THE GIFT OF 
 
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RadcHfFe College Monographs 
 
 No. 7 
 
 The Unity 
 
 OF 
 
 FicHTE's Doctrine of Knowledge 
 
 BY 
 
 ANNA BOYNTON THOMPSON 
 
 with an introduction 
 By JOSIAH ROYCE, Ph.D., 
 
 PROFESSOR OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY 
 
 BOSTON, U.S.A. 
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 A- 
 
RadclifFe College Monographs 
 
 No. 7 
 
 The Unity 
 
 OF 
 
 FicHTE's Doctrine of Knowledge 
 
 BY 
 
 ANNA BOYNTON THOMPSON 
 
 with an introduction 
 By JOSIAH ROYCE, Ph.D., 
 
 PROFESSOR OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY 
 
 BOSTON, U.S.A. 
 PUBLISHED BY GINN & COMPANY 
 
 1895 
 
Copyright, 18%, 
 By Radcliffe College, Cambridge, Mass. 
 
 3Eniber»its Ultras: 
 John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, U.S.A. 
 
TO 
 
 ALICE MARY LONGFELLOW, 
 assDctste nf iKaBcliffe Colleflc, 
 
 I DEDICATE THIS WORK 
 
 A3 AN EXPRESSION OF THE AFFECTION AND GRATITUDE I BEAR HER, 
 t 
 
 FOR FRIENDSHIP, 
 
 FOR UNFAILING SYMPATHY, 
 
 FOR PROFOUND HELP IN THOUGHT AND LIFE. 
 
PRE FAC E. 
 
 'T^HE following paper is a portion of an exposition of Fichte's 
 Doctrine of Knowledge upon which the writer is at work. 
 It was read before the Graduate Philosophical Seminary of Har- 
 vard University in the winter of 1893-94, and, as the view it 
 presents of Fichte's system differs somewhat from the current 
 one, it was deemed best to give the paper printed form at once, 
 that criticism might show where it must be mended before falling 
 into final shape. The exposition is the result of several years' 
 study of Philosophy under the stimulating guidance of Professor 
 Josiah Royce of Harvard University: its central thought, the 
 unity of Fichte's system, has been much influenced by his 
 criticism. For opportunity to do work of a kind impossible 
 elsewhere, a debt of gratitude has long been owed to the authori- 
 ties of Radcliffe College, which renews itself year by year and 
 which can never be adequately acknowledged. To the College 
 thanks must again be given for the use of its imprimatur. The 
 many friends who have patiently listened and kindly criticised 
 when Fichte's views have been thrust upon them, have had 
 large share in helping the writer to see his deeper meaning. To 
 one of these friends, whose daily living has been perpetual 
 preparation for the comprehension of the most spiritual doctrine, 
 whose forgetfulness of self gives that depth of insight which is 
 promised to the pure in heart, and whose generosity of nature 
 makes the giving of help an unconscious office, much in this 
 paper is due. 
 
VUl PREFACE. 
 
 He who knows Fichte knows that the essentials of Fichte's 
 system could be " bounded by a nut-shell," and to him the length 
 of the paper will be a prophecy of the repetition it contains. 
 But efforts toward exposition have made evident to the writer 
 that Fichte's point of view is so subtle and so elusive as to be 
 kept before the mind only by restatement at every turn of 
 the argument. The thinker who grasps it at once and holds 
 it fast is begged to forgive what to him must seem wearisome 
 prolixity. 
 
 The citations in the appendix will, it is hoped, lead the student 
 to a closer study of Fichte's works. The proofs of the German 
 text have had the advantage of revision by Dr. Max F. Blau. 
 For this friendly assistance the writer owes hearty thanks. 
 
 Cambridge, Mass., 
 
 October 27, 1894. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 I HAVE learned so much from following the growth of this 
 monograph as it has taken shape in the author's mind, and 
 am so much indebted to its ingenuity and scholarship for new 
 light upon Fichte's doctrine, that my little task in writing this 
 introduction limits itself to an acknowledgment of my own debt to 
 the author, and to the statement of a few considerations that may 
 help to prepare the reader to face its problem. Miss Thompson's 
 presentation, I think, speaks for itself. It is an historical study, 
 and has aimed only to be faithful to Fichte's thought. Yet faith- 
 fulness is in general the road to originality ; and IVIiss Thompson's 
 interpretation will be found to be, in plan and in execution, as 
 independent and original, within the limits possible in an exposi- 
 tory essay, as it is devoted and painstaking. For my own part, in 
 following the growth of this essay, I have, indeed, suggested from 
 time to time criticisms as to matters of detail, and have discussed 
 some of the problems at considerable length with the author; but 
 the outcome has been in many ways an unexpected one to me, 
 and as instructive as unexpected. Accepting, as I now do, the 
 main theses of this exposition of Fichte as being a fair presenta- 
 tion of his central thought, and avoiding at present any discussion 
 of the actual finality of Fichte's own form of idealistic doctrine, I 
 may still venture to indicate, in general terms, the historical and 
 philosophical interest of the whole enterprise. 
 
 Fichte always asserted that he had, from the beginning of his 
 independent labors as a philosophical teacher, to the very close of 
 his career, but one system, always called by himself the Wissen- 
 schaftslehre. He admitted that his own comprehension of its 
 
 b 
 
X Introduction. 
 
 significance was a growing thing, or, as he once stated the case, 
 that this doctrine had done much to alter him, as a thinker and as 
 a man, since first he held and taught its main principles. But this 
 alteration produced by the doctrine was not, he declared, a real 
 alteration of the doctrine; for he strenuously denied that the 
 essential insight upon which the whole was founded had itself 
 ever changed since first he reached this central idea. To be sure, 
 his own statement of the sense in which his doctrine is stable and 
 continuous is subject to certain fluctuations. In his correspond- 
 ence with Schelling^ there are two passages which, when com- 
 pared, illustrate how, even in the earlier half of his philosophical 
 career, he could already vary in his own account of the degree to 
 which the Wissenschaftslehre itself was to be viewed as identical 
 in its various successive presentations. For in one of these pas- 
 sages, occurring in a letter to Schelling, dated Dec. 27, 1800, 
 Fichte, looking back, of course, upon his own productions up to 
 that time, admits that there are certain important propositions 
 stated in Schelling's immediately previous letter which Fichte 
 himself has long understood, while, as he adds, " I believe that 
 these propositions do not follow from the principles of Transcen- 
 dentalism as heretofore stated, but are, on the contrary, in opposi- 
 tion thereto, and that they can only be demonstrated through a 
 still wider extension of the transcendental philosophy, even in its 
 principles [the italics are Fichte's], — an extension which, for the 
 rest, the need of the present time most urgently demands of us. 
 I," continues Fichte, " have not yet been able to bring these more 
 extensive principles into scientific form. The plainest indications 
 in regard to them occur in the third book of my ' Vocation of 
 Man.' Their development will be my first work so soon as I have 
 completed the new exposition of the Doctrine of Knowledge. In 
 a word, I lack still a transcendental system of the intelligible 
 world." Fichte here adds a few words which Schelling was dis- 
 posed to regard as an approximation to his own theory of the 
 Absolute. But less than six months later, Fichte, of whose con- 
 cession Schelling had naturally taken a dialectical advantage, 
 
 ^ I cite from Fichte's und Schelling's Philosophischer Briefwechsel, hrsg. v. I. H. 
 Fichte und K. Fr. A. Schelling (Stuttgart, 1856). 
 
Introduction. xi 
 
 Fichte himself, forgetting, with characteristic indifference to the 
 letter, his own previous form of expression, complains, under date 
 of May 31, 1801, of Schelling's method of reply. "I haven't 
 your letter at hand," says Fichte, " but if I remember rightly 
 you said in that letter that I admit that certain questions are not 
 disposed of by the principles heretofore stated. Now, I don't 
 admit that at all. The Doctrine of Knowledge is not at all 
 lacking in its principles. What it does lack is completeness. The 
 highest synthesis is not yet accomplished, — the synthesis of the 
 spiritual realm \_Geisterwelt, identical, of course, with the " intel- 
 ligible world" of the former letter]. When I undertook to accom- 
 plish this synthesis, the cry of atheism was raised." 
 
 Thus Fichte does indeed waver in his expressions as to the 
 degree of his own fidelity to the system with which he introduced 
 himself to the public. Certain it is at any rate that he admitted the 
 necessity of supplementing the first exposition, or rather of substi- 
 tuting for it a far completer expression of his system. Certain, on 
 the other hand, it is that, whether the needed supplement was to 
 concern " principles," or only the application of principles, Fichte 
 felt always sure that the old foundations would not be done a\^ay 
 with in making the needed alterations. There was held to be a 
 " unity" in his doctrine, from one end of his career to the other; 
 this, at all events, was his own thesis. 
 
 It is well known that this thesis has received comparatively little 
 support from the historians of philosophy. Few philosophers 
 have suffered more from the influence of mere cant phrases than 
 Fichte has done. Not without his own fault, but surely against 
 his own intention, he very early laid himself open to the deadly 
 dangers of seeming too comprehensible as to the general outline of 
 his system. The whole of his philosophy, as he first expounded 
 it, came to be reduced, in the minds of his average critics, to the 
 one proposition, " The Ego creates the world." No other of the 
 thinkers of his generation suggested any summary of such a fatal 
 simplicity. Kant, Schelling, Hegel, nobody could pretend to 
 reduce to any single phrase. But Fichte, — him anyone could 
 understand, and refute, in five minutes. One could state this theory 
 " succinctly " and even " in French." Having stated the supposed 
 
xii Introduction. 
 
 dogma of Fichte, one was absolved from asking of him any further 
 explanations, or from listening if he made any. He vociferated in 
 vain, he issued " Sunclear Expositions " in vain, he proclaimed 
 against the charge of atheism in vain, he wrote in vain upon 
 "Faith," upon the "Blessed Life," upon the Absolute. Why 
 should one ponder all these things? One knew better than Fichte 
 the inevitable outcome, — " The Ego makes the world." Now the 
 Ego is, to everybody who has ever learned how to take care of 
 himself, an extremely familiar principle. If a philosopher assigns 
 the world-creation to this most familiar of principles, — well, then 
 any reader must know what he means, and needs no account of 
 the " Blessed Life" to help one out. 
 
 Or again, since, in his later treatises, Fichte no longer chose to 
 speak so freely of the Ego, but talked of God, of the Absolute, 
 of Being, and cited the Fourth Gospel, — surely it must be mani- 
 fest to any reader, however superficial, that, since such phrases 
 and names as the philosopher now preferred to use were them- 
 selves also old friends, and were obviously out of place in that 
 endlessly simple system whose principle was, " The Ego creates 
 the world," it followed that Fichte had changed his system, after 
 about 1800, or a little later, and was, henceforth, either a Schel- 
 lingian, or else merely a popular lecturer on philosophy, with no 
 characteristic system of his own at all. So the popular opinion 
 has run, — an opinion usually founded upon nothing but a shame- 
 fully slavish repetition of mere phrases. 
 
 The professional students of philosophy in Fichte's day and 
 later had no excuse for being thus deceived by the current phrases. 
 Unfortunately, however, there were circumstances of a more 
 serious nature which long prevented most of even such students 
 from approaching the facts of the case in a spirit sufficiently far 
 removed from the foregoing errors. The first circumstance lay in 
 the fact that the Wissenshaftslehre, as presented in 1794, re- 
 mained to the end of Fichte's life the principal published ex- 
 pression of his systematic views. The " Darstellung" of 1801 
 never appeared until the publication of the complete works, a 
 generation later, long after Fichte's stronger influence was a thing 
 of the seemingly irrevocable past. As a fact, the principal later 
 
hitroduction. xiii 
 
 publications of Fichte related either to applied, or to popularized, 
 or, worst of all for the correction of such errors, to polemical 
 philosophy. Polemic may be a good weapon against foes, when 
 a doctrine is already well understood ; it is seldom a good device 
 for correcting current and widespread misunderstandings. By 
 polemic you may protect a thesis ; you can almost never set aside 
 a general misinterpretation. Popular philosophizing, on the other 
 hand, is never favorable to the finer estimate of technical distinc- 
 tions between one doctrine and another. For practical applica- 
 tions, meanwhile, the public may be thankful to the philosopher; 
 but they never repay him for such services by trying to under- 
 stand his theories. Why should they? Nobody cares what is in 
 such cases applied. The public interest is only in the apparent 
 patness of the application. Thus Fichte's technical influence over 
 professional students was almost unaided by his other publica- 
 tions, and was very nearly limited, during his lifetime, to the influ- 
 ence exerted by the " Grundlage " of 1794. Now the inadequacy 
 of this "Grundlage" lay in the unnecessary emphasis therein 
 placed upon certain aspects of the doctrine. Miss Thompson has, 
 indeed, tried to show that, in the " Grundlage," all the essential 
 factors upon which Fichte later lays stress, in those various tech- 
 nical expositions of his system which he wrote but never lived to 
 publish, are, in some degree, indicated and used. But there can 
 be no question that some of these fundamental factors are not em- 
 phasized in the " Grundlage " as they later came to be. Nor can 
 the most careful of Fichte's contemporary critics be blamed for 
 failing to notice the real significance of such of the elements in the 
 exposition of the " Grundlage " as only a careful comparison with 
 the posthumously published expositions has enabled Miss Thomp- 
 son to identify, while the full importance of these elements is 
 actually only to be learned from these later expositions. In short, 
 then, Fichte's professional contemporaries could not be expected 
 to see the full value of considerations which, if present in the 
 " Grundlage," had still not disclosed their own entire weight to 
 Fichte's own mind when he wrote this first exposition. So it came 
 to pass that Fichte's historical influence, even over those who 
 knew him best, and who were best able to understand what the 
 
xiv Introduction. 
 
 maligned principle called the " Ego " really meant, was still an 
 influence founded upon the reading of his least finished and most 
 immature technical treatise. When Fichte the son published the 
 complete works, he almost in vain tried to call the attention of the 
 historians to the necessity of rewriting that chapter of the history 
 of modern philosophy which dealt with his father's thought. The 
 influence of Fichte was itself by that time a matter of history, and 
 had been almost wholly dependent on the "Grundlage" of 1794. 
 It seemed vain to correct an old tradition by new documents that 
 had played no part in the controversies of their own day. The 
 Fichte of the " Grundlage " remained the typical Fichte; and the 
 new documents therefore only seemed the more to contain, not the 
 supplement and interpretation of the " Grundlage," but the work 
 of another and a later Fichte, who had possessed no noteworthy 
 historical influence. 
 
 The other circumstances of most moment in establishing the 
 tradition as to Fichte's doctrine were two. One was the fact that 
 Hegel, in his early essay on the " Difference between the Philoso- 
 phies of Fichte and Schelling," had reduced the contrast between 
 the two thinkers to a conveniently schematic form, which, without 
 being in any wise as trivial as the popular interpretation of Fichte, 
 was still wholly based, so far as Fichte was concerned, upon the 
 "Grundlage" of 1794, and, as now appears, was unfair even to that. 
 This schematic account of Fichte remained the basis of all Hegel's 
 later criticisms of the elder thinker, in numerous passages of Hegel's 
 works, and became, accordingly, generally authoritative in the 
 Hegelian School. The other circumstance was the fact that, after 
 the personal estrangement between Fichte and Schelling, the lat- 
 ter, with characteristic bitterness, accused Fichte of having pla- 
 giarized Schelling's own ideas in the " Way to the Blessed Life," 
 and in his other popular lectures. The accusation (made in 1806) 
 was founded upon the sharpest possible insistence upon the con- 
 trast between Fichte's earlier and later teachings. Few have been 
 influenced by the bitter tone of Schelling so far as to share his 
 estimate that here was conscious plagiarism. But it has been cus- 
 tomary to consider Fichte as under the more or less unconscious 
 influence of the spirit of the Romantic movement. And thus even 
 
Introduction. xv 
 
 the younger Fichte calls attention to the change in his father's 
 practical attitude, as regards ethical and religious questions, be- 
 tween 1804 and the lectures of the three closing years of his life. 
 All these circumstances, then, have contributed to fix attention 
 upon one line of tradition regarding Fichte. 
 
 There have not been altogether wanting voices in favor of 
 Fichte's own opinion concerning the unity of his development. 
 Notably Harms, in his history of philosophy, insists upon such 
 an unity, and to the end of indicating where it lay, is indisposed 
 to make the "Grundlage" of 1794 central in his exposition. On the 
 other hand, nearly all expositions still favor the " Grundlage" to an 
 extraordinary degree, despite Fichte's own frequent admissions of 
 its incompleteness. That it is possible thus to found one's exposi- 
 tion, in the main, upon the text of the " Grundlage," and still to see 
 unity in Fichte's development, and to reject the notion of " two 
 systems," is evidenced by Professor Everett's well known volume 
 on Fichte. But I fancy that Miss Thompson's method of expli- 
 citly interpreting the earlier in the light of the later expositions 
 has several arguments in its favor, and is worthy of a fair trial. 
 
 The result of Miss Thompson's study is substantially the thesis 
 that Fichte's one system is statable in a form consistent with the 
 real meaning of all of his principal expositions. If I may attempt 
 to restate Miss Thompson's view in my own way, I should find, 
 according to her, that Fichte's doctrine contains the following cen- 
 tral assertions: (i) The world is no Ding an sick, since a Ding 
 an sick is logically impossible. On the contrary, the world may 
 primarily be defined as a point of view, which of itself determines 
 whatever appears to experience and to thought from that point of 
 view. So far, and if this statement were the whole of it, the doc- 
 trine would seem a subjectivism, — bald, sceptical, Protagorean. 
 The world here, as with Schopenhauer, is meine Vorstelhmg ; for 
 whoever occupies the point of view can use exactly that phrase, 
 if Vorstelhmg be taken to include thinking as well as mere seeing. 
 But now: (2) There is, logically speaking, but one possible and 
 consistent point of view, and what is seen and thought from this 
 point of view is consequently fixed, eternal, free from caprice, in a 
 word, absolute. That this is true, the system proposes to demonf 
 
xvi Introduction. 
 
 strate, by a process of passing from lower, inconsistent, and tran- 
 sient points of view to a certain highest point of view that justifies 
 itself as such. The world is only as it is known. Being is not 
 conceivable as prior to or as apart from knowing. And the world 
 is what it is known as, — nothing else. Only knowing, in order to 
 be self-consistent, has to get one form, and one only. What form, 
 the system of philosophy must discover by showing that other 
 forms are self-contradictory. And the knowing, when it gets this 
 one absolute form, will have an absolute content. (3) This abso- 
 lute content of the absolute knowing, when found, is first to be 
 defined as a Life, — self-contained, complete, simple, yet infinitely 
 full. That this is what knowledge alone can know, i. e., can experi- 
 ence and think, if knowledge is to be consistent with itself, this the 
 system is to prove by experiment, viz., by trying to know what is 
 primarily given, and then by finding what the knowing of this 
 primary datum implies. (4) This one Absolute Life is known, 
 however, that is, is experienced and thought, as something mani- 
 festing itself in the form of finite beings, who necessarily aim to 
 live in the sight of laws, i. e., who either live under the dominion 
 of natural laws, or who live in free, /. e., voluntary accordance 
 with an absolute moral law. This world of manifested life can 
 only be consistently conceived as the manifestation of the One 
 Life, viz., that of the Absolute. Yet in no one of the finite lives, in 
 so far as they are lived alone, can the absolute life get any true ex- 
 pression. Thus, from the absolute point of view, the one life is 
 thought of as something absolutely self-possessed, but is directly 
 seen only as something endlessly engaged in expressing itself. 
 Hence, the finite lives are to be conceived as an endless series, 
 whose system is that of the spiritual world. The absolute life 
 itself is to be consistently conceived as that of God, who is seen 
 nowhere in the finite world, but who is thought of as its principle. 
 (S) The sole evidence for this doctrine, yes, the sole truth of it, 
 lies in the one central consideration that only thus can the truth 
 consistently be viewed. Take experience and think out its mean- 
 ing, and only this one consistent way of thinking its meaning will 
 finally come out. At the end, as at the beginning, there is but 
 the point of view, which of itself determines its own contents. To 
 
Introduction. xvii 
 
 be sure, Fichte distinguishes, in the absolute point of view, be- 
 tween what is content of direct experience, or Anschauung, and 
 what is content for thought, Denken. It is true, according to him, 
 that the concrete fulfilment of the absolute life in a completed con- 
 scious system of finite lives cannot possibly be directly seen from 
 any point of view. But the true view thinks as well as sees. It 
 thinks God, it sees His expression everywhere. (6) The terms 
 of the absolute point of view are thus indeed the Ego, as the sub- 
 jective aspect or principle of knowing, and its object the World, as 
 that which is known. But this Ego is not the empirical individual, 
 who as such is merely one of the objects in the finite world ; nor 
 is the Ego itself any sort of Ding an sich- If made the object of 
 knowledge, it at once appears as life or will. The world itself is 
 the manifestation of God, but only of course in so far as it is 
 necessarily thought to be so. God as the absolute, thought but 
 never directly beheld, manifesting Himself everywhere, but never 
 finally manifested, is so far conceived as the unattainable basis of 
 life, the incomprehensible in which all comprehension is rooted. 
 Yet God, too, is no Ding an sich, only the object which is thought 
 of from a certain inevitable point of view, — a point of view to 
 which all others are reduced if only you think out their meanings. 
 And viewed in His manifestation in the world, God is indeed viewed 
 as the best known of objects, viz., the life of all things, and conse- 
 quently as exemplified by all of them, and by their all-pervading 
 system. 
 
 This extremely interesting development of the doctrine of the 
 necessities of thinking viewed solely as inner necessities, and of 
 the objects of thinking viewed solely as relative to these necessities, 
 — this elaborate system whose central word is, " It is as if," — 
 this expression of what Fichte called absolutes Durch (i. e., absolute 
 relativity), — this it is which Miss Thompson has endeavored to 
 work out with great detail as the inner meaning of the misunder- 
 stood phrase concerning the " Ego " that " makes the world." 
 The posthumous lectures have constituted her most useful key. I 
 nee^ hardly say that I am here neither defending nor attacking 
 this highly ingenious form of idealism. Surely it is well that this 
 form should come to its rights. An effort to remove, absolutely 
 
 c 
 
xviii Introduction. 
 
 and forever, every shade of capriciousness and of changeableness 
 from a doctrine which still asserts the total relativity of thinking 
 and its objects, has its own reason for existence, and deserves a 
 more careful study than has ever been given to this particular 
 form of the doctrine. 
 
 I may conclude by calling attention to one passage, in the 
 correspondence already cited, in which Fichte is trying, in a last 
 desperate effort, to convey to Schelling the essence of Fichte's 
 own conception of the Absolute. Schelling, so Fichte supposes 
 (in the latter's letters of 1800-1801), falsely views the Absolute as 
 something that is to be real or true or absolute independently of 
 the thought of it. But meanwhile Fichte himself, as he also end- 
 lessly reiterates, does not view the Absolute, or any other truth, 
 e. g., the truth of nature, as in any wise dependent upon the mere 
 subjective thoughts of this or that individual. There is to be no 
 question, however, of this or of that separate point of view. 
 There is but one right point of view, because there is but one 
 logical, consistent, internally clear point of view ; and Fichte's 
 thesis is that the Absolute exists for that point of view, and has 
 no other existence. So too with nature, with mathematical truth, 
 with moral truth. 
 
 " One must not begin " (says Fichte, on p. 84 of the mentioned 
 correspondence, under date of May 31, 1801) " with a Being, but 
 with a Seeing." " Consider," he continues, " your consciousness 
 that there is only one straight line to be drawn between two points. 
 For the first, you have in this case your own self-comprehension 
 and your full self-possession, — the act that gives the assurance 
 of the truth. This for me is the basis. You assume, you assert, 
 that this principle holds of all possible lines, and for all possible 
 intelligences. And this occurs to you in the following way: In 
 respect of the first point [viz., that this holds of aW possible lines] 
 you regard your consciousness as determined content. In respect 
 of the second point, you regard yourself as a consciousness that is 
 determinable \_i. e., that is yet to be determined]. The first con- 
 sideration gives you (in the end) the individual. The second, in 
 regard to which you merely posit the empty form of selfhood, 
 "■gives you, further on, the spiritual world \i. e., the world of intelli- 
 
Introduction. xix 
 
 gences in general]. Finite consciousness in general is conse- 
 quently the absolute union of a consciousness of the world of 
 intelligences as a whole, with the consciousness of the individual. 
 The consciousness of the individual is the logical reason {Ideal- 
 grimd) for the consciousness of the world of intelligences as a 
 whole. But the latter world is the real reason (never to be fully 
 comprehended and exhaustively possessed) of the latter." [So far 
 one has a total relativity. Where I know myself well, I do so 
 by appealing to the universal insight of all. And the universal 
 insight of all is here known in so far as it is appealed to.] " But," 
 continues Fichte, " you asserted your own comprehension, your 
 case of the union of subject and object, as something determinate. 
 Now this assertion [that I know this universal truth] is made in 
 the absolute consciousness, which no consciousness can further 
 transcend and reflect upon. Your determinate character, in this 
 case, is consequently something absolute, upon which no con- 
 sciousness can reflect, which none can further possess, and herein 
 this something resembles a datum, a reality, Being (for Being is — 
 Seeing that cannot further comprehend or possess itself)." 
 
 Thus Fichte tries to exemplify what the comprehension of an ' 
 absolute truth implies. Such comprehension, where it comes, 
 implies the double insight, (i) that " I must so view this," and 
 (2) that the indeterminate but " determinable " Self called " all 
 intelligences " must so view this. These two insights are correla- 
 tive. Each means the other. I experience the one must, I think 
 the other must. But neither of these, the experienced must and 
 the conceived must, can be viewed apart from the other. If the 
 first must were conceived to hold only for me, it would be thought 
 as a necessary delusion, as a mere feeling, as nothing to be viewed 
 as a truth. If the second must were not exemplified by my own 
 case, it would never occur to me to believe it. In illustrating this 
 consideration Fichte continues (p. %'j') by saying: " Unser keiner 
 denkt ihm selber, noch wahnt er, ihm selber zu denken, so gewiss 
 er — denkt." No one of us thinks unto himself, nor does he 
 fancy that he does so, so long as he thinks at all. Thought 
 conceives itself as under absolute standards. 
 
 Thus, then, nothing can be thought as really true for me, with- 
 
XX Introduction. 
 
 out being conceived as, in some aspect, expressive of an abso- 
 lute truth for all. Where I really know myself, I presuppose the 
 Geisterwelt, and vice versa. " My relatively empirical self, with its 
 experiences, is thus," continues Fichte, " the object of a conscious- 
 ness whose form is absolute. And now this conception, that what 
 is true is universally true, and that my truth is known as my truth 
 by virtue of an absolute consciousness thereof, — this inevitably 
 leads us to a conception ol 2. System der Geisterwelt, with 2.Realgrund 
 for the relations of individual experiences therein, and an ' ideales 
 Band Alter = Gott.' " But now, Fichte insists, this God who is 
 conceived as the spiritual tie of the conceived world of truth, is he 
 now to be defined as a dead truth ? You can call him reines Seyn 
 if you will. He is certainly the Absolute. But (p. 88) : " Dieses 
 Seyn ist an sich nicht etwa Compression, sondern es ist durchaus 
 Agilitat, reine Durchsichtigkeit, Licht, nicht das Licht zuriick- 
 werfender Korper." The Absolute is thus the principle of the 
 conceived unity of the truth as conceived. It is the conceived 
 light whereby the truth is seen. It is known as such light. It has 
 no presence but this. " I asserted," says Fichte, in a still later 
 letter (id. p. 124), " that the Absolute of philosophy remains 
 always a Seeing. You replied that it can then be no seeing of 
 anything. You are right. I did not deny the fact. And therewith 
 the matter must rest. . . . The Absolute has only one manifestation, 
 simple, eternal ; and this is absolute Knowledge. The Absolute 
 itself is no Being, no knowledge, nor yet [Schelling's] Identity or 
 Indifference of the two. It is just the Absolute." 
 
 Thus Fichte struggled, in manifold obscurities, to express to 
 Schelling his thesis of absolute relativity. It is well for those who 
 conceive Fichte's " later system " as derived from Schelling, to 
 have such passages in mind while they read Miss Thompson's 
 exposition of the substance of this remarkable and stubbornly 
 misunderstood doctrine, as well as the elaborate verification 
 which, in her appendix, she has undertaken for each point of 
 the exposition. 
 
 JOSIAH ROYCE. 
 
UNITY OF FICHTE'S DOCTRINE OF 
 KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 PERHAPS no philosophic system given the world has been 
 more generally or more completely misunderstood than Fichte's 
 doctrine of knowledge. During Fichte's lifetime we have no evi- 
 dence that any one approached a comprehension of its central 
 thought. Fichte is keenly alive to the prevailing misconception 
 and exclaims again and again in despair that he shall never live to 
 be understood. Since his death his system has been hardly more 
 fortunate : its expounders have seized, now one partial aspect, now 
 another; but they fail to grasp it in its entirety and its proper 
 subordination of parts. Hence the world has, as common posses- 
 sion, not Fichte's doctrine of knowledge, but distorted fragments, 
 which Fichte himself would be the first to condemn as crude, self- 
 contradictory, abortive. 
 
 Such misapprehension is peculiarly unfortunate in the case of 
 Fichte, for his one conscious aim as author was intelligibility of 
 expression : he laid claim at first to no originality, but took upon 
 himself the task of so explaining Kant that Kant should appeal to 
 the general public, and become with them a moral force. His 
 wish was to be the absolutely transparent intermedium by which 
 spiritual truth might be revealed to the masses, and humanity 
 purified and lifted ; no man ever desired more honestly effacement 
 of self and loss of personality in the truth to be taught. But 
 instead of the simple, lucid writer he sought to be, he is in style 
 perhaps the most crabbed, the most difficult, of all philosophers : 
 his dialectic method is repulsive to many and awakens their inher- 
 ent obstinacy ; his pedantic attachment to form, leading him to 
 work out his conclusions in what he calls an " artistic synthesis," 
 is wearisome and perplexing ; his phraseology is highly technical 
 
2 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 and infinitely variable, — such words as "being," " the absolute," 
 "thought," "perception," etc., are used with every signification 
 which in the history of thought has been attached to them ; he 
 lacks all art-sense ; his Teutonic cumbrousness is unrelieved by 
 any touch of humor or of grace ; he is heavy, and plain, and plod- 
 ding ; he is exasperatingly thorough ; he is slow and obscure and 
 wordy ; indeed he has no excellence of style except that which 
 arises from honesty and earnestness ; his works are great, uncouth 
 fragments, formidable and repelling piles ; yet in them is to be found 
 the central thought of Idealism in its full development. 
 
 In this infelicity of style, rather than in any intrinsic abstruse- 
 ness of thought, lies the secret of the misunderstanding of Fichte's 
 doctrine. His critics have not had the unwearied patience in dis- 
 entangling his text which is necessary. Full comprehension of 
 Fichte can be gained only by tracking his thought through all its 
 hiding-places, by collating his rugged phrases, and wresting from 
 them their common meaning. This painstaking drudgery is repul- 
 sive, and a rough and ready criticism which dispenses with reading 
 his works is an easier way of disposing of his system. 
 
 The misconceptions resulting from inadequate reading may be 
 classed under three general heads: the first one charges Fichte 
 with setting forth a dogmatic, fanciful, and contradictory doctrine of 
 self-creation by the Ego ; the second one accuses him of teaching 
 subjective idealism, or solipsism, that is, that the individual knows 
 nothing but the content of his individual mind ; the third asserts 
 that Fichte has not one system, but two, that in the Jena period 
 the ego was all in all for his philosophy, but that later he taught 
 God to be the only reality and the ego his passive image. 
 
 The object of this paper is to meet these accusations. Of these, 
 the first is, perhaps, the most difficult to refute. To do so we 
 must show that Fichte's theory is no theory of a creation, of a 
 process, but the exposition of an organic, all-inclusive thought 
 which, at a given moment, is the content of the mind of the Fich- 
 tean thinker; this thought, since it is an organism, must be grasped 
 as a whole if it would be understood ; any single fact is meaning- 
 less alone, as is always an isolated member of an organism, and 
 acquires significance only in its relation to the whole ; if the parts 
 are looked upon as successive, instead of as coexistent, the view 
 that results utterly misses the truth, and is so ludicrously inade- 
 quate that it seems like the travesty of an enemy ; he who should 
 
Introduction. 3 
 
 describe an individual man as a temporal succession of his various 
 members, — his heart, lungs, digestive organs, etc., — and should 
 leave out the simultaneous interrelation of these members, and the 
 central personality, will, mind, which is the truth of man, would 
 fail no more signally in his description than he who presents 
 Fichte's theory as setting forth a process. 
 
 But unfortunately, the expositor who would present Fichte's 
 theory as that of an organic whole must do so in words, and 
 words, since they are successive, mislead when their task is 
 to set before the mind something whose only existence is co-exist- 
 ence, something which excludes successive development of its 
 members, because its being consists in the relation of simultane- 
 ously existing members ; the medium of presentation must, from 
 its very nature, contradict at every moment the truth which it 
 should set forth. That the reader may guard himself against this 
 constant danger, we beg him to keep in mind at every moment that 
 our final result, the theory which Fichte held as to the nature of 
 the universe, is not the conception of a process, but of a simulta- 
 neous content, which, under certain conditions, the mind must 
 hold at one and the same moment. 
 
 The second accusation will be met by showing that Fichte's Ego 
 is universal consciousness in its fullest conceivable extent, that the 
 individual is only member of the true Ego and subject to its laws, 
 that he does not create, but finds, a world of fixed fact, and that 
 he is forced to know a multiplicity of egos, as a condition of 
 knowing self. 
 
 The third charge will be answered by pointing out that the same 
 general outline can be discerned in each of Fichte's treatises. 
 Such analysis of Fichte's works is of great interest, and is most 
 satisfactory in result to the student who has once gained that 
 " Totalblick " of Fichte's doctrine which Fichte himself asserts 
 again and again to be absolutely essential to an understanding of 
 the Wissenschaftslehre. 
 
 Our immediate aim is, then, to grasp Fichte's system as a whole. 
 This we can best do if we try to follow the thought of Fichte as he 
 worked it out, reminding ourselves at every step that the result 
 reached is not one of a series of events which we are describing, 
 but, instead, a component element of a complex whole whose parts 
 reciprocally involve one another. The only process is the process 
 of thinking the system out, of disentangling the constituents into 
 
4 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 which a given entity, upon examination, resolves itself. We must, 
 however, not only follow Fichte, but we must follow him with 
 sympathy. Criticism cannot precede comprehension, and compre- 
 hension, when a doctrine is the result of the life-long thought of a 
 subtle, profound, and fearless thinker, is gained only by surrender 
 of self; we must for the moment think and feel with the master 
 from whom we would learn. To identify ourselves thus with 
 Fichte we should understand Fichte's nature ; when we see its 
 tendencies and feel its needs, we shall be impelled with him to the 
 thought in which he found full satisfaction, and which it was his 
 life's task to express. Thus his system will gradually shape itself 
 in us, and for the moment it will be our system. 
 
 I. Fichte's Temperament. 
 
 Fichte inherited, from ancestors who had fought as zealous 
 Lutherans in the Thirty Years' War, a strong moral nature. This 
 nature was developed by the precepts and example of pious parents : 
 they taught him that it lay in his power at every moment to choose 
 the right, and treated him as a free-will agent with moral responsi- 
 bility. Their teaching and treatment harmonized with his inherited 
 instincts. Furthermore his temperament was one of great activity 
 and energy : it inclined him to independent action, self-direction, 
 self-assertion ; he did not accept contentedly the present, or look 
 to authority, but, equally in the region of fact and of thought, his 
 impulse was to struggle earnestly and fearlessly that he might 
 bring the existing into harmony with his independent ideal. One 
 side of his nature then could find satisfaction only in such concep- 
 tion of the world as has room for freedom : his universe must 
 allow the exercise of free will if some of the deepest wants of his 
 nature were to be satisfied. 
 
 On the other hand, even in earliest childhood, Fichte showed 
 an extraordinary tendency toward reflection. His son tells us that 
 he used to stand by the hour gazing into the distance, till, as dark- 
 ness came on, the shepherds would lead him home. Fichte him- 
 self, when a man, speaks of these hours as the time in which his 
 spirit developed most strongly and most surely. He stood then at 
 the entrance of a new world, the world of reflection, where the 
 laws of thought reign. Later in life he discovered that the formal 
 
Development of Fichte : Determinism. 5 
 
 side of his nature was strong : he could not accept the facts of 
 existence as isolated phenomena, but demanded a world-formula 
 which should embrace them all in its ordered unity : explanation, 
 and law as a condition of explanation, became a recognized need. 
 We have now found in Fichte's nature two contradictory tenden- 
 cies, — one toward freedom, one toward necessity. Must one of 
 these be sacrificed, or would such ideal development be possible, 
 as should allow free play to each, and yet include both as two 
 aspects of one nature ? Can Fichte in any way look upon himself 
 as wholly free and yet as wholly under the dominion of law 'i This 
 problem proved to be his life-problem. He solves it in his philo- 
 sophic system, and its solution we are now to work out with him. 
 Let us see in what shape it first consciously appeared to him. To 
 do this we must enter his student life. 
 
 II. Development of Fichte: Determinism. 
 
 At the Universities of Jena and Leipsic, Fichte, less perhaps 
 from inclination than from prudential motives, studied theology. 
 Formal theology was then, as now, unsatisfactory. To a mind 
 like Fichte's, which, we have seen, demanded as the essential 
 of clear understanding a consistent theory springing from one 
 principle and embracing in its logical development all the facts of 
 life, the contradictions in the dogmas of the Church were unendur- 
 able. His first philosophic investigations, he says explicitly, sprang 
 from a desire to formulate for himself a tenable creed, one which 
 should explain the higher questions of theology in a rationally 
 consistent manner. In particular the problem of freedom and 
 necessity which, we have found, lay implicit in his nature as two 
 contradictory tendencies, now formally appeared in his mind as a 
 problem, and to it he devoted his first earnest thought. His tem- 
 perament and TOoral sense, of course, inclined him toward the 
 doctrine of Free Will, but the formal side of his nature triumphed, 
 and his first unaided thought led him to Determinism. Later a 
 friend directed him to Spinoza, and in him he found confirmation of 
 his individual views. The conclusiveness of Determinism for him 
 at this period is expressed in the first part of one of his popular 
 works, " Die Bestimmung des Menschen." He conceived nature 
 as an interlacing whole of cause and effect, of which man is a mere 
 
6 Unity of Fichtes Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 manifestation, determined by the total system of the universe ; the 
 individual does not act, but nature acts in him : he lives under the 
 inexorable power of rigid necessity, and must become fool or wise 
 man, sinner or saint, as she destines ; there is neither merit nor 
 blame for him or for nature because there is freedom for neither; 
 he stands under her laws and she under her own. This conclusion 
 filled him with sadness, for it contradicted his aspirations and his 
 deepest wants. 
 
 We of the nineteenth century, who live after the work of the 
 German Idealists, are keenly alive to the central defect of all deter- 
 ministic theories. They have no place for reflective ideas. Even 
 if by means of the assumption of the existence of mind and of 
 matter, and of the validity of the law of cause and effect, they can 
 account for our successive states, yet they can give no reason why 
 at any point in the succession the mind should abstract itself 
 from the immediate sensation, mount above itself to reflect upon 
 itself as receiving the sensation, again mount above itself to reflect 
 upon itself reflecting upon itself, and so indefinitely. Causality 
 theories have no explanation for self-consciousness. The deter- 
 ministic philosopher, in welding the chain of cause and effect, every 
 link of which shall be indissolubly connected with every other link, 
 and whose completed whole shall encompass the universe, cannot 
 include within the chain the subjective I, through whose activity 
 he sees the chain ; the power of the ego defies his calculation and 
 transcends every system that he can frame. 
 
 III. Development of Fichte : Idealism. 
 
 The study of Kant fixed the instant and exclusive attention of 
 Fichte upon this ego that had so long been neglected. Kant 
 taught him that the forms of the perceived, and nature as a system 
 of necessary laws, may be regarded as having their ground and 
 origin in the categories of the mind. Fichte straightway sprang 
 upon the thought that all knowledge is the product of the activity 
 of the Ego, and carried this thought to its farthest possible reaches. 
 
 (a) The Ego is an Absolute, therefore Free. 
 
 He gained a foundation for the thought by empirical observa- 
 tion. He saw that in the known sense-world, the stuff ai every 
 
Development of Fichte : Idealism. 7 
 
 object shows itself upon examination to be ego-stuff, for the ego 
 perceives the object only by becoming conscious of certain states 
 of self, which it calls hot, cold, sweet, sour, resistance, non-resist- 
 ance, pleasure, pain, etc. Though the ego assumes that these 
 states are produced through the affection of its external senses by 
 the stuff of a foreign object, it cannot prove that there is such for- 
 eign stuff, for proof must be received through another affection of 
 self, and that there is anything more than this affection again 
 demands proof, and so on to infinity. T\\q forms of every known 
 object must, before the perception of the object, lie, at least as 
 latent, in the ego, for the ego could not receive these forms into 
 itself, if its nature had no provision for their reception. Now, how 
 can we know but these ego-forms are the only forms 1 We assume, 
 to be sure, a parallel reality lying outside the ego, but to know 
 that there is such reality involves the ego's perceiving its forms, 
 which it does, again, by its own forms, and the original problem 
 reappears. Hence the existence of every known object has no 
 other testimony than the report of the powers of the ego, and the 
 ego can never leave these powers behind and go forth to discover 
 if they have told the truth. Every object of consciousness plainly" 
 is what it is for the ego only because the ego recognizes it as 
 such, and other existence than for the ego it cannot be proved to 
 have. Behind the object of knowledge is always the activity of 
 knowing. Whatever is found by the ego involves the ego's act of 
 finding, and it is impossible to prove that the act of finding does 
 not produce it, for to show that it exists before the ego knows it, 
 involves knowing it before it is known. Clearly, then, we cannot ' 
 prove that the known world of sense has other existence than as 
 product of the activity of the ego. 
 
 But in the unexplored world of sense, may there not be an 
 object that obviously cannot be a product of knowledge since it 
 has never been known by man .? May there not be in the Pleiades 
 a piece of lava.' And is it not impossible that this piece of lava is 
 the result of the activity of the ego since the ego has never known 
 it.' We cannot reply that there is a possibility of the existence of 
 such a piece of lava unknown to mind, for there cannot be its pos- 
 sibility unless all its conditions exist, and if all the conditions 
 eiist, the piece itself must exist. If we reply that such a piece of 
 lava does exist we supply the mind that now sees its existence, 
 and how can we prove that this existence has a reality beyond our 
 
8 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine oj Knowledge. 
 
 seeing it ? Existence is plainly a relative term, and means exist- 
 tence of object for subject. It is impossible to conceive objective 
 existence apart from a subject, for in conceiving it we supply the 
 subject. If, then, existence can be known only through the act of 
 conception by the ego, it is impossible to prove that this act is not 
 the sole source of existence. 
 
 The world of spirit, even more obviously than the world of 
 sense, admits no proof of reality except the ego's proof, and per- 
 haps this proof is its only reality. 
 
 Wherever we turn, then, whether to sense, or to reason, or to 
 spirit, we find only the Ego ; we cannot escape its activity, we can- 
 not flee from its presence. If we seek the uttermost parts of the 
 world it is there; if we ascend up into heaven, it is there. Every- 
 where we find self, the affections, the activity, the products of self. 
 All reahty, all existence, whatever we can know or conceive, we 
 see lying within self as boundary and matrix. 
 
 This empirical result, that the ego finds everywhere self, seemed 
 to Fichte, at first, so self-evident for the thinker that he did not 
 deem its formal exposition necessary. In his earliest work, the 
 " Grundlage," he disposes of the matter summarily : he simply 
 says that A is A by virtue of a law in the Ego which so pro- 
 nounces it; hence in seeing that A is A the Ego is seeing its 
 own law or self. A stands, of course, for the objective world ; 
 therefore in the few words just given Fichte is asserting the 
 whole Idealistic creed, — that the ego sees everywhere self. Later, 
 the need of an explanation of this creed is forced upon him, and 
 he gives it in many places, notably: i. in the " Grundriss," where 
 the process of knowledge is exhaustively analyzed and shown to 
 be always a knowledge of self; 2. in the " Darstellung," of 1801, 
 where knowledge is represented under the figure of an eye turned 
 ever inward upon self, and the total content of knowledge is 
 expounded by means of a series of reflections upon self; 3. in 
 the " Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns," of 1810-11; 4. and most fully 
 of all in the " Transcendental Logic," where the details of experi- 
 ence are minutely analyzed and shown to be always ego-stuff in 
 ego-forms. 
 
 If now the ego, accepting the empirical result, the omnipres- 
 ence of self, as basis, reason from it, and seek by unfolding its 
 implications to define its own nature, Fichte thinks that it must 
 come to the following conclusions : Since the activity of the ego 
 
Development of Fichte: Idealism. g 
 
 in seeing, knowing, recognizing, is the condition of all existence 
 for the ego, therefore of its own existence, the ego is activity. 
 Since it sees always self, it is the activity of identifying subject 
 and object, of apperception, of subsumption ; that is, it subsumes 
 under the general concept of self, or the I, every particular. Since 
 it can never transcend self to find an Other, but whatever it finds 
 must, through the act of finding, become self, it concludes that 
 "existence" is a predicate of itself, means existence of the object 
 for the subject, hence only self exists. If only self exists, self as a 
 whole is unrelated, unconditioned, absolute. It is also uncaused 
 by an Other, for there is no Other to cause it. If it is uncaused 
 by an Other, since it exists it must be causa sui. It cannot be 
 causa sui in the sense that its nature is such that it forces it to 
 exist, as with Spinoza's Substance, for then we separate the nature 
 from that of which it is nature, and see the nature compelling the 
 substance as foreign law. It can be truly causa sui only if it is a 
 will which can will whether to be or not, a free will. If it is a will 
 which can will its own existence, we are forced to conceive it as 
 existing before it does exist, or, rather to assume two stages of 
 existence, one of which is the mere possibility of the other ; one 
 of which is potential will, the other, actual will. The stage of 
 possibility, the potential will to exist or not to exist, which is not 
 yet actual existence, has none of the determinations of actual 
 existence: it is as yet wholly unlimited, wholly free. We name 
 it Freedom, signifying by that term complete absence of all the 
 determinations of actual existence, but complete liberty at any 
 moment to assume them, for it is not freedom unless it can assume 
 them, just as it is not freedom if it must assume them. We also 
 name it Power, for freedom can be freedom only as power to be or 
 not to be all things. Again, we name it Principle, for it, in its act 
 of willing to be, is the vital Principle of actual existence. 
 
 At this point, therefore, the ego concludes itself to be an Abso- 
 lute of Free Will, a potential Principle which freely becomes the 
 source of actual existence. 
 
 This conclusion that the ego is a Free Will Absolute, is a 
 logical conclusion in the mind of the ego. It has been reached 
 by accepting as premise the result of empirical observation that 
 the ego finds everywhere its own activity, and by reasoning from 
 this premise as to what the ego must be, and what this nature 
 involves as its condition. This conclusion has for Fichte the 
 
lo Unity of Fichie's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 validity and reality of a logical conclusion, and no other reality. 
 That behind this conclusion there is a real, potential Free Will 
 apart from the consciousness that conceives it, and a real free- 
 will act that precedes consciousness and creates it, Fichte never 
 for a moment asserts. We are not describing a reality or a process. 
 There is no real creator and no real process of creation. The 
 Free Will Absolute and its acts of creation are only present 
 products of the mind, originated by their conception, just as is das 
 Ding an sich. That is, for the thinker who unfolds the logical 
 conditions underlying empirical consciousness, underlying the 
 daily facts that red is red, and A is A, the final conclusion is, 
 Fichte thinks, a potential free-will principle that wills its appear- 
 ance as actuality. But this principle and its act of willing its 
 appearance as actuality have existence in the mind of the thinker, 
 and cannot be proved to have other existence : they are a part of 
 the content of his consciousness, the necessary thought-correlate 
 of his material world, the inseparable complement for him of sense- 
 facts, one necessary element in that complex whole which the total- 
 ity of his consciousness will prove itself to be when he has finished 
 his analysis. Indeed, one of the chief results of Fichte's theory is 
 to show that certainty of the existence of realities corresponding 
 to conclusions of the mind is impossible : the Absolute Ego is a 
 conclusion of the mind, and that it has any other reality than as a 
 conclusion of the mind we can never know. 
 
 We have now taken with Fichte one step in the development of 
 his doctrine. Its result was partially set forth in the first section 
 of the " Grundlage," where the conclusion is reached that the Ego 
 appears as an Absolute. The freedom of the ego seems to Fichte 
 to follow so closely and so inevitably from its absoluteness that he 
 does not think it necessary here to state explicitly that if the ego 
 seems to itself Absolute, it must seem to itself free. But the 
 doctrine of freedom, as we have given it, can be discerned in the 
 practical part of the " Grundlage." In the " Sittenlehre," of 1798, 
 consciousness of self as free will is deduced as the condition of all 
 consciousness, and the notion freedom receives, perhaps, the most 
 careful analysis ever given it. In the " Darstellung," of 1801, free- 
 dom is shown to be one of the necessary elements of the Absolute. 
 In the later works, freedom is constantly expounded as merely 
 formal freedom ; i. e., an inference of the mind from the form of the 
 ego as apperception. 
 
Development of Fichte : Idealism. 1 1 
 
 The conclusion reached in the " Grundlage " that the ego 
 appears as an Absolute, and therefore as unrelated to an extra- 
 mentem creator, awaked, as is well known, great philosophic 
 scandal. People misunderstood Fichte's form of expression, 
 paused here, and asserted that Fichte taught that the ego creates 
 itself. But Fichte's phraseology, method, and system as a whole, 
 all make it impossible that he for a moment should have held such 
 doctrine. If we examine his phraseology we find that Fichte says, 
 not that the ego is absolute, but that the ego "posits" itself as 
 absolute. The ego "posits" means with Fichte, " the ego recog-j 
 nizes as true, accepts something as valid, whether sense fact, ot 
 logical result." Anything that at any moment appears as conclu- 
 sive, or as undeniable reality, to the ego, the ego is said to posit. 
 Now, accepting as premise the empirical result that the ego finds ' 
 everywhere self, and reasoning from this premise, the ego, in 
 Fichte's eyes, is forced to conceive itself as a Free Will Absolute, 
 that wills its own actual existence, and this present conception in 
 the mind is the only creation : creation is a logical conclusion, not 
 a temporal fact. This logical conclusion Fichte means to expound' 
 as logical conclusion and as nothing else. It seems almost like an 
 ironical comment upon the necessary unintelligibility of philosophic 
 expression that the very paragraph in which Fichte is setting forth 
 the absoluteness of the ego, its complete lack of provable relation 
 to anything outside it, the impossibility of transcending self to find 
 reality beyond, should be thought to maintain that there is a pre- 
 actual ego-power capable of existing apart from the actual ego, 
 and standing in the relation to it of creator. Small wonder that 
 Fichte exclaims again and again in despair, " Das werde ich nicht 
 erleben dass man dies versteht." 
 
 But even if Fichte in the first section of the " Grundlage " teaches 
 explicitly that the ego creates itself, we should know from the 
 teaching's appearing in the first section that it is not his real 
 doctrine, for his method renders it impossible to accept any isolated 
 conclusion of his as correct. This method is usually described by 
 the words " thesis, antithesis, synthesis," and is understood as the 
 provisional acceptance of a fact or result only for the purpose of 
 showing that, because of some inherent contradiction, the present 
 position is untenable, and its two contradictory aspects, or thesis 
 and antithesis, must be reconciled in a higher synthesis. Hence, 
 even with this understanding of the method, we should expect 
 
12 Unity of Fichtis Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 the first section of the "Grundlage" to be modified, whatever its 
 substance. But Fichte's method, when employed in full, is not 
 adequately described in what we have just said of it. Thesis, 
 antithesis, synthesis, are only the results for him of the essential 
 of his method, which is a succession of returns of the ego upon 
 itself to examine in each return its activity in bringing forth the 
 product it has just evolved, and from the results of these examina- 
 tions to conclude as to the real nature of itself : each result is a 
 partial result, and in so far false, and must be corrected by the 
 next return upon self: any two successive results stand to each 
 other as thesis and antithesis, and the later ascent above self 
 which beholds the results of the first and the second ascent, and 
 reconciles them, is the synthesis. 
 
 That we may fully grasp the method, let us consider what 
 Fichte has already done, for his whole process is simply an ex- 
 haustive repetition of his present procedure. As a student he 
 thought out Determinism, unmindful of the self that was thinking 
 it out. Kant directed his attention to this self ; straightway he 
 examined the self in its activity in bringing forth a given product, 
 as Determinism, or A is A, and from the nature of this activity, 
 reached the conclusion that the self is a Free Will Absolute. 
 Just this process he is now to repeat. He is to mount above the 
 self that has been thinking out the nature of the self, consider it 
 in its activity of thinking out this nature, and by means of the 
 conclusion to which this second sight drives him, correct his first 
 result of an absolute free self. Again he will mount above the 
 self that has corrected the first by the second conclusion, con- 
 sider its nature, etc. This power of returning upon self to 
 see and to judge self is for Fichte the essential power of the 
 ego, for it is the power of self-consciousness ; hence its con- 
 tinual exercise seems to him a process eminently fitted for 
 developing the doctrine of knowledge, or the content of the ego. 
 For the same reason this return upon self must, Fichte thinks, 
 be the easiest of acts for the mind. But from some cause, 
 people failed to see what Fichte was doing, and he exclaims again 
 and again in vexation at their blindness, " Sie waren lieber ein 
 Stiick Lava im Monde als ein Ich." It is a repetition of this act 
 that Fichte is demanding when he constantly says, in speaking of 
 a given result, " It is now for us, but not for the I." He means 
 that we, as the ego, have thought it out, but since the ego is self- 
 
Development of Fickle: Idealism. 13 
 
 consciousness, this result does not exist for it as a part of itself, 
 until it has become aware that it has produced it and knows how it 
 has produced it. A consciousness of the exact processes by which 
 the activity of the ego has brought forth a given result is the con- 
 dition of the result's being for the ego, and to gain this conscious- 
 ness the ego must ascend above itself to watch itself working out 
 the result. 
 
 (^) The Ego is confronted by Law, therefore neither absolute 
 nor free. 
 
 We are now ready to take with Fichte the second step in the 
 development of his doctrine by ascending a second time with 
 him above the self to view the self. We are to mount above the 
 ego, which has just, from the empirical fact that it sees always 
 self, concluded that is absolute and free, and examine the pro- 
 cesses by which it has reached the conclusion, freedom. In 
 Fichte's eyes it has obviously done so by following the laws of 
 thought : inference, logical deduction, force the ego, Fichte ■ 
 thinks, to the judgment that it is free. Laws of thought ! ! 
 Force the ego ! ! Then the ego is subject to law ! Then the 
 ego is not free, and our first conclusion of freedom is error ! Let 
 us resort once more to empirical observation, and see if it shows 
 us in the ego's world the presence of law. Plainly, the so-called 
 objective world, the one described by Spinoza, is a complex of law : 
 it is divided, perforce, into ego and non-ego ; the two act and 
 react upon each other with inexorable compulsion ; the forms of 
 feeling, perception, thought, are prescribed and cannot be evaded. 
 If now we enter the world of self-consciousness revealed when the 
 ego turned its view upon self, we discern equally here, both in 
 form and content, the realm of law : its form of subject objectivity 
 is imposed upon it ; it is through necessity that it perceives 
 everywhere self; without its conscious will, and it knows not why, 
 it finds itself an I, and must see all things in the I form. Since 
 from this form its freedom is deduced, its very freedom is necessity : 
 the ego is forced to see itself as free, since, as eternal appercep- 
 tion, it can find no Other to control it : its freedom is a product of ' 
 the laws of thought, a freedom fashioned and maintained by law, ' 
 the last link in the chain of law. The content of the world of i 
 self-consciousness is pure thought, which exists only as it bodies 
 forth the laws of thought. 
 
14 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 The result of our second view of self is, then, that the ego feels 
 everywhere the control of law, and that escape from it is as impos- 
 sible as escape from self. Form, content, activity, every aspect of 
 its actual existence, is held and shaped by necessity. Here, surely, 
 we have found an Other that limits the ego. Hence our present 
 conclusion contradicts the one to which our first view of self led 
 us. We no longer see an ego that is absolute and free, but one 
 confronted by an Other and the mere creature of necessity. 
 
 The view of the ego which sees the compulsion that the ego 
 feels in all the spheres of its activity is variously expressed by 
 Fichte. In the " Grundlage " it appears in section 2 as the recog- 
 nition of the " non-ego," where the term " non-ego " includes the 
 whole stubborn world of empirical fact. But this empirical world, 
 when exhaustively analyzed in the succeeding sections of the 
 " Grundlage," resolves itself into a self limited by an unseizable 
 check (Anstoss), a law that there shall be for it an objective 
 world of given sort. This Anstoss, or law, we can never grasp, 
 for strive as we may we find never law itself, but always some 
 case in which law exemplifies itself, as for instance our con- 
 ception of law. Hence the object is not even a meeting of self 
 and the Anstoss (z. e., law), but is the meeting of two direc- 
 tions of the activity of the ego, one direction (J,, e., attention) given 
 by the ego itself as freedom, and one direction controlled by law 
 (J. e., perception of the object, which perception is attention shaped 
 by law as an object flowing back to the ego). The union of 
 these two opposite directions of the activity of the ego is for us 
 an object, and the compelling force of the object comes from law, 
 which checks and shapes the ego's activity whenever the ego 
 acts. In the " Darstellung," of 1801, the ego appears as Freedom, 
 and the compulsion of law as Seyn. Knowledge is the interpre- 
 tation of the two. In the posthumous works Fichte says dis- 
 tinctly that the philosopher, instead of believing in the plain man's 
 being and the constraint of an extra-mentem reality, recognizes 
 that he knows only the coercive power of law forcing him to see, 
 feel, think, in given fashion. 
 
 The third stage in the development of the doctrine is reached 
 by ascending with Fichte for a third time above the ego to ex- 
 amine the processes by which the ego has come to its present 
 conclusion of an all-pervading necessity. The result of the third 
 ascent is to re-establish, at least in part, the freedom and the abso- 
 
Development of Fichte : Idealism. 1 5 
 
 luteness of the ego. We see that it has reached the result, neces- 
 sity, through turning thought and attention in a certain direction : 
 it is through the exertion of the activity of the ego in perceiving 
 and concluding that lavir is for it : the existence for the ego of 
 the limiting Other depends upon the act of the ego : let the ego 
 refuse to perceive, to know, to think, and it escapes from the limi- 
 tations of the world of actual existence into the freedom of non- 
 existence : at every point the ego is free to know or not to know, 
 hence to find actual existence with its laws, or freedom from all 
 law : if it perceive and think, it is bound by the necessity of 
 fact and of logic ; if it choose inaction it escapes compulsion. 
 Freedom always lies within its grasp. Further, whatever the 
 ego sees is within itself, for it can see only self. Hence law is 
 enfolded within it, it originates and ends in the ego ; it is 
 not a foreign force that masters the ego, but something whose 
 existence depends upon the ego, and whose existence must be 
 in the ego. Hence the ego still controls content, and is there- 
 fore free, still is the circumference of all being, and is therefore 
 absolute. 
 
 The view of the final absoluteness of the ego and of its being 
 the ultimate ground of its content is expounded in the third sec- 
 tion of the " Grundlage," and its substance is expressed in the pro- 
 position, " the ego opposits in the ego a divisible non-ego to a 
 divisible ego." Later in the " Grundlage " it is forcibly restated. 
 In the discussion of the Anstoss, i. e., law that there shall be for \ 
 the ego an objective world of given sort, Fichte tells us that the 
 Anstoss, or law, has no objective existence of its own apart from 
 the ego : it does not exist without the action of the ego, but is 
 always directed upon the activity of the ego in becoming con- 
 scious : it occurs only in so far as the ego is active, and is a check 
 only in so far as the ego is active : its possibility is conditioned 
 by the activity of the ego: no activity of the ego, no law (I. 212). 
 In Fichte's later works his perpetual thesis is, " the activity of 
 the ego is the ground of existence," and the final point which he 
 reaches in every series of reflections is the all-inclusive circle of 
 the ego's will so to reflect, the absoluteness of the ego which 
 freely originates, through its own act, its content. 
 
 We need no longer continue the process of returning upon self, 
 for we shall find at each return a repetition of one of the results 
 aJready gained : we shall see either an ego determined by law in 
 
1 6 Unity of Fickte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 form and content, or a free and absolute ego holding within its 
 attention and thought the determined ego. Hence thesis and 
 antithesis, in their final form, stand before us, as a free ego and 
 a determined ego, and our task is to find some higher synthesis 
 that will reconcile them, some great central truth of which each 
 is a true but partial view, of which Freedom is one aspect and 
 Necessity another. 
 
 (f) Reconciliation of a Free and a Limited Ego as Holy Will or 
 a God of Love. 
 
 This central truth of double aspect may be approached from 
 either of its two points of view. We may ask, " How can a free 
 will see itself as in any aspect conditioned by law.' How can 
 freedom be freedom and yet be ruled by necessity .' How can 
 an Other exist for an Absolute .' " The obvious answer to this form 
 of the problem is that freedom remains freedom and yet appears 
 in the form of law if it voluntarily submits to law. If freedom 
 choose to become law it is law and freedom at the same time. 
 In that case the Other which the Absolute sees is only another 
 aspect of self. 
 
 Or we may state the problem from the side of law and ask how 
 law can be at the same time freedom. That law can be free- 
 dom for which the only substantial existence is a free will which 
 freely appears in its forms. If there is a law which can find con- 
 crete expression only in the substance of a free will, such law is 
 at once law and freedom : it is law in form and freedom in 
 stuff, in actual existence : it cannot be without being what it is, or 
 law ; it cannot be unless a free will gives it being, and therefore 
 unless it is freedom. Such law is the Moral Law. The Moral 
 Law finds objective existence only in the free will which volun- 
 tarily submits to it. 
 
 The two results are identical : the central truth behind actual 
 existence, of which law is one expression, and freedom another, is 
 a free will voluntarily submitting to law. The correction of our 
 two partial and seemingly contradictory views of the ego, first as 
 freedom and then as necessity, through their synthesis, has given 
 us now a view of the true nature of the ego : we see it as Will- 
 stuff freely becoming law and thereby appearing as the world of 
 consciousness. 
 
Development of Fichte: Idealism. 17 
 
 Since we have several times broken Fichte's train of reasoning 
 by discursive remarks, let us now summarize it that we may have 
 the present status of the argument clearly in mind. 
 
 Fichte, through empirical observation, and reasoning founded 
 upon this observation, reached the conclusion that the ego in its 
 true nature is a free will that wills its own actual existence as 
 the world of consciousness. But in examining the world of con- 
 sciousness he found everywhere law which the actual ego cannot 
 evade: instead of being a free-will creator who brings forth at 
 pleasure the products of its own devising, the ego appears in the 
 actual world as the passive beholder of a great opposeless force, as 
 the mere recipient of impressions made by an Other, as the crea- 
 ture of necessity. The only rational solution of these two contra- 
 dictory views of the ego is, in Fichte's eyes, the assumption that 
 a free will which as freedom is the power and possibility of any- 
 thing, of law or of not-law, of existence or of non-existence, wills 
 to be, or, in other words, to appear as law ; for actual existence is 
 the concrete cases in which law manifests itself Hereupon the 
 phenomenal world, the totality of consciousness, becomes visible. 
 This world is Freedom appearing as the world of consciousness 
 with its laws. Hence the phenomenal world may be defined as 
 Will-stuff freely becoming law : in substance it is Will, in form it 
 is Necessity. Any other form might be assumed, for the substance 
 is absolutely free with the unthinkable freedom of indifference, 
 caprice. But it chooses to renounce this freedom and appear as 
 the world of consciousness with its laws : in the world of con- 
 sciousness is no freedom except in so far as this world is that which 
 has freely willed to be not free : consciousness is merely the ap- 
 pearance of Freedom in law forms, the passive and fixed result of a 
 free-will act in a preconscious sphere ; hence freedom, action, will, 
 is excluded from it. This matter will be more fully discussed in the 
 ethical part of Fichte's system : for the present it is sufficient if we 
 realize that consciousness is only the passive appearance of a power 
 behind it. 
 
 We must keep in mind that this synthetic conclusion as to the 
 real nature of the ego is, just as was the conclusion of freedom 
 reached by the first view of the ego, only a logical conclusion. 
 We must not imagine a realm of actual existence when there is a 
 Free Will and a free-will act of submission to law, that results in 
 the world of consciousness, for such conception is self-contra- 
 
 3 
 
1 8 Utiity of Fichtes Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 dictory. We must recognize the truth that the Free Will and its 
 act exist only in the mind of the thinker, to satisfy the demands of 
 reason. The thinker finds himself within the world of conscious- 
 ness. From this world he cannot escape in order to discover its 
 origin and its significance. But within this world, and in accordance 
 with its laws, he analyzes it. He, through thought, resolves it into 
 two logical constituents, Freedom and Law, and further determines 
 their relations. But these constituents are only logical constitu- 
 ents, that is, they are sundered only in the mind : they have no 
 real existence as separate entities. The world of consciousness, in 
 its complex wholeness, is all that there is, after the labor of the 
 thinker as before : Freedom and Law have not been found stand- 
 ing apart in a realm of their own, where Freedom bows its neck 
 to Law and nature appears : the facts of life remain forever the 
 same, and they are forever an inextricable tangle of freedom and 
 law ; all that the thinker has done is to enrich them by one new 
 aspect, to view the whole machinery of consciousness, which is all 
 that there is, as Free-Will stuff which freely appears as law, to 
 see existence as the act of existing by a free Power. 
 
 The significance of our conclusion that the origin of existence 
 is Will-stuff becoming law, in its relation to the laws of thought, 
 is that the conceptions of freedom and of necessity are inseparable: 
 the final World Cause which the mind reaches in its analysis of 
 existence is the interpenetration of freedom and law as primal ele- 
 ments, and the Absolute must be for us in its every aspect a 
 fusion of the two. It is impossible for us to conceive freedom 
 alone, or law alone. The conception of the one involves the con- 
 ception of the other and of the whole world of consciousness. Let 
 us see. Freedom is conceived by the laws of thought which 
 define it, therefore limit it, therefore hinder it from being free and 
 bind it by law. Freedom, as freedom, is clearly unthmkable, for 
 thinking is limitation by law. Freedom involves power of choice, 
 power of choice involves an alternative which confronts freedom 
 as a not-I, for if there is only self thei'e is not full power of choice; 
 a not-I involves limitation, which again hinders freedom from 
 being free and binds it with necessity. In freedom viewing the 
 alternative and hovering in the moment of choice, we have subject 
 viewing object, or the world of consciousness with its laws. Law, 
 upon examination, transforms itself in like manner into a duality, 
 becoming the unseizable subjective which in the ego we call free- 
 
Development of Fichte : Idealism. 19 
 
 dom, and involving that external expression which we call the 
 objective, for pursue law forever and forever and we never find it : 
 we grasp only the concrete cases in which it exists, among which 
 concrete cases our own conception of law is one. In other words, 
 law involves a conception of law which is subjective, the product of 
 attention and thought, and concrete cases of law : neither can 
 exist without the other. Hence law involves the world of con- 
 sciousness, which we have found to be a union of freedom and of 
 necessity. Or, again, from the proposition, " law shapes the first 
 thought," let us deduce the nature of law. Law is either thought 
 or not-thought. Suppose law is thought. Since it shapes the first 
 thought it must itself be the first thought shaping itself. Hence 
 law is primal thought shaping self. But it does not shape self 
 if its form is imposed upon it : it can shape self only if it is a free 
 will which gives to itself the form law. Hence if law is thought 
 it is free will voluntarily appearing as law. Suppose law is not- 
 thought : law exists only as an abstraction from facts, only as a 
 deduction of the mind ; therefore it is a not-thought involving 
 thought; but the conception of not-thought involving thought 
 is the conception of the world of consciousness in which we have 
 been forced to postulate freedom. Hence if law is not-thought 
 it involves the conception of freedom. Law, then, in all cases, 
 involves the conception of freedom and of the whole world of 
 consciousness. Law and freedom ahke turn upon examination 
 into a fusion of subjective freedom and objective compulsion. 
 Freedom when pushed to the uttermost becomes Law, and law 
 when pursued insistently becomes the freedom that ever eludes, 
 the freedom that is never bound by the determinations of actual 
 existence. Law and freedom, equally, involve the whole world of 
 consciousness, and each involves the existence of the other, as 
 the condition of its own existence. 
 
 We now return to our last result, which, in order to account for 
 the facts of consciousness, postulated a sphere of potential exist- 
 ence containing Free Will, Law, and the act of voluntary submis- 
 sion by Free Will to Law. 
 
 The spheres of potential existence and of actual existence stand 
 to each other in the relation of cause and effect, for the act of 
 Freedom in willing to be, causes its appearance as consciousness. 
 Hence potential existence. Freedom, may be termed the reality, 
 
20 Unity of Fickte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 the true being ; and its result, the phenomenal world, may be 
 called mere appearance, mere image of the truth behind. Very 
 early in the history of thought men grasped the relation of the 
 two spheres. The postulated sphere was intuitively felt to be one 
 of Freedom whose fiat alone was sufficient to bring forth the world 
 of consciousness, which was apprehended as the image of its 
 Creator. " And God said let us make man in our own image, 
 after our likeness.'' This statement expresses in figurative lan- 
 guage the philosophic doctrine which Fichte would teach, but 
 for the clear understanding of the Biblical text we must know 
 what is meant by God, and what by Man. To the rational un- 
 folding of these two ideas Fichte devotes himself : his philoso- 
 phic system is an attempt to give a consistent explanation of the 
 natures and of the relation of the two. 
 
 Henceforth we may designate these two spheres, not only as 
 Freedom and Consciousness, but also as Being and Existence, or 
 Reality and Appearance, or God and Image, meaning by Freedom, 
 Being, Reality, God, that which we are forced to postulate as cause 
 of phenomena, and by Consciousness, Existence, Appearance, 
 Image, the result of this cause, i. e., the world of phenomena, the 
 world of consciousness. 
 
