ill mi Cornell University Law Library The Moak Collection PURCHASED FOR The School of Law of Cornell University And Presented February 14, 1893 IN nEHORY OF , JUDQE DOUGLASS BOARDMAN , FIRST DEAN OF THE SCHOOL ' By his Wife and Daughter ^-^ 'i;-; A. M. BOARDMAN and ELLEN D. WILLIAMS Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/cletails/cu31924022835726 LAW DICTIONARY USE OF STUDENTS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION. BY AKCHIBALD ^OWN, OF THE UIDDLE TEMPLE, BABBISTEE AT LAW, M. A. EDIH. AND OXON., AND B.C. L. OXON. ; AUTHOR OF "THE RULE OF THE LAW OF FIXTUIIES,** AND "AN EPITOME AND ANALYSIS OF SATIGNT'S TREATISE ON OBLIGATIONS IN ROMAN LAW." WITH NUMEROUS ADDITIONS AND COKRECTIONS APPENDIX OF LEGAL MAXIMS AND OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN REFERENCE TO LAW BOOKS. Br A. P. SPKAGUE, COnNSSLOB AT LAW. ALBANY: JOHN D. PARSONS, Jr., LAW PUBLISHER. 1875. Entered, according to act of Congress, in tlie year eighteen hundred and seventy-five. By JOHN D. parsons, Jr., In the office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. WEED, PARSONS AND COMPANY, PRINTERS AND STEREO TY PEBS, ALBANY, N. Y. PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION. The need of an Abridged Law Dictionary, which should contain the substance of the unabridged dictionaries, is conceded on all sides. Mr. Brown's English Law Dictionary seemed to supply this want in Great Britain ; but some changes were required to adapt it to American law, and some additions were found desirable to render it complete. The American editor has, therefore, made occasional changes in the text, and, while in some instances considerable matter has been stricken out as being without usefulness or interest to the American law studeut, yet many new titles have been added, and several definitions have been entirely rewritten. The new titles are indicated by an asterisk ; other modifications it has been found impracticable to indicate. It has not been the design to entirely Americanize the work, but only to conform it to the common law as existing in this country. The statutory law of the different States and of the United States could not be embraced within the limits of this work, even if that were appropriate in a law dictionary. It is believed that the law student will find every thing of value in this little work which can be found in either Bouvier's or Burrill's large dictionaries. And there are some features which are of unusual interest, such as the accounts of the English Courts and legal iastitutions, which Mr. Brown has furnished in a way unparalleled in any other dictionary. The tables of law reports and their abbreviations, and the list of legal maxims which are appended to the work by the American editor, will be found of great service. Although the work remaias substan- tially an English law dictionary, the American editor is confident that it wiU be entirely satisfactory to the professicfn in this country, besides possessing the superior merit of illustrating the principle of multum in fo/iroo. Octoler 1, 1876. PREFACE. It appeared to the author that a new Dictionary of the Law would be useful, if it succeeded in presenting a complete Institute of the whole Law of England, expressing briefly, but without inaccuracy or meagemess, the rules and principles of the Common Law, of Chancery Law, of Real Property or Conveyancing Law, of Mercantile Law, of Constitutional Law, and of Public or General, *. e., International Law, arranging these rules and principles, whether of doctrine, evidence or procedure, in lexicographical order, and'while giving prominence to what is modern, not ignoring what is ancient in the law, wherever the ancient principles or phrases were either valuable in themselves or serv- iceable in explaining the modern principles or phrases which are in numerous instances their equivalents. This scheme involving the observance of a double method, has not been very easy to carry through, but unsparing endeavors have been used towards accomplishing it. In the first place, it was manifest that if the dimensions of the dictionary were to be convenient (and they were strictly limited to such conven- ience as was compatible with usefulness), much that was old and totally disused would have to be excluded altogether, and much more that was also old but not totally disused would have to be most succinctly expressed ; and in the second place, it was manifest that the vast details of the modem law would have to be compressed to the maximum degree in order to admit of being comprised within the limits of the dictionary. Then, in the third place, the iteration of matter, which was in danger of creeping in thi'ough the combination of institute and diction- aiy, had to be watchfully excluded, and this want of iteration compen- sated by proper references, neither too numerous to be puzzling, nor too scanty to be imperfect. Lastly, all that part of the modem law which could point to an historical origin deserved to keep the merit of its lineage or pedigree, and some pains have been taken to be just in this respect. How far the author may be found to have accomplished the pur- poses (as hereinbefore expressed) of this compilation, he must leave to the judgment of others ; but without craving the indulgence of the public, whose servant he is, and to whom, therefore, if he serve up any VI PREFACE. thing he should in all conscience serve up a proper dish, he is reluctant to acknowledge that an unaccustomed feeling of diffidence has once or twice assailed him, lest his work should not prove so absolutely fault- less or so generally useful as it has been his wish to make it. But of one thing he is courageous, namely, of the service which his work will render to students preparing for the bar or for the lower branch of the profession. Of all persons who have to labor in the early hours of Hfe, students of the law are probably the most deserving of compassion — a compassion which should increase with each increasing year, inasmuch as Parliament is annually adding to the burdens of their already over- burdened shoulders. Surely, therefore, an institute of the character that is here attempted should prove a welcome manual to such. The student's eye will also be materially assisted by the style in which the work is printed. A. BKOWK 89 Ohaijoeet Laite, W. G. October, 1874. A NEW LAW DICTIONARY. = A ATER ET TENEE. To have and Abandonment of Legal Proceedings. — to hold. Litt., §§ 523, 534. {Continued.) *A CANCELLIS. A chancellor; so- called from the canceUi within which he performed his office. Cassiodorus Variar, lib. n, form 6. * A CONSILIIS. A counselor. The phrase "of counsel" is derived therefrom. * AB ACTIS* A notary ; a reporter. * AB INITIO. From the beginning. .Plowd. 