 
 302 368, 370, 371, 374 
 
 Herbert v. Eainey, 54 Fed. 248 . . 174 
 
 188, 196 
 Herndon v. Eidgeway, 17 How. 
 
 425, 15 L. ed. 100 103 
 
 V. Southern E. Co. 73 Fed. 
 
 307 846 
 
 Herold v. Kahn, 90 C. C. A. 307, 
 
 163 Fed. 947 772 
 
 Herron v. Comstoek, 71 C. C. A. 
 
 466, 139 Fed. 371 249 
 
 Hershberger v. Blewett, 55 Fed. 
 
 172 351 
 
 Hess V. Eeynolds, 113 U. S. 73, 
 
 28 L. ed. 927, 5 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 377 250 
 
 Hewitt V. Filbert, 116 U. S. 143, 
 
 29 L. ed. 582, 6 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 319 665, 694, 695 
 
 V. Story, 39 Fed. 160 550 
 
 H. G. Balder & Bro. v. Pink- 
 ham, 211 Fed. 728 .... 810 
 829 
 Hicklin v. Marco, 64 Fed. 609 . . 585 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XCl 
 
 Hicklin v. Marco, 6 C. C. A. 10, 
 15 U. S. App. 55, 56 
 Fed. 553.. 101, 225, 227, 228 
 231, 232, 356 
 Hickman v. Missouri, K. & T. 
 
 R. Co. 97 Fed. 113 .... 781 
 Hicks v. Otto, 85 Fed. 728 . .439, 600 
 Higbee v. Chadwick, 136 C. C. A. 
 
 317, 220 Fed. 874 . . 698, 699 
 Higgins V. Baltimore & 0. R. 
 
 Co. 99 Fed. 641 231, 245 
 
 805, 815 
 Higham v. Iowa State Traveler's 
 
 Asso. 183 Fed. 847 . . 320 
 325 
 Highland Boy Gold Min. Co. v. 
 Strickley, 54 C. C. A. 
 
 186, 116 Fed. 854 33 
 
 Higson V. North River Ins. Co. 
 
 184 Fed. 169 778 
 
 Hill V. Chicago & E. R. Co. 140 
 U. S. 54, 35 L. ed. 332, 
 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 690 . . 635 
 637, 707, 715 
 V. Chicago & E. R. Co. 129 
 U. S. 174, 32 L. ed. 653, 
 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269 . . 681 
 707 
 V. Empire State-Idaho Min. 
 
 6 Developing Co. 156 
 Fed. 797 112 
 
 v. Gordon, 45 Fed. 276 ... 319 
 
 320 
 
 v. Kuhlman, 31 C. C. A. 87, 
 59 U. S. App. 82, 87 
 Fed. 498 484 
 
 V. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 55 C. 
 f. C. A. 536, 118 Fed. 
 
 7 770 
 
 V. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 113 
 
 Fed. 44 770 
 
 V. Phelps, 41 C. C. A. 569, 
 
 101 Fed. 652 583, 605 
 
 606, 612 
 V. Ryan Grocery Co. 23 C. 
 C. A. 624, 41 U. S. App. 
 714, 78 Fed. 27 ..425, 449 
 V. Walker, 92 C. C. A. 633, 
 
 167 Fed. 241 200, 274 
 
 802 
 Hilliker v. Hale, 54 C. C. A. 252, 
 
 117 Fed. 220 258 
 
 Hilton V. Dickinson, 108 U. S. 
 165, 27 L. ed. 688, 2 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 424 .... 169 
 170, 173, 178, 703 
 V. Guyott, 42 Fed. 2.50 .... 413 
 Hinckley v. Oilman, C. & S. R. 
 Co. 94 U. S. 469, 24 L. 
 ed. 166 703 
 
 Hinds V. Keith, 6 C. C. A. 231, 
 
 13 U. S. App. 222, 57 
 
 Fed. 11 733 
 
 Hipp V. Babin, 19 How. 278, 15 
 
 L. ed. 635 25 
 
 Hirsch v. Independent Steel Co. 
 
 196 Fed. 104 241 
 
 Hirschl v. J. I. Case Threshing 
 
 Mach. Co. 42 Fed. 803 78 
 H. L. Bruett & Co. v. F. C. Aus- 
 tin Drainage Excavator 
 
 Co. 174 Fed. 669 86 
 
 Hoadley v. Day, 128 Fed. 302 . . 213 
 Hoadly V. Chase, 126 Fed. 818 . . 828 
 Hoard, Ex parte, 105 U. S. 578, 
 
 26 L. ed. 1176 849 
 
 Hobart v. Illinois C. R. Co. 81 
 
 Fed. 5 844, 845 
 
 Hobbs V. State Trust Co. 15 C. 
 
 C. A. 604, 30 U. S. App. 
 
 393, 68 Fed. 618 608 
 
 Hobbs Mfg. Co. V. Gooding, 100 
 
 C. C. A. 83, 176 Fed. 
 
 264 276, 349 
 
 V. Gooding, 164 Fed. 93 . . . 482 
 Hobe-Peters Land Co. v. Farr, 
 
 170 Fed. 644 213 
 
 Hocking Valley R. Co. v. New 
 
 York Coal Co. 132 C. C. 
 
 A. 387, 217 Fed. 731 . . 21 
 Hodge v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 57 
 
 C. C. A. 388, 121 Fed. 
 
 48 836 
 
 Hodges V. Kimball, 34 C. C. A. 
 
 103, 63 U. S. App. 688, 
 
 91 Fed. 851 357 
 
 V. Vaughan, 19 Wall. 12, 22 
 
 L. ed. 46 713 
 
 Hoe V. Kahler, 27 Fed. 145 .... 708 
 V. Scott, 87 Fed. 220 ..558, 562 
 
 563 
 Hoffman v. Knox, 1 C. C. A. 535, 
 
 8 U. S. App. 19, 50 Fed. 
 
 484 605, 608 
 
 Hoge v. Canton Ins. OflSce, 103 
 
 Fed. 513 820 
 
 V. Magnes, 29 C. C. A. 564, 
 
 56 U. S. App. 500, 85 
 
 Fed. 355 672, 675 
 
 Hogg V. Hoag, 107 Fed. 814 .... 443 
 
 450 
 V. Hoag, 83 C. C. A. 677, 154 
 
 Fed. 1003 450 
 
 Hohorst, Re, 150 U. S. 653, 37 L. 
 
 ed. 1211, 14 Sup, Ct. 
 
 Rep. 221 46, 88, 89 
 
 95, 96, 119, 120, 326, 329 
 
XCll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Hohorst V. Hamburg-American 
 Packet Co. 148 U. S. 
 265, 37 L. ed. 445, 13 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 590.. 582, 634 
 637, 638 
 V. Howard, 37 Fed. 97 ..28, 29 
 Holden v. Utah & M. Machinery 
 
 Co. 82 Fed. 210 ... . 169-174 
 178, 185, 200, 205, 550 
 Holgate V. Eaton, 116 U. S. 42, 
 29 L. ed. 540, 6 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 224 456 
 
 Holladay Case, The, 27 Fed. 842 534 
 
 539, 540, 542 
 
 Holland V. Challen, 110 U. S. 
 
 21, 28 L. ed. 54, 3 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 495 .... 18, 19, 260 
 
 Hollander v. Baiz, 40 Fed. 659 . . 516 
 
 535 
 Holliday v. Batson, 4 How. 645, 
 
 11 L. ed. 1140 717 
 
 Hollingaworth v. Barbour, 4 Pet. 
 
 473, 7 L. ed. 925 346 
 
 V. Southern R. Co. 86 Fed. 
 
 353 78, 79, 83, 84 
 
 Hollins V. Brierfield Coal & I. 
 Co. 150 U. 8. 379, 37 
 L. ed. 115, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 127 18 
 
 Holly Mfg. Co. V. New Chester 
 
 Water Co. 48 Fed. 880 254 
 255 
 Holmes v. Goldsmith, 147 U. S. 
 157, 37 L. ed. 120, 13 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 288 . .214, 220 
 221 
 V. Oregon & C. R. Co. 9 Fed. 
 
 229 96 
 
 V. Southern R. Co. 125 Fed. 
 
 301 842, 844 848 
 
 Holt V. Bergevin, 60 Fed. 2 175 
 
 V. Indiana Mfg. Co. 176 XJ. 
 S. 72, 40 L. ed. 376, 20 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 272.. 168, 186 
 Holton V. Davis, 47 C. C. A. 246, 
 
 108 Fed. 150 617, 618 
 
 478 
 V. Guinn, 65 Fed. 451 . . 422, 426 
 V. Helvetia-Swiss F. Ins. 
 
 Co. 163 Fed. 660 ..274, 809 
 V. Wallace, 66 Fed. 409 ... 297 
 Holyoke & S. H. F. Ice Co. v. 
 Ambden, 21 L.R.A. 319, 
 
 55 Fed. 593 316 
 
 Home & F. Invest. & Agency Co. 
 
 V. Ray, 69 Fed. 657 179 
 
 Home for Incurables v. New 
 York, 187 U. S. 155, 47 
 Li ed. 117, 63 L.R.A. 
 . 329, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 84 761 
 
 Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall, 
 
 454, 22 L. ed. 369 .... 782 
 V. Nobles, 63 Fed. 641 . . 198, 361 
 V. Virginia-Carolina Chemi- 
 cal Co. 109 Fed. 682 .. 300 
 y. Virginia-Carolina Chemi- 
 cal Co. 51 C. C. A. 21, 
 
 113 Fed. 5 300 
 
 Home Land & Cattle Co. v. Me- 
 
 Namara, 49 C. C. A. 642, 
 
 111 Fed. 822 ..570, 572, 578 
 Home L. Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 19 
 
 Wall. 224, 22 L. ed. 69 785 
 Home Street R. Co. v. Lincoln, 
 
 89 C. C. A. 133, 162 
 
 Fed. 133 586, 604, 605 
 
 Hone V. Dillon, 29 Fed. 465 ... 380 
 
 381 
 Honeyman v. Colorado Fuel & I. 
 
 Co. 133 Fed. 96 329 
 
 Hooe V. Jamison, 166 U. S. 397, 
 
 41 L. ed. 1050, 17 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 596 . . 54, 64, 632 
 Hoogendorn v. Daniel, 120 C. C. 
 
 A. 537, 202 Fed. 432 702 
 Hook V. Ayers, 12 C. C. A. 564, 
 
 24 U. S. App. 487, 64 
 
 Fed. 661 18 
 
 V. Mercantile Trust Co. 36 
 
 C. C. A. 645, 95 Fed. 
 
 41 601, 697, 698, 704 
 
 Hooker v. Barr, 194 U. S. 415, 
 
 48 L. ed. 1046, 24 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 706 597 
 
 V. Los Angeles, 188 U. S. 
 
 318, 47 L. ed. 491, 63 
 
 L.R.A. 471, 23 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 395 159, 165, 754 
 
 Hooper v. Remmel, 91 C. C. A. 
 
 322, 165 Fed. 338 .... 659 
 Hooven, 0. & R. Co. v. John 
 
 Featherstone's Sons, 49 
 
 C. C. A. 229, 111 Fed. 
 
 81 633, 637 
 
 Hope Ins. Co. v. Boardman, 5 
 
 Cranch, 57, 3 L. ed. 36 76 
 Hopkins v. Hebard, 114 C. C. A. 
 
 261, 194 Fed. 301 .... 607 
 ■ V. United States, 171 U. S. 
 
 578, 43 L. ed. 290, 19 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40 46 
 
 Hoppenstedt v. Fuller, 17 C. C. 
 
 A. 623, 36 U. S. App. 
 
 271, 71 Fed. 99 127 
 
 Horn V. Detroit Dry Dock Co. 
 
 150 U. S. 625, 37 L. ed. 
 
 1203, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 214 405, 416, 418 
 
 V. Lockhart, 17 Wall. 570, 
 
 21 L. ed. 657 ..67, 230, 232 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XClll 
 
 Horn V. Pere Marquette R. Co. 
 
 151 Fed. 634 471 
 
 Home v. George H. Hammond 
 
 Co. 155 U. S. 393, 39 L. 
 
 ed. 197, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 
 167 52, 125, 12(5, 274 
 
 Horner v. United States, 143 U. 
 
 S. 570, 36 L. ed. 260, 12 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522 . . 652, 654 
 Horner-Gaylord Co. v. Miller, 
 
 147 Fed. 295 299 
 
 Hornthall v. Keary. See Horn- 
 
 thall V. The Collector. 
 V. Tlie Collector, 9 Wall. 
 
 566, 19 L. ed. 562 555 
 
 Horst V. Merkley, 59 Fed. 503.. 171 
 
 199 
 Hoskin v. Fisher, 125 U. S. 217, 
 
 31 L. ed. 759, 8 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 834 718 
 
 Hosmer v. Wyoming R. & I. Co. 
 
 65 C. C. A. 81, 129 Fed. 
 
 888 31 
 
 Hostetter Co. v. Comerford, 99 
 
 Fed. 834 600 
 
 V. E. G. Lyons Co. 99 Fed. 
 
 735 412 
 
 Houghton V. . Whitin Mach. 
 
 Works, 160 Fed. 227 . . 350 
 House V. Mullen, 22 Wall. 46, 22 
 
 L. ed. 839 262, 427 
 
 Houston V. Emery, 76 Tex. 282, 
 
 13 S. W. 264 323 
 
 T. Filer & S. Co. 85 Fed. 757 318 
 
 327 
 V. Filer & S. Co. 43 C. C. A. 
 
 457, 104 Fed. 163 . . 52, 730 
 812 
 Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Shir- 
 ley, 111 U. S. 358, 28 
 
 L. ed. 455, 4 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 472 854 
 
 V. Texas, 177 U. S.' 66, 44 
 
 L. ed. 673, 20 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 545 151, 164 
 
 Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 443, 
 
 42 L. ed. 229, 17 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Eep. 841 392 
 
 V. McDonald, 109 U. S. 150, 
 
 27 L. ed. 888, 3 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 136 629, 687, 703 
 
 740 
 
 Howard v. Carroll, 195 Fed. 
 
 647 
 
 178 
 
 V. Gold Reefs, 102 Fed. 
 
 657 
 
 778 
 
 V. Milwaukee & St. P. R 
 
 Co. 
 
 
 101 U. S. 849, 25 L 
 
 ed. 
 
 
 1085 
 
 1 
 
 235 
 
 V. National Teleph. Co. 
 
 182 
 
 
 Fed. 221 
 
 
 242 
 
 Howard v. Stilhvell & B. Mfg. Co. 
 139 U. S. 205, 35 L. ed. 
 149, 11 Sup. Ct. Hep. 
 
 500 506, 542 
 
 y. United States, 184 U. S. 
 676, 46 L. ed. 754, 22 
 Sup. Ct. Rep^ 543 . . 141, 740 
 Howe V. Howe & 0. Ball Bearing 
 Co. 83 C. C. A. 438, 154 
 Fed. 822.. 231, 274, 549, 550 
 Howe & D. Co. V. Haugan, 140 
 
 Fed. 183 52, 209 
 
 Howth V. Owens, 29 Fed. 724 250 
 
 426 
 V. Owens, 30 Fed. 911 . . 352, 380 
 
 726 
 H. Scherer & Co. v. Everest, 94 
 C. C. A. 346, 168 Fed. 
 
 822 538, 547 
 
 Hubb V. Bidwell, 81 C. C. A. 43, 
 
 151 Fed. 564 465 
 
 Hubbard v. Central R. Co. 135 
 
 Fed. 256 789 
 
 V. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. 
 
 Co. 176 Fed. 994 ..829, 830 
 832, 833, 834 
 V. Manhattan Trust Co. 30 
 C. C. A. 520, 57 U. S. 
 App. 730, 87 Fed. 51.. 235 
 261, 262, 281, 360, 364, 397 
 V. Tod, 171 U. S. 494, 43 L. 
 ed. 253, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 
 14 740 
 
 V. Urton, 67 Fed. 425 . .284, 288 
 
 Hubbell V. De Land, 11 Biss. 
 
 382, 14 Fed. 475 407 
 
 Huber v. Texas & P. R. Co. — 
 Tex. Civ. App. — , 113 
 S. W. 984 797 
 
 Hudgins v. Kemp, 18 How. 535, 
 
 15 L. ed. 513 669, 683 
 
 689, 719, 731 
 Hudson V. Limestone Natural 
 
 Gas Co. 75 C. C. A. 678, 
 
 144 Fed. 952 662 
 
 V. Parker, 156 U. S. 284, 39 
 
 L. ed. 426, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 450, 9 Am. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 91 683 
 
 V. Randolph, 13 C. C. A. 
 
 402, 23 U. S. App. 681, 
 
 66 Fed. 216 259, 260 
 
 V. Wood, 119 Fed. 764. .292, 590 
 Huff V. Bidwell, 81 C. C. A. 43, 
 
 351 Fed. 564, 103 Fed. 
 
 363 180 
 
 V. Bidwell, 103 C. C. A. 520, 
 
 380 Fed. 374 734 
 
 V. Union Nat. Bank, 173 
 
 Fed. 336 145, 157 
 
XCIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Hughes V. Green, 28 C. C. A. 
 537, 56 tJ. S. App. 56, 
 
 84 Fed. 833 479 
 
 V. Northern P. E. Co. 18 
 
 Fed. 110 .• 287 
 
 V. Pepper Tobacco Ware- 
 house Co. 126 Fed. 687 826 
 Huguley v. Galeton Cotton Mills, 
 184 U. S. 295, 46 L. ed. 
 5*48, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 452 652, 744 
 
 Huguley Mfg. Co., Re, 184 U. S. 
 301, 46 L. ed. 551, 22 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 455 772 
 
 V. Galeton Cotton Mills, 184 
 U. S. 295, 46 L. ed. 548, 
 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 452.. 621 
 641, 652, 653, 657, 658, 734 
 741, 742 
 •Hukill V. Maysville, & B. S. R. 
 
 Co. 72 Fed. 745 . . . 807, 859 
 862 
 Hulbert v. Chicago, 202 U. S. 
 275, 50 L. ed. 1026, 26 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617 762 
 
 Hultberg v. Anderson, 170 Fed. 
 
 657 104, 213, 299 
 
 Humane Bit Co. v. Barnet, 117 
 
 Fed. 316 312, 480 
 
 Humes v. Ft. Smith, 93 Fed. 857 187 
 
 190 
 V. Little Rock, 138 Fed. 929 18 
 V. Third Nat. Bank, 4 C. C. 
 A. 668, 13 U. S. App. 
 
 86, 54 Fed. 917 697 
 
 Hunnewell v. New York C. & H. 
 
 R. R. Co. 196 Fed. 543 241 
 Hunt V. Illinois C. R. Co. 37 
 G. C. A. 548, 96 Fed. 
 
 647 703 
 
 V. Kile, 38 C. C. A. 641, 98 
 
 Fed. 49 710 
 
 V. New York Cotton Exch. 
 205 U. S. 322, 51 L. ed. 
 821, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 .529, 144 Fed. 511 190 
 
 Himter v. Robbins, 117 Fed. 922 58 
 
 231 
 
 V. Russell, 59 Fed. 966 314 
 
 Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 
 
 666, 36 L. ed. 1127, 13 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 224 . .155, 161 
 
 V. Laidley, 176 U. S. 676, 44 
 
 L. ed. 634, 20 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 526 642, 643, 649 
 
 651 
 V. Laidley, 79 Fed. 865 . . 428 
 V. Little Rock & Ft. S. R. 
 Co. 3 McCrary, 581, 16 
 Fed. 906 604 
 
 Huntington v. Pinney, 126 Fed. 
 
 237 801, 804, 812 
 
 Hurd V. Gere, 38 Fed. 537 .... 796 
 
 Hurst V. Cobb, 61 Fed. 2 140 
 
 Hurt V. Hollingsworth, 100 U. 
 
 S. 100, 25 L. ed. 569 . . 19 
 26, 864, 865 
 Hutcheson v. Bigbee, 56 Fed. 329 803 
 Hutchings v. Cobalt Central 
 
 Mines Co. 189 Fed. 241 242 
 Hutchinson v. Beckham, 55 C. C. 
 
 A. 333, 118 Fed. 399 187 
 190 
 V. Philadelphia & G. S. S. 
 
 Co. 216 Fed. 795 457 
 
 Huttig Sash & Door Co. v. 
 
 Fuelle, 143 Fed. 367 .. 564 
 575 
 Hutton V. Joseph Bancroft & S. 
 
 Co. 77 Fed. 481.. .804, '805 
 840 
 V. Joseph Bancroft & Sons 
 
 Co. 83 JFed. 17 243 
 
 Hyams v. Calumet & H. Mining 
 Co. 137 C. C. A. 239, 221 
 
 Fed. 538 244 
 
 V. Old Dominion Co. 204 
 
 Fed. 681 228, 394 
 
 Hyde v. Ruble, 104 U. S. 407, 26 
 
 L. ed. 823 69, 70, 820 
 
 V. Victoria Land Co. 125 
 
 Fed. 973 230 
 
 Hyman v. Wheeler, 33 Fed. 630 31 
 Hynes v. Briggs, 41 Fed. 468 . . 196 
 
 I. 
 
 Idaho & 0. Land Improv. Co. v. 
 
 Bradbury, 132 U. S. 
 
 509, 33 L. ed. 433, 10 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 177 .... 713 
 Illinois V. Illinois C. R. Co. 184 
 
 U. S. 77, 46 L. ed. 
 
 440, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 300 768-770 
 
 ex rel. Hunt v. Illinois C. 
 
 R. Co. 34 C. C. A. 138, 
 
 91 Fed. 955 ..616, 769, 770 
 Illinois C. R. Co. v. Adams, 35 
 
 C. C. A. 635, 93 Fed. 
 
 856 659 
 
 V. Adams, 180 U. S. 28, 45 
 
 L. ed. 410, 21 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 251 ..37, 146, 166, 241 
 243, 311 
 V. Brown, 156 U. S. 386, 39 
 
 L. ed. 461, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 656 638 
 
 V. Caffrey, 128 Fed. 770 .. 298 
 
 son 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XCV 
 
 Illinois C. R. Co. v. Chicago, 176 
 
 U. S. 646, 44 L. ed. 622, 
 
 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 509.. 157 
 
 158 
 
 V. McKendree, 203 U. S. 514, 
 
 51 L. ed. 298, 27 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 153 753 
 
 V. Walker, 164 Fed. 359 . . 826 
 Illinois L. Ins. Co. v. Shenelion, 
 
 109 Fed. 674 129 
 
 Illinois Steel Co. v. Ramsey, 100 
 C. C. A. 323, 176 Fed. 
 
 863 458, 459, 461 
 
 V. San Antonio & G. S. R. 
 
 Co. 67 Fed. 561 323 
 
 Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank v. 
 Des Moines, 224 Fed. 
 
 620 148 
 
 V. Kilbourne, 22 C. C. A. 
 599, 44 U. S. App. 663, 
 
 76 Fed. 883 703 
 
 Imperial ilajesty v. Providence 
 
 Tool' Co. 23 Fed. 572 . . 23 
 Imperial Ref. Co. v. Wyman, 3 
 
 L.R.A. 503, 38 Fed. 574 85 
 Importers' & T. Nat. Bank v. 
 
 Lyons, 134 Fed. 510.. 544 
 546 
 Independent School Dist. v. Hall, 
 113 U. S. 135, 28 L. ed. 
 054, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 371 215 
 V. Reid, 55 L.R.A. 364, 49 C. 
 
 C. A. 198, 111 Fed. 4 179 
 V. Rew, 55 L.R.A. 364, 49 
 
 C. C. A. 198, 111 Fed. 2 216 
 Indiana use of Delaware County 
 V. Alleghany Oil Co. 85 
 
 Fed. 870 279, 813, 827 
 
 ex rel. Muncie v. Lake Erie 
 
 6 W. R. Co. 85 Fed. 2 828 
 
 857, 858 
 V. Tolleston Club, 53 Fed. 18 857 
 
 Indiana Mountain Jellico Coal 
 Co. V. Asheville Ice & 
 Coal Co. 135 Fed. 837.. 826 
 
 Indianapolis Gas Co. v. Indian- 
 apolis, 90 Fed. 197 . . . . 430 
 
 Indianapolis Water Co. v. Ameri- 
 can Straw-Board Co. 65 
 Fed. 534 540 
 
 Indian Land & T. Co. v. Schoen- 
 felt, 68 C. C. A. 196, 135 
 Fed. 485 25 
 
 India Rubber Co. v. Consolidated 
 Rubber Tire Co. 117 
 Fed. 354 28, 864 
 
 Industrial & Min. Guaranty Co. 
 V. Electrical Supply Co. 
 
 7 C. C. A. 471, 16 U. S. 
 App. 196, 58 Fed. 742 456 
 
 Ingersoll v. Coram, 132 Fed. 172, 
 
 127 Fed. 418 ..249, 250, 
 Ingham v. Pierce, 37 Fed. 647 . . 
 Ingle V. Jones, 9 Wall. 486, 19 L. 
 
 ed. 621 
 
 Inglehart v. Stansbury, 151 U. S. 
 
 68, 38 L. ed. 76, 14 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 237 698, 
 
 Inman v. New York Interurban 
 
 R. Co. 131 Fed. 997 ... . 
 
 301 
 
 547 
 
 517 
 
 296 
 297 
 
 Insurance Co. v. Mordecai, 21 
 
 How. 195, 16 L. ed. 94 762 
 Insurance Co. of N. A. v. Dela- 
 ware Mut. Ins. Co. 50 
 
 Fed. 257 72, 810' 
 
 V. Guardiola, 129 U. S. 643, 
 32 L. ed. 803, 9 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 425 539 
 
 V. Svendsen, 74 Fed. 346.. 185 
 231, 232, 236, 265, 357, 360 
 361 
 Interior Constr. & Improv. Co. v. 
 Gibney, 160 U. S. 217, 
 40 L. ed. 401, 16 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 272 55, 111 
 
 121-123, 409, 649, 650 
 Intertial Improv. Fund v. Green- 
 ough, 105 U. S. 527, 20 
 
 L. ed. 1157 637, 639' 
 
 International & G. N. R. Co. v. 
 Bradt, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 82, 122 S. W. 59 256 
 
 V. Hoyle, 79 C. C. A. 128, 
 
 149 Fed. 180.. 817, 857, 862 
 v. Wynne, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 68, 122 S. W. 50 256 
 
 International Bank & T. Co. v. 
 Scott, 86 C. C. A. 248, 
 
 159 Fed. 59 126, 274 
 
 International Tooth Crown Co. v. 
 
 Carter, 13 2 Fed. 396 .. 508 
 V. Hank's Dental Asso. 101 
 
 Fed. 306 491, 508 
 
 International Trust Co. v. Nor- 
 wich Union F. Ins. Co. 
 17 C. C. A. 608, 36 U. 
 S. App. 277, 71 Fed. 83 33 
 
 v. Weeks, 116 Fed. 898 853 
 
 Interstate Bldg. & L. Asso. v. 
 Edgefield Hotel Co. 109 
 
 Fed. 692 170, 173 
 
 V. Edgefield Hotel Co. 120 
 
 Fed. 423 449 
 
 Interstate C'ommerce Commission 
 v. Baird, 194 U. S. 26, 
 48 L. ed. 862, 24 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 563 642 
 
 V. Louisville & N. R. Co. 101 
 
 Fed. 146 629 
 
XCVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Interstate Land Co. v. Maxwell 
 Land Grant Co. 139 U. 
 S. 569, 35 L. ed. 278, 
 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 656 . . 400 
 
 Iowa V. Rood, 187 U. S. 87, 47 
 L. ed. 86, 23 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 49 754 
 
 Iowa C. R. Co. V. Iowa, 160 U. 
 S. 389, 40 L. ed. 467, 16 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 344 ..148, 161 
 
 Iowa Lillooet Gold Min. Co. v. 
 
 Bliss, 144 Fed. 446 .. 45 
 
 70, 89, 810, 811, 814, 817 
 
 862 
 
 Iron Dyke Copper Min. Co. v. 
 Iron Dyke R. Co. 132 
 Fed. 208 ,318 
 
 Iron Mountain Co. v. Memphis, 
 37 C. C. A. 410, 96 Fed. 
 113 147 
 
 Iron R. Co. v. Toledo, D. & B. 
 R. Co. 10 C. C. A. 319, 
 18 U. S. App. 479, 62 
 Fed. 169 .... 598, 599, 638 
 
 Irvine v. Bankard, 181 Fed. 208 258 
 V. Blackburn, 198 Fed. 360 244 
 V. Putnam, 190 Fed. 321 .. 258 
 
 Irvine Co. v. Bond, 74 Fed. 849 62 
 
 Irving V. Smith, 132 Fed. 207 804 
 
 Irwin V. Meyrose, 2 MoCrary, 
 
 244, 7 Fed. 533 ...605, 606 
 
 Israel v. Israel, 130 Fed. 237.. 547 
 
 827 
 
 Issuing Writs of Error, Re, 117 
 C. C. A. 603, 199 Fed. 
 115 619, 745 
 
 Ives, Re, 51 C. C. A. 541, 113 
 
 Fed. 913 733 
 
 Jabine v. Gates, 115 Fed. 862 . . 619 
 684, 686, 764, 765 
 Jackson v. Allen, 132 U. S. 29, 33 
 L. ed. 249, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 9 275 
 
 V. Ashton, 11 Pet. 249, 9 L. 
 
 ed. 706 282 
 
 V. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 
 102 C. C. A. 159, 178 
 
 Fed. 432 75, 819 
 
 V. Delaware River Amuse- 
 ment Co. 131 Fed. 134 327 
 333 
 V. Gardiner Invest. Co. 118 
 C. C. A. 287, 200 Fed. 
 
 113 243 
 
 T. Hooper, 188 Fed. 509 .... 804 
 V. Simmons, 39 C. C. A. 514, 
 
 98 , Fed. 768 . . 443, 449, 455 
 
 Jackson v. Virginia, Hot Springs 
 
 Co. 130 C. C. A. 375, 213 
 
 Fed. 973 274 
 
 Jackson & S.' Co. v. Pearson, 60 
 
 Fed. 113 212, 489, 843 
 
 Jacksonville, T. & K. W. R. Co. 
 
 V. American Constr. Co. 
 
 6 C. C. A. 249, 13 U. S. 
 
 App. 377, 57 Fed. 06 711 
 Jaoobi, Ex parte, 104 Fed. 681 . . 755 
 Jacobs V. George, 150 U. S. 415, 
 
 37 L. ed. 1127, 14 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 159 . . 665, 091-690 
 V. Marks, 182 U. S. 583, 45 
 
 L. ed. 1241, 21 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 865 753 
 
 V. Mexican Sugar Co. 130 
 
 Fed. 591 176, 179 
 
 Jaffrey v. Bear, 42 Fed. 569 26 
 
 V. Brown, 29 Fed. 47 7.. 568, 574 
 Jahn V. Champagne Lumber Co. 
 
 152 Fed. 669 412 
 
 James v. Central Trust Co. 47 C. 
 
 C. A. 374, 108 Fed. 931 768 
 
 771 
 
 Jarboe v. Templer, 38 Fed. 217 . . 60 
 
 Jarnecke Ditch, Re, 69 Fed. 163 72 
 
 827, 835 
 Jarowsky v. Hamburg-American 
 
 Packet Co. 104 C. C. A. 
 
 548, 182 Fed. 320 ..89, 120 
 J. D. Randall Co. v. Foglesong 
 
 Mach. Co. 119 C. C. A. 
 
 185) 200 Fed. 741 ..627, 628 
 663, 664, 667 
 Jefferson v. Driver, 117 IJ. S. 
 
 272, 29 L. ed. 897, 6 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729 854 
 
 Jefferson Hotel Co. v. Brum- 
 baugh, 94 C. C. A. 279, 
 
 168 Fed. 867 576 
 
 Jellenik v. Huron Copper Co. 82 
 
 Fed. 778 105, 344 
 
 V. Huron Copper Min. Co. 
 
 177 U. S. 1, 44 L. ed. 
 
 647, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 559 105, 344 
 
 Jemison Mercantile Co., Re, 50 
 
 C. C. A. 641, 112 Fed. 
 
 969 705 
 
 Jei.kins v. York Cliffs Implement 
 
 Co. 110 Fed. 807 . . 55, 98 
 
 334 
 
 Jenks V. Brewster, 96 Fed. 625 483 
 
 Jennes v. Landes, 84 JFed. 73 . . 87 
 
 • 91, 285 
 
 V. Landes, 85 Fed. 801 87 
 
 Jennings v. Burton, 177 Fed. 603 726 
 V. Dolan, 29 Fed. 861 . . 569, 571 
 
 578 
 
TABLE OP CASES. 
 
 XCVll 
 
 Jennings v. Johnson, 78 C. C. A. 
 
 329, 148 Fed. 337.. 337, 338 
 V. Menaugh, 118 Fed. 612 . . 545 
 Jerome v. McCarter, 21 Wall. 
 
 17, 22 L. ed. 515 . .680, 682 
 684, 686-688, 690, 766 
 T. Rio Grande County, 5 
 MeCrary, 639, 18 Fed. 
 
 874 218 
 
 Jesup T. Illinois C. E. Co. 43 
 
 Fed. 495 455, 456 
 
 Jetton V. University of the South, 
 208 U. S. 489, 52 L. ed. 
 584, 28 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 
 375 146 
 
 Jewell V. State Life Ins. Co. 99 
 C. C. A. 372, 176 Fed. 
 
 64 517 
 
 Jewel Tea Co. v. Lee's Summit, 
 
 198 Fed. 532 187 
 
 Jewett V. Bradford Sav. Bank & 
 
 T. Co. 45 Fed. 801 . . 54 
 
 123, 213 
 
 T. Garrett, 47 Fed. 625 .. 93, 
 
 94, 103, 313-316, 318 
 
 V. Whitcomb, 69 Fed. 417 . . 140 
 
 Jewish Colonization Asso. v. 
 
 Solomon, 125 Fed. 994 86 
 J. I. Case Plow Works v. Finks, 
 26 C. C. A. 46, 52 U. S. 
 App. 253, 81 Fed. 529 162 
 256 
 J. L. Mott Iron-Works v. Stand- 
 ard Mfg. Co. 48 Fed. 345 532 
 John D. Park & Sons Co. v. 
 
 Bruen, 133 Fed. 807 . . 106 
 108, 410 
 V. Hartman, 12 L.R.A. (N.S. ) 
 135, 82 C. C. A. 158, 
 
 153 Fed. 31 188 
 
 Johnson, Re, 167 U. S. 126, 42 
 L. ed. lOS, 17 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 735 318 
 
 V. Bunker Hill & S. M. & 
 
 C. Co. 46 Fed. 417 64 
 
 V. Computing Scale Co. 139 
 
 Fed. 339 329, 780, 825 
 
 T. F. C. Austin Mfg. Co. 76 
 
 Fed. 616 ....275, 780, 836 
 
 V. Ford, 109 Fed. 503 67 
 
 V. Meyers, 4 C. C. A. 399, 12 
 U. S. App. 220, 54 Fed. 
 
 417 663 
 
 T. New York L. Ins. Co. 187 
 U. S. 491, 47 L. ed. 273, 
 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 194 . . 746 
 747, 754 
 V. St. Louis, 96 C. 0. A. 
 
 617, 172 Fed. 32 58 
 
 Johnson v. Trust Co. 43 C. C. A. 
 
 458, 104 Fed. 174.. 699, 704 
 V. Union P. E. Co. 145 Fed. 
 
 252 109 
 
 V. Waters, 108 U. S. 4, 27 
 
 L. ed. 630, 1 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 1 684 
 
 V. Vi'aters, 111 U. S. 668, 
 
 28 L. ed. 556, 4 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 619 250, 251 
 
 V. Wells, F. & Co. 91 Fed. 1 783 
 801, 824 
 V. Wilcox & G. Sewing Mach. 
 
 Co. 25 Fed. 373 .. .277, 398 
 Johnson Steel Street-Eail Co. v. 
 
 North Branch Steel Co. 
 
 48 Fed. 191 525, 528 
 
 Johnston v. Pittsburg, 106 Fed. 
 
 753 190 
 
 V. Eoe, 1 McCrary, 162, 1 
 
 Fed. 695 17 
 
 V. Trippe, 33 Fed. 530 192 
 
 198 
 Johnston E. Frog & Switch Co. 
 
 V. Buda Foundry & Mfg. 
 
 Co. 148 Fed. 883 814 
 
 Jones, Ex parte, 164 U. S. 691, 
 
 41 L. ed. 601, 17 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 222 87, 742 
 
 Re, 209 Fed. 717 32, 394 
 
 V. Adams Exp. Co. 129 Fed. 
 
 618 804, 820 
 
 V. Andrews, 10 Wall. 332, 19 
 
 L. ed. 936 332, 484 
 
 V. Casey-Hedges, 213 Fed. 43 799 
 V. Gould, 141 Fed. 698 ... 104 
 105, 337 
 V. Gould, 80 C. C. A. 1, 149 
 
 Fed. 153 104, 337, 343 
 
 344, 551 
 V. Hillis, 100 Fed. 355.. 418, 410 
 
 V. Lamar, 39 Fed. 585 567 
 
 V. League, 18 How. 76, 15 
 
 L. ed. 263 61, 549 
 
 v. McCormick Harvesting 
 
 Mach. Co. 27 C. C. A. 
 
 133, 53 U. S. App. 408, 
 
 82 Fed. 295 172, 173 
 
 V. McMasters, 20 How. 8, 15 
 
 L. ed. 805 7 
 
 V. Mann, 18 C. C. A. 442, 25 
 
 U. S. App. 700, 72 Fed. 
 
 85 715 
 
 V. Missouri-Edison Electric 
 
 Co. 117 C. C. A. 442, 
 
 199 Fed. 64, reversing 
 
 75 C. C. A. 631, 144 Fed. 
 
 765 243 
 
XCVlll 
 
 TABLE OF OASES. 
 
 Jones V. Missouri Edison Electric 
 
 Co. 75 C. C. A. 631, 144 
 
 Fed. 765 . .226, 243, 288, 299 
 
 V. Montague, 194 U. S. 147, 
 
 48 L. ed. 913, 24 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 611 732 
 
 V. Mosher, 46 C. C. A. 471, 
 
 107 Fed. 563 ..160, 797, 798 
 V. Mutual Fidelity Co. 123 
 
 Fed. 506 ..11, 15, 17, 18 
 24, 175, 176, 194, 195 
 V. Oregon C. R. Co. 3 Sawy. 
 
 523, Fed. Cas. No. 7,486 514 
 T. Rowley, 73 Fed. 286 . . 172, 201 
 V. Sands, 25 C. C. A. 233, 51 
 U. S. App. 153, 79 Fed. 
 
 913 458 
 
 V. Shapera, 6 C. C. A. 423, 
 13 U. S. App. 481, 57 
 
 Fed. 462 210, 216, 220 
 
 222 
 V. Subera, 150 Fed. 464 . . 125 
 Jordan, Ex parte, 94 U. S. 248, 
 
 24 L. ed. 123 565, 667 
 
 V. Brown, — Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 ,— , 94 S. W. 398 601 
 
 V. Taylor, 98 Fed. 646.. 246, 247 
 Jorgenson v. Young, 69 C. C. A. 
 
 222, 136 Fed. 381.. 607, 609 
 Jos. B. Thomas, The, 78 C. C. A. 
 
 428, 148 Fed. 767 175 
 
 The, 158 Fed. 559 726 
 
 Joseph Dry Goods Co. v. Hecht, 
 57 C. C. A. 64, 120 Fed. 
 
 760 67, 626, 632 
 
 Jourolmon v. Ewing, 29 C. C. A. 
 41, 56 U. S. App. 149, 
 
 85 Fed. 103 605-607 
 
 Joy V. Adelbert College, 146 U. 
 S. 355, 36 L. ed. 1003, 
 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 186 . . 638 
 V. St. Louis, 122 Fed. 524 152 
 163, 164 
 V. St. Louis, 201 U. S. 332, 
 50 L. ed. 776, 26 Sup,, 
 
 Ct. Rep. 478 142 
 
 J. P. Jorgenson Co. v. Rapp, 85 
 C. C. A. 364, 157 Fed. 
 
 738 757 
 
 J. S. Appel Suit & Cloak Co. v. 
 
 BaggOtt, 132 Fed. 1006 55 
 Judson V. Courier Co. 25 Fed. 
 
 706 358 
 
 Julian V. Central Trust Co. 193 
 U. S. 93, 48 L. ed. 629, 
 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 399 . . 477 
 Julius Kessler &, Co. v. Perilloux, 
 
 127 Fed. 1011 118 
 
 K. 
 
 Kail V. Wetmore, 6 Wall. 451, 
 
 18 L. ed. 862 681 
 
 Kaiser v. General Phonograph 
 
 Supply Co. 171 Fed. 432 266 
 
 Kaitel v. Wylie, 38 Fed. 865 . . 844 
 
 Kalamazoo Railway Supply Co. 
 V. Duff Mfg. Co. 113 
 Fed. 264 714 
 
 Kalb & B. Mfg. Co., Re, 165 Fed. 
 
 896 182 
 
 Kalispell Lumber Co. v. Great 
 Northern R. Co. 157 
 Fed. 845 96 
 
 Kamenicky v. Catterall Printing 
 
 Co. 188 Fed. 400 811 
 
 Kane v. Luekman, 131 Fed. 621 34 
 
 Kansas v. Atchison, T. & S. F. 
 
 R. Co. 77 Fed. 339. .151, 164 
 279 
 V. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125, 
 46 L. ed. 838, 22 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 552 39, 
 
 V. Colorado, 206 TJ. S. 46, 51 
 L. ed. 956, 27 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 655 4, 
 
 V. Meriwether, 96 C. C. A. 
 ■281, 171 Fed. 41 ..710, 
 
 Kansas City & T. R. Co. v. Inter- 
 state Lumber Co. 37 
 Fed. 3 786, 829, 
 
 Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. 
 V. Daughtry, 138 U. S. 
 298, 34 L. ed. 963, 11 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 306 
 
 778, 782, 783, 802, 807, 
 
 V. Stoner, 2 C. C. A. 437, 10 
 
 U. S. App. 209, 51 Fed. 
 
 650 505, 506, 
 
 Kansas City Gas Co. v. Kansas 
 City, 198 Fed. 500 .... 
 
 Kansas City North Western R. 
 
 Co. V. Zimmerman, 210 
 
 U. S. 336, 52 L. ed. 
 
 1084, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 730 644, 
 
 Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. 
 
 Prunty, 66 C. C. A. 163, 
 ^ 133 Fed. 13 ..364, 732, 
 
 V. Quigley, 181 Fed. 190 .. 
 
 Kansas City Star Co. v. Julian, 
 215 U. S. 589, 54 L. ed. 
 340, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 406 752 
 
 399 
 
 40 
 718 
 
 830 
 
 323 
 860 
 
 538 
 
 146 
 
 147 
 
 64.3 
 
 804 
 
 836 
 
 35 
 
 278 
 
TABLE OP CASES. 
 
 XCIX 
 
 Kansas City Suburban Belt R. 
 
 Co. V. Herman, 187 U. 
 
 S. 69, 47 L. ed. 78, 23 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 24 . . 807, 839 
 Kansas Loan & T. Co. v. Electric 
 
 R. Light & P. Co. 108 
 
 Fed. 704 531, 558, 563 
 
 Katz V. San Antonio, 34 C. C. 
 
 A. 10, 63 U. S. App. 
 
 452, 91 Fed. 567 721 
 
 Kauffman v. Kennedy, 25 Fed. 
 
 785 318, 841 
 
 Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. 
 
 Green Bay & M. Canal 
 
 Co. 142 U. S. 269, 35 L. 
 
 ed. 1009, 12 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 173 156 
 
 Kawailani, The, 63 C. C. A. 347, 
 
 128 Fed. 879 ..715, 716, 720 
 Kaw Valley Drainage Dist. v. 
 
 Union P. R. Co. 90 C. 
 
 C. A. 320, 163 Fed. 836 639 
 674 
 Kearney County v. Vaudriss, 53 
 
 C. C. A. 192, 115 Fed. 
 
 867 169, 172, 173 
 
 Kearny County v. Irvine, 61 C. 
 
 C. A. 607, 126 Fed. 694 211 
 215-217 
 V. Meilaster, 15 C. C. A. 
 
 353, 32 U. S. App. 367, 
 
 68 Fed. 177 216 
 
 Keasby, Re, 160 U. S. 228, 40 L. 
 
 ed. 404, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 273 53, 93-96, 110, 111 
 
 119, 323 
 Keene v. Meade, 3 Pet. 9, 7 L. 
 
 ed. 584 514 
 
 Keene Five-Cent Sav. Bank v. 
 
 Lyon County, 90 Fed. 
 
 530 216 
 
 Keerl v. Montana, 213 U. S. 135, 
 
 53 L. ed. 734, 29 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 469 746 
 
 Keith V. Alger, 59 C. C. A. 552, 
 
 124 Fed. 32 607, 614 
 
 V. Clark, 97 U. S. 456, 24 
 
 L. ed. 1072 427 
 
 Kell V. Trench ard, 76 C. C. A. 
 
 611, 146 Fed. 245 .... 639 
 Kellam v. Keith, 144 U. S. 570, 
 
 36 L. ed. 544, 12 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 922 804 
 
 Kellar v. CreiR, 61 C. C. A. 366, 
 
 126 Fed. 630 259, 260 
 
 Keller v. Asliford. 133 U. S. 626, 
 
 33 L. ed. 674, 10 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 494 263 
 
 V. Kansas Citv, St. L. & C. 
 
 R. Co. 125 Fed. 202 . . 74 
 817 
 
 Kelley v. Boettcher, 27 C. C. A. 
 177, 49 U. S. App. 620, 
 
 82 Fed. 794 728 
 
 V. Boettcher, 29 C. C. A. 14, 
 56 U. S. App. 363, 85 
 
 Fed. 55 230, 231, 268 
 
 275, 291, 299, 348, 349 
 Kelley Bros. v. Diamond Drill 
 & Match Co. 142 Fed. 
 
 868 606 
 
 Kellner v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 43 
 
 Fed. 626 415 
 
 Kelly V. Chicago & A. R. Co. 122 
 
 Fed. 286 75, 800, 806 
 
 819, 859-861 
 V. Dolan, 218 Fed. 90(i .... 241 
 V. Mississippi River Coaling 
 
 Co. 175 Fed. 483 242 
 
 Kelly, M. & Co. v. Sioux Nat. 
 
 Bank, 81 Fed. 4 479 
 
 Kemmerer v. Haggerty, 139 Fed. 
 
 693 243 
 
 Kemp V. National Bank, 48 C. 
 
 C. A. 213, 109 Fed. 48 634 
 637 
 Kendall v. American Automatic 
 Loom Co. 198 U. S. 477, 
 49 L. ed. 1133, 25 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 768 644 
 
 Kendig v. Dean, 97 U. S. 423, 24 
 
 L. ed. 1061 . .235, 42-7, 551 
 Kendrick v. Roberts, 214 Fed. 
 
 268 690 
 
 Kennedy v. Bank of Georgia, 8 
 
 How. 610, 12 L. ed. 1218 366 
 V. Creewell, 101 U. S. 641, 
 
 25 L. ed. 1075 419 
 
 V. Custer, 98 C. C. A. 584, 
 
 174 Fed. 981 280 
 
 V. Elliott, 85 Fed. 832 259 
 
 V. Solar Ref. Co. 69 Fed. 
 
 717 550 
 
 Kent V. Bay State Gas. Co. 93 
 
 Fed. 887 365 
 
 V. Hosinger, 167 Fed. 619.. 102 
 176, 194, 315, 316, 337, 340 
 V. Lake Superior Ship Canal 
 R, & Iron Co. 144 U. S. 
 90, 36 L. ed. 357, 12 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 650 252 
 
 Kentucky v. Chicago, I. & L. R. 
 
 Co. 123 Fed. 457 . . 63, 829 
 V. Powers, 201 U. S. 1, 50 L. 
 ed. 633, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 387, 5 Ann. Cas. 692 . . 746 
 Kentucky Coal Lands Co. v. Min- 
 eral Development Co. 
 191 Fed. 906 93 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Kentucky State Bd. of Control 
 
 V. Lewis, 100 C. C. A. 
 
 208, 176 Fed. 556 . . 640, 641 
 656 
 Kenyon v. Knipe, 46 Fed. 310 . . 189 
 Kern v. Huidekoper. See Dietzscli 
 
 V. Huidekoper. 
 V. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 
 
 485, 26 L. ed. 354.. 780, 786 
 Kerr v. Modern Woodmen, 54 C. 
 
 C. A. 655, 117 Fed. 595 836 
 v. New Orleans, 61 C. C. A. 
 
 450, 126 Fed. 920 .... 630 
 Kerrison v. Stewart, 93 U. S. 
 
 , 155, 23 L. ed. 843.. 252, 254 
 Kessinger v. Vannatta, 27 Fed. 
 
 890 859 
 
 Kesaler & Co. v. Ensley Co. 129 
 
 Fed. 397 242 
 
 Key, Re, 189 U. S. 84, 47 L. ed. 
 
 720, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 624 699 
 
 Keyser v. Farr, 105 U. S. 266, 26 
 
 L. ed. 1026 683 
 
 V. Lowell, 54 C. C. A. 574, 
 
 117 Fed. 400 656, 657 
 
 Keystone Manganese & Iron Co. 
 
 V. Martin, 132 U. S. 91, 
 
 33 L. ed. 275, 10 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 32 . . . 581, 634-636 
 638 
 Kibbler v. St. Louis & S. F. R. 
 
 Co. 147 Fed. 880.. ..94, 116 
 Kidder v. Fidelity Ins. Trust & 
 
 S. D. Co. 44 C. C. A. 
 
 593, 105 Fed. 825 695 
 
 697-699, 702, 703, 705 
 V. Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. 
 
 Co. 117 Fed. 997 ..854, 855 
 Kieley v. McGlynn. See Brod- 
 
 erick's Will. 
 Kilboum v. Sunderland, 130 U. 
 
 S. 505, 32 L. ed. 1005, 
 
 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594 . . 23 
 
 33, 260 
 
 Kilburn v. Hirner, 163 Fed. 540 444 
 
 Kilgore v. Norman, 119 Fed. 1008 129 
 
 Kilgour V. National Bank, 97 
 
 Fed. 693 570, 575 
 
 Kilham v. Wilson, 50 C. C. A. 
 
 454, 112 Fed. 573.. 554, 587 
 Killian v. Ebbinghaus, 110 U. S. 
 
 568, 28 L. ed. 246, 4 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232 . . 26, 28 
 489 
 Kimball v. Cedar Rapids, 99 Fed. 
 
 130 244, 805 
 
 V. Kimball, 174 U. S. 162, 
 
 43 L. ed. 934, 19 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 639 721 
 
 Kimberly v. Arms, 40 Fed. 548 
 
 608, 610, 613, 617, 
 
 V. Arms, 129 U. S. 512, 32 
 
 L. ed. 764, 9 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 355.. 558, 559, 572, 
 
 576, 
 
 King V. Buskirk, 24 C. C. A. 82, 
 
 42 U. S. App. 249, 78 
 
 Fed. 233 
 
 V. Cornell, 106 U. S. 398, 27 
 L. ed. 61, 1 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 313 90, 809, 
 
 T. Davia, 137 Fed. 206.. 315, 
 
 321, 
 
 V. Dundee Mortg. & Trust 
 
 Invest. Co. 28 Fed. 33 
 
 V. Inlander, 133 Fed. 416.. 
 
 V. McLean Asylum, 12 C. C. 
 
 A. 139, 21 U. S. App. 
 
 407, 64 Fed. 327 . . . : 
 V. McLean Asylum, 26 L.R.A. 
 
 784, 12 C. C. A. 145, 21 
 
 U. S. App. 481, 64 Fed. 
 
 351 
 
 V. St. Louis, 98 Fed. 641 . . 
 V. Southern R. Co. 119 Fed. 
 
 1016 170, 185, 
 
 V. Thompson, 49 C. C. A. 
 
 59, 110 Fed. 319 ..682, 
 
 692, 
 
 King Bridge Co. v. Otoe County, 
 
 120 U. S. 226, 30 L. ed. 
 
 624, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 552 
 
 131, 361, 
 
 King Iron Bridge & Mfg. Co. v. 
 
 Otoe County, 120 U. S. 
 
 226, 30 L. ed. 624, 7 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 552.. 46, 
 
 Kingman v. Holthaus, 59 Fed. 
 
 305 51, 61, 
 
 V. Western Mfg. Co. 170 U. 
 
 S. 678, 42 L. ed. 1193, 
 
 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 786.. 
 Kingman & Co. v. Western Mfg. 
 
 Co. 170 U. S. 678, 42 L. 
 
 ed. 1193, iS Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 786 638, 
 
 Kingsbury v. Buckner, 134 U. S. 
 
 650, 33 L. ed. 1047, 10 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638 
 
 677, 679, 683, 768, 
 Kinne v. Lant, 68 Fed. 436 . . 318, 
 Kinney v. Columbia Sav. & L. 
 
 Asso. 191 U. S. 78, 48 
 
 L. ed. 103, 24 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 30 
 
 607 
 771 
 
 574 
 577 
 
 482 
 
 810 
 32(J 
 586 
 
 606 
 
 612 
 
 52 
 
 295 
 
 655 
 
 828 
 159 
 
 824 
 
 683 
 699 
 
 126 
 549 
 
 197 
 
 274 
 
 129 
 
 601 
 
 663 
 
 613 
 773 
 333 
 
 836 
 
TABLE OP CASES. 
 
 CI 
 
 Kipley v. Illinois, 170 U. S. 186, 
 42 L. ed. 1001, 18 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 5d0 748 
 
 Kirby v. American Soda Foun- 
 tain Co. 194 U. S. 141, 
 48 L. ed. 911, 24 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 619.. 451, 755, 756 
 817 
 V. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 
 
 106 Fed. 551 ...780, 781, 
 835 
 V. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 
 120 U. S. 138, 30 L. ed. 
 572, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 430 17 
 
 Kirchberger v. American Acety- 
 lene Burner Co. 73 C. C. 
 A. 387, 142 Fed. 169 . . 733 
 Kirk V. DuBois, 28 Fed. 460 . . 28, 380 
 V. United States, 124 Fed. 
 
 336 314 
 
 Kirkpatrick v. Eastern Mill & 
 
 Export Co. 135 Fed. 151 685 
 
 703 
 
 V. Pope Mfg. Co. 61 Fed. 48 527 
 
 528 
 Elirvin v. Virginia-Carolina 
 Chemical Co. 76 C. C. A. 
 172, 145 Fed. 290, 7 
 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 219 118 
 200, 205, 210 
 Kissinger-Iron Co. v. Bredford 
 Belting Co. 59 C. C. A. 
 221, 123 Fed. 91 . . 547, 609 
 Kitchen v. Randolph, 93 U. S. 
 
 86, 23 L. ed. 810. . 669, 686 
 687, 690, 762, 764, 765 
 Kittel V. Augusta T. & G. R. 
 
 Co. 65 Fed. 860 400 
 
 Kittredge v. Race, 92 U. S. 121, 
 
 23 L. ed. 490 247 
 
 Kizer v. Texarkana & Ft. S. R. 
 Co. 179 U. S. 199, 45 L. 
 ed. 152, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 100 749 
 
 Klauder-Weldoh Dyeing Maeh. 
 Co. V. Giles, 212 Fed. 
 
 452 446 
 
 Klein v. Southern P. R. Co. 140 
 
 Fed. 213 602 
 
 Klenk v. Byrne, 143 Fed. 1008 . . 127 
 Klever v. Seawall, 12 C. C. A. 
 653, 22 U. S. App. 458, 
 
 65 JFed. 378 586 
 
 Kline Bros. & Co. v. Liverpool 
 & L. & G. Ins. Co. 184 
 
 Fed. 969 500 
 
 Klinger v. Missouri, 13 Wall. 
 
 267, 20 L. ed. 635 750 
 
 Knapp V. S. Jarvis Adams Co. 70 
 C. C. A. 536, 135 Fed. 
 
 1008 9 
 
 V. Troy & B. R. Co. 20 Wall. 
 
 124, 22 L. ed. 331 58 
 
 Kneeland v. American Loan & 
 T. Co. 136 U. S. 89, 34 
 L. ed. 379, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 950.. 597, 700, 702, 704 
 ICnight V. International & 6. N. 
 R. Co. 9 C. C. A. 376, 
 23 U. S. App. 356, 61 
 
 Fed. 90 794, 795 
 
 V. Lutcher & M. Lumber Co. 
 69 C. C. A. 248, 136 
 
 Fed. 404 270, 815 
 
 V. Shelton, 134 Fed. 426 147 
 
 KnophoUer v. St. Paul, M. & M. 
 R. Co. 1 McCrary, 299, 
 
 2 Fed. 302 277 
 
 Knott V. Evening Post Co. 124 
 
 Fed. 352 477 
 
 Knox County v. Harsham, 133 U. 
 S. 152, 33 L. ed. 586, 10 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 257 323 
 
 V. Harshman, 132 U. S. 16, 
 33 L. ed. 250, 10 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 8 629 
 
 V. United States, 131 U. S. 
 clxvi, Appx. 25 L. ed. 
 
 191 690 
 
 Knox Rock-Blasting Co. v. Rair- 
 don Stone Co. 87 Fed. 
 
 968 412 
 
 Knoxville v. Africa, 23 C. C. A. 
 252, 47 U. S. App. 74, 
 
 77 Fed. 501 631 
 
 V. Knoxville Water Co. 212 
 U. S. 8, 53 L. ed. 378, 
 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148 . . 574 
 576 
 V. Southern Paving Constr. 
 
 Co. 220 Fed. 237 868 
 
 Knoxville Water Co. v. Knox- 
 ville, 200 U. S. 22, 50 
 L. ed. 353, 26 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 224 147 
 
 Knuth V. Butte Electric R. Co. 
 
 148 Fed. 73 . .807, 817-819 
 861 
 Koenigsburger v. Richmond Sil- 
 ver Min. Co. 158 U. S. 
 50, 39 L. ed. 892, 15 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 751 64 
 
 Kohn V. McNulta, 147 U. S. 238, 
 37 L. ed. 150, 13 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 298 13 
 
 Koike V. Atchison, T. & S. F. 
 
 R. Co. 157 Fed. 623.. 97 
 272, 548 
 
Cll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Kolze V. Hoadley, 200 U. S. 76, 
 
 50 L. ed. 377, 26 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 220 213 
 
 Korn V. Wiebusch, 33 Fed. 50 . . 407 
 Kountze v. Omaha Hotel Co. 107 
 
 U. S. 389, 27 L. ed. 613, 
 
 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 911, 74 
 
 Fed. 1 680 
 
 Kramer v. Cohn, 119 U. S. 357, 
 
 30 L. ed. 440, 7 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 277 34, 552 
 
 Kraus v. Congdon, 88 C. C. A. 
 
 182, 161 Fed. 18 259 
 
 Kreider v. Cole, 79 C. C. A. 339, 
 
 149 Fed. 647 ..217, 548, 549 
 553 
 Kreigh v. Westingliouse, C. K. 
 
 & Co. 214 U. S. 249, 53 
 
 L. ed. 984, 29 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 619 813, 832 
 
 Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 
 
 276, 28 L. ed. 145, 4 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27 . . 459, 464 
 
 466, 468, 483 
 
 Krohn v. Williamson, 62 Fed. 877 30 
 
 Kuchler v. Greene, 163 Fed. 98 . . 225 
 
 Kunkel v. Brown, 39 C. C. A. 665, 
 
 i)9 Fed. 594 ..169, 170, 172 
 173, 178, 195, 200 
 Kunsemiller v. Hill, 29 G. C. A. 
 
 658, 57 U. S. App. 523, 
 
 86 Fed. 200 575 
 
 Kurtz V. Brown, 81 C. C. A. 498, 
 
 152 Fed. 373, 11 Ann. 
 
 Gas. 576 294 
 
 Kyle V. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. 
 
 Go. 173 Fed. 238 836 
 
 L. 
 
 Lackett v. Rumhaugh, 45 Fed. 
 
 31 334, 489 
 
 Lacroix v. Lyons, S7 Fed. 403 . . 867 
 La Daw v. E. Bement & Sons, 66 
 
 Fed. 198 450 
 
 Ladd V. Missouri Coal & Min. 
 
 Co. 14 C. C. A. 246, 32 
 
 U. S. App. 93, 66 Fed. 
 
 880 675 
 
 Laden v. Meek, 65 C. C. A. 361, 
 
 130 Fed. 877 815 
 
 Lader v. Tennessee Copper Go. 
 
 179 Fed. 245 126 
 
 Ladew v. Tennessee Copper Co. 
 
 218 U. S. 357, 54 L. ed. 
 
 1069, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 89 104 
 
 V. Tennessee Copper Go. 179 
 
 Fed. 245 10.4, 
 
 Lady Pike, The, 96 U. S. 461, 
 
 24 L. ed. 672 773 
 
 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 
 
 How. 404, 15 L. ed. 451 270. 
 
 Lafferty Mfg. Co. v. Acme R. Sig- 
 nal & Mfg. Co. 74 C. C. 
 A. 521, 143 Fed. 321... 613 
 
 Laidly v. Huntington, 121 U. S. 
 181, 30 L. ed. 884, 7 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 855 .... 794 
 
 Laird v. Indemnity Mut. M. 
 
 Assur. Go. 44 Fed. 712 214 
 
 Lake County v. Dudley, 173 U. 
 
 S. 251, 43 L. ed. 688, 19 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 398 . . 62 
 
 215, 217, 222, 553 
 
 V. Piatt, 25 C. G. A. 87, 49 
 
 U. S. App. 216, 79 Fed. 
 
 570 37, 587 
 
 V. Schradsky, 38 G. G. A. 17, 
 
 97 Fed. 2 62, 222 
 
 Lake Erie & W. R. Go. v. Fre- 
 mont, 34 C. G. A. 625, 
 92 Fed. 731 575 
 
 Lake Nat. Bank v. Wolfeborough 
 Sav. Bank, 24 G. C. A. 
 195, 33 U. S. App. 734, 
 78 Fed. 517 627, 628 
 
 Lake Street Elev. R. Co. v. Farm- 
 ers' Loan & T. Co. 23 
 C.C. A. 448, 46 U. S. 
 App. 630, 77 Fed. 773.. 781 
 783, 802. 
 V. Ziegler, 39 C. C. A. 431, 
 
 99 Fed. 122 230, 235 
 
 245, 255 
 
 Lamb v. Ewing, 4 C. G. A. 320, 
 12 U. S. App. 11, 54 
 Fed. 273 465 
 
 Lambert v. Barrett, 157 U. S. 
 700, 39 L. ed. 866, 15 
 Sup. Gt. Rep.' 722 754 
 
 Lamn v. Parrot Silver & Copper 
 
 Go. Ill Fed. 241 244 
 
 Lamon v. Speer Hardware Go. 
 119 G. C. A. ]!, 198 Fed. 
 453 698- 
 
 La Montagne v. T. W. Harvey 
 
 Lumber Co. 44 Fed. 647 783 
 826 
 
 Lampasas v. Bell, 180 U. S. 282, 
 45 L. ed. 530, 21 Sup. 
 Gt. Rep. 368 644, 654 
 
 Lancaster v. Asheville Street R. 
 
 Co. 90 Fed. 129*^.. 55, 5T 
 102, 104, 345 
 
 Land Co. v. Elkins, 22 Blatchf. 
 
 204, 20 Fed. 545 . !~234, 358 
 .Landers v. Felton, 13 Fed'.' 311.. 807 
 
TABLE OB CASES. 
 
 cm 
 
 Land Title & T. Co. v. Asphalt 
 Co. 62 C. C. A. 23, 127 
 
 Fed. 2 18, 459, 855 
 
 V. Tatnall, 65 C. C. A. 071, 
 
 132 Fed. 305 459 
 
 Lane v. Kuehn, — Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 — , 141 S. W. 365 410 
 
 Lang V. Choctaw, 0. & G. E. Co. 
 87 C. C. A. 307, 160 
 
 Fed. 356 367 
 
 Langdon v. Hillside Coal & I. Co. 
 
 41 Fed. 609 825 
 
 Lange, Ex parte, 18 Wall. 167, 
 
 21 L. ed. 876 586 
 
 V. Union P. R. Co. 62 C. C. 
 
 A. 48, 126, Fed. 340 ... 365 
 430 
 Lanier v. Alison, 31 Fed. 100 . . 26 
 Lanning v. Osborn, 79 Fed. 661 . . 188 
 Lant V. Alanley, 71 Fed. 12. .247, 248 
 Lantz V. Fretts, 173 Fed. 1008 . . 794 
 
 799 
 La Page v. Day, 74 Fed. 978 . . 780 
 
 784 
 Larabee v. Dolley, 175 Fed. 367 145 
 
 146 
 Lathrop, S. & H. Co. v. Interior 
 Constr. & Improv. Co. 
 
 143 Fed. 687 816 
 
 V. Interior Constr. & Improv. 
 
 Co. 150 Fed. 666 840 
 
 V. Pittsburg, S. & M. K. Co. 
 
 135 Fed. 619 74 
 
 Latta V. Kilbourn, 150 U. S. 540, 
 37 L. ed. 1175, 14 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 201, 113 Fed. 
 
 743 581, 636, 638 
 
 Lau Ow Bew, Re, 141 U. S. 586, 
 35 L. ed. 869, 12 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 43 737, 738 
 
 V. United States, 144 U. S. 
 47, 30 L. -ed. 340, 12 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 517 622 
 
 735, 737 
 Laurel Oil & Gas Co. v. Gal- 
 breath Oil & Gas Co. 
 91 C. C. A. 196, 165 
 
 Fed. 162 714 
 
 Lauriat v. Stratton, 6 Savpy. 339, 
 
 11 Fed. 107 255 
 
 Lawrence v. Nelson, 143 U. S. 
 215, 36 L. ed. 130, 12 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 440 249 
 
 V. Southern Pacific Co. 180 
 
 Fed. 827 243, 833 
 
 v. Southern P. Co. 165 Fed. 
 
 241 233, 2.1.'), 804 
 
 V. Southern P. R. Co. 177 
 
 Fed. 547 249 
 
 Lawrence v. Times Printing Co. 
 
 90 Fed. 28 233 
 
 Lawton v. Blitch, 30 Fed. 641 . . 860 
 Layton v. ilissouri, 187 U. S. 
 356, 47 L. ed. 214, 23 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 137 ..751, 754 
 L. Bucki & Son Lumber Co. v. 
 Atlantic Lumber Co. 63 
 C. C. A. 62, 128 Fed. 
 
 340 43 
 
 League v. Scott, 25 Tex. Civ. 
 
 App. 318, 61 S. W. .521 478 
 Leahy v. Haworth, 4 L.R.A. 
 (N.S.) 657, 73 C. C. A. 
 
 84, 141 Fed. 855 266 
 
 Leas V. Merriman, 132 Fed. 512. . 313 
 Leathe v. Thomas, 207 U. S. 93, 
 52 L. ed. 118, 28 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 30 153 
 
 V. Thomas, 38 C. C. A. 75, 
 
 97 Fed. 136 476 
 
 Leather Mfg. Nat. Bank v. Coop- 
 er, 120 U. S. 779, 30 L. 
 ed. 817, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 777 853 
 
 Lebensberger v. Scofield, 71 C. C. 
 
 A. 476, 139 Fed. 380 . . 789 
 Lebert v. Hunt, 108 Fed. 450 . . 274 
 Lederer v. Ferris, 149 Fed. 250 . . 95 
 
 96 
 
 V. Rankin, 90 Fed. 449 95 
 
 V. Sire, 105 Fed. 529 838 
 
 Lee V. Atlantic Coast Line R. 
 
 Co. 150 Fed. 776.. 270, 812 
 V. Watson, 1 Wall. 339, 17 
 
 L. ed. 558 169, 178 
 
 Leeds Woolen Mills, Re, 129 l?ed. 
 
 926 30 
 
 Leggett V. Great Northern R. Co. 
 
 180 Fed. 314 822 
 
 Lehigh Min. & Mfg. Co., Re, 156 
 U. S. 327, 39 L. ed. 440, 
 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 375 . . 649 
 650 
 V. Kelly, 160 U. S. 327, 40 
 L. ed. 444, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 307 .. .51, 62, 197, 217 
 222, 553 
 Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yen- 
 savage, 134 C. C. A. 275, 
 
 218 Fed. 549 123 
 
 Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Rainey, 
 
 99 Fed. 596 801 
 
 Lehigh Zinc & I. Co. v. New 
 Jersey Zinc & I. Co. 43 
 
 Fed. 545 192, 193 
 
 Leigh V. Green, 193 U. S. 79, 
 48 L. ed. 623, 24 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 390 752 
 
CIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Leigh V. Kewanee Mfg. Co. 127 
 
 Fed. 990 483 
 
 Leland v. Northwest . Stevedore 
 
 Co. 209 Fed. 626 782 
 
 Lem Iliiig Dun v. United States, 
 1 C. C. A. 209, 7 U. S. 
 App. 18, 49 Fed. 145 . . 718 
 720 
 Lemon v. Imperial Window 
 
 Glass Co. 199 Fed. 928 323 
 Lcngel V. American Smelting & 
 
 Ref. Co. 110 Fed. 21 . . . 98 
 L'Engle v. Gates, 74 Fed. 515 . . 334 
 Leonard v. Ozark Land Co. 115 
 U. S. 469, 29 L. ed. 446, 
 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 127 .. 685 
 Lerman v. Stevenson, 40 Fed. 
 
 359 864 
 
 ■ Leslie v. Leslie, 84 Fed. 70 296 
 
 297 
 Less V. English, 29 C. C. A. 275, 
 56 U. S. App. 16, 85 
 
 Fed. 477 33, 122, 169 
 
 177, 178, 201 
 Levin v. United States, 63 C. C. 
 
 A. 476, 128 Fed. 828 . . 44 
 Levinski v. Middlesex Bkg. Co. 
 34, C. C. A. 4.32, 92 Fed. 
 
 458 174, 200, 826 
 
 Levy V. Superior Ct. 167 U. S. 
 177, 42 L. ed. 126, 17 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 769 748 
 
 L. E. Waterman Co. v. Lock- 
 wood, 128 Fed. 174 ... 547 
 Lewis V. Baltimore & L. R. Co. 
 10 C. C. A. 446, 8 U. S. 
 App. 645, 62 Fed. 219 458 
 462, 638, 702 
 V. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. 
 
 R. Co. 192 Fed. 655 .. 806 
 807 
 V. Cocks, 23 Wall. 470, 23 
 
 L. ed. 71 11, 25, 29, 34 
 
 V. Darling, 16 How. 8, 14 
 
 L. ed. 822 266 
 
 V. Hitchman Coal & Coke 
 Co. 100 C. C. A. 137, 
 
 176 Fed. 549 626, 627 
 
 V. Holmes, 116 C. C. A. 408, 
 
 194 Fed. 842 610 
 
 V. Shainwald, 48 Fed. 493 . . 12 
 284, 285, 481 
 Lewis Blind Stitch Co. v. Arbet- 
 ter Felling Mach. Co. 
 
 181 Fed. 974 . .' 126 
 
 Lewis Pub. Co. v. Wyman, 152 
 
 Fed. 202 39 
 
 V. Wyman, 168 Fed. 760 . . 581 
 V. Wyman, 104 C. C. A. 453, 
 
 182 Fed. 14 553 
 
 Leyson v. Davis, 170 U. S. 40, 42 
 L. ed. 941, 18 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 500 160 
 
 L. 6. McKnight & Son Co. v. 
 Cramer Furniture Co. 
 110 C. C. A. 612, 189 
 
 Fed. 48 328 
 
 Lilienthal v. Drucklieb, 80 Fed. 
 
 563 19 
 
 v. McCormick, 54 C. G. A. 
 475, 117 Fed. 89 ..173, 179 
 451, 452, 453, 461, 468, 484 
 485 
 V. Washburn, 4 Woods, 65, 
 
 8 Fed. 707 556 
 
 Lincoln v. Sun Vapor Street 
 Light Co. 8 C. C. A. 
 253, 19 U. S. App. 431, 
 
 59 Fed. 756 727 
 
 Lincoln Nat. Bank v. Perry, 14 
 
 C. C. A. 273, 32 U. S. 
 
 App. 15, 66 Fed. 887 . . 585 
 
 586 
 
 Linden Invest. Co. v. Honstain 
 
 Bros. Co. 136 C. C. A. 
 
 121, 221 Fed. 179 35 
 
 Linder v. Lewis, 1 Fed. 378 389 
 
 391, 602 
 Lindsay v. First Nat. Bank, 156 
 U. S. 485, 39 L. ed. 505, 
 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 472 . . 16 
 Lindsay-Bitton Live Stock Co. v. 
 Justice, 111 C. C. A. 
 525, 191 Fed. 163 ..128, 132 
 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic 
 
 Gas Co. 162 Fed. 954 . . 149 
 244 
 Line Steamers v. Robinson, 134 
 C. C. A. 287, 218 Fed. 
 
 562 429 
 
 Linkswiler v. Schneider, 95 Fed. 
 
 203 . . . ; 159 
 
 Linn v. Green, 5 McCrary, 380, 
 
 637, 17 Fed. 407 ...... 281 
 
 Littell V. Erie Co. 105 Fed. 539 . . 272 
 Little V. Bowers, 134 U. S. 558, 
 33 L. ed. 1020, 10 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 620 701 
 
 V. Giles, 118 U. S. 602, 30 
 L. ed. 271, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 32 74 
 
 V. Tanner, 208 Fed. 608 ... . 228 
 
 295 
 Little Eock Junction R. Co. v. 
 Burke, 13 C. C. A. 341, 
 27 U. S. App. 736, 66 
 
 Fed. 88 604 
 
 Little York Gold-Washing & 
 Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 
 U. S. 204, 24 L. ed. 659 138 
 157-159, 166, 820 
 
TABLE or CASES. 
 
 CV 
 
 Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. 
 
 Phenix Ins. Co. 129 U. 
 
 S. 397, 32 L. ed. 788, 9 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 469 
 
 Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. 
 
 Clunie, 88 Fed. 160 
 
 Livingston v. Story, 11 Pet. 392, 
 
 9 L. ed. 763 
 
 V. Story, 12 Pet. 343, 9 L. 
 
 ed. 1110 
 
 Lloyd V. Pennie, 50 Fed. 4 .... 
 Lobensberger v. Scofield, 71 C. C. 
 
 A. 476, 139 Fed. 380 . . 
 Lochner v. Xew York, 198 U. S. 
 
 63, 49 L. ed. 944, 25 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 539, 3 A. 
 
 & E. Ann. Cas. 1133 . . 
 Lockhart v. Horn, 1 Woods, 628, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 8,445 
 
 V. Horn, 3 Woods, 542, Fed. 
 
 Cas. No. 8,446 387, 
 
 v. Leeds, 195 U. S. 427, 49 
 L. ed. 263, 25 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 76 
 
 Lockman v. Lang, 62 C. C. A. 
 
 550, 128 Fed. 280.. 670, 
 
 V. Lang, 65 C. C. A. 621, 132 
 
 Fed. 1. ..648, 667, 670, 
 
 691, 
 
 Lockwood V. Wickes, 21 C. C. A. 
 
 257, 36 U. S. App. 321, 
 
 40 U. S. App. 136, 75 
 
 Fed. 123 
 
 Lodge V. Twell, 135 U. S. 235, 34 
 L. ed. 154, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 745 581, 636, 
 
 Loeb V. Columbia Twp. 179 U. 
 
 S. 485, 45 L. ed. 288, 21 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 174.. 215, 
 
 649, 653, 709, 
 
 V. Columbia Twp. 91 Fed. 37 
 
 Loeber v. Schroeder, 149 U. S. 
 
 585, 37 L. ed. 859, 13 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 934 
 
 Logan V. Goodwin, 41 C. C. A. 
 
 573, 101 Fed. 654 
 
 686, 
 Lomax v. Foster Lumber Co. 99 
 
 C. C. A. 463, 174 Fed. 
 
 966 71, 
 
 Lombard Invest. Co. v. Seaboard 
 
 Mfg. Co. 74 Fed. 325.. 
 
 462, 
 
 Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 
 
 373, 52 L. ed. 1103, 28 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 708 
 
 20 
 
 226 
 300 
 
 409 
 
 768 
 526 
 
 841 
 
 148 
 56 
 
 389 
 391 
 
 583 
 
 673 
 
 677 
 693 
 
 721 
 638 
 
 451 
 743 
 216 
 
 750 
 752 
 
 669 
 765 
 
 73 
 
 461 
 463 
 
 754 
 
 London P. & A. Bank v. Aron- 
 stein, 54 C. C. A. 663, 
 117 Fed. 607 79 
 
 Long V. Long, 73 Fed. 369 . .841, 856 
 
 Loomis V. Rosenthal, 67 Fed. 369 129 
 
 Loop V. Winters, 115 Fed. 362.. 779 
 815 8.39 857 
 
 Lord V. De Witt, 116 Fed'. 713 824 
 V. Lehigh Valley R. Co. 104 
 
 Fed. 929 796 
 
 V. Veazie, 8 How. 255, 12 L. 
 
 ed. 1069 701 
 
 Los Angeles City Water Co. v. 
 Los Angeles, 103 Fed. 
 711 147 
 
 Lott V. King, 79 Tex. 293, 15 S. 
 
 W. 231 542 
 
 Louden Machinery Co. v. Ameri- 
 can Malleable Iron Co. 
 127 Fed. 1008 840 
 
 Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. 
 S. 1, 50 L. ed. 913, 26 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 408, 571.. 10 
 V. Pillsbury, 105 U. S. 294, 
 
 26 L. ed. 1095 146 
 
 V. Texas, 176 U. S. 1, 44 L. 
 ed. 347, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 251 39 
 
 Louisiana Nat. Bank v. Whit- 
 ney, 121 U. S. 285, 30 
 L. ed. 962, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 897 638 
 
 Louisville v. Cumberland Teleph. 
 & Teleg. Co. 84 C. C. A. 
 151, 155 Fed. 725, 12 
 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 500. . 148 
 151 
 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bitter- 
 man, 128 Fed. 176, 75 
 C, C. A. 192, 144 Fed. 
 44, 207 U. S. 222, 52 
 L. ed. 182, 28 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 91, 12 Ann. Cas. 
 
 693 188 
 
 V. Emerson, 43 Tex. Civ. 
 
 App. 281, 94 S. W. 1105 324 
 V. Fisher, 11 L.R.A.(N.S.) 
 926, 83 C. C. A. 584, 
 155 Fed. 68.... 97, 832, 858 
 V. Hughes, 201 Fed. 727 ... 46 
 V. Ide, 114 U. S. 52, 29 L. 
 ed. 63, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 735 72 
 
 V. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149, 
 
 53 L. ed. 126, 29 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 42.. . .45, 151, 822 
 V. Railroad Commission, 208 
 
 Fed. 37 472 
 
 V. Smith, 63 C. C. A. 1, 128 
 
 Fed. 5... 187, 188, 189, 226 
 
CVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Louiaville & N. E. Co. v. Smith 
 H. & Co. 204 U. S. 551, 
 51 L. ed. 612, 27 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 401 761 
 
 V. Wangelin, 132 U. S. 601, 
 
 33 L,. ed. 475, 10 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Eep. 203.. .74, 816, 859 
 861, 862 
 V. Western U. Teleg. Co. 218 
 
 Fed. 91 834 
 
 Louisville, C. & C. E. Co. v. Let- 
 son, 2 How. 555, 11 L. 
 
 ed. 376 76 
 
 Louisville, E. & St. L. E. Co. v. 
 Wilson, 138 U. S. 504, 
 
 34 L. ed. 1024, 11 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Eep. 405 700 
 
 Louisville, N. A. & C. E. Co. v. 
 Louisville Trust Co. 78 
 
 . Fed. 659 740 
 
 v. Louisville Trust Co. 174 
 
 U. ' S. 563, 43 L. ed. 
 
 1087, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 
 817.. 60, 78, 79, 81, 82, 109 
 
 V. Ohio Valley Improv. & 
 
 Contract Co. 57 Fed. 45 30 
 300 
 V. Pope, 20 C. C. A. 253, 46 
 
 U. S. App. 25, 74 Fed. 1 680 
 685, 697, 736 
 Louisville Trust Co. v. Knott, 
 191 U. S. 225, 48 L. ed. 
 159, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 119 643, 645 
 
 V. Knott, 65 C. C. A. 158, 
 
 130 Fed. 825 479 
 
 V. Louisville, N. A. & C. E. 
 Co. 22 C. C. A. 378, 43 
 U. S. App. 550, 75 Fed. 
 
 433 78, S3, 84 
 
 V. Stockton, 18 C. C. A. 408, 
 41 U. S. App. 579, 72 
 
 Fed. 1 663 
 
 V. Stone, 46 C. C. A. 299, 
 
 107 Fed. 309 137 
 
 Louisville Underwriters, Ee, 134 
 U. S. 488, 33 L. ed. 991, 
 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 587 . . 120 
 Loung .June, Ex parte, 160 Fed. 
 
 254 352 
 
 Love V. Atchison, T. & S. F. E. 
 Co. 107 C. C. A. 403, 
 
 185 Fed. 322 630 
 
 V. Busch, 73 C. C. A. 545, 
 
 142 Fed. 431 657, 707 
 
 V. Louisville & E. E. Co. 
 
 178 Fed. 507 181, 182 
 
 Loveless v. Ransom, 46 C. C. A. 
 
 515, 107 Fed. 627. .697, 698 
 699, 705 
 
 Loveless v. Eansom, 48 C. C. A. 
 
 434, 109 Fed. 391 677 
 
 Lovett V. Prentice, 44 Fed. 459 193 
 
 Low V. Durfee, 5 Fed. 256 593 
 
 Lowe V. Dowbarn, 26 Tex. 507 . . 173 
 Lownsdale v. Gray's Harbor 
 
 Boom Co. 117 Fed. 983 271 
 
 272, 274, 629 
 
 Lowrey v. Kusworm, 66 Fed. 539 499 
 
 544 
 Lowry v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 
 
 46 Fed. 83 138 
 
 V. Tile, Mantel & Grate 
 
 Asso. 98 Fed. 817 122 
 
 123, 334 
 Lucas V. Milliken, 139 Fed. 816 805 
 Lucker v. Phoenix Assur. Co. 66 
 
 Fed. 162 788, 800 
 
 Ludeling v. Chaffe, 143 U. S. 305, 
 
 36 L. ed. 314, 12 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Eep. 439 161, 749 
 
 Lull V. Clark, 22 Blatchf. 207, 
 
 20 Fed. 454 563, 567 
 
 Lumley v. Wabash R. Co. 71 Fed. 
 
 28 276, 281, 400 
 
 Lund V. Chicago, E. I. & P. E. 
 
 Co. 78 Fed. 385. .. .781,, 784 
 Lung Chung v. Northern P. E. 
 
 Co. 19 Fed. 256 332 
 
 Lusk V. Kimball, 87 Fed. 545... 266 
 
 Luten V. Camp, 221 Fed. 424 294 
 
 Luxton V. North Eiver Bridge 
 
 Co. 147 U. S. 341, 37 L. 
 
 ed. 195, 13 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 356 638 
 
 Lykins v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. 
 
 126 C. C. A. 395, 209 
 
 Fed. 573 473 
 
 Lynch v. Murphy, 161 U. S. 251, 
 
 40 L. ed. 689, 16 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 523 345, 346 
 
 Lyon V. Perin & G. Mfg. Co. 125 
 
 U. S. 702, 31 L. ed. 841, 
 
 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1024 . . 352 
 Lyon County v. Keene Five Cent 
 
 Sav. Bank, 40 C. C. A. 
 
 391, 100 Fed. 337.. 215, 216 
 
 M. 
 
 Maas v. Lonstorf, 91 C. C. A. 
 
 627, 166 Fed. 41... 582, 590 
 634 
 McAlister v. Chesapeake & 0. R. 
 Co. 85 C. C. A. 316, 157 
 Fed. 742, 13 A. & E. 
 
 Ann. Cas. 1068 782, 784 
 
 785, 786 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 evil 
 
 McAllister v. Chesapeake &. 0. E. 
 
 Co. 198 Fed. 660 ..806, 818 
 McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 
 
 340, 28 L. ed. 1015, 5 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652.. 225, 238 
 253 
 McBee v. Jlarletta & N. G. K. 
 
 Co. 48 Fed. 243 102 
 
 McBride v. Grand de Tour Plow 
 
 Co. 40 Fed. 1U2 334 
 
 V. Oriental Bank, 200 Fed. 
 
 895 258 
 
 McCabe v. Southern R. Co. 107 
 
 Fed. 214 350, 817 
 
 McCafferty v. Celluloid Co. 43 
 
 C. C. A. 540, 61 U. S. 
 
 App. 394, 104 Fed. 305 639 
 674 
 McCain v. Des Moines, 174 U. S. 
 
 168, 43 L. ed. 936, 19 
 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 644 161 
 
 McCall Co. V. Deuchler, 98 C. C. 
 
 A. 169, 174 Fed. 133 . . 326 
 McCandless v. Pratt, 211 U. S. 
 
 437, 53 L. ed. 271, 29 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 144 .... 161 
 
 MeCarley v. McGee, 108 Fed. 497 696 
 
 McClaskey v. Barr, 45 Fed. 151 320 
 
 V. Barr, 48 Fed. 138 . . 506, 542 
 
 McClellan v. Pyeatt, 1 C. C. A. 
 
 241, 4 U. S. App. 48, 49 
 
 Fed. 259 681, 682, 683 
 
 694, 696 
 V. Pyeatt, 1 C. C. A. 613, 4 
 
 U. S. App. 319, 50 Fed. 
 
 686 728 
 
 McClelland v. McKane, 154 Fed. 
 
 164 64 
 
 McClintock v. Pawtucket, 180 
 
 Fed. 320 613 
 
 McCloskey v. Barr, 38 Fed. 166 301 
 410, 412, 413 
 
 V. Barr, 40 Fed. 559 422 
 
 V. Pacific Coast Co. 22 L.R.A. 
 
 (N.S.) 673, 87 C. C. A. 
 
 568, 160 Fed. 795 33 
 
 McConihay v. Wright, 121 U. S. 
 
 206, 30 L. ed. 933, 7 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 940 . . 15, 17 
 McConnell v. Dennis, 82 C. C. A. 
 
 501, 153 Fed. 549 231 
 
 McCord Lumber Co. v. Doyle, 38 
 
 C. C. A. 34, 97 Fed. 22 322 
 McCormick v. Illinois C. R. Co. 
 
 100 Fed. 250 806 
 
 V. Walthers, 134 U. S. 41, 
 
 33 L. ed. 833, 10 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 485 93 
 
 McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. 
 
 V. Walthers, 134 U. S. 
 
 41, 33 L. ed. 833, 10 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 485 
 
 McCorquodale v. Texas, 211 U. 
 
 S. 432, 53 L. ed. 269, 
 
 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 146 . . 
 
 McCourt V. Singers-Bigger, 70 
 
 C. C. A. 73, 145 Fed. 
 
 103, 7 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 
 
 287 568, 
 
 V. Singers-Bigger, 80 C. C. 
 
 A. 56, 150 Fed. 104 
 
 McCoy V. Rhodes, 11 How. 140, 
 
 13 L. ed. 637 
 
 McCullough V. Virginia, 172 U. 
 
 S. 116, 43 L. ed. 387, 19 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 134 
 
 McDaniel v. Stroud, 45 C. C. A. 
 
 446, 106 Fed. 492 .... 
 V. Traylor, 123 Fed. 339, 196 
 
 U. S. 415, 49 L. ed. 533, 
 
 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 369.. 
 
 177, 
 
 McDonald v. Cooper, 32 Fed. 745 
 
 V. Miller, 84 Fed. 345 
 
 V. Nebraska, 41 C. C. A. 
 278, 101 Fed. 171.. 266, 
 
 V. Salem Capital Flour-Mills 
 
 Co. 31 Fed. 577 125, 
 
 V. Seligman, 81 Fed. 753 . . 
 
 V. Whitney, 39 Fed. 467 .. . 
 
 McDonnell v. Jordan, 178 U. S. 
 
 238, 44 L. ed. 1052, 20 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 886 ... . 
 McDowell V. McCormick, 57 C. C. 
 
 A. 401, 121 Fed. 65 
 
 McDuffee v. Boston & M. E. Co. 
 
 82 Fed. 865 
 
 McDufBe V. Montgomery, 128 
 
 Fed. 107 
 
 McEldowney v. Card, 193 Fed. 
 
 482 271, 273, 361, 
 
 McElroy v. Swope, 47 Fed. 380 
 McFadden v. United States, 213 
 
 U. S. 288, 53 L. ed. 801, 
 
 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 490 . . 
 McFarland v. State Sav. Bank, 
 
 129 Fed. 244 
 
 McFarlane v. Golling, 22 C. C. 
 
 A. 23, 46 U. S. App. 
 
 141, 76 Fed. 24 672, 
 
 McFaul V. Ramsey, 20 How. 523, 
 
 15 L. ed. 1010 
 
 McGarvey v. Butte Miner Co. 190 
 
 Fed. 672 
 
 95 
 
 750 
 
 752 
 
 676 
 
 429 
 
 146 
 
 677 
 
 175 
 193 
 342 
 343 
 29 
 
 354 
 364 
 
 413 
 
 482 
 609 
 
 8.54 
 
 477 
 
 678 
 
 59 
 
 364 
 
 578 
 
 653 
 
 392 
 
 674 
 
 7 
 
 807 
 
CVlll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 McGeorge v. Bigstone Gap Im- ! 
 
 prov. Co. 88 Fed. 599 . . 253 | 
 MeGill V. Sorensen, 209 Fed. 876 445 ! 
 
 446 
 McGilvra v. Eosg, 90 0. G. A. 
 
 398, 164 Fed. 604 159 
 
 655, 732 
 MacGinniss v. Boston & M. Con- 
 sol. Copper & S. Min. 
 
 Co. 55 C. C. A. 648, 119 
 
 Fed. 96 71, 816 
 
 McGorray v. O'Connor, 31 C. C. 
 
 A. 114, 59 U. S. App. 
 
 452, 87 Fed. 588 517 
 
 McGourkey v. Toledo & 0. C. R. 
 
 Co. 146 U. S. 546, 36 
 
 L. ed. 1083, 13, Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 170 581, 634, 636 
 
 637, 638 
 McGraw v. Woods, 96 Fed. 56 . . 284 
 
 288, 289 
 McGregor v. Vermont Ix)an & T. 
 
 Co. 44 C. C. A. 146, 104 
 
 Fed. 709.. 419, 586, 615, 733 
 MoGuire v. Great Northern R. 
 
 Co. 153 Fed. 434.. 807, 860 
 862 
 V. Massachusetts, 3 Wall. 
 
 385, 18 L. ed. 165 154 
 
 Mcllwaine v. Ellington, 99 Fed. 
 
 133 710 
 
 Mclntire v. Pryor, 173 U. S. 57, 
 
 43 L. ed. 613, 19 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 352 281 
 
 Mackall v. Richards, 116 U. S. 
 
 45, 29 L. ed. 558, 6 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 234 .'. 773 
 
 McKane v. Burke, 132 Fed. 688 344 
 Mackay v. Gabel, 117 Fed. 878 224 
 
 277 228 
 V. Kalyton, 204 V. S. 458* 
 
 51 L. ed. 566, 27 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 346 752 
 
 McKee v. Brooks, 64 Tex. 255 . . 141 
 V. Chautauqua Assembly, 124 
 
 Fed. 808 190, 244 
 
 V. Coffin, 66 Tex. 307, 1 S. 
 
 W. 276 141 
 
 MoKemey v. Supreme Lodge, A. 
 
 0. U. W. 104 C. C. A. 
 
 117, 180 Fed. 966 355 
 
 McKenny v. Supreme Lodge, A. 
 
 0. U. W. 104 C. C. A. 
 
 117, 180 Fed. 961 466 
 
 Mackenzie v. Barrett, 73 C. C. A. 
 
 280, 141 Fed. 965, 5 A. 
 
 & E. Ann. Cas. 551 .. 285 
 V. Pease, 77 C. C. A. 233, 
 
 146 Fed. 743 734 
 
 McKinley v. Lloyd, 128 Fed. 519 26 
 
 McKinney v. Big Horn Basin De- 
 velopment Co. 93 C. C. 
 
 A. 258, 167 Fed. 771 . . 581 
 Mackintosh v. Flint & P. M. R. 
 
 Co. 34 Fed. 614 371 
 
 McKnight v. James, 155 U. S. 
 
 687, 39 L. ed. 311, 15 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 248 .... 754 
 McKown V. Kansas & T. Coal Co. 
 
 105 Fed. 657 826, 859 
 
 McLean v. Clark, 31 Fed. 501 . . 553 
 McLennan v. Kansas City, St. J. 
 
 & C. B. R. Co. 22 Fed. 
 
 198 492, 516 
 
 MacLeod v. Graven, 24 C. C. A. 
 
 449, 47 U. S. App. 573, 
 
 79 Fed. 84 634 
 
 V. New Albany, 13 C. C. A. 
 
 525, 24 U. S. App. 601, 
 
 66 Fed. 378 461, 598 
 
 599, 600 
 McLish V. Roflf, 141 U. S. 661, 35 
 
 L. ed. 893, 12 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 118.. 625, 633, 645, 646 
 647, 650, 655, 756 
 McManus v. Chollar, 63 C. 0. A. 
 
 454, 128 Fed. 902 ... . 5 
 McMillan v. Nowes, 146 Fed. 926 74 
 McMillen v. Ferrun Min. Co. 197 
 
 U. S. 343, 49 L. ed. 784, 
 
 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 533.. 159 
 McMonagle v. M'Glinn, 95 Fed. 
 
 92 281 
 
 McMullen v. Ritchie, 64 Fed. 
 
 262 242, 543 
 
 McMullen Lumber Co. v. 
 
 Strother, 69 C. C. A. 
 
 433, 136 Fed. 295. .11, 291 
 299, 559, 560 
 McNamara v. Dwyer, 7 Paige, 
 
 239, 32 Am. Dec. 631 . . 481 
 v. Home Land & Cattle Co. 
 
 105 Fed. 202.. 569, 572, 578 
 V. Provident Sav. Life Aa- 
 
 sur. Soc. 52 C. C. A. 
 
 530, 114 Fed. 912 .... 489 
 McNulta V. Loehridge, 141 U. 
 
 S. 330, 35 L. ed. 798, 12 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 11 . . 153, 154 
 160, 182, 256, 257 
 V. West Chicago Park, 39 
 
 C. C. A. 545, 99 Fed. 
 
 328 692, 699, 730 
 
 Macomb v. Armstead, 10 Pet. 
 
 407, 9 L. ed. 473 717 
 
 Macon v. Georgia Packing Co. 9 
 
 C. C. A. 262, 13 U. S. 
 
 App. 592, 60 Fed. 783 653 
 659 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CIS 
 
 Macon, D. & S. E. Co. v. Shailer, 
 72 C. 0. A. 631, 141 
 Fed. 585 241 
 
 Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic 
 Coast Line E. Co. 21o 
 U. S. 501, 54 L. ed. 300, 
 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1S4.. 833 
 
 McPhee & McG. Co. v. Union P. 
 E. Co. 87 C. C. A. 619, 
 158 Fed. 8 121, 133 
 
 McPherson v. Mississippi Valley 
 Trust Co. 58 C. C. A. 
 455, 122 Fed. 367 ..247, 248 
 
 McQuade v. Trenton, 172 U. S. 
 639, 43 L. ed. 582, 19 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 292 748 
 
 McQuiddy v. Ware, 20 Wall. 14, 
 
 22 L. ed. 311 10 
 
 Macutis V. Cudahy Packing Co. 
 
 203 Fed. 291 818 
 
 McVeagh v. Denver City Water- 
 works Co. 29 C. C. A. 
 33, 55 U. S. App. 267, 
 85 Fed. 74 410 
 
 Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. 
 
 Bernard Min. Co. 196 U. 
 
 S. 239, 49 L. ed. 462, 
 
 25 Sup. Ct. Eep. 251 . . 477 
 
 786 
 
 V. St. Bernard Min. Co. 130 
 
 Fed. 789 812, 827, 835 
 
 Maeder v. Buffalo Bill's Wild 
 
 West Co. 132 Fed. 280. . 244 
 403 
 
 Maflfet V. Quine, 95 Fed. 199.. 172 
 
 188 
 
 Magniac v. Thompson, 15 How. 
 
 281, 14 L. ed. 696 11 
 
 Magone v. Colorado Smelting & 
 
 Min. Co. 135 Fed. 846 507 
 513, 515 
 
 Maher v. Tower Hotel Co. 94 
 
 Fed. 225 254, 783, 847 
 
 Mahler v. Animarium Co. 64 C. 
 
 C. A. 329, 129 Fed. 897 586 
 
 Mahoning Valley E, Co. v. 
 O'Hare, 116 C. C. A. 495, 
 196 Fed. 947 273 
 
 Mahopoulus v. Chicago, E. I. & 
 
 P. E. Co. 167 Fed. 165 811 
 
 Mahr v. Union P. E. Co. 140 Fed. 
 
 925 303 
 
 Maine v. Oilman, 11 Fed. 214. . 825 
 
 Maine Lumber Co. v. Kingfield 
 
 Co. 218 Fed. 902 269 
 
 Mailers v. Commercial Loan & 
 T. Co. 216 U. S. 613, 54 
 L. ed. 638, 30 S6p. Ct. 
 Rep. 438 751, 752 
 
 Mallett V. North Carolina, 181 
 
 U. S. 589, 45 L. ed. 
 
 1035, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 730, 15 Am. Crim. Rep. 
 
 241 752 
 
 Mallory Mfg. Co. v. Fox, 20 Fed. 
 
 409 593 
 
 Mallow V. Hinde, 12 Wheat. 198, 
 
 6 L. ed. 600 225 
 
 Malone v. Richmond & D. R. Co. 
 
 35 Fed. 625 842, 846 
 
 Maloney v. Cressler, 126 C. C. A. 
 
 618, 210 Fed. 1097 815 
 
 Mandeville v. Riggs, 2 Pet. -182, 
 
 7 L. ed. 493 .... 229, 238 
 Mangels v. Donau Brewing Co. 
 
 53 Fed. 513 .52, 66, 67 
 
 Manhattan L. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 
 61 C. C. A. 138, 126 
 Fed. 88 588, 732 
 
 Manhattan Medicine Co. v. 
 Wood, 108 U. S. 218, 27 
 L. ed. 706, 2 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 436 10 
 
 Manhattan Trust Co. v. Trust 
 Co. of N. A. 46 C. C. A. 
 322, 107 Fed. 328 587 
 
 Manitowoc Malting Co. v. Fuecht- 
 
 wanger, 169 Fed. 983 . . 357 
 364, 365 
 
 Mankato v. Barber Asphalt Pav- 
 ing Co. 73 C. C. A. 439, 
 142 Fed. 329 408 
 
 Mann v. Caddie, 88 C. C. A. 1, 
 
 158 Fed. 43 66 
 
 Manning v. Berdan, 132 Fed. 
 
 382 105, 344, 486 
 
 V. German Ins. Co. 46 C. C. 
 
 A. 144, 107 Fed. 53 587, 615 
 
 Mannington v. Hocking \'alley R. 
 
 Co. 183 Fed. 133 . .118, 789 
 
 Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co, v. 
 Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 28 
 L. ed. 462, 4 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 510 ....197, 274, 551 
 732, 849, 856, 857 
 
 Manufacturers' Commercial Co. 
 V. Brown Alaska Co. 148 
 Fed. 308 816, 830 
 
 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 
 
 137, 2 L. ed. 60 40 
 
 March v. Romare, 53 C. C. A. 
 
 574, 116 Fed. 354 626 
 
 Marconi '\\'ireles3 Teleg. Co. v. 
 National Electric Sig- 
 naling Co. 206 Fed. 295 446 
 447 
 
ex 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 ilardcn v. Campbell Printing- 
 Press & Mfg. Co. 15 C. 
 0. A. 26, 33 U. S. App. 
 123, 67 Fed. 810.. 583, 622 
 630, 631 
 Marine & Eiver Phosphate ilin. 
 & Mfg. Co. V. Bradley, 
 105 U. S. ISl, 26 L. ed. 
 
 1036 550 
 
 Marion v. Ellis, 10 Fed. 410 ..'180 
 
 Markell v. Kasson, 31 Fed. 104. . 455 
 
 Marks v. Marks, 75 Fed. 321 . . 51, 59 
 
 61, 97, 122, 124, 125,129, 272 
 
 477 
 
 V. Merrill Paper Co. 123 C. 
 
 C. A. 380, 203 Fed. 16 243 
 V. Northern P. P. Co. 22 C. 
 C. A. 630, 44 U. S. App. 
 
 714, 76 Fed. 941 663 
 
 Markwood v. Southern R. Co.. 65 
 
 Fed. 817 80, 84, 109 
 
 Jlarmo, Re, 138 Fed. 201 641 
 
 M'arquez v. Frisbie, 101 U. S. 
 
 473, 25 L. ed. 800 281 
 
 Marrs v. Felton, 102 Fed. 775 162 
 181, 818, 852 
 Marsh v. Nichols, S. & Co. 140 
 U. S. 356, 35 L. ed. 417, 
 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 798.. 160 
 Marshall v. Baltimore & 0. R. 
 Co. 16 How. 314, 14 L. 
 
 ed. 953 77 
 
 V. Holmes, 141 U. S. 589, 25 
 L. ed. 870, 12 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 62 ..251, 478, 614, 616 
 618, 782 
 V. Otto, 59 Fed. 249.. 264, 353 
 407, 409, 428 
 V. Turnbull, 34 Fed. 827 .. . 276 
 Marten v. Holbrook, 157 Fed. 716 150 
 Marthinson v. King, 82 C. C. A. 
 
 360, 150 Fed. 49 34, 192 
 
 V. Winyah Lumber Co. 125 
 
 Fed. 633 361 
 
 Martin v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. 
 151 U. S. 673, 38 L. ed. 
 311, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep, 
 533 . ..80, 84. 
 
 109, 726, 
 793-795, 
 
 596 
 
 197 Fed. 
 
 V. Carter, 48 Fed. 
 V. City Water Co 
 
 465 
 
 T. Hazard PoAvder Co. 93 U. 
 
 S. 302, 23 L. ed. 885.. 
 V. Rainwater, 5 C. C. A. 
 
 398. 12 U. S. App. 232, 
 
 56 Fed. 10 
 
 V. St. Louis, Southwestern 
 
 R, Co. 134 Fed. 135 ... . 
 
 790 
 837 
 796 
 
 824 
 
 628 
 
 194 
 823 
 
 Martin v. Snyder, 148 U. S. 663, 
 37 L. ed. 602, 13 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 706 810 
 
 Martin & H. Cash-Carrier Co. v. 
 Martin, 18 C. C. A. 234, 
 33 U. S. App. 373, 71 
 Fed. 519 730 
 
 Martindale v. Waas, 3 McCrary, 
 
 637, 11 Fed. 551.. 304, 599 
 
 Martog V. Memory, 116 U. S. 590, 
 
 29 L. ed. 726, 6 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 521 125 
 
 Marvin v. Ellis, 9 Fed. 367 . . 62, 563 
 
 Mason v. Crosby, 3 Woodb. & M. 
 
 258, Fed. Cas. No. 9,236 568 
 V. Dullagham, 27 C. C. A. 
 296, 53 U. S. App. 539, 
 
 82 Fed. 689 67, 230 
 
 V. Hartford, P. & F. E. Co. 
 
 10 Fed. 334 369 
 
 V. Hartford, P. & F. R. Co. 
 
 19 Fed. 53 382 
 
 V. Pewabic Min. Co. 153 U. 
 S. 361, 38 L. ed. 745, 14 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 847 .... 772 
 
 Massachusetts & S. Constr. Co. 
 V. Crane Creek Twp. 155 
 U. S. 285, 39 L. ed. 153, 
 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 91 ... . 234 
 
 Massachusetts Ben. Life Asso. v. 
 Lohmiller, 20 C. C.~ A. 
 274, 46 U. S. App. 103, 
 74 Fed. 23 18 
 
 Massachusetts Loan & T. Co. v. 
 Kansas City & A. R, Co. 
 49 C. C. A. 18, 110 Fed. 
 
 30 458, 462, 855 
 
 Massachusetts Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. 
 
 Chicago & A. R. Co. 13 
 
 Fed. 857 237 
 
 Massenberg v. Denison, 46 C. C. 
 
 A. 120, 107 Fed. 18 .... 714 
 Massie v. Buck, 62 C. C. A. 535, 
 
 128 Fed. 27 477, 630 
 
 Masterson v. Howard, 18 Wall. 
 
 103, 21 L. ed. 765 .... 391 
 Matheson v. Hanna-Schoelkopf 
 
 Co. 128 Fed. 163 .... 547 
 Mathews Slate Co. v. Mathews, 
 
 148 Fed. 490. .859, 863, 868 
 Mathieson v. Craven, 164 Fed. 
 
 471 230, 233 
 
 Matsumura v. Higgins, 109 C. C. 
 
 A. 431, 187 Fed. 601.. 728 
 Matthews v. Puffer, 20 Blatchf. 
 
 233, 10 Fed. 606 ..318, 320 
 Mattingly v. Northwestern Vir- 
 ginia R. Co. 158 U. S. 
 
 56, 39 L. ed.- 895, 15 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 725.. 692, 804 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXI 
 
 Mattison v. Boston & M. R. Co. 
 
 205 Fed. S21 813, 834 
 
 Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Am- 
 munition Co. V. Colts 
 Patent Firearms Mfg. 
 
 Co. 103 Fed. 39 526, 531 
 
 714 
 
 Maxwell v. Atchison, T. & S. F. 
 
 R. Co. 34 Fed. 286 174 
 
 196, 199, 326 
 V. Federal Gold & Copper Co. 
 83 C. C. A. 570, 155 
 Fed. 110 64 
 
 Maxwell Steel Vault Co. v. Na- 
 tional Casket Co. 205 
 Fed. 515 275, 277, 279 
 
 May V. St. John, 38 Fed. 770.. 839 
 
 Mayer v. Cohrs, 188 Fed. 443.. 59 
 V. Ft. Worth & D. C. R. Co. 
 
 93 Fed. 601 796 
 
 Mayhew v. West Virginia Oil & 
 Oil Land Co. 24 Fed. 
 205 596 
 
 Maynard v. Green, 30 Fed. 644 358 
 359, 368, 374 
 V. Hecht, 151 U. S. 324, 38 
 L. ed. 179, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 353 648 
 
 Mayo V. Dockery, 108 Fed. 897 141 
 142, 152, 791, 822, 859 
 
 Mays V. Newlin, 143 Fed. 576 . .' 780 
 
 782, 783 
 
 Meagher v. Minnesota Thresher 
 Mfg. Co. 145 U. S. 611, 
 36 ,L. ed. 835, 12 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 876,. 583, 634, 638 
 
 Mears v. Loekhart, 36 C. C. A. 
 
 239, 94 Fed. 274... 520, 714 
 
 Mechanics' Bank v. Seton, 1 Pet. 
 
 299, 7 L. ed. 152.. 263, 264 
 
 Mechanics' Ins. Co. v. C. A. Hoov- 
 er Distilling Co. 97 C. 
 C. A. 400, 173 Fed. 892 31 
 
 Mecke V. Valley Town Mineral 
 
 Co. 89 Fed. 209.. 112, 328 
 333, 780, 785, 791, 796, 840 
 V. Valleytown Mineral Co. 
 35 C. C. A. 151, 93 Fed. 
 697 329, 785 
 
 Medsker v. Bonebrake, 108 U. S. 
 71, 27 L. ed. 655, 2 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 351 567 
 
 Mehrhoff v. Mehrhoff, 26 Fed. 13 240 
 
 Meissner v. Buck, 28 Fed. 163 . . 450 
 
 Mellen v. Moline Malleable Iron 
 Works, 131 U. S. 366, 33 
 L. ed. 182, 9 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 781 ....102, 105, 345 
 
 Mellor V. Smither, 52 C. C. A. 
 
 64, 114 Fed. 116. .354, 366 
 367, 369 
 Memphis v. Postal Teleg. Cable 
 Co. 76 C. C. A. 292, 145 
 
 Fed. 602 825 
 
 Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Ala- 
 bama, 107 U. S. 585, 27 
 L. ed. 520, 2 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 432 80, 81 
 
 Memphis Keeley Institute v. Les- 
 lie E. Keeley Co. 144 ' 
 
 Fed. 628 637 
 
 Memphis Sav. Bank v. Houchens, 
 52 C. C. A. 176, 115 Fed. 
 
 96 194, 831 
 
 Menard v. Goggan, 121 U. S. 253, 
 30 L. ed. 914, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 873.... 60, 97, 125, 197 
 361 
 Mendenhall v. Hall, 134 U. S. 
 567, 33 L. ed. 1015, 10 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 616 .... 692 
 Menefee v. Frost, 123 Fed. 633 67 
 
 68 
 Menge v. Warriner, 57 C. C. A. 
 
 432, 120 Fed. 816 634 
 
 Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Barron, 
 
 165 Fed. 832 789 
 
 V. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 567, 
 
 25 L. ed. 815 355, 403 
 
 Mercantile Trust & D. Co. v. Col- 
 lins Park & Belt R. Co. 
 
 99 Fed. 812 147 
 
 V. Columbus, 203 U. S. 311, 
 51 L. ed. 198, 27 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 83 146 
 
 V. Rhode Island Hospital 
 
 Trust Co. 36 Fed. 863.. 403 
 V. Roanoke & S. R. Co. 109 
 
 Fed. 8 461, 477 
 
 Mercantile Trust Co. v. Atlantic 
 
 & P. R. Co. 70 Fed. 518 454 
 V. Chicago, P. & St. L. R. 
 Co. 60 C. C. A. 651, 123 
 
 Fed. 391 581, 636 
 
 V. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 
 
 84 Fed. 379.. 348, 423, 428 
 V. Portland & 0. R. Co. 10 
 
 Fed. 605 338 
 
 Merchants' Cotton Press & Stor- 
 age Co. V. Insurance Co. 
 of N. A. 151 U. S. 368, 
 38 L. ed. 195, 4 Inters. 
 Com. Rep. 499, 14 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 367.. 52, 71, 90, 91 
 232, 253, 804, 810 
 Merrihew v. Fort, 98 Fed. 899 . . 1 04 
 
 337 
 
CXll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Merrill v. Floyd, 2 C. C. A. 58, 
 5 U. S. App. 90, 50 Fed. 
 
 849 718 
 
 Merriman v. Chicago & E. I. R. 
 Co. 12 C. 0. A. 275, 24 
 U. S. App. 428; 64 Fed. 
 
 550 288, 289, 296, 359 
 
 V. Chicago & E. I. E. Co. 14 
 
 C. C. A. 36, 24 U. S. 
 
 App. 641, 66 Fed. 663 . . 733 
 
 V. Chicago, D. & V. R. Co. 
 
 56 G. C. A. 536, 120 Fed. 
 
 240 710 
 
 Merritt v. American Steel Barge 
 Co. 24 C. C. A. 530, 49 
 U. S. App. 85, 79 Fed. 
 
 231 344, 465, 477-479 
 
 Mersman v. Werges, 112 U. S. 
 143, 28 L. ed. 643, 5 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65 218 
 
 Messinger v. Anderson, 96 C. C. 
 
 A. 445, 171 Fed. 789.. 769 
 Metcalf V. American School Fur- 
 niture Co. 108 Fed. 911 29 
 242 
 V. American School Furni- 
 ture Co. 122 Fed. 115.. 415 
 V. Watertown, 128 U. S. 586, 
 32 L. ed. 543, 9 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 173 . . 45, 152, 163, 164 
 204, 213, 218, 361, 549 
 V. Watertown, 16 C. C. A. 
 37, 34 U. S. App. 107, 
 
 68 Fed. 861 772 
 
 Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Mc- 
 
 Nail, 81 Fed. 896 113 
 
 Metropolitan Nat. Bank v. St. 
 Louis Dispatch Co. 38 
 
 Fed. 58 358 
 
 Metropolitan R. Receivership, Re, 
 208 U. S. 91, 52 L. ed. 
 403, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 219 459, 553 
 
 Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Colum- 
 bus, S. & H. R. Co. 93 
 
 Fed. 689 257, 297 
 
 Mexican C. R. Co. v. Duthie, 189 
 U. S. 76, 47 L. ed. 715, 
 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 610 . . 357 
 365 
 V. Eckman, 187 U. S, 429, 
 47 L. ed. 245, 23 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 211 . . 59, 640, 643 
 645 
 V. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 194, 37 
 L. ed. 699, 13 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 859 ..52, 11], 271, 322 
 325, 326 
 
 Mexican Nat. Conatr. Co. v. Reu- 
 sens, 118 U. S. 54, 30 L. 
 ed. 78, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 945 680, 682 
 
 Mexican Nat. R. Co. v. Davidson, 
 
 157 U. S. 206, 39 L. ed. 
 
 674, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 563.. 209, 211, 212, 217, 334 
 
 829, 831 
 
 Meyer v. Consolidated Ice Co. 163 
 
 Fed. 400 496, 524 
 
 V. Hot Springs Imp. Co. 95 
 C. C. A. 156, 169 Fed. 
 
 628 662, 663 
 
 V. Kuhn, 13 C. C. A. 298, 25 
 U. S. App. 174, 65 Fed. 
 
 705 337, 343 
 
 V. Mansur & T. Implement 
 Co. 29 C. C. A. 465, 52 
 U. S. App. 474, 85 Fed. 
 
 874 711, 712 
 
 V. Pennsylvania Lumber- 
 men's Mut. F. Ins. Co. 
 
 108 Fed. 170 '329 
 
 V. Richmond, 172 17. S. 92, 
 43 L. ed. 377, 19 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 106 . . 153, 155, 750 
 Meyers v. Murray N. & Co. 11 
 
 L.R.A. 216, 43 Fed. 698 51 
 78, 79, 114, 839 
 Michigan Aluminum Foundry 
 Co. v. Aluminum Cast- 
 ings Co. 190 Fed. 879 . . 326 
 327, 328 
 Michigain C. R. Co., Re, 59 C. 
 
 C. A. 643, 124 Fed. 727 582 
 639, 702 
 Michigan Ins. Bank v. Eldred, 
 143 U. S. 298, 36 L. ed. 
 163, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 450 714 
 
 Michigan Sugar Co. v. Dix. 
 
 See Michigan Sugar Co. 
 
 V. Michigan. 
 
 V. Michigan, 185 U. S. 112, 
 
 46 L. ed. 829, 22 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 581 747, 753 
 
 Middleton v. Bankers & M. Teleg. 
 
 Co. 32 Fed. 524 579 
 
 Middleton Paper Co. v. Rock 
 River Paper Co. 19 Fed. 
 
 252 313 
 
 Midland Contracting Co. v. To- 
 ledo Foundry & Mach. 
 Co. 83 C. G. A. 489, 154 
 
 Fed. 798 122 
 
 Miles V. New South Bldg. & L. 
 
 Asso. 99 Fed. 4 254 
 
 Miller v. Ahrens, 150 Fed. 664 345 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cxm 
 
 Miller v. Clifford, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 
 
 49, 67 C. C. A. 52, 133 
 
 Fed. 881 72, 816 
 
 V. Cornwall R. Co. 168 U. 
 
 S. 133, 42 L. ed. 410, 18 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 34 751 
 
 V. Le Mars Nat. Bank, 116 
 
 Fed. 551 816 
 
 V. New York C. & H. R. R. 
 
 Co. 147 Fed. 772 89 
 
 V. Norfolk & W. R. Co. 41 
 
 Fed. 431 327 
 
 V. Pennsylvania R. Co. 91 
 
 Fed. 298 93, 273 
 
 V. Rickey, 123 Fed. 604 399 
 
 401, 411, 412 
 V. Rickey, 127 Fed. 580 .. 589 
 
 V. Rogers, 29 Fed. 401 377 
 
 V. Steele, 82 C. C. A. 572, 
 
 153 Fed. 714 22 
 
 V. Texas, 153 U. S. 535, 38 
 
 L. ed. 812, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 874 752 
 
 V. Wattier, 165 Fed. 362 .. 551 
 
 V. Weston, 199 Fed. 104 248 
 
 Miller-Magee Co. v. Carpenter, 34 
 
 Fed. 433 126 
 
 Millingar v. Hartupee, 6 Wall. 
 
 262, 18 L. ed. 830 156 
 
 Mills V. Chicago, 127 Fed. 732 30 
 
 241, 243 
 V. Chicago, 143 Fed. 431... 554 
 V. Green, 159 U. S. 654, 40 
 
 L. ed. 294, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 132.702, 721, 726, 732 
 V. Knapp, 39 Fed. 595 ..26, 34 
 
 V. Newell, 41 Fed. 529 786 
 
 v. Provident Life & T. Co. 
 
 100 Fed. 346 476 
 
 Milwaukee v. Shailer & S. Co. 34 
 
 C. C. A. 112, 91 Fed. 858 727 
 Milwaukee & M. R. Co. v. Cham- 
 berlain, 6 Wall. 748, 18 
 
 L. ed. 859 450, 484 
 
 T. Milwaukee & St. P. R. 
 
 Co. 2 Wall. 633, 17 L. 
 
 ed. 895 317, 369 
 
 T. Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co. 
 
 6 Wall. 742, 18 L. ed. 
 
 856 374, 456 
 
 V. Soutter. See Milwaukee 
 
 & M. R. Co. V. Milwau- 
 kee & St. P. R. Co. 
 Miner v. Markham, 28 Fed. 387 318 
 Minford v. Old Dominion S. S. 
 
 Co. 48 Fed. 1 . . . : HI 
 
 Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. 
 
 Minnesota, 193 U. S. 53, 
 
 48 .L. ed. 614, 24 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 396 152 
 
 Minnesota v. Duluth & I. R. Co. 
 
 87 Fed. 497 138, 139 
 
 V. Guaranty Trust & S. D.' 
 
 Co. 73 Fed. 914 63 
 
 V. Northern Securities Co. 
 
 184 U. S. 199, 46 L. ed. 
 
 499, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 308 224 
 
 V. Northern Securities Co. 
 
 194 U. S. 48, 48 L. ed. 
 
 870, 24 Supp. Ct. Rep. 
 
 .598 45, 548, 822, 829 
 
 Minot V. Mastin, 37 C. C. A. 234, 
 
 95 Fed. 735.. .183, 257, 457 
 458, 702 
 Miocene Ditch Co. v. Campion 
 
 Min. & Trading Co. 117 
 
 C. C. A. 61, 197 Fed. 498 615 
 Mirabile Corp. v. Purvis, 143 
 
 Fed. 920 56 
 
 Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. Ward, 
 
 2 Black, 485, 17 L. ed. 
 
 311 189 
 
 Mississippi & R. River Boom Co. 
 
 V. Patterson, 98 U. S. 
 
 403, 25 L. ed. 206 827 
 
 Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. 
 
 S. 205, 37 L. ed. 1053, 
 
 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 75.. 4, 6 
 16, 17, 213, 220 
 Mississippi R. Commission v. Il- 
 linois C. R. Co. 203 U. 
 
 S. 335, 51 L. ed. 209, 
 
 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90 . . 658 
 Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. 
 
 Washington N. R. Co. 
 
 212 Fed. 777 446 
 
 Missouri use of Public Schools v. 
 
 Alt, 73 Fed. 302 815 
 
 V. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208, 
 
 45 L. ed. 497, 21 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 331 40 
 
 V. Illinois, 202 U. S. 598, 50 
 
 L. ed. 1160, 26 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 713 547 
 
 Missouri K. & I. R. Co. v. 01a- 
 
 the, 156 Fed. 632 146 
 
 Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Eyas, 
 
 9 Tex. Civ. App. 572, 29 
 
 S. W. 1122 540 
 
 v. Dinsmore, 108 U. S. 31, 
 
 27 L. ed. 640, 2 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 9 718 
 
 V. Elliott, 184 U. S. 530, 46 
 
 L. ed. 673, 22 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 446 753 
 
 V. Goodrich, 129 C. C. A. 
 
 599, 213 Fed. 339 332 
 
 8 
 
CXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES- 
 
 Missouri, K.,& T. E. Co. v. Hab- 
 
 er, 169 U. S. 622, 42 
 
 L. ed. 881, 18 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 488 156 
 
 V. Hickman. See Missouri, 
 
 K. & T. R. Co. V. Mis- 
 souri R. & Wareliouse 
 
 Comrs. 
 V. Kolbe, 95 Tex. 76, 65 S. 
 
 W. 34 173 
 
 V. Missouri R. & Warehouse 
 
 Comrs. 183 U. S. 58, 
 
 46 L. ed. 80, 22 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 18 813 
 
 V. Scott, 4 Woods, 386, 13 
 
 Fed. 793 781 
 
 Missouri, K. & T. Trust Co. v. 
 
 Krumseig, 172 U. S. 
 
 361, 43 L. ed. 477, 19 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 179 ... . 19 
 Missouri P. R. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 
 
 160 U. S. 575, 40 L. ed. 
 
 540, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 389 673, 749, 750, 754 
 
 792, 850, 856 
 V. Meeh, 30 L.R.A. 250, 16 
 
 C. C. A. 510, 32 U. S. 
 
 App. 691, 69 Fed. 753 82 
 84 
 V. Omaha, 117 C. C. A. 12, 
 
 197 Fed. 516 148 
 
 V. Texas P. R. Co. 41 Fed. 
 
 313 181 
 
 V. Texas P. R. Co. 50 Fed. 
 
 151 413 
 
 Missouri Vallev Lan'd Co. v. 
 
 Wiese, 208 U. S. 234, 52 
 
 L. ed. 463, 28 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 294 759 
 
 Mitchell V. Bif; Six Development 
 
 Co. 186 Fed. 556. .367, 369 
 
 V. Dowell, 13 Fed. 141 551 
 
 V. Furman, 180 U. S.. 402, 
 
 45 L. ed. 596, 21 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 430 641, 642 
 
 V. International Tailoring • 
 
 Co. 169 Fed. 145 449 
 
 V. Marker, 25 L.R.A. 33, 10 
 
 C. C. A. 306, 22 U. S. 
 
 App. 325, 62 Fed. 140 728 
 V. Smale, 140 U. S. 406, 35 
 
 L. ed. 442, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 819 75, 823 
 
 V. United States, 21 Wall. 
 
 352, 22 L. ed. 587.. 51, 61 
 97 
 Mitchell Coal & Coke Co. v. 
 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. 112 
 
 C. C. A. 637, 192 Fed. 
 
 475 643 
 
 Mitchell Transp. Co. v. Green, 56 
 
 C. C. A. 455, 120 Fed. 
 
 49 671 
 
 Mobile & 0. R. Co. v. Tennessee, 
 
 153 U. S. 486, 38 L. ed. 
 
 793, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 968 3 
 Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 
 
 U. S. 707, 26 L. ed. 243 33 
 Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Mis- 
 sissippi, 210 U. S. 187, 
 
 52 h. ed. 1016, 28 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 650 754 
 
 Mobile Transp. Co. v. Mobile, 187 
 
 U. S. 480, 47 L. ed. 267, 
 
 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 170 . . 754 
 Moelle V. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 25, 
 
 37 L. ed. 352, 13 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 426 599 
 
 Moeller v. Southern P. Co. 211 
 
 Fed. 240 797 
 
 Moffat v. Soley, 2 Paine, 103, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 9,688 ... 56 
 Moffet V. Quine, 95 Fed. 199 ... . 733 
 Moline Trust & Sav. Pank v. 
 
 Wiley, 79 C. C. A. 446, 
 
 149 Fed. 734 722, 728 
 
 Moller V. United States, 6 C. C. 
 
 A. 459, 13 U. S. App. 
 
 472, 57 Fed. 491 .... 502 
 505, 532, 541 
 Moloney v. American Tobacco Co. 
 
 72 Fed. 801 828 
 
 Monmouth Invest. Co. v. Means, 
 
 80 C. C. A. 527, 151 
 
 Fed. 160 22, 59 
 
 Monroe v. Williamson, 81 Fed. 
 
 977 776, 782, 784 
 
 Montalet v. Murray, 4 Cranch, 
 
 47, 2 L. ed. 545 91 
 
 Montana ex rel. Haire v. Rice, 
 
 204 U. S. 291, 51 L. ed. 
 
 490, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 281 751 
 
 Montana, The. See Liverpool & 
 
 G. W. Steam Co. v. 
 
 Phenix Ins. Co. 
 Montana Min. Co. v. St. Louis 
 
 Min. & Mill. Co. 186 U. 
 
 S. 24, 46 L. ed. 1039, 
 
 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 744 . . 743 
 v. St. Louis Min. & Mill. 
 
 Co. 78 C. C. A. 33, 147 
 
 Fed. 897 587, 769 
 
 Montana Ore-Purchasing Co. v. 
 
 Boston & M. Consol. 
 
 Copper-S. Mining Co. 
 
 188 U. S. 644, 47 L. ed. 
 
 633, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 434 151 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXV 
 
 Montana Ore-l*urcliasing Co. v. 
 Boston & Jl. Consol. 
 Copper & S. Min. Co. 29 
 C. C. A. 462, 57 U. S. 
 App. 13, 85 Fed. 807 . . 
 V. Boston &, M. Consol. Cop- 
 per & S. Mln. Co. 35 C. 
 C. A. 1, 93 Fed. 274.. 
 
 159 
 
 138 
 151 
 
 Montgomery v. McDermott, 99 
 
 Fed. 502 410 
 
 V. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. 
 
 218 Fed. 471 779 
 
 Montgomery County v. Cochran, 
 
 116 Fed. 985 842, 844 
 
 840-848 
 V. Coehran, 62 C. C. A. 70, 
 
 126 Fed. 456 773 
 
 Montgomery Palace Stock-Car 
 Co. V. Street Stable-Car 
 
 Line, 43 Fed. 331 160 
 
 Moody V. Flagg, 125 Fed. 819 . . 253 
 Mooney v. Buford & G. Mfg. Co. 
 18 C. C. A. 421, 34 U. 
 S. App. 581, 72 Fed. 32 112 
 323 
 Moor V. Moor, — Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 — , 63 S. W. 350 478 
 
 Moore, Re, 209 U. S. 490, 52 L. 
 ed. 904, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 5S5, 706, 14 Ann. Cas. 
 1164 .. 122, 240, 813, 832 
 833, 858 
 V. Crawford, 130 U. S. 128, 
 32 L. ed. 880, 9 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rop. 447 10 
 
 V. Fidelity Trust Co. 70 C. 
 
 C. A. 663, 138 Fed. 1 247 
 V. Los Angeles Iron & Steel 
 
 Co. 89 Fed. 78 74, 815 
 
 V. Mississippi, 21 Wall. 638. 
 
 22 L. ed. 653 762 
 
 V. Moore, 58 C. C. A. 19, 
 
 121 Fed. 737 670 
 
 V. Simonds, 100 l". S. 145, 
 
 25 L. ed. 590 682 
 
 Moore Bros. Glass Co. v. Drevet 
 
 Mfg. Co. 154 Fed. 737 . . 211 
 Mootry v. Grayson,. 44 C. C. A. 
 
 83, 104 Fed. 613. .5S6, 587 
 592, 615 
 Moran, Ex parte, 75 C. C. A. 396, 
 
 144 Fed. 604 37 
 
 V. Hagerman. 151 U. 8. 333, 
 38 L. ed. 183, 14 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 354 649 
 
 V. Hagerman, 12 C. C. A. 
 2.39, 29 U. S. App. 71, 
 64 Fed. 503 . .431, 636, 638 
 
 Mordeeai v. Lindsay, 19 How. 
 
 201, 15 L. ed. 624 
 
 Moredock v. Moredock, 179 Fed. 
 
 163 
 
 Morgan v. East Tennessee & \'. 
 
 R. Co. 48 Fed. 705 .... 
 V. Gay, 19 Wall. 81, 22 L. 
 
 ed. 100 
 
 V. Kansas P. R. Co. 21 
 
 Blalchf. 134, 3 5 Fed. 55 
 Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. 
 
 V. Street, 57 Tex. Civ. 
 
 App. 194, 122 S. W. 270 
 
 V. Texas C. R. Co. 137 U. 
 S. 201, 34 L. ed. 635, 11 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 61 . .444, 
 
 V. Texas C. R. Co. 32 Fed. 
 
 530 . .391, ,586, 61.5, 687, 
 Morning Journal Asso. v. Smith, 
 
 4 C. C. A. 8, 1 U. S. 
 
 App. 270, 56 Fed. 141 . . 
 Morrill v. American Reserve 
 
 Bond Co. 151 Fed. 305.. 
 
 Morrin v. Lawler, 91 Fed. 693.. 
 
 Morris v. Bean, 123 Fed. fil8.. 
 
 V. Bean, 146 Fed. 423 
 
 V. Dunbar, 79 C. C. A. 226, 
 
 147 Fed. 406 
 
 V. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 315, 
 
 32 L. ed. 690, 9 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 289 ... .51, 61, 
 
 124, 130, 197, 199, 200, 
 
 205, 222, 549, 550, 
 
 V. Graham, 51 Fed. 53 .... 
 
 331, 333, 337, 
 
 V. Louisville & X. R. Co. 175 
 
 Fed. 491 
 
 V. United States, 174 U. S. 
 196, 43 L. ed. 946, 19 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 649 
 
 Morrison v. Burnette, 83 C. C. 
 
 A. 391, 154 Fed. G17 . . 
 
 233, 
 
 V. Kuhn, 26 C. C. A. 130, 
 
 52 U. S. App. 178, 80 
 
 Fed. 741 
 
 V. Marker, 93 Fed. 692 .... 
 
 Morrow v. Dudley, 144 Fed. 441 
 
 Morrow Shoe Mfg. Co. v. New 
 
 England Shoe Co. 24 
 
 L.R.A. 417, 6 C. C. A. 
 
 508, 18 U. S. App. 256, 
 
 57 Fed. 692 357, 
 
 Morse v. Bay State Gas Co. 91 
 Fed. 944 297, 
 
 633 
 410 
 110 
 219 
 253 
 
 790 
 797 
 
 452 
 485 
 
 765 
 
 240 
 
 149 
 835 
 
 678 
 684 
 188 
 188 
 
 634 
 
 97 
 204 
 554 
 102 
 345 
 
 818 
 
 10 
 
 231 
 714 
 
 703 
 104 
 318 
 
 360 
 430 
 
CXVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Morse Arms Mfg. Co. v. Win- 
 chester Repeating Arms 
 Co. 33 Fed. 184 26 
 
 Morton Trust Co. v. Keith, 150 
 
 Fed. 606 350 
 
 V. New York & 0. R. Co. 105 
 
 Fed. 539 461 
 
 Moses, Re, 83 Fed. 996 .... 88 
 
 Mosgrove v. Kountze, 4 Mo- 
 
 Crary, 561, 14 Fed. 315 368 
 370, 374 
 
 Mosher v. Joyce, 2 C. C. A. 322, 
 6 U. S. App. 107, 51 
 Fed. 441 579 
 
 Mossberg v. Nutter, 60 C. C. A. 
 
 98, 124 Fed. 966 630 
 
 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. 
 Eclair Film Co. 208 
 
 Fed. 416 448 
 
 V. Steiner, 119 C. C. A. 401, 
 
 201 Fed. 64 580, 639 
 
 V. Yankee Film Co. 192 Fed. 
 
 134 580 
 
 Motley V. Southern R. Co. 184 
 
 Fed. 958 238 
 
 Mound City Co. v. Castleman, 
 
 171 Fed. 520 ..348, 410, 424 
 V. Castleman, 177 Fed. 510 479 
 
 Mountain View Min. & Mill. Co. 
 V. Me Fadden, 180 U. S. 
 535, 45 L. ed. 656, 21 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488 748 
 
 Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. 
 
 S. 527, 25 L. ed. 702 . . 701 
 
 Mt. Vernon Refrigerating Co. v. 
 Fred W. Wolf Co. 110 
 C. C. A. 200, 188 Fed. 
 164 619 
 
 Moyer v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. 
 
 Co. 168 Fed. 105 813 
 
 832, 858 
 
 Mueller v. Dows, 94 U. S. 444, 
 
 24 L. ed. 207 270 
 
 Muhlenburg County v. Citizens' 
 
 Nat. Bank, 65 Fed. 537 487 
 
 Mulcahey v. Lake Erie & W. R. 
 
 "Co. 69 Fed. 172 858 
 
 Muller V. Chicago, I. & L. R. 
 
 Co. 149 Fed. 939 . .212, 836 
 v. Dows, 94 U. S. 444, 24 
 
 L. ed. 207 82 
 
 ]\Iulqueen v. Schlichter Jut Cord- 
 age Co. 108 Fed. 931 . . 864 
 
 Mumford v. Ecuador Develop- 
 ment Co. Ill Fed. 839 244 
 
 Municipal Invest Co. v. Gardiner, 
 
 62 Fed. 954 .. .44, 102, 105 
 345, 589 
 
 Municipal Signal Co. v. Game- 
 well Fire Alarm Teleg. 
 
 Co. 77 Fed. 452 613 
 
 Munroe v. Atlantic Mach. Works, 
 
 170 Fed. 863 517 
 
 Munson v. New York, 20 Blatchf. 
 
 358, 11 Fed, 72 600 
 
 Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 
 
 590, 22 L. ed. 429 . . 137, 153 
 Murphy v. East Portland, 42 
 
 Fed. 308 190 
 
 V. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe 
 
 Co. 184 Fed. 497 795 
 
 V. Milford, A. & W. Street 
 R. Co. 126 C. C. A. 649, 
 
 210 Fed. 135 714 
 
 V. Payette Alluvial Gold Co. 
 
 98 Fed. 321 ..221, 805, 830 
 837 
 V. Southern R. Co. 99 Fed. 
 
 469 575 
 
 V. Southern R. Co. 53 C. C. 
 
 A. 477, 115 Fed. 259 . . 575 
 Murray v. Bluebird Min. Co. 45 
 
 Fed. 385 159 
 
 v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 
 
 62 Fed. 24 20 
 
 V. Louisiana, 163 U. S. 107, 
 41 L. ed. 89, IG Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 990, 10 Am. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 242 527 
 
 V. Southern Bell Teleph. & 
 
 Teleg. Co. 210 Fed. 925 779 
 Muskogee Nat. Teleph. Co. v. 
 Hall, 55 C. C. A. 208, 
 
 118 Fed. 382 701, 702 
 
 Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Robi- 
 
 son, 22 L.R.A. 325, 7 
 
 C. C. A. 444, 19 U. S, 
 
 App. 266, 58 Fed. 732.. 539 
 
 545, 546 
 
 Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Blair, 130 
 
 Fed. 971 30 
 
 V. Conley, 11 C. C. A. 116, 
 25 U. S. App. 86, 63 Fed. 
 
 180 670, 673 
 
 V. Hill, 193 U. S. 553, 48 
 L. ed. 791, 24 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 538 769 
 
 V. Hill, 113 Fed. 44 770 
 
 V. Hill, 55 C. C. A. 536, 118 
 
 Fed. 711 771 
 
 V. Langley, 145 Fed. 421 ..779- 
 
 781, 783-785 
 
 V. McGrew, 188 U. S. 291, 47 
 
 L. ed. 480, 63 L.R.A. 33, 
 
 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 375 . . 154 
 
 746, 749, 752 
 
 V. Painter, 220 Fed. 998 . . 834 
 
TABiE OI' CASES. 
 
 CXVII 
 
 Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Pearson, 
 
 114 Fed. 390 : 22. 24 
 
 V. Phinney, ITS T. S. 334, 44 
 L. ed. 1092, 20 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 906 695 
 
 Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. 
 V. Beattv, 35 C. G. A. 
 
 573, 93 Fed. 747 769 
 
 V. Du Bois, 29 C. C. A. 354, 
 56 U. S. App. 586, 85 
 
 Fed. 586 674 
 
 V. Farmer, 23 C. C. A. 574, 
 36 U. S. App. 771, 77 
 
 Fed. 929 71, 74 
 
 V. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147, 47 
 L. ed. 987, 23 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 707 112, 117, 322 
 
 Mvers v. Fenn, 5 Wall. 207, 18 
 
 L. ed. 606 465 
 
 V. Hettinger, 37 C. C. A. 
 
 369, 94 Fed. 370 ..183, 257 
 485 
 V. Luzerne County, 124 Fed. 
 
 437 465 
 
 Myrtie il. Ross, The, 87 C. C. A. 
 
 175, 160 Fed. 19 . . .670, 672 
 Myrtle v. Nevada, C. & 0. R. Co. 
 
 137 Fed. 193 139, 158 
 
 797, 823 
 Mystic Jlilling Co. v. Chicago, M. 
 & St. P. R. Co. 132 Fed. 
 289 828 
 
 N. 
 
 Napier v. Westerhoff, 153 Fed. 
 
 985 366, 
 
 Nash V. McNamara, 145 Fed. 542 
 
 853, 854, 855, 
 
 V. Williams. See Cornett v. 
 
 Williams. 
 
 Nashua & L. R. Corp. v. Boston 
 
 & L. R. Corp. 136 U. S. 
 
 356, 34 L. ed. 363, 10 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1004 . . 
 
 81, 
 
 V. Boston & L. R. Corp. 2 C, 
 
 C. A. 542, 5 U. S. App. 
 
 97, 51 Fed. 931... 722, 
 
 V. Boston & L. R. Corp. 9 
 
 C, C. A. 468, 21 U. S. 
 
 App. 50, 61 Fed. 242 . . 
 
 708, 713, 718, 
 
 Nashville v.X^ooper, 6 Wall. 247, 
 
 18 L. ed. 851 
 
 Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. 
 McConnell, 82 Fed. 65 
 
 367 
 
 817 
 859 
 
 1 1 
 82 
 
 r23 
 
 707 
 723 
 
 39 
 
 187 
 188 
 
 Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. 
 
 Tavlor, 86 Fed. 171.. 7, 37 
 136, 137, 138, 139, 149, 152 
 153, 154, 155, 157, 166, 020 
 750 
 V. United States, 113 U. S. 
 261, 28 L. ed. 971, 5 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 460 039 
 
 National Aeci. Soe. v. S[)iro, 24 
 C. C. A. 334, 47 U. S. 
 App. 293, 78 Fed. 774 672 
 V. Spiro, 37 C. C. A. 388, 
 
 94 Fed. 750 547 
 
 National Automatic Mach. Co. 
 V. Automatic Weighing, 
 Lifting & Grip Mach. 
 Co. 44 C. C. A. 664, 105 
 
 Fed. 070 . . . ; 626 
 
 National Bank v. Allen, 33 C. C. 
 
 A. 169, 61 U. S. App. 
 
 102, 90 Fed. 545 . .465, 468 
 
 V. First Nat. Bank, 10 C. C. 
 
 A. 87, 27 U. S. App. 88, 
 
 61 Fed. 809 675 
 
 V. National Bank, 99 U. 
 
 S. 609, 25 L. ed. 362 . . 763 
 V. Smith, 156 U. S. 333, 39 
 L. ed. 442, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 358 634, 638 
 
 V. Wade, 84 Fed. 12 141 
 
 National Cash-Register Co. v. 
 
 Leland, 77 Fed. 242 . . 492 
 507, 508, 512, 545 
 V. Leland, 37 C. C. A. 372, 
 
 94 Fed. 502 ..507, 544, 545 
 National Enameling & Stamping- 
 Co. Ex parte, 201 U. S. 
 156, 50 L. ed. 707, 26 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 404 62i> 
 
 National Exch. Bank v. Peters, 
 
 144 U. S. 570, 36 L. ed. 
 
 ' 545, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 767 642 
 
 National Folding Box & Paper 
 
 C!o. V. Dayton Paper 
 
 Novelty Co. 91 Fed. 824 564 
 
 574, 578, 579 
 
 National Foundry & Pipe Works 
 
 v. Oconto City Water Supply 
 
 Co. 51 C. C. A. 465, 113 
 
 Fed. 793 408 
 
 V. Oconto Water Supply 
 Co. 183 U. S. 234, 46 L. 
 ed. 169, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 Ill 551, 555 
 
 National Heeling Mach. Co. v. 
 
 Abbott, 77 Fed. 464 ... 629 
 National Hollow Brake Beam 
 Co. V. Intercliangeable 
 Brake Beeaam Co. 83 
 
 Fed. 29 292, 405, 410 
 
 412, 426, 430, 435 
 
Cxvili 
 
 TABLJ;: or CASES. 
 
 National Masonic. Acci. Asso. v. 
 Sparks, 28 C. C. A. 399, 
 49 U. S. App. 681, 83 
 Fed. 225 
 
 National Mut. Bldg. & L. Asso. 
 V. Brahan, 193 U. S. 
 635, 48 L. ed. 823, 24 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 532 
 
 National S. S. Co. v. Tugman, 
 106 U. S. 118, 27 L. ed. 
 87, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58 . . 
 78, 84, 780, 
 Surety Co. v. State 
 Bank, 61 L.R.A. 394, 56 
 C. C. A. 657, 120 Fed. 
 
 593 15, 18, 
 
 Typographic Co. v. 
 New York Typographic 
 Co. 44 Fed. 711 .. .109, 
 
 National 
 
 National 
 
 125 
 
 146 
 
 77 
 800 
 
 617 
 
 114 
 119 
 Neal V. Briggs, 110 Fed. 477 . . 567 
 
 Neale v. Foster, 31 Fed. 55 847 
 
 V. Neale, 9 Wall. 1, 19 L. 
 
 ed. 590 . .286, 356, 357, 358 
 Neblett v. MacFarland, 92 U. S. 
 
 101, 23 L. ed. 471 10 
 
 Neel V. Pennsylvania Co. 157 U. 
 S. 154, 39 L. ed. 654, 15 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 589 .... 274 
 Nellis V. Pennoek Mfg. Co. 38 
 
 Fed. 379 357, 360 
 
 Nelson v, Eaton, 13 C. C. A. 523, 
 27 U. S. App. 677, 66 
 
 Fed. 376 21.3, 361, 362 
 
 386, 391, 392 
 V. First Nat. Bank, 70 Fed. 
 
 526 618 
 
 V. Hennessey, 33 Fed. 113 , . 839 
 
 T. Hill, 89 Fed. 477 593 
 
 V. Lowndes County, 35 C. C. 
 
 A. 419, 93 Fed. 538 ... 449 
 619, 684 
 V. Meehan, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
 374, 83 C. C. A. 597, 155 
 
 Fed. 9 617 
 
 Nesbit V. Independent Dist. 144 
 U. S. 610, 36 L. ed. 562, 
 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 746 . . 216 
 Neslin v. Wells, F. & Co. 104 
 
 U. S. 428, 26 L. ed. 802 10 
 Nevada Nickel Syndicate v. Na- 
 tional Nickel Co. 86 
 
 Fed. 488 275, 277, 366 
 
 367, 368, 370, 374, 377 
 V. National Nickel Co. 103 
 
 Fed. 391 594, 595 
 
 New Albany Waterworks v. 
 Louisville Bkg. Co. 58 
 C. C. A. 576, 122 Fed. 
 776 243 
 
 Newark & H. Traction Co. Re, 
 
 110 Fed. 25 800 
 
 Newberry v. Wilkinson, 118 C. 
 
 C. A. Ill, 199 Fed. 673 247 
 New Castle v. Postal Teleg. 
 
 Cable Co. 152 Fed. 572 822 
 859 
 V. Western U. Teleg. Co. 152 
 
 Fed. 569 824, 825, 859 
 
 New Chester Water Co, v. Holly 
 Mfg. Co. 3 C. C. A. 399, 
 3 U. S. App. 264, 53 
 
 Fed. 27 233 
 
 Newcombe \. Murray, 77 Fed. 
 
 493 380 
 
 New Departure Bill Co. v. Hard- 
 ware Specialty Co. 62 
 
 Fed. 463 444 
 
 Newell V. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. 
 
 181 Fed. 698 165 
 
 New England Mortg. Secur. Co. 
 V. Gay, 145 V. S. 130, 
 36 L. ed. 648, 12 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 815 179, 186 
 
 New England Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. 
 Wood worth, 111 U. S. 
 146, 28 L. ed. 381, 4 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 364 .... 112 
 114, 118, 323 
 New England Phonograph Co. v. 
 National Phonograph 
 
 Co. 148 Fed. 324 495 
 
 525, 526 
 New England R. Co. v. Hvde, 41 
 C. C. A. 404, lO'l Fed. 
 
 397 669, 686, 765 
 
 New England Waterworks Co. 
 V. Farmers' Loan & T. 
 Co. 69 V. C. A. 297, 136 
 
 Fed. 525 815 
 
 Newgass v. New Orleans, 33 Fed. 
 
 196 211, 213 
 
 Newgold V. American Electrical 
 Novelty & Mfg. Co. 108 
 
 Fed. 341 530 
 
 New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 
 
 108 U. S: 76, 27 L. ed. 
 
 656, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 176 39 
 
 New Hampshire Sav. Bank v. 
 
 Richer, 58 C. C. A. 294, 
 
 121 F'ed. 956 298 
 
 New Jersey v. New York, 3 Pet. 
 
 461, 7 L. ed. 741 ...39, 318 
 V. New York, 5 Pet. 289, 8 
 
 L. ed. 129 318 
 
 New Jersey Steel & I. Co. v. 
 
 Chormann, 105 Fed. 532 106 
 
 Newman, Re 79 Fed. 615 684 
 
 V. Moody, 19 Fed. 858 599 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXIX 
 
 Newman v. Scliwerin, 10 C. C. A. 
 129, 22 U. S. App. 393, 
 
 61 Fed. 870 794 
 
 V. Virginia T. & C. Steel & 
 I. Co. 25 C. C. A. 382, 
 
 42 U. S. App. 466, 80 
 Fed. 231 675 
 
 New Mexico v. Atchison, T.'& S. 
 
 F. R. Co. 201 U. S. 41, 
 
 50 L. ed. 651, 26 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 386 757 
 
 New Orleans v. Benjamin, 153 
 
 U. S. 433, 38 L. ed. 772, 
 
 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 905, 
 
 71 Fed. 758 138, 139 
 
 158, 210, 214, 216, 218, 645 
 V. Fislier, 34 C. C. A. 15, 63 
 
 U. S. App. 455, 91 Fed. 
 
 575 > 602 
 
 V. Gaines, 138 U. S. 606, 34 
 
 L. ed. 1106, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 428 57, 59 
 
 T. Howard, 87 C. C. A. 345, 
 
 160 Fed. 397 .183, 452 
 
 V. Louisiana Constr. Co. 129 
 
 U. S. 46, 32 L. ed. 607, 
 
 n Sup. Ct. Rep. 223 ... 16 
 T. New Orleans Water Works 
 
 Co. 142 U. S. 79, 35 L. 
 
 ed. 943, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 142 151, 749, 750 
 
 T. Peake, 2 C. C. A. 626, 2 
 
 U. S. App. 403, 52 Fed. 
 
 76 582 
 
 V. Quinlan, 173 U. S. 191, 
 
 43 L. ed. 664, 19 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 329, 92 Fed. 
 695 209, 214, 215, 218 
 
 V. Whitney. See New Or- 
 leans V. Gaines. 
 New Orleans & N. E. R. Co. v. 
 
 Clements, 40 C. C. A. 
 
 465, 100 Fed. 419 675 
 
 New Orleans Ins. Co. v. E. D. 
 
 Albro Co. 112 U. S. 507, 
 
 28 L. ed. 809, 5 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 289, 680, 682, 690 
 
 New Orleans, il. & T. R. Co. v. 
 
 Mississippi, 102 U. S. 
 
 135, 26 L. ed. 98 . . 139, 782 
 New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. 
 
 Louisiana, 185 U. S. 
 
 336, 46 L. ed. 936, 22 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 691 . .750, 753 
 Newport Light Co. v. Newport, 
 
 151 U. S. 537, 38 L. ed. 
 
 262, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 429 761, 762 
 
 New River Coal & Land Co. v. 
 Ruffner Bros. 165 Fed. 
 881 
 
 New River Mineral Co. v. Roan- 
 oke Coal & Coke Co. 49 
 0. C. A. 78, 110 Fed. 
 
 344 320, 
 
 V. Sceley, 117 Fed. 982 ... 
 
 Newton v. Gage, 155 Fed. 598 . . 
 
 452, 453, 463, 4li8, 
 
 New York v. Pine, 185 U. S. 98, 
 
 46 L. ed. 823, 22 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 592 
 
 New York & B. Coffee Polishing 
 
 Co. v. New York Coffee 
 
 Polishing Co. 20 Blatchf. 
 
 174, 9 Fed. 578 .. .510, 
 
 475 
 
 321 
 
 685 
 687 
 443 
 48.5 
 
 10 
 
 511 
 512 
 
 New York & N. E. R. Co. v. 
 
 Hyde, 5 C. C. A. 461, 5 
 
 U. S. App. 443, 56 Fed. 
 
 188 270, 272 
 
 New York Belting & P. Co. v. 
 
 New Jersey Car Spring 
 
 & R. Co. 137 U. S. 445, 
 
 34 L. ed. 741, 11 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 193 400 
 
 New York C. & H. R. R. Co. v. 
 
 New York, 186 U. S. 
 
 269, 46 L. ed. 1158, 22 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 916 . . 749, 750 
 New York C. R. Co. v. Lock- 
 wood, 17 Wall. 357, 21 
 
 L. ed. 627 21 
 
 New York Constr. Co. v. Simon, 
 
 53 Fed. 1 235, 840 
 
 New York Cotton Exch. v. Hunt, 
 
 144 Fed. 511 408 
 
 New York Grape Sugar Co. v. 
 
 Buffalo Grape Sugar Co. 
 
 20 Fed. 505 360 
 
 New York Mfg. Co. v. Illinois, C. 
 
 R. Co. 3 Wall. 107, 18 
 
 L. ed. 170 542 
 
 New York Security & T. Co. v. 
 
 Illinois Transfer R. Co. 
 
 44 C. C. A. 161, 104 Fed. 
 
 710 638 
 
 V. Lincoln Street R. Co. 74 
 
 Fed. 68 368 
 
 Nichols V. Nichols, 92 Fed. 1 . . . 51 
 Nickerson v. Warren City Tank 
 
 & Boiler Co. 223 Fed. 
 
 843 ..316, 317, 321 
 
 Nicola, Re 106 C. C. A. 464, 
 
 184 Fed. 322 87 
 
cxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 N. K. Fairbank & Co. v. Cincin- 
 nati, N. 0. & T. P. R. 
 Co. 4 C. C. A. 403, 9 
 U. S. App. 212, 54 Fed. 
 421 Ill, 115, 326, 332 
 
 Noble V. Massachusetts Ben. 
 
 Asso. 48 Fed. 337 . .780, 784 
 
 Noel Const. Co. v. Ceorge W. 
 Smith & Co. 193 Fed. 
 495 112 
 
 Nome Beacli Lighterage & 
 Transp. Co. v. Standard 
 M. Ins. Co. 156 Fed. 
 484 543 
 
 Non-Magnetic Watch Co. v. As- 
 sociation Horlogere 
 Suisse, 44 Fed. 6 344 
 
 Noonan v. Braley. See Noonan 
 V. Lee. 
 V. Chester Park Athletic 
 Club Co. 35 C. C. A. 
 
 457, 93 Fed. 576 662 
 
 664, 678, 692 
 V. Lee, 2 Black, 509, 17 L. 
 
 ed. 281 5 
 
 Norfolk & W. E. Co. v. Gard- 
 ner, 89 C. C. A. 14,. 
 162 Fed. 114 670, 671 
 
 Norris v. Hassler, 23 Fed. 581.. 525 
 
 North Alabama Development Co. 
 V. Ormond, 5 C. C. A. 
 22, 13 U. S. App. 215, 
 55 Fed. 20 864 
 
 North American Exploration Co. 
 V. Adams, 104 Fed. 404, 
 12 Mor. Min. Rep. 65.. 732 
 
 North American Loan & T. Co. 
 V. Colonial & U. S. 
 Mortg. Co. 28 C. C. A. 
 88, 55 U. S. App. 157, 
 83 Fed. 796 674 
 
 North American Transp. & Trad- 
 ing Co. V. Howells, 58 
 C. C. A. 442, 121 Fed. 
 
 898 513, 786, 787 
 
 V. Morrison, 178 U. S. 262, 
 44 L. ed. 1061, 20 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 869 171, 221 
 
 North British & M. Ins. Co. v. 
 
 Lathrop, 63 Fed. 508 . . 450 
 V. Lathrop, 17 C. C. A. 175, 
 25 U. S. App. 443, 70 
 Fed. 433 443 
 
 North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U. 
 S. 30, 33 L. ed. 852, 10 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 509 ..39, 64 
 
 North Carolina Min. Co. v. West- 
 
 feldt, 151 Fed. 296 ... 231 
 232 
 
 North Chicago Rolling Mil] Co. 
 V. St. Louis Ore & Steel 
 Co. 152 U. S. 615, 38 
 L. ed. 571, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 710 449 
 
 North Chicago Street R. Co. v. 
 Chicago Union Traction 
 Co. 150 Fed. 629 . . 362, 420 
 V. St. John, 29 C. C. A. 634, 
 
 57 U. S. App. 366, 85 
 
 Fed. 806 675 
 
 Northern Indiana R. Co. v. 
 
 Michigan C. R. Co. 15 
 
 How. 246, 14 L. ed. 680 233 
 234 
 Northern P. E. Co. v. Amacker, 
 
 1 C. C. A. 345, 7 U. S. 
 
 App. 33, 49 Fed. 537 . . 259 
 V. Amato, U4 U. S. 465, 36 
 
 L. ed' 506, 12 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 740 621, 622, 741 
 
 V. Amato, 1 C. C. A. 468, 
 
 1 U. S. App. 113, 49 
 
 Fed. 881 662 
 
 V. Austin, 135 U. S. 3l5, 34 
 
 L. ed. 218, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 758 798 
 
 V. Cunningham, 103 Fed. 
 
 708 189 
 
 V. Ellis, 144 U. S. 464, 36 
 
 L. ed. 506, 12 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 724 748 
 
 V. Glaspell, 1 C. C. A. 327, 
 
 4 U. S. App. 238, 49 
 
 Fed. 482 646 
 
 V. Holmes, 155 U. S. 138, 39 
 
 L. ed. 99, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 28 601 
 
 V. Kurtzman, 82 Fed. 243 . . 251 
 V. Minnesota, 208 U. S. 583, 
 
 52 L. ed. 630, 28 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 341 753 
 
 V. Pacific Coast Lumber 
 
 Mfrs. Asso. 91 C. C. A. 
 
 39, 165 Fed. 2 . . . . 187, 622 
 V. Paine, 119 U. S, 563, 30 
 
 L. ed. 514, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 323 864 
 
 V. Soderberg, 188 U, S. 526, 
 
 47 L. ed. 576, 23 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 365 743 
 
 V. Walker, 148 U. S. 391, 
 
 37 L. ed. 494, 13 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 650 175, 177 
 
 186, 190 
 Northern R. Co. v. Ogdensburg 
 
 & L. C. R. Co. 18 Fed. 
 
 815 450 
 
 V. Ogdensburg, & L. C. E. 
 
 Co. 20 Fed. 347 450 
 
TABLE OK CASES. 
 
 cxxi 
 
 Northern Securities Co. v. Harri- 
 man, 67 C. C. A. 245, 
 
 134 Fed. 331 630 
 
 T. United States, 193 U. S. 
 199, 48 L. ed. 679, 24 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 436 46 
 
 Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. 
 Keith, 23 C. C. A. 196, 
 40 U. S. App. 706, 77 
 Fed. 374 304 
 
 Northwestern Port Huron Co, v. 
 Babcock, — C. C. A. 
 — , 223 Fed. 486 478 
 
 Northwestern Union Pacl<et Co. 
 V. Home Ins. Co. 154 U. 
 S. 588, 20 L. ed. 463, 14 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1168 ... 759 
 
 Norton, Ex parte, 108 U. S. 242, 
 27 L. ed. 711, 2 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 490 635 
 
 T. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. 
 
 Co. 61 Fed. 618 326 
 
 V. Dover, 14 Fed. 106 ...... 321 
 
 T. European & N. A. R. Co. 
 
 32 Fed. 875 62, 553 
 
 V. W. H. Thomas & Sons Co. 
 — Te.x. Civ. App. — , 93 
 S. W. 711 328 
 
 Novelty Tuftincr iMach. Co. v. 
 Buser, "85 C. C. A. 413, 
 158 Fed. 83, 14 A. & 
 E. Ann. Cas. 192 . .606, 613 
 
 Noyes v. Crawford, 133 Fed. 796 210 
 
 Nugent V. Philadelphia Traction 
 
 Co. 87 Fed. 251 410 
 
 0. 
 
 Oakes v. Yonah Land & Min. Co. 
 
 89 Fed. 243 74 
 
 Oakland Sugar Mill Co. v. Fred 
 
 W. Wolf Co. 55 C. C. 
 
 A. 93, 118 Fed. 239 . . U8 
 Oakley v. Taylor, 64 Fed. 245 . . 248 
 Oberlin College v. Blair, 70 Fed. 
 
 419 ... .66-68, 101, 224, 233 
 Obert V. Marquet, 99 C. C. A. 
 
 60, 175 Fed. 50 633 
 
 O'Brien v. Champlain Constr. Co. 
 
 107 Fed. 338 430 
 
 O'Callaghan v. O'Brien. See Far- 
 
 rell v. O'Brien. 
 O'Callahan v. O'Brien, 116 Fed. 
 
 934 250 
 
 O'Connel v. Reed, 5 C. C. A. 586, 
 
 12 U. S. App. 369, 56 
 
 Fed. 531 179 
 
 O'Connor v. O'Connor, 146 Fed. 
 
 994 482 
 
 Odbert v. Marquet, 99 C. C. A. 
 
 60, 175 Fed. 44 33, 582 
 
 Odell v. Revnolds, 17 C. C. A. 
 
 317^ 37 U. S. App. 447, 
 
 70 Fed. 656 585 
 
 Odhner v. Northern P. R. Co. 
 
 188 Fed. 507 811 
 
 O'Dowd V. Russell, 14 Wall. 405, 
 
 20 L. ed. 858 764, 705 
 
 Oelrichs v. Spain, 15 Wall. 227, 
 
 21 L. ed. 44 30, 34 
 
 V. Williams. See Oelrichs 
 
 Spain. 
 Offner v. Chicago & E. R. Co. 78 
 
 C. C. A. 359, 148 Fed. 
 
 202 806, 807 
 
 Ogden V. Gilt Edge Consol. 
 
 Mines Co. — C. C. A. 
 
 — , 225 Fed. 728 244 
 
 Ogden City v. Armstrong, 168 U. 
 
 S. 224, 42 L. ed. 444, 
 
 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 98 . . . 186 
 T. Weaver, 47 C. C. A. 485, 
 
 108 Fed. 567 408, 636 
 
 Oglesby v. Attrill, 14 Fed. 214 . . 317 
 
 487 
 O'Hara v. MacConnell, 93 U. S. 
 
 150, 23. L. ed. 840 316 
 
 V. Mobile & 0. R. Co. 22 C. 
 
 C. A. 512, 40 U. S. App. 
 
 471, 76 Fed. 718 546 
 
 Ohio & M. R. Co. V. Wheeler, 1 
 
 Black, 286, 17 L. ed. 
 
 130 78, 81 
 
 Ohio Copper Min. Co. v. Hutch- 
 
 ings, 96 C. C. A. 653, 
 
 172, Fed. 202 510 
 
 Ohio C. R. Co. V. Central Trust 
 
 Co. 133 U. S. 83, 33 L. 
 
 ed. 561, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 235 386, 388, 391 
 
 Oil Well Supply Co. v. Hall. 63 
 
 C. C. A. 343, 128 Fed. 
 
 878 13, 574 
 
 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Atlanta 
 
 R. Co. 100 Fed. 798 . . 68 
 V. Wichita, 123 Fed. 762 . . 253 
 Old Dominion Copper Min. & 
 
 Smelting Co. v. Lewi- 
 
 sohn, 176 Fed. 746 358 
 
 359 
 Olds V. City Trust S. D. & Sure- 
 ty Co. 114 Fed. 975 ... 798 
 V. Herman H. Hettler Lum- 
 ber Co. 115 C. C. A. 91, 
 
 195 Fed. 9 653 
 
 Olds Wagon Works v. Benedict, 
 
 14 C. C. A. 28.5, 32 U. 
 
 S. App. 116, 67 Fed. 5 45 
 551, 8.14 
 
CXXll 
 
 TABLE OF OASES. 
 
 O'Leary v. Durant, 70 Tex. 409, 
 
 11 S. W. 116 346 
 
 Oliver v. Iowa C. R. Co. 102 
 
 Fed. 371 793 
 
 V. Raymond, 108 Fed. 927 . . 365 
 Olsen, Re, 40 C. C. A. 247, 100 
 
 Fed. 10 6^73 
 
 V. North Pacific Lumber Co. 
 
 55 C. C. A. 665, 119 
 
 Fed. 77 732 
 
 Omaha v. Redick, 11 C. C. A. 1, 
 
 27 U. S. App. 204, 63 
 
 Fed. 1 370, 374 
 
 Omaha Electric Light & P. Co. 
 
 V. Omaha, 133 C. C. A. 
 
 52, 216 Fed. 855 ..599, 769 
 773 
 Omaha Hotel Co. v. Kountze, 107 
 
 U. S. 395, 27 L. ed. 616, 
 
 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 911 . . 681 
 V. Wade, 97 U. 8. 13, 24 L. 
 
 ed. 917 58, 232 
 
 Ommen v. Talcott, 180 Fed. 927 585 
 O'Neil V. Vermont, 144 U. S. 336, 
 
 36 L. ed. 457, 12 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 693 750 
 
 V. Wolcott Min. Co. 27 
 
 L.R.A.(N.S.) 200, 98 C. 
 
 C. A. 309, 174 Fed. 528 233 
 701, 703 
 Onondaga Nation v. Thatcher, 
 
 189 U. S. 309, 47 L. ed. 
 
 827, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 636 762 
 
 Order of R. R. Telegraphers v. 
 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. 
 
 148 Fed. 437 824 
 
 Oregon v. Three Sisters Irrig. 
 
 Co. 158 Fed. 346 ... 63, 822 
 Oregon & Transcontinental Co. 
 
 V. Northern P. R. Co. 
 
 32 Fed. 428 366, 371 
 
 Oregonian R. Co. v. Oregon R. 
 
 & Nav. Co. 27 Fed. 279 91 
 Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Shell, 
 
 143 Fed. 1005 .. ..199, 201 
 206 
 Oregon Short Line & U. N. R. 
 
 Co. V. Skottowe, 162 U. 
 
 S. 494, 40 L. ed. 1049, 
 
 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 869 . . 142 
 143, 151 
 O'Reilly v. Fklrington, 96 U. S. 
 
 724, 24 L. ed. 659 679 
 
 682 
 17 
 
 Orendorf v. Budlong, 12 Fed. 26 
 Orient Ins. Co. v. Leonard, 57 
 
 C. C. A. 176, 120 Fed. 
 
 808 
 
 769 
 
 Orleans-Kenner Electric R. Co. 
 
 V. Dunbar, 134 C. C. A. 
 
 152, 218 Fed. 345 698 
 
 Ormsby v. Ottman, 29 C. C. A. 
 
 295, 56 U. S. App. 510, 
 
 85 Fed. 494 346 
 
 V. Union P. R. Co. 2 AXc- 
 
 Crary, 48, 4 Fed. 170 . . 401 
 Oroville & N. R. Co. v. Leggett, 
 
 162 Fed. 572 804, 816 
 
 Osborn v. Bank of United 
 ■ States, 9 Wheat. 818, B 
 
 L. ed. 223 7, 136 
 
 V. Detroit, 28 Fed. 385 .... 304 
 Osborne v. Clark, 204 U. S. 565, 
 
 51 L. ed. 619, 27 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 319 751 
 
 V. Wisconsin C. R. Co. 43 
 
 Fed. 824 30, 226 
 
 Osborne & Co. v. Barge, 30 Fed. 
 
 805 451, 468, 484 
 
 Osgood v. A. S. Aloe Instrument 
 
 Co. 69 Fed. 291 424 
 
 O'Shaughnessy v. Humes, 129 
 
 Fed. 954 399, 400 
 
 Ostrander v. Blandin, 211 Fed. 
 
 733 836 
 
 Oswego Twp. V. Travelers' Ins. 
 
 Co. 17 C. C. A. 77, 36 
 
 U. S. App. 13, 70 Fed. 
 
 225 675 
 
 Oteri V. Scalzo, 145 U. S. 589, 
 
 36 L. ed. 828, 12 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 895 570 
 
 Ottumway v. City Water Supply 
 
 Co. 59 L.R.A. 604, 56 
 
 C. C. A. 219, 119 Fed. 
 
 318 186 
 
 Ouings V. Tiernan, 10 Pet. 24, 9 
 
 L. ed. 333 707 
 
 Ouray County v. Geer, 47 C. C. 
 
 A. 450, 108 Fed. 480 . . 768 
 Overholt v. German American 
 
 Ins. Co. 155 Fed. 488 . . 793 
 Overman Wheel Co. v. Pope 
 
 Mfg. Co. 46 Fed. 577 . . 80 
 235, 821 
 Owens V. Heidbreder, 24 C. C. A. 
 
 362, 41 U. S. App. 736, 
 
 78 Fed. 837 5 
 
 V. Ohio 0. R. Co. 20 Fed. 
 
 10 319, 477, 479 
 
 Owensboro v. Owensboro Water- 
 works Co. 53 C. C. A. 
 
 , 146, 115 Fed. 318 641 
 
 642, 658 
 Owings V. Norwood, 5 Cranch, 
 
 344, 3 L. ed. 120 165 
 
 V. Tiernan, 10 Pet 24, 9 L. 
 
 ed. 333 716 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXlll 
 
 Owyhee Land & Irrig. Co. v. 
 Tautphaua, 48 C. C. A. 
 535, 109 Fed. 547 ..528, 529 
 
 Ozard-Bell Teleph. Co. v. Spring- 
 field, 140 Fed. 666 . . 30, 148 
 
 Ozark Land Co. v. Leonard, 24 
 
 Fed. 660 438 
 
 P. 
 
 Pacific Electric R. Co. v. Los 
 Angeles, 194 U. S. 112, 
 48 L. ed. 896, 24 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 586 147, 166 
 
 Pacific Gas Improv. Co. v. El- 
 
 lerk, 64 Fed. 421 ..159, 280 
 Pacific Live-Stock Co. v. Han- 
 ley, 98 Fed. 327 . . 188, 226 
 300 
 Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Tomp- 
 kins, 41 C. C. A. 488, 
 
 101 Fed. 539 114, 123 
 
 125, 129, 130, 199, 361 
 V. Williams, 79 Tex. 633, 15 
 
 S. W. 478 324 
 
 Pacific Northwest Packing Co. v. 
 Allen, 48 C. C. A. 521, 
 
 109 Fed. 515 632 
 
 Pacific R. Co. V. Ketchum, 101 U. 
 
 S. 289, 25 L. ed. 932 . . 66 
 639 
 T. Missouri P. R. Co. Ill 
 U. S. 505, 28 L. ed. 498, 
 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 583 . . 483 
 V. ilissouri P. R. Co. 1 Mc- 
 
 Crary, 647, 3 Fed. 772 485 
 487 
 Pacific Sheet Metal Works v. 
 Californian Canneries 
 Co. 91 C. C. A. 108, 164 
 
 Fed. 984 709 
 
 Pacific States Supply Co. v. San 
 
 Francisco, 171 Fed. 727 26 
 Paducah v. East Tennessee 
 Teleph. Co. 106 C. C. A. 
 333, 182 Fed. 625 ..641, 642 
 Page T. Chillicothe, 6 Fed. 602 . . 409 
 Paine v. Standard Plunger Ele- 
 vator Co. 186 Fed. 605 576 
 
 V. Warren, 33 Fed. 358 486 
 
 529 
 Painter v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. 
 
 Co. 177 Fed. 517 75 
 
 V. New River Mineral Co. 
 
 98 Fed. 544 798 
 
 Palmer v. Chicago Herald Co. 70 
 
 Fed. 886 117 
 
 T. Conner, 7 Wall. 541, 19 
 
 L. ed. 99 758 
 
 Panama R. Co. v. Napier Ship- 
 ping Co. 166 U. S. 284, 
 41 L. ed. 1005, 17 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 572 740 
 
 Parisian Comb Co. v. Eschwege, 
 
 92 Fed. 721 526, 53?. 
 
 Park v. New York, L. E. & W. 
 
 R. Co. 70 Fed. 641 ... , 60 
 452, 468, 485 
 
 Parker v. Morrill, 106 U. S. 1, 
 27 L. ed. 72, 1 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 14 193, 195 
 
 V. Ormsby, 141 U. S. 81, 35 
 L. ed. 654, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 912 126, 218, 220 
 
 221, 274, 756 
 V. Vanderbilt, 130 Fed. 250 847 
 
 Parker Washington Co. v. Cram- 
 er, 120 C. C. A. 216, 201 
 Fed. 878 270, 730 
 
 Parkinson v. Barr, 105 Fed. 81. . 812 
 815, 823, 839, 858, 859 
 
 Parks v. Southern R. Co. 90 Fed. 
 
 4 847 
 
 Parmelee v. Lawrence, 11 Wall. 
 
 39, 20 L. ed. 49 761 
 
 Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 446, 
 
 7 L. ed. 736 12 
 
 V. Robinson, 122 U. S. 114, 
 30 L. ed. 1122, 7 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 1153.. 583, 636, 038 
 
 Patch V. ^■\'abash R. Co. 207 U. S. 
 277, 52 L. ed. 204, 28 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 80, 12 
 Ann. Cas. 518 812 
 
 Patchin v. Hunter, 38 Fed. 51 . . 813 
 
 838 
 
 Patent Title Co. v. Stratton, 95 
 
 Fed. 746 400 
 
 Patillo V. Allen-West Commis- 
 sion Co. 47 C. C. A. 637, 
 108 Fed. 723 769 
 
 Paton v. Majors, 46 Fed. 211 . . 23 
 
 Patrick v. Isenhart, 20 Fed. 339 283 
 
 284 
 
 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 
 
 454, 51 L. ed. 879, 27 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 556, 10 
 
 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 689. . 754 
 
 V. Hoa, 131 U. S. Ixxxviii, 
 
 Appx. and 18 L. ed. 884 689 
 
 Patton V. Brady, 184 U. S. ,608, 
 46 L. ed. 713, 22 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 493 150, 165 
 
 V. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. 
 
 R. Co. 208 Fed. 29 .... 776 
 V. Marshall, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 
 127, 97 C. C. A. 610, 
 173 Fed. 350 452, 453 
 
CXXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Paul T. Baltimore & 0. & C. R. 
 
 Co. 44 Fed. 513 82 
 
 Pauley Jail Bldg. & Mfg. Co. v. 
 
 Crawford County, 28 C. 
 
 C. A. 579, 56 U. S. App. 
 
 53, 84 Fed. 942 659 
 
 Paxson V. Brown, 10 C. C. A. 
 
 135, 27 U. S. App. 49, 
 
 61 Fed. 877 714, 727 
 
 Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 19 
 
 L. ed. 260.. ..6, 12, 17, 22 
 
 227, 231, 239, 249-251, 583 
 V. Kailsas & A. Valley R. 
 
 Co. 46 Fed. 552 11 
 
 Peabody Gold Min. Co. v. Gold 
 
 Hill Min. Co. 49 C. C. 
 
 A. 637, 111 Fed. 822, 21 
 
 Mor. Min. Rep. 591 164 
 
 Peace River Phosphate Co. v. Ed- 
 wards, 17 C. C. A. 358, 
 
 30 U. S. App. 513, 70 
 
 Fed. 728 .. ..681, 695, 721 
 Peacock v. United States, 60 C. C. 
 
 A. 389, 125 Fed. 586.. 433 
 Peacock, H. & W. Co. v. Thag- 
 
 gard, 128 Fed. 1006 . . 452 
 Peale v. Marian Coal Co. 172 
 
 Fed. 639 299 
 
 Pearce v. Germania Ins. Co. See 
 
 Lady Pike, The. 
 V. Rice, 142 U. S. 28, 30 L. 
 
 ed. l^.',, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 130 *16, 418, 419, 420 
 
 Peck V. Ayres & L. Tie Co. 53 
 
 C. C. A. 551, 116 Fed. 
 
 273 16, 17 
 
 Peeler v. Lathrop, 1 C. C. A. 93, 
 
 2 U. S. App. 40, 48, 
 
 Fed. 780 169, 171 
 
 Pender v. Brown, 56 C. C. A. 
 
 646, 120 Fed. 497.. 694, 707 
 Pendery v. Carleton, 30 C. C. A. 
 
 510, 59 U. S. App. 288, 
 
 87 Fed. 41 286, 358 
 
 Peninsular Iron Co. v. Stone, 121 
 
 U. S. 631, 30 L. ed. 
 
 1020, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 1010 52, 72, 232, 816 
 
 Pennie v. Reia, 132 U. S. 469, 33 
 
 L. ed. 428, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 149 400 
 
 Pennington v. Smith, 24 C. C. 
 
 A. 145, 45 V. S. App. 
 
 409, 78 Fed. 409 58 
 
 Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Austin, 
 
 168 U. S. 685, 42 L. ed. 
 
 626, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 223 157, 166, 658 
 
 V. Union Trust Co. 83 Fed. 
 
 891 489 
 
 Penn Phonograph Co. v. Colum- 
 bia Phonograph Co. 66 
 
 C. C. A. 127, 132 Fed. 
 
 809 351 
 
 Pennsylvania v. Quicksilver Min. 
 
 Co. 10 Wall. 553, 19 L. 
 
 ed. 998 38 
 
 V. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co. 
 
 13 How. 518, 14 L. ed. 
 
 249 20 
 
 V. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co. 
 
 18 How. 462, 15 L. ed. 
 
 450 4, 11 
 
 Pennsylvania Co., Re, 137 U. S. 
 
 451, 34 L. ed. 738, 11 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141 . . 842 
 
 845-847, 849 
 
 V. Bay, 138 Fed. 203.. 188, 423 
 
 424, 433, 434, .548 
 
 V. Bay, 150 Fed. 770 299 
 
 V. Cole, 132 Fed. 668 429 
 
 V. Jacksonville T. & K. W. 
 
 R. Co. 5 C. C. A. 53, 2 
 
 U. S. App. 606, 55 Fed. 
 
 131 708, 712 
 
 Pennsylvania Globe Gaslight Co. 
 
 V. Globe Gaslight Co. 
 
 121 Fed. 1015 350 
 
 Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Mut. 
 
 F. Ins. Co. V. Meyer, 
 
 197 U. S. 407, 49 L. ed. 
 
 810, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 483 116 
 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Alleghany 
 
 Valley R. Co. 25 Fed. 
 
 113 17, 807 
 
 V. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. 
 
 Co. 118 U. S. 296, 30 
 
 L. ed. 87, 6 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 1094 80, 83, 84 
 
 Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New 
 
 York City R. Co. 157 
 
 Fed. 441 553 
 
 Pentlarge v. Pentlarge, 22 
 
 Blatchf. 120, 22 Fed. 
 
 412 416, 419 
 
 People's Bank v. ^Etna Ins. Co. 
 
 53 Fed. 161 779, 796 
 
 People's Gaslight & Coke Co. v. 
 
 Chicago, 194 U. S. 1, 48 
 
 L. ed. 851, 24 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 520 147 
 
 People's Nat. Bank v. Marye, 107 
 
 Fed. 570 300 
 
 People's Sav. Inst. v. Miles, 22 
 
 C. C. A. 152, 40 U. S. 
 
 App. 341, 76 Fed. 252 . . 459 
 461, 468 
 
, TABLE Olf CASES. 
 
 cxxv 
 
 People's United States Bank v. 
 Gilson, 88 C. C. A. 332, 
 
 161 Fed. 293 
 
 V. Goodwin, 160 Fed. 727 . . 
 
 143, 822, 
 
 Peper v. Fordyce, 119 U. S. 469, 
 
 30 L. ed. 435, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 287 
 
 Pepper v. Rogers, 128 Fed. 988 . . 
 
 182, 
 
 V. Rogers, 137 Fed. 173 
 
 Pequignot v. Detroit, 16 Fed. 211 
 
 Perego v. Dodge, 163 U. S. 165, 
 
 41 L. ed. 117, 16 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 971, 18 Mor. 
 
 Min. Rep. 364 
 
 Perkins v. Fourniquet, 6 How. 
 208, 12 L. ed. 407.. 470, 
 V. Fourniquet, 14 How. 330, 
 14 L. ed. 442.. 768, 771, 
 V. Hendryx, 23 Fed. 418 . . 
 V. Hendryx, 31 Fed. 522 .. 
 V. Hendryx, 52 C. C. A. 435, 
 
 114 Fed. 801 
 
 V. Hendryx, 127 Fed. 448.. 
 
 246, 
 
 V. Hendryx, 149 Fed. 526.. 
 
 V. Xorthern P. R. Co. 155 
 
 Fed 445, 
 
 Perrin v. Lepper, 26 Fed. 545 . . 
 
 Perry v. Bank of Cape Fear, 20 
 
 Fed. 775 
 
 V. Godbe, 82 Fed. 143. .459, 
 
 V. Johnston, 95 Fed. 323 . . 
 
 422 
 
 142 
 863 
 
 45 
 
 162 
 
 851 
 
 529 
 
 87 
 
 13 
 
 636 
 
 772 
 867 
 436 
 
 618 
 225 
 612 
 612 
 618 
 
 149 
 
 234 
 235 
 
 247 
 461 
 464 
 478 
 616 
 
 V. Rubber Tire Wheel Co. 
 
 138 Fed. 836 526 
 
 Person v. Illinois C. R. Co. 118 
 
 Fed. 342 817 
 
 Peter Ham Brewery Co. v. Se- 
 curity Title & T. Co. 46 
 C. C. A. 497, 107 Fed. 
 618 683 
 
 Peters v. Equitable Life Assur. 
 
 Soc. 149 Fed. 290 868 
 
 V. Tonopah Min. Co. 120 
 
 Fed. 587 433, 434 
 
 Petersburg Sav. & Ins. Co. v. 
 Dellatorre, 17 C. C. A. 
 310, 30 U. S. App. 504, 
 70 Fed. 645 586, 615 
 
 Peterson v. Chicago, M. & St. 
 
 P. R. Co. 108 Fed. 561 798 
 825 
 
 Peterson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. 
 
 R. Co. 205 U. S. 364, 51 
 
 L. ed. 841, 27 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 513 116 
 
 V. Morris, 98 Fed. 49 840 
 
 Petri V." Commercial Nat. Bank, 
 
 142 U. S. 644, 35 L. ed. 
 
 1144, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 325 86 
 
 V. F. E. Creelman Lumber 
 
 Co. 199 U. S. 487, 50 L. 
 
 ed. 281, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 133 106, 108, 049 
 
 Petterson, Ex parte, 166 Fed. 
 
 545 97 
 
 Pettus V. Smith, 117 Fed. 967.. 864 
 Peugh V. Davis, 110 U. S. 229, 28 
 
 L. ed. 128, 4 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 171 669, 680, 765 
 
 Pewabic Min. Co. v. Mason, 145 
 
 U. S. 349, 36 L. ed. 732, 
 
 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 881.. 590 
 595 
 Pfanschmidt v. Kelly Mercantile 
 
 Co. 32 Fed. 067 600 
 
 Phelps V. Elliott, 23 Blatchf. 
 
 470, 26 Fed. 881.. 864, 866 
 
 V. Elliott, 29 Fed. 53 258 
 
 V. McDonald, 99 U. S. 298, 
 
 25 L. ed. 473 589 
 
 V. Mutual Reserve Fund Life 
 
 Asso. 61 L.R.A. 717, 50 
 
 C. C. A. 339, 112 Fed. 
 
 465 476-478 
 
 T. Oaks. 117 U. S. 239, 29 L. 
 
 ed. 889, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 714 60, 464 
 
 Phenix Ins. Co. v. Charleston 
 
 Bridge Co. 13 C. C. A. 
 
 58, 25 U. S. App. 190, 
 
 65 Fed. 628 796 
 
 Philadelphia & B. Face Brick Co. 
 
 V. Warford, 123 Fed. 
 
 843 832, 856 
 
 Phillips V. Negley, 117 U. S. 678, 
 
 29 L. ed. 1016, 6 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 901 586 
 
 V. Ordway. See Goddard v. 
 
 Ordway. 
 V. Western Terra Cotta Co. 
 
 174 Fed. 873 856 
 
 Phipps V. Sedgwick, 95 U. S. 10, 
 
 24 L. ed. 594 367 
 
 V. Sedgwick, 131 U. S. 
 
 cx.xxix, Appx. 24 L. ed. 
 
 595 772 
 
 Phoenix Bridge Co. v. Castle- 
 berry, 65 C. C. A. 481, 
 
 131 Fed. 177 473 
 
CXXVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Phoenix Ins. Co., Ex parte, 117 
 U. S. 367, 29 L. ed. 923, 
 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 772 .. 177 
 
 Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Wulf, 
 
 9 Biss. 285, 1 Fed. 775 316 
 
 320, 321 
 
 Piekham v. Wheeler-Blisa Mfg. 
 Co. 23 C. C. A. 391, 46 
 U. S. App. 605, 77 Fed. 
 663 172 
 
 Pierce v. Corrigan, 77 Fed. 657 788 
 
 800 
 
 V. Cox, 9 Wall. 787, 19 L. 
 
 ed. 786 665 
 
 V. Molliken, 78 Fed. 196.. 158 
 Pike V. Gregory, 36 C. C. A. 299, 
 94 Fed. 373, 25 C. C. A. 
 48, 50 U. S. App. 4, 79 
 
 Fed. 520 487, 488 
 
 V. Gregory, 55 C. C. A. 78, 
 
 118 Fed. 128 688 
 
 Pike County v. Speneer, 112 C. 
 
 C. A. 433, 192 Fed. 13 129 
 274 
 
 Pikes Peake Power Co. v. Colo- 
 rado Springs, 44 C. C. 
 
 A. 333, 105 Fed. 1 641 
 
 642, 655, 657 
 
 Pillsbury-Washburn Flour Mills 
 Co. V. Eagle, 41 L.R.A. 
 162, 30 C. C. A. 386, 58 
 U. S. App. 490, 86 Fed. 
 629 226, 232 
 
 Pim V. St. Louis, 165 U. S. 273, 
 41 L. ed. 714, 17 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 322 751, 752 
 
 Pioneer Sav. & L. Co. v. Peck, 20 
 Tex. Civ. App. Ill, 49 
 S. W. 168 781, 850 
 
 Pirie v. Tvedt, 115 U. S. 43, 29 
 L. ed. 332, 5 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 1034, 1161 74 
 
 Pitkin V. Cowen, 91 Fed. 599 . . 182 
 
 257 
 
 Pitkin County Min. Co. v. Mark- 
 ell, 33 Fed. 387 94 
 
 Pitt V. Rodgers, 43 C. C. A. 600, 
 
 104 Fed. 389 319 
 
 Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. 
 Baltimore & 0. R. Co. 
 
 10 C. C. A. 20, 22 U. S. 
 App. 359, 61 Fed. 708.. 52 
 
 53, 66, 67, 470 
 V. Keokuk & H. Bridge Co. 
 15 C. C. A. 184, 46 U. 
 S. App. 530, 68 Fed. 20 6 
 14, 15, 17 
 Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. 
 V. Glinn, 135 C. C. A. 
 46, 219 Fed. 148 671 
 
 Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. 
 V. Keokuk & H. Bridge 
 Co. 46 C. C. A. 639, 107 
 Fed. 786.. 607, 608, 613, 614 
 617, 618 
 
 Pittsburgh Reduction Co. v. 
 Cowles Electric Smelt- 
 ing & Aluminum Co. 64 
 Fed. 125 600 
 
 Pittsburgh S. & N. R. Co. v. 
 Fiske, 101 C. C. A. 560, 
 178 Fed. 66.. 366, 367, 407 
 
 Pittsburgh Water Heater Co. v. 
 Beler Water Heater Co. 
 222 Fed. 952 286 
 
 Place V. Illinois, 16 C. C. A. 300, 
 18 U. S. App. 724, 69 
 Fed. 481 828 
 
 Plant V. Harrison, 101 Fed. 307 859 
 
 Plant Invest. Co. v. Jacksonville, 
 T. & K. W. R. Co. 152 
 U. S. 76, 38 L. ed. 360, 
 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 483.. 212 
 213, 218 
 
 Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. 
 V. Henderson, 170 U. S. 
 520, 42 L. ed. 1130, 18 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 685.. 39, 813 
 
 Piatt V. Manning, 34 Fed. 817 . . 315 
 V. Massachusetts Real Es- 
 tate Co. 103 Fed. 705.. 97 
 110, 114, 121, 133 
 
 Playford v. Lockard, 65 Fed. 870 204 
 
 Pleasants v. Southern R. Co. 93 
 
 Fed. 93 579 
 
 Plimpton V. Winslovy, 20 Blatchf. 
 
 82, 9 Fed. 365 318 
 
 Plume & A. Mfg. Co. v. Bald- 
 win, 87 Fed. 785 250 
 
 Plymouth Cordage Co., Re, 68 
 C. C. A. 434, 135 Fed. 
 1000 198, 207 
 
 P. M. Co. v. Ajax Rail Anchor 
 
 Co. 216 Fed. 636 293 
 
 Pokegama Sugar Pine Lumber 
 Co. V. Klamath River 
 Lumber & Improv. Co. 
 96 Fed. 55 14, 15, 22 
 
 Politz V. Wabash R. Co. 153 Fed. 
 
 942 '814 
 
 V. Wabash R. Co. 100 C. C. 
 
 A. 1, 176 Fed. 333 .... 814 
 
 Polk V. Mutual Reserve Fund 
 
 Life Asso. 128 Fed. 524 348 
 349 
 
 Pollard V. Reardon, 13 C. C. A. 
 171, 21 U. S. App. 639, 
 65 Fed. 849 23 
 
 Pollitz, Re, 206 U. S. 323, 51 
 L. ed. 1081, 27 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 729 849 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cxxvn 
 
 Pollitz V. Farmers' Loan & Trust 
 
 Co. 39 Fed. 707 102 
 
 V. Wabash R. Co. 180 Fed. 
 
 951 615 
 
 Pooler V. Hyne, 120 C. C. A. 408, 
 
 202 Fed. 194 604 
 
 Pooley Y. Lueo, 72 Fed. 561 ... . 91 
 Poor V. Iowa C. R. Co. 155 Fed. 
 
 226 149, 241 
 
 Pope V. Louisville, N. A. & C. 11. 
 Co. 173 U. S. 578, 43 L. 
 ed. 817, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 500. .162, 183, 257, 258, 483 
 852 
 Portage City Water Co. v. Port- 
 age, 102 Fed. 769.. 213, 220 
 Porter v. Northern P. R. Co. 
 
 161 Fed. 773 778, 824 
 
 V. Sabin, 149 U. S. 473, 37 
 L. ed. 815, 13 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 1008 183, 184, 241 
 
 242 
 
 V. Sabin, 36 Fed. 477 181 
 
 Porter Land & Water Co. v. Pas- 
 kin, 43 Fed. 323 ..345, 789 
 Portland Co. v. United States, 
 15 Wall. 2, 21 L. ed. 
 
 113 729 
 
 Portland Wood Pipe Co. v. Slick 
 Broa. Constr. Co. 222 
 
 Fed. 530 447 
 
 Post V. Reason Vacuum Pump & 
 E. Co. 32 C. C. A. 151, 
 50 U. S. App. 407, 89 
 
 Fed. 1 400, 730 
 
 V. Buck Stove & Range Co. 
 43 L.R.A.(N.S.) 498, 
 117 C. C. A. 214, 200 
 
 Fed. 918 242 
 
 Posts 1 Teleg. Cable Co. v. Ala- 
 bama. See Postal Teleg. 
 Cable Co. v. United 
 States. 
 V. Soutliern R. Co. 88 Fed. 
 
 803. .169, 170, 780, 791, 825 
 V. United States, 155 U. S. 
 482, 39 L. ed. 231, 15 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192.. 63, 142 
 152, 280, 812, 813, 822 
 V. Vane, 26 C. C. A. 342, 53 
 U. S. App. 319, 80 Fed. 
 
 961 697 
 
 Potter V. Real, 2 C. C. A. 60, 5 
 U. S. App. 49, 50 Fed. 
 
 860 634, 637 
 
 V. General Baking Co. 213 
 
 Fed. 698 782 
 
 V. United States, 58 C. C. 
 
 A. 231, 122 Fed. 55 714 
 
 Potts, Re, 166 U. S. 263, 41 L. 
 ed. 994, 17 Sup.Ct. Rep. 
 
 520 615, 768-770, 772 
 
 V. Creager, 71 Fed. 574 . . 770 
 Powell V. Brunswick County, 150 
 U. 8. 433, 37 L. ed. 
 1134, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 166 748, 749, 7,52, 762 
 
 V. Leicester ilills, 92 Fed. 
 
 115 460 
 
 V. Louisville, 73 C. C. A. 
 
 276, 141 Fed. 960. .2a, 29 
 Powers V. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. 
 169 U. S. 92, 42 L. ed. 
 673, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 264. . .72, 74, 640, 644, 790 
 792, 795, 797, 798, 805, 836 
 838, 839, S4y 
 V. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. 
 
 65 Fed. 132 783 
 
 P. P. JIaat & Co. V. Superior 
 Drill Co. 83 C. C. A. 
 
 357, 154 Fed. 45 671 
 
 Pratt V. Paris Gaslight & Coke 
 Co. 168 U. S. 255, 42 
 L. ed. 458, 18 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 62 151, 160, 822 
 
 Preferred Aeci. Ins. Co. v. Bark- 
 er, 32 C. C. A. 124, 58 
 U. S. App. 171, 88 Fed. 
 
 814 208, 272, 730 
 
 Premo Specialty Mfg. Co. v. Jer- 
 sey-Creme Co. 43 L.R.A. 
 (N.S.) 1015, 118 C. C. 
 A. 458, 200 Fed. 352 . . 325 
 Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 164 
 U. S. 110, 41 L. ed. 368, 
 
 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40 654 
 
 741-743 
 Presto, The, 35 C. C. A. 394, 93 
 
 Fed. 522 655, 677, 683 
 
 Preston v. Carten Bros. 80 Tex. 
 
 391, 16 S. W. 17 254 
 
 V. Finley, 72 Fed. 853 386 
 
 V. Smith, 26 Fed. 884 . . 292, 399 
 Preteca v. ila.wvell Laud Grant 
 Co. 1 C. C. A. 607, 4 U. 
 S. App. 326, 50 Fed. 
 
 674 30, 33 
 
 Price V. Ellis, 129 Fed. 482.... 797 
 
 826, 855 
 V. Lehigh Valley R. Co. 65 
 
 Fed. 826 796 
 
 V. Union Land Co. 110 C. 
 
 C. A. 20, 187 Fed. 886 241 
 Prince v. Illinois C. R. Co. 98 
 
 Fed. 1 806, 860, 862 
 
 y. Towns, 33 Fed. 162 .... 105 
 Probst V. Cowen, 91 Fed. 929 . . 779 
 
 780 
 
CXXVllX 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Proctor Coal Co. v. United 
 States Fidelity & G. Co. 
 
 158 Fed. 211 858 
 
 Protector, The, 11 Wall. 82, 20 
 
 L. ed. 47 682, 703 
 
 Providence Rubber Co. v. Good- 
 year, 6 Wall. 156, 18 L. 
 
 ed. 763 764 
 
 V. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 791, 19 
 
 L. ed. 567 .. .250, 444, 486 
 Provident Life & T. Co. v. Cam- 
 den & T. R. Co. 101 C. 
 C. A. 68, 177 Fed. 854 388 
 389, 698, 699 
 
 v. Mills, 91 Fed. 435 476 
 
 Provident Sav. Life Assur. Soc. 
 V. Ford, 114 U. S. 641, 
 29 L. ed. 263, 5 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 1104 , 155 
 
 V. Loeb, 115 Fed. 359 489 
 
 Provisional Municipality v. Leh- 
 man, 6 C. C. A. 349, 13 
 U. S. App. 411, 57 Fed. 
 
 330 424 
 
 Public School Fund v. New Ma- 
 drid County, 73 Fed. 306 234 
 Puget Sound Nat. Bank v. King, 
 
 County, 57 Fed. 433 . . 399 
 Puget Sound Nav. Co. v. Laven- 
 der, 84 C. C. A. 259, 156 
 
 Fed. '361 732 
 
 Puget Sound Sheet Metal Works 
 V. Great Northern R. Co. 
 
 195 Fed. 350 832 
 
 PuUiam v. Christian, 6 How. 211, 
 
 32 L. ed. 408 636 
 
 V. PuUiam, 10 Fed. 23 . . 250, 564 
 Pullman Co. v. Jordan, 134 C. 
 
 C. A. 301, 218 Fed. 574 507 
 V. Tamble, 173 Fed. 203 .. 278 
 Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Cen- 
 tral Transp. Co. 171 U. 
 S. 138, 43 L. ed. 108, 18 
 Sup.Ct. Rep. 808.. 350, 351 
 450, 646 
 V. Central Transp. Co. 71 
 
 Fed. 809 651, 667 
 
 V. Central Transp. Co. 22 
 C. C. A. 246, 39 U. S. 
 App. 307, 76 Fed. 401 646 
 647 
 V. Missouri P. R. Co. 3 Mc- 
 
 Crary, 645, 11 Fed. 634 400 
 Purdy V. Wallace Miller & Co. 
 
 81 Fed. 513 . .789, 841, 856 
 Purnell v. Page, 128 Fed. 496 . . 168 
 186, 190, 193 
 Purvine, Re, 37 C. C. A. 446, 
 
 96 Fed. 195 593 
 
 Pusey & J. Co. v. Miller, 61 
 
 Fed. 401 489 
 
 Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light & 
 
 R. Co. V. Ryan, 181 U. 
 
 S. 432, 45 L. ed. 938, 21 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 709 173 
 
 Putnian v. Day, 22 Wall. 65, 22 
 
 L. ed. 765 605 
 
 Putnam v. Ingraham, 114 U. S. 
 
 57, 29 L. ed. 65, 5 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 746 813, 838 
 
 Y. Timothy Dry Goods & 
 
 Carpet Co. 79 Fed. 454 176 
 
 194 
 
 Putney v. Whitmire, 66 Fed. 385 176 
 
 179, 369, 374 
 
 Q. 
 
 Quilhot V. Hamer, 158 Fed. 188 793 
 Quincy v. Steel, 120 U. S. 248, 
 
 30 L. ed. 626, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 520 241 
 
 Quinlan v. Green County, 205 U. 
 
 S. 410, 51 L. ed. 860, 
 
 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 505.. 735 
 V. New Orleans, 92 Fed. 695 215 
 Quinton v. Neville, 81 C. C. A. 
 
 673, 152 Fed. 879 605 
 
 Quirk V. Quirk, 155 Fed. 199.. 33 
 
 R. 
 
 Radford v. Folsom, 123 U. S. 
 725, 31 L. ed. 292, 8 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 334.. 665, 677 
 
 Rae V. Grand Trunk R. Co. 14 
 
 Fed. 402 91 
 
 Rahley v. Columbia Phonograph 
 Co. 58 C. C. A. 639, 122 
 Fed. 625 630 
 
 Rahtjen's American Composition 
 Co. V. Holzappel's Com- 
 positions Co. 97 Fed. 
 949 540 
 
 Raich V. Truax, 219 Fed. 283 . . 228 
 
 Railroad Commission v. Morgan's 
 L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. 
 115 C. C. A. 127, 195 
 Fed. 66 641, 642 
 
 Railroad Equipment Co. v. South- 
 ern R. Co. 34 C. C. A. 
 519, 92 Fed. 541.. 692, 694 
 696, 704 
 
 Rainey v. Herbert, 5 C. C. A. 
 183, 3 U. S. App. 592, 
 55 Fed. 443 189' 
 
 Raisin v. Statham, 22 Fed. 146 464 
 
 Ralston v. Sharon, 51 Fed. 707 478 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXIX 
 
 Ralston Steel Car Co. v. Nation- 
 al Dump Car Co. 222 
 Fed. 590 
 
 Ealya Market Co. v. Armour & 
 Co. 102 Fed. 530 . . 245, 
 
 124 
 
 806 
 823 
 
 Randall v. New England Order 
 
 of Protection, 118 Fed. 
 
 782 796 
 
 T. Venable, 17 Fed. 163 . . 513 
 Randolph v. Allen, 19 C. C. A. 
 
 353, 41 U. S. App. 117, 
 
 73 Fed. 23.. ..577, 670, 671 
 718 
 Randon v. Toby, 11 How. 493, 13 
 
 L. ed. 794 7 
 
 Ranger v. Campion Cotton-Press 
 
 Co. 52 Fed. 611 301 
 
 Rankin v. Herod, 130 Fed. 390. . 86 
 
 402, 518 
 Ransom v. Pierre, 41 C. C. A. 
 
 585, 101 Fed. 665. .687, 721 
 Raphael v. Trask, 194 U. S. 276, 
 
 48 L. ed. 975, 24 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 647 415 
 
 V. Trask, 118 Fed. 678.. 52, 86 
 232, 233, 234, 245, 483 
 Rause v. Letcher, 156 U. S. 49, 
 
 39 L. ed. 342, 15 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 266 183 
 
 Rawley v. Southern P. E. Co. 33 
 
 Fed. 305 93 
 
 Ray V. Pierce, 81 Fed. 882. .182, 258 
 V. Smith, 17 Wall. 411, 21 L. 
 
 ed. 666 538, 540 
 
 Raymond v. Chicago Union Trac- 
 tion Co. 207 U. S. 20, 52 
 
 L. ed. 78, 28 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 7, 12 A. & E. Ann. 
 
 Cas. 757 149 
 
 Reading Ins. Co. v. Egelhoff, 115 
 
 Fed. 393 576, 578 
 
 Rector v. City Deposit Bank Co. 
 
 200 U. S. 405, 50 L. ed. 
 
 527, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 289 761 
 
 V. Fitzgerald, 8 C. C. A. 277, 
 
 19 U. S. App. 423, 59 
 
 Fed. 808 614 
 
 V. Lipscomb, 141 U. S. 558, 
 
 35 L. ed. 857, 32 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 83 205, 757 
 
 Redfield v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. 
 
 124 Fed. 929 68 
 
 V. Parks. 130 U. S. 624, 32 
 
 L. ed. 1053, 9 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 642 710, 712 
 
 Red River Cattle Co. v. Needham, 
 
 137 U. S. 633, 34 L. ed. 
 
 800, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 208 197, 205 
 
 Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U. S. 
 
 596, 27 L. ed. 251, 1 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 434 .... 107 
 Reed' v. Pennsylvania Co. 49 C. 
 
 C. A. 572, 111 Fed. 714 678 
 
 V. Reed, 31 Fed. 53 248 
 
 V. Stanly, 89 Fed. 431.. 605, 607 
 608, 609, 617 
 V. Stanly, 38 C. C. A. 331, 
 
 97 Fed. 521 604, 610 
 
 Reedy v. Scott, 23 Wall. 352, 23 
 
 L. ed. 109 378 
 
 Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107, 
 
 22 L. ed. 72 11, 23 
 
 Reese v. Zinn, 103 Fed. 97.. 193, 805 
 
 815 
 Reeve v. North Carolina Land & 
 
 Lumber Co. 72 C. C. A. 
 
 287, 141 Fed. 821.. 366, 367 
 Reeves v. Corning, 51 Fed. 778 235 
 
 814, 846 
 Regis v. United Drug Co. 180 
 
 Fed. 201 71 
 
 Reich V. Tennessee Copper Co. 
 
 209 Fed. 880 93, 94 
 
 Reifsnider v. American Imp. Pub. 
 
 Co. 45 Fed. 433 333 
 
 Reinach v. Atlantic & G. W. R. 
 
 Co. 58 Fed. 38 58 
 
 Reinartson v. Chicago G. W. R. 
 
 Co. 174 Fed. 707 74, 75 
 
 Reinstadler v. Reeves, 33 Fed. 
 
 308 122 
 
 Reisenberg, Re. See Metropoli- 
 tan R. Receivership, Re. 
 Rejall V. Greenhood, 35 C. C. A. 
 
 97, 92 Fed. 945. . .253, 418 
 Reliable Incubator & Brooder Co. 
 
 V. Stahl, 44 C. C. A. 657, 
 
 105 Fed. 667. .646, 655, 657 
 Remer v. McKay, 54 Fed. 432 . 589 
 Remington v. Central P. R. Co. 
 
 198 U. S. 95, 49 L. ed. 
 
 959, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 577 644, 840 
 
 Remington Paper Co. v. Watson, 
 
 173 U. S. 443, 43 L. ed. 
 
 762, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 456 153, 747 
 
 Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457, 25 
 
 L. ed. 593.. 65, 66, 779, 786 
 Repauno Chemical Co. v. Victor 
 
 Hardware Co. 42 C. C. 
 
 A. 106, 101 Fed. 948. . 728 
 Revans v. Southern Missouri & 
 
 A. R. Co. 114 Fed. 982. . 323 
 Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U. S. 354, 
 
 32 L. ed. 934, 9 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 486 33 
 
cxxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Reynolds v. Burns, 141 U. S. 117, 
 35 L. ed. 648, 11 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 942 169 
 
 T. Crawfordsville, 112 U. S. 
 410, 28 L. ed. 735, 5 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 213 19 
 
 V. Lyon County, 97 Fed. 155 215 
 
 216 
 V. Manhattan Trust Co. 48 
 C. C. A. 249, 109 Fed. 
 
 99 733, 773 
 
 V. Watkins, 9 0. C. A. 273, 
 22 U. S. App. 83, 60 
 
 Fed. 824 33, 34 
 
 Rhino V. Emery, 18 C. C. A. 600, 
 37 U. S. App. 575, 72 
 
 Fed. 386 251 
 
 V. Emery, 79 Fed. 483.. 413, 416 
 Rhoades v. Selin, 4 Wash. C. 0. 
 
 715, Fed. Cas. No. 11,740 514 
 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 
 
 7 Pet. 651, 8 L. ed. 816 318 
 V. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 
 
 657, 9 L. ed. 1233 39 
 
 V. Massachusetts, 14 Pet. 
 
 257, 10 L. ed. 445.. 397, 415 
 417 
 Ribon V. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. 
 Co. 16 Wall. 450, 21 L. 
 
 ed. 368 225, 234 
 
 Rice V. Durham Water Co. 91 
 
 Fed. 433. ,461, 465, 484, 702 
 V. Houston, 13 Wall. 66, 20 
 
 L. ed. 484 59 
 
 Rich V. Bray, 2 L.R.A. 225, 37 
 
 Fed. 279 68, 195, 250 
 
 Richards v. Harrison, 218 Fed. 
 
 138 688 
 
 V. Macktiii, 113 U. S. 542, 
 28 L. ed. 1133, 5 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 535 665 
 
 Richardson v. Green, 130 U. S. ' 
 114, 32 L. ed. 875, 9 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443.. 665, 691 
 692, 693, 707 
 V. Green, 9 C. C. A. 565, 15 
 U. S. App. 488, 61 Fed. 
 
 423 248-, 249, 424 
 
 V. Loree, 36 C. C. A. 301, 94 
 
 Fed. 375 399, 618 
 
 V. Southern Idaho Water 
 
 Power Co. 209 Fed. 949 815 
 818 
 V. Walton, 9 C. C. A. 604, 
 17 U. S. App. 525, 61 
 
 Fed. 535 671 
 
 Richmond v. Atwood, 17 L.R.A. 
 615, 2 C. C. A. 596, 5 
 U. S. App. 151, 52 Fed. 
 21 581 
 
 Richmond v. Brookings, 48 Fed. 
 
 241 841 
 
 V. Irons, 121 U. S. 47, 30 L. 
 ed. 870, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 788 286, 359, 405 
 
 V. Milwaukee, 21 How. 391, 
 
 16 L. ed. 72 197 
 
 Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Findley, 
 
 32 Fed. 642 .... 854 
 
 Richter v. Jerome. See Richter 
 V. Union Trust Co. 
 V. Jerome, 123 U. S. 246, 31 
 L. ed. 137, 8 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 106 252, 464 
 
 T. Jerome, 25 Fed. 682 . . 499, 500 
 510, 511, 512, 515 
 V. Union Trust Co. 115 U. 
 S. 55, 29 L. ed. 345, 
 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1162 . . 511 
 Ricker v. Powell, 100 U. S. 108, 
 
 25 L. ed. 528 608, 610 
 
 Rickey Land & Cattle Co. v. 
 Wood, 81 C. C. A. 218, 
 
 152 Fed. 23 443, 451 
 
 Riddle v. New York, L. E. & W. 
 
 R. Co. 39 Fed. 290.... 114 
 Rider v. United States, 79 C. C. 
 
 A. 112, 149 Fed. 170.. 659 
 Ridge v. Manker, 67 C. C. A. 596, 
 
 132 Fed. 599 721 
 
 Rigney v. De Graw, 100 Fed. 213 284 
 
 286, 289, 320 
 
 Riggs V. Brown, 172 Fed. 637 . . 207 
 
 361, 362 
 V. Clark, 18 C. C. A. 242, 
 37 U. S. App. 626, 71 
 
 Fed. 560 192, 825 
 
 Rincon Water Co. v. Anaheim 
 Union Water Co. 115 
 
 Fed. 544 300 
 
 Rindskopf , Re, 24 Fed. 542 532 
 
 V. Platto, 29 Fed. 130 292 
 
 Rintoul V. New York C. & H. R. 
 
 R. Co. 20 Fed. 313 .... 600 
 Rio Grande Irrig. & Coloniza- 
 tion Co. V. Gildersleeve, 
 174 U. S. 606, 43 L. ed. 
 1104, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 761 335, 695 
 
 Rio Grande R. Co. v. Gornila, 
 132 U. S. 478, 33 L. ed. 
 400, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 155 248 
 
 V. Vinet. See Rio Grande 
 R. Co. V. Vinet. 
 Riser v. Southern R. Co. 116 Fed. 
 
 216 74, 75, 818, 819 
 
 Risley v. Utica, 168 Fed. 744 .. . 40 
 
 149, 168, 169, 175 
 
 V. Utica, 179 Fed. 877 .... 176 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXXl 
 
 Ritchie v. Burke, 109 Fed. 19.. 45 
 60, 610, 614 
 V. McMuIlen, 25 C. C. A. 50, 
 47 U. S. App. 470, 79 
 
 Fed. 522 438, 439 
 
 V. Sayers, 100 Fed. 537 281 
 
 288, 289, 478 
 Eitter v. ilutual L. Ins. Co. 169 
 U. S. 144, 42 L. ed. 694, 
 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 300.. 674 
 Riverside & A. R. Co. v. River- 
 side, 118 Fed. 736.. 146, 187 
 Riviere v. Wilkens, 31 Tex. Civ. 
 
 App. 454, 72 S. W. 608 541 
 Roach T. Summers, 20 Wall. 170, 
 
 22 L. ed. 253 429 
 
 Roberts v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. 
 
 Co. 168 Fed. 316 797 
 
 V. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. 
 
 Co. 45 Fed. 433 783 
 
 V. Lewis, 144 U. S. 656, 36 
 L. ed. 582, 12 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 781 126, 271 
 
 V. Northern P. R. Co. 158 U. 
 S. 26, 39 L. ed. 882, 15 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 756 439 
 
 V. Pacific & A. R.' & Nav. 
 
 Co. 104 Fed. 577 »37 
 
 V. Pacific & A. R. & Nav. 
 Co. 58 C. C. A. 61, 121 
 
 Fed. 785 90, 809, 811 
 
 V. Pineland Club, 139 Fed. 
 
 1001 830 
 
 Robertson v. Cease, 97 U. S. 648, 
 
 24 L. ed. 1058 45, 125 
 
 274 
 V. Scottish Union & Nat. 
 
 Ins. Co. 68 Fed. 173.. .. 84 
 Robinson v. Alabama & G. Mfg. 
 
 Co. 89 Fed. 221 576 
 
 V. American Car & Foundry , 
 
 Co. 132 Fed. 166 553 
 
 V. American Car & Foundry 
 
 Co. 132 Fed. 166 553 
 
 V. American Linseed Co. 147 
 
 Fed. 886 118 
 
 T. Anderson, 121 U. S. 522, 
 30 L. ed. 1021, 7 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 1011 165 
 
 T. Belt, 5 C. C. A. 521, 12 
 U. S. App. 431, 56 Fed. 
 
 328 625, 633 
 
 v. Caldwell, 165 U. S. 361, 
 41 L. ed. 746, 17 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 343.. 646, 647, 653 
 654, 743 
 V. Campbell, 3 Wiieat. 212, 
 
 4 L. ed. 372 5, 15, 17 
 
 V. Mutual Reserve L. Ins. | 
 
 Co. 162 Fed. 794 479 
 
 Robinson v. National Stock-yard 
 Co. 20 Blatchf. 513, 12 
 
 Fed. 361 320, 331 
 
 V. Parker-Washington Co. 
 
 170 Fed. 850 797 
 
 V. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 
 
 28 Fed. 341 526 
 
 T. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 
 
 28 Fed. 577 429 
 
 V. Rudkins, 28 Fed. 8 604 
 
 V. Suburban Brick Co. 62 
 C. C. A. 484, 127 Fed. 
 
 804.. ■ 170, 197, 205, 741 
 
 V. West Virginia Loan Co. 
 
 90 Fed. 772 243 
 
 V. Wilmington, 9 C. C. A. 
 84, 8 U. S. App. 541, 60 
 
 Fed. 471 633 
 
 Rockling v. JIcKinstry, 185 Fed. 
 
 843 97 
 
 Rocky Mountain Bell Teleph. Co. 
 V. Montana Federation 
 of Labor, 156 Fed. 809 190 
 
 Rodgers v. Pitt, 96 Fed. 676 121 
 
 122, 313, 334, 477, 479 
 Roessler-Hasslacher Chemical Co. 
 V. Doyle, 73 C. C. A. 
 
 174, 142 Fed. 118 826 
 
 Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 
 
 231, 48 L. ed. 417, 24 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 257 ... . 3 
 
 V. Jones, 214 U. S. 196, 53 
 
 L. ed. 965, 29 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 635 749, 750 
 
 V. Marshall, 13 Fed. 64 . . . 422 
 
 600 
 V. Marshall, 4 McCrary, 307, 
 
 15 Fed. 193 601 
 
 V. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. 
 Co. 33 C. C. A. 517, 02 
 U. S. App. 49, 697, 91 
 
 Fed. 299 244 
 
 V. Penobscot Min. Co. 83 C. 
 
 C. A. 380, 154 Fed. 610 130 
 231, 233, 244, 298, 671, 
 
 805, 815 
 
 V. Pitt, 96 Fed. 668 319 
 
 V. Riessner, 34 Fed. 270 . . 600 
 
 v. Riley, 80 Fed. 762 178 
 
 V. Van Nortwick, 45 Fed. 
 
 514 799, 814 
 
 Rollins V. Chaifee County, 34 Fed. 
 
 91 211, 214 
 
 Romaine v. Union Ins. Co. 28 
 
 Fed. 625 103, 314, 331 
 
 332, 333, 388 
 Rome Petroleum & Iron Co. v. 
 Hughes Specialty Well 
 Drilling Co. 130 Fed. 
 585 830, 831 
 
CXXXll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Romine, Re, 138 Fed. 839 532 
 
 Rondot V. Rogers Twp. 25 C. C. 
 A. 145, 47 U. S. App. 
 
 290, 79 Fed. 677 91 
 
 Rones v. Katalla Co. 182 Fed. 
 
 946 811 
 
 Root V. Lake Shore & M. S. R. 
 Co. 105 U. S. 189, 26 L. 
 
 ed. 975 11, 28 
 
 V. Mills, 94 C. C. A. 174, 168 
 
 Fed. 688 627, 628, 632 
 
 v. Woohvorth, 150 U. S. 413, 
 37 L. ed. 1126, 14 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 136,. 258, 281, 367 
 369, 372, 377, 590 
 Roschynialski v. Hale, 201 Fed. 
 
 1017 .' 318 
 
 Rosenstein v. Tarr, 51 Fed. 370 688 
 V. Tarr, 3 C. C. A. 466, 5 
 V. S. App. 197, 53 Fed. 
 
 112 688 
 
 Rosenthal v. Coates, 148 U. S. 
 142, 37 L. ed. 399, 13 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 576 ..72, 73 
 799, 844, 845 
 Ross V. Erie R. Co. 120 Fed. 703 806 
 
 861 
 376 
 
 V. Ft. Wayne, 58 Fed. 404 . . 
 V. Ft. Wayne, 11 C. C. A. 
 
 288, 24 U. S. App. 113, 
 
 63 Fed. 466.. 253, 376, 
 V. Prentiss, 3 How. 772, i: 
 
 L. ed. 824 
 
 Rothschild v. Knight, 184 U. S. 
 
 339, 46 L. ed. 579, 22 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 391 
 
 Rountree v. Adams Exp. Co. 91 
 
 C. C, A. 186, 165 Fed. 
 
 152 
 
 Rouse V. Hornsby, 14 C. C. A. 
 
 377, .32 U. S. App. Ill, 
 
 67 Fed. 220 
 
 V. Letcher, 156 U. S. 49, 39 
 
 L. ed. 342, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 266 258, 464, 
 
 Rowan v. Ide, 46 C. C. A. 214, 
 
 107 Fed. 161 627, 
 
 Rowbotham v. George P. Steele 
 
 Iron Co. 71 Fed. 758.. 
 
 Rowell V. Hill, 28 Fed. 433. .788, 
 Royal Ins. Co. v. Stoddard, 120 
 
 C. C. A. 434, 201 Fed. 
 
 916 
 
 Royal Trust Co. v. Washburn, B. 
 
 & I. R. Co. 113 Fed. 532 
 
 V. Washburn, B. & I. R. Co. 
 71 C. C. A. 579, 139 
 Fed. 865 
 
 482 
 186 
 
 752 
 
 465 
 
 468 
 
 628 
 
 79 
 430 
 800 
 
 168 
 
 182 
 587 
 
 479' 
 
 Royal Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. 
 
 Wynn, 177 Fed. 293 .. 448 
 449, 450 
 Rubber & C. Harness Trimming 
 Co. V. John L. Whiting- 
 J. J. Adams Co. 210 Fed. 
 
 393 834 
 
 Ruble V. Hyde, 1 McCrary, 513, 
 
 3 Fed. 331 69, 245 
 
 Ruby V. Atkinson, 35 C. C. A. 
 
 458, 93 Fed. 577.. .665, 692 
 711 
 Ruby Canyon Gold Min. Co. v. 
 
 Hunter, 60 Fed. 305 .. 796 
 Ruch V. Rock Island, 97 U. S. 
 
 694, 24 L. ed. 1101 .... 543 
 Rucker v. Bolles, 25 C. C. A. 600, 
 49 U. S. App. 358, 80 
 
 Fed. 504 125, 129 
 
 V. Bolles, 67 C. C. A. 30, 133 
 
 Fed. 860 439 
 
 V. Wheeler, 127 U. S. 92, 32 
 L. ed. 105, 8 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 1142 555 
 
 Rudland v. Mastic, 77 Fed. 689 260 
 Rumbarger v. Yokum, 174 Fed. 
 
 55 25 
 
 Rumsey v. Peoples R. Co. 154 
 
 Mo. 215, 55 S. W. 624.. 252 
 Rupp V. Wheeling & L. E. R. 
 Co. 58 C. C. A. 161, 121 
 
 Fed. 825 75, 818 
 
 Rural Home Teleph. Co. v. Pow- 
 ers, 176 Fed. 986 ..823, 85fl 
 Russell V. Clark, 7 Cranoh, 98, 
 
 3 L. ed. 281 227 
 
 V. Farley, 105 U. S. 437, 26 
 
 L. ed. 1061 639 
 
 T. Harriman Land Co. 145 
 
 Fed. 745 796 
 
 V. Kern, 16 C. C. A. 154, 34 
 U. S. App. 90, 69 Fed. 
 
 94 674 
 
 V. Place, 94 U. S. 606, 24 L. 
 
 ed. 214 403 
 
 V. Russell, 129 Fed. 438 .. 587 
 
 588 
 V. Shippen Bros. Lumber Co. 
 
 224 Fed. 255 208 
 
 V. Stansell, 105 U. S. 303, 
 
 26 L. ed. 989 176 
 
 Russell & Co. V. Lamb, 49 Fed. 
 
 771 .587 
 
 Russo-Chinese Bank v. National 
 Bank, 109 C. C. A. 398, 
 
 187 Fed. 80 728 
 
 Rust V. Brittle Silver Co. 7 C. 
 C. A. 389, 19 U. S. App. 
 237, 58 Fed. 611 ... . 68 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXXlll 
 
 Eust V, United Waterworks Co. 
 17 C. C. A. 36, 36 U. S. 
 App. 167, 70 Fed. 137 89 
 111, 116, 329, 637, 646, 655 
 HutLedge v. Waldo, 94 Fed. 265 382 
 
 384 
 Ryan v. Koch, 17 Wall. 19, 21 L. 
 
 ed. 611 729 
 
 V. Seaboard & R. R. Co. 83 
 
 Fed. 889 344 
 
 V. Seaboard & R. R. Co. 89 
 
 Fed. 397 299, 555 
 
 V. Williams, 100 Fed. 172 . . 243 
 Rycroft v. Green, 49 Fed. 177 . . 796 
 Ryder v. Bateman, 93 Fed. 31 . . 528 
 
 786, 787 
 
 S. 
 
 Safford v. Ensign Mfg. Co. 56 
 C. C. A. 630, 120 Fed. 
 482 292 
 
 Sagara v. Chicago, R. I. & P. K. 
 
 Co. 189 Fed. 220 . .832, 850 
 
 Sage V. Central R. Co. 93 U. S. 
 
 416, 23 L. ed. 934. .618, 685 
 686, 690, 700, 764, 765 
 V. Central R. Co. 96 U. S. 
 
 714, 24 L. ed. 643. .665, 677 
 682, 683, 692 
 V. St. Paul, S. & T. F. R. 
 
 Co. 47 Fed. 3 592 
 
 Saginaw Gaslight Co. v. Sagi- 
 naw, 28 Fed. 529 . .57, 66 
 163 
 
 St. Clair t. Cox, 106 U. R. 350, 
 27 L. ed. 222, 1 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. .3.54 322, 327 
 
 St. Clair County v. Interstate 
 Sand & Car Transfer Co. 
 40 C. C. A. 169, 110 
 Fed. 785 658 
 
 St. John V. United States Fidel- 
 ity & G. Co. 213 Fed. 
 685 776, 779, 834 
 
 St. Joseph & G. T. E. Co. v. 
 Steele, 167 U. S. 659, 42 
 L. ed. 315, 17 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 925 . , 77, 79, 80, 81 
 S3, 84, 151, 159, 271 
 
 St. Louis & K. C. R. Co. v. Con- 
 tinental Trust Co. 36 C. 
 C. A. 195 484 
 
 St, Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Had- 
 
 ley, 155 Fed. 220 367 
 
 V. Hadley, 161 Fed. 421 .... 149 
 V. James, 161 U. S. 545, 40 
 L. ed. 802, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep, 621 77-81, 83, 84 
 
 St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. John- 
 ston, 133 U. S. 577, 33 L. 
 ed. 686, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 390 281 
 
 V. McBride, 141 U. S. 127, 
 35 L. ed. 659, 11 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 982, .54, 110, U2 
 121, 122, 331, 332, 334 
 409 
 V. Wilson, 114 U. S. 62, 29 
 L. ed. 67, 5 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 738 73 
 
 St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. 
 V, American Cotton Co. 
 60 C. C. A. 80, 125 Fed. 
 
 196 640, 644, 653 
 
 St. Louis, G. & Ft. S. R. Co. v. 
 Missouri, 156 U. S. 483, 
 39 L. ed. 504, 15 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 443 749 
 
 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. 
 
 Davis, 132 Fed. 629 . . 14.S 
 152, 157 
 V. Newcom, 6 C. C. A. 172, 
 12 U. S. App. 503, 56 
 
 Fed. 951 270 
 
 V. Southern E.\p. Co. 108 U. 
 S. 24, 27 L. ed. 638, 2 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6 582 
 
 V. Taylor, 210 V. S. 281, 52 
 L. ed. 1061, 28 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 616 753 
 
 St. Louis Independent Packing 
 Co. V. Houston, 132 C. 
 C. A. 65, 215 Fed. 557 208 
 
 St. Louis, K. C. & C. R. Co. v. 
 
 Wabash R. Co. 81 C. C. 
 
 A. 643, 152 Fed. 861 . . 583 
 St. Louis Xat. Bank v. United 
 
 States Ins. Co. 100 U. 
 
 S. 43, 25 L. ed. 547 .. 
 St. Louis R. Co. V. Pacific R. 
 
 Co. 52 Fed. 770,. 55, 78, 
 
 St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. 
 V, Griffin, — Tex. Civ. 
 App. — , 154 S. W. 583 
 
 V. Holbrook, 19 C. C. A. 385, 
 41 U. S. App. 33, 73 
 
 Fed. 112 
 
 V. S. Samuels & Co. 128 C. 
 C. A. 188, 211 Fed. 588 
 
 St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. 
 Texas Southern R. Co. 
 — Tex. Civ. App. — , 
 126 S. W. 308 
 
 St. Louis United Elevator Co. v. 
 Nichols, 34 C. C. A. 90, 
 91 Fed. 833 
 
 722 
 
 109 
 119 
 
 148 
 149 
 
 256 
 93 
 
 568 
 697 
 
CXXXIV 
 
 TABLE OB" CASES. 
 
 St. Louis, V. & T. H. E. Co. v. 
 
 Terre Haute & I. R. Co. 
 
 33 Fed. 385.. ..93, 289, 359 
 St. Paul & C. R. Co. V. McLean, 
 
 108 U. S. 217, 27 L. ed. 
 
 704, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 498' -800 
 St. Paul Gaslight Co. v. St. Paul, 
 
 181 U. S. 142, 45 L. ed. 
 
 788, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 575 146 
 
 St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. v. St. 
 
 Paul & N. P. R. Co. 15 
 
 C. C. A. 167, 32 U. S. 
 
 App. 372, 68 Fed. 2. .157-159 
 164, 166, 167, 749 
 St. Paul Plough Works v. Star- 
 ling, 127 U. S. 378, 32 
 
 L. ed. 252, 8 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 1327 160 
 
 Salmon v. Mills, 13 C. C. A. 372, 
 
 27 U. S. App. 732, 66 
 
 Fed. 33 582 
 
 Saltmarsh v. Tuthill, 12 How. 
 
 389, 13 L. ed. 1035 .... 684 
 Salton Sea Cases, 97 C. C. A. 
 
 214, 172 Fed. 792 14 
 
 Salt's Textile Mfg. Co. v. Tingue 
 
 Mfg. Co. 208 Fed. 156 446 
 447 
 Samuel Bros. v. Hostetter Co. 55 
 
 C. C. A. Ill, 118 Fed. 
 
 257 539, 540, 542 
 
 Sanbo v. Union P. Coal Co. 72 
 
 C. C. A. 24, 140 Fed. 
 
 713 272 
 
 T. Union P. Coal Co. 146 
 
 Fed. 80 126, 360 
 
 Sanborn, Re, 52 Fed. 586 593 
 
 Sanderlin v. People's Bank, 140 
 
 Fed. 191 785 
 
 Sanders v. Bluefield Waterworks 
 
 & Improv. Co. 45 C. C. 
 
 A. 475, 106 Fed. 587 . '. 582 
 637 
 - V. Dfivereux, 8 C. C. A. 629, 
 
 19 U. S. App. 630, 60 
 
 Fed. 311 532, 
 
 V. Riverside, 55 C. C. A. 240, 
 
 118 Fed. 720.. 443, 456, 
 
 Sandford Fork & Tool Co., Re, 
 
 160 U. S. 247, 40 L. ed. 
 
 414, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 291 615, 708-770, 
 
 San Diego Flume Co. v. Souther, 
 
 32 C. C. A. 548, 61 U. 
 
 S. App. 134, 90 Fed. 164 
 Sands v " "' ^Ipv k Co " 
 Fed. 196 458, 
 
 554 
 
 572 
 
 577 
 
 772 
 
 455 
 466 
 
 Sanford v. Poe, 60 L.R.A. 641, 
 16 C. C. A. 305, 37 U. 
 S. App. 378, 69 Fed. 
 
 546 30 
 
 Sanford Tool Co., Re, 160 U. S. 
 259, 40 L. ed. 417, 16 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 291 .... 357 
 Sang Lung v. Jackson, 85 Fed. 
 
 502 30, 226, 300 
 
 San Joaquin & K. River, Canal 
 & Irrig. Co. v. Stanis- 
 laus County, 90 Fed. 516 45 
 148, 151, 165 
 San Josfi Land & Water Co. v. 
 San Jos6 Ranch Co. 189 
 U. S. 179, 47 L. ed. 766, 
 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 487.. 451 
 748 
 Santa Clara County v. Goldy 
 
 Mach. Co. 159 Fed. 750 804 
 805, 836 
 Saranac, The, 132 Fed. 942 .... 533 
 Sauer v. New York, 206 U. S. 
 536, 51 L. ed. 1176, 27 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 686 .... 153 
 Saunders v. Adams Exp. Co. 136 
 
 Fed. 494 85 
 
 Savage v. Worsham, 104 Fed. 18 276 
 
 277, 358 
 Savannah v. Hoist, 65 C. C. A. 
 
 449, 132 Fed. 901.. 147, 148 
 161 
 Savings & Loan Soe. v. David- 
 son, 38 C. G. A. 365, 97 
 
 Fed. 696 283, 673 
 
 Savings & T. Co. v. Bear Vallev 
 
 Irrig. Co. 112 Fed. 704 241 
 Sawyer, Ex parte, 21 Wall. 235, 
 
 22 L. ed. 617 772 
 
 Re, 124 U. S. 210, 31 L. od. 
 405, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 482 44 
 
 V. First Nat. Bank, 41 Te.x. 
 Civ. App. 486, 93 S. W. 
 3^53 254 
 
 V. Piper, 189 U. S. ir^i, 47 
 L. ed. 757, 23 Sup. C:. 
 
 Rep. 633 158, 749 
 
 V. White, 58 C. C. A. 587. 
 
 122 Fed. 223 . .18, 24S, 827 
 Sayward v. Denny, 1,58 U. S, ISO, 
 39 L. ed. 941, 15 Sun. 
 Ct. Rep. 77.. 153, .159, 748 
 751 
 Scarborough v. Pargoud, 108 U. 
 S. 567, 27 L. ed. 824, 
 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 877 .. 662 
 Scatherd v. Love, 91 C. C. A. 
 
 639, 166 Fed. 54 639 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cxxxv 
 
 Schacker v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 
 93 U. S. 241, 23 L. ed. 
 
 862 171 
 
 Sehell V. Alston Mfg. Co. 149 Fed. 
 
 440 295 
 
 Schenck v. Diamond Match Co. 
 19 C. C. A. 352, 39 U. S. 
 App. 191, 73 Fed. 22 . . 684 
 Schiffer v. Anderson, 76 C. C. A. 
 
 667, 146 Fed. 457 54 
 
 Schipper v. Consumer Cordage 
 
 Co. 72 Fed. 803 796 
 
 Schlemmer v. Buffalo R.- & P. 
 E. Co. 205 U. S. 1, 51 
 L. ed. 681, 27 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 407 748, 753 
 
 Schmeiser Mfg. Co. v. Blanchard, 
 
 192 Fed. 363 518 
 
 Schmidt v. West, 104 Fed. 272 . . 23 
 
 24 
 Schnauflfer v. Aste, 148 Fed. 867 415 
 Schneider v. Eldredge, 125 Fed. 
 
 640 59 
 
 Schollenberger, Ex parte, 96 U. 
 
 S. 369, 24 L. ed. 853.. 78 
 83, 110, 112, 114, 118, 121 
 322, 323 
 Schoolfield v. Rhodes, 27 C. C. A. 
 do, 49 U. S. App. 486, 
 
 82 Fed. 157 ..; 16, 33 
 
 Schultz V. Highland Gold Mines 
 
 Co. 158 Fed. 341.. 55, 123 
 V. Phenix Ins. Co. 77 Fed. 
 
 376 433 
 
 Schunk V. iloline, M. & S. Co. 
 147 U. S. 500, 37 L. ed. 
 255, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 416 169, 172 
 
 Schurmeier v. Connecticut Mut. 
 L. Ins. Co. 60 C. C. A. 
 
 51, 124 Fed. 865 250 
 
 V. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. 
 Co. 69 C. C. A, 22, 137 
 
 Fed. 42 250 
 
 Schutte V. Florida C. R. Co. 3 
 Woods, 692, Fed. Cas. 
 
 Ko. 17,434 522 
 
 Schwartz v. Duss, 43 C. C. A. 
 
 323, 103 Fed. 565 577 
 
 V. Kennedy, 156 Fed. 317 . . 392 
 Schwcnk V. Strang, 8 C. C. A. 
 92, 19 U. S. App. 300, 
 
 59 Fed. 209 845, 846 
 
 Scott V. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 
 512, 36 L. ed. 1063, 13 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148 19 
 
 T. Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. 
 
 112 Fed. 180 812, 823 
 
 Scott V. Donald, 165 U. S. 72, 41 
 L. ed. 632, 17 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 265 188, 189, 226 
 
 232, 238, 654 
 V. Hoover, 99 Fed. 247 ..122 
 
 334 
 V. McNeal, 154 U. S. 45, 38 
 L. ed. 901, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 1108 3, 149 
 
 V. Neely, 140 U. S. 110, 35 
 L. ed. 358, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 712.. 13, 16, 19, 25, 26 
 V. Stockholders Oil Co. 122 
 
 Fed. 835 320 
 
 Scoutt V. Keck, 20 C. C. A. 103, 
 36 U. S. App. 586, 73 
 
 Fed. 900 74, 234, 235 
 
 Scriven v. North, 67 C. C. A. 
 
 348, 134 Fed. 366 .... 582 
 Scruggs V. Memphis & C. R. Co. 
 131 U. S. cciv. 26 L. 
 
 ed. 741 763 
 
 Scruggs & Echols v. American 
 Cent. Ins. Co. 38 L.R.A! 
 (N.S.) 92, 100 C. C. A. 
 
 142, 176 Fed. 224 31 
 
 Scudder v. Coler. See Scudder 
 V. Comptroller. 
 V. Comptroller, 175 U. S. 36, 
 44 L. ed. 63, 20 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 26 74S 
 
 Scully V. Bird, 209 U. S. 481, 
 52 L. ed. 899, 28 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 597 643, 648 
 
 Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. 
 
 North Carolina R. Co. 
 
 123 Fed. 629 . .66, 805, 843 
 
 V. Railroad Commission, 129 
 
 C. C. A. 613, 213 Fed. 
 
 27 472 
 
 Seagrist v. Crabtree, 127 U. S. 
 774, 32 L. ed. 324, 8 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1394 604 
 
 Seaman v. Northwestern Mut. L. 
 Ins. Co. 30 C. C. A. 212, 
 58 U. S. App. 632, 86 
 
 Fed. 494 557, 595 
 
 Searl v. School Dist. No. 2, 124 
 U. S. 199, 31 L. ed. 416, 
 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 460 ... 835 
 Searles v. Jacksonville, P. & M. 
 R. Co. 2 Woods, 621, 
 Fed. Cas. No. 12,586 . . 56 
 Seattle v. Thompson, 52 C. C. A. 
 
 44, 114 Fed. 96 658 
 
 Seattle, L. S. & E. R. Co. v. 
 Union Trust Co. 24 C. 
 C. A. 512, 48 U. S. App. 
 
 255, 79 Fed. 187 313 
 
 334, 592 
 
CXXXVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Seattle R. & S. E. Co. v. Seattle, 
 190 Fed. 75 
 
 Seaver v. Bigelow, 5 Wall. 208, 
 18 J., ed. 595 .... 176, 
 
 Secor V. Singleton, 41 Fed. 725 . . 
 
 371, 
 
 Security Sav. & L. Agso. v. 
 
 Buchanan, 14 C. C. A. 
 
 97, 31 U. S. App. 244, 
 
 66 Fed. 801 .. .23, 26, 
 
 302, 
 
 Security Trust Co. v. Union 
 Trust Co. 134 Fed. 301 
 
 147 
 
 177 
 369 
 377 
 
 296 
 554 
 
 475 
 476 
 
 Seddon v. Virginia, T. & S. Steel 
 & I. Co. 1 L.R.A. 108, 
 36 Fed. 8 64 
 
 Seeberger v. McCormick, 175 U. 
 S. 280, 44 L. ed. 163, 
 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 128 ... 153 
 
 Seeley v. Kansas City Star Co. 
 
 71 Fed. 555 545 
 
 Seitz V. Mitchell, 94 U. S. 582, 
 
 24 L. ed. 180 430 
 
 Seligman v. Santa Rosa, 81 Fed. 
 
 524 468 
 
 Selma & M. R. Co. v. Louisiana 
 Nat. Bank, 94 U. S. 
 253, 24 L. ed. 32 684 
 
 Selz V. Unna, 6 Wall. 334, 18 U 
 
 ed. 801 276 
 
 Seminole Securities Co. v. South- 
 ern L. Ins. Co. 182 Fed. 
 85 228 
 
 Semmes v. United States, 91 U. 
 
 S. 21, 23 L. ed. 193 ... 321 
 
 Serapis, The, 49 Fed. 393 539 
 
 Sessions v. Southern P. Co. 134 
 
 Fed. 313 818, 819 
 
 Sewerage & Water Board v. How- 
 ard, 99 C. C. A. 177, 
 175 Fed. 555 26 
 
 Sewing Mach. Co.'s Case, 18 
 
 Wall. 553, 21 L. ed. 914 39 
 40, 56 
 
 Sexton V. Seelye, 39 Fed. 705 . . 74 
 
 Seybert v. ShamoUin & Mt. C. 
 Electric R. Co. 110 Fed. 
 810 104, 106,, 343 
 
 Seymour v. Freer, 5 Wall. 822, 
 
 18 L. ed. 491 683 
 
 V. White County, 34 C. C. 
 
 A. 240, 92 Fed. 115 . . 613 
 
 Shackleton v. Baggaley, 95 C. C. 
 
 A. 505, 170 Fed. 57 . . 288 
 
 Shaffer v. Union Brick Co. 128 
 
 Fed. 101 817, 819 
 
 Shainwald v. Davids, 69 Fed. 
 
 702 317, 486, 487 
 
 Shainwald v. Lewis, 6 Sawy. 585, 
 
 5 Fed. 517 104, 337 
 
 V. Lewis, 69 Fed. 492 ... 28, 384 
 
 481 
 Shane v. Butte Electric R. Co. 
 
 150 Fed. 801 783, 836 
 
 860, 862 
 Sharkey v. Indiana D. & W. R. 
 Co. 186 U. S. 479, 46 
 L. ed. 1266, 22 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 941 333 
 
 Sharon v. Hill, 10 Sawy. 394, 
 
 22- Fed. 29 517' 
 
 V. Hill, 10 Sawy. 634, 23 
 
 Fed. 353 < . . . . 271 
 
 V. Hill, 11 Sawy. 290, 26 
 
 Fed. 341 125, 272, 419 
 
 V. Hill, 10 Sawy. 666, 26 
 
 Fed. 723 417 
 
 V. Terry, 1 L.R.A. 572, 13 
 
 Sawy. 387, 36 Fed. 337 382 
 384 
 V. Tucker, 144 U. S. 533, 36 
 L. ed. 532, 12 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 720 31 
 
 Sharp V. Reissner, 20 Blatchf. 10, 
 
 9 Fed. 446 411, 419 
 
 Shaver v. Pacific Coast Con- 
 densed Milk Co. 185 
 
 Fed. 316 806 
 
 Shaw V. Bill, 95 U. S. 10, 24 
 
 L. ed. 333 373, 374 
 
 V. Little Rock & Ft. S. R. 
 Co. 100 U. S. 611, 25 
 
 L. ed. 758 252 
 
 V. Quincy Min. Co. 145 U. S. 
 444, 36 L. ed. 768, 12 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 935 51 
 
 53, 54, 57, 77, 78, 83, 93 
 94, 96, 111, 114, 119, 122 
 124, 272 
 Shawnee County v. Hurley, 94 
 C. C. A. 362, 169 Fed. 
 
 94 704 
 
 Shawnee Nat. Bank v. Missouri, 
 K. & T. R. Co. 175 Fed. 
 
 456 833 
 
 Shea v. Nellma, 66 C. C. A. 263, 
 
 133 Fed. 216 629 
 
 Shearing v. Trumbull, 75 Fed. 
 
 33 182 
 
 Sheeler v. Alexander, 211 Fed. 
 
 544 490, 600 
 
 Sheffield & B. Coal Iron & R. Co. 
 V. Gordon, 151 U. S. 
 285, 38 L. ed. 164, 14 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 343 558 
 
 567, 568, 570, 572 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXXVll 
 
 Sheffield & B. Coal, Iron & R. Co. 
 
 V. Newman, 23 C. C. A. 459, 
 
 41 U. S. App. 706, 77 
 
 Fed. 787 201, 204, 369 
 
 371, 397, 407, 426, 590, 597 
 
 Sheffield l^'urnace Co. \ . With- 
 erow, 149 U. S. 574, 37 
 L. ed. 853, 13 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 936 18, 24, 386 
 
 Sheidley v. Aultman, 18 Fed. 666 543 
 
 Shelby Steel Tube Co. v. Dela- 
 ware Seamless Tube Co. 
 161 Fed. 798 629 
 
 Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 449, 12 
 
 L. ed. 1151 212 
 
 V. Wabash R. Co. 105 Fed. 
 
 7S6 801 
 
 Shellabarger v. Oliver, 64 Fed. 
 
 306 491, 507, 545 
 
 Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. 163, 12 
 
 L. ed. 387 334 
 
 V. Van Kleeck, 106 U. S. 
 534, 27 L. ed. 270, 1 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 491 605 
 
 Shepard, Re, 3 Fed. 12 527 
 
 V. Adams, 168 U. S. 618, 42 
 L. ed. 602, 18 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 214 322, 644 
 
 Sherwood v. Xewport News & M. 
 
 Valley Co. 55 Fed. 5 . . 88 
 89 
 
 Shewalter v. Lexington, 143 Fed. 
 
 161 168, 177, 193 
 
 Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130, 
 
 15 L. ed. 158 101 
 
 225, 227, 230, 233, 234, 265 
 288, 289, 355, 359, 427, 443 
 453, 462, 551 
 V. Coleman, 157 U. S. 168, 
 39 L. ed. 660, 15 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 570 477, 479 
 
 643, 650 
 V. McCandlish, 73 Fed. 320 23 
 V. Thomas, 17 How. 3, 15 L. 
 
 ed. 93 175, 194, 195 
 
 Shinney v. North American Sav. 
 Loan & Bldg. Co. 97 
 Fed. 9 483 
 
 Shipman v. Ohio Coal Exch. 17 
 C. C. A. 313, 37 U. S. 
 App. 471, 70 Fed. 654 . . 572 
 675 
 V. Straitsville Central Min. 
 Co. 158 U. S. 356, 39 
 L. ed. 1015, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 886 ....558, 575, 576 
 
 Shipp V. Williams, 10 C. C. A. 
 247, 22 U. S. App. 380, 
 62 Fed. 7 ...54, 58, 67, 68 
 
 Shirk V. La Fayette, 52 Fed. 858 58 
 
 Shoecraft v. Bloxham, 124 U. S. 
 730, 31 L. ed. 574, 8 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 686 .... 212 
 213, 218 
 Short V. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. 
 
 Co. 33 Fed. 114 . . .845, 846 
 V. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. 
 
 Co. 34 Fed. 22.3 . . . 84_4, 846 
 Shoshone iiin. Co. v. Rutter, 177 
 U. S. 505, 44 L. ed. 864, 
 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 726 . . 158 
 Shreveport v. Cole, 129 L'. S. 41, 
 32 L. ed. 591, 9 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 210 139 
 
 Shumaker v. Security Life & An- 
 nuity Co. 86 C. C. A. 
 
 302, 159 Fed. 112 026 
 
 Shute V. Davis, Ret. C. C. 431, 
 
 Fed. Cas. Xo. 12,S2S . . 56 
 V. Keyser, 14!) U. S. 650, 37 
 L. ed. 884, 13 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 900 690 
 
 Shutte V. Thompson, 15 Wall. 
 
 160, 21 L. ed. 126 542 
 
 Sibbald v. United States, 12 Pet. 
 
 488, 9 L. ed. 1167 ..770, 771 
 Sidway v. Missouri Land & Live 
 
 Stock Co. 116 Fed. 382 244 
 430, 798 
 
 Silver v. Holt, 84 Fed. 811 160 
 
 V. Ladd, 6 Wall. 440, 18 L. 
 
 ed. 828, 683 
 
 Silvies River, Re, 199 Fed. 501 815 
 
 Simmons v. Morris, 109 Fed. 707 379 
 
 V. Mutual Reserve Fund Life 
 
 Asso. 114 Fed. 785 . . 798 
 824 
 V. Ogle, 105 U. S. 278, 26 L. 
 
 ed. 1090 10 
 
 V. Saul, 138 U. S. 439, 34 L. 
 ed. 1054, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 369 247, 248 
 
 Simms v. Guthrie, 9 Craneh, 19, 
 
 3 L. ed. 642 584 
 
 Simon v. House, 46 Fed. 319 . . 130 
 
 170, 171, 174, 178, 185, 192 
 
 193, 195, 196, 197, 199, 200 
 
 202, 549, 554 
 
 V. Southern R. Co. 115 C. C. 
 
 A. 58, 195 Fed. 56 325 
 
 Simpson v. First Nat. Bank. 63 
 C. C. A. 371, 129 Fed. 
 
 258 662, 665, 667, 670 
 
 673, 676, 677, 683 
 V. Geary, 204 Fed. 507 .... 176 
 V. Greeley, 20 Wall. 158, 22 
 
 L. ed. 339 697 
 
 V. Phillipsdale Paper Mill 
 Co. 223 Fed. 661 61 
 
CXXXVlll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Sims V. United States Wireless 
 
 Teleg. Co. 179 Fed. 540 412 
 
 Sinclair v. Pierce, 50 Fed. 852, 814 
 
 Single V. Scott Paper Mfg. Co. 
 
 55 Fed. 555 57, 102, 104 
 
 345 
 
 Singleton v. Felton, 42 C. C. A. 
 
 57, 101 Fed. 527 ..575, 577 
 
 Sinsheimer v. Simonson, 47 C. C. 
 
 A. 51, 107 Fed. 905 . . 503 
 
 Sioux City Terminal R. & Ware- 
 house Co. V. Insurance 
 Co. of N. A. 27 C. C. A. 
 73, 49 U. S. App. 523, 
 
 82 Fed. 124 60 
 
 V. Trust Co. of N. A. 27 C. 
 C. A. 73, 49 U. S. App. 
 
 523, 82 Fed. 126 227 
 
 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 230 
 461, 805 
 
 Sipe V. Columbia Ref. Co. 171 
 
 Fed. 295 299 
 
 Sipes V. Seymour, 22 C. C. A. 
 90, 40 U. S. App. 185, 
 76 Fed. 118 675 
 
 Sipperley v. Smith, 155 U. S. 86, 
 39 L. ed. 79, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 15 697 
 
 Skinner v. Barr, 77 Fed. 816 . . 210 
 
 220 
 V. Garnett Gold Min. Co. 96 
 
 Fed. 735 147 
 
 Slater Trust Co. v. Randolph- 
 Macon Coal Co. 166 Fed. 
 178 232 
 
 Slaughter \. Mallet Land & Cat- 
 tle Co. 72 C. C. A. 430, 
 141 Fed. 282 ..62, 408, 553 
 
 Slaughter-house Cases, 10 Wall. 
 
 293, 19 L. ed. 921 667 
 
 669, 765 
 
 Slaughter-house Cases, 16 Wall. 
 
 36, 21 L. ed. 394 147 
 
 Sliecher v. Pullman Co. 170 Fed. 
 
 365 841 
 
 Slide & S. Gold Mines v. Sey- 
 mour, 153 U. S. 509, 38 
 L. ed. 802, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 842 161 
 
 Sloan V. United States, 193 U. S. 
 614, 48 L. ed. 814, 24 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 570 641 
 
 Sloss Iron & Steel Co. v. South 
 Carolina & G. R. Co. 162 
 Fed. 542 33 
 
 Smale v. Mitchell, 143 U. S. 99, 
 
 36 L. ed. 90, 12 Sup. Ct. | 
 Rep. 353 770 
 
 Small V. Northern P. E. Co. 134 
 U. S. 515, 33 L. ed. 
 1007, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 614 707 
 
 V. Peters, 104 Fed. 401 ... 455 
 
 456 
 Smedley v. Smedley, 110 Fed. 257 70 
 
 82 
 Smellie v. Southern P. R. Co. 197 
 
 Fed. 642 93, 776, 834 
 
 Smith V. Adams, 130 U. S. 167, 
 
 32 L. ed. 895, 9 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 566 169, 193, 195 
 
 V. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 
 
 31 L. ed. 508, 1 Inters. 
 
 Com. Rep. 804, 8 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 564 20 
 
 V. American Nat. Bank, 32 
 
 C. C. A. 368, 60 U. S. 
 
 App. 431, 89 Fed. 838 . . 12 
 22, 27 
 V. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. 
 
 Co. 64 Fed. 1 54, 123 
 
 V. Babcock, 3 Sumn. 583, 
 
 -Fed. Cas. No. 13,008 .. 359 
 
 V. Bivens, 56 Fed. 352 30 
 
 164, 189 
 V. Chase & B. Piano Mfg. 
 
 Co. 197 Fed. 467 242 
 
 V. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 
 
 38 Fed. 322 496 
 
 V. Clark, 12 How. 22, 13 L. 
 
 ed. 876 717 
 
 V. Consumers' Cotton Oil Co. 
 
 30 C. C. A. 103, 52 U. 
 
 S. App. 603, 86 Fed. 
 
 .359 69, 245 
 
 V. Crosby Lumber Co. 46 
 
 Fed. 819 847 
 
 V. Fifleld, 33 C. C. A. 681, 
 
 63 U. S. App. 531, 91 
 
 Fed. 561 209, 213, 220 
 
 V. Ft. Scott, H. & W. R. Co. 
 
 99 ,U. S. 401, 25 L. ed. 
 
 438 6 
 
 V. Gale, 144 U. S. 519, 36 L. 
 
 ed. 525, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 674 462 
 
 V. Greenhow, 109 U. S. 671, 
 
 27 L. ed. 1081, 3 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 421 174, 195 
 
 V. International Mercantile 
 
 Co. 154 Fed. 786 492 
 
 V. Jennings, 206 U. S. 276, 
 
 51 L. ed. 1061, 27 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 610 754 
 
 V. Jones Lumber & Mercan- 
 tile Co. 200 Fed. 647 . . 181 
 184 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXXIX 
 
 Smith V. Lee, 77 Fed. 779 . . .225, 234 
 
 235 239 
 V. Lyon, 133 U. S. 315, 33* 
 L. ed. 635, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 303 ... .52, 53, 55, 57 
 98, 122 
 
 V. Lyon, 38 Fed. 54 56 
 
 V. McKay, 161 U. S. 355, 40 
 L. ed. 731, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 490 640, 045, 649 
 
 V. Hosier, 169 Fed. 431 ... 410 
 V. New York, N. H. & H. 
 
 R. Co. 96 Fed. 505 ... . 81 
 83, 84 
 V. Northern P. R. Co. 110 
 
 Fed. 342 508 
 
 V. Ontario, 18 Blatchf. 454, 
 
 4 Fed. 386 587 
 
 V. Pendergast, 82 Fed. 506 6S9 
 V. Portland, 30 Fed. 737 ... 253 
 V. Rackliffe, 87 Fed. 968 . . 58 
 
 V. Reed, 210 Fed. 968 93 
 
 V. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 44 
 L. ed. 1140, 20 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 919 • 63 
 
 V. Swormstedt, 16 How. 302, 
 
 14 L. ed. 948 238 
 
 V. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 
 U. S. 518, 41 L. ed. 810, 
 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 407 . . 631 
 V. Western U. Teleg. Co. 79 
 
 Fed. 132 824, 826 
 
 V. Whitney, 116 U. S. 167, 
 29 L. ed. 601, 6 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 570 195 
 
 V. Woolfolk, 115 U. S. 143, 
 29 L. ed. 357, 5 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 1177 .. .486, 487, 597 
 Sr..ithers v. Smith, 204 U. S. 
 642, 51 L. ed. 660, 27 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 297 ..185, 196 
 Smithson v. Hubbell, 81 Fed. 593 176 
 
 183, 187 
 Smyth V. Ames, 169 U. S. 516, 
 42 L. ed. 838, 18 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 418 15, 16, 24 
 
 Smythe v. Henry, 41 Fed. 715 . . 864 
 Snohomish County v. Puget 
 Sound Nat. Bank, 81 
 
 Fed. 518 783 
 
 Snow V. Smith, 88 Fed. 657 ... . 67 
 V. Texas Trunk R. Co. 16 
 
 Fed. 1 855 
 
 Snyder v. De Forest Wireless 
 
 Teleg. Co. 154 Fed. 142 402 
 V. McCarthy, 116 C. C. A. 
 
 390, 197 Fed. 166 639 
 
 Societe Fonciere v. Milliken, 135 
 U. S. 304, 34 L. ed. 208, 
 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 823 . . 89 
 324 
 
 Society of Shakers v. Watson, 
 
 15 C. C. A. 632, 37 U. 
 
 S. App. 141, 68 Fed. 730 61 
 
 236, 238, 468 
 
 T. Watson, 23 C. C. A. 203, 
 
 47 U. S. App. 170, 77 
 
 Fed. 512 607, 613 
 
 Soderberg v. Armstrong, 116 Fed. 
 
 710 418, 420 
 
 Sonnentheil v. Christian iloerlin 
 
 Brewing Co. 172 CJ. S. 
 
 404, 43 L. ed. 494, 19 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 233 . . 140 142 
 
 621 
 
 Souer V. De Bary, 44 C. C. A. 
 
 484, 105 "Fed. 293 771 
 
 South & North Ala. R. Co., Ex 
 parte, 95 U. S. 221, 24 
 
 L. ed. 355 463 
 
 V. Railroad Commission, 171 
 
 Fed. 225 348 
 
 Southard v. Russell, 16 How. 547, 
 
 14 L. ed. 1052 613 
 
 South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. 
 
 S. 4, 23 L. ed. 782 ... . 39 
 V. Virginia-Carolina Chemi- 
 cal Co. 117 Fed. 728 . . 822 
 828 
 South Dakota v. North Carolina, 
 192 U. S. 286, 48 L. ed. 
 448, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 269 39, 40, 214 
 
 South Dakota C. R. Co. v. Chi- 
 cago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 
 73 C. C. A. 176, 141 Fed. 
 
 578 73, 794, 824, 835 
 
 Southern Bank & T. Co. v. Fol- 
 som, 21 C. C. A. 568, 43 
 U. S. App. 713, 75 Fed. 
 
 931 479 
 
 Southern Bell Teleph. & Teleg. 
 Co. V. Richmond, 44 C. 
 C. A. 147, 103 Fed. 31 147 
 Southern Bldg. & L. Asso. v. 
 
 Carey, 1 17 Fed. 325 . . 667 
 676, 710, 713, 714, 767, 768 
 Southern California v. Ruther- 
 ford, 62 Fed. 797 11 
 
 Southern Cash Register Co. v. 
 Montgomery, 143 Fed. 
 
 700 824 
 
 V. National Cash Register 
 
 Co. 143 Fed. 659 824 
 
 Southern Electric R. Co. v. Hage- 
 man, 57 C. C. A. 348, 
 
 121 Fed. 262 129 
 
 Southern Exp. Co. v. Todd, 5 
 C. C. A. 432, 12 U. S. 
 App. 351, 56 Fed. 104 . . 122 
 Southern Land & Timber Co. v. 
 
 Johnson, 156 Fed. 240 195 
 
cxl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Southern Minnesota R. Exten- 
 sion Co. V. St. Paul & 
 
 S. C. E. Co. 5 C. C. A. 
 
 249, 12 U. S. App. 320, 
 
 55 Fed. 690 587 
 
 Southern P. Co. v. Bartine, 170 
 
 Fed. 765 187 
 
 V. Buroh, 82 C. C. A. 34, 
 
 152 Fed. 168 829 
 
 V. Denton, 146 U. S. 202, 
 
 36 L. ed. 942, 13 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 44 ....53, 110, 111 
 
 112, 113, 114, 119, 121, 122 
 
 126, 273, 323, 330, 331, 333 
 V. Earl, 27 C. C. A. 185, 48 
 
 U. S. App. 716, 82 Fed. 
 
 690 630 
 
 Southern P. R. Co. v. California, 
 
 118 U. S. 112, 30 L. ed. 
 
 104, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 993 166 
 V. Goodrich, 57 Fed. 880 ... 260 
 
 V. Stanley, 49 Fed. 264 260 
 
 V. Temple, 59 Fed. 17 . .390, 391 
 V. United States, 368 U. S. 
 
 55, 42 L. ed. 379, 18 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18 ..356, 701 
 V. United States, 66 C. C. A. 
 
 581, 133 Fed. 651 . . 32, 34 
 V. Whittaker, 47 Fed. 529 . . 159 
 Southern Pine Co. v. Hall, 44 
 
 C. C. A. 363, 105 Fed. 
 
 84 18 
 
 Southern R. Co. v. Allison, 190 
 
 U. S. 335, 47 L. ed. 
 
 1082, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 713 79, 80, 83 
 
 V. Carolina Coal & Ice Co. 
 
 81 C. C. A. 15, 151 Fed. 
 
 477 626, 627 
 
 V. McNeill, 155 Fed. 757 . . 150 
 V. North Carolina Corp. 
 
 Commission, 97 Fed. 513 148 
 V. North Carolina Corp. 
 
 Commission, 105^ Fed. 
 
 270 : 439 
 
 V. Postal Telep. Cable Co. 
 
 179 U. S. 643, 45 L. ed. 
 
 356, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 249 582, 636, 734 
 
 V. Rhodes, 30 C. C. A. 157, 
 
 58 U. S. App. 349, 86 
 
 Fed. 424, 4 Am. Neg. 
 
 Rep. 733 404 
 
 V. Simon, 153 Fed. 234 477 
 
 V. Thomason, 77 C. C. A. 
 
 170, 146 Fed. 974 844 
 
 Southern Realty Invest. Co. v. 
 
 Walker, 211 U. S. 603, 
 
 53 L. ed. 346, 29 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 211 51 
 
 South Penn Oil Co. v. Calf Creek 
 Oil & Gas Co. 140 Fed. 
 508 
 
 South Spring Hill Gold Min. Co. 
 V. Amador Medean Gold 
 Min. Co. 145 U. S. 301, 
 36 L. ed. 712, 12 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 921 
 
 Southwestern Surety Ins. Co. v. 
 Wells, 217 Fed. 295 ... 
 
 484 
 
 721 
 
 32 
 
 475 
 
 Southwestern Teleg. & Teleph. 
 
 Co. V. Robinson, 1 C. C. 
 
 A. 91, 2 U. S. App. 148, 
 
 48 Fed. 769 273 
 
 Southworth v. Reid, 36 Fed. 451 847 
 Sovereign Camp, W. W. v. Jack- 
 son, 38 C. C. A. 208, 
 
 97 Fed. 382 728 
 
 Sowles v. Witters, 43 Fed. 700 . . 139 
 Spaeth v. Sells, 176 Fed. 797 . . 379 
 
 381 
 Spangler v. Atchison, T. & S. F. 
 
 R. Co. 42 Fed. 305 796 
 
 Sparks v. National Masonic Acci. 
 
 Asso. 73 Fed. 285 117 
 
 Sparrow v. Strong, 3 Wall. 103, 
 
 18 L. ed. 49, 2 Mor. Min. 
 
 Rep. 320 715 
 
 Spears v. Flynn, 102 Fed. 7 95 
 
 Speokart v. German Nat. Bank, 
 
 85 Fed. 12 145, 855 
 
 Speckhert v. German Nat. Bank, 
 
 38 C. C. A. 682, 98 Fed. 
 
 151 87, 145, 258, 854 
 
 Spencer v. Duplan Silk Co. 191 
 
 U. S. 527, 48 L. ed. 287, 
 
 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 174 . . 740 
 742 
 V. Kansas City Stock- Yards 
 
 Co. 56 Fed. 741 ... 104, 343 
 345 
 v. Watkins, 94 C. C. A. 659, 
 
 169 Fed. 379 17, 249 
 
 410 
 Spies V. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. 
 
 30 Fed. 397 253, 254 
 
 Spofford, Re, 62 Fed. 443 525 
 
 Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. ilc- 
 
 Clain, 192 U. S. 397, 48 
 
 L. ed. 496, 24 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 376 641, 652, 653 
 
 657, 659 
 Spreen v. Delsignore, 94 Fed. 71 338 
 Springer v. American Tobacco 
 
 Co. 208 Fed. 200 776 
 
 V. Howes, 69 Fed. 849 783 
 
 785 
 
TABLE OF CASES, 
 
 cxli 
 
 Springfield Mill Co. v. Barnard 
 & L. Mfg. Co. 26 C. C. 
 A. 389, 49 U. S. App. 
 438, 81 Fed. 261 .. ..23, 443 
 444, 448-450 
 Spring Garden Ins. Co. v. Amuse- 
 ment Syndicate Co. 102 
 C. C. A. 29, 178 Fed. 
 
 531 577 
 
 Sprung y. Morton, 182 Fed. 330 87 
 Squair v. Lookout Mountain Co. 
 
 42 Fed. 732 241 
 
 Stabler v. Alexandria, 42 Fed. 
 
 490 323 
 
 Stadlemann v. White Line Tow- 
 ing Co. 92 Fed. 209 . . 806 
 825, 836 
 Stafford v. King, 32 C. C. A. 
 536, 61 U. S. App. 487, 
 
 90 Fed. 140 627, 687 
 
 Stalker v. Pullman's Palace-Car 
 
 Co. 81 Fed. 898 89 
 
 Stanbrough v. Cook, 3 L.E.A. 
 
 400, 38 Fed. 369 70-72 
 
 Standard Distilling & Distribut- 
 ing Co. V. Woolsey, 121 
 
 Fed. 1016 416, 426 
 
 Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 
 217 U. S. 413, 54 L. ed. 
 817, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 543 754 
 
 Standlev v. Roberts, 8 C. C. A. 
 " 30.). 19 U. S. App. 407, 
 
 59 Fed. 839 331, 489 
 
 582, 637 
 Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 
 281, 40 L. ed. 969, 16 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 754 771 
 
 Stanton v. Alabama & C. R. Co. 
 
 31 Fed. 585 574 
 
 Stanwood v. Wishard, 134 Fed. 
 
 959 180 
 
 Star Ball Retainer Co. v. Klahn, 
 
 14.J Fed. 834 399 
 
 Star ' Brass Works v. General 
 Electric Co. 63 C. C. A. 
 
 604, 129 Fed. 102 626 
 
 Starin v. New York, 115 U. S. 
 248, 29 L. ed. 388, 6 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 28 ..138, 
 
 139, 147 
 Starr v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. 
 
 Co. 110 Fed. 6 44, 477 
 
 State Bank v. Cox, 74 C. C. A. 
 
 285, 143 Fed. 92 170 
 
 State Nat. Bank v. Eureka 
 Springs Water Co. 174 
 Fed. 828 209 
 
 State Trust Co. v. Kansas City, 
 P. & G. R. Co. 110 Fed. 
 
 10 812, 816 
 
 V. Kansas City, P. & 6. R. 
 
 Co. 128 Fed. 129 295 
 
 Steam Stone Cutter Co. v. Jones, 
 21 Blatehf. 138, 13 Fed. 
 
 577 303, 304 
 
 Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co. v. Brown, 
 52 C. C. A. 559, 114 
 
 Fed. 939 474 
 
 Stebbins v. Duncan, 108 U. S. 
 46, 27 L. ed. 646, 2 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 313 543 
 
 Steel V. Lord, 35 C. C. A. 555, 
 
 93 Fed. 729 575 
 
 V. Rathbun, 42 Fed. 390 . . 211 
 Steele v. Crider, 61 Fed. 484 ... 681 
 V. Culver, 211 U. S. 26, 53 
 L. ed. 74, 29 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 9 6,5 
 
 Stegner v. Blake, 36 Fed. 184, 
 144 U. S. 690, 36 L. ed. 
 
 1143 500, 502, 503, 50.5 
 
 539, 541, 542, 544 
 
 Steiger v. Bonn, 4 Fed. 17 318 
 
 Steigleder v. McQuesten, 198 U. 
 S. 141, 49 L. ed. 986, 25 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 616 . . 125, 120 
 548 
 Stein V. Bowman, 13 Pet. 209, 10 
 
 L. ed. 129 494, 535 
 
 Stemmler v. McNeill, 102 Fed. 
 
 660 194 
 
 Stephen Morgan, The, 94 U. S. 
 
 599, 24 L. ed. 266 701 
 
 V. Good. See Stephen Mor- 
 gan, The. 
 Stephens v. McCargo, 9 Wheat. 
 
 502, 6 L. ed. 145 . .288, 299 
 V. Smartt, 172 Fed. 466 . . 65 
 
 415 
 Stevens v. Clark, 10 C. C. A. 
 379, 18 U. S. App. 584, 
 
 62 Fed. 321 662, 707 
 
 V. Germania L. Ins. Co. 26 
 Tex. Civ. App. 153, 62 
 
 S. W. 826 489 
 
 V. Gladding, 17 How. 455, 15 
 
 L. ed. 158 283 
 
 V. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 
 
 104 Fed. 936 498 
 
 V. Nave-Mr Cord Mercantile 
 Co. 80 C. C. A. 25, 150 
 
 Fed. 71 634 
 
 V. Nichols, 130 U. S. 231, 
 32 L. ed. 915, 9 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 518 837 
 
 V. Smith, 61 C. C. A. 624, 
 
 126 Fed. 711 224 
 
cxlii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Stevens v. The Railroads, 4 Fed. 
 
 97 350, 351 
 
 Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U. S. 168, 
 49 L. ed. 143, 25 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 6 3S 
 
 V. Illinois C. R. Co. 192 Fed. 
 
 956 75 
 
 Stewart v. Allen, 47 Fed. 400 . . 431 
 , . Aalitabula, 98 Fed. 518 . . 554 
 V. Chesapeake & 0. Canal 
 Co. 4 Hughes, 41, 1 
 
 Fed. 361 255 
 
 V. Cybur Lumber Co. 211 
 
 Fed. 343 813, 834 
 
 V. Dunham, 115 U. S. 61, 29 
 L. ed. 329, 5 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 1163 60, 179 
 
 V. Fasten, 156 U. S. 46, 39 
 L. ed. 341, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 268 272 
 
 V. Masterson, 131 U. S. 151, 
 33 L. ed. 114, 9 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 682 399, 403, 637 
 
 V. Tovi-nsend, 41 Fed. 121 . . 503 
 505, 506, 533, 534, 541 
 V. Wisconsin C. R. Co. 117 
 
 Fed. 782 477, 478 
 
 v.. Wright, 77 C. C. A. 499, 
 
 147 Fed. 346 10 
 
 Stillwagon v. Baltimore & 0. R. 
 Co. 86 C. C. A. 287, 159 
 
 Fed. 97 670 
 
 Stillwell-Bierce & S. V. Co. v. 
 Williamston Oil & Fer- 
 tilizer Co. 80 Fed. 68.. 172 
 179 
 Stinison v. United Wrapping 
 Mach. Co. 156 Fed. 298 
 
 Stinson v. Dousman, 20 How. 
 
 466, 15 L. ed. 969 
 
 Stockton V. Oregon Short Line 
 
 R. Co. 170 Fed. 633 . . 
 
 209 
 211 
 
 192 
 
 864 
 867 
 Stockwell V. Boston & M. Co. 131 
 
 Fed. 153 360. 
 
 Stokes V. Farnsworth, 99 Fed. 
 
 836 423, 424, 432 
 
 436, 437 
 StoU V. Loving, 120 Fed. 806 . . 773 
 Stone V. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 
 
 195 Fed. 835 832 
 
 V. Dugan Piano Co. 136 C. 
 
 C. A. 583, 220 Fed. 841 401 
 
 402 
 
 V. South Carolina, 117 U. S. 
 
 430, 29 L. ed. 962, 6 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 799 ..63, 782 
 
 783, 791, 792 
 
 Stone V. Southern Illinois & M. 
 
 Bridge Co. 206 U. S. 
 
 267, 51 L. ed. 1057, 27 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 015 754 
 
 Stonega Coal & Coke Co. v. 
 
 Louisville & JL R. Co. 
 
 139 Fed. 271 53, 54 
 
 114, 122, 123 
 Stonemetz Printers' Mach. Co. v. 
 
 Brown Folding Mach. 
 
 Co. 46 Fed. 852 ... 443, 450 
 Storm Lake Tub & Tank Co. v. 
 
 Minneapolis & St. L. R. 
 
 Co. 209 Fed. 895 ..776, 804 
 Story V. Livingston, 13 Pet. 366, 
 
 10 L. ed. 203 261, 568 
 
 569 
 Stout V. Rigney, 46 C. C. A. 459, 
 
 107 Fed. 545 58, 59 
 
 Stovail V. Banks, 10 Wall. 586, 
 
 19 L. ed. 1037 635 
 
 Stowe V. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co. 
 
 117 Fed. 368 840, 841 
 
 Strain v. Chicago Portrait Co. 
 
 ! 126 Fed. 832 325 
 
 I Strang v. Richmond, P. & C. R. 
 
 Co. 93 Fed. 72 13, 26 
 
 V. Richmond, P. & C. R. Co. 
 
 41 C. C. A. 474, 101 
 Fed. 511 .... 18, 26, 28, 428 
 
 Stratton v. Dewey, 24 C. C. A. 
 435, 41 U. S. App. 741, 
 
 79 Fed. 32 637 
 
 v. Essex County Park Com- 
 mission, 145 Fed. 436 . . 352 
 
 Strauser v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. 
 
 Co. 193 Fed. 293 776 
 
 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch, 
 
 267, 2 L. ed. 435 ... . 76 
 
 Strong V. Edson, 117 C. C. A. 
 
 455, 198 Fed. 813 242 
 
 Strother v. Union P. R. Co. 220 
 
 Fed. 732 777 
 
 Strout V. United Shoe Machin- 
 ery Co. 195 Fed. 314 .. 258 
 
 Stuart V. Easton, 156 U. S. 46, 
 39 L. ed. 341, 15 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 268 91, 126 
 
 V. Gay, 127 U. S. 518, 32 L. 
 ed. 191, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 1279 596, 597, 700 
 
 V. Hayden, 18 C. C. A. 618, 
 36 U. S. App. 462, 72 
 Fed. 402, 169 U. S. 1, 
 
 42 L. ed. 639, 18 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 274 446, 451 
 
 V. St. Paul, 63 Fed. 644 .. 391 
 392, 615 
 
TABLJK 01'' CASES. 
 
 cxliii 
 
 Sturgeon River Boom Co. v. W. 
 11. Sawyer Lumber Co. 
 
 89 Fed. 113 197, 
 
 824, 
 Stutsman County, Re, 88 Fed. 
 
 337 43, 52, 271, 
 
 827, 
 
 Sullivan v. Ayer, 174 Fed. 199 
 
 V. Barnard, 81 Fed. 886 . . 
 
 v. Portland & K. R. Co. 94 
 U. S. 806, 24 L. ed. 324 
 
 V. Texas, 207 U. S. 416, 52 
 
 L. ed. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 215 747, 
 
 V. Thurmond, — Tex. Civ. 
 
 App. — , 45 S. W. 394 
 Sunderland Bros. v. Chicago R. 
 
 I. & P. R. Co. 158 Fed. 
 
 805 
 
 825 
 
 334 
 835 
 210 
 182 
 483 
 
 22 
 34 
 
 Sun iliit. Ins. Co. v. Seeligson, 
 59 Tex. 4 
 
 Sun Printing & Pub. Asso. v. 
 Edwards, 194 V. S. 377, 
 48 L. ed. 1027, 24 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 696 . .270, 272, 
 V. Edwards, 58 C. C. A. 162, 
 121 Fed. 827 
 
 Sunset Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. 
 Eureka, 122 Fed. 960 . . 
 
 Superior v. Ripley, 138 U. S. 96, 
 34 L. ed. 916, 11 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 288 
 
 Supreme Council C. K. A. v. Fi- 
 delity & C. Co. 11 C. C. 
 A. 96, 22 U. S. App. 
 430, 63 Fed. 49 . . .672, 
 
 Supreme Lodge, K. P. v. Wilson, 
 14 C. C. A. 264, 30 U. 
 S. App. 234, 66 Fed. 785, 
 
 Susquehanna & W. Valley R. & 
 Coal Co. V. Blatchford, 
 11 Wall. 172, 20 L. ed. 
 
 179 54, 56-58, 
 
 98, 
 
 SwafTord v. Templeton, 185 U. 
 S. 487, 46 L. ed. 1005, 
 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 783 . . 
 
 V. Templeton, 108 Fed. 310 
 Swan V. Hill, 155 U. S. 394, 39 
 
 L. ed. 197, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 178 
 
 Swan Land & Cattle Co. v. 
 
 Frank, 148 U. S. 611, 
 
 37 L. ed. 580, 13 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 691 233, 
 
 752 
 253 
 
 46 
 324 
 
 274 
 656 
 443 
 
 220 
 
 675 
 
 856 
 
 68 
 121 
 
 147 
 1,58 
 147 
 
 681 
 
 23.1 
 554 
 
 Swann v. Fabyan. See Swann 
 V. Wright. 
 V. Mutual Reserve Fund Life 
 
 Asso. 100 Fed. 922 
 
 117, 328, 
 V. Mutual Reserve Fund Life 
 
 Asso. 116 Fed. 232 
 
 825, 860, 
 
 V. Wright, 110 U. S. 601, 
 
 28 L. ed. 256, 4 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 235 
 
 Swarts V. Christie Grain & Stock 
 
 Co. 166 Fed. 339 
 
 Sweeney v. Carter Oil Co. 199 
 U. S. 257, 50 L. ed. 180, 
 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 55 . . 
 
 Swift V. Kortrecht, 49 C. C. A. 
 68, 110 Fed. 328 ..681, 
 
 116 
 329 
 
 798 
 862 
 
 700 
 
 54 
 55 
 
 684 
 692 
 
 V. Meyers, 37 Fed. 42 316 
 
 V. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 
 
 58 Fed. 858 850 
 
 Swift & Co. y. Philadelphia & 
 R. R. Co. 4 Inters. Com. 
 Rep. 633, 58 Fed. 858 . . 20 
 46, 801 
 Swing V. Western Lvimber Co. 
 205 U. S. 275, 51 L. ed. 
 799, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 497 750 
 
 Swofford V. Cornucopia Mines, 
 
 140 Fed. 958 178 
 
 Swope V. Missouri Trust Co. 26 
 Tex. Civ. App. 133, 62 
 
 S. W. 950 284 
 
 Sydney v. Mugford Printing & 
 Engraving Co. 214 Fed. 
 
 843 32, 446 
 
 Svmmes v. Union Trust Co. 60 
 
 Fed. 853 483 
 
 Symonds v. Greene, 28 Fed. 834 101 
 
 T. 
 
 Tacoma v. Wright, 84 Fed. 836 847 
 
 Taenzer & Co. v. Chicago, R. I. 
 & P. R. Co. 112 C. C. A. 
 153, 191 Fed. 543 . , , , 769 
 
 Taintor v. Franklin Nat. Bank, 
 
 107 Fed. 825 575 
 
 Talbot V. First Nat. Bank, 185 
 U. S. 172, 46 L. ed. 857, 
 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 612 . . 753 
 
 Talkington v. Dumbleton, 123 U. 
 S. 745, 31 L. ed. 313, 8 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 335 205 
 
 Talley v. Curtain, 7 C. C. A. 1, 
 8 U. S. App. 424, 58 
 Fed. 4 582, 634 
 
cxliv 
 
 TABLE OB" CASES. 
 
 Tallman y. Baltimore & 0. E. 
 
 Co. 45 Fed. 156 ..321, 326 
 327, 841 
 Tambrino v. Galveston, H. & S. 
 
 A. R. Co. 38 Fed. 453 125 
 Tampa Suburban R. Co. Re, 168 
 U. S. 587, 42 L. ed. 590, 
 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 177 .. 626 
 631, 719 
 Tarver v. Tarver, 9 Pet. 174, 9 
 
 L. ed. 91 248 
 
 Taylor v. Adams Exp. Co. 90 C. 
 
 C. A. 526, 164 Fed. 616 678 
 V. Breese, 90 C. C. A. 558, 
 
 163 Fed. 679 622, 623 
 
 V. Carryl, 20 How. 597, 15 
 
 L. ed. 1032 476 
 
 V. Charter Oak L. Ins. Co. 3 
 McCrary, 484, 17 Fed. 
 
 566 609 
 
 V. Clark, 89 Fed. 7 260 
 
 V. Decatur Minerjil & Land 
 
 Co. 112 Fed. 449 , . 176, 194 
 241, 244 
 V. Easton, 103 C. C. A. 509, 
 
 180 Fed. 364 ..586, 606-610 
 
 V. Holmes, 14 Fed. 498 101 
 
 240, 276, 400, 427, 551 
 V. Illinois C. R. Co. 89 Fed. 
 
 119 78-80, 83, 84 
 
 V. Kercheval, 82 Fed. 497.. 44 
 V. Longworth, 14 Pet. 172, 
 
 10 L. ed. 405 10 
 
 V. Midland Valley R. Co. 197 
 
 Fed. 323 168 
 
 V. Robertson, 27 Fed. 537 . . 560 
 
 578 
 Tefft V. Stern, 21 C. C. A. 73, 43 
 U. S. App. 442, 74 Fed. 
 
 755 666 
 
 Teller v. United States, 49 C. C. 
 
 A. 263, 111 Fed. 120.. 708 
 709, 711 
 Tennent Stribling Shoe Co. v. 
 Roper, 36 C. C. A. 455, 
 94 Fed. 742.. 169, 172, 173 
 175, 200 
 Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 
 
 257, 25 L. ed. 648 . . 138, 139 
 V. Quintard, 26 C. C. A. 165, 
 47 U. S. App.' 621, 80 
 
 Fed. 835 596 
 
 V. Union & Planters Bank, 
 152 U. S. 454, 38 L. ed. 
 511, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 654.. 137, 138, 142, 143, 151 
 152, 159, 164, 280, 829, 859 
 Tenney v. American Pipe Mfg. 
 
 Co. 96 Fed. 919 793 
 
 Tennis Bros. Co. v. Wetzel & T. 
 
 R. Co. 140 Fed. 196.. .. 116 
 Terre Haute v. Evansville & T. 
 
 H. R. Co. 106 Fed. 549 844 
 Terrell v. Allison, 21 Wall. 291, 
 
 22 L. ed. 635 590 
 
 Terry v. Bank of Cape Fear, 20 
 
 Fed. 775 251, 562 
 
 V. Commercial Bank, 92 U. 
 
 S. 454, 23 L. ed. 620.. 607 
 V. Davy, 46 C. C. A. 141, 
 
 107 Fed. 50.. 199, 200, 204 
 661, 754 
 V. Sharon, 131 U. S. 40, 33 
 L. ed. 94, 9 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 705 380, 382, 384 
 
 Terry Steam Turbine Co. v. B. 
 F. Sturtevant Co. 204 
 
 Fed. 103 445 
 
 Tevis v. Palatine Ins. Co. 149 
 
 Fed. 561 795, 796 
 
 Texas v. Hardenburg, 10 Wall. 
 
 68, 19 L. ed. 839 283 
 
 V. Lewis, 12 Fed. 1 89, 808 
 
 V. Lewis, 14 Fed. 65. .40, 89, 808 
 V. White. See Texas v. 
 
 Hardenburg. 
 v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 19 L. 
 
 ed. 227 .... 39 
 
 Texas & M. R. Co. v. Wright, 
 — Tex. Civ. App. — , 29 
 
 S. W. 1134 324 
 
 Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. 
 Rucker, 38 Tex. Civ. 
 App. 591, 88 S. W. 816 179 
 Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene 
 Cotton Oil Co. 204 U. S. 
 426, 51 L. ed. 553, 27 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350, 9 A. 
 & E. Ann. Cas. 1075 . . 753 
 V. Anderson, 149 U. S. 237, 
 37 L. ed.. 717, 13 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 843 772, 773 
 
 v. Bloom, 9 C. C. A. 300, 
 
 23 U. S. App. 143, 60 
 Fed. 979 655 
 
 V. Cody, 166 U. S. 609, 41 L. 
 
 ed. 1134, 17 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 703, 1 Am. Neg. 
 
 Rep. 763 144 
 
 V. Cox, 145 U. S. 602, 36 L. 
 
 ed. 832, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 905 122, 141 
 
 V. Davis, 93 Tex. 378, 55 S. 
 
 W. 562 781 
 
 V. Eastin, 214 U. S. 153, 53 
 
 L. ed. 946, 29 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 564 785 
 
 V. Eastin, — Tex. Civ. App. 
 
 — , 89 S. W. 441 783 
 
TABLE OF OASES. 
 
 cxlv 
 
 Texas & P. E. Co. v. Hubor, — 
 Tex. Civ. App. — , 95 S. 
 
 W. 569 790 
 
 V. Humble, 38 C. C. A. 502, 
 
 97 Fed. 837 240 
 
 V Johnson, 151 U. S. 81, 38 
 L. ed. 81, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 
 ' Eep. 250 737 
 
 V. Kutemau, 4 C. (. . A. 503, 
 13 V. S. App. 99, 54 
 
 Fed. 547 30, 187 
 
 V. Murphy, 111 U. S. 489, 
 28 L. ed. 493, 4 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 497 602, G63, 765 
 
 T. Eeagan, oo C. C. A. 427, 
 
 118 Fed. 815 499, 545 
 
 V. Rogers, 6 C. C. A. 403, 13 
 U. S. App. 547, 57 Fed. 
 
 378 273 
 
 V. Watson, 50 C. C. A. 230, 
 
 112 Fed. 402 499, 790 
 
 V. Wilder, 35 C. C. A. 105, 
 
 92 Fed. 957. .499, 507, 508 
 544-546, 790 
 V. Wilder. 41 C. 0. A. 305, 
 
 101 Fed. 198 771 
 
 Texas & St. L. E. Co. v. Bust, 
 5 McCrary, 348, 17 Fed. 
 
 275 786 
 
 Texas Consol. Compress & Mfg. 
 Asso. V. Storrow, 34 C. 
 C. A. 182, 92 Fed. 10. . 631 
 Texas Cotton Products Co. v. 
 
 Starnes, 128 Fed. 183.. 817 
 841 
 Texas Traction Co. v. Barron G. 
 Collier, 115 C. C. A. 82, 
 
 195 Fed. 65 630 
 
 Texas Transp. Co. v. Seeligson, 
 122 U. S. 519, 30 L. ed. 
 1150, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 
 1261 817 
 
 Thacker Coal & Coke Co. v. Nor- 
 folk & W. E. Co. 171 
 
 Fed. 271 801 
 
 Thayer v. Life Association of 
 America, 112 U. S. 717, 
 28 L. ed. 864, 5 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 355 234, 253 
 
 Thiel Detective Service Co. v. Mc- 
 
 Clure, 130 Fed. 55 .... 247 
 Third Nat. Bank v. Atlantic 
 City, 65 C. C. A. 177, 
 
 130 Fed. 753 385 
 
 T. Gordon, 53 Fed. 473 .... 689 
 
 771 
 V. Gordon, 6 C. C. A. 125, 13 
 U. S. App. 554, 56 Fed. 
 792 689 
 
 Third Nat. Bank v. Harrison, 3 
 
 MeCrary, 162, 8 Fed. 721 107 
 V. National Bank, 30 C. C. 
 
 A. 436, 58 U. S. App. 
 
 148, 86 Fed. 852.. 564, 576 
 579 
 Third Street & Suburban R. Co. 
 
 V. Lewis, 173 U. S. 4o!l, 
 
 43 L. ed. 767, 19 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 451 271 
 
 Thom V. Pittard, 10 C. C. A. 
 
 352, 8 U. S. App, 597, 
 
 62 Fed. 232 672 
 
 Thomas, Ee, 35 Fed. 337.. 505, 517 
 533, 534, 541, 558 
 
 Ee, 35 Fed. 822 502, 506, 532 
 
 V. Anderson, 138 C. C. A. 
 
 405, 223 Fed. 41 . .208, 225 
 V. Brockenbrough, 10 Wheat. 
 
 151, 6 L. ed. 289 610 
 
 V. Council Bluffs Canning 
 
 Co. 34 C. C. A. 428, 92 
 
 Fed. 422 31 
 
 V. Elton, 100 Fed. 145 216 
 
 V. Great Northern R. Co. 77 
 
 C. C. A. 255, 147 Fed. 
 
 83 807, 816, 820, 858 
 
 V. Green County, 89 C. C. 
 
 A. 405, 159 Fed. 341 .. . 175 
 V. Matthiessen, 113 C. C. A. 
 
 101, 192 Fed. 495 245 
 
 V. Ohio State University, 
 
 195 U. S. 207, 49 L. ed. 
 
 160, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 24 45, 85, 86 
 
 V. Tensas Parish, 14 Fed. 
 
 390 379 
 
 Thompkins v. MacLeod, 96 Fed. 
 
 927 102 
 
 V. Thompkins, 123 Fed. 207 253 
 Thompson v. Allen County, 115 
 
 U. S. 550, 29 L. ed. 472, 
 
 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 140. .23, 26 
 V. Automatic Fire Protec- 
 tion Co. 151 Fed. 945 . . 198 
 207 
 
 V. Central Ohio E. Co. 6 
 Wall. 134, 18 L. ed. 765 
 11, 16, 19, 26, 29, 34, 
 
 V. Chicago, St. P. & K. C. 
 E. Co. 60 Fed. 773.. 
 
 552 
 
 786 
 812 
 
 V. Dean, 7 Wall. 346, 19 L. 
 
 ed. 95 635 
 
 V. Dixon, 28 Fed. 6 73 
 
 V. Maxvpell Land Grant & R. 
 
 Co. 95 U. S. 391, 24 L. 
 
 ed. 481 612, 617 
 
 10 
 
cxlvi 
 
 TABLE or CASES. 
 
 Thompson v. Maxwell Land Grant 
 & R. Co. 168 U. S. 451, 
 42 L. ed. 539, 18 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 121 769 
 
 V. Nelson, 18 C. C. A. 137, 
 37 U. S. App. 478, 71 
 
 Fed. 339 630, 631 
 
 V. Pen-ine, 106 U. S. 593, 27 
 L. ed. 300, 1 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 564 218 
 
 V. Roberts, 24 How. 240, 16 
 
 L. ed. 649 587 
 
 V. Schenectady Co. 124 Fed. 
 
 274 483 
 
 V. Schenectady R. Co. 119 
 
 Fed. 634 366, 610, 618 
 
 V. Searcy County, 6 C. C. A. 
 674, 12 LI. S. App. 618, 
 
 57 Fed. 1036 214 
 
 T. Stalman, 131 Fed. 809 . . 804 
 806, 820, 836 
 V. Stalmann, 139 Fed. 93.. 87 
 Thompson-Houston Electric Co. 
 V. Jeffrey Mfg. Co. 83 
 
 Fed. 614 5^2 
 
 Thomson v. Dean, 7 Wall. 345, 
 
 19 L. ed. 95 586-588 
 
 V. Elton, 100 Fed. 145 215 
 
 V. Travelers' Ins. Co. 89 C. 
 
 C. A. 61, 161 Fed. 868.. 619 
 V. Wooster, 114 U. S. 104, 
 29 L. ed. 105, 5 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 788 385, 388,' 389 
 
 391, 574 
 Thorn v. Pittard, 10 C. C. A. 
 352, 8 U. S. App. 597, 
 
 62 Fed. 235 667 
 
 Thornton N. Motley Co. v. De- 
 troit Steel & Spring Co. 
 
 130 Fed. 396 296, 864 
 
 Thorp V. Bonnifield, 177 U. S. 
 19, 44 L. ed. 653, 20 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 559 721 
 
 Threadgill v. Piatt, 71 Fed. 3 . . . 662 
 Three Friends, The, 166 U. S. 
 49, 41 L. ed. 913, 17 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495 738 
 
 Thresher v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 
 
 148 Fed. 649 ..807, 816-818 
 860, 862 
 Throckmorton Case, 98 U. S. 61, 
 
 25 L. ed. 93 616 
 
 Thruston v. Big Stone Gfap Im^ 
 
 prov. Co. 86 Fed. 484 . . 453 
 Thullen v. Triumph Electric Co. 
 128 C. C. A. 655, 212 
 
 Fed. 143 471, 474 
 
 Thurber v. Cecil Nat. Bank, 52 
 
 Fed. 515 541 
 
 Thurber v. Miller, 14 C. C. A. 432, 
 32 U. S. App. 209, 67 
 
 Fed. 374 73, 816 
 
 Thurston v. Big Stone Gap Im- 
 
 prov. Co. 86 Fed. 484.. 443 
 450 
 Tice V. Hurley, 145 Fed. 391. .55, 126 
 Tierney v. Helvetia Swiss F. Ins. 
 
 Co. 163 Fed. 82 88, 209 
 
 328 
 Tift V. Southern R. Co. 123 Fed. 
 
 790 : 30 
 
 V. Southern R. Co. 159 Fed. 
 
 558 458 ' 
 
 Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U. S. 
 136, 31 L. ed. 64, 8 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 894 .... 376 
 V. Werk, 39 Fed. 680.. 600, 601 
 
 606 
 Tillinghast v. Chace, 121 Fed. 
 
 436 291 
 
 Times Pub. Co. v. Hill, 36 Tex. 
 Civ. App. 389, 81 S. W. 
 
 806 173 
 
 Timmons v. Elytown Land Co. 
 139 U. S. 378, 35 L. ed. 
 195, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 585 52, 126, 272 
 
 Timolat v. Philadelphia Pneu- 
 matic Tool Co. 130 Fed. 
 
 903 629, 685 
 
 Tinsley v. Hoot, 3 C. C. A. 612, 2 
 U. S. App. 548, 53 Fed. 
 
 682 273, 549 
 
 Tobin, Re, 214 U. S. 506, 53 L. 
 ed. 1061, 29 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 702 850 
 
 Tod V. Cleveland & M. Valley R. 
 Co. 12 C. C. A. 521, 22 
 U. S. App. 707, 65 Fed. 
 
 145 783, 824, 856-858 
 
 Todds v. Whitaker, 217 Fed. 320 275 
 Toeg V. Suffert, 92 C. C. A. 577; 
 
 167 Fed. 125 619 
 
 Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300, 
 
 9 L. ed. 1093 314, 316 
 
 Toledo, A. A. & N. M. R. Co. v. 
 Pennsylvania, 19 L.R.A. 
 387, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 
 
 522, 54 Fed. 741 11 
 
 Toledo Computing Scale Co. v. 
 Computing Scale Co. 74 
 C. C. A. 89, 142 Fed. 
 
 919 322, 323, 325 
 
 Toledo Metal Wheel Co. v. Foyer 
 Bros. & Co. 138 C. C. A. 
 612, 223 Fed. 350 .... 720 
 Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R. Co. v. 
 Continental Trust Co. 
 36 C. C. A. 155, 95 Fed. 
 497.. 183, 257, 464, 483, 484 
 
TxVBLE OF CASES. 
 
 cxlvii 
 
 Xoledo Traction Co. v. Cameron, 
 
 09 C. C. A. 28, 137 Fed. 
 
 48 58, 59, 543, 546 
 
 Toler V. East Tennessee V. & G. 
 
 K. Co. 67 Fed. 170 . . 450 
 
 460, 462, 464, 465 
 
 Tomlinson v. Moore, 189 Fed. S45 495 
 
 525 
 Tompkins v. McLeod, 96 Fed. 
 
 927 181, 182 
 
 Tonopah Traction ilin. Co. v. 
 
 Douglass, 123 Fed. 936 271 
 Tootte V. Coleman, 57 L.R.A. 120, 
 
 46 C. C. A. 132, 107 
 
 Fed. 4] 856 
 
 Topliff V. Topliflf, 145 U. S'. 173, 
 
 36 L. ed. 665, 12 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 825 570 
 
 Tornanses v. Melsing-, 47 G. C. 
 
 A. 596, 109 Fed. 710 631, 
 
 685, 687 
 Torrence v. Shedd, 144 U. S. 527, 
 
 36 L. ed. 528, 12 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 726. .68, 70-73, 234 
 274, 816, 817, 821 
 • Torrent v. Duluth Lumber Co. 
 
 32 Fed. 229 600 
 
 V. S. K. Martin Lumber Co. 
 
 37 Fed. 727 786 
 
 Tortat V. Hardin Min. & Mfg. 
 
 Co. Ill Fed. 426 795 
 
 Tower v. Stimpson, 175 Fed. 130 350 
 Towle V. American Bldg. Loan & 
 
 Invest. Soc. 60 Fed. 131 176 
 194 
 Townsend v. Beatrice Cemetery 
 
 Asso. 70 C. C. A. 521, 
 
 138 Fed. 381 709 
 
 V. Little, 109 U. S. 504, 27 
 
 L. ed. 1012, 3 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 357 10 
 
 Traction Co. v. Madisonville St. 
 
 Barnard Min. Co. 196 U. 
 
 S. 245, 49 L. ed. 464, 
 
 25 Sup. Ct. Eep. 251 . . 785 
 Tracy v. Morel, 88 Fed. 801 . . 52, 90 
 
 272, 810 
 Travis County v. King Iron 
 
 Bridge & Mfg. Co. 34 C. 
 
 C. A. 620, 92 Fed. 690 660 
 661, 662, 719 
 Treadwell v. Cleveland, 3 Mc- 
 Lean, 283, Fed. Cas. No. 
 
 14,155 392 
 
 V. Seymour, 41 Fed. 580.. 314 
 Tredway v. Sanger, iq7 U. S. 323, 
 
 27 L. ed. 582, 2 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 691 209, 218 
 
 Tremelo Patent, The, 23 Wall. 
 
 518, 23 L. ed. 97 ..359, 360 
 
 Tremper v. Schwabacher, 84 Fed. 
 
 413 814, 836, 839 
 
 Trimble v. Erie Electric Motor 
 
 Co. 89 Fed. 51 321 
 
 Tripp v. Santa Rosa Street E. 
 
 Co. 144 V. S. 129, 36 L. 
 
 ed. 372, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 655 693, 695 
 
 Trivette v. Chesapeake & 0. R. 
 
 Co. 129 C. C. A. 177, 212 
 
 Fed. 641 806 
 
 Troy Bank v. Whitehead, 184 
 
 Fed. 932 175, 176, 210 
 
 Truman v. Holmes, 31 V. C. A. 
 
 215, 56 U. S. App. 739, 
 
 87 Fed. 743 39 
 
 Trust Co. V. Chicago, P. & St. 
 
 L. R. Co. 199 Fed. .593 183 
 Tubman v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. 
 
 190 U. S. 39, 47 L. ed. 
 
 947, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 777 586 
 
 .^.^uckerman v. Bigelow, Brunner, 
 
 Col. Cas. 631, Fed. Cas. 
 
 Xo. 14,228 56 
 
 Tug River Coal & Salt Co. v. 
 
 Brigel, 14 C. C. A. 577, 
 
 31 U. S. App. 665, 67 
 
 Fed. 625 ..52, 54, 236, 270 
 272, 341, 343 
 V. Brigel, 30 C. C. A. 415, 
 
 58 U. S. App. 320, 86 
 
 Fed. 818 ..45, 54, 230, 234 
 235 
 Tullar V. Illinois C. E. Co. 213 
 
 Fed. 280 776 
 
 TuUoek v. Mulvane, 184 U. S. 
 
 497, 46 L. ed. 657, 22 
 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 372 753 
 
 Tupino v. La Compania General 
 
 De Tabacos De Filipin- 
 
 as, 214 U. S. 268, 53 L. 
 
 ed. 992, 29 Sup. Ct. Eop. 
 
 610 168 
 
 Tupper V. Wise, 110 U. S. 398, 28 
 
 L. ed. 189, 4 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 26 756 
 
 Turk V. Illinois C. R. Co. 193 
 
 Fed. 252 832, 834 
 
 V. Illinois C. R. Co. 134 C. 
 
 C. A. Ill, 218 Fed. 315 55 
 Turnbull v. Ross, 72 C. C. A. 609, 
 
 141 Fed. 649 63, 553 
 
 Turnbull Wagon Co. v. Linthi- 
 
 cum Carriage Co. 80 
 
 Fed. 4 846 
 
 Turner, Ee, 119 Fed. 231 188 
 
 V. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 
 
 106 U. S. 555, 27 L. ed. 
 
 274, 1 Sup. Ct. Eep. 519 131 
 
Gxlviii 
 
 TABLE or CASES. 
 
 Turner v. Jackson Lumber Co. 87 
 C. C. A. 103, 159 Fed. 
 
 923 168, 186, 190, 274 
 
 V. Richardson, 180 U. S. 87, 
 45 L. ed. 438, 21 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 295. .748, 750, 752 
 V. Shackman, 27 Fed. 183.. 510 
 
 513 
 
 V. Southern Home Bldg. & 
 
 L. Asao. 41 C. C. A. 379, 
 
 101 Fed. 313 . . 169, 172, 443 
 
 Tuttle V. Claflin, 13 C. C. A. 281, 
 
 26 U. S. App. 678, 66 
 
 Fed. 8 583, 669 
 
 V. Claflin, 31 C. C. A. 419, 
 59 U. S. App. 602, 88 
 
 Fed. 122 637 
 
 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. 
 S. 78, 53 L. ed. 97, 29 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 14 150 
 
 Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 7 
 
 Wall. 324, 19 L. ed. 223 758 
 759 
 Tyler, Re, 149 U. S. 181, 37 L. 
 ed. 694, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 785 485 
 
 V. Magwire, 17 Wall. 253, 21 
 
 L. ed. 576 771-773 
 
 V. Savage, 143 U. S. 94, 36 
 L. ed. 88, 12 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 340 .. .22, 33, 34, 284 
 
 U. 
 
 Uhle V. Burnham, 44 Fed. 729 500 
 
 523, 539 
 
 Uhlmann v. Arnholt & S. Brew- 
 ing Co. 41 Fed. 369 429 
 
 Ulman v. Jaeger, 67 Fed. 980 . . 30 
 
 398, 402 
 V. Jaeger, 155 Fed. 1011... 454 
 
 485 
 
 Under-Feed Stoker Co. v. Ameri- 
 can Stoker Co. 169 Fed. 
 892 449 
 
 Underground Electric R. Co. v. 
 Owsley, 169 Fed. 671, 99 
 C. C. A. 500, 176 Fed. 
 26 247-249, 283, 583 
 
 Underground R. Co. v. New York, 
 193 U. S. 416, 48 L. ed. 
 733, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 494 146 
 
 Underwood Typewriter Co. v. 
 
 Manning, 165 Fed. 451 419 
 
 Ung Lung Chung v. Holmes, 98 
 
 Fed. 323. .167, 171-173, 201 
 
 Union & Planters' Bank v. Mem- 
 phis, 189 U. S. 71, 47 
 L. ed. 712, 23 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 604 648, 658 
 
 Union & Planters' Bank v. Mem- 
 phis, 49 C. C. A. 455, 
 
 111 Fed. 561 300, 546 
 
 Union Associated Press Co. v. 
 Times-Star Co. 84 Fed. 
 
 419 327 
 
 Union Cent. L. Ins. Co. v. Phil- 
 lips, 41 C. C. A. 263, 
 
 102 Fed. 19 30, 482 
 
 Union L. Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 123 
 
 Fed. 317 24 
 
 Union Mill & Jlin. Co. v. Dang- 
 
 berg, 81 Fed. 73 . . 188, 208 
 224, 225, 231, 239 
 
 V. Warren, 82 Fed. 519 259 
 
 Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Kirch- 
 off, 160 U. S. 378, 40 L. 
 ed. 463, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 318 638 
 
 V. University of Chicago, 10 
 
 Biss. 191, 6 Fed. 443.. 479 
 
 V. Windett, 36 Fed. 839 669 
 
 686 
 Union Nat. Bank v. Louisville, 
 N. A. & C. R. Co. 163 
 U. S. 330, 41 L. ed. 178, 
 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1039 . . 137 
 Union P. R. Co. v. Callaghan, 
 161 U. S. 95, 40 L. ed. 
 629, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 493 683 
 
 V. Colorado Eastern R. Co. 
 4 C. C. A. 161, 12 U. S. 
 App. 110, 54 Fed. 22.. 663 
 V. Cunningham, 173 Fed. 90 169 
 
 193 
 V. Harris, 158 U. S. 328, 39 
 L. ed. 1003, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 843 743 
 
 V. Novak, 9 C. C. A. 629, 15 
 U. S. App. 400, 61 Fed. 
 
 573 326 
 
 V. Oregon & W. Lumber 
 Mfrs. Asso. 91 C. C. A. 
 
 51, 165 Fed. 13 622 
 
 V. Reese, 5 C. C. A. 510, 
 15 U. S. App. 92, 56 
 
 Fed. 288 538, 540 
 
 V. Stewart, 95 U. S. 279, 24 
 
 L. ed. 431 708 
 
 Union S. B. Co., Ex parte, 178 
 U. S. 319, 44 L. ed. 
 1084, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 944 769 
 
 Union Terminal R. Co. v. Chi- 
 cago, B. & Q. R. Co. 119 
 
 Fed. 209 806, 807, 814 
 
 835, 861, 862 
 Union Trust Co. v. Rochester & 
 
 P. R. Co. 29 Fed. 609.. 82 
 
TABLE or CASES. 
 
 cxlix 
 
 United Cigarette Mach. Co. v. 
 
 Wright, 132 Fed. 195 . . 299 
 United Electric Secvirities Co. v. 
 
 Louisiana Electric Light 
 
 Co. 68 Fed. 673 . .4.32, 468 
 United Lace & Braid Mfg. Co. v. 
 
 BartUels Mfg. Co. 213 
 
 Fed. 536 508 
 
 V. Barthels Mfg. Co. 217 
 
 Fed. 175 518 
 
 United Shoe Machinery Co. v. 
 
 Duplessis Lndependent 
 
 Shoe Machinery Co. 133 
 
 Fed. 931 95 
 
 United States v. Aakervik, 180 
 
 Fed. 137 615 
 
 V. Agee, 47 C. C. A. 152, 108 
 
 Fed. 10 301 
 
 V. Agler, 62 Fed. 824 . . . , 285 
 
 >. Allen, 171 Fed. 907 299 
 
 V. American Bell Teleph. Co. 
 
 167 U. S. 225, 42 L. ed. 
 
 144, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 
 809 38 
 
 V. American Bell Teleph. Co. 
 
 21 Fed. 17 32S 
 
 V. American Bell Teleph. Co. 
 
 29 Fed. 17.. 112, 319, 320 
 
 .327, 3.32 
 V. American Bell Teleph. Co. 
 
 30 Fed. 524 407 
 
 V. American Bell Teleph. Co. 
 
 32 Fed. 593 276 
 
 V. American Bell Teleph. 
 
 Co. 39 Fed. 716 356 
 
 V. American Lumber Co. 80 
 
 Fed. 309.. 102, 3]4, 336-338 
 342, 345. 479 
 V. American Lumber Co. 29 
 
 C. C. A. 431, 56 U. S. 
 
 App. 655, 85 Fed. 827 280 
 314, .315, 319 
 V. Ames. 99 U. S. 35, 25 L. 
 
 ed. 295 - 400 
 
 V. Babbitt, 104 U. S. 768, 26 
 
 L. ed. 922 639 
 
 V. Barber Lumber Co. 169 
 
 Fed. 186 304 
 
 ex re!. Maxwell v. Barrett, 
 
 135 Fed. 193 38 
 
 V. Beebe, 127 U. S. 338, 32 
 
 L. ed. 121, 8 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 1086 38 
 
 V. Beebe, 180 U. S. 343, 45 
 
 L. ed. 563, 21 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 371 617 
 
 V. Beebe, 34 C. C. A. 321, 92 
 
 Fed. 244 478, 607 
 
 V. Bell Teleph. Co. 29 Fed. 
 
 17 110 
 
 United States v. Bitter Root De- 
 velopment Co. 200 U. S. 
 451, 50 L. ed. 550, 26 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 318 
 
 V. Bitter Root Development 
 Co. 66 C. C. A. 652, 133 
 Fed. 274 26, 29, 
 
 V. BlacUfeather. See Chero- 
 kee Kation v. Black 
 Feather. 
 
 V. Blaekfeather, 155 U. S. 
 180, 30 L. ed. 114, 15 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 04 
 
 V. Brelin, 92 C. C. A. 88, 
 166 Fed. 104 
 
 V. California & 0. Land Co". 
 148 U. S. 31, 37 L. ed. 
 354, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 458. . .406, 407, 410, 412, 
 
 V. Cameron, 15 Fed. 794 . . 
 
 26 
 292 
 
 701 
 546 
 
 415 
 417 
 513 
 516 
 
 V. Camou, 184 U. S. 572, 46 
 L. ed. 694, 22 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 505 773 
 
 V. Churchyard, 132 Fed. 82 38 
 
 ex rel. Montana Ore Pur- 
 chasing Co. V. Circuit 
 Ct. 61 C. C. A. 314, ,126 
 Fed. 169 661 
 
 V. Coal Dealers' Asso. 85 
 
 Fed. 252 238 
 
 ex rel. Harshman v. County 
 
 Ct. 39 Fed. 757 687 
 
 ex rel. Mcintosh v. Craw- 
 ford, 47 Fed. 501 314 
 
 V. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 
 
 23 L. ed. 588 149 
 
 V. Curry, 6 How. Ill, 12 L. 
 
 ed. 365 763 
 
 V. Dallas Military Road Co. 
 140 U. S. 616, 35 L. ed. 
 :](;5, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 988 416 
 
 V. E. C. Knight Co. 156 U. 
 S. 1, 39 L. ed. 325, 15 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249 46 
 
 V. Eisenbeis, 50 C. C. A. 179, 
 
 112 Fed. 196 319, 479 
 
 V. Elliott, 74 Fed. 94 ..... 72] 
 
 V. Evans, 213 U. S. 297, 53 
 L. ed. 803, 29 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 507 721 
 
 V. Ferguson, 24 C. C. A. 1, 
 45 U. S. App. 457, 78 
 Fed. 104 672 
 
 V. 50 Boxes & Packages of 
 
 Lace, 92 Fed. 601 492 
 
 50.5-507, 512, 513, 515, 516 
 534, 535, 540, 545 
 
cl 
 
 TABI.E OF CASES. 
 
 United States v. Fremont, 18 
 
 How. 36, 15 L. ed. 302.. 717 
 V. Gayle, 45 Fed. 107 .... 319 
 
 320 
 V. Gentry, 55 C. C. A. 658, 
 
 1J9 Fed. 75 732 
 
 V. Gillespie, 6 Fed. 802.... 262 
 407, 426, 427 
 V. Gleeson, 33 C. C. A. 272, 
 
 62 U. S. App. 311, 90 
 
 Fed. 778 607, 617 
 
 V. Gomez, 23 How. 326, 16 
 
 L. ed. 552 717 
 
 V. Goodrich, 4 C. G. A. 160, 
 
 12 U. S. App. 108, 54 
 
 Fed. 21 670, 673 
 
 V. Griffith, 141 U. S. 212, 35 
 
 L. ed. 739, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 1105 720 
 
 V. Gronich, 211 Fed. 548.. 93 
 97 125 
 V. Guglard, 79 Fed. 24 . . . .' 295 
 V. Hall, 11 C. C. A. 294, 21 
 
 U. S. App. 402, 63 Fed. 
 
 472 733 
 
 V. Harsha, 6 C. C. A. 178, 
 
 ]6 U. S. App. 13, 56 
 
 Fed. 953 270-272 
 
 V. Haynea, 29 Fed. 691 . . 39, 40 
 use of Edward Hines Lum- 
 ber Co. V. Henderlong, 
 
 102 Fed. 2 38 
 
 V. Horn Hing, 48 Fed. 638 494 
 V. Hopewell, 2 C. C. A. 510, 
 
 5 U. S. App. 137, 51 
 
 Fed. 798 364, 730 
 
 V. Jahn, ]55 U. S. 109, 39 
 
 L. ed. 87, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 39 . . 633, 645-647, 650 
 655 
 V. Kellar, 11 Biss. 314, 13 
 
 Fed. 82 87 
 
 V. Kettenbach, 175 Fed. 463 349 
 V. Larkin, 208 U. S. 333, 52 
 
 L. ed. 517, 28 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 417 649 
 
 V. Lee, 106 U. S. 204, 27 L. 
 
 ed. 176, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 240 39 
 
 V. Lee Yen Tai, 51 C. C. A. 
 
 299, 133 Fed. 467.. 656, 657 
 V. Loughrey, 43 Fed. 449 . . 332 
 
 333 
 292 
 432 
 
 V. McLaughlin, 24 Fed. 823 
 
 423, 430, 
 
 V. Marshall, 127 C. C. A. 
 
 231, 210 Fed. 595 
 
 V. Mar Ying Yuen, 123 Fed. 
 
 159 
 
 732 
 
 40 
 
 United States v. Michigan, 190 
 
 U. S. 379, 47 L. ed. 
 
 1103, 23 Sup. Ct. Kep. 
 
 ^42 38 
 
 V. Miller, 164 Fed. 444 .... 319 
 
 V. Minor, 26 Fed. 672 617 
 
 V. Mooney, 116 U. S. 107, 
 
 29 L. ed. 551, 6 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 304 96 
 
 V. Moore, 129 Fed. 632 147 
 
 V. Moy Yee Tai, 48 C. C. 
 
 A. 203, 109 Fed. 2 667 
 
 V. New York, 173 U. S. 464, 
 
 43 L. ed. 769, 19 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Eep. 464 773 
 
 V. New York & 0. S. S. Go. 
 
 132 C. C. A. 305, 216 
 
 Fed. 61 44, 84 
 
 V. New York Indians, 173 U. 
 
 S. 464, 43 L. ed. 769, 19 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 464 .... 772 
 V. New York, N. H. & H. E. 
 
 Co. 165 Fed. 742 ..148, 150 
 ex rel. Coffman v. Norfolk & 
 
 W. R. Co. 114 Fed. 686 555 
 ex rel. CoffmaTi v. Norfolk & 
 
 W. R. Co. 55 C. C. A. 
 
 320, 118 Fed. 554 350 
 
 V. North Carolina, 136 U. S. 
 
 211, 34 L. ed. 336, 10 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 920 ... . 38 
 V. Northern P. R. Co. 67 C. 
 
 C. A. 269, 134 Fed. 715 38 
 95, 109 
 T. Northern Securities Co. 
 
 128 Fed. 808 466 
 
 use of Brady v. O'Brien, 120 
 
 Fed. 448 55 
 
 V. Old Settlers, 148 U. S. 
 
 468, 37 L. ed. 524, 13 
 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 650 . . 138, 238 
 V. 1,621 Pounds of Fur Clip- 
 pings, 45 C. C. A. 263, 
 
 106 Fed. 163 733 
 
 V. Peralta, 99 Fed. 624 406 
 
 V. Philips, 46 C. C. A. 660, 
 
 107 Fed. 824 458, 459 
 
 V. Pings, 4 Fed. 714.. 513, 539 
 
 540 
 V. Pratt Coal & Coke Co. 18 
 
 Fed. 708 240, 264, 269 
 
 ex rel. Creek Nation v. 
 Eea-Read Mill & Eleva- 
 tor Co. 171 Fed. 515 .. 295 
 V. Reese, 166 Fed. 347.. 449, 453 
 
 V. Eeid, 90 Fed. 522 168 
 
 V. Eider, 163 U. S. 132, 41 
 L. ed. 101, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 983 735, 736 
 
 V. Eose, 14 Fed. 681 321 
 
TABLE OS- CASES. 
 
 cli 
 
 United States v. Sayward, 160 U. 
 
 S. 493, 40 L. ed. 508, 16 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 371 168 
 
 V. Sehoverling, 146 U. 8. 
 
 82, 36 L. ed. 895, 13 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 24 731 
 
 use of Salem-Bedford Stone 
 
 Co. V. Sheridan, 119 
 
 Fed. 236 38 
 
 V. Southern P. E. Co. 40 
 
 Fed. 611 403 
 
 V. Southern P. R. Co. 49 
 
 Fed. 297.. 46, 50, 93, 95, 96 
 110, 197 
 V. S. P. Shotter Co. 110 
 
 Fed. 2 78, 110, 273, 274 
 
 V. Standard Oil Co. 152 Fed. 
 
 290 46 
 
 V. Standard Sanitary Mfg. 
 
 Co. 187 Fed. 234. .524, 525 
 
 563 
 
 V. Stern, 177 Fed. 479 .... 314 
 
 V. Stoller, 180 Fed. 910 585 
 
 ex rel. Mudsill Min. Co. v. 
 
 Swan, 13 C. C. A. 77, 
 
 31 U. S. App. 112, 65 
 
 Fed. 647 640, 645 
 
 V. Swift, 71 C. C. A. 351, 
 
 139 Fed. 227 172 
 
 V. Texas, 143 U. S. 640, 30 
 
 L. ed. 291, 12 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 488 38 
 
 V. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 
 
 65, 25 L. ed. 95 ..478, 607 
 617 
 V. Trans-Missouri Freight 
 
 Asso. 166 U. S. 310, 41 
 
 L. ed. 1017, 17 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 540 ..'..205, 741, 756 
 
 V. Turner, 50 Fed. 734 313 
 
 V. Union P. E. Co. 98 U. S. 
 
 604, 25 L. ed. 151.. 40, 102 
 V. Union P. R. Co. 168 U. 
 
 S. 505, 42 L. ed. 559, 18 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 167 . . 735, 736 
 use of Hudson River Stone 
 
 Supply Co. V. Venable 
 
 Const. Co. 158 Fed. 833 547 
 V. White, 9 Sawy. 125, 17 
 
 Fed. 562 617 
 
 V. Whitmire, 110 C. C. A. 
 
 222, 188 Fed. 422. .390, 392 
 ex rel. Nicola v. Williams, 
 
 173 Fed. 626 87 
 
 V. Wilson, 118 U. S. 86, 30 
 
 L. ed. 110, 6 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 991 26, 29, 34 
 
 V. Winona & St. P. R. Co. 
 
 165 U. S. 479, 41 L. ed. 
 
 796, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 368 410 
 
 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 
 169 U. S. 655, 42 L. ed. 
 893, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456 20 
 
 United States Bank v. Lyon 
 
 County, 48 Fed. 634 . . 865 
 
 United States Expansion Bolt Co. 
 V. H. G. Kroncke Hard- 
 ware Co. 216 Fed. 187 446 
 447 
 
 United States Fastener Co. v. 
 
 Bradley, 143 Fed. 530 352 
 
 United States Fidelity & G. Co. 
 V. Woodson County, 76 
 C. C. A. 114, 145 Fed. 
 144 93, 121 
 
 United States Freehold Land & 
 Emigration Co. v. Galle- 
 gos, 32 C. C. A. 470, 61 
 U. S. App. 13, 89 Fed. 
 769 280, 647 
 
 United States Graphite Co. v. Pa- 
 cific Graphite Co. 68 
 Fed. 442 329 
 
 United States Gypsum Co. v. 
 
 Hoxie, 172 Fed. 505 . . 453 
 
 United States L. Ins. Co. v. 
 Cable, 39 C. C. A. 264, 
 98 Fed. 761 . . 16, 17, 24, 396 
 V. Ross, 42 C. C. A. 601, 102 
 
 Fed. 722 543, 546 
 
 United States Mineral Wool Co. 
 V. Manville Covering 
 Co. 101 Fed. 145 300 
 
 United States Min. Co. v. Law- 
 son, 115 Fed. 1007 .... 259 
 V. Lawson, 67 C. C. A. 587, 
 
 134 Fed. 769 260 
 
 United States Nat. Bank v. ile- 
 
 Nair, 56 Fed. 324 ..21!J~221 
 
 United States Rubber Co. v. 
 American Oak Leather 
 Co. 181 U. S. 434, 45 
 L. ed. 938, 21 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 670 10 
 
 V. Butler Bros. Shoe Co. 132 
 
 Fed. 398 ■. 117 
 
 United States Shipbuilding Co. 
 v. Conklin, 60 C. C. A. 
 680, 126 Fed. 135 18 
 
 United States Trust Co. v. Chi- 
 cago Terminal Transfer 
 Co. 110 C. C. A. 270, 
 
 188 Fed. 292 458, 459 
 
 V. Mercantile Trust Co. 31 
 C. C. A. 427, 59 U. S. 
 App. 330, 88 Fed. 153 572 
 570, 577 
 V. Omaha & St. L. E. Co. 
 
 63 Fed. 742 576 
 
clii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 United States Trust Co. v. West- 
 ern Contract Co. 26 C. C. 
 A. 472, 54 U. S. App. 67, 
 81 Fed. 468 
 
 Universal Sav. & T. Co. v. Stone- 
 burner, 51 C. C. A. 208, 
 113 Fed. 254 244, 
 
 Upshur County v. Kich, 135 U. 
 S. 470, 34 L. ed. 197, 10 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 051. .827, 
 
 Utah-Nevada Co. v. De Lamar, 
 66 C. C. A. 179, 133 
 Fed. 1]3, 75 C. C. A. 1, 
 
 145 Fed. 506 209, 
 
 2] 2, 220, 863, 866, 
 
 448 
 471 
 828 
 
 211 
 867 
 
 Vacuum Cleaner Co. v. American 
 
 Rotary Valve Co. 208 
 
 Fed. 419 447 
 
 Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co. 
 
 122 Fed. 105 413 
 
 V. Eagle Oil Co. 154 Fed. 
 
 867 417 
 
 Vance v. Burbank, 101 U. S. 519, 
 
 25 L. ed. 931 617 
 
 V. W. A. Vandercook Co. 170 
 
 U. S. 468, 42 L. ed. 1111, 
 
 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 645 . . 170 
 171, 173, 18,5, 196, 200 
 Vandalia R. Co. v. Indiana, 207 
 
 U. S. 359, 52 L. ed. 246, 
 
 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 130.. 754 
 Van Doren v. Pennsylvania R. 
 
 Co. 35 C. C. A. 282, 93 
 
 Fed. 260. .121, 122, 208, 266 
 Van-Dom v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 
 
 35 C. C. A. 282, 93 Fed. 
 
 271 586 
 
 Van Dresser v. Oregon R. & Nav. 
 
 Co. 48 Fed. 202 . . 322, 323 
 Van Horn v. Kittitas County, 112 
 
 Fed. 1 271 
 
 Vannerson v. Leverett, 31 Fed. 
 
 377 451 
 
 Van Norden v. Jlorton, 99 U. S. 
 
 378, 25 L. ed. 453 . .15, 16 
 Van Patten v. Chicago, ]\I. & St. 
 
 P. R. Co. 74 Fed. 981 46 
 
 Veariel v. United Engineering & 
 
 Foundry Co. 197 Fed. 
 
 877 71 
 
 Velie V. Manufacturers' Acci. In- 
 demnity Co. 40 Fed. 545 796 
 \'enner v. Great Northern R. Co. 
 
 209 U. S. 24, 52 L. ed. 
 
 666, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 328 65, 68 
 
 V. Great Northern R. Co. 
 
 153 Fed. 411 241 
 
 Vermilya v. Brown, 65 Fed. 149 841 
 \'ermont Farm Mach. Co. v. Con- 
 verse, 10 Fed. 825 600 
 
 ^^estal V. Ducktown Sulphur, 
 
 Copper & I. Co. 210 Fed. 
 
 375 89, 776, 836 
 
 Vetterlein v. Barnes, 124 U. S. 
 
 172, 31 L. ed. 401, 8 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 441 253 
 
 Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co. v. 
 
 Smith, 135 U. S. 195, 
 
 34 L. ed. 95, 10 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 728 185 
 
 Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. 
 
 Vicksburg, 185 U. S. 65, 
 
 46 L. ed. 808, 22 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 585 146 
 
 Victor G. Bloede Co. v. Carter, 
 
 148 Fed. 127 422 
 
 v. Joseph Bancroft & - Sons 
 
 Co. 98 Fed. 175 ..292, 528 
 
 530 
 
 v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons 
 
 Co. 110 Fed. 76 
 
 Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. 
 
 American Graphophone 
 
 Co. 118 Fed. 50 
 
 V. Hoschke, 169 Fed. 894.. 
 V. Sonora Phonograph Corp. 
 
 221 Fed. 676 ..491, 517, 
 Vigneron v. Auto Time Saver 
 
 Repair Kit Co. 171 Fed. 
 
 581 
 
 530 
 
 360 
 
 404 
 
 518 
 
 Van Wagenen v. Sewall, 160 U. 
 
 S. 369, 40 L. ed. 460, 
 
 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370 . . 
 648- 
 Vattief V. Hinde, 7 Pet. 202, 8 
 
 L. ed. 679 
 
 Veach v. Rice, 131 U. S. 293, 
 
 33 L. ed. 163, 9 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 730 
 
 643 
 -650 
 
 227 
 
 451 
 
 Villabolos v. United States, 6 
 How. 90, 12 L. ed. 356 
 
 Virginia v. Paul, 148 U. S. 107, 
 37 L. ed. 386, 13 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 536 
 
 V. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 25 
 
 L. ed. 667 786, 
 
 V. West Virginia, 206 U. S. 
 290, 51 L. ed. 1068, 27 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 732 
 
 Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. 
 
 V. Home Ins. Co. 51 C. 
 
 0. A. 21, 113 Fed. 3.. 
 
 289, 300, 483, 
 
 376 
 
 691 
 762 
 
 850 
 850 
 
 284 
 484 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cliii 
 
 Viiginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. 
 
 Sundry Ins. Co. 108 Fed. 
 
 453 53, 789, 830, 831 
 
 Virginia, T. & C. Steel & I. Co. 
 
 V. Harris, 80 C. C. A. 
 
 658, 151 Fed. 435. .311, 586 
 Volk V. B. F. Sturtevant Co. 3d 
 
 C. C. A. 646, 9!) Fed. 
 
 533 678 
 
 Von Auw V. Chicago Toy & 
 
 Fancy Goods Co. 69 
 
 Fed. 450 296 
 
 Von Roy v. Blackman, 3 Woods, 
 
 98, Fed. Cas. No. 10,997 310 
 319, 320 
 Von Schrodder v. Brittan, 98 Fed. 
 
 169 420 
 
 Von Sohroeder v. Brittan, 93 Fed. 
 
 9 188, 195, 196 
 
 Von ^'oight V. Michigan G. R. 
 
 Co. 130 Fed. 398 .. .91, 273 
 Vosburg Co. V. Watts, 137 C. C. 
 
 A. 272, 221 Fed. 403.. 29 
 Vose V. Rosebuck Weather Strip 
 
 & Wire Screen Co. 210 
 
 Fed. 687 279 
 
 Voss V. Jveineber, 68 Fed. 947 . . 59 
 Vowinckel v. X. Clark & Sons, 
 
 62 Fed. 992 479 
 
 W. 
 
 Wabash R. Co. v. Adelbert Col- 
 
 leo-e, 208 U. S. 38, 52 L. 
 
 ed^. 379, 28 Sup. Ct. Kep. 
 
 182 183, 451 
 
 V. Barbour, 19 C. C. A. 546, 
 
 43 U. S. App. 102, 73 
 
 Fed. 515 783 
 
 Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. 
 
 Central Trust Co. 23 
 
 Fed. 514 235 
 
 Wabasb Western R. Co. v. Brow, 
 
 164 U. S. 271, 41 L. 
 
 ed. 431, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 126.. 333, 789, 790, 791, 840 
 Waco Hardware Co. v. Michigan 
 
 Stove Co. 33 C. C. A. 
 
 511, 63 U. S. App. 396, 
 
 91 Fed. 289 826 
 
 W. A. Gaines & Co. v. Rock 
 
 Spring Distilling Co. 
 
 179 Fed. 544 416 
 
 Wagner v. Drake, 31 Fed. 852.. 781 
 Waha-Lewiston Land & Water 
 
 Co. V. Lewiston-Sweet- 
 
 water Irrig. Co. 158 Fed. 
 
 137 ..43, 824, 827, 828, 835 
 Wahl V. Frantz, 49 L.R.A. 62, 
 
 40 C. C. A. 638, 100 
 
 Fed. 680 ..43, 248, 827, 829 
 
 Waite V. O'Neil, 34 L.R.A. 550, 
 22 C. C. A. 248, 47 U. 
 S. App. 19, 70 Fed. 408, 
 
 72 Fed. 348 25, 28, 29 
 
 32, 33, 35 
 V. Phcenix Ins. Co. 02 Fed. 
 
 769 ■ 782, 820, 837 
 
 V. Santa Cruz, 184 U. S. 
 325, 46 L. ed. 567, 22 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 327.. 170, 175 
 217, 222 
 Wakeman v. Throckmorton, 124 
 
 Fed. 1010 179, 824 
 
 Walcott V. Watson, 46 Fed. 529 798 
 Walden v. Bodley, 14 Pet. 161, 
 
 10 L. ed. 400 . .283, 3.52, 358 
 Waldron v. Waldron, 150 U. S. 
 378, 39 L. ed. 457, 15 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383 710 
 
 Walker v. Brown, 58 Fed. 23 . .23, 20 
 T. Brown, 11 C. C. A. 135, 
 27 U. S. App. 291, 63 
 
 Fed. 205 26 
 
 V. Brown, 86 Fed. 364 . .616, 770 
 V. Collins, 167 U. S. 57, 42 
 L. ed. 76, 17 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep, 738. .142, 152, 164, 280 
 802, 859 
 V. Houghteling, 44 C. C. A. 
 
 18, 104 Fed. 513 683 
 
 V. Jack, 31 C. C. A. 462, 
 60 U. S. App. 124, 88 
 
 Fed. 576 432 
 
 V. Kinnare, 22 C. C. A. 75, 
 46 U. S. App. 150, 70 
 
 Fed. 101 577 
 
 V. Moser, 54 C. C. A. 202, 
 
 117 Fed. 232 580 
 
 V. O'Neill, 38 Fed. 374 ..89, 809 
 V. Powers, 104 U. S. 245, 20 
 
 L. ed. 729 . .213, 295, 296 
 V. Villavaso, 6 Wall. 128, 18 
 
 L. ed. 854 702 
 
 V. Windsor Nat. Bank, 5 C 
 
 C. A. 421, 5 U. S. App. 
 
 423, 50 Fed. 80.. .141, 160 
 
 Wall V. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. 
 
 37 C. C. A. 129, 95 Fed. 
 
 398 320, 320, 331, 332 
 
 V. Thomas, 41 Fed. 620 101 
 
 253, 255 
 Wallamet Iron Bridge Co. v. 
 Hatcli, 9 Sawy. 643, 19 
 
 Fed. 347 605, 608 
 
 Walla Walla v. Walla Walla 
 Water Co. 172 U. S. 2, 
 43 L. ed. 342, 19 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 77 23, 147 
 
 Wallenburg v. Missouri P. R. Co. 
 
 159 Fed. 217 87, 830 
 
cliv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Waller v. Coler, 125 Fed. 821.. 241 
 Wallin V. Reagan, 171 Fed. 763 230 
 
 233 
 Walter v. Northeastern E. Co. 
 147 U. S. 370, 37 L. ed. 
 206, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 348 175, 177, 186, 190 
 
 193, 195 
 Walter Baker & Co. v. Baker, 
 
 89 Fed. 673 377, 378 
 
 Walters v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. 
 
 Co. 104 Fed. 378 84 
 
 V. Western & A. R. Co. 69 
 
 Fed. 710 351, 575, 577 
 
 Walton V. Marietta Chair Co. 157 
 U. S. 347, 39 L. ed. 727, 
 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 626 . .731 
 V. Wild Goose Min. & Trad- 
 ing Co. 60 C. C. A. 155, 
 123 Fed. 209, 22 Mor. 
 
 Min. Rep. 688 728 
 
 Wanderly v. Lafayette County, 
 
 '77 Fed. 665 483 
 
 Wange v. Public Service R. Co. 
 
 159 Fed. 190.. Ill, 114, 328 
 Warax v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. 
 
 P. R. Co. 72 Fed. 637 . . 75 
 807, 818, 819, 862 
 Ward V. Congress Constr. Co. 39 
 
 C. C. A. 669, 99 Fed. 598 795 
 797 
 V. Franklin, 110 Fed. 794.. 818 
 V. Ward, 79 C. C. A. 162, 
 
 149 Fed. 204 607 
 
 Ware v. Wisner, 50 Fed. 312 . . ~87 
 ^^■armath r. O'Daniel, 16 L.R.A. 
 (N.S.) 414, 86 C. C. A. 
 
 277, 159 Fed. 87 33 
 
 Warner v. Godfrey, 186 U. S. 
 377, 46 L. ed. 1208, 22 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 852 770 
 
 V. New Orleans, 31 C. C. A. 
 238, 59 U. S. App. 131, 
 
 87 Fed. 829 10 
 
 V. Texas & P. R. Co. 4 C. C. 
 A. 670, 2 U. S. App. 647, 
 
 54 Fed. 920 682 
 
 V. Texas & P. R. Co. 4 C. C. 
 A. 673, 13 U. S. App. 
 
 236, 54 Fed. 922 676 
 
 Warren v. Keep, 155 U. S. 265, 
 39 L. ed. 144, 15 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 83 576 
 
 V. Younger, 18 Fed. 859 . . 512 
 
 513, 545 
 
 Wart V. Wart, 117 Fed. 766 ... . 248 
 
 249 
 Washington v. Dennisbn, 6 Wall. 
 
 496, 18 L. ed. 863 .... 694 
 
 Washington v. Island Lime Co. 
 
 117 Fed. 778 143 
 
 V. Northern P. E. Co. 75 
 
 Fed. 333 483 
 
 T. Northern Securities Co. 
 185 U. S. 255, 46 L. ed. 
 897, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 623 40 
 
 Washington, A. & G. R. Co. v. 
 Bradley, 10 Wall. 299, 
 19 L. ed. 894 . . 303, 355, 443 
 581 
 V. Washington. See Wash- 
 ington, A. & G. E. Co. 
 V. Bradley. 
 Washington & G. R. Co., Re, 140 
 U. S. 92, 35 L. ed. 340, 
 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 673.. 768 
 771, 772 
 Washington G. & A. R. Co. v. 
 Bradley, 7 Wall. 575, 19 
 
 L. ed. 274 459, 635, 667 
 
 669, 686 
 V. Washington. See Wash- 
 ington, G. & A. R. Co. 
 V. Bradley. 
 Washington Bridge Co. v. Stew- 
 art, 3 How. 413, 11 L. 
 
 ed. 658 773 
 
 Washington County v. Williams; 
 49 C. C. A. 621, 111 Fed. 
 
 801 172, 173, 175 
 
 Washington Market Co. v. HoflF- 
 man, 101 U. S. 112, 25 
 
 L. ed. 782 189 
 
 Washington, P. & C. R. Co. v. 
 
 Magruder, 198 Fed. 218 149 
 Washington State Sugar Co. v. 
 
 Sheppard, 186 Fed. 234 225 
 Waskey v. Hammer, 102 C. C. A. 
 
 629, 179 Fed. 273 773 
 
 Wasley v. Chicago, R. I. & P. 
 
 R. Co. 147 Fed. 608 .. . 812 
 Water Comrs. v. Robbins, 125 
 
 Fed. 656 842 
 
 Wateriield v. Rice, 49 C. C. A. 
 
 504, 111 Fed. 625 .... 173 
 Waterford v. Elson, 78 C. C. A. 
 
 675, 149 Fed. 91 ..643, 653 
 Waterloo Min. Co. v. Doe, 27 C. 
 C. A. 504, 8 U. S. App. 
 411, 82 Fed. 51, 19 Mor. 
 
 Min. Rep. 1 732 
 
 Waterman v. Banks, 144 U. S. 
 407, 36 L. ed. 484, 12 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 646 568 
 
 V. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 
 
 199 Fed. 667.. 210, 813, 829 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clv 
 
 Waters v. Central Trust Co. 62 
 C. C. A, 45, 126 Fed. 
 471 316 
 
 Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 
 177 U. S. 42, 44 L. ed. 
 663, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 518 322 
 
 W^atertown v. Greaves, 56 L.R.A. 
 865, 50 C. C. A. 172, 112 
 Fed. 183 87 
 
 Waterville v. Van SlyUe, 115 U. 
 S. 290, 29 L. ed. 406, 6 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 39 722 
 
 Watkins v. King, 55 C. C. A. 290, 
 
 118 Fed. 524.. 641, 656, 657 
 743, 744 
 
 Watson V. Bonfils, 53 C. C. A. 
 