 In speaking of the relation of these two spheres we may, at 
 different points in our paper, seem to hold contradictory language. 
 We shall say at times that the sphere of existence is God and at 
 times that it is not God. The apparent contradiction is recon- 
 ciled, however, by recognizing the exact sense in which the word 
 " is " is used in each proposition. When we say that existence is 
 God, " is " denotes the act of appearing as the world of conscious- 
 ness, the taking on of image form, " ex-isting,'' or standing forth 
 from God as his reflection; we mean by this proposition that 
 existence, or the world of consciousness, is the form in which God 
 himself appears when he makes himself known ; existence is 
 God coming into the form of knowledge or consciousness, God 
 living, subjecting himself to the laws of life. In this sense we 
 are the living God, or God willing to live : we are what God is 
 when Freedom has subjected itself to Law : God exists or is in 
 man : the world of consciousness is God existing. When we say 
 that existence is not God and never can be God, is denotes iden- 
 tity. Existence never can be identical with God because its very 
 essence is diremption. Existence is God in ego form, hence it 
 
Development of Fichte : Idealism. 2i 
 
 sees itself as eternal separation of subject and object, and 
 though it pursue forever the subjective self which reason says 
 must be the Reality of which the objective self is image, it can 
 never find it. The very condition of existence is separation from 
 God in that existence is not God, but his image: in that existence 
 is the existence of a world of consciousness. The proposition 
 " existence is identical with God " is self-contradictory, for exist- 
 ence means " standing forth from God as the image of his reality : 
 eternally separate from God as image must be from reality." 
 When the image is absolutely identical with the imaged there is 
 no image ; if existence were absolutely identical with God, there 
 would be no existence, no standing forth as separate. 
 
 The two spheres, God and his Appearance as the world of con- 
 sciousness, are for Fichte, we have seen, a logical whole, each 
 involving the other : if one is given, he must from it, if he allows 
 thought free play, deduce the other; the existence of the world 
 of consciousness forces him to postulate the preconscious as its 
 cause, and the preconscious exists only in the human mind : for 
 him, if there is man there must be God, and if there is God there 
 must be man. 
 
 The two spheres, with their relation to each other, which we 
 shall later develop as a third sphere, obviously include all that the 
 mind of man can conceive, for his thought can never pass beyond 
 existence and its First Cause. Hence we now have before us the 
 totality of consciousness both in its widest possible extent and 
 in its possible duplicity. Consciousness may consist of two 
 spheres of diverse content and of fixed relation and each may be 
 deduced from the other. In these two spheres as contained in 
 Fichte's mind, we have the Absolute Ego, or the sphere of actual 
 existence beholding itself springing from an unlike sphere which 
 it calls non-existence, knowledge seeing itself as resting upon not- 
 knowledge. These two spheres are in their totality the widest 
 conceivable circumference of the ego. 
 
 Here Fichte gives us in the ego beholding itself the only con- • 
 ception of an Absolute that is not self-destructive. By the "Ab- 
 solute " we mean " capable of being conceived by itself alone." It 
 follows that, if the mind try to conceive other Absolute than 
 itself, it tries to conceive that which through its own nature is 
 unrelated, and yet must be, through the act of conception, related 
 to the mind. If, on the contrary, it view the sum total of its own 
 
22 Unity of Fichtes Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 consciousness as an unconditioned, it sees that which, though 
 seen, appears unrelated. 
 
 Now that the limits of the Absolute Ego have been drawn for 
 us, our task is clearly defined. 
 
 The Wissenschaftslehre deals primarily, as the name signifies, 
 with the world of knowledge, of actual existence ; but since actual 
 existence is the mere appearance of a reality behind, the mere 
 image of God, we must, that we may grasp the true significance 
 of actual existence, understand the nature of God. Our last anal- 
 ysis showed us as First Cause a Freedom which voluntarily sub- 
 jects itself to law, thereby appearing as actual existence. The 
 question arises, why does Freedom subject itself to law ">. Since 
 we know only Freedom and law, if Freedom choose law, we 
 can conceive no other end in its so doing than law itself. Or, 
 more fully : the mind cannot extend beyond actual existence and 
 its postulated cause. Freedom : actual existence is the realm of 
 law, everything within it is ideal law, or the realization of law ; 
 Freedom, as Freedom, is undetermined ; if now Freedom choose 
 to renounce itself and become Law, Law must, for us, be its end, 
 as we can conceive no other end : Freedom obeys law for the 
 sake of law. But that will which chooses law for the sake of law 
 we call Holy Will, and describe it as " doing what it ought be- 
 cause it ought." The motive power of will is desire : a free will 
 that chooses must choose from preference, otherwise there is 
 no will and no choice, but blind chance. Hence Holy Will chooses 
 law because it loves law, and we have a God of whose nature 
 the ultimate fact is Love.^ Love desires that an other shall 
 freely yield itself and become one with the lover. But nothing 
 but God, or Love, exists. Hence the other must be a second 
 aspect of self. So God, or Love, enters the form of conscious- 
 ness, apperception : he reflects upon self, whom he throws off as 
 the world of consciousness, imaging his inseparable union of 
 freedom and law in that consciousness which at every moment 
 feels itself free and responsible, and yet at every moment recog- 
 nizes itself as the subject of law, — a self in image form, and thus 
 an other made an other and sundered in two only by the form 
 reflection, but very one in being and reality. In this ego form 
 are three direct glimpses of God : one as foundation and true life 
 of its existence, one as summit and crowning product of its 
 ' Anweisung zum seligen Leben. 
 
Development of Fichte : Idealism. 23 
 
 thought, the third as direct revelation of the concrete form God 
 would take upon earth. The first is given in the determinations 
 of sense, the second in the pure notion of God, the third in the 
 command of duty as heard in the heart of each. The Inconceiv- 
 able, whose nature we are deducing, and putting before us as a 
 notion, and the world of consciousness, his objective self, are in- 
 separably linked by love : — He threw off the world of conscious- 
 ness that it might freely yield itself to him ; He loves it with an 
 everlasting love, and draws it with loving kindness ; He encom- 
 passes it round about, offers himself incessantly to its regards, 
 calls it from every object of nature, from every height and depth 
 of thought ; He implores it continually to give itself to Him who 
 brought it forth and fashioned it, — to become one with Him in 
 will and life. His love, which is the very fibre of its existence, 
 which is its only substance, stirs in its midst, in the hearts of man, 
 moving them to know the Divine Lover, importuning them for 
 their love in return. Nought can separate us from the love of 
 God, neither height nor depth, nor things present, nor things to 
 come, for it is the very stuff of which he has formed us. And the 
 world of consciousness hears the call and feels after Him, if 
 haply it might find Him : it rests in no object, it pauses in no 
 thought : incessantly it is impelled forward in inextinguishable 
 desire for Him who calls. But He ever flies : He escapes sense 
 and eludes thought : He lies always just beyond the furthest 
 reach, and is seen forever through a veil darkly : sense presses 
 from pleasure to pleasure because it finds nowhere the satisfied 
 self it seeks, which it can reach only in oneness with Him : 
 reason pursues Him beyond all determinate and comprehensible 
 existence, beyond the whole world of thought, to admit at last that 
 inconceivable love, pure, absolute, unthinkable love, is higher 
 than all reason, is itself the fountain of reason, and the root of 
 existence. This love which binds together the subjective God 
 and the objective world, appears as life, as the ego : it appears as 
 the oneness of a duality which is not thereby destroyed, but is 
 eternally subsistent : the ego is in its very essence love, for the 
 ego is forever two who are yet one : the stuff of the phenomenal 
 world, which we have before defined as Will-stuff freely becoming 
 a law, is the Will of love, is love, love of law showing itself as 
 Will for law, as activity which produces law by itself becom- 
 ing law : this Love, as substance, and life, and ultimate truth of 
 
24 Unity of Fichtes Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 the phenomenal world, thought looks upon as God, and it con- 
 ceives the world as His tangible, sensible appearance. 
 
 * We have now developed our notion of the postulated sphere of 
 consciousness which we call God as fully as Fichte thinks pos- 
 sible by means of the direct consideration of this sphere. His 
 
 /reason for this judgment is as follows : our first knowledge of the 
 sphere is derived by deduction from the facts of consciousness ; 
 
 ' this deduction ascribes to God two elements, Freedom and Ne- 
 cessity. We contemplate directly these two elements as elements 
 of God, and ask how they can be welded into the oneness of 
 His nature. Reason answers, " By Freedom's voluntary submis- 
 sion to Necessity," or by the conception of Holy Will. The con- 
 ception of Will drives us to Desire, and our final result is a God of 
 Love. Further direct contemplation of God, Fichte thinks, is im- 
 possible, for we have no content to contemplate. For additional 
 knowledge of Him, we must again betake us to the second sphere, 
 the world of consciousness which is His image. 
 
 In this image His nature is expressed truly and wholly, and He 
 is in it as He is in Himself, for He and it are thought-correlates : 
 the one stands for cause of all that is, and is reached by reasoning 
 back from its perceived results ; the other stands for result of the 
 postulated Cause, and must exactly balance it, since the Cause is 
 
 I postulated only to account for it. He who sees that God is a de- 
 duction of the mind from the facts of life, and that other existence 
 of God than as a logical conclusion is unprovable, must see that 
 this God is fully expressed in these facts. In the image lies every- 
 thing which is in the Reality, but as image, utterance, not as 
 Reality. The appearance is the immediate revelation which 
 Being gives of itself, and is truth because it is the visibility of 
 real Being. 
 
 IV. The Unity of Fichte's System. 
 
 Now that we have before us Fichte's notion of God in a fully 
 developed form, we are in position to judge the justness of the 
 charge that he had not one system, but two. This charge, it will 
 be remembered, asserts that Fichte in his early treatises recognized 
 no God, teaching that the ego is sufficient unto itself, but in later 
 years preached a mysticism in which all reality was swallowed up 
 
The Unity of Fichte's System. 25 
 
 in God. This charge is not true. For Fichte there was always a 
 God : He appears in all the earlier cosmological works, though in 
 these His nature is not fully developed, as in the later so-called re- 
 ligious treatises : in the " Grundlage" He is the unabhdngige Thdtig- 
 keit with its two elements, one corresponding to the consciousness, 
 or freedom of reflection, of the ego, the other, to the compulsion, 
 or law, of the object ; in the "Grundriss," He is seen as the Freie 
 Krdfte (Freedom and Law) of which everything in the ego is 
 manifestation ; in the " Darstellung," of 1801, He is the Absolute, 
 which is explained as the union of the two elemental qualities, 
 freedom and law, in the formal unity of thought. And Fichte's 
 conception of the nature of this God never changed : he is 
 always for him a product of thought, with only logical existence, 
 the result of the analysis by the thinker, of the world of con- 
 ciousness into its ultimates ; his existence, his nature, his every 
 attribute, is deduced by what seems to Fichte an indivisible chain 
 of logical inference : from the empirical facts of frfeedom and 
 necessity, Holy Will is deduced, and from Holy Will, Love ; no 
 element of fancy, or dogmatism, or personal preference enters 
 the notion. 
 
 For Fichte the Eternal can be apprehended only by thought, 
 and in no other way is approachable by us : the One and Un- 
 changeable is conceived as the explanation of ourselves, and of the 
 world ; and this in a double aspect : partly as the cause whereby 
 all things have come into existence ; partly that in Him and His 
 essential nature, as we are forced to conceive it, is contained the 
 cause why all things exist as they are and in no other way. God/ 
 is a thought to explain the world : that is, man sees the sense world,| 
 seeks its rational explanation and finds it in the notion God. We( 
 must banish forever the idea of an exti'a-mentem God and an extra-\ 
 tnentem creation with its time-series, its process of evolution, its! 
 law of progress. God did not first exist and theji create the world j 
 of nature and then fashion man within it. Neither does Force 
 gradually evolve and differentiate itself into variously complex 
 organisms until it finally reaches its highest manifestations in man. 
 There is no evolution ; there is no law of progress : there is only 
 the One and Unchangeable existence which is the truth of thought. 
 Evolution, and progress, and process are merely our forms of see- 
 ing, the fashions in which we apprehend ; they are the laws of con- 
 sciousness forcing it to perceive in a given way. Consciousness is 
 
 4 
 
26 Unity of Fickle s Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 compelled to see in forms of time and space : these forms are of 
 great interest as forms, and we study them in the Natural Sciences, 
 in History, in Mathematics : in short, the so-called knowledge of the 
 world, its collection of facts and laws, is a collection of facts and laws 
 /of the forms of perception. But we must always hold fast to the 
 ' truth that it is consciousness that we are studying, and not an extra- 
 mentem reality ; it is our own mind that we are exploring, and not a 
 Ding an sick ; and as the boundary and circumference of conscious- 
 ness or mind we find God, a thought coexistent with the universe, 
 in which the universe finds explanation. This thought of God is 
 not a late result, a last and highest form of the evolution of man's 
 mind : humanity did not exist for ages without coming to the 
 notion God, and then finally reach it. The thought God is pres- 
 ent where any bit of consciousness is present. If you ask, " Sup- 
 pose there were only animals upon the earth ; since God is a notion 
 of mind, and animals do not conceive God, would God then exist .■"" 
 in asking the question you supply the notion God, just as in sup- 
 posing object without subject you supply subject. It is impossible 
 to think a world without God, for thought involves God : follow 
 thought along its lines and you find God in it : the thought that 
 thinks the world must think causation, and causation leads to God. 
 In one and the same moment that the world of consciousness 
 appears, the thinking consciousness that sees the world is forced, 
 Fichte thinks, to postulate the sphere of potential existence which 
 we have described, as its cause. Neither is before the other. Both 
 as inseparably united, come into being at once. The perception 
 of the external world and the idea of God are, in Fichte's eyes, in- 
 divisibly one, in that neither can exist without the other, neither 
 precedes or follows the other, neither is cause of the other; or, 
 rather, both are equally cause and effect of each other, just as are 
 the members of an organism, in that each involves the other and 
 depends for existence upon the other. The inkbottle is in Fichte's 
 eyes as much the cause of God as God is cause of the inkbottle, 
 for the existence of the inkbottle, as an example of the sense- 
 world, causes the thinker to engage in that process of thought 
 which, if carried to its logical results, issues in the thought God, 
 and God cannot exist without the consciousness that contains the 
 sense-world. God and the actual world are two contemporary and 
 coextensive regions of the thinker's mind. This is no First Cause 
 as objective reality, the only First Cause is a mental image pro- 
 
The Unity of Fichte's System. 27 
 
 duced by reason to satisfy its causal instinct. There is no real 
 creation, real werden : creation and werden are again mental 
 images brought forth to satisfy a mental desire to trace things to a 
 beginning, to see them becoming, arising. Genesis is an explana- 
 tion which the mind makes to itself, as the process by which things 
 are produced, and this explanation is the only genesis. No cosmol- 
 ogy is historical in the sense that it sets before us a reality, for the 
 mind can contain only mental images. Existence is, it does not 
 become, — it is the eternal Being of God in the eternal act of exist- 
 ing; hence it is eternal, unchangeable Unity. It is as God is, 
 for existence and the Being of God are merged inseparably into 
 one ; hence is immutable, without variation or shadow of turning. 
 But existence, in explaining itself to itself, must enter the forms of 
 thought, obey its laws, appear in connection of cause and effect : 
 creation, development, change, and all other terms which ex- 
 press process, are merely the forms of consciousness, the train of 
 images in which the ego sees self. The Wissenschaftslehre pre- 
 tends to be no more real than any other like attempt : it is only more 
 rational. It does not set before us an actual process of creation, 
 it gives us a mental figment which is in harmony with the laws of 
 reason, and consistent with the rational forms of the material 
 world. It unfolds with inflexible logic the implications of any 
 fact of consciousness, and shows what the image of God and the 
 image of Creation must be to be rationally consistent with the image 
 of the material world and of self : if red is red to the plain man, let 
 him trace the conditions which this appearing involves, and he will, 
 Fichte thinks, develop the Wissenschaftslehre, for the Wissen- 
 schaftslehre is simply the picture of the total web of consciousness 
 in its widest circumference ; it is the survey of the whole of that 
 image-world whose first stage is the physical universe ; it is the 
 recognition of the entire content of the knowledge of man as those 
 laws must shape it which give to him the facts of every-day life. 
 Fichte's system is an exposition of the laws of self-consciousness : 
 it is an answer to the question " How shall a self-conscious being 
 conceive himself?" it is a discussion of the character of egohood, a 
 formulation of the law of self-seeing. If the ego look at self per- 
 sistently and seek an explanation of its own nature it must finally, 
 Fichte thinks, see itself grounded in God, and coming forth as His 
 appearance in accordance with the laws which he chooses shall 
 control this appearance. 
 
28 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 The only difference between Fichte's earlier and Fichte's later 
 teaching is that in his earlier years he was chiefly interested in 
 working out the results, in developing the whole extent of con- 
 sciousness as a harmonious and rational unity, while in later years 
 his mind was fixed upon the thought that, after all, his result was 
 only a mental result, and was a necessary mental result. He 
 realized with ever-increasing distinctness that the mind knows 
 only its own mental images : it is incapable of grasping any reality 
 that may lie behind these images : it knows nothing but ap- 
 pearances : That Which Appears, it cannot even name, for if it 
 call it God, Reality, Truth, Absolute Being, Freedom, Principal, 
 Force, these are not it, for these are mental images : if the mind 
 make infinite efforts to define its nature, after each effort it is 
 forced to say, " It is not that, it is not that : " only one positive 
 predicate does it allow, — " it is that which appears." It can be 
 seized only as it enters the form visibility. It can be seen only as 
 image and never as reality, for the mind turns everything it 
 touches into mental image. Hence in his posthumous works, after 
 any new result of thought which he develops, Fichte cautions the 
 reader to remember that it is only a mental product, that it has no 
 reality in the sense of extra-mental existence, that there is no such 
 Reality, Creator, Creation, werden, except in so far as " is " pred- 
 icates image-being of its subject. Again, these images are neces- 
 sarily what they are. Reason is forced to see given products as 
 the results of its activity. There is no actual freedom anywhere. 
 Everything is fixed, even the assumption of freedom. The ego 
 is passive beholder of an activity which it ascribes to itself, but 
 which, since it is ordained for it, is not its own ; and of results of 
 this activity whose natures are determined by that which brings 
 them forth. While in the " Grundlage " attention was fastened 
 upon the activity and its results, now Fichte watches the ego 
 watching the activity and admitting that it knows not whence it 
 comes, for it can never transcend this activity. Hence the ego 
 seems the passive instrument of a Power beyond knowledge. 
 
 One great cause of the failure to grasp the unity of Fichte's 
 system lies in a peculiarity of his exposition : we have seen that his 
 doctrine is of such organic nature that, in it, separation of God, 
 morality, and phenomena, is impossible because each is only a 
 different aspect of the one sole existence, and because a God of 
 
The Unity of Fickte's System. 29 
 
 love is deduced from the facts of the world by an unbroken chain 
 of reasoning : yet Fichte, in his treatises, insists upon drawing a 
 sharp line between his discussions of Religion; Ethics, and Science ; 
 and, as his ethical and scientific works are far more numerous than 
 his religious, we hear comparatively little of a God of love. Since 
 for Fichte the result of God's Holy Will in choosing law for the 
 sake of law is the world of consciousness, his usual thesis is " Soil 
 ist der grund des Seyns." This thesis has both material and moral 
 significance. Of its material significance we are already possessed. 
 The origin of all things is for Fichte a moral act, or obedience to 
 law for the sake of law. The continued existence of all things is, 
 even for the plain man, dependent upon their obedience to law. 
 An atom of hydrogen exists as hydrogen only because it obeys the 
 laws of hydrogen : in all cases it must be true to its own nature 
 and comport itself according to the laws of that nature, or it ceases 
 to be hydrogen. Loss of existence is the penalty of disobedience 
 to law. But the plain man looks upon this obedience as passive 
 obedience. The world for him is lifeless matter which in some 
 mysterious way has been put under the dominion of law, and its 
 inertness prevents change of condition. The material world can 
 have no moral aspect ; it is a machine framed by a cunning artificer, 
 and it works as he has contrived it to work. For Fichte, however, 
 the material universe presents at every moment the spectacle of 
 active obedience through its own free will to law : it is will-stuff, abso- 
 lute freedom whose form and content depend only upon self: if it 
 appears as continuity of law it is because it is continuity of moral 
 choice. Every moment of the existence of the world is proof of 
 its morality, for the condition of its existence is obedience to 
 law for the sake of law. The material world is wholly and 
 always moral. 
 
 In the so-called world of human conduct we shall find that 
 the proposition " Soil ist der grund des Seyns " has great practi- 
 cal import. In this world Man is to do consciously what the 
 pre-conscious will of God has done in bringing forth the mate- 
 rial world; that is, he is, through free obedience to the Moral 
 Law, to become the source of his own existence; for his real 
 existence is the holy will which he sees in himself. This holy 
 will thus seen is the visibility of God, according to Fichte. 
 He reasons as follows : Since actual existence is the appearance 
 
30 Utiity of Fickie's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 of freedom, which is holy will, actual existence must appear as 
 holy will, that is, holy will must be visible to man, and he must 
 see that it is the end of existence. Such sight of holy will is 
 gained in the self-consciousness of a moral humanity. When it 
 sees itself looking upon the sense world and feeling its allure- 
 ment, but resisting these allurements to do what it ought 
 because it ought, it sees that its conduct is controlled by a sight 
 of holy will as the end of existence ; it realizes that the sense 
 world and the empirical ego exist only that the righteous act 
 of will may take place; it feels that the sight of the holy choice 
 within itself is the highest expression that existence can find, 
 the culmination to which it all tends, the final cause of its 
 being. The sight by man of holy will within self is the true 
 appearance of freedom, true image of God ; it is an appearance 
 because seen, that is, by man ; it is an appearance of freedom 
 because seen as holy will. It is the only phenomenon that has 
 intrinsic worth; everything else has worth only in so far as it is 
 a means towards the sight of holy will, and whatever is not such 
 means is in ilstM gar jiichts, as Fichte never wearies in telling 
 us. The individual and the sense world are an opportunity of 
 making visible the moral aspect of the world, and are without 
 value except as such opportunity. The world is in its core 
 morality, it must appear as morality, and all its parts are but 
 means to morality. 
 
 Once more do we repeat the warning with which we accom- 
 pany every step. Do not apply the category of actuality to the 
 thesis "Soil ist der grund des Seyns. " Do not look upon the 
 Divine Will as a Ding an sick. The repetition of this caution is 
 necessary, for the temptation to disregard it is bound up in the 
 
 ' very nature of reason, is a result of the instrument we are forced 
 to use. We are trying to discover by the help of reason what 
 
 :the logical conditions of present facts must be; we discover 
 them, — they are such and such; if they ar^ they have being, 
 and straightway we look upon them as actualities. But we must 
 always hold in mind that there are two stages of being, one the 
 actual, the other the logical, that is, the sphere of conditions 
 and pre-suppositions which the rationalizing of facts demands. 
 When we accept the thesis "Soil ist der grund des Seyns," we 
 must not fancy that at one time an actual Divine Will saw actual 
 
The Unity of Fichte's System. 31 
 
 law, actually willed to obey it, and then and only then appeared 
 as the world of consciousness, for the very obvious reason that 
 the first supposition, "an actual will," involves the whole world 
 of consciousness, as Fichte is forever telling us; every bit 
 involves the whole: the whole is in every bit, and the notion 
 that a will to be or not to be, existed alone by itself and was 
 the cause of being, is absolute absurdity and self-contradic- 
 tion; the notion of freedom involves the whole notion of the 
 world of consciousness with all its necessity. What "Soil ist 
 der grund des Seyns " means, is that the moral man, in beholding 
 the moral will now present in himself, and in seeking its 
 explanation, is forced to come upon, as ultimate condition of his 
 will, a Divine Will which is holy. This Divine Will exists 
 only as a conception of the mind to explain its own holy will. 
 The sight of holy will in holy men is all the holy will there is. 
 It is the Divine Will, the one organic will seen as self at an 
 infinite number of points of view called individuals, and there 
 is no other holy will. Humanity's view of will is all the will 
 there is. 
 
 This caution is necessary, and necessary here, though it 
 comes for the thousandth time. The student of Fichte after 
 years of study finds himself again and again resting in the dead 
 idea of a past, of an extra-mundane God, of a temporal creation, 
 when the very soul and essence of Fichte's teaching is an eter- 
 nal "now," a God who is the world, an ever-present creation. 
 We are at this moment, in Fichte's eyes, all that there is, and 
 we are infinite might, majesty, and power, and possibility, and 
 these have no other existence than in conception. The birth- 
 place and abiding place of these conceptions is the human soul ; 
 as they expand they lift it ever with them, as their circumfer- 
 ence, their substantial and enveloping tissue, for it is they; it 
 soars and dares and does with them. What the heart of man 
 conceives, that he is. The thoughts of the heart are the things 
 of life ; if they mount aloft and sing and soar in worship, Thought 
 is the God to whom the Te Deums and Benedicites are chanted. 
 We are what thought makes us. 
 
 Fichte's argument at present stands as follows: The Abso- 
 lute Ego sees itself as the world of actual existence springing 
 
32 Unity of Fickte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 from a Power behind. This Power it views as freedom sub- 
 mitting to law for the love of law, or Holy Will. The world 
 of actual existence is in its eyes the result of this free will act, 
 and is the appearance of the Power. Since this Power is Holy 
 Will, and actual existence is its appearance, actual existence 
 must appear as Holy Will. Actual existence appears as Holy 
 Will in man's seeing self making a holy choice to resist the 
 sense-world, and to do what he ought because he ought. Hence 
 the true nature of actual existence is to be found in its moral 
 aspect, and its various elements are merely means to morality. 
 These elements are : the sense-world, the moral command, the 
 individual, as containing both ; and they are valueless unless 
 they fulfil their end by issuing in a moral choice. 
 
 V. Faith. 
 
 Now that we have before us the outline of Fichte's doctrine 
 and see that, in his view, knowledge can never be transcended, 
 that the web of consciousness is all there is, and no extra-mentem 
 God can exist, since existence means a being within the mind, 
 the question naturally arises where in the system is there room 
 for the faith of which Fichte speaks so often. 
 
 Faith is the very essence of the system ; and he who under- 
 stands the system, sees that men live their daily life by faith and 
 faith alone. Fichte's philosophic point of view is that nothing 
 but mind exists, that mind is the only truth, and being, and 
 reality, and that mind in its every aspect, is truth, being, reality; 
 if the mind in obedience to its own laws reach a result, that 
 result has universal validity for thinking beings, and such uni- 
 versal validity is objective reality. Mind has faith in itself, 
 and this faith is the creator of reality. 
 
 We, as individuals, are to become conscious of this faith. 
 We are to feel faith in the results of thought and to abide stead- 
 fastly by these results. Thought has developed for us the whole 
 content of consciousness, divided it into two spheres, and estab- 
 lished the relation between these spheres : one sphere, God, it 
 declares to be the only Reality, the only True Being, the Life, 
 the Light, the Love, of all that is ; the other sphere exists only 
 
Faith. 33 
 
 to make God manifest, only as a field for the concrete realiza- 
 tion of the Divine Idea. We are to hold fast to this relation 
 which thought has revealed to us, to grasp it with faith and 
 believe it ; it is to be ever present to consciousness, and we are 
 to be absolutely true to it. It must be the guiding principle of 
 our lives, shaping every action. We are to believe and know 
 that we, in our true nature, are God incarnated, God working 
 among the facts of life through love of law and righteousness ; 
 we are to know that the holy man is God walking upon earth. 
 Every deed of ours should be a God deed, should be that which 
 reason tells us God himself wills in this given time and place. 
 So may the Eternal Word become flesh in every individual who 
 gives up his personal life to the Divine Life within him, pre- 
 cisely as it became incarnate in Jesus Christ. Christ is the one 
 man who has immediately seen and felt, and has unfalteringly 
 lived the truth that Man and God are one, and he tells us that 
 only by eating his flesh and drinking his blood, that is, by be- 
 coming absolutely identical in life with him, by being with him 
 the life of the One and the indivisible God, can we follow him. 
 
 This faith we are to take with us into daily life and with it 
 we are to confront its facts. If we look at these as mere facts 
 they are opaque, unintelligible; they give no reason in them- 
 selves why they are what they are, why so stubborn, and slow,, 
 and stupid, why brutal, sensual, devilish. They seem to be a 
 hostile power of equal and of independent strength ; they have 
 laws of their own which we must learn if we would conquer 
 them, and in learning these laws we seemingly subject ourselves 
 to them instead of dominating them. In understanding them, 
 we must take on, for the moment, their nature, that we may 
 overcome them; subjection of the Spirit instead of sovereignty 
 of the Spirit seems to be the rule of the world. These hostile 
 facts persist in their natures; they are obstinate, hard, inflexi- 
 ble; struggle against them seems unavailing, the struggle of 
 years, of generations. Evil is as vigorous and prolific now as 
 when the first holy man armed himself to do battle with it. 
 Our weakness is the one and only truth that the world of Set 
 teaches, weakness in will, in wisdom, and in material force. 
 
 These facts, so unintelligible in themselves, take on a mean- 
 ing only when the eye of faith looks at them. Faith recognizes 
 them as the material in which the true image of God shall be 
 
 S 
 
34 Unity of Fichtds Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 made to appear; it sees that its task is to go among them with 
 eye fixed upon the Divine Ideal, and to work out the realization 
 of that ideal, to make God's kingdom come and God's will be 
 done in their midst. They are no longer unintelligible. Their 
 opaqueness is perceived to be the necessary means by which the 
 ideal of intelligence becomes visible; their laws are seen to exist 
 that we may learn to conquer through law, for man's proper work 
 is the handling of laws, his life's task is to disentangle the com- 
 plex of laws infolded within his consciousness, to grasp them in 
 their relation to one another, to learn to set one off against the 
 other and nullify the lower by the interposition of the higher, to 
 work continually that which in a given plane seems a miracle 
 because it is a direct contradiction of the laws of that plane, 
 but which from a higher point of view is apprehended as merely 
 the intelligent comprehension of a vast system of laws and the 
 control of one by the intervention of another. Man is by nature 
 the miracle-worker, for he is by nature intelligence; the miracle 
 is the expression of his true being, and to the Absolute Ego all 
 things are possible at all times, for the Absolute Ego is com- 
 plete comprehension of law. The stubbornness of facts is seen 
 to be a warrant that man is engaged in a God-struggle with 
 God-forces; he has the strength of the Infinite but he must meet 
 infinite resistance, or he will never know the fulness of his own 
 strength. The weakness of man is discerned as weakness in 
 strength; it seems weakness only because at any moment is 
 beheld with the eye of intelligence the whole of the struggle, 
 while to the individual, as an existence in time and space, is 
 granted limited power; but the resistance which meets him is 
 also limited by time and space, and is never greater than his 
 strength. Man has the whole God-head upon which to draw, 
 Holy Will always triumphs, life is a continual overcoming. 
 
 Faith, for Fichte, is faith in reason and a complete surrender 
 of self to reason's last logical deduction. The loftiest flight of 
 thought of which the mind is capable reveals to us a God of Love, 
 who is the life of every man and who may come to conscious life 
 in every man; then, bids Fichte, abide continually in this high 
 thought, believe it utterly, act always in conformity with it, 
 control life through it, be true at every moment to reason. A 
 system of Philosophy which is thus exclusively loyal to reason, 
 and which finds God and union with God only through the 
 
Faith. 35 
 
 severest thought, is as far removed from the irrational fanati-' 
 cism and dogmatic statement of mysticism as is zenith from ! 
 nadir; it is as clear-cut and transparent as mysticism is vague 
 and obscure; for it the way of life is logic, not feeling, and the 
 Doctrine of Blessedness is a doctrine of knowledge. Man's well- 
 being depends, according to it, not upon illogical emotions, but 
 upon his holding a definite, rational conclusion as to himself 
 and the world, that is, that they both proceed from the essential 
 self-contained Divine Nature, and are merely the passive instru- 
 ments of the appearing of this nature. 
 
 This rational conclusion faith transforms into reality, for 
 faith is the only creator of reality in every sphere of existence. , 
 The objective world is real to man only because the ego thinks | 
 it so ; any other reality than that given by perfect faith in the j 
 concept reality, it cannot be proved to have. This lowest kind I 
 of faith is the birth-gift of every man and makes for him a firm 
 and abiding world; he wakes every morning with the certainty 
 of finding a realm of realities; he goes forth and labors in it 
 sure that it will yield to him real results, and in this conviction 
 of reality, reality of world and of results consists. This faith, 
 since it is a birth-gift, is not a conscious product of the indi- 
 vidual, but must be looked upon as born of that postulated sub- 
 jection of self by Freedom to Law which we have called Holy 
 Will, and described as taking place in a pre-conscious sphere. 
 When Freedom voluntarily subjects itself to law from love of 
 law it has full faith that the law it loves becomes real, that real 
 existence results, and man, as part of this existence and involved 
 in its law, shares in the faith; the faith is so complete that 
 it is not perceived as faith, but its result is unquestionably 
 accepted as fact. The primal act of faith in the primal creation 
 of reality is unseen by the natural man. 
 
 But in another realm, and to the spiritual eye, the creative 
 power of faith must become visible, for, since existence is an 
 ego, and an ego is seeing self, all within the ego, and, among the 
 rest, faith and its works, must appear. It does so appear in the 
 perfect man ; he sees an inward faith bringing forth an outward 
 reality, a conscious faith giving objective existence to the spiritual 
 ideal within him. Thus he becomes a creator through faith, and 
 is shaped into the very image of the creative God ; or, rather, 
 he sees within self God, is absolutely sure that this God can 
 
36 Unity of Fichtis Theory of Knowledge. 
 
 work his will in the material world, and does his holy deed in 
 His strength. 
 
 This deed is the test of his faith, — if he does the God-deed 
 then does he truly believe that God is One with him, and 
 thereby is his spiritual conception made an external truth ; faith 
 then becomes a seen and manifested creator of reality as it is 
 always its unseen creator. If he does not do the deed then has 
 he not the faith, — words do not avail, — the withered arm is 
 stretched forth, regardless of all thought of possibility or impos- 
 sibility, if there is belief in the heart. The man does, he does 
 instantly and instinctively; this doing is faith, and nothing else 
 is faith. The faith that is real, acts, for faith is action, and 
 the action is the reality of faith, the real making by faith, the 
 creative power in faith to produce reality. Faith is the action 
 of the ego in conscious effort to complete itself; it is the going 
 forth of the ego, as God, fully conscious of its power, in end- 
 less activity, energy, power, to create the real; it is the most 
 strenuous activity of which God or Man is capable, for it an 
 issuing into the realm of nothingness and night to plant there 
 reality, life, light, the infinite and eternal prolificness of Love 
 and Will. Where I have faith I do, and my doing is my faith; 
 if this Divine energy does not burst forth in my life I have no 
 faith, for faith is God's energy in creating reality manifested 
 through man. Faith is action, and action is faith. 
 
 VI. The Sense World. 
 
 Two immediate duties devolve upon the expositor: he must, 
 with Fichte, enter the sense world and the moral world and so 
 explain the facts of each that they shall be seen to be in har- 
 mony with the theory of their origin just developed. To this 
 task we now address ourselves. 
 
 The most obvious description of the sense world that sug- 
 gests itself to the beholder is that it is a world in which a mul- 
 titude of distinct objects, each with distinct qualities of its own, 
 are seen. Fichte has told us that these objects are ego-stuff 
 submitting to law. The question at once arises, submitting to 
 what law.' What is the law that forces the ego to see itself as 
 
The Sense World. 37 
 
 a multitude of facts with a multitude of qualities ? Our first 
 problem, then, is to seek the fundamental law of sight or of 
 perception. 
 
 Let us take the simplest possible perception, for instance, 
 that A is A, and ask what it involves. One thing, at least, it 
 involves, a sense of sameness ; it is recognized as identical from 
 moment to moment. It could not be so recognized unless there 
 were in the mind a permanent concept under which A is classed 
 and thereby known. Knowing, therefore, appears as a relating 
 by the individual of that which he finds to a concept already 
 within the mind. But the deeper problem at once comes to 
 view, How is this concept known .'' The simplest aspect under 
 which the given concept presents itself is as "this concept;" 
 hence its knowledge involves a knowledge of "this," and our 
 ultimate question becomes " How does the mind know 'this ' .•■ " 
 By hypothesis "this" is denuded of all qualities except "this- 
 ness," hence it can be known by no other quality or qualities. 
 What, then, is "this" eternally and forever for the mind.-" By 
 what may the mind identify it and recognize constancy in its 
 own meanings } What is its mark and token .■■ We are denied 
 all positive predicates as means of identification, for we have 
 voluntarily stripped them from "this" in order to discover its 
 essential nature, hence the mind can know it only through nega- 
 tion: "this" is "not that," or "this" is not "not-this." We 
 know only by holding together in the mind two contradictories, 
 two mentally exclusive concepts, "this" and "not this," and 
 perceiving what results from their union. The result is for us 
 an "object" of knowledge. Hence the ultimate law of Percep- 
 tion may be superficially described as a law of negativity. But 
 negativity is found upon examination to be dependent upon pos- 
 itive existence, to be possible only in the midst of a complex 
 of relations, and to be an urging which pushes us from one 
 member to another in endless quest of the reality of the first. 
 We can describe "this" as "not that" only because the mind 
 sees itself as holding within itself a sum-total of inter-related 
 parts, whose determinations individually are fixed by the whole 
 and the other parts. Hence the fundamental law of perception 
 is the law of reciprocal determination by the parts of an organic 
 entity. 
 
38 Unity of Fichtes Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 Now that we have grasped the fundamental law of percep- 
 tion we see why we were forced, when we were first investigating 
 the nature of the ego, to view it as something which in itself 
 is essentially self-contradictory. We said that its true being 
 lies within a sphere of potentiality where it is freedom, there- 
 fore without the determinations of actual existence, yet with the 
 power of assuming them at any moment. In short, we found it 
 to be the power of existence or of non-existence. But the idea 
 of freedom, or of a power of existence or of non-existence, con- 
 tradicts itself. Suppose the power choose non-existence. Then 
 it is a power which does not exist. It is and it is not at the 
 same moment. Yes, freedom can be conceived only as a hold- 
 ing together of opposites. If it \% freedom it can be limited by 
 none of the determinations of actual existence, therefore it can- 
 not exist, for all actual existence is determined; but if it is 
 freedom it exists as freedom. Hence we must always conceive 
 freedom as hovering between actual existence and non-exist- 
 ence, and refusing to be wholly either that it may be. 
 
 We were driven to this self-contradictory conception in our 
 ultimate analysis of the ego by our desire to see the ego in its 
 essential being. The law of perception is that the object per- 
 ceived is the result of the holding together of two mutually 
 exclusive conceptions. Hence the ego must always see itself as 
 the blending of contradictories, — of existence and non-existence, 
 of freedom and necessity, of mind and matter, of God and Man, 
 of the finite and the Infinite. 
 
 This holding together of opposites, this seizing of relations, 
 this perception of an object by means of relations, which Fichte 
 terms the law of reciprocal determination, is for him the essen- 
 tial truth of thought and of imagination; hence he constantly 
 pictures both as a hovering between contradictories, a grasping 
 of opposites, a seizing and a joining of a positive and a negative. 
 And this law is his chief instrument in developing his system; 
 for, given one fact, from its connotation, through the law of 
 opposites, he deduces the whole universe of thought. 
 
 The law of reciprocal determination measures for him the 
 circumference of consciousness, divides its content into inter- 
 dependent spheres, and subdivides each sphere into an infinite 
 correlation of members. The limits of consciousness are not 
 given to him with actual existence, but the sphere of actual exist- 
 
The Sense World. 39 
 
 ence determines, and is determined by, a sphere of potential 
 existence : it determines such sphere, for actual existence forces 
 him to postulate its opposite, as a non-existence, which is poten- 
 tial existence ; it is determined by such sphere as being thought 
 of as its result, and in being conceived only by means of oppo- 
 sition to it. Again, actual existence is divided into two worlds 
 which reciprocally determine each other: the merely physical 
 world in which the ground of its existence, that primal obedience 
 to Law for the sake of Law which Freedom yields in a pre- 
 conscious sphere, is unseen ; and the moral world in which this 
 ground of being is always visible as obedience to the Moral 
 Law. Again, the physical world and the moral world each is 
 subdivided into infinitely complex details, all of which recipro- 
 cally determine and involve one another as being members of a 
 definite organic entity. 
 
 The comprehension that the fundamental law of thought is 
 perception through the holding together of opposites puts us 
 in position to meet the problem of the essential difference 
 between presentations and representations. The problem may 
 be stated as follows: Suppose we grant the world to be only 
 a world of knowledge, nothing beyond the images of the mind, 
 which are ego-stuff shaped by law. Why, then, if this is true, 
 do we so persistently separate these images into two great 
 classes, with the ineradicable conviction that one class, which 
 we call the material phenomena of the world, or presentations, is 
 not mind, but matter, and that the other class, or representations, 
 is merely a system of images .' 
 
 Because, Fichte replies, in the former class we have a union 
 of sensation and thought, and in the latter we have pure thought. 
 
 What is sensation, and how does it differ from thought? 
 Sensation is the not-understood which understanding brings with 
 it as its necessary counterpart: the universe, as self-conscious 
 thought, is the understanding of understanding, consciousness 
 seeing itself, and explaining itself to itself: now the law of 
 reciprocal determinism which we have just formulated teaches 
 us that understanding can be understood only through the pres- 
 ence of its opposite; hence the I, or understanding, must from 
 
40 Unity of Fickte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 its very nature, bring with it the inexplicable; this inexplicable 
 the plain man calls sensation, and wonders that he cannot under- 
 stand it as he does the conclusions of thought, not knowing that 
 this very inexplicability is the condition of his having any 
 understanding at all; why red and green should be just what 
 they are, why we have not other senses, and why exactly these, 
 must remain forever unknown. The plain man, blindly obeying 
 the laws of thought, adds to understanding and sensation, sub- 
 stance as bearer and cause. To this substance, which is a mere 
 concept of the mind, his inborn faith gives a real existence: 
 he calls it matter, and fancies it an independent entity which 
 has separate existence of its own apart from mind. The philos- 
 opher rises to a point where he unifies mind and matter as 
 necessary opposites out of whose union existence is born, neces- 
 sary correlates of a whole which in one aspect is understanding, 
 in the other, the not-understood. They are the two contradic- 
 tories which, held together in eternal antagonism, produce the 
 world. Or, more simply, knowledge knows itself, therefore it 
 must know its boundary where it spring from not-knowledge; 
 this not-knowledge whence knowledge springs is called sensa- 
 tion. Sensations "are the boundaries of our thoughts, beyond 
 which the mind, whatever efforts it would make, is not able to 
 advance one jot ; nor can it make any discoveries when it would 
 pry into the nature and hidden causes of these ideas." 
 
 Sensation is where the Absolute meets man; it is what it is 
 because it is, and for no other reason. Hence the plain man 
 feels absolutely sure of the testimony of his senses: if he sees 
 and feels an object he laughs at the philosopher who seeks other 
 proof of its existence. Sensation is the mysterious law that 
 mind shall perceive in such and such fashion; it is the first 
 point of interpretation of freedom and necessity; it is born of 
 the reflex action of the Ego and the Other, and is the earliest 
 manifestation of God, of the Inconceivable. 
 
 But mark. Sensation always appears in the form of thought. 
 The ego knows, not sensation in general, but the this and that 
 of special sensation, and determination is a function of thought. 
 Since the qualitative can appear only in thought-forms, it may 
 be called empirical thinking. The sense world in its myriad 
 determinations is the first aspect in which the thought of the One 
 Originating Thinker appears, and in it are to be found the pos- 
 
The Sense World, 41 
 
 sibilities of all further developments of thought ; it is thought 
 in the concrete, thought solidified by faith, which faith is again 
 to resolve into its elements, to establish in proper relations, to 
 view as the plastic stuff in which to work out the will of God. 
 
 If presentations are inseparable union of sensation and 
 thought, are the real thinking, what then is the so-called pure 
 thought ? We have said that the world appears in ego-form, as 
 a self-seeing, as consciousness which sees itself seeing a world : 
 pure thought is the form of such seeing, as sensation is the stuff 
 seen. The one dominating, all-including, omnipresent form is 
 the ego-form; within it are unalterably fixed a multitude of 
 lesser forms. These forms, in their totality, are again, as is 
 sensation, the immediate presence of the Divine Life existing 
 as the laws it loves. God becomes visible as the laws of thought 
 shaping and supporting consciousness; maintaining it in exist- 
 ence, making its existence possible. The One Divine Life, 
 perfect and complete in itself, is manifested in the one absolute, 
 fundamental form of conception, likewise perfect and complete 
 in itself, the ego-form, apperception with its net-work of in- 
 cluded laws. Since these included laws, as concepts of thought, 
 shape an object, establish its nature, they can be called the 
 laws of the object, the condition of conceiving an object; when 
 something does not accord with a given concept it is not a given 
 object ; if it accord with no concept it has no existence. Here 
 again we see that real thinking is the material universe, per- 
 ception, or the inseparable union of sensation and thought. 
 After this union has come to pass, thought possesses the power 
 of tearing itself loose from the sense world and reflecting it in 
 empty images. Such reflections only, the plain man calls 
 thought, but we view them as the mere copy, the imitation, of 
 real thought. 
 
 In sensation and thought, in stuff and form of presentation 
 and representation, we have a direct giving of Himself by God 
 as visibility. But sensation and thought are only the visibility 
 of Him, not Himself; try to seize sense or thought and it van- 
 ishes leaving only an image of a fancied reality of a moment 
 before, — the reality, and the moment, and we who pursue, are 
 the stuff that dreams are made of, — mere image of that whose 
 jeality is also image. 
 
 6 
 
42 Unity of Fichie's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 The general truth that in beholding all these parts of the 
 sense world the ego sees only self has been proved to Fichte's 
 satisfaction, but he deems it a matter of importance to show 
 what aspect of self each great phenomenon or class of phenomena 
 represent. In other words, he seeks to deduce the facts of the 
 world from the nature of the ego. These deductions are often 
 ingenious, and though they are the details, rather than the essen- 
 tials of his system, a few of them may be of interest. 
 
 Space. Man sees the world lying in space because space 
 symbolizes his nature as a whole : for just as the true Being of 
 the Ego or Freedom, is an Infinite which presents itself to view 
 in finite form, so we must conceive space as an infinite which 
 is seen only in finite parts; just as the ego is possibility of 
 determination by law, so is space possibility of determination 
 by objects; since the ego sees its nature as activity which 
 involves succession, the ego must see itself in a field which 
 allows successive activity; such field is space. Space, then, 
 from any point of view, is that empirical image which most 
 truly expresses the nature of the ego, and it may be looked upon 
 as the visibility, the external symbol, of the ego. 
 
 Time. It will be remembered that the ego, in its first 
 analysis of its own nature, found it impossible to transcend 
 itself to find an Other, hence it judged itself to be a Free Will 
 Absolute which wills its own existence, or causa siii; causation 
 involves a succession of cause and effect, but this succession 
 differs from space-succession in that the latter is co-extensive, 
 whereas the members of the former reciprocally exclude each 
 other: a succession of reciprocally excluding members is empiri- 
 cally presented in time; hence we may say that time is the 
 external ization of the ego as pure cause. 
 
 Matter is the fixation of the construction of the ego by faith : 
 the ego can find no other constructor of the world than its own 
 activity, search as it may; certain of the images it constructs 
 we have seen to be an interpenetration of sensation and thought ; 
 such images are fixed firm and stable by faith which believes 
 matter to be behind them. 
 
 In organisms the organic unity of thought images itself. 
 
 The Laws of Nature are merely the ground forms of thought 
 divorced from their concrete filling. 
 
 The personal Ego. The same law of thought which forces 
 
The Sense World. 43 
 
 the plain man to postulate das Ding an sick behind his presen- 
 tations and an extra-mentem God behind the world, leads him 
 to assume a substantial ego behind the activity of which he is 
 conscious. There is no ego-in-itself which can act or refrain 
 from acting, any more than there is a thing-in-itself ; both are 
 products of thought, as is all substance. What man sees when 
 he fancies that he sees the ego is an activity which affirms that 
 a specific momentary perception is identical with the concept of 
 a general undetermined ego; hence apperception is founded 
 upon subsumption, and the ego is living Logic. 
 
 The truth of the individual may be expressed as follows: 
 there is One Absolute Thinking and only One; this Thinking, 
 in obedience to the laws of thought, becomes conscious of itself 
 at an infinite number of points. If, at each of the points, the 
 Thinking think about the point where thinking is perceived, it 
 is forced by the laws of thought to add to the point the concept 
 of being; that is, to conceive the point as a substance that 
 thinks or as an individual ego ; the individual exists only in this 
 thought of it as individual by the One Absolute Thinking. The 
 individual is only a point of sight of the Divine Thought and 
 has separate existence only as the Divine Thought thinks him 
 as a distinct point of sight of itself. Each, in his individuality, 
 is only a thought of God, and a thought which God thinks of as 
 reflecting, imaging, his own being. 
 
 Here we see plainly how absurd is the charge of solipsism 
 which was brought against Fichte. Fichte instead of assert- 
 ing that he, as Johann Gottlieb, originates the world and God, 
 asserts that he has no independent existence of his own, that 
 he exists only as held in the thought of the One Absolute 
 Thinking. The cause of the accusation and of the general 
 misapprehension of Fichte is the persistency with which the 
 natural mind clings to the concept of das Ding an sick as an 
 extra-mentem reality, and the inevitableness with which it adds 
 it to a thought of whose truth it is convinced. Against this 
 false notion Fichte waged the war of a lifetime. He declared 
 das Ding an sick to be the arch-enemy of Philosophy, the Satan 
 of metaphysics, the origin and source of all error. To hold to 
 this notion is to be guilty of the unpardonable sin which 
 excludes forever from the true kingdom, for in that kingdom 
 nothing extra-mentem can enter; the kingdom is of spirit, and 
 
44 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 they who enter must enter it in spirit only. In this battle of his 
 lifetime Fichte found himself met by the enemy at every turn, 
 for to every position which he took to prove that there was 
 no Ding an sich, men added the Ding an sick and confronted 
 him with it as an absurd production of his own. First, Fichte 
 tries to show men that the plain man's God is thought, and not 
 a Dittg an sich. God is the thought which the One Absolute 
 Thinking holds when it thinks of its own nature; that is, if the 
 plain man start from any of the facts of life and reason correctly 
 from them he will arrive at the notion of God as origin and 
 creator of these facts. The plain man, in so far as he reasons 
 correctly, is not the plain man as isolated person, but is a point 
 at which the One Absolute Thinking comes to consciousness 
 and speculates upon itself; in so speculating, it is forced by 
 its own laws to add the concept of being to its own activity 
 which it sees, and to think of a substantial God who creates 
 the visible universe; this substantial God is the thought of God 
 by the One Absolute Thinking. God is thought, and has no 
 other substance than thought. He is not a Ding an sich who 
 could exist without acting; instead, he is the activity of thought 
 which sees itself as God, and this seeing self as God is all the 
 God there is; if there were no thought there would be no God. 
 Fichte now calls upon the world to acknowledge that God is 
 thought, spirit, and not brute extra-mentem fact. But the 
 world replies by adding the Ding an sich to Fichte himself, 
 and by saying "You, as Fichte, say that you think out God, that 
 God is your notion, held in your mind; then he is less than your 
 mind, and is its product; then you, Johann Gottlieb, create God 
 and his result, the world." "No," Fichte shouts, "I, as Johann 
 Gottlieb, have no separate existence, I am not a Ding an sich, — 
 there is no Ding an sich, — there is only thought, and the thought 
 of the One Absolute Thinking. I, as Johann Gottlieb, am a 
 thought of this One Thinking, and instead of creating it, creat- 
 ing God, I am merely the sight of him and of his thought, 
 Johann Gottlieb." We, as individuals, are in thought: the One 
 Absolute and Only Thinking thinks each of us, and each has 
 this thought as his existence. Individuality is a thought by 
 God of a given reflection of himself; it is the addition of the 
 concept of being to the concept of sight of Thought by itself. 
 Given Absolute Thought seeing self, add to the concept of its 
 
The Sense World. 45 
 
 totality the concept of being, and you have God ; add to the con- 
 cept of its sight of self from one point of view the concept of 
 being, and you have the individual. God and the individual are 
 Father and Son because they are of exactly the same nature: 
 both are thought : God is the thought of the totality as embrac- 
 ing and sustaining all thought; the individual is the thought 
 of the potential totality seen from one point of view as having! 
 distinct existence. 
 
 If this doctrine be true each individual is, in his true nature, 
 perfect, for each is the entering of thought-forms, the coming 
 to self-consciousness under Time and Space limitations, by the 
 Absolute. An individual is where God chooses to manifest 
 himself as thought. Hence the only function of the individual 
 is to be conscious of self as the self-consciousness of God's 
 perfection. 
 
 But a question comes straightway to the mind of the plain man, 
 who still clings to the Ding an sick as the ultimate test of all 
 things : " If God and the individual are only thought, have they any 
 reality?" Certainly, for reality is only thought : there is no reality 
 except the thought of reality. God, then, as the thought of the 
 source of all reality, is reality kut i^o'xrjv : he is the completion and 
 fulfilment of all reality, since we are forced to postulate him as the 
 condition of real things ; he is the highest category, which contains 
 within itself all other categories, — hence he has, at least, all their 
 reality. God, though only thought, has true being, for being is 
 only thought : there is no being but the thought of being or the 
 being of thought : God, then, as that thought of being to which all 
 being leads and from which it issues, is the being of being, has 
 the only true being. God, though only thought, is truth, for truth 
 is the harmony of thought with itself : that which, when the whole 
 content of the mind is rationalized, persists in its place is true ; that 
 which is by such harmonious ordering thrust from its place is false ; 
 objective validity and truth mean the harmonious consistency of 
 thought with itself. God, then, is truth, for God is the thought to 
 which the rationalization of existence leads. 
 
 From what has been said, we see that, though there is no ext?-a- 
 mentem test of the correctness of thought, we yet have an infallible 
 test; and that though universality is this test, yet Athanasius may 
 be right against the world : the standard of truth, we have just 
 said, is consistency within the totality of thought as shaped by its 
 
46 Unity of Fichie's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 own laws, or, as we express it when we add the concept of being 
 to the activity of thought, the standard is the thought of the One 
 Absolute Thinker. Suppose the processes of mathematics were 
 not in the least understood, but the problem 4x2 were presented 
 to the world ; suppose one man proclaimed that he had a belief, an 
 insight, for which he could give no reason except that it was a 
 faith within him that the result is 8, and suppose all the rest 
 of the world insisted that the result is 9. We know that the 
 one man holds the truth, and that the rest of the world are in 
 the wrong, because the processes of thought which enable the world 
 to recognize the elements of the problem, or 4 x 2, will, if developed 
 according to their own laws, issue in the result 8, and not 9. 
 Athanasius is right against the world when the One Absolute 
 Activity of Thinking comes to self-consciousness in Athanasius. 
 It may come to self-consciousness in him at an advanced point, 
 and the connecting links may not yet be seen ; but if his insight 
 is the self-consciousness of the One Absolute Thinking, when 
 these links come to view the correctness of his position is demon- 
 strated against the world. 
 
 The individual has truth, being, and reality, as does God ; for he, 
 like God, is a thought of truth, being, and reality, connected by the 
 One Absolute Thinking with its own activity as seen at a certain 
 point. 
 
 Our puzzle of the finite and the infinite ego is now solved. In- 
 finity and finiteness are thoughts which the Absolute Thinking, in 
 obedience to its own law of reciprocal determination, correlates 
 and connects with its activity. Every appearance of Thinking, 
 which we call an individual, is seen to be infinite in so far as it is 
 the appearance of Absolute Thinking, and finite in so far as it is 
 only a partial appearance. The individual is the finite ego when 
 he fails to identify himself wholly with the One Absolute Activity, 
 and is the Infinite Ego when he sees himself as the manifestation 
 of this Absolute Activity. Our finiteness is the thought of our 
 finiteness, and our infiniteness is the thought of self as infinite. 
 
 A multiplicity of individuals is a necessary fact of consciousness, 
 without which consciousness is impossible. There is no Universal 
 Consciousness : the Absolute Ego does not see itself empirically 
 as one personality, for both logical and psychological reasons : a 
 logical reason is that consciousness of one involves consciousness 
 
The Sense World. 47 
 
 of the whole series of numbers ; one implies limitation, and an indi- 
 vidual as subject and object can be limited only by another subject 
 and object, or by another individual ; hence the perception of one 
 individual involves the perception of an infinite number of indi- 
 viduals : a psychological reason is that the child is waked to a 
 knowledge of its own faculties only by seeing in another certain 
 powers which it feels that it can imitate ; if it grew to old age in 
 solitude it would never reach the point of reflection upon self ; 
 the presence, therefore, of any individual who is conscious of self 
 as an individual is irrefragable proof of the existence of other 
 individuals. 
 
 The following questions immediately arise: (i) What is the 
 origin of the multiplicity of individuals ? (2) In what do individuals 
 differ from one another? (3) How far does this difference extend ? 
 (4) What is the significance of the fact that the same sum-total of 
 humanity appears in every man's consciousness ? (5) What is the 
 moral import of a multiplicity of egos ? 
 
 1. Origin. The ego form we have shown to be produced by the 
 reflection of the Absolute Ego upon itself. The infinite repetition 
 of such acts of reflection is the origin of the multiplicity of egos. 
 With each act comes the absolute certainty of individual identity 
 and existence, exactly as with the sensation " red " comes the cer- 
 tainty that it is red ; the two convictions are absolute facts of the 
 same class, and belong to the not-understood of sensation. 
 
 2. Difference. These egos are alike in form, i. e., in subject- 
 objectivity, and laws of thought; and in content, i. e., the same ob- 
 jective self, which we call the world of sense, is reflected upon. 
 They differ only in the centring of the feeling of selfhood about 
 diff"erent determinations of thought and sensation. 
 
 3. Degree of Difference. But determinations belong only to the 
 form of consciousness, i. e., anything to become visible to con- 
 sciousness must appear before it in the forms of Time, Space, Mat- 
 ter, etc. Since the difference between individuals results only from 
 the difference of determinations, it is mere formal difference, and 
 does not enter reality on the other side of consciousness. We are all 
 one in God. Again, the multiplicity of egos depends wholly upon 
 Freedom, for it is the result of reflection ; but Freedom is only! 
 form, not reality ; now a mere form can have no power to bring! 
 forth reality, hence the new individual that Freedom seems to! \ 
 create is new only in form : it is the One Life appearing at another! 
 
48 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 point. Nature well may be careless of the individual, for when 
 she destroys him she breaks only the empty form. 
 
 4. The Unity of the Human World. The significance of the ap- 
 pearance of the same community of individuals in every one's con- 
 sciousness is identical with that of the appearance of the same material 
 universe, — it is evidence that in all of us the One Divine Life (by 
 which image we vainly try to express the Inconceivable lying behind 
 knowledge) comes to consciousness at different points of view : 
 the One Life sees itself as picturing the same physical world, 
 and as looking at it with myriad eyes. How erroneous is that 
 doctrine which teaches a fundamental difference between soul and 
 body, degrades the body to exalt the soul, tells of the death of the 
 one and of the immortality of the other ! There is no body, there is 
 no soul, as separable entity, but there are various aspects of the 
 One Life : the first we call physical world, the second reflection : 
 neither is higher nor lower than the other, but both are one and the 
 same ; neither can exist or perish without the other ; this or that 
 special form may sink from sight, but the One Life is always equal 
 to itself, and, if it appears, it appears as the totality of conscious- 
 ness intact in every member ; for its appearance is an organic whole, 
 and each part is essential to every other part. If there is spiritual 
 life there must be what the plain man calls physical life, for that, 
 too, is spiritual ; nothing but spirit exists ; and sensation caught 
 in the web of thought is as truly mind as the empty forms of logic, 
 or the moral activity of the good man ; only it is that part of spirit 
 which is seen as, means to the rest. 
 
 From the doctrine of the One Life conclusions of practical im- 
 port can be drawn. Only in individuality does the One Life 
 break forth into consciousness, self-presentation : God can act only 
 in the form of the individual : the individual does not exist, only 
 God exists in individual form : since the individual is only a form 
 of the One Life there is no real separation between individuals : the 
 One Life is unchanging and eternal in its manifold forms : since 
 in every individual the One Life appears, heredity and environ- 
 ment have no compelling power : the One Life can act only in its 
 wholeness, hence the individual works with the power of God amid 
 those determinations of Space, Time, Matter, to which the indi- 
 vidual form binds him. 
 
The Moral World. 49 
 
 But the view of the One Life which the thought of the sum-total 
 of humanity presents is, as yet, far from an adequate view, for it 
 shows only a mechanical unity, whereas, in its other aspect, the 
 physical world, we see organic unity. Humanity is not the image 
 of God until consciousness beholds it freely shaping itself into one 
 organic whole which shall mirror him. This, then, is our next 
 task, — to discover how mankind may be looked upon as freely 
 forming that organic whole which is the image of God. This task, 
 with our last question, " What is the moral significance of a 
 multiplicity of egos .' " leads us at once to the moral world. 
 
 VII. The Moral World. 
 
 {a) The Freedom of the Individual. 
 
 Here, at the very beginning of our discussion of ethics, let us 
 summarize \vhat we have already said in disjointed fashion of 
 Fichte's theory of the freedom and the moral responsibility of the 
 individual, for this is always the first problem which meets us in 
 ..ethics. / 
 
 It will be remembered that in the sphere of potential existence 
 which we postulate as cause of actual existence and call God, we 
 distinguish a Free Will that voluntarily subjects itself to Law: 
 this act of subjection we look upon as the immediate appearance of 
 the world of consciousness. 
 
 If we keep in mind two truths about this act, we have at once 
 Fichte's doctrine of the Will. The first truth is that in the sphere 
 of potential existence Freedom is Freedom as the plain man under- 
 stands the word : it is indeterminate, the Freedom of indifference, 
 of caprice ; its act is uncaused, a first act, a beginning ; its choice 
 is incalculable and is affected by nothing ; it is absolutely without 
 law or limitation ; it is an unthinkable self-contradiction ; it can 
 choose not to yield to law or to yield : if it does not yield it re- 
 mains forever free with the inconceivable freedom of not being, 
 bound by no self, no nature, no existence ; if it does yield it appears 
 as the stuff of the concrete cases in which law manifests itself as 
 being, with the necessity of being. 
 
 The second truth is that the act of will which takes place in the 
 sphere of potential existence, and which has for its result the 
 
 7 
 
50 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 totality of consciousness, is the sole act of free will that reason can 
 discover in the universe ; for nothing precedes it, and what results 
 from it — the universe of thought — is unalterably fixed in its 
 smallest , particular by that law to which Freedom has submitted. 
 Thought can conceive but one free act, — that which decrees 
 thought ; and this free act excludes freedom forever, for it estab- 
 lishes the dominion of the laws of thought. The person, as such, 
 has no liberty of choice ; that which seems freedom to him is the 
 empty image of the one transcendent choice that fixes actuality. 
 
 Let us reconsider the nature of consciousness, and we shall see 
 that the person, in his isolation, must be absolutely without freedom. 
 The world of consciousness is the appearance of Holy Will as 
 creator of existence, and its various parts and relations are deter- 
 mined by the necessities of such appearance. Some of these 
 necessities are as follows : That Holy Will may appear as creator 
 of existence, absence of the existence created must first be seen, 
 and later the appearance of such existence through the act of will ; 
 but absence of existence is perceived only in opposition to exist- 
 ence, for the law of reciprocal determination governs perception ; 
 hence, in order that Holy Will may appear as creator, there must 
 be primarily given a certain sphere of existence which is seen to 
 lack another kind of existence : the given sphere we call the sense 
 world ; the lacking sphere, the moral character of man ; both the 
 given sphere with its lack and the act of creation of character by 
 Holy Will may rise to self-consciousness, for such possibility is a 
 necessary element in the world of consciousness : the given sphere 
 with its lack becomes self-conscious in the natural man who per- 
 ceives himself as a part of the sense world and without moral 
 character ; the act of creation of moral character by Holy Will 
 becomes self-conscious in men who see themselves resisting the 
 sense world that they may choose the right for the sake of the 
 right. Both classes of men are absolutely necessary for the ap- 
 pearance of Holy Will, the one as field for the appearance, the other 
 as the appearance itself; they must exist, and exist just as they 
 are, if consciousness exists ; neither class, as class, has the slightest 
 freedom, is in any wise responsible for its existence or for the kind 
 of existence that is shown forth in it. The One Divine Will wills 
 always that which appears, and how it shall appear; it works 
 always in its wholeness, and it cannot be compelled ; the person as 
 isolated unit has no power to constrain its higher or its lower 
 
The Moral World. 51 
 
 manifestation in himself ; he is the passive instrument of its visi- 
 bility, whether it show itself in him only as rudimentary possibility 
 or as completion, as highest truth, as the beauty of holiness; the 
 appearance of Good and of Evil is absolutely given, just as are 
 the facts of sense and the forms of thought. 
 
 Men, however, seem to themselves free, for this view of self is a 
 necessary condition of the appearance of will: the natural man 
 seems consciously and deliberately to choose to dwell in sense 
 and to refuse obedience to the higher law which bids him, through 
 holy choice, create character ; but it is only seeming : we call him 
 evil because we look at his lack ; yet in so far as he is, i. e., an oppor- 
 tunity for the display of Holy Will, is he good : we call him evil 
 because we view him alone, out of connection with the whole ; but, 
 as a necessary element of that great complex which is the appear- 
 ance of Holy Will or consciousness, his evil is holiness: everything 
 that appears is the appearance of God, and from this point of view 
 not only good, but perfect; the good man seems to rise of his own 
 free will from the realm of nature into the spiritual world, but such 
 is not the case: the birth of the Spirit in man is just as little his 
 work as his birth into the natural world : the wind bloweth where 
 it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but cannot tell 
 whence it cometh and whither it goeth : so is every one that is 
 born of the Spirit. Of himself man is nothing : personal merit and 
 blame are the short-sighted judgments of ignorance : persons as 
 independent integers have no power and no existence, for power 
 and existence are attributes of the One and Only Reality which we 
 conceive beyond the appearance. 
 
 But, though each in his phenomenal limitation is mere creature 
 and means, yet as rooted in the Divine Will the individual has its 
 infinite might and its creative power : as it, he is the author of his 
 own being and responsible for the quality of that being ; as it, he 
 can choose whether he shall remain in the world of sense, or lift 
 himself to fuller being in a higher sphere. The causal, the gener- 
 ative, the life-begetting power of choice to be, is present at every 
 moment in all existence. Just as the primal Holy Will to obey 
 law for the sake of law issues in permanent, tangible, conscious 
 existence, so persistence of holy will in conscious existence, and its 
 choice to do what it ought because it ought, issues in completer 
 existence, for the successive stages of spiritual development are 
 merely fuller, richer, more perfect life. 
 
52 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 Let us trace the successive stages that man can consciously 
 create for himself. 
 
 1. If, when the Superactual Ego, as Divine Freedom, wills to 
 be, and the universe, primarily grasped as the sense world, ap- 
 pears, — if then, in any point of this universe, i. e., a given indi- 
 vidual, the Will pause and will no further to be, the individual re- 
 mains stationary, he does not enlarge his being, he rests a part of 
 the sense world. But if the activity of Freedom presses on to 
 more and more intimate union with law, man enters the realm of 
 thought and creates a new being for himself: if his divine power 
 of activity offer itself ever anew for the imprint of law, if in un- 
 ceasingly toiling he unceasingly furnish that substance in which 
 alone law can become visible and stand as objective, recognized 
 truth, he produces a content of mind which is a new existence, he 
 discovers the laws of phenomena, and formulates science as this 
 content. In so doing he adds the realm of law to that of feeling, 
 and has now two worlds, — sense and thought. The mind of the 
 thinker is a new sphere of existence which the will to think adds 
 to the world of facts. 
 
 2. If human activity does not rest content with these two 
 spheres, but wills still further to subject itself to law in obeying 
 the laws of thought and pressing on to deduce from the given 
 spheres their origin and first cause, it creates a third sphere for 
 itself, — the notion of God and his attributes, and the notion of his 
 relation to the world. It sees God as the sole Reality, and the 
 world as his image whose only end is to give concrete form and 
 expression to the divine ideal. Hence it looks upon life as an end- 
 less striving to body forth the Infinite, as struggle to accomplish a 
 given task and to fulfil duty. The moral sphere is now created, and 
 the mind of man, in freely subjecting its activity to law, in willing 
 to think out relations in obedience to the laws of thought, has 
 possessed itself of three worlds. 
 
 3. If the activity of thought subject itself still further to law, 
 and seek a rational explanation of the exact connection between 
 God and his image, its three worlds are unified into one new world, 
 which becomes the kingdom of Heaven. The world of conscious- 
 ness is seen to be God becoming conscious of himself. He appears 
 in his actual, true, immediate life in us, — or rather, we ai'e his im- 
 mediate life, we are God living and breathing, feeling and thinking, 
 working and fashioning, the God-activity in time and place. ';)ur 
 
The Moral World. 53 
 
 function is the doing of God's deeds ; we are his power of action, 
 his appearance as the force that brings to pass in the finite world : 
 our only office is to receive his energy, allow it to fill our pulses 
 and to direct our action. There is no striving, no individual 
 struggle, there is no raising of self to a higher sphere, no toilsome 
 working out of his image, but the Holy, the True, the Beautiful, 
 are the immediate appearance of the being of God in us. This 
 world is heaven, in which God utters and expresses himself as he 
 is in his inner nature, and we have the infinite bliss of being this 
 world, this expression, this living God. His freedom is our free- 
 dom, his strength is our strength ; his Will for Truth, and Beauty, 
 and Holiness, and productive power, and enduring creation which 
 shall stand forever a monument of his might, is our Will ; and since 
 his Will is resistless. Truth, and Beauty, and Holiness, and Free- 
 dom of expression, and productive power, and creative strength 
 for fair and lasting works, shall be brought to pass in us. There 
 is no height we shall not reach, there is no power we shall not 
 possess, there is no glory we shall not put on, for the heights of 
 power and of glory are his, and we are He. 
 