6 a, 16 a; 1 Bl. Com. 440. ♦ABACTOR. A stealer of cattle in herds. CoweU, Paulus Sentent6, 5, tit. 20. Abigeui was also used in this sense. - ABANDONMENT. A word of very general application, and bears in every instance of its use its natural or popular meaning. Thus, the abandonment of children, or their desertion and exposure, for the law as to which see R. v. Falking- hrnn, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 222 ; also, the aban- donment of a distress or of an execution ; also, the abandonment of the excess of a claim in order to give jurisdiction to a lower court; also abandonment by hus- band or wife. Abandonment of insured property to the insurers, «e« Mabinb In- STJEANCE . * ABANDONMENT FOR TORTS. Civil law. The transfer of an animal or slave who had injured a person, in dis- charge of the owner's liability. ABANDONMENT OP LEGAL PRO- CEEDINGS. Such abandonment may either be wlunta/ry, where the plaintiff does it of his own accord, or compul- sory, where the defendant compels him either to abandon or to continue his ac- tion. The plaintifE may not voluntarily abandon his action, even although ad- verse, without first satisf3rtngthe defend- ant his costs. Pugh v. Kerr, 5 M. & W. 164. Under the C. L. P. Act, 1854, the appUcation of the defendant to compel an abandonment is to be made on summons, § 92. In case the plaintiff voluntarily abandons his action, he should give prompt notice thereof to the defendant, in order to save further costs. See Ptigh V. Kerr, supra. *ABARNARE. To discover and dis- close a crime. Leg. Canuti C. 104. ABATEMENT OF ACTIONS AND SUITS. As applied to actions or suits, this word denotes that for some cause or other the suit is become defective, and can no longer be proceeded with until such defect is removed. * ABATEMENT IN CONTRACTS. A reduction of a debt for prompt payment. Weskett Ins. 7. * ABATEMENT OF FREEHOLD. The unlawful entry of a stranger upon lands, after the death of the ^wner, and before the entry of the person entitled. 3 Bl. Com. 168; Co. Litt. 277 a; Cruise Dig. B. 1 60. ♦ABATEMENT OF LEGACIES. A proportional reduction of legacies when the estate is insufficient to pay the debts and legacies in fuU. 2 Bl. Com. 513, 513; 1 Story Eq. Jur., § 655; 2 Brown Ch. 19. ♦ABATEMENT IN MERCANTILE LAW. A reduction of duties on account of damage to imported goods. Act of Congress, Mar. 3, 1799, § 52 ; 1 Story U. S. Laws. 617. ABATEMENT OP NUISANCE. — ABATEMENT, PLEAS IN. ABATEMENT OP NUISANCE. In the case of a public nuisance the party abating same must have sustained some particular or special damage from it ; i. «. , some damage other than and besides the general inconvenience sustained by the public at large {Mayor of Colchester Y.Brooh, 7 Q. B. 339) ; but in the case of a private nuisance the party prejudiced may at once abate same. Lonsdale (Ewrl) v. Nelson, 3 B. & C. 302. However, the abate- ment must be made without any breach of the peace, and also without doing any unnecessary damage. Roberts v. Base, 4 H. L. 0. 163. Under the statute 18 & 19 Vict. c. 131, and the other acts rela- tive to the preservation of the public health, local authorities and their officers may abate nuisances in the manner men- tioned in the acts. See, also, title Nuisance. ABATEMENT OF POSSESSION: See titles Abatement of Peebhold; Dis- seisin; Intrusion. ABATEMENT OP RENT. This is an agreement to accept a less sum for rent than that comprised in the original agree- ment. No parol agreement to make such an abatement is binding. Lemnge v. O'Brien, 4 Ir. Jur. 32. ABATEMENT OP WRIT. This is the defeat or overthrow of a writ. In Staundf. P. C. 148, it is said that an appeal shall abate and be defeated by reason of covin or deceit. ABATEMENT, PLEAS IN. These pleas, which are also called dilatory pleas, because they delay for the time the fur- ther progress of the suit, or action, or prosecution, are pleas of some matter not material to the merits of the proceeding, but technically necessary or proper ; and as such they are onposed to pleas in bar or peremptory pleas. They occur either in civil or in criminal proceedings. I. In civil proceedings they are the fol- lowing : (1) To the jurisdiction of the Court ; (2) To the person of the plaintifE ; as that (flj) he is' an outlaw ; or (J) an alien; or (c) an excommunicated person ; or (d) an attainted person, and such like ; (3) To the person of the defendant; as that (as) he is privileged ; or (J) misnamed (mis- nomer) ; Abatement, Pleas in. — (Contimied.) or (c) misdescribed (addi- tion) ; (4) To the writ and action, and for- merly — (5) On account of certain events happening, namely: (as) The demise of the sovereign, corrected by 1 Edw. 6, c. 7, and other subsequent statutes ; (6) The marriage ( of the ) cor- (c) The death ( parties f rected by C. L. P. Act, 1852, and Chancery Jurisdiction Act, 1853. n. In criminal proceedings they are, generally speaking, the same ; but under the statute 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, s. 19, no in- dictment or information is to be abated for misnomer or addition, but the same shall be amended if the court is satisfied by affidavit of the true name or descrip- tion. See Bex v. Bhahspeare, 10 East, 83. Inasmuch as pleas in abatement are odious, they must be certain to every in- tent (3 Wms. Saund. 620), and must go so far as to specify the true mqde of proced- ure (Boans v. Stevens, 4 T. R. 237) ; and the same rule holds good in criminal cases also. O'GonneUY. Beg. (in error), 11 CI. & P. 155. And so a plea in abatement for non-joinder of defendants should mention all the co-defendants who are not joined. Grellin v. Gahert, 14 M. & W. 11. Every such plea must also be verified by affidavit (4 & 5 Anne, c. 16, s. 11), otherwise the plaintiff may sign judgment (Poole V. Pembrey, 1 Dowl. 692) ; and such affidavit must be delivered with the plea, unless an extension of time be granted. The time for pleading is also very limited, being four days after declaration. By- land V. Wormwald, 5 Dowl. 581. Upon issue joined on a plea in abate- ment, the judgment, when for the plain- tiff, may be of either of two kinds, namely : (1) Final, as when the issue is an issue of fact ; (3) Respondeat ouster, as when the issue is one of law. Large powers of wmendmemt are, how- ever, now given by the C. L. P. Acts, 1852 and 1854, in cases of the non-joinder or mis-joinder of parties, for which see titles Mis-joiNDBB and Non-joindbb. Pleas generally, whether in bar or in abatement, must be pleaded in the follow 1 ing order, which is invariable, namely : ABBAT. — ABJURATION. Abatement; Fleas in. — {UonUnued.) (i) To the jurisdiction; (ii) In abatement, (a) To the person (1) of the plaintiff, or (3) of the defendant, (b) To the count, (c) To the writ ; (iii) In bar of the action. Pleading a plea in any one of these classes is a waiver of the right to plead in any of the preceding classes. See, also, title Plea in Bak . ABBAT, called also Abbot. A spiritual lord. An aljbacy was the lordship with the revenues thereof and the spiritual duties attaching thereto. In England, abbats were either elective or presentative ; and again some abbats were mitred, having episcopal authority, and not being them- selyes subject to the jurisdiction of any diocesan, but others were unmitred, and were subject to such jurisdiction. The mitred abbats alone were lords of par- liament. It is supposed that there were twenty-seven such parliamentary abbats. All the abbacies are supposed to have been founded between 602 and 1133. An abbat, together with his monks, formed a corment, and were a corporation. By statute 37 Hen. 8, c. 38, the lesser mon- asteries were abolished, and by statute 31 Hen. 8, c. 13, the larger ones were dissolved also. ABDICATION. A renunciation of office by some magistrate or other person in office before the natural expiration thereof. Such a renunciation differs from a resignation of office, being usually pure and simple, whereas resignation is commonly in favor of some particular successor. James H. was considered to have abdicated the Crown in 1688. ABDUCTION. This word is com- monly used of the criminal offense of carrying off females on account of their fortunes. See statute 9 Geo. 4, c. 31; but the