 53.5, 116 Fed. 157.. .64, 225 
 364 
 V. Kational Life & T. Co. 88 
 C. C. A. 380, 162 Fed. 
 
 7 238, 300 
 
 V. Stevens, 53 Fed. 31 613 
 
 V. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74, 
 
 18 L. ed. 580 22, 196 
 
 V. United States Sugar Re- 
 finery, 15 C. C. A. 662, 
 34 U. S. App. 81, 68 
 Fed. 769 244, 297 
 
 Waxahachie v. Coler, 34 C. C. A. 
 
 349, 92 Fed. 284.. 662, 676 
 678, 722 
 
 Way V. Clay, 140 Fed. 352. .172, 185 
 
 Wayne County v. Kennicott, 94 
 
 U. S. 499. 24 L. ed. 260 770 
 771 
 
 W. C. Coyle & Co. v. Stern, 113 
 C. C. A. 450, 193 Fed. 
 586 822 
 
 Weathersbee v. American Free- 
 hold Land ilortg. Co. 77 
 Fed. 524 ... .443, 448, 449 
 
 Weaver v. Alter, 3 Woods, 152, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 17,308.. 451 
 V. Kelly, 34 C. C. A. 423, 92 
 
 Fed. 421 701, 721 
 
 V. Northern P. E. Co. 125 
 
 Fed. 1.55 75, 817 
 
 Webb V. Vermont C, R. Co. 9 
 
 Fed. 793 255 
 
 Webber v. Mihills, 59 C. C. A. 
 
 577, 124 Fed. 64 670 
 
 Weber v. Rogan, 188 U. S. 14, 47 
 L. ed. 365, 23 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 263 751 
 
 Weber Bros. v. Grand Lodge, F. 
 & A. M. 96 C. C. A. 410, 
 171 Fed. 840 657 
 
 Webster v. Oliver Ditson Co. 171 
 
 Fed. 895 390, 586 
 
 Webster v. Willis, 56 Tex. 468 . . 
 
 Wecker v. National Enameling 
 & Stamping Co. 204 U. 
 S. 176, 51 L. ed. 430, 
 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 184, 9 
 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 757 
 
 346 
 
 861 
 802 
 
 Weed v. Centre & C. Street E. 
 
 Co. 132 Fed. 151 115 
 
 Weeks v. International Trust Co. 
 
 60 C. C. A. 236, 125 
 
 Fed. 370 87 
 
 Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U. S. 
 
 323, 39 L. ed. 172, 15 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 129 . . 12, 14 
 15, 19, 259 
 Weidenfeld v. Northern P. R. Co. 
 
 63 C. C. A. 537, 129 Fed. 
 
 311 224 
 
 Weir v. Bay State Gas Co. 91 
 
 Fed. 940 244 
 
 Weiss v. Haight & F. Co. 148 
 
 Fed. 399 564 
 
 Welch V. Cincinnati N. 0. & T. 
 
 P. R. Co. 177 Fed. 760 806 
 Weldon v. Fritzlen, 128 Fed. 609 844 
 
 859 
 Weller v. Hanaur, 105 Fed. 193 64 
 
 207, 208 
 V. J. B. Pace Tobacco Co. 
 
 32 Fed. 860 854 
 
 V. Pennsylvania R. Co. 113 
 
 Fed.' 503 115, 323, 326 
 
 Wellhouse, Re, 113 Fed. 962 .. 286 
 Wellman v. Bethea, 213 Fed. 370 615 
 Wells V. Clark, 136 Fed. 462, 
 
 overruled in 203 U. S. 
 
 164, 51 L. ed. 138, 27 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 43 789 
 
 Wells, F. & Co. V. Oregon R. & 
 
 Nav. Co. 15 Fed. 561 . . 349 
 Welsbach Light Co. v. Mahler, 
 
 88 Fed. 427 350, 351 
 
 Welsh V. Mandeville, 5 Cranch, 
 
 321, 3 L. ed. 113 763 
 
 Wenham v. Switzer, 48 Fed. 612 517 
 
 518, 523 
 Werner v. Murphy, -60 Fed. 769 179 
 Werner Stave Co. v. Smith, — 
 
 Tex. Civ. App. ~, 120 
 
 S. W. 247 324 
 
 Wescott V. Wayne Agri. Works, 
 
 11 Fed. 303 254 
 
 West V. Brashear, 12 Pet. 101, 9 
 
 L. ed. 1016 717 
 
 V. Brashear, 14 Pet. 54, 10 
 
 L. ed. 351 768 
 
 V. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. 
 
 R. Co. 170 Fed. 349 .. 328 
 840 
 
clvi 
 
 TABLE 01' CASES. 
 
 West V. East Coast Cedar Co. 51 
 C. C. A. 416, 113 Fed. 
 
 743 484, 581, 634 
 
 635, 636 
 V. Irwin, 4 C. C. A. 401, 9 
 U. S. App. 547, 54 Fed. 
 419 691, 694, 706, 716 
 
 West Chicago Street R. Co. v. 
 Ellsworth, 23 C. C. A. 
 393, 46 U. S. App. 603, 
 77 Fed. 664 .. .707, 715, 716 
 
 Western Air Line Constr. Co. v. 
 McGillls, 127 U. S. 777, 
 32 L. ed. 325, 8 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 1390 686 
 
 Western & A. R. Co. v. Rober- 
 son, 9 C. C. A. 646, 22 
 U. S. App. 187, 61 Fed. 
 592 80, 109 
 
 Western Assur. Co. v. Polk, 44 
 C. C. A. 104, 104 Fed. 
 
 649 728 
 
 V. Ward, 21 C. C. A. 378, 
 41 U. S. App. 443, 75 
 Fed. 342 23 
 
 Western Cottage Piano & Organ 
 Co. V. Anderson, 97 Tex. 
 432, 70 S. W. 516 326 
 
 Western Div. of Western N. C. R. 
 Co. V. Drew, 3 Woods, 
 691, Fed. Gas. No. 
 17,434 563 
 
 Western Electric Co. v. Capital 
 Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 86 
 
 Fed. 770 517 
 
 V. Reedy, 66 Fed. 164 33 
 
 V. \Mlliams-Abbott Electric 
 Co. 48 C. C. A. 159, 108 
 Fed. 953 626 
 
 Western Loan & Sav. Co. v. 
 Butte, & B. Consol. 
 Min. Co. 210 U. S. 368, 
 52 L. ed. 1101, 28 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 720 ..813, 832, 833 
 
 Western Turf Asso. v. Green- 
 berg, 204 U. S. 359, 51 
 L. ed. 520, 27 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 384 753 
 
 Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Amer- 
 ican Bell Teleph. Co. 50 
 
 Fed. 664 351 
 
 V. American Bell Teleph. Co. 
 
 105 Fed. 686 575, 577 
 
 V. Andrews, 154 Fed. 95 . . . 149 
 
 V. Ann Arbor R. Co. 178 U. 
 
 S. 244, 44 L. ed. 1054, 
 
 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 867 . . 151 
 
 654 
 
 V. Brown, 32 Fed. 339.. 70, 71 
 
 Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Call Pub. 
 
 Co, 181 U. S. 101, 45 L. 
 
 ed. 770, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 561 20 
 
 V. Campbell, 41 Tex. Civ. 
 
 App. 204, 91 S. W. 312 825 
 V. Cooper, 182 Fed. 710 ... 787 
 V. Eyser, 19 Wall. 428, 22 
 
 L. ed. 44 669, 686, 765 
 
 V. Frear, 216 Fed. 200 777 
 
 V. Julian, 169 Fed. 166 ... 150 
 V. Louisville & N. R. Co. 120 
 
 C. C. A. 257,-201 Fed. 
 
 922 476 
 
 V. Louisville & N. R. Co. 
 
 201 Fed. 934 93, 103 
 
 104, 237, 338, 776, 779, 803 
 811, 832 
 V. Louisville & N. R. Co. 
 
 208 Fed. 581 580, 792 
 
 803, 863 
 V. Luck, 91 Tex. 178, 66 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 869, 41 S. W. 
 
 469 850 
 
 V. Southeast & St. L. R. Co. 
 
 125 C. C. A. 466, 208 
 
 Fed. 266 822 
 
 V. White, 102 Fed. 705 824 
 
 V. Wilson, 213 U. S. 52, 53 
 
 L. ed. 693, 29 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 403 746, 752 
 
 Westervelt, Re, 39 C. C. A. 350, 
 
 98 Fed. 912 772 
 
 V. Library Bureau, 55 C. C. 
 
 A. 436, 118 Fed. 825 . . 417 
 419 
 Westfeldt v. North Carolina 
 
 Min. Co. 100 C. C. A. 
 
 552, 177 Fed. 132 . .555, 580 
 Westheider v. Wabash R. Co. 115 
 
 Fed. 840 82 
 
 Westinghouse Air-Brake Co. v. 
 
 Christensen Engineering 
 
 Co. 44 C. C. A. 92, 104 
 
 Fed. 622 626, 627 
 
 v. Great Northern R. Co. 31 
 
 C. C. A. 525, 59 U. S. . 
 _ App. 592, 88 Fed. 261 . . 95 
 ■c Kansas City Southern R. 
 
 Co. 71 C. C. A. 1, 137 
 
 Fed. 31 295, 299 
 
 Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. 
 
 Co. V. Jefferson Electric 
 
 Light Heat & P. Co. 128 
 
 Fed. 751 410 
 
 Westinghouse Electric Mfg. Co. 
 
 V. Troell, 30 Tex. Civ. 
 
 App. 200, 70 S. W. 324 322 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clvii 
 
 Westinghouse Maeh. Co. v. Elec- 
 tric Storage Battery Co. 
 
 165 Fed. 992 499, .511 
 
 513, 514 
 V. Electric Storage Battery 
 to. 25 L.R.A.(N.S.) 
 673, 95 C. C. A. 600, 170 
 
 Fed. 432 510, 512, 513 
 
 T. Press Pub. Co. 110 Fed. 
 
 254 328 
 
 Weston V. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 
 
 7 L. ed. 481 43, 827 
 
 West Pub. Co. V. Edward Thomp- 
 son Co. 151 Fed. 142 . . 527 
 
 529 
 V. Edward Thompson Co. 
 
 152 Fed. 1019 538 
 
 West Side E. Co. v. California 
 
 P. R. Co. 200 Fed. 333 816 
 V. California P. K. Co. 202 
 
 Fed. 333 804 
 
 West Virginia v. King, 112 Fed. 
 
 3G9 797, 835 
 
 Wetherby v. Stinson, 10 C. C. A. 
 
 '243, 18 U. S. App. 714, 
 
 62 Fed. 175 52, 54 
 
 Wetmore v. Karriek, 205 U. S. 
 
 141, 51 L. ed. 745, 27 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 434 615 
 
 V. Rvmer, 169 U. S. 120, 42 
 
 h. ed. 684, 18 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 203 129, 132, 172 
 
 174, 200, 203, 222, 549, 808 
 Wetzel V. ilinnesota R. Transfer 
 
 Co. 12 C. C. A. 490, 27 
 
 U. S. App. 594, 65 Fed. 
 
 26 10 
 
 Whalen v. Enterprise Transp. 
 
 Co. 164 Fed. 96 484 
 
 V. Gordon, 37 C. C. A. 70, 
 
 95 Fed. 305 198, 207 
 
 Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 658, 
 
 8 L. ed. 1079 20 
 
 Wheeler v. Abilene Nat. Bank 
 
 Bltlg. Co. 16 L.R.A. 
 
 (N.S.) 892, 89 C. C. A. 
 
 482, 159 Fed. 391, 14 
 
 Ann. Cas. 917 243 
 
 V. Walton & W. Co. 65 Fed. 
 
 722 313, 319 
 
 Wheeling Bridge & Terminal R. 
 
 Co. V. Cochran, 15 C. 
 
 C. A. 321, 25 U. S. App. 
 
 306, 68 Fed. 143 680 
 
 Wheelwright v. St. Louis, N. O. 
 
 & O. Canal & Transp. 
 
 Co. 50 Fed. 709 102 
 
 Whelan v. Manhattan R. Co. 86 
 
 Fed. 219 678 
 
 Whelan v. New York, L. E. & W. 
 R. Co. 1 L.R.A. 65, 35 
 
 Fed. 849 842, 845 
 
 Wheless v. St. Louis, 180 U. S. 
 379, 45 L. ed. 583, 21 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 4&2, 96 
 
 Fed. 866 175, 186 
 
 Whitaker v. Davis, 91 Fed. 721 555 
 \A hitcomb v. Hooper, 27 C. C. A. 
 19, 53 U. S. App. 410, 
 
 81 Fed. 946 331, 334 
 
 V. Smithson, 175 U. S. 637, 
 44 L. ed. 305, 20 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 248 838 
 
 White V. Bower, 48 Fed. 188 . . 17 
 
 449 
 V. Bruce, 48 C. C. A. 400, 
 
 109 Fed. 364 ..667, 737, 768 
 V. Crow, 110 U. S. 184, 28 
 L. ed. 113, 4 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 71 608 
 
 V. Ewing, 159 U. S. 39, 40 
 L. ed. 68, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. ]018 182, 257, 484 
 
 V. Iowa Nat. Bank, 17 C. C. 
 A. 621, 36 U. S. App. 
 
 260, 71 Fed. 97 603 
 
 V. Joyce, 158 U. S. 147, 39 
 L. ed. 928, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 788 617 
 
 V. Miller. See White v. 
 Joyce. 
 
 V. Tacoma, 109 Fed. 32 148 
 
 V. Toledo St. L. & K. C. R. 
 Co. 24 C. C. A. 467, 51 
 U. S. App. 54, 79 Fed. 
 
 133 522 
 
 Whitehead v. Entwhistle, 27 Fed. 
 
 781 16, 26 
 
 V. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 152, 
 34 L. ed. 874, 11 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 276 12, 13 
 
 17, 18, 25, 29, 259, 260 
 Whitehead & H. Co. v. O'Calla- 
 
 han, 130 Fed. 243 532 
 
 White Swan Mines Co. v. Balliet, 
 
 334 Fed. 1004 230 
 
 Whitford v. Clark County, 119 
 
 a. S. 524, 30 L. ed. 
 
 500, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 306 409 
 
 545. 540 
 
 Whiting V. Bank of United 
 
 States, 13 Pet. 13, 10 L. 
 
 ed. 36 604 
 
 V. Equitable Life Aasur. Soc. 
 8 C. C. A. 558, 13 U. 
 S. App. 597, 60 Fed. 
 
 197 586 
 
 Whitman v. Hubbell, 30 Fed. 81 189 
 
clviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES, 
 
 Whitman College v. Berryman, 
 
 156 Fed. 112 146, 190 
 
 Whitney, Ex parte, 13 Pet. 404, 
 
 10 L. ed. 221 228 
 
 V. Fairbanlc, 54 Fed. 986 . . 23 
 V. Fox; 166 U. S. 648, 41 L. 
 
 ed. 1149, 17 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Kep. 713 281 
 
 Whitside v. Haselton, 110 U. 8. 
 
 297, 28 L. ed. 153, 4 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1 756 
 
 Whitsitt V. Union Depot & R. 
 
 Co. 122 U. S. 363, 30 
 
 L. ed. 1150, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 1248 678 
 
 Whittaker v. Illinois C. R. Co. 
 
 176 Fed. 131 95 
 
 Whittemore v. Patten, 81 Fed. 
 
 528 429,435 
 
 V. Patten, 84 Fed. 51 423 
 
 433, 449 
 Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U. S. 
 
 238, 40 L. ed. 410, 16 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 297 7 
 
 Whitworth v. Illinois C. R. Co. 
 
 107 Fed. 557 831 
 
 Wichita v. Missouri & K. Teleg. 
 
 Co. 122 Fed. 100 822 
 
 Wichita Nat. Bank v. Smith, 19 
 
 C. C. A. 42, 36 U. S. 
 
 App. 530, 72 Fed. 568 853 
 Wickelman v. A. B. Dick Co. 29 
 
 C. C. A. 436, 57 U. S. 
 
 App. 196, 85 Fed. 851 664 
 677, 678, (d3, 684 
 Widaman v. Hubbard, 88 Fed. 
 
 812 485 
 
 Wiemer v. Louisville Water Co. 
 
 130 Fed. 244 . . .22, 61, 129 
 Wiggins V. Bethune, 29 Fed. 51 59 
 Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio & M. 
 
 R. Co. 142 U. S. 415, 
 
 35 L. ed. 1061, 12 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 188 283, 286 
 
 358, 403, 730 
 
 Wight, Re, 134 U. S. 136 586 
 
 Wilbur V. Red Jacket Consol. 
 
 Coal & Coke Co. 153 
 
 Fed. 662 836 
 
 Wiley V. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58, 
 
 45 L. ed. 84, 21 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 17 642 
 
 Wilkins V. Queen City Sav. 
 
 Bank & T. Co. 154 Fed. 
 
 173 326 
 
 Wilkins Shoe-Button Fastener 
 
 Co. V. Webb, 89 Fed. 
 
 989 300 
 
 Willard v. Chicago, B. & Q. R, 
 
 Co. 91 C. C. A. 215, 165 
 
 Fed. 181 818 
 
 V. Spartanburg, U. & C. R. 
 
 Co. 124 Fed. 797 817 
 
 T. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 569, 19 
 
 L. ed. 504 10 
 
 V. Wood, 135 U. S. 309, 34 
 
 L. ed. 210, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 831 277 
 
 Willcox v. Jones, 101 C. C. A. 84, 
 
 177 Fed. 870 256 
 
 William Grace Co. v. Henry Mar- 
 tin Brick Mach. Mfg. 
 
 Co. 98 C. C. A. 167, 174 
 
 Fed. 132 326 
 
 Williams v. Bankhead, 19 Wall. 
 
 571, 22 L. ed. 184 228 
 
 231, 233, 237 
 V. Benedict, 8 How. 112, 12 
 
 L. ed. 1008 247 
 
 V. Clafflin, 103 U. S. 753, 26 
 
 L. ed. 606 684, 766 
 
 V. Conger, 131 U. S. 391, 33 
 
 L. ed. 201, 9 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 793 602 
 
 V. Crabb, 59 L.R.A. 425, 54 
 
 C. C. A. 213, 117 Fed. 
 
 193 249, 300 
 
 V. First Nat. Bank, 216 U. 
 
 S. 582, 54 L. ed. 625, 30 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 441 753 
 
 754 
 V. Gold Hill Co. 96 Fed. 457 112 
 V. Jackson, 107 U. S. 484, 
 
 27 L. ed. 531, 2 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 814 289 
 
 V. Massachusetts Ben. Asso. 
 
 47 Fed. 534 784 
 
 V. Morgan, 111 U. S. 696, 
 
 28 L. ed. 564, 4 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 638 464, 700, 702 
 
 V. Neely, 69 L.R.A. 232, 67 
 C. C. A. 171, 134 Fed. 
 1 22, 408 
 
 V. Nottowa, 104 U. S. 212, 
 
 26 L. ed. 720 199, 130 
 
 217, 222, 549, 554 
 
 V. United States, 137 U. S. 
 113, 34 L. ed. 590, 11 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 43 547 
 
 Williamson v. American Bank, 
 
 109 Fed. 36 245 
 
 V. Krohm, 13 C. C. A. 668, 
 31 U. S. App. 325, 66 
 Fed. 656 82, 83, 235 
 
 V. Liverpool L. & G. Ins. Co. 
 72 C. C. A. 542, 141 
 Fed. 54, 5 A. & E. Ann. 
 Cas. 402 149 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clix 
 
 Williamaon v. Monroe, 101 Fed. 
 
 322 30 
 
 Williams Patent Crusher & Pul- 
 verizer Co. V. Kinsey 
 Mfg. Co. 205 Fed. 375 446 
 Williard v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. 
 Co. 91 C. C. A. 215, 165 
 
 Fed. 181 802 
 
 V. Spartanburg, U. & C. R. 
 
 Co. 124 Fed. 801 75 
 
 Williston V. Raymond, 213 Fed. 
 
 528 470, 770 
 
 Willitt V. Baker, 133 Fed. 937 260 
 
 WUls V. Pauly, 51 Fed. 257 240 
 
 Wilmer v. Atlanta & R. Air-Line 
 K. Co. 2 Woods, 409, 
 Fed. Cas. No. 17, 775 . . 313 
 Wilmington City R. Co. v. Tay- 
 lor, 198 Fed. 160 148 
 
 Wilson V. Blair, 119 U. S. 387, 
 30 L. ed. 441, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 230 205 
 
 V. Brochon, 95 Fed. 82 . . 140 
 V. Giberson, 124 Fed. 701 . . 778 
 
 804 
 V. Hastings Lumber Co. 103 
 
 Fed. 801 59 
 
 V. Kiesel, 164 U. S. 252, 41 
 L. ed. 423, 17 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 124 697, 705 
 
 V. Knox County, 43 Fed. 481 211 
 214, 215, 216, 221 
 V. Xorth Carolina, 169 U. S. 
 595, 42 L. ed. 871, 18 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 435 ..553, 750 
 V. Oswego Twp. 151 U. S. 03, 
 38 L. ed. 74, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 259 52, 73, 231 
 
 234, 235, 813 
 V. Plutus Min. Co. 98 C. C. 
 
 A. 189, 174 Fed. 320 . . 284 
 V. Riddle, 123 U. S. 615, 31 
 L. ed. 283, 8 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 255 13 
 
 V. Smith, 06 Fed. 81 . , 835, 864 
 V. Smith, 61 C. C. A. 446, 
 
 126 Fed. 919 582, 633 
 
 V. Western U. Co. 34 Fed. 
 
 561 784 
 
 Wilson Packing Co. v. Hunter, 8 
 Biss. 429, Fed. 'Cas. No, 
 
 17,852 113 
 
 Winchester Repeating Arms Co. 
 V. Butler Bros. 128 Fed. 
 
 978 191 
 
 Wind River Lumber Co. v. 
 Frankport Marine, Acci. 
 & Plate Glass Ins. Co. 
 116 C. C. A. 160, 196 
 Fed. 343 809, 810 
 
 Winkler v. Chicago 4, E. I. R. 
 
 Co. 108 Fed. 305 . .270, 
 Winn, Re, 213 U. S. 459, 53 
 
 L. ed. 873, 29 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 515 45, 
 
 822, 
 V. Wabash R. Co. 118 Fed. 
 
 55 81, 
 
 Winter v. Koon, 132 Fed. 273 . . 
 Winters v. Drake, 102 Fed. 545 
 
 V. Ethell, 132 U. S. 209, 33 
 L. ed. 339, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 56 
 
 V. United States, 207 U. S. 
 564, 52 L. ed. 340, 28 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207 
 
 Winthrop Iron Co. v. Meeker, 
 
 109 U. S. 183, 27 L. ed. 
 
 899, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. Ill 
 Wirgaman v. Persons, 62 C. C. 
 
 A. 63, 126 Fed. 449 ... 
 Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U. S. 
 
 379, 24 L. ed. 668 .... 
 V. Pelican Ins. Co. 127 U. S. 
 
 300, 32 L. ed. 246, 8 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1370 . . . 
 Wisconsin C. R. Co. v. Phoenix 
 
 Ins. Co. 123 Fed. 989 . . 
 Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. v. 
 
 Jocobson, 179 U. S. 294, 
 
 45 L. ed. 197, 21 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 115 
 
 Wise V. Nixon, 78 Fed. 204 .... 
 
 158, 160, 
 
 Wisner, Ex parte, 203 U. S. 449, 
 
 51 L. ed. 264, 27 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 150 776, 
 
 833, 
 Witters v. Sowles, 31 Fed. 5 . . 
 
 V. Sowles, 32 Fed. 131 
 
 V. Sowles, 32 Fed. 705 
 
 V. Sowles, 43 Fed. 405 .... 
 
 Woerishofler, Re, 21 C. C. A. 
 
 175, 41 U. S. App. 411, 
 
 74 Fed. 915 077, 
 
 700, 
 Wolf V. Lovering, 86 C. C. A. 
 
 281, 159 Fed. 91 
 
 Wolfe V. Hartford Life & An- 
 nuity Ins. Co. 148 U. S. 
 389, 37 L. ed. 493, 13 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 602 ..52, 
 125 271- 
 Wolff V. Archibald, 14 Fed.' 369 
 V. Choctaw, 0. & G. R. Co. 
 
 133 Fed. 601 53, 
 
 109, 110, 
 
 799 
 
 151 
 
 828 
 
 82 
 343 
 823 
 862 
 
 038 
 
 698 
 699 
 
 634 
 
 056 
 
 38 
 
 40 
 
 177 
 
 727 
 152 
 104 
 
 813 
 84<) 
 600 
 001 
 585 
 OOO 
 578; 
 
 082 
 703 
 
 22 
 
 97 
 273 
 
 274 
 
 94 
 133 
 
clx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Wollensak v. Reiher, 115 U. S. 
 
 101, 29 L. ed. 351, 5 
 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1137 . . . 
 Wong Him v. Callahan, 119 Fed. 
 
 381 386, 
 
 Wong Sang v. United States, 7o 
 
 C. C. A. 383, 144 Fed. 
 
 Wood V. Brown, 43 C. C. A. 474, 
 104 Fed. 207 
 
 V. Collins, 8 C. C. A. 522, 
 23 U. S. App. 224, 60 
 Fed. 142 
 
 V. Davis, IS How. 467, 1.5 
 L. ed. 460 230, 235, 
 
 V. Davis, 108 Fed. 130 
 
 400 
 392 
 
 720 
 687 
 
 443 
 
 839 
 
 478 
 618 
 
 V. Deskins, 72 C. C. A. 558, 
 
 141 Fed. 507 66 
 
 V. Drake, 70 Fed. 881 . . 140, 143 
 Woodbury v. Shawneetown, 20 
 C. C. A. 400, 34 U. S. 
 App. 655, 74 Fed. 205 674 
 Woodridge v. McKenna, 8 Fed. 
 
 679 207 
 
 Woodrum v. Clay, 33 Fed. 899 810 
 Woods, Re, 143 U. S. 205, 36 L. 
 ed. 126, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 
 417 737, 738 
 
 V. Bailey, 111 Fed. 121 .... 678 
 V. Woodson, 40 C. C. A. 525, 
 
 100 Fed. 515 252, 337 
 
 338, 340 
 Woodside v. Ciceroni, 35 C. C. 
 
 A. 177, 93 Fed. 1 ..62, 193 
 Woodson County v. Toronto 
 
 Bank, 128 Fed. 157 ... 807 
 862 
 Woodwortli v. Northwestern 
 Mut. L. Ins. Co. 185 U. 
 S. 354, 46 L. ed. 945, 22 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 676 688 
 
 Woolridge v. McKenna, 8 Fed. 
 
 660 " 59, 246 
 
 Wooster v. Clark, 9 Fed. 854 .. 517 
 V. Gumbirnner, 20 Fed. 167 563 
 568, 571 
 V. Handy, 22 Blatchf. 307, 
 
 21 Fed. 51 601 
 
 Worcester County, Re, 42 C. C. 
 
 A. 637, 102 Fed. 810 . . 638 
 Workingraen's Amalgamated 
 
 Council V. United 
 States, 6 C. C. A. 258, 
 13 U. S. App. 426, 57 
 
 Fed. 85 630 
 
 World's Columbian Exposition 
 V. United States, 6 C. 
 C. A. 58, 18 U. S. App. 
 42, 56 Fed. 667 654 
 
 Wright, Re, 134 U. S, -136, 33 
 L. ed. 865, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 487 585 
 
 V. Gorman-Wright Co. 81 C. 
 
 C. A. 534, 152 Fed. 408 733 
 V. Hollingsworth, 1 Pet. 168, 
 
 7 L. ed. 98 350 
 
 V. ilacFarlane, 58 C. C. A. 
 
 570, 122 Fed. 770 «28 
 
 653, 658, 659 
 V. Nagle, 101 U. S. 791, 25 
 
 L. ed. 921 156 
 
 V. Skiimer, 3 36 Fed. 694 .. 126 
 
 274 
 
 Wrightman v. Boone County, 31 
 
 C. C. A. 570, 60 U. S. 
 
 App. 100, 88 Fed. 437 
 
 Wrightsville Hardware Co. v. 
 
 Colwell, 180 Fed. 589 . . 
 
 Wurts v. Hoagland, 105 U. S. 
 
 702, 26 L. ed. 1110 
 
 Wylie Permanent Camping Co. 
 
 V. Lynch, 115 C. C. A. 
 
 288, 195 Fed. 386 
 
 Wyly v. Richmond & D. R. Co. 
 
 03 Fed. 487 857, 
 
 Wyman v. Bowman, 62 C. C. A. 
 
 189, 127 Fed. 257 .. .30, 
 
 V. Wallace, 201 U. S. 230, 
 50 L. ed. 738, 26 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 495 
 
 659 
 
 803 
 
 686 
 765 
 
 325 
 
 858 
 
 31 
 226 
 
 87 
 
 Yarnell v. Felton, 102 Fed. 369 796 
 
 812, 823 
 V. Felton, 104 Fed. 161 .. 162 
 796, 812, 823 
 Yates V. Jones Nat. Bank, 206 
 U. S. 167, 51 L. ed. 
 1009, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 638 753 
 
 Yazoo & M. Valley E. Co. v. 
 Adams, 180 U. S. 20, 45 
 L. ed. 406, 21 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 240 84, 154 
 
 155, 749 
 
 V. Adams, 180 U. S. 45, 45 
 
 L. ed. 417, 21 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 256 .... 157, 748, 761 
 
 Yeandle v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 
 
 95 C. C. A. 282, 169 Fed. 
 
 941 45, 732 
 
 Yellow Aster Min. & Mill Co. 
 V. Crane Co. 80 C. C. 
 A. 566, 150 Fed. 580 . . 776 
 829 
 
TABLE OB" CASES. 
 
 clxi 
 
 Yonley v. LaTander, 21 Wall. 
 
 276, 22 L. ed. 536 24 
 
 247 
 York County Sav. Bank v. Ab- 
 bott, 131 Fed. 983 127 
 
 343, 34,3 
 V. Abbott, 139 Fed. 993 . . 344 
 
 345 
 Youmans v. Minnesota Title Ins. 
 
 & T. Co. U7 Fed. 284 . . 322 
 Young V. Gushing, 4 Biss. 4.")6, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 18,156 . . 204 
 V. Mercantile Trust Co. 140 
 
 Fed. 61 400 
 
 Youngstown Coke Co. v. Andrews 
 
 Bros. Co. 79 Fed. 669 . . 85 
 Younts V. Southwestern Teleg. & 
 Teleph. Co. 192 Fed. 
 
 200 813, 829 
 
 Youtsey v. Hoflfman, 108 Fed. 
 
 699 797, 817, 818 
 
 820, 859 
 Y'sleta V. Canada, 67 Fed. 8 . . 801 
 
 805 
 
 Z. 
 
 Zadig V. Baldwin, 166 U. S. 488, 
 41 L. ed. 1088, 17 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 639 ..673, 748, 751 
 
 Zambrino \. Galveston, H. & S. 
 
 A. R. Go. 38 Fed. 449 114 
 
 Zeillin \ . Rogers, 10 Sawy. 200, 
 
 21 Fed. 103 360 
 
 Ziegler v. Lake Street Elev. R. 
 Co. 22 G. C. A. 465, 46 
 U. S. App. 242, 76 Fed 
 663 243, 244 
 
 Zimmerman v. So Relle, 25 C. 
 C. A. 518, 4!) r. S. App. 
 
 387, 80 Fed. 417 408 
 
 415, 416, 479 
 
 ZyCh V. American Car & Foundry 
 
 Co. 127 Fed. 724 ". .495 
 
 500, 507, 513, 515, 544, 790 
 
A FEDERAL 
 
 EQUITY SUIT. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE FEDEBAL SYSTEM. 
 
 It is not my purpose to discuss the inconvenience and per- 
 haps uselessness of a divided system of law and equity in the 
 administration of justice in the Federal courts. It may be 
 that it is adhering to a practice too vague and shadowy for the 
 eye of common sense to perceive its utility ; it may be that such 
 a division has introduced discrepancies, fluctuations, and even 
 anomalies in the whole tenor of our laws ; it may be that equity 
 as a supplement to the imperfections of the common law should 
 be blended with it to perfect judicial procedure ; it may be that 
 the tenacity with which the Federal system has retained a di- 
 vided practice, long since abandoned by those from whom we 
 inherited it, is unaccountable and astonishing; and, lastly, it 
 may be that the chasm between law and equity, as administered 
 by the Federal courts, is an unnecessary pitfall to the lawyers 
 in the States having a blended system in practice and procedure, 
 when they seek admission or are removed to the Federal courts ; 
 and it may be that if it were in their power they would break 
 this graven image in the Federal temple of justice; yet the 
 fact obstinately faces them, that the condition is a reality, and 
 theorizing on a better method is useless. We have with us a sys- 
 tem which recognizes the distinction between law and equity 
 
 in practice and procedure, and the possibility of a change to 
 S. Eq.— 1. 
 
2 THE FEDBEAL SYSTEM. 
 
 conform to our blended system may be in the womb of the fu- 
 ture, but no shadow is yet cast telling of the coming event. 
 Taking into consideration this fact, and the vast jurisdiction 
 of the Federal courts, the profession, instead of shrinking from 
 contact vdth the system, should be pressing forward to master 
 its intricacies. 
 
 These courts have original cognizance of all suits of a civil 
 nature, both in law and equity, concurrent with the courts of 
 the State, subject to certain limitations. The limitations as 
 they now exist require that the matter in dispute exceeds the 
 sum of three thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs, 
 and arises under the Constitution and laws of the United 
 States, or treaties made, or to be made; between citizens of 
 different States ; between citizens of a State and foreign States, 
 citizens and subjects; and between citizens of the same State 
 claiming land under a grant from a different State. 
 
 It will be seen that a Federal court has jurisdiction concur- 
 rent with the courts of the State between citizens of a State 
 when a Federal question arises dependent upon a proper con- 
 struction of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United 
 States ; between citizens of a State and citizens of other States ; 
 between citizens of a State and aliens in any matter of dispute 
 within the rule of value and amount as above stated. The pro- 
 vision for jurisdiction between citizens of a State claiming land 
 under a grant from a different State has no application in many 
 States. 
 
 It will be seen that the field of jurisdiction of these courts, 
 applicable alike to common law and equity, is of vast extent; 
 then consider with it that Texas is only in its swaddling clothes 
 of development, and her possibilities must be developed by for- 
 eign capital, whose citizens and subjects would be anxious to 
 escape the local influence connected with our State courts in 
 the event of litigation, and you may catch a glimpse of the trend 
 and extent of the litigation of the future, and into what jurist- 
 diction it will be naturally drawn. 
 
 Again, consider the illimitable reach of that Federal octopus 
 commonly known as the 14th Amendment to the Constitution 
 of the United States, which keeps up the flood-tide of Federal 
 litigation, and of which it was said by Mr. Justice Miller, in 
 Davidson v. JS^ew Orleans, 96 U. S. 9Y, 24 L. ed. 616, "Though 
 
THE fedj;kal system. 3 
 
 it Las been in the Constitution of the United States but a few 
 years, the docket is crowded with cases in which the court is 
 asked to hold that a State court or a State legislature has de- 
 prived someone of property without due process of law.'' 
 
 This distinguished jurist goes on to say that "there seems to 
 be some strange misconception of its scope and power," and he 
 intimates that it is looked upon as a means of bringing into the 
 Federal court, the abstract opinion of every unsuccessful litigant 
 in a State court, and the merits of the State legislation upon 
 which it was founded, for its decision. 
 
 This apparent rebuke to the profession has never checked the 
 volume or variety of the questions that seek protection under 
 this particular Federal wing. Out of the cases in which the 
 Amendment has been set up in one form or another, there has 
 been deduced this rule : That the action which may be obnox- 
 ious to the 14th Amendment does not mean simply legislative 
 action, but applies to all instrumentalities and agencies officially 
 employed in the. execution of the law down to the point where 
 personal and property rights of a citizen ai-e touched, and 
 whether the agencies of the State be executive, legislative, or 
 judicial. Eogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 231, 48 L. ed. 417, 
 24 Sup. Ct. Kep. 257; Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442, 44 
 L. ed. 839, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 687 ; Mobile & 0. E. Co. v. Ten- 
 nessee, 153 U. S. 486, 38 L. ed. 793, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 968; 
 Scott V. MclSTeal, 154 U. S. 45, 38 L. ed. 901, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 1108 ; Chicago, B. & Q. E. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 41 
 L. ed. 979, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 581. 
 
 In addition to this vast field of concurrent jurisdiction, thus 
 briefly alluded to, there is an extensive exclusive jurisdiction 
 which will be referred to hereafter. 
 
 The System is Fixed hy the Constitution. 
 
 But it may be asked, What is the objection to administering 
 this jurisdiction under the blended system familiar to the pro- 
 fession of many of the States ? The reply is that the Federal 
 courts cannot adopt the blended system, nor can Congress 
 change the present Federal system, because it is fixed by the 
 Constitution of the United States. 
 
 By article 3, section 2, of the Constitution, it is provided 
 
4 THE FEDEBAL SYSTEM. 
 
 that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all 
 eases, both in law and equity, arising, etc. Kansas v. Colorado, 
 206 U. S. 46, 51 L. ed. 956; 27 Sup. Ot. Eep. 655. 
 
 The 7th Amendment recognizes again the distinction between 
 law and equity by declaring that in suits at common law the 
 right of trial by jury shall be preserved. 
 
 The 11th Amendment declares the judicial power shall not 
 be construed to extend to any suit in law and equity prosecuted 
 against the State. 
 
 These articles of the Constitution have been construed to be 
 a clear recognition that law and equity should be administered 
 separately in the Federal system. 
 
 From the passage of the act ^/eating the Federal system, in 
 1789, to the last jurisdictional act in 1888, the jurisdiction of 
 the United States courts has been declared to extend to all suits 
 of a civil nature, both in law and equity, and in the act of Sep- 
 tember 24, 1789, embodied in U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 723, it is 
 declared that suits in equity shall not be sustained in the United 
 States courts in any case where a plain, adequate, and complete 
 remedy at law may be had. 
 
 In section 913 of U. S. Eev. Stat. Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1536, passed in 1789, and amended in 1792, and known as 
 the process act, it is provided that the forms and mode of pro- 
 cedure in equity shall be according to the rules and usages of 
 courts of equity; and section 917, U. S. Eev. Stat., gives power 
 to the Supreme Court of the United States to prescribe rules of 
 practice in courts of equity. 
 
 In construing these various statutes recognizing the distinct 
 nature of these courts and a distinct procedure for each, they 
 have been declared to be but a recognition of the constitutional 
 requirements in organizing the Federal system. 
 
 It has been repeatedly stated by the Suprenae Court that 
 the State legislation could not change it, and that "suite in 
 equity" as designated by the Constitution were suits in which 
 relief was sought in accordance with the principles and prac- 
 tice of equity jurisdiction as established in the High Court of 
 Chancery in England. Alger v. Anderson, 92 Fed. 700 ; Black- 
 burn V. Selma, M. & M. E. Co. 3 Fed. 692, 693 ; Pennsylvania 
 V. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co. 18 How. 462, 15 -L. ed. 450; 
 Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. S. 205, 37 L. ed. 1053, 14 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 75. 
 
THE FEDEBAL SYSTEM. 5 
 
 In the early case of Eobinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212, 
 4 L. ed. 372, the question arose whether a mere equitable title 
 could be set up as an answer in ejectment. Justice Todd, in 
 rejecting the defense, says: "The acts of Congress have dis- 
 tinguished between common law and equity, and the courts of 
 the United States must administer remedies, not according to 
 the practice of the State courts, but according to the principles 
 of common law and equity as distinguished and defined in that 
 country from which the knowledge of the principles came." 
 
 In Bennett v. Butterworth (a Texas case), 11 How. 669, 
 13 L. ed. 859, Taney, Chief Justice, says: Whatever may be 
 the laws of Texas with reference to pleading and practice, they 
 cannot govern the United States courts to such an extent as 
 would confound the principles of law and equity, or admit the 
 blending of legal and equitable defenses in the same suit. He 
 further declares, "that the Constitution of the United States, 
 creating and defining the judiciary powers of the national gov- 
 ernment, establishes the distinction between law and equity; 
 and if the suit be an equitable one it must proceed under equita- 
 ble rules prescribed for the courts of the United States." 
 
 Equity jurisdiction, then, is vested, as a part of the judicial 
 power of the Federal government, in separate courts by the Con- 
 stitution and acts of Congress. (Fenn v. Holme, 21 How. 484, 
 485, 487, 16 L. ed. 199, 200 ; Berkey v. Cornell, 90 Fed. 717 ; 
 Thompson v. Central Ohio E. Co. 6 Wall. 137, 18 L. ed. 767 ; 
 Noonan v. Lee (ISToonan v. Braley) 2 Black, 509, 17 L. ed. 
 281) and the distinction is recognized as a matter of substance, 
 as well as of form and procedure. Green v. Mills, 30 L.E.A. 
 90, 16 C. C. A. 516, 25 U. S. App. 383, 69 Fed. 857 ; Owens 
 V. Heidbreder, 24 C. C. A. 362, 41 U. S. App. 736, 78 Fed. 
 837 ; Cates v. Allen, 149 U. S. 451, 37 L. ed. 804, 13 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 883, 977 ; Gravenberg v. Laws, 40 C. C. A. 240, 100 Fed. 
 4 ; Berkey v. Cornell, supra. But not only is this true, but the 
 Federal courts have been extremely jealous to guard the equity 
 jurisdiction against limitation or restraint by reason of State 
 legislation creating or limiting remedies. Thus guarded, it is 
 the only court in the United States that maintains uniformity in 
 practice and procedure in all of the States, and in this respect 
 the only national court in the whole judicial system. McManus 
 
6 THE FEDEEAL SYSTEM. 
 
 V. ChoUar, 63 0. C. A. 454, 128 Fed. 902; Pittsburgh, C. & 
 St. L. R Co. V. Keokuk & H. Bridge Co. 15 0. C. A. 184, 
 46 U. S. App. 530, 68 Fed. 21 ; Louisville & N. K. Co. v. Rail- 
 road Commission, 157 Fed. 944; Mississippi Mills v. Oohn, 
 150 U. S. 204, 37 L. ed. 1053, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 75; Payne 
 V. Hook, 7 Wall. 430, 19 L. ed. 261; Smith v. Ft. Scott, H. & 
 W. R. Co. 99 U. S. 401, 25 L. ed. 438. 
 
 Equity Rule 90, promulgated pursuant to U. S. Rev. Stat, 
 sec. 917, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1543, provides that in the 
 absence of any rule in the Supreme Court, the practice in 
 equity shall be regulated by the present practice of the High 
 Court of Chancery in England. This rule was left out of the 
 new rules. See new rule 81. Alger v. Anderson, 92 Fed. 696, 
 699, but this rule is abrogated by new rule 81. 
 
 I have thus called attention to a few of the decisions fixing 
 the status of courts of equity in the Federal system. We have 
 with us, then, a court wherein the practice and procedure dif- 
 fers from our State system. It is a court of vast jurisdiction, 
 and eminently progressive in increasing it. It is guarded from 
 limitation of restraint by State legislation, and whether its 
 practice and procedure are unfamiliar or distasteful to the State 
 Bar or not, there can be no change except through a change 
 in the Federal Constitution, of which there is no reasonable 
 hope. So we face a condition imbedded in Federal jurispru- 
 dence, which, I regret to say, many State lawyers have not ap- 
 preciated, but have been disposed to look upon it with sensi- 
 tive prejudice, and disinclined to approach it with any desire 
 to master its practice or understand its procedure. For some 
 reason the tendency has been to look upon it as a foreign court 
 in our midst; out of harmony with the system familiar to us; 
 and arousing our jealousy as year by year we have watched it 
 plume its wings for bolder flights of jurisdiction. This should 
 not be ; this court is a part of the judicial system, and as much 
 an instrument of remedial justice in every Stat© as the State 
 courts, and we. should so recognize it, and, rather than ignore 
 or resist, should equip ourselves to intelligently direct its great 
 powers within the limitations of the Constitution. 
 
 Our State Constitutions declare "the Constitution and laws of 
 the United States to be the supreme law of the land," and to 
 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM. 7 
 
 preserve that supremacy it became necessary to provide a judi- 
 cial system, and vest in it a jurisdiction that could best effect 
 this purpose. Const, of IT. S. art. 6, cl. 2, also declares this su- 
 premacy. Nashville, C. & St. L. K. Co. v. Taylor, 86 Fed. 171 ; 
 Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U. S. 238, 40 L. ed. 410, 16 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 297; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 818, 
 6 L. ed. 223. 
 
 The wisdom of our fathers created the system, great judges 
 have given to it shape and form, and though, viewed from 
 its modern surroundings, there appears quaintness and want 
 of harmony with our ideas, yet it is none the less efficient in 
 securing justice, for which alone we should strive. 
 
 I will remark in passing that our blended system of admin- 
 istering law and equity has not escaped criticism, and I will 
 briefly refer to some expressions of the Supreme Court of the 
 United States in which its efficiency has been doubted. 
 
 Several of the early cases in which the Supreme Court of the 
 United States was called upon to define the separate jurisdic- 
 tions of law and equity, went up from Texas, as it was some- 
 what of a pioneer in this blended procedure. In Green v. Cus- 
 tard, 23 How. 484, 16 L. ed. 471, the court said: "Because 
 the case originated in the courts of Texas the counsel were per- 
 mitted to turn it into a written wrangle, instead of requiring 
 them to plead as lawyers in a court of law." The court further 
 said it had occasion to notice before the consequences resulting 
 from this hybrid system of pleading being permitted in the 
 administration of justice in that State. The reference was to 
 Randon v. Toby, 11 How. 493, 13 L. ed. 784, and McFaul v. 
 Eamsey, 20 How. 523, 15 L. ed. 1010. Concluding, the court 
 says : "The case at bar adds another example of utter perplex- 
 ity and confusion of mind introduced into the administration 
 of justice by practice under such methods." In Jones v. Mc- 
 Masters, 20 How. 8, 15 L. ed. 805, the court said that many 
 of the cases at law coming up from that State are greatly em- 
 barrassed from the want of observance of the distinction be- 
 tween law and equity. I allude to these cases, not only to show 
 that there is not an univercal appreciation of our blended sys- 
 tem, but to show the spirit of our ancestors during the forma- 
 tion period of the Federal system, and why they have handed 
 down to us the divided system of practice and procedure. 
 
8 THE FEDERAL SYSTEM. 
 
 Since the above was written Congress by act of March 3d, 
 1915, adding section 274 (b) to the Judicial Code, has pro- 
 vided that in all actions at law equitable defenses may be inter- 
 posed by answer, plea, or replication; the defendant having 
 the same rights as if he had filed a bill in equity embodying 
 the defense and seeking relief where affirmative relief is thus 
 sought in a suit at law, the plaintiff must put the facts alleged 
 in issue by filing a replication, and review of the judgment or 
 decree may be by error or appeal. 
 
 The distinction between law and equity, which from the 
 foundation of the government has been declared to be, under 
 the Constitution of the United States, a matter of substance as 
 well as of form and procedure (Bennett v. Butterworth, 11 
 How. 669, 13 L. ed. 859), has been seriously modified by this 
 act permitting the blending of legal and equitable claims in a 
 suit at law ; for, as seen, it specifically provides that affirmative 
 equitable relief may be set up in the lawsuit by answer, plea, or 
 replication. 
 
 Is the act constitutional ? See Schurmeier v. Connecticut 
 Mut. L. Ins. Co. 96 C. C. A. 107, 171 Fed. 16, in which it 
 is declared "that no legislative act can change it," and authori- 
 ties there cited. See dicta in Whitcomb v. Shultz, 138 0. C. A. 
 510, 223 Fed. 275, 
 
CHAPTER TI. 
 
 MAXIMS. 
 
 As to what are matters of equitable cognizance, such as eqiii- 
 table titles, rights, and interests, it is not intended to discuss ' 
 in these lectures, further than to illustrate the practice and 
 procedure in the conduct of a suit in equity in the Federal 
 courts. The distinctive principles upon which general equity 
 jurisdiction rests, and the nature, character, and extent of the 
 jurisdiction, has already been discussed in my lectures on 
 Equity Jurisprudence. I have endeavored to state there the 
 rules by which you are to test the facts in hand, and by which 
 you may conclude with reasonable certainty whether your cause 
 of action be of equitable cognizance or not. 
 
 I am now attempting only a modest guide through the ap- 
 parent intricacies of a suit in equity in a Federal court, and 
 therefore I shall principally speak of the practice and proceed- 
 ing's which regulate this character of suit, from the filing of the 
 bill to the final decree; that is, I take up the procedure after 
 you have determined that your cause of action is an equitable 
 one, and proceed with it to a final decree in the courts of last 
 resort. Before entering into the successive steps to be taken 
 in a suit on the eqiiity side of the Federal court, it is necessary 
 to refresh your memories as to certain conditions that must ex- 
 ist to give you any standing in a court of equity, e\'en though 
 your cause of action be an equitable one, and in this connection 
 to especially call your attention to section 723 of the Revised 
 Statutes of the United States, which embodies in mandatory 
 form an ancient rule of equity jurisdiction. 
 
 The conditions referred to are contained in the maxims of 
 equity, which I will here restate: 
 
 First. You must come into equity with clean hands. Knapp 
 V. S. Jarvis Adams Co. 70 C. C. A. 536, 135 Fed. 1008, 1015 ; 
 
 9 
 
lO MAXIMS. 
 
 Camors-McConnell Co. v. McConnell, 140 "Fed." 412, 72 C. C. 
 A. 681, 140 Fed. 987; Edward Thompson Co. v. American 
 Law Book Co. 62 L.E.A. 607, 59 C. C. A. 148, 122 Fed. 922; 
 Manhattan Medicine -Co. v. Wood, 108 U. S. 218, 27 L. ed. 
 706, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436 ; Creath v. Sims, 5 How. 204, 12 L. 
 ed. 117. 
 
 Second. In asking equity you must have done or prepared 
 to do equity. Stewart v. Wright, 77 C. C. A. 499, 147 Fed. 
 346 ; Brown, B. & Co. v. Lake Superior Iron Co. 134 U. S. 535, 
 33 L. ed. 1024, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 604; McQuiddy v. Ware, 
 20 Wall. 14, 22 L. ed. 311; Hager v. Thomson, 1 Black, 94, 
 17 L. ed. 45; Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235, 25 L. ed. 339; 
 Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 569, 19 L. ed. 504; Duff v. Hop- 
 kins, 33 Fed. 609 ; ISTeblett v. MacFarland, 92 U. S. 101, 23 
 L. ed. 471. 
 
 Third. Equity considers that done which ought to»,have 
 been done, and that left undone which ought not to have been 
 done. Taylor v. Longworth, 14 Pet. 172, 10 L. ed. 405 ; War- 
 ner V. New Orleans, 31 C. C. A. 238, 59 U. S. App. 131, 87 
 Fed. 829; Morris v. United States, 174 U. S. 196, 43 L. ed. 
 946, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 649 ; Moore v. Crawford, 130 IT. S. 128, 
 32 L. ed. 880, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 447; Casey v. Cavaroc, 96 U. 
 S. 467, 24 L. ed. 779. 
 
 Fourth. Equality is equity. United States Rubber Co. v. 
 American Oak Leather Co. 181 U. S. 434, 45 L. ed. 938, 21 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 670 ; Glover v. Patten, 165 U. S. 394, 41 L. ed. 
 760, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 411. 
 
 Fifth. When equities are equal the first in time prevails. 
 Boone v. Chiles, 10 Pet. 177, 9 L. ed. 388; FitzSimmons v. 
 Ogden, 7 Cranch, 2, 3 L. ed. 249 ; Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 
 U. S. 1, 50 L. ed. 913, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 408, 571; :Nreslin v. 
 Wells, F. & Co. 104 U. S. 428, 26 L. ed. 802. 
 
 Sixth. When equities are equal the law prevails. Town- 
 send V. Little, 109 U. S. 504, 27 L. ed. 1012, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 357 ; Simmons v. Ogle, 105 U. S. 278, 26 L. ed. 1090. 
 
 Seventh. Equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber 
 upon their rights. New York v. Pine, 185 U. S. 98, 46 L. 
 ed. 823, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 592 ; Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U. 
 S. 368, 36 L. ed. 738,. 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 873; Wetzel v. Minne- 
 sota R. Transfer Co. 12 C. C. A. 490, 27 U. S. App. 594, 65 
 
MAXIMS. 11 
 
 Fed. 26 ; Citizen's Say. & T. Co. v. Belleville & S. I. E. Co. 84 
 C. C. A. 577, 157 Fed. 73. 
 
 Eighth. Equity follows the law. Aldrich v. Campbell, 38 
 C. C. A. 347, 97 Fed. 669 ; Magniac v. Thompson, 15 How. 
 281, 14 L. ed. 696 ; Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107, 22 L. 
 ed. 72 ; Gamewell Fire- Alarm Teleg. Co. v. Laporte, 42 C. C. 
 A. 405, 102 Fed. 420. 
 
 Ninth. Equity finds a remedy for every wrong. Southern 
 California v. Eutherford, 62 Fed. 797 ; Toledo, A. A. & N. M. 
 ■R Co. V. Pennsylvania, 19 L.E.A. 387, 5 Inters. Com. Eep. 
 522, 54 Fed. 741. 
 
 The application of these maxims were illustrated in my 
 equity lectures by both Federal and State authority, and it 
 was made apparent that a clear comprehension of their mean- 
 ing was necessary in solving any doubts as to the proper rem- 
 edy. So, without further observation on these maxims, I will 
 proceed at once to the discussion of section 723 of the Eevised 
 Statutes of the United States. 
 
 Section 723. 
 
 This statute is one of the principal tests of jurisdiction in 
 equity, that is, it is axiomatic in its nature, and universal in its 
 application, and is in these words: "Suits in equity shall not 
 be sustained in either of the courts of the United States [cir- 
 cuit and district] in any case where a plain, adequate, and com- 
 plete remedy may be had at law." This act is held to control 
 procedure in Federal courts. Jones v. Mutual Fidelity Co. 123 
 Fed. 506 ; Thompson v. Central Ohio E. Co. 6 Wall. 137, 18 
 L. ed. 767. 
 
 This rule is the test of equitable jurisdiction. Ibid. ; Eoot 
 V. Lake Shore & M. S. E. Co. 105 U. S. 207, 215-216, 26 L. 
 ed. 981, 984; Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Bonner Mercantile Co. 
 11 L.E.A. 623, 44 Fed. 155 ; McMullen Lumber Co. v. Stroth- 
 er, 69 C. C. A. 433, 136 Fed. 302. 
 
 The rule is as old as the recorded history of chancery courts 
 of England. Payne v. Kansas & A. Valley E. Co. 46 Fed. 552 ; 
 Lewis v. Cocks, 23 Wall. 470, 23 I . ed. 71, from whence the 
 Federal system was derived. See Equity rule 90 ; Pennsyl- 
 vania V. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co. 18 How. 462, 15 L. ed. 
 
12 MAXIMS. 
 
 450 ; Grether v. Wright, 23 C. C. A. 498, 43 U. S. App. 770, 
 75 Fed. 742. It grew out of the failure of the common law 
 to meet new social conditions, and the refusal of the common- 
 law courts to apply remedies to wrongs arising out of the com- 
 plex rights and duties of an advancing civilization. As said 
 by Mr. Pomeroy : "The common-law courts were closed against 
 a large and ever increasing class of rights and remedies, and 
 a distinct tribunal, with a broader and more flexible jurisdic- 
 tion and mode of procedure, became absolutely necessary, or 
 else justice had to be denied." Pom. Eq. Jur. 3d ed. § 23. 
 Whatever may have been its origin, it came to us with the sys- 
 tem of equity practice of the High Court of Chancery which 
 this country adopted, as shown by Equity Rule 90. Boyle 
 V. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 658, 8 L. ed. 536 ; Lewis v. Shainwald, 48 
 Eed. 493 ; as to the force of rule 90, Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 
 430, 19 L. ed. 261. ' 
 
 It may be asked, then, why did Congress emphasize the rule 
 by embodying it in an act, and in the particular mandatory 
 form in which it appears, as, "Suits in equity shall not," etc. ? 
 The language was intended to impress upon the Eederal judges 
 that the rule should be construed in the light of the 7th Amend- 
 ment to the Constitution of the United States, guarantying 
 trial by jury in all matters not clearly of equitable cognizance, 
 This Amendment was contemporaneous with the passage of the 
 act embodying section 723 ; that is, the Amendment was pro- 
 posed five days after the passage of the act. Alger v. Ander- 
 son, 92 Fed. 700; Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 446, 7 L. ed. 
 736; Grether v. Wright, supra; Smith v. American ISTat. Bank, 
 32 C. C. A. 368, 60 U. S. App. 431, 89 Eed. 838; White- 
 head V. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 151, 34 L. ed. 874, 11 Sup. Ot. 
 Rep. 276; Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U. S. 323, 39 L. ed. 
 172, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 129. 
 
 Trial by jury in civil as well as criminal cases was among 
 the privileges our ancestors most cherished, and it found ex- 
 pression in this 7th Amendment to the Federal Constitution in 
 the following words: "In all suits at common law, when the 
 value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of 
 trial by jury shall be preserved." The mandatory form of sec- 
 tion 723 was intended to breathe somewhat the spirit of this 
 Amendment, and require a liberal construction in behalf of the 
 
MAXIMS. ]^3 
 
 right to have issues of fact determined by a jury, instead of 
 by a chancellor (Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 150, 151, 
 34 L. ed. 874, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 276; Scott v. ISTeely, 14o'u. s! 
 109, 35 L. ed. 359, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 712; Strang v. Eich- 
 mond, P. & C. E. Co. 93 Fed. 74, 75), because every case con- 
 strued to be within the jurisdiction of equity virtually with- 
 drew the issues from trial by a jury, as in cases in chancery 
 both fact and law were determined by a chancellor. U. S. Eev. 
 Stat. sec. 648, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1584. 
 
 True, a chancellor may send issues of fact to a jury at his 
 pleasure, but the finding is only advisory, or for his informa- 
 tion, which he may regard or not, for he is in no way bound 
 by it. Flippen v. Kimball, 31 C. C. A. 282, 59 U. S. App. 1, 
 87 Fed. 258 ; Oil Well Supply Co. v. Hall, 63 C. C. A. 343, 
 128 Fed. 878; Wilson v. Eiddle, 123 U. S. 615, 31 L. ed. 283, 
 8 Sup. Ct. Eep. 255; Perego v. Dodge, 163 U. S. 165, 41 L. 
 ed. 117, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 971, 18 Mor. Min. Eep. 364; Kohn v. 
 McjSTulta, 147 U. S. 238, 37 L. ed. 150, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 298; 
 Dillingham v. Hawk, 23 L.E.A. 517, 9 C. C. A. 101, 23 U. S. 
 App. 273, 60 Fed. 496. 
 
 By act of 1875 (1 U. S. Eev. Stat. Supp. 1874-1881, p. 
 136, sec. 2) it is specially provided that courts of equity in pat- 
 ent causes may impanel a jury of from five to twelve men to 
 examine issues of fact, but the verdict has no greater force than 
 as stated above. 
 
 Again, the power of the chancellor in England, through equi- 
 table processes and inventions, was ever an expanding one, and 
 tending to suppress jury trials, and it was reasonable to sup- 
 pose that this object lesson inspired the mandatory form of 
 the Federal statute, and was an effort to restrict this ancient ju- 
 risdiction. That this spirit, or purpose, of our forefathers has 
 imbued either the minds or hearts of our Federal judges in 
 perfecting the Federal equity system which now overshadows 
 the jurisprudence of these United States, has at least been 
 doubted by one of the great political parties of this country, if 
 we may judge from its battle cry of "down with government 
 by injunction." 
 
 The Federal courts were called upon to construe this section 
 723 at a very early period, and Ave find in Boyce v. Grundy, 
 3 Pet. 210, 7 L. ed. 655, Mr. Justice Johnson saying, "that 
 
14 MAXIMS. 
 
 since its passage in 1789 the court has been often called upoH 
 to construe this article, and has as often held it 'declaratory 
 only' making no alteration whatever in the rules of equity 
 on the subject of legal remedies." Mr. Justice Story, 
 in Bean v. Smith, 2 Mason, 2Y0, Fed. Cas. No. 1,174, says: 
 "Section 723 is in no sense intended to narrow the jurisdiction 
 of courts of equity as to proper subjects of relief in the courts 
 of equity in England, the reservoir of our system." Alger v. 
 Anderson, 92 Fed. 696, 697. Sixty years after the Supreme 
 Court in Wehrman v. Oonklin, supra, says "that section 723 
 has never been regarded as restricting the ancient jurisdiction 
 of courts of equity or to prohibit their exercise of concurrent 
 jurisdiction wi'th courts of law, where such jurisdiction has 
 been previously upheld." Thus we see that the Supreme Court 
 has adhered to the construction that this section was only "de- 
 claratory," and that its mandatory form was only intended to, 
 impress the ancient rule, but not thereby to restrict the ancient 
 jurisdiction of the courts of equity as exercised by the chancery 
 courts of England. Salton Sea Cases, 97 C. G. A. 214, 172 
 Fed. 792; Grether v. Wright, supra; Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. 
 li. Co. V. Keokuk, & H. Bridge Co. 15 C. C. A. 184, 46 U. S. 
 App. 530, 68 Fed. 20 ; Pokegama Sugar Pine Lumber Co. 
 V. Klamath River Lumber & Improv. Co. 96 Fed. 55. 
 
 With this general view of section 723 I will now proceed to 
 discuss its principal features and how it is to be set up as a 
 defensive pleading. I will divide the discussion into four 
 heads, as follows: 
 
 First. Construction of the words "remedy at law." 
 
 Second. Construction of the words "plain, adequate, and 
 complete." 
 
 Third. When it must be set up to be effective as a defense. 
 
 Fourth. When a court of equity will act, though not set up- 
 as a defense. 
 
CHAPTEE III. 
 
 Tliese words refer to the common law, and not the statute 
 law of a State, and it has been uniformly held to have reference 
 to the common law as it existed in 1789, when the section was 
 passed. Pokegama Sugar Pine Lumber Co. v. Klamath Kiver 
 Lumber & Improv. Co. 96 Fed. 55, 56; McConihay v. Wright, 
 121 U. S. 206, 30 L. ed. 933, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 940 ; Green v. 
 Turner, 98 Fed. 756; H. B. Claflin Co. v. Furtick, 119 Fed. 
 433; National Surety Co. v. State Bank, 61 L.E.A. 394, 56 
 C. C. A. 657, 120 Fed. 593 ; Jones v. Mutual Fidelity Co. 123 
 Fed. 507, 520. 
 
 Thus in Eobinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212, 4 L. ed. 372, 
 it is said that the "remedy at law," used in the statute, meant 
 remedies known to the common law when the act was passed in 
 1789 (Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. E. Co. v. Keokuk & H. Bridge 
 Co. 15 C. C. A. 184, 46 U. S. App. 530, 68 Fed. 20, 21 ; Al- 
 ger V. Anderson, 92 Fed. 697; McConihay v. Wright, supra), 
 such as, ejectment, debt, covenant, detinue, assumpsit, replevin, 
 and trespass. 
 
 The Federal courts have refused to recognize any change 
 made by the statutes of the various States in these remedies 
 when testing their jurisdiction under this act. Van !N"orden 
 V. Morton, 99 U. S. 378, 25 L. ed. 453 ; Wehrman v. Conklin, 
 155 U. S. 314, 39 L. ed. 167, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 129; Alderson 
 V. Dole^20 C. C. A. 280, 33 U. S. App. 460, 74 Fed. 30 ; Gorm- 
 ley V. Clark, 134 U. S. 338, 33 L. ed. 909, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 554; Empire Circuit Co. v. Sullivan, 169 Fed. 1009; Smyth 
 V. Ames, 169 U. S. 516, 42 L. ed. 838, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 418. 
 
 The rule may be stated as follows : If according to the com- 
 mon law in 1789 a right was legal, no subsequent declaration 
 of a State statute, declaring it equiiable, could give jurisdic- 
 tion to the equity courts of the Federal system, and if the 
 
 15 
 
16 EEMEDY AT LAW. 
 
 right was equitable, no State law declaring it a legal right 
 would deprive the Federal equity courts of jurisdiction. Al- 
 ger V. Anderson, 92 Fed. 697; Whitehead v. Entwhistle, 27 
 Fed. 781 ; Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. S. 204, 205, 37 
 L. ed. 1053, 1054, 14 Sup. Ot. Eep. 75. 
 
 To illustrate the rule: A located land certificate in Texas 
 has been declared by the State supreme court a legal right 
 (Adams v. House, 61 Tex. 639 ; Dupree v. Frank [Tex. Civ. 
 App.] 39 S. W. 994) ; yet if an action is brought on that cer- 
 tificate in the Federal courts to try title, you must sue on the 
 equity side. If the legislature had declared that the certificate 
 was a legal right, it would not give jurisdiction to a Federal 
 court of law, nor deprive its equity courts of jurisdiction, be- 
 cause the essential nature of a certificate for land is only an 
 equitable right, which legislation cannot change, unless it be an 
 act of Congress. Bennett v. Butterworth, 11 How. 674, 675, 
 13 L. ed. 861, 862; Schoolfield v. Rhodes, 82 Fed. 153; Scott 
 V. l^eely, 140 U. S. 110, 111, 35 L. ed. 360, 361, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 712 ; Thompson v. Central Ohio R. Co. 6 Wall. 137, 18 
 L. ed. 767; Fenn v. Holme, 21 How. 484-487, 16 L. ed, 199, 
 200. 
 
 Again, the rule is thoroughly settled that to oust the jurisdic- 
 tion of a court of equity the remedy at law must be such as is 
 known to the Federal courts, and it must be a remedy at law 
 in the Federal courts (Coler v. Stanley County, 89 Fed. 260; 
 United States L. Ins. Co. v. Cable, 39 C. C. A. 264, 98 Fed. 
 761-765 ; Scott v. ITeely, 140 U. S. Ill, 35 L. ed. 360, 11 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 712; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 
 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418), that is, a remedy existing in 1789, 
 and known to the common law. We have, then, the remedies in 
 Federal courts at common law or equity, "according to the es- 
 sential character of the case," and to be determined in the light 
 of the jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery and common- . 
 law courts of England in 1789, the date of the judiciary act. 
 Green v. Turner, 98 Fed. 756 ; Van ISTorden v. Morton, 99 U. 
 S. 380, 25 L. ed. 454; JSTew Orleans v. Louisiana Constr. Co. 
 129 U. S. 46, 32 L. ed. 607, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 223 ; Lindsay 
 V. First JSTat. Bank, 156 \J. S. 485, 39 L. ed. 505, 15 Sup. Ot. 
 Rep. 472 ; Peck v. Ayers & L. Tie Co. 53 C, C. A. 551, 116 
 Fed. 275. 
 
EEMEDT AT LAW. 17 
 
 You will see upon examination of the judiciary act of 1789, 
 of which section 723 is a part, it is provided that the laws of 
 the States shall be rules of decision in the Federal courts, but 
 it was early decided that it had no reference to proceedings in 
 equity. Rev. Stat. sec. 721, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1538; 
 Bucher v. Cheshire E. Co. 125 U. S. 582, 31 L. ed. 798, 8 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 971; Davis v. Davis, 18 C. C. A. 438, 30 U. S. App. 
 723, 72 Fed. 81-81; Johnston v. Roe, 1 McCrary, 162, 1 Fed. 
 695; Robinson v. Campbell, 3 \Y'heat. 223, 4 L. ed. 376; Penn- 
 sylvania R. Co. V. Allegheny Valley R. Co. 25 Fed. 115 ; Peck 
 V. Ayres & L. Tie Co. 53 C. C. A. 551, 116 Fed. 273; Kirby 
 V. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 120 U. S. 138, 30 L. ed. 572, 7 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 430 ; White v. Bower, 48 Fed. 188 ; Pittsburgh, 
 a & St. L. R. Co. V. Keokuk & H. Bridge Co. 15 C. C. A. 184, 
 46 U. S. App. 530, 68 Fed. 21. 
 
 It has been thoroughly settled that the jurisdiction of courts 
 of equity cannot be limited or enlarged by State legislation, nor 
 its general powers affected by such legislation. McConihay v. 
 Wright, 121 U. S. 206, 30 L. ed. 933, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 941; 
 United States I. Ins. Co. v. Cable, 39 C. C. A. 264, 98 Fed. 
 764; Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. S. 205, 37 L. ed. 1053, 
 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 75 ; Jones v. Mutual Fidelity Co., 123 Fed. 
 507; Spencer v. Watkins, 94 C. C. A. 659, 169 Fed. 379; 
 Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 430, 19 L. ed. 261 ; Orendorf v. Bud- 
 long, 12 Fed. 26; Bennett v. Butterworth, 11 How. 674, 675, 
 13 L. ed. 861, 862; Broderick's Will (Kieley v. McGlynn) 21 
 Wall. 520, 22 L. ed. 605; Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 
 152, 34 L. ed. 874, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 276. 
 
 While State statutes cannot control the jurisdiction of equity 
 courts in any way by declaring what is a legal or an equitable 
 cause of action, yet it must not be understood that the Federal 
 courts of equity will not enforce new rights and remedies or 
 new remedies for old rights created by State legislation, after 
 it has acquired jurisdiction based upon its own independent 
 grounds of determining it. A Federal equity court has an ex- 
 ceedingly wide discretion in applying remedies, and does noL 
 hesitate to enforce new rights or remedies provided by State 
 statutes, if they are substantially consistent with the ordinary 
 modes of chancery proceeding and practice. Harrison v. Rem- 
 ington Paper Co. 3 L.R.A.(X.S.) 954, 72 C. C. A. 405, 140 
 
 S. Eq.— 2. 
 
15 EEMEDT AT LAW. 
 
 Fed. 399, 5 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 314; Humes v. Little Rock, 
 138 Fed. 929 ; United States Shipbuilding Co. v. Oonklin, 60 
 C. 0. A. 680, 126 Fed. 135 ; Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 
 15, 28 L. ed. 52, 3 Sup. Ct. Kep. 495; Gormley v. Clark, 134 
 U. S. 338, 33 L. ed. 909, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 554; Jones v. Mu- 
 tual Fidelity Co. 123 Fed. 519; Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 
 tr. S. 146, 34 L. ed. 873, 11 Sup. Ct. Kep. 276 ; Sheffield Fur- 
 nace Co. V. Witherow, 149 U. S. 574, 37 L. ed. 853, 13 Sup. 
 Ct. Kep. 936; Land Title & T. Co. v. Asphalt Co. 62 C. 0. A. 
 23, 127 Fed. 2 ; Southern Pine Co. v. Hall, 44 C. C. A. 363, 
 105 Fed. 84 ; Massachusetts Ben. Life Asso. v. Lohmiller, 20 C. 
 C. A. 274, 46 U. S. App. 103, 74 Fed. 23. 
 
 It has been frequently declared that "a party, by going into 
 the national courts, does not lose any right or approprate rem- 
 edy of which he might have availed himself in the State courts 
 in the same locality." Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 221, 21 
 L. ed. 447, 453 ; Sawyer v. White, 58 C. C. A. 587, 122 Fed. 
 227 ; National Surety Co. v. State Bank, 61 L.RA. 394, 56 C. 
 C. A. 657, 120 Fed. 593 ; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Mor- 
 ris, 67 L.RA. 761, 66 C. C. A. 55, 132 Fed. 945 ; Cowley v. 
 Northern P. K. Co. 159 U. S. 582, 40 L. ed. 266, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 127. To illustrate : A State law may declare what fact 
 or act is a cloud upon title, and a Federal court of equity will 
 remove it. On the other hand, if the remedy or proceeding au- 
 thorized by the State court is not consistent wtih the ordinary 
 modes of equitable proceeding, the Federal court will not en- 
 force it. Thus a State statute authorizing a simple contract 
 creditor to set aside a conveyance made in fraud of creditors 
 will' not be enforced in the Federal courts of equity, as, ac- 
 cording to the principles of equity, the plaintiff must first re- 
 duce his debt to judgment before he can attack a fraudulent 
 conveyance. In a word, the defendant is entitled to a jury to 
 determine the existence of the debt, before it can be made the 
 basis of an equitable proceeding. Cates v. Allen, 149 U. S. 451- 
 456, 37 L. ed. 804-807, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 883, 977; D. A. 
 Tompkins Co. v. Catawba Mills, 82 Fed. 782 ; HoUins v. Brier- 
 field Coal & I. Co. 150 U. S. 379, 37 L. ed. 115, 14 Sup. Ct 
 Rep. 127 ; Hook v. Ayers, 12 C. C. A. 564, 24 U. S. App. 487, 
 64 Fed. 661 ; Strang v. Richmond, P. & C. E. Co. 41 C. C. A. 
 474. 101 Fed. 511. 
 
REMEDY AT LAW. 19 
 
 Clark T. Smith, 13 Pet. 195, 10 L. ed. 123, was one of the 
 earliest eases recognizing equitable rights created by State laws, 
 and presents a case where the laws of Kentucky enlarging the 
 remedy for quieting title bv one in possession was enforced by 
 the Federal court; and since that time many cases have fol- 
 lowed, enforcing new rights and remedies provided by State 
 laws. Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 21, 28 L. ed. 54-, 3 Sup. 
 Ct. Kep. 495 ; Greeley v. Lowe, 155 U. S. 58-75, 39 L. ed. 69- 
 75, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 24 ; Grether v. Wright, 23 C. C. A. 498, 
 43 U. S. App. 770, 75 Fed. 746 ; Harding v. Guico, 25 C. C. 
 A. 352, 42 U. S. App. 411, 80 Fed. 164; Bardon v. Land & 
 Kiver Improv. Co. 157 U. S. 330, 39 L. ed. 720, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 650; Darragh v. H. Wetter Mfg. Co. 23 C. C. A. 609, 
 49 U. S. App. 1, 78 Fed. 14; Missouri, K. & T. Trust Co. 
 V. Krumseig, 172 U. S. 361, 43 L. ed. 477, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 179 ; Lilienthal v. Drucklieb, 80 Fed. 563 ; Cowley v. North- 
 ern P. E. Co. 159 U. S. 582, 40 L. ed. 266, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 127 ; Reynolds v. Crawfordsville, 112 U. S. 410, 411, 28 L. 
 ed. 735, 736, 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 213 ; Chapman v. Brewer, 114 
 U. S. 170, 171, 29 L. ed. 87, 88, 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 799. But to 
 do this certain conditions must exist, to wit, the new right and 
 remedy given by statute must not involve in its enforcement the 
 blending of legal and equitable remedies, nor should the new 
 equitable remedy infringe on the right of trial by jury, 
 Thompson v. Central Ohio E. Co. 6 Wall. 137, 18 L. ed. 767 
 Hurt V. HoUingsworth, 100 U. S. 103, 25 L. ed. 570; Scott v, 
 Armstrong, 146 U. S. 512, 36 L. ed. 1063, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep 
 148 ; Greeley v. Lowe, 155 U. S. 75, 39 L. ed. 75, 15 Sup. Ct 
 Eep. 24; Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U. S. 323, 39 L. ed. 172, 
 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 129 ; Scott v. 'Seelej, 140 TJ. S. 110, 35 L. 
 ed. 360, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 712; Gates v. Allen, 149 U. S. 456, 
 37 L. ed. 807, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 883, 977. 
 
 A statute of a State declaring a right that would exist with- 
 out the statute will be enforced by the Federal courts at law or 
 in equity as it may fall. First Nat. Bank v. Peavey, 69 Fed.. 
 457, and authorities cited. 
 
 Federal Common Law. 
 
 It may be asked, in determining this remedy at law, if there 
 
20 REMEDY AT LAW. 
 
 is no Federal common law as distinct from the common law of 
 England and as it exists in the States. It is said in Western 
 U. Teleg. Co. v. Call Pub. Co. 181 U. S. 101, 45 L. ed. 770, 
 
 21 Sup. Ct. Kep. 561, that there is no body of Federal common 
 law separate and distinct from the common law existing in the 
 several States. Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 658, 659, 8 L. ed 
 1079, 1080; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 478, 31 L. ed. 512, 
 1 Inters. Com. Eep. 804, 8 Sup. Ct. Eep. 564; United States 
 V. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 655, 42 L. ed. 893, 18 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 456; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling B. Bridge Co. 13 How. 
 518, 14 L. ed. 249. 
 
 In Murray v. Chicago & IST. W. E. Co. 62 Fed. 24, Judge Shi- 
 ras, in an elaborate discussion of the conditions under which the 
 common law of England was adopted and modified to suit the 
 surroundings of the Colonies, says that the adoption of the Con- 
 stitiition and the creation of our national government with its co- 
 ordinate branches did not abrogate the common law or deprive 
 the people of its benefits, and the Federal courts are called upon 
 to apply its rules whenever the particular case requires it, where 
 there is no statute or other obligatory rule of decision. Western 
 U. Teleg. Co. v. Call Pub. Co. 181 U. S. 92, 45 L. ed. 765, 21 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 561 ; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 31 L. 
 ed. 508, 1 Inters. Com. Eep. 804, 8 Sup. Ct. Eep. 564. See 
 Swift & Co. V. Philadelphia & E. E. Co. 4 Inters. Com. Eep. 
 633, 58 Fed. 859. 
 
 While it is said that the United States has no "common law" 
 distinct from the common law of England as adopted by the 
 several States, yet in the light of the various decisions of the 
 Federal courts, it seems the statement can be challenged. These 
 courts have created a body of "general law," notably in inter- 
 state commercial transactions ; liability of railroads to servants 
 the "lex mercatoria" etc. ; and in matters of concurrent juris' 
 diction they have not hesitated to administer the law independ 
 ent of the decisions of State courts in many instances. Balti- 
 more & 0. E. Go. V. Baugh, 149 U. S. 370, 37 L. ed. 773, 13 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 914; Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix 
 Ins. Cn (The Montana) 129 U. S. 397, 32 L. ed. 788, 9 Sup. 
 'Ct. Rep. 469 ; Swift v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 5 Inters. Com. 
 Rep. 116, 64 Fed. 65 ; Ells v. St. Louis, K. & N". W, E. Co. 
 52 Fed. 903 and cases cited; Murray v. Chicago IST. W. R. Oo. 
 
EEMEDY AT LAW. 21 
 
 supra. See New York C. E. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 
 21 L. ed. 627. 
 
 Without multiplying cases, it will be clearly seen that the 
 Federal courts enforce "a common law," at least they have es- 
 tablished rules of action independent of congressional or State 
 laws and decisions, for the government and security of persons 
 and property, which is the definition of "common law" as given 
 by Kent. 
 
 A Federal court is not boxmd by the decision of a State court 
 as to what the common law is. Hocking Valley E. Co. v. New 
 York Coal Co. 132 C. C. A. 387, 217 Fed. 731. 
 
CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 "plain-, adequate, and complete." 
 
 The statute requires that in order to oust the jurisdiction of 
 equity there must not only be a remedy at law, but it must be 
 "plain, adequate, and complete." Section 723, now sec. 267, 
 new Judicial Code, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1244. Tarwell v. 
 Colonial Trust Co. 78 C. C. A. 22, 147 Fed. 480 ; Williams v. 
 ISTeely, 69 L.E.A. 232, 67 C. C. A. 171, 134 Fed. 1; Brown 
 V. Arnold, 67 C. C. A. 125, 131 Fed. 723 ; Wiemer v. Louis- 
 ville Water Co. 130 Fed. 246 ; Monmouth Invest. Co. v. Means, 
 80 C. C. A. 527, 151 Fed. 160; Miller v. Steele, 82 C. C. A. 
 572,. 153 Fed. 714; Wolf v. Lovering, 86 C. C. A. 281, 159 
 Fed. 91. This language leaves much to the discretion of the 
 chancellor, and the circumstances of each particular case must 
 control his discretion. Watson v. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74, 18 
 L. ed. 580; Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210, 7 L. ed. 655 ; Sullivan 
 V. Portland & K. E. Co. 94 U. S. 806, 24 L. ed. 324; Mutual 
 L. Ins. Co. V. Pearson, 114 Fed. 396. We have here the "open 
 door" through which the chancellor may escape from the man- 
 datory feature of section 723. The frequent construction of 
 the words "plain, adequate, and complete" has established cer- 
 tain rules by which these courts have been guided in assuming 
 jurisdiction, and are as follows: 
 
 First. It is not enough that there be a remedy at law, biit 
 it must, in the discretion of the chancellor, be as plain, practi- 
 cal, efficient, and speedy as the remedy in equity, in order to 
 decline jurisdiction in equity. Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 591, 
 16 L. ed. 229 ; Tyler v. Savage, 143 U. S. 95, 26 L. ed. 88, 12 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 340; Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 430, 19 L. ed. 
 261 ; Pokegama Sugar Pine Lumber Co. v. Klamath Eiver Lum- 
 ber & Improv. Co. 96 Fed. 55 ; Bank of Kentucky v. Stone, 
 88 Fed. 390 ; Smith v. American ISTat. Bank, 32 C. C. A. 368, 
 
 22 
 
PLAIN, ADEQUATE, AND COMPLETE, 23 
 
 60 U. S. App. 431, 89 Fed. 839 ■ Western Assur. Co. v. Ward, 
 21 0. C. A. 378, 41 U. S. App. 443, 75 Fed. 342 ; Brun v. 
 Mann, 12 L.RA.(KS.) 154, 80 C. C. A. 513, 151 Fed. 154; 
 Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co. 71 0. C. A. 213, 140 Fed. 816. 
 
 Second. That the legal remedy, both in respect of the final 
 relief and the mode of obtaining it, must be as efficient in law 
 as in equity. Ibid. ; Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co. 
 172 U. S. 12, 43 L. ed. 346, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 77 ; Kilbourn 
 V. Sunderland, 130 U. S. 505-515, 32 L. ed. 1005-1009, 9 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 594; Springfield Mill Co. v. Barnard & L. Mfg„ 
 Co. 26 C. C. A. 389, 49 U. S. App. 438, 81 Fed. 261; Schmidt 
 V. West, 104 Fed. 272. Thus a bill may be brought for a stock 
 of goods in the hands of a collector of customs, because they 
 cannot be replevied (U. S. Eev. Stat. 934, Comp. Stat. 1913, 
 sec. 1560). Pollard v. Eeardon, 13 C. C. A. 171, 21 U. S. 
 App. 639, 65 Fed. 849. See His Imperial Majesty v. Provi- 
 dence Tool Co. 23 Fed. 572. 
 
 Third. A court of equity is not justified in declining juris- 
 diction unless it appears that the legal remedy is neither ob- 
 scure or doubtful as to its adequacy or completeness. (Au- 
 thorities above.) However, inadequacy of the remedy at law 
 does not mean that it fails to produce the money, but that in its 
 nature and character it is not fitted or adapted to the end in 
 view. Thompson v. Allen County, 115 U. S. 554, 29 L. ed. 
 473, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 140; Eees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 124, 
 125, 22 L. ed. 77; Buzard v. Houston, 119 U. S. 352, 30 L. 
 ed. 453, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 249 ; Adams v. Murphy, 91 C. C. A. 
 272, 165 Fed. 305. Thus, if the suit be for money by way of 
 damages for fraud, a judgment at law is an adequate remedy, 
 even though you may not be able to collect it by the usual 
 process. This latter fact does not make the remedy inadequate 
 within the meaning of § 723, but should the agreement pro- 
 cured by fratid be of a continuing nature, and rescission be 
 necessary for complete relief, in addition to damages sought, 
 then the judgment at law is not adapted to the end in view, 
 and equity will take jurisdiction. Ibid. ; Alger v. Anderson, 
 92 Fed. 708; Shields v. McCandlish, 73 Fed. 320; Security 
 Sav. & L. Asso. v. Buchanan, 14 C. C. A. 97, 31 U. S. App. 
 244, 66 Fed. 801; Walker v. Brown, 58 Fed. 29, 30; Whit- 
 ney V. Fairbank, 54 Fed. 986; Baton v. Majors, 46 Fed. 211. 
 
24 PLAIN, ADEQUATE, AND COMPLETE. 
 
 Fourth. A remedy at law is not adequate if it depends on 
 the will of the opposing party. Thus, where an insurance com- 
 pany has delivered a policy through fraudulent representation 
 a court of equity will maintain a suit to have the policy sur- 
 rendered, and not force the complainant to await a suit at law. 
 In such cases the remedy at law is not as efficient and prompt 
 as in equity. Schmidt v. West, 104 Fed. 272, 274 ; Mutual L 
 Ins. Co. V. Pearson, 114 Fed. 397 ; United States L. Ins. Go. 
 V. Gable, 39 0. C. A. 264, 98 Fed. 761 ; Bank of Kentucky v. 
 Stone, 88 Fed. 383, 391 ; Union L. Ins. Co. v. Eiggs, 123 Fed. 
 317. 
 
 Fifth. The remedy at law to be adequate must be a remedy 
 at law in the Federal court, where jurisdiction in equity is 
 sought. Coler v. Stanley County, 89 Fed. 257 ; Smyth v. Ames, 
 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 Sup. Ot. Kep. 418; Jones v. 
 Mutual Fidelity Co. 123 Fed. 518; Brun v. Mann, supra; 
 United States L. Ins. Co. v. Cable, 39 C. C. A. 264, 98 Fed. 
 763, 764; Yonley v. Lavender, 21 Wall. 276, 22 L. ed. 536 r 
 Sheffield Furnace Co. v. Witherow, 149 U. S. 579, 37 L. ed. 
 856, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 936. It is not enough that there may 
 be a remedy at law in the State courts. Ibid. ; Brun v. Mann, 
 12 L.E.A.(]Sr.S.) 154, 85 C. C. A. 513, 151 Fed. 153, 154; 
 United States L. Ins. Co. v. Cable, 39 C. C. A. 264, 98 Fed. 
 761 ; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 517, 42 L. ed. 838, 18 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 418 ; Schmidt v. West, 104 Fed. 273. A party is not 
 compelled to go into a foreign jurisdiction to avail himself of 
 it (United States L. Ins. Co. v. Cable, supra) ; especially if 
 by going into such jurisdiction he would be deprived of the 
 right of introducing certain evidence that would be admissible 
 in equity ; or forfeit any right. Ibid. ; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. 
 Pearson, 114 Fed. 397. 
 
 These rules are only suggestions to the chancellor's discre- 
 tion. Wo iron-bound rule can be laid down, defining an ade- 
 quate remedy at law to defeat jurisdiction in equity. The cases 
 above cited show that if there be any fact in a case disabling 
 a party from bringing it fairly and fully before a court of law, 
 as when something is to be done, or some impediment to com- 
 plete relief to be removed before complete relief can be had, 
 then equity takes jurisdiction. Beloit v. Morgan, 7 Wall. 619, 
 17 L. ed. 205. 
 
PI^IN, ADBQTJATEj AND COMPLETE. 25 
 
 To illustrate : If you are suing to recover land upon a legal 
 title, your action is at law, but if your remedy goes beyond a 
 mere writ of possession in order to obtain complete enjoyment 
 of the land, then jurisdiction is in equity. 
 
 Courts of equity have been very complacent and indulgent to 
 themselves in cases of doubt. It is said, however, that equity 
 courts must find some sensible ground for taking jurisdiction, 
 and in the first mentioned case the court adopted the words 
 "probable cause" to express the basis for assuming jurisdiction 
 in equity. Waite v. O'iNTeil, 72 Fed. 353 ; Allen v. Pullman's 
 Palace Car Co. 139 U. S. 658, 35 L. ed. 303, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep, 
 682. I think it can be fairly stated that jurisdiction in equity 
 wiU be taken unless by doing so there is a violent invasion of 
 the jurisdiction of the court of law. Ibid. ; Cosmos Exploration 
 Co. V. Gray Eagle Oil Co. 61 L.K.A. 230, 50 C. C. A. 79, 112 
 Fed. 10, 21 Mor. Min. Eep. 638 ; Acord v. Western Pocahon- 
 tas Corp. 156 Fed. 997 ; Rumbarger v. Yokum, 174 Fed. 55. 
 Or, to state it in another form : When the suit is for a simple 
 recovery of money, without complications of any character, or 
 for the recovery of specific real and personal property, without 
 other process than a writ of possession, the jurisdiction is at 
 law; all else falls within the jurisdiction of equity. Scott v. 
 
 N'eely, 140 U. S. 110, 35 L. ed. 358, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 712; 
 
 Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 152, 34 L. ed. 874, 11 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Eep. 276. 
 
 To refuse jurisdiction there must be no symptom of equity 
 
 or equitable pretense, delusive or otherwise. Waite v. O'l^eil, 
 
 72 Fed. 354; Clark v. Wooster, 119 U. S. 326, 30 L. ed. 393, 
 
 7 Sup. Ct.,Eep. 217. 
 
 It will be found that bills in equity that have been dismissed 
 
 because of an adequate remedy at law embrace either a suit for 
 
 a pimple debt, or the recovery of a specific real or personal 
 
 property without other complications. Whitehead v. Shattuck, 
 
 138 U. S. 151, 34 L. ed. 874, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 276 ; Scott v. 
 
 IsTeely, supra ; Hipp v. Babin, 19 How. 278, 15 L. ed. 635 ; 
 
 Lewis V. Cocks, 23 Wall. 470, 471, 23 L. ed. 71 ; Hayward v. 
 
 Andrews, 106 U. S. 675, 27 L. ed. 272, 1 Sup. Ct. Eep. 544; 
 
 Gaines v. Miller, 111 H. S. 398, 28 L. ed. 467, 4 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 426 ; Indian Land & T. Co. v. Schoenfelt, 68 C. C. A. 
 
 196, 135 Fed. 485, 486. For reference I will give some of the 
 
26 PLAIN, ADEQUATE^ AND COMPLETE. 
 
 cases showing various conditions under which the rule has been 
 applied, and in which it was held that the remedy at law was 
 adequate and the bill dismissed. Thompson v. Central Ohio K. 
 Co. 6 Wall. 134, 18 L. ed. Y65 ; Scott v. E"eely, 140 U. S. 110, 
 111, 35 L. ed. 360, 361, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 712 ; Thompson v. 
 Allen County, 115 TJ. S. 550, 29 L. ed. 472, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 140; Buzard v. Houston, 119 U. S. 351, 30 L. ed. 452,. 7 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 249 ; Killian v. Ebbinghaus, 110 U. S. 568, 28 L. ed. 
 246, 4 Sup. Ct. Eep. 232; Hurt v. HoUingsworth, 100 U. S. 
 103, 104, 25 L. ed. 570, 571; United States v. Wilson, 118 
 TJ. S. 86, 30 L. ed. 110, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 991 ; Whitehead v. 
 Entwhistle, 27 Fed. 778 ; Lanier v. Alison, 31 Fed. 100 ; Morse 
 Arms Mfg. Co. v. Winchester Eepeating Arms Co. 33 Fed. 184; 
 Mills T. Knapp, 39 Fed. 595; Jaffrey v. Bear, 42 Fed. 569; 
 Walker v. Brown, 58 Fed. 23 ; Security Sav. & L. Asso. v. 
 Buchanan, 14 C. C. A. 97, 31 TJ. S. App. 244, 66 Fed. 801; 
 Walker v. Brown, 11 C. C. A. 135, 27 U. S. App. 291, 63 Fed. 
 205 ; Strang v. Eichmond, P. & C. E. Co. 93 Fed. 72-75 ; Al- 
 ger V. Anderson, 92 Fed. 699, 709, 712 ; Strang v. Eichmond, 
 P. & C. E. Co. 41 C. C. A. 474, 101 Fed. 517 ; Sewerage & 
 Water Board v. Howard, 99 C. C. A. 177, 175 Fed. 555 ; Boise 
 Artesian Hot & Cold Water Co. v.' Boise City, 213 U. S. 276, 53 
 L. ed. 796, 29 Sup. Ct. Eep. 426; United States v. Bitter Eoot 
 Development Co. 200 U. S. 451, 50 L. ed. 550, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 318, S. C. 66 C. C. A. 652, 133 Fed. 274; Ambler v. Choteau, 
 107 U. S. 586-591, 27 L. ed. 322-324, 1 Sup. Ct. Eep. 556; 
 McKinley v. Lloyd, 128 Fed. 519 ; Powell v. Louisville, 73 C. 
 C. A. 276, 141 Fed. 960 ; Farwell v. Colonial Trust Co. 78 0. 
 C. A. 22, 147 Fed. 480 ; Griesa v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 94 C. C. 
 A. 635, 169 Fed. 509; Pacific States Supply Co. v. San Fran- 
 cisco, 171 Fed. 727; Buchanan v. Adkins, 99 C. C. A. 246, 
 175 Fed. 692 ; Equitable Life Assur. Soc v. Brown, 213 U. S. 
 25, 53 L. ed. 682, 29 Sup. Ct. Eep. 404. 
 
CHAPTEK V. 
 
 ■WHEIT A COURT OF EQUITY WILL ENFORCE A PURELY LEGAL 
 
 REMEDY. 
 
 There is no question that a legal right will be enforced if 
 the remedy sought be equitable (Smith v. American Nat. Bank, 
 32 C. C. A. 368, 60 U. S. App. 431, 89 Fed. 889, 840) ; that 
 is to say, if some equitable relief is necessary to sustain or 
 support the legal right, siich as specific performance, rescis- 
 sion, reformation, or injunction, equity will take jurisdiction 
 and give both legal and equitable relief; but there are condi- 
 tions under which a court of equity will give a purely legal 
 remedy. The rule may be stated as follows : When a court of 
 equity has rightfully obtained jurisdiction, it will retain it for 
 complete relief though it be purely legal, as — 
 
 First. When jurisdiction is taken upon an alleged equity 
 which ceases before the suit ends, or is dissipated by the evi- 
 dence on the trial of the cause, the court will administer the 
 legal remedy. However, this rule is dependent upon the ut- 
 most good faith in setting up the equitable phase through 
 which the jurisdiction is sought. 
 
 Under the old rule if it should appear that the complainant 
 had no reasonable ground upon which to base the equity the 
 court should dismiss the bill, but by new rule 22 if the equi- 
 table ground is not good the court is required to transfer the 
 case to the law side, if the case is such that it should have 
 been brought as an action at law ; and requiring the plaintiff to 
 make such alterations in the pleading as shall be essential. 
 Cubbins v. Mississippi River Commission, 204 Fed. 308 ; 
 Goldschmidt Thermit Co. v. Primes Chemical Co. 216 Fed. 
 382, 225 Fed. 769; Collins v. Bradley, 227 Fed. 199. 
 
 By act of Congress of March 3d, 1915, it is provided that if 
 in any case brought in the Federal courts it should appear that 
 a suit in equity should have been brought at law or suit at 
 
 27 
 
28 WHEN EQUITY WILL ENPOECE A PUEELY LEGAL EEMEDY. 
 
 law should have been brought on the equity side, the court 
 shall order amendments to conform them to the proper prac- 
 tice. Any party at any stage of the proceedings may obviate 
 by amendment any objection that his suit is brought on the 
 wrong side of the court. The court shall proceed with the 
 cause as amended, and all evidence taken in the case is ad- 
 missible. (See Dismissal by Court, p. 548.) See Waldo v. 
 Wilson, — C. C. A. — , 231 Ted. 654. 
 
 In Clark v. Wooster, 119 U. S. 325, 30 L. ed. 392, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 217, it is said that if the case was one for equitable relief 
 the mere fact that the ground for such relief expired, etc., 
 would not take away the jurisdiction and preclude the court 
 from granting the relief belonging to the case as made. Gris- 
 wold V. Hilton, 87 Fed. 257; Waite v. O'lSTeil, 34 L.K.A. 550, 
 22 C. C. A. 248, 47 U. S. App. 19, 76 Fed. 408, 72 Fed. 
 348; Kirk v. DuBois, 28 Fed. 460; Shainwald v. Lewis, 69 
 Fed. 492; Hohorst v. Howard, 37 Fed. 97; Chambers v 
 Cannon, 62 Tex. 293, 294. 
 
 The rule of the text-books is that courts of equity should 
 not entertain jurisdiction of bills where damages or compensa- 
 tion in money, which are purely legal remedies, are sought, 
 except when they are purely incidents to equitable relief; and 
 when damages are so sought and there is no ground for the 
 equitable relief demanded, the bill should be transferred under 
 new rule 22. 
 
 Again, where there are no liens or trusts involved, or the 
 equitable features are not apparent, equity should decline juris- 
 diction. Dowell V. Mitchell, 105 U. S. 432, 26 L. ed. 1143; 
 Dakin v. Union P. R. Co. 5 Fed. 665 ; Beers v. Chicago, M. & 
 St. P. R Co. 73 C. C. A. 273, 141 Fed. 959. The case of Alger 
 V. Anderson, 92 Fed. 697-714, reviews the English and Ameri- 
 can cases, and sustains the rule as above stated. Root v. Lake 
 Shore & M. S. R. Co. 105 U. S. 189, 26 L. ed. 975 ; Dowell v. 
 Mitchell, 105 U. S. 430, 26 L. ed. 1142 ; Germain v. Wilgus, 
 14 C. C. A. 561, 29 U. S. App. 564, 67 Fed. 600; Corbin v. 
 Taussig, 137 Fed. 153 ; Strang v. Richmond, P. & 0. R. Co. 41 
 C. C. A. 474, 101 Fed. 515 ; India Rubber Co. v. Consolidated 
 Rubber Tire Co. 117 Fed. 355; Clark v. Wooster, 119 U. S. 
 325, 30 L. ed. 392, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 217; Cherokee jSTation v. 
 Southern Kansas R. Co. 33 Fed. 915 ; Killian v. Ebbinghaus, 
 110 U. S. 574, 28 L. ed. 248, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232 ; Buzard v. 
 
WHEN EQUITY WILL ENFORCE A PUEELT I-EGAL EEMEDT. 29 
 
 Houston, 119 IT. S. 351, 30 L. ed. 452, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 249 ; 
 Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 151, 84 L. ed. 874, 11 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 276; United States v. Bitter Root Development Co. 
 133 Fed. 274. (See reference cases cited at the end of chap- 
 ter 4.) But should send the case to the law side under rule 22. 
 This may be after the case proceeds (Destructor Co. v. Atlanta, 
 219 Fed. 1001), but in most of the cases cited, the equity set 
 up was a pretext. Ibid. ; Burdell v. Comstock, 15 Fed. 395 ; 
 Powell V. Louisville, 73 C. C. A. 276, 141 Fed. 961, 962 ; Tru- 
 man V. Holmes, 31 C. C. A. 215, 56 U. S. App. 739, 87 Fed. 
 743, 744; Lewis v. Cocks, 23 Wall. 469, 23 L. ed. 70; McDon- 
 ald V. Miller, 84 Fed. 345 ; Thompson v. Central Ohio E. Co. 
 6 Wall. 136, 18 L. ed. 767 ; United States v. Wilson, 118 U. S. 
 86, 30 L. ed. 110, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 991 ; Waite v. O'JSTeil, 72 
 Fed. 355. These cases do not militate against the rule, that if 
 jurisdiction existed when the bill was filed the mere fact that 
 the equity was dissipated during the trial would not exclude 
 incidental relief, though it be entirely legal. Hohorst v. How- 
 ard, supra; Clark v. Wooster, 119 U. S. 322, 30 L. ed. 392, 7 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 217; Waite v. O'lSTeil, supra; Cosmos Explora- 
 tion Co. V. Gray Eagle Oil Co. 61 L.E.A. 230, 50 C. C. A. 79, 
 112 Fed. 10, 21 Mor. Min. Eep. 633; Acord v. Western Poca- 
 hontas- Corp. 156 Fed. 997. 
 
 Under new rule 23 it is provided that where a matter ordi- 
 narily determinable at law arises in a suit in equity, such matter 
 shall be determinable in that suit according to the principles 
 applicable, without sending the case or question to the law side. 
 Goldschmidt Thermit Co. v. Primes Chemical Co. 216 Fed. 
 382; American Car & Foundry Co. v. Merchants' Despatch 
 Transp. Co. 216 Fed. 911 ; Goldschmidt Thermit Co. v. Primes 
 Chemical Co. 225 Fed. 769 ; Wright v. Barnard, 233 Fed. 329. 
 But the legal relief sought, for instance, as damages, should be 
 connected with or grow out of the alleged equity set up as the 
 ground of jurisdiction in equity^ There is nothing in this rule 
 preventing the court from sending a fact in issue to a jury 
 incident to the main question. Vosburg Co. v. Watts, 137 C. 
 C. A. 272, 221 Fed. 403 ; Metcalf v. American School Furniture 
 Co. 108 Fed. 911 ; Du Pont v. Abel, 81 Fed. 535. See Linden 
 Invest. Co. v. Honstain Bros. Co. 221 Fed. 178. 
 
 Second. When a suit in equity is necessary to settle a mat- 
 ter in issue between parties, the court will administer complete 
 
30 WHEN EQUITY WILL ENFOBCE A PUEELT LEGAL EEMEDT. 
 
 relief, though, as to some matters involved, adequate reliBf may 
 have been afforded by an action at law. Krohn v. Williamson, 
 62 Fed. 877 ; Union Cent. L. Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 41 C. C. A. 
 263, 102 Fed. 19; Williamson v. Monroe, 101 Fed. 322; Re 
 Leeds Woolen Mills, 129 Fed. 926. Equity rule 21. 
 
 Third. A court of equity will take cognizance of a contro- 
 versy to prevent a multiplicity of suits, although the exercise 
 of such jurisdiction calls for adjudication on purely legal rights 
 and to confer purely legal relief. The formula has been stated 
 as follows : "An adequate remedy at law does not exist where a 
 multiplicity of actions are required to obtain complete relief." 
 Oelrichs v. Spain (Oelrichs v. Williams) 15 Wall. 227, 21 L. 
 ed. 44; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Blair, 130 Fed. 971; Mills v. 
 Chicago, 127 Fed. 735; Smith v. Bivens, 56 Fed. 353; San- 
 ford V. Poe, 60 L.R.A. 641, 16 C. C. A. 305, 37 U. S. App. 378, 
 69 Fed. 546-548 ; Preteca v. Maxwell Land Grant Co. 1 C, 0. 
 A. 607, 4 U. S. App. 326, 50 Fed. 676; Dinsmore v. Southern 
 Exp. Co. 92 Fed. 714; Bausman v. Denny, 73 Fed. 70; Grand 
 Trunk Western E. Co. v. Chicago & E. I. E. Co. 73 C. 0. A. 
 43, 141 Fed. 795 ; General Electric Co. v. Westinghouse Elec- 
 tric & Mfg. Co. 144 Fed. 468 ; Tift v. Southern R. Co. 123 Fed. 
 790-795; Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Frank, 110 Fed. 695; 
 Ozark-Bell Teleph. Co. v. Springfield, 140 Fed. 666 ; Texas & 
 P. R. Co. V. Kuteman, 4 C. C. A. 503, 13 U. S. App. 99, 54 
 Fed. 553. 
 
 Where numerous persons have a community of interest, or 
 a common right or title in the subject-matter in controversy, 
 against a common adversary, involving the same questions of 
 law and fact, equity will take jurisdiction. Louisville, N. A. 
 & C. R. Co. V. Ohio Valley Improv. & Contract Co. 57 Fed. 
 45 ; Ulman v. Jaeger, 67 Fed. 980-983 ; Sang Lung v. Jack- 
 son, 85 Fed. 502 ; Osborne v. Wisconsin C. R. Co. 43 Fed. 824. 
 
 Again, wherever there is a common point of interest between 
 the complainant and several defendants separately liable, the 
 remedy at law is not as efficient as in equity (Wyman v. Bow- 
 man, 62 C. C. A. 189, 127 Fed. 257-264 and authorities 
 cited) ; but, as said in the last ease, "there is no hard and fast 
 rule by which jurisdiction in equity, on the ground of avoid- 
 ing a multiplicity of suits, can be determined;" and as said in 
 Hale V. Anderson, 188 ¥. S. 77, 47 L. ed. 392, 23 Sup. Ct. 
 
WHEN EQUITY WILL ENFORCE A PUEELY LEGAL REMEDY. 31 
 
 Rep. 244, "Each case, if not brought directly within the prin- 
 ciple of some preceding case, must be decided upon the sub- 
 stantial convenience of all parties, etc." Wyman v. Bowman, 
 supra. In Hosmer v. Wyoming R. & I. Co. 65 C. C. A. 81, 
 129 Ped. 888, the same rule is substantially stated, and it is 
 added that, "it often becomes a nice question whether the con- 
 venience of the complainant outweighs the inconvenience of the 
 defendants arising from the joinder of two or more causes of 
 action in a single suit, and whether the relation between the 
 causes of action is sufEciently apparent to present a common 
 point of controversy" (see authorities cited in this case). See 
 Buchanan Co. v. Adkins, 99 C. C. A. 246, 175 Fed. 791; 
 Hyman v. Wheeler, 33 Fed. 630 ; De Forest v. Thompson, 40 
 Fed. 375; Scruggs & Echols v. American Cent. Ins. Co. 36 
 L.E.A.(K.S.) 92, 100 C. C. A. 142, 176 Fed. 224. 
 
 Again, the complainant to invoke the jurisdiction must be 
 the party threatened and not the fact that the defendant may 
 be subjected to a multitude of suits. Thomas v. Council Bluffs 
 Canning Co. 34 C. C. A. 428, 92 Fed. 422; Mechanics' Ins. 
 Co. V. C. A. Hoover Distilling Co. 97 C. C. A. 400, 173 Fed. 
 892. See Headrick v. Larson, 81 C. C. A. 378, 152 Fed. 93. 
 
 Again, it is said in Boise Artesian Hot & Cold Water Co. 
 V. Boise City, 213 U. S. 286, 53 L. ed. 800, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 426, that "where the multitude of suits to be feared consists 
 in repetitions of suits by the same person against the complain- 
 ant for causes of action arising out of the same facts and legal 
 principles, a court of equity ought not to interfere upon that 
 ground, unless it is clearly necessary to protect the plaintiff 
 from continued and vexatious litigation. Something more is 
 required than the beginning of a single action with an honest 
 purpose to settle the rights of parties." It is suggested, fur- 
 ther, that it might be necessary to await the final decision of 
 one suit at law, citing Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U. S. 533, 36 
 L. ed. 532, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 720, and Boston & M. Consol. 
 Copper & S. Min. Co. v. Montana Ore Purchasing Co. 188 U. 
 S. 632, 47 L. ed. 626, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 434. 
 
CHAPTEK VI. 
 
 ■WHEN SECTION 723 MtTST BE SET TJP AS A DEFENSE TO BE 
 EFFECTIVE. 
 
 This section, though mandatory in form, was intended to 
 preserve the right of trial by jury, which may be waived. It 
 has never been treated by the Federal courts as a fundamental 
 principle of jurisdiction; that is, it has not" been placed in the 
 same plane with such tests of jurisdiction as "diversity of citi- 
 zenship" (Waite V. O'lSTeil, 72 Fed. 351), but has been treated 
 as directory, and as a matter of simple abatement subject to 
 waiver. Green v. Turner, 98 Fed. 760. The courts uniformly 
 hold that when set up as a defense it must be pleaded at the 
 first opportunity ; and there is no question that where a bill pre- 
 sents a case in which it is competent for a court of equity to 
 grant relief, and it has jurisdiction of the subject-matter, an 
 objection to jurisdiction under section 723 must be pleaded in 
 limine, and must be set up by motion to dismiss or in the an- 
 swer, as new rule 29 abolishes pleas and demurrers, and re- 
 quires that objections to the bill of this character must be set 
 up as above stated, which motion may be called up and disposed 
 of before final hearing, at the discretion of the court. The rule 
 further provides that in the event the defense is set up, the 
 motion may be set down for hearing by either party upon five 
 days' noticey and if it be denied, answer shall be filed within 
 five days thereafter, or a decree pro confesso may be taken. 
 Southwestern Surety Ins. Co. v. Wells, 217 Fed. 295. See Ee 
 Jones, 209 Fed. 718 ; Bogert v. Southern P. Co. 211 Fed. 776. 
 This rule disposes of the old 31 to 38 inclusive. Sydney v. 
 Mugford Printing & Engraving Co. 214 Fed. 843. See Wright 
 v. Barnard, 233 Fed. 329. 
 
 If the issue under section 723 is not raised by motion or 
 answer, it vsdll be considered waived. Southern P. R. Co. v. 
 United States, 66 C. C. A. 581, 133 Fed. 651 ; Hapgood v. 
 Berry, 85 C. C. A. 171, 157 Fed. 807-812 ; Hawkeye Gold 
 Dredging Co. v. State Bank, 157 Fed. 253, 258 ; Aeord v. West- 
 
 32 
 
"WHEN SBC. 723 MUST BE SET UP. 33 
 
 em Pocahontas Corp. 156 Fed. 990; Quirk v. Quirk, 155 Fed. 
 199; McOloskey v. Pacific Coast Co. 22 L.E.A.(]Sr.S.) 673, 87 
 C. C. A. 568, 160 Fed. 795-801 ; Eeynes v. Dumont, 130 U. S. 
 354, 32 L. ed. 934, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 486 ; Brown & B. Co. y. 
 Lake Superior Iron Co. 134 U. S. 530, 33 L. ed. 1021, 10 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 604; Sloss Iron & Steel Co. v. South Carolina & G. R. 
 Co. 162 Fed. 542; Odbert v. Marquet, 99 C. C. A. 60, 175 Fed. 
 44; Dederick v. Fox, 56 Fed. 714^-717; Reynolds v. Watkins, 
 9 C. C. A. 273, 22 U. S. App. 83, 60 Fed. 824; Western Elec- 
 tric Co. V. Reedy, 66 Fed. 164; Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 130 
 U. S. 514, 32 L. ed. 1008, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594. The above- 
 cited cases sufficiently show that section 723 must be pleaded at 
 the threshold of the case, or it is waived, when the subject-matter 
 of the suit is of a class over which a court of equity has jurisdic- 
 tion, or even if there be a doubt, and it is competent to grant the 
 relief sought. Ibid. ; Preteca v. Maxwell Land Grant Co. 1 
 C. C. A. 607, 4 U. S. App. 326, 50 Fed. 674; Waite v. O'Neil, 
 72 Fed. 351-354; Tyler v. Savage, 143 U. S. 94, 36 L. ed. 88, 
 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340. In such cases, it is a personal privilege 
 that may be waived. Ibid. ; Warmath v. O'Daaiel, 16 L.R.A. 
 (IST.S.) 414, 86 C. C. A. 377, 159 Fed. 87; Foltz v. St. Louis & 
 S. F. R. Co. 8 C. C. A. 635, 19 U. S. App. 576, 60 Fed. 322 ; 
 Less V. English, 29 C. C. A. 275, 56 U. S. App. 16, 85 Fed. 
 477 ; International Trust Co. v. ISTorvsdch Union F. Ins. Co. 17 
 C. 0. A. 608, 36 U. S. App. 277, 71 Fed. 83. 
 
 The rule as above stated may be illustrated when suit is 
 brought for specific performance. If the allegations are suf- 
 ficient, a prima facie case of jurisdiction appears ; but if, under 
 the facts, the court may determine them insufficient to grant 
 specific performance, unless an issue as to the jurisdiction has 
 been raised in limine, the court will retain the bill under the 
 prayer for general relief, and give judgment for the damages 
 asked. Waite v. O'lSTeil, 72 Fed. 354; Mobile County v. Kim- 
 ball, 102 TJ. S. 707, 26 L. ed. 243. When construed to be a 
 personal privilege it comes too late after answer filed or after 
 appeal. Highland Boy Gold Min. Co. v. Strickley, 54 C. C. 
 A. 186, 116 Fed. 854, 855; Preteca v. Maxwell Land Grant 
 Co. supra; Waite v. O'lSTeil, 72 Fed. 355 ; Schoolfield v. Rhodes, 
 27 C. C. A. 95, 49 U. S. App. 486, 82 Fed. 157. However, it 
 is not the invariable rule that if not set up in limine the court 
 S. Eq.— 3. 
 
34 WHEN SEC. 723 WILL BE ENFOECED THOUGH WOT SET UP. 
 
 will not dismiss, for, as said in Reynolds v. Watkins, 9 C, 0. 
 A. 273, 22 U. S. App. 83, 60 Fed. 825, neither consent nor neg- 
 ligence can give a court jurisdiction when there is no reason- 
 able doubt that the bill brings into court matters that are cogniz- 
 able in a court of law alone. Ibid. The true rule is that where 
 the plaintiff, upon the face of the bill, shows he has a complete, 
 "adequate remedy at law, and no other equitable relief is prayed 
 for, it is not necessary that the objection be taken in limine, 
 but may be made at any stage of the case, or the court may 
 raise the objection sua sponte, which is the clear duty of the 
 court." Southern P. E. Co. v. United States, 66 0. 0. A. 581, 
 133 Fed. 655 and authorities cited; Lewis v. Cocks, 23 Wall. 
 470, 471, 23 L. ed. 71 ; Allen v. Pullman Palace Car Co. 139 
 U. S. 662, 35 L. ed. 305, 11 Sup. Ot. Eep. 682; Mills v. Knapp, 
 39 Fed. 595. Where, then, there is an entire absence of any 
 equitable phase, either in the case made or relief sought, the 
 provisions of section 723 become jurisdictional, to be set up, as 
 said, at any stage of the proceeding down to the final hearing on 
 appeal. Oelrichs v. Spain (Oelrichs v, Williams) 15 Wall. 
 227, 228, 21 L. ed. 44 ; Kane v. Luckman, 131 Fed. 621 and 
 authorities cited. Marthinson v. King, 82 0. C. A. 360, 150 
 Fed. 49; Tyler v. Savage, 143 TJ. S. 97, 36 L. ed. 89, 12 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 340 ; Thcmpson v. Central Ohio E. Co. 6 Wall. 136, 
 18 L. ed. 767 ; United States v. Wilson, 118 U. S. 86, 30 L. ed 
 110, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 991; Curry v. McCauley, 11 Fed. 370 
 Dowell V. Mitchell, 105 U. S. 432, 26 L. ed. 1143 ; Kramer v, 
 Cohn, 119 U. S. 357, 30 L. ed. 440, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 277 
 Sullivan v. Portland & K. E. Co. 94 U. S. 811, 24 L. ed. 326; 
 Brown, B. & Co. v. Lake Superior Iron Co. 134 U. S. 536, 33 
 L. ed. 1025, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 604. 
 This brings us to discuss — ■ 
 
 When the Court Will Act, Though Not Set Up as a Defense. 
 
 Having seen that the defense under section 723 is a privi- 
 lege that may be waived if not pleaded in limine, and having 
 intimated before that the failure to file such defense does not 
 always have the effect of holding jurisdiction in equity, I will 
 now state under what conditions a court of equity will entertain 
 the objection to its jurisdiction, under section 723, by simple 
 suggestion, or sua sponie. 
 
WHEN SEC. Y23 WILL BE ENFOECED THOUGH NOT SET UP. 35 
 
 If the MU on its face is clearly obnoxious to the provisions 
 of section 723^ then, whether pleaded or not, the court should 
 dispose of the bill as required under rule 22 as above set forth, 
 and where the bill goes to proof and there is an entire absence 
 of evidence showing any reasonable ground upon which plaintiff 
 could have expected relief in equity, the court should conform 
 to the provisions of rule 22 in disposing of the case. Oubbins 
 V. Mississippi Eiver Commission, 204 Fed. 308 ; Goldschmidt 
 Thermit Co. v. Primes Chemical Co. 216 Fed. 282 ; Same Case, 
 225 Fed. 772; Corsicana Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 184 C. C. A. 
 510, 218 Fed. 822. The court of equity is without jurisdiction 
 and a right of trial by jiiry can be demanded by the parties. 
 See equity rule 23. U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 723 ; Linden Invest 
 Co. V. Honstain Bros. Co. 136 C. C. A. 121, 221 Fed. 179 ; 
 Ee Empire Shipbuilding Co. 136 C. C. A. 633, 221 Fed. 223. 
 
 But if a court of equity on examination of the proofs can find 
 no reasonable grounds for its jurisdiction either in law or 
 equity, the court should on its own motion dismiss the case; 
 but, on the other hand, if the subject-matter of the suit, or the 
 relief sought, belongs to a class of which a court of equity might 
 take jurisdiction, or equitable relief can be granted to complete 
 the remedy, though there may be some doubt, then you must set 
 up the defense by answer in limine. (Authorities above.) 
 Erskine v. Forrest Oil Co. 80 Fed. 586, 18 Mor. Min. Pv«p. 297 ; 
 Alger v. Anderson, 92 Fed. 697 ; Kansas City Southern E. Co. 
 V. Quigley, 181 Fed. 190. New rules 22-29. 
 
 From this discussion of section 723, you will observe, as said 
 in Waite v. O'lSTeil, 72 Fed. 355, that, notwithstanding its 
 mandatory feature, "jurisdiction is never declined by courts 
 of equity, unless there was a stripping to the bone of pure legal 
 cognizance, and of every delusive pretense of equitable cogni- 
 zance relied on in the particular case ; and wherever this process 
 did not expose in the bone a case of pure and untinged legal 
 jurisdiction, the equitable power to deal with it was maintained, 
 whether the objection be made in limine or not." Occasionally 
 the courts have sought to emphasize the importance of section 
 723 as a measure intended to preserve the right of trial by jury, 
 but they have only been eddies in the great tide of decisions 
 which establish jurisdiction upon the suspicion of an equity. 
 
36 HOW DEFENSE TO BE MADE. 
 
 Row Defense to Be -Made amd How Presented. 
 
 By new rule 29, as we have seen (1st) all defenses in point 
 of law arising on the face of the bill, which heretofore was 
 made by demurrer, or plea, shall be made by motion to dismiss, 
 or in the answer. (2d) Every defense heretofore presentable 
 by plea in bar or abatement shall be made in the answer, and 
 may be separately heard and disposed of before the trial of the 
 principal case, in the discretion of the court. If the bill then 
 presents a naked legal claim the objection must be made by 
 motion to dismiss, or in the answer under rule 29 ; but rule 22 
 requires the case to be transferred to the law side. Goldschmidt 
 Thei-mit Co. v. Primos Chemical Co. 216 Fed. 382. If the ob- 
 jection does not appear on the face of the bill, then the issue 
 should be raised in the answer, which may be heard as stated in 
 the 2d clause of new rule 29. 
 
 Where the objection may be taken at any stage of the pro- 
 ceeding, as above set forth, as, where the evidence shows that 
 complainant, notwithstanding his allegations, could not reason- 
 ably have expected equitable relief, it may be taken in any man- 
 ner directing the court's attention to it. 
 
 By act of Congress March 3d, 1915, it is provided that any 
 party to a suit may obviate the objection that his suit was not 
 brought on the right side of the court, by amending his plead- 
 ings, and the cause shall be determined on the amended plead- 
 ings. (See Dismissal by Court, p. 548.) 
 
 Technical Forms Disregarded. 
 
 By new rule 18 technical forms of pleadings in Equity are 
 abolished. Zenith Carburetur Co. v. Stromberg Motor Devices 
 Co. 205 Fed. 158; Williams v. Pope, 215 Fed. 1000; Sheeler 
 V. Alexander, 211 Fed. 544. 
 
CHA.PTEE VII. 
 
 COURTS CREATED BY THE COjSTSTITUTION AND COWGRESS AND 
 THEIR JURISDICTION. 
 
 Having determined that you have not a plain, adequate rem- 
 edy at law, and your right to relief is not obnoxious to any of 
 the requirements embodied in the maxims of equity, the next 
 step would be to determine who are to be the parties to your 
 bill ; but inasmuch as it is peculiar to Federal courts that cer- 
 tain situations as to residence or citizenship may prevent any 
 procedure in these courts against persons who may be proper, 
 necessary, or indispensable parties to your suit; and inasmuch 
 as the jurisdiction of Federal courts is dependent upon other 
 statutory conditions and limitations which must appear in your 
 pleadings, I will now proceed to discuss these conditions pre- 
 cedent to a suit in a Federal equity court, and in connection 
 therewith to set forth as much of the Federal statute law affect- 
 ing the jurisdiction of the court as is necessary to be under- 
 stood to frame your pleadings so as to acquire the jurisdiction 
 sought. 
 
 Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine the subject- 
 matter in controversy between parties to a suit. JSTashville, C. 
 & St. L. E. Co. V. Taylor, 86 Fed. 168 ; Illinois C. E. Co. v. 
 Adams, 180 TJ. S. 528, 45 L. ed. 410, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 251 ; 
 Ex parte Moran, 75 C. C. A. 396, 144 Fed. 604 ; Foltz v. St. 
 Louis & S. F. E. Co. 8 C. C. A. 635, 19 U. S. App. 576, 60 
 Fed. 318 ; Lake County v. Piatt, 25 C. C. A. 87, 49 U. S. App. 
 216, 79 Fed. 570. But in going into a Federal court there are 
 two conditions to be considered, affecting your right : 
 
 First. Equitable as distinguished from legal. 
 
 Second. Federal as distinguished from State jurisdiction. 
 
 As to the first, a full discussion was presented to you in lec- 
 tures upon "Equitable Jurisprudence," and referred to in a 
 measure in discussing section 723 of U. S. Eev. Stat., so I will 
 pass to the discussion of Federal as distinguished from State 
 jurisdiction. 
 
 37 
 
38 COURTS CREATED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESS. 
 
 Article 3, section 1, of the Federal Constitution, vests the 
 judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court and 
 such other inferior courts as Congress may from time to time 
 ordain. It is thus seen that the Constitution provides only for 
 one court, the Supreme Court, and fixes its original jurisdic- 
 tion, and leaves to Congress unlimited power in ordaining and 
 establishing all inferior courts and distributing within its dis- 
 cretion the judicial power indicated in section 2, article 3, 
 among them. 
 
 Section 2 of this article extends the judicial power to all 
 cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution and laws 
 of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made 
 under their authority. 
 
 Second. To controversies between a State and citizens of 
 another State. 
 
 Third. To controversies between citizens of different States. 
 
 Fourth. Between citizens of the same State claiming lands 
 under grants from a different State. Stevenson v. Fain, 195 
 U. S. 168, 169, 49 L. ed. 143, 144, 25 Sup. Ct. Eep. 6. 
 
 Fifth. Between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign 
 States, citizens, or subjects. Pennsylvania v. Quicksilver Min. 
 Co. 10 Wall. 553, 19 L. ed. 998 ; Alabama v. Burr, 115 U. S. 
 413, 29 L. ed. 435, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 81 ; Wisconsin v. Duluth, 
 96 U. S. 379, 24 L. ed. 668. 
 
 Sixth. Controversies in which the United States shall be a 
 party. United States ex rel. Maxwell v. Barrett, 135 Fed. 193; 
 United States v. American Bell Teleph. Co. 167 U. S. 225, 42 
 L. ed. 144, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 809 ; United States v. Beebe, 127 
 U. S. 338, 32 L. ed. 121, 8 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1086. See United 
 States use of Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Henderlong, 102 
 Fed. 2 ; United States use of Salem-Bedford Stone Co. v. Sheri- 
 dan, 119 Fed. 236 ; United States v. Northern P. E. Co. 67 
 C. C. A. 269, 134 Fed. 715 ; United States v. Churchyard, 132 
 Fed. 82, 85 ; United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 640, 36 L. ed. 
 291, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 488 ; United States v. Michigan, 190 U. 
 S. 379, 47 L. ed. 1103, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 742 ; United States 
 V. North Carolina, 136 U. S. 211, 34 L. ed. 336, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 920. 
 
 Seventh. Controversies between two or more States. Vir- 
 ginia V. West Virginia, 206 U. S. 290, 51 L. ed. 1068, 27 Sup. 
 
COUETS CREATED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND GONGKESS. 39 
 
 Ci Y32; Florida v. Georgia, 11 How. 293, 13 L. ed. 702; 
 South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286, 48 L. ed. 448, 
 24 Sup. Ct. Kep. 269 ; South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S. 4, 
 23 L. ed. 782 ; Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1, 44 L. ed. 347, 
 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 251 ; Ehode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 
 657, 9 L. ed. 1233 ; Kansas y. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125, 46 
 L. ed. 838, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 552; Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 
 19 L. ed. 227; New Jersey v. New York, 3 Pet. 461, 7 L. ed. 
 741. 
 
 Eighth. To admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. 
 
 Ninth. To all cases affecting ambassadors, other public min- 
 isters, and consuls. 
 
 The 11th Amendment to the Constitution provides that the 
 judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
 extent to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted 
 against one of the United States by citizens of another State or 
 by citizens or subjects of any foreign State. South Dakota v. 
 North Carolina, 192 U. S. 315, 48 L. ed. 459, 24 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 269; Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 5 L. ed. 257; 
 Chisolm V. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L. ed. 440; New Hamp- 
 shire V. Louisiana, 108 U. S. 76-91, 27 L. ed. 656-662, 2 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 176; United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 204-206, 
 27 L. ed. 176, 177, 1 Sup. Ct. Eep. 240 ; Hans v. Louisiana, 
 134 U. S. 9-15, 33 L. ed. 845-847, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 504; 
 North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U. S. 30, 33 L. ed. 852, 10 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 509 ; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 524, 43 L. ed. 539, 
 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 269. The limits of the judicial power thus 
 defined, it is left to Congress to prescribe how much of it is 
 to be exercised by the inferior courts it creates. In this. Con- 
 gress is supreme in discretion and power. Lewis Pub. Co. v. 
 Wyman, 152 Fed. 202 ; Sewing Mach. Co.'s Case (Grover & 
 B. Sewing Mach. Co. v. Florence Sewing Mach. Co.) 18 Wall. 
 553, 21 L. ed. 914; United States v. Haynes, 29 Fed. 691; 
 Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U. S. 521, 
 42 L. ed. 1130, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 685. The Constitution gives 
 the capacity to take, and an act of Congress must have supplied 
 it. NashviUe v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247-250, 18 L. ed. 851, 852. 
 We must, then, look to the Constitution to see if Congress has 
 acted within its limits in distributing the powers granted, and 
 to the acts of Congress to determine what courts have been 
 
40 COUETS CREATED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND OONGEESS. 
 
 created, and the extent of jurisdiction granted to each, remem- 
 bering that the number, character, jurisdiction, and territorial 
 limits of these inferior courts rests entirely in the discretion of 
 Congress. Anderson v. Bassman, 140 Fed. 10; United States 
 T. Mar Ying Yuen, 123 Fed. 159 ; United States v. Haynes, 29 
 Fed. 696 ; United States v. Union P. R Co. 98 U. S. 605, 25 
 L. ed. 151; Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 18, 23 L. ed. 527; 
 Sewing Mach. Co.'s Case (Grover & B. Sewing Mach. Co. v. 
 Florence Sewing Mach. Co.) 18 Wall. 577, 21 L. ed. 919; Eis- 
 ley V. Utica, 168 Fed. 744. 
 
 What Courts Were Created. 
 
 As said, the Constitution having created the Supreme Court 
 and fixed its original jurisdiction in all oases affecting am- 
 bassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in 
 which a State shall be a party (U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 687; 
 Const, art. 3, sec. 2. See also Rev. Stat. sec. 563, cl. 17, as to 
 consuls; Ee Baiz, 135 U. S. 417, 34 L. ed. 226, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 854; Cooley v. Luco, 76 Fed. 146; Texas v. Lewis, 14 
 Fed. 65 ; Froment v. Duclos, 30 Fed. 385 ; Bors v. Preston, 111 
 U. S. 252, 28 L. ed. 419, 4 Sup. Ct. Eep. 407 ; Kansas v. Col- 
 orado, 206 U. S. 46, 51 L. ed. 956, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 655 
 South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286, 48 L. ed. 448 
 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 269 ; Washington v. Northern Securities Co. 
 185 U. S. 255, 46 L. ed. 897, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 623 ; Missouri 
 V. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208, 45 L. ed. 497, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 331 
 Ames V. Kansas, 111 U. S. 465, 28 L. ed. 489, 4 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 437), and given to it appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and 
 fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as Con- 
 gress shall make (art. 2, sec. 2, cl. 2), Congress can enlarge 
 neither the one or the other, but it may determine how far 
 within the limits of the capacity of the court to take, appellate 
 jurisdiction shall be given and exercised by it. California v. 
 Southern P. Co. 157 U. S. 261, 39 L. ed. 695, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 591 ; Const, art. 3, sec. 2 ; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch. 
 137, 2 L. ed. 60; Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 104, 19 L. ed. 338; 
 Daniels v. Chicago & R. I. R. Co. 3 Wall. 254, 18 L. ed. 225; 
 Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. 127 U. S. 300, 32 L. ed. 246, 
 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1370. 
 
COURTS CREATED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESS. 41 
 
 See section 233 of New Code, chapter 10, Comp. Stat. 1913, 
 sec. 1210, in substance as follows: The Supreme Court has 
 exclusive jurisdiction where a State is a party, except between a 
 State and its citizens or citizens of other States or aliens, in 
 which latter cases it has original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction. 
 See also New Code, chap. 11, sec. 256, clause 7, Comp. Stat. 
 1913, sec. 1233, 
 
 It has exclusive jurisdiction in suits against ambassadors or 
 other public ministers or their domestics or servants ; and orig- 
 inal, but not exclusive, jurisdiction of suits brought by am- 
 bassadors or other public ministers, or in which a consul or vice 
 consul is a party. See also JSTew Code, sec. 256, par. 8. Also 
 chap. 2, New Code, sec. 24, pars. 2 to 25, Comp. Stat. 1913, 
 sees. 991 (2)-991 (25). 
 
 The appellate jurisdiction is embodied in sections 236 and 
 237 of the/ New Code, Comp. Stat. 1918, sees. 1213, 1214. By 
 see. 234 of the New Code the Supreme Court may issue writs 
 of prohibition in cases provided therein. By sec. 262 of the 
 New Code, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1239, it may issue all writs 
 necessary to its jurisdiction. 
 
 Courts Established by Congress, 
 
 Congress, acting within its powers, in 1789 passed the first 
 judiciary act, establishing circuit and district courts, defining 
 their powers, or rather the jurisdiction of each. This original 
 act was amended from time to time, and as amended will be 
 found in title 13 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, 
 which set forth the basis of the jurisdiction of the circuit courts 
 until 1875, when the jurisdiction was vastly increased by giving 
 to these courts jurisdiction over all cases when the matter in 
 dispute arose under the Constitution and laws of the United 
 States, or treaties made or which shall be made under their au- 
 thority, and further increased it by providing for bringing in 
 parties within the jurisdiction of the court who lived beyond the 
 territorial limits or jurisdiction of the court in which the suit 
 was pending, by personal or published service of its process. 
 The jurisdictional act was again amended in 1887, and per- 
 fected in 1888, by which the jurisdiction was diminished by 
 enlarging the amount of value of the subject-matter in dispute 
 
4-2 COURTS CREATED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESS. 
 
 from five hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, as in the act of 
 1875, to two thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs. 
 
 By act of March 3d, 1911, knoven as the "Judicial Code," 
 which went into effect January 1st, 1912, and which abolished 
 circuit courts and transferred its powers to the district courts 
 of the United States (see Judicial Code, chap. 13, Appendix, 
 sees. 289 to 294 inclusive, Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 1266- 
 1271 ) Congress sought to codify the various statutes and amend- 
 ments affecting the jurisdiction of the courts of the United 
 States, and repealing all acts in conflict (see chap. 14 New 
 Code, sec. 297, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1274). Appendix sec. 24 
 of the Code (Comp. Stat. sec. 991), prescribes as follows: 
 
 "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 "First. Of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in 
 equity, brought by the United States, or by any officer thereof 
 authorized by law to sue, or between citizens of the same State 
 claiming lands under grants from different States; or, where 
 the matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and 
 costs, the sum or value of three thousand dollars, and (a) arises 
 under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties 
 made, or which shall be made, under their authority, or (b) 
 is between citizens of different States, or (c) is between citizens 
 of a State and foreign States, citizens, or subjects. 
 
 "iSTo district court shall have cognizance of any suit (except 
 upon foreign bills of exchange) to recover upon any promissory 
 note or other chose in action in favor of any assignee, or of 
 any subsequent holder, if such instrument be payable to bearer 
 and be not made by any corporation, unless such suit might 
 have been prosecuted in such court to recover upon said note or 
 other chose in action if such assignment had been made: Pro- 
 vided, however, that the foregoing provision as to the sum or 
 value of the matter in controversy shall not be construed to 
 apply to any of the causes mentioned in the succeeding para- 
 graphs of this section." These paragraphs are fully set forth, 
 in which the jurisdiction of the district court is not affected 
 by the sum or value of the subject-matt-er involved (see sec. 
 24, pars. 2 to 25, inclusive of the Judicial Code, Comp. Stat. 
 1913, sees. 991 (2)-991 (25), Appendix, chap. 2. 
 
 We see, then, the material change made by the new Code, 
 
JUBISDIOTION OF THE DISTRICT COUET IN EQUITY. 43 
 
 affecting jurisdiction is the abolishing of circuit courte, and in- 
 creasing the amount or value involved from two to three thou- 
 sand dollars exclusive of interest and costs. 
 
 A "Suit in Laiv or Equity" Defined. 
 
 The statute provides that the jurisdiction of the district court 
 ^xtends to all "suits in law or equity" of a civil nature. Suit 
 applies to any proceeding in a court of justice by which one pur- 
 sues that remedy that law or equity affords him. If a right is 
 to be litigated, it is a suit. Wahl v, Franz, 49 L.E.A. 62, 40 
 C. C. A. 638, 100 Fed. 702 ; L. Bucki & Son Lumber Co. v. 
 Atlantic Lumber Co. 63 0. C. A. 62, 128 Fed. 340; Weston v. 
 Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 7 L. ed. 481 ; Re Stutsman County, 88 
 Fed. 337-340; Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 20, 23 L. ed. 528; 
 Waha-Lewiston Land & Water Co. v. Lewiston-Sweetwater 
 Irrig. Co. 158 Fed. 140; Elk Garden Co. v. T. W. Thayer Co. 
 179 Fed. 558. 
 
 Jurisdiction of the District Court of the United States. 
 
 We then see that the original jurisdiction of the district court 
 in suits of a civil nature, with the exception of the amount or 
 value of the subject-matter involved, is the same as heretofore 
 given to the circuit court under the jurisdictional and removal 
 act of 1887—88, and may be stated as follows: 
 
 First. When a suit of a civil nature in law or equity arises 
 under the Constitution and laws of the United States, or treaties 
 made, or to be made, when tbe amount or value in dispute ex- 
 ceeds three thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs. 
 
 Second. When the controversy is between citizens of differ- 
 ent States, and the amount or value in dispute exceeds three 
 thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs. 
 
 Third. When the controversy is between citizens of a State 
 and foreign State's citizens and subjects, and the amount or 
 value in dispute exceeds three thousand dollars, exclusive of 
 interest and costs. 
 
 Fourth. As between citizens of the same State claiming 
 land under a grant from a different State. 
 
 Fifth. When the United States are plaintiffs, without refer- 
 
'44 JURISDICTION OF THE DISTEICT COUET IN EQUITY. 
 
 ence to amount; or by any ofScer thereof authorized by law to 
 sue. See United States v. New York & O. S. S. Co. 132 C. 0. 
 A. 305, 216 Fed. 63. 
 
 By sections 1 and 4, as above arranged, the jurisdiction is 
 not dependent on citizenship, but the Federal courts take their 
 jurisdiction from the nature of the suhject-matter. The issues 
 arising under these provisions are made Federal questioTis, 
 which may be litigated in the United States courts between 
 citizens of the sai^e State. 
 
 By sections 2 and 3, as above arranged, the jurisdiction is 
 based on diversity of citizenship; that is, all the parties plain- 
 tiff must be of a different citizenship from the parties defend- 
 ant; or the citizens of a State on oae side, and citizens or sub- 
 jects of foreign States, viz., aliens, on the other side. 
 
 It is thus seen that the jurisdiction of the district courts of 
 the United States is a limited one, and the basis of their juris 
 diction over property rights, with which alone equity deals, \i 
 limited either to diversity of citizenship or the existence of a 
 Federal question, and where the amount or value involved is 
 in excess of three thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and 
 costs, except in cases where the United States are parties plain- 
 tiff (Municipal Invest. Co. v. Gardiner, 62 Fed. 955; Byers v. 
 McAuley, 149 U. S. 618, 3Y L. ed. 872, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 906), 
 and within these limitations the United States courts determine 
 for themselves the limits of their jurisdiction. Starr v. Chi- 
 cago, E. I. & P. E. Co. 110 Fed. 6. As to the power of Con- 
 gress to confer judicial authority on the courts of States, see 
 Levin V. United States, 63 C. C. A. 476, 128 Fed, 828-833, 
 and authorities cited. / ■ 
 
 Courts of Equity Deal Only With Property Rights. 
 
 As said, within these limits, courts of equity deal only with 
 property rights and the maintenance of obligations between citi- 
 zens which affect them. Taylor v. Kercheval, 82 Fed. 497; 
 Ee Sawyer, 124 U. S. 210, 31 L. ed. 405, 8 Sup. Ct. Eep. 482. 
 They will not deal with matters of an executive or political 
 nature, nor do they 'interfere with the duties of any depart- 
 ment of government, unless absolutely necessary to maintain 
 and protect the rights of property (Ibid.) ; and in dealing with 
 
JUEISDICTION OB' THE DISTBIOT COUET IN EQUITT. 45 
 
 property rights these limitations, as set forth, require the suit 
 to be between citizens of different States, or citizens of a State 
 and aliens, or the right must depend on a proper construction 
 of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties 
 made by their authority ; and in either case the amount or value 
 of the subject matter in issue must exceed the sum of three thou- 
 sand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs. In a word, the 
 existence of one of these conditions with proper amount is 
 fundamental, and consent cannot supply absence. Minnesota 
 V. ISTorthern Securities Co. 194 U. S. 48, 48 L. ed. 870, 24 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 598 ; Ee Winn, 213 U. S. 459, 53 L. ed. 873, 29 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 515 ; Ex parte Wisner, 203 U. S. 449, 51 L. ed. 264, 
 
 27 Sup. Ct. Eep. 150 ; Louisville & N. E. Co. v. Mottley, 211 
 U. S. 149, 53 L. ed. 126, 29 Sup. Ct. Eep. 42; Thomas v. Ohio 
 State University, 195 U. S. 207, 49 L. ed. 160, 25 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 24; Henrie v. Henderson, 76 C. C. A. 196, 145 Fed. 316 ; Iowa 
 Lillovet Gold Min. Co. v. Bliss, 144 Fed. 446; Anderson v. 
 Bassman, 140 Fed. 10 ; Olds Wagon Works v. Benedict, 14 
 C. C. A. 285, 32 U. S. App. 116, 67 Fed. 5; San Joaquin & 
 K. Eiver Canal & Iirig. Co. v. Stanislaus County, 90 Fed. 
 520; Byers v. McCauley, 149 U. S. 608, 37 L. ed. 867, 13 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 906. And the jurisdiction depends on the exis- 
 tence of these conditions at the beginning of the suit. Tug 
 Eiver Coal & Salt Co. v. Brigel, 30 C. 0. A. 415, 58 U. S. App. 
 320, 86 Fed. 819; Eitchie v. Burke, 109 Fed. 19 ; Anderson v. 
 Watt, 138 U. S. 702, 34 L. ed. 1081, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 449. 
 
 Presumption of Jurisdiction. 
 
 The jurisdiction being limited, the presumption is against 
 jurisdiction, unless it affirmatively appears (Yeandle v. Penn- 
 sylvania E. Co. 95 C. C. A. 282, 169 Fed. 941 ; Hanford v. 
 Davies, 163 U. S. 279, 41 L. ed. 159, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1051; 
 Grace v. American Cent. Ins. Co. 109 U. S. 278, 27 L. ed. 932, 
 3 Sup. Ct. Eep. 207 ; Gamer v. Southern Mut. Bldg. & L. Asso. 
 
 28 C. C. A. 381, 52 U. S. App. 344, 84 Fed. 3 ; Fitchburg E. 
 Co. V. Nichols, 29 C. C. A. 464, 50 U. S. App. 280, 85 Fed. 
 869 ; Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U. S. 586, 32 L. ed. 543, 9 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 173 ; Peper v. Fordyce, 119 U. S. 469, 30 L. ed. 
 435, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 287; Eobertson v. Cease, 97 U, S. 649, 
 
46 JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT IN EQUITY. 
 
 24 L. ed. 1058 ; King Iron Bridge & Mfg. Co. v. Otoe County, 
 120 U. S. 226, 30 L. ed. 624, 7 Sup. Ct. Kep. 552), the rule 
 being that courts created by statute can only have the jurisdic- 
 tion given. United States v. Southern P. E. Co. 49 Fed. 300, 
 and cases cited. However, a judgment is not subject to col- 
 lateral attack, virhere jurisdiction has been exercised, though 
 not apparent. Evers v. Watson, 156 U. S. 527-533, 39 L. ed. 
 520-522, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 430 ; Dovcell v. Applegate, 152 U. 
 S. 327, 38 L. ed. 463, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 611. 
 
 Of course, there are many acts of Congress giving special 
 or exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal courts in such mat- 
 ters as concern the revenues of the United States, also bank- 
 rupt laws, interstate commerce, copyrights, patents, etc., 
 which are not controlled by the general jurisdictional acts; 
 therefore they do not fall within the purpose of these lectures, 
 as I propose only to deal with the fundamental conditions re- 
 quired by the general acts governing the Federal courts of 
 equity. United States v. Standard Oil Co. 152 Fed. 290-293 ; 
 Sunderland Bros. v. Chicago E. I. & P. E. Co. 158 Fed. 877; 
 Swift & Co. V. Philadelphia & E. E. Co. 4 Inters. Com. Eep. 
 633, 58 Fed. 858; Edmunds v. Illinois C. E. Co. 80 Fed. 79; 
 Van Patten v. Chicago, M. & St. P. E. Co. 74 Fed. 981; Ee 
 Horhorst, 150 U. S. 653-661, 37 L. ed. 1211-1214, 14 Sup. Ct 
 Eep. 221 ; Northern Securities Co. v. Unite ' States, 193 U. S. 
 199, 48 L. ed. 679, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 436 ; Bamhard Bros. & 
 Spindler v. Morrison, — Tex. Ci-.- App. — , 87 S. W. 376, 
 377; Gulf, C. & S. F. E. Co. v. Moore, 98 Tex. 302, 83 S. W. 
 362, 4 Ann. Cas. 770. In passing, I will call attention to the 
 fact that, as said in Camors-McConnell Co. v. McConnell, 140 
 Fed. 414: "A contract may affect interstate commerce in a 
 variety of ways," not direct, but merely incidental, when the 
 rule of exclusive jurisdiction would not apply. Hopkins v. 
 United States, I7l' U. S. 578, 43 L. ed. 290, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 40 ; United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 156 U. S. 1, 39 L. ed. 
 325, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 249. Louisville & N. E. Co. v. Hughes, 
 201 Fed. 727. 
 
 Again, it may be stated that where exclusive jurisdiction is 
 granted to State courts by State legislation, it does not affect the 
 jurisdiction of the Federal courts to deal with the same subject- 
 matter and apply the remedies given by the State. Barber 
 
J OEISDICTION OF THE DISTEICT COUET IN EQUITY. 47 
 
 Asphalt Paving Co. v. Morris, 67 L.RA. 761, 66 C. C. A. 55, 
 132 Fed. 945. 
 
 By § 256 of the new Judicial Code (Comp. Stat. 1913, § 
 1233 (Appendix) post, 882, the cases in which the jurisdiction 
 of the United States district is declared to be exclusive of the 
 jurisdiction of the State courts are specially stated. 
 
 See also sec. 24 of the new Judicial Code pars. 2 to 25 inclu- 
 sive, Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 991(2)-991(25). 
 
CHAPTEK VIII. 
 
 LIMITS OF TEEBITOEIAL JUEISDICTION". 
 
 In chapter XV. I discuss in detail the territorial jurisdiction 
 of the Federal courts, but in order to get a complete view of the 
 jurisdictional act, it is necessary here to state that portion of it 
 that defines the jurisdiction of the circuit courts with reference 
 to their territorial limits, together with other existing statutes 
 more or less affecting the provision. 
 
 Chap. 4, sec. 51 of the new Judicial Code (Comp. Stat. 
 1913, sec. 1033) provides that with the exception of such cases 
 as are provided for in the five succeeding sections, no person 
 shall be arrested in one district for trial in another in any civil 
 action before a district court ; and except as provided for in the 
 six succeeding sections no civil suit shall be brought in any dis- 
 trict court against any person by any original process or pro- 
 ceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabi- 
 tant ; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of 
 citizenship, suit shall be brought only in the district of the resi- 
 dence of either the plaintiff or defendant. See Bogue v. Chi- 
 cago, B. & Q. R. Co. 193 Fed. 728. 
 
 Section 52 of the Judicial Code provides that when a State 
 contains more than one Federal district, every suit not of a local 
 nature against a single defendant must be brought in the district 
 in which he resides, but if there are two or more defendants 
 residing in different districts of the State, you may bring the 
 suit in either, and a duplicate writ may be directed to the mar- 
 shal of the other district for service. 
 
 Sec. 53, Judicial Code, provides that where a judicial dis- 
 trict contains more than one division, every suit not of a local 
 nature against a single defendant must be brought in the 
 division in which he resides; but if two or more defendants 
 residing in different divisions it may be brought in either 
 division. 
 
 Sec. 57 of the Judicial Code provides, that by consent of par- 
 
 48 
 
LIMITS OF TBREITOEIAL JUEISDICTIOW. 49 
 
 ties and the order of the court, signed and filed in the case in 
 vacation, or term time, the case may be transferred to any other 
 division of the same district for trial without reference to the 
 residence of the defendants. 
 
 Sec. 54 of the Judicial Code provides that in suits of a local, 
 nature, where defendant resides in different district in the State 
 in which the suit is brought, process may issue against him, 
 directed to the marshal of the district in which he resides. Sec. 
 55, Judicial Code, provides that in suits of a local nature at 
 law or in equity, where the land or other subject-matter of a 
 fixed character lies partly in one and partly in another district 
 within the same State, you may sue in either district where the 
 land lies. Sec. 8 of the act of 1875, which has been incorporated 
 in the new Judicial Code as section 57, provides that where in 
 any suit commenced in any district court of the United States to 
 enforce any legal or equitable lien upon, or claim to, or remove 
 any encwnhrance or lien or cloud upon real or personal prop- 
 erty within the district where such suit is brought, one or more 
 of the defendants therein shall not be an inhabitant of or found 
 in the district, or shall not voluntarily appear thereto, it shall 
 be lawful for the court to make an order directing such absent 
 defendant to appear, plead, answer, or demur by a certain day 
 to be desig-nated by the court, which order shall be served on 
 such absent defendant or defendants, if practical, wherever 
 found, and also on the person or persons in possession, or in 
 charge of said property, if any. Or when such personal serv- 
 ice on the absent person or persons defendants cannot be had, 
 or is not practicable, such order shall be published once a week 
 for six consecutive weeks in such manner as the court directs. 
 With this grouping of the statutes afl^ecting the general and ter- 
 ritorial jurisdiction of the circuit courts, and asking you to 
 again remember that these courts have no jurisdiction other 
 than given in these statutes, — they having no common law ju- 
 risdiction as incident to their creation by Congress, — I will pro- 
 ceed to discuss the several features of the act of 1888 essential 
 to your right to go into a Federal court of equity, and which 
 must appear upon the face of your bill, to wit; 
 
 First. Diversity of citizenship. 
 
 Second. A Federal question. 
 
 Third. Amount necessary to jurisdiction. 
 
 Fourth. Territorial jurisdiction, 
 S. Eq.— 4. 
 
50 LIMITS OF T35KJBITOEIAL JUEISDICTIOlSr, 
 
 In discussing these features of jurisdiction, you must keep 
 in mind, as before said, that Federal courts possess no powers 
 except such as the Constitution and statutes of Congress con- 
 cur in conferring, and the presumption is against jurisdictioL 
 unless it affirmatively appears. United States v. Southern P. 
 R. Co. 49 Fed. 297; Ee Barry, 42 Fed. 113; Hanford v. 
 Davies, 163 U. S. 273, 41 L. ed. 157, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1051. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP. 
 
 The language of the act, as we have seen, provides substan- 
 tially that when the matter in dispute exceeds in amount or 
 value the sum of three thousand dollars, and the controversy -is 
 between citizens of different States, * * * and when suit 
 is dependent on diversity of citizenship only, that it must be 
 brought against the defendant in the district of the residence 
 of plaintiif or defendant. (See appendix for act.) See Bogue 
 V. Chicago, B. & Q. E. Co. 193 Fed. 731. 
 
 Citizenship, so far as the jurisdictional act is concerned, 
 must be that kind that identifies itself with a particular state, 
 and bona fide. Marks v. Marks, 75 Fed. 324 ; Southern Eealty 
 Invest. Co. v. Walker, £11 U. S. 603, 53 L. ed. 346, 29 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 211 ; Lehigh Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U. S. 327, 
 40 L. ed. 444, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 307; Meyers v. Murray IST. & 
 Co. 11 L.R.A. 216, 43 Fed. 698 ; Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 
 329, 32 L. ed. 695, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289 ; Kingman v. Holthaus, 
 59 Fed. 316; Mitchell v. United States, 21 Wall. 352, 353, 22 
 L. ed. 587, 588 ; Shaw v. Quincy Min. Co. 145 U. S. 447, 36 
 L. ed. 770, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 935. Harding v. Standard Oil 
 Co. 182 Fed. 421. 
 
 The 14th Amendment definition of citizenship does not affect 
 the jurisdictional rule. JSTichols v. Nichols, 92 Fed. 1, 2 ; An- 
 derson V. Watt, 188 U. S. 702, 34 L. ed. 1081, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 449. However, in Clausen v. American Ice Co. 144 Fed. 723, 
 it is said that an allegation in a bill that plaintiff is a citizen 
 of the United States and a resident of a certain State is suffi- 
 cient under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, the 
 language of the Amendment being: "All persons born or 
 naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction 
 thereof." It is not affected by U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 1992, Comp. 
 Stat. 1913, sec. 3946, defining citizenship "as all persons bom 
 
 51 
 
52 DIVEESITT OF CITIZENSHIP. 
 
 in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, 
 excluding Indians." This question will be fully discussed under 
 "Issue of Citizenship and How Proved," so I pass on. 
 
 Diversity of citizenship as a basis of jurisdiction must ap- 
 pear in the statement of the bill in equity, setting forth parties 
 and citizenship; and it must appear that every party on one 
 side of the controversy is a citizen of a different State from 
 every party on the other side. Mexican C. R. Co. v. Pinkney,' 
 149 U. S. 194, 37 L. ed. 699, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 859 ; Smith v, 
 Lyon, 133 II. S. 315, 33 L. ed. 635, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 303; 
 Wolfe V. Hartford Life & Annuity Co. 148 U. S. 389, 37 L. ed. 
 493, 13 Sup. Ct, Rep. 602 ; Wilson v. Oswego Twp. 151 U. S, 
 63, 64, 38 L. ed. 74, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 259; Timmons v. Ely- 
 ton Land Co. ;139 U. S. 378, 35 L. ed. 195, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 585 ; Home v. George H. Plammond Co. 155 U. S. 394, 39 
 L. ed. 197, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 167 ; Houston v. Filer & S. Co. 
 43 C. C. A. 457, 104 Fed. 163 ; Mangels v. Donau Brewing 
 Co. 53 Fed. 513; Re Stutsman County, 88 Fed. 337; Tug 
 River Coal & Salt Co. v. Brigel, 14 C. C. A. 577, 31 U. S. 
 App. 665, 67 Fed. 628. And if there be two causes of action, 
 diversity must appear in both. King v. Inlander, 133 Fed. 416. 
 See Howe & D. Co. v. Haugan, 140 Fed. 184, 185. 
 
 Under the present act it matters not how numerous the par- 
 ties may be; if there are parties from the same State on each 
 side of the controversy, jurisdiction is lost, provided they be 
 indispensable parties, as we shall hereafter see. Gage v. River- 
 side Trust Co. 156 Fed. 1007; Tracy v. Morel, 88 Fed. 801; 
 ilerchants' Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. 
 A. 151 U. S. 368-386, 38 L. ed. 195-204, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 
 499, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367 ; Consolidated Water Co. v. Bab- 
 cock, 76 Fed. 243; Anderson v. Bassman, 140 Fed. 10, 11; 
 Peninsular Iron Co. v. Stone, 121 U. S. 633, 30 L. ed. 1020^ 
 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1010; Raphael v. Trask, 118 Fed. 777; Ex- 
 celsior Pebble Phosphate Co. v. Brown, 20 C. C. A. 428, 42 
 U. S. App. 55, 74 Fed. 324; Pittsburgh C. & St. L. R. Co. v. 
 Baltimore & O. R. Co. 10 C. C. A. 20, 22 U. S. App. 359, 61 
 Fed. 712; Mangels v. Donau Brewing Co. 53 Fed. 513; Hous- 
 ton V. Filer & S. Co. 43 C. C. A. 457, 104 Fed. 163 and author- 
 ities cited. Even though a disclaimer be filed, if not dismissed. 
 Wetherby v. Stinson, 10 C. C. A. 243, 18 U. S. App. 714, 62 
 Fed. 175, 176. 
 
DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP. 53 
 
 To illustrate: In Empire Coal & Transp. Co. v. Empire 
 Coal & Min. Co. 150 U. S. 163, 87 L. ed. 1038, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 66, a corporation in Kentucky sued in the courts of Ten- 
 nessee citizens of Tennessee, and joined a Kentucky corpora- 
 tion. Held, court had no jurisdiction, as the case presents citi- 
 zens of the same State on both sides. The court further re- 
 marked that if the parties plaintiff and defendant are not citi- 
 zens of different States, there is an entire want of jurisdiction, 
 which cannot be waived by silence or othenvise. Shaw v. 
 Quincy Min. Co. 145 U. S. 444, 36 L. ed. 768, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 935; Southern P. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202, 36 L. ed. 942, 
 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 44. 
 
 In Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 10 
 C. C. A. 20, 22 U. S. App. 359, 61 Fed. 711, a Maryland and 
 Ohio corporation sued an Ohio corporation in Ohio. The ar- 
 rangement deprived the Federal court of Ohio of jurisdiction. 
 Central Trust Co. v. Virginia T. & C. Steel & I. Co. 55 Fed. 
 774. 
 
 To show the changes that have been made, and for the better 
 understanding of the decisions, I will state that under the act 
 of 1789, chap. 20, sec. 11, the jurisdiction was only between a 
 citizen of a State tuliere suit was brought and citizens of other 
 States. Brooks v. Bailey, 20 Blatchf. 85, 9 Fed. 438. 
 
 Under the act of 1875 it was decided that all that was neces- 
 sary was a diversity, and not that either party must necessarily 
 be a citizen of the State where suit was brought. Eureka 
 Consol. :Min. Co. v. Richmond Consol. Min. Co. 2 Fed. 830. 
 
 By sec. 51 of the Judicial Code (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1033), where the jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of 
 citizenship, the suit must be brought only in the district of 
 the residence of the plaintiff or defendant. 
 
 This brings us to the rule that a citizen of one State cannot 
 sue a citizen of another State in a third State. Wolff'v. Choc- 
 taw, O. & G. R. Co. 133 Fed. 602 and authorities cited; Re 
 Keasbey & M. Co. 160 U. S. 221, 40 L. ed. 402, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 273; Stonega Coal & Coke Co. v. Louisville & B. R. Co. 
 139 Fed. 271; Ex parte Wisner, 203 U. S. 449, 51 L. ed. 264, 
 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 150; Shaw v. Quincy Min. Co. supra; Vir- 
 ginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Sundry Ins. Co. 108 Fed. 453 ; 
 Smith V. Lyon, 133 U. S. 315, 33 L. ed. 635, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
54 DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP. 
 
 303. Except on foreclosure of land lying in the district. Burke 
 V. Mountain Timber Co. 224 Fed. 591. 
 
 Thus, a corporation incorporated in one State, and having a 
 usual place of business in another State, vyhere sued, cannot be 
 sued there by a citizen of a different State. Shaw v. Quincy 
 Min. Co. supra. 
 
 Again, citizens of the same State cannot sue each other in 
 the Federal courts of another State. Wetherby v. Stinson, 10 
 C. C. A. 243, 18 U. S. App. 714, 62 Fed. 173; Excelsior Peb- 
 ble Phosphate Co. v. Brown, supra; Tug River Coal & Salt Co. 
 V. Brigel, 30 C. C. A. 415, 58 U. S. App. 320, 86 Fed. 820; 
 Stonega Coal & Coke Co. v. Louisville & IST. E. Co. supra. 
 However the right to raise the jurisdictional question is a privi- 
 lege personal to the party being sued out of his State and can- 
 not be made by codefendants. Central Trust Co. v. McGeorge, 
 151 U. S. 129, 38 L. ed. 98, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 286; Jewett v. 
 Bradford Sav. Bank & T. Co. 45 Fed. 801 ; Schiffer v. Ander- 
 son, 76 C. C. A. 667, 146 Fed. 457 ; St. Louis & S. F. E. Co. 
 v. McBride, 141 U. S. 131, 35 L. ed. 661, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 982 ; Smith v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 64 Fed. 1. 
 
 To illustrate : Citizens of Texas sued citizens of Alabama in 
 Alabama, and joined Texas citizens as defendants; in this case 
 the court struck out the Texas citizens. Tug River Coal & Salt 
 Co. V. Brigel, supra. 
 
 As to the application of the rule to removals, see "Removals." 
 
 The foregoing cases clearly show that the test rule of juris- 
 diction based on diversity of citizenship is as follows: In ar- 
 ranging your parties to the bill, it must appear that each plain- 
 tiff is competent to sue, and each defendant liable to be sued, 
 in the State and in the Federal court in which suit is brought. 
 Tug River Coal & Salt Co. v. Brigel, 14 C. C. A. 577, 31 U. S. 
 App. 665, 67 Fed. 628 ; Anderson v. Watt, 138 U. S. 703, 34 
 L. ed. 1081, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 449 ; Excelsior Pebble Phosphate 
 Co. V. Brown, 20 C. C. A. 428, 42 U. S. App. 55, 74 Fed. 324; 
 Blunt V. Southern R. Co. 155 Fed. 500 ; Anderson v. Bassman, 
 140 Fed. 11 ; Consolidated Water Co. v. Babcock, 76 Fed. 243 ; 
 Shipp V. Williams, 10 C. C. A. 247, 22 U. S. App. 380, 62 
 Fed. 5; Hooe v. Jamison, 166 TJ. S. 397, 41 L. ed. 1050, 17 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 596; Susquehanna & W. Valley R. & Coal Co. 
 V. Blatchford, 11 Wall. 174, 175, 20 L. ed. 180, 181 ; SweeneJ 
 
DIVEESITT OF CITIZENSHIP. 55 
 
 V. Carter Oil Co. 199 U. S. 257, 50 L. ed. 180, 26 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 55 ; J. S. Appel Suit & Cloai Co. v. Baggott, 132 Fed 
 1006. 
 
 This means that where there is more than one plaintiff, or 
 more than one defendant, in 'personal actions, suit must be 
 brought in the State and district in which all the plaintiffs were 
 inhabitants, if brought in plaintiffs' residence district, or where 
 all the defendants were inhabitants, if brought in defendants' 
 residence district. Ames v. Holderbaum, 42 Fed. 342; Lan- 
 caster V. Asheville Street E. Co. 90 Fed. 129 ; Tice v. Hurley, 
 145 Fed. 391 ; Schultz v. Highland Gold Mines Co. 158 Fed. 
 341 ; McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Walthers, 134 U. S. 
 41, 33 L. ed. 833, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 485; United States use 
 of Brady v. O'Brien, 120 Fed. 448; Empire Min. Co. v. 
 Propeller Tow-Boat Co. 108 Fed. 902 ; Jenkins v. York Cliffs 
 Imp. Co. 110 Fed. 809 ; Greeley v. Lowe, 155 U. S. 58, 39 L. 
 ed. 69, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 24; Interior Constr. Improv. Co. v. 
 Gibney, 160 U. S. 217, 40 L. ed. 401, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 272 ; 
 Elkhart K'at. Bank v. Northwestern Guaranty Loan Co. 84 
 Fed. 76 ; St. Louis E. Co. v. Pacific E. Co. 52 Fed. 771, 772 ; 
 Freeman v. American Surety Co. 116 Fed. 550. That is, 
 parties from different States may sue a defendant or defend- 
 ants where all the defendants reside in the same district, or 
 parties plaintiff all residing in the same district may join sev- 
 eral defendants, citizens of different States. Sweeney v. Car- 
 ter Oil Co. 199 U. S. 252, 50 L. ed. 178, 26 Sup. Ct. Eep. 55 ; 
 Turk V. Illinois C. E. Co. 134 C. C. A. Ill, 218 Fed. 315. 
 
 In Smith v. Lyon, 133 U. S. 315, 33 L. ed. 635, 10 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 303, a resident of St. Louis, Missouri, together with a 
 citizen of Arkansas, sued in the eastern district of Missouri 
 one O. T. Lyon, a citizen of Texas, in a personal action. The 
 defendant moved to dismiss the case, because a citizen of Ar- 
 kansas was improperly joined as plaintiff with a citizen of 
 Missouri, and as between the Arkansas plaintiff and the Texas 
 defendant the suit was not brought in the State or district of 
 the residence of plaintiff or defendant. Ibid. ; Empire Min. 
 Co. V. Propeller Tow-Boat Co. supra. The court dismissed 
 the case. While the suit showed different citizenship on both 
 sides, and would have been well brought had the resident of St. 
 Louis sued alone in his own district, yet the statute makes 
 
56 DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP. 
 
 no provision for two or more plaintiffs from different Stal^. 
 suing a defendant in a third State, but it is required that the 
 plaintiffs must be inhabitants of the same district to sue a 
 defendant from another State in plaintiff's district. Sewing 
 Mach. Co.'s Case (Grover & B. Sewing-Mach. Co. v. Plor- 
 ence Sewing-Mach. Co.) 18 Wall. 575, 21 L. ed. 918. See 
 authorities above stated; Susquehanna & W. Valley R. & Coal 
 Co. V. Blatchford, 11 Wall. 174, 175, 20 L. ed. 180, 181; 
 Greeley v. Lowe, 155 U. S. 68, 69, 39 L. ed. 73, 74, 15 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 24 ; Freeman v. American Surety Co. supra. The rule 
 is adhered to that each plaintiff must be competent to sue, and 
 each defendant liable to be sued, in the court in which the 
 suit is brought, and clearly a citizen of one State cannot sue a 
 citizen of another State in the Federal court of a third State. 
 Empire Min. Co. v. Propeller Tow-Boat Co. supra ; and authori- 
 ties above cited; Consolidated Eubber Tire Co. v. Ferguson, 
 106 C. C. A. 330, 183 Fed. 758. 
 
 We have, then, the rule that a citizen and nonresident can- 
 not sue a nonresident in the citizen's district. Smith v. Lyon, 
 38 Fed. 53. Thus, a citizen of Texas and a citizen of Mis- 
 souri cannot join in a suit in Texas against a citizen of Kan- 
 sas. Smith V. Lyon, 38 Fed. 54; Excelsior Pebble Phosphate 
 Co. V. Brown, 20 C. C. A. 428, 42 U. S. App. 55, 74 Fed. 
 325 ; Dominion JSTat. Bank v. Olympia Cotton Mills, 128 Fed. 
 182; Mirabile Corp. v. Purvis, 143 Fed. 920; Moffat v. So- 
 ley, 2 Paine, 103, Fed. Cas. No. 9,688 ; Lockhart v. Horn, 1 
 Woods, 628, Fed. Cas. No. 8,445 ; Searles v. Jacksonville, P. 
 & M. R. Co. 2 Woods, 621, Fed. Cas. No. 12,586 ; Tuckerman 
 V. Bigelow, Brunner, Col. Cas. 631, Fed. Cas. No. 14,228; 
 Shute V. Davis, Pet. C. C. 431, Fed. Cas. No. 12,828. 
 
 The rule in Smith v. Lyon, supra, presents a case where 
 plaintiffs were improperly joined, but the rule is equally ap- 
 plicable to defendants. Freeman v. American Surety Co. 
 supra; Beusinger Self -Adding Cash Roister Co. v. National 
 Cash Register Co. 42 Fed. 81. 
 
 Thus citizens of Pennsylvania sued a corporation of West 
 Virginia in the State and residence district of defendant, but 
 joined a New York corporation as defendants. The court 
 struck out the New York corporation, under the rule as stated. 
 
DIVEESITY OF CITIZENSHIP. 57 
 
 Excelsior Pebble Phosphate Co. v. Brown, supra. The same 
 rule was applied in Ames v. Holderbaum, 42 Fed. 341, where 
 a citizen of Illinois sued a citizen of Iowa in Iowa, but joined 
 as defendants citizens of Ohio. 
 
 This rule that each of the plaintiffs must be competent to 
 sue, and each defendant liable to be sued, in the State and in 
 the court in which suit is brought, does not apply to foreclos- 
 ing liens (Lancaster v. Asheville Street E. Co. 90 Eed. 129, 
 and authorities cited), nor in local actions as will appear here- 
 after, for this character of suit is controlled in the first in- 
 stance by section 8 of the jurisdictional act of 1875, and in 
 second instance by sections 740 and 741 of the Revised Stat- 
 utes of the United States. The rule as stated above only 
 applies to personal suits. Dick v. Poraker, 155 IT. S. 404, 39 
 L. ed. 201, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 124; Single v. Scott Paper Mfg. 
 Co. 55 Fed. 555 ; Ames v. Holderbaum, supra. 
 
 Word "Citizen" Used Collectively. 
 
 The foregoing cases show that the word "citizen," used in 
 the statute, is "used collectively, and means all citizens on one 
 side of a suit; and the same construction is given to the word 
 "inhabitant," as used in the act of 1888. Greeley v. Lowe, 
 supra; Smith v. Lyon, 133 U. S. 318, 33 L. ed. 636, 10 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 303; Shaw v. Quincy Min. Co. 145 U. S. 447, 36 
 L. ed. 770, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 935; Saginaw Gaslight Co. v. 
 Saginaw, 28 Fed. 531. 
 
 Citizenship of Representative Parties. 
 
 In determining the diversity of citizenship, the citizenship 
 of representatives of parties becomes material, and tha gen- 
 eral rule may be stated that, where the suit is brought in the 
 name of one who acts in a representative capacity, such as ex- 
 ecutor, administrator, receiver, or trustee, it is the citizenship 
 of the representative party that controls the jurisdiction, and 
 not that of the beneficiary. ISTew Orleans v. Gaines (New Or- 
 leans V. Whitney) 138 U. S. 606, 34 L. ed. 1106, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 428 ; Bangs v. Loveridge, 60 Fed. 965 ; Susquehanna & 
 W, Valley E. & Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 11 Wall. 172, 20 L. 
 
58 , DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP. 
 
 ed. 179 ; Knapp v. Troy & B. R. Co. 20 Wall. 124, 22 L. ed. 
 331. (See authorities cited below.) Thus the citizenship of 
 a trustee controls. Hunter v. Eobbins, 117 Fed. 922 ; Johnson 
 V. St. Louis, 96 C. C. A. 617, 172 Fed. 32, 40, 41; Knapp v. 
 Troy & B. E. Co. 20 Wall. 117, 22 L. ed. 328 ; Susquehanna 
 & W. Valley R. & Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 11 Wall. 172-177, 
 20 L. ed. 179-181 ; Shipp v. Williams, 10 C. C. A: 247, 22 
 U. S. App. 380, 62 Fed. 6; Shirk v. La Fayette, 52 Fed. 858; 
 Griswold v. Batcheller, 75 Fed. 473. See Smith v. Eackliffe, 
 87 Fed. 968, as to citizenship of a receiver. 
 
 Exceptions to Bide. 
 
 However, there may be an exception to this rule where the 
 trustee is a naked trustee, simply to hold the property, with 
 no power over it and no right or duty to foreclose was given. 
 D. A. Tompkins v. Catawba Mills, 82 Fed. 780-784. Where 
 a trustee of a nonresident cestui que trust refuses to sue, the 
 nonresident beneficiary may sue in the Federal court (Bow- 
 doin College v. Merritt, 63 Fed. 213), unless the refusal was 
 collusive. (Detroit v. Dean, 106 U. S. 541, 27 L. ed. 302, 1 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 500 ; Cilley v. Patten, 62 Fed. 500 ; See Shipp 
 V. Williams, supra. See Einstein v. Georgia S. & F. R. Co. 
 120 Fed. 1009.) In Einstein v. Georgia S. & F. E. Co. 120' 
 Fed. 1008, one of three trustees refusing to sue was made 
 defendant; this trustee was a citizen of the State of the Cor- 
 poration defendant; it was held the Federal court had juris- 
 diction, citing Omaha Hotel Co. v. Wade, 97 U. S. 13, 24 L. 
 ed. 917. So, where the interest of the nonresident benefi-' 
 ciary is prosecuted in hostility to the trustees. Eeinach v. 
 Atlantic & G. W. E. Co. 58 Fed. 38. Where the action relates 
 only to the title or possession of the trust property, and the 
 relation of the trustee to the beneficiary is not involved, the 
 citizenship of the trustee controls; otherv the citizenship 
 of the cestui que trust may affect the jurisdiction. Griswold 
 V. Batcheller, 75 Fed. 473; Carey v. Brown, 92 U. S. 172, 
 23 L. ed. 469 ; see Stout v. Eigney, 46 C. C. A. 459, 107 Fed. 
 545. 
 
 The citizenship of a guardian controls jurisdiction. Pen- 
 nington V. Smith, 24 C. C. A. 145, 45 U. S. App. 409, 78 Fed. 
 409; Toledo Traction Co. v. Cameron, 69 C. C. A. 28, 137 
 
DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP. 59 
 
 Fed. 48 ; See Stout v. Rigney, supra ; Mexican E. Co. v. Eck- 
 man, 187 U. S. 429, 47 L. ed. 245, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 211. 
 
 So, also, the citizenship of administrators and executors. 
 Continental L. Ins. Co. v. Rhoads, 119 U. S. 240, 30 L. ed. 
 381, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 193 ; McDuffie v. Montgomery, 128 Fed. 
 107; Rice v. Houston, 13 Wall. 66, 20 L. ed. 484; JSTew Or- 
 leans V. Gaines (Sew Orleans v. Whitney), 138 IJ. S. 595, 
 34 L. ed. 1102, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep! 428 ; De Forest v. Thomp- 
 son, 40 Fed. 375; Harper v. Norfolk & W. E. Co. 36 Fed. 
 103 ; Bangs v. Loveridge, 60 Fed. 963 ; Bishop v. Boston & 
 M. R. Co. 117 Fed. 771; Monmouth Invest. Co. v. Means, 
 80 C. C. A. 527, 151 Fed. 160; Wilson v. Hastings Lumber 
 Co. 103 Fed. 801. See Schneider v. Eldredge, 125 Fed. 640 ; 
 Rice V. Houston, 13 Wall. 67, 20 L. ed. 484 ; Bogue v. Chicago, 
 B. & Q. R. Co. 193 Fed. 729. 
 
 In bankruptcy, the citizenship of the bankrupt must control. 
 Mayer v. Cohrs, 188 Fed. 443. 
 
 It may be stated generally that persons subrogated to the 
 rights of others control jurisdiction by their own citizenship. 
 Subrogation is not assignment. JSTew Orleans v. Gaines (I^ew 
 Orleans v. Whitney), 138 U. S. 606, 34 L. ed. 1106, 11 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 428. 
 
 By Next Friend. 
 
 A distinctive exception to the rule that the citizenship of 
 the representative determines jurisdiction arises in suits in 
 behalf of infants by next friend. In such cases the citizen- 
 ship of the infant controls. Blumenthal v. Craig, 26 C. C. A. 
 427, 55 U. S. App. 8, 81 Fed. 320; Woolridge v. M'Kenna, 8 
 Fed. 668 ; Voss v. I\Teineber, 68 Fed. 947 ; Dodd v. Ghiselin, 
 27 Fed. 405; Wiggins v. Bethune, 29 Fed. 51. The domi- 
 cil of the infant is that of its parents ; if the father be. liv- 
 ing, that of the father; if dead, that of the mother. Marks v. 
 Marks, 75 Fed. 325. Where the parents are divorced the domi- 
 cil will be governed by the domicil of the parent to whom the 
 infant has been awarded. Toledo Traction Co. v. Cameron, 
 69 C. C. A. 28, 137 Fed. 49. 
 
 For the Use of. 
 
 Another exception arises when suit is brought for the use 
 of another ; then the citizenship of the beneficiary controls. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 EFFECT OF CHANGE OF CITIZENSHIP PENDING SUIT^ 
 
 It has already been stated that the jurisdiction is deter- 
 mined by the status of the parties when begun. The uniform 
 rule has been that no change of residence after suit begun will 
 affect the jurisdiction; and this rule applies to either party. 
 Anderson v. Watt, 138 U. S. 702, 34 L. ed. 1081, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 449 ; Brigel v. Tug Eiver Coal & Salt Co. 13 Fed. 13-17, 
 30 C. C. A. 415, 58 U. S. App. 320, 86 Fed. 818; Menard 
 V. Goggan, 121 U. S. 253, 30 L. ed. 914, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 873; 
 Ritchie v. Burke, 109 Fed. 19 ; Collins v. Ashland, 112 Fed. 
 175 ; Jarboe v. Templer, 38 Fed. 217 ; Cross v. Evans, 29 C. 
 C. A. 523, 52 U. S. App. 720, 86 Fed. 4, 5 ; Louisville IST. A. 
 & C. R. Co. V. Louisville Trust Co. 174 U. S. 566, 43 L. ed. 
 1088, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 817. ISTor will any change by assign- 
 ment of the cause of action, pending the suit, whereby the par- 
 ties in interest become citizens of the same State ; nor will any 
 change of parties holding in a fiduciary capacity in any way 
 affect the jurisdiction of the court once obtained. Ibid. ; Hard- 
 enbergh v. Ray, 151 U. S. 112, 38 L. ed. 93, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 305 ; Jarhoe v. Templer, supra. 
 
 To illustrate : If you sue the tenant in possession and have 
 thereby proper diversity, the bringing in of the landlord into 
 the suit by the tenant will not affect jurisdiction, though the 
 landlord be a citizen of the same State with the plaintiff. 
 Phelps V. Oaks, 117 U. S. 239, 29 L. ed. 889, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 714; Hardenbergh v. Ray, 151 U. S. 118, 38 L. ed. 94, 14 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 305 ; Sioux City Terminal R. & Warehouse Co. 
 V Insurance Co. of IST. A. 27 C. C. A. 73, 49 U. S. App. 523, 
 82 Fed. 124; Park v. New York, L. E. & W. E. Co. 70 Fed. 
 641 ; Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U. S. 64, 29 L. ed. 330, 5 Sup. 
 
 60 
 
EPFECT OP CHANGE OF CITIZENSHIP PENDING SUIT. 61 
 
 Ct. Eep. 1163 ; Society of Shakers v. Watson, 15 C. C. A. 632, 
 37 U. S. App. 141, 68 Fed. 736. 
 
 But sometimes one changes his citizenship before suit in 
 order to bring his case within Federal jurisdiction. It is now 
 a fixed rule that this can be done if the change is bona fide, 
 though the purpose may be to bring a suit in the Federal court. 
 The change must be bona fide, that is, with the animo ma- 
 nendi, and not merely ostensible. Mitchell v. United States, 
 21 Wall. 352, 353, 22 L. ed. 587, 588. In Jones v. League, 18 
 How. 76, 15 L. ed. 263, plaintiff removed from Texas to 
 Maryland, and brought suit against citizens of Texas in a Fed- 
 eral court in that State, the case was reversed because it ap- 
 peared that the removal was not with the bona fide intent 
 of becoming a permanent citizen of Maryland; and, again, it 
 appeared that the deed to plaintiff by one Power was only col- 
 orable, as it was in pursuance of a scheme not to pass the title, 
 but to give the plaintiff the right to sue in Texas for the benefit 
 of Power, a citizen of Texas. Marks v. Marks, 75 Fed. 325. 
 In KingTaan v. Holthaus, 59 Fed. 316, where the plaintiff 
 rented a room in an adjoining State, without changing his 
 place of business or eating house, the suit was dismissed. Ala- 
 bama G. S. R Co. V, Carroll, 28 C. C. A. 207, 52 U. S. App. 
 442, 84 Fed. 780, and authorities cited. Simpson v. Phillips- 
 dale Paper Mill Co. 223 Fed. 661. 
 
 So again in Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 315, 32 L. ed. 690, 
 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 289, it appearing that plaintiff removed to 
 Tennessee to obtain jurisdiction in a Federal court in Ala- 
 bama, and with no purpose to acquire a settled home, the case 
 was dismissed, but on page 328 the court says: That a citi- 
 zen of a State can change his citizenship to another, and sue 
 in a Federal court, though his purpose in changing his domi- 
 cil was to invoke Federal jurisdiction. If this new citizenship 
 is really and truly acquired his right is a constitutional one. 
 Alabama G. S. E. Co. v. Carroll, 28 C. C. A. 207, 52 U. S. 
 App. 442, 84 Fed. 779, 780 ; Jones v. League, 18 How. 81, 15 
 L. ed. 264; Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 328, 32 L. ed. 694, 9 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289. In a word, the motive will not be con- 
 sidered if the change be real. Wiemer v. Louisville Water Co. 
 130 Fed. 244. The rule as above stated cannot be misunder- 
 stood, and, while the authorities are abundant, it is not deemed 
 necessary to make further reference to them. 
 
62 EFFECT OF CHAN^GE OF CITIZENSHIP PENDING SUIT. 
 
 Transfer of Property to Create Diversity. 
 
 Federal cognizance of prospective litigation is often sought 
 by transferring to a nonresident the subject of litigation or 
 cause of action. To make such transfers effective for the pur- 
 pose the same test as applied in change of citizenship is here 
 applied, — that is, good faith in the transfer. The rule is that 
 the transfer must be genuine, and bona fide, the title must in 
 good faith pass to the nonresident. There must be no reser- 
 vation of any right, title, or interest in the property trans- 
 ferred, nor must there be any secret purpose that after the 
 litigation the property or any interest therein is to be restored 
 to the resident grantee by repurchase or otherwise. As stated 
 in change of citizenship, motive is not considered if the trans- 
 fer be bona fide and vyithout secret reservation. 
 
 In Crawford v. Neal, 144 U. S. 593, 36 L. ed. 556, 12 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 759, it is said, if the transfer was fictitious to 
 make the nonresident a nominal or colorable party, then there 
 is no jurisdiction, but when all interest in the subject-matter is 
 parted with upon good consideration, then the fact that the 
 motive was to get Federal jurisdiction will not be considered. 
 Lehigh Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U. S. 327, 40 L. ed. 
 444, 16 Sup. Ct. Kep. 307 ; Slaughter v. Mallet Land & Cattle 
 Co. 72 C. C. A. 430, 141 Fed. 282; Alkire Grocery Co. v. 
 Kichesin, 91 Fed. 84 ; Lake County v. Dudley, 173 U. S. 251, 
 43 L. ed. 688, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 398; Irvine Co. v. Bond, 
 74 Fed. 849 ; Norton v. European & N. 'A. R Co. 32 Fed. 
 875 ; Woodside v. Ciceroni, 35 C. C. A. 177, 93 Fed. 1 ; Ashley 
 V. Presque Isle County, 27 C. C. A. 585, 54 U. S. App. 450, 
 83 Fed. 534; Lake County v. Schradsky, 38 C. C. A. 17, 97 
 Fed. 2; Hayden v. Manning, 106 U. S. 589, 27 L. ed. 307, 
 1 Sup. Ct. Eep. 617. 
 
 In Cross v. Allen, 141 U. S. 528, 35 L. ed. 843, 12 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 67, it was held that the transfer of an overdue' note 
 and mortgage to get Federal jurisdiction was not collusive. 
 A transfer made for the sole purpose of conferring jurisdic- 
 tion is collusive. Ibid. ; Bernards Twp. v. Stebbins, 109 U. S. 
 355, 27 L. ed. 961, 3 Sup. Ct. Eep. 252 ; Farmington v. Pills- 
 bury, 114 U. S. 144, 29 L. ed. 116, 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 807; Mar- 
 vin V. Ellis, 9 Fed. 367 ; Cofiin v. Haggin, 7 Sawy. 509, 11 
 Fed. 224. 
 
WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS WITHIN MEANING OF THE ACT. 63 
 
 Persons cannot by stratagem and device impose upon the 
 jurisdiction of the Federal court, and when it appears from 
 the evidence that the jurisdiction has been imposed upon, the 
 court under the fifth section of the act of March, 1875, must 
 dismiss the suit. Ibid. ; Fountain v. Angelica, 20 Blatchf. 
 448, 12 Fed. 8 ; Greenvalt v. Tucker, 3 McCrary, 450, 10 Fed. 
 '884; TurnbuU v. Eoss, 72 C. C. A. 609, 141 Fed. 649. 
 
 Suit hy Assignee. 
 
 Section 11 of the act of 1789, amended and somewhat 
 changed by the act of 1888, limits the jurisdiction of the Fed- 
 eral courts in suits by assig-nees of promissory notes and other 
 choses in action, which will be discussed hereafter. 
 
 See new Code, chap. 2, sec. 24, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 991. 
 
 Who Are Not Citizens ^Yithin the Meaning of the Act. 
 
 A State is not a citizen, therefore a State cannot sue in Fed- 
 eral courts on ground of diversity of citizenship, but it may 
 sue where the basis of jurisdiction is a Federal question. In- 
 diana use of Delaware County v. Alleghany Oil Co. 85 Fed, 
 872 ; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. United States (Postal Teleg, 
 Cable Co. v. Alabama), 155 U. S. 487, 39 L. ed. 232, 15 Sup 
 Ct. Eep. 19.2 ; Arkansas v. Kansas & T. Coal Co. 96 Fed. 353 
 Ames V. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449, 28 L. ed. 482, 4 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 437 ; Oregon v. Three Sisters Irrig. Co. 158 Fed. 349 
 Stone V. South Carolina, 117 U. S. 430, 29 L. ed. 962, 6 Sup 
 Ct. Eep. 799 ; Germania Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 119 U. S 
 473, 30 L. ed. 461, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 260 ; Minnesota v. Guar- 
 anty Trust & S. D. Co. 73 Fed. 914. ISTor has the Federal 
 court jurisdiction when a State sues its own or citizens of an- 
 other State. Kentucky v. Chicago, I. & L. E. Co. 123 Fed. 
 457. Where a State gives consent to its own citizens to sue 
 it, the suit cannot be carried into the Federal court, though 
 there be a Federal question; however, this would not prevent 
 a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States if 
 the decision of the court of last resort be against the right 
 claimed by virtue of a Federal law. Smith v. Eeeves, 178 U. 
 S. 436, 44 L. ed. 1140, 20 Sup, Ct. Eep. 919; Hang v. Louisi- 
 
64 WHO AEE >fOT CITIZENS WITHIN" MEANING OF THE ACT. 
 
 ana, 134 U. S. 1, 33 L. ed. 842, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 504; North 
 Carolina v. Temple, 134 U. S. 30, 33 L. ed. 852, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 509. 
 
 The citizens of the District of Columbia and the Territories 
 are not citizens of States within the meaning of the Federal 
 judiciary act. Maxwell v. Federal Gold & Copper Co. 83 C. 
 C. A. 570, 155 Fed. 110; Watson v. Bonfils, 53 C. C. A. 535, 
 116 Fed. 157; McClelland v. McKane, 154 Fed. 164, 165; 
 Weller v. Hanaur, 105 Fed. 193; Seddon v. Virginia, T. & 
 C. Steel & I. Co. 1 L.E.A. 108, 36 Fed. 8 ; Johnson v. Bunker 
 Hill & S. M. & C. Co. 46 Fed. 417; Hooe v. Jamieson, 166 
 IT. S. 397, 41 L. ed. 1050, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 596. See Koe- 
 nigsburger v. Eichmond Silver Min. Co. 158 U. S. 50, 39 L. ed. 
 892, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 751. 
 
 You cannot join a citizen of a State with a citizen of a Terri- 
 tory. Watson V. Bonfils, 53 C. C. A. 535, 116 Fed. 157. As 
 to citizens of Porto Eico, see Ee Gonzalez, 118 Fed. 941, s. c. 
 192 U. S. 1, 48 L. ed. 317, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 177. 
 
CHAPTEK XI. 
 
 SHIFTING PARTIES TO CEEATB DIVERSITT. 
 
 Having stated the general rules of jurisdiction dependent 
 on diversity of citizenship, which should appear in a bill in 
 equity, I will now speak of a condition of case when the cir- 
 cuit court will take jurisdiction, though a diversity of citi- 
 zenship does not appear in the bill. 
 
 Prior to the act of 1875 the pleadings only were looked to 
 to determine the diversity of citizenship, and the position of 
 parties on the record was conclusive. Bland v. Fleeman, 29 
 Fed. 672. 
 
 Since the act of 1875 the courts will not, in order to re- 
 tain jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of citizenship, be 
 bound by the position of parties in the bill, but will shift 
 them, if their interests will permit, and so arrange them as 
 to fall within the rule of jurisdiction, that all parties plaintiff 
 will be of a different citizenship from all parties defendant. 
 Stephens v. Smartt, 172 Fed. 471, and authorities cited; Re- 
 moval Cases, 100 U. S. 457, 25 L. ed. 593 ; Steele v. Culver, 
 211 U. S. 26, 53 L. ed. 74, 29 Sup. Ct. Eep. 9 ; Evers v. Wat- 
 son, 156 U. S. 532, 39 L. ed. 522, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 430; 
 Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Sav. Fund, S. D. Title & T. Co. 
 197 U. S. 178, 49 L. ed. 713, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 420 ; Venner v. 
 Great ISTorthem E. Co. 209 U. S. 24, 52 L. ed. 666, 28 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 328; Anderson v. Watt, 138 U. S. 701, 34 L. ed. 
 1080, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 449. 
 
 To this end, the court must determine; First, whether the 
 parties from the same State on either side are indispensable ; if 
 not, it will dismiss them to create the necessary diversity. 
 Delaware, L. & W. E. Co. v. Frank, 110 Fed. 694. Second, 
 if they cannot thus be dismissed, then the court determines their 
 relation to the subject-matter, and if their position can be 
 shifted so as to create diversity and still protect their rights, 
 S. Eq.-o. 65 
 
66 SHIFTIITG PAETIES TO CEBATB DIVEESITT. 
 
 it will do SO and take jurisdiction; if this cannot be done, the 
 case must be dismissed. In determining their relation to the 
 subject-matter, the court cannot divide indispensable parties- 
 having identical interests, as will be hereafter seen. 
 
 By shifting the parties is meant that parties defendant may 
 be made parties plaintiff, which can often be done and their 
 rights as well protected as if they had remained defendants. 
 In the same way parties plaintiff may be shifted to the de- 
 fendant side. That is, parties may be arranged according to 
 their actual interest in the controversy, and the court retain 
 jurisdiction. New Code, sec. 37, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1019. 
 Cilley V. Patten, 62 Fed. 498-500; Oberlin College v. Blair, 70 
 Fed. 417 ; Blake v. McKim, 103 U. S. 336, 26 L. ed. 563 ; Hart- 
 er Twp. V. Kemochan, 103 IT. S. 566, 567, 26 L. ed. 412, 413; 
 Mangels v. Donau Brewing Co. 53 Fed. 513 ; Claiborne v. 
 Waddell, 50 Fed. 368; First JSTat. Bank v. Radford Trust Co. 
 26 C. C. A. 1, 47 U. S. App. 692, 80 Fed. 573 ; Consolidated 
 Water Co. v. Babcock, 76 Fed. 248; Removal Cases, supra; 
 Wood V. Deskins, 72 C. C. A. 558, 141 Fed. 507; Mann v. 
 Gaddie, 88 C. C. A. 1, 158 Fed. 43; Sea Board Air Line E. 
 Co. V. JSTorth Carolina R. Co. 123 Fed. 631. This rule was first 
 applied in construing the second section of the judiciary act 
 of 1875, providing for removal of all suits of a civil nature 
 from State to Federal courts in which there was a controversy' 
 between citizens of different States, it being held that for the 
 purposes of removal the matter in dispute may be first ascer- 
 tained, and the parties arranged with reference to the actual 
 interest, on opposite sides of the dispute, and if in such ar- 
 rangement it appears that those on one side are of a different 
 citizenship from those on the other, the cause could be removed i 
 from the State to the Federal court. New Code, sec. 28. 
 Removal Cases and Consolidated Water Co. v. Babcock, supra; 
 Saginaw Gaslight Co. v. Saginaw, 28 Fed. 531 ; Evers v. 
 Watson, supra; Pacific R. Co. v. Ketchum, 101 U. S. 289, 
 25 L. ed. 932; Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Baltimore & 
 0. R. Co. 10 C. C. A. 20, 22 U. S. App. 359, 61 Fed. 709. 
 Although this section, as will be seen by reference to the stat- 
 ute, related to removals from State to Federal courts, it was 
 soon applied to suits originally brought in the circuit courts. 
 Ibid.; Pacific R. Co. v. Ketchum, 101 U. S. 298, 25 L. ed. 
 
SHIFTIITG PARTIES TO CREATE DIVEESITY. 67 
 
 936; Oberlin College v. Blair, supra; Ayres v. Wiswall, 112 
 U. S. 192, 28 L. ed. 695, 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 90; Dormitzer v. 
 Illinois & St. L. Bridge Co. 6 Fed. 21Y; Covert v. Waldron, 
 33 Fed. 312; Shipp v. Williams, 10 C. C. A. 247, 22 U. S. 
 App. 380, 62 Fed. 7. It is thus seen that the construction 
 given to the statute removes the jurisdiction by diversity of 
 citizenship from dependence on the arbitrary and capricious 
 arrangement of the pleader, and while often it becomes neces- 
 sary to join as defendants those who are unwilling to become 
 plaintiffs, yet such arrangement does not bind the court, if it 
 becomes necessary to change them, in order to remove a case 
 to the Federal court, or retain jurisdiction when originally filed. 
 Again, an improper joinder of parties that may defeat juris- 
 diction will not be permitted. Horn v. Lockhart, 17 Wall. 
 579, 21 L. ed. 660; Snow v. Smith, 88 Fed. 657; Mason v. 
 Dullagham, 27 C. C. A. 296, 53 U. S. App. 539, 82 Fed. 
 689. 
 
 Identity of Interests. 
 
 It has been said that you cannot place on both sides of the 
 controversy, in order to retain jurisdiction, indispensable par- 
 ties having identity of interests. Johnson v. Ford, 109 Fed. 
 503 ; Manefee v. Frost, 123 Fed. 633 ; Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. 
 E. Co. V. Baltimore & O. E. Co. 10 C. C. A. 20, 22 U. S. App. 
 359, 61 Fed. 705 ; Joseph Dry Goods Co. v. Hecht, 57 C. C. 
 A. 64, 120 Fed. 761 ; Carroll v. Chesapeake & O. Coal Agency 
 Co. 61 C. C. A. 49, 124 Fed. 309 ; Blacklock v. Small, 127 
 U. S. 96, 32 L. ed. 70, 8 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1096 ; Mangels v. Donau 
 Brewing Co. 53 Fed. 513; Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Sav. 
 Fund, S. D. Title & T. Co. 197 U. S. 178, 49 L. ed. 713, 25 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 420. If any of the parties plaintiff have the 
 same interest with any of the parties defendant, and the in- 
 terest is not separable, as will be hereafter explained, you can- 
 not separate them because they are citizens of different States, 
 in order to get jurisdiction by diversity. Thus a beneficiary, a 
 citizen of one State, suing a mortgagor, who is a citizen of an- 
 other State, in a Federal court in the former State to fore- 
 close a trust deed or mortgage, naming a trustee who is a citi- 
 zen of the latter State also, cannot make the trustee a party 
 
68 SPIIFTING PAETIES TO CKICATE DIVEESITT. 
 
 defendant so as to have diversity, where there is no antago- 
 nism or no relief asked against the trustee, because, so far as 
 the foreclosure is concerned, the interests of the beneficiary and 
 trustee are identical. Ibid. ; Boston Safe Deposit & T. Co. v. 
 Racine, 97 Fed. 817 ; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Atlanta E. Co. 
 100 Fed. 798; Venner v. Great Northern R Co. 209 U. S. 
 24, 52 L. ed. 666, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 328 ; Gage v. Riverside 
 Trust Co. 156 Fed. 1003; Redfield v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. 
 124 Fed. 929; Allen- West Commission Co. v. Brashear, 176 
 Fed. 119-122, and authorities cited. See Gaddie v. ilann, 147 
 Fed. 966 ; Casey v. Baker, 212 Fed. 247. So, if the trustee 
 and beneficiary be of the same State, and the trustee is made 
 a party defendant with the mortgagor, who is a nonresident, 
 the court will remove the cause and treat the trustee as plaintiff 
 with the beneficiary. If a trustee is a citizen of a State other 
 than the State in which the suit is brought, or, as said in Shipp 
 V. Williams, 10 C. C. A. 247, 22 U. S. App. 380, 62 Fed. 5, 
 if he is qualified by his citizenship to sue in a Federal court, 
 then the citizenship of the beneficiary under the trust is wholly 
 unimportant. But if the trustee is disqualified by being a citi- 
 zen of the same State with the defendants, a suit cannot be en- 
 tertained, even though the beneficiary be a nonresident. The 
 rule would not be changed by reason of the refusal of the trustee 
 to act. 10 C. C. A. 248. Gardner v. Brown, 21 Wall. 36, 22 L. 
 ed. 527 ; Caylor v. Cooper, 165 Fed. 758 ; Susquehanna & W. 
 Valley R. & Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 11 Wall. 172, 20 L. ed. 
 179 ; Redfield v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. 124 Fed. 929 ; Menefee 
 V. Frost, 123 Fed. 633; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Lake 
 Street Elev. R. Co. 122 Fed. 922 ; Rust v. Brittle Silver Co. 
 7 C. C. A. 389, 19 U. S. App. 237, 58 Fed. 611. See Bow- 
 doin College v. Merritt, 63 Fed. 213. 
 
 Again, the rule may be illustrated by cases where the in- 
 terests of heirs are identical : You cannot, because of their 
 diverse citizenship, place them on both sides of a suit in order 
 to settle an administration of the estate. Bland v. Fleeman, 29 
 Fed. 671 ; Cilley v. Patten, 62 Fed. 500 ; Oberlin College v. 
 Blair, 70 Fed. 414. So in partition, you cannot shift parties to 
 obtain jurisdiction. Rich v. Bray, 2 L.R.A. 225, 37 Fed. 279; 
 Torrence v. Shedd, 144 U. S. 527, 36 L. ed. 5^8, 12 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 726. Nor where there are two executors,' one of whom 
 
SHIFTING PARTIES TO CIIEATE DIVKKSITY. 69 
 
 is a citizen of the same State with defendants. See Anderson 
 V. Watt, 13S U. S. 694, 34 L. ed. 1078, 11 Snp. Ct. Rep. 449. 
 In Smith v. Consumers' Cotton Oil Co. 30 C. C. A. 103, 52 
 TJ. S. App. 603, 86 Fed. 359, it was held that you could dis- 
 miss as to one member of a firm from a State with plaintiff 
 in order to retain jurisdiction. This was a suit in which a 
 citizen of Illinois sued the members of a Texas firm, one of 
 whom was a citizen of Illinois, on a breach of contract. The 
 court permitted the Illinois member to be dismissed from the 
 suit in order to retain jiirisdiction. But in Ruble v. Hyde, 
 1 McCrary, 513, 3 Fed. 331, a partnership of JMinnesota sued 
 in Minnesota seven persons as copartners, one of whom was 
 a citizen of Minnesota. The suit was in the State court ; the 
 cause was removed by the six nonresident defendants to the 
 Federal court. On a motion to remand, the court granted it, 
 because the Minnesota member of the firm was not a nominal 
 party, and being a citizen of the same State with plaintiff, the 
 court could not take jurisdiction. Hyde v. Ruble, 104 IT. S. 
 407, 26 L. ed. 823. It will be seen that the case of Ruble v. 
 Hyde, supra, was not referred to in Smith v. Consumers' Cotton 
 Oil Co. It was evidently overlooked, or we should not have had 
 a different conclusion upon similar facts, in determining so 
 important a question of jurisdiction. 
 
CHAPTEE XII. 
 
 SEPARABLE CONTEOVEESY. 
 
 As to what is a separable interest which may control the 
 jurisdiction of the Federal courts, and by which diversity of 
 citizenship may be created, is indicated in the latter clause of 
 section 2 of the act of 1875, and amended in section 2 of the 
 judiciary act of 1888, which is as follows: "And when in 
 any suit mentioned in this section there shall be a controversy 
 which is wholly between citizens of different States, and which 
 can be fully determined as between them, then either one or 
 more of the defendants actually interested in such controversy 
 may remove such suit into the circuit court of the United 
 States." New Code, sec. 28 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1010), 
 Appendix. 
 
 In the act of 1875 either the plaintiff or defendant could 
 remove the case into the Federal court, but at present, under 
 the act of 1888, only a nonresident defendant or defendants can 
 remove the case from the State court. ISTew Code, sec. 28. 
 
 This clause of section 2 has been frequently construed and 
 applied to suits originally filed in the Federal courts, and the 
 principle fixed, that if the interest of the party whose situation 
 as to residence or citizenship woiild defeat jurisdiction, is a 
 separable interest, and the matters involved in the bill can be 
 wholly determined between the parties properly before the 
 court, without materially affecting the party holding the sep- 
 arable interest, then the court will dismiss the party holding 
 the separable interest and retain jurisdiction. Geer v. Ma- 
 thieson Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 432, 47 L. ed. 1124, 23 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 807 ; Smedley v. Smedley, 110 Fed. 258 ; ToTrence v. 
 Shedd, 144 U. S. 527, 36 L. ed. 528, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 726; 
 Chicago, E. I. & P. E. Co. v. Martin, 178 U. S. 245, 44 E. ed. 
 1055, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 854; Iowa Lillooet Gold Min. Co. v. 
 Bliss, 144 Fed. 455; Stanbrough v. Cook, 3 L.E.A. 400, 38 
 Fed. 372, 373; Hyde v. Euble, 104 U. S. 409, 26 L. ed. 823; 
 Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Brown, 32 Fed. 339 ; Barney v. La- 
 
 70 
 
SEPAEABLB CONTBOVEESY. 71 
 
 tham, 103 U. S. 205, 26 L. ed. 514; Lomax v. Foster Lumber 
 Co. 99 C. C. A. 463, 174 Fed. 966. 
 
 But tlie question is, what is the test of this separable inter- 
 est that will authorize a dismissal of a party to sustain diver- 
 sity of citizenship ? It must appear that a complete decree 
 can be granted without the presence of the separate interest, 
 and without injury to the party holding it, whose presence 
 would affect the jurisdiction. Ibid. ; Ayres v. Wiswall, 112 U. 
 S. 192, 28 L. ed. 695, 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 90 ; Torrence v. Shedd, 
 144 U. S. 530, 36 L. ed. 531, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 726; Mer- 
 chants' Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Insurance Co. of 'N. A. 
 151 F. S. 385, 38 L. ed. 204, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 499, 14 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 367 ; Hanrick v. Hanrick, 153 U. S. 196, 38 L. ed. 
 687, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 835; Bates v. Carpentier, 98 Fed. 452; 
 Eegis V. United Drug Co. 180 Fed. 201. But it is not sepa- 
 rable because parties are asking for separate decrees and execu- 
 tions, but what does the whole case show the controversy to be. 
 See MacGinnis v. Boston & M. Consol. Copper & S. Min. Co. 
 55 C. C. A. 648, 119 Fed. 100, 101. • 
 
 Thus, a case contains a separable controversy when the cause 
 of action sued upon is capable of separation into two or more 
 independent suits, one of which is wholly between citizens of 
 different States ; that is, can be fully determined between them 
 without the presence of the other party obnoxious to the Federal 
 jurisdiction. Barth v. Coler, 9 C. C. A. 81, 19 U. S. App. 646, 
 60 Fed. 468 ; Stanbrough v. Cook, supra ; Fraser v. Jennison, 
 106 U. S. 191, 27 L. ed. 131, 1 Sup. Ct. Eep. 171 ; Carothers 
 V. McKinley Min. & Smelting Co. 116 Fed. 951; Western U. 
 Teleg. Co. v. Brown, 32 Fed. 341; Barney v. Latham, 103 
 U. S. 212-216, 26 L. ed. 517, 518; Brown v. Trousdale, 138 
 U. S. 896, 34 L. ed. 990, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 308; Mutual Ee- 
 serve Fund Life Asso. v. Farmer, 23 C. C. A. 574, 36 U. S. 
 App. 771, 77 Fed. 931. See Veariel v. United Engineering 
 & Foundry Co. 197 Fed. 877. 
 
 The clear purpose of the clause in the act is to pemiit a non- 
 resident citizen joined with other defendants in a State court, 
 to remove the case to the Federal court, if as between him and 
 the plaintiff the cause be separable; that is, the issues affect- 
 ing him can be wholly determined without the presence of the 
 other defendants. Again, it is applied when an original bill is 
 
72 SEPAEABLE CONTllOVEEST. 
 
 filed and a party to the bill, whose situation as to residence 
 would defeat the jurisdiction, has a separable interest. In sucli 
 case the court will dismiss the separable interest to retain juris- 
 diction. Ibid. 
 
 This rule is frequently illustrated in suits brought against 
 many defendants to quiet title, where defendants hold under 
 separate deeds (Bates v. Carpentier, 98 Fed. 454; Stanbrough 
 V. Cook, 3 L.E.A. 400, 38 Fed. 369; Bacon v. Felt, 38 Fed. 
 8Y0), but not under a joint deed, for in this latter case no de- 
 cree could be rendered without affecting all parties in the deed, 
 ■which is a test of the separable interest. Peninsular Co. v. 
 Stone, 121 U. S. 632, 30 L. ed. 1021, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1010. 
 It seems that there must be neither joint right or liability. 
 Insurance Co. of N. A. v. Delaware Mut. Ins. Co. 50 Fed. 
 257, 258. 
 
 Again, in determining whether there is a separable contro- 
 versy, you must not be confused by the fact that various de- 
 fendants may set up various and separate defenses against a 
 single controversy. Such separate defenses, however different, 
 do not constitute the separable interest that must exist as a basis 
 to divide the controversy, and dismissing the party from the 
 suit if joined or omitting him from the bill. Ayres v. Wis- 
 wall, 112 U. S. 193, 28 L. ed. 695, 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 90; Con- 
 nell V. Smiley, 156 U. S. 340, 39 L. ed. 444, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 353 ; Torrence v. Shedd, 144 U. S. 530, 36 L. ed. 531, 12 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 726 ; Powers v. Chesapeake & O. E. Co. 169 U. S. 
 97, 42 L. ed. 674, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 264; Dougherty v. Yazoo 
 & M. Valley E. Co. 58 C. C. A. 651, 122 Fed. 205; Miller v. 
 Clifford, 5 L.E.A. (KS.) 49, 67 C. C. A. 52, 133 Fed. 884, 
 and authorities cited; Colbum v. Hill, 41 C. C. A. 467, 101 
 Fed. 505 ; Eosenthal v. Coates, 148 U. S. 142-147, 37 L. ed. 
 399, 400, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 576 ; Ee Jarnecke Ditch, 69 Fed. 
 169 ; Graves v. Corbin, 132 U. S. 588, 33 L. ed. 468, 10 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 196. See Cella v. Brown, 75 C. C. A. 608, 144 Fed. 
 756, 757. And this test of a separable interest is not affected 
 in equity by State statutes permitting judgment to be taken 
 against one or more of the defendants. Louisville & IST. K. 
 Co. V. Ide, 114 U. S. 52-57, 29 L. ed. 63-65, 5 Sup. Ct. Kep. 
 735. 
 
 To illustrate: A bill is filed to reach the property of a 
 
SEPARABLE CONTEOVEKST. 73 
 
 partnership axid to declare certain encumbrances void. We 
 have in snch case only a single controversy, though there are 
 various defendants and various defenses (Graves v. Corbin, 
 132 U. S. 5S5, 33 L. ed. 467, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 196; Tor- 
 rence v. Shedd, 144 U. S. 531, 36 L. ed. 531, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 726. See Brooks v. Clark, 119 U. S. 511, 30 L. ed. 485, 7 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 301), or a creditors' bill to subject encumbered 
 property ; the controversy is single, though the defenses are dif- 
 ferent (Fidelity Ins. Trust & S. D. Co. v. Huntington, 117 U. 
 S. 281, 29 L. ed. 899, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 733; Rosenthal v. 
 Coates, 148 U. S. 147, 37 L. ed. 400, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 576; 
 Thurber v. Miller, 14 C. C. A. 432, 32 U. S. App. 209, 67 
 Fed. 374; Colburn v. Hill, supra), for the plaintiff seeks a 
 complete decree to subject the property to sale free from any 
 encumbrance. Ibid. 
 
 So in trying title to a tract of land where residents and non- 
 residents are made parties defendant, no separable controversy 
 is presented so that a nonresident may remove the case. Lomax 
 v. Foster Lumber Co. 99 C. C. A. 463, 174 Fed. 959-965. See 
 South Dakota C. R. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 73 
 C. C. A. 176, 141 Fed. 581-582. Condemnation proceedings. 
 Cleveland v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. 77 C. C. A. 
 467, 147 Fed. 171. 
 
 So an action by a citizen of one State against a citizen cor- 
 poration of same State and nonresidents, to compel corpora- 
 tion to transfer stock, cannot be removed by nonresident on 
 the ground of a severable cause of action. St. Louis & S. F. 
 R. Co. V. Wilson, 114 U. S. 62, 29 L. ed. 67, 5 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 738. 
 
 So in suit to foreclose a mortgage, where mortgagor and 
 mortgagee are residents of same State. Thompson v. Dixon, 
 28 Fed. 6. 
 
 So in a creditors' suit to set aside collusive judgments. 
 Graves v. Corbin, 132 U. S. 589, 33 L. ed. 468, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 196. 
 
 So in suit seeking cancelation of bonds. Wilson v. Oswego 
 Twp. 151 U. S. 67, 38 L. ed. 75, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 259. 
 
 So in action for partition. Torrence v. Shedd, supra. 
 
 So in specific performance, where an agent negotiating the 
 sale was a necessary party and of the same citizenship, with 
 
74 SEP ARABLE CO]S"TROVEKST. 
 
 complainant. Scoutt v. Keck, 20 0. C. A. 103, 36 U. S. App 
 586, 73 Fed. 900. 
 
 These cases all illustrate the rule that where the bill dis- 
 closes but a single cause of action, it is not separable. Mc- 
 Millan V. ISTowes, 146 Fed. 926 ; Eeinartson v. Chicago G. W, 
 R. Co. 174 Fed. 707 ; Cleveland v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R, 
 Co. 77 C. C. A. 467, 147 Fed. 171. 
 
 Joint and Several Liability. 
 
 Where the liability of two or more is joint and several, and 
 plaintiff elects to sue jointly, a separable interest of one of 
 the defendants cannot be set up to obtain Federal jurisdic- 
 tion. Moore v. Los Angeles Iron & Steel Co. 89 Fed. 78, and 
 authorities cited; Gustafson v. Chicago, E. I. & P. K. Co. 128 
 Fed. 85; Graves v. City & Suburban Teleg. Asso. 132 Fed. 
 389 ; Lathrop-Shea &.H. Co. v. Pittsburg, S. & M. E. Co. 135 
 Fed. 619 ; Pirie v. Tvedt, 115 U. S. 43, 29 L. ed. 332, 5 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 1034, 1161; Brown v. Coxe Bros. & Co. 75 Fed. 689; 
 Mutual Eeserve Fund Life Asso. v. Farmer, 23 C. C. A. 574, 
 36 U. S. App. 771, 77 Fed. 929 ; Little v. Giles, 118 U. S. 602, 
 30 L. ed. 271, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 32 ; Sexton v. Seelye, 39 Fed. 
 705 ; Powers v. Chesapeake & 0. E. Co. 169 U. S. 97, 42 L 
 ed. 674, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 264; Goode v. Colorado Springs, 
 200 Fed. 99. 
 
 So in an action founded in tort, plaintiff may sue one or 
 all the joint tort feasers, but when all are sued there can be 
 no separable controversy with any one defendant so as to give 
 a Federal court jurisdiction (Creagh v. Equitable Life Assur. 
 Soc. 88 Fed. 1; Evans v. Felton, 96 Fed. 176; Carr v. Kan- 
 sas City, 87 Fed. 1; Doremus v. Eoot, 94 Fed. 760; Graves 
 V. City & Suburban Teleg. Asso. 132 Fed. 387; Keller v. 
 Kansas City, St. L. & C. E. Co. 135 Fed. 202; Eiser v. South- 
 ern E. Co. 116 Fed. 216; Fogarty v. Southern P. Co. 123 Fed. 
 974, and authorities cited. See Atlantic & P. E. Co. v. Laird, 
 164 U. S. 396, 41 L. ed. 486, 17 Sup. Ct. P \ 120 ; Little v. 
 Giles, 118 U. S. 600, 30 L. ed. 270, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 32 ; Louis- 
 ville & iN". E. Co. V. Wangelin, 132 U. S. 601, 33 L. ed. 475, 
 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 203), or where the bill is to cancel for fraud 
 (Oakes v. Yonah Land & Min. Co. 89 Fed. 243) ; but in such 
 cases there must be co-operation in fact, or community in wrong- 
 
SEPARABLE CONTROVEESY, 75 
 
 doing. Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U. S. 409, 35 L. ed. 443, 11 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 819, 840. 
 
 Again, where a party sues to recover personal damage against 
 two defendants, one being' nonresident, there is no separable 
 controversy, unless it be shown that the home party was joined 
 to oust jurisdiction. Graves v. City & Suburban Teleg. Asso. 
 supra. Thus a railroad company and conductor being joined, 
 it being alleged that party was injured by negligence of the 
 conductor to obey rules was held not to be separable. Riser 
 V. Southern R. Co. 116 Fed. 215. See Chesapeal?:e & 0. R. 
 Co. Y. Dixon, 179 U. S. 139, 45 L. ed. 125, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 (57: Weaver v. jSTorthern P. E. Co. 125 Fed. 155; Rupp v. 
 Wheeling & L. E. R. Co. 58 C. C. A. 161, 121 Fed. 825; 
 Warax v. Cincinnati, K O. & T. P. R. Co. 72 Fed. 637; 
 Doremus v. Root, 94 Fed. 760; Kelly v. Chicago & A. R. 
 Co. 122 Fed. 286 ; Painter v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 177 
 Fed. 517; Stevenson v. Illinois C. R. Co. 192 Fed. 956. 
 
 But in Deere v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 85 Fed. 876, 
 it is held that motive will not be considered if an interest 
 exists. 
 
 Where, however, a statute imposes an obligation on a corpo- 
 ration alone, then it seems that if injury occtirs by a breach 
 of the duty thus required by the statute, there can be no joint 
 liability between a corporation and an employee by failure of 
 the company to perform the duty, and such action is separable. 
 Kelly V. Chicago & A. R. Co. supra ; Bryce v. Southern R. Co. 
 
 122 Fed. 709; Williard v. Spartanburg, U. & C. R. Co. 124 
 Fed. 801. See Gustafson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 128 
 Fed. 87-96; Jackson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 102 C. C. 
 A. 159, 17S Fed. 432-435. See Fogarty v. Southern P. Co. 
 
 123 Fed. 975, as to proper allegations; Reinartson v. Chicago 
 G. W. R. Co. 174 Fed. 707. 
 
 In Batey v. jS^ashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. 95 Fed. 368, the 
 railroad company and Pullman company were sued, alleging the 
 injury to be caused by negligence in handling the train and 
 against the other for negligence in construction of the berth 
 by which he was thrown out. This was held separable. 
 
 While these cases founded upon tort and trespass are purely 
 actions at law, yet they serve to illustrate the principle upon 
 which separable controversies are based. (See "Tort Feasors, 
 Removal by.") Atlantic & P. R. Co. v. Laird, 164 U. S. 
 396, 41 L. ed. -t^'-g-^-Vrgii-p- -'^f, igpj 120. 
 
CHAPTEK XIII. 
 
 CITIZENSHIP OP COEPOEATIOSrS. 
 
 We have seen that the judicial power of the United States 
 has been declared to extend to controversies between citizens of 
 different States and citizens of a State and aliens, and the 
 words "citizens" and "aliens" have been construed to include 
 corporations. 
 
 For fifty years in the judicial history of this country the 
 word "citizen," as used in the Constitution, extending the ju- 
 dicial power of the Federal government to controversies be- 
 tween citizens of different states, was held not to include "cor- 
 porations." Hope Ins. Co. v. Boardman, 5 Cranch, 57-61, 3 
 L. ed. 36, 37. We find, however, corporations were litigants 
 in these courts from their organization, but in these cases the 
 citizenship of the incorporators was sufficient to create the di- 
 versity that gave jurisdiction. Ibid. ; Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 
 Cranch, 267, 2 L. ed. 435; Commercial & E. Bank v. Slo- 
 comb, 14 Pet. 60, 10 L. ed. 254. Thus we see the citizenship 
 of the individual stockholders controlled the jurisdiction over 
 corporations when it was dependent on diversity of citizenship, 
 and it was permitted the defendant to raise the issue by alleg- 
 ing and showing the citizenship of any or all of the stockhold- 
 ers composing the corporation, so as to defeat the jurisdic- 
 tion of the Federal court. This remained the rule until 1844, 
 when the Supreme Court of the United States, in an opinion 
 delivered by Mr. Justice Wayne, held that a corporation was a 
 person, though an artificial one, inhabiting and belonging to 
 the State of its birth (Loiiisville, C. & C. E. Co. v. Letson, 2 
 How. 555, 11 L. ed. 376) ; and this, though citizens of other 
 States may be members of the corporation, that for all jurisdic- 
 tional purposes, that is, to sue or be sued, it is a citizen within 
 the meaning of the Constitution and the judiciary act of 1789. 
 Thus we see that the doctrine of the previous cases was entirely 
 
 76 
 
CITIZENSHIP OF COEPOBATIONa. 
 
 It 
 
 overthrown, and for ten years acquiesced in as a final settle- 
 ment of the status of a corporation for judicial purposes. 
 
 In 1853 in Marshall v. Baltimore & O. E. Co. 16 How. 314, 
 14 L. ed. 953, the question again came before the Supreme 
 Court and, while the jurisdiction to sue a corporation in the 
 State of its organization was maintained, yet the jurisdiction 
 was not sustained upon the ground that the legal entity, both in- 
 visible and intangible, was a citizen in the meaning of the 
 Constitution, but it was held that the presumption arising from 
 the habitat of a corporation in the place of its creation was 
 conclusive as to the residence or the citizenship of those who 
 use the corporate name; in other words, the presumption was 
 conclusive that the stockholders and members of the corpora- 
 tion were citizens of the State where the corporation was or- 
 ganized, and the corporation as defendant could not deny it, 
 nor, when suing as plaintiff, could the defendant look beyond 
 the corporation to show want of diversity by reason of the 
 citizenship of its members. 
 
 This theory that the citizenship of the members composing 
 the corporation is indisputably a citizenship of the State cre- 
 ating the corporation has been adhered to ever since, and the 
 simple allegation that a party is a body corporate, created and 
 organized under and by virtue of the statutes of a particular 
 State, fijces the citizenship as a jurisdictional question. The 
 doctrine thus established has vastly increased the area of Fed- 
 eral jurisdiction, and the fiction by which it has been accom- 
 plished has been severely criticised. We find the courts have 
 since been often pressed to extend the fiction, but have firmly 
 resisted the creation of further artificial citizens for jurisdic- 
 tional purposes, truly declaring that in what has already been 
 done they had reached the verge of judicial power. Baltimore 
 & O. E. Co. V. Koontz, 104 U. S. 12, 26 L. ed. 645 ; St. Louis 
 & S. F. E. Co. V. James, 161 U.S. 555, 40 L. ed. 806, 16 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 621; Barrow S. S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 107, 42 
 L. ed. 967, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 526; St. Joseph & G. I. E. Co. v. 
 Steele, 167 U. S. 664, 42 L. ed. 317, 17^Sup. Ct. Eep. 925; 
 Shaw V. Quincy Min. Co. 145 U. S. 450, 36 L. ed. 771, 12 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 935 ; ISTashua & L. E. Corp. v. Boston & L. E. 
 Corp. 136 U. S. 356, 370, 34 L. ed. 363, 366, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 1004: ISTational S. S. Co. v. Tugman, 106 U. S. 121, 27 L. ed. 
 
Y8 CITIZENSHIP OF COEPOEATIONS. 
 
 88, 1 Sup. Ct. Eep. 58 ; Chicago & N. W. R Co. v. Wliitton, 
 13 Wall. 283, 20 L. ed. 575 j United States r. S. P. Shotter 
 Co. 110 Fed. 2 ; Louisville Trust Co. v. Lou-isville, K A. & C. 
 E. Co. 22 C. C. A. 378, 43 U. S. App. 550, 75 Fed. 433; 
 Hollingsworth v. Southern R. Co. 86 Fed. 356; Taylor v. 
 Illinois C. E. Co. 89 Fed. 119. 
 
 So, then, corporations, within the jurisdictional act, are 
 citizens, and, upon the theory that individual members are citi- 
 zens of the State of the incorporation, are indisputably citizens 
 of the State granting the charter (Ibid.; Ohio & M. E. Co. v. 
 Wheeler, 1 Black, 286, 17 L. ed. 130 ; Germania F. Ins. Co. v. 
 Francis, 11 Wall. 216, 20 L. ed. 78; Taylor v. Illinois C. E. 
 Co. supra; National S. S. Co. v. Tugman, 106 U. S. 118, 27 
 L. ed. 87, 1 Sup. Ct. Eep. 58 ; Freeman v. American Surety 
 Co. 116 Fed. 549 ; Louisville, K A. & C. E. Co. v. Louisville 
 Trust Co. 174 U. S. 563, 43 L. ed. 1087, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 817; St. Louis & S. F. E. Co. v. James, 161 U. S. 545, 40 
 L. ed. 802, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 621) ; and a citizenship which 
 cannot be changed (Ibid. ; Ex parte SchoUenberger, 96 U. S. 
 369, 24 L. ed. 853; Canadian Southern E. Co. v. Gehhard, 
 109 U. S. 527, 27 L. ed. 1020, 3 Sup. Ct. Eep. 363). The 
 rules of diverse citizenship as a basis of jurisdiction in the 
 Federal courts, as heretofore given, apply equally to corpora- 
 tions as to individuals (Shaw v. Quincy Min. Co. 145 U. S. 
 449, 36 L. ed. 771, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 935 ; Myers v. Murray, 
 ]Sr. & Co. 11 L.E.A. 216, 43 Fed. 698-699 ; Hirschl v. J. I. 
 Case Threshing Mach. Co. 42 Fed. 803 ; St. Louis E. Co. v. Pa- 
 cific E. Co. 52 Fed. 772) ; they are put on the same footing with 
 individuals in respect to jurisdiction in suits by and against 
 them (Barrow S. S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 106, 42 L. ed. 966, 
 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 526). 
 
 But it is well known that corporations engage in business^, 
 in other States than where created, and the rule further es- 
 tablished that a State may require of a corporation the per- 
 formance of any conditions not inconsistent with the laws and 
 Constitution of the United States before being admitted to do 
 business within the State. The restrictions and limitations 
 have been as various as the States, and the clear purpose of 
 many of them was to make the foreign corporation a corpora- 
 tion of the State in which it seeks to do business, and thereby 
 
CITIZENSHIP OF COEPOEATIONS. 79 
 
 mate it amenable to suits in State courts by citizens of the 
 State. But the requirement of State laws, however expressed, 
 as a condition precedent to doing business in a State, cannot 
 change the rule of the citizenship of a corporation as above 
 given, and cannot make the corporation a citizen of that State. 
 Hollingsworth v. Southern K. Co. 86 Fed. 353, 355; Goodwin 
 V. Boston & M. K. Co. 127 Fed. 986 ; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. 
 v. James, 161 U. S. 545, 40 L. ed. 802, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 621 ; 
 St. Joseph & G. I. E. Co. v. Steele, 167 U. S. 659, 42 L. ed. 
 315, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 925 ; Taylor v. Illinois C. R. Co. 89 Fed. 
 119; Canada Southern E. Co. v. Gebhard, supra; London P. 
 & A. Bank v. Aronstein, 54 C. C. A. 663, 117 Fed. 607 ; Myers 
 V. Murray, N. & Co. 11 L.E.A. 216, 43 Fed. 699 ; Eowboth- 
 am V. George P. Steele Iron Co. 71 Fed. 758. In a word, 
 you cannot change the corporation into a domestic corporation 
 by prescribing conditions precedent to its entering the State to 
 do business; you cannot change its citizenship so as to affect 
 the jurisdiction of the Federal courts. Ibid. ; Louisville, 'N. A. 
 & C. E. Co. V. Louisville Trust Co. 174 U. S. 560-563, 48 
 L. ed. 1085-1087, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 817 ; Southern E. Co. v. 
 Allison, 190 U. S. 335, 336, 47 L. ed. 1082, 1083, 23 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 713 ; Consolidated Store-Service Co. v. Lamson Con- 
 sol. Store-Service Co. 41 Fed. 834. 
 
 To illustrate : A Missouri corporation endowed by the laws 
 of Arkansas with all the powers and privileges of a domestic 
 corporation cannot be sued by a citizen of Missouri in the Fed- 
 eral courts of Arkansas. For jurisdictional purposes it is still 
 a citizen of Missouri, and two citizens from the same State can- 
 not sue in the Federal courts of another State. St. Louis & 
 S. F. E. Co. V. James, 161 U. S. 545, 40 L. ed. 802, 16 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 621; Hollingsworth v. Southern E. Co. 86 Fed. 353. 
 This presumption of citizenship of a corporation in a State 
 where organized accompanies corporations wherever they may 
 do business beyond the limits of such State, and it may sue or 
 be sued in the Federal courts in other States as a citizen of 
 the State of its incorporation. 
 
 In Louisville, 'N. A. & C. E. Co. v. Louisville Trust Co. 174 
 U. S. 562, 43 L. ed. 1086, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 817, the court 
 says that a corporation of one State may be made a corpora- 
 
80 CITIZENSHIP OF COEPOEATIONS. 
 
 tion of another State by the legislature in regard to property 
 and acts within its territorial jurisdiction, but in order to make 
 corporations already in existence under the laws of one State 
 a corporation of another State, the language used must implj 
 creation or adoption in such form as to confer the power usually 
 exercised over corporations by the State or by the legislature. 
 The mere grant of privileges and powers as an existing corpo- 
 ration does not do this. Southern R. Cq. v. Allison, 190 U. S. 
 326, 47 L. ed. 1078, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 713 ; Pennsylvania R 
 Co. V. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R Co. 118 U. S. 296, 30 L. ed. 
 87, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1094; Markwopd v. Southern R. Co. 65 
 Eed. 824; Overman Wheel Co. v. Pope Mfg. Co. 46 Fed. 578; 
 St. Louis & S. P. R. Co. V. James, 161 U. S. 562, 40 L. ed. 
 808, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 621 ; Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Alabama, 
 107 U. S. 585, 27 L. ed. 520, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 432; Goodlett 
 V. Louisville & 1^. R. Co. 122 U. S. 404, 30 L. ed. 1232, 7 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1254 ; Martin v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. (Gerling 
 V. Baltimore & 0. R. Co.) 151 U. S. 677, 38 L. ed. 313, 14 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 533. In Taylor v. Illinois C. R. Co. 89 Fed. 
 119, the court, construing a statute of Kentucky, which required 
 a foreign corporation to incorporate therein, and upon com- 
 pliance provides "it shall become a corporation citizen and 
 resident of the State," held a citizen of Kentucky could sue it 
 in a Federal court. Here we reach a point where this ques- 
 tion of the citizenship of corporations as affecting the jurisdic- 
 tion of the Federal courts becomes apparently complicated, and 
 especially in its application to railroad corporations leasing and 
 operating lines in other States, or in consolidating various inde- 
 pendent railway corporations of other States under one system 
 and one name. Cummins v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 193 Fed. 
 240, 241. 
 
 A railway company organized in one State does not make 
 itself a citizen of another State by leasing and operating a rail- 
 way therein. Western & A. R. Co. v. Roberson, 9 C. C. A. 
 646, 22 U. S. App. 187, 61 Fed. 592. So, a railway com- 
 pany owning and operating a line through several States may 
 receive and exercise powers gTanted by each State and may, 
 for many purposes, be recognized as a corporation of each State,; 
 but that does not, with reference to Federal jurisdiction, make 
 it a citizen of every State it passes thi'ough. St. Joseph & G. 
 
CITIZENSHIP OF COEPOEATIONS. 81 
 
 I. E. Co. T. Steele, 167 U. S. 663, 664, 42 L. ed. 316, 317, 17 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 925 ; St. Louis & S. F. R Co. v. James, 161 U. 
 S. 545, 40 L. ed. 802, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 621. 
 
 But sometimes corporations are created by co-operating leg- 
 islatures of several States, but such corporation cannot have 
 one and the same legal being in both States ; they are still dis- 
 tinct corporations deriving their powers from distinct sover- 
 eigns; and such corporations, though they be under one system 
 and under one name, cannot unite as plaintifPs in a Federal 
 court against a citizen of either State Mrhich chartered them. 
 Ibid.; Ohio & M. E. Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black, 286, 17 L. ed. 
 130 ; Memphis & C. E. Co. v. Alabama, 107 U. S. 585, 27 L. ed. 
 520, 2 Sup. Ct. Eep. 432 ; Smith v. ITew York, K H. & H. 
 E. Co. 96 Fed. 505. 
 
 In Louisville, K A. & C. E. Co. v. Louisville Trust Co. 174 
 U. S. 552, 43 L. ed. 1081, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 817, a corpora- 
 tion originally created by the laws of Indiana brought suit in 
 Kentucky against citizens of Kentucky and Illinois. Plaintiff 
 before suit was made a corporation of Kentucky, and pending 
 suit was made a corporation of Illinois by consolidation with an 
 Illinois corporation. The court says the plaintiff was first made 
 a corporation of Indiana, and, whatever may have been done 
 by consolidation or otherwise afterwards, for jurisdictional pur- 
 poses it remained a corporation of Indiana. It could neither 
 have brought suit as a corporation of both States against a cor- 
 poration or citizen of either State, nor could it sue or have 
 been sued as a corporation of Kentucky in the Federal courts. 
 The court held jurisdiction to adjudicate its rights as a corpo- 
 ration of Indiana. St. Joseph & G. I. E. Co. v. Steele, 167 U. 
 S. 659, 42 L. ed. 315, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 925 ; St. Louis & S. F. 
 E. Co. V. James, supra; Alabama & G. Mfg. Co. v. Eiverdale 
 Cotton Mills, 62 C. C. A. 295, 127 Fed. 497. 
 
 Where three railroad corporations organized under the laws 
 of different States are consolidated under the laws of each 
 State, the consolidated corporation is a citizen of each State, 
 and a citizen of any of the States where organized cannot 
 sue the corporation in the Federal courts in a State of which 
 he is a citizen (Winn v. Wabash E. Co. 118 Fed. 55 ; Nashua 
 & L. E. Corp. V. Boston & L. E. Corp. 136 U. S. 356, 34 L. ed. 
 363, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1004; Dodd v. Louisville Bridge Co. 
 S. Eq.— 6. 
 
S2 CITIZENSHIP OF COBPOKATIOITS. 
 
 130 Fed, 195, 196 ; Paul v. Baltimore & O. & C. E. Co. 44 Fed. 
 513 ; Baldwin v. Chicago & K W. E. Co. 86 Fed. 167 ; West- 
 heider v. Wabash E. Co. 115 Fed. 840; Graham v. Boston, H. 
 & E. E. Co. 118 U. S. 169, 30 L. ed. 196, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 1009 ; Missouri P. E. Co. v. Meeh, 30 L.E.A. 250, 16 0. C. A. 
 510, 32 U. S. App. 691, 69 Fed. 753), but a citizen of one 
 State of its incorporation may sue it in the Federal courts of 
 another State of its incorporation (Williamson v. Krohn, 13 
 C. C. A. 668, 31 U. S. App. 325, 66 Fed. 656-662; Boston 
 & M. E. Co. V. Hurd, 56 L.E.A. 193, 47 C. C. A. 615, 108 
 Fed. 116 ; ISTashua & L. E. Corp v. Boston & L. E. Corp. 136 
 U. S. 375, 376, 34 L. ed. 368, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1004; Muller 
 V. Dows, 94 U. S. 444, 24 L. ed. 207; Union Trust Co. v. 
 Eochester & P. E. Co. 29 Fed. 609 ; Goodwin v. Boston & M. 
 E. Co. 127 Fed. 986). Thus it seems that a corporation may 
 be so created as to have the constituent parts — citizens of dif- 
 ferent States, as 
 
 First. When it is created a corporation by different States. 
 Ibid. ; Graham v. Boston, H. & E. E. Co. supra ; Louisville, IsT. 
 A. & C. E. Co. V. Louisville Trust Co. 174 U. S. 563, 43 L. 
 ed. 1087, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 817 ; Goodwin v. New York, E". 
 H. & H. E. Co. 124 Fed. 358. 
 
 Second. When several corporations of different States are 
 consolidated by the legislatures of the several States. Ibid.; 
 Fitzgerald v. Missouri P. E. Co. 45 Fed. 815, 816; Nashua & 
 L. E. Corp. V. Boston & L. E. Corp. 136 U. S. 356, 34 L. ed. 
 363, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1004; Chicago & K W. E. Co. v. Whit- 
 ton, 13 Wall. 283, 20 L. ed. 575 ; Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S. 
 447, 24 L. ed. 208 ; Dodd v. Louisville Bridge Co. 130 Fed. 
 195 ; Winn v. Wabash, E. Co. and Baldwin v. Chicago & IST. W. 
 E. Co. supra; Missoi^ri P. E. Co. v. Meeh, 30 L.E.A. 250, 16 
 C. C. A. 510, 32 U. S'. App. 691, 69 Fed. 753-757. 
 
 Third. Whatever may be the actions of States jointly or 
 severally creating corporations, the corporate entity in each 
 State cannot be destroyed to affect jurisdiction. So, then, I 
 state the rule of citizenship and jurisdiction under these con- 
 ditions as follows: 
 
 When a foreign corporation simply becomes an adopted child 
 of another State, by conforming to the requirements of the 
 State, stich corporation may be regarded as a citizen of its own 
 
CITIZENSHIP OF COEPOEATIONS. ,S3 
 
 State of incorporation, and may be sued in the Federal courts 
 of the adopted State by its citizens, but not by the citizens of 
 the State of its incorporation. Ibid. ; Southern E. Co. v. Al- 
 lison, supra; Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, IsT. A. & C. K. 
 Co. 22 C. C. A. 378, 43 U. S. App. 550, 75 Fed. 433 ; St. Jo- 
 seph & G. I. E. Co. V. Steele, supra ; Taylor v. Illinois C. E. 
 Co. 89 Fed. 121, 122 ; HoUingsworth v. Southern E. Co. 86 
 Fed. 353; Smith v. New York, N. LI. & H. E. Co. 96 Fed. 
 505 ; Goodwin v. l^ew York, N. H. & H. E. Co. and St. Louis 
 & S. F. E. Co. V. James, supra. That where several corpora- 
 tions are originally created by several States, which after- 
 wards by authority unite for business purposes under a com- 
 mon name; or independent corporations of various States are 
 consolidated into one corporation by the legislation of the sev- 
 eral States originally creating them, — then the consolidated cor- 
 poration is a citizen of each State, and the citizen of one of the 
 States cannot maintain an action in the Federal courts of that 
 State on the ground of diverse citizenship, as the corporation 
 is a citizen of that State, and you must ignore its corporate 
 existence elsewhere (Ibid.; Baldwin v. Chicago & IST. W. E. 
 Co. supra ; Chicago & K W. E. Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270, 
 20 L. ed. 571 ; Pennsylvania E. Co. v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. 
 E. Co. 118 r. S. 290, 30 L. ed. 83, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1094; 
 Williamson v. Krohn, 13 C. C. A. 668, 31 U. S. App. 325, 
 66 Fed. 656) ; but a citizen of one State of its incorporation 
 may sue the corporation in the Federal courts of the other 
 States where incorporated (Ibid.). Thus, in Williamson v. 
 Krohn, supra, a consolidated Ohio and Kentucky corporation 
 was sued by a citizen of Ohio in the Federal courts of Ken- 
 tucky ; held, suit properly brought. Ibid. ; Fitzgerald v. Mis- 
 souri P. E. Co. 45 Fed. 812 ; Goodwin v. New York, IST. H. & 
 H. E. Co. supra. ' 
 
 We see, then, in this discussion of the citizenship of corpo- 
 rations — 
 
 First. That a corporation cannot, like a natural person, 
 change its domicil, but its home, residence, domicil and citi- 
 zenship is where it was originally created, and can be no- 
 where else. Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369, 24 L. ed. 
 853; Shaw v. Quincy Min. Co. 146 U. S. 444, 36 L. ed. 768, 
 
84 CITIZENSHIP OP COEPOBATIONS. 
 
 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 935; Gennania F. Ins. Co. v. Francis, 11 
 Wall. 216, 20 L. ed. 78. 
 
 Second. That doing business away from home does not 
 affect its citizenship. Markwood v. Southern R. Co. 65 Fed. 
 817; Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 12, 26 L. ed. 
 645 ; Martin v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. (Grerling v. Baltimore 
 & 0. R. Co.) 151 U. S. 677, 38 L. ed. 313, 14 Sup. Ct. Kep. 
 533. 
 
 Third. That conditions fixed by a State other than the 
 State of its origin, before it can do business in that state, does 
 not affect its citizenship. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. St. Louis, 
 A. & T. H. R. Co. 118 U. S. 296, 30 L. ed. 87, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 1094; Markwood v. Southern R. Co. 65 Fed. 824; St. Louis 
 & S. F. R. Co. V. James, 161 U. S. 562, 40 L. ed. 808, 16 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 621 ; Louisville, IST. A. & C. R. Co. v. Louisville Trust 
 Co. 174 U. S. 565, 43 L. ed. 1088, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 817; 
 Hollingsworth v. Southern R. Co. 86 Fed. 356; Taylor v. 
 Illinois C. R. Co. 89 Fed. 120 ; St. Joseph & G. I. R. Co. v. 
 Steele, 167 U. S. 663, 42 L. ed. 316, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 925. 
 
 Fourth. That two or more States cannot join in creating 
 a single corporation for jurisdictional purposes; the distinct 
 citizenship in each State cannot be destroyed. Missouri P. R 
 Co.. V. Meeh, supra; Smith v. ITew York, W. H. & H. E. Co. 
 96 Fed. 507; Walters v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 104 Fed. 
 378 ; Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 452, 27 L. ed. 786, 2 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 878 ; Graham v. Boston, H. & E. R. Co. 118 U. S. 
 165, 30 L. ed. 200, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1009 ; Baldwin v. Chi- 
 cago & IST. W. R. Co. 86 Fed. 167; Yazoo & M. Valley R Co. 
 v.. Adams, 180 U. S. 20, 21, 45 L. ed. 406, 407, 21 Sup. Ct, 
 Rep. 240. 
 
 Fifth. The corporation must be lawfully created. Gas- 
 tenia Cotton Mfg. Co. v. W. L. Wells Co. 63 C. C. A. Ill, 128 
 Fed. 369. See s. e. in 198 U. S. 177, 49 L. ed. 1003, 25 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 640. 
 
 Citizenship of Alien Corporations. 
 The same rules apply to the citizenship of alien corporations; 
 its foreign citizenship of the country where organized is con- 
 clusive. National S. S. Co. v. Tugman, 106 U. S. 118, 27 
 L. ed. 87, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58. See Robertson v. Scottish Union 
 & ISTat. Ins. Co. 68 Fed. 173, as to proper allegations of for- 
 eign citizenship. United States v. New York & 0. S. S. Co. 
 132 C. C. A. 305, 
 
CHAPTEE XIV. 
 
 CITIZENSHIP OP JOIXT STOCK COMPANIES AND OTHER 
 ASSOCIATIONS. 
 
 These companies partake of the nature of hoth partnership? 
 and corporations. There has been much conflict of opinion as 
 to whether joint stock companies are citizens of the State of 
 organization in the light of the Federal jurisdictional acts. 
 Foungstown Coke Co. v. Andrews Bros. Co. 79 led. 669 ; 
 Baltimore & O. R Co. v. Adams Exp. Co. 22 Fed. 404 ; Bush- 
 uell V. Park Bros. 46 Fed. 209 ; Carnegie v. Hurlbert, 3 C. C. 
 A. 391, 10 U. S. App. 454, 53 Fed. 11 ; Gregg v. Sanford, 
 12 C. C. A. 525, 28 U. S. App. 313, 65 Fed. 158. In Im- 
 perial Eef. Co. V. Wyman, 3 L.K.A. 503, 38 Fed. 574, Judge 
 Hammond doubted the policy of extending corporate citizen- 
 ship to these nondescript organizations. In Andrews Bros. Co. 
 V. Toungstown Coke Co. 30 C. C. A. 293, 58 U. S. App. 444, 
 86 Fed. 585, it was held that a partnership association limited 
 is a corporation. In Chapman v. Barney, 129 U. S. 677, 32 
 L. ed. 800, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 426, the Supreme Court required 
 the citizenship of the members of the association to be alleged, 
 and the question of the jurisdiction of the Federal court was 
 based on citizenship of the members, rather than upon the 
 place of organization. And in Great Southern Fire Proof 
 Hotel Co. V. Jones, 177 U. S. 449, 44 L. ed. 842, 20 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 690, 177 H. S. 449, it is held that such associations are 
 act corporations within the rule that in a suit by or against 
 a corporation in a Federal court, it is conclusively presumed to 
 be a citizen of the State creating it. Thomas v. Ohio State 
 University, 195 U. S. 211, 212, 49 L. ed. 164, 165, 25 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 24. It is now settled that joint stock companies are 
 not corporations within the jurisdictional act, and jurisdiction 
 depends on the citizenship of the members of the association. 
 Saunders v. Adams Exp. Co. 136 Fed. 494; Rountree v. Ad- 
 ams Exp. Co. 91 C. C. A. 186, 165 Fed. 152. 
 
86 
 
 Partnership. 
 
 The same rule would apply to partnership and voluntary 
 associations, who cannot sue or be sued in the Federal courts 
 unless the citizenship of the individuals composing them will 
 permit. Raphael v. Trask, 118 Fed. 777; H. L. Bruett & 
 Co. V. F. C. Austin Drainage Excavator Co. 174 Fed. 669, 
 672; Jewish Colonization Asso. v. Solomon, 125 Fed. 994; 
 Derk P. Youkerman Co. v. Charles H. Fuller's Advertising 
 Agency, 135 Fed. 613 ; Fred Macey Co. v. Macey, 68 C. C. A. 
 363, 135 Fed. 727; Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. 
 Jones, 177 U. S. 449, 44 L. ed. 842, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 690; 
 Thomas v. Ohio State University, 195 U. S. 212, 49 L. ed. 
 164, 25 Sup. Ct. Pep. 24; Columbia Digger Co. v. Rector, 215 
 Fed. 622. 
 
 National BoAiks. 
 
 Up to 1882 the right of the national banks to sue or be sued 
 in the. Federal courts was based on their Federal origin. In 
 1882 these corporations were by act of Congress placed upon 
 the saiiie footing as to jurisdiction in the Federal courts as 
 were banking associations not organized under Federal law. 
 Act July 12, 1882, 22 Stat, at L. 162, chap. 290, Comp. Stat. 
 1913, sec. 9665. This left the jurisdiction as to these banks, 
 except when the United States was a party, dependent on 
 diversity of citizenship or a Federal question. Petri v. Com- 
 mercial Nat. Bank, 142 U. S. 644, 35 L. ed. 1144, 12 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 325. In 1888 (25 Stat, at L. 443, chap. 891) the juris- 
 dictional and removal act embodied in section 4 the following, 
 provision : That national bank associations in all suits in law 
 or equity by or against them shall be deemed citizens of the 
 State in which they are respecti^'ely located, and Federal courts 
 had no jurisdiction other than such as they would have in 
 cases between individual citizens of the same State (First Nat. 
 Bank v. Forrest, 40 Fed. 705), unless the suit is brought by 
 the United States or its officers, or in winding up the affairs 
 of such banking association. Act Aug. 13, 1888, sec. 4. See 
 appendix p. 869 ; American Nat. Bank v. Tappan, 174 Fed. 431; 
 George v. Wallace, 68 C. C. A. 40, 135 Fed. 286; Rankin v. 
 
CITIZENSHIP OF MAHEIED WOMEN. 87 
 
 Herod, 130 Fed. 390; Continental Nat. Bank v. Buford, 191 
 U. S. 119, 48 L. ed. 119, 24 Snp. Ct. Eep. 54; Wyman v. Wal- 
 lace, 201 U. S. 230, 50 L. ed. 738, 26 Sup. Ct. Kep. 495. In 
 Dauahy v. National Bank, 12 C. C. A. 75, 24 U. S. App. 351, 
 64 Fed. 14S ; Ex parte Jones, 164 U. S. 691, 41 L. ed. 601, 17 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 222, and Speckhert v. German Nat. Bank, 38 C. 
 C. A. 6S2, 9S Fed. 151, the last act kas been construed, and 
 the bank declared to have all the rights of a citizen of the State 
 in •\\'hich such bank is situated to enter the Federal courts ; that 
 only jurisdiction based on the Federal origin of these banks was 
 cut off. But Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction when 
 national banks ai-e insolvent, in winding up its affairs. Ibid. ; 
 Wyman v. Wallace and George v. Wallace, supra; Weeks v. 
 International Trust Co. 60 C. C. A. 236, 125 Fed. 370 ; First 
 Xat. Bank v. Selden, 62 L.R.A. 559, 56 C. C. A. 532, 120 
 Fed. 212. 
 
 See chap. 2, sec. 24, clause 16, of new Code effective Janu- 
 ary 1st, 1912 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 991 (2)). 
 
 Citizenship of Married Women. 
 
 While the domicil of the husband is that of the wife, yet this 
 rule would not apply when a married woman has been aban- 
 doned. Watertown v. Greaves, 56 L.R.A. 865, 50 C. C. A. 
 172, 112 Fed. 183; Thompson v. Stalmann, 139 Fed. 93; 
 Ware v. Wisner, 50 Fed. 312 ; United States ex rel. Nicola v. 
 Williams, 173 Fed. 626. 
 
 A citizen marrying an alien female, she becomes a citizen. 
 U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 1994, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 3948, Fed. 
 Stat. Anno. 1909, p. 69. United States ex rel. Nicola v. Wil- 
 liams, 173 Fed. 626; Comitis v. Parkerson, 22 L.R.A. 148, 
 56 Fed. 561; Broadis v. Broadis, 86 Fed. 951; Pequignot v. 
 Detroit, 16 Fed. 211; United States v. Kellar, 11 Biss. 314, 
 13 Fed. 82; Sprung v. Morton, 182 Fed. 330; Re Nicola, 106 
 C. a A. 464, 184 Fed. 322. 
 
 But if she becomes an alien by marriage, in order to obtain 
 jurisdiction j'ou must plead the law producing that effect, or 
 jurisdiction will not be shown. Fed. Stat. Anno. 1909, p. 69 ; 
 Jennes v. Landes, 84 Fed. 74; Wallenburg v. Missouri P. R. 
 Co. 159 Fed. 217 ; Buckgaher v. Moore, 104 Fed. 947 ; Jenns 
 V. Landes, 85 Fed. 801. 
 
88 ■ JUEISDICTION AS TO ALIEJMS. 
 
 Aliens. 
 
 Closely connected with the diversity of citizenship as a 
 ground of jurisdiction in the Federal courts is the right of an 
 alien to sue and be sued in the courts of the United States. 
 The Constitution, article 3, section 2, clause 1, provides that 
 the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity 
 arising between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign 
 States, citizens, and subjects. The judiciary act of 1888 pro- 
 vides that when the controversy is between citizens of a State 
 and foreign States, citizens and subjects, and the amount or 
 value in controversy exceeds the sum of two thousand dollars, 
 exclusive of interest and costs, the circuit courts of the United 
 States shall have jurisdiction. This provision of the judiciary 
 act has, of course, been frequently construed, and I will briefly 
 give the rules affecting the jurisdiction of the Federal courts in 
 dealing with suits in which aliens are parties plaintiff or 
 defendant. 
 
 As indicated in the act, aliens are citizens or subjects of a 
 foreign government, and the jurisdiction is given when the con- 
 troversy is between a citizen or citizens of a State and a citi- 
 zen or citizens and subjects of a foreign State; and it seems 
 a mere declaration of intention to become a citizen does not 
 make him such, so far as jurisdiction is concerned. Creagh v. 
 Equitable Life Assur. Soc. 88 Fed. 1. "Alien," as used in the 
 act, is defined in Hennessy v. Richardson Drug Co. 189 U. S. 
 34, 47 L. ed. 698, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 532. See Ee Moses, 83 
 Fed. 996; Betzoldt v. American Ins. Co. 47 Fed. 706. 
 
 A citizen within the provisions of the act may sue an alien, 
 or an alien may sue a citizen. Act March 3, 1887, Comp. Stai. 
 1913, sec. 991(1); Hennessy v. Richardson Drug Co. supra. 
 See note to Sherwood v. Newport News & M. Valley Co. 65 
 Fed. 6; Barlow v. Chicago & IST. W. E. Co. 172 Fed. 515; 
 Tierney v. Helvetia Swiss F. Ins. Co. 163 Fed. 83. But such 
 suits are not suits between citizens of different States; there- 
 fore the clause of the jurisdictional act requiring suit to b© 
 brought in the district of the residence of plaintiff or defendant 
 does not apply to a suit against aliens, and he may be sued m 
 the district where he may be found (Ee Hohorst, 150 U. S. 
 653, 37 L. ed. 1211, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 221 ; Barrow S. S. Co. 
 
JURISDICTION AS TO ALIENS, 89 
 
 V. Kane, 170 U. S. 112, 42 L. ed. 968, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 526), 
 or where valid service can be made on him (Ibid. ; Barlow v. 
 Chicago & IST. W. R. Co. supra) ; Jarowsky v. Hamburg- Amer- 
 ican Packet Co. 104 C. C. A. 548, 182 Fed. 320; Vestal v. 
 Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & I. Co. 210 Fed. 377, 378. 
 
 The same rule applies to alien corporations. Barrow S. S. 
 Co. V. Kane, supra; Societe Fonciere v. Milliken, 135 U. S. 
 304, 34 L. ed. 208, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 823 ; Ee Hohorst, 150 
 U. S. 654, 37 L. ed. 1212, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 221. 
 
 However, where an alien sues a citizen, he must sue him in 
 the Federal district of which the citizen is an inhabitant (Camp- 
 bell V. Duluth, S. S. & A. E. Co. 50 Fed. 242 ; Iowa Lillooet 
 Gold Min. Co. v. Bliss, 144 Fed. 446 ; Miller v. New York C. & 
 H. E. E. Co. 147 Fed. 772 ; Galveston, H. & S. A. E. Co. v. Gon- 
 zales, 1-51 U. S. 497, 38 L. ed. 248, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 401) ; 
 Hall V. Great Northern E. Co. 197 Fed. 488, unless to enforce 
 liens on property, then where property located (De Hierapolis 
 V. Lawrence, 99 Fed. 321). Thus, an alien can only sue a 
 corporation where organized (Ibid. ; Campbell v. Duluth S. S. 
 & A. E. Co. supra; Filli v. Delaware L. & W. E. Co. 37 Fed. 
 65 ; Denton v. International Co. 36 Fed. 3 ; Sherwood v. ISTew- 
 port News & M. Valley Co. 55 Fed. 4; Eust v. United Water- 
 works Co. 17 C. C. A. 16, 36 U. S. App. 167, 70 Fed. 137) ; 
 but it seems that a corporation, when sued by an alien in a 
 state court and out of the State of its organization, may re- 
 move the suit to a Federal court in such State (Iowa Lillooet 
 Gold Min. Co. v. Bliss, 144 Fed. 450. See note to Sherwoorl 
 V. Newport News & M. Valley Co. supra ; Stalker v. Pullman's 
 Palace-Car Co. 81 Fed. 898; Creagh v. Equitable Life Assur. 
 Soc. 83 Fed. 849; Duncan v. Associated Press, 81 Fed. 420). 
 The question has arisen whether an alien when sued in a 
 State court can remove the case to a Federal court. In Texas 
 V. Lewis, 12 Fed. 1, and same case in 14 Fed. 65, it is said 
 an alien has the right of removal under the act, but in Cudaliy 
 V. McGeoch, 37 Fed. 1, it was said that an alien, under the 
 act of 1887, section 3, could not remove a case ivhen sued in 
 a State in which he resided ; nonresidence is a requisite. Walker 
 V. O'Neill, 38 Fed. 374; Creagh v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. 
 88 Fed. 2. So, he can remove if sued in a State in which he 
 does' not reside. 
 
90 JURISDICTION AS TO ALIENS. 
 
 The right of removal from State to Federal courts by aliens 
 will be discussed under "Removals." 
 
 Alien and Citizen Uniting. 
 
 An alien cannot unite vyith a citizen of a State in the citi- 
 zen's district, and sue citizens of other States. ConoUy v. Tay- 
 lor, 2 Pet. 565, 7 L. ed. 521. Nor can citizens of a State unite 
 as defendants an alien and citizen of another State, as all 
 the plaintiffs sued in the plaintiff's district, or all of the defend- 
 ants if sued in the defendant's district, must be aliens. Gage 
 V. Eiverside Trust Co. 156 Fed. 1002; Tracey v. Morel, 88 
 Fed. 803; King v. Cornell, 106 U. S. 398, 27 L. ed. 61, 1 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 313; Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. 
 Insurance Co. of N. A. 151 U. S. 386, 38 L. ed. 204, 4 Inters. 
 Com. Eep. 499, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 367. These cases hold that 
 where an alien and citizen are joined as defendants in a State 
 court, the alien, having a separable controversy, can remove the 
 case to a Federal court. In Eoberts v. Pacific & A. E. & I^av. 
 Co. 58 C. C. A. 61, 121 Fed. 787, these cases are reviewed, 
 and the conclusion reached that a suit brought in a State court 
 against a citizen of another State and an alien can be removed 
 by either defendant, because if either had been sued alone the 
 cause could have been removed by either; that in such case, if 
 the defendants joined in a petition for removal, a Federal court 
 could take jurisdiction. This case clearly denies the doctrine 
 stated ' in Black's Dillon, Eemoval of Causes, sections 68, 84. 
 
 When the suit has been brought by or against an alien, arid 
 the jurisdiction once attaches in the Federal court, the fact 
 that a citizen was admitted as a coplaintiff or codefendant upon 
 application would not defeat the Federal jurisdiction. Gra- 
 ham V. Boston, H. & E. E. Co. 14 Fed. 754. So, where an 
 alien having brought suit in a Federal court under the act per- 
 mitting it, the fact that the alien becomes a citizen pending the 
 suit does not devest the jurisdiction. Betzholdt v. American 
 Ins. Co. 47 Fed. 707 ; Conolly v. Taylor, 2 Pet. 556, 7 L. ed. 
 518, 
 
 Alien Suing Alien. 
 
 An alien cannot sue an alien in the Federal courts, either 
 
JURISDICTION AS TO ALIENS. 91 
 
 alone or by joining citizens (Pooley v. Luco, T2 Fed. 561-56-i; 
 Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. 
 A. 151 U. S. 386, 38 L. ed. 204, 4 Inters. Com. Eep. 499, 14 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 367 ; Eae v. Grand Trunk E. Co. 14 Fed. 402 ; 
 Hartog V. Memory, 23 Fed. 835; Montalet v. Murray, 4 
 Cranch, 47, 2 L. ed. 545; Gage v. Eiverside Trust Co. 156 
 Fed. 1007) ; unless there be a Federal question, when citizen- 
 ship becomes unimportant, as we will hereafter see (Gage v. 
 Eiverside Trust Co. 156 Fed. 1002). 
 
 As to Allegation of Alienage. 
 
 The act of Aug. 13, 1888, gives cogTiizance of controversies 
 between citizens of a State and foreign States, citizens or sub- 
 jects, and it was held, in view of this language, that a plaintiff 
 describing himself as a "resident of Ontario, Canada, and a 
 citizen of the Dominion of Canada and of the Empire of Great 
 Britain," is not a sufficient averment of alienage; that Cana- 
 dians are subjects of the King of England, and should be so 
 described. Eondot v. Eogers Twp. 25 C. C. A. 145, 47 U. S. 
 App. 290, 79 Fed. 677; Von Voight v. Michigan C. E. Co. 130 
 Fed. 398; Stuart v. Easton, 156 U. S. 46, 39 L. ed. 341, 15 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 268 ; Jennes v. Landes, 84 Fed. 74. So, one can- 
 not allege a foreign corporation as a citizen of Great Britain. 
 Oregonian E. Co. v. Oregon E. & ISTav. Co. 27 Fed. 279. "Citi- 
 zens of the Eepublie of France" is a sufficient allegation of 
 alienage. Hennessy v. Eichardson Drug Co. 189 U. S. 25, 47 
 L. ed. 697, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 532; new Code, sec. 24, cl. 1, 
 Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 991. , 
 
 (See Bill, p. 272.) 
 
CHAPTER XV. 
 
 TEREITOEIAL JUEISDICTION AND PLACE OF SUIT. 
 
 Having referred generally to resident and nonresident citi- 
 zenship as affecting jurisdiction in the Federal courts, I will 
 now taJke up the statutory conditions as to the place of suit, 
 that is, the judicial district in which suit can be brought. It 
 is embodied in the new Code, sec. 51 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1033), as follows: 
 
 "Except as provided in the five succeeding sections (being 
 sections 52 to 56 inclusive), no person shall be arrested in one 
 district for trial in another in any civil action in any district 
 court, and except as provided in the six succeeding sections, no 
 civil suit shall be brought in any district court against any 
 person by any original process or proceeding in any other dis- 
 trict than that whereof he is an inhabitant; but where the 
 jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is 
 between citizens of different States, suit shall be brought only 
 in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or 
 defendant." 
 
 In order to fully understand the decisions as to place of 
 suit or venue, it is necessary to briefly refer to the judiciary 
 acts of 1789 and 1875. 
 
 In the original judiciary act of 1789 the venue was fixed as 
 follows: Jurisdiction was given over all suits at law or in 
 equity between a citizen of the State in which the suit is 
 brought and a citizen of another State, and the place of suit 
 was fixed in these words: "ISTo suit shall be brought against 
 an inhabitant of the United States in any other district than 
 that of which he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall he found 
 at the time of serving the writ." Then came the general act 
 of 1875, greatly enlarging the jurisdiction of the Federal courts, 
 but did not change the clause affecting the district of suit 
 However, the words, "an inhabitant of the United States," in 
 the act of 1789, were substituted by the words "any person." 
 
 92 
 
TEEKITOEIAL JURISDICTION AKD PLACE OF SUIT, 93 
 
 The above section of the new Code following the act of 1888 
 changed the venue clause materially by leaving out the words, 
 "in which he may be found at the time of serving the writ or 
 commencing the proceedings," and the place of suit was 
 confined to the district of which the defendant is 
 an inhabitant, except when the jurisdiction is founded on the 
 fact that the controversy is between citizens of different States, 
 then it shall be brought only in the district of the residence of 
 either the plaintiff or defendant. Kentucky Coal Lands Co. v. 
 Mineral Development Co. 191 Fed. 906 ; Smellie v. Southern 
 P. E. Co. 197 Fed. 643 ; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Louisville 
 & ]Sr. K Co. 201 Fed. 932 ; Reich v. Tennessee Copper Co. 209 
 Fed. 880 ; Smith v. Eeed, 210 Fed. 968; United States v. Gron- 
 ich, 211 Fed. 548; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. S. Samuels 
 & Co. 128 C. C. A. 188, 211 Fed. 588 ; Re Keashey & M. Co. 
 160 IT. S. 228, 40 L. ed. 404, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; United 
 States V. Southern P. R. Co. 49 Fed. 299. 300 ; McCormick v. 
 Walthers, 134 U. S. 41-43, 33 L. ed. 833, 834, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 485; Miller v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 91 Fed. 298; Shaw v. 
 Quincy Min. Co. 145 U. S. 444, 36 L. ed. 768, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 935 ; Jewett v. Garrett, 47 Fed. 630 ; United States Fidelity & 
 G. Co. V. Woodson County, 76 C. C. A. 114, 145 Fed. 144. 
 
 It is thus seen that for one hundred years a defendant could 
 be sued in his own district, or in any Federal district in which 
 he may be found. Many hardships necessarily attended this 
 practice of catching a transient defendant, and it has in a meas- 
 ure been corrected, in the g,ct of 1888, by only permitting a 
 citizen to be sued out of his district when jurisdiction depended 
 on diversity of citizenship, and equalizing the inconvenience by 
 permitting the plaintiff to go to defendant's district, or making; 
 the defendant come to plaintiff's district to be sued. Bank of' 
 Winona v. Avery, 34 Fed. 81 ; Bostwick v. American Finance- 
 Co. 43 Fed. 897, 898, and authorities cited. St. Louis, V. & 
 T. H. R. Co. V. Terre Haute & I. R. Co. 33 Fed. 385 ; Rawley 
 V. Southern P. R. Co. 33 Fed. 305. 
 
 So we have in personal suits two forums when jurisdiction; 
 depends on diversity of citizenship, but when jurisdiction is 
 based on a Federal question, or any other provision of the> juris- 
 dictional act, there is only one place of suit under the act of' 
 1888, and that is in the district of which the defendant is an. in- 
 
94 TEKIIITOEJAL JUltlSBlCTION AND PLACE OF SUIT. 
 
 habitant. Jewett v. Garrett, 47 Fed. 632, 633. Therefore the 
 rule is, under the present act, that in personal suits between citi- 
 zens of different States, you must sue the defendant in his own 
 State, and in the judicial district of which he is an inhabitant, 
 or you may sue him in your State and in the Federal district 
 of which you are an inhabitant, if your jurisdiction in the Fed- 
 eral court depends on diversity of citizenship, and defendant 
 can be served there. Ibid. ; Shaw v. Quincy Min. Co. 145 
 U. S. 448, 36 L. ed. 770, 12 Sup. Ct Kep. 935 ; Danciger v. 
 Wells, F. & Co. 154 Fed. 379 ; Gale v. Southern Bldg. & L. 
 Asso. 117 Fed. 734; Goddard v. Mailler, 80 Fed. 422; Dinzy 
 V. Illinois C. E. Co. 61 Fed. 50 ; Kibbler v. St. Louis & S. F. 
 R Co. 147 Fed. 880, 881; Pitkin County Min. Co. v. Markell, 
 33 Fed. 387 ; American Locomotive Co. v. Dickson Mfg. Co. 
 117 Fed. 972. But if the jurisdiction depends on other pro- 
 visions of the Federal act, such as a Federal question, or an 
 alien suing a citizen, then suit must be brought in the district 
 whereof the defendant is an inhabitant. Ibid. ; Re Keasbey & 
 M. Co. 160 U. S. 229, 40 L. ed. 405, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 273; 
 Galveston H. & S. A. E. Co. v. Gonzales, 151 U. S. 497, 38 
 L. ed. 248, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 401 ; Cramer v. Singer Mfg. Co. 
 59 Fed. 74; Adriance, P. & Co. v. McCormick Harvesting 
 Mach. Co. 55 Fed. 287, 288 ; Cound v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R 
 Co. 173 Fed. 527 ; Wolff v. Choctaw, 0. & G. E. Co. 133 Fed. 
 601. Eeich v. Tennessee Copper Co. 209 Fed. 880 ; new Code, 
 sec. 51, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1033. 
 
 Venue When Jurisdiction Depends on Both Diversity wnd 
 Federal Question. 
 
 In Cound v. Atchison, T. & S. F. E. Co. supra, the jurisdic- 
 tion of the Federal court- was based on on both diversity of citi- 
 zenship and a Federal question. The case was brought in the 
 residence district of plaintiff against the defendant, a foreign 
 corporation, but operating its railroad in plaintiff's district of 
 residence and citizenship. A plea to the jurisdiction was sus- 
 tained, on the ground that plaintiff, to sue in his own district, 
 can only do so where diversity of citizenship is the only ground 
 of jurisdiction. Thus a very strict construction was given to the 
 word "only" in the latter clause of the first section of the act 
 
TEEEITOEIAL JUKISDICTIOX AND PLACE OF SUIT. 95 
 
 of 1888 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 991 (1)). The narrow view 
 of the word "only" was attacked in Whittaker v. Illinois C. R. 
 Co. 176 Fed. 131, but the court, in sustaining the former case, 
 seemed to think the question was not an open one, citing Mc- 
 Cormick Harvesting Mach. Co. f. Walthers, 131 U. S. 41, 33 
 L. ed. 833, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 485. See Adriance P. & Co. v. 
 McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. supra. 
 
 Exceptions to the Rule. 
 
 The provision that the defendant must be sued in his own 
 district does not apply to "patent" suits. U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 
 711, subdiv. 5, act of 1897 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1030). Re 
 Keasbey & M. Co. 160 U. S. 231, 40 L. ed. 402, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 273 ; Re Hohorst, 150 U. S. 653, 37 L. ed. 1211, 14 Sup. 
 Ct Rep. 221. These cases were decided under the act of 1887, 
 but under the act of 1897, cited above, the suit may be brought 
 either in defendant's residence district, or in any district in 
 which the infringement of the patent was committed, if the 
 defendant can be served there. Bowers v. Atlantic, G. & P. Co. 
 104 Fed. 887 ; Westinghouse Air-Brake Co. v. Great ISTorthern 
 R. Co. 31 C. C. A. 525, 59 U. S. App. 592, 88 Fed. 261, 262. 
 New Code, chap. 4, sec. 48 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1030) ; Act 
 March 3, 1897. Nor does it apply where a citizen sues an alien. 
 United Shoe Machinery Co. v. Duplessis Independent Shoe 
 Machinery Co. 133 Fed. 931, 932; Farl v. Southern P. Co. 75 
 Fed. 610; Barlow v. Chicago & K W. R. Co. 172 Fed. 516; 
 Davidson Bros. Marble Co. v. United States, 213 U. S. 10, 53 
 L. ed. 675, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324. In United States v. South- 
 em P. R. Co. 49 Fed. 301, it was said that the first section of 
 the act of 1887 as to venue did not control, where the United 
 States was a party plaintiff ; but in United States v. Northern 
 P. R. Co. 67 C. C. A. 269, 134 Fed. 715, a diiferent conclusion 
 is reached, and the United States, when coming into its courts 
 as a litigant, is subject to the requirements of sec. 24, ne\\- 
 Code (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 991). 
 
 Again, the rule of venue does not apply when brought for 
 infringement of copyrights. U. S. Rev. Stat, sec. 4966, U. S. 
 Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3415; Lederer v. Rankin, 90 Fed. 449; 
 Spears v. Flynn, 102. Fed. 7; Lederer v. Ferris, 149 Fed. 250. 
 
96 TEERITOBIAL JURISDICTION AND PLACE OF SUIT. 
 
 See Appendix. "Rules for practice and procedure in Copyright 
 Cases." ISTor do the limitations apply when suit is brought 
 under the interstate commerce law to recover damages. Inter- 
 state commerce act, sees. 8-9. "Van Patten v. Chicago, M. & St. 
 P. E. Co. 74 Fed. 981 ; Edmunds v. Illinois C. R Co. 80 Fed. 
 79 ; Kalispell Lumber Co. v. Great Northern E. Co. 157 Fed. 
 845. 
 
 So, the rule does not apply in suits arising under special 
 laws of Congress creating rights and giving exclusive jurisdic- 
 tion to the Federal courts such as acts concerning Federal 
 revenues ; or Federal anti-trust laws (26 Stat, at L. 209, chap. 
 646, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 9009), or alien contract labor (26 
 Stat, at L. 1084, chap. 551, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1294), 
 or United States public lands (23 Stat, at L. 321, chap. 149, 
 Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 4997), or condemning land for public use 
 (25 Stat, at L. 357, chap. 728, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 6909). 
 Special acts of the character above stated usually fix the venue, 
 and must be followed (United States v. Mooney, 116 U. S. 107, 
 108, 29 L. ed. 551, 552, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 304) ; otherwise the 
 suit may be brought where the defendant may be found. 
 
 So, it may be said generally that the clause of the judiciary 
 act requiring suit in the residence district of defendant applies 
 only to cases where State and Federal courts have concurrent 
 jurisdiction. Re Keasbey & M. Co. and Ee Hohorst, supra; 
 Van Patten v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 74 Fed. 985-987; 
 lederer v. Ferris, 149 Fed. 251. 
 
 Inhabitant Defined. 
 
 You will observe that the word "inhabitant" is used instead 
 of "citizen," in the new Code, sec. 51 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1033) ; "the district of which a party is an inhabitant," is the 
 language. This is construed to mean the district of his resi- 
 dence. Shaw\. Quincy Min. Co. 145 U. S. 449, 36 L. ed. 771, 
 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 935. The word "inhabitant" has the same 
 meaning as "citizen." Gormully & J. Mfg. Co. v. Pope Mfg. 
 Co. 34 Fed. 819, 820; Bicycle Stepladder Co. v. Gordon, 57 
 Fed. 529, 530 ; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Gonzales, 151 
 U. S. 504, 38 L. ed. 251, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 401. See United 
 States V. Southern P. R. Co. 49 Fed. 297 ; Holmes v. Oregon 
 
TEERITORIAL JURISDICTION AND PLACE OF SUIT. 97 
 
 & C. E.. Co. 9 Fed. 229. And "citizenship" means permanent 
 residence or domicil, wliich is residence acquired as a final abode. 
 Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 328, 32 L. ed. 694, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 289; Gaddie v. Mann, 147 Fed. 956; Mitchell v. United States, 
 21 Wall. 352, 22 L. ed. 587; Marks v. Marks, 75 'Fed. 324; 
 Chambers v. Prince, 75 Fed. 176 ; Ex parte Petterson, 166 Fed. 
 545, but jurisdiction depends on "citizenship," not residence. 
 Koike V. Atchison, T. & S. F. K. Co. 157 Fed. 624; Marks v. 
 Marks, 7'5 Fed. 321 ; Wolfe v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. 
 Co. 148 U. S. 389, 3Y L. ed. 493, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 602 ; Menard 
 V. Goggan, 121 U. S. 253, 30 L. ed. 914, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 873; 
 Rockling v. McKinstry, 185 Fed. 843 ; Harding v. Standard 
 Oli Co. 182 Fed. 421; United States v. Gronich, 211 Fed. 548. 
 I will observe here, but it will be fully illustrated hereafter, 
 that this provision of the act concerning venue does not affect 
 the general jurisdiction of the courts, but only provides a per- 
 sonal exemption or privilege, which may be waived if not 
 pleaded. Piatt v. Massachusetts Real Estate Co. 103 Fed. 706 ; 
 Cowell V. City Water Supply Co. 96 Fed. 769, and authorities 
 cited. Duncan v. Associated Press, 81 Fed. 418 ; Louisville 
 & ]Sr. R. Co. V. Fisher, 11 L.R.A.(N.S.) 926, 83 C. C. A. 584, 
 155 Fed. 69 ; Empire Min. Co. v. Propeller Tow-Boat Co. 108 
 Fed. 902 ; Central Trust Co. v. McGeorge, 151 U. S. 129, 38 
 L. ed. 98, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 286. 
 
 District of Suit When Two or More Plaintiffs and Defendcnts. 
 
 The rules heretofore given as to the particular State and 
 district of suit can be applied without any practical difficulty 
 when there is only one plaintiff and one defendant, but some 
 difficulty is apparent when there are numerous plaintiffs and 
 defendants residing in different States, or various districts of 
 the same State, or in the several divisions of the same district, 
 which then existed in some States. Goddard v. Mailler, 80 
 Fed. 423, 424. The rule is that in personal actions, where there 
 are two or more plaintiffs or defendants, suit must be brought 
 in the State and district of plaintiffs' or defendants' citizen- 
 ship, if the jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship and 
 residence; and if brought in plaintiffs' residence district, and 
 there be two or more plaintiffs, then all the plaintiff's must be 
 S. Eq.— 7. 
 
Q8 TEEEITOEIAL JURISDICTION AND PLACE OF SUIT, 
 
 inhabitants of the district; but if brought in defendants' resi- 
 dence district, then all of the defendants must be inhabitants 
 of the district. Lengel v. American Smelting & Eef. Co. 110 
 Fed. 21; Freeman v. American Surety Co. 116 Fed. 550;, 
 Smith V. Lyon, 133 U. S. 315, 33 L. ed. 635, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 303 ; Susquehanna & W. Valley K. & Coal Co. v. Bktchford, 
 11 Wall. 172, 20 L. ed. 179 ; Bensinger Self-Adding Cash Eeg- 
 ister Co. v. National Cash Register Co. 42 Fed. 81; Jenkins 
 V. York Cliffs Imp. Co. 110 Fed. 809, 810; Elkhart Nat.' Bank 
 V. Northwestern Guaranty Loan Co. 84 Fed. 76. That is, the 
 words "plaintiff" and "defendant," as before stated, are used 
 in the act in a collective sense. Ibid. It means that parties 
 from different States may join in suing a defendant in defend- 
 ant's district; or any number of defendants, if they all reside 
 in the same district, or that several parties plaintiff, if they 
 reside in the same district, may sue any number of defendants 
 from different States in the district of plaintiffs' residence. 
 
 It will be seen that this change in the venue clause of the 
 jurisdictional act was in furtherance of the spirit of the act, 
 the purpose of which was to limit the jurisdiction of the Fed- 
 eral court, and to narrow the door of entrance. The restrictive 
 effect of this clause has been very inconvenient at tim£s to liti- 
 gants, who would prefer a jurisdiction reasonably free from 
 local prejudices and influence. 
 
 A case involving a personal suit may be clearly within Fed- 
 eral jurisdiction; yet if there was more than one indispensable 
 defendant, the suit could not be brought if they lived in differ- 
 ent districts or States ; and when jurisdiction is dependent on 
 divers citizenship, while the suit may be brought in the resi- 
 dence district of the plaintiff, yet if there is more than one 
 plaintiff jointly interested, and they live in different districts, 
 it would be fatal to the siiit if objection was made. Smith v. 
 Lyon, 133 U. S. 315, 33 L. ed. 635, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 303. 
 
 However, this rule as to cases in which there are several 
 defendants residing in different districts of a State does not 
 apply under sec. 52 of the new Code (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1034), providing, that where there are two or more districts in a 
 State, and there are two or more defendants residing in differ- 
 ent districts of the State, suit may be brought in one of the dis- 
 tricts in which one of the defendants may reside, and process 
 
TEERITOEIAL JURISDICTION AND PLACE OF SUIT. 99 
 
 may issue to the defendant or defendants residing in other dis- 
 tricts of -tbe same State. This section now controls all cases not 
 of a local nature, and process may be sent to any other district 
 of the State, provided suit is brought in a district in which one 
 of the defendants reside and of which he is a citizen or inhabi- 
 tant. 
 
 See discussion of sec. 740 of U. S. Kev. Stat. 
 
CHAPTEE XVI. 
 
 EULE OF VENUE tTNDEE OTHER PEOVISIONS OF THE JUDICIAEY ACT 
 AND EXCEPTIONS. 
 
 We have seen by section 51 of the new Code (Comp. Stat. 
 1913, sec. 1033), suit must be brought in a district of which the 
 defendant is an inhabitant, but there are exceptions to this rule 
 created by statute. 
 
 First. By U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 741, it is provided that in 
 suits of a local nature, if there be but one defendant, or there be 
 more than one residing in different districts from the locus of 
 the subject-matter of the suit, in which district the suit is 
 brought, the plaintiffs may have process to the district or dis- 
 tricts where the defendant or defendants reside. See also acts 
 1902, reorganizing the Federal districts in Texas. See sec. 54, 
 chap. 4, new Code, embodying U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 741. By 
 section 742 it is provided that in a suit of a local nature, where 
 the land or other subject-matter of a fixed character lies in more 
 than one district vnthin the same State, suit may be brought in 
 either district, and process issued and executed as in section 741. 
 See sec. 55, chap. 4, new Code, embodying U. S. Eev. Stat, 
 sec. 742. Prior to the passage of this act in 1858, embodied in 
 the above sections, there was no way of reaching a defendant 
 beyond the district in local suits, nor where there were several 
 defendants residing beyond the district of suit process could not 
 reach them. The conditions were embarrassing to Federal 
 courts of equity when all parties interested in the subject-matter 
 must be brought in to enter a proper decree, and this embarrass- 
 ment increased with the growth of the country and the multi- 
 plicity of Federal districts in the same State. See Burke v. 
 Mountain Timber Co. 224 Fed. 592, and cases cited as to venue 
 in local suits. 
 
 While these changes greatly enlarged the field of Federal 
 process and the efficiency of its equity courts, yet you will ob- 
 serve these statutes were confined to reaching parties and differ- 
 
 100 
 
VENUE UNDEK OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE JUDICIARY ACT. 101 
 
 ent districts of the same State, and there was yet no way by 
 which parties out of the State, hut interested in the subject- 
 matter, could be reached by Federal process, however great the 
 necessity for bringing them in. Section 737 of the U. S. Rev. 
 Stat, only provided for proceeding without them, if not indis- 
 pensable; that is, where they may have been only proper or 
 necessary parties. It provided for dismissing parties, and not 
 bringing them into the suit. The language of that act was 
 ''Where there are several defendants in a suit in equity, and 
 one or more of them are neither inhabitants of, nor found in 
 the district of suit, and do not voluntarily appear, the court may 
 proceed without them to adjudicate between the parties prop- 
 erly before the court." See sec. 50, chap. 4, new Code, embody- 
 ing sec. 737, U. S. Eev. Stat. 
 
 But under this statute, if the parties were indispensable, the 
 court could not proceed. U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 737 ; Eq. Rule 
 39 ; Taylor v. Holmes, 14 Fed. 515 ; Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 
 142, 15 L. ed. 158 ; Hazard v. Durant, 19 Fed. 475, 476 ; Good- 
 man V. ISTiblack, 102 U. S. 556, 26 L. ed. 229 ; Gregory v. Swift, 
 39 Fed. 711, 712; Oberlin College v. Blair, 70 Fed. 419, 420; 
 d'Auxy v. Porter, 41 Fed. 68 ; Detweiler v. Holderbaum, 42 
 Fed. 338; Hicklin v. Marco, 6 C. C. A. 10, 15 U. S. App. 55, 
 56 Fed. 553; Wall v. Thomas, 41 Fed. 620. Thus we see, if 
 nonresidents had an interest in the land or personal property 
 within the State, the Federal courts of equity were powerless to 
 give relief to one who would litigate the title, or seek to remove 
 the cloud or encumbrance thereon, unless the nonresident should 
 voluntarily appear or come within the reach of the court's proc- 
 ess. The case of Barney v. Baltimore, 6 Wall. 280, 18 L. ed. 825, 
 illustrates the difficulties stated above, and which Congress sub- 
 sequent to thpt case sought to remove. The first act passed was 
 in 1872 (U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 738), wherein provisions were 
 made to reach nonresidents interested in real or personal estate 
 in the district of suit. This act only applied in terms to courts 
 of equity, but in 1875 was enlarged and applied to suits to 
 enforce any equitable or legal claim to property, or lien on, 
 or remove any encumbrance, lien, or cloud upon title to real or 
 personal property within the district in wliich the suit is brought. 
 It provided that in such suits, where one or more of the defend- 
 ants were not inhabitants of the State or found in the district 
 
102 VENUE UJSTDEK OTHEE PEOVISIONS OF THE JUDICIAEY ACT. 
 
 where suit is brought, the court may order the absent defendant 
 to appear and plead and answer or demur. If practicable, the 
 defendants are to be served with a copy of the order (Batt v. 
 Procter, 45 Fed. 517), and if not, the service is authorized to 
 be made by publication for six weeks. See sec. 8, chap. XVII. 
 See infra, chapter 58, whex-e the forms for this procedure are 
 given and the practice stated, p. 334. This section of the U. S. 
 Eev. Stat. sec. 738, as enlarged in the judiciary act of 1875 as 
 sec. 8, and retained in the new Code, sec. 57 (Comp. Stat. 1913, 
 sec. 1039), chap. 4, has been construed in the following cases, 
 and, being remedial, it will be seen that it has been construed 
 liberally except in the issue of the process and its service. The 
 principle embodied in the act of 1858 (U. S. Rev. Stat. sees. 741, 
 742), was extended, the field of Federal process was pushed 
 beyond State limits, and the Federal courts made vastly more 
 efficient in settling rights of property where nonresidents were 
 interested in the particular character of cases set forth in the 
 section. (See sec. 8, act 1875, chaps. 17 and 58 herein. ) Comp- 
 ton v. Jessup, 15 C. C. A. 397, 31 U. S. App. 486, 68 Fed., 285; 
 American F. L. M. Co. v. Benson, 33 Fed. 456 ; Kent v. Hosin- 
 ger, 167 Fed. 619; Forsyth v. Pierson, 9 Fed. 801; United 
 States V. American Lumber Co. 80 Fed. 309 ; Lancaster v. Ashe- 
 ville Street R. Co. 90 Fed. 1-29 ; Pollitz v. Farmers' Loan & 
 Trust Co. 39 Fed. 707 ; Wheelwright v. St. Louis, ]^. 0. & 0. 
 Canal & Transp. Co. 50 Fed. 709 ; Carpenter v. Talbot, 33 Fed. 
 538; Single v. Scott Paper Mfg. Co. 55 Fed. 553, but see 
 Municipal Invest. Co. v. Gardiner, 62 Fed. 954; Morris v. Gra- 
 ham, 51 Fed. 56; McBee v. Marietta & JST. G. R. Co. 48 Fed. 
 243 ; Greeley v. Lowe, 155 U. S. 74, 39 L. ed. 75, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 24; Mellen v. Moline Malleable Iron Works, 131 U. S. 
 366, 33 L. ed. 182, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 781 ; Amdt v. Griggs, 134 
 U. S. 327, 33 L. ed. 921, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 557; United States 
 V. Union P. R. Co. 98 U. S. 604, 25 L. ed. 151. 
 
CHAPTEE XVII. 
 
 SECTION 57 OF THE NEW CODE AND SECTION 740 OE THE TJ. S. 
 REV. ST. APPLIED. 
 
 Thus, in brief, is shown the gradual extension of territorial 
 jurisdiction, through the issuing and service of process, begin- 
 ning in 17S9, with the subpoena having no extraterritorial force, 
 and the service of which must be made within the territorial 
 jurisdiction of the court (Jewett v. Garrett, 47 Fed. 630, 631; 
 Herndon v. Eidgeway, 17 How. 425, 15 L. ed. 100 ; Eomaine 
 V. Union Ins. Co. 28 Fed. 639), and ending in 1875 with the 
 power of the court to direct its process to any of the United 
 States where the defendant may be found. This section ,does 
 not enlarge the jurisdiction of the court, but only gives greater 
 scope to its process, so as to exercise the jurisdiction given in 
 section 1 of the judiciary act, by creating an exception to the 
 rule that the defendant must be sued in the district of his resi- 
 dence. 
 
 Section 8 of the act of 1875 is as follows : 
 
 "That when in any suit commenced in any circuit court of 
 the United States, to enforce any legal or equitable lien upon, 
 or claim to, or to remove any encumbrance or lien or cloud upon 
 title to real or personal property within the district where suit 
 is brought, one or more of the defendants therein shall not be 
 an inhabitant of or found within the said district, or shall not 
 voluntarily appear thereto, it shall be lawful for the court to 
 make an order directing such absent defendant or defendants to 
 appear, plead, answer or demur, by a certain day to be desig- 
 nated, which order shall be served on such absent defendant 
 or defendants, if practicable, wherever found, and also upon 
 the person or persons, etc." See sec. 57 of new Code, embody- 
 ing sec. 8 of the act of 1875, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1039. (See 
 Process.) Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Louisville & IST. E. Co. 201 
 Fed. 943, and authorities cited. 
 
 Under this section of the act and the statutes iixing the venue 
 of suits of a local nature, the jurisdiction is determined by rea- 
 
 103 
 
104 SECTIOlir EIGHT APPLIED. 
 
 son of the fact that the subject-matter of the suit or property 
 is within the jurisdiction of the courts and in the nature of a 
 proceeding in rem (Shainwald v. Lewis, 5 Fed. 517; Ames v. 
 Holderbaum, 42 Fed. 341 ; Lancaster v. Asheville Street K. 
 Co. 90 Fed. 129 ; Hultberg v. Anderson, 170 Fed. 660 ; Cowell 
 V. City Water Supply Co. 96 Fed. 770; Ladew v. Tennessee 
 Copper Co. 179 Fed. 245; Jones v. Gould, 80 C. C. A. 1,-149 
 Fed. 153, S.' 0. 141 Fed. 698), and it matters not whether any 
 or all of the plaintiffs, or any or all of the defendants, are resi- 
 dent citizens of the district of suit (Ibid. ; Single v. Scott Paper 
 Mfg. Co. 55 Fed. 555 ; Seybert v. Shamokin & Mt. C. Electric 
 K. Co. 110 Fed. 811 ; Spencer v. Kansas City Stock- Yards Go. 
 56 Fed. 741 ; Greeley v. Lowe, 155 U. S. 58-73, 39 L. ed. 69- 
 75, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 24; Deck v. Whitman, 96 Fed. 890 ; Gillis 
 V. Downey, 29 C. C. A. 286, 56 TJ. S. App. 567, 85 Fed. 488, 
 489, 19 Mor. Min. Eep. 253 ; Ladew v. Tennessee Copper Co. 
 supra) and 218 TJ. S. 357, 54 L. ed. 1069, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 89; 
 Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Louisville & N. E. Co. 201 Fed. 944, 
 and where the case falls within section 8, then a citizen of one 
 State may sue a citizen of another State in a third State (Single 
 V. Scott Paper Mfg. Co. supra; Dick v. Foraker, 155 U. S. 404, 
 39 L. ed. 201, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 124; Grove v. Grove, 93 Fed. 
 869 ; De Hierapolis v. Lawrence, 99 Fed. 321 ; Carpenter v. 
 Talbot, 33 Fed. 537). Again, where the case falls within the 
 section, it may be at law, as ejectment (Spencer v. Kansas City 
 Stock- Yards Co. supra), or in equity, as in foreclosing a lieu 
 or removing a cloud from title (Merrihew v. Fort, 98 Fed, 
 899 ; Ames v. Holderbaum, 42 Fed. 341 ; Cowell v. City Water- 
 Supply Co. 96 Fed. 769 ; Bennett v. Fenton, 10 L.E.A. 500, 
 41 Fed. 283; Morrison v. Marker, 93 Fed. 692). 
 
 It has been held that a bill for specific performance comes 
 under section 8 of the act of 1875, if the statutes of the State 
 provide that a contract to convey land becomes a legal or equi- 
 table claim to or lien on the land, and if the relief provided by 
 the statute permits publication to bring in absent or nonresi- 
 dent defendants, and a decree for the land can be entered. This 
 is permitted in some States, and the United States courts will 
 follow the State practice in this respect. Single v. Scott Paper 
 Mfg. Co. 55 Fed. 553-556 ; Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 33 
 L. ed. 918, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 557; Bennett v. Fenton, supra. 
 
SECTION 740 U. S. EEV. ST. APPLIED. 105 
 
 Otherwise a contract to convey land or specific property does not 
 come under this clause, as it is a personal action, and thus must 
 be brought in the district of the residence of plaintiff or defend- 
 ant. Adams v. Heckscher, 80 Fed. 742 ; Mimicipal Invest. Co. 
 V. Gardiner, 62 Fed. 954. It has also been held that a suit 
 in equity to cancel a deed for fraud comes under this clause 
 (Mellen v. Moline Malleable Iron Works, 131 U. S. 352, 33 L. 
 ed 178, 9 Sup. Ct. Kep. 781 ; Evans v. Charles Scribner's Sons, 
 58 Fed. 303) ; so to cancel a note (Manning v.Berdan, 132 Fed. 
 382). 
 
 Again, section 8 is applicable when the jurisdiction rests 
 upon a Federal question, or in a suit that is ancillary where 
 the property is in possession of the courts. Compton v. Jessup, 
 15 C. C. A. 397, 31 U. S. App. 486, 68 Fed. 285. 
 
 Section 8 also applies in partition. Greeley v. Lowe, 155 
 U. S. 58, 39 L. ed. 69, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 24. But it has been 
 held not to apply to a suit to establish the ownership of stock 
 in a corporation, as the situs of stock is with the nonresident 
 holder. Jellenik v. Huron Copper Min. Co. 82 Fed. 778, see 
 177 IT. S. 1, 44 L. ed. 647, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 559, reversing the 
 case, and holding, under section 8, the suit could be brought, 
 and that the stock was to be deemed personal property within 
 the district where the suit was brought, being the habitation 
 of the corporation. This case was followed in Jones v. Gould, 
 141 Fed. 698. 
 
 Section 740 U. S. Rev. Stai. 
 
 I now come to U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 740, embodied in sec. 52 
 of the new Judicial Code, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1034, creating 
 another exception to the rule that the defendant must be sued in 
 the district of his residence. This section provides that when a 
 State contains more than one district, every suit not of a local 
 nature must be brought, if one defendant, where the defendant 
 resides; but if there be two or more defendants residing in 
 diiferent districts of the State, you may bring the suit in either 
 district of the residence of one of the defendants, and a dupli- 
 cate writ may be directed to the marshal of the other district for 
 service. This was a part of the act of 1858, providing for serv- 
 ice of process in local suits, already referred to. 
 
106 SECTION T40 tr. s. eev. st. applied. 
 
 It has been strenuously urged that, after the passage of sec- 
 tion 8, act of 1875, that section 740 was repealed, and that this 
 section 8 specially retained in the act of 1888 had superseded 
 all statutes prescribing the place where parties may be sued; 
 and now section 8 is the only exception to the rule that a de- 
 fendant can only be sued in the district whereof he is an in- 
 habitant. Greeley v. Lowe, 155 U. S. 72-75, 39 L. ed. 74-76, 
 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 24; Cely v. Griffin, 113 Fed. 981. 
 
 Judge Lacombe, of the southern district of New York, main- 
 tains the repeal of the act of 1858, sections 740-742, F. S. 
 Rev. Stat., and would not permit service on nonresident de- 
 fendants, except in the cases and under the conditions provided 
 for in section 8 of the act of 1875. New Jersey Steel & I. Co. 
 V. Chormann, 105 Fed. 532, 633; Seybert v. Shamokin & Mt. 
 C. Electric E. Co. 110 Fed. 810. 
 
 In Greeley v. Lowe, supra, it is intimated that, as no excep- 
 tion was made in the act of 1875 for the cases provided for in 
 sections 740, 742, U. S. Eev. Stat., it is at least open to doubt 
 as to whether suits will lie against nonresident defendants un- 
 der those sections. On the other hand, in Goddard v. Mailler, 
 80 Fed. 423, and East Tennessee, V. & G. E. Co. v. Atlanta 
 & F. E. Co. 15 L.E.A. 109, 49 Fed. 608, in comprehensive and 
 well-reasoned opinions, the contrary view has been maintained. 
 
 The act of 1888 purports to cover the general and territorial 
 jurisdiction of the Federal courts, and as it makes no pro- 
 vision for suing citizens of the same State living in different 
 districts of the State, it tends to show that the legislative mind 
 considered that this feature of Federal jurisdiction had been 
 sufficiently provided for by section 740. 
 
 I submit the better reasoning is found in the cases which 
 hold section 740 in force. John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Bruen, 
 133 Fed. 807. In Petri v. F. E. Creelman Lumber Co. 199 
 U. S. 493, 50 L. ed. 285, 26 Sup. Ct. Eep. 133, the court below 
 had dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, as defendants 
 did not reside in the district of Illinois in which the suit was 
 brought. The plaintiff in error contended that the suit was 
 brought under section 740, providing for service on defendants 
 out of the district of suit, while the defendant in error con- 
 tended that section 740 was repealed and the case was prop- 
 erly dismissed. The Supreme Court sustained the jurisdic- 
 
SECTION TiO U. S. EEV. ST. APPLIED. 107 
 
 tion in the case because the Special Statutes ci*eating the Fed- 
 eral districts in Illinois had provided, in the language of sec- 
 tion 740, for service on defendants out of the district of suit, 
 and therefore did not deem it necessary to decide whether sec- 
 tion 740 had been repealed or not. There is nothing in its lan- 
 guage bringing it in direct conflict with the present judiciary 
 act of ISSS, and therefore within the repealing clause 6 of that 
 act (Eed Eock v. Henry, 106 U. S. 596, 27 L. ed. 251, 1 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 434; Third isfat. Bank v. Harrison, 3 McCrary, 102, 
 S Fed. 721), and we may read section 740 into the first section 
 of the act, in all cases not of a local nature and not resting on 
 diversity of citizenship only for jurisdiction. But whatever 
 may be the rule applied in other districts, it seems that in 
 Texas, Congress has specially provided for service of process 
 on defendants who do not reside in the district. See Judicial 
 Code, sec. 52, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1034. 
 
 By an act of 1879, in rearranging the Federal districts in 
 Texas, it was enacted that if there be more than one defend- 
 ant, and they reside in different districts or in difl^erent di- 
 visions of the same district, the plaintiff may sue in either dis- 
 trict, or division of the district, and may send duplicate writs 
 to the other defendants, on which the plaintiff or his attorney 
 shall indorse that the writ thus sent is a true copy of a writ 
 sued out of the proper division. IJ. S. Bev. Stat. Supp. p. 417. 
 The last clause was evidently a mistake, and not enforced, ana 
 subsequently corrected in 1902. 
 
 Again, by act of 1902, adding the southern, district to the 
 Federal districts of Texas, it is provided that if there be more 
 than one defendant and they reside in different divisions of 
 the district, or in different districts, the plaintiff may sue in 
 either division of, or in either district, and send duplicate writs 
 to the other defendants on which the clerk shall endorse, etc. 
 
 So that as to Texas, with her four Federal districts, sub- 
 poenas from any of her districts may run into any other dis- 
 trict, or divisions of a district, if the conditions under the stat- 
 ute exist which permit it ; that is, where there are two or more 
 defendants residing in the different districts, or diiferent di- 
 visions of a district, you may sue in either district or division 
 of a district in which one of the defendants reside, and bring 
 in all otlier defendants who are proper, necessary or indispeiisa- 
 
108 SECTION 740 tr. s. eev. st. applied. 
 
 ble parties. Acts Congress 18Y9 and 1902. Attention is 
 called to the special laws creating the Federal districts in Texas, 
 because of the fact that Congress in creating Federal districts 
 in other States has uniformly adopted the provisions of section 
 740 in providing for service on defendants out of the district, 
 of suit, and it was unquestionably decided in Petri v. F. E. 
 Creelman Lumber Co. supra, that special laws creating new 
 Federal districts, and providing for service on defendants out 
 of the district of suit, were not repealed by the general juris- 
 dictional acts, though in conflict 199 U. S. 498 ; John D. Park 
 & Sons Co. v. Bruen, 133 Fed. 806 ; Ke Dunn, 212 U. S. 388, 
 53 L. ed. 564, 29 Sup. Ct. Kep. 299. 
 
 But the general provisions of section 740 as re-enacted in 
 section 52 of the new Federal Judicial Code, are now applicable 
 to all districts, all previous laws creating or changing these 
 districts having been expressly repealed by section 297 of such 
 Code, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1274. Doscher v. United States 
 Pipe Line Co. 185 Fed. 959. 
 
 By the express provisions of section 297 of the new Judicial 
 Code, "all acts and parts of acts authorizing the appointment 
 of United States circuit or district judges, or creating or chang- 
 ing judicial circuits, or judicial districts or divisions thereof, 
 or fixing the times or places of holding court therein enacted 
 prior to Feb. 1, 1911," are repealed. 
 
 And see section 53, chap. 4, new Code, requiring suit to be 
 brought in the division of the district in which the defendant 
 lives, or if he move, then one defendant residing in different 
 divisions of the district the suit may be brought in either of the 
 divisions and process served in all of the divisions. 
 
 By section 58, new Code, any suit may be transferred from 
 one division to another. Effective January 1st, 1912. 
 
CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 WHBEJE A CORPORATION MAT BE SUED. 
 
 Having discussed the citizenship of corporations, and that 
 under the jurisdictional act they are citizens, I will now dis- 
 cuss where they may be sued with reference to the State and 
 district. The general rule is that a corporation must be sued 
 in the State of its incorporation and in the district whereof it 
 is an inhabitant ; and within the jurisdictional act it is not con- 
 sidered a citizen, resident, or inhabitant of any State other than 
 that in which it has been incorporated. Wolff v. Choctaw O. 
 & G. R. Co. 133 Fed. 601 ; United States v. Northern P. R. Co. 
 67 C. C. A. 269, 134 Fed. 715; Pilli v. Delaware, L. & W. R. 
 Co. 37 Fed. 65; St. Louis R. Co. v. Pacific R. Co. 52 Fed. 
 770; Campbell v. Duluth, S. S. & A. R. Co. 50 Fed. 241; 
 I^ational Typographic Co. v. New Pork Typographic Co. 44 
 Fed. 711; Amsden v. ISTorwich Union F. Ins. Soc. 44 Fed. ri7. 
 
 If incorporated in several States, a citizen of each State of 
 its incorporation cannot sue it in the Federal court of that 
 State of which he is a citizen, but may sue it in a Federal court 
 in a State of which he is a nonresident, Goodwin v. New York, 
 N". H. & H. R. Co. 124 Fed. 358 ; Burger v. Grand Rapids & 
 I. R. Co. 22 Fed. 563 ; Goodwin v. Boston & M. R. Co. 127 
 Fed. 986 ; Johnson v. Union P. R. Co. 145 Fed. 252. But a 
 railroad operated in several States by license or lease has no 
 citizenship in such States, and may be sued by citizens of the 
 States in which it so operates, in the Federal Courts. Louis- 
 ville, N. A. & C. R. Co. V. Louisville Trust Co. 174 U. S. 562, 
 563, 43 L. ed. 1086, 1087, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 817; Martin v. 
 Baltimore & O. R. Co. (Gerling v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co.) 151 
 U. S. 677, 38 L. ed. 313, 14 Sup. Ot. Rep. 533; Baltimore 
 k 0. R. Co. V. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5, 26 L. ed. 643 ; Markwood 
 V. Southern R. Co. 65 Fed. 823 ; Western & A. R. Co. v. Rob- 
 erson, 9 C. C. A. 646, 22 U. S. App. 187, 61 Fed. 596, 597; 
 
 109 
 
110 WHERE A COEPORATIOKT MAY BE SUED. 
 
 Morgan v. East Tennessee & V. K. Co. 48 Fed. 705. Such are 
 the general rules as established since 1888. 
 
 Prior to the passage of the judiciary act of that year, a cor- 
 poration could be sued in any State where found; that is, in 
 any State where it accepted the conditions prescribed by the 
 State and had by its agents established its business. Hayden 
 V. Androscoggin Mills, 1 Fed. 93-95; Ex parte Schollenberger, 
 96 U. S. 375, 376, 24 L. ed. 854; United States v. Southern 
 P. K. Co. 49 Eed. 302 ; Southern P. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 
 207, 208, 36 L. ed. 945, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 44; Ee Keashey & 
 M. Co. 160 U. S. 228, 40 L. ed. 404, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 273, 
 and auth'orities cited; Piatt v. Massachusetts Eeal Estate Co. 
 103 Fed. 707; United States v. S. P. Shotter Co. 110 Fed. 2. 
 By sec. 51 of the new Code, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1033, fol- 
 lowing the act of 1888 we have seen that the words used in 
 the act of 1875, to wit, "or in which he shall be found at the 
 time of serving process or commencing proceedings," were re- 
 pealed, and the following language substituted: "But when 
 the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is 
 between citizens of different States, suit shall be brought only 
 in the district of the residence of plaintiff or defendant." So 
 that now we have established both as to corporations as well 
 as individuals, that if jurisdiction be founded on the diversity 
 of citizenship, the plaintiff, whether an individual or a cor- 
 poration (Central Trust Co. v. Virginia, T. & C. Steel & 
 I. Co. 55 Fed. 773; Empire Coal & Transp. Co. v. Empire 
 Coal & Min. Co. 150 U. S. 164, 37 L. ed. 1039, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 66), can sue a nonresident corporation either in plaintiff's 
 district, when the defendant corporation is doing business in 
 the State (United States v. Bell Teleph. Co. 29 Fed. 17), or 
 in the State and district of which defendant corporation is an 
 inhabitant, which, as we have seen, can only be the State of its 
 organization. Wolff v. Choctaw E. Co. 133 Fed. 602; St. 
 Louis & S. F. E. Co. v. McBride, 141 U. S. 127, 35 L. ed. 
 659, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 982; Ee Keasbey & M. Co. 160 U. S. 
 229, 40 L. ed. 405, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 273 ; Galveston, H. & 
 S. A. E. Co. v. Gonzales, 151 U. S. 497, 38 L. ed. 248, U 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 401 ; Southern P. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202, 
 36 L. ed. 942, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 44; Piatt v. Massachusetts 
 Eeal Estate Co. 103 Fed. 705-707; Filli v. Delaware, L. & W. 
 
WHEEE A CORPORATION MAY BE SUED. Ill 
 
 E. Co. 3T Fed. 66; IST. K. Fairbank & Co. v. Cincinnati, 
 :N'. O. & T. P. K. Co. 4 C. C. A. 403, 9 U. S. App. 212, Si 
 Fed. 421 ; Dinzy v. Illinois C. R. Co. 61 Fed. 51 ; Minford v. 
 Old Dominion S. S. Co. 48 Fed. 1. 
 
 From the above authorities we have the rule briefly stated 
 as follows: A nonresident corporation cannot be siied in the 
 Federal courts, ^^ithout its consent, in a State in which it is 
 merely doing business (Shaw v. Quincy Min. Co. 145 U. S. 
 450, 36 L. ed. 771, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 935; Southern P. Co. 
 V. Denton, 146 TJ. S. 205, 36 L. ed. 945, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 44), 
 except by a citizen of that State in the district of which he 
 is an inhabitant; or, to state the rule more fully. A corpora- 
 tion incorporated in one of the States of the Union cannot be 
 compelled to answer to a civil suit at law or in equity in a 
 circuit court of the United States held in another State or dis- 
 trict, even if the corporation has a usual place of business in 
 that district, unless the plaintiff is a citizen and resident of 
 the district. Ibid. ; Mexican C. E. Co. v. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 
 204, 37 L. ed. 703, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 859; Eust v. United 
 Waterworks Co. 17 C. C. A. 16, 36 U. S. App. 167, 70 Fed. 
 136, 137; Galveston H. & S. A. E. Co. v. Gonzales, 151 U. S. 
 496, 38 L. ed. 248, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 401; Wange v. Public 
 Service E. Co. 159 Fed. 190; Haight & F. Co. v. Weiss, 84 
 C. C. A. 224, 156 Fed. 328. Bear in mind, this rule only 
 applies when jurisdiction depends on diversity of citizenship ; 
 on any other ground, as the existence of a Federal question, 
 the corporation can only be sued, without its consent, in the 
 Federal courts in the State of its incorporation and district 
 of its habitation. Ibid. ; Adriance, P. & Co. v. McCormick 
 Harvesting Mach. Co. 55 Fed. 287, 288; Cramer v. Singer 
 Mfg. Co. 59 Fed. 75; Ee Keasbey & M. Co. 160 U. S. 231, 
 40 L. ed. 406, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273 ; Shaw v. Quincy Min. 
 Co. 145 U. S. 449, 36 L. ed. 771, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 935. The 
 provision of the judiciary act fixing venue as above set forth is 
 not fundamental, or essential to the exercise of judicial power 
 by the Federal courts, and therefore a corporation sued in the 
 Federal courts of any State may by general appearance waive 
 the right to object that the suit is not brought in a district of its, 
 or the plaintiff's, residence. Ee Keasbey & M. Co. 160 U. S. 
 •229, 40 L. ed. 405, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 273; Interior Constr. & 
 
112 WHERE A COEPOEATION MAY BE SUED, 
 
 Improv. Co. V. Gibney, 160 U. S. 219, 40 L. ed. 401, 16 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 272 ; Southern P. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 206, 36 
 L. ed. 945, 13 Sup., Ct. Eep. 44; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. 
 V. MeBride, 141 U. S. 127, 35 L. ed. 659, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 982. 
 
 In United States v. American Bell Teleph. Co. 29 Fed. 
 17, and Mecke v. Valley Town Mineral Co. 89 Fed. 114, it 
 was held that, in the absence of a voluntary appearance, three 
 conditions must concur in order to give a Federal court juris- 
 diction in personam over a corporation in a State other than 
 of its organization. 
 
 First. It must appear that the 'defendant corporation is 
 carrying on business in such State or district where suit is 
 brought. Barnes v. Western IJ. Teleg. Co. 120 Fed. 550 ; Con- 
 necticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. V. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 43 L. ed. 
 569, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 308; Southern P. Co. v. Denton, 146 
 U. S. 202, 36 L. ed. 942, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 44; Boardman v. 
 S. S. McClure Co. 123 Fed. 614; Frawley v. Pennsylvania 
 Casualty Co. 124 Fed. 263, and authorities cited. Auden 
 reid v. East Coast Mill. Co. 124 Fed. 697 ; Baldwin v. Pacific 
 Power & Light Co. 199 Fed. 293, 294; JSToel Const. Co. v. 
 George W. Smith & Co. 193 Fed. 495, and cases cited. 
 
 Second. That it is managed by some oiEcer or agent ap- 
 pointed by and representing the corporation in such State. Ibid. 
 
 Third. The existence of some local law making foreign cor- 
 porations generally amenable to suit in the State as a condi- 
 tion precedent to doing business in the State, either express or 
 implied. Williams v. Gold Hill Co. 96 Fed. 457; Dinzy v. 
 Illinois C. R. Co. 61 Fed. 49 ; Frawley v. Pennsylvania Cas- 
 ualty Co. 124 Fed. 259 ; Berry v. Knights Templars' & M. Life 
 Indemnity Co. 46 Fed. 441 ; Hill v. Empire State-Idaho Min. 
 & Developing Co. 156 Fed. 797; Mutual Reserve Fund Life 
 Asso. V. Phelps, 190 U. S. 157, 47 L. ed. 994, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 707 ; Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 200, 30 L. ed. 919, 1 Inters. 
 Com. Rep. 295, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 931 ; New England Mut. L. 
 Ins. Co. V. Woodworth, 111 U. S. 146, 28 L. ed. 381, 4 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 364; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 
 10, 26 L. ed. 644; Mooney v. Buford & G. Mfg. Co. 18 C. C. 
 A. 421, 34 U. S. App. 581, 72 Fed. 32 ; Ex parte Schollen- 
 berger, supra; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 81, 
 20 L. ed. 358. 
 
"SVHEKE A COEPOEATION MAY BE SUED. 113 
 
 Under tliis third ground it may be stated that the States, in 
 fixing the conditions under which foreign corporations can do 
 business, generally providing for issuing process, and service on 
 foreign corporations. It may be further stated as to the third 
 condition, that the statutes of States cannot abridge or impair 
 the jurisdiction of Federal courts over foreign corporations 
 (Blodgett V. Lanyon Zinc Co. 58 C. C. A. Y9, 120 Fed. 894) ; 
 that no limitation of stiability fixed in such local statutes can 
 affect Federal jurisdiction, it otherwise appearing (Barrow 
 S. S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. Ill, 42 L. ed. 968, 18 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 526), and while Federal courts will follow the statutory 
 conditions of States, it will not be bound by them, if in their 
 opinion they obstruct the due administration of justice, or are 
 in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the United States. 
 Barron v. Burnside, supra; Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Mc- 
 Xall, 81 Fed. 896; Groton Bridge & Mfg. Co. v. American 
 Bridge Co. 151 Fed. 874; Butler Bros. Shoe Co. v. United 
 States Rubber Co. 84 C. C. A. 167, 156 Fed. 18; Colby v. 
 Cleaver, 169 Fed. 206, 207. In a word, such statutes are not 
 essential to the jurisdiction of the Federal court. Barrow S. S. 
 Co. V. Kane, supra; Wilson Packing Co. v. Hunter, 8 Biss. 
 429, Fed. Cas. 5;o. 17,852. 
 
 Let us now illustrate the rules as above stated. In Southern 
 P. Co. V. Denton, 146 U. S. 205, 36 L. ed. 945, 13 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 44, jurisdiction rested upon diversity of citizenship. Den- 
 ton, a citizen of Red River county in Texas, and therefore an 
 inhabitant of the eastern district of Texas, sued the Southern 
 Pacific Railway Company, a Kentucky corporation, in the 
 United States court at Austin, which is in the western district 
 of Texas, alleging that the defendant was doing business in the 
 western district of Texas, having an agent there, one Jessup, 
 etc. The corporation filed a demurrer to the jurisdiction, thus 
 admitting the facts, but claiming that no jurisdiction was 
 shown. The Supreme Court of the United States sustained the 
 demurrer, holding that since the act of 1888 had repealed the 
 provision in the act of 1875, permitting suit where the de- 
 fendant may be found, and required the suit to be brought 
 in the district in which plaintiff was an inhabitant, or in the 
 district and State of which defendant was an inhabitant (in this 
 
 case Kentucky) that the suit in this case could only have been 
 S. Eq.— 8. 
 
114 WHEEB A CORPORATION MAY BE SUED. 
 
 brought in the eastern district of Texas or in Kentucky. Shaw 
 V. Quincy Min. Co. 145 TJ. S. 444, 36 L. ed. 768, 12 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 935 ; Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Tompkins, 41 G. 0. A. 
 488, 101 Fed. 545; Piatt v. Massachusetts Keal Estate Co. 
 103 Fed. 707 ; Stonega Coal & Coke Co. v. Louisville & M. E. 
 Co. 139 Fed. 271, 272. The contention was that doing busi- 
 ness in the western district of Texas, and having an agent 
 there, was equivalent to consenting to be sued in the western 
 district, under the statute of 1887 of Texas, requiring a for- 
 eign corporation transacting business in Texas to file with the 
 secretary of state a certified copy of its articles of incorpora- 
 tion, and authorizing service of process on any of its agents 
 and officers in the State. 
 
 The Supreme Court said that such a statute might subject 
 the corporation to suit in any of the districts under the statutes 
 of 1789 and 1875 (Ex parte SchoUenberger, 96 U. S. 375, 24 
 L. ed. 854; Piatt v. Massachusetts Keal Estate Co. 103 Fed 
 706, 707 ; New England Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, 111 
 U. S. 138-146, 28 L. ed. 379-382, 4 Sup. Ct. Kep. 364), but 
 such an agreement between the State and corporation since 
 1888, as interpreted in Shaw v. Quincy Min. Co. supra, could 
 not compel the defendant to be sued other than in the State 
 and district of its residence, or the residence of the plaintiff. 
 Ibid.; Southern P. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 208, 36 L. ed. 
 945, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 44. See Wange v. Public Service K. Co. 
 159 Fed. 190. 
 
 The case of Shaw v. Quincy Min. Co. supra, referred to, 
 raised the question whether a nonresident could sue a corpora- 
 tion doing business in the State where sued, such corporation 
 being chartered by a citizen of another State. The plea to 
 the jurisdiction was sustained because it presented a case where 
 neither plaintiif nor defendant were citizens of the State of suit. 
 
 You will find in Zambrino v. Galveston, H. & S. A. K. Go. 38 
 Fed. 449, and in Piddle v. New York, L. E. & W. E. Go. 39 
 Fed., 290, both cases tried shortly after the act of 1888 was 
 passed, it was held that a foreign corporation could be sued in 
 the district of a State in which it was doing business through its 
 agents; but in Filli v. Delaware, L. & W. E. Co. 37 Fed. 66; 
 Booth V. St. Louis Fire Engine Mfg. Co. 40 Fed. 1; My- 
 ers v. Murray, IST. & Co. 11 L.E.A. 216, 43 Fed. 695, and Na- 
 
WHERE A COEPOBATION MAT BE SUED. 115 
 
 tional Typographic Co. v. New York Typographic Co. 44 Fed. 
 711, a diti'erent conclusion was reached, which conclusion was 
 sustained by the Supreme Court in the cases above referred to. 
 
 WJtat District is the Domicil of a Corporation. 
 
 But the question often arises, when a corporation is "doing 
 business" in various Federal districts of a State, as to which . 
 of the districts it is an inhabitant. The rule may be stated, 
 that it is an inhabitant of the district in which it has its prin- 
 cipal office or headquarters, and having its principal office in 
 one district, it cannot be considered an inhabitant of anothei' 
 Federal district. Ee Dunn, 212 U. S. 375, 53 L. ed. 558, 29 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 299; Weed v. Centre & 0. Street R Co. l32 
 Fed. 151; Wolff v. Choctaw, O. & G. K. Co. 133 Fed. 601; 
 Galveston, H. & S. A. K. Co. v. Gonzales, supra; GormuUy & 
 J. ]\Ifg. Co. V. Pope Mfg. Co. 34 Fed. 818 ; N. K. Fairbank 
 & Co. V. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R Co. 4 C. C. A. 403, 9 U. 
 S. App. 212, 54 Fed. 421 ; Weller v. Pennsylvania K. Co. 113 
 Fed. 503. Thus, in Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Gonzales, 
 supra, it was held that a corporation organized under the laws 
 of a State in which there are four Federal districts, and hav- 
 ing its principal office in one of the districts, must be sued 
 there, though it operates its line of railway through the other 
 districts ; and this rule applies whether the suit be brought by 
 an alien or nonresident. 
 
CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 DOING BUSINESS. 
 
 A foreign corporation to be sued in a State other than the 
 State of its organization must be "doing business" in the State 
 where sued. Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. E. Co. 147 Ted. 767 ; 
 Commercial Mut. Acci. Co. v. Davis, 213 U. S. 255, 53 L. ed. 
 787, 29 Sup. Ct. Eep. 445, and authorities cited; Barrow S. 
 S. Co. V. Kane, 170 U. S. 100, 42 L. ed. 964, 18 Slip. Ct. 
 Rep. 526 ; Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. 
 S. 602, 43 L. ed. 569, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 308; Pennsylvania 
 Lumbermen's Mut. P. Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U. S. 407, 49 
 L. ed. 810, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 483 ; Peterson v. Chicago, E. I. 
 & P. R. Co. 205 U. S. 364, 51 L. ed. 841, 27 Sup. Ot. Eep. 
 513 ; Swann v. Mutual Reserve Pund Life Asso. 100 Fed. 
 922 ; Prawley v. Pennsylvania Casualty Co. 124 Fed. 263, and 
 authorities cited; Boardman v. S. S. McClure Co. 123 Fed. 
 614; Kibbler v. St. Louis & S. P. R. Co. 147 Ped. 882. (See 
 service of process on corporations.) If not "doing business," 
 legal service cannot be had, even though State laws authorize 
 it. Ibid. ; Swann v. Mutual Reserve Pund Life Asso. supra ; 
 Rust V. United Waterworks Co. 17 C. 0. A. 16, 36 U. S. App. 
 167, 70 Fed. 130 ; Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U. 
 S. 428, 47 L. ed. 1122, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 807. See also Bar- 
 row S. S. Co. V. Kane, supra. 
 
 This question is one of general, not local, law. Prawley v. 
 Pennsylvania Casualty Co. 124 Ped. 259; Barrow S. S. Co. 
 V. Kane, supra. A State may prescribe conditions, except as 
 to interstate matters, permitting business, but it cannot pre- 
 scribe in advance what acts will be considered as doing busi- 
 ness. Ibid. ; Cyclone Min. Co. v. Baker Light & P. Co. 165 
 Ped. 996; Tennis Bros. Co. v. Wetzel & T. R. Co. 140 Fed. 
 196. It is therefore sometimes difficult to determine whether 
 a foreign corporation is doing business in a State so that it 
 
 116 
 
DOING BUSINESS. Il7 
 
 may be sued there, and I can only suggest tlirongh illustration 
 when service can be perfected so as to give jurisdiction on a 
 foreign corporation in another State. A New York corporation 
 collecting and distributing news, but with no oiSce or place of 
 business in a State, is not doing business (Evansville Courier 
 Co. V. United Press, 74- Fed. 918), but a paper having an 
 agent in another State soliciting advertisements and making 
 contracts can be sued by service on such agent (Palmer v. Chi- 
 cago Herald Co. 70 Fed. 886). A bank receiving premiums 
 due to an insurance company for the convenience of policy hold- 
 ers does not constitute doing business so as to be bound by serv- 
 ice on the officers of the bank. Swann v. Mutual Keserve Fund 
 Life Asso. 100 Fed. 923; Cooper v. Brazelton, 68 C. C. A. 
 188, 135 Fed. 476. A corporation selling goods through a 
 drummer does not make service on the drummer good. Ameri- 
 can Wooden-Ware Co. v. Stem, 63 Fed. 676. But a manu- 
 facturing corporation outside of the State where sued, employ- 
 ing another corporation to sell goods for them, is doing busi- 
 ness in such State, and service on its agents is good. Code v. 
 Tuscaloosa Mfg. Co. 76 Fed. 891 ; United States Eubber Co. 
 V. Butler Bros. Shoe Co. 132 Fed. 398. Lending money in 
 a State by a foreign corjjoration to one who contracts to pay 
 in the foreign State is not doing business so that service would 
 be good in the State where the money is loaned. Gilchrist v. 
 Helena, H. S. & S. E. Co. 47 Fed. 595 ; Cajsar v. Capell, 83 
 Fed. 412—414. Collecting dues, premiums, and assessments 
 on policies in a State is doing business, though State license 
 is withdrawn. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. v. Phelps, 
 190 U. S. 157, 47 L. ed. 994, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 707; Sparks 
 V. Xational Masonic Acci. Asso. 73 Fed. 285 ; Connecticut 
 Mut. L. Ins. Co. V. Spratley, supra. Effecting insurance 
 through correspondence is not doing business. Hazeltine v. 
 Mississippi Valley F. Ins. Co. 55 Fed. 749 ; Good Hope Co. v. 
 Railway Barb Fencing Co. 23 Blatchf. 43, 22 Fed. 637. A 
 railroad company having no tracks in the district is not doing 
 business because it hires an office and maintains an agent in 
 the district to solicit business. Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. 
 Co. 205 U. S. 530, 534, 51 L. ed. 916, 917, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 595, and authorities cited. Goepfert v. Compagnie Generale 
 Transatlantique, 156 Fed. 196. So, having an agent in a State 
 
118 DOING BUSINESS, 
 
 soliciting orders for a foreign manufacturer, but not making 
 contracts, is not doing business within the rule permitting serv- 
 ice of process to be made. Fawkes v. American Motor Car 
 Sales Co. 176 Fed. 1010 ; Kirven v. Virginia-Carolina Chemi- 
 cal Co. 76 C. C. A. 172, 145 Fed. 293, 7 A. & E. Ann. Gas. 
 219. So sales of goods by a foreign corporation through sales- 
 men to citizens of another State, belonging to the operation of 
 interstate commerce, are not affected by restrictive laws of 
 the States requiring conditions precedent to "doing business" 
 in a State. Kirven v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. supra; 
 Julius Kessler & Co. v. Perilloux, 127 Fed. 1011. However, 
 it is held that the interstate commerce clause does not apply 
 to a foreign corporation maintaining a continuous agency in 
 a State from which orders are solicited and the goods deliv- 
 ered to purchasers. Diamond Grlue Co. v. United States Glue 
 Co. 187 U. S. 611, 47 L. ed. 328, 23 Sup. Ct. Kep. 206. 
 
 Nor are isolated contracts of this character between indir 
 viduals of a State and foreign corporations "doing business" 
 in the State. Kirven v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. su- 
 pra; Oakland Sugar Mill Co. v. Fred W. Wolf Co. 55 0. C. 
 A. 93, 118 Fed. 2"39 ;. Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 IJ. S. 
 734, 28 L. ed. 1139, 5 Sup. Ct. Kep. 739 ; Frawley v. Penn- 
 sylvania Casualty Co. supra; AUgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 
 592, 41 L. ed. 836, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 427; Caesar v. Capell, 
 83 Fed. 409, 413; Clews v. Woodstock Iron Co. 44 Fed. 31; 
 Hazeltine v. Mississippi Valley F. Ins. Co. supra; Gilchrist 
 V. Helena, H. S. & S. R Co. 47 Fed. 593 ; Good Hope Co. v. 
 Railway Barb Fencing Co. supra ; Eobinson v. American Lin- 
 seed Co. 147 Fed. 886; Chesapeake & O. R Co. v. Stojanski, 
 112 C. C. A. 310, 191 Fed. 720. 
 
 It has been stated as a test, that if a corporation of one State 
 engages in business in another State under such circumstances 
 that by the law of the latter State the corporation may be sued 
 in the courts thereof, then it may be sued in the Federal courts 
 in that State, if the ease would be otherwise within the Federal 
 jurisdiction. Dinzey v. Illinois C. R. Co. 61 Fed. 51; New 
 England Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, 111 U. S. 146, 28 
 L. ed. 381, 4 Sup. Ct. Eep. 364; Baltimore & 0. R Co. v. 
 Harris, 12 Wall. 81, 20 L. ed. 358; Ex parte Schollenberger, 
 96 U. S. 375, 24 L. ed. 854; Mannington v. Hocking Valley 
 E. Co. 183 Fed. 157. 
 
DOIISTG BUSINESS. 119 
 
 Corporations doing business in a State other than that of its 
 incorporation can only be sued in a Federal court by citizens of 
 that State, and not by citizens of another State. Shaw v. 
 Qpincy Min. Co. 145 U. S. 444, 36 L. ed. 768, 12 Sup. Ct. Kep. 
 935; St. Louis K. Co. v. Pacific E. Co. 52 Fed. 771; Adriance, 
 P. & Co. V. McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. 55 Fed. 287; 
 Central Trust Co. v. Virginia, T. & C. Steel & I. Co. 55 Fed. 
 769; Southern P. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 205, 36 L. ed. 945, 
 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 44; Central Trust Co. v. McGeorge, 151 U. S. 
 134, 38 L. ed: 100, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 286 ; Ee Keasbey & M. 
 Co. 160 U. S. 228, 229, 40 L. ed. 404, 405, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 273. Neither nonresidents nor aliens can thus sue a foreign 
 corporation, whether doing business in the State or not, out of 
 the State of its incorporation. Denton v. International Co. 
 36 Fed. 1 ; Campbell v. Duluth S. S. & A. E. Co. 50 Fed. 241, 
 242; Ee Hohorst, 150 U. S. 662, 37 L. ed. 1214, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 221 ; National Typographic Co. v. New York Typographic 
 Co. 44 Fed. 711 ; GormuUy & J. Mfg. Co. v. Pope Mfg. Co. 
 34 Fed. 820 ; Filli v. Delaware, L. & W. E. Co. 37 Fed. 65 ; 
 Barlow v. Chicago & N. W. E. Co. 164 Fed. 768. 
 
 Alien Corporations. 
 
 What has hitherto been said about "foreign" corporations 
 and the rules applicable to jurisdiction over them applies 
 wholly to corporations created and organized under the au- 
 thority and laws of one of the United States "doing business" 
 in another State than that of its organization. I come now 
 to speak of the rules of jurisdiction applicable to "alien" cor- 
 porations, or such as have been organized under the laws of a 
 foreign country, "doing business" in the United States through 
 its agencies. 
 
 Alien corporations are not citizens of or inhabitants of any 
 State within the jurisdictional acts (Shaw v. Quincy Min. 
 Co. 145 U. S. 453, 36 L. ed. 772, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 935), and 
 therefore jurisdiction cannot be based on diversity of citizen- 
 ship, but under the provision of the statute giving jurisdiction 
 where there shall be a controversy between citizens of a State 
 and foreign States, citizens or subjects. The provision of the 
 statute providing the place of suit does not apply to aliens, 
 
120 DOIJSrO BUSINESS. 
 
 and therefore they may be sued in any Federal district where 
 they may be found. 
 
 In Barrows S. S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 103, 42 L. ed. 965, 
 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526, an action was brought in the circuit 
 court of the United States for the southern district of New 
 York by Kane, a citizen of New Jersey, against the steamship 
 company, a corporation of Great Britain, for injuries received 
 as a passenger on a voyage from Ireland. The contention was 
 that, being a corporation organized in Great Britain, no suit 
 in personam could be brought in this country without its eon- 
 sent. That the statutes of New York made no provision for 
 nor conferred on any court the power to issue process in an 
 action by a nonresident ; therefore the circuit court of the 
 United States could acquire no jurisdiction; that is, a citizen 
 of New Jersey could not bring in a Federal court in New York 
 a suit against an alien corporation. The corporation had an 
 agent, an office in New York city, upon whom service was 
 made. The court answering the contention said : 
 
 First. That the courts of the United States were not de- 
 pendent on State statutes for perfecting service and acquiring 
 jurisdiction. 
 
 Second. That the conferring of jurisdiction by the Consti- 
 tution where citizens and aliens had a controversy was suffi- 
 cient to support the process and judgment. 
 
 Third. That, the defendant being an alien corporation, the 
 subsequent provisions of the judiciary act of 1888, providing 
 for the place of suit, did not apply, and therefore an "alien" 
 can be sued in any district in which valid service can be made 
 or where found. Ee Hohorst, supra; Re Louisville Underwrit- 
 ers, 134 U. S. 488, 33 L. ed. 991, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 587; Gal- 
 veston, H. & S. A. R. Co. V. Gonzales, 151 U. S. 497, 38 L. ed- 
 248, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 401. See Service of Process on Cor- 
 porations; Jarowski v. Hamburg- American Packet Co. 104 C. 
 C. A. 548, 182 Fed. 320. 
 
CHAPTEE XX. 
 
 ■WAIVEB OF JUKISDICTIOK. 
 
 In closing the subject as to the locus of the suit, I wish again 
 to state that the right or privilege to be sued in the district 
 of which one is an inhabitant is not jurisdictional in the sense 
 of being fundamental. If the jurisdiction of the Federal court 
 otherwise exists, then as to where the suit shall be brought may 
 be waived by entering a general appearance or by answer. 
 
 It is a personal exemption to be pleaded in order to be avail- 
 able (St. Louis & S. F. K. Co. v. McBride, 141 U. S. 127, 35 
 L. ed. 659, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 982; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. 
 Doty, 67 C. C. A. 38, 133 Fed. 869; Burch v. Southern P. Co. 
 139 Fed. 350; Piatt v. Massachusetts Real Estate Co. 103 
 Fed. 705 ; McPhee & McG. Co. v. Union P. R. Co. 87 C. C. A. 
 619, 158 Fed. 8, and authorities cited ; United States Fidelity 
 Co. V. Woodson County, 76 C. C. A. 114, 145 Fed. 144; Van 
 Doren v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 35 C. C. A. 282, 93 Fed. 260; 
 Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 378, 24 L. ed. 855 ; Rodgers 
 v. Pitt, 96 Fed. 676, and authorities cited ; Gregory v. Pike, 
 15 C. C. A. 33, 21 U. S. App. 658, 33 U. S. App. 76, 67 Fed. 
 847) ; but where it is apparent in the bill a demurrer is suffi- 
 cient, and it is not necessary to file a plea in abatement (South- 
 ern P. Co. V. Denton, 146 U. S. 206, 36 L. ed. 942, 13 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 44 ; Susquehanna & W. Valley R. & Coal Co. v. Blatch- 
 ford, 11 Wall. 172, 20 L. ed. 179). 
 
 Acts of Waiver. 
 
 Any answer to the merits which may, under the old rules, 
 have been set up by demurrer, plea, or answer, waives the 
 privilege. (Interior Constr. & Improv. Co. v. Gibney, 160 
 U. S. 219, 220, 40 L. ed. 401, 402, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 272; 
 Central Trust Co. v. McGeorge, 151 U. S. 133, 134, 38 L. ed. 
 100, 101, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 286 ; McPhee & McG. Co. v. Union 
 
 121 
 
122 WAIVEE OF JUEISDICTIOST. 
 
 P. E. Co. supra; Ee Moore, 209 U. S. 506, 507, 52 L. ed. 911, 
 912, 28 Sup. Ct. Eep. 585, 706, 14 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1164; 
 Marks v. Marks, 75 Fed. 332; Eodgers v. Pitt, 96 Fed. 676, 
 677, and authorities cited; Southern P. Co. v. Denton, supra; 
 Texas & P. E. Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 603, 36 L. ed. 832, 12 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 905. See Eeinstadler v. Eeeves, 33 Fed. 308, 
 for exceptions. Smith v. Lyon, 133 U. S. 315, 33 L. ed. 635, 
 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 303) ; or by pleading to the merits (Ibid.; 
 Southern Exp. Co. v. Todd, 5 C. C. A. 432, 12 U. S. App. 351, 
 56 Fed. 104; Collins v. Stott, 76 Fed. 613; Eddy v. Lafayette, 
 1 C. C. A. 441, 4 U. S. App. 247, 49 Fed. 810; Carter-Crume 
 Co. V. Peurrung, 30 C. C. A. 174, 58 U. S. App. 388, 86 Fed. 
 442; Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U. S. 476, 25 L. ed. 237; Van 
 Doren v. Pennsylvania E. Co. supra; Midland Contracting Co. 
 V. Toledo Foundry & Mach. Co. 83 C. C. A. 489, 154 Fed. 798; 
 Creagh v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. 83 Fed. 850 ; Less v. 
 English, 29 C. C. A. 275, 56 U. S. App. 16, 85 Fed. 477). 
 
 A motion to dismiss under new rule 29, because of insuffi- 
 ciency of facts to constitute a valid cause of action waived 
 (Ibid. ; St. Louis & S. F. E. Co. v. McBride, 141 U. S. 130, 35 
 L. ed. 660, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 982 ; Scott v. Hoover, 99 Fed. 
 247) because such a motion goes to the merit of the bill as 
 under the old rules (Lowry v. Tile, Mantel & Grate Asso. 98 
 Fed. 817). If, however, the motion raises only an issue of juris- 
 diction, as that the bill shows on its face a want of jurisdiction, 
 then such motion does not waive the privilege. • Shaw v. Quincy 
 Min. Co. 145 U. S. 453, 36 L. ed. 772, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 935. 
 
 Should the motion be overruled, answering over does not 
 waive the right to insist on the issue on appeal. Southern P. 
 Co. V. Denton, 146 U. S. 206, 36 L. ed. 945, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 44 ; Stonega Coal & Coke Co. v. Louisville & N. E. Co. 139 Fed. 
 272. Again, where there is an objection to jurisdiction filed 
 with the answer to the merits, and the issue on the merits con- 
 tested, the waiver of jurisdiction would be so held. Clark- 
 Herrin-Campbell Co. v. H. B. Claflin Co. 134 C. 0. A. 229, 
 218 Fed. 429. The rule, then, is that the failure of defendant 
 to present the issue as to want of jurisdiction by motion, or 
 answer before filing an answer to the merits is a waiver of 
 jurisdiction of the court, because of being sued in the wrong 
 district. Less v. English, supra, and authorities; Interior 
 
WAIVEE OF JUEISDICTION. 123 
 
 Constr. & Improv. Co. v. Gibney, 160 U. S. 217, 40 L. ed. 401, 
 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 272 ; Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 
 134 C. C. A. 275, 218 Fed. 549. 
 
 Talcing of Depositions as Waiver. 
 
 In Stonega Coal & Coke Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 139 
 Ped. 271, it was held that defendant did not waive objection 
 to jurisdiction by appearing and participating in taking depo- 
 sitions on the suit before issues made up (Pacific Mut. L. Ins. 
 Co. V. Tompkins, 41 C. 0. A. 488, 101 Fed. 539), but not 
 where the case has proceeded beyond the pleading. 
 
 Removal as waiver of jurisdiction will be discussed under 
 "Removals." 
 
 Who May Ohject for Want of Parties. 
 
 When there are several defendants, some of whom are not 
 inhabitants of the district in which suit is brought, the ques- 
 tion has arisen whether the defendants who are inhabitants 
 of the district may not take the objection that others are not. 
 The rule may be stated that the resident defendant cannot ob- 
 ject, that his codefendant is sued out of his district. Smith v. 
 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 64 Fed. 1 ; Jewett v. Bradford Sav. 
 Bank & T. Co. 45 Fed. 801. The joinder is not jurisdictional 
 unless the nonresident chooses to make it so. Schultz v. High- 
 land Gold Mines Co. 158 Fed. 341; Dominion Nat. Bank 
 V. Olympia Cotton Mills, 128 Fed. 182 ; Lowry v. Tile, Man- 
 tel & Grate Asso. supra. It is intimated in Interior Constr. 
 Co. V. Gibney, 160 U. S. 220, 40 L. ed. 402, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 272, that under certain conditions the resident defendant may 
 object to answering without the presence of the nonresident 
 indispensable party. Elkhart Nat. Bank v. Northwestern 
 Guaranty Loan Co. 84 Fed. 77, id., 30 C. C. A. 632, 58 U. 
 S. App. 83, 87 Fed. 252; Blanchard v. Bigelow, 109 Fed. 
 275; Continental Adjustment Co. v. Cook, 152 Fed. 655. 
 