 Here in this new world which religious thought creates we have 
 Fichte's whole doctrine of freedom of will : The One Divine Will 
 wills to obey Law, or to be in the uttermost degree of being ; it is, 
 and again it is in fuller degree, and still again and again ; in each 
 stage it is the One Divine Will pressing on to union with law, 
 yielding its freedom to more perfect service, seeking new being and 
 still new being — " urge and urge and urge, ever the procreant 
 urge " of the Will. All activity is the activity of this One Will ; all 
 life with its pulses of desire, its reaches of thought, its uplifting of 
 moral striving, its fervor of religious aspiration, is the one insep- 
 arable, indivisible, indestructible Life. Men are merely points at 
 which this life is conscious of itself, sometimes as the one sense 
 world, sometimes as universality of law, again as the one organic 
 moral will of humanity, yet again as the one God, and still again 
 as the one all-inclusive Mind with its ordered . unity. Men are 
 nothing in themselves : they are points of sight, eyes turned 
 inward on the One Life in its appearance. But again they are 
 points of the One Life, and hence its fulness dwells in them ; they 
 are what it is, — freedom and might and all that is, the great " I 
 am that I am." 
 
54 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 Thus the individual does make his world through his will as part 
 of the Divine Will, and he as self-consciousness of the Will must 
 ascribe will to himself : his world is the stage in which in him the 
 Will pauses, and he sees the will of the stage as his will. In and 
 through all the stages is the divine freedom to be or not to be, and 
 the individual in each stage is forced to postulate his will as the 
 cause of his being in that stage : the causal instinct can rest only 
 in free will as cause : for the mind, only the uncaused can be 
 true cause. Just as behind the sense world is seen by the thinker 
 the will of God as its genesis, so behind each one of the higher 
 stages and as its origin the man who finds himself in that stage 
 must as the self-consciousness of God's will, conceive an act of his 
 own free will by which he raised his being to this point of view. 
 The thinker who finds law as the uttermost truth sees that he has 
 done so by freely choosing to reflect upon the facts of life, and he 
 conceives that the content of his mind, as expressing the truth of 
 existence, in other words, his mental being, is the result of his 
 free-will in choosing to think. So the moral man sees that his 
 morality is conditioned by his own free choice to resist evil and to 
 do good. To the religious man is accorded the insight that all the 
 individual wills are merely points of self-consciousness of the One 
 Divine Will ; hence as distinct and sundered wills they do not 
 exist : their only reality is as manifold expressions of an all-per- 
 vading unity. The individual has no will and has all will ; he has 
 no unrelated independent power of his own, but he is grounded in 
 the total Will, and'Can draw its living energy to be and to do into 
 himself, and by it raise and expand himself to the uttermost bounds 
 of being. 
 
 Being, both the fact of being and the quality of being, must, for 
 the thinker, says Fichte, be the result of free will, for thought can 
 pause only in the uncaused. Being must be freedom choosing 
 that its activity and motive power be the minister of law. Being 
 is freedom consecrated to the service of law and made its bearer, 
 and holder, and objective support. Freedom alone is unproduc- 
 tive, it flits hither and thither and plays endlessly. Enduring result 
 comes only through law. Persistent being which shall remain as 
 nucleus for the addition of other lasting products must be a body- 
 ing forth of law. Each one of us is the divine Freedom, the vital 
 energy that lies at the heart of being. If this energy is left lawless, 
 if it is directed only by caprice, it hovers, flits, and disappears 
 
The Moral World. 55 
 
 forever as individual form. If it subject itself to law and thereby 
 become the vehicle and substance in which the permanent may 
 project itself, an everlasting life results, eternal being, which is the 
 interpenetration of freedom and law. If, then, Freedom love life, 
 and immortality, and enduring form, let it hasten to find Law, and 
 run and not be weary, and eagerly offer itself; let the search of 
 each moment be for the law of each moment, that, ever transfused 
 by law, no atom of its true being may be lost, but it may attain 
 the full and fair and free completion of the perfect life. 
 
 And above and beyond all, as the condition of effective living 
 and forceful action, we must wake, says Fichte, to the consciousness 
 of our true nature. We are God's power to do God's work. Each 
 has the Infinite upon which to draw. Each is wholly and solely to 
 blame in so far as he falls short of the highest, for his position in 
 the universe depends only upon his will : the power is his to swing 
 himself up to the highest that man can conceive ; he can do it, and 
 he ought to do it ; that he does not do it is his fault. But here 
 lies the incomprehensible mystery ; he sees only through a glass 
 darkly, and is not conscious of his power : he imagines himself 
 poor, and weak, and alone : he thinks himself the slave of nature, 
 and heredity, and habit : he does not know his divine birthright 
 of freedom, but crouches servilely before the phantoms whose 
 dominion would fade away forever if he should assert himself as 
 their creator and controller : he does not see his greatness. Sight 
 and light are what he needs, then will he have life and have it 
 more abundantly. 
 
 Fichte bids him open his eyes now, test his strength at this 
 moment. What task presents itself to him whose accomplishment 
 would seem noble if it did not seem impossible. Let him address 
 himself to it at once, regardless of its impossibility. He can at 
 least advance towards it ; and when he is close, his eyes will dis- 
 cern the rift in the rock through which the way shall be opened 
 to attainment. Do your task, bids Fichte. No new truth shall be 
 granted till the truth now seen is lived. Act your insight, and then 
 a higher insight shall be yours. Do the noble thing that now you 
 only dream, and it shall be revealed to you in what true nobility 
 consists. Be generous, and pure, and true, and the eternal beauty, 
 of which generosity, and purity, and truth are only forms, shall be 
 poured upon you, and you, with them, shall be a form in which 
 eternal beauty appears. Lead the strenuous life, dread inaction as 
 
56 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 death ; God is ceaseless activity, and you are God : only as the 
 divine energy bursts forth in action, is it in you : do the will, and 
 you shall know the doctrine. 
 
 But, again, sight and light are gifts. Only that man sees in 
 whom the One Life comes to self-consciousness, and its coming 
 cannot be compelled. Hence we have no right to condemn 
 another. He is to blame only from the point of view of one who 
 sees, and he is blind. Since his only existence, as an ego, is self- 
 consciousness, he has no real existence, for he sees none in him- 
 self : he is not yet life, but only opportunity for life, hence he can- 
 not sin : he does not exist in the spiritual kingdom of God, and 
 how can the non-existent disturb the kingdom, and confuse the 
 divine plan .■' Christ is the Lamb of God, who taketh away the 
 sin of the world since he reveals that he is the Life because he is 
 one with the Father, that only those live who like him are one 
 with God, and that, as the dead cannot sin, there is no sin. Sin 
 is a figment of faulty intelligence which does not understand the 
 truth of relations : it is not sin, but opportunity for holiness. 
 
 If there is no fundamental difference between Good and Evil, 
 but both are points of view of the observer, if the moral responsi- 
 bility of the individual is an idle dream, if what appears is the 
 perfect because it is God visible, wherein are Fichte's ethics unlike 
 Spinoza's 1 In several essential points : In the first place, with 
 Fichte, man is not the slave of the laws of nature, he is not a cal- 
 culable part of the world-formula, as with Spinoza ; but nature is 
 man's empty image, and is therefore dependent upon him for 
 existence, is shaped by his being. To the moralist who asks how 
 it is possible that within a given and finished nature he can inter- 
 fere with extra-natural volition and work out his own ends, Fichte 
 says, " Man is free and more than free, for he gives law to nature. 
 Nature is his objective self, its laws have their ground and origin 
 in the categories of his mind ; if his being were altered, nature would 
 be altered. Surely nature cannot control its own original. Instead 
 of man's being a part of nature, nature is a part of man." 
 
 Again, man is free and responsible as having his roots in that 
 supersensible Freedom whose act is the world. He is, in his true 
 being, behind the veil of appearance, the One and Only Will, and 
 in so far is free with its freedom and responsible with its responsi- 
 bility. This Will chooses eternally to become the world we see, 
 
The Moral World. 57 
 
 the world where evil is as strong and active as it is foul and de- 
 formed, where struggle is the law of life, where defeat and despair, 
 every passion and every pain, are always present : the Will wills 
 that the Law it loves shall conquer, that righteousness shall pre- 
 vail : hence it furnishes for conquest field and opponent, it becomes 
 itself a weaker antagonist that it may behold the triumph it longs 
 for, it appears as Evil that Holiness may overcome : and the evil 
 and the struggle are only appearance, for the sole Reality is Holy 
 Will. The world, which is man, is, as Will, free, and responsible 
 for itself ; and each individual, as member of the World, which is 
 Man, has share in its responsibility. 
 
 And, again, Fichte's doctrine does not in the least diminish the 
 necessity and the duty of individual effort, for it teaches that God 
 always works according to the laws of the ego, and the fundamental 
 law of the ego is seeing itself as free : hence, what God effects must 
 appear to be wrought by man's free will ; Man must ever seem to 
 himself to labor upon himself, and then God is working in him. 
 
 We have dwelt upon this subject of individual freedom because 
 Fichte's point of view in his different treatises varies, and hence his 
 statements seem conflicting. We meet constant assertions of 
 man's freedom, of his power to pass from a lower to a higher stage 
 of existence, and just as many declarations that he is absolutely 
 passive before the Will whose mere visibility he is. Both these! 
 statements are correct, for each is the expression of a different 
 aspect of man : as grounded in the primordial Will, man has all 
 power, as individual he is impotent ; as the energy of the Divine 
 Life he is almighty, as part, and therefore as negation of the whole, 
 he is helpless : man is always weakness in strength, and both his 
 weakness and his strength are infinite; his weakness appears when 
 he is separated from that Life of which he is branch ; his strength, 
 when he abides in the wholeness and might of that Life. 
 
 Here again we come upon a point where inadequate comprehen- 
 sion of Fichte leads the critic to accuse him of change of doctrine. 
 The impassioned fervor with which Fichte preaches the doctrine of 
 man's being in his true nature one with God, and without him 
 nothing, is called mysticism, and is described as a divergence from 
 his earlier teachings. If the critic would remember that the law 
 of reciprocal determination governs Fichte's universe he would 
 know that there is no truth for Fichte whose contradictory is not, 
 
58 Unity of Ficht^s Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 from some point of view, equally true, and that the final unity of 
 his system lies in a synthesis which embraces within itself all 
 possible contradictions. Fichte preaches to-day with deepest 
 ardor one gospel, and to-morrow seems to hold just as vehemently 
 its opposite, yet he is always true to himself ; his doctrine is one 
 and unchangeable, but it is so vast in its comprehensiveness that 
 it gathers within itself all partial views as true, yet inadequate, 
 expressions of the one all-inclusive truth. 
 
 Another question arises : if Fichte teaches that we are God ap- 
 pearing as the world of consciousness, what is the difference between 
 his doctrine and pantheism 1 All the difference in the world : 
 pantheism teaches that there is an extra-mentem God, that this 
 extra-mentem God is the only reality, that he is the world, and 
 that man is his accident; Fichte teaches that God is the activity of 
 thought seeing itself as God, that this subjective God has no reality 
 outside consciousness, that he appears as the world because reason 
 says that he does, that God, together with all the content of man's 
 mind, is the accident of the ego, for if the ego refuse to think, God 
 and mind-content will not appear. In Fichte's eyes the ego is the 
 only reality, the only truth, the only ultimate. Not pantheism but 
 egoism is the substance of Fichte's doctrine. For Fichte, God 
 does not exist through his own being independent of man, but he 
 exists through man's realization of him, because the ego sees that 
 He must stand in this relation to self if the ego is to be a true self, 
 /. e., a rationally consistent self-consciousness which sees its whole 
 being and the exact relations and dependencies of the different 
 parts of that being. Fichte's system may be reduced to three 
 terms : First, he bids the plain man tell him what God is, and 
 the plain man describes an infinite being who is the creator, up- 
 holder, and including circumference of all existence. Second, 
 Fichte then bids the plain man recognize that the God he has 
 described is a notion of God, and can be proved to have no other 
 existence than as notion ; if notion, it is held in the mind, therefore 
 less than the mind, therefore not infinite ; if projected by the mind, 
 it is the creature of the mind, not its creator. Here, then, we 
 have two contradictories : God and his claims as all-creative and all- 
 inclusive, and the mind and its claims as all-creative and all-inclu- 
 sive. These two contradictories are reconciled by Fichte's grand 
 synthesis, which declares that the mind in its fullest being is God 
 
The Moral World. 59 
 
 knowing himself as God : the mind in its farthest reaches is God 
 conscious of himself and declaring his divine nature with its infinite 
 creative power. The Mind is with Fichte the Alpha and the 
 Omega : at the beginning of philosophic inquiry we have only the 
 mind, and at its end only the mind, but in the course of the in- 
 quiry the Mind has declared itself to be God appearing. Hence 
 our ultimate truth is that the Absolute Ego is the visibiHty of God, 
 the Godhead made manifest. God is the Absolute Ego knowing 
 itself as it is known. The mind is the self-consciousness of God, 
 consciousness is always image, hence we are the image of God. 
 Since all existence is the existence of consciousness, and since 
 consciousness is always image, we may say that we are God, for 
 this assertion means that we are the image of God, as we have 
 said before. 
 
 The ego is always producing principle for Fichte, it brings forth' 
 its own being through reflection, differentiates this being, estab- \ 
 lishes the relations between its parts, and has_faiLhJn the^rsality \ 
 of its_productions. God is for Fichte pre-eminently a God of faith, 
 a God whom "reason deliberately and consciously frames for itself, 
 and deliberately and consciously has faith in as a reality. Fichte 
 says, " I cannot be I unless I am the appearance of God, for only a 
 God-being can adequately account for the facts of self : then I will 
 believe with all my heart, and with all my soul, and with all my 
 mind, and with all my strength, that I am God's appearance, and 
 I will act this belief." In so acting man produces as reality what "\ 
 he sees as ideal, and faith is creative : by doing every moment the \ 
 Godlike act he makes himself, in the same manner as Christ, very \ 
 God of very God. Fichte's doctrine, beyond that of any other, is 
 one of rational faith. A God of reason and a faith in reason are 
 Fichte's creed, not a God of whom reason is an accident. Reason 
 believes in itself with such intensity that its faith makes its con- 
 clusions realities. 
 
 Fichte's doctrine is as far removed from mysticism as from 
 Pantheism, and for the same reason. Mysticism, like Pantheism, 
 teaches absorption in another: we yield ourselves to an extra- 
 mentem God, who has an independent existence of his own. 
 Fichte's God is thought conscious of its own nature and attributes, 
 is mind in its largest aspect, is the greater self, in whom the 
 lesser selves live and move and have their being. 
 
 The possibility that at this stage of the argument there can arise 
 
6o Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 the question, " What is the difference between Fichte's doctrine and 
 pantheism ? " proves that our monotonous warning has not been 
 given too often. We must remember that every conclusion reached 
 is only a logical conclusion, therefore a part of the mind of the 
 thinker, not an external reality. Even when we prove that nothing 
 but God exists, we must not forget that the proof and its God are 
 concepts of mind. In studying Fichte we find ourselves doing 
 thousands of times what the world has done thousands of years, — 
 we forget the ego: we look upon its products as independent 
 realities : we apply the category of actuality beyond its legitimate 
 sphere and exalt its creation into its creator. When God is all in 
 all for us it is because the ego convinces itself that God is all in all. 
 The ego, its freedom, its activity, its faith, is the ultimate of 
 ultimates. " There is nothing beyond the ego and the ego is 
 God " is Fichte's creed. Fichte's doctrine is an Egoism which 
 faith turns into a Pantheism. Reason and faith, faith in reason, is 
 the heart of Fichte's teaching. 
 
 What we have said about the difference between the Wissen- 
 schaftslehre and pantheism may be summarized by saying that 
 Fichte's philosophy is the philosophy of consciousness as such. 
 Pantheism rests in its own product without knowing that it is only 
 product. Fichte sees always self behind that which the self ad- 
 vances as ultimate truth. Hence Fichte's philosophy is just twice 
 \ as comprehensive as pantheism. Pantheism pauses at law as an 
 \ ultimate, for though, like Duns Scotus, the pantheist may conceive 
 a God in whom indeterminateness of will is an essential, he does 
 so in obedience to the laws which govern his activity in thinking; 
 and since he rests in the result of law he does not pass beyond law. 
 J Fichte, in seeing always the free activity of the thinker in choosing 
 I to work out results in obedience to law, finds as ultimate, an in- 
 separable union of freedom and law. Fichte's doctrine has all of 
 pantheism for its one side, but correlates this side with another, 
 and the union of the two produces a whole with elements found in 
 neither of the parts. 
 
 The vital principle of Fichteanism, as the philosophy of con- 
 sciousness, its first and last and central truth, is reflection. He 
 who misses this misses everything, and can never grasp the essence 
 of Fichte's doctrine. Fichte conceives that the fundamental char- 
 acteristic of every fact of our world, whether material phenomenon 
 
The Moral World. 6i 
 
 or logical conclusion, is that it is "reflexible," i. e., that after being 
 perceived it permits us to reflect upon the act of perception and to 
 see behind the percept the ego as the cause of its appearing in 
 consciousness. This fact of " reflexibility," so long ignored by- 
 philosophy, Fichte takes for his corner-stone, and all that he 
 builds rests upon it as foundation. No result is final till supple- 
 mented by the comment " I, the ego, thought thus." At every step 
 Fichte demands from the ego the reflection upon self in its imme- 
 diately preceding activity, and the recognition that what has just 
 been perceived, whether world, or law, or God, |s_ a seeing of self 
 fl£_such__Broduct, a_seeing of a content of the mind aTlT^ven 
 reality. The word " as " is the key of his system, and expresses 
 the eternal diremption and eternal identification of existence : it 
 is the focus of the law of self-consciousness : that which is seen is i 
 seen as if it were reality or objective truth, or extra-nientem ia.ct,j 
 or what-not, and that which is beyond the " as if it were " we can! 
 never seize or see. The deepest analysis can never penetrate be-; 
 yond the image-form : we have just said that all seeing is a seeing 
 of self as such, because it is a seeing of a mind-content; but even; 
 the self is not seen, for a second analysis shows us that that which i 
 is seen is seen as if it were self " Die Erscheinung erscheint sich ; 
 als sich erscheinend." The seer is never seized : the reality of self 
 is just as inconceivable and elusive as the reality of God. Image 
 and image of image are all we can find : we conceive a God as 
 Origin, Uncaused Cause, then we see that this God, as notion of 
 the mind, is an image that self holds within its circumference, 
 and therefore a part of self; but next we are forced to recognize 
 that the mind with the image of God embraced within itself 
 is not even the real self, for the real self has just escaped, and 
 mounted above it to view it ; the mind with its content is only 
 seen as if it were self; but again the self that mounted to view 
 is not the real self, for that again has escaped to view the viewed 
 as if it were self, and so infinitely. Human consciousness can 
 never break through the image-form, for that is the law of its 
 existence : if it is not image, it is not, for it is the law that it shall 
 either not be or be an image unto itself. 
 
 The analysis of the diff"erent image-forms in which consciousness 
 sees, is the task of the Wissenschaftslehre. These forms are, in 
 the main, the physical world, the ego, law, God. Each is looked 
 upon by the plain man as a fact-in-itself, which has an existence 
 
62 Unity of Fickte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 independent of any consciousness of it ; and it is the work of Fichte 
 to show that each is only a perception by consciousness as world, 
 or ego, or law, or God. Fichte's system is an analysis of the law 
 of consciousness, of the forms which govern seeing, of the character 
 of ego-hood. His problem is, " How must a self-conscious being 
 iconceive existence .' " His solution is his philosophy in its various 
 /stages, the final conclusion of which is that the ego is forced to see 
 / existence as self, and self as a mind-content which discloses itself 
 to be God manifest in the flesh, God appearing as the world of 
 consciousness. 
 
 The fact that Fichte's philosophy is the philosophy of con- 
 sciousness and its image-forms, involves another difference between 
 it and Pantheism. Pantheism teaches that existence and God are 
 identical. Fichte teaches that existence is only " image," is in 
 itself utterly devoid of reality, mere emptiness, nullity, "gar 
 nichts ; " the word " is " means " image of being : " the expression 
 " we are God " means " we are the appearance, the image, the self- 
 consciousness of God, who is the only reality.'' And just here 
 a little reflection will show us Fichte's exact service in the evolu- 
 tion of religious thought. He has made possible to the thinker 
 rational faith in the reality of God, which Kant had destroyed. 
 The different stages of men's thought may be roughly summarized 
 as follows: Man is born into the first stage, where sensation is 
 inseparably mixed with pure thought and accompanied by the con- 
 viction of reality, /. e. the conviction that behind the sensation is a 
 Difzg an sich which has an existence of its own, independent of 
 man : whatever appears as sensation is instinctively and with 
 absolute certainty pronounced to be real; for the plain man 
 reality means sense-perception. 
 
 The second stage man has developed by thinking ; it is a region 
 of pure thought, the notion of God. In the devout man the con- 
 viction of reality adds itself to this notion, and he believes in a 
 real God who is a Ding an sich, and exists through himself, inde- 
 pendent of man. 
 
 The third stage was evolved by Kant, who pointed out that 
 " reality " is a category of the mind, that it is legitimately applied 
 to the sense-world and nowhere else: only that which is per- 
 ceived by the senses can, according to Kant, be affirmed to have 
 a Ding an sich behind it, and, therefore, to have real existence. 
 That there is such a Ding an sich behind God, we can never 
 
The Moral World. 63 
 
 know, for his existence is merely a logical conclusion: we can 
 only postulate his real being, and act as if our postulate were fact. 
 Kant's position is, then, that the circumference of consciousness 
 is divided into two spheres, — one of sense, one of pure thought : 
 behind the sense-sphere is a Ding an sick, therefore this sphere 
 is real ; behind the pure thought of God we can never know that 
 there is a Ding an sich, but we must act as if there were, — we 
 must have a faith without reason. 
 
 The fourth stage is developed by Fichte. Fichte says with 
 Kant that the circumference of consciousness is divided into two 
 spheres, — one of sense, one of pure thought, — but there is no Ding 
 an sich behind either. " Reality " is only a concept of the mind, and 
 nothing more. For the natural man the sense-world is merely a 
 certain form of consciousness plus the concept of reality, and God 
 is a certain form of consciousness minus the concept of reality. 
 But it is the duty of the natural man to raise himself to a different 
 apprehension of those two spheres through the use of reason : he 
 should examine their relation in the light of reason, and he will 
 discover that God must be the cause of the sense-world and the 
 sense-world his image; if this is so,_Gqd roust b_e_^ the reality, the 
 true being, and the sense-world without him an empty dream ; man 
 should have full faith in this decision of reason, and transfer, in 
 obedience to it, the concept of reality from the sense-world, where 
 he finds it at birth, to the realm of pure thought, or God ; this 
 transference marks for him a second birth, for the casting of reality 
 upon a sphere of thought is what " birth " means ; then he should 
 dwell in the realm of reality, or God, with abiding faith in the 
 judgment of reason, that it is the sole reality, the only true being, 
 and that all else has image-existence ; he should formulate by 
 reason the fitting relation in which this image-existence, or sense- 
 world, should stand to the reality, God, and then proceed to put it 
 in this relation : every thought, every act of life, should be gov- 
 erned by faith in reason. 
 
 The steps by which Fichte reaches a rational faith in God we 
 have formulated as four: (i) reason says there is no Ding an 
 sich; (2) "reaHty" is a concept which the natural man attaches 
 to the sense-world ; (3) but reason shows us that the cause of the 
 sense-world is God; (4) hence man should sever the concept 
 " reality " from the sense-world, and attach it to God. Fichte, then, 
 makes possible to the thinker the belief in the reality of God 
 
64 Unity of Fichtes Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 which the devout man has ; but it is a belief illumined by under- 
 standing, and one which can give a reason for itself. 
 
 (U) The Form of the Moral Law. 
 
 The second problem that meets us in Fichte's ethical system is 
 the form of the moral law as given to humanity. Is it the empty, 
 categorical imperative " Obey law for the sake of law " .■" No. 
 The moral law is a command to make visible God. God is Free- 
 dom interpenetrated by law, and is therefore as manifold in the 
 involutions of his nature as the world-content; as fully specified in 
 every particular as is the empirical world, for the empirical world 
 is the empty form of his image: this infinitely complex and highly 
 differentiated nature the world of consciousness is commanded to 
 make manifest. But consciousness exists only in iinite individuals, 
 and finiteness cannot receive the command in its wholeness: hence 
 the law cannot appear as the revelation of a definite ideal which 
 is to be realized by men upon earth, for no human mind can con- 
 tain it ; it appears primarily in its formal relation to the individual, 
 as addressing an eternal "ought" to his will in regard to some 
 definite act to be performed. Only because of the limitations of 
 man does it appear in this partial form : in its reality it is a com- 
 mand addressed to humanity to work out upon earth a concrete task 
 whose parts and relations are given by superactual law: the empty 
 formula "Will what you ought because you ought" is the barest 
 and most general expression of the relation of man to a specific 
 task; and even this general formula, we shall see in the discussion 
 that immediately follows, is capable of more exact determination. 
 
 if) Whence the Moral Law derives its Authority. 
 
 A problem that presents difficulties in other ethical systems 
 is the ground of moral obligation. Why should I do right .^ If I 
 do right for the result thereby gained, I am not doing right, I am 
 making a commercial venture. I do right only when I do the rio-ht 
 act for the sake of right. But why do right for the sake of right ? 
 What is there in the nature of " right" that authorizes it to subject 
 me to itself.? Why have not my natural desires an equally valid 
 claim to obedience? If the moralist tells me that the command 
 of duty has authority because it is the expression of the will of 
 God, I ask why my will should yield to God's will } As mere will 
 and whim, one is as good as the other. 
 
The Moral World. 65 
 
 We have already indicated Fichte's answer; but we repeat it 
 because it is here approached from a different side, and because 
 the question is asked again and again. 
 
 Doing right for the sake of right is finding fuller and more 
 perfect being. Right is in itself result, and the highest result that 
 existence can yield. The Wissenschaftslehre unites the utilitarian 
 and the transcendental view in teaching that morality is being and 
 being morality. 
 
 Let us see. Suppose a man in the midst of a moral struggle. 
 He holds in his mind two mental pictures : one of self yielding 
 to desire and tasting the pleasure of its gratification ; one of self 
 resisting desire and doing right for right's sake. Whichever pic- 
 ture he make actual, he is, according to Fichte, a manifestation of 
 God's will. Why, then, if he had the power to choose, should he 
 prefer the second actuality to the first .■' For the same reason that 
 would lead him to choose to be wise and rich and powerful, if he 
 could, — because thereby he would find fuller being: the higher 
 choice is the natural urge of being toward the fulfilment of itself, 
 towards its own complete expression. If he yield to desire, he is 
 the primary and incomplete manifestation of the Divine Will, that 
 which is only a means to a higher revelation ; if he does right, he 
 includes within himself the primary stage, or sense-world, as the 
 necessary condition of right action, and adds to it the second stage 
 of being, the moral world ; from mere means he becomes accom- 
 plished end, the actual appearance of Holy Will as the moral deed. 
 In the moral choice, being completes itself, and reaches the perfec- 
 tion of which it is capable. 
 
 Suppose the man in the moral struggle put the question to him- 
 self in a slightly different form, — suppose he look upon the two 
 mental pictures as the sight of two wills, and ask why his natural 
 will should yield to the moral will. The answer is the same : 
 natural will is only rudimentary will, partial will, the first step in 
 the appearance of will ; moral will is the fully developed will in 
 that perfection which includes natural desire as its member and 
 means : it is fitting that the means should minister to its only end, 
 — yield obedience to it. 
 
 But we must beware of considering these two mental pictures 
 as the sight of two wills. If we do so, we wholly misapprehend 
 Fichte's theory of will and his theory of sight. Of his theory of 
 will we have already said enough : there is only one will, as there 
 
 9 
 
66 Unity of Fichtes Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 is only one physical world, one mind, one humanity ; and indi- 
 viduals are merely points of sight of this one will, world, mind, 
 humanity: the organism sees itself with myriad eyes. Fichte's 
 theory of sight is that sight is always the perception of action and 
 not of a Ding an sick, — not of inert, quiescent being : the sight of 
 the physical world is the sight of the act of perceiving such world, 
 the sight of the truths of thought is the sight of thinking those 
 truths, the sight of the Holy Will is the sight of the actual willing 
 of the holy deed. We do not see the higher will unless we see its 
 act of willing. If we fancy that we see it, and that we choose to 
 disregard it, we see, not it, but its empty image. Will is action ; 
 it is not a Ding an sick upon which we can gaze as it lies quiescent : 
 only in the act do we see the will. Our concept of the noble deed 
 which the will might do in us, but does not, is not a view of the 
 will itself, it is only an empty picture of it. We see it face to face 
 in the deed that we do, and by the deed we know what degree of 
 sight is vouchsafed to us. 
 
 Sight is action. With equal truth, action is only sight. The 
 individual never acts, but he sees the whole act in him as nature, 
 as mind, as will, and this whole with its activity he can never seize. 
 At most he gets the image of that which has just fled : the image 
 of action, not action itself, is all that is granted to man. 
 
 What we have said above is tantamount to saying that the 
 moral law is nothing more than the law which reason itself imposes 
 upon the will, or that in man's own nature as a rational being 
 lies the authority of the " ought." We have said that the end of 
 right action is right action, which is fuller being; fuller being is 
 more complete realization of law, for being is, only as it is the con- 
 crete cases in which law manifests itself ; realized law is realized 
 reason, hence the end of morality is obedience to reason as the 
 truth of man's nature. No other result could be reached by 
 Fichte : he set out to find the explanation of the universe through 
 reasoning, and reason finds only herself wherever she turns ; she is 
 always her own end and authority, her own supreme judge : for 
 him who reasons, reason must be the end of all activity, whether of 
 
 I God or man. Fichte frames the sort of God that reason demands ; 
 
 \Holy Will is the ultimate which reason is forced to find in seek- 
 'ing its own origin ; hence obedience to Holy Will, or doing right 
 for the sake of right, is obedience to reason : the rationality of 
 God's will, or the moral law, is its authority. Indeed, " authority " 
 
The Moral World. 67 
 
 itself is a product of reason, a notion that a rational being has ; to 
 ask the authority of the moral law is to ask the reason of rationality. 
 
 {d) Morality, as End of Action in God and Man, identical with 
 Self-Consciousness as End. 
 
 The charge of lack in unity in Fichte's system is sometimes 
 supported by the statement that in his earlier works he makes 
 self-consciousness, knowledge, the end of the Absolute Ego, and 
 the final cause of the appearance of the finite world ; while in his 
 later period the Absolute Ego is transformed into Holy Will, whose 
 end is law for the sake of law, or morality. 
 
 Such criticism betokens shallow thought. Consciousness and 
 morality are identical with Fichte, as the reader of this paper must 
 have long since seen. The consciousness of any object is depend- 
 ent upon the unswerving obedience of the object to the laws of 
 its own nature, or, since the object is, according to Fichte, will- 
 stuff obeying law for the sake of law, upon the morality of the 
 object. How is any knowledge possible .? Take the simplest ex- 
 ample : how is it possible for me to be conscious that A is A .■' 
 Only because A is true from moment to moment to the laws of 
 A. If it swerved, it would no longer be A, and my consciousness 
 of it would be impossible. We know, only because there is no 
 variation or shadow of turning in the world of consciousness, but 
 continuity of law everywhere. The world is grandly moral ; hence 
 it is a world of consciousness, of knowledge. Morality is knowl- 
 edge, and not-morality is not-knowledge in a deeper sense than 
 Socrates thought it, for not-morality is not-being. In the Abso- 
 lute Ego of the Grundlage who seeks self-consciousness through a 
 finite world, in the God of the later works whose aim is law for 
 the sake of law, and in the holy man whose end is morality, we 
 have the same final cause directing activity ; and this final cause 
 may be expressed as self-consciousness, or morality, or the develop- 
 ment of being, or the appearing of God as existence, for all these 
 phases are identical in meaning. 
 
 [e) Why the Moral Will of Humanity is the Image of God. 
 
 One final problem remains for our solution. It may be stated as 
 follows: Consciousness is the appearance of Holy Will; Holy 
 Will is one and indivisible ; but we have shown that there is no 
 universal consciousness including all individuals in its one person- 
 
68 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 ality ; and, further, in the good man we have spoken only of suc- 
 cessive acts of holy choice : how can this broken, disintegrated, 
 multitudinous consciousness of humanity be looked upon as the 
 likeness of the one God? 
 
 Let us attack the question from the side of the individual first, 
 and see if it is possible to unify the will of the good man. His 
 will can become one and indivisible if by a supreme act he resolve 
 once for all to obey without hesitation the moral law in whatever 
 form it may appear in the world of perception. Then and only 
 then is his will a part of the eternal will of God. By this act he 
 creates his true being, the visibility of Holy Will as image of God. 
 Self has been annihilated, and he is a passive beholder of the life 
 of God. For him there is now no law, for he has become law ; his 
 will has freely transformed itself into constancy of relation, which 
 is the essence of law. Special commands to do this and that 
 cannot be addressed to him, for the natural development of him- 
 self, as Holy Will, embraces and determines all these special 
 cases. 
 
 Such an I has personal immortality. It does not believe, or 
 hope, or expect it, but has it immediately, at every moment ; for its 
 personality is the will of God seeing itself unfold itself in all eter- 
 nity. Eternal life is qualitative rather than quantitative. 
 
 Our categorical imperative has now revealed itself in a more 
 specific form : it stands at present as " See thyself with eternal, 
 unchangeable will to do duty for duty's sake." But this formula is 
 insufficient, for, instead of that unity which alone can image God, 
 the world presents at this stage of the argument a multiplicity of 
 good men, each singly, willing duty. That the one image of the 
 one God may be evolved, good men must transform themselves into 
 one Good Will : every moral man must will the morality of all. 
 If he does so, since morality is willing duty because it is dut)', all 
 wills will be formally alike and constitute but one will. But this 
 one will will have for its subject a composite man ; it will be an 
 organic unity each part of which is the centre of the whole and 
 necessary to the whole. Henceforth the true I will be recognized 
 as the community, and the supreme characteristic by which the 
 moral man will be distinguished is that he lives in the whole. 
 The natural man looks upon himself as standing alone, as the 
 single soul of his world-system ; and such a man is a bit of nature, 
 as are stocks and stones. He attains real being only as part of the 
 
The Moral World. 69 
 
 whole, and as subjecting himself to the order of the whole, for 
 only the whole has reality as image of God. We see this truth 
 exemplified in science. Every scientific insight acknowledges 
 reason to be one and consistent with itself, and claims a being of 
 its own only so far as it is a part of this universal reason. Science 
 has no individuality : it lifts isolated facts above their isolation 
 into the universality of law. So the true I lifts each out of the 
 petty, personal self into the One Man whose manifold features 
 are men, and henceforth action and causality in each have for their 
 aim to make manifest his unity in each of his members : the 
 same spirit must be seen in all, a spirit developed to the highest 
 degree that the given point of time allows : every one must strive 
 to make his knowledge, his insight, his skill, the possession of all, 
 and to gain for himself every excellence that his neighbor may 
 have. When all are indeed one, then we may hope a new revela- 
 tion of God. Our problem has now found a solution : conscious- 
 ness sees itself as image of God in seeing itself freely forming 
 itself into one, eternal, organic. Moral Will. 
 
 It follows that " ought '' is addressed to the community : there 
 is no individual duty as such ; there is only the duty of the whole, 
 of the community. This duty is the bringing forth of a given 
 world-order which we cannot conceive a priori, because it reveals 
 itself immediately. The revelation comes to the individual, since 
 there is no universal consciousness ; his first task is to make 
 known his view to all and to learn what insight has been granted 
 to them, that he and they may recognize the common truth and 
 throw away the personal illusion. The special, spiritual individu- 
 ality of each is the medium through which the common truth is 
 transmitted ; and the blending of all these individualities into one 
 in the shape which the common truth finally assumes, is the indi- 
 viduality of the community. 
 
 The task, then, of the present world is to shape the one com- 
 posite man to whom, in future existence, will be given the totality 
 of the image of God as world-creative concept. Here he must be 
 formed into the instrument that can realize it ; hence each member 
 of the multiform man must work upon himself and upon others, 
 for, in doing the one, he does the other. Reciprocity is the only 
 truth, since community is the only being. 
 
 Here, again, we see how necessary to the realization of God's 
 image is the immortality of every good man ; each is a member of 
 
-JO Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 the one organic man, who cannot set about his task maimed and 
 imperfect. Not one good will can perish, for it is a component 
 part of the good will of God. 
 
 We are now prepared to answer the question, What is the 
 moral significance of a multiplicity of egos .'' Its significance is 
 that it affords to consciousness an opportunity for seeing itself 
 freely organizing that unity of Holy Will which is the image of 
 God. God /ri?^/)/ subjects himself to law, thereby giving to him- 
 self a nature which appears as infinite diversity in unity ; this free- 
 dom of Holy Will is to be made visible, and it is visible in that 
 community of men who voluntarily submit themselves to a law 
 whereby they become one. If consciousness were given as a unity, 
 it could not see its own freedom in bringing forth unity ; hence it 
 is given as a multiplicity of egos, and this multiplicity is to weld 
 itself into one organic will. 
 
 The one organic Holy Will of humanity is the visibility of the 
 Absolute Ego in its lofty unity, which transcends all multiplicity. 
 The ego in its true nature is One, One as God ; the oneness wills 
 its appearance as multiplicity, and this multiplicity, that it may 
 image God, freely rises again to oneness in the Moral Will of the 
 world : God, by free will, differentiates himself, through law, into 
 many, and the many, by free will, unite themselves, through law, 
 into One. Through the Moral Will man returns into the truth of 
 his own nature; the Abiding, the Unchangeable, the Eternal, in 
 the phantasmagoria of fleeting forms, is the Good Will. 
 
 " Ob alles in ewigem Wechsel kreist, 
 Es beharret im Wechsel ein ruhiger Geist." 
 
 (_/") Universality and Individuality, 
 
 Since, as there is no collective consciousness, the revelation of 
 the concrete shape of the image of God comes only to the indi- 
 vidual, and since the individual is, of necessity, partial and incom- 
 plete, the question of the relation of the individual view to the 
 truth arises. The truth is the one revelation seen through an 
 infinite number of individuals, each individuality yielding some 
 phase of the whole, which but for it would not appear, each in- 
 dividuality being some part of the truth, for there is nothing but 
 individuality. 
 
 When all these images are comprehended by one another, their 
 unity and specific difference out of one principle is clear, and the 
 
The Moral World. 71 
 
 common image reflected in all is the true image. Hence the con- 
 crete image of God may be described as that soul which differen- 
 tiates itself into a closed circle of souls, each one of which is the 
 centre of the whole and potentially the whole ; or, as the world of 
 that self whose essence it is to be potentially an expression of the 
 whole truth from every point of view. 
 
 That the image seen by each may be comprehended by all, 
 each must live it ; thereby it becomes objective truth. 
 
 We may form for ourselves a sensuous image of this closed 
 circle, which, though it will be as far from the truth as image must 
 always be from the reality it images, yet may help us approach 
 Fichte's conception. Imagine a glass globe whose circumference 
 is filled with millions of eyes all looking inward. All the eyes see 
 the same content, though each from its own special point ; and into 
 the view of each eye the view of the others is received, though from 
 its own particular angle. Now suppose that the substance of the 
 globe, instead of glass, is merely the sight projected from each eye, 
 that without the eyes and their sight nothing whatever of the globe 
 would exist. We then have in the globe a unity of blended indi- 
 vidualities where the individualities may be looked upon as essen- 
 tial, for without them there is nothing ; individuality is all that 
 there is, and the ultimate reality is a blending of all individualities. 
 So in the world of truth there is no truth except as seen by indi- 
 viduals, and the totality of all the views of all the individuals is the 
 totality of truth. The substance of the individual mind, or its free 
 activity shaped by the laws of thought, is truth, — truth from one 
 point of view ; and the union of all minds in all minds gives us 
 ultimate-truth-. 
 
 The ideal globe, as God's mind, exists in perfect development. 
 Each eye does see the whole truth, and falls in no wise short of its 
 potential vision : each individual is all that he can be, or the whole 
 with the coloring, and accent, and relation of parts given by his 
 temperament : he is the sum-total with a new arrangement, a 
 new tint and tone. Again, all the fully developed individuals, as 
 they blend with each other, give to each point of the whole full 
 and complete expression ; for if it is subordinated in one, it is em- 
 phasized in another : no atom of God's truth suffers warping through 
 the necessarily partial expression of individuality : no accent of the 
 Holy Ghost is lost. Rather does each point of the whole find 
 myriad-voiced utterance, whereby its empty unity as point becomes 
 
72 Unity of Fichie's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 the richly complex unity of a harmony, its singleness as point finds 
 its infinite divisibility in the individuals in whom it exists. The 
 individual attains his perfect stature through gathering all truth 
 within himself, and the truth attains adequate expression through 
 manifesting itself in all individuals. The individuals enclose the 
 whole, and the whole exists only in the multiplicity of individuals. 
 
 The task of man is to give real content to this ideal, and the 
 task must be worked out by individuals. It has for each a twofold 
 aspect: first, he must strive to be the perfectly developed point of 
 view of the one truth, i. e., he must see all the truth and only truth. 
 That he may see only truth, he must discard the whimsical and 
 capricious, the merely personal element, and identify himself with 
 the mind of the Absolute Ego as manifested in humanity : he 
 must make its laws his laws, and become universal. In so becom- 
 ing he seeks the universal in others, and values men as they subject 
 themselves to law and embody principle. Universality, identity, 
 the common element, the one truth, is his quest. That he may see 
 all truth he must strive to gather within himself all knowledge and 
 all wisdom, for he is ideally and potentially the whole: he must 
 know all points of view, those of others as well as his own, see 
 the various aspects truth has assumed in the various ages and 
 peoples, the ideals and realizations of the epochs, the form which 
 it takes in the mind of his friend and of his enemy : he must grasp 
 truth in its myriad expressions, knowing that the manifoldness of 
 its expression is the essential fulness of its nature and the condi- 
 tion of its existence. Duty on this side is not done till he has pro- 
 jected self along all the lines of being, and gathered them into 
 one rational whole. Self-development through exhaustive knowl- 
 edge of the truth is the only means by which his ideal being can 
 be realized. 
 
 But, secondly, the universal, when found, he must transmit to 
 others, colored with his own individuality ; for his temperamental 
 view of the universal is his permanent contribution to truth, and 
 truth is not complete without it. To discover his own view in its 
 purity is pre-eminently the task of his life, since he exists for no 
 other purpose than to set forth this view. Its discovery requires 
 the full exercise of all his powers. He must hold up to his inner 
 self the world-view which he has gained through study and obser- 
 vation, question rigorously this inner self as to the righteousness 
 of the world-view, listen greatly for its answer, and allow it no rest 
 
The Moral World. 73 
 
 till the answer is given. The answer is the view which the indi- 
 vidual takes of the universal, and is his part in the manifestation 
 of the whole truth ; for the inner self, in its convictions and judg- 
 ments and in the conduct consistent with them, is the realization 
 of the ideal, and the real being of the individual who is one view of 
 God's being by Himself. The unfolding and bringing forth to 
 light of this inner self in its judgments upon the universal is the 
 temperamental utterance by each of his view of the truth, and that 
 necessary part of the whole truth which it is his function to supply. 
 Any other utterance by the individual than that of the inner self 
 is an imaginary one, as empty as air, which has no part in the 
 eternal whole. The judgments of the inner self are immediate, 
 and are given only to that individual whose task it is to make them 
 manifest : they appear to him as commands of duty, and another 
 cannot declare them for him : his own conviction as to right and 
 wrong within the limits of law, his own knowledge as to what uni- 
 versally possible deed he ought to do and what withhold from doing, 
 must be his ultimate guide ; and conduct shaped by obedience to 
 the inner voice is the realization of his ideal life hid in God. 
 
 It behooves us, then, to cherish our individuality as that which 
 is sacred within us. The condition of individuality, we have seen, 
 is rationality, for the individual is the not-divided : he is not sun- 
 dered from the common mind of humanity, but is only a new 
 coloring thrown upon the universality of law, or rather he is the 
 manifestation of reason in individual form. Hence the inner self 
 will always appear as a will whose maxim might become universal 
 law, and any inward movement that cannot translate itself into 
 public, universal terms does not come from the inner self. But 
 the completion of individuality is self-trust, — trust in the inner 
 self who bids what content to put within the empty form of univer- 
 sal law, and thereby reveals to each his meaning and his place in 
 the eternal thought, and the sole condition upon which he may 
 find life. 
 
 (^g) The Many and the One. 
 
 In the conception of Fichte of the ultimate nature of existence 
 as a closed circle of an infinite number of points of view, we have 
 his solution of the problem of the One and the Many, which is as 
 old as thought. The problem, when most baldly stated, asks 
 whether the reality behind phenomena is the One or the Many. 
 
74 Unity of Fickie's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 Fichte tells us that this reality exists only in thought, that 
 thought in apprehending it must obey its own laws ; and there- 
 fore, since the fundamental law of thought is the law of reciprocal 
 determination, or the establishment of whatever is through the 
 inseparable presence of its opposite, the ultimate reality can be 
 apprehended as the One only by being at the same time appre- 
 hended as the Many, and as the Many only by the being grasped as 
 the One. The " ultimate reality " is merely a mental concept, 
 which, like every concept, is a double, a holding together of two 
 opposites and a hovering between them : it is One only through 
 being at the same time Many, and Many only through being One. 
 To talk of its being either alone is an evident absurdity, since 
 " alone '' cannot be conceived alone : " alone " is one half of a 
 mental concept which is inseparably united with its other half, 
 "together," through whose negation it obtains meaning. From 
 the point of view of consciousness, also, either division is absurd : 
 suppose you- decide that the ultimate reality is the Many, your 
 mind, as the One, enfolds it and reduces it to unity ; suppose you 
 decide that it is the One, your mind as the other, making with it a 
 plurality, confronts it ; suppose you decide that it is the One Abso- 
 lute Ego beholding itself, then you have in it as ego the eternal 
 diremption into Subject and Object which produces plurality. 
 The Many and the One are inseparable aspects of an identity, and 
 the necessary conditions each of the other; and when the ego in its 
 furthest reach of thought finds itself as the encircling orb of all 
 being, hence as the ultimate reality, it must find itself as the Many 
 in One and the One in Many. Again, since the ego finds self as 
 the Many, and since self is consciousness of self, the Many must 
 also be self-conscious, conscious of its manifold as a self as is the 
 , encircling One who finds self the orb of being. Hence if thought 
 exist, thought must discover, as ultimate reality, spirit, whose 
 ■ essence and sum-total and only existence is an infinite number of 
 ; points of view of a self, while the self has no other atom, or ele- 
 ment, or essence, than the organic unity of the different points of 
 view, its oneness being only a oneness of a manifold, and the mani- 
 foldness being the manifoldness of aspect of a unity. 
 
 We have seen that when the moral man wills the morality of all, 
 he wills a closed system of egos that shall image the unity of 
 God. But the system cannot be closed till all its members have 
 appeared. Therefore this world, in which new individuals are con- 
 
The Moral World. 7S 
 
 stantly coming forth, must pass away, and another with fixed num- 
 ber — the race completed in its unity — must take its place : then 
 it will begin its true task, the realization of the specific image of 
 God which will fully appear to it. Hence the present world is 
 only one of the lower degrees of visibility and the condition of the 
 possibility of the true world-in-itself. Here we have the form of 
 the image given us, — the willing of the eternal morality of all ; 
 hereafter the qualitative content of the image in its infinitely rich 
 complexity will be vouchsafed, and we shall set about its realiza- 
 tion. But the Infinite cannot be realized in the finite terms of 
 space and time ; hence our task is an endless one, requiring an 
 infinite progress of worlds. To the moral man, therefore, appears 
 world above world rising in endless series. 
 
 But we must guard against thinking of the series of worlds with 
 their different tasks, in which the good man spends an immortal 
 life, as a Dmg an sick. Such time-series is a necessary form of 
 consciousness if we follow thought to its furthest limits, and nothing 
 more : when man speculates upon self he is forced to see self pass- 
 ing through a time-series, through such time-series, Fichte thinks, 
 as has been indicated, and his seeing is the only passing : it is the 
 task of the Wissenschaftslehre to describe the forms of conscious- 
 ness in all their aspects ; it is forced to describe them successively, 
 to set before us first one form and then another, and we are in con- 
 stant danger of thinking of the succession as an extra-mentem fact. 
 But we shall never know or experience more of this series of worlds 
 than we do at present : at every moment of existence we shall see 
 self in a present, with a past and a future ; for seeing, knowing, 
 involves time with its three terms. If we explore the past, thought 
 forms it into our past life, our parents and their ancestors, the 
 creation of the world, God ; if we explore the future, thought 
 shapes it as a series of worlds in which our perfected selves will 
 realize the ideal. But the extremes, the creation and the realized 
 perfection, find their only existence in the now, as its implications 
 and conditions. What we have is existence. The having of any 
 of it involves the having of the whole ; but existence appears in 
 time-forms, as the possessed and the not-possessed, or the present 
 with the past and the future. The law of reciprocal determination 
 rules here as everywhere. Existence means the immutable seeing! 
 of the immutable as the mutable, the perception of eternity as; 
 time, the apprehension of the One and Unchangeable as sequence :l 
 
•jS Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 existence means the conception of the Infinite as having a begin- 
 ning and an end, a creation and an attained goal of perfection : 
 wherever there is existence, there are these conceptions, and we 
 never were, and we never shall be, any nearer either than we are 
 now. They are merely the conditions and inseparable correlates 
 of a " now." 
 
 We have said that we are compelled to conceive self in terms 
 of time. Equally are we compelled to conceive self as the time- 
 less. Kant's very doctrine that the ego is forced to think in the 
 categories of time and space involves the thought of the timeless 
 and spaceless, which enters the forms of space and time. The law 
 of reciprocal determination will not let us conceive one without the 
 other. If we think of self as passing through a series of worlds, 
 we think of the self as the reality which passes, the Being that puts 
 on time and space as a garment, and hides himself in them. From 
 every conception, from every side of thought, we are driven to think 
 of the reality of man as the God in whose likeness he appears. 
 Man in time is only the image of God in eternity. The two are 
 thought-correlates which involve each other. 
 
 Thus, through the consciousness of time as form, we escape 
 from time : we get beyond it as a whole, and see it as the visibility 
 into which That Which Appears enters : we add the timeless to 
 our life, and may live in it if we will. We may feel at every 
 moment that we enter now, fresh from God, the world, to work in 
 it the Divine Will. We may wake every morning with the assur- 
 ance that we are just born and have all the possibilities of young 
 life before us. We are, if we will. The new birth and eternal 
 youth are found in the consciousness that time is put on out of 
 time, and that we may translate the putting-on into the time- 
 term " now " as appropriately as into the term " in the begin- 
 ning." We find ourselves in hard and fast surroundings which we 
 fancy our past life has fixed hopelessly upon us. But our past life 
 has no more fixed them than the life of our parents determined our 
 environment at the moment of natural birth. Instead of vainly 
 wishing that we could live our lives over again and avoid our mis- 
 takes, we may begin now to live them over. There is no past, 
 there is no future ; there is only existence, opportunity for the ex- 
 ercise of will. Now is the moment of creation if we choose, and 
 the realization of the Divine Ideal. 
 
The Moral World. •j'j 
 
 {Ji) Charges against Fichte. 
 
 We have now before us the general outlines of Fichte's system, 
 and this Totalblick carries with it the refutation of the popular 
 charges against Fichte which we mentioned at the beginning of 
 our paper. The world, for him, instead of being the capricious j 
 creation of the individual, is, in origin and construction, shaped.' 
 by unalterable law: every detail is a fixed "is " just as the plain 
 man sees it. Fichte neither doubts nor denies the categorical! 
 nature of fact : the smallest and most insignificant phenomenon is, j 
 and cannot but be, and every individual is forced to recognize it. i 
 Fichte's material world is just as obtrusive, self-assertive, and com- \ 
 pelling as that of the veriest materialist. How, then, does it differ [ 
 from the world of the materialist ">. In that it is a system of mental \ 
 images shaped by law, instead of being a Ding an sich which | 
 causes mental images : in that the being behind the appearance is , 
 concept and not extra-mentem reality, a product of the casual in- 
 stinct of man, and not an independent substance which exists in 
 itself whether mind perceives it or not. Fichte's physical world is 
 one absolute first thinking which appears in all individuals, thus 
 unifying them in the one absolute mind, giving validity to men's 
 thoughts, justifying their claim to know truth. Fichte's religious 
 world is just as real and just as omnipotent as that of the humblest 
 saint; it differs from that of the saint in that the God whom the 
 saint beholds from afar is enriched by the insight that the saint's 
 view of God is God beholding himself; God is an absolute second 
 thinking which must appear in all individuals willing to think, thus 
 unifying them in the one absolute being, giving reality, to their 
 image-life, justifying their right to exist in that they are the neces- 
 sary means for the complete expression of this being. 
 
 The charge of solipsism — i.e., that Fichte believes that only 
 Johann Gottlieb Fichte exists, and that other people are simply 
 ideas in his mind — is so manifestly absurd that it does not deserve 
 serious attempt at refutal. We have shown that the acme and sum- 
 mit of Fichte's theory — the organic moral will which is the imaging 
 by humanity of God as one who freely submits to law for the sake of 
 law — rests upon, as essential foundation, without which it is impos- 
 sible, the presence in the world of a multiplicity of individuals. 
 
 The third charge is that Fichte's doctrine lacks unity. The 
 general outline of the doctrine, which has been given above, shows 
 
78 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 an exceedingly complex whole, with many points of view, but always 
 a whole, an organic whole, every part of which involves every other 
 part. He who does not see the unity of Fichte's doctrine has 
 missed the very essence and soul of the doctrine, and his criticism 
 is valueless until further study reveals to him the underlying, all- 
 comprehensive thought which unites its many aspects as different 
 views of one and the same truth. 
 
 A more inteUigent criticism than the popular brings subtler 
 charges against Fichte. It says that the W.-L. cannot be the final 
 philosophy, for it fails to satisfy human needs in at least these 
 several directions : (i) it recognizes no value in human emotions ; 
 
 (2) it precludes the possibility of human help in vital matters ; 
 
 (3) it denies to God universal consciousness ; (4) it relieves the 
 individual of moral responsibility and shifts his sin upon God. 
 What is the force of these objections severally 1 
 
 We can best judge the value of emotions in Fichte's theory if 
 we reconsider briefly its view of the vocation of man. The voca- 
 tion of man is, it tells us, to give adequate expression to the Divine 
 Life that seeks in us consciousness of its own power and excellence. 
 Such an expression demands a double appearance within conscious- 
 ness, — an ideal appearance, and a realized appearance: 
 
 (i) The ideal appearance is shaped by reason : reason in 
 reflecting upon life sees it to be a network of relations ; these 
 relations it concludes to be a highly specified view of the law which 
 Freedom chooses from love of law; it seeks to discover the details 
 of this law by forming an ideal of the harmonious adjustment of all 
 relations. The formulation of this ideal tasks the utmost powers of 
 man, and is never completed : the ideal is always a-making, and 
 those races and individuals whose ethical discoveries have most 
 contributed to shape it we count as our greatest benefactors. Each 
 man is responsible for its further development : this responsibility 
 he discharges in part by working out and holding before himself 
 the highest possible ideal of his own life viewed as a recognition 
 and a fulfilment of all its relations. For the elaboration of this 
 ideal he needs the broadest thought, the keenest discrimination, 
 
The Moral World. 79 
 
 the nicest sense of values, for he is dealing with relations ; he must 
 seize the largest aspect of his life, its connections and reaches in 
 every direction ; within this compass he must distinguish between 
 the essential and the non-essential, and provide that opportunity 
 for the domination of the self by the essential which can be given 
 only by the rigorous subordination of the non-essential. In so 
 doing, he puts before himself a fair and harmonious picture of his 
 life, an ideal of the manner in which reason would shape his va- 
 rious relations ; by thus rationalizing the ideal of his own life, he 
 lends his powers to the development of the common ideal. 
 
 (2) But the appearance of the ideal in pure thought alone does 
 not give adequate expression to the life within us. The ideal must 
 be realized. This realization is effected through fidelity to those 
 relations which reason has shown to be the substance of our 
 existence. Noble living resolves itself into the recognition and 
 fulfilment of our essential relations, or into the choice of law for 
 the sake of law. 
 
 In such a theory of existence there is scant room for the emo- 
 tions : personal loves and hates it counts for nothing in the real 
 values of life : law for the sake of law is the only measure of worth 
 it knows. In its view the business of life is the harmonious ad- 
 justment of existence, the measuring of all co-existent relations 
 and the adjudging to each of its exact due, the dealing justice to 
 others' claims, the establishment of symmetry, the recognition of 
 the organic nature of life, and the constant solicitude that each 
 member of the organism shall receive due consideration. Fichte's 
 theory makes reason the guide of life and realized reason the result 
 of life : law is its ideal, and conduct controlled by law its reality. 
 
 Would the man who lived this theory lose anything of worth, 
 and would he not gain everything .? 
 
 He surely would gain himself, — his own perfect individuality ; 
 for individuality is the undivided whole of truth as viewed through 
 a given temperament : it is the sight of one's own life in its rela- 
 tion to the sum-total of life as grasped from one point of view : in 
 so far as we ignore relations, in so far do we cramp individuality : 
 the true self is the result of the interaction of the one, and the 
 whole ; it is a fatal mistake to think that it is found in tastes and 
 aptitudes alone, they are only one of its elements : the character 
 formed by the manner in which these tastes and aptitudes fulfil 
 the relations of life is the true nature and the completed expression 
 
8o Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 of each. That just this nature, just this individuality may be 
 evolved, the given temperament is placed in the given circum- 
 stances. Not for nothing does each find himself what he is and 
 where he is, but that through his temperament, in the fulfilment of 
 its relations, a special accent may be given to the truth, which 
 would reveal itself in him. The struggle is the true expression of 
 the man ; if he shuns it, he deserts himself. 
 
 The fear that the individuality may be lost through fidelity to 
 relations seems very idle when we consider that individuality is the 
 only means of expression which the Infinite chooses, and in order 
 that its infiniteness may utter itself fully, the complete individual- 
 ization of the members of its organic whole is necessary. Individ- 
 uality is of priceless worth to the heart of being ; it is its first and 
 last and supreme care, and the temporal means by which it brings 
 it about is the pressure of essential relations upon infinitely varied 
 temperaments. The command and the promise to each is, " Per- 
 form your functions in the Whole, and your individuality shall com- 
 plete itself." Each may safely leave to the Unseen Power the 
 care of his development, while he fixes his eye singly upon the 
 relations to which he should be faithful. The Organism takes care 
 of the individuality of its members, for its own richness of life 
 depends upon their specification. 
 
 He who lives this theory gains in intensity of emotion what he 
 may lose in variety. When he has recognized within himself the 
 Divine Power, and knows that the self has been thrown forth by 
 it through love, that in it it may behold its own excellence, and 
 live, and utter itself, the supreme love of life is aroused, and, like 
 a consuming fire, burns away all meaner passions : to live in con- 
 stant consciousness of the Power, to respond to its slightest move- 
 ment, to find fair and noble thought and deed in which it may fitly 
 express itself becomes his absorbing desire; duty is done with 
 passion, for doing duty is the expression of oneness with the Power 
 with whom he wills to be one, and the means of closer and still 
 closer union : daily living is a daily uttering of the love of the 
 heart, for in every thought and act self is yielded to the Divine 
 Will as its instrument. He may not say that he loves this Will 
 beyond every other object of love, for he loves only it : it alone is 
 the source of all his joy, the spring of all his thoughts, and acts, 
 and aspirations. Only for it does he desire to live, and life without 
 it would be hateful. 
 
The Moral World. 8i 
 
 II. 
 
 Does any free-will system allow the possibility of human help in 
 vital matters ? If the destiny of each depends upon his free-will 
 choice, can any man do good to another in the highest sense ? 
 Let us see what the standard of good is in a free-will system, and 
 then we can judge if another can help us to the good. We may 
 best do this by first considering the standard of good in the sense- 
 world where, apparently, there is no freedom. Here the appetites 
 of each creature fix the ends that it seeks. These ends seem to it 
 good because they gratify desire, and means to these ends seem 
 also good as helping towards gratification. Hence in the purely 
 physical world " good " is a relative term, and is applied to anything 
 that stands in a helpful relation towards the satisfaction of desire. 
 It follows that here there seems to be no fixed standard of good, 
 for it varies with desire ; and no one good, but as many goods as 
 there are desires. 
 
 In addition to this world of sense, the free-will philosopher 
 postulates a world of freedom where the activity of man can be 
 dirHcted by his free will instead of by his appetites. In this world 
 of freedom are there also an infinite number of ends suggested by 
 varying caprices instead of by varying appetites, or is the nature 
 of the free will such that it allows only one end and only one good >. 
 To answer this question we must examine the free will. That will 
 only is free which directs itself, which chooses its own end. If 
 the end toward which the activity is directed be a natural good, we 
 cannot assert freedom of the will, for in pursuing the end the will 
 may be governed by the laws of the physical world. The only end 
 that allows us to think that the will seeking it may be free, is free- 
 dom, freedom from the subjection of the laws of the physical world. 
 The end of the free will must be free will. But free will, if it is to 
 be, must have a nature, a being, of its own, and be true to that 
 being : in other words, in order to be, it must obey the law of its 
 being. Hence free will, in seeking free will, is seeking the law of 
 its own being. What is the law of free will .' What is the law of 
 any object .■• The law of an object is that ultimate principle obedi^ 
 ence to which secures the fullest possible existence of the object. 
 This ultimate principle in all objects will be found to be law for 
 the sake of law. 
 
82 Unity of Fickte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 It becomes evident that this statement is true if we consider 
 what the principle " law for the sake of law " involves. It involves 
 that whatever is accepted as law should contain within itself the 
 principle of its own perpetuation, and should be chosen because it 
 is capable of so maintaining itself. It is accepted because its 
 nature is such that it can be forever and forever law : it can com- 
 mand and be obeyed, and command and be obeyed eternally. 
 Suppose we adopt some rule of living, not for the sake of law, but 
 for the sake of its result ; for instance, " Thou shalt lie." If this 
 maxim of the will were made universal, it would destroy itself 
 in making lies impossible through the destruction of that trust 
 which is the necessary condition of deception by a lie. Every 
 maxim which seeks a material end, as " Thou shalt gather gold," 
 we find to be equally self-destructive, for the limited amount of the 
 material in existence causes obedience to the law finally to render 
 compliance with it impossible. In choosing the maxims of the will, 
 law for the sake of law is the only rational guide of choice, other- 
 wise our choice destroys itself: obedience to the maxims must 
 furnish continually the conditions for further obedience, and thus 
 insure their perpetual existence as universally active laws. The 
 quality of being law, i. e., the quality of expressing the nature of 
 perpetual existence, is the only rational end. In choosing " law 
 for the sake of law," we, in effect, choose that the special form in 
 which such law is embodied, whether rule of conduct or material 
 object, should continue to exist through its inherent quality. No 
 end can be intelligently chosen as end, as the constant goal of 
 activity, which is not the embodiment of "law for the sake 
 of law," for otherwise we choose an end which destroys itself: 
 in apparently choosing an end we choose a not-end, and we con- 
 tradict ourselves. 
 
 But the existence of law is possible only in a world of conscious- 
 ness divided between subject and object, where in the objective 
 world we find the concrete cases from which the subjective con- 
 cept "law" is abstracted. Law for the sake of law as end, means 
 the world of consciousness, existence, as end. Fichte has already 
 told us this in describing the Divine Will, whose end is an image 
 of itself, or the world of consciousness, as Holy Will, which seeks 
 law for the sake of law. 
 
The Moral World. 83 
 
 Now we see clearly that whoever seeks with the fullest intelli- 
 gence any object as end can do so only by seeking law for the sake 
 of law. Suppose gold is my end, gold exists only in the existence 
 of the world of consciousness, and can be sought only by such 
 means as are consonant with the existence of the world of con- 
 sciousness. But the world of consciousness exists only through 
 the continuity of law, and in seeking it I must seek those laws that 
 are consonant with themselves, those laws whose essence is per- 
 petual law, or law for the sake of law. In the intelligent seeking 
 of gold, I seek the law of gold, and the law of gold involves in itself 
 the law of the whole world of consciousness, which is, that existence 
 shall be of such nature as to exist, that law shall be that which 
 may continue as law, and therefore without contradiction or self- 
 destructive principle. The fact that the rational pursuit of any 
 end is the pursuit of all ends is one of the chief points of Fichte's 
 system. His fundamental assertion is that any bit of the world of 1 
 consciousness involves the existence of the whole of consciousness, 1 
 and that no bit can exist without the whole. This existence of the \ 
 whole is secured only by the rule of law which contains within 
 itself the vital principle of law, and can perpetuate itself, — or by 
 choosing as end law for the sake of law. 
 
 If reason now re-enter the sense-world and accept for its end 
 the gratification of desire she reaches the same result. If " the 
 gratification of desire " is end, it cannot be end that " the grati- 
 fication of desire " should destroy itself, but rather that it should 
 perpetuate itself in order that it may be perpetual end. If, then, 
 it is to be end, its nature must be understood, its law so grasped 
 that obedience to it shall introduce no principle of self-destruction, 
 but rather insure its eternal existence, — /. e., the law of " the gra- 
 tification of desire " must be sought as law, law as law must be end. 
 We see here that reason shows the sense-world to be, when ration- 
 ally considered, subject to the same laws as the moral world, or, 
 rather, both to be different aspects of the one truth of existence. 
 
 The course of our argument has brought us to the conclusion 
 that the only good which the free will recognizes is the free will, 
 or the will that chooses law for the sake of law. Can one man 
 give this good to another, or even help him towards it } The will, 
 in order to be free, must be absolutely uninfluenced : in so far as it 
 
84 Unity of Fickie's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 is influenced it is not free and is without worth : the so-called good 
 influence with which we seek to surround another may form his 
 habits and tastes, or teach him to value the results of moral con- 
 duct, or lead him through personal love of his educators to imitate 
 their lives; but conduct controlled by habit, or results, or per- 
 sonal love, is subject to the laws of the natural world, is not free, 
 and therefore is without worth. Only one thing in life is of worth, 
 the absolutely uninfluenced choice by the individual of law for the 
 sake of law. Since influence, if successful, binds us still more 
 firmly in the lower world of natural law, is not our highest duty 
 towards our neighbor to strive to be wholly without influence upon 
 him, — to respect his freedom so perfectly that we would present 
 no possible inducement for its foregoal 1 
 
 May not the lacks of the world, whether material or spiritual, 
 be finally reduced to lack of will, — the one lack which it is impos- 
 sible to supply? Noble men who give their lives in effort to make 
 good the terrible needs of humanity, needs of poverty, of ignor- 
 ance, of wickedness, at last are forced sorrowfully to admit that 
 the cure for evil lies beyond their power, and must be sought 
 by the sufferer within himself. Philanthropists tell us that the 
 ultimate cause of the misery of the poor is lack of will to remove 
 its causes : if the poor of the world should inflexibly will a 
 higher standard of living for themselves, and use the means within 
 their power to accomplish it, it would be brought about within a 
 generation : instead they prefer the gratifications of sense which 
 inevitably result in their present degradation. Educators, who 
 seek to raise the level of intelligence in our great democracies, by 
 pushing its children towards a broader training, find their chief 
 obstacle in the lack of will of the people. The people do not will 
 intellectual insight for themselves, but rather material pleasures. 
 The cause of ignorance is not lack of opportunity, but lack of will 
 for knowledge. The spiritual teacher who longs to see men enter- 
 ing the estate of freemen, choosing the right for the sake of the 
 right, finds that the only obstacle to their so doing is their not 
 willing it. Want of will is the great want, the only want, of the 
 world. We have what we will to have. Seek and ye shall find is 
 the law of life. The will creates its world, and the reason that, at 
 the present moment, each is in no higher stage of existence, is 
 that he does not will to be in a higher stage. Our condition is the 
 measure of our will. 
 
The Moral World. 85 
 
 Now will is exactly what another cannot give us. He can 
 furnish us with opportunities and furbish up our sinews of war, 
 but the resolution to use what is given can come only from within. 
 Can real help, then, ever be given by one man to another ? It is 
 the noblest natures who ask this question with the greatest sad- 
 ness, for the essence of the good is to propagate itself; it has the 
 generative force of perfect being, and urges towards more being, 
 towards fuller and fuller expression of itself on every side. Only 
 the good knows how much evil lacks, for it only has the positive 
 quantity by which evil may be measured : its fuller consciousness 
 can comprehend the greatness of the sin, for it knows through 
 possession the exact amount of being the sin forfeits. Hence it 
 is the good who bear the sins of the world, know them in their 
 awful waste, suffer vicariously for them. Christ is God made 
 manifest in the flesh, for he is the fulness of life measuring itself 
 against its lack, bearing the knowledge of what it might be and is 
 not, yearning to appear in each as his full stature, crucified unto 
 death in each in so far as he is denied the possibility living in him. 
 Can Christ help free-will beings? 
 
 Yes, there is room for help in the world of consciousness, — 
 for indirect help through knowledge. There are two ways in which 
 it can be given. The simpler, and perhaps the more effective way 
 is for the holy man to live his own life in all its fulness and in its 
 highest truth. In so doing, he develops within the knowledge of 
 beholders an image of the perfection of being, a concrete manifes- 
 tation of God ; he causes a conception of the possibilities latent in 
 human life to enter their consciousness ; they know what man can 
 do and be, and freely, because their own will moves thereto, they 
 may will to be in the fullest sense. Each of us can best help the 
 world by taking his own life just where it lies at this moment with 
 its various relations, and living it with perfect fidelity. Ask what 
 God would do if he were in your form of flesh at your point of time 
 and space, and then do it. So ask and so do continuously. Then 
 shall you make manifest God, and the beauty of holiness shall shine 
 in you : men, in seeing, shall know how divine a thing human life 
 may be, and they, through knowledge of the truth, may likewise 
 will to be free. 
 