law is now comprised in 34 & 35 Vict. c. 100, s. 53^. The term is applied also to the unlawful seizure or detention of a female for the purpose of marriage, concubinage or prostitution. iSee 3 N. T. Rev. Stat. 553, §§ 34-36 ; 1 Russ. on Crimes, 701 ; 3 Bl. Com. 139- 141. * ABEKE MURDER. Plain or down- right murder as distinguished from the less heinous crimes of manslaughter and chance-medley. Jacob's Law Diet. ; Leg. Canuti ch. 93 ; Cowel. ABETTORS: See title Aiders and Ajbettobs. ABEYANCE. This word as applied to real property, whether estates or digni- ties, denotes that the same are in expec- tation, remembrance, or intendment of the law. Abeyance is said to be of two sorts, being either — (1) Abeyance of the fee simple, or (3) Abeyance of the free- hold. The first is where there is an actual estate of freehold in esse, but the right to the fee simple is suspended, and is to revive upon the happening of some event; e. g., in the case of a lease to A for life, remainder to the right heirs of B, who is alive, the fee simple is in abeyance until B dies. Co. Litt. 343 b. Similarly, during the incumbency of each successive incumbent- of a church, he having only a freehold interest therein, the fee simple is in abeyance. Litt. § 644-6. The second species of abey- ance, i. e., an abeyance of the freehold itself, occurs on the death of an incum- bent, and until the appointment of his successor. Litt. § 647. But saving this one case, the freehold is never in abey- ance, and cannot possibly be so. It was customary in speaking of a thing in abeyance to say that it was "in nubiSus" (which was rather a profane expression), or ^'■ingremio legis" {Carter V. Barnardiston, 1 P. Wms. 516), the latter phrase denoting that the fee simple or freehold which was in abeyance was meanwhile under the care or protection of the law. There is no abeyance either of the fee simple or of the freehold in the case of conveyances operating under the Statute of Uses, for in these what is not given away remains in the grantor until it is so given. As to the law in the United States, see 9 Cranch, 47; 3 Mass. 500; 1 Washb. Real Prop. 48 ; 4 Wheat. 691 ; 1 Kent's Com. 103. * ABIGEUS : See title Abactok. *ABJUDICATIO. A removal from court. Calvinus Lex; Co. Litt. 100 b. ABJURATION. This is a foreswear- ing or renouncing upon oath. To abjure the realm was to take an oath to quit it forever, and such abjuring persons were and are civilly dead. So also to abjure the Pretender was to take an oath dis- claiming all allegiance or obedience to him. The oath of abjuration is a natural issue from the duty of allegiance, but, apparently, was not devised until after 4 ABORDAGB. — ABSOLUTION. Abjnration. — ( Continued.) the Revolution of 1688, when the 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 37, first imposed it in respect of temporal sovereigns at least. 8ee title Pk^mitnibe, as to spiritual sovereigns. More recently the oath of abjuration has been vn-apped up in the oath of allegi- ance prescribed by the 31 & 33 Vict. c. 48, s. 1. An alien on becoming a citizen of the United States abjures all allegi- ance to foreign powers. Rawle Const. 98; 3 Story U. S. Laws, 850. Formerly, i. e., in the time of Edward the Confessor, and the other succeeding sovereigns, down to the reign of James L, if a person committed a felony he might obtain sanctuary in a church or church- yard; and there on confession of the crime, he might abjure the realm. But this privilege, growing into an abuse, the thing was abolished by 31 Jao. 1, c. 38, since which statute this kind of abjura- tion has ceased. 3 Inst. 639. *ABOBDAGE. The collision of vessels. ABORTION. Under the statute 34 & 35 Vict. c. 100, s. 58, any woman being with child, who with intent to procure her own miscarriage, unlawfully admin- isters to herself any poison, or uses any instrument with the like intent, and any person other than the woman doing for her the like (whether or not thfe woman is with child), is guilty of felony; and by s, 59, the person supplying such poison or instrument with knowledge of the intended unlawful use thereof, is guilty of a misdemeanor. For the complete commission of this ofEense, the earlier statutes of 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, and 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 14, had required that the woman should be quick with child ; but that is no longer a requisite. S. v. Cfood- JiaU, 3 0. & K. 393 ; S. v. Isaaes, 9 Cox, G. C. 338; Arch. Grim. PI. and Evid. 711 ; 1 Bish. on Grim. Law, 338, 741, 769 ; 3 id. 691. ABRIDGMENT. An epitome. The principal abridgments of the BngUsh law are the following: 1516. Fitzherbert's Abridgment, going down to 31 Henry VII. 1568. Brooke's "Grand Abridgment," going down to Elizabeth. Statham's. Abridgment, going down to Henry VI. 1763. Comyns' Digest. 1736-51. Bacon's Abridgment. 1741-51. Viner's Abridgment. 1799-1806, with Supplement. Abridgment. — (Continued.) 1853. Chitty's Equity Index, 3rd Ed. ; and 1870. Harrison's Digest, by Fisher. ♦ABROGATION. The repeal of a law. ABSCONDING DEBTOR. Under the Debtor's Act, 1869 (33 & 33 Vict. c. 63), s. 13, a bankrupt or liquidating debtor, who either after or within four months before the commencement of the bank- ruptcy or liquidation, quits England, and wrongfully takes with him property to the amount of £30 or upward, is guilty of felony. And under the statute 33 & 34 Vict. c. 76, intituled "The Abscond- ing Debtors Act, 1870," such a debtor may be arrested, notwithstanding the abolition of arrest on mesne process by the Debtors Act, 1869 (33 & 33 Viot..c. 63), s. 6. The several States have stat- utes defining the status of an absconding debtor. ABSENCE. A presumption of death arises after the absence of a person for seven years without being heard from. 1 Stark. 131; 3 Gampb. 113; 4 "Wheat. 150; 3 Starlde Ev. 457, 458; Peake Ev. ch. 14, § 1. In French law, where a per- son has absented himself from his resi- dence and domicile for four years, and nothing has meanwhile been heard of him, a declaration of absence may be obtained against him (la dScla/ration d^absenee), one year after the parties have applied for same, failing the success of the inquiries for him that are officially directed upon such application. The effect of such a declaration is to put his next of kin (JiSHOers priionvptifi) into possession of his property, they giving security, and distributing the property according to the will of the absent per- son, or (in the case of intestacy), accord- ing to law. In case the absentee returns home, the next of kin are accountable to him, and return him a fifth part of the income if he returns before fifteen years, and one-tenth part if after fifteen years and before thirty; if after thirty, they return no part at all, and cease to be accountable, their security being dis- charged. The consort of such an absentee may re-marry, and the second marriage is not impeachable excepting by the absentee (personally). * ABSOLUTION. In French law, the dismissal of a charge; in civil law, a decree declaring the innocence of the ABSQUE HOC — ACCEPTANCE. Absolution. — ( Continued.) accused; in canon law, a judgment of the clergy that the sins of the penitent are remitted. ABSQUE HOC {without tMs). These were fornaal words made use of in the conclusion Of a special traverse, and the traverse itself was thence frequently called a traverse with an absque hoc. These words were not essential to a spe- cial traverse, others of a similar import being sometimes used in their stead; their object was directly to deny some proposition or averment set forth in the plaintiff's declaration. By the C. L. P. Act, 1852, s. 65, it is enacted that spe- cial traverses shall not be necessary in any pleading. See Special Tbatebse. ♦ABSTRACT OF FINE. An abstract of the writ of covenant and the concord, naming the parties, the parcel of land and the agreement. 