CHAPTEK XXL 
 
 HOW ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP BAISBD AND PEOOI' THEEEON. 
 
 Eule 29, which prescribes and regulates the presentation 
 of defenses to a suit in equity, abolishes pleas and demurrers, 
 but it does not abolish the issues formerly raised by them; the 
 manner of raising the issues of law and fact arising in the 
 cause has only been changed, so that motions as now required 
 must be drawn in the nature of demurrers and pleas, as required 
 under the old rules. Alexander v. Fidelity Trust Co. 215 Fed. 
 794. See Ealston Steel Car Co. v. National Dump Car Co. 
 222 Fed. 590. If the diversity of citizenship is not apparent 
 in the bill the issue may be raised by motion in the nature of 
 a demurrer, as indicated in the foi-m hereinafter given. If 
 the diversity of citizenship is sufficiently set forth, but not 
 in fact true, it may be raised by motion to dismiss in the 
 nature of a plea, or it may be raised in the answer. To prop- 
 erly understand how to formulate the motion or answer, and 
 the character of proof necessary, we must bear in mind that 
 citizenship, so far as the jurisdictional act is concerned, must 
 be that character of citizenship that identifies itself with a 
 particular State; and citizenship as defined in the lith Amend- 
 ment to the Constitution of the United States does not affect 
 the rule. Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 315, 32 L. ed. 690, 9 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 289 ; Shaw v. Quincy Min. Co. 145 U. S. 447, 
 36 L. ed. 770, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 935; Marks v. Marks, 75 Fed 
 324; Hammerstein v. Lyne, 200 Fed. 165. 
 
 Again, you must distinguish between judicial and political 
 citizenship. Marks v. Marks, 75 Fed. 327-332. As soon as 
 a citizen moves to a State anlmo manendi, he becomes a ju- 
 dicial citizen, and may sue or be sued instanter in a Federal 
 court and in the Federal district in which he may for the time 
 reside, though he cannot vote. For jurisdictional purposes, 
 then, citizenship requires: First, residence; second, intention 
 of permanency. 
 
 State citizenship and "domicil" are the same thing (Marks 
 
 124 
 
HOW ISSUE OF CITIZEKSHIP RAISED AKD PROOF THEREON. 125 
 
 V. Marks, 75 Fed. 324; Alabama G. S. E. Co. v. Carroll, 28 
 C. C. A. 207, 52 U. S. App. 442, 84 Fed. 779, 780) ; for domi- 
 cil means residence animo manendi. Collins v. Ashland, 112 
 Fed. 17S ; Pacific ]\[ut. L. Ins. Co. v. Tompkins, 41 C. C. A. 
 4S8, 101 Fed. 543 ; Harton v. Hawley, 155 Fed. 493 ; Marks v. 
 Marks, 75 Fed. 331. Residence may exist animo reverteyidi, 
 and for this reason the allegation of residence, as will hereafter 
 be seen, is not sufficient. Citizenship and residence are not 
 convertible terms. Sharon v. Hill, 26 Fed. 337-342; Rob- 
 ertson V. Cease, 97 U. S. 648, 24 L. ed. 1058 ; Pacific Miit. 
 L. Ins. Co. V. Tompkins, supra, and authorities cited ; Steig- 
 leder v. McQuesten, 198 U. S. 141, 49 L. ed. 986, 25 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 616; Chambers v. Prince, 75 Fed. 177; McDonald v. 
 Salem Capital Flour-Mills Co. 31 Fed. 579 ; Eisele v. Oddie, 
 128 Fed. 945; Jones v. Subera, 150 Fed. 464; Menard v. Gog- 
 gan, 121 U. S. 253, 30 L. ed. 914, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 873; 
 Home V. George H. Hammond Co. 155 U. S. 393, 39 L. ed. 
 197, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 167; Wolfe v. Hartford Life & An- 
 nuity Ins. Co. 148 U. S. 389, 37 L. ed. 493, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 602. A person may have several residences, but only one domi- 
 cil. Tambrino v. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. 38 Fed. 453, 
 and authorities cited. "Residence," however, is an element of 
 citizenship. McDonald v. Salem Capital Flour-Mills Co. 31 
 Fed. 577; Anderson v. Watt, 138 U. S. 695, 34 L. ed. 1078, 
 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 449. See Robertson v. Cease, supra ; Harding 
 V. Standard Oil Co. 182 Fed. 421 ; United States v. Gronich, 
 211 Fed. 548. 
 
 Burden of Proof. 
 
 The burden of proof is on the defendant to defeat jurisdic- 
 tion when the issue is raised. Foster v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. 
 L. R. Co. 56 Fed. 436; Collins v. Ashland, supra; National 
 Masonic Acci. Asso. v. Sparks, 28 C. C. A. 399, 49 U. S. App. 
 681, 83 Fed. 225 ; Adams v. Shirk, 55 C. C. A. 25, 117 Fed. 
 801 ; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Carroll, 28 C. C. A. 207, 52 U. 
 S. App. 442, 84 Fed. 779, 780 ; Rucker v. Bolles, 25 C. C. A. 
 600, 49 U. S. App. 358, 80 Fed. 504; Hartog v. Memory, 116 
 U. S. 590, 591, 29 L. ed. 726, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 521. " (See 
 "Plea, Burden of Proof.") Fleming v. Laws, 112 C. C. A. 27, 
 191 Fed. 283. 
 
126 HOW ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP RAISED AND PEOOF THEREON. 
 
 With these observations as to the character of citizenship 
 necessary to jurisdiction, I will proceed to discuss how the issue 
 is raised and proved. 
 
 It will be seen, in discussing the bill in equity, that the 
 diversity of citizenship must appear in the bill with certainty, 
 as it will not be inferred from allegations. International Bank 
 & T. Co. V. Scott, 86 C. C. A. 248, 159 Fed. 59 ; Boston Safe- 
 Deposit & T. Co. V. Racine, 97 Fed. 817; Stuart v. Easton, 
 156 U. S. 46, 39 L. ed. 341, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 268; Continen- 
 tal L. Ins. Co. V. Rhoads, 119 U. S. 239, 30 L. ed. 380, 7 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 193 ; Anderson v. Watt, 138 U. S. 702, 34 L. ed. 1081, 
 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 449; Timmons v. Elytown Land Co. 139 
 U. S. 378, 35 L. ed. 195, 11, Sup. Ct. Rep. 585; Roberts v. 
 Lewis, 144 U. S. 656, 36 L. ed. 582, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 781. 
 If it does not appear the appellate courts presume the court 
 below acted without jurisdiction. King Bridge Co. v. Otoe 
 County, 120 U. S. 226, 30 L. ed. 623, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 552; 
 Parker v. Ormsby, 141 IJ. S. 83, 35 L. ed. 655, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 912 ; Home v. George H. Hammond Co. 155 U. S. 394, 
 39 L. ed. 197, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 167. If it does not so appear 
 in the bill, you may (Southern P. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 
 202, 36 L. ed. 942, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 44) move to dismiss as 
 above stated. Tice v. Hurley, 145 Fed. 391 ; Sanbo v. Union 
 P. Coal Co. 146 Fed. 80; Miller-Magee Co. v. Carpenter, 34 
 Fed. 433. However, being fundamental, there is no exclusive 
 way of raising the issue. See Lewis Blind Stitch Co. v. Arbetter 
 Felling Mach. Co. 181 Fed. 974; Lader v. Tennessee Copper 
 Co. 179 Fed. 245; Steigleder v. McQuesten, 198 U. S. 141, 
 49 L. ed. 986, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 616. See Wright v. Skinner, 
 136 Fed. 694. 
 
 Raising hy Motion in the Nature of a Demurrer. 
 
 When the issue as to citizenship is based purely upon the 
 record, it may be raised by motion or in the answer, which 
 should be in the nature of a demurrer, and the following form 
 
 may be used: 
 
 In the District Court of the United 
 
 Title as in bill. States for the District of 
 
 Sitting at 
 
 And now comes the defendant (or defendants) (naming them) and 
 would show to the Court that it appears from the bill filed in this cause 
 that the jurisdiction of this court depends on diversity of citizenship and 
 that said diversity is not shown, for that plaintiff and defendants, or one 
 
HOW ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP RAISED AND PROOF THEEEON. 127 
 
 of the defendants (naming him) are as appears citizens of the same 
 state, and not different states, (or that both plaintiff and defendants 
 are aliens; or that there are aliens on both sides of the controversy with 
 citizens of states), (or that neither plaintiff nor defendants are citi- 
 zens of States in which the suit is brought; or that the citizens of the 
 same State are suing in a third State; or two or more citizens of different 
 States are suing a defendant from a third State; or any other form of 
 objection appearing under the rules of jurisdiction heretofore stated ) . 
 Wherefore defendant prays the court to dismiss the bill and that he re- 
 cover his costs in this behalf incurred. 
 
 R. F., 
 Solicitor. 
 
 See form in Stonega Coal & Coke Co. v. Lonisville & JST. K. 
 Co. 139 Fed. 2Yl. 
 
 This character of motion must be tried by the record. 
 
 Raising Issue hy Motion in Nature of Plea. 
 
 If the record shows a sufficient allegation of citizenship 
 which may not be true, the issue may be raised in the answer 
 or by motion in the nature of a plea, as a proper allegation 
 of ciiizenship is confessed if not denied. Hoppenstedt v. 
 Fuller, 17 C. C. A. 623, 36 U. S. App. 271, 71 Fed. 99. The 
 old rule that a proper allegation of citizenship, though denied 
 in the answer, is admitted unless a plea is filed, construing old 
 rule 39, now abrogated, is no longer the rule. See Crown Cork 
 & Seal Co. V. Standard Brewery, 174 Fed. 252; Klenk v. 
 Byrne, 143 Fed. 1008 ; York County Sav. Bank v. Abbot, 131 
 Fed. 980. If the issue is raised by motion or in the answer it 
 should be set up as follows: 
 
 Title as in bill. 
 
 And now comes the defendant (or defendants, naming them) and would 
 show to the court that it appears from said bill that the jurisdiction of 
 this Court is dependent on diversity of citizenship of the parties to the suit, 
 and that so much of the allegations of said bill as sets up the diversity of 
 citizenship is not true for defendant avers that the plaintiff, A. B., is not a 
 
 citizens or resident of the State of , as alleged by him but was at the 
 
 commencement of this suit, and is now, a citizen of the State of , of 
 
 which State the defendant, O. D., was at the commencement of this suit a 
 citizens and resident, (or that plaintiff and defendant are citizens of differ- 
 ent states from the one in which the suit is brought, or any other objection 
 as stated in the form above may be set up in the motion or answer). All of 
 which the defendant avers to be true and pleads the same in bar of the bill 
 and prays the court to dismiss the bill with his costs in this behalf incurred 
 
 E. P., 
 Solicitor. 
 
128 HOW ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP EAISED AND PEOOF THEEEOK. 
 
 If the defendant be a corporation the same form may be used 
 except that the motion should allege that the defendant is not 
 
 a corporation organized under the laws of the State of 
 
 as alleged, nor is it a citizen of or inhabitant of the State of 
 , where the corporate meetings are held and the cor- 
 porate business is transacted. 
 
 If the plaintiif's citizenship is attacked you may state it as 
 follows : 
 
 It is not true as averred that plaintiff is a citizen of the State of 
 
 , as alleged by him, but was, at the commencement of this suit 
 
 and now is a citizen and resident of the State of being the same 
 
 State of defendant's citizenship and residence. All of which defendant 
 avers to be true, etc. 
 
 If the objection be that plaintiff is not suing the foreign 
 corporation in the district of plaintiff's residence, then say, 
 after the words: "that the jurisdiction depends on the diversity 
 of citizenship," 
 
 That it is not true that plaintiflF at the commencement of this suit was 
 
 nor now is a resident and citizen of the District or of the 
 
 State of where this suit is brought, but he was, at the com- 
 mencement of this suit and now is, a citizen and resident of the 
 
 District of , all of which defendant alleges to be true. Wherefore 
 
 he says not this court but the District Court of the United States for the 
 
 District of , of which plaintiff is and was an inhabitant 
 
 and citizen, has jurisdiction and not this court. 
 
 Raising the Issue in the Answer. 
 
 By rule 29 the issue may be raised in the answer, and if so 
 raised the evidence under the issue may be taken in connection 
 with the evidence on the merits of the whole case, and the 
 issue may be submitted with the case on final hearing; or it 
 may be called up and disposed of before the final hearing, 
 which is the better practice. When the issue is raised in the 
 answer, the form as given for the "Motion" in the nature of a 
 plea may be used. However, in Lindsay-Bitton Live Stock 
 .Co. V. Justice, it is said that in a Code State where a general 
 denial puts in issue every material allegation of the complaint, 
 a general denial puts in issue an allegation of diverse citizen- 
 ship in the Federal courts. Ill C. C. A. 525, 191 Fed. 163, 
 and cases cited; Gaddie v. Mann, 14-7 Fed, 955-959. 
 
now issrE of cixizE^fSHip eaised anx) proof thereon. 120 
 
 Setting Issue Down for Hearing. 
 
 Bv rule 29 these defenses, however raised, may be separately 
 disposed of before the final trial, or when called for final trial, 
 in advance of the trial of the issnes on the merits of the case. 
 So, where the motion to dismiss the bill or any part thereof 
 is made, the motion may be set down for hearing by either 
 party upon five days' notice ; and where it raises an issue of 
 fact, five days is allowed to answer, and upon failure to do so 
 a decree pro confesso may be entered on the issue. The motion 
 to dismiss may also be set for hearing on a "motion day," as 
 fixed under rule 6 ; or the judge of the district may fix any 
 time or place as he may consider reasonable to make, and 
 direct all rulings and proceedings for the advancement, con- 
 duct, and hearing of causes. New rule 6. 
 
 Burden of Proof. 
 
 As before said, the burden of proof is on the defendant to 
 prove to a "legal certainty" facts relied upon to defeat the 
 jurisdiction. Ibid. ; AYiemer v. Louisville Water Co. 130 Fed. 
 244; Adams v. Shirk, supra; Chambers v. Prince, 75 Fed. 
 176, fact cases ; Canadian P. E. Co. v. Wenham, 146 Fed. 
 207; Marks v. Marks, 75 Fed. 324; Collins v. Ashland, 112 
 Fed. 175 ; Hanchett v. Blair, 41 C. C. A. 76, 100 Fed. 817 ; 
 Southc .1 Electric E. Co. v. Hageman, 57 C. C. A. 348, 121 
 Fed. 262; Loomis v. Eosenthal, 67 Fed. 369; Covel v. Chi- 
 cago, E. I. & P. E. Co. 123 Fed. 452 ; Illinois L. Ins. Co. v. 
 Shenehon, 109 Fed. 674; Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Tomp- 
 kins, 41 C. C. A. 488, 101 Fed. 539 ; Caldwell v. Firth, 33 
 C. C. A. 439, 62 U. S. App. 694, 91 Fed. 177; Creagh v. 
 Equitable Life Assur. Soc. 88 Fed. 1 ; Denver v. Sherrett, 31 
 C. C. A. 499, 60 U. S. App. 104, 88 Fed. 226; Eucker v. 
 Belles, supra ; Kingman v. Holthaus, 59 Fed. 305, 309 ; Pike 
 County V. Spencer, 112 C. C. A. 433, 192 Fed. 13, and cases 
 cited; Gad die v. Mann, 147 Fed. 955; Kilgore v. Norman, 119 
 Fed. 1008. 
 
 How Tried. 
 
 When the issue is raised, the judge may try the issue or sub- 
 mit it to a jury. Wetmore y. Eymer, 169 IJ. S. 120-122, 42 
 L. ed. 684, 685, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 293. See Canadian P. E. 
 Co. V. Wenham, 146 Fed. 206, 207. 
 
 R, Eq.— 9. 
 
CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 WANT OF JSTECESSAET CITIZENSHIP APPEABING ]N TRIAL. 
 
 But you may not be aware of the true facts of citizenship 
 so as to raise the issue by motion or answer, and the true state of 
 the citizenship may be developed by your evidence when the 
 depositions on the merits are read, or from instruments filed in 
 evidence. Remembering, as has been stated, that jurisdiction 
 by diversity of citizenship is fundamental, that is, if the Federal 
 jurisdiction is based upon it, and it does not exist, the court 
 should not proceed further (act of 1875, sec. 5), you may there- 
 fore meet it by motion to dismiss at any stage of the proceed- 
 ing, if it should appear. It is really the duty of the court 
 sua sponte to dismiss the case without either motion or sug- 
 gestion, if the want of jurisdiction clearly appears. However; 
 you may take the initiative by filing a motion. Pacific Mut. 
 L. Ins. Co. V. Tompkins, 41 C. C. A. 488, 101 Fed. 541, 542; 
 Williams v. ISTottawa, 104 U. S. 212, 26 L. ed. 719; Farming- 
 ton V. Pillsbury, 114 U. S. 144, 29 L. ed. 116, 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 807 ; Graves v. Corbin, 132 U. S. 590, 33 L. ed. 468, 10 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 196 ; Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 315, 32 L. ed. 690, 
 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289; Simon v. House, 46 Fed. 319; Rogers v. 
 Penobscot Min. Co. 83 C. C. A. 380, 154 Fed. 606. This duty 
 upon the part of the court to dismiss the case is made obliga- 
 tory by the fifth section of the act of 1875. Prior to that time 
 the jurisdiction of the court had to be raised by plea or answer 
 when properly alleged in the bill. Kardo Co. v. Adams, — 
 C. C. A. — , 231 Fed. 954. But this rule was changed bj 
 the act of 1875, sec. 5, new Code sec. 37, Comp Stat. 1913, 
 sec. 1039: 
 
 "That in any suit commenced in a district court or removed 
 from a State court, it shall be made to appear to the satisfac- 
 tion of said court, at any time after such suit has been brought 
 or removed, that such suit does not really and substantially 
 involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdic- 
 tion of said court, or that the parties to said suit have 
 
 130 • 
 
WAXT OF NECESSARY CITIZENSHIP Al'PExiEING IN TRIAL. 131 
 
 improperly or collusively made or joined, either as plaintiffs 
 or defendants, for the purpose of creating a case cognizable 
 or removable under this act, the said circuit court shall pro- 
 ceed no further therein, but shall dismiss the suit or remand it 
 to the court from which it was removed, as justice may require, 
 and shall make such order as to costs as shall be just." 
 
 It is seen that the district courts cannot escape the duty it 
 imposes. The Supreme Court has frequently enforced this 
 section on appeal, though no issue whatever was raised in the 
 court below, or the Supreme Court. Ibid. ; Turner v. Farm- 
 ers' Loan & T. Co. 106 U. S. 555, 27 L. ed. 2Y4, 1 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 519 ; King Bridge Co. v. Otoe County, 120 U. S. 226, 
 30 L. ed. 62-4, Y Sup. Ct. Eep. 552. 
 
 It is said that if the evidence discloses the want of jurisdic- 
 tion, or that the jurisdiction of the Federal court has been im- 
 posed upon, you should file a motion to dismiss. 
 
 Under the old rules the want of jurisdiction appearing in the 
 trial of the cause may have been discovered generally in advance 
 of the trial, as the evidence was taken by depositions, and abund- 
 ant opportunity thus given to discover the want of jurisdiction 
 if it existed; but under new rule 46, all testimony in an 
 equity cause is required to be taken orally, as at law, except 
 when otherwise provided by the new rules, or by statute. The 
 rule seeks, as regards the taking of evidence in the cause, to 
 make the trial in equity similar to a trial in law, and the, taking 
 of depositions in equity are exception as at law, and not the gen- 
 eral rule as under the old rules. ISTorth v. Herrick, 203 Fed. 
 591. 
 
 So now where the evidence is taken orally, one would have to 
 wait its development at the trial, in order to file a motion to 
 dismiss. 
 
 The motion may be as follows : 
 
 A. B. In the District Court of the United 
 
 vs. In Equity. States for the District of 
 
 CD. , sitting at 
 
 And now comes C. D., the defendant, and moves the court to dismiss 
 this suit and that he go hence with his costs in this behalf incurred, for 
 that it appears by the evidence or instruments taken and iiled in the 
 
 cause that >.... (naming him) is not a citizen of the State of 
 
 , as alleged (or whatever may be the fact affecting the jurisdic- 
 
132 WANT OF NECESSARY CITIZENSHIP APPEARING IN TRIAL. 
 
 tion), and therefore no diversjiv of citizenship exists as alleged and upon 
 which jurisdiction in this suit 13 based. 
 
 Wherefore defendant prays that because the suit does not really and 
 substantially involve a controversy properly within the jurisdiction of the 
 court, that the same be dismissed. E. F., 
 
 Solicitor, etc. 
 
 Wetmore v. Eymer, 169 U. S. 120, 121, 42 L. ed. 684, 18 
 Slip. Ct. Rep. 293. 
 
 Here I must caution you that if there be suspicion that the 
 jurisdiction is imposed upon, that you should raise the issue 
 by motion or answer, because if no issue is raised, and you trust 
 to its development in the evidence, you place yourself at a 
 disadvantage as to the proof, as the court will not infer a want 
 of jurisdiction unless it affinnatively appears in the legitimate 
 evidence taken on the substantial issues in the case. 
 
 To illustrate : If you have no motion or answer raising the 
 issue, the mere fact that you have asked questions as to citizen- 
 ship in your examinations, the responses to such questions, not 
 being on any issue in the case, would not be considered, as it 
 would not be legitimate evidence taken on a substantial issue; 
 but if you plead it, all the evidence remotely tending to prove 
 the issue made will be considered. 
 
 See Lindsay-Bitton Live Stock Co. v. Justice, 111 C. C. A. 
 525, 191 Fed. 163, as to effect of the general issue in cases at 
 law. See act of March 3d, 1915, Judicial Code, sec. 274(c), 
 providing that any suit brought on or removed to any district 
 court of the United States where jurisdiction is based on 
 diversity of citizenship and such diversity existed at the time the 
 suit was brought or removed, though defectively alleged, either 
 party may amend at any stage of the proceedings, in both the 
 district and appellate courts, so as to show diversity of citizen- 
 ship, and the case shall proceed as if properly alleged in the 
 original pleading, or in the petition for removal. 
 
CHAPTEE XXIII. 
 
 ISSUE AS TO DISTRICT OF SUIT OR VENUE. 
 
 What has been said as to the issue of jurisdiction, and the 
 fonns given hv whicli it is presented, has had reference to fun- 
 damental conditions which could not be waived. I will now 
 discuss the district of suit; how the issue is raised; and the 
 forms applicable. 
 
 The requirement that a civil suit cannot be brought in any 
 other district than that whereof the defendant is an inhabi- 
 tant, except when the suit is based on a diversity of citizenship, 
 then it may be brought in the district of the residence of either 
 the plaintiff, or defendant, is only a personal exemption and 
 must be pleaded in order to be available. Piatt v. Massachu- 
 setts Eeal Estate Co. 103 Fed. 705; Central Trust Co. v. Mc- 
 George, 151 U. S. 129, 132, 38 L. ed. 98, 99, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 2S6 (see "Territorial Jurisdiction," p. 92; Wolff v. Choctaw, 
 0. & G. E. Co. 133 Fed. 602, and authorities cited; McPhee 
 k McG. Co. V. Union P. E. Co. 87 C. C. A. 619, 158 Fed. 8. 
 If the suit is not brought in the district of which defendant is 
 an inhabitant, or in case of diversity of citizenship in the resi- 
 dence district of the plaintiff or defendant, the issue should be 
 raised at once by motion or answer. As said, if apparent on the 
 record a motion in the nature of a demurrer in the form hereto- 
 fore given should be filed ; and if not apparent, a motion in the 
 nature of a plea should be filed, or the issue should be set up 
 in the answer. The following form may be used : 
 
 A. B. In the District Court of the United 
 
 V. In Equity. States for the District of 
 
 C. D. ) sitting at 
 
 And now comes the defendant (naming him) and says that at the 
 commencement of this suit he was not, and is not now, an inhabitant 
 
 of, nor does he reside in the district of , where 
 
 this suit is brought (or if objection be to the division of the district use 
 county, which is in the district of the State of , and not in 
 
 1o 9 
 
134 ISSUE AS TO DISTEIOT OF SUIT OE VENUE. 
 
 the district of , where this suit is brought (or that at the 
 
 commencement of this suit he was and is now an inhabitant of and 
 
 resident citizen of the county of in the division of the 
 
 district of Texas, that all process issuing to said 
 
 county, of which he is an inhabitant and resident citizen, out of the 
 
 District Court of the United States, is returnable to the division of 
 
 said district of and not to the division of said 
 
 district where the suit is brought). 
 
 Wherefore defendant pleads his privilege to be sued in the dis- 
 trict of , of which he is a resident citizen and inhabitant ( or to be 
 
 sued in the division of the district of to which 
 
 district of , that all process issuing to said 
 
 attached), and insists upon his exemption from suit in this court because 
 
 he says the District Court of the United States for the district of 
 
 (or the. division of the District Court of the United States 
 
 for the district of ) has jurisdiction in the premises and 
 
 not this court. 
 
 Prayer to be dismissed. R. F., 
 
 Solicitor, etc. 
 
 If the defendant is a corporation and sued in the State of its 
 organization, and not in the district of its residence, then plea 
 may be in this form : 
 
 Title and commencement as before. 
 
 And now comes the C. D. Company, the defendant in the above cause, 
 and says that at the commencement of this suit and now it was and 
 
 is an inhabitant of, and resided in county in the 
 
 district of , where its principal office, or headquarters, is situated, 
 
 its corporate meetings held and its corporate business transacted, and is 
 not an inhabitant, etc. (See form above given.) 
 
 Wherefore insisting on its exemption it says not this court, but the Dis- 
 trict Court of the United States for the district of , has 
 
 jurisdiction in the premises. 
 
 Prayer to be dismissed. 
 
 (See new rule 24.) 
 
 It has been the practice in some of the Federal districts, 
 that where the defendant was an inhabitant of the district in 
 which suit was brought, though not a resident citizen of the 
 division of the district in which suit was brought, that the suit 
 on motion would be transferred to the division of the district 
 of which defendant was a resident citizen, and this was done 
 on motion of the plaintiff in answer to a plea of privilege. 
 This practice is now controlled by sees. 53 and 58 of the New 
 
ISSUE AS TO DISTRICT OF SUIT OE VENUE. 135 
 
 Code (Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 1035, 1040), authorizing the 
 transfer of the case to any other division of the same district. 
 The foregoing sections clearly confine the suit in personal 
 actions to the subdivision having the county of defendant's 
 residence in its jurisdiction, and distinctly indicates the court 
 in which suit must be brought. It gives to each subdivision a 
 distinct jurisdiction confining its process to the counties attached 
 to it, unless there be two or more defendants living in different 
 subdivisions. Of course this privilege may be waived, as stated 
 in discussing territorial jurisdiction. 
 
CHAPTEE XXIV. 
 
 FEDEEAL QUESTION'. 
 
 We have been discussing the jurisdiction of the Federal 
 courts as based upon the situation and citizenship of the par- 
 ties, and I will now take up jurisdiction as based on the char- 
 acter of the subject-matter of the suit. The statute of 1888 
 provides that the circuit courts of the United States shall have 
 jurisdiction of all cases at law or in equity arising under the 
 Constitution and laws of the United States, or treaties made 
 or to be made, if the amount or value in dispute exceeds two 
 thousand dollars exclusive of interest and costs. While the 
 Constitution of the United States left to Congress the power 
 to declare the extent and distribute the jurisdiction among the 
 Federal courts in this class of cases, JSTashville v. Cooper, 6 
 Wall. 252, 18 L. ed. 852, yet from 1789 to 1875 the power 
 was never exercised by Congress, except as to jurisdiction rest- 
 ing upon diversity of citizenship, and suits between aliens and 
 citizens. The courts were organized for the benefits of non- 
 residents and aliens, that they may escape the local influences 
 of a State court. Nashville, C. & St. L. E. Co. v. Taylor, 86 
 Fed. 174. 
 
 The changed conditions created by the war between the 
 States, and the strong tendency during that period to central- 
 ize power in the Federal government, inspired the judiciary act 
 of 1875, in which the limit of constitutional power was reached 
 by Congress in granting jurisdiction to the Federal courts. 
 
 It was deemed necessary that the supremacy of the laws 
 and Constitution of the United States (U. S. Const, art. 6, el. 
 2) must hereafter be enforced by the subordinate courts of 
 its creation. Nashville, C. & St. L. E. Co. v. Taylor, 86 Fed. 
 171 ; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 818, 6 L. 
 ed. 223 ; Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 5 L. ed. 257. It 
 sought a speedier way of construing and enforcing rights aris- 
 
 136 
 
FEDERAL QUESTION, 137 
 
 ing under the Constitution and laws of the United States than 
 the old method through the State courts, and then by writ of 
 error from the Supreme Court of the United States to the State 
 court finally passing upon the Federal question; and then only 
 when the State court had decided against the right claimed 
 tmder laws or Constitution of the United States. U. S. Rev. 
 Stat. sec. 709 ; Nashville, C. & St. L. E. Co. v. Taylor, 86 Fed. 
 175. 
 
 Even the examination by the Supreme Court of the United 
 States related only to the Federal question, and not to the issues 
 of a non-Federal character. Ibid. ; Murdock v. ]\Iemphis, 20 
 Wall. 590-626, 22 L. ed. 429-441; Dower v. Eichards, 151 
 U. S. 666, 38 L. ed. 308, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 452, 17 Mor. Min. 
 Rep. 704; Hammond v. Johnston, 142 U. S. 73, 35 L. ed. 
 941, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141. For if the judgment of the State 
 court rested on grounds independent of the Federal question 
 STifficient to sustain it, the writ of error would be refused. 
 Haley v. Breeze, 144 U. S. 130, 36 L. ed. 373, 12 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 836; California Powder Works v. Davis, 151 U. S. 393, 
 38 L. ed. 207, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350; Union JSTat. Bank v. 
 Louisville, X. A. & C. R. Co. 163 U. S. 330, 41 L. ed. 178, 16 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1039; Eustis v. BoUes, 150 U. S. 361-366, 37 
 L. ed. 1111, 1112, 14 Sup. Ct. 131. 
 
 On March 3, 1875, Congress passed a jurisdictional and re- 
 moval act, providing that all suits of a civil nature at common 
 law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exclusive of costs 
 exceeded the sum of five hundred dollars, and arising under 
 the Constitution and laws of the United States, or treaties 
 made or to be made, shall be heard in the circuit courts of the 
 United States. Colorado Cent. Consol. Min. Co. v. Turck, 150 
 U. S. 142, 37 L. ed. 1031, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 35. And thus 
 for the first time this jurisdiction was conferred on the subor- 
 dinate courts, and when the jurisdiction attached by reason of 
 the Federal question, it extended to the whole case, with all 
 the issues, Federal or non-Federal. Nashville, C. & St. L. 
 R. Co. V. Taylor, 86 Fed. 177, and authorities. Louisville 
 Trust Co. V. Stone, 46 C. C. A. 299, 107 Fed. 309 ; Tennessee 
 V. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 454-456, 38 L. ed. 511, 
 512, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654. With this brief view of the his- 
 
138 FEDEEAL QUESTIOlf. 
 
 tory of this jurisdiction the first question that presents itself 
 is — 
 
 What is a Federal Question? 
 
 A case presents a Federal question when it becomes neces- 
 sary to construe the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
 United States in order to reach a correct decision of the ma- 
 terial issues, or to decide as to the existence of some right, 
 title, privilege, claim, or immunity asserted under the Federal 
 Constitution and laws, or when plaintiff relies upon them, 
 in whole or in part, for a recovery. Dewey Min. Go. 
 V. Miller, 96 Fed. 3; Arkansas v. Kansas & T. Coal Co. 96 
 Fed. 355, 356 ; Starin v. New York, 115 U. S. 257, 29 L. ed. 
 390, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 28 ; Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 462, 28 
 L. ed. 487, 4 Sup. Ct. Kep. 437 ; Lowry v. Chicago, B. & Q. 
 R. Co. 46 Fed. 83 ; Minnesota v. Duluth & I. E. Co. 87 Fed. 
 497 ; Cooke v. Avery, 147 U. S. 385, 37 L. ed. 212, 13 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 340 ; Nashville, C. & St. L. E. Co. v. Taylor, 86 Fed. 
 181 ; Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 25 L. ed. 648 ; United 
 States V. Old Settlers, 148 U. S. 468, 37 L. ed. 524, 13 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 650 ; Hamblin v. Western Land Co. 147 U. S. 53i, 
 37 L. ed. 267, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep.. 353; Little York Gold-Wash- 
 ing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 24 L. ed. 656; City 
 E. Co. v. Citizens' Street E. Co. 166 U. S. 557, 41 L. ed. 
 1114, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 653. The Constitution, laws, or trea- 
 ties must be directly involved. Ibid. ; Carson v. Dunham, 121 
 U. S. 421, 426, .30 L. ed. 992, 993, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1030; 
 Montana Ore-Purchasing Co. v. Boston & M. Consol. Copper 
 & S. Min. Co. 35 C. C. A. 1, 93 Fed. 274^278, 
 
 It may be stated in another form, thus: The suit must be 
 such that some right, privilege, immunity, or title on which re- 
 covery depends will be defeated by one construction of the Con- 
 stitution or laws, or sustained by a contrary construction. 
 Cooke V. Avery, 147 U. S. 384, 37 L. ed. 212, 13 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 340; Little York Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 
 supra; New Orleans v. Benjamin, 153 U. S. 411-424, 38 
 L. ed. 764, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 905 ; Farson v. Chicago, 138 Fed 
 186 ; Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 460, 38 
 
IfEDBEAL QUESTION. 139 
 
 L. ed. 513, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 654; Starin v. New York, supra; 
 Gibbs V. Crandall, 120 U. S. 106, 30 L. ed. 590, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 497 ; Shreveport v. Cole, 129 U. S. 41, 32 L. ed. 591, 9 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 210. It must really and substantially involve 
 a controversy, the determination of which depends on the con- 
 struction of the Federal law. Nashville, C. & St. L. E. Co. v. 
 Taylor, 86 Fed. 174; California Oil & Gas Co. & v. Mil- 
 ler, 96 Fed. ]2; New Orleans v. Benjamin, 153 U. S. 42'4, 
 38 L. ed. 769, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 905 ; Myrtle v. Nevada, C. 
 & 0. E. Co. 137 Fed. 196; Bridge Proprs. v. Hoboken Land 
 & Improv. Co. 1 Wall. 116, 17 L. ed. 571 ; Hamblin v. West- 
 ern Land Co. supra; Carson v. Dunham, 121 U. S. 426, 30 
 L. ed. 993, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1030. It must be a question of 
 law as stated by the plaintiff in his complaint. Myrtle v. 
 Nevada, C. & O. R. Co. 137 Fed. 193 ; Austin v. Gagan, 5 
 L.RA. 476, 39 Fed. 626 ; California Oil & Gas Co. v. Miller, 
 supra; not an issue of fact. Ibid. Fitzgerald v. Missouri P. 
 Co. 45 Fed. 812. 
 
 And it may not only be a demand for something conferred 
 by the Federal law (Ibid. ; Cohen v. Virginia and Tennessee 
 V. Davis, supra), but it may be a right, claim, defense, or pro- 
 tection, in whole or in part, growing out of the Federal legis- 
 lation or constitutional provisions. Sowles v. Witters, 43 Fed. 
 700; Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Taylor, 96 Fed. 178; 
 Minnesota v. Duluth & I. R. Co. supra; Arkansas v. Kansas & 
 T. Coal Co. 96 Fed. 357 ; Cooke v. Avery and Starin v. New 
 York, supra; Bock v. Perkins, 139 U. S. 630, 35 L. Qd. 315, 
 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 677; Frank v. Leopold & F. Co. 169 Fed. 
 923 ; New Orleans, M. & T. E. Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 
 135, 26 L. ed. 96. Thus it is seen that the Federal question 
 arises not only when the claim is based on Federal law, but also 
 when it appears that the right of recovery may be defeated 
 by a construction which may fairly be contended for. Ibid. 
 
 Judge Shiras, in his Equity Practice, page 17, says the 
 jurisdiction in the phrase, "Oases arising under the Constitu- 
 tion, laws and treaties made," etc., is divided into two classes. 
 First. Where the cause of action springs directly from 
 some provision of the Federal laws, as when the right claimed 
 is directly given by Federal law, or where the cause of action 
 arises out of some act of a Federal officer, based on Federal 
 
140 TEDEEAL QUESTION'. 
 
 law, as in cases of United States marshals. This is designated 
 as jurisdiction direct and primary. 
 
 Second. When causes of action are based on or supported 
 by the laws of a State thought to be in conflict with some right, 
 duty, power, or franchise created or conferred by the Consti- 
 tution of the United States, or its laws and treaties. This may 
 be designated as derivative, or secondary, jurisdiction. 
 
 Direct and Primary. 
 
 Under this first head, suits by and against officers of the 
 Federal government must fall under the control of the Federal 
 courts when the acts complained of ^ were done in their official 
 capacity, and must necessarily be suits arising under the laws 
 of the United States. Bryant Bros. Co. v. Robinson, 79 C. 
 C. A. 259, 149 Fed. 321; Feibelman v. Packard, 109 U. S. 
 424, 27 L. ed. 985, 3 Sup. Ct. Eep. 289 ; Backrack v. Nor- 
 ton, 132 U. S. 338, 33 L. ed. 377, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 106; Son- 
 nentheil v. Christian Moerlin Brewing Co. 172 U. S. 404, 43 
 L. ed. 494, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 233; Bock v. Perkins, supra; 
 Wood V. Drake, 70 Fed. 881. Thus in 70 Fed. 881, supra, it 
 was held that an action for damages for false imprisonment 
 against a United States marshal acting under process from the 
 Federal courts was within the Federal jurisdiction and could 
 be removed, although the complaint is drawn to conceal the 
 official character of the officer. This case, however, was sub- 
 sequently modified, as will be seen hereafter. 
 
 An action against Federal officers as such, grovnng out of 
 acts in executing Federal process, is within the jurisdiction of 
 the Federal courts, regardless of citizenship or the absence of 
 any disputed question of Federal law. Ibid. ; Buck v. Col- 
 bath, 3 Wall. 334, 18 L. ed. 257 ; Bock v. Perkins and Wood 
 V. Drake, supra; Feibelman v. Packard, 109 U. S. 421, 27 
 L. ed. 984, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289 ; Guarantee Co. v. Hanway, 
 44 C. C. A. 312, 104 Fed. 371 ; Grant v. Spokane Nat. Bank. 
 47 Fed. 673; Jewett v. Whitcomb, 69 Fed. 417; Hurst v. 
 Cobb, 61 Fed. 2. 
 
 The rule has thus been laid down, and belongs to a line of 
 Federal cases that hold all actions which bring into question 
 the acts of officials or corporations created by, or representing. 
 
FEDEEAL QUESTION. 141 
 
 the national government, are cases arising under tlie Constitu- 
 tion and laws of the United States. Texas & P. E.. Co. v. Cox, 
 145 U. S. 602, 36 L. ed. 832, 12 Sup. Ct. Kep. 905 ; Walker 
 V. Windsor ISTat. Bank, 5 C. C. A. 421, 5 U. S. App. 423, 56 
 Fed. 80 ; Bailey v. Mosher, 11 C. C. A. 304, 2Y U. S. App. 339, 
 63 Fed. 491 ; National Bank v. Wade, 84 Fed. 12. As said, the 
 national government must be permitted to exercise its powers in 
 the States through its own appointed agencies, and national 
 courts must be the arbiters as to the lawfulness of the acts of its 
 agents. 
 
 In ilcKee v. Brooks, 64 Tex. 255, the supreme court of the 
 State says that to determine the liability of a United States 
 marshal sued upon his bond for a trespass committed while 
 acting in his official capacity, resort must be had to section 783 
 of the United States Revised Statutes, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1307 ; and as to the extent of the damage to be allowed, section 
 784 of the United States Revised Statutes is applicable, and 
 that a suit which cannot be prosecuted and detennined withotit 
 resort to the acts of Congress becomes a suit arising under the 
 laws of the United States, and therefore within Federal juris- 
 diction, following Feibelman v. Packard, supra, before cited, 
 Howard v. United States, 184 U. S. 676, 46 L. ed. 754, 22 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 543; Files v. Davis, 118 Fed. 465, 466. 
 
 There is no question that the rule as above given is the true 
 rule when the Federal officer is sued as such, or when suit is 
 upon his bond given by Federal law for a proper performance 
 of duty, but the question arises. Suppose the Federal officer 
 is not sued as such, nor is he sued upon his bond, but as a sim- 
 ple trespasser in seizing property under Federal process, then 
 what is the rule ? 
 
 In McKee v. Coffin, 66 Tex. 307, 1 S. W. 276, a United 
 States marshal was sued to recover the value of certain prop- 
 erty alleged to have been illegally seized and converted by him. 
 The United States marshal justified the seizure under Federal 
 process, and sought to remove the case into the Federal court. 
 The suit was not upon the bond of the marshal, nor was he 
 sued as United States marshal. The court denied the 
 right of removal on the ground that he was United 
 States marshal only shown by his own pleading. The 
 same condition of case arose in Mayo v. Dockery, 108 
 
1-1-2 FEDEEAL QUESTION. 
 
 Fed. 898, and the issue of jurisdiction arose on the motion to 
 remand to the State court, and the case was remanded back to 
 the State court. The court laid down as the basis of its action, 
 that since the jurisdictional act of 1888 the petition of plain- 
 tiff must set forth the fact that the defendant is sued as United 
 States marshal; that the rule prior to the act of 1888 as illus- 
 trated in Bock v. Perkins, supra, has been changed; and that 
 now the Federal question must appear in the petition (Ten- 
 nessee V. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 454, 38 L. ed. 511, 
 
 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654), or the Federal court cannot take juris- 
 diction, and that the defense that an act was performed in an 
 of&cial capacity could not give the Federal court jurisdiction 
 (Walker v. Collins, 167 U. S 58, 42 L. ed. 76, 17 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 738 ; Chappell v. Waterworth, 155 U. S. 102, 39 L. ed. 
 85, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 34; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. United 
 States [Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Alabama] 155 U. S. 482, 
 39 L. ed. 231, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192). 
 
 The rule then may be stated, that if the petition shows the 
 defendant is sued as United States marshal, or that the act 
 complained of was done in his official capacity, the case would 
 present a Federal question and within the jurisdiction of the 
 Federal courts, without reference to citizenship of parties 
 (Sonnenthiel v. Christian Moerlin Brewing Co. 172 U. S. 
 401-405, 43 L. ed. 492-494, 19 Sup.Ct. Rep. 233; Mayo v. 
 Dockery, 108 Fed. 899; Frank v. Leopold & F. Co. 169 
 Fed. 922), but if the defendant is sued as an individual, with- 
 out reference in the petition to his official position, then the 
 case cannot be removed to the Federal courts. People's United 
 States Bank v. Goodwin, 160 Fed. 728; Tennessee v. Union 
 & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 460, 38 L. ed. 513, 14 Sup.; Ct. 
 Rep. 654; Walker v. Collins and Chappell v. Waterworth, 
 supra ; Oregon Short Line & U. IST. R. Co. v. Skottowe, 162 
 U. S. 494, 495, 40 L. ed. 1049, 1050, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 869; 
 East Lake Land Co. v. Brown, 155 U. S. 488, 39 L. ed. 233, 
 
 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357 ; Filhiol v. Torney, 194 U. S. 356, 48 
 L. ed. 1014, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 698; Joy v. St. Louis,, 201 U. 
 S. 332, 50 L. ed. 776, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 478 ; Filhiol v. Mau- 
 rice, 185 U. S. 108, 46 L. ed. 827, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 560. 
 
 These cases clearly modify the , broad statements in Wood 
 V. Drake, supra, and is due to the difference between the jmis 
 
FEDERAL QUESTION. 143 
 
 dictional acts of 1875 and 1888 as shown in Tennessee v. Union 
 & Planters' Bank, supra ; People's United States Bank v. Good- 
 win, 160 Fed. 729. While the undoubted rule as stated in the 
 foregoing cases requires the Federal question to appear in the 
 plaintiff's statement of his own claim, and if it does not so 
 appear the want cannot be supplied in the subsequent pleadings 
 or petition for removal, yet we have a line of cases that seek 
 to evade this rule of Federal jurisdiction, where the ingenuity 
 of counsel has suppressed the facts that would have given juris- 
 diction. "Wood V. Drake, 70 Fed. 882. But as said in Fergus 
 Falls V. Fergus Falls Water Co. 19 0. 0. A. 212, 36 U. S. 
 App. 480, 72 Fed. 873, the plaintiff has a right to set up his case 
 as he pleases, and is not required to state matters not essential 
 to his cause of action, and which would more properly come from 
 the other side. As long as he sets up his claim in legal and 
 logical form, and specifically states his cause of action resting 
 upon the common law of the land, the courts have no right to 
 go behind it to uncover motive. People's United States Bank v. 
 Goodwin, 160 Fed. 730; Washington v. Island Lime Co. 117 
 Fed. 778 ; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Martin, 178 U. S. 248, 
 44 L. ed. 1056, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 854; Oregon Short Line & U. 
 K R. Co. V. Skottowe, 162 U. S. 495, 496, 40 L. ed. 1050, 16 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 869 ; Alabama G. S. R Co. v. Thompson, 200 U. 
 S. 206-216, 50 L. ed. 441-446, 26 Sup. Ct. Eep. 161, 4 A. & E. 
 Ann. Cas. 1147. 
 
 By section 643 of the United States Eevised Statutes, it is 
 provided that any civil or criminal suit commenced in any court 
 of a State against any officer appointed under or acting by au- 
 thority of any revenue law of the United States, now or here- 
 after enacted, shall be removed to the Federal court. This act 
 is held to cover United States marshals, deputies, and assist- 
 ants engaged in the service of process for arrest, or othei-wise 
 within the purview of the law. Davis v. South Carolina, 107 
 U. S. 600, 27 L. ed. 575, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 636 ; Tennessee v. 
 Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 463, 38 L. ed. 514, 14 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 654. New Code, sec. 33 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1015). 
 
144 FEDERAL QUESTIO]Sr. 
 
 Corporations Chartered hy Congress. 
 
 In the case of Texas & P. E. Co. v. Cody, 166 U. S. 609, 41 
 L. ed. 1134, 17 Sup. Gt Eep. 703, 1 Am. Neg. Eep. 763, the 
 Supreme Court of the United States held that the Texas & 
 Pacific Eailway Company, operating under a Federal charter, 
 may remove all suits begun in the State courts, involving, of 
 course, the jurisdictional amounts, to the Federal courts for 
 trial. Chief Justice Fuller bases this great privilege upon the 
 fact that the breath of life having been breathed into the corpora- 
 tion by Federal lungs, that it moves, acts, and has its being 
 in that source, and necessarily all of its faculties and capaci- 
 ties are derived from the national fiat; consequently all of its 
 acts, good, bad and indifferent, though wholly within the State 
 of Texas, could only have been inspired by its national life. 
 So, then, suits of any nature against or by this corporation 
 arise under the laws of the United States, whether it be for dam- 
 ages for personal injuries, or the failure to transport a car 
 of cattle shipped from one point in the State to another. The 
 Chief Justice says that it does not even require an allegation 
 of its Federal charter nor a hint of its national life, nor is it 
 necessary to show upon what Federal law its liability for inju- 
 ries to men, or cattle, or nondelivery of freight rests. Its com- 
 mon-law and statutory liability for carriage with the State is 
 overshadowed by its congressional charter. 
 
 Congress by an act of January 28, 1915, being an act to 
 amend an act entitled "An Act to Codify, Eevise, and Amend 
 the Laws Eelating to the Judiciary," approved March 3d, 1911, 
 section 5, has provided that "no court of the United States shall 
 have jurisdiction of any action or suit by or against any rail- 
 road company upon the ground that said railroad company was 
 incorporated under an act of Congress." 
 
 National Banks. 
 
 In chapter 14, I discussed the citizenship of National banks 
 as affecting jurisdiction, and we saw that these Federal corpo- 
 rations were placed on the same footing with the State corpora- 
 tions, except in cases where Federal officers were winding up 
 the affairs of the institution. Act 1888, sec. 4 (see Appendix) ; 
 
PEDEEAL QUESTION. 145 
 
 Speckart v. German ISTat. Bank, 85 Fed. 12 ; same case, 38 C. 
 C. A. 682, 98 Fed. 153 ; Guarantee Co. of N. A. v. Hanwav, 
 44 C. C. A. 312, 104 Fed. 372. In cases, however, where a 
 Federal question is involved, they may enter the Federal courts 
 without reference to citizenship, if the proper amount is in- 
 volved. The Federal charter is not the basis of the right, but in 
 cases where a Federal question is involved they may enter the 
 Federal courts without reference to citizenship if the proper 
 amount is involved. The Federal question must appear in the 
 statement of the case (Larabee v. Dolley, 175 Fed. 367-382), 
 and it does appear whenever the controversy touches their rights 
 under the law of their creation. Ibid., 384; Huff v. Union 
 Xat. Bank, 173 Fed. 336. 
 
 So all proceedings by any national bank association to enjoin 
 the comptroller of the cun-ency under the provisions of any law 
 relating to national banking associations shall be had in the dis- 
 trict where such association is located. Chap. 4, sec. 49, Code 
 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1031), 
 S. Eq.— 10. 
 
CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 FEDERAL QUESTIONS ARISING UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL 
 PROVISIONS. 
 
 The most frequent and familiar illustrations of the Federal 
 question arise under alleged conflicts of State legislation with 
 section 10, article 1, and the provisions of the 14th Amend- 
 ment to the Constitution of the United States. As where it is 
 claimed that State legislation has impaired the obligation of 
 a contract. American Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Decatur, 1Y6 
 Fed. 133 ; Jetton v. University of the South, 208 U. S. 489, 52 
 L. ed. 584,. 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 375 ; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Adams, 
 180 U. S. 28, 45 L. ed. 410, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 251 ; Hanford 
 V. Davies, 163 U. S. 273, 41 L. ed. 157, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 1051 ; Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 216, 41 L. ed. 136, 16 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 1023 ; Whitman College v. Berryman, 156 Fed. 112- 
 117; Green v. Oemler, 151 Fed. 936; Larabee v. Dolley, 175 
 Fed. 368; Harrison v. Remington Paper Co. 3 L.R.A.(]Sr.S.) 
 954, 72 C. C. A. 405, 140 Fed. 391, 392, 5 A. & E. Ann. Gas. 
 314; Riverside & A. R. Co. v. Riverside, 118 Fed. 736.; Wil- 
 son V. Brochon, 95 Fed. 82 ; City R. Co. v. Citizens' Street R 
 Co. 166 U. S. 563, 41 L. ed. 1116, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 653 
 McCuUough V. Virginia, 172 U. S. 116, 43 L. ed. 387, 19 Sup, 
 Ct. Rep. 134; Louisiana v. Pillsbury, 105 U. S. 294, 26 L. ed 
 1095 ; Underground R. Co. v. l^ew York, 193 U. S. 416, 48 L 
 ed. 733, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 494; National Mut. Bldg. & L. Asso, 
 V. Brahan, 193 U. S. 635, 48 L. ed. 823, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 532; 
 Brawner v. Irvin, 169 Fed. 964; Kansas City Gas Co. v. -Kan- 
 sas City, 198 Fed. 500-508. And such effect may arise from 
 a by-law or ordinance of a municipal corporation. Missouri K. 
 & I. R. Co. V. Olafhe, 156 Fed. 632, and authorities cited; Mer- 
 cantile Trust & D. Co. V. Columbus, 203 U. S. 311, 51 L. ed, 
 198, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83 ; Vicksburg "Waterworks Co. v. Vicks- 
 burg, 185 U. S. 65, 46 L. ed. 808, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585; St, 
 Paul Gaslight Co. v. St. Paul, 181 U. S. 142, 45 L. ed. 788, 21 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 575 ; Mercantile Trust & D. Co. v. Collins Park & 
 
 146 
 
FEDEEAL QUESTIONS UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 147 
 
 Belt R. Co. 99 Eed. 812 ; Davis & F. Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 
 189 U. S. 207, -17 L. ed. 778, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 498 ; Knoxville 
 Water Co. v. Knoxville, 200 U. S. 22, 50 L. ed. 353, 26 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 224; Bacon v. Texas, supra; Pacific Electric R. Co. v. Los 
 Angeles, 194 U. S. 112, 48 L. ed. 896, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 586; 
 Cleveland v. Cleveland City R. Co. 194 U. S. 517, 48 L. ed. 
 1102, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 756 ; Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water 
 Co. 172 JJ. S. 2, 43 L. ed. 342, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77 ; People's 
 Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Chicago, 194 TJ. S. 1, 48 L. ed. 851, 24 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 520; Defiance Water Co. v. Defiance, 191 U. S, 
 191, 48 L. ed. 143, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 63 ; American Teleph. 
 (t Teleg. Co. v. Decatur, supra, and cases cited; Los Angeles 
 City Water Co. v. Los Angeles, 103 Fed. 711 ; Southern Bell 
 Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Richmond, 44 C. C. A. 147, 103 Fed. 
 31 ; Savannah v. Hoist, 65 C. C. A. 449, 132 Fed. 901 ; Iron 
 Mountain Co. v. j\Iemphis, 37 C. C. A. 410, 96 Fed. 113 ; Kan- 
 sas City Gas Co. v. Kansas City, 198 Fed. 500; Llagerla v. 
 Mississippi River Power Co. 202 Fed. 784 ; American Smelting 
 & Ref. Co. V. Colorado, 204 U. S. 103, 51 L. ed. 393, 27 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 198, 9 Ann. Cas. 978; Seattle, R. & S. R. Co. v. 
 Seattle, 190 Fed. 75 ; American Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. New 
 Decatur, 176 Fed. 133. 
 
 Privileges and Immunities. 
 
 Again, when one has been deprived by such legislation of 
 certain privileges and immunities of citizenship. United States 
 V. Moore, 129 Fed. 632; Cooke v. Avery, 147 U. S. 384, 37 
 L. ed. 212, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340; Knight v. Shelton, 134 
 Fed. 426; Starin v. ISTew York, 115 U. S. 248, 29 L. ed. 388, 
 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 28 ; First State Bank v. Shallenberger, 172 Fed. 
 1000; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 116, 122, 21 L. 
 ed. 394, 421, 423 ; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 
 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427 ; Swafford v. Templeton, 108 
 Fed. 310, S. C. 185 U. S. 487, 46 L. ed. 1005, 22 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 783; Skinner v. Gamett Gold Min. Co. 96 Fed. 735. It 
 will be seen in these cases that the protection thus committed to 
 the Federal government is the right or privilege granted in 
 terms by some provision of the Constitution, or appropriate to 
 
lis FEDERAL QUESTIONS UNDEE CONSTITUTIOIfAL PEOVISIONS. • 
 
 the enjoyment of a right, etc., conferred on the citizen by the 
 Constitution. A corporation is not a citizen within the mean- 
 ing of this constitutional clause. Cumberland Gaslight Co. v. 
 West Virginia & M. Gas Co. 110 C. C. A. 383, 188 Fed. 586. 
 
 Due Process of Law. 
 
 Or of some right or interest without due process of law. 
 Central K. Co. v. Macon, 110 Fed. 865 ; San Joaquin & K. 
 Eiver, Canal & Irrig. Co. v. Stanislaus County, 90 Fed. 516; 
 Consolidated Water Co. v. San Diego,-35 C. C. A. 631, 93 Fed. 
 849 ; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 144, 52 L. ed. 722, 13 L.R.A. 
 (KS.) 932, 28 Sup. Ct. Eep. 441, 14 A. & E. Ann. Cas. Y64; 
 Hastings v. Ames, 15 C. C. A. 628, 32 U. S. App. 485, 68 Fed, 
 728; Barney v. ISTew York, 193 U. S. 430, 48 L. ed. 737, 34 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 502 ; United States v. New York, 'S. H. & H. 
 E. Co. 165 Fed. 742-746; Savannah v. Hoist, supra; Ozark- 
 Bell Teleph. Co. v. Springfield, 140 Fed. 666 ; Louisville v. 
 Cimiberland Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 84 C. C. A. 151, 155 Fed. 
 725, 12 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 500 ; Chicago E. Co. v. Chicago, 
 142 Fed. 845 ; Lochner v. E"ew York, 198 U. S. 63, 49 L. ed. 
 944, 25 Sup. Ct. Eep. 539, 3 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1133; Chi- 
 cago, B. & Q. E. Co. V. Chicago, 166 U. S. 235, 41 L. ed. 984, 
 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 581; White v. Tacoma, 109 Fed. 32; South- 
 ern E. Co. V. ISTorth Carolina Corp. Commission, 97 Fed. 513; 
 Missouri P. E. Co. v. Omaha, 117 C. C. A. 12, 197 Fed. 516; 
 Wilmington City E. Co. v. Taylor, 198 Fed. 160; Alabama & 
 N. 0. Transp. Co. v. Doyle, 210 Fed. 178 ; St. Louis South- 
 western E. Co. V. Griffin, — Tex. Civ. App. — , 154 S. W. 583; 
 niinois Trust & Sav. Bank v. Des Moines, 224 Fed. 620. 
 
 Equal Protection of the Laws. 
 
 Or of some deprivation of the equal protection of the laws. 
 Ibid.; Ex parte Young, supra; United States v. New York, 
 N. H. & H. E. Co. 165 Fed. 746; Cincinnati Street R. Co. v. 
 Snell, 193 U. S. 30, 37, 48 L. ed. 604, 607, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 319 ; Iowa C. E. Co. v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389, 393, 40 L. ed. 
 467, 469, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 344; St Louis, I. M. & S. E. Co. y. 
 Davis, 132 Fed. 629 ; Anglo American Provision Co. v. Davis 
 
FEDEEAL QUESTIONS UNDEE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 149 
 
 Provision Co. 105 Fed. 536; Nashville, C. & St. L. R Co. v. 
 Taylor, 86 Fed. 169 ; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. 
 183 U. S. 79, 102, 46 L. ed. 92, 106, 22 Sup. Ct. Kep. 30; 
 Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co. 207 U. S. 36, 52 
 L. ed. 87, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7, 12 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 757; 
 Williamson v. Liverpool L. & G. Ins. Co. 72 C. C. A. 542, 141 
 Fed. 54, 5 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 402. Again we have innumer- 
 able cases in which the railroads of the land have sought Fed- 
 eral protection from alleged unreasonable rates, upon the ground 
 that they were being deprived of their property without "due 
 process of law," and thus deprived of "the equal protection of 
 laws." Ex parte Young, supra ; Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co. 
 V. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 33 L. ed. 970, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 
 209, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 462, 702; Poor v. Iowa C. R. Co. 155 
 Fed. 226, 227 ; Perkins v. Northern P. R. Co. 155 Fed. 445, 
 and cases cited therein, illustrate the application of these clauses 
 of the Federal Constitution creating the "Federal question." 
 See Washington, P. & C. R. Co. v. MagTuder, 198 Fed. 218 ; 
 Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Westby, 47 L.R.A.(]Sf.S.) 97, 
 102 C. C. A. 65, 178 Fed. 619; Risley v. Utica, 168 Fed. 737; 
 St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Griffin, — Tex. Civ. App. — , 
 154 S. W. 583 ; Central Trust Co. v. Lueders, 137 C. C. A. 387, 
 21 Fed. 829. 
 
 The provisions of the 14th Amendment in protecting rights 
 of property and privileges and immunities of citizenship has 
 been applied not only to annual adverse legislation, but to execu- 
 tive and judicial acts, as well, affecting individual rights as 
 stated. Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co. 207 U. S. 
 20-36, 52 L. ed. 78-87, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7, 12 A. & E. Ann. 
 Cas. 757; Scott v. McWeal, 154 U. S. 45, 38 L. ed. 901, 14 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1108; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 
 542-545, 23 L. ed. 588-590; Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. 
 Taylor, 86 Fed. 184, 185 ; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 
 166 U. S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581. 
 
 We see, then, the 14th Amendment is directed against a 
 State and its agencies, and not individuals. Chicago, R. 1. 
 & P. R. Co. V. Ludwig, 156 Fed. 152; Western U. Teleg. Co. 
 v. Andrews, 154 Fed. 95 ; Morrill v. American Reserve Bond 
 Co. 151 Fed. 305; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Hadley, 161 
 Fed. 421; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 162 Fed. 954; 
 
150 FEDEEAL QUESTIOJSTS UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL PBOVISIONS. 
 
 Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Julian, 169 Fed. 166; Marten v. Hol- 
 brook, 157 Fed. 716; Central E. Co. v. McLendon, 157 Fed. 
 961; Central K. Co. v. Eailroad Commission, 161 Fed. 925; 
 Southern E. Co. v. McNeill, 155 Fed. 757. 
 
 So a Federal question may arise when right of recovery rests 
 upon unconstitutionality of an act of Congress. Fatten v'. 
 Brady, 184 U. S. 608, 46 L. ed. 713, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 493. 
 
 I have thus set forth the prolific source of Federal jurisdic- 
 tion. It would serve no useful purpose in this -work to review 
 the cases, but they have been selected to illustrate the various 
 phases and conditions under which the Federal courts have 
 given or refused relief under the provisions of the Constitution, 
 as above stated. 
 
 It is apparent that "due process of law" and "the equal pro- 
 tection of the laws" is the familiar refuge of those whose rights 
 are alleged to have been impaired by laws from whatever source 
 they emanate (Bacon v. -Texas, supra), and that the word 
 "law" as used in this Amendment means both tte general law 
 of the land, which protects life, liberty, property, and im- 
 munities, and the laws of procedure. Twining v. "New Jersey, 
 211 U. S. 78, 53 L. ed. 97, 29 Sup. Ct. Eep. 14; United States 
 v. New York, JST. H. & H. E. Co, supra. 
 
CHAPTEE XXVI. 
 
 SECTION 709, U. S. EEV. STAT. APPLIED. 
 
 Where the Federal Question must Appear. 
 
 Whether a case presents a Federal question or not must be 
 determined from the face of the bill. That is, it must appear 
 in plaintiff's statement of his own claim, not by mere averment. 
 Louisville & W. E. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149, 53 L. ed. 126, 
 29 Sup. Ct. Eep. 42 ; Ee Winn, 213 U. S. 458, 53 L. ed. 873, 
 29 Sup. Ct. Eep. 515; Xew Orleans v. New Orleans Water 
 Works Co. 142 U. S. 79-87, 35 L. ed. 943-946, 12 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 142; St. Joseph & G. I. E. Co. v. Steele, 167 U. S. 662, 
 42 L. ed. 316, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 925; nor from inference or 
 argument. Hanford v. Davies, 163 U. S. 273, 41 L. ed. 157, 
 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1051. But it must appear in the plain logical 
 statement of plaintiff's case. Western TJ. Teleg. Co. v. Ann 
 Arbor E. Co. 178 U. S. 244, 44 L. ed. 1054, 20 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 867; Louisville v. Cumberland Teleph. «& Teleg. Co. 155 
 Fed. 725-730, 12 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 550. San Joaquin & 
 K. Eiver Canal & Irrig. Co. v. Stanislaus County, 90 Fed. 
 520; Houston & T. C. E. Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 66-78, 44 
 L. ed. 673-680, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 545; Chappell v. Water- 
 worth, 155 U. S. 102, 39 L. ed. 85, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 34; Ten- 
 nessee V. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 454, 38 L. ed. 
 511, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 654 ; Arkansas v. Kansas & T. Coal 
 Co. 183 U. S. 185, 46 L. ed. 144, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 47 ; Fin- 
 ney V. Guy, 189 U. S. 335, 47 L. ed. 839, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 558; Oregon Short Line & U. A^. E. Co. v. Skottowe, 162 U. S. 
 495, 40 L. ed. 1050, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 869; Indiana use of 
 Delaware County v. Alleghany Oil Co. 85 Fed. 872 ; Pratt v. 
 Paris Gaslight & Coke Co. 168 U. S. 255, 42 L. ed. 458, 18 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 62; Kansas v. Atchison, T. & S. F. E. Co. 77 
 Fed. 341 ; Fergus Falls v. Fergus Falls Water Co. 19 C. C. A. 
 212, 36 U. S. App. 480, 72 Fed. 877; Montana Ore-Purchas- 
 ing Co. V. Boston & M. Consol. Copper & S. Min. Co. 35 C. C. 
 A. 1, 93 Fed. 274; S. C. 188 U. S. 644, 47 L. ed. 633, 23 Sup. 
 
 151 
 
152 SECTION 709, u. s. ebv. st. applied. 
 
 Ct. Eep. 434; Filhiol v. Torney, 119 Fed. 976; Joy v. St. 
 Louis, 122 Fed. 524; St. Louis, I. M. & S. E. Co. v. Davis, 
 132 Fed. 632. _ 
 
 These conditions were true under the act of 1875 in suits 
 originally brought in the circuit court (Metcalf v. Watertown, 
 128 U. S. 586, 32 L. ed. 543, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 173) ; but under 
 this act, in removals from State to Federal courts, the Federal 
 question could be presented in the plea, answer, or petition for 
 removal. Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 
 460, 38 L. ed. 513, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 654, and authorities 
 cited; Mayo v. Dockery, 108 Fed. 898. But this is not true 
 under the act of 1888. Ibid. The authorities above cited 
 show that the Federal question must appear in the bill, and 
 not in any subsequent pleading. Wise v. ISTixon, 78 Fed. 204; 
 Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank and Chappell v. Water- 
 worth, supra ; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. United States (Postal 
 Teleg. Cable Co. v. Alabama) 155 U. S. 482, 39 L. ed. 231, 
 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 192 ; Arkansas v. Kansas & T. Coal Co. 96 
 Fed. 355 ; Walker v. Collins, 167 U. S. 57, 42 L. ed. 76, 17 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 738. 
 
 Remedies if Federal Question Not Raised in Bill. 
 
 This fact, however, that the Federal question cannot be raised 
 by the answer or subsequent pleading to give Federal juris- 
 diction, does not deprive the defendant of the right of having 
 the question finally passed upon by the Supreme Court of the 
 United States. Minneapolis & St. L. E. Co. v. Minnesota, ^ 
 193 U. S. 53, 48 L. ed. 614, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 396. If you set 
 up the Federal question in the answer in the State court, you 
 place yourself in a position to appeal from the highest State 
 tribunal having jurisdiction to finally pass upon the issue, 
 which in some State may be the supreme court or one of the 
 lower courts, to the Supreme Court of the United States, pro- 
 vided the decision of the State court of last resort has been 
 against the right claimed under the Federal Constitution or 
 laws. U. S. Eey. Stat. sec. 709 ; Nashville, C. & St. L. E. Co. 
 v. Taylor, 86 Fed. 175 ; California Powder Works v. Davis, 151 
 U. S. 393, 38 L. ed. 207, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 350 ; Giles v. Teasley, 
 193 U. S. 160, 48 L. ed. 658, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 359 ; Chicago, B. 
 
SECTION 709, V. S. EEV. ST. APPLIED. 153 
 
 & Q. E. Co. V. Chicago, 166 U. S. 232, il L. ed. 983, 17 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 581 ; Meyer v. Richmond, 172 U. S. 92, 43 L. ed. 377, 
 19 Sup. Ct. Rep.' 106 ; Green Bay & M. Canal Co. v. Fatten 
 Paper Co. 172 U. S. 68, 43 L. ed. 368, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 97 ; 
 Harrison v. Morton, 171 U. S. 47, 43 L. ed. 66, 18 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 742 ; Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 366, 37 L. ed. 1112, 14 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 131. 
 
 In the event the Federal issue is declared against you by 
 the judgment of the State court, and the judgment of the 
 State court does not rest on any other ground than is involved 
 in the Federal question, then you may sue out a writ of error 
 from the Supreme Court of the United States to the State 
 court of final resort deciding against the Federal question, and 
 have the question determined by the Supreme Court of the 
 United States. MclSTulta v. Lockridge, 141 U. S. 331, 35 
 L. ed. 799, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 11; Sayward v. Denny, 158. U. S. 
 180, 39 L. ed. 941, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 777 ; Capital ITat. Bank 
 V. First A'at. Bank, 172 U. S. 425, 43 L. ed. 502, 19 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 202 ; Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 199, 43 L. ed. 666, 
 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 379. But if the judgment of the State court 
 rests wholly on grounds of a non-Federal character, the writ of 
 error will not be granted, though there be a Federal question in 
 issue. Leathe v. Thomas, 207 U. S. 93, 98, 62 L. ed. 118, 
 120, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30 ; Delaware City S. & P. S. B. ISTav. 
 Co. V. Reybold, 142 U. S. 637, 35 L. ed. 1142, 12 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 290; Haley v. Breeze, 144 U. S. 130, 36 L. ed. 373, 12 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 836; Giles v. Teasley, 193 U. S. 160, 48 L. ed. 
 658, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 359; Sauer v. New York, 206 U. S. 
 636-546, 51 L. ed. 1176-1181, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 686; Mur- 
 dock V. Memphis, 20 Wall. 690, 22 L. ed. 429 ; Seeberger v. 
 McCormick, 176 U. S. 280, 44 L. ed. 163, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 128; Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 227, 41 L. ed. 139, 16 ' Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 1023; Remington Paper Co. v. Watson, 173 U. S. 
 443, 43 L. ed. 762, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 466; Nashville, C. & 
 St. L. R. Co. V. Taylor, supra. 
 
 Section 709, United States Revised Statutes, 
 
 This power of revision of the decision of the State courts 
 by the Supreme Federal Court is given by the United States 
 
154 SECTION Y09, XT. S. EEV. ST. APPLIED. 
 
 Revised Statutes, sec. 709, which provides for the writ of error 
 to the State court of last resort : — 
 
 First. When the State court decides against the right elaimfed 
 under the Federal law, or the validity of a treaty, or an au- 
 thority exercised under the United States, when drawn in ques- 
 tion in the cause so decided. 
 
 Second. When there is drawn in question the validity of 
 a statute, or an authority exercised tinder a State, on the ground 
 of repugnancy to the Constitution, treaty, or laws of the United 
 States, and the decision of the State court is in favor of their 
 validity. 
 
 Third. When any right, title, privilege, or immunity is 
 claimed under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
 States, or commission held, or authority exercised under the 
 United States, and the decision of the State court is against 
 the right, title, privilege, or immunity set up or claimed by 
 either party, under the Constitution, laws, treaties, commis- 
 sion, or authority. U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 709, is embodied in sec. 
 237 of the new Judicial Code (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1214). 
 
 This statute is much more comprehensive than the sections 
 of the judiciary act of 1875 and 1888, giving to the circuit 
 courts of the United States jurisdiction when the Constitution, 
 laws, and treaties of the United States are to be construed in 
 determining the material issues in a case, in that it gives a fur- 
 ther right to Federal supervision, as when the cause of action 
 arises under a comm^ission held or authority exercised under 
 the United States (Columbia Water Power Co. v. Columbia 
 Electric Street E. Light & P. Co. 172 U. S. 475, 43 L. ed. 521, 
 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 247 ; Carson v. Dunham, 121 U. S. 428, 30 
 L. ed. 994, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1030 ; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Mc- 
 Grew, 188 U. S. 307, 47 L. ed. 484, 63 L.R.A. 33, 23 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 375; McGuire v. Massachusetts, 3 Wall. 385, 18 
 L. ed. 165 ; Cooke v. Avery, 147 U. S. 385, 37 L. ed. 212, 13 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340 ; Ya^oo & M. Valley R. Co. v. Adams, 180 
 U. S. 14, 15, 45 L. ed. 404, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 240; Avery v. 
 Popper, 179 U. S. 309, 45 L. ed. 204, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 94), 
 and creates a different mode in which a Federal question may 
 arise (Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Taylor, 86 Fed. 175, 
 176; McNulta v. Lockridge, 141 U. S. 330, 331, 35 L. ed. 
 798, 799, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 11) ; as, where a suit is brought 
 
SECTION 709 U. S. REV. ST. APPLIED. 155 
 
 in a State court on a Federal judgment obtained in another 
 State, while such suit could not be removed to the United 
 States circuit court, yet a writ of error would lie to the Su- 
 preme Court of the United States, if the State court of last 
 resort should fail to give full effect to the authority exercised 
 under the United States as shown by the judgment, because it 
 comes within the letter of section 709. Provident Sav. Life 
 Assur. Soc. V. Ford, 114 U. S. 641, 29 L. ed. 263, 5 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 1104; Carson v. Dunham, 121 U. S. 428, 429, 30 
 L. ed. 994, 995, 7 Sup. St. Eep. 1030 ; Avery v. Popper, 179 
 U. S. 314, 45 L. ed. 206, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 94; Nashville, C. 
 & St. L. E. Co. V. Taylor, 86 Fed. 175. 
 
 So where a suit enforcing a property right acquired under a 
 judgment of a Federal court, if the highest court of a State 
 should fail to give effect to the authority exercised under the 
 United States, as shown by the judgment and decrees of their 
 courts, then its decision may be subjected to revision under sec- 
 tion 709. Ibid.; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 666, 36 
 L. ed. 1127, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 224; Cooke v. Avery, 147 U. S. 
 375, 37 L. ed. 209, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 340. 
 
 Thus we see there are issues presenting a Federal question, 
 but only to be revised by the Supreme Court of the United 
 States and not within the acts of 1875 and 1888, giving juris- 
 diction to the circuit courts of issues resting upon the existence 
 of a Federal question. 
 
 To take advantage of this statute, you will see by the third 
 clause that it must be specially set up and claimed by either 
 party, that is, the right, title, or immunity claimed must be 
 pleaded. Yazoo & M. Valley E. Co. v. Adams, 180 U. S. 1, 
 45 L. ed. 395, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 240; F. G. Oxley Stave Co. 
 V. Butler County, 166 U. S. 648, 41 L. ed. 1149, 17 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 709 j Columbia Water Power Co. v. Columbia Electric 
 Street E. Light & P. Co. 172 U. S. 476, 43 L. ed. 521, 19 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 247 ; Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 198, 43 L. ed. 
 666, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 379 ; Eustis v. Bolles, supra ; See Eoby 
 v. Colehour, 146 U. S. 153, 36 L. ed. 922, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 47. See Meyer v. Eichmond, 172 U. S. 83, 43 L. ed. 374, 
 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 106 ; Green Bay & M. Canal Co. v. Patten 
 Paper Co. supra; But where the validity of a statute or 
 treaty of the United States is raised in any suit brought in a 
 
156 SECTION 709, tr. s. eev. st. applied. 
 
 State court, and the decision is against it, or where the validity 
 of a State statute is drawn in question as being repugnant to 
 the Constitution or laws of the United States, and the validity 
 of the State statute is sustained, then if the Federal question 
 appears in the record and was necessarily involved and decided, 
 or if the case could not be decided without deciding the Federal 
 question, then the fact that it was not specially set up does not 
 present a review of the question in the Supreme Court of the 
 United States. Ibid. ; German Sav. & L. Soc. v. Dormitzer, 192 
 U. S. 127, 48 L. ed. 376, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221 ; Wright v. 
 Nagle, 101 U. S. 791, 25 L. ed. 921 ; Kaukauna Water Power 
 Co. V. Green Bay & M. Canal Co. 142 U. S. 269, 35 L. ed. 
 1009, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 173; Chapman v. Goodnow (Chapman 
 V. Crane) 123 U. S. 548, 31 L. ed. 238, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 211 ; 
 Green Bay & M. Canal v. Patten Paper Co. 172 U. S. 58-68, 
 43 L. ed. 364-368, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 97; Harrison v. Morton, 
 supra; Chicago L. Ins. Co. v. I^eedles, 113 U. S. 579, 28 L. ed. 
 1086, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681 ; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 
 169 U. S. 622, 42 L. ed. 881, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488; Millingar 
 V. Hartupee, 6 Wall. 262, 18 L. ed. 830. 
 
 No particular form of words is necessary to raise the Fed- 
 eral question, within the meaning of the clause of the section 
 under consideration, yet there must be something in the case 
 before the State court which at least would call its attention 
 to the Federal question as one relied upon by the party claim- 
 ing it, and then even if the court did not notice the question, 
 but the effect of its decision was a denial of the right claimed, 
 it would be sufficient (Dewey v. Des Moines, supra; Chicago, B. 
 & Q. R. Co. V. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 581) ; but it is not enough that there be somewhere 
 hidden away in the record a question which if raised would be 
 of a Federal nature. Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Massachusetts, 6 
 Wall. 632, 18 L. ed. 904 (see Appeal from State to Supreme 
 Court of the United States, infra, chapter 113). 
 
CHAPTER XXVII. 
 
 HOW THE FEDERAL QUESTION MUST APPEAE. 
 
 We have discussed where the Federal question must appear, 
 and I now propose to briefly state how it must appear. 
 
 In St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. v. St. Paul & N. P. R. Co. 
 15 C. C. A. 167, 32 U. S. App. 372, 68 Fed. 2, it was held 
 that if, from the plaintiff's bill or petition, it appears that in 
 any aspect the case may assume the right of recovery may de- 
 pend on the construction of a Federal statute, and such right 
 is not a mere colorable claim, but rests on a reasonable founda- 
 tion, then a Federal question is involved adequate to confer 
 jurisdiction, though the case may be finally decided on other 
 grounds. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Davis, 132 Fed. 632 ; 
 Arkansas v. Choctaw & M. R. Co. 134 Fed. 107 ; Illinois C. R. 
 Co. V. Chicago, 176 U. S. 646, 44 L. ed. 622, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 509 ; Huff V. Union ISTat. Bank, 173 Fed. 336 ; Files v. Davis, 
 118 Fed. 469, 470; Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Austin, 168 U. 
 S. 695, 42 L. ed. 630, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 223. Whether the 
 claim that a Federal question exists is well founded, when 
 tried on its merits, does not affect jurisdiction, if as a matter 
 of fact the statement in the case presented the Federal question 
 as a real substantial issue. The court must take jurisdiction to 
 determine whether the claim is valid or not, and having ju- 
 risdiction may decide all the issues (Ibid. ; Nashville, C. & St. 
 L. R. Co. V. Taylor, 86 Fed. 168-178; Yazoo & M. Valley R. 
 Co. V. Adams, 180 U. S. 45, 45 L. ed. 417, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 256), though it should appear at the trial there was no Fed- 
 eral question. Ibid. ; Little York Gold- Washing & Water Co. 
 V. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 24 L. ed. 656. 
 
 But it is not to be understood that a mere reference in a bill 
 to a Federal statute, and setting up a mere colorable claim 
 thereunder, or the fact that it may be found necessary to con- 
 sult or refer to some Federal statute to ascertain the meaning 
 
 157 
 
158 HOW THE FEDERAL QUESTION MUST APPBAE. 
 
 of a contract, sets up a Federal question. Illinois C. IR. Co. 
 V. Chicago, 176 U. S. 656, 44 L. ed. 626, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 509 ; Sawyer v. Piper, 189 U. S. 154, 47 L. ed. 757, 23 Sup. 
 St. Eep. 633 ; Hamblin v. Western Land Co. 147 U. S. 531, 
 37 L. ed. 267, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 353 ; Swafford v. Tenapleton, 
 185 U. S. 487-493, 46 L. ed. 1005-1008, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 783; Little York Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 
 U. S. 203, 24 L. ed. 658 ; Wise v. Nixon, 78 Fed. 203 ; Cali- 
 fornia Oil & Gas. Co. V. Miller, 96 Fed. 18 ; New Orleans v. 
 Benjamin, 153 U. S.' 411, 38 L. ed. 764, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 905 ; St. Paul, M. & M. E. Co. v. St Paul & N. P. E. Co. 
 supra; Harris v. Eosenberger, 13 L.E.A.(KS.) 762, 76 C. 
 C. A. 225, 145 Fed. 452 ; Devine v. Los Angeles, 202 U. S. 
 313-332, 50 L. ed. 1046-1053, 26 Sup. Ct. Eep. 652. 
 
 To illustrate: Title to land may be derived from the Fed- 
 eral government, yet unless a construction of the granting 
 power was necessary to decide a material issue in the case 
 there would be no Federal question. St. Paul, M. & M. E. 
 Co. V. St. Paul & N. P. E. Co. supra ; California Oil & Gas 
 Co. V. Miller, 96 Fed. 17. Thus in a sale on execution issu- 
 ing out of a Federal court, if only the title of the defendant, 
 when the execution was levied, was assailed, there would be 
 no Federal question, but otherwise if the validity of the writ 
 is assailed. Shoshone Min. Co. v. Eutter, 177 U. S. 505-507, 
 44 L. ed. 864, 865, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 726 ; Avery v. Popper, 
 179 U. S. 314, 45 L. ed. 206, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 94; Black- 
 burn V. Portland Gold Min. Co. 175 U. S. 571, 44 L. ed. 276, 
 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 222, 20 Mor. Min. Eep. 358; De Lamar's 
 Nevada Gold Min. Co. v. Nesbitt, 177 U. S. 523, 44 L. ed. 872, 
 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 715 ; Florida, C. & P. E. Co. v. Bell, 176 
 IT. S. 321-828, 44 L. ed. 486-490, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 399; 
 Myrtle v. Nevada, C. & O. E. Co. 137 Fed. 195-196. See 
 Florida, C. & P. E. Co. v. Bell, 31 C. C. A. 9, 59 U. S. App. 
 189, 87 Fed. 369. Or the validity of the lien of the judgment 
 is in issue. Cooke v. Avery, 147 U. S. 375-390, 37 L. ed. 
 209-214, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 340. Or the title acquired under 
 the lien. Pierce v. MoUiken, 78 Fed. 196. 
 
 Again, where plaintiff claims lands from a grant by Con- 
 gress, which is not denied, but the defense is that the lands 
 in dispute are not covered by the grant, there is no Federal 
 
HOW THE FEDERAL QUESTION MUST APPEAR. 159 
 
 question, but otherwise if the title is put in issue. St. Paul, 
 M. & M. R Co. V. St. Paul & N. P. R. Co. supra ; Southern 
 P. E. Co. V. Whittaker, 47 Ped. 529 ; Murray v. Bluebird Min. 
 Co. 45 Fed. 385. See Butler v. Shafer, 67 Fed. 161. So 
 where there are conflicting claims to entries of public lands a 
 Federal question is raised. Linkswiler v. Schneider, 95 Fed. 
 203. Or where there is a conflict of riparian rights in lands 
 granted by the United States. King v. St. Louis, 98 Fed. 641 ; 
 Pacific Gas Improv. Co. v. EUert, 64 Fed. 429-430. See Mc- 
 Gilvra v. Eoss, 90 C. C. A. 398, 164 Fed. 604. So conflicting 
 claims to mining lands granted by the Federal government 
 (Cates V. Producers & C. Oil Co. 96 Fed. 8), but where there 
 is no dispute as to the meaning of the Federal law, but only 
 as to which claim was first made, there is no Federal question. 
 California Oil & Gas. Co. v. Miller, supra; Crystal Springs 
 Land & Water Co. v. Los Angeles, 82 Fed. 114; Hooker v. 
 Los Angeles, 188 U. S. 318, 47 L. ed. 491, 63 L.E.A. 471, 
 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 395. See Devine v. Los Angeles, 202 U. S. 
 338, 50 L. ed. 1055, 26 Sup. Ct. Eep. 652 ; Montana Ore Pur- 
 chasing Co. V. Boston & M. Oonsol. Copper & S. Min. Co. 29 
 C. C. A. 462, 57 TJ. S. App. 13, 85 Fed. 867 ; Argonaut Min. 
 Co. V. Kennedy Min. & Mill. Co. 84 Fed. 1; Bushnell v. 
 Crooke Min. & Smelting Co. 148 U. S. 683, 37 L. ed. 611, 13 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 771; Budzisz v. Illinois Steel Co. 170 U. S. 
 41, 42 L. ed. 941, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 503; Filhiol v. Torney, 
 119 Fed. 974; Gillis v. Stinchfield, 159 U. S. 658, 40 L. ed. 
 295, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 131 ; McMillen v. Ferrun Min. Co. 197 
 U. S. 343, 49 L. ed. 784, 25 Sup. Ct. Eep. 533. 
 
 The mere fact that in the progress of a cause it becomes 
 necessary to construe the Federal Constitution or laws does 
 not make a Federal question; it must appear that the recovery 
 sought is based on the construction to be given, and it is the 
 substantial issue. Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 
 U. S. 460, 38 L. ed. 513, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 654; Little York 
 Gold- Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 24 L. ed. 
 656; St. Joseph & G. L E. Co. v. Steele, 167 U. S. 659, 42 
 L. ed. 315, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 925; Hanford v. Davies, 163 
 U. S. 273-279, 41 L. ed. 157-159, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1051; 
 Sayward v. Denny, 158 U. S. 180, 39 L. ed. 941, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 777; Borgmeyer v. Idler, 159 U. S. 408, 40 L. ed. 199, 
 
160 HOW THE FEDEEAL QUESTION MTJST APPEAR. 
 
 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 34; Hamblin v. Western Land Co. 147 U. S. 
 533, 37 L. ed. 268, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 353; Wise v. Nixon, 
 supra; Arkansas v. Kansas & T. Coal Co. 96 Fed. 355, 356. 
 
 Cases involving the infringement of patents or copyrights 
 raises a Federal question, but suits merely to recover the price 
 if sold or the right to manufacture and sell the patented or 
 copyrighted articles under a contract, and not involving the 
 validity of the patent or copyright, does not raise a Federal 
 question. St. Paul Plough Works v. Starling, 127 U. S. 378, 
 32 L. ed. 252, 8 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1327 ; Pratt v. Paris Gaslight 
 & Coke Co. 168 U. S. 260, 42 L. ed. 460, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 62; Kartell v. Tilghman, 99 U. S. 555, 25 L. ed. 360; Marsh 
 V. Nichols, S. & Co. 140 U. S. 356, 35 L. ed. 417, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 798 ; Albright v. Teas, 106 U. S. 617, 27 L. ed. 297, 1 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 550; Densmore v. Three Elvers Mfg. Co. 88 
 Fed. 750 ; Montgomery Palace Stock-Car Co. v. Street Stable- 
 Car Line, 43 Fed. 331; Silver v. Holt, 84 Fed. 811. So 
 with reference to national banks, a suit against directors for 
 money loaned, alleged in a petition, raises no Federal ques- 
 tion. Bailey v. Mosher, 74 Fed. 15, S. C. 95 Fed. 224, 46 0. 
 C. A. 471, 107 Fed. 561. See Gates v. Jones ISTat. Bank, 206 
 U. S. 158, 51 L. ed. 1002, 27 Sup. Ct. Eep. 638 ; Bailey v. 
 Mosher, 11 C. C. A. 304, 27 U. S. App. 339, 63 Fed. 488. 
 Nor title to national bank stock. Leyson v. Davis, 170 U. S. 
 40, 41, 42 L. ed. 941, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 500. 
 
 But a suit on a bond of a cashier of a national bank is a Fed- 
 eral question. Walker v. Windsor Nat. Bank, 5 C. C. A. 421, 
 5 U. S. App. 423, 56 Fed. 80. So a suit by a receiver of a 
 national bank against stockholders for stock assessment, does 
 raise a Federal question. Hayden v. Brown, 94 Fed. 15. And 
 such receiver may sue without reference to amount or citizen- 
 ship. Brown v. Smith, 88 Fed. 565. A suit against a Fed- 
 eral receiver for acts of a former receiver does not raise a Fed- 
 eral question, McNulta v. Lockridge, 141 U. S. 329, 35 L. ed. 
 797, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 11, but suing a receiver without per- 
 mission where required does raise a Federal question. Comer 
 V. Felton, 10 C. C. A. 28, 22 U. S. App. 313, 61 Fed. 736, 
 737. 
 
 When full faith and credit are not given to the judgment 
 of a sister State a Federal question is involved. U. S. Const 
 
HOW THE FEDERAL QUESTION MUST APPEAR. 161 
 
 art. 4, § 1; Great Western Teleg. Co. v. Purdy, 162 U. S, 
 334, 40 L. ed. 989, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 810; Andrews v. An 
 drews, 188 U. S. 14, 47 L. ed. 366, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 237. 
 German Sav. & L. Soe. v. Dormitzer, 192 U. S. 125, 48 L. ed 
 373, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 221 ; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S 
 683, 684, 36 L. ed. 1133, 1134, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 224; Anglo- 
 American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. 105 Ped. 536 
 Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U. S. 103, 35 L. ed. 646, 11 Sup. Ct 
 Rep. 960. 
 
 The construction of a State statute of limitation does not 
 raise a Federal question. Ludeliug v. Chaffe, 143 U. S. 305, 
 36 L. ed. 314, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 439 ; Dupree v. Mansur, 214 
 U. S. 161, 53 L. ed. 950, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 548 ; Slide & S. 
 Gold Mines v. Seymour, 153 U. S. 509, 38 L. ed. 802, 14 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 842. Nor the refusal of a trial by jury. lovca C. R. 
 Co. V. Iowa, 160 U. S. 393-394, 40 L. ed. 469, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 344. Nor whether a party acquired a right under a 
 State land law before its withdrawal. Bacon v. Texas, 163 
 TJ. S. 209-219, 41 L. ed. 133-137, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1023. 
 Nor whether an ordinance of a city conforms to its charter. 
 Savannah v. Hoist, 65 C. C. A. 449, 132 Ped. 901-903 ; Mc- 
 Cain V. Des Moines, 174 U. S. 168, 43 L. ed. 936, 19 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 644. 
 
 The Federal right claimed to raise a Federal question must 
 be that of the plaintiff, and not a third person. Ludeling v. 
 Chaffe, supra; Giles v. Little, 134 U. S. 645-649, 33 L. ed. 
 1062, 1063, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 623 ; McCandless v. Pratt, 211 U. 
 S. 437, 53 L. ed. 271, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 144. And in alleging 
 the Federal question it is not necessary that the bill must show 
 the particular clause of the Constitution, but the allegation 
 must be positiTe, not argumentative. Crystal Springs Land 
 & Water Co. v. Los Angeles, 76 Fed. 148, 153, 154; Hanford 
 v. Davies, 163 U. S. 273, 41 L. ed. 157, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1051. 
 But if the whole theory of the case shows an impairment by 
 statute of a contract, the Federal question may appear with- 
 out mentioning the Constitution. 
 
 Receivers. 
 
 Receivers appointed by Federal courts have heretofore been 
 
 S. Eq.— 11. 
 
162 HOW THE FEDEBAL QUESTION MUST APPEAR. 
 
 held to have been fully within the class of Federal officers neces- 
 sarily exercising powers derived from Federal authority, and 
 could sue or be sued in the Federal courts by virtue of the 
 Federal appointment. Thompkins v. MacLeod, 96 Fed. 927; 
 J. I. Case Plow Works v. Finks, 26 C. C. A. 49, note; Gilmore 
 V. Herrick, 93 Fed. 525; Carpenter v. Northern P. R. Co. 75 
 Fed. 850; Gableman v. Peoria, D. & E. R. Co. 101 Fed. 6, 7; 
 Bradley v. Ohio Eiver & C. E. Co. 119 N. C. 918, 78 Fed. 
 387. But it has now been fully determined that the appoint- 
 ment of a receiver by a Federal judge does not by virtue of 
 his appointment raise a Federal question, so that if sued in a 
 State court the case would be removable to a Federal court on 
 the ground of a Federal question. Pope v. Louisville, N. A. 
 & C. E. Co. 173 U. S. 573, 43 L. ed. 814, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 500; Gableman v. Peoria, D. & E. E. Co. 179 U. S. 335, 45 
 L. ed. 220, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 171, S. C. 41 C. C. A. 160, 101 
 Fed. 6, 7; Chicago, E. I. & P. E. Co. v. Martin, 178 U. S. 
 245, 44 L. ed. 1055, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 854; Marrs v. Felton, 102 
 Fed. 778; Yamell v. Felton, 104 Fed. 163; Bankers' Mut. 
 Casualty Co. v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. E. Co. 192 
 U. S. 384, 48 L. ed. 490, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 325; Pepper v. 
 Rogers, 128 Fed. 988. See "Eemoval by Eeceivers." Dale 
 V. Smith, 182 Fed. 360. 
 
 Prior to the act of 1888, section 3, a Federal receiver could 
 not be sued out of the court appointing him, without special 
 permission of the appointing court, but since said act a receiver 
 may be sued in any court of competent jurisdiction. State or 
 Federal, in respect to any act or transaction of the receiver in 
 carrying on the business connected with the property held as 
 receiver. Ibid. The act of 1888, section 3, is discussed here- 
 after under "Jurisdictional Amount" in suits by and against 
 receivers, so I pass to another phase of tlie question. Section 3 
 of the act of 1888 is embodied in section 66 of the New Code 
 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1048). 
 
CHAPTER XXVIII. 
 
 ISSTE OF FEDERAL QUESTION" HOW RAISED. 
 
 Having shown what is a Federal question, where and how 
 it must appear, and how alleged, and its effect in giving juris- 
 diction to the Federal courts, — first, by writ of error to the 
 Supreme Court of the United States ; second, by original juris- 
 diction of the circuit courts, and by removal from State courts, 
 — let us now discuss the right of the plaintiff to obtain juris- 
 diction in the Federal courts, by anticipating in his bill the 
 defense of a Federal question upon which defendant will rest 
 his case. Cox v. Gilmer, 88 Fed. 346 ; Joy v. St. Louis, 122 
 Fed. 524; Filhiol v. Tomey, 119 Fed. 974; Florida, C. & 
 P. E. Co. V. Bell, 1T6 U. S. 321, 44 L. ed. 486, 20 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 399 ; Filhiol v. Torney, 194 U. S. 356, 360, 48 L. ed. 1014, 
 1017, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 698 ; Boston & M. Consol. Copper & S. 
 Min. Co. V. Montana Ore Purchasing Co. 188 U. S. 639, 47 
 L. ed. 631, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 434. 
 
 We have seen, to give jurisdiction to the Federal courts by 
 reason of a Federal question, the Federal question must appear 
 in plaintiff's statement of his own case. Ibid. The rule is 
 fixed that plaintiff cannot invoke Federal jurisdiction by an- 
 ticipating in his bill the defense of a Federal question, as, for 
 instance, to set up that defendant will claim that a State stat- 
 ute is invalid under the Federal Constitution. This is not neces- 
 sary to plaintiff's case. Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U. S. 589, 
 32 L. ed. 544, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 173. See, also, Boston & M. 
 Consol. Copper & S. Min. Co. v. Montana Ore Purchasing 
 Co. 188 U. S. 646, 47 L. ed. 635, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 440. 
 
 Judge Sanborn of the Eighth Circuit strongly combatted 
 this position, and quotes in support of his dissenting opinion in 
 Fergus Falls v. Fergus Falls Water Co. 19 0. C. A. 212, 36 
 U. S. App. 480, 72 Fed. 876, Saginaw Gaslight Co. v. 
 
 163 
 
164 ISSUE OF FEDERAL QUESTION HOW RAISED. 
 
 Saginaw, 28 Fed. 529; Smith v. -Bivens, 56 Fed. 352, and 
 other eases, 72 Fed. 880, which he contends clearly show that 
 the plaintiff may raise the Federal question by anticipating the 
 defense; and he claimed that 152 U. S., relied upon by the 
 majority of the court, does not sustain the majority opinion. 
 
 If it is true, as broadly stated by some of the cases hereto- 
 fore referred to, in discussing how the Federal question should 
 appear, that if in any aspect the case may assume the right of 
 recovery may depend on the construction of a Federal statute, 
 a Federal question appears, then it seems Judge Sanborn has 
 a basis for his conclusion. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. v. St. 
 Paul & K P. E. Co. 15 C. C. A. 167, 32 U. S. App. 372, 68 
 Fed. 2—12. See Crystal Springs Land & Water Co. v. Los 
 Angeles, 76 Fed. 151-153; Hamilton Gaslight & Coke Co. 
 V. Hamilton, 146 U. S. 258, 36 L. ed. 963, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 90. But the rule is otherwise. The Federal question, to sus- 
 tain jurisdiction, must be an existing one upon which plaintiff 
 depends to sustain Ms suit, and not one that may or may not 
 arise in the progress of the cause, as before said, to defeat his 
 case. Joy v. St. Louis, supra. He cannot rest on the doubt 
 as to whether it will be relied on or not. Ibid. ; Walker v. 
 Collins, 167 U. S. 57, 42 L. ed. 76, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 738; 
 Arkansas v. Kansas & T. Coal Co. 183 U. S. 185, 46 L. ed. 
 144, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 47; New Orleans v. Benjamin, 153 
 U. S. 430, 38 L. ed. 771, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 905 ; Kansas v. 
 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 77 Fed. 339, 341 ; Boston & M. 
 Consol. Copper & S. Min. Co. v. Montana Ore Purchasing 
 Co. 188 U. S. 639, 47 L. ed. 631, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 434; 
 Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 78, 44 L. ed. 680, 
 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 545 ; Peabody Gold Min. Co. v. Gold Hill . 
 Min. Co. 49 C. C. A. 637, 111 Fed. 822, 21 Mor. Min. Rep. 
 591. The jurisdictional allegation must be in the case made 
 in the bill. Ibid. ; Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 
 U". S. 454, 38 L. ed. 511, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654; Wise v. 
 Nixon, 78 Fed. 204; Florida v. Charlotte Harbor Phosphate 
 Co. 20 C. C. A. 538, 41 U. S. App. 405, 74 Fed. 578; Met- 
 calf V. Watertown, 128 U. S. 586, 32 L. ed. 543.. 9 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 173 ; Colorado Cent. Consol. Min. Co. v. Turck, 150 U. S. 
 138, 37 L. ed. 1030, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 35. But whatever may 
 be the rule in a case of anticipation of the Federal questipB, 
 when the answer comes in not setting up the Federal question, 
 
ISSUE OF FEDEEAL QUESTION HOW KAISED. 165 
 
 the case should be dismissed at oncq. Robinson v. Anderson, 
 1-21 U. S. 522-52-i, 30 L. ed. 1021, 1022, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 1011 ; Crystal Springs Land & Water Co. v. Los Angeles, 82 
 Fed. 114, 177 U. S. 169, 44 L. ed. 720, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 573 ; 
 Hooker v. Los Angeles, 188 U. S. 318, 47 L. ed. 491, 63 L.R.A. 
 471, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 395 ; Boston & M. Consol. Copper & S. 
 Min. Co. V. Montana Ore Purchasing Co. 188 U. S. 643, 47 
 L. ed. 633, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep; 434; Devine v. Los Angeles, 202 
 U. S. 338, 50 L. ed. 1055, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652. 
 
 Citizenship and Venue When Jurisdidion Rests on a Federal 
 
 Question. 
 
 Citizenship. — When the Federal question is a basis of juris- 
 diction, the citizenship of parties is not material. Citizens of 
 the same State may sue each other where the recovery is based 
 on a Federal question. Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 611, 46 
 L. ed. 715, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493 ; San Joaquin & K. River 
 Canal & Irrig. Co. v. Stanislaus County, 90 Fed. 520. The 
 same rule applies to suits arising under treaties made by the 
 United States (Owings v. Norwood, 5 Cranch, 344, 3 L. ed. 
 120) ; that is, where a right is given or protected by treaty. 
 
 Ve7iue. — The suit can only be brought in the district where- 
 of the defendant is an inhabitant (see chapter 15) and this is 
 true where the suit shows diversity of citizenship and a Federal 
 question (Newell v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 181 Fed. 698), and 
 though the Federal question be added by amendment (id., 
 700, and cases cited). 
 
 Issue, How Raised. 
 
 The want of a Federal question in the statement of the case 
 may be raised by motion, or answer. Ferg-us Falls v. Fergus 
 Falls Water Co. supra. Of course, if it does not appear, then 
 a demurrer is proper to raise the issue. But if the Federal ques- 
 tion appears in the bill, then you must raise the issue by motion 
 or in your answer ; however, it seems that unless in the trial of 
 the motion on answer it appears that the allegation of the Fed- 
 eral question was fraudulently made to acquire jurisdiction, 
 that it will not affect the final jurisdiction to determine the 
 
166 ISSUE OF FEDERAL QUESTION HOW EAISED. 
 
 case, though it appears upon the merits of the motion that no 
 actual Federal question was involved. Pacific Electric R. Co. 
 V. Los Angeles, 194 TJ. S. 112, 48 L. ed. 896, 24 Sup. (Jt. 
 Rep. 586 ; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Adams, 180 TJ. S. 38, 45 L. ed. 
 413, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 251. 
 
 The theory is that there is a distinction between the exist- 
 ence of a Federal question for the purpose of jurisdiction, and 
 the actual decision' of that question on its merits. Whether the 
 bill presents a Federal question, and whether it is well founded 
 when considered on its merits, are different questions, and the 
 court must take jurisdiction to determine whether it is well 
 founded. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Taylor, 86 Fed. lYS. 
 
 In Chicago L. Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 574, 28 L. ed. 
 1084, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681, it was held that the jurisdiction 
 on the ground of a Federal question being asserted, jurisdiction 
 is not defeated because in the trial it does not appear; where- 
 fore a motion to dismiss because no Federal question exists can- 
 not prevail. Southern P. R. Co. v. California, 118 U. S. 112, 
 30 L. ed. 104, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 993 ; Nashville, C. & St. L. E. 
 Co. v. Taylor, supra. 
 
 In Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Austin, 168 U. S. 695, 42 L. 
 ed. 630, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 223, it was held that jurisdiction must 
 be taken to determine the fact as to whether the claim of the 
 existence of a Federal question is meritorious; that is, it 
 depended on the allegations in the bill, and not on the facts 
 appearing subsequently. Little York Gold- Washing & Water 
 Co. V. Keyes, 96 U. S. 204, 24 L. ed. 659. Of course, the 
 claim must be real and colorable, not fictitious and fraudulent. 
 Hamblin v. Western Land Co. 147 U. S. 531, 37 L. ed. 267, 13 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 353. It is said in City R. Co. v. Citizens' Street 
 R. Co. 166 U. S. 557, 41 L. ed. 1114, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 653, 
 that all that is necessary to establish jurisdiction is to show that 
 complainant had in good faith asserted the claim. Fergus Falls 
 V. Fergus Falls Water Co. 12 C. C. A. 212, 36 U. S. App. 
 480, 72 Fed. 883 ; St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. v. St. Paul & N. 
 P. R. Co. supra. So then, to raise the issue by motion or answer 
 it must be alleged that the allegation is fictitious and fraudulent, 
 and it must be shown, or jurisdiction is not affected. 
 
 In the light of the fact that the Federal court is one of limited 
 jurisdiction, I cannot appreciate the soundness of the reasoning 
 
ISSUE OF FEDEEAL QUESTION HOW RAISED. 167 
 
 that makes a mere statement of a Federal question, though not 
 true, sufficient to sustain jurisdiction. If it is a fundamental 
 gTound of jurisdiction, its existence, and not a mere allegation, 
 should be shown. While the allegation and issue thereon may 
 bring it within the jurisdiction to determine the particular issue, 
 upon what rests the further power of the court to proceed after 
 determining the fundamental ground does not exist? The de- 
 cisions which hold that the suit should be dismissed seems to me 
 to be true constmction, as it is the logical conclusion from the 
 conditions (see Bank of Arapahoe v. David Bradley & Co. 19 
 C. C. A. 206, 36 IJ. S. App. 519, 72 Fed. 872 ; St. Paul, M. & 
 ]\[. E. Co. V. St. Paul & ]\T. P. K. Co. supra) ; that is, a want 
 of power in a court of limited jurisdiction. Act Mch. 3d, 1875, 
 sec. 5, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1019. 
 
 If the Federal qiiestion does not appear in the bill, you may 
 raise the issue by motion or answer. If it is an issue of law 
 you may use the form given under diversity of citizenship. 
 
 If the allegation of a Federal question is sufficient, but not 
 true, you may raise the issue by motion in the nature of a plea 
 or in the answer as follows: 
 
 A. B. In the District Court of tlie United 
 
 vs. In Equity. States for the District of 
 
 CD. , sitting at 
 
 And now comes the defendant C. D. (or defendants naming them) and 
 this his motion to dismiss this cause, because this court should not take 
 jurisdiction of this suit, for that the said suit does not really and substan- 
 tially involve a suit or controversy properly within its jurisdiction, for 
 that said suit is wholly based on the alleged existence of a Federal ques- 
 tion, and the allegations that said suit is dependent on a construction of 
 the constitution and laws of the United States (or whatever may be the 
 allegations as to the Federal question ) , are not truly and in good faith 
 made, but on the contrary, the averments in the bill as aforesaid are stated 
 with the false and fraudulent purpose of imposing on the jurisdiction of 
 this court. Wherefore defendant says that the allegations are fictitious 
 and fraudulent. 
 
 All of which he avers to be true, and pleads the same in bar of com- 
 plainant's said bill, and prays the judgment of this court whether he 
 should aiiswer, further pray to be hence dismissed with costs. 
 
 R. F., 
 Solicitor, etc. 
 
 The same form may be used if the Federal question is denied 
 in the answer. 
 
CHAPTEE XXIX. 
 
 AMOUNT, 
 
 Equally important and fundamental as one of tlie elements 
 of jurisdiction of the Federal courts is the amount or value of 
 the subject-matter in litigation, and it is essential, though there 
 be diversity of citizenship, or a Federal question. Holt v. 
 Indiana Mfg. Co. 176 U. S. 72, 73, 40 L. ed. 376, 377, 20 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 272; United States v. Sayvyard, 160 U. S. 493, 40 
 L. ed. 508, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 371 ; Tupino v. La Compania 
 General De Tabacos De Filipinas, 214 U. S. 268, 53 L. ed. 992, 
 29 Sup. Ct. Eep. 610; Shewalter v. Lexington, 143 Fed. 161; 
 Fishback v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 161 U. S. 99, 40 L. ed. 631, 
 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 506. 
 
 The amount or value of the subject-matter or right being 
 litigated must, under the act of 1888, exceed the sum of two 
 thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs. Prior to this 
 act the amount was only five hundred dollars, exclusive of costs. 
 Under the New Code, chap. 2, sec. 24, | 1, (Comp. Stat. 1913, 
 sec. 991), the amount to give jurisdiction must be in excess 
 of three thousand dollars exclusive of interest and costs. The 
 gradual increase of the jurisdictional amount was intended to 
 curtail the jurisdiction of the Federal courts. Taylor v. Mid- 
 land Valley E. Co. 197 Fed. 323. It must be in excess of three 
 thousand dollars. Eoyal Ins. Co. v. Stoddard, 120 C. C. A. , 
 434, 201 Fed. 916. Under this act amount is material, except 
 when the United States is a party, or citizens of the same State 
 are claiming under a grant from a different State. United 
 States V. Eeid, 90 Fed. 522; United States v. Sayward, supra; 
 Eisley v. Utica, 168 Fed. 744; Turner v. Jackson Lumber Co. 
 87 C. C. A. 103, 159 Fed. 923-925; Purnell v. Page, 128 Fed. 
 496. See new Code, chap. 2, sec. 24, |1[ 2 to 25, specifying cases 
 in which the amount is not essential to jurisdiction. 
 
 168 
 
AMOUNT. 169 
 
 "Matter in Dispute." 
 
 "The matter in dispute," as used in the statute, means the 
 matter for which the suit in good faith is brought, and issue 
 joined. Smith v. Adams, 130 U. S. 167-175, 32 L. ed. 895- 
 898, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 566 ; Cowell v. City Water Supply Co. 
 57 C. C. A. 393, 121 Fed. 53-55; Bruce v. Manchester & K. 
 E. Co. 117 U. S. 514, 29 L. ed. 900, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 849; 
 Eisley v. Utica, 168 Fed. 747 ; Union P. E. Co. v. Cunning- 
 ham, 173 Fed. 92; Lee v. Watson, 1 Wall. 339, 17 L. ed. 558; 
 Turner v. Southern Home Bldg. & L. Asso. 41 C- C. A. 379, 
 101 Fed. 313; Ung Lung Chung v. Holmes, 98 Fed. 323; 
 Kunkel v. Brown, 39 C. C. A. 665, 99 Fed. 593; Postal Teleg. 
 Cable Co. v. Southern E. Co. 88 Fed. 803; Gorman v. Ha- 
 vird, 141 U. S. 206, 35 L. ed. 717, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 943. And 
 when jurisdiction depends on it, the matter in dispute must be 
 capable of estimation in money (Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 
 10-20, 23 L. ed. 524-528 ; Schimk v. Moline, M. & S. Co. 147 
 U. S. 504, 37 L. ed. 258, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 416), for when 
 the matter is entirely incapable of pecuniary estimation, there 
 can he no jurisdiction, as in a suit for the custody of a child. 
 Amount in dispute and amount involved have the same legal 
 significance. Decker v. Williams, 73 Fed. 310; Eeynolds v. 
 Burns, 141 U. S. 117, 35 L. ed. 648, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 942. 
 
 When the suit is for a money demand, the amount demanded 
 in the body of the petition fixes the jurisdiction. Peeler v. 
 Lathrop, 1 C. C. A. 93, 2 U. S. App. 40, 48 Fed. 780; Bank 
 of Arapahoe v. David Bradley & Co. 19 0. C. A. 206, 36 U. 
 S. App. 519, 72 Fed. 870 ; Greene County Bank v. J. H. Teas- 
 dale Commission Co. 112 Fed. 801 ; Hilton v. Dickinson, 108 
 IT. S. 165-174, 27 L. ed. 688-691, 2 Sup. Ct. Eep. 424; Hay- 
 ward V. ISTordberg Mfg. Co. 29 C. C. A. 438, 54 U. S. App. 
 639, 85 Fed. 9 ; Holden v. Utah & M. Machinery Co. 82 Fed. 
 210; Lee v. Watson, supra; Less v. English, 29 C. C. A. 275, 
 56 U. S. App. 16, 85 Fed. 473; Kunkel v. Brown, supra; 
 Kearney County v. Vandriss, 53 C. C. A. 192, 115 Fed. 872; 
 Tennent-Stribling Shoe Co. v. Eoper, 36 C. C. A. 455, 94 
 Fed. 742, 743; Turner v. Southern Home Bldg. & L. Asso. 
 
170 AMOUJVT. 
 
 41 C. C. A. 379, 101 Fed. 313 j State Bank v. Cox, 74 C. 0. 
 A. 285, 143 Fed. 92. 
 
 When property is sued for, and the petition shows the value, 
 it is taken as prima facie correct (Bennett v. Butterworth, 8 
 How, 128, 12 L. ed. 1015), and until it is in some way shown 
 in the record that the sum stated is not the matter in contro- 
 versy, it will be sufficient for jurisdiction. King v. Southern 
 R Co. 119 Fed. 1016; Hilton v. Dickinson, 108 U. S. 174, 
 27 L. ed. 691, 2 Sup. Ct. Kep. 424; Battle v. Atkinson, 115 
 Fed. 384, 385. In a word, the court is governed by the claim 
 made, provided there is no reason to believe that it was falsely 
 made to obtain jurisdiction. Ibid. ; Holden v. Utah & M. 
 Machinery Co. 82 Fed. 209 ; Hayward v. Nordberg Mfg. Co. 
 29 C. C. A. 438, 54 U. S. App. 639, 85 Fed. 6, 7; Postal 
 Teleg. Cable Co. v. Southern R. Co. 88 Fed. 806 ; Barry v. 
 Edmunds, 116 U. S. 561, 29 L. ed. 732, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 501. 
 It is not essential to state the amount or value if it appears 
 from the allegations or record or from evidence taken in the 
 case before hearing on the jurisdiction. Robinson v. Suburban 
 Brick Co. ~62 C. C. A. 484, 127 Fed. 804, 806. If apparently 
 fraudulent, no jurisdiction will be taken. American Wringer 
 Co. V. Ionia, 76 Fed. 6, 7; Maxwell v. Atchison, T. & S. F. 
 R. Co. 34 Fed. 286; Green County Bank v. J. H. Teas- 
 dale Commission Co. 112 Fed. 802; Simon v. House, 46 Fed. 
 321 ; Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 115 U. S. 614, 29 
 L. ed. 503, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192; Fishback v. Western U. 
 Teleg. Co. 161 U. S. 100, 40 L. ed. 631, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 506; 
 Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co. 170 U. S. 472, 42 L. ed. 1112, 
 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 645 ; Hampton Stave Co. v. Gardner, 83 C. 
 C. A. 521, 154 Fed. 806. The court looks to the record, which 
 must create a legal certainty of want of jurisdictional amount. 
 Barry v. Edmonds, 116 U. S. 559, 29 L. ed. 732, 6 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 501 ; Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 IT. S. 327, 46 L. ed. 568, 
 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 327; Kunkel v. Brown, supra; Interstate 
 Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Edgefield Hotel Co. 109 Fed. 692, 693; 
 Battle V. Atkinson, 115 Fed. 385 ; Bowman v. Chicago & N. 
 W. R. Co. 115 U. S. 611-613, 29 L. ed. 502, 503, 6 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 192; Bank of Arapahoe v. David Bradley & Co. supra; 
 Hampton Stave Co. v. Gardner, 83 C. C. A. 521, 154 Fed. 
 805. And if less than jurisdictional amount cannot be le- 
 
AMOLTNr. lYl 
 
 gaily inferred from the bill the case must go to trial. Holden 
 V. Utah & M. Machinery Co. 82 Fed. 210. But the case 
 should be dismissed if the evidence shows fraudulent state- 
 ment of value to give jurisdiction (Horst v. .Merkley, 59 Fed. 
 .".02 ; Simon v. House, 46 Fed. 318 ; Bank of Arapahoe v. Brad- 
 ley & Co. supra) ; or' that plaintiff cannot legally be permitted 
 to sustain his claim (N"orth American Transp. & Trading 
 Co. v. Morrison, 178 U. S. 262, 44 L. ed. 1061, 20 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 869). 
 
 Cases Classified. 
 
 With these general observations I will now discuss the three 
 classes of cases in which the question of amount as affecting 
 jurisdiction has been raised. 
 
 First. Where a specific amount is sued for. 
 
 Second. When the value of the subject-matter or right in 
 issue has been disputed. 
 
 Third. When the case sounds in damages. 
 
 When a Specific Amount is Sued For. 
 
 Under this head the specific amount sued for, or the amount 
 recoverable under the allegations, is liquidated by the terms 
 of the alleged agreement, and about this class of contracts 
 there can be no difficulty (Peeler v. Lathrop; Greene County 
 Bank v. J. TI. Teasdale Commission Co. ; Hampton Stave Co. 
 V. Gardner ; and Bank of Arapahoe v. David Bradley & Co. — su- 
 pra; Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co. 170 U. S. 468, 42 L. ed. 
 1111, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 645 ; Denver City Tramway Co. v. Nor- 
 ton, 73 C. C. A. 1, 141 Fed. 599 ; Ung Lung Chung v. Holmes, 
 and Simon v. House, supra ; Gray v. Blanchard, 97 U. S. 565, 
 24 L. ed. 1109 ; Schacker v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 93 U. S. 241- 
 242, 23 L. ed. 862), unless the question arises when the origi- 
 nal amount sued for had been reduced below the jurisdiction 
 of the court by a payment of valid set-off. In such cases, if 
 the plaintiff before bringing suit knew that his claim had been 
 reduced by a valid payment, or some valid set-off, so that its 
 extreme limit did not fall within the amount giving jurisdic- 
 tion, then there is no jurisdiction, as it may be concluded that 
 
172 AMOTJNT. 
 
 the amount as stated was for the sole purpose of getting juris- 
 diction. Bedford Quarries Co. v. Welch, 100 Fed. 513 ; Pick- 
 ham V. Wheeler-Bliss Mfg. Co. 23 C. C. A. 391, 46 U. S. App. 
 605, 77 Fed. 663 ; Stillwell-Bieree & S. V. Co. v. Williamston 
 Oil & Fertilizer Co. 80 Fed. 68 ; Schunk v. Moline, M. & S. 
 Co. 147 U. S. 500, 37 L. ed. 255, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep., 416; Hay- 
 ward V. Wordberg Mfg. Co. 29 C. C. A. 438, 54 U. S. App. 
 639, 85 Fed. 7. So, where land is sued for, over the value of 
 three thousand dollars, and defendant disclaims as to all but 
 a small portion under the value of three thousand dollars, it 
 would not affect the jurisdiction (Way v. Clay, 140 Fed. 352; 
 Alkire Grocery Co. v. Eichesin, 91 Fed. 84) ; but the facts 
 must create a legal certainty of that conclusion (Wetmore v. 
 Eymer, 169 U. S. 115, 42 L. ed. 682, 18 Sup. a. Eep. 293; 
 Holden v. Utah & M. Machinery Co. supra; Barry v. Ed- 
 munds, 116 IT. S. 561, 29 L. ed. 732, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 501; 
 Maffet V. Quine, 95 Fed. 199; Kunkel v. Brown, supra). 
 
 It is not to be understood that jurisdiction is ousted because 
 some defense may be made, or is made, which reduces the 
 amount set up in the bill. United States v. Swift, 71 C. C. 
 A. 351, 139 Fed. 227; Kearny County v. Vandriss, supra; 
 Washington County v. Williams, 49 C. C. A. 621, 111 Fed. 
 801-811 ; Turner v. Southern Home Bldg. & L. Asso. 41 C. 
 C. A. 379, 101 Fed. 314; Ung Lung Chung v. Holmes, 
 98 Fed. 326; Kunkel v. Brovm, and Tennent-Stribling 
 Shoe Co. v. Eoper, supra; Jones v. McCormick Harvest- 
 ing Mach. Co. 27 C. C. A. 133, 53 U. S. App. 408, 
 82^ Fed. 295 ; Jones v. Eowley, 73 Fed. 288, 289. In fact, 
 it was held, in Schunk v. Moline, M. & S. Co. supra, that 
 a valid defense, although apparent on the face of the petition, 
 does not diminish the amount that is claimed, nor determine 
 the matter in dispute, for who can' say in advance that the de- 
 fense will be insisted on, or, if presented, will be sustained by 
 the court? The rule may be stated, that if it is necessary, to 
 ascertain the amount, to consider conflicting evidence as to 
 claim of payment or set-off, or to decide disputed questions of 
 law affecting the amount, then the court will take jurisdiction, 
 even though on trial a less amount be found. Ibid. ; Hay- 
 ward V. Nordberg Mfg. Co. 29 C. C. A. 438, 54 U. S. App. 
 639, 85 Fed. 7-9 ; Stillwell-Bieree & S. V. Co. v. Williamston 
 Oil & Fertilizer Co. 80 Fed. 69. 
 
AMOUNT. 173 
 
 Thus, in a suit in which various accounts have been aggre- 
 gated to give jurisdiction, a court will take jurisdiction, even 
 though some of the accounts be successfully attacked and the 
 claim reduced below the jurisdiction. Tennent-Stribling Shoe 
 Co. V. Koper, svipra. 
 
 In Texas, as decided in Lowe v. Dowbarn, 26 Tex. 507, and 
 Haddock v. Taylor, 74 Tex. 216, 11 S. W. 1093, it seems that 
 if exceptions be taken to certain aggregated items, and they 
 be sustained, and the amount is left below the jurisdiction, 
 the case will be dismissed. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Kolbe, 
 95 Tex. 76, 65 S. W. 34, see also Times Pub. Co. v. Hill, 36 
 Tex. Civ. App. 389, 81 S. W. 806, 808. When the amount 
 is reduced below the jurisdiction by the plea of limitations to 
 certain of the aggregated items, this will not affect the juris- 
 diction, as limitation is a plea of privilege, which may or not 
 be pleaded. Hardin v. Cass County, 42 Fed. 652-657 ; Water- 
 field v. Eice, 49 C. C. A. 504, 111 Fed. 625 ; Kearny County 
 V. Vaudriss, 53 C. C. A. 192, 115 Fed. 867. 
 
 It appears, then, from the cases cited that it is not the 
 amount plaintifF is able to prove when the jurisdictional 
 amount is alleged, but was the demand made in good faith, and 
 he has simply been mistaken as to the fact or the law. Inter- 
 state Bldg. & L. Asso. V. Edgefield Hotel Co. 109 Fed. 692; 
 Kunkel v. Brown, 39 C. C. A. 665, 99 Fed. 594; Washing- 
 ton County V. Williams, 49 0. C. A. 621, 111 Fed. 801; 
 Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light & R. Co. v. Ryan, 181 U. S. 
 432, 433, 45 L. ed. 938, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 709 ; Lilienthal v. 
 McCormick, 54 C. C. A. 475, 117 Fed. 89 ; Ung Lung Chung 
 V. Holmes, 98 Fed. 325. 
 
 By good faith is meant that the sum demanded is the real 
 matter put in dispute (Hilton v. Dickinson, 108 U. S. 174, 
 27 L. ed. 691, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 424; Holden v. Utah & M. 
 Machinery Go. 82 Fed. 210), and not so manifestly fictitious 
 as to make it legally certain that the amount alleged was only 
 to get jurisdiction (Jones v. McCormick Harvesting Mach. 
 Co. . ;pra; Battle v. Atkinson, 115 Fed. 384), because clearly 
 beyond a reasonable expectation of recovery (Holden v. Utah 
 & M. Machinery Co. 82 Fed. 209 ; Bank of Arapahoe v. David 
 Bradley & Co. 19 C. C. A. 206, 36 U. S. App. 519, 72 Fed. 
 867 ; Kunkel v. Brown, supra ; Vance v. W. A. Vandercook 
 
174 AMOUNT. 
 
 Co. 170 U. S. 468, 42 L. ed. 1111, 18 Sup. Ot. Rep. 645; 
 ifaxwell V. Atchison, T. & S. F. R Co. 34 Ted. 286). 
 
 Of course, in determining the bona fides of the allegation of 
 amount, a plaintiff can be held to the knowledge of well-settled 
 principles of law. So if an attempt is made to add an addi- 
 tional amount, which, under rules of law, would not be admis- 
 sible, or something is set up easily susceptible of proof, and 
 none is offered, or no satisfactory explanation given, then such 
 a claim must be held to be fictitious. Bank of Arapahoe v. 
 David Bradley & Co. supra. But in Holden v. Utah & M. 
 Machinery Co. supra, it is said it would require a very strong 
 case to justify a court in finding that a plaintiff had no rea- 
 sonable expectation of recovery of the amount as alleged. Hay- 
 ward V. Nordberg Mfg. Co. supra; Wetmore v. Eymer, 16& 
 U. S. 115, 42 L. ed. 682, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 293 ; see Simon v 
 House, 46 Fed. 318, collecting cases. If, however, the action 
 is for a trespass, or otherwise sounding in damages, where no 
 limitation is prescribed by law to the amount that may be re- 
 covered, then the estimate that plaintiff puts as his damages 
 must control, as this fixes the demand in dispute, whatever 
 may be the sum recovered. Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 
 561, 29 L. ed. 732, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 501 ; Herbert v. Rainey, 
 54 Fed. 251 ; Levinski v. Middlesex Bkg. Co. 34 C. C. A. 452, 
 92 Fed. 458; Smith v. Greenhow, 109 U. S. 671, 27 L. ed. 
 1081, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 421. (See "Amount in Cases Sounding 
 in Damages.") 
 
CHAPTEE XXX. 
 
 AGGEEGATIISrG AMOUNTS. 
 
 When several persons have a common and undivided inter- 
 est in a claim, and join in a suit, the amount of the joint 
 claim fixes the jurisdiction. Holt v. Bergevin, 60 Fed. 2; 
 Wheless v. St. Louis, 180 U. S. 379, 45 L. ed. 583, 21 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 402, 96 Fed. 867; Clay v. Field, 138 U. S. 464, 34 
 L. ed. 1044, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 419 ; McDaniel v. Traylor, 196 
 U. S. 416, 49 L. ed. 535, 25 Sup. Ct. Eep. 369; Thomas v. 
 Green County, 89 C. C. A. 405, 159 Fed. 341; Hagge v. Kan- 
 sas City S. E. Co. 104 Fed. 393 ; Shields v. Thomas", 17 How. 
 3, 15 L. ed. 93; Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U. S. 30-33, 30 
 L. ed. 1084, 1085, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1066; Tennent-Stribling 
 Shoe Co. V. Eoper, 36 C. C. A. 455, 94 Fed. 739. See Hart- 
 ford F. Ins. Co. V. Erie E. Co. 172 Fed. 899, 902 ; Eaton v. 
 Hoge, 72 C. C. A. 74, 141 Fed. 66, 5 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 487. 
 But if the interests are distinct, then they cannot join for con- 
 venience the several amounts due each, if the separate inter- 
 ests be less in amount than is necessary for jurisdiction. To 
 join distinct interests, each interest must reach the jurisdic- 
 tional amount. Ibid. ; Jones v. Mutual Fidelity Co. 123 Fed. 
 510 ; Walter v. Northeastern E. Co. 147 U. S. 370, 87 L. ed. 
 206, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 348; Eisley v. Utica, 168 Fed. 744; 
 McDaniel v. Traylor, 123 Fed. 338; Washington County v. 
 Williams, 49 C. C. A. 621, 111 Fed. 814; Henderson v. Car- 
 bondale Coal & Coke Co. 140 U. S. 25, 35 L. ed. 332, 11 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 691 ; Cowell v. City Water Supply Co. 57 C. C. A. 
 398, 121 Fed. 53; Northern P. E. Co. v. Walker, 148 U. S. 
 391, 87 L. ed. 494, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 650; Citizens' Bank v. 
 Cannon, 164 U. S. 322, 41 L. ed. 452, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 89 ; 
 Wheless v. St. Louis, supra ; Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U. S. 
 328, 46 L. ed. 568, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 327 ; Brown v. Denver, 
 186 U. S. 480, 46 L. ed. 1259, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 943; The 
 Joseph B. Thomas, 78 C. C. A. 428, 148 Fed. 767; Troy 
 
 175 
 
176 acmjeegating amounts. 
 
 Bank v. Whitehead, 184 Fed. 932-935; Simpson v. Geary, 204 
 Fed. 507. And this is true, though they join a class or party 
 whose rights and liabilities arose out of the same transaction, or 
 related to a common fund sought to be administered. Ibid.; 
 Clay V. Field, supra; Smithson v. Hubbell, 81 Fed. 593, 594; 
 Cowell V. City Water Supply Co. 57 C. C. A. 393, 121 Fed. 56; 
 Chatfield v. Bogle,- 105 U. S. 233, 26 L. ed. 945 ; Kussell v. 
 Stansell, 105 U. S. 304, 26 L. ed. 990 ; Seaver v. Bigelow, 5 
 Wall. 210, 211, 18 L. ed. 595, 596 ; Putney v. Whitmire, 66 
 Fed. 387. It may be a common fund involved in the litigation 
 which exceeds the jurisdictional amount, but if each creditor 
 can only recover the amount due him out of the fund, and said 
 amounts are less than the jurisdictional amount, then the case 
 should be dismissed. Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 TJ. S. 35, 30 L. 
 ed. 1086, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1066 ; Kussell v. Stansell, 105 U. S. 
 303, 26 L. ed. 989. Thus, a bill by a stockholder in behalf of 
 himself and others must show the value of the stock held by him 
 equals the jurisdictional amount, or exceeds it. Smithson v. 
 Hubbell, 81 Fed. 593 ; Harvey v. Ealeigh & G. R Co. 89 Fed. 
 117, 118 ; Troy Bank v. Whitehead, 184 Fed. 935 ; Kisley v. 
 Utica, 179 Fed. 877. There is a conflict of authorities on this 
 proposition. See Jacobs v. Mexican Sugar Co. 130 Fed. 591; 
 Carpenter v. Knollwood Cemetery, 198 Fed. 297. 
 
 The rule, however, does not apply to assignments for the 
 benefit of creditors, if the application is to protect the fund 
 and enforce an execution of the trust, as in such eases the fund, 
 and not plaintiff's demand, gives the jurisdiction. Handley 
 V. Stutz, 137 U. S. 366, 34 L. ed. 706, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 117; 
 Jones V. Mutual Fidelity Co. 123 Fed. 513-515; Towle v. 
 American Bldg. Loan & Invest. Soc. 60 Fed. 131 ; Putnam 
 V. Timothy Dry Goods & Carpet Co. 79 Fed. 454 ; Colston v. 
 Southern Home Bldg. & L. Asso. 99 Fed. 305 ; Estes v. Gun- 
 ter, 121 U. S. 183, 30 L. ed. 884, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 854. So 
 in proceeding against insolvent corporations. Taylor v. De- 
 catur Mineral & Land Co. 112 Fed. 450 ; Jones v. Mutual 
 Fidelity Co. 123 Fed. 506; Kent v. Honsinger, 167 Fed. 620. 
 (See "Creditors Suit.") 
 
 A single plaintiff cannot join several defendants, against 
 whom he has claims of a similar character, in order to reach 
 the jurisdictional amount. The claim against each defend- 
 
AGKIBEGATING AMOUNTS. 177 
 
 ant must be of the jurisdictional amount to be joined if a joint 
 judgment cannot be taken. McDaniel v. Traylor, 123 Fed. 
 339, see 196 U. S. 415-427, 49 L. ed. 533-538, 25 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 369 ; Busey v. Smith, 67 Fed. 15, 16 ; Henderson v. Wads- 
 worth, 115 U. S. 276, 29 L. ed. 379, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 140; 
 Walter v. ISTortheastem R. Co. 147 U. S. 376, 37 L. ed. 208, 
 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 348; Seaver v. Bigelow, 5 Wall. 208, 18 
 L. ed. 595 ; Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U. S. 27, 30 L. ed. 1083, 
 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1066; Shewalter v. Lexington, 143 Fed. 16:3, 
 164; JSTorthern P. R. Co. v. Walker, 148 U. S. 391, 37 L. ed. 
 494, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 650; Citizens' Bank v. Cannon, 164 
 U. S. 319, 41 L. ed. 451, 17 Sup. Ct Rep. 89 ; Ex parte Phoj- 
 nix Ins. Co. 117 U. S. 367-369, 29 L. ed. 923, 924, 6 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 772. Thus, you cannot aggi-egate amount against 
 several insurance companies. Wisconsin C. R. Co. v. Phoe- 
 nix Ins. Co. 123 Fed. 989. The rule applicable to several 
 plaintiffs having separate claims that each must be in the juris- 
 dictional amount is applicable when several defendants were 
 sued. Walter v. Northeastern R. Co. 147 U. S. 370, 37 L. ed. 
 206, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 348. When claims of various parties 
 have been assigned to one party such party can aggregate the 
 amounts for the purpose of jurisdiction, provided the assignors, 
 by reason of diversity of citizenship, could have sued in the Fed- 
 eral courts, if the amount had been jurisdictional. Chase v. 
 Sheldon Roller Mills Co. 56 Fed. 625 ; Bowden v. Bumham, 8 
 C. C. A. 248, 19 U. S. App. 448, 59 Fed. 752 ; Bergman v. 
 Inman, 91 Fed. 294; Brigham-Hopkins Co. v. Gross, 107 Fed. 
 769; Davis v. Mills, 99 Fed. 40. (See "Jurisdiction by As- 
 signment.") 
 
 What may he Included in Amount to Give Jurisdiction. 
 
 As stated by the judiciary act, the matter in dispute must 
 exceed, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of three 
 thousand dollars. In making up the amount it has been de- 
 cided that you cannot add mere items of expense in connec- 
 tion with the cause of action, unless it was agreed between the 
 parties that the expense was to be incurred, or from the na- 
 ture of the contract could be reasonably implied. Less v. Eng- 
 lish, 29 C. 0. A. 275, 56 U. S. App. 16, 85 Fed. 471. There 
 
 S. Eq.— 12. 
 
178 AGOEEGATINa AMOTJTTTS. 
 
 was, however, a vigorous dissenting of opinion to the appli- 
 cation of the rule in this particular case. You can add attor- 
 neys' fees when a part of the contract. Rogers v. Riley, 80 Fed. 
 762 ; Swofford v. Cornucopia Mines, 140 Fed. 958 ; Howard v. 
 Carroll, 195 Fed. 647. 
 
 You cannot, however, sue on a bond or other written instru- 
 ment to pay money, and add to it damages for a breach, in or- 
 der to make the amount jurisdictional. Less v. English, 29 
 C. C. A. 275, 56 U. S. App. 16, 85 Fed. 473; Hilton v. Dick- 
 inson, 108 U. S. 165, 27 L. ed. 688, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 424. The 
 rule seems to be that where the law gives no rule that fixes the 
 damage in any particular case, then the plaintiff's demand 
 must furnish the basis of jurisdiction; but when the law does 
 give a rule, as interest, then the cause of action must control, 
 and not the demand. Hayward v. Nordberg Mfg. Co. 29 
 C. C. A. 438, 54 U. S. App. 639, 85 Fed. 4; Barry v. Ed- 
 munds, 116 U. S. 550-556, 29 L. ed. 729-731, 6 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 501 ; Simon v. House, 46 Fed. 321. Thus in cases of debt 
 evidenced by written instruments, interest is the damage per- 
 mitted by law, and the character of demand cannot be added to 
 by alleging any further damage in order to increase the amount. 
 Holden v. Utah & M. Machinery Co. 82 Fed. 210 ; Barry v. 
 Edmunds, 116 U. S. 550, 29 L. ed. 729, 6 Sup. Ct Rep 501. 
 
 So in cases of contract where the amount recoverable is 
 liquidated by the terms of the agreement, the limit of recovery 
 is fixed, and you cannot add to it to obtain jurisdiction. Lee 
 V. Watson, 1 Wall. 339, 17 L. ed. 558 ; Bergman v. Inman, 91 
 Fed. 293 ; Kunkel v. Brown, 39 C. C. A. 665, 99 Fed, 595. 
 
 In this character of cases the sum demanded beyond what 
 , the law or parties have fixed as the limit of recovery is clearly 
 the matter in dispute (Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 
 115 U. S. 614, 29 L. ed. 503, 6 Sup. Ct, Rep. 192; Barry v. 
 Edmunds, 116 U. S. 550-556, 29 L. ed. 729-731, 6 Sup. Ct 
 Rep. 501), but you may bring suit on notes due, and those 
 not due, arising out of the same transaction, and thus acquire 
 the jurisdictional amount. In suits upon bonds and coupoii% 
 the interest on them cannot be added. Greene County v. Kort- 
 recht, 26 0. C. A. 381, 52 II. S. App. 250, 81 Fed. 241, and 
 authorities cited. But it seems you may include matured cou- 
 pons in making jurisdictional amount, as they are separable- 
 
AGGREGATING AMODNTS. 179 
 
 independent promises, and not interest within the meaning of 
 the statute. Edwards v. Bates County, 163 U. S. 269, 41 
 L. ed. 155, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 967; Home & F. Invest. & Agency 
 Co. V. Ray, 69 Fed. 657, — overruled; Independent School Dist. 
 V. Eeid, 55 L.RA. 364, 49 C. C. A. 198, 111 Fed. 4. 
 
 Foreclosure of Mortgage. 
 
 Falling within the rule, the specific amount sued for controls 
 the jurisdiction on foreclosures of chattel mortgages, and not 
 the value of the property mortgaged. Stillwell-Bierce & S. V. 
 Co. V. Williamston Oil & Fertilizer Co. 80 Fed. 68 ; Wakeman 
 V. Throckmorton, 124 Fed. 1010 ; Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U. S. 
 29, 30 L. ed. 1084, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1066 ; Lilienthal v. McCor- 
 mick, 54 C. C. A. 475, 117 Fed. 89; New England Mortg. 
 Secur. Co. v. Gay, 145 U. S. 130, 36 L. ed. 640, 12 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 815. But you may aggregate several notes and mortgages 
 against the same party. Fitchett v. Blows, 20 C. C. A. 286, 36 
 U. S. App. 597, 74 Fed. 49 ; Fitch v. Creighton, 24 How. 159, 
 16 L. ed. 596 ; O'Connel v. Eeed, 5 C. C. A. 586, 12 U. S. App. 
 369, 56 Fed. 531. The rule has been declared otherwise in 
 Texas, that is, the value of the property upon which foreclosure 
 is sought determines jurisdiction. Texas & IST. 0. E. Co. v. 
 Eucker, 38 Tex. Civ. App. 591, 88 S. W. 816. 
 
 Creditors' Suits. 
 
 The amount claimed by the creditor, and not the value of the 
 property, determines jurisdiction. Alkine Grocery Co. v. 
 Eiehesin, 91 Fed. 84 and authorities cited; Jacobs v. Mexican 
 Sugar Co. 130 Fed. 591; Werner v. Murphy, 60 Fed. 769; 
 Putney v. Whitmire, 66 Fed. 387. The only interest of the 
 creditor is his individual claim, for if paid it destroys his in- 
 terest, and this must test the matter in controversy. Ibid. 
 
 Creditors cannot unite their interests to make the jurisdic- 
 tional amount (Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U. S. 61, 29 L. ed. 
 329, 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1163), but may in good faith assign their 
 interests to one who may aggregate the claims to obtain the 
 jurisdictional amount (Alkire Grocery Co. v. Eiehesin, supra; 
 Putney v. Whitmire, 66 Fed. 385 ; Crawford v. Neal, 144 U. 
 
180 AGGEEGATIN^G AMOUNTS. 
 
 S. 585, 36 L. ed. 552, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 759; Marion v. Ellif?, 
 10 Fed. 410 ; Collinson v. Jackson, 8 Sawy. N". y. 357, 1-1 Fed. 
 309). But if one complainant in a creditors' suit has recov- 
 ered a judgment for over two thousand dollars, other credit- 
 ors holding smaller judgments may unite with him in the 
 suit. Huff V. Bidwell, 81 C. C. A. 43, 151 Fed. 564, 103 Fed. 
 363; Stanwood v. Wishard, 134 Fed. 959; Belmont JS'ail Go. 
 V. Columbia Iron & Steel Co. 46 Fed. 337. 
 
CHAPTEE XXXI. 
 
 BY AND AGAIlSrST FEDERAL EECEIVEES. 
 
 Prior to the act of 1888, section 3, suits could only be 
 brought against Federal receivers by permission of the court 
 appointing the receiver. Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 128, 
 26 L. ed. 674. Such suits were considered purely ancillai-y 
 to the main suit (Porter v. Sabin, 36 Fed. 477; Missouri P. 
 K. Co. V. Texas P. R Co. 41 Fed. 313; Gilmore v. Herrick, 
 93 Fed. 526), and fell within the jurisdiction of the appoint- 
 ing court, without reference to amount or citizenship. (C!ar- 
 penter v. Northern P. E. Co. 75 Fed. 850; Farmers' Loan & 
 T. Co. V. Chicago & IST. P. E. Co. 118 Fed. 204; Hampton 
 Eoads E. & Electric Co. v. Newport News & O. P. E. & Elec- 
 tric Co. 131 Fed. 534.) 
 
 But since the act of 1888, section 3, which permits suits 
 against a Federal receiver in any court of competent jurisdic- 
 tion, without the consent of the appointing court, in respect to 
 any act or transaction of the receiver in carrying on the busi- 
 ness connected with such property, the right of plaintiff to 
 select his own court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter 
 (except as modified by the removal act, Tompkins v. Mac- 
 Leod, 96 Fed. 927; Marrs v. Felton, 102 Fed. 775, 776) was 
 secured. See sec. 66, New Code, chap. 4, embodying sec. 3, 
 act of 1888, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1048; Love v. Louisville 
 & E. E. Co. 178 Fed. 507 ; Central Trust Co. v. Wheeling & 
 L. E. E. Co. 189 Fed. 82; Smith v. Jones Lumber & Mercan- 
 tile Co. 200 Fed. 647. 
 
 Federal courts could no longer draw to themselves jurisdic- 
 tion of suits against their receivers by process of contempt, or 
 injunction. Central Trust Co. v. East Tennessee, V. & G. E. 
 Co. 59 Fed. 523; Gilmore v. Herrick, supra. And. suits thus 
 brought were no longer in the class of ancillary suits, but be- 
 came original suits against the receiver, in which the amount, 
 
 181 
 
182 BY AND AGAINST FEDERAL EECEIVEES. 
 
 and some Federal ground of jurisdiction, became material to 
 jurisdiction.' Ibid.; Ray v. Pierce, 81 Fed. 881, 882; Pitkin 
 V. Cowen, 91 Fed. 599; Tompkins v. MacLeod, supra; Gable- 
 man V. Peoria, D. & E. E. Co. 179 U. S. 335, 45 L. ed. 220, 21 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 171 ; Pepper v. Eogers, 128 Fed. 988 ; Carpen- 
 ter V. ISTorthem P. E. Co. supra; and Sullivan v. Barnard, 81 
 Fed. 886, held a contrai-y doctrine, but it is not the rule as now 
 administered. 
 
 You will notice, however, that the language of the act is, 
 that where the suit is in respect of any act or transaction of 
 the receiver (McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U. S. 331, 35 L. ed. 
 799, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 11) in the administration of the trust, 
 then the receiver can be sued in any court of competent juris- 
 diction, and it is in such cases amount is important. Coster v. 
 Parkersberg Branch E. Co. 131 Fed. 115; Pitkin v. Cowen, 91 
 Fed. 602; Eoyal Trust Co. v. Washburn, B. & I. E. E. Co. 
 113 Fed. 532; Ee Kalb & B. Mfg. Co. 165 Fed. 896; Love 
 V. Louisville & E. E. Co. 178 Fed. 507. 
 
 An action in a State court against a receiver for damages 
 for personal injuries arises under the general law of liability 
 for damages, and comes within the above rule. Ibid. ; Gable- 
 man V. Peoria, D. & E. E. Co. 179 U. S. 340, 341, 45 L. ed. 
 223, 224, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 171, 41 C. C. A. 160, 101 Fed. 
 6 ; Shearing v. Trumbull, 75 Fed. 33 ; Bausman v. Dixon, 173 
 U. S. 113, 114, 43 L. ed. 033, 634, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 316; Bank- 
 ers' Mut. Casualty Co. v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R 
 Co. 192 U. S. 384, 48 L. ed. 490, 24 Sup. Ct Eep. 325; Chi- 
 cago, E. I. & P. E. Co. V. Martin, 178 U. S. 245, 44 L. ed. 1055, 
 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 854. So, where an action is brought by a re- 
 ceiver in a Federal court, other than that of its appointment,, 
 then amount is jurisdictional. Sullivan v. Swain, 96 Fed. 259. 
 
 There are still many suits that arise in the administration 
 of a Federal receivership that are only ancillary, and which 
 are not suits in respect of any act or transaction of the receiv- 
 er. In such suits the manner of amount and citizenship does 
 not affect the jurisdiction of the Federal court appointing the 
 receiver. Thus, where a receiver in administering his trust, 
 brings an action in the court appointing him in aid of his 
 trust, the matter of amount is not important, neither is citi- 
 zenship. White V. Ewing, 159 U. S. 36, 40 L. ed. 67, 15 Sup. 
 
BY AND AGAINST FEDERAL RECEIVERS. 183 
 
 Ct. Eep. 1018; Brown v. Allebach, 156 Fed. 697; Rause v. 
 Letcher, 156 U. S. 49, 53, 89 L. ed. 342, 343, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 266; Gmiby v. Armstrong, 66 C. C. A. 627, 133 Fed. 
 417 ; Pope v. Louisville, N. A. & 0. R. Co. 173 U. S. 573, 43 
 L. ed. 814, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 500; Bottom v. National R. Bldg. 
 & L. Asso. 123 Fed. 745 ; Compton v. Jesup, 15 0. C. A. 397, 
 31 U. S. App. 486, 68 Fed. 263; Bowman v. Harris, 95 Fed. 
 917 ; Gilmore v. Herrick, supra. See also Dale v. Smith, 182 
 Fed. 363 ; Tmst Co. v. Chicago, P. & St. L. R. Co. 199 Fed. 
 593. 
 
 Thus, a receiver may recover assets in the hands of others, 
 if there is no right asserted by the party in possession adverse 
 to the claim of the receiver without reference to the value of 
 the asset. Ibid. 
 
 Or when he seeks to foreclose a mortgage in behalf of the 
 fund by order of the court. Gunby v. Armstrong, supra ; 
 American Loan & T. Co. v. Central Vermont R. Co. 86 Fed. 
 390; Myers v. Hettinger, S7 C. C. A. 369, 94 Fed. 370; 
 Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R. Co. v. Continental Trust Co. 36 
 C. C. A. 155, 95 Fed. 497. 
 
 Or when it is sought to deal with the property in the hands 
 of the court to subject it to sale, or because of some claim or 
 right in and to the property thus situated. Gilmore v. Her- 
 rick, supra; Minot v. Mastin, 37 C. C. A. 234, 95 Fed. 735; 
 Compton V. Jesup, 15 C. C. A. 397, 31 U. S. App. 486, 68 Fed. 
 279 ; Wabash R. Co. v. Adelbert College, 208 U. S. 38, 52 L. 
 ed. 379, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 182; ISTew Orleans v. Howard, 87 
 C. C. A. 345, 160 Fed. 393. 
 
 Or on any cause of action not arising out of any act of the 
 receiver in carrying on the business of the receivership. Por- 
 ter V. Sabin, 149 U. S. 479, 37 L. ed. 818, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 1008 ; Compton v. Jesup, supra ; Buckhannon & iST. R. Co. v. 
 Davis, 68 C. C. A. 345, 135 Fed. 707. 
 
 So in receiverships of national banks, where jurisdiction is 
 specially reserved by the act of 1888, where amount is not im- 
 portant when necessary to sue. Sec. 4, act 1888; Earle v. 
 McCartney, 109 Fed. 13; Myers v. Hettinger, 37 C. C. A. 369, 
 94 Fed. 370. (See Smithson v. Hubbell, 81 Fed. 593.) (See 
 "Receivers as Parties".) Appendix, chap. 2, Tf 24, Judicial 
 Code (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 991). 
 
184 BY AND AGAINST FEDERAL EEOEIVEBS. 
 
 When a receiver is sued, it is in effect against the receive^ 
 ship, and his liability is official, and not personal. Smith v. 
 Jones Lumbej & Mercantile Co. 200 Fed. 650, and cases cited; 
 Porter v. Sabin, 149 U. S. 473, 37 L. ed. 815, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 1008. 
 
CHAPTEE XXXII. 
 
 AMOUNT IH" INJUNCTIONS. 
 
 To ascertain the value of the "matter in dispute" or sub- 
 ject-matter of the litigation, where jurisdiction depends on 
 amount in controversy, resort must be had to the character of 
 the action. Simon v. House, 46 Fed. 318. 
 
 In all suits for the specific recovery of property, the value 
 of the property in issue is the measure of jurisdiction, and 
 ordinarily presents no practical difficulty. Thus, in trying title 
 to land or the interest of plaintiff in property, real or personal, 
 the value of the property or interest is easily ascertained (Ben- 
 nett V. Butterworth, 8 How. 128, 129, 12 L. ed. 1015, 1016; 
 Simon v. House, supra; Way v. Clay, 140 Fed. 352; King v. 
 Southern E. Co. 119 Fed. 1016; Insurance Co. of N". A. v. 
 Sr«ndson, 74 Fed. 347 ; Vicksburg, S. & P. E. Co. v. Smith, 
 135 U. S. 195, 34 L. ed. 95, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 728 ; Smithers 
 V. Smith, 204 U. S. 642, 51 L. ed. 660, 27 Sup. Ct. Eep. 297; 
 Butters v. Carney, 127 Fed. 623), and the value alleged con- 
 trols, unless so grossly excessive as to evidence a want of good 
 faith in the allegation (Ibid.; Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co. 
 170 U. S. 468, 42 L. ed. 1111, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 645; Hay- 
 ward V. ISTordberg Mfg. Co. 29 C. C. A. 438, 54 U. S. App. 
 639, 85 Fed. 4 ; Holden v. Utah & M. Machinery Co. 82 Fed. 
 210). 
 
 Some difficulty arises, however, in enforcing purely equi- 
 table remedies, such as injunctions, specific performance, can- 
 celation, and rescission, quieting title, or removing cloud, and 
 in appointing receivers, in ascertaining the value of the right 
 claimed as controlling jurisdiction. 
 
 185 
 
186 AMOUNT IN INJUNCTIONS. 
 
 So far the preceding chapters have dealt with the amount 
 or value of the subject-matter in issue that could be recovered 
 by law as the measure of jurisdiction; but this is not the gen- 
 eral rule applicable to injunctions; while there is a large class 
 of cases where the direct pecuniary loss sought to be prevented 
 by injunction would be the measure, and not contingent loss, — 
 as, where one seeks to enjoin an execution for an amount less 
 than two thousand dollars as in Eoss v. Prentiss, 3 How. 772, 
 11 L. ed. 824, where jurisdiction was denied. New England 
 Mortg. Secur. Co. v. Gay, 145 U. S. 130, 131, 36 L. ed. 648, 
 649, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 815 ; Cowell v. City Water Supply Co. 
 57 C. C. A. 393, 121 Fed. 53. 
 
 Or where the individual taxpayer seeks to restrain the issue 
 of bonds by a city, and his personal interest is less than the 
 jurisdictional amount, the jurisdiction fails. Pumell v. Page, 
 128 Ped. 496, 498, and authorities cited; Colvin v. Jackson- 
 ville, 158 U. S. 456, 39 L. ed. 1053, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 866; 
 El Paso Water Co. v. El Paso, 152 U. S. 157, 38 L. ed. 396, 
 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 494. 
 
 See Ottumway v. City Water Supply Co. 59 L.E.A. 604, 
 56 C. C. A. 219, 119 Fed. 318 ; Helena v. Helena Waterworks 
 Co. 97 C. C. A. 320, 173 Fed. 18 ; Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co. 
 176 U. S. 72, 44 L. ed. 376, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 272; Coulter 
 V. Fargo, 62 C. C. A. 444, 127 Fed. 912. 
 
 So where the tax sought to be enjoined is on land, it would 
 be the amount of the tax, and not the value of the land, neces- 
 sary to support jurisdiction. Ibid. ; Douglas v. Stone, 110 Fed. 
 812, 815; Eachus v. Hartwell, 112 Fed. 564; Turner v. Jack- 
 son Lumber Co. 87 C. C. A. 106, 159 Fed. 926, and authori- 
 ties cited. 
 
 So, where adjoining owners of lots unite to enjoin the tax 
 upon their lots, the assessment of each must be over three thou- 
 sand dollars. Ibid. ; Wheless v. St. Louis, 180 U. S. 379, 45 L. 
 ed. 583, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 402, 96 Fed. 866; Northern P. E. 
 Co. V. Walker, 148 U. S. 391, 37 L. ed. 494, 13 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 650 ; Walter v. Northeastern E. Co. 147 U. S. 370, 37 
 L. ed. 206, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 348 ; Citizens' Bank v. Cannon, 
 164 U. S. 319, 41 L. ed. 451, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 89; Ogden City 
 
AMOUNT IN INJUNCTIONS. 187 
 
 V. Armstrong, 168 U. S. 224, 42 L. ed. 444, 18 Sup. Ct. Kep. 
 98. 
 
 So where it is sought to enjoin the paj^ment of a dividend, 
 the amount of plaintiff's claim must govern. Smithson v. Hub- 
 bell, 81 Fed. 593 ; Clay v. Field, 138 U. S. 464-483, 34 L. ed. 
 1044-1051, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 419. 
 
 So, a stockholder suing must rest upon his individual hold- 
 ing for jurisdiction, where he is seeking to recover a personal 
 judgment against a corporation. 
 
 But there is a class of injunctions where the value of the 
 right to be protected is much greater than the value of the 
 property about which the dispute originated, and in which the 
 value of the right to be protected or the extent of the injury to 
 be prevented fixes the jurisdiction without reference to the 
 amount that may be recovered by law. Nashville, C. & St. L. 
 E. Co. V. McConnell, 82 Fed. 65 ; Louisville & N". K. Co. v. 
 Smith, 63 C. C. A. 1, 128 Fed. 1 ; Delaware, L. & W. R Co. v. 
 Frank, 110 Fed. 689; Anderson v. Bassman, 140 Fed. 14; 
 Evenson v. Spaulding, 9 L.E.A.(]Sr.S.) 904, 82 C. C. A. 
 263, 150 Fed. 517 ; Board of Trade v. Cella Commission Co. 
 76 C. C. A. 28, 145 Fed. 28, 29; H[utchinson v. Beckham, 55 
 C. C. A. 333, 118 Fed. 399; Humes v. Ft. Smith, 93 Fed. 
 857 ; Eiverside & A. E. Co. v. Eiverside, 118 Fed. 743 ; Jewel 
 Tea Co. v. Lee's Summit, 198 Fed. 532. 
 
 To illustrate : In Texas & P. E. Co. v. Kuteman, 4 C. C. A. 
 503, 13 tr. S. App. 99, 54 Fed. 547, the railroad company 
 sought to enjoin one Kuteman from prosecuting in a state court 
 a number of small suits for penalties for overcharges for 
 freight. The court held the maintenance of the schedule rate 
 was a right to be protected, and being the real matter in dispute, 
 and of a value exceeding two thousand dollars, the court had 
 jurisdiction. The value of the object to be obtained and the 
 right to be protected controls, says the court. Louisville & 
 N. E. Co. v. Smith, 63 C. C. A. 1, 128 Fed. 5. 
 
 So we have had many suits to enjoin railroad companies 
 from establishing a new schedule of rates, where the value of 
 the right was only considered as the basis of jurisdiction, as in 
 l^orthern P. E. Co. v. Pacific Coast Lumber Mfrs. Asso. 91 
 C. C. A. 39, 165 Fed. 2-11 ; Chesapeake & D. Canal Co. v. 
 Gring, 86 C. C. A. 539, 159 Fed. 662; Southern P. Co. v. 
 Bartine, 170 Fed. 765. 
 
lyS AMOUNT IN INJUMCTIOjNS. 
 
 So the property right of a board of trade in its market quo- 
 tations is the basis of jurisdictional value, when an injunc- 
 tion is sought to protect it. Board of Trade v. Cella Commis- 
 sion Co. supra; John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 12 
 L.E.A.(KS.) 135, 82 C. C. A. 158, 153 Fed. 31. 
 
 So in restraining brokerage in railway tickets. Nashville, 
 C. & St. L. E. Co. V. McConnell, supra ; Delaware, L. & W. E. 
 Co. V. Frank, 110 Fed. 689 ; Chesapeake & O. Coal Agency Co. 
 V. Fire Creek Coal & Coke Co. 119 Fed. 948; Louisville & 
 ]Sr. E. Co. V. Bitterman, 128 Fed. 176, 178n, 75 C. C. A. 
 192, 144 Fed. 44, 207 U. S. 222, 223, 52 L. ed. 182, 183, 28 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 91, 12 Ann. Cas. 693; Pennsylvania Co. v. Bay, 
 138 Fed. 203. 
 
 In Lanning v. Osbom, 79 Fed. 661, it was held that in a 
 suit to enjoin the interference with the water rates of a city, the 
 right to fix rates and its value determined jurisdiction, and 
 not the difference .between the annual rate contended for by 
 the defendant and that asserted by the plaintiff. Board of 
 Trade v. Cella Commission Co. 145 Fed. 28. 
 
 So where injunctions are sued out to prevent destruction 
 or injury to property, the jurisdiction is ordinarily fixed by 
 the value of the property to be protected. Louisville & If. K. 
 Co. V. Smith, 63 C. C. A. 1, 128 Fed. 1 ; Maffet v. Quine, 95 
 Fed. 199 ; Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 107, 41 L. ed. 648, 17 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 262. 
 
 But the allegations of damage, actual or exemplary, in such 
 cases, will sustain jurisdiction. Maffet v. Quine, 95 Fed. 200; 
 Von Schroeder v. Brittan, 93 Fed. 9, 10; Herbert v. Eainey, 
 54 Fed. 248. 
 
 In a suit to prevent a permanent injury to land, the value 
 of the land determines amount. Ee Turner, 119 Fed. 231. 
 
 So in a suit for an injunction to restrain diversion of water 
 from plaintiff's land, against several defendants, the injury 
 as a whole to the land, and not the claim for damages against 
 each individual defendant, was the test of the jurisdictional 
 amount. Pacific Live-Stock Co. v. Hanley, 98 Fed. 327. See 
 Union Mill & Min. Co. v. Dangberg, 81 JFed. 73. Morris v. 
 Bean, 146 Fed. 423-429, placed the jurisdiction on the value 
 of the right. 123 Fed. 618. 
 
 So the owner of a house has a distinct right of property in 
 
AMOUNT IN INJUNCTIONS. 189 
 
 streets; and any interference with the right may be enjoined, 
 and the value of the right determines jurisdiction. American 
 Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers & D. M. Unions Nos. 1 & 3, 
 90 Fed. 608-613. 
 
 So in any interference with easements. Louisville & IST. E. 
 Co. V. Smith, 63 C. C. A. 1, 128 Fed. 3, and authorities cited. 
 
 The owner of a large body of land sought to protect it from 
 stock owners and neighborhood cattle, and the value of the 
 pasturage to be protected, and not the claims against each 
 owner, was the basis of jurisdiction. Northern P. E. Co. v. 
 Cunningham, 103 Fed. 708 ; Smith v. Bivens, 56 Fed. 352. 
 
 But where property is injured by the overflow of a stream 
 caused by unlawful or negligent construction, the landowners 
 may unite in a suit for injunctive relief, but the injury to each 
 must be of the jurisdictional amount. Hagge v. Kansas City, 
 S. E. Co. 104 Fed. 391 ; Kenyon v. Knipe, 46 Fed. 310 ; Clay 
 V. Field, 138 U. S. 464, 34 L. ed. 1044, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 419; 
 Citizens' Bank v. Cannon, 164 U. S. 319, 41 L. ed. 451, 17 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 89. 
 
 An injunction was sought to protect the alleged right of 
 plaintiif to import liquors into South Carolina, the right be- 
 ing valued over the value of liquors sought to be imported, the 
 jurisdiction was taken on the value of the right. Scott v. Don- 
 ald, 165 U. S. 107, 41 L. ed. 648, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 262. 
 
 An injunction having for its object the abatement of a nuis- 
 ance or removal of an obstruction, the jurisdictional amount is 
 based on the right, and not the amount of damage suffered by 
 the complainant. American Fisheries v. Lennen, 118 Fed. 
 872; Mississippi & M. E. Co. v. Ward, 2 Black, 485, 17 L. 
 ed. 311 ; American Smelting & Eef. Co. v. Godfrey, 89 C. C. 
 A. 139, 158 Fed. 225, 14 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 8; Amelia Mill 
 Co. v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & E. Co. 123 Fed. 811; Wash- 
 ington Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U. S. 112, 25 L. ed. 782 ; 
 Whitman v. Hubbell, 30 Fed. 81 ; Eainey v. Herbert, 5 C. C. 
 A. 183, 3 U. S. App. 592, 55 Fed. 443. 
 
 An injunction to restrain interference with a contract would 
 be the value of the right to be protected, and not the amount, 
 involved in the contract; as, enjoining ticket brokers from 
 buying and selling tickets issued by railroads, as before stated, 
 and authorities cited. So in a suit by a property owner and 
 
190 AMOUNT IN INJUNCTIONS. 
 
 taxpayer against a city and bidder to prevent a contract, it 
 wonld be the value of the contract, and not amount of tax, 
 that would give jurisdiction. Johnston v. Pittsburg, 106 Fed. 
 753. See Murphy v. East Portland, 42 Fed. 308. 
 
 Again, the value of the right to pursue one's business with- 
 out being subjected to an onerous tax, and a multiplicity of 
 suits for penalties, and not the amount of the illegal tax, fixes 
 the jurisdictional amount for injunction. Hutchinson v. Beck- 
 ham, 55 C. C. A. 333, 118 Fed. 399, 402; Whitman College v. 
 Berryman, 156 Fed. 112-114; Humes v. Ft. Smith, 93 Fed. 
 857. 
 
 The last cases cited must be differentiated from those where 
 it is apparent that the complainant can sustain no other dam- 
 age than the payment of the tax, and the amount of the tax 
 must be the basis for jurisdiction, as in Walter v. Northeast- 
 ern E. Co. 147 U. S. 370, 37 L. ed. 206, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 348 ; JSTorthern P. R Co. v. Walker, 148 U. S. 391, 37 L. ed. 
 494, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 650; Eachus v. Hartwell, 112 Fed. 564; 
 Purnell v. Page, 128 Fed. 498 ; Turner v. Jackson Lumber 
 Co. 159 Fed. 923. In the rule under consideration and the 
 cases sustaining it, the injunction sought was to protect a 
 right which was the "matter in dispute," and not the particu- 
 lar tax. 
 
 In protecting a business by injunction, past and prospec- 
 tive injury fixes the jurisdictional amount. Draper v. Sker- 
 rett, 116 Fed. 206; Evenson v. Spaulding, 9 L.R.A.(]Sr.S.) 
 904, 82 C. C. A. 263, 150 Fed. 517; Butchers' & D. Stock- 
 Yards Co. V. Louisville & IST. E. Co. 14 C. C. A. 290, 31 U. S. 
 App. 252, 67 Fed. 35 ; Eocky Mountain Bell Teleph. Co. v. 
 Montana Federation of Labor, 156 Fed. 809 ; Board of Trade 
 V. Cella Commission Co. 76 C. C. A. 28, 145 Fed. 29 ; Hunt v. 
 New York Cotton Exch. 205 U. S. 322, 51 L. ed. 821, 27 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 529, 144 Fed. 511. 
 
 So in enjoining a business that parties agreed not to carry 
 on, the value of the right to be protected, and not the loss that 
 msij have been occasioned, fixes the jurisdiction. Ibid.; Mc- 
 Kee V. Chautauqua Assembly, 124 Fed. 808-811; Board of 
 Trade v. Cella Commission Co. supra. 
 
 So, on enjoining infringement of a trademark, the value of 
 the trademark, and not the damage sustained, is the jurisdic- 
 
AMOUNT IN INJUNCTIONS. 191 
 
 tional amount. Hennessy v. Herrmann, 89 Fed. 669 ; De Kuy- 
 per V. Witteman, 23 Fed. 871. See Winchester Eepeating Arms 
 Co. V. Butler Bros. 128 Fed. 978, holding that the amount of 
 the damages claimed would he the jurisdictional amount. 
 Symonds v. Greene, 28 Fed. 834. 
 
CHAPTEE XXXIII. 
 
 VALUE OF SUBJECT MATTER OE EIGHT IN ISSUE IN SPECIFIC 
 
 EEMEDIES. 
 
 Specific Performance. 
 
 In a suit to enforce performance of a contract to convey 
 land, the value of the land to be conveyed as alleged fixes the 
 jurisdictional amount, unless fraudulent and fictitious. John- 
 ston V. Trippe, 33 Fed. 530. See Marthinson v. King, 82 C. 
 C. A. 360, 150 Fed. 49. 
 
 Cancellaiion and Rescission. 
 
 In Simon v. House, 46 Fed. 317, it is held that a suit 
 brought to cancel certain instruments conveying real estate 
 casting a cloud on title, that the amount considered in deter- 
 mining jurisdiction is the value of the land affected; it is based 
 on the theory that the vfhole value of the property, the posses- 
 sion and enjoyment of which is imperiled, is involved in the 
 controversy, and not limited to the pecuniary value of the in- 
 strument in controversy. Lehigh Zinc & I. Co. v. ITew Jer- 
 sey Zinc & I. Co. 43 Fed. 545. See Gordon v. Smith, 10 C 
 C. A. 516, 23 U. S. App. 451, 62 Fed. 503 ; and see "Quiet- 
 ing Title." Stinson v. Dousman, 20 How. 466, 15 L. ed. 969. 
 
 When suit is brought to cancel a mortgage, the amount in 
 dispute is the amount or value which complainant claims to 
 recover, or which defendant will lose if plaintiff recovers. 
 Cowell V. City Water Supply Co. 57 C. C. A. 393, 121 Fed. 
 53, reversing 96 Fed. 770; Fidelity & D. Co. v. Moshier, 151 
 Fed. 807 ; Kiggs v. Clark, 18 C. C. A. 242, 37 U. S. App. 626, 
 71 Fed. 560; Dickinson v. Union Mortgage Bkg. & T. Co. 64 
 Fed. 895. But this would not be the rule if complainant 
 owned the whole property and was contesting claims against it, 
 for then the value of the property to be protected would be the 
 
 192 
 
VALUE OF StTBJECT-MATTEE OE EIGHT IN ISSUE. 193 
 
 amount in dispute. Berthold v. Hoskins, 38 Fed. Y72 ; Smith 
 V. Adams, 130 U. S. 167, 32 L. ed. 895, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 566. 
 See Cowell v. City Water Supply Co. supra, for distinction 
 drawn by Judge Thayer. 
 
 So, to cancel judgments rendered by a court against differ- 
 ent defendants, they cannot aggregate the judgments to come 
 within the jurisdiction, no one judgment exceeding two thou- 
 sand dollars ; nor can the value of the real estate upon which 
 the judgments are liens be taken into consideration. McDaniel 
 V. Traylor, 123 Fed. 338, reversed in 196 U. S. 416, 49 L. ed. 
 535, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 369; Walter v. Northeastern R. Co. 
 147 U. S. 373, 37 L. ed. 208, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 348. As to 
 amount in canceling a lease, see Reese v. Zinn, 103 Fed. 97. 
 
 Quieting Title or Removing Cloud. 
 
 In quieting title or removing cloud, the amount in dispute 
 is the actual value of the land affected, and not the value of de- 
 fendant's claim. Smith v. Adams, supra; Woodside v. Ci- 
 ceroni, 35 C. C. A. 177, 93 Fed. 4; Shewalter v. Lexington, 
 143 Fed. 166 ; Greenfield v. United States Mortg. Co. 133 Fed. 
 785; McDaniel v. Traylor, 196 U. S. 416, 49 L. ed. 535, 25 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 369; Cowell v. City Water Supply Co. supra; 
 Union P. R. Co. v. Cunningham, 173 Fed. 90 ; Simon v. 
 House, 46 Fed. 318 ; Lehigh Zinc & I. Co. v. New Jersey Zinc 
 & L Co. supra; Lovett v. Prentice, 44 Fed. 459. 
 
 In Cooper v. Preston, 105 Fed. 403, it is said that a suit to 
 quiet title, against a number of defendants, of land of the ju- 
 risdictional value, it must appear that all defendants have a 
 privity of interest derived from a common source of title, or 
 the separate claim of each must be of the jurisdictional amount. 
 Bates V. Carpentier, 98 Fed. 452. See Parker v. Morrill, 106 
 U. S. 1, 27 L. ed. 72, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 14, as to the value of 
 the interest of plaintiff. 
 
 In setting aside a tax title the value of the land, not the tax 
 involved, fixes the jurisdiction. Felch v. Travis, 92 Fed. 210. 
 But to enjoin the tax, as we have seen, would be the amount 
 of tax, and not value of land. Douglas Co. v. Stone, 110 Fed. 
 814; Purnell v. Page, 128 Fed. 496; Shewalter v. Lexington, 
 143 Fed. 161. 
 
 S. Eq.— 13. 
 
194 VALUE OF SUBJECT-MATTEE OE EIGHT , IN ISSUE. 
 
 If, however, the suit is against various defendants having 
 distinct claims of title to a parcel of land, then the value of 
 each distinct parcel must exceed two thousand dollars. Cooper 
 V. Preston, supra; Bates v. Carpentier, 98 Fed. 452; Stemm- 
 ler V. McISTeill, 102 Fed. 660. See Oarothers v. McKinley 
 Min. & Smelting Co. 116 Fed. 947. 
 
 The rule that each plaintiff must be competent to sue, and 
 each defendant competent to be sued, is applied (Ibid.), but 
 if the interest of the various defendants is undivided and com- 
 mon, though separate as between themselves, the aggregate of 
 the common interest fixes the jurisdiction. Ibid. ; Clay v. 
 Field, 138 U. S. 479, 34 L. ed. 1049, 11 Sup. Ot. Eep. 419. 
 
 Dissolution of Partnerships or Corporations. 
 
 In the dissolution of a partnership or corporation, it is the 
 value of the estate to be distributed that fixes the jurisdiction 
 (Kent v. Honsinger, 167 Fed. 620; Taylor v. Decatur Mineral 
 & Land Co. 112 Fed. 449 ; Jones v. Mutual Fidelity Co. 123 
 Fed. 506 ; Towle v. American Bldg. Loan & Invest. Soc. 60 
 Fed. 131), and not individual claims of creditor joining in 
 bill (Ibid.), provided the claims of all exceed two thousand 
 dollars. It rests upon the fact that while each creditors has a 
 distinct claim, yet they have a common interest in the insol- 
 vent estate to be administered in the court, in order to ascer- 
 tain the amount each shall receive ; in a word, they have a joint 
 interest in a controversy involving a fund within the jurisdic- 
 tion. Davies v. Corbin, 112 U. S. 36, 28 L. ed. 627, 5 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 4 ; Shields v. Thomas, 17 How. 3, 15 L. ed. 93 ; Put-* 
 nam v. Timothy Dry Goods & Carpet Co. 79 Fed. 454; Jones 
 V. Mutual Fidelity Co. 123 Fed. 514; Martin v. Kainwater, 
 5 C. C. A. 398, 12 U. S. App. 232, 56 Fed. 10; Handley v. 
 Stutz, 137 U. S. 366, 34 L. ed. 706, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 117; 
 Memphis Sav. Bank v. Houchens, 52 C. C. A. 176, 115 Fed. 
 96. 
 
 Partition Suits. 
 
 It is ordinarily true that parties having distinct interests in 
 property cannot join or aggregate the interests to obtain juris- 
 
VALUE OF SUBJECT-MATTER OE EIGHT IN ISSUE. 195 
 
 dictional amounts, yet the representatives of a deceased per- 
 son bringing suit against an administrator under the same 
 title, and for a common or undivided interest, may obtain jur- 
 isdiction on the value of the whole property, and not the value 
 of the interests of each (Shields v. Thomas, 17 How. 3, 15 
 L. ed. 93; Prince v. Towns, 33 Fed. 162), but when two or 
 more heirs sue for their respective interests, and unite to 
 avoid a multiplicity of suits, then the interests of each must ex- 
 ceed two thousand dollars. Eich v. Bray, 2 L.K.A. 225, 37 
 Fed. 276; Walter v. Northeastern E. Co. 147 U. S. 373, 37 
 L. ed. 208, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 348 ; Southern Land & Timber Co. 
 V. Johnson, 156 Fed. 246 ; Parker v. Morrill, 106 U. S. 2, 27 
 L. ed. 72, 1 Sup. Ct. Eep. 14. 
 
 So where suit is brought to enforce the liability of heirs for 
 debts of a decedent, the distributive share of each heir must 
 exceed two thousand dollars to be suable in the Federal courts. 
 Busey v. Smith, 67 Fed. 14. See McDaniel v. Traylor, 123 
 Fed. 339 ; Jones v. Mutual Fidelity Co. 123 Fed. 510, 511. 
 
 Suits for an Office. 
 
 When the matter in dispute is the deprivation of an office, 
 the salary fixes the amount. Simon v. House, supra, citing 
 Smith V. Adams, 130 U. S. 175, 32 L. ed. 898, 9 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 566, and Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S. 167, 29 L. ed. 
 601, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 570. 
 
 Amounts in Cases Sounding in Damages. 
 
 While this branch of the subject is not exactly within equi- 
 table cognizance, yet it is useful in discussing Federal jurisdic- 
 tion based on amount. The general rule is that in suits sound- 
 ing in damages the damages claimed gives the jurisdiction 
 (Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 550, 29 L. ed. 729, 6 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 501 ; Smith v. Greenhow, 109 TJ. S. 671, 27 L. ed. 1081, 
 3 Sup. Ct. Eep. 421 ; Von Schroeder v. 'Brittan, 93 Fed. 9 ; 
 Bank of Arapahoe v. David Bradley & Co. 19 C. C. A. 206, 
 36 U. S. App. 519, 72 Fed. 871 ; Kunkel v. Brown, 39 C. C. 
 A. 665, 99 Fed. 694, 595) ; for the law gives no rule and the 
 demand must furnish it, but, as in other cases, there must be 
 
196 VALUE OF SITBJECT-MATTJBE OE EIGHT IN ISSUE. 
 
 manifest good faith (Bank of Arapahoe v. David Bradley & 
 Co. 19 C. C. A. 206, 36 U. S. App. 519, Y2 Fed. 872; Von 
 Schroeder v. Brittan, 93 Fed. 10) ; and the fact that the 
 amount stated is not recovered is not a test, unless the evi- 
 dence shows that the amount stated was clearly to get juris- 
 diction (Bank of Arapahoe v. David Bradley & Co. 
 supra; Simon v. House, 46 Fed. 320), as, where the damages 
 are so trivial as to rebut good faith. Maxwell v. Atchison, T. 
 & S. F. E. Co. 34 Fed. 290, is an illustrative case. See Smith- 
 ers V. Smith, 204 U. S. 642, 51 L. ed. 660, 27 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 297, and Clement v. Louisville R Co. 153 Fed. 979. 
 
 Of course, where damages are set up in tort or wilful tres- 
 pass or personal injuries, it is diifictilt for a court to decide 
 what a jury may do in giving actual or exemplary damage, and 
 they are therefore not inclined to question the good faith of the 
 claim, or to decide it only colorable. Where the law gives no 
 rule, the demand of plaintifF must furnish one. Barry v. Ed- 
 munds, 116 U. S. 561, 29 L. ed. 732, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 501; 
 Simon v. House, 46 Fed. 321 ; Hynes v. Briggs, 41 Fed. 468 ; 
 Herbert v. Eainey, 54 Fed. 251; Eisele v. Oddie, 128 Fed. 
 942. 
 
 Exemplary damages claimed in loss of property rights 
 through fraud will not ordinarily be considered; it is only in 
 cases of wilful injury to person or property, or in slander, libel, 
 seduction, false imprisonment, etc. Bank of Arapahoe v. 
 David Bradley & Co. 19 C. C. A. 206, 36 TJ. S. App. 519, 72 
 Fed. 870; Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 14 L. ed. 181; 
 Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 562, 29 L. ed. 733, 6 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 501. 
 
 Again, in action for detention of property, damages to be 
 a part of amount fixing jiirisdiction must arise from the de- 
 tention, and not consequential, as injury to business (Vance v. 
 W. A. Vandercook Co. 170 U. S. 480, 481, 42 L. ed. 1115, 
 1116, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 645), or loss of trade and credit (Ibid.; 
 Watson V. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74, 18 L. ed. 580). 
 
 How Amount Alleged in Bill. 
 
 The facts upon which jurisdiction rests must always be 
 clearly alleged in the bill, that is, affirmatively appear because 
 
VALUE OF StTBJECT-MATTEE OK EIGHT IN ISSUE. 197 
 
 of the limited jurisdiction of the court. Hagge v. Kansas City 
 S. R. Co. 104 Fed. 393 ; Dupree v. Leggette, 140 Fed. 776, S. 
 C. 1-24: Fed. 700; Hanford v. Davies, 163 U. S. 279, 41 L. ed. 
 159, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1051; Simon v. House, 46 Fed. 318; 
 Grace v. American Cent. Ins. Co. 109 U. S. 283, 27 L. ed. 934, 
 
 3 Sup. Ct. Eep. 207 ; Continental L. Ins. Co. v. Ehoads, 119 
 U. S. 237, 30 L. ed. 380, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 193; Halsted v. Bus- 
 ter, 119 U. S. 341, 30 L. ed. 462, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 276; Mans- 
 tield, C. & L. M. E. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 37!), 28 L. ed. 462, 
 
 4 Sup. Ct. Eep. 510; Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 315, 32 L. ed. 
 tU)0, 9 Sup. Ct Eep. 289 ; Menard v. Goggan, 121 U. S. 253, 
 30 L. ed. 914, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 873. And the presumption is 
 that the cause is without jurisdiction unless it aiSrmatively ap- 
 pears in the bill. Ibid. ; United States v. Southern P. R. Co. 
 49 Fed. 297; Grace v. American Cent. Ins. Co. supra; King 
 Iron Bridge & Mfg. Co. v. Otoe County, 120 U. S. 226, 30 
 L. ed. 624, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 552 ; Adams v. Eepublic County, 
 23 Fed. 212 ; Lehigh Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U. S. 337, 
 40 L. ed. 448, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 307. 
 
 "With this formula, then, before us in statutory jurisdictional 
 facts, the matter of amount must be shown by allegation to 
 exceed two thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs. 
 Harvey v. Ealeigh & G. E. Co. 89 Fed. 115 ; Sturgeon Eiver 
 Booih Co. V. W. H. Sawyer Lumber Co. 89 Fed. 113. However, 
 in Eobinson v. Suburban Brick Co. 62 C. C. A. 484, 127 Fed. 
 806, it is said, that it is not essentially necessary that the 
 amount in controversy should be stated if it appears from the 
 bill, or in any part of the record citing many cases. 
 
 Affidavits to Show Amount. 
 
 However, if the amount is defectively stated, or in some 
 cases when not stated, as in suits for land when value has been 
 omitted, affidavits have been allowed to show the value to sus- 
 tain jurisdiction (Carr v. Fife, 156 U. S. 494, 39 L. ed. 508, 
 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 427 ; Eobinson v. Suburban Brick Co. supra ; 
 Red Eiver Cattle Co. v. Xeedham, 137 U. S. 633, 34 L. ed. 
 800, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 208 ; Richmond v. Milwaukee, 21 How. 
 
198 VALUE or SUBJECT-MATTEE OE EIGHT IN ISSUE. 
 
 391, 16 L. ed. 72), and consequently you may amend the bill 
 in this particular (Home Ins. Co. v. Nobles, 63 Fed. 641; 
 Whalen v. Gordon, 37 C. 0. A. 70, 95 Fed. 305 ; Johnston v. 
 Trippe, 33 Fed. 530 ; Ke Plymouth Cordage Co. 68 C. C. A. 
 434, 135 Fed. 1000-1003 ; Thompson v. Automatic Fire Pro- 
 tection Co. 151 Fed. 945, and cases cited. See Bowden v. 
 Bumham, 8 C. C. A. 248, 19 U. S. App. 448, 59 Fed. 754, 
 755) ; so if amount sufficient, but there was a failure to plead 
 it (Whalen v. Gordon, 37 C. C. A. 70, 95 Fed. 307). See 
 Bureau of ITational Literature v. Sells, 211 Fed. 383. 
 
CHAPTEE XXXIV. 
 
 HOW ISSUE IS RAISED. 
 
 Under the act of 1789 the issue of jurisdiction could only 
 be raised by plea in abatement and proof, where the jurisdic- 
 tion was properly averred. The court was powerless to dismiss 
 the cause, and could only punish by costs when it was deter- 
 mined in the trial that the jurisdiction had been imposed upon. 
 
 By the act of 1875, section 5, Congress provided that in 
 any suit commenced in or removed to the circuit courts of the 
 United States, if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the 
 court that such suit does not really smd substantially involve a 
 dispute or controversy properly in the jurisdiction of the court, 
 etc., the court shall proceed no further. (See chapter 87.) 
 Simon v. House, 46 Fed. 319 ; Anderson v. Watt, 138 U. S. 
 694-701, 34 L. ed. 1078-1081, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 449 ; Ore- 
 gon E. & Xav. Co. V. Shell, 143 Fed. 1006 ; Williams v. Not- 
 towa, 104 U. S. 212, 26 L. ed. 720; Hartog v. Memory, 116 
 U. S. 588, 29 L. ed. 725, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 521 ; Morris v. Gil- 
 mer, 129 U. S. 315-326, 32 L. ed. 690-694, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 289'; Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Tompkins, 41 C. C. A. 488, 
 101 Fed. 542 ; Defiance Water Co. v. Defiance, 191 U. S. 184, 
 48 L. ed. 140, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 63 ; Farmington v. Pillsbury, 
 114 U. S. 138, 29 L. ed. 114, 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 807 ; new Code 
 sec. 37 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1019) ; Baum v. Longwell, 200 
 Fed. 454. The act, as is seen, is mandatory and it should be 
 construed according to its spirit and intent, and it becomes the 
 manifest duty of the Federal courts to protect their jurisdic- 
 tion from imposition at any stage of the proceeding and when- 
 ever made apparent. Ibid. ; Bank of Arapahoe v. David Brad- 
 ley & Co. 19 C. C. A. 206, 36 U. S. App. 519, 72 Fed. 867; 
 Maxwell v. Atchison, T. & S. F. E. Co. 34 Fed. 286; Horst 
 V. Merkley, 59 Fed. 503 ; Terry v. Davy, 46 C. C. A. 141, 107 
 Fed. 52. 
 
 199 
 
200 HOW ISSUE IS RAISED. 
 
 The courts, in construing this statute and applying it, exer- 
 cise a legal, not a personal, discretion. Mere receiving an im- 
 pression that a substantial controversy within the jurisdiction 
 of the court is not involved is not sufficient. It must be a legal 
 certainty, and not a personal conviction, created by facts which 
 justify the conclusion. It will be seen that the statute does 
 not prescribe any mode by which it should be made to appear 
 that the jurisdiction has been imposed upon; or how the ob- 
 jection should be interposed. Wetmore v. Eymer, 169 TJ. S. 
 120, 42 L. ed. 684, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 293 ; Morris v. Gilmer, 
 129 U. S. 326, 32 L. ed. 694, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289; Simon 
 V. House, supra. ISTo doubt the court may from any source be 
 advised or led to suspect imposition, and it may cause the 
 necessary inquiry to be made, and have the issue raised in such 
 form as it may direct (Ibid.), and tried as an independent 
 issue (Hartog v. Memory, 116 U. S. 591, 29 L. ed. 726, 6 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 521 ; Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U. S. 122, 42 L. ed. 
 684, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 293; Terry v. Davy, supra; Kirven v, 
 Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. 76 C. C. A. 172, 145 Fed. 
 291, 7 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 219; Hill v. Walker, 92 C. C. A. 
 633, 167 Fed. 245, 246) ; but the evidence must create a legal 
 certainty (Wetmore v. Rymer, supra) ; and if the court acts sua 
 sponte the plaintiff is entitled to a hearing. (Hartog v. Mem- 
 ory, supra). The issue is raised by motion or answer under 
 new rule 29. 
 
 The trial court is not bound by the pleadings of the parties, 
 and even though the amount may be alleged, yet if from the 
 allegations of the bill it may be determined as a matter of law 
 the amount could not be recovered, the court would dismiss. 
 Holden v. Utah & M. Machinery Co. 82 Fed. 209. Such was 
 the character of the case just cited, and it was so held on the 
 principle suggested in Simon v. House, 46 Fed. 321, and other 
 cases, that the subject-matter may be so far below the allega- 
 tions of amount as to raise the inference that the statement 
 as made showed knowledge or inexcusable ignorance. Ten- 
 nent Stribling Shoe Co. v. Roper, 36 C. C. A. 455, 94 Fed. 
 742 ; American Wringer Co. v. Ionia, 76 Fed. 7 ; Vance v. W. 
 A. Vandercook Co. 170 U. S. 468, 42 L. ed. 1111, 18 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 645 ; Levinski v. Middlesex Bkg. Co. 34 C. C. A. 452, 
 92 Fed. 463; Kunkel v. Brown, 39 C. C. A. 665, 99 Fed. 
 695. 
 
HOW ISSUE IS EAISED, 201 
 
 By Motion or Answer. 
 
 If, however, the jurisdiction is properly alleged, and it is 
 not apparent that the court has been imposed upon, then you 
 must raise the issue by motion or answer. If raised by motion, 
 and the allegations of the amount are shown not to have been 
 raised in good faith, the bill will be dismissed unless an amend- 
 ment can be fairly made to bring the case within the jurisdic- 
 tion, under new rule 28, el. 2, and rule 19. Jones v. Rowley, 
 73 Fed. 286; Bank of Arapahoe v. David Bradley & Co. supra; 
 Less V. English, 29 C. C. A. 275, 56 U. S. App. 16, 85 Fed. 
 477 ; Oregon E. & Nav. Co. v. Shell, 143 Fed. 1005 ; Ung Lung 
 Chung V. HoLmes, 98 Fed. 323 ; Butters v. Carney, 127 Fed. 
 623, see Ashley v. Presque Isle County, 27 C. C. A. 585, 54 
 IT. S. App. 450, 83 Fed. 534. But when made in good faith 
 the fact that plaintiff may not be able to recover all he sues for 
 will not affect jurisdiction. Ibid. 
 
 It is said you can raise the issue of jurisdiction by motion or 
 answer when the absence of jurisdiction is not apparent on the 
 bill. Where you are certain of your proof, and that the motion 
 will be sustained, and that there is no reasonable ground for 
 amendment, then the motion should be interposed, as it presents 
 a single issue to which your evidence can be confined; but if 
 there is a reasonable ground for amendment so as to bring the 
 ease within the jurisdiction of the court, then it is best to raise 
 the issue by answer; because. First, if you sustain your plea, 
 and the amendment is made, by which the court retains juris- 
 diction, you have lost the time in bringing the plea to issue, 
 taking the evidence and trial, which could have been used in 
 bringing the whole case to issue and trial, including the issue 
 of jurisdiction. 
 
 Second. Because if your plea is overruled you are left to 
 the mercy of the court. 
 
 (a) If you are permitted to answer over, the court may 
 arbitrarily fix the time for answer. 
 
 (b) You are debarred from setting up in your answer the 
 matter set up in the plea. 
 
 (c) In making your issues by answer you can take the 
 evidence on all the issues in your case, including the issue of 
 jurisdiction, at the same time, and after you strengthen the 
 
5j02 how issue is kaised. 
 
 plea to the jurisdiction by the general evidence taken in the 
 case in support of the answer. 
 
 The following forms may be used in raising the issue; 
 
 Motion When Want Of Jurisdiction Appears. 
 
 In District Court of the United 
 
 Title as in bill. States for the District of 
 
 , sitting at 
 
 Now comes the defendant (naming him) and says that it appears on the 
 face of the bill filed in this cause that this case does not really and sub- 
 stantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction 
 of this court, in that the amount or the value of the subject matter in 
 dispute, as appears from the bill, does not exceed the sum of three thousand 
 dollars exclusive of interest and costs: Wherefore defendant prays that 
 the bill be dismissed and that he have judgment for costs. 
 
 E. F., 
 Solicitor. 
 
 If the want of jurisdictional amount does not appear and 
 you wish to raise the issue then use the following form of 
 motion : 
 
 And now comes the defendant (naming him) and says that this case 
 does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly 
 In the jurisdiction of this court, in that the amount sued for or the value 
 of the subject matter as alleged is not truly stated or alleged in good faith. 
 And this defendant says the amount (or value of the subject matter) in- 
 volved in this suit does not exceed the sum of three thousand dollars exclu- 
 sive of interest and costs. All of which he avers to be true and sets up 
 the same in bar of the complaint in the bill and prays the court to dismiss 
 the said bill and give him judgment for his costs. 
 
 When the issue is set up in the answer you may use the same 
 form of words as in the motion. 
 
 While these forms are ordinarily sufficient, yet the language 
 to be used must, in view of the allegations of the bill and the 
 nature of the controversy, be such as to substantially raise the 
 issue. Simon v. House, 46 Fed. 318. 
 
 If neither plea nor answer raises the issue of jurisdiction, 
 but it should appear in the trial of the cause that the amount 
 actually involved (or value of the subject-matter in issue), is not 
 in excess of three thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and 
 costs, but in fact the jurisdiction has been imposed upon, and 
 
HOW ISSUE IS BAISBD. 203 
 
 from the evidence it seems that the allegations \yere not made 
 in good faith, then you may by suggestion, or a simple motion 
 in writing, ask the court to dismiss the case ; but, as before 
 said, the disclosure must arise out of legitimate evidence on 
 the material issues of the case, and in the absence of a plea or 
 answer raising the issue, the court will not hear direct evidence 
 upon the question of amount. Wetmore v. Eymer, 169 U. S. 
 122, 42 L. ed. 684, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 293. 
 
CHAPTEK XXXV. 
 
 HOW THE ISSUE IS TRIED. 
 
 When the issue is raised as prescribed by rule 29, either 
 party may set down the issue, whether raised by motion or 
 in the answer for hearing in advance of the trial on the merits. 
 By equity rule 6 it may be tried on any motion day, or at any 
 other time, or at any place as the judge may indicate, reason- 
 able notice being given to the opposite party of the time and 
 place of hearing. Rule ISTo. 29 indicates five days as reason- 
 able notice. 
 
 If the issue is a part of your answer to the bill, the evidence 
 is taken in connection with the evidence on the merits of the 
 whole bill, and is heard upon the final hearing, or may be sub- 
 mitted in advance of the hearing on the whole case, which is 
 the better practice, and to that end you may set down the issue 
 for hearing, without reference to the merits of the case. Butters 
 V. Carney, 127 Fed. 623. 
 
 If the issue has not been raised by motion or answer, but the 
 evidence taken shows a want of jurisdiction, as said, you may 
 call the attention of the court to the fact by motion or other 
 suggestion, and use the evidence taken to show it, or if you 
 do not raise the question the court may order the issue made 
 and tried, and it is its duty to do so if the evidence taken shows 
 imposition on the jurisdiction. Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 
 315-326, 32 L. ed. 690-694, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 289; Metcalf 
 V. Watertown, 128 U. S. 586, 32 L. ed. 543, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 173. In whatever way the issue is raised it should be tried 
 at once, as an independent issue in advance of the merits. 
 Playford v. Lockard, 65 Fed. 870 ; Terry v. Davy, 46 C. C. A. 
 141, 107 Fed. 52, and cases cited; Ashley v. Presque Isle 
 County, 8 C. C. A. 455, 16 U. S. App. 656, 709, 60 Fed. 
 
 204 
 
HOW THE ISSUE IS TRIED, 205 
 
 55-68 ; Kirven v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. 76 C. C. A. 
 172, 145 Fed. 291, 292, 7 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 219. 
 
 By Affidavits. 
 
 The practice of permitting affidavits to be filed in the Su- 
 preme Court to show jurisdiction arose from instances of acci- 
 dental omission of allegation in the pleadings, and no issue 
 of value raised in the court below. If there was a real con- 
 troversy as to value, it must be settled in the first instance 
 and upon notice and trial. Holden v. Utah & M. Machinery 
 Co. 82 Fed. 210 ; Eed River Cattle Co. v. Needham, 137 U. 
 S. 635, 34 L. ed. 800, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 208 ; Carr v. Fife, 
 156 U. S. 494, 39 L. ed. 508, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 427; Eector v. 
 Lipscomb, 141 U. S. 558, 559, 35 L. ed. 857, 858, 12 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 83. See Talkington v. Dumbleton, 123 U. S. 745, 
 746, 31 L. ed. 313, 314, 8 Sup. Ct. Eep. 335; Eobinson v. 
 Suburban Brick Co. 62 C. C. A. 484, 127 Fed. 806 ; Greene 
 County Bank v. J. H. Teasdale Commission Co. 112 Fed. 803, 
 and cases cited; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso. 
 166 U. S. 310, 41 L. ed. 1017, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 540. In 
 Wilson V. Blair, 119 U. S: 387, 30 L. ed. 441, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 230, it was declared to be good practice for the circuit 
 court to allow affidavits and counter-affidavits in determining 
 amount for appeal. Davie v. Heyward, 33 Fed. 95 ; Morris v. 
 Gilmer, 129 U. S. 326, 32 L. ed. 694, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 289. 
 
 In Talkington v. Dumbleton, 123 U. S. 745, 31 L. ed. 313, 
 8 Sup. Ct. Eep. 335, the court states the result of all tie cases, 
 as to pei-mitting affidavits to show the jurisdiction of the Su- 
 preme Court, as follows : 
 
 First. When demand not for money, and the value of the 
 thing demanded is required to be stated, you cannot vary by 
 affidavits the statement as made. Green County Bank v. J. H. 
 Teasdale Commission Co. 112 Fed. 803. 
 
 Second. Nor when evidence is oilered below on the ques- 
 tion of value. 
 
 Third. But when an appeal is taken without any question 
 of value, and it is nowhere disclosed in the record, affidavits 
 will be heard. (Authorities above.) 
 
206 HOW THE ISSUE IS TRIED. 
 
 Burden of Proof. 
 
 The burden is on the defendant, when raised by motion or 
 answer. Butters v. Carney, 127 Fed. 622 ; contra^ Oregon E. 
 & Nav. Co. V. Shell, 143 Fed. 1005. 
 
CHAPTER XXXVI. 
 
 AMENDING TO SHOW JURISDICTION. 
 
 Having now discussed the fundamental grounds of Federal 
 jurisdiction, and when, where, and how it must be shown, as 
 well as how the issue, if any, is to be made and tried, I will 
 now briefly speak of the right of amendment of jurisdictional 
 allegations. We have just said one may amend his bill to 
 show jurisdiction as to amount, where the facts warrant the 
 exercise of jurisdiction. Bowden v. Burnham, 8 C. C. A. 
 248, 19 IT. S. App. 448, 59 Fed. 754, 755 ; Whalen v. Gor- 
 don, 37 C. C. A. 70, 95 Fed. 307 ; Carnegie, P. & Co. v. Hul- 
 bert, 16 C. C. A. 498, 36 U. S. App. 81, 70 Fed. 218 ; Weller 
 V. Hanaur, 105 Fed. 194; Davis v. Kansas City, S. & M. R. 
 Co. 32 Fed. 863 ; Ee Plymouth Cordage Co. 68 0. C. A. 434, 
 135 Fed. 1003. And when an amendment is necessary, the 
 jurisdiction is established from the beginning of the suit, and 
 not date of amendment. Bowden v. Bumham, 8 C. C. A. 248, 
 19 TJ. S. App. 448, 59 Fed. 754; Betzoldt v. American Ins. 
 Co. 47 Fed. 707. And this rule applies to any jurisdictional 
 allegation that can be amended, as, where an allegation that a 
 plaintiff is a citizen of a State, when in fact he was an alien, 
 upon which status the jurisdiction depended; plaintiff may 
 amend his pleading and allege he was an alien when the action 
 was brought. Grove v. Grove, 93 Fed. 865 ; Woodridge v. Mc- 
 Kenna, 8 Fed. 679 ; Glover v. Shepperd, 11 Biss. 572, 15 Fed. 
 888 ; Thompson v. Automatic Fire Protection Co. 151 Fed. 
 945. Or where there is a failure to give the residence of the 
 parties, it may be amended on motion without delay. Harvey 
 V. Richmond & M. R. Co. 64 Fed. 20 ; Riggs v. Brown, 172 
 Fed. 637. See act of March 3d, 1915, sec. 274 (c) Judicial 
 Code. 
 
 So you may strike out by amendment the name of a party 
 not indispensable, if the presence of such party affects the 
 
 207 
 
208 AMENDING TO SHOW JUElSDICTIOIir. 
 
 jurisdiction, — as, wlien it is necessary to create diversity of 
 citizenship. Union Mill & Min. Co. v. Dangberg, 81 Ped. 89 ; 
 Grove V. Grove, 93 Fed. 867; new rule 39; Hayne v. Old 
 Dominion Co. 204 Fed. 682; St. Louis Independent Packing 
 Co. v. Houston, 132 C. C. A. 65, 215 Fed. 557 bot. 
 
 In Weller v. Hanaur, 105 Fed. 193, it was sought after the 
 trial to amend to get jurisdiction by setting up assignment of 
 the interest of one party plaintiff to the other so as to create 
 the diversity of citizenship necessary, but the court refused to 
 permit it, on the ground that the jurisdiction must have existed 
 when the suit was filed or tried. 
 
 So amendments of this character cannot be made on appeal, 
 but the appellate court will reverse where the record is defective 
 in its jurisdictional allegations, and remand the cause for 
 amendment in this respect. Preferred Acci. Ins. Co. v. Barker, 
 32 C. C. A. 124, 58 U. S. App. 171, 88 Fed. 814; Van Doren 
 V. Pennsylvania Co. 35 C. C. A. 282, 93 Fed. 272, and cases 
 cited ; Grove v. Grove, supra ; Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U. S. 
 590, 32 L. ed. 544, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 173. . 
 
 See act March 3d, 1915, allowing amendments after appeal to 
 show diversity of citizenship to sustain jurisdiction. Thomas 
 V. Anderson, 138 C. C. A. 405, 223 Fed. 42, where under equity 
 rule 27 the jurisdictional facts are required to be alleged and 
 sworn to, a failure to allege them as required cannot be amended. 
 Dickinson v. Consolidated Traction Co. 114 Fed. 242, 243. As 
 to allegations under the rule see Russell v. Shippen Bros. Lum- 
 ber Co. 224 Fed. 255. 
 
 However, see new rule 19, permitting the court in further- 
 ance of justice to amend any process, proceeding, pleading, or 
 record, and requiring the court to disregard at every stage of 
 the proceeding errors or defects which do not affect the sub- 
 stantial rights of parties, giving an illimitable scope to the exer- 
 cise of the discretion of the court in granting amendments at 
 any stage of a case. See act March 3d, 1915, permitting amend- 
 ments at any stage of proceedings to obviate the objection that 
 the suit was not brought on the right side of the court. 
 
CHAPTER XXXVIL 
 
 JUEISDICTION BY ASSIGNMENT. 
 
 Section 11 of the judiciary act of 1789 provided as follows : 
 "Nor shall any circuit or district court have cognizance of any 
 suits to recover the contents of any promissory note, or other 
 chose in action, in favor of an assignee, unless a suit might 
 have been prosecuted in such court if no assignment had been 
 made. Except in cases of foreign bills of exchange." This 
 restriction over assigned claims was intended to prevent the 
 creation of jurisdiction by simply assigning choses in action to 
 a citizen of another State. New Orleans v. Quinlan, 173 IT. S. 
 191, 43 L. ed. 664, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 329 ; Davis v. Mills, 99 
 Fed. 40, and cases cited ; Tierney v. Helvetia Swiss F. Ins. Co. 
 163 Fed. 82; Utah-Nevada Co. v. De Lamar, 66 C. C. A. 179, 
 133 Fed. 113, 75 C. C. A. 1, 145 Fed. 506; Mexican Nat. R. 
 Co. V. Davidson, 157 U. S. 206-208, 39 L. ed. 674, 675, 15 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563; Smith v. Fifield, 33 C. C. A. 681, 63 U. 
 S. App.. 531, 91 Fed. 561 ; Stimson v. United Wrapping Mach. 
 Co. 156 Fed. 298, 299; Bolles v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. 127 
 Fed. 884; Ferguson v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co. 169 Fed. 
 888, and cases cited; Dulles v. H. D. Crippen Mfg. Co. 156 
 Fed. 708 ; Gorman-Wright Co. v. Wright, 67 C. C. A. 345, 134 
 Fed. 365, and cases cited; State Nat. Bank v. Eureka Springs 
 Water Co. 174 Fed. 828. However where the court has juris- 
 diction of one claim it may determine the whole matter though 
 other claims sued on were assigned to the plaintiff by persons 
 that could not sue. Howe & D. Co. v. Hangan, 140 Fed. 183. 
 
 The act of 1875 provided: "No circuit or district court shall 
 have cognizance of any suit founded on contract in favor of an 
 assignee, unless suit might have been prosecuted in such court 
 to recover thereon if no assignment had been made, except in 
 eases of promissory notes negotiable by the law merchant, and 
 bills of exchange." Ibid. ; Tredway v. Sanger, 107 U. S. 324, 
 27 L. ed. 582, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 691; Emsheimer v. New Or- 
 S. Eq.— 14, 209 
 
210 JUEISDICTION BY ASSIGNMENT. 
 
 leans, 186 U. S. 43, 46 L. ed. 1046, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 170, 
 S. 0. 56 C. C. A. 189, 119 Fed. 1019 ; Glass v. Concordia Par- 
 ish, 176 U. S. 209, 44 L. ed. 437, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 346. 
 
 By the act of 1888, now in force, the language was some- 
 what changed as follows: "Nor shall any district or circuit 
 court of the United States have cognizance of any suits, except 
 on foreign bills of exchange, to recover the contents of any 
 promissory notes, or other choses in action in favor of any 
 assignee, or of any subsequent holder, if such instrument be 
 payable to hearer, and be not made hy any corporation, unless 
 such suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover 
 the said contents if no assignment or transfer had been made." 
 U. S. Rev. Stat. § 629. Embodied in new Code, sec. 24 
 (Comp. Stat. 1913, § 991) (appendix). 
 
 The act means that a district court of the United States shall 
 not have jurisdiction over a suit by an assignee of a promissory 
 note, or other chose in action (except a foreign bill of exchange), 
 unless the suit could have been maintained on the instrument 
 in said court before the assignment ; and that a subsequent hold- 
 er of a promissory note, or other chose in action, "payable to 
 bearer" (except a foreign bill of exchange, or an instrument 
 made by a corporation), cannot sue in the circuit court of the 
 United States unless the suit might have been brought upon 
 such instrument in said court before the transfer was made to 
 the subsequent holder. 
 
 Thus we see that Federal courts have not jurisdiction of a 
 suit brought by the assignee of a promissory note, or chose in 
 action, when the assignor could not have maintained it in said 
 court, when the suit was brought. Troy Bank v. Whitehead, 
 184 Fed. 932 ; Watterman v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. 199 Fed. 
 667, and cases cited; Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. Orr, 215 
 Fed. 263; Emsheimer v. New Orleans, 186 U. S. 44, 46 L. ed. 
 1047, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770; Noyes v. Crawford, 133 Fed. 796; 
 Jones V. Shapurn, 57 Fed. 457 ; New Orleans v. Benjamin, 153 
 U. S. 433, 38 L. ed. 772, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 905, 7l'Fed. 758; 
 Sullivan v. Ayer, 174 Fed. 199 ; Skinner v. Barr, 77 Fed. 816. 
 When the original beneficial owner could sue in the Federal 
 courts, then the assignee can sue though the nominal payee could 
 not, by reason of his citizenship. Kirvin v, Virginia-CaroUna 
 Chemical Co. 76 C. C. A. 172, 145 Fed. 290, 7 A. & E. Ann. 
 
JDEISDIOTION BY ASSIGNMENT. 211 
 
 Cas. 219, and cases cited. It is not necessary that the assignor 
 shoxild have been a resident of the assignee's district in which 
 the suit is brought. Stinson v. United Wrapping Mach. Co. 156 
 Fed. 298. See Dulles v. H. D. Crippen Mfg. Co. 156 Fed. 
 706, and Ferguson v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co. supra; 
 Cincinnati, H. & D. E. Co. v. Orr, 215 Fed. 261. 
 
 The clause, "if such instrument be payable to bearer, and 
 be not made by a corporation," operates as an exception to the 
 general rule, and gives jurisdiction to assignees, when the instru- 
 ment is made by a corporation, and payable to bearer, that is, 
 negotiable by mere delivery. 
 
 So an assignee of a foreign bill of exchange, or promissory 
 notes "payable to bearer," executed by corporations, may sue 
 in the Federal courts unrestricted by this section of the judiciary 
 act. ISTewgass v. Xew Orleans, 33 Fed. 196; Eollins v. Chaf- 
 fee County, 34 Fed. 91 ; Wilson v. Knox County, 43 Fed. 481 ; 
 Steel V. Eathbun, 42 Fed. 390; Kearny County v. Irvine, 61 
 C. C. A. 607, 126 Fed. 694. 
 
 With these exceptions, all choses in action which required 
 an assignment to give a right of action, and promissory notes 
 pavable to bearer and passing by delivery, are within the act 
 Ibid. 
 
 Effect of Reassignment. 
 
 If original assignor could sue, the fact the note has been re- 
 assigned by one who could not, by reason of his citizenship, sue 
 in the Federal court, would not affect right of the original as- 
 signor to sue in the Federal courts. Moore Bros. Glass Co. 
 v. Drevet Mfg. Co. 154 Fed. 737. Objection to the jurisdic- 
 tion, that it does not appear that the assignor could sue in the 
 Federal courts can be raised at any time. Utah-jSTevada Co. 
 V. De Lamar, 66 0. C. A. 179, 183 Fed. 117. 
 
 What Are Choses in Action Within the Statute? 
 
 In determining what is included in the words "choses in 
 action," as used by the statute, it was early stated that the words 
 comprehended all causes of action that could be equitably or 
 legally assigned. Mexican ISTat. R. Go. v. Davidson, 157 TJ. S. 
 201-206, 39 L. ed. 672-674, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 563 ; and Utah- 
 
212 JUKISDICTION BY ASSIGNMENT. 
 
 Nevada Co. v. De Lamar, 66 C. C. A. 179, 133 Fed. 119-123, 
 review the cases construing the several acts of 1789, 1875, and 
 1888. Gorman-Wright Co. v. Wright, 67 C. C. A. 345, 134 
 Fed. 364; Brown v. Beacon, 174 Fed. 814, 815; Jackson & S. 
 Co. V. Pearson, 60 Fed. 117; Farr v. Hobe-Peters Land Co. 
 110 C. C. A. 160, 188 Fed. 10. 
 
 It will be seen by these cases that the words include all char- 
 acter of contracts, covenants, and promises which confer the 
 right to recover a personal chattel, or sum of money, except 
 when transferrd by operation of law. Assignments by opera- 
 tion of law creating legal representatives are not within the 
 statute. Ibid. 
 
 In Mexican ISTat. R Co. v. Davidson, 157 U. S. 201-209, 
 39 L. ed. 672, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 563, the court holds that the 
 words, "if the instrument be payable to bearer, and be not made 
 by a corporation," did not limit the comprehensiveness of the 
 words "choses in action," as construed above. Ibid. ; Sheldon 
 V. Sill, 8 How. 449, 12 L. ed. 1151 ; Ban v. Columbia South- 
 ern E. Co. 54 C. C. A. 407, 117 Fed. 21 ; Color v. Grainger 
 County, 20 C. C. A. 267, 43 U. S. App. 252, 74 Fed. 21, 22; 
 Corbin v. Black Hawk County, 105 U. S. 664, 665, 26 L. ed. 
 1138 ; Plant Invest. Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & K. W. K. Co. 152 
 U. S. 77, 38 L. ed.' 360, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 483; Shoecraft v. 
 Bloxham, 124 U. S. 735, 31 L. ed. 576, 8 Sup. Ct. Eep. 686; 
 Ambler v. Eppinger, 137 U. S. 482, 34 L. ed. 766, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 173; Bertha Zinc & Mineral Co. v. Vaughan, 88 Fed. 
 569, 570. 
 
 "Choses in action" do not include rights of action founded 
 on a wrong-ful act or neglect of duty causing damages, but are 
 limited to suits founded upon contracts containing within them- 
 selves some promise or duty to be performed. Ambler v. Ep- 
 pinger, 137 U. S. 480, 34 L. ed. 765, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 173; 
 Bushnell v. Kennedy, 9 Wall. 387, 19 L. ed. 736; Conn v. 
 Chicago, B. & Q. E. Co. 48 Fed. 178 ; Muller v. Chicago, I. & 
 L. E. Co. 149 Fed. 940. 
 
 Illustrations. 
 
 A parol contract falls within the words "choses in action.' 
 IJtah-Ifevada Co. v. De Lamax, 66 C. C. A. 179, 133 Fed. 120. 
 So does an assignment of a lease. Brooks v. Laurent, 
 
JURISDICTION BY ASSIGNMENT. 21-3 
 
 39 C. C. A. 201, 98 Fed. 651 ; See Adams v. Shirk, 44 C. 
 C. A. 653, 105 Fed. 659-663. So does a judgment. Walker 
 V. Powers, 104 U. S. 248, 26 L. ed. T30 ; Mississippi Mills v. 
 Cohn, 150 U. S. 208, 87 L. ed. 1054, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 76; 
 Metcalf V. Watertown, 128 U. S. 588, 32 L. ed. 543, 9 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 173. See Hulthberg v. Anderson, 170 Fed. 657, for 
 exception. So does a contract for specific performance. Cor- 
 bin V. Black Hawk County, 105 U. S. 659, 26 L. ed. 136; 
 Shoecraft v. Bloxham, 124 U. S. 735, 31 L. ed. 576, 8 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 686. And a contract to convey land. Plant Invest. 
 Co. V. Jacksonville, T. & K. W. E. Co. 152 U. S. 76, 38 L. ed. 
 360, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 483. It includes non-negotiable instru- 
 ments also. Smith v. Fifield, 33 C. C. A. 681, 63 U. S. App. 
 531, 91 Fed. 561. So in a suit to foreclose a mortgage. Hoad- 
 ley V. Day, 128 Fed. 302 ; Kolze v. Hoadley, 200 U. S. 76, 50 
 L. ed. 377, 26 Sup. Ct. Eep. 220 ; Nelson v. Eaton, 13 C. C. 
 A. 523, 27 U. S. App. 677, 66 Fed. 376. But not to a pur- 
 chaser under foreclosure seeking to remove cloud. Hobe-Peters 
 Land Co. v. Farr, 170 Fed. 644. 
 
 A claim for overcharge in freight was held not to come 
 within the statute. Conn v. Chicago, B. & Q. E. Co. 48 Fed. 
 177; Edmunds v. Illinois E. Co. 80 Fed. 78. So, a nonresi- 
 dent assignee of a share in an estate, who sues the administra- 
 tor on his bond, is not an assignee of a chose in action. Bertha 
 Zinc & Mineral Co. v. Vaughan, 88 Fed. 566. So, a suit by 
 an assignee to force a transfer of stock is not within the statute. 
 Jewett V. Bradford Sav. Bank & T. Co. 45 Fed. 802. A pur- 
 chaser under a decree of foreclosure is not an assignee within 
 the statute. Portage City Water Co. v. Portage, 102 Fed. 
 769 ; Hobe-Peter Land Co. v. Farr, supra. 
 
 Having seen what character of obligations are included in 
 the words "choses in action," I will now illustrate by cases 
 the jurisdiction of the Federal court as limited by the first sec- 
 tion of the act of 1888. 
 
 In ISTewgass v. New Orleans, 33 Fed. 196, the statute was 
 construed shortly after its passage in 1887, and it was held that 
 when the transfers of "choses in action" required an assign- 
 ment, the court had no jurisdiction of a suit by the assignee, if 
 the assignor could not sue in the Fede'^al court; and where 
 transfers were made by delivery, the obligation being paid to 
 
214 JUEISDICTION BY ASSIGNMENT. 
 
 bearer, such choses in action were also excluded unless made 
 by a corporation, and the statute was construed as follows: 
 
 (a) When suits were on foreign bills of exchange. 
 
 (b) When suits were such that the original payee in the 
 instrument could sue in the Federal courts. 
 
 (c) When suits were upon "choses in action" payable to 
 bearer, executed by a corporation, then such suits could be 
 brought in the Federal court; otherwise a Federal court had 
 no jurisdiction of a suit brought by ap. assignee. The construc- 
 tion was followed in Rollins v. Chaffee County, 34 Fed. 91; 
 Wilson V. Knox County, 43 Fed. 481, and approved by the Su- 
 preme Court in New Orleans v. Quinlan, 173 U. S. 191, 43 
 L. ed. 664, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 329, 92 Fed. 695 ; Laird v. In- 
 demnity Mut. M. Assur. Co. 44 Fed. 712 ; Bank of British K 
 A. V. Barling, 46 Fed. 357; Thompson v. Searcy County, 6 
 C. C. A. 674, 12 U. S. App. 618, 57 Fed. 1036. 
 
 In Holmes v. Goldsmith, 147 U. S. 156, 37 L. ed. 120, 13 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 288, a note was made by a citizen of Oregon 
 and payable to a citizen of Oregon, it seems for accommodation. 
 The payee discounted the note in New York, and the New York 
 parties sued in the Federal courts of Oregon. Court held juris- 
 diction in the case, but placed it on the ground that the note 
 being made for the accommodation of the indorser, he was in 
 legal effect the maker, and had no cause of action against the 
 maker, and was not an assignor of a cause of action within the 
 meaning of the statute. But, as stated before, the section of 
 the act was intended to prevent assignments by citizens of the 
 same State with the debtor, so as to give jurisdiction to Fed- 
 eral courts. New Orleans v. Benjamin, 153 U. S; 433, 38 
 L..ed. 772, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 905; Brigham-Hopkins Co. v. 
 Gross, 107 Fed. 770; Chase v. Sheldon Roller-Mills Co. 56 
 Fed. 625. See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 287, 
 48 L. ed. 448, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269, holding a citizen of one 
 State can assign to his State bonds of another State, and suit 
 may be brought by the assignee Stat« in the Supreme Court of 
 the United States, but this is a clear evasion of the 11th Amend- 
 ment to the Constitution of the United States, as shown by the 
 dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White, pp. 329 et seq. 
 
CHAPTEK XXXVIII. 
 
 PROMISSORY NOTES PAYABLE TO BEARER MADE BY COEPORATIONS. 
 
 The evident purpose of this provision of the act was to retain 
 jurisdiction in the Federal courts of a large class of securities 
 made by corporations which are sold in open market and pass 
 by delivery.. Wilson v. Knox County, supra. 
 
 Municipal bonds payable to , or order, 
 
 and originally sold to a citizen of Iowa, from whom the plain- 
 tiff, a citizen of New Hampshire, purchased them, were held 
 m legal effect payable to bearer (Independent School Dist. v. 
 Hall, 113 U. S. 135, 28 L. ed. -954, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 371; 
 Reynolds v. Lyon County, 97 Fed. 155), and, being executed 
 by a corporation, were within the jurisdiction of a Federal court. 
 Lyon Comity v. Keene Five Cent Sav. Bank, 40 C. C. A. 391, 
 100 Fed. 337; Citizens' Sav. Bank v. Newburyport, 95 C. C. A. 
 232, 169 Fed. 766 ; Lake County v. Diidley, 173 U. S. 243- 
 250, 43 L. ed. 684-687, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 398; Gambee v. 
 Rural Independent School Dist. 182 Fed. 514. Contra Thom- 
 son V. Elton, 100 Fed. 145 ; Kearny County v. Irvine, 61 C. C. 
 A. 607, 126 Fed. 694. 
 
 In Quinlan v. Xew Orleans, 92 Fed. 695, it is held that if 
 the proper diversity of citizenship exists, the holder of a note 
 payable to bearer, executed by a corporation, may sue in the 
 Federal courts, but not so if not payable to bearer. New Or- 
 leans V. Quinlan, 173 U. S. 192, 43 L. ed. 664, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 329; Cloud v. Sumas, 52 Fed. 177; Loeb v. .Columbia Twp. 
 179 U. S. 485, 486, 45 L. ed. 288, 289, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 174. 
 
 You see, a distinction is made between bonds and notes, exe- 
 cuted by a corporation, payable to bearer, and not payable to 
 bearer; only those payable to hearer can be sued upon by an 
 assignee, whether the assignor could sue or not; that is, it is 
 
 215 
 
216 PEOMISSOEY NOTES PAYABLE TO BEAEEB. 
 
 not necessary to show diversity of citizenship between the origi- 
 nal parties to the instrument in order for an assignee to main- 
 tain the suit in a Federal court. See Keene Five-Cent Sav. 
 Bank v. Lyon County, 90 Fed. 530, 531 ; Jones v. Shapera, 
 6 C. C. A. 423, 13 U. S. App. 481, 57 Fed. 462. 
 
 In New Orleans v. Benjamin, 153 U. S. 411, 38 L. ed. 764, 
 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 905, suit was brought upon warrants executed 
 by a corporation, payable to the order of a certain person, and 
 other warrants simply stating an indebtedness to certain per- 
 sons, not being payable to bearer. The Supreme Court held the 
 assignee must show the assignor could sue in a Federal court. 
 
 In Thomson v. Elton, 100 Fed. 145, it was held that the 
 holder of a municipal bond payable to a person named, or order, 
 and indorsed in blank, could only maintain an action in the 
 Federal court when payee could do so, as the title comes through 
 him. However, though bonds cannot be sued upon, you may 
 sue on coupons payable to bearer. Independent School Dist. 
 V. Eew, 55 L.E.A. 364, 49 C. C. A. 198, 111 Fed. 2; Eeynolds 
 V. Lyon County, supra. But in Lyon County v. Keene Five- 
 Cent Sav. Bank, supra, the court held that a municipal bond 
 
 payable to , or order, is in legal, effect payable 
 
 to bearer and within the exception made by the statute, it hav- 
 ing been executed by a corporation. Keene Five-Cent Sav. 
 Bank v. Lyon County, 90 Fed. 523. 
 
 In Loeb v. Columbia TvTp. 91 Fed. 37, townships issued 
 bonds; held issued by a corporation, so that assignee may sue. 
 Kearny County v. Irvine, 61 C. C. A. 607, 126 Fed. 689. 
 
 In Wilson v. Knox County, 43 Fed. 481, held, county war- 
 rants not payable to bearer must show original payee could sue. 
 See Kearny County v. Irvine, 61 C. C. A. 607, 126 Fed. 694. 
 Citizens of another State brought suit on coupons payable to 
 bearer purchased after detached. Held, their right to siie in 
 the Federal court was not affected by the citizenship of the 
 holder of the bonds, though payable to citizens of the county. 
 Eeynolds v. Lyon County and Independent School Dist. v. 
 Eew, supra; Edwards v. Bates County, 163 U. S. 269, 41 
 L. ed. 155, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 967; J^esbit v. Independent Dist. 
 144 H. S. 610, 36 L. ed. 562, 12 S-ip. Ct. Eep. 746. County 
 warrants payable "to bearer" can be sued in the Federal courts 
 by assignee if nonresident. Kearny County v. McMaster, 15 
 
IIISTOKY OF ASSKtA'MENT CLAUSE IN ACT OF 1888. 217 
 
 C. C. A. 353, 32 U. S. App. 367, 68 Fed. 177 ; Kearny County 
 V. Irvine, 126 Fed. 694. Coupons also are primary causes of 
 action. Ibid. 
 
 Of course, a fictitious transfer of bonds or coupons to obtain 
 jurisdiction would be a fraud on the court. Bernard Twp. v. 
 Stebbins, 109 F. S. 355; Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Erie R. Co. 
 172 Fed. 902, and cases cited; Kreider v. Cole, 79 C. C. A. 
 339, 149 Fed. 647; Dickerman v. Northern Trust Co. 176 
 U. S. 181, 44 L. ed. 423, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 311. See Bernheim 
 V. Birnbauni, 30 Fed. 885 ; Lake County v. Dudley, 173 U. S. 
 251, 43 L. ed. 688, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 398 ; Lehigh Min. & Mfg. 
 Co. V. Kelly, 160 U. S. 335, 40 L. ed. 447, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 307; Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U. S. 326, 46 L. ed. 567, 22 
 Sup. Ct, Rep. 327; Williams v. Nottawa, 104 U. S. 212, 213, 
 26 L. ed. 720, 721. But assignment without consideration, for 
 purposes of suit, would not be collusive if the assignor could 
 have brought suit. Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Erie R. Co. 172 
 Fed. 899-902. See Blair v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 400, 50 L. ed. 
 801, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427, and cases cited. 
 
 The rule above applies to removals, as well as causes origi- 
 nally brought in the Federal courts. Mexican JSTat. R. Co. v. 
 Davidson, 157 U. S. 205, 39 L. ed. 674, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563. 
 
 History of the Assignment Clause in Act of 1888. 
 
 Having stated the rule of jurisdiction as affected by assign- 
 ments of choses in action, I will give a brief history of this 
 clause in the act of 1888, sec. 1, as it will enable you to better 
 understand the construction given it, aaid in a measure account 
 for conflicting decisions in the Federal courts. 
 
 Section 1 of the act of 1789 provided that the assignee of 
 the instruments named could not recover the contents of any 
 such instruments, unless the original payee could sue in the 
 Federal courts; that is, unless there existed a diversity of citi- 
 zenship between the maker and payee; but foreign bills of 
 exchange were excepted. Between 1789 and 1875 there are 
 numerous decisions construing the clause. 
 
 First. We find the words, "assignee of a promissory note 
 or other causes of action," strictly construed, and instruments 
 payable to bearer, or to a named person, excepted from the rule, 
 
■21S HISTORY OF ASSIGSr.MENT CLAUSE IN ACT OF 1888. 
 
 because the instrument was not technically assigned, but passed 
 by simple delivery. Thompson v. Perrine, 106 U. S. 593, 27 
 L. ed. 300, 1 Sup. Ot. Kep. 564, 568 ; Adams v. Eepublic Coun- 
 ty, 23 Fed. 213; New Orleans v. Quinlan, supra; Jerome v. 
 Rio Grande County, 5 McCrary, 639, 18 Eed. 874; Chick- 
 aming v. Carpenter, 106 U. S. 666, 27 L. ed. 308, 1 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 620. 
 
 Second. We find an indorsee could sue his immediate in- 
 dorser if diversity of citizenship existed between them, and 
 without reference to the citizenship of the immediate parties 
 to the instrument, because the claim was derived through a new 
 contract, and not through an assignment. Parker v. Ormsbj, 
 141 U. S. 85, 35 L. ed. 656, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 912, and cases 
 cited. 
 
 Third. Many cases drew the distinction between the recov- 
 ery of the "contents" of a note or other chose in action, and the 
 recovery of the notes or instruments themselves (but this lan- 
 guage is retained in the act of 1888, and will be noticed here- 
 after). Deshler v. Dodge, 16 How. 631, 14 L. ed. 1088; New 
 Orleans v. Benjamin, 153 U. S. 433, 38 L. ed. 772, 14 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 905; Plant Invest. Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & K. W. 
 R. Co. 152 U. S. 76, 38 L. ed. 360, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 483; 
 Shoecraft v. Blaxham, 124 U. S. 730, 31 L. ed. 574, 8 Sup, 
 Ct. Rep. 686. 
 
 March 3, 1875, Congi-ess, with a view of increasing the jur- 
 isdiction of the Federal courts, excepted from the rule notes 
 negotiable by the law merchant, as well as bills of exchange, 
 leaving out the word "foreign" before bills of exchange, in the 
 act of 1789. Here all the bars to entering Federal courts were 
 let down as to commercial paper, and exceptions evolved out 
 of the act of 1789 in the various decisions became of no im- 
 portance whatever. Tredway v. Sanger, 107 U. S. 323, 27 
 L. ed. 582, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 691; New Orleans v. Quinlan, 
 supra; Mersman v. Werges, 112 U. S. 143, 28 L. ed. 643, 5 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65. 
 
 In 1888 Congress, with a view of restricting again the juris- 
 diction of the Federal courts, changed the whole clause so as 
 to read, "Nor shall any circuit or district court have cognizance 
 of any suits (except upon foreign bills of exchange) to recover 
 the contents of any promissory note, or other chose in action, 
 
HISTORY OF ASSIGIN'MENT CLAUSE IIY ACT OF 18SS. 210 
 
 in favor of any assignee or of any subsequent holder, if such 
 instrument be made payable 'to hearer' and be not made hy any 
 corporation, unless the suit might have been prosecuted in such 
 court to recover the said contents if no assignment or transfer 
 had been made." The italicized words show the difference be- 
 tween the acts of 1789 and 1888. It appears then — 
 
 (a) That the word "foreign" was restored, as in the act 
 of 1789, before "bills of exchange." Morgan v. Gay, 19 Wall. 
 81, 22 L. ed. 100. 
 
 (b) That a note excluded by construction from the act of 
 1789 was now expressly included in the act of 1888, unless 
 made by a corporation. 
 
 (c) That the word "transfer" was evidently intended to 
 enlarge the scope given by the constrvTction to the word "as- 
 signee," under the act of 1789, and was intended to cover every 
 case in which title to negotiable paper, the contents of which 
 might be the subject of suit, had vested by acts of parties or 
 by operation of law. 
 
 (d) That the exception made under the act of 1789, by 
 which an indorsee could sue his immediate indorser, if di- 
 versity of citizenship existed, was abrogated by the act of 1888. 
 
 There being no question about the proposition (a), I will 
 now examine a few cases illustrating the propositions desig- 
 nated by (b), (c), and (d). 
 
 Proposition (b) has been fully illustrated in disci^ssing 
 "promissory notes payable to bearer made by corporations." 
 
 Proposition (c), relating to the intention of Congress in us- 
 ing the word "transfer" in the act of 1888. There is no ques- 
 tion that the word so used was intended to enlarge the scope of 
 the word "assignee," and to cover all methods, whether by acts 
 of parties or operation of law, by which title to choses in action 
 passed, and to annul the construction given to the word "as- 
 signment" under the act of 1789. United States Nat. Bank v. 
 McNair, 56 Fed. 326, 327. 
 
 Under proposition (d), the construction given to the act of 
 1789, whereby an assignee could sue his immediate assignor 
 if diversity of citizenship existed, was abrogated by the act of 
 1888. The language of the act of 1888 clearly shows the mind 
 of Congress to place the right of suit by the assignee, or subse- 
 quent holder, upon the citizenship existing between the maker 
 
220 HISTOEY OF ASSIGNMENT CLAUSE IN ACT OF 1888. 
 
 slnd the payee of the instrument assigned ; that is, the assignee 
 of a chose in action under the present act, or any subsequent 
 holder of the assigned instrument, cannot sue in the Federal 
 courts unless such suit might have been maintained between 
 the original parties to the instrument, or, as stated in the act, 
 "as if no assignment or transfer. had been made. Portage City 
 Water Co. v. Portage, 102 Fed. 769 ; Emsheimer v. New Or- 
 leans, 116 Fed. 893 ; Utah-lSrevada Co. v. De Lamar, 133 Fed. 
 119. But if suit could be maintained between original holders, 
 then citizenship of intermediate assignees is not important. 
 
 In Skinner v. Barr, 7Y Fed. 816, a note was executed by one 
 Price to Knap, and indorsed by one Barr, all of Pennsylvania. 
 One Skinner, of l^ew Jersey, became the assignee, and sued 
 Barr in the Federal court. Held, the original payee not being 
 able to sue in the Federal court. Skinner could not sue there. 
 United States Nat. Bank v. MclSTair, 56 Fed. 325. 
 
 In Superior v. Kipley, 138 U. S. 96, 97, 34 L. ed. 916, 11 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 288, it was held that a draft drawn by a citizen 
 of a State on a corporation of the same State, but in favor of 
 a citizen of another State, does not come within the statute, for 
 at the moment of acceptance the acceptor becomes the primary 
 debtor, and it is a new contract between the acceptor and non- 
 resident, and the latter may sue without tracing title through 
 the drawer. 
 
 In note payable "to order" and transferred, assignee cannot 
 sue in a Federal cOurt unless the assignor could. United States 
 Nat. Bank v. McNair, 56 Fed. 324; Parker v. Ormsby, 141 
 U. S. 83, 35 L. ed. 655, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 912. See Jones v. 
 Shapera, 6 C. C. A. 423, 13 U. S. App. 481, 57 Fed. 462. 
 And the record must show that the suit could have been main- 
 tained in the name of the assignor when brought. Emsheimer 
 V. New Orleans, 186 U. S. 33, 46 L. ed. 1042, 22 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 770 ; Dexter H. & Co. v. Sayward, 84 Fed. 300 ; United 
 States Nat. Bank v. McNair, 56 Fed. 327. So an assignee of 
 a State judgment depends for jurisdiction on the citizenship 
 of the assignor (Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. S. 208, 
 37 L. ed. 1054, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 75), and so as to all non- 
 negotiable instruments (Smith v. Fifield, 33 C. C. A. 681, 63 
 U. S. App. 531, 91 Fed. 561 ; Holmes v. Goldsmith, 147 U. S. 
 157, 37 L. ed. 120, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 288; Wilson v. Knox 
 
HOW ASSIGNMENTS ALLEGED IN BILL. 221 
 
 Coimty, 43 Fed. 482). So when assigned by partnership by 
 one partner. Ban v. Columbia Southern Co. 54 C. C. A. 407, 
 117 Fed. 21, U. S. Kev. Stat. 629, reversing 109 Fed. 499. 
 So a trustee as assignee of a contract between citizens of same 
 State cannot sue. Eau Claire v. Payson, 46 C. C. A. 466, 
 107 Fed. 552, 48 C. C. A. 608, 109 Fed. 676; American 
 Waterworks & Guarantee Co. v. Home Water Co. 115 Fed. 
 171. 
 
 How Assignments Alleged in Bill. 
 
 If the citizenship of the original payee is material to the 
 jurisdiction it is essential to show it in the bill. Act 1888, see. 
 1; Holmes v. Goldsmith, supra; Parker v. Ormsby, 141 U. S. 
 85, 35 L. ed. 656, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 912; Benjamin v. New 
 Orleans, 169 U. S. 163, 42 L. ed. 702, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 298 ; 
 ]!^orth American Transp. & Trading Co. v. Morrison, 178 U. 
 S. 268, 44 L. ed. 1064, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 869; Murphy v. 
 Payette Alluvial Gold Co. 98 Fed. 321 ; United States Nat. 
 Bank v. McNair, 56 Fed. 324; Dexter, H. & Co. v. Sayward, 
 supra, and cases cited. And the citizenship must be distinctly 
 alleged and not inferentially. Thus an allegation by an as- 
 signee, that each of said persons, etc., are now and were, on 
 
 the day of , citizens of States other than 
 
 the State of , and competent to maintain suit, as if 
 
 no such assignment had been made, is insufficient to confer 
 jurisdiction; must state citizenship of each party. Benjamin 
 V. New Orleans, 20 C. C. A. 591, 41 U. S. App. 178, 74 Fed. 
 417, 71 Fed. 758. 
 
 So in an action on claims aggregating the jurisdictional 
 amount, which have been acquired by assignment, the bill must 
 show the citizenship of the assignors; and the same rule ap- 
 plies in removals. Murphy v. Payette Alluvial Gold Co. supra ; 
 Davis V. Mills, 99 Fed. 39-41; North American Transp. & 
 Trading Co. v. Morrison, 178 IT. S. 269, 44 L. ed. 1064, 20 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 869 ; Fife v. Whittell, 102 Fed. 539, 540. 
 
 You cannot amend after removal to show it. Crehore v. 
 Ohio & M. E. Co. 131 U. S. 240, 33 L. ed. 144, 9 Sup. Ct.. 
 Eep. 692; Graves v. Corbin, 132 U. S. 590, 591, 33 L, ed,. 
 468, 469, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 196. 
 
222 HOW ASSIGNMENTS ALLEGED IN BILL AND ISSUE EAISED. 
 
 Subsequent Changes. 
 
 Subsequent changes are not considered if jurisdiction existed 
 when the suit was brought. Emsheimer v. New Orleans, IIC 
 Fed. 893, 186 U. S. 44, 46 L. ed. 1047, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770; 
 Jones V. Shapira, 57 Fed. 457. Citizenship of subsequent 
 holders not considered. Ibid. 
 
 Assignment Must Be Genuine. 
 
 The assignment must not be colorable, and when it is a suit 
 at law, jury may pass upon' it if evidence conflicting. Act 
 1888, sec. 5 ; Williams v. Nottawa, 104 TJ. S. 209, 26 L. ed. 
 719; Lake County v. Schradsky, 38 C. C. A. 17, 97 Fed. 1; 
 Farmington v. Pillsbury, 114 U. S. 138, 29 L. ed. 114, 5 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 807 ; Lake County v. Dudley, 173 U. S. 253, 43 L. ed. 
 688, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 398 ; Lehigh Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 
 160 U. S. 327, 40 L. ed. 444, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 307 ; Crawford 
 V. Heal, 144 U. S. 593; Waite v. Santa, Cruz, 184 U. S. 325; 
 Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 327. 
 
 How the Issue is Raised. 
 
 When the assignor not entitled to sue, defendant may dis- 
 miss. Ibid.; Farmington v. Pillsbury, 114 TJ. S. 144; Wet- 
 more V. Rymer, 169 U. S. 120, 42 L. ed. 684, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 393 ; Defiance Water Co. v. Defiance, 191 U. S. 194, 48 L. ed. 
 144, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 63. 
 
 The issue is raised by motion or answer, and if the diversity 
 <of citizenship to give the court jurisdiction after the assign- 
 ment is not apparent, it may be raised by motion in the nature 
 of a demurrer to the petition as follows : 
 
 In District Court of &c. 
 Title as before given In motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction — 
 Because it appears from said bill that the diversity of citizenship to 
 sustain the jurisdiction of this court is sought through the assignment 
 of the cause of action to complainant; and it does not appear that E. F. 
 the assignor was a citizen of a different State than that in which the suit 
 is brought, and that he was competent to maintain the suit in this court 
 if no such assignment had been made. 
 
HOW ASSIGNMENTS ALLEGED IN BILL AND ISSUE RAISED. 223 
 
 or if it appears from the bill that the allegations of jurisdiction 
 are sufficient but in fact not true then use the following form : 
 
 It appears from said bill that the diversity of citizenship to sustain 
 the jurisdiction of this court is souglit through the assignment of the 
 (cause of action) to complainant, and that so much of the allegation of 
 said bill as avers that E. F., the payee and assignor, through whom com- 
 plainant derives title, was a citizen of the State of is not true, 
 
 for defendant avers that he was at the time of the execution and delivery 
 
 of the ( cause of action ) , and is now, a citizen of the State of , 
 
 and not of the State of , as alleged in the bill, and that no diver- 
 sity of citizenship on which to base the jurisdiction of this court exists in 
 this suit. All of which matters and things this defendant avers to be true, 
 and pleads the same in bar of complainant's said bill. 
 
 Wherefore defendant prays the judgment of the court whether he shall 
 answer further, and asks to be dismissed hence with his cost. 
 
 R. F., 
 Solicitor, etc. 
 
 If the jurisdiction is based on the fact that it is alleged the 
 instrument was executed by a corporation and payable to bearer, 
 and you wish to raise the issue by plea or answer, use the same 
 form mutatis mutandis. You must deny specifically that it was 
 executed by a corporation, or that the chose in action is payable 
 to bearer. If raised in answer you may use the same form of 
 allegation. 
 
CHAPTER XXXIX. 
 
 PARTIES. 
 
 I have now discussed so much of the general and territorial 
 jurisdiction of the circuit courts .of. the United States as is 
 necessary to be known in order to intelligently prepare a bill 
 in a Federal equity suit. It is only a general treatment of the 
 subject, but my purpose is to stimulate and direct your inves- 
 tigation along lines that will lead to correct conclusions, as to 
 whether you have jurisdiction under the Constitution and laws 
 of the United States, and, having determined that fact, then to 
 correctly state it in your bill. 
 
 In what has been already said, it is seen that Federal juris- 
 diction depends largely upon who are to be parties to the bill, 
 for the Federal statutes create limitations on Federal jurisdic- 
 tion over parties. Bland v. Fleeman, 29 Fed. 672. I will 
 therefore now discuss parties generally, and how they are 
 affected by the limitation created by Federal laws, and the rules 
 of equity. 
 
 It is a cardinal principle in courts of equity generally, that 
 all persons interested in a suit, or to be affected by the results, 
 should be made parties (ibid. ; Minnesota v. I^orthern Securi- 
 ties Co. 184 U. S. 199, 235, 46 L. ed. 499, 515, 22 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 308; Stevens v. Smith, 61 C. C. A. 624, 126 Fed. 711; 
 Weidenfeld v. Northern P. R. Co. 63 C. C. A. 537, 129 Fed. 
 311; Arkansas, Southeastern R. Co. v. Union Sawmill Co. 83 
 C. C. A. 224, 154 Fed. 304; Golden v. Bruning, 72 Fed. 4); 
 either plaintiff or defendant (ibid.) because it is the aim of 
 courts of equity to do complete justice, and to settle the rights 
 of all parties interested in the subject-matter in one suit, in 
 order that litigation may end, and a multiplicity of suits be 
 avoided (ibid.; Union Mill & Min. Co. v. Dangberg, 81 Fed. 
 86 ; Mackay v. Gabel, 117 Fed. 878 ; Oberlin College v. Blair, 
 70 Fed. 419). 
 
 224 
 
PARTIES. 225 
 
 Xew nile 37 embodies this principle in setting forth who 
 should be made plaintiffs and defendants in a cause of action 
 in eqnitv. Atlas Underwear Co. v. Copper Underwear Co. 210 
 Fed. 355 ; Washington State Sugar Co. v. Sheppard, 186 Fed. 
 234. This rule, however, is open to exceptions and relaxation 
 and modification, which sometimes become necessary to pre- 
 serve the ends of justice. Smith v. Lee, 77 Fed. 782 ; Perkins 
 V. Hendryx, 127 Fed. 449 ; Watson v. Bonfils, 53 C. C. A. 535, 
 116 Fed. 159, 160; Cleveland Tel. Co. v. Stone, 105 Fed. 794; 
 Union Mill & Min. Co. v. Dangberg, 81 Fed. 87 ; McArthur v. 
 Scott, 113 U. S. 392, 28 L. ed. 1031, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652; 
 Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 139, 15 L. ed. 160; Kuchler v. 
 Greene, 163 Fed. 98. The necessity for relaxation and modi- 
 fication of the rule is more frequently apparent in Federal 
 courts of equity, where the enforcement of the rule would often 
 oust the jurisdiction of these courts. Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 
 Wheat. 168, 6 L. ed. 294; Mallow v. Hinde, 12 Wheat. 198, 6 
 L. ed. 600. In applying the rule to the Federal courts, it maj 
 be stated that if all the parties interested in the suit are withiu 
 the jurisdiction of the court, then the rule applies, and all the 
 parties materially interested in the subject-matter, or object of 
 the suit, should be brought before the court as plaintiffs or 
 defendants, so that the matter may be settled by one decree. 
 Gregory v. Stetson, 133 U. S. 579, 33 L. ed. 792, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 422; Consolidated Water Co. v. San Diego, 35 C. C. A. 
 631, 93 Fed. 851, 852; Bland v. Fleeman, 29 Fed. 673; Con- 
 solidated Water Co. v. Babcock, 76 Fed. 243 ; Ribon v. Chicago, 
 R I. & P. R. Co. 16 Walk 450, 21 L. ed. 368; Golden v. 
 Bruning, supra; Hicklin v. Marco, 6 C. C. A. 10, 15 U. S. App. 
 55, 56 Fed. 553, 554. 
 
 This condition as to parties has been specially provided for by 
 new rule 39, which is only declaratory of the former practice. 
 Thomas v. Anderson, 138 C. C. A. 405, 223 Fed. 41. 
 
 In stating this general rule it must not be understood that 
 all the parties must have an interest in all the matters involved 
 in the suit, but each parly must have an interest in some of 
 the material matters connected with the others. Brown v. Guar- 
 antee Trust & S. D. Co. 128 U. S. 403, 412, 32 L. ed. 468, 
 470, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 127; Golden v. Bruning, supra; Finegan 
 V. Read, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 36, 27 S. W. 261, and cases cited; 
 
 S. Eq,— 15. 
 
226 PAETiEa. 
 
 ■Jones V. Missouri-Edison Electric Co. 75 0. C. A. 631, 144 
 Fed. 780 ; Curran v. Campion, 29 C. C. A. 26, 56 U. S. App. 
 383, 85 Fed. 67-70. 
 
 If the cause of suit is entire in itself, and the relief sought 
 does not consist in separate, unconnected things, all the defend- 
 ants connected therewith and to be affected thereby should be 
 made parties. It is not necessary that the interest of each de- 
 fendant should extend to the whole subject-matter in litigation. 
 Pacific Live-Stock Co. v. Hanley, 98 Fed. 329; Bailey v. Til- 
 linghast, 40 C. C. A. 93, 99 Fed. 801 ; Dastervignes v. United 
 States, 58 0. C. A. 346, 122 Fed. 36 ; Louisville & N. R Co. 
 V. Smith, 63 C. C. A. 1, 128 Fed. 6, 7 ; Wyman v. Bowman, 62 
 C. C. A. 189, 127 Fed. 264. 
 
 It is not essential that there should be a community of interest 
 between parties defendant, but when a common question of law 
 arising under similar facts is involved between plaintifE and 
 each defendant, equity has jurisdiction. ISTor is it necessary 
 that there should be a common interest in the claims and rights 
 of action against the defendant, when they all arise from some 
 common cause, and are governed by the same legal rule, and 
 involve similar facts, and the whole matter may be settled 
 in one suit brought by those uniting as plaintiffs. Osborne v. 
 Wisconsin C. R Co. 43 Fed. 824 ; Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. 
 Co. V. Clunie, 88 Fed. 160; Sang Lung v. Jackson, 85 Fed. 
 502 ; Pillsbury Washburn Flour Mills Co. v: Eagle, 41 L.R.A. 
 162, 30 C. C. A. 386, 58 U. S. App. 490, 86 Fed. 629 ; Scott 
 V. Donald, 165 U. S. 108, 41 L. ed. 648, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 262. 
 There will be an illustration of these rules affecting parties, 
 hereafter, when I discuss "the rule of parties when numerous." 
 
 Thus far I have stated only the general rule of parties in 
 equity. We have seen that the Federal courts were incapaci- 
 tated to proceed against a person not a citizen of and residing 
 in the State and district in which the suit is brought, nor could 
 they proceed in the absence of a Federal question, unless all the 
 parties on one side were citizens of a different State from all 
 the parties on the other side. We have further seen, except in 
 a certain class of cases, the Federal courts were unable to bring 
 in a defendant living beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the 
 court. These conditions, of course, must have seriously affected 
 the general rule of equity as to parties, and confined these courts 
 
PARTIES. 227 
 
 ■within very narrow limits, and even within these limits the 
 question of parties became burdensome to litigants. 
 
 The Federal courts early sought to escape this incapacity 
 imposed upon them, and began to apply the rule that where the 
 real merits of the cause could be determined without essentially 
 affecting the interests of absent persons, though they may be 
 interested, they would dispense with their presence and pro- 
 ceed. Russell V. Clark, Y Cranch, 98, 3 L. ed. 281; Cameron 
 V. M'Eoberts, 3 \Y\iea.t. 594, 4 L. ed. 467 ; Vattier v. Hinde, 
 7 Pet. 262, 8 L. ed. 679 ; Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 17 L. ed. 
 260 ; Hagan v. Walker, 14 How. 36, 14 L. ed. 315. 
 
 In 1839 Congress embodied these decisions in a statute (sec. 
 737, United States Revised Statutes), which substantially pro- 
 vided that when there were several defendants in any suit at law 
 or equity, and one or more of them were not inhabitants of, or 
 found in the district of suit, and do not voluntarily appear, the 
 court could entertain jurisdiction, and proceed with the parties 
 who were properly before it, but the decree was not to affect the 
 absent defendants, and, further, that the nonjoinder of parties 
 who could not be reached by process shotild not be pleaded in 
 abatement. New rule 39. Mackay v. Gabel, 117 Fed. 878; 
 Hicklin v. Marco, 6 C. 0. A. 10, 15 U. S. App. 55, 56 Fed. 
 553, 554; Gross v. George W. Scott Mfg. Co. 48 Fed. 39, 40; 
 Barney v. Baltimore, 6 Wall. 287, 18 L. ed. 827 ; Clearwater 
 V. Meredith, 21 How. 489, 16 L. ed. 201. 
 
 This act related only to persons without the territorial juris- 
 diction of the court, and did not affect cases in which persons 
 having an interest were in reach of the court's process, and 
 whose joinder would not have defeated jurisd-'^tion because of 
 citizenship. Ibid. ; Barney v. Baltimore, 6 Wall. 284, 18 L. ed. 
 826; ConoUy v. Wells, 33 Fed. 204-214; Shields v. Barrow, 
 17 How. 130, 15 L. ed. 158 ; Williams v. Bankhead, 19 Wall. 
 571, 22 L. ed. 184; Sioux City Terminal R. & Warehouse Co. 
 v. Trust Co. of N. A. 27 C. C. A. 73, 49 U. S. App. 523, 82 
 Fed. 126. 
 
 In 1842 the Supreme Court promulgated equity rule 47, now 
 new rule 39, embodying this act of Congress, and provided for 
 cases where a joinder of parties would oust jurisdiction because 
 of citizenship, and it was in substance as follows : In all cases 
 where it shall appear to the court that persons who might other- 
 
228 PAltTIES. 
 
 wise be deemed necessary or proper, parties to the suit cannot be 
 made parties, by reason of their being out of the jurisdiction 
 of the court, or otlierwise incapable of being made parties, ur 
 because their joinder would oust the jurisdiction of the court, 
 the court may at its discretion proceed with the case without 
 making such persons parties ; and it was provided that the 
 decree should be without prejudice to the absent defendants. 
 Appendix ; Hicklin v. Marco, 6 C. C. A. 10, 15 U. S. App. 55, 
 56 Fed. 553; Mackay v. Gabel and Hagan v. Walker, supra; 
 Hyams v. Old Dominion Co. 204 Fed. 684; St. Louis Inde- 
 pendent Packing Co. v. Houston, 215 Fed. 557, 558. 
 
 About the same time equity rule 22, now new rule 25, was 
 promulgated by the Supreme Court, providing that if any per- 
 sons other than those named in the bill as defendants shall 
 appear to be necessary or proper parties, the bill must aver the 
 reason why they are not made parties, by showing that they are 
 out of the jurisdiction, or could not be made parties without 
 ousting jurisdiction as to those before the court. 
 
 Again, in the same year, equity rule 48, now new rule 3S, 
 was promulgated as follows: That where parties plaintiff and 
 defendant were numerous, and could not, without manifest in- 
 convenience and oppressive delays, be all brought in before the 
 court, then the court may in its discretion dispense with making 
 all parties, and may proceed with the suit, if there are sufficient 
 parties to represent all adverse interests, but the decree was to 
 be without prejudice to absent parties. This, however, was only 
 an affirmance of an old equity rule. Williams v. Bankhead, 19 
 Wall. 563, 22 L. ed. 184; American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire 
 Drawers' & Die Makers' Unions Nos. 1 & 3, 90 Fed. 606; 
 Little V. Tanner, 208 Fed. 608 ; see Seminole Securities Co. 
 V. Southern L. Ins. Co. 182 Fed. 85, 96, defining a "class 
 suit." See Raich v. Truax, 219 Fed. 283, 719, and cases cited; 
 Re Engelhart & Sons Co. 231 U. S. 646, 58 L. ed. 416, 34 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 258. 
 
 The above act of Congress, and rules of court having the 
 force and effect of an act of Congress (Ex parte Whitney, 13 
 Pet. 404, 10 L. ed. 221; Burton v. Smith, 13 Pet. 472, 10 
 L. ed. 252), created well-defined exceptions to the general rule 
 of parties, and I will here succinctly state the effect of these 
 exceptions. 
 
 First. That persons not inhabitants of or found in the 
 
PAETIES. 229 
 
 c'lislrict in which suit is brought need not, though they be proper 
 and necessary parties, be made parties unless they voluntarily 
 appear. 
 
 Second. That where making parties, though they be neces- 
 sary and proper, would oust the jurisdiction of the coiirt by 
 destroying diversity of citizenship upon which jurisdiction 
 rests, you may omit them. Sioux City Terminal E,. & Ware- 
 house Co. V. Trust Co. of IST. A. supra. 
 
 Third. ^Yhen parties are numerous, so that bringing them all 
 in would create delay, inconvenience, and extraordinary ex- 
 pense, you may bring in only so many as will fairly represent 
 the adverse interest to be litigated. Mandeville v. Riggs, 2 Fet. 
 487, 7 L. ed. 494 ; American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers' 
 & Die Makers' Union Xos. 1 & 3, supra. But see 90 Fed. 600, 
 where parties may be numerous and representatives not found. 
 
 It will be further seen that neither the statutes nor rule 39 
 authorizes the court to take jurisdiction in the absence of an in- 
 dispensable party. California v. Southern P. Co. 157 U. S. 
 250, 251, 39 L. ed. 691, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 591; Waterman v. 
 Canal-Louisiana Bank & T. Co. 215 U. S. 33. 54 L. ed. 80, 
 30 Sup. Ct. Eep. 10. 
 
 Joint and Several Demands. 
 
 jSTcw rule 42 governing parties in joint and several demands 
 adopts verbatim old rule 51. 
 
 To Execute Trusts of Will; Parties. 
 
 Xew rule 41 provides that it is not necessary to make the 
 heir a party, in suits to execute the trusts in a will. 
 
 Suits hy Trustees. 
 
 New rule 37 is substantially the same as old rule 49, provid- 
 ing when it is not necessary to make beneficiaries parties. See 
 chap. 43. 
 
 Suits hy and Against Incompetents. 
 
 See new rule 70. See chap. 42, Eepresentative parties, p. 246. 
 
CHAPTEE XL. 
 
 THEEE CLASSES OF PARTIES. 
 
 Toil will notice in the exceptions as stated, tliat botli the 
 classes of parties known to equity as "proper" and "necessary" 
 may be omitted in the Federal courts. This brings us to the 
 discussion of a third class of parties, which Federal courts of 
 equity have been compelled to recognize, to wit, "indispensable 
 parties." Barney v. Baltimore, 6 Wall. 280, 18 L. ed. 625; 
 California v. Southern P. Co. 157 U. S. 249, 250, 39 L. ed. 
 690, 691, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 591 ; Hamilton v. Savannah, F. & 
 W. E. Co. 49 Fed. 418; Caylor v. Cooper, 165 Fed. 758; 
 Mathieson v. Craven, 164 Fed. 471 ; Lake Street Elev. E. Co. v. 
 Ziegler, 39 C. C. A. 431, 99 Fed. 122 ; Tug Eiver Cod & Salt 
 Co. V. Brigel, 30 C. C. A. 415, 58 U. S. App. 320, 86 Fed. 
 821; Mason v. DuUagham, 27 C. C. A. 296, 53 U. S. App. 
 539, 82 Fed. 689 ; Horn v. Lockhart, 17 Wall. 570, 21 L. ed. 
 657 ; Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 139, 15 L. ed. 160. 
 
 In Barney v. Baltimore, supra, you will find clear defi- 
 nitions of the three classes of parties recognized by Federal 
 courts of equity. 
 
 First. There is a class with such relation to the subject- 
 matter that while they may be parties the court may dispense 
 with them if so made, and the plaintiff may or may not make 
 them parties, without making his bill objectionable in either 
 event. These are proper or formal parties. Lalce Street Elev. 
 E. Co. V. Ziegler, supra; Donovan v. Campion, 29 C. C. A. 
 30, 56 U. S. App. 388, 85 Fed. 72, 73, 19 Mor. Min. Rep. 
 247 ; Kelley v.. Boettcher, 29 C. C. A. 14, 56 U. S. App. 563, 
 85 Fed. 56; Sioux City Terminal E. & Warehouse Co. v. 
 Trust Co. of K A. 27 C. C. A. 73, 49 U. S. App. 523, 82 Fed. 
 126; Brown v. Murray, E". & Co. 43 Fed. 617; Hyde v. Vic- 
 toria Land Co. 125 Fed. 973; Wallin v. Eeagan, 171 Fed. 
 764; White Swan Mines Co. v. Balliet, 134 Fed. 1004; Wood 
 
 230 
 
THEEE CLASSES OF PAETIES. 231 
 
 V. Davis, 18 How. 469, 15 L. ed. 461 ; Higgins v. Baltimore 
 & O. E. Co. 99 Fed. 641. Thus, when the party is not inter- 
 ested in the controversy between the immediate litigants, but 
 has an interest in the subject-matter which may be convenient- 
 ly settled in the suit, he is a proper party. Ibid. ; Hicklin v. 
 Marco, 6 C. C. A. 10, 15 TJ. S. App. 55, 56 Fed. 553, 554; 
 Wilson v. Oswego Twp. 151 U. S. 64, 38 L. ed. 74, 14 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 259. See new rule 40, adopting the lang-uage of old 
 rule 54. 
 
 Second. There is another class of parties who, if their inter- 
 est in the subject-matter is called to the attention of the court, 
 it would require them to be brought in, if within the jurisdic- 
 tion, and if bringing them in would not oust the jurisdiction 
 of the court, but who are not so indispensable to the relief 
 asked as would prevent the court from entering a decree in 
 their absence. This class are called "necessary parties." Chad- 
 bourne V. Coe, 2 C. C. A. 327, 10 U. S. App. 78, 51 Fed. 481 ; 
 Williams v. Bankhead, 19 Wall. 571, 22 L. ed. 184; Donovan 
 V. Campion, 29 C. C. A. 30, 56 U. S. App. 388, 85 Fed. 72, 19 
 Mor. ilin. Eep. 247 ; Kelley v. Boettcher, 29 C. C. A. 14, 56 
 U. S. App. 363, 85 Fed. 56, 64; Sioux City Terminal E. & 
 W^arehouse Co. v. Trust Co. of N. A. supra ; Union Mill & Min. 
 Co. V. Dangberg, 81 Fed. 73, 90; Morrison v. Bumette, 83 
 C. C. A. 391, 154 Fed. 617 ; Howe v. Howe & O. Ball Bearing 
 Co. S3 C. C. A. 536, 154 Fed. 828 ; Hunter v. Eobbins, 117 
 Fed. 921. Thus, where a party is interested in the contro- 
 versy, or entitled to litigate the same question, but a decree 
 can be made between the litigants properly before the court 
 determining their interests without affecting his, then he is a 
 necessary party, and may be omitted if his presence would be 
 obnoxious to jurisdiction. Ibid. ; Boatmen's Bank v. Fritzlen, 
 68 C. C. A. 288, 135 Fed. 658 ; North Carolina Min. Co. v. 
 Westfeldt, 151 Fed. 296 ; McConnell v. Dennis, 82 C. C. A. 
 501, 153 Fed. 549, 550 ; Eogers v. Penobscot Min. Co. 83 C. C. 
 A. 380, 154 Fed. 610; Adams v. Woburn, 174 Fed. 194; 
 Union Mill & Min. Co. v. Dangberg, 81 Fed. 90; Payne v. 
 Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 19 L. ed. 260; Insurance Co. of N. A. v. 
 Svendsen, 74 Fed. 346. See new rule 39. 
 
 Under this class are placed all parties having a "separable 
 interest," as before explained. This fact is the test in deter- 
 
232 THEEE CLASSES OF PARTIES. 
 
 mining whether a party with an interest in the subject-matter 
 may be omitted, so as to retain jurisdiction in the Federal court. 
 Ibid. ; Omaha Hotel Co. v. Wade, 97 U. S. 20, 24 L. ed. 918. 
 It is proper here to call your attention to the fact that this 
 rule may sometimes be controlled by the complainant, as in 
 cases where contracts are joint and several and the complainant 
 elects to sue jointly, whereby diversity of citizenship is de- 
 stroyed, when he could have sued separately and retained the 
 diversity of citizenship. Hooe v. Jamieson, 166 U. S. 398, 
 41 L. ed. 1050, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 596 ; Merchants' Cotton Press 
 
 6 Storag-e Co. v. Insurance Co. of IST. A. 151 U. S. 384, 38 
 L. ed. 204, 4 Inters. Com. Eep. 499, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 367; 
 Peninsular Iron Co. v. Stone, 121 U. S. 631, 30 L. ed. 1020, 
 
 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1010 ; Eaphael v. Trask, 118 Fed. 779. 
 Necessary parties may not only be dismissed to retain juris- 
 diction, but such parties defendant may be dismissed at any 
 time before judgment, if a question of jurisdiction is raised. 
 Equity rule 47 ; Hicklin v. Marco, 6 C. C. A. 10, 15 U. S. App. 
 55, 56 Fed. 553; Insurance Co. of N. A. v. Svendsen, supra; 
 Sioux City Terminal E. & Warehouse Co. v. Trust Co. of N. 
 A. 27 C. C. A. 73, 49 U. S. App. 523, 82 Fed. 124; Claiborne 
 V. Waddell, 50 Fed. 369; JS^orth Carolina Min. Co. v. West- 
 feldt, 151 Fed. 296 ; Slater Trust Co. v. Eandolph-Macon Coal 
 Co. 166 Fed. 178 ; Davis v. Davis, 89 Fed. 538 ; Plorn v. Lock- 
 hart, 17 Wall. 579, 21 L. ed. 660 ; Donovan v. Campion, 29 
 C. C. A. 30, 56 U. S. App. 388, 85 Fed. 72, 73, 19 Mor. Min. 
 Eep. 247. And this right to dismiss or dispense with parties 
 is tested by the subject-matter. Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 
 116, 41 L. ed. 654, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 262 ; Hamilton v. Sa- 
 vannah, F. & W. E. Co. 49 Fed. 417, 418 ; Pillsbury- Washburn 
 Flour Mills Co. v. Eagle, 41 L.E.A. 162, 30 C. C. A. 386, 58 
 U. S. App. 490, 86 Fed. 629. 
 
 Third. There is a class of parties whose interests are so 
 bound up in the subject-matter of litigation and the rehef 
 sought, that the court cannot proceed without them, or proceed 
 to a final decree without affecting their interests; that is, their 
 rights must be unavoidably passed upon in reaching a final de- 
 cree. These are called "indispensable parties," and must be 
 made parties, even though the effect would be to oust the juris- 
 diction of the court. Sioux City Terminal E. & Warehouse 
 
THREE CLASSES OF PARTIES. 233 
 
 Co. V. Trust Co. of IST. A. supra ; Eogers v. Penobscot Min. Co. 
 83 C. C. A. 380, 154 Fed. 607, 610; Shields v. Barrow, siipra; 
 AYallin v. Eeagan, 171 Fed. 763, 764; New Chester Water Co. 
 y. Holly Mfg. Co. 3 C. C. A. 399, 3 U. S. App. 264, 53 
 Fed. 27; Williams v. Bankhead, 19 Wall. 571, 22 L. ed. 187; 
 Chadboume v. Coe, 2 C. C. A. 327, 10 U. S. App. 78, 51 
 Fed. 4S0; Mon-ison v. Burnette, supra; O'lSTeil v. Walcott Min. 
 Co. 27 L.R.A.(]Sr.S.) 200, 98 C. C. A. 309, 174 Fed. 536 
 and case cited ; Lawrence v. Southern P. Co. 165 Fed. 241 ; 
 Mathieson v. Craven, 164 Fed. 471 ; Cajdor v. Cooper, 165 Fed. 
 758 ; Lawrence v. Times Printing Co. 90 Fed. 28. 
 
 If then the issue arises, that parties who are indispensable 
 have not been made, or it should appear during the trial, the 
 court must either dismiss the case or hold it until they are 
 made parties; and if to make them parties would destroy the 
 diversity of citizenship, and thereby oust the jurisdiction of the 
 court, then the court cannot entertain jurisdiction of that case, 
 and should dismiss at once (Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 142, 
 15 L. ed. 161 ; Christian v. Atlantic & N. C. E. Co. 133 U. S. 
 241, 33 L. ed. 592, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 260 ; Barney v. Baltimore, 
 6 Wall. 280-291, 18 L. ed. 825-828; Swan Land & Cattle Co. 
 v. Frank, 148 U. S. 611, 37 L. ed. 580, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 691 ; 
 Elkhart Xat. Bank v. Northwestern Guaranty Loan Co. 30 C. 
 C. A. 632, 58 U. S. App. 83, 87 Fed. 254; Sioux City Termi- 
 nal E. & Warehouse Co. v. Trust Co. of ~N. A. supra; Greer, 
 M. & Co. V. Stoller, 77 Fed. 5 ; Eaphael v. Trask, 118 Fed. 
 678 ; ISTorthern Indiana E. Co. v. Michigan C. E. Co. 15 How, 
 246, 14 L. ed. 680) ; for the court cannot proceed if absent 
 defendants are indispensable. Authorities above; Bland v. 
 Fleeman, 29 Fed. 669 ; Gregory v. Stetson, 133 U. S. 579, 33 
 L. ed. 792, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 422 ; Gray v. Havemeyer, 3 C. C. 
 A. 497, 10 U. S. App. 456, 53 Fed. 178 ; Oberlin College v. 
 Blair, 70 Fed. 419 ; Fourth Nat. Bank v. New Orleans & 0. 
 R. Co. 11 Wall. 624, 20 L. ed. 82 ; Hagaxi v. Walker, 14 How. 
 29, 14 L. ed. 312. Section 737, U. S. Eev. Stat., U. S. Comp. 
 Stat. 1901, p. 587, and equity rule 39 does not affect this rule 
 of parties. Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 139, 15 L. ed. 160 ; 
 Duchesse d'Auxy v. Porter, 41 Fed. 69 ; Barney v. Baltimore, 
 6 Wall. 285, 18 L. ed. 826; Coiron v. Millaudon, 19 How. 115, 
 15 L. ed. 575; Conolly v. Wells, 33 Fed. 205; Gregory v. 
 
234 THEEE CLASSES OF PARTIES. 
 
 Swift, 39 Fed. 708 and cases cited; Collins Mfg. Co. v. Fer- 
 guson, 54 Fed. 721; Gregory v. Stetson, 133 U. S. 587, 33 
 L. ed. 794, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 422. If then you have all the 
 indispensable parties before the court, you may proceed with- 
 out reference to proper or necessary parties. Tug River Coal & 
 Salt Co. V. Brigel, 30 C. C. A. 415, 58 U. S. App. 3^0, 86 Fed. 
 818; Smith v. Lee, 77 Fed. 782. 
 
 It may be stated, then, that in testing the class to which the 
 party belongs, the inquiry should be: Can the interest of the 
 present and absent be separated ? If not, the absent are indis- 
 pensable parties, and the court cannot proceed without them. 
 Ibid. ; Eibon v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R Co. 16 Wall. 450, 21 
 L. ed. 368; Land Co. v. Elkins, 22 Blatchf. 204, 20 Fed. 545; 
 Fourth Nat. Bank v. New Orleans & C. R. Co. supra. Or it 
 may be asked if the interest of the absent parties will be affected 
 by the decree ; if so, they are indispensable. Shields v. Barrow, 
 17 How. 139, 15 L. ed. 160; Northern Indiana R. Co. v. Mich- 
 igan C. R. Co. 15 How. 246, 14 L. ed. 680. 
 
 To illustrate: If no relief can be given without accounting 
 with an absent defendant, then you cannot proceed without him. 
 Fourth Nat. Bank v. New Oceans & C. R. Co. 11 Wall. 630, 
 20 L. ed. 83; Bell v. Donohoe, 8 Sawy. 435, 17 Fed. 711; 
 Raphael v. Trask, 118 Fed. 779 ; Edgell v. Felder, 28 C. C. A. 
 382, 52 tr. S. App. 417, 84 Fed. 69; Duchesse d'Auxy v. 
 Porter, 41 Fed. 68; Perrin v. Lepper, 26 Fed. 545. So in 
 partition among joint owners (Barney v. Baltimore, 6 Wall. 
 280, 18 L. ed. 825 ; Torrence v. Shedd, 144 U. S. 527, 36 L. 
 ed. 528, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 726), and also in case of cancelation 
 of mortgage for fraud, mortgagor is an indispensable party. 
 So stockholders, or paiiiies in possession of real or personal 
 jDroperty, are indispensable when the right to property is liti- 
 gated. Ibid. ; Massachusetts & S. Constr. Co. v. Cane Greek 
 Twp. 155 U. S^ 285, 39 L. ed. 153, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 91; 
 Wilson V. Oswego Twp. 151 U. S. 56, 38 L. ed. 70, 14 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 259 ; Scoutt v. Keck, 20 C. C. A. 103, 36 U. S. App. 
 586, 73 Fed. 904 ; First Nat. Bank v. Radford Trust Co. 26 
 C. C. A. 1, 47 U. S. App. 692, 80 Fed. 569. So a trustee in 
 a mortgage in a suit by bondholders. Ibid. ; Missouri use of 
 Public School Fund v. New Madrid County, 73 Fed. 306, 307; 
 Thayer v. Life Association of America, 112 U. S. 717, 28 L. 
 
THREE CLASSES OF PARTIES. 235 
 
 ed. 864, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 355. See Lake Street Elev. R. Co. v. 
 Ziegler, 39 C. C. A. 431, 99 Fed. 122; Smith v. Lee, 77 Fed. 
 779. (See "Trustees as Parties.") 
 
 The pledgee of a chose in action having an equitable inter- 
 est should be made a party, and the pledgor is an indispensable 
 party where the pledge is involved. Hubbard v. Manhattan 
 Trust Co. 30 C. C. A. 520, 57 U. S. App. 730, 87 Fed. 57; 
 Smith V. Lee, 77 Fed. 783. 
 
 So, a bailee, where the possession sued for is held to await 
 the performance of a condition (Wilson v. Oswego Twp. 151 U. 
 S. 65, 38 L. ed. 74, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 259; see Lake Street 
 Elev. R. Co. V. Ziegler, 39 C. C. A. 431, 99 Fed. 122) ; but not 
 a mere depository or stake holder (Scoutt v. Keck, 20 C. C. A. 
 103, 36 U. S. App. 586, 73 Fed. 904; Reeves v. Coming, 51 
 Fed. 778; Central Trust Co. v. Benedict, 24 C. C. A. 56, 49 
 U. S. App. 35, 78 Fed. 202 ; First Nat. Bank v. Merchants' 
 Bank, 2 L.R.A. 469, 37 Fed. 658 ; but see Perrin v. Lepper, 
 26 Fed. 545) ; or agent having no personal interest (Overman 
 Wheel Co. r. Pope Mfg. Co. 46 Fed. 577). 
 
 In a suit to cancel a note, by the maker against the holder, 
 an endorsee for collection is not a necessary party. New York 
 Constr. Co. v. Simon, 53 Fed. 4 ; Wood v. Davis, 18 How. 469, 
 15 L. ed. 461. 
 
 So, in foreclosure of a mortgage, the mortgagor and mort- 
 gagee are indispensable (Davis v. Mercantile Trust Co. 152 U. 
 S. 594, 38 L. ed. 565, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 693; Coiron v. Mil- 
 laudon and Tug River Coal & Salt Co. v. Brigel, supra) ; and 
 subsequent judgment and lien creditors are indispensable, if 
 relief goes beyond simple foreclosure, and their interests would 
 be affected by the decree (Ibid. ; Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. 
 V. Central Trust Co. 23 Fed. 514; Howard v. Milwaukee & St. 
 P. R. Co. 101 U. S. 845, 849, 25 L. ed. 1083-1085). So a 
 corporation is indispensable in transfer of stock on the books 
 (Kendig v. Dean, 97 U. S. 425, 24 L. ed. 1062; Crump v. 
 Thurber, 115 U. S. 56, 29 L. ed. 328, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1154; 
 but see Williamson v. Krohn, 13 C. C. A. 668, 31 U. S. App. 
 325, 66 Fed. 661) ; or when corporate rights are affected (Swan 
 Land & Cattle Co. v. Frank, 148 U. S. 611, 37 L. ed. 580, 13 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 691) ; or when creditor sues a part of the stock- 
 holders of a corporation (Hale v. Coffin, 114 Fed. 573; Swan 
 
236 THBEE CLASSES OF PARTIES. 
 
 Land & Cattle Co. v. Frank, 148 U. S. 610, 611, 27 L. ed. 
 580, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 691. So are all partners in an action 
 to vacate partnership transaction. Bell v. Donohue, 8 Sawy. 
 435, 17 Fed. 711. So all heirs in suit for fraudulent conversion 
 hj an administrator. Bland v. Fleeman, 29 Fed. 672. So 
 adverse claimants in suits for conversion of notes. Gregory v. 
 Swift, 39 Fed. 712. 
 
 The bill must set forth indispensable parties under all con- 
 ditions, and it must set forth "necessary" parties, if within the 
 jurisdiction, or it is objectionable, which may be reached by 
 demurrer, plea, or answer. If, however, the parties set forth 
 are not indispensable, that is, if their interest in the cause of 
 action, is separable, and they are not within reach of the court's 
 pTOcess, the court may proceed without them. Or if they be 
 not indispensable, and within reach of the court's process, the 
 court should bring them in, unless it would oust jurisdiction. 
 Equity rule 22; Sioux City Terminal E. & Warehouse Co. v. 
 Trust Co. of ISr. A. 27 C. C. A. 73, 49 U. S. App. 523, 82 Fed. 
 124; Ins. Co. of N. A. v. Svendsen, 74 Fed. 346. 
 
 I will here call your attention to the fact that after jurisdic- 
 tion has attached with proper parties before the court, then 
 parties who if originally made parties would be dismissed to 
 protect jurisdiction may on their own petition come into the 
 case without affecting the jurisdiction of the court. Tug Eiver 
 Coal & Salt Co. v. Brigel, 14 C. C. A. 577, 31 U. S. App. 665, 
 67 Fed. 629 ; Hardenbergh v. Bay, 151 U. S. 112, 38 L. ed. 
 93, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 305; equity rule 39; U. S. Eev. Stat, 
 sees. 737, 738 ; Sioux City Terminal R. & Warehouse Co. v. 
 Trust Co. of !N". A. supra, and cases cited; Society of Shakers v. 
 Watson, 15 C. C. A. 632, 37 U. S. App. 185, 68 Fed. 736. This 
 exception is based on the fact that such petition would only be 
 ancillary to the main suit, in which diversity of citizenship is 
 not necessary to give jurisdiction, as will be seen hereafter. 
 
 Vnhnown Parties, 
 
 When the bill sets forth that the parties are unknown, the 
 cause must proceed in the absence of a denial by answer. Alger 
 V. Anderson, 78 Fed. 729. See Tug Eiver Coal & Salt Co. v. 
 
THREE CLASSES OF PARTIES. 237 
 
 Brigel, supra, where the allegation that parties are unknown 
 defeated jurisdiction. 
 
 From the discussion of parties so far to a bill, the following 
 rales may be deduced and considered in framing a bill : 
 
 First. You may join all proper parties if you desire to do so. 
 
 Second. You mtist join all necesary parties if in the juris- 
 diction of the coui't, unless fatal to jurisdiction. 
 
 Third. You must join all indispensable parties unless too 
 numerous to be brought before the court as provided for in new 
 rule 38. Continental &, Commercial Trust & Sav. Bank v. 
 Corey Bros. Constr. Co. 126 C. C. A. 64, 208 Fed. 982 ; Wil- 
 liams V. Bankhead, 19 Wall. 563, 22 L. ed. 184. 
 
 It is proper to here call your attention again to section 8 
 of act of 1875, providing that in a certain class of cases, to wit, 
 where suit is commenced to enforce a lien or claim, legal or 
 equitable, or to remove any cloud or encumbrance on the title 
 to real estate or personal property within the district where the 
 suit was brought, the defendant or defendants not being inhabi- 
 tants of or found within the district of said suit could be 
 brought in by a "warning order," or by publication, the decree, 
 however, only to affect the property, no personal judgment 
 being allowed. In this character of cases you may now bring 
 in a "necessary" or indispensable party who is beyond the 
 territorial limits of the court's jurisdiction. Massachusetts Mut 
 L. Ins. Co. V. Chicago & A. E. Co. 13 Fed. 857. New Code, 
 sec. 57, chap. 4, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1039 ; Western U. Teleg. 
 Co. V. Louisville & IST. E. Co. 201 Fed. 932-943, and cases 
 cited. 
 
 The "necessary parties," being brought within the reach of 
 process, though beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court, 
 by this act, should be made parties, as I think the act takes the 
 character of cases mentioned therein out of the rule that "neces- 
 sary" parties beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court 
 may be dispensed with. 
 
CHAPTEE XLI. 
 
 WHEN PARTIES AEE NUMEROUS. 
 
 Under the third exception to the general rule of parties, as 
 stated in equity rale 38, referring to the condition where par- 
 ties are numerous, it is submitted: That when parties are 
 numerous, or if the question be one of general interest, and only 
 a few may sue for the many, or when the parties from a volun- 
 tary association fairly represent the interests of all, the court 
 will permit the few to sue for the many. Watson v. National 
 Life & Trast Co. 88 C. C. A. 380, 162 Fed. 7-12; United 
 States V. Old Settlers, 148 U. S. 480, 37 L. ed. 529, 13 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 650; Barnes v. Berry, 156 Fed. 73; American Steel 
 & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers' & Die Makers' Union Nos. 1 & 
 3, 90 Fed. 606; Society of Shakers v. Watson, 15 C. C. A. 
 632, 37 U. S. App. 141, 68 Fed. 730 ; McArthur v. Scott, 113 
 U. S. 340, 28 L. ed. 1015, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652; Ayres v. 
 Carver, 17 How. 591, 15 L. ed. 179 ; Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 
 How. 302, 14 L. ed. 948. See Motley v. Southern R. Co. 184 
 Fed. 958, for an allegation held not sufficient to show a class 
 suit. Ex Parte Equitable Trust Co. 231 Fed. 592, — C. C. 
 A. — ; Merchants' & Mfrs.' Traffic Asso. v. United States, 231 
 Fed. 295 ; Kardo Co. v. Adams, — C. C. A. — , 231 Fed. 950. 
 
 The interest, however, must be in the subject-matter. Scott 
 V. Donald, 165 U. S. 108, 41 L. ed. 648, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 262; 
 United States v. Coal Dealers' Asso. 85 Fed. 252. 
 
 This rule is a very .convenient one, because where parties are 
 numerous their rights and liabilities are subject to change and 
 fluctuations, by death and assignment, which would greatly im- 
 pede the orderly progress of a suit under equity rules, which 
 are provided only for reaching an issue, and preparing an 
 equity case for hearing on its merits. For these reasons courts 
 of equity have sought to eliminate the probability of these in- 
 conveniences. Mandeville v. Riggs, 2 Pet. 482, 7 L. ed. 493. 
 
 Mr. Justice Story laid down many years ago the rules gov- 
 erning parties when numerous, as follows: 
 
 238 
 
WHEN PARTIES AEE NUMBEOUS. 239 
 
 First. When the object of the bill and the questions arising 
 are of common or general interest to all. 
 
 Second. In cases where parties have formed a voluntary asso- 
 ciation for public or private purpose, and those who sue fairly 
 represent the interest of all. 
 
 Third. Where parties are very numerous, and, though there 
 may have been separate and distinct interests, yet it is impos- 
 sible to bring them before the court without manifestly imped- 
 ing the cause and ends of justice ; but in those cases, where the 
 rights and interests are distinct and separate, the rule would not 
 apply unless the bill discloses a common interest or right sought 
 to be established, enforced, or protected. Bailey v. Tillinghast, 
 40 C. C. A. 93, 99 Fed. 801. Though the interests be separate, 
 the suit must be for an object common to all, or against numer- 
 ous parties representing a common interest. New rule 38, same 
 as old rule 48. Little v. Tanner, 208 Fed. 605. 
 
 The few selected as parties must fairly represent the inter- 
 ests of all, so that a full and honest trial may be had. Smith 
 V. Swormstedt, supra. Thus, a creditor may sue for the bene* 
 fit of all having like interests. Lastly, in considering the inile 
 of parties, much depends on the prayer of the bill. The ques- 
 tion is. Who are to be directly affected by the prayer, or have 
 to act under it? 
 
 Equity rule 54, now new rule 40, provides that when no 
 account, payment, conveyance, or other direct relief is sought 
 against a party to a suit not being an infant, the party need not 
 appear unless required to do so by the prayer of the bill. The 
 plain meaning of the rule is that no one should be made plain- 
 tiff who has no interest in the relief sought, and no one defend- 
 ant from whom nothing is demanded. A person may be inter- 
 ested in the subject-matter, but if his rights are not put in issue 
 so that some relief must be asked in your prayer, it is not neces- 
 sary to make him a party. Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 432, 19 
 L. ed. 262; Smith v. Lee, 77 Fed. 780; Union Mill & Min. 
 Co. V. Dangberg, 81 Fed. 89, 90. 
 
CHAPTER XLIL 
 
 PARTIES IN PAETICtTLAE CASES. 
 
 Married Women as Parties, 
 
 In suits by married women, the husband must join in all 
 cases, unless their interests are antagonistic, or he refuses to 
 join, then he must be made defendant; and in such cases the 
 wife must sue by next friend. Equity rule 70; Douglas v. 
 Butler, 6 Eed. 228; Taylor v. Holmes, 14 Fed. 498; United 
 States V. Pratt Coal & Coke Co. 18 Fed. Y08. Thus rule must 
 be observed, as Federal courts will not follow State practice or 
 State statutes creating a different rule in equity suits. Wills 
 V. Pauly, 51 Fed. 257 ; United States v. Pratt Coal & Coke 
 Co. supra. But they do follow State practice on the law side. 
 Texas & P. E. Co. v. Humble, 38 C. C. A. 502, 97 Fed. 837; 
 Morning Journal Asso. v. Smith, 4 C. C. A; 8, 1 U. S. App. 
 270, 56 Fed. 141; Mehrhoff v. Mehrhoff, 26 Fed. 13. 
 
 Joint and Several Parties. 
 
 Equity rule 51, now new rule 42, provides that in all cases in 
 which the plaintiff has a joint and several demand against sev- 
 eral persons, either as principal or surety, it shall not be neces- 
 sary to bring before the court all persons liable thereto, but 
 the plaintiff may proceed against one or more of the parties 
 severally liable, but plaintiffs must join as a general rule. 
 
 Stockholders as Parties. 
 
 Equity rule 27 provides that every bill brought by one or 
 more stockholders in a corporation against the corporation and 
 other parties, founded on rights which may be properly assorted 
 by the corporation, must be verified by oath, and must contain 
 an allegation that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time 
 of the transaction of which he complains, and that the suit 
 is not a collusive one to confer on a court of the United States 
 
 240 
 
STOCKHOLDERS AS PARTIES. 241 
 
 jurisdiction of a ease of which it otherwise would not have 
 cognizance. It must also set forth with particularity the effort 
 to secure by plaintiff such action as he desires on the part of 
 the managing directors or trustees, and, if necessary, of the 
 shareholders, and the cause of his failure to obtain such ac- 
 tion. (Jan., 1882.) The rule was promulgated to give effect 
 to the decision in Hawes v. Oakland (Hawes v. Contra Costa 
 Water Co.) 104 U. S. 450, 26 L. ed. 827. It is self-explana- 
 tory and states under what conditions stockholders may become 
 parties plaintiff in a bill in equity, and the conditions are im- 
 perative. Venner v. Great Northern R. Co. 153 Fed. 411 and 
 cases cited; Delaware & H. Co. v. Albany & S. R. Co. 213 U. 
 S. 435, 53 L. ed. 862, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540; Poor v. Iowa C. 
 R. Co. 155 Fed. 226; Mills v. Chicago, 127 Fed. 732; Waller 
 V. Color, 125 Fed. 821; Gage v. Riverside Trust Co. 156 Fed. 
 1006; Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U. S. 579, 49 L. ed. 606, 25 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 355; Foster v. Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. 36 
 Fed. 628 ; Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Min. Co. 187 U. S. 
 459-463, 47 L. ed. 258, 259, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 157 ; Price v. 
 Union Land Co. 110 C. C. A. 20, 187 Fed. 886 ; Hirsch v. Inde- 
 pendent Steel Co. 196 Fed. 104; Hunnewell v. New York 0. 
 & H. R. R. Co. 196 Fed. 543 ; Kelly v. Dolan, 218 Fed. 966. 
 
 Failure to comply with rule does not raise a question of 
 jurisdiction, but of authority of plaintiff to maintain the bill. 
 Illinois C. R. Co. v. Adams, 180 U. S. 35, 45 L. ed. 412, 21 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 251. See Wathen v. Jackson Oil & Ref. Co. 
 235 U. S. 635, 59 L. ed. 395, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 225; Dana 
 v. Morgan, 219 Fed. 313. 
 
 In Bill V. Western IT. Teleg. Co. 16 Fed. 14, it was de- 
 clared that the individual stockholder could only maintain suit 
 against the corporation, when it was made to appear that he 
 had exhausted all means to obtain redress in the corporation 
 itself, and that he has made proper effort to get other stock- 
 holders to take action. Ibid. ; Macon, D. & S. R. Co. v. Shail- 
 er, 72 C. C. A. 631, 141 Fed. 585; Edwards v. Mercantile 
 Trust Co. 124 Fed. 381, 382; Taylor v. Decatur Mineral & 
 Land Co. 112 Fed. 451; Squair v. Lookout Mountain Co. 42 
 Fed. 732 ; Quincy v. Steel, 120 U. S. 248, 30 L. ed. 626, 7 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 520; Detroit v. Dean, 106 U. S. 537-542, 27 
 L. ed. 300-302, 1 Sup. Ct. Eep. 500 ; Porter v. Sabin, 149 U. 
 
 S. 478, 37 L. ed. 818, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1008 ; Savings & T. 
 S. Eq.— 16. 
 
242 STOCKHOLDKliS AS PAETIES. 
 
 Oo. V. Bear Valley Irrig. Co. 112 Fed. 704; Metcalf v. Ameri- 
 can School Furniture Co. 108 Fed. 911 ; Elkins v. Chicago, 119 
 Fed. 957; Bimber v. Calivada Colonization Co. 110 Fed. 58. 
 See Kessler & Co. v. Ensley Co. 129 Fed. 397; Smith v. 
 Chase & B. Piano Mfg. Co. 197 Fed. 466, 467; Strong v. 
 Edson, 117 C. C. A. 455, 198 Fed. 813; Post v. Buck Stove 
 & Kange Co. 43 L.E.A.(]SI.S.) 498, 117 C. C. A. 214, 200 Fed. 
 918; Kelly v. Mississippi River Coaling Co. 175 Fed. 483; 
 Hutchings v. Cobalt Central Mines Co. 189 Fed. 241 ; Howard 
 y. jSTational Teleph. Co. 182 Fed. 221 ; Binney v. Cumberland 
 Ely Copper Co. 183 Fed. 651 ; Dana v. Morgan, 219 Fed. 313, 
 where majority approved the refusal of the company to act, 
 and it was held that the minority stock could not sue ; nor when 
 directors act under the advice of an attorney. Hendrickson v. 
 Bradley, 29 C. C. A. 803, 55 U. S. App. 715, 85 Fed. 508. 
 
 An individual stockholder bringing suit must show that the 
 rights of the corporation are involved, and the corporation 
 should be made a party to the suit, or the bill is demurrable. 
 Porter v. Sabin, supra ; Eldred v. American Palace Car Co. 44 
 C. C. A. 554, 105 Fed. 458 ; Davenport v. Dows, 18 Wall. 626, 
 21 L. ed. 938 ; Groel v. United Electric Co. 132 Fed. 252; Mc- 
 Mullen V. Ritchie, 64 Fed. 262; Ross v. Quinnesec Iron Min. 
 Co. 227 Fed. 337. 
 
 In Hawes v. Oakland (Hawes v. Contra Costa Water Co.) 
 104 U. S. 450-462, 26 L. ed. 827-832, it is held that a stock- 
 holder must show: First. Some action done or threatened, 
 by the directors or trustees which is beyond the authority con- 
 ferred by the charter or the law; or a fraudulent transaction 
 done or threatened among themselves, or with some other par- 
 ties or the shareholders, which will result in injury to the 
 company, or the other shareholders ; or that a majority of the 
 shareholders are illegally pursuing in the name of the com- 
 pany a cou-se which is violating the rights of other share- 
 holders, which can only be redressed in a court of equity, and 
 under any of these grounds it must further be alleged that the 
 complainant made an earnest effort to obtain redress from 
 the directors and shareholders of the company; that he owned 
 the stock when the transactions of which he complained oc- 
 curred, or it was thereafter transferred to him by operation of 
 law. Ibid. ; Cowell v. McMillin, 100 C. C. A. 443, 177 Fed. 
 25 ; Caffall v. Bandera Teleph. Co. — Tex. Civ. App. — , 136 
 
STOGKHOLDEES AS PARTIES. 243 
 
 S. \V. 105 ; Ziegler v. Lake Street Elev. E. Co. 22 C. C. A. 
 465, 46 U. S. App. 242, 76 Fed. 663 ; Clarke v. Eastern Bldg. 
 & L. Asso. 89 Fed. Y81 ; Consolidated Water Co. v. San Diego, 
 89 Fed. 272 ; Hutton v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. 83 Fed. 
 17. xis to allegation of ownership, see Robinson v. West Vir- 
 ginia Loan Co. 90 Fed. 772, and cases cited. 
 
 These conditions setting tip the right of a stockholder to 
 sue are not jurisdictional, but go simply to plaintiff's right 
 to maintain the bill (Illinois C. E. Co. v. Adams, 180 U. S. 
 34-35, 45 L. ed. 413, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 251), and should be 
 complied with under equity rule 27. Ziegler v. Lake Street 
 Elev. E. Co. supra ; Eldred v. American Palace (^ar Co. 99 
 Fed. 168; Church v. Citizens' Street E. Co. 78 Fed. 526; 
 Eyan v. Williams, 100 Fed. 172 ; Eussell v. Shippen Bros. 
 Limiber Co. 224 Fed. 254. 
 
 There must be no collusion. Equity rule 27. Kemmerer v. 
 Haggerty, 139 Fed. 693; Groel v. United Electric Co. 132 
 Fed. 252 ; Detroit v. Dean, 106 U. S. 541, 27 L. ed. 302, 1 
 ■Sup. Ct. Eep. 500; Farmington v. Pillsbury, 114 U. S. 146, 
 29 L. ed. 117, 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 807. See Mills v. Chicago, 
 127 Fed. 732 ; Consumers Gas Co. v. Quinby, 70 C. C. A. 220, 
 137 Fed. 882 ; K"ew Albany Waterworks v. Louisville Bkg. Co. 
 58 C. C. A. 576, 122 Fed. 776. The suit must show amount 
 of stock held by the stockholder, though suing in behalf of 
 others. Harvey v. Ealeigh & G. E. Co. 89 Fed. 115. As to 
 the relation of the stockholders to the corporation, and when 
 minority may sue, see Jones v. Missouri-Edison Electric Co. 
 75 C. C. A. 631, 144 Fed. 765; Foster v. Bank of Abingdon, 
 88 Fed. 606, 607; Wheeler v. Abilene Nat. Bank Bldg. Co. 
 16 L.E.A.(K".S.) 892, 89 C. C. A. 482, 159 Fed. 391, 14 Ann. 
 Cas. 917; Jones v. Missouri-Edison Electric Co. 117 C. C. A. 
 442, 199 Fed. 64, reversing 75 C. C. A. 631, 144 Fed. 765; 
 Jackson V. Gardiner Invest. Co. 118 C. C. A. 287, 200 Fed. 
 113; Backus v. Brooks, 115 C. C. A. 364, 195 Fed. 452; Citi- 
 zens' Sav. & T. Co. V. Illinois Central E. Co. 105 C. C. A. 145, 
 182 Fed. 608; Lawrence v. Southern P. Co. 180 Fed. 822; 
 Marks v. Merrill Paper Co. 123 C. C. A. 380, 203 Fed. 16. 
 
 The rules above given do not apply when a suit is brought by 
 depositors against directors who have wrecked the bank. Fos- 
 ter V; Bank of Abingdon, 88 Fed. 604-607. Nor when the 
 directors are charged with wrecking the bank (Ibid. ; Excelsior 
 
24-± STOCKHOLDEES AS PAETIES. 
 
 Pebble Phosphate Co. v. Brown, 20 C. C. A. 428, 42 U. S. 
 App. 65, 74 Fed. 323 ; De Neufville v. New York & N". K. Co. 
 26 C. C. A. 306, 51 U. S. App. 374, 81 Fed. 10; Kogers v. 
 Xashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. 33 C. C. A. 517, 62 U. S. App. 
 49, 697, 91 Fed. 299) ; or with being guilty of fraudulent acts 
 causing irreparable injury to corporate interests (Foster v. 
 Mansfield, C. & L. M. E. Co. 36 Fed. 628 ; McKee v. Chau- 
 tauqua Assembly, 124 Fed. 811). JSTor when the demand would 
 be useless. Zeigler v. Lake Street Elev. R. Co. 22 C. C. A. 
 465, 46 U. S. App. 242, 76 Fed. 662 ; Weir v. Bay State Gas 
 Co. 91 Fed. 940 ; Universal Sav. & T. Co. v. Stoneburner, 51 
 C. C. A. 208, 113 Fed. 255 ; Watson v. United States Sugar 
 Refinery, 15 C. C. A. 662, 34'U. S. App. 81, 68 Fed. 769-772; 
 Lamm v. Parrot Silver & Copper Co. Ill Fed. 241; Mumford 
 V. Ecuador Development Co. Ill Fed. 639 ; Berwind v. Ca- 
 nadian P. R. Co. 98 Fed. 158; Hyams v. Calumet & H. Min, 
 Co. 137 C. C. A. 239, 221 Fed. 529. IS^or when the bill seeks a 
 dissolution of the corporation and a distribution of its assets. 
 Taylor v. Decatur Mineral & Land Co. 112 Fed. 449. Nor when 
 the jurisdiction depends on a Federal question. Lindsley v. 
 Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 162 Fed. 957; Kimball v. Cedar 
 Rapids, 99 Fed. 130 ; Dickinson v. Consolidated Traction Co. 
 114 Fed. 241. Nor when the cause of action antedates the 
 right as stockholder. Rogers v. Penobscot Min. Co. 154 Fed. 
 606. New rule 27 does not apply to a bill by a stockholder to 
 appoint an ancillary receiver. Bluefields S. S. Co. v. Steele, 
 112 C. C. A. 411, 192 Fed. 23. Nor when the relief sought 
 would be detrimental to their interests as directors or stock- 
 holders. Hyams v. Calumet & H. Mining Co. 137 C. C. A. 239, 
 221 Fed. 538, and cases cited; Ogden v. Gilt Edge Consol. 
 Mines Co. — C. C. A. — , 225 Fed. 728. The provision re- 
 quiring a bill to be sworn to does not apply to cases removed. 
 Maeder v. Buffalo Bill's Wild West Co. 132 Fed. 280. 
 
 In a suit by a creditor to enforce the individual liability of 
 stockholders, the corporation and stockholders must be made 
 parties. Elkhart Nat. Bank v. Northwestern Guaranty Loan 
 Co. 30 C. C. A. 632, 58 U. S. App. 83, 87 Fed. 252, 84 Fed. 
 76; Continental Adjustment Co. v. Cook, 152 Fed. 652; Fur- 
 nald V. Glenn, 12 C. C. A. 27, 26 U. S. App. 202, 64 Fed. 
 49 ; Sidway v. Missouri Land & Live Stock Co. 116 Fed. 382. 
 See Hamilton v. Levison, 198 Fed. 444; Irvine v. Blackburn, 
 
PAETNEBSHIP AS PAETIBS. 245 
 
 198 Fed. 360; Thomas v. Matthiessen, 113 0. 0. A. 101, 192 
 Fed. 495. Of national banks, see Williamson v. American Bank, 
 109 Fed. 36. Stockholders need not be made parties to adjust 
 the liabilities of the corporation. 
 
 A bill asking a receiver and seeking to make the stockholders 
 liable must make the corporation a party. Elkhart Nat. Bank 
 V. Northwestern Guaranty Loan Co. 84 Fed. 76, 87 Fed. 252. 
 A receiver can bring an action against all stockholders, though 
 he has a separate suit against each. Bausman v. Denny, 73 
 Fed. 70, but see Hale v. AUinson, 188 U. S. 56, 47 L. ed. 
 380, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 244, and Fidelity Trust & S. D. Co. v. 
 Archer, 179 Fed. 32. 
 
 The corporation need not be a party to a suit against a 
 stockholder to try title to stock. Higgins v. Baltimore & O. R. 
 Co. 99 Fed. 640. And -when suit is brought by the corpora- 
 tion to cancel stock the trustee need not be made a party. Lake 
 Street Elev. E. Co. v. Ziegler, 39 C. C. A. 431, 99 Fed. 114. 
 
 Partnership — Parties. 
 
 As a general rule, partnership rights and liabilities cannot be 
 determined unless all the partners are parties to the bill (Bill 
 V. Donohoe, 17 Fed. 711; Eaphael v. Trask, 118 Fed. 779, 
 194 U. S. 277, 48 L. ed. 978, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 647), and they 
 are indispensable parties. Ibid. But sometimes one member 
 of a partnership may desire to file a bill in which the others 
 refuse to join, in which case those who refuse to join must 
 be made defendants. Edgell v. Felder, 28 C. C. A. 382, 52 
 U. S. App. 417, 84 Fed. 69. 
 
 Sometimes, also, it occurs that because of the citizenship of 
 one or more of the partners the jurisdiction of the Federal 
 court would be ousted, and, being indispensable parties, they 
 canuot be dismissed so as to give jurisdiction. (See "Citizen- 
 ship of Partners.") Euble v. Hyde, 1 McCrary, 513, 3 Fed. 
 331; Ealya Market Co. v. Armour & Co. 102 Fed. 532-533; 
 see Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U. S. 
 458, 44 L. ed. 845, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 690; see, also, Hall v. 
 Lanning, 91 U. S. 160, 23 L. ed. 271. I think this is the true 
 rule, but in Smith v. Consumers Cotton Oil Co. 30 C. C. A. 
 103, 52 U. S. App. 603, 86 Fed. 359, it was held that in an 
 
246 EEPBESENTATIVE PARTIES. 
 
 action against a firm having a member whose presence would 
 oust the jurisdiction of the Federal court, the court could dis- 
 miss as to him. This ruling seems to be based on section 737 
 of the United States Eevised Statutes, authorizing dismissal 
 of such defendants who are neither inhabitants of nor found 
 in the district, but this section has never before been applied 
 to nonresident defendants who are indispensable parties, as in 
 partnerships. 
 
 Where a nonresident partner dies it is held that his repre- 
 sentatives are not indispensable. Perkins v. Hendryx, 127 Fed. 
 448. 
 
 Representative Parties. 
 
 I will now briefly discuss parties who appear in the record, 
 not in their ovm, but in the interest of others, such as trustees, 
 executors and administrators, and guardians ad litem, and re- 
 ceivers. 
 
 Guardians ad Litem. 
 
 Equity rule 87, now new rule 70, provides that guardians ad 
 litem to defend a suit may be appointed by the court, or by a 
 judge thereof, for infants or other persons under guardianship, 
 or otherwise incapacitated for suing for themselves; and the 
 same character of persons may sue by guardian, if any, or next 
 friend, subject to such orders as the court may direct for the 
 protection of these persons. Bank of United States v. Eitchie, 
 8 Pet. 144, 8 L. ed. 897 ; Woolridge v. McKenna, 8 Fed. 660. 
 See in Re Moore, 209 U. S. 496-497, 52 L. ed. 907, 28 Sup. 
 Ct. Pep. 585, 706, 14 Ann. Cas. 1164. 
 
 Executors and Administrators as Parties. 
 
 In discussing executors and administrators as parties in a 
 Federal court, I will briefly speak of the jurisdiction of the 
 Federal courts in probate matters. See new rule 37. 
 
 The determination of the jurisdiction in cases of this char- 
 acter, as said in Jordan v. Taylor, 98 Fed. 645, is not free 
 from difficulty. There has been conflict of opinion as to how 
 far the Federal courts can interfere with the properties and 
 rights of parties in an estate in due course of administration 
 
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTKATOKS AS PARTIES. 247 
 
 under the probate laws of the respective States. Farrell v. 
 O'Brien (O'Calkghan v. O'Brien), 199 TJ. S. 89, 50 L. ed. 
 101, 25 Sup. Ct. Eep. 727; Underground Electric E. Co. v. 
 Owsley, 169 Fed. 671, 99 C. C. A. 500, 176 Fed. 26; Thiel 
 Detective Service Co. v. IMcClure, 130 Fed. 55 ; Byers v. Mc- 
 Auley, 149 U. S. 608, 37 L. ed. 867, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 906; 
 Moore v. Fidelity Trust Co. 70 C. C. A. 663, 138 Fed. 1; 
 Yonley v. Lavender, 21 Wall. 279, 22 L. ed. 537 ; Ee Foley, 80 
 Fed. 949; Simmons v. Saul, 138 F. S. 439-460, 34 L. ed. 
 1054-1063, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 369; Hale v. Coffin, 114 Fed. 
 575; Bedford Quarries Co. v. Tomlinson, 36 C. C. A. 272, 
 95 Fed. 210; Lant v. Manley, 71 Fed. 7. There is one prin- 
 ciple connected with the subject which has been firmly estab- 
 lished, and that is, when property is in possession of the pro- 
 bate court it cannot be taken or disturbed by another court. 
 Ibid.; Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 615, 37 L. ed. 871, 13 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 906; Yonley v. Lavender, 21 Wall. 284, 22 L. 
 ed. 539; Jordan v. Taylor, 98 Fed. 646; Hale v. Coffin, 114 
 Fed. 575 ; McPherson v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co. 58 C. 
 C. A. 455, 122 Fed. 367, 368; Hale v. Tyler, 115 Fed. 835; 
 IS^ewberry v. Wilkinson, 118 C. C. A. Ill, 199 Fed. 673, and 
 cases cited. An administrator appointed by a State court 
 is an officer of that court, and his possession of the assets of the 
 estate is the possession of the court. Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. 
 S. 615, 37 L. ed. 871, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 906; Williams t. 
 Benedict, 8 How. 112, 12 L. ed. 1008; McPherson v. Missis- 
 sippi Valley Trust Co. 58 C. C. A. 455, 122 Fed. 367, 368. 
 The States have conclusive control over estates of deceased per- 
 sons in their limits. Ibid. ; Yonley v. Lavender, supra ; Under- 
 ground Electric E. Co. v. Owsley, 169 Fed. 671 ; Kittredge v. 
 Eace, 92 U. S. 121, 23 L. ed. 490; Ball v. Tompkins, 41 Fed. 
 490; Lant v. Manley, 71 Fed. 12; Underground Electric E. 
 Co. V. Owsley, 99 C. C. A. 500, 176 Fed. 26. Thus, a non- 
 resident creditor having judgment in a Federal court against 
 a deceased person whose estate is being administered in a pro- 
 bate court of a State, cannot by process reach such estate (Yon- 
 ley V. Lavender, supra ; Perry v. Bank of Cape Fear, 20 Fed. 
 775; Ee Foley, 76 Fed. 395, 80 Fed. 950, 951; Ball v. Tomp- 
 kins, 41 Fed. 490; Hale v. Tyler, 115 Fed. 835) ; nor by bill 
 to compel administrators to satisfy debt (Bedford Quarries Co. 
 
248 EXBCUTOES AND ADMINISTRATOES AS PARTIES. 
 
 V. Tomlinson, supra; McPherson v. Mississippi Valley Trust 
 Co. 58 C. C. A. 455, 122 Fed. 367). JSTor will a bill lie in 
 equity to dispossess administrators of control over decedent's 
 estate. Lant v. Manley, Yl Fed. 12 ; Re Foley, 80 Fed. 951, 
 and cases cited. ISTor can jurisdiction be obtained by removal. 
 Wahl V. Frant, 49 L.R.A. 62, 40 C. C. A. 638, 100 Fed. 
 680; Ee Aspinwall, 83 Fed. 852; Copeland v. Bruning, 72 
 Fed. 8. Nor can a Federal court probate a will (Ee Foley, 80 
 Fed. 951; Ee Cilley, 58 Fed. 984; Tarver v. Tarver, 9 Pet. 
 174-180, 9 L. ed. 91-93; Fouvergne v. Municipality ISTo. 2, 
 18 How. 470, 15 L. ed. 399; Ball v. Tompkins, 41 Fed. 486; 
 Hale V. Coffin, 114 Fed. 574 ; Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485, 
 27 L. ed. 1006, 3 Sup. Ct. Eep. 327, discussed in Wahl v. 
 Franz, 49 L.E.A. 62, 40 C. C. A. 638, 100 Fed. 683-684. 
 See Cilley v. Patten, 62 Fed. 498; Miller v. Weston, 199 
 Fed. 104), or determine question of testamentwm vel non 
 (Copeland v. Bruning, 72 Fed. 8; Oakley v. Taylor, 64 Fed. 
 245; Eeed v. Eeed, 31 Fed. 53); but may entertain contest 
 after probate (Eichardson v. Green, 9 C. C. A. 565, 15 U. S. 
 App. 488, 61 Fed. 423 ; Sawyer v. White, 58 C. C. A. 587, 
 122 Fed. 223-227 ; Wart v. Wart, 117 Fed. 766. See Under- 
 groimd Electric E. Co. v. Owsley, 169 Fed. 671) ; or set aside 
 the probate. Carrau v. O'Calligan, 60 C. C. A. 347, 125 Fed. 
 657; Farrell v. O'Brien (O'Callaghan v. O'Brien), 199 U. S. 
 103, 50 L. ed. 108, 25 Sup. Ct. Eep. 727 ; Broderick's Will 
 (Kieley v. McGlynn), 21 Wall. 509-517, 22 L. ed. 602-604; 
 Briggs V. Stroud, 58 Fed. 720 ; Simmons v. Saul, 138 U. S. 
 450-459, 34 L. ed. 1059-1062, 11 Sixp. Ct. Eep. 369; Garrett 
 V. Boling, 15 C. C. A. 209, 37 U. S. App. 42, 68 Fed. 56. Nor 
 can a Federal court administer an estate of a deceased person, 
 either by original proceeding or removal (Clark v. Guy, 114 
 Fed. 783 ; Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608, 37 L. ed. 867, 
 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 906; Ee Foley, 80 Fed. 950; Copeland v. 
 Bruning, supra) ; but the rule of noninterference is not ap- 
 plicable to property in hands of Federal court when owner dies 
 (Eio Grande E. Co. v. Gornila [Eio Grande E. Co. v. Vinet], 
 132 U. S. 478, 33 L. ed. 400, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 155 ; Hale v. 
 Tyler, 115 Fed. 835). 
 
 W^e thus see that the prohibition of any interference by Fed- 
 eral courts in probate matters, and in matters where the local 
 
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS AS PARTIES. 249 
 
 courts have taken jurisdiction, rests upon the principle of non- 
 interference with the res when State courts have assumed juris- 
 diction, as well as on the fact that Congress has not conferred 
 on the circuit coiTrts any probate powers. When, however, a 
 suit can be brought originally against an executor or adminis- 
 trator in the courts of the State, with which the Federal courts 
 have concurrent jurisdiction, then the suit may be brought in 
 the Federal court, if the grounds of jurisdiction otherwise exist. 
 Farrell v. O'Brien (O'Callaghan v. O'Brien), 199 U. S. 110, 
 50 L. ed. Ill, 25 Sup. Ct. Eep. 727 ; IngersoU v. Coram, 132 
 Fed. 172, 127 Fed. 418; Bnm v. Mann, 12 L.E.A.(K'.S.) 154, 
 80 C. C. A. 513, 151 Fed. 145; Wart v. Wart, 117 Fed! 766; 
 Williams V. Crabb, 59 L.E.A. 425, 54 C. C. A. 213, 117 Fed. 
 193 ; Eichardson v. Green, 9 C. C. A. 565, 15 U. S. App. 488, 
 61 Fed. 423; Eddy v. Eddy, 93 C. C. A. 586, 168 Fed. 598; 
 Lawrence v. Nelson, 143 U. S. 215, 36 L. ed. 130, 12 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 440 ; Davis v. Davis, 89 Fed. 537 ; see Underground Elec- 
 tric E. Co. V. Owsley, 99 C. C. A. 500, 176 Fed. 26. 
 
 But a suit cannot be instituted in a Federal court in a State 
 other than the State in which the estate is being administered, 
 against an executor. Lawrence v. Southern P. E. Co. 177 
 Fed. 547. If the administration has been completed, and the 
 property has passed out of the control of the probate courts, the 
 Federal courts can avail themselves of their jurisdiction in law 
 or equity, in reference thereto. Llale v. Coffin, 114 Fed. 575 ; 
 Herron v. Comstock, 71 C. C. A. 466, 139 Fed. 371, 378; 
 Hayes v. Pratt, 147 U. S. 570, 37 L. ed. 284, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 503; Spencer v. Watkins, 94 C. C. A. 659, 169 Fed. 379; or 
 when State court has not taken possession of res. Hale v. Ty- 
 ler, 115 Fed. 838, 839. Or when the suit is one of acknowl- 
 edged equity jurisdiction, as, when specific enforcement of a 
 contract is brought against the heirs and administrator of a de- 
 ceased person, — a Federal court of equity will enforce it, though 
 the contract relates to property of an estate in process of ad- 
 ministration. Spencer v. Watkins, supra; Davis v. Davis, 89 
 Fed. 537; and authorities. Spencer v. Watkins, 94 C. C. A. 
 659, 169 Fed. 379. 
 
 So, an heir may establish his right to a distributive share 
 of the estate (Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 620, 37 L. ed. 
 873, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 906; Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 19 
 
250 EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTEATOES AS PAETIES. 
 
 L. ed. 260; O'Callahan v. O'Brien, 116 Fed. 934; Eich v. 
 Bray, 2 L.E.A. 225, 37 Fed. 273), or the possession of real 
 estate devised by will (Harrison v. Eowan, 4 Wash. C. C. 202, 
 Fed. Gas. No. 6,143). So, a creditor may establish in a Fed- 
 eral court a debt against an estate (Fondley v. Lavender, 21 
 Wall. 276, 22 L. ed. 536; Hess v. Eeynolds, 113 U. S. 73, 
 28 L. ed. 927, 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 377; Hale v. Coffin, 114 Fed. 
 568; see Farmers' Bank v. Wright, 158 Fed. 841; Bedford 
 Quarries Co. v. Thomlinson, 36 C. C. A. 272, 95 Fed. 208; 
 Johnson v. Waters, 111 U. S. 668-675, 28 L. ed. 556-559, 
 4 Sup. Ct. Eep. 619 ; Central Nat. Bank y. Fitzgerald, 94 Fed. 
 16; Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 431, 19 L. ed. 262) ; or a lien on 
 the undivided shares (IngersoU v. Coram, 127 Fed. 418 ; Con- 
 tinental Nat. Bank v. Heilman, 81 Fed. 42—43 ; see Schurmeier 
 V. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. 60 C. C. A. 51, 124 Fed. 
 S65, s. c. 69 C. C. A. 22, 137 Fed. 42) ; but the classification 
 of claims by probate law binds the Federal courts (Dodd v. 
 Ghiselin, 27 Fed. 407). Or a suit after final account rendered 
 may be brought against the administrator or executor who holds 
 in trust. Colt v. Colt, 111 U. S. 566, 28 L. ed. 520, 4 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 553. Or a court of equity may decree a discovery and 
 accounting against an executor. Plume & A. Mfg. Co. v. 
 Baldwin,. 87 Fed. 785 ; PuUiam v. PuUiam, 10 Fed. 23 ; Davis 
 V. Davis, 89 Fed. 537 ; Eddy v. Eddy, 93 C. C. A. 586, 168 
 Fed. 591. 
 
 So, a bill in equity will lie, in the enforcement of a trust, to 
 compel an administrator to account for and distribute assets 
 wrongfully withheld (Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 19 L. ed. 
 260 ; Johnson v. Waters, 111 U. S. 640, 28 L. ed. 547, 4 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 619 ; Hayes v. Pratt, 147 U. S. 570, 37 L. ed. 284, 
 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 503); but'not to disturb the possession of 
 an administrator rightfully holding the assets (Byers v. Mc- 
 Auley, 149 U. S. 608, 37 L. ed. 867, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 906). 
 When praying an account against executors, all must be joined 
 if more than one (Howth v. Owens, 29 Fed. 724; ConoUy v. 
 Wells, 33 Fed. 210) ; unless one be nonresident (Plume & A. 
 Mfg. Co. V. Baldwin, 87 Fed. 785), and may be dispensed with 
 under U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 737, or if the executor has not 
 administered (Providence Eubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 
 791, 19 L. ed. 567; Conolly v. Wells, 33 Fed. 210, 211). 
 
JUKISDICTION IN MATTERS WHEN FRAUD IKTEEVENES. 251 
 
 Wlien Fraud Intervenes. 
 
 A court of equity will take jurisdiction of a suit by a non- 
 resident to set aside a decree of a probate court for fraud (Ar- 
 rowsmith v. Gleason, 129 U. S. 99-100, 32 L. ed. 635, 9 Sup. 
 Ct. Kep. 237 ; Johnson v. Waters, 111 U. S. 668-675, 28 L. ed. 
 556, 559, i Sup. Ct. Rep. 619; Dodd v. Ghiselin, 27 Fed. 405; 
 Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 19 L. ed. 260; Arrowsmith v. 
 Gleason, 46 Fed. 256) ; or to set aside a fraudulent conveyance 
 made by the decedent, if the probate court has not taken pos- 
 session (Hale V. Tyler, 115 Fed. 834) ; or to set aside fraudu- 
 lent allowances by an administrator (Central Nat. Bank v. 
 Fitzgerald, 94 Fed. 16; and authorities; Dodd v. Ghiselin,. 27 
 Fed. 407) ; or fraudulent conveyances by the administrator 
 (Rhino V. Emery, 18 C. C. A. 600, 87 U. S. App. 575, 72 
 Fed. 386 ; Terry v. Bank of Cape Fear, 20 Fed. 775 ; Marshall 
 V. Holmes, 141 U. S. 509, 35 L. ed. 874, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 62; 
 Hale V. Tyler, 115 Fed. 838 ; Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 430, 19 
 L. ed. 261 ; Northern P. R. Co. v. Kurtzman, 82 Fed. 243 ; 
 iDaniels v. Benedict, 50 Fed. 354; Dodd v. Ghiselin, supra; 
 Central Xat. Bank v. Fitzgerald, 94 Fed. 19, and cases cited). 
 
OHAPTEE XLIII. 
 
 TEUSTEES AS PARTIES. 
 
 Equity rule 49, now new rule 37, provides tiat when real 
 estate is vested in trustees, with power to sell and receive the 
 purchase money and rents and profits of the estate, such trustee 
 may sue alone, without making persons beneficially interested 
 parties to the bill. Allen- West Commission Co. v. Brashear, 
 176 Fed. 121, and cases cited; Harrison v. Stewart, 93 U. S. 
 160, 23 L. ed. 845 ; Ee E. T. Kenney Co. 136 Eed. 455, and 
 eases cited; Bowling Green Trust Co. v. Virginia Pass. & P. 
 Co. 132 Ped. 921 ; Hayes v. Pratt, 147 U. S. 570, 37 L. ed. 
 284, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 503 ; Shaw v. Little Eock & Pt. S. E. . 
 Co. 100 U. S. 611, 25 L. ed. 758; Eitcher v. Jerome, 123 U. S. 
 246, 31 L. ed. 137, 8 Sup. Ct. Eep. 106, 207 ; Austin v. Cahill, 
 99 Tex. 172, 88 S. W. 548, 89 S. W. 552 ; Kerrison v. Stewart, 
 93 U. S. 155, 23 L. ed. 843; Caylor v. Cooper, 165 Fed. 757; 
 Allen-West Commission Co. v. Brashear, 176 Fed. 119. So, 
 beneficiaries are bound by judgments against the trustee in such 
 cases. Eichter v. Jerome, 123 U. S. 246, 31 L. ed. 137, 8 Sup.' 
 Ct. Eep. 106 ; Kent v. Lake Superior Ship Canal E. & Iron Co. 
 144 U. S. 90, 36 L. ed. 357, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 650; Eumsey 
 v. Peoples E. Co. 154 Mo. 215, 55 S. W. 624; Fletcher v. Ann 
 Arbor, 53 C. C. A. 647, 116 Fed. 481 ; Woods v. Woodson, 40 
 C. C. A. 525, 100 Fed. 519. And it is held that such trustees, 
 in respect to litigation touching the trust property, have the 
 same relative position to the property that executors and ad- 
 ministrators hold to the personal estate of the decedent in litiga- 
 tion. Carey v. Brown, 92 U. S. 171, 23 L. ed. 469; Allen- 
 West Commission Co. v. Brashear, 176 Fed. 121, and eases 
 cited; Denver v. ISTew York Trust Co. 110 C. C. A. 24, 187 
 Fed. 890 ; see new rule 41. 
 
 When the subject-matter of a trust is in controversy, all trus- 
 tees should be made parties, notwithstanding section 737, U. 
 
 252 
 
TRUSTEES AS PAETIES. 253 
 
 S. Eev. Stat. This statute does not apply to trustees in the 
 classes of suits provided in equity rule 49, now nbw rule 37, 
 nor in restraining trustees from certain acts in reference to the 
 trust, or for breach of duty not involving actual fraud. Wall 
 V. Thomas, 41 Fed. 621;'Boyd v. Gill, 21 Blatchf. 543, 19 
 Fed. 146; Hazard v. Durant, 19 Fed. 476. So, one of three 
 trustees has no authority to institute a suit without the others 
 or their knowledge. McGeorge v. Bigstone Gap Improv. Co. 
 88 Fed. 599. 
 
 Trustees are always necessary parties in a suit to defeat the 
 trust (McArthur v.' Scott, 113 U. S. 396, 28 L. ed. 1033, 5 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 652; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Lake Street 
 Elev. K. Co. 122 Fed. 921; Eejall v. Greenhood, 35 C. C. A. 
 97, 92 Fed. 945; Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. 
 Insurance Co. of K A. 151 U. S. 382, 383, 38 L. ed. 203, 4 
 Inters. Com. Rep. 499, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367; Thayer v. Life 
 Asso. of America, 112 U. S. 717, 28 L. ed. 864, 5 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 355 ; Old Colony Trust Co. v. ^Yichita, 123 Fed. 762- 
 767 ; Guardian Trust Co. v. Whitecliffs Portland Cement & 
 Chalk Co. 109 Fed. 527 ; Vetterlein v. Barnes, 124 U. S. 172, 
 31 ,L. ed. 401, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 441); or to enjoin a sale of 
 property under the trust (ibid. ; Moody v. Flagg, 125 Fed. 819 ; 
 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Wichita, 123 Fed. 762); unless 
 fraud charged only against the beneficiary. 
 
 So, when suit is brought to recover the property, or to reduce 
 it to possession by the trustee, and his relations to the benefi- 
 ciary are not affected, then he should sue alone. Griswold v. 
 Bacheller, 21 C. C. A. 428, 40 U. S. App. 142, 75 Fed. 473 ; 
 Carey v. Brown, 92 U. S. 172, 23 L. ed. 469 ; Sullivan v. Thur- 
 mond, — Tex. Civ. App. — , 45 S. W. 394; Ross v. Ft. Wayne, 
 11 C. C. A. 288, 24 U. S. App. 113, 63 Fed. 466 ; Austin v. 
 Cahill, 99 Tex. 172, 88 S. W. 548, 89 S. W. 552 ; Thompkins' 
 v. Thompkins, 123 Fed. 207 ; Dodge v. Tullays, 144 U. S. 451,, 
 36 L. ed. 501, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 728; Smith v. Portland, 30 
 Fed. 737. But otherwise, beneficiaries should be made parties. 
 
 So, seeking to reach the income of a trust estate through the 
 rights and powers of a trustee, he must be made a party. Spies<^ 
 V. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. 30 Fed. 398 ; Morgan v. Kansas P. 
 R. Co. 21 Blatchf. 134, 15 Fed. 55 ; Barry v. Missouri, K. & 
 T. R. Co. 22 Fed. 631. 
 
254 BENEFICIARIES AS PAETIES. 
 
 So, a trustee of bondholders refusing to sue must be made a 
 party defendant, or when a trustee holds securities of a corpo- 
 ration to secure outstanding bonds, he should be made a party, 
 in a suit to wind up a corporation. Miles v. ISTew South Bldg. 
 & L. Asso. 99 Fed. 4. 
 
 So in a' suit to cancel a mortgage made by a trustee wroii£;- 
 fully. So in suit to foreclose a trust deed, the trustee should 
 be party defendant. Maher v. Tower Hotel Co. 94 Fed. 225. 
 
 So in suits against trustees by a stranger seejiing to defeat 
 the trust, and the trustee represents the beneficiaries in all 
 things relating to their common interests, the beneficiaries need 
 not be made parties. Kerrison v. Stewart, 93 U. S. 160, 23 
 L. ed. 845. IS^ew rule 37. 
 
 Equity rule 50, now new rule 41, provides that in a suit to 
 execute the trusts of a will it is not necessary to make the heir 
 at law a party, unless the plaintiff is seeking to establish the will 
 against the heir at law. 
 
 Beneficmries as Parties. 
 
 In suits respecting trust property brought by or against trus- 
 tees, the beneficiaries are as a general rule, parties with the 
 trustee, except as stated in equity rules 37 and 41, and when 
 a trustee brings suit to recover the property, as heretofore stated. 
 Ebell V. Bursinger, 70 Tex. 122, 8 S. W. 77; Sawyer v. First 
 IS^at. Bajik, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 486, 93 S. W. 153; Kerrison 
 V. Stewart, 93 U. S. 155, 33 L. ed. 843 ; Preston v. Carten Bros. 
 80 Tex. 391, 16 S. W. 17 ; Hall v. Harris, 11 Tex. 303. 
 
 In all suits to wind up the trust and distribute the proceeds 
 the beneficiaries should be made parties. Wescott v. Wayne 
 Agri. Works, 11 Fed. 303. 
 
 In a suit by beneficiaries to compel a corporation to fulfil 
 an agreement in a deed of trust, and not seeking to reach the 
 security, the trustee need not be made a party. Spies v. Chi- 
 cago & E. I. E. Co. 30 Fed. 397. 
 
 So a trustee of a corporation mortgage need not, in a suit 
 by the beneficiaries, not affecting the lien, be made a party 
 (Holly Mfg. Co. V. ISTew Chester Water Co. 48 Fed. 880), 
 when all the beneficiaries are substantially before the court; 
 and this is especially true when the joinder of the trustee may 
 
BENEFICIARIES AS PARTIES. 255 
 
 oust the jurisdiction. Equity rule 47; Lake Street Elev. E. 
 Co. V. Ziegler, 39 C. C. A. '431, 99 Fed. 114. See Lawrence 
 V. Southern P. Co. 165 Fed. 241. 
 
 So beneficiaries may sue without making the trustee a party, 
 when the trustee is without power over the trust property (I'. 
 A. Tompkins Co. v. Catawba Mills, 82 Fed. 780), or a naked 
 trustee, and A^■hen no relief is demanded against him. Lake 
 Street Elev. E. Co. v. Ziegler, 39 C. C. A. 431, 99 Fed. 120. 
 Holly ilfg. Co. V. Chester Co. 48 Fed. 880-891. 
 
 In a suit by beneficiaries a nonresident triTstee may not be 
 made a party if four out of five trustees are parties. Stewart 
 V. Chesapeake & O. Canal Co. 4 Hughes, 41, 1 Fed. 361. Bene- 
 ficiaries having a separate interest in a trust fund may join 
 in an action against the trustee for its loss. Davenport v. 
 Prince, 41 Fed. 323. 
 
 When one of several beneficiaries sue to declare and enforce 
 an implied trust, all pai'ties claiming an interest in the trust 
 estate must be made parties. Hall v. Harris, 11 Tex. 303. 
 
 When a full investigation of the management of the trust 
 fund is sought, all the beneficiaries must be made parties. 
 Lauriat v. Stratton, 6 Sawy. 339, 11 Fed. 107. 
 
 When a trustee refuses to sue, the beneficiaries may sue, but 
 must make the trustee a party defendant, unless the suit comes 
 within one of the exceptions as above stated. Consolidated 
 Water Co. v. San Diego, 92 Fed. 759; First Nat. Bank v. 
 Eadford Trust Co. 26 C. C. A. 1, 47 U. S. App. 692, 80 Fed. 
 569 ; Bowdoin College v. Merritt, 63 Fed. 213 ; Clyde v. Eich- 
 mond & D. E. Co. 55 Fed. 448. 
 
 Or when the trustee neglects to defend the trust the bene- 
 ficiaries may do so. Thus they may sue to remove cloud, though 
 trustee has uncontrolled possession for five years. Bowdoin 
 College V. Merrett, 54 Fed. 55. 
 
 A beneficiary may bring a suit when the trustee has acquired 
 an adverse right. Webb v. Vermont 0. E. Co. 9 Fed. 793. 
 And where fraud has been committed by the trustees, or some 
 of them, the beneficiary may sue some or all; that is, the tort 
 may be considered joint or several. Wall v. Thomas, 41 Fed. 
 621; Boyd v. Gill, 21 Blatchf. 543, 19 Fed. 145. 
 
256 EECEIVEES AS PARTIES. 
 
 Receivers as J'arties. 
 
 I have already alluded to the cases in which the fundamental 
 grounds of jurisdiction as in citizenship, Federal questions, and 
 amount, arise to affect the right of the receiver to sue, or his lia- 
 hility to be sued, in a Federal court. 
 
 Section 3 of the judiciary act of 1888, embodied in sec. 66, 
 chap. 4, new Code, has already been referred to, in which it 
 is provided that every receiver or manager of any property, 
 appointed by any court of the United States, may be sued in 
 respect of any act or transaction of his in carrying on the busi- 
 ness connected with such property, without the previous leave 
 of the court appointing him, but such suit shall be subject to 
 the equity jurisdiction of the appointing court, if necessary to 
 the ends of justice. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 II. S. 330-332, 
 35 L. ed. 798-799, 12 Sup. Ct. Kep. 11 ; Gableman v. Peoria, 
 D. & E. E. Co. 179 U. S. 335-340, 45 L. ed. 220-223, 21 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 171 ; Buckhannon & IST. K. Co. v. Davis, 68 C. C. A. 
 345, 135 Fed. 710; Chicago, E. I. & P. E. Co. v. Martin, 178 
 U. S. 245, 44 L. ed. 1055, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 854; International 
 & G. 1ST. E. Co. V. Wynne, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 68, 122 S. W. 
 50 ; International & G. N. E. Co. v. Bradt, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 
 82, 122 S. W. 59 ; J. J. Case Plow Works v. Finks, 26 C. C. A. 
 46, 52 U. S. App. 253, 81 Fed. 529 ; Dillingham v. Hawk, 23 
 L.E.A. 517, 9 C. C. A. 101, 23 U. S. App. 273, 60 Fed. 494; 
 St. Louis S. W. E. Co. v. Holbrook, 19 C. C. A. 385, 41 U. S. 
 App. 33, 73 Fed. 112; Erb v. Morasch, 177 U. S. 585, 44 L. 
 ed. 898, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 819 ; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. 
 Chicago & a. P. E. Co. 118 Fed. 205. And the judgment ob- 
 tained is conclusive on the Federal court as to the. right to 
 recover, but time and manner of payment rests with the Federal 
 court. Willcox V. Jones, 101 C. C. A. 84, 177 Fed. 870. 
 
 Prior to this act, as has been said, it was a well-settled rule, 
 and is now, except as limited by this section of the act of 1888, 
 that a receiver could not be made a party defendant without 
 leave of the court appointing him. 
 
 The rule now is, a receiver can be made a party defendant 
 in any court. State or Federal, without leave of the appointing 
 court, whenever the cause of action is based on some act or 
 transaction of the receiver in administering the trust. If the 
 
RECEIVEES AS PARTIES. 257 
 
 cause of action does not come "within the terms of the act, then 
 you must obtain permission of the appointing court to make 
 him a party defendant, or you subject your case to dismissal, 
 or the judgment obtained to be declared void. Comer v. I'el- 
 ton, 10 C. C. A. 2S, 22 U. S. App. 313, 61 Fed. 737; Minot v. 
 Mastin, 37 C. C. A. 234, 95 Fed. 734; Grosscup v. German 
 Sav. Bank, 162 Fed. 951. U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 614, does not 
 authorize suit without permission, as to such acts and trans- 
 actions as come within the rule. See Dillingham v. Hawk, 23 
 L.E.A. 517, 9 C. C. A. 101, 23 U. S. App. 273, 60 Fed. 496, 
 and authorities. See ilcXulta v. Lockridge, 141 U. S. 329- 
 331, 35 L. ed. 797-799, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 11, where any act 
 or transaction of his was held to extend to the acts of his pred- 
 ecessors. 
 
 As to such acts and transactions the suits against receivers 
 are taken out of the class of ancillary suits, and become original 
 suits against receiver (Gilmore v. Herrick, 93 Fed. 526 ; Pit- 
 kin V. Cowen, 91 Fed. 599) ; and, as we have seen, the ground 
 of Federal jurisdiction is, important (ibid.). 
 
 When the receiver, however, is winding up an insolvent estate, 
 and he sues for property belonging to the fund, or the fore- 
 closure of a mortgage in behalf of the fund (Myers v. Het- 
 tinger, 37 C. C. A. 369, 94 Fed. 870; Bowman v. Harris, 95 
 Fed. 917; Pope v. Louisville, JST. A. & C. R. Co. 173 U. S. 
 573, 43 L. ed. 814, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 500; Toledo, St. L. & 
 K. C. R. Co. V. Continental Trust Co. 36 C. C. A. 155, 95 
 Fed. 497; Metropolitan Trust Co. v. ColumbUs, S. & H. R. 
 Co. 93 Fed. 689 ; Compton v. Jessup, 15 C. C. A. 397, 31 U. 
 S. App. 486, 68 Fed. 280) ; or when permission is given by 
 the court appointing the receiver, to sue hi,m as to some claim 
 or right in and to the property in the hands of the court (Minot 
 V. Mastin, 37 C. C. A. 234, 95 Fed. 735; Compton v. Jessup, 
 15 C. C. A. 397, 31 U. S. App. 486, 68 Fed. 279-280) ; or on 
 a cause of action not arising out of any act or transaction of 
 the receiver, as a bill in equity to collect assessments on stock 
 (Myers v. Hettinger, 37 C. C. A. 269, 94 Fed. 372 ; Bausman 
 V. Denny, 73 Fed. 69) ; or filing bill to quiet title (Connor v. 
 Alligator Lumber Co. 98 Fed. 155), then the receiver may sue 
 or be sued in the court appointing him, without reference to 
 amount or citizenship, as the suit in such cases would be only 
 ancillary to the main suit. White v. Ewing, 159 U. S. 39, 
 S. Eq.— 17. ■ 
 
258 EECEIVEES AS PAETIES. 
 
 40 L. ed. 68, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1018 ; Carpenter v. Northern P. 
 R. Co. 75 Fed. 850 ; Eay v. Pierce, 81 Fed. 882 ; Bottom v. 
 National R. Bldg. & L. Asso. 123 Fed. 744; Root v. Wool- 
 worth, 150 U. S. 413, 37 L. ed. 1126, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136; 
 Rouse V. Letcher, 156 U. S. 49-50, 39 L. ed. 342, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 266 ; Pope v. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. 173 U. S. 573, 
 43 L. ed. 814, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 500. 
 
 A receiver of a national bank is not a necessary party to a 
 suit to enforce a claim against the bank. Denton v. Baker, 
 24 C. C. A. 476, 48 U. S. App. 235, 79 Fed. 189 ; Speekert 
 V. German Nat. Bank, 38 C. C. A. 682, 98 Fed. 153; Bank of 
 Bethel v. Pahquioque Bank, 14 Wall. 384, 20 L. ed. 840. 
 
 A receiver need not be made a party when an ancillary suit 
 is filed to foreclose a mortgage on property in the hands of a 
 receiver (Continental Trust Co. v. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. E. 
 Co. 82 Fed. 642) ; nor when he has surrendered the property 
 sued for (Phelps v. Elliott, 29 Fed. 53). 
 
 Power to Sue in a Foreign Jurisdiction. 
 
 The appointing court cannot give a receiver power to sue in 
 another court of foreign jurisdiction, or go there and take 
 possession of property (Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 328, 15 L. ed, 
 166; Great Western Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Harris, 198 U. S. 
 561, 49 L. ed. 1163, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770; Hale v. Allinson, 
 188 U. S. 56-68, 47 L. ed. 380-388, 23 Siip. Ct. Rep. 244; 
 Edwards v. National Window Glass Jobbers Asso. 139 Fed. 
 797; Fowler v. Osgood, 4 L.R.A.(N.S.) 824, 72 C. C. A. 276, 
 141 Fed. 20; Hilliker v. Hale, 54 C. C. A. 252, 117 Fed. 
 220) ; even though ordered by the appointing court. (Great 
 Western Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Harris, supra). Hale v. Harden, 
 89 Fed. 283 ; Hale v. Allinson, 188 U. S. 56, 47 L. ed. 380, 23 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 244; Fairview Fluor Spar & Lead Co. v. Ul- 
 rich, 113 C. C. A. 372, 192 Fed. 897; McBride v. Oriental 
 Bank, 200 Fed. 895. 
 
 However, there are exceptions to the rule, as where the title is 
 in the receiver, or a statute vests authority to do so. See Bern- 
 heimer v. Converse, 206 TJ. S. 516, 51 L. ed. 1163, 27 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 755 ; Irvine v. Bankard, 181 Fed. 208 ; Strout v. United 
 Shoe Machinery Co. 195 Fed. 314; Irvine v. Putnam, 190 I'ed. 
 321. 
 
CHAPTEE XLIV. 
 
 PAETIES IIT REMOVING CLOUD AND QUIETING TITI-E. 
 
 Eemoving cloud from title has already been discussed in my 
 lectures on Equity Jurisprudence, and I will simply state the 
 rule of parties as applied in the Federal courts. 
 
 Eirst. The bill can be filed by the party in possession hav- 
 ing the legal title (Wehrman v." Conklin, 155 U. S. 325, 39 
 L. ed. 173^ 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 129 ; Kellar v. Craig, 61 G. C. A. 
 366, 126 Eed. 630; Bardon v. Land & Eiver Improv. Co. 157 
 F. S. 327, 39 L. ed. 719, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 650; Gormley v. 
 Clark, 134 U. S. 338, 33 L. ed. 909, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 554; 
 Kraus v. Congdon, 88 C. C. A. 182, 161 Fed. 18 : Kennedy 
 V. Elliott, 85 Fed. 832 ; Union Mill & Min. Co. v. Warren, 82 
 Fed. 519; Frost v. Spitley, 121 U. S. 556, 30 L. ed. 1012, 7 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1129; Harding v. Guice, 25 C. C. A. 352, 42 
 U. S. App. 411, 80 Fed. 163, and cases -cited; United States 
 Min. Co. V. Lawson, 115 Fed. 1007), because, being in posses- 
 sion, he cannot bring trespass to try title, and therefore has no 
 adequate remedy at law to protect his enjo}'ment. (Harding 
 V. Guice, supra.) 
 