 The second way is to enter through sympathy the lives of others, 
 and to show them what the Good Will would will if it should ap- 
 
86 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 pear in them, in their environment. It is an insoluble mystery why 
 immediate revelation of the highest truth is not given in all direc- 
 tions, and at all times, to each. We only know that it is not. Mind 
 chooses here and there an individual as the mouthpiece of its mes- 
 sages, and other men must learn from him. The truths of Mathe- 
 matics, and Metaphysics, and Science, the harmonies of Music and 
 Poetry, communicate themselves immediately only to the few, and 
 by them are given to the multitude. So it is with the Will. The 
 masses do not see the immutable relations between men which Holy 
 Will has decreed : to Moses and to Christ they are revealed, and 
 our lesser wills find their own true nature through their teachings. 
 So in every community there are more highly spiritual wills who 
 can see truths of conduct which are hidden from the many. By 
 making their special insight a common possession the sight of 
 the right is given the lesser will, and, seeing, they may will it for 
 its own sake. 
 
 Our duty to our neighbor, then, in Fichte's system, resolves 
 itself into a duty to introduce into his knowledge the concept of 
 the highest possible development of existence as shown in holy 
 will. This we must do always by the concrete example of our own 
 perfect lives, and may do, under certain circumstances, through 
 sympathetic interpretation of his life and duty. Here our duty 
 ends : further help we are absolutely powerless to give : he must 
 will alone whether or not to lift himself to the higher plane of 
 existence we have shown him : our task ends with showing him 
 the plane, with setting the alternative before him. If we add the 
 further incentive of approval, or displeasure, or bribe, we give him 
 no real help, but rather hold him in the lower plane by increasing 
 the pressure of natural desire. Our duty is bounded by the dispas- 
 sionate enlargement of his consciousness through placing before 
 him, in the two spheres of life disclosed to him, the moral and the 
 natural, the opportunity for a free choice, which we must leave 
 him to make. 
 
 III. 
 
 It is true that Fichte's God has not universal consciousness, 
 but does he the less satisfy human need on this account .? Let us 
 see. The orthodox notion of God is that he is an all-knowing 
 Father, who sees the hearts of men, is conscious of their wants. 
 
The Moral World. 87 
 
 hears them when they approach him in supplication or repen- 
 tance, and in infinite wisdom accords or withholds what they ask. 
 The idea of his perfect knowledge is as essential as that of his 
 perfect love ; upon it depend the possibility of his justice, and 
 the confidence with which men turn to him : he knows, if no 
 one else does, the purity of motive and the honesty of the mis- 
 take, or the inborn frailty that palliates the sin ; he knows the 
 struggle and the weakness, and can forgive because he knows. 
 His knowledge is the condition of his wisdom, his justice, his 
 intelligent love. 
 
 Such conception is absolutely foreign to Fichte's system, for 
 according to him nothing but consciousness exists, consciousness 
 appears only in individuals, and no individual knows the whole 
 content of the minds of other men. When Fichte says that there 
 is no Universal Consciousness, he simply says that no person holds 
 within his consciousness the content of the knowledge of all other 
 persons : no one individual personality belongs to God, but he ex- 
 presses himself in all personalities. In Fichte's eyes the Chrstian 
 conception must be false, for it pictures a God who is a Ding an 
 sick, and can exist apart from man, whereas every intelligent man 
 must say that man's God is man's notion of God, and other exist- 
 ence than as notion man can never prove him to have. 
 
 Fichte's notion of God, we have seen, is that he is a power 
 which seeks expression of himself in man, finds self-conscious ex- 
 istence only in man, becomes a person only in and through 
 man. The power is infinite, it seeks infinite expression, and 
 presses forward in each individual to nobler form, loftier mani- 
 festation. It would make of each a true individual, i. e., an undi- 
 vided expression of its whole might. In the conceptions of the 
 prophets and Christ, of the poets and the thinkers, and in the 
 realization of these conceptions, it finds its highest existence. God 
 is, according to Fichte, the subconscious power which flows forth 
 in the form of consciousness, as man, and thinks God and obeys the 
 thought. Man is God welling up into consciousness. What I call 
 my sins are a recognition that the power within me is capable of 
 higher manifestation than it has yet found in me; the form of my 
 consciousness does not suit its content, and this content is, in the 
 moment in which I recognize my sins, urging toward fitter shape. 
 For I know sin only as a lack, and I know a lack only by contrasting 
 
88 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 a lesser positive quantity with a greater positive quantity. I see sin 
 in me because I see at the same moment in me a goodness which 
 I have not yet realized. Instead of praying to an extra-mentem 
 God for forgiveness, and promising him to try again, I see rise 
 within myself a higher possible self with conceptions of infinite per- 
 fections in infinite directions, and I feel flowing into my conscious- 
 ness, into the Ego form which I call I, the power to realize this 
 self. My God, who forgives my sin, is the divine power of develop- 
 ment in me, in that I am the image of the Infinite. The wounds 
 of spirit heal and leave no scar, because that so-called mistake which 
 would be fatal in a Ding an sick is in the power of thought only a 
 stage of development, a lesser stage which gives way to a greater. 
 The form in which I see this power, the form of consciousness in 
 which the Power appears in each man, is a pressing on by the 
 Power to a fuller and more perfect assertion of itself. Surely here 
 we have a hope within us at least equal to that given by the orthodox 
 notion of God, for within, bodying itself forth in us, is an unimagin- 
 able force which must express all its greatness in man. Man is to 
 reach the perfect stature that God reaches, for God finds stature 
 only in the mind of man, only as thought. Our life is expressing 
 God in individual form, and the fulness ol life for each man is that 
 man's individuality should find its completion in being God's indi- 
 viduality, in being the flawless image-form in which the Power fully 
 appears. Surely the thought, " I am the self-consciousness of God, 
 the image in which he sees his perfections reflected " is as inspir- 
 ing and hopeful as any so-called orthodox notion. With this 
 thought as our guide, life has only one task for us, to keep the eye 
 fixed upon the Power, to let it take what shape it will in us, first 
 as conception of perfection, then as concrete realization of this 
 conception. The consciousness that we are thus, at every moment, 
 the reflection of God's being is our true being. All else is only 
 dream of being. 
 
 Such is Fichte's notion of God. 
 
 Though there is now no universal consciousness, the full devel- 
 opment of each man as a point of God's self-consciousness would 
 make of each that perfection of knowledge which the orthodox 
 conceives his God to be. The attainment by each of universality 
 of knowledge may be the ultimate goal of humanity, and the 
 
The Moral World. 89 
 
 concrete manifestation of God. There are perhaps already dim 
 indications of the manner in which the goal may be reached : 
 education helps toward community of mind content; hypnotism, 
 mind-reading, and experiences in the lives of all suggest that 
 there may be as yet undiscovered means of gathering within one 
 individuality the content of many selves. 
 
 Even without hypnotism, in a moment of exaltation we some- 
 times catch sight of these different coexistent selves with their 
 different coexistent contents : we see at the same moment one self 
 busy with the details of life, leading down the street and into the 
 market place, and by its side, step by step, goes the self that loves 
 and hates, and rejoices and sorrows, and with them both as insep- 
 arable companion, the self that knows the all-encompassing love of 
 God and the philosophic truths of life, and over them all floats 
 the including self that says, " All these are I, " that sees them 
 act contemporaneously, and knows that below them and above 
 them are an infinite number of other selves who also are I at this 
 moment, and whose coexistent activity is the condition of there 
 being an I. This is the experience of one instant of time. It is 
 not successive perception, but for one second we take in the dif- 
 ferent layers of selves and see their contemporaneous activities. 
 Another common experience is to awake and with this waking 
 self watch the self that dreams, let it dream on, and follow its 
 adventures with the interest which one gives to a novel or a 
 journey. 
 
 Now this outermost self which sees self as differentiated into 
 many selves, each with a content of its own, is like Fichte's con- 
 ception of God, — " the spirit which differentiates itself into an 
 infinite number of points of view." Hypnotism would, in Fichte's 
 eyes, confirm more fully than ever the truth that man is made in 
 God's image. But as yet there is no universal consciousness, for 
 the world of consciousness has not discovered the secret by which 
 the mind of the individual can hold consciously at one and the 
 same moment the contents of the minds of all other indviduals, 
 and consciousness appears only in individuals. We gain through 
 Fichte the empty form of universal consciousness ; modern research 
 is showing us how content may be given it, but now we see, as 
 image of God, only a sum total of distinct, private consciousnesses. 
 
90 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 IV. 
 
 Instead of relieving the individual of moral responsibility. - 
 Fichte's doctrine puts upon him the most tremendous responsi- 
 bility conceivable, for it makes him responsible, not for himself 
 alone, but for God. He can no longer feel that God has a sure 
 and safe existence of his own as a God apart from man, with cer- 
 tain fixed attributes which are unaltered by man's concepts and 
 conduct. God's attributes are those that the thoughts of man 
 give him, for attributes are not Dinge an sick, but thoughts, 
 and thoughts exist only in mind, and mind appears only in man. 
 If God finds noble and adequate existence only as men express 
 him, each is bound by loyalty and truth and honor not to belie 
 the Power that seeks to body forth in him a fitting likeness. Every 
 time we fail to think the highest thoughts, to seek the noblest 
 aspects of our lives, and to be true to them, we have wronged, not 
 only ourself, and our neighbor, but the sub-conscious power that 
 presses in us towards its highest manifestations. The individual 
 cannot escape blame by the plea that the Whole Will does not 
 will to utter itself fully in him, for he is potentially the Whole Will. 
 He, as individual, is forced to see himself as a point at which the 
 Whole Will presses to appear, and to see his individuality, what 
 he calls I, as the power to draw forth at this point the Whole Will 
 and express it in image form. His superactual, potential self is a 
 part of the superactual Will, free with its unthinkable freedom : his 
 superactual individuality is that part of the superactual Will which 
 has the power to express the Whole Will within a concept of self: 
 that special potential activity of the Will which throws forth its 
 image, and can, when fully exerted, draw into the image form, into 
 the visible expression, the whole power of the Will, thought isolates 
 by attaching to it the concept of being, and views it as an indi- 
 vidual. The individual must view himself as that part of the 
 superactual Will whose function it is to say to the rest of the Will, 
 "Come forth, appear;" and again, "Come forth in still higher 
 perfection; " and again, "Come forth, till the whole appears." In 
 so far as this potential function of forth-calling is not made actual, 
 the individual sins and the individual alone, — i. e. only that part 
 of the superactual Will which bids the rest appear. The rest 
 presses to rush forth, but it must await the activity which we call 
 
The Moral World. 91 
 
 the individual will. This activity of the Will it is which fails when 
 man sins, and since this activity, as isolated, is the self, he, as self, 
 sins. Not the Will as a whole, but the self, sins in man. The indi- 
 vidual, as the expression of the Will, sins, in that he is not a true 
 individual, not an undivided Whole : the sin lies in him as separate 
 utterance, in the expression, not in that which is expressed. And 
 this sin is only lack, the lack to express fully that which presses 
 for expression. Each man must say, in reckoning his sins, " My 
 power is the power of the Whole, my sin is the sin of the self." 
 
 If it be urged that, since the will of the individual is part of the 
 One Organic Will, when the will of the individual is faulty, the Whole 
 Will must contain some element of evil, Fichte would reply with 
 the law of reciprocal determination : we live in a universe of thought, 
 the law of thought rules consciousness, this law ordains that every 
 concept shall exist only through the presence and the denial of its 
 opposite : we conceive good only through the presence of evil ; holi- 
 ness is the rejection of unholiness ; that we may have a good God 
 who is infinite there must be in him evil which he eternally nega- 
 tives. Holy Will means a will whose weaker and rejected half is 
 unholy will ; this weaker and rejected portion appears as the wills 
 of wicked men. 
 
 The attempt of the individual to evade responsibility by shifting 
 it upon the Total Will arises from his misconception of the Total 
 Will as a Ding an sick. Even at this moment, after having read 
 Fichte to this point, he finds himself fancying that God's will 
 exists apart from him, that at a past moment in time it willed his 
 nature, and by this past act he is irrecoverably bound. But the will 
 as seen in individuals is all the will there is, and it wills only now for 
 there is no past, there is only the present notion of the past. This 
 will in reasoning upon its own nature concludes that, just as there 
 is one organic physical world, one organic humanity, one organic 
 mind, so there is one organic Will which appears as a community 
 of wills, and of which each individual is a point of sight. But all 
 the willing there is, is done in the individuals, and if they do not 
 will there is no will. The doctrine of the one organic will no more 
 releases man from the necessity of willing than the doctrine of the 
 one organic mind relieves him from the necessity of study. We 
 do not lie back with our minds because we are the points of sight 
 of the one Mind, and it does everything for us and in us, and 
 through us, but we feel that individual effort is necessary if we 
 
92 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 are to be personally conscious of as much of the One Mind as is 
 possible. I study that I may see within my personal horizon the 
 details of the working of the One Mind. My best way to study is 
 to banish self, with its personal interest and surroundings, yield 
 my mind as the passive substance in which the laws of thought 
 may work, mark their working and the results they attain. Such 
 marking we call concentration, attention, and without it intellectual 
 results are impossible : the individual must do his part or they can- 
 not appear. Still the true student knows that the results are not 
 his results : he cannot command the mathematical insight or the 
 poetic vision, or the synthetic imagination which marks the 
 genius. What comes is given whence he knows not, he only 
 knows that it is not his. It is a gracious illumination afforded 
 him : it is his because the Mind whose working can be neither com- 
 pelled nor controlled has chosen to bring it to pass in him. So 
 with our work in the Will. I am curious to know the details of the 
 Will. I wish to grasp within my personal consciousness all of its 
 manifestations that may be accorded me. Just as to know math- 
 ematics I must abstract my mind from its merely personal cares 
 and give it to the working of the laws of pure mathematics, so, 
 to be righteous, I must abstract my will from its merely personal 
 desires, banish and forget them, that I may yield it the passive 
 substance in which the One Divine Will may work. Abstraction 
 and attention are as necessary here as there, and without them 
 results are impossible. As in the one case I learn what the One 
 Mind thinks about the relations of numbers, so in the other I learn 
 what the One Will wills about the conduct of life. I fill my will 
 with universal and everlasting relations by yielding to the One 
 Will as I do my mind by obeying the laws of the One Mind. The 
 One Will is for action what the One Mind is for thought : it is the 
 harmonizer, the revealer of truth and beauty. But we are forced 
 to see that the power to permit the appearance of the harmony, 
 truth, and beauty of Will and Mind lies in the individual, and if 
 he do not perform his function they cannot appear. The individual 
 sees himself to be that function of the Will which should will at 
 his point of existence the appearance of the Total Will. 
 
LIST OF FICHTE'S WORKS UPON WHICH THIS 
 PAPER IS FOUNDED. 
 
 1790. Aphorismen iiber Religion und Deismus. W. V. 1-8. 
 1792. Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung. W. V. 9-174. 
 
 1792. Recension des Aenesidemus. W. I. 1-25. 
 
 1793. Recension von Creuzer's skeptischen Betrachtungen iiber die 
 
 Freiheit des Willens. W. VIII. 409-417. 
 
 1794. Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre. W. I. 27-81. 
 
 1 794. Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre. W. I. 83-328. 
 1794. Ueber die Wiirde des Menschen. W. I. 412-416. 
 
 1 794. Einige Vorlesungen tiber die Bestimmung des Gelehrten. W. 
 
 VI. 289-346. 
 
 1795. Grundriss des Eigenthiimlichen der Wissenschaftslehre. W, I. 
 
 329-411. 
 
 1796. Grundlage des Naturrechts. W. III. 1-385. 
 
 1797. Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre. W. I. 417-449. 
 1797. Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre. W. I. 451-518. 
 
 1 797. Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre. W. I- 
 
 519-534- 
 
 1798. Das System der Sittenlehre. W. IV. i-365, 
 
 1798. Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine gottiiche Weltregie- 
 
 rung. W. V. 175-189. 
 
 1799. (Anfang des Jahres.) Riickerinnerungen, Antworten, Fragen. 
 
 W. V. 335-373- 
 1799. Appellation an das Publicum. W. V. 191-238. 
 
 1799. Gerichdiche Verantwortungsschriften gegen die Anklage des 
 
 Atheismus. W. V. 239-333. 
 
 1800. Aus einem Privatschreiben. W. V. 375-396. 
 
 1800. Die Bestimmung des Menschen. W. II. 165-319. 
 
 1801. Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre. W. II. 1-163. 
 
 1801. Sonnenklarer Bericht an das grossere Publicum iiber das eigent- 
 liche Wesen der neuesten Philosophie. W. II. 321-420. 
 
94 Unity of Fichtis Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 1804. Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 87-314. 
 
 1805. Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten. W. VI. 347-448. 
 
 1806. Bericht uber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre, etc. W. VIII. 
 
 361-407. 
 1806. Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben. W. V. 397-580. 
 
 1810. Die Wissenschaftslehre in ihreni allgemeinen Umrisse. W. II. 
 
 693-709. 
 1810-11. Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. W. II. 535-691. 
 
 1811. Fiinf Vorlesungen iiber die Bestimmung des Gelehrten. Ngl. 
 
 W. III. 145-208. 
 
 1812. Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 315-492. 
 
 1812. (Ostern bis Michaelis.) Das System der Sittenlehre. Ngl. W. 
 
 III. 1-118. 
 1812. (Ostern bis Michaelis.) Das System der Rechtslehre. Ngl. W. 
 
 II. 493-652. 
 
 1812. (Michaelis bis Weihnachten.) Ueber das Verhaltniss der Logik zur 
 
 Philosophic oder transcendentale Logik. Ngl. W. I. 103-400. 
 
 1813. (Anfang des Jahres.) Die Thatsachen des Bevvusstseins. Ngl. 
 
 W. I. 401-574- 
 1813. (Friihjahr.) Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 1-86. 
 1813. (Sommer.) Die Staatslehre. W. IV. 367-600. 
 18 1 3. (Herbst.) Einleitungsvorlesungen in die Wissenschaftslehre. 
 
 Ngl. W. I. 1-102. 
 1830, 1862. Johann Gottlieb Fichte's Leben und literarischer Brief- 
 
 wechsel von seinem Sohne Immanuel Hermann Fichte. 2 vols. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Freedom 96 
 
 Necessity 97 
 
 Reconciliation of Freedom and Ne- 
 cessity 100 
 
 Holy Will 123 
 
 God 126 
 
 God and the world are two mutually 
 involving spheres of consciousness, 
 or das Fiinifache . . ... 134 
 
 God is fully expressed in the Erschei- 
 
 nung 142 
 
 Existence is God and Existence is 
 not God. " Is." 143 
 
 PAGE 
 
 " God " in the earlier works . . . 146 
 
 The Absolute 150 
 
 Seyn 164 
 
 Leben and Endzweck 178 
 
 Begriff 182 
 
 There is no Universal Consciousness 187 
 
 Anschauung mid Denken .... 189 
 
 Genesis 196 
 
 Nomenclature 199 
 
 Fichte's " point of view,'' or the Wis- 
 senschaftslehre as an all-inclusive 
 
 thought, an " it is as if " . . . . 200 
 
 It is the purpose of the writer, in the longer work upon Fichte which is 
 to follow, to examine his various treatises and to show that the outline 
 drawn in this paper can be discerned, in whole or in part, in each. For the 
 present the student may be helped to verify statements by a few references 
 to the text. As the reconciliation of Freedom and Necessity is the central 
 point of the outline, this reconciliation must first be substantiated. We can 
 best do so by putting before the reader passages which assert the freedom 
 of the ego and passages which deny it, and by then indicating those places 
 in which their reconciliation is most clearly expressed. The references are 
 to the " Sammtliche Werke," edited by I. H. Fichte, Berlin, 1845, and to 
 the " Nachgelassene Werke," edited by I. H. Fichte, Bonn, 1834. 
 
96 Unity of Fichtes Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 FREEDOM. 
 
 (1810-11) Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. W. II. 535-691. 
 
 . . . dem Triebe folgend, ist das Individuum durchaus nicht frei, sondem 
 es steht unter einem unwiderstehlichen Gesetze, und in dieser Region hat 
 das Lebeu, seiner blossen Form nach, als reines Leben, durchaus keine 
 Casuahtat. — Wiederum : bestimmt von der anderen Seite das Individuum 
 sich durch das Sittengesetz, so ist es abermals nicht frei, und das Leben, als 
 solches, hat abermals keine Causalitat ; denn diese eben wird unter Freiheit 
 verstanden. Hat es denn nun iiberhaupt keine? Allerdings, im Ueber- 
 gange, in der Erhebung von der Natur zur Sittlichkeit. (671.) 
 
 Brief an jfohanna Rahn, den 5 Sept., 1790. Leben I. 80-85. 
 Sage Deinem theuern Vater. . . . Ich sei jetzt ganzlich iiberzeugt, dass 
 der menschliche Wille frei sei, etc. (82, etc.). 
 
 Similar statements may be found : — 
 
 (1800) Die Bestimmung des Menschen. W. II. 283 fF., 299 ff., 308. 
 
 (1806) Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben. W. V. 513, 530. 
 
 (1810) Die Wissenschaftslehre in ihrem allgemeinen Umrisse. W. II. 
 
 693-709- 
 (18 1 2) Das System der Sittenlehre. Ngl. W. III. 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 
 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, etc. 
 
 (18 1 2) Transcendentale Logik. Ngl. W. I. 208-220. 
 
 (1813) Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. Ngl. W. I. 449, 462-464, 467- 
 
 478, 496, Si°» etc. 
 (1813) Die Staatslehre. W. IV. 382-398. 
 (181 3) Einleitungsvorlesungen in die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. L 
 
 9-40. 
 
Appendix. 97 
 
 NECESSITY. 
 
 The passages which deny the freedom of the individual are equally 
 strong : — 
 
 (1812) Das System der Sittenkhre. Ngl. W. III. 1-118. 
 
 Durch sich kann der Mensch Nichts thun : sich nicht sittlich machen, 
 sondern er muss es erwarten, dass das gottliche Bild in ihm herausbveche. 
 Dieser Glaube an eigenes Vermogen und Kraft, sich sitdich zu machen, ist 
 viehnehr das sichere Zeichen dass das gottliche Bild noch nicht herausge- 
 kommen sei und das grosste Hinderniss dagegen ; denn es ist Widersetz- 
 lichkeit gegen das wahre Leben. — Ueberdies ist eine solche Lehre unsittUch, 
 und das Princip aller Unsittlichkeit. Jene selbststandige Kraft — was ist 
 sie denn eigentlich ? die Kraft des Widerstandes : das sich Losreissen, und 
 sich widerspenstig als ein Eigenes Hinsetzen des Ich (45). Es zeigte sich 
 darum hier, was ohne dies sich versteht und bekannt ist, dass Keiner sich 
 selbst sittlich machen konne, sondern dass er es eben werden muss, schlecht- 
 weg : dass diese Wiedergeburt eben so wenig ein Werk der Freiheit ist, als 
 es die erste fleischliche ist (41). 
 
 Dass der Mensch Nichts sei . . . dass Keiner, so wenig er sich in der 
 Sinnenwelt selbst gebaren konnte, sich wiedergebaren kann zur sittlichen 
 Erscheinung, sondern, dass diese Wiedergeburt durch die Kraft des Begriffs 
 oder Gottes geschehen muss ; sehe ich so tief ein, als Einer, und ich habe 
 mich bestrebt, es Ihnen klar darzuthun, und auch in Ihnen diese Einsicht 
 zu erzeugen (58). 
 
 Similar passages may be found scattered through this work, also in 
 
 (1801) Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre. W. II. 127-132. 
 (1812) Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 337-346, 425-435, 485, 
 491. 
 
 The negative evidence on the side of necessity is even stronger than the 
 passages which we have quoted. Let the reader study with the utmost 
 attention the early works, " Grundlage," " Grundriss," " Sittenlehre " of 
 1 798, seeking to find room for freedom in Fichte's system, and he can find 
 it only in one place — in not-being : the potential Ego can will whether to 
 be or not. 
 
 Sometimes in the same year we find two different treatises, one laying 
 stress upon the freedom of initiative of the individual, while the other holds 
 
 13 
 
98 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 before our view the abnegation of selfhood which Holy Will demands. We 
 have already referred to a course of lectures which Fichte delivered in the 
 beginning of 1813, upon the "Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns," and which 
 were published in his posthumous works {Ngl. W. I. 401-574). In these 
 lectures Fichte deals with the moral world, and shows the moral responsibility 
 of the individual as isolated individual to be mere appearance. The essential 
 of moral act (" y ") is that it does not appear in the uninterrupted chain of 
 phenomenal cause and effect, but appears as something new (433 ff., 441 ff., 
 476, 479, 506 etc.), as an " Anfangen des Ereignisses, so ist die Freiheit zu 
 denken, so von uns gedacht. AUes andere ist reiner Nichtsinn " ( W. IV. 
 383, 384), as a free act {Ngl. W. I. 548), as " ein gewordenes " (433, 442, 
 447, 469, 504-506, 537, 538, 542, etc.). Fichte's favorite term to express this 
 apparent freedom of a moral act is " werden " (548, etc., 436, 437, 441-443, 
 447, 448, 449, etc., 48T, 505, 508, 509, etc., 529, 542, etc.), and " werden " 
 as the characteristic of the moral act is dwelt upon in almost every page. 
 " Absolutes Werden oder Freiheit " ( W. II. 1 7). But we are emphatically 
 told again and again, and over and over, that there is no real "werden" : 
 everything is eternally as it is : " werden " is only the image form in which 
 the Inconceivable appears in the world of consciousness : Freedom is a 
 mere mental image : man sees himself as a free moral agent, capable of 
 free acts, but only sees himself as such, for reality lies as far beyond Freedom 
 as it lies beyond Necessity (219, 414,415,421-424, 437, 438, 447, 469, 
 470. 479. 522, 537, 538, 542, 565-574). The Inconceivable appears as 
 Principle (519, 522) ; Power (535, 537); Will (461, 462, 474, 542, 543); 
 Freedom (19, 537, etc.); Life (19, 423, 536, 537); but all these are only 
 appearance, mental images, concepts of thought ; there is no real Freedom, 
 Will, Power, etc. (423, 424, 414, 415, 447, etc., 537, etc.). 
 
 Enleitungsvorlesungen in die Wissenschaftslehre, Ngl. W. I. 1-102, 
 written in the same year, says that the Wissenschaftslehre is an elevation 
 of man beyond his natural being, which is governed by necessity, into the 
 tegion of freedom and the consciousness of freedom (9-40). 
 
 Sometimes in the same work passages will be found which, to one who 
 has not yet the key, seem absurdly contradictory, as in the " Anweisung zura 
 seligen Leben " {W. V. 470, 475, 476, 512, 513, 524, 530, 531), in the 
 " Darstellung " of 1801, in the " Thatsachen " of 1810-181 1. This apparent 
 contradiction is specially noticeable in the " Bestimmung des Menschen " 
 ( W. II. 165-319) : — the very kernel of the last section is freedom of the 
 will : Fichte again and again affirms it with exultation, — " Mein Wille ist 
 mein, und er ist das einige, das ganz mein ist, und vollkommen von mir selbst 
 abhangt, und durch ihn bin ich schon jetzt ein Mitbiirger des Reiches der 
 
Appendix. 99 
 
 Freiheit und der Vernunftthatigkeit durch sich selbst" (283, 284). " Aber 
 was ich selbst seyn soUe in dieser Harmonic der Geister, muss ich wissen ; 
 denn nur ich selbst kann mich dazu machen, und es wird mir unmittelbar 
 offenbaret durch eine Stimme, die aus jener Welt zu mir heriibertont. So stehe 
 ich mit dem Einem, das da ist, in Verbindung, und nehme Theil an seinera 
 Seyn. Es ist nichts wahrhaft Reelles, Dauerndes, Unvergangliches an mir, 
 als diese beiden Stucke : die Stimme meines Gewissens und mein freier 
 Gehorsam. Durch die erste neigt die geistige Welt sich zu mir herab, und 
 umfasst mich, als eins ihrer Glieder ; durch den zweiten erhebe ich mich 
 selbst in diese Welt, ergreife sie und wirke in ihr. Jener unendliche Wille 
 aber ist der Vermittler zwischen ihr und mir ; denn er selbst ist der Urquell 
 von ihr und von mir (299). And yet, a little later, the absolute impotence 
 of bad men to be good is affirmed, " Die Verkehrtheit, dass sie das Gute 
 hassten, well es gut ist, und das Bose beforderten, aus reiner Liebe zura 
 Bosen, als solchem. . . . diese Verkehrtheit schreibe ich keinem zu, der 
 menschliches Angesicht tragt ; denn ich weiss, dass dieselbe nicht in der 
 menschlichen Natur liegt. Ich weiss, dass es ftir alle, die so handeln, 
 inwiefern sie so handeln, iiberhaupt kein Boses oder Gutes, sondern lediglich 
 ein Angenehmes oder Unangenehmes giebt ; dass sie uberhaupt nicht unter 
 ihrer eigenen Botmassigkeit, sondern unter der Gewalt der Natur stehen, 
 und dass nicht sie selbst es sind, sondern diese Natur in ihnen, die das 
 erstere mit aller ihrer Macht sucht, und das letztere flieht, ohne Rucksicht, 
 ob es iibrigens gut oder bose sey. Ich weiss, dass sie, nachdem sie nun 
 einmal sind, was sie sind, nicht um das Mindeste anders handeln konnen, 
 als sie handeln ; und ich bin weit entfernt, gegen die Nothwendigkeit mich 
 zu entriisten, oder mit der blinden und willenlosen Natur zu ziirnen. AUer- 
 dings liegt darin eben ihre Schuld und ihre Unwiirde, dass sie sind, was sie 
 sind, und dass sie, anstatt frei, und etwas fur sich zu seyn, sich dem Strome 
 der blinden Natur hingeben. Dies allein konnte es sein, das meinen Un- 
 willen erregte ; aber ich falle hier mitten in das absolut Unbegreifliche hinein. 
 Ich kann ihnen ihren Mangel an Freiheit nicht zurechnen, ohne sie schon 
 vorauszusetzen als frei, um sich frei zu machen. Ich will mich tiber sie 
 erziirnen und finde keinen Gegenstand fiir meinen Zorn. Was sie wirkHch 
 sind, verdient diesen Zorn nicht ; was ihn verdiente, sind sie nicht, und sie 
 wijrden ihn abermals nicht verdienen wenn sie es waren. Mein Unwille 
 trafe ein offenbares Nichts. . . . Und so kann es allerdings geschehen, dass 
 ich mit einer edlen Entriistung, als ob sie frei waren, gegen sie mich kehre 
 . . . die ich selbst in meinem Innern verniinftigerweise nie empfinden kann. 
 Nur der handeln de Mensch der Gesellschaft in mir ist es, der der Unver- 
 nunft und dem Laster ziirnt, nicht der auf sich selbst ruhende und in sich 
 selbst vollendete, betrachtende Mensch" (313-315). 
 
100 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 RECONCILIATION OF FREEDOM AND NECESSITY. 
 
 The reconciliation that man, as the visible appearance of God, who is 
 Free Will willing to appear as Law, has freedom in so far as he is this Will, 
 and is without freedom in so far as he is mere appearance, can be found 
 everywhere, — in the earlier works as well as in the later. Freedom, from 
 "Grundlage" to the last " Wissenschaftslehre," which death interrupted, is 
 always our conception of the freedom of the Absolute Ego to be or not to 
 be, our conception of the superactual power of choice on the other side of 
 existence, which is the ground of existence ; and strict necessity always 
 governs the world of existence which results from this choice. We indicate 
 some of the various forms in which the reconciliation finds expression, first 
 quoting in full a succinct statement in a letter to Jacobi : — 
 
 Fichte an jfacobi, Berlin, den 3. Mai, 1810. yohann Gottlieb Fichte^s 
 Leben und literarischer Briefwechsel, v. II. 179-184 . . . scheint mir eine 
 wirkliche und die HauptdifFerenz zwischen Ihnen und mir ausgesprochen 
 zu sein S. 68 Ihrer Schrift : " Die Vereinigimg von Naturnothwendigkeit 
 und Freiheit in einem und demselben Wesen ist ein schlechterdings unbe- 
 greifliches Factum, ein der Schopfung gleiches Wunder und Geheimniss. 
 Wer die Schopfung begriffe, wiirde dieses Factum begreifen, wer dieses 
 Factum, die Schopfung und Gott selbst." 
 
 " Meine Philosophic begreift zwar weder Gott selbst, noch dasjenige, was 
 ich Schopfung nennen wiirde, wenn ich dieses Wortes mich bedienen miisste ; 
 die letztere ist ihr ein absolutes Factum : — und dieses nicht zwar, als ob in 
 Gott Oder jenem Factum etwas lage, das dem Begreifen positiv zuwider 
 ware, sondern well das Factum des Begreifens Gott und das absolute Fac- 
 tum seines Erscheinens voraussetzt und das Begreifen innerhalb seines 
 factischen Seins nicht die Wurzel seines Seins vernichten kann. Aber die 
 Vereinigung von Naturnothwendigkeit und Freiheit in einem begreift nicht 
 sowol diese Philosophic, da sie vielmehr die Nichtigkeit der ganzen Unter- 
 scheidung und des vermeinten Widerstreites deutlich begreift und darlegt, 
 indem sie das eine Glied des Gegensatzes ganz aufhebt. 
 
 Ein Widerstreit konnte entstehen nur unter der Voraussetzung dass man 
 beiden, der Freiheit sowie der Naturnothwendigkeit, die gleiche Realitat 
 zuschriebe. Die Wissenschaftslehre ist weit davon entfernt, diese Voraus- 
 setzung zuzugeben. 
 
Appendix. loi 
 
 Nur das absolute Schema Gottes, sowie es ist, schlechthin durch das 
 blosse Erscheinen Gottes, ist nach ihr das Reale in der Erscheinung. Dieses 
 ist schlechthin wie es ist, durch sich selbst, ohne alien aussern Grund, ein- 
 fach, unveranderlich, zeitlos, unter keine Anschauungs- oder Denkform zu 
 bringen : — das Freie, d. i. Selbstandige und Absolute in der Erscheinung. 
 So ist es an und fur sich. Indem es aber erblickt wird und in seiner Be- 
 ziehung auf das sich selbst erblickende Vermogen (das Ich) erblickt wird, 
 bricht nach darzulegenden Gesetzen jene Einheit sich in eine Mannichfaltig- 
 keit ; der Zusammenhang aber dieses Mannichfaltigen (vermittelst dessen 
 allein die Riickkehr des BUcks auf die Einheit moglich ist) ist die Noth- 
 wendigkeit. Und so ist denn alle Nothwendigkeit durchaus nichts Reales, 
 sondern nur die Anschauungsform des einen wahrhaft Realen in der 
 Erscheinung. 
 
 Man kann, dies verfolgend, sagen : Nur durch das Werden zum abso- 
 luten Schema Gottes (zu einem Wilkn) wird das Vermogen (das Ich, der 
 Mensch) wirklich real ; ohne dies ist er gar nicht, weder frei, noch noth- 
 wendig, sondern eben nichts. Dieses an sich und in seiner Unsichtbarkeit 
 einfache Sein ist dem aus einem Mannichfaltigen es herausconstruirenden 
 Blicke und durch diesen Blick das absolut Nothwendige, das aus dem Total- 
 zusammenhange des Mannichfaltigen als resultirend Erscheinende. Und 
 so ist denn das Erzeugniss der absoluten Freiheit (das Leben in Gott) eben 
 dadurch, dass es dies ist, zugleich auch das Nothwendige in der soeben 
 erklarten Bedeutung des Wortes. 
 
 Ist das Vermogen (das Ich, der Mensch) nicht dies, so ist es in der 
 That gar nicht ; es ist nicht einmal Schema (Gottes namlich, was allein es 
 zu sein vermag) sondern Schema des Schemas, vielleicht vom Schema 
 u. s. f. — eine blosse leere Ansicht und Truggestalt (seiner selbst, wie dies 
 nicht anders sein kann). Das Materiale dieser Ansicht ist weder das Freie 
 (Absolute der Erscheinung) noch auch das Nothwendige. In der letzten 
 Riicksicht ist es zwar immer Zusammenhang irgendeiner Region der Man- 
 nigfaltigkeit und nothwendiges Resultat dieser Region, Ordnung, Reihe 
 (z. B. das aus der sinnlichen Individualitat in einem solchen Systeme sinn- 
 licher Individuen erfolgende) keineswegs aber Resultat der gesammten und 
 erschopften Mannichfaltigkeit (wie in dem erst beschriebenen Falle) indem 
 auf diesem Standpunkte ganze Reihen der Mannichfaltigkeit dem Blicke 
 verborgen bleiben und in seine Organisation nicht mit eintreten. 
 
 Zu diesem wahrhaftigen Sein wird nun das Vermogen nicht durch irgend- 
 eine ausser ihm liegende Kraft emporgehoben oder davon zuriickgehalten, 
 sondern beides schlechthin nur durch sich selbst : und dies ist die formale 
 Freiheit, die innere Selbstandigkeit der Erscheinung als solcher, die auch 
 ein Leben ist, keineswegs ein todtes und geschlossenes Sein. Und da sind 
 nur zwei Falle moglich ; entweder es ist dies, so ist es dasselbe ganz, au 
 
102 Unity of Fickte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 immer, hinweg iiber die Zeit und ihren Wechsel, der nur noch in dem 
 Blicke liegt, keineswegs im Sein ; oder es ist es nicht, so ist es eben nichts, 
 und es ist ganz gleichgiiltig, wie dieses Nichts gefarbt sei. 
 
 Ueber dieses unser wahres Wesen kann uns nun keine factische Selbst- 
 beobachtung Aufschluss geben ; denn gegeben (worauf doch allein die 
 Beobaclitung geht) werden wir uns in diesem Zustande nie ; sondem wir 
 konnen uns dazu nur machen, indem wir uns selbst ja nur als Leben, keines- 
 wegs als ein todtes Sein gegeben sind ; und dieses Machen findet nur statt 
 zufolge einer Erkenntniss, die hier eine rein apriorische, nur durch Intelli- 
 giren zu erwerbende ist. 
 
 Und dieses fiihrt mich denn auf den zweiten Punkt unserer wirklichen 
 Dififerenz, der formalen, iiber das Wesen, den Werth und den Erfolg des 
 Philosophirens. 
 
 Seite 15, 1 6 Ihrer Schrift : " Wenn ein Wesen ein von uns vollstandig 
 begriffener Gegenstand werden soli, so miissen wir es objectiv, als fur sich 
 bestehend, in Gedanken aufheben, um es ein blosses Schema werden zu 
 lassen." Richtig und trefflich ausgedriickt. In dieser Verwandlung der 
 dichten Wesen in durchsichtige Schatten besteht allerdings das Geschaft 
 der Speculation. Aber wie ist doch dem Menschen dieses wunderbare Ver- 
 mogen zu Theil geworden ? Warum ist er nicht lieber gleich durch seine 
 Natur in die Objectivitat fest hineingebannt, also dass ihm jener Muthwille 
 vergehen miisse ? Da er speculiren kann, so muss er wol speculiren solkn ; 
 und da dies in seinem urspriinglichen Vermogen liegt, so muss auch wol 
 die Entwickelung dieses Vermogens zur vollstandigen Entwickelung seines 
 Wesens gehoren. Der Grund davon findet sich auch bald. Wir werden 
 durch unsere natiirliche Geburt keineswegs in eine Welt der Wahrheit, son- 
 dern in eine Schatten- und Nebelwelt hineingeboren. Um diesen unfreien 
 Schematismus abzustreifen, erhielten wir das freie Vermogen zu schematisiren, 
 damit wir die Schemen, die wir ohnedies nicht dafiir ansehen, durch 
 andere, die wir als solche erkennen, auflosen. 
 
 Dieses Verfahren der Speculation durchgefiihrt kann freilich nur darait 
 endigen, dass das hdchstefiir sich Bestehende (als das absolute Factum der 
 Erscheinung Gottes) vernichtet und in ein blosses Schema verwandelt werde 
 (nicht Erscheinung schlechtweg, schema primum, bleibe, sondem Erschei- 
 nung der Erscheinung, schema secundum werde). Nun wird aber hoffent- 
 lich unser Philosoph wissen, was er selbst getrieben hat, und nicht dieses 
 letztere, sein Product, sondem das erste fur das Wahre und Rechte halten 
 und diesem sich hingeben. Er wird nicht das Wissen an die Stelle des 
 Lebens setzen und durch dieses sich mit dem Leben abfinden woUen, 
 sondern gerade zufolge seiner Erkenntniss vom Wesen des Wissens eben 
 leben. Dies, das wahre Leben leben, konnte er nun ohne sein Wissen 
 gar niclit ; denn das voUendete Leben der Erscheinung ist nothwendig ein 
 
Appendix. 103 
 
 sich selbst erscheinendes, durchsichtiges, klares, von sich durchdrungenes. 
 Und so zeigt sich denn die Speculation als cine durchaus nothwendige 
 Bestimmung des Lebens selbst, als der wahre Paraklet, auf den das Chris- 
 tenthum, das nur unter gewissen Zeitbedingungen, die dermalen durch 
 dasselbe selbst vernichtet zu sein scheinen, etwas vermochte, ^vertrostet 
 hat" (180-184). 
 
 In this letter Fichte's doctrine lies in a nutshell. In the longer treatises 
 the kernel is always the same, however hidden by cumbrous envelopment of 
 words. The aim of the following summaries of these treatises from the point 
 of view of the reconcihation, is to set before the reader the various forms in 
 which Fichte expressed the doctrine ; in them we support statements by 
 reference to volume and page, or by quotations. But before we reach these 
 treatises we find the reconciliation already in Fichte's mind, giving stuff and 
 form to the ego. Even in 1792 the ego was for him an absolute, therefore 
 what it is because it is, or a union of necessity and freedom : — 
 
 (1792) Recension des Aenesidemus. W. I. 1-25. "Wenn nemlich, — 
 urn die Momente jeuer Schlussart in ihrer hochsten Abstraction darzu- 
 stellen, — wenn das Ich in der intellectuellen Anschauung ist, weil es ist, 
 und ist, was es ist ; so ist es in sofern sich selbst setzend, schlechthin selb- 
 standig und unabhangig (22). 
 
 . . . das Gemiith . . . ist . . . transscendentale Idee ; die aber von 
 alien andern dadurch sich unterscheidet, dass wir sie durch intellectuelle 
 Anschauung, durch das Ich bin, und zwar : ich bin schlechthin, weil ich bin, 
 realisiren. Alle Anspruche Aenesidem's gegen dieses Verfahren grunden 
 
 sich bloss darauf, dass er die absolute Existenz und Autonomic des Ich 
 
 wir wissen nicht wie und fur wen — an sich gultig machen will : da sie doch 
 nur fur das Ich selbst gelten soil. Das Ich ist was es ist, und weil es 
 ist, fiir das Ich. Ueber diesen Satz hinaus kann unsre Erkenntniss nicht 
 gehen (16). 
 
 In these propositions lie latent the " Darstellung " of 1801 (see W. II. 
 16, 17) and the treatises of the last period with that insistence upon the 
 image-nature of existence which was called mysticism because it ascribed 
 reality only to God. 
 
 (1794) Grundlage. W. I. 83-328. 
 
 In this first formal exposition of his doctrine Fichte begins (91-123) with 
 the empirical world : this the plain man sees as consisting of himself and an 
 external universe, or of a self and a not-self. Two questions immediately 
 arise (123-149) : if the self and the not-self are distinct entities, how can the 
 
I04 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 self be conscious of the not-self, how can matter migrate into mind ? If, on 
 the other hand, the self and the not-self are one and the same substance, 
 if the non-ego is merely a fiction of the causal instinct of the ego, why 
 does the mind so persistently separate ego and non-ego and set them 
 against each other as the ultimate antithesis of existence? All theories 
 so far advanced in the history of thought have failed to answer one or 
 the other of these questions : causality, or material, theories, the former ; 
 substantiality, or ideal theories, the latter. Consciousness of a not-self, 
 and the compulsion which this not-self exercises upon the self are un- 
 solved problems. 
 
 To explain these problems, we are forced, Fichte thinks (149-170), to 
 assume behind and above the self and the not-self one common nature, of 
 which both are only two visible aspects : — the self can be conscious of 
 the not-self only in so far as it is kindred with it, and the not-self can compel 
 only that which is so adapted to it as to feel its compulsion : the ego and 
 the non-ego are two manifestations of one and the same being, of an un- 
 abhangige Thatigkeit behind them, which, with its manifestations, must be 
 for the mind, since for it they are the sum-total of existence, an Absolute, 
 and therefore free (unabhangig). Hence rational investigation of the em- 
 pirical world, and its laws of perception forces us, in Fichte's eyes, to 
 postulate, as its ground, origin, cause. Freedom : the world of consciousness 
 is the appearing of Free Will in the garb of Law. Though the individual is 
 not reached in the " Grundlage " it is self-evident that if he is considered 
 as an integral part of that Will which chooses to appear in his shape he is 
 free ; while if he is looked upon as mere, empty appearance of a power be- 
 hind, he is the creature of necessity. 
 
 Later (246-285) the freedom of the unabhangige Thatigkeit to give 
 birth to existence or to refuse to do so, is insisted upon. In the unabhan- 
 gige Thatigkeit must be the two elements (149 ff. W. II. 66) correspond- 
 ing to the two manifestations, self and not-self : the one is called the Pure 
 Ego, the other the Anstoss (210-227), pure limitation. Law, the Other. No 
 object can appear unless the Pure Ego relate its own activity with that of 
 the limiting Other (unless Freedom freely yield to Law). Upon this relat- 
 ing, objective existence depends, and this relating is an absolute one, un- 
 caused, without all ground : whether or not the objective world shall be, de- 
 pends only upon the Free Will which lies behind Consciousness. In the fol- 
 lowing passage this doctrine is stated perhaps as pointedly as anywhere in the 
 " Grundlage " — " Demnach ist X die durch das Ich in sich selbst gesetzte 
 unendliche Thatigkeit ; und diese verhalt sich zur objectiven Thatigkeit des 
 Ich, wie der Grund der Moglichkeit zu dem begriindeten. Der Gegenstand 
 wird bloss gesetzt, insofern einer Thatigkeit des Ich widerstanden wird ; 
 keine solche Thatigkeit des Ich, kein Gegenstand. Sie verhalt sich, wie 
 
Appendix. 105 
 
 das bestimmende zum bestimmten. Nur inwiefem jener Thatigkeit wider- 
 standen wird, kann ein Gegenstand gesetzt werden ; und inwiefem ihr nicht 
 widerstanden wird, ist kein Gegenstand. (The ego sees its own activity of 
 perceiving behind every object perceived) (259). 
 
 Wir betrachten jetzt diese Thatigkeit in Rticksicht ihrer Beziehung auf 
 die des Gegenstandes. An sich betrachtet sind beide voUig unabhangig 
 von einander, und vollig entgegengesetzt ; es findet zwischen ihnen gar 
 keine Beziehung statt. Soil aber, laut der Forderung, ein Object gesetzt 
 werden, so miissen sie doch durch das ein Object setzende Ich auf einander 
 bezogen werden. Von dieser Beziehung hangt gleichfalls das Setzen eines 
 Objects iiberhaupt ab ; insofern ein Object gesetzt wird, werden sie bezogen, 
 und inwiefem sie nicht bezogen werden, wird kein Object gesetzt. Ferner, 
 da das Object absolut, schlechthin und ohne alien Grund (der Handlung 
 des Setzens bloss als solcher) gesetzt wird, so geschieht auch die Beziehung 
 schlechthin und ohne alien Grund ; und erst jetzt ist vollig erklart, inwie- 
 fem das Setzen eines Nicht-Ich absolut sey : es ist absolut, inwiefem es sich 
 auf jene lediglich vom Ich abhangende Beziehung griindet. Sie werden 
 schlechthin bezogen, heisst : sie werden schlechthin gleich gesetzt. Da sie 
 aber, so gewiss ein Object gesetzt werden soil, nicht gleich sind, so lasst 
 sich nur sagen, ihre Gleichheit werde schlechthin gefordert : sie sollen 
 schlechthin gleich seyn. — Da sie aber wirklich nicht gleich sind, so bleibt 
 immer die Frage, welches von beiden sich nach dam anderen richten, und 
 in welchem der Grund der Gleichung angenommen werden soUe ? — Es ist 
 sogleich einleuchtend, wie diese Frage beantwortet werden miisse. So wie 
 das Ich gesetzt ist, ist alle Realitat gesetzt ; im Ich soil alles gesetzt seyn ; 
 das Ich soil schlechthin unabhangig, Alles aber soil von ihm abhangig seyn ; 
 (/. e., the ego can never transcend itself to find an Other : — it finds all 
 reality included within its own circumference as perceiver of the reality.) 
 Also, es wird die Uebereinstimmung des Objects mit dem Ich gefordert ; 
 und das absolute Ich, gerade um seines absoluten Seyns willen, ist es, 
 welches sie fordert (259, 260). 
 
 Kant's kategorischer Imperativ. Wird es irgendwo War, dass Kant seinem 
 kritischen Verfahren, nur stillschweigend, gerade die Pramissen zu Grunde 
 legte, welche die Wissenschaftslehre aufstellt, so ist es hier. Wie hatte er 
 jeraals auf einen kategorischen Imperativ, als absolutes Postulat der Ueber- 
 einstimmung mit dem reinen Ich, kommen konnen, ohne aus der Voraus- 
 setzung eines absoluten Seyns des Ich, durch welches alles gesetzt ware, 
 und, inwiefem es nicht ist, wenigstens seyn sollte. . . . Nur weil und 
 inwiefem das Ich selbst absolut ist, hat es das Recht, absolut zu postu- 
 liren ; und dieses Recht erstreckt sich denn auch nicht weiter. als auf ein 
 Postulat dieses seines absoluten Seyns, aus welchem denn freilich nocli 
 manches andere sich diirfte deduciren lassen (260, note). 
 
 14 
 
io6 Unity of Ficht^s Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 (179s) Grundriss. ?F. I. 329-411. 
 
 Existence with its laws is persistently explored until its very laws force 
 us into a region of freie Krafte (390-396) as source of these laws. 
 
 (1798) Sittenlehre. ?r. IV. 1-365. 
 
 The ego, in reflection upon itself (1-49) finds iXstM forced to view itself 
 as free, hence it must view itself as free and constrained, at one and the 
 same moment. How explain this seeming contradiction in such wise that 
 both the freedom and the compulsion of the ego shall be preserved, and 
 the facts of consciousness adequately accounted for ? Obviously the com- 
 pulsion must be of such sort as shall allow freedom. Such compulsion is 
 found only in the Moral Law (45-49, 51-53). The ego finds its existence 
 rationally explicable only as a moral fact : the laws of its being are 
 merely a moral necessity which addresses itself to Superactual Freedom as 
 an "ought." Superactual Freedom obeys, and the world of consciousness 
 with its objective laws results, — laws which, though seemingly imposed from 
 without, are really taken freely upon itself by the real being of the ego, or 
 Superactual Freedom. Hence the world of strict necessity is grounded in 
 freedom, the continuity of law is the result of the continuity of free choice, 
 and every phenomenon as rooted in the One Will is rooted in its freedom, 
 while, as result of the will it is only creature of law (1-62). Next, the con- 
 ception of Superactual Freedom which we have now gained is shown to 
 involve realization of self by Freedom as the world of consciousness, hence 
 to involve its laws, or necessity (75-122). 
 
 We add two quotations from the same work which recognize and ex- 
 press sharply the two points of view of man's freedom : — (i) that in his 
 original being he is free ; (2) that as actual phenomenon he is the creature 
 of necessity. Remember that these passages occur in the " Sittenlehre " of 
 1798, which every critic acknowledges to belong to Fichte's first period. 
 Yet they express the very doctrine which, expounded in the later works, 
 caused Fichte to be accused of change of system, of having deserted 
 Philosophy for Mysticism. 
 
 " IVenn der Mensch auf diesem Reflectionspuncte stehen bleibt, so ist 
 es nicht anders moglich, als dass er diese Maxime habe. Er kann unter 
 dieser Bedingung keine bessere haben. Aus dem vorausgesetzten Reflections- 
 puncte also lasst die Maxime sich theoretisch ableiten. Aber dass er auf 
 diesem Reflectionspuncte stehen bleibt, ist gar nicht nothwendig, sondern 
 hangt ab von seiner Freiheit ; er sollte schlechthin sich auf einen hoheren 
 schwingen, und konnte es auch. Dass er es nicht thut ist seine Schuld ; mit- 
 hin ist die untaugliche Maxime, die daher fliesst, gleichfalls seine Schuld. 
 Auf welchem Reflexionspuncte das Individuum stehen werde, lasst also 
 sich nicht vorher sagen ; denn dieser folgt aus keinem theoretischen Gesetze. 
 
Appendix. 107 
 
 Es ist sonach ganz richtig, wenn man urtheilt : in dieser Lage, d. h. bei 
 dieser Denkart und Charakter, konnte der Mensch schlechthin nicht anders 
 handeln, als er gehandelt hat. Es wiirde aber unrichtig seyn, wenn man 
 hierbei mit seinem Urtheile stehen bleiben and behaupten woUte, er konne 
 auch keinen anderen Character haben, als er habe. Er soil schlechthin 
 sich einen anderen bilden, wenn sein gegenwartiger nichts taugt, und er 
 kann es ; denn dies hangt schlechthin ab von seiner Freiheit (181). 
 
 Hier ist etwas unbegreifliches ; und es kann nicht anders seyn, well wir 
 an der Grenze aller Begreiflichkeit, bei der Lehre von der Freiheit in An- 
 wendung auf das empirische Subject, stehen. Nemlich, so lange ich in 
 dem hoheren Reflectionspuncte noch nicht stehe, ist er fiir mich gar nicht 
 da ; ich kann sonach von dem, was ich soUte, keinen Begriff haben, ehe ich 
 es wirklich thue. Dennoch bleibt es dabei, dass ich es absolut thun soil : 
 nemlich ich soil es in Beziehung auf einen anderen Beurtheiler, der diesen 
 Punct kennt, und in Beziehung auf mich selbst, wenn ich ihn einst kennen 
 werde. Ich werde mich alsdann nicht mit dem Unvermogen entschuldigen, 
 sondern mich dariiber anklagen, dass ich es nicht schon langst gethan habe. 
 Ich soil es in Beziehung auf meinen.urspriinglichen Character, welcher 
 aber selbst nur eine Idee ist_(j[8i, 182). 
 
 AnderrlraHrres auch gar nicht seyn; denn ein Act der Freiheit ist 
 schlechthin, well er ist, und ist ein absolut erstes das sich an nichts anders 
 ankniipfen und daraus erklaren lasst. . . . Begreifen heisst ein Denken an 
 ein anderes ankniipfen, das erstere vermittelst des letzteren denken. Wo / 
 eine solche Vermittelung moglich ist, da ist nicht Freiheit, sondern Mecha- j 
 nismus. Einen Act der Freiheit begreifen woUen, ist absolut widersprechend. I 
 Eben wenn sie es begreifen konnten, ware es nicht Freiheit (182). f 
 
 . . . Man denke sich den Menschen in dem beschriebenen Zustande. 
 Da er iiberhaupt seinem urspriinglichen Wesen nach, wenngleich nicht in 
 der Wirklichkeit, frei ist und unabhangig von der Natur, so soil er imraer 
 aus diesem Zustande sich losreissen ; und kann es auch, wenn man ihn als 
 absolut frei betrachtet : aber ehe er durch Freiheit sich losreissen kann, muss 
 er erst frei seyn. Nun ist es gerade seine Freiheit selbst, welche gefesselt 
 ist ; die Kraft durch die er sich helfen soil, ist gegen ihn im Bunde. Es ist 
 da gar kein Gleichgewicht errichtet; sondern es ist ein Gewicht seiner 
 Natur da, das ihn halt, und gar kein Gegengewicht des Sittengesetzes. 
 Nun ist zwar wahr dass er absolut in die andere Wagschale treten und jenen 
 Schritt entscheiden soil; es ist wahr, dass er auch wirklich Kraft in sich hat, 
 ins unendhche sich soviel Gewicht zu geben, als nothig ist um seine Trag- 
 heit zu iiberwiegen : und dass er in jedem Augenblicke durch einen Druck 
 auf sich selbst, durch den blossen Willen diese Kraft aus sich herausheben 
 kann ; aber wie soil er auch nur zu diesem Willen und zu diesem ersten 
 
io8 Unity of Ficht^s Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 Drucke auf sich selbst kommen ? Aus seinem Zustande geht ein solcher 
 keinesweges hervor, sondern vielmehr das Gegentheil das ihn halt und 
 fesselt. Nun ist auch dies wahr, dass dieser erste Anstoss daraus nicht 
 hervorgehen soil, noch kann, sondern absolut aus seiner Selbstthatigkeit. 
 Aber wo ist denn in seinem Zustande die Stelle, au; welcher er jene 
 Kraft hervorbringen konnte? — Absolut nirgends. Sieht man die Sache 
 natiirlich an, so ist es schlechthin unmoglich, dass der Mensch sich selbst 
 helfe ; so kann er gar nicht besser werden. Nur ein Wunder, das er 
 selbst zu thun hatte, konnte ihn retten. (Diejenigen sonach, welche ein 
 servum arbitrium behaupteten, und den Menschen als einen Stock und 
 Klotz characterisirten, der durch eigene Kraft sich nicht aus der Stelle 
 bewegen konnte, sondern durch eine hohere Kraft angeregt werden miisste, 
 hatten voUkommen rechl, und waren consequent, wenn sie vom natiirlichen 
 Menschen redeten : wie sie denn thaten) (201). 
 
 (1801) Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre. W. II. 1-163. 
 
 This treatise deals more directly than any other with the problem of 
 Freedom and Necessity : subordinate questions are neglected : the Erster 
 Theil is devoted to setting forth the rationaUty of the view that the world of 
 consciousness is the appearance of Superactual Freedom in the form of 
 Necessity, while the Zweiter 7%if// deduces from the interpenetration of Free-, 
 dom and Necessity the forms of existence. We transcribe a passage from 
 the closing pages where Fichte's characterization of Freedom is unusually 
 clear : — 
 
 Dieses ist nun die Freiheit, und hier zwar die absolute, die Indifferenz 
 in Bezug auf das absolute, ganze (nicht dieses oder jenes) Wissen selbst. 
 a) Die Freiheit kot' f^oxr\v ist daher ein Gedanke und nur in ihm, der selbst 
 mit Freiheit zu Stande gebracht ist, wie sich versteht. b) Sie ist, negativ 
 gefasst, nichts anderes als der Gedanke von der Zufdlligkeit des absoluten 
 Wissens. (Man beachte wohl den scheinbaren Widerspruch : das Wissen 
 nemhch ist das absolut Zufallige, oder das zufalhge Absolute — die Seite 
 der Zufalligkeit (friiher : Accidentalitat) des Absoluten — eben well es in 
 die Quantitat und die absolute Grundform derselben, die unendliche Zeit- 
 folge, hineinfallt.) Positiv gefasst, ist die Freiheit der Gedanke der 
 Absolutheit des Wissens, dass es eben sich selbst setzt durch sich verwirk- 
 lichende Freiheit. Das Verschmelzen beider Bestimmungen ist der Begriff 
 der Freiheit in seinem idealen und realen Momente. c) Dieser Gedanke 
 der Freiheit des Wissens ist nicht ohne sein Seyn (so wie iiberhaupt kein 
 Denken ohne Anschauung : es ist dieselbe durchgreifende Verbindung, wie 
 in den friiheren Synthesen). Nun ist dies die Freiheit kot' i^oxh^, und alle 
 andere Freiheit ist nur eine untergeordnete Art. Sonach : keine Freiheit 
 ohne Seyn (Gebundenheit, Nothwendigkeit) und umgekehrt. Die Zeit 
 
Appendix. ion 
 
 fallt unter das Band dieser Nothwendigkeit, nur Denken ist frei. Nur nach 
 voUendeter Zeit ware die Intelligenz ganz und durchaus Freiheit : dann 
 aber ware sie Nichts ; sie ware ein unwirkliches (seynloses) Abstractum, 
 und so bleibt es dabei, dass das Wissen seiner Substanz nach Freiheit, 
 immer jedoch in bestimmter Weise (in bestimmten Reflexionspuncten) 
 gebundene Freiheit ist (158, 159). 
 
 2) Hauptsatz : Es ist absoluter formaler Charakter des Wissens, dass es 
 reines Entspringen sey ; wo es daher zum Wissen kommt, kommt es durch- 
 aus nothwendig zum Wissen von der Freiheit. Die tiefste Potenz im 
 Principe der Wahrnehmung ist das blosse Analogon des Denkens, — das 
 Gefilhl. Jedes Individuum fuhlt sich wenigstens frei. Zusatz : Dies 
 Gefiihl der Freiheit ist aber nicht ohne eines der Gebundenheit (159). 
 
 Folgesatz : Durchaus alle Freiheit ist daher eine Abstraction von irgend 
 einer, in irgend einem Maasse gesetzten Realitat : ein blosses Scheniatisiren 
 derselben (159). 
 
 3) In jeder niederen Potenz der Freiheit ist fiir das Iqdividuum eine 
 hohere reale mitenthalten, die er selbst nicht erkennt, die ihm aber ein 
 Anderer anmuthen kann, und die fur ihn eine Gebundenheit, Concretion 
 seiner selbst ist. — Z. B. die gedachte Freiheit in ihrer niederen Potenz 
 haben wir kennen lernen als den Begriff eines beliebig zu fassenden sinn- 
 lichen Zweckes. Das Allgemeine dazu ist jene Freiheit, auf das sinnliche 
 Object, uber dem der Zweckbegriff schwebt, zu reflectiren oder auch nicht 
 (wo Nothwend/gkeit und Freiheit schlechthin in einen Punct zusammen- 
 fallen). Hier setzt das Wissen sich als frei, indiiiferent, nur gegen dieses 
 bestimmte Object ; — in der Wahrnehmung iiberhaupt aber ist es befangen, 
 und in ihrem ganzen Geiste und ihrer Sinnesart, ohne dies zu merken, — 
 und dies ist eben der Zustand des sinnhchen Menschen. Jeder, der hoher 
 steht, kann ihra sagen, dass er frei sey, sich auch dariiber zu erheben : nur 
 er selbst nicht " (159, 160.) 
 
 Another noteworthy passage is the following : — " Der letzte Grund des 
 jedesmaligen Zustandes der Welt ist nun aufgegangen : er ist das Seyn und 
 Ruhen des Gesammtwissens im Absoluten. Dadurch wird freilich auch der, 
 wenn auch nicht immer deutlich bemerkte Zustand jedes Einzelnen bestimmt, 
 der von seiner Seite wieder den Gesammtzustand bestimmt. Dieser Grund 
 aber, und seine Folge, konnte in jedem Augenblicke anders seyn, und kann in 
 jedem Momente der Zukunft anders werden, als er ist. Das hochste Gesetz 
 des Seyns, das da Gesetze tragt, ist kein Naturgesetz (Gesetz eines materia- 
 len Seyns), sondern ein Freiheitsgesetz, auszudriicken in dieser Formel : 
 Es ist eben Alles, wie die Freiheit es macht, und wird nicht anders, wenn sie 
 es nicht anders macht (IF. II. 113, 114; see also pp. 23, 24, 25, 30, etc.). 
 
 In this treatise Fichte never wearies in telling us that the world which 
 
1 10 Unity of Fickte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 we see is Freedom-stuff, is Freedom in the act of willing to exist : — it 
 arises " aus der vollzogenen Freiheit " (54) ; " durch absolute Vollziehung der 
 Freiheit" (61); "absolute Freiheit das Wissen, und das absolute Wissen 
 Freiheit" (32) ; " die Freiheit als Substrat des Accidens, kann seyn oder 
 auch nicht ; ist sie aber, so ist sie durch das absolute Seyn, als die Substanz, 
 unveranderHch bestimmt " (69). " Wenn einmal ein Wissen ist, so ist das- 
 selbe nothwendig frei (gebundene Freiheit) ; denn in der Freiheit besteht 
 eben sein Wesen. Dass aber tiberhaupt eins sey, hangt nur ab von 
 absoluter Freiheit, und es konnte daher eben sowohl auch keines seyn 
 (52), etc., etc. 
 
 The complete absence of empirical freedom is expounded in § 41, 
 127-132. 
 
 (1804) Die Wissenschaftskhre, Ngl. W. II. 87-314. See summary 
 under " The Absolute,'' Appendix, pages 150-159, especially the discussion 
 of Idealism and Realism (Ngl. W. II. 1 10-212) ; of Soil (212-238) ; of 
 Freedom (310, 311)- 
 
 (1806) Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben. W.Y. 397-580. 
 
 One of the clearest expressions of the truth that the individual, as the 
 appearance of God, has all His freedom and power, even though being sub- 
 ject to empirical law, is to be found in this popular work : — It tells us that 
 God is thought, " Das reine Denken ist selbst das gotthche Daseyn ; und 
 umgekehrt, das gottliche Daseyn in seiner Unmittelbarkeit ist nichts anderes, 
 denn das reine Denken (418-419, 410, 411); He is our notion of Free- 
 dom : " Freiheit ist gewiss und wahrhaftig da, und sie ist selber die Wurzel 
 des Daseyns : doch ist sie nicht unmittelbar real ; denn die ReaUtat geht in 
 ihr nur bis zur Moghchkeit " (513). Yet He appears, as Necessity, as Seyn 
 with its laws (403-406, 438-443), (i.e., as a notion which Reason forms of 
 him) which again appears as Daseyn with its laws (442, 443) (i. e., Reason 
 tells us that existence is the appearing of God) ; in this appearance is he 
 present with his full and complete power and to this appearance belongs all 
 that which he, inwardly and through his essential nature, is : in this very ne- 
 cessity is his very freedom, for the necessity is his freedom choosing to be 
 necessity, and every individual and atom of it is at once freedom and neces- 
 sity, the freedom of the Divine Will and the necessity which this Divine 
 Will wills that itself shall be. " Das reale Leben des Wissens ist daher, in 
 seiner Wurzel, das innere Seyn und Wesen des Absoluten selber und nichts 
 anderes ; und es ist zwischen dera Absoluten oder Gott, und dem Wissen 
 in seiner tiefsten Lebenswurzel, gar keine Trennung, sondern beide gehen 
 vollig ineinander auf " (443). Die Sache steht so : Inwiefern das gottUche 
 
Appendix. \\\ 
 
 Daseyn unmittelbar sein lebendiges und kraftiges Daseyen ist, — Daseyen 
 sage ich, gleichsam einen Act des Daseyns bezeichnend, — ist es dem inneren 
 Seyn gleich, und ist darum eine unveranderliche, unwandelbare und der 
 Mannigfaltigkeit durchaus unfahige Eins . . . (451). 
 
 (i) Was das absolute Seyn, oder Gott, ist, das ist er schlechthin und unmit- 
 telbar durch und von sich : nun ist er unter anderm auch da ; aussert und 
 ofFenbaret sich : dieses Daseyn, — dies ist der Punct, auf den es ankomrat, — 
 dieses Daseyn ist er daher auch von sich, und nur — im Vonsichseyn unmit- 
 telbar, das ist im unmittelbaren Leben und Werden. Er ist, in seinem 
 Existiren, mit seiner ganzen Kraft zu existiren dabei; und nur in diesem 
 seinem kraftigen und lebendigen Existiren besteht seine unmittelbare Exis- 
 tenz : und in dieser Riicksicht ist sie ganz, eins, unveranderlich (452). 
 
 (2) Hierin nun ist Seyn und Daseyn vollig in einander aufgegangen, und 
 mit einander verschmolzen und vermischt ; denn zu seinem Seyn von sich 
 und durch sich gehort sein Daseyn, und einen anderen Grund kann dieses 
 Daseyn nicht haben : wiederum zu seinem Daseyn gehort alles dasjenige 
 was er innerlich und durch sein Wesen ist. Der ganze in der vorigen Stunde 
 aufgezeigte Unterschied zwischen Seyn und Daseyn, und der Nichtzusam- 
 menhang zwischen beiden, zeigt sich hier als nur fiir uns, und nur als eine 
 Folge unserer Beschrankung seyend : keinesweges aber als an sich und un- 
 mittelbar in dem gottlichen Daseyn seyend (452). 
 
 See also 441. 
 
 (1810) Die Wissenschaftslehre in ihrem allgemeinen Umrisse. W. II. 
 693-709. 
 
 Soil nun das Wissen dennoch seyn, und nicht Gott selbst seyn, so kann 
 es, da nichts ist denn Gott, doch nur Gott selbst seyn, aber ausser ihm 
 selber ; Gottes Seyn ausser seinem Seyn ; seine Aeusserung, in der er ganz 
 sey, wie er ist, und doch in ihm selbst auch ganz bleibe, wie er ist. Aber 
 eine solche Aeusserung ist ein Bild oder Schema (696). 
 
 Nemlich dieses Seyn schlechtweg ausser Gott kann keinesweges ein in 
 sich gebundenes, fertiges und todtes Seyn seyn, wie denn auch Gott kein 
 solches todtes Seyn ist, vielmehr Leben ; sondern es muss seyn ein blosses 
 reines Vermogen, indem gerade ein Vermogen das formale Schema des 
 Lebens ist. Und zwar kann es seyn Vermogen zur Verwirklichung nur 
 dessen, was in ihm liegt, eines Schema. Da dieses Vermogen ein bestimmtes 
 Seyn ausdriickt, das Schema des gottlichen Lebens, so ist es freilich be- 
 stimmt, aber nur auf die Weise, wie ein absolutes Vermogen bestimmt seyn 
 kann, durch Gesetze, und zwar durch bedingte Gesetze. Soil das und das 
 wirklich werden, so muss unter dieser Bedingung das Vermogen so und so 
 wirken (697). 
 