2 Bl. Com. 351. ABSTRACT OF TITLE. An epitome of the vendor's evidence of ownership. A brief account of all the deeds on which the title rests. Preston on Ab- stracts ; Wharton's Diet. ; Lee on Abstracts. In England, when it is necessary (as it almost always is) to show the birth, death, or marriage of any person, the proper certificates of these facts must be produced ; when it is necessary to prove a pedigree, as where a descent occurs in tlie course of the abstract, then the heir- ships must be proved if possible by strict evidence, i. e., by means of certificates of births, deaths, and marriages, and by the wiUs and letters of administration of persons having a possible prior title ; but failing such proof, evidence of deeds, wills of relatives, extracts from parish books, from family Bibles, from tomb- stones, and such like, may be given. It should also be shown that no outstanding interest requires to be got in, such as dower, freebench, courtesy, or any unsat- isfied charge ; also (in the usual case) that legacies charged on the land have been paid ; also (if the property is sold free of land tax), the certificate of such redemp- tion, together with the receipt and mem- orandum of registration, should be pro- duced. In the case of leasehold proper- ties, the abstract should show the original lease and all subsequent . assignments thereof, unless where the original lease is of very ancient date, when some of the Abstract of Title. — (Continued.) mesne assignments may be left out. Also, when the lease is less than sixty years old, the lesssor's title must be shown. When land (whether freehold or lease- hold) has devolved upon any one by the death of another since the 19th of May, 1853, the payment of succession duty must be shown. It is usual, however, to limit the contents of the abstract of title by special conditions of sale. See title Conditions of Sale. ABUTTALS (abutter). The buttings and boundings of land, either to the east, west, north, or south, showing on what other lands or places it does abut. But strictly speaking, the sides on the breadth are properly adjacentes, i. e., lying or bor- dering, and only the ends on the length are amttantes, i. «., abutting or bound- ing. CoWel. *ACCEDAS AD CURIAM. A writ to remove a cause from an inferior court not of record, to a superior court. It is pe- culiar to replevin suits. 3 Bl. Com. 34 ; 1 Tidd's Pract. 38. *ACCEDAS AD VICE COMITEM. A writ directed to the coroner, command- ing him to deliver a writ to the sheriff requiring him to return a pone which he has suppressed. ACCEPTANCE. When a bUl is-^drawn by A B upon C D, and D writes the word ' ' accepted " and his name across the face of the bill, the bill becomes his acceptance. Such an acceptance is usual- ly made by C D when he holds goods consigned to him by A B and not yet paid for, or when he is otherwise in debt to A B. When he accepts it under other circumstances, the acceptance is for the accommodation or honor of the drawer. An acceptance by E F, who is not a party to the bUl, would also be an accept- ance for honor or accommodation, but in this case, for that of the drawee. Every acceptance must since 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 78, s. 2, be on the bill, — a requisite which by the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 6), is extend- ed to a foreign bill as well as an inland one. And acceptance may be either gen- eral, as where the word "accepted," either alone or with the words " payable at " a particular place is written on the bill, or it may be special, as where the words " and not elsewhere " are added to the particular place mentioned in the acceptance for payment. For the general ACCEPTANCE AND RECEIPT. — ACCIDENT. Acceptauce. — ( Continued.) law as to the liability of an acceptor, ape title Bills of Exchange. Acceptance of rent destroys the effect of a notice to quit for non-payment of such rent. 1 Wash- bume Eeal Prop. 333. ACCEPTANCE AND RECEIPT. The acceptance which is intended by the Statute of Frauds must either precede or be contemporaneous with the receipt of the goods, and as there can be no receipt without deUvery, it follows that the ac- ceptance must be separated from the receipt by the delivery, thus, — 1, accept- ance; 3, delivery, and 3, receipt. Con- sequently the acceptance signifies a mere expression of one's selection of the particu- lar goods or article. Upon the goods being delivered and received, the purchaser, if dissatisfied with those sent, may return them ; conse- quently the acceptance and receipt which the statute speaks of does not preclude subsequent objection. ACCESS : See title Bastabd. ACCESSAKT. A person guilty of a felonious offense, not by being the actor, or actual perpetrator, of the crime, nor by being present at its performance, but by being some way concerned therein, either before or after its commission. If he has been concerned in it before its commission he is termed an accessary before the fact ; if after, an accessary after the fact. An accessary before the fact is defined to be one who, being absent at the time the crime is committed, yet pro- cures, counsels, or commands another to commit it ; and, in this case, absence is necessary to constitute him an accessary, for if he be present, he is guilty of the crime as principal. Thus if A advises B to kill another, and B does it in the absence of A, in this case B is principal and A accessary to the murder. An ac- cessary after the fact is one who, know- ing a felony to have been committed, receives, reheves, comforts, or assists the felon ; and generally any assistance what- ever given to a felon, to hinder his being apprehended, tried, or suffering punish- ment, makes such assister an accessary, as furnishing him with a horse to escape his pursuers, money or victuals to support him, a house or other shelter to conceal him, or using open force and violence to rescue or protect him. 3 Hawk. P. 0. 316, 317, 818. And now by stat. 34 & Accessary. — ( Continued.) whoever shall become an accessary iefo7'e the fact to any felony, may be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished in all re- spects as if he were the principal felon. And by sect. 3 of the same statute, it is enacted, that whoever shall become an accessary aft&r the fact to any felony, may be indicted and convicted either as_ an accessary after the fact to the principal felony, together with the principal felon, or after the conviction of the principal felon, or may be indicted and convicted of a substantive felony, whether the prin- cipal felon shall or shall not have been previously convicted, and may thereupon be punished in like manner as any acces- sary after the fact to the same felony, if convicted as an accessary, may be pun- ished. And see generally the last-men- tioned Act, which is intituled "An Act to consolidate and amend the Statute Law of England and Ireland relating to Ac- cessaries to and Abettors of Indictable Offenses." To a misdemeanor there are no acces- saries, as neither is there to the offense of high treason. See also title Aiders and Abettors. ACCESSIO. A