 Second. It cannot be filed by a party having the legal title 
 and out of possession, notwithstanding State statutes permit 
 it (Hudson V. Eandolph, 13 C. C. A. 402, 23 U. S. App. 681, 
 66 Fed. 217; Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 146, 34 L. ed. 
 873, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 276 ; Boston & M. Consol. Copper & S. 
 Min. Co. V. Montana Ore Purchasing Co. 188 U. S. 642, 47 
 L. ed. 633, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 434 ; K"orthern P. E. Co. v. Am- 
 acker, 1 C. C. A. 345, 7 U. S. App. 33, 49 Fed. 537; Gordon 
 V. Jackson, 72 Fed. 89) ; except in cases where there is no ade- 
 quate remedy at law and relief in equity is necessary, as in 
 cases of wild lands clouded by tax titles, and purchasers not in 
 actual possession (Gordon v. Jackson, 72 Fed. 88; Gillis v. 
 Downey, 29 C. C. A. 286, 56 U. S. App. 567, 85 Fed. 483, 19 
 Mor. Min. Eep. 253; Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U. S. 328, 
 
 259 
 
260 PARTIES ISr EEMOVING CLOUD AND QUIETING TITLE. 
 
 39 L. ed. 174, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 129; Hudson v. Eandolph, 
 13 C. C. A. 402, 23 U. S. App. 681, 66 Fed. 216; Kilbourn 
 V. Sunderland, 130 U. S. 505-515, 32 L. ed. 1005-1009, 9 
 Sup. Ct. Kep. 594; Harding v. Guice, 25 0. C. A. 352, 42 
 U. S. App. 411, 80 Fed. 165 ; Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 
 15, 28 L. ed. 52, 3 Sup. Ct. Kep. 495 ; Frost v. Spitley, 121 
 U. S. 557, 30 L. ed. 1012, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1129; See David- 
 son V. Calkins, 92 Fed. 231) ; or as to mining lands (Willitt 
 V. Baker, 133 Fed. 937; Gillis v. Downey, 29 C. 0. A. 286, 
 56 TJ. S. App. 567, 85 Fed. 483, 19 Mor. Min. Eep. 253; 
 Carter v. Thompson, 65 Fed. 329, 18 Mor. Min. Eep. 134) ; 
 or oil lands (Elk Fork Oil & Gas Co. v. Jennings, 84 
 Fed. 839. See Kellar v. Craig, 61 C. C. A. 366, 126 Fed. 
 630). So it may be stated. 
 
 Third. That the bill can be filed when neither party is in 
 possession and plaintiff has the legal title, because there can 
 be no controversy in law if neither party is in possession. Hol- 
 land V. Challen, 110 TJ. S. 15-26, 28 L. ed. 52-56, 3 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 495 ; United States Min. Co. v. Lawson, 67 C. C. A. 587, 
 134 Fed. 769; Southern P. E. Co. v. Goodrich, 57 Fed. 880; 
 Southern P. E. Co. v. Stanley, 49 Fed. 264, 265. 
 
 Fourth. The bill cannot be filed against the defendant in 
 possession (Taylor v. Clark, 89 Fed. 7 ; Gordan v. Jackson, 
 72 Fed. 89 ; Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 146, 34 L. ed. 
 873, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 276; Gombert v. Lyon, 80 Fed. 305; 
 Davidson v. Calkins, 92 Fed. 232-236 ; Adoue v. Strahan, 97 
 Fed. 692), whether permitted by the State law or not, because 
 ejectment is an adequate remedy at law. Ibid. Eudland v. 
 Mastic, 77 Fed. 689; Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 146, 
 34 L. ed. 873, 11 Sup. Ct. Kep. 276 ; Blythe v. Hinckley, 84 
 Fed. 256; Davidson v. Calkins, 92 Fed. 239. 
 
 Then in these cases the bill must show that either the plain- 
 tiff is in possession, or that neither party is in possession ; other- 
 wise it cannot be filed. Southern P. E. Co. v. Goodrich, 5,7 
 Fed. 880 ; Davidson v. Calkins, 92 Fed. 239. 
 
 But it seems that, though an action at law was the proper 
 remedy because of the position of the parties as to the property, 
 yet where a bill was filgd and both parties treated it as an 
 equity suit, a decree will be enforced and not set aside. Book 
 V. Justice Min. Co. 58 Fed. 828, 829. 
 
CHAPTEE XLV. 
 
 DEFECT OF PARTIES AND ISSUE. 
 
 It has been seen that the principle on which a court of chan- 
 cery acts is to dispose of the whole subject-matter in one suit 
 and bind the rights of all persons interested in it. So a "de- 
 fect of parties" is a good defense, unless under the 4th clause 
 of new rule 25, providing that if any person other than those 
 named as defendants shall be necessary or proper parties, the 
 bill shall aver the reason they are not made parties, by showing 
 they are out of the jurisdiction, or cannot be joined without 
 ousting the jurisdiction of the Federal court as to other parties, 
 and if out of the jurisdiction, the bill should further ask that 
 they should be made parties if they should come within the 
 jurisdiction. Sheffield & B. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. ISTewman, 
 23 C. C. A. 459, 41 U. S^ App. 766, 77 Fed. 791 ; Story v. 
 Livingston, 13 Pet. 375, 10 L. ed. 207. 
 
 So if necessary parties that can be reached, and their pres- 
 ence does not oust jurisdiction, or indispensable parties, whether 
 they can be reached or not, are wanting in the bill, you must 
 object by motion or in the answer under new rule 29. See new 
 rule 43 as to setting up defect and hearing upon the issues ; — 
 and see new rule 44 as to the effect of not setting up a defect 
 of parties by motion or answer. If the defect is apparent the 
 issue whether raised in a motion, or in the answer, should be 
 in the nature of a demurrer. See Alexander v. Fidelity Trust 
 Co. 215 Fed. 791. And in either event, the proper parties 
 should be named. Dwight v. Central Vermont R. Co. 9 Fed. 
 785. And the same rule applies in misjoinder if that be the 
 objection, or where parties are made who have no interest. See 
 Hubbard v. Manhattan Trust Co. 30 C. C. A. 520, 57 U. S. App. 
 730, 87 Fed. 51 ; Sheffield & B. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Iv^ewman, 
 23 C. C. A. 459, 41 U. S. App. 766, 77 Fed. 787 ; Conolly v. 
 Wells, 33 Fed. 205 ; Halstead v. Manning, 34 Fed. 565 ; Elkhart 
 
 261 
 
262 DEFECT QI" PARTIES ANU ISSUE. 
 
 Nat. Bank v. Northwestern Guaranty Loan Co. 84 Fed. 76; 
 House V. Mullen, 22 "Wall. 46, 22 L. ed. 839. However, the 
 addition of a party having no- interest may be struck out on 
 motion. Hubbard v. Manhattan Trust Co. supra ; Badger Silver 
 Min. Co. V. Drake, 31 C. C. A. 378, 58 U. S. App. 129, 88 Fed. 
 52. If the objection is that it appears that a certain party 
 named should be a party to the bill, or a party to the bill should 
 not have been made, you may use the following forms: 
 
 In the District Court of the United 
 
 States for the District of 
 
 Sitting at 
 
 And now comes the defendant and moves the Court to dismiss the bill 
 filed in the above cause, for that it appears that one G. H. is a necessary 
 (or indispensable party) and has not been made a party to the bill (point 
 out briefly the alleg-ations of the bill showing that the person named is a 
 necessary or indispensable party in further proceedings and should be 
 joined.) Prayer — for dismissal of bill with costs. 
 
 If the objection goes to a misjoinder, use same form, chang- 
 ing allegations to such facts. 
 
 Where the nonjoinder (or misjoinder) of parties is not ap- 
 parent, but the fact exists, then, with title and commencement 
 as before, proceed as follows: 
 
 And for answer to said bill aver and say that one E. G. is a necessary 
 (or indispensable) party (if necessary, allege that he is a citizen of and 
 
 residing in , showing he is within the jurisdiction of court) to 
 
 said bill, because (here state why he is a necessary or indispensable party) ; 
 all of which matters this defendant avers to be true, and pleads the same 
 in abatement (or in bar) of complainant's bill, and prays judgment, etc. 
 
 (as before). R. F., 
 
 Solicitor. 
 
 If for misjoinder change allegations to suit facts. 
 
 While this is the regular course of pleading in equity, and 
 may be used in case of defect of parties, yet the Supreme Court 
 of the Uaited States has promulgated two rules making such 
 speedy disposition of all objections and suggestions as to parties 
 that nothing but time is gained, or rather, wasted, in filing a 
 plea in such cases. United States v. Gillespie, supra. 
 
 Equity rule 52, now new rule 43, provides that where the d& 
 fendant shall by his answer suggest that the bill is defective foi' 
 
DEFECT OF PAETIES AND ISSUE. 263 
 
 want of parties, the plaintiflF shall be at liberty, in fourteen 
 days after answer filed, to set down the cause for argument on 
 the objection only, and the purpose for which the same is so 
 set down shall be notified by an entry to be made in the clerk's 
 order book to the efl^ect following: "Set down for hearing on 
 defendant's objection for want of parties." 
 
 This action is taken by plaintiff by simply addressing a note 
 to the clerk to enter the order as above stated in the order book. 
 This should be done, for the rule proceeds, "and when the 
 plaintiff shall not set down his cause and proceed to a hearing, 
 then, if defendant's objection be allowed, the plaintiff' will not 
 be entitled, as a matter of course, for an order to amend by 
 adding parties, but the court is at liberty to dismiss his bill." 
 
 Equity rule 53, now new'rule 44, provides that if the defend- 
 ant shall at the hearing of a cause object that a suit is defective 
 for want of parties, not having made the objection by plea or 
 answer, and therein specified by name or description of parties 
 to whom the objection applies, the court may, in its discretion, 
 make a decree saving the rights of the parties not joined. 
 
 By these rules it is seen that a suggestion in the answer of 
 a defect of parties is all that is necessary to raise the issue, and 
 instead of having to wait the ordinary time under the rules for 
 a hearing, the plaintiff may, in fourteen days from filing the 
 answer, settle the preliminary matter of parties, having those 
 added that should be joined, or eliminating those improperly 
 joined. To induce the plaintiff to pursue this rule, it is de- 
 clared on failure to do so that he loses his right of amendment 
 as of course, and subjects his bill to dismissal by the court 
 should it appear that the suggestion of the defendant as to 
 parties should be found true at the final hearing. 
 
 On the other hand, equity rule 53, now new rale 44, in order 
 to induce the defendant to make the suggestion of a want of 
 parties by answer, the court can, if the defendant waits until 
 the final hearing to raise the question, proceed in disregard of 
 the suggestion then, and enter a decree on the case, saving the 
 rights of absent parties. Mechanics' Bank v. Seton, 1 Pet. 299- 
 306, Y L. ed. 152-155; Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 626, 33 
 L. ed. 674, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 494. This rule, however, cannot 
 apply when the absent parties are indispensable, but only when 
 hecessai-y parties or proper parties. The absence of indis- 
 
264 DEFECT OF PAETIES AND ISSUE. 
 
 pensable parties prevents the court from proceeding, except to 
 dismiss without prejudice, as before seen. Young v. Gushing, 
 4 Biss. 456, Fed. Gas. ISTo. 18,166; Mechanics' Bank v. Seton, 
 1 Pet. 299, 7 L. ed. 152. 
 
 It is further apparent by these rules that any objection for 
 want of parties or misjoinder of parties, whether raised by 
 motion, or by suggestion in the answer, must point out and 
 name the persons not joined or misjoined, and give reasons for 
 the objection. ShefBeld & B. Goal, Iron & R. Co. v. Newman, 
 supra; Garey v. Brown, 92 U. S. 171, 23 L. ed. 469; Harvey ' 
 V. Richmond & M. E. Go. 64 Fed. 20 ; United States v. Pratt 
 Goal & Coke Go. 18 Fed. 708. 
 
 But there are other grounds than those of non-joinder or 
 misjoinder, the existence of which 'Creates a defect of parties, 
 and which should be raised and settled in limine by motion, 
 or suggestion in the answer. 
 
 Any person having an equitable right or remedy may, if mi 
 juris, sue in his own name, and if not, may sue in the name of 
 another, and the defendant has the right to have on the record 
 some person sui juris who would be answerable for costs and 
 bound by a decree. So, infancy, coverture, lunacy, or the non- 
 existence of the character or capacity in which the party is 
 suing, or the parties are sued, such as partners, executors, ad- 
 ministrators, trustees, or heirs, should be met by motion or 
 answer at once, and settled in limine. 
 
 By new rule 43 it is clearly indicated that matters in abate- 
 ment touching the character and capacity of parties should be 
 settled in limine. 
 
 Many of the Federal districts have local rules requiring all 
 matters in abatement to be set up by preliminary answer in the 
 nature of a plea, and upon issue joined the court determines it 
 before the defendant is required to answer to the merits. Mar- 
 shall V. Otto, supra. 
 
 If any of these objections be raised by the defendant, you 
 may use the form given for want of parties, except the stating 
 part must present the specific objection, thus: 
 
 Where the bill is exhibited by an infant without next friend, 
 you insert: 
 
 "That said plaintiff, before and at the time of filing his said bill, was 
 and now is an infant under the age of twenty-one years, wherefore judg- 
 ment is prayed," etc. 
 
DEFECT OF PARTIES AND ISSUE. 265 
 
 In the case of lunacy say : 
 
 "That plaintiff has been declared a lunatic by virtue of inquiry duly and 
 legally made and judgment thereon, to which defendant asks leave to refer ; 
 that said judgment has never been set aside and remains in full force and 
 effect," etc. 
 
 Florida C. & P. K. Co. v. Bell, 31 C. 0. A. 9, 59 U. S. 
 App. 189, 87 Fed. 369 ; Dudgeon v. Watson, 23 Blatchf. 161, 
 23 Fed. 161. 
 
 Or in case plaintiff or defendant are not administrators, etc., 
 being the capacity in which they sue, or are being sued, the 
 motion or answer by the defendant must set up the fact clearly. 
 
 You must set up: 
 
 "Tliat at the time of bringing the suit the so-called intestate was not 
 dead and plaintiff could not be an administrator, or that letters of admin- 
 istration had been revoked, if they ever existed." 
 
 Or if defendant is sued as administrator, and is not, he must 
 set up: 
 
 "That he was not at the time of filing the suit nor prior thereto (if such 
 is the fact), nor is he now, administrator of A. B., as alleged, but the 
 allegations seeking to charge him as administrator are not true," etc. 
 
 If it is a case of coverture, you may set up : 
 
 "That A. B. at the time of exhibiting the bill was then, and is now, a 
 
 married woman, one being then, and is now, her husband, and 
 
 fully capacitated to institute this suit in her behalf." Or. if sued, she may 
 reply her coverture in the same way. 
 
 In each case the title, commencement, and form as given in 
 the plea may be used. 
 
 Making New Parties hy Amendment. 
 
 Jfew parties may be made by amendment by plaintiff (In- 
 surance Co. of ]Sr. A. V. Svendsen, 74 Fed. 348), so may strike 
 out; and defendant may force new parties by plea of non- 
 joinder (Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U. S. 563, 26 L. ed. 232 ; 
 Shields V. Barrow, 17 How. 145, 15 L. ed. 162; Lewis v. Dar- 
 
266 DEFECT OF PARTIES AND ISSUE. 
 
 ling, 16 How. 8, 14 L. ed. 822; Leahy v. Haworth, 4 L.R.A. 
 (KS.) 657, 73 C. 0. A. 84, 141 Fed. 855; Kaiser v. General 
 Phonograph Supply Co. 171 Fed. 432). See Lusk v. Kimball, 
 87 Fed. 545. Van Doren v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 35 C. C. A. 
 282, 93 Fed. 261; McDonald v. Nebraska, 41 C. C. A. 278, 
 101 Fed. 171. As to setting down the issue of defect of parties 
 for hearing, see chap. 69, p. 426. 
 
CHAPTER XLVI. 
 
 THE BILL. 
 
 The bill is the petition to the court containing the complaint 
 and relief desired. In the old forms the complainant was 
 styled "orator" or "oratrix," but this has gone into disuse, al- 
 though occasionally used in some of the States, and the custo- 
 mary phrase, "plaintiff," is used. 
 
 The historical development of the present bill in equity, 
 while interesting, is of no practical importance; I will there- 
 fore briefly allude to only two stages in its development, and 
 the causes for the form it now assumes. 
 
 Anciently the complainants made to the chancellor their 
 complaints verbally, and the defendant brought in and 
 compelled to answer under oath the charges made. In process 
 of time the charges were reduced to writing, and questions 
 formulated in the petition for the defendant to answer. The 
 petition thus framed was called a bill, and the defendant was 
 required to answer in writing to each specific question, without 
 evasion. 
 
 In this way the conscience of the defendant, through fear 
 of ecclesiastical punishment, was purged, discovery had, and 
 the answer thus made performed the doiible function of plead- 
 ing and proof. 
 
 With the gradual development of the chancery practice, the 
 bill assumed a stated form and was divided into nine parts : 
 
 First. Title and address to court. 
 
 Second. Names and places of abode of plaintiff and de- 
 fendant. 
 
 Third. Stating part of bill, or statement of case. 
 
 Fourth. Confederacy clause. Alleging unlawful combina- 
 ,tion of the defendant to injure, etc., the plaintiff. 
 
 Fifth. Charging part of the bill, so called, because the 
 plaintiff, by anticipation, charged that the defendant would set 
 
 267 
 
268 THE BILL. 
 
 up certain excuses and pretenses to defeat plaintiff's right, 
 which plaintiff denied or avoided in his bill. 
 
 Sixth. Jurisdiction clause. That plaintiff was remediless 
 at law. 
 
 Seventh. Inten-ogatory part, in which the plaintiff sought, 
 by questions based on the stating part of his bill, to make dis- 
 covery by purging the conscience of the defendants as tb the 
 truth of the statements made. 
 
 Eighth. Prayer for relief. 
 
 Ninth. Prayer for process. 
 
 It was long necessary to adhere to these formal divisions to 
 sustain a bill in equity, but as the perplexity of business in- 
 creased with an advancing civilization, and greater breadth of 
 jurisdiction was acquired, it was found that adherence to these 
 divisions unduly lengthened the bill and rendered them very 
 obscure. Lord' Chancellor Campbell declared that he remem- 
 bered when bills in equity told the same story over and over 
 again, and each time more obscurely. Prolixity, tautology, 
 scandal, and impertinence became the leading features in a 
 bill in equity. 
 
 It was sought to overcome this fault in England by coniiniiig 
 the bill to fifteen sheets, but the chancery lawyer met this rule 
 by enlarging the sheets, and this evasion carried to such an 
 extent that a further order was promulgated allowing only fif- 
 teen lines to a sheet. Kelley v. Boettcher, 29 C. C. A. 14, 56 
 U. S. App. 363, 85 Fed. 57; Story, Eq. PL § 226. These con- 
 ditions may be said to have existed when the practice of the 
 High Court of Chancery of England was adopted in our Fed- 
 eral system. 
 
 The Supreme Court of the United States, to overcome these 
 cumbersome methods promulgated rules practically reducing 
 the form of the bill to four divisions, and otherwise greatly 
 simplifying its structure. 
 
 By old equity rule 21 you could omit the confederacy clause, 
 the charging part of the bill, and the jurisdictional clause. 
 Gage V. Kaufman, 133 U. S. 471, 33 L. ed. 725, 10 Sup. Ct 
 Eep. 406. So the parts retained by new rule 25 are as follows: 
 
 1st Title of case and address to the court. 
 
 2d The full name when known of each plaintiff and de- 
 fendant and the citizenship and residence of each party, and 
 if any party be imder disability the fact must be stated. 
 
THE BILL. 269 
 
 3d A short and plain statement of the grounds upon which 
 the court's jurisdiction depends. 
 
 4th A short and simple statement of the ultimate facts upon 
 which relief is asked omitting any statement of evidence. 
 
 5th If there are persons other than those named as defend- 
 ants who appear to be proper parties, the bill should state why 
 they are not made parties; as parties not within the jurisdic- 
 tion or jurisdiction would be ousted if made parties. 
 
 6th Prayer for relief; if special relief asked pending suit, 
 a statement to support must be set forth in the bill and the bill 
 must be verified. See Alexander v. Fidelity Trust Co. 215 
 Fed. 79 ; Maine Lumber Co. v. Kingfield Co. 218 Fed. 902. 
 
 Each of these parts I will now discuss. Equity rule 25 re- 
 quires that the introductory part of the bill shall contain the 
 names, places of abode, and citizenship of all the parties, plain- 
 tiffs and defendants, by and against whom the bill is brought. 
 United States v. Pratt Coal & Coke Co. 18 Fed. 708 ; Atlantic 
 Coast Line K. Co. v. Whilden, 115 C. C. A. 254, 195 Fed. 263. 
 
 The form should be substantially as follows : 
 
 In the District Court of the United 
 
 States for the District 
 
 of , sitting at 
 
 To the Judges of the District Court of the United States for the 
 
 District of Texas: 
 
 A. B., a citizen of the State of , residing in county, 
 
 in said State, brings this his bill against C. D., a citizen of the State of 
 , and residing in county, in said State. 
 
 And therefore complainant (or plaintiff or your orator) complains and 
 says that, etc. 
 
 If the bill is by a corporation, or against a corporation, you 
 may say: 
 
 The (name of corporation), a corporation duly organized by 
 
 and existing under the laws of the State of , and 
 
 having its principal place of business at , in said 
 
 State, and a citizen of said State, humbly complains, etc. 
 
 If the suit be against a corporation, proceed and say, "humbly 
 complains of the (name of corporation), a corporation organ- 
 ized and existing under the laws of the state of , 
 
 and having its principal place of business at , in 
 
270 THE BILLi 
 
 said State, and a citizen and inhabitant of the District, 
 
 in same State." 
 
 The simple allegation that a corporation is a citizen of a 
 State is not sufficient (Swafford v. Templeton, 108 Fed. 309); 
 you must set forth a corporate name, followed by the averment 
 that the same is a corporation created under the laws of the 
 
 State of and having its principal place of 
 
 business at Shiras, Eq. Pr. § 34 ; Knight v. 
 
 Lutcher & M. Lumber Co. 69 C. C. A. 248, 136 Fed. 404: 
 Mueller v. Dows, 'J 4 U. S. 444, 24 L. ed. 207 ; Dalton v. Mil 
 waukee Mechanics Ins. Co. 118 Fed. 876 ; Lafayette Ins. Co. 
 V. French, 18 How. 404, 15 L. ed. 451; Sun Printing & Pub, 
 Asso. V. Edwards, 194 U. S. 377, 48 L. ed. 1027, 24~Sup. Ct 
 Eep. 696; DeLay v. Travelers Ins. Co. 59 Fed. 319; Ameri- 
 can Sugar Eef. Co. v. Johnson, 9 C. C. A. 110, 13 U. S. App, 
 681, 60 Fed. 504 ; Lee v. Atlantic Coast Line K. Co. 150 Fed, 
 800; Winkler v. Chicago & E. I. R Co. 108 Fed. 305; St, 
 Louis, L M. & S. K. Co. v. l^ewcom, 6 C. C. A. 172, 12 U. S. 
 App. 503, 56 Fed. 951; Tug Eiver Coal & Salt Co. v. Brigel 
 14 C. C. A. 577, 31 U. S. App. 665, 67 Fed. 627. See Chi- 
 cago Lumber Co. v. Comstock, 18 C. C. A. 207, 34 U. S. App. 
 414, 71 Fed. 480. 
 
 In E'ew York & W. E. R Co. v. Hyde, 5 C. C. A. 461, 5 U. 
 S. App. 443, 56 Fed. 192 and United States v. Harsha, 6 C. 
 C. A. 178, 16 U. S. App. 13, 56 Fed. 953, "Corporation duly 
 incorporated by law, having principal place of business in 
 Massachusetts," held, not good. "That defendant is a corpora- 
 tion condvicting a railroad in another State," held, not good. 
 Parker-Washington Co. v. Cramer, 120 C. C. A. 216, 201 Fed. 
 878 ; Farmers' Oil & Guano Co. v. Duckworth Co. 133 C. G. A. 
 278, 217 Fed. 363 ; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Whilden, 115 
 C. C. A. 254, 195 Fed. 263. 
 
 It has always been required in bills in equity that the names 
 and places of residence of the plaintiff should be carefully set 
 forth, but its purpose was to prevent fictitious persons from 
 bringing suit, and that the defendant might show where to re- 
 sort to compel obedience to any order of the court, such as to 
 pay costs that may be awarded ; but the accurate statement re- 
 quired in the Federal system is essential to show jurisdiction, 
 when dependent on diversity of citizenship, as heretofore ex- 
 plained. 
 
THE BILL. 271 
 
 The great majority of cases brought into the circuit courts 
 of the United States are dependent for jurisdiction on diversity 
 of citizenship, and whether brought into said courts originally 
 or by removal from State courts, or citizenship and alienage, 
 it is a universal rule that the juiisdiction of these courts must 
 appear in the bill, or in other parts of the record. Grace v. 
 American Cent. Ins. Co. 109 U. S. 2S4, 27 L. ed. 935, 3 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 207; McEldowney v. Card, 193 Fed. 482 and cases 
 cited; Wolfe v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co. 148 U. S. 
 389, 37 L. ed. 493, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 602; United States v. 
 Harsha, supra; Hanford v. Davies, 163 U. S. 273, 41 L. ed. 
 157, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1051; St. Joseph & G. I. E. Co. v. 
 Steele, 167 U. S. 662, 42 L. ed. 316, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 925 ; 
 Mexican C. E. Co. v. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 194, 37 L. ed. 699, 
 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 859; Eoberts v. Lewis, 144 U. S. 656, 36 
 L. ed. 582, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 781 ; Sharon v. Hill, 10 Sawv. 
 634, 23 Fed. 353, 355. 
 
 When dependent on diversity of citizenship the bill must 
 not only show diversity of citizenship, but it must affirmati\ely 
 show that it is brought in a Federal district of the State in 
 which either the plaintiffs or defendants are resident citizens, 
 as before explained. Authorities above; Donnelly v. United 
 States Cordage Co. 66 Fed. 613 ; Bank of Winona v. zivery, 34 
 Fed. 81. (See "Federal District of Suit") And it is not to be 
 inferred. Wolfe v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co. and 
 United States v. Harsha, supra; Lownsdale v. Gray's Harbor 
 Boom Co. 117 Fed. 988. See Tonopah Traction Min. Co. v. 
 Douglass, 123 Fed. 936. You cannot allege that "parties were 
 
 citizens of states other than the State of ," or that one 
 
 claims to be a citizen of ," etc. (Lownsdale v. Gray's 
 
 Harbor Boom Co. supra) ; or that defendants are citizens of (a) 
 or (b) (Van Horn v. Kittitas County, 112 Fed. 1). It is not 
 necessary to repeat jurisdictional averments in an amendment to 
 the bill. Mexican C. E. Co. v. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 200, 37 L. 
 ed. 701, 13 Slip. Ct. Eep. 859 ; Third Street & Suburban E. Co. 
 V. Lewis, 173 U. S. 459, 460, 43 L. ed. 767, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 451. It is the party named in the bill that controls, not those 
 that may be proper or even necessary. Ee Stutsman County, 
 88 Fed. 337. As said above, you cannot infer citizenship and 
 residence, nor can you allege that their State residence is un- 
 
272 
 
 THE BILL, 
 
 known; they must be citizens of a named State. Tracy v. 
 Morel, 88 Fed. 801; Tug River Coal & Salt Co. v. Brigel, 
 sujDra. You can allege, it seems, that a defendant is a citizen 
 of the United States and a resident of a State. Littell v. Erie 
 Co. 105 Fed. 539 ; Clausen v. American Ice Co. 144 Fed. 723. 
 
 Citizenship Not Residence. 
 
 You cannot aver simply residence; it must be citizenship. 
 Citizenship is the test. Sun Printing & Pub. Asso. v. Edwards, 
 194 U. S. 382, 48 L. ed. 1029, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 696; Gale v. 
 Southern Bldg. & L. Asso. 117 Fed. 732; Denny v. Pironi, 
 141 U. S. 123, 35 L. ed. 657, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 966; Shaw v. 
 Quincy Min. Co. 145 U. S. 447, 36 L. ed. 770, 12 Sup. Ct 
 Rep. 935 ; F. G. Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler County, 166 U. S. 
 655, 41 L. ed. 1151, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 709 ; Timmons v. Ely- 
 town Land Co. 139 U. S. 379, 35 L. ed. 195, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 585 ; Sharon v. Hill, 26 Fed. 342 ; Koike v. Atchison, T. & S. 
 F. R. Co. 157 Fed. 623; Marks v. Marks, 75 Fed. 321; Wolfe 
 V. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co. supra ; Crosby v. Cuba K. 
 Co. 158 Fed. 145-152; Sanbo v. Union P. Coal Co. 72 C. C. 
 A. 24, 140 Fed. 713 ; New York & N. E. R. Co. v. Hyde, 5 
 C. C. A. 461, 5 U. S. App. 443, 56 Fed. 188. If only allega- 
 tion of residence, the Supreme Court would reverse the case, 
 though no objection taken. Preferred Acci. Ins. Co. v. Bar- 
 ker, 32 C. C. A. 124, 58 U. S. App. 171, 88 Fed. 814. The 
 term "inhabitant" cannot be substituted for "citizenship." 
 Allen B. Risley Co. v. George E. Rouse Soap Co. 32 C. C. A. 
 496, 62 U. S. App. 240, 90 Fed. 6. As to sufficient allegation 
 of citizenship, see authorities above; United States v. Harsha, 
 supra ; Sun Printing & Pub. Asso. v. Edwards, 194 U. S. 377, 
 48 L. ed. 1027, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 696. (See chapter 21.) 
 Must be alleged. Lownsdale v. Gray's Harbor Boom Co. 117 
 Fed. 983. So in regard to an allegation of alienage. An alle- 
 gation that a party is a resident of London does not show juris- 
 diction. Bishop V. Averill, 76 Fed. 387; Stewart v. Easton, 
 156 U. S. 46, 39 L. ed. 341, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 268. May be, 
 and not be an alien. But an allegation that parties are all of 
 Cognac, France, and citizens of the Republic of France, is 
 good. Hennessey v. Richardson Drug Co. 189 U. S. 25, 47 
 
THE BILL. 273 
 
 L. ed. 697, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 532 ; Von Voight v. Michigan 0. 
 R. Co. 130 Fed. 398; Mahoning Valley R. Co. v. O'Hara, 116 
 C. C. A. 495, 196 Fed. 947; C. H. Nichols Lumber Co. v. 
 Franson, 203 U. S. 282, 51 L. ed. 183, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 102. 
 As to allegation of citizenship, see McEldowney v. Card, 193 
 Fed. 482 ; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Whilden, 115 C. C. A. 
 254, 195 Fed. 263. 
 
 Federal District of Suit. 
 
 The statute in case of diversity of citizenship only fixes the 
 venue of suit in the district of plaintiff's residence, or in the 
 district of defendant's residence. It is necessary to specifically 
 all^'e the venue as required, and it must he shown that the suit 
 is brought in the district court of the residence of plaintiff, or 
 defendant, if you are depending on diversity of citizenship 
 alone for jurisdiction. Miller v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 91 Fed. 
 298; United States v. S. P. Shotter Co. 110 Fed. 2; Southern 
 P. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 205, 206, 36 L. ed. 954, 13 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 44. 
 
 If, however, the county of plaintiff's or defendant's residence 
 and citizenship is alleged, the court will take judicial notice of 
 the district to which the county belongs. But bear in mind 
 that allegations of "residence" only in the county or district is 
 not equivalent to citizenship. Wolfe v. Hartford Life & An- 
 nuity Ins. Co. supra; Denny v. Pironi, 141 U. S. 121-123, 35 
 L. ed. 657, 658, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 966; Gale v. Southern Bldg. 
 & L. Asso. 117 Fed. 733. Diversity of residence does not give 
 jurisdiction. Southwestern Teleg. & Teleph. Co. v. Robinson, 
 1 C. C. A. 91, 2 U. S. App. 148, 48 Fed. 769 ; Texas & P. R. 
 Co. V. Rogers, 6 C. C. A. 403, 13 U. S. App. 547, 57. Fed. 378 ; 
 Tinsley v. Hoot, 3 C. C. A. 612, 2 U. S. App. 548, 53 Fed. 
 682. 
 
 'Necessity of Accuracy. 
 
 The jurisdiction of the court depending on the accuracy and 
 fullness of the statement of the grounds upon which the juris- 
 diction rests, especially as to citizenship and residence, a fail- 
 ure so to do is fatal to jurisdiction, as every case is without the 
 S. Eq.— 18. 
 
274r THE BILL. 
 
 jurisdiction not affirmatively appearing to be in it. Goeppert 
 V. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 156 Fed. 196-199; 
 Robertson v. Cease, 97 U. S. 646-649, 24 L. ed. 1057-1059; 
 United States v. S. P. Shotter Co. 110 Fed. 2, 3 ; Lownsdale 
 V. Gray's Harbor Boom Co. supra; Turner v. Jackson Lumber 
 Co. 87 C. C. A. 103, 159 Fed. 923 ; International Bank & T. 
 Co. V. Scott, 86 C. C. A. 248, 159 Fed. 59-61 ; Jackson v. 
 Virginia Hot Springs Co. 130 C. C. A. 375, 213 Fed. 973, 
 974; Pike County v. Spencer, 112 C. C. A. 433, 192 Fed. 13. 
 This rule applies only when jurisdiction is dependent upon 
 diversity. Wright v. Skinner, %36 Fed. 694. And when a 
 proper allegation is made it makes a prima facie case (Hill v. 
 Walker, 92 C. C. A. 633, 167 Fed. 241), which continues until 
 overcome by evidence creating a legal certainty. Where the 
 allegation of citizenship was upon information and belief, it was 
 held insufficient, in Wolff v. Archibald, 14 Fed. 369 ; Hamble- 
 ton V. Duham, 10 Sawy. 489, 22 Fed. 465. See Holton v. 
 Helvetia-Swiss F. Ins. Co. 163 Fed. 661. However, it is said 
 in Sun Printing & Pub. Asso. v. Edwards, 194 U. S. 382, 48 L. 
 ed. 1029, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 696, that the whole record may be 
 looked to for the purpose of curing defective averment of citi- 
 zenship, and facts constituting such allegations in legal intend- 
 ment are sufficient, citing Home v. George H. Hammond Co, 
 155 U. S. 393, 39 L. ed. 197, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 167; Howe v. 
 Howe & O. Ball Bearing Co. 83 C. C. A. 536, 154 Fed. 822 
 and cases cited. Bowers v. New York L. Ins. Co. 68 Fed. 785 ; 
 Lebert v. Hunt, 108 Fed. 450. In Adams Exp. Co. v. Adams, 
 159 Fed. 62, the defect was held to be cured by answer. 
 
 In the appellate courts the case will be dismissed if juris- 
 diction does not appear in the record, even though the question 
 was not raised in the lower courts^ The docket of the Supreme 
 Court of the United States is strewn with wrecks of this char- 
 acter. Mansfield, C. & L. M. E. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 382- 
 384, 28 L. ed. 463, 464, 4 Sup. Ct. Eep. 510; Hancock v. Hol- 
 brook, 112 U. S. 231, 28 L. ed. 715, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 115; 
 ISleel V. Pennsylvania Co. 157 U. S. 154, 39 L. ed. 654, 15 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 589; King Iron Bridge & Mfg. Co. v. Ottoe 
 County, 120 U. S. 226, 30 L. ed. 624, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 552; 
 Parker v. Ormsby, 141 U. S. 83, 35 L. ed. 655, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 912; Torrence v. Shedd, 144 U. S. 533, 36 L. ed. 532, 
 
THE BILL. 275 
 
 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 726. An amendment will not be permitted 
 in the appellate coi^rts when the record nowhere shows juris- 
 diction. Jackson v. Allen, 132 U. S. 29, 33 L. ed. 249, 10 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 9 ; Crehore v. Ohio & ]\I. R. Co. 131 U. S. 242, 
 33 L. ed. 144, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 692; Johnson v. F. C. Austin 
 Mfg. Co. 76 Fed. 616, and cases cited. However, if the aver- 
 ment be made insufficiently it may be amended. Johnson v. 
 F. C. Austin Mfg. Co. supra ; Carson v. Dunham, 121 U. S. 
 427, 30 L. ed. 994, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1030; Glover v. Shepperd, 
 11 Biss. 572, 15 Fed. 833. 
 
 In stating the necessity of accuracy it is not intended that 
 there must be certainty to a certain intent, but general certainty 
 without minute detail is sufficient. 
 
 Statement of the Case. 
 
 Old equity rule 26 requires that the statement of the case 
 shall be expressed in as brief and succinct a manner as possible 
 (Xevada Xickel Syndicate v. National Xickel Co. 86 Fed. 488 ; 
 Kelley v. Boettcher, 29 C. C. A. 14, 56 U. S. App. 363, 85 
 Fed. 57), and shall contain no unnecessary recitals of deeds, 
 documents, instruments, or contracts in haec verba, or any other 
 impertinent matter. Board of Trade v. National Bd. of Trade, 
 154 Fed. 239. 
 
 This rule was omitted in the new rules, but the substance was 
 retained in the second and third clauses of new rule 25. Old 
 equity rule 25, to promote brevity, provided a penalty; but 
 this rule has been omitted from the new rules. By new rule 20 
 a further and better statement of the nature of the claim or- 
 better particulars of any matter may be permitted by the court, 
 on terms, etc. Gimbel Bros. v. Adams Exp. Co. 217 Fv.i. 318. 
 See also Todds v. Whitaker, 217 Fed. 320. A simple stat&- 
 ment of the "ultimate facts" as stated in rule 25, means the- 
 issuable facts upon which recovery depends. Maxwell Steel 
 Vault Co. V. National Casket Co. 205 Fed. 525 ; Crim v. Rice,, 
 — C. C. A. — , 232 Fed. 570. 
 
 There are four component parts to make a complete case. 
 
 First. The bill must show that the complainant is the per- 
 son entitled to relief. 
 
 Second. That the facts entitle complainant to relief. 
 
 Third. That the defendant is the person from whom the 
 complainant should recover. 
 
276 THE MLL, 
 
 Fourth. That the claim, set up is equitable. 
 
 To these may be added that if the case rests upon a Eederai 
 question, it must be shown in the statement of the case, and 
 the amount, or value, of the subject-matter must be such as to 
 give the jurisdiction. 
 
 These requirements of "statement" express a general formula 
 in stating the case. I will now discuss them in detail and in 
 the order stated. Hobbs Mfg. Co. v. Gooding, 100 C. C. A. 
 83, 176 Fed. 264, 265 ; United States v. American Bell Teleph. 
 Co. 32 Fed. 593. 
 
 First. You must show the plaintiff has a right to the thing 
 demanded, or such interest in it that he may sue. 
 
 The bill must set forth some title or interest in the property, 
 contract or right which is the subject-matter of the litigation, 
 and in respect of which he is about to suffer the injury com- 
 plained of. If it be tangible property, he must show title, right, 
 ownership, or possession. If it be a contract, he must show 
 that he is a party to it orginally, or by assignment. If it be 
 a right out of which Aow^s a duty, he mu.st show a right to the 
 performance of the duty. Taylor v. Holmes, 14 Fed. 499; 
 Savage v. Worsham, 104 Fed. 18 ; Selz v. Unna, 6 Wall. 334, 
 18 L. ed. 801. 
 
 ■- In setting forth the title, interest, or claim, facts, not infer- 
 ences, must be alleged, nor can you rest upon conclusions of 
 lav,'. Mere averment of legal conclusion not good pleading. 
 Fuller V. Montague, 8 C. C. A. 100, 16 U. S. App. 391, 59 
 Fed. 215; Dillon v. Barnard, 21 Wall. 437, 22 L. ed. 676; 
 Gould V. Evansville & C. R. Co. 91 U. S. 536, 23 L. ed. 419; 
 Cornell v. Green, 43 Fed. 107 ; Dishong v. Finkbiner, 46 Fed. 
 17 ; Lumley v. Wabash E. Co. 71 Fed. 28 ; Butler v. ISFational 
 Home, 144 U. S. 74, 36 L. ed. 352, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581; 
 Fogg V. Blair, 139 U. S. 127, 35 L. ed. 107, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep, 
 476. 
 
 To illustrate: You should not allege simply that you are 
 ^entitled to an equitable interest by virtue of an instrument, but 
 you must state so much of the instrument as shows the inter- 
 est or claim set up, and let the court determine the effect or 
 character of the interest claimed. Marshall v. TumbuU, 34 
 Fed. 827 ; Electric Goods Mfg. Co. v. Kiltonski, 171 Fed. 552, 
 .553. Set up always your facts; then there is no objection to 
 
THE BILI^ 277 
 
 drawing conclusions in your bill, which you think legitimate. 
 Berwind v. Canadian P. E. Co. 98 Fed. 158 ; Allen v. O'Don- 
 ald, 23 Fed. 576. However, in this you nii\st bear in mind 
 the 3d claiise of new rule 25, requiring a short and simple state- 
 ment of ultimate facts, omitting any mere statement of evidence. 
 Maxwell Steel Vault Co. v. National Casket Co. 205 "Fed. 515- 
 525. Much must be left to the discretion and good sense of the 
 pleader. 
 
 Of course, if your right depends on the construction of the 
 whole instrument, you may set it up in your bill m haec verba, 
 without making your pleading obnoxious to the rule. Einstein 
 V. Schnebly, 89 Fed. 5-41-549; Nevada Nickel Syndicate Co. 
 V. National Nickel Co. 86 Fed. 486. The interest thus to be 
 stated applies to every plaintiff, if there be more than one, 
 and must be an actual existing interest, and not a probability ; 
 and whenever conditions precedent to the maturing of the 
 interest appear, you must allege performance or tender of per- 
 formance. Ibid. The statement should not be uncertain ; if it 
 is, the objection should be raised by motion. Einstein v. Schneb- 
 ly, 89 Fed. 547; Johnson v. Wilcox & G. Sewing Mach. Co. 25 
 Fed. 373. 
 
 Second. It must appear that plaintiff is entitled to relief. 
 
 ]\Ir. Heard remarks that this requirement in the stating 
 part of the bill does not involve so much a question of pleading, 
 but rather covers the whole subject-matter of equitable jurisdic- 
 tion. This is true, and all that can be said by way of general 
 direction is that when the title or interest claimed appears in 
 the bill, then you must state the injury or deprivation of right 
 clearly and accurately (Savage v. Worsham, supra; Boston & 
 A. K. Co. V. Parr, 44 C. C. A. 139, 104 Fed. 695 ; Knopholler 
 V. St. Paul, M. & ]\r. P. Co. 1 MeCrary, 299, 2 Fed. 302 ; Bent 
 V. Hall, 56 C. C. A. 246, 119 Fed. 342; Bishop v. York, 118 
 Fed. 352) ; that the court may see that the relief you ask is 
 not only equitable, but consistent with the claim set up. 
 
 A plaintiff may sue in equity on a promise to a third per- 
 son. Green v. Turner, 30 C. C. A. 427, 59 U. S. App. 252, 86 
 Fed. 838, and cases cited; Willard v. \Yood, 135 U. S. 309, 
 34 L. ed. 210, 10 Sup. Ct. Pep. 831. 
 
 Under old rule 21 you could in the bill anticipate the defense, 
 and meet it by proper allegations, but this rule has been omitted 
 from the new rules. 
 
278 THE BILL. 
 
 Third. It must appear that the defendant is the party from 
 whom the plaintiff should recover. 
 
 The bill must show that the defendant is liable. Of course, 
 if he is in possession of the property sued for; or if the sub- 
 ject-matter of his suit is based on contract to which he is a 
 party ; or if he owe a duty, which in equity of good conscience 
 he should perform, — then the statement of these conditions 
 would be sufficient to show liability, if plaintiff shows an inter- 
 est or right. The rule of precision in allegation is not applicable 
 when it is necessary to show what claims the defendant sets 
 up, or what interest, if any, he claims, as plaintiff cannot be 
 supposed to know always the nature of the defendant's interest, 
 especially when it can only be reached by discovery. 
 
 It sometimes happens that while plaintiff may have an inter- 
 est in property in the hands of another, yet there is not that 
 privity between them that will sustain a suit, so it must appear 
 from the bill, not only that the interest exists, but that the status 
 of the defendant to plaintiff and the subject-matter is such that 
 the suit will lie, and the defendant is the party from whom 
 the plaintiff should recover. 
 
 Fourth. That the claim set up is an eqtiitable one. 
 
 This requirement has been fully discussed in the application 
 of, section 723, U. S. Rev. Stat, in bringing suits in equity. It- 
 a fundamental rule that a bill in equity must state a case within 
 the jurisdiction of a court of equity, and this, as you have seen, 
 is shown either where the interest claimed is cognizable in 
 equity, or whatever be the nature of the claim, if the com- 
 plainant is entitled to relief in equity, because the remedy at 
 law is inadequate. Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Quigley, 
 181 Fed. 190; Pullman Co. v. Tamble, 173 Fed. 203, and 
 cases cited. 
 
 Joinder of Causes of Action. 
 
 By new rule 26 the plaintiff may join in one bill as many 
 equitable causes of action as he may have against the defendant. 
 If, however, there be more than one plaintiff, the Qause of 
 action must be joint, and if more than one defendant the liabil- 
 ity must be asserted against all material defendants, or suffi- 
 cient grounds must appear for uniting the -causes of action to 
 
THE BILL. 279 
 
 promote the convenient administration of justice. If this does 
 not appear, the court may order separate trials. So each cause 
 of action must be separately stated, and complete in itself, 
 though prior allegations may be referred to avoid repetition. 
 Maxwell Steel Vault Co. v. National Casket Co. 205 Fed. 515; 
 Electric Boat Co. v. Lake Torpedo Boat Co. 215 Fed. 381. 
 You cannot join legal and equitable causes of action entirely 
 disconnected. Bucyrus Co. v. McArthur; 219 Fed. 267. Nor 
 where the nature of the cause of action gives jurisdiction to the 
 court can you join a cause of action between parties which re- 
 quires diversity of citizenship to give jiirisdiction in which 
 diversity does not exist. Vose v. Rosebuck Weather Strip & 
 Wire Screen Co. 210 Fed. 687. (See chap. 50 for further 
 discussion. ) 
 
 The new rule seems to be self-explanatory, except in the 
 provision "that different causes of action may be joined vs'here 
 it appears that sufficient grounds for uniting the causes of 
 action may be permitted to promote the con^'enient adminis- 
 tration of justice." This means that where there is a joinder 
 of several causes of action not coming strictly within the specific 
 grounds as set forth in the rule, the court's discretion must 
 determine whether the suit can be further prosecxited as brought. 
 Of course, where discretion prevails there can be no fixed rules. 
 Again, the new rule 26 has rendered obsolete the doctrine of 
 multifariousness, which forbids the stating of separate and dis- 
 tinct causes of action, or distinct claims, in the same bill. (See 
 chap. 50 for exceptions.) However, the saving clause in the 
 new rule is that if the court determines that it would be incon- 
 venient to dispose of the case as brought, the court may order 
 separate trials of the several causes of action in the bill. 
 
 Allegation of the Federal Question. 
 
 When the jurisdiction depends on a Federal question, the 
 stating part of the bill must show that the suit arises under the 
 Constitution and laws of the United States or treaties made, 
 as has been before fully explained (see "Federal Questions," 
 Chap. 24). Kansas v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 77 Fed. 
 341-344; Fergus Falls v. Fergus Falls Water Co. 19 C. C. 
 A. 212, 36 U. S. App. 480, 72 Fed. 877; Indiana use of 
 
280 THE BILL. 
 
 Delaware County v. Alleghany Oil Co. 85 Fed. 872; Tennessee 
 V. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 454, 38 L. ed. 511, 14 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. .654; Chappell v. Waterworth, 155 U. S. 102, 
 3!) L. ed. 85, 15 Sup. Ct. Kep. 34; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. 
 United States (Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Alabama), 155 U. 
 S. 482, 39 L. ed. 231, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192; East Lake Land 
 Co. V. Brown, 155 U. S. 488, 39 L. ed. 233, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 357 ; AYalker v. Collins, 167 U. S. 57, 42 L. ed. 76, 17 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 738. The rule is that the Federal question must appear 
 in the bill itself (Colorado Cent. Consol. Min. Co. v. Turck, 
 150 U. S. 138, 37 L. ed. 1030, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 35, and au- 
 thorities above), and the bill must show a reliance upon it 
 (Pacific Gas Improv. Co. v. Ellert, 64 Fed. 421). See United 
 States Freehold Land & Emigration Co. v. Gallegos, 32 C. C. 
 A. 470, 61 U. S. App. 13, 89 Fed. 769 where the allegation of 
 a Federal charter was held sufficient. See chap. 26. 
 
 Allegation of Amount. 
 
 In the statement of the case the allegation of amount should 
 show that the value of the subject-matter or amount in dispute 
 is within Federal jurisdiction, that is, exceeds the sum of three 
 thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs, and this must 
 appear whether the jurisdiction be based on diversity of citizen- 
 ship, or a Federal question, or between a citizen and an alien. 
 I have already disciissed this element of jurisdiction, and given 
 the line of authorities controlling it, and covering such ques- 
 tions as may reasonably arise in determining it. (See chap. 
 33, p. 196, et seq. 
 
 < Allegation of Fraud. 
 
 Where relief is sought because of imposition or fraudulent 
 devices, the fraud should be alleged in the statement of the 
 case. It must distinctly state the particular act of fraud, mis- 
 representation, or concealment, and should specify how, when, 
 and in what manner created. Such charges must be definite 
 and reasonably certain, capable of proof, because they must 
 be clearly proved. Kennedy v. Custer, 98 C. C. A. 584, 174 
 Fed. 981; Cella v. Brown, 75 C. C. A. 608, 144 Fed. 754; 
 
THE BILL. 28] 
 
 Marqnez v. Frisbie, 101 U. S. 473, 25 L. ed. 800 ; Hammond 
 V. Hopkins, 143 U. S. 251, 36 L. ed. 145, 12 Sup. Ct. Kep. 
 41S; St. Louis lI- S. F. R Co. v. Johnston, 133 U. S. 577, 33 
 L. ed. 6S6, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 390; Braddock v. Louchheim, 87 
 Fed. 287; Field v. Hastings & B. Co. 65 Fed. 279; Lumley v. 
 Wabash R Co. 71 Fed. 21; Bangs v. Loveridge, 60 Fed. 966. 
 And the charge would not of itself be sufficient unless injury 
 shown. Linn v. Green, 5 McCrary, 380, 637, 17 Fed. 407. 
 You cannot find fraud if allegations do not sustain the finding. 
 Dashiel v. Grosvenor, 27 L. R. A. 67, 13 C. C. A. 593, 25 
 U. S. App. 227, 66 Fed. 334. 
 
 Laches. 
 
 Often in the statement of a case in a bill it appears some 
 length of time has elapsed between the accrual of the right and 
 the filing of the bill, so that the bill would be demurrable be- 
 cause of laches. This is an equity which ordinarily stays the 
 hand of a court of equity in granting the relief asked, though 
 an equitable cause of action has been properly stated. When- 
 ever delay in bringing the suit appears, you must, to properly 
 state your case, anticipate this defense, and reasonably excuse 
 the delay, such as the existence of some disability, or a fraudu- 
 lent concealment of the facts by the defendant, or it must be 
 shown that in the nature of things the cause of action or fraud 
 pei-petrated could not sooner have been discovered. There must 
 be distinct avennents when the fraud, mistake, concealment, or 
 misrepresentation was disco^'ered, and what the discovery is, 
 so that the court may clearly see whether by the exercise of 
 ordinary diligence the discovery might not have been sooner 
 made. Hubbard v. Manhattan Trust Co. 30 C. C. A. 520, 57 
 U. S. App. 730, 87 Fed. 59 ; Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U. 
 S. 251, 36 L. ed. 145, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 418; Mclntire v. Fry- 
 er, 173 U. S. 57, 43 L. ed. 613, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 352; Root 
 V. Woolworth, 150 U. S. 414, 37 L. ed. 1126, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 136; Mc]\[onagle v. M'Glinn, 85 Fed. 92; Hardt v. Heidmeyer, 
 152 U. S. 560", 38 L. ed. 552, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 671; Whitney 
 v. Fox, 166 U. S. 648, 41 L. ed. 1149, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 713. 
 See Ritchie v. Sayers, 100 Fed. 537. 
 
 Lastly, if in connection with the statement of the case it is 
 
282 THE BILL. 
 
 desired to have relief by injunction, ne exeat, or any other 
 special order pending the suit, it shall be specially asked for, 
 but the stating part of the bill must contain the necessary alle- 
 gations upon which to base the special relief, and the relief 
 must accord with the case thus made. Clause 5, rule 25. 
 
 I have thus pointed out in a general way the provisions of 
 the stating part of a bill in equity. The stating part is the 
 germ of the bill, for it is the plaintiff's case, and shows his 
 title to relief. It should be positive and free from inference, 
 looseness, and uncertainty of expression. The equity of your 
 case must be shown there, for you cannot refer to other parts 
 of the bill for it. If it omits material allegations you can- 
 not supply them by proof (Jackson v. Ashton, 11 Pet. 249,. 9 L. 
 ed. 706), and its further importance is shown fropi the follow- 
 ing facts: 
 
 First. That the defendant is not bound to answer any aver- 
 ments not contained in the stating part of the bill. Under new 
 riile 30 the defense must set up an answer to each claim in the 
 bill. Coulston v. Franke Steel Range Co. 221 Fed. 670. 
 
 Second. That any defense by motion, that was under the old 
 rules presentable by plea in bar, the validity must be determined 
 by the stating part of the bill. 
 
 Third. The stating part of the bill controls the prayer for 
 relief. In a word, the stating part must be complete in itself, 
 so that if admitted by the answer or proved by the evidence, 
 the court can enter a decree disposing of the subject-matter. 
 
CHAPTEE XLVII. 
 
 THE PEAYEB. 
 
 We now come to the prayer of the bill for relief and process. 
 Prayer for relief must include both general and special relief. 
 By new rule 25 a statement of and prayer for any special relief 
 pending the suit or on final hearing must be set forth, and may 
 be sought in the alternative. The prayer shall ask the special 
 relief to which the complainant supposes himself entitled, and 
 shall also contain a prayer for general relief out of abundant 
 caution, as a general prayer for relief and sufficient facts alleged 
 saves the bill from a general demurrer. Walden v. Bodley, 14 
 Pet. 164, 10 L. ed. 401 ; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio & M. R. 
 Co. 142 IJ. S. 397, 35 L. ed. 1056, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 188; 
 Stevens v. Gladding, 17 How. 455, 15 L. ed. 158; Patrick v. 
 Isenhart, 20 Fed. 339. And if any injunction or other auxil- 
 iary writ is required and justified by the stating part of the bill, 
 it must be specially prayed for. Chicago, St. L. & 'N. 0. R Co. 
 V. Macomb, 2 Fed. 19. 
 
 The usual form is as follows : 
 
 "And plaintiff prays that upon final hearing of this cause that it be 
 ordered and decreed (here insert special relief required) and for such 
 other general relief as may to the court be deemed just and equitable." 
 
 As to a proper prayer for an accounting see Elkhart Nat. 
 Bank v. JSTorthwestem Guaranty Loan Co. 84 Fed. 78. 
 
 The general prayer cannot broaden relief beyond the plead- 
 ings, and care should be taken to ask all relief in the special 
 prayer. First ISTat. Bank v. Woodrum, 86 Fed. 1005, 1006 ; 
 Texas v. Hardenburg (Texas v. White), 10 Wall. 68-85, 19 
 L. ed. 839-841 ; Savings & Loan Soc. v. Davidson, 38 C. C. A. 
 365, 97 Fed. 702, 703. While this is the general rule, yet, 
 under the general prayer the court can grant the relief accord- 
 ing to the case made. Underground Electric R. Co. v. Owsley, 
 
 283 
 
284 THE PRAYER. 
 
 169 Fed. 671 ; Tyler v. Savage, 143 U. S. 98, 36 L. ed. 90, 12 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 340; Crawford v. Moore, 28 Fed. 824; English 
 V. Foxall, 2 Pet. 612, 7 L. ed. 537 ; Swope v. Missouri Trust 
 Co. 26 Tex. Civ. App. 133, 62 S. W. 950; Haggart v. Wil- 
 czinski, 74 C. C. A. 176, 143 Fed. 22-28 ; Patrick v. Isenhart, 
 20 Fed. 339 ; Wilson v. Plutus Min. Co. 98 C. C. A. 189, 174 
 Fed. 320; Hayward v. McDonald, 113 C. C. A. 368, 192 Fed. 
 891. 
 
 Where you are not certain of your specific relief, it is per- 
 missible to frame your prayer in the alternative, such relief 
 being consistent with the case made. Virginia-Carolina Chemi- 
 cal Co. V. Home Ins. Co. 51 C. C. A. 21, 113 Fed. 5, 6; Hub- 
 bard V. Urton, 67 Fed. 419 ; Hardin v. Boyd, 113 U. S. 763, 
 28 L. ed. 1143, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 771 ; Eigney v. DeGraw, 100 
 Fed. 213- McGraw v. Woods, 96 Fed. 56. New rule 25, clause 
 5. Thus in a suit to recover property procured by fraud, you 
 may pray for the return or value. Hubbard v. Urton, 67 Fed. 
 425-426 ; Hardin v. Boyd, 113 U. S. 756, 28 L. ed. 1141, 5 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 771. But a bill should not contain antagonistic 
 prayers in the same cause of action. Cutter v. Iowa Water Co. 
 96 Fed. 777. But see Boyd v. New York & H. E. Co. 220 
 Fed. 174. 
 
 If an injunction is desired and your allegation will support 
 it, yoia may add to the prayer for process a special prayer for 
 the injunction, as follows: 
 
 "Complainant prays the court to grant him a, writ of injunction enjoin- 
 ing and restraining the said C. D. defendant, his attorneys, agents and 
 representatives, from (insert act or special matter to be enjoined), until 
 the further order of this court." 
 
 Ne Exeat. 
 
 The new Code, sec. 261 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1238), em- 
 bodying U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 717, provide for issuing a writ ne 
 exeat regno, as well as an injunction. Lewis v. Shainwald, 48 
 Fed. 492 ; Griswold v. Hazard, 141 U. S. 260, 35 L. ed. 678, 11 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 972, 999. The writ of ne exeat is applied for if 
 the defendant designs to quietly leave the United States, and 
 there is a personal suit pending against him. It rests upon the 
 allegation that his departure will produce a denial of justice and 
 irreijarable injury, or defeat the purpose of the suit. When proof 
 
THE PBAYllE. 285 
 
 as made, the judge will grant the prayer and issue a writ forbid- 
 ding the departure of the defendant unless he gives security to 
 abide the decree. See Mackenzie v. Barrett, 73 C. C. A. 280, 
 1-Jrl Fed. 965, 5 A. it E. Ann. Cas. 551, and cases cited; also in 
 Ee Appel, 20 L.K.A.(N.S.) 76, 90 C. C. A. 172, 163 Fed. 
 1002. Old equity rule 23 has been abrogated, and if the writ is 
 necessary, new Code, sec. 261, authorizes the issue. New rule 
 25, cl. 5, authorizes a statement of and prayer for any spe- 
 cial relief, requiring in such case the bill to be verified. 
 
 If the relief is necessary pray as follows: 
 
 Wherefore complainant prays the court to grant him a writ 
 of "ne exeat," forbidding and restraining the said C. D., de- 
 fendant herein, from departing beyond the limits of the United 
 States without leave of the court first had and obtained, etc. 
 Eev. Stat. sec. 717; Griswold v. Hazard, 141 U. S. 260, 35 L. 
 ed. 678, 11 Sup. Ct Eep. 972, 999; Lewis v. Shainwald, 48 
 Fed. 492. 
 
 Prayer for Process. 
 
 Under the old practice the prayer for process was carefully 
 stated. Equity rule 7, being one of the component parts of the 
 bill (Goebel v. American E. Supply Co. 55 Fed. 826 ; Carlsbad 
 V. Tibbetts, 51 Fed. 852-855; Armstrong Cork Co. v. Mer- 
 chants' Eefrigerating Co. 171 Fed. 778 ; United States v. Agler, 
 62 Fed. 824) ; old equity rule 23 required a prayer for process 
 of subpoena to contain the names of the defendants set forth in 
 the introductory part of the bill, and if any of them are known 
 to be infants, or otherwise under guardianship, the fact shall 
 be stated, that the court may take order therein upon the re- 
 turn of the process. However, where both in the caption and 
 body of the bill the defendants who were required to answer 
 were named and plainly designated, the omission of the prayer 
 for process was not demurrable. The strictness of the ancient 
 rule has been relaxed in this country. Jennes v. Landes, 84 
 Fed. 73-74; Buerk v. Imhaeuser, 8 Fed. 457 (waived by ap- 
 pearance). Old equity rule 23 has now been abrogated, and it 
 is now held that rules 25 and 30, being intended to secure 
 brevity and simplicity in pleading, that a prayer for subpoena is 
 not necessary, as it is the duty of the clerk under rule 12 to 
 
286 THE PEAYEE. 
 
 issue it. So the prayer that the defendant he required to answer 
 except under new rule 40, Pittsburgh Water Heater Co. v. 
 Beler Water Heater Co. 222 Fed. 952. 
 
 Amendment of Prayer. 
 
 When the prayer is not consistent with the case made in 
 ihe bill, it has been held that in sonie cases an amendment will 
 be permitted at the hearing, l^eale v. Neale, 9 Wall. 1, 19 
 L. ed. 590; Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 194, 29 L. ed. 843, 
 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 686; Ee Wellhouse, 113 Fed. 962; Pendery 
 V. Carleton, 30 C. C. A. 510, 59 IT. S. App. 288, 87 Fed. 41; 
 Eichmond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 47, 30 L. ed. 870, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 788 ; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio & M. E. Co. 142 U. S. 
 415, 35 L. ed. 1061, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 188 ; See Eig-ney v. De 
 Graw, 100 Fed. 213 ; Bass v. Christian Feigenspan, 82 Fed. 
 261. New rule 19 pyermits amendments of the pleadings or 
 proceedings at any stage of the case if in furtherance of justice. 
 (See Amendment of Bills.) 
 
 Signing Bills. 
 
 The bill must be signed by counsel, as it is considered an 
 affii'mation of good faith on his part, that there is ground for 
 the suit in the manner which it is alleged ajid filed. Equity 
 rule 24. The ancient rule of examining the bill. by the chan- 
 cellor before permitting it to be filed was in process of time 
 discontinued, and it was left to the honor of the Bar that the 
 bill would be framed without scandal or impertinence, and 
 the relief is sought in good faith, which was evidenced by his 
 signature. Brinkley v. Louisville & N. E. Co. 95 Fed. 349, 
 350 ; United States v. American Lumber Co. 29 C. C. A. 431, 
 66 U. S. App. 655, 85 Fed. 829, 830. 
 
 New rule 24 is substantially the same as old rule 24, cited 
 above, with this addition, that the signature of counsel is a 
 certificate that no scandalous matter has been inserted, and the 
 pleading, whatever it may be, is not interposed for delay. 
 
THE PEAYEE. 287 
 
 Verifying Bill. 
 
 It is not necessary, unless an injunction or some special 
 order or process is asked, to preserve some right pending the 
 suit, or when specially required by some rule of equity, as in 
 old equity rule 9i, now new rule 27, when a stockholder brings 
 a bill ag'ainst the corporation, or required by statute. Hughes 
 V. Northern P. E. Co. 18 Fed. 110; see, also. Black v. Henry G. 
 Allen Co. 9 L. E.A. 433, 42 Fed. 622. IS'or need an amendment 
 to the bill be verified. Chase Electric Constr. Co. v. Columbia 
 Constr. Co. 136 Fed. 699. See new rule 25, clause 5. 
 
 Form of Verification. 
 
 State of 1 
 
 County of f 
 
 Personally appeared before the undersigned authority, A. B., the plain- 
 tiff in the above cause, who, being duly sworn as to the truth of the allega- 
 tions made in the above bill, says that he has read the foregoing bill (or 
 heard it read) and knows the contents thereof, and that the same is true 
 of his own knowledge, except as to matters therein stated on information 
 and belief, and as to those matters he believes them to be true. 
 
 [bbai.] Officer's signature. 
 
CHAPTER XL VIII. 
 
 BILLS WITH DOUBLE ASPECT. 
 
 While under new rule 26 there may be a joinder in one bill 
 of as many equitable causes of action as one may have against 
 a defendant, or defendants, provided the liability is joint 
 against all material defendants, yet the separate causes of action 
 must be separately stated, and single in purpose. (See Joinder 
 of Causes of Action and authorities cited.) It, however, be- 
 comes necessary sometimes to state a cause of action with a 
 double aspect, or state an alternative case (Shackleton v. Bag- 
 galey, 95 C. C. A. 505, 170 Fed. 57; Shields v. Barrow, 17 
 How. 144, 15 L. ed. 162; Electric Goods Mfg. Co. v. Koltonski, 
 171 Fed. 550 ; Jones v. Missouri-Edison Electric Co. 75 C. C. 
 A. 631, 144 Fed. 767; McGraw v. Woods, 96 Fed. 56; Davis 
 V. Berry, 106 Fed. 761; Halsey v. Goddard, 86 Fed. 28; 
 American Box Mach. Co. v. Crosman, 57 Fed. 1025 ; Caldwell 
 V. Firth, 91 Fed. 177). As to recover specific property, or its 
 value (Hubbard v. Urton, 67 Fed. 425 ; Hardin v. Boyd, 113 
 U. S. 756, 28 L. ed. 1141, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 771), or set aside 
 fraudulent deed on two grounds (Fisher v. Moog, 39 Fed. 665). 
 The double aspect is not objectionable, and it is largely discre- 
 tionary with the court to permit it in the particular suit (Chaf- 
 fin V. Hull, 39 Fed. 891), where there is no alternative prayer 
 for inconsistent relief. Authorities above; Shields v. Barrow, 
 supra; Merriman v. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. 12 C. C. A. 275, 24 
 U. S. App. 428, 64 Fed. 550, 551; McGraw v. Woods, supra; 
 Cutter V. Iowa Water Co. 96 Fed. 777. Thus, there may be 
 alternative grounds upon which a plaintiff may be entitled to 
 an estate (Halsey v. Goddard, supra) ; such as where one 
 claims as heir and devisee (Stephens v. McCargo, 9 Wheat. 502, 
 6 L. ed. 145 ; DeForest v. Thompson, 40 Fed. 381 ; Chaffin v. 
 Hull, 39 Fed. 887) ; but the Federal court will not tolerate in- 
 consistent grounds and prayers in the same bill (Ritchie v. 
 
 288 
 
BILLS WITH DOUBLE ASPECT. 289 
 
 Savers, 100 Fed. 520 ; Cutter v. Iowa Water Co. 96 Fed. 711 ; 
 
 Electrical Accumulator Co. v. Brush Electric Co. 44: Fed. 607). 
 
 To illustrate: You cannot make a case that a party has a 
 title, and has no title, and ask relief according to either con- 
 dition. Meri-iman v. Chicago & E. I. E. Co. supra. You can- 
 not ask that a certain agreement of compromise be set aside 
 because induced by fraud, and have an alternative prayer for 
 performance if not set aside. St. Louis, V. & T. H. R Co. v. 
 Terre Haute & I. E. Co. 33 Fed. 448. See Hardin v. Boyd, 
 113 U. S. 763, 28 L. ed. 1143, 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 771 ; IMcGraw 
 V. Woods, 96 Fed. 58. You cannot ask to set aside a release 
 negligently executed by a trustee, and treat it as both void 
 and valid.' St. Louis, V. & T. H. E. Co. v. Terre Haute & I. E. 
 Co. supra; Williams v. Jackson, 107 U. S. 484, 27 L. ed. 531, 
 2 Sup. Ct. Eep. 814 ; Brooks v. Laurent, 39 C. C. A. 201, 98 
 Fed. 655, 656. Xor can you so treat a judgment. Brooks v. 
 Laurent and Cutter v. Iowa Water Co. supra. You cannot file 
 a bill to cancel a mortgage because the debt is illegal, and at 
 the same time, if you are mistaken, you be allowed to redeem. 
 Merriman v. Chicago & E. I. E. Co. supra; see Eigney v. De 
 Graw, 100 Fed. 213. 
 
 If plaintiff is in doubt as to whether he is entitled to one 
 kind of relief or another, he may frame a bill for relief in the 
 alternative, and so pray, if the state of facts upon which the 
 relief is prayed is not inconsistent. Cella v. Brown, 75 C. C. A. 
 608, 144 Fed. 742; Eitchie v. Sayers, 100 Fed. 536; Virginia- 
 Carolina Chemical Co. v. Home Ins. Co. 51 C. C. A. 21, 113 
 Fed. 5, 6, but either of the aspects must be set out distinctly 
 in order to be cognizable in equity. Electric Goods Mfg. Co. 
 V. Koltonski, 171 Fed. 553. 
 
 Sometimes the biU may have a double sound, that is, may be 
 interpreted in two ways; in such case the defendant may elect 
 what construction to put on it, and as he treats it plaintiff will 
 be bound. American Box ilach. Co. v. Crosman, 57 Fed. 1026 ; 
 Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 144, 15 L. ed. 162. 
 
 Such were the rulings under the old practice, but under the 
 5th clause of rule 25 it is provided that a statement of a 
 prayer for special relief may be stated or sought in the "alter- 
 native." In Boyd v. New York & H. E. Co. 220 Fed. 178, 
 it was stated that a lease was obnoxious to the Sherman act, 
 S. Eq.— 19. 
 
290 BII.I.S WITH DOUBLE ASPECT. 
 
 and cancelation was asked for, and the preservation of stocli 
 depending on the lease sought to be annulled was asked in the 
 same 'prayer. The inconsistency was not thought to be fata] 
 under the clause of rule 25 above quoted. 
 
CHAPTER XLIX. 
 
 DISCOVERT. 
 
 Having discussed the component parts of a bill now recog- 
 nized as essential, I will briefly speak of bills of discovery. 
 Their origin was found in a want of power in the common-law 
 courts to compel a discovery of the truth, either through the 
 oath of the party to the suit, or by any process of its own to 
 compel the production of written evidence in the possession of 
 an adverse party. Colgate v. Compagnie Francaise du Tele- 
 graphe, 23 Blatchf. 86, 23 Fed. 84. This right to demand 
 information only known to your antagonist in aid of your suit 
 was permitted in equity on filing a bill for that purpose, known 
 as bills of discovery. McMullen Lumber Co. v. Strother, 69 C. 
 C. A. 433, 136 Fed. 301 and authorities cited; Kelley v. 
 Boettcher, 29 C. C. A. 14, 56 U. S. App. 363, 85 Fed. 56-66; 
 Brown v. McDonald, 68 L.R.A. 462, 67 C. C. A. 59, 133 Fed. 
 898. The ancient practice of seeking discovery was through 
 interrogatories following the statement of your case, and this 
 method was maintained until a comparatively recent period in 
 the Federal courts. 
 
 In 1850 the Supreme Court, with a view of shortening the 
 bill, promulgated equity rule 40, providing that it shall not be 
 necessary to interrogate a defendant specially and particularly 
 on any statement of the bill, unless the complainant desired to 
 do so, and in case it was so desired a short form of interroga- 
 tion was prescribed, cutting off much of the reiteration and 
 prolixity that usually preceded interrogatories in the old forms. 
 Old rule 43 gave the form to be used. Tillinghast v. Ohace, 
 121 Fed. 436, and cases cited. 
 
 In 1864 Congress passed an act embodied in section 858 of 
 the Revised Statutes of the United States, Comp. Stat. 1913, 
 sec. 1464, providing that no witness should be excluded in 
 any civil action because he is a party or interested in the issue 
 
 291 
 
292 DISCOVEET. 
 
 tried. This statute created a coiTiplete revolution in tlie com- 
 mon-law rules affecting the competency of parties as witnesses, 
 and at once ended the necessity for a bill of discovery as auxil- 
 iary to a common-law suit. Field v. Hastings & B. Co. 65 Fed. 
 279. 
 
 In United States v. McLaughlin, 24 Fed. 825, the court 
 said, that in view of this statute it is very doubtful if a pure 
 bill of discovery will lie at this day, and no prudent counsel 
 will file a bill purely for discovery, or call for discovery in a 
 bill for relief. The court gives as a reason certain disadvan- 
 tages arising from it, and quotes in support of his view Ex 
 parte Boyd, 105 U. S. 657, 26 L. ed. 1204, see, also. Brown v. 
 McDonald, 130 Fed. 969, and cases cited; see Safford v. En- 
 sign Mfg. Co. 56 C. C. A. 630, 120 Fed. 482; Hudson v. 
 Wood, 119 Fed. 764; United States v. Bitter Boot Develop- 
 ment Co. 66 C. C. A. 652, 133 Fed. 280, and cases cited; Pres- 
 ton V. Smith, 26 Fed. 885 ; Rindskopf v. Platto, 29 Fed. 130. 
 
 In Colgate v. Compagnie Francaise du Telegraphe, supra, 
 the court says the change made in the common-law rules of evi- 
 dence, permitting a party to testify in his case, does not ne- 
 cessitate a court of equity foregoing the exercise of its an- 
 cient jurisdiction of discovery. See Boyer v. Keller, 113 Fed. 
 580.' 
 
 In ISTational Hollow Brake Beam Co. v. Interchangeable 
 Brake Beam Co. 83 Fed. 26, the court thinks the right of dis- 
 covery by bill in equity a valuable one, and when sought by 
 interrogatories in the bill they must be answered. Balfour v. 
 San Joaquin Valley Bank, 156 Fed. 500; Victor G. Bloede Co. 
 V. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. 98 Fed. 176 ; Gray v. Schnei- 
 der, 119 Fed. 474. 
 
 Old rules 40, 41, 42, 43, and 44, governing the issuing of 
 interrogatories in aid of discovery in an equity cause, have in 
 the last revision been embodied in new rule 58, the pertinent 
 part to the present inquiry being as follows: 
 
 The plaintiff at any time after filing the bill, and not later 
 than twenty-one days after joining issue, and the defendant 
 at anytime after filing his answer, and not later than twenty- 
 one days after joining issue, and either party at any time there- 
 after by leave of the court or judge, may file interrogatories 
 in writing for the discovery by the opposite party or parties 
 
DISCO VEKY. 293 
 
 of facts or documents material to the support or defense of the 
 cause, with a note at the foot thereof stating the particular 
 interrogatories each of the parties required to answer. P. M. 
 Co. V. Ajax Rail Anchor Co. 216 Fed. 636, construing this 
 rule, says either party has a right to require the other to answer 
 questions relating to material matters; that is, as to the nature 
 of the case and facts supporting it ; but the rule cannot be used 
 to discover the evidence of the opposite party. F. Speidel Co. 
 V. X. Barstow Co. 232 Fed. 617 ; Window Glass Mach. Co. v. 
 Brookville Glass & Tile Co. 229 Fed. 838. 
 
 Clause 2 of rule 58 provides for filing interrogatories to be 
 answered by an officer of a corporation. Clause 3 requires 
 copies of the interrogatories to be filed with the clerk, to be sent 
 by him to the respective solicitors or the interrogated parties, 
 or, if none, to the last known address of the opposite party. 
 The interrogatories may be taken before any examiner or other 
 officer authorized by new rule 52. Clause 4 requires the inter- 
 rogatories to be answered and the answers to be filed within 
 fifteen days after they have been served, unless the time is 
 enlarged by the court or judge. Within ten days after the 
 service of the interrogatories, objections to them or any of them 
 may be presented to the court or judge with proof of notice of 
 the purpose to do so and the answer shall be deferred until 
 the objections are ruled upon. Clause 5, upon motion and 
 reasonable notice the court may make such orders as may be 
 necessary to force answers, or effect the production of boolcs, 
 documents, etc., — for inspection — that may be material to the 
 adversary's cause either for prosecution or defense. A party 
 failing to obey such order may, if plaintiff', have his bill dis- 
 missed, if defendant, a judgment pro confesso may be taken. 
 By the 6th clause, either party may on demand served ten 
 days before the trial call on the other to admit in writing the 
 execution of or genuineness of any document, letter, or other 
 writing, and if such admission be not made within five days 
 after such service the costs of proving the document shall be 
 paid by the party refusing, unless at the trial the court should 
 find the refusal reasonable. 
 
 It will be seen that the rule sets forth the conditions under 
 which discovery may be asked, as well as the method of proce- 
 dure when sought; but with or without a rule, a court of equity 
 
294 DISCOVERY. 
 
 has an original and inherent power to hear and grant an appli- 
 cation by anyone having an equitable right or seeking an 
 equitable remedy to enforce discovery when necessary to facili- 
 tate justice in any cause whether pending or anticipated. Brown 
 V. McDonald, 68 L.R.A. 462, 67 C. C. A. 59, 133 Fed. 899; 
 Kurtz V. Brown, 81 C. C. A. 498, 152 Fed. 373, 11 Ann. Gas. 
 576 ; Brown v. Palmer, 157 Fed. 797 ; Brown v. Huey, 166 
 Fed. 483 ; but if there be no equity in the bill discovery can- 
 not be maintained. First State Bank v. Spencer, 135 C. C. A. 
 253, 219 Fed. 503. Again, by new rule 46 the testimony of 
 witnesses is required to be taken orally in open court as in 
 actions at law, so that if books, papers, documents, etc., are 
 necessary to be produced in evidence, sec. 724 of the Revised 
 Statutes of the United States (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1469), 
 confer authority on the courts upon motion to order their pro- 
 duction, if they contain evidence pertinent to the issues, and 
 to penalize the party refusing to obey the order. 
 
 In Luten v. Camp, 221 Fed. 424, construing rule 58, it is 
 held ( 1st) that a waiver of an oath to an answer does not relieve 
 the defendant from answering, as under the new rule the inter- 
 rogatory is no longer a part of the bill as under the old rule; 
 and (2d) that in issuing these interrogatories for discovery, the 
 party may interrogate as to facts, but not the evidence tending 
 to prove the facts. See also Blast Furnace Appliances Co. v. 
 Worth Bros. Co. 221 Fed. 430. 
 
CHAPTEK L. 
 
 MTJLTIFAEIOUSNESS AND MISJOINDER. 
 
 Under the old practice, multifariousness arose from a mis- 
 joinder of parties, or causes of action (Animarium Co. v. Nei- 
 man, 98 Fed. 15; Schell v. Alston Mfg. Co. 149 Fed. 440; 
 King V. Inlander, 133 Fed. 416; United States ex rel. Creek 
 Xation v. Eea-Read ilill & Elevator Co. 171 Fed. 515, and 
 cases cited). Separate and distinct claims, or two or more 
 independent causes of action against the same defendant in the 
 same bill. Westinghouse Air Brake Co. v. Kansas City South- 
 ern R. Co. 71 C. C. A. 1, 137 Fed. 31-32, and cases cited; 
 Walker v. Powers, 104 U. S. 245, 26 L. ed. 729. As before 
 stated in discussing "Joinder of Causes of Action," we have 
 seen that new rule 26 permits now the joinder of as many equi- 
 table causes of action as one may have against a single defend- 
 ant. And if there be more than one plaintiff or one defendant 
 such causes of action joined in one suit must be joint as to the 
 plaintiffs, and as to the defendants the liability inust be joint 
 as to all the material defendants. Or sufficient grounds must 
 appear for uniting causes of action in order to promote the 
 convenience of justice. See "Joinder of Causes of Action" for 
 further observation on this rule and authorities cited. It will 
 be seen that the rule requires a joint interest in plaintiffs in the 
 equitable causes of action joined in the suit, and a joint lia- 
 bility in the defendants joined, so that the bill would be still 
 multifarious, if one plaintiff sued on more than one cause of 
 action, and one action should be against a part of the defend- 
 ants, and another cause of action against other defendants. 
 See Little v. Tanner, 208 Fed. 608 ; Emmons v. National Mut. 
 Bldg. & L. Asso. 68 C. C. A. 327, 135 Fed. 689 ; State Trust Co. 
 v. Kansas City, P. & G. E. Co. 128 Fed. 129; liayden v. 
 Thompson, 67 Fed. 273 ; Church v. Citizens' Street E. Co. 78 
 Fed. 529 ; United States v. Guglard, 79 Fed. 24 ; Eastern Bldg. 
 
 295 
 
29(3 MULTIFAEIOUSNESS AND MISJOINDER. 
 
 & L. Asso. V. Denton, 13 C. C. A. 44, 31 U. S. App. 187, 65 
 Fed. 570 ; Farson v. Sioux City, 106 Fed. 278 ; Security Sav. 
 & L. Asso. V. Buchanan, 14 C. C. A. 97, 31 U. S. App. 244, 66 
 Fed. 802 ; Leslie v. Leslie, 84 Fed. 70 ; Inman v. New York 
 Interurban Water Co. 131 Fed. 997; Merriman v. Chicago & 
 E. L E. Co. 12 C. C. A. 275, 24 U. S. App. 428, 64 Fed. 552; 
 Crawford v. Washington Northern K. Co. 233 Fed. 962. 
 
 I do not think a joinder of such causes of action would fall 
 within the rule, "that causes of action may be united when to 
 join them would promote the convenient administration of 
 justice." So, joining an action at law against one party and a 
 suit in equity against another in same suit is multifarious. 
 Thornton N. Motley Co. v. Detroit Steel & Spring Co. 130 Fed. 
 396; Walker v. Powers, 104 U. S. 250, 26 L. ed. 731; Ooit v. 
 Sullivan-Kelly Co. 84 Fed. 724. So, relying upon and seek- 
 ing to avoid a decree is multifariovis. Cutter v. Iowa Water 
 Co. 96 Fed. 779; Cella v. Brown, 75 C. C. A. 608, 144 Fed. 
 742. 
 
 The rule has been treated as one of convenience, and used 
 to prevent parties from being harassed and vexed in litigating 
 matters in which they have no interest, and joining parties with 
 no interests to be litigated, and, on the other hand, to protect 
 the complainant from having to bring several suits when one 
 will suffice. Animarium Co. v. Neiman, 98 Fed. 14; Brown 
 V. Guarantee Trust & S. D. Co. 128 U. S. 415, 32 L. ed. 471, 
 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 127. 
 
 In Von Auw v. Chicago Toy & Fancy Goods Co. 69 Fed. 
 450, the court, quoting from Beach, Mod. Eq. Pr. says: 
 
 "To be multifarious, two or more causes of action must be 
 joined against two or more defendants (Security Sav. & L. 
 Asso. v. Buchanan, 14 C. C. A. 97, 31 U. S. App. 244, 66 Fed. 
 802 ; Brown v. Guarantee Trust & S. D. Co. 128 U. S. 403- 
 412, 32 L. ed. 468-470, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 127), when some of 
 the defendants are concerned with some of the causes of action 
 while others are not concerned with those which involve the 
 former." New rule 26. 
 
 The other grounds stated in Von Auw v. Chicago Toy & 
 Fancy Goods Co. supra, as a test of multifariousness, do not 
 apply under the new rule. 
 
 Mr. Heard, in his Pleading with Precedents, lays down the 
 
MTJLTIFAEIOUSNESS AND MISJOINDEK. 297 
 
 rule as follows : "Can the defendant say, I am called to answer 
 a bill containing two distinct subject-matters, with one of 
 which I am concerned, and there are other defendants not con- 
 cerned with me in that matter." lie illustrates by a bill 
 brought against several infringers of patents, each infringer 
 having no concern with the wrong done by others. 
 
 So, selling different lots of land out of the same tract to 
 different individuals cannot be enforced by one bill against all 
 the purchasers, nor can they unite in a bill to demand specific 
 performance. Gaines v. Chew, 2 How. 619, 11 L. ed. 402. 
 
 So, a bill setting up alleged liability of an assignee for un- 
 paid stock to a corporation, and the liability of five others for 
 colluding to defraud the creditors of the corporation, and a 
 fraudulent sale of a railroad, is multifarious. Holton v. Wal- 
 lace, 66 Fed. 409. 
 
 So, you cannot join an action against officers of a corporation 
 for deceit, and against the corporation for dissolution and ac- 
 counting. Watson V. United States Sugar Refinery, 15 C. C. 
 A. 662, 34 U. S. App. 81, 68 Fed. 769 ; Morse v. Bay State Gas 
 Co. 91 Fed. 944. 
 
 So, you cannot ask to enforce a trust in real estate and quiet 
 title of one of the complainants in the property (Leslie v. Les- 
 lie, 84 Fed. 71 ; see First Nat. Bank v. Peavey, supra) ; but a 
 trustee may set up a right in himself as well as trustee (Met- 
 ropolitan Trust Co. V. Columbus S. & H. R Co. 93 Fed. 689). 
 
 So, a suit by a stockholder, which seeks for himself to can- 
 cel stock and be relieved from the ownership, and in behalf of 
 other stockholders to set aside fraudulent transfers of property, 
 is multifarious. Church v. Citizens' Street R. Co. 78 Fed. 
 529 ; Inman v. ISTew York Interurban E. Co. 131 Fed. 997. 
 
 So, where one gives to another two mortgages on separate 
 lots, covering separate loans on each lot, and the lots have been 
 conveyed to different persons, who are made defendants, the 
 effort to foreclose both mortgages in one suit would be miilti- 
 farious. Eastern Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Denton, 13 C. C. A. 44, 
 31 U. S. App. 187, 65 Fed. 569; see Commercial Bank v. 
 Sandford, 99 Fed. 154. 
 
 So, antagonistic alternative prayers make the bill multi- 
 farious. Cutter V. Iowa Water Co. 96 Fed. 777 ; see Halsey v. 
 Goddard, 86 Fed. 25. These cases in a measure illustrate the 
 
298 MULTIFARIOUSNESS AND MISJOINDEE. 
 
 rule that joining in one bill distinct and unconnected, matters 
 against one defendant or several matters of a distinct and in- 
 dependent nature against several defendants, so that the parties 
 are liable respectively, and not as connected with each other, 
 makes the bill multifarious. Brown v. Guarantee Trust & S. 
 D. Co. 128 U. S. 403, 32 L. ed. 468, 9 Sup. Ct. Kep. 127. 
 
 Then a bill to be free from this vice must relate to matters of 
 the same nature having a connection with each other, and in 
 which all of the defendants are more or less concerned. Thus, 
 a cause of action against a corporation to foreclose, and one 
 against stockholders to recover dividends because of wrongful 
 distribution, would be multifarious if joined. ISTew Hamp- 
 shire Sav. Bank v. Eichey, 58 C. C. A. 294, 121 Fed. 956; 
 Central Nat. Bank v. Fitzgerald, 94 Fed. 16 ; Dial v. Eeynolds, 
 96 U. S. 340, 24 L. ed. 644; Hayden v. Thompson, 67 Fed. 
 273. For while courts of equity are averse to a multiplicity of 
 suits, yet they will not permit parties and causes of action to 
 be united in one suit, where the grounds of complaint are wholly 
 distinct and unconnected and parties have no common interest 
 in them. Farson v. Sioux City, 106 Fed. 278. While multi- 
 fariousness must depend on the facts of each case, and therefore 
 must necessarily depend on the discretion of the chancellor, yet 
 the judicial discretion has been largely controlled by the case 
 of Brown v. Guarantee Trust & S. D. Co. 128 U. S. 412, 32 L. 
 ed. 470, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 127, wherein the following formula 
 was stated: 
 
 First. The grounds of the suit must be different. 
 
 Second. Each ground must be sufficient as stated in the 
 bill. 
 
 Third. It is not indispensable that all the parties should 
 have an interest in all the matters contained in the suit, but 
 will be sufficient if each party has an interest in some material 
 matter in the suit and they are connected with the others. Cur- 
 ran V. Campion, 29 C. C. A. 26, 56 U. S. App. 383, 85 Fed. 
 70 ; TuUy v. Triangle Film Corp. 229 Fed. 297. 
 
 It may be said, then, that no bill is multifarious that pre- 
 sents a common point of litigation and the decision of which 
 will affect the whole subject-matter and settle the rights of all 
 parties to the suit. Rogers v. Penobscot Min. Co. 83 C. C. A. 
 380, 154 Fed. 608; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Caffrey, 128 Fed. 
 
MULTIFARIOUSNESS AND MISJOINDEE. 299 
 
 770; Kelley v. Boettcher, 29 C. C. A. 14, 56 U. S. App. 363, 
 So Fed. 64; Westingliouse Air Brake Co. v. Kansas City South- 
 ern R Co. 71 C. C. A. 1, 137 Fed. 26 ; Pennsylvania Co. v. 
 Bay, 150" Fed. 770. 
 
 To ilhistrate: Two persons cannot unite distinct titles, 
 although against the same person ; but a party claiming through 
 different titles the same property may unite the titles in the 
 same bill. Stephens v. McCargo, 9 Wheat. 504, 6 L. ed. 146 ; 
 Westinghouse Air Brake Co. v. Kansas City Southern R. Co. 
 71 C. C. A. 1, 137 Fed. 32, 33, reviewing cases. 
 
 The rule may be further illustrated as follows: 
 
 A claim of a minority stockholder on his own behalf and 
 in behalf of the corporation, founded on same facts, may be 
 joined. Jones v. Missouri-Edison Electric Co. 75 C. C. A. 
 631, 144 Fed. 767. See Eyan v. Seaboard & R. R. Co. 89 
 Fed. 397. 
 
 So, a bill for specific performance of an agreement to de- 
 liver coal for money advanced, with alternative prayer for fore- 
 closure of a mortgage securing the loan, would not be multi- 
 farious. Peale v. Marian Coal Co. 172 Fed. 639. 
 
 -So, a bill by a judgment creditor to subject property fraudu- 
 lently conveyed, because brought against different persons hold' 
 ing the property by different conveyances, is not multifarious 
 Fowler v. Palmer, 87 C. C. A. 157, 160 Fed. 1; Hultberg v. 
 Anderson, 170 Fed. 657; United States v. Allen, 171 Fed. 
 907. 
 
 So, a bill to require an accounting is not multifarious be- 
 cause of different and separate transactions set out, even though 
 as to some of them there was a remedy at law. United Cigar- 
 ette Mach. Co. V. Wright, 132 Fed. 195 ; McMullen Lumber 
 Co. V. Strother, 69 C. C. A. 433, 136 Fed. 296. 
 
 So, where a bill is filed against several persons involving mat- 
 ters of the same nature, making up a series of acts intended to 
 defraud the complainant, in which all the defendants were con- 
 cerned, is not multifarious. ITorner-Gaylord Co. v. Miller, 147 
 Fed. 295; Field v. Western Life Indemnity Co. 166 Fed. 
 607; Sipe v. Columbia Eef. Co. 171 Fed. 295. 
 
 So, a bill filed by a receiver against a number of directors 
 to recover money lost through misconduct is not multifarious. 
 Allen V. Luke, 141 Fed. 694; Boyd v. Schneider, 65 C. C. A. 
 209, 131 Fed. 223. 
 
300 MDLTIFAEI0USNES8 AND MISJOINDER. 
 
 So, joining two or more complainants having separate inter- 
 ests, but dependent on the same issues, requiring the same evi- 
 dence, and leading to the same decree, is not multifarious. Den- 
 nison Mfg. Co. v. Thomas Mfg. Co. 94 Fed. 651; see South 
 Penn. Oil Co. v. Calf Creek Oil & Gas Co. 140 Fed. 508; 
 Home Ins. Co. v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. 109 Fed. 
 682, S. C. 51 C. C. A. 21, 113 Fed. 5; Barcus v. Gates, 32 
 C. C. A. 337, 61 IT. S. App. 596, 89 Fed. Y83 ; Liverpool & 
 L. & G. Ins. Co. V. Clunie, 88 Fed. 160. 
 
 So, a bill to enjoin diverting veaters would not be multifari- 
 ous because portions of the water are claimed by different 
 rights. Rincon Water Co. v. Anaheim Union Water Co. 115 
 Fed. 544; Pacific Live-Stock Co. v. Hanley, 98 Fed. 327. 
 
 A bill is not multifarious because it seeks to enforce two 
 series of bonds against a city, though to be paid for differently. 
 Burlington Sav. Bank v. Clinton, 106 Fed. 270. 
 
 So, a bill to set aside a will and also a deed made by the same 
 person, and alleged to have been procured by fraud of one of 
 the defendants, would not be multifarious (Williams v. Crabb, 
 59 L.E.A. 425, 54 C. C. A. 213, 117 Fed. 193), provided the 
 rights of the other defendants will not be prejudiced thereby 
 (ibid.). Nor where the bill alleges the infringement of two 
 separate patents but both being processes having a single ob- 
 ject. United States Mineral Wool Co. v. Manville Covering 
 Co. 101 Fed. 145. See "Multifariousness in Patent Cases;" 
 Wilkins Shoe-Button Fastener Co. v. Webb, 89 Fed. 989 ; Chis- 
 holm V. Johnson, 106 Fed. 191. 
 
 Again, it has been held that where a person has a number of 
 separate claims against the same party, but all arising from a 
 common cause governed by the same law and facts, a court 
 will entertain the bill. This is permitted to avoid a multi- 
 plicity of suits, which is a distinct ground of equitable juris- 
 diction. Watson V. National Life & T. Co. 88 C. C. A. 380, 
 162 Fed. 7; Illinois C. E. Co. v. Caffrey, and Liverpool & L 
 & G. Ins. Co. V. Clunie, supra; Sang Lung v. Jackson, 85 Fed. 
 502 ; Louisville, N. A. & C. E. Co. v. Ohio Valley Improv. & 
 Contr. Co. 57 Fed. 42; LTnion & Planters' Bank v. Memphis, 
 49 C. C. A. 455, 111 Fed. 561; Virginia-Carolina Chemical 
 Co. V. Home Ins. Co. 51 C. C. A. 21, 113 Fed. 5; Delaware, L 
 & W. E. Co. V. Frank, 110 Fed. 695. See People's JSTat. Bank 
 
MULTIFAEIOUSNESS AND MISJOINDER. 301 
 
 V. Marye. 107 Fed. 570; Fitchett v. Blows, 20 C. C. A. 286, 
 36 U. S. App. 597, 71: Fed. 50. 
 
 So, to establish a lien and personal indebtedness. Ingersoll 
 V. Coram, 127 Fed. 418. 
 
 The above chapter must be read in the light of rule 26. 
 
 How Multifariousness Should he Set Up. 
 
 Under new rule 29 an objection to nonjoinder of parties, or 
 misjoinder of parties, or causes of action shall be made by mo- 
 tion to dismiss, or in the answer, which issue at the discretion 
 of the court may be called up and disposed of in limine. The 
 motion to dismiss may be set down for hearing by either party 
 on 5 days' notice. Emmons v. ISTational ilut. Bldg. & L. Asso. 
 68 C. C. A. 327, 135 Fed. 689; McCloskey v. Barr, 38 Fed. 
 166 ; Fitchett v. Blows, supra; Converse v. Michigan Dairy Co. 
 45 Fed. 18; Ranger v. Campion Cotton-Press Co. 52 Fed. 611; 
 Barney v. Latham, 103 U. S. 215, 26 L. ed. 518; United States 
 V. Agee, 47 C. C. A. 152, 108 Fed. 10; Tilden v. Barber, 227 
 Fed. 1010. 
 
 Form of Motion. 
 
 Title as in bill — Address as given before. 
 
 And now comes the defendant and moves to dismiss the bill filed in the 
 above cause because it appears from said bill that the same is exhibited 
 against this defendant and others (naming them) for several distinct 
 matters and causes of action, in some of which, as appears by the bill, this 
 ■defendant is in no way interested, that by thus Joining the causes of action 
 as therein contained, which are independent of each other, the proceedings 
 will be unnecessarily intricate and prolix, and this defendant will be put 
 to unnecessary costs in matters in which in no way relates to or concerns 
 him. 
 
 Wherefore the defendant prays the judgment of the court whether he 
 shall be compelled to answer further, and prays to be dismissed with his 
 costs in this behalf incurred. R. F., 
 
 Solicitor, etc. 
 
 ,It further appears from new rule 26 that it is left to the 
 discretion of the court to determine whether, in a joinder of 
 causes of action in the same bill, they can be conveniently tried 
 together, and if not, to order separate trials. This rule is 
 applicable when a legal cause of action is joined with an 
 
302 MULTIFABIOUSNESS AND MISJOINDEE. 
 
 equitable cause of action. A defendant having a right of trial 
 by jury if the cause be legal, the court under new rule 23 may 
 transfer the legal action to the law side and retain jurisdiction 
 of the equitable cause. Cubbins v. Mississippi Elver Commis- 
 sion, 204 Fed. 308 ; Goldschmidt Thermit Co. v. Primes Chem- 
 ical Co. 216 Fed. 382. See Security Sav. & L. Asso. v. Buchan- 
 an, 14 C. C. A. 97, 31 U. S. App. 244, 66 Fed. 801, 802. But 
 see act March 3, 1915 (see Dismissal by Court, p. 548). See 
 Curriden v. Middleton, 232 U. S. 633, 58 L. ed. 765, 34 Sup. 
 Ct. Kep. 458. See Act of Congress, p. 552 of Text. 
 
CHAPTEE LI. 
 
 EQtJITY RULES AND MOTION DAYS. 
 
 We have now reached a point where the bill is prepared ready 
 for filing, but before proceeding with the manner and effect of 
 filing the bill, it is necessary to speak of the rules governing 
 the preparation of a case in equity for final hearing in the 
 Federal courts, and of the "motion days," and the purposes for 
 which they are set apart. 
 
 From the time of filing the bill until the final hearing, every 
 step taken is governed by rules established by the Supreme 
 Court of the United States, as well as by the circuit and dis- 
 trict courts; the rules established by the two last courts being 
 only for convenience and entirely local in effect. The object 
 and purpose of the rules thus promulgated is to speed and ma- 
 ture the cause for final hearing on its merits (Allen v. ISTew 
 York, 18 Blatchf. 239, 7 Fed. 483), and they must be fol- 
 lowed (Washington, A. & G. R. Co. v. Bradley [Washington, 
 A. & G. E. Co. V. Washington ] 10 Wall. 307, 19 L. ed. 895; 
 Bank of United States v. White, 8 Pet. 269, 8 L. ed. 941; 
 Gaines v. Eelf, 15 Pet. 9, 10 L. ed. 642), unless insistence 
 upon them would cause great injustice. The authority to pro- 
 mulgate these rules is found in sec. 913 (Comp. Stat. 1913, 
 sec. 1536), act of 1792, and sec. 917, act of 1842, of the United 
 States Eevised Statutes, which provides that the Supreme 
 Court of the United States may from time to time prescribe, 
 in any manner not inconsistent with any law of the United 
 States, the forms of writs, etc. * * * and to regulate the 
 whole practice to be used in suits in equity. Steam Stone Cut- 
 ter Co. v. Jones, 21 Blatchf. 138, 13 Fed. 577; Mahr v. Union 
 P. E. Co. 140 Fed. 925; Deprez v. Thomson Houston Electric 
 Co. 66 Fed. 23. 
 
 •By section 918, U. S. Eev. Stat. , it is provided that the sev- 
 eral circuit and district courts of the United States may, in a 
 
 308 
 
30-i EQUITY EULES AND MOTION DAYS. 
 
 manner not inconsistent with a law of the United States or 
 with a rule of the Supreme Court, make rules and orders di- 
 recting the return of writs and process, filing pleading, taking 
 of rules, and otherwise regulate their own practice as may be 
 convenient for the advancement of justice or prevention of delay 
 in proceedings. 
 
 In accordance with the above provisions the Supreme Court 
 in promulgating its rules in 1842 provided by equity rule 89 
 for the circuit and district judges concurring, to prescribe 
 rules by them for their judicial districts not to be inconsistent 
 with the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. 
 
 By new rule 79 a majority of the circuit judges for the cir- 
 cuit, concurring with the district judge may make or amend 
 any rule for the practice, proceeding, and process, mesne, and 
 final in their respective districts, not inconsistent with the rules 
 promulgated by the Supreme Court. 
 
 So, then, we have the equity practice in the Federal courts 
 regulated : 
 
 First. By the laws of Congress. 
 
 Second. By the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court 
 under the authority of Congress, now ninety-four in number. 
 
 Third. By such local rules in particular districts as have 
 been promulgated by a majority of the circuit judges, as pro- 
 vided by new rule 79. Kev. Stat. sec. 913-918 (Comp. Stat. 
 1913, sees. 1536-1544) ; Steam Stone Cutter Co. v. Jones, 
 supra ; Gaines v. ISTew Orleans, 27 Fed. 411 ; Bein v. Heath, 12 
 How. 178, 13 L. ed. 943 ; Osborn v. Detroit, 28 Fed. 385 ; Allen 
 V. ISTew York, supra; Martindale v. Waas, 3 McCrary, 637, 11 
 Fed. 551 ; Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Keith, 23 C. C. A. 
 196, 40 U. S. App. 706, 77 Fed. 374-375. 
 
 The practice in equity, then, is regulated by the Federal 
 judiciary, if not provided for by Congress, as experience de- 
 velops necessity ; and when rules are thus established, they have 
 the full force of an act of CongTess, if not in conflict with some 
 previous law of Congress. United States v. Barber Lumber 
 Co. 169 Fed. 186-187 ; Northwestern Mut L. Ins. Co. v. Keith^ 
 supra; Bryant Bros. v. Robinson, 79 C. C. A. 259, 149 Fed. 
 321 ; Bein v. Heath, supra. 
 
 Old equity rule Xo. 90, providing that the practice of the 
 circuit court in equity shall be regulated by the practice 'of 
 
EQUITY ETJLES ANT) MOTION DAYS. 305 
 
 the high court of chancery in England, if a practice should 
 arise not provided for by the rules, is now abrogated by the 
 new rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United 
 States to be effective Febru.ary 1st, 1913. See new rule No. 81, 
 apph'ing the new rules to cases pending when they become 
 effective, as well as to future cases, and abrogating all rules here- 
 tofore prescribed by the Supreme Court regulating the practice 
 in suits in equity not contained or retained in the new rules. 
 ISTorth V. Herrick, 203 Fed. 592. 
 
 How Time Prescribed by the Rules Must Be Computed. 
 
 Rule 80. When the time prescribed by these rules for doing 
 any act expires on a Sunday or legal holiday, such time shall 
 extend to and include the next succeeding day that is not a 
 Sunday or legal holiday. The rule is self-explanatory. 
 
 So much, then, for the sources of authority and effect of the 
 equity rules. See 210 U. S. beginning at page 508, for a 
 history of the rules amendments. 
 
 District Court Always Open for Certain Purposes. 
 
 Rule 1. The district courts, as courts of equity, shall be 
 deemed always open for the purpose of filing any pleading, of 
 issuing and returning mean and final process, and of making 
 and directing all interlocutory motions, orders, rules, and other 
 proceedings preparatory to the hearing, upon their merits, of 
 all causes pending therein. Any district judge may, upon 
 reasonable notice to the parties, make, direct, and award, at 
 chambers or in the clerk's office, and in vacation as well as in 
 term, all such process, commissions, orders, rules, and other 
 proceedings, whenever the same are not grantable of course, 
 according to the rules and practice of the court. 
 
 l^ew rule No. 1 embodies old rules Nos. 1 and 3. There is 
 no material difference except in the fact that the notice re- 
 quired to be given of the application for orders not grantable 
 of course may require the appearance of the other party to 
 show cause to th« contrary at any time according to the rules 
 and practice of the court, and not on the next rule day as re- 
 quired in old rule No. 3, as rule days have been abolished by 
 S. Eq.— 20. 
 
306 EQUITY EULES AND MOTION DAYS. 
 
 tbe new rules. ISTew rule l^o. 1 is section 638 of the TJ. S. Rev. 
 Stat. 
 
 Rule Days Abolished. 
 
 'New Eule ISTo. 2. The clerk's office shall be open during 
 business hours on all days except Sundays and legal holidays, 
 and the clerk shall be in attendance for the purpose of receiving 
 and disposing of all motions, rules, orders, and other proceed- 
 ings which are grantable of course. 
 
 We see, then, that the clerk's office is open every day, except 
 the days specially excepted, for the purpose of receiving, enter- 
 ing, entertaining, and disposing of all motions, rules, orders, and 
 other proceedings applied for, grantable of course. 
 
 Orders Grantable of Course. 
 
 ISlew equity rule No. 5 defines motions "grantable of course" 
 as follows : All motions and applications in the clerk's office 
 for the issuing of mesne process or final process to enforce and 
 execute decrees, for taking bills pro confesso, and for other pro- 
 ceedings in the clerk's office which do not require any allow- 
 ance or order of the court or of a judge, shall be deemed motions 
 and applications grantable of course, by the clerk ; but the same 
 may be suspended or altered, or rescinded by the judge upon 
 special cause shown. 
 
 This rule is identical with old rule No. 5. 
 
 Orders Not Grantable of Course. 
 
 Old rule No. 3, now a part of new rule No. 1, as we have 
 seen, provides that any district judge may, upon reasonable 
 notice to the parties, make, direct, and award at chambers, or 
 in the clerk's office, and in vacation as well as in term time, all 
 such process, commissions, orders, rules, and other proceedings 
 whenever the same are not grantable of course according to 
 the rules and practice of the court. We see, then, that orders 
 not grantable of course require an application to the court, rea- 
 sonable notice to the opposite party, and to be heard at such 
 time as may be fixed by the rules of the court, or at such time 
 as the judge may assign. 
 
EQTTITY EULES AND MOTIOX BAYS. 307 
 
 !N"ew rule No. 6 requires the court to establish by rule "mo- 
 tion days" for the hearing of applications not grantable of 
 course, and is as follows : Each district court shall establish 
 regular times and places not less than one each month, when 
 motions requiring notice and hearing may be made and dis- 
 posed of; but the judge may at any time and place, and on 
 such notice, if any, as he may consider reasonable, make and 
 direct all interlocutory orders, rulings, and proceedings for the 
 advancement, conduct, and hearing of causes. If the public 
 interest permits, the senior circuit judge of the circuit may 
 dispense with the motion day during not to exceed two months 
 in the year in any district. 
 
 Thiis we see that applications for orders grantable of course 
 may be made on any day except Sundays and legal holidays, 
 to the clerk of the district court, but for orders "not grantable 
 of course" application must be made to the court and reason- 
 able notice given to the opposite party, to be heard upon "motion 
 day" as fixed by the court, or such motion days as the court may 
 establish for the hearing of applications not grantable of course, 
 or upon such other days as the court may indicate. 
 
CHAPTEE LIL 
 
 FILING MOTIONS AND PEACTICE GOVEENING. 
 
 Old rule ISTo. 3 has been abrogated, and new rule ISTo. 3 sub- 
 stituted, which is as follows: The clerk shall keep a book 
 known as "Equity Docket," in which he shall enter each suit, 
 with a file number corresponding to the folio in the book. All 
 papers and orders filed with the clerk in the suit, all process 
 issued and returns made thereon, and all appearances, shall 
 be noted briefly and chronologically in this book on the folio 
 assigned to the suit, and shall be marked with its file number. 
 
 The clerk shall also keep a book entitled "Order Book," in 
 which shall be entered at length, in the order of their marking, 
 all orders made or passed by him as of course, and also all 
 orders made or passed by the judge in chambers. He shall also 
 keep an "Equity Journal," in which shall be entered all orders, 
 decrees, and proceedings of the court in equity and causes in 
 term time. Separate and suitable indices of the equity docket, 
 order book, and equity journal shall be kept by the clerk under 
 the direction of the court. 
 
 It is thus seen that, instead of the order book, which under 
 the old rule contained all motions, orders, and other proceed- 
 ings in an e:[uity suit made and directed on rule days or in 
 chambers and grantable of course by the clerk or court with or 
 without notice, and in which was preserved a complete history 
 of the case, the clerk is now required to keep three books': first, 
 an equity docket, in which each suit shall be entered with a file 
 number corresponding to the folio of the book, and all papers 
 and orders filed with the clerk in the suit; all process issued 
 and returns thereon, and all appearances, shall be briefly noted 
 and marked with its file number; second, the order book, in 
 which all orders passed by the clerk as of course, and also all 
 orders made or passed by the judge at chambers, shall be entered 
 at length; third, an equity journal, in which shall be entered 
 
 308 
 
FILING MOTIOA^S AND PBACTICE GOVERNING. 30'J 
 
 all orders, decrees, and proceedings of the court in term time 
 in the case; fourth, separate and suitable indices of all the 
 books are to be. kept by the clerk. 
 
 Entry as Notice. 
 
 Xew rule ISTo. 4 abrogates old rule No. 4, which is as fol- 
 lows: Neither the noting of an order in the equity docket nor 
 its entry in the order book shall of itself be deemed notice to 
 the parties, or their solicitors; and when an order is made 
 without prior notice to and in the absence of a party, the clerk, 
 unless otherwise directed by the court or judge, shall forthwith 
 send a copy thereof by mail to such party or his solicitor, and 
 a note of such mailing shall be made in the equity docket, 
 which shall be taken as suiHcient proof of due notice of the 
 order. 
 
 An entry in the equity docket or order book is, as we see, 
 not notice of itself under the new rule, and if an order is made 
 without prior notice to or in the absence of a party the clerk 
 must forthwith send a copy to such party or his solicitor, and 
 the mailing of the order by the clerk as directed will be suffi- 
 cient proof of due notice of the order. If a rule shall require 
 notice of a proceeding to be given as in all proceedings and 
 orders to be made by a jxidge in. chambers when not grantable 
 of course, as provided in rule No. 1, notice is essential to 
 the solicitors or parties represented unless by any rule or prac- 
 tice of the court personal notice is required to be given to the 
 parties. The time and manner of service is under the control 
 of the court, as well as the time and place of the hearing, or it 
 may be governed by local rules established by the court. 
 
 Orders in Chamhers. 
 
 By new rule No. 1 any district judge may, on reasonable 
 notice to the parties interested, make, direct, and award in 
 chambers, or in the clerk's office, and in vacation as well as in 
 term, all such process, commissions, orders, rules, and other 
 proceedings whenever the same are not grantable of course 
 according to the rules and practice of the court. By new rule 
 ^0. 6 each district court shall establish regular times and places. 
 
310 FILING MOTIONS AND PEAOTIOE GOVEENING. 
 
 not less than once each month, when motions requiring notice 
 and hearing may be made and disposed of, but the judge may 
 at any time and place and on such notice, if any, as he may 
 consider reasonable, make and direct all interlocutory orders, 
 rulings, and proceedings for the advancement, conduct, and 
 hearing of equitable causes. It is provided in this rule, how- 
 ever, that the senior circuit judge may dispense with the motion 
 day in any district not to exceed two months in one year. 
 
 Motions. 
 
 Much of the preparation of any case in equity for final hear- 
 ing rests upon motions to be made during its progress, and 
 while heretofore it was considered that a motion to strike out 
 portions of pleadings subject to a demurrer, or plea, was not 
 good pleading in equity, yet the contrary has now been estab- 
 lished by new rule No. 29, which abolishes pleas and demurrers, 
 and provides that every defense heretofore made by pleas or 
 demurrers must now be made by motion, which motion should 
 request a dismissal of the bill, or the same defense can be set 
 up by the answer. By new rule No. 21 exceptions to pleading 
 for scandal and impertinence have been abolished, and a motion 
 to strike out the objectionable matter must now be made to the 
 judge. But whether the motion takes the place of the plea, 
 demurrer, or exception, it should be drawn with some of the 
 precision required of those abandoned methods of defense iu 
 order that the issue may be presented clearly, whether the mo- 
 tion be in abatement or in bar. It is provided in rule ISTo. 29 
 that these motions may be separately heard before final hearing, 
 at the discretion of the court, and the motion to dismiss the 
 bill or any part thereof may be set down for hearing by either 
 party on five days' notice, and if denied, the defendant shall 
 have five days only within which to ansv/er. All motions not 
 thus specifically mentioned by rule, but which become necessary 
 in developing the progress of the cause, would, it appears, be 
 controlled by rule No. 6 when not gmntable of course, and by 
 rule No. 5 if grcmtable of course. 
 
 We have seen that much of the preparation of a case rests 
 upon motions to be made during its progress, so I wish to 
 briefly allude to these informal applications for some action, 
 
FILING MOTIONS AND PKACTIOE GOVEKNING. 311 
 
 or order of the court deemed necessary to facilitate a hearing of 
 the case. They must state the parties in whose favor and 
 against whom the relief is asked, and they should state accu- 
 rately the particular relief required, with a prayer for the relief 
 as stated. They are of two kinds, ex parte and on notice, and 
 under which class your motion falls depends upon the rules of 
 court, and the court's discretion. We see, then, that the motion 
 may be set down for hearing either on the motion days estab- 
 lished by the court as required under rule No. 6 ; or applica- 
 tion can be made to hear the motion at any other time and 
 place than the time and place fixed by the motion day, if rea- 
 sonable notice has been given to the other party of the setting 
 down of the day, or according to a rule in which a definite 
 method has been provided. 
 
 Under the old rules motions were only appropriate in the 
 absence of a remedy by regular pleadings (Illinois C. K. Co. 
 V. Adams, 180 U. S. 29-38, 45 L. ed. 410-413, 21 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 251 ; Virginia, T. & C. Steel & I. Co. v. Harris, 80 C. C. 
 A. 658, 151 Fed. 435), but under the new rules they are used 
 in lieu of pleas and demurrers, to settle important questions of 
 law or fact, which dispose of the merits of the case. IS'ew 
 rule 29. 
 
 If the judge be not present on the day and at the place ap- 
 pointed for hearing, then it must be postponed to some future 
 day; and counsel should have notice of any change of time and 
 place as to when and where the motion will be heard. In cities 
 of a limited territory where a Federal judge may always be 
 found, there is not much difficulty in gettiiig a hearing at the 
 time and place fixed by the rules or the court; but where a 
 district covers a vast amount of territory, it is generally diffi- 
 cult and expensive to pursue the judge and get a hearing on 
 these preliminary steps to a final hearing. The consequence 
 is that the tediousness and delay in maturing a case for hear- 
 ing under these conditions still exist. 
 
CHAPTER LIII. 
 
 FILING THE BILL AND SERVING PROCESS. 
 
 By equity rule No. 1, the district courts of the United States 
 are always open as courts of equity for the purpose of tiling 
 bills, answers, and other pleadings; for issuing and returning 
 mesne and final process; and making and directing all inter- 
 locutory orders and motions, rules, and other proceedings pre- 
 paratory to the hearing of all causes pending therein on their 
 merits. U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 638. Under this rule you may 
 file at any time in the clerk's office your bill, and you are 
 entitled on filing the same to the process of subpoena. 
 
 By equity rule ISTo. 7 the process of subpoena shall constitute 
 the proper mesne process in all suits in equity, in the first 
 instance, to require the defendant to appear and answer the 
 bill; and unless otherwise provided in these rules, or specially 
 ordered by the court, a writ of attachment, and if the defend- 
 ant cannot be found, a writ of sequestration or a writ of assist- 
 ance to enforce a delivery of possession, as the case may require, 
 shall be the proper process for the purpose of compelling obedi- 
 ence to any interlocutory or final order or decree of the court. 
 
 The process of subpoena, then, requires the defendant to ap- 
 pear and answer the bill. 
 
 By equity rule ISTo. 11, which is the same as old rules Nos. 
 11 and 12, it is provided that no process of subpoena shall issue 
 from the clerk's ofiice until the bill is filed in said office. By 
 old rule ISTo. 16 it was not until the return of the subpoena as 
 served and executed upon the defendant that the clerk was al- 
 lowed to docket the cause as a suit pending; but by the new 
 rule ISTo. 3 the clerk is required to keep an equity docket in 
 which he shall enter each suit, with all process issued and 
 returns thereon, and, it seems, whether served or not. So 
 under this rule filing the bill is the beginning of the suit. See 
 Humane Bit Co. v. Barnet, 117 Fed. 316, citing Farmers' 
 
 312 
 
FILING THE BILL AND SEEVING PKOCESS. 313 
 
 Loan & T. Co. v. Lake Street Elev. E. Go. iTT U. S. 51, 44 L. 
 ed. 667, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 564; Armstrong Cork Co. v. Mer- 
 chants' Refrigerating Co. 171 Fed. 778. 
 
 8ubp<jen(i. 
 
 The process of subpoena issues as a matter of course when the 
 bill is filed in the clerk's office and not before upon the appli- 
 cation of the plaintiff (equity rule 12). It shall contain the 
 names of the parties, and be made returnable into the clerk's 
 office twenty days from the issuing thereof. At the bottom of 
 the subpoena shall be placed a memorandum that the defendant 
 is required to file his answer or other defense in the clerk's 
 office on or before the twentieth day after service, excluding the 
 day of service thereof. By the same rule 12, where there is 
 more than one defendant, the plaintiff may at his election sue 
 out a separate subpoena for each defendant, or order a joint 
 subpoena for all the defendants. See U. S. Rev. Stat. sees. 911, 
 912, Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 1534, 1535; Middleton Paper 
 Co. V. Rock River Paper Co. 19 Ped. 252 ; Chamberlain v. 
 Mensing, 47 Fed. 436; United States v. Turner, 50 Fed. 734; 
 Leas V. Merriman, 132 Fed. 512, and cases cited; Jewett v. 
 Garrett, 47 Fed. 627. 
 
 By equity rule 14 if the subpoena is returnable not served, 
 the plaintiff is entitled to another until service is had. 
 
 Office of Subpoena,. 
 
 We have seen by equity rule 7 that the subpcena is the propei 
 mesne process in equity to appear and answer the exigency of 
 the bill. Its sole office is to bring the defendant into court to 
 give jurisdiction. Seattle L. S. & E. R. Co. v. Union Tnist Co. 
 24 C. C. A. 512, 48 U. S. App. 255, 79 Fed. 179 ; Wheeler v. 
 Walton & W. Co. supra; Rodgers v. Pitt, 96 Fed. 673, 674; 
 ^ilmer v. Atlanta & R. Air-Line R. Co. 2 Woods, 409, Fed. 
 Cas. Iso. 17,775. It has no extraterritorial effect, so if issued 
 to be served out of the district it is a nullity, unless permitted 
 by statute, as in sections 740, 741 and 742, of U. S. Rev. Stat, 
 new Code, sees. 52-55, Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 1034-1037, 
 appendix, or in the act organizing the Federal district in which 
 
314 FILING THE BILL AND SEKVING PROCESS. 
 
 the suit is brought. In all of the acts of organization of these 
 districts the territorial extent of the process is generally stated. 
 United States v. American Lumber Co. 80 Fed. 311, S. C. 29 
 C. C. A. 431, 56 U. S. App. 655, 85 Fed. 827; United States 
 ex rel. Mcintosh v. Crawford, 47 Fed. 561; United States v. 
 Stern, 177 Fed. 479 ; Hunter v. Eussell, 59 Fed. 966 ; Kirk v. 
 United States, 124 Fed. 336; Eomaine v. Union Ins. Co. 28 
 Fed. 625; Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 368, 21 L. ed. 963; Tread- 
 well V. Seymour, 41 Fed. 580. 
 
 Sections 740, 741 and 742 have been before set forth, pro- 
 viding for service of process when there were several districts 
 in one State and defendants in different districts, or when the 
 action was local, or the land sued for lies in different districts. 
 It was permitted in these cases to direct subpoenas to the United 
 States marshals of the several districts in the same State. With 
 these exceptions the subpoena cannot go beyond its district 
 within which it is issued, and service in personal action can 
 only be perfected upon the defendant within the district of the 
 court's jurisdiction from whence the process issues. Ableman 
 V. Booth, 21 How. 524, 16 L. ed. 176 ; Toland v. Sprague, 12 
 Pet. 328-330, 9 L. ed. 1104, 1105. If not thus served the 
 court has no jurisdiction over the defendant unless he volun- 
 tarily appears. JSTew Code, sec. 51, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1033; Hardenberg v. Eay, 33 Fed. 814; Jewett v. Garrett, 
 47 Fed, 630. 
 
 Delivery to Marshal. 
 
 The subpoena, being thus prepared, must be delivered to the 
 United States marshal of the district where issued. Legisla- 
 tion does not provide how it is to be delivered, further than to 
 harmonize with the delivery of writs of that character in the 
 State. U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 911, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1534. 
 It is no doubt the policy of the law to keep the process of the 
 court under the supervision and control of the court; it should 
 therefore be delivered by the clerk to the United States marshal 
 for service. See Jewett v. Garrett, 47 Fed. 625. 
 
 In the act reorganizing the districts of Texas, it was pro- 
 vided that when process was issued to defendants residing in 
 several districts, that duplicate writs were to be indorsed by 
 
FILING THE BILL AND SERVING PEOGESS. 315 
 
 plaintiff or his attorney that such duplicates were true copies 
 of the process sued out of the proper district. This seems to 
 contemplate that the process was to be delivered to the plaintiff 
 or his attorney, to be sent to the marshals of other districts, but, 
 as stated, this practice has not been pursued in Texas. See 
 ibid. 
 
 Service of the Subpoena. 
 
 Jurisdiction is only required by service of subpoena or vol- 
 untary appearance. Jewett v. Garrett, 47 Fed. 630 ; Ee Gross- 
 mayer, 177 U. S. 50, 44 L. ed. 666, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 535; 
 Caledonian Coal Co. v. Baker, 196 U. S. 444, 49 L. ed. 545, 
 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 375, and cases cited; Kent v. Honsinger, 167 
 Fed. 625. 
 
 By equity rule 15 it is provided that the service of all mesne 
 and final process shall be by the marshal of the district, or his 
 deputy, or by some other person specially appointed by the 
 court for that purpose, and not otherwise. In the latter case 
 the person serving the process must make affidavit thereof. 
 TJ. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 787, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1311, makes 
 it the duty of United States marshals to serve throughout his 
 district all lawful precepts directed to him and issued under 
 the authority of the United States. See sees. 787, 789 and 790, 
 Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 1311—1314. Except when, as provided 
 in section 922, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1548, the marshal is a 
 party to the suit, then the court must on application name a 
 person to whom the process must be directed for service. But 
 it is held in Barnes v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 120 Fed. 550, 
 that if the deputy marshal serves the writ upon the marshal it 
 is waived by appearance. See Piatt v. Manning, 34 Fed. 817; 
 Jewett V, Garrett, 47 Fed. 625. 
 
 "J 
 
 Service; How Made. 
 
 The service of subpoenas shall be by a delivery of a copy 
 thereof by the officer serving the same to the defendant per- 
 sonally, or by leaving a copy thereof at the dwelling house or 
 usual place of abode of each defendant, with some adult person 
 who is a member or resident in the family. Equity rule 13; 
 King V. Davis, 137 Fed. 206 ; United States v. American Luni- 
 
316 FILIJSTG THE BILL AND SERVIJSTG PKOCESS. 
 
 ber Co. 29 C. 0. A. 431, 56 U. S. App. 655, 85 Fed. 831; 
 Phcenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Wulf, 9 Biss. 285, 1 Fed. 775; 
 Blythe v. Hinckley, 84 Fed. 228; Von Roy v. Blackman, 3 
 Woods, 98, Fed. Cas. No. 16,997. Usual place of abode mean- 
 ing present residence, and not last place of abode. Earle v. 
 McVeigh, 91 U. S. 508, 23 L. ed. 400; Swift v. Meyers, 37 
 Fed. 42; Blythe v. Hinckley, supra. The method thus pro- 
 vided for the service of process must be followed in equity. 
 State statutes have no control. Kent v. Honsinger, supra; U. 
 S. Eev. Stat. sec. 914, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1537, has no appli- 
 cation to equity. O'Hara v. MacConnell, 93 TJ. S. 150, 23 L. 
 ed. 840. The service is governed by the judiciary acts and rule 
 13. Nickerson v. Warren City Tank & Boiler Co. 223 Fed. 
 843. 
 
 Service; Where Made. 
 
 The service must be made within the district, or it is void. 
 Except as before stated, when authorized to be issued beyond 
 the district in which the suit is brought, as in sees. 52, 54 and 
 55, new Judicial Code (Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 1034-1037), 
 appendix. See E'ickerson v. Warren City Tank & Boiler Co. 
 supra. See further to same effect. Waters v. Central Trust Co. 
 62 C. C. A. 45, 126 Fed. 471 ; Cely v. Griffin, 113 Fed. 981 ; 
 Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300, 9 L. ed. 1093. It may be 
 served on party while in transit through district (Jewett v. 
 Garrett, 47 Fed. 625; Holyoke & S. H. F. Ice Co. v. Amb- 
 den, 21 L.E.A. 319, 55 Fed. 593), when suit filed in plaintiff's 
 district as provided for in section 51, new Judicial Code; and 
 if not made personally must be left with an adult person who 
 is a member of the family, or jesiding with the family. Von 
 Roy V. Blackman and Phcenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Wulf, supra. 
 If a person declines to receive the paper from the officer, he 
 may deposit it in any convenient place in the presence of the 
 party, and the service will be good. And the service of process 
 may be made by the marshal after removal, or an expired term. 
 U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 790, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1314. 
 
 Under old equity rule 13 service on the husband and wife 
 was held good if only served on husband, but since the amended 
 rule of 1874 it must be served on both. O'Hara v. MacCon- 
 
FILING THE BILL AND SERVING PKOCESS. 317 
 
 nell, supra, but new equity rule 13 requires service on both 
 separately. 
 
 Service on Attoineij. 
 
 When the suit is auxiliary in its nature, as when brought 
 to sustain an action at law or in cases of cross bills, service on 
 attorneys who appeared for the parties in the action at law or 
 in the original bill has been held to be valid, or then in such 
 eases such substituted ser\dce is not allowed. Shainwald v. 
 Davids, 69 Fed. 702, 703; Cortes Co. v. Thaunhauser, 20 
 Blatchf. 59, 9 Fed. 227; Bowen v. Christian, 16 Fed. 729. 
 (See "Substituted Service.") So when suit is brought to ob- 
 tain a new trial at law. Milwaukee & M. E. Co. v. Milwaukee 
 & St. P. R. Co. (Milwaukee & M. E. Co. v. Soutter) 2 Wall. 
 633, 17 L. ed. 895; Oglesby v. Attrill, 14 Fed. 214. 
 
 Service on Agent. 
 
 Service on any agents or employees having charge or 6on- 
 trol of the inclosure of public lands of the United States will 
 be sufficient when injunctions are sued out by the United 
 States to restrain any violation of the laws of the United States 
 in occupying said lands. Chap. 2, sec. 24, f 21, ISTew Code 
 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 991 (21)), effective January 1st, 1912. 
 
 When a State requires a corporation to appoint an agent in 
 the State upon whom service can be made, the Federal courts 
 will apply the law to service when necessary. Nickerson v. 
 Warren City Tank & Boiler Co. 223 Fed. 844. 
 
 Service on Executor or Guardian. 
 
 Service on in official capacity is sufficient as personal serv- 
 ice. Cornell v. Green, 37 C. C. A. 85, 95 Fed. 334. 
 
 Service on a State. 
 
 When process issues against a State, the subpoena should be- 
 served on the executive and attorney general. Rule 5. Pro- 
 cess must be directed to the State. Florida v. Georgia, 11 
 
318 FILING THE BILL ^ND SEEVING PROCESS. 
 
 How. 293, 13 L. ed. 702; Ehode Island v. Massachusetts, 7 
 Pet. G51, 8 L. ed. 816; JSTew Jersey v. New York, 3 Pet. 461, 
 7 L. ed. 741, s. c. 5 Pet. 289, 8 L. ed'. 129. 
 
 Subpoena Cannot be Served When Defendant Privileged from 
 
 Service. 
 
 A defendant may be privileged from service, though within 
 the jurisdiction" of the court issuing the service; and in such 
 cases service, if made, can be quashed on motion. Matthews 
 V. Puffer, 20 Blatchf. 233, 10 Fed. 606. Thus, a party en- 
 ticed into the district for the purpose of serving him cannot be 
 legally served with process. Ee Johnson, 167 U. S. Iii6, 42 
 L. ed. 105, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 735; Steiger v. Bonn, 4 Ped. 
 17; Cavanagh v. ilanhattan Transit Co. 133 Fed. 818; Jewett 
 V. Garrett, 47 Fed. -fiSl; Fitzgerald & M. Constr. Co. v. Fitz- 
 gerald, 137 U. S. 105, 34 L. ed. 608, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 36. Or 
 when attending a judicial hearing as party or witness. Brooks 
 V. Farwell, 1 McCrary, 132, 2 McCrary, 220, 4 Fed. 166; 
 Kinne v. Lant, 68 Fed. 436; Kauffman v. Kennedy, 25 Fed. 
 785 ; Morrow v. Dudley, 144 Fed. 441 ; Bridges v. Sheldon, 18 
 Blatchf. 295, 7 Fed. 19; Jewett v. Garrett, supra; PlimptoB 
 V. Winslow, 20 Blatchf. 82, 9 Fed. 365 ; Atchison v. Morris, 
 11 Biss. 191, 11 Fed. 582; Hale v. Wharton, 73 Fed. 741; 
 but see Iron Dyke Copper Min. Co. v. Iron Dyke R. Co. 132 
 Fed. 208, for exception. The privilege is limited to a rea- 
 sonable time. Miner v. Markham, 28 Fed. 387. And it does 
 not apply to one voluntarily coming within the jurisdiction of 
 the court. Brush Creek Coal & Min. Co. v. Morgan-Gardner 
 Electric Co. 136 Fed. 505; Houston v. Filer & S. Co. 85 Fed. 
 758; Roschynialski v. Hale, 201 Fed. 1017,. and cases cited. 
 
 Service Before Return Day. 
 
 The writ is functus officio if not served before return day. 
 Edmonson v. Bloomshire, 7 Wall. 310, 19 L. ed. 93. If served 
 after return day, all proceedings - thereafter, in the absence of 
 appearance by defendant, are void. Equity rule 12; equity 
 rule 14. 
 
FILING THE BILL AND SERVING PEOCESS. 319 
 
 Effect of Valid Service. 
 
 The jurisdiction of the Federal courts attaches when service 
 is perfected, and not on filing bill. United States v. Miller, 
 164 Fed. 4M; United States v. American Lumber Co. 29 C. 
 C. A. 431, 56 U. S. App. 655, 85 Fed. 827; Owens v. Ohio C. 
 E. Co. 20 Fed. 10-12; Eodgers v. Pitt, 96 Fed. 668-673; 
 United States v. Eisenbeis, 50 C. C. A. 179, 112 Fed. 196; 
 Wheeler v. Walton & W. Co. 65 Fed. 722. And this applies 
 when the issue arises between courts of conc;irrent jurisdiction 
 as to which court first took jurisdiction. Ibid. ; and Pitt v. 
 Eodgers, 43 C. C. A. 600, 104 Fed. 389. (See "Conflict be- 
 tween State and Federal Courts.") 
 
 Return of Subpcena. 
 
 By equity rule 12 it is provided that the subpcena shall be 
 returnable to the clerk's ofiice twenty days from the issuing 
 thereof. 
 
 U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 660 provides that no process in any 
 circuit court shall abate or be rendered invalid by reason of 
 any act changing the time of holding the court, but the same 
 shall be deemed returnable to the term next after the return 
 day thereof. The return imist be made by the marshal or 
 deputy or by the court's appointee by affidavit (Hill v. Gordon, 
 45 Fed. 278; see United States v. Gayle, 45 Fed. 107) ; and it 
 must show that the subpoena has been served in pursuance of 
 the requirements of equity rule 13, as previously given. 
 
 When the service is not made by a delivery of a copy of 
 the subpoena to the person named, but by leaving a copy at the 
 dwelling house or usual place of abode of each defendant, with 
 some adult person who is a member or resident in the family, 
 the return must show that the provision of the statute was 
 exactly pursued. Von Eoy v. Blackman, 3 Woods, 98, Fed. 
 Cas. No. 16,997. Thus, a return stating that a copy was de- 
 livered to an adult who was a resident of the place of abode 
 was held insufficient. Blythe v. Hinckley, 84 Fed. 228 ; Harris 
 V. Hardeman, 14 How. 334, 14 L. ed. 444; United States v. 
 American Bell Teleph. Co. 29 Fed. 32. Service may be made 
 at door outside of dwelling, not necessarily "in the dwelling." 
 
320 FILING THE BILL AND SEICVING PEOCESS. 
 
 Phcenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Wulf, 9 Biss. 285, 1 Fed. 175; 
 Earle v. McVeigh, 91 U. S. 510, 23 L. ed. 401. 
 
 Defective spelling of a name in a return will not vitiate it, 
 if it be idem sonans; but "Jacob Craig" and "Jacob Crag" 
 would not be idem sonans. MeClaskey v. Barr, 45 "Fed. 151. 
 
 When service on executor, the service reciting served on 
 
 A. B. as executor would be good individually, but not as execu- 
 tor. See Cornell v. Green, 37 C. C. A. 85, 95 Fed. 334. 
 
 A return by special deputy, not in name of the marshal, is 
 only an irregularity. Hill v. Gordon, 45 Fed. 276. 
 
 The return of an officer touching any fact about which he 
 was bound to make return is conclusive on the parties to the 
 suit and their privies (Von Roy v. Blackman, supra), on col-' 
 lateral attack. United States v. Gayle, supra ; see King v. 
 Davis, 137 Fed. 217; Cohen v. Portland Lodge, jSTo. 142, 
 
 B. P. O. E. 140 Fed. 775 ; Frank Parmelee Co. v. Jlltna L. 
 Ins. Co. 92 C. C. A. 403, 166 Fed. 743 ; New River Mineral 
 Co. V. Roanoke Coal & Coke Co. 49 C. C. A. 78, 110 Fed. 
 343. It is not conclusive as between strangers to the litigation. 
 Rig-ncy v. Delraw, 100 Fed. 213. 
 
 Motion to Quash. 
 
 If defect is apparent, it should be met by motion to quash; 
 if not apparent, the issue should be made by motion. See U. S. 
 Rev. Stat. sec. 954, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1591, providing for 
 procedure in cases of defect of form in the summons or writ. 
 Robinson v. ISTational Stock-yard Co. 20 Blatchf. 513, 12 Fed. 
 361; Scott V. Stockholders Oil Co. 122 Fed. 835; United 
 States V. American Bell Teleph. Co. 29 Fed. 17 ; Matthews v. 
 Puffer, 20 Blatchf. 233, 10 Fed. 606 ; Wall v. Chesapeake & 
 O. R. Co. 37 C. C. A. 129, 95 Fed. 398. However, the 
 motion to quash being the much more expeditious way of 
 settling the sufficiency of the services, the better method is to 
 move to quash, setting up the facts that render the service 
 bad, and supporting them by affidavits. Benton v. Mcintosh, 
 96 Fed. 132 ; American Cereal Co. v. Eli Pettijohn Cereal Co. 
 70 Fed. 276 ; Wall v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. supra ; Higham 
 V. Iowa State Travelers' Asso. 183 Fed. 847. See chap. 55, p. 
 331. 
 
 Extrinsic evidence to impeach return of marshal good on its 
 
FILHiTG THE BILL AND SERVING PEOCESS. 321 
 
 face will not be received where State law forbids it. Trimble v. 
 Erie Electric Motor Co. 89 Fed. 51. All presumptions are 
 in favor of the officer's return. New River Mineral Co. v. 
 Roanoke Coal & Coke Co. 49 C. C. A. 78, 110 Fed. 344. And 
 when attacked because not served in time, if the fac6 of return 
 shows it was served in time, it makes a prima facie case. Ibid. 
 If motion overruled, you cannot set up facts in answer. Foye 
 V. Guardian Printing & Pub. Co. 109 Fed. 368. 
 
 Amendment of Process, 
 
 You may amend the writ of summons if it varies from the 
 complaint, TJ. S. Rev. Stat. sees. 911, 948, 954, Comp. Stat. 
 1913, sees. 1534, 1580, 1591, new rule 19; King v. Davis, 137 
 Fed. 209; Dwight v. Merritt, 18 Blatchf. 305, 4 Fed. 616; 
 Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Wulf, 9 Biss. 285, 1 Fed. 775 ; J^^'or- 
 ton V. Dover, 14 Fed. 106 ; Chamberlain v. Bittersohn, 48 Fed. 
 40-42; Semmes v. United States, 91 U. S. 21, 23 L. ed. 193; 
 Gilbert v. South Carolina Interstate & W. I. Exposition Co. 113 
 Fed. 524; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. James, 1 C. C. A. 53, 4 
 U. S. App. 19, 48 Fed. 150. As, when the writ is return- 
 able on the wrong day. JSTorton v. Dover, 14 Fed. 107. Or you 
 may amend the return of service, and that power is freely exer- 
 cised in the interest of justice, — especially when the amendment 
 will not affect the rights of third parties. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. 
 Co. V. Wulf, 9 Biss. 285, 1 Fed. 775, U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 954, 
 Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1591, held to apply to equity procedure. 
 See Mckerson v. Warren City Tank & Boiler Co. 223 Fed. 
 843; Dancel v. United States Shoe Machinery Co. 120 Fed. 
 839. You cannot, however, in case of removal from a State to 
 a Federal court, amend the summons after removal. Hawkins 
 V. Peirce, 79 Fed. 452 ; Tallman v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. 45 
 Fed. 156, 
 
 When Not Allowed to Amend. 
 
 ■ -King v. Davis, 137 Fed. 209 ; Dwight v. Merritt, 18 Blatchf. 
 305, 4 Fed. 614; Frank v. Union Cent. L. Ins. Co. 130 Fed. 
 225; Brown v. Pond, 5 Fed. 34; United States v. Rose, 14 
 Fed. 681 ; Hawkins v. Peirce, 79 Fed. 452. 
 
 S. Eq.~21. 
 
CHAPTEE LIV. 
 
 SERVICE OF PEOCESS ON CORPOKATIONS. 
 
 We have seen a State may impose any condition on a for- 
 eign corporation as precedent to doing business -within her 
 limits, provided the conditions are not repugnant to the Fed- 
 eral Consti tuition and laws, or principles of natural justice. 
 Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 42, 44 L. ed. 663, 
 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 518; Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Perkins, 125 
 Fed. 502. The State may therefore stipulate the manner and 
 mode of service, and the person on vsrhom, in the event of suit, 
 service of the process can be made; and doing business in the 
 state is considered an assent to the methods established. Ex 
 parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369, 24 L. ed. 853 ; Tex. Rev. 
 Stat. 1223 ; Westinghouse Electric Mfg. Co. v. Troell, 30 Tex. 
 Civ. App. 200, 70 S. W. 324; Van Dresser v. Oregon R & 
 ISTav. Co. 48 Fed. 205. 
 
 While service from a Federal court in equity is not con- 
 trolled by State statutes, yet where there is no provision on 
 the particular case indicated by Federal law, the requirements 
 of the State statutes will be followed if deemed reasonable. 
 Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 603, 43 
 L. ed. 569, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 308 ; Board of Trade v. Hammond 
 Elevator Co. 198 U. S. 424-434, 49 L. ed. 1111-1116, 25 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 740; Shepard v. Adams, 168 U. S. 618, 42 
 L. ed. 602, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 214; Mutual Reserve Fund Life 
 Asso. V. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147, 47 L. ed. 987, 23 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 707 ; Toledo Computing Scale Co. v. Computing Scale 
 Co. 74 C. C. A. 89, 142 Fed. 922 ; Youmans v. Minnesota 
 Title Ins. & T. Co. 67 Fed. 284 ; Mexican C. E. Co. v. Pink- 
 ney, 149 U. S. 195, 37 L. ed. 700, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 859 ; Mc- 
 Cord Lumber Co. v. Doyle, 38 C. C. A. 34, 97 Fed. 22; Dinzy 
 V. Illinois C. E. Co. 61 Fed. 53 ; St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 
 359, 27 L. ed. 226, 1 Sup. Ct. Eep. 354. But this rule must 
 
 322 
 
SEKVICE OF PROCESS ON OOEPOEATIONS. 323 
 
 be considered in connection with the limitation of the Federal 
 law as to place of snit. See chap. 18. Weller ¥. Pennsylvania 
 R. Co. 113 Fed. 502; Southern P. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. 
 S. 202, 36 L. ed. 943, 13 Snp. Ct. Pep. 44; Re Keasby, 160 
 U. S. 228, 40 L. ed. 404, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273 ; Barrow S. S. 
 Co. V. Kane, 170 U. S. Ill, 42 L. ed. 968, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 526. It may be stated as a rule that Federal courts in deter- 
 mining the sufficiency of service follow the laws of the state. 
 Ibid. ; Amy v. Watertown, 130 U. S. 301, 32 L. ed. 946, 9 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 530 ; Toledo Computing Scale Co. v. Computing Scale 
 Co. 74 C. C. A. 89, 142 Fed. 919-922 ; Denver & R. G.^R. Co. 
 V. Roller, 49 L.R.A. 77, 41 C. C. A. 22, 100 Fed. 738 ; Illinois 
 Steel Co. V. San Antonio & G. S. R. Co. 67 Fed. 501 ; Gale 
 V. Southern Bldg. & L. Asso. 117 Fed. 734, 735 ; Van Dresser 
 V. Oregon R. & ISTav. Co. 48 Fed. 202; Ex parte Schollen- 
 berger, 96 U. S. 369, 24 L. ed. 853 ; New England Mut. L. 
 Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, 111 U. S. 146, 28 L. ed. 381, 4 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 364; Mooney v. Buford & G. Mfg. Co. 18 C. C. A. 
 421, 34 U. S. App. 581, 72 Fed. 40; Collier v. Mutual Re- 
 serve Fund Life Asso. 119 Fed. 619 ; Devere v. Delaware, L. 
 & W. R. Co. 60 Fed. 886; Revans v. Southern Missouri & 
 A. R. Co. 114 Fed. 982; Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. 
 Daughtry, 138 U. S. 305, 306, 34 L. ed. 065, 966, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 306. They are particularly exacting with reference to 
 corporations. Amy v. Watertown, 130 U. S. 316, 317, 32 
 L. ed. 951, 952, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 530; Lemon v. Imperial Win- 
 dow Glass Co. 199 Fed. 928. 
 
 The State of Texas provides the following laws controlling 
 service on corporations : 
 
 Batts's Rev. Stat. 1220, provides that in suits against a 
 county the process shall be served on the county judge of such 
 county. Brown v. Wheelock, 75 Tex. 385, 12 S. W. Ill, 841 ; 
 Knox County v. Harsham, 133 U. S. 152, 33 L. ed. 586, 10 
 Sup. Ct. Rep, 267. 
 
 Batts's Rev. Stat. 1221, provides that in suits against an 
 incorporated town, city, or village, the process may be served 
 on the mayor, clerk, secretary, or treasurer. Houston v. Emery, 
 76 Tex. 282, 13 S. W. 264; Amy v. Watertown, 130 U. S. 
 301, 32 L. ed. 946, 9 Sup. Ct Rep. 530 ; Stabler v. Alexandria, 
 42 Fed. 490. 
 
324 SEEVICE OF PEOCESS ON COEPOEATIONS. 
 
 Batts's Eev. Stiat. 1222, provides that in stiits against any 
 incorporated company or joint stock associations the citation 
 may be served on the president, secretary, or treasurer of such 
 company or association in the county in which suit is brought, 
 or by leaving a copy of the same at the principal office of the 
 company during office hours; and in suits against receivers of 
 railroad companies service may be had on the general division 
 superintendent or receiver, or upon any agent of the receiver 
 who resides in the county in which suit is brought. This act 
 was amended in. 1905, sec. 2 of said act providing for service 
 on foreign corporations by permitting service on train con- 
 ductors and ticket agents of railroads or agents authorized to 
 contract for transportation. 
 
 Batts's Rev. Stat. 1223, provides that in suits against any 
 foreign corporation, private or public, or any joint stock asso- 
 ciation or company, citation or other process may be served on 
 the president, vice president, secretary, treasurer or general 
 manager, or upon any local agent of any such corporation within 
 the State. There have also been special provisions made for 
 service of process in suits against life and health insurance 
 companies. Werner Stave Co. v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App.) 120 
 S. W. 247 ; Cameron v. W. M. Jones & B. Mach. Works, 41 
 Tex. Civ. App. 4, 90 S. W. 1129-1134; Frick Co. v. Wright, 
 23 Tex. Civ. App. 340, 55 S. W. 608 ; Societe Fonceire v. Mil- 
 liken, 135 U. S. 304, 34 L. ed. 208, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 823; 
 Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 79 Tex. 633, 15 S. W. 
 478 ; Bay City Iron Works v. Reeves & Co. 43 Tex. Civ. App. 
 254, 95 S. W. 739. The citation must be directed to the com- 
 pany. Texas & M. R. Co. v. Wright (Tex. Civ. App.) 29 S. 
 W. 1134; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Rawlins, 80 Tex. 580, 16 
 S. W. 430; Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Seeligson, 59 Tex. 4. And 
 the service must be within the State. Louisville & 'N. R. Co. 
 v. Emerson, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 281, 94 S. W. 1105. 
 
 Batts's Rev. Stat. art. 3070, act 1885, provides that suits 
 may be instituied and prosecuted against life and health insur- 
 ance companies in any county where the loss occurred or where 
 the policy holder instituting the suit resides, and process may 
 be served on any person in this State holding a power of attor- 
 ney from such company, and if no such person, then affidavit of 
 the fact may be filed and process served by publication. 
 
SEEVIOE OF PEOOESS ON COEPOEATIONS. 325 
 
 Batts's Eev. Stat. art. 30G4, act 1874, required life and healtli 
 insurance companies to file with the commissioner of insurance 
 under their corporate seals, powers of attorney for all of their 
 ag'ents, officers, and representatives in the State, authorizing 
 them to accept service of any civil process in behalf of such 
 company, and such service was to be held and taken as valid 
 and all claims of error by reason of such service was waived. 
 
 Batts's Eev. Stat. art. 3090, act 1889, provides that life or 
 casualty insurance companies or associations, organized under 
 any of the laws of the United States outside of Texas, shall 
 appoint the commissioner of insurance to be its true and law- 
 ful attorney, upon whom all lawful process in action or proceed- 
 ing ag'ainst it may be seiwed .... 
 
 I have thus grouped the Texas statutes providing for service 
 on corporations, foreign or domestic, and the construction there- 
 of, to be used as a standard of comparison with other States. 
 
 It was said above that Federal courts follow these laws in 
 determining upon whom service is to be made, but this reserva- 
 tion must be added, that the party named by the State law must 
 so far represent the company that he may be properly held an 
 agent to receive such process in behalf of the corporation; on 
 the theory that the relation of the person served to the company 
 must be such as would secure knowledge of the process by the 
 company. Denver & E. G. E. Co. v. Eoller, 49 L.E.A. 77, 
 41 C. C. A. 22, 100 Fed. 741 ; Frawley v. Pennsylvania Cas- 
 ualty Co. 124 Fed. 259; Strain v. Chicago Portrait Co. 126 
 Fed. 832 ; Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 
 602, 603, 43 L. ed. 569, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 308 ; Mexican C. E. 
 Co. V. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 195, 37 L. ed. 700, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 859 ; Bay City Iron Works v. Eeeves & Co. 43 Tex. Civ. App. 
 254, 95 S. W. 739 ; Toledo Computing Scale Co. v. Computing 
 Scale Co. 74 C. C. A. 89, 142 Fed. 919 ; Hagstoz v. Mutual 
 L. Ins. Co. 179 Fed. 570; Higham v. Iowa State Travelers' 
 Asso. 183 Fed. 847; Simon v. Southern E. Co. 115 C. C. A. 
 58, 195 Fed. 56 ; Chin v. Foster-Milburn Co. 195 Fed. 158 ; 
 Wylie Pennanent Camping Co. v. Lynch, 115 0. C. A. 288, 
 195 Fed. 386 ; Premo Specialty Mfg. Co. v. Jersey-Creme Co. 
 43 L.E.A.(]S\S.) 1015, 118 C. 0. A. 458, 200 Fed. 352. 
 
 The term "any agent," used in State laws, may not always 
 be followed. Thus a mere employee in the office of a local 
 
326 SERVICE OE PROCESS OK OOEPOEATIONS. 
 
 ag-ent would not be sufficient, not holding any of the designated 
 offices in the company. Fearing v. Glenn, 19 C. C. A. 388, 38 
 U. S. App. 424, 73 Eed. 116 ; Western Cottage Piano & Organ 
 Co. V. Anderson, 97 Tex. 432, 79 S. W. 516. So, service on a 
 passenger agent whose duty was only to solicit passage (Max- 
 well V. Atchison, T. & S. F. E. Co. 34 Fed. 286; William 
 Grace Co. v. Henry Martin Brick Co. 98 C. C. A. 167, 174 Fed. 
 131 ; Weller v. Pennsylvania E. Co. 113 Fed. 506 ; Green v. 
 Chicago, B. & Q. E. Co. 205 U. S. 530, 51 L. ed. 916, 27 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 595 ; William Grace Co. v. Henry Martin Brick Mach. 
 Mfg. Co. 98 C. C. A. 167, 174 Fed. 132 ; W. K. Fairbank & 
 Co. V. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. E. Co. 4 C. C. A. 403, 9 U. S. 
 App. 212, 54 Fed. 421), or to solicit business, without power 
 to make contracts (Wall v. Chesapeake & 0. E. Co. 37 C. C. A. 
 129, 95 Fed. 398), would not bind the corporation; but service 
 on an agent of a foreign railroaid company, who solicits busi- 
 ness, both freight and passenger, the foreign corporation leasing 
 lines of railway in the State, and the agent being the gen- 
 eral manager in the State, was held good. ISTorton v. Atchison, 
 T. & S. F. E. Co. 61 Fed. 618; Christie v. Davis Coal & Coke 
 Co. 92 Fed. 4. 
 
 So service on a station agent, if permitted by statute,- is suf- 
 ficient to bring a foreign corporation into court. Dinzy v. 
 niinois C. E. Co. 61 Fed. 49. 
 
 Service on a ticket agent at union depot office was held good. 
 Union P. E. Co. v. Novak, 9 C. C. A. 629, 15 U. S. App. 
 400, 61 Fed. 573. But if service is required by law to be made 
 on the "regular" ticket agent, it must be so made. Tallman 
 V. Baltimore & 0. E. Co. 45 Fed. 166. Service on an officer 
 temporarily in the State was held not good. Wilkins v. Queen 
 City Sav. Bank & T. Co. 154 Fed. 173 ; Goldey v. Morning 
 jSTews, 156 U. S. 518, 39 L. ed. 517, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 559. 
 ISTor service on a traveling salesman. McCall Co. v. Deuchler, 
 98 C. C. A. 169, 174 Fed. 133. 'See Michigan Aluminum Co. 
 V. Aluminum Casting Co. 190 Fed. 880. 
 
 As to effect of service on a joint agent of corporations, see 
 Mexican C. E. Co. v. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 202, 37 L. ed. 702, 
 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 859; William Grace Co. v. Henry Martin 
 Brick Mach. Mfg. Co. 98 C. C. A. 167, 174 Fed. 132. 
 
 As to service on a general agent, see Ee Hohorst, 150 U. S. 
 
SEEVIGE OF PROCESS ON COEPOEATIONS, 327 
 
 663, 3Y L. ed. 1215, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221 ; Christie v. Davis 
 Coal & Coke Co. 92 Fed. 4; Block v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. 
 Co. 21 Fed. 531; Denver & E. G. R. Co. v. Roller, 49 L.R.A. 
 77, 41 C. C. A. 22, 100 Fed. 738; Gottschalk Co. v. Distilling 
 & Cattle Feeding Co. 50 Fed. 681; Henrietta Min. & ^[ill. Co. 
 V. Johnson, 173 U. S. 221, 43 L. ed. 675, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 402. Or on a managing agent, see United States v. American 
 Bell Teleph. Co. 20 Fed. 18. A "managing agent" is defined 
 in Atlas Glass Co. v. Ball Bros. Glass Mfg. Co. 87 Fed. 418; 
 St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 357, 27 L. ed. 225, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 354; Houston v. Filver & S. Co. 85 Fed. 757; Denver & R. 
 G. R. Co. V. Roller, supra ; Union Associated Press Co. v. 
 Times-Star Co. 84 Fed. 419 ; Michigan Aluminum Co. v. Alum- 
 inum Casting Co. 190 Fed. 880; Swarts v. Christie Grain & 
 Stock Co. 166 Fed. 339. 
 
 If the State statute provides that it may be sen'ed on certain 
 persons, if the officers are not found in the county, then the 
 return must shovy in the Federal court that the officers could 
 not be found in the district, if served upon persons named in 
 the statute. Miller v. JSTorfolk & W. R. Co. 41 Fed. 431 ; Amy 
 V. Watertown, 130 U. S. 316, 317, 32 L. ed. 951, 952, 9 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 530; Collins v. American Spirit iifg. Co. 96 Fed. 
 133; Tallman v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. 45 Fed. 156. 
 
 Doing Business. 
 
 "We have thus seen who may be served to bring a foreign or 
 domestic corporation into a Federal court ; but there is another 
 consideration, in case of foreign corporations, to which your 
 attention must be caylled, before service on the parties named 
 can bind the foreign corporation, so as to bring it wdthin the 
 jurisdiction of a Federal court in a State other than the State 
 of its incorporation. 
 
 The general rule is that legal service of process issuing from 
 the Federal courts can only be had on a foreign corporation in 
 the State of its incorporation, when it is doing hm^iness in the 
 State where sued and in the Federal district of which plaintiff 
 is a resident citizen, and this must be shown somewhere in the 
 record. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350, 27 L. ed. 222, 1 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 354; Jackson v. Delaware River Amusement Co. 131 
 
328 SEETIOE OF PK0CEI3S ON COEPOEATIONS. 
 
 Fed. 134 ; Swann v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. 100 Fed. 
 922; Earle v. Chesapeake & 0. E. Co. 127 Fed. 237; Tiemey 
 V. Helvetia Swiss F. Ins. Co. 163 Fed. 83 ; Westinghouse Mach. 
 Co. V. Press Pub. Co. 110 Fed. 254; Conley.v. Mathieson 
 Alkali Works, 110 Fed. 730 ; Eldred v. American Palace Car 
 Co. 45 C. C. A. 1, 105 Fed. 455 ; Goldey v. Morning iXews, 
 supra; Central Grain & Stock Exchange v. Board of Trade, 
 60 C. C. A. 299, 125 Fed. 463, 464; Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. 
 Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 603, 43 L. ed. 569, 19 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 308 ; Buffalo Glass Co. v. Manufacturers' Glass Co. 
 142 Fed. 273 ; Cody Motors Co. v. Warren Motor Car Co. 196 
 Fed. 254 ; L. G. McKnight & Son Co. v. Cramer Furniture Co. 
 110 C. C. A. 612, 189 Fed. 48. 
 
 And the business must warrant the inference that the corpo- 
 ration is there present through its agent. Green v. Chicago, B. 
 & Q. B. Co. supra; Norton v. W. H. Thomas & Sons Co. — 
 Tex. Civ. App. — , 93 S. W. 711. That is, plaintiff may only 
 sue a foreign corporation in his own residence district, if it is 
 doing business there, and only on those conditions can valid 
 service be made on the persons named to bind the corporation. 
 Ibid. 
 
 I have already discussed what is meant by the words "doing 
 business," to which reference is made, and a foreign corporation 
 to obtain valid service upon it must (chap. 19) — 
 
 First. Be doing business in the State and district where 
 sued; Central Grain & Stock Exchange v. Board of Trade, 60 
 C. C. A. 299, 125 Fed. 464, which is a question of general, 
 not local law. Frawley v. Pennsylvania Casualty Co. 124 Fed. 
 259; West v. Cincinnati, IST. O. & T. P. R. Co. 170 Fed. 349; 
 Wange v. Public Service E. Co. 159 Fed. 190; Michigan Alum- 
 inum Foundry Co. v. Aluminum Castings Co. 190 Fed. 879. 
 
 Second. It must be the State and district where the plain- 
 tiff resides. Ibid. 
 
 Third. The service must be on some agent or officer repre- 
 senting it there. 
 
 Fourth. Must be local law making it amenable to suit there 
 as a precedent to doing business. Mecke v. Valley Town Min- 
 eral Co. 89 Fed. 114 ; United States v. American Bell Teleph. 
 Co. 21 Fed. 17. 
 
 So, when business ceases, the right to serve ceases. De- 
 
SEEVIOE OF PROCESS ON COUPOEATIONS. 329 
 
 Castro V. Compagnie Frangaise du Telegraphe, 76 Fed. 426 ; 
 Friedman v. Empire L. Ins. Co. 101 Fed. 535; Forrest v. 
 Pittsbiirgh Bridge Co. 53 C. C. A. 577, 116 Fed. 357. 
 
 So, when a license is revoked, the right to service ceases. 
 Swann v. Mutual Eeserve Fund Life Asso. supra. 
 
 However, a withdrawal from the State would not have that 
 effect as long as outstanding business remains upon which 
 money is collected or paid. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. 
 Spratley, 172 U. S. 610, 43 L. ed. 571, 19 Sup. Ct. Kep. 308. 
 If not doing business, the officers temporarily or casually in a 
 State cannot be served. Buffalo Sandstone Brick Co. v. Ameri- 
 can Sandstone Brick Machinery Co. 141 Fed. 211 ; Honeyman 
 V. Colorado Fuel & I. Co. 133 Fed. 96 ; Johnson v. Computing 
 Scale Co. 139 Fed. 339; Eirich v. Donnelly Contracting Co. 
 104 Fed. 1; Mecke v. Valleytown Mineral Co. 35 C. C. A. 
 151, 93 Fed. 697; United States Graphite Co. v. Pacific 
 Graphite Co. 68 Fed. 442 ; Bust v. United Waterworks Co. 17 
 C. C. A. 16, 36 U. S. App. 167, 70 Fed. 137; Goldey v. Morn- 
 ing ISTews, 156 U. S. 522, 39 L. ed. 518, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 559; Barrow S. S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. Ill, 42 L. ed. 968, 
 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526 ; Fitzgerald & M. Constr. Co. v. Fitzger- 
 ald, 137 U. S. 99, 34 L. ed. 608, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 36. But 
 when doing business, then service on a resident director of a 
 foreign corporation is good (Meyer v. Pennsylvania Lumber- 
 men's Mut. F. Ins. Co. 108 Fed. 170) ; or service on the 
 head of a firm, agent of a foreign corporation, is good (Re 
 Hohorst, 150 U. S. 663, 37 L. ed. 1215, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221) ; 
 or service on persons named by State statutes: but either the 
 return or the record must show that at the time of service the 
 corporation was doing business in the State and district where 
 served. Central Grain & Stock Exchange v. Board of Trade, 
 60 C. C. A. 299, 125 Fed. 463, 464, and authorities cited. 
 
CHAPTER LV. 
 
 APPEAEANCE. 
 
 By new rule ISTo. 16, after service has been made and the writ 
 returned, it shall be the duty of the defendant, unless the time 
 shall be otherwise enlarged for cause shown, to file his answer 
 or other defense to the bill within twenty days from the time 
 of issuing thereof, as provided by rule No. 12 ; in default 
 thereof, pro confesso may be taken and entered. Entering an 
 appearance otherwise than by answer or other defense to the 
 bill is now abolished, old rule Wo. 17 being abrogated. So any 
 character of defense to the bill in point of law, whether it be 
 misjoinder, or nonjoinder, or insufficiency of fact arising on 
 the face of the bill, or any other defense that may have been 
 made by plea or demurrer, is an appearance in the cause. The 
 distinction between general and special appearances no longer 
 obtains, and the technical rules of waiver, except as will be 
 hereinafter stated, arising from the character of the appear- 
 ance, are now submerged in the effort to expedite the cause. If 
 you wish to object to some defect in the subpcena when tested 
 by the statute; or some irregularity of service, or to deny any 
 service; or some irregularity or insufiiciency in the return of 
 the subpcena; or that you were not amenable to service; or if 
 you desire to claim the privilege of being sued in your own 
 district, you must do so within the time required by rule ISTo. 12, 
 and by motion raising the objection. These are privileges, how- 
 ever, which may be waived by filing a defense to the bill, as a 
 defense to its suSiciency or merit would be equivalent to such 
 an appearance as would waive these irregularities and privileges, 
 which must be specially claimed in limine. Barnes v. Western 
 U. Teleg. Co. 120 Eed. 550 ; Southern P. Co. v. Denton, 146 
 U. S. 206, 36 L. ed. 945, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 44; Harkness v. 
 Hyde, 98 U. S. 476, 25 L. ed. 237; Ellsworth Trust Co. v. 
 Parramore, 48 C. C. A. 132, 108 Eed. 906. See also Creighton 
 
 330 
 
APPEAEAJN'CE. 331 
 
 V. Kerr, 20 Wall. 12, 22 L. ed. 310; Whitconib v. Hooper, 27 
 C. C. A. 19, 53 U. S. App. 410, 81 Fed. 946; St. Louis & S. 
 F. E. Co. V. McBride, 141 U. S. 127, 35 L. ed. 659, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 Kep. 9S2 ; Crawford v. Foster, 28 C. C. A. 576, 56 U. S. Aj)p. 
 ■231, Si Fed. 939; Edgell v. Felder, 28 C. C. A. 382, 52 U."S. 
 App. 417, 84 Fed. 69. 
 
 Of course if objection has been made by "motion to quash" 
 because of the irregularities of process, or to the district of suit, 
 and overruled before filing some character of defense to the 
 bill, and exception to the ruling taken, then the filing of the 
 defense does not waive so as to prevent a review of the ruling. 
 Donahue v. Calumet Fire Clay Co. 94 Fed. 27 and cases cited. 
 Baumgardner v. Bono Fertilizer Co. 58 Fed. 4; Standley v. 
 Eoberts, 8 C. C. A. 305, 19 U. S. App. 407, 59 Fed. 844. So 
 a removal of the cause from a State to a Federal court, after a 
 motion to quash as above stated has been filed, would not waive 
 action of the Federal court on the motion. See Morris v. 
 Graham, 51 Fed. 53; Southern P. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 
 206, 36 L. ed. 945, 13 Sup. Ct. Kep. 44. 
 
 Proper Practice in Siu;h Cases. 
 
 A motion to quash, supported by affidavit if the objection is 
 not apparent, is the proper practice. Romaine v. Union Ins. 
 Co. 28 Fed. 627; Robinson v. National Stock- Yard Co. 20 
 Blatchf. 513, 12 Fed. 361 ; Bostwiek v. American Finance Co. 
 43 Fed. 897 ; Benton v. Mcintosh, 96 Fed. 132 ; Wall v. Chesa- 
 peake & O. E,. Co. 37 C. C. A. 129, 95 Fed. 398; Forrest v. 
 Pittsburgh Bridge Co. 53 C. C. A. 577, 116 Fed. 358 ; Ameri- 
 can Cereal Co. v. Eli Pettijohn Cereal Co. 70 Fed. 276. (S.e 
 "motion to quash," chap. 53, p. 320. 
 
 The motion to quash the writ or service may be as follows: 
 
 Title as in bill. 
 
 And now comes the defendant A. B. by his solicitor (or by himself) and 
 moves the court to quash the writ of aubpcena (or service or whatever the 
 cause) issued herein, so far as the same relates to the defendant (naming 
 him or myself) because said subpoena is invalid (or service defective, or 
 return untrue, or served out of his district, but whatever the ground state 
 specifically and then proceed ) , and for the reasons set forth above to vacate 
 and hold the same for naught; and defendant prays the judgment of this 
 court whether he shall be compelled to appear herein or answer thereto 
 
332 APPEA.EANOE. 
 
 because of the many defects in the process and return as above set forth by 
 reason of which no legal service has been had, nor Jias defendant accepted 
 service herein, nor has he (or they) voluntarily appeared, nor has he (or 
 they) waived due service of process upon him (or them). 
 
 United States v. American Bell Teleph. Co. 29 Fed. 17-28. 
 
 The motion to quash the writ or service, whatever the cause, 
 should go no further than raising the special objection to the 
 form of the writ, or the irregularity of the service, for any af- 
 firmative matter raising an issue on the merits would waive 
 the irregTilarity of service. Bankers' Surety Co. v. Holly, 134 
 C. C. A. 536, 219 Fed. 101, and cases cited; St. Louis & S. F. 
 E. Co. V. McBride, 141 U. S. 127, 35 L. ed. 659, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 982; Crawford v. Foster, 28 C. C. A. 576, 56 U. S. App. 
 231, 84 Fed. 939; Jones v. Andrews, 10 Wall. 332, 333, 19 L, 
 ed. 936 ; Edgell v. Felder, 28 C. C. A. 382, 52 U. S. App. 417, 
 84 Fed. 69. You will iind that the Federal courts have been 
 liberal in permitting the defendant to attack irregularities of 
 service, or want of jurisdiction (Romaine v. Union Ins. Co. 28 
 Fed. 626-636; Harlmess v. Hyde, 98 U. S. 479, 25 L. ed. 238; 
 Lung Chung v. Northern P. E. Co. 19 Fed. 256; Forrest v. 
 Union P. R. Co. 47 Fed. 2) ; and it seems that the fact the 
 defendant accepted service outside of his district would not pre- 
 vent him from appearing and moving to dismiss, because not 
 brought in his district (Butterworth v. Hill, 114 U. S. 133, 29 
 L. ed. 120, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 796; United States v. Loughrey, 43 
 Fed. 449; Graham v. Spencer, 14 Fed. 605, 606). 
 
 If the invalidity, irregularity, or defects claimed in the mo- 
 tion are apparent, the court will act at once, but if issues of 
 fact are involved in the motion, and not admitted, then the 
 motion should be supported by affidavits to which plaintiff 
 may reply, which issue the court can set for hearing and hear 
 in such manner as he may deem proper to expedite the cause, 
 under rules 1 and 6. Where the objection to the service was 
 that the party seiwed was not the agent, or the party as alleged 
 in the return, see Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Goodrich, 129 
 C. C. A. 599, 213 Fed. 339; American Cereal Co. v. EH 
 Pettijohn Cereal Co. 70 Fed. 276 ; United States v. American 
 Bell Teleph. Co. 29 Fed. 18 ; Wall v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. 
 37 C. C. A. 129, 95 Fed. 398 ; N. K. Fairbank & Co. v. Cincin- 
 nati, K 0. & T. P. R. Co. 4 C. C. A. 403, 9 U. S. App. 213, 
 
APPEA.EANCE. 333 
 
 54 Fed. 421 ; Jackson v. Delaware River Amusement Co. 131 
 Fed. 134; Collins v. American Spirit Mfg. Co. 96 Fed. 133. 
 A petition to remove does not vs^aive objections to the service. 
 Clews V. Woodstock Ins. Co. 44 Fed. 31 ; Morris v. Graham, 51 
 Fed. 53 ; Southern P. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 206, 36 L. ed. 
 942, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 44; Goldey v. Morning Xews, 156 U. S. 
 522, 523, 39 L. ed. 518, 519, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 559 ; Reifsnider 
 V. American Imp. Pub. Co. 45 Fed. 433 ; Wabash Western R. 
 Co. V. Brow, 164 U. S. 276, 41 L. ed. 433, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 126 ; Kinne v. Laht, 68 Fed. 436 ; Donahue v. Calumet Fire 
 Clay Co. 94 Fed. 26; Collins v. American Spirit Mfg. Co. 96 
 Fed. 133; Mecke v. Valley Town Mineral Co. 89 Fed. 114; 
 Sharkey v. Indiana D. & W. R. Co. 186 U. S. 479, 46 L. ed. 
 1266, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 941. 
 
 When Defendant Not Sued in His District. 
 
 When the subpcena and service are regiilar, but the defendant 
 is sued out of his residence district, and he wishes to claim 
 his privilege to be sued in his own district (new judicial Code, 
 sec. 51, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1033), or the division of the 
 district in which he resides (new judicial Code, sec. 53), you 
 may use the following form of motion : 
 
 Title as in bill; commencement as" above, and proceed: 
 
 Says he is not a citizen or inhabitant of, nor does he reside in, the 
 
 district of , but that he is an inhabitant of and resides in the county 
 
 of , which is in the district of , which said dis- 
 trict has jurisdiction of this defendant and not the district in 
 
 which this suit is brought (deny acceptance of service, or waiver of it, or 
 voluntary appearance as in above form). Wherefore defendant C. D. 
 pleads his exemption to be used in this Federal district and says he is 
 only subject to the jurisdiction of tlie Circuit Court of the United States 
 
 for the District of , and prays to be dismissed hence 
 
 with his reasonable costs in this behalf incurred. 
 
 E. F., 
 Solicitor, etc. 
 
 See Romalne v. Union Ins. Co. 28 Fed. 626 ; Ellsworth Trust 
 Co. V. Parramore, 48 C. C. A. 132, 108 Fed. 906 ; Butterworth 
 V. Hill, 114 IT. S. 133, 29 L. ed. 120, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 796 ; 
 United States v. Loiighrey, 43 Fed. 449 ; Graham v. Spencer, 
 14 Fed. 605-606. 
 
o'o-i APPEAEANCE. 
 
 ^Vliile we have seen that an answer, or other defense filed 
 under rules 12 and 16, which raises either a point of law or 
 question of fact going to the merits of the case and setting up 
 matter in bar of the suit waives irregularity of process, or the 
 privilege of venue, or any matter purely in abatement. Fosha 
 V. Western U. Teleg. Co. 114 Fed. 702 ; Callahan v. Hicks, 90 
 Fed. 539 ; Lowry v. Tile, Mantel & Grate Asso. 98 Fed. 822 ; 
 Beamer v. Werner, 86 C. C. A. 289, 159 Fed. 101 ; L'Engle v. 
 Gates, 74 Fed. 515; Scott v. Hoover, 99 Fed. 250; Whiteomb 
 V. Hooper, 27 C. C. A. 19, 53 U. S. App. "410, 81 Fed. 946; 
 Creighton v. Kerr, 20 Wall. 8-12, 22 L. ed. 309, 310; Seattle, 
 L. S. & E. K. Co. V. Union Trust Co. 24 C. C. A. 512, 48 U. S. 
 App. 255, 79 Fed. 187; Eddy v. Lafayette, 1 C. C. A. 441, 
 4 tr. S. App. 247, 49 Fed. 809 ; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. 
 McBride, 141 U. S. 127, 35 L. ed. 659, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 982. 
 Yet it does not waive matters touching the fundamental juris- 
 diction of the court, as want of diversity of citizenship, or the 
 absence of a Federal question, or the insufficiency of amount, 
 as these defects can be raised at any time during the progress 
 of the cause. They go to the power of the court, whereas the 
 matters waived by answer to the merits or exercised by consent 
 are but the means whereby the power is exercised. Ibid. ; 
 Lackett v. Eumbaugh, 45 Fed. 31; Fales v. Chicago, M. & St. 
 P. E. Co. 32 Fed. 673; Eodgers v. Pitt, 96 Fed. 676; Re 
 Stutsman County, 88 Fed. 341, 342 ; Duncan v. Associated 
 Press, 81 Fed. 417; Central Trust Co. v. Virginia, T. & C. 
 Steel & I. Co. 55 Fed. 769 ; McBride v. Grand de Tour Plow 
 Co. 40 Fed. 162 ; Mexican ISTat. E. Co. v. Davidson, 157 U. S. 
 201, 39 L. ed. 672, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563; Less v. English, 29 
 C. C. A. 275, 56 U. S. App. 16, 85 Fed. 477, 478. 
 
 Sometimes an answer which would waive venue or irregu- 
 larities in the subpoena or service may be entered without 
 authority ; in which event the defendant may appear showing 
 a want of authority to waive venue, etc., and set up the objec- 
 tion to the process or venue. Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. 163, 12 
 L. ed. 387; Graham v. Spencer, 14 Fed. 603; Jenkins v. York 
 Cliffs Implement Co. 110 Fed. 807. 
 
 Again, an answer to the merit may be withdrawn (Creighton 
 v. Kerr, 20 Wall. 8-13, 22 L. ed. 309-311) ; but a withdrawal 
 without leave of court, or by leave and "without prejudice to 
 
APPEAllANCE. 335 
 
 plaintiff," leaves the record in a condition to take judgment by 
 defaiilt for want of appearance (Eio Grande Irrig. & Coloniza- 
 tion Co. V. Gildersleeve, IT-i U. S. 606, 43 L. ed. 1104, 19 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 761 ; First Kat. Bank v. Cunningham, 48 Fed. 
 517) ; or the court may proceed as if the defendant was still in 
 its presence (Graham v. Spencer, 14 Fed. 607), 
 
 Substituted Service. 
 
 There is a service of process known as substituted service, 
 which will be discussed under "Auxiliary Proceedings." 
 
CHAPTEK LVI. 
 
 SECTION 8, ACT 1875, AND PEACTICE THKEEUNDBE. 
 
 What has been said about process has referred to the process 
 of subpoe,na and its limited scope within the district of suit, 
 and those cases where it could, reach beyond to other districts 
 in the same State. Cely v. Griffin, 113 Fed. 981. -I now pro- 
 pose to discuss section 8 of the act of March 3, 1875- (Comp. 
 Stat. 1913, sec. 1039). 
 
 This section was passed in 1872 (U. S. Eev. Stat.) but was 
 enlarged in 1875 and specially retained in the act of -1888 by 
 section 5 of that act. American F. L. M. Co. v. Benson, 33 
 Fed. 456. The act did not enlarge the jurisdiction of the 
 court, but gave greater scope to its process, and was of great 
 importance, as it gave, for the first time in the history of the 
 Federal system, the power and authority to reach nonresidents 
 claiming an interest or right in and to property within the 
 jurisdiction of the court. Special process was provided by this 
 section to be sent beyond the limits of the State, and to require 
 nonresidents to appear and answer. Goddard v. Mailler, 80 
 Fed. 423 ; United States v. American Lumber Co. 80 Fed. 313. 
 I have heretofore alluded to this act in its relation to venue of 
 suits, but I will now discuss it as an additional process, and give 
 forms for its use. The act is as follows : Sec. 57, new Code 
 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1039). 
 
 "When in any suit commenced in any circuit court of the 
 United States to enforce any legal or equitable lien upon or 
 claim to, or to remove any encumbrance, or lien, or cloud upon 
 the title to real or personal property within the district where 
 the suit is brought, one or more of the defendants shall not be 
 an inhabitant of or found within the district, or shall not vol- 
 untarily appear thereto ; it shall be lawful for the court to make 
 an order, directing such defendants to appear, plead, answer, or 
 demur, by a day certain, to be designated, which order shall be 
 served on such absent defendants if practicable, wherever found, 
 and also on the person or persons in possession or charge of 
 
SECTION 8, ACT 1875, AND PBAOTICE THEEEUNDBE. 337 
 
 said property, if any there be ; or, when such personal service is 
 not practicable, such order shall be published in such manner 
 as the court may direct, not less than once a week for six suc- 
 cessive weeks, and in case such absent defendant shall not ap- 
 pear and plead, answer, or demur within the time limited or 
 within such further time as may be allowed by the court in its 
 discretion, and on proof of the service or publication of such 
 order and of the performance of the directions contained in the 
 same, it shall be lawful for the court to entertain jurisdiction 
 and proceed to the hearing and adjudication of said suit in' the 
 same manner as if the absent defendants had been served with 
 process in the said district, but such adjudication shall as re- 
 gards such absent defendant without appearance affect only the 
 property which shall have been subject to the siiit and under 
 the jurisdiction of the court therein within such district, and 
 when a part of such property shall be within another district 
 of the same State, the suit may be brought in either district. 
 Provided that the defendant or defendants not personally noti- 
 fied may, upon entering his appearance within one year from 
 the judgTnent, obtain an order setting aside the judgment and 
 permitting him to defend on the payment of costs." U. S. 
 Eev. Stat. sec. 738. 
 
 The special retention of this act in the act of 1888 was con- 
 gressional recognition of the right of service personally or by 
 publication, where title, claim, or encumbrance in, to, and upon 
 property located in the district of suit was involved (Morris 
 V. Graham, 51 Fed. 56, 57), and whether the suit be in law 
 or equity; Shainwald v. Lewis, 6 Sawy. 585, 5 Fed. 517; 
 Jones v. Gould, 80 C. C. A. 1, 149 Fed. 158 ; Merrihew v. Fort, 
 98 Fed. 899 ; Woods v. Woodson, 40 C. C. A. 525, 100 Fed. 
 515. A strict compliance with its provisions is exacted by the 
 courts. Jennings v. Johnson, 78 C. C. A. 329, 148 Fed. 337 ; 
 Meyer v. Kuhn, 13 C. 0. A. 298, 25 U. S. App. 174, 65 Fed. 
 705; Batt v. Procter, 45 Fed. 515; Gage v. Eiverside Trust 
 Co. 156 Fed. 1002; Jones v. Gould, 141 Fed. 698; Bracken 
 v. Union P. R. Co. 5 C. C. A. 548, 12 U. S. App. 421, 56 
 Fed. 447. The notice must be one authorized by law, or it is 
 void. United States v. American Lumber Co. 80 Fed. 313; 
 Kent V. Honsinger, 167 Fed. 627. See Blake v. Foreman Bros. 
 Bkg. Co. 218 Fed. 264. 
 
 See sec. 57, chap. 4, New Code, embodying sec. 8 of the act 
 S. Eq.— 22. 
 
338 SECTION 8, ACT 1875, and pkactice theeeunder. 
 
 of 1875, and the practice thereunder. Western U. Teleg. Co. 
 V. Louisville & N. E. Co. 201 Fed. 943. 
 
 Warning Order. 
 
 The order issued by the court requiring the appearance of 
 the absent defendant to plead, answer, or demur is called the 
 "warning order," and must be personally served unless imprac- 
 ticable, and this must be shown before publication is authorized. 
 Batt V. Procter, 45 Fed. 516, 517; Jennings v. Johnson, 78 
 C. C. A. 329, 148 Fed. 337 ; Forsyth v. Pierson, 9 Fed. 801. 
 
 The essential difference between a "warning order" and a 
 subpoena is that the subpcsna issues as of course, but has no 
 force beyond the district of suit, unless otherwise provided by 
 statute, as before stated, while the warning order can only is- 
 sue upon application to the court, and only in cases covered 
 by the statute (United States v. American Lumber Co. 80 Fed. 
 313) ; and may be directed wherever the nonresident can be 
 found. It was not necessary to issue a subpoena and return "not 
 found" as a basis for the warning order (Forsyth v. Pierson, 
 9 Fed. 801; Batt v. Procter, 45 Fed. 515), although this has 
 been intimated in Bronson v. Keokuk, 2 Dill. 498, Fed. Cas. 
 JSTo. 1,928 ; and see United States v. American Lumber Co. 
 80 Fed. 314. 
 
 The allegation of the bill as to nonresidence is a sufficient 
 predicate upon which to make the application to the court for 
 a warning order or special order of service (United States v. 
 American Lumber Co. 80 Fed. 309 ; Mercantile Trust Co. v. 
 Portland & O. E. Co. 10 Fed. 605, note; Woods v. Woodson, 
 40 C. C. A. 525, 100 Fed. 515 ; Batt v. Procter, 45 Fed. 516) ; 
 but not when affidavit as to nonresidence made four months 
 before application. Spreen v. Delsignore, 94 Fed. 71. The 
 proper practice is to apply for the order of service as the first 
 process, if the allegations of your bill as to the nonresidence of 
 the defendant sought to be served are sufficient, and your cause 
 of action falls within the provisions of the statute, but if the 
 nonresidence of the defendant sought to be served is not shown 
 in the bill, then subpoenas may be issued, and upon a return 
 "not found" you may predicate an application for the "warn- 
 ing order." The forms to be used are as follows : 
 A. B. 1 In United States District Court for 
 
 vs. ^ In Equity. the District of 
 
 C. D. I sitting at 
 
SECTION 8, ACT 1875, AND PRACTICE THEREUNDEK. 339 
 
 Now comes A. B., plaintiff in the above cause, and shows to the court 
 
 that on the day of A. D. 19 . ., he commenced suit in 
 
 this court, the same being a bill to remove cloud, etc. (or an action to try 
 title; or any of the causes mentioned in section of the act authorizing the 
 service) as is shown by the bill (or petition, if at common law) filed in 
 the said court to enforce his equitable (or legal) right to certain real 
 estate therein described (or personal property therein set forth), lying and 
 
 being situated in the county of in the district of the 
 
 State of , and which real estate (or personal property) is therein 
 
 described as part of the (if land here describe as in petition ) , 
 
 against C. D., defendant, the said C. D. being citizen of (or can 
 
 be found in ) , the State of of the United States of 
 
 America. That said C. D. resides in (or can be found in) county, 
 
 in the said State of (State as particularly as you can the resi- 
 dence of the nonresident or where he can be found, as the warning order 
 must be addressed to the United States marshal of the Federal district of 
 the residence, or the Federal district of the State, where the nonresident 
 can be found.) 
 
 Plaintiif further shows that he is a resident citizen and an inhabitant 
 
 of the State of (or that he is a citizen of the State of 
 
 and a resident and inhabitant of the district of said State). That 
 
 the said defendant is not to be found within the State of where 
 
 the suit is brought, nor has he voluntarily appeared to answer, plead or 
 demur to the bill filed by plaintiff. 
 
 Wherefore plaintiff moves the court that its order be granted, entered 
 and served as provided by law, directing the defendant to appear and 
 answer, plead or demur in said cause by a day certain to be designated by 
 this court. 
 
 • R. F., 
 Solicitor, etc. 
 
 If there be several nonresident defendants, the specific resi- 
 dence or place where to be found must be stated as to each. 
 If the defendant be a corporation, then say: 
 
 And the , a corporation created, organized and existing under 
 
 the laws of the State of , of which said corporation one M 
 
 is president, who is a citizen of (or can be found in) the State or 
 
 and one N is secretary, who is a citizen or (or can be found in) the 
 
 State of and that the said corporation and the said M 
 
 and the said N are all residents and inhabitants of (or can be found 
 
 in ) the county of in the State of , etc. 
 
 There is nothing in the act requiring the motion or applica- 
 tion to be' sworn to, but in Forsyth v. Pierson, 9 Fed. 803, it 
 is intimated that it should be supported by affidavit as to the 
 
34:0 SECTION 8, ACT 1875, and practice ti-iereundee. 
 
 truth of the allegations made. Woods v. Woodson, 40 0. C. 
 A. 565, 100 Fed. 518. 
 
 With the motion prepare and present a]i order as follows:, 
 
 Title and commencement as in motion. 
 
 On this day at tlie division of the Circuit Court of the United 
 
 States in and for the district of , came on to be heard the 
 
 application of A. B., plaintiff in the above styled and numbered cause, for 
 an order directing the absent defendant C. D. (or defendants C. D. and E. 
 F., or , a corporation, etc., describe as in motion, stating presi- 
 dent and secretary, etc. ) to appear and plead, answer or demur herein by a 
 day certain to be designated by the court. And it appearing to the court 
 that this suit is commenced by plaintiff, who is a resident citizen and 
 
 inhabitant of the State of '. . (or of as stated in the motion), 
 
 to enforce an equitable (or legal, if at law) claim to land situated in the 
 
 county of , in the State of , being in the district 
 
 of said State, the said suit being to remove cloud (or whatever it may be) 
 and the said G. D., defendant therein named, is not an inhabitant of the 
 
 said district of , nor is he to be found in said State and 
 
 has not voluntarily appeared in said suit. 
 
 And the court being of opinion that said application should be granted, 
 it is ordered that the said C. D., defendant, shall appear, plead, answer or 
 
 demur to the bill (or petition) of plaintiff on or before the day 
 
 of A. D. 19.., the same being the first Monday (or whatever 
 
 day it may be in the J;erm) at the next term of this court (or the term 
 
 now in session ) at the court room thereof in the city of in the 
 
 coimty of. , in the State of 
 
 That certified copies of this order and plaintiff's bill (or petition) be 
 
 served on the said CD. days before the date above named and 
 
 that service be made on said defendant C. D. by the United States marshal 
 for the District of the State of 
 
 This order should always he obtained in open court, and 
 should the suit be pending in one division of a district, you 
 may apply to the court in session in any other division of the 
 district, for the order. If you should apply out of the division 
 of the district where the suit is pending, you should add to the 
 order granted by the court the following: 
 
 It is further ordered that the clerk of this court enter this order of rec- 
 ord and certify the same to the division at for record 
 
 and observance. 
 
 Done in open court in the city of , in the State of , this 
 
 the day of A. D. 19.., 
 
 I. M., 
 United States Judge. 
 See Kent v, Honsinger, 167 Fed. 624. 
 
SECTION S, ACT ISTTi, AXD PRACTICE THEEEUNDEK. 341 
 
 The clerk of the court where suit is pending should de- 
 liver certified copies of the order to plaintiif's counsel, who 
 should forward them to the marshal of the district set forth in 
 the order, and copies of the order are to be delivered by the 
 clerk of the court to the marshal of the district where the suit 
 is pending, to be served on the parties in charge of or in pos- 
 session of the property in suit, if any such person or persons be 
 in possession or charge. 
 
 The United States marshal serving the order on the nonresi- 
 dent makes the service and return as provided by statute and 
 rules, of equity, in serving and returning subpoenas, and must 
 return the order, with return of ser^'ice thereon, to the clerk 
 of the court in which the suit is pending. Forsyth v. Pierson, 
 9 Fed. 801; Woods v. Woodson, 40 C. C. A. 565, 100 Fed. 
 517; Elk Garden Co. v. T. W. Thayer Co. 179 Fed. 558. 
 
 If upon the return of the order it appears that service was 
 made the full number of days before the day of appearance des- 
 ignated in the order, then the cause may proceed under the 
 rules of equity. 
 
 If the cause be at common law and the parties do not ap- 
 pear, you may take judgment by default, and if in equity you 
 may enter a decree pro confesso, and proceed ex parte under 
 the rules of equity. Tug Kiver Coal & Salt Co. v. Brigel, 14 
 C. C. A. 577, 31 U. S. App. 665, 67 Fed. 625. 
 
 How Served. 
 
 Must be served by the marshal or his deputy of the Federal 
 district where defendant resides. Forsyth v. Pierson, 9 Fed. 
 801. 
 
 Publication, Service By. 
 
 It often happens that you do not know where the defendants, 
 or defendant, resides or can be found, so that it is impracticable 
 to apply for, or get,. personal service of the warning order. In 
 such case the statute permits service by publication. 
 
 In this case your petition or motion must be drawn with 
 this view and in the form already given, except that it must 
 be stated that personal service is impracticable because the 
 
342 sectiojS' 8, act 1875, and practice thereundee. 
 
 residence or place where the defendant may be found is un- 
 known; that you have used due diligence to discover the resi- 
 dence or whereabouts of the unlmown defendant, stating wliat 
 diligence you have used. In a word, the facts must show the 
 impracticability of personal service mentioned in the statute. 
 Batt V. Procter, 45 Fed. 516 ; McDonald v. Cooper, 32 Fed. 
 745. You must ask an order of publication as to the defendant 
 whose residence and citizenship is unknown. The court may 
 direct the manner of publication of the "warning order," 
 though it cannot be for less than six weeks, as prescribed by 
 the statute; that is, once each week for six successive weeks. 
 Dick V. Foraker, 155 U. S. 411, 412, 39 L. ed. 204, 15 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 124; United States v. American Lumber Co. 80 Fed. 
 314, 315; Beattie v. Wilkinson, 36 Fed. 649; Guaranty Trust 
 & S. D. Co. V. Green Cove Springs & M. R. Co. 139 U. S. 137, 
 35 L. ed. 116, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 512. 
 
 The warning order must be published as directed by the 
 court, and if the defendant does not appear in obedience to 
 its mandate, and answer, plead, or demur within the time 
 stated in the order, then, upon proof of the publication of the 
 order made in the manner ordered, the court will proceed to 
 adjudicate the case ; provided, however, that the defendant 
 may within one year from the judgment enter his appearance 
 and set it aside on payment of costs. The courts have strictly 
 construed the act, and held that personal service of the "warn- 
 ing order" must be made if practicable. Batt v. Procter, 45 
 Fed. 515. The advantage of personal service is of great value 
 to plaintiff, if it can be possibly obtained, as in such case the 
 decree has the ordinary effect from entry, while by publication 
 you have only a conditional decree for one year from entry, 
 and within the time preventing any disposition of the property 
 involved in the suit. 
 
 It sometimes happens, when there are several defendants, 
 that the residence of some may be known and others unknown; 
 in such case you should file separate motions or petitions, and 
 prepare separate orders, as the substance and prayer in each 
 case are entirely different, as seen above. 
 
 When publication is ordered the court designates the news- 
 paper and time of publication, not less than six weeks, and the 
 manner of publication must be strictly pursued; no other 
 
SECTION 8, ACT 1875, AND PRACTICE THEEEUNDEE. ;]4;] 
 
 method than that designated would be legal. Ibid. ; McDonald 
 V. Cooper, supra; Meyer v. Kuhn, 13 C. C. A. 298, 25 U. S. 
 App. 174, 65 Fed. 712. 
 
 This method of service, as will be seen, is somewhat similar 
 to that prescribed by the statutes of Texas (Batts' Kev. Stat. 
 1230 to 1235) providing for service on nonresident defendants 
 and defendants whose residence is unknown. 
 
 By the State statute any disinterested citizen of the State 
 where the nonresident citizen resides or may be found may 
 serve the notice of suit, and make affidavit of its delivery as a 
 proper return of service, but in the Federal courts the order 
 must be served by a United States marshal of the district of 
 which the citizen to be served is a resident, or can be found. 
 Batts' Eev. Stat. 1231. 
 
 Again, in the State statutes, four weeks' (Batts' Eev. Stat. 
 1235) consecutive publication is sufficient, while six weeks is 
 the minimum in the Federal court. The mode provided by 
 Congress is exclusive. U. S. Supp. 1874, 91, p. 84; Bracken 
 V. Union P. K. Co. 5 C. C. A. 548, 12 U. S. App. 421, 56 
 Fed. 449. 
 
 Having thus given the act and the form that may be used 
 in effecting service under it, I will now briefly refer to a few 
 cases interpreting the act. 
 
 As stated, the act does not enlarge the jurisdiction, but gives 
 greater scope to the process of the courts in a certain class of 
 cases of which the Federal courts have jurisdiction. Greeley 
 V. Lowe, 155 U. S. 65, 39 L. ed. 70, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 24; 
 Compton V. Jesup, 15 C. C. A. 397, 31 U. S. App. 486, 68 
 Fed. 285 ; Tug Eiver Coal & Salt Co. v. Brigel, 14 C. C. A. 
 577, 31 U. S. App. 665, 67 Fed. 625; Eldred v. American 
 Palace Car Co. 103 Fed. 211. The act includes suits to en- 
 force any legal or equitable claim to, or lien upon, or to re- 
 move cloud from the .title of real or personal property withm 
 the district where suit is brought. Ibid. ; Spencer v. Kansas 
 City Stockyards Co. 56 Fed. 745; Jones v. Gould, 80 C. C. 
 A. 1, 149 Fed. 157; York Coimty Sav. Bank v. Abbot, 131 
 Fed. 983, see S. C. 139 Fed. 993; Winter v. Koon, 132 Fed. 
 273; Seybert v. Shamokin & Mt. C. Electric E. Co. 110 Fed. 
 810. It was not intended to cover anything but real and 
 tangible property susceptible of being reduced to actual posses- 
 
344 SECTION 8, ACT 1S75, applied to special cases. 
 
 sion, and not incorporeal and intangible interests (Ifon-Mag- 
 netic Watch Co. v. Association Horlogere Suisse, 44 Fed. 6), 
 as patent right. Ibid.; York County Sav. Bank v. Abbot, 139 
 Fed. 993; Eldred v. American Palace Car Co. 45 C. C. A. 
 1, 105 Fed. 455. 
 
 Title to Stock. 
 
 In Jellenik v. Huron Copper Min. Co. 177 U. S. 1, 44 L. ed. 
 647, 20 Sup. Ct Eep. 559, suit was brought in Michigan Fed- 
 eral district against a corporation of Michigan and citizens of 
 Massachusetts holding certificates of stock. Plaintiff claimed 
 title to the shares of stock so held, and sought a decree remov- 
 ing cloud from the title. It was held that the certificates of 
 stock were only evidence of the ownership of the shares, and 
 the interest represented by the shares was held by the company 
 for the benefit of the true owner; that suit could be brought 
 against the company in its residence district, and nonresident 
 parties claiming ownership of the certificates of stock could 
 be brought in under section 8 to try the title. Ibid. 177 U. S. 
 13, 82 Fed. 778, overruled; Eyan v. Seaboard & K. E. Co. 
 83 Fed. 889. But not where the stock is not held by a defend- 
 ant who resides within the State where the suit is brought. 
 McKane v. Burke, 132 Fed. 688. See Jones v. Gould, 80 
 C. C. A. 1, 149 Fed. 153. The statute applies to establish a 
 lien on stock. Merritt v. American Steel-Barge Co. 24 C. C. 
 A. 530, 49 U. S. App. 85, 79 Fed. 228. 
 
 Suit to Cancel for Fraud. 
 
 In Evans' v. Charles Scribner's Sons, 58 Fed. 303, it was 
 held that service under section 738 to cancel a deed for fraud 
 to property within the district of suit could be had, but not 
 to set aside transfers of life policies not within the district 
 issued by a foreign company. Castello v. Castello, 4 McCrary, 
 543, 14 Fed. 207. So may cancel a note for fraud. Manning 
 V. Berdan, 132 Fed. 382-385. Or contract to convey. 
 
 Specific Performance. 
 
 It has been held that the act does not apply to a suit for 
 
SECTIOJ^T S, ACT 187"), AlTLIEl) TO SPECIAL CASES. 3-!-:") 
 
 specific performance of a contract to convey laud, Municipal 
 Invest. Co. v. Gardiner, 62 Fed. 954, unless the State statute 
 provided for constructive service in such cases, and that the 
 judgment therein shall be in effect a conveyance. Single v. 
 Scott Paper Mfg. Co. 55 Fed. 553; Bennett v. Fenton, 10 
 L.E.A. 500, 41 Fed. 283; Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 
 33 L. ed. 918, 10 Sup. Ct. Kep. 557. But in a suit by a vendee 
 for specific performance, if there is a condition precedent that 
 an abstract of title shall be furnished, and upon failure dam- 
 age is to be given, then the statute does not apply. See Adams 
 ■V. Heckscher, 83 Fed. 281, 282, S. C. 80 Fed. T42. 
 
 Suit to Remove Cloud. 
 
 A suit to remove cloud (Morris v. Graham, 51 Fed. 53 ; 
 Arndt v. Griggs, supra), conies vpithin the statute (Lynch v. 
 Murphy, 161 U. S. 251, 252, 40 L. ed. 689, 16 Sup. Ct. Kep. 
 523; Brown v. Pegram, 143 Fed. 701; Miller v. Ahrens, 150 
 Fed. 644) ; or by a creditor to set aside a conveyance (Mellen 
 V. Moline Malleable Iron Works, 131 U. S. 352, 33 L. ed. 178, 
 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 781 ; Evans v. Charles Scribner's Sons, supra) ; 
 or to cancel a land patent (United States v. American Lum- 
 ber Co. 80 Fed. 309). 
 
 Foreclosure of Liens. 
 
 Suits to foreclose liens (York County Sav. Bank v. Abbot, 
 131 Fed. 980, but see 139 Fed. 993; Ames v. Holderbaum, 42 
 Fed. 341; Deck v. Whitman, 96 Fed. 890; Grove v. Grove, 
 93 Fed. 865 ; Lancaster v. Asheville Street R Co. 90 Fed. 132), 
 or to enjoin foreclosure (Dupont v. Abel, 81 Fed. 534), come 
 within the statute; or to cancel a mortgage (Mellen v. Moline 
 Malleable Iron Works, supra). So a lien on a specific fund 
 (Goodman v. ISTiblack, 102 U. S. 556, 26 L. ed. 229). So in 
 a suit to establish a trust, service may be had on a nonresident 
 though there be a prayer for accounting (Porter Land & Water 
 Co. V. Baskin, 43 Fed. 323). 
 
 Trying Title. 
 
 Actions to try title at law are within the statute (Spencer 
 
346 UNKNOWN IllCmS AS TAETIES. 
 
 V. Kansas City Stock-Yards Co. 56 Fed. 741) ; or a suit to 
 partition land (Greeley v. Lowe, 155 U. S. 58, 74, 39 L. ed. 
 69, 75, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 24). "Title" in the act is explained 
 in Jones v. Gould, supra. 
 
 Unknown Heirs. 
 
 We see, then, by virtue of section 8 of the act of 1875, where 
 it is impracticable to get personal service on an absent de- 
 fendant, as where the residence or habitation of the defendant 
 is unknown, you may serve by publication in the class of cases 
 mentioned in said section ; but the question arises, can you sue 
 unknown heirs in the Federal courts in those States where such 
 suits are permitted, as in Texas (see Batts's Rev. Stat. 1236), 
 which provides that a party having a claim against property 
 which may have accrued to the heirs of a deceased person, may 
 sue the heirs whose names are unknown and obtain service by 
 publication. Webster v. Willis, 56 Tex. 468; O'Leary v. 
 Durant, 70 Tex. 409, 11 S. W. 116 ; Texas Eev. Stat. 1911, 
 art. 1875 ; Gibson v. Oppenheimer, — Tex. Civ. App. — , 154 
 S. W. 695. 
 
 It may be stated that while the Federal courts may sustain 
 a judgment recovered in a State court permitting such service 
 (Arndt v. Griggs, siipra; Ormsby v. Ottman, 29 C. C. A. 295, 
 56 U. S. App. 510, 85 Fed. 494, 495 ; Connor v. Tennessee C. 
 E. Co. 54 L.E.A. 687, 48 C. C. A. 730, 109 Fed. 936 ; Lynch 
 v. Murphy, supra), if the statute has been strictly pursued, 
 and where such judgment is brought collaterally in issue in 
 the Federal court (Guaranty Trust & S. D. Co. v. Green Cove 
 Springs & M. E. Co. 139 IJ. S. 148, 35 L. ed. 120, 11 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 512; HoUingsworth v. Barbour, 4 Pet. 473-475, 7 
 L. ed. 925, 926 ; Harris v. Hardeman, 14 How. 345, 14 L. ed. 
 449), yet an original suit cannot be brought in the Federal 
 courts and service perfected under the statute providing for 
 service against "unknown heirs." Many reasons may be stated 
 why State statutes of this character cannot be followed in the 
 Federal courts, where citizenship enters so largely into ques- 
 tions touching the jurisdiction of these courts, but the princi- 
 pal reason may be found in the fact that Congress has legis- 
 lated upon the subject of "service by publication," and having 
 
UNKA^OWN HEIES AS PARTIES. 347 
 
 extended it only to cases where the residence of the defendant 
 is unknown, so as to make it impracticable to serve him per- 
 sonally, it excludes from these courts any other conditions upon 
 which such service can be made. As has been repeatedly said, 
 where Congress has legislated upon a particular subject, State 
 legislation upon the same subject is superseded in federal 
 courts. Braken v. Union P. R. Co. supra. 
 
CHAPTER LVII. 
 
 SCANLiAL AND IMPEETIISIENCE. 
 
 If the bill, answer, or any pleading is scandalous or imperti- 
 nent, it may be expunged under new rule No. 21, which is as 
 follows: The right to except to bills, answers, and other pro- 
 ceedings for scandal or impertinence shall not obtain, but the 
 court may, upon motion or its own initiative, order any redund- 
 ant, impertinent, or scandalous matter stricken out, upon such 
 terms as the court shall think fit. 
 
 Unnecessary allegations bearing cruelly on the moral char- 
 acter of an individual, or anything stated contrary to good man- 
 ners or to hear which would offend the dignity of the court, 
 are scandalous. ,KelIey v. Boetteher, 29 C. C. A. 14, 56 U. S. 
 App. 363, 85 Fed. 55. If, however, the matter be relevant, 
 though injurious, it is not scandalous. Mercantile Trust Co. v. 
 Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 84 Fed. 379 ; Burden v. Burden, 124 
 Fed. 255; South & N. A. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 171 
 Fed. 225 ; Mound City Co. v. Castleman, 171 Fed. 521. 
 
 Impertinence consists in allegations irrelevant to the issues, 
 which includes tautology and verbosity'' ; also unnecessary recitals 
 of written instruments, now forbidden by the requirements of 
 rule No. 25. Harrison v. Perea, 168 U. S. 318, 42 L. ed: 481, 
 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 129 ; Polk v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. 
 128 Fed. 524; Electrolibration Co. v. Jackson, 52 Fed. 776; 
 Kelley v. Boetteher, 29 C. C. A. 14, 56 U. S. App. 363, 85 Fed. 
 55-61. By rule No. 21 objections to pleadings for scandal or 
 impertinence are no longer raised by exceptions, but by a motion 
 to strike out, or on suggestion, or on the court's own initiative, 
 the objectionable allegations may be stricken out. If raised 
 by motion it may be drawn as follows : 
 
 Title as in bill. 
 
 Now comes the plaintiflf (or defendant) and moves the court to stiiko 
 out so much of the allegations of the bill or answer) as set up (here 
 
 348 
 
SCANDAL AND IMPEETINENCE. 3i9 
 
 state the objectionable matter) because the said allegation is scandalous 
 
 (or impertinent) in that it cruelly attacks the character of , 
 
 or the language is indecent or contrary to good morals, (or if imperti- 
 nent) the language of the pleading is disconnected, tautological, verbose 
 and not pertinent to the issue. Wherefore, be prays, etc. 
 
 The motion must be signed by connsel, and must be filed after 
 the process on the bill is returnable, or, if taken to the answer, 
 after the answer has been filed and within twenty days from the 
 bill or answer. Hall v. Bridgeport Trust Co. 122 Fed. 163 ; 
 Kelley v. Boetteher, 29 C. C. A. 14, 56 U. S. App. 363, 85 
 Fed. 55; Polk v. Mutual Reserve Fund tife Asso. 128 Fed. 
 526; Hobbs Mfg. Co. v. Gooding, 100 C. C. A. 83, 176 Fed. 
 264. See United States v. Kettenbach, 175 Fed. 463.- The 
 objection is purely formal and technical, and its simple pur- 
 pose is to force clearness of pleading, and the court should not 
 permit any delay in presenting the objection. 
 
 By new rule 24 the signature to the bill by counsel is a certifi- 
 cate that the bill contains no scandalous matter. In dealing 
 with objections of this character, and particularly because of 
 impertinence in the bill, they should not be allowed unless it is 
 clear that the objectionable matter cannot be material to the 
 plaintiff's case. Wells, F. & Co. v. Oregon R & Nav. Co. 15 
 Fed. 561. If it is doubtful as to its being material, the matter 
 will be permitted to remain until final hearing. 
 
CHAPTEE LVIII. 
 
 DISMISSAL OF BILL BY PLAINTIFF. 
 
 The bill having been filed and prcx;ess issued, I will no-w 
 discuss what steps plaintiff may take to dismiss his bill. 
 
 The dismissal of a bill is either voluntary by plaintiff, or 
 involuntary by the court on motion, or by the court on its own 
 motion. Involuntary dismissals will be discussed under de- 
 fenses in equity. 
 
 The general rule is that the plaintiff has the right, at any 
 time before an interlocutory or final decree in a case, to dis- 
 miss it on paying costs, and without prejudice to his right to 
 file another, and where the dismissal will deprive the defendant 
 of no substantial right accrued since the suit commenced and 
 the defendant has not prayed for affirmative relief to which 
 he would be entitled. Morton Trust Co. v. Keith, 150 Fed. 
 606; Houghton v. Whitin Mach. Works, 160 Fed. 227; Gil- 
 more V. Bort, 134 Ted. 659; McCabe v. Southern R Co. 107 
 Fed. 214 ; Pennsylvania Globe Gaslight Co. v. Globe Gaslight 
 Co. 121 Fed. 1015 ; Ebner v. Zimmerly, 55 C. C. A. 430, 118 
 Fed. 818 ; United States ex rel. Coffman v. Norfolk & W. K. 
 Co. 55 C. C. A. 320, 118 Fed. 554; Welsbach Light Co. v. 
 Mahler, 88 Fed. 427 ; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Union Rolling 
 Mill Co. 109 U. S. 702-713, 27 L. ed. 1081-1085, 3 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 594; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Central Transp. Co. 
 171 U. S. 138, 145, 43 L. ed. 108, 111, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808; 
 Stevens v. The Railroads, 4 Fed. 97-105 ; Detroit v. Detroit 
 City R. Co. 55 Fed. 572; Carlisle v. Smith, 224 Fed. 231; 
 Tower v. Stimpson, 175 Fed. 130. This general rule has its 
 conditions and exceptions. 
 
 In the first place, you cannot dismiss without a motion and 
 notice, and an order of the court ; dismissal by an order as of 
 course is not known in the Federal practice. This means that 
 the pleading must be submitted to the court, and there must be 
 the exercise of some discretion in granting it. Electrical Ac- 
 
 350 
 
DISMISSAL OF BILL BY PLAINTIFF. 351 
 
 cunralator Co. v. Brush Electric Co. 44 Fed. 604; Gregory v. 
 Pike, 15 C. C. A. 33, 21 U. S. App. 658, 33 U. S. App. 76, 
 67 Fed. 838; Penn Phonograph Co. v. Columbia Phonograph 
 Co. 66 C. C..A. 127, 132 Fed. 809. 
 
 xVgain, the plaintiff cannot dismiss where such dismissal 
 \\'ould prejudice the defendant, or where rights have been 
 fixed by an interlocutory decree (see authorities cited above; 
 Callahan v. Hicks, 90 Fed. 539 ; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. 
 Central Transp. Co. 49 Fed. 261 ; Electrical Accumulator Co. 
 V. Brush Electric Co. 44 Fed. 604, 605 ; Hat-Sweat Mfg. Co. 
 V. Waring, 46 Fed. 87; Hershberger v. Blewett, 55 Fed. 172), 
 or where the defendant seeks affirmative relief. Ibid. The re- 
 fusal to dismiss when the rights of the defendant may be 
 prejudiced does not mean that by the dismissal he may be bur- 
 dened by another suit, but the record must show some right 
 upon which he should be heard and which is properly in issue. 
 Western U. Teleg. Co. v. American Bell Teleph. Co. 50 Fed. 
 664; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Central Transp. Co. 171 U. S. 
 138, 161, 43 L. ed. 108, 117, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808. Especially 
 is this the case when an issue has been sent to the master and 
 decided for defendant. Detroit v. Detroit City R. Co. 55 Fed. 
 572. 
 
 So, where parties agree to refer to a master, the plaintiff 
 cannot dismiss. American Bell Teleph. Co. v. Western U. 
 Teleg. Co. 16 C. C. A. 367, 21 U. S. App. 627, 69 Fed. 666, 
 overrules 50 Fed. 662. See Walters v. Western & A. R. Co. 
 69 Fed. 710. 
 
 Again, the plaintiff will not be allowed to dismiss, if in the 
 light of the proceedings the defendant is reasonably entitled to 
 a decree. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Union Roiling Mill Co. 109 
 U. S. 713-716, 27 L. ed. 1085-1087, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594; 
 Hershberger v. Blewett, 55 Fed. 170; Pullman Palace Car Co. 
 V. Central Transp. Co. l7l U. S. 146, 43 L. ed. 112, 18 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 808. But if the circumstances were such that on final 
 hearing the plaintiff would be allowed to dismiss without 
 prejudice, then a dismissal without prejudice may be per- 
 mitted. Stevens v. The Railroads, 4 Fed. 97. 
 
 Again, if nothing has been done for two years after it has 
 been at issue, plaintiff will not be allowed to dismiss. Wels- 
 bach Light Co. v. Mahler, supra. Plaintiff cannot dismiss where 
 
352 DISMISSAL OF BILL BY PLAINTIFF. 
 
 new action would bar defendant's relief. CallaJian v. Hicks, 
 90 Fed.' 543. 
 
 Where there is more than one plaintiff, any one of them may 
 dismiss as to himself, if without prejudice to other parties, or 
 may dismiss as to one or more defendants under similar condi- 
 tions. The motion to dismiss may be as follows: 
 
 Title as in bill. 
 To the Honorable Judge of the District .Court of the United States in and 
 
 for the District of the State of : 
 
 Your petitioner, having exhibited his bill in this honorable court on the 
 
 day of A. D. 19 . . , against C. D., defendant, is, since 
 
 the filing of the same, advised to proceed no further; wherefore he prays 
 that the bill may stand dismissed vfithout prejudice. 
 
 E. F., 
 Solicitor, etc. 
 
 This form is sufficient, noting, however, the following con- 
 ditions : 
 
 First. If the defendant has not appeared, so state, and the 
 court will grant the dismissal. 
 
 Second. If the defendant has appeared, so state, and further 
 state if any action has been taken by him, and, if so, what. 
 
 Third. If the defendant has appeared and taken action, but 
 consents to the dismissal, then let his solicitor sign the motion 
 with plaintiff's solicitor. 
 
 The motion may be heard in vacation, or any motion day, 
 proper notice having been given of the application. 
 
 The practice in dismissing is to use the words "without prej- 
 udice," for if you do not, the presumption is that it was heard 
 on its merits. Graves v. Faurot, 64 Fed. 242 ; Plowth v. Owens," 
 30 Fed. 911; Durant v. Essex Co. 7 Wall. 109, 19 L. ed. 156; 
 Lyon V. Perin & G. Mfg. Co. 125 U. S. 702, 31 L. ed. 841, 8 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1024 ; Garner v. Second Nat. Bank, 89 Fed. 636 ; 
 Stratton v. Essex County Park Commission, 145 Fed. 436. We 
 have then the rule. 
 
 A decree dismissing a bill generally may be set up as a 
 bar, but if dismissed "without prejudice," or on grounds other 
 than on merit, it cannot be set up in bar. Walden v. Bodley, 
 14 Pet. 161, 10 L. ed. 400 ; United States Fastener Co. v. Brad- 
 ley, 143 Fed. 530 ; Clark v. Bernhard Mattress Co. 82 Fed. 
 340. Ex parte Loung June, 160 Fed. 254. 
 
DISMISSAL OP BILL BY PLAINTIFF. 353 
 
 So, dismissal by consent, showing no adjustment, cannot be 
 set up in bar to a second suit. Marshall v. Otto, 59 Fed. 249. 
 Xor is it appealable, because not final if dismissed without 
 prejudice. Fidelity Ins. Trust & S. D. Co. v. Dickson, 24 C. 
 C. A. 60, 46 U. S. App. 691, 78 Fed. 207. 
 
 A voluntary dismissal will not be reinstated tinless there is 
 fraud or mistake. Willard v. Wood, 164 II. S. 521, 41 L. ed. 
 539, 17 Sup. Ct. Kep. 176. (See "Dismissal by Defendant," 
 chap. 73, p. 442 ; ''Effect on Cross Suit," chap. 74, p. 455. 
 S. Eq.— 23, 
 
CHAPTER LIX. 
 
 AMENDING BILL. 
 
 I wil] now discuss what steps the plaintiff should take to 
 perfect his bill when, through inadvertence or change in con- 
 ditions, it becomes necessary. 
 
 First. When he can amend his bill. 
 
 Second. When he must file a supplemental bill. 
 
 Third. When he must file a bill of revivor. 
 
 Office of Amendment. 
 
 Amendments are intended to cure defective pleadings. 
 Mellor V. Smither, 52 C. C. A. 64, 114 Fed. 120. Section 954, 
 U. S. Rev. Stat. Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1591; McDonald v. 
 ISTebraska, 41 C. C. A. 2Y8, 101 Fed. 171-177. And under 
 new rule ISTo. 19, the court may at any time, in furtherance of 
 justice, upon such terms as may be just, permit any process, 
 proceeding, pleading, or record to be amended, or material sup- 
 plemental matter to be set forth in an amended or supplemental 
 pleading. 
 
 When the Bill Can Be Amended. 
 
 i^ew rule No. 28, embodying old rules 28, 29 and 30 is as 
 follows : 
 
 Rule So. 28. The plaintiff may, as, of course, amend his 
 bill before the defendant has responded thereto, but if such 
 amendment be filed after any copy has issued from the clerk's 
 office, the plaintiff at his own cost shall furnish to the solicitor 
 of record of each opposing party a copy of the bill as amended, 
 unless otherwise ordered by court or judge. After pleading filed 
 by any defendant, plaintiff may amend only by consent of the 
 defendant or leave of the court or judge. 
 
 354 
 
AMENDING BTLi. 355 
 
 We have then, first, the plaintiff may amend as of course, 
 his bill before the defendant has responded thereto. Second, 
 if the amendment is filed after any copy has issued from the 
 clerk's office, the plaintiff, at his own cost, shall furnish to the 
 solicitor of record of each opposing party a copy of the bill as 
 amended unless otherwise ordered by the court. Third, when 
 the plaintiff is required to serve the amendment on the solicitor 
 or solicitors of the party or parties defendant, he must furnish 
 a copy of the bill as amended, and not simply the amendment 
 proposed as under the old rules. 
 
 Amendments Not of Course. 
 
 The last clause of the new rule 28 as above set forth, pro- 
 vides that after a pleading or any defense is filed in the cause 
 the right to amend must he by consent of the defendant or leave 
 of the court (old rule No. 29). Gubbins v. Laughtenschlager, 
 75 Fed. 619 ; Mercantile Wat. Bank v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 
 567, 25 L. ed. 815. The matter is in the hands of the court, and 
 is not reviewable unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. 
 ^cKemey v. Supreme Lodge, A. O. U. W. 104 C. C. A. 117, 
 180 Fed. 966, 967; Hardin v. Boyd, 113 U. S. 756, 28 L. ed. 
 11-11, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 771, overruling Shields v. Barrow, 17 
 How. 130, 15 L. ed. 158. The matter of costs is discretion- 
 ary Viith the court. Berliner Gramophone Co. v. Seaman, 51 
 C.'C. A. 44-0, 113 Fed. 754. 
 
 By new rule Xo. 20 the court may, upon motion, order a fur- 
 ther and better statement of the nature of the claim or the 
 defense, or further and better particulars of any matter stated 
 in any pleading, and upon such terms as to costs and otherwise 
 as may be just. Under new rule ISTo. 31 the cause is at issue 
 when the answer is filed, replications having been abolished ex- 
 cept in special instances, and the requirements under old rule 
 No. 29, directing amendments after replication filed, no longer 
 apply, having been superseded by new rule No. 28, providing 
 for amendments after answer by consent of the judge, or the 
 other party, by simple motion, which the judge may grant on 
 such terms as may be deemed necessary to speed the cause. 
 Washington, A. & G. E. Co. v. Bradley (Washington, A. & 
 G. E. Co. V. Washington) 10 Wall. 299, 19 L. ed. 894. The 
 
356 AMENDING BILL. 
 
 IDlaintiff should file the amended bill or pleading as presented 
 to the court, at once, if granted by the court; otherwise the 
 cause will proceed as if no amendment had been applied for. 
 Boston & A. R. Co. v. Parr, 98 Fed. 484. 
 
 Sometimes the answer makes it necessary to amend .the bill. 
 This must be done on motion, and leave will be granted, with 
 or without costs, as to the court may seem proper. Equity rule 
 28 ; Southern P. E. Co. v. United States, 168 U. S. 55, 42 L. 
 ed. 379, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18. 
 
 However, where the answer includes a set-off or counterclaim, 
 the plaintiff may, within ten days after filing the answer, unless 
 a longer time is allowed, file a replication to the set-off or coun- 
 terclaim, and need not amend his bill to meet the new matter. 
 ISTew rule 31. 
 
 Such are the rules prescribed for amending a bill in equity 
 by plaintiff, but the power of a court of equity to grant an 
 amendment at any stage of the case seems to rest alone in the 
 discretion of the court', unhampered by rules, if justice requires 
 the amendment. Hardin v. Boyd, 113 U. S. 756, 28 L. ed. 
 1141, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 771 ; Equity rules 19-28 ; U. S. Rev, 
 Stat. sec. 954, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1591; Berliner Gramo- 
 phone Co. V. Seaman, 51 C. C. A. 440, 113 Eed. 754 and eases 
 cited; United States v. American Bell Teleph. Co. 39 Fed. 716; 
 American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers' & Die Makers' 
 Unions Wos. 1 & 3, 90 Eed. 598-602 ; Neale v. Neale, 9 Wall, 
 8, 9, 19 L. ed. 591, 592 ; Re Glass, 119 Fed. 511. 
 
 It has been frequently declared that the power to permit 
 amendments must be controlled by the case, and not by stated 
 rules, and it has been the practice of Federal courts to be guided 
 by the special circumstances in permitting amendments at any 
 stage of the proceedings. Hardin v. Boyd, 113 U. S. 761, 28 
 L. ed. 1141, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 711 ; Berliner Gramophone Co. 
 V. Seaman, 51 C. C. A. 440, 113 Fed. 754; Gubbins v. Laught- 
 enschlager, 75 Fed. 619. And the granting or refusing amend- 
 ments, being a matter of discretion, will not be revised by an 
 appellate court, unless there be an apparent gross abuse of the 
 court's discretion. Wright v. Hollingsworth, 1 Pet. 168, 7 
 L. ed. 98 ; Brown v. Schleier, 194 U. S. 18, 48 L. ed. 857, 24 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 558 ; Hicklin v. Marco, 6 C. C. A. 10, 15 U. S, 
 App. 55, 56 Fed. 552 ; Chapman v. Barney, 129 U. S. 677, 32 
 
AMENDING BII-L. 35Y 
 
 L. ed. 800, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 426 ; Blalock v. Equitable Life 
 Assur. Soc. 21 C. C. A. 208, 41 U. S. App. 761, 75 Fed. 47. 
 
 While it is not proper to sacriiice the ends of justice to rigid 
 technical rules, vet upon the other hand, this nonrevisable dis- 
 cretion of the chancellor has some disadvantages. However, it 
 will be seen that, as the cause progresses, the courts, as they 
 should do, use greater caution in permitting amendments, and 
 preventing, if possible, inconvenience and expense. Gibbins v. 
 Laughtenschlager, 75 Fed. 619 ; Hodges v. Kimball, 34 C. C. 
 A. 103, 63 U. S. App. 688, 91 Fed. 851; Insurance Co. of 
 X. A. v. Svendsen, 74 Fed. 348. Thus, after the cause has 
 been prepared for trial, and hearing had, and fully, submitted, 
 the discretion of the chancellor is not easily moved to grant 
 an amendment on material matters. Gubbins v. Laughten- 
 schlager, 75 Fed. 619, and authorities. 
 
 Amendments At and After Trial. 
 
 But we find cases where the courts have not hesitated to per- 
 mit the pleadings to be changed and adapted to the proofs at 
 any stage of the cause after issue joined. U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 
 954, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1591; Manitowoc Malting Co. v. 
 Fuechtwanger, 169 Fed. 983; Mexican C. E. Co. v. Duthie, 
 189 U. S. 76, 47 L. ed. 715, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 610; Burgess v. 
 Graffam, 10 Fed. 219; Bass v. Christian Feigenspan, 82 Fed. 
 260; ^^eale v. ISTeale, 9 Wall. 1, 19 L. ed. 590; Bowden v. 
 Burnham, 8 C. C. A. 248, 19 U. S. App. 448, 59 Fed. 755 ; 
 Collinson v. Jackson, 8 Sawy. 357, 14 Fed. 305; Hamilton v. 
 Southern Xevada Gold & S. Min. Co. 13 Sawy. 113, 33 Fed. 
 568, 15 Mor. Min. Eep. 314; Morrow Shoe Mfg. Co. v. New 
 England Shoe Co. 24 L.E.A. 417, 6 0. C. A. 508, 18 U. S. 
 App. 256, 57 Fed. 692 ; Xellis v. Pennock Mfg. Co. 38 Fed. 
 379; Ee Sanford Tool Co. 160 U. S. 259, 40 L. ed. 417, 16 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 291. JSTew rule 19. 
 
 In Neale v. Xeale, 9 Wall. 1-12, 19 L. ed. 590-593, the 
 cause had been heard but decree not entered, but it appeared 
 that the evidence showed a different case for equitable relief 
 than stated in the bill, but supported a case for equitable relief. 
 The court permitted an amendment to conform to the proof, stat- 
 ing that it was clearly in the court's discretion, but it has been 
 
358 AMENDING BILL. 
 
 uniformly held that the amendment must he consistent with 
 the substance of the original bill, that is, you will not be per- 
 mitted to make a new suit by amendment either as to parties 
 or cause of action. (Authorities above) ; Confectioners' Ma- 
 chinery & Mfg. Co. V. Eacine Engine & Mach. Co. 163 Fed. 
 918 J Pendery v. Carleton, 30 C. C. A. 510, 59 U. S. App. 
 288, 87 Fed. 41. Where, after pleadings are closed and evi- 
 dence taken it becomes necessary to amend, it must be done 
 by amendment, and not by a substituted bill. Old Dominion 
 Copper Min. & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 176 Fed. 746. Gales- 
 burg & K. Electric E. Co. v. Hart, 136 C. C. A. 633, 221 Fed. 
 12, 13. Eule 19. 
 
 In the instances where amendments have been permitted 
 after issue joined and proofs taken, it will be seen that it was 
 shown the plaintiff was entitled to equitable relief under the 
 general prayer, though it may be different from that sought in 
 the special prayer. Ibid.; locale v. Neale, 9 Wall. 1, 19 L. ed. 
 590; Walden v. Bodley, 14 Pet. 164, 10 L. ed. 401; Bass v. 
 Christian Feigenspan, 82 Fed. 261 ; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. 
 Ohio & M. E. Co. 142 U. S. 414, 35 L. ed. 1061, 12 Sup. Ct , 
 Eep. 188. 
 
 Under the old rules it was held that a change in interest of 
 parties cannot be introduced by amendment. Land Co. v. 
 Elkins, 22 Blatchf. 204, 20 Fed. 546; The Ask, 156 Fed. 681, 
 682; Savage v. Worsham, 104 Fed. 18, 19; Maynard v. Green, 
 30 Fed. 644; Judson v. Courier Co. 25 Fed. 706; Metropolitan 
 Nat. Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co. 38 Fed. 58, but new 
 rules 19 and 37, authorizing amendments with the consent of 
 the court at any stage of the proceeding, and permitting any 
 party at any time to be made a party if his presence is neces- 
 sary to a complete determination .of the cause, would seem to 
 admit by amendment parties acqviiring an interest pending the 
 suit. However, the better practice would be to introduce the 
 party by a supplemental bill, under new rule 34. See "Supple- 
 mental Bill," chap. 61 . 
 
 Again, it has been frequently decided that amendments under 
 old rule 29, now new rule 28, sought to be made after issue 
 joined, are not to be made to strengthen plaintiff's case, or 
 change the character and quantity of relief, but to enable the 
 coiirt to do complete justice when a case for relief is made out. 
 
AMENDING BILL. 359 
 
 and not specifically asked for in the prayer. Ibid. ; I-iictimond 
 V. Irons, 121 U. S. 47, 30 L. ed. 870, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 788 ; 
 ]\rajTiard v. Green, 30 Fed. 644 ; Old Dominion Copper Min. 
 
 6 Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 176 Fed. 746 ; The Tremolo Pat- 
 ent, 23 Wall. 527, 23 L. ed. 98. 
 
 But by new rule 20 "plaintiff may strengthen his case by a 
 better statement of the nature of his claim, or a further and 
 better statement of particulars of any matters stated in any 
 pleading, upon such terms as the court may order." It is in 
 the discretion of the court. Gimbel Bros. v. Adams Exp. Co. 
 217 Fed. 318 ; Maxwell Steel Vault Co. v. National Casket Co. 
 205 Fed. 515. 
 
 Amendments should harmonize, or at least be germane to the 
 whole case. Anthony v. Campbell, 50 C. C. A. 195, 112 Fed. 
 217 ; Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 46, 47, 30 L. ed. 870, 871, 
 
 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 788. In Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 143, 15 
 L. ed. 161, a bill to set aside an agreement for fraud was not 
 permitted to be amended so as to ask for specific performance. 
 St. Louis, V. & T. H. R. Co. v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co. 33 
 Fed. 448 ; Merriman v. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. 12 C. C. A. 
 275, 24 IT. S. App. 428, 64 Fed. 551. 
 
 Again, when the matter has not been sufficiently put in issue 
 by the bill, or when the prayer is not consistent with the case 
 made, the court will permit an amendment at the trial (Graf- 
 fam V. Burgess, 117 U. S. 195, 29 L. ed. 844, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 686 ; Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 47, 30 L. ed. 870, 7 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 788 ; Hardin v. Boyd, 113 U. S. 761, 28 L. ed. 1142, 
 
 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 771), and make the prayer conform to the 
 proof. Ibid. ; but see Bass v. Christian Feigenspan, 82 Fed. 
 261; Maynard v. Green, 30 Fed. 644. In Gotten v. Fidelity 
 
 6 C. Co. 41 Fed. 510, it was held that an amendment may be 
 filed at any time before decree to bring the merits fairly to 
 trial, but some courts have held that if the facts were known, 
 or ought to have been known, leave to file an amendment after 
 the facts are in will be refused. 
 
 Thus in Gubbins v. Laughtenschlager, 75 Fed. 622, the suit 
 began in 1892, and the decision was filed in 1896, when the 
 amendment was sought to be made, but it was denied because 
 ■ no reason was shown why the point was not sooner presented ; 
 but you will find in Smith v. Babcock, 3 Sumn. 583, Fed. Cas. 
 'No. 13,008 and Calloway v. Dobson, 1 Brock. 119, Fed. Cas. 
 
360 AMEXDINU BILL. 
 
 'No. 2,325 an amendment was permitted, though the facts were 
 known, but not deemed material. 
 
 In Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 197, 29 L. ed. 844, 6 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 686, a formal charge of fraud was permitted to be 
 added at the trial by amendment. 
 
 In Hubbard v. Manhattan Trust Co. 30 C. C. A. 520, 57 U. 
 S. App. 730, 87 Fed. 57, it was held that you may strike out 
 an allegation, or leave out parties at the trial, and change the 
 allegation and prayer. Insurance Co. of N. A. v. Svendsen, 
 74 Fed. 348. So you may add a claim inadvertently omitted. 
 Nellis V. Pennock Mfg. Co. 38 Fed. 379. Or dismiss a party. 
 Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. American Graphophone Co. 118 
 Fed. 50. 
 
 As to the practice of the Texas courts in allowing amend- 
 ments during the progress of the case, see Fidelity & C. Co. 
 V. Carter, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 359, 57 S. W. 316, and authori- 
 ties. 
 
 As to amending as to parties, generally, see end of chap. 46. 
 
 AmendTnent After Decree. 
 
 In the Tremolo Patent, 23 Wall. 518, 23 L. ed. 97, the court 
 says you may amend your bill after decree, if the cause was 
 tried as if the bill had contained the averment sought to be 
 made, and defendants would not be prejudiced by the amend- 
 ment. Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 195, 29 L. ed. 844, 6 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 686; Ee Glass, 119 Fed. 511; IS^ew York Grape 
 Sugar Co. v. Buffalo Grape Sugar Co. 20 Fed. 505 ; Zeillin v. 
 Eogers, 10 Sawy. 200, 21 Fed., 103; Gubbins v. Laughten- 
 schlager, 75 Fed. 620 ; Morrow Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Xew England 
 Shoe Co. 24 L. E.A. 417, 6 C. C. A. 508, 18 U. S. App. 256, 
 57 Fed. 692. 
 
 Aviendment to Cure Jurisdiction. 
 
 You may amend to cure jurisdiction, thus when proper juris- 
 dictional allegations are not made, — as, where "residence," and 
 not "citizenship," is alleged, the appellate courts have reversed, 
 permitting the bill to be amended. New rule 19. Stockwell v. 
 Boston & M. Co. 131 Fed. 153 ; Sambo v. Union P. Coal Co. 146 
 
AMENDIJroi BII.L. 361 
 
 Fed. SO; ]\[euard v. Goggan, 121 U. S. 253, 30 L. ed. 914, 7 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 873 ; Great Soiitliern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. 
 Jones, 193 U. S. 540, 48 L. ed. 784, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 576; 
 Betzoldt V. American Ins. Co. 47 Fed. 705 ; ]\Iarthinson v. Win- 
 yali Lumber Co. 125 Fed. 633 ; King Bridge Co. v. Otoe County, 
 120 U. S. 227, 30 L. ed. 624, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 552; iletcalf v. 
 Watertown, 128 U. S. 587, 32 L. ed. 543, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 173. It is in the discretion of the court. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. 
 Co. V. Tompkins, 41 C. C. A. 488, 101 Fed. 539; Chicago, E. 
 I. & P. E. Co. V. Stephens, 134 C. C. A. 263, 218 Fed. 535. 
 See act of Congress iLarch 3d, 1915, allowing appellate court 
 to amend to show jurisdiction. 
 
 So, where objection to the jurisdiction of the court has been 
 sustained, the plaintiff has a right to amend the bill (Equity 
 rule 19 ; Ins. Co. of ^t. A. v. Svendsen, 74 Fed. 347 ; Ilardon 
 V. Boyd, 113 U. S. 701, 28 L. ed. 1142, 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 771 ; 
 Eiggs V. Brown, 172 Fed. 637) b^' striking out or shifting par- 
 ties. After decree pro confesso on bill showing no jurisdic- 
 tion, amendment was allowed to cure it (Welson v. Eaton, 13 
 C. C. A. 523, 27 U. S. App. 677, 66 Fed. 376; Atchison, T. & 
 S. F. E. Co. V. Gilliland, 113 C. C. A. 476, 193 Fed. 608 ; Mc- 
 Eldowney v. Card, 193 Fed. 476) ; but it seems that where facts 
 are to be alleged, as in equity new rule 27, to give a Federal 
 court jurisdiction, you cannot amend to give jurisdiction (Diclc- 
 inson v. Consolidated Traction Co. 114 Fed. 233), not to defeat 
 jurisdiction (Gibbins v. Laughtenschlager, 75 Fed. 616). 
 
 Amendment as to Amount. 
 
 You may amend as to amount if not definitely stated. Home 
 Ins. Co. V. ISTobles, 63 Fed. 641 ; Bureau of National Literature 
 V. Sells, 211 Fed. 383, 384, and cases cited. See Affidavit to 
 show amount (end of chap. 33 ; chap. 35, p. 205). 
 
 Ejfed of Amendment. 
 
 Amending a bill is a continuation of the original, if no new 
 parties are made (French v. Hay [French v. Stewart] 22 
 Wall. 246, 22 L. ed. 856), or new suit (Columbia Valley E. Co. 
 V. Portland & S. E. Co. 89 C. C. A. 361, 162 Fed. 609). 
 
362 AMENDING BILL. 
 
 If the amendment is of a material matter, time must be al- 
 lowed the defendant to answer. Nelson v. Eaton, 13 C. C. A. 
 523, 27 U. S. App. 677, 66 Fed. 378. By new rule 32, it is 
 provided that where the amendment to the bill is made after 
 the answer is filed, the defendant shall put in a new or sup- 
 plemental answer, within ten days after the amendment or 
 amended bill is filed, unless further time is given; upon 
 failure to do so Tpro confesso may be taken. Equity rules 
 12, 16, 29. It authorizes the defendant to put in an entirely 
 new answer (Blythe v. Hinkley, 84 Fed. 244 j Nelson v. Eaton, 
 13 C. C. A. 523, 27 TJ. S. App. 677, 66 Fed. 378; North 
 Chicago Street R. Co. v. Chicago Union Traction Co. 
 150 Fed. 631-633) ; and may state under new rule 30 as many 
 defenses, in the alternative, regardless of consistency, as he 
 deems essential to his defense. 
 
 If an amendment is allowed on hearing an interlocutory in- 
 junction, it takes effect at once, if no new parties are made. 
 American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers' & Die Makers' 
 Union Nos. 1 & 3, 90 Fed. 598; U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 954; 
 Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1591. Or if the merits are not particu- 
 larly affected by the amendments and new parties, requiring 
 further process, the plaintiff may proceed without further an- 
 swer. In Columbia Valley R. Co. v. Portland & S. R. Co. 89 
 C. C. A. 361, 162 Fed. 603. A distinction is drawn as to time 
 of taking effect between an amended bill and amendments to a 
 bill. An amended bill speaks from the time it is filed, and not 
 from the filing of the original bill. 
 
 In North Chicago Street R. Co. v. Chicago Union Traction 
 Co. 150 Fed. 613, it was strenuously urged and sustained that 
 an amendment to a bill does not entitle the defendant to an- 
 swer anew the entire bill, but only the amended matter. 
 
 Motion to Amend. 
 
 Where the amendment is not of course, and is sought after 
 answer, a motion must be filed asking permission. Rule A"o. 28. 
 Riggs V. Brown, 172 Fed. 637 ; Boston & A. R. Co. v. Parr, 98 
 Fed. 484, unless the defendant consents to the amendment. 
 Equity rule 28, clause 2. 
 
AMENDING BILL. 363 
 
 Form of Motion. 
 
 Title as in bill. 
 
 And now comes plaintiflF and begs leave to file in this cause the amended 
 bill, a copy of which is hereto attached. 
 
 R. F., 
 
 Solicitor. 
 
 The whole matter of amendment of the pleading is controlled 
 by the court, so that the insertion of amendments if not numerous 
 without rewriting the whole bill may be allowed. 
 
 Stating the Amendment. 
 
 If permitted to state the proposed amendments without filing 
 a new pleading it may be stated as follows: 
 Title as in bill. 
 
 Now comes plaintiff and by leave of the court amends his bill (or 
 
 answer) as follows: After the words, etc., on line of the 
 
 page of the bill (or answer) insert , or that the allegation 
 
 beginning on line , page of the bill (or answer) be so 
 
 amended as to read as follows Or that the words 
 
 on line page be stricken out. 
 
 E. F., 
 Solicitor. 
 
 Xew rule 32 contemplates that the amendments sought after 
 answer filed may be made as above stated without filing an 
 entirely new pleading. By new rule Xo. 28 amendments made 
 before answer filed, and after a copy of the bill has been taken 
 from the clerk's office, no motion is necessary, but a copy of the 
 "amended bill" must be served on the solicitor of the opposite 
 party. So much of the old rule 'No. 28 permitting the amend- 
 ments to be inserted in the bill to be served on the opposite 
 party, as indicated above, has been omitted from new rule 28, 
 and a co])y of the whole bill as amended must be served unless 
 by consent of parties, or order of the court, the proposed amend- 
 ments may be served without rewriting the bill. 
 
 We see, then, a motion to amend, and the amended bill in the 
 absence of consent of opposite counsel to permit the amend- 
 ments proposed, must be served on the opposite party or his 
 solicitor. (1st) When a copy of the bill has been taken out of 
 the clerk's office and before answer. (2d) When an answer has 
 been filed and the cause at issue. (3d) When the answer makes 
 it necessary to amend the bill. 
 
364 AMENDING BILL. 
 
 When Amendment to Be Filed. 
 
 After permission to amend has been granted the plaintiff to 
 amend his bill, the amendments proposed, or the bill as amended 
 attached to the motion, should be filed at once, or the amend- 
 ments will be treated as abandoned, and the cas^ will so proceed. 
 While old equity rule 30, fixing the time within which an 
 amendment was to be filed after permission to do so, has been 
 omitted from the new rules, yet the purpose of the new rules is 
 to expedite the preparation of the case for final hearing, and 
 unreasonable delay will be penalized. See Boston & A. E. Co. 
 V. Parr, 98 Fed. 484. 
 
 Amendment After Appeal. 
 
 A motion to amend a bill in the court of appeals so as to 
 retain jurisdiction can only be made by consent. Fitchburg K. 
 Co. V. Nichols, 29 C. C. A. 464, 50 U. S. App. 280, 85 Fed. 
 869 ; Kansas City Southern E. Co. v. Prunty, 66 C. C. A. 103, 
 133 Fed. 61Y. But, as we have seen, the judgments may be 
 reversed and amendment allowed in the court below without' 
 consent. Ibid. ; United States v. Hopewell, 2 C. C. A. 510, 5 
 U. S. App. 137, 51 Fed. 798. Thus when a bill has been dis- 
 missed on demurrer for laches, the appellate court may send it 
 back for amendment, showing excuse for delay. Hubbard v. 
 Manhattan Trust Co. 30 C. C. A. 520, 57 U. S. App. 730, 87 
 Fed. 51; Watson v. Bonfils, 53 C. C. A. 535, 116 Fed. 161. 
 See act March 3d, 1915, permitting amendments after appeal 
 to cure defective allegations of diversity of citizenship. 
 
 When an amendment is sought to be made after appeal, it 
 will not be permitted if it requires new evidence. American 
 Bell Teleph. Co. v. United States, 15 C. C. A. 569, 33 U. S. 
 App. 236, 68 Fed. 570. The record must show the evidence 
 to sustain the allegations sought to be made. Ibid. 
 
 We see now that under section 954, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1591, amendments have been allowed at every stas-e of the case 
 from the summons to the final judgment. iMcDonald v. 
 Xebraska, 41 C. C. A. 278, 101 Fed. 177. See "amendment 
 to cure jurisdiction," chap. 59, p. 360, new rule 19. McEldow- 
 ney v. Card, 193 Fed. 483, and cases cited; Manitowoc Malting 
 Co. v. Fuechtwanger, 169 Fed. 986-988. 
 
AMENDING BILL. 365 
 
 Not Affected hy State Statutes. 
 
 The right to allow amendments in the Federal courts is not 
 affected by State statutes (Mexican C. E. Co. v. Duthie, 189 
 U. S. Te/iT L. ed. 715, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 610; Oliver v. Ray- 
 mond, 108 Fed. 927 ; Kent v. Bay State Gas Co. 93 Fed. 887), 
 because Congress h9.s legislated upon the subject. Manitowoc 
 Malting Co. v. Fiiechtwanger, 169 Fed. 987-988, and cases 
 cited; Lange v. Union P. R. Co. 62 C. 0. A. 48, 126 Fed. 339. 
 
CHAPTER LX. 
 
 SUPPLEMENTAL BILL. ' 
 
 Old rule 57, providing the conditions under wliicb a supple- 
 mental bill could be filed, has been substituted by new rule 34, 
 as follows: 
 
 "Upon application of either party the court or judge may, 
 upon reasonable notice and such terms as are just, permit him 
 to file and serve a supplemental pleading, alleging material 
 facts occurring after his formal pleading, or of which he was 
 ig-norant when the original pleading was filed, including the 
 judgment or decree of a competent court rendered after the 
 commencement of the suit determining the matters in contro- 
 versy, or a part thereof. 
 
 The following cases construing and applying old rule 57 in- 
 dicate more or less a proper construction of new rule 34: 
 Nevada Nickel Syndicate Co. v. National Nickel Co. 86 Fed. 
 489; Thompson v. Schenectady E. Co. 119 Eed. 638; Kennedy 
 V. Bank of Georgia, 8 How. 610, 12 L. ed. 1218; Hazleton 
 Tripod-Boiler Co. v. Citizens' Street R. Co. 72 Fed. 325; 
 Central Trust Co. v. Western North Carolina R. Co. 89 Fed. 
 24 ; Chester v. Life Asso. of America, 4 Fed. 489 ; Reeve v. 
 North Carolina Land & Lumber Co. 72 C. C. A. 287, 141 Fed. 
 821-834; Curtis Davis & Co. v. Smith, 105 Fed. 949; Oregon 
 & Transcontinental Co. v. Northern P. R. Co. 32 Fed. 428; 
 Napier v. Westerhoff, 153 Fed. 985; Pittsburgh, S. & N. E. 
 Co. V. Fiske, 101 C. C. A. 560, 178 Fed. 67, and cases cited; 
 Bush V. Pioneer Min. Co. 102 C. C. A. 372, 179 Fed. 78. 
 
 The supplemental pleadin_g is in the nature of an amend- 
 ment, however it differs from the amended pleading in the fact 
 that it does not take the place of the original pleading, but is 
 an independent aid to it by adding some material fact occurring 
 after the original pleading was filed, or which may have existed 
 at the time, but was unknown to the pleader. Rule 34. Mellor 
 
 366 
 
SUPPLEMENTAL BILL. 367 
 
 V. Smither, 52 C. C. A. 64, 114 Fed. 116 ; Eoot v. Woolworth, 
 15.0 U. S. 401, 3Y L. ed. 1123, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136 ; Mitchell 
 V. Eig Six Development Co. 186 Fed. 556. It may be used as 
 well after as before a decree. Ibid. The rule obviously means 
 that any change of interest in the parties, or if a larger or dif- 
 ferent kind of relief is required b}^ reason of events arising after 
 the suit, then a supplemental bill is the proper proceeding to 
 bring it before the court, and not by amendment; providing, 
 always, that the complainant had a cause of action when the 
 original bill was filed and it was set forth in the original bill. 
 Mellor V. Smither, 52 C. C. A. 64, 114 Fed. 120 ; Chicago Grain 
 Door Co. V. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 137 Fed. 103, and cases 
 cited; Banks Law Pub. Co. v. Lawyers' Co-op. Pub. Co. 139 
 Fed. 702 ; Berliner Gramophone Co. v. Seaman, 51 C. C. A. 
 440, 113 Fed. 754. 
 
 Supplemental Bill When Necessary. 
 
 Frequently after filing a suit, circumstances changing con- 
 ditions, as a change of interest in parties, renders it necessary 
 to bring in new parties, or perhaps some new fact had arisen 
 affecting the subject-matter. This should be brought in by sup- 
 plement, which is in effect a method of amendment. It is a 
 continuation of the original bill, and adds to the former pro- 
 ceeding what is necessary for the court to enter a complete de- 
 cree. Berliner Gramophone Co. v. Seaman, 51 C. C. A. 440, 
 113 Fed. 752; K'apier v. Westerhoff, 153 Fed. 985; Lang v. 
 Choctaw, O. & G. E. Co. 87 C. C. A. 307, 160 Fed. 356; 
 Reeve v. Xorth Carolina Land & Timber Co. 72 C. C. A. 287, 
 141 Fed. 821; Chapman v. Yellow Poplar Lumber Co. 74 C. 
 C. A. 331, 143 Fed. 201; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Hadley, 
 155 Fed. 220; Electrical Accumulator Co. v. Brush Electric 
 Go. 44 Fed. 606 ; jS^'evada Nickel Syndicate v. National Nickel 
 Co. 86 Fed. 486; Pittsburgh, S. & N. R. Co. v. Fiske, 101 C. 
 C. A. 560, 178 Fed. 67, 69, and cases cited. Thus any after 
 acquired title should be brought in by supplement (Bush v. 
 Pioneer Min. Co. 102 C. C. A. 372, 179 Fed. 78), or where 
 the plaintiff has sued in another right, and his interest has 
 determined by the appointment of a successor (Phipps v. Sedg- 
 wick, 96 U. S. 10, 24 L. ed. 594), such as a change of trustees, 
 
368 SUPPLEMENTAL BILL. 
 
 or where there has been a partial transfer of interest by the 
 original plaintiff, or by one of several original plaintiffs (Camp- 
 bell V. New York, 35 Fed. 14) ; or where there happens to be 
 one born with same class of interest as the parties to the bill; 
 or when the husband and wife are parties, and by the death 
 of one a new interest survives to the other ; or where a party 
 who is a feme sole marries during suit, a supplemental bill can 
 be iiled. Hazleton Tripod-Boiler Co. v. Citizens' Street E. Co. 
 72 Fed. 327-329. But where the facts to be set up existed 
 before suit and by reasonable diligence could have been dis- 
 covered and pleaded by way of amendment, then a supplemental 
 bill will not be allowed. MosgTove v. Kountze, 4 McCrary, 561, 
 14 Fed. 315. 
 
 While the province, then, of a supplemental bill is to supply 
 some defect in the structure of the original bill when this can- 
 not be done by amendment, or to introduce matters occuiTing 
 subsequent to the filing of the original bill, yet in the light of 
 equity rules 19 and 28 and U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 954 (Comp. 
 Stat. 1913, sec. 1591), providing for amendments to bills at 
 any progress of the cause, and the construction of courts per- 
 mitting amendments at any stage, and in view of a further 
 recognized rule of practice, that when the same end can be 
 obtained by amendment, a supplemental bill will not lie (Henry 
 V. Travelers' Ins. Co. 45 Fed. 302), it results that purely sup- 
 plemental bills are only necessary in a few cases. 
 
 It is difficult under the various decisions to trace the line of 
 demarcation where amendment ends and supplement begins; 
 however, under equity rule 34 a supplemental bill is proper 
 when the bill becomes defective (as when a new interest or 
 right because of a change of interest in parties or of the sub- 
 ject-matter), requiring new facts to be alleged, which has ac- 
 crued to one or all of the parties, after the bill has been filed, 
 thereby creating a defect in the structure of the bill. Nevada 
 JSTickel Syndicate Co. v. National Nickel Co. 86 Fed. 489, and 
 authorities cited at beginning of the chapter; Cedar Valley 
 Land & Cattle Co. v. Coburn, 29 Fed. 586 ; New York Secur. 
 & T. Co. V. Lincoln Street E. Co. 74 Fed. 68 ; Anglo-Florida 
 Phosphate Co. v. McKibben, 13 C. C. A. 36, 23 IT.. S. App. 
 675, 65 Fed. 529 ; De Forest v. Thompson, 40 Fed. 375 ; May- 
 nard v. Green, 30 Fed. 644 ; Mosgrove v. Kountze, 4 McCrary, 
 561, 14 Fed. 315. 
 
SUPPLEMENTAL BILL. 369 
 
 When No Ccmse in Original Bill. 
 
 If complainant has no ground for relief in tie original bill, 
 then you cannot file a supplemental; but if the original bill is 
 sufficient for one kind of relief, and facts subsequently occur 
 giving another kind of relief and more extensive, then it may 
 be set up by supplement, but it is in the discretion of the court. 
 Henderson v. 300 Tons of Iron Ore, 38 Fed. 40; Mason v. 
 Hartford, P. & F. E. Co. 10 Fed. 334; Mellor v. Smither, 52 
 C. C. A. 64, 114 Fed. 116-120; Putney v. Whitmore, 66 Fed. 
 385 ; Sheffield & B. Coal, Iron & E. Co. v. Newman, 23 C. C. 
 A. 459, 41 U. S. App. 766, 77 Fed. 791. When supplemental 
 bill is permitted, you may set up matters that were omitted 
 from the original bill. Mellor v. Smither, 52 C. C. A. 64, 
 114 Fed. 116. 
 
 After Decree. 
 
 It may be stated as a rule that after decree a supplemental 
 bill must be filed when you require some aid in the execution 
 of the decree, or further directions, or where a purchaser of 
 the subject-matter desires to obtain the benefit of the decree. 
 Secor V. Singleton, 41 Fed. 725 ; Eoot v. Woolworth, 150 U. S. 
 402-411, 37 L. ed. 1124-1126, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 136 ; French 
 V. Hay (French v. Stewart) 22 Wall. 246, 22 L. ed. 856; Mil- 
 waukee E. Co. V. Milwaukee & St. P. E. Co. (Milwaukee & 
 M. E. Co. V. Soutter) 2 Wall. 634, 17 L. ed. 895 ; Mitchell v. 
 Big Six Development Co. 186 Fed. 557. 
 
 In Eoot V. Woolworth, 150 U. S. 402-411, 37 L. ed. 1124- 
 1126, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 136, it is decided that when the title 
 of the original party is determined, but another party becomes 
 interested in the subject-matter through a title not derived 
 from the original party, but in such manner as to render it 
 just that this second party should have the benefit of the prior 
 proceedings then such party can file a bill in the nature of a 
 supplemental bill, to be discussed hereafter. 
 
 When one seeks to modify the decree, on the ground of newly 
 discovered evidence, then a supplemental bill in the nature of 
 a bill of review can be filed, but it must show definitely that 
 the facts set up were not known prior to the entry of th« de- 
 
 S. Eq.— 24. 
 
370 SUPPLEMENTAL BILL. 
 
 cree. Omalia v. Eedick, 11 C. C. A. 1, 27 U. S. App. 204, 
 63 Fed. 6; Henry v. Travelers' Ins. Co. 45 Fed. 299-303. 
 Again, supplemental bills are proper to obtain restraining or- 
 ders to protect decrees of courts, as where parties attempt to 
 nullify in a State court a decree of a Federal court foreclosing 
 a moi-tgage. 
 
 Motion to File Supplemental Bill. 
 
 Equity rule 34 further requires that before either character 
 of supplemental bill can be filed, you must obtain consent of 
 the court through a motion to file it, with reasonable notice to 
 the other party showing proper cause. The motion is intended 
 to advise the defendant of the ground upon which the bill is 
 based, and to advise the court that probable cause exists for 
 granting the motion, and that the matter embraced in the mo- 
 tion, if properly pleaded, would sustain the supplemental bill. 
 The motion must show that the event upon which it is founded 
 occurred after the filing of the bill (Nevada Nickel Syndicate 
 Co. V. National Nickel Co. 86 Fed. 489) ; or if the fact ex-- 
 isted before that, it was not known, or could not by reasonable 
 diligence have been known (Mosgrove v. Kountze, 4 McCrary, 
 561, 14 Fed. 315; Omaha v. Eedick, 11 C. C. A. 1, 27 U. S. 
 App. 204, 63 Fed. 6; Henry v. Travelers' Ins. Co. 45 Fed. 
 303), or through misapprehension, or some excusable cause, 
 he was prevented from setting it up. 
 
 The following form is sufiicient : 
 
 Title as in bill, and address. 
 
 The motion ( or petition ) of A. B. respectfully shows that on the 
 
 day of A. D. 19 . . . he filed his bill in this Honorable Court 
 
 against C. D., defendant, for the purpose of (state object of bill) and plain- 
 tiff prayed in said bill as follows ( state prayer of bill ) . 
 
 Plaintiff shows that the defendant appeared and answered (state sub- 
 stance of answer or so much as will show the relevancy of the supplement 
 to be filed) or did not answer. That since the filing of the suit (here state 
 what has occurred since upon which the supplement rests). 
 
 Wherefore your petitioner is advised that it is necessary to bring in 0. 
 H. as a party to the suit (or whatever is sought in the supplemental bill), 
 and your petitioner prays that relief be granted to file a supplemental bill 
 against C. H. for the purpose of making him a party and for such general 
 and special relief as may be proper. 
 
 R. F., 
 Slolicitor. 
 
SUPPLEMENTAL BILL. 371 
 
 Leave must be obtained to file (Henrv v. Travelers' Ins. 
 3o. 45 Fed. 303) and the motion may be filed at any stage of 
 the cause (Seeor v. Singleton, 41 Fed. 726) ; but the grant- 
 ing- of it is entirely in the discretion of the coiTrt (Mackintosh 
 V. Flint & P. M. R. Co. 34 Fed. 614; Shefiield & B. Coal, Iron 
 & R. Co. V. Newman, 23 0. C. A. 459, 41 U. S. App. 766, 
 77 Fed. 7S7 ; Berliner Gramaphone Co. v. Seaman, 51 C. C. 
 A. 440, 113 Fed. 750). 
 
 In determining the motion, the court does not proceed to 
 try the ease on the motion, or determine questions that could 
 be raised by demurrer to the bill, but will ordinarily grant the 
 filing, though grave doubts may exist as to the relief prayed 
 for. Oregon & Transcontinental Co. v. Northern P. li. Co. 
 32 Fed. 428. 
 
 Notice of Motion. 
 
 Equity rule 34 "provides that either party may, on reason- 
 able notice, make an application to file and serve a supplemental 
 pleading." The time of hearing the application as fixed in old 
 rule 57 has been omitted in the new rule, but the presentation 
 and hearing may be designated in the motion as upon any "mo- 
 tion day" fixed under rule 6, or any other day may be stated. 
 The judge, at any time and place, and upon notice considered 
 reasonable, may make any interlocutory order advancing the 
 cause for hearing. Rule 6 and rule 1. 
 
 Title as in bill. 
 To Messrs , Solicitors for Defendant, etc. : 
 
 You will please take notice that I will present to his Honor , 
 
 Judge of the District Court of the United States for the District 
 
 of , on the day of .A. D. 19. . ., or as soon there- 
 after as practicable, a motion, a copy of which is hereto attached, praying 
 for permission to file a supplemental bill (or a bill in the nature of a sup- 
 plemental bill) in the above cause and upon the grounds therein stated. 
 
 E. F., 
 Solicitor, etc. 
 
 This notice may be served by an officer or sent by a clerk, 
 and it is usual for counsel to indorse acceptance of service, but 
 if not, the officer serving may make his return of service as 
 usual, or if served by one not an officer, he may make affidavit 
 of the delivery to counsel on the notice as follows : 
 
o72 SUi'PJLEilEKTAL BILL. 
 
 State of , 
 
 County of 
 
 On the day of , A. U. 19. . ., I served the within notice 
 
 on X. Y., solicitor of record for the defendant, by handing him a copy of 
 
 (or leaving it at his place of business or residence). 
 
 (Signed) John Smith. 
 
 Sworn to before me S. M., a notary public in and for County, 
 
 in the State of , this the day of A. D. 19. .. 
 
 [SEAL.] 
 
 Notary. 
 
 ISTew equity rule 35 provides that it shall not be necessary to 
 set forth in a supplemental bill any of the statements in the orig- 
 inal bill, unless special circumstances require it. The supple- 
 mental bill as stated is only a continuation of the original suit, 
 and it should set forth as much of the original pleadings as is 
 necessary to clearly show the relevancy of the supplement, or 
 the new matter sought to be introduced; that is, the change 
 of interest of the parties and how the subject-matter is affected 
 thereby. 
 
 Parties. 
 
 If a new party is made, then show his interest in the subject- 
 matter and that he is entitled to a decree, and is further en- 
 titled to the benefit of the prior proceedings, or, if a defendant, 
 that his presence is necessary to perfect the relief sought in 
 the suit. 
 
 The parties to the bill depend on the purpose. Ordinarily 
 the parties to the original bill are parties to the supplement, 
 but when change of interest only occurs in one defendant, then 
 a supplemental bill may be exhibited against him alone, and 
 also when the purpose is only to make formal parties, then you 
 need only make them parties to the supplemental bill. 
 
 In this character of bill, questions of citizenship do not affect 
 jurisdiction, as it is only auxiliary to the principal suit. Eoot 
 V. Woolworth, 150 U. S. 401, 37 L. ed. 1123, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 Ptep. 136; Miller v. Kogers, 29 Fed. 401. 
 
 Process. 
 
 Again, if the matter of supplement does not require new 
 
SUPPLEMENTAL BILL. 373 
 
 parties to be made, then there is no necessity for further proc- 
 ess. Shaw V. Bill, 95 U. S. 10, 24 L. ed. 333. You may 
 direct a rule to the parties already served to answer. Hazleton 
 Tripod-Boiler Co. v. Citizens' Street E. Co. 72 Fed. 329 ; but 
 see French v. Hay (French v. Stewart) 22 Wall. 246, 247, 
 22 L. ed. 856, 857, holding new process necessary, unless 
 waived. 
 
CHAPTEE LXI. 
 
 EELATIOW OF SUPPLEMENTAL TO ORIGINAL BILL. 
 
 The supplement is only a continuation of the original bill, 
 and the facts set up must have a near relation to the original 
 bill, and the relief sought must be a modification or enlarge- 
 ment of the original relief sought, Maynard v. Green, 30 Fed. 
 645. And the facts in the supplement must not contradict the 
 facts in the original bill. (Ibid.; Electrical Accumulator Co. 
 V. Brush Electric Co. 44 Fed. 606), but must further the ob- 
 ject (Shaw V. Bill, 95 U. S. 10, 24 L. ed. 333). If it has 
 no connection with the original bill, it should be dismissed. 
 Milwaukee & M. E. Co. v. Milwaukee & St. P. E. Co. 6 Wall. 
 742, 18 L. ed. 856. 
 
 You cannot make new case by supplement (Electrical Ac- 
 cumulator Co. V. Brush Electric Co. 44 Fed. 607), or pray 
 for relief manifestly inconsistent with original prayer. (Ibid.) 
 
 Again, if there is no cause of action in the original bill, it 
 will not support a supplement stating a cause of action. Put- 
 ney V. Whitmire, 66 Fed. 385. 
 
 If the supplemental bill be brought to set up new matter it 
 must fui-ther appear that it was filed as soon as practicable 
 after the discovery. Henry v. Travelers' Ins. Co, 45 Fed. 303 ; 
 Omaha v. Eedick, 11 C. C. A. 1, 27 U. S. App. 204, 63 Fed. 
 1; Mosgrove v. Kountze, 4 McCrary, 561, 14 Fed. 315. A 
 supplemental bill setting up documents in hcec verba will not 
 be expunged if material. (IS^evada Nickel Syndicate Co. v. 
 IsTational Nickel Co. 86 Fed. 488; but repetitions will be. 
 (Ibid.) 
 
 Form of Supplemental Bill. 
 
 Title and address as in 'bill. 
 
 That on the day of -. ., A. D. 19. . ., plaintiff exhibited 
 
 his original bill of complaint in this Honorable Court against C. D. defend- 
 
 374 
 
BELATION OF StrPPLEMENTAL TO OEIGIISTAL BILL. 375 
 
 ant (state purpose of bill and prayer). That said defendant was duly 
 served with process and entered an appearance and put in his answer (here 
 
 state the stage the case has reached) . That on the day of , 
 
 A. D. 19 ... , C. D. was declared a bankrupt and that E. P. was chosen 
 assignee of the estate of C. D., all of which has been duly conveyed and 
 assigned to the said E. F., and plaintiff is advised that he is entitled to the 
 same relief against the said E. F., as he would have been entitled to if C. 
 D. had not become a bankrupt. 
 
 To the end, therefore, that the defendant E. F. may show why the plain- 
 tiff may not have the relief prayed for, and may answer under oath fully 
 and truly to all tlie matters herein stated as if particularly interrogated 
 thereto, and that the plaintiff may have the same relief against E. F. as 
 he would have been entitled to against the said C. D. had he not become a 
 bankrupt and that plaintiff may have such other further general and spe- 
 cial relief as the facts of the case entitle him to, may it please Your Honor 
 to grant to plaintiff a writ of subpoena directed- to the said E. F., command- 
 ing to appear and make answer to the premises and abide by and perform 
 sxich orders and decrees as to the court may seem proper. 
 
 Equity rule 3o. 
 
 E. F., 
 Solicitor. 
 
 The prayer of the bill may pray for a subpnena to the end 
 that the defendant may answer the new supplemental matter, 
 and the court to grant further relief based on the supplemental 
 statements. Or if the defect arises from a change of parties 
 a subpcena is prayed against the new parties to the end that 
 they may answer the premises, and the plaintiff have the bene- 
 fit of the former proceedings, and the same relief he would 
 have been entitled to against the former parties. 
 
 The answer to the supplemental pleading should be filed 
 within ten days after the supplemental pleading is filed, unless 
 further time is allowed by the judge of the court; and upon 
 default the like proceedings may be had as in case of an omis- 
 sion to put in an answer. Equity rules 32, 12, and 16. The 
 defensive pleading would be governed by rules 29 and 30. 
 
CHAPTEE LXIL 
 
 BILL IW THE NATUEE OF SUPPLEMEN'TAL BILL. 
 
 It will be noticed that old equity rule 57 provided not only 
 for a supplemental bill, but for a bill in the nature of a supple- 
 mental bill "as may be necessary to be filed," which means, as 
 the facts may demand. Judges of the Federal courts often 
 spoke of the two classes of bills as if the distinction was only 
 artificial, but there was a marked difference. Curtis Davis & 
 Co. V. Smith, 105 Fed. 950 ; Campbell v. New York, 35 Fed. 
 14 ; Vigneron v. Auto Time Saver Repair Kit Co. 171 Fed. 581 ; 
 Eoss V. Ft. Wayne, 58 Fed. 404, reversed in 11 0. C. A. 288, 
 24 TJ. S. App. 113, 63 Fed. 466. ISTew rule 34 omits the men- 
 tion of bills in the nature of supplemental bills. Presumably 
 the omission is because of new rule 19, providing that the court 
 may at any time allow material supplemental matter to be set 
 forth in an amended or supplemental pleading, while new rule 
 34 sets forth, as we have seen, the nature of the matter requir- 
 ing a supplemental pleading, which in effect includes all mat- 
 ters heretofore set up by a "bill in the nature of a supplemental 
 bill." So, under the present rules any supplementary matter 
 set up in the pleading is only amendatory process to cure matters 
 which render the original bill or answer defective, and is only 
 a continuation of the original pleading so amended, while under 
 the old rule it was held that a bill in the nature of a supple- 
 mental bill was in effect the beginning of a new suit, drawing 
 to itself the advantage of the proceedings under the original 
 bill. While then, under the new rules "a bill in the nature of 
 a supplemental bill" need not, as such, be filed, yet the decisions 
 under the old rule indicating the nature of the supplemental 
 matter that should be set up in such a bill are still valuable, 
 as they point out by illustration what is supplemental matter 
 now controlled by new rules 34 and 19. 
 
 The decisions under old rule 57, discussing the supplemental 
 
 376 
 
BILL IN THE NATUEE OF SUPPLEMENTAL BILL. 377 
 
 matter that should be set up by "a bill in the nature of a sup- 
 plemental bill," are as follows : When the property which is 
 the subject-matter of the suit has been entirely transferred by a 
 sole plaintiff or sole defendant, or by all the plaintiffs or de- 
 fendants, to a third person, or if the title has passed by death 
 and transferred to another, then a bill in the nature of a sup- 
 plemental bill should be filed (Nevada Nickel Syndicate v. 
 National Nickel Co. 86 Fed. 489 ; Hazleton Tripod-Boiler Co. 
 V. Citizens' Street E. Co. 72 Fed. 325 ; Secor v. Singleton, 41 
 Fed. 725; Walter Baker & Co. v. Baker, 89 Fed. 673; Root v. 
 Woolworth, 150 TJ. S. 401, 37 L. ed. 1123, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 136; Miller v. Rogers, 29 Fed. 401), because the parties in 
 these cases are out of court for want of interest; the suit is 
 virtually ended, and the court cannot enter a decree, nor can it 
 be continued by revivor, or a pure supplemental bill for or 
 against the new party. Ibid. 
 
 Again, suppose the interest is cut off by death, and the prop- 
 erty in dispute transferred to a third person who does not hold 
 in the same right as the deceased party; it cannot be continued 
 by pure supplemental bill because he comes in by a different 
 right and by a title that might be litigated, as, when property 
 is cut off by bankruptcy. Hazleton Tripod-Boiler Co. v. Citi- 
 i;ens' Street R. Co. 72 Fed. 328 ; Chester v. Life Asso. of Amer- 
 ica, 4 Fed. 487; Miller v. Rogers, 29 Fed. 401. It would 
 not be enough that the new party states that his assignor in- 
 stituted suit and assigned to him, or that suit was instituted 
 by the deceased and his interest arose by reason of the death, 
 etc., as would be sufficient in a pure supplemental bill, but he 
 must show that his assignor had the property, and the manner 
 in which he had acquired the property carried with it the right 
 to sue. Foster, Eq. Pr. sec. 190. This requires an original 
 bill and supplementary only so far as advantage may be taken 
 of the prior proceedings. 
 
 A bill in the nature of a supplemental bill must, however, 
 follow the general purpose of the original bill and be in accord 
 with the tenor of its allegations. Electrical Accumulator Co. 
 V. Brush Electric Co. 44 Fed. 607. It must set forth so much 
 of the original bill or answer as shows how the interest of the 
 original party has terminated, and the circumstances under 
 which the new party can claim the benefit of the prior proceed- 
 
378 BILL IN THE NATUEE OF SUPPLEMENTAL BILL. 
 
 ings, and it must show a cause of action against the original 
 defendants, and be in form an original bill. 
 
 It has been held, however, that if a supplemental bill has 
 been filed, when the remedy should have been sought through 
 a bill in the nature of a supplemental bill, and no objection 
 is raised to the irregularity, the court will disr^ard it and 
 proceed on the supplemental bill. Reedy v. Scott, 23 Wall. 
 352, 23 L. ed. 109 ; see Coburn v. Cedar Valley Land & Cattle 
 Co. 138 U. S. 196, 34 L. ed. 876, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 258. 
 
 Again, if a party defendant dies before appearance, or, hav- 
 ing appeared, dies before answer, plea, or demurrer, and be- 
 fore a judgment pro confesso has been taken, his successor must 
 be brought in by a bill in the nature of a supplemental bill. 
 There is some confusion on the subject of making new parties 
 when a purchase has been made pendente lite. 
 
 A distinction has been drawn where the plaintiff sells and 
 where the defendant sells. Thus it is held that when the de- 
 fendant sells, his purchaser is bound by the decree, and it is 
 not necessary to file a supplemental bill ; but when the plaintiff 
 sells, there can be no decree, and the purchaser must be brought 
 before the court by an. original bill in the nature of a supple- 
 mental bill. Hazleton Tripod-Boiler Co. v. Citizens' Street E. 
 Co. 72 Eed. 329 ; Walter Baker & Co. v. Baker, 89 Fed. 675. 
 
 In Hazleton Tripod-Boiler Co. v. Citizens' Street R. Co. 72 
 Fed. 328, 329, the court recognizes the distinction between 
 privies in law and privies in deed, and holds that if the new 
 party obtains the interest by transfer he must file an original 
 bill in the nature of a supplemental bill, but the interest of an 
 administrator or heir at law may be set up by a pure supple- 
 mental bill. 
 
CHAPTEE LXIII. 
 
 MOTION" TO REVIVE. 
 
 Under old rule 56 the revival of a suit abated by death or 
 any other event was by a bill, and not by motion. Dillavd v. 
 Central Virginia Iron Co. 125 Fed. 158 ; Simmons v. iiorris, 
 109 Fed. 707. But new rule ~So. 45 is substituted for old rule 
 ^o. 56, and provides for the revival of a suit in equity by a 
 simple motion in the event of the death of any of the parties. 
 Where a party to the suit dies, representatives of the deceased 
 should apply within a reasonable, time by motion to be made par- 
 ties to the suit ; but on failure to do so any party to the suit may 
 make the application, in which event the court must make the 
 order for notice to the parties to be substituted and to file the 
 necessary pleadings. The new rules dispense with bills of re- 
 vivor. 
 
 By U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 955, Comp. Stat. 1913, see. 1592, 
 it is provided that when either of the parties plaintiff or de- 
 fendant die before final judgment the executor or administrator 
 may, if the suit survives, prosecute or defend to final judgment 
 . . . . If the executor or administrator refuses or neglects 
 to become a party twenty days after being served by scire 
 facias, the court may nevertheless render judgment against the 
 deceased party. The executor or administrator becoming a 
 party is entitled to a continuance. This section, however, has 
 reference to a cause wherein a sole plaintiff or defendant dies. 
 See Allen v. Fairbanks, 40 Fed. 188; Spaeth v. Sells, 176 
 Fed. 797. See also Thomas v. Tensas Parish, 14 Fed. 390, 
 and note; Spring v. Webb, 227 Fed. 481. 
 
 By U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 956, it is provided that when one 
 of several plaintiffs or defendants die in an action which sur- 
 vives to or against the other, the writ or action shall not abate, 
 but upon suggestion on the record the action shall proceed in 
 favor of or against the surviving party 
 
 379 
 
380 MOTION TO ItEVIVE. 
 
 We thus see at a glance the rules of equity and Federal stat- 
 utes controlling the revival of suits in Federal courts. There 
 is nothing inconsistent in the equity rules and statutes; the 
 former provides how the suggestion of death and subsequent 
 revival is to be made, which must be followed in equity causes 
 (Fitzpatrick v. Domingo, 4 Woods, 163, 14 Fed. 216), as 
 section 955 does not apply to equity suits. Brown v. Fletcher, 
 140 Fed. 642. 
 
 Nature of the Motion. 
 
 Like the old bill of revivor, "the motion" is only an incident 
 to the original suit. See Hone v. Dillon, 29 Fed. 465 ; New- 
 combe V. Murray, 77 Fed. 493 ; Terry v. Sharon, 131 U. S. 48, 
 33 L. ed. 96, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 705. To revive the suit the inter- 
 est of the deceased must survive death, and must be of such a 
 nature that it passes by operation of law to the legal representa- 
 tives, or to the heirs at law of the deceased. If the interest is 
 cut off by death or passed by will, it would fall within the con- 
 ditions requiring a supplemental bill. Chester v. Life Asso. 
 of America, 4 Fed. 489. 
 
 See new rule 35, controlling the drawing of the motion. 
 
 Parties. 
 
 The new rule requires the motion to be filed by the repre- 
 sentatives of the deceased, and upon their failure to do so in 
 a reasonable time, then any party to the record may make the 
 motion. It is a matter of right where conditions exist, but not 
 after an order dismissing the suit. Fitzpatrick v. Domingo, 4 
 Woods, 163, 14 Fed. 216 ; Howth v. Owens, 30 Fed. 911. New 
 rule JSTo. 45 requires notice where other parties than the legal 
 representatives of the deceased seek to revive the suit. 
 
 When Sole Plaintiff Dies. 
 
 When the sole plaintiff dies, the executor or administrator 
 must revive, or if there be no necessity for administration, 
 then the heirs and all the defendants in the original bill must 
 be made parties to the motion. Kirk v. Du Bois, 28 Fed. 460 ; 
 
MOTION TO KEVIVE. 381 
 
 Childs V. Ferguson, 181 Fed. 795. See U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 
 955, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1592. 
 
 y\}ien Several Plaintiffs and One Dies. 
 
 If there be several plaintiffs, and one die, the suit may be 
 revived by the representatives of the deceased party, or by one 
 or all of the surviving plaintiffs. If any of the surviving plain- 
 tiffs refuse to join in the motion, make them defendants. See 
 U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 956 cited above and U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 
 955; Spaeth v. Sells, 176 Fed. 797. Upon failure to make the 
 application in a reasonable time, any other party to the suit may 
 make the motion. Equity rule 45. 
 
 One of Several Defendants Dies. 
 
 When one of several defendants dies, the suit abates as to 
 him, and you may proceed without him, unless he is an indis- 
 pensable party, in which event the representative of the de- 
 ceased must be made a party to the motion which may be filed 
 by any one of the plaintiffs in tlie original bill, or by the repre^ 
 sentatives of the deceased party to be made a party, and in the 
 event the application is not made in a reasonable time, any 
 other party to the bill may make the motion. 
 
 Under old rule 56 it was held that the defendant could not 
 make the plaintiff revive a suit, nor could he revive before de- 
 cree, but he could demand the revival within a given time or 
 have the suit dismissed, but under new rule 45, as we have seen, 
 he can force the revival as stated above. 
 
 When one of several plaintiffs, or one of several defendants; 
 dies, and the interest of the deceased passes to the coplaintiffs, 
 or codefendants, then there is no necessity for a revival, as in 
 cases where a husband joined with the wife -pro forma dies, or 
 where there are several executors or trustees, and one dies. 
 
 In making parties to the motion to revive, the fact that the- 
 new party or parties would destroy the diversity of citizenship - 
 would not affect the jurisdiction of the court if it existed when 
 the suit was filed. Being only a continuation of the old suit, of 
 which the court had jurisdiction, a subsequent change of situa- 
 tion cannot affect it. Clarke v. Mathewson, 12 Pet. I7l, 9 L.. 
 ed. 1043 ; Hone v. Dillon, 29 Fed. 465. 
 
382 MOTION TO KEVIVE. 
 
 You cannot object to the motion to revive the suit on account 
 of the death of parties because the original pleading shows no 
 cause of action or defense; the sole question is, Do the con- 
 ditions exist provided bj the rales for revival ? Allen v. Fair- 
 banks, 40 Fed. 188 ; Mason v. Hartford, P. & F. E. Co. 19 Fed. 
 53; Fretz v. Stover, 22 Wall. 198, 22 L. ed, 769. But if the 
 court has no jurisdiction of the original bill, then a motion to dis- 
 miss the revivor would be good. Sharon v. Terry, 1 L.E.A. 
 572, 13 Sawy. 387, 36 Fed. 337; Eutledge v. Waldo, 94 Fed. 
 266. 
 
 Motion to Revive When Filed by Any Other Party. 
 
 The motion to revive by "any of the parties" may be filed 
 at any time during the progress of the cause when it becomes 
 necessary, and either before or after the decree. Terry v. 
 Sharon, 131 U. S. 40, 33 L. ed. 94, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 705. kew 
 rule No. 45. It must suggest the facts upon which the revival 
 is sought as a basis for the notice to show cause. The court 
 must make the order for notice to the parties to be substituted. 
 This last clause of rule 45 applies to the motion made by "any 
 other parties," where the representatives or successors of the 
 deceased fail to make the application in a reasonable time after 
 death. 
 
 Other Causes for Revival. 
 
 Old rule 56, providing for revival of the suit when abatement 
 was caused by death, added "or any other event," which words 
 were omitted in new i-ule 45, and we had these words construed 
 as applying to abatements caused by marriages or when the cir- 
 cumstances show that the interest of the deceased party ceases 
 at death, as when the deceased party was litigating a contingent 
 interest; or when the interest of the deceased has been trans- 
 ferred by will to a third party ; or in case where after death tlae 
 interest of the deceased party would not pass tO' the adminis- 
 trator or heir ; or where a sole party is suing in a representative 
 capacity ; or where the defendant dies before service or appear- 
 ance; or where he dies after appearance, but before a decree 
 pro confesso, but cases of this character clearly fall within new 
 rule 34, requiring a supplemental bill to be filed. 
 
MOTIOJY TO llEVIVE. 383 
 
 T17(«/ Must Be Alleged to Revive a Suit. 
 
 Xew nile 35 adopted the language of old rule 58 as follows: 
 "It shall not be necessary in any 'bill of revivor' or supple- 
 mental bill to set forth any of the statements in the original 
 suit unless the special circumstances require it." Bills of re- 
 vi^'or as such, having been abolished by new rule 45, which 
 requires only a simple motion, to substitute proper parties in 
 the event of death of either of them, if new rule 35 has any 
 application whatever, it must mean that in the motion to 
 revive it is not necessary to set forth any of the statements 
 in the original suit, unless special circumstances require it. 
 
 The motion to revive should simply set forth the pendency 
 of the suit, the proceedings had, the cause of the abatement, and 
 the proper parties to represent the deceased, when the motion 
 is made by others than the representatives or successors of the 
 deceased party. Equity rule 45. 
 
 Again, where the motion is filed by others than the representa- 
 tives or successors of the deceased party, under rule 45, there 
 must be a prayer for the necessary orders for notice to the par- 
 ties sought to be substituted for the deceased party. If no 
 objection is filed after service of the notice ordered by the court, 
 the suit stands revived as of course; but an order should be 
 entered of the fact upon which the suit proceeds. After the 
 revival the suit has the benefit of all previous proceedings. 
 
 After the suit has abated, and before revival, no order can 
 be taken, except such orders as may be necessary to the preser- 
 vation of the property, or enforcing contempt for disobeying an 
 injunction, or the performance of an act previously ordered 
 by the court when all parties to the suit were before it. 
 
 Form of Motion. 
 
 I will now give the outlines of a motion to revive which may 
 be perfected according to the circumstances of your case, and 
 by observing the rules heretofore given : 
 
 Title and address as in original bill. 
 
 That A. B., late of , but now deceased, on the day 
 
 of , A. D. 19. . ., exhibited his original bill of complaint in this 
 
 court against 0. D., defendant therein, stating (here state purpose of bill), 
 
384 MOTION TO REVIVE. 
 
 and praying (here state prayer of bill). That defendant C. D. was duly 
 served with process, appeared and answered the bill (if such was fact). 
 
 That on the day of , A. D. 19. . ., A. B. departed this 
 
 life intestate (or having made his last will and testament naming therein 
 L. N. as executor, who has duly qualified under said will), and G. H. was 
 duly made administrator, and has taken out letters of administration as 
 required by law. That the suit has become abated by the death of A. B. 
 and the plaintiff is entitled to have the said proceedings revived against 
 said defendants (naming them). 
 
 To the end, therefore, that the said defendants may show cause why the 
 said suit and proceedings heretofore had may not stand revived, may it 
 please the court to grant to the plaintiff a writ of subpoena to revive (and 
 answer if death occurred before answer), directed to the said defendants 
 
 ( naming them ) , commanding them to appear before this court by the 
 
 day of , A. D. 19 . . . , being the motion day in the month of , 
 
 then and there to show cause why the said suit should not be revived 
 against him (or them), and to abide such further order as to the court 
 may seem proper. 
 
 R. F., 
 Solicitor. 
 
 Eevival After Decree. 
 
 The motion may be made after decree (Terry v. Sharon, 131 
 U. S. 40, 33 L. ed. 94, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 705 ; Sharon v. Terry, 
 1 L.R.A. 572, 13 Sawy. 387, 36 Fed. 337; Shainwald v. Lewis, 
 69 Fed. 493, 494), and defendant may show court had .no 
 jurisdiction to enter the decree. (Eutledge v. Waldo, 94 Fed. 
 265.) Under rule 45. 
 
CHAPTEE LXIV. 
 
 DECEEB PRO CONEESSO. 
 
 Having discussed the character of bills that a plaintiff may 
 be called upon to file at various stages of the case in order to 
 perfect it for hearing, and having discussed the process by 
 which the defendants are brought into court to answer, I v?ill 
 now proceed to show the effect of a failure of defendant to re- 
 spond to the subpcena by entering an appearance or pleading 
 to the bill. 
 
 New rule 16 provides that it shall be the duty of the defend- 
 ant, unless the time shall be enlarged, to file his answer or other 
 defense to the bill in the clerk's office, twenty days from issuing 
 the subpcena, as provided by new rule 12 ; otherwise the bill 
 will be taken "pro confesso" as of course, upon the order of 
 the plaintiff. 
 
 By new rule 17 when the bill is taken "pro confesso" the 
 court may proceed to a final decree at any time after the expi- 
 ration of thirty days after the entry of the "pro confesso" order ; 
 and unless set aside at the same time, or the time is enlarged 
 for filing an answer upon cause shown by motion and afiidavit, 
 the decree shall be deemed absolute (old rule 19 same). Third 
 Xat. Bank v. Atlantic City, 65 C. C. A. 1Y7, 130 Fed. 753, 
 754; Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U. S. 114, 29 L. ed. 108, 5 Sup. 
 Ot. Rep. 788. 
 
 But no such motion to set aside the decree pro confesso shall 
 be granted unless upon payment of the costs of the plaintiff up 
 to that time, or such part thereof as the court may deem reason- 
 able, and unless the defendant shall undertake to file his answer 
 within such time as the court shall direct for the purpose of 
 speeding the cause. Rule 17. 
 
 When Pro Confesso Can Be Taken. 
 
 We thus see under these rules a decree pro confesso can be 
 
 S. Eq.-2u. 385 
 
386 DECREE PEO CONFESSO. 
 
 taken upon failure to answer the bill as provided by rule 12 
 within the time prescribed, to wit, twenty days. Sheffield Fur- 
 nace Co. V. Witherow, 149 U. S. 576, 37 L. ed. 855, 13 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 936; Preston v. Finley, 72 Fed. 853; American Steel 
 & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers' & Die Makers' Unions, 90 Fed. 
 598. 
 
 If the allegations of the bill will not support a decree pro 
 confesso cannot be taken. Wong Him v. Callahan, 119 Fed. 
 381 ; Ohio C. R. Co. v. Central Trust Co. 133 U. S. 83, 33 L. 
 ed. 561, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 235 ; Nelson v. Eaton, 13 C. C. A. 
 523, 27 U. S. App. 677, 66 Fed. 377. 
 
 The conflict of opinion heretofore shown as to when the "de- 
 cree nisi" should be entered under the old rules 12 and 18 is 
 now set at rest by new rule No. 16 requiring the defendant to 
 file his answer within the time required by new rule No. 12, 
 in default of which, the rule nisi may be entered; mle days 
 and appearance days having been abolished, there can be no 
 longer any conflict as to whether the "rule nisi" can be entered 
 on the first rule day of appearance or the succeeding rule day 
 when the answer was to be filed. 
 
 But there are other stages of the cause when decrees pro 
 confesso can be entered. By new rule No. 29 it is provided that 
 every defense heretofore presentable by plea in bar or abate- 
 ment shall be made in the answer, which may be separately 
 heard and disposed of before the final trial ; aiid if the defendant 
 moves to dismiss the bill or any part thereof, the motion may 
 be set down for hearing in five days, and if denied, answer to 
 the bill must be filed in five days thereafter, or a decree pro 
 confesso may be entered. 
 
 By new rule No. 31, uf)on failure to reply to a counterclaim 
 set up in the answer a decree pro confesso may be entered. 
 Again, by new rule No. 32, where an amendent to a bill after 
 answer filed has been allowed, the defendant must in ten days 
 thereafter put in a new or supplemental answer unless time is 
 enlarged, and on default of which a decree pro confesso may be 
 taken on the amended bill. 
 
 Old equity rule No. 34, providing that if upon hearing a 
 demurrer or plea the defendant is assigned to answer further, 
 and fails to do so, a decree pro confesso may be entered ; and 
 old rule 64, where exceptions to answer have been allowed, and 
 
DECREE PEO CONFESSO. 387 
 
 defendant is required to answer over, and fails to do so, a de- 
 cree pro confesso may be allowed, are both abrogated by the new 
 rules. 
 
 The decree can be taken against any one or more of several 
 defendants. Frow v. De La Vega, 15 Wall. 554, 21 L. ed. 61 ; 
 Lockhart v. Horn, 3 Woods, 548, Fed. Cas. JSTo. 8,446. 
 
 Order to Take Bill As Confessed. 
 
 Xew equity rule 16 provides that the plaintiff may at his elec- 
 tion enter an order (as of course) taking the bill as confessed. 
 This order must be entered in the order book in the clerk's office, 
 and you may use the following form : 
 
 Title as in bill. 
 
 The subpoena in the above entitled cause having been returned, which 
 return has been filed, and it appearing therefrom that the said subpoena 
 was duly served on C. D., the defendant herein, and no answer having been 
 
 filed, which answer should have been filed on or before tlie day of 
 
 , A. D. 19 . . . , the same being the 20th day after the service of the 
 
 subpoena excluding the day of service, therefore, on motion of R. F., solic- 
 itor for plaintiff, it is ordered and decreed that bill be taken as confessed 
 as to the said C. D. defendant. 
 
 Date 
 
 The decree to be subsequently entered must follow the order 
 and a proper basis for the pro confesso must be shown. 
 
 Equity rule 17 further provides that when the bill is taken 
 as confessed, the court may proceed to a decree at any time 
 after the expiration of thirty days from and after the entry of 
 the order to take the bill pro confesso; and equity rule 16 pro- 
 vides that when the order is entered, the cause shall proceed 
 ex parte, and the matter of the bill be decreed by the court at 
 any time after thirty days, if proper to be decreed. 
 
 The following form for a decree pro confesso may be used : 
 
 Title as in bill. 
 
 It appearing to the court that the bill in the above cause was filed in 
 
 this court on the day of , A. D. 19. . ., and that Bubpo5na 
 
 was duly issued and served on the defendant herein, and that no answer 
 has been filed as required by rule 16 by the defendant 0. D., and that an 
 order taking the bill as confessed was duly entered in the order book on 
 the day of , A. D. 19. . ., in the office of the clerk of this court. 
 
388 DECEEE PEO COMFESSO. 
 
 and no proceeding lias been taken bj' the defendant since the entry of 
 said order, and more than thirty days have elapsed since entering the order 
 pro confesso. It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed (insert decree). 
 
 Serving Notice of the Decree. 
 
 The question has arisen whether notice of the decree should 
 be served on defendant. In Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U. S. 
 114, 29 L. ed. 108, 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 788, the court leaves it 
 an open question, and in Austin v. Riley, 65 Fed. 833, the 
 court calls attention to the fact that it is an open question, but 
 seems to think it is not necessary. 
 
 Taking into consideration the English practice and the prac- 
 tice of the Federal courts prior to 1842, and the defects sought 
 to be remedied by equity rales 16 and 17, I conclude that the 
 v?ords ex parte used in the rule, applied to proceedings after 
 the bill is taken as confessed, v^ere intended to cut o£F any fur- 
 ther appearance of the defendant, or action on his part aii'ect- 
 ing the subject-matter of the bill, and notice of any character 
 vpould therefore be an unjustiiiable increase of costs. Austin 
 v. Riley, 55 Fed. 833; Provident Life & T. Co. v. Camden & 
 T. R. Co. 101 C. C. A. 68, 177 Fed. 854. 
 
 In Frow v. De La Vega, 15 Wall. 552, 21 L. ed. 60, the. 
 court construes ex parte to mean, that the defendant is not 
 entitled to service of notice in the cause, nor to appear in it 
 in any v^ay. He can adduce no evidence nor be heard at the 
 final hearing. Clason v. Morris, 10 Johns. 524. 
 
 In Romaine v. Union Ins. Co. 28 Fed. 632, the court says 
 that now, instead of seeking to compel an appearance as under 
 the old practice, the present rule prescribes a penalty for non- 
 appearance by proceeding ex parte on the pro confesso decree.. 
 
 Is Proof Necessary Before Entering Final Decree? 
 
 Closely connected with the qvxere above discussed is the ques- 
 tion: Must you offer proof of the allegations of your bill be- 
 fore you can enter the final decree, and, if so, can the defendant 
 then appear and rebut the proof ? 
 
 If the allegations of the bill are sufficient to support the 
 decree asked, the court will enter the final decree on the pro- 
 confesso order without further proof (Ohio C. R. Co. v. Central. 
 
DECREE PKO CONFESSO. 389 
 
 Trust Co. 133 U. S. 91, 33 L. ed. 563, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 235) ; 
 that is, if the allegations of the bill can be decreed without fur- 
 ther discovery, the statements in the bill will be acted on as 
 if true. (Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U. S. 104, 29 L. ed. 105, 
 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 788.) 
 
 Effect of the Final Decree. 
 
 When a final decree is entered, which is warranted by the 
 bill, it has the same effect as if the defendant had appeared 
 and contested it (Hefner v. Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. 123 
 U. S. 756, 757, 31 L. ed. 313, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 337), and fail- 
 ure to enter an order pro confesso does not affect it. Allen v. 
 Xew York, 18 Blatchf. 239, 7 Fed. 483; Linder v. Lewis, 1 
 Fed. 378. 
 
 Can Defendant offer Proof. 
 
 The decisions, as we have seen, clearly contemplate that if 
 the bill is complete and the matter can be decreed without fur- 
 ther discovery, such as an accounting, then the defendant can- 
 not resist. But suppose a discovery or accounting is neces- 
 sary to complete decree, or proof necessary to cure a defective 
 allegation, such as uncertainty, can the defendant, as a matter 
 of right, then appear and rebut plaintiff's proof before the 
 court or master to whom it may be sent to state an account 
 or ascertain some other fact necessary to a decree? 
 
 Under the English practice and the equity rule of 1822, 
 controlling this matter, the defendant was permitted to appear 
 before the master if the cause was submitted to him to take 
 evidence, but these rules prior to 1842 did not contain the 
 word ex parte. This ex parte clause of the rule of 1842 clearly 
 cuts off the right of defendant to appear, and any interference 
 by him between the order pro confesso and final decree. Thom- 
 son V. Wooster, 114 U. S. 104, 29 L. ed. 105, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 788 ; Lockhart v. Horn, 3 Woods, 542, Fed. Cas. No. 8,446. 
 He loses his standing in court. Frow v. De La Vega, 15 Wall. 
 554, 21 L. ed. 61. And permitting him to be heard would be 
 a mere act of favor. Provident Life & T. Co. v. Camden & 
 T. E. Co. 101 C. C. A. 68, 177 Fed. 854. 
 
390 DECREE PRO COBTFESSO. 
 
 Final Decree Not Matter of Course. 
 
 While it may be said that defendant is closed out from any 
 intervention or interference between the order pro confesso and 
 final decree, yet it must not be understood that plaintiff is 
 entitled to a final decree as a matter of course. 
 
 The rule requires the matter of the bill to be decreed by' the 
 court-j and the practice is to set down the bill for hearing on 
 the order pro confesso, and the matter of decree is then in the 
 discretion of the court. Andrews v. Cole, 22 Blatchf. 184, 
 20 Fed. 410, 411. Where the defendant has appeared, but hot 
 answered, he can be heard on the . form and extent of the de- 
 cree. Southern P. R. Co. v. Temple, 59 Fed. 17; Webster v, 
 Oliver Ditson Co. 171 Fed. 895. 
 
 Compelling to Answer. 
 
 The rights amd procedure for compelling an answer by the 
 defendant under certain conditions, given in old rule 18, have 
 been entirely omitted in new rule 16, providing for a pro con- 
 fesso decree in default of an answer. Discovery if thought 
 necessary to enter a proper decree must be sought under new 
 rule 58. 
 
 Rights of Defendant After Default. 
 
 The rights of defendant to further participate in the pro- 
 ceedings after he has failed to answer are as follows: Old 
 equity rule 32, providing that after default but before the bill 
 is taken as confessed, the defendant with leave of the court 
 may file defensive pleading, has been omitted from the new 
 rules; and new rule 16 is the only rule upon or affecting the 
 practice in such cases, but there can be no objection to the old 
 practice permitting the defendant to file an answer until the 
 plaintiff has elected under rule 16 to take order that the bill be 
 taken as confessed. 
 
 After the bill has been taken as confessed and before an abso- 
 lute decree is entered, the defendant on motion showing cause 
 may obtain leave of the court to answer or enlarge time for an- 
 swering. (French v. Hay (French v. Stewart) 22 Wall. 238, 22 
 L. ed. 854; Southern P. E. Co. v. Temple, 59 Fed. 18; United 
 
DECEEE PEO CONFESSO, 391 
 
 States V. Whitmii-e, 110 C. C. A. 222, 188 Fed. 422), but 
 under new rule 17 the payment of costs, or such part thereof 
 as may be deemed reasonable, and the undertaking by the de- 
 fendant to file his answer within such time as the court may 
 direct, or any other condition ordered by the coiirt, are con- 
 ditions precedent to granting the motion. ISTew rule 17. 
 
 Third. By new equity rule 17 after the final decree has been 
 entered, the defendant may at the same term, but not after- 
 wards, appear by motion supported by afiidavit showing cause, 
 and have the decree set aside, or have the time extended to 
 answer, but the payment of costs, or such part thereof as the 
 court may require, and filing answer within such time as the 
 court may fix, are conditions precedent. The matter is entirely 
 within the discretion of the court. Nelson v. Eaton, 13 C. 
 C. A. 523, 27 U. S. App. 677, 66 Fed. 378 ; Southern P. R. 
 Co. V. Temple, 59 Fed. 18. 
 
 Fourth. After the term in which the final decree has been 
 entered, the court has no power to set aside the decree and re- 
 open the case. ISTew equity rules 17 and 69 ; Stuart v. St. Paul, 
 63 Fed. 644; Linder v. Lewis, 1 Fed. 378; Cammej'er v. Dur- 
 ham House Drainage Co. 35 Fed. 52; Austin v. Kiley, 55 Fed. 
 833;, Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U. S. 104, 29 L. ed. 105, 5 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 788 ; Morgan's L. & T. E. & S. S. Co. v. Texas 
 C. E. Co. 32 Fed. 530; Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S. 415, 
 26 L. ed. 799; Allen v. Wilson, 21 Fed. 881. See "Vacating 
 Decrees." 
 
 Under such conditions the only remedy left to the defendant 
 is an appeal, and he will be confined to the issues that the 
 averments of the bill do not support the decree. Masterson v. 
 Howard, 18 Wall. 103, 21 L. ed. 765 ; Ohio C. E. Co. v. Cen- 
 tral Trust Co. 133 U. S. 83, 33 L. ed. 561, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 235 ; Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U. S. 104-120, 29 L. ed. 105- 
 110, 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 788. 
 
 Grounds for Setting Aside the Order or Decree Pro Oonfesso. 
 
 A decree against one joint defendant settles no right (Lock- 
 hart V. Horn, 3 Woods. 548, Fed. Cas. No. 8,446) ; he merely 
 loses his standing in court (Frow v. De La Vega, 15 Wall. 
 552, 21 L. ed. 60). So when a decree pro confesso has been 
 
392 DECREE PEO CONFESSO. 
 
 talcen against one of several joint defendants, and decided on 
 the merits in favor of the other defendants, it sets aside the 
 pro confesso decree. Ibid. See United States v. Whitmire, 
 110 C. C. A. 222, 188 Fed. 422 and new rule 19. 
 
 Again, v?hen the order pro confesso has been entered on ir- 
 regular service, it is good ground for setting it aside. Blythe 
 V. Hinckley, 84 Fed. 228 ; Treadwell v. Cleveland, 3 McLean, 
 283, Fed. Cas. ISTo. 14,155. So when the bill is fatally de- 
 fective (Eldred v. American Palace Car. Co. 103 Fed. 209; 
 Nelson v. Eaton, 13 C. C. A. 523, 27 U. S. App. 677, 66 Fed. 
 376) ; or failure to file an answer by oversight of counsel 
 (Schwartz v. Kennedy, 166 Fed. 317, 318; see also McFar- 
 land V. State Sav. Bank, 129 Fed. 244) ; or allegations insuf- 
 ficient (Wong Him v. Callahan, 119 Fed. 381; Eldred v. 
 American Palace Car Co. 103 Fed. 209). So when the bill 
 has been amended materially after service of process. ISTelson 
 V. Eaton, 13 C. C. A. 523, 27 U. S. App. 677, 66 Fed. 378; 
 Blythe v. Hinckley, 84 Fed. 244. So entry of order after, 
 service by publication if motion promptly made. American 
 Freehold Land Mortg. Co. v. Thomas, 18 C. C. A. 327, 30 
 TJ. S. App. 690, 71 Fed. 782; Beach v. Mosgrove, 4 McCrary, 
 50, 16 Fed. 305. So when an answer has been stricken out 
 on ground of contempt, it will not justify entering a decree 
 pro confesso. Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 443, 42 L. ed. 229, 
 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 841. 
 
 The discretion of the court is not hard to move when a 
 meritorious defense is shown, and some excuse for not appear- 
 ing within the time required by the rules. The motion, how- 
 ever, must be made promptly (Conly v. Buchanan, 81 Fed. 58), 
 at the term in which the decree is entered. You cannot vacate 
 at a subsequent term, as stated above, unless your motion was 
 filed at the entry term, and went over without hearing, or con- 
 tinued by the court. Stuart v. St. Paul, 63 Fed. 644. 
 
 Form of Motion to Set Aside. 
 
 Title as in bill. 
 
 And now comes the defendant and moves the court to set aside the order 
 
 (or decree) pro confesso entered on the day of , A. D. 
 
 19 ... , and permit him to appear and plead for the following reasons to 
 wit: (Here set out your reasons in full why you did not appear, and if 
 
DECREE PEO CONEESSO. 393 
 
 motion is supported by irregularity of service, or defects in bill, state them 
 specifically, and if you wish to answer the bill, and try on merits, you 
 should show meritorious defense.) 
 
 The motion must be supported by aifidavit, unless based on 
 grounds appearing of record. 
 
 The same form of motion applies to final decrees. Old equity 
 rule 19, now new rule 17. 
 
CHAPTEE LXV. 
 
 DEFENSES. 
 
 The defendant, having been served with proper process and 
 brought into court to answer, may by motion plead his privilege 
 to be sued in the district of his residence, or any other ground 
 upon which want of jurisdiction may appear, or any other 
 matter of defense which may have heretofore been raised by 
 plea or demurrer, or may answer directly to the merits of the 
 bill. 
 
 By equity rule 12 a memorandum must be placed at the 
 bottom of the subpoena requiring the defendant to file his 
 answer or other defense on or before the twentieth day after 
 service of the subpoena. By new rule 16 the answer is to be 
 filed as required by rule 12, on default of which a decree pro 
 confesso may be taken, as we have already seen. 
 
 Old rule 32, forbidding the defendant to plead, demur, and 
 answer to the whole bill at the same time, is now abrogated. By 
 new rule ~So. 29 demurrers and pleas are abolished, and every 
 defense in point of law must, if arising on the face of the bill, 
 whether for misjoinder, or nonjoinder, or insufiiciency of fact, 
 which heretofore may have been raised by demurrer or plea, 
 now be raised by a motion to dismiss, or may be raised in the 
 answer. Hyams v. Old Dominion Co. 204 Fed. 681 ; Bogert 
 V. Southern P. Co. 211 Fed. Y76; Ee Jones, 209 Fed. 717; 
 Alexander v. Fidelity Trust Co. 214 Fed. 495-496 ; Fordham v. 
 Hicks, 224 Fed. 810. 
 
 Again, by this new rule every defense heretofore presentable 
 by plea in bar or abatement shall now be made in the answer. 
 By new rule ISTo. 30 the defendant shall answer the merits of 
 the bill in short and simple terms. We see, then, that by these 
 new rules, Nos. 29 and 30, the defendant may by motion or 
 in the answer raise any question of privilege, of jurisdiction, 
 or of law, which might have been raised heretofore by plea or 
 demurrer, and that all these defenses may be set up at the same ■ 
 
 394 
 
DEFENSES. 395 
 
 time and in the same paper answering to the merits. It is 
 fiu'ther seen that all defenses permitted to be set up by motion, 
 if set up in the answer, may be separately heard before final 
 hearing at the discretion of the court. Eqiiity rule No. 2t». 
 And if the defenses by motion or in the answer are heard in 
 advance of the trial and a dismissal of the bill is asked, the 
 motion may be set down for hearing by either party upon five 
 days' notice, and if denied, and a further answer is required, 
 it must be filed in five days thereafter. 
 
 But the question arises whether under the new rules, filing 
 an answer to the merits under rule No. 30 waives all defenses 
 that may have been set up by plea or demurrer, as under the 
 old rules. Without doubt the filing of an answer to the merits, 
 as above stated, would waive any objection that co\ild have been 
 but was not raised, that would be dilatory, and not fundamental, 
 in its nature ; but filing these defenses at the same time with an 
 answer to the merits would not, as under the old rules, be 
 ground for striking out such defenses; in such cases answering 
 to the merits does not admit the sufficiency of the bill if attacked 
 by motion or in the answer, if such attack is made in due 
 order of pleading. Boyd v. JSTew York & li. K. Co. 220 Fed. 
 1Y4. Though old rules Nos. 32 and 37 have been abrogated, 
 yet it cannot be intended to abrogate the due order of pleading, 
 though filed in one paper at the same time. New rule No. 29, 
 
 Again, under the new rules one may by motion set up a 
 defense in point of law, or to a point of fact, to any part of the 
 bill where such defenses have been heretofore set up by plea 
 or demurrer, and may answer as to residue. Rule No. 29. Or 
 he may raise all defenses heretofore permitted by plea or de- 
 murrer, to the whole bill, and answer the whole bill at the 
 same time. See Alexander v. Fidelity Trust Co. 214 Fed. 495, 
 same case 215 Fed. T91. 
 
 But the court may consider whether any of the legal objec- 
 tions can be heard or should be heard before taking testimony 
 on the whole case, or by merely taking such evidence as was al- 
 lowed formerly to support a plea. Boyd v. New York & H. E.' 
 Co. 220 Fed. 174. And a legal proposition going to less than 
 the whole case should not be heard in advance, unless such issue 
 would add to or eliminate testimony the presence or absence of 
 which would not affect the presentation of other issues. Id. , 
 
396 DEFENSES. 
 
 Defenses Which May he Raised hy Motion. 
 
 If scandalous or impertinent matter is apparent, it should 
 be disposed of, as heretofore stated ; after which the defendant 
 should scan the bill with a view to determining: 
 
 (a) Questions of jurisdiction. 
 
 (b) A defect of parties, as misjoinder, or a want of neces- 
 sary parties. 
 
 (c) As to substance or form. 
 
 (d) As to appearance of laches. 
 
 As to Jurisdiction. 
 
 I have already discussed territorial jurisdiction, or the right 
 of a party to be sued in his residence district, and where there 
 are divisions in the Federal districi; of his residence and citi- 
 zenship, his right to be sued in the division of the district of 
 his residence, — and how the right is asserted. I now will dis- 
 cuss other grounds of jurisdiction that must appear in the bill. 
 
 First. With this purpose in view you shall inquire if, as 
 brought, it is obnoxious to section 723 of the United States 
 Revised Statutes, forbidding the bringing of a suit in equity 
 when there is an adequate remedy at law. If this is apparent, 
 demurrer will lie. Farley v. Kittson, 120 U. S. 316, 30 L. ed. 
 689, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 534; United States L. Ins. Co. v. Cable, 
 39 C. C. A. 264, 98 Fed. 764. 
 
 If the suit is one in equity, either as to subject-matter or 
 the relief sought, you will then inquire: 
 
 Second. Is there proper diversity of citizenship, and is it 
 shown by the bill as heretofore explained ? 
 
 If the jurisdiction does not rest upon diversity of citizen- 
 ship, you will then inquire : 
 
 Third. Is a Federal question stated ; that is, does the right 
 of recovery depend on a proper construction of the Constitution 
 or laws of the United States or treaties made, etc., as before 
 explained, and is the Federal question properly set out? 
 
 Fourth. Whatever be the basis of jurisdiction, you will 
 next inquire if the proper amount is involved to give the court 
 jurisdiction. 
 
 Fifth. Is the suit brought under any of the fundamental 
 
DEFENSES. 397 
 
 heads of jurisdiction as contained in section 1, act of 1888, and, 
 if so, is it properly alleged, so that jurisdiction appears both 
 general and territorial? 
 
 Defect of Parties. 
 
 Assuming you are satisfied on the point of jurisdiction, you 
 will next inquire as to parties. Are the parties to the hill 
 proper parties, or does it appear that other parties should be 
 made 'i Have the parties that have been made, capacity to sue, 
 and, if so, are they suing in their proper capacity? 
 
 We have already seen that defect of parties is a good de- 
 fense, unless under new equity rule 25, cl. 4, the bill shows good 
 cause for not malting them parties. Sheifield & B. Coal, Iron 
 & E. Co. V. Xewman, 23 C. C. A. 459, 41 U. S. App. 766, 77' 
 Fed. 787. If the defect is apparent, you may set up by motion 
 rule 29 ; but the motion must name the proper parties. See 
 form, chap. 65. Hubbard v. Manhattan Triist Co. 30 C. C. A. 
 520, 57 U. S. App. 730, 87 Fed. 51-57. 
 
 Sufficiency of Substance of Bill. 
 
 Being satisfied with the parties, you will next inquire into 
 the substance of the bill. 
 
 (a) Is there any equity in the bill ? Farley v. Kittson, 
 120 U. S. 316, 30 L. ed. 689, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 534; Ehode 
 Island V. Massachusetts, 14 Pet. 210-258, 10 L. ed. 423-446. 
 
 (b) Does plaintiff show an interest, and, if so, is the de- 
 fendant answerable? 
 
 (c) Does it appear that the defendant has, or claims an 
 interest ? 
 
 (d) Is the plaintiff entitled to the relief prayed for? 
 
 (e) Does the bill cari-y its own death wound by showing a 
 defense ? 
 
 (f ) Does it appear that limitations, or the statute of frauds, 
 or any other statute prevents relief ? 
 
 (g) Does stale demand appear and not properly excused ? 
 Hubbard v. Manhattan Trust Co. 30 C. C. A. 520, 57 U. S. 
 App. 730, 87 Fed. 59 ; Hanchett v. Blair, 41 C. C. A. 76, 100 
 Fed. 827; Fuller v. Montague, 8 C. 0. A. 100, 16 U. S. App. 
 
398 DEFENSES. 
 
 391, 59 Fed. 220 ; Ulman v. Jaeger, 67 Fed. 980 ; Alexander 
 V. Fidelity Trust Co. 215 Fed. 794. 
 
 (li) Is the claim against public 'policy, or illegal ? 
 
 The above constitute defenses to the bill, and, as said, when 
 apparent may be met by motion in the nature of a demurrer 
 under rule 29, which only changes the manner of raising the 
 questions, but neither the issues nor the equitable principles 
 upon which they rest are changed. Alexander v. Fidelity Trust 
 Co. 215 Fed. 794. 
 
 Where your motion is in the nature of a demurrer to the 
 whole bill, it cannot prevail if any relief whatever can be 
 granted under the bill, however defective the allegations may 
 be. Edwards v. Bay State Gas Co. 91 Fed. 946. 
 
 You will next examine the bill as to matter of form. 
 
 (a) The proper allegation of jurisdictional facts, though 
 jurisdiction exists. 
 
 (b) Does plaintiff state positively facts within his knowl- 
 edge ? 
 
 (c) Are the allegations sufficiently certain? Einstein, v. 
 Schnebly, 89 Fed. 540 ; Johnson v. Wilcox & G. Sewing Mach. 
 Co. 25 Fed. 373. 
 
 (d) Is the prayer for process properly stated? 
 
 (e) Is the bill signed by counsel ? 
 
 (f ) Is the bill one that should be verified, and, if so, is the 
 affidavit in proper form ? 
 
 These objections are, for the most part, formal, and easily 
 amendable. 
 
CHAPTEE LXVI. 
 
 MOTIONS IN THE NATURE OF A DEMUEEEE. 
 
 Xew mle 29 abolishes demurrers, and now requires every 
 point of law arising upon the face of the bill, as insufficiency 
 of fact to constitute a cause of action in equity, to be raised 
 by motion to dismiss the bill, or it may be raised in the answer, 
 but, as before said, the rule only changes the manner of raising 
 the issue, and not the allegations necessary to raising the issue 
 of law, whether set up by motion, or in the answer. (See Mo- 
 tions. ) The motion may be in the nature of a general demurrer 
 applying the defects in the substance of the bill when clearly 
 apparent, or in the nature of a special demurrer going to de- 
 fective allegations or to parts of the bill defectively stated. 
 This rule disposed of the old rules from 31 to 38 inclusive, 
 covering the form, hearing, and proceedings after hearing, 
 whether sustained or overruled. The rule applies to Bankrupt 
 Courts. Pollock V. Meyer Bros. Drug Co. 233 Fed. 861. 
 
 Effect of a Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 29. 
 
 Motions in the nature of demurrers raise only the question 
 of legal sufficiency as under the old rules it cannot recite facts, 
 and must show distinctly the parts of the bill objected to. 
 Miller V. Eickey, 123 Fed. 604; Star Ball Eetainer Co. v. 
 Klahn, 145 Fed. 834; Eichardson v. Loree, 36 C. C. A. 301, 
 94 Fed. 379 ; Stewart v. Masterson, 131 U. S. 151, 33 L. ed. 
 114, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 682 ; Eichardson v. Loree, 36 C. C. A. 
 301, 49 Fed. 379; O'Shaughnessy v. Humes, 129 Fed. 960. 
 A "speaking demurrer" is not allowed. Star Ball Co. v. Klahn, 
 145 Fed. 834. And it admits as true all allegations of the bill 
 well pleaded, and in substance says that, admitting the facts 
 to be true, the plaintiff cannot recover. Kansas v. Colorado, 
 185 U. S. 126, 46 L. ed. 838, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 552 ; Edison 
 V. Thomas A. Edison, Jr., Chemical Co. 128 Fed. 957 ; Puget 
 Sound iSTat. Bank v. King County, 57 Fed 433; Preston v. 
 
 399 
 
4:00 MOTIONS IN THE NATURE OF A DEMUEEEE. 
 
 Smith, 26 Fed. 884; Angle v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. R. Co. 
 151 U. S. 10, 38 L. ed. 59, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 240; Chicot 
 County V. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 636, 37 L. ed. 549, 13 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 695 ; Dennison Co. v. Thomas Mfg. Co. 94 Fed. 654. 
 It does not admit conclusions of law (Young v. Mercantile 
 Trust Co. 140 Fed. 61; United States v. Ames, 99 U. S. 35-45, 
 25 L. ed. 295-300 ; General Electric Co. v. Westinghouse Elec- 
 tric & Mfg. Co. 144 Fed. 467 ; Pennie v. Reis, 132 U. S. 469, 
 
 33 L. ed. 428, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 149; Cornell v. Green, 43 
 Fed. 106; Haynes v. Brewster, 46 Fed. 473); as alleging 
 simply the transaction was fraudulent (Lumley v. Wabash R. 
 Co. 71 Fed. 28 ; Fogg v. Blair, 139 U. S. 127, 36 L. ed. 107, 
 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 476; Patent Title Co. v. Stratton, 95 Fed. 
 746 ; Edison v. Thomas A. Edison, Jr., Chemical Co. 128 Fed. 
 957; Kittel v. Augusta T. & G. R. Co. 65 Fed. 860). ISTor 
 matters of inference or argument. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. 
 Missouri P. R. Co. 3 McCrary, 646, 11 Fed. 634. ISTor does 
 it admit constructions given in a bill to a statute. Pennie v. 
 Reis, 132 U. S. 464-470, 33 L. ed. 426-429, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 149. ISTor of a written instrument. Gould v. Evansville & C. 
 R. Co. 91 U. S. 636, 23 L. ed. 419 ; Interstate Land Co. v. 
 Maxwell Land Grant Co. 139 U. S. 669, 36 L. ed. 278, 11 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 666; Dillon v. Barnard, 21 Wall. 437, 22 L. ed. 676; 
 O'Shaughnessy v. Humes, 129 Fed. 964. ISTor any ascription 
 of purpose not justified by acts. Dillon v. Barnard, 21 AVall. 
 437, 22 L. ed. 676 ; Taylor v. Holmes, 14 Fed. 509. Nor that 
 the design in a patent is new. New York Belting & Packing 
 Co. V. New Jersey Car Spring & Rubber Co. 137 U. S. 445, 
 
 34 L. ed. 741, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 193 ; Fordham v. Hicks, 224 
 Fed. 810. 
 
 In Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U. S. 180, 36 L. ed. 116, 12 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 375, it was held that a demurrer admitted the alle- 
 gation that a party was a naturalized citizen as alleged. In 
 Post V. Beacon Vacuum Pump & Electrical Co. 32 C. C. A. 
 151, 50 U. S. App. 407, 89 Fed. 1, it was held that, under a 
 motion in the nature of a general demurrer, equitable estoppel 
 may be assigned ore tenus, and whenever the bill alleges matter 
 detrimental to the case it may be taken advantage of by a motion 
 in the nature of a demurrer, as where laches appears in the bill. 
 Wollensak v. Reiher, 115 U. S. 101, 29 L. ed. 351, 5 Sup. Ct. 
 
MOTIONS IN THE NATURE OV A DEMUEEEB. ' 401 
 
 Eep. 1137; Hardt v. Heidweyer, 152 TJ. S. 558, 38 L. ed. 552, 
 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 671; Alexander v. Fidelity Trust Co. 215 
 Fed. 791; Ealston Steel Car Co. v. National Dump Car Co. 
 222 Fed. 590. 
 
 Form of Motion in the Nature of a Demurrer, 
 
 Title as in bill. 
 
 And now comes 0. D. defendant in the above cause and moves the Court 
 to dismiss the bill filed in this cause, because said bill does not state any 
 matter of equity entitling plaintiff to the relief prayed for, nor are the 
 facts as stated sufficient to entitle plaintiff to any relief against this de- 
 fendant. 
 
 Wherefore defendant prays the judgment of this court whether he shall 
 further ansv\er, and that he be dismissed with his costs. 
 
 E. F., 
 Solicitor, etc. 
 
 These motions have the same flavor of the demurrei;, by vphat- 
 ever name they may be called, and usually go to a want of 
 equity in the bill ; or to defects of substance when apparent ; or 
 to defective allegations; or to a part of the bill defectively 
 stated ; and should point out particularly the defects complained 
 of. All facts well pleaded are admitted. Stone v. Dugan Piano 
 Co. 136 C. C. A. 583, 220 Fed. 841. When the objection to 
 the bill goes only to a part, such part should be set forth in 
 the motion, and should be pointed out with such certainty, as 
 to give specific information as to what part defendant would 
 not be required to answer if the prayer of the motion be granted. 
 Miller v. Eickey, 123 Fed. 604; Ormsby v. Union P. E. Co. 
 2 McCrary, 48, 4 Fed. 170 ; Chicago, St. L. & IST. O. E. Co. 
 V. Macomb, 2 Fed. 18. Where you object to only a part of the 
 bill, the other must be answered, or it will be taken as con- 
 fessed. 
 
 By new rule 'N.o. 24 every pleading must be signed by one 
 or more solicitors of record, and such signatures shall be con- 
 sidered as certificates by each solicitor that he has read the 
 pleading signed by him, that according to his instruction there 
 is good ground for the same; that no scandalous matter is 
 inserted, and that it is not interposed for delay. So by the rule, 
 formal certificates and afiidavits are no longer required to mo- 
 tions, though in their nature demurrers. 
 S. Eq.— 26. 
 
402 MOTIONS IN THE NATUEE OF A DEMUEEER. 
 
 Setting Down for Hearuvg. 
 
 Old equity rule JSTo. 38, requiring the plaintiff to set down 
 for hearing defenses set up by demurrer, has been abrogated, 
 and now either party may set down the motion for hearing. 
 By new rule Xo. 1 the judge in chambers, or in term, upon 
 reasonable notice to the parties, may make, and award any 
 order not gTantable of course, preparatory to hearing the case 
 on its merits. By new rule Xo. 6, while the judge may appoint 
 motion days for hearing these interlocutory motions, yet he 
 may at any other time and place, upon such notice as he con- 
 siders reasonable, make and direct all interlocutory orders for 
 the advancement and conduct of the cause. 
 
 By equity rule 29 it is provided that if the defendant moves 
 to dismiss the bill, or any part thereof, either by motion or 
 answer, the motion may be set down for hearing by either party 
 on five days' notice, and if the motion be denied the defendant 
 must answer in five days thereafter, or the bill will be taken 
 as confessed. (See Motions, end of chap. 52). 
 
 On hearing a motion in the nature of a demurrer to the bill, 
 old rule Xo. 36 has been abrogated, and the authorities con- 
 struing it no longer apply. When the answer is in its nature 
 a demurrer to a part of the bill as well as to the whole bill, 
 and the motion is only sustained as to a part of the bill, the 
 proper order is to dismiss as much of the bill covered by the 
 special objection and overrule as to the remainder, which must 
 be answered. Grant Powder Co. v. California Works, 98 U. 
 S. 140, 25 L. ed. 83. The court may refuse to decide the 
 motion, or may leave the decision to the final hearing. Snyder 
 V. De Forest Wireless Teleg. Co. 154 Fed. 142; Eankin v. 
 Miller, 130 Fed. 229. In hearing these motions under rule 
 29 the allegations of the bill well pleaded are taken as true. 
 Destructor Co. v. Atlanta, 219 Fed. 996; Stone v. Dugan Piano 
 Co. 136 C. C. A. 583, 220 Fed. 841. 
 
 Again, in determining the motion, the bill and exhibits are 
 taken together (Continental Securities Co. v. Interborough 
 Eapid Transit Co. 165 Fed. 945; Ulman v. Jaeger, 67 Fed. 
 980) ; and if it appears that plaintiff is entitled to some kind 
 of relief, even though the specific relief will not be granted, the 
 motion will be overruled. Edwards v. Bay State Gas Co, 91 
 
MOTIONS IN THE NATURE OF A DEMUKEEE, 403 
 
 Fed. 946; Berwind v. Canadian Co. 98 Fed. 158; Benedict 
 V, Moore, 76 Fed. 472 ; Mercantile Trust & D. Co. v. Ehode 
 Island Hospital Trust Co. 3(1 Fed. 863; United States v. 
 Southern P. R Co. 40 Fed. 611; Stewart v. Masterson, 131 
 U. S. 158, 33 L. ed. 116, 9 Sup. Ct. Kep. 682. Or, to put the 
 proposition in another form, the motion will be overruled unless 
 it appears that under no possible state of the evidence a decree 
 could be entered. Failey v. Talbee, 55 Fed. 892; Maeder v. 
 Buffalo Bill's Wild West Co. 132 Fed. 280. 
 
 Allowing the Motion. 
 
 Whenever a motion is sustained, and there is probable ground 
 that the pleading can be perfected by an amendment, the court 
 will permit the amendment under such terms as may be just. 
 Xew rule 19. U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 954; U. S. Comp. Stat. 
 1901, p. 696 ; Boston & A. R. Co. v. Parr, 98 Fed. 483 ; Edward 
 P. Allis Co. V. Withlacoochee Lumber Co. 44 C. C. A. 673, 
 105 Fed. 680. It is in the discretion of the court to permit the 
 amendment, and is not a matter of right, for it is held that 
 an order refusing an amendment will not be revised by the 
 Supreme Court, unless you set forth in the record the amend- 
 ment sought and there appears a clear abuse of discretion. 
 Ibid.; Mercantile Xat. Bank v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 568, 25 
 L. ed. 815 ; Dowell v. Applegate, 7 Sawy. 232, 8 Fed. 69S. 
 
 The judgment on a motion sustained is to dismiss the bill 
 (Fowler v. Osgood, 4 L.E.A.(KS.) 824, 72 C. C. A. 276, 141 
 Fed. 20—24), unless amendment allowed, but it is only an 
 adjudication as to the exact point raised (Dennison Mfg. Co. 
 V. Scharf Tag, Label & Box Co. 121 Fed. 313-318; Wiggins 
 Ferry Co. v. Ohio & M. E. Co. 142 U. S. 396, 35 L. ed. 1055, 
 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 188 ; Eussell v. Place, 94 U. S. 606, 24 L. ed. 
 214). 
 
 Overruling the Motion. 
 
 By rule 19 the court must, at any stage of the proceeding, 
 disregard errors or defects not affecting the substantial rights 
 of the parties. If the motion is overruled, the defendant will 
 be assigned to answer (Files v. Brown, 59 C. C. A. 403, 124 
 Fed. 133), and if the defense falls within those mentioned in 
 
404 MOTIONS IN THE NATUKE OF A BEMUEEEE. 
 
 Tule jSTo. 29, the answer must be filed in five days after the 
 motion is denied ; and upon failure to file such defense the bill 
 may be taken as confessed. Otherwise, the judge may make 
 .such order as to the time of filing the answer as to him may 
 seem best for the advancement of the case. New rule JSTo. 6. 
 Successive motions of this nature will not be allowed, and when 
 overruled an answer is required at the next step. Puller v. 
 Knapp, 24 Fed. 100; Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Hoschke, 
 169 Fed. 894. Where a motion of this nature has been filed, 
 the record must show what has become of it, if not, it is pre- 
 sumed to have been abandoned. Basey v. Gallagher, 20 Wall. 
 679, 22 L. ed. 453, 1 Mor. Min. Kep. 683 ; Southern E. Co. v, 
 Rhodes, 30 C. C. A. 157, 58 U. S. App. 349, 86 Fed. 424, 4 
 Am. Neg. Rep. 733. , 
 
CPIAPTEE LXVIa. 
 
 MOTION", OE ANSWER IN THE NATtJEE OF A PLEA. 
 
 We have seen under what conditions defenses in the nature 
 of demurrers may be filed, when the legal objections appear on 
 the face of the bill, but it may be that the same objections, 
 touching jurisdiction, parties, and the substance of the bill may 
 not be apparent on the face of the bill, but still be an existing 
 fact ; that is, the allegations as to these matters may not be true 
 in fact, which, if shown, may abate the suit ; or, it may be that 
 facts connected with the subject-matter, jurisdiction, or par- 
 ties are not alleged which if alleged would abate or destroy the 
 equity of the bill which under the old rules were put in issue 
 by a plea, xf ow the same defects .may be met by an answer in 
 the nature of a plea. Equity rule 29. By equity rule No. 29 
 pleas have been abolished, and every defense heretofore raised 
 by plea must be made by motion, or it may be made in the 
 answer, except, if the defense is in the nature of a plea in bar 
 or abatement, it must be made in the answer, ' if the defect is 
 not apparent on the face of .the pleading; and, as we shall see 
 hereafter, whether made by motion or in the answer, may be 
 disposed of separately by hearing in advance of the final hear- 
 ing at the discretion of the court. 
 
 The office of the answer in the nature of a plea is to present 
 some distinct fact alleged which, if true, abates or bars the 
 suit, and when going to the whole bill avoids the delay and ex- 
 pense of a trial of other issues tendered in the bill. JSTational 
 Hollow Brake Beam Co. v. Interchangeable Brake Beam Co. 83 
 Fed. 29 ; Parley v. Kittson, 120 U. S. 314, 30 L. ed. 688, 7 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 534; Horn v. Detroit Dry Dock Co. 150 U. S. 
 625, 37 L. ed. 1203, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 214; Briggs v. Stroud, 
 58 Fed. 717. To illustrate: Take a case to which the statute 
 of frauds is an answer to the whole bill, as in an agreement to 
 sell lands in parol. The advantage of the statute may be set 
 
 405 
 
406 MOTION OE AK.SWJiK IN THE NATXJEE OF A PLEA. 
 
 up by answer in the nature of a demurrer if the bill shows it 
 was in parol, or by answet in the nature of a plea if the bill 
 is silent or if it is alleged to be in writing, and the allegation 
 is not true. The defense may be heard, in advance of the 
 trial, to dismiss the bill, or may be heard at the final trial. 
 Eule Xo. 29. Farley v. Kittson, '^120 U. S. 303, 30 L. ed. 684, 
 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 534. Defenses of this nature create a single 
 issue fatal to the bill, if proven. These defenses should pray 
 for a dismissal of the bill. United States v. California & 0. 
 Land Co. 148 U. S. 31-49, 3Y L. ed. 354-362, 13 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 458. 
 
 Filing the Answer in the Nature of a Plea,. 
 
 By new rules K'os. 12 and 10 the defendant is required to 
 file his defenses twenty days from the service of the subpoena, 
 excluding the day of service unless the time be enlarged by 
 the court as provided by rule No. 16, in default of which an 
 order as of course may be entered by the clerk upon applica- 
 tion that the bill be taken as confessed. 
 
 Ojjice of an Answer in the Nature of a Plea in Abatement. 
 
 Though pleas have been abolished, yet the defense, whether 
 set up by motion or answer which is in its nature a plea should, 
 for the sake of the certainty necessary in good pleading, clearly 
 define the issue, contain all the elements of a good plea, — 
 which shows specifically that the complainant has failed to 
 allege a fact which should have been alleged and which if it 
 had been alleged would have destroyed the equity of the bill. 
 In a word, the old office of the plea and demurrer are not 
 abrogated because as pleas and demurrers they are abolished. 
 In filing these defenses there should be kept in mind the dif- 
 ference between the answer in the nature of a demurrer, and 
 one in the nature of a plea. In the first the sufficiency of the 
 bill in point of law is attacked, and in the second case it must 
 appear that the bill should have inserted a fact which, if true, 
 or the answer must deny a fact which, if proven, in either case 
 would destroy the equity of the bill. United States v. Peralta, 
 99 Ted. 624; Farley v." Kittson, 120 U. S. 314, 30 L. ed. 688, 
 
MOTION OE AXSWEE IN THE NATURE OF A PLEA. 407 
 
 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. :.;U : Korn v. Wiebusch, 33 Fed. 50 ; Hubbell 
 V. De Land, 11 Biss. 382, 11 Fed. 175. 
 
 An answer in the nature of a plea to abate the suit perma- 
 nently should present the single issue which, if true, the bill 
 need not be fiirther answered (United States v. American 
 Bell Teleph. Co. 30 Fed. 524; United States v. California & 
 O. Land Co. IIS U. S. 31-49, 37 L. ed. 351-362, 13 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 458). 
 
 Ansicers in Abate inent. 
 
 Old rule Xo. 39, excepting matters of form, abatement, and 
 character of parties from defenses to be set up by answer, is 
 now abrogated, and these defenses, by equity rule Xo. 29, may 
 be set up by motion or answer when apparent on the fact of 
 the bill; but may be heard separately in advance of the final 
 trial in the discretion of the court. 
 
 In matters purely dilatory in their nature, such as setting up 
 venue, or the personal privilege of being sued in one's own 
 district or residence; or for disability of parties of some char- 
 acter, siich as infancy, or the capacity in vphich parties are 
 suing or are being- sued ; or another suit pending, or any other 
 defense of this character requiring something to be stricken 
 out or added in. order to get the issues of the case before the 
 court for final hearing, — should be set up by answer, as rule 29 
 requires that all matter of defense in the nature of pleas in bar 
 or abatement shall be made in the answer, but may be separately 
 heard before the final hearing, in the discretion of the court. 
 
 You may set up by answer in abatement, bankruptcy, cover- 
 ture, lunacy, or the nonexistence of the character and capacity 
 in which parties are suing or being sued, such as partners, 
 trustees, executors, administrators, or heirs, when not appear- 
 ing in the face of the" bill. You may set up by answer in abate- 
 ment want of interest, or any other matter which would abate 
 the suit, not appearing on the face of the bill. See Pittsburgh, 
 S. & y. E. Co. V. Fiske, 101 C. C. A. 560, 178 Fed. 66-69 
 and cases cited ; United States v. Gillespie, 6 Fed. 803 ; Shef- 
 field & B. Coal, Iron & E. Co. v. IvTewman, 23 C. C. A. 459, 41 
 U. S. App. 766, 77 Fed. 791; Marshall v. Otto, 59 Fed. 252. 
 Forms for these pleas have already been given. You may set 
 up by answer in abatement "another suit pending," however 
 
408 MOTIOI^ OE ANSWBE IN THE NATUKE OF A PLEA. 
 
 your attention is called to tke conditions under whicli the 
 answer can be filed and sustained in the Federal court when 
 the suit is pending in a State court. On the law side, the pend- 
 ency of a suit in a State court does not abate a suit in the 
 Federal court. Burk v. McCaflfrey, 136 Fed. 696; Barber As- 
 phalt Paving Co. v. Morris, 67 L.E.A. 761, 66 0. C. A. 55, 
 132 Fed. 945 ; Slaughter v. Mallet Land & Cattle Co. 72 0. C. 
 A. 430, 141 Fed. 282; Mankato v. Barber Asphalt Paving 
 Co. 73 C. C. A. 439, 142 Fed. 329; Bank of Commerce v. 
 Stone, 88 Fed. 398 ; Ogden City v. Weaver, 47 C. C. A. 485, 
 108 Fed. 568; Defiance Water Co. v. Defiance, 100 Fed. 178. 
 On the equity side a case will not be dismissed though the plea 
 be sustained, but if the suit is pending in a State equity court, 
 the Federal court will suspend proceedings and await the re- ' 
 suit of the suit in the State court. Zimmerman v. So Kelle, 
 25 C. C. A. 518, 49 U. S. App. 387, 80 Fed, 417 ; New York 
 Cotton Exch. v. Hunt, 144 Fed. 511 ; Williams v. ISTeely, 69 
 L.E.A. 232, 67 C. C. A. 171, 134 Fed. 2 ; Boatmen's Bank v. 
 Fritzlen, 135 Fed. 667 ; Foley v. Hartley, 72 Fed. 570,; Gam- 
 ble V. San Diego, 79 Fed. 487 ; Hennessy v. Tacoma Smelting & 
 Ref. Co. 129 Fed. 40 ; Green v. Underwood, 30 C. C. A. 162, 
 57 U. S. App. 535, 86 Fed. 429. 
 
 The rules as above given apply only to suits that are of a 
 personal character. When the suit affects the custody of prop- 
 erty in the State court, the court first acquiring jurisdiction 
 retains it, without interference from the other. Zimmerman 
 V. So Eelle, 25 C. C. A. 518, 49 U. S. App. 387, 80 Fed. 
 417 ; Williams v. Neely, 69 L.E.A. 232, 67 C. C. A. 171, 134 
 Fed. 2 ; Gates v. Bncki, 4 C. C. A. 116, 12 U. S. App. 69, 53 
 Fed. 965 ; National Foundry & Pipe Works v. Oconto City 
 Water Supply Co. 51 C. C. A. 465, 113 Fed. 793; Briggs v. 
 Stroud, 58 Fed. 720 ; Ogden City v. Weaver, 108 Fed. 568. 
 
 If you should set up in abatement a suit pending, the plea 
 should show, first, same parties ; second, same cause of action ; 
 third, whether the case is pending in law or equity ; fourth, the 
 same relief sought ; fifth, the state of the pleadings in the other 
 court. If not strictly within these rules, the plea should be 
 overruled. Griswold v. Bacheller, 77 Fed. 857 ; Green v. Un- 
 derwood, 30 C. C. A. 162, 57 U. S. App. 535, 86 Fed. 429. 
 
 Answers purely in abatement such as are set forth above, 
 
MOTIOSr OE ANSWEE IN THE NATURE OE" A PLEA. 409 
 
 would be waived by answer in bar, or setting up affirmative 
 matter to abate permanently the suit, if not set up before the 
 answer in bar. Page v. Chillicothe, 6 Fed. 602 ; Briggs v. 
 Stroud, 58 Fed. 717 ; St. Louis & S. F. E. Co. v. McBride, 141 
 U. S. 131, 35 L. ed. 661, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 982; Central Trust 
 Co. V. McGeorge, 151 U. S. 133, 38 L. ed. 100, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 286; Interior Constr. & Improv. Co. v. Gibney, 160 U. S. 
 220, 40 L. ed. 402, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 272. 
 
 Issues of this character should be disposed of at the earliest 
 possible moment, and many districts have adopted local rules 
 governing the practice of their respective districts, requiring 
 all matters of pure abatement to be set tip by preliminary an- 
 swer in the nature of a plea, to which issue must be joined and 
 the issue determined at once and before defendant is required 
 to answer. Marshall v. Otto, 59 Fed. 252 ; Livingston v. Story, 
 11 Pet. 392, 9 L. ed. 763. 
 
CHAPTEE LXVII. 
 
 ANSWER IN THE NATURE OF A PLEA IX BAR. 
 