 Zuvorderst also : zu einem wirklichen Seyn ausser Gott kommt es nur 
 
112 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 durch die Sich-Vollziehung des absoluten Vermogens ; dieses aber kann 
 vollziehen nur Schemen, die durch ein zusammengesetztes Verfahren mit 
 ihnen zu einem wirklichen Wissen werden. Was daher ausser Gott da ist, 
 ist da nur durch das absolut freie Vermogen, als Wissen dieses Vermogens, 
 und in seinem Wissen ; und ein anderes Seyn ausser dem wirklich in Gott 
 verborgenen Seyn ist schlechthin unmoglich (697). 
 
 (1810-11) Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. W. II. 535-691. 
 
 Consciousness, upon examination, proves itself to be a Leben involving 
 the conception of a Seyn, or God, of whom it is only utterance, image (680- 
 685). This Seyn has Freedom (683). " Weiteres nun, als dass es sey das 
 Absolute, und dass es nicht sey Anschauung oder irgend etwas Anderes, das 
 in der Anschauung zufolge ihrer Lebendigkeit liegt, liisst sich von demselben 
 in diesem seinem blossen Begriffe nicht aussagen. Dies aber ist die blosse 
 Form seines Seyns, und zwar bloss im Gegensatze mit dem Seyn der Er- 
 scheinung. Was Gott wirkhch an und in sich ist, erscheint in der Anschauung ; 
 diese driickt ihn ganz aus, und er ist in derselben, wie er innerhch ist in 
 ihm selbst ; aber diese Anschauung wird nicht wieder angeschaut, sondern 
 sie aussert sich nur durch die mit ihr verkniipfte Freiheit. Also sein 
 Wesen, sowie es in ihm selbst ist, aussert sich in alle Unendlichkeit fort, 
 zunachst und unmittelbar in der Anschauung des ewigen Endzwecks. Das 
 Leben darum in seinem eigentlichen Seyn ist Bild Gottes, so wie er ist 
 schlechthin in sich selbst (684, 685). 
 
 The world of consciousness is the image of God and expresses His being 
 fully ; He is freedom, therefore it is freedom ; it is law, therefore He is a 
 freedom which is Law, or a Moral Will : the sight of the moral will in 
 humanity is His immediate visibility in which His nature utters itself un- 
 changeably in all eternity. 
 
 (1812) Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 315-492. 
 
 In this treatise the problem of Freedom and Necessity is explicitly 
 treated, and Fichte gives us his solution in the clearest terms possible to 
 him. His statement may be summarized as follows : The world of con- 
 sciousness is called the Erscheinung because it is the appearance of God. 
 God is Freedom. Hence the Erscheinung must appear as Freedom. It 
 does so appear : it appears as the freedom of reflection, or as the ego form 
 (382, 488, 489). This freedom to reflect or not to reflect upon a given self 
 images exactly God who is necessity and freedom, i. e., who is and who yet 
 has freedom. These two elements in God, freedom and necessity, are re- 
 conciled by his freedom's being a freedom to reflect upon self or not ; since 
 His self is, His self has being or is governed by law j hence if freedom 
 
Appendix. \ 1 3 
 
 reflects upon it, freedom subjects itself to law; by so reflecting Freedom 
 images the being of God, and becomes the world of consciousness. Now 
 the freedom of reflection always remains. It is at any moment God's free- 
 dom, therefore can at any moment continue to reflect or cease reflecting. 
 If it should cease reflecting the world of consciousness would fade away. 
 As a fact, it does reflect : it exists only for the purpose of reflecting, and it 
 chooses to fulfil the purpose of its existence : it chooses to be Holy Will. 
 It appears as a totality of individuals. They, as isolated points, have no 
 power, but as points of self-consciousness of God's freedom ascribe this 
 freedom to themselves. We quote passages to confirm this synopsis : — 
 
 The Erscheinung is the appearing of God. Die Erscheinung ist 
 Erscheinung Gottes (388). "Wir haben darum, was wir woUten, eine 
 doppelte Form der einen und selbigen Erscheinung. (1) Die Erschei- 
 nung ist schlechtweg, und insofern erscheint in ihr das Absolute, wie es ist 
 in ihm selber. Insofern, und wenn man in diesem Sinne von der Erschei- 
 nung redet, ist sie, wie sie ist, ganz, sich selbst gleich, keiner Veranderung, 
 keines Zuwachses und keiner Abnahme fahig. Zu ihr wird Nichts und 
 vergeht Nichts, und die Genesis ist aus ihrem innern Sein durchaus heraus- 
 zudenken. (2) Diese eine Erscheinung nun erscheint auch eben so schlecht- 
 hin, als sie ist, sich selbst in sich selbst, — diese selbige, sage ich, seiend 
 und bleibend dasselbige. ... Ist klar, dass in dem : sie erscheint sich, als 
 Verbum, ausgesprochen wird ein Leben und eigene Thatigkeit, also aller- 
 dings eine Genesis und Eintreten in die Genesis des, in der ersten Form 
 der Genesis durchaus unempfanglichen Seins (337, 338). 
 
 Verdeutlichung. In dem ersten Sinne und Form ist die Erscheinung 
 schlechthin Nichts durch sich : Sie ist da, formahter, durch das absolute 
 Erscheinen Gottes, und ist qualitativ, was sie ist, dadurch Gott so ist. 
 Dieses ihr Sein ist nun unwandelbar und unveranderlich, und kann nicht 
 durch irgend eine andere Form geandert oder modificirt werden ; denn es 
 ist ihr absolutes Sein. Dieses, also als unveranderlich festzuhaltende, 
 erscheint nun wieder in einem neuen Bilde, welches eben die unverander- 
 liche Erscheinung ist durch sich selbst, und in ihr selbst, indem sie dadurch 
 erscheint sich. Das Bild, das absolute, das Urschema, Schema I., bildet 
 sich. In dem ersten ist kein Wandel : in dem zweiten, dem neuen Bilde 
 von dem dauernden Urbilde, mag wohl ein unendlicher Wandel sein. Jenes 
 ist und bleibt die Grundlage alles Bildens in der zweiten Potenz : es tritt 
 aber selbst in die zweite Potenz schlechthin niemals ein, indem in ihr ja nicht 
 ist das Bild unmittelbar, sondem schlechthin nur das Bild vom Bilde. 
 (Jenes Seiende, als Sein, bildet sich) . . . Das Sein des Bildes ist Eins ; 
 und insofern starres und unveranderliches Sein : dieses ist nun zugleich ein 
 sich abbildendes Leben, sich in jenem unveranderlichen Sein. Das Bild 
 
 IS 
 
114 Unity of Fichtes Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 ist in sich selbst nicht lebendig, noch selbststandig, sondem es ist, wie es ist, 
 durch Gott. Das Leben und zwar keinesweges ein reales, sondem nur ein 
 schematisirendes Leben tritt zu jenem ersten Sein hinzu, und empfangt von 
 ihm das Gesetz. (Es kann nicht bilden, ausser nach dem Urbilde.) So nicht 
 das Absolute, welches in ihm selbst lebendig und selbststandig ist, und kein 
 beschrankendes Gesetz annehmen kann (338, 339). 
 
 The Erscheinung appears as Freedom. "Zufolge der Reflexion, 
 und diese gesetzt, erhalt die Erscheinung ein absolut freies und selbststdn- 
 diges Leben in der That und Wahrheit : nicht Erscheinung, sondem 
 (?;-2^«(?' der Erscheinung ; (eben auf dem Gebiete der Reflexion). Diese 
 Freiheit hat ein Gesetz der Freiheit ; * sie soil ins Werk gerichtet werden, 
 damit Wahrheit sei, damit die Erscheinung als solcJte erkannt werde, und 
 hinter ihr Gott. Umgekehrt: soil die Erscheinung a/f Ji?/ir/4^, und so Gott 
 in seiner Reinheit erscheinen, so muss die Freiheit sein : denn nur das freie 
 und selbststandige Leben kann sich reflektiren. Jenes Gesetz * ist Realgrund 
 der Freiheit ■\ (377). 
 
 Wir haben damit eigentlich die Aufgabe gelost : Wie erscheint die Er: 
 scheinung als Princip , indem wir ein noch Hoheres gefunden haben, als 
 wir suchten, eine reale Freiheit der Erscheinung. Wir selbst von unserm 
 Standpunkte der Wissenschaftslehre aus erblicken sie als absolut reales und 
 lebendiges Princip in ihr selbst. Als Reflexionsvermogen ihrer eigenen 
 Erscheinung ist sie namlich dieses (378, 379). 
 
 Was ist nun jene Reflexibilitdt und was liegt in ihr ? Wir gehen zur 
 Analyse der Reflexibilitat, die ganz getreten ist an die Stelle des Sich, das 
 wir vorher analysirten. Auch sie ist Sich, aber ein Sich mit Freiheit. . . . 
 Sich ist verwandelt in Reflexibilitdt ; ein freies Sich. AUes friihere nur 
 Hinleitung zu diesem Begriffe. Mit dessen Analyse wird die Deduktion der 
 Wissenschaftslehre enden ; wie Sie sehen, liegen darin die zwei Welten, die 
 der Gesetzmdssigkeit, in welche die Freiheit selbst mit aufgenommen worden, 
 und die der Freiheit selbst (379). 
 
 . . . giebt es wirklich ausser Gott eine Freiheit, eine Selbstbestimmung 
 aus sich, von sich, durch sich? Wir haben dieselbe schon ganz klar und 
 unumwunden mit Ja beantwortet. Bringen wir jedoch damit nicht ein ab- 
 solutes Aus sich, Durch sich in die Erscheinung, die doch schlechthin nicht 
 durch sich ist ; also einen Widerspruch ? Wir verlangen nur recht ver- 
 standen zu sein. Die Erscheinung ist allerdings frei ; sie ist ein Zeben iiber- 
 haupt, nicht von sich, sondem durch Gott: selbst aber bestimmend dieses 
 Leben durch sich. Sie ist darum in der letzten Bedeutung allerdings selbst- 
 standiger Grund von Etwas, das ohne sie durchaus nicht ist : aber von 
 keinem Sein, da sie ja selbst dies nicht ist, sondem von Erscheinungen. 
 
 * Moral Law. t Soil ist der Grund des Seyns. 
 
Appendix. 115 
 
 So frei femer ist sie nach dem Gesetze, das das Erscheinen Gottes ihr giebt : 
 sie soil frei sein ; und alle die Aeusserungen ihrer Freilieit, die durch das 
 Gesetz bedingt sind, und in ihm liegen, sollen sein. Nur kann das Gesetz 
 sich nicht durch sich selbst zur Wirklichkeit bringen ; sondern die Verwirk- 
 lichung liegt in der Freiheit Die Freiheit ist darum eine \td\^\c\i formale : 
 nicht Grund des Was, denn dies ist das Gesetz, sondern Grund des £>ass. 
 Eine Freiheit des Was, qualitativ, ist schlechterdings ungereimt. Ob sie 
 iiberhaupt sei, oder nicht, hangt von ihr selbst ab. Was sie dann wird, und 
 wovon der Grund, liegt im Gesetze (379, 380). 
 
 Diese Freiheit ist nun nach ihrem Gehalte Reflexibilitat und durchaus 
 nichts welter : Besinnungsvermogcn iiber die durch das absolut (mechanisch) 
 gebietende Gesetz herbeigefiihrte Erscheinung : also Grund eines gewissen 
 Erscheinens der absolut gegebenen Erscheinung, welches Erstere sich eben, 
 wenn nur die Form der Besinnung durch absolute Freiheit eintritt, selbst 
 macht durch das Gesetz. Also Resultat der Freiheit ist eine blosse Ansicht 
 dessen, was schlechthin ist und sich selbst macht. Wie nun das, was uns 
 als Freiheit erscheint, das Wirken, das sitthche namlich, (denn ausserdem, 
 wenn uns das empirische Wirken auch als Freiheit erscheint, sind wir ganz 
 im Irrthume) : und das Hochste, der Wille, denn doch auch nur sind eine 
 gewisse bestimmte Form der Besinnung, werden wir eben nachweisen 
 miissen. Grund aller Realitat in der Erscheinung ist diese Freiheit ; die 
 eigentliche und einzige Wurzel des Realen in der Erscheinung (380). 
 
 Jetzt haben wir den Satz : dass die Erscheinung eben/m sei, in seiner 
 Grundeinheit eingesehen und dies ist das Wichtigste. (381). 
 
 Wenn dies nun so ist, dass die einzige wahre Freiheit der Erscheinung 
 die sei, zu reflektiren : — so lasst sich dem Menschen nichts anmuthen, als 
 sich eben vollstandig zu besinnen : dies aber lasst sich auch Allen anmuthen. 
 Mit jenem hat er Alles (381). 
 
 Wir sagten : die Reflexibilitat, oder die Freiheit, gehort zum absoluten 
 Sein der Erscheinung : und dieses ganze Sein ist durch dieselbe begriffen. 
 Ist so sehr unser Ernst, dass wir durch die blosse Erschopfung der Reflexi- 
 bilitat auch das Wesen der Erscheinung zu erschopfen glauben (382). 
 
 Die Reflexibihtat gehort zum Wesen : dies griindet sich auf den friihern 
 Satz : das Absolute soil erscheinen als solches. Dies kann es nun schlecht- 
 hin nicht durch einen blossen Mechanismus des Sicherscheinens, sondern 
 nur durch Reflexion auf denselben in seiner Gegebenheit, die ein Leben 
 innerhalb des Lebens, und so Freiheit ist. Die Erscheinung muss darum 
 frei sein, so gewiss das Absolute, als solches, in ihr erscheinen soil : sie ist 
 nothwendig frei (382). 
 
 Gott macht sich nicht unmittelbar zum Erscheinenden, sondern nur mit- 
 telbar in und vermoge der Freiheit der Erscheinung : seine wirkliche Er- 
 scheinung ist ein Produkt der Erscheinung vermittelst der ihr zu diesem 
 
Ii6 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 Behufe einwohnenden Freiheit. Er kann erscheinen nur in einem Freien 
 
 (382, 383)- 
 
 Die Erscheinung ist darum schlechtliin ein Freies ; durch und an Gott, 
 ein blosses, reines Vermogen, zu erscheinen und sichtbar zu machen so 
 Sich wie Gott. Dieses ist ihr ideates Sein durch Gott (383). 
 
 So viel im AUgemeinen fiber die Reflexibilitat als Freiheit, als absolute 
 Selbstandigkeit, Leben aus sich und von sich der Erscheinung (384, 385). 
 
 (i) Die Erscheinung ist Erscheinung Gottes. Was sie als solche ist, ist 
 sie eben durch Gott selbst. Dies ist ofifenbar nicht a priori einzusehen 
 sondem aus dem Erscheinen Gottes zu erwarten. Es ist das Reale in 
 der Erscheinung. (2) Ist sie eben Erscheinung, nicht Gott selbst : was 
 ist sie nun als solche, was setzt sie dadurch zu dem Realen zu ? Sie ist 
 Sicherscheinung, somit Reflexibilitat ; falls dies erschopft ist, so kennen 
 wir den Zusatz, die Form, in welche von ihr das Reale aufgenommen 
 wird (388). 
 
 Welche Form wird durch die Reflexibilitat der Erscheinung gesetzt? 
 
 (i) Sie setzt, oder ist Freiheit der Erscheinung : reale Kraft und Vermogen 
 der weiteren Fortbestimmuug des, durch ihr blosses Sein aus Gott in ihr 
 gesetzten Lebens. • ■ • (2) Die Reflexibilitat ist aber nicht unbeschrankte, son- 
 dern beschrdnkte Freiheit : zuvorderst nicht des Seins, sondem der Erschei- 
 nung iiberhaupt, also zu erscheinen, zu bilden. Darum nicht qualitative 
 (ein Sein und Schaffen), sondem formate. Sodann insbesonders Freiheit zu 
 reflektiren; ein Bild, das als Sache gesehen wurde, durch Freiheit sich 
 sichtbar zu machen als Bild (388, 389). 
 
 Dies ist der Grundbegriff der Reflexion: die Sichtbarmachung des 
 Seienden als Bild (389). 
 
 See also 400-424. 
 
 The Empirical World appears through Freedom's freely Yield- 
 ing ITSELF to Law. Dass eine faktische Welt sei, hangt iiberhaupt ab von 
 dem sich Hingeben der Freiheit der Erscheinung an das Gesetz * (430). 
 
 Die ganze faktische Welt griindet sich auf absolute Freiheit, und auf ein 
 Gesetz* an diese (431). 
 
 Darum alles wirkliche Leben ist bedingt durch eine Bestimmung der 
 absoluten Freiheit ; und zwar hebt diese Bestimmung nothwendig an vom 
 sich Hingeben, indem die entgegengesetzte, das sich Losreissen, bedingt ist 
 durch die Hingegebenheit. Auf diesem Akte der Freiheit beruht nun alles 
 Sehen, welches es auch sei, als dem Grunde seiner Wirklichkeit. Aus dem 
 absoluten selbst, dem Realen, geht nur hervor die Sichtbarkeit ; d. i. eben 
 die beschriebene Freiheit, und nichts mehr (432). 
 
 Diese Freiheit hat ein Gesetz der Freiheit ; * sie soil ins Werk gerichtet 
 
 * Moral Law. 
 
Appendix. 1 1 7 
 
 werden, damit Wahrhdt sei, damit die Erscheinung als solche erkannt 
 werde, und hinter ihr, Gott. Umgekehrt : soil die Erscheinung ah solche, 
 und so Gott in seiner Reinheit erscheinen, so muss die Freiheit sein : denn 
 nur das freie und selbststandige Leben kann sich reflektiren. Jenes Gesetz 
 ist Realgrund der Freiheit. So gewiss die Erscheinung ist, so gewiss soil 
 sie sich ah Erscheinung erkennen ; und so eine neue Form des Gesetzes 
 (377. See 380). 
 
 Giebt sie (die Freiheit) sich nicht hin (an das faktische Gesetz) so 
 kommt es iiberhaupt zu gar keiner Anschauung (431). 
 
 . . . zu einem Blicke gehort ein Gesetz, und die Freiheit des sich Hin- 
 gebens. Es giebt aber zwei Grundgesetzgebungen der BUcke, als hohere 
 und niedere Welt. Welche eintrete, hangt ab vom Hingeben der Freiheit. 
 Wenn darum die Frage so gestellt wird : nicht, warum ist dieser oder jener 
 Blick moglich ? denn sie sind alle gleich moghch, — sondern : warum ist 
 er wirklich 1 so muss der Grund gesucht werden in der Freiheit. Sie ist der 
 Grund der Wirklichkeit alles Be wusstseins. In ihr liegt der Disjunctionsgrund ; 
 dieser darum jenseits der Wirklichkeit : alles wirkliche Bewusstsein aber 
 liegt innerhalb der Disjunction. ... In der Freiheit ist darum das Grund- 
 gesetz der wirklichen Bestimmtheit aufzusuchen, und zwar in einem an sie 
 gerichteten Gesetze (433). 
 
 The Law to which Freedom yields is the Moral Law. Giebt 
 es nun etwa wiederum ein Gesetz dieses Hingebens? Dass die Frei- 
 heit nicht muss sich hingeben, ist klar ; ausserdem ware sie nicht Freiheit. 
 (Spaterhin werde ich doch das Gesetz an die Freiheit hinstellen als ein fak- 
 tisches Gesetz, indem ich den faktischen Blick betrachte als den Schopfer der 
 Freiheit selbst. — Wie dies ? ist ein schwerer Punkt ! ) (The parenthesis 
 signifies that the command of duty to reflect until freedom in God to do right 
 for the sake of right is discovered, is an empirical fact within the breast of 
 every one, absolutely given just as are red and green. Reflection discovers 
 this Freiheit, whose only existence is in consciousness as a logical conclu- 
 sion, hence der faktische Blick ist der Schopfer der Freiheit selbst.) Das 
 gesuchte Gesetz ist darum kein faktisches, mit Nothwendigkeit gebietendes. 
 Erst nachdem die Freiheit sich hingegeben und dadurch sich als Freiheit 
 aufgehoben und vernichtet hat, tritt dieses faktische Gesetz ein. Was fiir 
 eins nun? Wir haben gesehen, dass durch das faktische Sehen die An- 
 schauung des Realen, des absoluten Von Sich bedingt sei. Gesetzt nun 
 es sollte zu diesem Sehen kommen, das Absolute machte sich sichtbar, so 
 miisste, da dies unter dieser Bedingung nur moglich ist, die Freiheit sich 
 hingeben sollen an das faktische Gesetz. Giebt sie sich nicht hin, so 
 kommt es iiberhaupt zu gar keiner Anschauung. Aber es soil dazu kom- 
 men. Die Freiheit soli darum sich hingeben. Die ganze faktische Welt 
 
1 1 8 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 griindet sich auf absolute Freiheit, und auf ein Gesetz an diese ; nicht zwar 
 so weit wir bisjetzt sehen, auf ein qualitatives und materiales, denn dieses 
 hat sie in sich selbst, sondern auf ein bless Formates des Hingebens. (Dies 
 diirfte bedeutend werden ; es diirfte uns schon hier ein Eingang eroffnet sein 
 zur Einsicht in das Gesetz einer faktischen Welt iiberhaupt) (430, 431). 
 
 Atlgemeine Uebersicht. Wo stehen wir ? Was haben wir fiir den Zweck 
 unserer Untersuchung gewonnen? (i) Durch die ganze Anschauung haben 
 wir uns gestellt in den Zusammenhangspunkt der beiden Welten, der fak- 
 tischen und iiberfaktischen. Da wir auf die Einsicht des Einheits- und 
 Grundpunktes jener Disjunction ausgehen, so ist dies ohne Zweifel ganz 
 richtig. (2) Der letzte bedeutende Fund war : eine Freiheit, frei zu bleiben, 
 Oder auch sich hinzugeben an ein, die Freiheit bindendes Gesetz. Diese 
 Freiheit ist jetzt welter bestimmt, und ein Irrthum abgeschnitten. Sie ist 
 keiuesweges ein an sich reales Princip, sondern sie ist lediglich Princip ver- 
 schiedenartigen Sehens. Sie ist in sich selber durchaus nicht das Reale 
 selbst, sondern sie ist nur das aus der Anschaubarkeit des Realen schlecht- 
 hin erfolgende, und durch dieselbe abgesetzte Vermogen, das Reale anzu- 
 schauen. Frei ist dieses Princip, als Bestimmungsgrund verschiedener 
 Weisen des Sehens. (Es ist darum, dieser Ansicht zufolge, in ihm ein wirk- 
 lich realer Kern, der kein Sehen ist, sondern Grund eines Sehens jenseits 
 alles Sehens : nicht wirkliches Sehen, sondern nur Sichtbarkeit des wahrhaft 
 Realen^ . . . Will man doch das wirkliche Sehen, das hier lediglich von 
 der Freiheit abhangt, mit dem Realen durch ein Gesetz verbinden ; so kann 
 man nur sagen : das Reale sott gesehen werden : Die Freiheit sott darum 
 sich hingeben an das faktische Gesetz ; die absolute Freiheit selbst wird 
 erblickt unter einem Gesetze, und zwar einem Freiheitsgesetze, einem 
 blossen 5^// (431, 432). 
 
 See also JVgl W. II. 377, 380. 
 
 Hence the Existence of the World is a Moral Fact. Das Sehen 
 ist gar nicht schlechtweg faktisch, sondern es ist dies um seiner hohern 
 Bestimmung willen : seine Bestimmung ist der eigentliche Sitz seines Seins. 
 Es ist frei und soli. Es ist, wenn man so will, durch und durch praktisch 
 und moralisch. (Dies ist die Spitze und der reinste Ausdruck des Idea- 
 lismus der Wissenschaftslehre, zu dem ich durch friihere Satze vorbereiten 
 wollte) (470). 
 
 Nach uns erhalt die Natur auch nur eine sittliche Beziehung : sie ist in 
 gewisser Weise die Darstellung der Sittlichkeit, und diese der Grund ihres 
 Seins (398). 
 
 Also das absolute Leben = A ist nicht sichtbar, ohne ein B (substantial I) 
 im Gesichte zu setzen, was nun lediglich ist dessen Sichtbarkeit : aber hin- 
 wiederum B ist nicht sichtbar, ohne ein C (empirical I) zu setzen, das nun 
 
Appendix. iig 
 
 abermals ist die Sichtbarkeit dieses B, welches selbst lediglich ist die Sicht- 
 barkeit des A, das alkin mehr ist, als blosse Siclitbarkeit (427). 
 
 See also Ngl. W. 1. 457, II. 485 ; W. II., 87, 90, 150-157, 657, 702-709. 
 
 Fichte's View of the Phenomenon of Willing is clearly expressed in 
 this treatise : its substance is that the individual, as isolated self, never wills ; 
 he is only a point of self-consciousness of the Total Will. We adduce 
 texts : 
 
 Setze nun, das also Hingegebene reisse sich los (i. e. the individual 
 abjures the sense-world that he may do right for the sake of right) : so er- 
 blickt es sich als sich absolut schaffend. Nun aber haben wir gesehen, dass 
 dieses ganze, hier eintretende Ich gar nichts Wahres und Reales ist, sondern 
 dass bloss die wirkliche Anschauung des absolut Realen, des Von sich, diese 
 Glieder mit sich bringt. In der Wahrheit schafft darum nicht das Ich, die 
 Freiheit sicli, sondern sie wird durch die Losreissung wirklich die An- 
 schauung des Realen, welche durch ihr Sein ein solches Ich, in dieser 
 Form, mit sich bringt. Also durch das Sichlosreissen wird die Freiheit 
 abermals hingegeben, oder giebt sich hin einem faktischen Gesetze, dem 
 der Anschauung des Von sich, wie einem andern, dem der Einfachheit und 
 Wahrheit : da es in dem andern, faktischen Gesetze hingegeben war der 
 Mannigfaltigkeit, und nicht der Wahrheit, sondern der blossen Sichtbarkeit 
 der Wahrheit. Wie wir oben die Freiheit in Beziehung auf die niedere 
 Welt, als ein blosses Hingeben, nannten Receptivitdt, Sinn : so finden wir, 
 dass auch in Beziehung auf die hohere Welt, ungeachtet aller Vorspiegelung 
 von Freiheit des Denkens, welches ja die blosse Anschauungsform ist, sie 
 auch nichts mehr ist, denn Sinn und Receptivitdt. Auch diese Anschauung 
 macht die Freiheit nicht, sondern diese macht sich ihr, nur unter der Be- 
 dingung, dass sie sich losreisse von der niedern des concreten Mannigfal- 
 tigen {Ngl. W. II. 432, 433). 
 
 Davon erwarten wir nun eben auch eine tiefere Charakteristik der 
 beiden Welten (the world of Trieb and the world of Soil). Die alte ist 
 verschwunden. Bisher namlich bezeichneten wir die faktische als die Ge- 
 bundenheit des Sehens, die hohere als die Freiheit ; — aber die Freiheit hat 
 sich jetzt gefunden als durchaus nicht die des Sehens, sondern eines absolut 
 Sichtbaren, jenseits des Sehens. Beides ist darum Receptivitdt und Sinn. 
 Denken und faktischer Blick, vorher entgegengesetzt, jetzt beides Sinn. 
 Es bleibt bei diesem Resultate, weil wir tief genug gedrungen sind. Es 
 anders zu nehmen, ist ein Halten auf der Oberflache (434). 
 
 Man setze, diese Moglichkeit solle zur Wirklichkeit iibergehen; was 
 wiirde geschehen mtissen? Die absolute Construction (explained page 482 
 in the following terms : " Alles Sehen aber entsteht durch eine That des 
 absoluten Constructionsvermogen (des, das eben ist, des allgemeinen. — 
 
I20 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 Bemerken Sie wohl, dass ich hier noch nicht sage : des Ich ; — haben wir 
 so etwas als unabtrennlich eingemischt, so ist hier der Ort, wo wir es ablegen 
 miissen) " — dieselbe, von der wir oben redeten, nicht das Ich — miisste sich 
 ebeu beschranken auf das Gesetz des urspriinglichen Construirens ; mithin 
 sich losreissen von dem ersten, bloss faktischen Gesetze, als das Sehen 
 allein bestimmendes. Dies miisste es thun durchaus ohne ersichtlichen 
 Grund ; indem ja hier das eigenthche Sehen erst angeht, also schlechtweg. 
 Was wiirde dadurch im Sehen entstehen? Das Ich, das gegebene faktische, 
 ist der unmittelbare Reflex jener Construction ; also dieses, seiner sich be- 
 wusste Ich wiirde sich erblicken, als mit seiner bekannten, schon im Bilde 
 gegebenen Freiheit sich losreissend von jenem faktischen Gesetze, das auch 
 als Trieb angeschaut ist. Mit der bekannten, sage ich, d. i. mit der in der 
 faktischen Welt zwischen einem vorausgegebenen Mannigfaltigen schweben- 
 den Freiheit : also mit der, die da kann, oder auch nicht, mit der Freiheit in 
 Indifferenz. So, sage ich, wird das sichtbare, itidividuelle Ich (denn nur 
 dieses ist faktisch gesehen) sich erscheinen im Reflexe. Wie es sich in der 
 That verhalt, sehen wir. Nicht es reisst sich los, sondern die absolute Seh- 
 kraft reisst sich los, und dieses wahrhafte Losreissen reflektirt sich nur als 
 freies Losreissen des Ich (485). 
 
 Das sittliche Ich vollzieht das Gesetz durchaus um des Gesetzes willen. 
 Der Wille ist darum lediglich Erscheinung der durch das absolute Gesetz 
 bestimmten faktischen Ich-anschauung ; der Reflex der Bestimmung der 
 faktischen Construction (see 482) durch das Gesetz, und fiir uns, die wir 
 uns anschauen, das Unterpfand, dass wir ergriffen sind vom Gesetze der 
 Sittlichkeit (487). 
 
 Auch biirgt diese Ergriffenheit durch das Gesetz fiir die Ewigkeit und 
 Unendlichkeit des Ich, und des Willens. Das Gesetz in seiner Einheit ent- 
 wickelt nach seinem innern Wesen sich nothwendig fort in unendlicher Ge- 
 staltung, und dies eben ist das Gesetz und seine Einheit, und der Reflex, 
 der es fiihrt bis in die faktische Welt. Ich aber und Wille ist ja nichts 
 weiter, denn der Reflex dieser Fortentwicklung den jene nothwendig bei 
 sich fiihrt (487). 
 
 See also 380, 415, 416. Ngl. W. III. 69, etc. 
 
 (181 2) Das System der Siitenlehre. Ngl. W. III. i-n8. (See under 
 "BegrifT," Appendix, pages 182-184.) 
 
 (18 1 2) Transcendentale Logic. Ngl. rf^. I. 103-400. 
 Logic deals with the forms of thought. Thought is, with Fichte, in its 
 primary appearance, the empirical world. Hence Transcendental Logic 
 
•Appendix. 121 
 
 deals with phenomena, or with the form of consciousness and its laws. 
 Examination of these phenomena shows that the only place in which the 
 notion of freedom can be introduced is the point of transition from potential 
 existence to actual existence, when That Whicli Appears takes on the form 
 of consciousness, or the ego-form. " Es bleibe darum der Freiheit der 
 Construction Nichts ubrig, als sich zu machen zum Ich, zu einem solchen 
 Sein, das sein Bild von sich mitbringt " (218). " In dem Erscheinen des 
 Absoluten selbst liegt das : Ich bin nicht, wie wir wohl gesehen haben. 
 In ihr liegt nur Inhalt und nichts weiter ; in ihm nicht, heisst in der Er- 
 scheinutig selbst, und da dies hier begriffen ist als ein durchaus freies Princip ; 
 so heisst es, die Ichform liegt in der Freiheit. . . . Was bleibt also der 
 Freiheit ubrig fur die Construction eines Unconstruirbaren ? Der Gehalt zu 
 construiren nicht ; denn setzest du die Ichform nicht, so ist kein Gehalt, 
 setzest du sie aber, so ist das Bild nach dem Gesetze, und da hat die Frei- 
 heit ihr Ende erreicht. Wo lasst sich hier also ein Construiren noch 
 denken? Wie wenn es ware in dem Sichsetzen der Erscheinung in der 
 Ichform selbst?" (219.) The only conception of Freedom which it is pos- 
 sible for us to entertain is the conception of a free potential Ego which 
 voluntarily renounces its freedom and yields itself to law, or to existence as 
 an actual ego : which voluntarily appears in the ego form, or as the world 
 of consciousness. The ego images itself as free to be not free. " Bedenken 
 Sie : Die Erscheinung macht sich selbst zu einem Ich, setzt sich in diese 
 Form, haben wir gesagt. Nennen wir diesen Satz = O. Mit diesem Satze 
 ist es nun allerdings seinem Inhalte nach unser voUer Ernst, und dabei soil 
 es bleiben. Ferner sagen wir : — von diesem ihrem Machen hat sie nun ein 
 Bild ; von ihrem Machen, sage ich, also sie, die fiir sich schon ist, macht 
 sich ; also sie hat schon ein Ich vor dem Ich, das hier gemacht wird, wel- 
 chem das Machen im Bilde eben zugeschrieben wird. Jetzt soil es sich 
 machen zu einem nicht freien, zu einem solchen, welches zum Bilde wird 
 durch Nothwendigkeit, durch sein Sein. Also es miisste sich bilden als 
 aufgebend seine Freiheit, also sich hingeben an das sich selbst machende 
 Sein ; es bildet sich also dies Ich als frei zum Nichtfreisein, als 
 schlechthin sich bestimmen konnend zum sich nicht machenden und be- 
 stimmenden. So und nicht anders muss es im Bilde erscheinen" (219, 
 220). 
 
 This Treatise has abundant room for the recognition of God in its " Bild 
 des Seyns " which occurs on almost every page, but it confines itself to 
 material phenomena. 
 
 (1813) Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseins. Ngl. W. I. 401-574. See 
 Appendix, page 98; also under " Begriff," Appendix, pages 184-186. 
 
 16 
 
122 Unity of Fichtes Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 (1813) Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 1-86. 
 Consciousness examines itself by means of a series of returns upon itself, 
 and reaches the conclusion that it is Absolute Principle of itself (54-60), there- 
 fore an Absolute (33), (therefore free). Further examination forces it to see 
 that it is an Absolute Principle under Law (60-68). At this point the 
 treatise was interrupted by the war and was never completed (see also 
 summary under " Seyn," Appendix, pages 1 71-175). 
 
 (18 1 3) EinleitungsvorUsungen in die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. I. 
 1-102. See under "Leben and Endzweck/' Appendix, page 181 and 
 Seyn," Appendix, pages 175-177. 
 
Appendix. 123 
 
 HOLY WILL. 
 
 We have given as the two main points of Fichte's creed: (i) that 
 consciousness can never know God as a Ding an sick : instead it sees only 
 its own conception of him, a bit of consciousness itself, a mental image ; 
 (2) that the most truthful image of God which thought, in obedience 
 to its laws, can frame, is a notion of an infinite Holy WUl. We refer to 
 the text : — 
 
 Consciousness never finds God. 
 
 (1800) Die Bestimmung des Menschen. ?F. II. 165-319. 
 Wie du fiir dich selbst bist, und dir selbst erscheinest, kann ich nie ein- 
 sehen, so gewiss ich nie du selbst werden kann. Nach tausendmal tausend 
 durchlebten Geisterleben werde ich dich noch ebensowenig begreifen als 
 jetzt, in dieser Hiitte von Erde. — Was ich begreife, wird durch mein blosses 
 Begreifen zum Endlichen ; und dieses lasst auch durch unendliche Steige- 
 rung und Erhohung sich nie ins Unendliche umwandeln. Du bist vom End- 
 lichen nicht dem Grade, sondern der Art nach verschieden. Sie machen 
 dich durch jene Steigerung nur zu einem grosseren Menschen, und immer 
 zu einem grosseren ; nie aber zum Gotte, zum Unendlichen, der keines 
 Maasses fahig ist. — Ich habe nur dieses discursiv fortschreitende Bewusst- 
 seyn, und kann kein anderes mir denken. Wie diirfte ich dieses dir zu- 
 schreiben? In dem Begriffe der Personlichkeit liegen Schranken. Wie 
 konnte ich jenen auf dich iibertragen ohne diese? etc. (304, 305. See also: 
 W. II. 13, 22, 27, 30, 35, 85, 87, 106, III, 147, 684, 68s ; W. V. 453, 
 4S4, 458) 461, 539) 540; NgL W. I. 45, 78, 148, 376, 377, 414, 415, 537, 
 563) 564; NgL W. II. 3, 4, 383, 440, 443; Leben II. 181). 
 
 God for Consciousness must be Holy Will. 
 
 In the (1800) " Bestimmung des Menschen," W. II. 165-319, the fullest 
 expression is given to Fichte's conception of God as an Organic Moral Will 
 (294-319). Of this Organic Will the individual wills are members, and move 
 and determine it (298). This popular work is so generally known that it is 
 unnecessary to quote from it. 
 
1 24 Unity of Fichtes Doctritte of Knowledge. 
 
 (1798) Das System der Sittenlehre. W. IV. 1-365. The pure I is 
 freedom (1-39). The pure I is " uber alle Zeit und alle Veranderung in der 
 Zeit erhaben" (169), or a God-element. The pure I appears as necessity 
 (46-49). The only reconciliation of the pure I's being at the same time 
 freedom and necessity is that the necessity which rules it is one that allows 
 the exercise of freedom, or that it is a moral necessity. The pure I in ap- 
 pearing as necessity is obeying the Moral Law (39-49, 49-7S); or is Holy 
 Will. 
 
 (r8o6) Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben. W. V. 397-580. God is 
 Will : — es (das Seyn des Daseyns, Gott,) ist der stehende, ewige, und unver- 
 anderhche Wille der absoluten Realitat, so sich fort zu entwickeln, wie sie 
 nothwendig sich entwickeln muss (517- See 516-523). 
 
 God as Will must be Holy Will in Fichte's eyes, for he tells us continu- 
 ally that the will of the holy man is identical with God's Will. " So wie 
 durch den hochsten Act der Freiheit und durch die Vollendung derselben 
 dieser Glaube schwindet, fallt das gewesene Ich hinein in das reine gotdiche 
 Daseyn, und man kann der Strenge nach nicht einmal sagen: dass der 
 Affect, die Liebe und der Wille dieses gottlichen Daseyns die seinigen 
 wiirden ; indem tiberhaupt gar nicht mehr Zweie, sondern nur Eins, und 
 nicht mehr zwei Willen, sondern iiberhaupt nur noch Einer und ebender- 
 selbe Wille Alles in Allem ist" (518. See 519, 522, etc.). 
 
 The same result can be reached by correlating the various statements 
 about God which this work contains: for instance, God is Will (516-523) ; 
 God is Seyn (403-407, 438, 439) ; Seyn loves itself for its own sake (525, 
 498, S'?) 540-550); Seyn must be concrete law, or it would not be Seyn; 
 "itself" is the law of its being (see under " Seyn," Appendix, pages 164^ 
 167). Hence God is a Will moved by desire for law, or Holy Will. 
 
 (18 10) Die Wissenschaftslehre in ihrem allgemeinen Umrisse. W. II. 
 693-7°9- The world of consciousness, or knowledge, is the " Bild," 
 " Schema " of God (696). The holy will of humanity is the actual Schema 
 of God (707-709). 
 
 (1812) Das System der Sittenlehre. Ngl. IV. III. 1-118. The sub- 
 stance of this work is that moral humanity is the direct appearance of God : 
 we are constantly told that the moral man is " das Leben des Begrififs." 
 The reading of this work alone convinces the student that Fichte's notion 
 of God is the notion of an organic Holy Will. 
 
Appendix. 125 
 
 (1812) Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 315-492. See extracts 
 above, Appendix, pages 11 2-120. 
 
 (18 1 3) Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. Ngl. W. I. 401-574. The 
 substance of this treatise is that the Erscheinung, as the image of God, must 
 see itself wilhng to throw forth the image of God, since God wills to throw 
 forth his image. The image of God which it throws forth is a free will 
 doing what it ought because it ought, or a multiplicity of egos freely organ- 
 izing themselves into the unity of One Moral Will (516-574. See Appen- 
 dix, pages 184-186). 
 
126 Unity of Ficht^s Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 GOD. 
 
 The term " God " is used loosely by Fichte. Its three chief uses may 
 
 be summarized as follows : (i) sometimes it stands for the Inconceivable, 
 
 for that which allows no predicates, and is unthinkable, for that which, when 
 
 we seek the cause of consciousness, we are forced to postulate as lying beyond 
 
 consciousness and generating it, but which by this very act of postulating we 
 
 ! make part of consciousness ; (2) sometimes it denotes the ultimate image 
 
 \ which reason forms of this Inconceivable ; (3) and again it is used as an 
 
 j identical expression for those appearances in consciousness for which reason 
 
 I can find no explanation, as the this and that of sensation, the commands of 
 
 duty, the activity that thinks, etc. Besides these technical senses of the 
 
 word, Fichte often employs it in a merely conventional way, attaching to it no 
 
 sharply defined signification. 
 
 We give references to the text, preceding them by a quotation which states 
 briefly the relations of God and existence as Fichte conceived them, and 
 which shows that for him the terms "God," "Seyn," "the Absolute," and 
 " Leben " are interchangeable. 
 
 (1805) Ueber das Wesendes Gelehrten. fT. VI. 347-448. 
 
 (i) Das Seyn, durchaus und schlechthin als Seyn, ist lebendig und in 
 sich thatig, und es giebt kein anderes Seyn, als das Leben ; keinesweges 
 aber ist es todt, stehend und innerlich ruhend . . . (361). 
 
 (2) Das einzige Leben, durchaus von sich, aus sich, durch sich, ist das 
 Leben Gottes oder des Absoluten, welche beide Worte eins und dasselbe 
 bedeuten ; und wenn wir sagen : das Leben des Absoluten, so ist dies auch 
 nur eine Weise zu reden ; indem in der Wahrheit das Absolute das Leben, 
 und das Leben das Absolute ist (361). 
 
 (3) Dieses gottliche Leben ist an und fiir sich rein in sich selber ver- 
 borgen, es hat seinen Sitz in sich selber, und bleibt in sich selbst, rein auf- 
 gehend in sich selbst, zuganglich nur sich selber. Es ist — alles Seyn, und 
 ausser ihm ist kein Seyn. Es ist darum durchaus ohne Veranderung oder 
 Wandel (361, 362). 
 
 (4) Nun aussert sich dieses gottliche Leben, tritt heraus, erscheinet und 
 stellt sich dar, als solches, als gottUches Leben : und diese Darstellung, 
 oder sein Daseyn und ausserliche Existens ist die Welt. Nehmen Sie das 
 
Appendix. 127 
 
 gesagte strenge ; es stellt sich dar, sich selber, so wie es innerlich wirklich 
 ist und lebt, und kann sich nicht anders darstellen ; es tritt daher zwischen 
 sein wahres inneres Seyn, und seine aussere Darstellung keinesweges etwa 
 eine grundlose Willkiir in die Mitte, zufolge welcher es sich nur theilweise 
 hergabe, theilweise aber verbarge ; sondern seine Darstellung, d. h. die 
 Welt ist lediglich durch die zwei Glieder, sein eigenes inneres Wesen an 
 sich, und die unveranderHchen Gesetze seiner Aeusserung und Darstellung 
 iiberhaupt, bedingt, und unveranderhch bestimmt. Gott stellt sich dar, wie 
 Gott sich darstellen kann. Sein ganzes, an sich unbegreifliches Wesen, 
 tritt heraus, ungetheilet und ohne Riickhalt, so wie es in einer blossen Dar- 
 stellung heraustreten kann (361, 362). 
 
 (S) Das gottliche Leben an sich ist eine durchaus in sich geschlossene 
 Einheit, ohne aller Veranderlichkeit oder Wandel, sagten wir oben. In der 
 Darstellung wird Dasselbe, aus einem begreiflichen nur hier nicht aus- 
 einanderzusetzenden Grunde, ein ins unendliche sich fortentwickelndes und 
 iinmer hoher steigendes Leben in einem Zeitflusse, der kein Ende hat. 
 Zuvorderst ; es bleibt in der Darstellung Leben, haben wir gesagt. Das 
 Lebendige kann keinesweges dargestellt werden in dem Todten, denn 
 diese beiden sind durchaus entgegengesetzt, und darum, so wie das Seyn 
 nur Leben ist, ebenso ist das wahre und eigentliche Daseyn auch nur 
 lebendig, und das Todte ist weder, noch ist es, im hoheren Sinne des 
 Wortes, da. Dieses lebendige Daseyn in der Erscheinung nun nennen wir 
 das menschliche Geschlecht. Also allein das menschliche Geschlecht ist da. 
 So wie das Seyn aufgeht und erschopft ist in dem gottlichen Leben, so gehet 
 das Daseyn, oder die Darstellung jenes gottlichen Lebens auf in dem ge- 
 sammten menschlichen Leben, und ist durch dasselbe rein und ganz 
 erschopft. Sodann: das gottliche Leben wird in seiner Darstellung zu 
 einem ins unendliche sich fortentwickelnden, und nach dem Grade der 
 inneren Lebendigkeit und Kraft immer hoher steigenden Leben. Daher, — 
 welche Folgerung wichtig ist : daher ist das Leben in der Darstellung, in 
 alien Zeitpuncten seines Daseyns, im Gegensatze mit dem gottlichen Leben 
 beschrankt, d. h. zum Theile nicht lebendig, und noch nicht zum Leben 
 hindurchgedrungen, sondern insofern todt. Diese Schranken soil es nun 
 immer fort durch sein steigendes Leben durchbrechen, entfernen, und in 
 Leben verwandeln (362, 363). 
 
 Sie haben an dem soeben aufgestellten Begriffe der Schranken, . . . 
 den Begriff der objectiven und materiellen Welt; oder der sogenannten 
 Natur (363). 
 
 Fichte in attaching, in the passage quoted above, predicates to God, is 
 not describing a Ding an sich, but is showing us in what form the notion 
 " God " must appear in consciousness. We subjoin another passage which 
 describes the action of consciousness in presenting in image-form. 
 
128 Unity of Ficht^s Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 (1806) Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben. W.N. 397-580. 
 
 . . . wir begreifen zu allernachst und selber nicht, wie wir an sich 
 sind : und dass wir das Absolute nicht begreifen, davon liegt der Grund 
 uiclit in dem Absoluten, sondern er liegt in dem Begriffe selber, der sogar 
 sich nicht begreift. Vermochte er nur sich zu begreifen, so vermochte er 
 ebensowohl das Absolute zu begreifen ; denn in seinem Seyn jenseits des 
 Begriffes ist er das Absolute selber (453, 454). 
 
 Also das Bewusstseyn, als ein Unterscheiden, ist es, in welchem das ur- 
 spriingliche Wesen des gottlichen Seyns und Daseyns — eine Verwandlung 
 erfahrt. Welches ist nun der absolut Eine und unveranderUche Grund- 
 charakter dieser Verwandlung? (454). 
 
 Bedenken Sie folgendes : Das Wissen als ein Unterscheiden, ist ein 
 Charakterisiren der Unterschiedenen ; alle Charakteristik aber setzt durch 
 sich selbst das stehende und ruhende Seyn und Vorhandenseyn des charak- 
 terisirt werdenden voraus. Also, durch den Begriff wird zu einem stehenden 
 und vorhandenen Seyn (die Schule wiirde hinzusetzen, zu einem Objectiven, 
 welches aber selbst aus dem ersten folgt, und nicht umgekehrt) dasjenige, 
 was an sich unmittelbar das gottliche Leben im Leben ist, und oben auch also 
 beschrieben wurde. Also : das lebendige Leben ist es, was da verwandelt 
 wird ; und ein stehendes und ruhendes Seyn ist die Gestalt, welche es in 
 dieser Verwandlung annimmt, oder : die Verwandlung des unmittelbaren 
 Lebens in ein stehendes und todtes Seyn ist der gesuchte Grundcharakter 
 derjenigen Verwandlung, welche der Begriff mit dem Daseyn vomimmt. — 
 Jenes stehende Vorhandenseyn ist der Charakter desjenigen, was wir die 
 Welt nennen ; der Begriff daher ist der eigentliche Weltschopfer, vermittelst 
 der aus seinem inneren Charakter erfolgenden Verwandlung des gotriichen 
 Lebens in ein stehendes Seyn, und nur fiir den Begriff und im BegrifiFe ist 
 eine Welt, als die nothwendige Erscheinung des Lebens im Begriffe ; jen- 
 seits des Begriffes aber, d. h. wahrhaftig und an sich, ist nichts und wird in 
 alle Ewigkeit nichts, denn der lebendige Gott in seiner Lebendigkeit (454). 
 
 Die Welt hat in ihrem Grundcharakter sich gezeigt, als hervorgehend 
 aus dem Begriffe ; welcher Begriff wiederum nichts ist, denn das Als zum 
 gottlichen Seyn und Daseyn (454). 
 
 This passage, taken in connection with the three preceding pages already 
 quoted in part {W. V. 451, 452, 453), shows that Fichte's " Seyn Gottes," 
 here as everywhere, is a notion, and not a Ding an sich. God exists only 
 in the consciousness of thinking men (see also W. I. 498, 499 ; Ngl. W. I. 
 42-45, 78). 
 
Appendix. i2q 
 
 God is the Inconceivablb. 
 
 (1813) Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. IV. 11. 1-86. "Wir haben im- 
 mer gesagt : Gott, oder das Absolute erscheint, bildet sich ab. Konnen wir 
 nochso sagen? Nein. Das Absolute erscheint gar nicht so unmittelbar, 
 sondern nur in der Ableitung dieser Glieder. Das Sein des Absoluten ist 
 Gesetz fiir eine bestimmte Freiheit des Verstandes, ftir die Verstandlichkeit 
 seiner selbst, namlich als Bild Gottes " (46). 
 
 (18 1 3) Einleitungsvorlesungen in die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. I. 
 1-102. " Selbst in deinem Begriffe von Gott siehst du dein Begreifen : 
 in dem Bilde seines Lebens dein eigenes Bilden dieses Lebens. Was du 
 siehst, bist immer du selbst" (78). 
 
 (1812) Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 315-492. Nun erscheint 
 zwar auch nach uns alles Sein : namlich Gottes, und das ideale Sein der Er- 
 scheinung (das Letztere in der Aeusserung der Freiheit). Nun erscheint es 
 nicht, wie es ist, die Erscheinung bringt das Ihrige mit hinzu. Diese Son- 
 derung soil nun hier gemacht werden, damit Gott nach Abzug der Bildform 
 in seiner urspriinglichen Reinheit erscheine. So erhellet recht die Freiheit 
 als Grund der Erscheinungen, qualitativ genommen : indem jenseits ihrer 
 Aeusserung durchaus keine qualitative Erscheinung ist. Ihrer Aeusserung 
 zusehen, heisst darum allerdings sich in den Werdepunkt der Wirkhchkeit 
 stellen, der Schopfung der Welt zuschauen, die hier nur eine andere Be- 
 deutung bekommt, als gewohnlich (383). 
 
 See also : — 
 
 (1798) Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an 
 
 eine gottliche Weltregierung. W. V. 179, 180, T87, 188. 
 
 (1799) Gerichtliche Veranwortunggegendie An- 
 
 klage des Atheismus. W. V. 258-267. 
 
 (1800) Bestiramung des Menschen. W. II. 304, 305. 
 
 (1801) Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre. W. II. 61. 
 (1806) Anweisung zum seligen Leben. W. V. 461. 
 (1810, 11) Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. W. II. 684, 685. 
 (1812) Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 315-492.1 
 
 1 In this work is developed more fully than in any other the interrelation 
 of the two spheres of consciousness, God and the world. Fichte constantly 
 reminds us that the consideration of the one member involves the postulating 
 
 17 
 
1 30 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 (1812) Die Sitttenlehre. Ngl. W. III. 4, 25, 36, 72.1 
 
 (181 2) Die Transcendentale Logik. Ngl. W. I. 376, 377. 
 
 (1813) Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. Ngl. W. I. 414, 415. 
 
 See also references under " Holy Will," " Consciousness never finds God," 
 Appendix, page 123. The two sets of references, since they concern the same 
 subject, have much in common. 
 
 God is Consciousness viewing itself as God, therefore a Notion. 
 
 In the following passages determinations of God are given, hence Fichte 
 is obviously dealing with the notion which reason is forced to form of God. 
 
 (1792) Recension des Aenesidemus. W. I. 23. 
 (1794) Grundlage. W. I. 278, note. 
 
 (1779) Appellation an das Publicum. W. V. 208, 214, 216. 
 
 (1799) Ruckerinnerungen, Antworten, 
 
 Fragen. W. V. 348-352, 369. 
 
 (1800) Aus einem Privatschreiben. W. V. 394-395. 
 
 (1804) Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 146, 223, 313, 314. 
 
 (1806) Anweisung zum seligen Leben. W. V. 406, 411, 418, 419, 443, 444, 448, 
 
 449. 45o> 452, 455. 47i, 472. 47S-49J. 
 
 SIC, 511, 540. 
 (1810) Umriss. W. II. 696, 697. 
 
 (1812) Sittenlehre. Ngl. W. III. 13, 42, 50, 58, 79, 92, in, 
 
 117. 
 (1812) Transcendentale Logik. Ngl. W. I. 138. 
 
 (181 2) Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 334, 339, 343-346, 348, 354, 
 
 ,-,9„^ r,- TW ,, .. T. . 361, 365. 377. 380, 383. 388, 389- 
 
 (1813) Die Thatsachen des Bewusst- 
 
 seyns. Ngl. W. I. 408, 409, 420, 421, 446, 447, 
 
 448, 449. 481, 515. 522, 530, 535, 536, 
 
 537. 540, 541. 542, 554, 555. 5S6. 564- 
 (1813) Einleitung. Ngl. W. I. 42-45. 
 
 (1813) Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 13. 
 
 of the other. Since both are confessedly spheres of consciousness, whenever 
 the name God is mentioned, there is a tacit admission that he is notion. Yet 
 our instinct forces us to add to the recognized notion the notion of a Reality 
 behind, of which it is notion. Hence the Inconceivable hovers constantly on 
 the verge of the mind. It is impossible to separate the image from its reality 
 which through recognition becomes — image. 
 
 1 A careful consideration of these passages will convince the student that 
 in them God is recognized as the Inconceivable : the Begriff is creator of the 
 world, hence the plain man's God, but the Begriff is in the texts said to be only 
 
Appendix, 131 
 
 God as Immediacy. 
 
 The Inconceivable and the determined notion of God are deductions 
 of pure thought. Besides this mediate appearance God gives himself to us 
 immediately at every moment in forms which we do not recognize as God. 
 These forms may be classified under three heads : (i) our being as con- 
 sciousness, or that which thinks within us, and the law by which it thinks ; 
 (2) sensation ; (3) moral conduct, beauty, genius, etc. 
 
 (1806) Die Anwetsung zum seligen Leben. W.V. 397-580. 
 
 (i) das Bewusstseyn, Oder auch wir selber, — ist das gottliche Daseyn 
 selber, und schlechthin Eins mit ihm. In diesem Seyn fasst es sich nun, 
 und wird dadurch Bewusstseyn ; und sein eigenes oder auch das gottliche, 
 wahrhaftige Seyn, wird ihm zur Welt. . . . Nun aber, — wo ist denn jenes 
 unmittelbare gottiiche Leben, welches in seiner Unmittelbarkeit das Bewusst- 
 seyn ja seyn soil, — wo ist es denn hingeschwunden, da es laut unseres 
 eigenen, durch unsere Satze durchaus nothwendig gewordenen Gestand- 
 nisses, — im Bewusstseyn, seiner Unmittelbarkeit nach, unwiederbringlich 
 ausgetilgt ist? Wir antworten : es ist nicht verschwunden, sondern es ist 
 und bleibt da, wo es allein seyn kann : im verborgenen und dem Begriffe 
 unzuganglichen — Seyn des Bewusstseyns : in dem, was allein das Bewusst- 
 seyn tragt und es im Daseyn erhalt, und es im Daseyn moglich macht. . . . 
 Wo bleibt denn also die Eine, in sich geschlossene und voUendete Welt, als 
 das eben abgeleitete Gegenbild des in sich selber geschlossenen gottlichen 
 Lebens ? Ich antworte : sie bleibt da, wo allein sie ist — nicht in einer 
 einzelnen Reflexion, sondern in der absoluten und Einen Grundform des 
 Begriffes ; welche du niemals im wirklichen unmittelbaren Bewusstseyn, 
 wohl aber in dem dariiber sich erhebenden Denken wiederherstellen kannst ; 
 ebenso wie du in demselben Denken das noch weiter zuriickKegende und 
 noch tiefer verborgene gottliche Leben wiederherstellen kannst (457,458). 
 
 (2) Unmittelbar mit seinem realen Seyn, und bildlos, ist es von jeher 
 eingetreten im wirklichen Leben des Menschen, nur unerkannt, und fahrt 
 auch, nach erlangter Erkenntniss, ebenso fort in ihm einzutreten, nur dass 
 es noch iiberdies auch im Bilde anerkannt wird. Jene bildliche Form aber 
 ist das innere Wesen des Denkens. . . . Es ist durchaus nichts im Daseyn, 
 ausser dem unmittelbaren und lebendigen Denken . . . ferner, das reale 
 Leben dieses Denkens, das im Grunde das gottliche Leben ist; welche 
 beide, jenes Denken und dieses reale Leben, zu einer inneren organischen 
 Einheit zusammenschmelzen, so wie sie auch ausserlich eine Einheit, eine 
 ewige Einfachheit und unveranderliche Einerleiheit sind (444, 445). 
 
1 32 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 (Anschauung und Denken, or the stuff of special Sensations in the forms of 
 thought : — red, green, etc.) 
 
 (1801) Die Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre. W. II. 1-163. 
 
 Das Wissen musste daher, als absolutes und in seiner Urspriinglichkeit 
 schlechthin gebundenes, bezeichnet werden als das Eine . . . sich selbst 
 gleiche, unveranderliche, ewige und unaustilgbare Seyn schlechthin (Gott — 
 wenn man ihm doch ein Andenken vom Wissen und Verwandtschaft zum 
 Wissen lassen will) und im Zustande dieser urspriinglichen Gebundeuheit, 
 als Ge/iihl {61. See 62, 64, 65). 
 
 (1806) Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben. JV.V. 397-580. 
 
 (3) Es giebt durchaus kein Seyn und kein Leben ausser dem unmittel- 
 baren gottlichen Leben. Dieses Seyn wird in dem Bewusstseyn, nach den 
 eigenen, unaustilgbaren und in dem Wesen derselben gegriindeten Gesetzen 
 dieses Bewusstseyns, auf mannigfaltige Weise verhiillt und getrtibt ; frei aber 
 von jenen Verhiillungen, und nur noch durch die Form der Unendlichkeit 
 modificirt, tritt es wieder heraus in dem Leben und Handeln des gotterge- 
 benen Menschen. In diesem Handeln handelt nicht der Mensch, sondern 
 Gott selber in seinem urspriinglichen inneren Seyn und Wesen ist es, der in 
 ihm handelt, und durch den Menschen sein Wirk wirket (475, 476). 
 
 Die ganze . . . Sinnenwelt wird auf diesem Standpunkte (dem der 
 hoheren und eigentlichen Moralitat) bloss und lediglich Mittel . . . Mittel, 
 fur ein wirkliches und reales Seyn. Was ist das fiir ein Seyn ? . . . Es ist 
 das innere Seyn Gottes selber, wie es durch sich selbst und in sich selbst 
 schlechthin ist, unmittelbar, rein und aus der ersten Hand, ohne durch 
 irgend eine in der Selbststandigkeit des Ich liegende, und eben darum be- 
 schriinkende Form bestimmt, und dadurch verhiillt und getriibt zu seyn ; 
 nur noch in der unzerstorbaren Form der Unendhchkeit gebrochen. Da, 
 wie schon in der vorigen Stunde sehr scharf ausgesprochen wurde, dieses 
 Seyn nur durch das absolut in sich gegriindete gottliche Wesen von der 
 einen, und durch die im wirklichen Daseyn nie aufzulosende oder zu 
 endende Form der Unendlichkeit von der anderen Seite, bestimmt ist, 
 so ist klar, dass durchaus nicht mittelbar und aus einem anderen, und so a 
 priori, eingesehen werden konne, wie dieses Seyn ausfallen werde ; sondern 
 dass es nur unmittelbar erfasst und erlebt, und nur auf der That seines 
 lebendigen Ausstromens aus dem Seyn in das Daseyn ergriffen werden 
 konne (524, 525). 
 
 Alles Seyn fiihrt seinen Affect (498, 499, 517, 502, 503, 507) bei sich 
 und seine Liebe ; und so auch das in der Form der Unendlichkeit heraus- 
 tretende unraittelbare gottliche Seyn. Nun ist dies . . . um sein selbst 
 
Appendix, 133 
 
 willen : . . . Und so hatten wir denn das gesuchte aussere Kriterium der 
 gottlichen Welt, wodurch sie von der sinnlichen Welt durchaus ausge- 
 schieden wird, gefunden. Was schlechthin durch sich selber, und zwar in 
 dem hochsten, alien anderen Grad des Gefallens unendlich iiberwiegenden 
 Grade gefallt, ist Erscheinung des unmittelbaren gdttlichen Wesens in der 
 Wirklichkeit. . . . Ich sage : Gottes inneres und absolutes Wesen tritt 
 heraus als Schonheit ; es tritt heraus als voUendete Herrschaft des Menschen 
 iiber die ganze Natur ; es tritt heraus als der voUkommene Staat und Staaten- 
 verhaltniss ; es tritt heraus als Wissenschaft, etc., etc., etc. (525-537). 
 
 See also W. V. 186-188, 210-212, 223, 224, 260, 261, 348, 366, 368, 
 371 J W. VI. 368-371 ; Ngl. W. III. 1-118. 
 
1 34 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 GOD AND THE WORLD ARE TWO MUTUALLY INVOLVING 
 SPHERES OF CONSCIOUSNESS OR DAS FUNFFACHE. 
 
 The thought that God and the World are two mutually involving spheres 
 of consciousness underlies all Fichte's writings. With him each is the con- 
 dition of the other, each is absolutely impossible without the other ; God 
 cannot exist without the world, just as the world cannot exist without God. 
 This thought finds definite expression in the following passages : — 
 
 (1799) Gerichtliche Verantwortungsschriften etc. W.N. 239-301. 
 
 Es giebt eine Region des Bewusstseyns, in welcher die sinnliche Ansicht 
 des einigen wahren Stoffes alias unseres Bewusstseyns, des Uebersinnlichen, 
 begleitet von einem Gefiihle (dem Sinnengefiihle, dem Eindrucke), sich 
 uns schlechterdings aufdringt ; in welcher Region sonach, ohne die Erorte- 
 rungen und Ableitungen einer Transcendental- Philosophic, das sinnliche 
 als erstes, urspriingliches, fiir sich existirendes erscheint. Diese Region ist 
 die gesammte aiissere Erfahrung. Nur demjenigen, was in dieser Region 
 liegt, kommen diejenigen Bestimmungen in unserem Denken zu, die wir in 
 der Sprache durch das Pradicat des Seyns (Beharrens und Bestehens) be- 
 zeichnen ; nur ihm die weiteren Bestimmungen dieses Seyns, Substantiali- 
 tat, Causalitat, u. s. w. — Nur der Gegenstand der Erfahrung ist, und es isi 
 nichts, ausser der Erfahrung (welches schlechtweg gebrauchte ist freilich 
 etwas ganz anderes bedeutet, als die logische Copula : ist. In dieser Bedeu- 
 tung bedienen wir uns in der Philosophic, fur Philosophen, dieses Ausdrucks ; 
 und es ist nicht unsere Schuld, wenn Leute, die unseren Sprachgebrauch 
 nicht gelernt haben, doch unsere Schriften lesen und beurtheilen) (260). 
 
 In dieser Region ist der Begriff Erkenntniss ; und man nennt diesen 
 Boden den theoretischen (260). 
 
 Neben dieser versinnlichten Ansicht des einigen wahren Urstoffes alles 
 unseres Bewusstseyns, des Uebersinnlichen, und mit derselben unzertrennlich 
 vereinigt, giebt es noch eine andere Ansicht desselben,* die durch das blosse 
 reine Denken. Diese Ansicht giebt das unmittelbare Bewusstseyn unserer 
 moralischen Bestimmung. Was in dieser Form, d. h. nicht durch Sinuen- 
 eindruck gegeben wird, ist, den Vermunftgesetzen gemass, nicht als Stoff im 
 
 * The italics in this paragraph to this point are our own. 
 
Appendix. 135 
 
 Raurae nach dem zweiten Schema zu construiren, und wer es so construirt, 
 denkt vernunftwidrig ; es ist als ein Handeln zu construiren, nach dem 
 ersten Schema; und es kommt ihm kein moghches sinnhches Pradicat, 
 nicht das des Seyns, der Substantiahtat u. s. f. zu. Wer ihm ein solches 
 Pradicat beilegt, verfahrt vernunftwidrig. In Riicksicht des Einen Theils 
 dessen, was in dieser Sphare hegt, anerkennt man jene Bemerkung als allge- 
 mein. Niemand hat sich noch die Tugend als eine Kugel, oder als eine 
 Pyramide gedacht; man denkt sie als eine Handelsweise (261). 
 
 Aber der andere Theil dieser Sphare ist das, was wir Gott nennen. 
 Nur in dieser Sphare entsteht uns die Idee des wahren Gottes. Entsteht 
 sie in der Sphare der sinnlichen Erfahrung, so ist sie ein Product des Aber- 
 glaubens und der Unsittlichkeit. Sonach ist diese Idee gleichfalls zu be- 
 schreiben nach dem ersten Schema ; und Gott ist zu denken als eine Ordnung 
 von Begebenheiten, keinesweges aber als eine Form der Ausdehnung. Man 
 kann von ihm nicht sagen : er ist Substanz, oder dess etwas : denn dies 
 heisst nach unserem Systeme, und nach dem nothwendigen Sprachgebrauche 
 desselben, sagen : er ist eine ausgedehnte Materie, und lasst sich sehen, 
 horen, fiihlen, u. s. w. {261). 
 
 Rein philosophisch miisste man von Gott so reden : er ist (die logischel 
 Copula) kein Seyn, sondern ein retries Handeln (Leben und Princip einer 
 iibersinnlichen Weltordnung), gleichwie auch ich, endliche Intelligenz, kein 
 Seyn, sondern ein reines Handeln bin : — pflichtmassiges Handeln, als Glied 
 jener iibersinnhchen Weltordnung (261). 
 
 Aus diesem Zusammenhange des Denkens ist die S. 188* meines Auf- j 
 satzes befindliche Stelle : der Begriffvon Gott, als emer besonderen Substanz \ 
 sey unmoglich und wider sprechend, zu erklaren. Sie heisst in der Sprache 
 des Gegners soviel als : der Begriff von Gott, als einem materiellen Dinge 
 sey unmoghch und widersprechend. Mochte wohl der gegnerische Ver- 
 stand das Gegen theil behaupten? (26r, 262.) 
 
 Aus ihm ist die Forbergische Stelle zu erklaren : — Ist ein Gott ? Antw., 
 etc. (262, 263). 
 
 In diesem Sinne ist die S. 1 86 f meines Aufsatzes befindliche Stelle zu 
 erklaren : " Es hegt kein Grund in der Vernunft, aus jener moralischen 
 Weltordnung herauszugehen, und vermittelst eines Schlusses vom Begrlinde- 
 ten auf den Grund noch ein besonderes Wesen als die Ursache desselben 
 anzuerkennen." Dieser Schluss vom Begriindeten auf den Grund wird 
 durch den urspriinglichen Verstand gemacht lediglich auf dem Gebiete der 
 sinnlichen Erfahrung, um das fliessende Phanomen an ein bestehendes 
 Substrat auzukniipfen, welches stets korperlich ist. Hier soli bei dem 
 Fliessenden, dem reinen Handeln, stehen geblieben werden ; denn dies ist 
 selbst das unmittelbare, ist das hier allein giiltige Schema, und wer jenen 
 
 » Fichte's sammtliche Werke, V. 188. t Fichte's sammtliche Werke, V. 186. 
 
136 Unity of Fickte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 Schluss macht, sucht und erhalt unvermeidlich ein bestehendes, korper- 
 liches Substrat fur das reine Handeln der Gottheit (263). 
 
 Nun wird es jedoch, wenn von jenem reinen Handeln besonders geredet, 
 und ihm, als logischem Subjecte, ich sage, als logischem Subjecte, gewisse 
 Pradicate beigelegt werden sollen (welches alles man, meiner Meinungnach, 
 schicklicher unterlasst, indem es zur Erbauung nichts beitragt, und denn 
 doch gar zu leicht theoretische Irrthiiraer und Aberglauben herbeifiihren 
 kann) — es wird, sage ich, dann durch die Sinnlichkeit unsers Vorstellungs- 
 vermogens nothwendig, selbst jenes reine Handeln auf etwas, zwar nicht im 
 Raume, aber doch in der Zeit ausgedehntes {auf eine fixirte ZeitUnie) zu 
 iibertragen, um das, audi nur durch die Sinnlichkeit unsers Vorstellungs- 
 vermogens eutstandene Mannigfaltige des Handelns darin, als in seiner 
 Einheit, zu fixiren. Dieses lediglich durch die Zeit ausgedehnte, diese 
 fixirte Zeitlinie nennt die Sprache eitien Geist. Auf diesem Wege ensteht 
 uns der Begriff unserer eigenen Seek, als eines Geistes ; in demselben Zusam- 
 menhange des Denkens sagt man : Gott sey ein Geist (264). 
 
 Nun ist ein Geist nicht, in der oben erklarten Bedeutung des Worts ; 
 er ist kein Ding, aber nur das Ding ist. Ein Geist ist ein blosser auf dem 
 soeben beschriebenen Wege entstandener Begriff. Er ist ein Nothbehelf 
 unserer Schwache, die nachdem sie alles eigentlich existirende weggedacht 
 hat, doch in die leere Stelle des logischen Subjects, von dem sie spricht 
 (und weit kliiger nicht davon sprache) etwas hineinsetzt, das nicht eigent- 
 lich seyn soil, und denn doch seyn soil (264). 
 
 Der Satz : Gott ist ein Geist, hat bloss als negativer Satz, als Negation 
 der Korperlichkeit, seinen guten, triftigen Sinn, etc. (264). 
 