term in Roman law used to denote a mode of acquisition of property by natural means; and the like use of the word is not uncommon in Enghsh law. Thus, the maxim " accessio cedit principali" denotes generally that an accessary thing when annexed to (as it naturally is annexed to) a principal thing, becomes part and parcel of the lat- ter, and thereupon and thereby becomes the property of the owner of the principal thing. This mode of acquisition is par- ticularly illustrated by the Law of Fix- tures, as well in English as in Roman law, the maxim of the English law being " Quidquid plantatur solo, soh eedit" and of the Roman law being " Omne quod in- mdificatur solo, sola cedit." See Brown on Fixtures, 3d ed. 1872. But the prin- ciple is of universal application, applying to the incorporation of any substance of minor importance in, or its addition to, another substance of a larger or principal importance. By many civilians it is used as the general term including in it the various more particular natural modes of acquisition, which are designated re- spectively Aliumo, Speeijicatio, Oonfusio, OormmkcUo. See these several titles. ACCIDENT. This is any unforeseen 25 ViQt. c. 94, s. 1, it is enacted, that! event that is not attributable to the con- ACCIDENTAL DEATH. — ACCOUNT, ACTION OP. Accident. — ( Contintied.) trivance or negligence of the party. It is a rule of all systems of jurisprudence that no one is liable for an accident, be- ing purely such ( Wakeman y. Bobinson, 1 Bing. aiS; 8 Moore, 63); but it is an equally uniyersal rule, that the slightest negligence will exclude the defense of accident. Kearney v. London, Brighton, dsc., By. Go.^ L. R. 5 Q. B. 411. But this non-liability from accident does not, of course, protect the purchaser of a spe- cific chattel from payment of the price, in case the chattel is either injured or destroyed by accident. Twrling y. Baxter, Tudor's M. C. 596. The courts of equity go further than the courts of law, and attempt even to relieve parties against the consequences of accident, but within a limited group of cases only. Story Eq. Jur. s. 78 ; 1 Spence Eq. Jur. 628, 639. ACCIDENTAL DEATH. For the Eng- lish law of compensation in the case of persons killed by railway accidents, see Lord Campbell's Act (9 & 10 Vict. c. 93) ; also the act amending same (37 & 28 Vict, c. 95). By the latter act any of the per- sons beneficially interested in the death may, when no action for compensation is brought within six months from the death by the executor or administrator of the deceased, bring such action; and the defendant is enabled to pay a lump sum of money into court, without specifying the shares into which the same is to be di- vided among the parties interested. ACCIDENTS, INSURANCE AGAINST. The law of insurance in its general prin- ciples is applicable to this particular species of insurance. Thus, the assuring person must have an interest in the life of the assuree, under the stat. 14 Geo. 8, 0. 48, s. 2. Shilling v. Accidental Death Inmranee Oo., 3 H. & N. 43. Also, there must be a full disclosure of aU cir- cumstances material to the exposure to accidents. Shilling's Case, supra. It is usual in such policies to provide that the injury from the accident insured against shall be caused by some outward and vis- ible means, of which satisfactory proof can be furnished to the company ; as to the meaning of such a provision, see Trew y.Bailway Passengers' Inswranee Oom- pany, 5 H. & N. 311 ; on app. 6 H. & N. 839. And see generally Fisher's Dig. 4936-30 ; Bliss on Life Ins. 702-741. ACCOMMODATION i OF Exchange. See title Bills ACCOMPLICE : See title Aidees and Abbttohs. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. A defense in law consisting (as the name imports) of two parts, viz., something given or done to the plaintiff by the de- fendant as a satisfaction, and agreed to (or accorded) as such by the plaintiff. Therefore accord without satisfaction is not a good plea {Parher v. Samsbottom, 8 B. & C. 357), as neither is satisfaction without accord (Sardmam v. Bellhouse, 9 M. & W. 596) ; but accord and satisfac- tion with one of several enures to the benefit of all. Wallace v. Rensall, 7 M. & W. 364 ; Nicholson v. Beoill, 4 A. & E. 675. But the satisfaction must be com- plete and executed. Vloeton v. Hall, 16 Q. B. 1039. In the case of an ascertained sum of money, a less sum is no satisfaction for the debt unless there is some additional consideration (Fitch v. Button, 5 East, 230; CwmberY. Wane, 1 Sm. L. C, 6th ed. 301) ; but in other cases the value of the satisfaction is not inquired into (J'in- nePs Case, 5 Rep. 117 a ; Ourlewis v. Ouvrlc, 3 Exch. 375) ; excepting so far as to ascer- tain that the chattel given in satisfaction is of some value. Preston v. Ghristmas, -3 "Wils. 86 ; Oa/rtm-ight v. Cooh, 3 B. & Ad. 701. One security is no satisfaction for another, unless it is of a higher or better quahty than the original security; e. g., by being negotiable. Sibree v. Tripp, 15 M. & W. 23. After breach, accord and satisfaction is in general a good defense (when spec- ially pleaded) to an action on any con- tract, whether made by parol or by spec- ialty (Blake's Case, 6 Rep. 43 b) ; unless where a sum certain is payable under the specialty (Peyto's Case, 9 Rep. 79 a) ; but before breach it is never a good defense to an action on a specialty ' ' nam, unum- quodque eodem modo quo colligaMi/r dissolvi An accord and satisfaction obtained by fraud may be set aside in equity (Stewart V. Great Western By. Co., 2 De G., J. & S. 319) ; and a receipt given for money re- ceived as compensation under circum- stances amountmg to imposition, or even undue consideration, will not estop the injured party even at law. Boherts v. Eastern Counties By. Co., 1 F. & F. 460; Zee V. Lancashire & Torlcshire By. Oo., L. R. 6 Ch. App. 537. ACCOUNT, ACTION OF. An action which lies against a party to compel him 8 A.CCOUNTANT TO THE CROWN.— ACCRUER, CLAUSE OF. Account, Action of* — {Gontmued.) to render an account to another with whom he has had transactions ; and the writ by which this action was commenced was thence termed a writ of account. F. N. B. 116 to 119 ; Co. Litt. 173 a. From the greater facilities, however, which are afforded by the courts of equity in taking an account of profits or receipts, the ac- tion of account at law is now seldom resorted to, one of the most recent cases in which it was used being Beer v. Beer, 12 C. B. 2. The action may still, how- ever, be brought in a proper case ; for, by the common law, it lies against a baiUfi or receiver; also, against one merchant at the suit of another for not rendering a reasonable account of profits ; and by the Stat. 4 Anne, c. 16, s. 2, 7, it is made to lie by one joint-tenant or tenant in com- mon against the other as bailiff (although not expressly so appointed) for receiving more than comes to his just share or pro- portion. This action as between mer- chants and merchants was an exception to the statute of limitations (21 Jac. c. 16, B. 3), but since the M. L. A. Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 9), it is no longer so, the limit for bringing the action being now six years in aU cases. The equitable jurisdiction in account applies in the following cases : (1) Where a principal asks for an account against his agent, there existing in this case a fiduciary relation between the parties {Mackenzie v. Johnston, 4 Mad. 373), but not in the converse case of agent against principal. Padwich v. Stanley, 9 Hare, 637. (3) Where there are mutual accounts between plaintiff and defendant, i. e., when each of two parties has both received and paid on the other's account. Phillips V. PhMips, 9 Hare, 471. And (3) where the accounts are of a very complicated character, and therefore not admitting of being examined on a trial at Nisi Prius. O'Connor v. Spaight, 1 Sch. & Lef. 305. ACCOUNTANT TO THE CROWN. One who receives money for the Crown, and is accountable therefor. The Crown has a hen upon the lands (other than the copyhold lands) of the accountant for any moneys he may misapply or become chargeable with, and such hen attaches as from the time he becomes such account- ant, and continues to attach, even as against purchasers of the lands without notice. Goxhead's Case, F. Moore, 136. See title Ckowh Debts. ACCOUNTANT-GBNEEAL. An offi- cer of the Court of Chancery, appointed by the statute, 13 Geo. 1, c. 33, out who has since been superseded by an officer called the Paymaster-Greneral of England, under the Chancery Funds Act, 1873 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 44), and the Chancery Fund Rules, 1873, which came into operation on the 7th January, 1873. See title Patmastbk-Q-enekai. ACCOUNTS CURRENT. Running ac- covmts or open accounts. ACCOUNT STATED. This is nothing more than the admission of a balance due from one party to another ; and that bal- ance being due there is a debt ; and the statement of the account implies a prom- ise in law to pay the debt shown by the balance. For an account stated, it is requisite that a sum certain should be due in certainty (Hughss v. Thorpe, 5 M. & W. 656) ; but the sum need not be payable in presenti. Wheatley v. Williams, 1 M. & W. 533. The account must have been stated to the creditor himself or his agent, and is not sufficient if made to a stranger. Tucker v. Bcurrow, 7 B. & C. 633. The statement may be in vn-iting or by word of mouth (Smgleton v. Ba/rrett, 3 C. & J. 368) ; an I. O. U. is evidence of an ac- count stated. Jacobs v. Fisher, 1 0. B. 178. But, to revive debts barred by statute, the account stated must be in writing. 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, s. 1. ■ An account stated is not conclusive, but an error therein may be shown {Thomas v. Hawkes, 8 M. & W. 140) ; also that an item therein is not a valid debt for want of consideration. French v. French, 3 M. & G. 644. It is, however, no objection to a debt that it arose upon a contract which was bad for want of writing within the statute of frauds {Ooching v. Wa/rd, 1 C. B. 858), unless the contract has continued executory. Lord Falmouth v. Thomm, 1 C. & M. 89. It is a rule of law that an infant cannot state an account {Trueman v. Burst, 1 T. R. 40) ; upon attaining his age of twenty- one years he may, however, ratify such an account. WUlia/ms v. Moor, 11 M. & W. 256. * ACCREDIT. To acknowledge ; used in international law of diplomatic agents. ACCRETION. A mode of acquisition by natural law. See title Accessio. ACCRUER, CLAUSE OF. An express clause frequently occurring in the case of ACCUMULATIONS. — ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF A DEBT. 9 Accruer J Clause of. — (Conimued.) gifts by deed or will to persons as tenants in common, providing that, upon the death of one or more of the beneficiaries, his or their shares shall go to the survivors or survivor. It is a rule of lav7 that there is "no survivorship upon survivorship;" i. e., that the clause of accruer extends only to the original, not also to the aor crued, shares, unless in terms it is ex- pressly made to extend to the latter also, which it customarily is made to do. Pain V. Benson, 3 Atk. 80. ACCUMULATIONS. The rule which limits the accumulation of the income of property used to be the rule of perpetui- ties, viz., a life or lives in being, twenty- one years, and (where gestation actually existed) the period of gestation (CMeZZ v. Palmer, 1 CI. & F. 373) ; but, in conse- quence of the supposed abuse of that rule in TheUmson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. 113, and by virtue of the so-called Thellusson Act (39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 98), the period within which such accumulation may at the present day be lawfully directed is one or other severally, and not two or more together, of the following periods, namely: — (1) The. life of the grantor ; (3) The term of twenty-one years from the death of such grantor, or (but in the case of a will only) from the death of the testator ; (3) The minority or minorities of any life or lives in being, or in ventre, at the death of sucTi grantor or of such testator (as the case may be); ... , (4) The minority or minorities of any person or persons who, under the deed or will (as the case may be), is entitled to the income, or rather would, if of full age, and but for the direction to accumu- late, be entitled thereto. ACCUMUIATITE JUDGMENT. The passing distinct sentences for two or more distinct ofienses. By the common law such a judgment could only be given in cases of misdemeanors, and not upon convictions for felony, the party attainted of felony becoming thenceforth dead in law. Latterly, however, by stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 38, s. 10, the court was empow- ered to pass a second sentence, to com- mence after the expiration of the first, in a case of felony ; and under the criminal statutes at present in force (34 & 35 Vict.) such accumulative punishments Accumulative Judgment. — (Cont'd.) are in general use, not exceeding three in all. See titles Pbkjuby ; Labceny. ♦ACCUSATION. A charge against a person for the commission of a crime or misdemeanor. ACCUSED. The generic name for the defendant in a criminal case, and is more appropriate than either prisoner or de- fendant. Sex V. M''Naughten, 1 C. & K. 181. AC ETIAM BILLJE. The ac eUam clause was a form or fiction of law adopted first in the Queen's Bench, and afterward in the Common Pleas, to give jurisdiction to these courts in actions for ordinary debts. The bill of Middlesex in the Queen's Bench being framed only for actions of trespass; and the statute, 13 Car. 3, St. 3, c. 3, having required that the true cause of action should be ex- pressed in the writ or process, the Court of Queen's Bench was in danger of losing its entii'e jurisdiction in matters of debt ; to obviate that result, the ac etiam clause was invented. And some few years after- ward, North, C. J., directed that in the Common Pleas the Hke fiction should be added to the usual complaint of breaking the plaintiflE's close. But since the Uni- formity of Process Act (3 Will. 4, c. 39) the necessity for this fiction has ceased. ♦ACKNOWLEDGMENT. The act of going before a competent officer and de- claring the execution of a deed. The certificate of the officer that it has been so acknowledged. ACKNOWLEDGMENT MONET. A sum of money paid by copyhold tenants in some parts of England on the deaths of their landlords as an acknowledgment of their new lords. It is the laudemium, or Icmdativum of Roman law, being so- called a laudando domino. Leominster used to be an instance of it, see Cowel ; but there is no trace of it at Leominster at the present day. The author is not aware of any district in England in which it is now payable. The payment of fines by copyhold tenants is, however, an analogous payment. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF A DEBT. This consists in the admission that a debt is owing. Its eflect upon a debt not yet barred by the Statute of Limitations is to cause the statutory period to commence running anew. The acknowledgment 10' AOKNOWLEDaMENT OF MARRIED WOMEN. — ACT OF GOD. Acknowledgment of a Debt.— (Coraif'i.) must be in writing under Lord Tenter- den's Act (9 Geo. 4, c. 14), s. 1, and must be addressed to the creditor, or, aembh, his agent {Fuller v. Recknan, 36 Beav. 614) ; it may be signed either by the debtor himself or his agent (19 and 20 Vict., c. 97, s. 13). The acknowledgment, in order to be sufficient, must involve a promise to pay {Tanner v. Smart, 6 B. & 0. 602) ; therefore the effect of a sufficient acknowl- edgment of a debt already actually barred is the same as the acknowledgment of a debt not yet barred, i. e., the time will run afresh from the last acknowledg- ment. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OP MARRIED WOMEN: See titles Deed Acknowl- edged ; Fine and Common Reootbbt. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF TITLE. Under the stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s 14, a written acknowledgment of the title of a person entitled to any land, when given to him or his agent, and signed by the party in po.ssession or in receipt of the rents and profits of the lands, has the ef- fect of rendering such possession or re- ceipt that of the person whose title is acknowledged ; and the title of the latter to make an entry or to bring an action for the recovery of the lands shall be deemed to accrue at the date of such ac- knowledgment for the purpose of saving the Statute of Limitations. ACQUIESCENCE. Where a person having a full knowledge of the facts (Eamsden v. Dyson, 1 H. L. C. 129) neg- lects to dispute the right of another, he is said to acquiesce in such right. The efEect of such acquiescence is a species of estop- pel hy conduct. See titles Estoppel and Waiver. *ACQUIENTANDIS PLEGIIS. A writ of justices for a surety against a cred- itor who refuses to release him after the debt has been satisfied. ACQUITTAL. This word has two meanings. 1. It signifies to be free from entries and molestations of a superior lord for services issuing out of lands. 3. It signifies a deliverance or setting free of a person from a charge or suspicion of guilt. ACQUITTANCE. A discharge in writ- ing of a sum of money or other duty. Such a discharge, unless it is by deed, is not pleadable, neither is it conclusive as evidence, for it may be shown to have Acquittance. — ( Continued.) been given through mistake. A duly authorized agent may sign an acquittance so as to bind his principal. *ACT IN PAIS. An act done out of court and not a matter of record. See 2 BI. Com. 294. . ACT OF BANKRUPTCY. This phrase denotes any one of the various grounds upon which a debtor may be adjudicated a bankmpt. Under the English Bank- ruptcy Act, 1869, s. 6, these acts of bank- ruptcy are the following: — (1) A general conveyance or assign- ment by the debtor in trust for his creditors; ♦ (2) A fraudulent conveyance or trans- fer by the debtor of the whole or part of his property; (3) The debtor's, having done any of the f oUovsring things with intent to defeat or delay his creditors, ,namely : (a) Departed out of England; (b) Remained out of England; (c) Being a trader, departed from his dwelling-house; (d) Begun to keep house; or, (e) Suffered himself to be outlawed ; (4) The debtor's having filed in court a declaration of his inability to pay; (5) The levying of an execution for not less than 50Z. against the d.ebtor by seizure and sale of his goods ; (6) The debtor's having neglected, if a trader, for seven days, and if not a trader, for twenty-one days, after service thereof, to pay or to secure or compound for the amount (not being an' amount under 50/.) demanded on the debtor's summons of the petitioning creditor. See United States Bankrupt Act of 1867, as amended 1874. ACT OF GOD. A pious phrase for an inevitable accident. No one is to be prejudiced by the act of Qod. But when a debtor has agreed to an alternative obligation, and one of the alternatives becomes impossible by the act of God, he is not thereby discharged from doing the other, which remains possible (Barh- worth V. Young, 4 Drew. 1) ; for that is no prejudice to him, and the contrary would be a prejudice to the creditor. See also title Impossibilitt. ACT OP PARLIAMENT. — ACTION AND SUIT. 11 ACT OF PARLIAMENT: See title Statute. ACTES. In French law, denotes doc- uments, e. g., les aetes de I' Stat civil — public documents. Compare the use of acta in Roman law, and the phrase Acts of Parliament in English law. ACTES DE DECES. In French law, are the certifica,tes of death, which are required to be drawn up before any one may be buried. Aiiaune inhumation ne serafaite sans une autorisation de V offieier de V etat ciml. — Code Nap. i. 2-4. ACTES DE MARIAGE. In French law, are the marriage certificates, and contain names, professions, ages, and places of birth and domicile of the two persons marrying, and of their parents ; also the consent of these latter, and the mutual agreements of the intended hus- band and wife to take each the other for better and worse, together with the usual attestations. ACTES DE NAISSANCE. In French law, denote the certificates of birth, and must contain the day,^ hour, and place of birth, together witli the sex and in- tended Christian name of the child, and the names of the parents and of the wit- nesses. *ACTIO IN PERSONAM. An action against the person founded on personal liability. *ACTIO IN REM. An action against a thing out of which satisfaction of a claim is sought. 1 Kent, Com. 373, 367 ; 3 id. 196. ACTIO NON ACCRETIT INFRA SEX ANNOS. In the times of Latin plead- ing, this was the phrase by which a defendant pleaded the statute of limita- tions to an action of assumpsit or on other simple contract, six years being the period limited for bringing the action. ACTION AND SUIT. This is defined as the right of recovering in a court of justice what is due or owing to oneself \ms persequendi in judieio quod sibi debe- twr). All actions arise either out of contract or out of tort ; if a proceeding originates put of a crime it is not (in English law, at any rate) an action, but a prosecution. The varieties of the several actions are the following: — Action and Suit. — (Continued.) I. On contract, — (1) Covenant, being on a deed alone ; (3) Assumpsit, — being on a simple contract only ; (3) Debt, — being indifferently on a deed or a simple contract : (4) Scire facias, — being on a judg- ment; (5) Account; and (6) Annuity. n. On tort, — (1) Trespass, — being either (a) Trespass quare clauswm /regit, — to real property; (5) Trespass de lonis asportatis, — to personal property ; (2) Case, — (8) Trover,— (4) Detinue, — and (5) Replevin. For a particular explanation of each of these forms of action, see the respective titles. There were also a numerous group of actions called real and mixed actions, but all of these, saving ejectment only, have been abolished by the statute 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 37, s. 36, and the C. L. P. Acts, 1852, 1854, and 1860. There are certain general principles that are applicable to all actions and suits. Thus, first, it is necesssuy before com- mencing an action to see that the cause of action is complete, and, therefore, in the case of payments due against a cer- tain day to see that the day has arrived and is over, and in the case of payments to become due only upon the performance of some condition to see that such condi- tion