 Any single fact which if set up in the answer would destroy 
 the equity of the bill and permanently abate the suit would be a 
 plea in bar as designated under the old rules. Xational Hollow 
 Brake Beam Co. v. Interchangeable Brake Beam Co. 83 Fed. 
 29. Thus, first, the statutes of frauds, or limitations, or other 
 defense may be set up in bar of the equit3^ ilcCloskey v. Barr, 
 38 Fed. 166 ; United States v. California & O. Land Co. 148 
 IT; S. 38, 39, 37 L. ed. 358, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 458. Second, 
 laches in bringing suit. Farrand y. Land & River Improv. 
 Co. 30 C. C. A. 128, 58 F. S. App. 559, 86 Fed. 393. Third, 
 records, such as ju.dgmeuts and decrees, showing prior adjudi- 
 cation. Mound City Co. v. Castleman, 171 Fed. 521 ; West- 
 inghouse Electric &: ^Ifg. Co. v. Jefferson Electric Light, Heat 
 & P. Co. 128 Fed. 751 ; John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Bruen, 
 133 Fed. 807; Harrison v. Remington Paper Co. 3 L.E.A. 
 (X.S.) 954, 72 C. C. A. 405, 140 Fed. 386, 5 Ann. Cas. 314; 
 Fowler v. Stebbins, 69 C. C. A. 209, 136 Fed. 365 ; Montgom- 
 ery V. McDermott, 99 Fed. 502; Desert King Min. Co. v. 
 Wedekind, 110 Fed. 873 ; Xugent v. Philadelphia Traction Co. 
 87 Fed. 251; Moredock v. Moredock, 179 Fed. 163; Spencer 
 V. AVatkins, 94 C. C. A. 659, 169 Fed. 380 ; Smith v. Mosier, 
 169 Fed. 431 ; Lane v. Kuehn, — Tex. Civ. App. — , 141 S. W. 
 365. Fourth, release agreements and awards. Armengaud v. 
 Coudert, 23 Blatchf. 424, 27 Fed. 247. Fifth, title acquired 
 by limitation. Sixth, title by will. Seventh, ho7m fide piu'- 
 chaser. United States v. California & O. Land Co. 148 U. S. 
 40, 37 L. ed. 359, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep.' 458 ; United States v. 
 Winona & St. P. E. Co. 165 U. S. 479, 41 L. ed. 796, 17 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 368. Eighth, collusive suit. Dinsmore v. Central E. 
 Co. 19 Fed. 153 ; McVeagh v. Denver City Waterworks Co. 29 
 C. C. A. 33, 55 U. S. App. 267, 85 Fed. 74. 
 
 If you consider your plea an effective bar, such as limita- 
 
 410 
 
ANSWER IN THE NATURE OF A PLEA IN BAR. 411 
 
 tion or the statute of frauds, former adjudication, etc., reach- 
 ing the very vitals of the cause of action upon which the bill 
 is based, then by all means file the answer in the nature of a 
 plea, for it reduces the issue to a single point and saves time 
 and expense and proof at large. E^•eleth v. Southern Califor- 
 nia E. Co. 123 Fed. 838 ; Farley v. Kittson, 120 U. S. 303, 30 
 L. ed. 684, 7 Sup. Ct. Kep. 534; :\riller v. Kickey, 123 Fed. 
 608. But if the result of your plea is doubtful, or it only goes 
 to a part of the bill, and you have to answer to the other part, 
 then let the plea alone and present your issues in answer to the 
 whole bill and take the benefit of the entire defense. Sharp v. 
 Eeissner, 20 Blatchf. 10, 9 Fed. 446 ; Chisholm v. Johnson, 84 
 Fed. 384. 
 
 Under new rule 'No. 29 you may set up in your answer all 
 matters in bar that you could have heretofore insisted upon 
 by plea; which means that you may rest your case on a single 
 plea in bar, or as many others as in the opinion of counsel may 
 be effective ; and under new rule No. 80 the answer may state 
 as many defenses in the alternative, whether consistent or 
 not, as is deemed essential for the defense. 
 
 Of course the burden of proof is on the pleader where the 
 issue is tried in advance of the final trial, but at the final trial 
 the burden is on the complainant to establish his case before 
 you are called upon to prove your plea, unless the court at 
 the final trial orders the plea to be tried first before hearing 
 on the issues of fact made by the answer to the whole bill. 
 
 Form of Answer in the Nature of a Plea in Bar. 
 
 In tile United States District Court 
 
 Title as in bill. j; ii, t%- i. • j. ^ 
 
 for the District of 
 
 The answer of C. D. (or, the joint answer of C. D. and E. F., defendants) 
 to the hill of complaint. 
 
 And now comes C. D. (or, defendants, etc. ), and for answer to said liill 
 (or, so much of said bill as seeks, etc., state part pleaded to substantially) 
 and says (here insert matter in bar) all of which he alleges to be true, 
 and pleads the same in bar, (or, in abatement) to the bill (or, so much 
 as is plead to) and prays the judgment of the court whether he shall 
 further answer said bill (or, the part pleaded to) and upon hearing said 
 answer that this bill be dismissed and the defendant go hence with his 
 costs in this behalf incurred. 
 
 E. F., 
 Solicitor, for •. 
 
412 ANSWEK IN THE NATCTEE OE &. PLEA IN BAB. 
 
 The Answer in the Nature of a Plea in Bar Must be Single. 
 
 While under rules Nos. 29 and 30 you may set up as many 
 different defenses by answer as you may deem necessary, yet 
 each defense in the nature of a plea in bar must be single in 
 purpose; that is, contain but one defense (Knox Eock-Blasting 
 Co. V. Eairdon Stone Co. 8Y Fed. 968 ; Miller v. Kickey, 123 
 Fed. G 04-607; United States v. California & O. Land Co. 148 
 U. S. 39, 37 L. ed. 359, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 458; Jahn v. Cham- 
 pagne Lumber Co. 152 Fed. 669 ; Farley v. Kittson, 120 U. S. 
 303-316, 30 L. ed. 684-689, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 634; Hostetter 
 Co. V. E. G. Lyons Co. 99 Fed. 735 ; JS^ational Hollow Brake 
 Beam Co. v. Interchangeable Brake Beam Co. 83 Fed. 27; 
 Sims V. United States Wireless Teleg. Co. 179 Fed. 540) ; by 
 which is meant, a single answer containing matter in the nature 
 of a plea in bar must not contain within itself two separate 
 defenses, but a single well-defined issue. The objections to a 
 double plea under the old rule should exist under the new, in 
 the interest of good pleading so necessary to create definite 
 issues (see authorities above and Briggs v. Stroud, 58 Fed. 
 718 ; Gilbert v. Murphy, 100 Fed. 161 ; Fayerweather v. Ham- 
 ilton College, 103 Fed. 547-548). Thus, one should not set 
 Tip in the same plea matters of law and fact (Hostetter v. E. G. 
 Lyon Co. 99 Fed. 734) ; or the statute of limitations and no 
 liability (McCloskey v. Bstrr, 38 Fed. 168. See also Briggs 
 V. Stroud, 58 Fed. 717). But under the new rule you may 
 set them up separately, either to the whole or separate parts 
 of the bill. See authorities above. But they should be well- 
 defined issues which can be separately determined. See also 
 Bunker Hill & S. Min. & Concentrating Co. v. Shoshone Min. 
 Co. 47 C. C. A. 200, 109 Fed. 506. 
 
 Averments in Answer in Nature of a Plea. 
 
 The averments must be clear, positive, and distinct. When- 
 ever the defense sets up a single ground for barring or abating 
 permanently the suit, the averment must present in itself a 
 complete equitable defense. McCloskey v. Barr, 38 Fed. 165. 
 The averment must be positive, not argumentative, facts, not 
 legal conclusions. Thus, in ownership or fraud, facts showing 
 -ownership or fraud must be alleged. Ibid. ; Hostetter v. E. G. 
 
ANSWER IN THE NATUEE OF A PLEA IN BAE. 413 
 
 Lyon Co. 99 Fed. 736, 736 ; Chisholm v. Johnson, 84 Fed. 385 ; 
 McCloskey v. Barr, 38 Fed. 166; ]\IcDonald v. Salem Capital 
 Flour-Mills Co. 31 Fed. 677; Computing Scale Co-, v. Moore, 
 139 Fed. 197. 
 
 While it is said that a plea must be single, stating a single 
 fact upon which the abatement or bar rests, yet it is not to be 
 understood that you may not allege a variety of facts if they 
 all tend to one clear ground of defense which may dispose of the 
 bill. Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co. 122 Fed. 105 ; Cooper 
 V. Preston, 105 Fed. 403; Ehino v. Emery, 79 Fed. 483; 
 Hazard v. Durant, 25 Fed. 26 ; Missouri P. E. Co. v. Texas & 
 P. K. Co. 50 Fed. 151. To illustrate: If you wish to plead 
 a release, you may set up all the facts inducing the release or 
 by which it may be shown. McCloskey v. Barr, 38 Fed. 169. 
 
 So in averment of heirship in a bill, you may set up all the 
 facts in a plea to meet the averment. Bhino v. Emery, 79 Fed. 
 483-485. So if you set up limitations by a plea, and the bill 
 has sought to anticipate it by setting up disabilities, you may 
 negative the disabilities in a plea. McCloskey v. Barr, 38 
 Fed. 166. 
 
 Again, if you set up the defense of a bona fide purchaser by 
 plea, you must set up all the elements that constitute one a 
 lona fide purchaser. Ibid. So if you plead the statute of 
 frauds, you must set out the facts so that the court may see 
 the application. Ibid. So in pleading non compos. Dudgeon 
 V. Watson, 23 Blatchf. 131, 23 Fed. 161. 
 
 Again, in drawing your answer in the nature of a plea in bar 
 of the suit, and you rest upon a single issue to destroy the 
 equity of the bill, the allegations of the bill are taken as true, 
 as in the case of a motion to dismiss in the nature of a demurrer, 
 so if there is anything in the bill negativing the fact that you 
 intend setting up by the answer in the nature of a plea, you must 
 negative all such allegations in the answer. Dwight v. Central 
 Vermont K. Co. 20 Blatchf. 200, 9 Fed. 788; Goldsmith v. 
 Gilliland, 10 Sawy. 606, 24 Fed. 164, 155; Hilton v. Guyott, 
 42 Fed. 250, 251 ; Ehino v. Emery, 79 Fed. 483 ; McDonald v. 
 Salem Capital Flour-Mills Co. 31 Fed. 577. You may file 
 separate answers in the nature of pleas to separate parts of a 
 bill, or a single plea to the whole bill, or you may file several 
 distinct answers in the nature of pleas to the whole bill or any 
 part thereof. Eule 30. 
 
CHAPTEE LXVIII. 
 
 SETTIISTG DOWN THE ANSWER IN THE NATUEE OF A PLEA FOE 
 
 HEARING. 
 
 By eqiiilv rule Xo. 20, providing for defenses and how pre- 
 sented, all pleadings in abatement or bar, whether bv motion to 
 dismiss or in the answer, may be set down for hearing by either 
 party in advance of final trial of the ease on its merits on five 
 days' notice, but this hearing and advance is entirely within 
 the discretion of the court, as the court may defer the issue to 
 the final trial. Alexander v. Fidelity Trust Co. 214 Fed. 497. 
 Or the setting down for hearing may be ordered under rules 1 
 and 6 which are substantially as follows : 
 
 Xew equity rule Xo. 1 provides that the district courts are 
 always open for the purpose of making and directing all inter- 
 Jociitory motions, orders, etc., preparatory to hearing the case 
 on its merits and the judge may, on reasonable notice to the 
 parties, make, direct, and award at chambers, in the clerk's 
 office, and in vacation as well as in term time, all orders and 
 l)roceedings not gTantable of course. 
 
 By new rule Xo. (i the judges must establish regular times 
 and places not less than once in each month, when motions re- 
 quiring notice and hearing may be made and disposed of. But 
 the judge may at any other time and place than that established 
 on the motions day, 'upon reasonable notice, make and direct all 
 interlocutory orders, rules, and proceedings for the advance- 
 ment or conduct of the cause. 
 
 Having thus grouped the new rules providing for hearing of 
 all interlocutory motions and issues preliminary to the trial of 
 the case on its merits, we see that either party may set down 
 answers in the nature of pleas or interlocutory matter for hear- 
 ing, thus abrogating all the old rules requiring the plaintiff 
 alone to do so ; and whether the defense in the nature of a plea 
 be made by motion or answer, it may be taken up at any time, 
 
 414 
 
SETTI^•(f DOWX AXSWEE IN THE iS^ATUEE OF A PLEA. 415 
 
 at the discretion of the court, or it may be postponed until the 
 final hearing. The penalty attached for not setting down de- 
 fenses of this character for hearing under old rule jSTo. 38 is 
 not now enforced. 
 
 Effect of Setting Down an A nsver in the Nature of a Plea for 
 
 Hea ring. 
 
 Formerly when a plea was set down for hearing, the issue of 
 its sufficiency in law was only raised, and not an issue of fact. 
 The issue of fact was raised only by the complainant's replica- 
 tion to the plea. But the old rule governing this practice having 
 been abrogated, a motion or answer in the nature of a i^lea may 
 be set down for hearing, first, on its sufficieucy in law as a 
 defense, second, on an issue wherein the truth of the motion or 
 answer is challenged. If set down to try the legal sufficiency 
 only, the allegations of the motion or answer are taken as true 
 to determine its legal sufficiency; but if set down for hearing 
 as to its truth, the allegations of the answer are denied with- 
 out further pleading. Xew rule 31. 
 
 As to the effect of setting down an answer in the nature of a 
 plea to test its sufficiency the following authorities are applica- 
 ble: American Sulphite Pulp C'n. v. Eabless Pulp & Paper Co. 
 163 Fed. 84.-I ; Burrell v. Ilackley, 3,1 Fed. 83:] ; Cook v. Ster- 
 ling Electric Co. 118 Fed. 45 ; iletcalf v. American School 
 Furniture Co. 122 Fed. 11.5 ; Schnauffer v. Aste, 148 Fed. 867; 
 General Electric Co. v. Xew England Electric ilfg. Co. 03 C. C. 
 A. 448, 128 Fed. 73.s ; Paphael v. Trask, 194 U. S. 27(5, 48 L. 
 ed. 975, 24 Sup. Ct. Pep. 647; Stejihciis v. Smartt, 172 Fed. 
 466; General Electric Co. v. Bullock Electric Alfg. Co. 138 Fed. 
 412; Farley v. Kittson, 120 U. S. 303-314, 30 L. ed. 6,S4-(;ss, 
 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 534; Kellner v. :Mutual L. Ins. Co. 43 Fed. 
 626 ; United States v. California & 0. Land Co. 148 F. S. 39, 
 37 L. ed. 359, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 458; Gaines v. Rock Spring 
 Distilling Co. 179 Fed. 544; Zimmerman v. So Relle, 25 C. C. 
 A. 518, 49 IT. S. App. 387, 80 Fed. 421 ; Metcalf v. American 
 School Furniture Co. 122 Fed. 115; Burrell v. I-Iackley, 35 
 Fed. 833; General Electric Co. v. Xew England Electric ilfg. 
 Co. 123 Fed. 310; s. c. 63 C. C!. A. 448, 128 Fed. 739; Rhode 
 Island V. Massachusetts, 14 Pet. 257-260, 10 L. ed. 445, 446. 
 
416 SETTING DOWW ANSWER IN THE NATURE OF A PLEA. 
 
 Overriding for Insufficiency. 
 
 When upon the hearing the answer on the nature of a plea 
 is overruled for insufficiency, the judgment is that the plea be 
 disallowed, and the defendant has a right to answer over. New 
 rule 29 allows five days to answer over, but this should be taken 
 to apply only where the court does not fix the time. When 
 the answer is determined against the defendant on an issue of 
 fact interposed as a bar to the suit, if permitted to answer over, 
 the same defense cannot be set up unless by special permission 
 to renew it in the new answer (Chisholm v. Johnson, 84 Fed. 
 384) ; or the court^ if the issue is tried in advance, may decline 
 to act upon it, and let it stand over for the final trial (Standai'd 
 Distilling & Distributing Co. v. Woolsey, 121 Fed. 1016 ; Pent- 
 large v. Pentlarge, 22 Fed. 412). 
 
 Sibstaining the Legal Sufficiency of the Answer or Motion. 
 
 If the answer is sustained as sufficient in law, the truth of the 
 plea becomes an issue for trial. United States v. Dalles Mili- 
 tary Eoad Co. 140 U. S. 616, 617, 35 L. ed. 565, 566, 11 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 988. Which issues of fact may be tried in advance on 
 the trial of the case or at the final trial. Pearce v. Eice, 142 
 U. S. 42, 35 L. ed. 931, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 130; Zimmerman v. 
 So Eelle, 25 C. C. A. 518, 49 U. S. App. 387, 80 Fed. 421; 
 Files V. Brown, 59 C. C. A. 403, 124 Fed. 133; Baltimore 
 Trust & Guarantee Co. v. Hofstetter, 29 C. C. A. 35, 56 U. S. 
 App. 122, 85 Fed. 75 ; see Gunning System v. Buffalo, 157 Fed. 
 251, 252. 
 
 Where the plea as an issue of law meets all the allegations 
 of the bill, which bars the suit, defendants are entitled to final 
 decree. W. A. Gaines & Co. v. Eock Spring Distilling Co. 179 
 Fed. 544; Horn v. Detroit Dry Dock Co. 150 U. S^ 626, 37 
 L. ed. 1203, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 214. If the plea be good in part 
 and bad in part the court will hold for trial the good part upon 
 issues of fact, and will overrule the bad part, which shall not 
 longer be an issue unless amendable and the amendment allowed. 
 Ehino v. Emory, 79 Fed. 485, 486. Eeplications having been 
 abolished, answers raising issues of fact will be considered 
 denied for the purposes of trial. New rule J^o. 31. 
 
A^;SWEE IN THE A'ATUIiE t)F A PLEA FOE HEARING. 417 
 
 When the Answer is Set Doiun for Hearing as an Issue of Fact. 
 
 Formerly, as stated above, the only way of putting a plea 
 raising a question of fact in issue was by replication, wliicb in 
 effect admitted its validity if proved ; but now by new rule No. 
 31 any defense is considered an issue without "replication," 
 which has been abolished. Isew rule Xo. 31. If the answer in 
 the nature of a plea as aforesaid is set down for trial on issues 
 of fact, and the answer goes to the whole bill, and the facts are 
 proven, its effect is to dismiss the bill. Cottle v. Krementz, 25 
 Fed. 494 ; Ehode Island v. Massachusetts, 14 Pet. 257, 10 L. 
 ed. 445; Farley v. Kittson, 120 U. S. 814, 30 L. ed. 688, 7 Sup. 
 Ct Kep. 534; Westervelt v. Library Bureau, 55 C. C. A. 436, 
 118 Fed. 825. But now setting down the answer for trial on 
 issues of fact does not admit the validity of the plea, nor does 
 the fact that the plea is proven necessarily dismiss th« bill. 
 
 When the answer setting up an issue of fact in the nature of a 
 plea to the bill to bar the suit or permanently to abate it, the only 
 issue is the truth of the answer. Eveleth v. Southern California 
 E. Co. 123 Fed. 836; Farley v. Kittson, 120 U. S. 315, 30 
 L. ed. 688, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 534; Appleton v. Marx, 10 C. C. A. 
 555, 23 U. S. App. 420, 62 Fed. 644; Hart? v. Cleveland Block 
 Co. 37 C. C. A. 227, 95 Fed. 682 ; Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil 
 Co. 154 Fed. 867; Birdseye v. Heilner, 26 Fed. 147; United 
 States V. California & 0. Land Co. 148 U. S. 31, 37 L. ed. 354, 
 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 458. 
 
 The burden is on the defendant (Sharon v. Hill, 10 Sawy. 
 666, 26 Fed. 723 ; American Graphophone Co. v. Leeds & C. Co. 
 140 Fed.' 981); and strict proof must be made (Elgin \A^ind 
 Power & Pump Co. v. Nichols, 12 C. C. A. 578, 24 U. S. App. 
 542, 6. J Fed. 218). You cannot prove less than what is alleged, 
 or something different. United States v. California & O. Land 
 Co. 148 U. S. 31, 37 L. ed. 354, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 458. You 
 proceed with the proof in the same way as upon the trial of other 
 issues of fact. 
 
 When the Answer in the Nature of a Plea is Proven. 
 
 When the answer sets up specific matter in the nature of a 
 plea in bar, as before stated, and the issue is tried in advance 
 S. Eq.— 27. 
 
418 AKSWEl! lA- TUB AATL'K£ OF A i'LJCA FOIt IIEAEIXG. 
 
 of the final tria], and is proven (rule 29), and the plea goes to 
 the whole bill, destroying its equity, the defendant is entitled to 
 dismissal. Eveleth v. Southern California E. Co. 123 Fed. 838 
 and cases cited; Horn v. Detroit Di-y Dock Co. 150 U. S. 610, 
 37 L. ed. 1199, 14 Siip. Ct, Eep. 214; Earll v. Metropolitan 
 Street E. Co. 87 Fed. 528 ; Daniels v. Benedict, 38 C. C. A. 
 592, 97 Fed. 374; Briggs v. Strond, 58 Fed. 720, 721; Eejall 
 V. Greenhood, 35 C. C. A. 97, 92 Fed. 946. Bnt if the answer 
 setting up the special matter to bar the eqxiity of the bill does 
 not go to the whole bill, then the bill is not necessarily dismissed 
 if the answer is proven, but in the further prosecution of the 
 case will avail the defendant as far as in law and equity it 
 should do so. Pearce v. Eice, 142 U. S. 28, 30 L. ed. 925, 12 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 130 ; American Graphophone Co. v. Edison 
 Phonograph Works, 68 Fed. 451, 452 ; Appleton v. Marx, 10 
 C. C. A. 555, 23 U. S. App. 420, 62 Fed. 644; Jones v. Hillis, 
 100 Fed. 355; Elgin Wind Power & Pump Co. v. Xichols, 13 
 C. G. A. 578, 24 U. S. App. 542, 6.1 Fed. 215 ; Green v. Bogue, 
 158 U. S. 500, 39 L. ed.'l069, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 975; Soder- 
 berg V. Armstrong, 116 Fed. 710. 
 
 Under the old English rule, if the plaintiff replied to a plea 
 in bar, and joined issue on the facts, he thereby admitted the 
 sufficiency of the plea as an answer to his bill ; and if the facts 
 were proven in his bill was dismissed, though other equities 
 were set up not put in issue, and which would have been suffi- 
 cient to save the case from dismissal. 
 
 The ruling ^^•as absurdly technical, and enforced even when 
 the allegations of the plea were not a proper defense. The 
 theory was that joining issue on the plea was an admission that 
 plaintiff staked his case on the falsity of the plea, and he must 
 accept the consequence. 
 
 In the interest of common sense and the justice, the Federal 
 courts very early departed from the English rule. Green v. 
 Bogue, 158 U. S. 500, 39 L. ed. 1069, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 975; 
 Edward P. Allis Co. v. Withlacoochee Lumber Co. 44 C. C. 
 A. 673, 105 Fed. 6S1, 682. The courts of the United States 
 never did, in fact, adhere to the old rule. Green v. Bogue, 158 
 U. S. 478, 39 L. ed. 1069, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 975. 
 
 When the answer is proven, the proper practice, as before 
 said, is to dismiss the bill where the proven plea is an effectual 
 
A.XSWJ:!} Ii\ THE JN'ATUEE OF A PLEA FOB HEAKIJN'G. 4111 
 
 bar to the whole bill (see authorities above) ; but if the proven 
 plea be not an entire defense to all the equities in the bill, that 
 IS, if there are allegations upon which an equity may i*est, and 
 ■which have not been met by the plea, and the plea only defeats 
 a part of the bill, then the bill will be rc-tained and the defend- 
 ant ordered to answer. Jones v. Hillis, 100 Fed. 356; Green 
 V. Eogue, 15S F. S. 500, 39 L. ed. 106S, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 975; Pearce v. Eicc, 112 U. S. 41, 35 L. cd. t»3(), 12 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 130; Farley v. Kittson, 120 U. S. 314, 30 L. ed. GSy, 
 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 534. There is nothing in the new rules obnox- 
 ious to the practice as above stated. Of course under new rules 
 19 and 2S the plaintiff may be permitted to so amend his bill 
 as to avoid, if he can, the effect of the plea. See Alexander v. 
 Fidelity Trust Co. 214 Fed. 497, where the issue was tried 
 at the final hearing and allowance of amendment. 
 
 ^yhen the Answer in the Nature of a. Plea is Xot Proven-. 
 
 By equity rule 29 it is provided that if the answer in the 
 nature of a plea is denied, the defendant is given five days to 
 file an answer to the bill, or a decree pro confesso may l)e taken, 
 if he fails to do so, on the bill. ^McGregor v. Vermont Loan & 
 T. Co. 44 C. C. A. 146, 104 Fed. 709. The answer after the 
 plea is overruled is an absolute right under this rule. Sharp 
 V. Eeissner, 20 Blatchf. 10, 9 Fed. 446 ; Westervelt v. Library 
 Bureau, 55 C. C. A. 436, llS Fed. S24; ^Vmerican Graphophone 
 Co. v. Leeds A: Co. 140 Fed. 981 ; Appleton v. Marx, 10 C. C. A. 
 555, 23 r. S. App. 420, 62 Fed. 644; Files v. Brown, 59 C. C. 
 A. 403, 124 Fed. 133 ; Underwood Ty]iewriter Co. v. Manning, 
 105 Fed. 451. 
 
 In Sharon v. Hill, 10 Sawy. 666, 26 Fed. 341, the defendant 
 was not allowed to set up in his answer the issu(\s determined 
 against him in plea. Pentlarge v. Pentlarge, 22 Blatchf. 120, 
 22 Fed. 412; Bean v. (!lark, 30 Fed. 225. 
 
 In Kennedy v. Creswell, 101 U. S. 641, 25 L. ed. 1075, Jus- 
 tice Bradley propounds the interrogatory, whether a defendant 
 who pleads a false plea would be entitled to answer o\ei-. lie 
 intimates that when defendant has put the plaintiff to the neces- 
 sity of trying the issue which is found against him, and the 
 delay occasioned thereby, that defendant should not be allowed 
 
420 ANSWER IN THE WATTJBE OF A PLEA FOE HEABIUa. 
 
 to answer over, unless plaintiff demands it for further discov- 
 ery. That finding the plea false, it should stand as an admis- 
 sion of the bill, and if true, the bill should be dismissed. Fol- 
 lowed in Eagle Oil Co. v. Vacuum Oil Co. 89 C. C. A. 463, 
 162 Fed. 673; Farley v. Kittson, 120 U. S. 303, 30 L. ed. 
 684, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 534. 
 
 In Earll v. Metropolitan Street R Co. 87 Fed. 528, these 
 two cases are reviewed and held not to conflict, but a finding 
 against the plea in this ease authorized a decree for plaintiff. 
 Eagle Oil Co. v. Vacuum Oil Co. 89 C. C. A. 463, 162 Fed. 
 671. In Elgin Wind Power & Pump Co. v. Nichols, 12 C. C. 
 A. 578, 24 U. S. App. 542, 65 Fed. 215 ; ISTorth Chicago Street 
 E. Co. V. Chicago Union Traction Co. 150 Fed.' 629, 630; 
 Pearce v. Rice, 142 U. S. 28, 30 L. ed. 925, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 130; Soderberg v. Armstrong, 116 Fed. 710. 
 
CHAPTER LXIX. 
 
 THE AISrSWEK. 
 
 Framing the Ansiuer. 
 
 By rule 'No. 29 every defense which heretofore conld be raised 
 by plea or demurrer may be set up in the answer or by a motion 
 to dismiss, so that now all questions of law or fact may be incor- 
 porated in one pleading called the answer. Boyd v. New York 
 & H. R. Co. 220 Fed. 174. By equity rule No. 30 the answer 
 to allegations of the bill, as distinct from defenses set up 
 formerly by plea or demurrer, is provided for as follows : 
 
 Eule 30. The defendant, in his answer, shall in short and 
 simple terms set out his defense to each claim asserted by the 
 bill, omitting any mere statement of evidence, and avoiding any 
 general denial of the averments of the bill. 2d. The defendant 
 must specifically admit or deny or explain the facts upon which 
 the plaintiff relies, unless he is without knowledge of such facts, 
 in which case he must so state in his answer, which statement 
 operates as a denial. All averments in the bill other than that 
 of value or amount of damage shall be deemed confessed except 
 as against an infant, a lunatic, or other person non compos if 
 not under guardianship. 3d. The answer may be amended by 
 leave of the court or jiidge, upon reasonable notice, so as to put 
 any averment of the bill in issue when justice requires it. 4th. 
 The answer may state as many defenses in the alternative, 
 regardless of consistency, as, the defendant deems essential to 
 the defense. 5th. The answer must state in short and simple 
 form any counterclaim arising out of the transaction which is 
 the subject-matter of the suit. 6th. The defendant may set 
 up in his answer without cross bill any setoff or counterclaim 
 against the plaintiff which might be the subject of an inde- 
 pendent suit in equity against him ; and such set-off or counter- 
 claim so set up shall have the effect of a cross suit so as to enable 
 
 HI 
 
422 THE A.NTSWEE. 
 
 t]).e court to pronounce a final judgment thereon botli on the 
 original and cross bill. Hari^er Bros. v. Klaw, 232 Fed. 609. 
 
 We see, then, the new rule requires, as formerly, a full and 
 fair answer for each allegation of the bill forbidding all general 
 denial. Each allegation must be either specially denied or ad- 
 mitted, or an explanation by confession or a\-oidance, or other- 
 wise, must appear. 
 
 We see then under the rule each specific allegation of the bill 
 must be answered, that is, answered as if each allegation was 
 a direct interrogatory. You cannot allege generally in an an- 
 swer that every fact in the bill not admitted is denied, but each 
 specific allegation must be denied or admitted, or disposed of 
 by some character of reply. Brown v. Pierce, 7 Wall. 211, 212, 
 19 L. ed. 135, 136; Holton v. Guinn, 65 Fed. 451; People's 
 United States Bank v. Gilson, 88 C. C. A. 332, 161 Fed. 293. 
 Plaintiff is entitled to see which of his allegations are admitted 
 or denied (McCloskey v. Barr, 40 Fed. 559), so that the atten- 
 tion of the court may be directed to the debatable ground. But 
 while specific answers are required, you must avoid gxeat minu- 
 tias in detail ; an answer that meets fairly the allegation is suffi- 
 cient without detailing your evidence. Field v. Hastings & B. 
 Co. 65 Fed. 279. The answers, if in the knowledge of the 
 defendant, must be direct and positive; if he has no absolute 
 knowledge, about the matter charged, he should so state. See 
 Victor G. Bloede Co. v. Carter, 148 Fed. 127. Xew rule 30 
 el. 1. Coulston v. H. Franke Steel Eange Co. 221 Fed. 669. 
 
 Statements that a defendant has no knowledge, and neither 
 denies nor admits the facts charged in the bill, does not admit 
 their truth or relieve the plaintiff from proving them. Brown 
 V. Pierce, 7 Wall. 205, 19 L. ed. 134; Eogers v. Marshall, 
 13 Fed. 64. 
 
 Under new rule 30 the assertion that one has no knowledge, 
 etc., is equivalent to a denial, but one cannot say he has no 
 knowledge of a matter of record, or of something he himself has 
 done. Under this rule, again, all avennents not answered 
 specifically, other than of value and damages, shall be deemed 
 confessed except as to infants, lunatics, and persons non compos, 
 and not under guardianship. 
 
 Again, a defendant may plead, all facts he has a right to prove. 
 He may set them up in the alternative, regardless of consistency, 
 
THE ANSWER. 423 
 
 if lie deems tliem essential to liis defense. He may set up any 
 eonntci'claini arising out of the traiisaetidn which is the subject- 
 matter of the suit. He may without cross bill set out any set- 
 off or counterclaim against the plaintiff which might be the sub- 
 ject-matter of an independent siiit in equity against him. Buf- 
 falo Specialty Co. v. Vancleff, 217 Fed. 91. 
 
 Scandal and IinperUnence. 
 
 The answer should be free from scandal and impertinence. 
 However, it will not be suppressed if the allegations of the bill 
 justified it. United States v. McLaughlin, 24- Feil. 826; Mer- 
 cantile Trust Co. V. Missouri, K. k T. R. Co. 84 Fed. 37!); 
 Whittemore v. Patten, 84 Fed. 51 ; Barrett v. Twin City Power 
 Co. Ill Fed. 45; Pennsylvania Co. v. Bay, l;;8 Fed. 2(10. 
 IIowe^■er, the right to except to the answer for scandal and im- 
 pertinence is not now permitted by new rule 21. The court may, 
 on its own initiative or by simple motion, order redundant or 
 scandalous matter to be stricken out upon such terms as he may 
 see fit. An answer is impertinent when it apjDcars that the 
 matter alleged is not material, or relevant ; or is stated with 
 needless prolixity. Whittemore v. Patten, 84 Fed. 56. Or 
 when not responsive to the bill. Hamlin v. Toledo, St. L. & 
 K. C. E. Co. 36 L.R.A. 826, 24 C. C. A. 271, 47 U. S. App. 
 422, 78 Fed. 667. Or when rambling and verbose. Stokes v. 
 Farnsworth, 99 Fed. 838. And when sought to strike out for 
 impertinence, it must be clearly made out. BaiTett v. Twin 
 City Power Co. Ill Fed. 45 ; see Blanton v. Ciialmers, 158 
 Fed. 907. Impertinent allegations should not be permitted to 
 be proved. Gunnell v. Bird, 10 Wall. 308, 19 L. ed. 915; 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Bay, 138 Fed. 206. 
 
 Inconsistent Matter. 
 
 Formerly the answer, having to be verified by the oath of the 
 defendant, could not contain inconsistent matter, but by new 
 rule !N"o. 30 the answer may now contain as many defenses in 
 the alternative consistent or inconsistent, as the defendant may 
 deem essential to his defense, which of course cannot be alleged 
 under oath. It is difficult to see how the permission, under this 
 
424 THE AlSrSWEE. 
 
 rule, to file any number of inconsistent defenses, and thereby 
 permit the pleading to assume the form of a written wrangle, 
 will conduce either to clearness in the issue, or, by thus forcing 
 the plaintiff to prepare to meet all kinds of inconsistent defenses 
 at the final trial will tend to expedite the cause, or reduce the 
 expense of the trial, which should have been a controlling factor 
 in promulgating the new rules. This feature of new rule No. 
 30 seems to have been promulgated in the interest of the lay- 
 man who wishes to defend his own cause, and perhaps in that 
 point of view it may be a success. 
 
 When there are inconsistent, separate defenses, they cannot 
 be offered in evidence to defeat each other, and thus virtually 
 abolish the effect of the rule. See Cowen & Hill's notes to 
 Phillipps on Evidence, vol. 1, pp. 209, 210 ; Bauman v. Cham- 
 bers, 91 Tex. Ill, 41 S. W. 471. But where there is incon- 
 sistency in the same plea the part most favorable to the plaintiff 
 may be treated as an admission in his favor. Fowler v. Daven- 
 port, 21 Tex. 633, 634. 
 
 Affirmative Matter. 
 
 You, as a general ri^le, cannot expand the denial beyond the 
 allegations in the bill (Osgood v. A. S. Aloe Instrument Co. 69 
 Fed. 291) ; but you may set up afiirmative matter, though not 
 responsive, if it is a defense to the case made in the bill. Adams 
 V. Bridgewater Iron Co. 6 Fed. 179 ; Pennsylvania Co. v. Bay, 
 138 Fed. 206 ; Bower Barff Eustless Iron Co. v. Wells Rustless 
 Iron Co. 43 Fed. 391; Stokes v. Farnsworth, 99 Fed. 837; 
 Mound City Co. v. Caatleman, 171 Fed. 520, and it may be 
 of law as well as fact. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. JSTorthem P. 
 R. Co. 76 Fed. 15. An answer may be treated as a cross bill. 
 Central Improvement Co. v. Cambria Steel Co. 127 C. C. A. - 
 184, 210 Fed. 722. 
 
 When Answer Cures Bill. 
 
 Setting up in the answer material facts omitted in the bill 
 cures the bill. Cavender v. Cavender, 114 U. S. 471, 29 L. ed. 
 214, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 955; Provisional Municipality v. Lehman, 
 6 a C. A. 349, 13 U. S. App. 411, 57 Fed. 330; Richardson 
 V. Green, 9 C. C. A. 565, 15 U. S. App. 488, 61 Fed. 431. 
 
THE AlSrSWEE. 425 
 
 Form of Answer. 
 
 Title as in bill. 
 
 The answer of C. D. (or, the joint and several answers of C. D. and 
 E. F. ) to the bill of complaint. 
 
 Now comes C. D., the defendant, and says for answer thereto: (here 
 take up each allegation of the bill and answer it as if specially inter- 
 rogated and state such defense as you have. You must either deny or 
 admit the allegation or state that you have no knowledge but believe the 
 allegations to be true or not true or that you have no knowledge or belief 
 as to the allegation, etc.). 
 
 When each allegation has been responded to, then conclude the answer as 
 follows: Having thus made a full answer to all the matters and things 
 contained in the bill this defendant prays that the bill be dismissed and 
 for judgment for his costs in this behalf incurred. 
 
 The prayer of the answer should be for a, dismissal of the bill. Hill 
 V. Eyan Grocery Co. 23 C. C. A. 624, 41 U. S. App. 714, 78 Fed. 27, or it 
 may be treated as a cross bill and ask affirmative relief. Central Improve- 
 ment Co. v. Cambria Steel Co. 127 C. C. A. 184, 210 Fed. 722. 
 
 And by rule No. 30, as seen, you can further set up in the answer any 
 set-off or counterclaim either arising out of the subject-matter of the 
 cause of action, or which might be the subject-matter of an independent 
 bill against the plaintiff, and ask affirmative relief thereon. 
 
 Yerifying the Answer. 
 
 THe answer need not be sworn tO' as contemplated by old rule 
 !N"o. 59, which has been abrogated by new rule ISTo. 36. This 
 new rule refers only to pleadings which are required to be veri- 
 fied by these rules, or by statute, and provides, when the plead- 
 ings are required to be verified, before whom the verification 
 must be made. As to the officers before whom the oath is to be 
 taken, the new rule is substantially the same as old rule No. 59, 
 except that masters in chancery and commissioners have been 
 omitted from the new rule. New rule 78, permitting parties to 
 affirm, is identically the same with old rule jSTo. 91. By new 
 rule Xo-^-i the signature of counsel to the pleadings is con- 
 sidered a certificate that there is good ground for the allegations 
 to the pleading, and that they are not interposed for delay. The 
 only pleading now required to be verified seems to be all bills 
 where special relief is asked, pending the suit. Equity rules 
 Nos. 25 and 73. Also by new rule No. 69 a petition for rehear- 
 ing, and by new rule No. 27 bills filed by stockholders of a corpo- 
 ration. Other than tbese there seems to be no necessity for veri- 
 fication of pleadings under these rules. 
 
426 THE AI^rSWEG. 
 
 When Need Not Anstcer Fully. 
 
 Old equity rule J^To. 39, creating an exception to answering 
 fvilly the allegations of the bill, has been omitted from the new 
 rules; but new rules jSTos. 29 and 30, providing for all character 
 of defenses to be set up by motion, or in answer, and for their 
 submission to the court, which have already been discussed, 
 are a substitute for old rule Iso. 39. By the new rule one may 
 by motion, or in the answer, set up a "plea in bar" to the merits 
 of the bill without answering the entire allegations of the bill. 
 Thus, one who wishes to rest his defense on the plea of a bona 
 fide i^urchaser may do so, and need not make further defense 
 where the plea would be a bar to further prosecution of the suit 
 (Hatch, V. Bancroft-Thompson Co. 67 Fed. 805; Gaines v. Ag- 
 nelly, 1 Woods, 238, Fed. Cas. Xo. 5,173; Xational Hollow 
 Brake Beam Co. v. Interchangeable Brake Beam Co. 83 Fed. 
 29) ; or one may set up any number of pleas in bar going to the 
 merits of the ease without fully answering, where such pleas 
 would bar the plaintiff's equity as was formerly the case under 
 old rule iSi^o. 39. See Standard Distilling & Distributing Co. 
 V. Woolsey, 121 Fed. 1017 ; Holton v. Guinn, 6.5 Fed. 450 ; Yon 
 Schroder v. Brittan, 98 Fed. 169 ; Green v. Turner, 30 C. C. A. 
 427, 49 U. S. App. 252, 86 Fed. 837. Where, however, the 
 matter set up by motion or answer only seeks a temporary 
 abatement of the suit, or goes merely to some irregularity in the 
 form of the bill, then the bill should be answered as required 
 under rule No. 30. 
 
 May Object to Parties in Answer. 
 
 You may object by answer or motion to want of parties, as 
 this would be a bar to a decree in the case, if parties are indis- 
 pensable. Howth V. Owens, 29 Fed. 725 ; Sheffield & B. Coal, 
 Iron & E. Co. v. Newman, 23 C. C. A. 459, 41 U. S. App. 766, 
 77 Fed. 787; Carey v. Brown, 92 U. S. 173, 23 L. ed. 470; 
 United States v. Gillespie, 6 Fed. 803. New rule 43, which is 
 identical with old rule 52, recogTiizes and permits this to be 
 done, but it provides that plaintiff must in fourteen days after 
 answer filed set down the cause for hearing on this issue alone. 
 If the plaintiff neglects to do so, but proceeds with the cause to 
 
THE jVKSWEE. 427 
 
 hearing witlioiit notieino- the objection, he will not be allowed 
 as of course to amend his bill and cure defect, but the court 
 may in its discretion permit it. If the parties are indispensable, 
 the court may dismiss the bill. You see, equity rule 43 must 
 be strictly pursued, or you will find your case hanging alone on 
 the covirt's discretion. 
 
 By equity rule 44 the court may, on hearing the cause, when 
 the defendant objects for the want of parties, not having talcen 
 the objection by motion or answer, and therein specified by name 
 or description the parties to whom the objection applies, the 
 court shall be at liberty to make a decree saving the rights of 
 the absent parties ; but this n^le clearly refers to only necessai-y 
 parties or proper parties, whose interests are separable as hereto- 
 fore shown, because if the absent parties are indispensable, the 
 court cannot proceed. Barney v. Baltimore, 6 \\'all. 284, 18 
 L. ed. 825. The court may, however, stop the case imtil indis- 
 pensable parties are brought in, otherwise it must be dismissed. 
 Taylor v. Holmes, 14 Fed. 515; Fourth Xat. Bank v. !New 
 Orleans & C. R Co. 11 Wall. 6-31, 20 L. ed. 84; Collins .]\Ifg. 
 Co. V. Ferguson, 54 Fed. 721; Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 142, 
 15 L. ed. 161. (See "Parties.") In these cases the dismissal 
 should be without prejudice. Kendig v. Dean, 97 U. S. 426, 24 
 L. ed. 1063; Keith v. Clark, 97 V. S. 456, 24 L. ed. 1072; 
 Goodman v. :Xiblack, 102 U. S. 563, 26 L. ed. 232; House v. 
 Mullen, 22 AYall. 47, 22 L. ed. 839. 
 
 This practice, provided by equity rule 43 for the disposal 
 of the issue of the lua-nt of parties raised by the answer, is so 
 speedy that one need not object to defect of parties by motion 
 in the nature of a plea (United States v. Gillespie, 6 Fed. 803), 
 but the answer must specify by name or description who the 
 parties are. Equity rules 43 and 44. 
 
CHAPTEE LXX. 
 
 EFFECT OF ANSWEE. 
 
 First. As a pleading. 
 Second. As evidence. 
 
 First, As a Pleading. 
 
 When it answers the merits of the whole bill, it waives all 
 irregularities in all previous proceedings. Strang v. Richmond, 
 P. & C. E. Co. 41 C. C. A. 474, 101 Fed. 515 ; Huntington v. 
 Laidley, 79 Fed. 865; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Missouri, K. 
 & T. E. Co. 84 Fed. 383; Bryant Bros. Co. v. Eobinson, 79 
 C. C. A. 259, 149 Fed. 329 ; Marshall v. Otto, 59 Fed. 249. 
 Answering to the merits of the whole bill under new rule l^o. 30 
 waives all defenses that may have been set up formerly by plea 
 or demun-er, where such defenses have not been set up pre- 
 viously by motion or in the answer or at the same time with 
 the answer to the merits. The old rule that an answer waives 
 all defenses set iip at the same time with the answer to the 
 merits (Adams v. Howard, 20 Blatchf. 38, 9 Fed. 347; Strang 
 V. Eichmond, P. & C. E. Co. 41 C. C. A. 474, 101 Fed. 511), 
 is not now of force under the new rules,' as all defenses may be 
 set up at the same time and included in one answer. However, 
 the defenses thus waived, as before stated, are only those of a 
 dilatory nature, as veniie, or matters of form, or any other matter 
 that would temporarily abate the suit. 
 
 When there are two or more defendants, a motion or answer 
 of one in the nature of a demurrer, or in the nature of a plea, 
 as before explained, would not be affected by an answer to merits 
 by any other defendant. Dakin v. Union P. E. Co. 5 Fed. 665. 
 
 Under new rule 3 1 the answer puts in issue the bill, and as no 
 replication is now required, the allegations of the answer are 
 put in issue by filing the same, even though it set up affirmative 
 matter, except in cases of set-off or counterclaim. It puts plain- 
 
 428 
 
EFFECT OF ANSWEE, 429 
 
 tiff on proof if the allegations of his bill, hut all averments, 
 except of value, or amount of damages, in the bill, if not denied, 
 need not be proven, unless the bill is brought against an infant, 
 lunatic, or person non compos, not under guardianship. 
 
 This rule changes the general trend of decisions. Under the 
 old rule that required proof of the allegations of the bill unless 
 admitted, the burden did not shift except when the answer 
 set up new matter or confession and avoidance, but under the 
 new rule 30, allegations not denied by the answer are taken as 
 confessed. As to the old rule, see Hanchett v. Blair, 41 C. C. A. 
 7G, 100 Fed. 821, and authorities cited; Whittemore v. Patten, 
 81 Fed. 528. 
 
 The Answer as Evidence. 
 
 The answer, not being required to be sworn to, puts in issue 
 the allegations of the bill, and is not evidence. The old rule 
 that the sworn answer may be so used, and forcing upon the 
 plaintiff a greater degree of proof to overcome its allegations, is 
 no longer of force. So, though defenses are inconsistent, neither 
 can be used as evidence. See Line Steamers v. Robinson, 134 
 C. C. A. 287, 218 Fed. 562, and cases cited. (See Inconsistent 
 Defenses. ) Admissions made in the answer, material to plain- 
 tiff's case, may be offered in evidence by the plaintiff. Whitte- 
 more V. Patten, supra. Rule 30 ; Robinson v. Philadelphia & 
 E. R. Co. 28 Fed. 577; Uhlmann v. Amholt & S. Brewing 
 Co. 41 Fed. 369. However, admission by one defendant, when 
 two or more, would not be evidence against a codefendant unless 
 the interest was joint, or they are parties or privies in estate. 
 Earle v. Art Library Pub. Co. 95 Fed. 544; Clark v. Van 
 Riensdyk, 9 Cranch, 160, 3 L. ed. 690. 
 
 So the answer may be offered to show what averments of the 
 bill are not denied and therefore confessed, under new rule 30. 
 
 New Matter in Answer; Effect. 
 
 ITew matter in answer must be proven by the defendant as 
 original matter. Allen v. O'Donald, 28 Fed. 17 ; Pennsyl- 
 vania Co. V. Cole, 132 Fed. 668 ; McCoy v. Rhodes, 11 How. 
 140, 141, 13 L. ed. 637, 638 ; Roach v. Summers, 20 Wall. 170, 
 
430 EFFECT OF ANSWEK. 
 
 22 L. ed. 253; Seitz v. Mitchell, 94 U. S. 582, 24 L. ed. 180. 
 Rule 31. 
 
 Answer of Corporations. 
 
 The answer of corporations was never required to be under 
 oath under the old rules. The coi"poration answers only under 
 the corporate seal, Continental Xat. Bank v. Heilman, 66 Fed. 
 184, but, like an individual, must give all the information 
 sought in the bill, and if ignorance is alleged without excuse, 
 the court will be justiiied in charging it with the costs of the 
 suit. Colgate v. Campagnie Francaise du Telegraphs, 23 
 Blatchf. 86, 23 Fed. 83; National Hollow Brake Beam Co. 
 V. Interchangeable Brake Beam Co. 83 Fed. 28 ; Indianapohs 
 Gas Co. V. Indianapolis, 90 Fed. 197 ; Gamewell Fire Alarm 
 Teleg. Co. v. A^ew York, 31 Fed. 312. 
 
 Officers as Parties. 
 
 The joinder of officers who have taken part in the transac- 
 tions about which the suit is brought is proper, although no 
 decree against them personally can be entered, and if the corpo- 
 ration is dismissed from the suit for want of jvirisdiction, or any 
 other cause, no relief can be obtained against the officers (Eow- 
 botham v. George P. Steel Iron Co. 71 Fed. 758), unless a 
 joint liability exists, as when alleged misconduct be part of the 
 purpose of the suit. Morse v. Bay State Gas Co. 91 Fed. 944; 
 Sidway v. Missouri Land & Live Stock Co. 116 Fed. 386; 
 Geer v. Matthieson Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 435, 47 L. ed. 
 1126, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 807. The answer of the corporation 
 should be made by the principal officers, who should be able to 
 admit or deny the allegations of the bill, or state want of 
 knowledge clearly and truly. Hale v. Continental Ins. Co. 16 
 Fed. 718. For this purpose they should be made parties to the 
 bill. O'Brien v. Champlain Constr. Co. 107 Fed. 338 ; Con- 
 tinental ISTat. Bank v. Heilman, 66 Fed. 184. Answer is not evi- 
 dence. United States v. McLaughlin, 24 Fed. 823. 
 
 Effect of Answer in Putting in Issue the Bill. 
 
 Old equity rule ISTo. 41 is now abrogated, and new rule Wo. 31 
 
EFFECT OF ANSWER. 431 
 
 provides that no replication shall be required but the cause shall 
 be deemed at issue upon the filing of the answer. And the plain- 
 tiff must prove his ease by a pre])onderance of the testimony. 
 (Stewart v. Allen, 47 Fed. 400), and all the technical learning 
 as to waiving or requiring the answer to be verified is now obso- 
 lete. 
 
 Affirmative Belief in Answer. 
 
 By equity rule Xo. 30 defendant in his answer may set up 
 any counterclaim or set-oft' against the plaintiff' that may have 
 arisen out of the transaction, or that may have been the subject- 
 matter of a suit in equity by cross bill against the plaintiff'. 
 Such set-oft' or counterclaim so set up shall have the effect of a 
 cross bill ui}on which the court may give a final judgment as 
 well as upon the original bill. Harper Bros. v. Klaw, -loi Fed. 
 609. 
 
 Under the former rule forbidding affirmative matter to be set 
 up in the aiiswer, it was generally held that it should have been 
 set up by cross bill, but even under the old system the court may 
 treat the answer as a cross bill, and grant affirmative relief 
 where no objection was made. Coburn v. Cedar Valley Land 
 & Cattle Co. 138 U. S. 221, 34 L. ed. 886, 11 Sup. Ct. Kep. 
 238; Moran v. Hagerman, 12 C. C. A. 239, 29 U. S. App. 71, 
 64 Fed. 500; Book v. Justice Min. Co. 58 Fed. 827. 
 
 Filing Answer and Procedure After. 
 
 By new rule Xo. 16, unless the time be extended the answer 
 must be filed as required by new rule Xo. 12, to wit, within 
 twenty days after service of the subpoena ; but, as before said, the 
 new rule X'^o. 12, designating the time of filing the answer, 
 applies to any other defense, \\'hether it be of law or fact, which 
 by rule Xo. 29 may be tried in advance of the trial on the merits, 
 and if denied an answer must be filed five days thereafter, or 
 pro confesso r.iay be taken. 
 
 Testing Legal Sufficiency of the Answer. 
 
 The test of the legal sufficiency of the answer by settinj,' down 
 the case for hearing on bill and answer is not provided for under 
 
432 EFFECT OF ANSWEE. 
 
 the new rules. New rule IvTo. 33 provides that if an answer sets 
 up an affirmative defense the plaintiff may on five days' notice, 
 or such time as the court may allow, test the sufficiency of the 
 answer by motion to strike out, and if found insufficient but 
 amendable, the court may allow an amendment upon terms, or 
 strike out the matter. But this procedure applies where the 
 answer sets up an affirmative defense, set-off, or counterclaim, 
 but does not provide for attacking the insufficiency of the an- 
 swer as where evasive, to the allegations of the bill, which here- 
 tofore were met by exceptions to the answer, which by the new 
 rules have been, abolished. 
 
 The test of the sufficiency of the answer, as provided under 
 new rule No. 33, may be made on any motion day or in cham- 
 bers or on any other day appointed, and if amendable the court 
 may allow the amendment, or strike out. Where the motion is 
 to strike out the answer, and for final judgment on the prayer 
 of the bill because of the insufficiency of the answer as a matter 
 of law to defeat the bill, the motion ought to be heard in term 
 time in open court, when a final decree may be entered. Camp- 
 bell Printing-Press & Mfg. Co. v. Manhattan Elev. E. Co. 48 
 Fed. 344; Church Ward International Steel Co. v. Bethlehem 
 Steel Co. 233 Ped. 322. 
 
 I take it that the provision made by rale No. 33 refers more 
 to its legal sufficiency as a pleading, than objection to the an- 
 swer as a response to the allegations of the bill. Motions which 
 raise no question of law, but go simply to objection to the 
 answer because irresponsive, evasive, or irrelevant, which under 
 the old rules were met by exception (Stokes v. Parnsworth, 99 
 Ped. 836 ; Walker v. Jack, 31 C. C. A. 462, 60 U. S. App. 124, 
 88 Ped. 5Y6) ; or when argumentative; or impertinent, would 
 now be a useless waste of time for many reasons. Pirst, the 
 answer is not now required to be sworn to, and cannot be used 
 as evidence except as to admissions therein; second, allegations 
 of the bill not specifically denied or explained are admitted. 
 (Rule No. 30) ; third, discovery is no longer necessary through 
 interrogatories in the bill, as parties may be examined orally, 
 or by deposition, and thus be made to ansv?er definitely the 
 allegations. (United States v. McLaughlin, 24 Ped. 825; Ex 
 parte Boyd, 105 U. S. 657, 26 L. ed. 1204; Field v. Hastings & 
 B. Co. 65 Ped. 279.) The reason of the rule has ceased. 
 
 But while there is now no necessity to meet objections to an- 
 
EFFECT OF ANSWER. 433 
 
 swei-s for evasiveness, or shuffling to avoid speciiic answers, yet 
 a motion to strike out such answers to allegations of the bill may 
 be made and heard by the court at his discretion. Peacock v. 
 United States, 60 C. C. A. 389, 12.5 Fed. 586. Of course the 
 complainant is entitled to an explicit answer to every material 
 allegation of the bill. He has a right to know what is admitted, 
 and what denied, and what he must prove ; and there is no rea- 
 son why the court may not permit it to be accomplished by a 
 motion to strike out. See ]\Iarconi Wireless Teleg. Co. v. Na- 
 tional Electric Signaling Co. 206 Fed. 205, and Sydney v. 
 Mugford Printing & Engraving Co. 214 Fed. 841, where motion 
 to strike out counterclaim allowed. 
 
 Form of Motion to Strilce Out Allegations of Antswer.' 
 
 Title as in bill. 
 
 And now comes the plaintiff A. B. and moves the court to strike out 
 the answer to clause 1 of the bill (or whatever clause it may be) charging, 
 etc., because — 
 
 First. It is evasive and not responsive. 
 
 Second. It is scandalous and impertinent. 
 
 Third. It is imperfect and insufficient and plaintiff prays, that it be 
 stricken out and taken for naught. 
 
 R. F., 
 Solicitor. 
 
 Of course it may be amended if stricken out, but if not 
 amended, the allegation of the bill will be taken, as confessed, 
 imder rule 30. 
 
 Your motion should set forth the charges in the bill, and 
 the answers as made that are excepted to, and shoAving in what 
 the insufficiency consists, or that it is obnoxious to the objec- 
 tion made. Schultz v. Phenix Ins. Co. 77 Fed. 376 ; Fuller v. 
 Knapp, 24 Fed. 100 ; Whittemore v. Patten, 84 Fed. 53 ; Bower 
 Barff Rustless Iron Co. v. Wells Rustless Iron Co. 43 Fed. 391 ; 
 Blanton v. Chalmers, 158 Fed. 907. An answer is impertinent 
 and liable to exception when it is apparent that the matter set 
 up is not material or relevant, or is stated with needless pro- 
 lixity. Pennsylvania Co. v. Bay, 138 Fed. 206; Greene v. 
 Aurora Co. 158 Fed. 908. So when the allegations of the bill 
 are immaterial, exceptions will not lie, because they are not 
 answered. Hardeman v. Harris, 7 How. 728, 729, 12 B. ed. 
 889, 890; Peters v. Tonopah Min. Co. 120 Fed. 587. A liberal 
 S. Eq.— 28. 
 
434 EFFECT OF AXSWEE. 
 
 construction is given to the answer when excepted to.. Ibid. And 
 if the paragraph of the answer excepted to is partly good, an 
 exception to the whole will not lie. Board of Trade v. Xational 
 Bd. of Trade, 154 Fed. 238. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. 
 Snellenburg, 152 Fed. 662. 
 
 New matter, whether responsive to the allegations of the bill, 
 or not, may be set up in the answer under the new rule, and 
 whether intended as a defense or for aiffirmative relief, cannot 
 now be objected to because irresponsive to the bill. New ride 
 No. 30. See Board of Trade v. National Bd. of Trade, 154 
 Eed. 238, where objections to the answer are partly good. 
 
 Scandal and Impertinence in Answer. 
 
 By equity rule No. 21 exception for scandal or impertinence 
 in answer is abolished, but the court may, on motion or its own 
 initiative, order any redundant, imperinent, or scandalous mat- 
 ter in the answer to be stricken out upon such terms as the court 
 may direct. Where the bill justifies the answer charged as scan- 
 dalous, etc., the motion should not be sustained. Equity rule 
 21 ; Comstock v. Herron, 45 Fed. 660. An answer is im- 
 pertinent when the matter set up is not material or relevant or 
 stated with needless prolixity. Pennsylvania Co. v. Bay, 138 
 Fed. 206 ; Greene v. Aurora R. Co. 158 Fed. 909. This last 
 objection is not favored because if the matter set up might be 
 material the objection should not be sustained ; for it struck out 
 and it should afterwards appear material on the final trial, it 
 could not be remedied. Again, when new matter is set up in the 
 answer, though it be not responsive to any allegation of the bill, 
 yet if it sets up a substantial defense it cannot be objected to 
 because irresponsive. Again, where the allegations to the bill 
 are immaterial they cannot be objected to though not answered. 
 Peters v. Tonopah Min. Co. 120 Fed. 587. 
 
 When Motion Mmt Be Filed. 
 
 A motion raising the question of the insufiiciency of the an- 
 swer, if desired to be done, may be filed at any time within the 
 provision of rule No. 1, and may be heard on any motion day 
 or any other time as provided by rule No. 6. If the answer set 
 up an affirmative defense or counterclaim, and objection be 
 
EFFECT OF ANSWER. 435 
 
 made, the plaintiff, on five days' notice, unless the time be 
 enlarged, may test the sufficiency of the answer by motion to 
 strike out. See also new rule ]No. .'3;J. 
 
 ^yhe)l Motion is Sustained. 
 
 Where the motion is sustained the defendant will be ruled for 
 a better answer. If the motion goes to the whole answer, and 
 none is filed within the time required by the court the bill may 
 be taken as confessed. If the objection goes only to certain 
 phases of the answer, and is sustained, further answer should be 
 filed. If not filed within the time required, the allegations of 
 the bill, if material, to which the defective answer is intended as 
 a reply, will be considered as confessed. 
 
 When Motion Overruled. 
 
 When the answer is held suSicient as a response to the bill it 
 puts in issue at once the allegations of the bill. New rule lio. 
 31. The answers of corporations are controlled by the same rule. 
 Xational Hollow Brake Beam Co. v. Interchangeable Brake 
 Beam Co. 83 Fed. 28; Whittemore v. Patten, 81 Fed. 528. 
 
CHAPTER LXXI. 
 
 AMENDING A^^SWEE. 
 
 We have seen by new rule Xo. 33, that when the answer was 
 attacked for insufficiency, and held insufficient, the court may 
 allow it to be amended, if amendable, on such terms as it may 
 order. By rule N"o. 30 the answer may be amended by leave of 
 the court or judge upon reasonable notice, so as to piit any aver- 
 ments in issue when justice requires it. The rules contemplate 
 that an amendment to the answer must be made by the court, or 
 judge, and are not grantable of course. By new rule l^o. 20 a 
 further and more particular statement of the nature of the de- 
 fense may be ordered by the court on terms. See Gubbins v. 
 Laughtenschlager, 75 Fed. 615 and Bass v. Christian Feigen- 
 span, 82 Fed.''260. 
 
 The motion to amend may, by new rule Xo. 1'.), be made at 
 any time and upon such terms as may be just, and the Amend- 
 ment may extend to any material supplemental matter that may 
 be set forth in an amended or supplemental fileading; and it 
 seems that this amendment may be ordered at the discretion of 
 the court at any stage of the proceedings when it would not con- 
 flict with the substantial rights of the parties. See sections 754 
 ■and 954, U. S. Rev. Stat. Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 1282, 1591. 
 Of' course the answer may be amended by consent. Stokes v. 
 Farnsworth, 99 Fed. 836. 
 
 By new equity rule Xo. 32 when the bill has been amended 
 after answer filed, the defendant must file a new or supplemental 
 answer. Perkins v. Ilendryx, 31 Fed. 522. This rule is the 
 same as old rule Xo. 46, except that when the amendment to the 
 bill is filed the defendant must file a new or supplemental an- 
 swer within ten days thereafter, unless the time is enlarged or 
 otherwise ordered by the judge of the court ; and upon default a 
 decree pro confesso may be taken. 
 
 Thus having grouped the rules afl^ecting the amendment of 
 
 436 
 
AiJK.\Ul.\G A.XSWEK. 437 
 
 answers, we see, as before stated, no material amendments can 
 be allowed except npon motion and upon application to the court. 
 The motion may be as follows: 
 
 Title as in bill. 
 
 And now comes the defendant in the above and entitled cause and moves 
 the court for leave to amend his answer as will appear in the amended 
 answer herewith filed. That said amendments are material and necessary 
 to a proper defense of the case; that the matter as amended and the 
 amendments offered were not known prior to filing the original answer 
 (or, if known, show that they were inadvertently or through mistake not 
 incorporated in the original answer or that the materiality has arisen 
 since). Wherefore he prays that said amendments be allowed and con- 
 sidered a part of the answer upon the hearing of this cause. 
 
 E. F. 
 Solicitor. 
 
 While under new rule Xo. 30 it is said that the court may 
 allow any amendment to the answer to put in issue any aver- 
 ment in the bill when justice requires it, yet, giving a liberal 
 construction to the rule, the defendant may set up any covniter- 
 claim against the plaintiff by amendment which might be the 
 subject of an independent suit in equity against the plaintiff'. 
 
 Notice of the Motion, 
 
 Equity rule ISTo. 30 requires reasonable notice of the motion 
 to be given to the other party, the reasonableness of which 
 must be determined by the court if objection is taken. 
 
 To A. B., Plaintiff, or E. S., his Counsel of Record: 
 
 Please take notice that I have filed a motion for leave to amend the 
 answer heretofore filed by the defendant in this cause, a copy of wliicli 
 motion containing the amendments sought is hereto attached for your 
 information. ' 
 
 I will present said motion on the day of , A. D. 19. . ., 
 
 or as soon thereafter as practicable, to his Honor, judge, etc., at 
 
 R. F. 
 Solicitor. 
 
 You may file the motion and attach a copy of the amend- 
 ments sought both to the motion and notice. Ibid. ; Stokes v. 
 Parnsworth, 99 Fed. 837. 
 
 If the order to amend is granted by the coiirt, prepare it as 
 follows : 
 
438 AMENDING ANSWEK. 
 
 Title as in bill. 
 
 This cause coming on to be heard in chambers (or in open court) on the 
 motion of defendant to amend his answer, and both parties having appeared 
 (or it appearing that notice was served on plaintiff and he came not), and 
 the court being fully advised of the amendments sought to be made to the 
 
 answer of defendant heretofore filed in this cause on the day of 
 
 , A. D. 19. . ., it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that 
 
 the motion be granted and that the amendments as set forth in the motion 
 be allowed and the clerk of the court is hereby ordered to file the same as 
 of the date of this order as amendments to the original answer. 
 
 Judge, etc. 
 
 This and all other forms given are mere general directions 
 in the successive steps of a suit in equity, which you may use 
 or improve upon, as you deem best. 
 
 The order will be entered by the clerk as a part of the pro- 
 ceedings, and the amendments will be filed by him as a plead- 
 ing in the cause. 
 
 The distinction heretofore existing as between allowing 
 amendments to bills and allowing them to answers, because of 
 the fact that the answer had to be sworn to, no longer obtains, 
 and the reason for amendment in one case need not be more 
 cogent than satisfactory than in the other. 
 
 But in allowing amendments to answers when the facts 
 sought to be set up by amendment were known to the defendant 
 when the answer was filed, the court should hesitate before 
 permitting the litigant to experiment with" the court's discretion 
 (Gubbins v. Laughtenschlager, 75 Fed. 624; Ritchie v. Mc- 
 Mullen, 25 C. G. A. 50, 47 U. S. App. 470, 79 Fed. 522; Cross 
 V. Morgan, 6 Fed. 244, 245. See new rule 34), especially if the 
 amendment sought to be set up would affect substantial rights 
 (rule 19). 
 
 When Amendment Conflicts with Other Allegations. 
 
 Under the former rules an amendment that conflicts with 
 the allegations of the answer were not permitted, as the answer 
 had to be under oath, and in such cases the court would strike 
 out both the allegation of the original answer and the amend- 
 ment (Ozark Land Co. v. Leonard, 24 Fed. 660) ; but under 
 rule 30 the answer may state as many defenses as the defendant 
 deems essential, regardless of consistency. 
 
AMENDING ANSWiii;. 439 
 
 Amendment After Cause Ready for Hearing. 
 
 There shoiild be very strong reasons to justify an amend- 
 ment to the answer after the canse is ready for hearing, but 
 there is no doubt of the plenary powers of the court to remove 
 by amendment all impediments to the attainment of justice 
 in the particular case. U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 954, Comp. Stat. 
 1013, sec. 1:>!>1; Eules 19-34; see Lange v. Union P. R. Co. 
 62 C. C. A. 4S, 121) Fed. 340-341; Eucker v. Bolles, 67 C. C. 
 A. 30, 133 Fed. 860 ; Ritchie v. McMullen, 25 C. C. A. 50, 
 47 U. S. App. 470, 79 Fed. 522-529 ; Southern R. Co. v. North 
 Carolina Corp. Commission, 105 Fed. 270 ; Hicks v. Otto, 85 
 Fed. 728. The rules hei'etofore stated as to "amending bills at 
 and after trial" apply to the amendment of answers. And a 
 party may be permitted to amend his answer at the hearing 
 to conform to the proof (Hamilton v. Southern JSTevada Gold 
 & S. Min. Co. 33 Fed. 568, 15 Mor. Min. Rep. 314. See 
 "Amendment of Bills at and after trial" and authorities cited) ; 
 and unless there was an abuse of discretion, the granting or 
 refusal by the court of the amendment would not be reviewable 
 (Roberts v. Northern P. R. Co. 158 F. S. 26, 39 L. ed. 882, 15 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 756). 
 
 Supplemental Answer. 
 
 New rule 32, which is substantially the same as old rule 46, 
 provides, where a. bill has been amended after answer filed, 
 the defendant shall put in a new or supplemental answer within 
 ten days after the amended bill or amendment is filed. Unless 
 the time is enlarged, the failure to do so permits the plaintiff 
 to take the amendment, or amended bill, as confessed. 
 
 Again, a supplemental answer may be filed upon applica- 
 tion, upon reasonable notice, alleging material facts occurring 
 after his former ansAver, or of which he was ignorant when it 
 was made. New rule 34, which covers substantially old rule 
 57. (See Supplemental Bills.) 
 
CHAPTEE LXXII. 
 
 E.EPLI CATION. 
 
 By equity rule 31, unless the answer asserts a set-off or coun- 
 terclaim no replication is required without the special order 
 of a court or judge, but the cause shall be deemed at issue upon 
 the filing of the answer, and any new or affirmative matter 
 set up in the answer shall be deemed to be denied by the plain- 
 tiff. Electric Boat Co. v. Lake Torpedo Boat Co. 215 Eed. 382. 
 Second. If the answer include a set-off or counterclaim the 
 party against whom it is asserted must reply within ten days 
 after the filing to the answer setting up the set-off or counter- 
 claim, unless a longer time be allowed by the covirt or judge. 
 Third. The rule further provides that if the counterclaim af- 
 fects the rights of other defendants, then a copy of the same 
 must be served on the solicitors or parties within ten days from 
 the filing of the counterclaim. Then ten days shall be allowed 
 to those defendants upon whom a copy of the counterclaim has 
 been served, for filing a reply. In default of filing a reply 
 a decree pro confesso on the counterclaim may be entered. 
 
 We see, then, that replications have been abolished except in 
 the matter of set-off or counterclaim ordered by the court. With 
 these exceptions, above stated, the answer puts in issue the 
 allegations of the bill, and all the allegations of the answer are 
 considered denied without the necessity of replication. The 
 reply required by the new rule to the counterclaim is not a 
 replication as known to the old rule, but simply has the efi'ect 
 of an answer putting in issue the new matter, and the rules 
 governing answers apply. Goodno v. Hotchkiss, 230 Eed. 515 ; 
 Williams v. Adler-Goldman Commission Co. 227 Fed. 374. 
 
 By acts of Congress March 3rd, 1915, where affirmative re- 
 lief is prayed for in a suit at law the plaintiff must file a 
 replication. 
 
 So far we have endeavored to state the new rules and pro- 
 cedure thereunder in preparing a case for final hearing in 
 equity. In the past, judges have not followed the rules in many 
 
 440 
 
IJEPLICATIOX. 441 
 
 cases, nor recognized any limitations to their discretion in ap- 
 plying them. In such cases their action was only the law of 
 the particular case, and could not be regarded as precedent, 
 but the result was confusimi. Xow that the new rules give 
 larger discretion to the judges in granting or refusing orders 
 in the preparation of a cause for final hearing, and now that 
 many of the old rules that required some semblance of order in 
 the procedure have been abrogated, I think we will realize fully 
 the truth of the prevalent reproach to the system, that what may 
 or may not be done to an equity suit in a Federal court depends 
 on the condition of the judge's conscience, or the breadth of 
 his discretion. In many instances the effort to eliminate and 
 shoi-ten the old rnles has resulted in obscurity, and we mnst 
 await the lapse of years before precedents can be assembled 
 that will produce uniformity and definiteness in the construc- 
 tion of these new rules. 
 
 With due deference to the assembled wisdom that labored 
 so long to create a system that would expedite the trial of equity 
 causes, it is the belief of the writer that with a change in ten 
 of the old rules, and the omission of a very few more that had 
 practically become obsolete, a better result would have been 
 reached without entirely wrecking the old system, which, 
 though tardy, at times sought, at least, to create definiteness in 
 the issue. 
 
CHAPTER LXXIIL 
 
 DISMISSAL OF A CASE IN EQUITY. 
 
 By the Defenda-nt. 
 
 Old equity rules JSTos. 38 and 66 having been abrogated, there 
 can be' no dismissal by the defendant, as of course, of the bill. 
 There are but two rules now affecting the rights of parties to 
 dismiss the suit. New rule ISTo. 29 contemplates that the de- 
 fendant can only dismiss on an application by motion, or in the 
 answer setting up some issue of law or fact, upon which the 
 court must grant the dismissal. By new rule !N"o. 57 when the 
 case has been dropped from the trial calendar by continuance, 
 and no application is made to reinstate it within the year, it is 
 provided that the suit shall be dismissed without prejudice to 
 a new one. Again, under the old rules, where the representa- 
 tive of a deceased complainant failed to revive a suit within a 
 reasonable time, the defendant could dismiss it; but new rule 
 Xo. 45, which is a substitute for the old rule, contemplates that 
 any of the parties to the suit may revive it if the representa- 
 tives of the deceased do not make the application within a rea- 
 sonable time. Davis v. Virginia R. & Power Co. — C. C. A. 
 — , 229 Fed. 633. 
 
 442 
 
CHAPTER LXXIV. 
 
 CROSS SUITS. 
 
 The cross bill of the old practice was in the nature of an 
 answer, and became necessary whenever the defendant sought 
 affirmative relief, as the answer could only pray for a dis- 
 missal of the bill. Electric Boat Co. v. Lake Torpedo Boat 
 Co. 215 Fed. 380 ; Xewton v. Gage, 155 Fed. 608 ; Weathersbee 
 V. American Freehold Land Mortg. Co. 77 Fed. 524; Xorth 
 British & M. Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, 17 C. C. A. 175, 25 U. S. 
 App. 443, 70 Fed. 433 ; Eickey Land & Cattle Co. v. Wood, si 
 C. C. A. 218, 152 Fed. 23; Springfield Mill Co. v. Barnard & 
 L. Mfg. Co. 26 C. C. A. 389, 49 U. S. App. 438, 81 Fed. 2(;i ; 
 Commercial Bank v. Sandford, 103 Fed. 99 ; Jackson v. Sim- 
 mons, 39 C. C. A. 514, 98 Fed. 768; Gilmore v. Bort, 134 Fed. 
 661; Turner v. Southern Home Bldg. & L. Asso. 41 C. C. A. 
 379, 101 Fed. 316; Washington, A. & G. R. Co. v. Bradley 
 (Washington, A. & G. E. Co. v. Washington), 10 Wall. 299, 19 
 L. ed. 894; Wood v. Collins, 8 C. C. A. 522, 23 U. S. App. 224, 
 60 Fed. 142. It was a counter bill against the plaintiff, or it 
 may have been brought against the codefendants, or both to- 
 gether, but it was necessary to touch or be germane to the cause 
 of action set up in the original bill. ISTewton v. Gage, 155 Fed. 
 608; Book v. Justice Min. Co. 58 Fed. 831 ; Shields v. Barrow, 
 17 How. 145, 15 L. ed. 162; Brande v. Gilchrist, 18 Fed. 465 ; 
 Sanders v. Eiverside, 55 C. C. A. 240, 118 Fed. 720. And new 
 and distinct matters wholly disconnected with the original bill 
 could not be introduced by a cross bill. Bunel v. O'Day, 125 
 Fed. 319; Gilmore v. Bort, 134 Fed. 658; Hogg v. Hoag, 107 
 Fed. 814; Stonemetz Printers' Mach. Co. v. Brown Folding- 
 jlach. Co. 46 Fed. 852; Fidelity Trust & S. V. Co. v. .Mobile 
 Street E. Co. 53 Fed. 861; Ayi'cs v. Chicago, 101 U. S. 187, 
 25 L. ed. 840; Cross v. DeVaile, 1 Wall. 5, 17 L. ed. 515; 
 Sunset Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Eureka, 122 Fed. 960; Thurston 
 
 443 
 
444 CEOSS STJITS. 
 
 V. Big Stone Gap Improv. Co.. S6 Fed. 484; Providence Rub- 
 ber Co. V. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 809, 19 L. ed. 589 ; Kilburn v. 
 Hirner, 163 Fed. 540; Springfield Co. v. Barnard Co. 81 Fed. 
 263, and cases cited; Goff v. Kelly, 74 Fed. 327; Morgan's L. 
 & T. E. & S. S. Co. V. Texas C. E. Co. 137 U. S. 201, 34 L. ed. 
 635, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 61 ; jSTew Departtire Bill Co. v. Hardware 
 Specialty Co. 62 Fed. 463. See Continental Trust Co. v. Toledo, 
 St. L. & K. C. E. Co. 86 Fed. 950, 951, and Bunel v. O'Day, 
 125 Fed. 304. 
 
 Under the old practice its uses were various: 
 
 First. To obtain affirmative relief against the plaintiff. 
 
 Second. It was used for discovery in aid of the answer, under 
 old equity rule 72, but this rule is abrogated. 
 
 Third. As a matter of defense to the bill to set up new 
 matter, when it was too late to set it up by plea or answer, as 
 after replication and issue joined. 
 
 Fourth. To settle conflicting claims between defendants 
 which are necessary to be adjusted before a complete decree can 
 be entered. 
 
 Fifth. When necessai-y to bring about a complete determina- 
 tion of all matters affected by the bill. 
 
 Sixth. It was sometimes taken as an answer and vice versa. 
 
 By new rule 30 the answer may, without cross bill, contain as 
 many defenses in the alternative, regardless of consistency, as 
 the defendant may deem essential to his defenses. It may set 
 up any counterclaim or set-off which might be the subject-matter 
 of an independent suit in equity, or which may arise out of the 
 transaction; and when so set up, it shall have the effect of a 
 cross bill, so that the court may pronoxmce final judgment on the 
 same suit, both on the original bill and the cross suit. Under 
 this rule the cross suit set up in the answer may have for its 
 subject-matter any equitable claim against the plaintiff which 
 might be the subject-matter of an independent suit against him. 
 Therefore the cross suit need not be confined to the subject- 
 matter of the original bill, as new and distinct matter wholly 
 disconnected with the subject-matter of the suit may be intro- 
 duced in the answer. The old test. Do the matters in the cross 
 bill grow out of, and does the relief prayed for depend on, the 
 subject-matter of the original bill ( no longer obtains. All that 
 seems necessary now to the cross suit is that the claim set up be 
 
CROSS SUITS. 445 
 
 an equitable one, such as could have been maintained against 
 the plaintiff in an original snit in eqviity. That the purpose of 
 the cross suit is different from the original bill, or the fact that 
 the subject-matter of the cross suit is not germane, can no longer 
 be set up to defeat the cross suit. So we see that cross bills are 
 no longer necessary, as by rule 30 conflicting claims, and a de- 
 mand for affirmative relief, must be set up in the answer. 
 
 Again, there is no feature of independence in the cross suil 
 as in the old cross bill, as no citation is to be issued or served, 
 but by new rule 31 the party against whom a set-off or counier- 
 claim is set up must reply within ten days after filing the an- 
 swer, unless further time be granted by the court or judge. If 
 the counterclaim affects the rights of codefendants they or their 
 solicitors must be served with a copy of the counterclaim within 
 ten days from filing the same, and ten days within which to file 
 a reply is accorded to the codef endant against whom the counter- 
 claim is set up. 
 
 The Scope of the Cross Suit under the New Rules. 
 
 iluch diversity of opinion has already arisen as to the scope 
 and effect of rule 30 in abolishing cross bills and substituting 
 cross suits in the answer. 
 
 In Terry Steam Turbine Co. v. B. F. Sturtevant Co. 204 
 Fed. 103, it is held that a counterclaim, to be the subject of a 
 cross siiit under the new v\\le, miist "arise out of the transac- 
 tion," which is the subject-matter of the original suit; that in 
 an infringement suit, a cross suit for the infringement of an- 
 other patent by plaintiff cannot be set up. ( McGill v. Sorensen, 
 209 Fed. 876. See also Eler^tric Boat Co. v. Lake Torpedo 
 Boat Co. 215 Fed. 378) ; that the word "counterclaim" as used 
 in the rule was not intended to include all cross claims upon 
 which the defendant may sue the plaintiff in equity, but only 
 such as are connected with or grov^' out of the subject-matter of 
 the original bill. This car-o clearly indicates that the words 
 "arising out of the transaction," in the rule, qualify the subse- 
 qiient clause, "and may ^vithout cross bill set out any set-off or 
 counterclaim which might be the subject of an independent suit 
 in equity" against the plaintiff. 
 
 It is further said that the main purpose of the rule was to 
 
446 CEOSS SUITS. 
 
 dispense with cross bills, but to allow all matters that could 
 heretofore be set up by cross bill, to be now set up in the answer; 
 that the matters that could be set up by cross bill must be 
 confined to the subject-matter of the suit in the original bill, and 
 therefore wholly disconnected causes of action setting up new 
 and distinct matter not germane to the subject-matter of the 
 original bill, was not permitted under the new rule; that to 
 make all claims having no remote connection with the original 
 cause of action would be permitting two original bills in the 
 same suit, which would be in violation of well-settled principles 
 of equity, — citing Stuart v. Hayden, 18 C. C. A. 618, .'iO U. S. 
 App. 462, 72 Fed. 402-410, 169 U. S. 1, 42 L. ed. 639, 
 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 274. The court could not believe that so ?-aJi- 
 cal a change was intended by the new rules. 
 
 This case was followed by Adamson v. Shaler, 208 Fed. 566; 
 Sydney v. Mugford Printing & Engraving Co. 214 Fed. 844; 
 Klauder-Weldon Dyeing Mach. Co. v. Giles, 212 Fed. 4:)2. So 
 in Williams Patent Crusher & Pulverizer ('o. v. Kinsey Mfg. 
 Co. 205 Fed. ;375, it was held that damages arising out of tort 
 not connected with the transaction, or any contractual relations 
 upon which the suit was brought, would not be a proper sub- 
 ject of set-off, inasmuch as set-offs in equity must rest upon some 
 equitable consideration or agreement between the parties, — cit- 
 ing many authorities. See McGill v. Sorensen, 209 Fed. 876. 
 As to pleading diversion of funds as a counterclaim, see Missis- 
 sippi A^alley Trust Co. v. Washington X. R. Co. 212 Fed. 777. 
 
 In Salt's Textile Mfg. Co. v. Tingue Mfg. Co. 208 Fed. 157, 
 the court insisted upon a more liberal construction of the rules 
 intended to bring about a more speedy relief and settlement of 
 all controversies between the parties in a single suit. However, 
 in this case the counterclaim arose out of the transaction sued 
 upon. Buffalo Specialty Co. v. Yancleff, 217 Fed. 91. See 
 United States Expansion Bolt Co. v. H. G. Kroncke Hardware 
 Co. 216 Fed. 187. In Marconi Wireless Teleg. Co. v. National 
 Electric Signaling Co. 206 Fed. 295, the court clearly distin- 
 guishes the mandatory and permissive clause of rule 30, which 
 a proper construction of the rule demands, in view of the clear 
 purpose of the rule to settle all controversies between parties in 
 the bill and answer. The rule, after permitting the defendant 
 to set up as many defenses, regardless of consistency, as he 
 
CROSS SUITS. 447 
 
 deems essential to his defense, provides that (1st) any counter- 
 claim arising out of the transaction which is the subject-matter 
 of the suit, may be set up in the answer; and (2d) any set-off 
 or counterclaim against the plaintiff which might be the subject 
 of an independent suit against him may be set up in the answer. 
 See Electric Boat Co. v. Lake Torpedo Boat Co. 215 Fed. 382; 
 Fnited States Expansion Bolt Co. v. li. G. Kroncke Plardware 
 Co. supra. 
 
 The courts hold that the first clause is mandatory, and a 
 counterclaim growing out of the cause of action or subject-mat- 
 ter of the suit would be waived if not set up in the suit imder 
 this rule. (Portland "Wood Pipe Co. v. Slick Bros. Constr. Co. 
 222 Fed- 530 ; Marconi Wireless Teleg. Co. v. Xational Elec- 
 tric Sig-naling Co. 206 Fed. 295, 296 TSalt's Textile Mfg. Co. 
 V. Tingue Mfg. Co. 208 Fed. 156; Electric Boat Co. v. Lake 
 Torpedo Boat Co. 215 Fed. 377; Fnited States Expansion Bolt 
 Co. V. H. G. Kroncke Hardware Co. 216 Fed. ls7) ; while in the 
 second or permissive clause a suit would not be waived by not 
 setting up the independent cause of action, but the sviit may be 
 filed afterwards. The rule is emj^hatic that any claim which 
 would be the subject-matter of an independent suit in equity 
 may be, "without cross bill," set up in the answer. 
 
 In Vacuum Cleaner Co. v. American Rotary Valve Co. 208 
 Fed. 419, Judge La Combe reco£inizes the distinction in the two 
 clauses of the rule. 
 
 Rule 30 was clearly intended (1st) to affirm the old juris- 
 dictional maxim of equity, that a court of equity, having taken 
 jurisdiction of a cause of action, will decide all incidental mat- 
 ters necessary for a full determination of the controversy be- 
 tween the parties ; and consequently all claims against the 
 plaintiff by a cross bill nuist now be set up in the answer. 
 
 2d. It Avas fui-ther intended to extend the defense to other 
 controversies between the parties, which could not have been 
 litigated by a cross bill under the former practice, because not 
 incident to or germane to the subject-matter of the original 
 suit. The simple test provided by the rule is, could the defend- 
 ,ant have brought an original independent suit in eqiiity against 
 the plaintiff on the cause of action set up in the answer ''. In 
 Electric Boat Co. v. Lake Torpedo Boat Co. 215 Fed. 382, the 
 court pertinently says that as rule 26 allows a plaintiff to join 
 
4-48 CEOSS SUITS. 
 
 in one bill as many causes of action cognizable in equity as be 
 may have against the defendant, rule 30 was intended to give the 
 same option to the dependant, and thus place them on the same 
 footing, as to joining causes of action; the saving clause being 
 that if inconvenient to try the various causes of action at the 
 same time, the court may order separate trials. Kule 26. 
 
 As to the Nature of the Causes of Action that May he Set Up in 
 the Answer wider Rule SO. 
 
 1st. Rule 30 provides that any counterclaim arising out of 
 the transaction without reference to its being legal or equitable. 
 
 2d. Any counterclaim that might be the subject-matter of an 
 independent suit in equity. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. 
 Eclair Film Co. 208 Fed. 416. 
 
 As to the first clause, "any counterclaim arising out of the 
 transaction" was only, as said, a reaffirmation of the practice 
 under the cross bill, in which one could set up matters purely 
 legal as well as equitable, if they were connected with the sub- 
 ject-matter of the original bill. See Rule 23. As to what could 
 have been set up under the old cross bill which now may be 
 set up by answer, as matters "arising out of the transaction," 
 see the following authorities ■: Weathersbee v. American Free- 
 hold Land Mortg. Co. 77 Fed. 524; Chicago, M. & St. P. E. 
 Co. v. Third Wat. Bank, 134 U. S. 288, 33 L. ed. 904, 10 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 550 ; Springfield ilill Co. v. Barnard & L. Mfg. Co. 
 26 C. C. A. 389, 49 U. S. App. 438, 81 Fed. 261 ; Royal Union 
 Mut. L. Ins. Co. V. Wynn, 177 Fed. 293. Thus a discharge 
 in bankruptcy should be set up by cross bill. So an agreement, 
 or conveyance. Carnochan v. Christie, 11 Wheat. 446, 6 L. ed. 
 516. 
 
 It has been held that mistake or fraud, or that one is an inno- 
 cent purchaser, or that a party is not the assignee of the note 
 sued upon, when a defense to a bill, may be set up by cross 
 bill. Commonwealth Title Ins. & T. Co. v. Cummings, 83 
 Fed. 767. So a counterclaim is only recognized by cross bill. 
 Brande v. Gilchrist, 18 Fed. 465; Springfield Mill Co. v. 
 Barnard' & L. Mfg. Co. 26 C. C. A. 389, 49 U'. S. App. 438, 
 81 Fed. 261 ; United States Trust Co. v. Western Contract Co. 
 26 C. C. A. 472, 54 U. S. App. 67, 81 Fed. 468. However, 
 
CEOSS SUITS. 449 
 
 in Bausman v. Denny, 73 Fed. 69, the court intimates it can 
 be set lip by answer. Biit a suit for accounting does not need 
 a cross bill ; a balance in favor of defendant will be decreed 
 without it. Whittemore v. Patten, 84 Fed. 57. Under the old 
 practice, matters that should have been included in a cross bill 
 were permitted to be set up by answer, and in the absence of 
 objection relief would be granted. TTuited States v. Eeese, 166 
 Fed. 350 ; Book v. Justice Min. Co. 58 Fed. 831 ; Coburn v. 
 Cedar Valley Land & Cattle Co. 138 U. S. 321, .",4 L. ed. 886, 
 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 258; Bausman v. Denny, 73 Fed. 60. In 
 brief, you can now, under rule 30, set up any matter connected 
 with the original transaction, in your answer by which affirma- 
 tive relief is sought under the cross bill. Chapin v. Walker. 
 2 ilcCrary, 175, 6 Fed. 794; Ewing v. Seaboard Air Line R. 
 Co. 175 Fed. 517; Mitchell v. International Tailoring Co. 169 
 Fed. 145 ; Under-Feed Stoker Co. v. American Stoker Co. 169 
 Fed. 892 ; Ames Realty Co. v. Big Indian Min. Co. 146 Fed. 
 169 ; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. ^Denver, L. & G. R. Co. 60 
 C. C. A. 588, 126 Fed. 46; Jackson v. Simmons, 39 C. C. A. 
 514, 98 Fed. 773, 774; jS^'elson v. Lowndes Coimty, 35 C. C. 
 A. 419, 93 Fed. 538 ; Hill v. Ryan Grocery Co. 23 C. C. A. 624, 
 41 U. S. App. 714, 78 Fed. 27, 28; Springfield Mill Co. v. 
 Barnard & L. Mfg. Co. 26 C. C. A. 389, 49 U. S. App. 438, 81 
 Fed. 261 ; Interstate Bldg. & Loan Asso. v. Edgefield Hotel Co. 
 120 Fed. 423 ; White v. Bower, 48 Fed. 186 ; Royal Union itut. 
 L. Ins. Co. V. Wynn, 177 Fed. 293. 
 
 Mistake and fraud in the execution of the instrument sued 
 on, whereby the true contract is not expressed, was set up by 
 cross bill. Commonwealth Title Ins. & T. Co. v. Cummings, 
 83 Fed. 767. See Royal Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Wynn, 177 
 Fed. 289 ; Big Creek Gap Coal & I. Co. v. American Loan & 
 T. Co. 62 C. C. A. 351, 127 Fed. 627. You could set up by 
 cross bill your title when sued to remove cloud from title. 
 Greenwalt v. Duncan, 5 McCrary, 132, 16 Fed. 36. A^ou could 
 set up usurious interest, and ask for the penalty. Weathersbee 
 V. American Freehold Land Mortg. Co. 77 Fed. 523. 'i'ou 
 could set up offsets by cross bill, ^orth Chicago Rolling ]\[ill 
 Co. V. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co. 152 U. S. 615, 38 L. ed. 57], 
 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 710 ; Central Appalachian Co. v. Buchanan, 
 33 C. C. A. 598, 62 U. S. App. 195, 90 Fed. 454. You could 
 
 S. Eq.— 29. 
 
450 CROSS siriTS. 
 
 reform and enforce an instrument which is sought t-o be can- 
 celed (Springfield Mill Co. v. Barnard & L. Mig. Co. 26 C. V. 
 A. 389, 49 U. S. App. 438, 81 Fed. 263, 264; Meissner v. Biiek, 
 28 Fed. 163), or vice versa (Commonwealth Title Ins. & T. 
 Co. V. Cummings, 83 Fed. 767) ; but in Is'orthern R. Co. v. 
 Ogdensbnrg &: L. C. R. Co. 18 Fed. 815, 816, the court held 
 it was not necessary to file a cross bill to reform, as it could be 
 set up by answer. See Xorthern R. Co. v. Ogdensbnrg i: L. 
 C. E. Co. 20 Fed. .')47 ; Bradford v. Union Bank, 13 How. 69, 
 70, 14 L. ed. 54, 55. You could file a cross bill to obtain de- 
 livery of property. Piillman Palace Car Co. v. Central Transp. 
 Co. 171 U. S. 138, 43 L. ed. 108, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808. You 
 could by cross bill ask for a surrender of the agreement sought 
 to be specifically performed. Meissner v. Biiek, 28 Fed. 161 ; 
 Spring-field Mill Co. v. Barnard & L. Mfg. C^o. 26 C. C. A. 
 389, 49 U. S. App. 438, 81 Fed. 264. You could in every case 
 where a contract lien is sought to be enforced seek by cross bill to 
 cancel it, or vicp versa. Royal Union ]\fut. L. Ins. Co. v. Wynn, 
 177 Fed. 289; Milwaukee k M. R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 6 Wall. 
 748, 18 L. ed. 859 ; La Daw v. E. Bement & Sons, 66 Fed. 198; 
 Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Third Nat. Bank, 134 U. S. 
 288, 33 L. ed. 904, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 550. Bondholders could 
 by cross bill set up a diminution of the fund by bad management 
 Gasquet v. Fidelity Trust & S. V. Co. 6 C. C. A. 253, 13 U. S. 
 App. 564, 57 Fed. 80 ; Hogg v. Hoag, 107 Fed. 807, approved 
 in 83 C. C. A. 677, 154 Fed. 1003 ; see Bowling Green Trust 
 Co. V. Virginia Pass & Power Co. 132 Fed. 925, s. c. 164 Fed. 
 753 ; Toler v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. 67 Fed. 172. But 
 see Fidelity Trust & S. V. Co. v. Mobile Street R. Co. 53 Fed. 
 852; Thurston v. Big Stone Gap Improv. Co. 86 Fed. 484, 485; 
 Stonemetz Printers' Mach. Co. v. Brown Folding ]\Iach. Co. 46 
 Fed. 853. 
 
 When a suit on an insurance policy is enjoined, you could 
 recover the amount by way of cross bill. iN'orth British & 31. 
 Ins. Co. V. Lathrop, 63 Fed. 508. Prior mortgagee could by 
 cross bill have his mortgage first foreclosed. First ?J"at. Bank v. 
 Salem Capital Flour-Mills Co. 31 Fed. 583. 
 
 These citations sulficiently illustrate when cross bills were 
 used for aflirmative relief. 
 
 We thus see that every character of defense asking affinna- 
 
CEOSS SUITS. 451 
 
 tive relief, if in any way connected with tlic snbject-matter of 
 (lie original bill, could be set np by cross bill, the functions of 
 which by rule 30 have now been transferred to the answer. 
 
 To Settle Matters Between Defendants. 
 
 Under the old practice when matters between the defendants 
 were required to be settled, in order to render a com]:)lete decree 
 in the case, they could be set \ip by cross bill and adjusted. 
 Weaver v. Alter, 3 Woods, 152, Fed. ('as. Xo. I7,30s ; JRickey 
 Land eV Cattle Co. v. Wood, 81 C. C. A. 21S, 152 Fed. 2:5 ; 
 Craig v. Dorr, 76 C. C. A. 559, 145 Fed. 310 and ca-<es cited. 
 Yeach v. Rice, 131 U. S. 293, 33 L. ed. 163, 9 Sup. Ct. Kep. 
 730; Corcoran v. Chesapeake & 0. Canal Co. 91 U. S. 714, 24 
 L. ed. 191; Commercial Bank v. fSandford, 103 Fed. 99; Ames 
 Kealtv Co. v. Big Indian Min. Co. 146 Fed. 166. But issues 
 independent of the bill could not be raised between the defend- 
 ants in the cross bill. Gilmore v. Bort, 134 Fed. 658 ; Stiiart 
 v. Hayden, 18 C. 0. A. 618, 36 U. S. App. 462, 72 Fed. 410; 
 Vannerson v. Leverett, 31 Fed. 377; see Weaver v. Alter, 3 
 Woods, 152, Fed. Cas. Xo. 17,307. 
 
 The issues between the defendants necessary to a complete 
 decree in the whole case may now be set up in the answer, and 
 in doing so the question of their citizenship is not material to 
 the jiTrisdiction- of the court. See latter part of new rule 31. 
 (Lilienthal v. McCormick, 54 C. C. A. 475, 117 Fed. 96; 
 Osborne & Co. v. Barge, 30 Fed. 805 ; First Xat. Bank v. Salem 
 Capital Flour-Mills Co. 31 Fed. 5S0 ; Conipton v. Jesup, 15 
 C. C. A. 397, 31 IT. S. App. 4S6, 68 Fed. 282 ; Wabash R. Co. 
 V. Adelbert College, 2(is U. S. 39, 52 L. ed. 379, 28 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 182) ; nor the amount involved (Kirby \. American Soda 
 Fountain Co. 194 U. S. 141, 48 L. ed. 911, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 619). Of course the v\\\e last stated would not apply to issues 
 raised by the defendants not necessary to a complete decree in 
 the original cause of action ; citizens of the same state could not 
 settle in a Federal court conflicting interests foreign to the main 
 suit. Thus a nonresident suing for partition citizens of a State 
 defendants by cross suit cannot litigate title as between them- 
 selves (Beebe v. Louisville, X^. O. & T. R. Co. 39 Fed. 481 ; 
 Vannerson v. Leverett, 31 Fed. 376 ; Farmers" Loan & T. Co. 
 
452 CKOSS SUITli. 
 
 V. San Diego Street-Car Co. 40 Fed. 110; Peacock, 11. & W. 
 Co. V. Thaggard, 128 Fed. 1006; Patten v. Marshall, 26 
 L.K.A.(KS.) 127, 97 C. C. A. 610, 173 Fed. 351), un- 
 less the proiJerty" is in court (Newton v. Gage, 155 Fed. 
 598; New Orleans v. Howard, 87 C. C. A. 345, 160 Fed. 
 397; United Electric Securities Co. v. Louisiana Electric Light 
 Co. 68 Fed. 673 ; Lilienthal v. McCormick, 54 C. C. A. 475, 
 117 Fed. 89; Compton v. Jesiip, 15 C. C. A. 397, 31 U. S. 
 App. 486, 68 Fed. 282 ; Morgan's L. & T. E. & S. S. Co. v. 
 Texas C. R. Co. 137 U. S. 201, 34 L. ed. 635, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 61; Park v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. 70 Fed. 642, 643). 
 
 An hidependent Cause of Action may he Set Up in the Answer. 
 
 It will be seen that under the old cross bill no new and in- 
 dependent cause of action could have been set up. So we come 
 to the phase of rule 30 which permits a dependant to set up 
 any set-orf or counterclaim against the plaintiff which might be 
 the subject of an independent suit in equity, against him, which, 
 as said before, was intended to extend and enlarge the defenses 
 in equity which may be set up by a cross suit, and thus remove 
 the limitations of the old cross bill. Buffalo Specialty Co. v. 
 Vancleff, 217 Fed. 91. 
 
 You will notice under this phase of the rule that the independ- 
 ent cause of action which may be set up in an answer/must be the 
 subject of an independent suit in equity, thus excluding inde- 
 pendent legal causes of action. This featiire of the rule is a 
 recognition of the divided system on the Federal administra- 
 tion of law and equity protected by the Constitution, and there- 
 fore all the causes of action set up must be of such a nature that 
 the defendant could maintain an independent suit on the equity 
 side of the court against the plaintiff over each cause of action. 
 So joining legal and equitable causes of action under this phase 
 of the rule would be objectionable as a misjoinder, and should 
 be remedied as provided in new rule 29. In Atlas Underwear 
 Co. V. Cooper Underwear Co. 210 Fed. 348, rule 30 was held 
 not to entitle one not a necessary nor proper party to a suit to 
 intervene to set up a counterclaim which has no bearing on the 
 issues. 
 
CEOSS SUITS. 453 
 
 Foi-^n of the Cross Suit. 
 
 When affirmative relief is asked in the answer, it should be 
 drawn with the same care as is required in settiiig up the cause 
 of action in the original bill and presenting an appeal to equi- 
 table cog-nizance. Kew rules 25 and 30. When the causes of 
 action are independent of the subject-matter of the original bill. 
 Eule 30 requires the answer to state in short and simple terms 
 any counterclaim arising out of the transaction which may be 
 legal or equitable, as we have seen. See United States v. Reese, 
 166 Fed. 347. It is not necessary, however, in cross suits to set 
 forth jurisdictional averments as to citizenship. Badger Gold 
 ilin. & MiU Co. V. Stockton Gold & Copper Min. Co. 139 Fed. 
 840. 
 
 Parties to Cross Suits. 
 
 Rule 30 provides that where the defendant has a set-off or 
 counterclaim against the plaintiff, he may, without cross bill, 
 set it up in the answer. Both rules 30 and 31 evidently con- 
 template, that the set-off and counterclaim must be confined to 
 the parties plaintiffs and defendants in the suit, and you can- 
 not use the cross suit to introduce new parties. This would 
 be unquestionably true where the counterclaim arose out of the 
 subject-matter of the suit by plaintiff (Lilienthal v. McCor- 
 mick, 54 C. C. A. 475, 117 Fed. 90 ; United States Gypsum 
 Co. V. Hoxie, 172 Fed. 505 ; Bunel v. O'Day, 125 Fed'! 319 ; 
 Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 145, 15 L. ed. 162 ; United States 
 Gypsum Co. v. Hoxie, 172 Fed. 505; JSTewton v. Gage, 15."> 
 Fed. 610; Thruston v. Big Stone Gap Improv. Co. 86 Fed. 
 484; Patton v. Marshall, 26 L.R.A.(X.S.) 127, 97 C. C. A. 
 '610, 173 Fed. 350; Central Trust Co. v. Cincinnati, H. & D. 
 R. Co. 169 Fed. 466 ; Adelbert College v. Toledo, AY. & W. R. 
 Co. 47 Fed. 846 ) ; because in such cases the cross suit would 
 be wholly defensive; but where the cross suit involves a coun- 
 terclaim unconnected with the subject-matter of the bill, and 
 might be subject of an independent suit in which affirmative 
 relief may be given, new parties necessary to granting the re- 
 lief may be brought in, as would be permitted in an independent 
 suit. New rule 37, which provides "that any person may at 
 
454 CEOSS SUITS. 
 
 any time be made a party if his presence is necessary or proper 
 to a complete determination of the cause." See Ulman v. 
 Jaeger, 155 Fed. 1016, 1017, and cases cited; Mercantile Trust 
 Co. V. Atlantic & P. E. Co. 70 Fed. 518. Anyone who could 
 intervene in the independent cross suit could be made a party 
 (rule 37, last clause) if his presence was necessary or proper 
 for its determination. Atlas Underwear Co. v. Cooper Under- 
 wear Co. 210 Fed. 355. The case of Adamson v. Shaler, 208 
 Fed. 566, cited in the above case, is not a proper construction 
 of rule 30 in its application to cross suits based upon inde- 
 pendent causes of action brought by defendants. See United 
 States V. Woods, 138 C. C. A. 578, 223 Fed. 316. 
 
 Filing the Cross Suit. 
 
 By rules 12 and 16 the defendant is required "to file his an- 
 swer on or before the twentieth day after the service of the 
 subpoena," in which answer the cross suit may be set up, or it 
 may be, under rule 30, set up by amendment by leave of the 
 court after reasonable notice, and at any time before decree, if 
 the end of justice demands it. 
 
 Amending the Cross Suit. 
 
 The court may at any time, in furtherance of justice, permit 
 any pleading or proceeding to be amended. 'Sew rule 19. So 
 a further and better statement of the nature of a claim, whether 
 in the original bill or in defense, may in any case be ordered 
 upon terms. ISTew rule 20. By rule 30 the answer may be 
 amended by leave of the court or judge, upon reasonable notice, 
 so as to put any a^-erinent in issue Avhen justice requires it. 
 
 Putting the Cross Suit in Issue. 
 
 By rule 31 unless the answer asserts a set-off or counter- 
 claim no reply shall be required to put the answer in issue, 
 unless the court orders a reply ; but the matters in the answer 
 shall be deemed to be denied ; but if the answer include a set- 
 off or counterclaim the party against whom it is asserted shall 
 reply within ten days after filing the answer, unless further 
 time be granted by the court or judge. In default of a reply, 
 a decree pro confesso may be entered ou the cross claim. 
 
CKoss SUITS. 455 
 
 Scrrice of the Counterclaim. 
 
 There is no provision by rnle for the service of the answer 
 setting up a counterclaim of any character, except when the 
 counterclaim is one which affects the rights of other defend- 
 ants. In such cases the party setting up the counterclaim 
 miist serve a copy of the pleading on such other defendants or 
 their solicitors within ten days from the filing of the same, 
 and such defendants shall have ten days after service to reply, 
 in default of which a decree pro confesso may be entered. See 
 Fidelity Trust Co. v. D. T. McKeithan Lumber Co. 212 Fed. 
 231, 232, for illustration. 
 
 Hearing the Cross Suit. 
 
 Where the cross suit sets up a counterclaim arising out of 
 the transaction, the original and cross demand should be con- 
 sidered together; bvit where the answer sets up independent 
 suits unconnected with the original cause of action set forth 
 in the bill, the court may, if convenient, hear them together ; 
 if not, it may order separate trials. Eule 26. The last clause 
 of rule 30 provides that the court may pronounce a final judg- 
 ment in the same suit, both on the original and cross claims. 
 See the two preceding sections as to when judgxaents by default 
 may be entered on the cross suits. 
 
 Effect of Dismissing the Original Bill. 
 
 Where the answer seeks affirmative relief by way of cross 
 suit, the dismissal of the original bill would not affect the 
 cross suit. Green v. Underwood, 30 C. C. A. 162, 57 U. S. 
 App. 535, 86 Fed. 427; Jackson v. Simmons, 39 C. C. A. 514, 
 98 Fed. 768; Craig v. Dorr, 76 C. C. A. 559, 145 Fed. 310; 
 Badger Gold Min. & Mill. Co. v. Stockton Gold & Copper Co. 
 139 Fed. 838-840; Markell v. Kasson, 31 Fed. 104; Jesup v. 
 Illinois C. R. Co. 43 Fed. 495 ; Small v. Peters, 104 Fed. 401 ; 
 Heinze v. Butte & B. Consol. Min. Co. 61 C. C. A. 63, 126 
 Fed. 6; San Diego Flume Co. v. Souther, 32 C. C. A. 548, 61 
 
456 CEOSS SUITS. 
 
 U. S. App. 134, 90 Fed. 164; Sanders v. Riverside, 55 C. C. 
 A. 240, 118 Fed. 722 ; liolgate v. Eaton, 116 U. S. 42, 29 L. 
 ed. 540, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 224. However, where the cross suit 
 was entirely defensive, so that it would be useless if the original 
 bill was dismissed, then the cross suit would fall with the orig- 
 inal bill. Small v. Peters, 104 Fed. 403 ; Jesup v. Illinois C. 
 R. Co. 43 Fed. 495 ; Milwaukee & M. R. Co. v. Milwaukee & 
 St. P. R. Co. 6 Wall. 747, 18 L. ed. 859 ; Dows v. Chicago, 11 
 Wall. 112, 20 L. ed. 67; Industrial & Min. Guaranty Co. v. 
 Electrical Supply Co. 7 C. C. A. 471, 16 U. S. App. 196, 58 
 Fed. 742. So when cross bill is between citizens of same State, 
 Cabaniss v. Reco Min. Co. 54 C. C. A. 190, 116 Fed. 319. 
 
CHAPTER LXXV. 
 
 INTBEVBNTIOIT. 
 
 What is. 
 
 Intervention is the application of a person not a party to the 
 suit to litigate some claim of title or interest, by way of lien 
 or otherwise, in the property which is the subject-matter of the 
 suit, or which has been drawn into the possession of the court 
 during the progTess of the cause. 
 
 Two Kinds. 
 
 Xew rule 37, last clause, provides that anyone claiming an 
 interest in the litigation may at any time be permitted to assert 
 his right by intervention, but the intervention shall be in subor- 
 dination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main 
 proceeding. Atlas Underwear Co. v. Cooper Underwear Co. 
 210 Fed. 348 ; Hutchinson v. Philadelphia & G. S. S. Co. 216 
 Fed. 795; Glass v. Woodman, 223 Fed. 621 (Must have in- 
 terest or lien). While the new rule permits one claiming an 
 interest to intervene at any time, yet it is required to be in 
 subordination to the main proceeding. It is evidently contem- 
 plated that the application must (1st) show a substantial in- 
 terest in the subject-matter of the main proceeding in order 
 to assert the right; (2d) that the intervention sought must have 
 regard to and be in subordination to the issues in the main 
 suit, so as not to needlessly interfere with the orderly progress 
 of the main suit. 
 
 The mere fact that a party asserts some interest in the con- 
 troversy or in the property does not bind the court to permit 
 the intervention (Minot v. Mastin, 37 C. 0. A. 234, 95 Fed. 
 739), even though the property be in the hands of a receiver 
 (ibid.). If the interest asserted would not be affected by the 
 
 457 
 
458 IXTEEVEXTIOX. 
 
 proceedings, or where it appears that the right asserted is 
 entirely subordinate to the rights of the parties to the suit, or 
 that the interest of one seeking intervention is already repre- 
 sented in the case, or that he has other adequate remedies to 
 protect his interest without burdening the principal suit with 
 his collateral issues, then the right of intervention lies wholly 
 within the court's discretion. Ibid. ; Massachusetts Loan & T. 
 Co. V. Kansas City & A. E. Co. 49 C. C. A. 18, 110 Eed. 30, 
 and cases cited; United States v. Philips, 46 C. C. A. 660, lOT 
 Fed. 824; Credits Commutation Co. v. United States, 177 U. S. 
 311, 44 L. ed. 782, 20 Sup. Ct. Kep. 636 ; Jones v. Sands, 2.1 
 C. C. A. 233, 51 U. S. App. 153, 79 Fed. 913; Lewis v. Balti- 
 more & L. R Co. 10 C. C. A. 446, 8 U. S. App. 645, 62 Fed. 
 219; Sands v. E. S. Greeley & Co. 80 Fed. 195; Continental 
 & Commercial Trust & Sav. Bank v. Allis-Chambers Co. 200 
 Fed. 601 ; L'nited States Trust Co. v. Chicago Terminal Trans- 
 fer Co. 110 C. C. A. 270, 188 Fed. 292. On the other hand, 
 the right to intervene may be absolute, that is, to forbid it may 
 be appealed from as an abuse of discretion. Minot v. Mastin, 
 37 C. C. A. 234, 95 Fed. 739 ; Brinckerhoff v. Holland Trust 
 Co. 146 Fed. 203; Tift v. Southern R. Co. 159 Fed. 558, 559; 
 Credits Commutation Co. v. LTnited States, 34 C. C. A. 12, 62 
 U. S. App. 728, 91 Fed. 573 ; Illinois Steel Co. v. Eamsey, 100 
 C. C. A. 323, 176 Fed. 853) ; as where the petition for inter- 
 vention shows that in the pending suit the right of the party 
 seeking intervention is in jeopardy, that is, an inability to ob- 
 tain relief by other means, as when the party seeking interven- 
 tion has a lien or title to the subject-matter in the hands of the 
 court, or a present right to possession superior to the rights 
 asserted in the main suit ; or when the refusal would be a prac- 
 tical denial of relief, as where in the pending suit the fund may 
 be dissipated out of which he must look for relief, these and 
 kindred conditions make the right to intervention absolute, and 
 a refusal may be appealed from as a right. Credits Commuta- 
 tion Co. V. United States, 34 C. C. A. 12, 62 U. S. App. 728, 
 91 Fed. 573 ; United States v. Philips, 46 C. C. A. 660, 107 
 Fed. 824, and authorities above cited; Credits Commutation 
 Co. V. United States, 177 U. S. 315, 316, 44 L. ed. 785, 786, 
 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 636 ; Central Trust Co. v. Chicago, E. L k 
 P. E-. Co. 134 C. C. A. 144, 218 Fed. 336. 
 
INTEEVEiN'TJOiN". 459 
 
 So, then, we see that there are, as said in United States Trust 
 Co. V. Chicago Terminal Transfer Co. 110 C. C. A. 270, 188 
 Fed. 292, two kinds of intervention. In one the applicant 
 having other means of redress open to him, the court may re- 
 fuse to incumber the main case with collateral issues; while 
 in the other the applicant's claim for relief depends on inter- 
 vention in the case in which it is sought. However, this case 
 recognizes the fact that an election of remedies is not by any 
 means a sole test controlling the court's discretion. See the fol- 
 lowing authorities : Ex parte Cutting, 91- U. S. 22, 24 L. ed. 
 51; United States v. Philips, 46 C. C. A. 660, 107 Fed. 824, 
 and cases cited; Ke Metropolitan R. Receivership (Re Reisen- 
 berg) 208 U. S. Ill, 52 L. ed. 413, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 219; 
 Land Title & T. Co. v. Tatnall, 65 C. C. A. 671, 1.32 Fed. 305 ; 
 Land Title & T. Co. v. Asphalt Co. 62 C. C. A. 23, 127 Fed. 
 2; Blaffer v. Isew Orleans Water Supply Co. 87 C. C. A. 341, 
 160 Fed. 389 ; Central Trust Co. v. Cincinnati, LI. & D. R. Co. 
 169 Fed. 470 ; Illinois Steel Co. v. Ramsey, 100 C. C. A. 323, 
 176 Fed. 863; Central Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. 
 Co. 134 C. C. A. 144, 21S Fed. 339. 
 
 Procedure. 
 
 You must file a petition asking permission of the court to file 
 a, bill of intervention in all cases whe]'c the right to intervene is 
 within the sound discretion of the court. Blaffer v. New Or- 
 leans Water Supply Co. 87 C. C. A. 341, 160 Fed. 392; 
 Perry v. Godbe, S2 Fed. 143 ; Bom v. Schneider, 128 Fed. 17'.). 
 The form of the proceeding is determined by the circum- 
 stances of the case. Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 286, 28 
 L. ed. 149, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27. And it must not only appear 
 that a petition was • filed, but that it was granted. Ibid. ; 
 Washington, G. k A. R. Co. v. Bradley, 7 Wall. 575, 19 L. 
 ed. 274; Perry v. Godbe, 82 Fed. 143. See People's Sav. Inst. 
 V. Miles, 22 C. C. A. 152, 46 U. S. App. 268, 76 Fed. 254. 
 
 Form of Application, 
 
 Title as in bill, thus: A. B. vs. C. D.; F. W., Intervener. 
 
 To the Honorable Judges of the District Court of the United States for the 
 
 District of : 
 
 The petition of F. W., a citizen of and residing in county in 
 
4G0 INTEEVENTION. 
 
 the State of . . , humbly complaining of A. B., plaintiff, and C. D., 
 
 defendant, in the above cause, would show unto your honors that A. B., 
 
 plaintiff, did on the day of , A. D. 19 ... , file his bill in 
 
 this cause wherein he (here set forth substance of bill and prayer) ; that 
 
 on the day of , A. D. 19 ... , the defendant C. D. filed his 
 
 answer (or sucli proceedings as were taken, setting forth only the sub- 
 stance) ; that petitioner claims an interest, etc. (here set forth interest, 
 showing how it arose and the necessity for intervention and a right to par- 
 ticipate in the decree). 
 
 Then pray for permission to file the intervention and the relief desired 
 by your intervention. 
 
 This petition should be accompanied with your pleading you 
 seek to file in the event you are let in, and the court must see 
 from the pleading — 
 
 First. That there will be no delay to the plaintiff in prose- 
 cuting his suit. 
 
 Second. That the pleading is reasonably sufficient to effect 
 the purpose intended, and, — 
 
 Third. As before stated, that it is a proper case for inter- 
 vention. Toler V. East Tennessee, V. & G. K. Co. 67 Fed. 
 174, 175. 
 
 Contesting Application. 
 
 Any of the parties to the suit may contest the apjjlication, and 
 they have a right to have all the grounds upon which the appli- 
 cation is based to be specifically set forth. See Powell v. 
 Leicester Mills, 92 Fed. 115, 116. While the petition in in- 
 tervention may not be as formal as a bill, yet it should exhibit 
 all the material facts relied upon, and embody by recital or 
 reference as much of the record of the original suit as is essen- 
 tial; also proceedings taken in the main suit after filing the 
 petition, which would streng-then the right of petitioner, may be 
 incorporated by amendment. Empire Distilling Co. v. Mc- 
 ?fulta, 23 C. C. A. 415, 46 U. S. App. 578, 77 Fed. 701. 
 
 Order When Application Granted. 
 
 Title as in bill; W. F., intervener. 
 
 This cause coming on to be heard on the application of W. F., intervener 
 in this suit, to be made a party (plaintiff or defendant), and the petition 
 having been duly considered, and it appearing to the court that the said 
 
I2v'TEEVENT10N. 461 
 
 W. F., petitioner (here state llio basis of the application that the court lias 
 found true ) . 
 
 It is tlierefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed that W. F., petitioner, has 
 leave to intervene in said suit and to that end may appear in said suit 
 
 witliin , . . days from the date of this order, in tlie same manner and 
 
 witli like effect as if named in the original bill as a party (plaintiff or 
 defendant ) . 
 
 Tliis order to be without prejudice to any proceedings heretofore had 
 in this cause. 
 
 Judge, ftc. 
 Effect of Order. 
 
 The effect of the order is to make the applicant a party to 
 the suit in all subsequent proceedings, and gives the right oi 
 appeal. Eice v. Durham Water Co. !)1 Fed. 433. Mercantile 
 Trust k D. Co. v. Eoanoke & S. R. Co. 109 Fed. 8. 
 
 But intervention cannot affect jurisdiction once obtained 
 (Clarke v. Eureka County Baidi, 116 Fed. 534), though as- 
 serted by cross bills against other defendants from same State. 
 (Lilienthal v. McCormick, 54 C. C. A. 475, 117 Fed. 89). 
 'Sot can an intervener attack jurisdiction. Morton Trust Co. 
 V. K^ew York & O. E. Co. 105 Fed. 539 ; Eice v. Durham Water 
 Co. 91 Fed. 434; Sioux City Terminal E. i: Warehouse Co. v. 
 Trust Co. 27 C. C. A. 73, 49 U. S. App. 523, 82 Fed. 128. 
 
 Waiving Order of Tntervenlion. 
 
 While leave to intervene should be by order, yet parties to the 
 suit failing to object to it on that account waive it, or filing an 
 answer to the intervening bill. Perry v. Godbe, 82 Fed. 141 ; 
 Illinois Steel Co. v. Eamsey, 100 C. C. A. 323, 176 Fed. 864, 
 and cases cited; People's Sav. Inst. v. Miles, 22 C. C. A. 152, 
 40 U. S. App. 341, 76 Fed. 254; Gest v. Packwood, 39 Fed. 
 536; French v. Gapen, 105 U. S. 525, 26 L. ed. 956. 
 
 Notice of Intervention. 
 
 ISTotice is not necessary, the filing of the application is suffi- 
 cient; however, in Lombard Invest. Co. v. Seaboard Mfg. Co. 
 74 Fed. 325 ; McLeod v. Xew Albany, 13 C. C. A. 525, 24 U . 
 S. App. 601, 66 Fed. 378, it is held that to give notice is the 
 better practice, though there is no rule requiring it. Ibid. ; 
 Central Trust Co. v. Madden, 17 C. 0. A. 236, 25 U. S. App. 
 430, 70 Fed. 453. 
 
462 INTEEVEKTION. 
 
 Mciking Defendant by Intervention. 
 
 The general rule is that a stranger cannot make himself a 
 defendant in a suit in equity, and courts of equity have adhered 
 to this rule as a basis in determining whether the application to 
 intervene should be granted. Lombard Invest. Co. v. Seaboard 
 Mfg. Co. 74 Fed. 326 ; Smith v. Gale, 144 U. S. 519, 36 L. ed. 
 525, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 674; Chester v. Life Asso. 4 Fed. 488- 
 491. In Toler v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. 67 Fed. 
 170, the court says : "That a stranger to a suit will not be per- 
 mitted on his own application to be made a party defendant in 
 an equity suit over the objections of plaintiff is a well estab- 
 lished general rule to which there are few exceptions" (and the 
 reasons are fairly stated in Gregory v. Pike, 15 C. C. A. 33, 21 
 U. S. App. 658, 33 U. S. App. 76, 67 Fed. 845 ; Chester v. Life 
 Asso. of America, 4 Fed. 491), unless, of course he is an in- 
 dispensable party. Carter v. New Orleans, 19 Fed. 659; 
 Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 139, 15 L. ed. 160. In such case 
 a court will require the plaintiff to amend his bill on penalty 
 of dismissal for want of parties essential to determining the 
 case. See Chester v. Life Asso. of America, 4 Fed. 491, for 
 further exceptions to the rule. 
 
 The equities of the case must show strongly the necessity of 
 admitting a, stranger to the suit as defendant on his own appli- 
 cation, and the petition to intervene as defendant must be ac- 
 companied by the proposed answer upon the face of which the 
 necessity appears. Toler v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. 
 67 Fed. 168. The court shotild exercise extreme caution (Lom- 
 bard Invest. Co. v. Seaboard Mfg. Co. 74 Fed. 326), and it 
 should appear that the interest of the party seeking to be made 
 a party to the suit is of a direct and immediate character that is 
 a claim to or lien upon the property involved (Carter v. New 
 Orleans, l9 Fed. 659 ; Smith v. Gale, 144 U. S. 518, 36 L. 
 ed. 524, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 674 ; Clarke v. Eureka County Bank, 
 116 Fed. 537, and cases cited) ; and even then it rests in the 
 sound discretion of the chancellor (Hamlin v. Toledo St. L. & 
 K. C. E. Co. 36 L.R.A. 826, 24 C. C. A. 271, 47 U. S. App. 
 422, 78 Fed. 665 ; Lewis v. Baltimore & L. E. Co. 10 C. C. A. 
 446, 8 U. S. App. 045, 62 Fed. 219 ; Massachusetts Loan & 
 T. Co. V. Kansas City & A. E. Co. 49 C. C. A. 18, 110 Fed. 
 
I^•^£l:vl:^-TION. 463 
 
 30; Xewton v. Gage, 155 Fed. 598). A general averment of 
 interest is bad ; it must state facts showing interest. Clarke v. 
 Eureka County Bank, 116 Fed. 536, 537r 
 
 The reason of this caution on the part of the courts is based 
 upon the theory that the plaintiff should not be compelled to 
 enter into litigation with parties not of his own seeking; if so, 
 what he sets out to do by a simple suit may, against his will, 
 become complicated, expensive ;;nd interminable. Gregory v. 
 Pike, 15 C. C. A. 33, 21 U. S. App. 658, 33 U. S. A^^.^Q, 
 67 Fed. 845 ; Chester v. Life Asso. of America, 4 Fed. 401, 
 492. If plaintiff has failed to make the necessary parties, 
 the remedies are pointed out in the rales heretofore explained. 
 Ibid. While Gah-eston H. i: H. E. Co. v. Cowdrey, 11 Wall. 
 459, 20 L. ed. 199, and Ex parte South & ISTorth Ala. K. Co. 
 95 U. S. 221, 24 L. ed. 355, seem to militate against this rule, 
 ^'et in these cases the admission of the parties upon their appli- 
 cation was not contested. See Atlas Underwear Co. v. Cooper 
 Underwear Co. 210 Fed. 347. 
 
 I have thus considered the rule applicable to one who is a 
 stranger to the suit seeking to be made a party against the will 
 of the plaintiff. The rule woiild not apply where, — 
 
 First. The application is made by one who was named in the 
 suit, but not served with process, but subsequently comes with- 
 in the jurisdiction. 
 
 Second. When the application is made by one of a class rep- 
 resented in the bill, and for whose beueiit or against whom the 
 suit is brought. Chester v. Life Asso. of America, 4 Fed. 491 ; 
 Fidelity Trust k Safety Vault Co. v. Mobile Street R. Co. 53 
 Fed. 850; Forest Oil Co. v. Crawford, 42 C. C. A. 54, 101 Fed. 
 851; Lombard Invest. Co. v. Seaboard Mfg. Co. 74 Fed. 326. 
 
 Third. When the party applying represents a party to the 
 bill whose interest has been transmitted by death or operation 
 of law. Ex parte South & Xorth Ala. E. Co. 95 U. S. 226, 24 
 L. ed. 357; Chester v. Life Asso. of America, 4 Fed. 491. 
 
 In the second and third exceptions it will be seen that the 
 persons allowed to become parties are not altogether strangers, 
 but in effect are quasi parties. Lombard Invest. Co. v. Seaboard 
 Mfg. Co. 74 Fed. 326 ; Fidelity Trust & S. V. Co. v. Mobile 
 Street E. Co. 53 Fed. 850; Gasquet v. Fidelity Trust & S. V. 
 Co. 6 C. 0. A. 253, 13 U. S. App. 564, 57 Fed. 83. 
 
 Undfr the second, where the suit is by some of a class for the 
 
464 INTEEVENTION. 
 
 benefit of all similarly situated, and a common trustee is de- 
 fendant, or where a suit is by a common trustee and relates to 
 the mortgage or trust deed, a beneficiary will not be allowed to 
 come in, unless his interests are in jeopardy by reason of coHu- 
 sion or incompetency or fraud of the trustee. Toler v. East 
 Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. 67 Fed. 172. See Williams v. Mor- 
 gan, 111 U. S. 696, 697, 28 L. ed. 564, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638; 
 Eichter v. Jerome, 123 U. S. 246, 31 L. ed. 137, 8 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 106 ; Fletcher v. Ann Arbor R Co. 53 C. C. A. 647, 116 
 Fed. 481 ; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Kansas City, W. & IST. W. 
 E. Co. 53 Fed. 182; Carter v. l^ew Orleans, 19 Fed. 659; 
 Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Cape Fear & Y. Valley E. Co. 71 
 Fed. 39. 
 
 Pro Suo Interesse. 
 
 What has heretofore been said refers to one who seeks to be 
 made a party on his own application to contest the issues in 
 the principal case, and whereby, as we have seen, he becomes as 
 fully a party to the original suit as if named in the original 
 bill. This question of making defendants or parties by inter- 
 vention, as stated in Gregory v. Pike, 15 C. C. A. 33, 21 U. 
 S. App. 658, 33 TJ. S. App. 76, 67 Fed. 846, is entirely dif- 
 ferent from that of an intervention pro suo interesse, permitted 
 in Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276, 28 L. ed. 145, 4 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 27 ; Perry v. Godbe, 82 Fed. 143 ; Phelps v. Oaks, 
 117 U. S. 241, 29 L. ed. 890, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 714; Eaisin 
 v. Statham, 22 Fed. 146, and in cases hereafter to be cited. 
 In this latter case the applicant does not become a party to the 
 main controversy, nor can such applicant change the main issues 
 by his intervention. Ibid. Thus when the court has jurisdic- 
 tion of the res, or where a fund is to be distributed, and the 
 party has to prove his claim against the res, or fund, or where 
 one beneficiary desires to contest the claim of another to the 
 fund, then intervention lies. 
 
 The possession of the court draws the right to intervene by 
 parties having a claim. Eouse v. Letcher, 156 U. S. 50, 39 L. 
 ed. 342, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 266 ; Compton v. Jesup, 15 C. C. A. 
 397, 31 U. S. App. 486, 68 Fed. 279 ; Toledo, St. L. & K. C. 
 E. Co. V. Continental Trust Co. 36 C. C. A. 155, 95 Fed. 504, 
 
IKTEKVENTXON. 465 
 
 505; Central Trust Co. v. Carter, 24 C. C. A. TS, 41 U. S. 
 App. 663, 78 Fed. 233 ; Myers v. Luzerne County, 124 Fed. 
 437; Merritt v. American Steel-Barge Co. 24 C. C. A. 530, 
 49 U. S. App. 85. 79 Fed. 231 ; Rice v. Durham Water Co. 91 
 Fed. 433. So a fund to be distributed entitles all parties claim- 
 ing an interest to intervene and show it, and this is true, though 
 the jurisdiction of the court would forbid the filing of an orig- 
 inal bill. Ibid. ; Toler v. East Tennessee, V. i: G. R. Co. 67 
 Fed. 172; Central Trust Co. v. Carter, 24 C. C. A. 73, 41 V. 
 S. App. 663, 78 Fed. 233 ; Xational P.ank v. Allen, 33 C. C. A. 
 169, 61 U. S. App. 102, 90 Fed. 555. 
 
 These rules are illustrated by the familiar cases of receiver- 
 ships, where a party, without reference to citizenship or amount, 
 may intervene. Electrical Supply Co. v. Pi;t-in-Bay ^Vater- 
 works, Light & R. Co. 84 Fed. 740 ; Fish v. Ogdensburgh & L. 
 C. R. Co. 79 Fed. 131; Lamb v. Ewing, 4 C. C. A. 320, 12 IT. 
 S. App. 11, 54 Fed. 273 ; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Houston 
 & T. C. R. Co. 44 Fed. 116; Carey v. Houston & T. C. R. 
 Co. 52 Fed. 674. 
 
 So in creditors' bills, the practice of permitting judgment 
 creditors to make themselves parties without leave of court is 
 well settled. Myers v. Fenn, 5 Wall. 207, 18 L. ed. 606; 
 Richmond v. Irons, 121 IT. S. 43-47, 30 L. ed. S69-871, 7 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 788 ; National Bank v. Allen, 33 C. C. A. 169, 61 
 U. S. App. 102, 90 Fed. 545-555 ; Hubb y. Bidwell, 81 C. C. 
 A. 43, 151 Fed. 564. 
 
 The power of a court of equity to permit siich interventions 
 rests independent of statute. Rice v. Durham Water Co. 91 
 Fed. 433, 434; Gregory v. Van Ee, 160 U. S. 646, 40 L. ed. 
 567, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431. It is necessarily inherent, or its 
 process would be abused to the injury of others. Compton v. 
 Jesup, 15 C. C. A. 397, 31 U. S. App. 486, 68 Fed. 279. 
 
 When Intervention Will Not Lie. 
 
 In Rouse v. Hornsby, 14 C. C. A. 377, 32 U. S. App. Ill, 
 67 Fed. 220, it was held that when the petition for interven- 
 tion shows a legal demand, such as damages for personal injury, 
 plaintiff is entitled to a jury to assess ; that is, you must estab- 
 lish your claim at law before you can file an intervention. 
 S. Eq.— 30. 
 
466 INTBEVENTIOW. 
 
 Again, a claim cannot be the subject-matter of intervention in 
 one ancillary jurisdiction, when the party lives and the claim 
 arose in another ancillary jurisdiction. Clyde v. Eichmond & 
 D. R. Co. 65 Fed. 338, 339 ; Sands v. E. S. Greeley & Co. 
 80 Fed. 196; Central Trust Co. v. United States Flour Mill. 
 Co. 112 Fed. 371; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Northern P. 
 R. Co. 72 Fed. 26. 
 
 To illustrate : A receiver is appointed in Texas of a railroad 
 running through other States, in which other States ancillary 
 receiverships have been appointed by the Federal courts, say 
 Arkansas and Missouri, then a claim originating in Arkansas 
 cannot be the subject-matter of intervention in Missouri. 
 
 An equitable right cannot be the subject-matter of interven- 
 tion in a suit at law. Gravenberg v. Laws, 40 C. C. A. 240, 
 100 Fed. 5, 6; Clarke v. Eureka County Bank, 116 Fed. 534; 
 McKenny v. Supreme Lodge, A. O. U. W. 104 C. C. A. 117, 
 180 Fed. 961. The equitable right must be enforced by a bill 
 in equity, which would be ancillary to the lawsuit, and the ques- 
 tion of parties as affecting diversity of citizenship would not 
 affect jurisdiction. ]^either would the amount or value of the 
 interest. Gravenberg v. Laws, supra ; Clarke v. Eureka County 
 Bank, 116 Fed. 534; Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 287, 28 
 L. ed. 149, 4 Sup. Ct. Eep. 27. 
 
 ISTor will intervention lie after decree, unless to protect an 
 interest which cannot otherwise be protected. United States v. 
 JSTorthern Securities Co. 128 Fed. 808". 
 
 Form of Intervention When Res in Court's Possession. 
 
 Having stated the right of intervention when the res is in 
 possession of the court, I will now suggest a form to be used. 
 
 Title as in bill (in which receiver appointed or the res or fund was put 
 into the hands of the court) adding as before W. F., intervener. 
 
 Your petitioner,. W. F., a citizen of and residing in the county of 
 
 in the State of , praying for leave to intervene in the above cause, 
 
 respectfully represents that on the .day of , A. D. 19. . ., 
 
 and prior to the order of this court appointing .John Smith receiver of the 
 (railroad, estate, or fund), and placing the property of said (railroad, 
 estate, or fund) in his hands as such receiver, all of which matters are 
 now pending in this honorable court, your petitioner obtained a judgment 
 in the court of.... county, in the State of , against 
 
INTERVENTION. 467 
 
 tlie said (railroad, estate, or fund) (here describe judgment or claim, giv- 
 ing court date, amount, etc., and attach certified copy; or, if judgment has 
 been recovered against the receiver so state ; in a word, accurately state 
 your claim, whatever it may be, and such evidence of it as will satisfy the 
 court ) . 
 That said judgment (or claim) declares and establishes the said sum of 
 
 dollars as a proper charge (or said claim is a proper charge, etc.) 
 
 and lien on the earnings of said railroad (or the property of said estate or 
 the fund, etc.), and petitioner prays an order of this lionorable court to 
 permit him to intervene and upon hearing to have the lien fixed and the 
 judgment paid in the due order of the administration of the trust and for 
 such further order as to the court may seem equitable. 
 
 R. F. 
 Solicitor. 
 
 Attach, as stated, your judgment, certified to from the court 
 where obtained, or your claim properly verified. You may also 
 attach to the petition a motion to refer to the special master 
 usiTally appointed in these cases, unless there be a general order 
 in the case, as is usual, to refer all intervening petitions to the 
 special master, in which case the clerk will refer the case. 
 
 If a motion is necessary, then file as follows: 
 
 Title as in bill; W. F., Intervener. 
 
 Xow comes W. F., intervener, by counsel, and moves the court to refer 
 his petition for intervention in all things to E. 'SI., Esq., special master in 
 chancery, for his examination and report, and intervener will ever pray, 
 etc. 
 
 R. F., 
 Solicitor, etc. 
 
 Citizensliip and Amount as Ajfecting Jurisdiction, of Federal 
 Courts in Intervention, Pro Suo Iiiteresse. 
 
 The rule of jurisdiction in Fedeial courts depending on 
 citizenship and amount, or value of the subject-matter, does not 
 apply to interventions, or other auxiliary suits. Citizenship is. 
 not material, and Federal courts having jurisdiction of the' 
 original suit ; and having in possession the property or fund in 
 which the intervener has an interest will permit an intervention 
 pro suo interesse without reference to the citizenship of the 
 parties, and this intervention will be permitted by motion, 
 petition, or by ancillary bill in equity; and in whatever way 
 
-JG8 INTEEVEXTIOS. 
 
 you seek the intervention you may use substantially the form 
 given. Compton v. Jesup, 15 C. C. A. 397, 31 IJ. S. App. 
 486, 68 Fed. 279. 
 
 The diverse citizenship of the original parties, if that be the 
 ground of jurisdiction, is sufficient to support subse(iuent inter- 
 ventions. Nevfton V. Gage, 155 Fed. 604, and cases cited; 
 Clarke v. Eureka County Bank, 116 Fed. 534; Society of 
 Shakers v. Watson, 68 Fed. 730 ; Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 
 U. S. 276, 28 L. ed. 145, 4 Sup. Ct. Eep. 27 ; Lilienthal v. 
 McCormick, 54 C. C. A. 475, 117 Fed. 96; Continental Trust 
 Co. V. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. E. Co. 82 Fed. 642; Osborne 
 V. Barge, 30 Fed. 805 ; Park v. Xew York, L. E. & W. K. Co. 
 70 Fed. 641 ; Eouse v. Letcher, 156 U. S. 50, 39 L. ed. 342, 15 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 266; Henderson v. Goode, 40 Fed. 887; Farm- 
 ers' Loan & T. Co. v. Houston & T. C. E. Co. 44 Fed. 115. 
 But diverse citizenship of original parties -will not support an 
 intervention of a third party who is a citizen of the same State 
 with defendant, unless the controversy between complainant and 
 defendant is one which draius to the court's possession the de- 
 fendant's property in which intervener claims an interest. 
 United Electric Securities Co. v. Louisiana Electric Light Co. 
 68 Fed. 673 ; Seligman v. Santa Eosa, 81 Fed. 524. See For- 
 est Oil Co. V. Crawford, 42 C. C. A. 54, 101 Fed. 849. So 
 citizens of a State having property attached and thus drawn 
 into the Federal court may intervene pro suo inter esse for its 
 protection. Compton v. Jesup, 68 Fed. 280, and authorities 
 cited; Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U. S. 132, 31 L. ed. 374, 8 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 379. 
 
 Nor is Ainourht Important. 
 
 When the Federal court has jurisdiction, and the control of 
 the fund or property, it can entertain jurisdiction of an inter- 
 vention without reference to the amoiint or value of inter- 
 vener's claim. People's Sav. Inst. v. Miles, 22 C. C. A. 152, 
 40 U. S. App. 341, 76 Fed. 252; National Bank v. Allen, 
 33 C. C. A. 169, 61 U. S. App. 102, 90 Fed. 545. 
 
 Amendment of. 
 
 Bill of intervention may be amended. Anthony v. Campbell,; 
 50 C. C. A. 195, 112 Fed. 212-217. 
 
INTERVENTION. 409 
 
 Denial of^ Not Appealable, 
 
 An order denying the right to intervene is not appealable 
 (Farmers' & M. Bank v. Arizona Mnt. Sav. & L. Asso. 135 C. C. 
 A. 577, 220 Fed. 7 ; Clark v. Arizona Mut. Sav. & L. Asso. 217 
 Fed. 640), unless there is a practical denial of certain relief to 
 which the intervener is clearly entitled, and in cases where 
 intervention is not discretionary. 220 Fed. 7, and cases cited ; 
 but see Credits Commutation Co. v. United States, 177 U. S. 
 311, 44 L. ed. 782, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 636. 
 
CHAPTER LXXVI. 
 
 INTEELOCDTOEY PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 Interlocutory Orders. 
 
 I will now conclude the discussion of the successive steps in a 
 suit in equity, which matures the case for taking evidence, by 
 a brief general view of interlocutory orders. It is necessary, as 
 we have seen at varioiis Stages of its progress, to take orders in , 
 furtherance of its preparation for final hearing, or for the 
 preservation and protection of property in litigation, or rights 
 therein, as heretofore shown. All such orders are called inter- 
 locutory orders, and are limited as to time, on their faces some- 
 times, or by law, as in case of injunctions (equity rule 73 ; U. 
 S. Rev. Stat. sec. 719), or they may continue in force until the 
 final hearing. 
 
 As said, they may be gi-anted at any time during the progress 
 of the cause, either in term time or vacation, on motion days or 
 such time as the court may appoint for hearing, when not 
 grantable of course. All interlocutory decrees remain under 
 the direction of the court, to be set aside by proper application 
 at any time (Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Baltimore & 
 O. R. Co. 10 C. C. A. 20, 22 U. S. App. 359, 61 Fed. 708; 
 Blythe v. Hinckley, 84 Fed. 228), and no appeal lies therefrom. 
 (Ibid.; Perkins v. Fourniquet, 6 How. 209, 12 L. ed. 407; see 
 "Appeals" ) . They are granted on petition or motion, and maj 
 be on ex 'parte applications, as in cases of imminent danger to 
 property, but the general rule is to serve notice of the applica- 
 tion for them by motion or otherwise. 
 
 AYhen a motion for any character of interlocutory order is 
 made, it should set out every material fact" necessary to relief, 
 and especially is this so when a preliminary order is sought that 
 is necessary to protect some right or the property in litigation. 
 Motions of the latter class must be supported by affidavits, and 
 
 470 
 
IXTEELOCTJTOEY BEO(;EEDI>,GS. 471 
 
 when the application is ex parte, the necessity of such character 
 of application must be shown in the affidavits. 
 
 Again, if interlocutory relief in such cases is necessary at the 
 time of filing the bill, the facts to support it ought to be set 
 up in the bill, and the bill be sworn to and supported by affi- 
 davits, and the prayer; whether the application be by motion 
 or contained in the bill, it must specifically pray for the relief 
 required and must conform to the case made. 
 
 Injunctions. 
 
 Writs of injunction pending a suit in equity may issue when- 
 ever cause exists, by the court or a judge thereof. 
 
 By new rule 73 a temj)orary restraining order or preliminary 
 injunction pending suit may be granted. See Judicial Code, 
 sees. 264-266, Comp. Stat." 1913, sees. 1241-1243. See also 
 Universal Sav. & T. Co. v. Stoneburner, 51 C. C. A. 208, 113 
 Fed. 254; Horn v. Pere Marquette R. Co. 151 Fed. 634; Thul- 
 len V. Triumph Electric Co. 128 C. C. A. 655, 212 Fed. 143 ; 
 Cathey v. Iforfolk & W. E. Co. — C. C. A. — . Again, by 
 new rule Xo. 25, where special relief of this nature is re- 
 quired pending the suit, the bill should be sworn to by the 
 plaintifl^, or anyone having knowledge of the facts. JSTew rule 
 Xo. 74 provides for injunctions pending appeal, to be hereafter 
 noticed. 
 
 By Whom Granted. 
 
 By section 264, Judicial Code, injimctions may be granted 
 by any justice of the Supreme Court in cases where they may 
 be g-ranted by the Supreme Court; and by any judge of the 
 district court in cases where they may be granted by the dis- 
 trict court. 
 
 No justice of the Supreme Court shall hear or allow any 
 application for an injunction or restraining order in any cause 
 pending in the circuit to which he has been allotted, elsewhere 
 than in such circuit, or any place outside of the circuit where 
 parties stipulate in writing it can be heard, except when it can- 
 not be heard by the district judge of the district. When the 
 district judge is absent from his district, or is under disability, 
 any circuit judge of the circuit in which the district is situated 
 may grant the restraining order. 
 
472 INTERLOCUTORY PEOCEEDIXGS. 
 
 When the injunction is sought to suspend or restrain the 
 enforcement, operation, or execution of any statute of a State, 
 by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the 
 enforcement or execution of such statute, it cannot be gTanted 
 or issued by any justice of the Supreme Court, or by any dis- 
 trict court of the United States, or any judge thereof, or by 
 any circuit judge acting as district judge, upon the ground of 
 the unconstitutionality of such statute, unless the application 
 shall be presented to any one of the judges above named, who 
 shall immediately call to his assistance two other judges to hear 
 the application. Three judges must hear the application, one 
 of whom must be either a justice of the Supreme Court or a cir- 
 cuit judge, and the other two may be either circuit or district 
 judges. Judicial Code, sec. 266. 
 
 In case of danger of irreparable loss or damage, a temporary 
 restraining order may be issued by any of the judges who are 
 authorized to hear the cause, to be in force until the hearing 
 and determination of the application. Upon notice as afore- 
 said, which means notice to governor and attorney general of 
 the state, and such other persons as may be defendants in the 
 suit. On March 4th, 1913 (37 Stat, at Law, 1013, chap. 160, 
 Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1243), sec. 266 of the -Judicial Code 
 was amended as follows : or "in the enforcement or execution 
 of an order made by an administrative board or commission 
 acting under or pursuant to the statutes of such state." Louis- 
 ville & :N'. E. Co. v. Eailroad Commission, 208 Fed. 37; Sea- 
 board Air Line E. Co. v. Eailroad Commission, 129 C. C. A. 
 613, 213 Fed. 27. This amendment was evidently induced by 
 the strict construction given to the act, and limiting its pur- 
 pose only when the constitutionality of a State statute was at- 
 tacked, as in Chicago, B. & Q. E. Co. v. Ogiesby, 198 Fed. 
 153; Cumberland Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Memphis, 198 Fed. 
 956, 957. It will be noticed that it is only when an inter- 
 locutory injunction is asked for that three judges are required 
 to sit in the case. So, when a permanent injunction is asked 
 for, and there is no prayer for a preliminary injunction or in- 
 jvmction pendente lite, or the interlocutory injunction is waived 
 and the case goes to trial on its merits section 266 (Comp. Stat. 
 1913, sec. 1243), does not apply. Seaboard Air Line E. Co. 
 V. Eailroad Commission, 129 C. C. A. 613, 213 Fed. 27. 
 
IXTEBLOCUTOEY PEOlJEEDIJSTGS. 473 
 
 Again, it is held that a "statute of a State,", as embodied in 
 section 266, does not apply to the ordinance of a city, as it is 
 apparent that the intent of the act was to prevent a single United 
 States district judge from stopping the functions of a State 
 government, and the statute of a State means one passed by a 
 State legislatvire, and any officer of a State meant an officer 
 ■^vhose authority extended throughout the State. Cumberland 
 Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. :jremphis, 198 Fed. 95Y. 
 
 In Lykins v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 126 C. C. A. 395, 209 
 Fed. 573, it was held that section 266 did not apply to a suit to 
 enjoin a tax levied for the benefit of a turnpike company. 
 However, in this case the act was not attacked as unconstitu- 
 tional, authorizing the tax. See also Birmingham Waterworks 
 Co. V. Birmingham, 211 Fed. 497. 
 
 Security on Issuing Restraining Order. 
 
 By act October 15th, 1914, sec. 18, no restraining order can 
 issue without security in such sum as the judge may fix except 
 as provided in section 16 of the Act. Ee Burr Mfg. & Supply 
 Co. 217 Fed. 16. See 38 Stat, at L. 787, chap. 323, for pro- 
 vision of section 16, restraining violation of anti-trust laws. 
 
 What Order Shall Set Forth. 
 
 By section 19 of the above act, every order shall set forth the 
 reasons for issuing the injunction, and the act or acts sought to 
 be restrained, and such order shall only be binding on the parties 
 to the suit, or those in active concert or participating with them 
 and who, by personal service or otherwise, have received actual 
 notice of the same. 
 
 Restraining Orders Between Employers and Employees. 
 
 'No restraining order shall be granted in any case between 
 employer and employees, or employers and employees, or be- 
 tween employees or between persons employed and persons seek- 
 ing employment involving or growing out of a dispute concern- 
 ing terms, or conditions of employment, unless necessary to 
 prevent irreparable injury to property or a property right of 
 
474 IXTEELOCUTOEY PEOCDISDINGS. 
 
 the party making the application, for which injury there is no 
 adequate remedy at law. The property or property right threat- 
 ened must be described with particularity in the applicalion, 
 which must be sworn to by the applicant, his agent or attorney. 
 Sec. 20, act October 15, 1914. Sees." 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 of 
 the above-mentioned act provide for the procedure and punish- 
 ment of contempt in such cases. 
 
 Notice of Motion. 
 
 By new rule 73, no preliminary injunction shall be granted 
 without notice to the opposite party, nor any temporary restrain- 
 ing order without notice, unless it shall clearly appear by facts 
 set up in affidavits, or by a verified bill, that immediate and 
 irreparable loss or damage will result before the matter can be 
 heard on notice. If the order is granted without notice, the 
 matter shall be made retui'nable at the earliest possible time, and 
 in no event later than ten days from the date of order ; and for 
 such hearing the case shall have precedence of all other mat- 
 ters except older matters of the same character. Sec. 263 of 
 the Judicial Code (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1240), authorizing 
 the issuing of injunctions on motion without preliminary notice^ 
 with or without security, was repealed by Act October 14, 1914, 
 chap. 323, sec. 17, and the following provisions substituted: 
 
 1st. Xo preliminary injunction can be issued without notice. 
 
 2d. Xo temporary restraining order shall be granted without 
 notice unless by affidavits or by verified bill irreparable injury 
 or loss will result if not issued before notice can be served. 
 ^A'hen the restraining order is issued it must be indorsed with 
 date and hour of issuance, and forthwith filed in the clerk's 
 office, and entered of record. The order shall define the injury 
 anticipated and state why it is irreparable, and why granted 
 without notice, and shall by its terms expire, not to exceed ten 
 days, which the court must indicate in the order. However, ■ 
 for good cause the order may be extended for a like period as 
 fixed by the original order, and the reasons for such extension 
 must be stated and entered of record. See Thullen v. Triumph 
 Electric Co. 128 C. C. A. 655, 212 Fed. 143, 145; Stearns- 
 Roger Mfg. Co. v. Brown, 52 C. C. A. 559, 114 Fed. 939. 
 
 3d. Where a temporary restraining order is granted without 
 
IKTEEXOCU rOKY PEOCEi!;DI>iGS. 475 
 
 notice, tte matter of the issiiance of a preliminary injunction 
 shall be set down for hearing at the earliest jDOssible time, and 
 shall take precedence of all matters except older matters of 
 the same character. The party asking the preliminary injunc- 
 tion must proceed when called for hearing at the time fixed, 
 and if he does not, the court must dissolve the temporary in- 
 junction. 
 
 4th. Upon two days' notice to the party obtaining the re- 
 straining order, the opposite party may move a dissolution or 
 modification. The court must determine the motion as expedi- 
 tiously as the ends of justice require. See new._rule Y3. 
 
 oth. This act does not affect sec. 266 of the Judicial Code. 
 
 Where a preliminary injunction is sought to suspend or 
 restrain the enforcement, operation, or execution of any statute 
 of a State, upon the ground of unconstitutionality of such stat- 
 ute, said application shall not be heard or determined before at 
 least five days' notice of the hearing shall be given to the gover- 
 nor and attorney general of the State, and to such other persons 
 as may be defendants in the suit. Judicial Code, sec. 266. 
 The application must be heard at the earliest practicable day 
 after the expiration of the notice, precedence being given to it 
 for hearing. 
 
 In Southwestern Surety Co. v. Wells, 21Y Fed. 295, it is 
 said a motion for a preliminary injunction must be pursued 
 under new rule 29, to be called up and disposed of in the discre- 
 tion of the court or upon five days' notice. 
 
 Enjoining Proceedings in State Courts. 
 
 By sec. 265 of the Judicial Code (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1242), an injunction shall not be granted to "stay proceedings" 
 in a State court except in bankruptcy cases. This statute limits 
 the powers of the circuit court in furtherance of a harmonious 
 administration of justice in the two jurisdictions. Central 
 Trust Co. V. Western M'orth Carolina E. Co. 112 Fed. 475, 476 ; 
 Evans v. Gorman, 115 Fed. 401; Security Trust Co. v. Union 
 Trust Co. 134 Fed. 301. In bankruptcy the Federal courts 
 may enjoin taking away property from the trustee. Ee Gut- 
 man, 114 Fed. 1009 ; Xew Eiver Coal & Land Co. v. Euffner 
 Bros. 165 Fed. 881-882; Ee Blue Stone Bros. 174 Fed. 54. 
 
47'6 llfTEELOCUTOEY PBOCEEDINGS. 
 
 However, we will see further that the limitation does not apply 
 to an injunction issued by the Federal courts in defense of its 
 jurisdiction of a cause of action, when the res is in possession 
 of the court. (Ibid.) ; nor to proceedings in the State court 
 after removal. Williston v. Raymond, 213 Fed. 528, and cases 
 cited ; Chesapeake & 0. E. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U. S. 146, 58 
 L. ed. 544, 34 Sup. Ct. Eep. 278 ; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. 
 Louisville & K E. Co. 120 C. C. A. 267, 201 Fed. 922, id. 134 
 C. C. A. 386, 218 Fed. 628. 
 
 We see that the prohibition is against a "stay of proceedings" 
 in a State court, so our next inquiry will be — 
 
 What Are "Proceedings." 
 
 Proceedings cover not only the successive steps in the suit up 
 to the entry of judgment, but all process necessary to the full 
 execution of the judgment. Mills v. Provident Life & T. Co, 
 100 Fed. 346, 347 ; Phelps v. Mutual Eeserve Fund Life Asso. 
 112 Fed. 463, 464; Leathe v. Thomas, 38 C. C. A. 75, 97 Fed, 
 136 ; American Asso. v. Hurst, 7 C. C. A. 598, 16 U. S. App 
 325, 59 Fed. 1 ; Provident Life & T. Co. v. Mills, 91 Fed. 435; 
 Security Trust Co. v. Union Trust Co. 134 Fed. 301. 
 
 Section 265 originated in 1793, and is a legislative command 
 that the courts of these two jurisdictions must move within their 
 respective limits, and exercise their respective powers without 
 conflict. The courts have adhered with remarkable consistency 
 to the letter and spirit of the law. It may be, as often declared, 
 that the act was but the declaration of that comity between 
 courts of concurrent jurisdiction, which has always been recog- 
 nized, but there is no doubt that its mandatory form has been 
 a wholesome restriction upon the Federal courts. It has empha- 
 sized the duty to give preference to those methods of procedure 
 which served to conciliate the distinct and independent tribunals 
 of the two systems. Phelps v. Mutual Eeserve Fund Life Asso. 
 61 L.E.A. 717, 50 C. C. A. 339, 112 Fed. 464, 465; Evans v. 
 Gorman, 115 Fed. 401, 402; Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 597, 
 15 L. ed. 1032. 
 
 When Section 265 of the Judicial Code Does Not Apply^ •; 
 
 It does not apply when the court is seeking to maintain its 
 
INTEELOCUTORY PltOCEEDINGS. 4:11 
 
 own jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the possession of which 
 has been first obtained by the court. It is a settled rule of 
 comity that the possession of the res vests the court first acqxiir- 
 ing the same with the power to hear and determine all contro- 
 versies relating thereto, and disables the other courts of con- 
 current jurisdiction from interfering therewith. Phelps v. 
 Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. 61 L.E.A. 717, 50 C. C. A. 
 339, 112 Fed. 465 ; Garner v. Second Nat. Bank, 16 C. C. A. 
 86, 33 U. S. App. 91, 67 Fed. 833 ; Julian v. Central Trust Co. 
 193 U. S. 93, 48 L. ed. 629, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 399 ; Foster v. 
 Lebanon Springs R. Co. 100 Fed. 543 ; Eodgers v. Pitt, 96 Fed. 
 671; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Lake Street Elev. R. Co. 177 
 U. S. 61, 44 L. ed. 671, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564; Knott v. Eve- 
 ning Post Co. 124 Fed. 352 ; McDowell v. McCormick, 57 C. C. 
 A. 401, 121 Fed. 65 ; Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard 
 :irin. Co. 196 U. S. 239, 49 L. ed. 462, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 251 ; 
 Southern R. Co. v. Simon, 153 Fed. 234; Massie v. Buck, 62 
 C. C. A. 535, 128 Fed. 27; Stewart v. Wisconsin C. R. Co. 117 
 Fed. 782 ; Mercantile Trust & D. Co. v. Roanoke & S. R. Co. 
 109 Fed. 3 ; Re Chetwood, 165 U. S. 443, 41 L. ed. 782, 17 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 385 ; Central Trust Co. v. Western Xorth Caro- 
 lina R. Co. 89 Fed. 24 ; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Wabash R. Co. 
 ■>7 C. C. A. 322, 119 Fed. 679 ; Starr v. Chicago, R. I. & P. 
 E. Co. 110 Fed. 6, 7. And the rule is not restricted in its appli- 
 cation to property actually seized, but appears as well when suits 
 are brought to enforce liens, to marshal assets, administer trusts, 
 or liquidate insolvent estates, or whenever the suits is of such 
 a character that the court may in its progress be compelled to 
 assume possession of the property to be affected. Ibid. ; Mer- 
 ritt V. American Steel Barge Co. 24 C. C. A. 530, 49 U. S. 
 App. 85, 79 Fed. 231 ; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Wabash R. 
 Co. 57 C. C. A. 322, 119 Fed. 680; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 
 V. Lake Street Elev. R. Co. 177 U. S. 61, 44 L. ed. 671, 20 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564; Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U. S. 148, 43 
 L. ed. 399, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119; Marks v. Marks, 75 Fed. 
 333; Shields v. Coleman, 157 U. S. 178, 39 L. ed. 663, 15 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 570; Owens v. Ohio C. R. Co. 20 Fed. 12, 13 ; Apple- 
 ton Waterworks Co. v. Central Trust Co. 35 C. C. A. 302, 93. 
 Fed. 289. 'Nov is it restricted to protecting its own prior juris- 
 diction, but the Federal court may enjoin when necessary to 
 
-l-TS INTERI.OCUTOEY PfiOCEKDIKGS. 
 
 protect its decree. Central Trust Co. v. Western Xortli Caro- 
 lina E. Co. 112 Fed. 471-477 ; Stewart v. Wisconsin C. E. Co. 
 117 Fed. 782. 
 
 Nor does this section affect the right of the Federal coiu-t to 
 restrain a judgment of a State court obtained by fraud. Phelps 
 V. MutualEoserve Fund Life Asso. 61 L.E.A. 717, 50 C. C. A. 
 339, 112 Fed. 465 and cases cited; Wood v. Davis, 108 Fed. 
 130; Hendryx v. Perkins, 52 C. C. A. 435, 114 Fed. 807, and 
 cases cited ; Arrowsniith v. Gleason, 129 IT. S. 86, 32 L. ed. 
 630, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 237; Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U. S. 
 590, 35 L. ed. 871, 12 Sup. CH. Eep. 62 ; Bailey v. Willeford, 
 126 Fed. 806, 807; United States v. Beebe, 34 C. C. A. 321, 
 92 Fed. 544; United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 68, 25 
 L. ed. 96. See "Bill of Eevivor for Fraud." Xor when a 
 judgment is obtained in a State court by collusion, conspiracy, 
 or false swearing. Eitchie v. Sayers, 100 Fed. 533 ; Braxton 
 V. Eich, 47 Fed. 178 ; Perry v. Johnston, 95 Fed. 325 ; Moor v. 
 Moor (Tex. Civ. App.), 63 S. W. 350; Holton v. Davis, 47 
 C. C. A. 246, 108 Fed. 150, 151. Xor when the judgment 
 has been obtained without service (Cooper v. Xewell, 173 U. 
 S. 556, 43 L. ed. 808, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 506 ; Hekking v. Pfaff, 
 43 L.E.A. 618, 33 C. C. A. 328, 50 U. S. App. 484, 91 Fed. 
 60), or jurisdiction (Phoenix Bridge Co. v. Ca^^tleberry, 65 
 C. C. A. 481, 131- Fed. 177, 178) ; or when it is otherwise void 
 (Harrison v. Lokey, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 404, 63 S. W. 1030) ; 
 and State courts may thus attack Federal judgments. Ealston 
 V. Sharon, 51 Fed. 707; League v. Scott, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 
 318, 61 S. W. 521. See Central ^at Bank v. Stevens, 169 
 U. S. 463, 42 L. ed. 818, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 403. 
 
 Federal courts may allow an equitable set-off against State 
 judgments. Northwestern Port Huron Co. v. Babcock, — C. 0. 
 A. — , 223 Fed. 486. 
 
 When Jurisdiction Attaches. 
 
 While the rule that the court obtaining possession of the 
 subject-matter prior in point of time cannot be interfered with, 
 yet the issue as to when the jurisdiction attached has often 
 arisen. Baltimore & O. E. Co. v. Wabash E. Co. 57 C. C. A. 
 322, 119 Fed. 679 ; Merritt v. American Steel Barge Co. 79 
 
INTERLOCUTOKY PEOCEEDINGS. 479 
 
 Fed. 231, 24 C. C. A. 530, 49 U. S. App. 85. In testing this, 
 the Federal courts have held that jurisdiction does not attach 
 except on the service of process, and the rule is not controlled 
 by State statntes. United States v. Eisenbeis, 50 C. C. A. 179, 
 112 Fed. 196; Benoist v. Smith, 191 Fed. 514 and cases cited. 
 
 In Owens v. Ohio C. R Co. 20 Fed. 10, it is said that the 
 jurisdiction of the court attaches on the service of process. 
 Rodgers v. Pitt, 96 Fed. 673 ; Union Mnt. L. Ins. Co. v. Uni- 
 versity of Chicago, 10 Biss. 191, 6 Fed. 443; Hughes v. Green, 
 28 C.'C. A. 537, 56 U. S. App. 56, 84 Fed. 833; Zimmerman 
 V. So Eelle, 25 C. C. A. 518, 49 U. S. App. 387, SO Fed. 417 ; 
 Colston V. Southern Home Bldg. & L. Asso. 00 Fed. 309. In 
 Eodgers v. Pitt, 96 Fed. 673, it is said that jurisdiction of a 
 cause does not attach, within the meaning of the general rule, 
 by filing the complaint and issuance of summons, but attaches 
 only on the service of process, and the court whose process is 
 first served holds the cause. Ibid, and cases cited; Baltimore 
 & 0. E. Co. V. Wabash E. Co. 57 C. C. A. 322, 119 Fed. 679 ; 
 Shields v. Coleman, 157 U. S. 177, 178, 39 L. ed. 663, 664, 
 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 570; United States v. American Lumber Co. 
 80 Fed. 315. 
 
 There is no question that process which first seizes and holds 
 property and brings it ^vithin the dominion of the court gives to 
 that court exclusive jiii-isdiction. Vowinckel v. K. Clark & 
 Sons, 62 Fed. 992, 993 ; Eobinson v. ^Mutual Eeserve L. Ins. 
 Co. 162 Fed. 794; Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, 18 L. ed. 257 ; 
 Eoyal Trust Co. v. Washburn, B. k 1. E. Co. 71 C. C. A. 579, 
 139 Fed. 865; Cooper v. Eeynolds, 10 Wall. 317, 19 L. ed. 
 932; Gates v. Bucki, 4 C. c". A. 116, 12 U. S. App. 69, 53 
 Fed. 967; Southern Bank & T. Co. v. Folsom, 21 C. C. A. 568, 
 43 U. S. App. 713, 75 Fed. 931 ; Kelly, M. & Co. v. Sioux Nat. 
 Bank, 81 Fed. 4. But in suits for foreclosvire of liens, or when 
 the suit is substantially in rem, and by the allegations of the 
 bill the dominion over the subject-matter is contemplated, and 
 necessary to a proper decree, then a suit in equity is begun by 
 fihng the bill. Louisville Trust Co. v. Knott, 65 C. C. A. 158, 
 130 Fed. 825; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Lake Street Elev. 
 R. Co. 177 U. S. 61, 44 L. ed. 671, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 564; 
 Mound City Co. v. Castleman, 177 Fed. 510; Merritt v. Ameri- 
 can Steel Barge Co. 24 C. C. A. 530, 49 U. S. App. 85, 79 Fed. 
 
480 INTERLOCUTOEY PEOCEEDINGS. 
 
 231 ; Heidrltter v. Elizateth Oil Cloth Co. 112 U. S. 294-301, 
 28 L. ed. 729-731, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 135; Harding v. Corn 
 Products Ref. Co. 94 C. C. A. 144, 168 Fed. 659 ; Appleton 
 Waterworks Co. v. Central Trust Co. 35 C. C. A. 302, 93 Fed. 
 286-288. See Humane Bit Co. v. Bamet, 117 Fed. 318, hold- 
 ing a suit in equity is begun by filing bill, following Farmers' 
 Loan & T. Co. v. Lake Street Elev. R. Co. 177 U. S. 61, 44 L. 
 ed. 671, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564, but as between the parties in a 
 proceeding in rem, when process issued. The Farmers' Loan & 
 T. Co. V. Lake Street Elev. R. Co. supra, was a foreclosure of 
 a mortgage in the Federal court; the defendant filed a bill in 
 the State court and sought to enjoin proceedings in the Fed- 
 eral court. The bill had been first filed in the Federal court, 
 but process from the State court had been first served. The 
 court says filing the bill in the Federal court gave jurisdiction 
 to this court first, and it was not controlled by the service of 
 process. Ibid. The filing of the bill and the hona fide issue 
 of process is sufficient. Equity rule 11. The court says the rule 
 as stated is of special importance in its application to Federal 
 and State courts; and, in applying the doctrine of Us pendens 
 to the case of a third person who is a bona fide purchaser, notice 
 is held to begin from date of service of process, and not from 
 filing the bill, 
 
 Ne Exeat. 
 
 Section 261 of the Judicial Code (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1238), authorizes the issuing of this writ. I have already re- 
 ferred to the prayer for this writ in chap. 47, p. 284. 
 
 A form for the writ will be foxind in Griswold v. Hazard, 
 141 U. S. 263, 35 L. ed. 681, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 972, 999, and 
 it will be seen that it is designed to prevent a defendant against 
 whom an indebtedness is alleged from going beyond the juris- 
 diction of the court in which the suit is pending, and to secure 
 which sufficient bail or security is required of the defendant, or 
 to be imprisoned in case of refusal to give it. 
 
 A party arrested upon we exeai may obtain a discharge of the 
 writ upon motion or petition, upon defendant's giving security 
 to answer- the bill and to render himself amenable to process 
 during the pendency of the suit, and to such process as may be 
 
INTEKLOCUTUKY ruOCEEDIA'GS. 481 
 
 issued to compel a performance of the decree. Griswold v. Ha- 
 zard, 141 U. S. 281, 35 L. ed. 687, 11 Sup. Ot. Rep. 972, 999. 
 
 The writ is in force, when isaued, until the judgment is sat- 
 isfied, or property security given, or is some way discharged 
 by the court (Lewis v. Shainwald, 48 Fed. 500 ; McXamara v. 
 Dwyer, 7 Paige, 239, 32 Am. Dec. 631), and it seems that the 
 writ may, after judgment, be issued upon motion or petition, 
 though there was no prayer in the bill asking it. Ibid. ; 14 Am. 
 Dec.'sei, note; Lewis v. Shainwald, 48 Fed. 500; U. S. Eev. 
 Stat. sec. 717, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 580. 
 
 It is not of itself a remedy, but a means to efFectuate a rem- 
 edy, viz., by keeping a party within the jurisdiction of the court. 
 Shainwald r. Lewis, 69 Fed. 496, 497; Ee Cohen, 136 Fed. 
 999; Gooding v. Reid, M. & Co. 101 0. C. A. 310, 177 Fed. 
 684. The old law is embodied in sec. 261' of the ^"ew Code. 
 Gooding V. Eeid, M. & Co. 101 0. C. A. 310, 177 Fed. 684. 
 
 S. Eq.— 31. 
 
CHAPTEE LXXVIL 
 
 AUXILIAEY SUITS. 
 
 All interventions, bills of revivor, supplemental bills, and bills 
 for injunctive relief pending a suit are auxiliary bills in equity. 
 Tbe object and effect of filing these bills have been already 
 discussed, and I now propose only to speak of auxiliaiy bills 
 generally. 
 
 All bills growing out of or connected with a pending suit are 
 called auxiliary or ancillary suits in equity. Brooks v. Lau- 
 rent, 39 C. C. A. 201, 98 Fed. 652; McDonald v. Seligman, 
 81 Fed. Y53 ; Campbell v. Golden Cycle Min. Co. 73 C. C. A. 
 260, 141 Fed. 610; Hobbs Mfg. Co. v. Gooding, 164 Fed. 93; 
 Cooper V. Newton, 160 Fed. 190; Brown v. Allebach, 156 Fed. 
 697; O'Connor v. O'Connor, 146 Fed. 994; King v. Buskirk, 
 24 C. C. A. 82, 42 U. S. App. 249, 78 Fed. 233-235. The 
 jurisdiction of the main suit supports the auxiliary bill. Eoss 
 v. Ft. Wayne, 11 C. C. A. 288, 24 U. S. App. 113, 63 Fed. 
 471; Cunningham v. Cleveland, 39 C. C. A. 211, 98 Fed. 660; 
 Continental Trust Co. v. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. E. Co. 82 
 Fed. 642; Compton v. Jessup, 15 C. C. A. 397, 31 U. S. App. 
 486, 68 Fed. 263; Everette v. Independent School Dist. 102 
 Fed. 530; Carey v. Houston & T. C E. Co. 161 U. S. 133, 40 
 L. ed. 644, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 537. But such bill must, both in 
 a proper and legal sense, be an ancillary bill ; it must, in fact, 
 be only a continuation of the original suit, that is, it must 
 relate to some matter already litigated by the same parties or 
 their representatives. If the bill contains matter not before 
 litigated by the same parties standing in the same interests, that 
 is, if new parties are brought in, and new matter charged as a 
 basis of relief, then the bill is not an ancillary, but original 
 bill, and cannot be supported by the former suit, but must stand- 
 independently on its parties and subject-matter for jurisdiction 
 in the Federal courts. Union Cent. L. Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 
 
 482 
 
AUXILIAEY SUITS. 483 
 
 41 C. C. A. 263, 102 Fed. 19 ; Anglo-Florida Phosphate Co. v. 
 McKibbeu, 13 C. C. A. 36, 23 U. S. App. 675, 65 Fed. 529; 
 Eaphael v. Trask, 118 Fed. 777; Campbell v. Golden Cycle 
 Min. Co. 73 C. C. A. 260, 141 Fed. 610 ; Shinney v. North 
 American Sav. Loan & Bldg. Co. 97 Fed. 9. 
 
 We have the most freqnent illustrations of these ancillary 
 bills, which are brought to restrain or regulate judgments recov- 
 ered in law or equity. Leigh v. Kewanee Mfg. Co. 127 Fed. 
 990 ; South Penn Oil Co. v. Calf Creek Oil cV Gas Co. 140 Fed. 
 .">0s ; Broadis v. Broadis, 86 Fed. 9.")1 ; Freeman v. Howe, 24 
 How. 460, 16 L. ed. 752 ; Pacific R. Co. v. Missouri P. R. Co. 
 Ill r. S. :>0r,, 28 L. ed. 49S, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 583; Kri])- 
 pendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276, 28 L. ed. 145, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 27: Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Home Ins. Co. 51 C. 
 C. A. 21, 113 Fed. 3 ; Bradshaw v. :Miners' Bank, 26 C. C. A. 
 673, 53 U. S. App. 399, 81 Fed. 902. So bills to revive a 
 judgment. AYanderly v. Lafayette County, 77 Fed. 665. Or 
 set aside a decree. Carey v. Houston & T. C. R. Co. 161 U. S. 
 128, 40 L. ed. 643. 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. .■)37; Symmes v. Union 
 Trust Co. 60 Fed. 853. Or to modify or correct it. Thompson 
 V. Schenectady Co. 124 Fed. 274. Or to obtain the enforce- 
 ment or construction of a former decree. Jenks v. Brewster, 
 96 Fed. 625. So all bills tiled by receivei's to protect property 
 or remove cloud. Connor v. Alligator Lumber Co. 98 Fed. 155 ; 
 Toledo, St. L. i: K. C. R. Co. v. Continental Trust Co. 36 C. 
 C. A. 15."i, 95 Fed. 497; Compton v. Jesup, 15 C. C. A. 397, 
 31 r. S. App. 486. 6s Fed. 279-2SO; Pope v. Louisville, X. A. 
 & C. R. Co.' 173 r. S. 578, 43 L. ed. 817, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 500; Brooktield v. Hecker, 118 Fed. 942; Bausman v. Denny, 
 73 Fed. 69. Or suits brought against the receivers touching 
 the property in their possession. Shinney v. ]^orth American 
 Sav. Loan i: Bldg. Co. 97 Fed. 9; Toledo, St. L. k K. C. E. 
 Co. V. Continental Trust Co. 36 C. C. A. 155, 95 Fed. 497; 
 Washington v. ^^orthern P. R. Co. 75 Fed. 333 ; Sullivan v. 
 Barnard, 81 Fed. 886; Carpenter v. Northern P. R. Co. 75 
 Fed. 850; Continental Trust Co. v. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R. 
 Co. 82 Fed. 642. Or in any case, as heretofore shown, where 
 the court takes possession of property or a fund for distribu- 
 tion, and wherein all bills filed by those claiming an interest 
 are auxiliary; and the jurisdiction is not affected because the 
 
484 AUXILIAEY SUITS. 
 
 question involved may be of a legal nature. Cunningliam v. 
 Cleveland, 39 C. C. A. 211, 98 Fed. 657; St. Louis & K. C. E. 
 Co. V. Continental Trust Co. 36 C. C. A. 195, note; Continental 
 Trust Co. V. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R Co. 82 Fed. 643 ; Osborn 
 & Co. V. Barge, 30 Fed. 805 ; see Whalen v. Enterprise Transp. 
 Co. 164 Fed. 96; White v. Ewing, 159 U. S. 36, 40 L. ed. 
 67, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1018. So in matters of injunctive relief 
 that becomes necessary during the pendency of a cause in 
 equity "or law ; bills filed in aid of such suits to preserve property, 
 or the status of parties and subject-matter, are auxiliary. South 
 Penn Oil Co. v. Calf Creek Oil & Gas Co. 140 Fed. 508 ; Hill 
 V. Kuhlman, 31 C. C. A. 87, 59 U. S. App. 82, 87 Fed. 498; 
 Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Home Ins. Co. 51 C. C. A. 
 21, 113 Fed. 3; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 460, 16 L. ed. 
 752 ; Berliner Gramophone Co. v. Seaman, 51 C. C. A. 440,. 
 113 Fed. 750; Jones v. Andrews, 10 Wall. 333, 19 L. ed. 
 937; West v. East Coast E. Co. 51 C. C. A. 426, 113 Fed. 
 742. 
 
 T cannot possibly cover by illustration the field when and 
 where these auxiliary bills are appropriate, so I will conclude 
 by calling attention to the distinguishing features of these bills 
 from original bills in Federal courts. 
 
 First. As to the citizenship of the parties, and other matters 
 affecting the jiirisdiction of Federal courts. 
 
 Second. As to the service of process when auxiliary bills are 
 filed. 
 
 First, These bills can be filed and maintained in the Fed- 
 eral courts, though the court would not have jurisdiction of 
 them as original bills (Eice v. Durham Vv^ater Co. 91 Fed. 
 433 ; American Surety Co. v. Lawreneeville Cement Co. 96 Fed. 
 25 ; Brooks v. Laurent, 39 C. C. A. 201, 98 Fed. 652 and cases 
 cited; Milwaukee & M. E. Co. v. Chamberlain, 6 Wall. 748, 
 18 L. ed. 859 ; Osbom & Co. v. Barge, 30 Fed. 805 ; First N"at, 
 Bank v. Salem Capital Flour-Mills Co. 31 Fed. 580 ; Lilienthal 
 V. McCormick, 54 C. C. A. 475, 117 Fed. 96), because neither 
 diverse citizenship, residence, or amount, nor value of subject- 
 matter, as required under the general judiciary act, are neces- 
 sary to appear to support the jurisdiction (Toledo, St. L. & K. 
 C. E. Co. V. Continental Trust Co. 36 C. C. A. 155, 95 Fed. 
 497; Central Trust Co. v. Bridges, 6 C. C. A. 539, 16 F. S. 
 
AUXILIAKY dUITS. 485 
 
 App. 115, 57 Fed. 753; Park v. New York, L. E. & W. E. 
 Co. 70 Fed. 643 ; Morgan's L. & T. K. & S. S. Co. v. Texas C. 
 E. Co. 137 U. S. 201, 34 L. ed. 635, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 61 ; 
 Lilienthal v. McCormick, 54 C. C. A. 75, 117 Fed. 96; Ames 
 Eealty Co. v. Big Indian Min. Co. 146 Fed. 179 ; Newton v. 
 Gag-e, 155 Fed. 604; Ulman v. Jaeger, 155 Fed. 1011; Craig 
 T. Dorr, 76 C. C. A. 559, 145 Fed. 311 ; Aldrich v. Campbell, 
 38 C. C. A. 347, 97 Fed. 663 ; ]\Iyers v. Hettinger, 37 C. C. A. 
 369, 94 Fed. 370; Widaman v. Hubbard, 8S Fed. 812; Ee Ty- 
 ler, 149 U. S. 181, 37 L. ed. 694, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 785). 
 
 Substituted Service. 
 
 Second. As to service of process in auxiliary bills, equitj' 
 rule 13 requires that the service of all subpoenas shall be by de- 
 livering a copy to the defendant personally, or leaving a copy at 
 the dwelling house or usual place of abode; but notwithstand- 
 ing this rule and equity rules 14, 15, it is now well settled that 
 in all classes of proceedings of an auxiliary character the serv- 
 ice of process may be made by what is called substituted 
 service. 
 
 Every departure from the rule governing service of process 
 as provided in equity rule 13, and by which other methods are 
 provided for obtaining jurisdiction over parties, is substituted 
 service. Boswell v. Otis, 9 How. 350, 13 L. ed. 170. Thus, 
 service on the agent or attorneys of the parties to the suit, in 
 lieu of the service on the parties themselves, when permitted, 
 is substituted service. Ibid. There must be an order for this 
 service. Pacific E. Co. v. ilissouri P. R. Co. 1 McCrary, 647, 
 3 Fed. 772 ; Gregory v. Pike, 25 0. C. A. 48, 50 U. S. App. 
 4, 36 C. C. A. 299, 94 Fed. 373, 79 Fed. 520. So the service 
 authorized by section 8 of the act of 1875, providing for special 
 process to be sent beyond the limits of the State, or by publica- 
 tion, is a form of substituted service. Forsyth v. Pierson, 9 
 Fed. 801. 
 
 On Agents. 
 
 Service on agents or attorneys of parties is not known to 
 equity on original bills, but applies to auxiliary bills, and such 
 
486 AUXILIARY SUITS. 
 
 bills as are in fact continuations of the original suit (Gasquet 
 V. Fidelity Trust & S. V. Co. 6 C. C. A. 253, 13 U. S. App. 
 564, 57 Fed. 80 ; Fidelity Trust & S. V. Co. v. Mobile Street 
 R. Co. 53 Fed. 851). 
 
 The relief sought must be germane to the suit, and not under 
 new facts not in the original bill, in order to support substi- 
 tuted service (ibid.), as ancillary bills of an original nature 
 must be served as original bills (Gregory v. Pike, 35 C. C. A. 
 48, 47 U. S. App. 4, 79 Fed. 521, and cases cited; Smith v. 
 Woolfolk, 115 U. S. 143, 29 L. ed. 357, 5 Sup. Ct.Rep. 1177; 
 Manning v. Berdan, 132 Fed. 382; Bowen v. Christian, 16 
 Fed. 729 ; Providence Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 810, 19 
 L. ed. 589; Shainwald v. Davids, 69 Fed. 703). 
 
 Its use has been permitted in injunctions to restrain or 
 in aid of actions at law ; and in all these instances the attorney 
 ]-epresenting the defendant in the bill, who had conducted the 
 action at law, is a recognized agent upon whom the service can 
 be made. Abraham v. ITorth German F. Ins. Co. 3 L.E.A. 
 188, 37 Fed. 731; Cortes Co. v. Thannhauser, 20 Blatchf. 59, 
 9 Fed. 227 ; Bartlett v. Sultan of Turkey, 19 Fed. 346 ; Paine 
 V. Warren, 33 Fed. 358. 
 
 To illustrate: An action at law is brought on a policy of 
 insurance, but it is discovered that a reformation is necessary, 
 for which you must file a bill in equity ; in such case you may 
 serve the attorney of the defendant in the common-law suit by 
 delivering the subpoena to him. 37 Fed. 731, supra. 
 
 Persons belonging to a class represented in a suit, who are 
 regarded as quasi parties, may have service on the attorney of 
 nonresident parties, if they should file a petition in a suit to 
 protect themselves. Fidelity Trust & S. V. Co. v. Mobile Street 
 Co. 53 Fed. 851 ; Gasquet v. Fidelity Trust & S. V. Co. 6 C. C. 
 A. 253, 13 U. S. App. 564, 57 Fed. 80. Substituted service is 
 sometimes allowed on a party who has absconded to avoid serv- 
 ice, or who conceals himself, but has a legal and acknowledged 
 representative or general agent in the jurisdiction of the court. 
 Shainwald v. Davids, 69 Fed. 702. 
 
 Character of Attorney on ^Yhom Service Made. 
 
 If the attorney is not a general agent of the party to be 
 
AUXILIARY SUITS. 487 
 
 served, then the service is not good (Shainwald v. Davids, su- 
 pra; Bowen v. Christian, 16 Fed. 730; Cortes Co. v. Thann- 
 hauser, 20 Blatchf. 59, 9 Fed. 22S ; Brown v. Arnold, 127 Fed. 
 390; Pike v. Gregory, 36 C. C. A. 299, 94 Fed. 371; Smith v. 
 Woolfolk, 115 U. S. 143-150, 29 L. ed. 3.-.7-360, 5 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 1177) ; and the bill must not contain such new facts or 
 prayer for relief as would destroy the presumption that the 
 attorney on whom the t=erviee was made was authorized to rep- 
 resent the respondent in the cross bill. Fidelity Trust & S. V. 
 Co. V. ilobile Street K. Co. 53 Fed. 851. Bowen v. Christian, 
 16 Fed. 729. 
 
 How Substituted Service Obtained. 
 
 This character of service can only be made on application to 
 the court and upon an order by the court granting leave to 
 serve the attorney or agent; if not based on an order of court, 
 it is void. Pacific R. Co. v. Missouri P. E. Co. 1 iicCrarv, 
 647, 3 Fed. 772 ; Pike v. Gregorv, 36 G. C. A. 299, 94 Fed. 
 373, ,374, S. C. 25 C. C. A. 48', 50 U. S. App. 4, 79 Fed. 520; 
 Fidelity Trust & S. V. Co. v. Mobile Street R. Co. 53 Fed. 
 851; Gage v. Riverside Trust Co. 156 Fed. 1002. The order 
 to make the service is granted on motion filed for that purpose, 
 and the motion must be based on some legal or equitable merit, 
 as shown in your auxiliary bill (Muhlenburg County v. Citi- 
 zens' !N'at. Bank, 65 Fed. 537), and the circumstances render- 
 ing such service necessaiw must be clearly stated (Ibid. ; Shain- 
 wald V. Davids, 69 Fed. 702, 703 ; Oglesby v. AttriU, 14 Fed. 
 214). 
 
 The application for substituted service may be stated in the 
 bill or by motion setting up the facts upon which substituted 
 service will be granted, and whether in the bill, or otherwise, 
 should be as follows: 
 
 ■ Complainant siiows that tlie said C. D., defendant, is a resident of XeAv 
 
 Orleans and citizen of the State of , and is not an inhabitant and 
 
 citizen of the district of , where this suit is brought, and 
 
 cannot be found therein so as to be served with process and summons to 
 appear as defendant in this suit; and complainant shows that the said C. 
 D. has an attorney appearing for him in this suit and sundry other suits 
 Brought by the said C. D. concerning the matter in controversy, some of 
 which are still pending, namely, Charles Smith, Esq., of this city. 
 
488 AtrXILIAEY SUITS. 
 
 I 
 
 Wherefore the complainant A. B. prays that this court may order that 
 notice of this suit and a summons to appear therein may be served on said 
 Charles Smith, Esq., and that such notice being thus duly served may be 
 held to be notice of this suit duly served on the defendant C. D. 
 
 The form as above given is only the general frame work 
 of the application. If the substituted service is sought of a 
 cross bill, or in an injunction proceeding, or in any auxiliary 
 suit, or in whatever proceeding, your bill or your motion must 
 show that it is a proceeding in which substituted service is per- 
 mitted, and that the circumstances exist which render such serv- 
 ice necessary. Constructive service on nonresidents has already 
 been discussed and forms given. 
 
 Motion to Vacate. 
 
 If there is any ground upon which a motion to vacate the 
 substituted service can be made, you should file it at once, and 
 you may use the following form: 
 
 Title as in bill. 
 
 And now comes C. D., defendant in this cause, and not admitting the 
 jurisdiction of the court in or over the above entitled cause, and for the 
 purpose of objecting to the exercise of this court of any such jurisdiction, 
 comes and moves the court that the writ of subpoena issued out of the 
 
 clerk's office of said court on the day of , A. D. 19..., 
 
 which has not been served on him as the law requires, may be quashed and 
 that said cause may be dismissed by the court for want of jurisdiction of 
 the same. 
 
 By Charles Smith, his solicitor, who appears specially for the purpose of 
 raising the question of jurisdiction, and that alone. 
 
 Charles Smith, 
 Solicitor for C. D. 
 
 Pike V. Gregory, 36 C. C. A. 299, 94 Fed. 3Y4. 
 
 Be careful in this motion that you do not put in issue any 
 other fact than that which asserts jurisdiction, or you waive 
 the service. 
 
 Interpleader. 
 
 A bill of interpleader is filed by one who has the possession, 
 but no interest in the subject-matter of the suit. It seeks the 
 
AUXILIARY SUITS. 489 
 
 instniction of the court as to whom the fund or property in 
 possession should be delivered as between contesting litagants. 
 Bolin V. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. — Tex. Civ. App. — , 
 61 S. W. iU. In Groves v. Sentell, 153 IT. S. 485, :!S L. ed. 
 785, 14- Sup. Ct. Rep. S98, it is said: The general rule is that 
 a party who has an interest in the subject-matter of the suit 
 cannot file a bill of interpleader, strictly so called; in fact, per- 
 fect disinterestedness is an essential ingredient of such bill, cit- 
 ing Killian v. Ebbinghaus, 110 U. S. 568-572, 28 L. ed. 246- 
 248, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232, which declares that a bill of inter- 
 pleader must aver that petitioner has no interest in the subject- 
 matter of the suit, must admit title in claimants, and a^'er in- 
 difference between them, and cannot seek relief against either. 
 Standley v. Roberts, 8 C. C. A. 805, 19 U. S. App. 407, 59 
 Fed. 841 ; Pusey & J. Co. v. Miller, 61 Fed. 401 ; Penn ]\rut. 
 L. Ins. Co. V. Fnion Trust Co. 83 Fed. 891; see Provident 
 Sav. Life Assur. Soc. v. Loeb, 115 Fed. 359; and McXamara 
 V. Provident Sav. Life Assur. Soc. 52 C. C. A. 530, 114 
 Fed. 912-914; Stevens v. Germania L. Ins. Co. 26 Tex. 
 Civ. App. 153, 62 S. W. 826 ; Jackson & S. Co. v. Pearson, 60 
 Fed. 123; Hayward v. McDonald, 113 0. C. A. 368, 192 
 Fed. 891, and cases cited. 
 
 Bill in Nature of Interpleader. 
 
 There has been recognized in Groves v. Sentell, 153 U. S. 
 485, 38 L. ed. 792, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 898, and many other 
 cases, a bill in the nature of a bill of interpleader when com- 
 plainant sets up, as between the conflicting interests of par- 
 ties to the suit, an interest for which equitable relief is sought. 
 Ibid. ; McXamara v. Provident Sav. Life Assur. Soc. 52 C. C. 
 A. 530, 114 Fed. 912 ; Lackett v. Rumbaugh, 45 Fed. 32 and 
 cases cited; Gregory v. Pike, 15 C. C. A. 33, 21 U. S. App. 
 658, 33 U. S. App. 76, 67 Fed. 844, 845. But when a com- 
 plainant in a bill of interpleader has acquired an interest from 
 two adverse claimants, his bill of interpleader cannot be sus- 
 tained. Standley v. Roberts, 8 C. C. A. 305, 19 U, S. App. 
 407, 59 Fed. 840-842. 
 
CHAPTEE LXXVIII. 
 
 EVIDENCE IX EQUITY SUITS. 
 
 Statutes and Rules Controlling the Talcing of Evidence in 
 
 Equity Suits. 
 
 U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 862 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1470), pro 
 vides that the mode of proof in causes in equity shall be accord- 
 ing to the rules now or hereafter provided by the Supreme 
 Court. IT. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 917 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1543), 
 provides that the Supreme Court shall have power to prescribe 
 from time to time, and in a manner not in conjlict with any 
 law of the United States, the mode and manner of taking evi- 
 dence and obtaining discovery in suits in equity. Under this 
 power the Supreme Court has promulgated its rules providing 
 for the manner of taking; testimony in equity causes. 
 
 In 1912 the Supreme Court promulgated a system of new 
 rules which went into effect January 1st, 1913, which radically 
 changed the mode and manner of taking evidence in equity 
 cases. Under the old system the trial by the court .of equity 
 cases was upon the record, consisting of the pleadings, deposi- 
 tions and instruments in writing; and the taking of any evi- 
 dence orally was an exception, which might have been per- 
 mitted in the discretion of the court upon application. By the 
 new rules the taking of depositions to support the issues is now 
 made the exception, and in the trial the testimony of the wit- 
 nesses must be taken in open court orally, as in trials at law, 
 except as otherMase provided by the statutes or the new rules. 
 Sheeler v. Alexander, 211 Fed. 545. jSTew rule 46 provides that 
 the testimony of witnesses shall be taken in open court except 
 as otherwise provided by the statutes and these rules. The 
 court shall pass upon the evidence as in actions at law. 
 
 By new rule 47 the court upon application by either party, 
 when allowed by statute, or for good and exceptional cause for 
 
 490 
 
EVIDENCE IN EQUITY SUITS. 491 
 
 departing from the general rule (as stated above), to be shown 
 by affidavit, may permit the depositions of named witnesses to 
 be used before the court or upon a reference to a master, to 
 be taken before an examiner or other named officer upon the 
 notice and terms specified in the order. Every deposition taken 
 under the statutes or under any such order of the court shall be 
 taken and filed as follows, unless otherwise ordered by the court 
 for good cause shown: 
 
 1st. Those of the plaintiff within sixty days from the time 
 the cause is at issue. 
 
 2d. Those of the defendant within thirty days from the 
 expiration of the time for the filing of plaintiff's depositions. 
 
 3d. Rebutting depositions by either party within twent}' 
 days after time for taking original deposition, expires. (See 
 rule 48 as to time of taking expert testimony.) Counsel by 
 consent may extend the time for taking testimony. Fortney v. 
 Carter, 121 C. C. A. 514, 203 Fed. 454. By equity rule 54, 
 depositions under the United States Statutes, sees. 863, 865, 
 866, 867 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 1472, 1474, 1477, 1478), 
 may be taken after the cause is at issue, and by rule 31 the cause 
 is at issue when the answer is filed, whether it specifically denies 
 or sets up new matter, except a set-off or counterclaim to 
 which a reply miist be made to put them in issue. Rule 47 as to 
 time of taking applies to these statutes : Victor Talking ^lachine 
 Co. V. Sonora Phonograph Corp. 221 Fed. 678. Referring to 
 the United Statutes, sec. 863 provides for depositions de bene 
 esse, sec. 865 provides for the transmission of depositions when 
 taken de bene esse. Sec. 866 provides for taking depositions 
 under a dedimus potestatem and in perpetuani. Sec. 875 
 provides for taking testimony of a foreig-n witness by letters 
 rogatory. 
 
 March 9, 1892, Congress passed the following act (Comp. 
 Stat. 1913, sec. 1476) : That in addition to the mode of taking- 
 depositions in causes in the district courts of the United States, 
 it shall be lawful to take depositions or testimony of witnesses 
 in the mode prescribed by the laws of the State in which the 
 courts are held. 27 Stat, at L. p. 7, chap. 14 ; Shellabarger v. 
 Oliver, 64 Fed. 306; Despeaux v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 81 Fed. 
 897; International Tooth-Crown Co. v. Hank's Dental Asso. 
 101 Fed. 306; Ex parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 723, 28 L. ed. 1121, 5 
 
492 EVIDENCE IN EQUITY SUITS. 
 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 724; Batts's Eev. Stat. (Tex.) 2273 to 2298. 
 This act was only cumulative. United States v. Fifty Boxes, 
 92 Fed. 601 ; Carrara Paint Agency Co. v. Carrara Paint Co. 
 137 Fed. 319; Sniitli v. International Mercantile Co. 154 Fed. 
 786; National Cash-Register Co. v. Leland, 77 Fed. 242; Mc- 
 Lennan V. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R Co. 22 Fed. 198., 
 All of which methods will be hereinafter discussed. 
 
 Who May Be Examined as Witnesses. . 
 
 By act of Congress June, 1906, the law of the State in which 
 the court is held shall be the rule as to the competency of wit- 
 nesses. Sec. 858 U. S. Rev. Stat. (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1464) was amended. 
 
 By i-ule 48 in cases involving the validity and scope of a 
 patent or trademark, the court may upon petition order the 
 testimony in chief of expert witnesses when directed to mat- 
 ters of opinion, to be set forth in affidavits, and to be filed by 
 the plaintiff within forty days after issue ; and by the defendant 
 within twenty days after the expiration of plaintiff's time, and 
 fifteen days after the expiration of the time for original affi- 
 davits. See Fortney v. Carter, 121 C. C. A. 514, 203 Fed. 454. 
 
 Who to Issue the Commission. 
 
 We have seen by rule 54 that depositions taken under the 
 statutes of the United States must be taken in the manner pro- 
 vided by such statutes, and those taken under State laws as pro- 
 vided by such laws, in all of which the clerk of the court issues 
 the commission, and it is issued as of course when the statute 
 is complied with. Rule 47, however, prescribes a specific time 
 within which the parties must take and return the depositions, 
 as we have before seen, whether taken by order of the coiirt or 
 under a statute. Again, we ha^^e seen by rule 47 that the require- 
 ment of rule 46 that testimony in an equity case shall be taken 
 orally in open court is to be considered hereafter the general 
 rule; but that on the application of either party, taking testi- 
 mony under a statute, or for good and exceptional cause for 
 departing from the general rule, to be shown by affidavit, the 
 party applying may be permitted to take the evidence before an 
 
EVIDENCE IN EQUITY SUITS. 493 
 
 examiuer or other named officer uiDon the notice and terms speci- 
 lied in the order. In sneh cases the order of the court would 
 bv the authority of the officer to talce and return the depositions 
 within the time required by the court. 
 
 Before 1T7) om Taken. 
 
 'We have seen by rule 47 the evidence before an examiner or 
 other named officer may be ordered by the court, which will be 
 discussed hereafter. 
 
 If taken according to State practice, the depositions may be 
 taken before any clerk of a district court, aiij' judge or clerk 
 of a county court, or any notary public in his proper county, 
 if taken in the State. If taken out of the State, and within 
 the United States, tliey may be taken before any clerk of a 
 court of record having a seal, any notary public (U. S. Rev. 
 Stat. sec. 863, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1472), or any commis- 
 sioner of deeds duly appointed under the State law for some 
 other State or Territory. If taken out of the United States, the 
 depositions may be taken before any notarj' public or any min- 
 ister, commissioner, or charge d'affaires of the United States 
 resident in and accredited to the country where taken, or any 
 consul general, consul, viceconsnl, commercial agent, vicecom- 
 mercial agent, deputy consul, or consular agent of the United 
 States resident in such country. 
 
 In the Federal court, by equity rules 47 and 52, the deposi- 
 tions are taken before the commissioner named by the court, or 
 before an examiner of the court, or a special examiner pro liar 
 vice, or on commission before an officer authorized to take depo- 
 sitions. 
 
 By U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 863, when depositions are taken 
 de bene esse, they may be taken before any judge of a court 
 of the United States, or any commissioner of a United States 
 circuit court, or any clerk of a district or circuit court, or any 
 chancellor, justice or judge of a supreme court or superior 
 court, mayor or chief magistrate of a city, judge of a county 
 court or court of common pleas of any of the United States, 
 or any notary public not being of counsel or attoimey of either 
 of the parties, or interested in the result of the cause. Bird v. 
 Halsy, 87 Fed. 677. 
 
494 EVIDENCE IN EQUITY SUITS. 
 
 In the supplement to U. S. Rev. Stat, of 1874, vol. 1, p. 251, 
 it is provided that notaries public of the several States and 
 Territories and the District of Columbia are authorized to 
 take depositions and do all other acts in relation to taking testi- 
 mony to be used in the courts of the United States, as well 
 as affidavits and acknovyledgments, in the same manner and 
 with the same effect, as a commissioner of a United States cir- 
 cuit court may now lawfully take or do. Act August 15, 1876. 
 As to powers of the circuit court commissioners, see United 
 States V. Horn Hing, 48 Fed. 638, note. 
 
 So depositions may be taken by a notary, under a commis- 
 sion addressed to any officer authorized to take depositions, 
 whether taken de bene esse, or in the ordinary form. By act 
 of May 15, 1893, witnesses may be examined before the court, 
 who must preserve the evidence to be incorporated in the 
 record. 
 
 In foreign countries depositions may be taken, under the Fed- 
 eral statutes, before a secretary of legation or consular officer. 
 U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 1750 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 3211); 
 see Depositions to Foreign Countries; Stein v. Bowman, 13 
 Pet. 218, 10 L. ed. 133; U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 2157 (Comp. 
 Stat. 1913, sec. 4160), as to taking depositions in the Indian 
 country; also see 1 U. S. Rev. Stat. Supp. p. 251. 
 
 How Witnesses Are Brought Before a Commissioner, Exam- 
 iner, or Master, and Made to Testify. 
 
 United States Revised Statutes, sec. 868 (Comp. Stat. 1913, 
 sec. 1479), provides that vyhen a commission issues from any 
 United States court to take the testimony of a witness named 
 therein at any place within any district or Territory, the clerk 
 of any court of the United States in such district or Territory 
 shall, on the application of either party, issue a subpoena for 
 such witness, requiring him to appear and testify before the 
 commissioner named in the commission ; and if such witness 
 refuses or neglects to appear, or appearing, refuses to testify, 
 then the judge of the court whose clerk issues the subpoena may 
 punish the disobedience by contempt proceedings. 
 
 By new rule 52, vsrhich is substantially the same as old rule 
 78, it is provided that witnesses who live within the district 
 
EVU/iiA'CE ra EQUITY SUITS. 495 
 
 may, upou dne notice to the opposite party, be summoned to 
 appear before a commissioner appointed to take testimony, or 
 before a master or examiner appointed in any cause, by sub- 
 poena, in the usual form, which may be issued in blank and 
 filled up by the party praying for the same, or by the commis- 
 sioner, master, or examiner. If any witness shall refuse to 
 appear or give evidence, it shall be deemed a contempt, which 
 when certified to the clerk's office issiTing the subpoena, an 
 attachment may issue thereon by order of the court or any 
 judge thereof. 
 
 By U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 863 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1472), 
 it is provided that any person may be compelled to appear and 
 testify when the testimony is taken de bene esse, in the same 
 manner as witnesses may be compelled to appear and testify 
 in court. Tomlinson v. !Moore, 189 Fed. 845. 
 
 By new rule 52 it is provided that if any witness refuses 
 to appear or give evidence, it shall be deemed a contempt of 
 court, which, being certified to the clerk's office by the com- 
 missioner, master, or examiner an attachment may issue there- 
 cm by order of the court. U. S. Eev. Stat. sees. 863-868, given 
 above. Zych v. American Car & Foundry Co. 127 Fed. 723 ; 
 Xew England Phonograph Co. v. National Phonograph Co. 148 
 Fed. 324, 325; Blease v. Garlington, 92 U. S. 1, 23 L. ed. 
 521. See Crocker- Wheeler Co. v. Bullock, 134 Fed. 241 ; Butte 
 &B. Consol. Min. Co. v. Montana Ore Purchasing Co. 139 Fed. 
 843. 
 
 United States Eevised Statutes, sec. 869 (Comp. Stat. 1913, 
 sec. 1480), requires attendance of witnesses under a subpoena 
 duces tecum, and compels obedience by the process of contempt. 
 Except that it is provided by U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 870, that no 
 witness shall be required under the provisions of IT. S. Eev. 
 Stat. sees. 868 and 869, to attend at any place out of the county 
 of his residence, nor more than forty miles from the place of 
 Ms residence; nor is a witness giiilty of contempt under either 
 of these sections, unless his fee for going to, returning from, and 
 one day's attendance at the place of examination is paid or 
 tendered him at the time of the service of the citation. Tomlin- 
 son V. Moore, supra. 
 
 Section 871 provides for taking the testimony of a witness 
 found within the District of Columbia, to be used in a suit de- 
 
496 EVIDENCE IN EQUITY SUITS. 
 
 pending in any State, Territory, or foreign court, and by see. 
 873 a refusal to appear is punished as a refusal to testify be- 
 fore a court on a trial of the suit. 
 
 Subpoenas for Wihiesses in Equity Suits. 
 
 We ha^'e seen by new rule 46 that in all trials in equity the 
 testimony of witnesses must be taken orally unless otherwise 
 provided. By U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 876 (Comp. Stat. 1913, 
 sec. 1487), subpoenas may run into any other district than that 
 in which the court is held, provided the witness does not live at 
 a greater distance than 100 miles from the place of trial. Meyer 
 V. Consolidated Ice Co. 163 Fed. 400; Smith v. Chicago & X. 
 W. R. Co. 38 Fed. 322. See Rev. Stat. sec. 877, Comp. Stat. 
 1913, sec. 1488. 
 
 If living more than 100 miles his deposition must be taken. 
 See Depositions "De Bene Esse." 
 
 By act of Congress October 15, 1914, chap. 323, sec. 13, 
 governing "monopolies and combinations in trade," it is pro- 
 vided that in any suit brought by the United States on any 
 case arising under the anti-trust laws subpoenas for witnesses 
 may run into any other district, provided no subpoena can 
 issue for witnesses living out of the district in which the court 
 is held, at a greater distance than 100 miles from the place of 
 holding the court, without the permission of the trial court being 
 first had on proper application and cause shown. 
 
CHAPTEE LXXIX. 
 
 EVIDEXCE IN EQUITY SUITS (CONTINUED.) 
 
 Having thus seen the conditions under which coiumissions 
 to take testimony in equity causes are issued, who may be wit- 
 nesses, and the means of enforcing their attendance and testi- 
 fying, I will, before discussing the different methods of taking 
 the testimony by commission on interrogatories attached, by 
 oral examination, and by examination in open court at the final 
 hearing, state the statute and rules controlling 
 
 (a) The time to begin taking testimony, and — 
 
 (b) The time in which it miist be taken. 
 
 The Time to Begin. 
 
 We have seen that new rule Xo. 46 contemplates that the evi- 
 dence in equity causes must be given orally in open court at the 
 final trial of the cause, and is not to be taken before the final 
 hearing, by deposition, as is now the rule in lawsuits. V\e have 
 seen that the taking of depositions can only be permitted in ex- 
 ceptional cases and when authorized by act of Congress. 
 
 When depositions are to be taken, either in exceptional cases 
 provided by rule 47, or under acts of Congress under rule 54, 
 those of the plaintiff must be filed within sixty days from the 
 time the cause is at issue; those of the defendant within thirty 
 days from the expiration of the time of filing the plaintitt''s 
 deposition, and . rebutting depositions by either party within 
 twenty days after the time for taking original depositions ex- 
 pire, unless otherwise ordered by the court or judge for good 
 cause shown. Eule 47. 
 
 Rule 54 simply provides that depositions de bene esse and 
 
 under a deditnus protestatem and in perpetuam may be taken 
 
 after the cause is at issue. U. S. Rev. Stat. sees. 863-860 
 
 (Comp. Stat. sees. 1472-1474, 1477). But a further provision 
 
 S. Eq.-32. 497 
 
498 EVIDENCE IX EQQITY SUITS. 
 
 is added to this nile, that whenever depositions are taken under 
 these statutes, if no notice is given to the adverse party of the 
 time and place of taking the deposition, he shall on motion and 
 affidavit of the fact be entitled to a cross-examination of the 
 witness, either under a commission or by a new deposition, if 
 a court or a judge thereof shall under the circumstances permit 
 it. There is no doubt of the general rule that depositions in 
 equity cannot be taken until after the cause is at issue. Flower 
 V. MacGinniss, 50 C. C. A. 291, 112 Fed. 377; Stevens v. 
 Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 104 Fed. 936. There are, however, 
 conditions when the enforcement of the rule will lead to injus- 
 tice and therefore create exceptions, which have been recog- 
 nized by the Supreme Court in promulgating equity rule 58. 
 
 Depositions May Be Taken Before Issue Joined. 
 
 By equity rule 58 the plaintiff at any time after filing the 
 bill, and not later than twenty-one days after joining issue, and 
 the defendant after filing his answer, and not later than twenty- 
 oUe days after the joinder of issue, • and either party at any 
 time thereafter by leave of the court or judge, may file interroga- 
 tories in writing for the purpose of discovery, by the opposite 
 party or parties, of facts and document material to the sup- 
 port or defense of a cause, noting which of the interrogatories 
 each of the parties interrogated must answer ; provided no party, 
 unless by order of the court, shall file more than one set of in- 
 terrogatories. The rule further provides that in case of corpo- 
 ration parties the interrogatories may be required to be an- 
 swered by any ofiicer of the corporation. (See "Discovery" 
 for discussion of the rule. ) To support the taking of depositions 
 before issue joined in equity, I am aware that section 863 has 
 been held to refer to taking depositions only after issue joined, 
 as stated in Flower v. MacGinniss and Stevens v. Missouri, K. 
 & T. E. Co. supra. See Frost v. Barber, 173 Fed. 847, and 
 cases cited. It will be seen that section 863 does not indicate 
 by its provisions the time in which depositions de bene esse, i. e., 
 provisionally, can be taken, but inferentially it is indicated in 
 the conditions under which they are permitted. Thus a wit- 
 ness bound on a journey beyond the reach of the court's process, 
 or when ancient and infirm, clearly indicates that he ma}' be i 
 
EVIDENCE IN EQUITY SUITS. 499 
 
 examined under this section before issue joined, see Richter v. 
 Jerome, 25 Fed. 679 ; Lowrey v. Kusworm, 66 Fed. 539 ; so it 
 is indicated when provision is made for notice of taking v^hen 
 the defendant is absent, and has no attorney of record. Again, 
 it is provided that depositions may be taken in any civil cause 
 depending in a circuit court ; which means after the bill is filed. 
 
 Section 863 was intended to provide a method of examin- 
 ing witnesses before the trial of a common-law case, and at 
 any time between filing the suit and its trial, if the conditions 
 stated rendered it urgent. Clearly, when the conditions exist, 
 it would present a good and exceptional cause, under rule i1, 
 to order the depositions taken. 
 
 Again, in section 866 of the United States Eevised Statutes, 
 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1477), it is provided that any circuit 
 court of the United States as a court of equity may direct depo- 
 sitions to be taken in rei meinoria/m, or any of the courts of the 
 United States may grant a dedimus protestatem to take depo- 
 sitions, if necessary to prevent a failure or delay of justice. 
 Depositions may be taken under this section whenever it may 
 appear to the court that it is necessary to prevent a delay of 
 justice, whether the application to the court be before or after 
 issue joined. An abuse of the statute by instituting inquisi- 
 torial proceedings under it is guarded against by requiring an 
 order of the court. Flower v. MacGinniss, 50 C. C. A. 291, 
 112 Fed. 378 ; Westinghouse Mach. Co. v. Electric Storage 
 Battery Co. 165 Fed. 994. 
 
 Again, by section 867, it is provided that any court of the 
 United States may admit in evidence in any cause, depositions, 
 taken in rei memoriam, which would be so admissible in the 
 court of a State in which the court is sitting. 
 
 Be Bene Esse. 
 
 Be bene esse means "provisionally," and when depositions 
 are thus permitted, it is with the intent that they may be used, 
 provided the witness cannot be put upon the stand on the trial 
 of the cause. Whitford v. Clark County, 119 U. S. 524, 30 
 L. ed. 500, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 306 ; Texas & P. R Co. v. Wat- 
 son, 50 C. C. A. 230, 112 Fed. 402; Texas & P. R. Co. v. 
 Wilder, 35 C. C. A. 105. 92 Fed. 958; Texas & P. E. Co. v. 
 
DOO EVIDENCE IN EQUITY SUITS. 
 
 Reagaii, 55 C. C. A. 427, 118 Fed. 815. See Frost v. Barber, 
 17;! Fed. 848 ; Zych v. American Car & Foundry Co. 127 Fed., 
 723 ; Hartman v. Feenaiighty, 139 Fed. 887 ; U. S. Eev. Stat, 
 sec. 863. The rule applies now to trials in equity suits, which 
 by rule 46 are now tried as actions at law, requiring the wit- 
 nesses to be examined orally in open court. 
 
 The grounds upon which depositions de bene esse may be 
 ordered either before or after issue joined, are plain. U. S. 
 Eev. Stat. sec. 863 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1472). Your appli- 
 cation to the court for an order must be supported by affidavit 
 clearly stating one or more of the grounds provided by the 
 statute. Equity rule 47. Stegner v. Blake, 36 Fed. 183. See 
 Eichter v. Jerome, 25 Fed. 679. When this is done, the court 
 may permit the deposition of the named witness to be taken 
 before an examiner or other named officer upon such notice and 
 terms as may be specified in the order. Rule 47. Iowa AYashing 
 Mach. Co. V. Montgomery Ward & Co. :^27 Fed. 1004. Leave 
 to take not necessary in "de bene esse,'' id. 
 
 Notice of Taking De Bene Esse. 
 
 When the examiner or officer before whom the witness is to be 
 examined, and the time of notice have been stated in the order, 
 the length of the notice depending, of course, on the circum- 
 stances, such as the number of witnesses and the distaijce and 
 facility of communication (Uhle v. Burnham, 44 Fed. 729 ; 
 see also Kline Bros. & Co. v. Liverpool & L. it G. Ins. Co. 184 
 Fed. 969; American Exch. Xat. Bank v. First Xat. Bank, 27 
 C. C. A. 274, 48 U. S. App. 633, 82 Fed. 961), then you must 
 give notice to counsel of the name of the witness or witnesses, 
 the time and place of taking their testimony, and the terms of 
 the order required by the court. See new rule Xo. 53. By 
 sec. S63, U. S. Eev. Stat. (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1472), 
 it is provided that whenever by reason of the absence from 
 the district and want of an attorney of record or other reason 
 the giving of the notice in de bene esse depositions shall be im- 
 practicable, it shall be lawful to take such depositions as there 
 shall be urgent necessity therefor, upon such notice as any judge 
 authorized to hold courts in such district or circuit shall think 
 reasonable and direct. The application to the court for the 
 order to take depositions is made without notice, but the court 
 
EVIDEKCE IN EQUITY SUITS. 501 
 
 in granting the order to be taken before the examiner or other 
 named officer must certify the notice to be given, etc., in the 
 order. 
 
 Form of Notice. 
 
 Title as in bill. 
 
 To C. D., the defendant, or liis solicitor, (naming him) under an order 
 
 granted by the Hon , Judge, etc., on tlie day of , 
 
 A. D , authorizing the plaintiff, (or, defendant) to take the tes- 
 timony of A. B., a material witness in this cause before Mr , 
 
 (naming him) as examiner named in said order, you will please take 
 notice that plaintiff will proceed to take the testimony of the said A. B., 
 
 who resides in the City of, , County of , State of , 
 
 before the examiner named at the office of the said examiner in 
 
 street, in said city (number of house or office to be given) (or the place 
 
 stated wherever the deposition is to be taken) on the days of 
 
 , A. D , at the hour of 10 A. M. and said examination 
 
 will proceed from day to day until completed. That said depositions when 
 taken will be used by plaintiff at the final bearing of this cause. 
 
 R. S., 
 Solicitor. 
 
 Service of Notice. 
 
 This notice may be served on the adverse party, or his at- 
 torney of record, and in all cases m rem the person having the 
 possession at the time of seizure shall be deemed the adverse 
 party (U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 863, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 14:72), 
 and when there is no attorney of record, and the defendant is 
 beyond the reach of the process of the court, or absent from the 
 district, so that giving notice is impracticable, you must then 
 apply to the judge to indicate what character of notice shall be 
 given if the necessity be urgent. Ibid. There must be evi- 
 dence that service was made, or accepted. 
 
 Taking the Testimony De Bene Esse. 
 
 The testimony may be taken by written interrogatories and 
 cross interrogatories given to the officer before taking, or by 
 oral questions put at the time, as new rules 49 and 52 provide 
 that they may be taken by oral examination, or otherwise. 
 When taken orally, questions and answers must be reduced to 
 writing, whether direct, cross, or on re-examination, or the testi- 
 mony may be reduced to writing in narrative form. Rule 49. 
 
502 E\IDENCE IlSr EQBITy SUITS. 
 
 If taken on written interrogatories and cross interrogatories, the 
 answers must be reduced to writing by the officer or under his 
 direction, in the presence of the witness or by the witness in 
 the magistrate's presence. U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 864 (Comp. 
 Stat. 1913, sec. 1473) ; Re Thomas, 35 Fed. 823. 
 
 By new rule 50 the testimony may be taken by a stenogi-apher 
 who may be appointed by the court or the officer taking the 
 testimony, who is afterwards required to transcribe the same if 
 taken in shorthand. (144 U. S. 689, 36 L. ed. 1143.) Whether 
 the testimony is taken by questions and answers, or is reduced 
 to narrative form, by rule 51 it must be read over to or by 
 him in the presence of the officer, and signed by him in the 
 presence of the officer. Moller v. United States, 6 C. C. A. 459, 
 13 U. S. App. 472, 57 Eed. 491. See "How Examination to 
 Be Conducted." 
 
CHAPTER LXXX. 
 
 CEETIFICATE OF OFFICER WHEN- TAKEN DE BENE ESSE. 
 
 Under the old rules it was held that sec. 865 of the United 
 States Eevised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 14-74), requir- 
 ing that the certificate of the officers to the depositions after 
 taking de he?ie esse should give the reasons for taking them, in 
 which it should appear that the witness could not be present to 
 be examined in open court at the trial (Bird v. Halsey, 87 Fed. 
 677. See Stewart v. Townsend, 41 Fed. 121), did not apply 
 to equity cases (Stegner v. Blake, 36 Fed. 184), but strictly to 
 cases at law, which recpired that the witness, if within 100 
 miles of the place of trial, must be brought by subpoena to 
 testify orally at the trial. Sec. 863 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1472). By new equity rule 47 the testimony of witnesses in 
 equity causes must be taken orally as at trials at law, unless by 
 order of the court, for good and exceptional reasons, the rule 
 should be 'departed from. 
 
 I take it, then, that sec. 865 applies now to equity cases, 
 and on return of the depositions de bene esse, to the trial court, 
 the certificate of the officer should show that the depositions 
 were taken because of the existence of one or more of the dis- 
 abilities existing whereby the witness was unable to appear in 
 open court at the trial as required by sec. 865. However, where 
 depositions are taken de bene esse under new rule 47, the party 
 applying to have them taken must by affidavit show the exist- 
 ence of one or more of the causes existing as prescribed by sec. 
 863 of U. S. Rev. Stat, in order to use them at the trial; and 
 this being the case, it would be sufficient for the officer taking 
 the deposition to certify that it was taken under the order of 
 the court authorizing them. 
 
 The following form of certificate is suggested: 
 
 603 
 
504 CEl^TIFICATE OF OFFICEE WHEN TAKEN DE BENE ESSE. 
 
 Caption — to certificate. 
 
 Style of Case — State and County where taken — then proceed. 
 
 I C. D. (official designation) by virtue of an order of the District 
 
 Court of the United States for the district of , began 
 
 the examination of witnesses "de bene esse" on the day of 
 
 at . , (stating city street number, if any,) in the above 
 
 styled suit now pending in the United States District Court for the 
 district of , sitting at 
 
 A. B'., a witness on behalf of plaintiff (or defendant) was introduced, 
 and being duly sworn to testify the whole truth, deposes and says: 
 
 To question 1. State your name and age. 
 
 Answer. 
 
 After the depositions have been completed and signed, it 
 should be closed with the following certificate: 
 
 State of 
 
 County of 
 
 I, C. D. (official designation), do hereby certify that the above witnesses 
 (naming them) were by me first duly sworn to testify the whole truth; 
 that their depositions were reduced to writing by me (or in my presence 
 
 by , a stenographer, or on a typewriter by ) in the presence 
 
 of said witnesses respectively, and when completed were read over to said 
 witnesses respectively, and subscribed by them in my presence, and such of 
 the parties and counsel as attended. 
 
 That said depositions were taken in pursuance of an Order of the United 
 States District Court as set forth in the Caption, and after due notice, as 
 
 required by the order of said Court at my office at , beginning on 
 
 the day of A. D. 19. . ., and continued from day to day 
 
 until the day of A. D. 19. . ., when the same were completed. 
 
 That the parties were represented by their respective counsel in the 
 examination of said witnesses (if such was the fact; if exhibits were 
 offered during the evidence state) and the several exhibits attached to the 
 depositions were offered in evidence, and marked for identification as 
 appears in the deposition. 
 
 I further certify that I am not of counsel nor interested in any manner 
 in the case, and it being impracticable to deliver the depositions in person I 
 have sealed up, directed and transmitted them by due course of mail to 
 the court in which the cause is pending. 
 
 In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and official seal (if 
 any). 
 
 C. D., 
 Official Signature. 
 
 See Donahue v. Roberts, 19 Fed. 863 ; Gartside Coal Co. v. 
 ^laxwell, 20 Fed. 187 ; Stegner v. Blake, 36 Fed. 184, 144 U. 
 
CERTIFICATE OF OFFICEE WHE.V TAKEX DE BENE ESSE. 505 
 
 S. (390, 36 L. ed. 1143; Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. E. Co. v. 
 Stoner, 2 C. C. A. 437, 10 U. S. App. 209, 51 Fed. 650 ; Ameri- 
 can Exch. Xat. Bank v. First Xat. Bank, 27 V. C. A. 274, 4S 
 U. S. App. 633, 82 Fed. 961 ; Brown v. Ellis, 103 Fed. 837. 
 
 While a seal to certification is not necessary, yet the deposi- 
 tions must be sealed np for transmission. U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 
 S()5,Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1474; Re Thomas, 35 Fed. 337; 
 Brown v. Ellis, 103 Fed. 836, 837. It is not necessary to cer- 
 tify that the depositions were held until mailed. Stewart v. 
 Townsend, 41 Fed. 121; see Mailing Dep. If the depositions 
 are taken on direct and cross interrogatories handed to the 
 officer before taking, it must be so certified, and the interroga- 
 tories returned with the order of the court authorizing them. 
 If the testimony is reduced to writing by a stenographer it 
 must be certified "that said questions and answers were taken 
 down stenographically, and afterwards typewritten, or reduced 
 to writing in my presence by j\Ir , a skillful stenog- 
 rapher appointed by the court, or approved and agreed to by 
 both parties, and duly sworn by me." 
 
 Informality in Certificate. 
 
 It has been frequently decided that statutory requirements 
 in taking depositions de bene esse must be strictly pursued 
 (Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. Stoner, 2 C. C. A. 437, 
 10 U. S. App. 209, 51 Fed. 656. Cook v. Burnley, 11 Wall. 
 668, 20 L. ed. 30; Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 356, 7 L. ed. 176; 
 Gartside Coal Co. v. Maxwell, 20 Fed. 187 ; ]M oiler v. United 
 States, 6 C. C. A. 459, 13 F. S. App. 472, 57 Fed. 495) ; and 
 there must be evidence of compliance with the rule and statu- 
 tory requirements. Ibid. While this is true, yet if it appears 
 that the thing to be done has been done, the deposition will be 
 admitted, though the certificate be informal. (Ibid. ; United 
 States V. 50 Boxes & Packages of Lace, 92 Fed. 601; Moller 
 V. United State, 6 C. C. A. 459, 13 IT. S. App. 472, 57 Fed. 
 495; Stegner v. Blake, 36 Fed. 1S4; Brown v. Ellis, 103 Fed. 
 837; Stewart v. Townsend, 41 Fed. 121), because, if informal, 
 it may be amended to meet the facts (Donahue v. Roberts, 19 
 Fed. 863; Gartside Coal Co. v. Maxwell, 20 Fed. 187; Steg- 
 ner v. Blake, 36 Fed. 184). If only irregular, it will be waived 
 
506 ciiirriFiuATE of officee when taken de bene esse. 
 
 if not disposed of before going to trial, as will hereafter be 
 seen. Ee Thomas, 35 Fed. 823; Doane v. Glenn, 21 Wall. 
 35, 22 L. ed. 476 ; Howard v. Stillwell & B. Mfg. Co. 139 U. 
 S. 205, 35 L. ed. 149, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 500 ; Kansas City, Ft. 
 S. & M. E. Co. V. Stoner, 2 C. C. A. 437, 10 U. S. App. 209, 
 51 Fed. 656 ; Brown v. Ellis, 103 Fed. 837 ; See McClaskey v. 
 Barr, 48 Fed. 138. (See "Suppressing Depositions.") 
 
 Thus the depositions will not be suppressed when the officer 
 does not certify that he is not an attorney for either party, or 
 omits to insert that he has no interest, when it appears that 
 the depositions were taken in shorthand by a disinterested per- 
 son. Stewart v. Townsend, 41 Fed. 121. i^or when notice is 
 actually given, failure to attach the notice to the return of the 
 deposition is not a ground to suppress. Stewart v. Townsend, 
 41 Fed. 121. ISTor need the certificate show that he retained 
 the depositions until mailed. Ibid. ISTor is a seal required 
 when taken under U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 863 (Comp. Stat. 1913, 
 sec. 1472) ; Brown v. Ellis, 103 Fed. 836, 837. So a certifi- 
 cate as to the manner of taking down the answers of witnesses, 
 though informal, will not be objectionable on that account. 
 Ibid. Nor when taken in a diiferent place from that contained 
 in notice, if counsel for both parties are present. Gartside 
 Coal Co. V. Maxwell, 20 Fed. 187. 
 
 Effect of the Act of March 9, 1892, on Taking Depositwis in, 
 Mode Prescribed by State Laws. 
 
 When State Permits Depositions in Advance of the Issues. 
 
 By the act of March 9, 1892, it was provided by Congress 
 that the practice in the State courts in issuing depositions may 
 be pursued in the Federal courts. In many of the States dep- 
 ositions may be taken at any stage of the case, but the pro- 
 visions of these statutes authorizing depositions in advance of 
 the issues do not apply to the Federal courts. The act of 1892 
 has been frequently construed, and with few exceptions it has 
 been held that State statutes are only to be followed in the man- 
 ner of taking, and do not apply to the grounds for taking depo- 
 sitions. United States v. 50 Boxes & Packages of Lace, 92 
 Fed. 601; Hanks Dental Asso. v. International Tooth Crown 
 
OEETLFIOATE OF OFFICER WHEN TAKEN DE BENE ESSE. 507 
 
 Co. 194 U. S. 309, 48 L. ed. 991, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 700, re- 
 viewing cases ; Zych v. American Car & Foundry Co. 127 Fed. 
 728; Texas & p" E. Co. v. Wilder, 35 C. C. A. 105, 92 Fed. 
 953 ; K'atioual Cash-Register Co. v. Leland, 37 C. C. A. 372 ; 
 94 Fed. 502; Pullman Co. v. Jordan, 134 C. C. A. 301, 218 
 Fed. 574. Congress, it is held, did not enlarge the conditions 
 under which they may be taken for use in the Federal courts. 
 Ibid.; Ex parte' Fiske, 113 U. S. 713-725, 28 L. ed. 1117- 
 1121, 5 Slip. Ct. Rep. 724 ; Shellabarger v. Oliver, G4 Fed. 307, 
 308; Despeaux v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 81 Fed. 897; Magone 
 V. Colorado Smelting & Min. Co. 135 Fed. 846. In Ex parte 
 Fiske, the Supreme Court held that section 914 of the United 
 States Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1537), con- 
 forming the practice of the Federal courts on the common-law 
 side to the practice of the State courts, did not include' an 
 authority to take the depositions of a defendant under oath be- 
 fore trial; that to do so was in conflict with U. S. Rev. Stat. 
 sec. 801 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1468). Ibid.; United States 
 V. 50 Boxes & Packages of Lace, 92 Fed. 601 ; jSTational Cash 
 Register Co. v. Leland, 94 Fed. 502 ; Hanks Dental Asso. v. 
 International Tooth Crown Co. 194 U. S. 306, 48 L. ed. 990, 
 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 700. This was a construction of a New York 
 law permitting an examination of a party as a witness in ad- 
 vance of the trial. This case was followed in construing the 
 act of 1892, with the result as above stated, and it may be stated 
 that the Texas statute (from 2273 to 2293), in so far as it per- 
 mits depositions in advance of the issues to be taken does not 
 apply in trials in Federal courts, and this whether the suit be in 
 law or equity. Shellabarger v. Oliver, 64 Fed. 307, 308 ; Xa- 
 tional Cash Register Co. v. Leland, 77 Fed. 242. 
 
 In the light of these decisions, then, depositions in advance 
 of the issues joined cannot be taken in the Federal courts un- 
 less coming within the provisions of equity rule 47 and the 
 statutes of the United States, sections 863, 866 and 867, as 
 these acts were not in any way added to or modified by the act 
 of 1892. Congress would have so stated in apt words if so 
 intended, is the language of the decisions. Blood v. Morrin, 
 140 Fed. 919. 
 
 The Federal courts have never permitted a party to use 
 depositions for the> purpose of fishing for information, or to 
 
508 CEETIFICATE OF OFFICER WHEN TAKEN DE BENE ESSE. 
 
 force a party to disclose his case by pumping him, or his wit- 
 nesses out of time. Ibid. Flowei' v. ]\IacGinniss, 50 C. C. A. 
 291, 112 Fed. 377; Despeaux v. Pennsylvania R Co. 81 Fed. 
 897; ISTational Cash-Register Co. v. Leland, 77 Fed. 242; 
 Hanks Dental Asso. v. International Tooth Crown Co. 194 
 U. S. 306, 48 L. ed. 990, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 700. A contrary 
 view has been strenuously insisted upon by Judge Lacombe of 
 the second circuit in construing the act of 1892 (International 
 Tooth Crown Co. v. Hanks' Dental Asso. 101 Fed. 306; In- 
 ternational Tooth Crown Co. v. Carter, 112 Fed. 396), and 
 by Judge Hanford in Smith v. Xorthern P. E. Co. 110 Fed. 
 342, but the rule as stated has been decided in the fifth cir- 
 cuit. Texas & P. E. Co. v. Wilder, 35 C. C. A. 105, 92 Fed. 
 958 ; United Lace & Braid Mfg. Co. v. Barthels Mfg. Co. 213 
 Fed. 536. See Curtis v. Phelps, 209 Fed. 263. By new rule 
 ISTo. 58, however, parties to siiit before or after issue joined 
 may file interrogatories for discovery of material facts and 
 documents in possession of the opposite party material to the 
 support, or the defense of the cause. Said rule provides as 
 follows: The plaintiff, at any time after filing the bill, and 
 not later than twenty-one days after issue joined, and the de- 
 fendant at any time after filing his answer, and not later than 
 twenty-one days after joining issue, and either party at any 
 time after that by leave of the court, may file interrogatories 
 in writing for discovery by the opposite party or parties of 
 facts and documents material to the support or defense of the 
 cause. By this rule we see that from the time of filing the bill, 
 vmtil twenty-one days after issue joined, the plaintiff may, and 
 after filing the answer and twenty-one days thereafter the de- 
 fendant may, file interrogatories for discovery to aid them in 
 the prosecution or defense of the cause. After this, either 
 party upon application to the court or judge may file inter- 
 rogatories for discovery of facts and documents for the purpose 
 as stated above. Only one set of interrogatories of this char- 
 acter can be addressed to the same party without leave of the 
 court or judge. Where the party from whom a discovery is 
 sought is a private or public corporation, application must be 
 made to a court or judge for an order to allow him to file them 
 to be delivered by any ofiicer of the corporation. Upon this 
 application the court will make the order for the examination 
 
CEKTIFIOATE OF OFFICER WHEN TAKEN DE BENE ESSE. 50& 
 
 of such officer as may appear to be proper, and upon such in- 
 terrogatories as the court or judge shall think fit. 
 
 Procedure in Issuing. 
 
 Where the plaintiff or defendant issue interrogatories for 
 discovery within the twenty-one days after issue joined, as 
 provided by the rule, they must be filed in the clerk's office, 
 with copies for the use of the interrogated parties or party, 
 which the clerk of the court must send to the respective solici- 
 tors of record, or, if none, to the last known address of the 
 opposite party. The same procedure applies whether the inter- 
 rogatories are issued after the twenty-one days have elapsed 
 from issue joined, or issued to a corporation, except that an 
 order of court in these cases to file the interrogatories must be 
 obtained and filed with the copies to be served in the clerk's 
 office. See Discovery. 
 
CHAPTEK LXXXI. 
 
 DEPOSITIONS IjV EEI PEEPETUAM. 
 
 We have seen that the U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 866 (Comp. 
 Stat. 1913, sec. 1477), provides . that any of the courts may 
 according to the usages of chancery direct depositions to be 
 taken in perpetua-m, to be used in law or equity, if they relate 
 to matters that may be cognizable in a Federal court (Westing- 
 house Mach. Co. V. Electric Storage Battery Co. 25 L.R.A. 
 (KS.) 673, 95 C. C. A. 600, 170 Fed. 431); and by U. S. 
 Eev. Stat. sec. S67, any United States court may in its discre- 
 tion admit in evidence depositions taken in perpetuam, which 
 would be so admissible in a court of the State where such cause 
 is pending, according to the laws thereof. Ohio Copper Min. 
 Co. V. Hutchings, 96 C. C. A. 653, 172 Fed. 202-204. While 
 you cannot use depositions provided for under U. S. Rev. Stat, 
 sec. 866, solely to find out what a defendant or witness will 
 swear to, in advance of the issue (Turner v. Shackman, 27 Fed. 
 183), yet if your bill is filed and service had (Green v. Com- 
 pag-nia General Italiana Di Navigation, 82 Fed. 495), then the 
 imperative nature of your case may be such that the court will 
 permit testimony to be taken in advance of the issue joined, 
 and even ex parte (Xew A''ork & B. Coffee Polishing Co. v. 
 Xew York Coffee Polishing Co. 20 Blatchf. 174, 9 Fed. 578) ; 
 as when, after defendant is served with process, he absconds 
 before answering. Westinghouse Mach. Co. v. Electric Storage 
 Battery Co. 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 673, 95 C. C. A. 600, 170 Fed. 
 430. In this last case it is said that an original bill in perpet- 
 uam rei inemoriam according to usages of chancery and a 
 dedimus to take depositions according to "common usage," are 
 distinct methods contemplating different procedure. Richter 
 V. Jerome, 25 Fed. 682. 
 
 .^s to when an order will issue to take evidence in perpetuam 
 in a Federal court depends on a proper construction of the 
 words "according to usages in chancery." The provision is 
 
 510 
 
DEPOSITIOlSrS IN EBI PEUl'ETUAM. 511 
 
 substantially the same as was enacted in clause 30 of the judi- 
 ciary act of 1789, and it has been held that the usages referred 
 to were such as were known to the English chancery practice 
 in 1789. Greene v. Compagiiia Generale Italiana Di JSTaviga- 
 tion, 82 Fed. 494; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr. 1572-1574; Richter'v. 
 Jerome, 25 Fed. 682 ; see old equity rule 90, not in new rules. 
 
 Under the usages of chancery the original bill must be filed 
 and service had on the defendant before an order will issue, 
 and ordinarily, it is said, the defendant must answer before the 
 testimony is taken, but if he has been served and refuses to 
 answer or absconds, or conceals himself, then you may proceed 
 ex parte to perpetuate the testimony. In the English cases, 
 this is said to be the utmost extent to which courts will go in 
 allowing the depositions of this character taken before issue 
 joined. 
 
 In Richter v. Union Trust Co. (Richter v. Jerome) 115 U. 
 S. 55, 29 L. ed. 345, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1162, it was held that 
 depositions in rei perpettuun could be taken in a case appealed 
 to the Supreme Court from sustaining a demurrer to the bill, 
 and pending which it became necessary to take the depositions 
 of aged witnesses which were material and necessary, in the 
 event the trial on its merits was permitted. 
 
 It will be noticed that the langiiage of the statute contem- 
 plates taking this character of deposition, if it relates to mat- 
 ters that may he cognizable in courts of the United States, but 
 it is further seen that it must be according to "the usages of 
 chancery," so it is held under the United States laws the depo- 
 sition cannot be taken in contemplation of a suit that may be 
 brought, and in anticipation of such suit, to perpetuate the 
 testimony. Green v. Compagnia Generale Italiana Di N'avi- 
 gation, 82 Fed. 494. A contrary view is taken in Westing- 
 house Mach. Co. V. Electric Storage Battery Co. 25 L.R.A. 
 (KS.) 673, 95 C. C. A. 600, 170 Fed. 432, wherein it is 
 held the right exists when the complainant has an interest. which 
 cannot be made the subject of judicial inquiry at the time, and 
 where the interest may be lost by the death of a witness. This 
 view is supported by abundance of authority. S. C. 165 Fed. 
 994, See New York & B. Coffee Polishing Co. v. ISTew York 
 Coffee Polishing Co. 11 Fed. 813, S. C. 9 Fed. 578. We may 
 next inquire how far it can be done for use in a Federal court, 
 
512 DEPOSITIONS IN EEI PEEPKTUAM. 
 
 when talcen under a State law, if such provision is made. We 
 have seen that by U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 867 (Comp. Stat. 1913, 
 sec. 1478), that a court of the United States may in its discre- 
 tion admit in evidence in any cause before it, any deposition 
 taken in perpetucum rei memoriarn, which would be so admis- 
 sible in a court of the State wherein such cause is pending, 
 according to the laws thereof. Richter v. Jerome, 25 Fed. 682 ; 
 See Hanks Dental Asso. v. International Tooth Crown Co. 194 
 U. S. 306, 48 L. ed. 990, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 700. 
 
 In Texas by article 2277' of Batts's Eev. Stat., depositions 
 may be taken by one anticipating a suit who may desire to 
 perpetuate the testimony, and such testimony may be used in 
 any suit by and between any parties to the statement, etc. The 
 question arises then. Can a person who expects to be a party 
 to a suit in a Federal court take the depositions under this 
 statute ? In Xew York & B. Coffee Polishing Co. v. ^STew York 
 Coffee Polishing Co. 20 Blatchf. 174, 9 Fed. 578, it is said 
 the provision is intended to admit in evidence testimony of 
 this character taken and perpetuated according to the laws of 
 the State in which the Federal court is sitting, and does not 
 refer to testimony perpetuated by direction of a circuit court 
 of the United States in pursuance of the statute of the United 
 States. See also act March 9, 1892, 27 Stat, at L. 7, chap. 14 
 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1476) ; United States v. 50 Boxes & 
 Packages of Lace, 92 Fed. 602, 603. See Warren v. Younger, 
 18 Fed. 859 ; National Cash Eegister Co. v. Leland, 77 Fed. 
 242. See Westinghouse Mach. Co. v. Electric Storage Battery 
 Co. 25 L.E.A.(N'.S.) 673, 95 C. C. A. 600, 170 Fed. 432. 
 
 So it may be said that it rests in the discretion of the Fed- 
 eral judge to permit depositions taken in perpetvmn rei me- 
 nwriam, to be used in evidence when taken under the laws of the 
 State in which the court is sitting, and this power rests upon 
 section 867 of the United States Eevised Statutes, and is not 
 affected by the act of 1892 authorizing depositions to be taken 
 in the Federal courts in the modes prescribed by the laws of 
 the State in which the court is sitting. 
 
 Dedimus Potestdtem. 
 
 By U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 866 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1477), 
 it' is provided that in any case where it is necessary to prevent 
 
DEPOSITIOXS JX i;EI rElU'ETUAM. 513 
 
 a failure or delay of justice, any of the courts of the United 
 States may grant a dediiiuts poteaiafeyn to take depositions 
 according to ""conimon usage." It has been held "that in any 
 case where it is necessary,"' etc., means civil or criminal cases, 
 and civil case means any case at law, or in equity. United 
 States V. Cameron, 15 Fed. 7!'4. The words "common usage" 
 have been variously construed, but mean, so far as it may be 
 applied to equity causes, the practice in courts of equity. Bud- 
 dicum V. Kirk, 3 Cranch, :^!).3, 2 L. ed. 4r4-4 ; Turner v. Shack- 
 man, 27 Fed. 183; Westinghouse ]Mach. (*o. v. Electric Storage 
 Battery Co. 1(35 Fed. 992; Bischotfscheim v. Baltzer, 20 
 Blatchf. ■2-2<:\, 10 Fed. 1; Encyclopedia Britannica Co. v. Wer- 
 ner Co. 138 Fed. 462 ; United States v. 50 Boxes <t Packages 
 of Lace, 92 Fed. 602, 603; Warren v. Yoimger, IS Fed. 862; 
 Green v. Compagnia Generale Italiana Di iSTavigation, 82 Fed. 
 194; United States v. Pings, 4 Fed. 716; North American 
 Transp. & Trading Co. v. Flowells, 58 C. C. A. 442, 121 Fed. 
 696. "Common usage" miist be construed to mean the com- 
 mon usage in 1874 when the act was passed. Rev. Stat. sec. 
 ^%%. United States v. 50 Boxes & Packages of Lace, 92 Fed. 
 602, 603. 
 
 The purpose of the act is evidently to provide a method for 
 taking depositions of a witness, to prevent a failure or delay 
 of Justice where the particular conditions existing do not come 
 within the provisions of section 863. 
 
 It is a supplementary proceeding in a case already brought, 
 and not a method to procure testimony in anticipation of a suit. 
 Westinghouse Mach. Co. v. Electric Storage Battery Co. 25 
 L.E.A.(X.S.) 673, 95 C. C. A. 600, 170 Fed. 432; North 
 American Transp. & Trading Co. v. Howells, 58 C. C. A. 442, 
 121 Fed. 694 ; Zych v. American Car & Foundry Co. 127 Fed. 
 724; Turner v. Shackman, 27 Fed. 183. 
 
 What the threatened delay of failure of justice may be 
 which is not provided for by other acts of Congress must be 
 left to the discretion of the court upon the facts of each partic- 
 ular case, when the application is made and the reasons stated. 
 United States v. Cameron, 15 Fed. 794; ^lagone v. Colorado 
 Smelting & Min. Co. 135 Fed. 846 ; Eandall v. Venable, 17 
 Fed. 163; Compania Azucarera Cubana v. Ingraham, 180 Fed. 
 
 517. A showing of necessity must be made. Magone v. Col- 
 S. Eq.— 33. 
 
514 DEPOSITIONS IN EEI PEEPETUAM, 
 
 orado Smelting & Min. Co. 135 Fed. 847, 848. Conditions have 
 been held imperative, and a dedimus issued in case of sailors 
 in transit, and the courts have permitted the depositions to be 
 taken without notice, or on such terms as to notice as seemed 
 proiDer in the particular case. 
 
 Kew rule 54, providing for taking depositions according to 
 the acts of Congress, embraces sees. 866 and 867 of the Kevised 
 Statutes of the United States (Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 1477, 
 1478), but makes a further provision for cases in vyhich the 
 deposition has to be taken vs'ithout notice to the adverse party 
 of the time and place of taking, by permitting the adverse 
 party afterwards to cross-examine the witness, or issue new 
 depositions with the permission of the judge. 
 
 Certificate to a Dedimus. 
 
 The certificate need not show the many details required under 
 sees. 863, 864, and 865, U. S. Eev. Stat. Jones v. Oregon 
 C. R. Co. 3 Sawy. 523, Fed. Cas. m. 7,486 ; Ehoades v. Selin, 
 4 Wash. C. C. 715, Fed. Cas. ISo. 11,740; Giles v. Paxson, 
 36 Fed. 882 ; Keene v. ifeade, 3 Pet. 9, 7 L. ed. 584. The 
 person appointed to execute the dedimus represents the court, 
 and not the parties, and the return is sufiicient, showing that 
 the witness was examined in pursuance of the commission and 
 was duly sworn or affirmed. Ibid. As to form, see Jones v. 
 Oregon C. R. Co. 3 Sawy. 523, Fed. Cas. :Xo. 7,486. 
 
 Procedure. 
 
 To take testimony under section 866 you must file a petition 
 or motion to be served on the adverse party or his counsel, and 
 it must be averred that there is a suit pending in which the 
 testimony of the witness named will be material; that the 
 depositions cannot be taken by the ordinary methods prescribed 
 by the statutes or rules of court, and the aid of the court is 
 necessary to prevent a failure or delay of justice if the evi- 
 dence is not taken. The facts expected to be proven must be 
 shown and the danger that the testimony may be lost by delay 
 ( Westinghouse Mach. Co. v. Electric Storage Battery Co. 165 
 Fed. 992-994; Flower v. MacGinnis, 50 C. C. A. 291, 113 
 
DEPOSITIONS IN E3SI PEEPETUAM. 515 
 
 Fed. 37S; Zyeh v. American Car & Foundry Co. 12T Fed. 
 723; Magoue v. Colorado Smelting & jM^n. Co. 135 Fed. 8-1:6; 
 Eichter v. Jerome, 25 Fed. 680, 681) ; and the application must 
 be made to the court. jSTew rules -47 and 54. 
 
 The defendant may appear and answer, showing cavise why 
 the application should not be granted, and fourteen days is al- 
 lowed to do this. Greene v. Compagnia Generale Italiana Di 
 Navigation, 82 Fed. 495. If, however, the application is made 
 for an ex parte examination, the necessity must be clearly stated, 
 as where the defendant has absconded, or is beyond the reach 
 of service, and has no counsel of record, and the situation of the 
 witness renders his examination without delay imperative. 
 
 Form of Order. 
 
 -, , . _ -. _ ., In District Court of the United States 
 
 Style of Case. In Equity. , ^, ,. i . ^^ , 
 
 •' ' "^ f or the district of 
 
 Tliis cause coming on to be heard on the motion of plaintiff for a dedi- 
 
 mtis potestatem to issue, to take the testimony of , a material 
 
 witness for plaintiff, who is now at , and both parties being rep- 
 resented by counsel, and the court having considered the motion and 
 answer thereto and the affidavits filed therewith, it is the opinion of the 
 court that the motion should be granted. It is therefore ordered that a 
 dedimus potestatem be issued in this cause, directed to A. B., Esq., at 
 
 , empowering him to examine the said witness, due 
 
 notice of the time and place of said examination to be given to counsel of 
 both parties (or if on interrogatories and cross interrogatories, then 
 state). 
 
 It is ordered that a dedimus potestatem be issued in this cause, directed 
 
 to A. B., Esq., at , empowering him to examine , the 
 
 witness named in this cause, upon the interrogatories and cross interroga- 
 tories to be attached to the order issued herein. It is further ordered that 
 the testimony given under such examination shall be reduced to writing, 
 signed by the witness, certified by the said A. B., Esq., and returned by him 
 by mail to the clerk of this court at the city of 
 
 The testimony thus taken shall be subject to such legal objections as may 
 be properly made to the same on the trial of the cause. 
 
 C. B., Judge of the District Court, etc. 
 
 The duties of the examiner or commissioner appointed to take 
 depositions may be reg-ulated by the court, either by general 
 rules or special instructions accompanying the order. United 
 States v. 50 Boxes & Packages of Lace, 92 Fed. 601. See 
 
516 DEPOSITIONS IN EEl I'ERPETUAM. 
 
 Hollander v. Baiz, 40 Fed. 659. The order may not state 
 the place or time when the examination is to be held, but in 
 this event reasonable notice must be given by the examiner 
 or commissioner to counsfel of the time and place the examina- 
 tion is to be held. However, when directed to a foreign coun- 
 try the time within which the examination is to be held, and 
 the city or cities where it is to be held, are usually stated, re- 
 quiring the examiner or commissioner to give a more specific 
 notice of the day and place, within the period of time allotted 
 by the order. 
 
 While it has been held that common usage limited the tak- 
 ing of depositions under a dedimus to interrogatories and cross 
 interrogatories, yet it is the better opinion that "common 
 usage" embraces any method of taking the examination au- 
 thorized by Congress in the past or present, or according to the 
 existing practice in equity (Bischoffsoheim v. Baltzer, 20 
 Blatchf. 229, 10 Fed. 1 ; United States v. 50 Boxes & Packages 
 of Lace, 92 Fed. 603; Giles v. Paxson, 36 Fed. 882; United 
 States V. Cameron, 15 Fed. 794) ; or by any of the methods pro- 
 vided by equity rule, or the statutorj^ provisions of the State 
 (Giles V. Paxson, 36 Fed. 882 ; Compania Azucarera Cubana 
 V. Ingraham, 180 Fed. 517; McLennan v. Kansas City, St. J. 
 & C. B. R. Co. 22 Fed. 198). 
 
CHAP TEE LXXXII. 
 
 DEPOSITIONS AFTEK ISSUE JOINED. 
 
 Time in Which Evidence Must Be Taken. 
 
 Having discussed the taking of depositions before issue 
 joined, under the equity rules and statutes permitting it, I 
 will now discuss the taking of depositions after issue joined, 
 and, iirst, I will speak of the time within which you must com- 
 plete your CAT-dence in an equity cause. 
 
 Xew rule 47 provides that all depositions allowed to be taken 
 under these rules or the Federal statutes shall be taken and filed 
 as follows, unless for good cause the court or judge has extended 
 the time: Those of the plaintiff within sixty days from the 
 time the cause is at issue ; those of the defendant within thirty 
 days from the expiration of the time for filing plaintiff's deposi- 
 tions; and rebutting depositions by either party within twenty 
 days after the time for taking original deposition expires. 
 Under old rule 69, now substituted by new rule 47, three months 
 was allowed for all parties within which depositions were to 
 be taken, unless the court enlarged the time, and no testimony 
 taken after that period was permitted to be read on the hearing. 
 Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Sonora Phonograph Corp. 2-21 
 Fed. 676. Hule 47 controls all depositions, whether taken under 
 a statute or the rule (Ibid. 678; Ingle v. Jones, 9 AVall. 486 
 19 L. ed. 621. The rule has been frequently declared impera- 
 tive. Ibid. ; Wooster v. Clark, 9 Fed. 854 ; Ee Thomas, ;)."i Fed 
 337; McGorray v. O'Cpnnor, 31 C. C. A. 114, 59 IT. S. App 
 452, 87 Fed. 588; Jewell v. State Life Ins. Co. 99 C. C. A 
 372, 176 Fed. 64; Wenham v. Switzer, 48 Fed. 612; iMun- 
 roe V. Atlanta Mach. Works, 170 Fed. 863.; Wooster v. Clark, 
 
 9 Fed. 854;, Brown v. Worster, 113 Fed. 20; Sharon v. Hill, 
 
 10 Sawy. 394, 22 Fed. 29; Western Electric Co. v. Capital 
 Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 86 Fed. 770; Fischer v. Hayes, 19 
 
 517 
 
518 DEPOSITIONS AFTEK ISSUE JOINED. 
 
 Blatehf. 13, 6 Fed. 76), unless tlie court had extended the time 
 (Schmeiser Mfg. Co. v. Blanchard, 192 Fed. 363; Fischer v. 
 V. Hayes, 19 Blatehf. 13, 6 Fed. 76 ; Coon v. Abbott, 37 Fed. 
 98; Grant v. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. 121 U. S. 115, 116, 30 
 L. ed. 908, 909, 7 Sup. Gt. Rep. 841; Goosan Min. Go. v. 
 Farmers' ]\rin. Co. 67 Fed. 32), upon motion, seasonable cause 
 being shown. Emerson Co. v. jSTimocks, 88 Fed. 280. 
 
 ^Ve thus see that the decisions under the old rule held that 
 the time within which depositions were to be taken was impera- 
 tive. Yet great latitude to the discretion of the court or judge 
 was allowed even to permitting the filing nunc pro tunc (Wen- 
 ham V. Switzer, 48 Fed. 612), and taking and filing after trial, 
 as in the case of Rankin v. Miller, 199 Fed. 342, where the 
 court considers the proof of the fact essential to the doing of 
 justice in the case. The discretion of the court permitting 
 depositions to be taken after the time provided by the rules has 
 elapsed has not been impaired or limited by the new rules when 
 the testimony sought is essential to doing complete justice in 
 the case, and where it may be shown that the witness cannot 
 be put on the stand to testify on the trial. 
 
 !N'ew rule 56 clearly indicates that after the case has been 
 put on the trial calendar the court may, for strong reasons set 
 forth by affidavit, permit depositions to be taken at any time 
 ])efore trial. United Lace & Braid Mfg. Co. v. Barthels Mfg. 
 Co. ^17 Fed. 175, 176. 
 
 Rule 56 is as follows: After the time has elapsed for taking 
 and filing depositions under these rules, the case shall be placed 
 on the trial calendar. Thereafter no further testimony by depo- 
 sition shall be taken except for some strong reason shown by 
 affidavit. In every such application the reason why the testi- 
 mony of the witness cannot be had orally on the trial, and why 
 his deposition has not been before taken, shall be set forth, 
 together with the testimony which it is expected the witness 
 shall give. Victor Talking Mach. Go. v. Sonora Phonograph 
 Corp. 221 Fed. 677. It must be kept in mind that under the 
 new rules the witness must appear in open court unless the con- 
 ditions exist permitting his deposition to be taken (see Compania 
 Azucarera Cubana v. Ingraham, 180 Fed. 517) ; and when they 
 have not been talien within the time required by the ^ules, the 
 question whether the witness can be produced to testify in open 
 
DEPOSITIONS AFTER ISSUE JOINED. 519 
 
 court becomes an important consideration in applyiiic; for per- 
 mission to take his deposition. 
 
 By equity rule 48, in patent and trademark cases the court 
 may on petition order the testimony in chief of expert witnesses 
 in matters of opinion to be set forth by affidavits to he Hied as 
 follows: Those of the plaintiff within forty days after the 
 cause is at issue ; those of the defendant within twenty days after 
 plaintiff's time has expired ; and rebutting affidavits within fif- 
 teen days after the time for original nffida\'its has expired. 
 Should the opposite party desire the production of an affiant 
 for cross-examination, the court or judge upon motion shall 
 direct that said cross-examination and any re-examination take 
 place before the court on trial of the cause; and unless such 
 affiant is produced and submits to cross-examination, his affi- 
 davit shall not be used as evidence in the cause. This rule 
 applies simply to opinions of expert witnesses, even though they 
 may not come within sec. 86.'i, U. S. Eev. Stat. (Comp. Stat. 
 1913, sec. 1472). It is intended to promote the convenience of 
 professional witnesses who know nothing of the facts of the ease, 
 as well as to expedite the taking of evidence. So where it is 
 shown to the court that the evidence sought is purely expert 
 opinion, he may order that the opinions be taken by affidavits, 
 instead of requiring the witness to appear at the trial, unless 
 the opposite party demand his presence for cross-examination. 
 The rule is cumulative, and does not exclude the ordinary 
 methods of taking depositions if allowed under the rules or 
 statutes. 
 
 Counsel may Agree upon the Time within Which Depositions 
 Tnay be Taken. 
 
 We have seen by rule 56, that after the time for taking depo- 
 sitions under the rules as above stated has expired, the case must 
 be placed upon the trial calendar, which concludes the taking 
 of further testimony except upon application supported by 
 strong reasons therefor. In the fourth circuit it has been de- 
 cided that counsel may consent to take testimony regardless of 
 the time required by the rules. Fortney v. Carter, 121 C. C. A. 
 514, 203 Fed. 454; United Lace & Braid Mfg. Co. v. Barthsly 
 Mfg. Co. 217 Fed. 175. 
 
520 DEPOSITIONS 4FTEE ISSUE JOINED. 
 
 How Witnesses Examined After Issue Joined. 
 
 There are five ways of examining witnesses under the rules: 
 
 1st. By examination in open court. Equity rule 46. 
 
 2d. By oral examination before an examiner or commis- 
 sioner or officer appointed for that purpose. Equity rule 47. 
 
 3d. By taking them under the laws of the State in which 
 the trial is had. Act of Congress March 9th, 1892 (Comp. Stat. 
 ■1913, sec. 1476.) 
 
 4th. Upon written interrogatories by order of the court, 
 Equity rules 58-63, 65. 
 
 5th. By affidavits as provided by rule 48. 
 
 1st. By Exaviinaiion in Open Court. 
 
 Rule 46 provides that all trials in equity shall be taken orally 
 in open court, except as otherwise provided by statute and these 
 rules. The court is required to pass upon the admissibility of 
 evidence offered, as in actions at law. The court shall report 
 all exceptions to the evidence when offered and excluded taken 
 by the party offering it, or so rauch thereof as will clearly show 
 the character of the evidence, the form in which it was offered, 
 the objection made, the ruling, and the exception. 
 
 Under the old rules a case in equity was tried upon the rec- 
 ord, which was required to contain all the evidence taken, and 
 consequently on an oral examination in court the testimony was 
 required to be taken down in writing and signed by the witness 
 and filed as a part of the record. Blease v. Garlington, 92 U. 
 S. 7, 23 L. ed. 523 ; Mears v. Lockhart, 36 C. C. A. 239, 94 
 Fed. 274. But by rule 46, requiring the trial to be as an 
 action at law, and new rule 75, requiring that the record shall 
 not contain the evidence in full, but that the evidence shall be 
 stated in simple and condensed form, omitting all parts not 
 essential to the decision of questions presented by an appeal, 
 and forbidding the reproduction of any part of the testimony in 
 the langiiage of the witness, unless either party desires it and 
 the court allows it, it becomes apparent that the old rule as 
 stated above no longer applies, and the evidence is taken as in 
 trials at law. United States v. Motion Picture Patents Co. 230 
 Eed. 541 ; Louisville & IS^. E. Co. v. United States, 238 U. S. 1, 
 59 L. ed. 1177, 35 Sup. Ct. Eep. 696. 
 
DEPOSITIONS AFTER ISSUE JOIXED. 321 
 
 2d. By Oral Examination hefore an Examiner or Commis- 
 sioner — Appointment of an Examiner, etc. 
 
 Xew rule 47, which recognizes that the testimony of witnesses 
 in eqxiitv trials must be taken in open court orally, as the general 
 rule, provides that for good and exceptional cause for departing 
 from said rule, either party may, when allowed by statute or 
 the rules, to be shown by affidavit, may apply to take the depo- 
 sitions of witnesses named out of court, before an examiner 
 or other named officer upon notice and terms specified in the 
 order of the court or judge granting the application. 
 
 The application may be as follows: 
 
 Title as in bill. 
 
 And now comes A. B., plaintiff, (or defendant) and says that the above 
 cause is now at issue and that he desires to take the testimony of C. D. E. 
 & F., who are material witnesses in this cause, before Jno. D. Smith, Esq., 
 
 who is a citizen of , in the County of , in the State of 
 
 , which testimony is to be used in the trial of this Cause before 
 
 the Court. 
 
 That this application is made under rule 47, and for the following 
 reasons — 
 
 (Here state your reasons whether the application is made under a Stat- 
 ute permitting the depositions to be taken, or under rule 47 permitting for 
 some good and sufficient reasons, independent of the statutes, depositions 
 to be taken.) 
 
 Wherefore plaintiff prays tlie Court to grant the application and to ap- 
 point the aforesaid Jno. Smith, an Examiner (or Commissioner), to take 
 the testimony of said witnesses (named) upon such notice and terms as 
 the Court may deem proper to make. 
 
 R. F., 
 Solicitor. 
 
 The application must be veriiied by oath, by the oath of the 
 party making it, or the application may be made, supported by 
 affidavit of the causes upon which the application is made. 
 
 Order Appointing the Examiner. 
 
 The court granting the application, counsel should draw up 
 the order for his signature, as follows: 
 
 Title as in hill. ' 
 
 Tliis cause coming on to be heard on this the day of , 
 
 •^- B , upon the motion of plaintiff (or defendant) to take the 
 
522 DEPOSITIONS AFTER ISSUE JOINED. 
 
 testimony of A. B. C. D. etc., alleged to be material witnesses in this cause, 
 
 before Jno. Smith, Esq., of , in the County of , in the State 
 
 of , as Examiner, it is hereby ordered that the said Jno. Smith, 
 
 Esq., be appointed Examiner to take the depositions of the said witnesses 
 above named to be used in court on the trial of said cause. It is ordered 
 that notice of the time and place of taking said testimony shall be served 
 
 upon the opposite party or his Solicitor of record at least days 
 
 before said examination begins. 
 
 Equity rule 53. 
 
 (Here insert a,ny further terms the Court may order.) 
 
 That said evidence shall be taken in accordance with rules 49-50 and 51, 
 and the same returned into Court within the time provided by rule 47. 
 
 (If further time be given so state in the order.) 
 
 Judge, . 
 
 The old rule permitting the appointment of an examiner to 
 take the testimony of any witnesses that may be brought before 
 him has been abrogated, and the application and order must 
 state specifically the names of the witnesses to be examined. 
 
 If the application is filed pending a cause or after it has been 
 placed on the calendar for trial, where the depositions cannot 
 be tal?:en and returned within the time required by rule 47, then 
 the time of taking and return must be specifically stated in the 
 order of the court. The time stated in the order must be reason- 
 ably sufficient. American Exch. Nat. Bank v. First ISTat. Bank, 
 27 C. C. A. 274, 48 U. S. App. 633, 82 Fed. 961. 
 
 EoMminers Beyond the Limits of the Court's Jurisdiction. 
 
 The practice of appointing examiners beyond the jurisdic- 
 tion of the court was, under the old rules, doubted by some of 
 the judges, but the reasons given are no longer tenable under 
 the new rules. There is no question as to exercise of this power 
 under rule 47. Schutte v. Florida C. R. Co. 3 Woods, 692- 
 697, Fed. Cas. ISTo. 17,434, decided on circuit. White v. Toledo, 
 St. L. & K. C. E. Co. 24 C. C. A. 467, 51 U. S. App. 54, 79 
 Fed. 133 ; Davis v. Davis, 90 Fed. 791. 
 
 Notice of Examination. 
 
 As soon as possible after the appointment of an examiner, the 
 taking of testimony should begin. By rule 53 it is provided 
 
DEPOSITIONS AFTEE ISSUE JOIKED. 523 
 
 that notice shall be given by the respective counsel or parties 
 to the opposite counsel or parties of the time and place of ex- 
 amination before an examiner or officer, for such reasonable 
 time as the court or officer may fix by order in each case. By 
 rule 47 the court may fix the notice and terms to be followed 
 by the examiner and counsel, but if circumstances should make 
 the time so fixed inconvenient and unreasonable to any of the 
 parties, or should the court not direct the notice to be given, 
 the officer taking the deposition 'may give notice of the time 
 and place of the examination to counsel or parties interested, 
 as was the practice under the old rules. Wenham v. Switzer, 
 48 Fed. 612. See Uhle v. Burnham, 44 Fed. 729. The form 
 of notice: 
 
 Title as in Bill. 
 To A. B., Solicitor, etc. 
 You will please take notice, that having been appointed by the Hon. 
 
 , judge of the District Court for the district of , 
 
 an examiner to take the testimony of , witnesses named in the 
 
 order of the Court for and in behalf of plaintiff, (or defendant). 1 
 
 will begin said examination on the day of , A. D. 19 . . . . , 
 
 at 10 A. M. (here designate place, stating street, house, number, City, 
 County and State,) and that I will proceed with said examination from 
 day to day until completed. 
 
 Jno. Smith, 
 Examiner. 
 Notice accepted on this the day of , A. D. 19 ... . 
 
 If the notice of the time and place of taking is fixed in the 
 order of the court, and the notice is given by the solicitor of the 
 party applying to take the depositions, the form may be changed 
 accordingly, and signed by the solicitor. It may be served by 
 an officer, or service accepted by the opposite party or his coun- 
 
 Examiruition of Witnesses. 
 
 First, process for. The examiner being furnished with the 
 order of the court naming the witnesses to be examined. By 
 rule 52, witnesses living within the district of trial, and whose 
 testimony may be taken out of court, may be summoned to ap- 
 pear before an examiner appointed to take testimony, by 
 
524 DEPOSITIONS AFTER laSUB JOINED. 
 
 subpoena in the usual form, which may be issued by the clerk 
 in blank, and filled in by the party praying the same, or by 
 the commissioner, master, or examiner requiring the attendance 
 of the witnesses at the time and place specified. 
 
 By sec. 876, U. S. Eev. Stat. (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1487), 
 subpoenas for witnesses who are required to attend court in any 
 district may run into any other district, provided that in civil 
 causes the witnesses living out of the district in which the court 
 is held. 
 
 By U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 868 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1479), 
 the clerk of any district court of the United States or territory 
 on application of either party to the suit or his agent shall issue 
 a subpoena for any witness named to appear, etc., before any 
 examiner or commissioner authorized to examine witnesses in 
 the pending suit, in any district or territory where such exam- 
 ination is being held. The examiner will use the blank sub- 
 poanas furnished by the clerk of the court- in which the suit is 
 pending, and when prepared, the examiner will deliver them to 
 the United States marshal to be served, or to a deputy usually 
 provided to attend the examiner, for service on the witnesses. 
 
 If the examination i^ being held in another Federal district, 
 and over one hundred miles from the place where the suit is 
 pending, then the clerk of the United States circuit court of 
 the district in which the examination is being held should issue 
 the subpoenas upon application of the examiner (U. S. Eev. 
 Stat. sec. 876 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1487); Meyer v. Con- 
 solidated Ice Co. 163 Fed. 400), and this subpoena must be 
 served by the officers of the Federal district in which the ex- 
 amination is being held. Ee AUis, 44 Fed. 217 ; United States 
 V. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. 187 Fed. 234, and cases cited. 
 
 ISTote that the subpcEua must be issued by the clerk of the 
 court in which the suit is pending, if the witness resides, or is 
 within a hundred miles of the place of suit, though in another 
 district. U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 876, provides that a subpoena 
 may run into any other district, if the witness lives within a 
 hundred miles of the courthouse where the court is held and 
 from which the subpoena is issued. See sec. 868. Meyer v. 
 Consolidated Ice Co. 163 Fed. 404., And a witness under sec. 
 863, U. S. Eev. Stat, may be required to appear and submit 
 to an examination outside the district in which the suit is pend- 
 
DEPOSITIONS AFTER ISSUE JOINED. 525 
 
 iiig. Davis T. Davis, 90 Feci. 791 ; Tomlinson v. Moore, 189 
 Fed. 84.K 
 
 By sec. 870, U. S. Rev. Stat., no witness under a dedimuf< 
 potestatein shall be required to attend out of the county of his 
 residence, nor more than forty miles from his residence, and 
 no witness is guilty of contempt for nonattendance unless his 
 fees are paid or tendered when service is made. The fees to be 
 tendered or paid must be the expense of going to and return- 
 ing from the place of examination, and one day's attendance. 
 This being done, the witness must obey. U. S. l\ev. Stat. sec. 
 8(iS; Xorris v. Hassler, 23 Fed. 581; Re Boeshore, 125 Fed. 
 (3.'i2; Butte &• B. Consol. ]\lin. Co. v. ^fontana Ore Purchas- 
 ing Co. 139 Fed. 843. If the witness refuses to appear, or, 
 appearing, refuses to answer, it is deemed a contempt of court, 
 if he is not otherwise privileged from giving testimony. The 
 refusal to appear, or appearing, to answer, must be certified 
 to the clerk's office from which the subprrna issued, by the exam- 
 iner, and the Judge of the court may proceed to enforce obe- 
 dience to the process, as in like cases in any court. IT. S. Rev. 
 Stat. sec. 868; Re Spotford, 62 Fed. 443'; Re Allis, 44 Fed. 
 217; Bird v. Halsy, 87 Fed. 07.") ; Xew England Phonograph Co. 
 V. jSTational Phonograph Co. 148 Fed. 324 ; United States v. 
 Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. 187 Fed. 234; Johnson Steel 
 Street-Rail. Co. v. Xorth Branch Steel Co. 48 Fed. 192. 
 
 By rule .52, if a witness shall refuse to appear or give evi- 
 dence, it shall be deemed a contempt of CDurt, which being certi- 
 fied to the clerk's office by the examiner, an attachment may 
 issue thereon by order of the cnuit or any judge thereof, in the 
 same manner as if the contempt was for refusal to appear or 
 refusing to gi\'e testimony in court. In cases of refusal of 
 witnesses to attend or be sworn, or to answer any question })ut 
 by the examiner or counsel, the same practice shall be adopted 
 as is now practiced with respect to witnesses to be ju-oduced on 
 examination before an examiner on written interrogatories. 
 
 By rule .')8, el. 5, the court or judge upon motion and rea- 
 sonable notice may enforce answers by parties to the suit to 
 interrogatories material to the cause of action or defense. A 
 party failing to comply with an order to answer is liable to 
 attachment, and, further, if plaintiff, the cause may be dis- 
 missed; if defendant, he is liable to have his answer stricken 
 out and default taken. 
 
526 DEPOSiTioiirs apteb issue joineb. 
 
 Who is to Pass upon Materiality or Relevancy of 'Evidence 
 Taken iy. Examiners, etc., out of the District of Trial. 
 
 The question has arisen as to whose duty it is to pass upon 
 the relevancy or materiality of the evidence when taken in a 
 district other than that of the trial. 
 
 In Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Lochren, Y4 C. C. A. 341, 143 
 Fed. 211-215, 6 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 5Y3, and cases cited, it is 
 said that it is not the duty of the auxiliary judge to consider or 
 determine these questions, but only to compel the production of 
 the evidence though deemed incompetent or^ irrelevant by him, 
 but with the proviso that he will not compel privileged evi- 
 dence, or a privileged witness to testify, nor when there is no 
 doubt that the evidence sought is incompetent, immaterial, or 
 irrelevant. The rule thus laid down ajiplies to equity rules 52, 
 53, 59, 60, 63, 65, as well as to evidence under sections 863, 
 868, and 869 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 1472, 1479, 1480), at 
 law. Blease v. Garlington, 92 U. S. 1, 23 L. ed. 521; See 
 Crocker-Wheeler Co. v. Bullock, 134 Fed. 241. In Butte & B. 
 Consol. Min. Co. v. Montana Ore Purchasing Co. 139 Fed. 
 844, Judge Lacombe thought it best to send back the question 
 of materiality and relevancy to the trial judge, and upon his 
 determination of the matter to compel or not the witness to 
 answer; but in this his associates differed with him, and the 
 rule as above stated was enforced. See ISTew England Phono- 
 graph Co. V. ISTational Phonograph Co. 148 Fed. 324 and cases 
 cited ; Fayerweather v. Pitch, 89 Fed. 529 ; Maxim Nordenfelt 
 Guns & Ammunition Co. v. Colts Patent Firearms Mfg. Oo. 
 103 Fed. 39; Lloyd v. Pennie, 50 Fed. 4-12; Parisian Comb 
 Co. V. Eschwege, 92 Fed. 721. These cases overrule the con- 
 clusion reached in Ee AUis, 44 Fed. 216. Except under the 
 conditions above stated, the witness will be compelled to answer. 
 Perry v. Eubber Tire Wheel Co. 138 Fed. 836 ; Robinson v. 
 Philadelphia E. Co. 28 Fed. 341. 
 
 By equity rule 51 the officer has no power to pass upon or 
 decide on the competency, materiality, or relevancy of any ques- 
 tion under whatever rule the depositions are taken, see chap. 87. 
 
 Subpoena duces tecum. 
 
 By equity rule 58, el. 5, the court or judge may make upon 
 
DEPOSITIONS AFTEIt ISSUE JOINED. 52Y 
 
 reasonable notice an order to effect tlie inspection or production 
 of documents in the possession of either party, containing mate- 
 rial evidence for the cause of action or defense. 
 
 By sec. 869, U. S. Rev. Stat. (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1480), 
 a subpoena duces fecuui under a dedimus poiestatem requires 
 a witness to appear and testify, and to bring with him to be 
 produced before the court, commissioner, or examiner, any 
 paper, writing, book, or document in his possession or power, 
 material to the investigation. Ee Shepard, 3 Fed. 12. The 
 book, jaaper, document, etc., sought must be described in the 
 application, supported by affidavit; and in the subpoena, if the 
 court is satisfied it should be issued; and the order made to 
 the clerk to issue it completes the process. This section regu- 
 lates the issuing of these subpcenas in the United States courts 
 and also applies to cases where depositions are taken de bene 
 esse under sec. S63 or in perpetuam under sec. 866 (Davis v. 
 Davis, 90 Fed. 791 ; Kirkpatrick v. Pope Mfg. Co. 61 Fed. 48), 
 or when a dedimus is issued. Under sec. 869, U. S. Rev. Stat., 
 the subpoena should only be issued under the order of a court, 
 for reasons lucidly set forth in Dancel v. Goodyear Shoe Ma- 
 chinery Co. 128 Fed. Y60, 762; Crocker-Wheeler Co. v. Bul- 
 lock, 134 Fed. 241. 
 
 Application for a/tid description of instrument. 
 
 Sec. 869, which, as said, regulates the issuing of subpoenas 
 duces tecum in the courts of the United States, requires an ap- 
 plication to the judge of the district, to be supported by the af- 
 fidavit of the party applying, and the court, being satisfied, 
 by the affidavit or otherwise, that there is reason to believe that 
 the paper, document, etc., is in the possession or power of the 
 witness, and that the same if produced would be competent 
 and material evidence for the party applying, may order the 
 clerk to issue the subpoena. See Dancel v. Goodyear Shoe Ma- 
 chinery Co. 128 Fed. 162; also West Pub. Co. v. Edward 
 Thompson Co. 151 Fed. 142. Of course, the instrument, etc., 
 should be described in the application as a basis for issuing the 
 subpoena, which must contain the description. If the instru- 
 ment is not properly described, the production will be re- 
 fused. Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U. S. 107, 41 L. ed. 89, 16 
 
528 DEPOSITIONS AFTER ISSUE JOINED. 
 
 Sup. Ct. Kep. 990, 10 Am. Crim. Eep. 242. But if properly 
 desci-ibed, the witness must produce what is called for. Edison 
 Electric Light Co. v. United States Electric Lighting Co. 44 
 Fed. 297, s. e. 45 Fed. 55; Johnson Steel Street-Kail Co. v. 
 North Branch Steel Co. 48 Fed. 195. In Victor G. Bloede 
 Co. V. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. 98 Fed. 176, it is said gen- 
 eralitj' in the designation of books or writings is not objec- 
 tionable if the subject-matter to which they relate is specific- 
 ally mentioned in the motion and subpoena. When properly 
 described, the witness cannot say he delivered them to his coun- 
 sel, but must produce them, as they are still in his power. 
 Edison Electric Light Co. v. United States Electric Lighting 
 Co. 44 Fed. 297, see s. c. 45 Fed. 55 ; see Davis v. Davis, 90 
 Fed. 792. 
 
 E.vcepiions to Rule. 
 
 A call for private papers not in issue will not be enforced 
 (Dancel v. Goodyear Shoe Machinery Co. 128 Fed. 754-762) ; 
 nor when the call is for a cart load of books (Ibid.) ; nor to 
 reveal trade secrets ( Crocker- Wheeler Co. v. Bullock, 134 Fed. 
 241 ; Victor G. Bloede Co. v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. 98 
 Fed. 176 ; but see Johnson Steel Street-Rail Co. v. l^orth 
 Branch Steel Co. 48 Fed. 191). 
 
 When Issued in Equity Causes. 
 
 By sec. 724 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1469), in causes at 
 law the court may on motion grant to either party, after due 
 notice thereof, an order requiring the parties to produce books 
 or other writings in their possession or power, which contain 
 evidence pertinent to the issue, under circumstances in which 
 they may be compelled to produce the same by the ordinary 
 rules of proceeding in Chancery. The whole purpose of this 
 section was to eliminate the formality of going into a court 
 of equity for a bill of discovery. Owyhee Land & Irrig. Co. v. 
 Tautphaus, 48 C. C. A. 535, 109 Fed. 547; Eyder v. Bate- 
 man, 93 Fed. 31 ; Kirkpatriek v. Pope Mfg. Co. 61 Fed. 48. 
 This section applies only to causes at law, but before granting 
 the order, the party applying must make reasonable proof of 
 
DEPOSITIONS AFTER ISSUE JOINED. 529 
 
 the existence of the documents, etc., and their pertinency to the 
 issues, and the possession or control of the opposite party. 
 Ibid.; Owyhee Land & Irrig. Co. v. Tautphaus, 48 C. C. A. 
 535, 109 Fed. 547 ; Paine v. Warren, 33 Fed. 357. It is not 
 a matter of right, as the issuing of a suhpcena ad testificanduin, 
 but the court exercises a discretion, following the practice in 
 such cases in chancery. Gregory v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 
 3 McCrary, 374, lOFed. 529; Dancel v. Goodyear Shoe Ma- 
 chinery Co. 128 Fed. 761, 762. However, in American Litho- 
 graphic Co. V. Werckmeister, 91 C. C. A. 376, 165 Fed. 426, 
 the court held that the power to require the production of docu- 
 mentary evidence was not limited to an order made on motion, 
 as provided by sec. 724, but that under Rev. Stat. sec. 716, 
 that it had express power, as well as its inherent power to issue 
 any writ necessary for the proper exercise of its jurisdiction. 
 
 So far, then, we see that this chancery power was given to 
 courts of law to avoid an appeal to equity for discovery, but 
 in equity the chancery rules and procedure in issuing the .sub- 
 poena dv£es tecum have not been changed. West Pub. Co. v. 
 Edward Thompson Co. 151 Fed. 140. Equity rule 58. 
 
 A subpcena duces tecum may issue when the depositions in 
 chancery are taken under equity rule 47, and whether taken 
 under a commission on direct or cross interrogatories, or orally 
 before an examiner. As said in Dancel v. Goodj^ear Shoe Ma- 
 chinery Co. 128 Fed. 762, the settled practice of the courts is 
 not to issue nuhpcerms duces tecum under sec. 863 (Comp. Stat. 
 1913, sec. 1472), or rule 47, except by order of the court and 
 upon preliminary proofs of necessity. There is no question, 
 that whether depositions are being taken under a commission 
 de bene esse (U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 863) or a dedimus under U. 
 S. Eev. Stat. sec. 869, or equity rule 58, there must an applica- 
 tion and an order, as herefore stated, as a basis for contempt 
 proceedings in case of refusal to obey the subpcena. Dancel v. 
 Goodyear Shoe Machinery Co. 128 Fed. 761, 762; see West 
 Pub. Co. V. Edward Thompson Co. 151 Fed. 141; Crocker- 
 Wheeler Co. V. Bullock, 134 Fed. 242, 243 ; Gregory v. Chicago, 
 M. k St. P. R. Co. 3 McCrary, :574, 10 Fed. 529. In Dancel 
 V. Goodyear Shoe Machinery Co. supra, it is said a notary' pub- 
 he taking depositions has no power to issue a subpoena dncex 
 tecum. In Pepper v. Rogers, 137 Fed. 173, it is said that when 
 S. Eq.— 34. 
 
530 DEPOSITIONS AFTEE ISSUE JOINED. 
 
 papers are produced before an examiner by witnesses under a 
 subpcena duces tecum, the court cannot order the examiner to 
 remove them to another district, to be used in the examination 
 of other witnesses. 
 
 Penalty for Refusal. 
 
 Sec. 724 provides a penalty if the plaintiff or defendant fails 
 to comply with the order, to wit, nonsuit in case of the plain- 
 tiff, and judgment by default in case the defendant fails to 
 comply (Victor G. Bloede Co. v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. 
 98 Fed. 175, s. c. 110 Fed. 76), but not when the action is 
 penal, or for the recovery of penalties, as, for instance, under 
 sec. 4901 of U. S. Eev. Stat (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 9447); 
 Newgold V. American Electrical I^ovelty & Mfg. Co. 108 Fed. 
 341, 342. Equity rule 58, cl. 5. 
 
CHAPTEE LXXXIII. 
 
 HOW EXAMII^ATION TO BE CONDUCTED. 
 
 The examiuation of the witness takes place in the presence 
 of the commissioner, examiner, and the parties, or their agents, 
 and by the commissioner or examiner or counsel, if present, and 
 the witnesses are subject to cross-examination or re-examina- 
 tion if talien orally, as if upon the stand in court. New rule 49. 
 By this rule all evidence offered before an examiner or like 
 officer, together with any objections, shall be saved and returned 
 into court. Depositions, whether upon oral examination before 
 an examiner, or otherwise, shall be taken on questions and an- 
 swers reduced to writing, or the evidence may be taken in narra- 
 tive form, whether direct, cross, or re-examination. 
 
 By rule' 50 a stenogTapher may be appointed by the court or 
 officer, who may be required to transcribe the evidence. 
 
 By rule 51 objections to the evidence shall be in short form, 
 stating gTOunds. The testimony, after being reduced to writ- 
 ing, must be read to witness gi^'ing the evidence, and should 
 be signed by him in the presence of the officer, provided that 
 if the witness refuses to sign, the officer shall sign the same, 
 giving reasons, if any, assigned by the witness, for the refusal. 
 Objections made to questions shall be noted by the officer on the 
 deposition, but the officer cannot decide on the competency 
 or materiality of the questions. RoUman Mfg. Co. v. Universal 
 Hardware Works, 229 Fed. 581. 
 
 We see, then, any question objected to must be noted, with 
 objections made, but the examiner has no power to decide on 
 the competency, materiality, or relevancy of the question asked. 
 The court alone can deal with the competency and relevancy ; 
 nor will the court pass upon it during the examination of the 
 witness. Maxim-Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co. v. Colt's 
 Patent Firearms Mfg. Co. 103 Fed. 39 ; Kansas Loan & T. Co. 
 v. Electric R. Light & P. Co. 108 Fed. 702 ; Brown v. Worster, 
 113 Fed. 20; Blease v. Garlington, 92 U. S. 7, 23 L. ed. 523; 
 
 531 
 
532 HOW EXAMINATION TO BE CONDUCTED, 
 
 Wiiitehead & H. Co. v. O'Callahan, 130 Fed. 243 ; Ee Eomine, 
 138 Fed. 839 ; Diamond Drill & Macli. Co. v. Kelly Bros. 120 
 Fed. 282. Tlie court can control irrelevant questions by charg- 
 ing up the costs, where there is a reckless disregard of the rules 
 of evidence. Ibid. This may be met by motion to strike out 
 the irrelevant evidence and charge up the costs. Griffith v. 
 Shaw, 89 Fed. 313. Equity rule 51. 
 
 Counsel cannot instruct a witness not to answer a question, 
 unless it is criminating (Thompson-Houston Electric Co. v. 
 Jeffrey Mfg. Co. 83 Fed. 614), nor can the examination be 
 stopped to refer the relevancy of the question to the court (De 
 Eoux V. Girard, 90 Fed. 537 ; Parisian Comb Co. v. Eschwege, 
 92 Fed. 721). Again, an examiner is not under the instruction 
 of counsel, and they cannot stop the examination (Ee Einds- 
 kopf, 24 Fed. 542), nor control it in any way. First Xat. Bank 
 v. Forest, 44 Fed. 246; J. L. ilott Iron-Works v. Standard 
 Mfg. Co. 48 Fed. 345. 
 
 The Examination is to Be Reduced to WrHi7ig. 
 
 The examiner is to reduce to writing the questions and an- 
 swers as put and gi^-eu, or by consent of parties it may be writ- 
 ten in narrative form. By equity rule 50, the questions and 
 answers may be taken by a stenographer, or typewriter, as the 
 examiner may elect. Brown v. Ellis, 103 Fed. 837. It has been 
 held that it was not properly taken, if not reduced to writing, 
 under sections 863 and 864 (Moller v. United States, 6 C. C. A. 
 459, 13 U. S. App. 472, 57 Fed. 491 ; Cook v. Burnley, 11 
 Wall. 659, 20 L. ed. 29), and not admissible in evidence. 
 
 In :iIoller v. United States, 6 C. C. A. 459, 13 U. S. App. 
 472, 57 Fed. 495, the questions and answers were taken steno- 
 graphically, but were not reduced to writing in presence of wit- 
 ness, or read over to him after they had been written out. They 
 were not admissible. Ibid. See Ee Thomas, 35 Fed. 822. 
 When completed, whether taken down by a stenogTapher or 
 written down by the examiner, he should read it over to the wit- 
 ness, or it should be read over to the witness in the presence 
 of the examiner, and be signed by the ;witness in the presence 
 of the examiner. U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 864 (Oomp. Stat. 1913, 
 sec. 1473.) 
 
HOW EXAMINATION TO BE CONDUCTED. 533 
 
 Equity rule 51. If the witness refuses to sign, the examine! 
 shall sign them, stating in the record thb reasons, if any, given 
 by the witness why he did not sign (equity rule 51) ; and he 
 may state any other special matters that he may think fit to be 
 presented in the report of his action. 
 
 How Authenticated and Transmitted. 
 
 Equity rule 49 provides that all evidence offered and objec- 
 tions made shall be saved and returned into court. Section 865, 
 TJ. S. Kev. Stat., provides for the transmission by the officer 
 of the depositions to the court, either in person or by mail. This 
 section provides that the magistrate taking the deposition shall 
 deliver it with his own hand into the court for which it is taken, 
 or it shall, together with a certificate of the reasons for taking 
 it, and of the notice, if any, given to the parties, be sealed up and 
 directed to the court, and remain under seal until opened in 
 court. See "Mailing Depositions." As to certificate of officer 
 see "Defective Certificate," p. 540. Ke Thomas, 35 Fed. 
 340, 824; The Saranac, 132 Fed. 942; Stewart v, Townsend, 
 41 Fed. 121 ; see Columbus E. Co. v. Patterson, 73 C. C. A. 
 603, 143 Fed. 248. (See chap. 84, p. 534). 
 
CHAPTER LXXXIV. 
 
 EETURNING AND TILING DEPOSITIONS. 
 
 As we have seen, new rule 49 is the only rule governing the 
 returning of depositions to the court by the officer taking them, 
 so the method of returning must be followed as provided by 
 section 865 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (Comp. 
 Stat. 1913, sec. 1474), and they cannot be held back under in- 
 structions from counsel of the party on whose behalf the witness 
 was examined. First Nat. Bank v. Forest, 44 Fed. 246. 
 
 Returning hy Mail. 
 
 The envelop should be addressed to the clerk of the court 
 issuing the commission, marked with the style of the case, 
 sealed, and the commissioner taking should indorse his name 
 across the seal. Egbert v. Citizens Ins. Co. 2 MeCrary, 386, 
 7 Fed. 47 ; Stewart v. Townsend, 41 Fed. 121. It may then 
 be sent by mail or express; the rule requires it simply to be 
 transmitted. United States v. 50 Boxes & Packages of Lace, 
 92 Fed. 604; Batts's Rev. Stat. (Tex.) 2286. See Re Thomas, 
 35 Fed. 337, 340; Brown v. Ellis, 103 Fed. 836. 
 
 Publication of Depositions. 
 
 Equity rule 55 provides that on the filing of any deposition 
 or afiidavit taken under the new rules or any statute, it shall be 
 deemed published unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
 
 Exhibits. 
 
 When exhibits are oifered in connection with testimony, they 
 must be attached, and if copies, the officer must certify that he 
 has compared the copies with original. The Holladay Case, 
 
 534 
 
KOSTUEXING AND FILING DEPOSITIONS. 535 
 
 27 Fed. 842. It is not necessary to place a certificate on the 
 exhibits, but they may be referred to in the certificate to the 
 depositions, and the commissioner may send them in a separate 
 envelop (Bird v. lialsy, 87 Fed. 672; Dundee Mortg. & T. 
 Invest. Co. v. Cooper, 26 Fed. 670, 671 ; United States v. 50 
 Boxes & Packages of Lace, 92 Fed. 601) ; or they may be iden- 
 tified in any manner that will make certain the fact that they 
 are the paper offered in connection with the evidence (ibid.) ; 
 and mailing them in separate packages is permissible (Bird v. 
 Halsy, 87 Fed. 671, 672). 
 
 : Depositions to Foreign Countries. 
 
 Sections 863 and 864 of the United States Eevised Statutes 
 (Comp. Stat. 1918, sees. 14-72, 1473 ) refer to taking deposi- 
 tions within the United States, as is clearly shown by the desig- 
 nation of the officers authorized to take them. Encyclopaedia 
 Britannica Co. v. Werner Co. 138 Fed. 461 ; Bird v. Halsy, 
 87 Fed. 667; Cortes Co. v. Tannhauser, 21 Blatchf. 552, 18 
 Fed. 667; The Alexandra, 104 Fed. 904. In Stein v. Bow- 
 man, 13 Pet. 209, 10 L. ed. 129, it was said that the only 
 method by which depositions can be taken in a foreign coun- 
 try is by a commission, and in Cortes Co. v. Tannhauser, 21 
 Blatchf. 552, 18 Fed. 667, it is said the proper course is by 
 commission, but where notice that oral examinations would be 
 required in the case has been given, that the evidence may be 
 so taken in a foreign country. Edison Electric Co. v. West- 
 inghouse, C. K. Co. 138 Fed. 460, 461, following Bischoffs- 
 heim v. Baltzer, 20 Blatchf. 229, 10 Fed. 1. 
 
 Commissions to take evidence in a foreign country may issue 
 under a dediiniis pursuant to the provisions of U. S. Rev. 
 Stat. see. 866 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1477). (Ibid.; United 
 States V. 50 Boxes & Packages of Lace, 92 Fed. 602, 603) ; 
 or by order under equity rule 47 (Bischoffsheim v. Baltzer, 20 
 Blatchf. 229, 10 Fed. 4. See Hollander v. Baiz, 40 Fed. 659, 
 s. c. 43 Fed. 35) ; or under the forms provided by State statutes 
 (United States v. 50 Boxes & Packages of Lace, 92 Fed. 603, 
 604) ; or under "Letters Eogatory" (U. S. Bev. Stat. sec. 
 875). 
 
536 EETUKNING AND FILING DEPOSITIONS. 
 
 Before Whom Taken. 
 
 By sec. 1750 of the Eevised Statutes of the United States 
 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 3211), it is provided that depositions 
 may be taken in foreign countries before any secretary of lega- 
 tion or consular officer within the limits of his legation, con- 
 sulate, or commercial agency, and it is further provided that 
 such officers may perform any notarial act vs^hich a notary public 
 may perform in this country, and when the depositions are so 
 taken and certified under the seal of office of such officer, they 
 shall be as valid as if taken in the United States under the laws 
 thereof. Bischoffsheim v. Baltzer, 20 Blatchf. 229, 10 Fed. 1 ; 
 Cortes Co. v. Tannhauser, 21 Blatchf. 552, 18 Fed. 667. 
 
 Letters Rogatory. 
 
 By U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 875 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1486), 
 evidence may be taken in a foreign country, either by commis- 
 sion or letters rogatory, in any suit in which the United States 
 is a party, or has an interest, and by sections 4071 to 4074 
 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 7619-7622), it provided for taking 
 the testimony of witnesses in this country upon letters rogatory 
 addressed to any circuit court of the United States by any court 
 of a foreign country. The circuit court to which the letters 
 are addressed will designate a commissioner to take the testi- 
 mony required, with all powers necessary to execute the com- 
 mission. 
 
 In Gross v. Palmer, 105 Fed. 833, it is said that letters 
 rogatory may issue from a circuit court where testimony cannot 
 otherwise be obtained, but it must be shown with certainty that 
 a commission is not adequate. 
 
 Letters rogatory are prepared in the name of the President of the United 
 States and addressed to the presiding officer of some court of record of a 
 foreign country, stating the pending of a suit in a court of the United 
 States and suggesting certain parties (naming them) are within the juris- 
 diction of the foreign court and are material witnesses in the pending 
 cause. 
 
 Then follows a request that by the usual process of the foreign court the 
 parties named be brought before the court, or some competent person 
 appointed by the court, to be examined on the interrogatories and cross- 
 interrogatories annexed to the letter; that the answers be taken in writing 
 
EETUENING AND FILING DEPOSITIONS. 537 
 
 and returned, addressed to the clerk of the court where the cause is pend- 
 ing. They are to be sealed up with the letter rogatory and returned. 
 
 The teste to the letter rogatory should be: 
 
 Witness the , Chief Justice of the United States, this 
 
 day of , A. D. 19. . ., and the year of the independence of 
 
 the United States of America. 
 
 Attest: Clerk of the 
 
 (SEAL.) (Court in which suit is pending.) 
 
 If issued from a district court of the United States, it shall 
 bear teste of the judge and attested by the clerk of the court as 
 above. 
 
 When executed by the court or commissioner to whom di- 
 rected, it must be returned to the minister or consul of the 
 United States nearest to the place where exec\Tted, who is to 
 indorse on it a certification when and where it was received, 
 and the condition in which he received it, and he shall then 
 transmit the letter on commission so executed and certified, to 
 the clerk of the court from whence it issued. 
 
CHAPTEE LXXXV. 
 
 SUPPRESSING DEPOSITIONS. 
 
 The requirements of the laws under which depositions are 
 taken must be complied with (Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351, 
 7 L. ed. 174), and the certificate of the ofiicer taking should 
 show compliance as to the manner of taking, as already ex- 
 plained. Formerly the rulings were very strict because of the 
 fact that under the 30th section of the act of 1789 they could 
 be taken without notice, but now, notice being required, the 
 rule may be stated as follows : If the right to take the deposi- 
 tion exists, and notice has been given, so that the opportunity 
 for cross-examination has been secured, then the objection must 
 be substantial to he sustained. Kansas City, Pt. S. & M. K. 
 Co. V. Stone, 2 C. ,C. A. 437, 10 U. S. App. 209, 51 Fed. 
 656 ; U. Scherer & Co. v. Everest, 94 C. C. A. 346, 168 Fed. 
 822; Union P. P. Co. v. Reese, 5 C. C. A. 510, 15 U. S. App. 
 92, 56 Fed. 288-290. 
 
 A motion to suppress evidence taken in rebuttal will not be 
 granted if there is any evidence in rebuttal in the deposition. 
 West Pub. Co. V. Edward Thompson Co. 152 Fed. 1019. 
 
 Subject to the above rule every step in the taking of deposi- 
 tions can be excepted to with a view to suppressing the deposi- 
 tions. 
 
 First. As to notice of taking. — While proper notice of tak- 
 ing as to time and place must be given, yet attending an ex- 
 amination waives all irregularities, and allowing the deposition 
 to be read without objection at the trial, though a motion to 
 suppress before the trial has been made and overruled, waives 
 any objection to the manner of taking. Union P. R. Co. v. 
 Reese, 5 C. C. A. 510, 15 U. S. App. 92, 56 Fed. 291 ; Kay 
 V. Smith, 17 Wall. 411, 21 L. ed. 666. In Gartside Coal Co. 
 V. Maxwell, 20 Fed. 187, it is said that depositions will not 
 
 538 
 
SUPPitliSSlNG DEPOSITIONS. 5i59 
 
 be suppressed though taken at a different place from the one 
 named in the notice, if both parties are present when talcen. 
 Bird V. Halsy, 87 Fed. 672; Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Rob- 
 ison, 22 L. R. A. :]-2o, 7 C. C. A. 444, 19 U. S. App. 266, 58 
 Fed. 732; Brown v. Ellis, 103 Fed. 837; Gormley v. Bunyan, 
 138 U. S. 632, 34 L. ed. 1089, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 453. 
 
 New rule 54 provides that in case notice of taking depositions 
 has not been gi\-en, to the opposite party, of the time and place 
 of taking, he shall, on application and notice, be entitled to have 
 the witness examined orally before the court, or to a cross- 
 examination before an examiner or like officer, or a new deposi- 
 tion taken, with notice, as the court or judge under the cir- 
 cumstances shall order. 
 
 Beasonahle Notice. 
 
 What constitutes reasonable notice in point of time depends 
 on the circumstances in each case. American Exch. Xat. Bank 
 V. First Xat. Bank, 27 C. C. A. 274, 48 U. S. App. 633, 82 
 Fed. 961; The Serapis, 49 Fed. 393; Uhle v. Burnham, 44 
 Fed. 729. Where a mistake is made in the name of the witness 
 in the order for examination, but the opposite party had rea- 
 sonable notice of the time and place of taking, it would not be a 
 ground for suppressing the deposition. Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. 
 S. 48S, 37 L. ed. 822, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 950; Brown v. Ellis, 
 103 Fed. 836; United States v. Pings, 4 Fed. 714. 
 
 When Defectively Taken. 
 
 If the depositions are defectively taken, a motion to sup- 
 press must be made at once, or it will waive the objection to 
 form and manner of taking. Samuel Bros. v. Flostetter Co. 
 55 C. C. A. Ill, 118 Fed. 257; Stegner v. Blake, 36 Fed. 184. 
 Thus, where the commissioner attached copies of the exhibits, 
 instead of the originals, and marked them for identification, 
 without saying he had compared them, the objection must be 
 met by motion to suppress before the hearing, or it is waived. 
 The Holladay Case, 27 Fed. 842 ; Insurance Co. of N. A. v. 
 Guardiola, 129 U. S. 643, 32 L. ed. 803, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 425. 
 Blackburn v. Crawford, 3 Wall. 191, 192, 18 L. ed. 192, 193. 
 
So a motion to suppress because defectively taken, filed one 
 month after cause is set for hearing, comes too late. Ibid. 
 Setting the cause for hearing waives technical objections. The 
 Holladay Case, 27 Fed. 842, 843, and cases cited. Blackburn 
 V. Crawford, 3 Wall. 191, 192, 18 L. ed. 192, 193. 
 
 Where cross interrogatories were not answered, the deposi- 
 tion will not be suppressed if the motion comes too late to re- 
 take them. Kahtjen's American Composition Co. v. Holzap- 
 pel's Compositions Co. 97 Fed. 949. So when defectively 
 taken, objections are waived if allowed to be used. Indianap- 
 olis Water Co. v. American Straw-Board Co. 65 Fed. 534; 
 Union P. E. Co. v. Eeese, 5 C. C. A. 510, 15 U. S. App. 92, 
 56 Fed. 288 ; Kay v. Smith, 17 Wall. 417, 21 L. ed. 669, or 
 counsel present when taken, Brown v. Ellis, 103 Fed. 834, and 
 not excepting. 
 
 When the brother of the attorney took the depositions, it 
 was held that the depositions could be read. And where the at- 
 torney wrote the answers, while irregular, yet no fraud being 
 shown, the court would not suppress. Missouri, K. & T. E. 
 Co. V. Byas, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 572, 29 S. W. 1122. However, 
 it was intimated otherwise in Dawson v. Poston, 28 Fed. 606; 
 United States v. Pings, 4 Fed. 714. 
 
 Witness Adopting Previous Answers. 
 
 A witness on his second examination read over a copy of his 
 testimony given previously and subscribed it as his deposition. 
 This was held not to render the deposition inadmissible. Sam- 
 uel Bros. V. Hostetter Co. 55 C. C. A. Ill, 118 Fed. 257. 
 
 Defective Certificate. 
 
 A commissioner taking depositions in a foreign country, 
 who fails to certify that the examination was "subscribed by 
 the sworn interpreter," as directed, is immaterial if the certifi- 
 cate shows the interpreter was sworn. United States v. 50 
 Boxes & Packages of Lace, 92 Fed. 601. 
 
 Where the notary certifies that he is not attorney for either 
 party, omission to certify that he is not interested in the event 
 
SUPPRESSING DEPOSITIONS. 541 
 
 of suit is not sufficient cause to suppress. Stewart v. Town- 
 send, -il Fed. 121. See also Giles v. Paxson, 36 Fed. 882. 
 In Columbus E. Co. v. Patterson, 73 C. C. A. 603, 143 Fed. 
 24S, where the name of the witness was not rightly given, but 
 there was no doubt from the record who was intended, the depo- 
 sition was not suppressed. 
 
 In Steg-ner v. Blake, 36 Fed. 184, the defect in the certificate 
 was a want of a statement of the cause of taking. Such de- 
 feet was ^s-aived because not taken before final hearing. Bird 
 V. Halsy, 87 Fed. 672. 
 
 In Brown v. Ellis, 103 Fed. 834, it is held that depositions 
 for use in the Federal court under U. S. Eev. Stat. sees. 863- 
 865 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 1472-1474), and under a com- 
 mission to a notary public, his official seal to the certificate is 
 not essential. 
 
 Again, where a commission issued to A. C. Strong, the deposi- 
 tions are not inadmissible because certified by Alfred C. Strong. 
 Ibid. 
 
 See Columbus E. Co. v. Patterson, 73 C. C. A. 603, 143 
 Fed. 245. (See "Informality of Certificate.") 
 
 Will Be Suppressed. 
 
 When taken after the time allowed. Ee Thomas, 35 Fed. 
 337. When a witness is re-examined before an examiner on 
 the same matter without an order of court. Thurber v. Cecil 
 Hnt. Bank, 52 Fed. 515. So when taken by a party before he 
 becomes party to the suit. Eiviere v. Wilkens, 31 Tex. Civ. 
 App. 454, 72 S. W. 608. 
 
 So where a party declines to introduce his witness for cross- 
 examination, the direct examination will be suppressed. So 
 when ans-wers taken stenographically, and not reduced to writ- 
 ing in the presence of the witness, or read over to him. Mol- 
 ler V. United States, 6 C. C. A. 459, 13 U. S. App. 472, 57 
 Fed. 491 ; Cook v. Burnley, 11 Wall. 668, 20 L. ed. 30. But 
 see Bird v. Halsy, 87 Fed. 677, not applying rule to deposi- 
 tions taken in a foreign country. So when witness refuses to 
 answer a material question. Bird v. Halsy, 87 Fed. 674. But 
 not where no effort is made to make him answer, and no notice 
 or intention to suppress, and two terms intervene before a 
 
motion to suppress is made. Ibid. But it seems exception 
 must be noted before examiner. Ibid. Doane v. Glenn, 21 
 Wall. 35, 22 L. ed. 476; McClaskey v. Barr, 48 Fed. 138. 
 While you can not prevent a party from taking irrelevant tes- 
 timony, yet they will be suppressed if none of the answers are 
 relevant. Griffith v. Shaw, 89 Fed. 313 ; First Xat. Bank v. 
 Eush, 29 C. C. A. 333, 56 U. S. App. 556, 85 Fed. 541. 
 
 Motion to Suppress. 
 
 As before seen, in stating the cause for suppressing deposi- 
 tions, the motion must be made before the case is called for 
 trial at law. Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S. 481, 37 L. ed. 819, 13 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 950; Bird v. Halsy, 87 Fed. 672; Howard v. 
 Stillwell & B. Mfg. Co. 139 U. S. 199, 35 L. ed. 147, 11 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 500; Stegner v. Blake, 36 Fed. 184. There must be 
 given an opportunity to correct the deposition, or the defects 
 in taking, to which objections have been made. Ibid. ; Doane 
 V. Glenn, 21 Wall. 35, 22 L. ed. 476; McClaskey v. Barr, 48 
 Fed. 138 ; The Holladay Case, 27 Fed. 842 ; Xew York Mfg. 
 Co. V. Illinois C. E. Co. 3 Wall. 113, 114, is L. ed. 172; 
 Shutte V. Thompson, 15 Wall. 160, 21 L. ed. 126; Samuel 
 Bros. V. Hostetter Co. 55 C. C. A. Ill, 118 Fed. 257. This 
 rule, it is said, may be relaxed when returned just before trial. 
 New York Mfg. Co. v. Illinois C. E. Co. 3 Wall. 107-114, 
 18 L. ed. 170-172. 
 
 In equity all technical objections must be presented by mo- 
 tion before the case is set for hearing. (Authorities above.) 
 Where the evidence is irrelevant, or other substantial objection 
 exists, as being hearsay, secondary, or irresponsive, it may be 
 taken when evidence is offered at the hearing, and not by mo- 
 tion to suppress. First I^Fat. Bank v. Eush, 29 C. C. A. 333, 
 56 U. S. App. 556, 85 Fed. 542 ; Lott v. King, 79 Tex. 293, 
 15 S. W. 231. When a motion to suppress is necessary, it is 
 only necessary to state specifically the grounds upon which it 
 is based, and a prayer to suppress, and to be filed, as indicated 
 above, in such time that opportunity for curing the defect may 
 be given. 
 
SUPPRESSING DEPOSITIONS. 543 
 
 Effect of Death On. 
 
 A deposition of a party as to transactions with another party, 
 taken while the latter is alive, may be used when the suit is 
 revived in the name of his representatives. Sheidley v. Ault- 
 man, IS Fed. 666; McMullen v. Eitchie, 64 Fed. 253, 266; 
 See Ruch v. Eock Island, 97 U. S. 694, 24 L. ed. 1101 ; United 
 States L. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 42 G. C. A. 601, 102 Fed. 722. 
 And this, too, though the party with whom the transaction was 
 had dies before his evidence was taken. Ibid. As to offering 
 testimony of deceased witness at law see Nome Beach Lighter- 
 age & Transp. Co. v. Standard M. Ins. Co. 156 Fed. 484," 485, 
 and cases cited. 
 
 When Destroyed. 
 
 When the depositions are destroyed by fire or other accident, 
 copies may be used, though the witness be living. U. S. Rev. 
 Stat. sees. 899, 900 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 1513, 1514). Steb- 
 bins V. Duncan, 108 U. S. 46, 27 L. ed. 646, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 313. See Ruch v. Rock Island, 97 Fed. 693, 124 L. ed. 1101, 
 as to reproducing the evidence of deceased witness. 
 
 Evidence in a Former Case. 
 
 Evidence taken in a former case is only secondary and is 
 incompetent unless a foundation is laid, as, that the witnesses 
 are dead or unavoidably absent. Ecaubert v. Appleton, 15 
 C. C. A. 73, 35 U. S. App. 221, 67 Fed. 917 ; Dover v. Green- 
 wood, 177 Fed. 947; Diamond Coal & Coke Co. v. Allen, 71 
 C. C. A. 107, 137 Fed. 706; Toledo Traction Co. v. Cameron, 
 69. C. 0. A. 28, 137 Fed. 49. 
 
CHAPTEE LXXXVI. 
 
 DEPOSITIONS ON LAW SIDE. 
 
 Before closing the discussion of depositions, I wish to briefly 
 speak of depositions de bene esse taken in a cause at law in 
 the Federal courts. We have seen that sec. 863, United States 
 Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1472), provides for 
 taking depositions when the witness lives at a greater distance 
 than one hundred miles from the place of trial, or is bound on 
 a sea voyage, or about to go out of the United States, or when 
 aged and iniirm, or when a single witness to a material fact. 
 Bird V. Halsy, 87 Fed. 676, 677 ; Lowrey v. Kusworm, 66 Fed. 
 539; see Frost v. Barber, 173 Fed. 847; Zych v. American 
 Car & Foundry Co. 127 Fed. 724. We have seen that this 
 statute applies in equity as well as law (Stegner v. Blake, 36 
 Fed. 184), but that in its application in equity the provisions 
 other than the clause referring to the distance of the witness 
 from the place of' trial were the grounds for taking the deposi- 
 tions in equity before issue joined only. 
 
 At law, unless one or more of these conditions exist, you 
 cannot take the evidence of a vsdtness by deposition in the 
 United States courts, but must have him at the trial, to be 
 examined orally. Ibid. ; Diamond Coal & Coke Co. v. Allen, 
 71 C. C. A. 107, 137 Fed. 705, 706 ; Compania Azucarera Cu- 
 bana v. Ingraham, 180 Fed. 516 ; IsTational Cash Register Co. 
 V. Leland, 37 C. C. A. 372, 94 Fed. 502 ; Texas & P. R. Co. 
 V. Wilder, 35 C. C. A. 105, 92 Fed. 957, 958; Henning v. 
 Boyle, 112 Fed. 397; Hartman v. Feenaughty, 139 Fed. 888; 
 Importers' & T. ^at Bank v. Lyons, 134 Fed. 510, 511. 
 But it seems the rule does not apply when depositions are taken 
 in answer to a rule to show cause where facts disputed. Im- 
 porters' & T. Nat. Bank v. Lyons, 134 Fed. 512. This has 
 not been the practice in the Federal courts sitting in Texas, 
 for depositions have been taken and read under the State prac- 
 
 544 
 
DEPOSITIC:SS ON LAW SIDE. 545 
 
 tice, and without objection. This practice was evidently based 
 upon a rule adopted in 1872 in the western district of Texas 
 (equity rule 15), permitting depositions to be taken as in the 
 State courts (^Yarren v. Younger, 18 Fed. 859), and in 1880 
 in the northern district of Texas upon a similar rule, promul- 
 gated by Judges Woods and MeCormick. Ibid. However, the 
 rule as promulgated conflicts with the act of Congress, and is 
 not new the practice. 
 
 In 1892, as before stated, Congress permitted depositions to 
 be taken in the mode prescribed by the State laws and prac- 
 tice, but, as we have before seen, this merely simplified the 
 practice without enlarging the conditions under which deposi- 
 tions could be taken in the Federal courts. Texas & P. R. Co. 
 V. Wilder, 35 C. C. A. 105, 92 Fed. 957 ; Xational Cash Reg- 
 ister Co. V. Leland, 37 C. C. A. 372, 94 Fed. 502, s. c. 77 
 Fed. 242; Despeaux v. Pennsylvania R Co. 81 Fed. 897. 
 This act of 1892 has been frequently construed, and, without 
 further discussion, I will give the rules that have been evolved, 
 which control the practice on the law side of the Federal courts 
 in taking the testimony of witnesses by deposition. 
 
 First. The State statutes do not affect the causes or grounds 
 for taking depositions on the law side. United States v. 50 
 Boxes & Packages of Lace, 92 Fed. 601. 
 
 Second. That depositions taken from a witness living with- 
 in one hundred miles from the place of trial cannot be read 
 in evidence, and the distance is to be determined by taking the 
 ordinaiy, usual, and shortest route of public travel (Jennings 
 V. Menaugh, 118 Fed. 612; see authorities above; Mutual Ben. 
 L. Ins. Co. V. Eobison, 22 L.E.A. 325, 7 C. C. A. 444, 19 
 U. S. App. 266, 58 Fed. 732 ; Texas & P. R Co. v. Eeagan, 
 55 C. C. A. 427, 118 Fed. 817; Whitford v. Clark County, 
 119 U. S. 522, 30 L. ed. 500, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 306), unless 
 the witness was aged and infirm, or the gTound for taking came 
 under the other conditions of sec. 863, United States Revised 
 Statutes. 
 
 Third. That the act of 1892 did not change this rule. 
 
 Shellabarger v. Oliver, 64 Fed. 306; Seeley v. Kans'^s City 
 
 Star Co. 71 Fed. 555; National Cash Register Co. v. Leland, 
 
 77 Fed. 242. 
 
 Fourth. That even where the depositions have been taken, 
 S. Eq.— 35. 
 
546 DEPOSITION'S o>r law side. 
 
 in a State court, of a witness who lives within one hundred 
 miles of the place of trial, they cannot be read in the Federal 
 court when the case has been removed thereto, if the suit be 
 at law (Ibid.; Texas & P. R Co. y. Wilder, 35 C. C. A. 105, 
 92 Fed. 958; Toledo Traction Co. v. Cameron, 69 C. C. A. 
 28, 137 Fed. 59), unless the witness was dead when offered. 
 (United States L. Ins. Co. v. Eoss, 42 C. C. A. 601, 102 Fed. 
 722 ; Toledo Traction Co. v. Cameron, supra. ) 
 
 The words "must live a greater distance than one hundred 
 miles" has been construed to mean that when the deposition 
 was taken, where the witness was at the time found sojourn- 
 ing, or abiding for his health, was the point to which the dis- 
 tance was calculated, in order to determine its admission (Mu- 
 tual Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Eobison, 22 L. E. A. 325, 7 C. C. A. 
 444, 19 U. S. App. ,266, 58 Fed. 724), and it seems courts will 
 take judicial notice of the distance. (Ibid. 732.) 
 
 Fifth. It cannot be taken before trial, but orally in court. 
 Importers' & T. Xat. Bank v. L\ons, 134 Fed. 511. 
 
 Sixth. Though deposition taken, it cannot be read if the 
 witness is in court. U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 865 (Comp. Stat. 
 1913, sec. 1474) ; Whitford v. Clark County, 119 U. S. 524, 
 30 L. ed. 500, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 306 ; Texas & P. E. Co. v. Wild- 
 er, 35 C. C. A. 105, 92 Fed. 958. But this rule not applicable 
 to depositions taken under a dedimus. Ibid. 
 
 Special Federal Statutes Controlling Evidence. 
 
 I will here add without discussion reference to certain special 
 statutes affecting the admission of record evidence in the trial 
 of civil causes in the Federal courts. 
 
 U. S. Eev. Stat. sees. 883 to 896 (Comp. Stat. 1918, sees. 
 1495-1498, 1500-1509), provide for the admission of copies 
 of all documents from the various departments of the govern- 
 ment. United States v. Brelin, 92 C. C. A. 88, 166 Fed. 104. 
 
 Sections 899 to 901 provide for restoring lost judgments and 
 records of the Federal courts and their admission as evidence. 
 Cornett v. Williams (Nash v. Williams) 20 Wall. 226, 22 
 L. ed. 254 ; O'Hara v. Mobile & 0. E. Co. 22 C. C. A. 512, 
 40 U. S. App. 471, 76 Fed. 718 ; Union & Planters' Bank v. 
 Memphis, 49 C. C. A. 455, 111 Fed. 561; Embry v. Palmer, 
 107 U. S. 3, 27 L. ed. 346, 2 Sup. Ct. Eep. 25. 
 
DEPOSITIONS ON LAW SIDE. 547 
 
 Section 005 provides for the admission in evidence of acts 
 of the State legislation, also the records and judicial proceed- 
 ings of the courts of States and Territories, and how they are 
 to be ant^lienticated or proved. Israel v. Israel, 130 Fed. 237 ; 
 Bohlander v. Heikes, 91 C. C. A. 298, 168 Fed. 886; National 
 Acci. Soc. V. Spiro, 37 C. C. A. 388, 94 Fed. 750. 
 
 Section 906 provides for the admission of all records, and 
 exemplification of books, which may be kept in any piiblic 
 office of any State or Territory not appertaining to a court. 
 Williams v.' United States, 137 U. S. 113, 34 L. ed. 590, 11 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 43. 
 
 Section 907 provides for the admission of copies of foreign 
 records relating to land titles in the United States. 
 
 Section 908 provides that the puhlication of the laws and 
 treaties of the United States by Little, Brown & Co. shall be 
 competent evidence of the public and private acts of Congress 
 and of the treaties therein contained, in all courts of law and 
 equity of the United States and the several States without 
 further proof. 
 
 Who May Use the Deposition. 
 
 One may use any part of a deposition taken by the other 
 side. H. Scherer & Co. v. Everest, 94 C. C. A. 346, 168 Fed. 
 827, and cases cited. 
 
 Cost Allowed in Taking and Reading. 
 
 U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 824 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1378) ; 
 Matheson v. Hanna-Schoelkopf Co. 128 Fed. 163 ; L. E. Water- 
 man Co. V. Lockwood, 128 Fed. 174; United States use of 
 Hudson Eiver Stone Supply Co. v. Venable Const. Co. 158 Fed. 
 833; Kissinger-Iron Co. v. Bradford Belting Co. 59 C. C. A. 
 221, 123 Fed. 91 ; Missouri v. Illinois, 202 U. S. 598, 50 L. 
 ed. 1160, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 713; Ingham v. Pierce, 37 Fed. 
 647; Broyles v. Buck, 37 Fed. 137. 
 
CKAPTEE LXXXVII. 
 
 DISMISSAL BY THE COL'ET. 
 
 Having brought the cause up to the point of final hearing, 
 I will again call your attention to the fact that it is the duty 
 of the court to guard against imposition upon its jurisdiction, 
 and to dismiss the cause whenever it appears from the record 
 that its jurisdiction has been imposed upon. Section 5 of the 
 act of 1875, 18 Stat, at L. 470, chap. 137 (Comp. Stat. 1913, 
 sec. 1019), provides that at any time after filing a suit in the 
 United States court, it should appear that such siiit does not 
 substantially involve a suit or controversy properly within the 
 jurisdiction of the court,, or that parties have been collusively 
 or improperly joined in order to make a case cognizable in the 
 Federal court, the court shall proceed no further, but shall 
 dismiss the case. Excelsior Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pacific Bridge 
 Co. 185 U. S. 287, 46 L. ed. 913, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681 ; Penn- 
 sylvania Co. V. Bay, 138 Fed. 205 and cases cited. Kreider 
 V. Cole, 79 C. C. A. 339, 149 Fed. 647. Judicial Code, sec. 
 37 (Comp. Stat.' 1913, sec. 1019); Baum v. Longwell, 200 
 Fed. 450. 
 
 It is seen by this act that it is a duty devolving upon the 
 court without reference to the action of counsel, to dismiss the 
 case if it comes within the condemnation of the act, and does 
 not substantially involve a controversy properly within the 
 jurisdiction of the court, and this duty is mandatory, when the 
 conditions authorizing a dismissal are apparent, or developed 
 by the facts in the trial of the case. Grand Trunk E. Co. v. 
 Twitchell, 8 C. C. A. 237, 21 U. S. App. 45, 59 Fed. 727; 
 Farming-ton v. Pillsbury, 114 U. S. 144, 29 L. ed. 116, 5 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 807; Briggs v. Traders' Co. 145 Fed. 254; Koike v. 
 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 157 Fed. 623; Baxter, S. & S. 
 Const. Co. V. Hammond Mfg. Co. 154 Fed. 992; Minnesota 
 V. ITorthem Securities Co. 194 U. S. 65, 66, 48 L. ed. 878, 
 879, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 598 ; Steigleder v. McQuesten, 198 U. 
 
 548 
 
DISMISSAL BY THE COURT. 549 
 
 S. 141, 49 L. ed. 986, 25 Sup. Ct. Kep. 616; Wetmore >. 
 Eymer, 169 U. S. '120, 42 L. ed. 684, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 293; 
 see Howe v. Howe & 0. Ball Bearing Co. 154 Fed. 822, and 
 cases cited. The provision is a salutary one (Williams v. IST Ot- 
 tawa, 104 U. S. 212, 26 L. ed. 720), and evidently intended 
 to confine the Federal courts within the limits of the jurisdic- 
 tion as enlarged by the jurisdictional and removal act of 1875. 
 Simon V. House, 46 Fed. 319 ; Hartog v. Memory, 116 U. S. 
 588, 29 L. ed. 725, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 521. 
 
 Under section 5 of the act of 1875, 18 Stat, at L. 470, chap. 
 137 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1019), the court will, of its own 
 motion, dismiss a case where the jurisdictional ground is not 
 apparent in the bill. Carlsbad v. Tibbetts, 51 Fed. 852 ; Tins- 
 ley V. Hoot, 3 C. C. A. 612, 2 U. S. App. 548, 53 Fed. 682; 
 King Bridge Co. v. Otoe County, 120 U. S. 226, 30 L. ed. 
 624, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 552 ; Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U. S. 
 587, 32 L. ed. 543, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 173 ; Hartog v. Memory, 
 116 U. S. 591, 29 L. ed. 726, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 521 ; Morris 
 V. Gihner, 129 TJ. S. 327, 32 L. ed. 694, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 289; 
 Kreider v. Cole, 79 C. C. A. 339, 149 Fed. 647; Anderson 
 V. Bassman, 140 Fed. 12, 13. (See chapter 35.) But I wish 
 briefly, but more particularly, to discuss the dismissal of the 
 suit by the court when the evidence taken in the case develops 
 the absence of jurisdiction. 
 
 Prior to 1875, as has been before stated, when the jurisdic- 
 tional fact 'was properly alleged, though untrue, it could only 
 be attacked by plea, and a plea to the merits waived it. Jones 
 V. League, 18 How. 81, 15 L. ed. 264; Hartog v. Memory, 116 
 U. S. 590, 591, 29 L. ed. 726, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 521. But since 
 the statute, a plea is not absolutely necessary to dismiss if dur- 
 ing the progTCss of the cause, or at the final hearing, the want 
 of jurisdiction is made apparent; the court is required to 
 dismiss without any suggestion of counsel. 
 
 But the question arises, how and to what extent it must be 
 made apparent that there is a want of jurisdiction, in order 
 to invoke the action of the court, when there is no plea, or the 
 issue not raised. The rule seems to be that the facts upon 
 which the court will act must amount to a legal certainty ; that 
 a mere impression, though it may amount to a moral certainty 
 that the jurisdiction has been imposed upon, will not be suf- 
 ficient to require the court to dismiss the case under the act, 
 
550 DISMISSAL BT THE COUBT. 
 
 and it is held that this is the true interpretation of the words 
 of the fifth section, "that it should appear to the satisfaction 
 of the court." Ibid. ; Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 559, 29 
 L. ed. Y32, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 501 ; Gubbins v. Laughtenschlager, 
 75 Fed. 621 J Howe v. Howe & O. Ball Bearing Co. 83 C. C. 
 A. 536, 154 Fed. 820; Holden v. Utah & M. Machinery Co. 
 82 Fed. 210; Hayward v. Wordeberg Mfg. Co. 29 C. C. A. 
 438, 54 U. S. App. 639, 85 Fed. 6-10; Deputron v. Young, 
 134 U. S. 252, 33 L. ed. 929, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 539. It may 
 be made. apparent by affidavit; no distinct method stated. Mor- 
 ris V. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 327, 32 L. ed. 694, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep, 
 289 ; Anderson v. Bassman, 140 Fed. 13. 
 
 Then it may be said that the provisions of section 5 do not 
 avoid, unless there appears from the evidence a legal certainty 
 that the 'jurisdiction has been imposed upon. But this would 
 not be the rule, if you pleaded to the jurisdiction; only the 
 preponderance of proof, or the reasonable certainty, would be 
 sufficient to support a dismissal of the cause under a plea. 
 Ibid. ; in Hartog v. Memory, 116 U. S. 588, 29 L. ed. 725, 6 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 521, it is said that to attack the jurisdiction by 
 evidence, you must plead it (Marine & River Phosphate Min. 
 & Mfg. Co. V. Bradley, 105 U. S. 181, 26 L. ed. 1036, and 
 Deputron v. Young, 134 U. S. 241, 33 L. ed. 923, 10 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 539). It is said, if the jurisdictional allegation is 
 not traversed, no question involving the capacity of the party 
 to sue can be made. Kennedy v. Solar Ref. Co. 69. Fed. 717 ; 
 see Hewitt v. Story, 39 Fed. 160, 161. In the light of the 
 fifth section of the act of 1875, these cases must mean that if 
 you do not plead to the jurisdiction, you cannot offer any direct 
 evidence showing a want of jurisdiction, and that the proof 
 to create the legal certainty upon which the court can act must 
 clearly appear from the evidence legitimately drawn out on the 
 other material issues in the case. Ibid. 
 
 To illustrate, we will assume that the case rests upon di- 
 versity of citizenship for jurisdiction, which is properly, but 
 not truly, alleged; no plea is interposed, but perhaps the ques- 
 tion may be directly asked as to the citizenship of a party; 
 there being no issue, the answer could not be used upon which 
 to base the dismissal, but should the same fact be developed 
 
DISMISSAL BY THE OOUKT. 551 
 
 in the answers to questions on material issues in the case, then 
 it would he sufficient to sustain a dismissal of the cause. 
 
 For ^Yant of Parties. 
 
 The court may dismiss of its own motion when it appears 
 that an indispensable party has not been joined, and when the 
 joinder would defeat jurisdiction. Fourth Xat. Bank v. ISTew 
 Orleans & C. E. Co. 11 Wall. 631, 20 L. ed. 83; Taylor v. 
 Holmes, 14 Fed. 515; Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 139, 15 
 L. ed. 160. Or where indispensable parties cannot be served. 
 Jones V. Gould, 80 C. C. A. 1, 149 Fed. 159, and cases cited. 
 Or the court may dismiss at the hearing for want of parties, 
 where the objection has been made at the beginning of the suit, 
 and the plaintiff has failed to set it down for hearing on the 
 objection, and it appeared at the trial the objection was well 
 taken. Equity rule 43 ; Olds Wagon ^^'orks v. Benedict, 14 
 C. C. A. 285, 32 U. S. App. 116, 67 Fed. 5 ; See ilansfield, 
 C. & L. M. E. Co. V. Swan, 111 U. S. 382-384, 28 L. ed. 
 463, 464, 4 Sup. Ct. Eep. 510. 
 
 So the court will dismiss a bill when it appears that pend- 
 ing the suit the plaintiff has parted with his title, and no bill 
 in the nature of a supplemental bill has been filed. Campbell 
 V. Xew York, 35 Fed. 14 ; Hazleton Tripod-Boiler Co. v. Citi- 
 zens' Street E. Co. 72 Fed. 325 ; Brown v. Fletcher, 140 Fed. 
 639; Miller v. Wattier, 165 Fed. 362. But the dismissal 
 should be without prejudice (Kendig v. Dean, 97 U. S. 423, 
 24 L. ed. 1061),, because a general dismissal would create the 
 presumption that it was on the merits. Baker v. Cummings, 
 181 U. S. 125, 45 L. ed. 780, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 578; Greene 
 V. United Shoe Machinery Co. 60 C. C. A. 93, 124 Fed. 964; 
 see iS^ational Foundry & Pipe Works v. Oconto Water Supply 
 Co. 183 U. S. 234, 46 L. ed. 169, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 111. 
 
 Want of Equity. 
 
 If on the trial the case shows that there is no equity in the 
 bill, and the jurisdiction of the court was not sought in good 
 faith, the court will of its own motion dismiss the bill (Fou- 
 geres v. Jones, 66 Fed. 316; Mitchell v. Dowell, 13 Fed. 141, 
 
552 DISMISSAL BY THE COUET. 
 
 s. c. 105 U. S. 432, 26 L. ed. 1143 ; Cherokee I^Tation v. South- 
 ern Kansas K. Co. 33 Fed. 915; Alger v. Anderson, 92 Fed. 
 710 ; Thompson v. Central Ohio K. Co. 6 Wall. 13Y, 18 L. ed. 
 767; Kramer v. Cohn, 119 U. S. 357, 30 L. ed. 440, 7 Sup. 
 Ct. Kep. 277; see "Adequate Remedy at Law"), but without 
 prejudice to a suit at law. (Sanders v. Devereux, 8 C. 0. A. 
 629, 19 TJ. S. App. 630, 60 Fed. 311). 
 
 By new rule 22, if at any time it appears that a suit com- 
 menced in equity should have been brought at law, it shall 
 forthwith be transferred to the law side to be tried there after 
 recasting the pleadings if necessary. However, since the pro- 
 mulgation of the above rule, Congress on March 3d, 1915, added 
 sec. 274 (a) to the Judicial Code as follows: 
 
 "CI. 1. In case said courts shall find that a suit at law 
 should have been brought in equity, or a suit in equity should 
 have been brought at law, the court shall order any amendments 
 to the pleading necessary to conform them to the proper prac- 
 tice. Any party may amend his pleadings to obviate the objec- 
 tion that his suit is brought on the wrong side. 
 
 "CI. 2. The cause shall proceed and be determined upon 
 such amended pleadings, and all evidence taken in the case 
 before the amendment is admissible." 
 
 It will be noticed under this act, that at any stage of the 
 cause, the objections mentioned in the act may be obviated by 
 amendment, and the trial proceed on the pleadings as amended. 
 
 Assuming that the objections are made after the case has 
 gone to trial in a court of law, or equity; in the one case with 
 a jury, and in the other case without a jury, what order should 
 be made if the objection is sustained ? In the light of past 
 decisions, if the case is brought on the equity side when it 
 should have been brought at law, and the pleadings are amended 
 to conform to a lawsuit and the case proceeds as at law, the 
 coart must respect the constitutional right of a trial by jury, 
 and order a jury, if not waived by consent in writing by both 
 parties. See Jury. This perhaps would stop the proceedings 
 until a jury could be impaneled. On the other hand, if the 
 suit is brought at law and on trial before a jury, when it should 
 have been brought in equity, and by the amended pleadings it 
 must proceed as a suit in equity, there would be no objection 
 to the court proceeding with the case before the jury, under the 
 
DISMISSAL BY THE OOUKT. 553 
 
 power of a chancellor to submit the issues of fact in an equity 
 cause to a jury — not, however, being bound by the verdict as at 
 law. Where no real dispute remains, the court may dismiss. 
 Allen V. Georgia, 166 U. S. 140, 41 L. ed. 949, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 525 ; Lewis Pub. Co. v. Wyman, 104 C. C. A. 453, 182 Fed. 
 14; see Eobinson v. American Car & Foundry Co. 132 Fed. 
 166. 
 
 lT7),e?i Collusively Ohtahied. 
 
 The fifth section of the act of 1875 says the court must 
 guard itself against fraudulent collusion to obtain jurisdiction. 
 This means combination of any kind by which jurisdiction is 
 obtained fraudulently (Coffin v. Haggin, 7 Sawy. 509, 11 Fed. 
 224) ; and when the evidence discloses the fact (Lehigh ilin. 
 & ilfg. Co. V. Kelly, 160 U. S. 342, 40 L. ed. 450, 16 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 307; Cilley v. Patten, 62 Fed. 500; Hayden v. i\[an- 
 ning, 106 U. S. 588, 27 L. ed. 306, 1 Sup. Ct. Eep. 617 ; Mar- 
 vin v. Ellis, 9 Fed. 367) ; or where the ground for jurisdiction 
 . sought is frivolous or fictitious (Douglas v. Wallace, 161 U. 
 S. 348, 40 L. ed. 728, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 485; Llamblin v. 
 Western Land Co. 147 U. S. 532, 37 L. ed. 268, 13 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 353 ; Wilson v. K'orth Carolina, 169 U. S. 595, 42 L. ed. 
 871, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 435 ; see Ee Metropolitan E. Eeceiver- 
 ship (Ee Eeisenberg) 208 U. S. 91, 52 L. ed. 403, 28 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 219, and Chicago v. Mills, 204 U. S. 321, 51 L. ed. 
 504, 27 Sup. Ct. Eep. 286; Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. Xew 
 York City E. Co. 157 Fed. 441). Thus collusive assignments 
 will be gTound for dismissal (Farmington v. Pillsbury, 114 
 U. S. 144-146, 29 L. ed. 116, 117, 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 807; 
 Kreider v. Cole, 79 C. C. A. 339, 149 Fed. 656 ; McLean v. 
 Clark, 31 Fed. 501, 502 ; ISTorton v. European & JST. A. E. Co. 
 32 Fed. 865 ; Detroit v. Dean, 106 U. S. 541, 27 L. ed. 302, 
 1 Sup. Ct. Eep. 500; TurnbuU v. Eoss, 72 C. C. A. 609. 141 
 Fed. 649-652, and cases cited. Slaughter v. Mallet Land & 
 Cattle Co. 72 C. C. A. 430, 141 Fed. 282; Lake County v. 
 Dudley, 173 U. S. 253, 43 L. ed. 688, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 398, 
 and cases cited. Greenwalt v. Tucker, 10 Fed. 884; Coffin 
 V. Haggin, 7 Sawy. 509, 11 Fed. 219; Fountain v. Angelica, 
 12 Fed, 8) ; or fraudulent making of parties; or when the case 
 
554 DISMISSAL BY THE COUET. 
 
 is dishonestly brought to force a compromise which develops in 
 the evidence (ibid.), it is the duty of the court to exercise the 
 power (Simon v. House, 46 Fed. 319; Williams v. Xottawa, 
 104 U. S. 212, 213, 26 L. ed. 720, 721 ; Hartog v. Memory, 
 116 U. S. 590, 29 L. ed. 726, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 521) ; and if 
 the court should suspect the conditions as stated above to exist, 
 it should institute proceedings of its own motion to discover 
 it (Hartog v. Memory, 116 TJ. S. 591, 29 L. ed. 726, 6 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 521; Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 327, 32 L. ed. 694, 
 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 289) ; but collusive arrangements will not be 
 inferred. (Ashley v. Presque Isle County, 8 C. C. A. 455, 16 
 U. S. App. 656, 709, 60 Fed. 55, 56; Mills v. Chicago, 143 
 Fed. 431, 432). 
 
 Effect of Dismissal. 
 
 A dismissal of a case ordinarily stands on the same footing as 
 a judgment at law, and will be presumed to be final and conclu- 
 sive unless the contrary appears in the proceedings or decree of 
 the court. Graves v. Faurot, 64 Fed. 242 ; Stewart v. Ashta- 
 bula, 98 Fed. 518, 519 ; Durant v. Essex Co. 7 \Yall. 109, 19 
 L. ed. 156; Kilham v. Wilson, 50 C. C. A. 454, 112 Fed. 573; 
 Fowler v. Osgood, 4 L.E.A.(N.S..) 824, 72 C. C. A. 276, 141. 
 Fed. 24. So in all these cases when the objection does not go to 
 the merits of the case the judgment of dismissal should always 
 be "without prejudice." Baker v. Cummings, 181 U. S. 125, 
 45 L. ed. 780, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 578 ; American Surety Co. v. 
 Choctaw Constr. Co. 68 C. C. A. 199, 135 Fed. 487; Greene 
 V. United Shoe Machinery Co. 60 C. C. A. 93, 124 Fed. 964; 
 Sanders v. Devereux, 8 C. C. A. 629, 19 V S. App. 630, 60 
 Fed. 311 ; Swan Land & Cattle Co. v. Frank, 148 U. S. 612, 
 37 L. ed. 580, 13 Sup.. Ct. Eep. 691 ; Security Sav. & L. Asso. 
 V. Buchanan, 14 C. C. A. 97, 31 U. S. App. 244, 66 Fed. 803; 
 Elkhart IvTat. Bank v. l^rorthwestem Guaranty Loan Co. 30 
 C. C. A. 632, 58 U. S. App. 83, 87 Fed. 255. As to the effect 
 of a judgment "without prejudice," see Eobinson v. American 
 Car & Foundry Co. 142 Fed. 171. 
 
 In determining the effect of the dismissal the opinion may 
 be looked to for ground of dismissal. Baker v. Cummings, 
 181 U. S. 125, 45 L. ed. 780, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 578 ; see ISTa- 
 
DISMISSAL BY THE COUET. 555 
 
 tional Foundry & Pipe ^Yorks v. Oconto Water Supply Co. 
 183 U. S. 23-i, 46 L. ed. 169, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. Ill; United 
 States ex rel. Coffman v. Norfolk & W. K. Co. 114 Fed. 686. 
 
 For Want of Prosecution. 
 
 By new rule 57, where a case has been dropped from the 
 calendar upon continuance by parties, it may, upon applica- 
 tion, be reinstated in one year. If no application is made 
 within the time, it will be dismissed without prejudice. When 
 a suit is dismissed by the court for want of prosecution it is 
 not a bar to another suit (Whitaker v. Davis, 91 Fed. 721; 
 Eobinson v. American Car & Foundry Co. 142 Fed. 171) ; 
 nor when dismissed for failure to observe a rule of court (Eyan 
 V. Seaboard K. K. Co. 89 Fed. 397). 
 
 Costs on Dismissal. 
 