 Derselbe Satz, als positiver, zur Bestimmung des gottlichen Wesens die- 
 nender Satz ist ganz unbrauchbar ; denn wir wissen ebensowenig, worin das 
 Wesen eines Geistes, als wir wissen, worin das Wesen Gottes bestehe (264, 
 265). 
 
 (1804) Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. H. 87-314. 
 
 Wie man das Ansich auffassen moge, so ist es doch immer bestimmt durch 
 Negation eines ihm Entgegengesetzten, somit, als Ansich, selber ein rela- 
 tives, Einheit einer Zweiheit, und umgekehrt. Freilich wohl eigentlich syn- 
 thetisches und analytisches Princip zugleich, wie wir es von jeher gesucht : 
 aber doch keine vorher selbststandige Einheit ; denn die Einheit lasst sich 
 nur fassen durch die Zweiheit: obwohl freilich die Zweiheit auch durch die 
 Einheit sich voUkommen fassen und erklaren lasst. Mit einem Worte, das 
 Ansich, tiefer erwogen, ist kein Ansich, kein Absolutes ; denn es ist keine 
 wahre Einheit, und sogar unser Realismus ist nicht zum Absoluten durch- 
 gedrungen. Nach Strenge angesehen, ist in der Einheit im Hintergrunde, 
 eine Projection des Ansich, und Nichtansich, die sich gegenseitig setzen, zur 
 
Appendix. 137 
 
 Erklarung und Verstandlichkeit, und vernichten in der Realitat ; und wie- 
 derum die Einlieit ist eine Projection der beiden Glieder. Ferner geschieht 
 diese Projektion schlechthin unmittelbar, /«/- kiaium, ohne gehorige Rechen- 
 schaft von sich ablegen zu konnen. Denn wie aus der Einheit, als blosser 
 reinen Einheit, ein Ansich und Nichtansich folge, lasst sicli niclat erklaren ; 
 freilich, wenn sie schon vorausgesetzt wird, als Einheit des Ansich und 
 Nichtansich ; dann aber ist die Unbegreiflichkeit, und Unerklarlichkeit in 
 dieser Bestlmmthdt der Einheit, und sie selber ware nur das proiectum per 
 hiatum irrationalem. Diese Bestimmtheit hatte kein anderes Unterpfand, 
 als das unmittelbare Bewusstsein; und es hat, wenn wir uns riickgehend 
 besinnen woUen, wie wir zu allem jetzt Gesagten gekommen, in der That 
 kein anderes. " Denken Sie ein Ansich," hat es angehoben, und dieses 
 Denken oder Bewusstseyn war moglich. Diese Moglichkeit nun hat unsere 
 ganze bis jetzt gefiihrte Forschung bestimmt ; also doch auf das Bewusst- 
 sein, wenn gleichnicht in seiner Wirklichkeit, dennoch in seiner Moglichkeit 
 haben wu: uns gestiitzt, und in dieser Qualitat es zu unserm letzten Princip 
 gehabt. Unser hochster Realismus daher, d. h. der hochste Standpunkt 
 unserer eigenen Spekulation, ist hier selber als ein bisher nur in seiner 
 VVurzel verborgen gebliebener Ideahsmus aufgedeckt ; er ist im Grunde 
 faktisch, und projectuvi per hiatum, besteht nicht vor seinem eigenen 
 Gericht, und ist nach der Regel, die er selbst aufstellt, aufzugeben (202, 
 203. See also 1 14-122, 138-148, 152, 156, etc.). 
 
 (1806) Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben. W.V. 397-580. 
 
 Wir haben sonach die beiden Stiicke : — das Seyn, wie es innerlich und 
 in sich ist, und die Form, welche das erstere dadurch, dass es da ist, an- 
 nimmt. — Wie haben wir uns ausgedriickt ? Was ist es, das eine Form 
 annimmt ? Antwort : das Seyn, wie es in sich selber ist, ohne die mindeste 
 Veranderung seines inneren Wesens — darauf eben kommt es mir an. Was 
 also ist — in dem Daseyn ? Antwort : Durchaus nichts anderes, als das Eine, 
 ewige und unveranderliche Seyn, ausser welchem gar nichts zu seyn vermag. 
 Wiederum vermag denn dieses ewige Seyn dazuseyn, ausser gerade in dieser 
 Form? Wie ware es doch moglich, da diese Form nichts anderes ist als 
 das Daseyn selbst ; somit die Behauptung : das Seyn konne auch in einer 
 andern Form daseyn, heissen wiirde ; das Seyn konne daseyn, ohne doch 
 dazuseyn. Nennen Sie das Seyn A, und die Form, die versammte Form 
 versteht sich, in ihrer Einheit gedacht, B, so ist das wirkliche Daseyn A X B 
 und B X A. A bestimmt durch B, und gegenseitig. Bestimmt, sage ich, 
 mit dem Accente, so dass Sie mit Ihrem Denken nicht von einem der End- 
 punkte, sondern vom Mittelpunkte ausgehen, und sich so verstehen ; beide 
 sind in der Wirklichkeit verwachsen und gegenseitig von einander durch- 
 drungen, so dass sie in der Wirklichkeit, und ohne dass die Wirklichkeit des 
 
 18 
 
138 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 Daseyns vernichtet werde, nicht wieder getrennt werden konnen. Dieses 
 nur ist es, worauf mir alias ankommt ; dies der organische Einheilspunct 
 aller Speculation ; und der in diesen eindringt, dem ist das letzte Licht 
 aufgegangen (509, 510). 
 
 Um es noch zu verstarken — Gott selbst, d. i. das innere ^^'esen des 
 Absoluten, welches nur unsere Beschranktheit von seinem ausseren Daseyn 
 unterscheidet, kann jene absolute Verschmelzung des Wesens mit der Form 
 nicht auflieben ; denn selbst sein Daseyn, was nur denn ersten lediglich 
 factischeii Blicke als factisch und zufallig erscheint, ist ja fur das allein ent- 
 scheidende wahrhaftige Denken nicht zufallig, sondem, da es ist, und es 
 ausserdem nicht sein konnte, es muss nothwendig folgen aus dem inneren 
 Wesen. Zufolge Gottes innerem Wesen demnach ist dieses innere Wesen 
 mit der Form unabtrennlich verbunden und durch sich selber eingetreten 
 in die Form ; welches fiir die, die es zu fassen vermogen die vom Anfange 
 der Welt bis auf den heutigen Tag obgewaltete hochste Schwierigkeit der 
 Speculation leicht auflost, und etc., etc. (510). 
 
 (18 1 2) Das System der Sittenlehre. Ngl. W. III. 1-118. 
 
 Die objective Anschauung des gegebenen Seins bekommt darum eigent- 
 lich zwei verschiedene Sphiiren : die des Ich, als blossen Princips aller 
 Objektivitat ; insofern ist sie die Form des Bewusstseyns des Begriffs als 
 Grund. Sodann die eines Nicht-Ich, Ausser-Ich ; ein seiches Bewusstseyn 
 muss durch das Ich als Leben des Begriffs hervorgebracht werden, und inso- 
 fern hangt das objective Bewusstseyn sowohl, das iiberhaupt eins ist, als was 
 in demselben enthalten ist, ab von der VoUziehung der Principheit des 
 Ich (19, read in connection with page 18). 
 
 (1813) Die Wissenschaftskhre. Ngl. W. 11. 1-86. 
 
 1 ) . . . Bisher haben wir iramer das Erscheinen hingestellt als Accidens 
 Gottes, nur es durch den Verstand formiren zu lassen. In der vorigen 
 Stunde blieb es uns unentschieden, ob wir es noch so voraussetzen diirfen. 
 Entscheiden wir es jetzt eben kiihn ! ich sage : keinesweges diirfen 
 wir es . . . (31). 
 
 2) Der Verstand ist also als letzter Grund des Daseyns, d. i. alles 
 Daseyns gesetzt ; als solchen woUen wir ihn sehen : mithin wollen wir ihn 
 sehen als Nichtdasein, im Uebergehen vom Nichtdaseienden zum Dasein. 
 Was ware denn das fur ein Bild ? Man konnte sagen : das bekannte Bild 
 eines Vermdgens. einer blossen Moglichkeit, da zu sein. Wenn wir aber 
 dieses Vermogen eben setzten als Anfang des Daseyns, so setzten wir es 
 doch auch wieder objectiv nieder, objectivirten es, bejahend, in allem Ernste ; 
 gaben ihm darum auch wieder ein Sein und Daseyn, d. h. eben die ganze 
 
Appendix. 1 39 
 
 Verstandesform der Duplicitat des Bildes und Seins in der Einheit fande 
 sich auch hier wieder ; und reflektirten wir darauf, so wiirde sich finden, dass 
 wir nur ein VermSgen des Vermogens hatten : und da fande sich dieselbe 
 Schwierigkeit. Diese besteht eigentlich darin, dass wir begehren niit Ver- 
 stand hinauszugehen iiber alien Verstand, um den Verstand zu erklaren ; 
 und diese Schwierigkeit ist nie zu Ende, wenn sich nicht irgend wo im Ver- 
 stande selbst und durch ihn eine Unterscheidung findet dessen, was in ihm 
 gehalten werden soUe fur Dasein, und was nicht fiir Dasein, sondern fiir die 
 Construction oder die Genesis des Daseins, welche die Wissenschaftslehre 
 anstrebt (31, 32.) 
 
 Wir haben immer gesagt Gott, oder das Absolute erscheint, bildet sich ab. 
 Konnen wir noch so sagen ? Nein. Das Absolute erscheint gar nicht so 
 unmittelbar, sondern nur in der Ableitung dieser Glieder. Das Sein des 
 Absoluten ist Gesetz fiir eine bestimmte Freiheit des Verstandes, fiir die 
 Verstandlichkeit seiner selbst, namlich als Bild Gottes. Aber um sich zu 
 verstehen, muss der Verstand liefern ein Bild seiner selbst, und zwar ein 
 solches, dass darin erkannt werden konne das Bild des Absoluten. Also 
 zufolge dieser Verstandlichkeit wird das Sein des Absoluten fur den Verstand 
 Gesetz des absoluten Sichconstruirens zu einem Bilde, welches als Bild des 
 Absoluten verstandlich sei (46). 
 
 Das Absolute hat sich namlich gefunden in dem Exponenten des x als 
 Bild (see page 47), und zwar lag es darin als in einem rein formalen Bilde, 
 dem Reflexionsbilde, dass x Bild sei. Das Hochste und Letzte, die Basis 
 selbst alles Wissens, ist darum abgeleitet aus dem Verstande (48). For 
 " das absolute Zerfallen des Verstandes in eine doppelte Form, in die des 
 Seins, und in die des Bildes," see 48-54. 
 
 See also : — 
 
 (1805) Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten. W. VI. 362. 
 
 (18 10) Umriss. W. II. 696. 
 
 (1810-11) Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. W. II. 658-661. 
 
 (1 8 12) Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 333, 343-346, 361. 
 
 (1813) Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. . Ngl. W. I. 408, 420-429, 541. 
 
 See also references to passages saying that God is wholly and fully ex- 
 pressed in the Erscheinung. The "Wissenschaftslehre" of 18 12, the 
 " Transcendentale Logik, 181 2, the "Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns," 18 13, 
 the "Einleitung" of 1813, the "Wissenschaftslehre" of 1813, are grounded 
 upon the fact that the fundamental concept under which all thought and all 
 existence are subsumed is a duplicity, a double sphere, one half of which is 
 Seyn, the other half, Bild. 
 
I40 Unity of Fickte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 Das FiJNFFACHE. 
 
 Fichte is fond of analyzing still further this double sphere of conscious- 
 ness and of showing that it is a Funffache. His analysis may be resumed 
 as follows : — take any bit of existence, for instance, a stone : in the stone 
 we seem to ourselves to have an image of being: analyze being and we find 
 that it consists of (i) the notion, empty and formal, of pure being, which 
 we fancy stands for (2) a reality behind it (also another concept) ; analyze 
 image and we have (3) the general concept of image under which we classify 
 (4) the special image of a stone. If we now reflect upon these four mem- 
 bers we recognize that they are all images, are all held within the one 
 mind, (5) the Ego. Hence consciousness, or the Ego, always appears as a 
 Funffache. 
 
 (1812) Die Wissenschaftskhre. Ngl. W. II. 1-86. 
 
 Nach dieser Darstellung spaltet sich der absolute Verstand zuvorderst 
 in zwei Halften, zufolge seines Gesetzes : in Bildsein und Seinsein. Die 
 letztere Halfte ist die blosse Negation des Bildseins, die Negation des Seins 
 im Bilde und als abgebildetes, und die Form dieses Ganzen im Bilde oder 
 nicht im Bilde Seins ist das absolute Princip dieser Zweiheit (47). 
 
 Diese beiden Grundhalften spalten sich aber wieder in zwei Glieder: 
 zuvorderst die des Seyns : der Verstand, als Sein, ist Princip, und zwar 
 unsichtbares Princip eines x (see pages 33, 36, the plain man's being, for 
 example, a stone) und zwar eines solchen Principiates, das im Bilde ist 
 unmittelbar, also welches als seiend im Bilde anschaut wird, ohne irgend 
 ein Bild des Princips ; welches unmittelbar im Bilde ist, gegeben ist, weil 
 ausserdem die andere Halfte gar nicht sein konnte. Sodann : er ist Princip 
 eines solchen, das im Bilde sein soil und kann, namlich der Exponent von 
 X, als Bild des absoluten Seins (see pages 33, 36, 45). Der Verstand ist darin 
 zugleich Princip der Einheit (Expon. X x) dieser beiden Bilder in einem 
 Schlage, obwohl das letzere, der Exponent, nicht in der Wirklichkeitj 
 dennoch sicher in der Moglichkeit liegt. Man kann demnach sagen : x ist 
 an sich, wenn auch noch nicht in einem volhogenen Bilde, Bild des abso- 
 luten ; da es schlechthin als solches verstdndlich sein soil. Sein Sein ist 
 nichts als diese Verstandlichkeit, und nur weil es diese ist, kann es, falls 
 es zum Exponenten im Bilde kommt, darin also verstanden werden. So 
 spaltet sich die Eine Grundhalfte des Verstandes, die des Seins, in x und 
 seinen Exponenten; beide setzend in ihrer Einheit (47). 
 
 b) Aber auch die andere Grundhalfte, die des Bildes, spaltet sich. 
 Namlich in dieser Halfte liegt die Bildlichkeit selbst ; diese Bildlichkeit aber 
 
Appendix. 141 
 
 ist schlechthin Bild ihrer selbst, und spaltet sich demnach in der Form des 
 Bildseins von sich, in diese Duplicitat ihrer selbst : Bildlichkeit subjectiv und 
 Bildlichkeit objectiv (47). 
 
 Nun aber hangen diese beiden Grundhalften — mit ihren Nebenhalften 
 wieder zusammen durch das dritte oder funfte Glied, dass x begriffen wird 
 eben als Bildlichkeit, und als tragend diesen Charakter. In der Halfte liegt 
 Bildlichkeit iiberhaupt ; in der andern eine gewisse Bestimmung der Bild- 
 lichkeit. Das Glied des Zusammenhanges ist darum die Evidenz, dass 
 dies bestimmte ^ x ist Bild : die Ichheit, oder die Apperception. Dieses 
 jetzt beschriebene Mannigfaltige, Drei- oder FiinfFach in absolut organischer 
 Einheit ist es nun, was durch den absoluten Verstand gesetzt ist, und unsre 
 Analyse ist hiermit beendigt (47, 48). 
 
142 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 GOD IS FULLY EXPRESSED IN THE ERSCHEINUNG. 
 
 If the two spheres of consciousness, God and the world, are thought- 
 correlates involving each other, if they are necessities of reason which stand 
 to each other as cause and effect, it follows that each must be the equal of 
 the other. God, the cause, is postulated to explain the effect, and is postu- 
 lated only in so far as there is effect to explain, while, on the other hand, 
 the effect is effect of its cause only in so far as it displays its causality, it is 
 the effect of that cause whose causality it makes manifest and of no greater 
 cause as cause. Fichte reminds us constantly of this logical necessity. 
 
 (1812) Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 315-492. 
 
 2) Aber denn doch ein Bild in der That, d. h. das Absolute, gatiz%o wie 
 es in ihm selbst ist, tritt ein in's Bild. . . . Unmittelbares Urbild, durchaus 
 genaues, treues und entsprechendes (334). 
 
 See also : — 
 
 (1804) Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 270-278. 
 
 (1805) Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten. W. VI. 361, 362. 
 
 (1806) Anweisung zum seligen Leben. W. V. 443. 
 (1810) Umriss. W. II. 696. 
 (1810-11) Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. W. II. 684, 685. 
 
 (1812) Transcendentale Logik. Ngl. W. I. 148. 
 (i8r2) Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 337, 338. 
 
 (1813) Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. Ngl. W. I. 447. 
 
 This same truth is expressed in many of the passages quoted in the 
 Appendix under different heads. 
 
Appendix. 143 
 
 EXISTENCE IS GOD AND EXISTENCE IS NOT GOD. ''IS." 
 
 Both these assertions occur again and again in Fichte's works. Yet 
 they involve no contradiction if the meaning of the word " is " is understood 
 in each. We quote Fichte's explanation of " is " in the first proposition, 
 " Existence is God." In the second, " Existence is not God," "is " is an 
 affirmation of identity. 
 
 " IS." 
 
 (1806) Die Anweisung ziim seligen Leben. W.Y. 397-580. 
 
 . . . unmittelbar und in der Wurzel ist — Daseyns des Seyns das — Be- 
 wusstseyn, oder die Vorstellung des Seyns, wie sie an dem Worte : Isf, 
 dasselbe von irgend einem Objecte, z. B. dieser Wand, gebraucht, sich auf 
 der Stelle klar machen konnen. Denn was ist nun dieses Is/ selber in dem 
 Satze : die Wand ist ? Offenbar ist est nicht die Wand selber, und einerlei 
 mit ihr ; auch giebt es sich dafiir gar nicht aus, sondern es scheidet durch die 
 dritte Person diese Wand, als ein unabhangig von ihm Seyendes, aus von 
 sich ; es giebt sich also nur fiir ein ausseres Merkzeichen des selbststandigen 
 Seyns, fiir ein Bild davon, oder, wie wir es oben aussprachen, und wie es am 
 bestimmtesten auszusprechen ist, als das unmittelbare, aussere Daseyn der 
 Wand, und als i/ir Seyn ausserhalb ihres Seyns. (440.) . . . Zwar pflegt 
 sogar dies von der gemeinen Denkart nicht bemerkt zu werden ; und es 
 kann wohl seyn, dass ich an dem Gesagten vielen etwas ganz Neues und 
 Unerhortes gesagt habe. Der Grund davon ist der, dass ihre Liebe und 
 ihr Herz ohne Verzug nur sogleich zum Objecte eilt, und nur fiir dieses 
 sich interessirt, in dasselbe sich wirft und nicht Zeit hat, bei dem Ist be- 
 trachtend zu verweilen, und so dasselbe ganzlich verliert. Daher kommt es, 
 dass wir gewohnlich, das Daseyn iiberspringend, in das Seyn selber gekom- 
 men zu seyn glauben ; indess wir doch immer und ewig nur in dem Vor- 
 hofe, in dem Daseyn, verharren. (440.) . . . Das Bewusstseyn des Seyns, 
 das Ist zu dem Seyn — ist unmittelbar das Daseyn. (441.) . . . Wir haben 
 sonach im Denken darzuthun, dass das Bewusstseyn des Seyns, die einzig- 
 mogliche Form und Weise des Daseyns des Seyns, somit selber ganz unmit- 
 telbar, schlechthin und absolut dieses Daseyn des Seyns sey. (441.) • . • 
 
144 Uftity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 Und so leuchtet es denn . . . ein, dass das Daseyn des Seyns — nothwendig 
 ein — Selbstbewusstseyn seiner (des Daseyns) selbst, als blossen Bildes, von 
 detn absolut in sich selber seyenden Seyn, seyn — miisse, und gar nicht 
 anderes seyn konne (442. See W. II. 658, 659 ; W. V. 258-267 ; A^gl. 
 W. I. 422, 423, 450-452; 477 ; ^E^- ^ II- 130; 147; 200, 201, 249, 251, 
 258). 
 
 It is noteworthy that while thus recognizing that " is '' is a term of ex- 
 istence and means " to stand forth in image-shape," Fichte just as often con- 
 nects it with Seyn and asserts that it is a predicate only of God (see W. V. 
 223, 224, 470; Ngl. W. I. 408, 409; Ngl. W. II. 331, etc.). 
 
 Existence is God : Nun aber tritt Gott dennoch, wie wir dies oben 
 fieissig auseinander gesetzt haben, ausser diesem leeren Schattenbegriffe, in 
 seinem wirklichen wahren und unmittelbaren Leben in uns ein ; oder 
 strenger ausgedriickt, wir selbst sind dieses sein unmittelbares Leben 
 {W. V. 471. See also 441-446, 448, 451-460, 474, 475-491. 509-512, 
 
 539)- 
 
 Wir sind daher das Eine ungetheilte Sein selber, in sich, von sich, durch 
 sich, das schlechthin nicht herausgehen kann zur Zweiheit (Ngl. W. II. 
 206-208. See also Ngl IV. II. 138, 300-314). 
 
 The innumerable passages in which Fichte tells us that the Erscheinung 
 is the Erscheinung Gottes, certainly say that existence is God appearing. 
 
 Existence is not God : Im consequenten Stoicismus wird die unend- 
 liche Idee des Ich genommen fiir das wirkliche Ich : absolutes Seyn und 
 wirkliches Daseyn werden nicht unterschieden. Daher ist der stoische 
 Weise allgenugsam und unbeschrankt ; es werden ihm alle Pradicate bei- 
 gelegt, die dem reinen Ich, oder auch Gott, zukommen. Nach der stoischen 
 Moral soUen wir nicht Gott gleich werden, sondern wir sind selbst Gott. 
 Die Wissenschaftslehre unterscheidet sorgfdltig absolutes Seyn und wirkliches 
 Daseyn und legt das erstere bless zum Grunde, um das letztere erkldren zu 
 konnen. Der Stoicismus wird dadurch wiederlegt, dass gezeigt wird, er 
 konne die Moglichkeit des Bewusstseyns nicht erklaren. Darum ist die 
 Wissenschaftslehre auch nicht atheistisch* wie der Stoicismus nothwendig 
 seyn muss, wenn er consequent verfahrt {Die Grundlage. W. I. 278 note). 
 
 Wir haben gesagt die Erscheinung ist schlechthin dadurch, dass das 
 Absolute erscheint ; sie ist das Erscheinen des Absoluten selbst. Nun ist 
 doch aber diese Erscheinung nicht das Absolute selbst in seiner Verborgen- 
 
 * The italics in this paragraph are our own. 
 
Appendix. 145 
 
 heit und Immanenz in sich ; sondern es ist das ganz Andere und Entgegen- 
 gesetzte des innern Seins, seiner Form nach {Ngl. W. I. 199). 
 
 Ist sie eben Erscheinung, nicht Gott selbst : was ist sie nun als solche, 
 was setzt sie dadurch zu dem Realen zu? Sie ist Sicherscheinung, somit 
 Reflexibilitat ; falls dies erschopft ist, so kennen wir den Zusatz, die Form, 
 in welche von ihr das Reale aufgenommen wird {^Ngl. W. II. 388). 
 
 See also : — 
 
 (1800) Bestimmung des Menschen. W. II. 304, 305. 
 
 (1801) Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre. W. II. 22. 
 (1804) Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 147. 
 
 (1806) Anweisung zum seligen Leben. W. V. 439-446, 448, 4JI, 452-455, 
 
 461, 516, 517, 539. 540. 
 
 (1812) Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 331, 326-336, 383, 384. 
 
 (1813) Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. Ngl. W. I. 199, 200-203, 481. 
 
 19 
 
146 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 "GOD" IN THE EARLIER WORKS. 
 
 The unjustness of the charge that Fichte's first series of treatises left 
 God out of consciouness, and made the Ego, as Ego, its totality, is very 
 apparent to the careful reader. Fichte's earliest work as a disciple of Kant, 
 the " Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung,'' has as one of its main points 
 the demonstration that reason is forced to postulate a God with certain fixed 
 attributes. We quote : — 
 
 (1792) Versiich einer Kritik aller Offenbarung. JF. V. g-174. 
 
 Das Sittengesetz selbst also muss, wenn es sich nicht widersprechen, und 
 aufhoren soil, ein Gesetz zu seyn, diese von ihm selbst ertheilten Rechte be- 
 haupten (i. e., sich zu befriedigen) ; es muss mithin auch iiber die Natur 
 nicht nur gebieten, sondern herrschen. Das kann es nun nicht in Wesen, 
 die selbst von der Natur leidend afficirt werden, sondern nur in einem 
 solchen, welches die Natur durchaus selbstthatig bestimmt ; in welchem 
 moralische Nothvvendigkeit, und absolute physische Freiheit sich vereinigen. 
 So ein Wesen nennen wir Gott. Eines Gottes Existenz ist mithin eben so 
 gewiss anzunehmen, als ein SiHtngesetz. — Es u/ ein Gott. . . . Gott ist /2«7?^ 
 und selig und . . . allmdchtig . . . er muss ganz gerecht seyn. . . . Es muss 
 also ein ewiger Gott seyn. . . . Diese Siitze nennen wir, als mit der Auforde- 
 rung der Vernunft, uns endlichen Wesen ein praktisches Gesetz zu geben, 
 unmittelbar verbunden, und von ihr unzertrennlich, Postulate der Vernunft. 
 Nemlich diese Satze werden nicht etwa durch das Gesetz geboten, welches 
 t\x\ praktisches Gesetz fiir Theoreme nicht kann, sondern sie miissen noth- 
 wendig angenommen werden, wenn die Vernunft gesetzgebend seyn soil. 
 Ein solches Annehmen nun, zu dem die Moglichkeit der Anerkennung eines 
 Gesetzes iiberhaupt uns nothigt, nennen wir ein Glauben (40, 41). 
 
 Fichte's first work of importance after his system had taken shape in his 
 mind was (i 792) " Recension des Aenesidemus " ( W. I. 1-25). Here God 
 appears as an Idee whose existence is subjective truth even for himself. 
 A\'e quote the passage in full, as its substance, when taken in connection 
 with its date, is convincing proof that the God of Fichte's later works did 
 not break the unity of his system : his system always had a God, and this 
 God was always " eine Idee," the activity of thought seeing itself as God. 
 
Appendix. 147 
 
 (1792) Recension des Aenesidemus . W. I. 1-25. 
 
 Jene Vereinigung : Ein Ich das durch seine Selbstbestimmung zugleich 
 alles Nicht-Ich bestimme (die Idee der Gottheit) ist das letzte Ziel dieses 
 Strebens ; ein solches Streben, wenn durcli das intelligente Ich das Ziel 
 desselben ausser ihm vorgestellt wird, ist ein Glaube (Glauben an Gott). 
 Dies Streben kann nicht aufhoren, als nach Erreichung des Ziels, d. h. die 
 InteUigenz kann keinen Moment ihres Daseyns, in welchera dieses Ziel noch 
 nicht erreicht ist, als den letzten annehmen (Glauben an ewige Fortdauer). 
 An dieser Idee ist aber auch nichts Anderes, als ein Glaube moglich, d. h. die 
 InteUigenz hat zum Object ihrer Vorstellung keine empirische Empiindung, 
 sondern nur das nothwendige Streben des Ich ; und in aller Ewigkeiten 
 Ewigkeiten hinaus kann nichts anderes moglich werden. Dieser Glaube ist 
 aber so wenig bloss eine wahrscheinliche Meinung, dass er vielmehr, wenig- 
 stens nach des Rec. innigster Ueberzeugung, mit dem unmittelbar gewissen : 
 Ich bin, den gleichen Grad der Gewissheit hat, welche alle, erst durch das 
 intelligente Ich mittelbar niogliche, objective Gewissheit unendlich iiber- 
 trifft. — Freilich, A. will einen objectiven Beweis fur die Existenz Gottes 
 und die Unsterblichkeit der Seele. Was mag er sich dabei denken ? Oder 
 ob ihm die objective Gewissheit etwa ungleich vorziiglicher scheint, als 
 die — nur — subjective ? Das : Ich bin — selbst hat nur subjective Gewissheit ; f 
 und, so viel wir uns das Selbstbewusstsein Gottes denken konnen, ist Gott 
 selbst fiir Gott subjectiv. Und nun gar ein objectives Daseyn der Unsterb- f 
 lichkeit ! (es sind Aenesidem's eigne Worte). Wenn irgend ein sein Da- 
 seyn in der Zeit anschauendes Wesen in einem Momente seines Daseyns 
 sagen konnte : nun bin ich ewig; so ware es nicht ewig (23). 
 
 The note to the " Grundlage " {W.l.i 78, bottom) which we have quoted ; 
 above (Appendix, page 144), shows beyond question that in the (r794) ; 
 " Grundlage," Fichte's earUest formal exposition of his system, there is the i 
 same God that appears in the later works : die unabhangige Thatigkeit is a ' 
 God who is the causal Being that must be postulated to explain existence, 
 the true Seyn, das Absolute, as cause of all that appears. 
 
 The student should always read, as the last section of the " Grundlage," 
 " Ueber die Wtirde des Menschen. Beim Schlusse seiner philosophischen 
 Vorlesungen gesprochen von y. G. Fichte, 1794, which is to be found W. I. 
 412-416. In this address Man was put before his audience by Fichte as the 
 appearance of a power behind, as the temple in which God dwells : to him 
 the immortality and the series of worlds are promised which Fichte so em- 
 phasized in his later works : Man is the utterance of the great organic unity 
 of Pure Spirit in which the individual is only member and which images 
 itself in the One Moral Will developed by humanity. We quote: — 
 
148 Ujtity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 Hindert, vereitelt seine Plane ! — Auflialten konnt ihr sie : aber was 
 sind tausend und abermals tausend Jahre in dem Jahrbuche der Mensch- 
 heit? — was der leichte Morgentraum ist beim Erwachen. Er dauert fort 
 und er wirM fort, und was euch Verschwinden scheint, ist bloss eine Er- 
 weiterung seiner Sphare: was euch Tod scheint, ist seine Reife fur ein 
 hoheres Leben. Die Farben seiner Plane, und die dusseren Gestalten der- 
 selben konnen ihm verschwinden ; sein Plan bleibt derselbe ; und in jedem 
 Momente seiner Existenz reisst er etwas neues ausser sich in seinen Kreis 
 mit fort, und er wird fortfahren an sich zu reissen, bis er alles in denselben 
 verschlinge : bis alle Materie das Geprag seiner Einwirkung trage, und alle 
 Geister mit seinem Geiste Einen Geist ausmachen (415). 
 
 SoUte ich nicht beben vor der Majestat im Menschenbilde ; und vor 
 der Gottheit, die vielleicht im heimlichen Dunkel — aber die doch gewiss 
 in dem Tempel, der dessen Geprage tragi wohnt (416). 
 
 Erd und Himmel und Zeit und Raum und alle Schranken der Sinnlich- 
 keit schwinden mir bei diesem Gedanken ; und das Individuum soUte mir 
 nicht schwinden? Ich fiihre Sie nicht zu deraselben zuriick (416). 
 
 Alle Individuen sind in der Einen grossen Einheit des reinen Geistes 
 eingeschlossen ; dies sey das letzte Wort, wodurch ich mich Ihrem Andenken 
 empfehle j und das Andenken zu dem ich mich Ihnen empfehle (416), 
 
 In the (179s) "Grundriss," W. I. 329-411, the phenomenal Ego has an 
 accidental Anschauung X (392). This accidental Anschauung involves a 
 necessary Anschauung Y (392, 393), (ego and non ego). The phenomenal I 
 in now viewing the two Anschauungen includes them within itself (393-395)- 
 A new not-I or not-X + not-Y is of necessity opposed. Since I is accidental 
 not-I is necessary ; therefore not-X + not-Y = necessary X -f- necessary Y. 
 We therefore have accidental X -f Y in the I opposed to a necessary XY 
 outside the I. Or all within the consciousness of the I is accidence whose 
 Substance lies without. Or all within the consciousness of the I is the mere 
 expression of free powers without the consciousness. " Das heisst zuvor- 
 derst, es wird ihnen nach dem im vorigen § deducirten Verfahren entgegen- 
 gesetzt ein nothwendiges Y und X, in Beziehung auf welche beide zufallig 
 sind — die Substanzen, denen beide zukommen, als Accidenzen (396). 
 
 Ohne uns langer bei diesem Gliede der Untersuchung aufzuhalten, gehen 
 wir sogleich fort zur oben gleichfalls deducirten synthetischen Vereinigung 
 des jetzt als zufallig gesetzten mit dem ihm entgegengesetzten nothwendigen. 
 Nemlich, das im Ich aufgefasste und insofern zufallige Y ist E-rscheinung, — 
 bewirktes, Aeusserung der nothwendig vorauszusetzenden Kraft Y: X das 
 gleiche, und zwar beide Aeusserungen/mirr Krafte (396). 
 
 Here in the Grundriss, Substance, Seyn, is the sphere of potentiality 
 
Appendix. i/^g 
 
 where the Freie Krafte dwell, the God-sphere ; the other sphere of pheno- 
 mena is mere " Erscheinung," " Aeusserung." 
 
 In the (1798) " Sittenlehre," W. IV. 1-365, in "das urspriingliche Ich," 
 " fiber alle Zeit und alle Veranderung in der Zeit erhaben" (169), " in der 
 blossen Idee bestimmten . . . Ich" (143), in " diereine absolute Thatigkeit " 
 (140), in the Trieb, of which it is said, " Der reine Trieb ist etwas ausser 
 allera Bewusstseyn liegendes, und blosser transcendentaler Erklarungsgrund 
 von etwas im Bewusstseyn" (152), we have the God-element Freedom with 
 its love for moral activity. In the " Nothwendigkeit " which the objective 
 self displays (48, 49, 52, 53), we have the other God-element, Law. 
 
 The discussion of the ground of our behef in God forms the substance 
 of two short articles which appeared in 1798 and 1799 : — (1798) " Ueber 
 den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine gottliche Weltregierung " (W. V. 175- 
 189), and (1799) " Gerichtliche Verantwortung gegen die Anklage des 
 Atheisraus " (W. V. 239-333). 
 
150 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 THE ABSOLUTE. 
 
 The Absolute must appear in all of Fichte's complete expositions of his 
 system, for his system asserts itself to be an exhaustive analysis of existence. 
 It is the central point of discussion in the " Wissenschaftslehre " of 1804, hence 
 we give a summary of this work. This treatise is interesting in another re- 
 spect : in it Fichte strives to give realistic expression to his doctrine : since he 
 teaches that we are forced to conceive, as the reality of self, an Absolute Life 
 which chooses to manifest itself as the world of consciousness, it is possible 
 to lay stress either upon the Absolute Life itself or upon its manifestation ; in 
 his exposition of 1804 he chooses the former course, led thereto, doubtless, by 
 the popular misconception of his system as empty idealism. In his closing 
 pages, however, he acknowledges that the result reached. Reason as an Ab- 
 solute Life, is, as empirical fact, a result, a concept, and therefore a state of 
 the ego, and is produced by the free act of the ego in choosing to reflect. 
 But he argues that since the ego is result of Reason, or the Absolute Life, in 
 manifesting itself as the ego, its very freedom is result and therefore not 
 freedom. There is no real freedom. " Rein in der Erscheinung aber, = 
 dem mir nur in seinem Princip unzuganghchen Vernunft-Effekt, hegt . . . 
 dass ich y>r/ sei" {Ngl. W. II. 311). The only reality is the Absolute 
 Life, die schlechthin sich-machende Vernunft, und dieses Machen ist ihr 
 keinesweges zufallig, sondern durchaus und schlechthin nothwendig; ihr 
 Sein gesetzt, ist dies, und darin geht ihr Sein auf (308). 
 
 (1804) DIE WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE. Ngl. W. II. 87-314. 
 
 ERSTER THEIL (87-213). 
 
 Die reine Wahrheits- und Vernunftslehre (213). 
 
 We are the appearance (Erscheinung) of the Absolute (205-212). 
 
 (1.89-97.) Philosophy seeks to reduce all multiplicity to unity. But 
 that unity which includes all multiplicity is an Absolute. Hence the aim of 
 Philosophy is the discovery of the Absolute, and the various systems of 
 Philosophy differ from each other only in their respective views of the 
 Absolute. 
 
Appendix. 1 5 1 
 
 (II. 97-105.) The totality of the world of consciousness, which we will 
 call das Wissen, appears as an Absolute, for consciousness can never tran- 
 scend self to find another. 
 
 (III. 106-113.) But this absoluteness of das Wissen is, at present, merely 
 an empirical fact, i. e., we find upon empirical investigation that every fact 
 of consciousness reveals, as condition of its appearance, the act of percep- 
 tion by the ego. Now the Wissenschaftslehre rests in no empirical fact, but 
 seeks always the genesis of fact : i. e., it believes in no Ding an sich, but 
 looks upon existence as the appearance of activity, and in every existence it 
 seeks to find the activity of which it is the appearance. Hence it cannot 
 accept das Wissen as an existing fact, a Ding an sich which is an Absolute, 
 but must discover some act which appears as das Wissen. 
 
 (IV. 1 1 3-1 22.) Since das Wissen is an Absolute and is sight, it can be 
 only the act of self-seeing by a light (see Plotinus, Enn. V. m. 6). 
 
 (V. 122-131.) This Light, which in its self-seeing is our Absolute, is the 
 pure unity which Philosophy seeks ; but in being pure unity it excludes dis- 
 junction, or discrimination, hence is incomprehensible. 
 
 (VI. 1 31-140.) Let us now examine our result that " das Wissen is the 
 self-seeing of a Light '' : — In holding this result we hold in mind two 
 thought-correlates, z. e., two notions, the Light and its self-seeing, which 
 mutually involve each other and which the laws ot thought force upon us. 
 But this reciprocal involution forced upon us is, at present, only an empiri- 
 cal fact : we must find its genesis, or the activity which appears as reciprocal 
 determination. This activity is the activity of thinking. " Also weg mit 
 Zeichen und Wort ! Es bleibt nichts fibrig, als unser lebendiges Denken und 
 Einsehen selber, das sich nicht an die Tafel zeichnen, noch auf irgend eine 
 Art stellvertreten lasst, sondern das eben in natura geliefert werden muss. 
 
 " Hier kommt nun Alles darauf an, dass Jeder sich recht mit dieser Ein- 
 sicht, in diesem reinen Lichte identificiere ; wird er dies, so wird ihm nicht 
 etwa einfallen, dieses Licht wieder zu verdunkeln, und es ausser sich zu 
 setzen. Er wird einsehen, dass das Licht ja nur ist, inwiefern es lebendig 
 in ihm einsieht, eben einsieht das Aufgestellte. Nur im lebendigen Sich- 
 darstellen, als absolutes Einsehen, ist das Licht, und wen es nicht also er- 
 greift und erfasst, und ihn an der Stelle erfasst, in der wir jetzo stehen, der 
 koramt nie zu dem lebendigen Lichte, wiewohl er einen scheinbaren Stellver- 
 treter desselben haben mag " (138). 
 
 (VII. 140-144) We now have the result that the activity of thinking ap- 
 pears as the holding together of two concepts, — pure Light, and its appear- 
 ance as das Wissen. What is the genesis of the empirical result ? An act 
 of the activity of thinking which is a Life holding together the two members 
 of a double Denkform or Urbegriff, pure being -f image. At this point the 
 Light appears as the product of thinking. 
 
152 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 (VIII. 144-152) But is it impossible to get beyond the products of 
 thinking which are only images ? Can we reach no reality ? Yes, we can 
 find and we possess reality. This reality is the immediate activity of think- 
 ing, which, indeed, cannot be grasped, and is inconceivable, yet in its incon- 
 ceivable activity is reality. " Wiederum aber behaupten wir, was die 
 innere Existenz und Aeusserung des Lichtes betreffe, so sei diese ohne alle 
 Bedingung, und hier insbesondere, ob sie eingesehen werde oder nicht, 
 welche Einsicht ja es nur ist, die durch die erscheinende Freiheit bedingt 
 ist, an und fiir sich, falls nur das Licht sei, dieselbe Eine, ewig sich gleiche, 
 durchaus nothwendige. Wir behaupten daher, was bedeutend ist, und 
 was ich wohl zu merken bitte, zwei verschiedene Weisen des Lichtes 
 dazusein und zu leben : die eine mittelbar, und ausserlich im Begriffe, 
 die zweite schlechthin unmittelbar durch sich selber, ob es auch Keiner 
 einsieht, und der Strenge nach, dass es wirklich durchaus Keiner einsieht, 
 sondern dieses inwendige Leben des Lichtes durchaus ufibegreiflich wird 
 
 (149)- 
 
 Die Urdisj unction des Lichtes ist im Sein und Denken. Das Licht lebt 
 schlechthin, heisst daher : es spaltet sich durchaus unspriinghch in stehen- 
 den, jedoch eben als Begriff vernichteten Begriff und Sein : welcher Spal- 
 tung nun die Einsicht allerdings folgen kann, wie sie ihr jetzo von unserer 
 Seite folgt, Nachconstndrend, von der Spaltung eben in Begriff, als Begriff, 
 und Sein, als Sein : doch aber stehen lassen miissend, als ihr undurch- 
 dringlich, die innere Spaltung selber ; was nun erst, ausser der schon oben 
 gefundenen, sehr wohl begriffenen Form der Unbegreiflichkeit einen ewig 
 unbegreiflich bleibenden materialen Inhalt des Lichtes als reine Einheit 
 giebt" (149, 150). At this point the Light appears as an absolute reality 
 
 (ISO- 
 
 (IX. 153-161.) The Urbegriff, with its two mutually involving members, 
 pure being (Light) and image, is now for us an empirical Durcheinander. 
 We must seek the genetic connection of the two members, or the act of 
 causality which results in two images : does pure being cause image, or does 
 image cause pure being? 
 
 (X. 1 61-170) We first examine pure being or Light, and find that for 
 the mind it is = O (163), hence we cannot predicate causahty of it. We 
 must, therefore, examine the other member, or image, to see if it is cause of 
 pure being. 
 
 (XI.-XV. 170-212.) We cannot maintain that image is cause of being, 
 or the idealistic theory, for if we do we are mere Empiricists : — idealism 
 bases itself upon the fact of reflection, i. e., it finds the act of reflection ac- 
 companying every perception, and it asserts that this act is the cause of the 
 percept ; the act of reflection is an empirical fact, hence idealism is merely 
 an empirical system (180, 181, 185, 186, 189, 190, 192, 193-195,209,210). 
 
Appendix. 153 
 
 On the other hand, we cannot maintain that being, or an Ansich, is the 
 cause of image, or the realistic theory, for not only does reaUsm fail to ex- 
 plain the connection between being and image (174, 175), but it accepts as 
 ultimate the results of the laws of thought, knowing no ground for these laws : 
 the realist thinks out his Ansich, using the methods of thought without 
 questioning them, accepting the validity of results obtained by obedience to 
 the laws of thought without seeking the ground of such validity ; hence con- 
 sciousness, in its activity and laws, is really his ultimate, and he is an idealist : 
 in effect he says, " Consciousness is the only reality, and whatever it asserts 
 must be so " (202, 203, 211, 212). 
 
 We have just said that the " being," or Ansich of realism is invalid as 
 ultimate and absolute, because it is an empirical fact entangled in the rela- 
 tions of thought — the product of thought instead of an unconnected Abso- 
 lute. If we abstract this " being," or Ansich, from all empirical thought 
 relations, the objection will be removed. How is this possible ? How can 
 it be abstracted from thought-relations and yet be, when " being " is a thought- 
 term? It can be abstracted from relations only as the being and life of 
 thought itself, which thinks but is unthinkable : " wir sind daher das Eine 
 ungetheilte Sein selber, in sich, von sich, durch sich, das schlechthin nicht 
 herausgehen kann zur Zweiheit (205, 206). . . . 
 
 " Dass wir nun dieses Wir mit seinem inwendigen Leben selbst wiederum 
 objektiviren, dessen sind wir uns, wenn wir uns recht besinnen, freilich un- 
 mittelbar bewusst : wir miissen aber einsehen, dass diese Objektivitat eben 
 so wenig, als irgend eine andere, Etwas bedeudet, und wir wissen ja, dass gar 
 nicht von diesem Wir an sich (the objective I) die Rede ist, sondern ledig- 
 lich von dem einen in sich selber lebenden Wir in sich, welches wir be- 
 greifen lediglich durch unsere eigene kraftige Vernichtung des Begreifens, 
 das sich uns hier faktisch aufdrangte. — Jenes Wir im unmittelbaren Leben 
 selber ; jenes Wir, nicht bestimmt oder charakterisirbar durch irgend Etwas, 
 das hier Jemandem beifallen diirfte, sondern charakterisirbar lediglich durch 
 unmittelbares, actuelles Leben selber (206, 207, 211, 212). 
 
 " Ist das Sein im eigenen absoluten Leben befasst, und kann es nimmer 
 daraus heraus, so ist es eben ein in sich geschlossenes Ich, und kann durchaus 
 nichts Anderes sein, als dies, und wiederum ein in sich geschlossenes Ich 
 ist das Sein : welches Ich wir nun auch, in der Aussicht auf eine Theilung 
 in ihm Wir nennen konnen. Wir stiitzen uns daher hier gar nicht auf eine 
 empirische Wahrnehmjing unseres Lebens, welche, als eine Modifikation des 
 Bewusstseins durchaus abzuweisen ware ; sondern auf die genetische Ein- 
 sicht des Lebens und Ich, aus der Construction des Einen Seins, und 
 umgekehrt (207). 
 
 " Wie in der erzeugten Einsicht wir selbst das Sein werden, so konnen 
 wir zufolge dieser Einsicht nicht mehr zum Sein herausgehen, denn wir sind 
 
154 Unity of Fichtes Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 es : und iiberhaupt absolut nicht aus uns herausgehen, weil das Sein nicht 
 aus sich herausgehen kann (208). . . . 
 
 " Heute kam es uns nur darauf an, die, die reine Vernunft ausdriickende 
 Einsicht, dass das Sein, oder das Absolute ein sich selber geschlossenes Ich 
 sei, in ihrer Unveranderlichkeit festzustellen " (208). 
 
 ZWEITER THEIL (213, 214). 
 Phdnomenologie (213, 208). 
 Deduction of the Erscheinung, or why the Absolute appears as the World 
 of Consciousness (217, 218, 262, 263). 
 
 Summary. 
 
 Division I. 212-238. "Soil" (if) as principle of the world of conscious- 
 ness. 
 
 Division II. 238-254. The world of consciousness as self-creative, as 
 ein absolutes Von. 
 
 Division III. 254-314. If absolute knowledge, which is everlasting life 
 (289-292), is to appear, the world of consciousness must appear. 
 
 Result = the deduction of the Erscheinung is the showing that the Er- 
 scheinung is a necessary condition of eternal life, or of the realized image 
 of God : the Absolute appears as the world of consciousness that the image 
 of God may appear. 
 
 Division I. 212-238. "Soll" (if), as Principle of the World of 
 
 Consciousness. 
 
 (XVI. 212-221.) In Part I. we have discovered the Absolute, for we 
 have found that " wir sind das Eine ungetheilte Sein selber " (206) ; /. e., 
 that Sein projects itself as the world of consciousness, as the Absolute Ego 
 (207). The task remains to analyze the content of this Absolute, and our 
 first problem is to find the principle of projection. Why does Sein project 
 itself as consciousness, or reflect upon itself? Must it do so perforce, or is 
 this projection, this reflection a free act for a purpose? (217, 218). 
 
 Since Sein does project itself, /. e., reflect upon self, and since there is 
 nothing but Sein, the ground of the projection, whatever it is, must be in 
 Sein ; hence, in so far, the projection, though ideal, is real, and ideality and 
 reality are organic members of the unity " Sein " (215). 
 
 The ground of projection, or reflection upon self, which is in Sein, we 
 are now to seek. Let us examine our last act : we gained the result, " the 
 ground of self-projection is in Sein." How did we gain it? by projection 
 or reflection. Were we forced to project? No; not forced uncondition- 
 ally, but if we wished to gain the result we were forced ; ah ! j/" (soil) ! con- 
 
Appendix. 155 
 
 ditional necessity ! this is the ground of reflection, of self-projection ; Sein 
 is not forced to project itself, but if\l is to gain a certain result, for instance, 
 image of self, Holy Will, or what-not, it must reflect. In if, then, or Soil, we 
 have a principle at once problematic and categorical, — problematic as to 
 actualization, categorical in actualization (218-220). 
 
 If we analyze Soil, we find that: — (i) Soil is free because problematic, 
 if it were grounded in necessity it would be " must" not Soil; (2) because 
 free, Soil is Schopfung aus nichts, Selbstschopfer seines Seins, und Selbst- 
 trager seiner Dauer; (3) if Soil is realized, a determined result follows, 
 therefore there is in Soil a categorical and absolute, the absolute determina- 
 tion of its actualized being : if the result is, it must be in given fashion (219). 
 
 Hence " das Soil tragt durchaus alle Kennzeichen des im Grundsatze 
 eingesehenen Seins an sich, ein innerlich lebendiges von sich, durch sich, 
 in sich, schaffend und tragend sich selber, reines Ich u. s. f. ; und zwar 
 innerlich organisirt und zusammenhaltend durchaus als solches (219, 220). 
 Sonach diirfte wohl dieses Soil . . . die unmittelbare . . . ideale Sichconstruc- 
 tion des Seins selber sein . . . dass wir daher Aussicht hatten, an diesem 
 Soil endlich ein Princip gefunden zu haben, welches in sich selber Con- 
 struction und Sache, Ideal und Real ist, und Eins nicht sein kann ohne 
 das Andere (220). 
 
 (XVII. 221-229.) I' follows that between the Erscheinung and the inner 
 being of Sein there enters Soil, freedom, or the form of the Erscheinung. 
 In this middle member lies the analytic-synthetic principle of thought, or 
 the law of reciprocal determination (226). 
 
 The difierence between Sein and Soil is that Sein is a von sich u. s. w., 
 while Soil is a von sich u. s. w. als solches, i. e., Sein is reality, Soil is only 
 image of reality: Sein acts and is, Soil sees activity and is as if it were 
 (2 2 8," 2 29). 
 
 (XVIII. 229-238.) Soil says, "if a given result is to follow, there must, 
 etc." : here we are in the region of ideality, of concept : but if Soil realizes 
 itself, the given result follows as a reality ; hence the complete and realized 
 Soil involves, as its two members, the ideal and the real (230, 231). 
 
 In Soil we shall find the genesis of consciousness, or the reason why the 
 ■ Absolute projects itself in image-form as the Absolute Ego (231, 232). 
 
 We are realists because we see that it is Sein in and von sich that pro- 
 jects itself, /. e., an independent Sein ; we are idealists because we see it, be- 
 cause we know that we are Sein seeing self (234-236). 
 
 (XIX. 238-245.) We have found in Soil the contradiction that, while 
 asserting a certain existence as problematic, it at the same time gives the 
 
IS6 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Kttowledge. 
 
 existence as categorical, i. e., wlien we say, " if we are to gain a given result 
 we must, etc.," tlie given result, which is assumed as non-existing, already 
 has fully determined existence in the mind. This same contradiction meets 
 us in consciousness : any theory which we advance as to the genesis of con- 
 sciousness involves the existence of consciousness as the condition of the 
 theory (238, 239). 
 
 In another aspect Soil is fitting type of consciousness : it seeks as end 
 reality for a given concept ; the end of conscious life is to give real existence 
 to its higher ideals (239). 
 
 Division II. 238-254. The World of Consciousness as self-creative, 
 
 AS EIN ABSOLUTES VoN. 
 
 The contradiction mentioned above cannot lie in Sein, for Sein is indi- 
 visible unity ; it must lie in the imaging of Sein. Since this imaging leaves 
 the content unaltered it must be ungrounded or free ; this freedom contra- 
 dicts the absolute necessity which we have found in Sein, and we have as 
 future task the reconciliation of freedom and necessity (239, 240). 
 
 It now devolves upon us to demonstrate the validity of causality, for our 
 whole argument is founded upon causality. Our argument to this point 
 may be summarized as follows : — we found that the data of consciousness, 
 when abstracted from content, and inter-relation, and multiplicity, remain as 
 facts of consciousness, i. e., the ultimate existence of each datum is existence 
 as a state of the ego : the ultimate after all possible abstraction is the ego or 
 das \\'issen ; hence das Wissen is an absolute ; but if das Wissen is an absolute 
 and can find no other than self, its cause can be no other than self, therefore 
 it must be self-created, causa sui, ein Vonsich (240), ein absolutes Von (246, 
 247). — In this argument it is assumed that there must be some cause for 
 existence, and if no other cause can be found, existence must be causa 
 sui ; in other words, the universaHty and validity of causahty is assumed. 
 Suppose our opponent bid us rest satisfied with the categorical " it is " of 
 existence, and not concern ourselves with causality, with a Von (241). 
 We reply that we are well aware that causality and creation exist only in 
 thought, and the very fact that we are able to think about the cause of the 
 objective world proves that this objective world is a thought-world : if it 
 were something foreign to thought lying outside it, we could never speculate 
 about its cause. The ineradicable tendency of the mind to predicate cause 
 and effect of the sense world proves that the sense-world is one aspect of a 
 thought-world. Thought, as the Absolute Ego, as the one and only Thinking 
 which manifests itself in us, is all that there is, and if this Thinking think 
 causality, causality is valid, for the only test of validity is the one absolute 
 Thinking (241-245). 
 
Appendix. \t^'j 
 
 (XX. 245-254.) Our present doctrine is : — (i) Causality and creation 
 are not extra-mentem facts, they lie only in Wissen ; (2) since Wissen is 
 causality and creation, we may call it ein absolutes Von; (3) Wissen, in its 
 assertion of causality and creation, is trustworthy, for Wissen is what it 
 knows itself to be (246, 247). Our argument may be formulated as 
 follows : — 
 
 All existence has a cause, either self or as other. 
 
 Wissen is an existence whose cause is not another. 
 
 Hence Wissen is causa sui, a Vonsich, ein absolutes Von (247, 248). 
 
 Our conclusion "Wissen is ein absolutes Von," becomes a new premise 
 from which to draw further conclusions (248). 
 
 If the question is asked, " Why is Wissen an absolutes Von instead of 
 something else ? we reply that Wissen in its qualitative and material determi- 
 nations is, of necessity, incomprehensible (this incomprehensibility is the 
 necessary condition of comprehension as its inseparable opposite) . Even 
 if we could understand Wissen in its qualitative absoluteness we should not 
 have compassed universal comprehension ; for if the incomprehensible hid 
 itself no longer in the known, it would still lurk in the knower, in the unseen 
 and unseizable seer who ever eludes. Wissen is the cause of cause, hence 
 it is absurd to ask the cause of Wissen (249). 
 
 Von includes two members, cause and effect ; hence Wissen, which is a 
 Von, must appear as a duality, as subject and object : in the ignorant dis- 
 junction of the two members of the organic unity Von, we have the origin 
 of the dead " is," i. e., of the conception of an extra-mentem world of 
 matter (250-254). 
 
 Division III. (254-314). If Absolute Knowledge, which is Ever- 
 lasting Life, is to appear, the World of Consciousness must 
 
 APPEAR. 
 
 Genesis of Sein. XXI.-XXIV. 254-278. 
 
 We have been describing Wissen as a Von, but we must not forget that 
 Wissen is only presupposed : — we say " j/" there is a Wissen, it must be ein 
 absolutes Von, genesis, causality, self-creation" (254). 
 
 This Soil has seemed to us a possible principle of the Erscheinung for 
 reasons already given. Soil is, in its inner being, genesis, /. <?., it implies 
 that something does not yet exist, seeks the condition of its existence, and 
 thereby demands its real existence, hence it involves real and ideal (254- 
 
 259)- 
 
 Accepting empirical perception as self-genesis, /. e., as the constant ac- 
 tivity of appearing as an ungrounded qualitative absolute in consciousness, 
 we are forced by the laws of thought to postulate a principle of this genesis. 
 
158 Unity of Fichtes Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 or to reduce it to not-genesis, or being. This act of thought is the genesis 
 of the plain man's Sein (259-270). 
 
 We accept this conclusion as certain because we are certain of the 
 validity of the results of the laws of thought. Upon what is certainty 
 grounded ? How is mental certainty justifiable ? The ground of certainty 
 is that certainty is a life which projects itself as it is inwardly, sees the exact 
 projection, therefore is certain of what it sees : i. e., certainty is the Abso- 
 lute seeing self as it really is, knowing that there is no Other to invalidate, 
 and accepting implicitly what it sees : the mind is certain of the results of 
 the laws of thought, because these laws and their results are the ulti- 
 mates of existence, therefore there is no power which can controvert them 
 (270-276). 
 
 The fact that the ego sees only self elucidates an important point, — the 
 apparent hiatus between the real and the ideal : in the objective world the 
 ego sees self, but self is an absolute, hence the objective world must seem 
 independent and unconnected (276-278). 
 
 Freedom and Necessity. XXIV., XXV. 278-292. 
 
 If we are asked to justify our statement that the ego projects and sees 
 self we reply that if the ego predicates anything of itself it must project itself 
 per hiatum, or appear as subject and object (278, 279). 
 
 Here again we give problematic proof : — " if . . . %o must . . ." In 
 this formula we have a union of freedom and necessity: — the ego is not 
 forced to predicate of itself, therefore there is freedom, but if it does, neces- 
 sity governs the result : whether or not there shall be any result is a matter 
 of freedom ; but if there is a result it is governed by the law that it shall be 
 subject to law. This law that there shall be law we may call the absolute 
 law (280-285). 
 
 But how is it possible that law should reign in the world of consciousness, 
 when this world is made up wholly of images, and images are the result of 
 the freedom of the ego ? The very law of which we are talking is only image 
 of law (285, 286). 
 
 The fact that we recognize image as image proves that in the image is 
 law controlling and shaping it : if the image were not true to the law of 
 image we should never know it to be an image : the fact that the world in 
 which we live is a world of knowledge, of consciousness, proves that it is a 
 world of law (286, 287). 
 
 We see now what the world of the Wissenschaftslehre is : it is not a world 
 of capricious images or a world of Dinge an sich, but a world of images 
 shaped by law, a world created by the interpenetration of freedom and 
 necessity (287). 
 
 Bird's eye view of rest of system (288-292). 
 
Appendix. icq 
 
 Genesis of Absolutes Sein. XXVI. 292-300. 
 If the world of consciousness is a world of images it postulates the reality 
 of which it is image, or absolutes Sein (294, 295). But this Sein is, of 
 course, not an extra-mentem existence : it is the Sein of consciousness, its 
 own higher Sein, in comparison with which it denies that its lower existence 
 has reality : it is its ideal, of which it predicates reality, and before which it 
 asserts the nullity of its material existence (295). Hence consciousness 
 sees itself as absolutes Sein. 
 
 Consciousness is ground of its own existence. XXVII. 300-307. 
 If consciousness sees itself, has an image of itself, this act of seeing, this 
 image, involves the actual existence of consciousness. Here the ontological 
 proof is admissible, and concept involves actual existence for consciousness 
 is the act of seeing, and if there is the seeing, the act, or consciousness, ex- 
 ists : the act of seeing, or consciousness, is the ground of consciousness : in 
 the assertion of seeing lies the inwardly grounded existence and hfe of 
 consciousness (301-307). 
 
 Deduction of the Erscheinung. XXVIII. 308-314. 
 
 Our present result is that consciousness sees itself as the ground of its 
 own existence. In this result we have not reached unity, or the goal of 
 Philosophy, for consciousness is divided into subject and object (308). 
 We get unity by viewing consciousness as the act which makes itself into 
 subject viewing object. " Die Vernunft macht sich selber schlechthin in- 
 tuirend. ... In diesem sich schlechthin, in wirklicher Lebendigkeit und Ex- 
 istenz intuirend Machen besteht nun das rein an sich klare und durchsichtige 
 Licht (= Vernunft), erhaben iiber alle objectivirende Intuition, als selber ihr 
 Grund, und fiillt nun durchaus den Hiatus zwischen Object und Subject, 
 vernichtet daher beide (308, 309). 
 
 In this view, though empirically we do objectify consciousness, we ab- 
 stract from objectivity (310). 
 
 If we objectify conciousness we regard this act of reflection as a free act 
 and the resulting objective concept of consciousness as a state of the ego. 
 This free act with the ensuing state is the result of the ego, but the ego is 
 the result of the activity which manifests itself as an ego, hence the free act 
 is result and not free. " Rein in der Erscheimmg aber, = dem mir nur in 
 seinem Princip unzuganglichen Vernunft- Efifekt, liegt . . . das sich/m sei " 
 
 (311)- 
 
 The world of consciousness now appears as a unity. But the condi- 
 tion of unity is multiplicity, hence if the view of consciousness as the unity 
 of die schlechthin sich-machende Vernunft is to be reached, the multi- 
 plicity of empirical consciousness must exist : i. e., the Erscheinung is the 
 condition of the appearance of Absolute Knowledge (311). 
 
i6o Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 One of the chief difficulties with which the student of Fichte has to con- 
 tend is Fichte's loose use of language. We give a few of his apparently 
 contradictory statements about the Absolute. 
 
 The Absolute is Freedom : " So nicht das Absolute, welches in ihm 
 selbst lebendig und selbststandig ist, und kein beschrankendes Gesetz anneh- 
 men kann {Ngl. IV. II. 339; W. II. 113, 114). 
 
 The Absolute is Necessity : Sie kann nicht nicht sein, so gewiss das 
 Absolute nicht nicht sein kann {Ngl. W. I. 408). 
 
 One of the ends of the Darstellung of 1801 is to set forth " das absolute 
 Seyn " as necessity ( W. II. 1-163). 
 
 The Absolute is both Freedom and Necessity. Denke sich der 
 Leser zuvorderst das Absolute, schlechthin als solches, so wie oben sein Be- 
 griff bestimmt worden. Er wird finden, behaupten wir, dass er es nur unter 
 folgenden zwei Merkmalen denken konne, theils dass es sey schlechthin, was 
 es sey, auf und in sich selbst ruhe durchaus ohne Wandel und Wanken, fest, 
 vollendet und in sich geschlossen, theils, dass es sey, was es sey, schlechthin 
 weil es sey, von sich selbst, und durch sich selbst, ohne alien fremden Ein- 
 fiuss, indem neben dem Absoluten gar kein Fremdes iibrig bleibt, sondern 
 alles, was nicht das Absolute selbst ist verschwindet. . . . Wir konnen das 
 erstere absolutes Bestehen, ruhendes Seyn u. s. w. nennen ; das letztere 
 absolutes Werden oder Freiheit ( W. II. 16, 17, 22, 30). 
 
 The Absolute is neh-her Freedom nor Necessity. Also diese 
 Freiheit, durch welche der Mensch, als faktisches Selbstbewusstsein, zur 
 Sittlichkeit kommt, liegt weder im Ich, welches tief unter ihr steht, indem 
 dieses Bild erst durch jene gebildet, und so das Ich, durch die Entwicke- 
 lung des Lebens erst sich als frei erscheinen kann : noch auch hegt sie im 
 Absoluten, in Gott, welches iiber ihr steht, hoher denn sie ; sondern sie liegt 
 in der Form der Erscheinung selbst. . . . Wie steht es denn also ? Gott 
 liegt iiber alle Erscheinung hinaus, also auch iiber die Freiheit, die ja zur 
 Erscheinung gehort ; also die Erscheinung selbst ist dies Princip der Frei- 
 heit : ihr frei sich entwickelndes Leben ist es, welches im Individuum aus 
 der Sinnhchkeit zur Sittlichkeit sich erhebt {Ngl. W. I. 414, 415. See 
 also 423, 447, 448, 537, etc.).' 
 
 Indem es (das Reale in der Erscheinung) aber erblickt wird und in seiner 
 Beziehung auf das sich selbst erblickende Vermogen (das Ich) erblickt wird, 
 bricht nach darzulegenden Gesetzen jene Einheit sich in eine Mannichfal- 
 tigkeit ; der Zusammenhang aber dieses Mannichfaltigen (verniittelst dessen 
 allein die Riickkehr des Blicks auf die Einheit moglich ist) ist die Noth- 
 ■wendigkeit. Und so ist denn alle Nothwendigkeit durchaus nichts Reales, 
 sondern nur die Anschauungsforra des einen wahrhaft Realen in der Erschei- 
 nung {Leben II. 181, etc.). 
 
Appendix. 
 
 I6i 
 
 The Absolute is God. Gott, oder das Absolute ist und nur er ist 
 {Ngl. W. I. 408, 414; ^ii- W. II. 13, 46; W. II. 61 ; W. V. 443, 452, 
 510; W.^l. 361). 
 
 The Absolute is a Form of Thought. Sonach sind die beiden hier 
 aufgezeigten Qualitaten : Seyn und Freiheit, die hochsten und absoluten 
 Qualitaten. Dalier kam es auch, dass wir sie oben als nicht weiter 
 aufzulosende oder zu vereinigende Qualitaten des Absoluten fanden, 
 welches letztere wohl selbst nichts Anderes seyn diirfte, als die Vereinigung 
 der beiden Urqualitaten in der formellen Einheit des Denkens ( W. II. 30, 
 i3> 16, 17, 60, 63, 64, etc.). 
 
 All through the " Darstellung " of 1801 {W. II. 1-163), the terms the 
 Absolute (60-63), Absolute Being (60), Pure Thinking (39, 40, 68), Bound 
 Thinking (49-51, S4-s6> 59) 60, 64, etc.), and Absolute Thinking (40, 43, 
 47, 50, 53) are interchanged. 
 
 The Absolute is unknowable. Wir begreifen immer das Absolute ; 
 denn ausser ihm ist nichts Begreifbares, und wir begreifen dennoch, dass 
 wir es nie vollig begreifen werden ; denn zwischen ihm und dem Wissen 
 liegt die unendliche Quantitabilitat {W. II. 106). 
 
 (3) Nun aber erhebt sich das Wissen iiber sich selbst und diese Welt, 
 und erst da, jenseits der Welt, ist es Wissen. Die Welt, die man nicht will, 
 fiigt sich nur ohne sein Zuthun hinzu. Jenseits jener Unmittelbarkeit aber, 
 worauf ruht da das Wissen ? Auch nicht auf dem absoluten Seyn, sondern 
 auf einer Bestimmung der — nicht formalen, wie sich versteht, denn diese 
 ist durchaus unbestimmbar, sondern — der absolut realen Freiheit durch 
 das absolute Seyn. Das Hochste demnach ist ein synthetisches Denken 
 (eben der Sitz der hochsten Substantialitat) in welchem das absolute Seyn, 
 nicht /ar sich, sondern als ein bestimmendes — als absolute Substanz, welches 
 ja schon eine Form des Wissens als Denkens ist, — und als absoluter Grund, 
 welcher dasselbe ist, vorkommt. Selbst das absolute Wissen weiss daher 
 nur mittelbar vom ihm, dem Seyn {W. II. 87, 13, 30, 70, 71, 85, iii, 
 684, 68s). 
 
 The Absolute -expresses its whole Nature in the Erscheinung 
 (see Appendix, page 142). 
 
 The Absolute is not Knowledge. Das Absolute ist weder Wissen, 
 noch ist es Seyn, noch ist es Identitat, noch ist es Indifferenz beider, sondern 
 es ist durchaus bloss und lediglich das Absohite ( W. II. 13, 22, 27). 
 
 The Absolute is Knowledge. Oder, denke nochmals das Absolute 
 so wie es oben beschrieben worden. Es ist schlechthin, was es ist, und 
 ist dieses schlechthin, well es ist. Aber dadurch ist ihm noch immer kein 
 Auge eingesetzt, und wenn du nun fragest, fiir wen es sey ... so magst 
 du dich nur nach einem Auge ausser ihm umsehen ; und wenn wir dir 
 dieses Auge auch in der That schenken woUten, wie wir doch nicht konnen, 
 
 21 
 
i62 Unity of Fickte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 so wirst du ferner die Verbindung desselben mit jenem Absoluten nimmer 
 erklaren, sondem sie nur in den Tag hinein beiiaupten. Aber dieses Auge 
 liegt nicht ausser ihm, sondem in ihm, und ist eben das lebendige sich 
 Durchdringen der Absolutlieit selbst ( W. II. 19). 
 
 Absolute Being is Law. Das Absolute Seyn ist im Wissen Gesetz 
 ( W. II. 108, 64 ; Ngl. W. II. 46, 48). 
 
 Absolute Being is the Ground of Knowledge. Was da gewusst 
 wird, hangt durchaus von der Freiheit ab ; dass aber irgend etwas sey, und 
 wenn es zu einem Diesen kommt, das es gewusst werde (vollig auf- und 
 eingehe ins Wissen) ist gegriindet im absoluten Seyn {W. II. in. Ngl. 
 W. I. 200). 
 
 Absolute Being is not the Ground of Knowledge. Dies gabe 
 nun das Eine, unendliche Wissen, das ganze Accidens des absoluten Seyns. 
 Aus dem Seyn geht durchaus weder die Moglichkeit noch Wirklichkeit des 
 Wissens, wie es nach Spinoza seyn miisste, sondern auf den Fall seiner 
 Wirklichkeit nur seine Bestimmtheit iiberkaupt hervor (^W. II. 109). 
 
 The Absolute is pure Thought. Wir haben ausser dem zu Anfange 
 aufgestellten Begriffe des Absoluten, wahrend der letzteren Untersuchungen 
 einen noch scharferen von der Form des Absoluten uns errungen : den, 
 dass es, in Beziehung auf ein mogliches Wissen, ein reines, durchaus und 
 schlechthin gebundenes Denken sey {W. II. 60). 
 