 When a bill is dismissed for want of jurisdiction the court 
 cannot decree costs. Citizens' Bank v. Cannon, 164 U. S. 324, 
 41 L. ed. 453, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 89 ; see Rucker v. Wheeler, 
 127 U. S. 92,. 32 L. ed. 105, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1142; Hornthall 
 V. The Collector (Hornthall v. Keary) 9 Wall. 560, 567, 19 
 L. ed. 562. See Westfeldt v. North Carolina Min. Co. 100 
 C. C. A. 552, 177 Fed. 132. 
 
 Continuances of Case by Parties — Effect. 
 
 New rules 56 and 57 were intended to force speedy trials by 
 limiting the right to continue the cause beyond the term, after 
 it has been placed on the trial calendar. These rules provide 
 that after the time for taking testimony as fixed by the new- 
 rules the case shall be placed on the trial calendar. After being 
 so placed, it may be passed over to another day of the term, 
 but shall not be continued beyond the term save in exceptional 
 cases, upon good cause shown by affidavit, and upon terms the 
 court may deem just. If the continuance is granted by consent, 
 it will be allowed by the court only when the consent is signed 
 by counsel for all the parties and all previous costs paid. If 
 the continuance is granted, the case will be dropped from the 
 
556 DIWills.SAL BY THE OOUET. 
 
 trial calendar, to be reinstated on aiDplication within one year. 
 If not so reinstated, the case will be dismissed. 
 
 PIISTAL HEARING. 
 
 "Final hearing" is submitting the case on its merits, or on 
 some question the determination of which will finally dispose 
 of the case. Barron v. The Mt. Eden, 87 Fed. 483, 484. 
 
 Placing the case on the trial calendar under rule 56 is equiva- 
 lent to setting it down for hearing on the regular call of the 
 docket as at law. 
 
 Effect on Previous Orders. 
 
 At the hearing all previous orders made in the case are sub- 
 ject to revision, though such changes are seldoin made, but affi- 
 davits taken before the cause was at issue cannot be used in 
 evidence in the final hearing. Lilienthal v. Washburn, 4 
 Woods, 65, 8 Fed. 707. 
 
CHAPTER LXXXVIII. 
 
 MASTERS IX CHANCEEY. 
 
 By new rule 68, which is substantially the same with old 
 rule 82, the district courts of the United States may appoint - 
 standing masters in chancery in their respective districts (a 
 majority of all the judges thereof concurring in the appoint- 
 ment), or special masters pro hac vice in any particular case. 
 This rule was amended in 1894 as to the manner of appoint- 
 ment of standing masters only. By act of March 3, 187'J, 20 
 Stat, at L. 415, chap. 179, no clerk of the United States courts, 
 or their deputies, shall be appointed a master in any case, ex- 
 cept special reasons shall exist therefor, which are to be as- 
 signed in the order of appointment. Briggs v. JSTeal, 56 C. C. 
 A. 572, 120 Fed. 224. 
 
 Nature of the Office. 
 
 The master is a judicial officer representing the court in the 
 matter referred to him. Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Gillette, 
 28 Fed. 673. Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Lochven, 74 C. C. A. 
 341, 143 Fed. 213, 6 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 573. He derives his 
 powers from the appointment and the rules of equity prescrib- 
 ing his duties, as will be hereinafter set forth, and he need not 
 give bond, nor does the validity of an order appointing him 
 depend on showing an order in the records. Seaman v. North- 
 western Mnt. L. Ins. Co. 30 C. C. A. 212, 58 U. S. App. 632, 
 86 Fed. 494. 
 
 Who to Be Appointed. 
 
 We have seen above that neither clerks nor their deputies can 
 be appointed, except under special circumstances, nor should 
 one be appointed having an interest in or a relationship to the 
 parties to the suit, but, beyond this, anyone learned in the law, 
 
 557 
 
558 MASTEES IH" C}IAKCE1!Y. 
 
 or supposed to be, may be appointed master, and the appoint- 
 ment should be made with reference to his fitness to perform 
 the duties. Hoe v. Scott, 87 Fed. 220 ; Shipman v. Straits- 
 ville Cent. Min. Co. 158 U. S. 361, 39 L. ed. 1016, 15 Sup. 
 Ct. Kep. 886 ; Finance Committee v. Warren, 27 C. C. A. 472, 
 53 U. S. App. 472, 82 Fed. 525; Ee Thomas, 35 Fed. 337, 
 338. 
 
 Object and Effect of the Appointment and When the Reference 
 
 Can he Made. 
 
 Under the old rules the appointment was purely discretionary 
 (Brown v. Grove, 25 C. C. A. 644, 42 U. S. App. 508, 80 Fed. 
 564), and when made was impervious to collateral attack 
 (Elgutter V. ]N"orthwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. 30 C. G. A. 218, 
 58 U. S. App. 643, 86 Fed. 500). The purpose of the appoint- 
 ment of a master in a case was to economize the time of the 
 court (Kansas Loan & T. Co. v. Electric R Light & P. Co. 108 
 Fed. 704; Sheffield & B. Coal, Iron & R Co. v. Gordon, 151 
 U. S. 290, 38 L. ed. 165, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 343), by assisting 
 in the various proceedings incidental to the progress of the 
 cause (Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U. S. 512, 32 L. ed. 764, 9 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 355). But by new rule 59, save in matters of account, 
 it is declared that a reference to a master shall be the exception, 
 not the rule, and shall be made only on a showing that some 
 exceptional condition requires it. The rule clearly contem- 
 plates that the court must try the case unless a party to the suit 
 may show good and sufiicient cause for a reference. I do not 
 understand that the new rule limits in any way the matters 
 incidental to the progress of the cause that may be referred, 
 but that no reference can be made except on application of 
 one of the parties, showing good cause therefor. Save in 
 matters of account the court cannot abdicate its duty by refer- 
 ence to a master on its own motion, but at the request of either 
 party, for cause, may refer any issue in the case, when neces- 
 sary to a proper and complete decree, either to a standing or 
 special master. Brown v. Grove, 25 C. C. A. 644, 42 U. S. 
 App. 508, 80 Fed. 566; Briggs v. Neal, 56 C. C. A. 572, 120 
 Fed. 225; Briggs v. IS^eal, 56 C. C. A. 572, 120 Fed. 225; 
 Babcock v. DeMott, 88 C. C. A. 64, 160 Fed. 882 ; Hatch v. 
 
MASTERS IN CILAJSTCEET. 559 
 
 Indianapolis & S. E. Co. 11 Biss. 138, 9 Fed. 856 ; Gay Mfg. 
 Co. V. Camp, 15 C. C. A. 226, 25 U. S. App. 376, 68 Fed. 68; 
 See Coliniibian Equipment Co. v. Mercantile Trust & D. Co. 
 113 Fed. 23 ; Gunn v. Brinklev Car AYorks & Mfg. Co. 13 C. 
 C. A. 529. 27 r. S. App. 779, 66 Fed. 383; McMullen Lum- 
 ber Co. V. Strother, 69 C. C. A. 433, 136 Fed. 295, 296. 
 
 Eefereiice of the Whole Case by Consent. 
 
 There is nothing in the new rule 59 that would prevent the 
 reference of the entire case VTpon law and fact to a master to 
 report his judgment thereon, where both parties consent in 
 writing and the application is based upon the consent to sub- 
 mit the controversy to such a special tribunal. Connor v. 
 United States, 131 C. C. A. 68, 214 Fed. 526, 527; Kimberly 
 V. Arms, 129 TJ. S. 512-530, 32 L. ed. 764-771, 9 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 355; Garinger v. Palmer, 61 C. C. A. 436, 126 Fed. 910, 
 911; Cleveland v. United States, 62 C. C. A. 393, 127 Fed. 
 670. See Effect of Masters Report when Reference by Consent, 
 chap. 90, p. 576. 
 
 Form of Eeference. 
 
 Should the court grant the application for reference to a 
 master, it may be prepared as follows: 
 
 Title as in bill. 
 
 This cause coming on to be heard on the pleadings (or pleadings and 
 
 proof; or on motion of to submit the issues to a master to take 
 
 and report the evidence thereon, etc. ) , and both parties appearing by coun- 
 sel, and the court having considered the same and being of opinion that it 
 is necessary to take an account ( or whatever is necessary to be referred ) , 
 it is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that this cause be referred to 
 
 the Hon , standing master of this court (or that , 
 
 Esq., be appointed a special master in chancery to whom shall be sub- 
 mitted, etc.), to ascertain and report (here set forth what the master 
 has to investigate and report). 
 
 It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the master do make and 
 
 file his report by the day of , A. D. IP ... , with the 
 
 clerk of this court to await the further order of this court. 
 
 Judge, etc. 
 
560 :ma.stees iis" chanceky. 
 
 See Edgell v. Felder, 39 C. C. A. 540, 99 Fed. 325, for 
 order appointing a Special Master. 
 
 There can 'be no reference on the law side. Gunn v. Brink- 
 ley Car Works & Mfg. Co. 13 C. C. A. 529, 27 U. S. App. 
 779, 66 Fed. 383; Cleveland v. United States, 62 C. C. A. 
 393, 127 Fed. 670 ; McMullen Lumber Co. v. Strother, 69 C. 
 C. A. 433, 136 Fed. 296. See Dartmouth College v. Inter- 
 national Paper Co. 132 Fed. 89. May appoint an auditor. 
 Fenno v. Primrose, 56 C. C. A. 313, 119 Fed. 801. 
 
 It must show without the least ambiguity what is referred 
 to the master, and should determine clearly the scope of au- 
 thority, and beyond this, parties cannot consent to have him 
 pass on any matter not in the line of the order of reference. 
 Taylor v. Kobertson, 27 Fed. 537. If the matter is by con- 
 sent, and submits the whole case to the decision of the master, 
 then you may use the following form of order: 
 
 This cause coming on to be heard upon the application of both parties 
 to refer the issues both of law and fact to a master for his investigation 
 and decision, and it appearing to the court that said cause is at issue and 
 both parties are present, consenting to the reference (or a written consent 
 of reference is on file in the cause), it is therefore ordered, adjudged and 
 decreed that said cause with its pleadings, evidence and exhibits, be 
 
 referred to to hear and determine the issues of law and fact 
 
 arising in this cause; and it is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that 
 
 shall report his conclusions of law and fact and his judgment 
 
 thereon (if desired you may add "together with the evidence upon which 
 
 he founds his conclusions") to this court by the day of , 
 
 A. D. 19. . ., and the same shall be filed to wait the further action of this 
 court. 
 
 Judge, etc. 
 
 If either party desires to make a motion for reference, the 
 following form luay be used: 
 
 Title as in bill. 
 
 And now comes A. B., plaintiff in the above cause, and moves the court 
 that the issues in this cause setting up conflicting accounts as between 
 E. jF. and C. D. (or so much of the bill as sets up a claim for damages or 
 whatever else it may be desired to refer) be referred to Richard Roe, Esq., 
 the standing master of this Honorable Court (or to appoint a special 
 master, etc.), who shall be required to inquire Into and investigate the 
 same and that he report to this court by the day of , A. 
 
MASTEES IN OHANO.EEY. 561 
 
 D. 19. . ., what, if anything, be due by reason of the claim, etc., and that 
 said report be filed subject to the further order of this court. 
 
 That said application is based upon the following grounds to wit: 
 (Here state the exceptional condition as required by rule 59, upon which 
 your application is made.) Wlierefore the plaintiff (or defendant) prays 
 the Court to grant this application. 
 
 R. F., 
 Solicitor. 
 
 ISTotice of the motion and of time and place to be heard should 
 be given to the opposite party or his counsel. 
 
 A master in chancery, being an officer of the court, should 
 be, when the appointment of a special master is asked, made 
 without suggestion of counsel, and therefore the application 
 for a special master should not name any particular person for 
 appointment. Any arrangement or agreement to appoint a spe- 
 cial master and fix his compensation in advance is improper, 
 especially when the master to be appointed is a party to the 
 understanding. Finance Committee v. Warren, 27 C. C. A. 
 472, 53 U. S. App. 472, 82 Ted. 625. Let the court select 
 the master and fix the compensation without suggestion, un- 
 less the court invites it. 
 
 Action to Be Taken After Reference Made. 
 
 When the motion is granted and the order thereon entered, 
 the mover must, within 20 days after the order is granted, or 
 such other time as the court may direct, bring the matter before 
 the master. Equity rule 59. Upon failure to do so, the adverse 
 party is at liberty forthwith to cause the proceedings to be had 
 before the master at the cost of the party procuring the refer- 
 ence. Equity rule 59. If the court refers, or the reference 
 be by consent, then the party on whom, the burden, rests to 
 prove the issue must see that the reference is made as ordered, 
 and the same rule applies if he fails to make the reference 
 within the time prescribed by the order. In either event, the 
 matter is brought before the master by delivering to him a 
 certified copy of the order of reference, and the clerk shall 
 deliver to him the pleadings, evidence, if any, and proceed- 
 ings in the cause. 
 S. Eq.— 36. 
 
562 MASTEES IN CHANCERY. 
 
 Duty of Master on Receiving Order of Reference. 
 
 As soon as the master can, after receiving the order of refer- 
 ence (equity rule 60), he should assign a time and place for 
 the hearing, and give notice to the parties, or their counsel, as 
 to the particular hour and place he will begin to take testi- 
 mony, or hear the cause, or whatever may be required by the 
 order of reference. The notice shall require their attendance, 
 and if they do not appear, he can proceed with the investiga- 
 tion, or if this cannot be done, he may adjourn the examina- 
 tion to a future day, giving notice to the absent party or par- 
 ties of such adjournment. 
 
 The master must so speed the cause as to have his report filed 
 with the clerk within the time limited by the order, unless upon 
 his application, or the application of one of the parties to the 
 court, the time has been extended (equity rule 60), and must 
 certify the cauae of delay, if any. 
 
 Authority of the Master. 
 
 The master is authorized to regulate the proceedings before 
 him. (Hoe v. Scott, 87 Eed. 220; equity rule 62.) He'has 
 full authority and power to swear and examine witnesses, or 
 have them examined in his presence toviching all matters re- 
 ferred to him. He m.ay require all books, voiichers, and papers 
 of every character relevant to the issues produced before him. 
 H® may order the examination by interrogatories, tinder a com- 
 mission to be issued by the clerk of the court, under his certifi- 
 cate, or in any other manner authorized by the acts of Con- 
 gress, or rules of equity, and he may do what is necessary to 
 reach the truth and justice of the particular matter referred 
 to him. Equity rule 62 ; Gross Printing Press Co. v. Scott, 
 119 Ped. 941. By equity rule 65 he has authority to examine 
 any creditor or other person filing a claim, either viva voce 
 or upon interrogatories, or in both modes, as the nature of the 
 case may demand. Terry v. Bank of Cape Fear, 20 Ped. 781, 
 782; Cushman & D. Mfg. Co. v. Grammes, 225 Ped. 884. 
 
 Beyond Territorial Jurisdiction. 
 
 The master can take testimony outside of the territorial juris- 
 diction of the court appointing him, and also in foreign coun- 
 
MASTEES IN CHANCERY. 563 
 
 tries (Consolidated Fastener Co. v. Columbus Button & Fas- 
 tener Co. 85 Fed. 54; Gulf & B. Valley K. Co. v. Winder, 
 26 Tex. Civ. App. 263, 63 S. W. 1046), either in person or 
 under a commission, as before stated (United States v. Stan- 
 dard Sanitary Mfg. Co. 187 Fed. 234, and cases cited; Bate 
 Eefrigerating Co. v. Gillette, 28 Fed. 673 ; Encyclopaedia Bri- 
 tannica Co. v. Werner Co. 138 Fed. 462; Western Div. of 
 AVestern N. C. E. Co. v. Drew, 3 Woods, 691, Fed. Cas. JSTo. 
 17,434). 
 
 Procedure Before the Master. 
 
 The hearing is conducted in the order of trials in court. The 
 evidence shall be taken down by the master, or by some other 
 person by his order and in his presence, who has been duly 
 sworn by the master for the particular service. 
 
 Tahing Evidence. 
 
 T'nless the master is acting as examiner only, the admission 
 and rejection of evidence rests in his sound discretion (Woos- 
 ter V. Gumbimner, 20 Fed. 167; equity rvile 62) ; but the ob- 
 jections to any proceeding had, or to any evidence admitted or 
 rejected, must be duly noted by the master (Kansas Loan & 
 T. Co. V. Electric Pt. Light & P. Co. 108 Fed. 704 ; Chadeloid 
 Ohemical Co. v. Chicago Wood Finishing Co. 173 Fed. 797; 
 Blease v. Garlington, 92 U. S. 1, 23 L. ed. 521), with the 
 grounds of objection, if it is desired to take advantage of the 
 ruling by exceptions to the master's report, as will be here- 
 inafter explained. In taking testimony the court will not enter- 
 tain a motion to instruct or control the master in the admission 
 of testimony during the investigation, or before the report is 
 made. Lull v. Clark, 22 Blatchf. 207, 20 Fed. 454; Bate Ee- 
 frigerating Co. V. Gillette, 28 Fed. 673; DeEoux v. Girard, 
 90 Fed. 537 ; Hoe v. Scott, 87 Fed. 220. 
 
 By equity rule 64 all affidavits, depositions, and documents 
 which have been previously filed, read, or used in the cause 
 may be used before him. By equity rule 63, in matters of ac- 
 counting, creditors must bring in their respective accounts in 
 the form of debits an^l credits, and anyone interested may ex- 
 
564 MASTERS IN C.HANCEKY. 
 
 amine the accounting party viva voce in reference to the same, 
 or upon interrogatories, as the master may direct. Pulliam v. 
 Pulliam, 10 Fed. 24-31. The master has great discretion in 
 adjourning for the convenience of parties and witnesses, but 
 he may refuse to adjourn to obtain additional evidence after 
 ample time has been given and long delays occasioned. Third 
 JSTat. Bank v. National Bank, 30 C. C. A. 436, 58 U. S. App. 
 148, 86 Fed. 852. 
 
 Report of the Master. 
 
 As soon as the evidence is concluded, the Master should pre- 
 pare his report in direct response to the order of reference, 
 whether the reference is to report back the evidence, or the 
 master's conclusions of fact. Equity rule 61 provides that the 
 master shall recite in his report no part of any state of facts, 
 charge, affidavit, deposition, examination, or answer brought in 
 or used before him, but they should be identified, specified, 
 and referred to, so as to inform the court as to the basis of his 
 report, and if there is substantial evidence to sustain his find- 
 ings or statement of the facts. Huttig Sash & Door Co. v. 
 Fuelle, 143 Fed. 367. In Weiss v. Haight & F. Co. 148 Fed. 
 399, it is said that it is not necessary for the master to report 
 all the evidence taken, unless required by the order of reference. 
 In Dartmouth College v. International Paper Co. 132 Fed. 91 
 (law case), a motion was made to require the master to send up 
 the testimony taken and depositions, and the court held that 
 while it was in its discretion to do so, yet it would not be ordi- 
 narily exercised after the report has been filed. In this ease 
 the reference was to ascertain the amount of damages to be 
 recovered. 
 
 When referred to hear and determine all issues, it is not 
 necessary to report his finding on all issues; a report of the 
 result is sufficient. Hecker v. Fowler, 2 Wall. 132, 17 L. ed. 
 761. 
 
 As soon as the report is prepared the master is required by 
 equity rule 66 to return the same to the clerk's office which 
 return shall be entered in the equity docket. National Folding 
 Box & Paper Co. v. Dayton Paper Novelty Co. 91 Fed. 822. 
 The parties have no vested right in it, as the report is only 
 
EXCEPTIONS TO mastek's eepoet. 565 
 
 advisory, and it may, in tlie discretion of the court, be per- 
 mitted to withdraw it for amendment or re-reference. Ibid. 824. 
 Bliss V. Anaconda Copper Min. Co. 167 Fed. 342-347. Of 
 course the report must be returned within the time required by 
 the order, unless, upon application and for cause shown, further 
 time has been allowed. 
 
 Exceptions to the Report. 
 
 By equity rule 66 the parties have twenty days from the 
 filing of the master's report within which to except, and if no 
 exceptions are filed the report stands confirmed. Decker v. 
 Smith, 225 Fed. 776 ; Ke Pierce, 210 Fed. 389. 
 
 When to he Heard. 
 
 If exceptions are filed, they shall stand for hearing before 
 the court if in session, or if not at the next sitting held there- 
 after; by adjournment or otherwise. The court will not hear 
 exceptions filed after the time given, unless occasioned by 
 fraud, accident, or mistake. Gasquet v. Crescent City Brew- 
 ing Co. 49 Fed. 494 ; Fx parte Jordan, 94 tf. S. 252, 24 L. 
 ed. 125, and the exceptions must be to the final report filed 
 and not to the draft of the report by the master. Decker v. 
 Smith, 225 Fed. 777. 
 
 Form of Exceptions. 
 
 Title as in bill. 
 
 And now comes A.D., plaintiff (or defendant), and excepts to the re- 
 port of , Esq., the standing (or special) master, filed in this cause 
 
 on the day of , A. D. 19. . ., and for cause of exception 
 
 shows : 
 
 First. That the master has in said report stated and certified that, etc. 
 (state it), whereas the master ought to have found that, etc. 
 
 Second. That the master, in the trial of the cause, permitted, over 
 exceptions taken at the time as shown by the record, one E. F. to testify 
 that, etc., when in fact the evidence was not admissible because (state 
 objections). 
 
 Third. That the master refused to allow H. R. to testify on objection of 
 (plaintiflt or defendant), who, if he had been permitted to testify, would 
 have sworn, etc., all of which was duly excepted to at the time as appears 
 of record. 
 
 And so on, stating each ground of exception. 
 
 R. F., 
 Solicitor, etc. 
 
566 EXCEPTIONS TO mastee's eepoet. 
 
 COST OF EXOEPTIOIfS. 
 
 By equity rule 67, in order to prevent frivolous exceptions, 
 or for mere delay, the party whose exceptions are overruled 
 shall, for every exception so overruled, pay $5 costs to the 
 other party, and for every exception sustained he shall be 
 allowed the same amount. 
 
CHAPTEK LXXXIX 
 
 EXCEPTIONS TO master's eepobt ( Continued. ) 
 
 Exceptions are special demurrers to the report (General 
 Fire Extinguisher Co. v. Lamar, 12 C. C. A. 501, 141 Fed. 
 353—355, and cases cited), and must point out, article by article, 
 the matter objected to and cause of objection. They should 
 be precise and raise well-defined issues. Ibid. ; Shefiield & B. 
 Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Gordon, 151 U. S. 290, 38 L. ed. 165, 
 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 343 ; Fordyce v. Omaha, K. C. & E. R. Co. 
 145 Fed. 544-557; Columbus, S. & H. R. Co.'s Appeal, 48 C. 
 C. A. 275, 109 Fed. 219. Vagnieness and generality are good 
 grounds for overruling them. Ibid. ; Re Covington, 110 Fed. 
 143 ; ]sreal v. Briggs, 110 Fed. 477. 
 
 As before stated, cases are referred to a master to economize 
 time, and if general exceptions are permitted, the court would 
 have to review the whole case, and the effect of the reference 
 thus be lost. Neal v. Briggs, 110 Fed. 478 ; Sheffield & B. 
 Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Gordon, 151 U. S. 286, 38 L. ed. 164, 
 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 343 ; Jones v. Lamar, 39 Fed. 585 ; Chand- 
 ler V. Pomeroy, 87 Fed. 267 ; Medsker v. Bonebrake, 108 U. 
 S. 71, 72, 27 L. ed. 655, 656, 2 Siip. Ct. Rep. 351. Equity 
 rule 67, to prevent frivolous exceptions for mere delay, pro- 
 vides for a party excepting to pay the costs when exceptions 
 overruled, and vice versa. 
 
 Again, when exceptions are based on irrelevancy and incom- 
 petency, or objections to evidence or witness, they must show 
 that the objections were taken before the master and preserved 
 in the record, as well as the specific grounds of the objection. 
 Equity rule 62 ; Fischer v. JS^eil, 6 Fed. 90 ; Liill v. Clark, 22 
 Blatchf . 207, 20 Fed. 454 ; Hamilton v. Southern Nevada Gold 
 & S. Min. Co. 13 Sawy. 113, 33 Fed. 567, 568, 15 Mor. Min. 
 Eep. 314; Bliss v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co. 156 Fed. 311, 
 reviewing cases. Evanston v. Gunn, 99 U. S. 665, 25 L. ed. 
 
 567 
 
568 WAIVING EXCEPTIONS. 
 
 307 ; Burton v. Driggs, 20 Wall. 133, 22 L. ed. 301 ; Wooster v. 
 Gumbirnner, 20 Fed. 167 ; Celluloid Mfg. Co. v. Cellonite Mfg. 
 Co. 40 Fed. 476 ; Gay Mfg. Co. v. Camp, 15 C. C. A. 226, 25 
 U. S. App. 376, 68 Fed. 67 ; See Gray v. JSTew York Nat. Bldg. 
 & L. Asso. 125 Fed. 512. Exceptions must be supported by 
 the statement of the master, or by the evidence, to which 
 attention must be called (Jaffrey v. Brown, 29 Fed. 477; 
 Cutting V. Florida R & ISTav. Co. 43 Fed. 743; Farrar v. 
 Bernheim, 20 C. C. A. 496, 41 IJ. S. App. 172, 74 Fed. 438; 
 s. c. 21 C. C. A. 264, 75 Fed. 136; Sheffield & B. Coal, Iron 
 & R. Co. V. Gordon, 151 U. S. 285-293, 38 L. ed. 164-166, 
 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 343: McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 Fed. 
 112) ; and the particular error, or erroneous principle upon 
 which the master acted must be pointed out. Gaines v. IvTew 
 Orleans, 1 Woods, 104, Fed. Cas. JS^o. 5,177 ; Mason v. Crosby, 
 3 Woodb. & M. 258, Fed. Cas. No. 9,236. A new defense 
 cannot be set up by exceptions, If, however, the master fails 
 to report all evidence upon the matter to which a proper excep- 
 tion has been taken, the party should apply to the court for a 
 further report. Story v. Livingston, 13 Pet. 367, 10 L. ed. 
 204. 
 
 Effect of Withdrawal of Exceptions. 
 
 The withdrawal of exceptions leaves the report confirmed 
 (equity rule 66), for, in the absence of exceptions, there can 
 be no inquiry into the correctness of the facts found; only 
 misapprehension of the legal consequences are open for cor- 
 rection. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Texas Southern E. Co.. 
 — Tex. Civ. App. — , 126 S. W. 308 ; Burke v. Davis, 26 C. 
 C. A. 675, 53 U. S. App. 414, 81 Fed. 907; Re Carver, 113 
 Fed. 138; Gasquet v. Crescent City Brewing Co. 49 Fed. 493; 
 Green v. Bogue, 158 U. S. 504, 39 L. ed. 1070, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 975 ; Hamm v. J. Stone & Sons Live Stock Co. 18 Tex. Civ. 
 App. 241, 45 S. W. 330. As to waiver of, see Waterman v. 
 Banks, 144 U. S. 407, 36 L. ed. 484, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 646. 
 
 Waiving Exceptions Not Taken Before Master. 
 
 The question arises, what exceptions are waived if not taken 
 before the master before filing his report. We have seen that 
 
EXCEPTIONS TO BE MADE BEFORE THE MASTEE. 569 
 
 equity rule 66 gives twenty days within which to file exceptions 
 to the master's report; but can under this rule any character 
 of exception be filed that was not taken during the trial before 
 the master? In Story v. Livingston, 13 Pet. 366, 10 L. ed. 
 203, the court held that all exceptions should be taken before 
 the master in order to save time and give him an opportunity 
 to correct his errors and reconsider his opinion, and a failure 
 to do so prevents a party from excepting after the report is 
 filed, unless the court should refer it back to take exceptions. 
 
 This decision was made in 1839, when the Federal courts 
 adhered to the English practice in this respect. Gaines v. JSTew 
 Orleans, 1 Woods, 104, Fed. Cas. ISTo. 5,177 ; American Nich- 
 olson Pav. Co. V. Elizabeth, 1 Bann. & Ard. 439, Fed. Cas. 
 Xo. 309; Gass v. Stinson, 2 Sumn. 605, Fed. Cas. No. 5,261. 
 The practice of England required the master to make a draft 
 of his report and notify counsel, so as to give an opportunity 
 to point out errors. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr. 1314. This procedure 
 was called settling the master's report, but there is no such 
 practice now, because equity rule 83, promulgated in 1842, 
 now new rule 66, provides what the master must do with refer- 
 ence to his report, which is to file it as soon as it is prepared, 
 and the parties have one month to except to it from the date 
 of filing. This is a cheaper and more expeditious mode than 
 the old practice of settling the report, and is evidently intended 
 by the Supreme Court as a substitute for it. Hatch v. Indian- 
 apolis & S. E. Co. 11 Biss. 138, 9 Fed. 856; Fidelity Ins. & 
 S. D. Co. v. Shenandoah Iron Co. 42 Fed. 374, 375. 
 
 In Hatch v. Indianapolis & S. R. Co. supra, the court dis- 
 tinctly recognizes that there is no such practice as settling the 
 report before filing, and that a party has thirty days to file 
 such exceptions as he may deem necessary. Jennings v. Dolan, 
 29 Fed. '861. 
 
 In Celluloid Mfg. Co. v. Cellonite Mfg. Co. 40 Fed. 476, 
 the master had drafted his report after the English method, 
 and the court would not hear exceptions not taken before the 
 master; overruling Hatch v. Indianapolis & S. R. Co. 9 Fed. 
 856, and Jennings v. Dolan, 29 Fed. 861, above cited. Mc- 
 Ifamara v. Home Land & Cattle Co. 105 Fed. 202; Gray v. 
 New York Nat. Bldg. & L. Asso. 125 Fed. 512 ; Gay Mfg. Co. 
 v. Camp, 18 C. C. A. 137, 25 U. S. App. 134, 65 Fed. 798. 
 
570 EXCEPTIONS AFTER FILING MASTEr's REPORT. 
 
 In Fidelity Ins. & S. D. Co. v. Shenandoah Iron Co. 42 Fed. 
 374, the court held that exceptions to the master's report could 
 be taken within thirty days after filing the report, whether taken 
 before the master or not, and the practice followed in 13 Pet. 
 had been abrogated. In Gay Mfg. Co. v. Camp, 13 C. C. A. 
 137, 25 U. S. App. 134, 65 Fed. 798, the court followed 13 
 Pet., reaffirmed the old rule, and refused to hear exceptions not 
 taken before the master. See also Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U. S. 
 173, 36 L. ed. 665, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 825. 
 
 In Gay Mfg. Co. v. Camp, 15 C. C. A. 226, 25 U. S. App. 
 376, 68 Fed. 68, the court followed 65 Fed. 798, but stated that 
 the rule should only extend to issues of fact, and exceptions 
 to conclusions of law were not necessary to be taken before the 
 master. Home Land & Cattle Co. v. McXamara, 49 C. C. A. 
 642, 111 Fed. 827. 
 
 In Burke v. Davis, 26 C. C. A. 675, 53 U. S. App. 414, 81 
 Fed. 910, the exceptions had not been filed in thirty days, but 
 it is strongly intimated that if they had been, they would have 
 been heard, but that the master's conclusions of law could be 
 attacked, with or without exceptions. In Kilgour v. ISTational 
 Bank, 97 Fed. 693, the master's conclusions of fact were set 
 aside on exceptions filed in thirty days, and they may be set 
 aside, though the reference be by consent. Oteri v. Scalzo, 145 
 U. S. 589, 36 L. ed. 828, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 895; Shefiield & 
 B. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Gordon, 151 U. S. 291, 38 L. ed. 
 166, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 343. So may exceptions be filed to con- 
 clusions of law, though not excepted to before the master. Home 
 Land & Cattle Co. v. McNamara, 49 C. C. A. 642, 111 Fed. 
 822 ; Central Improv. Co. v. Cambria Steel Co. 127 C- C. A. 
 184, 210 Fed. 696-700. 
 
 In view of these cases, it seems that it is still an open ques- 
 tion as to what is the proper practice. I will venture to state 
 what should be the rule of practice, and my reasons therefor. 
 The reasons for filing exceptions before the master was to give 
 him an opportunity to correct any errors he may have com- 
 mitted during the trial. Gay Mfg. Co. v. Camp, 15 C. C. A. 
 226, 25 U. S. App. 376, 68 Fed. 68. They are the same rea- 
 sons that existed under the old practice, requiring a draft of the 
 report on the law and fact, and requiring it to be brought to 
 the attention of counsel, that they might then and there file 
 
EXCEPTIONS AFTEE PILING MASTER'S KEPOET. 571 
 
 such exceptions as were necessary, which were to be submitted 
 to the chancellor if overruled. But does not equity rule 83, now 
 new rule 66, change to some extent the old practice, and conse- 
 quently modify the reasons upon which the old rule was based ? 
 Equity rule 83 evidently was intended for some purpose other 
 than to merely repeat exceptions taken before the master, and 
 which have been already incorporated in the record, and the 
 thirty days gi\'eu for filing is evidently intended to give an 
 opportunity to examine the report for errors. The rule does not 
 intimate that the exceptions to be taken within the time allowed 
 must be only such as were previously entered of record, nor that 
 the exceptions to the conclusions of the master must be taken 
 before filing his report, but excludes this idea by requiring the 
 report to be filed as soon as prepared, and the exceptions to be 
 filed after filing the report. 
 
 If the equity rule 66 has any meaning, then it is intended 
 that there are errors which may be committed by the master, 
 and which may be excepted to, though no exception was taken 
 before the master. I therefore suggest the proper practice to 
 be, that in all matters pertaining to the conduct and hearing 
 of the case before the master, and in the admission and rejec- 
 tion of evidence (Wooster v. Gumbirnner, 20 Fed. 167), that 
 any objections thereto must be made before the master, and 
 exceptions reserved, if overruled, and made a part of the record, 
 otherwise the objections will not be heard by the court (Hamil- 
 ton V. Southern Nevada Gold & S. Min. Co. 13 Sawy. 113, 
 33 Fed. 567, 568, 15 Mor. Min. Rep. 314 ; Gorham Mfg. Co. 
 V. Emery-Bird-Thayer Dry Goods Co. 43 C. C. A. 511, 104 
 Fed. 245 ; Gray v. New York Nat, Bldg. & L. Asso. 125 Fed. 
 512), but considered waived. No objection to these matters 
 of detail should be heard if not made at the proper time and 
 incorporated in the record. It is fair to counsel and the mas- 
 ter, that they should have an opportunity to correct errors of 
 this character, but when the exceptions go to the action of the. 
 master involving the merits of the entire case, as his conclu- 
 sions of law and fact and his judgment thereon, they are open 
 to attack under equity rule 66, whether the master's atten- 
 tion was called to the particular ground of error or not. Fidel- 
 ity Ins. & S. D. Co. V. Shenandoah Iron Co. 42 Fed. 372; Jen- 
 nings V. Dolan, 29 Fed. 861 ; Hatch v. Indianapolis & S. R. 
 Co. 11 Biss. 138, 9 Fed. 856. 
 
572 EXCEPTIONS AETEE EILING MASTEe's EEPOET. 
 
 There is no question, that if a master is correct in his con- 
 clusions of fact, but wrong in his conclusions of law, that the 
 court will correct the law, whether the master had an opportu" 
 nity to correct it or not. Sheffield & B. Coal, Iron & E. Co. v. 
 Gordon, 151 U. S. 285, 38 L. ed. 164, 14 Sup. Ct. Kep. 343; 
 Celluloid Mfg. Co. v. Cellonite Mfg. Co. 40 Fed. 476; Ship- 
 man v. Ohio Coal Exch. 17 C. C. A. 313, 37 U. S. App. 471, 
 70 Fed. 654 ; United States Trust Go. v. Mercantile Trust Co, 
 31 C. C. A. 427, 59 U. S. App. 330, 88 Fed. 153; Home 
 Land & Cattle Co. v. MclSTamara, 49 C. C. A. 642, 111 Fed. 
 827. An appellate court will correct an erroneous construction 
 of a contract by a master, whether excepted to or not (Ibid.), 
 and there is no reason why a court should not correct an erro- 
 neous conclusion of fact with the whole record before it, even 
 though no exception to the conclusion had been filed before 
 the master. Of course, in the light of what has been said, an 
 objection to conclusions of fact, if based on erroneous admis- 
 sion, or exclusion of testimony not excepted to before the mas- 
 ter, would not be considered (Gray v. JSTew York Nat. Bldg. & 
 L. Asso. 125 Fed. 512) ; but there is no reason why conclu- 
 sions of fact, based on admitted evidence, cannot be excepted to, 
 though no exception to the finding had been made before the 
 master. 
 
 There is one character of reference, perhaps, where an excep- 
 tion to conclusions of fact may be considered waived if not 
 taken before the master. This rule may be applied when the 
 entire case hy consent of parties has been referred to a master 
 for his judgment and decision on both law and fact, for rea- 
 sons that will appear in discussing the "Effect of the Master's 
 Eeport." MclSTamara v. Home Land & Cattle Co. 105 Fed. 
 202; Kimberly V. Arms, 129 U. S. 524, 32 L. ed. 764, 9 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 355 ; Sanders v. Eiverside, 55 C. C. A. 240, 118 Fed. 
 720. See Elkin v. Denver Engineering Works Co. 105 C. C. A. 
 1, 181 Fed. 684. But where the cause has been referred on 
 motion of one of the parties, or by the court on his own motion, 
 the litigant yields no right, by proper exception under equity 
 rule 66, to have his cause finally determined by the court on the 
 law and fact, whether excepted to before the master or not. 
 
 In Bliss V. Anaconda Copper Min. Co. 156 Fed. 309, review- 
 ing many of the cases cited above, it is suggested that it is the 
 
COST OF EXCEPTIONS 573 
 
 duty of the master to submit to counsel a draft of his report, 
 thereby inviting suggestions as to error, if any, in the conclu- 
 sions reached; and counsel in response should make at once 
 such objections as may appear to them to be proper, before the 
 return of the masters report; and it is within the discretion 
 of the court to refuse to entertain any objection not made before 
 the master. It is further suggested that counsel should agree 
 that exceptions thus taken before the master should be consid- 
 ered as exceptions taken under rule 66, in order to avoid dupli- 
 cating. Ibid. 313. This method is clearly not within the letter 
 or spirit of the rule that contemplates exceptions to the merits 
 to be filed at any time within thirty days. Bridges v. Sheldon, 
 18 Blatchf. 295, 7 Fed. 19. 
 
 Cosis in Exceptions to Master's Report. 
 
 'New rule 67 same as old rule 84 except in specifying the sum 
 of $5 for every exception overruled, which has been added to 
 prevent frivolous exceptions. 
 
CHAPTER XC. 
 
 EFFECT OF THE MASTBk's KEPOET. 
 
 The report of a master, whether special or general, is entirely 
 within the power of the court to set aside, modify, or correct 
 in any manner consistent with the justice of the case, but the 
 power should not be exercised but for good cause shown. 
 National Folding Box & Paper Co. v. Dayton Paper Novelty 
 Co. 91 Fed. 824; Jaffery v. Brown, 29 Fed. 477; Stanton v. 
 Alabama & C. E. Co. 31 Fed. 585; Thomson v. Wooster, 114 
 U. S. 104-112, 29 L. ed. 105-108, 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 788 ; Con- 
 nor V. United States, 131 C. C. A. 68, 214 Fed. 526, 527; 
 Fordyce v. Omaha, K. C. & E. R Co. 145 Fed.- 544 (see Refer- 
 ence by Consent). 
 
 The report on the facts has been given the effect of a ver- 
 dict of a jury upon an issvie sent to them by the chancellor, 
 which in equity is only advisory. Oil Well Co. v. Hall, 63 0. 
 C. A. 343, 128 Fed. 878 ; Guarantee Gold Bond Loan & Sav. 
 Co. V. Edwards, 90 C. C. A. 585, 164 Fed. 809, 810; Bliss 
 V. Anaconda Copper Min. Co. 167 Fed. 342-347; Flippen v. 
 Kimball, 87 Fed. 259; Babcock v. DeMott, 88 C. C. A. 64, 
 160 Fed. 882 (see section 723). However, it is said in Bos- 
 worth V. Hook, 23 C. C. A. 404, 46 IJ. S. App. 598, 77 Fed. 
 686, that when the reference is on motion of one of the par- 
 ties, and not by the consent of both, the master's finding has 
 not the force of a verdict, or the report of a referee, and upon 
 exception thereto, the court must determine by its own judg- 
 ment the controversy presented. Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U. 
 S. 512, 32 L. ed. 764, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 355 ; Babcock v. De- 
 Mott, 88 C. C. A. 64, 160 Fed. 882; Knoxville v. Knoxville 
 Water Co. 212 IJ. S. 8, 53 L. ed. 378, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148. 
 
 The rule is that the findings of fact by the master have all 
 the presumptions in their favor, and should not be set aside, 
 unless error clearly appears, and this is especially true when 
 
 574 
 
575 
 
 submitted by consent. Crawford v. iSTeal, 144 U. S. 596, 36 
 L. ed. 557, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 759, and cases cited; Cimiotti 
 Unhairing Co. v. American Fur. E^f. Co. 93 C. C. A. 546, 168 
 Fed. 529 ; Lake Erie & W. E. Co. v. Fremont, 34 C. C. A. 625, 
 92 Fed. 731; Davis v. Schwartz, 155 U. S. 636, 39 L. ed. 291, 
 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 237 ; Girard Life Ins. Annuity & T. Co. v. 
 Cooper, 162 U. S. 538, 40 L. ed. 1065, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 879 ; 
 Huttig Sash & Door Co. v. Fuelle, 143 Fed. 363 ; Cimotti Un- 
 hairing Co. V. American Fur Eef. Co. 158 Fed. 171 ; Mtir- 
 phy V. Southern E. Co. 99 Fed. 469 ; s. c. 53 C. C. A. 477, 115 
 Fed. 259; Columbus, S. & H. E. Co.'s Appeal, 48 C. C. A. 
 275, 109 Fed. 219 ; Singleton v. Felton, 42 C. C. A. 57, 101 
 Fed. 527; Walters v. Western & A. E. Co. 69 Fed. 710; Emil 
 Kiewert Co. v. Juneau, 24 C. C. A. 294, 47 U. S. App. 394, 
 
 78 Fed. 712; Central Trust Co. v. East Tennessee Laud Co. 
 
 79 Fed. 19 ; Chandler v. Pomeroy, 87 Fed. 262. It is prima 
 facie correct. Guarantee Gold Bond Loan & Sav. Co. v. Ed- 
 wards, 90 C. C. A. 585, 164 Fed. 810; Crawford v. K"eal, 144 
 F. S. 596, 36 L. ed. 557, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 759; Gav Mfg. Co, 
 V. Camp, 13 C. C. A. 137, 25 U. S. App. 134, 65 "Fed. 794 
 Lake Erie & W. E. Co. v. Fremont, 34 C. C. A. 625, 92 Fed 
 731; Kilgour v. K'ational Bank, 97 Fed. 693; Davis v 
 Schwartz, 155 U. S. 636, 39 L. ed. 291, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 237 
 Furrer v. Ferris, 145 U. S. 134, 36 L. ed. 651, 12 Sup. Ct 
 Eep. 821. The only question is, are the findings supported 
 (Ciidaliy Packing Co. v. Sioux K"at. Bank, 21 C. C. A. 428, 
 40 U. S. App. 142, 75 Fed. 475 ; Chicago, M. & St. P. E. Co. 
 V. Clark, 35 C. C. A. 120, 92 Fed. 983 ; Steel v. Lord, 35 C. 
 C. A. 555, 93 Fed. 729 ; Shipman v. Straitsville Central Min. 
 Co. 158 U. S. 356, 39 L. ed. 1015, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 886), and 
 should not be overruled, unless manifestly wrong. The Elton, 
 31 C. C. A. 496, 42 IT. S. App. 666, 83 Fed. 520; Denver & 
 E. G. E. Co. V. Eistine, 23 C. C. A. 13, 40 U. S. App. 579, 77 
 Fed. 59; Crawford v. Neal, 144 U. S. 585, 36 L. ed. 552, 12 
 Sup. Ct; Eep. 759; Kunsemiller v. Hill, 29 C. C. A. 658, 57 
 U. S. App. 523, 86 Fed. 200 ; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Ameri- 
 can Bell Teleph. Co. 105 Fed. 686 ; Taintor v. Franklin Nat. 
 Bank, 107 Fed. 825 ; Columbus S. & H. E. Co.'s Appeal, 48 
 C. C. A. 275, 109 Fed. 180 ; Ferguson Contracting Co. v. Man- 
 hattan Trust Co. 55 0. C. A. 529, 118 Fed. 792; Singleton 
 
576 EFFECT OF THE MAS'.L'Ee's EEPOKT. 
 
 V. Felton, 42 C. C. A. 57, 101 Fed. 526. This rule is appli- 
 cable to disputed facts, but not to conclusions from undisputed 
 facts, or the construction of a document. United States Trust 
 Co. V. Mercantile Trust Co. 31 C. C. A. 427, 59 U. S. App. 
 330, 88 Fed. 153, and the court will not always enforce the 
 rule as given. United States Trust Co. v. Omaha & St. L. E. 
 Co. 63 Fed. 742; Knoxyille v. Knoxville Water Co. 212 U. 
 S. 8, 53 L. ed. 378, 29 Sup. Ct. Eep. 148 ; Bosworth v. Hook, 
 23 C. C. A. 404, 46 U. S. App. 598, 77 Fed. 686, 687; Kim- 
 berly v. Arms, 129 U. S. 612, 32 L. ed. 764, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 355. Ultimate facts should be found. Paine v. Standard 
 Plunger Elevator Co. 186 Fed. 605. 
 
 Findings in Matters of Account. 
 
 The findings in matters of account because of the nature 
 of the evidence will be rarely set aside or interfered with. 
 Camden v. Stuart, 144 U. S. 118, 36 L. ed. 368, 12 Sup. Ot. 
 Eep. 585 ; Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U. S. 136, 31 L. ed. 664, 
 8 Sup. Ct. Eep. 894; Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U. S. 619, 32 
 L. ed. 550, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 177; Eobinson v. Alabama & G. 
 Mfg. Co. 89 Fed. 221.' So in findings in damages, error must 
 be obvious (Warren v. Keep, 155 U. S. 265-267, 39 L. ed. 
 144, 145, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 83) ; or value of stock of goods, etc. 
 (Eeading Ins. Co. v. Egelhoff, 115 Fed. 393). A reference 
 to a master commissioner, there being no such oflacer, would 
 not affect the report. Shipman v. Straitsville Central Min. Co. 
 158 U. S. 361, 39 L. ed. 1016, 15 Sup. Ct. Ecd. 886, (See 
 "Who to be Appointed.") 
 
 Effect When Reference hy Consent. 
 
 When a cause is submitted to a master by consent to hear 
 and determine the questions of law and fact, and report his 
 conclusions thereon, the courts talce a different view of the force 
 and effect of the master's findings than when the submission 
 has been made on motion of one of the parties, or by the court 
 on its own motion. Guarantee Gold Bond Loan & Sav. Co. v. 
 Edwards, 90 C. C. A. 585, 164 Fed. 810 ; Jefferson Hotel Co. 
 v. Brumbaugh, 94 C. C- A. .279, 168 Fed. 867-872; Third 
 
EFFECT OF THE MASTEu's KEPOET. 611 
 
 Xat. Bank v. National Bank, 30 C. C. A. 436, 58 U. S. App. 
 148, 86 Fed. 858; Channcey v. Dyke Bros. 55 C. C. A. 579, 
 119 Fed. 21, 22; Blassengame v. Boyd, 101 C. C. A. 129, 178 
 Fed. 1; Spring Garden Ins. Co. v. Amusement Syndicate Co. 
 102 C. C. A. 29, 178 Fed. 531. The leading case upon the 
 effect of reference hv consent is Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U. S. 
 513, 32 L. ed. 764, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 355, familiarly known as 
 the Arms Case. This case has been followed in Crawford v. 
 Neal, 144 F. S. 585, 36 L. ed. 552, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 759; 
 Davis Y. Schwartz, 155 U. S. 637, 39 L. ed. 293, 15 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 287 ; Singleton v. Felton, 42 C. C. A. 57, 101 Fed. 
 526, 527; Schwartz v. Duss, 43 C. C. A. 323, 103 Fed. 565; 
 Western U. Teleg. Co. v. American Bell Teleph. Co. 105 Fed. 
 686; Sanders v. Eiverside, 55 C. C. A. 240, 118 Fed. 720; 
 Fidelity & C. Co. v. St Matthews Sav. Bank, 44 C. C. A. 225, 
 104 Fed. 861 ; Walker v. Kinnare, 22 C. C. A. 75, 46 U. S. 
 App. 150, 76 Fed. 101 ; Walters v. Western & A. E. Co. 69 
 Fed. 710; Eandolph v. Allen, 19 C. C. A. 353, 41 U. S. App. 
 117, 73 Fed. 32 ; Elkin v. Denver Engineering Works Co. 105 
 C. C. A. 1, 181 Fed. 684. 
 
 The Arms Case substantially holds that when a case has been 
 referred by consent to a master to determine the issues of law 
 and fact, and such reference is entered as a rule of court, it is 
 in effect the submission of a controversy to a private tribunal, 
 whose decisions are not subject to be set aside and disregarded 
 by the court. The special tribunal being agreed upon, there 
 is no reason to give to its conclusions less weight than when 
 decided by the court. Ibid. ; Farrar v. Bernheim, 20 C. 0. A. 
 496, 41 U. S. App. 172, 74 Fed. 438 ; s. c. 21 0. C. A. 264, 
 75 Fed. 136 ; Grayson v. Lynch, 163 TJ. S. 473, 41 L. ed. 232, 
 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1064; Davis v. Schwartz, 155 U. S. 631, 39 
 L. ed. 289, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 237 ; see Elkin v. Denver Engi- 
 neering Works Co. 181 Fed. 684. And if the conclusions are 
 drawn from disputed facts, they are unassailable. Davis v. 
 Schwartz, 155 U. S. 631-636, 39 L. ed. 289-291, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 237; Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U. S. 512, 32 L. ed. 764, 
 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 355 ; United States Trust Co. v. Mercantile 
 Trust Co. 31 C. C. A. 427, 59 U. S. App. 330, 88 Fed. 153; 
 Ferguson Contracting Co. v. Manhattan Trust Co. 55 C. C. A. 
 
 S. Eq.— 37. 
 
578 KE-EEFEKENCE TO MASTER. 
 
 529, 118 Fed. 791; Connor v. United States, 131 C. C. A. 68, 
 214 Fed. 527. 
 
 It is in such cases, perhaps, that the contention that excep- 
 tions to the conclusions of the master should be taken before 
 the master, or they will be considered waived, is correct, be- 
 cause, having referred your case to a special tribunal by con- 
 sent, the errors which you assign on an appeal from its de- 
 cision must have been passed upon adversely by the special 
 tribunal. MelSTamara v. Home Land & Cattle Co. 105 Fed. 
 202-204, and authorities; but see 111 Fed. 822. 
 
 Re-reference to a Master. 
 
 In stating exceptions to a master's report, there may be a 
 prayer for re-reference, but this may be done by motion. ISTa- 
 tional Folding Box Co. v. Dayton Paper K'ovelty Co. 91 Fed. 
 822. However, after the report is filed and exceptions taken, 
 coui-ts will not readily grant a re-reference, unless the report 
 shows that further investigation is necessary to a proper de- 
 cree. Empire Trust Co. v. Egypt R. Co. 182 Fed. 100-102. 
 Mere inaccuracies of statement, or omissions made, or even 
 vacating the report, would not be cause for a re-reference. 
 There must be some material injury, or a finding unjust in its 
 consequences, or want of sufiicient finding, to enter a proper 
 decree. McElroy v. Swope, 47 Fed. 380. Inaccuracies may 
 usually be corrected from the record. Fischer v. Hayes, 16 
 Fed. 469 ; Witters v. Sowles, 43 Fed. 405 ; Jennings v. Dolan, 
 29 Fed. 862 ; Taylor v. Eobertson, 27 Fed. 537 ; Cimiotti Un- 
 hairing Co. v. Bowsky, 113 Fed. 699 ; Empire Trust Co. v. 
 Egypt E. Co. 182 Fed. 100. But if the facts be imperfectly 
 stated, so that it is apparent that further evidence is needed, 
 or if unsatisfactory and other evidence can be obtained, and 
 the justice of the case demands it, a re-reference will be ordered ; 
 but in the absence of these features, the court will not, after the 
 report has been filed, permit the case to be" reopened for further 
 evidence, especially cumulative- evidence (Ibid.; Central Trust 
 Co. V. Georgia P. R. Co. 83 Fed. 386-399) ; s. c. 81 Fed. 281; 
 nor re-refer it on a point as to which neither party requested a 
 finding. Reading Ins. Co. v. Egelhoff, 115 Fed. 393. The 
 master may, before the case leaves his hands, reopen it for good 
 
COMPEXSATION OF MASTER. 579 
 
 cause shoMTi, to hear further evidence. Central Trust Co. v. 
 Richmond & D. E. Co. 69 Fed. 762; Central Trust Co. v. 
 Marietta & K G. E. Co. 75 Fed. 41. But when there has been 
 long delay through negligence, he should refuse. Third Nat. 
 Bank v. Xational Bank, 30 C. C. A. 436, 58 U. S. App. 148, 
 86 Fed. S:y2. 
 
 A re-reference will not be allowed to file an amendment set- 
 ting up new ground for damages. Clyde v. Eichraond & D. 
 E. Co. 59 Fed. 394. jS^or to allow additional testimony to 
 base a recovery on special views entertained by the master and 
 concurred in by the court. Central Trust Co. v. Georgia E. 
 E. Co. 83 Fed. 386. The court, however, may re-refer it, or 
 permit the master to withdraw it for correction and amend- 
 ment. Xational Folding Box & Eaper Co. v. Dayton Paper 
 Isoveltj Co. 91 Fed. 822; Mosher v. Joyce, 2 C. C. A. 322, 6 
 U. S. App. 107, 51 Fed. 441. See "Withdrawal." But where 
 the master is thus permitted to withdraw his report, he cannot 
 reverse his former findings without notice to parties. It is 
 within the spirit of equity rule 75. National Folding Box & 
 Paper Co. v. Dayton Paper Novelty Co. supra. 
 
 Compensation of the Master. 
 
 A master's compensation should be measiired by the work 
 done, time employed, responsibility assumed, and the magni- 
 tude of the interests involved. It should be reasonable, perhaps 
 liberal, but never exorbitant. Equity rule 68. Pleasants v. 
 Southern E. Co. 93 Fed. 93. Finance Committee v. Warren, 
 27 C. C. A. 472, 53 U. S. App. 472, 82 Fed. 52.J; Middle- 
 ton V. Bankers & M. Teleg. Co. 32 Fed. 524; Brown v. King, 
 10 C. C; A. 541, 23 U. S. App. 524, 62 Fed. 529; Edgell v. 
 Felder, 39 C. C. A. 540, 99 Fed. 325; Brickill v. New\'ork, 
 55 Fed. 565. He cannot retain his report as security for his 
 compensation, but when allowed by the court he is entitled, to 
 an attachment for the amount against the party who is ordered 
 to pay the same, if upon notice he does not pay in time pre- 
 scribed by the court. Where the rules of court fix the per diem 
 compensation of the master, a stipulation by parties to the suit 
 to pay more will not be allowed. Ee Berkeley, 121 0. C. A. 
 359, 203 Fed. 7. 
 
580 EULES AND STATUTES PEOVIDING POE COSTS. 
 
 Costs in Equity. 
 
 All the old rules, except as to costs on exceptions to a master's 
 report, stating a definite amount, have been abrogated, and the 
 matter is now in the discretion of the court. The new rules 
 referring to costs are as follows : 
 
 Rule 8, when attachment issued to enforce compliance with 
 a decree or order of court. 
 
 Rule 17, upon setting aside a decree pro confesso. 
 
 Rule 20, in amending pleadings. 
 
 Rule 40, nominal parties entitled to. 
 
 Rule 50, stenographers' fees taxed as. 
 
 Rule 51, when depositions "irrelevant, immaterial, or incom- 
 petent." 
 
 Rule 5Y, when case continued. 
 
 Rule 58, in proving execution or genuineness of document. 
 
 Rule 59, on reference to master. 
 
 Rule 67, in exceptions to master's report. 
 
 Rule 76, imposed on offending solicitors. 
 
 By U! S. Rev. Stat. sec. 982 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1623), 
 an attorney who increases the costs unreasonably shall be re- 
 quired by the court to pay the excess. Motion Picture Patents 
 Co. V. Steiner, 119 C. C. A. 401, 201 Ped. 64; Motion Picture 
 Patents Co. v. Yankee Film Co. 192 Ped. 134. 
 
 Rule 76, for infraction of rule as to record on appeal. 
 
 ( See also the rules of various circuits as to costs. ) 
 
 (See also "Costs on Dismissal of Case by the Court," end 
 of chap. 87, p. 555. 
 
 The discretion vested in the court to grant or apportion costs 
 does not authorize a departure from the usual practice of award- 
 ing costs to the prevailing party. Westfeldt v. ISTortiti Carolina 
 Min. Co. 100 C. C. A. 552, 177 Ped. 135. As to taxing a 
 "Docket Pee" see Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. 
 Co. 208 Ped. 581. 
 
CHAPTER XCI. 
 
 DECEEE. 
 
 Definition. 
 
 The decree is the judicial decision in an equity cause upon 
 the particular issues submitted, and can go no further than 
 the prayer of the bilh and the allegations as proved. Wash- 
 ington,. A. & G. R Co. V. Bradley (Washington, A. & G. R Co. 
 V. Washington) 10 Wall. 303, 19 L. ed. 895 ; Baldwin v. Liver- 
 pool & L. & G. Ins. Co. 69 C. C. A. 660, 124 Fed. 206-208 ; 
 Lewis Pub. Co. v. Wyman, 168 Fed. 760; McKinney v. Big 
 Horn Basin Development Co. 93 C. C. A. 258, 167 Fed. 771. 
 
 Classified. 
 
 Decrees are either interlocutory or final. Richmond v. At- 
 wood, 17 L.R.A. 615, 2 C. C. A. 596, 5 U. S. App. 151, 52 
 Fed. 21. The interlocutory decree is an adjudication upon 
 some point arising during the progress of the cause, which 
 does not wholly determine the merits, but is necessary to pre- 
 serve the subject-matter, the status quo, or to facilitate the trial 
 of the case on the merits. All decrees not final, as hereinafter 
 stated, are classed as interlocutory, even though they may settle 
 the equities of the bill, as in Lodge v. Twell, 135 U. S. 232, 34 
 L ed. 158, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 745 ; McGourkey v. Toledo & O. 
 C. R. Co. 146 U. S. 537, 36 L. ed. 1081, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 170 ; 
 Keystone Manganese & Iron Co. v. Martin, 132 U. S. 93, 33 
 L. ed. 276, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 32; Latta v. Kilbourn, 150 U. S. 
 539, 37 L. ed. 1175, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 201; California Nat. 
 Bank v. Stateler, 171 U. S. 449, 43 L. ed. 234, 19 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 6; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Chicago, P. & St. L. R. Co. 
 60 C. C. A. 651, 123 Fed. 392 ; Deitch v. Staub, 53 C. C. A. 
 137, 115 Fed. 317; West v. East Coast Cedar Co. 51 C. C. A. 
 
 581 
 
582 DECKEE. 
 
 416, 113 Fed. '743; Covingion v. First Js^at. Bank, lSr> U. S. 
 277, 46 L. ed. 908, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 645; Southern R. Co. 
 V. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. 179 U. S. 643, 45 L..ed. 356, 21 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 249. 
 
 Final Decree. 
 
 A final decree is one that entirely disposes of the cause, so 
 that nothing is left for the court to adjudicate (2 Dan. Ch. Pr. 
 974n) ; or a decree that disposes ultimately of the suit (Adams, 
 Equity, page 375) ; or a fiinal decree is one determining the 
 litigation on its merits, and leaves nothing to be done, but to 
 enforce by order or execution, what has been determined by 
 the court. Ibid. ; Talley v. Curtain, 7 C: C. A. 1, 8 U. S. App. 
 424, 58 Fed. 4; Blythe v. Hinckley, 84 Fed. 238; Maas v. 
 Lonstorf, 91 C. C. A. 627, 166 Fed. 41 ; Xew Orleans v. Peake, 
 2 C. C. A. 626, 2 U. S. App. 403, 52 Fed. 76 ; Harrison v. 
 Clarke, 90 C. C. A. 413, 164 Fed. 539 ; Beebe v. Russell, 19 
 How. 283-286, 15 L. ed. 668, 669; Odbert v. Marquet, 99 
 G. C. A. 60, 175 Fed. 50, 51; Wilson v. Smith, 61' C. C. A. 
 446, 126 Fed. 919; Scriven v. North, 67 C. C. A. 348, 134 
 Fed. 366; Sanders v. Bluefield Waterworks & Improv. Co. 45 
 C. C. A. 475, 106 Fed. 587; Easton v. Houston & T. C. E. Co. 
 44 Fed. 9 ; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Southern Exp. Co. 
 108 U. S. 24, 27 L. ed. 638, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6 ; Andrews v. 
 iN'ational Foundry & Pipe Works, 19 C. C. A. 548, 34 U. S. 
 App. 632, 73 Fed. 517 ; Gunn v. Black, 8 C. C. A. 542, 19 U. 
 S. App. 489, 60 Fed. 159 ; Re ]\Iichigan C. R. Co. 59 C. C. A. 
 643, 124 Fed. 730, 731; Baxter v. Bevil Phillips & Co. 219 
 Fed. 309. 
 
 Whether it is final depends on its essence, and not on its 
 form, or what it is called. Better v. Beal, 2 C. C. A. 60, 5 
 U. S. App. 49, 50 Fed. 860 ; Standley v. Roberts, 8 C. C. A. 
 305, 19 U. S. App. 407, 59 Fed. 840 ; Salmon v. Mills, 13 
 C. C. A. 372, 27 U. S. App. 732, 66 Fed. 33; Eau Claire v. 
 Payson, 46 C. C. A. 466, 107 Fed. 557. The controversy must 
 be settled (Hohorst v. Hamburg American Packet Co. 148 D. S. 
 265, 37 L. ed. 445, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 590 ; French v. Shoemaker, 
 12 Wall. 98, 20 L. ed. 271), and must leave the case in such a 
 condition that if there be an afiirmance in the appellate court, 
 
DECEEE. 683 
 
 the court below will have nothing to do but execute its judgment. 
 Connell v. Smiley, 156 U. S. 339, 39 L. ed. i-i-i, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 353 ; Marden v. Campbell Printing-Press & Mig. Co. 15 
 C. C. A. 26, 33 U. S. App. 123, 67 Fed. 812, 813 ; Tuttle v. 
 Olaflin, 13 C. C. A. 281, 26 U. S. App. 678, 66 Fed. 8 ; Dainese 
 V. Kendall, 119 U. S. 54, 30 L. ed. 305, 7 Sup. Ct. K«p. 65 ; 
 Meagher v. Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co. 145 U. S. 611, 36 L. 
 ed. 835, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 876; Parsons v. Kobinson, 122 U. S. 
 115, 30 L. ed. 1123, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1153 ; Chicago & 0. River 
 E. Co. V. McCammon, 10 C. C. A. 50, 18 U. S. App. 628, 709, 
 61 Fed. 776. 
 
 So much for classification and definition for the present. As 
 interlocutory and final decrees will be discussed under "Ap- 
 peals" (see "Final Decree as Basis of Appeal''), I pass on to — 
 
 Framing the Decree. 
 
 A decree in equity adapts itself to the necessities of each 
 case. Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 432, 19 L. ed. 262. Its great 
 elasticity is the advantage over the judgment at law, but it 
 should not go beyond the relief necessary to secure complain- 
 ant in what he is entitled to under the pleadings and prayer. 
 Underground Electric R. Co. v. Owsley, 169 Fed. 671; Hill v. 
 Phelps, 41 C. C. A. 569, 101 Fed. 650; Lockhart v. Leeds, 
 195 U. S. 427-437, 49 L. ed. 263-269, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 76 ; 
 Gage V. J. F. Smyth Mercantile Co. 87 C. C. A. 377, 160 Fed. 
 426; Graham v. La Crosse & M. R. Co. 3 Wall. 710-712, 18 
 L. ed. 251, 252. Or it may be entered on conditions, as doing 
 equity. Andrews v. Connolly, 145 Fed. 43 ; St. Louis, K. C. 
 & C. E. Co. V. Wabash E. Co. 81 C. C. A. 643, 152 Fed. 861; 
 Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Denver, L. & G. E. Co. 60 C. C. A. 
 588, 126 Fed. 46-50. It may provide for payment of future 
 instalments. Dancel v. Goodyear Shoe Machinery Co. 137 Fed. 
 157-161. Or it may conform the decree to the case made. 
 Bracken v. ^eill, 15 Tex. 110, but see Baldwin v. Liverpool & 
 L. & G. Ins. Co. 59 C. 0. A. 660, 124 Fed. 208. 
 
 Who to Prepare. 
 
 The solicitor of the party obtaining the decree must prepare 
 
584 DECREE. 
 
 it for the judge's signature. If for the plaintiff, it must be 
 prepared in accordance with the prayer of the bill, or what- 
 ever part thereof is granted by the court. Crocket v. Lee, 7 
 Wheat, 525, 5 L. ed. 514; Simms v. Guthrie, 9 Cranch, 27, 3 
 L. ed. 644. After drawing the decree, it must be submitted to 
 opposite counsel, and such objections as are made to the draft 
 must be noted, and if not admitted by counsel, they must be 
 presented to the court for settlement. If there is no objection 
 to the decree, or after objections made have been settled by the 
 court, it must then be presented for the judge's signature, after 
 which it is delivered to the clerk for record in the minutes of the 
 court. 
 
 If the judgment is for the defendant, his solicitor draws the 
 decree dismissing the bill, but if the defendant is in by cross 
 bill, praying affirmative relief, which is granted, then his coun- 
 sel draws the decree, as required when plaintiff recovers. 
 
 Rules Referring to Drawing Decrees. 
 
 By equity rule 71 it is provided that in drawing decrees and 
 orders, neither the bill nor answer nor other pleadings, nor any 
 part thereof, nor the report of any master, nor any other pro- 
 ceeding shall be recited or stated in the decree or order ; but the 
 decree or order shall begin in substance as follows: 
 
 This cause came on to be heard (or to be further heard, as the case may 
 be) at this term, and was argued by counsel; and, thereupon, upon con- 
 sideration thereof, it was ordered, adjudged, and decreed as follows (here 
 insert the decree or order ) . 
 
 Equity rules 8, 9. 
 
 The decree should be expressed in apt terms, and set forth 
 the exact conclusion of the court, especially as to any act to be 
 done, or not done; and in case anything is to be done, time, 
 mode, and conditions miist be clear and plain. Equity rule 8. 
 The decree must conform to the allegations, proof and prayer. 
 Crocket v. Lee, 7 Wheat. 522, 5 L. ed. 513; Simms v. Guthrie, 
 9 Cranch, 19-27, 3 L. ed. 642-645. 
 
 By equity rule 73 it was provided that every decree for an 
 account of the personal estate of a testator, or intestate, shall 
 contain a direction to the master to whom it is referred to state 
 
DECEMJE. 585 
 
 what parts, if any, are outstanding, or undisposed of, unless 
 otherwise directed, but this rule has been omitted from the 
 new rules. 
 
 By equity rule 10 it is provided that in foreclosure suits a 
 decree for any balance over and above the proceeds of the sale 
 under the mortgage may be entered with an execution for such 
 balance, as provided in equity rule 8, where the decree is solely 
 for money. However broad the terms of the decree, it will 
 be read in the light of the pleading and proof. Graham v. 
 Chamberlain, 3 Wall. 710-712, 18 L. ed. 251, 252 ; Crocket v. 
 Lee, 7 Wheat. 522, 5 L. ed. 513. As to necessity of signing, 
 see Ommen v. Talcott, 180 Fed. 927. See also United States 
 v. Stoller, 180 Fed. 910. 
 
 Recording the Decree. 
 
 Counsel can rely on the clerk to correctly transcribe the de- 
 cree, and his failure to do so does not affect the relief granted. 
 (Blythe v. Hinckley, 84 Fed. 228) ; has no effect until entry 
 (Ommen v. Talcott, 180 Fed. 927); must be recorded in the 
 equity journal (Equity rule 3, cl. 3.) 
 
 Correcting Errors. 
 
 Clerical errors in decrees or errors of omission, can be cor- 
 rected at any time before close of term, upon application to the 
 court, without the expense of a rehearing. Equity rule 72 ; 
 Witters v. Sowles, 32 Fed. 131 ; Hicklin v. Marco, 64 Fed. 609 ; 
 Henderson v. Carbondale Coal & Coke Co. 140 U. S. 40, 35 
 L. ed. 338, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 691 ; Ommen v. Talcott, 180 Fed. 
 927; Ee Wight, 134 U. S. 136, 33 L. ed. 865, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 487; Lincoln Nat. Bank v. Perry, 14 C. C. A. 273, 32 U. S. 
 App. 15, 66 Fed. 887. See "Eehearing" for further discussion 
 over decrees during the term. 
 
 As distinguished from altering or amending the decree, courts 
 may correct errors after the term, first, when the necessity and 
 matter to make the correction appears of record; or, second, 
 when the matter requiring correction rests in the recollection of 
 the court, or may be proved aliunde. Odell v. Eeynolds, 17 C. 
 C. A. 317, 37 TJ. S. App. 447, 70 Fed. 656-659, and cases cited ; 
 
586 DECBEE. 
 
 Gilmer v. Grand Eapids, 16 Fed. 708-710; Ee Wight, 134 
 U. S. 136-143 ; Bernard v. Abel, 84 C. C. A. 361, 156 Fed. 
 652, and cases cited; Gagnon v. United States, 193 U. S. 456, 
 48 L. ed. 747, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 510; Whiting v. Equitable Life 
 Assur. Soc. 8 C. C. A. 558, 13 U. S. App. 597, 60 Fed. 200; 
 Lincoln ]S[at. Bank v. Perry, 14 C. C. A. 273, 32 U. S. App. 
 15, 66 Fed. 888, 889. 
 
 Amending Decree. 
 
 Judgments may be amended by the court during the tenn 
 (Ibid.; Whiting v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. 8 C. C. A. 558, 
 13 U. S. App. 597, 60 Fed. 197; Eev. Stat. sec. 954, Comp. 
 Stat. 1913, sec. 1591 ; Eq. rule 19 ; Bronson v. Schulten, 
 104 U. S. 415, 26 L. ed. 799 ; Mahler v. Animarium Co. 64 C. 
 C. A. 329, 129 Fed. 897 ; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 167, 21 L. 
 ed. 876; Goddard v. Ordway, 101 U. S. 752, 25 L. ed. 1043; 
 Webster v. Oliver Ditson Co. 171 Fed. 895) ; but not after the 
 term, except in correcting errors apparent, as before stated 
 (Phillips V. l^egley, 117 U. S. 678, 29 L. ed. 1016, 6 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 901; Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S. 410, 26 L. ed. 797; 
 Van-Dorn v. Pennsylvania E. Co. 35 C. C. A. 282, 93 Fed. 271 ; 
 Campbell v. James, 31 Fed. 526 ; Morgan's L. & T. E. & S. S. 
 Co. V. Texas, 32 Fed. 530 ; Doe v. Waterloo Min. Co. 60 Fed. 
 643 ; Petersburg Sav. & Ins. Co. v. Dellatorre, 17 C. C. A. 310, 
 30 U. S. App. 504, 70 Fed. 645 ; Tubman v. Baltimore & 0. 
 E. Co. 190 U. S. 39, 47 L. ed. 947, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 777; 
 McGregor v. Vei-mont Loan & T. Co. 44 C. C. A. 146, 104 Fed. 
 710 ; Klever v. Seawall, 12 C. C. A. 653, 22 U. S. App. 458, 65 
 Fed. 378, 379 ; Mootry v. Grayson, 44 C. C. A. 83, 104 Fed. 
 613; Easton v. Houston & T. C. E. Co. 44 Fed. 10; Home 
 Street E. Co. v. Lincoln, 89 C. C. A. 133, 162 Fed. 137; Vir- 
 ginia T. & C. Steel & I. Co. v. Harris, 80 C. C. A. 658, 151 Fed. 
 435 ; Thomson v. Dean, 7 Wall. 345, 19 L. ed. 95). It cannot 
 be done by motionj but only by a bill in equity. Ibid. ; King v. 
 Davis, 137 Fed. 217, 218, and cases cited; Taylor v. Easton, 
 103 C. C. A. 509, 180 Fed. 364. Except where a motion was 
 made at the term and continued by the court over. Walker v. 
 Moser, 54 C. C. A. 262, 117 Fed. 232 ; Amy v. Watertown, 130 
 
DECEEE. 587 
 
 U. S. 313, 32 L. ed. 950, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 530 ; Manning v. Ger- 
 man Ins. Co. 46 C. C. A. 144, 107 Fed. 53. 
 
 It has, however, been held that in decrees, as in foreclosures, 
 "which direct the manner in which the decree shall be enforced, 
 it is in the power of the court to change or modify this feature 
 of the decree at any term of the court, because such provision in 
 a decree is only in effect an eqviitable execution, and there is no 
 vested right in a party to have the execution of a decree per- 
 formed in any particular manner. Mootiy v. Grayson, 44 C. C. 
 A. 83, 104 Fed. 613 ; Eoyal Trust Co. v. Washburn, B. & I. 
 R Co. 113 Fed. 536 ; Graham v. Coolidge, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 
 273, 70 S. W. 231; see Earle v. McCartney, 112 Fed. 372; 
 Thomson v. Dean, 7 Wall. 346, 19 L. ed. 95. 
 
 Force of the Decree. 
 
 The decree is conclusive on all issues joined (Russell & Co. 
 V. Lamb, 49 Fed. 771 ; Manhattan Trust Co. v. Trust Co. of 
 IS. A. 46 C. C. A. 322, 107 Fed. 328-3^2; Black v. Caldwell, 
 83 Fed. 884; Lake County v. Piatt, 25 C. C. A. 87, 49 U. S. 
 App. 216, 79 Fed. 570, 571 ; Confectioners' Machinery & Mfg. 
 Co. V. Racine Engine & Mach. Co. 163 Fed. 915 ; Russell v. 
 Russell, 129 Fed. 434-438; Montana Min. Co. v. St. Louis 
 Min. & Mill. Co. 78 0. C. A. 33, 147 Fed. 904; Gamer v. 
 Second ISTat. Bank, 89 Fed. 636), as well as those that should 
 obviously have been made (Ibid.; Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 
 C. S. 351, 24 L. ed. 195 ; Southern Minnesota R. Extension Co. 
 V. St. Paul & S. C. R. Co. 5 C. C. A. 249, 12 U. S. App. 320, 
 55 Fed. 690; Smith v. Ontario, 18 Blatchf. 454, 4 Fed. 386; 
 Burton v. Huma, 37 Fed. 738; Chavent v. Schefer, 59 Fed. 
 232; see Russell v. Russell, 129 Fed. 438). Or, to state it in 
 another form, a decree is conclusive as to all facts without the 
 admission or proof of which the decree could not have been ren- 
 dered. Kilham v. Wilson, 50 C. C. A. 454, 112 Fed. 572; see 
 also Wilson v. Smith, 117 Fed. 711 ; ^tna L. Ins. Co. v. Hamil- 
 ton County, 54 C. C. A. 468, 117 Fed. 84. 
 
 While most of the cases cited refer to judgments at law, yet 
 there is no essential difference between the effect of the decree 
 in equity and judgment at law. Thompson v. Roberts, 24 How. 
 240, 16 L. ed. 649 ; Kilham v. Wilson, 50 C. C. A. 454, 112 
 
588 DECREE. 
 
 Fed. 573. However, in some cases, as in Kussell v. Eussell, 
 129 Fed. 438, it is intimated that there is a difference. Where 
 by the terms of a decree anything is ordered to be done, as a 
 transfer of property, the effect of the act when done is to invest 
 the transfer with rights of ownership, as completely as if it had 
 been under execution, or order of sale. Thomson v. Dean, 7 
 Wall. 345, 19 L. ed. 95. 
 
 Presumed to Be Bight. 
 
 A decree in equity is presumed to be right. Manhattan L. 
 Ins. Co. V. Wright, 61 C. C. A. 138, 126 Fed. 88, and cases 
 cited; Big Six Development Co. v. Mitchell, 1 L.E.A.(N.S.) 
 332, 70 C. C. A. 569, 138 Fed. 280. 
 
 Acting on the Person. 
 
 It is an ancient maxim that "equity acts upon the person." 
 It was only the expression of the fact that anciently the chan- 
 cellor could not bind the right, but only coerce the person. 
 But this bearded maxim has been shorn of much of its force, 
 for now equity binds the right, and coercion of the party has 
 but limited application in modem practice. The most forcible 
 illustrations of its application are found in injunctions, and 
 where -the parties are within the jurisdiction of the court, but 
 the property to be affected by the decree is beyond the jurisdic- 
 tion of the court. 
 
 It will be seen under "Enforcement of Decrees" that the Fed- 
 eral courts, through the equity rules, still retain the right to 
 coerce the person, where an act is to be done to render the de- 
 cree effective, in many of the States; however, decrees estab- 
 lishing an estate, interest, or right of property, divesting out 
 of one party and vesting in another, are by statute made suffi- 
 cient muniments of title, independent of any action of the 
 parties to the decree, and such decrees may be recorded as title. 
 Tex. Kev. Stat. 3625, 4649, 5275. See new equity rule 8. 
 
 Extraterritorial Effect. 
 
 A decree cannot act extraterritorially, that is, it cannot affect 
 
D.ECKEE. , 589 
 
 lands in other States. Carpenter v. Strange, 141 TJ. S. 105, 
 35 L. ed. 647, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 960; Remer v. McKay, 54 
 Ted. 434; Dull v. Blackman, 169 U. S. 247, 42 L. ed. 734, 18 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 333. Yet where the court has jurisdiction of 
 the person, it can bind the conscience of the party in regard to 
 land, and compel him to do equity. It may decree a conveyance 
 by him of land in another State and may enforce the decree by 
 process against the defendant. Miller v. Rickey, 127 Fed. 580 ; 
 Phelps V. McDonald, 99 U. S. 298, 25 L. ed. 473 ; Baltimore 
 Bldg. & L. Asso. V. Alderson, 32 C. C. A. 542, 61 U. S. App. 
 636, 90 Fed. 146; Gage v. Riverside Trust Co. 86 Fed. 998. 
 Or remove cloud from title. Remer v. McKay, 54 Fed. 432 ; 
 Hart v. Sansom, 110 U. S. 154, 28 L. ed. 103, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 586; Municipal Invest. Co. v. Gardiner, 62 Fed. 956. It may 
 enjoin a resident suit in another State. Cole v. Cunningham, 
 133 U. S. 116, 33 L. ed. 543, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269 ; Gage y. 
 Riverside Trust Co. 86 Fed. 999. 
 
 Lien of a Decree. 
 
 By act of 1888, 25 Stat, at L. 357, chap. 729, Comp. Stat. 
 1913, sec. 1606, the decree of a Federal court has the same 
 lien on property in the State where rendered as are given to 
 the judgment and decrees of the courts of the State having 
 general jurisdiction; and whatever is necessary to be done by 
 State statutes to fix and retain the liens of judgments and de- 
 crees must be done in the same manner to fix the lien of the 
 Federal decree, provided the State statute authorizes the Federal 
 decrees to be so registered and recorded; or to do whatever is 
 required by the State laws with reference to its own judgments 
 and decrees. Batts' Rev. Stat. (Tex.) Arts. 3283-3293. 
 
 In 1895 this act was amended (28 Stat, at L. 813, 814, 
 chap. 180), so that it was not necessary to record or register 
 the judgment or decree in the county in which the Federal 
 court was held, in order to fix the lien, if by law the clerk of 
 the United States court be required to have a permanent office 
 there, and a judgment record open at all times for inspection. 
 By U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 967, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1608, 
 decrees of Federal courts cease to be liens in like manner as de- 
 crees in State courts. 
 
590 DECEEE. 
 
 Enforcement of the Decree. 
 
 Eemedies in enforcing judgments at law (U. S. Eev. Stat, 
 sec. 916; Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1540), do not apply in equity 
 (Hudson V. Wood, 119 Fed. 764). Decrees are controlled by 
 rules of court, and terms of the decree. General Electric Co. 
 V. Hurd, 171 Fed. 984; see Cumberland Lumber Co. v. Tunis 
 Lumber Co. 96 C. C. A. 244, 171 Fed. 352. As to sale of 
 lands in the Federal courts see 27 Stat, at L. 751, chap. 225, 
 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1640) ; Pewabic Min. Co. v. Mason, 
 145 U. S. 349, 36 L. ed. 732, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 881 ; Godchaux 
 V. Morris, 57 C. C. A. 434, 121 Fed. 482 ; and Files v. Brown, 
 59 C. C. A. 403, 124 Fed. 133. By equity rule 8 final process 
 to execute any decree may, if the decree be solely for money, be 
 by a writ of execution, as at common law. If for the perform- 
 ance of any specific act, as executing a conveyance of land, or 
 delivering up deeds or other documents, where the time in which 
 the act to be done, which must be stated in the decree has lapsed, 
 and not complied with, then upon affidavit of the plaintiff of the 
 fact, filed with the clerk, he shall be entitled to a writ of attach- 
 ment against the delinquent party, who, when his person has 
 been attached, shall not be discharged unless upon a full compli- 
 ance, with the payment of all costs. The court, however, may 
 extend the time of performance, and thus release him. If the 
 delinquent party cannot be found, a writ of sequestration may 
 issue against his estate, upon a return of nan est inventus, to 
 compel obedience. Equity rule 7; equity rule 8. When the 
 decree requires delivery of possession, which is refused, then 
 upon affidavit of a demand and refusal to obey the decree or 
 order, the party is entitled to a writ of assistance from the clerk 
 of the court. Equity rule 9 ; equity rule 8, as to interlocutory 
 orders. Alton Water Co. v. Brown, 92 C. C. A. 598, 166 Fed. 
 840-843; Maas v. Lonstorf, 91 C. C. A. 627, 166 Fed. 41; 
 Collin County Nat. Bank v. Hughes, 83 C. C. A. 661, 155 Fed. 
 390; Terrell v. Allison, 21 Wall. 291, 22 L. ed. 635; Root v. 
 Woolworth, 150 U. S. 410, 37 L. ed. 1125, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136. 
 
 By equity rule 11 it is provided that every person not being 
 a party in any cause, who has obtained an order, or in whose 
 favor an order shall be made, shall be enabled to enforce obedi- 
 ence by the same process as if he were a party. And every per- 
 
DECREE. 591 
 
 son not being a party to the cause against whom ohedience to an 
 order of the conrt may be enforced shall be liable to the same 
 process for enforcing obedience as if he were a party. 
 
 The same rnles apply to the enforcement of interlocutory 
 orders and decrees, and the same practice to enforce them. 
 Eqnity rule S. You must file in the clerk's office an affidavit, 
 showing the noncompliance of the defendant with the order. 
 The affidavit must show the order, the time within which it 
 was to be obeyed, the default of the defendant, and a prayer 
 for the attachment or whatever process is asked. The clerk is 
 authorized to issue an attachment directed to the United Stales 
 marshal, connnanding him to attach the defendant, if found in 
 the district, and to bring him forthwith (or some appointed 
 day), before the jiidge of the district court of the United States 
 for the . . . district of . . . , in the city of . . . 
 in said district, to answer for contempt in not obeying the de- 
 cree of the court by which he was directed and required to 
 (State part of the decree that required the act to be done), 
 and you are hereby commanded to detain him in custody until 
 he is discharged by the court. 
 
 Witness the Hon. . . , , Chief Justice of the United 
 States, etc. 
 
 Attest : 
 
 X. Y., 
 Clerk, etc. 
 
 See Pease v. Eathbun-Jones Co. — C. C. A. — , 228 Fed. 
 2Y5; Eichards v. Harrison, 218 Fed. 134. 
 
 The writ of sequestration authorized to be issued against 
 the estate of a person to compel obedience to the decree follows 
 the failure to attach the person because not found. The plain- 
 tiff should file a petition reciting the order that has been dis- 
 obeyed, the issuance of the attachment, the return not found, 
 and then set forth that the defendant has property within the 
 jurisdiction, and ask the court for an order of sequestration. 
 
 Judge Shiras says in the second edition of his Equity Prac- 
 tice, page 141, that the writ is directed to the sequestrators, that 
 is, the parties selected to take charge of the property. The 
 writ should command them to take possession of the estate of 
 the delinquent defendant, and to hold the same, with its pro- 
 ceeds, rents, and profits for the order of the court, who may 
 
592 DECEEB. 
 
 ultimately apply it to the satisfaction of the decree, though the 
 primary purpose of the seizure was to coerece the defendant. 
 Although the process is still retained in the rules, there is no 
 reported case that I know of illustrating its use. Equity rule 8. 
 
 Delivery of Possession. 
 
 If the decree he for possession of property, an affidavit that 
 a party refuses possession authorizes the clerk to issue a writ 
 of assistance, directed to the United States marshal, command- 
 ing him to put the plaintiff in possession. The writ is a fa- 
 miliar one, and will be issued by the clerk upon application 
 based upon aiSdavit, as stated. Equity rule 9. (See authori- 
 ties above.) 
 
 Execution of Decree in Foreclosure. 
 
 In matters of foreclosure, as before stated (equity rule 10), 
 when a decree is rendered for a balance that may be found due 
 over and above the proceeds of sale of the mortgaged property, 
 execution may issue as at common law (equity rule 8 ; U. S. 
 Eev. Stat. sec. 985, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1631) ; Seattle, 
 L. S. & E. R Co. V. Union Trust Co. 24 C. C. A. 512, 48 U. S. 
 App. 255, 79 Fed. 187, 188 ; Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. 
 Keith, 23 C. 0. A. 196, 40 U. S. App. 706, 77 Fed. 374); 
 and when the decree is for the payment of money, you may use 
 any statutory method provided by a State for collecting. Sage 
 V. St. Paul, S. & T. F. R Co. 47 Fed. 3. 
 
 As to decrees of foreclosure and orders of sale, the forms 
 that are familiar to you in State practice may be used. In en- 
 forcing a decree a court cannot require as a precedent con- 
 dition the payment of money found by a master to be due the 
 defendant, where the facts upon which such finding is based 
 were not pleaded. Burke v. Davis, 26 C. C. A. 675, 53 U. S. 
 App. 414, 81 Fed. 907. Again, in enforcing a decree, a court 
 retains jurisdiction, even after the term, to make further orders 
 directing the manner of its execution ; and to that extent it may 
 modify the provisions of the original decree, as by changing the 
 times or terms of a sale of property. Mootry v. Grayson, 44 
 C. C. A. 83, 104 Fed. 613; Bound v. South Carolina R Co. 55 
 Fed. 186 ; Alton Water Co. v. Brown, 92 0. C. A. 598, 166 
 
DECBEE. 593 
 
 Fed. 840 ; Graham v. Coolidge, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 273, 70 S. W. 
 231; Sinsheimer v. Simonson, 47.0. C. A. 51, 107 Fed. 905; 
 Ee Sanborn, 52 Fed. 586. 
 
 So mnch for the statutes and equity rules controlling the 
 enforcement of decrees. There is no question that a circuit 
 court has full powers, coextensive v?ith its jurisdiction to make 
 decrees, to enforce them by proper process, or ancillary suits, if 
 necessary ; but in the matter of issuing attachments for the per- 
 son of the defendant, either by mesne or final process, it is 
 proper here to call your attention to sections 990 and 991 of 
 the United States Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 
 1636, 1637), providing that no person can be arrested and im- 
 prisoned for debt on any process issuing out of the United 
 States courts, in a State that forbids imprisonment for debt. 
 Re Purvine, 37 C. C. A. 446, 96 Fed. 195. Consequently, the 
 rules which make this provision in mesne or final process cannot 
 be enforced in svich a State, when the sole purpose of the suit 
 is for the recovery of money, as in accounting, or for money due 
 on any judgment or decree founded upon contract. Nelson v. 
 Hill, 89 Fed. 477 ; Mallory Mfg. Co. v. Fox, 20 Fed. 409 ; Low 
 V. Durfee, 5 Fed. 256. The first clause of equity rule 8 provides 
 the only method by which money can be Collected under a decree 
 in equity. 
 
 By the last clause of new rule 8, if mandatory orders, in- 
 junctions, and decrees for specific performance be not complied 
 with, the court or judge, instead of proceedings for contempt 
 may direct the act to be done by some other person appointed by 
 him, at the cost of the disobedient party. 
 S. Eq.— 38. 
 
CHAPTEE XOII. 
 
 SALES UNDEE DECEEE. 
 
 You must note the special provisions of the Tederal statute, 
 act of 1893, 27 Stat, at L. 751, chap. 225 (Comp. Stat. 1913, 
 sec. 1640), and not pursue the State methods. Cumberland 
 Lumber Co. v. Tunis Lumber Co. 96 C. C. A. 244, 171 Fed. 
 352. By the act above cited, it is provided that all real estate 
 or any interest in land ordered to be sold by a decree of any 
 United States court, must be sold at the court house of the 
 county in which the property, or a greater part thereof, is lo- 
 cated, or upon the premises, as the court 'may decree. That 
 personal property must be sold in the same way, unless other- 
 wise ordered. (See authorities under "Execution of Decree^" 
 also under "Enforcement of Decree.") 
 
 By section third of the act it is provided that the sale of real 
 estate must be published at least once a week for four weeks 
 in a newspaper published and circulating in the county where 
 the land is situated. If the real estate is in more than one 
 county, then notice must be published in such of the counties 
 as the court may direct. The real estate must be described in 
 the notice; " This statute, it is declared, is for the benefit of the 
 defendant in executioii, anrd creates a personal privilege or 
 right which he may insist on or waive. Nevada Nickel Syndi- 
 cate V. National Nickel Co. 103 Fed. 391-393. 
 
 Sale by Master. 
 
 Whether the sale be made by the United States marshal, or 
 the master in chancery, or a special master commissioner, the 
 same rules must be pursued, unless otherwise directed by the 
 decree. It must be made subject to the provisions of the act 
 above given, and in such manner as the court may direct within 
 the provisions of the act of 1893. 
 
 594 
 
SALES UKDEB DECEEE. 595 
 
 The authority upon which this ministerial duty is performed, 
 whether hy marshal or master, is the decree, a copy of which 
 the clerk must furnish him. Seaman v. Northwestern Mut. 
 L. Ins. Co. 30 C. 0. A. 212, 58 U. S. App. 632, 86 Fed. 497. 
 The decree must be strictly followed, and when the sale is 
 made, a prompt return must be made by the officer. As to form 
 of return of sale, see Nevada Nickel Syndicate v. National 
 mckel Co. 103 Fed. 392, 393 ; Byrne v. Jones, 90 C. C. A. 
 101, 159 Fed. 321; Clark v. Iowa Fruit Co. 185 Fed. 604. 
 
 Motion to Confirm. 
 
 On filing the report of sale, counsel for plaintiff should make 
 a motion to confirm the sale, but the court usually gives a 
 reasonable time within which to file exceptions to the sale. The 
 act being purely ministerial, no right can be claimed under 
 equity rule 66, providing for exceptions to master's reports. 
 Pewabic Min. Co. v. Mason, 145 U. S. 363, 36 L. ed. 736, 12 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 887. If no exceptions are filed, the sale may 
 on motion be confirmed, or the court may of its own motion 
 set the sale aside. See Duncan v. Atlantic, M. & O. li. Co. 4 
 Hughes, 125, 88 Fed. 843, 844-850, for decree confirming 
 sale. As to the practice, see Coltrane v. Baltimore Bldg. & 
 L. Asso. 126 Fed. 839, 840. Anyone interested in having the 
 sale confirmed, whether purchaser, creditor, or receiver, may 
 make the motion. Ibid. 
 
 Exceptions to Sale. 
 
 i Any objections to the officer appointed to sell must be made 
 by direct attack on the order appointing him, A standing mas- 
 ter appointed to sell need not take an oath nor file a bond. 
 Seaman v. Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. 30 C. C. A. 212, 
 58 U. S. App. 632, 86 Fed. 497. Exceptions to the sale or 
 tlie price, or the failure of the officer to perform a required 
 duty, must be made specifically, and supported by affidavit, if 
 the objection raised is not apparent in the record. 
 
 If the exceptions are sustained, a resale is ordered; if not 
 sustained, or no exceptions are filed within the time allowed 
 by the -court, the sale will be confirmed, and the court will order 
 
596 SALES UNDER DECEEE. 
 
 the officer selling to execute and deliver a conveyance to the pur- 
 chaser. If any delay is occasioned in executing the deed, as 
 where under the laws of a State a party has a right to redeem 
 within a certain period after sale, then a certificate of the sale 
 should be delivered to the purchaser until the period for redemp- 
 tion has expired. If the property has not been redeemed, a 
 report should be made to the court, with a proper deed executed 
 for the court's approval, and then delivered to the purchaser 
 if approved. However, this may not be necessary where the 
 court has anticipated the period of redemption in his approval 
 of the sale, and ordered the master to execute and deliver the 
 deed after the period of redemption expires without having been 
 redeemed. Of course, if the property is redeemed, a report 
 must be made at once for the further action of the court. 
 
 Effect of Bid. 
 
 The sale, report, and confirmation are all necessary to trans- 
 fer the property; a bid at the sale accepted by the master is 
 dependent upon confirmation before it in reality becomes an 
 accepted bid. The bid, then, is but an offer to take the prop- 
 erty, the acceptance of which is evidenced by the confirmation 
 by the court. Tennessee v. Quintard, 26 C. C. A. 165, 47 U. 
 S. App. 621, 80 Fed. 835 and cases cited; Camden v. May- 
 hew, 129 U. S. 73, 32 L. ed. 608, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 246; Blos- 
 som V. Milwaukee & C. R. Co. 3 Wall. 196, 18 L. ed. 43. 
 When purchaser fails to complete bid he is entitled to notice 
 of resale. Bayne v. Brewer Pottery Co. 90 Fed. 623 ; Stuart 
 V. Gay, 127 U. S. 526, 32 L. ed. 193, 8 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1279; 
 Sheflield & B. Coal, Iron & E. Co. v. Newman, 23 C. C. A. 
 459, 41 U. S. App. 766, 77 Fed. 787 ; Mayhew v. West Vir- 
 ginia Oil & Oil Land Co. 24 Fed. 205. 
 
 Purchaser Under. 
 
 A purchaser under a judicial sale becomes a quasi party to 
 the suit from which the process issued, and he must take no- 
 tice of all the subsequent proceedings in the cause, if any. 
 Tennessee v. Quintard, 26 0. C. A. 165, 47 U. S. App. 621, 
 80 Fed. 835 ; Davis v. Mercantile Trust Co. 152 U. S. 594, 38 
 
SALES UNDEE DECEEE. 597 
 
 L. ed. 565, 14 Sup. Ct. Kep. 693 ; Kneeland v. American Loan 
 & T. Co. 136 TJ. S. 89, 31 L. ed. 379, 10 Sup. Ct. Kep. 950; 
 Stuart V. Gav, 127 U. S. 518, 32 L. ed. 191, 8 Sup. Ct. Kep. 
 1279. See Hooker v. Burr, 194 U. S. 415, 48 L, ed. 1046, 24 
 Sup. Ct. Kep. 706. 
 
 Notice of Proceedings After Decree. 
 
 After final decree, parties to the suit are not botind to take 
 notice of subsequent proceedings, unless served witli process, 
 or they voluntarily appear (Smith v. Woolfolk, 115 U. S. 147, 
 29 L. ed. 359, 5 Sup. Ct. Kep. 1177; Great AYestern Teleg. Co. 
 V. Purdy, 162 U. S. 336, 40 L. ed. 990, 16 Sup. Ct. Kep. 810; 
 Sheffield & B. Coal, Iron & K. Co. v. Newman, 23 C. C. A. 
 459, 41 TJ. S. App. 766, 77 Fed. 793) ; especially when new 
 and distinct issues from the original bill are set up. Smith v. 
 WooHolk, 115 U. S. 148, 29 L. ed. 359, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1177. 
 
CHAPTEE XCIII. 
 
 EEHEAEING. 
 
 A court of equity has full power over its decrees during the 
 term in whieli they are entered, and may vacate, modify, sup- 
 plement, or supersede, as we have before seen in chapter 95 
 (Doss V. Tyack, 14 How. 312, 313, 14 L. ed. 435; Henderson 
 v. Carbondale Coal & Coke Co. 140 U. S. 40, 35 L. ed. 338, 
 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 691; Bronson v. Schulten, 104 TJ. S. 415, 
 26 L. ed. 799 ; Goddard v. Ordway [Phillips v. Ordway] 101 
 U. S. 752, 25 L. ed. 1043) ; or grant a rehearing, which is 
 addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and cannot be 
 reviewed or assigned as error (McLeod v. New Albany, 13 C. 
 C. A. 525, -24 U. S. App. 601, 66 Fed. 379, 382; Iron K. Co. 
 V. Toledo, D. & B. E. Co. 10 C. C. A. 319, 18 U. S. App. 479, 
 62 Fed. 169, and cases cited). After decree, and before term 
 closes, you may apply for a rehearing by petition, or you may 
 directly appeal, as will be hereafter shown. Equity rule 69; 
 First Nat. Bank v. Woodrum, 86 Fed. 1004; Giant Powder 
 Co. V. California Vigorit Powder Co. 6 Sawy. 527, 5 Fed. 
 197; Harman v. Lewis, 24 Fed. 530. (See "Eehearing in Ap- 
 peals.") 
 
 A rehearing in equity is in effect nothing more than an ap- 
 plication for a new trial at law, based on similar grounds and 
 subject to the same limitations in considering evidence and 
 errors of law and fact. Giant Powder Co. v. California Vigorit 
 Powder Co. 6 Sawy. 527, 5 Fed. 201. The difference, how- 
 ever, is this : in equity the application for a rehearing is not an 
 ex parte proceeding. Ibid. ; Harman v. Lewis, 24 Fed. 530. 
 
 The party complaining must file a petition embodying the 
 requisites of equity rule 69. Easton v. Houston & T. C. R. 
 Co. 44 Fed. 9. It must contain the special matter upon which 
 the rehearing is applied for, it shall be signed by counsel, and 
 the facts stated must be sworn to unless apparent in the rec- 
 
 698 
 
EEHEAKING. 599 
 
 ord. McLeod v. New Albany, 13 C. C. A. 525, 24 TJ. S. App. 
 601, 66 Fed. 379 ; AUis v. Stowell, 85 Fed. 481. 
 
 Time of Filing. 
 
 The rule further provides for the time of filing the petition, 
 or within which it may be filed, as follows : If the case is ap- 
 pealable, it must be filed by the end of the term in which the 
 case is tried ; if not appealable, the petition may be filed before 
 the end of the next term of the court. Equity rule 69 ; First 
 IvTat. Bank v. Woodrum, 86 Fed. 1004; Easton v. Houston T. 
 C. K. Co. 44 Fed. 9 ; Moelle v. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 25, 37 
 L. ed. 352, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 426 ; Newman v. Moody, 19 Fed. 
 858. This latter clause of the rule is not now applicable, as all 
 the cases decided in the circuit court are appealable to the 
 circuit court of appeals. So that now there is no exception to 
 the rule that a petition for rehearing must be filed before the 
 end of the term in which the decree is entered. Halsted v. 
 Forest Hill Co. 48 C. C. A. 681, 109 Fed. 820 ; Omaha Elec- 
 tric Light & P. Co. V. Omaha, 133 C. C. A. 52, 216 Fed. 854. 
 
 Order to Shoiv Cause. 
 
 As said, the application is not ex . parte j but the applicant 
 should procure an order from the court requiring the adverse 
 party to show cause at some future day why the prayer of the 
 petition should not be granted. The adverse party may then 
 answer the petition, and on petition and answer the application 
 is heard. Harman v. Lewis, 24 Fed. 531. 
 
 Grounds of Application. 
 
 Unless you have some new and forcible ground, such as 
 where a mistake is palpable, or some material fact has been 
 overlooked by the court, it is better to appeal at once. Martin- 
 dale V. Waas, 3 McCrary, 637, 11 Fed. 551. It is not profii> 
 able to catch at straws, or rehash old arguments, as the result 
 of a vast majority of these applications attest ; besides, the ac- 
 tion of the court on rehearing is not reviewable on appeal. Iron 
 R. Co. V. Toledo, D. & B. R. Co. 10 C. C. A. 319, 18 U. S. App. 
 
600 EEHEAEING. 
 
 479. 62 Fed. 169 ; MeLeod v. New Albany, 13 C. 0. A. 525,- 24 
 U. S. App. 601, 66 Fed. 379 ; Eogers v. Eiessner, 34 Fed. 270. 
 If fraud alleged, state the facts; general allegations not good. 
 Hicks V. Otto, 85 Fed. 728. 
 
 Newly Discovered Evidence. 
 
 ISTewly discovered evidence is a ground upon which to base a 
 rehearing in equity, but in such cases the petition must con- 
 tain, independently of the aiEdavits setting up the newly dis- 
 covered evidence, the nature of the evidence; that it is ma- 
 terial, showing in what way; the fact that it was not kno^Ti 
 until after the decree ; the time and circumstances under which 
 it came to the knowledge of the party setting it up; and that 
 it could not have been discovered sooner by reasonable dili- 
 gence. Acme Flexible Clasp Co. v. Cary Mfg. Co. 99 Fed. 
 500; Hostetter Co. v. Comerford, 99 Fed. 834; Pittsburgh Re- 
 duction Co. V. Cowles Electric Smelting & Aluminum Co. 64 
 Fed. 125 ; McLeod v. ISTew Albany, 13 C. C. A. 525, 24 U. S. 
 App. 601, 66 Fed. 379 ; Hicks v. Otto, 85 Fed. 728 ; Allis v. 
 Stowell, 85 Fed. 481; Central Trust Co. v. Worcester Cycle 
 Mfg. Co. 91 Fed. 212 ; Anderson Land & Stock Co. v. McCon- 
 nell, 171 Fed. 475 ; Tilghman v. Werk, 39 Fed. 680 ; Witters 
 V. Sowles, 31 Fed. 5 ; Vermont Farm Mach. Co. v. Converse, 
 10 Fed. 825 ; Rintoul v. New York C. & H. E. E. Co. 20 Fed. 
 313 ; Colgate v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 22 Blatchf. 118, 19 Fed. 
 828; Sheeler v. Alexander, 211 Fed. 544, 545; equity rule 69; 
 American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Nancy Hanks Hay Press & 
 Foundry Co. 224 Fed. 524. 
 
 Must Be Material. 
 
 It must be material, and not cumulative (Eogers v. Marshall, 
 13 Fed. 59), and reasonably sufficient to change the result 
 (Torrent v. Duluth Lumber Co. 32 Fed. 229; Allen v. New 
 York, 18 Blatchf. 239, 7 Fed. 483; Munson v. New York, 20 
 Blatchf. 358, 11 Fed. 72; Pfanschmidt v. Kelly Mercantile Co. 
 32 Fed. 667; Witters v. Sowles, 32 Fed. 765), and not mis- 
 taken view of counsel (Witters v. Sowles, 31 Fed. 5). 
 
EEHEAEING. 601 
 
 On EiTor in Law. 
 
 If the complaint is that the court has committed an error in 
 law, it must be shown that the particular point was not pre- 
 sented in argument. 
 
 On Ground Defejidant Not Represented. 
 
 If on ground that defendant was not present, or represented 
 by counsel on the hearing, you must show excuse, and that you 
 have a meritorious defense. Blair v. Silver Peak Mines, 93 
 Fed. 332; Tilghman v. Werk, 39 Fed. 680. See Jordan v. 
 Brown, — Tex. Civ. App. — , 94 S. W. 398; Witters v. Sowles, 
 31 Fed. 5. 
 
 Effect of Granting. 
 
 If rehearing is granted to admit additional proof, the de- 
 cree should stand pending the rehearing. Hook v. Mercantile 
 Trust Co. 36 C. C. A. 645, 95 Fed. 41 ; Eogers v. Marshall, 4 
 McCrary, 307, 15 Fed. 193. But if the rehearing is granted 
 because the court doubts the correctness of the judgment, then 
 the decree should be set aside until the case is reheard. 
 
 On Interlocutory Orders. 
 
 ' Eehearings cannot be granted on interlocutory orders. Equity 
 rule 69 provides for them after final decree. Wooster v. Handy, 
 22 Blatchf. 307, 21 Fed. 51; see Deitch v. Staub, 53 C. C. A. 
 137, 115 Fed. 317; and Gillette v. Bate Eefrigerating Co. 12 
 Fed. 108. 
 
 Time for Appeal Not Included. 
 
 If the petition for rehearing is entertained by the court, 
 then the time for appeal is not included, while the application 
 is pending. Aspen Min. & Smelting Co. v. Billings, 150 U. S. 
 36, 37 L. ed. 988, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 4; JSTorthern P. E. Co. v. 
 Holmes, 155 U. S. 138, 39 L. ed. 99, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 28; 
 Kingman v. Western Mfg. Co. 170 U. S. 678, 42 L. ed. 1193, 
 
602 , EEHEAEING. 
 
 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 786; Cutting v. Tavares, O. & A. E. Co. 9 
 C. C. A. 401, 23 U. S. App. 363, 61 Fed. 155; Texas & P. R 
 Co. V. Murphy, 111 U. S. 489, 490, 28 L. ed. 498, 4 Sup.^ Ct. 
 Eep. 497. 
 
 Hearing Application After the Term. 
 
 We have seen that the jurisdiction of the court to, entertain 
 any motion affecting the judgment ends with the term (Linder 
 V. Lewis, 1 Fed. 378; Halsted v. Forest Hill Co. 109 Fed. 
 822, 823) ; and we have seen after the term rehearing will not 
 be entertained (Ibid. ; Graham v. Swayne, 48 C. C. A. 411, 
 109 Fed. 367; Williams v. Conger, 131 U. S. 391, 33 L. ed. 
 201, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 793 ; Bushhell v. Crook Min. & Smelting 
 Co. 150 U. S. 83, 37 L. ed. 1007, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 2; Bank 
 of Lewisburg V. Sheffey, 140 U. S. 451, 35 L. ed. 496, 11 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 755) ; Farmers' & M. Bank v. Arizona Mut. Sav. & L. 
 Asso. 135 C. C. A. 577, 220 Fed. 1, but an exception has been 
 recognized, where at the time the decree has been entered some 
 order is made virtually keeping the judgment open for further 
 relief or proceedings (Linder v. Lewis, 1 Fed. 380) ; or unless 
 the application has been filed at the entry term, but continued 
 over by the court until the next term for rehearing (Graham 
 V. Swayne, 48 C. C. A. 411, 109 Fed. 367 ; First Nat. Bank 
 V. Woodrum, 86 Fed. 1005 ; Giant Powder Co. v. California 
 Vigorit Powder Co. 5 Fed. 197; New Orleans v. Fisher, 34 C. 
 C. A. 15, 63 U. S. App. 455, 91 Fed. 575 ; Klein v. Southern 
 P. E. Co. 140 Fed. 213). In this kst case it is held the court 
 must continue it over. The mere filing, without action, does 
 not have that effect. In Goddard v. Ordway, 101 U. S. 745, 
 25 L. ed. 1040; and Aspen Min. & Smelting Co. v. Billings, 
 150 U. S. 36, 37, 37 L. ed. 988, 989, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 4, the 
 above is declared the correct rule if the petition is entertained 
 by the court, and some action, as continuing it, is taken by 
 the court, it goes over as unfinished business. Graham v. 
 Swayne, 48 C. 0. A. 411, 109 Fed. 366. 
 
 Form of Petition for Rehearing. 
 
 You may use the form of application for a new trial In 
 
BE HEARING. 603 
 
 your State courts, which I assume is familiar to you, but ap- 
 plying strictly the requisites provided by equity rule 69, above 
 referred to. The following may be used : 
 
 Title as in bill; addressed to the Honorable Circuit Judges of, etc. 
 
 The petition of the defendant C. D. showeth unto your Honors that, being 
 
 aggrieved by the decree entered in this cause on the day of , 
 
 A. D. 19..., by which petitioner was required, etc. (state substance of 
 decree, then grounds of application), wherefore your petitioner humbly 
 prays that your Honors will grant a rehearing, humbly submitting to such 
 orders as the court may make if the application be without merit, etc. 
 
 R. F., 
 Solicitor, etc. 
 
 Facts not apparent of record must be verified by oath of the 
 party, or by some other person. Equity rule 69. 
 
CHAPTEE XCIV. 
 
 BILL OF REVIEW. 
 
 Final decrees in equity may be modified or set aside by .ap- 
 peals within the time prescribed by law, or by a bill of review 
 filed within the time allowed for appeals, or by an original bill 
 in the nature of a bill of review charging fraud or newly dis- 
 covered evidence. Huntington v. Little Rock & Ft. S. E. Co. 
 3 McCrary, 581, 16 Fed. 906 ; Eobinson v. Eudkins, 28 Fed. 
 8. It is not considered a continuance of the former bill, but 
 in the nature of an original bill. Home Street E. Co. v. Lin- 
 coln, 89 C. C. A. 133, 162 Fed. 133 ; but see Dowagiac Mfg. 
 Co. V. McSherry Mfg. Co. 84 C. C. A. 38, 155 Fed. 524; 
 contra — see also Little Eock Junction E. Co. v. Burke, 13 
 C. C. A. 341, 27 U. S. App. 736, 66 Fed. 88 ; Barrow v. Hun- 
 ton, 99 U. S. 80, 25 L. ed. 407. 
 
 Distinction Between Bill of Review and Rehearing. 
 
 There is a distinction between a bill of review and an ap- 
 plication for rehearing, which I have already discussed, and 
 the distinction when stated will be a sufiicient explanation of 
 the nature of a bill of review. 
 
 First. A rehearing is not appealable, and you may appeal 
 from an adverse decision on a bill of review. 
 
 Second. You can attack in a rehearing the conclusions of 
 law and fact, whereas in a bill of review you can only attack 
 errors apparent upon the face of the record. 
 
 Third. The application for a rehearing must be filed be- 
 fore the end of the entry term, whereas a bill of review may 
 be filed after the term and within the time an appeal may be 
 taken under the statute. Copeland v. Bruning, 104 Fed. 170; 
 Eeed v. Stanly, 38 C. C. A. 331, 97 Fed. 521. 
 
 According to the practice in this country a final decree is 
 deemed to be enrolled at the end of the term. Whiting v. Bank 
 of United States, 13 Pet. 13, 10 L. ed. 36. 
 
 604 
 
BILL or REVIEW. 605 
 
 For What Bill of Review Lies. 
 
 First. For error apparent in the record. 
 Second. For new matter arising since the decree. 
 Third. Newly discovered evidence after the term. 
 Fourth. For fraud in procuring the decree. 
 
 First. For Error Apparent. 
 
 Where an error is apparent on the face of the decree, or in 
 the pleadings or proceedings, and without reference to the evi- 
 dence, you may correct it by a bill of review. Hill v. Phelps, 
 41 C. C. A. 569, 101 Fed. 652 ; Home Street R. Co. v. Lin- 
 cok, 89 C. C. A. 133, 162 Fed. 133 ; Eeed v. Stanly, 89 Fed. 
 430; Irwin v. Meyrose, 2 McCrary, 244, 7 Fed. 533; Quin- 
 ton V. ISTeville, 81 C. C. A. 673, 152 Fed. 879 ; Allen v. Wil- 
 son, 21 Fed. 884; Chamberlin v. Peoria, D. & E. R. Co. 55 
 C. C. A. 54, 118 Fed. 33; Cocke v. Copenhaver, 61 C. 0. 
 A. 211, 126 Fed. 145. Mr. Daniels in his Chancery Prac- 
 tice says that the error in law which will maintain a bill 
 of review must consist of the violation of some statute, or 
 established principle of law or equity, or of the settled prac- 
 tice of the court. Hill v. Phelps, 41 C. C. A. 569, 101 
 Fed. 652 ; Freeman v. Clay, 2 C. 0. A. 587, 2 TJ. S. App. 
 254, 52 Fed. 7, and authorities cited. It must be apparent from 
 the proceedings, pleadings, and decree, without reference to 
 the evidence. Ibid. This view has been adopted by the Federal 
 courts in passing upon applications for bills of review. Buf- 
 fington V. Harvey, 95 IT. S. 99, 24 L. ed. 381; Acord v. 
 Western Pocahontas Corp. 156 Fed. 989 ; Freeman v. Clay, 2 
 C. C. A. 587, 2 U. S. App. 254, 52 Fed. 7; Hoffman v. 
 Knox, 1 C. C. A. 535, 8 U. S. App. 19, 50 Fed. 490; Putnam 
 v. Day, 22 Wall. 65, 22 L. ed. 765; Jourolmon v. Ewing^ 
 29 C. C. A. 41, 56 U. S. App. 149, 85 Fed! 106. 
 
 The error must be on the face of the record proper, and 
 not error claimed in the conclusions of law, which is simply 
 a mistake of judgment. Ibid. ; Shelton v. Van Kleeck, 106 
 U. S. 534, 27 L. ed. 270, 1 Sup. Ct. Eep. 491; Quinton v. 
 Neville, 81 C. C. A. 673, 152 Fed. 879 ; Wallamet Iron Bridge 
 Co. V. Hatch, 9 Sawy. 643, 19 Fed. 347 ; Eeed v. Stanly, 89- 
 
606 BILL OF REVIEW. 
 
 Fed. 430. If the decree is consistent witli tlie record, without 
 considering the evidence, a bill of review will not be alloAved. 
 You must appeal to have the evidence considered as a ineans 
 of correction. Jourolmon v. Ewing, 29 C. C. A. 41, 56 U. S. 
 App. 149, 85 Fed. 106; Acord v. "Western Pocahontas Corp. 
 156 Fed. 989. 
 
 In He Brown, 213 Fed. 701, it is said a bill of review to coiv 
 rect errors may be filed without leave. See cases cited. 
 
 Secoiid. New Matter Arising Since the Decree. 
 
 Whatever the new matter may be upon which you base your 
 application for review, it must have arisen after the rendition 
 of the decree. Hill v. Phelps, 41 C. C. A. 569, 101 Fed. 652; 
 Camp Mfg. Co. v. Parker, 121 Fed. 195. A change by the 
 Supreme Court of its ruling on a question of law and fact is 
 not such new matter as will sustain a bill of review. Tilgh- 
 man v. Werk, 39 Fed. 680 ; King v. Dundee Mortg. & Trust 
 Invest. Co. 28 Fed. 33. If not error of law, it must be newly 
 discovered evidence to bring the bill. Irwin v. Meyrose, 2 Me- 
 Crary, 244, 7 Fed. 533; Beard v. Burts, 95 U. S. 436, 24 
 L. ed. 486. 
 
 Third. On Ground of Newly Discovered Evidence After the 
 Term. 
 
 I have already discussed newly discovered evidence as a basis 
 for a rehearing during the term, but after the decree. Where 
 the evidence has been discovered after the term and within 
 the time in which a bill of review may be filed, you may make 
 it a basis for a revision of the decree. It must be shown that 
 it was evidence not known, and could not with reasonable dili- 
 gence have been found before the term expired. Kelley Bros. 
 V. Diamond Drill & Match Co. 142 Fed. 868; Taylor v. Fas- 
 ten, 103 C. C. A. 509, 180 Fed. 364; Acord v. Western Poca- 
 hontas Corp. 156 Fed. 989 ; Camp Mfg. Co. v. Parker, 121 
 Fed. 195; Birdsboro Steel Foundry & Mach. Co. v. Kelley 
 Bros. 78 C. C. A., 101, 147 Fed. .713; JSTovelty Tufting Mach. 
 Co. V. Buser, 85 C. C. A. 413, 158 Fed. 83, 84,^ 14 A. & E. 
 Ann. Cas. 192; Hill v. Phelps, 41 C. C. A. 569, 101 Fed. 652; 
 
BILL OF REVIEW. 607 
 
 Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Keokuk & H. Bridge Co. 
 46 C. C. A. 639, 107 Fed. 781; Jorgenson v. Young, 69 C. 
 C. A. 222, 136 Fed. 381. In addition you must show that 
 the evidence or new matter is material, and not cumulative, but 
 if cumulative, it is highly pertinent and controlling in its in- 
 fluence. Society of Shakers v. Watson, 23 C. C. A. 263, 47 
 TJ. S. App. 170, 77 Fed. 512 ; Jourolmon v. Ewing, 29 C. C. 
 A. 41, 56 U. S. App. 149, 85 Fed. 103; Keith v.- Alger, 59 
 C. C. A. 552, 124 Fed. 35; Craig v. Smith, 100 U. S. 234, 
 25 L. ed. 580. New matter, new evidence, and new witnesses 
 simply for impeaching will not be sufficient. Ibid. ; United 
 States V. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 65, 66, 25 L. ed. 95. Nor 
 when hearsay or otherwise inadmissible. Ward v. Ward, 79 
 C. C. A. 162, 149 Fed. 204. Nor that new evidence would 
 show the decree technically erroneous, but it must further ap- 
 pear that the party has been deprived of a substantial right. 
 Keith V. Alger, 59 C. C. A. 552, 124 Fed. 32. 
 
 A bill of review based on newly discovered evidence is not a 
 matter of right; leave must be granted to file the bill. Hop- 
 kins V. Hebard, 114 C. C. A. 261, 194 Fed. 301 ; Taylor v. Fas- 
 ten, 103 C. C. A. 509, 180 Fed. 364. 
 
 Fourth. For Fraud in Procuring the Decree. 
 
 A bill of review will lie for fraiid where the fraud alleged 
 was extrinsic to the matters tried, and not fraud raised in the 
 issues, such as fraud practised upon the party, or the court 
 during the trial, or in obtaining the judgment. Taylor v. 
 Easton, 103 C. C. A. 509, 180 Fed. 364; Reed v. Stanly, 89 
 Fed. 431; Hendryx v. Perkins, 52 C. C. A. 435, 114 Fed. 
 807; Kimberly v. Arms, 40 Fed. 549-558; Pittsburgh, C. C. 
 & St. L. R. Co. V. Keokuk & H. Bridge Co. 46 C. 0. A. 039, 
 107 Fed. 786 ; Graver v. Faurot, 64 Fed. 243, S. C. 22 C. 
 C. A. 156, 46 U. S. App. 268, 76 Fed. 262 ; Ten-y v. Com- 
 mercial Bank, 92 U. S. 454-456, 23 L. ed. 620, 621. 
 
 Where the fraud arose in procuring the decree it must be 
 attacked by an original bill and independent litigation. Do- 
 wagiac'Mfg. Co. v. McSherry Mfg. Co. 84 C. C. A. 38, 155 
 Fed. 524. See United States v. Gleeson, 33 C. C. A. 272, 
 62 TJ. S. App. 311, 90 Fed. 778, and United States v. Beebe, 
 
608 BILL OF EEVIEW. 
 
 34 C. C. A. 321, 92 Fed. 244; Setting Aside Decree for 
 Fraud, chapter 101. As to allegations in bill, see Pittsburgh, 
 C. C. & St. L. E. Co. V. Keokuk & H. Bridge Co. 46 0. C. A. 
 639, 107 Fed. 782; White v. Crow, 110 U. S. 184, 28 L. ed. 
 113, 4 Sup. Ct. Eep. 71 ; Kimberly v. Arms, 40 Fed. 558; Tay- 
 lor V. Easton, 103 C. C. A. 509, 180 Fed. 364. 
 
 (See chapter 93, pp. 599, 600, "Eehearing.") 
 
 Bill Must Show Why Decree Not Performed. 
 
 It is a rule that a bill of review will not be allowed if per- 
 formance of the decree, or a sufficient reason why it has not 
 been performed, has not been shown, and if not alleged in the 
 bill, it is demurrable. Kimberly v. Arms, 40 Fed. 548 ; Eicker 
 V. Powell, 100 U. S. 108, 25 L. ed. 528 ; Wallamet Iron Bridge 
 Co. V. Hatch, 9 Sawy. 643, 19 Fed. 347. But see Davis v. 
 Speiden, 104 U. S. 84, 85, 26 L. ed. 660, 661, when the court 
 may disregard the requirement. If the decree has not been 
 performed, it must ask that the bill be allowed without per- 
 formance, and especially when it can be shovrai, or is shown^ 
 that the performance would render nugatory the relief sought 
 by the bill of review. Ibid. ; Kimberly v. Arms, 40 Fed. 555; 
 Hoffman v. Knox, 1 C. C. A. 535, 8 U. S. App. 19, 50 Fed. 
 484. The rule, however, would not apply if the decree does 
 not require the party to do anything. Hobbs v. State Trust 
 Co. 15 C. C. A. 604, 30 U. S. App. 393, 68 Fed. 618. 
 
 Time of Filing a Bill of Review. 
 
 Leave to file a bill of review can only be obtained from the 
 court in which the decree was rendered and enrolled. Camp 
 Mfg. Co. V. Parker, 121 Fed. 195. The time within which a 
 bill of review should be filed is not fixed by statute or rule^ but: 
 the courts, by analogy, require- the bill to be filed, within the 
 time allowed by the statute for appeals, and not after., Ibid.; 
 Taylor v. Easton, 103 C- C. A. 509, 180 Fed. 364; Eeed v. 
 Stanly, 89 Fed. 431; Jorgenson v. Young, 69 C. C. A. 222. 
 
BrL,L OF EEVIEW. 609 
 
 136 Fed. 381; Cocke v. Copenhaver, 61 C. C. A. 211, 126 
 Fed. 145 ; Halsted v. Forest Hill Co. 109 Fed. 823 ; Blythe 
 Co. V. Hinckley, 49 C. C. A. 647, 111 Fed. 827; Chamberlin 
 V. Peoria, D. & E. R Co. 55 C. C. A. 54, 118 Fed. 32 ; Hen- 
 dryx V. Perkins, 52 C. C. A. 435, 114 Fed. 804; Duncan v. 
 Atlantic, M. & O. K. Co. 4 Hughes, 125, 88 Fed. 840 ; Central 
 Trust Co. V. GraJit Locomotive Works, 135 U. S. 227, 34 L. ed. 
 105, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 736; Taylor v. Easton, 103 C. C. A. 
 509, 180 Fed. 364. 
 
 In cases of fraud it is governed by the rule of laches, and 
 the bill should show when the fraud was discovered. Taylor 
 V. Easton, 103 C. C. A. 509, 180 Fed. 364. And when it af- 
 firmatively appears that the bill was not filed within the period 
 limited for appeals, it is subject to a demurrer; otherwise the 
 issue must be raised by answer to the bill. Ibid. ; Copeland 
 V, Pruning, 104 Fed. 169. 
 
 The rule as above stated applies, without exception, where 
 errors appear in the decree or proceedings, because it should be 
 brought within the time in which error could be appealed from. 
 Taylor v. Charter Oak L. Ins. Co. 3 McCrary, 484, 17 Fed. 
 566; Chamberlin v. Peoria, D. & E. R. Co. 55 C. C. A. 54, 
 118 Fed. 32; Hendryx v. Perkins, 52 C. C. A. 435, 114 Fed. 
 804; Eeed v. Stanly, 89 Fed. 433; Dunlevy v. Dunlevy, 38 
 Fed. 462; McDonald v. Whitney, 39 Fed. 467; Camp Mfg. 
 Co. V. Parker, 121 Fed. 195. But when founded on new mat- 
 ter or newly discovered evidence, then the review will be al- 
 lowed, if filed within a reasonable time after discovery. Camp 
 Mfg. Co. V. Parker, 121 Fed. 195; Acord v. Western Pocahon- 
 tas Corp. 156 Fed. 989. It is largely a question of diligence. 
 Kissinger-Ison Co. v. Bradford Belting Co. 59 C. C. A. 221, 
 123 Fed. 91. 
 
 The time for filing a bill of review when based on error ap- 
 parent being controlled by analogy to the statute giving a cer- 
 tain time for appeal, the rule would be that if the right of ap- 
 peal lies to the circuit court of appeals, then by the act of 
 March 3, 1891, six months is allowed; but if the right of ap- 
 peal lies from the circuit to the Supreme Court under section 
 S of the act of 1891, then you may sue out a bill of review 
 within two years, that being the time limited for such appeals 
 by Eev. Stat. sec. 1008 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1649), pro- 
 S. Eq.— 39. 
 
610 BILL OF REVIEW. 
 
 vided, however, that the circuit court certifies vp-ithin the term 
 that the jurisdiction of the circuit court is involved. Upon 
 failure to so certify there is no right of appeal, and consequent- 
 ly no right to a bill of review. Reed v. Stanly, 97 Fed. 521 ; 
 Blythe Co. v. Hinckley, 49 C. 0. A. 647, 111 Fed. 837 ; Cham- 
 berlin v. Peoria, D. & E. R Co. 55 C. C. A. 54, 118 Fed. 33; 
 Taylor v. Easton, 103 C. C. A. 509, 180 Fed. 364. 
 
 Leave of Court to File. 
 
 Where the application for a bill of review is based on error 
 apparent in the decree or the proceedings, it may be filed as of 
 right without leave of the court. Acord v. Western Pocahontas 
 Corp. 156 Fed. 989-996; Ricker v. Powell, 100 TJ. S. 104, 
 25 L. ed. 527 ; Camp Mfg. Co. v. Parker, 121 Fed. 195 ; Ritchie 
 V. Burke, 109 Fed. 16; Copeland v. Bruning, 104 Fed. 170; 
 Hendryx v. Perkins, 52 C. C. A. 435, 114 Fed. 809 ; Thompson 
 V. Schenectady R. Co. 119 Fed. 638 ; Lewis v. Holmes, 116 C. C. 
 A. 408, 194 Fed. 842 ; Farmers & M. Bank v. Arizona Mut. Sav. 
 & L. Asso. 135 C. C. A. 577, 220 Fed. 7, and cases cited. 
 It is regarded as in the nature of a writ of error; so also when 
 filed to set aside for fraud (Ritchie v. Burke, 109 Fed. 16; 
 Hendryx v. Perkins, 52 C. C. A. 435, 114 Fed. 807) ; but when 
 based on newly discovered facts dehors the record, then permis- 
 sion to file the bill must be granted by the court (Acord v. West- 
 em Pocahontas Corp. 156 Fed. 995 ; Ricker v. Powell, 100 U. 
 S. 107, 25 L. ed. 528 ; Hendryx v. Perkins, 52 C. C. A. 435, 
 114 Fed. 809 ; Camp Mfg. Co. v. Parker, 121 Fed. 196) ; and 
 it rests entirely in the court's discretion (Thomas v. Brbcken- 
 brough, 10 Wheat. 151, 6 L. ed. 289; Hendiyx v. Perkins; 52 
 C. C. A. 435, 114 Jed. 808. See Central Trust Co. v. Grant 
 Locomotive Works, 135 U. S. 226, 34 L. ed. 104, 10 Sup. Ot. 
 Rep. 736). 
 
 When the bill rests partly on grounds requiring leave to file 
 and partly on errors of law, leave to file must be granted; or a 
 motion to dismiss the bill will be allowed, as it must be treated 
 as a whole. Kimberly v. Arms, 40 Fed. 558; Ricker v. Powell, 
 100 U. S. 109, 25 L. ed. 528. 
 
 Leave to file a bill of review must be obtained from the court 
 rendering the decree. Camp Mfg. Co. v. Parker, 121 Fed. 195.' 
 
BILL OF EEVIEW. 611 
 
 Not Appealable. 
 
 When the granting of a bill of review is discretionary, the 
 granting or refusing is not appealable, but proceedings after 
 gTanting are. Hendryx v. Perkins, 52 C. C. A. 435, 114 Fed. 
 808, 809, 
 
 Form to Be Used. 
 
 Title as in bill; address to the District Judge for District of 
 
 Applicant (as plaintiff) vs. all other parties to the original suit as 
 defendants. 
 
 Your petitioner would show unto your Honors that on the day of 
 
 , A. D. 19. . ., C. D. hereinafter styled defendant, exhibited his 
 
 bill of complaint in the United States District Court for the Dis- 
 trict of against your petitioner, and therein he alleged (state sub- 
 stance of bill). 
 
 That your petitioner appeared and answered said bill on the day 
 
 of , A. D. 19..., as follows (here state substance of answer); 
 
 that issue was joined and proof taken and the cause heard on the 
 
 day of , A. D when a, decree was rendered and recorded in 
 
 said cause as follows ( here insert decree ) . 
 
 Your petitioner here shows unto your Honors that said decree is errone- 
 ous and it would be inequitable to permit it to stand as entered in this 
 cause for that (here insert errors complained of). 
 
 That no decree should have been rendered, but the bill should have been 
 dismissed. 
 
 That in consideration of the error thus apparent your petitioner prays 
 that it be reviewed and reversed, and no further proceedings taken thereon, 
 to the end, therefore, that the defendant may show cause why the peti- 
 tioner should not have the relief prayed for, your petitioner prays that a 
 subpcBna be directed to the said C. D., defendant, commanding him at a 
 certain time to show cause why the decree should not be reviewed and 
 reversed as prayed for. 
 
 R. F., 
 Solicitor, etc. 
 
 Swear to the petition as follows : 
 
 I, A. B., pla-intifiF in the foregoing petition for review, being duly sworn, 
 say that I have read the same and that the matters and things set forth 
 therein are true. 
 
 A. B. 
 Plaintiff. 
 
 Sworn to before me this day of ., A. D. 19. . . 
 
 Notary. 
 
612 BILL OF EEVIEW, 
 
 If the petition rests upon new matter arising since the de- 
 cree, or newly discovered evidence, you must set forth that: 
 
 Since the time of rendering and recording the decree, you have discovered 
 new matter, or new evidence material to the case, which is as follows: 
 (Here insert specifically the new matter or the new evidence discovered, 
 with averments to show materiality. If new evidence, attach, if possible, 
 the affidavits of the newly discovered witnesses, showing the new evidence 
 and show specifically that you were not in default in discovering the evi- 
 dence sooner.) Then proceed — 
 
 Wherefore said decree should be reviewed, reversed, and set aside, and 
 to the end that plaintiff should be permitted to prove the matter aforesaid, 
 he prays process of subpcena, etc. 
 
 If the decree is such that you are required to perform some 
 act, etc., set up why you have not done so as has been previous- 
 ly stated. 
 
 Parties to Bills of Review. 
 
 The rule is that all parties to the original suit must he made 
 parties to a bill of review. The applicant is plaintiff, and all 
 other parties are defendants, if necessary parties. King v. 
 Dundee Mortg. & T. Invest. Co. 28 Fed. 33 ; Frankfort v. De- 
 posit Bank, 120 Fed. 167, 168 ; Perkins v. Hendryx, 127 Fed. 
 448, Same, 149 Fed. 526 ; Thompson v. Maxwell Land-Grant & 
 R Co. 95 U. S. 397, 24 L. ed. 483. However, if codefendants 
 were not necessary parties in the original biU they may be 
 omitted. Id. 
 
 Who May Attack Decree. 
 
 Creditors appearing before a master in a creditors' suit, who 
 have filed intervening petitions to prove their claims, become 
 parties to the record, and may attack the decree by petition 
 (Continental Trust Co. v. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. K. Co. 99 
 Fed. 171) ; but not parties brought into appellate proceedings 
 by citation, who do not avail themselves of the opportunity of 
 appeal. Ibid. 
 
 A party accepting the benefit of a decree ca?a|ftPt review it 
 (Hill V. Phelps, 41 C. C. A. 569, 101 Fed. 654), or where he 
 
BILL OF EEVIEW. 613 
 
 disclaims interest. Brigham City v. Toltec Ranch Co. 41 
 C. C. A. 232, 101 Fed. 85. 
 
 Bill of Review After Appeal. 
 
 A bill of review will not be sustained if an appeal has been 
 applied for and allowed, but not an attempted appeal when 
 there was no right of appeal, if bill of review is filed in time. 
 Ensminger v. Powers, 108 IJ. S. 302, 303, 27 L. ed. 736, 2 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 643; Kimberly v. Arms, 40 Fed. 548-551; 
 Blythe Co. v. Hinckley, 49 C. C. A. 647, 111 Fed. 838, 839. 
 However, such appeal does not operate to suspend the time in 
 which the bill of review should have been sued out (Ibid. ; see 
 Ensminger v. Powers, 108 U. S. 302, 27 L. ed. 736, 2 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 643), nor can it be brought in the circuit court after 
 the case has been passed upon by the appellate court (Conti- 
 tental Trust Co. v. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R. Co. 99 Fed. 
 171-175; Central Trust Co. v. Evans, 19 C. C. A. 563, 43 
 r. S. App. 214, 73 Fed. 562 ; Southard v. Russell, 16 How. 
 547-570, 14 L. ed. 1052-1062; Camp Mfg. Co. v. Parker, 
 121 Fed. '195; Durant v. Essex Co. (Durant v. Storrow) 101 
 U. S. 555, 25 L. ed. 961; Franklin Sav. Bank v. Taylor, 4 
 C. C. A. 55, 9 U. S. App. 406, 53 Fed. 866; Hendryx v. Per- 
 kins, 52 C. C. A. 435, 114 Fed. 809 ; see ^Yatson v. Stevens, 
 53 Fed. 31, as to granting right in mandate; Kingsbury v. 
 Buckner, 134 U. S. 671, 33 L. ed. 1055, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 638) ; but you may apply to the appellate court for permission 
 to file a bill of review (Xovelty Tufting Mach. Co. v. Buser, 
 85 C. C. A. 413, 158 Fed. 83, 14 Ann. Cas. 192; Camp Mfg. 
 Co. V. Parker, 121 Fed. 195; Lafferty Mfg. Co. v. Acme R. 
 Signal & Mfg. Co. 74 C. C. A. 521, 143 Fed. 321 ; Society of 
 Shakers v. Watson, 33 C. C. A. 263, 47 U. S. App. 170, 77 Fed. 
 512; Seymour v. White County, 34 C. C. A. 240, 92 Fed. 115 ; 
 Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Keokuk & H. Bridge Co. 46 
 C. C. A. 639, 107 Fed. 781 ; Frankfort v. Deposit Bank, 120 
 Fed. 165; McClintock v. Pawtucket, 180 Fed. 320) ; and this 
 may be done after case is affirmed and mandate issued, if based 
 on newly discovered evidence (Lafferty Mfg. Co. v. Acme R. 
 Signal & Mfg. Co. 74 C. C. A. 521, 143 Fed. 321 ; Municipal 
 Signal Co. v. Gamewell Fire Alarm Teleg. Co. 77 Fed. 452; 
 
614 BILL OF EEVIEW. 
 
 Re Gamewell Fire Alarm Teleg. Co. 20 C. C. A. Ill, 33 U. S. 
 App. 452, 13 Fed. 908; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. E. Co. v. 
 Keokuk & H. Bridge Co. 46 C. C. A. 639, 107 Fed. 785). 
 
 It was held, however, in Eector v. Fitzgerald, 8 C. C. A. 
 277, 19 U. S. App. 423, 59 Fed. 808-811, that the pending 
 application for a bill of review was not so far lis pendens as 
 to affect a sale under the decree, when sold in good faith by 
 the successful party. 
 
 While a bill of review will not lie after an appeal, except 
 with the permission of the appellate court, yet an original bill 
 in the nature of a bill of review may be filed in the court in 
 which the original judgment was obtained, without permission, 
 when sought to be set aside for fraud (Eitchie v. Burke, 109 
 Fed. 16, and see Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. E. Co. v. Keokuk 
 & H. Bridge Co. 46 C. C. A. 639, 107 Fed. 786), if the fraud 
 was practiced upon the court, or the party during the trial, 
 and not involved in the subject-matter of the litigation, or the 
 issues that were tried. See Graver v. Faurot, 22 C. C. A. 156, 
 46 U. S. App. 268, 76 Fed. 257; Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U. 
 S. 596-599, 35 L. ed. 872-874, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 62. 
 
 Who to Determine Application. 
 
 When an order of the circuit court of appeals stays the man- 
 date the case is kept in the jurisdiction of that court (Burget 
 V. Robinson, 59 C. C. A. 260, 123 Fed. 262), and the leave to 
 file a bill of review in the court below must be made to the 
 circuit court of appeals, but the court below must determine the 
 application on its merits. Frankfort v. Deposit Bank, 59 C. 
 C. A. 539, 124 Fed. 18. 
 
 After mandate is sent down it should be tried in the circuit 
 court of appeals unless facts arose in the court below after man- 
 date, in which case, for convenience, the circuit court of appeals 
 will require the court below to hear it. Keith v. Alger, 59 
 C. C. A. 552, 124 Fed. 32. ; 
 
CHAPTEE XCY. 
 
 VACATING DECREE. 
 
 No rule is better settled than that a Federal court cannot 
 vacate a decree after the tei-m, except in equity upon bills of 
 review, or upon writs of error coram vobis in cases at law 
 (United States v. Aakervik, 180 Fed. 137-143 ; Miocene Ditch 
 Co. V. Campion Min. & Trading Co. 117 C. C. A. 61, 197 Fed. 
 498 ; Wellman v. Bethea, 213 Fed. 370 ; Allen v. Wilson, 21 
 Fed. 881; Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. v. Texas C. R. 
 Co. 32 Fed. 530, and cases cited; McGregor v. Vermont Loan 
 & T. Co. 44 C. C. A. 146, 104 Fed. 709 ; Bronson v. Schulten, 
 104 U. S. 410, 26 L. ed. 797 ; Austin v. Riley, 55 Fed. 833 ; 
 Doe V. Waterloo Min. Co. 60 Fed. 643 ; Petersburgh Sav. & 
 Ins. Co. V. Dellatorre, 17 C. C. A. 310, 30 U. S. App. 504, 70 
 Fed. 645 ; Manning v. German Ins. Co. 46 C. 0. A. 144, 107 
 Fed. 53 ; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Iowa Water Co. 80 Fed. 
 467; Craven v. Canadian P. R. Co. 62 Fed. 171; Mootry v. 
 Grayson, 44 C. C. A. 83, 104 Fed. 613; Wetmore v. Karrick, 
 205 U. S. 141, 51 L. ed. 745, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 434; PoUitz 
 V. Wabash R. Co. 180 Fed. 951), unless for want of jurisdiction 
 (Pollitz V. Wabash R. Co. 180 Fed. 951), or unless a motion to 
 vacate was made at the tei-m in which the decree was entered, 
 and continued over by the court (Stuart v. St. Paul, 63 Fed. 
 644; Graham v. Swayne, 48 C. C. A. 411, 109 Fed. 366; 
 Amy V. Watertown, 130 U. S. 313, 32 L. ed. 950, 9 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 530), or unless for fraud, as before stated. 
 (See Fraud in Procuring Decree, chapter 94.) 
 After the circuit court of appeals has affirmed the decree, the 
 circuit court cannot entertain a bill to modify or vacate it. 
 (See "Bill of Review.") Continental Trust Co. v. Toledo, St. 
 L. & K. C. R. Co. 99 Fed. 171 ; Re Sanford Fork & Tool Co. 
 160 U. S. 255, 40 L. ed. 416, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 291; Re Potts, 
 166 U. S. 266, 41 L. ed. 995, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 520 ; Bissell 
 OarpetSweeper Co. v. Goshen Sweeper Co. 19 C. 0. A. 25, 
 43 U. S. App. 47, 72 Fed. 552; Re Gamewell Fire-Alarm 
 Teleg. Co. 20 C. C. A. Ill, 33 U. S. App. 452, 73 Fed. 910; 
 
 615 
 
616 VACATING DECEEE. 
 
 Walker v. Brown, 86 Fed. 365 ; Illinois ex rel. Hunt v. Illi- 
 nois C. E. Co. 34 0. C. A. 138, 91 Fed. 957. 
 
 Setting Aside Decree for Fraud. 
 
 When the- fraud alleged is extrinsic to the matters tried, such 
 as when practised upon the court, or a party whereby his case 
 was not fully presented, a bill of review will lie ; but the ques- 
 tion has arisen whether by an original bill, or a bill in the na- 
 ture of a bill of review, you can set aside a decree for fraud, 
 which consisted in false swearing and perjury by witnesses in 
 the case. Graver v. Faurot, 64 Fed. 241, 242. In consider- 
 ing this case the court calls attention to a distinct conflict be- 
 tween the Throckmorton Case, in 98 TJ. S. 61, 25 L. ed. 93. 
 and the case of Marshall v. Holmes, in 141 U. S. 598, 35 L. ed. 
 873, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 62. 
 
 In the former case it was decided that only when the fraud 
 is of such a character that it is apparent that there was no 
 real contest or hearing of the case by reason of it, will the bill 
 be maintained; and that a judgment founded on a fraudulent 
 instrument, as in the case at bar, or on perjury or false swear- 
 ing, could not be set aside by an original bill, or a bill in the 
 nature of a bill of review. 
 
 In Marshall v. Holmes the judgment was obtained on an al- 
 leged forged and false instrument, and the court entertained 
 an original bill to set the judgment aside. The court says: 
 "Any fact which clearly proves it to be against conscience to 
 execute a judgment, and of which the injured party could not 
 have availed himself in a court of law, or was prevented from 
 doing so by fraud or accident unmixed with negligence, will 
 justify an application to chancery." Perry v. Johnston, 95 
 Fed. 323-325. 
 
 The principle announced is undoubtedly correct, but clearly 
 not applicable to the facts of the case at bar as a ground to sus- 
 tain an original bill to set the judgment aside. Several efforts 
 seem to have been made to get the Supreme Court to settle the 
 conflict, but it declined to do so. (See "Fraud in Procuring 
 Decree," chapter 94). Graver v. Faurot, 162 TJ. S. 436, 40 
 L. ed. 1031, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 799. 
 
 In Graver v. Faurot, 64 Fed. 241, the judgment was at- 
 
VACATHifQ DECEEK, 617 
 
 tacked on the ground that it was procured by false swearing 
 and perjury, and the court, unable to reconcile the cases, fol- 
 lowed the Throckmorton Case. 
 
 In United States v. Gleeson, 33 0. 0. A. 2Y2, 62 U. S. App. 
 311, 90 Ted. 778, a case arose where the judgment was sought 
 to be set aside on the ground that it was procured by perjury, 
 and the court followed the Throckmorton Case and dismissed 
 the bill. Brooks v. O'Hara, 8 Fed. 533 ; Kimberly v. Arms, 
 40 Fed. 558; Vance v. Burbank, 101 U. S. 519, 25 L. ed. 
 931; United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 66, 25 L. ed. 
 95; Holton v. Davis, 47 C. C. A. 246, 108 Fed. 150. 
 
 In these cases it seems settled that a decree will not be set 
 aside upon the attack of one of the parties to it by an original 
 bill, or a bill in the nature of a bill of review, upon the ground 
 of fraud in procuring it, unless the fraud is extrinsic or col- 
 lateral. Ibid.; Nelson v. Meehan, 12 L.K.A.(KS.) 374, 
 83 C. C. A. 597, 155 Fed. 9 ; United States v. Beebe, 180 U. 
 S. 343, 45 L. ed. 563, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 371 ; Bailey v. Willi- 
 ford, 126 Fed. 803, Same Case, 69 C. C. A. 226, 136 Fed. 
 382; IsTational Surety Co. v. State Bank, 61 L.E.A. 394, 56 
 C. C. A. 657, 120 Fed. 593 ; Graver v. Faurot, 22 C. C. A. 
 156, 46 U. S. App. 268, 76 Fed. 260; United States v. White, 
 9 Sawy. 125, 17 Fed. 562; Eeed v. Stanly, 89 Fed. 433; 
 Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. K. Co. v. Keokuk & H. Bridge Co. 
 46 C. C. A. 639, 107 Fed. 786 ; United States v. Minor, 26 
 Fed. 672; Andes v. Millard, 70 Fed. 517. 
 
 Bill to Impeach Consent Decree. 
 
 A bill will not lie to impeach a consent decree (Thompson 
 V. Maxwell Land Grant & E. Co. 95 U. S. 391, 24 L. ed. 481), 
 unless consent without authority. (White v. Joyce [White 
 V. Miller] 158 U. S. 147, 39 L. ed. 928, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 788; 
 but see Craven v. Canadian P. E. Co. 62 Fed. 171). 
 
 On Ground of Mistake or Accident. 
 
 A circuit court may entertain a bill to set aside a decree on 
 the ground of mistake, accident, or surprise, though the time 
 for appeal or bill of review has passed. (See Dewey v. Strat- 
 
618 VACATING DECEISE. 
 
 ton, 52 C. C. A. 135, 114 Fed. 179 ; Perkins v. Hendryx, 149 
 Ped. 526, S. 0. 52, C. C. A. 435, 114 Fed. 801-821 ; Brown 
 V. Buena Vista County, 95 U. S. 157, 24 L. ed. 422; Pitts- 
 burgh, 0. C. & St. L. R Co. V. Keokuk & H. Bridge Co. 46 
 C. C. A. 639, 107 Fed. 786; Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U. S. 
 589, 25 L. ed. 870, 12 Sup. Ct. Kep. 62; Nelson v. First Nat. 
 Bank, 70 Fed. 526), but not after nine years (Hendryx v. 
 Perkins, 52 C. C. A. 435, 114 Fed. 801). 
 
 Third Party Impeaching Decree. 
 
 One not a party to a suit may, with leave of the court, at- 
 tack by original bill in the nature of a bill of review, a judg- 
 ment or decree obtained by the fraud of one of the parties, if it 
 affects his interests (Thompson v. Schenectady E. Co. 119 Fed. 
 634-638; Richardson v. Loree, 36 C. C. A. 301, 94 Fed. 375; 
 See Sage v. Central R. Co. 93 U. S. 419, 23 L. ed. 935 ; Wood 
 V. Davis, 108 Fed. 130; Cutter v. Iowa Water Co. 96 Fed. 
 777) ; and it is discretionary with the judge to whom applica- 
 tion is made to require, or not, notice to the defendant (Thomp- 
 son V. Schenectady R. Co. 119 Fed. 638). 
 
 Evidence that false testimony was produced and used know- 
 ingly in the trial would not of itself be sufficient, unless it ap- 
 pears with reasonable certainty that but for the perjury the 
 judgment would not have been obtained (Wood v. Davis, 108 
 Fed. 130) ; that is, it must appear that the judgment or de- 
 cree had no other ground to sustain it but the false evidence or 
 fraud perpetrated (Holton v. Davis, 47 C. C. A. 246, 108 Fed. 
 150). 
 
CHAPTER XCVI. 
 
 APPEAI,. 
 
 We have reached a point in the case when effort in the lower 
 court is at an end, and you must now appeal. 
 
 Two Methods. 
 
 There are two methods by which causes are taken to the 
 higher courts for revision. 
 
 First. By appeal. 
 ■ Second. By writ of error. Re Issuing Writs of Error, 117 
 C. C. A. 603, 199 Fed. 115, and cases cited. 
 
 Appeal is the method by which equity cases are reviewed 
 (Thomson v. Travelers' Ins. Co. 89 C. C. A. 61, 161 Fed. 868 ; 
 Files V. Brown, 59 C. C. A. 403, 124 Fed. 133 ; Frankfort v. 
 Deposit Bank, 62 C. C. A. 492, 127 Fed. 814, and cases cited ; 
 Carino v. Insular Government, 212 U. S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 
 29 Slip. Ct. Rep. 334; ISTelson v. Lowndes County, 35 C. C. 
 A. 419, 93 Fed. 538 ; Jabine v. Gates, 115 Fed. 862 ; Toeg 
 v. Suffert, 92 C. C. A. 577, 167 Fed. 125), while a writ of 
 error applies to cases on the law side of the court. In the 
 former — that is, by appeal — the whole case, both law and fact, 
 is taken up for examination on its merits (Mt. Vernon Refriger- 
 ating Co. V. Fred W. Wolf Co. 110 C. C. A. 200, 188 Fed. 
 164; Central Improv. Co. v. Cambria Steel Co. 120 C. C. A. 
 121, 201 Fed.. 811 ; Harry Bros. Co. v. Yaryan Naval Stores Co. 
 135 C. C. A. 454, 219 Fed. 884) ; while by the latter only points 
 of law can be reviewed (Dower v. Richards, 151 U. S. 663, 38 
 L. ed. 307, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 452, 17 Mor. Min. Rep. 704; Chi- 
 cago, B. & Q. R. Co. V. Chicago, 166 U. S. 246, 41 L. ed. 
 988, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581), except that in cases where ap- 
 peals are allowed directly from a State court to the Supreme 
 Court of the United States, the cause, whether in law or eqiiity, 
 is taken up on a writ of error from the Supreme Court (Dower 
 
 619 
 
620 APPEAL. 
 
 V. Eiehards, 151 U. S. 666, 38 L. ed. 308, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 452, 17 Mor. Min. Rep. 704; Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. 
 Taylor, 86 Fed. 175), and the question must be one of law, and 
 not of fact. 
 
 The appeal, then, being the only mode by which a decree in 
 chancery can be carried from an inferior Federal court to the 
 appellate courts for re-examination on its merits, I shall only 
 discuss appeals, and not writs of error, except as this method 
 of appeal may incidentally arise. 
 
 Acts Ooveming Appeals. 
 
 On March 3, 1891, the existing Federal system governing 
 appeals was established. 26 Stat, at L. 826, chap. 517 (Comp. 
 Stat. 1913, sec. 1108), Title "Judiciary." 
 
 It was an act entitled an act to establish circuit courts of 
 appeal, and to define and regulate in certain cases the juris- 
 diction of the courts of the United States, and for other pur- 
 poses. 
 
 Under this act a circuit court of appeals was created in each 
 circuit, and the appellate jurisdiction established as follows: 
 
 By section 5 . it is provided that appeals or writs of error 
 may be taken from the district courts, or from the existing 
 circuit courts to the Supreme Court direct, in the following 
 cases (Ibid.; sec. 5, p. 549) : > 
 
 First. When the jurisdiction of the lower court is in issue, 
 in which case the question of jurisdiction alone shall be certi- 
 fied to the Supreme Court from the court below for decision. 
 
 Fourth. In any ease that involves the construction or ap- 
 plication of the Constitution of the United States. 
 
 Fifth. In any case in which the constitutionality of any 
 law of the United States, or the validity or construction of any 
 treaty made under its authority, is drawn in question. 
 
 Sixth. In any case in which the Constitution or law of a 
 State is claimed to be in contravention of the Constitution of 
 the United States. 
 
 These clauses of the act of 1891 extended the act of Febru- 
 ary 25, 1889, authorizing appeals from the circuit to the Su- 
 preme Court without reference to amount when the jurisdic- 
 tion of the circuit court was involved. See U. S. Stat, at L. 
 vol, 25, p. 693, chap. 236. 
 
APPEAL. 621 
 
 Appeal From State Courts. 
 
 it is further provided in the act, that nothing therein con- 
 tained shall affect the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in 
 cases appealed from the highest court of the State, nor of the 
 statute providing for a review of such cases. U. S. Eev. Stat, 
 sec. 709, 710, 1003 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1662). 
 
 Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 
 These sections thus provide for a direct appeal to the Su- 
 preme Court of the United States from the circuit and dis- 
 trict courts, under the special conditions therein named, and 
 section 6 of the act provides that the circuit court of appeals 
 shall exercise appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal or 
 writ of error final decisions in the district and circuit courts 
 of the United States in all cases other than provided for in the 
 above sections, unless otherwise provided by law. 
 
 Final Appellate Jurisdiction of Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 
 Section 6 then proceeds to give to the circuit court of appeals 
 final appellate jurisdiction in all cases in which the jurisdic- 
 tion of the circuit courts depended entirely on diversity of 
 citizenship, or between aliens and citizens of the United States ; 
 also when the cases arise under the patent laws, revenue, and 
 criminal laws, and in admiralty cases. Here note the fact, 
 that to be final in the circuit court of appeals the jurisdiction 
 of the lower court must rest entirely on diversity, etc. ; if there 
 be any other ground besides diverse citizenship, or grounds 
 stated in said section, the jurisdiction of the circuit court of 
 appeals is not final. Chicago, E. I. & P. R. Co. v. Martin, 178 
 U. S. 249, 44 L. ed. 1056, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 854; see also Son- 
 nenthiel v. Christian Moerlein Brewing Co. 172 U. S. 401, 43 
 L. ed. 492, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 233; Huguley Mfg. Co. v. Gale- 
 ton Cotton Mills, 184 U. S. 295, 46 L. ed. 548, 22 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 452; Harding v. Hart, 187 U. S. 638, 47 L. ed. 344, 23 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 846 ; Cary Mfg. Co. v. Acme Flexible Clasp Co. 
 187 U. S. 428, 47 L. ed. 245, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 211 ; Northern 
 P. R. Co. V. Amato, 144 U. S. 465, 36 L. ed. 506, 12 Sap. Ct. 
 
622 APPEAL. 
 
 Rep. 740 ; Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U. S. 47, 36 L. 
 ed. 340, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 517. 
 
 While the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit court of ap- 
 peals is final, so far as the parties to the litigation are con- 
 cerned, yet it is specially provided in section 6 that the circuit 
 court of appeals may certify any question to the Supreme 
 Court concerning which it desires instruction, or the Supreme 
 Court may require any case made final in said circuit court of 
 appeals, by certiorari or otherwise, to be certified to the said 
 court for its review and determination. 
 
 See section 128, chapter 6, New Code (Comp. Stat. 1913, 
 sec. 1120), embodying section 6 of the act of 1891. 
 
 Appeal from Circuit Court of Appeals to Supreme Court. 
 
 In all cases that are carried to the circuit court of appeals, in 
 which its appellate jurisdiction is not final, there shall be by 
 right, an appeal, or writ of error, or review of the case by the 
 Supreme Court, where the matter in controversy shall exceed 
 one thousand dollars, besides costs ; and one year, and no more, 
 from the entry of the order, judgment or decree, is given in 
 which to take the appeal. Northern P. E.. Co. v. Amato, 144 
 U. S. 471, 472, 36 L. ed. 508, 509, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 740. 
 
 As to appeals from bankrupt courts, see Dodge v. Norlin, 66 
 0. C. A. 425, 133 Ted. 363. 
 
 Appeal from Interlocutory Order. 
 
 By section 7 of the act of 1891, a new feature was added 
 to the appellate system of the United States (Harden v. Camp- 
 bell Printing-Press & Mfg. Co. 15 C. C. A. 26, 33 U. S. App. 
 123, 67 Ped. 811) ; that is,; an appeal in equity is permitted 
 from an interlocutory order granting or continuing an injunc- 
 tion during the progress of the cause in all cases in which an 
 appeal would lie from the final decrees to the circuit court of 
 appeals. IJbid. ; 26 Stat, at L. 828, chap. 517 (Comp. Stat. 
 1913, sec; 1121) — Title Judiciary; Northern P. E. Co. v. Pa- 
 cific Coast Lumber Mfrs. Asso. 91 C. C. A.. 39, 165 Fed. 1; 
 Union P. E. Co. v. Oregon & W. Lumber Mfrs. Asso. ,91 C. C. 
 A. 51, 165 Fed. 13 ; Taylor v. Breese, 90 C. C. A. 558, 163 Fed. 
 
APPEAL. 623 
 
 679-686. Interlocutory order denied in Taylor v. Breese, 
 supra, p. 684. 
 
 By sections 13 and 15 of the act the appellate jurisdiction 
 of the Supreme and Circuit Court of Appeals over the Terri- 
 torial courts is provided for. 
 
 TIME WITHIN WHICH TO TAKE AN APPEAL. 
 
 Appeals to the Supreme Court. 
 
 Section 5 of the act of 1891 enumerates the cases in which 
 an appeal may be taken direct from the circuit and district 
 courts to the Supreme Court of the United States. The time 
 for an appeal in these cases is fixed by the old law, U. S. Eev. 
 Stat. sec. 1008 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1649), at two years from 
 the entry of the decree, judgment, or order, saving disabilities, 
 in which cases the period begins to run after the disability is 
 removed. See Danville v. Brown, 128 U. S. 503, 3-2 L. ed. 
 507, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 149. 
 
 In prize cases an appeal must be sued out in thirty days 
 from the rendition of the decree, unless time is extended or 
 the Supreme Court, authorizes the appeal after the time. U. 
 S. Rev. Stat. sees. 1006, 1009, 4636 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 
 1665, 1650, 8413). 
 
 From Circuit Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. 
 
 By section 6 of the act of 1891 an appeal must be sued out 
 of the circuit court of appeals to the Supreme Court within 
 one year after the entry of the order or decree sought to be re- 
 viewed, in all cases in which the decision of the circuit court 
 of appeals is not made final. 
 
 Appeals from Highest Court of State to Supreme Court of the 
 
 United States. 
 
 Appeals from the highest court of a State to the Supreme 
 Court must be sued out within two years from the entry of the 
 decree. U. S. Rev. Stat. sees. 1008, 709 (Comp. Stat. 1913, 
 sec. 1649). 
 
624 APPEAL. 
 
 Appeals to Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 
 By section 11 of the act of 1891 no appeal can be sued out 
 to the circuit court of appeals, authorized by section 6 of the 
 same act, except within six months after the entry of the decree. 
 Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 3120; Baxter v. Bevil Phillips & Co. 
 219 Fed. 309, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1647. 
 
 By section Y of the act of 1891 appeals from interlocutory 
 orders granting or continuing an injunction are allowed, pro- 
 vided they are taken within thirty days from the entry of the. 
 decree or order. 
 
 There are other shorter terms of appeal provided by special 
 acts, as by section 16 of the interstate commerce act, by which 
 an appeal is required to be taken within twenty days from the 
 judgment, but a review of these acts is not necessary to my 
 purpose. 
 
 I have thus given the material features of the act of 1891, 
 establishing the circuit court of appeals and regulating appel- 
 late jurisdiction over the inferior courts, and of which act it 
 has been said by the Supreme Court of the United States "that 
 it is so variant, and its provisions so comprehensive, that it 
 must be taken as a substitute for all former acts governing ap- 
 peals, and may be considered as furnishing the exclusive rules 
 in respect to the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal courts.'' 
 The Habana, 175 U. S. 684, 44 L. ed. 322, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 290; Fisk v. Henarie, 142 U. S. 459-468, 35 L. ed. 1080- 
 1082, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207. 
 
CHAPTER XCVII. 
 
 PRACTICE AS TO APPEALS. 
 
 By the latter clause of section 11 of the act of 1891, 26 Stat, 
 at L. 829, chap. 517 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1651), it is pro- 
 vided that all provisions of law now in force regulating the 
 method and system of review through appeals or writs of error 
 shall regulate the method and system of appeals and writs of 
 error provided for in this act in respect of the circuit court 
 of appeals, including all provisions for bonds and allowance of 
 appeals. As to the laws in force and referred to, see U. S. 
 Kev. Stat, from sec. 997 to sec. 1013, inclusive; Comp. Stat. 
 1913, sees. 1653-1655; see also the rules of the Supreme Court 
 and circuit court of appeals. The various provisions of the 
 statutes and rules referred to will be discussed as we proceed ; 
 and first: 
 
 As to Appeals from Interlocutory Decrees. 
 
 We have seen, in stating the provisions of the act of 1891, 
 that the appellate jurisdiction is now divided between the Su- 
 preme Court and the circuit court of appeals (McLish v. Eoff, 
 141 U. S. 666, 35 L. ed. 894, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 118), the di- 
 vision being clearly defined. We have seen also that there are 
 two kinds of decrees from which an appeal may be taken, which 
 was a new departure in the practice of the Federal courts. 
 
 First. Interlocutory decrees. 
 
 Second. Final decrees. 
 
 And the rule may be stated thus: The appellate jurisdic- 
 tion of the circuit court of appeals is restricted to reviewing 
 find decrees, with the single exception of the power to re- 
 view interlocutory orders granting or continuing an injunction 
 (Robinson v. Belt, 5 C. C. A. 521, 12 U. S. App. 431, 56 Fed. 
 328), or appointing receivers, added by act of June 6, 1900. 
 S. Eq.— 40. 625 
 
626 PEACTICB AS TO APPEALS. 
 
 I]SrTEELOCtrTOEY DECEBES. 
 
 Ads Ooveming Appeals. 
 
 To understand the decisions under section 7 of the act of 
 1891, permitting appeals from interlocutory orders granting 
 or continuing an injunction, a brief review of successive changes 
 is necessary. The original act, as stated, permitted appeals 
 from interlocutory orders only vs'hen they granted or continued 
 an injimction. Sec. 7, act of 1891. In 1895 (see 28 Stat, at 
 L. 666, chap. 96, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1121). Congress 
 amended this section, and enlarged its scope by adding the 
 words "or refusing or dissolving an injunction." Re Tampa 
 Suburban E. Co. 168 U. S. 588, 42 L. ed. 590, 18 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 177. New Code sec. 129 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1121). 
 
 By the act of June 6, 1900, Congress amended the seventh 
 section of the act without mentioning the act of 1895, and as 
 amended the seventh section read substantially that when on 
 hearing in equity by a judge in vacation, or in open court, an 
 injunction shall be granted or continued, or a receiver is ap- 
 pointed by interlocutory order, the same may be appealed from. 
 Joseph Dry Goods Co. v. Hecht, 57 C. C. A. 64, 120 Fed. 760. 
 
 This act of 1900 has been construed to mean a repeal of the 
 act of 1895, and now interlocutory orders granting or contmu- 
 ing an injunction can only be appealed from, and the right of 
 appeal does not extend to refusing or dissolving an injunction. 
 Columbia Wire Co. v. Boyee, 44 C. C. A. 588, 104 Fed. 173; 
 March v. Romare,-53 C. C. A. 574, 116 Fed. 354; Westing-, 
 house Air-Brake Co. v. Christensen Engineering Co. 44 C. C' 
 A. 92, 104 Fed, 622 ; Heinze v. Butte & B. Consol. Min. Co. 
 46 C. C. A. 219, 107 Fed. 167; Western Electric Co. v. Wil- 
 liams-Abbott Electric Co. 48 C. C. A. 159, 108 Fed. 953; 
 Berliner Gramophone Co. v. Seaman, 51 C. C. A. 440, 113 
 Fed. 750; Shumaker v. Security Life & Annuity Co. 86 C. 
 C. A. 302, 159 Fed. 112 ; Southern R. Co. v. Carolina Coal & 
 Ice Co. 81 C. C. A. 15, 151 Fed. 477; Star Brass Works v. 
 General Electric Co. 63 C. C. A. 604, 129 Fed. 102; Lewis 
 V. Hitchinan Coal & Coke Go. 100 C. C. A. 137, 176 Fed. 549 ; 
 ^STational Automatic. Mach. ; Co:, v.. Automatic Weighing, Lift- 
 ing & Grip Mach. Co. 44 C. C. A. 664, 105 Fed. 670. 
 
PEACTICE AS TO APPEALS. 627 
 
 Section 7 of the acts of 1891 and 1900 was again amended 
 in April, 1906, as follows: That where, upon a hearing in 
 eq^iity by a judge in a district or circuit court, or by a judge 
 in vacation, an injunction shall be granted or continued or a 
 receiver appointed by an interlocutory order, an appeal may 
 be taken, provided it is taken in thirty days from the entry of 
 the order, and it shall have precedence in the appellate court; 
 but the proceedings are not stayed unless so specially ordered, 
 and the court may require an additional bond. Grainger v. 
 I)o^^glas Park Jockey Club, 78 0. C. A. 199, 148 Fed. 513, 8 
 A. & E. Ann. Gas. 997; Root v. Mills, 94 G. G. A. 174, 168 
 Fed. 688 ; Lewis v. Hitchman Coal & Goke Go. 100 C. G. A. 
 137, 176 Fed. 549; Grainger v. Douglas Park Jockey Glub, 
 78 G. C. A. 199, 148 Fed. 513, 8 A. & E. Ann. Gas. 997; 
 Southern E. Go. v. Garolina Goal & Ice Co. 81 C. G. A. 15, 
 151 Fed. 477. See Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1907, p. 192. The 
 cases under the Act of 1895 are no longer authority. Colum- 
 bia Wire Go. v. Boyce, 44 G. G. A. 588, 104 Fed. 172 ; West- 
 inghouse Air-Brake Co. v. Christensen Engineering Go. 44 C. 
 C. A. 92, 104 Fed. 622 ; Rowan v. Ide, 46 C. C. A. 214, 107 
 Fed. 161. 
 
 See sec. 129, ISTew Code, chap. 6 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1121), effective January 1st, 1912, allowing appeals from de- 
 crees or orders granting, continuing, refusing, dissolving, or 
 refusing to dissolve an injunction, or appointing a receiver. 
 American Grain Separator Co. v. Twin City Separator Co. 120 
 C. C. A. 644, 202 Fed. 202 ; J. D. Randall Co. v. Foglesong 
 Mach. Co. 119 G. G. A. 185, 200 Fed. 741. 
 
 Appeal, How Limited. 
 
 The next point to be observed is that an appeal from the in- 
 terlocutory order, as above stated, is dependent upon the fact 
 that an appeal would lie to the circuit court of appeals from a 
 final decree in the main case. Lake Nat. Bank v. Wolfeborough 
 Sav. Bank, 24 G. C. A. 195, 33 U. S. App. 734, 78 Fed. 517, 
 518; Grainger v. Doiiglas Park Jockey Glub, 78 G. C. A. 199, 
 148 Fed. 514, 8 A. & E. Ann. Gas. 997; Macon v. Georgia 
 Packing Co. 9 C. C. A. 262, 13 U. S. App. 592, 60 Fed. 781; 
 Stafford v. King, 32 G. 0. A. 536, 61 U. S. App. 487, 90 Fed.. 
 
628 PEACTICE AS TO APPEALS. 
 
 140. Where the Supreme Court alone would have appellate 
 jurisdiction under section 5 of the act of 1891, there would be 
 no appellate jurisdiction of an interlocutory decree rendered in 
 such case, was held to be the rule in Wright v. MacFarlane, 58 
 C. C. A. 570, 122 Fed. 770, 771, and cases cited above; but 
 it is now held, under the act amending section 7 of March, 
 1906, above referred to, that an appeal to the circuit court of 
 appeals can be had from an interlocutory order, etc., though a 
 question of jurisdiction be the only issue. Grainger v. Douglas 
 Park Jockey Club, 78 C. C. A. 199, 148 Fed. 514, 8 A. & E. 
 Ann. Cas. 997. See Lake Nat. Bank v. Wolfeborough Sav. 
 Bank, 24 C. C. A. 1^)5, 33 U. S. App. 734, 78 Ted. 518. 
 
 Time of Appeal. 
 
 The next point to be observed in appeals of this character is 
 that it must be taken in thirty days from the entry of the 
 order, or you lose your right. Sec. 7, act of 1891, sec. 129, 
 ISTew Code (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1121) ; Re Haberman Mfg. 
 Co. 147 U. S. 530, 37 L. ed. 266, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 527. This 
 short time given is for the protection of the defendant. Rowan 
 V. Ide, 46 C. C. A. 214, 107 Fed. 161. See Fed. Stat. Anno. 
 Supp. 1907, p. 192; Root v. Mills, 94 C. C. A. 174, 168 Fed. 
 688 ; J. D. Randall Co. v. Foglesong Mach, Co, 119 C. C. A. 
 185, 200 Fed. 742. 
 
 Bond in Interlocutory Appeals. 
 
 By original rule 13, section 2, of the rules governing the 
 circuit court of appeals, it is provided that on all appeals from 
 any interlocutory order or decree granting or continuing an 
 injunction in the circuit or district court, the appellant shall, at 
 the time of the allowance of said appeal, file with the clerk of 
 the court a bond to the opposite party, in such sum as such 
 court shall direct, to answer all costs if he shall fail to sustain 
 his appeal. The amount rests in the discretion of the court 
 Barcus v. Sherwood, 69 C. C. A. 200, 136 Fed. 184; Maxtin v. 
 Hazard Powder Co. 93 U. S. 302, 23 L, ed. 885. 
 
PRACTICE AS TO APPEALS, 629 
 
 Effect of Appeal on Injunction. 
 
 In appeals from decrees granting, continuing, or dissolving 
 injunctions, the giving of bond gTants the appeal, but does not 
 affect the order as to the injvinction, whether the bond be in 
 form a supersedeas or not. In this respect it differs from ap- 
 peals in ordinary chancery suits, where giving a supersedeas 
 bond operatea as a supersedeas. Lownsdale v. Gray's Harbor 
 Boom Co. 117 Fed. 982. The rule, then, is that an appeal 
 from granting or continuing or dissolving an interlocutory in- 
 junction has no effect whatever on the injunction. The judge 
 may, on allowing the appeal, make such modifications of the in- 
 junction as he sees proper under the particular circumstances ; 
 that is, he may suspend or change it or restore as he sees proper, 
 or as to him may appear equitable, but the giving of bond and 
 notice of appeal has no effect as a supersedeas. Equity rule 74 ; 
 Proviso sec. 7, act of 1891 ; and amendments above referred to. 
 See sec. 129, l^ew Code, chap. 6 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1121), 
 embodying old law. Green Bay & M. Canal Co. v. Norrie, 118 
 Fed. 923 ; Knox County v. Harshman, 132 U. S. 16, 33 L. ed. 
 250, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. ' 8 ; Interstate Commerce Commission v. 
 Louisville & IST. E. Co. 101 Fed. 146 ; see Shelby Steel Tube Co. 
 V. Delaware Seamless Tube Co. 161 Fed. 798; Timolat v. 
 Philadelphia Pneumatic Tool Co. 130 Fed. 903 ; Ee Haberman 
 Mfg. Co. 147 U. S. 530, 37 L. ed. 266, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 527 ; 
 Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Standard Stopper Co. 69 C. C. A. 
 200, 136 Fed. 184; Andrews v. l^ational Foundry & Pipe 
 Works, 10 C. C. A. 60, 18 U. S. App. 458, 24 U. S. App. 81, 
 61 Fed. 790 ; American Strawboard Co. v. Indianapolis Water 
 Co. 26 C. C. A. 470, 46 U. S. App. 526, 81 Fed. 423 ; Hovey 
 V. McDonald, 109 U. S. 150, 27 L. ed. 888, 3 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 136 ; see National Heeling Mach. Co. v. Abbott, 77 Fed. 464, 
 465, where supersedeas allowed to avoid closing a ousiness. 
 
 So an order which keeps in statu quo the property in litiga- 
 tion will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a 
 gross abuse of discretion. Shea v. Nelima, 66 0. C. A. 263, 
 133 Fed. 216, and cases cited. Again, the appeal does not 
 affect the power of the trial court to proceed with the cause in 
 respect to any matter not involved in the appeal. Ex parte Na- 
 tional Enameling & Stamping Co. 201 U. S. 156, 50 L. ed. 
 
630 PEAGTICE AS TO APPEALS. 
 
 707, 26 Sup. Ct. Eep. 404- Cuyler v. Atlantic & IST. C, R. Co. 
 132 Eed. 568. 
 
 Rule Governing the Court of Appeals in Considering Inter- 
 locutory Appeals. 
 
 The court of appeals will not reverse, unless improvidently 
 granted and hurtful (Workingmen's Amalgamated Council v. 
 United States, 6 C. C. A. 258, 13 U. S. App. 426, 57 JFed. 
 85; Rahley v. Columbia Phonograph Co. 58 C. C. A. 639, 122 
 Fed. 625; Southern P. Co. v. Earl, 27 C. C. A. 185, 48 U. S. 
 App. 716, 82 Fed. 690 ; Thompson v. Nelson, 18 C. C. A. 137, 
 37 U. S. App. 478, 71 Fed. 339 ; Duplex Printing-Press Co. v. 
 Campbell-Printing Press & Mfg. Co. 16 C. C. A. 220, 37 U. S. 
 App. 250, 69 Fed. 250; see Northern Securities Co. v. Har- 
 riman, 67 C. C. A. 245, 134 Fed. 331, for exception), which 
 should be made clearly to appeal. Kerr v. New Orleans, 61 
 C. C. A. 450, 126 Fed. 920 ; Massie v. Buck, 62 C. C. A. 535, 
 128 Fed. 27 ; Acme Acetylene Appliance Co. v. Commercial 
 Acetylene Co. 112 C. C. A. 573, 192 Fed. 321; Texas Traction 
 Co. V. Barron G. Collier, 115 C. C. A. 82, 195 Fed. 65 ; Love 
 V. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 107 C. C. A. 403, 185 Fed. 322; 
 Crescent Specialty Co. v. National Fireworks Distributing' Co. 
 135 C. C. A. 28, 219 Fed. 130. Nor will it on motion remand 
 the cause for further proceeding without reversing after exam- 
 ination on merits. Greene v. United Shoe Machinery Co. 60 
 C. C. A. 93, 124 Fed. 961. It will on proper application dis- 
 miss an appeal without prejudice to appellant, if appellee is not 
 unduly prejudiced (Ibid.) ; and it seems upon request of trial 
 judge, it will dismiss an appeal for defendant to file a bill of 
 review on newly discovered evidence. Mossberg v. Nutter; 
 60 C. C. A. 98, 124 Fed. 966;. see Marden v. Campbell Print- 
 ing-Press & Mfg. Co. 15 C. C. A. 26, 33 U. S. App. 123, 67 
 Fed. 810. 
 
 Entering Decree on Merits. 
 
 The question has often arisen as to the right of the appel- 
 late court to enter a decree on the merits of the whole case, when 
 the case has been appealed under section 7 of the act of 1891 ; 
 
PEACTICE AS TO APPEALS. 631 
 
 and while there has been some conflict of authority, yet the rule 
 seems to be established, that where the nature of the case per- 
 mits, the appellate court will end the litigation, and enter a 
 decree on the merits. Knoxville v. Africa, 23 C. 0. A. 252, 47 
 U. S. App. 74, 246, 77 Fed. 501 ; Berliner Gramophone Co. 
 V. Seaman, 49 C. C. A. 99, 110 Fed. 33; Smith v. Vulcan 
 Iron Works, 165 U. S. 518, 41 L. ed. 810, 17 Sup. Ct. Kep. 
 407 ; Texas Consol. Compress & Mfg. Asso. v. Storrow, 34 C. C. 
 A. 182, 92 Fed. 10; Re Tampa Suburban R. Co. 168 U. S. 
 588, 42 L. ed. 590, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 177; Bissell Carpet- 
 Sweeper Co. v. Goshen Sweeper Co. 19 C. C. A. 25, 43 U. S. 
 App. 47, 72 Fed. 545 ; Tornanses v. Melsing, 47 C. C. A. 596, 
 109 Fed. 710; Harden v. Campbell Printing-Press & Mfg. Co. 
 15 C. 0. A. 26, 33 U. S. App. 123, 67 Fed. 810 ; Co-operating 
 Merchants' Co. v. Hallock, 64 C. C. A. 104, 128 Fed. 596-598 ; 
 Harriman v. Northern Securities Co. 197 U. S. 287, 49 L. ed. 
 760, 25 Sup. Ct. Eep. 493, and cases cited; Chapman v. Yellow 
 Poplar Lumber Co. 74 C. C. A. 331, 143 Fed. 204, 205 ; Car- 
 son V. Combe, 29 C. C. A. 660, 52 U. S. App. 622, 86 Fed. 
 210; Clark v. McGhee, 31 C. C. A. 321, 59 U. S. App. 69, 87 
 Fed. 789. But not when the rights of parties can only be made 
 apparent upon full proof. Knoxville v. Africa, 23 C. C. A. 
 252, 47 U. S. App. 74, 246, 77 Fed. 502 ; Clark v. McGhee, 
 31 C. C. A. 321, 59 U. S. App. 69, 87 Fed. 789. 
 ■ Thus, where the question is one of law, which determines 
 the ultimate rights of the parties (Knoxville v. Africa, 23 C. 
 C. A. 252, 47 U. S. App. 74, 246, 77 Fed. 501) ; or where in 
 granting the interlocutory injunction the whole merits of the 
 case are involved, or when it should appear that the bill had 
 no equity to support it (Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 
 IJ. S. 525, 41 L. ed. 812, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 407) ; or under 
 similar conditions shown in the cases above cited, the court will 
 dispose of the case on its merits, though coming up under sec- 
 tion 7 of the act. Where, however, the record is insufficient 
 or incomplete (Clark v. McGhee, 31 C. C. A. 321, 59 U. S. App. 
 69, 87 Fed. 789), as where there is no full proof of the facts 
 and the rights of the parties are not made to fully appear, then 
 the court will only consider whether the interlocutory order 
 was providently granted (Ibid. ; Knoxville v. Africa, supra ; 
 Thompson v. Nelson, 18 C. 0. A. 137, 37 U. S. App. 478, 71 
 
632 PKACTICE AS TO APPEALS. 
 
 Fed. 339). As to forms of petition for appeal and notice and 
 of such other procedure as is necessary to perfect the appeal, 
 formulas will be hereafter given, as each step of the procedure 
 is discussed. 
 
 Appeal from Interlocutory Decree Appointing Receivers. 
 
 An appeal lies from an interlocutory order appointing a re- 
 ceiver, though the order was made on an ex parte hearing. 
 Joseph Dry Goods Co. v. Hecht, 57 C. C. A. 64, 120 Fed. 
 760 ; Pacific JSTorthwest Packing Co. v. Allen, 48 C. C. A. 521, 
 109 Fed. 515 ; see lieinze v. Butte & B. Consol. Min. Co. 46 
 C. C. A. 219, 107 Fed. 166 ; see Koot v. Mills, 94 C. C. A. 
 174, 168 Fed. 688, construing the amendment to section 1906 
 as to the words "a hearing in equity." 
 
CHAPTER XOVIII. 
 
 FIITAL DECREES AS A BASIS FOR APPEALS, 
 
 With the exception created by the seventh section of the 
 act of 1891, the general rule, without question, is that to au- 
 thorize an appeal, the decree miist be final as to all matters 
 within the pleadings. Obert v. Marquet, 99 C. C. A. 60, 175 
 Fed. 50, and cases cited; Wilson v. Smith, 61 C. C. A. 446, 
 126 Ted. 919 ; Mordecai v. Lindsay, 19 How. 201, 15 L. ed. 
 624; Robinson v. Wilmington, 9 C. C. A. 84, 8 U. S. App. 
 541, 60 Fed. 471; Craighead v. Wilson, 18 How. 201, 15 L. 
 ed. 333 ; Green v. Fisk, 103 U. S. 519, 26 L. ed. 486 ; McLish 
 V. Eoff, 141 U. S. 661, 25 L. ed. 893, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 118. 
 (See "Final Decrees.") By section 6 of the act of 1891 it is 
 provided that the circuit court of appeals shall exercise appel- 
 late jurisdiction to review by appeal final decisions in the cir- 
 cuit and district courts, in all cases other than those provided 
 in section 5, or otherwise provided by law, as in remanding a 
 case to a State court, etc. Robinson v. Belt, 5 C. C. A. 521, 
 12 U. S. App. 431, 56 Fed. 328 ; Hooven, O. & R. Co. v. Feath- 
 erstone's Sons, 49 C. C. A. 229, 111 Fed. 81 ; McLish v. Roff, 
 141 U. S. 666, 35 L. ed. 894, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 118 ; Bowker 
 V. United States, 186 TJ. S. 138, 46 L. ed. 1091, 22 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 802. 
 
 In section 5 of the act of 1891, providing for appeals to the 
 Supreme Court direct, the word "final" is not used, but in Mc- 
 Lish V. Roff, supra, it is held that appeals under this section 
 can be taken only after final judgment entered, when the party 
 must elect whether he will take his writ of error or appeal to 
 the Supremo Court, or to the court of appeals upon the whole 
 case. McLish v. Roff, 141 U. S. 666, 35 L. ed. 894, 12 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 118; Bowker v. United States, 186 U. S. 138, 46 
 L ed. 1091, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 802; United States v. John, 
 155 U. S. 114, 39 L. ed. 90, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 39 ; Gates v. 
 Bucki, 4 C. C. A. 116, 12 U. S. App. 69, 53 Fed. 961 ; Bar- 
 ling V. Bank of British N. A. 1 C. C. A. 510, 7 U. S. App. 
 194, 50 Fed. 263; Davis & R. Bldg. & Mfg. Co. v. Barber, 
 9 C. C. A. 79, 18 U. S. App. 476, 60 Fed. 465, 466. So a 
 
 633 
 
684 FINAL DECKEES AS A BASIS FOE APPEALS. 
 
 writ of error to review the judgments of the circuit court of 
 appeals by the Supreme Court, — the decree must be final. Mac- 
 Leod V. Graven, 24 C. C. A. 449, 47 U. S. App. 573, 79 Fed. 
 84, 85; Morris v. Dunbar, 79 C. 0. A. 226, 147 Fed. 406; 
 Beamer v. Werner, 86 C. C. A. 289, 159 Fed. 99. 
 
 What is a Final Decree? 
 
 I have already defined a final decree under "Decrees," ref- 
 erence to which, and authorities there cited, is here made. We 
 saw that whether it is final depends on its essence, and not on 
 its form, or what it is called (Potter v.- Beal, 2 C. 0. A. 60, 
 5 U. S. App. 49, 50 Fed. 860), and the Supreme Court has 
 been liberal, and not technical, in construing the words "final 
 decree." Eau Claire v. Payson, 46 C. C. A. 466, 107 Fed. 557. 
 We saw, again, that to be final the controversy must be settled 
 (Hohorst V. Hamburg-American Packet Co. 148 U. S. 265, 37 
 L. ed. 445, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 590; French v. Shoemaker, 12 
 Wall. 98, 20 L. ed. 271) ; and the case must be left in such con- 
 dition that if there be an afiirmance by the appellate court, the 
 court below will have nothing to do but execute the judgment 
 (West V. East Coast Cedar Co. 51 C. C. A. 416, 113 Fed. 
 743 ; Talley v. Curtain, 7 C. C. A. 1, 8 U. S. App. 424, 58 Fed. 
 4, 5 ; Maas v. Lonstorf, 91 C. C. A. 627, 166 Fed. 41 ; Stevens 
 V. ISTave-McCord Mercantile Co. 80 C. C. A. 25, 150 Fed. 71 ; 
 National Banlc v. Smith, 156 U. S. 333, 39 L. ed. 442, 15 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 358 ; Meagher v. Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co. 
 145 U. S. 611, 36 L. ed. 835, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 876 ; Winthrop 
 Iron Co. v. Meeker, 109- TJ. S. 183, 27 L. ed. 899, 3 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. Ill ; McGourkey v. Toledo & O. C. R. Co. 146 U. S. 
 546, 36 L. ed. 1083, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 170; Keystone Man- 
 ganese & Iron Co. V. Martin, 132 U. S. 91, 33 L. ed. 275, 10 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 32 ; Kemp v. ISTational Bank, 48 C. 0. A. 213, 
 109 Fed. 50; Grant v. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. 106 U. S. 431, 
 27 L. ed. 238, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 414; Defer v. DeMay, 168 U. S. 
 704, 42 L. ed. 1211, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 941) ; and finally must 
 be determined by Federal, and not State law (Menge v. Warri- 
 ner, 57 C. C. A. 432, 120 Fed. 816, 817 and cases cited). 
 
 At common law it is not difiicult to determine when a judg- 
 ment is final, but difficulties arise in determining when a de- 
 cree in equity is final when tested by the rules above given. 
 The various forms it assiimes.^because of its flexibilitv. have 
 
FINAL DECEEES AS A BASIS FOE APPEALS. 635 
 
 given rise to much conflict of authority in determining a de- 
 cree to be final and appealable. Chase v. Driver, 34 C. C. A. 
 668, 92 Fed. YSS, and cases cited. 
 
 Of course, when the decree determines the litigation, and 
 leaves nothing to be done but to enforce it by execution or or- 
 der, we can have no difficulty in determining its character 
 (West V. East Coast Cedar Co. 51 C. C. A. 416, 113 Fed. 743) ; 
 but where something is to be done before the decree can be 
 carried into execution, then arises the question whether it can 
 be the basis of an appeal. It would not be profitable to follow 
 the labyrinth of cases, and I can do no more than state some 
 of the conditions under which a decree has been held final, 
 though other proceedings were necessary to make it effective. 
 
 First. It seems a decree may be final, though the court 
 gives parties a right to apply for modifications and directions 
 (Stovall V. Banks, 10 Wall. 586, 19 L. ed. 1037; Eau Claire 
 V. Payson, 46 C. C. A. 466, 107 Fed. 552, 557 ; Ee Farmers' 
 Loan & T. Co. 129 U. S. 213, 32 L. ed. 657, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 265) ; or though the bill be retained after the decree to adjust 
 by further decree the accounts between the parties pursuant to 
 the decree passed (Thompson v. Dean [Dean v. Nelson] 7 
 Wall. 346, 19 L. ed. 95; Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 204, 12 
 L. ed. 405 ; Bray v. Staples, 103 C. C. A. 451, 180 Fed. 330, 
 and cases cited). 
 
 Second. A decree may be final which determines the is- 
 sues, but holds the fund for distribution. Bank of Lewis- 
 burg V. Sheffey, 140 U. S. 452, 35 L. ed. 496, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 755 ; Ex parte JSTorton, 108 U. S. 242, 27 L. ed. 711, 2 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 490; Andrews v. ISTational Foundry & Pipe 
 Works, 19 C. C. A. 548, 34 TJ. S. App. 632, 73 Fed. 518; 
 Washington & A. E. Co. v. Bradley (Washington & A. E. Co. 
 V. Washington), 7 Wall. 577, 19 L. ed. 274. But in Bank of 
 Lewisburg v. Sheffey, 140 U. S. 452, 35 L. ed. 496, 11 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 755, it is said that it must be the distribution as de- 
 creed, and not held, pending consideration how to be dis- 
 tributed. 
 
 Third. A decree may be final though referred to a master 
 (Chase v. Driver, 34 C. C. A. 668, 92 Fed. 785, and cases 
 cited; Hill v. Chicago & E. E. Co. 140 U. S. 54, 35 L. ed. 
 332, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 690), but the reference must be as to 
 some matter in aid of the execution, and not affecting the sub- 
 stance of the decree itself. Keystone Tiiangancse & Iron Co. v. 
 
636 FINAL DECREES AS A BASIS FOE APPEALS. 
 
 Martin, 132 TJ. S. 93, 38 L. ed. 276, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 32, and 
 authorities cited ; Grant v. East & West E. Co. 1 C. C. A. 681, 
 2 TJ. S. App. 182, 50 Fed. Y97. Thus if the decree be made 
 fixing the rights and liabilities of the parties, and the reference 
 to the master is only for a ministerial purpose, and not for fur- 
 ther proceedings contemplated by the court, then the decree is 
 appealable, though referred to a master. McGourkey v. To- 
 ledo & O. 0. R. Co. 146 U. S. 545, 36 L. ed. 1083, 13 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 170; West v. East Coast Cedar Co. 51 C. C. A. 416; 
 Latta V. Kilbourn, 150 U. S. 540, 37 L. ed. 1175, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 201, 113 Fed. 743. 
 
 To illustrate: If the reference to a master is to state an ac- 
 count upon which a decree is to be entered, then it is not final. 
 Chase v. Driver, 34 C. C. A. 668, 92 Fed. 784; Perkins v. 
 Fourniquet, 6 How. 208, 12 L. ed. 407 ; PuUiam v. Christian, 
 6 How. 211, 212, 12 L. ed. 408, 409 ; Craighead v. Wilson, 18 
 How. 201, 15 L. ed. 333 ; Keystone Manganese & Iron Co. v. 
 Martin, 132 U. S. 93, 33 L. ed. 276, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 32; 
 Lodge V. Twell, 135 U. S. 235, 34 L. ed. 154, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 745 ; Moran v. Hagerman, 12 C. C. A. 239, 29 U. S. App. 
 71, 64 Fed. 503 ; California IsTat. Bank v. Stateler, 171 U. S. 
 449, 43 L. ed. 234, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6 ; Parsons v. Robinson, 
 122 U. S. 114, 30 L. ed. 1122, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1153; Bur- 
 lington, C. R. & N. R. Co. V. Simmons, 123 U. S. 56, 31 L. 
 ed. 74, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58 ; Southern R. Co. v. Postal Teleg. 
 Cable Co. 179 U. S. 643, 45 L. ed. 356, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249; 
 Ogden City v. Weaver, 47 C. C. A. 485, 108 Fed. 567; Mer- 
 cantile Trust Co. V. Chicago, P. & St. L. R. Co. 60 C. C. A. 
 651, 123 Fed. 391.. But if an accounting is not asked in the 
 bill, and the court should order an accounting simply in exe- 
 cution of the decree, then it is final. Ibid. ; McGourkey v. To- 
 ledo & 0. C. R. Co. 146 U. S. 545, 36 L. ed. 1083, 13 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 170; West v. East Coast Cedar Co. 51 C. C. A. 416, 
 113 Fed. 743 ; Grant v. East & W. R. Co. 1 C. C. A. 681, 2 U. 
 S. App. 182, 50 Fed. 797 ; Chase v. Driver, 34 C. C. A. 668, 
 92 Fed. 784, 785. It appears, then, in all of these cases, that 
 if the rights and liabilities of the parties are fixed by the decree, 
 and the further act to be done, or ordered to be done, is only 
 in aid of the execution of the decree, then the decree is final; 
 but if the act to be done or contemplated is intended to be used 
 in any way to determine judicially the rights or liabilities of 
 
I-INAL DECEEES AS A BASIS FOE APPEALS. 63Y- 
 
 parties, then the decree is not final. McGourkey v. Toledo & 
 0. 0. R. Co. 146 U. S. 545, 36 L. ed. 1083, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 170. 
 
 Fourth. A decree may be final that completely determines 
 the right of some of the parties to a suit, who are not jointly 
 liable with those against whom the suit is retained, and which 
 completely determines a collateral matter distinct from the 
 general subject of litigation. Illustrative cases: Potter v. 
 Seal, 2 C. C. A. 60, 5 U. S. App. 49, 50 Fed. 860 ; Rust v. 
 United Waterworks Co. 17 C. C. A. 16, 36 U. S. App. 167, 
 70 Fed. 132 ; Hooven, O. & R. Co. v. John Featherstone's Sons 
 49 C. C. A. 229, 111 Fed. 81 ; Kemp v. National Bank, 48 
 C. C. A. 213, 109 Fed. 48; Standley v. Roberts, 8 C. C. A. 
 305, 19 U. S. App. 407, 59 Fed. 839, 840, and cases cited. 
 Hill V. Chicago & E. R. Co. 140 U. S. 54, 35 L. ed. 332, 11 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 690 ; Sanders v. Bluefield Waterworks & Im- 
 prov. Co. 45 C. C. A. 475, 106 Fed. 587 ; Eau Claire v. Pay- 
 son, 46 C. C. A. 466, 107 Fed. 552; Edgell v. Folder, 39 C. C. 
 A. 540, 99 Fed. 324; Tuttle v. Claflin, 31 C. C. A. 419, 59 U. 
 S. App. 602, 88 Fed. 122 ; Stewart v. Masterson, 131 TJ. S. 
 159, 33 L. ed. 117, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 682. But see Frow v. De 
 La Vega, 15 Wall. 554, 21 L. ed. 61 ; Hohorst v. Hamburg- 
 American Packet Co. 148 U. S. 265, 37 L. ed. 445, 13 Sup. 
 Ct Rep. 590 ; Baker v. Old Nat. Bank, 33 C. C. A. 570, 63 
 F. S. App. 34, 91 Fed. 450 ; Blossom v. Milwaukee & C. R. 
 Co. 1 Wall. 656, 17 L. ed. 673; Internal Improv. Fund v. 
 Greenough, 105 U. S. 531, 26 L. ed. 1159. 
 
 Judgments Not Final and Appealable. 
 
 A decree on condition is not a final decree (Stratton v. 
 Dewey, 24 C. C. A. 435, 41 U. S. App. 741, 79 Fed. 32) ; nor 
 an order dismissing a defendant in a joint obligation (Beck & 
 P. Lithographing Co. v. Wacker & B. Brewing & Malting Co. 
 .26 C. C. A. 11, 46 U. S. App. 486, 76 Fed. 10; Frow v. D© 
 La Vega, 15 Wall. 554, 21 L. ed. 61 ; Hohorst v. Hamburg- 
 American Packet Co. 148 U. S. 265, 37 L. ed. 445, 13 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 590; Gay v. Vereen, 75 C. C. A. 667, 144 Fed. 839; 
 Baker v. Old Nat. Bank, 33 0. 0. A. 570, 63 U. S. App. 34, 
 91 Fed. 450; Memphis Keeley Institute v. Leslie E. Keeley Co. 
 144 Fed. 628):; nor when default entered against one defend- 
 ant jointly obligated, while cause pending as to others (Frow 
 
•638 PlM'AL DECREES AS A BASIS FOE APPEALS. 
 
 V. De La Vega, 15 Wall. 554, 21 L. ed. 61) ; nor an order deny- 
 ing an intervention (Lewis v. Baltimore & L. K. Co. 10 C. 0. 
 A. 446, 8 U. S. App. 645, 62 Fed. 219 ; Buel v. Farmers' Loan 
 & T. Co. 44 C. 0. A. 213, 104 Fed. 839 ; see Hamlin v. To- 
 ledo, St. L. & K. C. R. Co. 36 L.RA. 826, 24 C. C. A. 271, 47 
 U. S. App. 422, 78 Fed. 664; Iron E. Co. v. Toledo, D. & B. 
 E. Co. 10 C. C. A. 319, 18 U. S. App. 479, 62 Fed. 166) ; nor 
 while petition for rehearing is pending (Aspen Min. & Smelt- 
 ing Co. V. Billings, 150 U. S. 36, 37 L. ed. 988, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 4, and authorities) ; or motion for new trial (Kingman 
 
 6 Co. V. Western Mfg. Co. 170 U. S. 680, 42 L. ed. 1194, 18 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 786; in Ee Worcester County, 42 C. C. A. 
 637, 102 Fed. 810) ; nor judgments remanding causes to Sta;te 
 Courts (Joy v. Adelbert College, 146 U. S. 355, 36 L. ed. 
 1003, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 186; Bender v. Pennsylvania Co. 148 
 U. S. 502, 37 L. ed. 537, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 640 ; Illinois C. E. 
 Co. V. Brown, 156 U. S. 386, 39 L. ed. 461, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 656; Chicago, St. P. M. & O. E. Co. v. Eoberts, 141 U. S. 
 694, 35 L. ed. 905, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 123) ; nor when referred 
 to a master whose functions as to the matter of reference are 
 judicial, and not ministerial. Moran v. Hagerman, 12 C. C. 
 A. 239, 29 U. S. App. 71, 64 Fed. 503, and authorities. 
 
 Illustrative cases declaring judgments not final: National 
 Bank V. Smith, 156 U. S. 330, 39 L. ed. 441, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 358 ; Latta v. Kilbourn, 150 U. S. 524, 37 L. ed. 1169, 14 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 201; Louisiana ISTat. Bank v. Whitney, 121 U. S. 
 285, 30 L. ed. 962, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 897; Luxton v. ISTorth 
 Eiver Bridge Co. 147 U. S. 341, 37 L. ed. 195, 13 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 356 ; McGourkey v. Toledo & O. E. Co. 146 U. S. 545, 
 36 L. ed. 1083, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 170 ; Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. 
 V. Kirchoff, 160 U. S. 378, 40 L. ed. 463, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 318; Lodge v. Twell, 135 U. S. 235, 34 L. ed. 154, 10 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 745 ; Hohorst v. Hamburg- American Packet Co. 148 
 U. S. 264, 37 L. ed. 444, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 590; Meagher v. 
 Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co. 145 U. S. 610, 36 L. ed. 835, 
 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 876 ; Keystone Manganese & Iron Co. v. 
 Martin, 132 U. S. 93, 33 L. ed. 276, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 32; 
 Winters v. Ethell, 132 U. S. 209, 33 L. ed. 339, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 56 ; Parsons v. Eobinson, 122 U. S. 115, 30 L. ed. 1123, 
 
 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1153; New York Security & T. Co. v. Illi- 
 nois Transfer E. Co. 44 C. C. A. 161, 104 Fed. 710; Baker 
 V. Old Nat. Bank, 33 C. C. A. 570, 63 U. S. App. 34, 91 Fed. 
 
FINAL DECEEES AS A BASIS FOE APPEALS. 639 
 
 449; Florida Constr. Co. v. Young, 8 C. 0. A. 231, 11 U. S. 
 App. 683, 59 Fed. 722; Dufour v. Lang, 4 C. C. A. 663, 2 
 U. S. App. 477, 54 Fed. 916. 
 
 Judgments for Costs. 
 
 As a_ general rule, judgments for costs alone cannot be ap- 
 pealed from. Glendale Elastic Fabrics Co. v. Smith, 100 U. 
 S. 112, 25 L. ed. 547; Russell v. Farley, 105 U. S. 437, 26 
 L. ed. 1061; Burns v. Rosenstein, 135 U. S. 456, 34 L. ed. 
 195, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 817 ; see The City of Augusta, 25 C. C. 
 A. 430, 50 U. S. App. 39, 80 Fed. 304; Scatcherd v. Love, 91 
 C. C. A. 639, 166 Fed. 54; Blassengame v. Boyd, 101 C. C. A. 
 129, 178 Fed. 5, and cases cited. Ibid. But the courts recognize 
 exceptions to the rule (Internal Improv. Fund v. Greenough, 
 105 U. S. 527, 26 L. ed. 1157) ; as where the judgment is on 
 the merits and the question of costs arises. See also Re Michi- 
 gan C. R. Co. 59 C. C. A. 643, 124 Fed. 727 ; Kell v. Trench- 
 ard, 76 C. C. A. 611, 146 Fed. 245; Com Products Ref. Co. 
 V. Chicago Real Estate Loan & T. Co. 107 C. C. A. 283, 185 
 Fed. 63 ; Snyder v. McCarthy, 116 C. C. A. 390, 197 Fed. 166 ; 
 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Steiner, 119 C. C. A. 401, 201 
 Fed. 63. 
 
 Judgments hy Consent. 
 
 The old rule that decrees by consent cannot be appealed from 
 does not always prevail in the United States courts ; yet the 
 court will not consider in such cases any error which in law 
 is waived by the consent. Eustis v. Henrietta, 20 C. , C. A. 
 537, 41 U. S. App. 182, 74 Fed. 578; Pacific R. Co. v. 
 Ketchum, 101 U. S. 289-296, 25 L, ed. 932-935. See Kaw 
 Valley Drainage Dist. v. Union P. R. Co. 90 C. 0. A. 320, 
 163 Fed. 836, and cases cited; United States v. Babbitt, 104 
 U. S. 768, 26 L. ed. 922. 
 
 It has been held that parties accepting benefits under a de- 
 cree cannot attack it (Albright v. Oyster, 9 C. C. A. 173, 19 
 U. S. App. 651, 60 Fed. 644), and in. McCafferty v. Celluloid 
 Co. 43 C. C. A. 540, 61 U. S. App. 394, 104 Fed. 305, it was 
 held that a party stipulating that a decree in a pending suit 
 shall be entered upon conditions to be fulfilled, and the decree 
 being entered in pursuance thereof, errors cannot be assigned. 
 ISTashville C. & St. L. R. Co. v. United States, 113 U. S. 261, 
 28 L. ed. 971, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 460. 
 
CHAPTEE XOIX. 
 
 APPEALS, WHERE TAKEIST. 
 
 From the District Court to Supreme Court Direct. 
 
 We have seen that the act of 1891 distributes the appellate 
 jurisdiction of the national judicial system between the Su- 
 preme Court and the circuit court of appeals, and has estab- 
 lished by designated classes the cases in which each of the 
 two courts shall respectively have jurisdiction. I will now 
 discuss appeals from the circuit courts to the Supreme Court 
 direct This jurisdiction is based on three classes of cases. 
 
 First. Cases in which the jurisdiction of the district court 
 is challenged directly in the suit in which a final judgment has 
 been entered, in which case the judge must certify only the 
 question of jurisdiction for decision. Ay res v. Polsdorfer, 187 
 U. S. 585, 47 L. ed. 314, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 196 ; Bowker v. 
 United States, 186 U. S. 135, 46 L. ed. 1090, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 802 ; Powers v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. 169 U. S. 96, 42 L. 
 ed. 674, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 264 ; Mexican C. R. Co. v. Eckman, 
 187 U. S. 429, 47 L. ed. 245, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 211 ; Hennessy 
 V. Richardson Drug Co. 189 U. S. 25, 47 L. ed. 697, 23 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 532 ; St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. American Cot- 
 ton Co. 60 C. C. A. 80, 125 Fed. 198 ; Crawford v. McCarthy, 
 78 C. C. A. 356, 148 Fed. 198 ; Davis v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. 
 L. R. Co. 84 C. C. A. 453, 156 Fed. 776, 777 ; United States 
 ex rel. Mudsill Min. Co. v. Swan, 13 C. C. A. 77, 31 U. S. 
 App. 112, 65 Fed. 647 ; Fisheries Co. v. Lennen, 65 C. C. A. 
 79, 130 Fed. 533; Davis & R. Bldg. & Mfg. Co. v. Barber, 9 
 C. C. A. 79, 18 U. S. App. 476, 60 Fed. 465; Smith v.' Mc- 
 Kay, 161 U. S. 355, 40 L. ed. 731, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 490; 
 Chappell V. United States, 160 U. S. 507, 40 L. ed. 512, 16 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 397; Kentucky State Bd. of Control v. Lewis, 
 100 C. C.'A. 208, 176 Fed. 556. See Bien v. Robinson, 208 
 
 640 ^ 
 
APPEALS FEOM DISTEICT TO SUPKEMB COUE.T. 641 
 
 U. S. 423, 52 L. ed. 556, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 379 ; Empire State- 
 Idalio Min. & Developing Co. v. Henley, 205 TJ. S. 225, 51 L. 
 ed. 779, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 476 ; Huguley Mfg. Co. v. Galeton 
 Cotton Mills, 184 U. S. 290, 46 L. ed. 546, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 452; Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. 191 
 U. S. 376, 48 L. ed. 228, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 93 ; Harris v. Rosen- 
 berger, 13 L.R.A.(KS.) 762, 76 C. C. A. 225, 145 Fed. 451 
 (where other questions involved prevented a direct appeal or 
 permitted an appeal to either the circuit or Supreme Court). 
 See also Kentucky State Bd. of Control v. Levris, 100 0. C. A. 
 208, 176 Fed. 556 ; A. J. Phillips Co. v. Grand Trunk Western 
 R Co. 115 C. C. A. 94, 195 Fed. 12; Railroad Commission v. 
 Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. 115 C. C. A. 127, 195 Fed. 
 66; Paducah v. East Tennessee Teleph. Co. 106 C. C. A. 333, 
 182 Fed. 625. 
 
 Second. Cases involving the construction or application of 
 the Constitution of the United States. Arkansas v. Schlierholz, 
 179 U. S. 598, 45 L. ed. 335, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229 ; Cosmo- 
 politan Min. Co. V. Walsh, 193 U. S. 468, 48 L. ed. 752, 24 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 489 ; Sloan v. United States, 193 U. S. 614, 48 
 L. ed. 814, 24 Snp. Ct. Rep. 570 ; Cummings v. Chicago, 188 
 U. S. 411, 47 L. ed. 527, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 472; Harris v. 
 Rosenberger, 13 L.R.A.(]Sr.S.) 762, 76 C. C. A. 225, 145 Fed. 
 449. A mere construction of an act of Congress is not em- 
 braced in statute. Spreckles Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 
 U. S. 397, 48 L. ed. 496, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 376. 
 
 Third. Cases in v^hich the constitutionality of a lavy of the 
 United States, or the validity of a treaty, is in issue, or when 
 the Constitution or law of a State is claimed to be in contra- 
 vention of the Constitution of the United States (Re Marmo, 
 138 Fed. 201 ; Mitchell v. Furman, 180 U. S. 402, 45 L. ed. 
 596, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 430; Arkansas v. Schlierholz, 179 U. 
 S. 598, 45 L. ed. 335, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229; Connolly v. 
 Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 431 ; Pikes Peak Power Co. v. Colorado Springs, 44 
 C. C. A. 333, 105 Fed. 1 ; Owensboro v. Owensboro Waterworks 
 Co. ,53 C. C. A. 146, 115 Fed. 318; see Harris v. Rosenberger, 
 13 L.R.A.(KS.) 762, 76 C. C. A. 225, 145 Fed. 451, 452; 
 Watkins v. King, 55 C. C. A. 290, 118 Fed. 524; American 
 Sugar Ref. Co. v. New Orleans, 181 U. S. 277, 45 L. ed. 859, 
 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 646 ; Field v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 194 
 
 S. Eq.— 41. 
 
642 APPEALS FROM DISTBICT TO SUFEEME COURT. 
 
 U. S. 618, 48 L. ed. 1142, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 784; Pike's Peak 
 Power Co. v. Colorado Springs, 44 C. C. A. 333, 105 Pad. 1; 
 Davis & P. Mfg. Co. y. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 216, 47 L. ed. 
 779, 23 Sup. Ct. Pep. 498; Owensboro v. Owensboro Water 
 Works Co. 53 C. G. A. 146, 115 Fed. 318) ; or power of Con- 
 gress over navigable waters (Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U. S. 
 410-431, 47 L. ed. 525-531, 23 Sup. Ct, Rep. 472) ; or aris- 
 ing under a treaty (Mitchell v. Purman, 180 U. S. 402, 45 
 L. ed. 596, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 430) ; or a right to vote for a 
 member of Congress (Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 TJ. S. 58, 45 L. ed. 
 84, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 17). See Railroad Commission v. Mor- 
 gan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. 115 C. C. A. 127, 195 Ped. 66; 
 Paducah v. East Tennessee Teleph. Co. 106 C. C. A. 333, 182 
 Ped. 625. 
 
 The direct appeal to the Supreme Court, provided by U. S. 
 Rev. Stat. sees. 652, 693, upon a certificate of dissent, has not 
 been referred to in the act of 1891, and was declared repealed 
 in The Habana, 175 U. S. 684, 44 L. ed. 322, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 290, and Pisk v. Henarie, 142 TJ. S. 459, 35 L. ed. 1079, 12 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207. Again, by section 16 of the interstate com- 
 merce act of 1887, 24 Stat, at L. 379, chap. 104, amended in 
 25 Stat, at L. 855, chap. 382 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 8584), 
 either party may appeal direct to the Supreme Court if the 
 matter in dispute exceeds two thousand dollars, and the appeal , 
 is taken in twenty days, but in view of the decision in The 
 Habana, 175 U. S. 684, 685, 44 L. ed. 322, 323, 20 Sup. Gt. 
 Rep. -290, this provision has been repealed, and there is now 
 no direct appeal from the circuit to the Supreme Court except 
 as stated in the act of 1891. N"ational Exch. Bank v. Peters, 
 144 U. S. 570, 36 L. ed. 545, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 767. See Inter- 
 state Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 26, 48 L. ed. 
 862, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563, construing act 1903, sec. 3, pro- 
 viding for direct appeal to the Supreme Court in proceedings 
 brought by the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
 
 I will now take up the cases in which a direct appeal can be 
 taken to the Supreme Court, in their order. 
 
 Pirst. In any case in which the jurisdiction of the circuit 
 court is in issue, in which case the question of jurisdiction 
 alone must.be certified to the Supreme Court by the judge be- 
 low, and the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction. Hunt- 
 ington V- Laidley, 176 U. S. 676, 44 L. ed. 634, 20 Sup. Ct. 
 
APPEALS FROM DISTEICT TO SUPEEME COURT. 643 
 
 Kep. 526; Mexican 0. E. Co. v. Eclanaiij 187 U. S. 429, 47 
 L. ed. 245, 23 Sup. Ot. Kep. 211 ; Crawford v. McCarthy, 78 
 C. C. A. 356, 148 Fed. 200 and cases cited. Halpin v. Amer- 
 man, 70 C. C. A. 462, 138 Fed. 548; Alton Water Co. v. 
 Brown, 92 C. C. A. 598, 166 Fed. 840-842. These cases limit 
 the jurisdiction to the jurisdiction as a Federal court, exclud- 
 ing questions of jurisdiction applicable to State and Federal 
 courts. Bowker v. United States, 186 U. S. 135, 46 L. ed. 
 1090, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 802 ; Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 485, 
 52 L. ed. 901, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 597 ; Bache v. Hunt, 193 U. 
 S. 523, 48 L. ed. 774, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 547 ; Evans-Snider-Buel 
 Co. V. McCaskill, 41 C. C. A. 577, 101 Fed. 658 ; Courtney 
 V. Pradt, 196 U. S. 89, 49 L. ed. 398, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 208. 
 See Board of Trade v. Hammond Elevator Co. 198 U. S. 424, 
 49 L. ed. 1111, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 740; Louisville Trust Co. 
 V. Knott, 191 U. S. 225, 48 L. ed. 159, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119; 
 Boston & M. R. Co. v. Gokey, 79 C. C. A. 64, 149 Fed. 42, 
 9 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 384; Mitchell Coal & Coke Co. v. Penn- 
 sylvania R. Co. 112 C. C. A. 637, 192 Fed. 475-478, and cases 
 cited. 
 
 In Huntington v. Laidley, 176 U. S. 676, 44 L. ed. 634, 
 
 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526, the court says that in order to maintain 
 jurisdiction in the Supreme Court in this class of cases, the rec- 
 ord must distinctly show, without equivocation, that the court 
 below sends up for consideration the single and definite question 
 of jurisdiction. Waterford v. Elson, 78 C. C. A. 675, 149 
 Fed 93 ; Arkansas v. Schilerholz, 179 U. S. 600, 45 L. ed. 336, 
 
 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229; Shields v. Coleman, 157 TJ. S. 168, 39 
 L. ed. 660, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 570; Chappell v. United States, 
 160 U. S. 499-507, 40 L. ed. 510-512, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 397 ; 
 Mexican C. R. Co. v. Eckman, 187 U. S. 429, 47 L. ed. 245, 
 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 211 ; Cosmopolitan- Min. Co. v. Walsh, 183 
 U. S. 460, 48 L. ed. 749, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 489 ; Anglo-Ameri- 
 can Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. 191 if. S. 376, 48 
 L. ed. 228, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 93. See Giles v. Harris, 189 
 U. S. 490, 47 L. ed. 913, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 639. There must 
 •be no mere suggestion that the jurisdiction was in issue, and 
 no other question can be certified with it. Davis v. Geissler, 
 162 U. S. 291, 40 L. ed. 972, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 796; Van 
 Wagenen v. Sewall, 160 TJ. S. 373, 40 L. ed. 461, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 370; Hennessy v. Richardson Drug Co. 189 U. S. 25, 
 
644 APPEALS FEOM mSTEICT TO SUPEEME COUET, 
 
 47 L. ed. 697, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 532. But it seems, where a 
 case is taken direct on ground of jurisdiction alone, and thus 
 certified, the Supreme Court may pass upon a question of 
 fact where the decision below is wrong, and upon this set aside 
 the judgment of the court below. Commercial Mut. Acci. Co. 
 V. Davis, 213 U. S. 256, 53 L. ed. 787, 29 Sup. Ct. Eep. 445. 
 Questions for direct appeal must be real and substantial. Lam- 
 pasas V. Bell, 180 U. S. 282, 45 L. ed. 530, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 368. 
 
 Grounds of Certification. 
 
 The absence of jurisdiction may be certified on the want 
 of service of process. Board of Trade v. Hammond Ele- 
 vator Co. 198 U. S. 424, 49 L. ed. 1111, 25 Sup. Ct. Kep. 740; 
 Remington v. Central P. R. Co. 198 U. S. 95, 49 L. ed. 959, 
 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 577; Kendall v. American Automatic Loom 
 Co. 198 U. S. 477, 49 L. ed. 1133, 25^Sup. Ct. Rep. 768; 
 Shepard v. Adams, 168 U. S. 618, 42 L. ed. 602, 18 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 214; St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v; American Cotton 
 Co. 60 C. C.' A. 80, 125 Fed. 196 ; Davis v. Cleveland, C. C. 
 & St. L. R. Co. 217 U. S. 157, 54 L. ed. 708, 27 L.R.A.(]Sr.S.) 
 823, -30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 463, s. c. 84 C. C. A. 453, 156 Fed. 
 775 ; see St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. American Cotton 
 Co. 60 C. C. A. 80, 125 Fed. 196-201, and cases cited; Com- 
 mercial Mut. Acci. Co. V. Davis, 213 U. S. 246, 53 L. ed. 782, 
 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445 ; Boston & M. R. Co. v. Gokey, 79 0. C. 
 A. 64, 149 Fed. 44. The cases which limit the jurisdiction of 
 the Federal court as a Federal court apply to questions arising 
 after a valid service is made, and not to the question as to 
 whether service has been made and jurisdiction acquired. 
 Board of Trade v. Hammond Elevator Co. 198 U. S. 424, 49 
 L. ed. 1111, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 740. Such certificate may also 
 issue when the cause is not properly removed from the 
 State court '(Ro'^vers v. Chesapeake & Q. R. Co. 169 U. S. 
 92, 42 L. ed. 673, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 264 ; see Kansas City 
 North Western R. Co. v. Zimmerman, 210 U. S. 336, 52 L. 
 ed. 1084, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730); or when party sues as 
 assignee and the assignor could not have sued (Barling v. 
 Bank of British IST. A. 1 C. C. A. 510, 7 U, J, App. 194, 50 
 Fed. 261); or any other ground upon whiclithe jurisdiction 
 of the court below has been decisively attacked, and the same 
 
APPEALS PEOM DISTRICT TO SUPREME COtTRT, 645 
 
 has been overruled, or when case dismissed on motion 
 for want of jurisdiction (Davis & R. Bldg. & Mfg. Co. v. 
 Barber, 9 C. C. A. 79, 18 TJ. S. App. 476, 60 Fed. 465, 466 ; 
 The Alliance, 17 C. C. A. 124, 44 U. S. App. 52, 70 Fed. 274; 
 Hennessy v. Eichardson Drug Co. 189 U. S. 25, 47 L. ed. 697, 
 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 532) ; but not when the question has been 
 made that there is no jurisdiction in eqiiity because of an ade- 
 quate remedy at law (United States ex rel. Mudsill Min. Co. 
 V. Swan, 13 C. C. A. 77, 31 U. S. App. 112, 65 Fed. 647; 
 Smith r. McKay, 161 U. S. 355, 40 L. ed. 731, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 Kep. 490 ; Blythe v. Hinckley, 173 U. S. 501, 43 L. ed. 783, 
 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 497; Louisville Trust Co. v. Knott, 191 U. 
 S. 225, 48 L. ed. 159, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119; Kansas City 
 Xorth Western R. Co. v. Zimmerman, 210 U. S. 338, 52 L. ed. 
 1086, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730). 
 
 Conditions Under Which the Issue is Presented and Decided. 
 
 First. To present the issue, the record must show the juris- 
 diction in issue, and that a final judgment was entered in the 
 case in the district court (Excelsior Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pacific 
 Bridge Co. 185 U. S. 285, 46 L. ed. 913, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 681; McLish v. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 35 L. ed. 893, 12 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 118), in favor of the defendant, thus disposing of the 
 case. In such case the plaintiff should have the case certified 
 to the Supreme Court, direct. United States v. Jahn, 155 
 U. S. 114, 39 L. ed. 90, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 39 ; Bowker v. United 
 States, 186 U. S. 138, 46 L. ed. 1091, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 802 ; 
 Mexican C. R. Co. v. Eckman, 187 U. S. 432, 47 L. ed. 246, 
 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 211; Evans-Snider-Buel Co. v. McCaskill, 
 41 C. C. A. 577, 101 Fed. 658-660; Campbell v. Golden Cycle 
 Min. Co. 73 C. C. A. 260, 141 Fed. 610. 
 
 Second. If jurisdiction is in issue, and the jurisdiction sus- 
 tained, and judgment on merits is in favor of the defendant, 
 the plaintiff should appeal the case to the circuit court of ap- 
 peals, and if jurisdiction arises, it may be certified to the Su- 
 preme Court. New Orleans v. Benjamin, 153 U. S. 411, 38 
 L. ed. 764, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 905 ; Evans-Snider-Buel Co. v. 
 McCaskill, 41 C. 0. A. 577, 101 Fed. 658-660. 
 
 Third. When the question of jurisdiction was directly in- 
 volved, but the judgment of the whole case was in favor of the 
 
646 APPEALS FROM DISTRICT TO SUPREME COURT. 
 
 plaintiff, the defendant may go direct to the Supreme Court 
 on the question of jurisdiction, or go to the court of appeals on 
 the merits, and have that court to certify the question of juris- 
 diction. McLish V. Eoff, 141 U. S. 668, 35 L. ed. 895, 12 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 118 ; United States v. Jahn, 155 U. S. 114, 115, 
 39 L. ed. 90, 15 Sup. Ct. Kep. 39 ; Harris v. Kosenberger, 13 
 L.R.A.(]Sr.S.) 762, 76 C. C. A. 225, 145 Fed. 449; Gates v. 
 Bucki, 4 C. C. A. 116, 12 U. S. App. 69, 53 Fed. 965 ; Car- 
 ter V. Eoberts, 177 U. S. 500, 44 L. ed. 863, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 713 ; Reliable Incubator & Brooder Co. v. Stahl, 44 0. C. A. 
 657, 105 Fed. 667. 
 
 Fourth. If plaintiff recovers in part, but is dissatisfied, 
 and the jurisdiction has been put in issue and sustained, the 
 defendant can go direct to the Supreme Court on the jurisdic- 
 tional question, while the plaintiff may appeal to the circuit, 
 court of appeals on the merits. United States v. Jahn, 155 
 U. S. 115, 39 L. ed. 90, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 39; McLish v. Roff, 
 141 U. S. 661, 35 L. ed. 893, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 118; ISTorth- 
 ern P. R. Co. v. Glaspell, 1 C. C. A. 327, 4 U. S. App. 238, 
 49 Fed. 482. "The same observations are applicable where the 
 the plaintiff objects to the jurisdiction and is, or both parties 
 are dissatisfied with the judgment on its merits." Evans- 
 Snider-Buel Co. v. McCaskill, 41 C. C. A. 577, 101 Fed. 660. 
 But where there are separate appeals of this character, the 
 circuit court of appeals will continue the case until the Su- 
 preme Court acts on the question of jurisdiction. Pullman's 
 Palace Car Co. v. Central Transp. Co. 22 C. C. A. 246, 39 U. 
 S. App. 307, 76 Fed. 401, S. C. 171 U. S. 138, 43 L. ed. 108, 
 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808. 
 
 I repeat, then, that when the jurisdiction of the district court 
 is put in issue with other issues on the merits, there is given to 
 the losing party an election between the Supreme Court and 
 the circuit court of appeals; that is, he may go direct to the 
 Supreme Court on the question of jurisdiction, or he may take 
 the whole case on its merits to the circuit court of appeals 
 (Ibid.; Robinson v. Caldwell, 165 U. S. 361, 41 L. ed.' 74'6, 
 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 343 ; Rust v. United Waterworks Co. 17 C. 
 C. A. 16, 36 U. S. App. 167, 70 Fed. 129-132) ; and the cir- 
 cuit court of appeals may determine the question of jurisdicr 
 tion in passing upon the whole case (Ibid. ; see chapter 106, 
 
APPEALS FKOiE DISTRICT TO SUPREME COURT. 647 
 
 "May Circuit Court of Appeals Determine Jurisdictional 
 Questions") ; or the court of appeals may certify the question 
 of jurisdiction (Barling v. Bank of British N. A. 1 C. C. A. 
 510, 7 U. S. App. 194, 50 Fed. 260; Grand Trunk Western 
 R. Co. V. Keddick, 88 C. C. A. 80, 160 Fed. 898). 
 
 Again, if the jurisdiction is sustained, but the judgment is 
 rendered in favor of the defendant on the merits, the plaintiff 
 who has sustained the jurisdiction must appeal on the merits 
 to the circuit court of appeals, where, if the question of juris- 
 diction arises, the circuit court of appeals may certify it for 
 instruction or decide it. Ibid. ; United States Freehold Land 
 & Emigration Co. v. Gallegos, 32 C. C. A. 470, 61 U. S. App. 
 13, 89 Fed. 769. 
 
 Again, when the jurisdiction is sustained, but the plaintiff 
 has a grievance as to the extent of his recovery, upon which ac- 
 count he desires to appeal, the plaintiff may appeal to the cir- 
 cuit court of appeals on the merits ; or if the defendant has ap- 
 pealed, he may by cross appeal have the case reviewed as to his 
 cause of complaint ; or if the defendant has taken the case 
 direct to the Supreme Court, on the question of jurisdiction, 
 the plaintiff may appeal to the circuit court of appeals on the 
 merits, but in this case the circuit court of appeals will sus- 
 pend the hearing until the Supreme Court has determined the 
 question of jurisdiction. United States v. Jahn, 155 U. S. 114, 
 115, 39 L. ed. 90, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 39, and authorities above 
 cited. 
 
 Can Same Party Sue Out Two Appeals. 
 
 The question has arisen whether the same party can sue out 
 two appeals, one to the Supreme Court on jurisdiction, and the 
 other to the circuit court of appeals on the merits. It was 
 clearly decided in Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Central Transp. 
 Co. 22 0. C. A. 246, 39 U. S. App. 307, 76 Fed. 402, that he 
 could^ but that he cannot is clearly inferred from the language 
 of the court in McLish v. Eoff, 141 U. S. 665, 666, 35 L. ed. 
 894, 895, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 118 ; United States v. Jahn, 155 
 U. S. 113, 39 L. ed. 89, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 39; Carter v. Rob- 
 erts, 177 U. S. 499, 44 L. ed. 862, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 713; 
 Eobinson v. Caldwell, 165 U. S. 359, 41 L. ed. 745, 17 Sup. 
 
648 APPEALS FEOM DISTRICT TO SITPEEME COUET. 
 
 Ct. Eep. 343 ; Columbus Constr. Co. v. Crane Co. 174 U. S. 
 601, 43 L. ed. 1103, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 721 ; Union & Planters' 
 Bank v. Memphis, 189 U. S. 74, 47 L. ed. 714, 23 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 604. However, it is said in Lockman v. Lang, 132 Fed. 
 1, that the practice of taking an appeal and writ of error to 
 review the same adjudication is not only permissible, but com- 
 mendable when counsel have just reason to doubt which is the 
 proper proceeding. 
 
 Certificate a Prerequisite. 
 
 The first clause of section 5, act of 1891, requires, in any 
 case in which the jurisdiction of the court is involved, the ques- 
 tion of jurisdiction alone shall be certified to the Supreme 
 Court by the court below. Some form of certificate under this 
 clause is essential to the appeal. It must not only appear of 
 record that the question of jurisdiction was involved, but that 
 question, and that alone, must be certified. If there be other 
 questions mixed with the jurisdictional one, and an appeal in 
 general form be allowed without certifying or specifying the 
 question of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court will dismiss the 
 appeal. Colvin v. Jacksonville, 157 U. S. 368, 39 L. ed. 736, 
 
 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 634, S. C. 158 U. S. 456, 39 L. ed. 1053, 15 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 866; Maynard v. Hecht, 151 U. S. 324, 38 
 L. ed. 179, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 353 ; Davis & E. Bldg. & Mfg. 
 Co. V. Barber, 157 U. S. 673, 39 L. ed. 853, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 719 ; Ansbro v. United States, 159 U. S. 695, 40 L. ed. 310, 
 
 16 Sup. ,Ct. Eep. 187 ; Chappell v. United States, 160 U. S. 
 507, 40 L. ed. 512, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 397. See Scully v. Bird, 
 209 U. S. 481, 52 L. ed. 899, 28 Sup. Ct. Eep, 597. 
 
 In Davis & E. Bldg. & Mfg. Co. v. Barber, lo7 U. S. 673, 
 
 39 L. ed. 853, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 719, the appeal was dismissed 
 because jurisdiction was not directly certified, following. Ibid. ; 
 Maynard v. Hecht, 151 U. S. 324, 38 L. ed. 179, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 353; Van Wagenen v. Sewall, 160 U. S. 369, 40 L. ed. 
 460, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 370; Davis v. Geissler, 162 U. S. 290, 
 
 40 L. ed. 972, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 796; Colvin v. Jacksonville, 
 157 U. S. 368, 39 L. ed. 736, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 634; C. H. 
 Nichols Lumber Co. v. Franson, 203 U. S. 278, 51 L. ed. 181, 
 37 Sup. Ct. Eep. 102. Where the decree of the circuit court 
 
APPEALS FROM BISTEICT TO SUPEBMB COURT. 649 
 
 and allowancie of appeal states bill was dismissed for want of 
 jurisdiction, no separate certificate is necessary. Excelsior 
 Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pacific Bridge Co. 185 U. S. 282, 46 L. 
 ed. 910, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 681. There is no question that the 
 certificate required by the act is a prerequisite. Maynard v. 
 Hecht, 151 U. S. 324, 38 L. ed. 179, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 353 ; 
 Moran v. Hagerman, 151 U. S. 333, 38 L. ed. 183, 14 Sup. 
 Ct Rep. 354. 
 
 Form it May Asswme. 
 
 What form may the certificate assume ? 
 
 It may appear in several ways: Either by the terms of 
 the decree and the order allowing the appeal, the record, the 
 opinion of the court, or by separate certificate of the court be- 
 low, which is the safest proceeding. Huntington v. Laidley, 
 176 U. S. 676, 44 L. ed. 634, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526 ; Loeb v. 
 Columbia Twp. 179 U. S. 483, 45 L. ed. 287, 21 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 174; Excelsior Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pacific Bridge Co. 
 185 U. S. 282, 46 L. ed. 910, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681 ; United 
 States V. Larkin, 208 U. S. 333, 52 L. ed. 517, 28 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 417; Van Wagenen v. Sewall, 160 U. S. 372, 40 L. ed. 
 461, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370 ; Petri v. F. E. Creelman Lumber 
 Co. 199 U. S. 487, 50 L. ed. 281, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 133 ; Chi- 
 cago V. Mills, 204 U. S. 321, 51 L. ed. 504, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 286 ; Interior Constr. & Improv. Co. v. Gibney, 160 U. S. 217, 
 40 L. ed. 401, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 272 ; Re Lehigh Min. & Mfg. 
 Co. 156 U. S. 322, 39 L. ed. 438, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 375. 
 If in the decree it should appear that the case was dismissed for 
 the want of jurisdiction only, and a review of the judgment 
 generally is asked by the petition for appeal, and the only 
 question tried below was the jurisdiction, which is clearly ap- 
 parent in the decree, it has been held that the decree was a 
 sufficient certificate (Smith v. McKay, 161 U. S. 357, 40 L. 
 ed. 731, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 490 ; Davis v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. 
 L. R. Co. 217 U. S. 157-171, 54 L. ed. 708-717, 27 L.R.A. 
 (KS.) 823, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 463; Petri v. F. E. Creelman 
 Lumber Co. 199 U. S. 487, 50 L. ed. 281, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 133; Huntington v. Laidley, 176 U. S. 677, 44 L. ed. 634, 20 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526) ; but it must be understood that the court 
 
050 APPEALS FEOM BISTKIGT TO SUPREME COURT. 
 
 will not searcli for it (Shields v. Coleman,- 157 IT. S. 168, 39 
 L. ed. 660, 15 Sup. Ot. Eep. 570; Interior Oonstr. & Impro^. 
 Co. V. Gibney, 160 U. S. 219, 40 L. ed. 401, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 272 ; Van Wagenen v. Sewall, 160 U. S. 369, 40 L. ed. 460, 
 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 370). 
 
 The word "certify" need not be used if there is a plain dec- 
 laration that the single matter sent up is the question of juris- 
 diction. Ibid.; Chappell v. United States, 160 U. S. 508, 
 40 L. ed. 513, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 397. The entry of a judge, 
 "Appeal allowed," upon a petition, was held not equivalent 
 to a certificate. The Bayonne, 159 U. S. 693, 40 L. ed. 309, 
 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 185; Chappell v. United States, 160 U. S. 
 499, 40 L. ed. 510, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 397; Arkansas v. Schlier- 
 holz, 179 U. S. 600, 45 L. ed. 336, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 229. So 
 filing an assignment of errors and allowance of an appeal is 
 not an equivalent. As said, then, the safest method of proceed- 
 ing is to apply to the court for a certificate, which should he 
 specific in stating the question of jurisdiction. Ibid. ; Carey 
 V. Houston & T. C- E. Co. 150 U. S. I7l, 37 L. ed. 1042, 14 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 63. 
 
 Granted in Term. 
 
 It is absolutely necessary that this certificate should be grant- 
 ed during the term at which the judgment was entered (Colvin 
 V. Jasksonville, 158 U. S. 456, 39 L. ed. 1053, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 866 ; Ee Lehigh Min. & Mfg. Co. 156 U. S. 327, 39 L. ed. 440, 
 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 375 ; The Bayonne, 159 U. S. 693, 40 L. ed. 
 309, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 185 ; Chamberlin v. Peoria, D. & E. K. 
 Co. 55 C. C. A. 54, 118 Fed. 32), and that the judgment in 
 which the certificate is granted is final (Gates V; Bucki, 53 
 Fed. 961; Excelsior Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pacific Bridge Co. 
 185 U. S. 285, 46 L. ed. 913, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 681; McLish 
 V. Eoff, 141 U. S. 661, 35 L. ed. 893, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 118; 
 Carey v. Houston & T. C. E. Co. 150 U. S. 171, 37 L. ed. 
 1042, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 63; United States v. Jahn, 155 U. S. 
 109, 39 L. ed. 87, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 39) ; and against the ap- 
 pellant. (Ibid.) It is said in Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. 
 
APPEALS FROM DISTRICT TO SUPREME COURT. 651 
 
 Central Transp. Co. 71 Fed. 809, that this right of appeal is 
 absolute, and cannot be controlled by the circuit judge to either 
 allow or disallow; the Supreme Court alone determines the 
 right. Dudley v. Lake County, 43 C. C. A. 184, 103 Fed. 
 209. 
 
 FORM OF CERTIFICATE. 
 
 A. B. "] In the United States District Court 
 
 TS. j. for the District of , 
 
 C. D. i sitting at 
 
 This cause came on to be heard upon the application for an Injunction 
 as prayed In the bill of complaint, and for the appointment of a receiver, 
 etc. (or whatever was the purpose of the bill). 
 
 The bill alleged, etc. 
 
 The defendant denied the amount in issue exceeded the sum of two thou- 
 sand dollars, etc. (or state so much of the bill as shows the question in- 
 volved). 
 
 Now, therefore, it is certified that the question of the jurisdiction of 
 this court upon the grounds heretofore stated, to wit: (state the issue) 
 was the issue upon which the case was decided, I having found that ( con- 
 clusion of court on the issue) it was the duty of the court to dismiss 
 the bill, which was accordingly done (or whatever action was taken) ; and 
 I further certify that it is the only question of law upon the pleading 
 and process for the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States; 
 that the certificate was granted at the term in which the judgment in the 
 cause was entered. 
 
 W. R., 
 United States Circuit Judge. 
 
 See Colvin v. Jacksonville, 158 U. S. 458, 39 L. ed. 1053, 
 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 866, for certificate held sufficient. 
 
 This certificate applies where the question of jurisdiction is 
 decided for the defendant and disposes of the case, and it may 
 be signed by the district judge. Huntington v. Laidley, 176 
 U. S. 668, 44 L. ed. 630, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526. 
 
CHAPTEE 0. 
 
 APPEALS UNDER CLAUSES 4, 5, AND 6, OF SECTION 5, ACT OJ 
 
 1891. 
 
 We have so far discussed appeals from the circuit court to 
 the Supreme Court under clause 1 of section 5, act of 1891. 
 Under clauses 4, 5, and 6, of section 5, act of 1891, it is pro- 
 vided that a direct appeal may be taken from the circuit court 
 to the Supreme Court of the United States, when the construc- 
 tion or application of the Constitution of the United States is 
 involved, or the constitutionality of any law of the United 
 States, or the construction or validity of any treaty is drawn in 
 question; or in cases in which the constitution or law of any 
 State is claimed to be in contravention of the Constitution of 
 the United States. The provisions permit, when any of the 
 enu.merated Federal questions arise and are the controlling 
 questions in the determination of the case, an appeal direct to 
 the Supreme Court from the circuit court, although all other 
 questions were open for determination (see appendix for act of 
 March 3rd, 1891). Carey v. Houston & T. C. E. Co. 150 U. S. 
 181, 37 L. ed. 1044, 14 Sup.- Ct. Eep. 63; Homer v. United 
 States, 143 U. S. 5Y0, 36 L. ed. 266, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 522; 
 Carter v. Eoberts, 177 U. S. 496, 44 L. ed. 861, 20 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 713 ; Cincinnati, H. & D. E. Co. v. Thiebaud, 177 U. S. 
 619, 620, 44 L. ed. 912, 913, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 822. And if 
 the jurisdiction of the circuit court rests on the ground that the 
 suit arises under any of these clauses, then the jurisdiction of 
 the Supreme Court is exclusive. Hastings v. Ames, 15 C. C. 
 A. 628, 32 U. S. App. 485, 68 Fed. 728; American Sugar 
 Eef. Co. V. New Orleans, 181 U. S. 277, 45 L. ed. 859, 21 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 646 ; Huguley Mfg. Co. v. Galeton Cotton Mills, 
 184 U. S. 295, 46 L. ed. 548, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 452; Spreckels 
 Sugar Eef. Co. v. McClain, 192 U. S. 407, 48 L. ed. 499, 24 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 376 ; Wright v. MacFarlane, 58 C. C. A. 570, 
 
 652 
 
APPEALS UBTDEE CLS. 4, 6, 6, SEC. 5, ACT 1891. 653 
 
 122 Fed. 770; Macon v. Georgia Packing Co. 9 C. 0. A. 262, 
 13 U. S. App. 592, 60 Fed. 783 ; Loeb v. Columbia Twp. 179 
 U. S. 472, 45 L. ed. 280, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 174; Boston & M. E. 
 Co. V. Gokey, 79 C. C. A. 64, 149 Fed. 44, 9 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 
 384; Waterford v. Elson, 78 C. G. A. 675, 149 Fed. 91 ; Halpin 
 V. Amerman, 70 C. C. A. 462, 138 Fed. 548; St. Louis Cot- 
 ton Compress Co. v. American Cotton Co. 60 C. G. A. 80, 125 
 Fed. 196. But if the jurisdiction of the circuit court attaches 
 on ground of diversity, and afterwards issues are raised under 
 these clauses, then you may go direct to the Supreme Court, or 
 to the circuit court of appeals. Huguley Mfg. Go. v. Galeton 
 Cotton Mills, 184 U. S. 295, 46 L. ed. 548, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 452; Spreckles Sugar Eef. Co. v. McClain, 192 U. S. 407, 
 408, 48 L. ed. 499, 500, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 376 ; Field v. Barber 
 Asphalt Paving Co. 194 U. S. 618, 48 L. ed. 1142, 24 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 784; Davis & F. Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 
 207, 47 L. ed. 778, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 498. But the option is 
 lost by taking an appeal to the circuit court of appeals. Mc- 
 Fadden v. United States, 213 U. S. 288, 53 L. ed. 801, 29 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 490; Eobinson v. Caldwell, 165 U. S. 359, 41 
 L. ed. 745, 17 Sup. Ot. Eep. 343 ; Olds v. Herman H. Hettler 
 Lumber Co. 115 G. C. A. 91, 195 Fed. 9-12. 
 
 It is said in Ayres v. Polsdorfer, 187 U. S. 585, 47 L. ed. 
 314, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 196, that when the jurisdiction of the 
 circuit court is invoked solely on the ground of diversity of 
 citizenship, two classes of cases may arise, one in which any of. 
 the questions expressed in section 5 of the act of 1891 may 
 appear in the prosecution of the case, and another class where 
 other questions of Federal character not expressed in section 
 5 may arise. In the first class of cases yovi may appeal direct 
 to the Supreme Court or go to the circuit court of appeals, and 
 in the second class you must appeal to the circuit court of ap- 
 peals, and its judgment will be final, and you can therefore only 
 reach the Supreme Court by certiorari. 
 
 ■But when an appeal under any of these clauses is taken, it 
 must really and substantially appear that it involves a dispute 
 or controversy under one or more of them, and that an issue is 
 presented upon the determination of which the suit depends. 
 Cincinnati, H. & D. E. Co. v. Thiebaud, 177 U. S. 619, 44 
 L ed. 912, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 822; Hastings v. Ames, 15 G. C. 
 
654 APPEALS UNDER CLS. 4, 5, 6, SEC. 5, ACT 1891. 
 
 A. 628, 32 TJ. S. App. 485, 68 Fed. 728. The Federal ques- 
 tion must be the controlling one, and real and substantial (Carey 
 V. Houston, & T. C. E. Co. 150 U. S. 181, 37 L. ed. 1044, 14 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 63; Horner v. United States, 143 U. S. 570, 36 
 L. ed. 266, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 522; Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 
 73, 74, 41 L. ed. 633, 634, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 265; Lampasas 
 V. Bell, 180 U. S. 282, 45 L. ed. 530, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 368); 
 and it must so appear in the record by a statement in legal and 
 logical form, such as is required in good pleading (Lampasas 
 V. Bell, 180 U. S. 283, 45 L. ed. 530, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 368; 
 Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Ann Arbor E. Co. 178 U. S. 239, 
 44 L. ed. 1052, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 867 ; Press Pub. Co. v. Mon- 
 roe, 164 U. S. Ill, 41 L. ed. 369, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 40 ; World's 
 Columbian Exposition v. United States, 6 C. C. A. 58, 18 U. 
 S. App. 42, 56 Fed. 667). 
 
 You will notice that there is no limitation in these clauses 
 as in the first clause, confining the investigation of the Supreme 
 Court to question of jurisdiction alone, nor is a certificate, as 
 under the first clause, required. Eobinson v. Caldwell, 165 U. 
 S. 362, 41 L. ed. 746, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 343. So when the Su- 
 preme Court does take jurisdiction under any or all of these 
 three clauses, it will decide all other questions involved in the 
 case. Davis & F. Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 217, 47 
 L. ed. 780, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 498 ; Chappell v. United States, 
 160 U. S. 509, 40 L. ed. 513, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep., 397; Press 
 Pub. Co. V. Monroe, 164 U. S. Ill, 41 L. ed. 369, 17 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 40; Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 72, 73, 41 L. ed. 632, 
 634, 17 Sup. Ct.. Eep. 265 ; Horner v. United States, 143 U. 
 S. 577, 36 L. ed. 269, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 522. 
 
 May the Circuit Court of Appeals Determine Question's of 
 
 Jurisdiction. 
 
 To emphasize the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases 
 involving causes for appeal under section 5, I will briefly dis- 
 cuss whether the circuit court of appeals can determine the 
 question of the jurisdiction of the lower court, when properly 
 raised; that is, in view of the act of 1891, can a circuit court 
 of appeals ever determine the issue of' the jurisdiction of the 
 trial court in causes appealed to it, in .which that issue is raised! 
 
APPEALS TJNDEE CLS. i, 5, 6, SEC. 5, ACT 1891. 655 
 
 In Rust V. United Waterworks Co. 17 C. C. A. 16, 36 U. S. 
 App. 167, 70 Fed. 132, it is held that when a final judgment 
 is rendered in the circuit or district courts of the United States, 
 in which the issue of jurisdiction was raised below, that if the 
 losing party should elect to take the whole case to the circuit 
 court of appeals, it can determine the jurisdiction of the court 
 below with the other issues of law, and fact. 
 
 In the fifth circuit, Judge Pardee, in American Sugar Eef. 
 Co. V. Johnson, 9 C. C. A. 110, 13 U. S. App. 681, 60 Fed. 509, 
 and cases cited, construing section 5 of the act of 1891, in the 
 light of McLish v. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 35 L. ed. 893, 12 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 118, and the Carey Case in 150 U. S. 171, 37 L. ed. 
 1042, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 63, decides that the question of the 
 jurisdiction of the trial court can be considered with the other 
 issues in the case, Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Meyei^, 10 C. C. 
 A. 485, 18 U. S. App. 569, 62 Fed. 371; The Presto, 35 C. 
 C. A. 394, 93 Fed. 522, and says that the statement that the 
 question of jurisdiction be certified to the Supreme Court by 
 the circuit court of appeals does not make it obligatory, but 
 is a matter of discretion when needing instruction on the point. 
 United States v. Jahn, 155 U. S. 109-114, 39 L. ed. 87-90, 15 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 39; Campbell v. Golden Cycle Min. Co. 73 C. 
 C. A. 260, 141 Fed. 610; McLish v. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 
 35 L. ed. 893, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 118; McGilvra v. Ross, 
 90 C. C. A. 398, 164 Fed. 604, 605 ; Rust v. United Water 
 Works Co. 17 C. C. A. 16, 36 U. S. App. 167, 70 Fed. 132; 
 Pikes Peak Power Co. v. Colorado Springs, 44 C. C. A. 333, 
 105 Fed. 1; Boston & M. R. Co. v. Gokey, 210 U. S. 155, 52 
 L. ed. 1002, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 657 ; Reliable Incubator & Brooder 
 Co. V. Stahl, 44 C. C. A. 657, 105 Fed. 663 ; Crabtree v. Mad- 
 den, 4 C. C. A. 408, 12 U. S. App. 159, 54 Fed. 426 ; Barling 
 V. Bank of British K A. 1 C. C. A. 510, 7 U. S. App. 
 194, 50 Fed. 260; King v. McLean Asylum, 12 C. C. A. 
 139/21 U. S. App. 407, 64 Fed. 327; American Sugar Ref. 
 Co. V. Johnson, 9 C. C. A. 110, 13 U. S. App. 681, 60 Fed. 
 503-508 ; Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Meyers, 10 C. 0. A. 485, 18 
 U. S. App. 569, 62 Fed. 371 ; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Bloom, 9 
 C. C. A. 300, 23 U. S. App. 143, 60 Fed. 979 ; Green v. Mills, 
 30 L.R.A. 90, 16 C. C. A. 516, 25 U. S. App. 383, 69 Fed. 
 852. 
 
656 APPEALS UNDEK CLS. 4, 5, 6, SEC. 5, ACT 1891. 
 
 It is apparent, then, from the cases, when the judgment of 
 the court below is not upon the question of jurisdiction alone, 
 but upon various issues involving the merits of the case, and 
 an appeal has been taken on the whole case to the circuit court 
 of appeals, that court may decide the whole case, and the ques- 
 tion of jurisdiction must be left with that court to decide 
 whether it is of sufficient gravity to warrant its submission to 
 the Supreme Court. Watkins v. King, 55 C. C. A. 290, 118 
 Fed. 524; Keyser v. Lowell, 54 0. C. A. 574, 117 Fed. 401, 
 and authorities cited. 
 
 In the second circuit it is held that when the pleadings and 
 proof do not show diversity, the circuit court of appeals can- 
 not determine the question. Sun Printing & Pub. Asso. v. 
 Edwards, 58 C. C. A. 162, 121 Fed. 827. See, also. United 
 States V. Lee Yen Tai, 51 C. C. A. 299, 113 Fed. 467; and 
 Fisheries Co. v. Lennen, 65 C. C. A. 79, 130 Fed. 534. But 
 if the case involves other questions on the merits, the circuit 
 court of appeals may decide them and certify the jurisdictional 
 question to the Supreme Court. 
 
 Jurisdiction of Circuit Court of Appeals When Case Based on 
 Clauses Jf., 5 and 6. 
 
 We may now inquire if the court of appeals can take juris- 
 diction of cases involving grounds of appeal set forth in clauses 
 4, 5, and 6 of section 5 of the act of 1891, which provide for 
 an appeal direct to the Supreme Court. 
 
 It has been decided that when cases arise which are controlled 
 by a construction or application of the Constitution of the 
 United States, a direct appeal lies to the Supreme Court, and if 
 carried to the circuit court of appeals those courts may decline 
 to take jurisdiction. Carter v. Eoberts, 177 U. S. 496, 44 L. ed. 
 861, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 713; Kentucky State Bd. of Control 
 V. Lewis, 100 C. C. A. 208, 176 Fed. 556. But when ques- 
 tions designated in these clauses are mixed with other questions 
 in the case going to the merits, those courts may take jurisdic- 
 tion and certify the constitutional question^ which being an- 
 swered, they may proceed to judgment, or those courts may 
 decide the case on the merits in the first instance. Wirgaman v. 
 Persons, 62 C. C. A. 63, 126 Fed. 449-455, see cases cited; 
 
APPEALS UNDEK CLS. 4, 5, 6, SEO. 5, AOT 1891. 667 
 
 Araeriean Sugar Ref. Co. t. ISTew Orleans, 181 U. S. 282, 
 45 L. ed. 862, 21 Sup. Ct Rep. 646; Reliable Incubator & 
 Brooder Co. v. Stahl, 44 C. C. A. 657, 105 Fed. 663 ; Camp- 
 bell V. Golden Cycle Min. Co. 73 C. C. A. 260, 141 Fed. 610 
 Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. Roddick, 88 C. C. A. 80, 160 
 Fed. 898; Re Can Pon, 93 C. C. A. 635, 168 Fed. 479, 482 
 Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U. S. 397, 48 L. ed, 
 496, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 376 ; Harris v. Rosenberger, 13 LR.A 
 (N.S.) 762, 76 C. C. A. 225, 145 Fed. 451; United States v 
 Lee Yen Tai, 51 C. C. A. 299, 113 Fed. 467. The circuit 
 court of appeals may, under these conditions, certify the juris- 
 dictional question, but is under no obligation to do so. Weber 
 Bros. v. Grand Lodge, F. & A. M. 96 C. 0. A. 410, 171 Fed. 
 840 and cases cited. 
 
 We have already seen that where jurisdiction depends on 
 diversity of citizenship, and it turns out that the case involves 
 the construction or application of the Constitution of the United 
 States, or any question under the fourth, fifth, and sixth clauses 
 of section 5 of the act of 1891, the circuit court of appeals may 
 certify the constitutional question, or may decide the whole 
 ease. The court having jurisdiction by diversity of citizenship 
 only, the mere fact that one or more of the constitutional ques- 
 tions referred to in section 5 arose subsequently would not de- 
 prive the court of appeals of jurisdiction, or justify it in 
 declining to exercise it. American Sugar Ref. Co. v. New 
 Orleans, 181 U. S. 277, 45 L. ed. 859, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 646 ; 
 Love V. Busch, 73 C. C. A. 545, 142 Fed. 429 ; Huguley Mfg. 
 Co. v. Galetbn Cotton Mills, 184 U. S. 290, 46 L. ed. 546, 22 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 452 ; Pikes Peake Power Co. v. Colorado Springs, 
 44 C. C. A. 333, 105 Fed. 1 ; Keyser v. LoweU, 54 C. C. A. 
 574, 117 Fed. 400; Watkins v. King, 55 C. C. A. 290, 118 
 Fed. 524. 
 
 In Alton Water Co. v. Brown, 92 C. C. A. 598, 166 Fed. 840, 
 it is said that giving exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the 
 Supreme Court under the act of 1891 is limited, (1) to cases 
 which the jurisdiction of the Federal court, as such, is put 
 in issue; (-2) to an issue as to whether defendant has been 
 served with proper process. To determine, then, where to ap- 
 peal, the rule may be stated, where a constitutional question 
 IS involved, and the jurisdiction of the circuit court is original- 
 
 S. Eq.— 42. 
 
658 APPEALS UNDER CLS. 4, 5, 6, SEC. 5, ACT 1891. 
 
 ly invoked upon it, the appeal must be to the Supreme Court 
 only: the circuit court of appeals cannot decide it. Union & 
 Planters' Bank v. Memphis, 189 U. S. 71, 47 L. ed. 712, 
 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 604; Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Austin, 168 
 U. S. 685, 42 L. ed. 626, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 223; Huguley Mfg. 
 Co. V. Galeton Cotton Mills, 184 U. S. 291, 46 L. ed. 546, 
 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 452; Carter v. Roberts, 177 U. S. 496, 44 
 L. ed. 861, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 713; Evaus^Snider-Buel Co. 
 T. McCaskill, 41 C. C. A. 577, 101 Fed. 658; St. Clair 
 County V. Interstate Sand & Car Transfer Co. 49 C. C. A. 
 169, 110 Fed. 785 and cases cited; American Sugar Ref. Co. 
 V. New Orleans, 181 U. S. 277, 45 L. ed. 859, 21 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 646, s. c. 43 C. C. A. 393, 104 Fed. 2 ; Owensboro v. 
 Owensboro Waterworks Co. 53 C. C. A. 146, 115 Fed. 318; 
 Barr v. New Brunswick, 19 C. C. A. 71, 39 U. S. App. 187, 
 72 Fed. 689; Fisheries Co. v. Lennen, 65 C. C. A. 79, 130 
 Fed. 533 ; Davis & R. Bldg. & Mfg. Co. v. Barber, 9 C. C. 
 A. 79, 18 U. S. App. 476, 60 Fed. 465 ; Seattle v. Thompson, 
 52 C. C. A. 44, 114 Fed. 96. If, however, diverse citizen- 
 ship is set up as well as the constitutional question, an appeal 
 can be taken to the circuit court of appeals, and a writ of 
 error from its decision to the Supreme Court (Mississippi R. 
 Commission v. Illinois C. R. Co. 203 U. S. 335, 51 L. ed. 
 209, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90 ; American Sugar Ref. Co. v. New 
 Orleans, 181 U. S. 277, 45 L. ed. 859,' 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 646; Hug-uley Mfg. Co. v. Galeton Cotton Mills, 184 U. S. 
 290, 46 L. ed. 546, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 452 ; Wright v. Mac- 
 Farlane Co. 58 C. C. A. 570, 122 Fed. 774, 775) ; or direct to 
 the Supreme Court (Davis & F. Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 
 U. S. 207, 47 L. ed. 778, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 498). 
 
 To illustrate: If the case depends on the construction or 
 application of the Constitution of the United States, or a case 
 in which a State law is claimed to be in contravention thereof; 
 the circuit court of appeals has no jurisdiction, and the appeal 
 must be dismissed, if the jurisdiction of the circuit court was 
 based on the constitutional question. Ibid. ; Hamilton v. Brown, 
 3 C. C. A. 639, 2 U. S. "App. 540, 53 Fed.' 753, 754; Chicago', 
 M. & St. P. R. Co. V. Evans, 7 C. C. A. 290, 19 U. S. App. 233, 
 58 Fed. 433; Re Abbey Press, 67 C. C. A. 161, 134 Fed. 
 55; Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Austin, 168 U. S. 685, 42 L. 
 
APPEALS UNDEE CIS. 4, 5, 6, SEC. 5, ACT 1891. 659 
 
 ed. 626, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 223. However, as said in Harris v. 
 Eosenberger, 13 L.RA.(N'.S.) 762, 76 C. C. A. 225, 145 Fed. 
 449, though there be no diversity of citizenship, and the valid- 
 ity of an act of Congress is in isaue, if the- case also involves 
 the proper construction of an act of Congress, the jurisdiction 
 of the Supreme Court is not exclusive (Spreckels Sugar Eef. 
 Co. V. McClain, 192 U. S. 397, 48 L. ed. 496, 24 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 376; Eider v. United States, 79 C. C. A. 112, 149 
 Fed. 170) ; or where matters are involved with the constitutional 
 question not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme 
 Court (Hooper v. Eemmel, 91 C. C. A. 322, 165 Fed. 338), 
 as where the only and controlling question is, would the pro- 
 posed acts of a municipal corporation deprive the applicant 
 of property without due process of law (Barr v. New Bruns- 
 wick, 19 C. C. A. 71, 39 U. S. App. 187, 72 Fed. 689 ; Hastings 
 v. Ames, 15 C. C. A. 628, 32 U. S. App. 485, 68 Fed. 726) ; 
 or where a city ordinance is held to discriminate against com- 
 merce (Macon v. Georgia Packing Co. 9 C. C. A. 262, 13 U. S. 
 App. 592, 60 Fed. 781 ; Davis & F. Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 
 189 U. S. 207, 47 L. ed. 778, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 498) ; or the 
 case depends on the constitutionality of State statutes (Wright- 
 man V. Boone County, 31 C. C. A. 570, 60 TJ. S. App. 100, 
 88 Fed. 437; Wright v. MacFarlane, 58 C. C. A. 570, 122 
 Fed. 773; Hlinois C. E. Co. v. Adams, 35 C. C. A. 635, 93 
 Fed. 856 ; Pauley Jail Bldg. & Mfg. Co. v. Crawford County, 
 28 C. C. A. 579, 56 U. S. App. 53, 84 Fed. 942). 
 
OHAPTEE CI. 
 
 APPEAL TO CIECUIT COtJET OF APPEALS. 
 
 Jurisdiction. 
 
 I have incidentally discussed the jurisdiction of the circuit 
 court of appeals under the clauses of section 5 of the act of 
 1891. I will now take up section 6 of that act, that provides 
 "that the circuit court of appeals shall exercise appellate juris- 
 diction to review by appeal or writ of error final decisions 
 of the district courts of the United States in all cases other 
 than those provided for in section 5, unless otherwise 
 provided by law, and the judgments or decrees of the 
 circuit court of appeals shall be final in all cases in which the 
 jurisdiction is dependent entirely upon the opposite parties 
 to the suit being aliens and citizens of the United States, or 
 citizens of different States; also in all cases arising under the 
 patent laws, revenue laws, and in admiralty cases." Civil Code, 
 see. 128. Power is further granted to these courts to certify in 
 every case within its appellate jurisdiction any question or 
 proposition of law concerning which it desires instruction. 
 
 The Supreme Court is authorized in those cases made final 
 in the circuit court of appeals, to have sent up by certiorari, 
 or otherwise, any such ease for its review and determination, 
 rt is further provided that in all cases not made final in the 
 circuit court of appeals, the case may be taken to the Supreme 
 Court for review on appeal or writ of error, where the matter 
 In controversy shall exceed one thousand dollars besides costs, 
 and one year is given within which an appeal can be taken from 
 the circuit court of appeals to the Supreme Court. 
 
 Such is the statute fixing the jurisdiction of the circuit court 
 ■of appeals, and it is seen that it is wholly appellate (Travis 
 
 660 
 
APPEAL TO CIRCUIT COUBT OF APPEALS. 661 
 
 County V. King Iron Bridge & Mfg. Co. 34 0. C. A. 620, 
 92 Fed. 690), and confined to a revision of the decisions in the 
 district courts of the United States. Its mission seems to 
 be to settle property rights, rather than to determine con- 
 stitutional questions, as it is excluded from reviewing cases 
 arising under section 5, already discussed. It is further ex- 
 cluded from reviewing cases "otherwise provided for by law," 
 and it is suggested by Mr. Curtis that this tei-m covers — 
 
 First. Cases in which the decision of the district court is 
 final, as where a district court remands a case to a State 
 court. 
 
 Second. Cases where the United States Supreme Court exer- 
 cises appellate revision in habeas corpus and mandamus proceed- 
 ings, or any other method than by appeal or writ of error. 
 
 Third. To some exceptional revenue cases. 
 
 In The Habana, 175 U. S. 683, 44 L. ed. 322, 20 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 290, it is said the words refer to provisions of the same, 
 or contemporaneous acts, or subsequent acts of Congress, and 
 do not include provisions of earlier statutes. The circuit 
 courts of appeals have no power to review judgments of State 
 ■supreme courts (Terry v. Davy, 46 C. C. A. 141, lOT Fed. 
 50) ; nor judgments of the district courts of the United States 
 by certiorari (Travis County v. King Iron Bridge & Mfg. 
 Co. 34 C. C. A. 620, 92 Fed. 690 ; United States ex rel. Mon- 
 tana Ore Purchasing Co. v. Circuit Ct. 61 C. C. A. 314, 126 
 Fed. 169). 
 
 It is not necessary to pursue the provisions of the act any 
 further to determine when equity causes may be appealed to 
 the circuit court of appeals. The method of exclusion provided 
 by the sixth section fixes aflSrmatively what cases are within the 
 appellate jurisdiction of these courts. 
 
 Practice in Appeals and Statutes Stated. 
 
 I have already called your attention to section 11 of the. act 
 of 1891, proAdding that appeals under the act are to be regulated 
 by existing statutes and rules of court, including the provision 
 for bonds, or other security required on appeals, or writ of 
 error, and that judges have the same power as to allowing 
 
662 APPEALS TO OIECiriT COUET OF APPEALS. 
 
 appeals as now belong by law to such judges and justices. - See 
 U. S. Eev. Stat. sees. 997 to 1013 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 
 1653-1655), relating to practice on appeal or' error; see, also 
 Rules of Supreme Court of the United States; Act of 1891 sec. 
 11 ; Northern P. E. Co. v. Amato, 1 C. C. A. 468, 1 U. S. App. 
 113; 49 Fed. 881; Simpson v. First Nat. Bank, 63 C. C. A. 
 371, 129 Fed. 258. 
 
 Time for Appealing. 
 
 If aggrieved by the decision, you may appeal at once, that is, 
 during the term, or you have six months after the entry of the 
 final decree to take an appeal (Act of 1891, sec. 11, note 15, 
 90 Fed. CLix; Cocke v. Copenhaver, 61 C. 0. A. 211, 126 Fed. 
 147; Condon v. Central Loan & T. Co. 20 C. C. A. 110, 36 U. 
 S. App. 579, 73 Fed. 907 ; Travis County v. King Iron Bridge 
 & Mfg. Co. 34 C. C. A. 620, 92 Fed. 690 ; Blaffer v. New 
 Orleans Water Supply Co. 87 C. C. A. 341, 160 Fed. 389, 
 390, and cases cited; Waxahachie v. Coler, 34 C. C. A. 349, 
 92 Fed. 284, Meyer v. Hot Springs Imp. Co. 95 0. C. A. 156, 
 169 Fed. 628 ; Born v. Schneider, 128 Fed. 179 ; Connecticut 
 F. Ins. Co. V. Oldendorif, 19 C. C. A. 379, 44 U. S. App. 487, 
 73 Fed. 89 ; Hudson v. Limestone Natural Gas Co. 75 C. 0. A. 
 678, 144 Fed. 952; Butt v. United States, 126 Fed. 794; Green 
 V. Lynn, 31 C. C. A. 248, 50 U. S. App. 380, 87 Fed. 839; 
 Noonan v. Chester Park Athletic Club Co. 35 C. 0. A. 457, 93 
 Fed. 576 ; Coe v. East & W. R. Co. 29 C, C. A. 292, 52 U. S. 
 App. 532, 85 Fed. 489; Threadgill v. Piatt, 71 Fed. 3. It 
 must not only be allowed, but must be issued within the time. 
 Ibid. ; Stevens v. Clark, 10 C. C. A. 379, 18 IJ. S. App. 584, 62 
 Fed. 321 ; Blaffen v. New Orleans Water Supply Co. 160 Fed. 
 391 ; Scarborough v. Pargoud, 108 U. S. 567, 27 L. ed. 824, 
 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 877) ; unless in the particular character of 
 case less time is fixed by law governing appeals and writs of 
 error when the act was passed. Act of 1891, sec. 11. It will 
 be noticed that section 11 of the act of 1891 only applies to 
 appeals to the circuit court of appeals. (See Appendix.) 
 
 In appealing to the Supreme Court direct, the act of 1891 
 dor not apply, so we must look at the law fixing the time within 
 which the appeal to the Supreme Court must be taken, U. S. 
 
APPEALS TO OIECUIT COUET OF APPEALS. 663 
 
 Eev. Stat. sec. 1008 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1649), which 
 fixes two years from the entry of the order, except when a dis- 
 ability intervenes, then the time begins from its removal. 
 Andrews v. Thum, 18 C. C. A. 566, 33 U. S. App. 430, 72 
 Fed. 290 ; Duncan v. Atlantic, M. & 0. E. Co. 4 Hughes, 125, 
 88 Fed. 840. In computing the time the day on which the 
 decree is entered is excluded, and when an application for 
 rehearing is filed and entertained, then time begins when the 
 application is overruled. Andrews v. Thum, 18 C. C. A. 566, 
 33 U. S. App. 430, 72 Fed. 290 ; S. C. 12 C. C. A. 77, 21 U. 
 S. App. 459, 64 Fed. 149; Louisville Trust Co. v. Stockton, 
 18 C. C. A. 408, 41 U. S. App. 579, 72 Fed. 1 ; Aspen Min. 
 & Smelting Co. v. Billings, 150 U. S. 36, 37 L. ed. 988, 14 
 Sup. Ct. Kep. 4 ; Alexander v. United States, 6 C. C. A. 602, 
 15 U. S. App. 158, 57 Fed. 828 ; Kingman & Co. v. Western 
 Mfg. Co. 170 U. S. 678, 42 L. ed. 1193, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 786 ; 
 Texas & P. E. Co. v. Murphy, 111 U. S. 489, 28 L. ed. 493, 
 4 Sup. Ct. Eep. 497 ; Altenberg v. Grant, 28 C. C. A. 244, 54 
 U. S. App. 312, 83 Fed. 980 ; See Marks v. Northern P. E. 
 Co. 22 C. C. A. 630, 44 U. S. App. 714, 76 Fed. 941 ; Duncan 
 V. Atlantic, M. & O. E. Co. 4 Hughes, 125, 88 Fed. 840. If 
 the last day for an appeal falls on Sunday, or a dies non you 
 had better perfect the appeal the day before. Johnson v. 
 Meyers, 4 C. C. A. 399, 12 TJ. S. App. 220, 54 Fed. 417; 
 Meyer v. Hot Springs Imp. Co. 95 C. C. A. 156, 169 Fed. 629. 
 When the appeal is filed after six months under the act of 
 1891, it will be dismissed. Blaffer v. New Orleans Water 
 Supply Co. 87 C. C. A. 341, 160 Fed. 389; Coulliette v. 
 Thomason, 1 C. C. A. 675, 2 U. S. App. 221, 50 Fed. 787; 
 Hamilton v. Brown, 3 C. C. A. 639, 2 U. S. App. 540, 53 Fed. 
 753. The court has no jurisdiction of an appeal filed after 
 the time. Union P. E. Co. v. Colorado Eastern E. Co. 4 C. C. 
 A. 161, 12 U. S. App. 110, 54 Fed. 22; White v. Iowa JSTat. 
 Bank, 17 C. C. A. 621, 36 U. S. App. 260, 71 Fed. 97 ; Condon 
 V. Central Loan & T. Co. 20 C. C. A. 110, 36 U. S. App. 579, 
 73 Fed. 907. See J. D. Eandall Co. v. Foglesong Mach. Co. 
 119 C. C. A. 185, 200 Fed. 741, where the judge could not be 
 reached, subsequently made nunc pro tunc order held good. 
 
664 APPEALS TO CIECniT COURT OF APPEALS. 
 
 When is Appeal Said to Be Taken. 
 
 The question arises, when is the appeal said to be "taken" 
 so as to save the bar? The appeal is taken when allowed by 
 the court (Credit Co. v. Arkansas C. E. Co. 128 U. S. 261, 
 32 L. ed. 449, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. lOY ; See "Allowance of Ap- 
 peal") ; and the filing of the bond and issuance of citation after 
 six months will not bar the appeal, as neither requirement is 
 jurisdictional, that is to say, the allowance of the appeal in six 
 months as stated is suiScient, as neither the filing of the bond 
 •jr issuing citation is jurisdictional. IToonan v. Chester Park 
 Athletic Club Co. 35 C. C. A. 457, 93 Fed. 576; Columbus 
 Chain Co. v. Standard Chain Co. 76 C. C. A. 164, 145 Fed. 
 186; Wickelman v. A. B. Dick Co. 29 C. C. A. 436, 57 U. S. 
 App. 196, 85 Fed. 851. See Altenberg v. Grant, 28 C. C. A. 
 244, 54 U. S. App. 312, 83 Fed. 980; J. D. Randall Co. v. 
 Foglesong Mach. Co. 119 C. C. A. 185, 200 Fed. 743 and 
 cases cited ; Pooler v. Hyne, 120 C. C. A. 408, 202 Fed. 194. 
 
 There may be, because of separable controversies created by 
 the bill, cross bills or interventions, several final appealable 
 decrees, and the time for appealing will date from the entry of 
 the parti^iular decree. In discussing "cross" appeals, it will 
 be seen that they are governed by the same time limit. 
 
 Notice of Appeal. 
 
 Having seen the time within which one must act who desires 
 an appeal, the next step is to give "notice of appeal," and have 
 the amount of the bond fixed. You may give this notice of 
 appeal in open court, or within the six months allowed. If 
 notice is given in open court when the case is decided, and 
 the bond fixed by the court is filed and accepted by the judge 
 during the term in which the decree is rendered, and the appeal 
 thus perfected, this will be an "allowance" of the appeal, and 
 no petition is necessary; provided, however, that you assign 
 errors at once, for by rules now in force, an assignment of errors 
 must be filed before an appeal should be allowed. See Rule 
 11, Circuit Court of Appeals; "Assignments of Errors." The 
 rule is applicable to equity causes aa well as writs of error. 
 Dufour V. Lang, 4 C. C. A. 663, 2 U. S. App. 477, 54 Fed. 
 
APPEALS TO CIECUIT COUET OF APPEALS. 665 
 
 913; Simpson v. Eirst Wat. Bank, 63 0. C. A. 371, 129 
 Fed. 261. 
 
 If the appeal thus allowed in open court is perfected by filing 
 in the appellate court the transcript and docketing the case 
 within the required time, the issuance and service of a citation 
 to the adversary party is not necessary. Richardson v. Green, 
 130 IT. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 8Y5, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 443 ; Jacobs v, 
 George, 150 IT. S. 416, 37 L. ed. 1127, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 159: 
 Central Trust Co. v. Continental Trust Co. 30 C. C. A. 235, 
 58 U. S. App. 604, 86 Fed. 524; Columbus Chain Co. v. Stand- 
 ard Chain Co. 76 C. C. A. 164, 145 Fed. 186; Dodge v. 
 Knowles, 114 U. S. 430, 438, 29 L. ed. 144, 297, 5 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 1108, 1197. If you have given notice of appeal in open 
 court, but 3^ou have not given bond, or the security required 
 during the term, then your notice is of no avail, and you must 
 have issued and served on the opposite party or his counsel a 
 citation, in form as will be hereafter given, unless waived. 
 Richardson v. Green, 130 IT. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 875, 9 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 443 ; Radford v. Folsom, 123 U. S. 727, 31 L. ed. 293, 8 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 334; Brown v. McConnell, 124 U. S. 491, 31 L. 
 ed. 496, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 559; First ISTat. Bank v. Dmaha, 96 
 F. S. 738, 24 L. ed. 881; Hewitt v. Filbert, 116 U. S. 143, 29 
 L. ed. 582, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 319. 
 
 I If you do not give notice in open cotirt, but determine 
 afterwards to appeal, you must present a petition to the judge 
 of the district, a circuit judge of the circuit, or the justice 
 assigned to the circuit for permission to appeal, and citation 
 must issue and be sen-ed. Haskins v. St. Louis & S. E. R. Co. 
 109 IT. S. 107, 27 L. ed. 873, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 72; Sage v. 
 Central R. Co. 96 IT. S. 715, 24 L. ed. 643 ; Ruby v. Atkinson, 
 35 C. C. A. 458, 93 Fed. 579. But failure to serve in time 
 does not necessarily dismiss the appeal. Richards v. Mackall, 
 113 IT. S. 542, 28 L. ed. 1133, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 535 ; see Pierce 
 V. Cox', 9 Wall. 787, 19 L. ed. 786. At the same time request 
 that the amount of the bond be fixed, and file concurrently with 
 these acts an assignment of errors in the clerk's office, present- 
 ing your grounds of objection, which must be confined to ques- 
 tions raised through the trial, or that are apparent in the record. 
 
666 ai'pl:als to circuit couirr oi' aiteals. 
 
 Petition for Appeal. 
 
 If the appeal is perfected in open court, the petition and 
 citation is not necessary, for the transcript showing the appeal 
 was taken in open court gives the appellate court jurisdiction; 
 but if the appeal is taken after the term, though notice may 
 have been given in open court, then you must file a petition 
 as follows: 
 
 Title as in bill. ) r m j. 
 No. of case. C 
 
 Petition for appeal filed , A. 
 
 D. 19 ... , in tlie District Court of the 
 
 United States for District. 
 
 To the Hon , District Judge, etc. : 
 
 The above named plaintiff (or defendant) feeling himself aggrieved by 
 
 the decree made and entered in this cause on the day of , 
 
 A. D. 19. . ., does hereby appeal from said decree (or order) to the Circuit 
 
 Court of Appeals for the Circuit, for the reasons specified in the 
 
 assignment of errors, which is filed herewith, and he prays that his appeal 
 be allowed and that citation issue as provided by law, and that a trans- 
 cript of the record, proceedings and papers upon which said decree was 
 based, duly authenticated, may be sent to the United States Circuit Court 
 
 of Appeals for Circuit, sitting at 
 
 And your petitioner further prays that the proper order touching the 
 security to be required of him to perfect his appeal be made. 
 
 R. F., 
 Solicitor. 
 
 Tefft V. Stern, 21 C. C. A. 73, 43 U. S. App. 442, 74 Fed. 
 755. 
 
 If you desire a supersedeas, add "and desiring to supersede 
 the execution of the decree, petitioner here tenders bond in such 
 amount as the court may require for such purpose, and prays 
 that Avith the allowance of the appeal a supersedeas be issued." 
 The judge usually endorses the petition. 
 
 The petition granted and the appeal allowed upon giving bond condi- 
 tioned as required by law in the sum of dollars. 
 
 A. B., 
 Judge, etc. 
 
 See Columbus Chain Co. v. Standard Chain Co. 76 C. C. A. 
 164, 145 Fed. 186, 187. 
 
APPKALS TO CIRCUIT COPKT Oir APPEALS. 667 
 
 "Or the appeal is allowed and shall operate as a supersedeas 
 
 upon the petitioner filing a bond in the sum of dollars, 
 
 with sufficient sureties to be conditioned as required by law." 
 (See chapter 110.) 
 
 As said before, the judge of the district in which the case 
 is tried, or the circuit judge of the circuit, or the justice as- 
 signed to the circuit, can act upon the petition (Eule 35, 79 
 0. C. A. liv., 90 Fed. Ixvi. United States v. Moy Yee Tai, 48 
 0. C. A. 203, 109 Fed. 2; Brown v. McConnell, 124 U. S. 
 489-491, 31 L. ed. 495-497, 8 Sup. Ct. Eep. 559; Copper 
 Eiver Min. Co. v. jMcClellan, 70 C. C. A. 623, 138 Fed. 338), 
 but cannot allow an appeal from another district while sitting 
 in his own district (United States v. Moj Yee Tai, supra.) 
 The act is not altogether ministerial in granting appeals, it is 
 not a matter of course, says White v. Bruce, 48 C. C. A. 400, 
 109 Fed. 355-363; Brinkley v. Louisville & N. R Co. 95 Fed. 
 345-351. However, in Simpson v. First ISTat. Bank, 63 C. 
 C. A. 371, 129 Fed. 259, it is said the right of appeal is an 
 absolute right, and no judge can condition the allowance, the 
 procedure having been complied with. The judge passes on 
 only the sufficiency of the security. Pullman's Palace Car Co. 
 V. Central Transp. Co. 71 Fed. 809. There are cases where 
 they have been disallowed, that is considered not appealable ; 
 but not where appealable, however frivolous (Southern Bldg. 
 & L. Asso. V. Carey, 117 Fed. 325 ; Lockman v. Lang, 65 C. C. 
 A. 621, 132 Fed. 1) ; it is a matter of right, and mandamus will 
 he. Ex parte Jordan, 94 U. S. 248, 251, 24 L. ed. 123, 125 ; 
 Thorn V. Pittard, 10 C C. A. 352, 8 U. S. App. 697, 62 Fed. 
 235. See J. D. Kandall Co. v. Foglesong Mach. Co. 119 C. 
 C. A. 185, 200 Fed. 742. 
 
 Motion for Supersedeas. 
 
 When bond has been given in time, and appellee seeks to 
 have some action taken in the court below, you may enjoin the 
 action, and move for a supersedeas after the appeal. Washing- 
 ton, G. & A. E. Co. V. Bradley (Washington, G. & A. E. Co. v. 
 Washington) 7 Wall. 577, 19 L. ed. 274; Slaughter-house 
 Cases, 10 Wall. 293, 19 L. ed. 921. The petition should be 
 addressed to the circuit court of appeals, and in the following 
 form: 
 
668 APPEALS TO CIECUIT COUET OF APPEALS. 
 
 Title as in appeal. In Equity. 
 
 Address Circuit Judges. 
 
 And now comes tiie appellant, A. B., in the above entitled cause and 
 
 would show unto your Honors that on the day of , A. D. 
 
 19. . ., this cause came on to be heard before the Hon , judge 
 
 of the district of , sitting at , and that on the 
 
 day of. , A. D. 19 . . ., a decree was entered in said 
 
 cause in substance as follows (state fully the decree that the court may 
 determine whether it be final ) . 
 
 That petitioner appealed from said decree, which said appeal was allowed 
 on the day of , A. D. 19. . ., and security given condi- 
 tioned as provided by law, as will appear, reference being had to the pro- 
 ceedings here on file in this Honorable Court. That said security thus 
 taken was such as properly to operate » supersedeas to stay all pro- 
 ceedings while this cause is pending on appeal before this Honorable Court. 
 
 Petitioner shows that, notwithstanding the allowance of the appeal in 
 this cause, and the filing the security for its pi^oseoution as aforesaid, 
 appellees are seeking to take further proceedings in the court below (here 
 state them). That said proceedings will work an injury and injustice to 
 petitioner if permitted. 
 
 Wherefore petitioner prays this Honorable Court to issue a writ of super- 
 sedeas to the United States District Court for the District of 
 
 , its judges, clerk and marshal, staying and enjoining said court, its 
 
 judges, clerk and marshal, from taking or suffering to be taken before them 
 any further proceedings herein until the hearing and decision by this court 
 of the appeal taken herein and the return of the mandate thereon, and for 
 such further relief as to this court may seem proper, and petitioner will 
 ever pray, etc. 
 
 If granted, draw the decree containing substantially the 
 prayer of the petition or in whatever form it may be granted. 
 The writ issued is as follows : 
 
 UNITED STATES OP AMERICA. 
 
 The President of the United States to the Judges of the District Court of 
 -the United States for the District of , and to the Clerk 
 
 and Marshal of said District — Greeting: 
 
 Whereas an appeal has heretofore been taken to the United States Cir- 
 cuit Court of Appeals for the Circuit from a certain final decree 
 
 entered in the United States District Court for the District of 
 
 on the day of , A. D. 19. . ., in a certain cause 
 
 wherein A. B. is complainant and appellant and C. D. is defendant and 
 appellee; and whereas said appeal waS taken and good and sufficient secu- 
 rity was given in time to operate by virtue of the statute in such cases 
 made and provided as a supersedeas and stay of all proceedings in said 
 cause in said circuit court; now, therefore, we being willing that full jus- 
 
APPEALS TO CIECUIT COUET OF APPEALS. 669 
 
 tice should be done the said A. B., petitioner in this behalf, and that his 
 rights should be fully protected, do command and enjoin you to refrain 
 from taking or suffering to be taken before you any proceedings whatsoever, 
 and especially (state proceedings sought to be taken) until the hearing and 
 decision of this court on the appeal taken herein and the return to you of 
 the mandate thereon. 
 
 Witness the Hon , Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of tlie 
 
 United States, this day of , A. D. 19 . . . 
 
 Attest : 
 Clerk 
 
 Gunn V. Black, 8 C. C. A. 542, 19 U. S. App. 489, 60 Fed. 
 160; Tuttle v. Claflin, 13 C. C. A. 281, 26 U. S. App. 678, 66 
 Fed. 8. 
 
 When an appeal is properly filed, appellate court may issue 
 supersedeas to lower court on filing bond in the appellate court, 
 if done in time. U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 1007 (Comp. Stat. 
 1913, see. 1666), sec. 1012, Comp. Stat. 1901; Bound v. South 
 Carolina K. Co. 55 Fed. 188 ; Kitchen v. Eandolph, 93 U. S. 88, 
 23 L. ed. 810 ; New England R. Co. v. Hyde, 41 C. C. A. 404, 
 101 Fed. 397; Peugh v. Davis, 110 U. S. 229, 28 L. ed. 128, 4 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 17; Hudgins v. Kemp, 18 How. 535, 15 L. ed. 
 513 ; Slaughterhouse Cases, 10 Wall. 291, 19 L. ed. 920 ; Union 
 Mut. L. Ins. Co. V. Windett, 36 Fed. 839; Logan v. Goodwin, 
 41 C. C. A. 573, 101 Fed. 654 ; Washington, G. & A. E. Co. v. 
 Bradley (Washington, G. & A. E. Co. v. Washington), 7 Wall. 
 577, 19 L. ed. 274 ; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Eyser, 19 Wall. 
 428, 22 L. ed. 44 ; Baltimore & O. E. Co. v. Harris, 7 Wall. 574, 
 19 L. ed. 100; French v. Shoemaker, 12 Wall. 100, 20 L. ed. 
 271. 
 
CHAPTEE OIL 
 
 ASSIGITMENT OF EKROES. 
 
 With the petition for appeal must be assigned the matters 
 complained of, and to correct which the appeal is prayed for, 
 and this must be done whether the appeal be direct to the 
 Supreme Court or the circuit court of appeals. (See "KTotice 
 of Appeal.") United States v. Goodrich, 4 C. C. A. 160, 12 
 U. S. App. 108, 54 Fed. 21; Simpson v. First ISTat. Bank, 
 63 C. C. A. 371, 129 Fed. 257 ; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Conley, 
 11 C. C. A. 116, 25 U. S. App. 86, 63 Fed. 180; Webber v. 
 Mihills, 59 C. C. A. 577, 124 Fed. 64; Moore v. Moore, 58 
 C. C. A. 19, 121 Fed. 737. As to evidence of filing. . Copper 
 Kiver Min. Co. v. McClellan, 70 C. C. A. 623, 138 Fed. 333; 
 Lockman v. Lang, 62 C. C. A. 550, 128 Fed. 280, s. c. 65 0. 
 C. A. 621, 132 Fed. 1. Eule 35 of Supreme Court rules 
 requires that the appellant shall file with the clerk below, with 
 his petition for an appeal, an assignment of errors, which shall 
 set out separately and particularly each error asserted and in- 
 tended to be urged, and no appeal shall be allowed unless it is 
 tiled, and errors not assigned will be disregarded. Rule 11, 79 
 C. C. A. xxvii., 150 Fed. xxvii. U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 937 
 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1563) ; Randolph v. Allen, 19 C. C. A. 
 353, 41 U. S. App. 117, 73 Fed. 23 ; The Myrtie M. Ross, 87 
 C. C. A. 175, 160 Fed. 19 ; Stillwagon v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. 
 86 C. C. A. 287, 159 Fed. 97 ; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Gardner, 
 89 C. C. A. 14, 162 Fed. 114. In Simpson v. First Nat. Bank, 
 63 C. C. A. 371, 129 Fed. 259, it is held that it is not necessary 
 to assign errors before an appeal is allowed, as in an applica- 
 tion for a writ of error, but the assignment may be filed at any 
 time before the security is approved and accepted. 
 
 Rule 11 of the circuit court of appeals rules requires that 
 the appellant shall file with the clerk below with his petition 
 an assignment of errors, and no appeal shall be allowed until 
 
 670 
 
ASSIGNMENT OF EEEOES. 671 
 
 the assignment of errors has been filed. This assignment forms 
 part of the transcript, and must be printed with it. See Rule 
 11, 79 C. C. A. xxvii., 150 Fed. xxvii. ; Dufoiir v. Lang, 4 C. 
 C. A. 663, 2 U. S. App. 477, 54 Fed. 913; Conlliette v. Thoma- 
 son, 1 C. C. A. 675, 2 U. S. App. 221, 50 Fed. 787 ; See P. P. 
 Mast & Co. V. Superior Drill Co. 83 C. C. A. 157, 154 Fed. 
 45; JTorfolk & W. E. Co. v. Gardner, 89 C. C. A. 114, 162 Fed. 
 115; Pittsburgh, C. 0. & St. L. E. Co. v. Glinn, 135 C. C. A. 
 46, 219 Fed. 148. 
 
 The purpose of the assignment is to advise the court of the 
 questions it is called upon to decide, without going beyond 
 the assignment itself, and it states the limits within which the 
 appellant will be confined in presenting objections to the pro- 
 ceedings below. Grape Creek Coal Co. v. Farmer's Loan & T. 
 Co. 12 C. C. A. 350, 24 U. S. App. 38, 63 Fed. 891 ; Findlay 
 V. Pertz, 20 C. C. A. 662, 43 U. S. App. 383, 74 Fed. 685 ; 
 Grand Trunk E. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408-415, 36 L. ed. 
 485-488, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 679 ; Andrews v. National Foun- 
 dry & Pipe Works, 36 L.E.A. 139, 22 C. C. A. 110, 46 U. S. 
 App. 281, 76 Fed. 166. See Simkins, Fed. Eq. Suit, chap. 21. 
 
 Cross Errors. 
 
 Cross errors are not assignable in the Federal Courts, Eogers 
 V. Penobscot Min. Co. 83 C. C. A. 380, 154 Fed. 606; citing. 
 Guarantee Co. of N. A. v. Phenix Ins. Co. 59 C. C. A. 376, 
 124 Fed. 170-173 ; iEtna Indemnity Co. v. J. E. Crowe Coal 
 & Min. Co. 83 C. C. A. 431, 154 Fed. 567. 
 
 Must Be Specific, 
 
 The assignment must not be argumentative, but direct (Eule 
 11 C. C. A. ; Eandolph v. Allen, 19 C. C. A. 353, 41 U. S. 
 App. 117, 73 Fed. 23) ; not general but specific (Eichardson 
 V. Walton, 9 C. C. A. 604, 17 U. S. App. 525, 61 Fed. 535; 
 Mitchell Transp. Co. v. Green, 56 C. C. A. 455, 120 Fed. 49 ; 
 Baltimore v. Maryland, 92 C. C. A. 335, 166 Fed. 645, and 
 cases cited. Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Cutting, 15 C. C. A. 
 597, 30 U. S. App. 428, 68 Fed. 586; Guggenheim v. Kirch- 
 hofer, 14 C. C A. 72, 26 U. S. App. 664, 66 Fed. 755 ; Ran- 
 
672 ASSIGBTMENT OF EREOES. 
 
 dolph V. Allen, 19 C. C. A. 353, 41 U. S. App. 117, 73 Fed. 
 23 ; Hart v. Bowen, 31 C. C. A. 31, 58 U. S. App. 184, 86 
 Fed. 877; Findlay v. Pertz, 20 C. C. A. 662, 43 U. S. App. 
 383, 74 Fed. 681, 682; Adams v. Shirk, 44 C. C. A. 653, 105 
 Fed. 659 ; Anniston v. Safe Deposit & T. Co. 29 C. 0. A. 457, 
 52 U. S. App. 510, 85 Fed. 856) ; for if it points out no par- 
 ticular error, it will not be noticed ; Deering Harvester Co. v. 
 Kelly, 43 C. C. A. 225, 103 Fed. 261 ; (U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 
 997 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1653), Ibid.; Supreme Council 
 C. K. A. V. Fidelity & C. Co. 11 C. C. A. 96, 22 U. S. App. 
 439, 63 Fed. 49 ; see Eule 24, 79 C. C. A. xxxiii., 150 Fed. 
 xxxiii. ; Flagler v. Kidd, 24 C. C. A. 123, 45 U. S. App. 461, 
 78 Fed. 341 ; United States v. Ferguson, 24 C. C. A. 1, 45 U. 
 S. App. 457, 78 Fed. 104 ; National Acci. Soc. v. Spiro, 24 C. 
 C. A. 334, 47 U. S. App. 293, 78 Fed. 774) ; when error may 
 be noticed though general or not assigned (Rule 24, 79 C. C. A. 
 xxxiii., 150 Fed. xxxiii. ; cl. 4; Doan v. American Book Co. 45 
 C. C. A. 42, 105 Fed. 772 ; The Myrtie iL Ross, 87 0. C. A. 
 175, 160 Fed. 22). Thus, to assign that there is error in the 
 decree, in that the court upon the evidence should have decreed 
 for appellant, would be too general (Doe v. Waterloo Min. Co. 
 17 C. C. A. 190, 44 U. S. App. 204, 70 Fed. 455, 18 Mor. 
 Min. Rep. 265), but you must specify in what respect the 
 decree is erroneous, and your reasons. (Andrews v. ISTational 
 Foundry & Pipe Works, 36 L.R.A. 139, 22 C. C. A. 110, 46 U. 
 S. App. 281, 76 Fed. 166 ; McFarlane v. GoUing, 22 C. C. A. 
 23, 46 U. S. App. 141, 76 Fed. 23.) 
 
 Your assignment is defective if the court is required to look 
 in the brief for a specific statement of the question presented. 
 Grape Creek Coal Co. v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 12 C. C. A. 
 350, 24 U. S. App. 38, 63 Fed. 891; Hoge v. Magnes, 29 C. C. 
 A. 564, 56 U. S. App. 500, 85 Fed. 355. So, general except- 
 tions to a charge of the court at law are unavailing. Thom v. 
 Pittard, 10 C. C. A. 352, 8 U. S. App. 597, 62 Fed. 232; Balti- 
 more V. Maryland, 92 C. C. A. 335, 166 Fed. 645, and cases 
 cited. 
 
 Form of Assignment. 
 
 Title as In bill. 
 
 And now, on this the ..day of , A. D. 19..., came the 
 
 defendant by his solicitor, E. F., and says that the decree entered in the 
 
ASSIGNMENT OF EEEOES. 673 
 
 above cause on the day of , A. D. 19 . . . , is erroneous and 
 
 unjust to defendant. 
 
 First. Because, etc. (stating specifleally and separately each error com- 
 plained of, and numbering them consecutively ) . 
 
 Wherefore the defendant prays that the said decree be reversed and the 
 circuit court directed to dismiss the bill (or such relief as the nature of 
 the case demands; or if the plaintiff assigns he may pray that the decree 
 be reversed, and the circuit court be instructed to enter such decree as is 
 prayed for by said bill, or that the court of appeals shall reverse and ren- 
 der a proper decree on the record, etc.). 
 
 R. S., 
 Solicitors. 
 
 Time of Filing. 
 
 No appeal will be allowed unless the assignment of errors is 
 filed with the petition. Eule 11, 79 C. C. A. xxvii., 150 Fed. 
 xxvii.; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Conoley, 11 0. C. A. 116, 25 U. 
 S. App. 86, 63 Fed. 180; Dufour v. Lang, 4 C. C. A. 663, 2 U. 
 S. App. 477, 54 Fed. 913, 917; Savings & Loan Soc. v. David- 
 son, 38 C. C. A. 365, 97 Fed. 696; Flahrity v. Union P. R..O0. 
 6 C. C. A. 167, 12 U. S. App. 532, 56 Fed. 908 ; Crabtree v. 
 McCurtain, 10 C. C. A. 86, 19 U. S. App. 660, 61 Fed. 808; 
 Frame v. Portland Gold Min. Co. 47 C. C. A. 664, 108 Fed, 
 751; United States v. Goodrich, 4 C. C. A. 160, 12 U. S. App. 
 108, 54 Fed. 21; Lockman v. Lang, 62 C. C. A. 550, 128 Fed. 
 280. We have seen, in discussing the application of rule 11 C. 
 C. A. and 35 of the Supreme Court, that the rule as stated 
 above is unquestionably correct as to applications for writs of 
 error, but in appeals the assignment of errors may be filed at 
 any time before the security is approved and accepted. Simp- 
 son V. First jSTat. Bank, 63 C. C. A. 371, 129 Fed. 259 ; see Ee 
 Olsen, 40 C. C. A. 247, 100 Fed. 10; Bernard v. Lee, 127 C. 
 C. A. 219, 210 Fed. 583. 
 
 Confined to the Issues. 
 
 You cannot import a question by your assignment ; the plead- 
 ings must develop it. Zadig v. Baldwin, 166 U. S. 488, 41 
 Led. 1088, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 639; Cornell v. Green, 163 U. S. 
 80, 41 L. ed. 78, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 969; Missouri P. E. Co. 
 V. Fitzgerald, 160 U. S. 575, 40 L. ed. 540, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 
 S. Eq.— 43. 
 
674 ASSIGNMENT OF EEROKS. 
 
 389; Woodbury v. Shawneetown, 20 C. 0. A. 400, 34 U. S. 
 App. 655, 74 Fed. 205 ; Cheney v. Bacon, 1 C. C. A. 244, 4 U. 
 S. App. 207, 49 Fed. 305. And while error is assignable 
 to the ruling or order, it is not assignable to reasons given for 
 the ruling or order. Eussell v. Kern, 16 C. C. A. 154, 34 U. 
 S. App. 90, 69 Fed. 94; McFarlane v. GoUing, 22 0. 0. A. 23, 
 46 U. S. App. 141, 76 Fed. 24, and cases cited. Thus, assign- 
 ments on the opinion of the court are not noticfed. Ibid. ; see 
 rule 14 circuit court of appeals, sec. 2 ; Columbus Safe Deposit 
 Co. V. Burke, 32 C. C. A. 67, 60 U. S. App. 253, 88 Fed. 633 ; 
 Evans v. Suess Ornamental Glass Co. 28 C. C. A. 24, 53 U. S. 
 App. 567, 83 Fed. 706; Worth American Loan & T. Co. v. 
 Colonial & U. S. Mortg. Co. 28 C. C. A. 88, 55 U. S. App. 157, 
 83 Fed. 796; Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. v. Du Bois, 29 
 C. C. A. 354, 56 U. S. App. 586, 85 Fed. 586. 
 
 Consent Decree. 
 
 Assignments are not allowed on consent decrees, nor upon 
 error in one's favor (McCafFerty v. Celluloid Co. 43 C. C. A. 
 540, 61 U. S. App. 394, 104 Fed. 305 ; Hitter v. Mutual L. 
 Ins. Co. 169 U. S. 144, 42 L. ed. 694, 18 Sup. Ct. Hep. 300) ; 
 unless consent is denied, when the issue may be carried up by 
 appeal (Kaw Yalley Drainage Dist. v. Union P. R. Co. 90 C. 
 C. A. 320, 163 Fed. 837). 
 
 To the Admission or Rejection of Evidence. 
 
 By Supreme Court rule 13 and circuit court of appeals rule 
 12, it is provided' that in all cases in equity no objection will 
 be heard to the admission or rejection of evidence of such dep- 
 ositions, deeds, or other exhibits found in the record, unless 
 objection was taken thereto and entered of record in the court 
 below, but the same shall otherwise be deemed to be admitted 
 by consent. Thus, to warrant a consideration of a ruling in 
 evidence in equity, the ruling and exceptions must be taken 
 when admitted or rejected over objections at the time, and it 
 must so appear to have been taken in the record. (See "Bill 
 of Exceptions.") Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Emery-Bird-Thayer Dry 
 Goods Co. 43 C. C. A. 511, 104 Fed. 243; Bunker Hill & S. 
 
ASSIGNMENT OF EEEOES. 675 
 
 Min. & Concentrating Co. v. Oberder, 25 C. C. A. 171, 48 U. S. 
 App. 339, 79 Fed. 726 ; Sipes v. Seymour, 22 C. C. A. 90, 40 
 U. S. App. 185, 76 Fed. 118. . 
 
 An assignment of error to the admission or rejection of evi- 
 dence should quote the full substance of the evidence rejected 
 or admitted. Rule 11, circiiit court of appeals rules; rule 35, 
 Supreme Court rules. Cass County v. Gibson, 46 C. C. A. 
 341, 107 Fed. 363; North Chicago Street E. Co. v. St. John, 
 29 C. C. A. 634, 57 TJ. S. App. 366, 85 Fed. 806 ; Haldane v. 
 United States, 16 C. C. A. 447, 32 U. S. App. 607, 69 Fed. 
 819; ]Srewman v. Virginia T. & C. Steelfc I. Co. 25 C. C. A. 
 382, 42 U. S. App. 466, 80 Fed. 231 ; Columbus Safe Deposit 
 Co. v. Burke, 32 C. C. A. 67, 60 U. S. App. 253, 88 Fed. 630 ; 
 Gallot v. United States, 31 C. C. A. 44, 58 U. S. App. 243, 87 
 Fed. 446 ; New Orleans & ¥. E. R. Co. v. Clements, 40 C. C. A. 
 465, 100 Fed. 419 ; Ladd v. Missouri Coal & Min. Co. 14 C. C. 
 A. 246, 32 U. S. App. 93, 66 Fed. 880 ; see Hoge v. Magnes, 
 29 C. C. A. 564, 56 U. S. App. 500, 85 Fed. 358. General 
 assignments that the court erred in admitting or rejecting evi- 
 dence will not be considered. Supreme Council, C. K. A. v. 
 Fidelity & C. Co. 11 C. C. A. 96, 22 U. S. App. 439, 63 Fed. 
 49; Oswego Twp. v. Travelers' Ins. Co. 17 C. C. A. 77, 36 
 TJ. S. App. 13, 70 Fed. 225 ; National Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 
 10 C. C. A. 87, 27 U. S. App. 88, 61 Fed. 809. Assignments 
 of error are controlled by Federal, not State law. Shipman v. 
 Ohio Coal Exch. 17 C. C. A. 313, 37 U. S. App. 471, 70 
 Fed. 654. 
 
CHAPTER cm. 
 
 ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL. 
 
 We have discussed the filing of a petition for an appeal, and 
 the assignment of errors which we have seen should precede the 
 allowance of an appeal. Circuit court of appeals rule 11. We 
 have also seen that an appeal must be allowed, and who should 
 allow the appeal. (See "Petition for Appeal" chapter 101, p. 
 666.) 
 
 See Section 132, New Code, chapter 6 (Comp. Stat. 1913, 
 sec. 1124), by whom and how allowed. Effective — January 
 1st, 1912. 
 
 It is said in Brinkley v. Louisville & N. E. Co. 95 Fed. 350, 
 351, that no case can be found authorizing the refusal of an 
 appeal, however frivolous or vexatious. However, this case 
 seems to recognize that it can be done. Southern Bldg. & L, 
 Asso. V. Carey, 117 Fed. 325. The appeal must be allowed 
 (Barrel v. Western Transp. Co. [Barrell v. The Mohawk] 3 
 Wall. 424, 18 L. ed. 168; McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 80 C. 
 C. A. 56, 150 Fed. 104; Southern Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Carey, 
 117 Fed. 326 ; Simpson v. First ISTat. Bank, 63 C. C. A. 371, 
 129 Fed. 259 ; Green v. Lynn, 31 C. C. A. 248, 50 U. S. App. 
 380, 87 Fed. 840 ; Warner v. Texas & P. R. Co. 4 C. C. A. 
 673, 13 tr. S. App. 236, 54 Fed. 922 ; Blaffer v. New Orleans 
 Water Supply Co. 87 C. C. A. 341, 160 Fed. 390, 391, and 
 cases cited), but the statute makes no provisions in terms for 
 form of allowance (U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 692, U. S. Comp. Stat. 
 1901, p. 566), the filing of the petition and assignment of 
 errors within six months is not sufiieient (Green v. Lynn, 31 
 C. C. A. 248, 50 U. S. App. 380, 87 Fed. 839). See Waxa- 
 hachie v. Color, 34 C. C. A. 349, 92 Fed. 286, as to writ of 
 error, and Blaffer v. New Orleans Water Supply Co. 160 Fed, 
 391. 
 
 The oral request in open court, or the petition and prayer 
 for appeal in vacation, with the order allowing it, makes a valid 
 
ALlOWANCli! OF APPEAL. 677 
 
 a])peal. Plowever, it has been held that no formal order is 
 necessary. Chamberlain Transp. Co. v. South Pier Coal Co. 
 61 C. C. A. 109, 126 Fed. 165-167, and cases cited; Loveless 
 V. Kansom, 48 C. C. A. 4:34, 109 Fed. 391; Braiidies v. 
 Cochrane, 105 U. S. 262, 26 L. ed. 989. The signing of the 
 citation by the judge, or the approval of the bond, has been 
 held to allow the appeal. Simpson v. First ISTat. Bank, 63 C. 
 C. A. 371, 129 Fed. 259, and cases cited ; Sage v. Central R. 
 Co. 96 U. S. 714, 715, 24 L. ed. 643, 644; Chamberlain 
 Transp. Co. v. South Pier Coal Co. 61 C. C. A. 109, 126 Fed. 
 167; see Brown v. McConnell, 124 U. S. 490, 31 L. ed. 496, 
 S Sup. Ct. Eep. 559 ; Fai-mers' Loan & T. Co. v. Chicago & 
 X. P. E. Co. 19 C. C. A. 477, 34 U. S. App. 626, 73 Fed. 314, 
 317; Brandies v. Cochrane, 105 U. S. 262, 26 L. ed. 989; lie 
 Goodman, 42 C. C. A. 85, 101 Fed. 920 ; Re Woerishoffer, 21 
 C. C. A. 175, 41 U. S. App. 411, 74 Fed. 916; Re Fiechtl, 46 
 C. C. A. 497, 107 Fed. 618; McDaniel v. Stroud, 45 C. C. A, 
 446, 106 Fed. 492 ; Green v. Lynn, 31 0. C. A. 248, 50 TJ. S. 
 App. 380, 87 Fed. 840. 
 
 So it has been held that the bond is not essential (Edmonson 
 V. Bloomshire, 7 Wall. 311, 19 L. ed. 92 ; Beardsley v. Arkan- 
 sas & L. R. Co. 158 U. S. 127, 39 L. ed. 921, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 786 ; see "Bond") ; that is, an appeal may be perfected not- 
 withstanding security was not given within the time allowed for 
 appeal (Wickelman v. A. B. Dick Co. 29 C. C. A. 436, 57 U. S. 
 App. 196, 85 Fed. 851), and it seems allowance of appeal 
 relates back (Radford v. Folsom, 123 U. S. 725, 31 L. ed. 292, 
 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 334 ; Kingsbury v. Buckner, 134 U. S. 682, 33 
 L. ed. 1060, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638; Evans v. State ISTat. Bank, 
 134 U. S. 330, 33 L. ed. 917, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493) ; but the 
 allowance of appeal depends on giving bond; such appeal is 
 not perfected ,:ntil bond is given (Lockman v. Lang, 65 C. C. 
 A. 621, 132 Fed. 1.) 
 
 Alloiuance in Forma Pauperis. 
 
 27 Stat, at L. 252, chap. 209 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1626) ; 
 The Presto, 35 C. C. A. 394, 93 Fed. 522; Columb v. Webster 
 Mfg. Co. 76 Fed. 198 ; Fuller v. Montague, 53 Fed. 206 ; Wick- 
 elman V. A. B. Dick Co. 29 C. C. A. 436, 57 U. S. App. 196, 
 
678 ALLOWANCE OF AL'PEAl. 
 
 85 Fed. 851. As to the affidavit, see Ee Collier, 93 Fed. 191; 
 Volk V. B. F. Sturtevant Co. 39 C. C. A. 646, 99 Fed. 533; 
 Donovan v. Salem & P. JSTev. Co. 134 Fed. 316, 317; Whelan v. 
 Manhattan K Co. 86 Fed. 219 ; McDuffee v. Boston & M. E. 
 Co. 82 Fed. 865; Woods v. Bailey, 111 Fed. 121. There was. 
 a great divergence of opinion among the circuit courts as to the 
 application of the act to appeals and writs of error (see Bristol 
 V. United States, 63 C. C. A. 529, 129 Fed. 88, 89, for authori- 
 ties pro and con) ; but in Bradford v. Southern R. Co. 195 U. 
 S. 243, 49 L. ed. 178, 25 Sup. Ct. Eep. 55, it is said appeals 
 cannot he taken under the act. This case is followed in Ee 
 Bradford, 71 C. C. A. 334, 139 Fed. 518, and Taylor v. Adams 
 Exp. Co. 90 C. C. A. 526, 164 Fed. 616, overruling Eeed v. 
 Pennsylvania Co. 49 C. C. A. 572, 111 Fed. 714. 
 
 When Jurisdiction of the Appellate Court Attaches. 
 
 Jurisdiction of the appellate court attaches when the appeal 
 is allowed, provided the appeal has been taken within the time 
 limited. Noonan v. Chester Park Athletic Club Co. 35 C. C. 
 A. 457, 93 Fed. 576 (See "Time for Appealing"). See Morrin 
 V. Lawler, 91 Fed. 694; Columbus Chain Co. v. Standard Chain 
 Co. 76 C. C. A. 164, 145 Fed. 186; Waxahachie v. Coler, 34 0. 
 C. A. 349, 92 Fed. 286 ; Wickelman v. A. B. Dick Co. 29 0. 0. 
 A. 436, 57 U. S. App. 196, 85 Fed. 851 ; Butt v. United States, 
 126 Fed. 794; Fowler v. Hamill, 139 U. S. 550, 35 L. ed. 266, 
 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 663 ; Whitsitt v. Union Depot & E. Co. 122 
 U. S. 363, 30 L. ed. 1150, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1248. As we have 
 seen the United States circuit court of appeals has no jurisdic- 
 tion of appeal not taken within six months from the entry of 
 the judgment. Connecticut F. Ins. Co. v. Oldendorff, 19 C. C. 
 A. 379, 44 U. S. App. 487, 73 Fed. 90, and cases cited ; Coulh- 
 ette V. Thomason, 1 0. 0. A. 675, 2 U. S. App. 221, 50 Fed. 
 787, judiciary act 1891, sec. 11 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1647). 
 An appeal in open court is inoperative unless prosecuted within 
 the time (Credit Co. v. Arkansas C. E. Co. 128 U. S. 259-261, 
 32 L. ed. 449, 450, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 107) ; and it seems that an 
 allowance relates back to date of prayer for. 
 
allowajstce oe appeal. 679 
 
 Boivd. 
 
 The next step is to prepare and file a bond covering the 
 amount required by the court in allowing the appeal, whether 
 it be for costs or a supersedeas. By section 11 of the act of 
 1891, it is provided that all provisions of law now in force 
 regulating the methods and system of review through appeals 
 or writs of error shall regulate the methods and system of ap- 
 peals and writs of error provided for in said act in respect to 
 the circuit court of appeals, including all provisions for bonds 
 or other security required or to be taken on such appeals, etc., 
 and any judge of the circuit court of appeals in respect of 
 cases brought, or to be brought to that court, shall have the 
 same powers and duties as to allowance of appeals, etc., and the 
 conditions of such allowance, as now by law belong to judges 
 of the existing courts of the United States respectively. 
 
 The provision of law then in force and referred to in this 
 clause of the section was TJ. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 1000 (Comp. 
 Stat. 1913, sec. 1660), requiring the judge to take good security 
 that the appellant shall prosecute his appeal to effect, and if he 
 fail to make good his plea, shall answer all damages and costs, 
 where the writ is a supersedeas and stays execution ; or all costs 
 when not a supersedeas. O'Reilly v. Edrington, 96 U. S. 724, 
 24 L. ed. 659. But the bond is not jurisdictional, and may be 
 waived. Kingskiry v. Buckner, 134 U. S. 682, 33 L. ed. 1059, 
 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638. 
 
 Amount of Bond. 
 
 By rule 13, circuit court of appeals, it is provided that super- 
 sedeas bonds in the circuit and district courts of the United 
 States must be taken with good and sufficient security, that 
 the appellant shall prosecute his appeal to effect, and answer 
 all damages and costs if he fail to make his plea good. When 
 the judgment or decree is for money not otherwise secured, the 
 bond should be for the whole amount recovered, and in addition 
 it must cover an amount of the probable damages, costs, and 
 interest which may accrue. 31 C. C. A. liii, 47 Fed. vi. S. C. 
 Eule 32, 6 Wall. v. 
 
 If, however, it be a foreclosure, or in suits where the prop- 
 
680 ALXOWAWCE OP APPEAL. 
 
 erty is in court, or follows the coutroversy, as in real actions 
 and replevin, then the indemnity required will be the amount 
 suiEcient to secure the sum recovered for the use and detention 
 of the property, the costs of suit, just damages for delay, and 
 costs and interest on appeal. Louisville W. A. & 0. E. Co. v. 
 Pope, 20 0. C. A. 253, 46 U. S. App. 25, 74 Fed. 1 ; Kountze ■ 
 V. Omaha Hotel Co. 107 U. S. 389, 27 L. ed. 613, 2 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 911, 74 Fed. 1, 2 ; Clark v. Fatten, 93 Fed. 342. 
 
 This riile is not applicable where no supersedeas is asked 
 (Wheeling Bridge & Terminal R. Co. v. Cochran, 15 C. C. A. 
 321, 25 U. S. App. 306, 68 Fed. 143), and U. S. Rev. Stat, 
 sec. 1000, would apply in such cases. The judge who takes the 
 security on appeal is the sole and exclusive judge of what it 
 should be, and his decision is final, unless he violates a statute 
 or rule of practice. Jerome v. McCarter, 21 Wall. 17—33, 22 
 L. ed. 515-517. See "supersedeas." Ex parte French, 100 
 U. S. 5, 25 L. ed. 530 ; JSTew Orleans Ins. Co. v. E. D. Albro 
 Co. 112 U. S. 507, 28 L. ed. 809, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289 ; Mexican 
 Nat. Constr. Co. v. Reusens, 118 U. S. 54, 30 L. ed. 78, 6 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 945. This rule applies except when the bond has been 
 fraudulently obtained. Florida C. R. Co. v. Schutte, 100 U. 
 S. 646, 25 L. ed. 605. 
 
 Form of Bond on Appeal. 
 Title as in bill. 
 
 Bond on Appeal. 
 
 Know all Men by these Presents: Ihat we, A. B., as principal, and 
 
 , as sureties, acknowledge ourselves to be jointly indebted 
 
 to C. D., appellee in the above cause, in the sum of (as indi- 
 cated by the judge allowing the appeal), conditioned that, whereas, on the 
 
 day of , A. D. 19. . ., in the District Court of the United 
 
 States for the District of , in a suit depending in that court, 
 
 wherein A. B. was plaintiff and C. D. was defendant, numbered on the 
 
 equity docket as , a decree was rendered against the said A. B. 
 
 and the said A. B. having obtained an appeal to the , and filed a 
 
 copy thereof in the office of the clerk of the court to reverse the said decree, 
 and a citation directed to the said C, D. citing and admonishing him to be 
 and appear at a session of the United States Circuit Court of Appeal? 
 
 f 01' the Circuit, to be holden in the city of , in the State 
 
 of .on the day of . ., A. D. 19. . . next. 
 
 Now, if the said A. B. shall prosecute his appeal to effect and answer 
 
ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL. 681 
 
 all damages and costs (or all costs only if not a supersedeas) if he fail 
 to make his plea good, then the above obligation to be Toid, else to re- 
 main in full force and virtue. 
 
 A. B., 
 Sureties. 
 Approved (date) 
 Judge, etc. 
 
 See Babbitt v. Finn (Babbitt v. Shields) 101 TJ. S. Y, 25 L. 
 ed. 820; Kail v. Wetmore, 6 Wall. 451, 18 L. ed. 862. 
 
 To Whom Payable. 
 
 It should be made payable to the appellees, and where the 
 only party to whom it is made payable is not an appellee, the 
 appeal will be dismissed (Swan v. Hill, 155 TJ. S. 394, 39 L. 
 ed. 197, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 178; Swift v. Kortrecht, 49 C. C. 
 A. 68, 110 Fed. 828), but the court will allow names to be 
 inserted (Blaffer v. ISTew Orleans Water Supply Co. 87 C. C. 
 A. 341, 160 Fed. 389; McClellan v. Pyeatt, 1 C. C. A. 241, 
 4 U. S. App. 48, 49 Fed. 260 and cases cited; Davenport v. 
 Fletcher, 16 How. 142, 14 L. ed. 879 ; Hill v. Chicago & E. E. 
 Co. 129 U. S. 175, 32 L. ed. 653, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 269), or 
 defects to be ciired. 
 
 C oiditions. 
 
 The bond is not good when the conditions stated in it are 
 not in conformity to the law. Peace River Phosphate Co. v. 
 Edwards, 17 C. C. A. 358, 30 U. S. App. 513, 70 Fed. 728 ; 
 Swan V. Hill, 155 U. S. 394, 39 L. ed. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 178. There is no obligation. Steele v. Crider, 61 Fed. 484. 
 Thus, "to answer all costs and damages in the event the decree 
 is confirmed," instead of "if it fails to make its plea good" 
 (Peace River Phosphate Co. v. Edwards, supra.) ; but if con- 
 taining the required conditions, then added conditions are sur- 
 plusage (Omaha Hotel Co. v. Kountze, 107 U. S. 395, 27 L. 
 ed. 616, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 911, see rule 13 C. C. A., U. S. Rev. 
 Stat. sec. 1000 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1660) ; Gay v. Parpart, 
 101 U. S. 392, 25 L. ed. 841). 
 
682 ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL. 
 
 By Whom Signed. 
 
 See rule 13 C. C. A., U. S. Kev. Stat. sec. 1000. It should 
 be signed by the appellant and sureties; however, it is not 
 necessary for all appellants to join in bond, for if approved, it 
 stands as security. King v. Thompson, 49 C. C. A. 59, 110 
 Fed. 319 ; McClellan v. Pyeatt, 1 0. C. A. 241, 4 U. S. App. 48, 
 49 Fed. 261 ; Babbitt v. Finn (Babbitt v. Shields) 101 U. S. 
 7, 25 L. ed. 820. Where partners appeal, the individual part- 
 ners should sign. The Protector, 11 Wall. 82, 20 L. ed. 47. 
 Unless it can be amended by the record the appeal will be dis- 
 missed. Moore v. Simondsj 100 U. S. 145, 25 L. ed. 590 ; Ke 
 Woerishoffer, 21 C. C. A. 175, 41 U. S. App. 411, 74 Fed. 916; 
 Estis V. Trabue, 128 U. S. 229, 32 L. ed. 438, 9 Sup. Ct.. 
 Kep. 58. 
 
 The sureties must sign, and their sufficiency must be de- 
 termined by the judge, and he may require as many as he deems 
 necessary. Jerome v. McCarter, 21 Wall. 17-33, 22 L. ed. 515- 
 517 ; Ex parte French, 100 U. S. 5, 25 L. ed. 530 ; New Orleans 
 Ins. Co. V. E. D. Albro Co. 112 U. S. 507, 28 L. ed. 809, 5 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289 ; Mexican Nat. Constr. Co. v. Eeusens, 118 
 U. S. 54, 30 L. ed. 78, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 945. 
 
 Approval hy the Judge. 
 
 By U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 1000, the security for appeal is to 
 be taken by the jxidge who signed the citation and allowed the 
 appeal. This statute has received a liberal construction, and 
 the bond may be approved by any judge or justice who could 
 allow the appeal (Brown v. Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. 55 
 C. C. A. 654; Sage v. Central R. Co. 96 U. S. 715, 24 L. ed. 
 643, 119 Fed. 149, 150) ; but the bond inust be approved by a 
 judge or justice who could allow the appeal. This duty cannot 
 be delegated to the clerk or a commissioner. O'Reilly v. 
 Edrington, 96 U. S. 726, 24 L. ed. 659; Haskins v. St. Louis 
 & S. E. R. Co. 109 U. S. 107, 27 L. ed. 873, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 72; U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 1000 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1660), 
 also sec. 1012 (Id. sec. 1673); Freeman v. Clay, 1 C. C. A. 
 115, 2 U. S. App. 151, 48 Fed. 849 ; Warner v. Texas & P. R. 
 Co. 4 C. C. A. 670, 2 U. S. App. 647, 54 Fed. 920 ; First Xat. 
 Bank v. Omaha, 96 U. S. 738, 24 L. ed. 881 ; Anson Co. v. Blue 
 
ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL. 683 
 
 Eidge E. Co. 23 How. 2, 16 L. ed. 518. The bond may be 
 approved out of Court. Hudgens v. Kemp, 18 How. 530, 15 
 L. ed. 511. 
 
 Sweai-ing obligor as to solvency has been held an approval. 
 Silver v. Ladd, 6 Wall. 440, 18 L. ed. 828. And an approval 
 has been held to be a sufficient allowance of an appeal. Peter 
 Ham Brewery Co. v. Security Title & T. Co. 46 C. C. A. 497, 
 lOT Fed. 618, 619 ; see Simpson v. First ISTat. Bank, 63 C. C. 
 A. 371, 129 Fed. 257 ; Keyser v. Farr, 105 U. S. 266, 26 L. ed. 
 1026. If the judge refvises to approve, the appellate court may 
 be applied to for approval. Sage v. Central E. Co. 96 U. S. 
 715, 24 L. ed. 643 ; Hudson v. Parker, 156 TJ. S. 284, 39 L. ed. 
 426, 15 Sup. Co. Eep. 450, 9 Am. Crim. Eep. 91 ; Anson Co. v. 
 Blue Eidge E. Co. 23 How. 2, 16 L. ed. 518. But an approval 
 obtained by fraud destroys the bond. Florida C. E. Co. v. 
 Schutte, 100 U. S. 646, 25 L. ed. 605. 
 
 Ejfect of Irregularities in Oiving'Bond. 
 
 The appeal will not be dismissed for irregularities in giving 
 bond. Union P. E. Co. v. Callaghan, 161 U. S. 95, 40 L. ed. 
 629, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 493; Chicago Dollar Directory Co. v. 
 Chicago Directory Co. 13 C. C. A. 8, 24 U. S. App. 525, 65 
 Fed. 466 ; Blaffer v. Xew Orleans Water Supply Co. 87 C. C. 
 A. 341, 160 Fed. 389 ; McClellan v. Pyeatt, 1 C. C. A. 241, 4 
 U. S. App. 48, 49 Fed. 259 ; King v. Thompson, 49 C. C. A. 
 59, 110 Fed. 321. The court will not necessarily dis"iiss an 
 appeal for want of a bond, but will grant time to furnish one. 
 Edwards v. United States, 102 U. S. 576, 26 L. ed. 293; 
 Beardsley v. Arkansas & L. E. Co. 158 U. S. 127, 39 L. ed. 
 921, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 786 ; Seymour v. Freer, 5 Wall. 822, 18 
 L. ed. 491; Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U. S. 685, 39 L. ed. 583, 15 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 555; The Presto, 35 C. C. A. 394, 93 Fed. 524; 
 see Walker v. Houghteling, 44 G. C. A. 18, 104 Fed. 513; 
 Davidson v. Lanier, 4 Wall. 454, 18 L. ed. 379. Nor will 
 waiver of bond affect jurisdiction. Kingsbury v. Buckner, 134 
 U. S. 682, 33 L. ed. 1059, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 638. Bond may 
 be given at any time while appeal is alive (Edmonson v. Bloom- 
 shire, 7 Wall. 312, 19 L. ed. 92 ; Wickelman v. A. B. Dick Co. 
 2'9 C. C. A. 4a6, 57 U. S. App. 196, 85 Fed. 851 ; Brown v. 
 McConnell, 124 U. S. 492, 31 L. ed. 497, 8 Sup. Ct. Eep. 559) ; 
 
684 ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL. 
 
 but not after four years (Beardsley v. Arkansas & L. K. Co. 158 
 U. S. 127, 39 L. ed. 921, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 786). Delay of a 
 month in filing bond not unreasonable. Schenck v. Diamond 
 Match Co. 19 C. C. A. 352, 39 U. S. App. 191, 73 Fed. 22. 
 See Wickelman v. A. B. Dick Co. 29 C. C. A. 436, 57 U. S. 
 App. 196, 85 Fed. 851; and Blaffer v. New Orleans Water 
 Supply Co. 87 C. C. A. 341, 160 Fed. 393, deciding that an 
 appeal may be perfected though the security was not given 
 within six months from the entry of the decree, — and cases 
 cited. Failure to mention term not fatal (Davis v. Wakelee, 
 156 U. S. 685, 39 L. ed. 583,, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 555), but an 
 appeal from circuit to Supreme Court cannot be sustained with- 
 out a bond for costs. Selma & M. E. Co. v. Louisiana Nat. 
 Bank, 94 U. S. 253, 24 L. ed. 32 ; Ee Newman, 79 Fed. 615. 
 A bond given on appeal from a case at law is a nullity. Jabine 
 V. Gates, 115 Fed. 864; Saltmarsh v. Tuthill, 12 How. 389, 
 13 L. ed. 1035; Nelson v. Lowndes County, 35 C. C. A. 419, 
 93 Fed. 538. 
 
 Amendment of Bond. 
 
 The bond may be amended in the appellate court (Farmers' 
 Loan & T. Co. v. Chicago & N. P. E. Co. 19 C. C. A. 477, 34 
 U. S. App. 626, 73 Fed. 314; Morrin v. Lawler, 91 Fed. 694) ; 
 or an application to file a new bond may be made (Clarke v. 
 Eureka County Bank, 131 Fed. 145; Morrin v. Lawler, 91 
 Fed. 693; Jerome v. McCarter, 21 Wall. 31, 22 L. ed. 516; 
 Chicago Dollar Directory Co. v. Chicago Directory Co. 43 C. 
 C. A. 8, 24 U. S. App. 525, 65 Fed. 463; Swift v. Kortrecht^ 
 49 C. C. A. 68, 110 Fed. 328 ; Brown v. McConnell, 124 U. S. 
 492, 31 L. ed. 497, 8 Sup. Ct. Eep. 559 ; Draper v. Davis, 102 
 U. S. 370, 26 L. ed. 121). 
 
 When Becomes Insufficient After Appeal. 
 
 If bond becomes insufiicient as a supersedeas, the court may 
 require another to be given, or dismiss appeal on failure to do 
 so. Jerome v. McCarter, 21 Wall. 31, 22 L. ed. 516; Williams 
 V. Clafflin, 103 U. S. 753, 754, 26 L. ed. 606, 607. See 
 Johnson v. Waters, 108 U. S. 4, 27 L. ed.' 630, 1 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 1. 
 
CHAPTER CIV. 
 
 SUPEESEDEAS BOND. 
 
 Power to Grant. 
 
 There is no question of the power of the conrt to grant a 
 supersedeas in case of an appeal from a final decree and the 
 right is discretionary. Tornanses v. Melsing, 45 C. C. A. 615, 
 106 Fed. 775-787; Timolat v. Philadelphia Pneumatic Tool 
 Co. 130 Ped. 903; Bissell Carpet-Sweeper Co. v. Goshen 
 Sweeper Co. 19 C. C. A. 25, 43 U. S. App. 47, 72 Fed. 547, 
 548; Ee Claasen, 140 U. S. 200, 35 L. ed. 409, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 735. See Eule 36 S. C. and Sec. 11 of Act Mch. 3 1891, 
 IJ. S. Eev. Stat. sees. 1000-1007 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 
 1660-1666) ; equity rule 93, Leonard v. Ozark Land Co. 115 
 U. S. 469, 29 L. ed. 446, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 127. This rule as 
 stated above is unquestionably true in appeals from injunctions 
 (New Eiver Mineral Co. v. Seeley, 117 Fed. 982 ; see "Appeal 
 in Injunctions"), but in appeals in other causes a supersedeas 
 is a statutory right. U. S. Eev. Stat. sees. 1000, 1007, 1012 
 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 1660, 1666, 1673); McCourt v. 
 Singer-Bigger, 76 C. C. A. 73, 145 Fed. 103, 7 A. & E. Ann. 
 Cas. 287 and cases cited. But the amount is discretionary, and 
 a supersedeas may be granted though the bond be very much less 
 than the amount recovered, especially when the decree declares a 
 lien. Louisville I^. A. & C. E. Co. v. Pope, 20 C. C. A. 253, 46 
 IT. S. App. 25, 74 Fed. 2 ; Kirkpatrick v. Eastern Mill. & Export 
 Co. 135 Fed. 151 ; Fuller v. Aylesworth, 21 C. C. A. 505, 43 U. 
 S. App. 657, 75 Fed. 694. But supersedeas is a statutory reme- 
 dy, and there should be a strict compliance ^yith all required con- 
 ditions, and when complied with, the bond operates as a super- 
 sedeas per se, and suspends power of court below. See Covington 
 Stock Yards Co. v. Keith, 121 U. S. 250, 30 L. ed. 914, 7 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 881; Sage v. Central E. Co. 93 U. S. 417, 23 L. ed. 
 
 685 
 
686 SUPERSEDEAS BOND. 
 
 935 ; Jabine v. Gates, 115 Fed. 864; Gunn v. Black, 8 C. C. A. 
 542, 19 U. S. App. 489, 60 Fed. 159, 160. The rule is, then, 
 that, when the judg-ment is for the recovery of money otherwise 
 unsecured, the security must cover the whole amount of the 
 judgment, but where the property follows the event of the suit, 
 the amount is in the discretion of the court. Jerome v. Mc- 
 Carter, 21 Wall. 31, 22 L. ed. 516; Fuller v. Aylesworth, 21 
 C. C. A. 505, 43 U. S. App. 657, 75 Fed. 694. To have the 
 effect of a supersedeas, the appeal must be perfected within sixty 
 days, excluding Sundays, after the rendition of the decree, that 
 is, appeal taken, and security filed. Kitchen v. Randolph, 93 
 U. S. 86, 23 L. ed. 810; Logan v. Goodwin, 41 C. C. A. 573, 
 101 Fed. 656 ; French v. Shoemaker, 12 Wall. 100, 20 L. ed. 
 271 ; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Eyser, 19 Wall. 428, 22 L. ed. 
 44 (See Chapt. 119); Washington & A. E. Co. v. Bradley 
 (Washington & A. R. Co. v. Washington) 7 Wall. 577, 19 L. ed. 
 274. U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 1007 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1666). 
 After that time, in view of Rev. Stat. sec. 1007, which ap- 
 plies to appeals as well as writs of error, the bond will not 
 have the effect of a supersedeas. Ibid. ; Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. 
 v. Windett, 36 Fed. 839 ; Brown v. Evans, 8 Sawy. 502, 18 
 Fed. 56 ; New England R. Co. v. Hyde, 41 C. C. A. 404, 101 
 Fed. 397 ; Western Air Line Constr. Co. v. McGillis, 127 U. S. 
 777, 32 L. ed. 325, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1390. But the appeal 
 having been sued out within sixty days, the bond may be given 
 afterwards with the permission of a justice or judge of the 
 appellate court. U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 1007; Peugh v. Davis, 
 110 U. S. 229, 28 L. ed. 128, 4 Sup.'Ct. Rep. 17. If the appeal 
 is not so taken, a supersedeas cannot be awarded subsequently. 
 New England R. Co. v. Hyde, 41 C. C. A. 404, 101 Fed. 
 398; Logan v. Goodwin, 41 C. 0. A. 573, 101 Fed. 654; 
 Sage V. Central R. Co. 93 II. S. 417, 23 L. ed. 935. As to- 
 when a writ of error operates as a supersedeas, U. S. Rev. Stat, 
 sec. 1007 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1666), see Kitchen v. Ran- 
 dolph, 93 U. S. 92, 23 L. ed. 812; Wurts v. Hoagland, 105 
 U. S. 703, 26 L. ed. 1110. 
 
 Effect of Supersedeas Bond. 
 
 In ordinary chancery causes, not involving action as to an 
 
SUPERSEDEAS BONB. 687 
 
 injunction, an appeal, if the supersedeas bond be given in ac- 
 cordance with the statute, operates as a supersedeas. JSTew River 
 Mineral Co. v. Seeley, 117 Fed. 982 ; Kitchen v. Randolph, 93 
 U. S. 86, 23 L. ed. 810; U. S. Rev. Stat. sees. 1000, 1007, 
 1012 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 1660, 1666, 1673). 
 
 The supersedeas stays the effect of the decree until affirm- 
 ance ; that is, no action by execution, or otherwise, can be taken 
 under the decree after the bond has been approved. It suspends 
 the power of the court below to take any proceedings under 
 the decree, or if an execution has been issued or other proceed- 
 ings begun, it prohibits any further steps to be taken. Stafford 
 V. King, 32 C. C. A. 536, 61 U. S. App. 487, 90 Fed. 140; 
 Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U. S. 157, 27 L. ed. 890, 3 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 136; Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. v. Texas C. R. 
 Co. 32 Fed. 530; Ransom v. Pierre, 41 C. 0. A. 585, 101 Fed. 
 669. 
 
 In Jerome v. McCarter, 21 Wall. 28, 22 L. ed. 516, it is said 
 that a bond given as a supersedeas, but not providing for secur- 
 ity for costs, would be insufficient as a supersedeas. It covers 
 the amount appealed from, damages for delay, and costs. Amer- 
 ican Surety Co. v. North Packing & Provision Co. 102 C. C. 
 A. 258, 178 Fed. 810. 
 
 A supersedeas bond given on appeal froni an ordev issuing 
 an execution at once stops any proceeding under the execution 
 (Wood V. Brown, 43 C. C. A. 474, 104 Fed. 207 ; see United 
 States ex rel. Harshman v. County Ct. 39 Fed. 757) ; or if 
 from the appointment of a receiver, the power of the receiver 
 is suspended and appellant is entitled to a return of the prop- 
 erty (Tornanses v. Melsing, 45 C. C. A. 615, 106 Fed. 775) ; 
 or granting a writ of possession (Green Bay & M. Canal Co. v. 
 Norrie, 118 Fed. 925). However, the supersedeas bond does 
 not preclude collateral or independent proceedings based on 
 grounds not involving the issues settled by the decree. Fidelity 
 Trust & S. V. Co. V. Mobile Street R. Co. 54 Fed. 26. 
 
 Liability on Supersedeas Bond. 
 
 ByU. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 1000 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1660), 
 the bond is required of appellant, conditioned that he shall 
 prosecute his appeal to effect, and if he fail to make his plea 
 
688 SUPERSEDEAS BOND. 
 
 good, he shall answer all damages and costs when the writ 
 is a supersedeas, etc. Supreme Court rules 29; circuit court 
 of appeals rule 13. 
 
 This condition covers all compensation for delay arising 
 from the appeal, as well as the amount in the decree appealed 
 from, so far as the latter directs the payment of money. Wood 
 V. Brown, 43 C. C, A. 4Y4, 104 Fed. 206, and cases cited; 
 Egan V. Chicago G. W. R Co. 163 Fed. 350, and cases cited; 
 Jerome v. McCarter, 21 Wall. 17, 22 L. ed. 515. Pike v. 
 Gregory, 55 C. C. A. 78, 118 Fed. 128 ; Davis v. Patrick, 6 C. 
 C. A. 632, 12 U. S. App. 629, 57 Fed. 911 ; Brown v. JSTorth- 
 western Mut. L. Ins. Co. 55 C. C. A. 654, 119 Fed. 149; 
 Woodworth v. Northwestem Mut. L. Ins. Co. 185 U. S. 354, 
 46 L. ed. 945, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 676 ; Eosenstein v. Tarr, 51 
 Fed. 370, s. c. 3 C. C. A. 466, 5 U. S. App. 197, 53 Fed. 112; 
 Crane v. Buckley, 150 Fed. 402, s. c. 70 C. C. A. 452, 138 
 Fed. 22; Green Bay & M. Canal Co. v. Norrie, 118 Fed. 923; 
 American Surety Co. v. ISTorth Packing & Provision Co. 102 
 C. C. A. 258, 178 Fed. 810; and costs of both courts. Expanded 
 Metal Co. v. Bradford, 177' Fed. 604 ; Richards v. Harrison, 
 218 Fed. 138. 
 
 Damages Covered By. 
 
 But the damages sought must he the result of the supersedeas. 
 Ibid. 
 
 To illustrate: Where a supersedeas bond has been given 
 in a sviit involving injunctive relief, and damages are sought 
 for violating the injunction, such damages would not arise 
 under, nor be covered by, the supersedeas bond, as the super- 
 sedeas did not suspend the effect of the injunction, as has been 
 heretofore stated. In a word, the damage sustained is not the 
 result of the supersedeas. The remedy was by contempt pro- 
 ceedings, or an action for damages independent of the bond. 
 Green Bay & M. Canal Co. v. Norrie, 118 Fed. 923; Buckley 
 V. Crane, "59 C. C. A. 109, 123 Fed. 29. 
 
 Failure to Prosecute Appeal. 
 
 The bond becomes operative when accepted, and any failure 
 
STJPEESEDEAS BOND. 689 
 
 to prosecute the appeal to effect, as failing to file the transcript 
 in the appellate court under the statute and rules of the court, 
 is a breach of the condition, and the obligor and sureties become 
 liable. Smith v. Pendergast, 82 Fed. 506; Crane v. Buckley, 
 70 C. C. A. 452, 138 Fed. 22. So a judgment of affirmance 
 fixes the liability of the principal and sureties. Davis v. 
 Patrick, 6 C. C. A- 632, 12 U. S. App. 629, 5Y Fed. 909; 
 Babbitt v. Finn (Babbitt v. Shields) 101 U. S. 7, 25 L. ed. 
 820; Third Nat. Bank v. Gordon, 53 Fed. 473, s. c. 6 C. C. 
 A. 125, 13 U. S. App. 554, 56 Fed. 792; Egan v. Chicago 
 G. W. R. Co. 163 Fed. 350. 
 
 Sureties. 
 
 As to the obligee, sureties are principals, and nothing but 
 reversal discharges sureties on an appeal bond (Ibid. ; Babbitt 
 V. Finn [Babbitt v. Shields], 101 U. S. 14, 15, 25 L. ed. 822; 
 Gordon v. Third Nat. Bank, 6 C. C. A. 125, 13 U. S. App. 
 554, 56 Fed. 792-796) ; nor will they be discharged by requir- 
 ing new bond for fuhther appeal (Babbitt v. Finn [ Babbitt v. 
 Shields], 101 U. S. 13, 14, 25 L. ed. 821, 822.) 
 