 The Absolute is content of the Erscheinung (Qualitative Sen- 
 sations). In welcher Riicksicht nun die Erscheinung an sich sei, ist aus 
 dem Obigen auch schon klar : in Riicksicht ihres Inhaltes namlich, mit ab- 
 soluter Abstraktion von der Form ihres Seins, dass sie nicht ist das Abso- 
 lute selbst, sondern nur seine Erscheinung, welches nur in einem Gegensatze 
 mit dem Sein, und darum in einem absoluten Bilde moglich ist, wovon wir 
 jetzt noch nicht reden, sondern nur von ihrem Inhalte. Dieser Inhalt ist 
 nun schlechthin, wie er ist, nicht durch die Erscheinung oder ihre Form, 
 sondern durch das Absolute, indem er dessen Inhalt selbst ist, und Erschei- 
 nung ist er nur dadurch, dass er ist in dieser Form, nicht das innere Sein des 
 Absoluten selbst, sondem sein Erscheinen, was dermalen uns Nichts angeht. 
 Dieser Inhalt nun ist offenbar nicht begriindet durch irgend ein Bild, nicht 
 abzuleiten und modificirt aus irgend einem Bilde, sondem er ist, als Sein der 
 Erscheinung, und innerer Grund und Boden derselben, durchaus absolut, ihre 
 Suhstanz (obwohl, wenn an sie selbst der Satz des Grundes angelegt wird, 
 sie nicht in sich begriindet ist, sondern in dem Erscheinen des Absoluten, 
 was aber hier, wo von dem Sein der Erscheinung an sich die Rede ist abge- 
 halten werden muss). {Ngl. W. I. 200, 201 ; W. II. 61). 
 
 The Absolute has nothing outside it. Absolute heisst: durchaus 
 Nichts dem Verstande wrawjgesetzt, Nichts neben ihn gesetzt, Nichts mit 
 ihm in Verbindung gebracht, sondern ihn genommen als schlechthin und 
 
Appendix. \ 63 
 
 durchaus ruhend auf sich selbst, als Selbststandigkeit, Immanenz in sich 
 {Ngl. W.\\.Z2,; fT. II. 16, 17, 19). 
 
 The Absolute has something outside it. Also — ausser dem Abso- 
 luten ist da, weil es nun einmal da ist, sein Bild. 1st der absolut bejahende 
 Satz der Wissenschaftslehre, von dem sie aufgeht: ihre eigentliche Seele 
 {Ngl. W. 11. 333, 326-337 ; Ngl. W. I. 408, 409 ; W. II. 696). 
 
 These apparently contradictory statements are always reconciled when 
 we understand what Fichte means by the Absolute in the paragraphs under 
 consideration : — sometimes it stands for the sphere of consciousness 
 which we have called God, Being, etc. ; sometimes it denotes both spheres 
 of consciousness, the mind in its widest circumference viewing itself as 
 Knowledge springing from Not- Knowledge ; and again it signifies the Incon- 
 ceivable which manifests itself in the totality of consciousness. In all cases, 
 if we know from what point of view Fichte is looking we find his statement 
 logical, and only another aspect of that which seems to contradict it. 
 
164 Unity of Fickte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 SEYN. 
 
 The word " Seyn " is often used by Fichte in its ordinary sense, i. e. to 
 denote the plain man's " being." In such cases Fichte usually proceeds to 
 show that Seyn is merely the concept of Seyn. 
 
 The truly Fichtean meaning of the word, as we have already seen, is 
 something entirely different : — it denotes that which Fichte thinks we are 
 forced to postulate as cause of existence, God, or the Divine Being. When 
 this causal sphere is divided into its two elements, freedom and Law, Law 
 is often spoken of as "das absolute Seyn," or, more simply, " Seyn." 
 
 We point out the special use of the word in the various treatises : — 
 
 (1794) Grundlage. ^1.278, note; see Appendix, page 144. Here 
 "absolutes Seyn " is evidently an equivalent for God. 
 
 (1797) Zweite Einldtung. ^. I. 45r-5i8. In whatever sense Fichte 
 uses the word " Seyn," he never means that it shall be thought of as a Ding 
 an sich : it is always a logical conclusion of the Ego, created by its activity 
 and existing as a part of its consciousness. In this work the opponent is 
 supposed to ask, " Wenn ihr von keinem Seyn ausgeht, wie mogt ihr doch, 
 ohne inconsequent zu verfahren, ein Sein ableiten konnen? Fichte says, 
 Ich antworte : es wird auch allerdings kein Seyn abgeleitet in dem Sinne, wie 
 ihr das Wort zu nehmen pflegt: kein Seyn an sich. Was der Philosoph vor 
 sich nahm, ist ein nach Gesetzen Handelndes : und was er aufstellt, ist die 
 Reihe der nothwendigen Handlungen dieses Handelnden. Unter diesen 
 Handlungen kommt auch eine vor, welche dem Handelnden selbst als ein 
 Seyn erscheint, und, nach aufzuweisenden Gesetzen, ihm nothwendig so 
 erscheinen muss. Dem Philosophen, der von einem hoheren Gesichtspuncte 
 zusieht, ist es und bleibt es ein Handeln. Ein Seyn ist lediglich fiir das 
 beobachtete Ich; dieses denkt realistisch: fiir den Philosophen ist Handeln, 
 und nichts als Handeln ; denn er denkt, als Philosoph, idealistisch (498). 
 
 Dass ich es bei dieser Veranlassung einmal ganz klar sage : darin besteht 
 das Wesen des transcendentalen Idealismus iiberhaupt, und das der Darstel- 
 lung in der Wissenschaftslehre insbesondere, dass der Begrifif des Seyns gar 
 nicht als ein erster und urspriinglicher Begriff angesehen, sondern lediglich 
 als ein abgeleiteter, und zwar durch Gegensatz der Thatigkeit abgeleiteter, 
 
Appendix. 165 
 
 also nur als ein negativer Begriff betrachtet wird. Das einzige positive ist 
 dem Idealisten die Freiheit ; Seyn ist ihm blosse Negation der ersteren 
 (499. See 1797). Versucheiner neuen Darstellung i^W. I. 524, 525). 
 
 (1801) Darstellung. W. II. 1-163. In this work the world of con- 
 sciousness is analyzed into content and form: the content is seen to 
 be unalterably determined and given to us as an ultimate whose existence 
 we are absolutely certain of, and absolutely unable to change : this unchang- 
 ing and compelling nature of content is indicated by the term " das absolute 
 Seyn," often " Seyn " ; the form is the Ego-form, which, since it sees only 
 self, can see no foreign creator and controller, and is therefore called Free- 
 dom. The interpenetration beyond existence, in the sphere of potentiality, 
 of Seyn and Freiheit, produces the world of consciousness. This sphere 
 of interpenetration shows itself to be God in the act of creation, or a living 
 Moral Law. We partially repeat a quotation that we may present the passage 
 without break. 
 
 " Denke sich der Leser zuvorderst das Absolute, schlechthin als solches, 
 sowie eben sein Begriff bestimmt worden. Er wird finden, behaupten wir, 
 dass er es nur unter folgenden zwei Merkmalen denken konne, theils dass 
 es sey schlechthin, was es sey, auf und in sich selbst ruhe durchaus ohne 
 Wandel und Wanken, fest, voUendet und in sich geschlossen, theils, dass es 
 sey, was es sey well es sey, von sich selbst, und durch sich selbst, ohne alien 
 fremden Einfluss, indem neben dem Absoluten gar kein Fremdes iibrig bleibt, 
 sondern alles, was nicht das Absolute selbst ist, verschwindet. (Es kann seyn, 
 dass diese Duplicitat der Merkmale, mit welcher wir das Absolute fassen, und 
 es anders gar nicht fassen konnen, welche dem Absoluten gegeniiber allerdings 
 sonderbar scheint, selbst Resultat unseres Denkens, also eben eines Wissens 
 ist, welches wir vorlaufig unentschieden lassen mtissen) (16, 17). 
 
 Wir konnen das erstere absolutes Bestehen, ruhendes Seyn u. s. w. 
 nennen ; das letztere absolutes Werden oder Freiheit. Beide Ausdrucke 
 sollen, wie sich dies von einem ehrlichen und grfindlichen Vortrage ver- 
 steht, nichts mehr bezeichnen, als was in der bei dem Leser vorausgesetzten 
 Anschauung der beiden Merkmale des Absoluten liegt (17). 
 
 Nun soil das Wissen absolut seyn, als Eins, eben als sich selbst gleiches, 
 und ewig gleich bleibendes Wissen, als Einheit einer und eben der hochsten 
 Anschauung, als blosse absolute Qualitat. Im Wissen sonach miissten die 
 beiden oben unterschiedenen Merkmale des Absoluten schlechthin in ein- 
 ander fallen und verschmelzen, so dass beide gar nicht mehr unterscheidbar 
 waren ; und eben in dieser absoluten Verschmelzung wiirde das Wesen des 
 Wissens, als solchen, oder das absolute Wissen bestehen (17). 
 
 Ich sage, in dem zu einer untrennbaren Einheit Verschmelzen, und im 
 innigsten sich Durchdringen beider, so dass beide ihren Charakter der Un- 
 
1 66 Unity of Fickle' s Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 terscheidung in der Vereinigung ganzlich aufgeben und verlieren, und als 
 Ein Wesen, und ein durchaus neues Wesen dastehen, also in einer eigent- 
 lich realen Vereinigung und wahren Organisation : keinesweges aber in einem 
 blossen Nebeneinander sich verhalten, wodurch niemand begreift, wie 
 sie denn doch neben einander bestehen, und lediglich eine formale und 
 negative Einheit, eine Nichtverschiedenheit entsteht, die man doch auch 
 nur, Gott weiss aus welchem Grunde, behaupten, keinesweges aber nach- 
 weisen kann. Nicht etwa : in irgend ein, somit schon vorausgesetztes, 
 Wissen tritt ein das ruhende Seyn, und tritt ein die Freiheit, und diese 
 beiden treten nun in diesem Wissen zusammen, und machen in dieser ihrer 
 Vereinigung das absolute Wissen, wodurch noch ein Wissen ausser dem 
 absoluten Wissen, und dieses innerhalb des ersten gesetzt wiirde ; sondern : 
 jenseits alles Wissens, nach unserer gegenwartigen Darstellung, treten Frei- 
 heit und Seyn zusammen, und durchdringen sich, und diese innige Durch- 
 dringung und Identificirung beider zu einem neuen Wesen giebt nun erst 
 das Wissen, eben als Wissen, als ein absolutes Tale. Von der Einsicht in 
 diesen Punct hangt alles ab, und die Vemachlassigung desselben hat die 
 neuesten Misverstandnisse veranlasst (17, 18). 
 
 Uebrigens ist noch zu bemerken, dass das absolute Wissen hier lediglich 
 seiner Materie nach geschildert ist. Seyn und Freiheit, sagten wir, treten 
 zusammen ; sie also sind das Thatige, inwiefem hier nach einem Thatigen 
 gefragt werden soUte, und sind thatig, inwiefem sie eben noch nicht Wissen, 
 sondern Seyn und Freiheit sind. Wie sie sich aber durchdringen, ihre 
 separaten Naturen aufgeben, um zu einer einigen, zu einem Wissen sich zu 
 vereinigen, sind sie eben gegenseitig durch einander gebunden ; denn sie 
 sind ja nur in dieser Gebundenheit Wissen, ausser derselben aber separates 
 Seyn und Freiheit, und sind nun in einem ruhigen Bestehen. Dieses nennen 
 wir nun die Materie des absoluten Wissens oder die absolute Materie des 
 Wissens. Es konnte seyn, dass diese zur absoluten Form desselben Wis- 
 sens sich gerade so verhielte, wie ruhendes Seyn zur Freiheit in der abso- 
 luten Materie selbst (18. See 20, 24, 25, in). 
 
 Das Wissen muss fiir sich seyn, schlechthin Was es ist, und unmittelbar 
 weil es ist. In dem Weil liegt nicht zugleich die Bestimmung des Was : 
 diese liegt durchaus im Seyn des Wissens. . . . Wie es aber sich erzeugend 
 findet. so findet es zugleich unmittelbar, ohne Erzeugung, schlechthin sein 
 Was, und ohne dieses Was findet es sich auch nicht, als sich erzeugend — 
 und dies nicht zufolge seiner Freiheit, sondern zufolge seines absoluten 
 Seyns (38, 39). 
 
 Das absolute Seyn ist im Wissen Gesetz (108, 109). 
 
 On almost every page of this treatise we are told that Seyn is the law 
 that determines preception and thought when the Ego, or Freedom, chooses 
 
Appendix. 167 
 
 to think. Later Seyn shows itself to be that sphere of consciousness which 
 is the thought-correlate of the world, or God and his act of creation, and 
 again God in his act of creation or Seyn is given as the living Moral Law 
 (63, 64). 
 
 Was ist denn nun das absolute Seyn? Der im Wissen ergriffene absolute 
 Ursprung desselben und daher das Nichtseyn des Wissens : Seyn — eben 
 als im Wissen, und doch nicht Seyn des Wissens; — absolutes Seyn, weil 
 das Wissen absolut ist. Nur der Anfang des Wissens ist reines Seyn ; wo 
 das Wissen Wissen schon ist, ist sein Seyn, und alles, was sonst noch etwa 
 fiir Seyn (objectives) gehalten werden konnte, ist dieses Seyn und tragt seine 
 Gesetze. Und so hatten'wir uns von afteridealistischen Systemen zur Ge- 
 niige getrennt. Das reine Wissen gedacht, als Ursprung fur sich, und seinen 
 Gegensatz als Nichtseyn des Wissens, weil es sonst nicht entspringen 
 konnte, ist reines Seyn (63). 
 
 (Oder sage man, wenn man es nur recht verstehen will, die absolute 
 Schopfung, als Erschaffung, nicht etwa als Erschaffenes, ist Standpunct 
 des absoluten Wissens ; dies erschafft sich eben selbst aus seiner reinen 
 Moglichkeit, als das einzig ihr vorausgegebene, und diese eben ist das reine 
 Seyn) (63). 
 
 Dies nemUch ist das reine Seyn fiir die Wissenschaftslehre, eben weil sie 
 rF/x««j-lehre ist, und das Seyn aus diesem als seine Negation ableitet, also 
 eine ideale Ansicht desselben und zwar die hochste ideale Ansicht ist. 
 Nun kann es wohl seyn, dass hier die Negation selbst die absolute Position, 
 und unsere Position selbst in gewisser Riicksicht eine Negation ist, und dass 
 sich in der Wissenschaftslehre, doch ihr untergeordnet, eine hochste reale 
 Ansicht finden werde, nach der zwar das Wissen auch absolut sich selbst 
 schafft und damit alles Geschaffene und zu Schaffende, aber nur der Form 
 nach, der Materie nach aber nach einem absoluten Gesetze (worein sich 
 eben das absolute Seyn verwandelt) welches Gesetz nun einiges Wissen und 
 dadurch Seyn, als die hochste Position negirt — (Reiner Moralismus, der 
 realistisch (praktisch) durchaus dasselbe ist, was die Wissenschaftslehre 
 formal und idealistisch) (64). 
 
 (1804) Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 87-314. Seyn = the plain 
 man's being (254-278). Seyn = Absolutes Seyn (292-300), God (146, 147)' 
 
 (1805) Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten. W. VI. 347-448. Seyn = 
 Gctt (361-371). 
 
 (1806) Anweisung zum seligen Leben. W. V. 397-580. Seyn — Gott 
 (403-407, 438, 439, 454, 539, etc.). 
 
1 68 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 (1810) Umriss. W. II. 693-709. Here Seyn is " Gottes Seyn und 
 Wissen, or the world of Consciousness, is " Gottes Seyn ausser seinem Seyn 
 (696). 
 
 (1810-11) Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. ^.11.535-691. Seyn = 
 Gott (681, 684, 685). 
 
 {i?,i2) Sittenlehre. Ngl. ^. III. 1-118. In this treatise " Seyn " at 
 first denotes the world of consciousness (4), then it is shown to be a mere 
 concept (6), and, finally, as the world of consciousness, it sinks into the image 
 of the real Seyn, which is God (33, 35). As the image of the real Seyn is 
 Morality, Sittenlehre becomes Seynslehre (34). 
 
 (1812) Die Wissenschaftslehre. iV^/. fF. II. 315-492. Here the word 
 "Seyn" is often used incidentally in its ordinary meaning, but Seyn kox 
 kioyr\v is God (326-346, 365, 383, etc.). 
 
 (1812) Transcendentale Logik. Ngl. ^F. I. 103-400. This work, as its 
 name indicates, is an analysis of thought. But, as we have already said, 
 thought is for Fichte, in its first appearance, the empirical world ; therefore 
 Transcendentale Logik is an explanation of the phenomena of conscious- 
 ness. The chief problem to be solved is the relation between presentations 
 and representations. In this solution the word " Seyn " plays, of course, an 
 important part — so important, indeed, that its discussion forms the body 
 of the treatise. No detached quotations can give an idea of the course of 
 the argument. We therefore append the briefest possible summary of the 
 work. 
 
 I. The object of this work is to state the difference between two views 
 of thought, — that of ordinary Logic and that of Transcendental Logic (105- 
 
 113)- 
 
 II. Ordinary Logic concerns itself primarily with the formation of con- 
 cepts, or with the unification of a manifold of completed representations in 
 one general notion. But in its process the concepts, the formation of which 
 it pretends to explain, are assumed : for how otherwise are completed 
 representations recognized as such ? How are they distinguished from one 
 another ? How are the characteristics of each representation discriminated ? 
 How are single representations felt to be unsatisfactory till classified under 
 general notions ? Evidently by means of concepts. Not the most rudimen- 
 tary knowledge, not even the stuff of special sensations is possible, we shall 
 find, without concepts (113-119). 
 
Appendix. 169 
 
 Transcendental Logic teaches that thinking is the form of immediate 
 perception : man does not slowly and painfully frame concepts as ordinary 
 logic asserts that he does ; but he is born immediately into thought, a world 
 shaped in concepts. It is the special task of Transcendental Logic to 
 separate the form, thought, from its filling, or Anschauung (i 19-124). 
 
 IIL-IV. Transcendental Logic holds that thinking is a seizing of rela- 
 tions between primal concepts, which it brings with it, and empirical images, 
 which it frames ; for example, it knows a special spot "a " only in so far as 
 this special spot is held against the great concept, Space : it knows any in- 
 dividual only in so far as it is set in opposition with its universal (122- 
 
 130- 
 
 The fundamental relation seized is the difference between Seyn and 
 Bild. The very first exercise of thought recognizes the existence of physical 
 facts as such : this recognition would be impossible if thought did not bring 
 with it a primal notion of the difference between Seyn and Bild. Analysis 
 can find nothing simpler : the first element of thought is a synthetic union 
 of two images, one of Seyn, one of Bild, and a discrimination between them. 
 Henceforth everything known to thought is subsumed under one or the other 
 half of this double notion, everything is either Seyn or Bild. Therefore 
 we may say that the Begriff of the relation between Seyn and Bild is the 
 Urbegriff, Denkform, Grundanschauung (131-140). 
 
 In the analysis we have just given we are really understanding Under- 
 standing, and there is involved in this understanding, we see, not-Under- 
 standing. The importance of this truth will appear later. 
 
 V.-VIII. But a question immediately arises : the primal, double notion 
 which we have just described is a synthesis of two images, one of Seyn and 
 one of Bild : since they are both images, how do we distinguish them ? 
 
 The image of Seyn is the image of something complete in itself : the 
 image of Bild, of something which refers to a cause, asserts itself to be an 
 utterance, hence a genesis, werden (140-152). 
 
 But though the image is an utterance of the I, we must not think of it as 
 a mere creation of the I, for this conception would lead us to empty 
 Idealism : Bild involves Seyn. Neither must we think of Bild as the result 
 of Seyn, in the plain man's sense, for there is no Seyn, as he means it : there 
 is only the concept of Seyn. The truth lies in the inseparable union of das 
 absolute Seyn and the I, the result of which is the double thought-form, Seyn 
 and Bild (152-159). 
 
 An unanswerable proof that the Bild is not the sole work of the I is the 
 presence of the qualitative : why red, why green, admits no explanation ; 
 we can only say that the content of the Absolute is such that its image must 
 appear as qualitatively determined. The stuff of the qualitative is some- 
 thing very different from Bild, but must appear in Bild-form to enter the I, 
 
170 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 hence it comes as the material of Bild, a flow of sensations. Specific Sensa- 
 tions are the Other caught in Bild form (152-17 1). 
 
 This flow of sensations is unified into Bild by the I's perceiving at every 
 point of Sensation that it is one and the same I (i 71-180). 
 
 We have now gained a general idea of Bild — we see that its form is the 
 I, its content sensation. We have next to consider the relation of the I to 
 Bild. 
 
 IX.-XXIII. The I is forced to see the Bild, but the Bild is itself: hence 
 the I is the law of Subject Objectivity (184-195). 
 
 The Bild is of such nature that it cannot be conceived as Bild alone, it 
 involves the notion of Seyn : on the other hand Seyn cannot be conceived 
 without Bild, it must enter the mind as Bild. Hence Bild involves Seyn 
 and Seyn involves Bild. The conception of Seyn which is derived from 
 Bild is pure thought or Denken : the Bild which results from Seyn is An- 
 schauung ; hence every Bild is an organic union of Denken and Anschauung 
 (195-208). 
 
 Bild and Seyn exist as such only in so far as Thought classifies them 
 under the concepts of Bild and Seyn, hence the I is free and they are its 
 creation. But Seyn — Sensation — is forced upon the I ; hence the I is 
 not free. How can the same I be free and not free ? By freely choosing 
 to be not free : a free I chooses to submit to Law (208-220). 
 
 The link which inseparably unites Bild and Seyn is a double one, a free, 
 and a necessary one : given either and Denken, if it choose, can deduce 
 the other as a logical necessity, hence we have in Denken the free link ; 
 Anschauung is forced to make the connection, for in Anschauung there is 
 a melting together of subject and object, a losing of both in one only and 
 single consciousness (220-232). 
 
 Sensation involves the I 's seeing itself as a sphere of determinability, which 
 involves Space, and a judgment that the undetermined general I is identified 
 with a determined Sense I (232-253, 289). 
 
 The reason that Seyn and Bild are inseparably connected is that nothing 
 exists but the understanding of Understanding, which involves the simulta- 
 neous presentation of the Understood, or Denken, and the Not-Understood, 
 or the stufif of special sensations — Anschauung. Hence consciousness 
 appears as an inseparable and mutually involving union of Denken and 
 Anschauung, or Bild and Seyn, or what the plain man calls " recognition of 
 object," "consciousness of sensation" (289-319). 
 
 XXni.-XXXI. We have now shown the view which Transcendental 
 Logic takes of thought : It sees as its fundamental, ultimate-form, which is 
 incapable of further analysis, a double form, one half of which is Bild, the 
 other half Seyn : or it considers it as an inseparable union of what the plain 
 man calls Denken and Anschauung, Denken here meaning the pure 
 
Appendix, 171 
 
 empty form of thought, and Anschauung the stuff of special sensation. 
 Neither can exist without the other : their union, or consciousness of the 
 sense-world, may be called " das empirische Denken." There remains for us 
 a task parallel to that of ordinary Logic, i. e., the explanation of concepts, 
 judgments, conclusions, etc. (319-400). Lack of space forbids our follow- 
 ing Fichte here. 
 
 Logic, of course, stops short of Rehgion ; therefore Fichte does not pursue 
 Seyn beyond the empirical world. In that world he has shown it to be a 
 notion. The development of this notion gives a religious Lehre. Such a 
 Lehre we have in the " Anweisung zum seligen Leben." 
 
 (1813) Die Wissenschaftshhre. Ngl. W. II. 1-86. Here, as in the 
 " Transcendentale Logik" and in the " Einleitung," the analysis of Seyn 
 forms the body of the treatise. We therefore give a summary of the 
 work. 
 
 The problem of Knowledge may be stated as " What is Understanding ? " 
 (14, i6.) As starting-point and object of the first analysis the plain man's 
 view, that Understanding is only formal Understanding, or pure thought, 
 is accepted (16-19). If Understanding is formal, the question immediately 
 arises, " what is its content?" (19, 20.) Its content is Seyn ; but, of course, 
 only image of Seyn, since formal Understanding can contain only image (20). 
 But if Seyn is only image, how does it differ from image pure and simple ? 
 Only in that Understanding labels it Seyn : it is an image which is asserted 
 to be Seyn, i. e., it is a union of image of image and image of Seyn (20, 2 1). 
 We can go no further in our analysis ; as the ultimate of Understanding, as 
 Grundanschauung, Denkform, Urbegriff, we find a double image, an image 
 formed by union of two images, one of image and one of Seyn. In this 
 Denkform all existence must appear (20-25). 
 
 But so far we have analyzed only formal Understanding, and have left 
 out that which the plain man thinks is the Seyn itself, — that which he con- 
 ceives to lie behind Understanding and to be mirrored by it (27, 28). Now 
 the Wissenschaftslehre declares that all Seyn is the product of the Under- 
 standing. It must, therefore, show that that Seyn which the Understanding 
 seems only to find and to mirror, is, in reality, produced by it. This it does 
 by showing us Understanding as an Absolute, including within itself all the 
 world of Consciousness viewing itself (32, ^-^ : — this Absolute Understand- 
 ing has two functions, an unconscious and a conscious ; its essential nature 
 is to understand, i. e., to be what the plain man calls mind (35) ; but that it 
 may understand, it must have something to understand, therefore, as means 
 to the end of its being, /. e., understanding something, it, through its own 
 .being, posits something to understand, or the so-called " external Seyn " (35) ; 
 
172 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 (it does not really posit, God in it posits ; but it sees itself as positing (^Ngl. 
 W. I. 217, 244, 271, 446, 565); and we are now dwelling wholly in the 
 image-region, hence speak of images as reahty, for reality is image). This 
 Seyn exists only for the purpose of being understood, and in as far as it is 
 understood ; if understanding were removed, Seyn would vanish, for it has 
 no other existence than as the first element of Understanding (33). 
 
 This first function, positing Seyn as something to be understood, is an 
 unconscious function for the plain man. 
 
 The second function is to mount above the first image thrown off. 
 Understanding mounts above the so-called " external Seyn " in the shape of 
 the formal Understanding already described — a duplicity of image of Seyn 
 and image of image, or Anschauung and Begriff (33-35). Hence we see that 
 the being, the nature, of Absolute Understanding brings with it as one of its 
 elements, Seyn ; that there may be Understanding there must be something 
 to be understood, hence Understanding involves Seyn : in other words, 
 Understanding divides itself into subject and object (37). 
 
 The image first thrown off — the plain man's Seyn, which we will call x 
 (36) — is governed by the law that its content must be such that Under- 
 standing can understand it as image of the Absolute (40). That is, x is not 
 a capricious image of the fancy, but must seem to be an image of a real 
 Seyn behind it (39, 40). 
 
 We have now developed a new proposition. By our former analysis 
 Understanding understood itself as image. Now Understanding understands 
 itself as image of das absolute Seyn (40). 
 
 If it is true that Understanding understands x as image of das absolute 
 Seyn, x must bring with it an exponent, a Begriff, that can tell what its 
 nature is (44) . It does ; every presentation is accompanied by a Begriff 
 which says that it is image of das absolute Seyn. It follows that the Begriff 
 is the formal image of Seyn in general (45). It is that image of Seyn in 
 general which, in our analysis of the formal Understanding we found opposed 
 to image, since the plain man in understanding an object has always the 
 instinct that he is seeing a reality (47). 
 
 What have we won so far by our analysis ? The recognition of the truth 
 that all existence is deduced from Understanding. To be sure the Absolute 
 appears in the exponent of x, the Begriff that x is image of the Absolute. 
 But even here the Absolute itself does not appear — we see only a formal 
 image of it, hence even the Absolute appears in the form of Understanding- 
 So the highest and last, the basis even of all Knowledge is deduced from the 
 Understanding (48). 
 
 Our analysis has also made clear the relation between Anschauung and 
 Begriff — they both issue from the Understanding : — when the principle- 
 ship of the Understanding remains unseen, and its product only is perceived, 
 
Appendix. jj^ 
 
 it is an Anschauung ; when we see clearly that the Understanding forms the 
 image, it is a Begriff (48, 49). 
 
 The view of Absolute Understanding which we have at this point, is not 
 our own arbitrary construction, but a view which we are forced to take by 
 the laws of thought ; hence our view is a self-understanding of Absolute Un- 
 derstanding j we are Absolute Understanding understanding itself (51, 52). 
 
 It follows that Absolute Understanding is not only itself, but it is also 
 image of itself, i. e., just as its product is divided into x or Seyn, and image 
 ef X or Seyn, so itselfis divided into its own Seyn and image of this Seyn (53). 
 
 Und jetzt stande die Sache demnach so : der Absolute Verstand ausser 
 dem Spalten seines Principiats in Bild und Seyn, theilt noch dazu sich 
 selbst, als schlechthin seiendes, als Substanz und absolutes Princip in seiner 
 Gesetzmassigkeit, in Sein und Bild (53, 54). 
 
 Also das Absolute Sein des Verstandes selbst spaltet sich, ist nunmehr 
 zu sagen. In der Einheit dieser Spaltung bekommen wir sonach erst den 
 hohern Begriff von dem absoluten Sein des Verstandes ; und zwar ist dieser 
 ein synthetischer, bestehend aus den Halften einmal als Sein in der That 
 und Wahrheit, sodann als Bild, im blossen Reflexe dieses wahrhaftigen 
 Seins (54). - 
 
 This division of itself by Absolute Understanding into two mutually in- 
 volving spheres of consciousness, into Seyn and Bild, is of the utmost im- 
 portance, and we must be careful not to misconceive its nature. Two errors 
 are to be avoided : — (i) We must not think of Understanding as Seyn 
 alone ; (2) neither must we think of it as Bild alone. If we see it as Seyn 
 alone we fancy it an extra-mentem reality which may or may not throw forth 
 an image. Fichte warns us against this misconception in the following terms : 
 
 Man darf es darum nicht etwa so fassen, als ob der objective absolute 
 Verstand, nachdem er vorher schon ist, sich unter andern auch abbilde in 
 diesem Bilde, als ob es nur moglich ware accidentaliter, so dass er auch 
 wohl objectiv sein konnte, ohne sich in diesem Seyn abzubilden in dem 
 aufgezeigten Bilde, nun aber einmal faktisch es thue : dass darum sein ob- 
 jektives Sein unabhangig von diesem Bilde sei, und umgekehrt das Bild 
 nicht schlechthin durch das objektive Seyn gesetzt sei, und von ihm abhange. 
 Sondern beides, Bild und Seyn ist schlechthin bei einander. So gewiss der 
 Verstand absolut ist, so ist er Alles, was er ist, absolute, und fubrt darum 
 auch dieses Bild seines selbst schlechthin bei sich (55). 
 
 On the other hand, if we see it as Bild alone, we fall into empty Idealism. 
 We quote Fichte's warning : — Das game reale Principsein geht nicht vollig 
 auf in diesem Bilde, sondern das bleibt iibrig, dass diese Principiate, die 
 hier gesetzten Bilder, ja eben als seiende Bilder gebildet werden, namlich 
 in der Anschauungs- oder Seins-Form, und dass der Verstand sich ja 
 nicht setzt als selbst Princip durch sein Bild des Principseins, sondern dass 
 
1 74 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 er sich setzt als blossen Reflex eines ohne ihn vorhandenen Principseins. 
 Und so verhielte sich die Sache demnach also : das Principsein mit allem, 
 was durch dasselbe wieder gesetzt ist, mit alien Principiaten, ist zwar freilich 
 durchaus nur im Bilde ; dieses Bild aber (was auch als Principiat hier an- 
 gesehen werden kann) ist wirklich und in der That Bild eines Principseins 
 aus sich, von sich, durch sich ; es wird sich darum, falls es sich etwa erkennt, 
 nicht als selbst Princip, sondem nur als blossen leidenden Reflex jenes 
 Principseins anerkennen (56). 
 
 Fichte resumes the relation of the two mutually involving spheres of 
 consciousness in the following terms : — Und so stande denn demnach die 
 Sache also : — der absolute Verstand ist Bild seines selbst als eines absoluten 
 Principes ; es versteht sich innerhalb des Granzen seines Wesens. Indem 
 er darum dieses Bild von sich, als von einem absoluten ist, thut dies darauf 
 Verzicht, dass es Grund sei des Principseins, und lasst dem Principsein 
 seine eigne Absolutheit ubrig (57). 
 
 Und so ist denn der Verstand gespalten in Bild und Seyn iiber und an 
 seinem Principsein Dies diirfte (i) wohl eine Spaltung am absoluten Ver- 
 stande selbst sein, indem mit Princip wohl etwas erkleckliches gemeint ist, 
 namlich sogar Princip seines Seins selbst, und so mochten wir denn durch 
 das Setzen des Verstandes als Princip wohl dahin gekommen sein, ihn abso- 
 lut zu setzen. (Hieraus das Grundgesetz der Sitdichkeit.) (2) Ist dies 
 eine wahrhafte Spaltung, indem hier namlich im Bilde etwas liegt, was nur 
 in ihm liegen kann, eine Principheit namlich, die doch keine ist, ein Sein, 
 jenseits alles Seins ; und indem umgekehrt im Sein etwas ist, das durchaus 
 nicht im Bilde sein kann, indem das Bild darauf verzichtet, sich nur fiir 
 einen leidenden Reflex gebend des effectiven Principseins (57). 
 
 Absolute Understanding has been forced by its own laws to take the 
 view of itself as principle of itself which we have set forth above. In now 
 recognizing this truth it sees that it is not a capricious principle, but, in- 
 stead, Absolute Principle under Law (60-68). 
 
 Suppose now Understanding develops its principleship : then the An- 
 schauung x, or the plain man's Seyn, arises, and is conceived as image. 
 So far have we gone and no farther in our exposition (69, 70). 
 
 But this is not sufficient : the conception of the image must be such that 
 from it may be mediately understood that Understanding is principle of this 
 image, hence there must be with every image a permanent image of Under- 
 standing ( 70) ; every image that lies in Understanding must be absolutely 
 accompanied by the potential image " I am the understanding principle in 
 this image." Hence perception involves apperception (71). 
 
 This I is the absolutely permanent and indestructible in all Understand- 
 ing (71). 
 
 Hence our fundamental and basal proposition is, " Das Absolute Verste- 
 
Appendix. 175 
 
 hen ist das ^«V/%verstehen des Verstandes in seiner Gesetzmassigkeit." This 
 is the Seyn which does not become, which suffers no variation or shadow of 
 turning, which is indestructible (71). 
 
 Der nervus probandi liegt darin : es ist schleclithin unzerstorbene Ver- 
 standesform, dass er sich Verstehe als Princip in alien seinen Bestimmungen : 
 dieses, dass er sich verstehe, ist sein absoluter und unwandelbarer Wesens- 
 begriff von sich selbst, der nicht w/r^/ sondern schlechthin ist {i\). 
 
 Hence Understanding must see itself as principle, not only of Anschau- 
 ung, but of Begreifen (72). 
 
 But this is hardly correct, for there is no freedom in Begreifen. Accord- 
 ing to what we have so far said, the 1 is only possible principle of Anschau- 
 ung (60-65) J hence it may or it may not be the principle, hence it is freedom 
 (70). But if the Anschauung does come, the Begrifif that it is image and that 
 the I sees it as image must, of necessity, follow. Hence Understanding is 
 not principle of Begriff, but substance to be moulded into Begriff j and that 
 into which it is moulded without any co-operation of its own is its accident 
 
 (73. 74)- 
 
 Hence we must say, " Der Verstand ist sonach in seinem Wesensbegriffe 
 von sich selbst Substanz (in Beziehung auf das Begreifen, als sein Accidens) ; 
 und Princip in Beziehung auf die Anschauung. Diese beiden Formen des 
 Bildes, Substanz und Princip, sind darum im urspriinglichen Wesensbegriffe 
 schlechthin mit einander verschmolzen, und in einem Schlage. Substanz 
 ist das Bild eines bloss formalen Seins, synthesirt mit der absoluten Moglich- 
 keit eines Werdens : aber eines Werdens nicht durch sich, denn sonst ware 
 es ein Principsein, sondern durch ein fremdes gebietendes Gesetz (74). 
 
 Schematismus (74-81). 
 
 Apperception is the point of unity of all existence (81-86). 
 
 (1813) Einkitungvorksungen in die Wissenschaftskhre. Ngl. W. I. i- 
 102. 
 
 The "Einleitung" of 1813 is devoted wholly to the discussion of Seyn, 
 hence its analysis is fitting here. It is also Fichte's last philosophical trea- 
 tise, and was intended as an introduction to the final exposition of his 
 system which was to be given to the world in the summer of 18 14. After 
 this task was finished he hoped to devote the rest of his life to the educa- 
 tion of youth. We therefore read the " Einleitung " with interest as an ex- 
 pression of Fichte's final opinions. 
 
 He begins the treatise with the statement that the Wissenschaftskhre is 
 a view of the premises upon which the judgment " this is something " is 
 founded. For this view a new sense is necessary which may be developed 
 in every man (4-32). As an exercise for this sense he asks his hearers to 
 construct with him Sein (43). In this construction his method is essentially 
 
176 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 that of the Jena period and of the " Darstellung " of 1801 : he starts with a 
 bit of consciousness, develops contradictions within it, reconciles the contra- 
 dictions by mounting above the consciousness that beholds them, and 
 analyzing it as their synthesis. 
 
 The first contradiction is that Sein is external yet within consciousness 
 (43, 44). The solution of the contradiction is found in the nature of Seeing 
 Seyn, or Consciousness. Consciousness is a holding together of two oppo- 
 sites, ego and non-ego, hence it is a Leben (45). As each opposite exists 
 only through the presence of the other we may call the Leben a " lebendiges 
 Durch " (46). " Dieses Durch ist die allbekannte Denkform, in der jeder 
 sein Lebelang sich bewegt hat " (47). The unity of the two opposites takes 
 the form of a conclusion, of the judgment " it is." This act of concluding 
 we call Seeing (48-50). 
 
 The second contradiction is developed from the first solution, for this 
 solution makes " Sein " the product of thought ; but what the plain man 
 means by " Sein " is not-thought, something-in-itself (54). 
 
 The second solution is that Seeing Sein is really Seeing Seeing, for the 
 conception by the plain man of Sein as an independent existence which is 
 not produced by himself, involves his holding in his mind a concept of self 
 producing something seen, his comparing Sein with this concept, and his 
 denying that Sein is like it (55). The fundamental difference between his 
 own production and Sein is that he sees in Sein an independent Leben of 
 its own which his activity does not produce (55). In other words, Seeing 
 Seyn is holding together the concepts of image and reality, and classifying 
 the seen under reality (55, 56). 
 
 We see that the essence of Seeing Seyn is the projection of an inde- 
 pendent Leben which absolutely determines itself without any co-opera- 
 tion from Seeing (57). As the act of projecting and the independent 
 Leben condition each other, we have two lebendige Durch (84), hence we 
 may say that "Das Sehen ist Durch eines absoluten Durch'' (58). 
 
 But a great problem remains for us. If Seeing is the cause of every- 
 thing seen, how does this independent Leben, which absolutely determines 
 itself, this second Durch, enter it (59, 60) ? (Problem repeated, 81, 82.) 
 
 Before we discuss this question let us examine the synthesis of the two 
 Durch. We find it to be an organic union of Anschauung and Denken, or 
 of ego-stuff in thought-forms (60-68). 
 
 Seeing Seeing further involves a general concept of Seeing, a view of a 
 given Seeing, and the subsumption of the given under the concept, or 
 apperception (68-80). 
 
 We have discovered that the true nature of Seeing Seyn is the Seeing 
 of Seeing in its formal being and nothing else (/. e., Seyn is the negation of 
 the concept of Seeing, Seyn is the image "not image"). This Seeing of 
 Seeing is called " experience " (81). 
 
Appendix. 177 
 
 But our chief problem remains unanswered : — Seeing from our point of 
 view is absolute principle and ground, hence cause of Seyn. But Seyn ap- 
 pears as an independent Leben and as not caused by Seeing. If we say 
 that Seeing is principle, not of Seyn itself, but of its image, we merely evade 
 the difficulty. The reconciliation Ues deeper : — Seeing is cause of an 
 independent Leben, because Seeing, by choosing to be, gives this inde- 
 pendent Leben opportunity to appear : if Seeing did not begin, did not will 
 to be, did not offer itself as sphere for the appearance of the independent 
 Leben, this Leben could not appear. Hence it may be said to be the 
 Durch of this Leben. Therefore Seeing is a Durch in two senses : — 
 (i) a cause of image ; (2) a condition and ground of possibility of an 
 independent Leben (83). 
 
 We have now found the category of reciprocity. We have two Durch, 
 two principles, which meet and unite at one blow, one of Seeing, one of 
 Seyn, in order to bring forth their mingled product — the given world of 
 consciousness. But the two principles are not of equal rank. The Durch 
 of Seeing stands above: from it the reciprocity starts: the Durch of 
 Seeing is condition of the other Durch, therefore of the real object (84). 
 
 Recapitulation (85-91). 
 
 Space (91-93). 
 
 In the two Durch, the two principles, the two independent Leben of 
 Fichte's last work, the "Einleitung" of 1813, we have the unabhangige 
 Thatigkeit of the "Grundlage " with its two elements, the freie Krafte of the 
 "Grundriss," the Moral Law involving Freedom of the "Sittenlehre" of 
 1798, the Freedom and Law of the " Darstellung " of 1801. Fichte's 
 philosophy in its essentials is unchanged from first to last. 
 
 23 
 
1 78 Unity of Fickie's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 LEBEN AND ENDZWECK. 
 
 The term Leben is sometimes used interchangeably with God, hence it 
 sometimes denotes: — (i) the Inconceivable which appears as the world of 
 consciousness ; (2) the notion which we form of the Inconceivable. Ordi- 
 narily it means the postulated generating power of the world of conscious- 
 ness, which we have called in our paper " Freedom," and have described 
 as, in the sphere of potential existence, seeing potential Law, choosing it 
 from love of Law, and by this act appearing as the world of consciousness, 
 — « die Erscheinung in und an Gott." In describing Freedom or Leben as 
 consciously choosing Law, Fichte gives it consciousness or the ego-form. 
 Hence he constandy tells us that the essence of the ego is Freedom, Leben, 
 Vermogen, Princip, etc. Since Freedom is one of the elements of the 
 sphere which we call " God," the true ego is the " Leben Gottes," the 
 power of God to manifest himself as the world of consciousness. Die 
 Erscheinung an sich is a God element. 
 
 (1805) Ueber das Wesen des Gehhrten. W. VI. 347-448. Leben = 
 Gott (361-371). 
 
 (1806) Anweisung zum seligen Leben. W. V. 397-580. Leben ap- 
 pears in its various significations, as may be seen by reading the first few 
 pages, but usually it denotes God (403-407, 443, 475-491, 539, 540, etc.). 
 
 (1810) Umriss. ^K II. 693-709. Leben = Gott (696-709). 
 
 (1810, 1811) Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. W. II. 535-691. 
 Leben und Endzweck. The various parts of consciousness : — Perception 
 (542-549) ; Reflection (549-565) I Reproduction (565-570) ; Time (570- 
 582) ; Design (583-600) ; plurality of egos (600-615) ; laws of thought 
 (615-628) ; the Moral Law (628-649), are examined by Fichte, and the con- 
 clusion is reached that consciousness, in its every aspect, is the expression 
 which One Organic Life gives to itself. Das Leben is looked upon as a 
 power, a will to exist or not to exist, which chooses to exist. The question 
 
Appendix. 1 79 
 
 is next asked, " why does it so choose ? " The answer is, " to realize an 
 Endzweck, which is tliat Leben shall be the realization of the Moral Law, 
 the form of perception of morality (649-656). This Endzweck is the ground 
 of Leben (658), it creates and determines Leben because it wills to be 
 realized, and needs an instrument for this realization (659). It follows 
 that the Endzweck is a consciousness in which are a Free Will and Law : it 
 is another name for the Begriff of the " Sittenlehre " of 18 12, and das Leben 
 is the Ich, the will, of that treatise, and the Freedom of the other works 
 (680). Fichte now recognizes the two spheres of consciousness, and de- 
 scribes them as such (658-662) ; the one is a sphere of potential existence, 
 in which we have a fully determined, unchangeable Endzweck conceived as 
 having absolute Freedom, Leben, or a sphere of potential Freedom and 
 potential Law (659, 660) ; the second sphere is the sphere of visible ex- 
 istence (660.) The specified content of the Endzweck finds concrete 
 existence in the activity of individuals, and the natural world exists as the 
 sphere of such activity (663, 664) . What the exact form of the activity 
 of the individual shall be in realizing the Endzweck is shown him in his 
 inner self-consciousness as his duty. He must will to obey in all eternity 
 the voice of duty in whatever form it appears. This will in holy men 
 is the immediate visibihty of the Endzweck (669-675). 
 
 Is this Endzweck an absolute, or is it only the visibility of a higher be- 
 ing? (680.) Since it is a concept, a mental image (683), it involves a higher 
 being behind it of which it is image (684) ; but this higher being we can 
 never reach (684, 685) ; we must content ourselves with its appearance in 
 image form (685). Fichte reaches this result by the following steps : — Be- 
 ing is that which does not become (68 1 ) ; Leben is a becoming (68 1 ) ; hence 
 to ask the being of Leben is to ask the being of becoming ; the being of 
 becoming is that in becoming which does not become, but persists (681), 
 that which enables us to perceive it as becoming (682) ; this is the only 
 being in becoming, for otherwise it would not be a becoming, but a perma- 
 nence (681). That which persists in becoming is the aim to utter itself as 
 becoming, or to utter its being (682) ; hence the being of becoming is aim, 
 Endzweck, and the Endzweck is the utterance of being in becoming (683). 
 This being of becoming can be differently expressed : — that which persists 
 in becoming is the perception, the image of becoming, hence the being of 
 becoming is Bild, Anschauung (683) ; but Anschauung, Bild relates itself to 
 the being which it images (684) ; hence behind the ultimate Bild, whether 
 Endzweck, Begriff, or what not, we must postulate inconceivable being or 
 God (684). More than the postulated existence of this being, this Incon- 
 ceivable, we cannot know ; but it expresses its nature fully in the Erschei- 
 nung (684, 685). Hence for us the Endzweck is truth as the ultimate 
 image which reason finds. 
 
I So Unity of Ficht^s Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 (1812) Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. 11. 315-492. Here the term 
 " Leben " is used incidentally as identical with Principle, Power, Freedom, 
 etc., to express the ultimate image which reason forms of the true being of 
 the ego (372,425, etc.). 
 
 (1812) Sittenlehre. Ngl. W. III. 1-118. In this work that sphere of 
 consciousness which we have described as containing Superactual Freedom, 
 Superactual Law, and the superactual choice of Freedom to subject itself to 
 Law for the love of Law, or Holy Will, is called the Begriff. In the Begriff 
 Superactual Freedom as the power to be or not to be, the power which 
 sees Law and has the power to choose whether or not to subject itself 
 to Law, is called das Leben des Begriffs (13, 17). This power, since it 
 sees, understands and chooses, is evidently an ego; hence the ego is 
 das Leben des Begriffs (16-20). Ein Ich ist gefunden, als das stehende 
 und feste Leben des Begriffs, der Einheitspunkt seines Lebens. Dieses 
 darum auch der eigentliche Standpunkt der Sittenlehre. Wir miissen also 
 von nun an ersehen und analysiren aus dem Standpunkte dieses also erkann- 
 ten und abgeleiteten Ich (19). 
 
 (\'i\2) Transcendentale Logik. Ngl. W.l. \07,-/^oo. In this work Leben 
 usually denotes the superactual power of consciousness as God's freedom to 
 exist or not to exist. The Erscheinung (world of consciousness) in its true 
 nature is a Leben (152, 156, 157, 191-193, 201, 202, 204, 205, 235, etc.). 
 This Leben, when visible, is the appearing of the Absolute itself (203, 205, 
 etc.). Leben, as Freedom, sees itself freely choosing law (211-220). Leben 
 is the expression in the Anschauung of the hovering of existence between 
 being and image (226, 227). The Bildleben (life of consciousness) is limited 
 by the laws of thought (228-232). From the hmitation of the Bildleben 
 we have the various phenomena of the world of consciousness (232-326). 
 
 (1813) Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. Ngl. ^.1.401-574. Here also 
 das Leben is the superactual ego (410, 411); but on almost every page 
 Fichte reminds us that such terms as Leben, Freiheit, Vermogen, Werden, 
 Princip, etc., by which we try to express the Inconceivable, are, after all, only 
 mental images. The Erscheinung, in its true nature, is a Leben (410, 411, 
 421, 422, 526, 548). To the form of the Erscheinung belongs the only 
 freedom which exists. Freedom is not an attribute of God or of the indi- 
 vidual, but of the form of the Erscheinung (412-415). Leben, Princip, 
 and all similar terms are only human notions to express the Inconceivable 
 (423). Leben = Gottes Erscheinen selbst (535-537) : discrimination be- 
 
Appendix. \ 8 1 
 
 tween the ordinary concept " Leben " und " das wahre und eigentliche 
 Leben der Erscheinung," which is " Identitat des Bildens und des Verste- 
 hens des Gottlichen " (535-537). Vermogen, Freiheit, Leben, are mere 
 images in which the Superactual Erscheinung appears to consciousness 
 (537)- 
 
 (1813) Einleitungsvorlesungen in die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. I. 
 1-102. Since Seinsetzen is the holding together of two opposites, ego and 
 non-ego, and concluding from them as to the existence of an object, it must 
 be a Leben. Since it exists only through opposites, we may call it a " leben- 
 diges Durch." Since its holding together is the cause of the appearance of 
 a seemingly independent object with a life of its own which absolutely de- 
 termines itself, but which gains existence only through the activity of the 
 ego in Seinsetzen, we may call it a " Durch eines absoluten Durch." Hence 
 we have as ultimates of consciousness two Durch (Freedom and Law). 
 These two Durch image themselves as Space and Matter, or as the world of 
 consciousness (42, 74, 45, 46, 78; 49, 50; 52, 53 ; 55-59 ; 60, 64, 66 j 70; 
 72 ; 81-83 ; 87 ; 88 ; 94-96 ; 99-101). 
 
1 82 Unity of Fichtes Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 THE BEGRIFF. 
 
 With Fichte the " Begrifif " is key to the understanding of the two worlds, 
 and the unfolding of the Begriff is the substance of his philosophy. In its 
 simplest form the Begriff is that exponent of every object which tells us that 
 what we see is image of being, a mental picture of a reality behind. Hence 
 it is the fundamental Denkform, Urbegriff, Grundanschauung in which all 
 existence is cast. When we learn that what we see is self, it becomes " I 
 am image of being." The development of the two spheres indicated in 
 this proposition, image and being, puts before us the phenomenal world and 
 God's nature. Hence the Begriff, in its fullest expansion, includes within 
 itself the totahty of consciousness viewing its own significance and functions, 
 and is a synonym for the Absolute Ego and the Intellectuelle Anschauung. 
 Sometimes the word means chiefly the sphere of being, or God, since this 
 sphere is pure Begriff unmixed with Anschauung, and since it involves the 
 phenomenal world, because if it exist it must exist in men's mind. Fichte 
 uses the term in its more or less highly developed meaning in almost all his 
 works. In its simplest form as the exponent of empirical objects, it is the 
 foundation of Fichte's Transcendental Logic (see summary under Seyn and 
 Ngl. W. I. 131-140). It is given most prominence in the " Sittenlehre " 
 of i8i2 and in the "Thatsachen " of 1813, therefore we summarize what 
 Fichte says of it in these two treatises. 
 
 (1812) Das System der Sittenlehre. Ngl W.\\\. 1-118. Here con- 
 sciousness seeing itself as creator of the world is called the Begriff. The 
 plain man calls the Begriff God, and fancies it a Ding an sick : he does not 
 know that what he sees is consciousness seeing itself as creator of the world. 
 In our paper we have called the Begriff the sphere of potential existence, 
 and have analyzed it : — reason shows us that it contains Superactual Free- 
 dom, Superactual Law, and the act of choice by Superactual Freedom of 
 Superactual Law from love of law : on account of this act we have also 
 named the sphere Holy Will. In the "Sittenlehre" of 1812 the outlines 
 of this analysis are very clear ; we sketch them : — 
 
Appendix. ig. 
 
 Consciousness examines itself and seeks its ground, its creator. It finds 
 only self, and formulates its creed in the proposition, " Der Begriff ist 
 Grund der Welt, mit dem absoluten Bewusstsein, dass er es sei " (3). From 
 this proposition it follows that:— (1°) the plain man's "being" is only 
 the concept ;of being grounded in consciousness (6) ; (2°) since conscious- 
 ness with its concepts is the only existence, the act of being ground, or the 
 act of creation, exists only as consciousness thinks it, i. e., the act of creation 
 was not the temporal beginning of a process, but is a conclusion at which 
 consciousness in the moment of reflection arrives (8, 9) ; (3°) if conscious- 
 ness can find only self as creator, it must look upon itself as Freedom (9) ; 
 (4°) if it is Freedom to be ground of the world, or not, it must be a Power' 
 Life (12, 13). Such concept of potential consciousness, or of the potential 
 Begriff, free will, essential life, creative power, is the concept of God, and 
 the concept of its appearing through an act of free will as the actual Begriff, 
 is the concept that the world of consciousness is the appearing of God as 
 consciousness, or, since consciousness consists of mental images, in image 
 form (13, 14). Also: der Begriff ist Grund seiner selbst, heisst : er setzt 
 ausser sich ab in einem objektiven Sein sein inneres Sein : und er hat ein 
 Vermogen, realiter Grund zu sein, heisst : er hat das Vermogen, ein Bild, 
 das das Geprage seines inneren Wesens tragt, ausser sich hinzustellen ; 
 er ist eine absolut freie, reale, und objektive Kraft (14). (5°) Freedom, or 
 das Leben des Begriffs, has only one free choice, to be ground of the world 
 or not to be ground ; what results from the choice, or the world, is fixed 
 by law (15). (6°) We have now found: — (1°) confronting Freedom, as, 
 with Freedom, an ultimate element of consciousness. Law ; and (2°) Free- 
 dom, or das Leben des Begriffs, conscious of this law in willing to become 
 ground of the world by submitting to it (16, 17). Hence our ultimate 
 conception of the origin of consciousness, of Freedom or das Leben des 
 Begriffs and of its act of submission to Law, takes the ego form, and we have 
 completed the circle which the mind is always forced to tread in seeking 
 its Creator ; it finds only self, or " Das eben heisst, und so soil genommen 
 werden der Satz : der Begriff ist unmittelbar Grund : die Sehe ist nnmittel- 
 bar und durch sich selbst schopferisches Leben : die Realitat wird in der 
 That hingesehen ; hingesehen, sage ich, ohne Anwendung irgend eines 
 anderen Organs, ah Realitat hingesehen, nicht etwa als blosses Bild, indem 
 sie eben Realitat ist fur die andere objektive Anschauungsform " (17). 
 
 The important results of this analysis by consciousness of itself are 
 that : (1°) In obedience to the laws of consciousness the First Cause takes 
 the form in consciousness of a Power, a Life, a Free-Will ; (2°) this Free-Will 
 is conscious of an inseparable companion. Law, hence appears in ego-form 
 (18) ; through free self-determination to submit itself to Law, or to be ground 
 of the world, it changes itself from a merely ideal principle into a real 
 
184 Unity of Fickte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 principle, i. e., into one creating a world seen as real and objective (18). 
 Hence the realization of the Begriff is the creation of existence ; obedience 
 to the ideal creates the real (18). 
 
 In other words, consciousness falls upon examination into two spheres : 
 one, of the Superactual Ego, as mere potentiality of existence, mere prin- 
 ciple of objectivity, mere power to be or not to be ground of the world ; 
 the second sphere is the objective existence which results from the Super- 
 actual Ego's act of choosing to become ground of the world. If we call 
 the first sphere the ego, we may call the second, in contradistinction, the 
 non-ego, signifying by this term that it is the world of consciousness as 
 appearance in image-form of the reality behind it (19). 
 
 Superactual Freedom, Power, Life, is that part of the Begriff whose 
 function it is by an act of will to give concrete existence to Law, the other 
 essential element of the Begriff. This partial function of the total Begriff 
 we call the ego-power, and it appears only in individual form. The func- 
 tion of the ego is to will that Law shall be made manifest everywhere. 
 Hence it ought so to will. " Ought " is inextricably involved in the very 
 nature of the ego, and obedience to duty is only fidelity to its own nature 
 (19-22). The ego is, of necessity, conscious of duty which its nature in- 
 volves, for the ego is self-consciousness (23, 24). This duty is to be the 
 image of God ; the specified content of this image should take form in 
 man's daily activity (25-30). 
 
 The absolute Begriff, which is the totality of consciousness understand- 
 ing its own nature to be a free will doing duty for the sake of duty, or Holy 
 Will, appears only in individuals (43). It appears in holy men who recog- 
 nize that they are merely the concrete appearance of the function of willing 
 the manifestation of law everywhere, that they are a part of God's Holy 
 Will, and that the isolated self has no will; what may seem to be the 
 evil will of a self is only a point where the Begriff wills to manifest itself 
 partially (30-46). Holy men will duty for the sake of duty (39), and will 
 that all shall so will (77). This One Moral Will, composed of an infinite 
 number of individual wills, is the direct appearance of the form of the abso- 
 lute Begriff (79, 80). The content of the absolute Begriff will find direct 
 appearance when the consciousness of each individual has penetrated the 
 consciousness of all individuals, and each holds the content of all within 
 itself. The totality of the perfections of these infinite points of view of a 
 unity will be the actualized Begriff (80) . 
 
 (1813) Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. Ngl. W. I. 401-574. In 
 this work the Begriff "dass das Sehen ein absolutes Sein setze " (507), is 
 shown to be the means " des Ueberganges vom Wirklichen zum Ueberwirk- 
 
Appendix. 185 
 
 lichen . . . dadurch dass das Sehen durch seinen Begriff von sich selbst, 
 sich ausdehnt iiber alle seine Gegebenheit und Wirklichkeit. Der Geist 
 meiner Philosophie ist eben die Erliebung iiber das Sichtbare zum Unsicht- 
 baren ; und die Erkenntniss, der Begriff des Sehens ist dabei das vermittelnde 
 GUed " (507). 
 
 The connection between the two worlds is effected as follows : With 
 any object of perception is connected the Begriff, "it is image of being," 
 and the causal instinct is only a reaching after the being which the fun- 
 damental Denkform postulates (418-420, 440-444, 449-451). (For the 
 strongest statement that the Begriff is der Urbegriff, die Absolute Denkform, 
 see " Transcendentale Logik " {NgL W. I. 133-140). 
 
 Now suddenly there appears within the circumference of consciousness, 
 a moral command or a moral deed which we will call y (424-435). Its 
 perception is accompanied, of course, by the Begriff (434-444), and we seek 
 the being of which it is image, or its cause. Since it is a moral deed, it 
 appears as a free deed, i. e., it does not lie in the uninterrupted chain of 
 cause and effect in nature, but seems to be without natural cause, to generate 
 itself, to become ; this freedom we express by the term " werden " : y miisste 
 angeschaut werden als ein Gewordenes, neues Wirkliches (433, 436, 441, 
 447, 469, 506, etc.). "Absolutes Werden oder Freiheit" {W. II. 17 top). 
 Freiheit-Anfangen des Ereignisses, Principseyn {W. IV. 383, 384). Gewor- 
 denheit 3.n y — die Neuheit desselben in Bezug auf die Natur {Ngl. W. 
 I. 476, 440-442, 479, 505). " Werden, entstehen, und zu demselben 
 hinzutreten durch eine neue Schopfung der Erscheinung" (436). Als 
 Werden., aisfreier Akt (548). 
 
 The Begriff, however, gives us the unshaken conviction that some cause 
 y must have, some being there must be of which y is image (440-444, 
 
 449-453)- 
 
 We can never transcend consciousness ; if this cause does not lie within 
 
 the sphere of empirical consciousness, we can seek it only by adding to 
 consciousness another sphere which shall contain the potentiality of con- 
 sciousness as cause oiy; hence we judge the Superactual Erscheinung to be 
 the cause of moral commands and deeds (451, 452). If its nature is such 
 that it seek morahty, it must be Holy Will. 
 
 Hence the Begriff reveals to us a new sphere of consciousness in which 
 dwells the Superactual Ego as a Moral Will, or, since such are the condi- 
 tions of a Moral Will, as Freedom subjecting itself to Law for the sake of 
 Law. The Begriff, therefore, leads from the world of sense to the world of 
 spirit, and hnks the two inseparably (442. 444, 4S3-4S7, 503-509)- 
 
 The Begriff, " I am image of Being," has now become, in its fullest ex- 
 pansion, the sight by consciousness of itself as image world resting upon 
 not-image or Being. Hence it is identical with the Absolute Ego and the 
 
 24 
 
1 86 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 Intellectuelle Anschauung (453). Dieser lebendige Gedanke nun ists, der 
 in der intellectuellen Anschauung sich selbst anschaut {W. II. 31-38). 
 
 In order that the Begriff, " I am image of Being," may become realized, 
 the empirical I, or the world of consciousness must actually appear in the 
 likeness of God : it does so appear through the free development by 
 the multiplicity of egos — in which form the empirical I is given — of 
 the One Organic Moral Will ; this One Organic Will freely subjects itself to 
 Law for the sake of Law, hence it is the image of God who is Holy Will 
 (516-556). 
 
Appendix. 187 
 
 THERE IS NO UNIVERSAL CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 It is asserted again and again by Ficlite that there is no Universal 
 Consciousness : Nur in der individuellen Form, und zwar nur in der Fort- 
 setzung derselben, kann es (das Leben) seiner sich bewusst warden ( W. II. 
 647, 606, 610, 667. Ngl. W. II. 484; Ngl. W. III. 43, 70, 73, 79). 
 
 This statement, of course, refers only to the present world of conscious- 
 ness which we know as spirits in the flesh. It is in perfect harmony with 
 Fichte's system to have faith in the existence of a Universal Consciousness, 
 as image of God, which is infinitely more rich and complex than that ascribed 
 to the Christian God. We remember that Fichte deduces immortality 
 and an infinite series of worlds for moral humanity which is only a-forming 
 in this world : when the Composite Man, " whose multiform features are 
 men,'' is developed, his specific task is to be revealed to him. This Com- 
 posite Man may be the interpenetration of the consciousness of each by 
 each; the souls of holy men who have died may, through death, have 
 learned how to penetrate all existing consciousness, and may now fall short 
 of perfect knowledge neither in extent nor in exactness : they may know even 
 as they are known. The only limitation of their knowledge may be that, as 
 all the members of the great Organism are not yet developed, the widest con- 
 ceivable interpenetration is not yet possible. This faith is a faith in the com- 
 munion of saints, in the wisdom and efficacy of prayer : it is a spiritualism 
 of the highest kind, for it sees the holy dead as points of sight of infinite 
 knowledge, as now existing and knowing each of us with all his needs and 
 aspirations, as having God's power to speak to our souls with God's con- 
 sciousness. We quote a passage from Fichte which suggests such a possi- 
 bility, though the context shows that it was not in his mind. 
 
 Der absolute Begrifif, d. i. der eigentlich qualitative Inhalt der Erschei- 
 nung, das wahrhafte unmittelbare Bild Gottes, tritt nicht heraus in einem 
 Gesammtbewusstsein, well es ein inneres Gesammtbewusstsein nicht giebt, 
 sondern nur im individuellen Bewusstseyn. Wie verhalt sich nun dieses 
 Bild in jedem individuellen Bewusstsein zum wahrhaftigen und einigen 
 Bilde? Offenbar ist es ein Bild jenes Bildes, und zwar ist das Bild eines 
 jeden besondern Individui von denen aller iibrigen unterschieden, nach 
 dem Gesetze der organischen Einheit eines Begriffs aus alien. Wenn alle 
 
1 88 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 diese individuellen Bilder durch einander begriffen werden ; ihre Einheit 
 und ihre specifische Differenz aus einem Principe klar wird ; dann ist das 
 Allen zu Grunde liegende wahrhafte Bild begriffen. Dieses aber ist erst 
 der waiirhaftige Begriff: dieser soil, dem sittlichen Willen zufolge, sein 
 Leben bekommen. Aber er muss fur diesen Behuf erst ein Bewusstsein be- 
 kommen. Die Form eines solchen Bewusstseins ist beschrieben : alle Indi- 
 viduen ohne Ausnahme miissen die Bilder aller iibrigen kennen und mit den 
 ihrigen in einer organischen Einheit begreifen, und nun hatten alle iibrigen 
 den wahrhaften einen Begriff, oder Bild (^Ngl. W. III. 79, 80). 
 
Appendix. 1 89 
 
 ANSCHAUUNG AND DENKEN. 
 
 The reader of Fichte is at first greatly troubled by his use of the words 
 " Anschauung," and " Denken," and as Fichte tells him repeatedly that their 
 proper understanding is the key to his system, his perplexity seems a serious 
 hindrance. In the (1810-11) "Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns," and in the 
 (1812) " Transcendentale Logik,'' the two words are carefully discriminated. 
 We will place the results of these works before the reader under the heads 
 "Anschauung," " Denken." 
 
 Anschauung. 
 
 (1812) Transcendentale Logik. Ngl. W. I. 103-400. 
 
 The problem of Fichte's " Transcendentale Logik " is stated to be, " to 
 discover how much of the empirical world is a matter of pure Anschauung, 
 and how much of Denken (316, 317, 140, 195, 232, 245, 260, 262 etc.). 
 
 As the plain man reads these words he understands by "Anschauung" 
 the objective world (137, 222, 245, 262, 313), which he assumes to be a 
 not-I. Hence to him the statement means, " how much of the physical 
 world is I, and how much not-I ? " But investigation shows that all exist- 
 ence is the I, and that the not-I is simply an inference of the I ; hence the 
 problem must be, " how much of existence is a reference to a not-I, a recog" 
 nition of another, a confession of passivity? (142, 152, 262). 
 
 Evidently it will be that part of the I which cannot be explained as the 
 result of the I. Now, assuming the I to be understanding, its only inex- 
 plicable element, which is, therefore, not to be looked upon as the work of 
 the I, is the stuff of special sensations : why we experience red and blue, 
 hot and cold, moist and dry, hard and soft, pain and pleasure, why we 
 have just these senses and just these determinations of these senses, we can 
 never know. Hence the stuff of special sensation is a matter of pure An- 
 schauung : it is only gazed at, not understood as created by self ; it is 
 assumed by the I to be the work of another, hence it is a reference to a 
 not-I, a confession of passivity. 
 
 To prove the truth of this solution — that only the stuff of special sen- 
 sation is Anschauung and everything else is Denken — Fichte must show 
 that everything but sensation can be explained, hence is Denken : in other 
 words he must explain all of the universe except the qualitative. This he 
 
190 Unity of Ficht^s Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 does : he begins with the physical world, but assumes that his hearers know 
 that they see only the content of their own consciousness, only mental 
 images of what they assume to be things-in-themselves (iii, 131-133). 
 
 Fichte first analyzes the nature of image : he finds that it derives its 
 unity from the analytic unity of apperception (131-180). 
 
 Next the I must be analyzed to show how much is explicable, and there- 
 fore the result of Denken. All existence, he finds, with one exception, can 
 be explained : The I as law of Subject Objectivity, the necessity of Being 
 if there is Image, the unity of Image and Being, or freedom and necessity, 
 space, the senses, the I-form, or apperception, the necessity of the not- 
 understood, the necessity of a determined not-understood, can be deduced 
 from the self-evident truth that the I is the understanding of understand- 
 ing : hence all this is Denken (180-298). 
 
 The one inexplicable fact is the stuff of special sensations, the quali- 
 tative content of life — why red and green should be just what they are 
 instead of something else ; why man should know just the determinations 
 that he does instead of other determinations ; why we have not other senses, 
 and why just these (298-319). 
 
 Fichte has now shown Anschauung to be the concrete qualitative as stuff, 
 for the determinations of the qualitative are, as determinations, thought 
 (122, 280, 294, 317-319)- Since the qualitative can appear only in thought- 
 forms, the sum total may be called Denken, and concrete sense determina- 
 tions may be termed empirical thinking (318, 319). 
 
 This view that quaUtative content is in itself something wholly different 
 from image is of the utmost importance. Our only knowledge of it is in its 
 image, a flow of sensations, for only in image can it enter the understand- 
 ing, the I ; but in itself it is not sensation. Hence sensations are not in 
 any wise realities, they are the images of deeper truths that we can never 
 know, for these truths are not images, but their realities, and we can know 
 only images (153-155)- Thus the Wissenschaftslehre leads us directly 
 to a spiritual world, and teaches the nothingness of the empirical world 
 
 (397> 398)- 
 
 We shall find that sensation is the image-form of morality, and that 
 morality is the truest image of reality that man can know, is for liim real 
 being : morality needs qualitative determinations that there may be choice, 
 for it is right to do this and wrong to do that, hence this and that must be 
 distinguished, or the qualitative must exist. Sensation is the image of ma- 
 terial out of which the moral image must be formed (307). The empirical 
 is that which has not yet been stamped by morality (314, 307). 
 
 Such is the analysis of Anschauung as given by " Transcendental Logic." 
 Its result is identical with that of the " Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns " of 
 1810-11, which we now put before the reader. 
 
Appendix. igi 
 
 (1810-11) Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. W. II. 535-691. 
 
 Fichte aims to show that in the perception of so-called external objects, 
 in the consciousness of a tree, a stove, there is an inseparable union of 
 Denken and Anschauung ; that which would be obtained if all Denken 
 were eliminated from such objects is Anschauung pure and simple : this 
 Anschauung is the stuff of self : " Anschauung ist dasjenige Wissen, welches 
 durch das Seyn der Freiheit unmittelbar sich ergiebt " (560). Perception 
 is ego-stuff in thought-forms, or concrete Denken (541-565). 
 
 To reach this result, Fichte analyzes a presentation ; it contains : (i) an 
 aifection of the external senses which report red, bitter, etc. (542) ; (2) space 
 relations, which are a view by self of its own power of quantitating (542- 
 545 ) ; (3) ^ certainty that the object affecting us in space is outside self 
 
 (S4S-549)- 
 
 (3) Now this last element is a result of thought j it is a result of: (i) an 
 unconscious tearing of self loose from the affection of the senses ; (2) the 
 sight of a power of quantitating, and of reasoning in obedience to the causal 
 instinct that, since the affection of the senses, etc., is not caused by any- 
 thing within self, it must be caused by something outside self. Hence the 
 fact upon which the plain man insists — that an external world exists — is 
 simply the logical conclusion of a bit of unconscious thinking (545, 546). 
 In accepting as indisputable fact the existence of an external world because 
 such external world is necessary to satisfy its own causal instinct, thought 
 reveals its nature as z. positing, a creating, for the plain man's intelligence : 
 in this positing an opposition is posited, the world is opposed to the I, 
 hence the nature of thought is a positing of an opposition (547, 548). 
 Thought has now revealed itself as a power to tear itself loose from 
 Anschauung, or as a free and independent Life (548). 
 