 Motion to Vacate Supersedeas. 
 
 If the supersedeas has been granted without authority, as 
 where the appeal was not perfected in sixty days, or for any 
 other cause, you may file in the appellate court a motion to 
 vacate the supersedeas (ITudgins v. Kemp, 18 How. 530, 15 
 L. ed. 511) in the following form (Brown v. Evans, 8 Sawy. 
 502, 18 Fed. 57). 
 
 Title of case as appealed. 
 
 And now come the appellees in this cause by , their counsel, 
 
 and move the court to vacate the supersedeas in the above cause, or for 
 an order declaring the appeal bond filed by appellant in said cause does 
 not operate as a supersedeas, because the appeal was not sued out within 
 sixty days after the rendering of the judgment entered and complained of 
 in said cause. 
 
 R. P., 
 Solicitor, etc. 
 
 Patterson v. Hoa, 131 U. S. Ixxxviii., Appx. and 18 L. ed. 
 
 S. Eq.— 44. 
 
690 SUPERSEDEAS BOND. 
 
 884; Knox County v. United States, 131 U. S. clxvi., Appx. 
 and 25 L. ed. 191 ; Kitchen v. Eandolph, 93 U. S. 89, 23 L. 
 ed. 811 ; Sage v. Central B. Co. 93 U. S. 416, 23 L. ed. 934. 
 
 The action of a judge approving an amount to give the hond 
 the effect of a supersedeas will not be set aside, except great 
 abuse is apparent (Jerome v. McCarter, 21 Wall. 31, 22 L. 
 ed. 516; New Orleans Ins. Co. v. E. D. Albro Co. 112 U. S. 
 507, 28 L. ed. 809, 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 289) ; or, as we have before 
 seen, when approval procured by fraud (Florida C. R. Co. v. 
 Sehutte, 100 U. S. 646, 25 L. ed. 605). 
 
 When approved and the record filed the district judge can- 
 not vacate the supersedeas, Kendrick v. Eoberts, 214 Fed. 268, 
 
CHAPTER OV. 
 
 CITATION IN APPEAL. 
 
 A citation Is a formal written notice to the adverse party that 
 an appeal has been allowed in the case, and notifying appellee 
 that he must appear in the appellate court at the time designated 
 therein if he desires to be heard. Villabolas v. United States, 
 6 How. 90, 12 L. ed. 356; Dodge v. Knowles, 114 U. S. 438, 
 29 L. ed. 297, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1108, 1197. The citation is 
 signed by the judge or justice authorized to grant the appeal 
 (U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 999 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1659), 
 Rule 8, circuit court of appeals) ; but failure to sign is cured by 
 the appearance of appellees (Freeman v. Clay, 48 Fed. 
 849). 
 
 When Necessary. 
 
 Unless the appeal is taken and perfected in open court, as 
 before explained, or unless waived, a citation is necessary to 
 be issued, and served on the adverse party. Richardson v. 
 Green, 130 U. S. 104, 32 L. ed. 872, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443. So 
 when the appeal is taken after the term in which the decree is 
 entered, a citation must be issued or the appeal will be dis- 
 missed. Jacobs V. George, 150 U. S. 417, 37 L. ed. 1128, 14 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 159; Lockman v. Lang, 65 C. C. A. 621, 132 
 Fed. 3; West v. Erwin, 4 C. C. A. 401, 9 U. S. App. 547, 54 
 Fed. 419. 
 
 In Jacobs v. George, 150 U. S. 415, 37 L. ed. 1127, 14 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 159, the following rules governing the issuance of 
 a citation in appeals are laid down for guidance : 
 
 First. No citation is necessary when notice of appeal in 
 open court has been given and the appeal perfected at the term 
 in which the decree was entered, by filing in the appellate court 
 the transcript and docketing the cause in the required time.. 
 
 691 
 
692 ciTATioisr in appeal. 
 
 McNulta V. West Chicago Park, 39 0. C. A. 545, 99 Fed. 328; 
 Ee Fiechtl, 46 C. C. A. 497, 107 Fed. 619 and cases cited; 
 Swift V. Kortrecht, 49 C. C. A. 68, 110 Fed. 328 ; King v. 
 Thompson, 49 C. C. A. 59, 110 Fed. 319 ; Central Trust Co. 
 V. Continental Trust Co. 30 C. C. A. 235, 58 U. S. App. 604, 
 86 Fed. 517; Noonan v. Chester Park Athletic Club Co. 35 
 C. C. A. 457, 93 Fed. 577. 
 
 Second. Though notice is given in open court, a citation is 
 necessary if the appeal is not perfected, as above stated, until 
 after the term in which the decree was entered. Kuby v. Atkin- 
 son, 35 C. C. A. 458, 93 Fed. 577; Jacobs v. George, 150 
 U. S. 415, 37 L. ed. 1127, 14 Sup. Ct, Rep. 159 ; Haskins v. 
 St. Louis & S. E. E. Co. 109 U. S. 107, 27 L. ed. 873,. 3 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 72. 
 
 Third. A citation, unless waived, is always necessary when 
 the appeal is allowed after the term. Jacobs v. George, 150 
 U. S. 416, 37 L. ed. 1127, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 159; Eailroad 
 Equipment Co. v. Southern E. Co. 34 C. C. A. 519, 92 Fed. 
 541 ; see Gray v. Grand Forks Mercantile Co. 70 C. C. A. 634, 
 138 Fed. 346; Sage v. Central E. Co. 96 IJ. S. 715, 24 L. ed. 
 643. 
 
 Fourth. Also when allowed at a subsequent term, though 
 in open court. Jacobs v. George, 150 TJ. S. 417, 37 L. ed. 1128, 
 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 159 ; Chicago & P. E. Co. v. Blair, 100 TJ. 
 S. 662, 25 L. ed. 587. 
 
 May Be Waived. 
 
 The issue of citation is not fundamentally jurisdictional, 
 and may be waived. Berliner Gramophone Co. v. Seaman, 
 47 C. C. A. 630, 108 Fed. 715 ; Mattingly y. ISTorthwestern 
 Virginia E. Co. 158 U. S. 56, 39 L. ed. 895, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 725: Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Chicago & IST. P. R. 
 Co. 19 G. C. A. 477, 34 U. S. App. 626, 73 Fed. 317; 
 Eichardson v. Green, 130 TJ. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 875, 9 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 443 ; Andrews v. National Foundry & Pipe Works, 
 36 L.R.A. 153, 23 C. C. A. 454, 77 Fed. 775 ; Mendenhall 
 V. Hall, 134 TJ. S. 567, 33 L. ed. 1015, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 616 ; Railroad Equipment Co. v. Southern E. Co. 34 C. C. 
 A. 519, 92 Fed. 544; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Chicago & 
 
CITATION IN APPEAl,. 693 
 
 K P. E. Co. 19 C. C. A. 477, 34 U. S. App. 626, 73 Fed. 316, 
 317; Lockman v. Lang, 65 C. C. A. 621, 132 Fed. 4, and eases 
 cited. 
 
 A failure to issue and serve a citation, tlie appeal being al- 
 lowed and docketed, will not be ground for dismissal until 
 after an opportunity has been given to do so. Ibid. 
 
 It is not intended to give jurisdiction, but an opportunity 
 to appear. Ibid. 
 
 It seems that where counsel for appellee indorsed the appeal 
 bond it was held a waiver of citation. Gopdwin v. Fox, 120 
 U. S. 775, 30 L. ed. 815, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 779. So, joining 
 in a motion to dismiss appeal was a waiver. Andrews v. Na- 
 tional Foundry & Pipe Works, 36 L.R.A. 153, 23 C. C. A. 454, 
 77 Fed. 774. So a general appearance in the appellate court 
 waives the citation. Richardson v. Green, 130 U. S. 115, 
 32 L. ed. 875, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443. Or any act acknowledging 
 notice. Tripp v. Santa Rosa Street R. Co. 140 U. S. 129, 36 L. 
 ed. 372, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 655. 
 
 When citation is necessary the following form may be used : 
 
 United States of America to Greeting: 
 
 You are hereby notified that in a certain case in equity in the United 
 
 States District Oourt in and for the District of , wherein 
 
 is complainant and are defendants, an appeal has 
 
 been allowed the therein to the You are hereby cited 
 
 and admonished to be and appear in said court at , days 
 
 after the date of this citation, to show cause, if any there be, why the order 
 and decree appealed from should not be corrected and speedy justice done 
 the parties in that behalf. 
 
 Witness the Hon , judge of the United States District Court 
 
 for the District of , this the day of , A. D. 
 
 19... 
 
 M. S. 
 United States Circuit Judge. 
 
 SMras, Equity Practice, p. 209 ; U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 999 
 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1659). 
 
 It may be stated that the rule is settled, that, except in 
 cases of appeal allowed in open court during the term in 
 which the decree is entered, a citation returnable at the same 
 term with the appeal is necessary to perfect jurisdiction, unless 
 waived. Jacobs v. George, 150 U. S. 417, 37 L. ed. 1128, 14 
 
694 CITATION IN APPEAL. 
 
 Sup. Ct. Kep. 159 ; West v. Erwin, 4 C. C. A. 401, 9 U. S. 
 App. 54T, 54 Fed. 420; Eailroad Equipment Co. v. Southern 
 E. Co. 34 C. C. A. 519, 92 Fed. 544; Henry v. Alabama & V. 
 E. Co. 164 U. S. 701, 41 L. ed. 1180, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 994; 
 Hewitt V. Filbert, 116 U. S. 143, 29 L. ed. 582, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 319 ; Pender v. Brown, 56 C. C. A. 646, 120 Fed. 497. 
 
 When May Be Issued and When Returnable. 
 
 Whether the appeal be to the Supreme Court or circuit cOurt 
 of appeals, the citation must be made returnable not exceeding 
 thirty days from date of signing, and whether the return day 
 fall in term time or vacation, and must be served before the 
 return day. Supreme Court rule 8, see. 5, and rule 9, sec. 
 1 ; 137 U. S. 710 ; see Washington v. Dennison, 6 Wall. 496, 18 
 L. ed. 863 ; Seagrist v. Crabtree, 127 U. S. 774, 32 L. ed. 324, 
 8 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1394; Andrews v. Thum, 12 C. C. A. 77, 
 21 U. S. App. 459, 64 Fed. 152 ; Chamberlain Transp. Co. v. 
 South Pier Coal Co. 61 C. C. A. 109, 126 Fed. 165. (See 
 "How Served.") 
 
 It may be issued properly returnable even after expiration 
 of time for taking appeal, if allowance of appeal made in time. 
 Altenberg v. Grant, rule 8, par. 5, S. C. 137 U. S. 710, 28 
 C. C. A. 224, 54 U. S. App. 312, 83 Fed. 981, and cases cited; 
 Jacobs V. George, 150 U. S. 415, 37 L. ed. 1127, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 159; Seagrist v. Crabtree, 127 U. S. 773, 32 L. ed. 
 323, 8 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1394; McClellan v. Pyeatt, 1 C. C. A. 
 241, 4 U. S. App. 48, 49 Fed. 259 ; circuit court of appeals 
 rule 14, sec. 5. However, there is some variance in this rule 
 fixing the return day in the different circuits, as well as in the 
 language, to which your attention is called in order to examine 
 the rules of your circuit. 
 
 In appeals from interlocutory orders granting or continuing 
 an injunction in the fifth circuit, the citation is returnable ten 
 days from its date. In other cases appeals and citations are 
 made returnable not exceeding thirty days from the day of 
 signing the citation whether it fall in term time or vacation, and 
 must be served before the return day, rule 14, par. 5, 5th 
 circuit. In the eighth circuit the citation is returnable in sixty 
 
CITATION IN APPEAL. 695 
 
 days from the day of signing the citation. I believe, however, 
 the different circuits generally follow the 8th S. C. rule, par. 5. 
 
 How Served. 
 
 If the service is not accepted it may be served by any citizen, 
 who must make affidavit that he delivered a copy of the citation 
 to the appellee as follows : 
 
 State of 
 
 County of 
 
 On this the day of , A. D. 19 ... , personally appeared 
 
 before the undersigned authority Richard Roe, who, being sworn, says that 
 he delivered a copy of the within citation to C. D. or (R. F., Solicitor of 
 CD.). 
 
 Sworn to before me this the day of , A. D. 19 . . . 
 
 L. R., 
 [seal.] Notary Public. 
 
 See Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Phinney, 178 U. S. 334, 44 L 
 ed. 1092, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 906. 
 
 Service may be made on the attorney of the appellee, and 
 such service is good for all parties represented by him. Davis 
 V. Wakelee, 156 U. S. 684, 39 L. ed. 582, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 555; Bigler v. Waller, 12 Wall. 147, 20 L. ed. 261. And an 
 attorney cannot withdraw so as to prevent service. Dayton v. 
 Lash, 94 U. S. 112, 24 L. ed. 33 ; Rio Grande Irrig. & Coloniza- 
 tion Co. V. Cildersleeve, 174 U. S. 606, 43 L. ed. 1104, 19 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 761. So, acceptance on the citation by the attorney 
 of record is sufficient. Andrews v. National Foundry & Pipe 
 Works, 36 L.R.A. 153, 23 C. C. A. 454, 77 Fed. 774. You 
 cannot send it through the postoffice (Tripp v. Santa Rosa 
 Street R. Co. 144 U. S. 129, 36 L. ed. 372, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 655) ; but may leave copy at house. (Ibid.) It must be served 
 to give jurisdiction. Peace River Phosphate Co. v. Edwards, 
 17 C. C. A. 358, 30 U. S. App. 513, 70 Fed. 728; Jacobs v. 
 George, 150 F. S. 415, 37 L. ed. 1127, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 159; 
 Hewitt V. Filbert, 116 IT. S. 143, 29 L. ed. 582, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 319; Davidson v. Lanier, 4 Wall. 44-7, 18 L. ed. 377; Babbitt 
 V. Finn (Babbitt v. Shields) 101 U. S. 11, 25 L. ed. 821. 
 However, where parties are numerous, notice to a few of each 
 class who should appear in good faith in defense of the interests 
 of that class would be sufficient. Kidder v. Fidelity Ins. Trust 
 
696 CITATION IN APPEAL. 
 
 & S. D. Co. 44 C. C. A. 593, 105 Fed. 825, and cases cited. 
 As to service of, writs of error, TJ. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 1007 
 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1666), see McCarley v. McGee, 108 
 Fed. 497. Service may be perfected by personal service, as 
 in the service of ordinary process. Ibid. 
 
 Alias Citation. 
 
 The court of appeals may order an alias citation to bring in 
 parties not served under the original (Altenberg v. Grant, 28 
 C. C. A. 244, 54 TJ. S. App. 312, 83 Fed. 980), if appeal 
 docketed in time. Railroad Equipment Co. v. Southern E. 
 Co. 34 C. C. A. 519, 92 Fed. 544; Shute v. Keyser, 149 U. 
 S. 650, 37 L. ed. 884, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 960. But if not issued 
 and served before end of next ensuing term, appeal becomes 
 inoperative if not waived. Jacobs v. George, 150 U. S. 416, 
 417, 37 L. ed. 1127, 1128, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 159, and author- 
 ities; see McClellan v. Pyeatt, 1 C. C. A. 241, 4 U. S. App. 
 48, 49 Fed. 259; Bloomingdale v, Watson, 62 C. C. A. 600, 
 128 Fed. 269. 
 
CHAPTEK CVI. 
 
 WHO MAY APPEAL. 
 
 It may be stated, as a general rule, that all parties having 
 an interest in the cause, and affected by the decree should 
 join in the appeal. Kidder v. ^Fidelity Ins. Trust & S. D. Co. 
 44 C. C. A. 593, 105 Fed. 821 ; Loveless v. Ransom, 46 C. C. 
 A. 515, 107 Fed. 627 and cases cited. Simpson v. Greeley, 
 20 Wall. 158, 22 L. ed. 339; Sipperley v. Smith, 155 U. S. 
 86, 39 L. ed. 79, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 15; Davis v. Mercantile 
 Trust Co. 152 F. S. 593, 38 L. ed. 564, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 693 ; Wilson v. Kiesel, 164 U. S. 252, 41 L. ed. 423, 17 Sup. 
 Ct Rep. 124; St. Louis United Elevator Co. v. Nichols, 34 
 C. C. A. 90, 91 Fed. 833 ; Dodson v. Fletcher, 24 C. 0. A. 69, 
 49 U. S. App. 61, 78 Fed. 214; Hedges v. Seibert Cylinder Oil 
 Cup Co. 1 C. C. A. 594, 3 U. S. App. 25, 50 Fed. 643 ; Aiken 
 v. Smith, 4 C. C. A. 654, 2 U. S. App. 618, 54 Fed. 896 ; Humes 
 v. Third Nat. Bank, 4 C. C. A. 668, 13 U. S. App. 86, 54 
 Fed. 917 ; Hook v. Mercantile Trust Co. 36 C. C. A. 645, 95 
 Fed. 41; Hardee v. Wilson, 146 U. S. 180, 36 L. ed. 933, 13 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 39 ; Fordyce v. Trigg, 175 U. S. 723, 44 L. ed. 
 337, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1024 (See "Who Made Parties to Ap- 
 peal") ; but parties not affected by the decree need not join 
 (Giimian v. McKee, 159 U. S. 312, 40 L. ed. 163, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 6; Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Pope, 20 C. C. A. 253, 
 46 U. S. App. 25, 74 Fed. 5 ; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Water- 
 man, 106 U. S. 269, 270, 27 L. ed. 116, 117, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 131; Basket v. Hassell, 107 U. S. 608, 27 L. ed. 501, 2 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 415; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Vane, 26 C. C. A. 
 342, 53 U. S. App. 319, 80 Fed. 961) ; as in cases where the 
 decree is several, and interest separate (Ibid. ; Hall v. Gambrill, 
 34 C. C. A. 190, 63 U. S. App. 740, 92 Fed. 32; Grand Island 
 & W. C. R. Co. V. Sweeney, 43 C. C. A. 255, 103 Fed. 342; 
 Hanrick v. Patrick, 119 TJ. S. 164, 30 L. ed. 402, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 
 697 
 
 fct. 
 
698 WHO MAY APPEAL. 
 
 Rep. 147). See Provident Life & T. Co. v. Camden & T. 
 E. Co. 101 C. C. A, 68, 177 Fed. 857, 858 ; Lamon v. Speer 
 Plardware Co. 119 C. C. A. 1, 198 Fed. 453 ; Orleans-Kenner 
 Electric R. Co. v. Dunbar, 134 C. C. A. 152, 218 Fed. 345; 
 Winters v. United States, 207 U. S. 564, 52 L. ed. 340, 28 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 207 ; Fulton Invest. Co. v. Dorsey, 136 C. C. A. 108, 
 220 Fed. 298. The interest must be substantial, not a remote 
 consequence of the judgment. Hamilton Trust Co. v. Cornu- 
 copia Mines Co. 139 C. C. A. — , 223 Fed. 494. 
 
 That parties having an interest in the decree must join in 
 the appeal has been held to be jurisdictional, unless there has- 
 been a summons and severance. Loveless v. Ransom, 46 C. C. 
 A. 515, 107 Fed. 627; Hook v. Mercantile Trust Co. 36 C. 
 
 C. A. 645, 95 Fed. 41-49; Kidder v. Fidelity Ins. Trust & S. 
 
 D. Co. 44 C. C. A. 593, 105 Fed. 821 ; Ayres v. Polsdorfer, 
 45 C. C. A. 24, 105 Fed. 737 ; Dolan v. Jennings, 139 U. S. 
 387, 35 L. ed. 217, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 584; Estis v. Trabue, 128 
 U. S. 230, 32 L. ed. 438, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58; Hanrick v. 
 Patrick, 119 U. S. 163, 30 L. ed. 402, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 147; 
 The Columbia, 15 C. C. A. 91, 29 U. S. App. 647, 67 Fed. 
 944; Fitzpatrick v. Graham, 56 C. C. A. 95, 119 Fed. 353; 
 Hedges v. Seivert Cylinder Oil Cup Co. 1 C. C. A. 594, 3 U. 
 S. App. 25, 50 Fed. 643. But not when interest nominal, or not 
 substantial. Higbee v. Chadwick, 136 C. C. A. 317, 220 Fed. 
 874, and cases cited. 
 
 Summons and Severance in Appeal. 
 
 If the parties interested refused to join, then you should 
 apply to the judge for a severance, which is done by first serv- 
 ing the parties with notice that you intend to appeal and re- 
 quest them to join; if they refuse, then file a motion in court 
 stating the facts and the refusal, and a copy of the notice 
 served, and pray for a severance. The motion with the order of 
 severance must be made a part of the record to give jurisdiction. 
 Faulkner v. Hutchins, 61 C. C. A. 425, 126 Fed. 363 ; Copland 
 V. Waldron, 66 C. C. A. 271, 133 Fed. 217 ; Provident Life 
 & Trust Co. V. Camden & T. R. Co. 101 C. C. A. 68, 177 Fed. 
 854;. Detroit v. Guaranty Trust Co. 93 C. C. A. 604, 168 Fed. 
 610 ; Ingiehart v. Stansbury, 151 U. S. 68, 38 L. ed. 76, 14 
 
WHO MAT APPEAL. 699 
 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 237; Beardsley v. Arkansas & L. K. Co. 158 
 U. S. 123, 39 L. ed. 919, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 786; Winters 
 V. United States, 207 U. S. 564, 52 L. ed. 340, 28 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 207 ; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. McClure, 24 C. C. A. 
 66, 49 U. S. App. 46, 78 Fed. 211 ; Ee Key, 189 U. S. 84, 
 47 L. ed. 720, 23 Sup. Ct, Eep. 624; Provident Life & T. Co. 
 V. Camden & T. E. Co. 101 C. C. A. 68, 177 Fed. 854. 
 
 A separate appeal by one of several joint defendants is not 
 maintainable until after notice, and refusal. Higbee v. Chad- 
 wick, 136 C. C. A. 317, 220 Fed. 873. Ibid. ; Johnson v. Trust 
 Co. 43 C. C. A. 458, 104 Fed. 174; Beardsley v. Arkansas & 
 L. E. Co. 158 U. S. 127, 39 L. ed. 921, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 786. 
 The excuse for nonjoinder must appear in the record. Ingie- 
 haxt V. Stansbury, 151 U. S. 72, 38 L. ed. 77, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 237. And where one of two or more defendants does not 
 join in the appeal, and he has not been served with summons 
 and notice of severance he cannot be made a party by amend- 
 ment after the time for appeal has expired (Copland v. Wal- 
 dron, 66 C. C. A. 271, 133 Fed. 217 ; Consumers' Cotton Oil 
 Co. V. K'ichol, 57 C. C. A. 321, 120 Fed. 818) ; and objection 
 may be made at any time (Loveless v. Eansom, 46 C. C. A. 
 515, 107 Fed. 626 ; Ayres v. Polsdorfer, 45 C. C. A. 24, 105 
 Fed. 737) ; but it seems that upon appeal taken by one of sev- 
 eral defendants in a joint decree, in open court, and allowed by 
 the court at the time the decree is entered, when all parties are 
 presumed to be present, that such allowance will be equivalent 
 to "summons and severance." Loveless v. Eansom, 46 C. C. A. 
 515, 107 Fed. 627 ; McNulta v. West Chicago Park, 39 C. C. A. 
 545, 99 Fed. 328 ; Kidder v. Fidelity Ins. Trust & S. D. Co. 
 44 G-. C. A. 593, 105 Fed. 824; Johnson v. Trust Co. 43 0. C. 
 A. 458, 104 Fed. 174; King v. Thompson, 49 C. C. A. 59, 110 
 Fed. 319 ; Detroit v. Guaranty Co. 93 C. C. A. 604, 168 Fed. 
 611. 
 
 Appeals hy Parties Not Parties to the Original Proceedings 
 
 Below. 
 
 The general rule is that one who is not a party or privy to a 
 decree cannot appeal therefrom. Guion v. Liverpool & L. & 
 G. Ins. Co. 109 U. S. 173, 37 L. ed. 895, 3 Sup. Ct. Eep. 108 ; 
 
700 WHO MAT APPEAL. 
 
 Aiken V. Smith, 4 0. 0. A. 652, 2 U. S. App. 445, 54 Fed. 895; 
 Ex parte Cutting, 94 U. S. 19, 20, 24 L. ed. 50 ; Ex parte Cock- 
 croft, 104 U. S. 578, 26 L. ed. 856; Cook v. Lasher, 19 C. 
 C. A. 654, 42 U. S. App. 42, 73 Fed. 704; Elwell v. Fosdick, 
 
 134 U. S. 513, 33 L. ed. 1002, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 598 ; Re Woer- 
 ishoffer, 21 C. C. A. 175, 41 U. S. App. 411, 74 Fed. 916, and 
 cases cited. But sometimes the interests of parties not made 
 parties to the original proceedings are affected by the decree 
 to such an extent that the courts have recognized their right 
 to have the decree revised. 
 
 Thus a purchaser of property under a decree becomes a party 
 to all subsequent proceedings had after the sale, and he may 
 appeal from the action of the trial court affecting his rights. 
 Kneeland v. American Loan & T. Co. 136 U. S. 94, 34 L. ed. 
 382, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 950; Davis v. Mercantile Trust Co. 
 152 U. S. 594, 38 L. ed. 565, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 693; Louisville, 
 E. & St. L. R. Co. V. Wilson, 138 U. S. 504, 34 L. ed. 1024, 
 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 405; Andrews v. ISTational Foundry & Pipe 
 Works, 76 Fed. 166 ; Williams v. Morgan, 111 U. S. 697, 28 
 L. ed. 564, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638 ; see Sage v. Central R. Co. 
 93 U. S. 419, 23 L. ed. 935. However, see Swann v. Wright 
 (Swann v. Fabyan) 110 U. S. 601, 28 L. ed. 256, 4 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 235, where a purchaser at foreclosure could not attack 
 prior liens. Central Trust Co. v. Grant Locomotive Works, 
 
 135 U. S. 222, 34 L. ed. 103, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 736 ; Central 
 Trust Co. V. Georgia P. R. Co. 30 C. C. A. 648, 58 U. S. 
 App. 120, 87 Fed. 293. So vehere a sale is subject to condi- 
 tions, a purchaser cannot be heard upon them. Kneeland v, 
 American Loan & T. Co. 136 U. S. 94, 34 L. ed. 382, 10 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 950. Nor can he dispute the correctness of the de- 
 cree. Compton V. Jesup, 15 C. C. A. 397, 31 U. S. App. 486, 
 68 Fed. 305 ; Baltimore Trust & Guarantee Co. v. Hofstetter, 
 29 C. C. A. 35, 56 U. S. App. 122, 85 Fed. 78; see also Stuart 
 V. Gay, 127 U. S. 530, 32 L. ed. 195, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1279. 
 
 An appeal by one not a party to the original proceedings 
 must be perfected by a svyorn petition, setting up the interest 
 and hov7 affected by the decree, and praying to be permitted 
 to intervene in order to appeal. See Aiken v. Smith, 4 C. C. 
 A. 654, 2 U. S. App. 618, 54 Fed. 896 ; Sage v. Central R. Co. 
 93 U. S. 418, 419, 23 L. ed. 935, 936. 
 
WHO MAY APPEAL, 701 
 
 Parties Dying After Decree. 
 
 (Act 1875, sec. 9, 18 Stat, at L. 473, chap. 137.) 
 When a party dies after judgment and before the time for 
 an appeal elapses, his personal representatives may enter an 
 appeal, etc. Conaway v. Third ISTat. Bank, 92 C. C. A. 488, 167 
 Fed. 26; Dolan v. Jennings, 139 U. S.-387, 35 L. ed. 217, 11 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 584. (See "Effect of Death on Appeal," chap. 
 109, p. 723.) 
 
 Party Not Appealing. 
 
 If a party does not appeal, the decree cannot be reversed, 
 though error has been committed affecting his rights (Southern 
 P. E. Co. V. United States, 168 U. S. 66, 42 L. ed. 383, 18 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 4; Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 527, 
 25 L. ed. 702; United States v. Blackfeather, 155 U. S. 180, 
 39 L. ed. 114, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 64 ; Cherokee Nation v. Black- 
 feather [United States v. Blackfeather] 155 U. S. 218, 39 
 L. ed. 126, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 63; The Stephen Morgan [The 
 Stephen Morgan v. Good] 94 U. S. 599, 24 L. ed. 266; 
 Bensiek v. Thomas, 13 C. C. A. 451, 27 U. S. App. 765, 66 
 Fed. 106), though he has assigned error (United States v. 
 Blackfeather, supra; Muskogee Nat. Teleph. Co. v. Hall, 55 
 C. C. A. 208, 118 Fed. 382 ; O'Neil v. Wolcott Min. Co. 27 
 L.E.A.(]Sr.S.) 200, 98 C. C. A. 309, 174 Fed. 528), 
 
 An Appeal From a Fictitious Case. 
 
 There can be no appeal if there is no actual controversy 
 (Little v. Bowers, 134 U. S. 558, 33 L. ed. 1020, 10 Siip. Ct. 
 Eep. 620; California v. San Pablo & T. E. Co. 149 U. S. 
 314, 37 L. ed. 748, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 876 ; East Tennessee V. 
 & G. E. Co. V. Southern Teleg. Co. 125 U. -S. 695, 31 L. ed. 
 853, 8 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1391 ; Lord v. Veazie, 8 How. 255, 12 
 L. ed. 1069) ; nor after compromise (Dakota County v. Glidden, 
 113 U. S. 226, 28 L. ed. 982, 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 428) ; nor if 
 collusive (Benner v. Hayes, 26 C. C. A. 271, 53 U. S. App. 
 376, 80 Fed. 953 ; Weaver v, Kelly, 34 0. C. A. 423, 92 Fed. 
 421 ; Arnold v. Woolsey, 4 0. C. A. 319, 12 U. S. App. 157, 
 54 Fed. 269) ; nor where possibility of relief ceases pending 
 
702 WHO MAY APPEAL, 
 
 suit (Mills V. Green, 159 U. S. 654, 40 L. ed. 294, 16 Sup. Ot. 
 Eep. 132). One who was paid a judgment is not precluded 
 from appealing. Hoogendorn v. Daniel, 120 C. C. A. 537, 202 
 Fed. 432. 
 
 As to Appeals by Interveners. 
 
 Will not lie on refusal to allow intervention, because inter- 
 vention is within the discretion of the court. Re Columbia 
 Eeal Estate Co. 50 C. C. A. 406, 112 Fed. 645, and cases 
 cited. Hamlin v. Toledo, St. L. & K C. R Co. 36 L.R.A. 
 826, 24 C. C. A. 271, 4-7 TJ. S. App. 422, 78 Fed. 665; Lewis 
 V. Baltimore & L. R. Co. 10 C. C. A. 446, 8 U. S. App. 645, 
 62 Fed. 219; Creditors Commutation Co. v. United States, 
 34 C. C. A. 12, 62 U. S. App. 728, 91 Fed. 573 ; S. C. 177 U. 
 S. 311, 44 L. ed. 782, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 636; Ex parte Cutting, 
 94 U. S. 14, 24 L. ed. 49 ; Buel v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 
 44 C. C. A. 213, 104 Fed. 839. However, in certain applica- 
 tions for intervention, where a party would be denied all re- 
 lief by refusing the inters^ention, such leave to intervene is 
 not discretionary, and may be appealed from (see chapter 80). 
 Minot V. Mastin, 37 C." C. A. 234, 95 Fed. 739 ; Credits Com- 
 mutation Co. V. United States, 177 U. S. 315, 316, 44 L. ed. 
 785, 786, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 636. But having intervened, may 
 appeal as when, after intervention allowed, they have been dis- 
 missed. Hamlin v. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. E. Co. 36 L.E.A. 
 -826, 24 C. C. A. 271, 47 U. S. App. 422, 78 Fed. 672; Knee- 
 land V. American Loan & T. Co. 136 U. S. 94, 34 L. ed. 382, 
 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 950; Williams v. Morgan, 111 U. S. 696, 
 699, 28 L. ed. 564, 4 Sup. Ct. Eep. 638 ; Eice v. Durham Water 
 Co. 91 Fed. 434; Ee Michigan C. E. Co. 59 C. C. A. 643, 124 
 Fed. 727-730 and cases cited. Kidder v. Fidelity Ins. Trust 
 & S. D. Co. 44 C. C. A. 593, 105 Fed. 823. And when appeal 
 taken where intervener did not join, the appellate court will 
 not consider refusal of court to grant the relief prayed for by 
 intervener. Muskogee Nat. Teleph. Co. v. Hall, 55 C. C. A. 
 308, 118 Fed. 382. 
 
 As to Appeals By and Against Receivers. 
 
 A receiver in foreclosure suit may appeal, though not a party 
 
WHO MAY APPEAL. 703 
 
 (Hinckley v. Gilman, 0. & S. E. Co. 94 U. S. 469, 24 L. ed. 
 166; Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U. S. 155, 27 L. ed. 889, 3 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136 ) ; but not when his intervention has been 
 refused without prejudice. As to appeals by receivers, see Bos- 
 worth V. St. Louis Terminal R Asso. 174 U. S. 182-186, 43 
 L. ed. 941-943, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625. He cannot question 
 orders of the court, or conditions of his appointment, unless 
 they affect his personal rights. Hunt v. Illinois C. R. Co. 37 
 C. C. A. 548, 96 Fed. 647, 648 ; Chapman v. Atlantic Trust Co. 
 56 C. C. A. 61, 119 Fed. 266 ; Kidder v. Fidelity Ins. Trust & 
 S. D. Co. 44 C. C. A. 593, 105 Fed. 824; see Kirkpatrick v. 
 Eastern Mill. & Export Co. 135 Fed. 151 ; Edgell v. Felder, 39 
 C. C. A. 540, 99 Fed. 324; Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank v. Kil 
 bourne, 22 C. C. A. 599, 44 U. S. App. 663, 76 Fed. 883. 
 
 Appeal by Partners. 
 
 You cannot appeal in firm name, but must state the indi- 
 vidual members of the firm (Estis v. Trabue, 128 U. S. 225, 
 32 L. ed. 437, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58), and each must sign bond 
 (The Protector, 11 Wall. 82, 20 L. ed. 47 ; Re Woerishotfer, 
 21 C. C. A. 175, 41 U. S. App. 411, 74 Fed. 915) ; and both 
 as to appellants and appellee, individual names must be given ; 
 no collective designation is permitted. This does not apply to 
 corporations. Ibid. 
 
 Cross Appeals. 
 
 An appellee may file a cross appeal at the same time with 
 appellant's appeal, or he may file it at any time within the 
 time limit, but the same rules regarding assignments of error 
 and procedure in appeals must be pursued, without reference 
 to appellant's appeal. Hilton v. Dickinson, 108 U. S. 168, 
 27 L. ed. 689, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep, 424 ; Building & L. Asso. v. 
 Logan, 14 C. C. A. 133, 30 U. S. App. 163, 66 Fed. 827; 
 Morrison v. Kuhn, 26 C. C. A. 130, 52 U. S. App. 178, 80 
 Fed. 741; Green v. Lynn, 31 C. C. A. 248, 50 U. S. App. 380, 
 87 Fed. 840. It cannot be done by assigning cross errors 
 (O'Neil V. Wolcott Min. Co. 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 200, 98 C. C. A. 
 309, 174 Fed. 528 ; ^tna Indemnity Co. v. J. R, Crowe Coal 
 
704 WHO MAY APPEAL. 
 
 & Min. Co. 83 C. C. A. 431, 154 Fed. 567; Guarantee Co. of 
 N. A. V. Phenix Ins. Co. 59 C. 0. A. 376, 124 Fed. 172; 
 Shawnee County v. Hurley, 94 C. C. A. 362, 169 Fed. 94), 
 except that the transcript filed by one party may be used by 
 both. TJ. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 1013 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1655) ; circuit court of appeals rules 25; Supreme Court rules 
 22. 
 
 Who Made Parties to Appeal. 
 
 All parties to the record interested in the decision are en- 
 titled to be heard on appeal has already been stated when dis- 
 cussing "Who may Appeal" above. For further authorities, 
 see Kidder v. Fidelity Ins. Trust & S. D. Co. 44 C. C. A. 593, 
 105 Fed. 823, and cases cited. Grand Island & W. C. R. Co. v. 
 Sweeney, 37 C. C. A. 127, 95 Fed. 396, s. c. 43 C. C. A. 255, 
 103 Fed. 342. Railroad Equipment Co. v. Southern R. Co. 
 34 C. C. A. 519, 92 Fed. 541 ; Bloomingdale v. Watson, 62 
 C. C. A. 600, 128 Fed. 269 ; Johnson v. Trust Co. 43 C. C. A. 
 458, 104 Fed. 174; Detroit v. Guaranty Trust Co. 93 C. 0. A. 
 604, 168 Fed. 611; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Longworth, 
 22 C. C. A. 420, 48 U. S. App. 71, 76 Fed. 610. And this 
 is true though parties have defaulted. American Loan & T. 
 Co. V. Clark, 27 C. C. A. 522, 49 U. S. App. 571, 83 Fed. 
 230. 
 
 An insolvent corporation is a necessary party to an appeal 
 from a decree ordering a receiver to pay certain judgments. 
 Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Longworth, supra. Subcontractors 
 are necessary parties to an appeal from a decree holding them 
 liable with the contractors. Grand Island & W. C. R. Co. v. 
 Sweeney, 37 C. C. A. 127, 95 Fed. 398. So purchasers at 
 sale under a mortgage, and the mortgagor, should be made 
 parties to an appeal from the confirmation of the sale. Davis 
 V. Mercantile Trust Co. 152 U. S. 594, 38 L. ed. 565, 14 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 693 ; Kneeland v. American Loan & T. Co. 136 U. S. 
 89,, .34 L. ed. 379, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 950. So in an appeal 
 from decree of foreclosure. Davis v. Mercantile Trust Co. 
 152 U. S. 594, 595, 38 L. ed. 565, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 693. 
 The appeal will be dismissed where the record shows the 
 absence of a party vitally interested. Hook v. Mercantile Trust 
 
WHO MAY APPEAL. 705 
 
 Co. 36 C. C. A. 645, 95 Fed. 41 ; Wilson v. Kiesel, 164 U. S. 
 252, 41 L. ed. 423, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 124; Hardee v. Wilson, 
 146 U. S. 179, 36 L. ed. 933, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 34; Love- 
 less V. Ransom, 46 C. C. A. 515, 107 Fed. 627; Faulkner v. 
 Hutchins, 61 C. C. A. 425, 126 Fed. 363. Except as before 
 stated, where parties are very numerous, service of citation 
 upon several of a class who appear in good faith in defense of 
 the class interests will be sufficient. Kidder v. Fidelity Ins. 
 Trust & S. D. Co. 44 C. C. A. 593, 105 Fed. 825 ; citing 
 Franklin Sav. Bank v. Taylor, 4 C. C. A. 55, 9 U. S. App. 406, 
 53 Fed. 867. See Re Jemison Mercantile Co. 50 C. C. A. 
 641, 112 Fed. 969. As to creditors appealing in bankrupt mat- 
 ters see also Re A. L. Robertshaw Mfg. Co. 135 Fed. 221, 222. 
 S. Eq.— 45. 
 
CHAPTER CVII. 
 
 TRANSCEIPT. 
 
 The rules of both the Supreme Court and circuit court of 
 appeals require, as we have seen, the return of the citation for 
 appeal not exceeding thirty days from the signing by the judge, 
 and whether in term time or vacation. Circuit court of appeals 
 rule 14, sec. 5; id., rule 16; Supreme Court rule 8, sec. 5; 
 U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 999 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1659). Ed- 
 monson V. Bloomshire, 1 Wall. 309, 310, 19 L. ed. 91, 92; 
 Chamberlain Transp. Co. v. South Pier Coal Co. 61 C. 0. A. 
 109, 126 Fed. 165. 
 
 You have, then, the duty upon you of prosecuting vigorously 
 the appeal, as you have only thirty days within which to file 
 the transcript in the appellate court (circuit court of appeals 
 rule 16), unless for good cause shown the justice or judge who 
 signed the citation, or any judge of the circuit court of appeals, 
 extends the time by or before its expiration. West v. Irwin, 
 4 C. C. A. 401, 9 U. S. App. 547, 54 Fed. 419. 
 
 If the order of enlargement is given, you must file it with the 
 cleric -of the circuit court of appeals. The appellant should then 
 at once direct the clerk to make out the transcript and forward 
 to the clerk of the appellate court. Chamberlain Transp. Co. 
 V. South Pier Coal Co. 61 C. C. A. 109, 126 Fed. 167; Re 
 Alden-Electric Co. 59 C. C. A. 509, 123 Fed. 415. 
 
 The six months given within which to file the appeal does 
 not affect this rule. You have that time to consider whether 
 you will appeal or not, but, having sued out your appeal, then 
 you have only thirty days to file the transcript in the court of 
 appeals, unless extended as stated. 
 
 If the transcript is not filed under the rule, the appellee may 
 have the case docketed and dismissed on certificate that an 
 appeal had been sued out and not prosecuted. Rule 9, S. C. ; 
 
 706 
 
TEANSCKIPT. V07 
 
 circuit court of appeals, rule 16. See Love v. Busch, 73 0. C. 
 A. 545, 142 Fed. 431 ; Evans v. State Nat. Bank, 134 U. S. 
 330, 33 L. ed. 917, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 493 ; Hill v. Chicago & 
 E. E. Co. 129 U. S. 174, 32 L. ed. 653, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269; 
 Hill V. Chicago & E. R. Co. 140 U. S. 53, 35 L. ed. 331, 11 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 690; Richardson v. Green, 130 U. S. Ill, 32 
 L. ed. 874, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 443 ; Small v. Northern P. R. Co. 
 134 U. S. 515, 33 L. ed. 1007, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 614; Stevens 
 V. Clark, 10 C. C. A. 379, 18 U. S. App. 584, 62 Eed. 324; 
 Pender v. Brown, 56 C. C. A. 647, 120 Eed. 497. The filing 
 of the record is a jurisdictional necessity. Nashua & L. R. 
 Corp. v. Boston & L. R. Corp. 9 C. C. A. 468, 21 U. S. App. 
 50, 61 Eed. 242. It seems, hovi^ever, that the failure to docket 
 in time will not be noticed if no motion to have it dismissed 
 on certificate is made (West Chicago Street R. Co. .v. Ells- 
 worth, 23 C. C. A. 393, 46 U. S. App. 603, 77 Eed. 664, and 
 authorities), before it is docketed. Ouings v. Tiernan, 10 Pet. 
 24, 9 L. ed. 333 ; Chicago Dollar Directory Co. v. Chicago Di- 
 rectory Co. 13 C. C. A. 8, 24 U. S. App. 525, 65 Eed. 463 ; 
 Andrews v. Thum, 12 C. C. A. 77, 21 U. S. App. 459, 64 Eed. 
 149. See Earmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Chicago & N. P. E. Co. 
 19 C. C. A. 477, 34 U. S. App. 626, 73 Fed. 314, for excuse for 
 failure to file in time. As to return of transcript in writ of 
 error, see Gilman v. Fernald, 72 C. C. A. 666, 141 Eed. 940, 
 and cases cited. 
 
 What Transcript to Contain, 
 
 By U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 698 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1654), 
 also Ibid. sec. 750 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1604), it is pro- 
 vided that the transcript in an appeal in equity should contain 
 the record as directed by law to be made, and copies of the 
 proofs and of such entries and papers on file as may be neces- 
 sary on the hearing of the appeal; that they shall be trans- 
 mitted to the Supreme Court, and the court below or the appel- 
 late court can order any original document to be sent up in 
 lieu of the copy. 
 
 By equity rule 75 (a), it shall be the duty of the appellant 
 to file with the clerk of the court from which the appeal is 
 prosecuted, together -wiib. proof or acknowledgment of service 
 
708 TBANSCEIPT. 
 
 of a copy on the appellee or his solicitor, a prwcipe whicli shall 
 indicate the portions of the record to be incorporated in the 
 transcript on appeal. The appellee, should he desire additional 
 portions of the record incorporated in the record, shall file his 
 prwcipe also within ten days thereafter, unless the court or 
 judge enlarges the time, indicating the portions of the record 
 he desires incorporated. Ee General Equity Rule T5 (c), 138 
 C. C. A. 574, 222 Fed. 884. If any difference arises concerning 
 the directions of either party, such difference must be submitted 
 to the court or judge in conformity with the provisions of para- 
 graph (b) of this rule, and his decision will be the guide for the 
 clerk. Hoe v. Kahler, 27 Fed. 145 ; Union P. R Co. v. Stewart, 
 95 U. S. 279, 24 L. ed. 431; Ee General Equity Eule 75, 
 supra. The clerk should have no discretion in the matter, 
 though intimated otherwise in Blanks v. Klein, 1 C. C. A. 
 254, 2 U. S. App. 155, 49 Fed. 1, as he is not learned in the 
 law, or sufficiently familiar with the issues or the evidence to 
 determine the matter. This is clearly intimated in Pennsyl- 
 vania Co. V. Jacksonville, T. & K. W. E. Co. 5 C. C. A. 53, 
 2 U. S. App. 606, 55 Fed. 131, and approved in Nashua & 
 L. E. Corp. V. Boston & L. E. Corp. 9 C. C. A. 468, 21 U. S. 
 App. 50, 61 Fed. 244. If the court cannot be reached to de- 
 termine the question, it is the clerk's duty to insert the whole 
 matter. Ibid. Teller v. United States, 49 G. C. A. 263, 111 
 Fed. 120, and cases cited. See Ee A. L. Eobertshaw Mfg. 
 Co. 135 Fed. 222. 
 
 By equity rule 76, care must be taken to avoid the inclu- 
 sion of more than one copy of any paper, and to exclude the 
 formal and immaterial parts of all exhibits, documents, and 
 other papers included therein. For infraction of this rule 
 the appellate court will impose costs, and they may be imposed 
 on the solicitors disregarding the rule. 
 
 How Evidence to be Stated in the Transcript. 
 
 By equity rule 'No. 75, the evidence shall not be set out in 
 full, but shall be stated in simple and condensed form, omit- 
 ting all evidence not essential to the decision of the questions 
 presented in the appeal ; and the testimony of witliesses bearing 
 upon the issue must be stated in narrative form ; but if desired 
 
TBANSOIUPT. 709 
 
 by either party the exact language of the witness may be stated 
 if permitted by the court or judge. This duty of condensing 
 vests primarily upon the appellant, and it must be prepared by 
 him and lodged in the clerk's office for examination by other 
 parties; and the statement as thus made must be lodged with 
 the clerk at or before the time required for filing his prwcipe as 
 required by this rule. Ee Equity Eule 75, 138 C. C. A. 574, 
 222 Fed. 8S5. If the evidence is set out in full it must be 
 remedied. Eule 76 id. Louisville & IST. E. Co. v. United States, 
 238 U. S. 1, 59 L. ed. 1177, 35 Sup. Ct. Eep. 696; Wong 
 Keow V. United States, 131 C. C. A. 403, 215 Fed. 95 ; United 
 States V. Motion Picture Patents Co. 230 Fed. 541. 
 
 Facts in the Clerk's Ojflce. 
 
 When the appellant lodges his statement of facts in the 
 clerk's office, he shall notify the other parties or their solicitors 
 of such lodgment, and in the notice shall state time and place 
 when he will ask the approval of the court or judge of said 
 statement; but the time must be within ten days after service 
 of the notice. 
 
 Presenting the Statement to the Court. 
 
 At the expiration of the time named in the notice, unless the 
 time is enlarged by the court or judge, the statement, together 
 with any objections made by the appellee, or such amendments 
 as are proposed by either party, shall be presented to the court 
 or judge for approval. Whatever then is necessary to com- 
 plete and properly prepare the statement in accordance with the 
 rule may be done under the direction of the court or judge, and 
 shall, after that, be approved by him and filed in the clerk's 
 office as a part of the record of appeal. 
 
 By Supreme Court rule 8 the clerk of the court below is 
 required to transmit a true copy of the record and assignment 
 of errors (rule 11, circuit court of appeals) and all proceed- 
 ings in the case under his hand and the seal of the court 
 (Supreme Court rule 8, sec. 1). Also a copy of liie opinion 
 of the court below, if one has been rendered. Supreme Court 
 rule 8, sec. 2 ; Loeb v. Columbia Twp. 179 U. S. 483, 45 L. 
 ed. 287, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 174; Teller v. United States, 49 C. C. 
 
710 TEANSCEIPT. 
 
 A. 263, 111 Fed. 120. See Townsend v. Beatrice Cemetery 
 Asso. 70 C. C. A. 521, 138 Fed. 381 ; Pacific Sheet Metal Works 
 V. Califomian Canneries Co. 91 C. 0. A. 108, 164 Fed. 984; 
 as to force of opinion. It also provides that no case will be 
 heard unless a complete record, containing in itself, and not hy 
 reference, all the papers, exhibits, depositions, and other pro- 
 ceedings necessary to a hearing, and that original papers may be 
 ordered up with the record. Supreme Court rule 8, sees. 3 
 and 4; circuit court of appeals rule 14; Dowagiac Mfg. Co. 
 V. Brennan, 156 Fed. 213. The transcript, of course, includes 
 the pleadings, that is, the hill, process, return showing juris- 
 diction, then answer showing issues, then the evidence by both 
 parties. JSText, opinion of the court and its decree. Then 
 should follow the appellate proceedings containing petition for 
 appeal, assignment of errors, order allowing appeal, and bond, 
 citation in appeal and service if not given in open court; and 
 finally the clerk's certificate, sec. 698 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1654). Mcllwaine v. Ellington, 99 Fed. 133; Hunt v. Kile, 
 38 C."C. A. 641, 98 Fed. 49; Eedfield v. Parks, 130 U. S. 
 624, 32 L. ed. 1053, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 642 ; Southern Bldg. & 
 L. Asso. V. Carey, 117 Fed. 326, 327 ; Merriman v. Chicago, D. 
 & V. E. Co. 56 C. C. A. 536, 120 Fed. 240 ; Kansas v. Meri- 
 wether, 96 C. C. A. 281, 171 Fed. 41, 42. 
 
 The record in an equity suit usually means the proceedings 
 from filing the bill to the final decree, and the procedure in 
 getting the cause to the appellate court. 
 
 By new rule 77 a further method of appeal has been pro- 
 vided where the issue can be decided without an examination of 
 all the pleadings and evidence filed and taken in the case. The 
 rule is as follows : 
 
 What Transcript to Contain, on Agreed Statement. 
 
 Where the questions on appeal can be determined without 
 an examination of all the pleadings and evidence, the parties, 
 with the approval of the court before whom the case is tried, 
 or the judge thereof, may prepare and sign a statement of the 
 case showing how the question arose and where decided in the 
 district court, and setting forth only so much of the facts 
 alleged and proved as is essential to a decision of such ques- 
 
TEANSCEIPT. 711 
 
 tions, and, with the decree in the case shall be copied and 
 certified to the appellate court as the record. 
 
 The transcript for a cross appeal is governed by the same 
 rules. U. S. Kev. Stat. sec. 1013 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1913, 
 sec. 1655) ; Gregory v. Pike, 12 C. C. A. 202, 21 U. S. App. 
 474, 64 Ted. 415; Farrar v. Churchill, 135 U. S. 609, 34 L. 
 ed. 246, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 771. 
 
 If counsel wishes to stipulate what the transcript should 
 contain, it may be drawn as follows: 
 
 A. B., Appellant, 
 
 vs. 
 C. D., Appellee 
 
 United States Circuit Court of Ap- 
 peals for the Circuit. 
 
 Appeal from the United States Dis- 
 trict Court for the. . .• District of 
 
 It is hereby stipulated by counsel for both parties in the above cause 
 that the clerk in making up the transcript may omit therefrom the fol- 
 lowing papers and records (here set forth what is to be omitted), and 
 that an order may be entered accordingly with the permission of the court. 
 
 R. F., 
 Counsel for A. B., Appellant. 
 E. F., 
 Counsel for C. D., Appellee. 
 Date 
 
 Certificate to the Transcript. 
 
 Section 997, U. S. Eev. Stat. (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1653), 
 requires an authenticated transcript of the record, and rule 
 8 of the Supreme Court rules, and rule 14 (79 C. C. A. xxviii, 
 90 Fed. cxxv.), of the circuit court of appeals, require a true 
 . copy of the record, assignment of errors, and all proceedings in 
 the case under the hand of the clerk and seal of the court to 
 be transmitted to the appellate court. Teller v. United States, 
 49 C. C. A. 263, 111 Fed. 120. U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 698 
 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1654). Eev. Stat sec. 750 (Comp. 
 Stat. 1913, sec. 1604). 
 
 The certificate must show that the transcript is complete, 
 and not simply that the matters contained in the transcript 
 are correct copies (Euby v. Atkinson, 35 C. C. A. 458, 93 
 Fed. 577 ; Meyer v. Mansur & T. Implement Co. 29 C. C. A. 
 
712 TEANSCEIPT. 
 
 465, 52 U. S. App. 474, 85 Fed. 874, 875 ; Jacksonville, T. & 
 K. W. R Co. V. American Constr. Co. 6 C. C. A. 249, 13 U. S. 
 App. 377, 57 Fed. 66 ; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Eaton, 51 
 C. C. A. 640, 114 Fed. 18; See "Form of Certificate"), or 
 it must show that the record as sent up was designated by the 
 stipulations of counsel, or that the clerk was guided by rule 
 75 in preparing the transcript, and selecting the papers 
 necessary to a hearing (Bumham v. North Chicago Street E. 
 Co. 30 C. C. A. 594, 59 U. S. App. 274, 87 Fed. 168 ; Meyer 
 V. Mansur & T. Implement Co. 29 C. C. A. 465, 52 U. S. App. 
 474, 85 Fed. 874; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Eaton, 51 C. C. 
 A. 640, 114 Fed. 18). 
 
 In Pennsylvania Co. v. Jacksonville T. & K. W. R. Co. 5 
 C. C. A. 53, 2 U. S. App. 606, 55 Fed. 131 "that the fore- 
 going is a true, full and complete transcript of all the papers, 
 orders and decrees from the files and records of my office in the 
 above-entitled cause," was sufficient. 
 
 In Cutting v. Tavares, 0. & A. R Co. 9 C. C. A. 401, 23 
 U. S. App. 363, 61 Fed. 150, a certificate, "that the fore- 
 going papers, numbered from 1 to 200, inclusive, is a true, full, 
 and complete transcript of so much of the said records, papers, 
 
 exhibits and proceedings in the said cause of as now 
 
 appears and is of file and of record in my office; said tran- 
 script being true and correct copies of the originals of the several 
 papers, proceedings, depositions, files and orders therein con- 
 tained as they are now of file and of record in my office," — 
 was held insufficient. 
 
 Form of Certificate. 
 
 I, W. E., clerk of the District Court of the United States for the 
 
 District of , in the circuit, do hereby certify that the 
 
 above and foregoing is a true, full, correct and complete transcript of the 
 
 record, assignment of errors and all proceedings had in cause No 
 
 equity, wherein A. B. is complainant and C. D. is defendant, as fully as 
 the same remains on file and of record in my oiSce at , 
 
 Witness my hand officially and the seal of said court at ., the 
 
 .day of , A. D. 19... 
 
 Clerk, etc. 
 
 See Redfield v. Parks, 130 U. S. 624, 32 L. ed. 1053, 9 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 642 ; Pennsylvania Co. v. Jacksonville,. T. & K. W. R - 
 
TRANSOEIPT. T13 
 
 Co. 5 C. C. A. 53, 2 U. S. App. 606, 55 Fed. 131 ; Meyer v. 
 Mansur & T. Implement Co. 29 C. C. A. 465, 52 U. S. App. 
 474, 85 Fed. 874; Idaho & O. Land Improv. Co. v. Bradbury, 
 132 U. S. 509, 33 L. ed. 433, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 177 ; Gameau 
 V. Dozier, 100 U. S. 7, 25 L. ed. 536. 
 
 If there should be an issue raised as to the omitted portions, 
 and it does not appear that the omitted parts are "necessary 
 to a hearing," it will not support a motion to dismiss the 
 appeals. If, however, the appellee thinks the transcript is de- 
 fective, then he should resort to a certiorari to bring up a 
 complete record. ISTashua & L. E. Corp. v. Boston & L. K Corp. 
 9 C. C. A. 468, 21 U. S. App. 50, 61 Fed. 237, 238 ; Cutting v. 
 Tavares, O. & A. E. Co. 9 C. C. A. 401, 23 U. S. App. 363, 
 61 Fed. 150, as to sufficiency of a transcript where the records 
 were burned. 
 
 If the clerk refuses to sign the certiiicate, you may reach him 
 by mandamus. Nashua & L. E. Corp. v. Boston & L. E. Corp. 
 supra. If there be no certificate, leave will be granted to with- 
 draw the record and supply it. Hodges v. Vaughan, 19 Wall. 
 12, 22 L. ed. 46. Matters tacked to the transcript, and not 
 certified, are not part of the record. Grand County v. King, 
 14 C. C. A. 421, 32 U. S. App. 402, 67 Fed. 945. 
 
 If appeal is dismissed, you may take second appeal if in 
 time. Evans v. State Nat. Bank, 134 U. S. 330, 33 L. ed. 
 917, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 493. 
 
 Bill of Exceptions. 
 
 It is seen that a true copy of a bill of exceptions is required 
 to be certified with assignment of errors, etc., by circuit court 
 of appeals rule 14, sec. 1. This applies to writs of error, and 
 not appeals, as a bill of exceptions proper is not known to 
 equity. As said in Southern Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Carey, 117 
 Fed. 325: "The practice of bringing into the record by bill 
 of exceptions pleadings on papers which the court has refused 
 to allow is not knovsm to the Federal courts in equity cases." 
 Ibid. 32p, 330. In this case the party was permitted to have 
 certified to the appellate court a rejected document not as a 
 part of the record, but for the information of the court. 
 
714 TEAJSrSCElPT. 
 
 The judges of the Federal courts in chancery act upon the 
 rule that they are not required to certify to a bill of exceptions 
 in equity. Continental Trust Co. v. Toledo, St. L. & K. 0. 
 E. Co. 99 Fed. 177 ; Morrison v. Burnette, 83 C. C. A. 391, 
 154 Fed. 617; Dodge v. ISTorlin, 66 C. C. A. 425, 133 Fed. 
 369 ; Laurel Oil & Gas Co. v. Galbreath Oil & Gas. Co. 91 C. C. 
 A. 196, 165 Fed. 162; Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Emery-Bird-Thayer 
 Dry Goods Co. 43 C. C. A. 511, 104 Fed. 243. The Court 
 of appeals cannot remodel a defective bill of exceptions. Mur- 
 phy V. Milford, A. & W. Street R Co. 126 C. C. A. 649, 210 
 Fed. 135. 
 
 Thus, where exceptions are taken to the admission of evi- 
 dence during the progress of an equity cause, they must be 
 entered at the time and become incorporated into the record, 
 and objections made to any proceedings must be noted at the 
 time made, and so appear in the record, and not in the form 
 of a separate bill of exceptions. ISTew rule 46, Supreme 
 Court rule 13 ; circuit court of appeals rule 12 ; KalamazoQ 
 Eaihvay Supply Co, v. Duff Mfg. Co. 113 Fed. 264 ; Goodwin 
 V. Fox, 129 U. S. 630, 32 L. ed. 815, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 567; 
 Continental Trust Co. v. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R. Co. 99 Fed. 
 179; Dodge v. ISTorlin, 66 C. C. A. 425, 133 Fed. 369. If the 
 exceptions do not thus appear, the objections will be considered 
 waived. Ibid. ; Potter v. United States, 58 C. C. A. 231, 122 
 Fed. 55 and cases cited; Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Emery-Bird- 
 Thayer Dry Goods Co. 43 C. C. A. 511, 104 Fed. 243 ; Massen- 
 berg v. Denison, 46 C. C. A. 120, 107 Fed. 18 ; Maxim-Nor- 
 denfelt Guns & Ammunition Co. v. Colt's Patent Firearms Mfg. 
 Co. 103 Fed. 39 ; Fayerweather v. Pitch, 89 Fed. 529 ; Paxson 
 V. Brown, 10 C. C. A. 135, 27 U. S. App..49, 61 Fed. 877; 
 Mears v. Lockhart, 36 C. C. A. 239, 94 Fed. 274; Michigan 
 Ins. Bank v. Eldred, 143 U. S. 298, 36 L. ed. 163, 12 Sup. Ot. 
 Rep. 450 ; Blease v. Garlington, 92 U. S. 4-7, 23 L. ed. 522, 
 523; Adee v. J. L. Mott Iron Works, 46 Fed. 39. (See "As- 
 signment of Error to the Admission or Rejection of Evidence," 
 chapter 108.) 
 
 An exception to the rule may be found in a case where 
 some issue has been sent to a jury for trial. - There a bill of ex- 
 ceptions to admission of evidence must be taken and pre- 
 served and incorporated in the record. Southern Bldg. & L- 
 Asso. v. Carey, 117 Fed. 333. 
 
CHAPTEE CVIII. 
 
 PEOCEEDINGS AFTER TEANSCEIPT DELIVERED. 
 
 Filing Transcript. 
 
 It is the duty of the appellant to file the transcript with the 
 clerk of the appellate court on or before the return day, whether 
 it falls in vacation or term. On failure to comply with the 
 rule the defendant, or appellee, may have the case docketed 
 and dismissed upon producing a certificate, whether in term 
 time or vacation, from the clerk of the court in which the de- 
 cree was rendered, stating the case and certifying that an appeal 
 had been duly sued out and allowed. In no case shall the 
 appellant be entitled to docket the case after the same has been 
 dismissed on certificate, unless by order of the court. Circuit 
 court of appeals rule 16. 
 
 I It will be seen, by the terms of this rule, that the time in 
 which the transcript is to be filed is directory, as it provides 
 for an enlargement of the time for good cause shown upon 
 application to the judge signing the citation, or to any judge of 
 the court of appeals, in whose sound discretion relief, if needed, 
 lies. T'lorida v. Charlotte Harbor Phosphate Co. 17 C. C. A. 
 472, 30 U. S. App. 535, 70 Fed. 883 ; Jones v. Mann, 18 C. C. 
 A. 44:2, 25 U. S. App. 700, 72 Fed. 85; Farmers' Loan & 
 T. Co. V. Chicago & N. P. R. Co. 19 C. C. A. 477, 34 U. 
 S. App. 626, 73 Fed. 314; Altenberg v. Grant, 28 0. C. A. 
 244, 54 U. S. App. 312, 83 Fed. 980; The Kawailani, 63 
 0. C. A. 347, 128 Fed. 880 ; Sparrow v. Strong, 3 Wall. 103, 
 18 L. ed. 49, 2 Mor. Min. Rep. 320; West Chicago Street 
 R. Co. V. Ellsworth, 23 0. C. A. 393, 46 U. S. App. 603, 
 77 Fed. 665 ; Re Alden Electric Co. 59 C. C. A. 509, 123 
 Fed. 415 ; See Hill v. Chicago & E. R. Co. 140 U. S. 53, 35 
 L. ed. 331, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 690; and Gwin v. Breedlove, 
 15 Pet. 285, 10 L. ed. 741. The order extending the time, 
 
 715 
 
716 PEOCEEDINGS AFTEE TEANSCEIPT DELIVEEED. 
 
 when obtained, must be filed with the clerk of the court of 
 appeals. Circuit court of appeals rule 16. 
 
 An order enlarging the time, signed by a district judge who 
 did not sign the citation, would be void unless he Avas at the 
 time sitting as a member of the circuit court of appeals. 
 West V. Irwin, 4 C. C. A. 401, 9 U. S. App. 547, 54 Fed. 419. 
 
 An application to enlarge the time may be applied for after 
 the time has elapsed to file the record, where it had been filed 
 and docketed before the motion to dismiss was made (West 
 Chicago Street E. Co. v. Ell worth, 77 Fed. 664; Andrews v. 
 Thum, 12 C. C. A. 77, 21 U. S. App. 459, 64 Fed. 150; Ke 
 Alden Electric Co. 59 C. C. A. 509, 123 Fed. 415; The 
 Kawailani, 63 C. G. A. 347, 128 Fed. 879 ; Altenberg v. Grant, 
 28 C. C. A. 244, 54 U. S. App. 312, 83 Fed. 980 ; Bingham v. 
 Morris, 7 Oranch, 99, 3 L. ed. 281 ; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. 
 V. Tolbert, 76 C. C. A. 212, 145 Fed. 339, and cases cited) ; 
 and so when both made simultaneously. Owings v. Tieman, 
 10 Pet. 24, 9 L. ed. 333. 
 
 Waiver of Irregularity in Filing Transcript. 
 
 A general appearance of appellee waives defects (Freeman 
 V. Clay, 1 C. C. A. 115, 2 U. S. App. 151, 48 Fed. 849), 
 and defendant moving for new bond waives the transcript not 
 being filed and docketed in time (Waldron v. Waldron, 156 
 U. S. 378, 39 L. ed. 457, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 383). 
 
 Docketing Case. 
 
 By rule 9 of the Supreme Court and rule 16 of the circuit 
 court of appeals it is made the duty of appellant to docket the 
 case by or before the return day, whether in vacation or term 
 time, unless for good cause shown the time be enlarged by the 
 judge signing the citation, or by one of the judges of the 
 circuit court of appeals. 1 
 
 A failure to docket the case in time gives appellee the oppor- 
 tunity of dismissing the case on certificate as in cases when 
 the transcript has not been filed. See "Filing Transcript." 
 
 Upon docketing the case the appearance of counsel for the 
 party docketing must be entered, and counsel for appellee 
 
PEOCEEDIH-GS AFTEE TEANSCEIPT DELIVEEED. 717 
 
 should notify the clerk to enter his appearance. Briefs will 
 not be received from counsel who have not entered an appear- 
 ance, and to enter an appearance counsel must be enrolled as 
 members of the bar of the court in which the case is docketed. 
 Circuit court of appeals rule 7. 
 
 By circuit court of appeals rule 17, the clerk dockets the 
 case in chronological order, and in its time it is placed on the 
 trial docket, the record is ordered printed (circuit court of 
 appeals rule 23), and it is assigned for a particular day for 
 argument, of which the clerk gives timely notice. See amended 
 rules fifth circuit, rule 35. 
 
 Certificate of Clerk Necessary to Dismiss Appeal. 
 
 The certificate of the clerk below as a basis for dismissal 
 is imperative; it will be required though the appellant has 
 deposited a transcript in the circuit court of appeals, where 
 the defendant seeks to docket and dismiss. Macomb v. Arm- "> 
 stead, 10 Pet. 407, 9 L. ed. 473 ; see also West v. Brashear, 
 12 Pet. 101, 9 L. ed. 1016. It must state the case and certify 
 that an appeal has been sued out and allowed. United States 
 V. Gomez, 23 How. 326, 16 L. ed. 552. 
 
 The certificate must be regular, and the names of all the 
 parties to the record must be distinctly set forth. Smith v. 
 Clark, 12 How. 22, 13 L. ed. 876 ; Holliday v. Batson, 4 How. 
 645, 11 L. ed. 1140. 
 
 The filing of a certified copy of the record in the court of 
 appeals would be sufficient. United States v. Fremont, 18 
 How. 36, 15 L. ed. 302. 
 
 Printing Record. 
 
 The appellant is required, at least six days before the case 
 is called for argument, to have printed and file with the clerk 
 twenty copies of the record, unless a different order is made 
 by the court upon application. Circuit court of appeals rule 
 23. The appellant must furnish three copies of the printed 
 record to adverse counsel at least six days before the argument. 
 ■ In printing the record counsel may stipulate as to what 
 parts of the record shall be printed, and that it shall be heard 
 on the record as printed. 
 
718 PROCEEDINGS AFTER TRANSCRIPT DELIVERED. 
 
 If the record is not printed when the case is reached in the 
 regular call of the docket, you may move to dismiss it. Lem 
 King Dun v. United States, 1 C. C. A. 209, Y U. S. App. 18, 
 49 Fed. 145. 
 
 The clerk of the appellate court attends to the printing of 
 the record and its preparation for hearing, at the expense of 
 the appellant; the amount, however, is taxed as costs against 
 the losing party. Circuit court of appeals rule 23. 
 
 By rule 23 of the fifth circuit the clerk makes an estimate of 
 the printing, notifying the party docketing of the cost. If he 
 does not pay the amount in a reasonable time, then the clerk 
 notifies the adverse party, and he may. pay it. If neither party 
 pays, and it is not printed when reached on call, it will be dis- 
 missed. 
 
 It is made the duty of the clerk to have the record printed 
 when the amount is paid, and to furnish to counsel appearing for 
 both parties three copies each of the printed record. At least 
 twenty-five copies of the record must be printed, and the cost 
 of printing is finally taxed up against the losing party, or as 
 directed by the court. 
 
 Diminution of the Record. 
 
 Presumptively the transcript filed is correct (Randolph v. 
 Allen, 19 C. C. A. 353, 41 U. S. App. 117, 73 Ted. 23), but 
 if the transcript be defective in that something has been omit- 
 ted or improperly copied (circuit court of appeals rule 18), 
 then the practice is to suggest a diminution of the record, and 
 have the omitted part or defective record properly certified up. 
 Nashua & L. R. Corp. v. Boston & L. E. Corp. 9 C. C. A. 468, 
 21 U. S. App. 50, 61 Fed. 245 ; Cunningham v. German Ins. 
 Bank, 43 C, C. A. 377, 103 Fed. 932; Chappell v. United 
 States, 160 U. S. 506, 40 L. ed. 512, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 397; 
 Merrill v. Floyd, 2 C. C. A. 58, 5 U. S. App. 90, 50 Fed. 849; 
 Blanks v. Klein, 1 C. C. A. 254, 2 U. S. App. 155, 49 Fed. 1; 
 Hoskin V. Fisher, 125 U. S. 217-224, 31 L. ed. 759-762, 8 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 834 ; Missouri, K. & T. E. Co. v. Dinsmore, 108 U. S. 
 31, 27 li. ed. 640, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 9 ; Kansas v. Meriwether, 96 
 C. C. A. 281, 171 Fed. 42; Florida C. E.Co. v. Schutte, 100 
 U. S.^644, 25L..ed. 605. New rule 76. 
 
PEOCEEDINGS AFTEE TEANSCErPT DELIVEEED. 719 
 
 The proceeding cannot be used as a writ of error, but only 
 as auxiliary to bring up a full record. Ibid. American Constr. 
 Co. V. Jacksonville, T. & K. W. R. Co. 148 U. S. 372, 37 L. ed. 
 486, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 758 ; Travis County v. King Iron Bridge 
 & Mfg. Co. 34 C. C. A. 620, 92 Fed. 693 ; Re Tampa Suburban 
 R. Co. 168 U. S. 587, 42 L. ed. 590, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 177. 
 
 The suggestion of a diminution of the record must be made 
 by motion in the appellate court. Circuit court of appeals rule 
 18 ; Supreme Court rule 14. The motion must be made at the 
 first term of the entry of the case, unless upon special cause 
 shown to the court; and the motion must state the facts upon 
 which the application is founded, and be verified by affidavit 
 if not admitted by the other party. Chappell v. United States, 
 160 U. S. 506, 40 L. ed. 512, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 397. 
 
 It seems that where a necessary part of the record that has 
 been omitted was presented with the motion, it may be admitted 
 without certiorari, if certified to by the clerk below. Burnham 
 V. Forth Chicago Street R. Co. 30 C. C. A. 594, 59 U. S. App. 
 274, 87 Fed. 168. Mere clerical errors in transcript on certifi- 
 cate may be amended by the court. Hudgins v. Kemp, 18 
 How. 534, 15 L. ed. 512. 
 
CHAPTEE CIX. 
 
 DISMISSING APPEALS. 
 
 The transcript being properly filed, the next inquiry of the 
 appellee is as to whether any cause exists to dismiss the appeal. 
 
 There are many causes stated in the rules, and I will briefly 
 enumerate them. 
 
 First. The appellant may dismiss with leave of the court 
 Donallan v. Tannage Patent Co. 24 C. C. A. 64Y, 50 IJ. S. 
 App. 1, 79 Fed. 385 ; United States v. Griffith, 141 U. S. 213, 
 35 L. ed. 719, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1105; Greene v. United Shoe 
 Machinery Co. 60 C. C. A. 93, 124 Fed. 963, 964. 
 
 Second. When the appellant and appellee shall, in vacation 
 bj^ their counsel, sign and file an agreement with the clerk, 
 in writing, directing the case. to be dismissed, the clerk may 
 enter the order. Supreme Court rule 28 ; circuit court of 
 appeals rule 20. 
 
 Third. A failure to file a transcript in the appellate court 
 and docket the cause on or before the return day of the cita- 
 tion is a ground of dismissal. Supreme Court rule 9; circuit 
 court of appeals rule 16 ; Wong Sang v. United States, 75 
 C. C. A. 383, 144 Fed. 968 ; see The Kawailani, 63 C. C. A. 
 347, 128 Fed. 879. Unless excused. Toledo Metal Wheel Go. 
 v. Foyer Bros. & Co. 138 C. C. A. 612, 223 Fed. 350. 
 
 Fourth. When no counsel appears or brief is filed for ap- 
 pellant at the time the case is called for trial. Circuit court 
 of appeals rule 22 ; Lem Hing Dun v. United States, 1 C. 0. 
 A. 209, 7 U. S. App. 18, 49 Fed. 145 ; Supreme Court rule 
 16. 
 
 Fifth. When a case is reached in regular order and neither 
 party has entered an appearance. Circuit court of appeals rule 
 22, sec. 3; Supreme Court rule 18. 
 
 Sixth. Failure of counsel for appellant to have the record 
 printed by the time the case is reached on regular call. Circuit 
 court of appeals rule 23; Supreme Court rule 10, sec. 2. 
 
 720 
 
DISMISSING APPEALS. 
 
 721 
 
 Seventh. Failure of appellant to file with the clerk of the 
 court of appeals at least six days before the day assigned for 
 argument twenty copies of a printed brief. Circuit court of 
 appeals rule 24, sec. 5 ; Supreme Court rule 21, sec. 5. 
 
 Eighth. When representatives of the deceased appellant 
 are cited and do not appear within sixty days, the appellee may 
 have the appeal dismissed. Circuit court of appeals rule 19, 
 sec. 1. 
 
 Ninth. An appeal will be dismissed when the parties have 
 settled their differences and the further prosecution is collusive. 
 Benner v. Hayes, 26 C. C. A. 271, 53 U. S. App. 376, 80 Fed. 
 953; Weaver v. Kelly, 34 C. C. A. 423, 92 Fed. 421; United 
 States V. Elliott, 74 Fed. 94; Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 654, 
 
 40 L. ed. 294, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 3 32; Thorp v. Bonnifield, 177 
 U. S. 19, 44 L. ed. 653, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 559 ; South Spring 
 Hill Gold Min. Co. v. Amador Medean Gold Min. Co. 145 U. 
 S. 301, 36 L. ed. 712, 12 Sup. Ct. Kep. 921. Or when there 
 is no material issue. Ibid. ; Allen v. Georgia, 166 U. S. 140, 
 
 41 L. ed. 949, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 525. Or when the question is 
 moot, or some abstract proposition. Kimball v. Kimball, 174 
 F. S. 162, 43 L. ed. 934, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 639; United States 
 V. Evans, 213 U. S. 297, 53 L. ed. 803, 29 Sup. Ct. Eep. 507 ; 
 Mills V. Green, 159 U. S. 653, 40 L. ed. 293, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep, 
 132. Or where relief becomes impossible. Mills v. Green, 
 159 U. S. 653, 40 L. ed. 293, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 132; Flour 
 Inspectors v. Glover, 160 U. S. 170, 40 L. ed. 382, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 321; Katz v. San Antonio, 34 C. C. A. 10, 63 U. S. 
 App. 452, 91 Fed. 567; Gamewell Fire Alarm Teleg. Co. v. 
 Municipal Signal Co. 23 C. C. A. 250, 33 U. S. App. 714, 
 77 Fed. 492 ; Lockwood v. Wickes, 21 C. C. A. 257, 36 U. S. 
 App. 321, 40 U. S. App. 136, 75 Fed. 123. As when statutes 
 repealed. Flour Inspectors v. Glover, 160 U. S. 170, 40 L. 
 ed. 382, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 321, 161 U. S. 103, 40 L. ed. 632, 
 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 492. And may hear evidence as to dismissal. 
 Kidge V. Manker, 67 C. C. A. 596, 132 Fed. 599-601, and 
 cases cited. Eansom v. Pierre, 41 C. C. A. 585, 101 Fed. 
 665. 
 
 Tenth. An appeal will be dismissed if no citation is sued 
 out, or sued out and not served (Peace Eiver Phosphate Co. 
 r. Edwards, 17 C. C. A. 358, 30 U. S. App. 513, 70 Fed. 
 
 S. Eq.— 46. 
 
722 DISMISSING APPEALS. 
 
 728) ; but the regular appearance of appellee waives it (Free- 
 man V. Clay, 1 C. C. A. 115, 2 U. S. App. 151, 48 Fed. 849). 
 
 Eleventh. An appeal will be dismissed when based on 
 grounds affecting the jurisdiction of the court a quo, or the 
 jurisdiction of the appellate court (Gorman Wright Co. v. 
 Wright, 67 C. C. A. 345, 134 Fed. 363-365; Great Southern 
 Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U. S. 449-453, 44 L. ed. 
 842-844, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 690), as when the appeal was not 
 sued out within the time limited (Waxahachie v. Coler, 34 
 C. C. A. 349, 92 Fed. 284). 
 
 Twelfth. When decree joint, and appeal by one without 
 notice to others. Fitzpatrick v. Graham, 56 C. C. A. 95, 
 119 Fed. 353 and cases cited. 
 
 Thirteenth. When no assignment of errors or brief. Moline 
 Trust & Sav. Bank v. Wiley, 79 C. C. A. 446, 149 Fed. 
 734; Fitch v. Eichardson, 77 C. C. A. 422, 147 Fed. 196. 
 
 ' Motion to Dismiss. 
 
 By circuit court of appeals rule 21, sec. 3, all motions must 
 be reduced to writing and contain a brief statement of the facts 
 and objects of the motion; and no motion to dismiss, except on 
 special assignment by the court, shall be heard, unless previous 
 notice has been given to the adverse party or his counsel, of 
 the motion and time of hearing. Supreme Court rule 6, sec. 3. 
 
 In' the Supreme Court the time of service is three weeks 
 before the day of submission, and with the notice of the motion 
 must be furnished a copy of the brief or argument to be served 
 on opposite counsel. Carey v. Houston & T. C. R. Co. 150 
 IT. S. 179, 37 L. ed. 1043, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 63 
 
 The Supreme Court will not hear motions to dismiss appeals 
 before the record is printed, if there is any question about the 
 facts upon which the motion is based (St. Louis ISTat. Bank 
 V. United States Ins. Co. 100 U. S. 43, 25 L. ed. 547) ; kit 
 it is only necessary to print so mnch of the record as will enable 
 the court to act understandingly without referring to the trans- 
 cript. Nashua & L. R. Corp. v. Boston & L. R. Corp. 2 0. C. 
 A; 542, 5 U. S. Ap-1. 97, 51' Fed. 931; Waterville v. Van 
 Slyke, 115 U. S. 290, 29 L. ed. 406, G Sup. Ct. Rep. 39. 
 ■ Again, in the Supreme Court the hearing is by brief and 
 
DISMISSIITG APPEALS. 723 
 
 not oral argument, unless invited. Supreme Court rule 6, sec. 
 4; Carey v. Houston & T. C. R Co. 150 U. S. 170, 37 L. ed. 
 1041, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 63. If oral argument is desired, counsel 
 will be notified, and it will be heard in connection with the 
 hearing on the merits. 
 
 In the circuit court of appeals the motion may be heard at 
 such time as the court will indicate, and one hour to each 
 side is given to argue motions. Circuit court of appeals rule 
 21, sec. 2. 
 
 The motion must contain within itself the statement of the 
 facts upon which the motion is based, and after one motion has 
 been filed no other can be filed except by permission of the 
 court Nashua & L. R. Corp. v. Boston & L. E. Corp. 2 C. 
 C. A. 54, 25 TJ. S. App. 97, 51 Fed. 931, S. C. 9 C. C. A. 468, 
 21 U. S. App. 50, 61 Fed. 238. 
 
 Motion to Dismiss, 
 
 A. B., Appellant, 
 
 vs. 
 C. D., Appellee. 
 
 In the Circuit Court of Appeals for 
 the Circuit, at 
 
 Motion to Dismiss. 
 And now comes appellee and moves the court to dismiss the appeal filed 
 herein and for cause shows: 
 
 First. That it appears that said appeal was not sued out within eix 
 months, etc. 
 Second. Because, etc. 
 
 E. F., 
 Solicitor. 
 Have the following notice served : 
 
 , Title as in case appealed. 
 
 Please take notice that I have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal taken 
 in this cause, a copy of which is attached to this notice, and that on the 
 
 day of , A. D. 19. . ., or as soon thereafter as counsel can 
 
 be heard, I will submit the same to the Honorable Circuit Court of Ap- 
 peals at for decision. 
 
 R. F., 
 Solicitor. 
 
 Effect of Death on the Appeal.' 
 
 Section 9 of the judiciary act of 1875 provides that when 
 either party to a final decree dies, or shall die before the time 
 
724 EFFECT OF DEATH ON APPEALS. 
 
 allowed for taking an appeal has expired, it shall not be neces- 
 sary to revive the suit by any formal proceedings. The repre- 
 sentative of such deceased party may file in the clerk's office 
 a duly certified copy of his appointment and thereupon may 
 enter an appeal. If the party in whose favor the decree is 
 entered dies before appeal taken, notice to his representatives 
 from the appellate court shall be given as provided in case of 
 death after appeal taken. Dolan v. Jennings, 139 U. S. 385, 
 35 L. ed. 217, 11 Sup. Gt. Rep. 584. 
 
 Supreme Court rule 15 provides that if either party shall 
 die pending the appeal, the representative may voluntarily 
 come in and be admitted a party to the appeal. If they do not 
 voluntarily come in the other party may suggest the death on 
 the record, and thereupon obtain, on motion, an order that 
 unless such representatives shall become parties within the 
 first ten days of the ensuing term, the party moving, if defend- 
 ant, will have the appeal dismissed, and if appellant he shall 
 be entitled to open the record and have on hearing the judgment 
 reversed if it be erroneous ; provided, that a copy of such order 
 shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation within 
 the State or district from which the case is brought for three 
 successive weeks and at least sixty days before the beginning 
 of the term of the appellate court next ensuing. 
 
 Section 2 of the rule provides that if the representative of 
 the party does not appear by the tenth day of the second term 
 next succeeding the suggestion, and no measures are taken by 
 the opposite party within that time to compel an appearance, 
 the case shall abate. 
 
 Section 3 provides that when either party desires to sue out 
 an appeal, and the other party is dead and has no representative 
 in the jurisdiction so that the suit cannot be revived, but the 
 deceased has a representative in another State, the party may 
 have the judgment stayed and procure the appeal; but he must, 
 within thirty days from the commencement of the term to which 
 the appeal is returnable, make a suggestion in the appellate 
 court, supported by aifidavit, setting up that the party was 
 dead when the appeal was taken and had no representative with- 
 in the jurisdiction of the court so that the suit could not be 
 revived, but that the party has a representative in another Stat* 
 or Territory (setting forth where specifically). 
 
 Upon this suggestion he may obtain an order that unlea 
 
EFFECT OF DEATH ON APPEALS. 725 
 
 such representatives shall appear within ten days after the com- 
 mencement of the next ensuing term the appellant can open 
 the record and have the decree reversed, if erroneous. But the 
 appellant must have a citation issued reciting the substance of 
 the order, which must be served on the representative at least 
 sixty days before the beginning of the next term of the ap- 
 pellate court. 
 
 Eule 19 of the circuit court of appeals is to the same effect, 
 with the exception of certain changes, to which I will call 
 your attention. 
 
 First. Rule 19 of the circuit court of appeals provides that 
 a party may suggest the death on the record, and, on motion, 
 obtain an order that unless the representative shall become 
 a party within sixty days, instead of within ten days after 
 the next ensuing term, as in the Supreme Court rule, the party 
 moving for such order, if defendant or appellee, shall have the 
 right to have the appeal dismissed; and if appellant, he shall 
 be entitled to open the record and proceed ; provided, however, 
 that a copy of every such order be served personally on the 
 representative at last thirty days before the expiration of such 
 sixty days, instead of being published in a newspaper, as re- 
 quired in the Supreme Court rule. 
 
 Again, the third section of circuit court of appeals rule 19 
 requires the appellant to file his suggestion of death within 
 thirty days from filing the record in the circuit court of appeals, 
 instead of within thirty days after the commencement of the 
 term to which the appeal is returnable. 
 
 Again, circuit court of appeals rule 19, sec. 3, requires the 
 representative to make himself a party within ninety days from 
 the date of the order, instead of within ten days after the 
 beginning of the next ensuing term, as in the Supreme Court 
 rule. 
 
 Again, in the circuit court of appeals rule the service is 
 to be made on the representative at least thirty days before the 
 expiration of the ninety days, instead of sixty days before the 
 next ensuing term, as in the Supreme Court rule. 
 
 Again, by the circuit court of appeals rule the representative 
 is required to appear within ten days after the -ninety days 
 has expired, instead of being required to appear by the tenth 
 day of the next ensuing term, as in the Supreme Court rule. 
 
726 EFFECT OF DEATH ON APPEALS. 
 
 (See "Parties Dying after Decree," chapter 112), see, as to 
 abating appeal by death, Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 655, 40 
 L. ed. 294, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 132; Martin v. Baltimore & 0. 
 R. Co. (Gerling v. Baltimore & 0. E. Co.) 151 U. S. 703, 88 
 L. ed. 322, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 533. As to form of suggestion, 
 see Howth v. Owens, 30 Fed. 910. As to order permitting 
 representatives to be made parties, see Edmonson v. Bloom- 
 shire, 7 Wall. 307, 19 L. ed. 91. 
 
 Costs on Appeal. 
 
 The bond is liable for costs of the court below, as well as 
 the court of appeals. Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 177 
 Fed. 604; The Joseph B. Thomas, 158 Fed. 669; Jennings v. 
 Burton, 177 Fed. 603. 
 
CHAPTEK ex. 
 
 SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE APPELLATE COURT. 
 
 We have seen that the record must be printed in order to be 
 submitted, and copies furnished counsel. 
 
 Briefs. 
 
 The case may be submitted on briefs alone, or on briefs 
 and oral argument. The briefs must be printed and iiled by 
 the appellant at least six days before the case is called for 
 argument. He must file with the clerk of the court of appeals 
 twenty copies, at least, for the use of the court and counsel, one 
 copy being sent, on application, to each of the counsel on the 
 opposite side. If in the Supreme Court, he must file six days 
 at least before the case is called for argument twenty-five copies 
 of his brief, one copy of which shall, on application, be fur- 
 nished to each of the counsel engaged on the opposite side. 
 
 The counselfor appellee shall file with the clerk of the circuit 
 court of appeals twenty copies of his printed brief at least 
 three days before the case is called for argument, and if in 
 the Supreme Court he must file twenty-five copies at least thre« 
 days prior to the case being called for argument. Supreme 
 Court rule 21 ; circuit court of appeals rule 24 ; Wisconsin, 
 M. & P. E. Co. V. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 294, note 1, 45 L. ed. 
 197, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 115; Milwaukee v. Shailer & S. Co. 
 34 C. C. A. 112, 91 Fed. 858. 
 
 The form and order of statement in the brief are fully set 
 forth in Supreme Court rule 21 and circuit court of appeals 
 rule 24. Ibid. ; Lincoln v. Sun Vapor Street Light Co. 8 C. 
 C. A. 253, 19 U. S. App. 431, 59 Ted. 756 ; Paxson v. Brown, 
 10 0. C. A. 135, 27 U. S. App. 49, 61 Ped. 877; Balliet v. 
 United States, 64 C. C. A. 201, 129 Fed. 693. 
 
 The brief must set forth the assignment of errors relied upon 
 (Haldane v. United States, 16 C. C. A. 447, 32 U. S. App. 
 
 727 
 
728 SUBMITTIJSTG THE CASE TO THE APPELLATE COUKT. 
 
 607, 69 Fed. 819), and unless the error in the record is 
 flagrant it will not be noticed if not assigned in the brief. 
 Repauno Chemical Co. v. Victor Hardware Co. 42 C. C. A. 
 106, 101 Fed. 948; circuit court of appeals rule 24, sec. 4; 
 Supreme Court rule 21, sec. 4; Ibid.; ^tna Indemnity Co. 
 V. J. R. Crowe Coal & Min. Co. 83 C. C. A. 431, 154 Fed. 
 558, 559 ; Moline Trust & Sav. Bank v. Wylie, 79 C. C. A. 
 446, 149 Fed. 734, and cases cited; Chicago G. W. R. Co. 
 V. Egan, 86 C. C. A. 230, 159 Fed. 46 ; Walton v. Wild Goose 
 Min. & Trading Co. 60 C. C. A. 155, 123 Fed. 209, 22 Mor. 
 Min. Rep. 688 ; Mitchell r. Marker, 25 L.R.A. 33, 10 C. C. A. 
 306, 22 U. S. App. 325, 62 Fed. 140; McClellan v. Pyeatt, 
 1 C. C. A. 613, 4 U. S. App. 319, 50 Fed. 686; Sovereign 
 Camp, W. W. V. Jackson, 38 C. C. A. 208, 97 Fed. 382; 
 Western Assur. Co. v. Polk, 44 C. C. A. 104, 104 Fed. 649. 
 
 Circuit court of appeals rule No. 23, regulating the printing 
 of the record and filing and serving briefs, does not necessarily 
 entail the dismissal of an appeal without regard to the merits, 
 but additional time will not be allowed where only delay would 
 arise. Matsumura v. Higgins, 109 C. C. A. 431, 187 Fed. 601. 
 
 Rule 24 of circuit court of appeals, requiring counsel for 
 plaintiff to serve a copy of printed brief at least ten days before 
 the case is called for argument, was held sufiiciently complied 
 with in Russo-Chinese Bank v. National Bank, 109 C. C. A. 
 398, 187 Fed. 80. 
 
 Scandal in briefs will be penalized. Kelley v. Boettcher, 
 27 C. C. A. 177, 49 U. S. App. 620, 82 Fed. 794; Green v. 
 Elbert, 137 U. S. 615, 34 L. ed. 792, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 188. 
 
 Form and Size. 
 
 The form and size of printed briefs are controlled by circuit 
 court of appeals rule 26 and Supreme Court rule 31. 
 
 Not Filed. 
 
 A brief will not be filed if counsel has not entered an appear- 
 ance, and counsel must be enrolled as a member of the bar of 
 that court. 
 
SUBMITTING THE C^SE TO THE APPELLATE COURT. T29 
 
 , Oral Argument. 
 
 Oral argument, if desired, will be heard on the day the case 
 is set for hearing, and is controlled by circuit court of appeals 
 rule 25 and Supreme Court rule 22. It will be seen that in 
 the Supreme Court two hours are allowed to each side, while 
 in the circuit court of appeak the time varies. In the fifth 
 circuit, by an amendment adopted February 27, 1894, to rule 
 24, one hour to open and one half hour to reply is allowed 
 to appellant, and one hour to appellee. 
 
 BvJes Applied When Cause Called for Hearing. 
 
 When no counsel appears, and no brief has been filed for 
 appellant, defendant may have plaintiff called, and on failure 
 to answer, the appeal may be dismissed (rule 22, sec. 1 • Fitch 
 V. Eichardson, 77 C. C. A. 422, 147 Fed. 196; Portland Co. v. 
 United States, 15 "Wall. 2, 21 L. ed. 113; Eyan v. Koch, 17 
 Wall. 19, 21 L. ed. 611) ; and by Supreme Court rule 16 he 
 may, instead of dismissing the case, have it opened and af- 
 firmed. 
 
 If defendant fails to appear when the case is called, the 
 court may permit the appellant to proceed. Circuit court of 
 appeals rule 22, sec. 2 ; Supreme Court rule 17. 
 
 A^Tien neither party has appeared the case is dismissed at 
 the cost of appellant. Circuit court of appeals rule 22, sec. 
 3; Supreme Court rule 18. 
 
 By Supreme Court rule 19, if a case is called at two suc- 
 cessive terms, and neither party is ready for argument, it will 
 he dismissed at the cost of the appellant unless cause shown 
 for further postponement. 
 
 Amendments Allowed in Appellate Court. 
 
 We have already referred to proceeding by certiorari when 
 the record is defective; but I will briefly refer to amendments 
 permitted to cure defects in a record properly certified, and, 
 first, as to amendments to show jurisdiction. Equity rule 19. 
 
 A defective allegation of citizenship may be amended in the 
 
730 SUBMITTING THE CASE TO TJIE APPELLATE COURT. 
 
 appellate court by consent of both parties, but in the absence of 
 such consent the judgment ^vill be reversed to allow an amend- 
 ment in accordance with the facts, but only to submit that 
 issue. U. S. Eev. St.at. sec. 954 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1591); 
 circuit court of appeals rule 11, sees. 1 and 3 ; Preferred 
 Acci. Ins. Co. V. Barker, 32 C. C. A. 124, 58 U. S. App. I7l, 
 
 88 Fed. 814; Houston v. Filer & S. Co. 43 C. C. A. 457, 
 104 Fed. 164; Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 
 177 U. S. 449, 44 L. ed. 842, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 690; Fred 
 ilacey Co. v. Macey, 68 C. C. A. 363, 135 Fed. 729 ; United 
 States V. Hopewell, 2 C. C. A. 510, 5 U. S. App. 137, 51 Fed. 
 798. As to motion to amend, see Post v. Beacon Vacuum 
 Pump & Electrical Co. 32 C. C. A. 151, 50 U. S. App. 407, 
 
 89 Fed. 3. See Parker Washington Co. v. Cramer, 120 C. C. 
 A. 216, 201 Fed. 878. See Act! Mch. 3, 1915, proceeding for 
 amendment in appellate courts to show diversity of citizenship. 
 
 Amendments to cure defective pleadings touching the merits 
 of the case will not be allowed; but where equity requires it, 
 or justifies it, the case will be remanded to the lower court 
 with permission to make the amendments, otherwise it cannot 
 be done after the decision in the appellate court. Ibid. ; Post 
 V. Beacon Vacuum Pump & Electrical Co. 32 C. C. A. 151, 
 50 U. S. App. 407, 89 Fed. 6; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio 
 & M. R. Co. 142 U. S. 413, 415, 35 L. ed. 1061, 1062, 12 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 188. See He Gamewell Fire-Alarm Teleg. Co. 
 20 C. C. A. Ill, 33 IT. S. App. 452, 73 Fed. 911, 912. 
 
 Such amendment in the lower court must be based on a 
 petition, or motion in the appellate court, for permission to 
 apply to the court below to make the amendments, and when 
 granted, the appellate court should order that the petitioner 
 should have permission to apply to the court below to file 
 further pleadings in pursuance of the suggested amendment. 
 Ibid. But an amendment which seeks to set up a new or 
 additional cause of action will not be allowed. Martin & H. 
 Cash-Carrier Co. v. Martin, 18 C. C. A. 234, 33 U. S. App. 
 373, 71 Fed. 519 ; American Bell Teleph. Co. v. United States, 
 15 C. C. A. 569, 33 U. S. App. 236, 68 Fed. 542. See Mc- 
 JSTulta V. West Chicago Park, 39 C. C. A. 545, 99 Fed. 328, 
 amending by making new bond and bringing in new parties. 
 
SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE APPELLATE COUET. 731 
 
 Defective Procedure. 
 
 If there is any failure on the mere procediire to perfect 
 the appeal, you may apply to the appellate court to have it 
 perfected. Thus, if it be in mere matters of form, or names 
 which can be cured by the record, the appellate court will 
 permit the amendment if in furtherance of justice and not 
 prejudicial to the adverse party (U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 1005, 
 Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1664); Copland v. Waldron, 66 C. 
 0. A. 271, 133 Fed. 218; Estis v. Trabue, 128 U. S. 228, 
 32 L. ed. 438, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58; Walton v. Marietta Chair 
 Co. 157 U. S. 347, 39 L. ed. 727, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 626 ; United 
 States V. Schoverling, 146 U. S. 82, 36 L. ed. 895, 13 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 24. See Fred Macey Co. v. -Macey, 68 C. C. x\. 
 363, 135 Fed. 729), or a mere clerical error in the transcript 
 (Hudgins v. Kemp, 18 How. 530, 15 L. ed. 511); but if 
 some necessary step to give the court jurisdiction is not 
 apparent in the record, as where no allowance of appeal is 
 shown in the records of the court below, or in the transcript, 
 though in fact the appeal was allowed, the proper practice is 
 not by certiorari, but by motion for permission to apply to 
 the court bolow to enter the allowance of the appeal nunc pro 
 tunc, and then have the entry certified up (Chicago v. Bigelow, 
 131 U. S. xciii. Appx. and 19 L. ed. 257). But if the allow- 
 ance of appeal was noted, and not certified in transcript, then 
 certiorari applies. See "Diminution of Record." 
 
 Rules Applied in Considering Cases on Appeal. 
 
 Assuming the appeal is perfected, there are certain rules 
 evolved out of the cases which are applied by appellate courts 
 to which I will call your attention. 
 
 First. The first and fundamental question is that of the 
 jurisdiction of the appellate court, and of the court from which 
 the appeal came; and this question the court is bound to ask 
 itself, whether suggested or not. Great Southern Fire Proof 
 Hotel Co. V. Jones, 177 U. S. 449, 44 L. ed. 842, 20 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 690; Continental Nat. Bank v. Burford, 191 U. S. 
 120, 48 L. ed. 119, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 54; Defiance Water Co. 
 V. Defiance, 191 U. S. 184, 48 L. ed. 140, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 63; Giles v. Teasley, 193 U. S. 146, 48 L. ed. 655, 24 Siip. 
 
Y32 SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE APPELLATE COUET. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 359; Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Prunty, 66 
 0. C. A. 163, 133 Fed. 13 ; Central Grain & Stock Exchange 
 V. Board of Trade, 60 C. C. A. 299, 125 Fed. 4-63; Puget 
 Sound Wav. Co. v. Lavender, 84 C. C. A. 259, 156 Fed. 361; 
 Yeandle v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 95 C. C. A. 282, 169 Fed. 
 939; McGilvra v. Ross, 90 C. C. A. 398, 164 Fed. 604; Gor- 
 man-Wright Co. V. Wright, 6Y C. C. A. 345, 134 Fed. 363; 
 Grace v. American Cent. Ins. Co. 109 U. S. 283, 27 L. ed. 
 934, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207; Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. 
 Swan, 111 U. S. 386, 28 L. ed. 465, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 510. 
 And the same rule applies in removals. Fred llacey Co. v. 
 Macey, 68 C. C. A. 363, 135 Fed. 725-729. 
 
 Second. In equity cases the appellate court considers the 
 Avhole case, both fact .and law. Waterloo Min. Co. v. Doe, 27 
 C. C. A. 504, 8 U. S. App. 411, 82 Fed. 51, 19 Mor. Min. 
 Rep. 1, and cases cited ; Carson v. Combe, 29 C. 0. A. 660, 52 
 TJ. S. App. 622, 86 Fed. 210. 
 
 Third. The decree entered when the evidence is conflict- 
 ing is presumptively correct. Manhattan L. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 
 61 C. C. A. 138, 126 Fed. 88, and cases cited; Gorham Mfg. 
 Co. V. Emery-Bird-Thayer Dry Goods Co. 43 C. C. A. 511, 
 104 Fed. 243 ; North American Exploration Co. v. Adams, 
 104 Fed. 404, 12 Mor. Min. Rep. 65 ; Daugherty v. Bogy, 44 
 C. C. A. 266, 104 Fed. 938 ; United States v. Marshall, 127 C. 
 C. A. 231, 210 Fed. 595-597 andcases cited. 
 
 Fourth. The presumption is that error has produced preju- 
 dice, and it is only when it is clearly apparent that no prejudice 
 was suffered by the error that the appellate court will refuse 
 to reverse. Choctaw 0. & G. R. Co. v. Holloway, 52 C. C. A. 
 260, 114 Fed. 458 ; United States v. Gentry, 55 C. C. A. 658, 
 119 Fed. 75 and cases cited. 
 
 Fifth. Finding of court below in equity suits not conclu- 
 sive. U. S. Rev. Stat sec. 1012 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1673) ; Hendryx v. Perkins, 59 C. C. A. 266, 123 Fed. 268. 
 
 Sixth. Case must be a real case. Jones v. Montague, 194 
 U. S. 147, 48 L. ed. 913, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 611; American 
 Book Co. V. Kansas, 193 U. S. 52, 48 L. ed. 614, 24 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 397; Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651, 40 L. ed. 293, 
 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132. What may be heard on second ap- 
 peal. Olsen V. North Pacific Lumber Co. 55 C. C. A. 665, 
 119 Fed. 77. 
 
SUBMITTING THE CASE TO T1[E APPELLATE COUET. 733 
 
 Seventh. Material prejudice must appear, to reverse the 
 case. Equity rule 46. 
 
 Rehearing. 
 
 Eule 29 of the circuit court of appeals provides for rehear- 
 ing, and the time within v?hich to be filed. See Appendix. 
 It is not granted or permitted to be arg-ued unless a judge who 
 concurred in the judgment desires it, and a majority of the 
 court grants it, and at same term of court (The Comforts, 
 23 Blatchf. 371, 32 Fed. 327) ; but this requirement is for 
 the protection of the court, and may be waived. Burget v. 
 Robinson, 59 C. C. A. 260, 123 Fed. 262; Kirchberger v. 
 American Acetylene Burner Co. 73 C. C. A. 387, 142 Fed. 
 169; Re Gamewell Fire-Alarm Teleg. Co. 20 C. C. A. Ill, 
 33 U. S. App. 452, 73 Fed. 908 ; Wright v. Gorman-Wright 
 Co. 81 C. C. A. 534, 152 Fed. 408 ; Hendryx v. Perkins, 52 
 C. C. A. 435, 114 Fed. 809. (See "Rehearing," chapter 93 
 and "Bill of Review," chapter 94.) 
 
 The petition for. — The petition for rehearing must con- 
 form to CC. rule 29. 31 C. C. A. clxvii, 47 Fed. xiii. ; Hinds 
 V. Keith, 6 C. C. A. 231, 13 U. S. App. 222, 314, 57 Fed. 11 ; 
 The Dago, 63 Fed. 182 ; Kirchberger v. American Acetylene 
 Burner Co. 73 0. C. A. 387, 142 Fed. 169. 
 
 Filing ; as to time. 
 
 Brooks V. Burlington & S. W. R. Co. 102 U. S. 107, 26 L. 
 ed. 91; Bushnell v. Crooke Min. & Smelt. Co. 150 U. S. 83, 
 37 L. ed. 1007, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2 ; Allen v. Wilson, 21 Fed. 
 884; Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S. 410, 26 L. ed. 797; 
 ^[cGregor v. Vermont Loan & T. Co. 44 C. C. A. 146, 104 Fed. 
 710; Re Ives, 51 C. C. A. 541, 113 Fed. 913; Reynolds v. 
 Manhattan Trast Co. 48 C. C. A. 249, 109 Fed. 99 ; United - 
 States V. 1,621 Pounds of Fur Clippings, 45 C. C. A. 263, 
 106 Fed. 163. 
 
 Cannot introduce neiu quedion. — Merriman v. Chicago & E. 
 I. R. Co. 14 C. C. A. 36, 24 U. S. App. 641, 66 Fed. 663; 
 Gregory v. Pike, 15 C. C. A. 33, 21 U. S. App. 658, 33 U. S. 
 App. 76, 67 Fed. 839; Moffet v. Quine, 95 Fed. 199; United 
 States V. Hall, 11 C. C. A. 294, 298, 21 U. S. App. 402, 426, 
 63 Fed. 472. 
 
CHAPTEE CXI. 
 
 APPEAL FEOM CIRCUIT COUET OF APPEALS TO SUPREME COURT. 
 
 The Supreme Court exercises appellate jurisdiction over tlie 
 circuit court of appeals. Southern K. Co. v. Postal Teleg. 
 Cable Co. 1Y9 U. S. 641, 45 L. ed. 355, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 249. By section 6 of the act of 1891, as we have already seen, 
 the circuit court of appeals may certify to the Supreme Court 
 at any time any questions or propositions of lav? in any case 
 vs^ithin its appellate jurisdiction, vphether its jurisdiction be 
 by the statute final or not; and the Supreme Court may an- 
 swer the questions certified, or may order up the entire record, 
 and decide the whole case as if originally brought before it on 
 writ of error or appeal. Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. 
 Eeddick, 88 C. C. A. 80, 160 Fed. 900 • Dickinson v. United 
 States, 98 C. C. A. 516, 174 Fed. 808 ; Henningsen v. United 
 States Fidelity & G. Co. 208 U. S. 404, 52 L. ed. 547, 28 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 389. 
 
 Again, the Supreme Court may, by certiorari or otherwise, 
 order up any case before the circuit court of appeals in which 
 such court, under the act of 1891, has final appellate jurisdic- 
 tion. 
 
 Again, in all cases not made final in the circuit court of 
 appeals there is of right an appeal, by writ of error, to the 
 Supreme Court when the matter in controversy shall exceed 
 one thousand dollars besides costs, and if sued within one year 
 after the entry of the decree. There is no right of appeal when 
 cases made final in circuit court of appeals. Act 1891, sec. 6. 
 Huguley Mfg. Co. v. Galeton Cotton Mills, 184 U. S. 290, 46 
 L. ed. 546, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 452; Cary Mfg. Co. v. Acme 
 Flexible Clasp Co. 187 U. S. 427, 47 L. ed. 244, 23 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 211 ; MacKenzie v. Pease, 77 C. C. A. 233, 146 Fed. 
 743. See Huff v. Bidwell, 103 C. C. A. 520, 180 Fed. 374. 
 
 We then have four ways by which the Supreme Court may 
 exercise appellate jurisdiction over the circuit court of appeals. 
 
 734 
 
APPEALS FROM CIECUIT COUUT TO SUPREME COUET. 735 
 
 First. It may decide the legal question certified. 
 
 Second. It may order the whole record up and decide the 
 case. Supreme Court rule 37; American Constr. Co. v. Jack- 
 sonville, T. & K. W. R Co. 148 U. S. 372, 37 L. ed. 486, 13 
 Sup. Ct. Kep. 758; Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U. S. 514, 41 
 L. ed. 1098, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 665; Lau Ow Bew v. United 
 States, 144 U. S. 58, 36 L. ed. 344, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 517. 
 
 Third. In any case where the jurisdiction of the circuit 
 court of appeals is final it may require it to be certified up. 
 Ibid. See Quinlan v. Green County, 205 U. S. 410, 51 L. ed. 
 860, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 505. 
 
 Fourth. It may review, by appeal, any decree of the circuit 
 court of appeals not made final in said court. Ibid. 
 
 Review by Certifying Questions hy Court of Appeals to Su- 
 preme Court. 
 
 Any question in any case within the appellate jurisdiction 
 of the circuit court of appeals may be certified by it for its 
 instruction, and when answered, such answers are binding on 
 the circuit court of appeals. Act of 1891, sec. 6. See sec. 239, 
 new Code, chap. 10 (Comp. Stat. 1913, see. 1216). 
 
 The form of the certificate is very simple, and requires that 
 the questions should be introdxiced by a brief statement of the 
 case and so much of the facts as are pertinent and necessary 
 to understand the questions propounded. The questions must 
 be purely of law, and not mixed questions of law and fact 
 (Emsheimer v. New Orleans, 186 U. S. 42, 46 L. ed. 1046, 
 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770; Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Williams, 205 
 U. S. 444-453, 51 L. ed. 875-878, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 559; 
 United States v. Rider, 163 U. S. 132, 41 L. ed. 101, 16 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 983; German Ins. Co. v. Heame, 55 C. C. A. 84, 118 
 Fed. 134; United States v. Union P. R. Co. 168 U. S. 505- 
 512, 42 L. ed. 559-561, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 167, and cases cited ; 
 Graver v. Faurot, 162 U. S. 435, 40 L. ed. 1030, 16 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 799; Felsenheld v. United States, 186 U. S. 134, 46 
 L. ed. 1089, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 740), and should be certified in 
 cases only of grave doubt (Cella v. Brown, 75 C. C. A. 608, 
 144 Fed. 765, and cases cited; Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U. 
 S. 514, 41 L. ed. 1098, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 665 ; Supreme Court 
 
736 APPEALS FROM CIECUIT COURT TO SUPREME COURT, 
 
 rule 37). It must be pertinent and necessary to the decision 
 of the particular case, and not abstract questions which may 
 or not be applicable. 
 
 It cannot certify the whole case, but must be distinct points 
 of law. Chicago, B. & Q. R Co. v. Williams, 205 U. S. 453, 
 51 L. ed. 878, 27 Sup. Ct. Kep. 559; United States v. Rider, 
 163 U. S. 132, 41 L. ed. 101, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 983; United 
 States V. Union P. R. Co. 168 U. S. 505, 48 L. ed. 559, 18 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 167; Graver v. Faurot, 162 U. S. 435, 40 L. ed. 1030, 
 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 799 ; Cross v. Evans, 167 U. S. 60, 42 L. ed. 
 77, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 733; Emsheimer v. New Orleans, 186 
 U. S. 33, 46 L. ed. 1042, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770; Columbus 
 Watch Co. v. Robbins, 148 U. S. 266-269, 37 L. ed. 445, 446, 
 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594; see Del Monte Min. & Mill. Co. v. 
 Last Chance Min. & Mill. Co. 171 U. S. 55, 56, 43 L. ed. 72, 
 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 895, 19 Mor. Min. Rep. 370. The certifica- 
 tion of a question of law is discretionary with the circuit court 
 of appeals. Louisville, IST. A. & C. R. Co. v. Pope, 20 C. C. 
 A. 253, 46 U. S. App. 25, 74 Eed. 1 ; Cella v. Brown, 75 0. 
 C. A. 608, 144 Fed. 765; Andrews v. National Foundry & 
 Pipe Works, 36 L.R.A. 153, 23 C. C. A. 454, 46 U. S. App. 
 619, 77 Fed. 774; Dickinson v. United States, 98 C. C. A. 
 516, 174 Fed. 808. Rules governing certification under this 
 act are governed by rules laid down in respect of certificates of 
 division under U. S. Rev. Stat. sees. 652, 693 ; United States 
 V. Union P. R. Co. 168 U. S. 512, 42 L. ed. 561, 18 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 167. 
 
 All of the judges of the court of appeals must sign the cer- 
 tificate, and cannot certify on motion if point is not doubtful. 
 German Ins. Co. v. Hearne, 55 C. C. A. 84, 118 Fed. 134. 
 
 May Order Up Entire Record. 
 
 The Supreme Court, instead of answering the questions, 
 may, of its own motion, order up the entire record, and decide 
 the whole matter in controversy as if brought originally before 
 them. But in view of the sixth section of the act of 1891, it 
 promulgated rule 37, the second clause of which provides that 
 if application is made to this court that the whole record be 
 sent up for its consideration, the party making said application 
 
AJ:'±'J!iAl.S i<-KOM CIEGTJIT COUET TO SUPEEMB COUET. 737 
 
 shall, as a part thereof, furnish this court with a certified copy 
 of the whole of said record. This clearly contemplates that 
 the court will only order up the entire case upon application 
 accompanied with a full record (Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 
 144 U. S. 58, 36 L. ed. 344, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 517), but the 
 ease must be of sufficient gravity and importance to invoke 
 such action (Re Lau Ow Bew, 141 U. S. 586, 587, 35 L. ed. 
 869, 870, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 43 ; Cella v. Brown, 75 C. C. A. 
 608, 144 Fed. 765 ; Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U. S. 514, 41 
 L. ed. 1098, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 665 ; Re ^Yoods, 143 U. S. 205, 
 36 L. ed. 126, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 417). 
 
 By Certiorari. 
 
 By certiorari all cases may be ordered up which are made 
 final in the circuit court of appeals. White v. Bruce, 48 C. C. 
 A. 400, 109 Fed. 364; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Johnson, 151 
 U. S. 81, 38 L. ed. 81, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 250; American Constr. 
 Co. V. Jacksonville, T. & K. W. R. Co. 148 U. S. 372, 37 L. 
 ed. 486, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 758. 
 
 The act of 1891, section 6, provides, among other things, for 
 a revision by the Supreme Court, by certiorari or otherwise, 
 of any case made final in the circuit court of appeals, and it 
 is competent to order the case up, whether its advice is requested 
 or not, except those that may be brought up by appeal or 
 error. Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U. S. 47, 36 L. ed. 
 340, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 517; Aspen Min. & Smelting Co. v. 
 Billings, 150 U. S. 37, 37 L. ed. 988, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 4; 
 Harriman v. Korthem Securities Co. 197 U. S. 244, 49 L. ed. 
 739, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493. The power thus given is not af- 
 fected by the stage or condition of the case as it exists in the 
 court of appeals when the application for certiorari is made. 
 It may be exercised before or after the decision of the circuit 
 court of appeals, but the right may be lost by delay. The 
 Conqueror, 166 U. S. 113, 114, 41 L. ed. 939, 940, 17 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 510. See sec. 239, new Code (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1216), embodying sec. 6, act of 1891. 
 
 The Supreme Court has acted with much caution in grant- 
 ing writs of certiorari under the conditions mentioned, but, 
 while exercising its power sparingly, it will issue the writ when 
 S. Eq.— 47. 
 
738 APPEALS PEOM CIKCDIT COURT TO SUPREME COUET. 
 
 there are in issue questions of great public concern, or matters 
 of gravity and importance (Re Lau Ow Bew, 141 U. S. 583, 
 35 L. ed. 868, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 43), as when there is a con- 
 flict betAveen a State supreme court and the circuit court of 
 appeals as to large property rights (Forsyth v. Hammond, 
 166 U. S. 514, 41 L. ed. 1098, 17 Sup. Ct. Kep. 665; The 
 Three Friends, 166 U. S. 49, 41 L. ed. 913, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 495), and when the matter complained of is important in its 
 immediate effect and far-reaching in its consequences (Re 
 Woods, 143 U. S. 205, 206, 36 L. ed. 126, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 417). So where the decision would seriously affect the admin- 
 istration of justice (Re Chetwood, 165 U. S. 443, 41 L. ed. 
 782, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 385), or prevent extraordinary embar- 
 rassment in the conduct of a cause, it may be granted (Ameri- 
 can Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & K. W. R. Co. 148 U. S. 
 384, 37 L. ed. 491, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 758). 
 
 It may be said of it, that it exists if some great necessity 
 demands it, and though it may be invoked at any stage of the 
 case, yet the Supreme Court will very rarely grant it before 
 a final judgment in the circuit court of appeals. 
 
 Petition For. 
 
 The certiorari is issued on the petition of a party to the 
 suit, which may be as follows : 
 
 Title of case to be certified. 
 To the Honorable Supreme Court of the United States: 
 
 The petition of A. B., appellant, etc., respectfully shows to this Honor- 
 able Court that he filed in the District Court of the United States for the 
 
 district of a bill in equity on, to wit: the. .' day of 
 
 , A. C, 19. . . (here state substance of bill and prayer) ; that 
 
 said cause was heard and determined and on the , . .day of , 
 
 A. D. 19. . ., a decree was entered in said court as follows (insert decree). 
 
 That thereafter, to wit, on the day of , A. D. 19. . ., an 
 
 appeal was allowed and perfected, and on the day of A. 
 
 D. 19 ... , a transcript of all the proceedings was filed in the United States 
 
 Circuit Court of Appeals for the circuit, sitting at , 
 
 and said cause was entered and docketed in said Court of Appeals, entitled 
 A. B., appellant, vs. C. D., appellee, and numbered on said docket. 
 
 That the assignment of errors filed in said cause was as follows (here 
 Insert assignment of errors). 
 
APPEALS FEOM CIECUIT COUET TO SUPEEME COUET. 739 
 
 That afterwards, to wit, on the day of , A. D., 19. . ., tlic 
 
 case came on to be heard in the Circuit Court of Appeals before the Hon. 
 
 , the Hon , and the Hon , and on the day 
 
 of , A. D. 19..., a decree was entered in said cause by the Cir- 
 cuit Court of Appeals of circuit as follows (state judgment oi 
 
 affirmance). 
 
 Your petitioner is advised that said judgment of the Circuit Court of 
 Appeals, is final, and is erroneous, and that this Honorable Court should 
 require the case to be certified to it for its review and determination under 
 the act of Congress permitting causes made final in the Circuit Court ol 
 Appeals to be certified for revision. 
 
 (Here recite the grounds upon which you seek the writ of certiorari, 
 and it must appear that the case comes fully within the statute. ) 
 
 Wherefore your petitioner respectfully prays that a. writ of certiorari 
 be issued under the seal of the court, directed to the United States Cir- 
 cuit Court of Appeals for the circuit, sitting at , com- 
 manding the court to certify and send to this court on a day to be desig- 
 nated a full and complete transcript of the record and all proceedings of 
 the Circuit Court of Appeals had in said cause, to the end that this cause 
 may be reviewed and determined hy this Honorable Court as provided by 
 the act of Congress approved March 3, 1891, establishing the Circuit Court 
 of Appeals and defining and regulating their jurisdiction; and that the 
 said judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals be reversed by this Honor- 
 able Court, and for such further relief as may seem proper. 
 
 And your petitioner will ever pray. 
 
 Signed by petitioner or by his counsel. 
 
 The petition must be verified by tbe petitioner or by counsel 
 as follows : 
 
 If by petitioner : "That he has read the foregoing petition 
 by him subscribed, and the facts stated therein are true to the 
 best of his information and belief." 
 
 If by counsel : State the fact of being counsel, and that he 
 knows of the above proceedings had, and "that the facts therein 
 stated are true to the best of his knowledge and belief." 
 
 Notice of the Application Must Be Oiven. 
 
 If the writ is granted, tbe clerk of the United States Supreme 
 Court issues it under the seal of the court, directed to the cir- 
 cuit court of appeals, and commanding it to send up the said ' 
 cause with the record and proceedings had therein, and that 
 the same be certified and removed to the Supreme Court vnth- 
 out delay, so that the Supreme Court may act tliereon, as ac- 
 cording to law ought to be done. 
 
14:0 APPEALS FEOM CIECUIT COUET TO SUPREME COURT. 
 
 By rule 37, promulgated by, the Supreme Court May 11, 
 1891, a certified copy of the entire record of the case in the 
 circuit court of appeals shall be furnished to the Supreme Court 
 by the applicant as a part of the application. 
 
 Time. 
 
 A party is entitled to a year within which to sue out the writ, 
 and the fact that the mandate has gone down does not affect 
 the right. The Conqueror, 166 U. S. 113, 41 L. ed. 939, 17 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 510; Panama E. Co. v. Napier Shipping Co. 
 166 U. S. 284, 41 L. ed. 1005, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 572; Ayres 
 V. Polsdorfer, 187 U. S. 595, 47 L. ed. 318, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 196; Spencer v. Duplan Silk Co. 191 U. S. 532, 48 L. ed. 291, 
 24 Sup. Ct Eep. 174. It may be lost by delay. Ibid. 
 
 Effect of Granting the Writ. 
 
 First. When the writ is granted by the Supreme Court it 
 suspends the mandate of the circuit court of appeals, and all 
 action by the circuit court of appeals, as well as of the circuit 
 court from whence the appeal came. It is, in effect, a super- 
 sedeas (Louisville, N. A. & C. E. Co. v. Louisville Trust Co. 
 78 Fed. 659-662), except that the court below may perfect 
 its judgment or allow a remittitur (Hovey v. McDonald, 109 
 U. S. 157, 27 L. ed. 890, 3 Sup. Ct. Eep. 136). 
 
 Second. When the writ is issued the ease is before the 
 court for its determination with the same power as if carried 
 up by appeal. Act of 1891, sec. 6 ; Panama E. Co. v. Napier 
 Shipping Co. 166 U. S. 280-284, 41 L. ed. 1004-1005, 17 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 572. But see, Hubbard v. Tod, 171 U. S. 494, 
 43 L. ed. 253, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 14. The entire case is before 
 the court for examination. Where an intervener applied for 
 the writ, and the court entertained only errors assigned, and 
 not whether there was error in the decree below of which other 
 parties could have complained. 
 
CHAPTER CXII. 
 
 APPELLATE POWEE OF SUPREME COUKT IN CASES NOT FINAL IN 
 OIECUIT OOUET OF APPEALS. 
 
 The Supreme Court may review, by appeal or writ of error, 
 all cases not made final in the circuit court of appeals by the 
 sixth section of the judiciary act of 1891, when the matter in 
 controversy exceeds one thousand dollars besides costs, and if 
 taken in one year after the entry of the decree or judgment 
 in the circuit court of appeals. Huguley Mfg. Co. v. Galeton 
 Cotton Mills, see appendix sec. 6, act 1891, 184 U. S. 294, 46 
 L. ed. 547, 22 Sup. St. Rep. 452. See sec. 241, chap, 10, new 
 Code (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1218), embodying the old law. 
 
 So, then, we have in all cases decided by the circuit court 
 of appeals in which the jurisdiction was not dependent on 
 diversity of citizenship entirely, or between aliens and citi- 
 zens, or where the case arose under the patent, revenue, or 
 admiralty laws, or in bankiaiptcy proceedings where the amount 
 in controversy is under two thousand dollars, or judgments 
 in arbitration claims (U. S. Stat, at L. vol. 30, p. 426 ; Press 
 Pub. Co. V. Monroe, 164 U. S. 110, 41 L. ed. 368, 17 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 40), a right of appeal to the Supreme Court from the 
 decree of the circuit court of appeals, provided only that the 
 matter in controversy exceeds one thousand dollars in value 
 or amount besides costs, and that the appeal to be taken within 
 one year from the entry of the decree. JSTorthem P. R. Co. v. 
 Amato, 144 U. S. 472, 36 L. ed. 509, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 740. 
 The statutory amount must be in the controversy, but the fact 
 may be shown by affidavit. United States v. Trans-Missouri 
 Freight Asso. 166 U. S. 310, 41 L. ed. 1017, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 540; Robinson v. Suburban Briek Co. 62 C. 0. A. 484, 127 
 Fed. 806. 
 
 By enumerating the conditions in the act of 1891, under 
 which the decrees in the circuit court of appeal are made final, 
 
 741 
 
742 APPEALS FBOM CIECUIT COUKTS OF APPEALS. 
 
 and declaring that all cases not made final in the circuit court 
 of appeals may be carried as of right to the Supreme Court on 
 appeal or error, much of the difficulty is removed in determin- 
 ing whether a case decided in the court of appeals can be 
 taken by appeal or error, or must be taken by certiorari. 
 
 In determining the question of the finality of the judg- 
 ment in the circuit court of appeals we must go back to the 
 jurisdiction of the circuit court, and when that rests upon 
 diversity of citizenship alone, or between aliens and citizens, 
 or the case has been brought under the patent or revenue laws, 
 or is a case in admiralty, then the decision of the circuit court 
 of appeals is final and appeal or error to the Supreme Court 
 would not lie. Harding v. Hart, 18Y U. S. 638, 47 L. ed. 344, 
 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 846 ; Spencer v. Duplan Silk Co. 191 U. S. 
 527, 48 L. ed. 28Y, 24 Sup. Ct. Hep. 174; Colorado Cent. 
 Consol. Min. Co. v. Turck, 150 TJ. S. 138, 37 L. ed. 1030, 14 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 35; Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 164 U. S. 110, 
 111, 41 L. ed. 368, 369, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 40 ; Ayres v. Pols- 
 dorfer, 187 U. S. 588-595, 47 L. ed. 315-318, 23 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 196; Huguley Mfg. Co. v. Galeton Cotton Mills, 184 
 U. S. 294, 46 L. ed. 547, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 452; Ex parte 
 Jones, 164 U. S. 691, 41 L. ed. 601, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 222. 
 However, an appeal would lie when the case is between a for- 
 eign state and citizens of one of the United States, as it is 
 not within the statute. 
 
 It may, then, be stated that under the act of March 3, 1891, 
 where the jurisdiction of the circuit court of appeals wag based 
 on diversity of citizenship, or any of the grounds mentioned in 
 section 6 of the act which have been referred to above, there 
 can be no review by appeal or error by the Supreme Court 
 of the judgment or decree of the circuit court of appeals in 
 such cases. And this would be true, though after jurisdiction 
 had attached in the circuit court issues are raised and decided 
 bringing the case within either of the clauses set forth in sec- 
 tion 5 of the act of 1891, and by virtue of which the case 
 could have been carried direct to the Supreme Court, but was 
 Qot, but carried to the circuit court of appeals. See authorities 
 above; American Sugar Eef. Co. v. New Orleans, 181 TJ. S. 
 280, 45 L. ed. 861, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 646; Spencer v. Duplan 
 Silk Co. 191 U. S. 526, 48 L. ed. 287, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 174; 
 
APPEALS FEOM CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS. 74;; 
 
 Gary Mfg. Co. v. Acme Flexible Clasp Co. 187 U. S. 428, 47 
 L. ed. 245, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 211; Arbuckle v. Blackburn, 
 191 U. S. 405, 48 L. ed. 239, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 148; Watkins 
 V. King, 55 C. C. A. 290, 118 Fed. 532; Loeb v. Columbia 
 Twp. 179 U. S. 479, 45 L. ed. 285, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 174. 
 Cannot be two appeals. Ibid.; Eobinson v. Caldwell, 165 
 U. S. 362, 41 L. ed. 746, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 343. 
 
 If, however, the jurisdiction of the circuit court rests upon 
 diversity of citizenship and a Federal question when the suit 
 is begun, and appears in the pleading in due and logical form, 
 and the case is carried to the circuit court of appeals, and 
 judgment entered in said court, then such judgment would not 
 be final, and an appeal or error would lie to the Supreme 
 Court from the circuit court of appeals' judgment. Howard 
 V. United States, 184 U. S. 676, 46 L. ed. 754, 22 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 543; Loeb v. Columbia Twp. 179 U. S. 480, 481, 45 
 L. ed. 286, 287, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 174; Fidelity Mut. Life 
 Asso. V. Mettler,' 185 U. S. 315, 46 L. ed. 925, 22 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 662; Cound v. Atchison, T. & S. F. E. Co. 173 Fed. 527; 
 Empire State-Idaho Min. & Developing Co. v. Hanley, 198 
 U. S. 292, 49 L. ed. 1053, 25 Sup. Ct. Eep. 691; Arbuckle 
 V. Blackburn, 191 U. S. 405, 48 L. ed. 239, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 148; Union P. E. Co. v. Harris, 158 U. S. 328, 39 L. ed. 1003, 
 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 843 ; Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 164 U. S. 
 110, 111, 41 L. ed. 368, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 40. 
 
 Ifot final unless depending wholly on diversity. Northern 
 P. E. Co. V. Soderberg, 188 U. S. 526, 47 L. ed. 576, 23 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 365. 
 
 In Montana Min. Co. v. St. Louis Min. & Mill. Co. 186 U. 
 S. 24, 46 L. ed. 1039, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 744, it is said when 
 both parties who have been defeated in some part of their con- 
 tention appeal to the circuit court of appeals, and the judg- 
 ment is affirmed in favor of one party, and reversed by him as 
 to the contention against him, writs of error from the Supreme 
 Court to review each judgment would not lie, because such 
 judgment is not final so far as the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
 Court is concerned. Covington v. First Nat. Bank, 185 U. S. 
 270, 46 L. ed. 906, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 645. 
 
 When the jurisdiction of the circuit court rests wholly upon 
 a Federal question the Supreme Court alone would have ju- 
 
744 APPEALS FROM CIECUIT COUJ.IT OF APPEALS. 
 
 risdiction of an appeal from the circuit court. American Sugar 
 Eef. Co. V. New Orleans, 181 U. S. 279, 280, 45 L. ed. 860, 
 861, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 646 ; Gary Mfg. Co. v. Acme Flexible 
 Clasp Co. 187 U. S. 428, 47 L. ed. 245, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 211; 
 Watkins v. King, 55 C. C. A. 290, 118 Fed. 532; Huguley 
 V. Galeton Cotton Mills, 184 U. S. 295, 46 L. ed. 548, 22 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 452. 
 
 There are special statutes dealing with special subjects, and 
 making the judgment of the circuit court of appeals final 
 when called upon to review cases arising under such statutes. 
 In all such cases no appeal to the Supreme Court will lie, nor 
 a writ of error, but a revision, if any, must be by certiorari 
 to the circuit court of appeals. For illustration, see bank- 
 ruptcy act of 1898, sec. 25; U. S. Stat, at L. vol. 30, p. 553, 
 chap. 541, and see also an act concerning carriers in interstate 
 commerce, 1898; U. S. Stat, at L. vol. 30, p. 426, chap. 370, 
 sec. 4 of act. 
 
 Petition for Appeal or Writ of Error. 
 
 Title of case aa appealed. 
 
 To the Hon , Chief Joiatice, or to Any Associate Justice of 
 
 the Supreme Court of the United States: 
 
 Now comes the (appellant) by his solicitor and complains that in the 
 record and proceedings, and also in the rendition of the decree (or judg- 
 ment) of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the cir- 
 cuit, sitting at , in the State of , in the above styled and 
 
 numbered cause, on the day of , A. D. 19. . ., affirming the 
 
 decree of the United States District Court for the district of 
 
 in said cause, manifest error has intervened to the great damage 
 
 of the petitioner; that the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United 
 
 States for the district of depended upon the fact (that 
 
 the railroad company defendant was a corporation created by an act of 
 Congress, or any other ground of jurisdiction other than where the juris- 
 diction of the Circuit Court of Appeals is made final) ; that the amount 
 involved therein and the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of one 
 thousand dollars besides costs, and this is not a case in which the juris- 
 diction of the Circuit Court of Appeals is made final. 
 
 Wherefore petitioner prays for an allowance of the appeal to the end 
 that the cause may be carried to the Supreme Court of the United States, 
 and petitioner prays for a supersedeas of said judgment and such other 
 process as is required to perfect the appeal prayed for, to the end that the 
 error therein may be corrected. 
 
 E. F., 
 Solicitor. 
 
APPEALS FROM CIECUIT COUET OF APPEALS. 745 
 
 Appeal and supersedeas allowed, and bond fixed in the sum of 
 
 dollars, conditioned as the laws directs, this the day of 
 
 A. D. 19... 
 
 Associate Justice Supreme Court, etc. 
 
 The appeal may be allowed by any of the justices of the Su- 
 preme Court or any of the judges of the court of appeals. 
 
 In the matter of authority to issue writs of error from the 
 Supreme Court to the circuit court of ap]3eals it was held in 
 Efi Issuing Writs of Error, 117 C. C. A. 603, 199 Fed. 115 
 that it should be issued by the clerk of the Supreme Court, or 
 the clerk of the circuit court of appeals. U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 
 1004, as amended Jan. 22, 1912, 37 Stat, at L. 54, chap. 12 
 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1663). 
 
 Assignment of Errors. 
 
 With this petition should be filed an assignment of errors, 
 in form as before given. 
 
 When the appeal is allowed the clerk, as stated above, issues 
 the writ, and the petition and assignment of errors and bond, 
 when approved, are filed with the clerk of the circuit court 
 of appeals. ISTotice of appeal is issued and the clerk incor- 
 porates certified copies of these proceedings with the record 
 and proceedings in the cause before the circuit court of appeals, 
 duly certifies the transcript, and forwards to the clerk of the 
 Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
 Forms given heretofore for the proceedings in appeals from 
 the circuit court to the circuit court of appeals may be used, 
 the difference being as to time within which the appeal is taken 
 being one year from the circuit court of appeals to the Supreme 
 Court. 
 
 An appeal from the circuit court of appeals to the Supreme 
 Court in cases of bankruptcy is provided for in sec. 252, new 
 Code (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1229), effective January 1st, 
 1912. See 4th sec. act Jan. 18th, 1915, providing that the 
 judgments and decrees in bankruptcy shall be final in circuit 
 court of appeals, except that the Supreme Court may by cer- 
 tiorari review the judgment or decree, provided a petition is 
 filed in three months from the date of the judgment, etc., — for 
 that purpose. 
 
CHAPTER CXTII. 
 
 APPEAL PEOM STATE COURTS TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
 
 COURT. 
 
 I discussed incidentally, under "Federal Questions," appeals 
 from the highest State court to the Supreme Court of the 
 United States. We saw in chapter 26, that by U. S. Rev. Stat, 
 sec. 709, a firial judgment or decree in any suit in the highest 
 court of a State wherein is drawn in question the validity of 
 a statute or treaty, or authority exercised under the United 
 States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is 
 drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority 
 exercised under, any State on the ground of their being repug- 
 , nant to the Constitution of the United States, its treaties, or ' 
 laws, and the decision is in favor of their validity j or when 
 any title, right, privilege, or immunity is claimed under the 
 Constitution or any treaty Or statute of, or commission held or 
 authority exercised under, the United States, and the decision 
 is against the title, right, privilege, or immunity specially set 
 up or claimed by either party under such treaty, statute, con- 
 mission, or authority, — may be re-examined and reversed or 
 affirmed in the Supreme Court upon writ of error (see sec. 709, 
 chapter 26). Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. McGraw, 188 U. S. 291, 
 47 L. ed. 480, 23 L.E.A. 33, 23 Sup. St. Rep. 375 ; Western 
 U. Teleg. Co. v. Wilson, 213 U. S. 52, 53 L. ed. 693, 29 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 403 ; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 
 55, 53 L. ed. 695, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 397 ; Keerl v. Montana, 
 213 U. S. 135, 53 L. ed. 734, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 469 ; Kentucky 
 V. Powers, 201 U. S. 1, 50 L. ed. 633, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 387, 
 5 Ann. Cas. 692; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Swanger, 
 157 Fed. 789; Johnson v. New York L. Ins. Co. 187 U. S. 
 491, 492, 47 L. ed. 273, 274, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 194. U. S. 
 Rev. Stat. sec. 709, is embodied in sec. 237 of the new Code, 
 chap. 10 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1214). 
 
 By U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 1003 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1662), 
 
 746 
 
APPEAL FBOM STATE COTJETS TO U. S. StTPBEME COtTBT. 747 
 
 it is provided that writs of error from the Supreme Court to 
 the State court shall be issued in the same manner and under 
 the same regulations, and shall have the same effect, as if the 
 judgment or decree complained of had been rendered in a 
 United States court 
 
 By section 5 of the appellate court act of 1891, the appel- 
 late jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over State courts of last 
 resort involving a Federal question is not affected by that act; 
 and the statutes governing the exercise of that jurisdiction are 
 sections 709, 710, 1003 of the United States Revised Statutes, 
 and sections 997 to 1013 of the United States Revised Statutes 
 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 1653-1655) governing proceedings 
 on error and appeal. 
 
 Having thus referred to the statutes by which writs of er- 
 ror from the Supreme Court to State courts are controlled, I 
 will, before giving the necessary forms and substance of the 
 statutes governing practice in such cases, state certain rules 
 which have been settled by the cases, and which control the 
 Supreme Court in granting the writs of error to State courts. 
 It will be seen by these rules that the object of this jurisdiction 
 is solely to restrain unconstitutional legislation, and not to cor- 
 rect errors. Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103, 40 
 L. ed. 91, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 80; Remington Paper Co. v. Wat- 
 son, 173 U. S. 451, 43 L. ed. 764, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456. 
 
 First. It need not be the decision of the Supreme Court 
 of a State, but it will grant a writ of error to any court of last 
 resort in the State having jurisdiction to determine the case. 
 Thus, if by a State statute any inferior court is authorized to 
 finally determine the case, a writ of error will be issued to that 
 court; or when the highest State tribunal refuses to review a 
 case from an inferior court the writ of error will be directed 
 to the inferior court. Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 215, 41 L. 
 ed. 135, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1023 ; Sullivan v. Texas, 207 U. S. 
 416, 52 L. ed. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 215. 
 
 Second. In order to sustain the jurisdiction of the Federal 
 Supreme Court, it must appear: 
 
 (a) That a Federal question is presented, and it is apparent 
 from the record. Johnson v. ISTew York L. Ins. Co. 187 U. 
 S. 491, 492, 47 L. ed. 273, 274, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 194 ; Michi- 
 gan Sugar Co. v. Michigan (Michigan Sugar Co. v. Dix) 185 
 
748 APPEAL FB.OM STATE COURTS TO U. S. STJPKEME COURT.' 
 
 U. S. 112, 46 L. ed. 829, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 581; San Jose Land 
 & Water Go. v. San Jose Eanch Co. 189 U. S. 180, 47 L. ed. 
 768, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 487; Fowler v. Lamson, 164 U. S. 255, 
 41 L. ed. 424, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 112 ; German Sav. & L. Soc. 
 V. Dormitzer, 192 U. S. 125, 48 L. ed. 373, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 221; Reals y. Cone, 188 U. S. 184, 47 L. ed. 435, 23 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 275 ; Kipley v. Illinois, 170 U. S. 186, 42 L. ed. 1001, 
 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 550; Turner y. Richardson, 180 U. S. 87, 45 
 L. ed. 438, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 295 ; Mountain View Min. & Mill. 
 Co. Y. McFadden, 180 U. S. 535, 45 L. ed. 656, 21 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 488; Scudder v. Comptroller (Scudder v. Coler), 175 
 U. S. 36, 44 L. ed. 63, 20 Sup. Ct, Rep. 26 ; Green Bay & M. 
 Canal Co. y. Patten Paper Co. 172 U. S. 68, 43 L. ed. 368, 19 
 Sup. Ct. Rep, 97; Zadig v. Baldwin, 166 U. S. 488, 41 L. ed. 
 1088, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 639; Levy v. Superior Ct. 167 U. S. 
 177, 42 L. ed. 126, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 769. It cannot be sup- 
 plied by an assignment of errors. Cbapin y. Fye, 179 U. S. 
 127, 45 L. ed. 119, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 71. 
 
 (b) That a decision was made thereon, or that such a ques- 
 tion must have arisen and been necessarily involved (Ibid.; 
 Columbia Water Power Co. y. Columbia Electric Street R. 
 Light & P. Co. 172 U. S. 488, 43 L. ed. 525, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 247, and cases cited ; Connecticiit ex rel. New York & JST. E. R. 
 Co. V. Woodruff, 153 IT. S. 689, 38 L. ed. 869, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 976 ; Powell y. Brunswick County, 150 U. S. 433-440, 37 L. ed. 
 1134-1137, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 166 ; Fowler v. Lamson, 164 U. 
 S. 255, 41 L. ed. 424, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 112; McQuade v. 
 Trenton, 172 U. S. 639-640, 43 L. ed. 582, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 292 ; Sayward v. Denny, 158 U. S. 184, 39 L. ed. 942, 15 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 777 ; Castillo v. McConnico, 168 U. S. 679, 42 L. ed. 
 624, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229 ; Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. 
 Adams, 180 U. S. 48, 45 L. ed. 418, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 256; 
 Allen V. Southern P. R. Co. 173 U. S. 489, 43 L. ed. 778, 19 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 518; Schlemmer v. Buffalo R. & P. R. Co. 205 
 U. S. 1, 2, 51 L. ed. 681, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 407 ; Bachtel v. 
 Wilson, 204 U. S. 36, 51 L. ed. 357, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 243; 
 see Gulf & S. I. R. Co. y. Hewes, 183 U. S. 66, 67, 46 L. ed. 
 86, 87, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 26), in the case, and the decision as 
 made comes within the provisions of the United States Revised 
 Statutes, sec. 709 (Northern P. R. Co. v. Ellis, 144 U. S. 464, 
 
APPEAL FEOM STATE COUE.TS TO 0. S. SUPEEME COUET. 749 
 
 36 L. ed. 506, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 724; Hammond v. Johnston, 
 142 U. S. 73, 35 L. ed. 941 ; 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 41 ; Powell v. 
 Brunswick County, 150 U. S. 439, 37 L. ed. 1136, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 166 ; Eogers v. Jones, 214 U. S. 196, 53 L. ed. 965, 29 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 635). The decision must be against the Federal 
 question. Baier v. Baldwin, 187 U. S. 61, 47 L. ed. 75, 23 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 19 ; Kizer v. Texarkana & Ft. S. E. Co. 179 U. 
 S. 199, 45' L. ed. 152, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 100; Chesapeake & 0. 
 K. Co. V. McDonald, 214 U. S. 193, 53 L. ed. 964, 29 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 546; Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361-366, 37 L. ed. 1111, 
 1112, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 131. However, when the case arises 
 under the third section of U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 709, where a 
 right, title, privilege, or immunity is claimed, there can be no 
 inference from the case that it was involved ; it must be specific- 
 ally set up and must be claimed by the plaintiff in error, and 
 not a third person. Ludeling v. Chaffe, 143 U. S. 301, 36 L. 
 ed. 313, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 439 ; Braxton County Ct. v. West 
 Virginia, 208 U. S. 192, 52 L. ed. 450, 28 Sup. Ct. Eep. 275; 
 Giles V. Little, 134 U. S. 645, 33 L. ed. 1062, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 623 ; F. G. Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler County 166 U. S. 
 658, 41 L. ed. 1152, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 709 ; Yazoo & M. Valley 
 E. Co. V. Adams, 180 U. S. 14, 45 L. ed. 404, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 240; Columbia Water Power Co. v. Columbia Electric Street 
 K. Light & P. Co. 172 U. S. 488, 43 L. ed. 525, 19 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 247; Chesapeake & 0. E. Co. v. McDonald, 214 U. S. 
 193, 53 L. ed. 964, 29 Sup. Ct. Eep. 546. 
 
 (c) A bare averment of a Federal question is not sufficient. 
 Goodrich V. Ferris, 214 U. S. 71, 53 L. ed. 914, 29 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 580 ; Xew Orleans v. JSTew Orleans Waterworks Co. 142 
 U. S. 87, 35 L. ed. 946, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 142 ; St. Louis, G. 
 & Ft. S. E. Co. V. Missouri, 156 U. S. 483, 39 L. ed. 504, 15 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 443 ; Clarke v. McDade, 165 U. S. 173, 41 L. 
 . ed. 674, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 284 ; St. Paul, M. & M. E. Co. v. 
 St. Paul & ISi. P. E. Co. 15 C. C. A. 167, 32 U. S. App. 372, 
 68 Fed. 11; Fayerweather v. Eitch, 195 U. S. 299, 49 L. ed. 
 210, 25 Sup. Ct. Eep. 58 ; Sawyer v. Piper, 189 U. S. 154, 47 
 L. ed. 757, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 633 ; New York 0. & H. E. E. 
 Co. V. New York, 186 U. S. 269, 46 L. ed. 1158, 22 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 916; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. McGrew, 188 U. S. 291, 
 47 L. ed. 480, 63 L.E.A. 33, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 375. 
 
750 APPEAL FEOM STATE OOTJETS TO U. S. SUPREME COUET. 
 
 (d) It must be a real, not fictitious, Federal question. 
 Hamblin v. Western Land Co. 147 U. S. 531, 37 L. ed. 267, 13 
 Sup. Ct. Eepl 353 ; Wilson v. North Carolina, 169 U. B. 595, 
 42 L. ed. 871, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 435 ; Nashville, 0. & St. L. 
 E. Co. V. Taylor, 86 Fed. 182 ; Farrell v. O'Brien (O'Galla- 
 ghan V. O'Brien), 199 U. S. 100, 50 L. ed. 107, 25 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 727; Swing v. Western Lumber Co. 205 U. S. 275, 51 L. 
 ed. 799, 27 Sup. Ct. Eep. 497 ; New Orleans Waterworks Co. 
 V. Louisiana, 185 TJ. S. 336, 46 L. ed. 936, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 691. 
 
 Third. It must appear that, though the Federal question 
 was raised, the decision was not, or could not have been, made 
 under rules of general jurisprudence broad enough in them- 
 selves to sustain the judgment without considering the Federal 
 question. Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361, 37 L. ed. 1111, 14 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 131 ; Connecticut ex rel. New York & N. E. E. 
 Co. V. Woodruff, 153 TJ. S. 689, 38 L. ed. 869, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 976; Eogers v. Jones, 214 U. S. 196, 53 L. ed. 965, 29 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 635; Klinger v. Missouri, 13 Wall. 257, 20 L. 
 ed. 635; Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 227, 41 L. ed. 139, 16 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1023 ; Missouri P. E. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 160 U. 
 S. 576, 40 L. ed. 540, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 389 ; New Orleans v. 
 New Orleans Waterworks Co. 142 U. S. 79, 35 L. ed. 943, 12 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 142 ; Delaware City S. & P. S. B. Nav. Co. v. 
 Eeybold, 142 U. S. 643, 35 L. ed. 1144, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 290; 
 O'Neil V. Vermont, 144 U. S. 336, 36 L. ed. 457, 12 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 693 ; New York C. & H. E. E. Co. v. New York, 186 
 U. S. 269, 46 L. ed. 1158, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 916. 
 
 Fourth. When it appears the State decision was correct, 
 regardless of the Federal question, jurisdiction will not attach. 
 Hammond v. Johnston, 142 U. S. 78, 35 L. ed. 942, 12 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 141. 
 
 Fifth. The Federal question must be raised in the original 
 pleadings and not in' the proceedings after the State court's 
 judgment (Chesapeake & 0. E. Co. v. McDonald, 214 U. S. 
 191, 53 L. ed. 963, 29 Sup. Ct. Eep. 546 ; McCorquodale v. 
 Texas, 211 U. S. 432, 53 L. ed. 269, 29 Sup. Ct. Eep. 146; 
 Meyer v. Eichniond, 172 U. S. 92, 43 L. ed. 377, 19 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 106 ; Loeber v. Schroeder, 149 U. S. 585, 37 L. ed. 859, 
 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 934; Turner v. Eichardson, 180 U. S. 87, 
 
APPEAL FROM STATE COUETS TO U. S. SUPREME COUET. 751 
 
 45 L. ed. 438, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 295 ; Pirn v. St. Louis, 165 
 U. S. 273, 41 L. ed. 714, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 322 ; F. G. Oxley 
 Stave Co. v. Butler County, 166 U. S. 648, 41 L. ed. 1149, 17 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 709 ; Zadig v. Baldwin, 166 U. S. 488, 41 L. ed. 
 1088, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 639; Erie R. Co. v. Purdy, 185 U. S. 
 148, 46 L. ed. 848, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 605 ; Layton v. Missouri, 
 187 U. S. 356, 47 L. ed. 214, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 137; Miller v. 
 Cornwall R. Co. 168 U. S. 133, 42 L. ed. 410, 18 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 34; Sayward v. Denny, 158 U. S. 183, 39 L. ed. 942, 15 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 777; Chapin v. Fye, 179 U. S. 127, 45 L. ed. 
 119, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 71; Burt v. Smith, 203 U. S. 129, 51 
 L. ed. 121, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 37; Osborne v. Clark, 204 U. 
 S. 565, 51 L. ed. 619, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 319 ; Mailers v. Com- 
 mercial Loan & T. Co. 216 U. S. 613, 54 L. ed. 638, 30 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 438; Harding v. Illinois, 196 U. S. 78, 49 L. ed. 
 394, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 176), and by plaintiff or defendant. 
 But since the rule of the Supreme Court was promulgated 
 requiring opinions of the court below to be sent up -with the 
 record, it is held sufficient to give jurisdiction if the Federal 
 question is fully considered in the opinion of the State court 
 and ruled against the plaintiff in error. San Jose Land & 
 Water Co. v. San Jose Ranch Co. 189 U. S. 179, 180, 47 
 L ed. 766, 768, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 487; Dibble v. Bellingham 
 Bay Land Co. 163 U. S. 69, 41 L. ed. 74, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 939; Loeb v. Columbia Twp. 179 U. S. 472, 45 L. ed. 280, 
 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 174; Chambers v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 
 207 F. S. 142, 52 L. ed. 143, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 34 ; German 
 Sav. & L. Soc. V. Dormitzer, 192 U. S. 127, 48 L. ed. 376, 24 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221. Thus, it is said that, though a Federal 
 right is not set up in the original petition or earlier proceedings, 
 yet if it clearly appear from the opinion of the State court 
 that a Federal question was in issue and was actually decided 
 against the Federal claim, and such decision was essential to 
 the judgment, then the Supreme Court would re-examine the 
 case. Ibid.; Montana ex rel. Haire v. Rice, 204 U. S. 291, 
 51 L. ed. 490, 27 Sup. Ct. Eep. 281 ; San Jose Land & Water 
 Co. V. San Jose Ranch Co. 189 U. S. 177, 47 L. ed. 765, 23 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 487. 
 
 In Weber v. Rogan, 188 U. S. 14, 47 L. ed. 365, 28 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 263, it is decided that a Federal question is raised too 
 
752 APPEAL FEOM STATE COURTS TO U. S. SUPKEME COUKT. 
 
 late where it is first suggested in aji application for a rehear- 
 ing, citing Miller v. Texas, 163 U. S. 535, 38 L. ed. 812, 14 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 874; Eastern Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Welling, 
 181 U. S. 47, 45 L. ed. 739, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 531; McCorquo-' 
 dale V. Texas, 211 U. S. 437, 53 L. ed. 271, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 146 ; Loeber v. Schroeder, 149 U. S. 580, 37 L. ed. 856, 13 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 934; Pirn v. St. Louis, 165 U. S. 273, 41 L. ed. 714, 
 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 322; Turner v. Richardson, 180 U. S. 87, 
 45 L. ed. 438, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 296 ; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. 
 McGrew, 188 U. S. 291, 47 L. ed. 480, 63 L.R.A. 33, 23 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 376 ; Mailers v. Commercial Loan & T. Co. 216 L. S. 
 613, 64 L. ed. 638, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 438; Forbes v. State 
 Council, 216 U. S. 396, 54 L. ed. 534, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 295. 
 
 But in Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U. S. 589, 45 L. ed. 
 1015, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730, 15 Am. Crim. Rep. 241, it was 
 held that a Federal question raised by an application for re- 
 hearing is not too late when that court proceeds to discuss the 
 Federal question in denying the application. McCorquodale 
 V. Texas, 211 U. S. 437, 53 L. ed. 269, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 146, 
 and cases cited. Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79, 48 L. ed. 623, 
 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 390; McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U. S. 458, 51 
 L. ed. 566, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 346 ; Sullivan v. Texas, 207 U. 
 S. 416, 52 L. ed. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 215. 
 
 And in Rothschild v. Knight, 184 U. S. 339, 46 L. ed. 
 679, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 391, it is said that where the Federal 
 ,question was raised on writ of error to the supreme court of 
 the State, it would be sufiicient, citing several cases (Corkran 
 Oil & Development Co. v. Arnaudet, 199 U. S. 193, 60 L. ed. 
 149, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 41 ; see Mailers v. Commercial Loan & 
 T. Co. 216 U. S. 613, 64 L. ed. 638, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 438); 
 but not where raised for the first time in a petition for rehear- 
 ing to the State supreme court (Kansas City Star Co. v. 
 Julian, 215 U. S. 689, 64 L. ed. 340, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 406). 
 
 Sixth. It must appear that the Federal question was pre- 
 sented, distinctly ruled upon, and denied. Fowler v. Lamson, 
 164 U. S. 255, 41 L. ed. 425, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 112 ; Western 
 U. Teleg. Co. v. Wilson, 213 U. S. 52, 53 L. ed. 693, 29 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 403; Eustis v. Bolles, 150 II. S. 362, 37 L. ed. 1111, 
 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 131; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Sowers, 
 213 U. S. 55, 53 L. ed. 695, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 397 ; Powell 
 
APPEAL FKOM STATE COTTETS TO U. S. SUPREME CO0ET. I '.J') 
 
 V. Brunswick County, 150 U. S. 439, 440, 37 L. ed. 1136, 1137, 
 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 166; Harrison v. Morton, 171 U. S. 47, 43 
 L. ed. 66, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 742 ; Michigan Sugar Co. v. Michi- 
 gan (Michigan Sugar Co. v. Dix), 185 U. S. 112, 46 L. ed. 
 829, 32 Sup. Ct. Eep. 581. And the fact that the State court 
 declared no Federal question exists does not affect the right 
 to a writ of error. Missouri, K. & T. E. Co. v. Elliott, 184 
 U. S. 530, 46 L. ed. 673, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 446. \'\here the 
 State court declines to pass on the Federal question, the issue 
 is not so raised as to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction (Erie 
 K. Co. V. Purdy, 185 U. S. 148, 46 L. ed. 847, 22 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 605; Schlemmer v. Buffalo, E. & P. E. Co. 20.-, I'. S. 11, 
 51 L. ed. 685, 27 Sup. Ct. Eep. 407), when it is not .set up in 
 the original pleadings ; but if set up in the pleadings, then the 
 refusal of the court to pass upon it would not oust the jurisdic- 
 tion, where there was a fair gTound for asserting the Federal 
 question (ISTew Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana, 185 U. S. 
 336, 46 L. ed. 936, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 691). 
 Illustrative cases: Yates v. Jones ISTat. Bank, 206 V. S. 167, 
 
 51 L. ed. 1009, 27 Sup. Ct. Eep. 638, and cases cited; North- 
 ern P. E. Co. V. Minnesota, 208 TJ. S. 583, 52 L. ed. 630, 28 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 341 ; Texas & P. E. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil 
 Co. 204 U. S. 426, 61 L. ed. 553, 27 Sup. Ct. Eep. 350, 9 A. 
 & E. Ann. Cas. 1075 ; Hammond v. Whittredge, 204 U. S. 
 538, 51 L. ed. 606, 27 Sup. Ct. Eep. 396; Western Turf Asso. 
 V. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359, 51 L. ed. 520, 27 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 384;. St. Louis L M. & S. E. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, 
 
 52 L. ed. 1061, 28 Sup. Ct. Eep. 616 ; Jacobs v. Marks, 182 
 U. S. 583, 45 L. ed. 1241, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. .S6.", ; Gulf & S. 
 L E. Co. V. Hewes, 183 U. S. 67, 46 L. ed. 87, 22 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 26; Tullock v. Mulvane, 184 U. S. 497, 46 L. ed. 657, 
 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 372; Talbot v. First Nat. Bank, 185 U. S. 
 172, 46 L. ed. 857, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 612 ; Cummings \-. Chi- 
 cago, 188 U. S. 410, 47 L. ed. 525, 23 Sup. C^t. Eep.' 472 ; De- 
 troit, Ft. W. & B. I. E. Co. V. Osborn, 189 U. S. 383, 47 L. 
 ed. 860, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep, 540 ; Illinois C. E. Co. v. McKen- 
 dree, 203 U. S. 514, 51 L. ed. 298, 27 Sup. Ct. Eep. 153; 
 Williams v. First Nat. Bank, 216 U. S. 582, 54 L. ed. 625, 80 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 441, held to involve a Federal question support- 
 ing the writ of error and California Powder Works v. Davis, 
 
 S. Bq.— 48. 
 
754 APPEAL FEOM STATE COUETS TO U. S. SUPREME COUKT, 
 
 151 TJ. S. 389, 38 L. ed. 206, 14 Sup. Ot. Rep. 350; Mis- 
 souri P. K. Co. V. Fitzgerald, 160 U. S. 556, 40 L. ed. 636, 
 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389 ; Chadwick v. Kelley, 187 U. S. 540, 47 L. 
 ed. 293, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 175 ; Avery v. Popper, 179 U. S. 
 305, 45 L. ed. 203, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 94 ; Hooker v. Los An- 
 geles, 188 U. S. 314, 47 L. ed. 487, 63 L.R.A. 471, 23 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 395; Iowa v. Rood, 187 U. S. 87, 47 L. ed. 86, 
 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 49 ; Mobile Transp. Co. v. Mobile, 187 U. S. 
 480, 47 L. ed. 267, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 170; Johnson v. New 
 York L. Ins. Co. 187 U. S. 492, 47 L. ed. 273, 23 Sup. Ct' 
 Rep. 194; Layton v. Missouri, 187 U. S. 356, 47 L. ed. 214, 23 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 137; Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373, 52 L. 
 ed. 1103, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 708 ; Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. 
 Mississippi, 210 U. S. 187, 52 L. ed. 1016, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 650 ; Delmar Jockey Club v. Missouri, 210 U. S. 324, 52 L. 
 ed. 1080, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 732; Elder v. Wood, 208 U. S. 
 226, 52 L. ed. 464, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 263 ; Vandalia R. Co. v. 
 Indiana, 207 IJ. S. 359, 52 L. ed. 246, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 130; 
 Elder v. Colorado, 204 U. S. 85, 51 L. ed. 381, 27 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 223 ; Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 51 L. ed. 879, 
 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 556, 10 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 689; Atlantic 
 Coast Line R. Co. v. ISTorth Carolina Corp. Commission, 206 U. 
 S. 1, 51 L. ed. 933, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585, 11 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 
 398; Stone v. Southern Illinois & M. Bridge Co. 206 U. S. 
 267, 51 L. ed. 1057, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 615 ; Smith v. Jennings, 
 206 U. S. 276, 51 L. ed. 1061, 27 Sup. 'Ct. Rep. 610; Pair 
 Haven & W. R. Cq^ v. New Haven, 203 U. S. 379, 51 -L. ed. 
 237, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 74 ; Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217 
 U. S. 413, 54 L. ed. 817, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 543 ; Williams v. 
 First Nat. Bank, 216 U. S. 582, 54 L. ed. 625, 30 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 441, — held not to present a Federal question. 
 
 The alleged error of a State court in not following the law 
 of another State raises no Federal question. Terry v. Davy, 
 46 C. C. A. 141, 107 Fed. 50 ; see Johnson v. New York L. 
 Ins. Co. 187 U. S. 491, 47 L. ed. 273, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 194. 
 
 Seventh. A writ of error goes only to a final judgment of 
 the State court (McKnight v. James, 155 U. S. 687, 39 L. 
 ed. 311, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 248; Great Western Teleg. Co. v. 
 Bumham, 162 II. S. 341, 40 L. ed. 992, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 850 j ; 
 not orders of a judge in chambers (Lambert v. Barrett, 157 U. 
 
APPEAL FROM STATE COURTS TO U. S. SUPREME COURT, 755 
 
 S. TOO, S9 L. ed. 866, 15 Sup. Ct Eep. 722 ; Ex parte Jacobi, 
 104 Fed. 681). 
 
 PROCEDURE. 
 
 Time Within Which to Sue Out Writ. 
 
 By U. S. Eev. Stat. see. 1008 (Corap. Stat. 1913, sec. 1649), 
 a writ of error must be sued out within two years after the 
 judgment of the State court, except when the party is under 
 disability of infancy, insanity, or imprisonment, then two years 
 from the removal of the disability. 
 
 Amount Involved. 
 
 Where a decision of a State court involves any of the ques- 
 tions indicated in section 709 of the United States Kevised 
 Statutes, as given above, the Supreme Court may revise by 
 writ of error the decision of the State court of last resort, with- 
 out any reference to the amount involved. The Habana, 175 
 LT. S. 683, 684, 44 L. ed. 322, 323, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 290. It is 
 the Federal question that gives jurisdiction under section 709, 
 and not the value of the subject-matter; and here I will call 
 your attention to amount and value as an element in the appel- 
 late jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the changes that 
 have been made in the history of that court as to amount as a 
 controlling factor in its jurisdiction. Kirby v. American Soda 
 Fountain Co. 194 U. S. 144, 48 L. ed. 912, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 619. 
 
 Effect of Amount on Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme 
 
 Court. 
 
 For a century after the organization of the government the 
 judiciary acts imposed pecuniary limits on appellate jurisdic- 
 tion. The Habana, 175 U. S. 680, 44 L. ed. 321, 20 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 290. For a long time it was fixed at two thousand, 
 dollars, and in 1875 it was raised to five thousand dollars. In 
 1889 it was provided (25 Stat, at L. p. 693, chap. 236), 
 that when the judgment or decree did not exceed five thousand 
 
750 APPEAL FROM STATE COUKTS TO V. S. SUPREME COTJET. 
 
 dollars the Supreme Court would have appellate jurisdictiom 
 ou an issue of jurisdiction in the circuit court of the United 
 States, and upon that issue only; hut if the amount of the 
 decree exceeded five thousand dollars, then the Supreme Court 
 could decide all the issues in the case on the merits. Parker 
 V. Ormsbv, 141 U. S. 81, 35 L. ed. 654, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 912; Tupper v. Wise, 110 U. S. 398, 28 L. ed. 189, 4 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 26; Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U. S. 38, 30 L. ed. 1087, 
 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1066. 
 
 Thus stood the law until 1891, when it was changed by the 
 act of ]\rarch 3d of that year. This act created a new and com- 
 plete scheme of appellate jurisdiction (see 26 Stat, at L. 826, 
 chap. 517), and under this act the appellate jurisdiction of the 
 Supreme Court was made to rest rather on the nature of the case 
 than on the amount involved. 
 
 As the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court now 
 stands, you may appeal from the circuit courts of the United 
 States on a question of jurisdiction direct to the Supreme Court 
 without reference to amount. The Habana, 175 U. S. 682, 
 683, 44 L. ed. 322, 20 Slip. Ct. Eep. 290; Kirby v. American 
 Soda Fountain Co. 194 U. S. 144, 48 L. ed. 912, 24 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 619. 
 
 In McLish V. Eoff, 141 U. S. 661, 35 L. ed. 893, 12 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 118, the repealing clause of the act of 1891 was held 
 to remove any question of amoimt as affecting jurisdiction, 
 and sections 692 and 695 of the United States Eevised Statutes 
 were held repealed by implication. 
 
 In appeals by writ of error from the Supreme Court of the 
 United States to the State court of last resort, no amount is 
 required to give jurisdiction under section 709 of the United 
 States Eevised Statutes authorizing the writ to issue. The 
 Habana, 175 U. S. 683, 44 L. ed. 322, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 290. 
 
 In appeals from the circuit court of appeals to the Supreme 
 Court of the United States the act of 1891 imposes a pecuniary 
 limit of one thousand dollars in all cases not made final in 
 the circuit court of appeals ; that is, in order to appeal in 
 this class of cases, the amount involved must exceed one thou- 
 sand dollars besides costs. And if this should not appear in 
 the record you may supply it by affidavits. (United States v. 
 Trans-Missouri Freight Asso. 166 U. S. 310, 41 L. ed. 
 1017, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 540; Whitside v. Haselton, 110 U. S. 
 
APPEAL FROM STATE COURTS TO U. S. SUPREME COURT. 757 
 
 297, 28 L. ed. 153, 4 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1; Rector v. Lipscomb, 
 141 U. S. 557, .35 L. ed. 857, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83), which 
 may be rebutted by counter-affidavits (Ibid.) ; but in determiu- 
 ing amount, if the judgment is against the plaintiff, the amount 
 in good faith claimed shovUd control, but if the judgment be 
 against the defendant then the amount of the judgment must 
 control (Gorman v. Havird, 141 U. S. 208, 35 L. "ed. 718, 11 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 943 ; J. P. Jorgenson Co. v. Rapp, 85 C. C. A. 
 364, 157 Fed. 738; New Mexico v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. 
 Co. 201 U. S. 41, 50 L. ed. 651, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 386), unless 
 there be a counterclaim disallowed (Buckstaff v. Russell & Co. 
 151 U. S. 626, 38 L. ed. 292, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 448). 
 
 In the bankrupt act of July 1, 1898, an appeal to the Su- 
 preme Court from the circuit court of appeals is allowed if the 
 amount in controversy, in the allowance or rejection of a claim, 
 exceeds two thousand dollars and a Federal question is in- 
 volved; otherwise the judgment of the circuit court of appeals 
 is final and the question can only be taken to the Supreme 
 Court by certiorari. 30 Stat, at L. 553, chap. 541. 
 
 PRACTICE IN APPEALS, 
 
 Practice. 
 
 ByU. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 1003 (Cornp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1662), 
 writs of error from the Supreme Court to the State court of 
 last resort are issued and prosecuted in the same manner and 
 are to have the same effect as if the judgment or decree ap- 
 pealed from was rendered in the United States court. U. S. 
 Rev. Stat. sec. 709. 
 
 So, then, bearing in mind the conditions above stated, and 
 this statute, you may prepare your petition for the writ of 
 error as follows: 
 
 Petition for Wt-it. 
 A. B. 1 
 
 vs. [.In Equity. 
 C. D. J 
 
 In the Supreme Court of the United 
 
 States, Term, 
 
 A. D., 19 , . . 
 
 To the Honorable , Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
 
 United States, and the Associate Justices of said Court: 
 
 Now comes A. B., plaintiff in the above cause, and would show unto this 
 
i oS APPEAL FJJOM STATE COURTS TO U. S. SUPREME COUET. 
 
 Honorable Court that in the record and proceedings, and rendition of the 
 
 decree in the above cause by the Supreme Court of the State of , 
 
 it being the highest court of said State in which a d'Bcision could be had 
 on the said suit between A. B. and C. D., manifest error has occurred, 
 greatly to his damage, whereby petitioner feels aggrieved. 
 
 That in the record and proceedings it will appear that there was drawn 
 in question (the validity of the statute, or a treaty, or an authority exer- 
 cised under the United States, and the decision was against their valid- 
 ity ) , or ( the validity of a statute or an authority exercised under said 
 State on the ground of repugnancy to the constitution, laws or treaties of 
 the United States, and the decision was in favor of the validity of the 
 law of the State), or (there was drawn in question the construction of a 
 clause of the constitution, or of a treaty, or statute or commission held 
 under tlie United States, and the decision was against the right, title, 
 privilege, or exemption specially set up or claimed under such clause, 
 treaty, statute or commission) (the Federal question particularly involved 
 in your ease being specially stated, then proceed) ; all of which is fully 
 apparent in the record and proceedings of the case, and specifically set 
 forth in the assignment of errors filed herewith. 
 
 Wherefore petitioner prays that his appeal be allowed and that a 
 transcript of the record, proceedings and papers upon which said orders 
 were made, duly authenticated, be ordered sent to the Supreme Court of 
 the United States, at Washington, D. C, under the rules of said court in 
 such cases made and provided, that the same may be inspected and cor- 
 rected as according to law and justice should be done. 
 
 R. F., 
 Solicitor. 
 
 By Whom Citation Signed and Appeal Allowed. 
 
 By section 999, U. S. Rev. Stat. (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1659), it is provided that when a writ of error is issued to a 
 State court the citation shall be signed by the chief justice, 
 judge or chancellor of the State court in which judgment was 
 rendered, or by a justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
 States, and at least thirty days' notice given. Bartemeyer v. 
 Iowa, 14 Wall. 28, 20 L. ed. 792 ; Palmer v. Donner, 7 Wall. 
 54-1, 19 L. ed. 99; Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 7 Wall. 324, 
 19 L. ed. 223; Haynor v. New York, 170 U. S. 410, 42 L. 
 ed. 1088, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 631 ; Felix v. Scharnweber, 125 
 U. S. 59, 31 L. ed. 688, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 759; Butler v. 
 Gage, 138 U. S. 56, 34 L. ed. 871, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 235. 
 It may be allowed by any of the judicial officers above named 
 (Ibid. ; Gleason v. Florida, 9 Wall. 779, 19 L. ed. 730- Aid- 
 
APPEAL FROM STATE COUKTS TO U. S. SUPREME COURT. 759 
 
 rich V. iEtna Ins. Co. 8 Wall. 495, 19 L. ed. 475; Ex parte 
 Chadwick, 159 Fed. 576; Haynor v. Xew York, 170 U. S. 
 411, 42 L. ed. 1088, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 631), but only by 
 those named. Thus where the Supreme Court of a State 
 was composed of a chief justice and three associate justices, a 
 writ allowed by an associate justice will be dismissed.. It must 
 be allowed by the chief justice (see authorities above; Barte- 
 meyer v. Iowa, 14 Wall. 28, 20 L. ed. 792; Northwestern 
 Union Packet Co. v. Home Ins. Co. 154 IT. S. 588, and 20 
 L. ed. 463, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1168) ; but in the absence of 
 the chief justice the presiding justice may act, it being shown 
 that he was acting as chief justice (Ibid.; Butler v. Gage, 
 138 U. S. 56, 34 L. ed. 871, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 235 ; Missouri 
 Valley Land Co. v. Wiese, 208 U. S. 234, 52 L. ed. 463, 28 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 294). 
 
 So the judge, chancellor, or presiding judge of any inferior 
 State court of last resort in the particular case may allow the 
 writ and sign the citation. 
 
 The allowance is essential to the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
 Court. Gleason v. Florida, 9 Wall. 783, 19 L. ed. 731; 
 Northwestern Union Packet Co. v. Home Ins. Co. 154 U. S. 
 588, and 20 L. ed. 463, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1168. It is not a 
 matter of right. Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 7 Wall. 324, 19 
 L. ed. 223. 
 
 The petition must be accompanied with an assignment of 
 errors (see fomi of assigiament), and when made to a justice 
 of the Supreme Court of the United States it must be accom- 
 panied with a complete record from the State court, so that 
 the justice to whom the application is made may ascertain 
 whether a question cognizable on appeal was made and decided 
 in the proper State court, and whether the face of the record 
 will justify the allowance of the writ. Ibid. 
 
 Order of Allowance. 
 
 Title as in -bill. 
 
 Court where allowed. 
 
 On this the day of , A. D. 19. . ., came on to be heard 
 
 the application of A. B., plaintiff (or the defendant), said plaintiff being 
 represented by counsel, for a writ of error, and it appearing to the court 
 from the petition filed herein, and the record filed therewith, that the 
 
760 APPEAL FEOM STATE COUETS TO U. S. SUPREME COUKT. 
 
 application ought to be granted and that a transcript of the reocrd and 
 proceedings and papers upon which the judgment of the court was ren- 
 dered, properly certified, should be sent to the Supreme Court of the 
 United States, as prayed for in the petition, that such proceedings may 
 be had as will be just in the premises. 
 
 It is therefore ordered that the writ of error be allowed upon the plain- 
 tiff giving bond, conditioned as the law directs, in the sum of 
 
 dollars (which may operate as a supersedeas; if so, add it), and that a 
 true copy of the record, assignment of errors and all proceedings had in 
 
 the case in the court of shall be transmitted to the 
 
 Supreme Court of the United States, properly cei-tified as the law directs, 
 tliat the said court may inspect the same and do what according to law 
 should be done. 
 
 However, a formal order is not necessary if the citation is 
 signed, and the writ of error is endorsed, allowed as seen in 
 form hereafter given. 
 
 The court upon the application may grant the writ_ of error, 
 and if to the State supreme court from the Supreme Court of 
 the United States, the following form may be used: 
 
 The President of the United States to the Honorable Judges of the Su- 
 preme Court of the State of , or to the Presiding Judge or 
 
 Chancellor of the Court of the State of , etc. — Greeting : 
 
 Because in the record and proceedings, as also in the rendition of the 
 judgment, of a plea which is in said court before you, or some of you, 
 between ( state parties ) , your court being the highest coiirt of said State 
 having jurisdiction to render judgment in the case; there was drawn in 
 question (here state any of the grounds indicated in the U. S. Rev. Stat. 
 § 907, authorizing the writ), and the decision was against the validity (or 
 in favor of the validity), etc., and there being manifest error in said 
 decision greatly to the damage of A. B., the petitioner in error, and we 
 being willing that if there is error it should be duly corrected, we do 
 therefore command you, if judgment be therein given, that, under the seal 
 of 3'our court you send the record and proceedings had in said cause to 
 the Supreme Court of the United States, together with this writ, so that 
 
 you have the same at Washington on the day of , A. D. 
 
 19 ... , in the Supreme Court to be then and there held, that the record 
 may be inspected by said court and justice done. 
 
 Witness the Hon , Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the 
 
 day of , in the year of our Lord 19 . . . 
 
 [SEAL.] Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
 Allowed on , giving bond according to law in the sum of 
 
 dollars. 
 
 L. M. 
 Justice of the Supreme Court. 
 
APPEAL FROM STATE COURTS TO U. S. SUPEE.VIE COVET. 761 
 
 The same form may be used when granted by the chief jus- 
 tice of the State court or judge or chancellor finally deciding 
 the case. The writ is a writ of the Supreme Court of the 
 United States without reference to who issues it, and whoever 
 allows it and issues the citation, but exercises an authority 
 vested by Congress in him concurrently with each of the jus- 
 tices of the Supreme Court (Felix v. Schamweber, 125 U. S. 
 59, 31 L. ed. 688, 8 Sup. Ct. Eep. Y59 ; Havnor v. New York, 
 170 U. S. 411, 42 L. ed. 1088, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 631; Clea- 
 son V. Florida, 9 Wall. 783, 19 L. ed. 731; Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 
 14 Wall. 28, 20 L. ed. 792), except that it is directed to the 
 court of last resort deciding the case, instead of the Supreme 
 Court of the State, and is signed by the clerk and endorsed 
 hj the judge of the court allowing it: "Allowed, M. F. 
 judge, etc." 
 
 Ejfect of the allowance and Certificate of a Judge or Chan- 
 cellor of a State Court. 
 
 While a chief justice, judge, or chancellor of a State court 
 may allow the writ, yet certifying such allowance, and the 
 grounds for it, cannot supply the want of evidence in the record 
 that a Federal question which would authorize the writ under 
 U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 709, did exist. Felix v. Scharnweber, 
 125 U. S. 59, 31 L. ed. 688, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 759; Louisville 
 & isi; R. Co. V. Smith H. & Co. 204 U. S. 551, 51 L. ed. 612, 
 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 401; Rector v. City Deposit Bank Co. 200 U. 
 S. 405, 50 L. ed. 527, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289 ; Allen v. Arguim- 
 ban, 198 U. S. 149, 49 L. ed. 990, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 622; 
 Home for Incurables v. ISTew York, 187 IT. S. 155, 47 L. ed. 
 117, 63 L.R.A. 329, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 84; Gulf & S. I. R. Co. 
 V. Hewes, 183 U. S. 66, 46 L. ed. 86, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 26 ; 
 Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. Adams, 180 U. S. 41, 42, 45 
 L. ed. 415^416, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 256. 
 
 The office of such certification is not to originate a Federal 
 question, but to make it more specific and certain. Ibid. ; 
 Parmelee v. Lawrence, 11 Wall. 39, 20 L. ed. 49; Newport 
 Light Co. V. Newport, 151 U. S. 537, 38 L. ed. 262, 14 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 429; Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. Adams, 180 
 
762 APPEAL FROM STATE COUETS TO U. S. SUPREME COURT. 
 
 U. S. 48, 45 L. ed. 418, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 256; Hulbert v. 
 Chicago, 202 U. S. 275, 50 L. ed. 1026, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617. 
 The Supreme Court must determine for itself from the 
 record whether a Federal question is involved (Powell v. 
 Brunswick County, 150 U. S. 439, 37 L. ed. 1136, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 166 ; Newport Light Co. v. ITewport, 151 U. S. 537, 38 
 L. ed. 262, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 429 ; Moore v. Mississippi, 21 
 Wall. 638, 639, 22 L. ed. 653, 654; Walker v. Villavaso, 6 
 Wall. 128, 18 L. ed. 854), and the writ of error must be dis- 
 missed if no Federal question appears. Onondaga JTation v. 
 Thatcher, 189 U. S. 309-311, 47 L. ed. 827, 828, 23 Sup. Ct 
 Rep. 636. 
 
 Citation. 
 
 By U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 999, (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1659), 
 when the writ is allowed a citation shall be signed by the 
 justice or judge granting the writ. Insurance Co. v. Mordecai, 
 21 How. 195, 202, 16 L. ed. 94, 96, and admonishing the 
 defendant in error to be and appear before the Supreme Court 
 of the United States to be holden at the city of Washington, 
 
 D. C, on the day of A. D. 19 , next 
 
 (See Supreme Court rule 8, sec. 5, as when to be made return- 
 able), pursuant to a writ of error filed in the office of the 
 (court in which filed) wherein A. B. was plaintiff and you 
 were defendant, that you may answer why the judgment ren- 
 dered against A. B., the plaintiff in error, may not be revised 
 and justice done in the premises. It is issued in the name 
 of the President of the United States to the defendant in error, 
 and tested in the name of the Chief Jiistice of the Supreme 
 Court of the United States, and signed by the judge allowing 
 the ivrit of error. 
 
 The service of the citation is necessary to give jurisdiction, 
 unless waived, or a general appearance entered by the defend- 
 ant in error (Dayton v. Lash, 94 U. S. 112, -24 L. ed. 33; 
 Kitchen v. Randolph, 93 U. S. 87, 23 L. ed. 810; Farmers' 
 Loan & T. Co. v. Chicago & N. p. R. Co. 19 C. C. A., 477, 34 
 U. S. App. 626, 73 Fed. 316, 317 ; Freeman v. Clay, 1 C. C. 
 A. 115, 2 U. S. App. 151, 48 Fed. 849 ; Villabolos v. United 
 States, 6 How. 90, 12 L. ed. 356) ; but service on the attorney 
 
APPEAL FROM STATE COURTS TO V. S. SUPREME COURT. 763 
 
 of record is sufficient (Bigler v. Waller, 12 Wall. 147, 20 L. 
 ed. 261; United States v. Curry, 6 How. Ill, 12 L. ed. 365; 
 Scruggs V. Memphis & C. E. Co. 181 U. S. cciv, and 26 L. 
 ed. 741). 
 
 The defendant in error must have thirty days' notice before 
 the first day of the term to which the writ is returnable, or 
 he cannot be compelled to go to a hearing, and the case can 
 only be taken up by consent during that term. Welsh v. il^n- 
 deville, 5 Cranch, 321, 3 L. ed. 113; IS^ational Bank v. 
 ]S""ational Bank, 99 U. S. 609, 25 L. ed. 362. 
 
 Bond. 
 
 But by U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 1000, (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1660), every justice or judge signing a citation on any writ of 
 error shall take good and sufficient security that the plaintiff in 
 error or appeal shall prosecute his writ or appeal to effect, and 
 if he fail to make good his plea shall answer all damages and 
 costs (when writ is to be siipersedeas) of all costs (when not to 
 act as supersedeas). This bond is to be approved by the judge 
 granting the writ. See form of appeal bond and approval. 
 
 When Writ of Error a Supersedeas. 
 
 By U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 1007, (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1666), it is provided that in any ease where a writ of error 
 may be a supersedeas, the defendant may obtain such superse- 
 deas by serving the writ of error by lodging a copy in the 
 clerk's office, where the record remains, within sixty days (Sun- 
 days excepted) after the rendering of the judgment complained 
 of, and giving the security required by laM- on the issuing of 
 citation. Danville v. Brown, 128 U. S. 504, 32 L. ed. 508, 9 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 149; Danielson v. K^orthwestern Fuel Co. 55 
 Fed. 50. 
 
 But if he desires to stay process, he may, having lodged a 
 copy of the writ of error with the clerk as aforesaid, give the 
 security required by law at any time within sixty days after 
 the rendition of such judgment, or even after sixty days, upon 
 application to a justice or judge of the appellate court for a 
 supersedeas. 
 
T64 APPEAL FEOM STATE COTTETS TO V. S. SUPEEME COUET. 
 
 Ill sucli cases, where a writ of error may be a supersedeas, 
 execution shall not issue until the expiration of ten days. 
 Therefore, to make a writ of error operate as a supersedeas, 
 it must not only be issued and served, but a copy must be 
 lodged with the clerk for the adverse party, in the office where 
 the record remains. Kitchen v, Eandolph, 93 U. S. 87, 88, 23 
 L. ed. 810, 811 ; Foster v. Kansas, 112 IT. S. 204, 28 L. ed. 
 63.0, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 897; Jabine v. Gates, 115 Fed. 864; Sage 
 V. Central E. Co. 93 U. S. 417, 23 L. ed 935; Baltimore & 
 O. E. Co. V. Harris, 7 Wall. 574, 19 L. ed. 100 ; O'Dowd v. 
 Eussell, 14 Wall. 405, 20 L. ed. 858 (See chapter 110.) 
 
 By the original act of 1789 this was required to be done 
 in ten days after rendering judgment and passing the decree 
 complained of, but by act of June, 1872, corrected by act of 
 February 17, 1875, sixty days was allowed. Boise County v. 
 Gorman, 19 Wall. 661, 22 L. ed. 226. 
 
 You will notice in the latter clause of the act, that in eases 
 where a writ of error maj^ be a supersedeas, that execution shall 
 not issue until ten days expires. Foster v. Kansas, supra. 
 This means that while you have sixty days within which to 
 obtain a supersedeas, yet after ten days from the rendition of 
 the judgment execution can issue if the supersedeas has not 
 been fixed within the ten days. Boise Coimty v. Gorman, 
 supra. 
 
 The supersedeas when issued will stay further proceedings, 
 but not interfere with executions issued after ten days and 
 before the supersedeas is sued out. Ibid. ; Doyle v. Wisconsin, 
 94 U. S. 50, 24 L. ed. 64. 
 
 Time. 
 
 In calculating lapse of time you calculate from the entry 
 of the judgment or decree, not when signed by the judge. Boise 
 County V. Gorman, 19 Wall. 665, 22 L. ed. 227; Providence 
 Eubber Co. v. Goodyear, 6 Wall. 156, 18 L. ed. 763. 
 
 In Green v. Van Buskirk, 3 Wall. 448, 18 L. ed. 245, it 
 was held that when judgment is given in a Supreme Court of 
 a State, and the record is returned to an inferior court with an 
 order to enter a judgment there, time affecting the supersedeas 
 runs from the entry of the judgment in the inferior court. 
 
APPEAL FEOM STATE COURTS TO U. S. SUPEEME COTJET. 765 
 
 After Sixty Days Cannot Obtain Supersedeas. 
 
 Unless a writ of error is siied out or an appeal perfected in 
 sixty days after the entry of a judgment, there is no power in 
 a justice of the appellate court to gi'ant a supersedeas (Logan 
 V, Goodwin, 41 C. C. A. 573, 101 Fed. 654 ; Kitchen v. Ean- 
 dolph, 93 U. S. 86, 23 L. ed. 810 ; Brown v. Evans, 18 Fed. 
 56; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Eyser, 19 Wall. 428, 22 L. ed. 
 44; Sag'e v. Central E. Co. 93 U. S. 417, 23 L. ed. 935; Texas 
 & P. E. Co. v.- Murphy, 111 U. S. 490, 28 L. ed. 493, 4 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 497; Peugh v. Davis, 110 U. S. 229, 28 L. ed. 128, 
 4 Sup. Ct. Eep. 17; Wurts v. Hoagland, 105 U. S. 702, 2G L. 
 ed. 1110 ; New England E. Co. v. Hyde, 4l C. C. A. 404, 101 
 Fed. 397; U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. lOoV, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1666 ; see Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S. 204, 28 L. ed. 630, 5 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 897) ; and after citation is signed and security 
 approved the judge of the court below has no jurisdiction to 
 grant it (Draper v. Davis, 102 U. S. 371, 26 L. ed. 122 ; ilor- 
 gan's L. & T. E. & S. S. Co. v. Texas C. E. Co. 32 Fed. 530) ; 
 but it seems if the delay was occasioned by the court, and not 
 the fault of the parties, and injustice would be done, a nunc 
 pro tu7ic order can be entered (Sage v. Central E. Co. 93 IT. S. 
 412, 23 L. ed. 933). 
 
 Act Must Be Followe'd. 
 
 A supersedeas is not obtained by virtue of any process issu- 
 ing from the court, but it follows as matter of law by complying 
 with the act of Congress. Goddard v. Orway, 94 U. S. 673, 
 24 L. ed. 238 ; Slaughter-house cases, 10 Wall. 291, 19 L. ed. 
 920'. It is indispensable that the requirements of the acts of 
 Congress be fulfilled. Jabine v. Gates, 115 Fed. 864; Balti- 
 more & O. E. Co. V. Harris, 7 Wall. 574, 19 L. ed. 100; 
 O'Dowd V. Eussell, 14 Wall. 405, 20 L. ed. 858 ; Sage v. Cen- 
 tral E. Co. 93 U. S. 417, 23 L. ed. 935. 
 
 ]Srote that the authorities above given were decided under 
 the original act of 1789 and before 1872, when the amended 
 act extended the time to sixty days for suing out a supersedeas, 
 but the necessity for strictly pursuing the statute decided by 
 these cases applies to the act of 1872. 
 
706 APl'EAL FKO-M STATE COl'KTS TO V. S. SUPKEME COUKT. 
 
 When Supersedeas Bond Becomes Impaired, 
 
 When the security of a supersedeas bond becomes impaired, 
 the Supreme Court may so adjudge it and order additional 
 security; Williams v. Claflin, 103 U. S. 753, 754, 26 L. ed. 
 606, 607; Jerome v. McCarter, 21 Wall. 31, 22 L. ed. 516. 
 
CHAPTEE CXIV. 
 
 MANDATE. 
 
 The appellate court may affirm, modify, or reverse any decree 
 or order lawfully brought before it for the review, or may direct 
 such judgment to be rendered or such further proceedings to 
 be had by the inferior court as the justice of the case may 
 require. Sec. 10, act 1891, (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1670) ; 
 Southern Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Carey, U. S. Rev. Stat. 701, U. 
 S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 571; U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 709; 117 
 Fed. 328. 
 
 How Issued. 
 
 The clerk of the appellate court issues the mandate accord- 
 ing to the order or decree of the appellate court, and certifies 
 it to the lower court. C. C. A. rule 32 (See Eule of your Cir- 
 cuit; Rule of Supreme Covirt.) 
 
 When Issued. 
 
 By Supreme Court rule 24, sec. 5, in dismissal of any suit 
 the clerk is to issue a mandate or other proper process to the 
 court below for its information, and to proceed as required. 
 
 By Supreme Court rule 39, 159 U. S. 709, mandates shall 
 issue as of course after the expiration of thirty days from the 
 day the judgment or decree is entered, unless time enlarged 
 by order of the court or a justice thereof in vacation. 
 
 Circuit court of appeals rule 32 requires a mandate or other 
 proper process to be issued on the order of the court in order 
 to inform the co^^rt below of the proceedings had, and that 
 further proceedings may be had in the court below as to law 
 and justice may appertain (See Rule of your Circuit.) 
 
 767 
 
768 MANDATE. 
 
 Executing It. 
 
 The mandate is the guide in executing the judgment, and 
 the lower court must follow it and carry the decree into effect. 
 Southern Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Carey, 117 Fed. 328; Durant v. 
 Essex Co. (Durant v. Storrow), 101 U. S. 555, 25 L. ed. 
 961; West v. Brashear, 14 Pet 54, 10 L. ed. 351; Ex parte 
 Dubuque & P. E. Co. 1 Wall. 69, 17 L. ed. 514; Great North- 
 em K. Co. V. Western U. Teleg. Co. 98 C. C. A. 193, 174 Eed. 
 321 ; see Illinois v. Illinois C. K. Co. 184 U. S. 7Y, 46 L. ed. 
 440, 22 Sup. Ct. Kep. 300 ; Ke Washington & G. K. Co. 140 
 U. S. 92, 35 L. ed. 340, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 673; see Ex parte 
 First ISTat. Bank, 207 U. S.. 66, 52 L. ed. 106, 28 Sup. Ct. Kep. 
 23. The lower court has nothing to do but execute the man- 
 date. Ibid. ; Perkins v. Fourniquet, 14 How. 330, 14 L. ed. 
 442; Aspen Min. & Smelting Co. v. Billings, 150 U. S. 37, 37 
 L. ed. 988, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 4; Bissell Carpet-Sweeper Co. v. 
 Goshen Sweeper Co. 19 C. C. A. 25, 43 U. S. App.' 47, 72 Fed. 
 549; Ee Sanford Fork & Tool Co. 160 U. S. 255, 40 L. ed. 
 416, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 291; Gaines v. Eugg, 148 U. S. 243, 
 37 L. ed. 437, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 611 ; White v. Bruce, 48 C. 
 C. A. 400, 109 Fed; 364; Chapman v. Yellow Poplar Lumber 
 Co. 32 C. C. A. 402, 61 U. S. App. 499, 89 Fed. 904. The 
 lower court cannot vary it, or examine if for , any purpose 
 other than its execution, or give any or further relief, or, review 
 it for apparrent error upon any matter decided on appeal, or 
 intermeddle with it further than to settle so much as has been 
 remanded. If in doing so it mistakes or misconceives the order 
 of the appellate court, and does not give effect in fuU to the 
 mandate, its action may be controlled by appeal or mandamus, 
 as will be hereafter seen. Ibid. ; Southern Bldg. & L. Asso. v. 
 Careyj 117 Fed. 328 ; Livingston v. Story, 12 Pet. 343, 9 L. 
 ed. 1110; James v. Central Trust Co. 47 C. C. A. 374, 108 
 Fed. 931, and cases cited; Bissell Carpet-Sweeper Co. v. 
 Goshen Sweeper Co. 19 C. C. A. 25, 43 U. S. App. 47, 72 Fed. 
 545 ; Great Northern E. Co. v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 98 C. C. 
 A. 193, 174 Fed. 323 ; Ouray County v. Geer, 47 C. C. A. 450, 
 108 Fed. 480; Ee Potts, 166 U. S. 263, 41 L. ed. 994, 17 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 520 ; Kingsbury v. Buckner, 134 U. S. 650, 33 L. ed. 
 1047, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 638; Fellows v. Borden's Condensed 
 
MAS DATE. 
 
 769 
 
 Milk Co. 1S8 Fed. 863; Great JSTorthern R Co. v. Western U. 
 Teleg. Co. 98 C. C. A. 193, 174 Fed. 321. 
 
 Effect of Mandate. 
 
 The issues in the case are closed, and the decision embodied 
 in the mandate constitutes an adjudication of all questions of 
 law and fact in the case before the court. Omaha Electric 
 Light & P. Co. Y. Omaha, 133 C. C. A. 52, 216 Fed. 854; Har- 
 rison V. Clarke, 105 C. C. A. 197, 1S2 Fed. 768, and cases 
 cited; Taenzer & Co. v. Chicago, K. I. & P. E. Co. 112 C. C A. 
 153, 191 Fed. 543 ; Ex parte Union S. B. Co. 178 U. S. 319, 44 
 L. ed. 1084, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 944 ; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 
 193 U. S. 554, 48 L. ed. 791, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 538; iletsinger 
 V. Anderson, 96 C. C.A. 445, 171 Fed. 789, 790 and cases 
 cited; Chaffin v^ Taylor, 116 U. S. 567, 29 L. ed. 727, 6 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 518; Thompson v. Maxwell Land Grant & E. Co. 168 
 U. S. 451-456, 42 L. ed. 539-542, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 121 ; Hli- 
 nois V. Illinois C. E. Co. 184 U. S. 92, 46 L. ed. 447, 22 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 300; Mutual Eeserve Fund Life Asso. v. Beatty, 
 35 G. C. A. 573, 93 Fed. 747 ; Montana Min. Co. v. St. Louis 
 Min. & Mill. Co. 78. C. C. A. 33, 147 Fed. 897; Orient Ins. 
 Co. V. Leonard, 57 C. C. A. 176, 120 Fed. 808; Patillo v. 
 Allen-West Commission Co. 47 C. C. A. 637, 108 Fed. 723 ; 
 Illinois ex rel. Hunt v. Illinois C. E. Co. 34 C. C. A. 138, 91 
 Fed. 955; Ee Gamewell Fire-Alarm Teleg. Co.- 20 C. C. A. 
 Ill, 33 TJ. S. App. 452, 73 Fed. 910 ; Ee Sanford Fork & Tool 
 Co. 160 tr. S. 247, 40 L. ed. 414, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 291; Ee 
 ,Potts, 166 U. S. 267, 41 L. ed. 995, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 520. 
 When there is no direction to enter any specific decree, but there 
 is only a simple reversal, the effect is to put the case in the same 
 posture as if no decree had been entered, and amendments may 
 be permitted enlarging the issues. Ee Sanford Fork & Tool 
 Co. 160 U. S. 247, 40 L. ed. 414, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 291 ; Hawk- 
 ins V. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. E. Co. 39 0. C. A. 538, 99 Fed. 
 322; See Atlanta K. & K E. Co. v. Hooper, 44 C. C. A. 586, 
 105. Fed. 550; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U. S. 553, 48 
 L. ed. 791, 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 538.r So the court below cannot 
 jgrant a rehearing, or new trial, or permit a new defense or 
 aoiendment to the answer, unlesS; the right is resented in the 
 
 S. Eq.— 49. 
 
770 MAS^DATE. 
 
 decree of the appellate court, or pel-mission given on applica- 
 tion to that court where the case has been considered on its 
 merits. Ee Potts, 166 U. S. 267, 268, 41 L. ed. 995, 996, 17 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 520; Walker v. Brown, 86 Fed. 364; Re Sanford 
 Fork & Tool Co. 160 U. S. 247, 40 L. ed. 514, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 291; Sibbald v. United States, 12 Pet. 488, 9 L. ed. 1167; 
 Re Gamewell Fire-Alarm Teleg. Co. 20 C. C. A. Ill, 33 U. S. 
 App. 452, 73 Fed. 910 ; Hawkins v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. 
 R. Co. 39 C. C. A. 538, 99 Fed. 322; Continental Trust Co. 
 V. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R. Co. 99 Fed. 176 ; Ex parte Du- 
 buque & P. R. Co. 1 Wall. 69, 17 L. ed. 514; see Smale v. 
 Mitchell, 143 U. S. 99, 36 L. ed. 90, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 353. 
 Nor will an appellate court remand a bill to set up new grounds, 
 for relief. Warner v. Godfrey, 186 U. S. 377, 46 L. ed 1208, 
 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 852. A mandate ordering a new trial opens 
 up the entire case; it assumes the same posture as if no decree 
 has been entered, and amendments enlarging the issues and 
 permitting further proof are admissible (Potts v. Creager, 71 
 Fed. 574; Hawkins v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. R. Co. 39 C. 
 C. A. 538, 99 Fed. 324; Citing Re Sanford Fork & Tool Co. 
 160 U. S. 247, 40 L. ed. 414, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 291 ; see Burn- 
 ham V. North Chicago Street R. Co. 32 C. C. A. 64, 60 U. S. 
 App. 225, 88 Fed. 627), except iipon issues made and dis- 
 tinctly decided (Wayne County v. Kennicott, 94 U. S. 499, 24 
 L. ed'. 260; Balch v. Haas, 20 C. C. A. 151, 36 U. S. App. 693, 
 73 Fed. 976; Chaffin v. Taylor, 116 U. S. 567, 29 L. ed. 727, 
 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 518.) So where a case has been considered at 
 length on its merits, and been remanded for further proceed- 
 ings, the defendant will not be permitted to amend his answer 
 so as to deny a fact affirmatively passed upon and determined 
 by the Appellate court. Walker v. Brown, 86 Fed. 364; Hill 
 v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 113 Fed. 44; S. C. 55 C. C. A. 536; 
 118 Fed. 708 ; Brown v. Lanyon Zinc Co. 102 C. C. A. 497, 
 179 Fed. 311, and cases cited. Or where it reserves a single 
 question of fact left open to be determined, that question alone 
 can be tried. Ibid. ; Re Sanford Fork & Tool Co. 160 U. S. 
 247, 40 L. ed. 414, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 291 ; Illinois ex rel. Hunt 
 V. Illinois C. R. Co. 34 C. C. A. 138, 91 Fed. 957 ; S. C. 184 
 U. S. 92, 46 L. ed. 447, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 300. _ So where a 
 decree is affirmed, the lower court can only record the decree 
 
M.4X1)ATE. 771 
 
 and proceed with its execution. Dnrant v. Essex Co. (Diirant 
 V. StoiTow), 101 U. S. 555, 25 L. ed. 961; Kimberly v. Arms, 
 40 Fed. 551 ; Ee Washington & G. K. Co. 140 U. S. 96, 35 L. ed. 
 341, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 673; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 55 C. 
 C. A. 536, 118 Fed. 711. The effect of the decrees and man- 
 dates of the circuit court of appeals is the same as that of the 
 Supreme Court. Bissell Carpet-Sweeper Co. v. Goshen 
 Sweeper Co. 19 C. C. A. 25, 43 U. S. App. 47, 72 Fed. 545. 
 
 So in second appeals or error, only proceedings subsequent 
 to mandate are carried up, and no inquiry is allowed into origi- 
 nal judgment. Tyler v. Magwire, 17 Wall. 283, 284, 21 L. ed. 
 583, 584 ; Wayne County v. Kennicott, 94 U. S. 499, 24 L. ed. 
 260; Souer v.^De Bary, 44 C. C. A. 484, 105 Fed. 293; Texas 
 & P. E. Co. V. Wilder, 41 C. C. A. 305, 101 Fed. 198, 199, 
 and cases cited. 
 
 Issuing Execution. 
 
 The appellate court cannot issue execution; if necessary it 
 may be provided for in the mandate. Sec. 10, act 1891, 26 
 Stat, at L. 829, chap. 517, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1670. The 
 court below must execute the mandate. Sibbald v. United 
 States, 12 Pet. 492, 9 L. ed. 1169 ; Third Xat. Bank v. Gordon, 
 53 Fed. 473; Tyler v. Magwire, 17 Wall. 283, 21 L. ed. 583. 
 Where a State court refuses to carry mandate into effect, the; 
 Supreme Court may on appeal proceed to a final decision and 
 award execution. Tyler v. Magwire, 17 Wall. 290, 21 L. ed. 
 585; Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 281, 40 L. ed. 969, 16 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 754. Xew rule 8. 
 
 Remedy if the Court Does Not Enforce the Mandate. 
 
 It may be by appeal or mandamus. 
 
 When by Appeal. 
 
 Where the court below errs in construing opinion, the rem- 
 edy is by appeal. James v. Central Trust Co. 47 C. C. A. 
 374, 108 Fed. 931, and cases cited, but in Perkins v. Tourni- 
 quet, 14 How. 330, 14 L. ed. 442, it is said you may use 
 
772 MANDATE. 
 
 either mandamus, or appeal. Ee Blake, 175 U. S. 117, 44 L. 
 ed. 95, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep?^42; see Ee Westervelt, 39 C. C. A, 
 350, .98 Fed. 912 ; Tyler v. Magwire, 17 Wall. 290, 21 L. ed. 
 585 ; see Metealf v. Watertown, 16 C. C. A. 37, 34 U; S. App. 
 107, 68 Fed. 861. 
 
 When hy Mandamus. 
 
 Where the mandate leaves nothing to the judgment or discre- 
 tion of the court below, and full effect is not given to the 
 mandate, a mandamus may be applied for. Ee Blake, 175 U. 
 S. 117, 44 L. ed. 95, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 42 ; Perkins v. Tourni- 
 quet, 14 How. 330, 14 L. ed. 442; Ee Washington & G. R. 
 Co. 140 U. S. 95, 35 L. ed. 341, 11 Sup-. Ct. Eep. 673, and- 
 cases cited ; City :^rat. Bank v. Hunter, 152 U. S. 512, 38 L. 
 ed. 534, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 675 ; Ee City ^^at. Bank, 153 U. S. 
 246, 38 L. ed. 705, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 804; Gaines v. Eugg, 148 
 U. S. 243, 37 L. ed. 437, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 611 ; Ee Potts, 166 
 U. S. 263, 41 L. ed. 994, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 520; Ex parte 
 Sawyer, 21 Wall. 235, 22 L. ed. 617; Ee Huguley Mfg. Co. 
 184 U. S. 301, 46 L. ed. 551, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 455; Ee San-- 
 ford Fork & Tool Co. 160 U. S. 247, 40 L. ed. 414, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 291. 
 
 In Mason v. Pewabic Min. Co. 153 U. S. 361, 38 L. ed. 
 745, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 847, it is said that where a mandate of 
 the court has been misconstrued or disregarded, the proper 
 remedy is by mandamus, but where the action of the lower 
 court conforms to the mandate, there can be neither mandamus 
 nor appeal. Texas & P. E. Co. v. Anderson, 149 U. S. 237, 
 37 L. ed. 717, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 843; United States v. :New 
 York Indians, 173 U. S. 464, 43 L. ed. 769, 19 Sup. Ct. liep. 
 464. 
 
 Can Court Recall Mandate After Term. 
 
 See Phipps v. Sedgwick, 131 U. S. cxxxix Appx., and 24 
 L. ed 595;. Gardner v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. 131 U. 
 S. eiii Appx. and 21 L. ed. 141. See Herold v. Kahn, 90 0. 
 C. A. 307, 163 Fed. 947, where mandate was recalled; also 
 Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee,' 163 U. S. 416, 41 L. ed. 311, 
 
MANDATE. 773 
 
 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1113. In Cannon v. United States, 116 U. 
 S. 55, 29 L. ed. 561, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 278, the mandate was 
 recalled for want of jurisdiction. In Reynolds v. Manhattan 
 Trust Co. 48 C. C. A. 249, 109 Fed. 97, it is said the court 
 has no power to recall a mandate after the term has expired. 
 See, also, Waskey v. Hammer, 102 C. C. A. 629, 179 Fed. 273. 
 
 Stay of Mandate. 
 
 The stay of mandate is in effect the retaining jurisdiction of 
 the cause so that a motion for rehearing may be maintained 
 after the term. Buijget v. Robinson, 59 C. C. A. 260, 123 Fed. 
 262; Omaha Electric Light & P. Co. v. Omaha, 133 C. C. A. 
 52, 216 Fed. 855, and cases cited. 
 
 Second Appeals. 
 
 We have seen already that in second appeals no inquiry is 
 allowed into the original judgment, and where the decision of 
 the lower court is in accord with the mandate no appeal will 
 be allowed. United States v. New York, 173 U. S. 464, 43 L. 
 ed. 769, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 464 ; Kingsbury v. Buckner, 134 U. 
 S. 650, 33 L. ed. 1047, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638 ; Mackall v. Eich- 
 ards, 116 U. S. 45, 29 L. ed. 558, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 234; Texas 
 & P. E. Go. V. Anderson, 149 U. S. 237, 37 L. ed. 717, 13 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 843. They apply when the mandate of the court has 
 not been properly executed (The Lady Pike [Pearce v. Ger- 
 mania Ins. Co.] 96 U. S. 461, 24 L. ed. 672), or when issues 
 arise not settled by the mandate. (Hinckley v. Morton, 103 U. 
 S. 764, 26 L. ed. 458). When allowed, they bring up only the 
 proceedings subsequent to the mandate. Tyler v. Magwire, 17 
 Wall. 253, 21 L. ed. 576 ; Clark v. Keith, 106 U. S. 465, 27 
 L ed. 302, 1 Sup. Ct. Eep. 568 ; United States v. Camou, 184 
 U. S. 572, 46 L. ed. 694, 22 Sup, Ct. Eep. 505 ; Washington 
 Bridge Co. v. Stewart, 3 How. 413, 11 L. ed. 658; Stoll \-. 
 loving, 120 Fed. 806, and cases cited ; Guarantee Co. of N". A. 
 V. Phenix Ins. Co. 59 C. C. A. 376, 124 Fed. 174 ; Montgom- 
 ery County V. Cochran, 62 C. C. A. 70, 126 Fed. 456. 
 
CHAPTEK CXV. 
 
 REMOVALS. 
 
 There have always been two ways of removing a cause from 
 a State court to a Federal court — one, as we have before seen 
 under TJ. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 709, by a writ of error from the 
 Supreme Court of the United States to the court of last resort 
 of a State; the other, by petition and removal from a State 
 court to a circuit court of the United States. See Judicial 
 Code, sec. 28, (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1010.) 
 
 This last provision for removal to a circuit court of the 
 United States was made by Congress in the judiciary act of 
 1789, section 12, U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 639, clause 1, and this 
 act continued in force until 1875. Under this act no removal 
 from a circuit court to a State court, based on the fact of a Fed- 
 eral question could be made, but only when the jurisdiction 
 rested upon diversity of citizenship, and it was not until 1875 
 that the fact that the case depended on a Federal question, that 
 any removal from a State court to a circuit court of the United 
 States was permitted. 
 
 By the second section of the act of 1875, any suit of a civil 
 nature where the matter in dispute exceeded the sum or value 
 of five hundred dollars arising under the Constitution or laws 
 of the United States, or treaties made, or in which the suit 
 depended on a diversity of citizenship, etc., either party could 
 remove it into the circiiit court of the United States ; and, fur- 
 ther, that when there was a separable controversy in a suit 
 which could be wholly determined between citizens of different 
 States, either one or more of the defendants, or plaintiffs so 
 interested could remove the case from the State to the Federal 
 court. 
 
 Thus stood the law until 1887, when Congress passed an- 
 other jurisdictional and removal act, which was revised and 
 corrected in 1888, and known as the act of 1887 and 1888, 
 which is now in force. 
 
 774 
 
EEMO\'ALS. 775 
 
 The first section of the act has already been given and dis- 
 cussed in detail, and we saw the jurisdiction of the Federal 
 conrts was contracted by increasing the amount or value 
 involved from five hundred to t«o thousand dollars, but the 
 grounds of jurisdiction were not changed otherwise. Eoulk v. 
 Gray, 120 Fed. 159-161. 
 
 By section 1 of the act of 1888, providing for removals, it 
 was provided that any suit of a ci\dl nature, in law or equity, 
 arising under the Constitution, or laws of the United States, 
 or treaties made or to be made, or which shall be made under 
 their authority (of which the district courts of the United 
 States are given original jurisdiction by the preceding section), 
 which may now be pending, or which may hereafter be brought 
 in any State court, may be removed by the defendant or defend- 
 ants therein to the the circuit court of the United States for the 
 proper district. jSTew Code, sec. 28. 
 
 Thus far it provides for any suit depending on a Federal 
 question to be removed to a Federal circuit court by the defend- 
 ant or defendants. It then proceeds : Any other suits of a 
 civil nature, at law or in equity, of which the district courts 
 of the United States are given jiirisdiction by section 1 of the 
 act, which are now pending or may hereafter be brought in a 
 State court, may be removed into the district court of the 
 United States by the defendant or defendants therein being 
 nonresidents of the State. Xew Code, sec. 28. 
 
 Again, it retained the separable clause of the Act of 1875, 
 with a change as follows : "And when in any suit mentioned 
 in section 2 there shall be a controversy which is wholly between 
 citizens of different States, and which can be fully determined 
 between them, then either one or more of the defendants actu- 
 ally interested can remove the case." It is thus seen by the 
 act of 1888 jurisdiction by removal has been greatly restricted. 
 iS^ew Code, sec. 28. 
 
 First. The amount or value necessary to jurisdiction of 
 the district courts of the United States was increased from five 
 himdred dollars, exclusive of costs, to two thousand dollars, 
 exclusive of interest and costs, and now raised to three thousand 
 dollars exclusive of interests and costs. New Code, sec. 24. 
 
 Second. Jurisdiction by removal under this act is limited 
 to cases of which the district court of the United States is 
 
776 REMOVALS. 
 
 given original jurisdiction by section 1, — that is, to such suits 
 as might have been instituted by the plaintiff in the United 
 States circuit court under the first section of the act. Ex parte 
 Wisner, 203 U. S. 449-457, 51 L. ed. 264-267, 27 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 150, and cases cited; Yellow Aster Min. & Mill. Co. v. 
 Crane Co. 80 C. C. A. 566, 150 h'cd. 580 ; Blunt v. Southern R. 
 Co. 155 Fed. 499 ; Baxter, S. & S. Const. Co. v. Hammond lUg. 
 Co. 154 Fed. 992 (See chap. 121, p. 838). New Code, sec. 28. 
 
 Third. Instead of "either party," as in the act of 1875, 
 having the right of removal, only the defendant, or defendants, 
 imder the act of 1888, can remoA'e the case when the case de- 
 pends on a Federal question, and in other cases only by defend- 
 ant, or defendants, when nonresidents of the State in which the 
 suit is brought. Monroe v. Williamson, 81 Fed. 988, 989 (See 
 "Who Can Remove"). Xew Code, sec. 28. 
 
 Fourth. In the clause providing for the removal of a separ- 
 able controversy by either party interested therein, only the de- 
 fendant or the defendants who are nonresidents of the State can 
 remove the controversy to the United States circuit court (See 
 "Who Can Remove," "When Controversy Separable"). ISTew 
 Code, sec. 28. Casey v. Baker, 212 Fed. 247 ; Hagerla v. Mis- 
 sissippi River Power Co. 202 Fed. 773 ; Judicial Code, sec. 
 28. Burnett v. Spokane, P. & S. R. Co. 210 Fed. 94;- Tullar 
 V. Illinois C. R. Co. 213 Fed. 280. 
 
 The right of removal is not changed by the new Code, except 
 as to amount, and procedure as shown in section 29 of the Code. 
 Bogue V. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 193 Fed. 730. As to the 
 Construction of sec. 28 Code, see Smellie v. Southern P. R. Co. 
 197 Fed. 643 ; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 
 201 Fed. 934; Springer v. American Tobacco Co. 208 Fed, 
 200 ; Storm Lake Tub k Tank Factory v. Minneapolis & St. L. 
 R. Co. 209 Fed. 895 ; St. John v. United States Fidelity & G. 
 Co. 213 Fed. 685 ; Vestal v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & L 
 Co. 210 Fed. 376. 
 
 See sec. 28, ISTew Code, chap. 3, providing no case can be 
 removed relating to the liability of common carriers to their 
 employees, brought in a State court. Eft'ective January 1st, 
 1912. Patton v. Cincinnati, I\T. Q. & T. P. R. Co. 208 Fed. 29; 
 Strauser v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 193 Fed. 293; Eng. v. 
 Southern P. Co. 210 Fed. 92 ; Gibson v. Bellingham & N. R. 
 
E.EMOVALS. 11 I 
 
 Co. 213 Fed. 488. Unless brought under the State act, Strother 
 V. Union P. R Co. 220 Fed. 732. State statutes seeking to 
 prevent removals are uiieonstitutional. Western U. Teleg. Co. 
 V. Frear, 216 Fed. 200. 
 
 Local Influence, 
 
 Under the same section (Xo. 2) of the act a provision is 
 made for removal on the ground of local influence, and which 
 provides that where a suit is now pending or may hereafter 
 be brought in a State court in which there is a controversy 
 between a citizen of another State, any defendant being a citi- 
 zen of another State may remove such suit into the circuit 
 court of the United States for the proper district, at any time 
 before the trial thereof, when it shall be made to appear to such 
 circuit court that from prejudice or local influence he will not 
 be able to obtain justice in such Stat* court, or anj- other State 
 court to which the defendant under the State laws may remove 
 the same, because of such prejudices or local influence; pro- 
 vided, however, that if it should further appear that there are 
 other defenlants not affected by such prejudice or local influ- 
 ence, and there can be a separation of the parties to the suit 
 who are affected by this local influence without prejudice to 
 those who are not affected, then the circuit court shall remand 
 the cause as to such parties not affected by the local influence. 
 Crotts V. Southern K. Co. 90 Fed. 2 ; Fisk v. Henarie, 142 U. 
 S. 468, 35 L. ed. 1082, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 207. (See "Practice" 
 under this section. See "Eemoval on Ground of Local Preju- 
 dice.") Section 28, new Code, chap. 3 (Comp. Stat. 1913, 
 sec. 1010). 
 
 Agreements Not to Remove Suits. 
 
 States statutes have been frequently enacted requiring corpo- 
 rations admitted to do business in the State to sign an agree- 
 ment not to remove causes to the Federal court. All such 
 conditions are unconstitutional and void. Western U. Teleg. 
 Co. V. Frear, 216 Fed. 200-202, and authorities cited. 
 
CHAPTEE CXVI. 
 
 PROCEEDINGS IN STATE COURTS. 
 
 Time of Filing PetHion. 
 
 By section 3 of the act of 1888 it is provided that a petition 
 must be filed in the State court asking for a removal of the 
 suit to the United States circuit court (See "Motion to Ee- 
 mand;" First Nat. Bank v. Prager, 34 C. C. A. 51, 63 U. S. 
 App. 703, 91 Fed. 689; Wilson v. Giberson, 124 Fed. 701), 
 of the district in which the suit is brought; and requires the 
 petition to be filed at or before the time when, by the law or 
 practice of the State court, the petitioner is required to plead 
 or answer to the suit (Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. E. Co. v. 
 Daugherty, 138 U. S. 298, 34 L. ed. 963, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 306; Austin v. Gagan, 5 L.E.A. 476, 39 Fed. 626; Fox v. 
 Southern E. Co. 80 Fed. 94.5 ; Heller v. Ilwaco Mill & Lumber 
 Co. 178 Fed. 112). The cause cannot be removed by consent; 
 petition and bond must be filed within the time required ; First 
 JS^at. Bank v. Prager, 34 C. C. A. 51, 63 U. S. App. 703, 91 
 Fed. 689. New Code, sec. 29 (Comp. Stat. 1913, see. 1011); 
 Higson V. North Eiver Ins. Co. 184 Fed. 169. 
 
 The petition should be verified, but if no objection made on 
 this gTound, the removal would not be affected. Porter v. 
 Northern P. E. Co. 161 Fed. 773; Howard v. Gold Eeefs, 102 
 Fed. 657; see Donovan v. Wells F. & Co. 22 L.E.A. (N.S.) 
 1250, 94 C. C. A. 609, 169 Fed. 367; Canal & C. Streets E. 
 Co. V. Hart, 114 U. S. 660, 29 L. ed. 228, 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 1127. All essential averments showing jurisdiction on re- 
 moval must be set forth. Gillespie v. Pocahontas Coal & Coke 
 Co. 162 Fed. 744; Alexander Nat. Bank v. Willis C. Bates 
 Co. 87 C. C. A. 643, 160 Fed. 839. Allegations not denied 
 by the record are taken as true. Atlanta K. & N. E. Co. v. 
 Southern E. Co. 82 C. C. A. 256, 153 Fed. 122, 11 A. & E. 
 
 778 
 
PKOCEEDINGS IN STATE COUKTS. 779 
 
 Ann. Cas. 766; Carlisle v. Suniiet Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 116 
 Fed. 896. The record may be looked to, in aid of the allega- 
 tions of the petition. Gillespie v. Pocahontas Coal & Coke Co. 
 162 Fed. 744; Hadiield v. Northwestern Life Assur. Co. 105 
 Ted. 530. 
 
 See see. 29, chap. 3, new Code, embodying sec. 3 of the act 
 of 1888. 
 
 As to construction, see Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Louisville 
 & N. R. Co. 201 Fed. 934; Adams v. Puget Sound Traction, 
 ■Light & Power Co. 207 Fed. 205; Murray v. Southern Bell 
 Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 210 Fed. 925; as to veriiication of the 
 petition, St. John v. United States Fidelity & G. Co. 213 Fed. 
 685. Written notice of intent to file petition for removal is 
 mandatory (see notice of filing). Compliance with sec. 29, 
 Code, accomplishes the entire removal. Williston v. Raymond, 
 213 Fed. 527; Montgomery v. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. 218 
 Fed. 47L 
 
 Bond. 
 
 With the petition for removal must be filed a bond with good 
 and sufficient security, conditioned to file a copy of the record 
 of the case pending in the State court in the district court of 
 the United States within thirty days from the date of filing the 
 petition. Chase v. Erhardt, 198 Fed. 306 ; new Code, sec. 29. 
 As to filing bond within the time see sec. 1, act 1888 ; Clark v. 
 Guy, 114 Fed. 783 ; Austin v. Gagan, 5 L.R.A. 476, 39 Fed. 
 626, 628 ; Bryant Bros. Co. v. Robinson, 79 C. C. A. 259, 140 
 Fed. 321 ; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Langley, 145 Fed. 415 ; Probst 
 V. Cowen, 91 Fed. 929, 930 ; People's Bank v. ^tna Ins. Co. 
 53 Fed. 161; Alexandria ISTat. Bank v. Willis C. Bates Co. 87 
 C. C. A. 643, 160 Fed. 839. One good surety is suflicient. 
 Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 472, 25 L. ed. 599. It is not neces- 
 sary for the removing party to sign. Groton Bridge & Mfg. 
 Co. V. American Bridge Co. 137 Fed. 291. A seal is not 
 necessary. Loop v. Winters, 115 Fed. 364. As to form, see 
 Groton Bridge & Mfg. Co. v. American Bridge Co. supra. 
 
 While informality in petition and bond may be waived by 
 a failure to promptly object, yet a failure to file a bond is not 
 waived. 25 Stat, at L. 435, chap. 866, U. S. Comp. Stat. 
 
7S0 PKOCEEDIXGS IN STATE COrETS. 
 
 1901, p. 510; Alexandria ?J at. Bank v. Willis C. Bates Co. 
 ST C. C. A. 643, 160 Fed. 839 ; Austin v. Gagan, 5 L.R.A. 476, 
 ;i9 Fed. 626; Clark v. Guy, 114 Fed. 783. 
 
 Informality may be waived or amended. Cobum v. Cedar 
 Valley Land"& Cattle Co. 25 Fed. 791; Johnson v. F. C. Aus- 
 tin iifg. Co. 76 Fed. 616; Probst v. Cowen, 91 Fed. 929; 
 Deford v. ilehaffy, 13 Fed. 487. 
 
 It seems that when made by attorney without authority, it 
 may be ratified before motion to remand. Ashe v. Union Cent. 
 L. ins. Co. 115 Fed. 236. See Alexandria :Sa.t. Bank v. Willis " 
 C. Bates Co. 87 C. C. A. 643, 160 Fed. 839. 
 
 Effect of -Filing Petition and Bond. 
 
 The petition and bond must be filed in the county in which 
 the venue is laid (^oble v. ^lassachusetts Ben. Asso. 48 Fed. 
 337), and a proper petition and bond having been filed, it 
 does not require any order of the State coiirt to remove the 
 ease; the jurisdiction of the State court ceases, and the juris- 
 diction of the Federal court attaches at once. Eisenmann v. 
 Delemar's Xevada Gold Min. Co. 87 Fed. 248 ; Mutual L. Ins. 
 Co. V. Langley, 145 Fed. 415 ; Barlow v. Chicago & X. W. R. 
 Co. 164 Fed. 765 ; La Page v. Day, 74 Fed. 977 ; Mecke v. 
 Valley Town Mineral Co. 89 Fed. 209; Johnson v. Comput- 
 ing Scale Co. 139 Fed. 339; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. South- 
 ern E. Co. 88 Fed. 803 ; Kern v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 485, 
 
 26 L. ed. 354; National S. S. Co. v. Tugman, 106 U. S. 118, 
 
 27 L. ed. 87, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58; Burlington, C. R. & K R. 
 Co. V. Dunn, 122 U. S. 513, 30 L. ed. 1159, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 1262 ; Hamilton v. Fowler, 83 Fed. 325 ; Crehore v. Ohio & 
 :\r. R. Co. 131 U.. S. 243, 33 L. ed. 145, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 692. 
 There has been much conflict as to the proposition of the eo 
 instanti removal upon filing petition and bond. See Mays v. 
 Xewlin, 143 Fed. 576, 577, collecting authorities pro and con ; 
 Coker V. Monaghan Mills, 110 Fed. 806. The State court 
 declining to remove does not affect the jurisdiction of the 
 United States court if the case is removable. Kern v. Huide- 
 koper, 103 U. S. 490, 26 L. ed. 356 ; Kirby v. Chicago & IST. W. 
 R. Co. 106 Fed. 551 ; Atlantic Coast Line E. Co. v. Bailey, 151 
 Fed. 891. Whatever be the action of the State court the de- 
 
PKOCEEDINGS ISr STATE COL'KTS, 781 
 
 fendant may file the record in the Federal court and proceed 
 with the ease as if originally filed there, for the jurisdiction of 
 the Federal court depends on the removability of the case, and 
 not the order of the State court (Lund v. Chicago, R. I. & P. 
 K. Co. 78 Fed. .385 ; Hickman v. Missouri, K. & T. E. Co. 97 
 Fed. 113; Kirby v. Chicago & X. W. E. Co. 106 Fed. 551; 
 Chesapeake 6: 0. E. Co. v. White, 111 U. S. 137, 28 L. ed. 378, 
 4 Sup. Ct. Eep. 353 ; Lake Street Elev. E. Co. v. Farmers' 
 Loan ir T. Co. 23 C. C. A. 448, 46 U. S. App. 630, 77 Fed 
 773; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Bailey, 151 Fed. 893j ; 
 and should the Federal court decide for the defendant, he may 
 enjoin the execution of a State judgment against him in the 
 same case, or the State court from further proceeding (Atlan- 
 tic Coast Line E. Co. v. Bailey, 151 Fed. 896; Dietzsch v. 
 Huidekoper [Kern v. Huidekoper] 103 U. S. 498, 26 L. ed. 
 498; AVagner v. Drake, 31 Fed. 852; Frishraan v. Insurance 
 Cos. 41 Fed. 449 ; French v. Hay [French v. Stewart] 22 Wall. 
 2.52, 22 L. ed. 858; Chicago, E. L & P. E. Co. v. Stepp, 151 
 Fed. 909; ilissouri, K. & T. E. Co. v. Scott, 4 Woods, 386, 
 13 Fed. 79:!. See Coeur D'Alene E. & JvTav. Co. v. Spalding, 
 35 C. C. A. 302, 93 Fed. 280 ; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Langley, 
 145 Fed. 415), and thus protect its jurisdiction and judgment, 
 as we have before seen. Baltimore & 0. E. Co. v. Ford, 35 
 Fed. 173 ; Bowdoin College v. Mei'ritt, 59 Fed. 7. Where the 
 State court proceeds to trial under these circumstances, its 
 judgment would be a nullity if the eau.se had been properly 
 removed. Texas & P. E, Co. v. Davis, 93 Tex. 378, 55 S. \V. 
 562. See, hoAvever, Pioneer Sav. k L. Co. v. Peck, 20 Tex. 
 Civ. App. Ill, 49 S. W. 168. 
 
 If the clerk of the State court refuses to furnish the record 
 for removal after legal fees tendered, he subjects himself to a 
 fine and imprisonment, or the district court may by writ of 
 certiorari command the State court to send up the record, or, 
 if impossible to obtain the record from any cause, the moving 
 party may file a copy of the paper or proceeding by which the 
 same was commenced, and the other party may be re<iuired to 
 plead, and the action proceed to judgment. Sec. 39, new 
 Code, chap. 3, (Comp. Stat, 1913, sec. 1021), effective Janu- 
 ary 1st, 1912. 
 
782 PBOCEEDIiSrGS IN STATE COUETS. 
 
 Notice of Filing Petition for Removal. 
 
 ISTew Code, see. 29, chap. 3 (effective January 1st, 1912), 
 requires notice of filing petition and bond for removal to be 
 given prior to filing the same; the copy of the- record is to be 
 filed in the United States District court vyithin thirty days 
 from the date of filing the petition and bond. The parties re- 
 moving have thirty days after filing the record to plead, answer, 
 or demur. Goins v. Southern P. Co. 198 Fed. 432; Chase v. 
 Erhardt, 198 Fed. 305; Hansford v. Stone-Ordean-Wells Co. 
 201 Fed. 185. As to form of notice and authorities see Pot- 
 ter V. General Balding Co. 213 Fed. 698. The rale is manda- 
 tory. Arthur v. Maryland Casualty Co. 216 Fed. 386; Loland 
 V. Northwest Stevedore Co. 209 Fed. 626. 
 
 Power of State Court. 
 
 The rule is certain, that on the filing of the petition and 
 bond in the State court for removal, in a removahle case, no 
 further action can be taken by the State court except to re- 
 move, as it is divested of jurisdiction over the ease (Boatmen's 
 Bank v. Fritzlen, 68 C. C. A. 288, 135 Fed. 653; Home Ins. 
 Co. V. Morse, 20 Wall. 454, 22 L. ed. 369; New Orleans, M. & 
 T. E. Co. V. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 136, 141, 26 L. ed. 96, 98; 
 Carson v. Dunham, 121 U. S. 427, 30 L. ed. 994, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 1030; Marshall v. Holmes, 141 IT. S. 595, 35 L. ed. 872, 
 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 62; Monroe v. Williamson, 81 Fed. 987; 
 Ashe V. Union Cent. L. Ins. Co. 115 Fed. 234), and need not 
 present petition to the Federal court. Waite v. Phoenix Ins. 
 Co. 62 Fed. 769. 
 
 But the State court is not altogether an automaton in deal- 
 ing with the question of removal ; it is not bound to surrender 
 its jurisdiction on a petition for a removal, until a case is 
 made which on the face of the record shows the petitioner has 
 a right to the transfer. Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U. S. 
 430, 29 L. ed. 962, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 799 ; Mays v. Newlin, 143 
 Fed. 576; Coker v. Monaghan Mills, 110 Fed. 806; McAlister 
 V. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. 85 C. C. A. 316, 157 Fed. 742, 13 A. 
 & E. Ann. Cas. 1068 ; Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 459, 22 
 L. ed. 370; Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. Daughtery, 138 
 
PEOCEEDIXGS IN STATE COURTS. 783 
 
 . U. S. 303, 34 L. ed. 964, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 306 ; Donovan v. 
 Wells, F. & Co. 22 L.RA.(KS.) 1250, 94 C. 0. A. 609, 169 
 Fed. 364; Crehore v. Ohio & if. 11 Co. 131 IT. S. 241-243, 33 
 L. ed. 144, 145, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 692; Johnson v. Wells, F. & 
 Co. 91 Fed. 25 ; Lake Street Elev. R. Co. v. Fanners' Loan & 
 T. Co. 23 C. C. A. 448, 46 U. S. App. 630, 77 Fed. 773. 
 
 It may act on the law but not the facts (Powers v. Chesa- 
 peake & 0. R. Co. 65 Fed. 132 ; Coker v. Monaghan Mills, 110 
 Fed. 806, and cases cited; Shane v. Butte Electric E. Co. 150 
 Fed. 801 ; Texas & P. E. Co. v. Eastin, —Tex. Civ. App. — , 
 89 S. W. 441, 442) ; but if solely a question of law the Fed- 
 eral court may pass vipon it as well as the State court. Atlanta 
 Coast Line E. Co. v. Bailey, 151 Fed. 892, 893. If a prima 
 facie case is not shown by the record, then the court can refuse 
 to remove. Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U. S. 432, 29 L. ed. 
 962, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 799 ; Powers v. Chesapeake & 0. E. Co. 65 
 Fed. 132 ; Springer v. Howes, 69 Fed. 850 ; Crehore v. Ohio 
 & M. E. Co. 131 U. S. 244, 33 L. ed. 145, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 692 ; La Montagne v. T. W. Harvey Lumber Co. 44 Fed. 647 ; 
 Tod V. Cleveland & M. Valley E. Co. 12 C. C. A. 521, 22 U. 
 S. App. 707, 65 Fed.' 148 ; Foster v. Paragould Southeastern 
 E. Co. 74 Fed. 273; Florida v. Charlotte Harbor Phosphate 
 Co. 20 C. C. A. 538, 41 U. S. App. 405, 74 Fed. 578 ; Wabash 
 E. Co. V. Barbour, 19 C. C. A. 546, 43 U. S. App. 102, 73 Fed. 
 515; Donovan v. Wells, F. & Co. 22 L.E.A.(1T.S.) 1250, 94 C. 
 C. A. 609, 169 Fed. 366. 
 
 Issue of Fa-ct as to Removability Tried in Federal Court. 
 
 The State court can decide for itself whether, as a matter of 
 law, the petitioner is entitled to removal. Coker v. Monaghan 
 Mills, 110 Fed, 806, and authorities cited. If, however, the 
 record makes a prima facie case, and the issues raised are upon 
 facts stated in the petition, these issues must be tried in the 
 Federal court, and the jurisdiction of the State court is in 
 abeyance until the Federal court trying the issues remands 
 the case. Dow v. Bradstreet Co. 46 Fed. 828; Boatmen's 
 Bank V. Fritzlen, 68 0. C. A. 288, 135 Fed. 653 ; Mutual L. 
 Ins. Co. V. Langley, 145 Fed. 415; Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. 
 R. Co. V. Daughtry, 138 U. S. 303, 34 L. ed. 964, 11 Sup. Ct. 
 
784 PROCEEDINGS IN STATE COUETS. 
 
 Kep. 306; Donovan v. Wells, F. & Co. 22 L.KA.(N.S.) 1250, 
 94 C. C. A. 609, 169 Fed. 366 ; Chesapeake & O. K. Co. v. Mc- 
 Gabe, 213 U. S. 208, 53 L. ed. Y66, 29 Sup. Ct. Kep. 430 > 
 Shane v. Butte Electric E. Co. 150 Fed. 801; Atlantic Coast 
 Line R. Co. v. Bailey, 151 Fed. 891 ; see Snohomish County v. 
 Puget Sound Xat. Bank, 81 Fed. ."il8. 
 
 Should Be Presented to State Court. 
 
 It has been held that the cause will be remanded, where it 
 appears that the petition and bond for removal were filed in 
 the State court in vacation, and there was nothing to show 
 that they were ever presented to the State court. Fox v. 
 Southern E. Co. 80 Fed. 945 ; see — Mays v. ISTewlin, 143 Fed. 
 576, 577; giving authorities pro and con; Eoberts v. Chicago, 
 St. P. il. & 0. E. Co. 45 Fed. 433; Williams v. Massachu- 
 setts Ben. Asso. 47 Fed. 534. But in Groton Bridge & Mfg. 
 Co. V. American Bridge Co. 137 Fed. 284-289, a contrary 
 view is taken. Brown v. Murray, M. & Co. 43 Fed. 614. Thp 
 better rule is, that it should be brought to the attention of the 
 State court (Ibid.), and may be so brought by one motion. 
 Monroe v. Williamson, 81 Fed. 977; La Page v. Day, 74 Fed. 
 977 ; McAlister v. Chesapeake & 0. E. Co. 85 C. C. A. 316, 
 157 Fed. 742, 13 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1068. It is the more de- 
 corous practice, and the safer practice. Noble v. Massachu- 
 settes Ben. Asso. 48 Fed. 338-339. 
 
 Order of Bemoval. 
 
 It is not necessary to enter an order of removal (Mutual L. 
 Ins. Co. V. Langiey, 145 Fed. 415 ; La Page v. Day, 74 Fed. 
 978; Lund v. Chicago, E. I. & P. E. Co. 78 Fed. 385; ISToble 
 V. Massachusetts Ben. Asso. 48 Fed. 338 ; Wilson v. Western 
 U. Co. 34 Fed. 561 ; Groton Bridge & Mfg. Co. v, American 
 Bridge Co. 137 Fed. 284) ; nor, as we have seen, would refusal 
 affect the right, if removable. 
 
 An exception to "the i-ule that it is necessary to present the 
 petition and bond to the judge of the State court has been indi- 
 cated in Brown v. Murray JSTelson & Co. 43 Fed. 614 and Gro- 
 
PEOCEEDINGS IN STATE COURTS. 785 
 
 ton Bridge & Mfg. Co. v. American Bridge Co. 137 Fed. 289. 
 It seems under some conditions it may be granted by a judge in 
 chambers (Mecke v. Yalleytown Mineral Co. 35 C. C. A. 151, 
 93 Fed. 697; Groton Bridge & Mfg. Co. v. American Bridge 
 Co. 137 Fed. 288), and under some conditions by a clerk of 
 the State court (Sanderlin v. People's Bank, 140 Fed. 191). 
 
 If the State court refuses to enter an order of removal wrong- 
 fully, but retains jurisdiction and hears the cause, the wrong, 
 if any, can be remedied by reserving the question, and a iinal 
 appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, should the 
 highest court of the State having jurisdiction on appeal sustain 
 the ruling of the lower coiirt on the application to remove. 
 Goker v. Monaghan Mills, 110 Fed. 806; Home L. Ins. Co. 
 V. Dunn, 19 Wall. 224, 225, 22 L. ed. 69 ; Springer v. Howes, 
 69 Fed. 849 ; McAlister v. Chesapeake & 0. E. Co. 85 C. C. A. 
 316, 157 Fed. 742, 13 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1068. Or if right- 
 fully removed, the Federal court may enjoin the further pro- 
 ceeding in the' State court, as heretofore stated. Traction Co. 
 V. MadisonviUe St. Bernard Min. Co. 196 U. S. 245, 49 L. ed. 
 464, 25 Sup. Ct. Hep. 251; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Stepp, 
 151 Fed. 914. 
 
 Again, the refusal of the State court, rightfully or wrong- 
 fully, does not prevent the removal. The petitioner can file the 
 record in the Federal court and proceed with his case there, 
 though pending in the State court; and filing defenses in the 
 State court after removal would not affect his proceedings in 
 the Federal court. See Mecke v. Valley Town Mineral Co. 89 
 Fed. 211 ; see Texas & P. R. Co. v. Eastin, 214 U. S. 153, 53 
 L. ed. 946, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564, where an affirmative remedy 
 asserted in the State coiirt estopped a party from attacking the 
 refusal of the State court to remove the case. The result would 
 be that if the Federal court determines that the case is remov- 
 able, and takes jurisdiction, the party removing may enjoin the 
 action of the State court, or enjoin the plaintiff from proceed- 
 ing under the decree of the State court. French v. Hay 
 (French v. Stewart), 22 Wall. 252, 22 L. ed. 858; Mutual L. 
 Ins. Co. V. Langley, 145 Fed. 421, 422; Dietzsch v, Huide- 
 koper (Kern v, Huidekoper), 103 U. S. 498, 26 L. ed. 498. If 
 the cause was removable, all action by the State court would be 
 without jurisdiction, and void, Flint v. Coffin, 100 C. C. A. 
 S. Eq.— 50. 
 
786 POWER OF FEDERAL COURT BEFORE REMOVAL. 
 
 342, I76Fed. 872; Virginia v. Eives, 100 U. S. 317, 25 t. ed. 
 669; McAlister v. Chesapeake & O. E. Co. 85 C. C. A. 316, 
 157 Fed. 741, 13 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1068 ; Madisonville Trac- 
 tion Co. v. St. Bernard Min. Co. 196 U. S. 239, 49 L. ed. 462, 
 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 251 ; Kern v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 492, 26 
 L. ed. 357; Baltimore & O. E. Co.. v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 14, 26 
 L. ed. 645. 
 
 Power of the Federal Court Between Filing Petition for Re- 
 moval and Filing the Record. 
 
 We have just seen that as soon as the petition and bond for 
 removal are filed in the State court its jurisdiction ceases, and 
 the question becomes important as to what action the Federal 
 court can take before the record is filed thereiii. Coeur D'Alene 
 E. & J^av. Co. V. Spalding, 35 C. C..A. 295, 93 Fed. 285, and 
 authorities. 
 
 It was held in Ee Barnesville & M. E. Co. 2 McCrary,,216, 
 4 Fed. 10, that the jurisdiction of the Federal court is not 
 complete, so as- to hear and determine the cause before the day 
 prescribed by the statute, even though the transcript has been 
 filed (Eemoval Cases, 100 U. S. 475, 25 L. ed. 600), but that 
 many incidental proceedings may be taken, and provisional 
 remedies, such as attachment, etc., granted. Hamilton v. Fow- 
 ler, 83 Fed. 321; Goldberg B. & Co. 'v. German Iris. Co. 152 
 Fed. 831; Eyder v. Bateman, 93 Fed. 23; Xorth American 
 Transp. & Trading Co. v. Howells, 58 C. C. A. 442, 121 Fed. 
 696.' 
 
 :When the record is filed in. the Federal court before the re- 
 turn day, — that is, the. next regular term after the removal, 
 the Federal court; cannot entertaiu a motion to remand even for 
 want of jurisdiction. Kansas City & T. E. Co. v. Interstate 
 Lumber Co. 36 Fed. 9 ; Torrent v. S. K. Martin Lumber Co. 
 37 Fed. 727.; However, these cases were disapproved in 
 Thompson v. Chicago,^ St. P. .& K. C. E. Co. 60 Fed. 773, where 
 the party moving to remind had filed the record and given prop- 
 er notice of the motion, following Delbauco v. Singietary, 40 
 Fed. 181, and Mills v. ^STewell, 41 ■Fed.-529. See Texas & St. 
 L. E. Co. V. Eust, 5 McCrary, 348, 17 Fed. 27-5,.276. 
 
POWBB OF FEDEEAL COURT BEFORE REMOVAL. 787 
 
 Cannot Enjoin. 
 
 The Federal court cannot enjoin proceedings in a State court, 
 where, though a petition and bond for removal have been filed, 
 no action has been taken thereon by the State court, nor a copy 
 of the record been entered in the Federal court. Coeur D'Alene 
 E. & Kav. Co. V. Spalding, 35 C. C. A. 295, 93 Fed. 280. 
 
 While it does not seem to be well settled what are the powers 
 of a Federal court over the intermediate state of the case, be- 
 tween the filing of the petition and bond in the State court, and 
 the return day to the Federal court, which, as said, is the first 
 day of the next succeeding term of the Federal court, yet I 
 think the rule may be stated, first, that the State court jurisdic- 
 tion ceases, and the Federal court jurisdiction attaches upon 
 the filing of the petition and bond for removal ; second, that 
 while the plaintiif in the State court has not to appear in the 
 Federal court before the return day, and therefore the Federal 
 court has no jurisdiction to proceed to hear' the cause on its 
 merits before such return day, or eutei'tain any issue as to the 
 removal itself, yet if any extraordinary proceeding be necessary 
 to preserve the property or rights of the litigants, then upon no- 
 tice either party may be required to appear for that purpose, 
 and the court may grant the relief. Aiithorities above ; Hamil- 
 ton V. Fowler, 83 Fed. 321; Goldberg B. & Co. v. German Ins.. 
 Co. 152 Fed. 831; see Ryder v. Bateman, 93 Fed. 1'6~; Western 
 U. Teleg. Co. v. Cooper, 182 Fed. 710. ■ ■ 
 
 Cannot Take Depositions. 
 
 It has been held that an application to take depositions, made 
 to the Federal court while the case was in a state of transition, 
 would not be granted, as no extraordinary condition appeared 
 calling for the exercise of the power of the Federal court. 
 Xorth American Transp. & Trading Co. v. Howells, 58 C. C. 
 A. 442, 121 Fed. 698. Your attention is called to a review of 
 the cases upon the subject in Hamilton v. Fowler, 83 Fed. 321. 
 
 Motion to Remand at Once. 
 
 In Hartford & C. W. R Co. v. Montague, 94 Fed. 227, it 
 
788 FILING TRANSCRIPT IN FEDERAL COUBT. 
 
 is declared the settled practice in the second circuit to allow a 
 motion to remand to be made at once on the removal of a cause, 
 without waiting for the next term, and the plaintiff may file 
 the record if the defendant does not. 
 
 Filin<j Transcript. 
 
 We have seen that the filing of the petition and bond for 
 removal vests jurisdiction in the Federal court for all pur- 
 poses, but the regular course of proceeding is suspended until 
 the record of the case below is filed in the Federal court. So 
 filing the transcript, while not necessary to jurisdiction, yet 
 is necessary for the court to proceed with the trial. Goldberg 
 B. & Co. V. German Ins. Co. 152 Fed. 831. (See "Transmit- 
 ting Eecord.") K'ew Code, sec. 29 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1011). 
 
 The record of the removed case must be filed within thirty 
 days from the date of filing the petition for removal. New 
 Code, sec. 29. But filing the record is not a question of juris- 
 diction, and the right is not lost by delay, for the court may 
 permit the record to be filed after the time appointed by stat- 
 ute for proper cause shown. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Koonti, 
 104 U. S. 16, 26 L. ed. 646; Rowell v. Hill, 28 Fed. 434; 
 Lucker v. Phoenix Assur. Co. 66 Fed. 162; Burgunder v. 
 Browne, 59 Fed. 498; Eisenmann v. Delemar's Nevada Gold 
 Min. Co. 87 Fed. 250 and cases cited; Pierce v. Corrigan, 77 
 Fed. 657; Hatcher v. Wadley, 84 Fed. 915. 
 
CHAPTEE CXVII. 
 
 STATUS AFTER REMOVAT-. 
 
 The case is docketed in the Federal court, retaining the same 
 status as to all process and proceedings that have been taken in 
 the State court, and which have the same effect as if sued out in 
 the Federal court. Sees. 4 and 6, act 1875 ; 1 U. S. Eev. Stat. 
 Supp. 83. See sec. 36, new Code, chap. 3 (Comp. Stat. 1913, 
 sec. 1018) ; also sec. 38, new Code, chap. 3. Cleaver v. 
 Traders' Ins. Co. 40 Fed. 713 ; Davis v. St. Louis & S. F. R 
 Co. 25 Fed. 786 ; Bryant v. Thompson, 27 Fed. 881 ; Guernsey 
 V. Cross, 153 Fed. 827; Chicago & A. Bridge Co. v. Anglo- 
 American Packing & Provision Co. 46 Fed. 590 ; Duncan v. 
 Gegan, 101 U. S. 810-812, 25 L. ed. 875, 876 ; Wabash West- 
 ern E. Co. V. Brow, 164 U. S. 271, 41 L. ed. 431, 17 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 126; Bragdon v. Perkins-Campbell Co. 82 Fed. 338; 
 AUmark v. Platte S. S. Co. 76 Fed. 615 ; Champlain Constr. 
 Co. V. O'Brien, 104 Fed. 930; Denison v. Shawmut Min. Co. 
 124 Fed. 860; Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Sundry Ins. 
 Co. 108 Fed. 454; Eureka & K. E. Co. v. California & JST. E. 
 Co. 103 Fed. 897; Porter Land & Water Co. v. Baskin, 43 Fed. 
 325; Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Barron, 165 Fed. 832; Man- 
 nington v. Hocking Valley E. Co. 183 Fed. 133. 
 ' Thus the lien of an attachment property sued out in the 
 State court is not affected by removal. Hatcher v. Hendrie 
 & B. Mfg. & Supply Co. 68 C. C. A. 19, 133 Fed. 267 ; Hub- 
 bard V. Central E. Co. 135 Fed. 256; Lebensberger v. Sco- 
 field, 71 C. C. A. 476, 139 Fed. 380. And where the action 
 in the State court against a nonresident is by attachment, the 
 removal by him does not give the Federal court jurisdiction 
 of his person. Wells v. Clark, 136 Fed. 462, overruled in 203 
 U. S. 164, 51 L. ed. 138, 27 Sup. Ct. Eep. 43, followed in 
 Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Barron, 165 Fed. 832. See Purdy 
 V. Wallace Miller & Co. 81 Fed. 513. 
 
 789 
 
VOO STATUS AFTER EE^rOVAL. 
 
 The rale as above given applies unless repugnant to the Con- 
 stitntion and laws. See Texas & P. R. Co. v. Wilder, 35 C. 
 C. A. 105, 92 Fed. 957, refusing to allow depositions taken in 
 the State court to be read in the Federal court. Zych v. Ameri- 
 can Car & Foundry Co. 127 Fed. 726-727; see Texas & P. E. 
 Co. V. Watson, 50 C. C. A. 230, 112 Fed. 402 ; Hanks Denta] 
 Asso. V. International Tooth Crown Co. 194 U. S. 309, 48 L. 
 ed. 991, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 700. 
 
 Defenses to he Heard in the Federal Court. 
 
 The purpose of the removal act is to give the nonresident 
 defendant the privilege of having his defenses heard: in the 
 Federal court (M'^abash Western E. Co. v. Brow^, 164 U. S. 
 277-278, 41 L. ed. 433, 434, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 126), and he is 
 required to file his petition for removal on or before the time 
 he is required, to file his defenses in the State court. . Martin 
 V. Baltimore & O. E. Co. (Gerling v. Baltimore & O. R. Co.) 
 151 U. S. 686, 38 L. ed. 316, 14 Sup. Ct. E«p. 533; sec. 3, 
 act 1875. (See '^When N"ot Removed in Time," chapter 118, p. 
 793. And this rule applies whatever may have been the proceed- 
 ings in the State court befone the time the defendant was re- 
 quired to remove (Atlanta, K. & IST. E. Co. v. Southern R. Co. 
 66 C. C. A. 601, 131 Fed. 661; Champlain Constr. Co. v. 
 O'Brien, 104 Fed. 930), unless trial on the merits has begun 
 in the State courts though raised by demurrer (Alley v. JSTott, 
 111 U. S. 476, 477, 28 L. ed. 492, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495; Bank 
 of Maysville v. Claypool, 120 U. S. 270, 30 L. ed. 633, 7 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 545; Gregory v. Hartley, 113 U. S. 742-746, 28 
 L. ed. 1150-1152, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 743), but not hearing a 
 preliminary motion to dissolve an injunction in the State court 
 (Cella V. Brown,- 136- Fed. 439, 440, and cases, cited; see At- 
 lanta, K. & N. R. Co. V. Southern R. Co. 66 C. C. A. 601, 
 131 Fed, 661-663; new Code, sec. 38). 
 
 When Plaintiff Dismisses After Removal. 
 
 Where plaintiff appears and dismisses his suit in the Fed- 
 eral court after removal, he must file a new suit ; he cannot pro- 
 ceed on the old pleading in the State court. Texas & P. R. 
 Co. v. Huber, — Tex. Civ. App. — , 95 S. W. 569, 570. 
 
CHAPTEE OXVIII. 
 
 EEMANDING. 
 
 I liave thns given the acts of Congress afifecting tlie removal 
 of a snit from the State court to the United States circuit 
 court, and the status of the case after removal. It is not my 
 purpose to discuss these acts further than may be necessary 
 to develop the practice of the United States circuit court upon 
 motions to remand. Excellent works on removals have been' 
 given to the profession, and these must be consulted for pro- 
 cedure and forms. 
 
 I shall assume that the cause has been removed under one 
 of the provisions of the act as above given, and will only dis- 
 cuss such steps as should be taken in the Federal court after 
 the removal. 
 
 The first step to be taken after the case has been removed 
 is to examine whether the defendant or defendants have com- 
 plied with the Federal statutes in the procedure required, or 
 the grounds upon which removals are permitted. , They must 
 be followed because jurisdictional. Mayo v. Dockery, 108 
 Fed. 899; Wabash Western E. Co. v. Brow, 164 U. S. 276, 
 41 L. ed. 433, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 126. And the right to deter- 
 mine these questions is wholly with the Federal courts after 
 removal (Dow v. Bradstreet Co. 46 Fed. 828 ; Kansas City, 
 Ft. S. & M. E. Co. V. Daughtry, 138 U. S. 303, 34 L. ed. 964, 
 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 306 ; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Southern E. 
 Co. 88 Fed. 805 ; Woodson County v. Toronto Bank, 128 Fed. 
 159), because, as said, on filing of the petition and bond the 
 removal is affected at once (Mecke v. Valley Town Mineral Co. 
 89 Fed. 209-211). 
 
 If the jurisdictional facts are not sho^vn, however, the State 
 court is not bound to give, up its jurisdiction (Stone v. South 
 Carolina, 117 U. S. 432, 29 L. ed. 962, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 799; 
 Coker V. Monaghan Mills, 110 Fed. 806; Burliiig-ton, C. E. & 
 K E. Co. V. Dunn, 122 U. S. 516, 30 L. ed. 1160, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 
 791 
 
792 EEMANDIWQ. 
 
 Eep.-1262; Powers y. Chesapeake & O. K Co. 169 U. S. 101, 
 42 L. ed. 676, 18 Sup. Ct. Kep. 264) ; and if the case goes to 
 judgment in the State court, you may review the refusal by 
 writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States. Ibid. ; 
 Missouri, P. R. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 160 U. S. 557-582, 40 L. ed. 
 536-542, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389 ; Stone v. South Carolina, 117 
 U. S. 432, 29 L. ed. 962, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 799. 
 
 Statutes Controlling the Remanding of Causes. 
 
 It is provided by section 5 of the act of 1875, that if in any 
 suit removed to the Federal court from a State court it shall 
 appear to the satisfaction of said circuit court at any time after 
 such suit, has been ranoved thereto, that such suit does not 
 really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy proper- 
 ly within the jurisdiction of said court or that parties to such 
 suit in the State court have been improperly or collusively 
 joined, either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose of 
 creating a case removable into the Federal court, the said cir- 
 cuit court shall proceed no further therein, but shall remand it 
 to the court from which it was removed, making such order as 
 to costs as may be just. Baiim v. Longwell, 200 Fed. 450; 
 new Code, sec. 37 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1019) ; Cerri v. 
 Akron People's Teleph. Co. 219 Fed. 285 ; Western U. Teleg. 
 Co. V. Louisville & N. R. Co. 208 Fed. 581 ; Bowens v. Chi- 
 cago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 215 Fed. 287. 
 
 Again, under clause 2 of the act of 1888 it is provided for 
 remanding causes removed on the ground of local prejudice as 
 follows: "At any time before the trial of any suit which is 
 now pending in any circuit court, or may be hereafter entered 
 therein, and which has been removed from a State court on the 
 ground of local prejudice, the circuit court shall, on the appli- 
 cation of the other party, examine into the truth of the affidavit 
 of local prejudice, and unless it shall appear to the satisfaction 
 of the circuit court that said party will not obtain justice in 
 the State court it shall cause the suit to be remanded to the 
 State court. ISTew Code, sec. 28 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1010). 
 
 By the sixth clause of section 2 of the act there is no appeal 
 from the order to remand. 
 
EEMANDING. 793 
 
 Causes for Remanding. 
 
 Thus, having seen the statutory duty of the circuit courts of 
 the United States as to remanding causes, I shall now inquire 
 into the causes for remanding, assuming that a proper petition 
 and bond have been filed ; and first — 
 
 When Not Removed in Time. 
 
 The first inquiry would be as to the time the petition and 
 bond for removal were filed in the State court, and the Federal 
 court must determine it. Fidelity Trust & S. Co. v. Newport 
 E"ews & M. Valley Co. 70 Fed. 403. The statute, as we have 
 seen, requires it to be filed at or before the time when by the 
 State law the defendant is required to plead or answer to the 
 petition in the State court, which, in Texas, must be on or 
 before the second day of the return term of the citation. Tex. 
 Eev. Stat. 1447, 1263. First Nat. Bank v. Appleyard, 138 
 Fed. 939; Martin v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. (Gerling v. Balti- 
 more & O. R Co.) 151 U. S. 673, 38 L. ed. 311, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 533 ; Daugherty v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 61 Fed. 138 ; 
 American Bonding Co. v. Mills, 81 C. C. A. 325, 152 Fed. 
 107; Goldberg v. German Ins. Co. 152 Fed. 831; Overholt 
 V. German American Ins. Co. 155 Fed. 488 ; Quilhot v. Hamer, 
 158 Fed. 188 ; Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 524, 39 
 L. ed. 519, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 559 ; Fidelity & C. Co. v. Hub- 
 bard, 117 Fed. 952; Oliver v. Iowa C. R. Co. 102 Fed. 371; 
 Gregory v. Boston Safe Deposit & T. Co. 88 Fed. 4 ; Donahue 
 V. Calumet Fire Clay Co. 94 Fed. 27 ; Maher v. Tower Hotel 
 Co. 94 Fed. 226; First Littleton Bridge Co. v. Connecticut 
 River Lumber Co. 71 Fed. 225. See Winkler v. Chicago & 
 E. I. R. Co.— see, also, 120 U. S. 786-794, 108 Fed. 307, as to 
 the time required under the Federal acts of 1789, 1866, and 
 1875. 
 
 When the service on the nonresident defendant has been 
 made by publication, which is required to be published for a 
 specific number of weeks, the full time must expire before the 
 defendant is required to answer within the removal act, though 
 the last publication was made before the time expired. Tenney 
 v. American Pipe Mfg. Co. 96 Fed. 919; Batts'a Rev. Stat. 
 (Tex.) 1235. 1264. 
 
794 EE.UAKDlK"a. 
 
 Again, when the State law permits a person served by publi- 
 cation to have a retrial if appearing within a certain time, 
 the cause could not be removed by such defendant on his appear- 
 ance. Davis V. Harris, 124 Fed. 713. 
 
 If the petition for removal is filed after the day upon which' 
 a dilatory plea or the answer is required to be filed by the 
 State law, the State court may refuse the removal, and, if re- 
 moved, the Federal court should remand (Head v. Selleck, llO 
 Fed. 786; Lantz v. Fretts, 173 Fed. 1008, and cases cited. 
 First Xat. Bank v. A. E. Appleyard & Co. 138 Fed. 939; 
 Martin v. Baltimore & 0. E. Co. [Gerling v. Baltimore & 0. 
 R. Co.] 151 U. S. 673, 678, 38 L. ed. 311, 313, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 533 ; Gregory v. Boston Safe Deposit & T. Co. 88 Fed. 
 3; First Littleton Bridge Corp. v. Connecticut River Lumber 
 Co. 71 Fed. 225; Daugherty v. Western TJ. Teleg. Co. 61 Fed. 
 138 ; Laidly v. Hunting-ton, 121 U. S. 181, 30 L. ed. 884, 7 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 855; Delbanco v. Singletary, 40 Fed. 178; 
 South Dakota C. RCo. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 73 
 C. C. A. 176, 141 Fed. 578) ; and when the action is joint, 
 if by expiration of time one defendant loses his right the other 
 is bound (Calderhead v. Downing, 103 Fed. 29 and cases 
 cited ; see Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. v. Street, 57 Tex. 
 Civ. App. 194, 122 S. W. 270) ; but this failure to file the peti- 
 tion in time may be- waived, as it has been held that it is not 
 essential to jurisdiction (Powers v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. 
 169 U. S. 98, 42 L. ed. 675, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 264, and cases 
 cited; Martin v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. [Gerling v. Baltimore 
 & 0. R. Co.] 151 U. S. 688, 38 L. ed. 316, 14 Sup. Ct. .Rep. 
 533 ; French v. Hay, 22 Wall. 238, 22 L. ed. 801 ; Knight v. 
 International & G. J^. R. Co. 9 C. C. A. 376, 23 U. S. App. 
 356, 61 Fed. 90), and going to trialin the Federal court would 
 waive (ISTewman v. Schwerin, 10 C. C. A. 129, 22 U. S. App. 
 393, 61 Fed. 870; Collins v. Stott, 76 Fed. 614). 
 
 So where the plaintiff appears for any other purpose than to 
 object to the removal, and to move to remand would waive. 
 
 Again, where one consents to the removal he cannot object 
 to the time of removal. Connell v. Smiley, 156 U. S. 339, 39 
 L. ed. 444, 15 Siip. Ct. Rep. 353. 
 
 When the service of summons in the State court is void, 
 the time limited by statute does not bind the defendant, but 
 
EEMANDIKG. 795 
 
 he may appear and remove even after judgment. Tortat v. 
 Hai-din Min. & Mfg. Co. Ill Fed. 426; Cady v. Associated 
 Colonies, 119 Fed. 424; Ward v. Congress Constr. Co. 39 C. C. 
 A. 669, 99 Fed. 598. 
 
 When Motion to Remand Made. 
 
 The motion to remand on the ground that the petition for 
 removal was not filed in time should be made promptly as it 
 may be waived, because, as said, the failure to file in time is 
 not fundamental, but in a sense modal and formal (Act 1888, 
 sec. 3; Ayers v. Watson, 113 U. S. 598, 28 L. ed. 1094, 5 
 Sup. Ct. JRep. 641; Collins v. Stott, 76 Fed. 614; Powers v. 
 Chesapeake & O. K. Co. 169 U. S. 99, 42 L. ed. 6Y5, 18 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 264; Wewman v. Schwerin, 10 C. C. A. 129, 22 U. S. 
 App. 393, 61 Fed. 8Y0) ; and acts recognizing the jurisdiction 
 of the Federal court, or great delay in the motion to remand, 
 would waive the faihire of the defendant to file the petition 
 for removal in time (ibid. ; Guarantee Co. of JST. A. v. Han- 
 way, 44 C. C. A. 312, 104 Fed. 369, 374, and cases cited; 
 Atlantic, K. & N. R. Co. v. Southern R. Co. 66 C. C.A. 601, 
 131 Fed. 660, 661 ; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Ford, 35 Fed. 
 170 ; Hamilton v. Fowler, 83 Fed. 321 ; ISTewman v. Schwerin, 
 10 C. C. A. 129, 22 U. S. App. 393, 61 Fed. 870 ; Martin v. 
 Baltimore & 0. R. Co. [Gerling v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co.] 
 151 U. S. 688, 38 L. ed. 316, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 533). 
 
 Effect of Extension of Time to Answer. 
 
 The agreement of parties to extend the time to answer cannot 
 change the statute requiring the petition for removal to be filed 
 at or before the time required by the State law to answer, and 
 it must be filed as required, whether there be an agreement to 
 extend the time to answer or not. There has, however, been 
 such confiict of opinion that it would be proper to say the rule 
 varies in the different circuits. Tevis v. Palatine Ins. Co. 149 
 Fed. 561. See Murphy v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. 184 
 Fed. 497. 
 
 Thus, the rule, as stated above, has been upheld in Austin 
 v. Gagan, 5 L. R. A. 476, 39 Fed. 626 ; Dixon v. Western U. 
 
796 EEMANDING. 
 
 Teleg. Co. 38 Fed, 377; Martin v. Carter, 48 Fed. 596; Yar- 
 nell V. Felton, 102 Fed. 369 ; same case 104 Fed. 161 ; Cham- 
 plain Constr. Co. v. O'Brien, 104 Fed. 932, 933; Vfelie v. 
 Manufacturers' Acci. Indemnity Co. 40 Fed. 545 ; Euby Can- 
 yon Gold Min. Co. v. Hunter, 60 Fed. 305 ; Schipper v. Con- 
 sumer Cordage Co. 72 Fed. 803. A distinction is drawn in 
 this last case between an extension of time by agreement and 
 by the order of the court. Ibid. ; Fidelity Trust & S. V. Co. 
 V. Newport News & M. Valley Co. 70 Fed. 406; Mecke v. 
 Valley Town Mineral Co. 89 Fed. 209 ; Price v. Lehigh Valley 
 K. Co. 65 Fed. 826. See Spangler v. Atchison, T. & S. F. 
 K. Co. 42 Fed. 305, as to distinction between order of court 
 and rule of court as to extension of time. While it has been 
 held contra in Eussell v. Harriman Land Co. 145 Fed. 745 ; 
 Groton Bridge & Mfg. Co. v. American Bridge Co. 137 Fed. 
 297-299 ; Chiatovich v. Hanchett, 78 Fed. 193 ; People's Bank 
 V. ^tna Ins. Co. 53 Fed. 161; Cancel v. Goodyear Shoe 
 Machinery Co. 106 Fed. 551; Eycroft v. Green, 49 Fed. 177; 
 Lord V. Lehigh Valley R. Co. 104 Fed. 929; Mayer v. Ft. 
 Worth & D. C. R Co. 93 Fed. 601; Collins v. Stott, 76 Fed. 
 613; Phenix Ins. Co. v. Charleston Bridge Co. 13 C. C. A. 
 58, 25 U. S. App. 190, 65 Fed. 628; See Tevis v. Palatine 
 Ins. Co. 149 Fed. 561, 562, collecting authorities pro and con. 
 
 Again, it has been held that the time to file a petition for 
 removal cannot be extended when the court extends the time to 
 answer on an ex parte order (Hurd v. Gere, 38 Fed. 537) ; 
 nor when the time has been extended by rule of court (see 
 Spangler v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 42 Fed. 305 as to 
 distinction between order of court and rule of court). The 
 Federal court will not take judicial notice of a rule of court 
 extending the time for pleading beyond the statute. Yarnell 
 V. Felton, 104 Fed. 161, s. c. 102 Fed. 369. 
 
 The Federal courts do not take judicial notice of the rules 
 of the State courts. Randall v. New England Order of Pro- 
 tection, 118 Fed. 782. 
 
 I submit the rule as first stated is correct; the act requires 
 the petition to be filed at or before the time when answer is 
 due according to the State law, and a proper construction 
 clearly excludes the idea that it may be dependent on the agree- 
 ment of parties, or the extension of time by a court to answer 
 
EEMANDING. 797 
 
 beyond that fixed by the statute. Besides, the right of removal 
 must appear in the ease as the plaintiff has made it, and does 
 not in any way depend on the answer to be filed ; and the right 
 of removal existing and apparent when the agreement to ex- 
 tend the time for answering is made, should be construed to 
 be a waiver of the right of removal, rather than an extension of 
 the time to apply for it. 
 
 When Bight of Removal Arises After the Time Fixed by 
 
 Statute. 
 
 Sometimes the right of removal does not exist at the time 
 when by the State law the answer is to be filed, but may arise 
 in the subsequent proceeding's in the State court, as where the 
 amended petition first discloses the right to remove, or other 
 defendants made (Jones v. Mosher, 46 C. C. A. 471, 107 Fed. 
 563; Guarantee Co. of K A. v. Hanway, 44 C. C. A. 312; 
 104 Fed. 374; Green v. Valley, 101 Fed. 884; Enders v. Lake 
 Erie & W. E. Co. 101 Fed. 203 ; Bailey v. Mosher, 95 Fed. 
 223; Myrtle v. Nevada, C. & O. E. Co. 137 Fed. 193; Barber 
 V. Boston & M. E. Co. 145 Fed. 52 ; Eobinson v. Parker-Wash- 
 ington Co. 170 Fed. 850; Eoberts v. Chicago, B. & Q. E. Co. 
 168 Fed. 316; Toutsey v. Hoffman, 108 Fed. 693; Ward v. 
 Congress Constr. Co. 39 C. C. A. 669, 99 Fed. 598; West 
 Virginia v. King, 112 Fed. 369), as, for instance, when by 
 change of parties by dismissal, or otherwise, the controversy 
 for the first time becomes one wholly between citizens of differ- 
 ent States (Ibid.; Powers v. Chesapeake & 0. E. Co. 169 
 U. S. 92, 42 L. ed. 673, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 264; Green v. 
 Valley, 101 Fed. 882; Ward v. Congress Constr. Co. 39 C. C. 
 A. 669, 99 Fed. 598 ; Didky v. ISTew York, P. & O. E. Co. 
 107 Fed. 567; Calderhead v. Downing, 103 Fed. 27; Moeller v. 
 Southern P. Co. 211 Fed. 240; but the right may be lost, see 
 Morgan's L. & T. E. & S. S. Co. v. Street, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 
 194, 122 S. W. 270 ; Huber v. Texas & P. E. Co. — Tex. Civ. 
 App. — , 113 S. W. 984) ; or when the original petition in the 
 State court is for an amount not in excess of two thousand 
 dollars, but plaintiff by amendment greatly increases the claim 
 so as to bring it within Federal jurisdiction (Enders v. Lake 
 Erie E. Co. 101 Fed. 203 ; Price v. Ellis, 129 Fed. 485, 486 ; 
 
798 KEMAisrmjN'G. 
 
 Walcott V. Watson, 46 Fed. 529; Clarkson v. Manson, 18 
 Blatchf. 443,. 4 Fed. 257; Jones v. Mosher, 46 C. C. A. 471, 
 107 Fed. 563, citing I«rorthern P. R Co. v. Austin, 135 U. S. 
 315, 34 L. ed. 218, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep..758; Swann v. Mutual 
 Reserve Fund Life Asso. 116 Fed. 232 ; Peterson v. Chicago, 
 M. & St. P..R Co. 108 Fed. 561; Simmons v. Mutual Reserve 
 Fund Life Asso. 114 Fed. 785) ; or where by amendment the 
 cause of action is made to depend on a Federal question not 
 appearing in the original petition (Green v. Valley, 101 Fed. 
 882; Bailey v. Mosher, 95 Fed. 223; Guarantee Co. of N. A. 
 V. Hanway, 44 C. C. A. 312, 104 Fed. 369) ; but the amend- 
 ment must, in effect, state a .new cause of action (Painter v. 
 New River Mineral Co.: 98 Fed. 544). 
 
 In either of the events happening as above stated, a motion 
 to remove to the Federal court promptly made should be sus- 
 tained, and therefore a motion to remand when a motion is 
 made under these conditions will not be siistained. 
 
 In determining the promptness with which a motion to re- 
 move is made, time must be calculated from the filing of the 
 amended petition. Evans v. Dillingham, 43 Fed. 177. 
 
 Effect of Filing Answer in State Court. 
 
 The filing of an answer in the State court before the time has 
 elapsed for pleading or answering under the State law, and 
 the petition for removal to be filed, as when necessary to move 
 the dismissal of a preliminary injunction, does not affect the 
 right to remove within the period permitted by statute. Cella 
 V. Brown, 136 Fed. 439 ; Powers v'. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. 
 169 U. S. 93, 42 L. ed. 673, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 264; Champlain 
 Constr. Co. V. O'Brien, 104 Fed. 930; Wilcoxen v. Chicago, 
 B. & Q. R. Co. 116 Fed. 444; Sidway v. Missouri Land & Live 
 Stock Co. 116 Fed. 382-394, and cases cited. As to effect 
 of plea to jurisdiction of the State court, see Olds v. City Trust 
 S. D. & Surety Co. 114 Fed. 975. The rule may be stated 
 that whether necessary to be filed in aid of some preliminary 
 procedure or not, the mere filing of an answer in the State 
 court before the time has elapsed to file a petition for removal 
 ■does not bar the right to remove within the time permitted bv 
 statute. The right is only lost by going beyond the absolutely 
 
TO WHAT TEEM TJIE CASE SHOULD BE KEMOVED. 
 
 799 
 
 required time. Champlain Constr. Co. v. O'Brien, 104 Fed. 
 933 ; Donahue v. Calumet Fire Clay Co. 94 Fed. 27. 
 
 But it seems that where a State fixes no time for filing an 
 answer, that a demurrer to the bill for insufficieney, which was 
 presented and overruled, would cut off the right to remove 
 (Winkler v. Chicago & E. I. R Co. 108 Fed. 305-307 ; Lantz 
 V. Fretts, 173 Fed. 1007, 1008). The hearing and determina- 
 tion of a demurrer in a State court bars the right of removal. 
 Ibid. 1009, and cases cited; Eosenthal v.. Coates, 148 U. S. 
 142, 37 L. ed. 399, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 576. Or when defendant 
 files a demurrer and stipulates for a hearing of the cause. Case 
 V. Olney, 106 Fed. 433. 
 
 Where one is sued in the State court in the same action 
 both upon individual and partnership liability, the appearance 
 in the State court to contest the validity of an attachment affect- 
 ing his individual liability would not deprive him of the right 
 as a member of tlie partnership to remove the cause. Calder- 
 head v. Downing, 103 Fed. 27. 
 
 Where Action Joint. 
 
 The rule, however, is that when the action is joint, and one 
 defendant answers and stibniits to the jurisdiction of the State 
 court, it deprives the other of the privilege of removing the 
 cause (Ibid.; Abel v. Book, 120 Fed. 47); or one defendant 
 loses his right the other is bound, as where one partner loses 
 the right to remove it subjects the other to the disability. 
 Fletcher v. Hamlet, 116 U. S. 410, 29 L. ed. 680, 6 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 426; Eogers v. Van Xortwick, 45 Fed. 514; Jones v. 
 Casey-Hedges Co. 213 Fed. 43. 
 
 To ]yhat Term of the Federal Court Case Should Be Renioved. 
 
 The next point of observation should be as to whether the 
 record from the State court has been filed at the proper term 
 of the Federal court, and within proper time. 
 
 Under sec. 29, chap. 3 of the new Code (Comp. Stat. 1913, 
 sec. 1011), effective January 1st, 1912, it is required that a cer- 
 tified copy of the record must be filed within thirty days from 
 the date of filing the petition and bond, and the party removing 
 
800 WANT OF JUEISDICTION AS A GROUND TO BEMAND. 
 
 has thirty days from filing the record to plead, answer, or 
 demur. 
 
 A failure to file the record in the Federal court within the 
 time stated does not restore the jurisdiction of the State court 
 (National S. S. Co. v. Tug-man, 106 U. S. 122, 27 L. ed. 89, 
 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58), but is a cause for remanding the case. 
 U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 641; Hatcher v. Wadley, 84 Fed. 913. 
 However, many exceptions have been recognized, and Federal 
 courts have refused to remand when a reasonable cause for the 
 failure has been set up and proven. Hatcher v. Wadley, 84 
 Fed. 915; Lucker v. Phcenix Assur. Co. 66 Fed. 162; Pierce 
 V. Corrigan, Y7 Fed. 657; St. Paul & C. R. Co. v. McLean, 108 
 U. S. 217, 27 L. ed. 704, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 498 ; Baltimore & 0. 
 R. Co. V. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5, 26 L. ed. 643 ; Rowell v. Hill, 
 28 Fed. 433 ; Eisenmann v. Delemar's Nevada Gold-Min. Co. 
 87 Fed. 248. (See "When Not Removed in Time.") 
 
 Thus, in Kelly v. Chicago & S. R. Co. 122 Fed. 286, the 
 removing defendant awaited the action of the State court upon 
 his application to remove, and was thus delayed until after the 
 time the transcript should have been filed in the Federal court. 
 It was held a reasonable ground, and the court refused to re- 
 mand the ca:se. So it may be said that a failure to file the 
 record in the Federal court within the statutory time required 
 would be good ground for remanding, if the failure was with- 
 out reasonable excuse. 
 
 Transmitting the Record. 
 
 The removing party must transmit the record (Hatcher v. 
 Wadley, 84 Fed. 913), but adverse party may file it and move 
 to remand. Re Newark & H. Traction Co. 110 Fed. 25. (See 
 Filing Transcript.) 
 
 Want of Jurisdiction as a Ground to Renmnd. 
 
 Our next point of observation would be, did the State court 
 have jurisdiction of the subject-matter; for if the court a quo 
 had done, the jurisdiction in the Federal court cannot . attach 
 by removal, even though the suit could have been originally 
 brought in the Federal court. 25 Stat, at L. 438, chap, 866, 
 
EEMANDING CASE NOT IN J UEISDIGTIONAL ACT. 801 
 
 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1010); Thacker Coal & Coke Co. v. 
 Xorfolk & W. E. Co. 171 Fed. 271; Cowley v. Northern P. R. 
 Co. 159 U. S. 583, 40 L. ed. 267, 16 Sup. Ot. Rep. 127; 
 Swift & Co. V. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 
 633, 58 Fed. 858. This qiiestion of the State's jxirisdiction of 
 the subject-matter may be raised in the Federal court after re- 
 moval, whereupon the Federal court should dismiss, and not 
 remand. Auracher v. Omaha & St. L. R. Co. 102 Fed. 1. 
 
 To illustrate: An action in a State court upon some mat- 
 ter exclusively within the jurisdiction of a Federal court, as 
 an action founded upon the violation of the interstate law, is 
 removable, and when removed will be dismissed (Sheldon v. 
 Wabash R. Co. 105 Fed. 786; Swift & Co. v. Philadelphia 
 & R. R. Co. 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 633, 58 Fed. 858 ; Fidelity 
 Trust Co. V. Gill Car Co. 25 Fed. 737 ; Crowley v. Southern 
 R. Co. 139 Fed. 853, 854), but if the State court had jurisdic- 
 tion, the fact that defendant pleaded a defense of which the 
 State court could not have taken cognizance would not affect 
 the Federal jurisdiction. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Rainey, 99 
 Fed. 596. 
 
 In a limited sense the jurisdiction of the Federal court in 
 removal cases is derivative, so that if the State court had no 
 jurisdiction the Federal court has none. Ibid. 
 
 When Case Not Withiji the. Jurisdictional Act. 
 
 We must next look to see if the case in the State court falls 
 within the terms of the Federal jurisdictional act, for if not, 
 it will be remanded. See Re Cilley, 58 Fed. 977, for construc- 
 tion of act of 1888. 
 
 Removals made on the ground of diversity of citizenship, 
 proper amount, or a Federal question, apparent in the plain- 
 tiff's case, touch the fundamental jurisdiction of the Federal 
 court, and, as we have heretofore seen, in such cases, it must 
 clearly appear in the petition of plaintiff, if based on a Federal 
 question; or may appear in the petition of plaintiff in the 
 State court, or made to appear in the petition for I'emoval if 
 based on diversity of citizenship. Harrington v. Great ISTorth- 
 ern R. Co. 169 Fed. 714; Huntington v. Pinney, 126 Fed. 
 237, 238; Johnson v. Wells, F. Co. 91 Fed. 3; Ysleta v. Can- 
 
 S. Eq.— 51. 
 
802 REMANDING CASE NOT IN JURISDICTIONAL ACT. 
 
 da, 67 Fed. 8; Cella v. Brown, 75 0. C. A. 608, 144 Fed. 
 744; Fitzgerald v. Missouri P. E. Co. 45 Fed. 814; Chappell 
 V. Waterworth, 155 U. S. 107, 39 L. ed. 87, 15 U. S. App. 
 34; Alexandria Nat. Bank v. Willis C. Bates Co. 87 C. C. A. 
 643, 160 Fed. 841; Walker v. Collins, 167 U. S. 59, 42 L. ed. 
 76, 17 Sup. Ct. Kep. 738; Carson v. Dunham, 121 U. S. 426, 
 30 L. ed. 993, 7 Sup. Ct. Kep. 1030; Broadway Ins. Co. v. 
 Chicago G. W. R. Co. 101 Fed. 508; Helena Power Trans- 
 mission Co. V. Spratt, 146 Fed. 311 ; Gillespie v. Pocahontas 
 Coal & Coke Co. 162 Fed. 742 ; Willard v. Chicago, B. & Q. 
 R Co. 91 C. C. A. 215, 165 Fed. 181. (See "Eemoval on 
 Diversity of Citizenship," and "On Ground of Federal Ques- 
 tion.") 
 
 By section 5 of the act of 1875, as we have seen, it is made 
 the duty of the Federal court to remand the cause at any time ■ 
 after the suit is removed, when it appears that such suit does 
 not involve a dispute or controversy properly within the juris- 
 diction of the Federal court, or when parties ha\'e been col- 
 lusively joined to make the cause removable (see chapter 92). 
 Hill V. Walker, 92 C. C. A. 633, 167 Fed. 241. 
 
 Whenever the cause is removed because of the alleged exist- 
 ence of one of these grounds of jurisdiction, you may make 
 the issue by motion to remand, and contest the truth of the 
 allegation, whether it be of citizenship, amount, or a Federal 
 question. 
 
 The issue can only be tried in the Federal court (Lake Street 
 Elev. E, Co. V. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 23 C. C. A. 448, 
 46 U. S. App. 630, 77 Fed. 773; Carson v. Hyatt, 118 U. S. 
 287, 30 L. ed. 169, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1050 ; Burlington, C. E. 
 
 6 X. E. Co. V. Dunn, 122 U. S. 515-517, 30 L. ed. 1160, 1161, 
 
 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1262; Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. E. Co. v. 
 Daughtry, 138 U. S. 303, 34 L. ed. 964, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 306), and when raised it must be in the language of the stat- • 
 ute, and be proven to the satisfaction of the court that the juris- 
 diction does not exist, or the case must be remanded. And 
 when shown, it is the duty of the court to remand at any stage 
 of the proceeding where it appears that the cause has been 
 wrongfully removed, though pleading and evidence have been 
 permitted to be filed and taken in the Federal court. Broad- 
 way Ins. Co. v. Chicago G. W. E. Co. 101 Fed. 508. Juris- 
 
EEMANDING WHERE QIESTIOJN^ DOUBTFUL. 8015 
 
 diction cannot be inferred by acts of plaintiff or by consent. 
 Crane Co. v. Guanica Centrale, 132 Fed. 713. 
 
 Again, this duty to remand cannot be affected by the fact 
 that there is no apparent cause of action stated, that is for the 
 State court to determine. Broadway Ins. Co. v. Chicago G. 
 W. E. Co. 101 Fed. 508; Ayres v. Wiswall, 112 U. S. 187- 
 193, 28 L. ed. 693-695, 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 90 ; Evans v. Felton, 
 96 Fed. 176. 
 
 TT7!e/! Question Doubtful Should Bemand. 
 
 It is the duty of the court to, remand where there is doubt. 
 Groel v. United Electric Co. 132 Fed. 265 and cases cited ; 
 Concord Coal Co. v. Haley, 76 Fed. 882; Hutcheson v. Big- 
 bee, 66 Fed. 329; Boatmen's Bank v. Fritzlen, 68 C. C. A. 
 288, 135 Fed. 650 ; Wrightsville Hardware Co. v. Colwell, 180 
 Fed. 589 ; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Louisville & K. K. Co. 201 
 Fed. 932; Drainage Dist. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. E. Co. 198 
 Fed. 264. 
 
 Costs on Remand. 
 
 Court can make such order as to costs as shall be just. Tncw 
 Code, sec. 37 (Comp. Stat. 1913,. sec. 1019). See Western U. 
 Teleg. Co. v. Louisville & K E. Co. 208 Fed. 582, as to allow- 
 ing docket fee. Bowens v. Chicago, M. & St. P. E. Co. 215 
 Fed. 287. 
 
CHAPTEK CXIX. 
 
 DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP IN EEMOVAL. 
 
 When diversity of citizenship is set up as ground for re- 
 moval it must appear to have existed when the suit began, as 
 well as at the time the application for removal was made; and 
 if it does not so appear, the case should be remanded. Wilson 
 V. Giberson, 124 Fed. 701; Huntington v. Pinney, 126 Fed. 
 237 ; Freeman v. Butler, 39 Fed. 1 ; German Sav. & L. Soc. v. 
 Dormitzer, 63 C. C. A. 639, 116 Fed. 471 ; Kellam v. Keith, 
 144 U. S. 570, 36 L. ed. 544, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 922; Mat- 
 tingly V. Northwestern Virgina R. Co. 158 U. S. 56, 39 L. ed. 
 895, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 725 ; Oroville & E". R. Co. v. Leggett; 
 162 Fed. 572; Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. In- 
 surance Co. of ]Sr. A. 151 U. S. 384, 38 L. ed. 204, 4 Inters. 
 Com. Rep. 499, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367; Alexandria ISTat. Bank 
 V. Willis C. Bates Co. 87 C. C. A. 643, 160 Fed. 841 ; Santa 
 Clara County v. Goldy Mach. Co. 159 Fed. 750; Jones v. 
 Adams Exp. Co. 129 Fed. 618; Irving v. Smith, 132 Fed.' 
 207; Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Prunty, 66 C. C. A. 163,' 
 133 Fed. 13 ; Thompson v. Staulmann, 131 Fed. 809; Lawrence 
 V. Southern P. Co. 165 Fed. 241. Code, sec. 28 (Comp. 
 Stat. 1913, sec. 1010) ; West Side R. Co. v. California P. R. 
 Co. 202 Fed. 333 ; Storm Lake Tub & Tank Co. v. Minneapo- 
 lis & St. L. R. Co. 209 Fed. 895. See Jackson v. Hooper, 188 
 Fed. 509, where parties were citizens of the United States, but 
 neither of them residents in a State. The case was remanded. 
 Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U. S. 206, 50 L. ed. 
 441, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 161, 4 Ann. Cas. 1147. However, in de- 
 termining diversity as ground of removal one is not bound by the 
 manner in which parties are placed in the bill, but as has been 
 before shown, the court will place or shift the parties according 
 to their real interest, and if by thus shifting them the proper 
 diversity can be shown the court will not remand. Hutton v. 
 Joseph Bancroft & S. Co. 77 Fed. 482 ; Groel v. United Elec- 
 
 804 
 
DIVEESITY OF CITIZENSHIP IN EEMOVAL. ,805 
 
 trie Co. 132 Fed. 254; Harter Twp. v. Kernochan, 103 U. S. 
 666-567, 26 L. ed. 412 j Adelbert College v. Toledo, W. & W. 
 E. Co. 47 Fed. 844. 
 
 Indispensable Parties are Alone Considered. 
 
 Sioux City Terminal E,. & Warehouse Co. v. Trust Co. of 
 N. A. 27 C. C. A. 73, 49 U. S. App. 523, 82 Fed. 124; Cella 
 V. Brown, 136 Fed. 441; Rogers v. Penobscot Min. Co. 83 
 C. C. A. 380, 154 Fed. 610 and cases cited; Geer v. Mathie- 
 son Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 428, 47 L. ed. 1122, 23 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 807; Higgins v. Baltimore & O. K Co. 99 Fed. 641; 
 Lucas V. Milliken, 139 Fed. 816. 
 
 If the bill does not show diversity of citizenship to give 
 jurisdiction, the petition for removal may set up the facts 
 showing diversity of citizenship does exist by shifting the par- 
 ties according to interest, or by striking out informal parties, 
 or it may set up a collusion and fraudulent joinder of parties 
 by plaintiff in order to prevent removal. Santa Clara County 
 V. Goldy Mach. Co. 159 Fed. 750; Groel v. United Electric 
 Co. 132 Fed. 254; Fife v. Whittell, 102 Fed. 537; Ysleta v. 
 Cauda, 67 Fed. 8; Hutton v. Joseph Bancroft & S. Co. 77 
 Fed. 482; Harter Twp. v. Kernochan, 103 U. S. 566, 567, 
 26 L. ed. 412, 413 ; Seaboard Air Line E. Co. v. North Caro- 
 lina E. Co. 123 Fed. 630 ; Eeese v. Zinn, 103 Fed. 97 ; Kim- 
 ball V. Cedar Eapids, 99 Fed. 132. 
 
 If neither the bill nor the petition for removal shows' juris- 
 dictional facts, the circuit court will not permit an amendment 
 to show jurisdiction and cause for removal, as we shall here- 
 after see. Fife v. Whittell, 102 Fed. 537 ; Murphy v. Payette 
 Alluvial Gold Co. 98 Fed. 321; Powers v. Chesapeake & O. 
 E. Co. 169 U. S. 92, 42 L. ed. 673, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 264; 
 Sturgeon Eiver Boom Co. v. W. H. Sawyer Lumber Co. 89 
 Fed. 113. Where diversity is alleged but defectively, it may 
 be amended. See act of Congress March 3d, 1916, providing 
 if suit is brought in, or removed to a Federal court upon the 
 ground of diversity of citizenship, and such diversity actually 
 existed, though defectively alleged, either party may amend at 
 any stage of the proceedings, and in the appellate court upon 
 such terms as the court may impose, so as to show on the record 
 
80(5 DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP IN EEilOVAL. 
 
 the divei-sity. Thompson v. Stalmann, 131 Fed. 811 ; Stadle- 
 mann v. Whiteline Towing Co. 92 Fed. 209. (See "Amending 
 Petition for Eemoval.") Diversity cannot he set up in a peti- 
 tion for removal by stating citizenship of partners, if not made 
 parties to suit as individuals. Kalya Market Co. v. Armour 
 & Co. 102 Fed. 530; see "Amendment of Petition." 
 
 Fraudulent Joinder to Prevent Uemoval. 
 
 The circuit court of the United States will not permit plain- 
 tiif to join formal parties, or fraudulently join with the de- 
 fendant parties whose citizenship would defeat a diversity of 
 citizenship and thereby prevent removal. Free v. Western U. 
 Teleg. Co. 122 Fed. 311; Kelly v. Chicago & A. K. Co. 122 
 Fed. 286 ; Crawford v. Illinois C. R. Co. 130 Fed. 395 and 
 cases cited; Gustafson v. Chicago, E. I. & P. R. Co. 128 Fed. 
 86; Boatner v. American Exp. Co. 122 Fed. 714; Ross v. Erie 
 R. Co. 120 Fed. 703; McCormick v. Illinois C. R. Co. 100 
 Fed. 250 ; Union Terminal R. Co. v. Chicago, B. Sa Q. R. Co. 
 119 Fed. 209; Axline v. Toledo W. V. & O. R. Co. 138 Fed. 
 169; Offner v. Chicago & E. R. Co. 78 C. C. A. 359, 148 
 Fed. 202; Prince r. Illinois C. R. Co. 98 Fed. 1; Doremus 
 V. Root, 94 Fed. 760; Dow v. Bradstreet Co. 46 Fed. 824; 
 See Charman v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co. 105 Fed. 449, and 
 Welch V. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R. Co. 177 Fed. 760 ; Lewis 
 v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R. Co. 192 Fed. 655; Gibson v. 
 Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 131 C. C. A. 332, 215 Fed. 24; Ala- 
 bama G. S. R. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U. S. 206, 50 L. ed. 441, 
 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 161, 4 Ann. Cas. 1147; Armstrong v. Kansas 
 City Southern R. Co. 192 Fed. 608; Clark v. Chicago, R. I. 
 & P. R. Co. 194 Fed. 505; McAllister v. Chesapeake' & 0. R. 
 Co. 198 Fed. 660. The burden of proof on the party charging. 
 Enos V. Kentucky Distillers & Warehouse Co. Ill C. C. A. 
 74, 189 Fed. 342. See Trivette v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 
 129 C. C. A. 177, 212 Fed. 641 ; Armstrong v. Kansas City 
 Southern R. Co. 192 Fed. 608 ; Shaver v. Pacific Coast Con- 
 densed Milk Co. 185 Fed. 316. 
 
 Fraudulent Joinder to Remove. 
 
 Nor can you fraudulently join a party to create diversity 
 
DIVEKSITY OF CITIZE:\SHIP IN EEMOVAL, 807 
 
 SO as to remove. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Alleghany Valley 
 E. Co. 25 Fed. 113. Where the cause of action is joint, you 
 may join a defendant, though the purpose is to prevent re- 
 moval. Evansberg'v. Insurance Stove, Eange & Foundry Co. 
 168 Fed. 1001; Hukill v. Maysville & B. S. K Co. 72^ Fed. 
 750; Thresher v. Western U. feleg. Co. 148 Fed. 651; Gustaf- 
 son V. Chicago, R. I. & P. P. Co. 128 Fed. 85 ; see Khuth v. 
 Butte Electric E. Co. 148 Fed. 73. See "Motion to Eemand 
 for Fraudulent Joinder," chapter 131. McGarvey v. Butte 
 Miner Co. 199 F«d. 672. 
 
 ^Yhere Issue Determined. 
 
 These issues are to be determined by the Federal court. 
 Carlisle v. Sunset Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 116 Fed. 896; Kansas 
 City Suburban Belt R. Co. v. Herman, 187 U. S. 70, 47 L. ed. 
 79, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 24; Woodson County v. Toronto Bank, 
 128 Fed. 157 ; Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. E. Co. v. Daughtry, 
 138 U. S. 298, 34 L. ed. 963, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 306 ; Arrow- 
 smith V. Xashville & D. R. Co. 57 Fed. 170; Thomas v. Great 
 Northern R. Co. 77 C. C. A. 255, 147 Fed. 83 ; ]\IcGuire v. 
 areat Northern R. Co. 153 Fed. 434; Lewis v. Cincinnati, AT. 
 
 0. & T. P. R. Co. 192 Fed. 655. 
 
 What Mmt he Alleged and Shown hi Trial of Issue. 
 
 It must appear that no cause of action is stated- against the 
 lefendant alleged to be fraudulently joined; or that in law 
 le has been improperly joined; or that the averments upon 
 vhich he is joined are untrue so that a want of good faith in 
 he joinder is apparent. Hukill v. Maysville & B. S. R. Co. 
 '2 Fed. 7'45, 746 ; AVarax v. Cincinnati," N. O. & T. P. R. Co. 
 ■2 Fed. 637, 638; Thomas v. Great S'orthern R. Co. 77 C. 
 1 A. 255, 147 Fed. 83 ; Offner v. Chicago & E. R. Co. 78 C. 
 
 1. A. 359, 148 Fed. 201 ; Union Terminal R. Co. v. Chicago, 
 3. & Q. R. Co. 119 Fed. 209. General allegations are not suf- 
 icient. Ibid. See also Durkee v. Illinois C. R. Co. 81 Fed. 
 ; Landers v. Felton, 73 Fed. 311. Whether or not an allega- 
 ion of a joint cause of action in the complaint is true or not 
 lay be put in issue by the petition for removal alleging a fraud- 
 
808 DIVEESITY OF CITIZENSHIP IN REMOVAL. 
 
 ulent joinder to prevent removal. Gustafson v. Chicago, E. 
 I. & P. E. Co. 128 Fed. 85 ; Bryce v. Southern E. Co. 122 
 Fed. 709. See Boatner v. American Exp. Co. 122 Fed. 714. 
 
 How Issue Raised as to Diversity of Citizenship. 
 
 The issue as to whether there is diversity of citizenship upon 
 which to base the removal is raised in the circuit court of the 
 United States in the same manner as the issue is raised to 
 defeat the original jurisdiction of the circuit courts, which has 
 already been sufficiently discussed, together with the proof re- 
 quired. 
 
 If the original bill does not show diversity, and the petition 
 to remove does not specifically set forth facts showing it, then 
 a simple motion to remand can be made. If, however, the pe- 
 tition to remove sets forth facts showing diversity or that by 
 shifting parties diversity would exist, or that there has been 
 a collusion and fraudulent joinder of parties to prevent re- 
 moval, then the motion to remand must take issue with the 
 allegations of the petition for removal, which issues will be 
 tried in the usual manner or as the court may direct. (See 
 "Shifting Parties.") Harrington v. Great ITorthern E. Co. 
 169 Fed. 714; Wetmore v. Eymer, 169 U. S. 115-119, 42 
 L. ed. 682-684, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 293 ; Boatmen's Bank v. 
 Fritzlen, 66 C. C. A. 288,J.35 Fed. 650. 
 
 Removal hy Aliens. 
 
 The question arises. Will a motion to remand a cause re- 
 moved by an alien defendant be granted; or, in other words, 
 can an alien remove a cause on the ground of his alienage ? 
 
 I will briefly state the result of various cases in which the 
 issue has been raised. 
 
 In Texas v. Lewis, 12 Fed. 1, in a controversy between a 
 State and an alien defendant the case was held removable. 
 
 In 14 Fed. 65, the case was again heard with a similar re- 
 sult. These cases came under the second subdivision of Eev. 
 Stat. sec. 639, which was repealed by the act of 1875, and not 
 reinstated in the act of 1887. 
 
 In Cudahy v. McGeoch, 37 Fed. 1, it is held that an alien 
 
EEMOVAL BY ALIENS. 809 
 
 sued in the State of his residence by citizens of another State 
 cannot remove the case to the Federal court nnder the act of 
 1887. The ground was that the suit was not a suit between 
 citizens of different States; and, secondly, that, though it was 
 a suit between a citizen of a State and a foreign citizen, yet 
 the foreign citizen was a resident of the State in which he was 
 sued, and therefore did not come within the provisions of the 
 removal act permitting only nonresident citizens to remove. 
 King V. Cornell, 106 U. S. 398, 27 L. ed. 61, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 313; Walker v. O'Keil, 38 Fed. 375; Eddy v. Casas, 118 Fed. 
 363 ; Hall v. Great Northern R. Co. 197 Fed. 488. 
 
 By an examination of the act of 1888, section 2, affecting 
 removals, two restrictions are attached to removals from a State 
 to Federal courts: First. Removals are limited to cases in 
 which the United States circuit court has original jurisdiction 
 under section 1 of the act; and, second, the right to remove is 
 limited to a nonresident defendant. New Code, sees. 24-28 
 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 991-991(25), 1007-1010). 
 
 Now, by the first section of the act, jurisdiction is given to 
 the circuit courts when the controversy is between a citizen 
 of a State and foreign State citizens or subjects. 
 
 So, a citizen may sue an alien in the Federal court in the 
 first instance, but if the alien should be sued in the State court 
 his right to remove depends upon the second limitation as above 
 stated, to wit, he must be a nonresident of the State in which 
 he is sued to remove the case to the Federal court ; otherwise he 
 cannot remove, and a motion to remand will be granted. Ibid. ; 
 Colley V. McArthur, 35 Fed. 372; Baumgarten v. Alliance 
 Assur. Co. 153 Fed. 301; Holton v. Helvetia-Swiss F. Ins. 
 Co. 163 Fed. 660 ; Wind River Lumber Co. v. Frankport Ma- 
 rine, Acci. & Plate Glass Ins. Co. 116 C. C. A. 160, 196 Fed. 
 343. 
 
 But the question has arisen, Can a suit be removed from a 
 State court in which a citizen of the State where the suit is 
 brought has sued a nonresident citizen and alien jointly and 
 both joining in the petition for removal ? This identical ques- 
 tion wa5 raised in Roberts v. Pacific & A. R. & Nav. Co. 58 
 C. C. A. 61, 121 Fed. 785, and it was held that the suit could 
 be removed, but it will be noticed that the conclusion of the 
 court was based on the ground that both the citizen and alien 
 
810 KEMOVAL BY ALIENS. 
 
 were nonresidents of the State in which the suit was brought, 
 and if each had been sued separately could remove. But had 
 the alien been a resident of the State, no removal could have 
 been had unless the controversy was separable as to the noil- 
 resident citizen. This case repudiates the doctrine in Black's 
 Dillon on Kemovals, sees. 68, 84, and seeks to avoid. Tracy 
 v. Morel, 88 Fed. 803, and King v. Cornell, 106 U. S. 395, 
 27 L. ed. 60, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 313, referred to below, and 
 minimizes the force of the word "wholly" in the act of 1888, 
 sec. 2. However, an action by a nonresident against a citizen 
 of the State, and alien is not removable. Hackett v. Kuhne, 
 157 Fed. 317, citing Martin v. Snyder, 148 U. S. 663, 37 L. ed. 
 602, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 706. 
 
 Another question arises, to wit: Can a suit be removed by 
 an alien sued jointly with a citizen of a State on the ground 
 that the controversy with the alien is separable? In Insur- 
 ance Co. of N. A. V. Delav^are Mut. Ins. Co. 50 Fed. 257, the 
 question is stated as a query, with the intimation by the court 
 that the langnaage of the act of 1887 entitled him to remove the 
 cause if he be a nonresident alien. It says the test is actual 
 interest in the separable controversy. In Creagh v. Equitable 
 Life Assur. Soc. 88 Fed. 2, it is held that the statute limits 
 removals in a separable controversy to cases where it is wholly 
 , between citizens of different States, and an alien who is a party 
 to a separable controversy can not remove, and conversely a 
 nonresident defendant cannot remove, a separable controversy 
 with an alien plaintiff. Tracy v. Morel, 88 Fed. 803, citing 
 King V. Cornell, 106 U. S. 395, 27 L. ed. 60, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 313 ; Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Insurance 
 Co. of ISr. A. 151 U. S. 368, 38 L. ed. 195, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 
 499, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367 ; Woodrum v. Clay, 33 Fed. 899 ; 
 See Iowa Lillooet Gold Min. Co. v. Bliss, 144 Fed. 447 ; H. G. 
 Baker & Bro. v. Pinkham, 211 Fed. 728. 
 
 So the rules may be stated : 
 
 First. That where an alien is sued alone in a State in which 
 he does not reside, he may remove the cause to the Federal 
 court as a "nonresident" defendant. Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. 
 Frankford Marine, Acci. & Plate Glass Ins. Co. 202 Fed. 293 ; 
 Wind River Lumber Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Acci. & Plate 
 Glass Ins. Co. 116 C. C. A. 160, 196 Fed. 340. 
 
BKMO^'AI, BY AI.IEXS. 811 
 
 Second. That wlicii an alien is sued jointly with a resident 
 defendant in a State court, he cannot remove on the ground of 
 a separate controversy, because the statute only permits a re- 
 moval on the ground that the separable Controversy must be 
 wholly between citizens of different States. 
 
 Third. That in view of this act a separable controversy be- 
 tween an alien plaintiff and a nonresident defendant cannot be 
 removed by the nonresident defendant. 
 
 Fourth. In view of the decision in Roberts v. Pacific & A. 
 E. Co. 58 C. C. A. 61, 121 Fed. 785, if an alien is joined with 
 a nonresident defendant, either of whom could remove if sued 
 separately, then both may join in a removal to the Federal 
 court. If, however, the alien joined with the nonresident de- 
 fendant was a resident of the State in which he is sued, the 
 case could not be removed. 
 
 Fifth. Where alien sues nonresident the latter may re- 
 move. Iowa Lillooet Gold Min. Co. v. Bliss, 144 Fed. 447 ; 
 Barlow v. Chicago & N. W. R Co. 164 Fed. 765 ; s. c. 172 
 Fed. 514-516; Bagenas v. Southern P. R. Co. 180 Fed. 888; 
 Rones v. Katalla Co. 182 Fed. 946; Smellie v. Southern P. R. 
 Co. 197 Fed. 642. The courts conflict on this question, many 
 holding that nonresidents cannot remove unless by consent, be- 
 cause not a siiit that could have been originally brought in the 
 district courts of the United States. New Code, sec. 28 (Comp. 
 Stat. 1913, sec. 1010). Mahopoulus v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. 
 Co. 167 Fed. 165 ; Odhner v. Northern P. R. Co. 188 Fed. 
 507; Kamenicky v. Catterall Printing Co. 188 Fed. 400; 
 "Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 201 Fed. 937- 
 939, and eases cited. j 
 
 Sixth. Any civil suit against any officer appointed under or 
 acting by authority of any revenue law of the United States, 
 brought in a State court, may be removed. New Code, sec. 33. 
 Seventh. Any personal action brought in a State court by 
 an alien against an officer of the United States being a nonresi- 
 dent of that State, may be removed into the district court of 
 the United States in and for the district in which the defendant 
 was served with process. New Code, sec. 34. Jackson v. Wil- 
 liam Kenefick Co. 233 Fed. 130. 
 
 Removal by Corporations. 
 
 Corporations are citizens of the State granting their charters 
 
812 WHO CAN EEMOVE IN DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP. 
 
 which determines citizenship in removals. Butler Bros. Shoe 
 C. V. United States Eubber Co. 84 C. C. A. 167, 156 Fed. 1; 
 Lee V. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 150 Fed. 776. See Patch 
 V. Wabash R. Co. 207 U. S. 277, 52 L. ed. 204, 28 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 80, 12 Ann. Cas. 518 ; Wasley v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. 
 Co. 147 Fed. 608. 
 
 Who Can Remove the Case in Diversity of Citizenship. 
 
 When jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, then 
 the nonresident defendant may remove, or when more than one 
 defendant, then all nonresident defendants concurring may re- 
 move (chap. 2, sec. 1, act of 1888 ; new Code, sees. 24-28 
 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 991-991(25), 1007-1010). State 
 Trust Co. V. Kansas City P. & G. R. Co. 110 Fed. 10 ; Houston 
 V. Filer & S. Co. 43 C. C. A. 457, 104 Fed. 162, and cases 
 cited; Huntington v. Pinney, 126 Fed. 237; Blackburn v. 
 Blackburn, 142 Fed. 901 ; German Sav. & L. Soc. v. Dormitzerj 
 53 C. C. A. 639, 116 Fed. 471 ; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. 
 Martin, 178 U. S. 248, 44 L. ed. 1056, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 854; 
 Gableman v. Peoria, D. & E. R. Co. 179 U. S. 337, 45 L. ed. 
 221, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. I7l; Scott v. Choctaw, 0. & G. R. Go. 
 112 Fed. 182; Parkinson v. Barr, 105 Fed. 83, 84; Thompson 
 v. Chicago, St. P. & K. C, R. Co. 60 Fed. 773 ; see Madison- 
 ville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Min. Co. 130 Fed. 789, de- 
 fining "nonresident" as used in the statute), and by the word 
 "concurring" is meant that they must join in the petition for 
 removal (Ibid. ; Yarnell v. Felton, 104 Fed. 161, s. c. 102 Fed. 
 369), and the petition must show all the defendants are non- 
 residents and concur in the application (Parkinson v. Barr, 
 105 Fed. 83, 84; Bates v. Carpentier, 98 Fed. 452), unless 
 cause separable. 
 
 It is held, however, in First Nat. Bank v. Bridgeport Trust 
 Co. 117 Fed. 969, that the failure of the husband to join where 
 the subject-matter of the litigation was the wife's intere.st in 
 property was immaterial, and where one is only a nominal de- 
 fendant against whom no relief is prayed, his failure to join 
 in the application will not affect the removal. Henderson v. 
 Cabell, 43 Fed. 257. See "Nominal Party." 
 
 There can be no removal on the ground of diversity of citi- 
 
WHO CAN EEMOVE IN DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP. 813 
 
 zensliip when the State is a party (Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. 
 United States [Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Alabama] 155 U. 
 S. 482, 39 L. ed. 231, 15 Snp. Ct. Eep. 192 ; Indiana use of 
 Delaware County v. Alleghany Oil Co. 85 Fed. 870; Pla- 
 quemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U. S. 520, 42 
 L. ed. 1130, 18 Sup. Ct. Eep. 685 ; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 
 V. Missouri R & Warehouse Comrs. [Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 
 V. Hickman] 183 U. S. 58, 46 L. ed. 80, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 18) ; nor when a nonresident is suing a nonresident in State 
 court (Ex parte Wisner, 203 U. S. 449, 51 L. ed. 264, 27 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 150), unless the plaintiff assents (Moyer v. Chicago, 
 M. & St. P. E. Co. 168 Fed. 105) ; but if removed, the objec- 
 tion is waived (Kreigh v. Westinghouse, C. K. & Co. 214 U. 
 S. 249, 53 L. ed. 984, 29 Sup. Ct. Eep. 619 ; Re Moore, 209 
 U. S. 490, 52 L. ed. 904, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585, 14 Ann. 
 Cas. 1164; Western Loan & Sav. Co. v. Butte & B. Consol. 
 Min. Co. 210 U. S. 368, 52 L. ed. 1101, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 720). See chapter 126; Stewart v. Cybur Lumber Co. 211 
 Fed. 343; Baldwin v. Pacific Power & Light Co. 199 Fed. 
 293, 294. 
 
 Again, where the suit is instituted in a State court of a 
 State of which neither party is a resident, if removal is had, 
 it must be to the Federal district court of the Federal district 
 in which defendant resides. Thus, a suit brought by a citizen 
 of Vermont against a citizen of Massachusetts in a New York 
 State court cannot be removed to a Federal court in New 
 York, but to the district of defendant's residence. Mattison v. 
 Boston & M. R. Co. 205 Fed. 821; Stewart v. Cybur Lumber 
 Co. 211 Fed. 344. You cannot remove a cause into a Federal 
 court unless it is one that could have been originally brought 
 there. Younts v. Southwestern Teleg. & Teleph. Co. 192 Fed. 
 200; Waterman v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 199 Fed. 667. 
 
 Joinder of Defendcunis Not Served. 
 
 When the cause of action in which a defendant not served 
 is joint, the nonresident sensed cannot remove as if a separable 
 controversy (Patchin v. Hunter, 38 Fed. 51 ; Ames v. Chicago, 
 S. F. & C. E. Co. 39 Fed. 881. See Putnam v. Ingraham, 
 114 U. S. 59, 29 L. ed. 66, 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 746; Wilson v. 
 
814 REMOVAL WHEN JOINDEE OE DEEEJN'DAIs'T NOT SEEVED. 
 
 Oswego Twp. 151 U. S. 66, 38 L. ed. 75, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 259; Sinclair v. Pierce, 50 Fed. 852; Carlisle v. Sunset 
 Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 116 Fed. 896), unless there, is an allega- 
 tion of fraudulent joinder and no issue joined, says the court 
 in Dishon v. Cincinnati, N. D. & T. P. R. Co. 133 Fed. 471; 
 Union Terminal E. Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. E. Co. 119 Fed. 
 209. See "Effect of Eemoval on Service in State Court." 
 
 In Tremper v. Schwabacher, 84 Fed. 415, the case rested 
 upon the fact that the nature of the joint interest was one of 
 copartnership, and therefore held that. the other partners not 
 being served would not prevent a removal by the nonresident 
 partner served. Diday v. ISTew York, P. & 0. E. Co. 107 Fed. 
 569. If, however, it is removed and tried without objection, a 
 severance will be presumed. Guarantee Co. v. Mechanics Sav. 
 Bank & T. Co. 26 C. C. A. 146, 47 U. S. App. 91, 80 Fed. 
 766. 
 
 If one joint defendant loses, the right to remove, it cannot 
 be exercised by the others in the absence of a separable con- 
 troversy. Calderhead v. Downing, 103 Fed. 27.; Fletcher v. 
 Hamlet, 116 U. S. 410, 29 L. ed. 679, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 426; 
 Brooks v. Clark, 119 U. S. 513, 30 L. ed, 485, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 301; Abel v. Book, 120 Fed. 47; Eogers v. Van IsTortwick, 45' 
 Fed.. 514. 
 
 Misjoinder. 
 
 Where there is a misjoinder of parties their presence may 
 be disregarded in removal. loAva Lilliooet Gold Min.. Co. v. 
 Bliss,- 144 Fed. 447; Politz v. Wabash E. Co. 153 Fed. 942; 
 S. C. 100 C. C. A. 1, 176 Fed., 333; Helms v. ISTorthern P. E. 
 Co. 120 Fed.' 395, and by misjoinder is meant that no cause 
 of action is stated against some of the defendants. 
 
 Nominal Parties. 
 
 Nominal parties, or parties against whom no relief is prayed, 
 need not join in applying for removal, or it may be stated their' 
 failure 'to join in the petition for removal would not- aifect- it 
 (Eeeves V. Corning, 51 Fed. 778; Johnston E. Frog & Switch 
 Co. v.'Buda ;Fouhdry. & Mfg. -Cd. 148 Fed.: 883; Cella' v. 
 
REMOVAL WHEN CONTEOVEESY SEPAEABLE. 815 
 
 Brown, 75 C. C. A. 608, 144 Fed. 742 ; Eeese v. Zinn, 103 
 Fed. 97 ; Delaware, L. & W. E. Co. v. Frank, 110 Fed. 689 ; 
 First Xat. Bank v. Bridgeport Trust Co. 117 Fed. 969; Loop 
 V. Winters, 115 Fed. 362; Kogers v. Penobscot Min. Co. 83 
 C. C. A. 380, 154 Fed. 606, 607; Parkinson v. Barr, 105 
 Fed. 81 ; Higgins v. Baltimore & 0. E. Co. 99 Fed. 640 ; Geer 
 V. Matliieson ""Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 434, 47 L. ed. 1125, 
 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 807 ; Carver v. Jarvis-Conklin Mortg. Trust 
 Co. 73 Fed. 9; iEissouri use of Public Schools v. Alt, 73 Fed. 
 302), as when defendant has only an option (Garrard v. Sil- 
 ver Peak Mines, 76 Fed. 1 ; Eichardson v. Southern Idaho 
 Water Power Co. 209 Fed. 949.) 
 
 When Controversy Separable. 
 
 While the rule, as given, that all the nonresident defendants 
 must join the removal, or the court will remand (Bates v. Car- 
 pen tier, 98 Fed. 453 ; Moore v. Los Angeles Iron & Steel Co. 
 89 Fed. 78 ; Colburn v. Hill, 41 C. C. A. 467, 101 Fed. 500 ; 
 Knight V. Ltitcher & M. Lumber Co. 69 C. C. A. 248, 136 
 Fed. 405, yet the rule is not applicable if there be a separable 
 controvei'sy between plaintiffs and one or more of the defend- 
 ants, as heretofore explained ; the nonresident defendant having 
 the separate controversy may remove the case. Parkinson v. 
 Barr, 105- Fed. 83, 84, and authorities cited; see clause 3, sec. 
 2, act 1875 amended by act 1888 ; Bates v. Carpentier, 98 Fed. 
 452; New England Waterworks Co. v. Farmers'; Loan & T. Co. 
 69 C. C. A. 297, 136 Fed. 525; Chicago, E. & P. E. Co. v. 
 Martin, 178 U. S.,247, 44 L. ed. 1056, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 854; 
 Laden v. Meek, 65 C. C. A. 361, 130 Fed. 877; American 
 Bridge Co. v. Hunt, 64 C. C. A. 548, 130 Fed, 303 ; Harding 
 V. Standard Oil Co. 170 Fed. 651 ; Batey v. 5[ashville C. & 
 St. L. E. Co. 95 Fed. 368; new Code,, sees. 24-28 (Comp. Stat. 
 1913, sees. 991-991 (25), 1007-1010); Maloney v. Cressler, 
 126 C. C. A. 618, 210 Fed. 1097 and cases cited; Casey v; 
 Bakei*, 212 Fed. 255, aid cases cited; Buck v. Felder, 196 Fed. 
 421; Ee Silvies Eiver, 199 Fed. 501. Separate defenses, as; we 
 haves heretofore seen, do not create ■ a separahle - controversy, 
 Graces v. Corbin, 132 U. S. 588, 33 L. ed. 468, .10 Sup Ct. 
 Eep. 196 ; Fidelity Ins. Tj-ugt & S., D. Co. v. Iluntingtoh, 117 
 
816 REMOVAL WHEN CONTBOVEESY SEPARABLE. 
 
 U. S. 281, 29 L. ed. 899, 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 733; Thurber v. 
 Miller, 14 C. C. A. 432, 32 U. S. App. 209, 67 Fed. 375 ; Tor- 
 rence v. Shedd, 144 U. S. 530, 36 L. ed. 531, 12 Sup Ct. 
 Rep. 726. 
 
 In equity the qu&stion of the existence of a separable con- 
 troversy must be determined from the allegations of the bill, 
 independent of the petition for removal. Elkins v. Howell, 
 140 Fed. 157, 159 and cases cited. Graves v. Corbin, 132 U. 
 S. 585, 33 L. ed. 467, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 196. So also in tort. 
 See Cleveland v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. 77 C. C. A. 
 467, 147 Fed. 171; Blunt v. Southern R. Co. 155 Fed. 500; 
 Louisville & IST. R. Co. v. Wangelin, 132 U. S. 601, 33 L. 
 ed. 475, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 203 ; Thresher v. Western U. Teleg. 
 Co. 148 Fed. 651 ; Fogarty v. Southern P. Co. 123 Fed. 973, 
 974; Galleotti v. Diamond Match Co. 178 Fed. 127; Coram 
 V. Davis, 182 Fed. 939 ; Davey v. Yolo Water & Power Co. 211 
 Fed. 345 ; West Side R. Co. v. California P. R. Co. 200 Fed. 
 333. 
 
 To avoid repetition I- must refer you to the discussion of a 
 separable controversy and illustrative cases, as they apply to 
 removal of causes as stated in the act of 1888, sec. 1. See for 
 illustration Miller v. Clifford, 5 L.R.A.(]Sr.S.) 49, 67 C. C. 
 A. 52, 133 Fed. 881; Oroville & N. R. Co. v. Leggett, 162 
 Fed. 572 ; Manufacturers' Commercial Co. v. Brown Alaska 
 Co. 148 Fed. 308; Elkins v. Howell, 140 Fed. 157; Heffel- 
 finger v. Choctaw, A. & G. R. Co. 140 Fed. 75; Blackburn 
 V. Blackburn, 142 Fed. 901 ; Lathrop, S. & H. Co. v. Interior 
 Constr. & Improv. Co. 143 Fed. 687; Helena Power Trans- 
 mission Co. V. Spratt, 146 Fed. 311 ; Thomas v. Great North- 
 ern R. Co. 77 C. C. A. 255, 147 Fed. 83; Peninsular Iron 
 Co. V. Stone, 121 U. S. 632, 633, 30 L. ed. 1020, 1021, 7 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 1010; Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 
 428, 47 L. ed. 1122, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 807-; MacGinniss v. Bos- 
 ton & M. Consol. Copper & S. Min. Co. 55 C. C. A. 648, 119 
 Fed. 96 ; Hanover Nat. Bank v. Credits Commutation Co. 118 
 Fed. 110 ; State Trust Co. v. Kansas City, P. & G. R. Co. 110 
 Fed. 10 ; German Sav. & L. Soc. v. Dormitzer, 53 C. C. A. 639, 
 116 Fed. 471 ; Miller v. LeMars ISTat. Bank, 116 Fed. 551. 
 
 Where the case is removed by one defendant on the ground 
 of a separable controversy, you may dismiss as to him in order 
 
EBMOVAL WIIEK COXTBOVEKSY SEPARABLE. 817 
 
 to remand the case. Youtsey v. Hoffman, 108 Fed. 699 ; Mc- 
 Oabe V. Southern R. Co. 107 Fed. 213 ; Texas Transp. Co. v. 
 Seeligson, 122 U. S. 519, 30 L. ed. 1150, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 1261 ; Torrence v. Shedd, 144 U. S. 533, 36 L. ed. 532, 12 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep 726; Texas Cotton Products Co. v. Stames, 128 Fed. 
 183. 
 
 An alien, as we have seen, cannot remove on the ground of 
 a separable controversy. (See "Removal by Aliens.") 
 
 Removal in Cross Suit. 
 
 In cross suit the original plaintiff becomes defendant, and 
 he may remove if conditions exist that would give the right 
 of removal if suit had been originally filed against him. Kirby 
 V. American Soda Fountain Co. 194 U. S. 141, 48 L. ed. 911, 
 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 619 ; Hagerla v. Mississippi River Power Co. 
 202 Fed. 775, and cases cited. In Nash v. McNamara, 145 Fed. 
 541, it is said that parties brought into a suit by cross bill in 
 a State court cannot remove. (See "Intervention for "Re- 
 moval.") See p. 855. 
 
 Tort Feasors. 
 
 Where tort feasors are joined, one cannot remove on the 
 
 ground of a separable controversy. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 
 
 v. Dixon, 179 .U. S. 131, 45 L. ed. 121, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 67; Blunt v. Southern R. Co. 155 Fed. 499; Shaffer v. Union 
 
 Brick Co. 128 Fed. 101 ; Gustafson v. C^hicago, R. I. & P. R. 
 
 Co. 128 Fed. 85 ; Dougherty v. 'Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 126 
 
 Fed. 240; Keller v. Kansas City, St. L. & C. R. Co. 135 Fed. 
 
 202 ; Heffelfinger v. Choctaw, 0. & G. R. Co. 140 Fed. 75 ; 
 
 Iowa Lillooet Gold Min. Co. v. Bliss, 144 Fed. 452 ; Knuth v. 
 
 Butte Electric R. Co. 148 Fed. 73 ; Alabama, G. S. R. Co. v. 
 
 Thompson, 200 U. S. 206; 50 L. ed. 441, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 161, 
 
 4 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1147 ; Thresher v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 
 
 148 Fed. 651; American Bridge Co. v. Hunt, 64 C. C. A. 548, 
 
 130 Fed. 302 ; International & G. IS^". R. Co. v. Hoyle, 79 C. C. 
 
 A. 128, 149 Fed. 181; Davenport v. Southern R. Co. 68 V. C. A. 
 
 444, 135 Fed. 960; Person v. Illinois C. R. Co. 118 Fed. 342; 
 
 Willard v. Spartanburg, U. & 0. R. Co. 124 Fed. 797 ; Weaver 
 S. Eq.— 52. 
 
818 EEMOVAL IN CASE OF JOINT TOET FEASORS, 
 
 V. :N"oi-them P. R. Co. 125 Fed. 155 ; MaiTS v. Felton, 102 Fed. 
 775; Ward v. Franklin, 110 Fed. 794; Rupp v. Wheeling & 
 L. E. E. Co. 58 C. C. A. 161, 121 Fed. 825; Willard v. 
 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 91 C. C. A. 215, 165 Fed. 181; Rich- 
 ardson V. Southern Idaho Water Power Co. 209 Fed. 953; 
 Buchanan v. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co. 126 C. C. A. 658, 210 
 Fed. 144. The separable controversy must be determined by 
 the face of the pleading. Thresher v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 
 148 Fed. 651; Fogarty v. Southern P. Co. 123 Fed. 973, 974; 
 Riser v. Southern R. Co. 116 Fed. 215. But where a corpo- 
 ration sues for damages alleged to have been sustained by the 
 corporation by reason of the officers' misconduct, and no con- 
 spiracy is alleged, the action is severable. Sessions v. South- 
 ern P. Co. 134 Fed. 313 ; Davenport v. Southern R. Co. 68 C. 
 C. A. 444, 135 Fed. 962, and cases cited; Youtsey v. Hoffman, 
 108 Fed. 693. 
 
 Again, where two corporations are sued for a personal in- 
 jury from falling down an elevator, one being sued as owner 
 of the building and the other as having negligently built the 
 elevator, it was held the cause was separable. Coker v. Monag- 
 han Mills, 110 Fed. 803. 
 
 So it has been held that a joint action cannot be maintained 
 against a railroad company and an employer to recover for an 
 injury resulting solely from the negligence of the employee; 
 the causes of action, being based on separate grounds, are dis- 
 tinct, and present a separable controversy. Helms v. Northern 
 P. R. Co. 120 Fed. 389 ; Sessions v. Southern P. Co. 134 Fed. 
 313 ; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Stepp, 151 Fed. 909 ; Atlan- 
 tic Coast Line R. Co. v. Bailey, 151 Fed. 891; Gustafson v. 
 Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 128 Fed. 87, 88 ; See Knuth v. 
 Butte Electric R. Co. 148 Fed. 73 ; See Morris v. Louisville 
 & ISr. R. Co. 175 Fed. 491 ; McAllister v. Chesapeake & 0. 
 R. Co. 198 Fed. 660 ; Armstrong v. Kansas City Southern R. 
 Co. 192 Fed. 608 ; Macutis v. Cudahy Packing Co. ,203 Fed. 
 291. 
 
 By referring to Warax v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. 
 72 Fed. 637, 643, it will be seen that up to the date of its 
 delivery the authorities were conflicting, and it seems that the 
 cases have been differentiated and a rule of construction ap- 
 plied to determine when the controversy in an action against 
 
EBMOVAL IN CASE OF JOII7T TOBT FEASOBS. 819 
 
 the employer and employee for a personal injury can be made 
 separable. 
 
 The rule is that in all cases where the master is sought to be 
 made liable for the negligent or wrongful act of his servant 
 solely on the ground of his relationship as master, under the 
 doctrine of respondeat superior, and not by reason of any 
 personal share in the negligent or wrongful act by his presence, 
 or express direction, he is liable severally only, and not jointly 
 with his servant. Warax v. Cincinnati, X. 0. & T. P. K. Co. 
 72 Fed. 641, 642; Sessions v. Southern P. Co. 1.34 Fed. 315; 
 Gustafson v. Chicago, E. I. & P. E. Co. 128 Fed. 93-96; Shaf- 
 fer V. Union Brick Co. 128 Fed. 102. See Dishon v. Cincin- 
 nati, K 0. & T. P. E. Co. 66 C. C. A. 345, 133 Fed. 474; 
 and Charman v. Lake Erie & W. E. Co. 105 Fed. 454; Adder- 
 son V. Soxithern E. Co. 177 Fed. 571 ; Jackson v. Chicago, E. 
 I. & P. E. Co. 102 C. C. A. 159, 178 Fed. 432. 
 
 There must be some community in the wrong doing among 
 the parties united as codefendants, and a co-operation in fact, 
 and not a mere joint responsibility and based on entirely dif- 
 ferent grounds and presenting two causes of action in the same 
 complaint. Helms v. ^Torthern P. E. Co. 120 Fed. 394; Shaf- 
 fer V. Union Brick Co. 128 Fed. 101. See Knuth v. Butte 
 Electric E. Co. 148 Fed. 73; Davenport v. Southern E. Co. 
 68 C. C. A. 444, 135 Fed.. 967. As to the rule when the law 
 of the State permits it, see Charman v. Lake Erie & ^Y. E. Co. 
 105 Fed. 449, 454; Helms v. Northern P. E. Co. 120 Fed. 
 397, 398. 
 
 Again, it has been held that the employee is not liable to 
 third persons for a nonperformance of duty, but only for acts 
 of positive wrong and negligence; thus, an employee charged 
 with the inspection of engines cannot be joined with the com- 
 pany as defendant, so as to prevent a removal of the cause to 
 the Federal court. Ibid. ; Kelly v. Chicago & A. E. Co. 122 
 Fed. 286. See Helms v. ^^orthern P. E. Co. 120 Fed. 396, 
 397. See Eiser v. Southern E. Co. 116 Fed. 216, 217, citing 
 Chesapeake & 0. E. Co. v. Dixon, 179 U. S. 131, 45 L. ed. 
 121, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 67 (See "Joint and Several Liability.") 
 
 The Whole Case is Removed. 
 
 When a case is removed on the ground of a separable con- 
 
820 PETITION TO REMOVE IN DIVEKSITY OF CITIZENSHIP. 
 
 troversy, the whole case under the act of 1875 is taken up. 
 Barney v. Latham, 103 U. S. 212-216, 26 L. ed. 517-518; 
 Hoge V. Canton Ins. Office, 103 Fed. 513; Hyde v. Euble, 
 104 U. S. 407, 26 L. ed. 823 ; Atlantic & V. Fertilizing Co. v. 
 Carter, 88 Fed. 70g ; Brooks v. Clark, 119 F. S. 502^ 30 L. 
 ed. 482, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 301; see Youtsey v. Hoffman; > 108 
 Fed. 699. The case would be remanded if only the separable 
 controversy was taken up. U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 639, act of 
 1866 was repealed by the act of 1875; Hyde v. Euble, 104 IT. 
 S. 407, 26 L. ed. 823. See Deepwater E. Co. v. Western Poca- 
 hontas Coal & Lumber Co. 152 Fed. 830, 831, where a dis- 
 tinction is drawn between a "separate controversy" and the 
 joinder of wholly distinct cause of action; in the latter case the 
 rule does not apply. 
 
 Substance of Petition to Remove. 
 
 The petition to remove on the ground of separable contro- 
 versy must show that there is in said suit a controversy wholly 
 between citizens of different States, and which can be fully 
 determined as between them. It should show the citizenship 
 clearly, and not by inference, of the parties between whom 
 the separable controversy exists. It should be determined by 
 the condition of the record in the State court at the time of 
 filing the petition for removal. Thomas v. Great Northern 
 E. Co. 77 C. C. A-. 255, 147 Fed. 83 ; Davenport v. Southern 
 E. Co. 68 C. C. A. 444, 135 Fed. 965, 966; Carp v. Queen 
 Ins. Co. 168 Fed. 782; Alexandria 'Sat. Bank v. Willis C. 
 Bates Co. 87 C. C. A. 643, 160 Fed. 839; Jones v. Adams 
 Exp. Co. 129 Fed. 618; Little York Gold-Washing & Water 
 Co. V. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 24 L. ed. 656 ; Thompson v. Stal- 
 mann, 131 Fed. 811. See Elkins v. Howell, 140 Fed. 157, 
 holding that in a suit in equity the separable controversy must 
 be determined from the bill alone. Atlanta, K. & 'S. E. Co. 
 V. Southern E. Co. 82 C. C. A. 256, 153 Fed. 122, 11 A. & E. 
 Ann. Cas. 766. 
 
 It should show the nature of the controversy, and that the 
 relief asked as between the parties to the separable controversy 
 would not affect the others; in a word, that in the issue only 
 
PETITION TO REMOVE IN DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP. 821 
 
 petitioner and plaintiff are interested, and then should follow 
 a prayer for removal. Smedley v. Smedley, 110 Fed. 257. 
 
 It must speak in exact language of the removal act (Earth 
 V. Coler, 9 C. C. A. 81, 19 U. S. App. 646, 60 Fed. 469), in 
 using the words "citizen," "resident" and "inhabitant." Over- 
 mau Wheel Co. v. Pope Mfg. Co. 46 Fed. 5Y8 ; Freeman v. 
 Butler, 30 Fed. 1. 
 
 If, however, the separable controversy is settled by stipu- 
 lations, the cause should be remanded. Bane v. Keefer, 66 
 Fed. 612 ; Torrence v. Shedd, 144 U. S. 533, 36 L. ed. 532, 12 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 726. ISTeed not be verified. Harley v. Home 
 Ins. Co. 125 Fed. 792. See for form, 110 Fed. 257. 
 
CHAPTER OXX. 
 
 REMOVAL ON GEOUiN'D OF FEDERAL QUESTION. 
 
 When a Federal question is set up, upon which the removal 
 is based, the mere allegation in the petition that a Federal 
 question exists is not sufficient. The plaintiff's claim as set 
 forth by himself must also show the Federal question, for if 
 the court cannot find the Federal question in the statements 
 of the claim made, it must remand without reference to the 
 allegation that one exists. Xor can any statement in the 
 petition for removal or in any subsequent pleading help the 
 case, 25 Stat, at L. 433, chap. 866 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 1010) ; People's United States Bank v. Goodwin, 160 Fed. 
 727 ; Oregon v. Three Sisters Irrig. Co. 158 Fed. 346 ; Hall 
 v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R Co. 149 Fed. 564; Cella v. Brown, 
 75 C. C. A. 608, 144 Fed. 763 ; Arkansas v. Choctaw & M. E. 
 Co. 134 Fed. 107; Dewey Min. Co. v. Miller, 96 Fed. 1; 
 California Oil & Gas Co. v. Miller, 96 Fed. 12; New Castle 
 V. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. 152 Fed. 572, 573 ; Broadway Ins. 
 Co. V. Chicago, G. W. R. Co. 101 Fed. 508 ; Mayo v. Dockery, 
 108 Fed. 897 ; South Carolina v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical 
 Co. 117 Fed. 728; Wichita v. Missouri & K. Teleg. Co. 123 
 Fed. 100 ; Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co. 194 TJ. S. 64, 
 48 L. ed. 878, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 598 ; Postal Teleg Cable Co. 
 V. United States (Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Alabama) 155 
 U. S. 482-487, 39 L. ed. 231-233, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192; 
 Pratt V. Paris Gaslight & Coke Co. 168 U. S. 255, 42 L. ed. 
 458, 18 Slip. Ct. Rep. 62; Caples v. Texas & P. R. Co. 67 
 Fed. 9. (See "How Federal Question Must Appear," chap- 
 ter 27) ; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Southeast & St. L. R. Co. 
 125 C. C. A. 466, 208 Fed. 266 ; Leggett v. Great Northern 
 R. Co. 180 Fed. 314; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mottley, 211. 
 U. S. 149, 53 L. ed. 126, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 42; Re Winn, 213 
 U. S. 458, 53 L. ed. 873, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 515 ; Bowers v. 
 First Nat. Bank, 190 Fed. 677 ; W. C. Coyle & Co. v. Stern, 
 
 822 
 
EEMOVAL ON GROUND OF FEDERAL QUESTION. 823 
 
 113 C. C. A. 450, 193 Fed. 586; Rural Home Telepli. Co. v. 
 Powers, 176 Eed. 986. And it seems the State court may 
 refuse to remove the case on this ground. Galveston, H. & S. 
 A. E. Co. V. Texas, 170 U. S. 235, 42 L. ed. 1020, 18 Sup. Ct. 
 Kep. 603. 
 
 Howe\'er, it seems that there is a class of. cases when the 
 Federal question may be set up in the petition to remove the 
 case, as when the petition fails to^ assert the fact that would 
 give the Federal court jurisdiction, in order to evade the juris- 
 diction of these courts. See Winters v. Drake, 102 Fed. 545, 
 as to proper application of the rule permitting removal though 
 Federal question does not appear in the bill. 
 
 ISTor will a mere attack on a State statute make a case under 
 the removal act. Ealya Market Co. v. Armour & Co. 102 Fed. 
 530; see "Federal Question" for ftirther disciTSsion. 
 
 Where the Supreme Court has decided the particular ques>- 
 tion of law upon which the suit is based, it ceases to be a 
 Federal question for removal purposes. Myrtle v. Nevada, C. 
 & 0. E. Co. 137 Fed. 195, 196, and cases cited. 
 
 ^Tho May Eemove on Ground of Federal Question. 
 
 The defendant or all of the defendants concurring must 
 make the application (sec. 1, clause 1, act of 1888 ; Chicago, 
 E. I. & P. E. Co. V. Martin, 178 U. S. 245, 44 L. ed. 1055, 
 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 854; explains and modifies Mitchell v. Smale, 
 140 U. S. 406, 55 L. ed. 442, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 819, 840; 
 Martin v. St. Louis, Southwestern E. Co. 134 Fed. 135, 136; 
 Yarnell v. Felton, 104, Fed. 161, S. C. 102 Fed. 369; Scott 
 V. Choctaw, 0. & Or. E. Co. 112 Fed. 180-182; Heffelfinger 
 v. Choctaw, O. & G. E. Co. 140 Fed. 75), unless, as before 
 stated, the controversy with the moving defendant is separable, 
 then the application need not be joint (Yarnell v. Felton, 102 
 Fed. 370 ; Parkinson v. Barr, 105 Fed. 83 ; Gates Iron Works 
 V. James E. Pepper & Co. 98 Fed. 449). 
 
CHAPTER CXXI. 
 
 AMOUNT AS GEOtTND FOE MOTION TO REMOVE. 
 
 We have seen that one of the fundamental grounds of juris- 
 diction in the Federal courts is the amount of value of the sub- 
 ject-matter in controversy, and this must appear in the petition 
 of plaintiffs, or in the application for removal (Sturgeon River 
 Boom Co. V. W. H. Sawyer Lumber Co. 89 Fed. 113 ; Order of 
 R. R. Telegraphers v. Louisville & IT. R. Co. 148 Fed. 437 ; 
 South Dakota C. R. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 73 
 C. C. A. 176, 141 Fed. 578-.582; King v. Southern R. Co. 
 119 Fed. 1016; Southern Cash Register Co. v. National Cash 
 Register Co. 143 Fed. 659 ; Southern Cash Register Go. v. 
 Montgomery, 143 Fed. 700 ; Waha-Lewiston Land & Water Co. 
 V. Lewiston-Sweetwater Irrig. Co. 158 Fed. 137. See Porter 
 V. ISTorthern P. R. Co. 161 Fed. 773, 774, and Davis v. Wells, 
 134 Fed. 139, as to value in action of ejectment. Johnson v. 
 Wells, F. & Co. 91 Fed. 1 ; Daugherty v. Sharp, 171 Fed. 466 ; 
 Xew Castle v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 152 Fed. 571 ; Simmons 
 V. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. 114 Fed. 785 ; Lord v. 
 DeWitt, 116 Fed. 713; Baltimore v. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. 
 62 Fed. 500 ; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. White, 102 Fed. 705 ; 
 see ("Amount to Give Jurisdiction"), and as alleged is suf- 
 ficient if not colorable. (Ibid. ; Hay ward v. ISTordberg Mfg. 
 Co. 29 C. C. A. 438, 54 U. S. App. 639, 85 Fed. 4; Wakeman 
 v. Throckmorton, 124 Fed. 1010; See Smith v. Western U. 
 Teleg. Co. 79 Fed. 132 ; Martin v. City Water Co. 197 Fed. 
 465). 
 