 (2) In the second element of the presentation we also find thought: 
 we have said that a view of space is a view by self of its own power of quan- 
 titating (544, S4S) ; but the view of a power is a general view, rising above 
 all special cases of its own causality (560, 561) : since it is general, since it 
 goes beyond the special, it has the character of thought. Hence in space 
 there is a most intimate union of Anschauung and Denken (560, 561). 
 This view of space is more fully developed in the " Transcendentale Logik," 
 where space is shown to lie in the middle between pure thinking and em- 
 pirical thinking, and to form a third class of concepts which partake equally 
 of the nature of Denken and Anschauung {Ngl. W. I. 250, 251, 258-263, 
 334-336). In space we have something recognized by sense, and something 
 grasped by thought. 
 
 (i) Hence, after apparently subtracting thought from the presentation, 
 we seem to have left as pure Anschauung only the qualitative. But the 
 qualitative always appears as determined; determinations are thought- 
 
192 Unity of Fichtes Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 forms; hence it is absolutely impossible to separate Anschauung from 
 Denken ; Anschauung as absolute not-thought could not be known by the 
 I iW. II. 561). 
 
 Though what the plain man sees is more properly called "concrete 
 thought " than Anschauung, yet as the activity of thought in it is hidden to 
 all but the philosopher, and the prominent fact is a sight of something, the 
 sense world passes for an Anschauung. 
 
 Fichte uses the word " Anschauung " loosely in many of his treatises. 
 He by no means confines himself to the technical meaning which he has 
 given it. We give a few examples from the " Transcendentale Logik" 
 {Ngl. W. I. 103-400). 
 
 (i) The collective sense world (137, 145, 313)- Empiricism (222, 245, 
 262). 
 
 (2) The collective sense world viewed as mental representation, hence 
 " reference " to something beyond, mtia that something is imaged in it (134- 
 
 136, 142, 152, 262). This meaning involves passivity, recognition of a 
 not-I (153, 262). 
 
 (3) View of any kind, as of the law of subject objectivity (125, 126, 134- 
 
 137. i43> 191. 192, etc.). 
 
 (4) Intellectuelle Anschauung, as view of self (137, 187, 281, 282), as 
 view of truth (135). 
 
 (5) It is constantly stated in the " Transcendentale Logik " that its prob- 
 lem is to discover how much of knowledge is Anschauung and how much 
 Denken (140, 195, 232, 245, 260, 262, 316, etc.). The inference is that 
 Anschauung is not-thought. We are told that sense is not-thought (260, 
 298-319). 
 
 In his other works we sometimes find Fichte saying that the Anschau- 
 ung has all thought within itself, and again that it is not-thought. In the 
 former statement he uses Anschauung in its ordinary sense, to denote per- 
 ception, the objective universe of the plain man, and he means that what is 
 seen is ego-stuff in thought-forms ; by the second statement, when Anschau- 
 ung is used in its technical sense, he signifies that the only " Anschauung- 
 as-opposed-to-Denken " is the this and that of the qualitative. 
 
Appendix. jg. 
 
 Denken. 
 
 (1812) Transcendentale Logik. Ngl. W. I. 103-400. 
 
 The I has two constituents, its stuff and its form : the former we have 
 found to be Anschauung ; the latter is Denken. When the potential I de- 
 cides to be, it goes forth in obedience to Law as the formal activity, Den- 
 ken, as Life, its forms filling with the stuff of the I, and the empirical world 
 appears. 
 
 The forms of Denken are established by Absolute Being or law ; hence 
 Denken may be figured as an eye which looks at concepts prescribed for 
 it, and relates the stuff within its forms to them : it may be described as a 
 seizing of relations, /. e., it seizes the relation between the fact and the 
 original concept it brings with it (125) ; or we may say that it is an imaging 
 which posits absolutely an image of itself (124) ; or, again, it is the fashion- 
 ing of the relation of a determined to another within which it is determined 
 (129); or it is a view of absolute laws in accordance with which the fact 
 directs itself (331). 
 
 Since the concepts of Denken establish the nature of an object, they 
 can be called the laws of the object, the conditions of conceiving the ob- 
 ject ; when something does not accord with a given concept it is not a given 
 object ; if it accord with no concept at all, it has no existence, for sin against 
 the concepts of Denken is expiated only by the loss of being (367-372). 
 Denken may accordingly be said to be the image of the law of an object 
 (204, 260). 
 
 The only real thinking is the material universe, perception. In percep- 
 tion every object is the conclusion of a syllogism whose three terms are ; 
 (i) all cases of such a union of attributes are cases of such an object; 
 (2) this is a case of such a union of attributes ; (3) hence this is such an 
 object. But three terms of the syllogism are inseparably synthesized in one 
 complex act — the empirical glance, or perception. This is the " urspriing- 
 liche Denken " of the " Darstellung " and of the " Thatsachen des Bewusst- 
 seyns" (319, 320, 326, 328, 330, 335, 347, 348, 357, 368, 369, etc.). 
 
 There is no such thing as pure Denken, for in true thinking, Den- 
 ken and Anschauung are inseparably united (thought-forms and sense). 
 Much less does thought create objects. It would, perhaps, be better to sub- 
 stitute the term "understanding " for Denken, in order to express the truth 
 that something is given as object for thought (230, 244, 245, 256, 267, 268, 
 270, 271, 277, 281). 
 
 But after thought has appeared in its first stratum, the empirical world, 
 it possesses the power of divorcing itself from Anschauung, tearing itself 
 loose from the sense world, floating over it to view it, and tp form empty 
 
 25 
 
194 Unity of Fickte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 images of it and of itself. Such mere images the plain man and the logician 
 call " thought." But we must never forget their emptiness, and that the 
 only true thinking is the sense world (319-332. Tht. d. B., W. II. 561). 
 
 Since thought has the power of freeing itself from its present work and 
 rising above it to view it, any product of thought may be called an Anschau- 
 ung, and thought in this sense is creative, i. e., it weaves a web like the 
 Wissenschaftslehre which may be viewed as an integral production {Tht. 
 d. B., W. II. 589, 593, 594). 
 
 Inseparability of Anschauung and Denken. 
 
 Anschauung and Denken are from many points of view inseparable : — 
 (i) Denken, in its primal aspect, is Anschauen, for it is a looking at the 
 laws of Absolute Being to image these laws {Ngl. W. I. 124-131). 
 
 (2) Any product of thought may become an Anschauung, a "view" of 
 the thinker. (See first lectures of the Transcendentale Logik for constant 
 use of word in this sense.) 
 
 (3) In the sense world Denken and Anschauung are inseparably welded 
 together, for sensation can appear only as determinations, and determina- 
 tions are thought-forms (317-319), or, in other words, sensation involves 
 discrimination and assimilation which are thought-processes. 
 
 (4) Anschauung, or Sense, refers to something beyond : sense appears 
 to the plain man as an affection by a thing-in-itself ; it is a reference, and 
 can be expressed in no more elementary terms. But this reference is 
 thought, for it discloses the nature of the sense-affection as not something 
 independent in itself, but merely a result (2 74) ; and thought is the seeing 
 the nature of a being, the grasping of its laws (204, 260). Hence Sense in- 
 volves thought. On the other hand, thought involves sense, for, as we have 
 just said, thought is understanding the nature of something. If the some- 
 thing is not given, its nature cannot be understood : there can be no pure 
 thinking, no thought without sense (230, 244, 256, 268, 277). Thought is 
 the law of an image, hence can exist only in and through the image. 
 Thought is a determiner, hence is only in as far as something is determined. 
 Thought determines empirical being, never posits it. " Das Denken bleibt 
 immer ein Bestimmen eines faktischen Seins, niemals ein Setzen desselben " 
 (278, 279). 
 
 (5) The absolute inseparability of Denken and Anschauung is finely 
 demonstrated in lectures XIX. XX., where it is shown that the universe is 
 merely the understanding of understanding. Understanding can be under- 
 stood only through the presence of its opposite — the not-understood ; 
 hence the I, or understanding, must from its very nature bring with it the 
 
Appendix. igc 
 
 inexplicable ; understanding itself the plain man calls mind ; its insepa- 
 rable complement, the not-understood, he calls matter, and goes no further. 
 The philosopher sees both as reciprocally involving elements of one whole 
 which in one aspect is understanding, and in another, the not-understood. 
 Understanding can rise above itself continually in reflection, for its nature is 
 to understand itself; but the not-understood never rises, it is shut in itself, 
 its existence as counterpart is sufficient ; it is an absolute image, closed and 
 incomprehensible. 
 
 Thought is the immediate appearance of the Absolute, of the supersen- 
 suous. Hence thought is in its nature spiritual, the means of expression of 
 the supersensuous, and leads us at once to the spiritual world as the only 
 reality (397). Therefore Kant's problem, — " How can reason know super- 
 sensuous truths ? " is answered (322-326, 331). 
 
 Another advantage of our theory is that it deduces thought from the ab- 
 solute law of the being of the Appearance, of the Erscheinung, the I. This 
 law is that the I shall be image of Absolute Being ; hence Denken, the form 
 given to the I, must establish relations between the content of the I and 
 the concepts imposed upon it by Absolute Being ; it holds the original con- 
 cepts of law, and in their image shapes sensation, the stuff of the I. Pre- 
 supposed the one law that the I is image of the Absolute, and the form of 
 Denken follows as necessity. We, therefore, understand thought in its 
 essence ; we see why it is a seizing of relations ; why its nature is ever 
 double, and a thing is understood only through its opposite. With the 
 logician, on the contrary, thought is empirical, he knows that he thfnks in 
 such and such fashion, but can give no reason for the process (320-336). 
 
 From what we have said, it appears that Denken is the form of the 
 activity, of the Life, of the I. It goes forth, and straightway the stuff of the 
 I appears and fills its forms, the physical world is seen. Again it tears 
 itself loose from its union with sensation, and shapes as free thought what- 
 ever image of itself it will. It is the form of the freedom of the I in so far 
 as the I is free after its creation. 
 
 The law of the form of the I is subject-objectivity (188-195), hence in 
 this case Denken is subject-objectivity. Since subject-objectivity is the one 
 all-comprehensive form into which all knowledge, all existence, must come. 
 Subject-objectivity may be called Denken Km kt°yj\v ', it is the image of 
 the supreme law of all being. 
 
196 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 GENESIS. 
 
 In Fichte's later works one of his favorite terms is "genesis." To 
 understand it we must remember that in his doctrine there is no Ding an 
 sich, there is only activity everywhere ; when, therefore, reason reaches a 
 logical conclusion as to any necessary existence, whether actual or super- 
 actual, whether Absolute Ego, God, Freedom, Holy Will, or what not, it 
 remembers at once that this apparent existence is not a Ding an sich, but 
 that it is only some activity of its own which appears as this existence, and 
 straightway returns upon itself to discover what the act is which generates 
 the appearance ; in so doing it discovers, as such, the ground, the law of 
 thought, which has led it to conclude as to the necessity of the existence, 
 hence "genesis" is sometimes described as a seeing of the ground {Ngl. 
 W. II. 128, 135) ; sometimes as a seeing of the law of an object {Ngl. 
 IV. I. 19s) ; sometimes as a seeing of an activity {Ngl. W. II. 129, 194) ; 
 sometimes as an analysis of existence {NgL W. I. 205). We quote : — 
 
 (1804) Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 87-314. 
 
 " Eine Bemerkung, die fiir alle friihern und kiinftigen Vorlesungen gilt, 
 und sehr dienlich sein wird, um dieselben zu reproduciren und zu iiber- 
 sehen. — Unser Gang ist fast imnier der, dass wir (a) Etwas vollziehen, in 
 dieser VoUziehung ohne Zweifel geleitet durch ein unmittelbar in uns 
 thatiges Vernunftgesetz. — Was wir in diesem Falle eigentlich, in unserer 
 eigenen hochsten Spitze sind, und worin wir aufgehen, ist doch noch Faktici^ 
 tat. — Dass wir sodann (b) das Gesetz, welches eben in diesem ersten Voll- 
 ziehen uns mechanisch leitete, selber erforschen und aufdecken ; also das 
 vorher unmittelbar Eingesehene, mittelbar einsehen aus dem Princip und 
 Grunde seines Daseins, also in der Genesis seiner Bestimmtheit es durch- 
 dringen. Auf diese Weise nun werden wir von faktischen Gliedern auf- 
 steigen zu genetischen ; welches Genetische denn doch wieder in einer 
 andern Ansicht faktisch sein kann, wo wir daher gedrungen sein werden, 
 wieder zu dem, in Beziehung auf diese Fakticitat, Genetischen aufzusteigen, 
 so lange bis wir zur absoluten Genesis, zur Genesis der Wissenschaftslehre 
 hinaufkommen (128). 
 
 Das kann nun die Wissenschaftslehre sich keinesweges zu Schulden 
 kommen lassen so gewiss sie Wissenschaftslehre ist ; sie darf jene Unab- 
 
Appendix. 197 
 
 trennlichkeit der Divisionsfundamente nicht nur behaupten, sondern sie 
 muss dieselbe in ihrem Principe, und aus ihrem Principe als nothwendig 
 begreifen, sie daher genetisch und mittelbar einsehen (135). 
 
 (18 1 2) Transcendentah Logik. Ngl. W. I. 103-400. 
 
 Davon hat die transcendentale Logik ihren Beweis zu fiihren durch 
 genetisciies Entstehenlassen des faktiscli gegebenen Wissens, von dem wir 
 hier reden, und durch Nachweisung des Denkens darin. (Ich sage : durch 
 genetisches Entstehenlassen ; nicht, als ob es etwa wirklich entstande, in 
 der That ist es.) Das Entstehenlassen ist bloss das Sichtbarmachen des 
 Gesetzes und der Art und Weise dieses Seins. (Dariiber haben auch Miss- 
 verstandnisse obgewaltet ; wir haben ihnen stets widersprochen. Dass sie 
 hier nicht auch einreissen ! Es ist gar keine historische oder faktische 
 Causalitat, sondern eine lediglich intelligibele der Gesetze. Es gehort gar 
 sehr zu unserm Zwecke, dies zu erklaren, and wir werden darauf zuriick- 
 kommen (19s). 
 
 (1804) Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 87-314. 
 
 Dieser Idealismus ist, als an sicli giiltig, widerlegt : obwohl er, als Er- 
 scheinung, und wahrscheinlich als Urgrund aller Erscheinung wieder Dasein 
 erhalten dtirfte, was wir abzuwarten haben : — widerlegt aus dem Grunde, 
 well er faktisch ist, und eine hohere Genesis auf seinen Ursprung deutet. 
 Faktisch nennt man eine Thatsache, und da hier vom Bewusstsein die Rede 
 ist, ware diese Thatsache eine Thatsache des Bewusstseins ; oder es strenger 
 ausgedriickt : nach diesem idealistichen Systeme, ware das Bewusstseyn 
 selber Thatsache, und da das Bewusstsein ihm das Absolute ist, das Abso- 
 lute ware Thatsache. Nun hat die Wissenschaftslehre, von dem ersten Au- 
 genblicke ihrer Entstehung an, erklart, dass es das vpMTov >/feC8os der bishe- 
 rigen Systeme sei, von Thatsachen auszugehen, und in diese das Absolute 
 zu setzen : sie lege zu Grunde, hat sie bezeugt, eine Thathandlung, was ich 
 in diesen Vortragen mit dem griechischen Worte, dergleichen oft williger 
 richtig verstanden werden, als die deutschen. Genesis benannt habe. Sonach 
 ist die Wissenschaftslehre von ihrer ersten Entstehung an iiber den beschrie- 
 benen Idealismus hinausgewesen (194; see also 129). 
 
 (181 2) Transcendentale Logik. Ngl. fF! I. 103-400. 
 
 Nun spricht das Bild von dem Erscheinen des Absoluten. Wird da ein 
 historischer Act ausgedriickt? das ware ja ein Widerspruch : denn indem 
 sich die Erscheinung beschreibt in ihrer Genesis, ist sie ja schon. Was 
 ist denn nun diese Genesis ? Sie ist reines Bild, das schlechthin durch sich 
 
198 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 setzt, dass ihm kein Sein entspreche. Bei dieser hochsten Ansicht der 
 Genesis der Erscheinung aus dem Absoluten selbst soil Ihnen klar warden, 
 was unter Genesis verstanden werden muss. Alle genetische Erklarung 
 setzt das Sein voraus ; sie ist reines leeres Bild des innern Seins, Analyse des 
 Seins. Die Unkunde aller dieser Satze hat die grossten Irrthiimer verbreitet 
 fiber die Theorie des BegrifFs und der Anschauung, des a priori und a pos- 
 teriori und ihren Zusammenhang (205). 
 
Appendix. 
 
 199 
 
 NOMENCLATURE. 
 
 Fichte's philosophic nomenclature varies with almost every treatise, for 
 he sought continually a more simple and concrete way of expressing his 
 doctrine. In the following table we indicate some of the terms which he 
 used to express the totality of consciousness as divided into two spheres — 
 one of pure thought commonly called God, and a second called the em- 
 pirical world : — 
 
 God. 
 
 Thatig- 
 
 1794. Grundlage. 
 
 1795- 
 1800. 
 
 1801. 
 
 1804. 
 
 1805. 
 
 1806. 
 
 1810. 
 1810. 
 1810, 1 
 1811. ) 
 1812. 
 
 Grundriss. 
 Bestimmung 
 Menschen. 
 Darstellung. 
 
 des 
 
 Die Wissenschafts- 
 lehrt. 
 
 Ueber das Wesen 
 des Gelehrten. 
 
 Anweisung zum seli- 
 geii Leben. 
 
 Umriss. 
 
 Fichte an yacobi. 
 
 Thatsachen des Be- 
 
 wusstseyns. 
 Die Wissenschafts- 
 
 lehre. 
 
 181 2. Sittenlehre. 
 
 1812. TranscendentaU Lo- 
 
 gik. 
 
 1813. Die Wissenschafts- 
 
 lehre. 
 181 3. Thatsachen des Be- 
 
 wusstseyns. 
 1813. Einleitung. 
 
 Die unabhangige 
 
 keit. 
 Die freien Krafte. 
 Gott. 
 
 Das Absolute. 
 
 Die Einheit, das eine An- 
 sicli, das Unbegreifliche, 
 das Licht, das Abgebil- 
 dete, (Ngl. W. II. 163, 
 167, 168), die reine Ver- 
 nunft, etc. 
 
 Seyn, Leben, das Absolute, 
 Gott. 
 
 Seyn, das Leben. 
 
 The World. 
 Das Ich und das Nicht-Ich. 
 
 Das Ich und das Nicht-Ich. 
 Die Welt. 
 
 Das Wissen as interpenetra- 
 tion of Freiheit und das ab- 
 solute Seyn. 
 
 Das Wissen, die Erscheinung. 
 
 Die Welt. 
 
 Daseyn (sometimes " das 
 Leben " includes both Seyn 
 and Daseyn). 
 
 Das Wissen. 
 
 Die Erscheinung. 
 
 Das Bewusstseyn (title), das 
 Wissen, Leben, Denken. 
 
 Erscheinung, die Sichtbar- 
 keit, die Construction. The 
 sum of both spheres is 
 called das Absolute Sehen. 
 
 Das Ich. 
 
 Bild (die Erscheinung re- 
 solves itself into Bild des 
 Seyns und Bild des Bildes). 
 Absolutes Verstehen ist Bildsein seiner selbst als absolu- 
 
 ten Principes unter Gesetzen. 
 Das Absolute. Die Erscheinung. 
 
 Gott. 
 
 Gott. 
 
 Endzweck als das Seyn 
 Gottes; 
 
 Das Absolute, das Sicht- 
 bare, Gott, das Licht, das 
 absolute Von sich. 
 
 Begrift als das Bild Gottes. 
 Seyn. 
 
 Zwei Durch, Principheiten, 
 Leben. 
 
 Die gegebene Vorstellungs- 
 welt. 
 
200 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 FICHTE'S "POINT OF VIEW," OR THE WISSENSCHAFTS- 
 LEHRE AS AN ALL-INCLUSIVE THOUGHT, AN "IT IS 
 AS IF." 
 
 We have said that the Wissenschaftslehre is not the description of 
 Dinge an sich which have done certain deeds that have had certain results : 
 it is not the account of an historical process which has extra-mentem 
 reality. The Wissenschaftslehre is an analysis of consciousness and an ex- 
 position of its grounds : it places before us every articulation of the whole 
 organic thought of which so-called external facts are only one bit : it is a 
 showing that whenever the plain man says of any bit of existence "it is," 
 the philosopher must say, " it is as if the whole content of the Wissenschafts- 
 lehre were." 
 
 Passages explaining the nature of the Wissenschaftslehre are found in 
 almost every treatise, and one work, the (1801) " Sonnenklarer Bericht an 
 das grossere Publicum liber das eigentliche Wesen der neuesten Philoso- 
 phie " ( IV. II. 321-420), is wholly devoted to such explanation. We give 
 summary and quotations : — 
 
 Consciousness is at first compared to the mechanism of a watch, where 
 each piece is part of one whole, and all pieces help in bringing about one 
 and the same result, (346-356). From one piece he who understands the 
 mechanism can deduce the others. " Setze ferner den Fall, dass die Philo- 
 sophic, Oder, weim du lieber willst, die Wissenschaftslehre eben in dem 
 Aufsuchen dieses Mannigfaltigen des Bewusstseyns, auf dem Wege des 
 Schlusses aus dem Gegebenen auf das Nichtgegebene, bestehe, so hattest du 
 schon jetzt einen sehr klaren Begriff von dieser Wissenschaft. Sie ware die 
 Demonstration, die Ableitung des ganzen Bewusstseyns, es versteht sich 
 immer, seinen ersten und Grundbestimmungen nach, aus irgend einer im 
 wirklichen Bewusstseyn gegebenen Bestimmung desselben ; ebenso, wie du 
 dir eine Demonstration der ganzen Uhr aus einem einzigen dir gegebenen 
 Rade derselben sehr wohl denken kannst" (349). 
 
 Die Wissenschaftslehre setzt, urn nur erst einen Eingang in sich selbst und 
 eine bestimmte Aufgabe zu gewinnen,voraus,dass in dem Mannigfaltigen jener 
 Grundbestimmungen, dem angegebenen Umfange nach, ein systematischer 
 
Appendix. 20 1 
 
 Zusammenhang seyn moge, zufolge dessen, vveim Eins ist, aUes Uebrige seyn, 
 und gerade so seyn muss, wie es ist ; dass sonach, welches in der Voraus- 
 setzung liegt, jene Grundbestimmungen, dem angegebenen Umfange nach, 
 ein vollendetes und in sich geschlossenes System ausmachen (353). 
 
 In the watch the final cause of each piece is the moving of the hand ; 
 in consciousness the final cause of each element is the development of self- 
 consciousness. " Die Voraussetzung, von welcher wir ausgehen, ist die, 
 dass das letzte und hochste Resultat des Bewusstseyns, d. i. dasjenige, zu 
 welchem alles Mannigfaltige desselben sich verhalte, wie Bedingung zum 
 Bedingten, oder wie die Rader, Federn und Ketten in der Uhr zum 
 Zeiger der Stunde, nichts Anderes sey, als das klare und vollsfdndige Selbst- 
 bewusstseyn; so wie du, ich, und wir alle uns unserer bewusst sind (361). 
 Die Ichheit ist es, die Subject-Objectivitiit, und sonst durchaus nichts ; das 
 Setzen des Subjectiven und seines Objectiven, des Bewusstseyns und seines 
 Bewussten als Eins ; und schlechthin nichts waiter, ausser dieser Ideutitat 
 (362, 363)- 
 
 But just as the deductions by the watch-maker of the other parts of the 
 watch from one wheel, have only ideal existence in his mind, so the deduc- 
 tions of the Wissenschaftslehre exist only as logical conclusions in the mind 
 of the thinker " Giebst du, oder irgend ein verniinftiger Mensch eine solche 
 Representation, innerliche Entwerfung und Abzeichnung einer solchen Ma- 
 schine ftir die wirkliche, gehende, ihre Functionen im Leben verrichtende 
 Maschine aus? und sagt dir jemand, nachdem er z. B. eine Taschenuhr 
 beschrieben, und demonstrirt : nun stecke diese Taschenuhr zu dir ; sie wird 
 richtig gehen ; du kannst sie herausziehen, wenn du willst, und an ihr sehen 
 welche Zeit es ist? (351.) 
 
 Nicht, dass ichs wtisste ; wenn er nicht ein ausgemachter Thor ist (351). 
 
 Die Wissenschaftslehre leitet sonach, ohne alle Riicksicht auf die 
 Wahrnehmung, a priori ab, was ihr zufolge eben in der Wahrnehmung also 
 a posteriori, vorkomnien soil. Ihr bedeuten sonach diese Ausdriicke nicht 
 verschiedene Objecte, sondern nur eine verschiedene Ansicht eines und 
 ebendesselben Objects (355). 
 
 The Wissenschaftslehre is next compared to our view of the procedure of 
 reason in constructing a rectilineal triangle : " Mit dieser Anschauung meines 
 Construirens eines Triangels miisste nun, um meine allgemeine Behauptung 
 zu begriinden, unmittelbar verkniipft seyn die absolute Ueberzeugung dass 
 ich nie und in keinem Falle anders construiren konne ; in der Anschauung 
 sonach ergriffe und umfasste ich mein ganzes Constructionsvermogen mit 
 Einem Male, und auf Einen Blick, durch ein unmittelbares Bewusstseyn, 
 nicht dieses bestimniten Construirens, sondern schlechthin alles meines Con- 
 struirens iiberhaupt, und zwar, als eines solchen (373). Die Anschauung 
 ware daher die sich selbst unmittelbar als solche constituirende Auffassung 
 
 26 
 
202 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 der Handelsweise der Vernunft iiberhaupt, auf einmal, und mit Einem 
 
 Blicke"(374). 
 
 So in the Wissenschaftslehre we see the procedure of reason in construct- 
 ing self-consciousness, or we have an Anschauung of the pure I : " Wenn 
 nun auf die von dir soeben als Bedingung der Geometrie nachgewiesene, und 
 beschriebene Anschauung, aber in ihrer hochsten Abgezogenheit, die Wissen- 
 schaftslehre sich grundete, und die ganze Reihe derselben darlegte;— ja 
 wenn sie von derselben in ihrer hochsten Abgezogenheit sogar ausginge ; 
 wenn diese Anschauung fur sich selbst, also die sich selbst in ihrem einzigen 
 Mittelpuncte auffassende und fiir immer bestimmende allgemeine Vernunft 
 selbst, das erste Glied in ihrer Kette, diese eben sich selbst, als Vernunft 
 fassende Vernunft, sonach das schon oben beschriebene reine Ich im 
 hochsten Sinne dieses Wortes ware, etc. (374, 375). Von jenem reinen Ich 
 sonach, oder der Anschauung in ihrer hochsten Abgezogenheit, hebt die 
 Wissenschaftslehre nur an" (375). 
 
 Just as the parts of a triangle reciprocally condition each other, so do 
 the members of the content of consciousness : the law is always reciprocal 
 determination by the parts of an organic whole : So wie in der urspriing- 
 lichen Construction des Triangels die dritte Seite sich bestimmt findet durch 
 die anderen zvvei und den eingeschlossenen Winkel ; ebenso findet sich, der 
 Wissenschaftslehre zufolge, in der urspriinglichen Construction ein Gewisses 
 im Bewusstseyn bestimmt durch ein Anderes im Bewusstseyn (378). 
 
 Es tritt jetzt eine dort gebildete Bestimmung des Bewusstseyns wirklich 
 ein ; ebenso wie ein Winkel und zwei Seiten, deren freie Construction moglich 
 war, im Felde gefunden werden. Du kannst ebenso fest glauben, dass mit 
 der eingetretenen wirklichen Bestimmung zugleich die in dem Bilde als un- 
 zertrennlich von der ersteren gefundenen, in der Wirklichkeit eingetreten — 
 bestimmt so eingetreten sind, wie sie dort beschrieben werden, und du 
 wirst es, falls du die Beobachtung anstellst, wirklich so finden. Davon ist 
 jeder, der sich zu dieser Speculation erhebt, ebenso gewiss iiberzeugt, als es 
 der Geometer davon ist, dass die Messung der wirklichen Linie seine 
 Rechnung bestatigen werde. Die Bestimmungen des wirklichen Bewusst- 
 seyns, auf die er die Gesetze des frei construirten Bewusstseyns, anzu- 
 wenden gezwungen ist, eben so wie der Geometer die Gesetze des frei 
 construirten Triangels auf den im Felde gefundenen, sind ihm nun auch 
 gleichsam Resultate einer ursprunglichen Construction, und werden in jener 
 Beurtheilung so behandelt. Ob nun wirklich eine solche urspriingliche Con- 
 struction des Bewusstseyns vor allem Bewusstseyn vorher vorgegangen dar- 
 auf Idsst er sich nicht ein ; ja diese Frage ist fiir ihn v'dllig ohne alien 
 Sinn* (378,379). 
 
 The Wissenschaftslehre is a view of the totality of consciousness in its 
 
 * The italics are ours. 
 
Appendix. 203 
 
 necessary interrelations : " Das durch die Wissenschaftslehre Abgeleitete soil, 
 der Absicht nach, eine getroffene und vollstandige Abbildung des ganzen 
 Grundbewusstseyns seyn. Kann nun dasselbe mehr enthalten, oder weni- 
 ger, oder irgend etwas anderes Bestimrates, als im wirklichen Bewusstseyn 
 vorkommt?" (394.) 
 
 Keinesweges, so gewiss die Wissenschaftslehre ihren Zweck erfullt. Jede 
 Abweichung derselben von dem wirklichen Bewusstseyn ware der sicherste 
 Beweis der Unrichtigkeit ihrer Ableitung (394). 
 
 Demnach ware, zufolge alles bisher Gesagten, im ganzen Bewusstseyn 
 eines endlichen verniinftigen Wesens, nur Folgendes moglich : 
 
 Zuvorderst die ersten und Grundbestimmungen seines Lebens als solche ; 
 das gemeine Bewusstseyn, das in unmittelbarer Erfahrung vorkommende, 
 oder wie man es nennen will. Dieses ist ein durchaus geschlossenes, vollen- 
 detes System ; fiir alle, lediglich die durchaus individuellen Bestimmungen 
 abgerechnet, voUig dasselbe. Die oben charakterisirte erste Potenz. 
 Sodann die Reflexion hieriiber und Reprasentation desselben, das freie 
 Trennen, Zusammensetzen und Beurtheilen ins Unendliche ; welches von 
 der Freiheit abhangt, und nach dem verschiedenen Gebrauche derselben 
 verschieden ist. Die oben sogenannten hoheren Potenzen, — gleichsam 
 die mittlere Region in unserem Geiste. Es ist dabei nicht aus der Acht zu 
 lassen, dass nichts in diesen hoheren Potenzen vorkommen kann, das nicht 
 wenigstens seinen Eleraenten nach in der ersten gelegen. Die Freiheit des 
 Geistes kann ins Unendliche trennen und verbinden das im Grundbewusst- 
 seyn Gegebene, aber sie kann nicht erschaffen. — Endlich eine vollstandige j 
 Ableitung des der ersten Potenz ohne alle Riicksicht auf die wirkliche ! 
 Erfahrung, aus dem blossen nothwendigen Verfahren der Intelligenz tiber- ' 
 haupt ; gleich als ob * das Grundbewusstseyn Resultat dieses Verfahrens ware : 
 die Wissenschaftslehre, als absolut hochste Potenz, tiber welche kein 
 Bewusstseyn sich erheben kann. Auch in dieser kann durchaus nichts vor- 
 kommen, was nicht im wirklichen Bewusstseyn, oder in der Erfahrimg, der 
 hochsten Bedeutung des Wortes nach, liegt (394, 395). 
 
 The conclusions of the Wissenschaftslehre are not actualities : Kein 
 einziger ihrer Gedanken, Satze, Ausspriiche, ist einer des wirklichen Lebens, 
 noch passend in das wirkliche Leben. Es sind eigentlich nur Gedanken 
 von Gedanken, die man hat, oder haben soUte, Satze von Satzen, die man 
 sich zu eigen machen, Ausspriiche von Ausspriichen, die man selbst aus- 
 sprechen soil (396). 
 
 The content of the Wissenschaftslehre is not a categorical " it is," but 
 only an "as if it were." D. L. "Aber ohnerachtet dieser Uebereinstim- 
 mung eurer Lehre mit dem gemeinen Menschenverstande, die ihr uns 
 zusichert, konnt ihr doch wohl nicht laugnen, dass ihr sagt: Alles, was 
 
 * The italics are ours. 
 
204 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 fur uns da sey, werde durch uns selbst hervorgebracht. Dies ist doch ohne 
 Zweifel eine Behauptung, die dem gemeinen Bewusstseyn geradezu ins 
 Gesicht widerspricht. Wir sind uns nicht bewusst, dass wir das Daseyende 
 hervorbringen, sondern dass es eben da ist, schlechthin da ist j dass wir es 
 finden, und z/^^-finden " (397). 
 
 D. A. Ich verstehe nicht einmal recht die Behauptung, die du uns 
 zuschreibst ; dass ich sonach nicht weiss, ob ich sie als die unsrige aner- 
 kennen, oder sie ablaugnen soil. Doch lass uns dieselbe erwagen (397). 
 
 Dass in der Wissenschaftslehre jeder, der dieselbe in sich erzeugt, das 
 Bild des wirklichen Bewusstseyns, sonach die Reihe der Bilder alles dessen, 
 was im Bewusstseyn als daseyend gefunden wird, selbst hervorbringe, und 
 sich zusehe, wie er sie hervorbringt, liegt in der Beschreibung unserer Wis- 
 senschaft, und jeder, der sie studirt und versteht, wird es als unmittelbares 
 Factum in sich selbst finden. Dass nun ebenso im gemeinen Bewusstseyn 
 diese Reihe erzeugt werde, wiirde nicht nur diesem unmittelbaren Bewusst- 
 seyn selbst, sondern sogar der eigenen Behauptung der Wissenschaftslehre 
 widersprechen und ihr ganzes System aufheben. Das Bewusstseyn ist nach 
 dieser Lehre ein vollstandiges System, und kein einzelner Theil desselben 
 kann seyn, ohne dass alle iibrigen, noch alle iibrigen, ohne dass jeder ein- 
 zelne sey. Es kann sonach, nach derselben Lehre, im gemeinen Bewusst- 
 seyn keinesweges allmahlig, und in einer Reihe, erst ein einzelnes A, sodann 
 ein B u. s. w. erzeugt vverden, indem ja keines ohne das andere moglich ist, 
 sondern wenn ja von einer Erzeugung geredet werden sollte, so miisste das 
 Ganze, niit alien seinen einzelnen Theilen, schlechthin durch Einen Schlag 
 erzeugt werden (398). 
 
 Aber warum woUten wir auch hier von Erzeugung reden ? Das wirkliche 
 Bewusstseyn ist ; es ist ganz und durchaus fertig, so wie nur wir selbst fertig 
 sind und Selbstbewusstseyn haben, mit welchem, als mit ihrem letzten 
 Ghede die Wissenschaftslehre schliesst. Unsere bestehende Welt ist fertig, 
 unstreitig nach Aller Urtheil so wie nur Wir sind. Unser wirkliches Leben 
 kann nichts weiter thun, als dieser Welt, Stiick fiir Stiick, so wie der uner- 
 klarliche Zufall es fiigt, inne werden ; dieselbe durchlaiifen, analysiren und 
 beurtheilen* Eine Erzeugung im wirklichen Leben zu behaupten hat 
 durchaus keinen Sinn. Das Leben ist kein Erzeugen, sondern ein Finden. 
 Eben dem vermeinten Erzeugen anderer Philosophien widerspricht die 
 unsrige, und weist es ab (398). 
 
 Dieses absolut Vorhandene nun lasst, zufolge unserer Philosophic, im 
 wirklichen Leben sich behandeln und beurtheilen gleich als ob es durch eine 
 ursprungliche Construction, so wie die Wissenschaftslehre eine voUzieht, ent- 
 standen sey : das wirkliche Leben lasst nach den Gesetzen einer solchen 
 Construction sich erganzen und suppliren, und man kann sicher seyn, dass 
 
 * The italics are ours. 
 
Appendix. 205 
 
 die wirkliche Beobachtung eine solche Erganzung bestatigen werde. Man 
 braucht nicht gerade Alles, alle Mittelglieder, zu leben und zu erleben ; 
 ebenso wie man, durch eine wissenschaftliche Geometrie unteistiitzt, nicht 
 alle Linien wirklich zu inessen braucht, sondern mehrere durch blosse 
 Berechnung finden kann (398). 
 
 Dieses gleich als ob fiir ein kategorisches dass, diese Fiction fur die 
 Erzahlung einer wahren, irgend einmal zu irgend einer Zeit eingetretenen 
 Begebenheit zu halten, ist ein grober Misverstand. Glauben sie denn, dass 
 wir an der Construction des Grundbewusstseyns in der Wissenschaftslehre 
 eine Historic von den Thathandlungen des Bewusstseyns, ehe das Bewusst- 
 seyn war, die Lebensgeschichte eines Mannes vor seiner Geburt, liefern 
 wollen ? Wie konnten wir doch, da wir selbst erklaren, dass das Bewusst- 
 seyn nur mit alien seinen Bestimmungen zugleich ist ; und kein Bewusstseyn 
 vor allem Bewusstseyn, und ohne alles Bewusstseyn, begehren? Dies sind 
 Misverstandnisse, gegen welche man keine Vorkehrungen trifft, well sie 
 einem nicht beifallen, bis sie sich wirklich ereignen (398, 399). 
 
 So sind alle Kosmogonien Versuche einer urspriinglichen Construction 
 des Universums aus seinen Grundbestandtheilen. Will denn nun der 
 Urheber einer solchen sagen, dass es sich wirklich einmal also begeben 
 habe, wie er es in seiner Kosmogonie vortragt ? Gewiss nicht, so gewiss er 
 sich selbst versteht und weiss, was er redet. Denn ohne Zweifel ist ihm 
 doch das Universum ein organisches Ganzes, von welchem kein Theil seyn 
 kann, wenn nicht alle ubrigen sind ; das sonach gar nicht allmahlig entstehen 
 konnte, sondern zu jeder Zeit, da es da war, ganz da seyn musste. Frei- 
 lich glaubt der unwissenschaftliche Verstand, den man im Umfange des 
 Gegebenen erhalten und Forschungen dieser Art nicht an ihn kommen 
 lassen sollte, eine Erzahlung zu horen, weil er nichts denken kann, als 
 Erzahlungeu. Lasst sich nicht aus der gegenwartigen Annahme so vieler, 
 dass wir durch unsere Gnosogonie eine Erzahlung zu geben glauben, schlies- 
 sen, dass sie selbst nicht abgeneigt seyn wurden, es fiir eine Erzahlung zu 
 nehmen, wenn nur das Siegel der Autoritat und des Alterthums darauf 
 ruhte ? (399.) 
 
 The conclusions of the Wissenschaftslehre are not Dinge an sich, but 
 determinations of consciousness. 
 
 D. L. Aber doch hore ich auch jetzt immer nur von Bestimmungen 
 eines Bewusstseyns, die da seyen, und einem Systeme des Bewusstseyns, das 
 da sey u. dergl. Damit sind eben die Anderen nicht zufrieden ; ein System 
 von Dingen soil ihrer Forderung zufolge da seyn, und von diesen erst das 
 Bewusstseyn erzeugt werden (399). 
 
 D. A. Begehre doch also nicht selbst uber dich selbst hinauszuspringen, 
 und irgend etwas anders zti fassen, als du es eben fassen kannst, als Be- 
 wusstseyn und Ding, als Ding und Bewusstseyn ; oder eigentlicher als keines 
 
2o6 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 von beiden, sondern als dasjenige, das erst hinterher in beides unterschieden 
 wird, das absolut Subjectiv-objective und Objectiv-subjective (400), . . . wisst 
 ihr denn je, ohne dass ihr eben ein Bewusstseyn habt ; konnt ihr denn also 
 je mit allem eurem Wissen, und da dieses, wofern ihr euch nicht in Stocke 
 und Klotze, verwandelt, von eurem Wesen unzertrennlich ist, mit eurem 
 ganzen Wesen je iiber Bestimmungen des Bewusstseyns hinauskommen ? 
 (401.) 
 
 Es ist uns freilich sehr wohl bekannt, dass, wenn ihr iiber jene Bestim- 
 mungen des Bewusstseyns wiederum urtheilt, also ein Bewusstseyn der zwei- 
 ten Potenz erzeugt, euch dieses nun in diesem Zusammenhange ganz 
 besonders als Bewusstseyn, und als blesses Bewusstseyn, abgehoben votn 
 Dinge, erscheint ; und euch nun jene erste Bestimmung, in Riicksicht auf 
 dieses blosse Bewusstseyn, als blosses Ding erscheint : ebenso, wie das Mass 
 eurer Linie auch noch etwas Anderes seyn soil, als die Linie selbst. Aber 
 ihr werdet euch durch diesen Schein nicht tauschen lassen, nachdem ihr 
 ja einmal wisst, dass fiir euch gar nichts da seyn kann, ausser Bestimmungen 
 des Bewusstseyns ; ihr werdet sonach auch jetzt noch sehr wohl begreifen, 
 dass auch jenes Ding nichts sey, als eine solche Bestimmung, die nur in 
 Beziehung auf ein hoheres Bewusstseyn Ding genannt werde ; ebenso wie 
 ihr jeden Augenblick innewerden konnt, dass euer Maass der Linie durchaus 
 nichts Anderes sey, als die Linie selbst, nur in einer anderen Beziehung und 
 deutlicher gedacht (401, 402). 
 
 Ebenso wenig ist uns unbekannt, dass, wenn ihr ein stehendes System 
 von Grundbestimmungen des Bewusstseyns denken soUt, wie ihr freilich, 
 um auch nur den Begriff der VVissenschaftslehre zu fassen, es sollt, es euch 
 nicht wohl moglich ist, das Lebendige, in steter Agilitat und ini Werden Be- 
 griffene, wie euer Bewusstseyn euch erscheint, zu fixiren, und' als ein Hal- 
 tendes und Festes vor euch hinzustellen, welches euch auch niemand 
 anmuthet; sondern dass euch dieses System sodann, euerm Bewusstseyn 
 gegeniiber, zu einem Systeme der Welt ausschlagt : wie denn cure ganze, 
 selbst im Standpuncte des gemeinen Bewusstseyns gedachte Welt nichts 
 Anderes ist, als eben jenes stillschweigend vorausgesetzte System der 
 Grundbestimmungen eines Bewusstseyns iiberhaupt. Ihr sollt aber aus der 
 vorhergegangenen Selbstbesinnung wissen und euch lassen erinnern, dass es 
 doch, so gewiss ihr es denkt, davon wisst und redet, und nicht — nicht 
 denkt, nicht davon wisst noch redet, — eigentlich nur System von Bestim- 
 mungen eurer Bewusstseyns seyn konne (402). 
 
 The conception of the nature of the Wissenschaftslehre which is set forth 
 in the " Sonnenklarer Bericht," Fichte held from the beginning. His doctrine 
 was never given as a categorical " it is," but always as a "gleich als ob," as 
 a statement of the way in which consciousness is forced to view its content. 
 He wished always to teach that the only reality man can find is the image 
 
Appendix. 207 
 
 " reality ; " this image attaches itself to all rational conclusions ; the phi- 
 losopher is he whose eyes see that what they see is image. The Wissen- 
 schaftslehre was always for Fichte an exposition of the logical implications 
 and connections of consciousness, not a statement of the existence of extra- 
 mentem realities and acts. 
 
 It is a matter of exceeding interest to find this essentially Fichtean point 
 of view so fully established in Fichte's mind, even before his first formal ex- 
 position of his system, that he does not think it needs explanation ; he takes 
 it for granted that it is the essence of Kant's teaching and familiar to all who 
 know Kant, hence mere allusion to it will be sufficient. 
 
 We quote from a work written two years before his succession to the 
 Jena professorship. 
 
 (1792) Recension des Aenesidemus. W. I. 1-25. 
 
 " Nachdem der Skeptiker die in jenen Abschnitten enthalten seyn soUen- 
 den Behauptungen aufgezahlt hat : (a) dass das Vorstellungs-Vermogen der 
 Grund der Wirklichkeit der Vorstellungen sey ; (b) dass das V. V. vor 
 aller Vorstellung auf eine bestimmte Art vorhanden sey; [was mag das 
 heissen soUen, und wo sagt das Reinhold ?] . . . sowie das Wort : " Vor- 
 stellungs-Vermogen " sein Ohr trifft, sich dabei nichts Anderes denken kann, 
 als irgend ein (rundes oder vierecktes ?) Ding, das unabhUngig von seinem 
 VorsieUen als Ding an sich, und zwar als vorsiellendcs Ding existirt. Dass 
 durch diese Deutung unserm Skeptiker gar nicht Unrecht geschehe, wird 
 der Leser in kurzem sehen. — Das V. V. existirt fur das V. V. und durch 
 das V. V. ; diess ist der nothwendige Zirkel, in welchem jeder endliche, und 
 das heisst, jeder uns denkbare, Verstand eingeschlossen ist. AVer iiber 
 diesen Zirkel hinaus will, versteht sich selbst nicht, und weiss nicht, was er 
 will" (11). 
 
 Aber die Frage ist ja eben von einem Uebergange von dem Aeussern 
 zum Innem, oder umgekehrt. Es ist ja eben das Geschaft der kritischen 
 Philosophic, zu zeigen, dass wir eines Ueberganges nicht bediirfen ; dass , 
 alles, was in unserm Gemiithe vorkommt, aus ihm selbst vollstandig zu 
 erklaren und zu begreifen ist. Es ist ihr nicht eingefallen, eine Frage zu 
 beantworten, die, nach ihr, der Vernunft widerspricht. Sie zeigt uns den 
 Zirkel, tiber den wir nicht hinausschreiten konnen ; innerhalb desselben 
 aber verschafiFt sie uns den innigsten Zusammenhang in unsrer ganzen Er- 
 kenntniss (15). 
 
 A wirft die Frage auf, ob das Gemuth als Ding an sich, oder als Noume- 
 non, oder als transcendentale Idee, Grund der Erkenntnisse a priori sey? 
 Als Ding an sich nicht. . . . Insofern das Gemuth der letzte Grund gewisser 
 
208 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 Denkformen uberhaupt ist, ist es Noumenon ; insofem diese als unbedingt 
 nothwendige Gesetze betrachtet werden, ist es transcendentale Idee ; die aber 
 von alien andern dadurch sich unterscheidet, dass wir sie durch intellectuelle 
 Anschauung, durch das Ich bin, und zwar : ich bin schlechthin, weil Jch bin, 
 realisiren. Alle Anspriiche Aenesidem's gegen dieses Verfahren grunden sich 
 bloss darauf, dass er die absolute Existenz und Autonoraie des Ich — wir 
 wissen niclit wie und fur wen — an sich gtiltig machen will ; da sie doch 
 nur/«r das Ich selbst gelten soil. Das Ich ist was es ist und weil es 
 istf/ur das Ich. Ueber diesen Satz hinaus kann unsre Erkenntniss nicht 
 gehen (i6). 
 
 Sollte durch weiteres Zuriickschreiten auf dem von ihm [Reinhold] so 
 ruhmvoll gebahnten Wege sich etwa in der Zukunft entdecken, dass das un- 
 mittelbar gewisseste : Ich bin, auch nur /iir das Ich gelte ; dass alles Nicht- 
 Ich nur fiir's Ich sey ; dass es alle Bestimmungen dieses Seyns a priori nur 
 durch seine Beziehung auf ein Ich bekomme ; dass aber alle diese Bestim- 
 mungen, in sofern nemlich ihre Erkenntniss a priori moglich ist, durch die 
 blosse Bedingung der Beziehung eines Nicht-Ich auf ein Ich uberhaupt, 
 schlechthin nothwendig werden : so wiirde daraus hervorgehen, dass ein 
 Ding an sich, in sofern es ein Nicht-Ich seyn soil, das keinem Ich entgegen- 
 gesetzt ist, sich selbst widerspreche, und dass das Ding wirklich und an sich 
 so beschaffen sey, wie es von jedem denkbaren intelligenten Ich, d. i. von 
 jedem nach dem Satze der Identitat und des Widerspruchs denkenden 
 Wesen, gedacht werden miisse ; dass mithin die logische Wahrheit fiir jede 
 der endlichen Intelligenz denkbare Intelligenz zugleich real sey, und dass 
 es keine andere gebe, als jene. — Alsdann wiirde es auch Niemanden mehr 
 beikommen, zu behaupten welches audi A. wiederholt, dass die kritische 
 Philosophie idealistisch sey, und alles fiir Schein erklare, d. h. dass sie an- 
 nehme, eine Intelligenz lasse sich ohne Beziehung auf etwas Intelligibles 
 denken (20, 21. See also 19, 23). 
 
 Such was Fichte's first and last conception, — that consciousness can 
 never transcend itself; but within itself is governed by unalterable laws 
 which force it to see self in certain fashions, — as an ego, as created by a 
 God, as determined by a non-ego, — all of which, God and ego and non- 
 ego, are onXj forms of seeing self , yet truth and reality, since they are logical 
 results of thought. In view of the general misconception of the " Wissen- 
 schaftslehre " one is tempted to ask if it is worth while for the philosophic 
 mind to try to express itself. 
 
 (1794) Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre. fPl I. 27-81. 
 
 In Fichte's introduction to the " Grundlage," " Ueber den Begriff der 
 
Appendix. 209 
 
 Wissenschaftslehre " printed in 1794, before the " Grundlage," he describes 
 the nature of the " Grundlage " as a view of the acts of reason in setting con- 
 sciousness before itself, a reflection upon the logical connection and the 
 classification under general laws of the acts of reason in fully developed 
 consciousness, a view of the logically connected system of rational acts to 
 which consciousness can be reduced. 
 
 Nun aber ist ja die Wissenschaftslehre selbst die Wissenschaft von etwas ; 
 nicht aber dieses Etwas selbst. Mithin ware dieselbe liberhaupt mit alien 
 ihren Satzen Form eines gewissen vor derselben vorhandenen Gehaltes. 
 Wie verhalt sie sich zu diesem Gehalte, und was folgt aus diesem Ver- 
 haltnisse? (70.) 
 
 Das Object der Wissenschaftslehre ist nach allem das System des mensch- 
 lichen Wissens. Dieses ist unabhangig von der Wissenschaft desselben vor- 
 handen, wird aber durch sie in systeraatischer Form aufgestellt. Was ist nun 
 diese neue Form ; wie ist sie von der Form, die vor der Wissenschaft vorher 
 vorhanden seyn muss, unterschieden ; und wie ist die Wissenschaft iiber- 
 haupt von ihrem Objecte unterschieden? (70.) 
 
 Was unabhangig von der Wissenschaft im menschlichen Geiste da ist, 
 konnen wir auch die Handlungen desselben nennen. Diese sind das Was 
 das vorhanden ist ; sie geschehen auf eine gewisse bestimmte Art ; durch 
 diese bestimmte Art unterscheidet sich die eine von der anderen ; und 
 dieses ist das Wie. Im menschlichen Geiste ist also ursprunglich vor un- 
 serem Wissen vorher Gehalt und Form, und beide sind unzertrennlich 
 verbunden ; jede Handlung geschieht auf eine bestimmte Art nach einem 
 Gesetze, und dieses Gesetz bestimmt die Handlung. Es ist, wenn alle diese 
 Handlungen unter sich zusammenhangeri, und unter allgemeinen, besonderen 
 und einzelnen Gesetzen stehen, fiir die etwanigen Beobachter auch ein Sys- 
 tem vorhanden (71)- 
 
 Es ist aber gar nicht nothwendig, dass diese Handlungen wirklich der 
 
 Zeitfolge nach in jener systematischen Form, in welcher sie als von einander 
 
 dependirend werden abgeleitet werden, eine nach der anderen, in unserem 
 
 Geiste vorkommen; dass etwa die, welche alle unter sich fasst, und das 
 
 hochste, allgemeinste Gesetz giebt, zuerst, sodann die, welche weniger unter 
 
 sich fasst, u. s. f. vorkommen ; ferner ist auch das gar nicht die Folge, dass 
 
 sie alle rein und unvermischt vorkommen, so dass nicht mehrere, die durch 
 
 einen etwanigen Beobachter gar- wohl zu unterscheiden waren, als eine einzige 
 
 erscheineu sollten. Z. B. die hochste Handlung der Intelligenz sey die, 
 
 sich selbst zu setzen, so ist gar nicht nothwendig, dass diese Handlung der 
 
 Zeit nach die erste sey, die zum deutlichen Bewusstseyn komme ; und eben 
 
 so wenig ist nothwendig, dass sie jemals rein zum Bewusstseyn komme, dass 
 
 die Intelligenz je fahig sey, schlechthin zu denken : Ich bin, ohne zugleich 
 
 etwas anderes zu denken, dass nicht sie selbst sey (71). 
 
 27 
 
2IO Unity of Fickte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 Hierin liegt nun der ganze Stoff einer moglichen Wissenschaftslehre, aber 
 nicht diese Wissenschaft selbst. Um diese zu Stande zu bringen, dazu gehort 
 noch eine, unter jenen Handlungen alien nicht enthaltene Handlung des 
 menschlichen Geistes, nemlich die, seine Handlungsart liberhaupt zum Be- 
 wusstseyn zu erheben. Da sie unter jenen Handlungen, welche alle noth- 
 wendig, und die nothwendigen alle sind, nicht enthalten seyn soil, so muss 
 es eine Handlung der Freiheit seyn. — Die Wissenschaftslehre entsteht also, 
 insofern sie eine systematische Wissenschaft seyn soil, gerade so, wie alle 
 moglichen Wissenschaften, insofern sie systematisch seyn soUen, durch eine 
 Eestimmung der Freiheit ; welche letztere hier insbesondere bestimmt ist, 
 die Handlungsart der Intelligenz iiberhaupt zum Bewusstseyn zu erheben ; 
 und die Wissenschaftslehre ist von anderen Wissenschaften nur dadurch 
 unterschieden, dass das Object der letzteren selbst eine freie Handlung, das 
 Object der ersteren aber nothwendige Handlungen sind (71, 72). 
 
 Durch diese freie Handlung wird nun etwas, das schon an sich Form 
 ist, die nothwendige Handlung der Intelligenz, als Gehalt in eine neue 
 Form, die Form des Wissens, oder des Bewusstseyns aufgenommen, und 
 demnach ist jene Handlung eine Handlung der Reflection (72). 
 
 (1794) Grundlage. W. I. 83-328. 
 
 The same conception of the nature of the Wissenschaftslehre is hinted in 
 the " Grundlage." " Das Handeln, von welchem hier die Rede ist, ist wie 
 immer, ein bloss ideales, durch Vorstellung. Auch unsere sinnliche Wirk- 
 samkeit in der Sinnenwelt, die wir glauben, kommt uns nicht anders zu, 
 als mittelbar durch die Vorstellung" {W.\. 328). 
 
 (1795) Grundriss. W. I. 329-411. 
 
 In this work we are told that the " Grundlage " is an attempt to find in 
 the original nature of the rational being something which can be thought of 
 as corresponding to the determination of the I by the not-I. Wir sind in 
 der Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, zur Begriindung einer 
 theoretischen ausgegangen von dem Satze : das Ich setzt sich als bestimmt 
 durch das Nicht-Ich. Wir haben untersucht, wie und auf welche Weise 
 etwas diesem Satze entsprechendes * als urspriinglich im verniinftigen Wesen 
 vorhanden gedacht werden konne. Wir haben, nach Absonderung alles un- 
 moglichen und widersprechenden, die gesuchte einzig-mogliche Weise auf- 
 gefunden. So gewiss nun jener Satzgelten soil, und so gewiss er nur auf die 
 
 own 
 
 » The italics in this quotation from the " Grundriss " are, with two exceptions, our 
 
Appendix. 2 1 1 
 
 angezeigte Weise gelten kann, so gewiss muss dieselbe ah Factum urspriing- 
 lich in unserem Geiste vorkommen. "Die^zi postulirie Factum war folgendes : 
 auf Veranlassung eines bis jetzt noch voUig unerklarbaren und unbegreiflichen 
 Anstosses auf die urspriingliche Thatigkeit des Ich producirt die zwischen 
 der urspriinglichen Richtung dieser Thatigkeit, und der durch die Reflexion 
 entstandenen — schwebenden Einbildungskraft etwas aus beiden Richtungen 
 zusammengesetztes. Da im Ich, laut seines Begriffes, nichts seyn kann, das 
 es nicht in sich setze, so muss es auch jenes Factum in sich setzen, d. i. es 
 muss sicli dasselbe urspriinglich erkldren, voUstandig bestimmen und 
 begriinden (331). 
 
 Ein System derjenigen Thatsachen welche in der urspriinglichen Erkld- 
 rung jenes Factums im Geiste des verniinftigen Wesens vorkommen, ist eine 
 theoretische Wissenschaftslehre iiberhaupt ; und jene urspriingliche Erkld- 
 rung umfasst das theoretische Vermogen der Vernunft. — Ich sage mit Be- 
 dacht : die urspriingliche Erkldrung jenes Factums. Dasselbe ist ohne 
 unser wissentliches Zuthun in uns vorhanden ; es wird ohne unser wissent- 
 liches Zuthun, bloss durch und nach den Gesetzen und der Natur eines 
 verniinftigen Wesens erkldrt ; und die verschiedenen unterscheidbaren 
 Momente im Fortgange dieser Erkldrung sind neue Thatsachen. Die 
 Reflexion geht auf das urspriingliche Factum; und dies nenne ich denn 
 die urspriingliche Erkldrung, etc. (331-335)- 
 
 (1797) Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre. fFi I. 417-449. 
 
 Here Fichte tells us that in transcendental Idealism, from the union of 
 freedom and necessity found in every free act of thought, the entire content 
 of consciousness is deduced. Hierbei verfuhrt er auf folgende Weise. Er 
 zeigi dass das zuerst als Grundsatz aufgestellete und unmittelbar im Bewusst- 
 seyn nachgewiesene nicht moglich ist, ohne dass zugleich noch etwas anderes 
 geschehe, i4nd dieses andere nicht, ohne dass zugleich etwas drittes geschehe ; 
 so lange, bis die Bedingungen des zuerst aufgewiesenen vollstdndig erschdpft, 
 und dasselbe, seiner Moglichkeit nach, vdllig begreiflich ist. Sein Gang ist 
 ein ununterbrochenes Fortschreiten vom Bedingten zur Bedingung. Die 
 Bedingung wird wieder ein Bedingtes, und es ist ihre Bedingung aufzu- 
 suchen (446). 
 
 Ist die Voraussetzung des Idealismus richtig, und ist in der Ableitung 
 richtig gefolgert worden : so muss als letztes Resultat, als Inbegriff" aller 
 Bedingungen des zuerst aufgestellten, das System aller nothwendigen Vor- 
 stellungen, oder die gesammte Erfahrung herauskommen : welche Verglei- 
 chung gar nicht in der Philosophic selbst, sondern erst hinterher angestellt 
 wird (446). 
 
212 Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 (1797) Zweite EinUihcng in die Wissenschaftslehre. ^1.451-518. 
 
 Later in the same year, in the " Zweite Einleitung," we are told that 
 the conclusions of the Wissenschaftslehre are conclusions of thought, 
 not extra-mentem beings and acts : " Das Ich ist urspriinglich durch 
 sich selbst gesetzt," means only that, since the essence of the I is self-con- 
 sciousness, and since self-consciousness involves the act of the I in returning 
 upon self and recognizing self, the philosopher, " jenes in sich Zuriickkehren 
 alien anderen Acten des Bewusstseyns voraus denken miisse, als dieselben 
 bedingend, oder, was dasselbe heisst, jenes in sich Zuriickkehren als den ur- 
 spriingUchsten Act des Subjects denken miisse : und zwar, da nichts fijr ihn 
 ist, das nicht in seinem Bewusstseyn sey, alles iibrige in seinem Bewusstseyn 
 aber durch diesen Act selbst bedingt ist, mithin in derselben Riicksicht nicht 
 wiederum ihn bedingen kann — als einen f&r ihn ganz unbedingten und 
 sonach absoluten Act; dass demnach/^wi? Voraus setzung und dieses Denken 
 des Ich, als urspriinglich durch sich selbst gesetzt, abermals ganz identisch 
 seyen ; und der transcendentale Idealismus, wenn er systematisch zu Werke 
 gehe, gar nicht anders verfahren konne, als er in der Wissenschaftslehre 
 verfahrt (462,463). 
 
 The origin of Seyn given by Fichte in this treatise (498) and quoted 
 under Seyn (Appendix, pages 164, 165) shows that it is at every moment 
 the creation of the present activity of the I. Hence it is impossible to 
 look upon God or the ego as a Ding an sich with a history : God and the 
 ego are logical conclusions of the activity of thinking ; they did not first 
 exist and then act : activity is their existence. 
 
 (1806) Anweisung zum seligen Leben. W. V. 397-580. 
 
 In this treatise the "as" is emphasized: " Ferner sagte ich in der 
 vorigen Vorlesung : das Seyn darf in dem blossen Daseyn mit dem Daseyn 
 nicht vermischt, sondern beides muss von einander unterschieden werden 
 damit das Seyn als Seyn, und das Absolute als Absolutes heraustrete. Diese 
 Unterscheidung, und dieses Als der bieden zu Unterscheidenden, ist zunachst 
 in sich selber absolute Trennung, und das Princip aller nachmaligen Tren- 
 nung und Mannigfaltigkeit, wie Sie auf folgende Weise in Kurzem sich klar 
 machen konnen " (452, 453). 
 
 a. Zuvorderst das Als der beiden liefert nicht unmittelbar ihr Seyn, 
 sondern es liefert nur was sie sind, ihre Beschreibung und Charakteristik : 
 es liefert sie im Bilde ; und zwar liefert es — ein gemischtes, sich durch- 
 dringendes und gegenseitig sich bestimmendes Bild beider ; indem jedes 
 von den beiden zu begreifen und zu charakterisiren ist nur durch das zweite, 
 dass es nicht sey, was das andere ist, und umgekehrt, dass das andere nicht 
 
Appendix. 2 1 3 
 
 sey, was dieses ist. — Mit dieser Unterscheidung hebt nun das eigentliche 
 Wissen und Bewusstseyn — wenn Sie woUen und was dasselbe heisst : das 
 Bilden, Beschreiben und Charakterisiren, mittelbare Erkennen und Anerken- 
 nen, eben durch den Charakter und das Merkmal, an, und in diesem Unter- 
 scheiden liegt das eigentliclie Grundprincip des Wissens. (Es ist reine 
 Relation ; die Relation zweier liegt aber duichaus nicht weder in dem 
 einen, noch in dem anderen, sondern zwischen beiden, und als ein drittes, 
 welches die eigentliche Natur des Wissens, als ein vom Seyn durchaus ver- 
 schiedenes, anzeigt (453). 
 
 b. Dieses Unterscheiden geschieht nun im Daseyn selber, und gehet von 
 ihm aus ; da nun das Unterscheiden sein Object nicht unmittelbar, sondern 
 nur das Was desselben und seinen Charakter fasset, so fasset auch das 
 Daseyn im Unterscheiden, d. i. im Bewusstseyn, nicht unmittelbar sich selbst, 
 sondern es fasset sich nur im Bilde und Reprasentanten. Es begreift sich 
 nicht unmittelbar wie es ist, sondern es begreift sich innerhalb der, im ab- 
 soluten Wesen des Begreifens liegenden Grenzen. . . . (See Appendix, 
 page 128, for rest of paragraph beginning "wir begreifen zu allernachst") 
 
 (453)- 
 
 d. Die Welt hat in ihrem Grundcharakter sich gezeigt, als hervorgehend 
 aus dem Begriffe ; welcher Begrifif wiederum nichts ist, denn das Als zum 
 gottlichen Seyn und Daseyn. Wird nun etwa diese Welt im Begriffe, und 
 der Begrifif an ihr noch eine neue Form annehmen ? — es verstehet sich 
 mit Nothwendigkeit, und also, dass die Nothwendigkeit einleuchte (454, 
 
 455)- 
 
 . . . Diese Kraftanwendung des Daseyns und Bewusstseyns folgt daraus, 
 
 dass ein Als des Daseyns seyn soil : dieses Soil selbst aber ist gegriindet 
 
 unmittelbar in dem lebendigen — Daseyen Gottes (455)- 
 
 (1812) Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 315-492. 
 
 Here again the " as " is emphasized : Endlich : die Erscheinung erscheint 
 sich, als sicherscheinend. Dieses Als ist der eigentliche synthetische Ver- 
 einigungspunkt, das wahrhaft neue Glied des Ganzen, in welchem Begriff und 
 Anschauung beisammen liegen. Es bedarf daher einer sehr genauen Unter- 
 
 suchung (357). 
 
 Zuvorderst : sichtbar (ich bitte Sie eben, es sich sichtbar zu machen) ist 
 dieses Als der eigentliche Mittelpunkt der Erscheinung, der hier statt findet : 
 oder, falls wir vorlaufig uns erlauben wollen, von Sehen zu sprechen, der, 
 Sitz der Sehe. Die seiende Erscheinung erscheint sich als das und das : 
 darf ich so sagen, darf ich das Letztere unentschieden lassen ? AUerdings : 
 Erscheint nur ein bestimmtes Als, wie ja vorausgesetzt ist ; so ist in diesem 
 
214 Unity of Fichtes Doctrine of Knowledge. 
 
 Als und durch das Sehen dieses Ah alles andere gegeben und liegt darin. 
 Das Sehen eines solchen Als muss freilich absolut gesetzt werden ; ist aber 
 dies gesetzt, so ist Alles, was in demselben liegt, mit im Sehen gesetzt, well 
 es das Sehen eines solchen Als ist, und wird durch dasselbe hindurch gesehen. 
 Darum sage ich : das Als ist der eigentliche Sitz der Sehe (357). 
 
 Die Erscheinung wird gesehen als das und das : ist deinnach der Sitz der 
 absoluten Sehe : die Erscheinung, als seiend eben, ist das logische Subjekt : 
 als das und das, das logische Pradikat; dies ist der Grundinhalt dieser 
 Sehe. Die Erscheinung, die da ist, und an der nicht weiter gesehen wird, 
 dass auch dieses Sein nur sei ihr Bild, tritt darum in diese Sehe ein mit 
 einem Als das und das, also in einem Bilde, Schema, Stellvertreter. Dies 
 ware das eigendiche Schema II., das uns hier in die Mitte trate ; und was 
 wir zuerst als Schema II. dachten, mochte uberhaupt in dieser Bedeutung 
 nicht Statt finden : es war selbst nur Anfang der weitern Bestimmung. Be- 
 denken Sie ferner : ich sage, in diesem Sehen erscheint die Erscheinung als 
 sicherscheinend. — Sage ich etwa: sie erscheint sich? Nun, so habe ich 
 gesagt im ersten Kapitel ; habe aber jetzt den Ausdruck naher bestimmt 
 und verbessert. Ist also in dieser Sehe ihr Erscheinen? Keinesweges, 
 sondern es ist bloss ein Bild ihres Erscheinens. Sie schwebt sich vor, 
 selbst im Bilde, und zwar als ein erscheinendes ; genau dies und nicht mehr 
 liegt in der Sehe, die wir jetzt aber das Als befestigt haben. Giebt denn 
 nun die eigentliche und wahre Urerscheinung A ein Bild von sich unmittel- 
 bar, was in Beziehung auf Gott sein wlirde Schema 11. Bild des Bildes ? 
 Wer mochte es laugnen? Was aber liegt in diesem Bilde? Antwort: 
 Nichts mehr, denn ihr Erscheinen, ihr bildendes Leben. Sie stellt sich dar 
 als substantialiter seiend, mit dem Accidens eines bildenden Lebens uber- 
 haupt, und schlechtweg : gerade also : wie wir selbst beim Beginne des 
 zweiten Kapitels dieses Bild waren (357) 358). 
 
 Dieses ihr Sicherscheinen — (Sehen Sie, wie darin Begriff und An- 
 schauung, logisches Subject und Pradikat synthetisch vereinigt sind) — 
 nimmt nun die subjekt-objektive Form an ; und so wird denn eben dieses 
 ihr Sicherscheinen zu dem letzten objektiven, dem Fakto, das da eben ist, 
 und darait gut. Ein Bewusstseyn, das nur in diesem Standpunkte steht, 
 weiss nichts weiter, als dass es so sei ; dass selbst dies wieder das Sicher- 
 scheinen der Erscheinung iiberhaupt ist nach den nothwendigen Gesetzen, 
 die wir in der Form des Sicherscheinens gefunden haben, sehen wir ein, 
 die Wissenschaftslehre (358). 
 
 In several of the posthumous works there are interesting passages setting 
 forth the nature of the " Wissenschaftslehre " as an analysis of consciousness 
 and an exposition of the logical premises upon which it is founded. 
 
Appendix. 215 
 
 See: — 
 
 (1812) Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 317-326. 
 
 (1813) Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 3-n. 
 (1813) Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. Ngl. W. I. 563-574. 
 (1813) Einleitungsvorlesungen. Ngl. W. I. 1-42. 
 (1806) Bericht iiber die Wissenschaftslehre. W. VIII. 361-407. 
 
 See also : — 
 
 W. VI. 367. 
 
 Ngl. W. I. 98, 99, 145, 410, 411, 522, 523, 534-540. 564-574- 
 Ngl. W. II. 20-27, 42, 53-57. 229, 230, 339, 340, 430, 431, etc. 
 Ngl. W. III. 17. 
 
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