 The amount or value in controversy must exceed three thou- 
 sand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs (new Code, sec. 
 24 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec 991), or the case cannot be removed 
 to the Federal court (Johnson v. Wells, F. & Co. 91 Fed. 1 ; 
 Tod V. Cleveland & M. Valley R. Co. 12 C. C. A. 521, 22 U. 
 S. App. 707, 65 Fed. 145 ; Simmons v. Mutual Reserve Fund 
 
 824 
 
AMOUNT AS GROUND FOE MOTION TO EEMOVE. 825 
 
 Life Asso. 114 Fed. 785; Swann v. Mutual Eeserve Fund Life 
 Asso. 116 Fed. 232; E. A. Holmes & Co. v. United States F. 
 Lis. Co. 142 Fed. 863; Memphis v. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. 
 76 C. C. A. 292, 145 Fed. 602 ; Amelia Mill Co. v. Tennessee 
 Coal, Iron & E. Co. 123 Fed. 811; Chambers v. McDougal, 42 
 Fed. 694; Stadlemann v. White Line Towing Co. 92 Fed. 
 209 ; Langdon v. Llillside Coal & I. Co. 41 Fed. 609 ; Detroit 
 V. Detroit City R. Co. 54 Fed. 5), whether jurisdiction is 
 based on diversity of citizenship or a Federal question, and 
 the amount must be determined by the Federal court (Postal 
 Teleg. Cable Co. v. Southern E. Co. 88 Fed. 803), and the 
 burden is on the defendant. jSTew Castle v. Western U. Teleg. 
 Co. 162 Fed. 569. 
 
 The amount at the time of filing the application to remove, 
 must exceed three thousand dollars, as above stated (Eiggs v. 
 Clark, 18 C. C. A. 242, 37 U. S. App. 626, 71 Fed. 563 ; Maine 
 V. Gilman, 11 Fed. 214; Carrick v. Landman, 20 Fed. 209; 
 Sturgeon Eiver Boom Co. v. W. H. Sawyer Lumber Co. 89 
 Fed. 113; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Campbell, 41 Tex. Civ. 
 App. 204, 91 S. W. 312) ; but the question arises how far the 
 plaintiff in the State court can diminish the amount to prevent 
 removal. 
 
 Whatever may have been the original demand, the plaintiff 
 can diminish the amount before the bond perfecting the appli- 
 cation for removal has been filed, and his motive does not 
 affect his right. Maine v. Gilman, 11 Fed. 215, 216; Coffin 
 v. Philadelphia, W. & B. E. Co. 118 Fed. 688. However in 
 Peterson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. E. Co. 108 Fed. 561, it was 
 held that where the original petition in the State court was 
 based on a claim of ten thousand dollars, but was amended, 
 reducing the amount to nineteen hundred and ninety-nine dol- 
 lars, and the amendment was not served as required by the 
 State law, before the application for removal was filed, that 
 this reducing the amount by amendment would not prevent the 
 removal. The decision, however, is extremely technical, and 
 not supported by reason in view of the facts of the case. 
 
 After the petition and bond for removal has been filed the 
 jurisdiction of the Federal court attaches, and plaintiff cannot 
 diminish his demand to defeat the Federal jurisdiction. John- 
 son V. Computing Scale Co. 139 Fed. 339 ; Hayward v. Nord- 
 
826 AMOUNT AS GBOUKD FOE MOTION TO EEMOVE. 
 
 berg Mfg. Co. 29 C. C. A. 438, 54 U. S. App. 639, 85 Ted. 
 4-9 ; Donovan v. Dixieland Amusement Co. 152 Fod. 661 ; 
 Coffin V. Philadelphia, W. & B. E. Co. 118 Fed. 688 ; Waite 
 V. Phcenix Ins. Co. 62 Fed. 769. The claim made at the time 
 the removal takes place determines the jurisdiction for removal, 
 but see. exception to the riile, Hughes v. Pepper Tobacco Ware- 
 house Co. 126 Fed. 687, where mistake in stating amount was 
 shown. The fact that the amount is reduced below two thou- 
 sand dollars by an attack on items would be no ground 
 to remand, unless good faith attacked. Koessler-Hasslacher 
 Chemical Co. v. Doyle, 73 C. C. A. 174, 142 Fed. 118; Levin- 
 ski V. Middlesex Bkg. Co. 34 C. C. A. 452, 92 Fed. 449. The 
 party removing cannot attack amount to show want of juris- 
 diction. Smith V. Western U. Teleg. Co. 79 Fed. 132 ; Eustis 
 v. Henrietta, 20 C. C. A. 537, 41 U. S. App. 182, 74 Fed. 
 577. 
 
 Effect of Piling Counierclaim. 
 
 The jurisdiction depends on the amount in controversy, as 
 stated in the original petition in the State court, and not the 
 counterclaim of the defendant, is said to be the rule in Illinois 
 C. K. Co. V. Waller, 164 Fed. 359; Falls Wire Mfg. Go. v. 
 Broderick, 2 McCrary, 489, 6 Fed. 654; Indiana Mountain 
 Jellico Coal Co. v. Asheville Ice & Coal Co. 135 Fed. 837; 
 La Montagne v. T. W. Harvey Lumber Co. 44 Fed. 645 ; Ben- 
 nett V. Devine, 45 Fed. 705; McKown v. Kansas & T. Coal 
 Co. 105 Fed. 657 ; Waco Hardware Co. v. Michigan Stove Co. 
 33 C. C. A. 511, 63 U. S. App. 396, 91 Fed. 289. But it was 
 held contra in Clarkson v. Manson, 18 Blatchf. 443, 4 Fed. 
 257. Price v. Ellis, 129 Fed. 482, reviewing the cases and 
 concluding that the plaintiff may remove at and before the 
 time he is called to plead to the counterclaim. The cases are 
 conflicting and irreconcilable, but the better rule is that the 
 original petition fixes the amount upon which jurisdiction to 
 remove depends. ISTor can the nonresident plaintiff, being de- 
 fendant in the counterclaim, remove, McKown v. Kansas, & 
 T. Coal Co. 105 Fed. 658. However, the query is presented 
 in this case, whether the right of the nonresident plaintiff to 
 remove would not exist, if under the State law he was required 
 to plead to a counterclaim. 
 
CHAPTEE CXXIL 
 
 MUST BE A SUIT OF A CIVIL NATURE. 
 
 As to what is a suit of a civil nature, was said in Weston 
 V. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449-404, Y L. ed. 481-487, to apply to 
 any proceeding in which one pursues in a court of justice a 
 remedy which the law gives him to secure the right litigated. 
 Ee Jarnecke Ditch, 69 Ped. 166. Waha-Lewiston Land & 
 Water Co. v. Lewiston-Sweetwater Irrig. Co. 158 Ped. 140; 
 Upshur County v. Eich, 135 U. S. 474, 34 L. ed. 199, 10 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 651; Ee Stutsman County, 88 Ped. 337; Wahl v. 
 Pranz, 49 L.E.A. 62, 40 C. C. A. 638, 100 Ped. 682 ; Gruet- 
 ter V. Cumberland Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 181 Ped. 249 ; Elk 
 Garden Co. v. T. W. Thayer Co. 179 Ped. 556; Gruetter v. 
 Cumberland Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 181 Ped. 249. 
 
 Proceedings in garnishment is a removable suit. Baker v. 
 Duwamish 3,[ill Co. 149 Ped. 612. Suit for condemnation is 
 a suit of a civil nature. Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Ber- 
 nard Min. Co. 130 Ped. 790, 791, and cases cited; Mississippi 
 k E. Eiver Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, 25 L. ed. 206. 
 So is a claim for alimony. Israel v. Israel, 130 Fed. 238, 239, 
 and cases cited. 
 
 Again, a suit to probate a will has been held not to be a suit 
 of a civil nature within the meaning of the first section of the 
 act of 1888, and therefore cannot be removed. (See "Probate 
 Jurisdiction," chapter 42, p. 246 ; Wahl v. Franz, 49 L.E.A. 62, 
 40 C. C. A. 638, 100 Ped. 683; Ee Cilley, 58 Fed. 977; Cope- 
 land V. Bruning, 72 Ped. 5-8 ; Ee Aspinwall, 83 Fed. 851. 
 
 So a suit or proceeding in a probate court to determine 
 whether property is separate or community is not a suit of a 
 civil nature within the removal act. Ee Foley, 80 Fed. 949. 
 But not a suit to annul a will as a muniment of title. Saw- 
 yer V. White, 58 C. C. A. 587, 122 Fed. 227, and cases cited. 
 So a suit to enforce penalties for a violation of a "State stat- 
 ute is not a suit of a civil nature." Indiana use of Delaware 
 
 827 
 
828 MUST BE A SUIT OF A CIVIL NATURE. 
 
 County V. Alleghany Oil Co. 85 Fed. 870; Arkansas v. Si 
 Louis & S. F. R. Co. 173 Fed. 574; South Carolina v. Vir- 
 ginia Chemical Co. 117 Fed. 727, 728 ; Moloney v. American 
 Tobacco Co. 72 Fed. 801. So a proceeding for an original writ 
 of mandamus is not. Indiana ex rel. Muncie v. Lake Erie & 
 AV. E. Co. 85 Fed. 3; Mystic Milling Co. v. Chicago, M. & 
 St. P. E. Co. 132 Fed. 289. So to test the title to an office in 
 a corporation organized in a State. Place v. Illinois, 16 C. 
 C. A. 300, 18 U. S. App. 724, 69 Fed. 481. So an appeal 
 from board of commissioners assessing taxes. Waha-Lewistoii 
 Land & Water Co. v. Lewiston-Sweetwater Irrig. Co. 158 Fed. 
 140, 141; Upshur County v. Eich, 135 U. S. 470-477, 34 
 L. ed. 197-200, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 651 ; Ee Chicago, 64 Fed. 
 899. So a Federal court cannot exercise the function of 
 parens patriw for the determination of the right to custody, as, 
 for instance, an insane person. Hoadly v. Chase, 126 Fed. 
 818. This authority resides in the States. Church of Jesus 
 Christ of L. D. S. v. United States, 136 U. S. 3, 34 L. ed. 
 478, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 792 ; Fontain v. Ravenel, 17 How. 369- 
 384, 15 L. ed. 80-86; King v. McLean Asylum, 26 L.R.A. 
 784, 12 C. C. A. 145, 21 U. S. App. 481, 64 Fed. 351. Nor 
 where the suit deals with a fund in a State court. Daugherty 
 V. Sharp, 171 Fed. 466. 
 
 The Suit Must Be One That Could Be Originally Brought in 
 the Federal Court. 
 
 By sec. 1 of the Act of 1888, now new Code, sec. 28 (Comp. 
 Stat. 1913, sec. 1010), it is provided that any suit arising 
 under the Constitution and laws of the United States, of which 
 the circuit courts of the United States are given original juris- 
 diction under section 1 of the act, can be removed by the de- 
 fendant; and all other suits of a civil nature, of which the 
 circuit courts are given jurisdiction by section 1 of the act, 
 new Code, sec. 24 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 991), may be re- 
 moved by the defendant or defendants if nonresidents. Ex 
 parte Wisner, 203 U. S. 449, 51 L. ed. 264, 27 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 150 ; Ee AVinn, 213 U. S. 458-464, 53 L. ed. 873-875, 29 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 515; citing Boston & M. Consol. Copper & S. Min. 
 Co. V. Montana Ore Purchasing Co. 188 U. S. 632, 47 L. ed. 
 
MUST BE SUIT WITIIIW OEIGINAL FEDERAL JUEISDICTION. 829 
 
 626, 23 Sup. Ct. Eep. 434, and Ex parte Wisner, supra ; Wahl 
 V. Franz, 49 L.E.A. 62, 40 C. C. A. 688, 100 Fed. 681, 682, 
 and cases cited ; Kansas City & T. R. Co. v. Interstate Lumber 
 Co. 37 Fed. 6, Y; Carp v. Queea Ins. Co. 168 Fed. 782; Hub- 
 bard V. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 176 Fed. 994; Southern 
 P. Co. V. Burch, 82 C. C. A. 34, 152 Fed. 168 ; Goldberg, B. 
 & Co. V. German Ins. Co. 152 Fed. 832 ; Yellow Aster Min. & 
 Mill. Co. V. Crane Co. 80 C. C. A. 566, 150 Fed. 580 ; Blunt v. 
 Southern R. Co. 155 Fed. 499 ; Baxter, S. & S. Const. Co. v. 
 Hammond Mfg. Co. 154 Fed. 992, 993 ; Kentucky v. Chicago 
 I. & L. R. Co. 123 Fed. 458; Minnesota v. K"orthern Securities 
 Co. 194 U. S. 63, 64, 48 L. ed. 877, 878, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 .598; Foulk v. Gray, 120 Fed. 156; Eddy v. Casas, 118 Fed. 
 364; Baldwin v. Pacific Power & Light Co. 199 Fed. 291; 
 Waterman v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. 199 Fed. 667 ; Gruetter 
 V. Cumberland Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 181 Fed. 249; Canary 
 Oil Co. V. Standard Asphalt & Rubber Co. 182 Fed. 664; 
 Younts V. Southwestern Teleg. & Teleph. Co. 192 Fed. 200 ; 
 Anderson v. Sharp, 189 Fed. 247 ; H. G. Baker & Bro. v. Pink- 
 ham, 211 Fed. 728. 
 
 We thus see the right of removal is limited to such siiits as 
 could have been originally brought in the United States circuit 
 courts under the first section of the jurisdictional act, which 
 has already been discussed. While this was not the rule imder 
 the acts of 1789 and 1875, yet section 1 of the act of 1888, 
 sec. 28 new Code, made a radical change in the right of re- 
 moval by confining it to those suits that could be originally 
 brought in the Federal court (Foulk v. Gray, 120 Fed. 161- 
 163; Mexican I^Tat. R. Co. v. Davidson, 157 U. S. 201, 39 L. 
 ed. 672, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563 ; Tennessee v. Union & Planters' 
 Bank, 152 U. S. 454, 38 L. ed. 511, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654: 
 Cochran v. Montgomery County, 199 U. S. 260, 50 L. ed. 182, 
 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58, 4 Ann.' Cas. 451; Madisonville Trac- 
 tion Co. V. St. Bernard Min. Co. 196 U. S. 240, 49 L. ed. 462, 
 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 251; Blunt v. Southern R. Co. 155 Fed. 
 499; Re Cilley, 58 Fed. 978, 979), and in which four things 
 are necessary: 
 
 First. It has to be a suit of a civil nature in law or equity. 
 
 Second. It must involve a sum or value in controversy ex- 
 ceeding three thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs. 
 See "Amount as Ground for Remanding." 
 
830 MUST BE SUIT W^THI^- OEIGIXAL FEDEEAL JURISDICTION. 
 
 Third. It must arise between citizens of different States 
 or uiK'ler one of the conditions set forth in the first clause of 
 that section, and not falling within any exception to the juris- 
 diction as contained in that act. 
 
 To illustrate : There is excepted out of the jurisdiction of 
 the United States circuit court by the twenty-fourth section of 
 the new Code any suit by an assignee of a chose in action, 
 if such instrument be payable to bearer and not made by a 
 corporation (and not a foreign bill of exchange) to recover the 
 contents- of such chose in action, unless such suit might be 
 brought by the assignor in the Federal court. Therefore, if 
 the assignor could not sue in the Federal court the case cannot 
 be removed, though as between the assignee and defendant there 
 be diversitjr of citizenship. Murphy v. Payette Alluvial Gold 
 Co. 98 Fed. 321; Brooks v. Laurent, 39 C.'c. A. 201, 98 Fed. 
 647. 
 
 It had been frequently held that the circuit cotirt would 
 entertain a controversy removed from a State court, notwith- 
 standing the fact that neither the plaintifl: nor the defendant 
 was resident within the district where the suit was brought, 
 that the right of removal by the nonresident defendant had no 
 relation to that clause of the act relating to the district in 
 which the suit was brought, and consequently a class of cases 
 arose where the removal was sustained though the suit could 
 not have been originally brought in the Federal district. 
 
 Thus, citizens of different States may sue each other in a 
 State court ; in such case the nonresident defendant may remove 
 the case to the Federal court of the district in which the suit 
 is brought, though these nonresident citizens could not, by 
 reason of the restriction on residence, have maintained the suit 
 in the Federal court to which it was removed, as an original 
 suit. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Sundry Ins. Cos. 
 108 Fed. 454; Manufacturer Commercial Co. v. Brown Alaska 
 Co. 148 Fed. 312, and cases cited; liubbard v. Chicago, M. & 
 St. P. K. Co. 176 Fed. 996, 997 ; Kansas City & T. R Co. 
 Y. Interstate Lumber Co. 37 Fed. 3 ; Rome Petroleum & Iron 
 Co. V. Hughes Specialty Well Drilling Co. 130 Fed. 585; 
 ■Cowell V. City Water-Supply Co. 96 Fed. 769 ; Robert v. Pine- 
 land Club, 139 Fed. 1001. 
 
 The theory was that the restrictive clause of the act is only a 
 
MUST BE SUIT WITHIN ORIGINAL FEDERAL JURISDICTION. 831 
 
 privilege whicli the defendant may plead, or waive, if sned out 
 of his district, and by his petition and removal he wai\-es the 
 privilege and invokes the jurisdiction of the court. Foulk v. 
 (Jray, 120 Fed. 157. 
 
 The plaintiff could not object, as the right of removal is in- 
 tended for the benefit of the nonresident defendant, and he 
 may exercise the right if the grounds exist, without the remot- 
 est reference to the wishes of the plaintiff. Virginia-Carolina 
 Chemical Co. v. Sundry Ins. Cos. 108 Fed. 454; ^Mexican -Nat. 
 E. Co. V. Davidson, 157 U. S. 201, 39 L. ed. 672, 15 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 563 ; Duncan v. Associated Press, 81 Fed. 421 ; Burch 
 V. Southern P. Co. 139 Fed. 350; Gregory v. Pike, 15 C. C. 
 A. 33, 21 U. S. App. 658, 33 U. S. App. 76, 67 Fed. 847; 
 Creagh v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. 83 Fed. 849 ; Empire 
 Min. Co. V. Propeller ToAv-Boat Co. 108 Fed. 900; Baggs v. 
 Martin, 179 U. S. 206, 45 L. ed. 155, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 109 ; 
 Cowell V. City Water-Supply Co. 96 Fed. 769. And the filing 
 of the petition and bond for removal waived the right of the 
 defendant to be sued in his district. Whitworth v. Illinois C. 
 E. Co. 107 Fed. 557; Faulk v. Gray, 120 Fed. 157; Memphis 
 Sav. Bank v. Houchens, 52 C. C. A.' 176, 115 Fed. 96. 
 
 We see from the foregoing that there has been much con- 
 flict of authority, but the stronger current was in favor of the 
 rule "that suit must be brought in defendant's residence dis- 
 trict, or in plaintiff's district if jurisdiction depended on 
 diversity of citizenship, or in defendant's resident district if 
 jurisdiction rested on a Federal question" did not apply to 
 removals. Such was the understanding of the profession until 
 the doctrine of the earlier eases was revised in Ex parte Wisner, 
 203 U. S. 449, 51 L. ed. 264, 27 Sup. Ct. Eop. 150. Wisner, 
 a citizen of Michigan, sued Beardsley, a citizen of Louisiana, 
 in the State Court in St. Louis, Missouri ; the defendant filed 
 his petition for removal to the United States circuit court for 
 the eastern district of Missouri, on the ground of di^'ersity of 
 citizenship. The motion to remand was refused on the au- 
 thority of Foulk V. Gray, 120 Fed. 156, and Eome Petroleum 
 & Iron Co. V. Hughes Specialty Well Drilling Co. 130 Fed. 
 585. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court in the nature 
 of a petition for prohibition and mandamus by Wisner on the 
 ground that the circuit court had no jurisdiction. 
 
832 MUST BE SUIT WITHIN OEIGINAL FEDERAL JUEISDICTION. 
 
 The court granted the writ of mandamus, ordering the cir- 
 cuit court to remand the case upon the ground that a citizen 
 of one State suing a citizen of another State in a third State 
 is not a removable case, as such suit could not have been origi- 
 nally brought in the Federal circuit court under sec. 1 of the 
 jurisdictional and removal act of 1888. The Chief Justice re- 
 ferred to the earlier cases for support, but unquestionably 
 arrested the trend of authority as developed in the circuit 
 courts, and states without reservation that the removal by a 
 nonresident defendant contemplated that the suit must have 
 been brought by the plaintiff in the State and district of plain- 
 tiff's citizenship. Hubbard v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 
 176 Fed. 996, 997. Subsequently Ee Moore, 209 U. S. 490, 52 
 L. ed. 904, 28 Sup. Ct. Eep. 585, 706, 14 Ann. Cas. 1164, 
 came before the Supreme Court, involving the same questions. 
 It was held that nothing in Ex parte Wisne;r, supra, changed 
 the rule that parties may waive the objection that the case 
 was not brought in or removed to the particular Federal court 
 required by statute. That where both parties consent to the 
 jurisdiction of the Federal Court, as evidenced by the defend- 
 ant in filing his petition and bond for removal, and by the 
 plaintiff amending his pleading without challenging the juris- 
 diction or proceeding to trial, then the Federal court could 
 proceed to judgment. Western Loan & Sav. Co. v. Butte & 
 B. Consol. Min. Co. 210 IJ. S. 369, 52 L. ed. 1101, 28 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 720 ; Moyer v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 168 Fed. 
 105 ; Kreigh v. Westinghouse, C. K. & Co. 214 U. S. 249, 53 
 L. ed. 984, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 619 ; De Valle Da Costa v. South- 
 ern P. Co. 160 Fed. 217 ; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Fisher, 11 
 L.R.A.(E'.S.) 926, 83 C. C. A. 584, 155 Fed. 68; Clark v. 
 Southern P. Co. 175 Fed. 123; Philadelphia & B. Face Brick 
 Co. V. Warford, 123 Fed. 843 ; Bottoms v. St. Louis & S. F. R. 
 Co. 179 Fed. 319; Clark v. Southern P. Co. 175 Fed. 122; 
 Turk V. Illinois C. R. Co. 193 Fed. 254, and cases cited; 
 Stone V. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 195 Fed. 835 ; Sagara v. Chi- 
 cago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 189 Fed. 220 ; Western U. Teleg. Co. 
 V. Louisville & N. R. Co. 201 Fed. 935 ; Mover v. Chicago, M. 
 & St. P, R. Co. 168 Fed. 105 ; Puget Sound Sheet Metal 
 Works V. Great Northern R. Co. 195 Fed. 350; Baldwin v. 
 Pacific Power & Light Co. 199 Fed. 291 ; George v. Tennessee 
 
BEMOVAL, MUST BE MADE TO PEOPEE DISTEICT. 833 
 
 Coal, Iron & R. Co. 184 Fed. 951. Biit -when a plea to the 
 jurisdiction of the Federal court is seasonably made under 
 the conditions as above stated, it should be sustained and the 
 case remanded. Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. 
 Co. 215 U. S. 501. 54 L. ed. 300, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 184; Hub- 
 bard V. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 176 Fed. 997 ; Shawnee 
 Xat. Bank v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 175 Fed. 456 ; Bottoms 
 V. St. Louis &' S. F. R. Co. 179 Fed. 819 ; Lawrence v. South- 
 ern Pacific Co. 180 Fed. 827. The rule, then, seems now to 
 be established that while a suit by a citizen of one State 
 against a citizen of another State, brotight in a third State, 
 would be fatal to its removal, if seasonably objected to, yet 
 if the suit is otherwise Avithin Federal jurisdiction, and is re- 
 moved, and both parties recognize the jurisdiction of the Fed- 
 eral court by proceeding with the case therein, then the covirt 
 may adjudicate the case. 
 
 Removal Must he Made to the "Proper District." 
 
 Section 28, chap. 3, of the Judicial Code, (Comp. Stat. 
 1913, sec. 1010), provides that removals from State courts 
 must be to the "proper Federal district" by the defendant or 
 defendants being nonresidents. 
 
 Section 51, chap. 4, of the Judicial Code, (Comp. Stat. 
 1013, sec. 1033), provides that no suit can be brought in any 
 district court of the United States against any person in any 
 other district than that of which he is an inhabitant, except 
 that when jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship it 
 may be brought in plaintiff's district, or defendant's resi- 
 dence district. In Ex parte Wisner, 203 U. S. 449, 51 L. ed. 
 264, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 150, it was held that section 28 was an 
 absolute limitation to any removal from a State court to any 
 United States district court other than the Federal district 
 in which the suit could be brought originally. This case, how- 
 ever, was subsequently modified in Re Moore, 209 U. S. 491, 
 52 L. ed. 904, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585, 706, 14 Ann. Cas. 1164, 
 and in Western Loan & Sav. Co. v. Butte & B. Consol. Min. 
 Co. 210 U. S. 368, 52 L. ed. 1101, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 720, decid- 
 ing that Avhere a suit was brought in a State court in a State 
 of which neither party was an inhabitant, that the defendant 
 S. Eq.— 53. 
 
834 KEMOVAL MUST BE MADE TO PROPEE DISTRICT. 
 
 could remove the case to the United States district court in the 
 Federal district in which the suit was brought with the con- 
 sent of plaintiff, exjDressed or implied from acts. In Stewart 
 V. Cybur Lumber Co. 211 Fed. 343, it is held that the "proper 
 district" is the district of defendant's residence, if the suit 
 could have been originally brought there under sec. 24, Judicial 
 Code,'(Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 991); Mattison v. Boston & 
 M. R. Co. 205 Fed. 821 ; Gruetter v. Cumberland Teleph. & 
 Teleg. Co. 181 Fed. 249 ; Smellie v. Southern P. R Co. 197 
 Fed. 642 ; Turk v. Illinois C. R. Co. 193 Fed. 252 ; Rubber & 
 C. Harness Trimming Co. v. John L. Whiting-J. J. Adams Co. 
 210 Fed. 393; St. John v. United States Fidelity & G. Co. 
 213 Fed. 685 ; Hubbard v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 1Y6 
 Fed. 994. In ]\Iattison v. Boston & M. R. Co. and Stewart v. 
 Cybur Lumber Co. supra, it is intimated that where the parties 
 to the suit were citizens of other States than where the suit was 
 brought, that defendant could remove the suit to the Federal 
 district of the State of which he was an inhabitant; that de- 
 fendant cannot be deprived of his right to remove, because 
 plaintiff sued in a State of which neither party was an inhabi- 
 tant. But in St. John v. United States "Fidelity & G. Co. 213 
 Fed. 687, it is held that sec. 29, construed with sec. 28, con- 
 fines removals to the Federal district in which the suit was 
 pending, and not to other Federal districts in or out of the 
 State. St. John v. Taintor, 220 Fed. 457. 
 
 In conclusion it may be stated that the "proper district" in 
 cases where jurisdiction depends on diversity of citizenship is 
 either the districts of plaintiff's residence and citizenship or 
 defendant's district; and where jurisdiction depends on a Fed- 
 eral question the "proper district" is defendant's residence dis- 
 trict. Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. Qrr, 215 Fed. 261; 
 Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Painter, 220 Fed. 998; see Louisville & 
 N. R. Co. v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 218 Fed. 91, criticized in 
 Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Painter, supra. Where a cause is re- 
 moved, and it appears from the record that the parties are not 
 citizens of the State in which the suit is brought, the Federal 
 court will allow the petition for removal to be amended to show 
 that the plaintiff was in fact a citizen of the district of suit. 
 Harding v. Standard Oil Co. 170 Fed. 651. 
 
 But there is a class of cases which, by reason of the procedure 
 
REMOVAL MUST BE MADE TO PEOPEK DlSTltlCT. 835 
 
 necessary to prosecute them, canBot be brought originally in 
 the Federal court, yet may be removed. As in condemnation 
 suits. Colorado Midland R Co. v. Jones, 29 Fed. 193; Union 
 Terminal E. Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. E. Co. 119 Fed. 210; 
 Searl v. School Dist. Xo. 2, 124 U. S. 199, 31 L. ed. 416, 8 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 460 ; Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard 
 Min. Co. 130 Fed. 790, 791; South Dakota C. E. Co. v. Chi- 
 cago, M. & St. P. E. Co. 73 C. C. A. 176, 141 Fed. 578; 
 Broadmoor Land Co. v. Curr, 73 C. C. A. 537, 142 Fed. 42] ; 
 Kirby v. Chicago & N. W. E. Co. 106 Fed. 552 ; AVest Virginia 
 V. King, 112 Fed. 369; Union Terminal E. Co. v. Chicago, B. 
 & Q. E. Co. 119 Fed. 213, 214; Wilson v. Smith, 66 Fed. 81; 
 Ee Jarnecke Ditch, 69 Fed. 163. 
 
 Thus a suit under a statute of a State to collect taxes may 
 require such procedure as would prevent an original action in 
 the Federal court, yet the controversy may present every ele- 
 ment necessary under the first section of the act of 1888 ; in 
 such case the suit can be removed to the Federal court. Ee 
 Stutsman County, 88 Fed. 337; Ee Jarnecke Ditch, 69 Fed. 
 163 ; Waha Lewiston Land & Water Co. v. Lewiston-Sweet- 
 water Irrig. Co. 158 Fed. 141 ; Union Terminal E. Co. v. Chi- 
 cago, B. & Q. E. Co. 119 Fed. 209. 
 
 The conferring of exclusive jurisdiction by States on its own 
 courts by prescribing exclusive methods cannot affect the right 
 of removal if it be a suit of a civil nature cognizable in law 
 or equity. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Morris, 67 L.E.A. 
 761, Q6C. C. A. 55, 132 Fed. 949, and cases cited; Movrill 
 V. American Eeserve Bond Co. 151 Fed. 306. 
 
CHAPTER CXXIII. 
 
 AMENDING PETITION FOE EEMOVAL. 
 
 The rule is, a petition for removal cannot be amended if 
 the jurisdiction is not stated, but can if imperfectly stated. 
 Santa Clara County v. Goldy Mach. Co. 159 Fed. 751; Cre- 
 hore V. Ohio & M. E. Co. 131 U. S. 240-245, 33 L. ed. 144, 
 145, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 692 ; Shane v. Butte Electric R. Co. 150 
 Fed. 801-814; Fife v. Whittell, 102 Fed. 537; Healy v. Mc- 
 Cormick, 157 Fed. 318; Wallenburg v. Missouri P. R. Co. 
 159 Fed. 217; Fred Macey Co. v. Macey, 68 C. C. A. 363, 135 
 Fed. 729 ; Dinet v. Delavan, 117 Fed. 978 ; Dalton v. Milwaukee 
 Mechanics' Ins. Co. 118 Fed. 877; Dalton v. Germania Ins. 
 Co. 118 Fed. 936; Fitzgerald v. Missouri P. R. Co. 45 Fed. 
 814; Donovan v. Wells, F. & Co. 22 L.R.A.(KS.) 1250, 94 C. 
 C. A. 609, 169 Fed. 363 ; Ostrander v. Blandin, 211 Fed. 733; 
 Vestal V. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & I. Co. 210 Fed. 375. 
 
 Thus, allegations as citizenship have been permitted to be 
 amended when defectively stated (Thompson v. Stalman, 131 
 Fed. 809 ; Powers v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. 169 U. S. 92, 
 42 L. ed. 673, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 264; Kinney v. Columbia 
 Sav. & L. Asso. 191 U. S. 78, 48 L. ed. 103, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 30; Muller v. Chicago, I. & L. R. Co. 149 Fed. 939, 940; 
 Flynn v. Fidelity & C. Co. 145 Fed. 265 ; Hodge v. Chicago 
 & A. R. Co. 57 C. C. A. 388, 121 Fed. 48 ; Kerr v. Modern 
 Woodmen, 54 C. C. A. 655, 117 Fed. 595 ; Kyle v. Chicago, R. 
 I. & P. R. Co. 173 Fed. 238 ; Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. 
 Prunty, 66 C. C. A. 163, 133 Fed. 14; De La Montanya v. De 
 La Montanya, 158 Fed. 117 ; Wilbur v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal 
 & Coke Co. 153 Fed. 662; Crehore v. Ohio & M. R. Co. 131 
 U. S. 245, 38 L. ed. 145, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 692 ; Johnson v. F. 
 C. Austin Mfg. Co. 76 Fed. 616; Tremper v. Schwabacher, 84 
 Fed. 414; Powers v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. 169 U. S. 101, 
 42 L. ed. 676, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 264; Stadleman v. White Line 
 Towing Co. 92 Fed. 209 ; Hadfield v. JSTorthwestem Life Assur. 
 
 836 
 
AMENDIKG PBTITIOIf FOE REMOVAL, 837 
 
 Co. 105 Fed. 530) ; and it seems under certain conditions the 
 State court may pei-mit an amendment. Eoberts v. Pacific & A. 
 E. & Nav. Co. 104 Fed. 577. 
 
 With the exceptions above stated, you must stand on your 
 case as made, showing jurisdiction. Ibid. ; Fife v. Whittell, 
 102 Fed. 537 ; Murphy v. Payette AUuvial Gold Co. 98 Fed. 
 321 ; Martin v. Baltimore & O. K. Co. (Gerling v. Baltimore 
 & O. E. Co.), 151 U. S. 676, 38 L. ed. 312, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 533 ; Copies v. Texas & P. E. Co. 67 Fed. 9 ; Grand Trunk R. 
 Co. V. Twitchell, 8 C. C. A. 237, 21 U. S. App. 45, 59 Fed. 729, 
 and cases cited; Waite v. Phoenix Ins. Co. 62 Fed. 769; Car- 
 son V. Dunham, 121 U. S. 430, 30 L. ed. 995, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 1030; Stevens v. Nichols, 130 TJ. S. 231, 32 L. ed. 915, 9 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 518 (see authorities under "Petition cannot be 
 Amended.") 
 
 But vehatever the rule may be, if the circuit court of the 
 United States permits the amendment, it will not be reversed 
 on appeal. Ayres v. Watson, 137 U. S. 584, 34 L. ed. 803, 
 11 Sup. Ct Rep. 201. 
 
!n 
 
 CHAPTEK CXXIV. 
 
 SEEVICB OF PROCESS IN A STATE COUBT AFFECTING EBMOVAL. 
 
 We have seen that when a case is removed it retains the 
 same status as to all process and proceedings that have been 
 taken in the State court. Sees. 4 and G, act of 18Y5. I will 
 now speak of how far the service or nonsei-vice of process in 
 the State court will bind the Federal court in removing a 
 cause, or after its removal. Xew Code, sec. 38, (Comp. Stat. 
 1913, sec. 1020.) 
 
 In discussing who may remove a cause when the right of re- 
 moval depends on diversity of citizenship, it was stated as a 
 rule that where the cause of action was joint and the suit 
 brought against a resident and nonresident defendant, the fact 
 that the resident was not ser^'ed at the time the application for 
 removal should be made did not give the nonresident the right 
 of removal. Patchin v. Hunter, 38 Fed. 51 ; Putnam v. In- 
 graham, 114 U. S. 57, 29 L. ed. 65, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 746; 
 Brooks V. Clark, 119 U. S. 502, 30 L. ed. 482, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 301 ; Lederer v. Sire, 105 Fed. 529. 
 
 The nonservice of the resident defendant cannot change 
 the character of the suit, ibid, and the U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 
 737, authorizing the court to proceed to the trial of the suit 
 between the parties properly before the court, does not apply 
 to removals. Ames v. Chicago, S. F. & C. R. Co. 39 Fed. 881. 
 See Whiteomb v. Smithson, 175 U. S. 637, 638, 44 L. ed. 305, 
 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 248. 
 
 Plowever, if the cause of action be joint, and both parties 
 sued, but the resident not served is dismissed from the suit, 
 or if both resident and nonresident be served and the resident 
 be dismissed, then the nonresident defendant may remo\'e the 
 cause to the Federal court as soon as the resident is dismissed, 
 though the time for removal has elapsed ; but as long as the 
 plaintiff seeks to recover against both the resident and non- 
 resident, and for that ptirpose holds them in the case, the fact 
 that he has not served the resident would not give the nonresi- 
 dent the right of removal. Powers v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. 
 
PEOCESS IN A STATE COURT AFFECTING EEMOVAL, So 9 
 
 169 U. S. 92-102, 42 L. ed. 673-677, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 264; 
 Doremus v. Eoot, 94 Fed. 762; Kansas City Suburban Belt 
 R. Co. V. Herman, 187 U. S. 69, 47 L. ed. 78, 23 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 24. 
 
 In Tremper v. Schwabacher, 84 Fed. 413, another rule is 
 indicated, which is as follows : Where by a State statute a 
 suit is brought against several parties, residents and nonresi- 
 dents, the nature of whose interest in the subject-matter is 
 one of copartnership, and a joint judgment against all can be 
 recovered on a service on one of them, thereby subjecting their 
 joint interest to execution under such judgment, then, where 
 the service is made on the nonresident only, he may remove. 
 See, also, Diday v. l^evf York, P. & O. R. Co. 107 Fed. 
 569. If, however, both resident and nonresident be served, 
 and joint as well as individual judgments be sought, then tlie 
 nonresident cannot remove. See "Partners as Parties." 
 
 Another rule to which your attention is called is as follows : 
 If the plaintiff sues on a joint and several liability a resident 
 and nonresident defendant, and serves only the nonresident, 
 and proceeds against him, this is an election to sever, and gives 
 the nonresident the right to remove as soon as the purpose is 
 evident that he alone is to be sued. Berry v. St. Louis & S. 
 F. E. Co. 118 Fed. 911-915 ; Powers v. Chesapeake & O. R. 
 Co. 169 U. S. 92, 42 L. ed. 673, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 264. See 
 Carlisle v. Sunset Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 116 Fed. 896. 
 
 Another rule to be deduced from the authorities is that the 
 fact that resident parties to the suit are merely formal parties, 
 or not sufficiently identified in interest as to be materially af- 
 fected by a judgment, or joined under some pretense without 
 any real interest, then whether they be served or not with pro- 
 cess will not affect the right of a nonresident defendant or de- 
 fendants joining in the application from removing the cause 
 to the Federal court. Myers v. Murray, K & Co. 11 L.R.A. 
 216, 43 Fed. 696; Nelson v. Hennessey, 33 Fed. 113; May v. 
 St. John, 38 Fed. 770; Parkinson v. Barr, 105 Fed. 81; 
 Loop V. Winters, 115 Fed. 362-366; Henderson v. Cabell, 43 
 Fed. 258; Wood v. Davis, 18 How. 467, 15 L. ed. 460. (See 
 "ITominal Parties.") 
 
 Again, where a suit is brought against a resident and non- 
 resident, if the interest of the resident defendant is identical 
 
840 PROCESS IN A STATE CO PET AEFECTIITG EEMOVAL, 
 
 with that of the plaintiff, the nonresident defendant may re- 
 move, though the resident be served or not with process. Brown 
 V. Murray, IST. & Co. 43 Fed. 614; Hutton v. Bancroft & S. 
 Co. 77 Fed. 481. 
 
 Second. Eemoval does not waive the question as to the 
 proper service of process in the State courts. 
 
 The special appearance of the defendant to petition for re- 
 moval is not such an appearance as will waive objection to 
 service after removal. Lathrop-Shea & H. Co. v. Interior 
 Constr. & Improv. Co. 150 Fed. 666-670, and cases cited; Cady 
 V. Associated Colonies, 119 Fed. 420; Eemington v. Central 
 Pacific K. Co. 198 U. S. 95, 49 L. ed. 959, 25 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 577; Davis v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. R Co. 146 Fed. 
 403; Goepfert v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 156 
 Fed. 199, 200; Louden Machinery Co. v. American Malleable 
 Iron Co. 127 Fed. 1008 ; West v. Cincinnati, E". O. & T. P. 
 E. Co. 170 Fed. 349 ; Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 110 
 Fed. 730, s. c. 190 U. S. 411, 47 L. ed. 1115, 23 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 728; Stowe v. Santa Fe Pacific E. Co. 117 Fed. 368; 
 Collins V. American Spirit Mfg. Co. 96 Fed. 133 ; Mecke v. 
 Valley Town Mineral Co. 89 Fed. 114; Calderhead v. Down- 
 ing, 103 Fed. 30. But in ]^ew York Constr. Co. v. Simon, 
 53 Fed. 1, it was declared that it was the settled rule of the 
 sixth circuit that a removing defendant could not object to 
 service unless the objection was raised in the State court. 
 Bentlif v. London & C. Finance Corp. 44 Fed. 667, disap- 
 proved. 
 
 If the State court did not rightly acquire jurisdiction, it 
 may be raised in the Federal court. (See authorities above.) 
 Empire Min. Co. v. Propeller Tow-Boat Co. 108 Fed. 903; 
 Goldey v. Morning ISTews, 156 U. S. 518, 39 L. ed. 517, 15 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 559 ; Wabash Western E. Co. v. Brow, 164 U. 
 S. 276, 41 L. ed. 433, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 126 ; Cady v. Associated 
 Colonies, 119 Fed. 423 ; Peterson v. Morris, 98 Fed. 49 ; Aur- 
 acher v. Omaha & St. L. E. Co. 102 Fed. 1 ; Case v. Smith, 
 L. & Co. 152 Fed. 730. 
 
 It seems that if the State court has overruled the motion 
 to set aside service, the Federal court will not rehear it, that 
 is where the service in the State court is valid the Federal 
 court should not set it aside, even though it may have been, 
 
PROCESS IN A STATE COURT AFFECTING REMOVAL 841 
 
 had the suit been originally brought in the Federal court. 
 Sleicher v. Pullman Co. 170 Fed. 365, 366 ; Allmark v. Platte 
 S. S. Co. 76 Fed. 615. But when a motion is made in a State 
 court and not acted on, it may be heard in the Federal court 
 (KaufFman v. Kennedy, 25 Fed. 785) ; and where service is 
 by publication, objection that the State court was without jur- 
 isdiction for want of a res to support it may be made. Ahlhaus- 
 er V. Butler, 50 Fed. 705 ; Atchison v. Morris, 11 Biss. 191, 
 11 Fed. 582. 
 
 The rule may be stated that the authority to determine 
 whether the state court had jurisdiction is not limited by state 
 laws. Cady v. Associated Colonies, 119 Fed. 423, 424, and 
 cases cited ; Case v. Smith, L. & Co. 152 Fed. 730 ; Goldey v. 
 Morning News, 156 U. S. 523, 39 L. ed. 519, 15 Sup, Ct. 
 Eep. 559. 
 
 Where the service was by publication on the foreclosure of 
 a mortgage, the Federal court will not set aside the service 
 so far as the foreclosure is concerned, but will not give a per- 
 sonal judgment on the service. Du Pont v. Abel, 81 Fed. 534. 
 
 Where service is by attachment in State court without per- 
 sonal service, it is no ground to remand. Purdy v. Wallace 
 Miiller & Co. 81 Fed. 513 ; Lebensberger v. Scofield, 71 C. C. 
 A. 476, 139 Fed. 380 ; Long v. Long, 73 Fed. 369 ; Vermilya 
 V. Brown, 65 Fed. 149 ; Eichmond v. Brookings, 48 Fed. 241. 
 See Clark v. Wells, 203 IT. S. 164, 51 L. ed. 138, 27 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 43. (See chapter 117, "Status after Eemoval.") 
 
 Amending Service After Removal. 
 
 Whatever may be the defects of service, a state officer can- 
 not amend after removal. Tallman v. Baltimore & O. E. 
 Co. 45 Fed. 156; Hawkins v. Peirce, 79 Fed. 452. ISTor has 
 the Federal court after removal any power to issue process 
 to perfect the service of the State court. Stowe v. Santa Fe P. 
 E. Co. 117 Fed. 368. Therefore the Federal court must, in 
 the absence of proper service, dismiss the case, because if the 
 State court had no jurisdiction it cannot take any. Ibid. But 
 thus dismissing the case will not prevent the State court from 
 again taking jurisdiction on the same cause of action. Gass- 
 man v. Jarvis, 100 Fed. 146; Texas Cotton Products Co. v. 
 Stames, 128 Fed. 183, 184, and cases cited. 
 
CHAPTER CXXV. 
 
 REMOVAL ON GROUND OF LOCAL PEEJUDICE. 
 
 Who Mai/ Bemove. 
 
 I have already referred to the statute permitting the re- 
 movals from State courts by miy defendant being a nonresident, 
 at any time before the trial in the State court, when it shall 
 be made to appear to the United States circuit court that from 
 prejudice or local influence, such defendant will not be able to 
 obtain justice in the State court in which the suit is pending 
 or in any other State court to which the said defendant may, 
 under the laws of the State, remove the same, provided, the 
 amount in controversy be over three thousand dollars. Water 
 Comrs. V. Robbins, 125 Fed. 656 ; Cochran v. Montgomery 
 County, 199 U. S. 271, 50 L. ed. 187, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58, 
 4 Ann. Cas. 451; Re Pennsylvania Co. 137 U. S. 451, 34 
 L. ed. 738, 11 Sup. 'Ct. Rep. 141; Malone v. Richmond & 
 D. R. Co. 35 Fed. 625; Fisk v. Henarie, 142 U. S. 468, 
 35 L. ed. 1082, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207 ; new Code, sees. 28, 29 
 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sees. 1010,. 1011); Armstrong v. Kansas 
 City Southern R. Co. 192 Fed. 616. 
 
 There has been much controversy over the fact as to -whether, 
 under the language of the act, a nonresident defendant could 
 remove unless there was a separable controversy; but, what- 
 ever may have been the rule under U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 639, 
 see Fisk v. Henarie, 142 U. S. 467, 35 L. ed. 1082, 12 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 207, yet the recognized rule under the act of 1888 
 permits any nonresident defendant, though joined M'ith resident 
 citizen, to remove the case, if prejudice or local influence exists. 
 Holmes v. Southern R. Co. 125 Fed. 301; Whelan v. Xew 
 York L. E. & W. R. Co. 1 L.R.A. 65, 35 Fed. 849 ; Boatmen's 
 Bank v. Fritzlen, 68 C. C. A. 288, 135 Fed. 665, and cases 
 cited; Montgomery County v. Cochran, 116 Fed. 994; Bart- 
 
 842 
 
EEMOVAL ON GROUND OF LOCAL PEEJUDICE, 843 
 
 lett V. Gates, 117 Fed. 362; Seaboard Air Line E. Co. v. North 
 Carolina R. Co. 123 Fed. 629 ; Jackson & S. Co. v. Pearson, 
 60 Fed. 113; Haire v. Rome R. Co. 57 Fed. 321; Fisk v. 
 Henarie, 32 Fed. 417. 
 
 The weight of authority is certainly in favor of the text, as 
 ■far as numbers go, at least, but the cases xipholding this rule 
 rest upon the fact that sec. 1 of the act of 1888, sec. 28, Code 
 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1010), allowing a removal for exists 
 ing prejudice, or local -influence is a distinct, or rather inde- 
 pendent, ground for removal. It will be seen, however, that 
 the case of Cochran v. Montgomery County, cited above, was 
 appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, in which 
 a citizen of Alabama had sued a citizen of Alabama and a 
 citizen of Maryland in the State court of Alabama, which was 
 removed to the Federal court in Alabama upon the petition of 
 the Maryland defendant, setting up prejtidice and local in- 
 fluence. The case was reversed and remanded to the State 
 court because improperly removed, the court stating that the 
 4th clause of section 2 of the act of 1875 amended by the act 
 of 1888 does not furnish a separate and independent groimd 
 of Federal jurisdiction, but only a special condition to be ap- 
 plied in the preceding clauses; that is, the local prejudice 
 clause does' not describe a new class of suits that may be 
 removed from the State courts, but a ground for removing 
 a class of suits previously defined. Therefore the Chief Justice 
 concludes that the construction given by the various cases, above 
 cited, to the local prejudice clause, to wit, that the words 
 "any defendant being such citizen of another State may re- 
 move" implied that there might be defendants who were not 
 citizens of another State, and yet the cause be removable was 
 erroneous, and in the light of the preceding section of the re- 
 moval act, requiring the controversy to be removed, to be 
 between a citizen or citizens of one State and a citizen or cit- 
 izens of another or other States, did not include cases where 
 the controversy was partly between citizens of the same State, 
 and consequently the local prejudice clause could not apply 
 to the latter condition. Again, it is assumed that to reach a 
 different conclusion would conflict with the rule that a cause 
 is only removable when it may have been originally brought 
 in the Federal court. This case was followed in Cleveland v. 
 
844 REMOVAL ON GEOTIND OF LOCAL PEEJTJraCE. 
 
 Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R Co. Y7 C. C. A. 467, 147 Fed. 
 173, and in Southern E. Co. v. Thomason, 77 C. C. A. 170, 
 146 Fed. 974. So the rule seems to be established that to 
 remove on the ground of local prejudice, etc., it must be a 
 suit in which there is a controversy between citizens of dif- 
 ferent States, as required under the rule of jurisdiction by 
 diversity of citizenship. Terre Haute v. Evansville & T. H. E. 
 Co. 106 Fed. 549; Campbell v. Milliken, 119 Fed. 982; 
 Eosenthal v. Coates, 148 U. S. 146, 37 L. ed. 400, 13 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 576 ; Armstrong v. Kansas City Southern E. Go. 192 
 Fed. 614, and cases cited. 
 
 Must Defendants All Join in Petition. 
 
 The act says, "any defendant being a citizen of another State 
 may remove," and it is said in Cochran v. Montgomery Coun- 
 ty, 199 U. S. 273, 50 L. ed. 188, 26 Sup. Ct. Eep. 58, 4 
 Ann. Cas. 451, that these words were inserted in order that 
 a defendant entitled to remove may not be cut off from the 
 right by a refusal of codefendants to join in the application. 
 Holmes v. Southern E. Co. 125 Fed. 302, 303; Bonner v. 
 Meikle, 77 Fed. 485. One defendant cannot remove because 
 of local prejudice as between him and another defendant. 
 Hanrick v. lianrick, 153 U. S. 198, 38 L. ed. 687, 14 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 835. 
 
 Petition for Removal. 
 
 The petition must be sworn to and presented to the Federal 
 court before the trial of the cause in the State court, and when 
 removed the plaintiff must join issue in the Federal court, 
 where alone the facts can be tried. Act of 1888, sec. 1 ; 
 Bonner v. Meikle, 77 Fed. 485 ; Hanrick v. Hanrick, 153 U. 
 S. 197, 38 L. ed. 687, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 835; Short v. Chicago, 
 M. & St. P. E. Co. 34 Fed. 225; Hobart v. Illinois C. E.-Co. 
 81 Fed. 5 ; Kaitel v. Wylie, 38 Fed. 865 ; Farmers' & M. ]S"at. 
 Bank v. Schuster, 29 C. C. A. 649, 52 U. S. App. 612, 86 
 Fed. 161; Fisk v. Henarie, 142 U. S. 467, 35 L. ed. 1082, 
 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 207. See Montgomery County v. Cochran, 
 116 Fed. 986, for form of petition. Also Weldon v, Fritzlen, 
 128 Fed. 609, 610. 
 
KEMOVAL OK GEOUND OF LOCAL PREJUDICE, 845 
 
 What to i^tate. 
 
 It is not sufficient to state that one has reason to believe 
 that from prejudice, etc., he will be unable to obtain justice. 
 The existence of prejudice must be alleged as a matter of fact. 
 Collins v. Campbell, 62 Fed. 850. (See Affidavit, below.) 
 
 WJiere Application Made and When. 
 
 We see the application must be made to the Federal court, 
 and can be made "at any time before the trial" in the State 
 court of the case on its merits. Fisk v. Henarie, 142 IJ. S. 
 467, 35 L. ed. 1082, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 207 ; liobart v. Illinois 
 C. E. Co. 81 Fed. 5, but see Whelan v. :New York, L. E. & 
 W. R. Co. 1 L.RA. 65, 35 Fed. 849, holding not too late 
 after demurrer heard in the State court, but not after trial 
 in the State court, though a mistrial. Farmers' & M. ]S[at. 
 Bank v. Schuster, 29 C. C. A. 649, 52 U. S. App. 612, 86 Fed. 
 161; Rosenthal v. Coates, 148 U. S. 143, 37 L. ed. 399, 13 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 576. 
 
 The Affidavit. 
 
 The affidavit for removal should set forth the facts and cir- 
 cumstances so as to satisfy the court, if true, of the existence 
 of prejudice or adverse local iniluence. Amy v. Manning, 38 
 Fed. 868; Ee Pennsylvania Co. 137 U. S. 457, 34 L. ed. 741, 
 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 154. 
 
 It should not rest upon mere belief or opinion, but be direct 
 in its allegations. Franz v. Wahl, 81 Fed. 9 ; Short v. Chicago, 
 M. & St. P. E. Co. 33 Fed. 114; Schwenk v. Strang, 8 C. C. 
 A. 92, 19 U. S. App. 300, 59 Fed. 209 ; Crotts v. Southern E. 
 Co. 90 Fed. 2 ; Curnow v. Phcenix Ins. Co. 44 Fed. 305 ; Hall 
 V. Chattanooga Agri. Works, 48 Fed. 602. 
 
 In Collins v. Campbell, 62 Fed. 851, and Crotts v. South- 
 em E. Co. 90 Fed. 2, it is said that the petition and affidavit 
 need not set out the facts upon which the belief in the existence 
 of the prejudice is founded, but the existence of the prejudice 
 must be alleged as a fact. 
 
 The affidavit may be filed in the State court, and a certified 
 
846 ee:\io\'al on geouxd of locax prejudice. 
 
 copy iu the Federal court. Short v. Chicago, M. & St, P. R. 
 Co. 34 Fed. 225. See Crotts v. Southern E. Co. 90 Fed. 1 ; 
 Montgomery County v. Cochran, 116 Fed. 987, 988, for form 
 of affidavit. 
 
 See affidavit held insufficient. Dennison v. Brown, 38 Fed. 
 535; Hakes v. Burns, 40 Fed.. 33; Short v. Chicago, M. & St. 
 P. R. Co. 34 Fed. 225; Turnbull Wagon Co. v. Linthicum 
 Carriage Co. 80 Fed. 4; Collins v. Campbell, 62 Fed. 850. 
 See sec. 28, new Cqde, chap. 3 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1010). 
 
 Notice. 
 
 Reasonable notice of the application to the Federal court 
 ought to be given to the adverse party, so that an opportunity 
 to contest the application in the Federal court may be had. 
 Schwenk v. Strang, 8 C. C. A. 92, 19 U. S. App'. 300, 59 
 Fed. 209-211 ; Carson & R. Lumber Co. v. Holtzclaw, 39 Fed. 
 578; Malone v. Richmond & D. R. Co. 35 Fed. 625. See 
 Crotts V. Southern R. Co. 90 Fed. 1 ; and authorities cited, 
 where it is held that the removal may be granted on an ear 
 parte hearing (Montgomery County v. Cochran, 116 Fed. 985), 
 but when so granted plaintiff may thereafter contest the allega- 
 tions of the petition (Ellison v. Louisville & IST. R. Co. 50 C. C. 
 A. 530, 112 Fed. 805) ; but, giving notice of the application 
 is the hotter practice. Herndon v. Southern R. Co. 73 Fed. 
 307; Bonner v. Meikle, 77 Fed. 485; Reeves v. Corning, 51 
 Fed. 774. But when obtained without notice the court will 
 permit the plaintiff to contest the allegations, and will give a 
 reasonable time to do so. Ellison v. Louisville & JST. R. Co. 
 50 C. C. A. 530, 112 Fed. 805. 
 
 I 
 
 How Issue Tried. 
 
 The judiciary act of 1888, section 1, provides that the cir- 
 cuit court shall examine into the truth of the affidavit and 
 the grounds thereof on application of the plaintiff. The is- 
 sue may be tried in such manner as the court may direct; that 
 is, by affidavits, depositions, or by oral evidence. Short v. 
 Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 33 Fed. 117; Re Pennsylvania Co. 
 137 U. S. 466, 457, 34 L. ed. 741, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141; 
 
EEMO^'AL OSr GEOUND OF LOCAL PEEJUDICB. 847 
 
 Carpenter v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 47 Fed. 535; Car- 
 son V. Dnuham, 121 U. S. 425, 30 L. ed. 993, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 1030; Carlisle t. Snnset Telepli. & Teleg. Co. 116 Fed. 896. 
 (See Xatiire of Proof, below.) 
 
 Xature of Proof. 
 
 The amount and manner of proof required must be left to 
 the discretion of the court (Crotts v. Southern R. Co. 90 Fed. 
 1; Tacoma v. Wright, 84 Fed. 836; Smith v. Crosby Lumber 
 Co. 46 Fed. 819; Parker v. Vanderbilt, 136 Fed. 250; Mont- 
 gomery County V. Cochran, 116 Fed. 985; Amy v. Manning, 
 38 Fed. 868; Maher v. Tower Hotel Co. 94 Fed. 225; Detroit 
 V. Detroit City R. Co. 54 Fed. 2; Southworth v. Reid, 36 
 Fed. 451 ; Bellaire v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 146 17. S. 118, 
 36 L. ed. 911, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 16), but the inability to obtain 
 justice because of prejudice or local influence in the State court 
 in which the suit is brought, as well as in any State court to 
 which under the laws of the . State the case could be removed, 
 must appear to the legal satisfaction of the court (ibid. ; Fisk 
 V. Henarie, 142 U. S. 468, 35 L. ed. 1082, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 207), as to changing venue in case of local prejudice. 
 
 As to what is sufficient to create legal satisfaction will be 
 found discussed in Re Pennsylvania Co. 137 U. S. 457, 34 
 L. ed. 741, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141, and it need not be shown that 
 the prejudice or influence primarily exists against the party 
 seeking removal, but it may be a prejudice in favor of his ad- 
 versary (Xeale v. Foster, 31 Fed. 55; Parks v. Southern R. 
 Co. 90 Fed. 4; Bartlett v. Gates, 117 Fed. 362), and to which 
 the judge is exposed. ^Montgomery County v. Cochran, 116 
 Fed. 985, is a case where the facts wei'e held sufficient. De- 
 troit V. Detroit City R. Co. 54 Fed. 18. 
 
 Order of Removal. 
 
 The circuit court issues its order to the clerk of the State 
 court in which the cause is pending, and requires him to cer- 
 tify to the United States circuit court a transcript of the 
 proceedings in the cause (see 90 Fed. 2-4, for forms or order) ; 
 and while the law does not require it, proper respect for State 
 
848 EEMOVAL O^ QKOUND OF LOCAL PREJUDICE, 
 
 courts demands that the certified copy of the order of removal 
 be filed in the State court. Bartlett y. Gates, 117 Fed. 362. 
 
 Motion to Remand, 
 
 The plaintiff may contest in the Federal court the grounds 
 of the petition for removal to prevent it, if seasonably notified 
 of the application, or he may after removal, upon motion to 
 remand, contest the allegations of the petition for removal. 
 Ellison V. Louisville & IST. R Co. 50 C. C. A. 530, 112 Fed. 
 805; Montgomery County v. Cochran, 116 Fed. 985. As to 
 form of motion to remand, see 116 Fed. 988. 
 
 The suit may be divided and remanded in part. Fisk v. Hen- 
 arie, 142 U. S. 468, 35 L. ed. 1082, 12 Sup. Ct. Kep. 207. 
 By clause 4 of section 2 of the act of 1875, as amended by the 
 act of 1888, it is provided that if it further appear that said 
 suit can be fully determined as to other defendants in a State 
 court, unaffected by prejudice, and no party to the suit will be 
 prejudiced by a separation of the parties, said court may direct 
 the suit to be remanded as to such parties. Holmes v. Southern 
 K. Co. 125 Fed. 303. 
 
 Burden of Proof. 
 
 We thus see what issue can be made in a motion to remand 
 the cause to the State court, and where the allegations of the 
 petition by which the case has been removed have thus been put 
 in issue, the burden is on the defendant to establish the juris- 
 diction he seeks. Carson v. Dunham, 121 U. S. 421, 30 L. ed. 
 992, 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1030. 
 
 Remedy When Remand Refused. 
 
 If the remand for any cause is refused, file your bill of ex- 
 ceptions as follows: 
 
 Title as in cause. 
 
 In the United States District Court 
 
 , A. 
 
 D. 19 . . . 
 Bill of Exceptions. 
 Be it remembered that on this day came on to be heard the plaintiff's mo- 
 
MANDAMUS EE:\IEDY WHEX REitAND REFUSED. 849 
 
 tion to remand the above entitled and numbered cause to the State court 
 from whence it was removed, and the court having heard the motion and 
 argument of counsel thereon, and having considered the same, said motion 
 was by said court in all things overruled, and held for naught, to which 
 ruling of the court plaintiff excepted, and here tenders his bill of fixceptions 
 asking that the same be approved and made a part of the record, which is 
 accordingly done. 
 
 The object is to reserve the point in case the cause is appealed. 
 There is no appeal from an order to remand (German !Nat. 
 Bank v. Speckert, 181 U. S. 407-409, 45 L. ed. 926, 927, 21 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 688; Re Pennsylvania Co. 137 U. S. 451, 34 
 L. ed. 738, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep, 141 ; sec. 2, act 1875, amended by 
 act 1-888, claiise 6) ; but %vhere jurisdiction is retained by over- 
 ruling the motion to remand, it may be revised by the appellate 
 court. Mansfield, C. & L. M. E. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 
 28 L. ed. 462, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 510 ; Powers v. Chesapeake & 
 O. R. Co. 169 U. S. 98, 42 L. ed. 675, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 264; 
 Missouri P. R. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 160 U. S. 557-582, 40 L. ed. 
 536-543, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389. See Harding v. Corn Products 
 Mfg. Co. 117 C. C. A. 332, 198 Fed. 628. 
 
 Mandamus as Remedy When Remand Refused. 
 
 That mandamus lies to correct an abuse of judicial discre- 
 tion, as in retaining jurisdiction of a removed ease when in 
 fact the United States district court had no jurisdiction of the 
 case, because not one that may have been originally brought in 
 the court to which it had been removed, was decided in Re 
 Dimn, 212 U. S. 375, 53 L. ed. 558, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 299 ; 
 Re Winn, 213 U. S. 458, 53 L. ed. 873, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 515 ; 
 Ex parte Wisner, 203 U. S. 449, 51 L. ed. 264, 27 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 150. But in Ex parte Harding, 219 U. S. 363, 55 L. ed. 
 252, 37 L.R.A.(l\r.S.) 392, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324, these deci- 
 sions were disapproved and greatly qualified as to the use of 
 mandamus to control the discretion of the court refusing to re- 
 mand a removed case, as the writ cannot be used as an appeal 
 or perform the office of a writ of error. Ex parte Hoard, 105 
 U. S. 578, 26 L. ed. 1176 ; Re Pollitz, 206 U. S. 323, 51 L. ed. 
 1081, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729 ; Ex parte Greutter, 217 U. S. 586, 
 54 L. ed. 892, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 690. The conclusion is reached 
 S. Eq.— 54. 
 
850 MANDAMUS REMEDY WJfEX REMAND REFUSED. 
 
 that only in most exceptional cases, as where the court refusing 
 to remand had no jurisdiction whatever over the case, that man- 
 damus would lie, as in Virginia v. Hives, 100 U. S. 313, 25 L. 
 ed. 667, and in Virginia v. Paul, 148 U. S. 107, 37 L. ed. 386, 
 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 536 ; Sagara v. Chicago, R I. & P. R Co. 189 
 Fed. 223 ; Ke Tobin, 214 U. S. 506, 53 L. ed. 1061, 29 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 702. 
 
 Effect of Order Remrnvding. 
 
 The order is conclusive on the State court. Western U. 
 Teleg. Co. v. Luck, 91 Tex. 178, 66 Am. St. Eep. 869, 41 S. 
 W. 469 ; Missouri P. E. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 160 TJ. S. 557, 40 
 L. ed. 536, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 389 ; Pioneer Sav. & L. Co. v. 
 Peck, 20 Tex. Civ. App. Ill, 49 S. W. 168. 
 
CHAPTER CXXVI. 
 
 REMOVAL BT EECEIVEES. 
 
 I will briefly refer to removals by Federal receivers ■when 
 sued in a State court, only to suggest when motions to remand 
 may be made. 
 
 By section 3 of the act of 1888, amending the act of 1887, 
 25 Stat, at L. 436, chap. 866 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1048), 
 a Federal receiver can be sued in a State court in respect of 
 any act or transaction of his in carrying on the business con- 
 nected with the property of which he is a receiver, without the 
 previous leave of the court appointing him. 
 
 As to the right of Federal receivers to remove a case brought 
 in the State court under this act, there has been conflict in the 
 cases, but I think the questions are now settled with reasonable 
 definiteness. 
 
 In Gableman v. Peoria, D. & E. E. Co. 179 U. S. 335, 45 
 L. ed. 220, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 171, the direct questions arose 
 in an eifort by a Federal receiver, to remove a case from the 
 State court on the sole ground that he was sued as a Federal 
 receiver. S. C. 41 C. C. A. 160, 101 Fed. 5; Rural Home 
 Teleph. Co. v. Powers, 176 Fed. 986. 
 
 The court, construing the act above referred to, says : "This 
 act gave the citizen the right to determine in his local court 
 by verdict of a jury the amount and justness of his cause of 
 action, and the manifest object rejects the construction of many 
 of the circuit courts that the act of 1888 did not change the 
 laW: further than to relieve one from contempt for suing the re- 
 ceiver in the State court." Pepper v. Rogers, 128 Fed. 988: 
 Chesapealfe, O. & S. W. R. Co. v. Smith, 101 Ky. 707, 42 
 S. W. .538; Central T:fust Co. v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. 
 Co. 59 Fed. 523. 
 
 To permit such a construction eliminated the very spirit, if 
 not the letter, of the act, for if it could be removed to the Fed- 
 
 851 
 
852 REMOVAL BY KECEIVEKS. 
 
 eral court simply because the receiver was appointed by a Fed- 
 eral court, wherein was the benefit to the citizen to sue in his 
 local court? 
 
 The privilege in no way interferes with the receiver's cus- 
 tody of the property, for this is abundantly protected by the lat- 
 ter clause of section 3 of the act against such interference. 
 Ibid.; Gableman v. Peoria, D. & E. E.Co. 179 U. S. 338, 45 
 L. ed. 222, 21 Sup. Ct. Kep. 171; Marrs v. Felton, 102 Fed. 
 778. 
 
 This case reasonably settles the question that the right to 
 sue a Federal receiver in a State court to establish a claim 
 growing out of any act or transaction of such receivers in 
 carrying on the business is a substantial right and presents no 
 Federal question, nor a case arising under the Constitution and 
 laws of the United States simply by reason of the fact that the 
 defendant was a Federal receiver. Consquently, a case removed 
 on this ground can be remanded on motion. 
 
 In Pope V. Louisville, IST. A. & C. E. Co. 173 U. S. 573, 43 
 L. ed. 814, 19 Sup. Ct. Eep. 500, the court held that the order 
 of a Federal court appointing a receiver was not equivalent to a 
 law of the United States in the meaning of the Constitution. 
 Bausman v. Dixon, 173 U. S. 114, 43 L. ed. 634, 19 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 316. 
 
 Of course, if the suit in the State court against the Federal 
 receiver substantially involves a controversy dependent on the 
 construction of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
 States, and which appears in the case as stated by the plaintiff, 
 or on any other ground of Federal jurisdiction appearing, then 
 receivers, like any other citizen, may remove the case from the 
 State to the Federal courts. Gableman v. Peoria, D. & E. R. 
 Co. 179 U. S. 341, 342, 45 L. ed. 223, 224, 21 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 171. 
 
 What has thus been said about the right of removal by Fed- 
 eral receivers does not apply to receivers of corporations created 
 by Congress. Such corporations are exceptions to the rules 
 applicable to the jurisdiction of the Federal courts, and the 
 bare statement in the petition for removal that the applicant is 
 a receiver of a Federal corporation, would be sufficient to sup- 
 port the removal of the cause. I have, however, sufiiciently 
 discussed this anomaly. 
 
KEMOVAL BY NATIONAL BANKS. 853 
 
 National Banls. 
 
 National banks, thongh created by Congress, are excluded 
 from this privilege attached to a national charter. By act of 
 1882, 22 Stat, at L. 162, chap. 290 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 
 9665), they are put upon the same plane with banks not organ- 
 ized under the laws of the United States. 
 
 In Leather Mfg. ISlat. Bank v. Cooper, 120 U. S. YY9, 30 
 L. ed. 817, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 777, this act was construed, and it 
 was held that removals by these banks from the State to the 
 Federal courts were prohibited unless some ground of Federal 
 jurisdiction existed other than their creation by Congress. 
 Wichita Xat. Bank v. Smith, 19 C. C. A. 42, 36 U. S. App. 
 530, 72 Fed. 568; Burnham v. First 'Rut. Bank, 3 C. C. A. 
 486, 10 U. S. App. 485, 53 Fed. 163. 
 
 By section 4 of the act of 1888, 25 Stat, at L. 436, chap. S66, 
 all banlcing associations for the purpose of jurisdiction were to 
 be deemed citizens of the State in which they were located, and 
 Federal jurisdiction was conferred to the grounds upon which 
 other citizens may invoke it, except in cases where the affairs 
 of the bank were being wound up, or in suits by the United 
 States, its officers or agents. Guarantee Co. v. Hanway, 44 C. 
 C. A. 312, 104 Fed. 369; International Trust Co. v. Weeks, 
 116 Fed. 898. 
 
 Intervention for Removal. 
 
 In closing this subject, I shall call your attention to cases 
 removed by interveners, and causes for remanding the same. 
 
 The question arises as to whether a party can intervene in 
 a suit and remove it to the Federal court, there being no ground 
 of Federal jurisdiction prior to his intervention. 
 
 It is clear that whatever may have been the right of removal 
 by the defendant before one has intervened, if at the time of the 
 intervention the right has been lost by lapse of time, or from 
 any other cause by the defendant, then the intervener who 
 causes himself to be associated with, or substituted for, the de- 
 fendant cannot remove the case to the Federal court. One com- 
 ing voluntarily into the action must take the case as he finds 
 it. ISTash v. MclSTamara, 145 Fed. 543, and cases cited; Cable 
 
So-t EEMOVAL BY liS'TERVENOKS. 
 
 V. Ellis, 110 U. S. 389, 28 L. ed. 186, 4 Sup. Ct. Eep. 85; 
 Speckert v. German Nat. Bank, 38 C. C. A. 682, 98 Fed. 154, 
 155; Kidder v. Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. 117 Fed. 997; 
 Farmers' & M. Nat. Bank v. Schuster, 29 C. 0. A. 649, 52 U. 
 S. App. 612, 86 Fed. 161 ; Eichmond & D. K. Co. v. Findley, 
 32 Fed. 642; Olds Wagon Works v. Benedict, 14 C. C. A. 
 285, 32 U. S. App. 116, 67 Fed. 1; McDonnell v. Jordan, 178 
 U. S. 238, 44 L. ed. 1052, 20 Sup. Ct. Eep. 886. 
 
 A substituted party comes in only with the rights of the 
 party whose place he takes. Houston & T. C. E. Co. v. Shir- 
 ley, 111 U. S. 358, 28 L. ed. 455, 4 Sup. Ct. Eep. 472. So a 
 party who purchases property pendente lite comes in subject to 
 the disabilities of the original parties so far as removal is con- 
 cerned. Jefferson v. Driver, 117 U. S. 272, 29 L. ed. 897, 6 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 729. So an intervener who introduces himself 
 into an action to protect himself as against an indemnity to 
 the defendant cannot remove it if the defendant cannot; or if 
 he holds in privity with defendant. Ibid. ; Olds Wagon Works 
 V. Benedict, 14 C. C. A. 285, 32 U. S. App. 116, 67 Fed. 1-4; 
 Goodnow V. Dolliver, 26 Fed. 470 ; Weller v. J. B. Pace To- 
 bacco Co. 32 Fed. 860; Concord Coal Co. v. Haley, 76 Fed. 
 882 ; Grand Trunk E. Co. v. Twitchell, 8 C. C. A. 237, 21 
 U. S. App. 45, 59 Fed. 727. So parties brought into a suit 
 \iy cross bill in a State court, who have succeeded to the in- 
 terests of plaintiff, cannot remove as defendants. Nash v. Mc- 
 Namara, 145 Fed. 541. So where one intervenes in a suit 
 claiming the proceeds of a check sued upon cannot remove the 
 case if the right of removal did not exist when he intervened. 
 Kidder v. Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. 117 Fed. 997-999, 
 and authorities cited; Cable v. Ellis, 110 U. S. 389, 28 L. ed. 
 186, 4 Sup. Ct. Eep. 85. 
 
 In Kidder v. Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. 117 Fed. 998, it 
 is said the statute makes no provision for a removal by anyone 
 except the "defendant or defendants therein." It makes no 
 provision at the instance of persons who may be pecuniarily in- 
 terested to intervene and remove the cause to the Federal court. 
 Nor does it make any provision for compelling or allowing 
 other parties to be influenced or substituted as defendants, and 
 thereby make a removable cause out of one which was previous- 
 ly not removable 
 
ItEJEOVAL BY INTEEVENOES. 85.J 
 
 If the State court refuses intervention, the Federal courts 
 are bound by it, and an intervener cannot remove to test his 
 right to intervene. Kidder v. JSTorthwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. 
 117 Fed. 998, 999. The Snow v. Texas Trunk E. Co. 16 Fed. 
 1, and American Xat. Bank v. National Ben. & Casualty Co. 
 70 Fed. 420, are noted, but declared erroneous. 
 
 Where a petition has not been granted they are not parties, 
 and cannot remove. As to the effect of the refusal of an ap- 
 plication to intervene, see Credits Commutation Co. v. United 
 States, 177 U. S. 314, 315, 44 L. ed. 784, 785, 20 Sup. Ct. 
 Eep. 636; Land Title & T. Co. v. Asphalt Co. 127 Fed. 21; 
 Massachusetts Loan & T. Co. v. Kansas City & A. E. Co. 49 
 C. C. A. 18, 110 Fed. 30. But it seems vsrhere the intervener 
 is the substantial party to the contest he may intervene and 
 remove. Chase v. Beech Creek E. Co. 144 Fed. 572. A re- 
 ceiver may intervene, where the bank of which he is receiver 
 is being wound up, when the bank is sued, and such receiver 
 may remove the case to the Federal court. Speckart v. German 
 Xat. Bank, 85 Fed. 12. 
 
 Interpleader. 
 
 "When he may remove. First Xat. Bank v. Bridgeport Trust 
 Co. 117 Fed. 969. 
 
 Cross Suit. 
 
 Where cross suit is filed by the defendant, it makes the plain- 
 tiif defendant, and he may remove the case to the Federal court 
 at or before the time he is required to plead to the cross claim. 
 Price V. Ellis, 129 Fed. 482; Hagerla v. Mississippi Eiver 
 Power Co. 202 Fed. 775, and cases cited; Nash v. McXamara, 
 145 Fed. 541. 
 
CHAPTER CXXVIL 
 
 MOTION TO EEMAND. 
 
 By Whom Made. 
 
 The motion to remand must be made by the plaintiff in the 
 suit, as the party removing is estopped from making it (Tod 
 V. Cleveland & M. Valley E. Co. 12 C. C. A. 521, 22 U. S. 
 App. 707, 65 Fed. 145; Long v. Long, 73 Fed. 372; Edwards 
 V. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. 20 Fed. 452; Cowley v. 
 ISTorthern P. R Co. 159 U. S. 569, 40 L. ed. 263, 16 Sup. 
 Ct. Eep. 127; Empire Min. Co. v. Propeller Tow-Boat Co. 
 108 Fed. 903 ; Philadelphia & B. Face Brick Co. v. Warford, 
 123 Fed. 843), unless the court a- quo had no jurisdiction, 
 then he may dismiss (Tootte v. Coleman, 57 L.E.A. 120, 46 
 C. C. A. 132, 107 Fed, 41-45; Swift v. Philadelphia & E, 
 E. Co. 58 Fed. 858 ; see Purdy v. Wallace, Muller & Co. 81 
 Fed. 515). 
 
 Ejfect Of. 
 
 It is equivalent to a special plea to the jurisdiction (Mans- 
 field, C. & L. M. E. Co. V. Swan, 111 U. S. 384, 28 L. ed. 
 464, 4 Sup. Ct. Eep. 510; Phillips v. Western Terra Cotta 
 Co. 174 Fed. 873), and an order refusing it is subject to 
 reconsideration until final judgment (Missouri P. E. Co. v. 
 Fitzgerald, 160 U. S. 580, 40 L. ed. 542, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 389). In considering the motion the presumption is against 
 the party objecting to the jurisdiction. Evers v. Watson, 156 
 U. S. 531, 39 L. ed. 522, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 430. 
 
 The petition for removal is a part of the record (Supreme 
 Lodge, K. P. V. Wilson, 14 C. C. A. 2G4, 30 U. S. App. 234; 
 66 Fed. 785), and the jurisdictional facts set out in the peti- 
 tion are presumed to be true on motion to remand, and unless 
 
 856 
 
MOTION TO REMAND. 857 
 
 evidence is introduced to contradict them, or the record shows 
 the contrary, the remand will be refused. Durkee v. Illinois 
 C. E. Co. 81 Fed. 1; Loop v. Winters, 115 Fed. 362; Carlisle 
 V. Snnset Teleph. ^' Teleg. Co. 116 Fed. 896. 
 
 They are not put in issue by a mere motion to remand. 
 Ibid. 
 
 Time to Be Made. 
 
 TVe have seen that the motion to remand must be made 
 promptly, — especially where the ground of the motion is a 
 failure to remove the case in time, which is not fundament- 
 ally jurisdictional; and this is true, where the motion would 
 be made, on any irreg'ularity, Avhich may be waived by ac- 
 quiescence or delay. Wyly y. Richmond & D. R. Co. 63 Fed. 
 487; Tod v. Cleveland & M. Valley E. Co. 12 C. C. A. 521, 
 32 U. S. App. 707, 65 Fed. 145; see Collins v. Stott, 76 
 Fed. 613. Of course, if the objection goes to some fundamental 
 ground of jurisdiction, it would be the duty of the court, 
 tinder section 5 of the act of 1875, to remand the cause at any 
 time, when it appeared that the suit did not involve a contro- 
 versy properly within the jurisdiction. Indiana v. Tolleston 
 Club, 53 Fed. 18 ; Indiana ex rel. Muncie v. Lake Erie & AV. 
 E. Co. 85 Fed. 2 ; Mansfield, C. & L. M. E. Co. v. Swan, 111 
 U. S. 379, 28 L. ed. 462, 4 Sup. Ct. Eep. 510; International 
 & G. X. E. Co. V. Hoyle, 79 C. C. A. 128, 149 Fed. 180- 
 182; Broadway Ins. Co. v. Chicago, G. W. E. Co. 101 Fed. 
 510 ; American Bridge Co. v. Hunt, 64 C. C. A. 548, 130 Fed. 
 302. See sec. 37, chap. 3, new Code, embodying sec. 5, act 
 of 1875 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1019), effective January 1st, 
 1912. 
 
 In discussing what power the Federal court had between 
 petition to remove and the removal, we spoke of the right to 
 remand within that period, to which you are referred. 
 
 What Acts May Waive the Right to Remand. 
 
 When the ground for remanding is of such a nature that it 
 may be waived, then any act of the plaintiff after removal, 
 recognizing the jurisdiction of the Federal court, would have 
 
858 MOTION TO KEMAND. 
 
 that effect, as entering a general appearance in the Federal 
 court (Corwin Mfg. Co. v. Henrici Washer Co. 151 Fed. 938^ 
 Foulk V. Gray, 120 Fed. 156; Moyer v. Chicago, M. & St. 
 P. E. Co. 168 Fed. 105; Ee Moore, 209 U. S. 490, 491, 52 
 L. ed. 904, 28 Sup. Ct Eep. 585, 706, 14 Ann. Cas. 
 1164; Louisville & IS". E. Co. v. Fisher, 11 L.E.A.(]Sr.S.) 926, 
 83 C. C. A. 584, 155 Fed. 68) ; or delay on motion to re- 
 mand (Wyly V. Eichmond & D. E. Co. 63 Fed. 487 ; Tod v. 
 Cleveland & M. Valley E. Co. 12 C. C. A. 521, 22 U. S. App. 
 707, 65 Fed. 145; Mxilcahey v. Lake Erie & W. E. Co. 69 
 Fed. 172; Proctor Coal Co. v. United States Fidelity & G. 
 Co. 158 Fed. 211). However, not to give the court jurisdic- 
 tion if it had none. Indiana ex rel. Muncie v. Lake Erie & 
 ^Y. E. Co. 85 Fed. 1. 
 
 It is held in Parkinson v. Barr, 105 Fed. 82-83, that the 
 plaintiff appearing in the Federal court by asking to file an 
 amended complaint did not waive his right to move to re- 
 mand. See Frisbie v. Cheapeake & O. E. Co. 57 Fed. 1; 
 Thomas v. Great Northern E. Co. 77 C. C. A. 255, 147 Fed. 
 83. 
 
 Again (Collins v. Stott, 76 Fed. 613), the plaintiff was 
 allowed to withdraw his pleading and move to remand. 
 
 Form of Motion to Bemcund. 
 
 Title as in suit. 
 
 In the District Court of the United 
 States for the District of 
 
 And now comes the plaintiff and moves the court to remand the above 
 entitled cause to the State court from whence it was removed for trial for 
 the following reasons: 
 
 Because some of the defendants herein are residents and citizens of the 
 
 State of and plaintiff is a resident and citizen of the State of , 
 
 or a corporation duly incorporated under and by virtue of the laws of 
 
 , and that there is involved in this suit no separable controversy 
 
 which is wholly between citizens of another state on the one hand and 
 
 citizens of the State of on the other hand, all of which facts are 
 
 apparent in the record in this cause. 
 
 Wherefore plaintiff says this court has no jurisdiction to try and deter- 
 mine this case and prays that the same may be remanded to 
 
 district court of the State of from whence it came. 
 
 R. F., 
 Solicitor, etc. 
 
MOTION TO REMAND. 859 
 
 See Parkinson v. Barr, 105 Fed. 82 ; Weldon v. Fritzlen, 
 128 Fed. 611 ; Carothers v. McKinley, Min. & Smelting Co. 
 122 Fed. 305. 
 
 Or you may set up that defendant, who remoi'es the cause 
 on the ground that he is a nonresident of the State, is in truth 
 and fact a resident and citizen of the State, and, therefore, 
 the diversity of citizenship, upon which the jurisdiction is 
 claimed, does not exist, but, in fact, the controversy is wholly 
 between citizens of the State. (Helena Power Transmission 
 Co. V. Spratt, 146 Fed. 311), or that there was no fraudulent 
 joinder of parties, as alleged. Louisville & IST. R. Co. v. 
 Wangelin, 132 U. S. 599, 33 L. ed. 474, 10 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 203; Hukill v. Maysville & B. S. R. Co. 72 Fed. 751; Kelly 
 V. Chicago & A. R. Co. 122 Fed. 286. Or that a party claim- 
 ing to be an alien is a naturalized citizen of the United States 
 and a citizen of the State of suit where the suit was brought; 
 subsequent change would not affect the jurisdiction. Hara- 
 covic V. Standard Oil Co. 105 Fed. 785. Or that it is not 
 shown from the claims set up that it arises under the Constitu- 
 tion and laws of the United States, or is dependent for re- 
 covery upon a proper construction or application of either, etc. 
 See New Castle v. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. 152 Fed. 572; 
 Mayo V. Dockery, 108 Fed. 899 ; Tennessee v. Union & Planters' 
 Bank, 152 U. S. 454, 38 L. ed. 511, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654; 
 Chappell V. Waterworth, 155 U. S. 107, 39 L. ed. 87, 15 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 34; Walker v. Collins, 167 U. S. 59, 42 L. ed. 
 76, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 738. 
 
 Or that the suit was not one that could have been originally 
 brought in the Federal court. See authorities below. Or 
 that amount was not sufficient. New Castle v. Western U. 
 Teleg. Co. 152 Fed. 569-571 and cases cited. 
 
 As we have ^een, a dismissal as to the removing defendant 
 gives the right to remand. Youtsey v. Hoffman, 108 Fed. 
 699 ; Cassidy v. Atlanta & C. Air Line R. Co. 109 Fed. 673. 
 
 If the jurisdiction is doubtful on a motion to remand, it 
 should be remanded. McKown v. Kansas & T. Coal Co. 105 
 Fed. 657; Kessinger v. Vannatta, 27 Fed. 890; Nash v. 
 McNamara, 145 Fed. 542 ; Plant v. Harrison, 101 Fed. 307 ; 
 Ernst V. American Spirits Mfg. Co. 114 Fed. 981 ; Mathews 
 Slate Co. v. Mathews, 148 Fed. 490. And the duty to remand 
 
860 MOTION TO EEMAND, 
 
 should not be affected by the fact that no cause of action 
 it stated; that is a question for the State court. Broadway 
 Ins. Co. V. Chicago, G. W. R. Co. 101 Fed. 507. Nor can the 
 consolidation of a suit, with one pending in the Federal court, 
 affect the right to remand. Colburn v. Hill, 41 C. C. A. 467, 
 101 Fed. 500. When a suit is prosecuted in a State court of 
 equity, and, if removed, would fall on the law side of the 
 Federal court, then it should be remanded. Gombert v. Lyon, 
 80 Fed. 305; Gates v. Allen, 149 U. S. 460, 37 L. ed. 808, 
 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 883, 977. Consent cannot remand. Lawton 
 V. Blitch, 30 Fed. 641. 
 
 How Issue Joined and Tried. 
 
 We have already seen how the issue is to be joined and tried 
 when diverse citizenship is put in issue. 
 
 The existence of a Federal question, we have seen, must 
 appear in the case as made by the plaintiff's petition in the 
 State court, and cannot be raised by the petition to remove ; 
 so the issue in the motion to remand must rest upon the state- 
 ments in plaintiff's original or amended petition in the State 
 court. 
 
 The burden is on the removing party (Swann v. Mutual 
 Reserve Fund Life Asso. 116 Fed. 232), to sustain juris- 
 diction. See Thresher v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 148 Fed. 
 649. 
 
 Fraudulent Joinder, 
 
 Again, we have seen that the plaintiff cannot fraudulently 
 join parties as defendants in order to evade Federal juris- 
 diction and prevent removal. If the fact exists, the petition 
 for removal may set it up, and the issue is to be tried in the 
 Federal court. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R Co. v. Daughtry, 
 138 U. S. 303, 34 L. ed. 964, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 306; Carlisle 
 V. Sunset Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 116 Fed. 896; McGuire v. 
 Great ISTorthern E. Co. 153 Fed. 434; Kelly v. Chicago & A. 
 R. Co. 122 Fed. 289 ; Shane v. Butte Electric R. Co. 150 Fed. 
 801 ; Prince v. Illinois C. R. Co. 98 Fed. 1. The- allegation 
 of the jurisdictional fact, being taken as prima facie true is 
 
MCriOW TO EEMANB. 861 
 
 sufficient for the removal. Arrowsmith v. JSTashville & D. E. 
 Co. 57 Fed. 170 ; Kelly v. Chicago & A. R Co. 122 Fed. 289 ; 
 Ross V. Erie R Co. 120 Fed. 703. See sec. 37, chap. 8, of the 
 new Code (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1019). 
 
 When the petition for removal alleges the fact of a fraudu- 
 lent joinder, it is the practice of some of the Federal courts 
 to require an issue to be raised, or, upon failure to do so, the 
 truth of the petition is presumed, and the case will not be re- 
 manded; while, in other jurisdictions, the petition is treated 
 as traversed without express denial, and on motion to remand 
 to place the burden of proving such allegations on the defendant. 
 Boatner v. American Exp. Co. 122 Fed. 714. 
 
 This latter ruling is based on Louisville & !N^. R. Co. v. 
 Wangelin, 132 U. S. 601, 33 L. ed. 475, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 203, in which the Supreme Court says that the removal cannot 
 be maintained unless the petitioner both alleges and proves 
 that the defendants were wrongfully joined for the purpose 
 of preventing a removal. Wecker v. National Enameling & 
 Stamping Co. 204 IT. S. 182, 183, 51 L. ed. 434, 435, 27 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 184, 9 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 757 ; Union Terminal R. Co. 
 v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 119 Fed. 210, 211. 
 
 There is no question that an action brought in a State 
 court for a tort against several, or where the plaintiff has a 
 legal right to bring a joint action, that neither of the defend- 
 ants can remove the same to a Federal court, even though the^ 
 plaintiff may have brought the action against each defendant 
 separately. Louisville & JST. R. Co. v. Wangelin, 132 U. S.. 
 601, 33 L. ed. 475, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 203 ; Kniith v. Butte 
 Electric R. Co. 148 Fed. 73; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. 
 Daniels, 175 Fed. 302. 
 
 As to how the suit is to be brought is entirely within the 
 discretion of the plaintiff; so, when the petition is filed, if 
 fraudulent joinder be charged and the cause removed, the 
 Federal court must determine the right of removal by the peti- 
 tion as filed by the plaintiffs ; that is, it must act on the record 
 as made in the State court when the petition for removal was 
 filed. It will so act when a motion to remand is made, unless 
 the moving petitioner proves his allegations of fraTidulent 
 joinder. This right to elect whether the suit shall be joint or 
 several must be overcome when the suit is brought against 
 
862 MOTION TO EEMAND, 
 
 several defendants, by the removing defendant,- by allegatioji 
 and proof that the joinder was frandnlent, otherwise the suit 
 as brought must control upon motion to remand. Louisville 
 E. Co. V. Wangelin, 132 U. S. 601, ?,3 L. ed. 475, 10 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 203 ; Charman v. Lake Erie & W. R Co. 105 Fed. 449 ; 
 Brycc V. Southern R. Co. 122 Fed. 710; Prince v. Illinois 
 C. R. Co. 98 Fed. 2; Iowa Lillooet Gold :\nn. Co. v. Bliss, 
 144 Fed. 452; Alabama, G. S. R. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U. 
 S. 206, 50 L. ed. 441, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 161, 4 A. (t E. Ann. 
 Cas. 1147; Cincinnati, X. 0. & T. P. R. Co. v. Bohon, 200 
 U. S. 221, 50 L. ed. 448, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 166, 4 A. & E. 
 Ann. Cas. 1152; Hukill v. Maysville & B. S. R. Co. 72 Fed. 
 750, 751. 
 
 So we see that the issue is raised between the petition for 
 the plaintiff and the allegations for removal, and it is not 
 necessary to specially deny the allegations of the removal peti- 
 tion in order to remand. 
 
 Nature of Proof. 
 
 In order to justify a removal on the ground of fraudulent 
 joinder, it must appear not only that they were not joined for 
 that purpose, but that no cause of action is stated against 
 them, or that they are, in law, improperly joined, or that the 
 allegations of the petition joining therein a common liability 
 are so palpably untrue or imfounded as to make the want of 
 good faith of the plaintiff apparent. Winters v. Drake, 102 
 Fed. 550; Hukill v. Maysville & B. S. R. Co. 72 Fed. 745, 
 746 ; Warax v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R. Co. 72 Fed. 638 ; 
 Shane v. Butte Electric R. Co. 150 Fed. 801; AVecker v. 
 Xational Enameling & Stamping Co. 204 V. S. 176, 51 L. ed. 
 430, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 184, 9 A. & &E. Ann. Cas. 757 ; McGuire 
 V. Great Northern R. Co. 153 Fed. 434. 
 
 The burden of proof is on the removing party to show the 
 fraudulent joinder. Swann v. Miitual Reserve Fund Life 
 Asso. 116 Fed. 232; Thresher v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 148 
 Fed. 649; Bryce v. Southern R. Co. 122 Fed. 709; Union 
 Terminal R. Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 119 Fed. 211; 
 Woodson County v. Toronto Bank, 128 Fed. 157. As to cases 
 for remanding, see International & G. N. R. Co. v. Hoyle, 
 
 ■& 
 
MOTIONS' TO KEMAAD. 863 
 
 T9 C. C. A. 128, 149 Fed. 180; Utali-Xevada Co. v. De Lamar, 
 7r. C. C. A. 1, 145 Fed. 505 ; Mathews Slate Co. v. Mathews, 
 14S Fed. 490; Goldberg, B. & Co. v. German Ins. Co. 152 
 Fed. 832 ; Helena Power Transmission Co. v. Spratt, 146 Fed. 
 311 ; People's United States Bank v. Goodwin, 160 Fed. 727. 
 If a cause is properly removable it will not be remanded 
 because the procedure was irregular. Bryant Bros. Co. v. 
 Eobinson, 79 C. C. A. 259, 149 Fed. 321. 
 
 Costs in Eemanding. 
 
 Judicial Code, sec. 37 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 1019) ; Bow- 
 ens V. Chicago, M. & St. P. R Co. 215 Fed. 287 ; Western U. 
 Teleg. Co. v. Louisville & IT. R. Co. 208 Fed. 581. 
 
CHAPTEK CXXVIIL 
 
 EECASTING PLEADINGS. 
 
 In jurisdictions, where legal and equitable causes of action 
 may be joined, we have often causes removed from the State 
 to the Federal courts in this condition. The equitable cause 
 cannot be tried on the law side, nor the action at law on the 
 equity side, nor even an equitable defense permitted. North- 
 ern P. K. Co. V. Paine, 119 U. S. 563, 30 L. ed. 514, 7 
 Sup. Ct. Kep. 323; Bennett v. Butterworth, 11 How. 674, 
 675, 13 L. ed. 861, 862; Pettus v. Smith, 117 Fed. 967; 
 India Eubber Co. v. Consolidated Eubber Tire Co. 117 Fed. 
 354; Mulqueen v. Schlichter Jute Cordage Co. 108 Fed. 931; 
 Berkey v. Cornell, 90 Fed. 717 ; Davis v. Davis, 18 C. C. A. 
 438, 30 U. S. App. 723, 72 Fed. 83, 84; Lerma v. Stevenson, 
 40 Fed. 359; Smythe v. Henry, 41 Fed. 715; Hatcher v. 
 Hendrie & B. Mfg. & Supply Co. 68 C. C. A. 19, 133 Fed. 
 271. So it becomes necessary to recast the pleadings in order 
 that the equitable cause of action may be prosecuted according 
 to the procedure and usages of courts of equity. Thornton N. 
 Motley Co. v. Detroit Steel & Spring Co. 130 Fed. 396; Re 
 Foley, 76 Fed. 390 ; Bryant Bros. Co. v. Robinson, 79 C. C. A. 
 259, 149 Fed. 321; Stockton v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. 
 170 Fed. 633; Fletcher v. Burt, 63 C. C. A. 201, 126 Fed. 
 619-621; Phelps v. Elliott, 23 Blatchf. 470, 26 Fed. 881; 
 Benedict v. Williams, 20 Blatchf. 276, 10 Fed. 208; Hurt 
 V. Hollingsworth, 100 U. S. 103, 25 L. ed. 570; Coosaw Min. 
 Co. V. South Carolina, 144 U. S. 550, 36 L. ed. 537, 12 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 689. As the case becomes one in law or equity as 
 the nature of the case demands. ISTorth Alabama Develop- 
 ment Co. V. Ormond, 5 C. C. A. 22, 13 U. S. App. 215, 55 
 Fed. 20; Wilson v. Smith, 66 Fed. 81. See Detroit v. De- 
 troit City E. Co. 55 Fed. 569. Where the case was in 
 Chancery in the State court and removed and by the State 
 equity rules the defendant may have afSrmative relief set up 
 
 864 
 
EECASTING PLOiADINGS. 865 
 
 in his answer, the defendant need not recast his pleadings by 
 setting up his case by cross bill. 
 
 When the case is removed, then the clerk dockets it. If 
 the case is purely equitable, such as mere foreclosure of a mort- 
 gage, the clerk by request can at once assig-n it to the equity 
 docket, but if purely legal, such an action to try title or simply 
 recover money, he may assign it at once to the law docket. 
 Should the case be equitable in its nature and not placed on 
 the equity docket, either party may move the court for a trans- 
 fer to the proper docket. United States Bank v. Lyon County, 
 48 Fed. 634; Dancel v. United Shoe Machinery Co. 120 Fed. 
 840. You may use the following form : 
 
 Title as in case. 
 
 In the United States District Covirt 
 
 for the District of , sitting 
 
 at 
 
 And now comes (plaintiff or defendant) in the above cause 
 
 and shows to the court that this is a suit to recover certain taxes and to 
 foreclose a tax lien thereon for the amount of said taxes, with a prayer 
 for foreclosure of the lien (or whatever may be the cause of action show- 
 ing that it is a case in equity) , and the says that the relief 
 
 sought can be more fully granted in equity than on the law side of this 
 Honorable Court, wherefore he prays that said cause be transferred to the 
 equity docket for trial. 
 
 R. F., 
 Attorney of Record. 
 
 Issue may be taken on the motion, and the case shown to be 
 fully remediable at law. 
 
 If the cause is transferred to the equity side of the docket, 
 the court may order the pleadings changed to conform to the 
 equity rules, or it may be required on the motion of either 
 party, in which event the court orders the bill to be filed by a 
 certain time and the defendant to demur, plead or answer by a 
 certain other time, usually pursuing the time permitted by the 
 rules. Hurt v. Hollingsworth, 100 U. S. 100, 25 L. ed. 569. 
 
 The plaintiff may recast his pleading as soon as the order is 
 
 made transferring his case to the equity side, without any 
 
 order of court or motion to reqviire or permit it. You must 
 
 bear in mind that as soon as your case is docketed as an equity 
 
 suit, you must pursue the equity rules in preparing it for hear- 
 S. Eq.— 55. 
 
866 RECASTING PLEADINGS. 
 
 ing on the merits, and you at once become subject to the penal- 
 ties for noncompliance with them. Eule 19 C. C. A. ; Utah- 
 JSTevada Co. v. De Lamar, 75 0. C. A. 1, 145 Fed. 507. 
 
 If the plaintiff elects to stand on his pleading as it comes 
 from the State court, which in a simple foreclosure you may 
 do if your petition has been properly drawn in the State court 
 (Phelps V. Elliott, 23 Blatchf. 470, 26 Fed. 883), you must 
 so state in answer to the order to replead if one has been 
 made, and file your reply as notice to the defendant to answer 
 within the rules. Thus, where a case in equity in a State 
 court has been removed, and the chancery rules of that State 
 permit aifirmative relief to be set up by way of cross bill in 
 the answer, you need not file cross bill. Detroit v. Detroit 
 City K. Co. 55 Ted. 569, 570. 
 
 In case no order has been made to recast your pleadings, 
 and you have elected to stand on your petition as filed in the 
 State court, you should at once notify the defendant so that 
 he may answer by the next rule day as required, and if so 
 notified and he does not plead under the rules, you may enter 
 a judgment pro confesso. 
 
 Sometimes the defendant has, in advance of the day he is 
 required to plead in the State court, filed a demurrer and 
 general issue in said court, and the case, though an equitable 
 one, comes up to the Federal court when removed with the 
 issue so joined. Such a paper is neither good as a demurrer 
 or answer to a suit in equity in the Federal court, and if the 
 cause has been transferred to the equity side, will not be 
 noticed, and consequently will not prevent a judgment pro 
 confesso, if the defendant has not answered under the rules. 
 The defendant being notified that the cause is upon the equity 
 side of the docket, and that the plaintiff stands upon his plead- 
 ing as it came from the State court, or that the plaintiff has 
 recast his pleadings and filed his bill, must answer within the 
 rules as heretofore explained. 
 
 But sometimes the case as it comes from the State court 
 carries two distinct causes of action: one equitable and the 
 other legal. It may be necessary to divide them, retaining the 
 legal cause of action on the law side and transferring the 
 equitable cause to the equity side, and thus have the divided 
 
EEOASTINl> PLEAni;XGS. 367 
 
 suits pending at the same time. C. C. rule 19, 75 C. C. A. 1, 
 145 Fed. 507 ; Perkins v. Hendryx, 23 Fed. 418 ; Lacroix v. 
 Lyons, 27 Fed. 403; Stockton v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. 
 170 Fed. 633; Utah-]S^evada Co. v. De Lamar, 75 C. C. A. 1, 
 145 Fed. 505-507. 
 
 To illustrate: You may have a simple money claim against 
 the defendant, evidenced hy a note, and j'ou may have a claim 
 evidenced by a note, but the latter secured by a mortgage. 
 You may sue the defendant in the State court on both causes 
 of action in the same suit. The defendant appears in the 
 State court and on sufficient ground removes the cause to the 
 Federal court; here there is no question, joxi must divide your 
 suit and carry your foreclosure to the equity side. To do this 
 you must necessarily recast your pleadings. 
 
 If each note is in excess of three thousand dollars, exclusive 
 of interest and costs, there is no difficulty as you have the 
 necessary amount to give the Federal court jurisdiction on 
 either side of the divided system. But suppose neither note 
 is for three thousand dollars, or one of the notes was under and 
 the other exceed the jurisdictional amount, clearly the court 
 must remand the case, unless the plaintiff waives the fore- 
 closure and sues on the law side for the aggregated amount 
 of the two notes. If one note is in excess and the other under 
 the amount, the Federal court by the removal may retain 
 jurisdiction of the note in excess of three thousand dollars, 
 but cannot retain jurisdiction of the other, unless the equitable 
 phase of the case has been abandoned and the amounts aggre- 
 gated. 
 
 Often cases go up from the State court in which ancillary 
 process has been sued out to preserve the subject-matter or 
 status until the judgment at law can be recovered. If in such 
 eases the ancillary proceeding is an equitable proceeding, such 
 as an injunction, the pleadings must be recast and the injunc- 
 tion carried to the equity side of the docket. 
 
 Again, your cause of action may be legal, but an equitable 
 remedy be sought. This fact would carry your case to the 
 equity docket, for, as we have seen, courts of equity take juris- 
 diction, both when the cause of action or the remedy sought is 
 equitable. However, it seems that when a remedy in equity is 
 given Ijy a State statute, and a suit is brought in the State court 
 
868 EECASTING PLEADINGS. 
 
 under the statute, and is removed on ground of diversity of 
 citizenship to the Federal court, the case should be remanded 
 if the case as made in the State court is not within the equity 
 jurisdiction of the Federal court and not require the pleadings 
 to be recast. Cates v. Allen, 149 U. S. 451, 37 L. ed. 804, 13 
 Sup. Ct. Kep. 883, 977; Mathews Slate Co. v. Mathews, 148 
 Fed. 490 ; Peters v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. 149 Fed. 290 ; 
 Knoxville v. Southern Paving Constr. Co. 220 Fed. 237 ; Gom- 
 bert v. Lyon, 80 Fed. 305. 
 
 If the object of the suit is to obtain a perpetual injunction, 
 or any other essential equitable, remedy, you must go to the 
 equity side, even though damages are involved and are prayed 
 for. Du Pont v. Abel, 81 Fed. 535. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 THE JUDICIAL CODE 
 
 CHAPTER TWO. 
 
 DISTRICT COUBTS — JUBISDICTION. 
 
 Sec. 
 
 24. Original jurisdiction. 
 
 Par. 1. Where the United States are plaintiffs; and of civil suits 
 at common law or in equity. 
 
 Sec. 24. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 First. Of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, 
 brought by the United States, or by any officer thereof authorized by law 
 to sue, or between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants 
 from different States; or, where the matter in controversy exceeds, ex- 
 clusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of three thousand dollars, 
 and (a) arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or 
 treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, or (b) is 
 between citizens of different States, or (c) is between citizens of a State 
 and foreign States, citizens, or subjects. No district court shall have 
 cognizance of any suit (except upon foreign bills of exchange) to recover 
 upon any promissory note or other chose in action in favor of any assignee, 
 or of any subsequent holder if such instrumeiit be payable to bearer and 
 be not made by any corporation, unless such suit might have been prose- 
 cuted in such court to recover upon said note or other chose in action if 
 no assignment had been made: Provided, however, That the foregoing 
 provision as to the sum or value of the matter in controversy shall not 
 be construed to apply to any of the cases mentioned in the succeeding para- 
 graphs of this section. 
 
 CHAPTER THREE. 
 
 DISTRICT COUBTS — BEMOVAL OF CAUSES. 
 
 Sec. 
 
 28. Removal of suits from State to United States district courts. 
 
 29. Procedure for removal. 
 
 30. Suits under grants of land from different States. 
 
 31. Removal of causes against persons denied any civil rights, etc. 
 
 32. When petitioner is in actual custody of State court. 
 
 33. Suits and prosecutions against revenue officers, etc. 
 
 34. Removal of suits by aliens. 
 
 35. When copies of records are refused by clerk of State court. 
 
 869 
 
g^O JUDICIAL CODE. 
 
 36. Previous attachment bonds, orders, etc., remain valid. 
 
 .37. Suits improperly in district coiirt may be dismissed or remanded. 
 
 38. Proceedings in suits removed. 
 
 39. Time for filing record; return of record, how enforced. 
 
 Sec. 28. Any suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, arising under 
 the Constitution or laws of the United States; or treaties made, or which 
 shall be made, under their authority, of which the district courts of the 
 United States are given original jurisdiction by this title, which may now 
 be pending or which may hereafter be brought, in any State court, may 
 be removed by the defendant or defendants therein to the district court of 
 the United States for the proper district. Any other suit of a civil nature, 
 at law or in equity, of which the district courts of the United States are 
 given jurisdiction by this title, and which are now pending or which may 
 hereafter be brought, in any State court, may be removed into the district 
 court of the United States for the proper district by the defendant or de- 
 fendants therein, being nonresidents of that State. And when in any suit 
 mentioned in this section there shall be a controversy which is wholly be- 
 tween citizens of diilerent States, and which can be fully determined as 
 between them, then either one or more of the defendants actually interested 
 in- such controversy may remove said suit into the district court of the 
 United States for the proper district. And where a suit is now pending, or 
 may hereafter be brought, in any State court, in which there is a contro- 
 versy between a citizen of the State in which the suit is brought and a citi- 
 zen of another State, any defendant, being such citizen of another State, 
 may remove such suit into the district court of the United States for the 
 proper district, at any time before the trial thereof, when it shall be, made 
 to appear to said district court that from prejudice or local influence he 
 will not be able to obtain justice in such State court, or in any other State 
 court to which the said defendant may, under the laws of the State, have 
 the right, on account of such prejudice or local influence, to remove said 
 cause: Provided, That if it further appear that said suit can be fully and 
 justly determined as to the other defendants in the State court, without 
 being affected by such prejudice or local influence, and that no party to the 
 suit will be prejudiced by a separation of the parties, said district court 
 may direct tlie suit to be remanded, so far as relates to such other de- 
 fendants, to the State court, to be proceeded with therein. At any time be- 
 fore the trial of any suit which is now pending in any district court, or 
 may hereafter be entered therein, arid which has been removed to said court 
 from a State court on the aflidavit of any party plaintiff that he had rea- 
 son to believe and did believe that, from prejudice or local influence, he 
 was unable to obtain justice in said State court, the district court shall, 
 on application of the other party, examine into the truth, of said affidavit 
 and the grounds thereof, and, unless it shall appear, to. the satisfaction 
 of said court that said party will not be able to obtain justice in said 
 State court, it shall cause the same to- be remanded thereto. Whenever 
 any cause shall be removed from any state court into any district court of 
 the United States, and the district court shall deeide that the cause was 
 improperly removed, and order the same to be remanded to the State court 
 
JUDICIAL CODE. §71 
 
 from whence it came, such remand shall be immediately carried into execu- 
 tion, and no appeal or writ of error from the decision of the district court 
 so remanding such cause shall be allowed: Provided, That no case arising 
 under an act entitled "An Act relating to the liability of common carriers 
 by railroad to their employees in certain cases," approved April twenty- 
 second, nineteen hundred and eight, or any amendment thereto, and brought 
 in an\- State court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court 
 of the United States. 
 
 Sec. 29. Whenever any party entitled to remove any suit mentioned 
 in the last preceding section, except suits removable on the grounds of 
 prejudice or local influence, may desire to remove such suit from a State 
 court to the district court of the United States, he may make and file a 
 petition, duly verified, in such suit in such State court at the time, or any 
 time before the defendant is required by th^ laws of the State or the rule 
 of the State court in which such suit is brought to answer or plead to the- 
 declaration or complaint of the plaintiflf, for the removal of such suit into 
 the district court to be held in the district where such suit is pend- 
 ing, and shall make and file therewith a bond, with good and sufficient 
 surety, for his or their entering in such district court, within thirty days 
 from the date of filing said petition, a certified copy of the record in such 
 suit, and for paying all costs that may be awarded by the said district court 
 if said district court shall hold that such suit was wrongfully or improperly 
 removed thereto, and also for their appearing and entering special bail 
 in such suit if special bail was originally requisite therein. It shall then 
 be the duty of the State court to accept said petition and bond and proceed 
 no further in such suit. ^Vritten notice of said petition and bond for re- 
 moval shall be given the adverse party or parties prior to filing the same. 
 The said copy being entered within said thirty days as aforesaid in said 
 district court of the United States, the parties so removing the said cause 
 shall, within thirty days thereafter, plead, answer, or demur to the declara- 
 tion or complaint in said cause, and the cause shall then proceed in the 
 same manner as if it had been originally commenced in the said district 
 court. 
 
 Sec. 30. If in any action commenced in a State court the title of land 
 be concerned, and the parties are citizens of the same State and the matter 
 in dispute exceeds the sum or value of three thousand dollars, exclusive 
 of interest and costs, the sum or value being made to appear, one or more 
 of the plaintiflfs or defendants, before the trial, may state to the court, 
 and make affidavit if the court require it, that he or they claim, and shall 
 rely upon, a right or title to the land under a grant from a State, and 
 produce the original grant, or an exemplification of it, except where the 
 loss of public records shall put it out of his or their power, and shall 
 move that any one or more of the adverse party inform the court whether 
 he or they claim a right or title to the land under a grant from some 
 other State, the party or parties so required shall give such information, 
 or otherwise not be allowed to plead such grant or give it in evidence 
 upon the trial. If he or they inform the court that he or they do claim 
 under such grant, any one or more of the party mioving for such informa- 
 
872 
 
 JUDICIAL. CODE. 
 
 tion may then, on petition and bond, as hereinbefore mentioned in this 
 chapter, remove the cause for trial to the district court of the United 
 States next to be holden in such district; and any one of either party re- 
 moving the cause shall not be allowed to plead or give evidence of any 
 other title than that by him or them stated as aforesaid as the ground 
 of his or their claim. 
 
 Sec. 31. When any civil suit or criminal prosecution is commenced in 
 any State court, for any cause whatsoever, against any person who is de- 
 nied or cannot enforce in the judicial tribunals of the State, or in the 
 part of the State where such suit or prosecution is pending, any right 
 secured to him by any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens 
 of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the 
 United States, or against any officer, civil or military, or other person, for 
 any arrest or imprisonment or other trespasses or wrongs made or com- 
 mitted by virtue of or under color of authority derived from any law 
 providing for equal rights as aforesaid, or for refusing to do any act on 
 the ground that it would be inconsistent with such law, such suit or prose- 
 cution may, upon the petition of such defendant, filed in said State court 
 at any time before the trial or final hearing of the cause, stating the facts 
 and verified by oath, be removed for trial into the next district court to be 
 held in the district where it is pending. Upon the filing of such petition 
 all further proceedings in the State courts sliall cease, and shall not be 
 resumed except as hereinafter provided. But all bail and other security 
 given in such suit or prosecution shall continvie in like force and effect 
 as if the same had proceeded to final judgment and execution in the 
 State court. It shall be the duty of the clerk of the State court to furnish 
 such defendant, petitioning for a removal, copies of said process against 
 him, and of all pleadings, depositions, testimony, and otlier proceedings in 
 the case. If such copies are filed by said petitioner in the district court 
 on the first day of its session, the cause shall proceed therein in the same 
 manner as if it had been brought there by original process; and if the 
 said clerk refuses or neglects to furnish such copies, the petitioner may 
 thereupon docket the case in the district court, and the said court shall 
 then have jurisdiction therein, and may, upon proof of such refusal or 
 neglect of said clerk, and upon reasonable notice to the plaintiif, require 
 the plaintift' to file a declaration, petition, or complaint in the cause; 
 and, in case of his default, may order a nonsuit and dismiss the case at 
 the costs of the plaintiif, and sucli dismissal shall be a bar to any further 
 suit touching the matter in controversy. But if, without sucli refusal or 
 neglect of said clerk to furnisli such copies and proof thereof, the petitioner 
 for removal fails to file copies in the district court, as herein provided, a 
 certificate, under the seal of the district court, stating such failure, shall 
 be given, and vipon the production thereof in said State court the cause 
 shall proceed therein as if no petition for removal had been filed. 
 
 Sec. 32. \A'hen all the acts necessary for the removal of any suit or 
 prosecution, as provided in the preceding section, have been performed, 
 and the defendant petitioning for such removal is in actual custody on 
 process issued by said State court, it shall be the duty of the clerk of 
 
JUDICIAL CODE, 87LJ 
 
 said district court to issue a, writ of liabeas corpus cum causa, and of the 
 marshal, by virtue of said writ, to take the body of the defendant into his 
 custody, to be dealt with in said district court according to law and 
 the orders of said court, or, in vacation, of any judge thereof; and the 
 marshal shall file with or deliver to the clerk of said State court a dupli- 
 cate copy of said writ. 
 
 Sec. 33. When any civil suit or criminal prosecution is commenced in 
 any court of a State against any officer appointed under or acting by au- 
 thority of any revenue law of the United States now or hereafter enacted, 
 or against any person acting under or by authority of any such officer 
 on account of any act done under color of his office or of any such law, 
 or on account of any right, title, or autliority claimed by such officer or 
 other person under any such law; or is commenced against any person 
 holding property or estate by title derived from any such officer, and affects 
 the validity of any such revenue law: or when any suit is commenced 
 against any person for on account of anything done by him while an 
 officer of either House of Congress in the discharge of his official duty, 
 in executing any order of such House, the said suit or prosecution may, 
 at any time before the trial or final hearing thereof, be removed for trial 
 into the district court next to be holden in the district where the same is 
 pending, upon the petition of such defendant to said district court, and 
 in the following manner: Said petition shall set forth the nature of the 
 suit or prosecution and be verified by affidavit, and, together with a certifi- 
 cate signed by an attorney or counselor at law of some court of record 
 of the State where such suit or prosecution is commenced, or of the United 
 States, stating that, as counsel for the petitioner, he has examined the 
 proceedings against him and carefully inquired into all the matters set 
 forth in the petition, and that he believes them to be true, shall be pre- 
 sented to the said district court, if in session, or if it be not, to the clerk 
 thereof at his office, and shall be filed in said office. The cause shall 
 thereupon be entered on the docket of the district court, and shall proceed 
 as a cause originally commenced in that court; but all bail and other 
 security given upon such suit or prosecution shall continue in like force 
 and effect as if the same had proceeded to final Judgment and execution in 
 the State court. When the suit is commenced in the State court by sum- 
 mons, subpoena, petition, or other process except capias, the clerk of the 
 district court shall issue a writ of certiorari to the State court, requiring 
 it to send to the district court the record and proceedings in the cause. 
 When it is commenced by capias or by any other similar form or proceed- 
 ing by which a personal arrest is ordered, he shall issue a writ of habeas 
 corpus cum causa, a duplicate of which shall be delivered to the clerk of 
 the State court, or left at his office, by the marshal of the district or his 
 deputy, or by some person duly authorized thereto; and thereupon it 
 shall be the duty of the State court to stay all further proceedings in the 
 cause, and the suit or prosecution, upon delivery of such process, or leaving 
 ihe same as aforesaid, shall be held to be removed to the district court, 
 and any further proceedings, trial, or judgment therein in the State 
 court shall be void. If the defendant in the suit or prosecution be in actual 
 
§74 JUDICIAL CODE, 
 
 custody on mesne process therein, it shall be the duty of the marshal, by 
 virtue of the writ of habeas corpus cum causa, to take the body of tlie de- 
 fendant into his custody, to be dealt with in the cause according to law 
 and the order of the district court, or, in vacation, of any judge thereof; 
 and if, upon the removal of such suit or prosecution, it is made to appear 
 to the district court that no copy of the record and proceedings therein 
 in the State court can be obtained, the district court may allow and re- 
 quire the plaintiff to proceed de novo and to file a declaration of his cause 
 of action, and the parties may thereupon proceed as in actions originally 
 brought in said district court. On failure of the plaintiff so to proceed, 
 judgment of non prosequitur may be rendered against him, with costs for 
 the defendant. 
 
 See. 34. Whenever a personal action has been' or shall be brought in 
 any State court by an alien against any citizen of a State who is, or at the 
 time the alleged action accrued was, a civil officer of the United States, 
 being a nonresident of that State wherein jurisdiction is obtained by 
 the State court, by personal service of process, such action may be removed 
 into the district court of the United States in and for the district in which 
 the defendant shall have been served with the process, in the same manner 
 as now provided for the removal of an action brought in a State court by 
 the provisions of the preceding section. 
 
 Sec. 35. In any case where a party is entitled to copies of the records 
 and proceedings in any suit or prosecution in a State court, to be used in 
 any court of the United States, if the clerk of said State court, upon de- 
 mand, and tlie payment or tender of the legal fees, refuses or neglects to 
 deliver to him certified copies of such records and proceedings, the court 
 of the United States in which such records and proceedings are needed 
 may, on proof by affidavit that the clerk of said State court has refused or 
 neglected to deliver copies thereof, on demand as aforesaid, direct such 
 record to be supplied by affidavit or otherwise, as the circumstances of 
 the case may require and allow; and thereupon such proceeding, trial, 
 and judgment may be had in the said court of the United States, and all 
 such processes awarded, as if certified copies of such records and proceed- 
 ings had been regularly before the said court. 
 
 Sec. 36. When any suit shall be removed from a. State court to a dis- 
 trict court of the United States, any attachment or sequestration of the 
 goods or estate of the defendant had in such suit in the State court 
 shall hold the goods or estate so attached or sequestered to answer the 
 final judgment or decree in the same manner as by law they would have 
 been held to answer final judgment or decree had it been rendered by the 
 court in which said suit was commenced. All bonds, undertakings, or 
 security given by either party in such suit prior to its removal shall remain 
 valid and effectual notwithstanding said removal; and all injunctions, or- 
 ders, and other proceedings had in such suit prior to its removal shall 
 remain in full force and effect until dissolved or modified by the court to 
 which such suit shall be removed. 
 
JUDICIAL CODE, 375 
 
 See. 37. If in any suit commenced in a district court, or removed from 
 a State court to a district tiourt of the United States, it shall appear 
 to the satisfaction of the said district court, at any time after such suit 
 has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit does not really and 
 substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the juris- 
 diction of said district court, or that the parties to said suit have been 
 improperly or collusively made or joined, either as plaintiffs or defendants, 
 for the purpose of creating a case cognizable or removable under this 
 chapter, the said district court shall proceed no further therein, but 
 shall dismiss the suit or remand it to the court from which it was re- 
 moved, as justice may require, and shall make such order as to costs as 
 shall be just. 
 
 Sec. 38. The district court of the United States shall, in all suits re- 
 moved under the provisions of this chapter, proceed therein as if the suit 
 had been originally commenced in said district court, and the same pro- 
 ceedings had been taken in such suit in said district court as shall have 
 been had therein in said State court prior to its removal. 
 
 Sec; 39. In all causes removable under this chapter, if the clerk of 
 the State court in which any such cause shall be pending shall refuse to 
 any one or more of the parties or persons applying to remove the same, 
 a copy of the record therein, after tender of legal fees for such copy, 
 said clerk so offending shall, on conviction thereof in the district court of 
 the United States to which said action or proceeding was removed, be fined 
 not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than one year, 
 or both. The district court to which any cause shall be removable under 
 this chapter shall have power to issue a writ of certiorari to said State 
 court commanding such State court to make return of the record in any 
 such cause removed as aforesaid, or in which any one or more of the plain- 
 tiffs or defendants have complied with the provisions of this chapter for 
 the removal of the same, and enforce said writ according to law. If it 
 shall be impossible for the parties or persons removing any cause under 
 this chapter, or complying Avith the provisions for the removal thereof, 
 to obtain such copy, for the reason that the clerk of said State court 
 refuges to furnish a copy, on payment of legal fees, or for any other reason, 
 the district court shall make an order requiring the prosecutor in any 
 such action or proceeding to enforce forfeiture or recover penalty, as 
 aforesaid, to file a copy of the paper or proceeding by which the same was 
 commenced, within such time as the court may determine; and in default 
 thereof the court shall dismiss the said action or proceeding; but if said 
 order shall be complied with, then said district court shall require the 
 other party to plead, and said action or proceeding shall proceed to final 
 judgment. The said district court may make an order requiring the 
 parties thereto to plead de novo; and the bond given, conditioned as afore- 
 said, shall be discharged so far as it requires copy of the record to be 
 filed as aforesaid. 
 
S7(3 JUDICIAL CODE. 
 
 CHAPTER FOUR. 
 
 DISTRICT COUETS MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS. 
 
 Sec. 
 
 .50. When a part of several defendants can not be served. 
 
 .51. Civil suits; where to be brought. 
 
 52. Suits in States containing more than one district. 
 
 53. Districts containing more than one division ; where suit to be brought ; 
 
 transfer of criminal cases. 
 
 54. Suits of a local nature, where to be brought. 
 
 55. When, property lies in different districts in same State. 
 
 56. When property lies in different States in same circuit; jurisdiction of 
 
 receiver. 
 
 57. Absent defendants in suits to enforce liens, remove clouds on titles, etc. 
 
 58. Civil causes inay be transferred to another division of district by agree- 
 
 ment. 
 
 65. Receivers to manage property according to State la^ys. 
 
 66. Suits against receiver. 
 
 68. Certain persons not to be masters or receivers, 
 
 Sec. 50. Where there are several defendants in any suit at law or in 
 equity, and one or more of them are neither inhabitants of nor found 
 within the district in which the suit is brought, and do not voluntarily 
 appear, the court may entertain jurisdiction, and proceed to the trial and 
 adjudication of the suit between the parties who are properly before it; 
 but the judgment or decree rendered therein shall not conclude or prejudice 
 other parties not regularly served with process nor voluntarily appearing 
 to answer; and non-joinder of parties who are not inhabitants of nor found 
 within the district, as aforesaid, shall not constitute matter of abatement 
 or objection to the suit. , 
 
 Sec. 51. Except as provided in the five succeeding sections, no person 
 shall be arrested in one district for trial in another, in any civil action 
 before a district court; and, except as provided in the six succeeding sec- 
 tions, no civil suit shall be brought in any district court against any per- 
 son by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that 
 whereof he is an inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on 
 the fact that the action is between citizens of different States, suit shall 
 be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or 
 the defendant. 
 
 Sec. 52. When a State contains more than one district, every suit not 
 of a local nature, in the district court thereof, against a single defendant, 
 inhabitant of such State, must be brought in the district where he re- 
 sides; but if there are two or more defendants, residing in different dis- 
 tricts of the State, it may be brought in either district, and a duplicate 
 writ may be issued against the defendants, directed to the marshal of 
 any other district in which any defendant resides. The clerk issuing the 
 duplicate writ shall indorse thereon that it is a. true copy of a writ sued 
 out of the court of the proper district; and such original and duplicate 
 
JUDICIAL CODE. 377 
 
 writs, when executed and returned into the office from which they issue, 
 shall constitute and be proceeded on as one suit; and upon any judgment 
 or decree rendered therein, execution may be issued, directed to the mar- 
 shal of any district in the same State. 
 
 Sec. 53. When a district contains more tlian one division, every suit 
 not of a local nature against a single defendant must be brought in the 
 division where he resides; but if there are two or more defendants residing 
 in different divisions of the district it may be brought in either division. 
 All mesne and final process subject to the provisions of this section may 
 be served and executed in any or all of the divisions of the district, or if 
 the State contains more tlian one district, tlien in any of such districts, 
 as provided in the preceding section. All prosecutions for crimes or offenses 
 shall be had within the division of such districts where the same were com- 
 mitted, unless the court, or the judge thereof, upon the application of the 
 defendant, shall order the cause to be transferred for prosecution to an- 
 other division of the district. When a transfer is ordered by the court or 
 judge, all the papers in the case, or certified copies thereof, shall be trans- 
 mitted by the clerk, under the seal of the court, to the division to which 
 the cause is so ordered transferred; and thereupon the cause shall be pro- 
 ceeded with in said division in the same manner as if the offense had been 
 committed therein. In all cases of the removal of suits from the courts of 
 a State to the district court of the United States such removal shall be 
 to the United States district court in the division in whicli the county is 
 situated from which the removal is made; and tlie time within which the 
 removal shall be perfected, in so far as it refers to or is regulated by tlie 
 terms of the United States courts, shall be deemed to refer to the terms 
 of the I'nited States district court in such division. 
 
 Sec. .54. In suits of a local nature, where the defendant resides in a dif- 
 ferent district, in the same State, from tliat in whicli the suit is brought, 
 the plaintiff may have original and final process against him, directed to 
 the mar,shal of the district in whicli he resides. 
 
 Sec. .35. Any suit of a local nature, at law or in equity, where the 
 land or otlier subject-matter of a fixed character lies partly in one 
 district and partly' in another, within the same State, may be brought 
 in the district court of either district; and the court in which it is 
 brought shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide it, and to cause mesne 
 or final process to be issued and executed, as fully as if the said subject- 
 matter were wholly within the district for which said court is consti- 
 tuted. 
 
 Sec. 56. Where in any suit in which a receiver shall be appointed the 
 land or other property of a fixed character, the subject of the suit, lies 
 within different States in the same judicial circuit, the receiver so ap- 
 pointed shall, upon giving bond as required by the court, immediately be 
 vested with full jurisdiction and control over all the property, the sub- 
 ject of the suit, lying or being within such circuit; subject, however, 
 to the disapproval of such order, within thirty days thereafter, by the 
 
g-^g JUDICIAL CODE. 
 
 circuit court of appeals for such circuit, or by a circuit judge thereof, 
 after a reasonable notice to adverse parties and an opportunity to be heard 
 upon the motion for such disapproval; and Subject, also, to the filing and 
 entering in the district court for each district of the circuit in vifhich any 
 portion of the property may lie or be, vcithin ten days thereafter, of a 
 duly certified copy of the bill and of the order of appointment. The dis- 
 approval of such appointment within such thirty days, or the failure to file 
 sucli certified copy of the bill and order of appointment within ten 
 days, as herein required, shall divest such receiver of jurisdiction over 
 all such property except that portion thereof lying or being within the 
 State in which the suit is brought. In any case coming within the 
 provisions of this section, in which a receiver shall be appointed, process 
 may issue and be executed within any district of the circuit in the same 
 manner and to the same extent as if the property were wholly within 
 the same district; but orders affecting such property shall be entered of 
 record in each district in which the property affected may lie or be. 
 
 See. 57. When in any suit commenced in any district court of the 
 United States to enforce any legal or equitable lien upon or claim to, 
 or to remove any incumbrance or lien or cloud upon the title to real 
 or personal property within the district where such suit is brought, one 
 or more of the defendants therein shall not be an inhabitant of or found 
 within the said district, or shall not voluntarily appear thereto, it shall 
 be lawful for the court to make an order directing such absent defend- 
 ant or defendants to appear, plead, answer, or demur by a day certain 
 to be designated, which order shall be served on such absent defendant 
 or defendants, if practicable, wherever found, and also upon the person 
 or persons in possession or charge of said property, if any there be; or 
 where such personal service upon such absent defendant or defendants 
 is not practicable, such order shall be published in such manner as the 
 court may direct, not less than once a week for six consecutive weeks. 
 In case such absent defendant shall not appear, plead, answer, or de- 
 mur within the time so limited, or within some further time, to be 
 allowed by the court, in its discretion, and upon proof of the service or 
 publication of said order and of the performance of the directions con- 
 tained in the same, it shall be lawful for the court to entertain juris- 
 diction, and proceed to the hearing and adjudication of such suit in the 
 same manner as if such absent defendant had been served with process 
 within the said district; but said adjudication shall, as regards said 
 absent defendant or defendants without appearance, affect only the prop- 
 erty which shall have been the subject of the suit and under the juris- 
 diction of the court therein, within such district; and when a part of 
 the said real or personal property against which such proceedings shall 
 be taken shall be within another district, but within the same State, such 
 suit may be brought in either district in said State: Provided, however. 
 That any defendant or defendants not actually personally notified as above 
 provided may, at any time within one year after final judgment in any 
 suit mentioned in this section, enter his appearance in said suit in said 
 district court, and lihereupon the said court shall make an order setting 
 
JUDICIAL CODE. g^-g 
 
 aside the judgment therein and permitting said defendant or defendants 
 to plead therein on payment by him or them of such costs as the cour*; 
 shall deem just; and thereupon such suit shall be proceeded with to final 
 judgment according to law. 
 
 Sec. 58. Any civil cause, at law or in equity, may, on written stipula- 
 tion of the parties or of their attorneys of record signed and filed with 
 the papers in the case, in vacation or in term, and on the written order 
 of the judge signed and filed in the case in vacation or on the order of 
 the court duly entered of record in term, be transferred to the court of 
 any other division of the same district, without regard to the residence of 
 the defendants, for trial. When a cause shall be ordered to be transferred 
 to a court in . any other division, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the 
 court from which the transfer is made to carefully transtuit to the clerk 
 of the court to which the transfer is made the entire file of papers in the 
 cause and all documents and deposits in his court pertaining thereto, 
 together with a certified transcript of the records of all orders, interlocu- 
 tory decrees, or other entries in the cause; and he shall certify, under 
 the seal of the court, that the papers sent are all which are on file in 
 said court belonging to the cause; for the performance of which duties 
 said clerk so transmitting and certifying shall receive the same fees as 
 are now allowed by law for similar services, to be taxed in the bill of 
 costs, and regularly collected with the other costs in the cause ; and such 
 transcript, when so certified and received, shall henceforth constitute a 
 part of the record of the cause in the court to which the transfer shall 
 he made. The clerk receiving such transcript and original papers shall 
 file the same and the case shall then proceed to final disposition as other 
 cases of a like nature. 
 
 Sec. 65. Whenever in any cause pending in any court of the United 
 States there shall be a receiver or manager in possession of any prop- 
 erty, such receiver or manager shall manage and operate such property 
 according to the requirements of the value laws of the State in which 
 such property shall be situated, in the same manner that the owner or 
 possessor thereof would be bound to do if in possession thereof. Any 
 receiver or manager who shall wilfully violate any provision of this sec- 
 tion shall be fined not more than three thousand dollars, or imprisoned 
 not more than one year or both. 
 
 Sec. 66. Every receiver or manager of any property appointed by any 
 court of the United States may be sued in respect of any act or trans- 
 action of his in carrying on the business connected with such prop- 
 erty, without the previous leave of the court in which such receiver 
 or manager was appointed ; but such suit shall be subject to the gen- 
 eral equity jurisdiction of the court in Which such inanager or receiver 
 was appointed so far as the same may be necessary to the ends of jus- 
 tice. 
 
 Sec. 68. No clerk of a district court of the United States or his deputy 
 'shall be appointed a receiver or master in any case, except where the judge 
 of said court shall determine that special reasons exist therefor, to ba 
 assigned in the order of appointment. 
 
ggO JUDICIAL CODE. 
 
 CHAPTER SIX. 
 
 CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS. 
 
 Sec. 
 
 128. Jurisdiction; when judgment final. 
 
 129. Appeals in proceedings for injunctions and receivers. 
 132 Allowance of appeals, etc. 
 
 Sec. 128. The circuit courts of appeals shall exercise appellate juris- 
 diction to review by appeal or writ of error final decisions in the dis- 
 trict courts, including the United States district court for Hawaii, in 
 all cases other than those in which appeals and writs of error may be 
 taken direct to the Supreme Court, as provided in section two hundred and 
 thirty-eight, unless otherwise provided by law; and, except as provided 
 in sections two hundred and thirty-nine and two hundred and forty, 
 the judgments and decrees of the circuit courts of appeals shall be 
 final in all cases in which the jurisdiction is dependent entirely upon 
 the opposite parties to the suit or controversy being aliens or citizens 
 of the United States, or citizens of different States; also in all cases 
 arising under the patent laws, under the copyright laws, under the reve- 
 nue laws, and under the criminal laws, and in admiralty eases. 
 
 Sec. 129. Where upon a hearing in equity in a district court, or by a 
 judge thereof in vacation, an injunction shall be granted, continued, 
 refused, or dissolved by an interlocutory order or decree, or an applica- 
 tion to dissolve an injunction shall be refused, or an interlocutory order 
 or decree shall be made appointing a receiver, an appeal may be taken 
 from such interlocutory order or decree granting, continuing, refusing, 
 dissolving, or refusing to dissolve, an injunction, or appointing a re- 
 ceiver, to the circuit court of appeals, nothwitlistanding an appeal in such 
 case might, upon final decree under the statutes regulating the same, 
 be taken directly to the Supreme Court: Provided, That the appeal 
 must be taken within thirty days from the entry of such order or decree, 
 and it shall take precedence in the appellate court; and the proceedings 
 in other respects in the court below shall not be stayed unless otherwise 
 ordered by that court, or the appellate court, or a judge thereof, during 
 the pendency of such appeal: Provided, however, That the court below 
 may, in its discretion, require as a condition of the appeal an additional 
 bond. 
 
 Sec. 132. Any judge of a circuit court of appeals, in respect of cases 
 brought or to be brought before that court, shall have the same 
 powers and duties as to allowances of appeals and writs of error, and 
 the conditions of such allowances, as by law belong to the justices or 
 judges in respect of other courts of the United States, respectively. 
 
JUDICIAL CODE. gg^^ 
 
 CHAPTER TEN. 
 
 THE SUPREME COURT. 
 
 233. Original disposition. 
 
 234. Writs of prohibition and mandamus. 
 
 235. Issues of fact. 
 
 236. Appellate jurisdiction. 
 
 237. Writs of error from judgments and decrees of State courts. 
 23S. Appeals and writs of error from United States district courts. 
 
 Sec. 233. The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all 
 controversies of a civil nature where a State is a party, except between 
 a State and its citizens, or between a State and citizens of other States, 
 or aliens, in which latter cases it shall have original, but not exclusive, 
 jurisdiction. And it shall liave exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits 
 or proceedings against ambassadors or other public ministers, or their 
 domestics or domestic servants, as a court of law can have consistently 
 with the law of nations ; and original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction, of 
 all suits brought by ambassadors, or other public ministers, or in which 
 a consul or vice consul is a. party. 
 
 See. 234. The Supreme Court shall have power to issue writs of pro- 
 hibition to the district courts, when proceeding as courts of admiralty 
 and maritime jurisdiction; and writs of mandamus, in cases warranted 
 by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed under 
 the authority of the United States, or to persons holding office under the 
 authority of the United States, where a State, or an ambassador, or 
 other public minister, or a consul, or vice consul is a party. 
 
 Sec. 235. The trial of issues of fact in the Supreme Court, in all 
 actions at law against citizens of the United States, shall be by jury. 
 
 Sec. 236. The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction in the 
 cases hereinafter specially provided for. 
 
 Sec. 237. A final judgment or decree in any suit in the highest court 
 of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn 
 in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exer- 
 cised under, the United States, and the decision is against their valid- 
 ity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an 
 authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repug- 
 nant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the 
 decision is in favor of their validity; or where any title, right, privilege, 
 or immunity is claimed under the Constitution, or any treaty or statute 
 of, or ccmmission held or autliority exercised under, the United States, 
 and the decision is against the title, right, privilege, or immunity espe- 
 cially set up or claimed, by either party, under such Constitution, treaty, 
 S. Eq.— 56. 
 
gg2 JUDICIAL CODE. 
 
 statute, commission, or authority, may be re-examined and reversed or 
 affirmed in the Supreme Court upon a. writ of error. The writ shall 
 have the same effect as if the judgment or decree complained of had 
 been rendered or passed in a court of the United States. The Supreme 
 Court may reverse, modify, or affirm the judgment or decree of such 
 State court, and may, at their discretion, award execution or remand 
 the same to the court from which it was removed by the writ. 
 
 Sec. 238. Appeals and writs of error may be taken from the district 
 courts, including the United States district court for Hawaii, direct to 
 the Supreme Court in the following cases : In any ease in which the 
 jurisdiction of the court is in issue, in which case the question of juris- 
 diction alone shall be cerliiied to the Supreme Court from the court 
 below for decision; from the final sentences and decrees in prize causes; 
 in any case that involves the construction or application of the Consti- 
 tution of the United States; in any case in which the constitutionality 
 of any law of the United States, or the validity or construction of any 
 treaty made under its authority is drawn in question; and in any case 
 in which the Constitution or law of a State is claimed to be in contra- 
 vention of the Constitution of the United States. 
 
 CHAPTER ELEVEN. 
 
 PROVISIONS COMMON TO MORE THAN ONE COURT. 
 
 Sec. 
 
 256. Cases in which jurisdiction of United States courts shall be exclusive 
 of State courts. 
 
 261. Writs of ne exeat. 
 
 262. Power to issue writs. 
 
 263. Temporary restraining orders. 
 
 264. Injunctions; in what cases judge may grant. 
 
 265. Injunctions to stay proceedings in State courts. 
 
 266. Injunctions based upon alleged unconstitutionality of State statutes; 
 
 when by whom may be granted. 
 
 267. When suits in equity may be maintained. 
 
 Sec. 256. The jurisdiction vested in the courts of the United States in 
 the cases and proceedings hereinafter mentioned, shall be exclusive of the 
 courts of the several states: 
 
 Seventh. Of all controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, 
 except between a state and its citizens, or between a state and citizens of 
 other states, or aliens. 
 
 Eighth. Of all suits and proceedings against ambassadors, or other 
 public ministers, or their domestics, or domestic servants, or against con- 
 suls or vice consuls. 
 
 Sec. 261. Writs of ne exeat may be granted by any justice of the Supreme 
 Court, in cases where they might be granted by the Supreme Court; and 
 by any district judge, in cases where they might be granted by the district 
 court of which he is a judge. But no writ of ne exeat shall be granted 
 
JUDICIAL CODE, g83 
 
 unless a suit in equity is commenced, and satisfactory proof is made to 
 the court or judge granting the same that the defendant designs quickly 
 to depart from the United States. 
 
 Sec. 262. The Supreme Court and the district courts shall have power 
 to issue writs of scire facias. The Supreme Court, the circuit court of 
 appeals, and the district courts shall have power to issue all writs not 
 specifically provided for by statute, wliich may be necessary for the exer- 
 cise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the usages and prin- 
 ciples of law. 
 
 Sec. 263. Whenever notice is given of a motion for an injunction ovit 
 of a district court, the court or judge thereof may, if there appears to be 
 danger of irreparable injury from delay, grant an order restraining the act 
 thought to be enjoined until the decision upon the motion; and such order 
 may be granted with or without security, in the discretion of the court or 
 judge. 
 
 [This section repealed by act Oct. 15, 1914 (38 Stat, at L. 737, chap 
 323), specifying how preliminary injunctions shall be issued.] 
 
 Sec. 264. Writs of injunction may be granted by any justice of the 
 Supreme Court in cases where they might be granted by the Supreme 
 Court; and by any judge of a district court in cases where they might be 
 granted by such court. But no justice of the Supreme Court shall hear or 
 allow any application for an injunction or restraining order in any cause 
 pending in the circuit to which he is allotted, elsewhere than within such 
 circuit, or at such place outside of the same as the parties may stipulate 
 in writing, except when it cannot be heard by tlie district judge of the dis- 
 trict. In case of the absence from the district of the district judge, or of 
 his disability, any circuit judge of the circuit in which the district is 
 situated maj' grant an injunction or restraining order in any case pending 
 in the district court, where the same might be granted by the district 
 judge. 
 
 Sec. 26.5. The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of 
 the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a, state, except in 
 eases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to 
 proceedings in bankruptcy. 
 
 Sec. 266. No interlocutory injunction suspending or restraining the en- 
 forcement, operation, or execution of any statute of a state by restraining 
 the action of any officer of such state in the enforcement or execution of 
 such statute, shall be issued or granted by any justice of the Supreme 
 Court, or by any district court of the United States, or by any judge 
 thereof, or by any circuit judge acting as district judge, upon the ground 
 of the unconstitutionality of such statute, unless the application for the 
 same shall be presented to a justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
 States, or to a circuit or district judge, and shall be heard and determined 
 by three judges, of whom at least one shall be a justice of the Supreme 
 Court, or a circuit judge, and the other two may be either circuit or dis- 
 trict judges, and unless a majority of said three judges shall concur in 
 granting such application. Whenever such application as aforesaid is pre- 
 sented to a justice of the Supreme Court, or to a judge, he shall imme- 
 
88^ 
 
 JUDICIAL CODE, 
 
 diately call to his assistance to hear and determine the application two 
 otlier judges: Provided, however, That one of such tliree judges shall be 
 a justice of the Supreme Court, or a circuit judge. Said application shall 
 not be heard or determined before at least five days' notice of the hearing 
 lias been given to the governor and to the attorney general of the state, 
 and to such other persons as may be defendants in the suit: Provided, 
 that if of opinion that irreparable loss or damage would result to the 
 complainant unless a temporar}' restraining order is granted, any justice 
 of the Supreme Court, or any circuit or district judge, may grant such 
 temporary restraining order at any time before such liearing and deter- 
 mination of the application for an interlocutory injunction, but such tem- 
 porary restraining order sliall remain in force only until the hearing and 
 determination of the application for an interlocutory injunction upon 
 notice as aforesaid. The hearing upon such application for an interlocu- 
 tory injunction shall be given precedence and shall be in every way expe- 
 dited and be assigned for a hearing at the earliest practicable day after 
 the expiration of the notice liereinbefore provided for. An appeal may be 
 taken direct to the Supreme Court of tlie United States f.'om tlie order 
 granting or denying, after notice and liearing, an interlocutory injunction 
 in such case. 
 
 Sec. 267. Suits in equity shall not be sustained in any covirt of the 
 United States in any case where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy 
 may be liad at law. 
 
 Judicial Code, § 274a. (Act March 3, 1915, 38 Stat, at L. 956, chap. 90.) 
 Amendments to pleadings in suits at law which should have been brought 
 in equity, or in suits in equity which should liave been brought at law. 
 
 In case any of said courts shall find that a, suit at law should have been 
 brouglit in equity or a suit in equity should have been brought at law, the 
 court slial] order any amendments to the pleadings which may be necessary 
 to conform them to the proper practice. Any party to the suit shall have 
 the riglit, at any stage of the cause, to amend his pleadings so as to obviate 
 the objection that his suit was not brought on the right side of the court. 
 The cause shall proceed and be determined upon sucli amended pleadings. 
 All testimony taken before such amendment, if preserved, shall stand as 
 testimony in the cause with like effect as if the pleadings had been orig- 
 inally in the amended form. 
 
 Sec. 274b. (Act March 3, 1915, 38 Stat, at L. 956, chap. 90.) Equitable 
 defenses and equitable relief in actions at law ; review of judgments or 
 decrees in such cases. 
 
 In all actions at law equitable defenses may be interposed by answerj 
 plea, or replication without tlie necessity of filing a bill on the equity side 
 of the court. The defendant shall have the same rights in such case as 
 if he had filed a bill embodying the defense of. seeking the relief prayed for 
 in such answer or plea. Equitable relief respecting the subject-matter of 
 the suit may thus be obtained by answer or plea. In case affirmative re- 
 lief is prayed in such answer or plea, the plaintiff shall file a replication. 
 Review of the judgment or decree entered in such case shall be regulated 
 liy rule of court. Whether such review be sought by writ of error or by 
 
JUDICIAL CODE. ■ 835 
 
 appeal the appellate court shall have full power to render such judgment 
 upon the records as law and justice shall require. 
 
 Sec. 274c. (Act March 3, 1915, 38 Stat, at L. 956, chap. 90.) Amend- 
 ments to show jurisdiction based on diverse citizenship of parties. 
 
 Where, in any suit brought in or removed from any State court to any 
 district of the United States, the jurisdiction of the district court is based 
 upon the diverse citizenship of the parties, and such diverse citizensliip in 
 fact existed at the time the suit was brought or removed, though defectively 
 alleged, either party may amend at any stage of the proceedings and in the 
 appellate court upon such terms as the court may impose, so as to show on 
 the record such diverse citizenship and jurisdiction, and thereupon such 
 suit shall be proceeded with the same as though the diverse citizenship 
 had been fully and correctly pleaded at the inception of the suit, or, if it 
 be a removed case, in the petition for removal. 
 
PAGES OF TEXT UPON WHICH SECTIONS OF THE 
 JUDICIAL CODE ARE EEFEEEED TO OR DIS- 
 CUSSED. 
 
 Section 24. pp. 41, 42, (2-25) 47, 63. 01. 16, p. 87, (1) 91, 95, (1, 2-25) 
 168, 210. 183. Par. 21, p. 317, 775, 809, 812, 815, 824, 
 828 834 
 
 Section 28, pp. 66, 70, 774, 775, 776, 777, 792, 804, 809, 811, 812, 815, 
 828, 829, 833, 834, 842, 843, 846. 
 
 Section 29, pp. 776, 778, 779, 782, 788, 799, 834, 842. 
 
 Section 33, p. 811. 
 
 Section 34, p. 811. 
 
 Section 36, p. 789. 
 
 Section 37, pp. 66, 130, 199, 548, 803, 857, 861, 863. 
 
 Section 38, pp. 789, 790, 838. 
 
 Section 39, p. 781. 
 
 Section 46, p. 131. 
 
 Section 49, p. 145. 
 
 Section 50, p. 101. 
 
 Section 51, pp. 48, 53, 92, 94, 96, 100, 110, 314, 316, 333, 833. 
 
 Section 52, pp. 48, 98, 105, 107, 108, 313, 316. 
 
 Section 53, pp. 48, 108, 134, 333, 313, 316. 
 
 Section 54, pp. 49, 100, 313, 316. 
 
 Section 55, pp. 100, 313, 316. 
 
 Section 57, pp. 48, 49, 102, 103, 237, 336, 337. 
 
 Section 58, pp. 108, 134.' 
 
 Section 66, pp. 162, 181, 256. 
 
 Section 128, p. 622. 
 
 Section 129, pp. 626, 627, 628, 629. 
 
 Section 132, p. 676. 
 
 Section 233, p. 41. 
 
 Section 234, p. 41. 
 
 Section 236, p. 241. 
 
 Section 237, pp. 41, 154, 746. 
 
 Section 239, pp. 735, 737. 
 
 Section 241, p. 741. 
 
 Section 252, p. 745. 
 
 Section 256, pp. 41, 47. 
 
 Section 261, pp. 284, 285, 480, 481. 
 
 Section 262, p. 41. 
 
 Section 263, p. 474. 
 
 Section 264, p. 471. 
 
 Section 265, pp. 475, 476. 
 
 Section 266, pp. 471, 472, 473, 475. 
 
 Section 267, p. 22. 
 
 Section 274 (b) p. 8. 
 
 Section 274 (c) pp. 132, 207. 
 
 Section 274 (a) p. 552. 
 
 Section 289, p. 42. 
 
 Section 294, p. 42. 
 
 Section 297, pp. 42, 108. 
 
 886 
 
RULES OF PRACTICE FOR THE COURTS 
 OF EQUITY OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 RULE. 
 
 DISTRICT COURT ALWAYS OPEN FOR CERTAIN PURPOSES- 
 ORDERS AT CHAMBERS. 
 
 The district courts, as courts of equity, shall be deemed always open 
 for the purpose of filing any pleading, of issuing and returning mesne 
 and final process, and of making and directing all interlocutory mo- 
 tions, orders, rules, and other proceedings preparatory to the hearing, 
 upon their merits, of all causes pending therein. 
 
 Any district judge may, upon reasonable notice to the parties, make, 
 direct, and award, at chambers or at the clerk's office, and in vacation as 
 well as in term, all such process, commissions, orders, rules, and other 
 proceedings, whenever the same are not grantable of course, according to 
 the rules and practice of the court. 
 
 2. 
 
 CLERK'S OFFICE ALWAYS OPEN, EXCEPT, ETC. 
 
 The clerk's office shall be open during business hours on all days, ex- 
 cept Sundays and legal holidays, and the clerk shall be in attendance for 
 the purpose of receiving and disposing of all motions, rules, orders, and 
 other proceedings which are grantable of course. 
 
 3. 
 
 BOOKS KEPT BY CLERK AND ENTRIES THEREIN. 
 
 The clerk shall keep a book known as "Equity Docket,'' in which 
 he shall enter each suit, with a file number corresponding to the folio 
 in the book. All papers and orders filed with the clerk in the suit, 
 
 887 
 
S88 RULES OF PRACTICE IN EQUITY. 
 
 all process issued and returns made thereon, and all appearances, shall 
 be noted briefly and chronologically in this book on the folio assigned to 
 the suit, and shall be marked with its file number. 
 
 The clerk shall also keep a book entitled 'Order Book," in which 
 shall be entered at length, in the order of their making, all orders made 
 or passed by. him as of course, and also all orders made or passed by 
 the judge in chambers 
 
 He shall also keep an "Equity Journal," in which shall be entered all 
 orders, decrees, and proceedings of the court in equity causes in term 
 time. 
 
 Separate and suitable indices of the Equity Docket, Order Book, and 
 Equity Journal shall be kept by the clerk under the direction of the court. 
 
 NOTICE OF ORDERS. 
 
 Neither the noting of an order in the Equity Docket nor its entry in 
 the Order Book shall of itself be deemed notice to the parties or their 
 solicitors; and when an order is made without prior notice to, and in the 
 absence of, a party, the clerk, unless otherwise directed by the court or 
 judge, shall forthwith send a copy thereof, by mail, to such party or his 
 solicitor, and a note of such mailing shall be made in the Equity Docket, 
 which shall be taken as sufficient proof of due notice of the order. 
 
 MOTIONS GRANTABLE OF COURSE BY CLERK. 
 
 All motions and applications in the clerk's office for the issuing of 
 mesne process or final process to enforce and execute decrees; for taking 
 bills pro confesso; and for other proceedings in the clerk's office which 
 do not require any allowance or order of the court or of a judge, shall be 
 deemed motions and applications grantable of course by the clerk; but 
 the same may be suspended, or altered, or rescinded by the judge upon 
 special cause shown. 
 
 6, 
 
 MOTION DAY. 
 
 Each district court shall establish regular times and places, not less 
 than once each month, when motions requiring notice and hearing may 
 be made and disposed of; but the judge may at any time and place, and 
 on such notice, if any, as he may consider reasonable, make and direct 
 all interlocutory orders, rulings, and proceedings for the advancement, 
 conduct, and hearing of causes. If the public interest permits, the senior 
 
RULES OP PRACTICE IN EQUITY. 889 
 
 circuit judge of the circuit may dispense Avith the motion day during not 
 to exceed two months in the year in any district. 
 
 PROCESS, MESNE AND FINAL. 
 
 The process of subpoena shall constitute the proper mesne process in 
 all suits in equity, in the first instance, to require the defendant to appear 
 and answer the bill; and, unless otherwise provided in these rules or 
 specially ordered by the court, a writ of attachment, and, if the defendant 
 cannot be found, a writ of sequestration, or a writ of assistance to en- 
 force a delivery of possession, as tlie case may require, shall be the proper 
 process to issue for tlie purpose of compelling obedience to any interlocu- 
 tory or final order or decree of the court. 
 
 8. 
 
 ENFORCEMENT OF FINAL DECREES. 
 
 Final process to execute any decree may, if the decree be solely for the 
 payment of money, be by a writ of execution, in the form used in the 
 district court in suits at common law in actions of assumpsit. If the 
 decree be for the performance of any specific act, as, for example, for 
 the execution of a conveyance of land or the delivering up of deeds or 
 other documents, the decree shall, in all cases, prescribe the time within 
 which the act shall be done, of which the defendant shall be bound, with- 
 out further service, to take notice; and upon affidavit of the plaintiff, 
 filed in the clerk's office, that the same has not been complied witli within 
 tlie prescribed time, the clerk shall issue a writ of attachment against 
 the delinquent party, from which, if attached thereon, he shall not be dis- 
 charged, unless upon a full compliance with the decree and the payment 
 of all costs, or upon a special order of the court, or a judge thereof, upon 
 motion and affidavit, enlarging the time for the performance thereof. If 
 the delinquent party cannot be found, a writ of sequestration shaJl issue 
 against his estate, upon the return of non est inventus, to compel obe- 
 dience to the decree. If a, mandatory order, injunction, or decree for the 
 specific performance of any act or contract he not complied with, the 
 court or a judge, besides, or instead of, proceedings against the diso- 
 bedient party for a contempt or by sequestration, may by order direct 
 that the act required to be done be done, so far as practicable, by some 
 other person appointed by the court or judge, at the cost of the disobe- 
 dient party, and the act, when so done, shall have like effect as if done by 
 him. 
 
 9. 
 
 WRIT OF ASSISTANCE. 
 When any decree or order is for the delivery of possession, upon proof 
 
890 RULES OF PRACTICE IN EQUITY. 
 
 made by affidavit of a demand and refusal to obey the decree or order, 
 the party prosecuting the same shall be entitled to a writ of assistance 
 from the clerk of the court. 
 
 10. 
 
 DECREE FOR DEFICIENCY IN FORECLOSURES, ETC. 
 
 In suits for the foreclosure of mortgages, or the enforcement of other 
 liens, a decree may be rendered for any balance that may be found due 
 to the plaintiff over and above the proceeds of the sale or sales, and exe- 
 cution may issue for the collection of the same, as is provided in rule 8 
 when the decree is solely for the payment of money. 
 
 11. 
 
 PROCESS IN BEHALF OF AND AGAINST PERSONS NOT PARTIES. 
 
 Every person, not being a party in any cause, who has obtained an order, 
 or in whose favor an order shall have been made, may enforce obedience 
 to such order by the same process as if he were a party; and every per- 
 son, not being a party, against whom obedience to any order of the court 
 may be enforced, shall be liable to the same process for enforcing obedience 
 to such orders as if he were a party. 
 
 12. 
 
 ISSUE OF SUBPCENA— TIME FOR ANSWER. 
 
 Whenever a bill is filed, and not before, the clerk shall issue the pro- 
 cess of subpcena thereon, as of course, upon the application of the plain- 
 tiff, which shall contain the names of the parties and be returnable into 
 the clerk's office twenty days from the issuing thereof. At the bottom 
 of the subpoena shall be placed a memorandum that the defendant is re- 
 quired to iile his answer or other defense in the clerk's office on or before 
 the twentieth day after service, excluding the day thereof; otherwise the 
 bill may be taken pro confesso. Where there is more than one defendant, 
 a writ of subpoena may, at the election of the plaintiff, be sued out sepa- 
 rately for each defendant, or a, joint subpoena against all the defendants. 
 
 13. 
 
 MANNER OF SERVING SUBPCENA. 
 
 The service of all subpoenas shall be by delivering a copy thereof to 
 the defendant personally, or by leaving a copy thereof at the dwelling 
 house or usual place of abode of each defendant, with some adult per- 
 son who is a member of or resident in the family. 
 
RULES OF PRACTICE IN EQUITY. 891 
 
 14. 
 
 ALIAS SUBPOENA. 
 
 Whenever any subpoena shall be returned not executed as to any de- 
 fendant, the plaintiff shall be entitled to other subpcenas against such 
 defendant, until due service is made. 
 
 15. 
 
 PROCESS, BY WHOM SERVED. 
 
 The service of all process, mesne and final, shall be by the marshal 
 of the district, or his deputy, or by some other person specially appointed 
 by the court or judge for that purpose, and not otherwise. In the lat- 
 ter case, the person serving the process shall make affidavit thereof. 
 
 16. 
 
 DEFENDANT TO ANSWER— DEI' AULT— DECREE PRO CONFESSO. 
 
 It shall be the duty of the defendant, unless the time shall be enlarged, 
 for cause shown, ))y a judge of the court, to file his answer or other de- 
 fense to the bill in the clerk's office within the time named in the sub- 
 poena, as required by rule 12. In default thereof the plaintiff may, at 
 his election, take an order as of course that the bill be taken pro confesso; 
 and thereupon the cause shall be proceeded in ex parte, 
 
 17. 
 
 DECREE PRO CONFESSO TO BE FOLLOWED BY FINAL DECREE- 
 SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT. 
 
 When the bill is taken pro confesso the court may proceed to a final 
 decree at any time after the expiration of thirty days after the entry of 
 the order pro confesso, and such decree shall be deemed absolute, unless 
 the court shall, at the same term, set aside the same, or enlarge the time 
 for filing the answer, upon cause shown upon motion and affidavit. No 
 such motion shall be granted, unless upon the payment of the costs of the 
 plaintiff up to that time, or such part thereof as the court shall deem 
 reasonable, unless the defendant shall undertake to file his answer within 
 Buch time as the court shall direct, and submit to such other terms as the 
 court shall direct, for the purpose of speeding the cause. 
 
 18. 
 
 PLEADINGS— TECHNICAL FORMS ABROGATED. 
 
 Unless otherwise prescribed by statute or these rules the technical 
 forms of pleadings in equity are abolished. 
 
892 RULES OF PRACTICE IN EQUITY. 
 
 19. 
 
 AMENDMENTS GENERALLY. 
 
 The court may at any time, in furtherance of justice, upon such terms 
 as may be just, permit any process, proceeding, pleading, or record to be 
 amended, or material supplemental matter to be set forth in an amended 
 or supplemental pleading. The court, at every stage of the proceeding, must 
 disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the 
 substantial rights of the parties. 
 
 20. 
 
 FURTHER AND PARTICULAR STATEMENT IN PLEADING MAY BE 
 
 REQUIRED. 
 
 A further and better statement of the nature of the claim or defense, or 
 further and better particulars of any matter stated in any pleading, may 
 in any ease be ordered, upon such terms, as to costs and otherwise, as 
 may be just. 
 
 21. 
 
 SCANDAL AND IMPERTINENCE. 
 
 The right to except to bills, answers, and other proceedings for scandal 
 or impertinence shall not obtain, but the court may, upon motion or its 
 own initiative, order any redundant, impertinent, or scandalous matter 
 stricken out, upon such terms as the court shall think fit. 
 
 22. 
 
 ACTION AT LAW ERRONEOUSLY BEGUN AS SUIT IN 
 EQUITY— TRANSFER. 
 
 If at any time it appear that a suit commenced in equity should have 
 been brought as an action on the law side of the court, it shall be forth- 
 with transferred to the law side and be there proceeded with, with only 
 such alteration in the pleadings as shall be essential. 
 
 23. 
 
 MATTERS ORDINARILY DETERMINABLE AT LAW, WHEN ARISING 
 IN SUIT IN EQUITY TO BE DISPOSED OF THEREIN. 
 
 If in a suit in equity a matter ordinarily determinable at law arises, 
 such matter shall be determined in that suit according to the principles 
 applicable, without sending the case or question to the law' side of the 
 court. 
 
RULES OF PRACTICE IN EQUITY. 893 
 
 24. 
 
 SIGNATURE OF COUNSEL. 
 
 Every bill or other pleading shall be signed individually by one or more 
 solicitors of record, and such signatures shall be considered as a certificate 
 by each solicitor that he has read the pleading so signed by him; that 
 upon the instructions laid before him regarding the case there is good 
 ground for the same; that no scandalous matter is inserted in the plead- 
 ing; and that it is not interposed for delay. 
 
 25. 
 BILL OF COMPLAINT— CONTENTS. 
 
 Hereafter it shall be sufficient that a, bill in equity shall contain, in 
 addition to the usual caption: 
 
 First, the full name, when known, of each plaintiff and defendant, and 
 the citizenship and residence of each party. If any party be under any 
 disability that fact shall be stated. 
 
 Second, a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the 
 court's jurisdiction depends. 
 
 Third, a short and simple statement of the ultimate facts upon which 
 the plaintiff asks relief, omitting any mere statement of evidence. 
 
 Fourth, if there are persons other than those named as defendants who 
 appear to be proper parties, the bill should state why they are not made 
 parties, — as that they are not within the jurisdiction of the court, or 
 cannot be made parties without ousting the jurisdiction. 
 
 Fifth, a. statement of and prayer for any special relief pending the suit 
 or on final hearing, which may be stated and sought in alternative forms. 
 If special relief pending the suit be desired, tlie bill sliould be verified by 
 the oath of the plaintiff, or someone having knowledge of the facts upon 
 which such relief is asked. 
 
 26. 
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 
 
 The plaintiff may join in one bill as many causes of action, cognizable' 
 in equity, as he may have against the defendant. But when there are more 
 than one plaintiff, the causes of action joined must be joint, and if there 
 be more than one defendant, the liability must be one asserted against all 
 of the material defendants, or sufficient grounds must appear for uniting 
 the causes of action in order to promote the convenient administration 
 of justice. If it appear that any such causes of action cannot be con- 
 veniently disposed of together, the court may order separate trials. 
 
894 RULES OF PRACTICE IN EQUITY. 
 
 27. 
 
 STOCKHOLDER'S BILL. 
 
 Every bill brought by one or more stockholders in a corporation against 
 the corporation and other parties, founded on rights which may properly 
 be asserted by the corporation, must be verified by oath, and must contain 
 an allegation that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of the trans- 
 action of which he complains, or that liis share had devolved on him since 
 by operation of law, and that the suit is not a collusive one to confer 
 on a court of the United States jurisdiction of a case of which it would 
 not otherwise have cognizance. It must also set forth with particularity 
 the efforts of the plaintiff to secure such action as he desires on the part 
 of the managing directors or trustees, and, if necessary, of the shareholders, 
 and the causes of his failure to obtain such action, or the reasons for not 
 making such effort. 
 
 28. 
 
 AMENDMENT OF BILL AS OF COURSE, 
 
 The plaintiff may, as of course, amend his bill before the defendant has 
 responded thereto, but if such amendment be filed after any copy has issued 
 from the clerk's office, the plaintiff at his own cost shall furnish to the 
 solicitor of record of each opposing party a copy of the bill as amended, 
 unless otherwise ordered by the court or judge. 
 
 After pleading filed by any defendant, plaintiff may amend only by 
 consent of the defendant or leave of the court or judge. 
 
 29. 
 
 DEFENSES— HOW PRESENTED. 
 
 Demurrers and pleas are abolished. Every defense in point of law 
 arising upon the face of the bill, whether for misjoinder, nonjoinder, or 
 insufficiency of fact to constitute a valid cause of action in equity, which 
 might heretofore have been made by demurrer or plea, shall be made by 
 motion to dismiss or in the answer; and every such point of law going 
 to the wliole or a material part of the cause or causes of action stated 
 in the bill may be called up and disposed of before final hearing, at the 
 discretion of the court. Every defense lieretofore presentable by plea in 
 bar or abatement shall be made in the answer and may be separately 
 heard and disposed of before the trial of the principal case, in the dis- 
 cretion of the court. If the defendant move to dismiss the bill or any 
 part thereof, the motion may be set down for hearing by either party 
 upon five days' notice, and, if it be denied, answer shall be filed within 
 five days thereafter, or a decree pro confesso entered. 
 
RULES OF PRACTICE IN EQUITY. 895 
 
 30. 
 
 ANSWER— CONTENTS— COUNTERCLAIM. 
 
 The defendant in his answer shall, in short and simple terms, set out 
 his defense to each claim asserted by the bill, omitting any mere state- 
 ment of evidence, and avoiding any general denial of the averments of 
 the bill, but specifically admitting or denying or explaining the facts 
 upon which the plaintiff relies, unless the defendant is without knowledge, 
 in which case he shall so state, such statement operating as a denial 
 Averments other than of value or amount of damage, if not denied, shall 
 be deemed confessed, except as against an infant, lunatic, or other person 
 non compos and not under guardianship, but the answer may be amended, 
 by leave of the court or judge, upon reasonable notice, so as to put any 
 averment in issue, when justice requires it. The answer maj' state as 
 many defenses, in the alternative, regardless of consistency, as the defend- 
 ant deems essential to his defense. 
 
 The answer must state in short and simple form any counterclaim 
 arising out of the transaction which is the subject-matter of the suit, and 
 may, without cross bill, set out any set-off or counterclaim against the 
 plaintiff which might be the subject of an independent suit in equity 
 against him, and such set-off or counterclaim, so set up, shall have the 
 same effect as a cross suit, so as to enable the court to pronounce a final 
 judgment in the same suit, both on the original and cross claims. 
 
 31. 
 
 REPLY— WHEN REQUIRED— WHEN CAUSE AT ISSUE. 
 
 Unless the answer assert a set-off or counterclaim, no reply shall be 
 required without special order of the court or judge; but the cause shall 
 be deemed at issue upon the filing of the answer, and any new or affirma- 
 tive matter therein shall be deemed to be denied by the plaintiff. If the 
 answer include a set-off or counterclaim, the party against whom it is 
 asserted shall reply within ten days after the filing of the answer, unless 
 a longer time be allowed by the court or judge. If the counterclaim is 
 one which affects the rights of other defendants, they or their solicitors 
 shall be served with a copy of the same within ten days from the filing 
 thereof, and ten days shall be accorded to such defendants for filing a 
 reply. In default of a reply, a decree pro confesso on the counterclaim 
 may be entered as in default of an answer to the bill. 
 
 32. 
 
 ANSWER TO AMENDED BILL. 
 
 In every case where an amendment to the bill shall be made after 
 answer filed, the defendant shall put in a new or supplemental answer 
 
,S96 RULES OF PRACTICE IN EQUITY. 
 
 within ten days after that on which the amendment or amended bill is 
 filed, unless the time is enlarged or it is otherwise ordered by a judge of 
 the court; and upon a default, the like proceedings may be had upon 
 an omission to put in an answer. 
 
 33. 
 
 TESTING SUFFICIENCY OF DEFENSE. 
 
 Exceptions for insufficiency of an answer are abolished. But if an 
 answer set up an affirmative defense, set-off, or counterclaim, the plaintiff 
 may, upon five days' notice, or such further time as the court may allow, 
 test the sufficiency of the same by motion to strike out. It found insuf- 
 ficient but amendable, the court may allow an amendment upon terms, 
 or strike out the matter. 
 
 34. 
 
 SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADING. 
 
 Upon application of either party the court or judge may, upon rea- 
 sonable notice and such terms as are just, permit him to file and serve 
 a supplemental pleading, alleging material facts occurring after his former 
 pleading, or of which he was ignorant when it was made, including the 
 judgment or decree of a competent court, rendered after the commence- 
 ment of the suit determining the matters in controversy, or a part thereof. 
 
 35. 
 
 BILLS OF REVIVOR AND SUPPLEMENTAL BILLS— FORM. 
 
 It shall not be necessary in any bill of revivor or supplemental bill 
 to set forth any of the statements in the original suit, unless the special 
 circumstances of the case may require it. 
 
 36. 
 
 OFFICERS BEFORE WHOM PLEADINGS VERIFIED. 
 
 Every pleading which is required to be sworn to by statute, or these 
 rules, may be verified before any justice or judge of any court of the 
 United States, or of any state or territory, or of the District of Columbia, 
 or any clerk of any court of the United States, or of any territory, or 
 of the District of Columbia, or any notary public. 
 
KULES OF PRACTICE IN EQUITY. 897 
 
 37. 
 PARTIES GENERALLY— INTERVENTION. 
 
 Every action sliall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
 interest, but an executor, administrator, guardian, trustee of an express 
 trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made 
 for the benefit of another, or a party expressly authorized by statute, 
 may sue in his own name without joining with him the party for whose 
 benefit the action is brought. All persons having an interest in the subject 
 of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded may join as plaintiffs, 
 and any person may be made a defendant who lias or claims an interest 
 adverse to the plaintiff. Any person may at any time be made a party 
 if liis presence is necessary or proper to a complete determination of the 
 cause. Persons having a united interest must be joined on the same side 
 as plaintiffs or defendants, but when anyone refuses to join, he may for 
 such reason be made a defendant 
 
 Anyone claiming an interest in the litigation may at any time be per- 
 mitted to assert his right by intervention, but the intervention shall be 
 in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main 
 proceeding. 
 
 38. 
 
 REPRESENTATIVES OP CLASS. 
 
 When the question is one of common or general interest to many persons 
 constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring 
 them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole. 
 
 9 
 
 39. 
 
 ABSENCE OF PERSONS WHO WOULD BE PROPER PARTIES. 
 
 In all cases where it shall appear to the court that persons who might 
 otherwise be deemed proper parties to the suit cannot be made parties 
 by reason of their being out of the jurisdiction of the court, or incapable 
 otherwise of being made parties, or because their joinder would oust the 
 jurisdiction of the court as to the parties before the court, the court may, 
 in its discretion, proceed in the cause without making such persons par- 
 ties: and in such cases the decree shall be without prejudice to the righta 
 of the absent parties. 
 
 40. 
 
 NOMINAL PARTIES. 
 
 Where no account, payment, conveyance, or other direct relief is sought 
 S. Eq.— 57 
 
898 RULES OF PRACTICE IN EQUITY. 
 
 against a party to a suit, not being an infant, the party, upon service 
 of the subpoena upon him, need not appear and answer the bill, unless 
 the plaintiff specially requires him to do so by the prayer; but i>e may 
 appear and answer at his option; and if he does not appear and answer, 
 he shall he bound by all the proceedings in the cause. If the plaintiff 
 sliall require him to appear and answer, he shall be entitled to the costs 
 of all the proceedings against him, unless the court shall otherwise direct. 
 
 41. 
 
 SUIT TO EXECUTE TRUSTS OF WILI^-HEIR AS PARTY. 
 
 In suits to execute the trusts of a will, it shall not be necessary to make 
 the lieir at law a party; but the plaintiff shall be at liberty to make the 
 heir at law a party where he desires to have the will established against 
 him. 
 
 42. 
 
 JOINT AND SEVERAL DEMANDS. 
 
 In all cases in which the plaintiff has a joint and several demand 
 against several persons, either as principals or sureties, it shall not be 
 necessary to bring before the court as parties to a suit concerning such 
 demand all the persons liable thereto; but the plaintiff may proceed against 
 one or more of the persons severally liable. 
 
 43. 
 
 DEFECT OF PARTIES— RESISTING OBJECTION. 
 
 Where the defendant shall by his answer suggest that the bill of com- 
 plaint is defective for want of parties, the plaintiff may, within fourteen 
 days after answer filed, set down the cause for argument as a motion 
 upon that objection only; and where the plaintiff shall not so set down 
 his cause, but shall proceed therewith to a hearing, notwithstanding an 
 objection for want of parties, taken by the answer, he shall not at the 
 hearing of the cause, if the defendant's objection shall then be allowed, 
 be entitled as of course to an order to amend his bill by adding parties; 
 but the court shall be at liberty to dismiss the bill, or to allow an 
 amendment on such terms as justice may require. 
 
 44. 
 
 DEFECT OF PARTIES— TARDY OBJECTION. 
 
 If a defendant shall, at the hearing of a cause, object that a suit is 
 defective for want of parties, not having by motion or answer taken the 
 
RULES OF PRACTICE IN EQUITY. 899 
 
 objection and therein specified by name or description the parties to whom 
 tlie objection applies, the court shall be at liberty to make a decree 
 saving the rights of the absent parties. 
 
 45. 
 
 DEATH OF PARTY— REVIVOR. 
 
 In the event of the death of either party the court may, in a proper 
 case, upon motion, order the suit to be revived by the substitution of 
 the proper parties. If the successors or representatives of the deceased 
 party fail to make such application within a reasonable time, then any 
 other party may, on motion, apply for such relief, and the court, upon 
 any such motion, may make the necessary orders for notice to the parties 
 to be substituted, and for the filing of such pleadings or amendments as 
 may be necessary. 
 
 46. 
 
 TRIAL— TESTIMONY USUALLY TAKEN IN OPEN COURT- 
 RULINGS ON OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE. 
 
 In all trials in equity the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally 
 in open court, except as otherwise provided by statute or these rules. 
 The court shall pass upon the admissibility of all evidence offered as in 
 actions at law. When evidence is offered and excluded, and the party 
 against whom the ruling is made excepts thereto at the time, the court 
 shall take and report so much thereof, or make such a statement respecting 
 it, as will clearly show the character of the evidence, the form in which 
 it was offered, the objection made, the ruling, and the exception. If the 
 appellate court shall be of opinion that the evidence should have been 
 admitted, it shall not reverse the decree unless it be clearly of opinion 
 that material prejudice will result from an affirmance, in which event it 
 shall direct such further steps as justice may require 
 
 47. 
 
 DEPOSITIONS— TO BE TAKEN IN EXCEPTIONAL INSTANCES. 
 
 The court, upon application of either party, when allowed by statute, 
 or for good and exceptional cause for departing from the general rule, 
 to be shown by affidavit, may permit the deposition of named witnesses, 
 to be used before the court or upon a reference to a master, to be taken 
 before an examiner or other named officer, upon the notice and terms 
 ,8pecifled in the order. All depositions taken under a statute, or under 
 any such order of the court, shall be taken and filed as follows, unless 
 otherwise ordered by the court or judge for good cause shown: Those 
 of the plaintiff within sixty days from the time the cause is at issue; 
 
90 a RULES OF PRACTICE IN EQUITY. 
 
 those of the defendant within thirty days from the expiration of the time 
 for the filing of plaintiff's depositions ; and rebutting depositions by either 
 party within twenty days after the time for taking original depositions 
 expires. 
 
 48. 
 
 TESTIMONY OF EXPERT WITNESSES IN PATENT AND 
 TRADEMARK CASES. 
 
 In a case involving the validity or scope of » patent or trademark, 
 the district court may, upon petition, order that the testimony in chief 
 of expert witnesses, whose testimony is directed to matters of opinion, 
 be set forth in affidavits and filed as follows: Those of the plaintiff 
 within forty days after the cause is at issue; those of the defendant 
 within twenty days after plaintiff's time has expired; and rebutting affida- 
 vits within fifteen days after the expiration of the time for filing original 
 affidavits. Should the opposite party desire the production of any affiant 
 for cross-examination, the court or judge shall, on motion, direct that 
 said cross-e.xaraination and any re-examination take place before the court 
 upon the trial; and unless the affiant is produced and submits to cross- 
 examination in compliance with such direction, his affidavit shall not be 
 used as evidence in the cause. 
 
 49. 
 
 EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE EXAMINERS, ETC. 
 
 All evidence offered before an examiner or like officer, together with 
 any objections, shall be Saved and returned into the court. Depositions, 
 whether upon oral examination before an examiner or like officer or other- 
 wise, shall be taken upon questions and answers reduced to writing, or 
 in the form of narrative, and the witness shall be subject to cross and 
 re-examination. 
 
 50. 
 
 STENOGRAPHER— APPOINTMENT— FEES. 
 
 When deemed necessary by the court or oflScer taking testimony, a 
 stenographer may be appointed who shall take down testimony in short- 
 hand and, if required, transcribe the same. His fee shall be fixed by the 
 court and taxed ultimately as costs. The expense of taking a deposition, 
 or the cost of a, transcript, shall be advanced by the party calling the 
 witness or ordering the transcript. 
 
 51. 
 
 EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE EXAMINERS, ETC. 
 Objections to the evidence, before an examiner or like officer, shall be 
 
RULES OF PRACTICE IN EQUITY. 901 
 
 in short form, stating the grounds of objection relied upon, but no tran- 
 script filed by such officer shall include argument or debate. The testi- 
 mony of each witness, after being reduced to writing, shall be read over 
 to or by him, and shall be signed by him in the presence of the officer; 
 provided, that if the witness shall refuse to sign his deposition so taken, 
 the officer shall sign the same, stating upon the record the reasons, if 
 any, assigned by the witness for such refusal. Objection to any question 
 or questions shall be noted by the officer upon the deposition, but he shall 
 not have power to decide on the competency or materiality or relevancy 
 of the questions. The court shall have power, and it shall be its duty, 
 to deal with the costs of incompetent and immaterial or irrelevant depo- 
 sitions, or parts of them, as may be just. 
 
 52. 
 
 ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES BEFORE COMMISSIONER, 
 MASTER, OR EXAMINER. 
 
 Witnesses who live within the district, and whose testimony may be 
 taken out of court by these rules, may be summoned to appear before a 
 commissioner appointed to take testimony, or before a master or examiner 
 appointed in any cause, by subpoena in the usual form, which may be 
 issued by the clerk in blank and filled up by the party praying the same, 
 or by the commissioner, master, or examiner, requiring the attendance of 
 the witnesses at the time and place specified, who shall be allowed for 
 attendance the same compensation as for attendance in court; and if any 
 witness shall refuse to appear or give evidence it shall be deemed a con- 
 tempt of the court, which being certified to the clerk's office by the com- 
 missioner, master, or examiner, an attachment may issue thereupon by 
 order of the court or of any judge thereof, in the same manner as if the 
 contempt were for not attending, or for refusing to give testimony in, 
 the court. 
 
 In case of refusal of witnesses to attend or be sworn or to answer 
 any question put by the commissioner, master, or examiner, or by counsel 
 or solicitor, the same practice shall be adopted as is now practised with 
 i-espect to witnesses to be produced on examination before an examiner 
 of said court on written interrogatories. 
 
 53. 
 
 NOTICE OF TAKING TESTIMONY BEFORE EXAMINER, ETC. 
 
 Notice shall be given by the respective counsel or parties to the opposite 
 counsel or parties of the time and place of examination before an examiner 
 or like officer for such reasonable time as the court or officer may fix 
 by order in each case. 
 
902 RULES OF PRACTICE IN EQUITY. 
 
 54. 
 
 DEPOSITIONS UNDER REV. STAT §§ 863, 865, 866, 867— 
 CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
 
 After a cause is at issue, depositions may be taken as provided by 
 §§ 863, 865, 866, and 867, Revised Statutes. But if in any case no notice 
 has been given the opposite party of the time and place of taking the 
 deposition, he shall, upon application and notice, be entitled to have the 
 witness examined orally before the court, or to a cross-examination before 
 .■)n examiner or like officer, or a new deposition taken with notice, as 
 the court or judge, under all the circumstances, shall order. 
 
 55. 
 
 DEPOSITION DEEMED PUBLISHED WHEN FILED. 
 
 Upon the filing of any deposition or affidavit taken under these rules 
 or any statute, it shall be deemed published, unless otherwise ordered by 
 the court. 
 
 56. 
 
 ON EXPIRATION OF TIME FOR DEPOSITIONS, CASE GOES 
 ON TRIAL CALENDAR. 
 
 After the time has elapsed for taking and filing depositions under these 
 rules, the case shall be placed on the trial calendar. Thereafter no further 
 testimony by deposition shall be taken except for some strong reason 
 shown by affidavit In every such application the reason why the testi- 
 mony of the witness cannot be had orally on the trial, and why his 
 deposition has not been before taken, shall be set forth, together with 
 the testimony which it is expected the witness will give. 
 
 57. 
 
 CONTINUANCES. 
 
 After a cause shall be placed on the trial calendar it may be passed 
 over to another day of the same term, by consent of counsel or order 
 of the court, biit shall not be continued beyond the term save in ex- 
 ceptional eases by order of the court, upon good cause shown by affidavit, 
 and upon such terms as the court shall, in its discretion, impose, Con- 
 tinuances beyond the term by consent of the parties shall be allowed on 
 condition only that a stipulation be signed by counsel for all the parties, 
 and that all costs incurred theretofore be paid. Thereupon an order shall 
 be entered dropping the case from the trial calendar, subject to reinstate- 
 ment within one year, upon application to the court by either party, in 
 
KULES OF PRACTICE IN EQUITY. 903 
 
 which event it shall be heard at the earliest convenient day. If not so 
 reinstated within the year, the suit shall be dismissed without jjrejudice 
 to a new one. 
 
 58. 
 
 DISCOVERY— INTERROGATORIES— INSPECTION AND PRODUCTION 
 OF DOCUMENTS— ADMISSION OF EXECUTION OR GENUINENESS. 
 
 The plaintiff, at any time after iiling the bill, and not later than 
 twenty-one days after the joinder of issue, and the defendant at any 
 time after filing his answer, and not later than twenty-one days after 
 the joinder of issue, and either party at any time thereafter by leave 
 of the court or Judge, may file interrogatories in writing for the discovery 
 by the opposite party or parties of facts and documents material to the 
 support or defense of the cause, with a note at the foot thereof, stating 
 which of the interrogatories each of the parties is required to answer. 
 But no party shall file more than one set of interrogatories to the same 
 party without leave of the court or judge 
 
 If any party to the cause is a public or private corporation, any oppo- 
 site party may apply to the court or Judge for an order allowing him to 
 file interrogatories to be answered by any officer of the corporation, and 
 an order may be made accordingly for the examination of such officer as 
 may appear to be proper, upon such interrogatories as the court or judge 
 shall think fit. 
 
 Copies shall be filed for the use of the interrogated party and shall 
 be sent by the clerk to the respective solicitors of record, or to the last 
 known address of the opposite party if there be no record solicitor. 
 
 Interrogatories shall be answered, and the answers filed in the clerk's 
 office, within fifteen days after they have been served, unless the time be 
 enlarged by the court or Judge. Each interrogatory shall be answered 
 separately and fully, and the answers shall be in writing, under oath, 
 and signed by the party or corporate officer interrogated. Within ten 
 days after the service of interrogatories, objections to them, or any of 
 them, may be presented to the court or Judge, with proof of notice of the 
 purpose so to do, and answers shall be deferred until the objections are 
 determined, which shall be at as early a time as is practicable. In so far 
 as the objections are sustained, answers shall not be required. 
 
 The court or Judge, upon motion and reasonable notice, may make all 
 such orders as may be appropriate to enforce answers to interrogatories 
 or to effect the inspection or production of documents in the possession 
 of either party and containing evidence material to the cause of action 
 or defense of his adversary. Any party failing or refusing to comply 
 with such an order shall be liable to attachment, and shall also be liable, 
 if a, plaintiff, to have his bill dismissed, and, if a defendant, to have his 
 answer stricken out, and be placed in the same situation as if he had 
 failed to answer. 
 
904 RULES OF PRACTICE IN EQUITY, 
 
 By a demand served, ten days before the trial, either party may call 
 on the other to admit in writing the execution or genuineness of any 
 document, letter, or other writing, saving all just exceptions; and if such 
 admission be not made within five days after such service, the costs of 
 proving the document, letter, or writing shall be paid by the party re- 
 fusing or neglecting to make such admission, unless, at the trial, the court 
 shall find that the refusal or neglect was reasonable. 
 
 59. 
 
 REFERENCE TO MASTER— EXCEPTIONAL, NOT USUAL. 
 
 Save in matters of account, a reference to a master shall be the ex- 
 ception, not the rule, and shall be made only upon a showing that some 
 exceptional condition requires it. When such a reference is made, the 
 party at whose instance or for whose benefit it is made shall cause 
 the order of reference to be presented to the master for a hearing within 
 twenty days succeeding the time when the reference was made, unless a 
 longer time be specially granted by the court or judge; if he shall omit 
 to do so, the adverse party sliall be at liberty forthwith to cause pro- 
 ceedings to be had before the master, at the costs of the party procuring 
 the reference. 
 
 60. 
 
 PROCEEDINGS BEFORE MASTER. 
 
 Upon every such reference, it shall be the duty of the master, as soon 
 as he reasonably can after the same is brought before him, to assign a 
 time and place for proceedings in the same, and to give due notice thereof 
 to each of the parties, or their solicitors; and if either party shall fail 
 to appear at the time and place appointed, the master shall be at liberty 
 to proceed ex parte, or, in his discretion, to adjourn the examination and 
 proceedings to a future day, giving notice to the absent party or his 
 solicitor of such adjournment; and it shall be the duty of the master to 
 proceed with all reasonable diligence in every such reference, and with 
 the least practicable delay; and either party shall be at liberty to apply 
 to the court, or a judge thereof, for an order to the master to speed the 
 proceedings and to make his report, and to certify to the court or judge 
 the reason for any delay. 
 
 61. 
 
 MASTER'S REPORT— DOCUMENTS IDENTIFIED BUT NOT 
 SET FORTH. 
 
 In the reports made by the master to the court, no part of any state 
 of facts, account, charge, affidavit, deposition, examination, or answer 
 
RULES OF PRACTICE IN EQUITY. 905 
 
 brought in or used before him shall be stated or recited. But such state 
 of facts, account, charge, affidavit, deposition, examination, or answer shall 
 be identified and referred to, so as to inform the court what state of facts, 
 account, charge, affidavit, deposition, examination, or answer were so 
 brought in or used. 
 
 62. 
 
 POWERS OF MASTER. 
 
 The master sliall regulate all the proceedings in every hearing before 
 him, upon every reference; and he shall have full authority to examine 
 the parties in the cause, upon oath, touching all matters contained in 
 the reference; and also to require the production of all books, papers, 
 writings, vouchers, and other documents applicable thereto; and also to 
 examine on oath, viva voce, all witnesses produced by the parties before 
 him, or by deposition, according to the acts of Congress, or otherwise, as 
 here provided; and also to direct the mode in which the matters requiring 
 evidence shall be proved before him; -and generally to do all other acts, 
 and direct all other inquiries and proceedings in the matters before him, 
 which he may deem necessary and proper to the justice and merits thereof 
 and the rights of the parties. 
 
 63. 
 
 FORM OF ACCOUNTS BEFORE MASTER. 
 
 All parties accounting before a master shall bring in their respective 
 accounts in the form of debtor and creditor; and any of the other parties 
 who shall not be satisfied with the account so brought in shall be at 
 liberty to examine the accounting party viva voce, or upon interrogatories, 
 as the master shall direct. 
 
 64. 
 
 FORMER DEPOSITIONS, ETC., MAY BE USED BEFORE MASTER. 
 
 All affidavits, depositions, and documents which have been previously 
 made, read, or used in the court upon any proceeding, in any cause or 
 matter, may be used before the master. 
 
 65. 
 
 CLAIMANTS BEFORE MASTER EXAMINABLE BY HIM. 
 
 The master shall be at liberty to examine any creditor or other person 
 coming in to claim before him, either upon written interrogatories or 
 viva voce, or in both modes, as the nature of the case may appear to 
 
906 RULES OF PRi^CTICE IN EQUITY. 
 
 him to require. The evidence upon such examinations shall be taken 
 down by the master, or by some other person by his order and in his 
 presence, if either party requires it, in order that the same may be used 
 by the court if necessary. 
 
 66. 
 
 RETURN OF MASTER'S REPORT— EXCEPTIONS— HEARING. 
 
 The master, as soon as his report is ready, shall return the same 
 into the clerk's office, and the day of the return shall be entered by the 
 clerk in the Equity Docket. The parties shall have twenty days froin 
 the time of the filing of the report to file exceptions thereto, and if no 
 exceptions are within that period filed by either party, the report shall 
 stand confirmed. If exceptions are filed, they shall stand for hearing 
 before the court, if then in session, or, if not, at the next sitting held 
 thereafter, by adjournment or otherwise. 
 
 67. 
 
 COSTS ON EXCEPTIONS TO MASTFR'S REPORT. 
 
 In order to prevent exceptions to reports from being filed for frivolous 
 causes, or for mere delay, the party whose exceptions are overruled shall, 
 for every exception overruled, pay $5 costs to the other party, and for 
 every exception allowed shall be entitled to the same costs. 
 
 68. 
 
 APPOINTMENT AND COMPENSATION OF MASTERS. 
 
 The district courts may appoint standing masters in chancery in their 
 respective districts (a majority of all the judges thereof concurring in 
 the appointment), and they may also appoint a master pro hac viee in 
 any particular case. The compensation to be allowed to every master 
 shall be fixed by the district court, in its discretion, having regard to all 
 the circumstances thereof, and the compensation shall be charged upon 
 and borne by such of the parties in the cause as the court shall direct. 
 The master shall not retain his report as security for his compensation; 
 but when the compensation is allowed by the court, he shall be entitled 
 to an attachment for the amount against the party who is ordered to 
 pay the same, if, upon notice thereof, he does not pay it within the time 
 prescribed by the court. 
 
 69. 
 
 PETITION FOR REHEARING. 
 Every petition for a rehearing shall contain the special matter or cause 
 
RULES OF PRACTICE IN EQUITY. 907 
 
 on which such rehearing is applied for, shall be signed by counsel, and 
 the facts therein stated, if not apparent on the record, shall be verified 
 by the oath of the party or by some other person. No rehearing shall be 
 granted after the term at which the final decree of the court shall have 
 been entered and recorded, if an appeal lies to the circuit court of appeals 
 or the Supreme Court. But if no appeal lies, the petition may be admitted 
 at any time before the end of the next term of the court, in the discretion 
 of the court. 
 
 70. 
 
 SUITS BY OR AGAINST INCOMPETENTS. 
 
 Guardians ad litem to defend a suit may be appointed by the court, or 
 by any judge thereof, for infants or other persons who are under guardian- 
 ship, or otherwise incapable of suing for themselves All infants and other 
 persons so incapable may sue by their guardians, if any, or by their 
 prochein ami; subject, however, to such orders as the court or judge may 
 direct for the protection of infants and other persons. 
 
 71. 
 
 FORM OF DECREE. 
 
 In drawing up decrees and orders, neither the bill, nor answer, nor 
 other pleadings, nor any part thereof, nor the report of any master, nor 
 any other prior proceeding, shall be recited or stated in the decree or 
 order; but the decree and order shall begin, in substance, as follows: 
 "This cause came on to be heard (or to be further heard, as the case 
 may be) at this term, and was argued by counsel; and thereupon, upon 
 consideration thereof, it was ordered, adjudged, and decreed as follows, 
 viis:" (Here insert the decree or order.) 
 
 72. 
 
 CORRECTION OF CLERICAL MISTAKES IN ORDERS AND DECREES. 
 
 Clerical mistakes in decrees or decretal orders, or errors arising from 
 any accidental slip or omission, may, at any time before the close of the 
 term at which final decree is rendered, be corrected by order of the court 
 or a judge thereof, upon petition, without the form or expense of a 
 rehearing. 
 
 73. 
 
 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS AND TEMPORARY 
 RESTRAINING ORDERS. 
 
 No preliminary injunction shall be granted without notice to the oppo- 
 site party. Nor shall any temporary restraining order be granted without 
 
908 KULES OF PRACTICE IN EQUITY. 
 
 notice to the opposite party, unless it shall clearly appear from specific 
 facta, shown by affidavit or by the verified bill, that immediate and irrepa- 
 rable loss or damage vifill result to the applicant before the matter can 
 be heard on notice In ease a temporary restraining order shall be granted 
 without notice, in the contingency speeifled, the matter shall be made re- 
 turnable at the earliest possible time, and in no event later than ten days 
 from the date of the order, and shall take precedence of all matters, except 
 older matters of the same character. When the matter comes up for 
 liearing the party who obtained the temporary restraining order shall 
 proceed with his application for a preliminary injunction, and if he does 
 not do so the court shall dissolve his temporary restraining order. Upon 
 two days' notice to the party obtaining such temporary restraining order, 
 the opposite party may appear and move the dissolution or modification 
 of the order, and in that event the court or judge shall proceed to hear 
 and determine the motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice may 
 require. Every temporary restraining order shall be forthwith filed in 
 the clerk's office. 
 
 74. 
 
 INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL. 
 
 When an appeal from a final decree, in an equity suit, granting or 
 dissolving an injunction, is allowed by a justice or a judge who took 
 part in the decision of the cause, he may, in his discretion, at the time 
 of such allowance, make an order suspending, modifying, or restoring the 
 injunction during the pendency of the appeal, upon such terms, as to bond 
 or otherwise, as he may consider proper for the security of the rights of 
 the opposite party. 
 
 75. 
 
 RECORD ON APPEAL— REDUCTION AND PREPARATION. 
 
 In case of appeal: 
 
 (a) It shall be the duty of the appellant or his solicitor to file with 
 the clerk of the court from which the appeal is prosecuted, together with 
 proof or acknowledgment of service of a copy on the appellee or' his so- 
 licitor, a prsEcipe which shall indicate the portions of the record to be 
 incorporated into the transcript on such appeal. Should the appellee or 
 his solicitor desire additional portions of the record incorporated into 
 the transcript, he shall file with the clerk of the court his prsecipe also 
 within ten days thereafter, unless the time shall be enlarged by the court 
 or a judge thereof, indicating such additional portions of the record de- 
 sired by him 
 
 (b) The evidence to be included in the record shall not be set forth 
 in full, but shall be stated in simple and condensed form, all' parts riot 
 essential to the decision of the questions presented by the appeal being 
 
RULES OF PRACTICE IN EQUITY. 909 
 
 omitted and the testimony of witnesses being stated only in narrative 
 form, save that if either party desires it, and the court or judge so directs, 
 any part of the testimony shall be reproduced in the exact words of the 
 witness. The duty of so condensing and stating the evidence shall rest 
 primarily on the appellant, who shall prepare his statement thereof and 
 lodge the same in the clerk's office for the examination of the other parties 
 at or before the time of filing his praecipe under paragraph a of this rule. 
 He shall also notify the other parties or their solicitors of such lodgment 
 and shall name a time and place when he' will ask the court or judge to 
 approve the statement, the time so named to be at least ten days after 
 such notice. At the expiration of the time named or such further time 
 as the court or judge maj' allow, the statement, together with any objec- 
 tions made or amendments proposed by any party, shall be presented to 
 the court or the judge, and if the statement be true, complete, and properly 
 prepared, it shall be approved by the court or judge, and if it be not true, 
 complete, or properly prepared, it shall be made so under the direction 
 of the court or judge, and shall then be approved. When approved, it 
 shall be filed in the clerk's office and become a part of the record for the' 
 purposes of the appeal. 
 
 (c) If any dift'erence arise between the parties concerning directions 
 as to the general contents of the record to be prepared on the appeal, 
 such difference shall be submitted to the court or judge in conformity 
 with the provisions of paragraph 6 of this rule, and shall be covered by 
 tl'.e directions which the court or judge may give on the subject. 
 
 76. 
 
 RECORD ON APPEAL— REDUCTION AND PREPARATION— COSTS- 
 CORRECTION OF OMISSIONS. 
 
 In jjreparing the transcript on an appeal, especial care shall be taken 
 to avoid tlie inclusion of more than one copy of the same paper, and to 
 exclude the "formal and immaterial parts of all exhibits, documents, and 
 other papers included therein ; and for any infraction of this or any 
 kindred rule the appellate court may withhold or impose costs as the cir- 
 cumstances of the case and the discouragement of like infractions in the 
 future may require. Costs for such an infraction may be imposed upon 
 offending solicitors as well as parties. 
 
 If, in the transcript, anything material to either party be omitted by 
 accident or error, the appellate court, on a proper suggestion or its own 
 motion, may direct that the omission be corrected by a supplemental 
 transcript, 
 
 77. 
 
 RECORD ON APPEAL— AGREED STATEMENT. 
 
 When the questions presented by an appeal can be determined by the 
 appellate court without an examination of all the pleadings and evidence, 
 the parties, with the approval of the district court or the judge thereof. 
 
910 RULES OF PRACTICE IN EQUITY. 
 
 may prepare and sign a statement of the case, showing how the questions 
 arose and were decided in the district court, and setting forth so much 
 only of the facts alleged and proved, or sought to be proved, as is essential 
 to a, decision of such questions by the appellate court. Such statement, 
 when filed in the office of the clerk of the district court, shall be treated 
 as superseding, for the purposes of the appeal, all parts of the record 
 other than the decree from which the appeal is taken, and, together with 
 such decree, shall be copied and certified to the appellate court as the 
 record on appeal. 
 
 78. 
 
 AFFIRMATION IN LIEU OF OATH. 
 
 Whenever under these rules an oath is or may be required to be taken, the 
 party may, if conscientiously scrupulous of taking an oath, in lieu thereof 
 make solemn affirmation to the truth of the facts stated by him. 
 
 79. 
 
 ADDITIONAL RULES BY DISTRICT COURT. 
 
 With the concurrence of a majority of the cij-cuit judges for the circuit, 
 the district courts may make any other and further rules and regulations 
 for the practice, proceedings, and process, mesne and final, in their re- 
 spective districts, not inconsistent with the rules hereby prescribed, and 
 from time to time alter and amend the same. 
 
 80. 
 
 COMPUTATION OF TIME— SUNDAYS AND HOLIDAYS. 
 
 When the time prescribed by these rules for doing any act expires on 
 a Sunday or legal holiday, such time shall extend to and include the next 
 succeeding day that is not a Sunday or legal holiday. 
 
 81. 
 
 THESE RULES EFFECTIVE FEBRUARY 1, 1913— OLD RULES 
 ABROGATED. 
 
 These rules shall be in force on and after February 1, 1913, and shall 
 govern all proceedings in cases then pending or thereafter brought, save 
 that where in any then-pending cause an order has been made or act 
 done which cannot be changed without doing substantial injustice, the 
 court may give effect to such order or act to the extent necessary to 
 avoid any such injustice. 
 
 All rules theretofore prescribed by the Supreme Court, regulating the 
 practice in suits in equity, shall be abrogated when these rules take effect. 
 
INDEX TO EQUITY RULES 
 
 Eule. Page. 
 Abatement, defenses formerly presentable by, to be made in 
 
 answer 29 894 
 
 Absence of persons who would be proper parties 39 897 
 
 Account, matters of, reference to master riii 904 
 
 to be identified but not stated in master's report til 904 
 
 forms of, before master 63 905 
 
 Action, at law, erroneously begun as suit in equity transfer. ... 22 892 
 
 joinder of, causes of 79 910 
 
 to be prosecuted in name of real party in interest 37 897 
 
 Additional rules, by district court 79 910 
 
 Administrator as party 37 897 
 
 Admissibility of evidence offered to be passed on by court 46 899 
 
 Admission of execution, etc., of documents, etc 58 904 
 
 Advancement of causes, notice of interlocutory orders, etc 6 888 
 
 Affidavit, plaintiff's, of noncompliance with decree, attachment 
 
 to issue 8 889 
 
 to be made of service of process by person appointed there- 
 for 15 891 
 
 of expert witnesses in patent and trademark eases, provi- 
 sions as to 48 900 
 
 required on application for continuance 57 902 
 
 to be identified but not stated in master's report 61 904 
 
 previously used in court, etc., may be used before master 64 905 
 
 on application for preliminary injunction 73 907 
 
 Affirmation in lieu of oath 78 910 
 
 Agreed statement, record on appeal 77 909 
 
 Alternative defenses may be stated in answer 30 895 
 
 Amended bill, ansv.er to 32 895 
 
 Amendments generally 19 892 
 
 permitted of any process, pleading, record, etc 19 892 
 
 of bill as of course 28 894 
 
 not after defendant's pleading filed, except, etc 28 894 
 
 on suggestion of defect of parties 43 898 
 
 of pleadings on substitution of parties 45 899 
 
 911 
 
912 INDEX TO EQUITY EULES. 
 
 Rule. Page. 
 
 Answer, subpoena, proper process to compel 7 889 
 
 time for 12 890 
 
 to be filed within time named in subpoena 16 891 
 
 enlarging time for filing 17 891 
 
 when to be filed, on motion set aside decree pro confesso . . 17 891 
 
 exceptions to, for scandal and impertinence, shall not obtain 21 892 
 
 defenses to be presented in 29 894 
 
 to be filed if motion to dismiss denied 29 894 
 
 if not filed, decree pro confesso entered 29 894 
 
 defenses formerly presentable by plea in bar or abatement, 
 
 to be made in 29 894 
 
 what to contain 30 895 
 
 amendment of, by leave, on reasonable notice 30 895 
 
 to omit statement of evidence 30 895 
 
 to avoid general denial of averments of bill 30 895 
 
 to specifically admit, or deny, or explain facts upon wliicli 
 
 plaintiff' relies 30 895 
 
 contents, counterclaim 30 895 
 
 to state counterclaims 30 895 
 
 may state defenses in alternative 30 895 
 
 cause at issue on filing of, unless, etc 31 805 
 
 to amended bill 32 895 
 
 new or supplemental, to be filed to amended bill 32 895 
 
 exceptions for insufficiency of, abolished 33 896 
 
 if insufficient may be amended or matter stricken out .... 33 896 
 
 when defect of parties suggested, proceedings on 43 898 
 
 may be stricken out for failure to answer intcnogatories or 
 
 produce documents 58 903 
 
 to be identified but not stated in master's report 61 904 
 
 Appeal, injunction pending 74 908 
 
 record on, diff'erences as to 75 908 
 
 reduction and preparation 75 908 
 
 costs — correction of omissions 76 909 
 
 agreed statement 77 909 
 
 Appearance, filed with clerk to be noted in equity docket 3 887 
 
 subpoena proper process to compel 7 889 
 
 Appellant, to notify opposing party or solicitors, etc 75 908 
 
 to file praecipe indicating portion of record on appeal 75 908 
 
 to condense evidence, etc 75 908 
 
 Appellate court not to reverse decree unless 46 899 
 
 court may direct further steps as justice may require 46 899 
 
 Appellee to file prascipe indicating additional portions of record 
 
 on appeal . . . 75 908 
 
 Appointment and fees of stenographers 50 900 
 
 compensation of masters 68 906 
 
 Assistance, writ of, when to issue 7 889 
 
 on refusal to obey decree for deli\ ery of possession 9 889 
 
INDEX TO EQUITY RULES. 9 13 
 
 Rule. Page. 
 
 Attachment, provisions as to 7 889 
 
 for noncompliance with decree 8 889 
 
 not to be discharged unless upon full compliance with 
 
 decree, etc 8 889 
 
 may issue for failure to answer interrogatories or produce 
 
 documents 58 903 
 
 Attendance of witnesses before commissioner, master, or examiner 52 901 
 
 Averments of bill, if not denied, deemed confessed, except, etc. . . 30 895 
 Bill, subpoena proper mesne process to compel appearance and 
 
 answer to 7 889 
 
 when filed, clerk to issue subpoena 12 890 
 
 may be taken pro conf esso if answer not filed, etc 12 890 
 
 exceptions to, for scandal and impertinence, shall not obtain 21 892 
 
 to be signed by solicitors 24 893 
 
 of complaint, contents 25 893 
 
 stockholder's 27 894 
 
 stockholder's, what to contain 27 894 
 
 amendment of, as of course 28 894 
 
 amended, answer to 32 895 
 
 supplemental, what necessary in 35 896 
 
 of revivor and supplemental bills, what necessary in 35 896 
 
 may be dismissed for failure to answer interrogatories or 
 
 produce docunients 58 903 
 
 verification of, on application for preliminary injunction, 
 
 etc 73 907 
 
 Bond on order suspending, etc., injunction pending appeal 74 908 
 
 Books, clerk to keep equity docket, order book, equity journal 3 887 
 
 papers, etc., production of, required by master 62 905 
 
 Calendar, trial, case goes on, when 56 902 
 
 Cause, speeding, provision as to, on motion to set aside decree 
 
 pro confesso 17 891 
 
 Causes, advancement, conduct and hearing of, notice of inter- 
 locutory orders for 6 888 
 
 of action, joinder of 26 893 
 
 frivolous, imposition of costs on exceptions to master's re- 
 port 67 906 
 
 Certificate, signature of solicitor to pleading to be considered . . 24 893 
 Chambers, awarding process, commissions, orders, rules, etc., 
 
 by judge at 1 887 
 
 Charge to be identified, but not stated in master's report 61 904 
 
 Circuit court of appeals, if appeal lies to, rehearing not granted 
 
 after term 69 906 
 
 Circuit judge may dispense with motion day if public interest 
 
 permits 6 888 
 
 Citizenship, name, and residence of each party to be stated in bill 25 893 
 
 Claim, further and better statement of nature of, may be ordered 20 892 
 S. Eq.— 58. 
 
9][4 INDEX TO EQUITY RULES. 
 
 Kule. Page. 
 
 Claimants Ijefore master, examinable by him 65 905 
 
 Class, representatives of, may sue or defend 38 897 
 
 Clerical mistakes in orders and decrees, correction of 72 907 
 
 Clerk, duties of 2 887 
 
 to keep equity docket 3 887 
 
 order book 3 887 
 
 equity journal 3 887 
 
 motions grantable of course by 5 888 
 
 to grant as of course, motions and applications not requir- 
 ing order of court or judge 5 888 
 
 to issue writ of assistance on refusal to obey decree for de- 
 livery of possession 9 889 
 
 to issue subpoena when bill filed, and not before 12 890 
 
 of court, verification of pleadings before 36 896 
 
 to send copies of interrogatories to solicitors of record .... 58 903 
 office of, awarding of process, commissions, orders, rules, 
 
 etc., by judge at 1 887 
 
 when open 2 887 
 
 master to return report into 66 906 
 
 temporary restraining orders to be filed in 73 907 
 
 statement as to appeal to be filed in 75 908 
 
 Commissioner, attendance of witnesses before 52 901 
 
 Commissions, award of, by judge at chambers, etc 1 887 
 
 Compensation and appointment of masters 68 906 
 
 of master to be fixed by court 68 906 
 
 Competency, etc., of questions asked before examiner not to be 
 
 decided by him 51 900 
 
 Computation of time — Sundays and holidays 80 910 
 
 Conduct of causes, notice of interlocutory orders for 6 888 
 
 Contempt for noncompliance with mandatory order, etc 8 889 
 
 Continuances, provisions as to 57 902 
 
 Copy of praecipe indicating portions of record on appeal 75 908 
 
 service Of, indicating, etc 75 908 
 
 Corporate officer to sign interrogatories under oath 58 903 
 
 Corporation, when interrogatories to be answered Ijy officer of 57 902 
 
 stockholder's bill against 27 894 
 
 Correction of clerical mistakes in orders and decrees 72 907 
 
 omissions in transcript on appeal 76 909 
 
 Costs, payment of, and full compliance with decree before a dis- 
 charge of attachment 8 889 
 
 of plaintifi' to be paid before court will set aside decree pro 
 
 conf esso, etc 17 891 
 
 terms as to, when further and particular statement in plead- 
 ing required 20 892 
 
 Costs, to nominal parties 40 897 
 
 stenographer's fees to be taxed as 50 900 
 
INDEX TO EQUITY RULES. gj^5 
 
 Rule. Page. 
 
 Costs, of incompetent, etc., depositions to be dealt with by court 51 900 
 
 on continuances, provisions as to 57 902 
 
 proving execution or genuineness of document, etc. ... 58 903 
 
 reference to master 59 904 
 
 exception to master's report 67 906 
 
 may be imposed upon offending solicitors 76 909 
 
 imposition of, for infraction of rule as to record on appeal 76 909 
 
 Counsel, signature of 24 893 
 
 to give notice of taking testimony before examiner, etc. ... 53 901 
 
 consent of, to continuances, provisions as to 57 902 
 
 to sign petition for rehearing 69 906 
 
 Counterclaim, to be stated in answer 30 895 
 
 to be replied to 31 895 
 
 in default of reply to, decree pro confesso entered 31 895 
 
 Court, on motion or own initiative, may order redundant, imper- 
 tinent or scandalous matter stricken out 21 892 
 
 testimony usually to be taken in, at trial 46 899 
 
 to deal with costs of incompetent, etc., depositions 51 900 
 
 contempt of, by witness refusing to appear before commis- 
 sioner, master or examiner 52 901 
 
 may appoint standing masters in chancery 68 906 
 
 provisions as to approval by, of appellant's statement, etc., 
 
 on appeal 75 908 
 
 district, additional rules by 79 910 
 
 Creditor making claim before master examinable by him 65 905 
 
 Cross-bill, — coimterclaim to- be stated in answer, and not by . . . . 30 895 
 Cross-examination of expert witnesses in patent and trade- 
 mark cases 48 900 
 
 witness where no notice of deposition given 54 902 
 
 Damage, averments in bill as to 30 895 
 
 to be shown on application for preliminary injunction .... 73 907 
 
 Death of party, revivor 45 899 
 
 Decrees of court to be entered in equity journal. . 3 887 
 
 process to issue to compel obedience to 7 889 
 
 compelling obedience to, writ of sequestration 8 889 
 
 discharge of attachment upon compliance with 8 889 
 
 for specific performance; provision as to 8 889 
 
 for performance of specific act, attachment when 8 889 
 
 solely for payment of money, writ of execution on 8 889 
 
 final, enforcement of 8 889 
 
 for delivery of possession, writ of assistance on refusal to 
 
 obey ; 9 889 
 
 for defieienpy in foreclosures, etc 10 890- 
 
 pro confesso on default in answer 16 891 
 
 when may be set aside 17 891 
 
 to be followed by final decree 17 891, 
 
QIQ INDEX TO EQUITY RULES. 
 
 Rule. Page. 
 
 Decrees, final, following decree pro confesso .-. 17 891 
 
 pro eonfesso entered, if answer not filed, etc 29 894 
 
 in default of reply to counterclaim 31 895 
 
 not to be reversed unless material prejudice would result ... 46 899 
 
 form of 71 907 
 
 shall not recite pleadings 71 907 
 
 correction of clerical mistakes in , 72 907 
 
 final, appeals from in injunction suits 74 908 
 
 to be sent up with agreed statement on appeal 77 909 
 
 Deeds, etc., decree for delivering up, attachment in 8 889 
 
 Default to answer, bill taken pro eonfesso 16 891 
 
 of reply to counterclaim, decree pro eonfesso 31 895 
 
 in answer to amended bill, proceedings on 32 895 
 
 Defect, court to disregard in proceeding not affecting substantial 
 
 rights 19 892 
 
 of parties resisting objection 43 898 
 
 tardy objection to 44 898 
 
 Defendant, subpoena proper process to compel appearance and 
 
 answer of 7 889 
 
 if not found, writ of sequestration proper process to issue, 
 
 etc 7 889 
 
 to take notice of certain decrees 8 889 
 
 required to file answer on or before 20th day after service 
 
 of subpoena 12 890 
 
 service of subpoena to be upon 13 890 
 
 to answer within time named in subpoena 16 891 
 
 person refusing to join as plaintiff or defendant may be 
 
 made defendant 37 897 
 
 time within which to take deposition for 47 899 
 
 Defense, further and better statement of nature of, may be or- 
 dered 20 892 
 
 how presented 29 894 
 
 what to be heard separately and disposed of before trial, etc. 29 894 
 
 testing sufficiency of 33 896 
 
 Deficiency in foreclosures, etc., decree for 10 890 
 
 Delay, signature of solicitor to pleadings certificate that plead- 
 ings not interposed for 24 893 
 
 master to certify reason for any to court 60 904 
 
 imposition of costs for, on exceptions to master's report. . . 67 906 
 
 Delivery of possession, writ of assistance to enforce 7 889 
 
 Demands, joint and several 42 898 
 
 Demurrers abolished 29 894 
 
 Depositions to be taken In exceptional instances 47 899 
 
 time within which to be taken '. . . . . 47 899 
 
 taken before examiners, etc 49 900 
 
 expense Of taking to be advanced by party calling witnesses 50 900 
 
INDEX TO EQUITY RULES. 9I7 
 
 Rule. Page. 
 
 Depositions, court to deal with costs of Incompetent, etc. . . 51 900 
 
 under Eev. Stat. 863, 865, 866, 867,— cross-examination ... 54 902 
 
 deemed published when filed 55 902 
 
 on expiration of time for, case goes on trial calendar 56 902 
 
 to be identified, but not set forth in master's report 61 904 
 
 may be taken by master 62 905 
 
 etc., former may be used before master 64 905 
 
 previously used in court may be used before master 64 905 
 
 Differences concerning directions as to contents of record on 
 
 appeal, provisions as to 75 908 
 
 Disability of any party to be stated in bill 25 893 
 
 Discovery, interrogatories for, when to be filed 58 903 
 
 Dismiss, motion to, setting down for hearing 29 894 
 
 Dismissal of causes continued, if not reinstated 57 902 
 
 District courts, always open for certain purposes 1 887 
 
 to establish times and places when motions may be made 
 
 and disposed of 6 888 
 
 additional rules by 79 910 
 
 District judge, may make, direct, and award process, commis- 
 sions, orders, rules, etc 1 887 
 
 Documents, inspection and production of 58 903 
 
 court may enforce inspection and production of 58 903 
 
 interrogatories for discovery of, when to be filed 58 903 
 
 execution or genuineness of, call for admission of 58 903 
 
 identified, but not set forth in master's report 61 904 
 
 production of, required by master 62 905 
 
 previously used in court may be used before master ...... 64 905 
 
 Dwelling house, service of subpoena by leaving copy at 13 890 
 
 Equity Docket, clerk to keep 3 887 
 
 index of 3 887 
 
 noting of order in, not notice 4 888 
 
 day of return of master's report to be entered in 66 906 
 
 Equity Journal, clerk to keep 3 887 
 
 index of 3 887 
 
 Equity, suit in, action at law erroneously begun as — transfer . . 22 892 
 matters ordinarily determinable at law when arising in, 
 
 to be disposed of therein 23 892 
 
 Error or defect in proceedings, court to disregard when not 
 
 affecting substantial rights 19 892 
 
 Evidence, mere statement of, to be omitted from bill 25 893 
 
 admissibility of, to be passed on by court 46 899 
 
 offered and excluded, proceedings on 46 899 
 
 aflSdavits of expert witnesses in patent and trademark cases, 
 
 when not to be used as '. .' 48 900 
 
 taken before examiners to be returned to court 49 900 
 
 taken before examiners, provisions as to 51 900 
 
918 INDEX TO EQUITY RULES. 
 
 Rule. Page. 
 
 Evidence, objections to, taken before examiner, etc 51 900 
 
 court or judge may enforce answers to interrogatories and 
 
 production of documents containing 58 903 
 
 master may direct mode of proving matters before him .... 62 905 
 
 before master on examination to be taken down 65 905 
 
 how to be stated in record 75 908 
 
 Ex parte, cause to be proceeded with after decree pro confesso 16 891 
 
 Examination to be identified, but not stated in master's report 61 904 
 
 Examiners, evidence taken before, to be returned to court 49 900 
 
 provisions as to 51 900 
 
 not to decide on competency, materiality, or relevancy of 
 
 questions 51 900 
 
 attendance of witnesses before 52 901 
 
 notice of taking testimony before, etc 53 901 
 
 cross-examination of witness before 54 902 
 
 Exceptions for insufficiency of answer abolished 33 896 
 
 to evidence offered and excluded, provisions as to 46 899 
 
 to master's report 66 906 
 
 costs on 67 906 
 
 Execution, writ of, provisions as to 8 889 
 
 admission of, of documents, etc ' 58 903 
 
 Executor as party 37 897 
 
 Expert witnesses, testimony of, in patent and trademark cases 48 900 
 Facts, ultimate statement of, upon which relief asked, to be 
 
 stated in bill 25 893 
 
 insuificiency of, as defense, how presented 29 894 
 
 material, may be alleged in supplemental pleading. 34 896 
 
 not to be stated in master's report 61 904 
 
 Fees, of stenographer 50 900 
 
 File number, each suit and all papers, process, etc., to be marked 
 
 with, and noted on equity docket 3 887 
 
 Filing of deposition deemed publication 55 902 
 
 Final hearing, points of law may be disposed of before 29 894 
 
 Final process, issue and return of 1 887 
 
 to be served by marshal, deputy, etc 15 891 
 
 Foreclosure of mortgages, etc., decree for balance due 10 890 
 
 Form of accounts before master 63 905 
 
 decree 71 907 
 
 Former depositions, etc., may be used before master 64 905 
 
 Forms, technical, of pleadings abrogated 18 891 
 
 alternative— prayer for specific relief may be in 25 893 
 
 Genuineness of documents, admission of, etc 58 903 
 
 Guardian as party 37 397 
 
 may sue for infants 70 907 
 
 ad litem, may be appointed by court or judge, etc 70 907 - 
 
nSTDEX TO EQUITY RULES. 9I9 
 
 Rule. Page. 
 Hearing on merits — making and directing interlocutory motions, 
 
 orders, rules, etc., preparatory to 1 887 
 
 of causes, notice of interlocutory orders for 6 888 
 
 final, points of law may be disposed of before 29 894 
 
 on exceptions to report of master 66 906 
 
 Heir as party to suits to execute trusts of will 41 898 
 
 Holidays, legal, clerk's office not open 2 887 
 
 computation of time 80 910 
 
 Impertinence, scandal, exceptions to bills, answers, etc., for, shall 
 
 not obtain 21 892 
 
 Incompetents, suits by or against 70 907 
 
 Indices of Equity Docket, Order Book, and Equity Journal, 
 
 clerk to keep 3 887 
 
 Infants, nothing to be taken against as confessed 30 895 
 
 nominal parties in suits not against 40 897 
 
 may sue by guardian or by prochein ami 70 907 
 
 guardians ad litem may be appointed to defend suits against 70 907 
 
 Injunction, for specific performance, provision as to 8 889 
 
 preliminary, and temporary restraining orders 73 907 
 
 pending appeal 74 908 
 
 Insufficiency of fact, defense of, how presented 29 894 
 
 Interlocutory, motions, orders, rules, etc., making and directing 1 887 
 Interrogatories, written, practice as to, to be followed in case 
 
 of refusal of witness before master, examiner, etc 52 901 
 
 when to be filed 58 903 
 
 when to be answered, etc 58 903 
 
 court may enforce answers to 58 903 
 
 to be answered separately and fully, in writing, under oath, 
 
 and signed 58 903 
 
 objections to, provisions as to 58 903 
 
 copies to be sent by clerk to solicitors of record 58 903 
 
 examination of accounting party before master on 63 905 
 
 claimants before master examinable on 65 905 
 
 Intervention, when allowed 37 897 
 
 Issue, of subpoena 12 890 
 
 cause at, upon filing of answer, except, etc 31 895 
 
 Joinder of causes of action 26 893 
 
 parties, provision as to 37 897 
 
 Joint and several demands 42 898 
 
 Judge, district, may make, direct, and award process, commis- 
 sions, orders, rules, etc 1 887 
 
 in chambers, orders by, to be entered in order book 3 887 
 
 may suspend, alter or rescind motion granted as of course 
 
 by clerk 5 888 
 
 on notice, if any, may make interlocutory orders, etc 6 888 
 
 verification of pleadings before 36 896 
 
920 INDEX TO EQUITY RULES. 
 
 Rule. Page. 
 
 Jurisdiction, ground on which depends to be stated in bill 25 893 
 
 Justice, convenient administration of, joinder of causes of action 
 
 to promote 26 893 
 
 Land, decree for conveyance of, attachment in 8 889 
 
 Law, action erroneously begun as suit in equity — transfer .... 22 892 
 matters ordinarily determinable at, when arising in suit in 
 
 ■equity, to be disposed of therein 23 892 
 
 points of, may be disposed of before Bnal hearing 29 894 
 
 Letter, call for admission of genuineness of, etc 58 903 
 
 Loss, immediate and irreparable to be shown on application for 
 
 temporary restraining order 73 907 
 
 Lunatic, nothing to be taken against as confessed 30 895 
 
 Marshal, deputy, etc., to serve all process, except 15 891 
 
 Master, attendance of witnesses before 52 901 
 
 reference to, exceptional not usual 59 904 
 
 proceedings before 60 904 
 
 duties of 60 904 
 
 may proceed ex parte when 60 904 
 
 may adjourn examination, etc., when 60 904 
 
 to proceed with reasonable diligence. 60 904 
 
 reports of, — documents to be identified, but not set forth. . . 61 904 
 
 powers of 62 905 
 
 to regulate all proceedings before him 62 905 
 
 may require production of all books, papers, etc.. 62 905 
 
 form of accounts before 63 905 
 
 former depositions, etc., may be used before 64 905 
 
 claimants before, examinable by him 65 905 
 
 appointment and compensation of 68 906 
 
 entitled to attachment for his compensation, when 68 906 
 
 not to retain report as security for compensation 68 906 
 
 pro hac vice, in particular cases, may be appointed by court 68 906 
 
 in chancery, standing, may be appointed by the court 68 906 
 
 Master's report, return of — exceptions — jhearing 66 906 
 
 costs on exception to g7 ggg 
 
 not to be recited in decree or order 71 907 
 
 Material supplemental matter may be set forth in amended 
 
 pleadings I9 §92 
 
 Materiality of questions not to be decided by examiner 51 900 
 
 Matter, further and better particulars of, in any pleading may 
 
 be ordered .......". _ 20 892 
 
 new or affirmative, in answer, deemed denied by plaintiff. . 31 895 
 Matters ordinarily determinable at law, when arising in suit in 
 
 equity, to be disposed of therein 23 892 
 
 Merits, hearing on— making and directing interlocutory motions, 
 
 orders, rules, etc., preparatory to 1 gg'r 
 
INDEX TO EQUITY RULES. 921 
 
 Rule. Page. 
 
 Mesne process, issuing and returning 1 887 
 
 subpoena shall constitute proper 7 889 
 
 to be served by marshal, deputy, etc v . 15 891 
 
 Misjoinder, defense of, how presented 29 894 
 
 Mistakes, clerical, correction of, in orders and decrees 72 907 
 
 Money, payment of, final process to execute decree for 8 889 
 
 Mortgages, foreclosure of, decree for balance due 10 890 
 
 Motions, interlocutory, making and directing 1 887 
 
 when may be made 1 887 
 
 etc., grantable of course, received and disposed of by clerk 2 887 
 
 grantable of course by clerk 5 888 
 
 for mesne process grantable of course by clerk 5 888 
 
 and applications not requiring order of court or judge 
 
 grantable of course by clerk 5 888 
 
 grantable of course by clerk may be suspended, etc., by 
 
 judge 5 888 
 
 requiring notice and hearing, times and places for 6 888 
 
 to enlarge time for filing answer 17 891 
 
 will not be granted unless payment of costs, etc 17 891 
 
 to strike out, to test sufficiency of answer 33 896 
 
 Motion day 6 888 
 
 may be dispensed with by senior circuit judge 6 888 
 
 Motion to dismiss, defenses to be presented in 29 894 
 
 ifames of plaintifi" and defendant to be stated in bill 25 893 
 
 Nominal parties 40 897 
 
 Non est inventus, return of, issuance of writ of sequestration 8 889 
 
 Nonjoinder, defense of, how presented 29 894 
 
 Notary public, verification of pleadings before 36 896 
 
 Notice, reasonable, to parties, of process, commissions, orders, 
 
 rules, etc. 1 887 
 
 of orders 4 888 
 
 order without prior, to be mailed by clerk to party, etc 4 888 
 
 of interlocutory orders, etc 6 888 
 
 defendant to take of certain decrees 8 889 
 
 of motion to dismiss 29 894 
 
 reasonable, of amendment of answer, by leave, etc 30 895 
 
 reasonable, of filing supplemental pleading 34 896 
 
 to be given to parties to be substituted 45 899 
 
 reasonable, of motion to enforce answers, etc 58 903 
 
 of taking testimony before examiner, etc 53 901 
 
 to parties or solicitors of proceedings before master 60 904 
 
 no preliminary injunction granted without 73 907 
 
 Oath, may be made by plaintiff if special relief asked 25 893 
 
 stockholder's bill to be verified by 27 894 
 
 interrogatories to be signed under. . , 58 903 
 
922 
 
 INDEX TO EQUITY RULES. 
 
 Eule. Page. 
 
 Oath, petition for rehearing to he verified by 69 906 
 
 affirmation in lieu of 78 910 
 
 Objections, to defect of parties. 43 898 
 
 tardy, to defect of parties 44 898 
 
 to evidence taken before examiner, provisions as to 51 900 
 
 to be noted by examiner, etc 51 900 
 
 Officers before whom pleadings verified 36 896 
 
 Old rules abrogated 81 910 
 
 Omissions, etc., in orders and decrees may be corrected without 
 
 rehearing 72 907 
 
 of portions of record on appeal 75 908 
 
 correction of, in record on appeal 76 909 
 
 Orders, when may be made 1 887 
 
 award of, by judge at chambers, etc 1 887 
 
 interlocutory, making and directing 1 887 
 
 grantable of course, received and disposed of by clerk .... 2 887 
 
 filed with clerk to be noted In Equity Docket* 3 887 
 
 of court to be entered in Equity Journal 3 887 
 
 made or passed by clerk, or judge in chambers, to be entered 
 
 in Order Book 3 887 
 
 made without notice, to be mailed by clerk 4 888 
 
 noting of, in Equity Docket or entered in Order Book, not 
 
 notice to parties 4 888 
 
 interlocutory, notice of 6 888 
 
 process to issue to compel obedience to 7 889 
 
 mandatory, for specific performance, provision as to 8 889 
 
 for delivery of possession, writ of assistance on refusal to 
 
 obey..... 9 889 
 
 in favor person not party, how enforced 11 890 
 
 against person not party, how enforced 11 890 
 
 that hill be taken pro conf esso on default 16 891 
 
 shall not recite pleadings 71 907 
 
 correction of clerical mistakes in -72 907 
 
 temporary restraining, and preliminary injunctions 73 907 
 
 justice or judge may make order suspending, etc., injunc- 
 tion pending appeal 74 908 
 
 Order book, clerk to keep 3 887 
 
 to contain all orders made or passed by judge in chambers 
 
 or by clerk 3 887 
 
 Index of, clerk to keep 3 887 
 
 entry of order in, not notice 4 888 
 
 Papers and orders filed with clerk, etc., to te noted in Equity 
 
 Docket 3 887 
 
 production of, required by master 62 905 
 
 Parties, noting or entry of order not notice to 4 888 
 
 persons not made 25 893 
 
INDEX TO EQUITY RULES. 923 
 
 Rule. Page. 
 
 Parties, generally — intervention 37 897 
 
 joinder of 37 897 
 
 proper, absence of persons who would be 39 897 
 
 nominal, appearance of 40 897 
 
 in cases of joint and several demands 42 898 
 
 defect of, resisting objection 43 898 
 
 defect of, tardy objection, proceedings on 44 898 
 
 to give notice of taking testimony before examiner, etc 53 901 
 
 clerk to send copies of interrogatories to if there be no 
 
 record solicitor 58 903 
 
 notice to, of proceedings before master 60 904 
 
 failing to appear before master 60 904 
 
 may be examined on oath by master 62 905 
 
 accounting before master, how to bring in accounts 63 905 
 
 to examine accounting party viva voce or upon interrogatory 63 905 
 
 time for filing exceptions to master's report by 66 906 
 
 to verify petition for rehearing by oath 69 • 906 
 
 to be given notice of preliminary injunctions, etc 73 907 
 
 Party, when order made in absence of, clerk to mail copy 4 888 
 
 heir as, to execute trusts of will 41 898 
 
 death of, revivor ; 45 899 
 
 procuring reference to master, payment of costs by 59 904 
 
 Patent cases, testimony of expert witnesses in 48 900 
 
 Persons not parties, process on behalf of and against 11 890 
 
 Person appointed to serve process to make affidavit thereof .... 15 891 
 
 Persons not made parties to bill 25 893 
 
 Person, non compos, nothing to be taken against as confessed. . 30 895 
 
 Persons joining as parties 37 897 
 
 who would be proper parties, absence of 39 897 
 
 Person making claim before master examinable by him 65 905 
 
 Petition for rehearing 69 906 
 
 Plaintiff entitled to subposna as of course when bill filed 12 890 
 
 time within which to take deposition for 47 899 
 
 Plea in bar, defenses formerly presentable by, to be made in 
 
 answer 29 894 
 
 Pleadings, filing of 1 887 
 
 technical forms abrogated 18 891 
 
 court may permit any to be amended 19 892 
 
 further and particular statement in, may be required 20 892 
 
 further and better particulars of matter stated in any may 
 
 be ordered 20 892 
 
 alteration in, on transfer of action at law erroneously 
 
 begun as suit in equity 22 892 
 
 to be signed by solicitors 24 893 
 
 When bill may be amended as of course 28 894 
 
 demurrers and pleas abolished 29 894 
 
924 INDEX TO EQUITY RULES. 
 
 Rule. Page. 
 
 Headings, supplemental, permitted when 34 896 
 
 officers before whom verified 38 896 
 
 filing, or amendment of, on substitution of parties 45 899 
 
 Pleas abolished 29 894 
 
 Possession, delivery of, writ of assistance to enforce 7 889 
 
 on refusal to obey decree for 9 889 
 
 Powers of master 62 905 
 
 Practice, additional rules for, by district court 79 910 
 
 Praecipe, filing indicating portions of record on appeal 75 908 
 
 Prayer for special relief to be stated in bill 25 893 
 
 Precedence given to hearing in cases of temporary restraining 
 
 orders 73 907 
 
 Prejudice, unless material, will result appellate court not to 
 
 reverse decree 46 899 
 
 Preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders 73 907 
 
 Preparation and reduction of record on appeal 75 908 
 
 —costs — corrections of omissions 76 909 
 
 Pro confesso, taking bills, motion for, grantable of course by 
 
 clerk 5 888 
 
 bill may be taken when answer not filed, etc 12 890 
 
 decree on default in answer 16 891 
 
 to be followed by final decree 17 891 
 
 entered if answer not filed 29 894 
 
 Proceedings before master, speeding of 60 904 
 
 powers in 62 905 
 
 Process, mesne and final, issuing and returning 1 887 
 
 award of, by judge at chambers, etc 1 887 
 
 issuing and return of 1 887 
 
 issued and returns thereon to be noted in Equity Docket ... 3 887 
 
 for taking bills pro confesso grantable of course by clerk.. 5 888 
 mesne or final, to enforce and execute decrees grantable. of 
 
 course by clerk 5 888 
 
 mesne and final, defined 7 889 
 
 in behalf of and against persons not parties 11 890 
 
 by whom served 15 891 
 
 mesne and final to be served by marshal, deputy, etc 15 891 
 
 may be served by person appointed therefor 15 891 
 
 court may permit any process to be amended 19 892 
 
 additional rules as to, by district court 79 910 
 
 Prochein ami may sue for infants 70 907 
 
 Production of books, papers, etc., may be required by master. . . 62 905 
 
 Publications of deposition, when filed 55 902 
 
 Questions, competency, materiality, or relevancy of, not to be 
 
 -decided by examiner 51 ggo 
 
 Record, court may permit any record to be amended 19 892 
 
 how evidence to be stated in 75 gog 
 
INDEX TO EQUITY RULES, 925 
 
 Rule. Page. 
 Record, appellant's statement as to record on appeal to liecome 
 
 part of 75 908 
 
 on appeal indicating portions of 75 908 
 
 additional portions, how indicated 75 908 
 
 reduction and preparation 75 908 
 
 difference as to 75 908 
 
 reduction and preparation — costs — correction of omis- 
 sions 76 909 
 
 agreed statement 77 909 
 
 Reduction and preparation of record on appeal 75 908 
 
 costs — corrections of omissions 76 909 
 
 Reference to master — exceptional, not usual 59 904 
 
 Rehearing, petition for, provisions as to 69 906 
 
 correction of clerical mistakes in orders and decrees Avitliout 72 907 
 
 Reinstatement of causes, continued 57 902 
 
 Relevancy of questions not to be decided by examiner, etc 51 900 
 
 Relief, special, prayer for, to be stated in bill 25 893 
 
 to be verified by oath of plaintiff, etc 25 893 
 
 Reply — when required — when cause at issue 31 895 
 
 none required unless answer asserts set-off or counterclaim 31 895 
 
 Report, master's, to court 60 904 
 
 documents to be identified, but not set forth 61 904 
 
 of master, exceptions, hearing 66 906 
 
 costs on exceptions to ; 67 906 
 
 not to be recited in decree or order 71 907 
 
 Representatives of class may sue or defend 38 897 
 
 Residence and citizenship of each party to be stated in bill 25 893 
 
 Restraining orders, temporary, and preliminary injunctions.... 73 907 
 
 Returns on process to be entered on Equity Docket 3 887 
 
 Return of subpoena not executed 14 891 
 
 of master's report — exceptions — hearing 66 906 
 
 Revivor, bills of, what necessary in 35 896 
 
 on death of party ,....,, , 45 899 
 
 Rights, substantial, court to disregard error or defect in pro- 
 ceedings which does not affect 19 892 
 
 Rules, when they may be awarded 1 887 
 
 interlocutory, making and directing 1 887 
 
 award of by judge at chambers, etc 1 887 
 
 grautable of course, received and disposed of by clerk 2 887 
 
 additional, by district court 79 910 
 
 when effective 81 910 
 
 old, abrogated 81 910 
 
 Sale, amount due above proceeds of decree for ; . . 10 890 
 
 Scandal and impertinence 21 892 
 
 Scandalous matter, signature of solicitor, certificate that rionS 
 
 inserted in pleading 24 893 
 
926 
 
 INDEX TO EQUITY EULES. 
 
 Rule. Page. 
 
 Sequestration, writ of, proper process if defendant not found.. 7 889 
 
 against estate of delinquent 8 88<l 
 
 person other than disobedient party to comply with man- 
 datory order for specific performance 8 889 
 
 Service of subpcena by delivery of copy, etc 13 890 
 
 Set-off to be stated in answer 30 895 
 
 replied to . 31 895 
 
 Signatures, pleadings to be signed by solicitors of record 24 893 
 
 Solicitors, noting or entry of order not notice to 4 888 
 
 of record to sign every pleading 24 893 
 
 to be furnished copy of amended bill 28 894 
 
 clerk to send, copies of interrogatories to 58 903 
 
 notice to, of proceedings before master 60 904 
 
 offending, imposition of costs on 76 909 
 
 to file prsecipe indicating portions of record on appeal 75 908 
 
 Specific performance, by some other person than disobedient 
 
 party 8 889 
 
 Standing masters in chancery, courts may appoint 68 906 
 
 Statement, further 'and particular in pleading may be required 20 892 
 
 agreed as to record on appeal 77 909 
 
 Stenographer — appointment — fees 50 900 
 
 Stockholder's bill 27 894 
 
 Subpoena shall constitute proper mesne process, etc 7 889 
 
 issue of, time for answer 12 890 
 
 to issue when bill filed and not before 12 890 
 
 to contain names of parties 12 890 
 
 when returnable 12 890 
 
 memorandum at bottom thereof 12 890 
 
 joint, against more than one defendant 12 890 
 
 separately, for each defendant when against more than one 12 890 
 
 manner of serving 13 890 
 
 not executed, provision as to 14 891 
 
 alias 14 891 
 
 Substitution of proper parties by revivor 45 899 
 
 Sufficiency of defense, how tested 33 896 
 
 Suits, papers filed, process issued, etc., to be noted on Equity 
 
 Docket 3 887 
 
 to execute trusts of will — heir as party 41 898 
 
 by or against incompetence 70 907 
 
 Supplemental pleading, when may be filed 34 896 
 
 Supreme Court, if appeal lies to, rehearing not granted after 
 
 term 69 906 
 
 Simdays, clerk's office not open 2 887 
 
 and holidays — computation of time 80 910 
 
 Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions '73 "907 
 
INDEX TO EQUITY RULES 92 Y 
 
 Rule. Page 
 Term, awarding process, commissions, orders, rules, etc., by 
 
 judge at chambers, etc., in 1 887 
 
 orders, decrees, etc., of court to be entered in Equity Journal 3 887 
 
 rehearing not granted after, if appeal lies 69 906 
 
 Testimony, usually to be taken in open court at trial 46 899 
 
 of expert witnesses in patent and trademark cases 48 900 
 
 may be taken down by stenographer 50 900 
 
 to be signed by witness 51 900 
 
 of witnesses before examiner to be read to him 51 900 
 
 contempt of coiu-t for refusal of witness to give testimony 
 
 before commissioner, examiner, etc 52 901 
 
 notice of taking before master or examiner 53 901 
 
 no further by deposition to be taken after case goes on trial 
 
 calendar, except, etc 56 902 
 
 how stated in record on appeal 75 908 
 
 Testing sufficiency of defense 33 896 
 
 Time, enlargement of, for full compliance with decree 8 889 
 
 to file answer 16 891 
 
 on expiration of, for depositions, case on trial calendar. ... 56 902 
 
 computation of — Sundays and holidays 80 910 
 
 Trademark cases, testimony of expert witnesses in 48 900 
 
 Transcript, cost of, to be advanced by party ordering 50 900 
 
 of evidence before examiner not to include argument 51 900 
 
 on appeal, indicating portions of 75 908 
 
 supplemental, correction of, omission by 76 909 
 
 Transfer of action at law erroneously begun as suit in equity. . 22 892 
 Trial, testimony usually taken in open court, rulings on objec- 
 tions to evidence 46 899 
 
 calendar, on expiration of time for depositions case goes on 56 902 
 
 Trials, separate — court may order separate trials of joint actions 26 893 
 
 Trustee as party 37 897 
 
 Vacation, awarding process, commissions, orders, rules, etc., by 
 
 judge at chambers in , 1 887 
 
 Value, averments in bill other than of, if not denied, deemed 
 
 confessed 30 895 
 
 Verification, bill to be verified by oath if special relief asked. . 25 893 
 
 of pleadings, officers before whom taken 36 896 
 
 petition for rehearing to be verified by oath, etc 69 906 
 
 Viva voce, master may examine persons before him 65 905 
 
 Vouchers, production of, required by master 62 905 
 
 Will, execution of trusts of — heir as party 41 898 
 
 Witnesses, testimony usually to be taken in open court 46 899 
 
 depositions of, may be taken when 47 899 
 
 testimony of expert in patent and trademark cases 48 900 
 
 before examiners, etc., cross-examination of, etc 49 900 
 
928 INDEX TO EQUITY KULES. 
 
 Rule. Page. 
 
 Witnesses, testimony of, to be read to 51 900 
 
 to be signed by 51 900 
 
 refusing to sign testimony 50 900 
 
 expense of taking deposition of, to be advanced by party 
 
 calling 50 900 
 
 attendance of before commissioner, etc 52 901 
 
 refusing to appear before commissioner, master or examiner 52 901 
 compensation of, for attendance before commissioner, master 
 
 or examiner 52 901 
 
 may be examined orally before court, or cross-examined 
 
 before examiner, etc., when no notice of deposition given 54 902 
 
 testimony of, by deposition, after case goes on trial calendar 56 902 
 
 may be examined on oath by master 62 905 
 
 testimony of, how stated in record on appeal 75 908 
 
 Writing, call for admission of execution or genuineness of.. ... 58 903 
 
 Writings, production of req^uired by master 62 905 
 
PAGES OF THE TEXT UPOl^ WHICH THE EQUITY 
 RULES ARE DISCUSSED OR REFERRED TO. 
 
 Rule 1, on pages 305, 306, 309, 312, 332, 371, 402, 414, 434. 
 
 Rule 2, on page 306. 
 
 Rule 3, on pages 306, 308, 312. CI. 3, p. 585. 
 
 Rule 4, on page 309. 
 
 Rule 5, on pages 306, 310, 317. 
 
 Rule 6, on pages 129, 204, 307, 310, 311, 332, 371, 402, 404, 414, 434. 
 
 Rule 7, on pages 312, 313, 590. 
 
 Rule 8, pp. 584, 585, 590, 591, 593, 771. 
 
 Rule 9, pp. 584, 590, 592. 
 
 Rule 10, p. 585. 
 
 Rule 11, pp. 312, 480, 590. 
 
 Rule 12, pp. 285, 313, 318, 319, 330, 334, 362, 375, 385, 386, 394, 406, 
 
 431, 454. 
 Rule 13, pp. 315, 316, 317, 319, 485. 
 Rule 14, pp. 313, 318, 485. 
 Rule 15, pp. 315, 485. 
 
 Rule 16, pp. 330, 334, 362, 375, 385, 386, 387, 388, 390, 394, 406, 431, 454. 
 Rule 17, on pages 330, 385, 387, 388, 391, 393. 
 Rule 18, on page 36. 
 Rule 19, on pages 201, 208, 286, 321, 354, 356, 357, 358, 360, 361, 364, 
 
 368, 374, 376, 392, 403, 419, 436, 438, 439, 454, 586, 729. 
 Rule 20, on pages 275, 355, 359, 436, 454. 
 Rule 21, on pages 30, 268, 310, 348, 423, 434. 
 Rule 22, on pages 27, 28, 29, 35, 302, 552. 
 Rule 23, on pages 29, 448. 
 Rule 24, on pages 134, 286, 349, 401, 425. 
 Rule 25, on pages 228, 261j 268, 269, 275, 277, 280, 283, 284, 285, 287, 
 
 290, 348, cl. 4 of Rule, p. 397, 425, 453, 471. 
 Rule 25, (3), p. 277. 
 Rule 25, (5) pp. 282, 284, 287, 289. 
 
 Rule 26, on pages 278, 279, 288, 295, 296, 301, 447, 448, 455. 
 Rule 27, on pages 208, 240, 243, 244, 287, 361, 425. 
 Rule 28, (2), on pages 201, 354, 355, 356, 358, (clause 2), 362, 363, 
 
 368, 419. 
 Rule 29, on pages 32, 35, 36, 122, 124, 128, 129, 200, 204, 261, 296, 
 
 301, 310, 311, 362, 375, 386, 394, 395, 398, 399, 402, 404, 
 
 405, 407, 411, 412, 414, 416, 418, 419, 421, 426, 431, 442, 452. 
 Rule 30, on pagss 282, 285, 362, 375, 394, 395, 411, 412, 413, 421, 422, 
 
 423, 424, 425, 426, 428, 429, 431, 432, 433, 434, 436, 437, 
 
 438, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455. 
 Rule 31, on pages 355, 356, 386, 415, 416, 417, 428, 430, 435, 440, 445, 
 
 451, 453, 454, 491. 
 Rule 32, on pages 362, 363, 375, 386, 436, 439. 
 Rule 33, on pages 432, 435, 436. 
 
 Rule 34, on pages 358, 366, 368, 370, 371, 376, 382, 386, 438, 439. 
 Rule 35, on pages 372, 375, 380, 383. 
 Rule 36, on page 425. 
 S. Eq.— 59 
 
 929 
 
930 
 
 TABLE OF EQUITY EULES. 
 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 Rule 
 
 on pages 225, 229, 246, 252, 253, 254, 358, 453, 454, 457. 
 
 on pages 228, 237, 238, 239, 402. 
 
 on pages 101, 225, 227, 231, 233, 236, 426. 
 
 on pages 231, 239, 286, 291. 
 
 on pages 229, 252, 254. 
 
 on pages 229, 240. 
 
 on pages 261, 262, 264, 426, 427. 
 
 on pages 261, 263, 427. 
 
 on pages 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 442. 
 
 on pages 131, 294, 492, 496, 497, 500, 520, 714, 733. 
 
 on pages 232, 490, 491, 492, 493, 497, 499, 500, 503, 507, 515, 
 
 517, 520, 521, 522, 523, 529, 535. 
 on pages 491, 492, 519, 520. 
 on pages 501, 522, 531, 533, 534. 
 on pages 502, 522, 531, 532. , 
 on pages 502, 522, 526, 531, 532, 533. 
 on pages 293, 493, 494, 495, 501, 523, 525, 526. 
 on pages 500, 522, 526. 
 on pages 491, 492, 497, 514, 515, 539. 
 on page 534. 
 on pages 518, 519, 555. 
 on pages 442, 555 
 on pages 292, (clauses 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) 293, 294, 390, 498, 507, 520. 
 
 CI. 5, pp. 525 and 526, 529, 530. 
 --- --' --' 559, 561. 
 
 59, on pages 425, 526, 558 
 
 60, on pages 526, 562. 
 
 61, on page 564. 
 
 62, on pages 562, 563. 
 
 63, on pages 520, 526, 563. 
 
 64, on page 563. 
 
 65, on pages 520, 526, 562. 
 
 66, on pages 564, 565, 568, 569, 571, 595. 
 
 67, on pages 566, 567, 573. 
 on page 557. 
 on pages 391, 425, 598, 599, 600, 601 
 
 70, on pages 229, 240^ 246. 
 
 71, on page 584. 
 
 72, on page 585. 
 
 73, on pages 425, 470, 471, 474, 475, 584. 
 
 74, on pages 471, 629. 
 
 75, on pages 520, 708, 709, 712. 
 75 (a), on pages 707, 708. 
 
 75 (b), on page 708. 
 75 (c), on page 708. 
 
 76, on pages 708, 709. 
 
 77, on page 710. 
 
 78, on page 425. 
 
 79, on page 304. 
 
 80, on page 305. 
 
 81, on page 305. 
 
 603. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 ABATEMENT. 
 
 answer in the nature of a plea in abatement, 406. 
 filing such answer, 406. 
 answer in abatement, 407. 
 
 ACCOUNTS. 
 
 finding by master in matters of accoxmt, 576. 
 
 ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW. 
 
 must be practical and efficient, 22. 
 
 U. S. Eev. Stat. sec. 723, now sec. 267 New Code construed, 22-26. 
 
 when must be set up as defense, 32, 33. 
 
 how defense to be made, 36. 
 
 court may dismiss though not set up, 34. 
 
 see Remedy at Law, 15. 
 
 must be plain, adequate and complete, 22. 
 
 see chap. 5, p. 27, when court must transfer case. 
 
 five rules given as tests, 22-24. 
 
 -AFFIRMATION TO PLEADINGS. 
 
 need not verify bill unless special order or process asked, 287, 425. 
 need not verify answer, 423, 425. 
 must verify bill under rule 27, 240. 
 
 AGOREGATING AMOUNTS, 
 to obtain jurisdiction, 175. 
 when it can be done, 175, 176. 
 what may be included, 177. 
 in special cases, 178-180. 
 when interests joined are distinct, 175. 
 when common fund involved, 176. 
 
 not several defendants owning distinct amounts, 176, 177. 
 when by assignment, 176. 
 
 ALIEN CORPORATIONS, 119. 
 citizenship of, 84, 119. 
 where may be sued, 120. 
 
 ALIENS. 
 
 right to sue and be sued, 88. 
 citizenship of, 88. 
 
932 INDEX. 
 
 ALIENS— continued. 
 
 statutes affecting jurisdiction, 88. 
 citizenship of alien Corporations, 84. 
 alien and citizen uniting, 90. 
 alien suing alien, 90, 91. 
 as to allegation of, 91. 
 suits between aliens and citizens, 88, 89. 
 must sue citizen in his district, 89. 
 alien sued in district where found, 88. 
 see Removal by, 89, 808-811. 
 
 ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL, 676. 
 in forma pauperis, 677. 
 
 jurisdiction of appellate court attaches, when allowed, 678. 
 see Appeals. 
 
 ALTERNATIVE STATEMENT AND PRAYER. 284, 288. See Dootle 
 Aspect. 
 Amending answer, see Answer. 
 
 AMENDING BILL. 
 
 when the bill can be amended, 354. 
 new rule 28 stated, 354. 
 amendments not of course, 355. 
 at and after trial, 357, 359. 
 new rule 20 stated, 359. 
 amendment after decree, 360. 
 
 to cure jurisdiction, 207, 360. 
 as to amount, 361. 
 effect of amendment, 361. 
 motion to amend, 362. 
 stating amendment, 363. 
 when to be filed, 364. 
 amendment after appeal, 208, 364. 
 not affected by state statutes, 365. 
 when cannot amend, 208. 
 see Amendments. 
 
 AMENDMENTS, 
 office of, 354. 
 not of course, 355. 
 at and after trial, 357. 
 after decree, 360. 
 amending decree, 586. 
 to cure jurisdiction, 207, 208, 369. 
 as to amount, 198, 361. 
 effect of amendment, 361. 
 motion to amend, 362. 
 
INBEX. 933 
 
 AMEND JIENTS— continued, 
 form of, 363. 
 when to be filed, 364. 
 amendment after appeal, 208, 364. 
 not affected by state statutes, 365. 
 of judgment, 586. 
 petition for removal, 836. 
 of process, 321. 
 of bill, 354. 
 
 of answer, 421, 436 et seq. 
 in appellate court, 208, 364. 
 fourteentli amendment, 2, 148. 
 amendment of return, 323. 
 amendment at any stage of the proceeding-, 208. 
 
 AMOUNT. 
 
 act of 1888, sec. 24, New Code stated and construed, 16|8. 
 
 matter in dispute, 169. 
 
 is jurisdictional, 168. 
 
 increased in New Code, 168. 
 
 when suit for money, 171. 
 
 when property sued for, 170. 
 
 must be in good faith, 173, 174. 
 
 reducing by credits, 171, 172. 
 
 by limitation, 173. 
 
 cases classified, 171. 
 
 see Aggregating Amount, 175. 
 
 in foreclosing a mortgage, 179. 
 
 in creditor's suits, 179. 
 
 what may be included in amoimt, 177. 
 
 in suits by and against receivers, 181. 
 
 in injunction suits, 185-191. 
 
 value of right in issue, 192. 
 
 cancelation and rescission, 192. 
 
 quieting title, 193. 
 
 dissolution of partnerships, 194. 
 
 in partition suits, 194. 
 
 in suits for office, 195. 
 
 in cases sounding in damages, 174, 195. 
 
 how amount alleged, 196. 
 
 affidavits to show, 197. 
 
 how issue is raised, 199. 
 
 •rthen by motion or answer, 201. 
 when by motion in nature of a demurrer, 202. 
 form of motions, 202. 
 iow the issue is tried, 204. 
 affidavits to show, 205. 
 burden of proof, 206. 
 
934 INDEX. 
 
 AMOUNT — continued. 
 
 amending to show amount, 198, 361. 
 
 in appellate jurisdiction, 205. 
 
 amendment as to, 205, 361. 
 
 as ground to remand, 824. 
 
 when amount not essential, New Code, Par. 2-25, Appendix. 
 
 ANCILLARY SUITS. 
 
 see AuxiLiABY Suits. ■ 
 
 ANSWER. 
 
 framing the answer, 421. 
 
 in the nature of a plea, 405. 
 
 ofBce of, in the nature of a plea in abatement, 406. 
 
 in abatement, 407. 
 
 in the nature of a plea in bar, 410. 
 
 form for, 411. 
 
 must be single, 412. 
 averment in answer as plea in bar, 413. 
 setting down for hearing, 414. 
 eflfect of setting down for hearing, 415, 417. 
 
 overruling for insufficiency, 416. 
 
 sustaining the legal sufficiency of the answer, 416. 
 
 when set down for hearing on issue of fact, 417. 
 
 when such answer is proven, 417. 
 
 when such answer is not proven, 419. 
 framing, to the merits of the whole bill, 421, 
 
 rule 30 stated, 421. 
 
 scandal and impertinence in, 423. 
 
 inconsistent matter allowed, 423. 
 
 setting up affirmative matter, 424. 
 
 when answer cures bill, 424. 
 
 need not verify, 425, 430. 
 
 new rule 36 states in what cases must be verified, 425. 
 
 form of answer, 425. 
 when need not answer fully, 426. 
 
 may object to parties in answer, 426. 
 
 rule 44 stated, 427. 
 effect of answer to the bill, 428. 
 
 as a, pleading, 428. 
 
 as evidence, 429. 
 
 new matter in answer, 429. 
 
 puts cause at issue, 430. 
 answer of corporations, 430, 
 
 officers as parties, 430. 
 affirmative relief in, 431. 
 when to be filed, rule 16, 431. 
 testing legal sufficiency of, 431. 
 
INDEX. 935 
 
 ANSWER— continued. 
 
 form of motion to strike out allegations, 433. 
 
 when motion to be filed, 434. 
 
 when motion sustained, 435. 
 overruled, 435. 
 
 scandal and impertinence in answer, 434. 
 amending answer, 421, 436. 
 
 form of motion, 437. 
 
 notice of motion, 437. 
 
 form of order il granted, 438. 
 when amendment conflicts with other allegations, 438. 
 amendment after cause ready for hearing, 439. 
 supplemental answer, 439. 
 
 APPEALS. 
 
 two methods, 619. 
 
 by writ of error, 619, 
 
 by appeal, 619. 
 by appeal is the method of equity, 619. 
 is the right absolute, 667. 
 acts governing, 620. 
 section 5 of the act of 1891 stated, 620. 
 
 from State to United States Supreme Court, 621, 763. 
 section 6 act 1891 providing final appellate jurisdiction of circuit court 
 
 of appeals, 621. 
 from interlocutory decrees, 622, 625. 
 
 acts governing, 622, 626. 
 
 time to be taken out, 628. 
 
 how limited, 627. 
 
 bond in, 628. 
 
 eff'ect of appeal on injunction, 629. 
 
 rules governing courts in considering appeals of this kind, 630. 
 
 effect as supersedeas, 629 (see Sdpeesedeas ) . 
 
 entering decree on merits on appeal, 630. 
 
 from decree appointing receivers, 632. 
 final decree as basis of appeal, 633. 
 
 statutes stated, 633. 
 
 what is a final decree, 634. 
 
 rules testing, 635-637. 
 
 judgments not final illustrated, 637. 
 
 judgments for costs not, 639. 
 
 judgments by consent not, 639. 
 time in which various appeals to be taken, 623, 624. 
 
 in interlocutory decrees, 628. 
 from circuit to Supreme Court, 622, 623. 
 to circuit court of appeals, 624, 662. 
 from circuit court of appeals to Supreme Court, 623. 
 from State to United States Supreme Court, 623. 
 how lapse of time calculated, 764. 
 
936 INDEX. 
 
 APPEALS— continued. 
 
 appeals, where taken, 640. 
 
 from district to the Supreme Court direct, 040. 
 
 three classes of cases, 640-642. 
 
 first, when jurisdiction of district court in issue, 640. 
 
 second, eases involving construction of the Constitution, 641. 
 
 third, when constitutionality of a law of Congress or a state in 
 issue, 641. 
 certification required, 642. 
 
 grounds of certification, 644. 
 
 certification is a prerequisite, 642, 643, 648. 
 
 what record must show, 645, 649. 
 
 form certification must assume, 649. 
 
 certificate to be granted in term, 650, 
 
 form of certificate, 651. 
 
 how issue presented and decided, 645. 
 
 four conditions under which it may be presented, 645, 646. 
 
 can same party sue out two appeals, 647. 
 appeals under clauses 4, 5, 6, sec. 5, act 1891, 652. 
 
 can circuit court of appeals determine questions of jurisdiction, 
 654, 656. 
 
 its jurisdiction when the appeal is based on clauses 4, 5, 6, of 
 act of 1891, 656. 
 
 election court of appeals or Supreme Court, 653. 
 
 Supreme Court taking jurisdiction decides all questions involved, 
 654. 
 appeal to circuit court of appeals, 621, 624, 660. 
 
 jurisdiction in appeal, 660. 
 
 statute stated, 660. 
 
 wholly appellate, 660. 
 practice in appeals; statutes, 661. 
 who may appeal, 697-705. 
 
 time to be taken, 624, 662. 
 
 notice of appeal, 664. 
 
 when is appeal said to be taken, 664. 
 
 petition for appeal, 666. 
 form of, 666. 
 motion for supersedeas, 666, 667. 
 
 form for, 666, 668. 
 
 see Supersedeas. 
 assignment of errors, 670. 
 
 must be filed with petition, 670. 
 
 equity rule 35 of Supreme Court rules stated, 670. 
 
 purpose of assignment, 671. 
 
 must be specific, 671, 672. 
 
 form of assignment, 673. 
 
 time for filing, 673. 
 
 confined to issues, 673. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 937 
 
 APPEALS— continued. 
 
 to the admission or rejection of evidence, 674. 
 
 not allowed to consent decree, 674. 
 
 cross errors not assignable, 671. 
 allowance of appeal, 676. 
 
 who may allow, 676. 
 
 what considered allowance, 677. 
 
 in forma pauperis, 677. 
 
 when jurisdiction attaches, 678. 
 bond, 679. 
 
 amount of bond, 679. 
 
 form of bond on appeal, 680. 
 
 conditions in bond, 680, 681. 
 
 to whom payable, 681. 
 
 by whom signed, 682. 
 
 approval of bond, 682. 
 
 effect of irregularities in giving bond, 683. 
 
 amendment of bond, 684. 
 
 when it becomes insufficient after appeal, 684. 
 supersedeas bond, 685. 
 
 power to grant, 685. 
 
 effect of, 686. 
 
 liability on, 687. 
 
 damages covered by, 688. 
 
 failure to prosecute appeal, 688. 
 
 sureties on, 689. 
 
 motion to vacate supersedeas, 689. 
 
 form of, 689. 
 citation on appeal, 691. 
 
 when necessary, 691. 
 
 may be waived, 692. 
 
 form of, 693. 
 
 when may be issued and when returnable, 694. 
 
 how served, 695. 
 
 alias citation, 696. 
 who may appeal, 697. 
 
 who made parties, 704. 
 
 summons and severance, 698. 
 
 when parties are not parties to the original proceedings, 699. 
 
 effect of death on, 701, 723. 
 
 as to parties in the suit not appealing, 701. 
 
 from a fictitious case, 70'1. 
 
 appeal by interveners, 702. 
 
 by and against receivers, 702. 
 
 by partners, 703. 
 
 cross appeals, 703. 
 transcript, 706. 
 
 what to contain. 707. 
 
938 INDEX. 
 
 APPEALS— continued. 
 
 form of stipulation by counsel, 707, 708. 
 
 how evidence to be stated, 708. 
 
 statement of facts to be deposited in clerk's office and notice to 
 
 other parties given, presenting statement to court, 709. 
 what transcript to contain on agreed statement, 710. 
 certificate to transcript, 711. 
 form of certificate, 712. 
 no bill of exceptions in equity, 713. 
 filing transcript, 715. 
 waiving irregularity in filing, 716. 
 docketing case in circuit court of appeals, 716. 
 failure to docket, 716. 
 printing record for hearing, 717. 
 diminution of record, 718. 
 dismissing appeal, 720. 
 
 certificate of clerk below as a, basis of dismissal necessary, 717. 
 twelve grounds on which motion to dismiss may be based, 720-722. 
 motion to dismiss, 722. 
 
 form of, 723. 
 effect of death on appeal, 723-726. 
 costs on appeal, 726. 
 submitting case to appellate court, 727. 
 briefs, 727. 
 form and size, 728. 
 
 when not allowed to be filed, 728. 
 oral argument, 729. 
 
 rules applied when cause called for hearing, 729. 
 amendments allowed in appellate court, 729. 
 to show jurisdiction, 729. 
 to cure defective pleadings, 730. 
 to cure defective procedure, 731. 
 
 rules applied in considering eases on appeal, 731-733. 
 rehearing in appellate court, 733. 
 filing petition for, 733. 
 new question not allowed, 733. 
 from circuit court of appeals to Supreme Court, 734. 
 appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court over, 734. 
 
 several methods of appeal stated, 734, 735. 
 
 first by certifying legal question, 735. 
 
 second may order whole record up, 735, 736. 
 
 third ordering up in case of final jurisdiction, 735. 
 
 fourth review by appeal when judgment not final, 735. 
 review by certifying questions to Supreme Court, 736. 
 
 ordering up entire record, 736. 
 
 by certiorari, 737. 
 
 petition for, and form, 738. 
 
IjSidex. 939 
 
 APPEALS— continued. 
 
 notice of application to be given, 739. 
 time to sue out writ, 740. 
 effect of granting writ, 740. 
 review by Supreme court when case not final in court of appeals, 
 741. 
 petition for appeal or writ of error, 744. 
 form of, 744. 
 assignment of errors, 745. 
 appeal from State courts to United States Supreme Court, 746. 
 
 statutes stated, U. S. Rev. St. sees. 709, 746 (see Chapter XXVI. ). 
 seven rules stated governing these appeals, 747-755. 
 time within which to appeal, 755. 
 amount involved affecting jurisdiction, 755. 
 
 effect of amount on appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 755. 
 practice in these appeals, 757. 
 statutes stated, 757. 
 petition for writ and form, 757. 
 citation, 762. 
 
 by whom citation signed and allowed, 758. 
 order of allowance and form, 759, 760. 
 effect of allowance by State judge, 761. 
 bond, 763. 
 when writ a supersedeas, 763. 
 
 time within which to obtain, 764. 
 not after sixty days, 765. 
 act must be followed to obtain, 765. 
 when supersedeas bond impaired, 766. 
 
 see JiANDATB. 
 
 APPEARANCE, 330. 
 rule 16 stated, 330. 
 now by defense to the bill, 330. 
 
 objection to subpoena, service, or return to be made in limine, 330. 
 objection made by motion to quash, 331. 
 proper practice in such cases, 331, 
 
 motion to quash, 330, 331. 
 
 form of motion, 331. 
 
 issue on merits would waive, 332, 
 
 when motion to be supported by affidavits, 332. 
 
 when defendant not sued in his district, 333. 
 
 form of objection, 333. 
 
 want of fundamental jurisdiction raised at any time after ap- 
 pearance, 334. 
 
 answer filed without authority, 334. 
 
 answer may be withdrawn with leave, 334. 
 
940 INDEX. 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 sections of Judicial Code referred to in text, 869. 
 
 rules in equity, 887. 
 
 index to equity rules, 911. 
 
 ARGUMENT IN APPELLATE COURT, 
 by brief, 727. 
 oral argument, 729. 
 
 ASSIGNMENT. 
 
 jurisdiction by, 209. 
 
 history of assignment clause in judiciary act, 217. 
 
 acts of 1789 and 1875 stated, 209, 217. 
 
 act of 1888 stated and construed, 210, 218. 
 
 what are choses in action within the statute, 211. 
 
 illustration of promissory notes payable to bearer made by cw- 
 porations, 215. 
 assignment must be genuine, 222. 
 effect of reassignment, 211. 
 how assignment alleged on bill, 221. 
 
 change after jurisdiction attached does not affect the suit, 222. 
 how issue raised, 222. 
 form for, 222, 223. 
 
 ASSIGNMENT OP ERRORS, 670. 
 cross errors, 671. 
 confined to the issues, 673. 
 must be specific, 671, 672. 
 form of, 673. 
 time of filing, 673 (see Appeals). 
 
 AUXILIARY SUITS, 
 what are, 482. 
 defined, 482. 
 
 distinction between auxiliary and original bill, 482-484. 
 supported by jurisdiction of main suit, 482. 
 illustrations given, 484. 
 
 not affected by citizenship, residence, or amount, 484. 
 substituted service of process in, 485. 
 service on agents, 485. 
 character of attorney on whom made, 486. 
 how service obtained, 487. 
 
 form of application for, 487. 
 motion to vacate service, 488. 
 
 form of, 488. 
 see Interpleader. 
 
INDEX. yil 
 
 BANKRUPTCY. 
 
 appeals in, 622, 745. 
 
 BANICS. 
 
 citizenship, 86. 
 parties to suit, 86. 
 removal by, 853. 
 Federal question, 144. 
 
 BILL. 
 
 old form, 267. 
 
 see Pamies. 
 
 present form under equity rules, 268, 269. 
 
 form of commencement, 269. 
 
 by corporations, 269. 
 must allege citizenship of parties, 270-272. 
 
 Federal district of residence, 271, 273, 
 necessity of accuracy, 273. 
 statement of the case, 275, 277. 
 
 four parts necessary, 275, 276. 
 discussed, 276-282. 
 
 stating part important, 277, 282. 
 
 equity rule 25 stated, 268. 
 allegation of Federal question, 279. 
 
 amount, 280. 
 
 fraud, 280. 
 laches must be explained, 281. 
 the prayer, 283. 
 
 form of, 283, 284. 
 
 alternative prayer, 289. 
 
 for me exeat, 284. 
 
 for injunction, 284, 
 
 for process, 285. 
 
 inconsistent prayers, 284, 288. 
 amendment of prayer, 286. 
 
 after replication, 286, 357. 
 see Amended Bill, 354. 
 signing bills, 286. 
 verifying bills, 287. _ 
 
 form of verification, 287. 
 joinder of causes of action, 278. 
 see Double Aspect, 288. 
 see Bills of Discovery, 291. 
 filing the bill, 312. 
 issuing process on, 312. 
 see StiBPCENA, 313. 
 
 how to examine to make defenses, 275-278. 
 multifariousness and misjoinder, 296. 
 
942 INDEX. 
 
 BILL, CROSS. 
 
 see Cboss Suit. 
 
 BILL OF DISCOVERY, 
 brief sketch of, 291. 
 necessity of, discussed, 291-294. 
 see DiscovEBY. 
 
 BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. 
 
 to the report of a master, 565. 
 
 form of, 565. 
 applies to writs of error and not to appeals, 713. 
 to remanding a case, when refused, 848. 
 
 form of bill, 848. 
 how exceptions noted in equity, 714. 
 
 BILL OF REVIEW, 
 purpose of, 604. 
 differs from rehearing, 604, 
 for what it lies, 605. 
 
 first, for error apparent, 605. 
 
 second, new matter since decree, 606, 
 
 third, newly discovered evidence, 606. 
 
 fourth, for fraud in decree, 607. 
 what bill must show, 608. 
 form of, 611, 612. 
 time of filing, 608, 
 leave to file, 610. 
 not appealable, 611, 
 parties to bill, 612. 
 who may attack decree, 612. 
 bill of, after appeal, 613. 
 who determines application, 614. 
 
 BILL OF REVIVOR, 
 obsolete, 379. 
 
 rule 45 requires, simple motion, 379. 
 nature of motion, 380. 
 v/hat motion to contain, 383, 
 
 form of, 383. 
 parties to, 380. 
 
 any party to the suit may make the motion, 381. 
 when sole plaintiff dies, 380. 
 when one of several plaintiffs dies, 381. 
 when one of several defendants dies, 381. 
 when to be filed, 382.' 
 other causes for revival, 382. 
 revival after decree, 384. 
 
INDEX. 94-3 
 
 BILL, SUPPLEMENTAL, 
 see Supplemental Bill. 
 
 BOND. 
 
 see Appeal. 
 in appeal, 628. 
 when supersedeas, 629. 
 see Supersedeas. 
 
 BRIEFS, 727. 
 
 CERTIFICATE. 
 
 of clerk, see Appeai« 
 to transcripts, 712. 
 
 CERTIORARI. 
 
 appeal by, 731. 
 
 petition for, 738. 
 
 form of, 738. 
 
 notice of application, 739, 
 
 time for, 740. 
 
 effect of granting, 740. 
 
 CHAMBERS. 
 
 see Ordebs in. 
 
 CITATION IN APPEAL, 691. 
 alias citation, 696. 
 see Appeal. 
 
 CITIZENSHIP. See Diveksitt of Citizenship. 
 inhabitant defined, 96, 272. 
 word used collectively, 57. 
 how issue raised and proof, 124. 
 residence and domicil defined, 124, 125. 
 burden of proof, 125. 
 issue of law by motion, and form, 126. 
 raising issue by motion in nature of plea, 127. 
 form, if corporation, 128. 
 raising issue in answer, 128. 
 want of appearing at trial, 130. 
 burden of proof, 125, 129. 
 section 5 act 1875, stated and discussed, 130. 
 motion and form to dismiss, 131. 
 
 how tried, 129. 
 not material, when Federal question, 165. 
 must be stated in bill, 272. 
 how stated, 272. 
 
944 IKDEX. 
 
 CITIZENSHIP— continued. 
 
 must be citizenship, not residence, 125, 272. 
 
 of corporations, 76. 
 
 rules stated, 82-84. 
 
 alien corporations, 84. 
 
 joint stock companies, 85. 
 
 partnership, 86. 
 
 national banks, 86. 
 
 married women, 87. 
 
 aliens, 88. 
 
 of representative parties, 57. 
 
 exceptions to rule, 58. 
 
 change of, affecting suit, 60. 
 
 who are not within meaning of act, 63, 64. 
 
 diversity of, as ground for removal, 804. 
 
 CIVIL SUIT, 
 what is, 43. 
 one that could be originally brought in the Federal court, 775, 776, 828. 
 
 CLERK. 
 
 office to be open during business hours, 306. 
 
 applications grantable of course by him, 306, 307. 
 
 must keep three books in which proceedings in a suit to be entered, 308. 
 
 see Certificate of. 
 
 CODE JUDICIAL. 
 
 see Appendix giving section befeered to in the Text, pages 869-885. 
 list of pages on which sections are construed, page 886. 
 
 COMMON LAW. 
 
 Federal Common Law, 19-21. 
 
 CONOEBSSIONAL CHARTERS. 
 
 is not now basis of a Federal question, 144. 
 
 CONSENT. 
 
 cannot give jurisdiction, 34. 
 
 cannot impeach consent decree, 617. 
 
 cannot appeal from it, 674. 
 
 COPYRIGHT, 95, 96. 
 
 CORPORATIONS. 
 
 citizenship of, 76-84, 109. 
 
 requirements and conditions of state to do business, 78, 116. 
 
 citizen of state where incorporated, 77-79. 
 
 can not change citizenship, 79, 83. 
 
IKDEX, 945 
 
 CORPORATIONS— continued, 
 illustrations given, 79. 
 when consolidated 81-84. 
 
 is a citizen of each state where incorporated, 83. 
 rules testing citizenship, 83, 84. 
 citizenship of alien corporations, 84. 
 where alien corporation must be sued, 119, 120. 
 
 when based on diversity of citizenship, 109-111. 
 rules governing venue in suits against corporations, 112. 
 what district is the domicil of a, corporation, 115. 
 foreign corporations to be sued must be doing business in the district 
 
 where sued, 116. 
 illustrations of doing business, 116-119. 
 
 nonresidents and aliens must sue corporations where incorporated, 119 
 where alien corporation must be sued, 119, 120. 
 Congressional charters not a ground of Federal jurisdiction, 144. 
 see Ba^'ks. 
 
 form of commencement of bill by or against a corporation, 269. 
 service or process on, 322. 
 stockholders as parties, 240-245. 
 officer as parties, 430. 
 Equity rule 27 discussed, 240-245. 
 removal by, 811. 
 
 COSTS. 
 
 in equity, 580. 
 
 on dismissal by court, 555. 
 
 allowed in taking and reading depositions, 547. 
 
 appeal from, 639. 
 
 on appeal, 726. 
 
 on remanding, 803. 
 
 COUXTERCLAIM. 
 
 effect of, on motion to remove, 826. 
 
 jurisdiction not affected by a defense that may reduce amount, 171, 172. 
 
 setting up in answer (new rule 30), 421, 431, 444. 
 
 see discussion as to when the counterclaim arises out of the transaction 
 
 and when not, 445-451. 
 new rule 30 as to counterclaim discussed, 444-45Q. 
 
 COURTS. 
 
 what courts created, 40, 41. 
 creation of Supreme Court, 40. 
 jurisdiction of, 40. 
 
 New Code, sects. 215, 233-252 inclusive, 
 district courts, section 24 New Code, pp. 42-44. 
 see Jurisdiction of Distbict Coubts, 43. 
 as courts of equity in the Federal system, 4-6. 
 courts of equity deal only with property rights, 44. 
 S. Eq.— 60. 
 
946 INDEX. 
 
 CROSS APPEAL. 
 
 must pursue rules for appeals, 703. 
 
 CROSS SUITS. 
 
 old cross bill and its uses discussed, 443, 444. 
 scope of the cross suit under new rules, 445. 
 rule 30 discussed, 445. 
 
 its purpose stated, 447. 
 nature of causes that may be set np under rule 30, 448. 
 to settle matters between defendants, 451. 
 
 in such case citizenship not material, 451. 
 may set up independent cause of action, 452. 
 
 form of the cross suit, 453. 
 parties to cross suit, 453. 
 cannot introduce new parties, 453. 
 filing the cross suit, 454. 
 amending the cross suit, 454. 
 putting the cross suit in issue, 454. 
 service of counterclaim when to be made, 455. 
 effect of dismissing original bill, 455. 
 
 DAMAGES. 
 
 when court of equity will give, 27, 28. 
 must be connected with the equity sought, 28. 
 
 DEATH. 
 
 effect on suit, see Bill of Revivob. 
 effect when complainant dies, 381. 
 effect on appeal, 701. 
 
 DE BENE ESSE, 
 see Evidence. 
 
 DECREE. 
 
 definition, 581. 
 classified, 581. 
 pro confesso, 385. 
 interlocutory, 581. 
 final, what is, 582, 634. 
 framing decree, 583. 
 
 who to prepare, 583. 
 
 rules for drawing decree, 584. 
 correcting errors in, 585. 
 recording decree, 585. 
 amending decree, 586. 
 efi^ect of decree, 587. 
 
 presumed to be right, 588. 
 
INDEX. 947 
 
 DECREE— continued. 
 
 extraterritorial effect, 588. 
 
 acting on the person, 588. 
 lieu of decree, 589. 
 enforcement of, 590. 
 
 equity rules 7, 8, 9, 10 applied, 590, 591. 
 when attachment or sequestration needed, 591. 
 delivery of possession, 592. 
 execution of, in foreclosure, 592. 
 
 sales under, 594. 
 
 sale by master, 594. 
 
 motion to confirm, 595. 
 
 exceptions to sale, 595. 
 
 effect of bid, 596. 
 
 purchaser under, 596. 
 notice of proceedings after decree, 597. 
 vacating decree, 615. 
 
 for fraud, 616. 
 
 on ground of mistake, 617. 
 
 third party impeaching, 618. 
 cannot impeach consent decree, 617. 
 who may attack decree, 616-618. 
 see BiLi OP Eeview. 
 
 DECREE PRO CONPESSO. 
 
 equity rules governing, 385. 
 
 when can be taken, 385, 386. 
 
 order to take bill as confessed, 387. 
 
 rule 17 stated, 387. 
 
 serving notice of the decree, 388, 
 
 form of order, 387. 
 
 form for decree pro confesso, 387, 388. 
 
 is proof necessary to enter final decree, 388. 
 
 effect of final decree, 389. 
 
 can defendant offer proof, 389. 
 
 final decree not matter of course, 390. 
 
 compelling an answer, 390. 
 
 right of defendant after default, 390. 
 
 setting aside decree, 391. 
 
 form of motion to set aside, 392. 
 
 defect of parties and issue as to, 261. 
 
 DEFENSES. 
 
 demurrers and pleas abolished, 394. 
 
 may file all defenses at same time, 394. 
 
 defenses presented by pleas in bar or abatement under old rules must 
 
 now be set up in answer, 394. 
 rules pertaining to defenses stated, 394, 395. 
 
948 INDEX. 
 
 DEFENSES— continued. 
 
 due order of pleading required, 395. 
 defenses that may be raised by motion, 396. 
 defenses as to jurisdiction, 396. 
 
 defect of parties, 397. 
 sufBciency of substance of bill, 397. 
 as to matter of form of bill, 398. 
 
 see Answer ; Motion in Natuee of a Demurbeb; Motiow IK Natuke 
 OF A Plea. 
 
 DELIVERY OF POSSESSION, 590, 592. 
 
 DEMURRER, MOTION IN NATURE OF. 
 
 demurrers abolished by rule 29, 394, 399. 
 motions in the nature of a demurrer, 399, 
 
 raise only questions of law, 399. 
 form of motion, 401. 
 
 have same effect and flavor of the demurrer, 401. 
 setting down motion for hearing, 402. 
 effect of sustaining the motion, 402, 403. 
 effect of overruling the motion, 403. 
 
 DEPOSITION. 
 see Evidence. 
 
 must apply to court to issue and take, 490. 
 de bene esse, 493, 499. 
 in rei perpetuam, 499, 500, 510-512. 
 dedimus potestatem, 512-516, 527. 
 before issue joined, 498. 
 after issue joined, 498, 491, 517. 
 returning and filing,, 534. 
 
 by mail, 534. 
 to foreign countries, 535. 
 publication of, 534. 
 letters rogatory, 536. 
 suppressing, 538-543. 
 witness adopting previous answers, 540. 
 on law side, 544. 
 
 costs allowed in taking and reading, 547. 
 defective certificate, 540. 
 see Discovery; Evidence. 
 
 DISCOVERY. 
 
 866"^%^!, OF, 291. 
 
 sketch of, 291, 292. 
 
 new rule 58 discussed, 292, 293. 
 
INDEX. 949 
 
 DISMISSAL OF BILL, 
 by plaintiflf, 350. 
 
 when may dismiss, 350. 
 
 ky mxttion and, uotiee,- 350>-. 
 
 when he cannot, 350, 351. 
 
 form of motion, 352. 
 
 without prejudice, 352. 
 
 three rules to be observed, 352. 
 
 when may be set up as bar, 352, 353. 
 
 after removal, 790. 
 dismissal by defendant, 442. 
 
 equity rule 29 stated, 442. 
 dismissal by court, 548. 
 
 when court will dismiss, 548. 
 
 section 5 act 1875, stated and applied, 549. 
 
 duty of court, 548, 549. 
 
 rule prior to 1875 not in force, 549. 
 
 reason why plea to jurisdiction should be filed, 549, 550. 
 
 for want of parties, 551. 
 
 when complainant has parted with title, 551. 
 
 for want of equity, 551. 
 
 new rule 22 applied in such cases, 552. 
 
 now obviated by amendment, see New Code, section 274a, 552. 
 
 for want of prosecution, 555. 
 
 when jurisdiction collusive, 553. 
 
 effect of dismissal, 554. 
 on cross suit, 455. 
 
 costs in, 555. 
 
 when complainant has parted with interest, 551. 
 
 when case will be dropped from trial calendar, 555. 
 
 DISMISSING APPEALS. 
 
 thirteen grounds stated, 720 et seq. 
 
 DISTRICT COURTS ALWAYS OPEN, 305. 
 jurisdiction of, 43. 
 
 DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP, 
 statutes governing, 51. 
 character of citizenship, 51. 
 not controlled by 14th Amendment, 51. 
 who are not citizens within act, 63. 
 where diversity must appear, 52. 
 how appear, 52, 53. 
 rule under act of 1875, 53. 
 
 of 1888, 52. 
 
 illustrations of, 53. 
 
950 INDEX. 
 
 DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP— continued. 
 
 each plaintiff and each defendant must be competent to sue or be 
 
 sued in the State and district where suit is brought, 54. 
 rule explained and illustrated and exceptions stated, 54. 
 citizens of different States cannot sue in third State, 53. 
 citizens of same State cannot sue each other in another State, 54. 
 citizen and nonresident cannot sue nonresident in citizen's district, 56. 
 word "citizen" used collectively, 56. 
 citizenship of representative parties, 56. 
 
 exceptions to rule, 58. 
 
 suit by next friend, 59. 
 
 "for use of," 59, 60. 
 effect of change of citizenship pending suit, 60, 61. 
 transfer of property to create diversity, 62. 
 assignment to get diversity, 63, 
 
 to be alleged in bill, 272, 273. 
 State not, 63. 
 
 citizens of territories not, 64. 
 nor District of Columbia, 64. 
 shifting parties to create diversity, 65. 
 
 discussed and explained, 65-67. 
 identity of interest in determining diversity, 67-69. 
 separable controversy creating, 70. 
 
 illustrations, 73. 
 diversity in joint and several contracts, 74. 
 
 illustrations, 75. 
 citizenship of corporations, 76. 
 
 illustrations, 79. 
 
 see Citizenship. 
 when want of diversity appears in trial, 130, 131. 
 form of motion to dismiss in such case, 131. 
 diversity in removals, 804-817. 
 when may be waived, 830, 831. 
 
 DOING BUSINESS, 116. See Cokpokations. 
 must be doing business where sued, 116. 
 illustrations of, 117-119. 
 
 DOMICIL, 124. 
 
 DOUBLE ASPECT, 
 bills with, 228. 
 
 illustrations, 289. 
 cannot be alternative prayer for inconsistent relief, 284. 
 
 illustrations, 284, 289. 
 as to bills with double sound, 289. 
 
ISTDEX. 951 
 
 DUCES TECUM, 
 nature of, 526. 
 application for, 527. 
 exceptions to rule, 528. 
 in equity cases, 528. 
 penalty for i-efusal, 530. 
 
 how issued under U. S. Rev. Stat, section, 716, 529. 
 see Evidence. 
 
 DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
 Federal question, 148. 
 
 EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. 
 Federal question, 148. 
 
 EQUITY COURTS, JURISDICTION, 
 see Jurisdiction. 
 deal only with property rights, 44. 
 
 EQUITY RULES, 303-305. 
 see Motion Days. 
 
 "how time prescribed by rules computed, 303. 
 rules printed in full, see Appendix, 887, 910. 
 index to, 911. 
 
 EVIDENCE IN EQUITY SUITS, 
 statutes and rules stated, 490. 
 rule 46 requires evidence to be taken orally, 490. 
 taking depositions now made an exception, 490. 
 rule 47 requires application to court to issue depositions, 490. 
 when to be taken and filed, 491. 
 cause must be at issue, 491. 
 cause at issue when answer filed, 491. 
 unless counterclaim set up, 491. 
 may take depositions or testimony in mode prescribed by state laws, 
 
 491. 
 who may be examined as witnesses, 492. 
 who may issue commission to take depositions, 492. 
 before whom taken, 493, 494. 
 
 equity rules 47 and 52 governing, 493. 
 
 when taken under U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 863, de bene esse, 493. 
 
 when taken in foreign countries, 494. 
 
 how witnesses are brought before officer, 494. 
 
 compelled to answer, 495, 525. 
 
 equity rule 52 providing for case where witness refuses to appear, 
 495. 
 section 869, U. S. Rev. Stat, requiring attendance under subpoena 
 
 "duces tecum," 495. 
 
952 INDEX. 
 
 EVIDENCE IN EQUITY SUITS— continued. 
 
 taking testimony on District of Columbia, 495. 
 
 subpoenas for witnesses in Equity Suits, 496, 524. 
 
 when may run into other districts, 490. 
 
 time to begin taking depositions when permitted, 497. 
 
 when must be filed, 497, 491. 
 
 cause must be at issue, 498, 491. 
 
 at issue when answer filed, 491. 
 
 may however be taken before issue joined, 498. 
 
 when taken "in rei memoriam" or "dc bene esse," 499, 500. 
 notice when taken "dc bene esse," 500. 
 form of notice, 501. 
 service of notice, 501. 
 how taken, 501. 
 
 certificate of officer when taken de bene esse, 503. 
 form of caption and certificate when taken "de bene esse," 504. 
 when informality in certificate, 505. 
 taking depositions in mode prescribed by Stiite before issue joined, 506. 
 new rule 58 controlling discovery of material facts discussed, 508. 
 
 procedure in issuing interrogatories for discovery, 509. 
 depositions "in rei perpetuam," 510-512. 
 
 usages of chancery in sec. 866, U. S. Rev. St. discussed, 510, 511. 
 "dedimus potestatem," discussed, 512-516, -"127. 
 certificate to "dedimus," 514. 
 procedure, 514, 515. 
 form of order, 515. 
 witnesses required to attend, 525. 
 depositions after issue joined, 517. 
 
 when allowed, time in which to be taken, 517-519. 
 new rule 47 stated, 517. 
 
 in expert evidence in patents, etc., 519. 
 counsel may agree on time, 519. 
 how witnesses examined after issue joined, 520. 
 in open court, 520. 
 
 by oral examination before, examiner, 521. 
 form of application to take depositions out of court, 521. 
 order to appoint examiner when granted, 521.- 
 appointing examiner beyond limits of court's jurisdiction, 522. 
 notice of examination, 522. 
 form of notice, 523. 
 examination of witnesses before .examiner, 521, 523, 531. 
 issuing subpo3nas by examiner, 524. 
 blanks to be furnished by clerk, 524. 
 witnesses when required to attend, 525. 
 witness refusing to answer, 495, 525. 
 who to pass on materiality or relevancy, 526, 531. 
 subpoena "duces tecum," 526. 
 
 Equity rule 58, el. 5 stated, 527. 
 
INDEX. 951; 
 
 EVIDENCE IN EQUITY SUITS— continued. 
 
 under "dedimus potestatem,'' 527, 612. 
 
 application for, what to contain, 527. 
 exceptions to rule controlling "duces tecum," 528. 
 
 when issued in eqviity, 528, 529. 
 
 penalty for disobedience of witness, 530. 
 how examination of witness conducted before examiner, 521, 523, 531. 
 
 must be reduced to writing, 532. 
 
 how authenticated and transmitted, 533. 
 as to caption and certificate, 503, 504. 
 as to returning and filing depositions, 534. 
 as to publication of, 534. 
 how exhibits must be returned, 534. 
 depositions to foreign countries, procedure, 535. 
 
 before whom taken, 536. 
 
 letters rogatory, 536. 
 how prepared, 536. 
 suppressing depositions, 538. 
 
 causes for, 538. 
 
 proper notice, 538, 539. 
 
 when defectively taken, 539. 
 
 defective certificate, 540. 
 
 not taken in time allowed, 541, 
 
 motion to suppress, 542. 
 effect of death of witness after taking, 543. 
 when destroyed, 543. 
 taken in former case, 543. 
 depositions on law side, 544. 
 
 Federal statutes controlling, 546. 
 
 who may use depositions, 547. 
 
 costs allowed, 547. 
 
 EXAMINERS. 
 
 appointment of, 521. 
 
 order appointing, 521, 522. 
 
 notice of appointment stated in the order as to manner and terms, 521. 
 
 beyond territorial jurisdiction, 522. 
 
 form of motion to appoint, 521. 
 
 form of order appointing, 521, 522. 
 
 notice given of time and place testimony is to be taken before, 523. 
 
 notice of examination, 523. 
 
 form of notice, 523. 
 
 examination of witnesses before, 523. 
 
 order appointing must name the witnesses to be examined, 522, 523. 
 
 EXCEPTIONS TO ANSWER, 
 see Akswek. 
 exceptions to, abolished by rule 33, 432. 
 
954 INDEX. 
 
 EXCEPTIONS TO ANSWER— continued. 
 
 made by motion to strike out, 432, 433. 
 
 what motion to state, 433. 
 
 executors and administrators as parties, 246-250. 
 
 EXHIBITS. 
 
 bill and exhibits taken together in hearing motion for insufficiency, 402. 
 exhibits to depositions, 534. 
 
 FEDERAL COMMON LAW. 
 see Common Law. 
 
 FEDERAL JURISDICTION. 
 
 see JUBISDICTION. 
 
 FEDERAL QUESTION. 
 
 statute of 1888 stated, 136. 
 as ground of jurisdiction, 137. 
 what is a Federal question, 138. 
 
 two classes, 139, 140. 
 
 illustrations given, 140, 141. 
 U. S. Rev. St. sec. 643, stated, 143. 
 corporations chartered by Congress, 144. 
 
 no longer ground of jurisdiction, 144. 
 national banks, 144. 
 impairing obligation as, 146. 
 state legislation conflicting with 14th Amendment, United States 
 
 Constitution, 147 et seq. 
 where Federal question must appear, 151. 
 remedy when it does not appear in the bill, 152. 
 sec. 709, U. S. Rev. Stat, stated and discussed, 152, 154. 
 how Federal question must appear, 157^16] . 
 
 illustrations given, 158. 
 mere reference to Federal Constitution and laws not sufficient, 157, 159. 
 when Federal receivers are parties, 161, 162. 
 Federal question, how raised, 163-165. 
 cannot anticipate, 163. 
 
 form of plea or answer, 167. 
 citizenship not material if Federal question, 165. 
 venue fixed in district of defendant's residence, 165. 
 may support jurisdiction though it does not appear in the trial, 166. 
 allegation of, in bill, 279. 
 removal on ground of, 822. 
 
 FEDERAL SYSTEM, 1. 
 
 fixed by the Constitution, 3. 
 law and equity distinct, 4, 8. 
 legislation cannot change it, 4. 
 
INDEX. 955 
 
 FEDERAL SYSTEM— continued. 
 
 status of courts of equity in the system, 5. 
 abrogated, 6. 
 
 blended systems criticized, 7. 
 distinction between Law and Equity modified, 8. 
 is it constitutional, 8. 
 
 FINAL DECREE, 
 see Decree. 
 what is, 582, 634. 
 as a basis of appeals, 634-637. 
 judgments not final and appealable, 637. 
 
 FINAL HEARING, 
 what is, 556. 
 effect on previous orders, 556. 
 
 FORECLOSURE. 
 
 executing decree in, 592. 
 
 FOREIGN CORPORATIONS, 
 see Alien Coepokations. 
 
 must be doing business in the State where sued, 116, 327. 
 service of process on, 322. 
 
 upon whom served, 322-327. 
 citizenship of, 77, 109. 
 
 when incorporated in several states, 83, 84. 
 state may require conditions before doing business, 116. 
 cannot change citizenship, 78, 79, 83. 
 
 FORMAL PARTIES, 230. 
 
 FORMS. 
 
 see subject for which form desired. 
 
 FRAUD. 
 
 how alleged in bill, 280. 
 
 on jurisdiction, 553. 
 
 fraudulent joinder to prevent removal, 806. 
 
 fraudulent joinder to remove, 806. 
 stating amount fraudulently, 170, 173. 
 setting aside judgments of probate court for fraud, 251. 
 
 GUARDIANS AD LITEM, 246. 
 
 HEARING. 
 
 motion preparatory to. 305, 306, 310. 
 motion days to be established, 307. 
 
956 INDBX. 
 
 HEARING— continued. 
 
 setting issues down, 129, 204, 402. 
 
 setting down answer, 414. 
 
 cause placed on trial calendar for rules 56 and 57, 555. 
 
 nature of final hearing, 556. 
 
 effect on previous orders, 556. 
 
 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY, 
 old rule 90, abrogated, 6. 
 
 IDENTITY OF INTERESTS. 
 in shifting parties, 67. 
 
 IMPAIRING- OBLIGATION. 
 Federal question, 146. 
 
 IMPERTINENCE. 
 
 see Scandal and Impertinence. 
 
 INDISPENSABLE PARTIES, 
 defined, 232. 
 test of, 234. 
 
 court cannot proceed in absence of, 233, 234. 
 alone considered in removal, 805. 
 illustrations of, 234. 
 
 INFANTS. 
 
 guardians ad litem for, 246. 
 
 suing by next friend, 59. 
 
 form, when bill exhibited by, 264. 
 
 IN FORMA PAUPERIS. 
 
 for act authorizing suit in, 677. 
 allowance of appeal in, 677. 
 
 INHABITANT, 
 defined, 96. 
 
 INJUNCTIONS. 
 
 as interlocutory proceeding, 471. 
 
 by whom granted, 471. 
 
 life of, 470. 
 
 new Code as to granting, sect. 266, 472. 
 
 notice for, 470, 474. 
 
 security on issuing, 473. 
 
 what order shall set forth, 473. 
 
 restraining order between employer and employees, 473. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 INJUNCTIONS— continued. 
 
 as to proceedings in state courts, 470. 
 
 what are proceedings, 476. 
 when sec. 265, Judicial Code does not apply, 476. 
 in conflicts between state and Federal jurisdiction, 477. 
 when jurisdiction attaches, 478. 
 see Auxiliary Suits, 
 appeal from, 
 effect of appeal on, 
 pending appeal rule, 74. 
 see Appeals. 
 amount in suing out, 185. 
 
 INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS, 
 nature of, 470. 
 injunctions, 471. 
 by whom granted, 471. 
 
 all interlocutory orders remain under direction of court, 470. 
 when facts to be set vtp in bill, 471. 
 see Injikctions. 
 ne exeat, 480. 
 
 may be granted at any stage of the suit, 470. 
 motion for, 470. 
 by whom granted, 471. 
 appeal from, 622, 625. 
 
 INTERLOCUTORY PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 see liMTERLOCUTORY ORDERS. 
 
 INTERPLEADER, 
 bii; of, 488. 
 
 one in possession, but with no interest, may file, 489. 
 bill in nature of interpleader, 489. 
 
 when can be filed, 489. 
 removal by, 855. 
 
 INTERSTATE COMMERCE. 
 
 exclusive jurisdiction in Federal courts, 46, 96. 
 
 INTERVENTION, 
 what is, 457. 
 two kinds, 457. 
 rule 37 stated, 457. 
 
 first, riglit discretionary, 458. 
 
 second, absolute, 458. 
 when right discretionary discussed, 458. 
 when right absolute discussed, 458. 
 
958 INDEX. 
 
 INTERVENTION— continued, 
 procedure, 459. 
 
 form of application, 459. 
 contesting application, 400. 
 form of order when granted, 160. 
 effect of order, 461. 
 waiving order,, 461. 
 notice of intervention, 461. 
 making defendant by, 462. 
 intervention pro suo interesse, 464. 
 when will not lie, 465. 
 form of intervention pro suo, 466. 
 citizenship and amount as affecting intervention, 467. 
 supported by jurisdiction of parties in main suit, 468. 
 nor is amount important, 468. 
 amendment of bill for, 468. 
 intervention for removal, 468. 
 denial not appealable, 469, 
 
 JOINDER. 
 
 to defeat jurisdiction, 860. 
 fraudulent joinder to remove, 806. 
 joint action to defeat removal, 813. 
 fraudulent joinder to prevent removal, 806. 
 joinder of causes of action, 278. 
 
 JOINT AND SEVERAL DEMANDS, 229. 
 
 JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY. 
 
 as affecting separable controversy, 74. 
 tort feasors, 74, 817. 
 
 JOINT AND SEVERAL PARTIES, 229-240. 
 
 JOINT STOCK COMPANIES. 
 
 citizenship of, in diversity, 85. 
 
 JUDICIAL SALE, 594. 
 
 JUDGMENTS. See Deobek. 
 vacating, 615. 
 setting aside for fraud, 616. 
 
 mistake, 617. 
 impeached by third party, 618. 
 amending, 586. 
 correcting errors in, 585, 
 force of, 587. 
 lien of, 589. 
 
INDEX. 959 
 
 JUDICIAL CODE, see pages 869, 910, also page 911. 
 
 JURISDICTION, 
 defined, 37. 
 two conditions considered in Federal courts, 37. 
 
 first, equitable as distinguished from legal, 37. 
 
 second. Federal as distinguished from state, 37. 
 given by the Constitution, 38. 
 of Supreme Court, 40, 41. 
 act 1888 stated, 43. 
 of district courts stated, 42, 43. 
 new Judicial Code as to jurisdiction stated, 42. 
 jurisdictional acts, see Appendix,. New Code, see. 24 et seq. 
 as to exclusive jurisdiction of Federal courts, 46, 47. 
 courts of equity deal only with property rights, 44. 
 jurisdiction limited, 44, 50. 
 no presumption of, 45. 
 
 U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 723, testing equity jurisdiction discussed, 11-14, 32. 
 see Sec. 723. 
 
 maxims controlling, 9-11. 
 "remedy at law" discussed, 15. 
 what remedies will bar equity jurisdiction, 25. 
 when equity will enforce purely legal remedy, 27 et seq. 
 when equity will give damages, 28, 29. 
 
 equity courts do not readily decline jurisdiction, 23, 25, 35. 
 jurisdiction to be stated accurately, 273. 
 jurisdiction distributed by Congress, 39. 
 courts established by Congress, 41. 
 diversity of citizenship as basis, 51. 
 see Diversity of Citizenship, 51. 
 territorial jurisdiction, 48. 
 Federal question as basis of, 137. 
 see Fedeeal Question. 
 Amount as basis of, 168. 
 see Amount. 
 
 amending to show jurisdiction, 207, 208. 
 after appeal taken, 208. 
 consent cannot give, 34. 
 
 nor in removal, 802, 803. 
 jurisdiction by assignment, 209. 
 see Assignment. 
 changing citizenship to get, 60. 
 transferring property to get, 62. 
 see JuEiSDicTiaN of District Courts, 43 et seq. 
 see Territorial Jurisdiction, 92 et seq. 
 jurisdiction in probate matters, 246-256. 
 how issue raised and form of plea, 128. 
 
 in diversity of citizenship, 128. 
 
960 INDEX. 
 
 JURISDICTION— continued. 
 
 in Federal question, 163, 1G7. 
 
 as to amount, 199. 
 how issue tried, 204, 129. 
 
 effect of fraud and collusion on, 130, 131, 173, 174. 
 see Fkaud. 
 as to venue or district of suit, 133, 
 
 in Federal question, 165. 
 waiving jurisdiction as to venue, 121, 
 acts of waiver, 121. 
 who may object to venue, 123. 
 
 conflict of, between state and Federal courts, 477-480. 
 when jurisdiction attaches, 478. 
 state legislation cannot affect, 17. 
 by assignment, 209. 
 see ASSIGNMEA'T. 
 
 JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS, 42, 43. 
 
 see JUBISDICTION. 
 
 in equity, 11, 43. 
 
 U. S. Rev. Stat sec. 723 discussed, 11-14; now 267 Judicial Code, also 
 
 pp. 32-37. 
 equitable as distinguished from legal, 37. 
 Federal as distinguished from state, 37. 
 permitted by the Constitution, 38, 39. 
 established by Congress, 41, 42, 43. 
 statutes controlling, 43. 
 Constitution gives. Congress distributes, 39. 
 new Judicial Code, 42. 
 deals only with property rights, 44. 
 limited, no presumption of, 45. 
 their territorial jurisdiction, 48. 
 see Teeritorial Jurisdiction. 
 
 special acts creating exclusive jurisdiction, 46, 47. 
 not controlled by state statutes, 17. 
 but state remedies will be enforced, 17. 
 "plain, adequate, and complete" discussed, 22. 
 
 five tests given, 22-24. 
 character of legal remedy that will bar equity, 25. 
 when legal remedy will be enforced in equity, 27. 
 
 three rules stated, 27-30. 
 when sec. 723 must be set up as a defense, 32. 
 must be set up in limine, 32, 33. 
 when court will dismiss bill though not set up, 34. 
 consent cannot give jurisdiction, 34. 
 jurisdiction involving corporations, 73-85. 
 
 aliens, 88-91. 
 married women, 87. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 9G1 
 
 JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS— continued. 
 
 see Diversity of Citizenship, Federal Question, Amount, Terei- 
 
 TOKiAL Jurisdiction, Assignment. 
 in probate matters, see Executors and Administrators and Parties. 
 when fraud intervenes, 251. 
 
 JURY IN EQUITY, 12, 13. 
 
 LACHES. 
 
 maxim, 10. 
 
 must be explained in bill, 281. 
 
 LEGAL REMEDY IN EQUITY COURTS, 27. 
 when equity disappears in trial, 27. 
 when suit in equity necessary, 29. 
 when multiplicity suits prevented, 30. 
 
 LIEN. 
 
 of judgment, 589. 
 
 LOCAL INFLUENCE. 
 
 removal on ground of, 777, 842. 
 
 court to examine into truth, 846. 
 
 local prejudice, 777. 
 
 see Removals on Ground of Local Influence. 
 
 MANDAMUS WHEN REMAND REFUSED, 849. 
 
 MANDATE. 
 
 supreme court may affirm, modify, or reverse, 767. 
 
 may direct judgment, 767. 
 
 how issued, 767. 
 
 when issued, 767. 
 
 executing mandate, 768. 
 
 effect of, 769. 
 
 issuing execution, 771. 
 
 appellate court does not issue, 771. 
 
 remedy of court does not enforce, 771. 
 
 when by appeal, 771. 
 
 when by mandamus, 772. 
 can court recall after term, 772. 
 
 as to second appeals when mandate not executed, 773. 
 stay of mandate, 773. 
 
 S. Eq.— 61. 
 
962 INDEX. 
 
 MARKIED WOMEN, 
 citizenship of, 87. 
 as parties, 240. 
 
 issue as to coverture, how plead, 265. 
 when she becomes an alien by marriage, 87. 
 
 MASTERS IN CHANCERY. 
 
 rule of court and statutes stated, 557. 
 
 nature of office, 557. 
 
 who is to be appointed, 557. 
 
 object and effect of appointment, 558. 
 
 when reference may be made, 558. 
 
 by new rule 59 reference is the exception, 558. 
 
 motion for reference, 558, 560. 
 
 form of reference, 559. 
 reference of the whole case, 559. 
 form when whole case submitted by consent, 560. 
 action after reference made, 561. 
 
 duty of master on receiving order of reference, 562, 
 authority of the master, 562. 
 authority beyond territorial jurisdiction, 562. 
 procedure before master, 563. 
 taking evidence, 563. 
 report of master, 564. 
 
 exceptions to, 565. 
 
 when to be heard, 565. 
 
 form of exceptions, 565. 
 
 cost of exceptions to, 566, 573. 
 
 exceptions to be specific, 567. 
 
 withdrawal of exceptions, 568. 
 
 waiving exceptions when not taken before master, 568. 
 eflFect of master's report, 574. 
 findings in matters of account, 576. 
 effect when reference by consent, 576. 
 reference to master, 578. 
 compensation of master, 579. 
 see Sales by. 
 
 MAXIMS. 
 
 to be considered in going into a court of equity, 9. 
 sec. 723 as a maxim, 11. 
 
 construed with 7th Amendment to United States Const., 12. 
 sec. 723 declared declaratory, 14, 
 
 f 
 
 MINORITY STOCKHOLDERS, WHEN MAY SUE, 241-245. 
 
INDEX. 9613 
 
 MISJOINDER. See Multifariousness, 295. 
 rule 26 stated, 295, 301. 
 new rule 22 applied, 302. 
 fraudulent joinder to prevent removal, 806. 
 misjoinder in removal, 814. 
 
 MOTIONS, 310. 
 
 motion days, 307. 
 
 ex parte or grantable of course, 306, 310. 
 
 on notice when not grantable of course, 306, 310. 
 
 where to be entered, 308. 
 
 clerk to keep three books, 308. 
 
 entry by clerk as notice, 309. 
 
 orders in chambers, 309. 
 
 MULTIFARIOUSNESS, 295. 
 under old rule, 295. 
 new rule 26, 295. 
 see Joinder of Causes of Action. 
 under present rule discussed, 296, 297. 
 illustrations given, 297-300. 
 formula as stated by the Supreme Court, 298. 
 how to set it up, 301. 
 form of motion, 301. 
 how affected by new rule, 26 and 22, 301, 302. 
 
 MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS, 
 ground of jurisdiction, 30. 
 who may invoke jurisdiction, 31. 
 illustration, 30, 31. 
 
 NATIONAL BANKS, 
 citizenship of, 86. 
 
 exclusive jurisdiction in winding up, 87. 
 removal by, 853. 
 see Banks. 
 
 NE EXEAT. 
 
 equity rule and statute stated, 284. 
 
 prayer for, 284. 
 
 purpose of, 285. 
 
 how writ discharged, 285, 
 
 NOMINAL PARTIES, 230. 
 
 NONRESIDENCE. 
 
 see DivEESiTT of Citizenship. 
 only can remove, 812. 
 
964 INDEX. 
 
 NUMEEOUS PARTIES, 
 discussed, 238. 
 
 OFFICERS OF CORPORATIONS, AS PARTIES, 430. 
 when no personal judgment can be taken, 430. 
 answer should be made by principal officers of, 430. 
 
 OPINION IN TRANSCRIPT, 709, 710. 
 
 ORAL EXAMINATIONS. 
 
 Evidence in equity suits to be taken orally, 490. 
 equity rule 46 stated, 490, 570. 
 taking depositions now, the exception, 490. 
 oral examination before examiner, 521. 
 see Examiners. 
 
 ORDER BOOK. 
 
 clerk required to keep "equity docket," "order book," and "equity 
 
 journals," 308. 
 entry as notice, 309. 
 
 ORDERS IN CHAMBERS. 
 
 granted any time at chambers, 305. 
 made to facilitate trials, 305. 
 orders grantable of course, 306. 
 orders not grantable of course, 306. 
 
 PARTIES. 
 
 who should be in equity, 224. 
 
 nature of interest to become, 225, 226. 
 
 rule of parties in Federal courts, 225, 230. 
 
 amending, 265. 
 
 exceptions when not found in district, 227, 228. 
 
 rules and statutes governing, 225, 226-229. 
 
 effect of the exceptions, 228. 
 
 sec. 737, U. S. Rev. Stat, stated and applied, 227. 
 
 equity rules 25, 38 and 39 stated, 225, 227, 228. 
 
 three classes of parties in Federal courts of equity, 230. 
 
 these classes defined and discussed, 230-236. 
 unknown parties, 236. 
 unknown heirs, 346. 
 
 three rules governing making parties to a bill, 237. 
 rule when parties are numerous, equity rule, 38, 228, 238. 
 effect of sec. 8, act 1875, 237. 
 joint and several parties, 229, 240. 
 married women as, 240. 
 stockholders as, 240-245. 
 officers of corporations, as, 430. 
 
INDEX. 965 
 
 PARTIES— continued, 
 partnerships as, 245. 
 representative parties, 246. 
 
 guardians ad litem, 246. 
 
 executors and administrators as parties, 246-251. 
 wlien fraud intervenes, 251. 
 
 trustees as, 229, 252-254, 
 
 beneficiaries as, 254. 
 
 receivers as, 256. 
 
 by and against incompetents, 229. 
 
 power of receivers to sue in a foreign district, 258. 
 parties in removing cloud, 259. 
 defect of parties and issue, 261. 
 
 by demurrer, 262. 
 
 form for, 262. 
 
 by plea, 262. 
 
 for form, 262. 
 equity rule 43 disposing of issue discussed, 261, 262. 
 equity rule 43 applied, 261. 
 
 tried in fourteen days, 262. 
 equity rule 47 stated, 
 equity rule 44 discussed, 263, 264. 
 local rules may control, 264. 
 form when demurrer or plea is raised because of infancy, 264. 
 
 in case of lunacy, 265. 
 
 in case of administrators, 265. 
 
 in case of coverture, 265. 
 making new parties by amendment, 265. 
 stranger cannot make himself party defendant, 462. 
 shifting to create diversity, 65. 
 
 change of interest by plaintiff pending suit defeats bill, 367. 
 bring in new parties by supplemental bill, 367. 
 United States as party defendant, see Tucker Act, 202 Fed. 314. 
 in supplemental bill, 372. 
 
 PARTNERSHIP. 
 
 citizenship of, 86. 
 as parties, 245. 
 
 PATENTS, see Jurisdiction in Causes, 95. 
 PENDENTE LITE, 407, 408. 
 
 PLAIN, ADEQUATE, AND COMPLETE, 
 remedy at law discussed, 15-22. 
 remedy known to the common law in 1789, 15. 
 five rules guiding the courts in test of, 22-24. 
 
 the remedy confined to simple suit for money or recovery of property, 
 25. 
 
966 INDEX. 
 
 PLEA IN ABATEMENT. 
 
 pendency in state court does not abate suit in a Federal court, 408. 
 but in equity may suspend proceedings, 408. 
 
 PLEA, MOTION IN NATURE OF. 
 pleas abolished by rule 29, 405. 
 substance of, now set up by motion or answer, 405. 
 nature and office of, 405, 406. 
 
 when set-up allegations of bill taken as true, 413. 
 when to be filed, 406. 
 in abatement, 407. 
 
 abatements should be set up in answer, 407. 
 setting up in abatement ''suit pending" in state court, 408. 
 dilatory pleas should be promptly disposed of, 409. 
 answer in the nature of a plea in bar, 410, 412. 
 form of, 411. 
 
 must be single, 412. 
 must be positive, 412. 
 illustrations, 413. 
 setting down for hearing, 414. 
 eflfeet of setting down for hear on sufficiency, 415. 
 overruling answer for insufficiency, 416. 
 sustaining answer, 416. 
 
 when answer set down for hearing on fact, 417. 
 when proven, 417. 
 not proven, 419, 
 see Answer. 
 
 POSSESSION, DELIVERY OF, 592. 
 
 PRACTICE IN APPEALS, 757, 761. 
 see Appeals. 
 who may appeal, 697. 
 from interlocutory orders, 628. 
 where taken, 622-624, 640, 642. 
 from circuit to Supreme Court, 
 under clauses 4, 5, 6, sec. 5, act 1891, 652. 
 to circuit court of appeals, 621, 624, 660. 
 allowance of appeal, 676. 
 
 when jurisdiction of appellate court attaches, 678. 
 bond in appeal, 679. 
 supersedeas, 685. 
 citation in appeal, 691. 
 transcript in, 706 et seq. 
 dismissing appeals, 720. 
 submitting case, 
 rehearing on, 598 et seq. 
 from circuit court of appeals to the Supreme Court, 734. 
 
IISTDEX. 967 
 
 PRACTICE IN APPEALS— continued. 
 
 from state court to United States Supreme Court, 740. 
 
 practice and procedure, 746-755. 
 order of allowance, 676, 759, 760, 761. 
 amendments in appellate court, 7-0. 
 see Briefs. 
 
 PEAYER OF BILL. 
 see Bill. 
 
 form of special prayer, 283. 
 rule of general prayer, 283. 
 for ne exeat, 284. 
 for process, 285. 
 amendment of prayer, .286. 
 
 PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES, 147. 
 
 PROBATE JURISDICTION. 
 
 e.^ecutors and administrators as parties, 246-250. 
 when fraud intervenes, 251. 
 
 PROCESS. See Service of Peocess; Stibposna. 
 prayer for, 285. 
 courts always open to issue, 305. 
 
 PRO CONFESSO JUDGMENT, 
 equity rules governing, 385. 
 see Deoeee Pec Confesso. 
 
 PRO SUO INTERESSE, 464. 
 see Inteevextion. 
 
 applicant does not become party to main suit, 464. 
 possession by court of fund give this right of intervention, form for 
 intervention, 464. 
 
 RECASTING PLEADINGS, 
 in removal, 864. 
 
 whether case in law or equity controls, 864, 865. 
 motion to iile case on equity side, 865. 
 
 when case contains both a legal and equitable cause of action, 866. 
 when cause of action legal but remedy equitable, 867. 
 
 RECEIVERS. 
 
 as parties, 181, 256. 
 
 power to sue in foreign jurisdiction, 258. 
 
 suits by and against, 181. 
 
 effect of suit, 184. 
 
 U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 3, act 1888, stated and construed, 181. 
 
9CS IZMDEX. 
 
 RECEIVERS— continued. 
 
 in ancillary suits amount and citizenship not important, 182, 183. 
 suit by, as involving a Federal question, 161, 162. 
 appeals by and against, 702. 
 removal by receivers, 851. 
 
 REFERENCE TO MASTER, 558. 
 by consent, 560. 
 
 REHEARING. 
 
 power of court to rehear, 598. 
 nature of, 598. 
 time of filing, 599. 
 order to shovf cause, 599. 
 grounds of application, 599. 
 
 newly discovered evidence, 600. 
 if material, 600. 
 on error in law, 601. 
 
 on ground defendant not represented, 601. 
 effect of granting, 601. 
 on interlocutory orders, 601. 
 when time for appeal not included, 601. 
 hearing application after term, 602. 
 form of petition for rehearing, 602, 603. 
 by appellate court, 733. 
 
 petition must conform to Circuit Court rule 29, 733, 
 
 as to time of filing, 733. 
 cannot introduce new question, 733. 
 
 REMANDING. 
 
 statutes controlling, 792. 
 causes for, 791-793. 
 
 when not removed in time, 793. 
 
 in this case, when motion to be made, 793-795. 
 effect of extension of time to answer, 795. 
 want of jurisdiction as ground to remand, 800, 801. 
 when case not in jurisdictional act, 801. 
 when question doubtful, 803. 
 amo\mt as ground for motion to remand, 824. 
 remand when local prejudice ground for removal, 
 remedy when remand refused, 849. 
 effect of order remanding, 850. 
 by whom motion made, 856. 
 effect of motion to remand, 856. 
 time to be made, 857. 
 what acts waive right, 857. 
 form of motion to remand, 858. 
 how issue joined and tried, 802, 860. 
 
INDEX. 969 
 
 REMANDING— continued. 
 
 when tliere was fraudulent joinder to remove, 860. 
 
 nature of proof, 862. 
 
 effect of order to remand, 850. 
 
 duty to remand at any stage, 802. 
 
 when separable controversy nonresident removes, may dismiss as to 
 
 him to remand, 816, 817. 
 no appeal from, 849. 
 mandamus to remand, 849. 
 costs on remanding, 803. 
 
 REMEDY AT LAW, 15. 
 discussed, 15-19. 
 
 must be plain, adequate and complete, 22-26. 
 Federal common law, 19-21. 
 when court of equity will enforce legal remedy, 22. 
 
 REMOVALS. 
 
 statutes stated, 774. 
 
 right restricted by act of 1888, 775. 
 
 requiring agreements not to remove by state statutes, 777. 
 
 must be a suit of a civil nature to remove, 775, 827. 
 
 must be one that could have been brought originally in the Federal 
 
 court, 775, 776, 828. 
 must be made to the proper district, 833. 
 proceedings in state court, 778. 
 
 time of filing petition for, 778. 
 petition to be verified, 778. 
 see New Code as to, sec. 29, chap. III. 779. 
 substance of petition, 778. 
 time of filing bond, 779. 
 efi'ect of filing petition and bond, 780. 
 notice of filing petition, 782. 
 
 New Code requires it, sec. 29, chap. 3, 782. 
 power of state court, 782. 
 
 prima facie case for removal must be shown, 782. 
 issue of fact as to, must be tried in Federal court, 783. 
 petition and bond must be presented in state court, 784. 
 order of removal, 784. 
 not necessary, 785. 
 jurisdiction of Federal court between petition for, and filing, 786. 
 the record in that court, 786. 
 
 can Federal court issue injunction during this time, 787, 
 cannot take depositions, 787. 
 
 plaintiff may file record and make motion to remand, 787. 
 filing record in Federal court, 788. 
 cutting off right of removal, 
 
 when petition for, not filed in time, 793, 794. 
 
 when motion for this cause to remand is made, 795. 
 
970 INDEX. 
 
 REMOVALS— continued. 
 
 when hearing demurrer in state court will prevent, 799. 
 
 filing answer in state court before time for filing petition will not 
 prevent removal, 798. 
 
 employers' liability act, 798. 
 
 answer by one joint defendant in joint action prevents removal, 
 799. 
 
 when record must be filed in Federal court, 799. 
 
 statutes stated, 799. 
 
 to what district, 833. 
 
 transmitting the record, 800 
 
 extension of time to answer, 795. 
 
 when right to remove arises after time to answer, 797. 
 
 effect of filing answer in state court before the time, 798. 
 status after removal, 789. 
 
 as to attachments, etc., 789. 
 
 all defenses heard in the Federal court, 790, 802. 
 
 removal does not waive question of proper service, 840. 
 issue tried in Federal court, 840, 841. 
 
 dismissal for want of service may sue again, 841. 
 amending service after removal, 841. 
 
 when petition for removal may be amended, 836. 
 
 dismissing by plaintiff after removal, 790. 
 diversity of citizenship as ground for removal, 804. 
 
 indispensable parties alone considered, 805. 
 fraudulent joinder to prevent not allowed, 806. 
 
 fraudulent joinder to remove, 806. 
 nor is it allowed to create diversity, 806. 
 
 issues of this kind determined by the Federal court, 807. 
 
 as to allegation and proof, 807. 
 how issue raised as to diversity of citizenship in removal, 808. 
 who can remove in case of diversity, 812. 
 
 when cause of action joint, 813. 
 
 when there is a misjoinder, 814. 
 
 when parties nominal, 814. 
 
 when controversy separable, 815. 
 whole case removed, 819. 
 
 in tort feasors, 817. 
 substance of petition in case of diversity,. 804. 
 may amend if defectively stated, 132. 
 citizens of different states suing in state court, 830. 
 see Diversity op Citizenship. 
 
 but may waive objection, 831. 
 removal on ground of Federal question, 822. 
 
 who may remove, 823. 
 amount necessary for removal, 824, 825. 
 
 effect of filing counterclaim, 825, 826. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 971 
 
 REMOVALS— continued. 
 
 removal on gi-ound of local prejudice, 777, 842. 
 
 who may remove, 842. 
 
 all defendants need not join, 842-844. 
 
 petition for removal when to be presented in such cases, 844. 
 
 what petition to state, 845. 
 
 when and where application made, 845. 
 
 as to the affidavit for removal, 845. 
 
 notice of, must be given, 846. 
 
 order of removal, 847. 
 
 how issues tried, 846. 
 
 nature of proof, 847. 
 
 motion to remand, 848, 
 
 burden of proof, 848. 
 
 remedy when remand refused, 848. 
 
 mandamus as remedy, 849. 
 
 effect of order remanding, 850. 
 removal by receivers, 851. 
 
 by national banks, 853. 
 
 by intervener, 853. 
 
 of cross suits, 817, 854, 855. 
 
 by interpleader, 855. 
 removal by aliens, 808-811. 
 
 when alien sues nonresident, 811. 
 
 by corporations, 811. 
 see Eemanding. 
 
 REMOVING CLOUD, 345. 
 amount involved, 193. 
 parties to suit, 259. 
 serving nonresident, 336. 
 
 REPLICATION. 
 
 no replication unless answer asserts to counterclaim rule 31, 440. 
 filing answer puts in issue allegations, 428. 
 
 RES JUDICATA 
 as plea, 410. 
 
 REVENUE. 
 
 jurisdiction in revenue cases, 96. 
 
 REVIEW. 
 
 see Bill op Review. 
 
 REVIVOR. 
 
 see Bill of Revivob. 
 
972 INDEX. 
 
 RULE DAYS. 
 
 abolished, 306. 
 see Motion Days. 
 
 RULES IN EQUITY. See Appendix. 
 source, object, and purpose, 303, 304. 
 what courts may promulgate, 304. 
 have force of statute, 304. 
 statutes stated, 303, 304. 
 time stated and how computed, 305. 
 repeal of old rules, 305. 
 
 RULES OF SUPREME COURT. 
 Appendix. 
 
 SALES BY MASTER, 594. 
 how made, 594. 
 effect of bid, 596. 
 purchaser under, 596. 
 motion to confirm, 595. 
 exceptions to sale, 595. 
 
 parties to suit not bound to take notice of subsequent proceedings 
 after final decree, 597. 
 
 SALES UNDER DECREES, 
 how made, 594. 
 see Sales by Masteb. 
 see Decree. 
 
 SCANDAL AND IMPERTINENCE, 
 practice under new rule 21, 348. 
 raising issue and form, 348, 349. 
 effect of new rule 24 as to, 349. 
 
 SECTIONS OF U. S. REV. STAT. AFFECTING JURISDICTION IN 
 EQUITY, 
 sec. 723, pp. 11-14, 32. 
 
 when to be set up as a defense, 32, 
 when may be obviated, 36. 
 court will dismiss bill when not set up, 34. 
 how defense to be made, 36. 
 sec. 8, act 1875, section 57, new Code, 103, 104, 386. 
 see Service of Process. 
 
 sec. 5, U. S. Rev. Stat, of 1875, New Code, sec. 37, p. 548 — dismissal by 
 court, 
 
INDEX. 973 
 
 SECTIONS OF U. S. REV. STAT., ETC.— continued. 
 
 sec. 709 — appeal from state courts to Supreme Court of United States, 
 
 153, 746. 
 sec. 740, embodied in sec. 52, New Code, 105-108. 
 U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 720, control of proceedings in state courts Civil 
 
 Code, sec. 265, p. 475. See Injunctions. 
 sec. 741, suits of local nature, 100. 
 
 SEPARABLE CONTROVERSY, 
 statiites stated, 70. 
 what is, 70. 
 test of, 71. 
 
 cause of action divisible, 71. 
 illustrations, 72, 73. 
 purpose of the clause, 71. 
 in joint and several liability, 74. 
 in cases of tort, 74. 
 as basis for removal, 815. 
 see Removals. 
 
 SERVICE OF PROCESS. See Stjbpcena. 
 subpoena, 312, 313. 
 service of, 315. 
 privileged from service, 318. 
 see SuBPCENA, 312 et seq. 
 
 under sec. 8, act of 1875, new Code sec. 57, 336. 
 sec. 8 stated and applied, 336. 
 New Code embodies it, sec. 57. 
 applies to certain character of suits, 336. 
 purpose to bring in defendants out of state, 336. 
 proceed by warning order instead of subpoena, 338. 
 form of petition for warning order, 338, 339. 
 form when defendant is a corporation, 339. 
 form of warning order, 340. 
 duty of clerk in, 341. 
 who and how served, 341. 
 when may be served by publication, 341, 342. 
 act does not enlarge jurisdiction, 343. 
 act applies in suit for title to stock, 344. 
 to cancel instruments, 344. 
 in specific performance, 344. 
 to remove cloud, 345. 
 foreclosure of liens, 345. 
 in trying title, 345. 
 does not apply to unknown heirs, 346. 
 service of process on corporations, 322. 
 
 Federal courts will follow state laws in serving corporations, 
 
 322, 325. 
 illustrations of service on corporations, 320. 
 
974 INDEX. 
 
 SERVICE OF PROCESS— continued. 
 
 to serve corporation must be doing business where suit brought, 327- 
 
 329. 
 service of process may be attacked after removal, 840, 
 see Supplemental Bills. 
 amendment of process, 321. 
 
 when not allowed, 321. 
 
 SET OFF. See Cross Suit. 
 
 SHIFTING PARTIES. 
 
 to get diversity of citizenship, 65. 
 
 SPECIAL APPEARANCE. See Appeabajstce. 
 
 STATE. 
 
 not a citizen, 63. 
 
 service of subpoena on, 317. 
 
 conflict between state and Federal jurisdiction, 477-480. 
 
 enjoining proceedings in state court, 475. 
 
 when judgment obtained by fraud, 478, 616. 
 
 STATE COURTS. See State, 
 
 STATEMENT OF THE CASE, 275. 
 
 STOCKHOLDER AS PARTY. 
 
 equity rule 27 discussed, 240. 
 when minority may sue, 241-245. 
 
 SUBMITTING CASE TO APPELLATE COURT. 
 practice, 727-733. 
 
 SUBPCENA. See Sebvice of Pbocess. 
 courts always open to issue, 305. 
 issuing subpoena, 312, 313. 
 bill must be filed, 312. 
 
 what to contain, 313. 
 when more than one defendant, 313. 
 when made returnable, 313. 
 office of, 313. 
 delivery to marshal, 314. 
 service of, 315. 
 
 how made, 315. 
 
 where made, 316. 
 when service on attorney, 317. 
 
 on agent, 317. 
 
 on executor or guardian, 317. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 9Y5 
 
 SUBPCENA— continued, 
 service on state, 317. 
 
 when subpoena cannot be served as where defendant privileged, 318. 
 must be served before return day, 318. 
 eflFect of valid service, 319. 
 may amend writ, 321. 
 return of subpoena, 319, 
 motion to quash, 320. 
 may amend service, 321. 
 when not allowed to amend, 321. 
 sec. 740 new code, sec. 52 is now the rule applied to all districts, 105- 
 
 108. 
 can issue subpoena to another Federal district, see chap. 717, pp. 107, 
 
 108. 
 see Duces Tecum, 
 
 SUBSTITUTED SERVICE, 
 what is, 485. 
 
 applies generally to auxiliary suits, 485. 
 must be an order for, 485. 
 sec. 8 act of 1875 is a form of, 485. 
 on agents and attorneys, 485. 
 character of attorney to sustain, 486. 
 how this service is obtained, 487. 
 
 form of application for, 487. 
 
 motion to vacate, 488. 
 form of motion, 488. 
 
 SUIT IN LAW OR EQUITY DEFINED, 43, 44. 
 
 SUIT PENDING, 407, 408. 
 
 SUPERSEDEAS. 
 
 petition for, 666, 667. 
 
 form of, 668. 
 form of decree for, 668. 
 when appellate court ma}' issue, 669. 
 who allows, 668, 669. 
 appellate court may issue, 669. 
 supersedeas bond, 685. 
 
 power to grant, 685. 
 
 within what time to be perfected, 686. 
 
 effect of bond, 686. 
 liability on, 687. 
 
 damages covered, 688. 
 
 failure to prosecute appeal, 688. 
 
 sureties on, 689. 
 
976 INDEX. 
 
 SUPERSEDEAS— continued. 
 
 motion to vacate, 689. 
 form of, 689. 
 
 in writ of error from state to United States Supreme Com t, 763^ 
 
 after sixty days cannot obtain supersedeas, 763, 765. 
 
 when writ of error a supersedeas, 763. 
 rule to calculate time, 7fi4. 
 act must be followed, 765. 
 
 bond to be given, 763. 
 
 when bond becomes impaired, 766. 
 when execution can issue on judgment, 764. 
 
 SUPPLEMENTAL BILL, 366. 
 rule 34 stated, 366. 
 nature of, 366. 
 when necessary, 367. 
 only necessary now in few cases, 368. 
 when no case in original bill, 369. 
 after decree when necessary, 369. 
 motion to file, 370. 
 form of motion, 370. 
 notice of motion, 371. 
 form of notice, 371. 
 equity rule 35, stated, 372. 
 parties to, 372. 
 
 process in, 372. 
 
 relation to original bill, 374. 
 
 form of supplemental bill, 374. 
 bill in the nature of a supplemental bill, 376. 
 
 new rule 34 does not mention them, 376. 
 
 but cases stated when necessary, 377. 
 
 SUPREME COURT. 
 
 only constitutional court, 38. 
 original exclusive jurisdiction, 40, 41. 
 appellate powers, 40, 41. 
 appeal from state courts, 746. 
 
 from district courts to Supreme Court direct, 640-642. 
 
 circuit court of appeals, 724. 
 
 see Appeals. 
 rules of ( appendix ) . 
 
 TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION, 92. 
 limits of, 48. 
 
 statutes stated, 48, 49, 92. 
 
 statute does not apply to removals if objection not made, 830-833. 
 two forums in diversity of citizenship, 93, 94. 
 
INDEX. 97Y 
 
 TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION— continued. 
 
 defendant must be sued in district of residence when otlier grounds 
 for jurisdiction is basis of suit, 94. 
 
 venue when jurisdiction depends on both diversity and Federal ques- 
 tion, 94. 
 
 exceptions to rule, 95. 
 
 "inhabitant" in statute defined, 96. 
 
 venue when two or more plaintiffs and defendants, 97. 
 
 see sec. 8, sec. 57, new code act of 1875, stated and applied as to terri- 
 torial jurisdiction, 108. 
 
 see Seevice of Pbocess. 
 
 rule of venue under the judiciary act of 1888, 100. 
 
 U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 741, stated, 101, 102. 
 
 U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 742, stated. Code, sec. 55, 100. 
 
 sec. 737 embodied in New Judicial Code, sec. 50, 101. 
 
 XJ. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 738 embodied in New Judicial Code sec. 58, 102. 
 
 process can be served beyond the territorial limits of the district, 101, 
 102. 
 
 U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 740, embodied in New Code, sec. 52, 105, 108. 
 
 where a corporation may be sued, 109, 110. 
 
 rules stated, 112. ' 
 
 illustrations, 113. 
 
 what district is the domicil of a corporation, 115. 
 see Corporations. 
 
 where alien corporations may be sued, 119, 120. 
 
 territorial jurisdiction may be waived, 121. 
 
 acts of waiver, 121-123. 
 
 must be pled, 121. 
 
 who may object to want of territorial jurisdiction, 123. 
 
 objection that defendant is not sued in his district, how made, 133. 
 
 when defendant a corporation, 134. 
 
 TORT FEASORS. 
 
 no separable controversy in, 74. 
 removal by, 817. 
 
 TRANSCRIPT, 706. 
 see Appeal. 
 
 TRUSTEES. 
 
 as parties, 229, 252-25£ 
 
 equity rule 37 stated and applied, 252. 
 
 necessarj' party when suit to defeat the trust, 253. 
 
 so in suit to recover property, 253. 
 
 so when income of trust estate is sought to be reached, 253. 
 
 equity rule 41 stated, 254. 
 
 UNKNOWN HEIRS, 346. 
 S. Eq.— -62. 
 
978 INDEX. 
 
 UNKNOWN PARTIES, 236. 
 
 see Unknown Heies as Pakties. 
 
 sec. 57 new Code does not apply to unknown heirs, 236. 
 
 VENUE. 
 
 see Teeeitoeial Jurisdiction, 92. 
 
 in diversity of citizenship, 92, 93. 
 
 when two or more plaintiffs and defendants, 97. 
 
 as to venue only a personal exemption, 97. 
 
 provisions of act of 1888 stated, 93, 94. 
 
 two forums in diversity, 93. 
 
 rule of venue under other provisions of the act, 94, 100. 
 
 exception to the rule, 95. 
 
 when jurisdiction depends on Federal question, 94. 
 
 issue as to district of suit in diversity of citizenship, 133. 
 
 how raised and form of plea, 133, 134. 
 issue as to Federal question, 165. 
 
 form of plea, 167. 
 venue in suing corporations, 109, 
 where is the domicil of a corporation, 115. 
 see Waiver. 
 
 VERIFYING ANSWER. 
 
 not necessary, 425, 430. 
 
 VERIFYING BILL. 
 
 need not unless special order or process asked, 287. 
 form if necessary, 287. 
 
 WAIVER. 
 
 waiver of jurisdiction, 121. 
 acts of waiver, 121. 
 
 taking depositions as, 123. 
 
 waiver of exceptions to master's report, by withdrawing, 568. 
 
 waiver of exceptions not taken before master, 568. 
 rule when reference by consent, 572. 
 waiving irregularity in filing transcript, 716. 
 waiving citation in appeal, 692. 
 waiving order to intervene, 461. 
 
 waiving defense under sec. 723 of U. S. Rev. Stat., 32. 
 waiving defect in certificate to depositions, 505, 506. 
 
 WITNESSES, SUBPOENAS FOR, IN EQUITY SUITS, 496. 
 who may be examined as, 492. 
 how brought before examiner or master, 494. 
 notice of examination, 522. 
 examination of, 520, 521, 523. 
 
INDEX. 979 
 
 WITNESSES, SUBPOENAS FOR, IN EQUITY SUITS— continued, 
 where refuses to appear or answer, 495, 525. 
 how examination conducted, 520. 
 oral examination at hearing, 490. 
 who to pass on materiality, 526. 
 witnesses on law side, 
 adopting previous answers, 540. 
 see SuBPCENA; SuBPCENA DucES Tecum. 
 
 WRIT OF ASSISTANCE, ,590.