has been performed, otherwise, If there was no cause of action at the date of the issuing of the writ of summons whereby the action is commenced, the plaintiff must necessarily fail. Secondly, it is necessary, especially in actions grow- ing out of contracts, to see that the plain- tiff has that privity which is necessary to support the action and as against the par- ticular defendant, otherwise the action will be demurrable. Lumley v. Oye, 2 E. & E. 216. Thirdly, in the case of torts, the ground of action must be what the law regards as an injuria and not a dam^ rattro merely. BteoemonY. Newnham, HG. B. 385; Actm v. Blundell, 13 M. & W. 334. Fourthly, that the wrongful act does not amount to a felony. Welloch v. Oonstantine, 3. H. & C. 146. And, fifth- ly, in case of the injuria being the breach of a pubUo duty, private damage must 12 ACTIONES NOMINATE — ADMINISTRATION. Action and Suit. — (Oontimied.) have arisen to the plaintifl from it. Kearns v. Gordwainers Co., 6 C. B. 388. See also following titles, Joindbr of Oausbs ; Consolidation Rule ; Parties ; Ckoss Actions, etc. *ACTIONES NOMINATE. Writs for which there were precedents in the Eng- lish Chancery prior to 13 Edw. I, c. 34. AD DAMNUM. That part of the dec- laration which commences with the words ''to the damage;" &c., is termed the breach, and is thence sometimes called Vii&'bx&aah. ad damnum. Ch. on Pleading, 363, 6th ed. ADDITION. This term is used in law to denote the address and profession of the party to, or of any deponent in an action. The greatest accuracy in the addition is often necessary, e. g., in the affidavit which is to accompany the reg- istration of a biU of sale. ADELING, otherwise ATHELING. An expression which was used to designate among the Saxons their chief nobility, and pre-eminently the eldest son of the king. Spelman. ADEMPTION. The taking away. For the application of this word to lega- cies and devises, and for the English and Roman law of ademption of legacies, see title Lkgacibs and Devises. AD INQUIRENDUM. A judicial writ commanding inquiry to be made of any thing relating to a cause depending in the King's courts. It is granted upon many occasions for the better execution o'f justice. See title Wbit of Inquiry. ADJOURNMENT. A putting off until another time or place. Thus, a court may be adjourned; Parliament is adjourned; the further consideration or hearing is adjourned ; and in consequence of such adjournment, the parties and witnesses have permission to forbear their attend- ance during the period of adjournment. See as to Adjournment Days, CTieetlumn, v. SturUvint, 13 M. & W. 615. ADJUDICATION. A giving of judg- ment. In Roman Law, the adjudicaUo was the fourth of the four formulae in use during the period of the formulary pro- cedure (177 B. c. till 386 A. D.). It occur- red in three actions only, viz., Finium regwndorwm, Corwmuni dwidundo, and *AD JURA REGtIS. A writ brought by the King's clerk, presented to a living, against those who endeavor to eject him, to the prejudice of the King's title. Ja- cob's Diet. ; Reg. of Writs, 61. ADJUSTMENT. The ratable distri- bution of a loss which is matter for gen- eral average. See General Average. In an adjustment, the rule now adopted in England differs according as, -:— (1) The ship arrives at its port of des- tination, in which case the selling price of the goods is taken; or (3) The ship puts back to the port of lading, in which case the invoice price of the goods is taken. But in either case the goods sacrificed as well as the goods saved are liable to contribute toward making good the loss, it being obvious that the owners of the goods saciiflced are not to be on a better footing than the owners of the goods saved. Sm. M. Law, 395. See title General Average. *AD IITEW. For the suit; as a guardian ad litem. ADMEASUREMENT. A writ which lay against those who usurped more than their share. It used to lie in two cases, first, for admeasurement of dower, and secondly, for admeasurement of pasture. In the former case, it was brought by the heir against the widow of a deceased, who withheld from such heir, of his guardian, more land in respect of her dower than she was justly entitled to, in which case the heir was to be restored to the overplus. In the second case, it lay between those who had common of pas- ture appendant to their freehold, or com- mon by vicinage, when any one or more surcharged the common with more cattle than he or they ought to have thereon. F. N. B. 125, 148; Les Termes de la Ley. ADMINICULUM. An aid or support to something else, whether a right or tJie evidence of one. It is principally used to designate evidence adduced in aid or support of other evidence, which with- out it is imperfect. ADMINISTRATION. The discharg- ing of some duty or office, usually that of getting in and distributing the assets of a deceased person. ' See titles Administration of Assets; Administrator. ADMINISTRATION, GRANT OF.— ADMINISTRATION OF ASSETS. 13 ADMINISTRATION, GRANT OF. The administration of the personal estate of a deceased intestate belonged, anciently, to the sovereign as parens patricB, or to certain lords of manors under a general grant from him, and afterward to the ordinary, who by the statute of West- minster 3 (13 Edw. 1), c. 19, was re- quired to pay the debts of the deceased, and who, at a still later period by the Stat. 31 Edw. 3, st. 1, c. 11, was required to depute the administration to the next of kin of the intestate. Thus stood administration until the Court of Probate Act (1857), 30 & 21 Vict. c. 77, whereby the power of granting admitiistration was transferred to that court from the ecclesiastics. In the grant of letters of administration, there are certain relations of the deceased who are considered to have a preferable right. Thus, the husband has an abso- lute right to administer to his wife, and the widow has a moral right (which the court generally recognizes) to administer to her husband. When there is no hus- band or widow, the right to administer belongs to the next of Mn according to their proximity in relationship, the right to the beneficial interest under the Stat- ute of Distributions generally regulating the right to the grant of administration ; and in the case of there being several next of kin in equal proximity, he whom the majority shall elect in general admin- isters. A creditor may also administer ; and the court may even appoint to the administration a person entirely without interest, in which latter case the grant is merely ad colligendum. There are various species of adminis- tration, namely: (1) A general administration — when the deceased is wholly intestate ; (3) Administration de bonis' non — as upon the death of a sole executor after probate inte8tate,«or upon the death of a sole administrator ; (3) Administration dv/rante minoritate — as where the executor appointed by the will being a sole executor is a minor ; (4) Administration pendente lite — as where any suit touching the validity of the will is pending, and generally where- ever the court of chancery would appoint a receiver of the estate ; (5) Administration See title Lotjagb. BAIL A LOTEK ) BAIL COURT. An auxiliary court of the Court of Queen's Bench, at Westmin- ster, wherein points connected more par- ticularly with pleading and practice are argued ahd determined. BAILIFF. There are various sorts of bailiffs: as bailiffs of liberties, sheriff's bailiffs,. bailiffs of lords of man- ors, &c., &c. Sheriffs are also called king's bailiffs, anfl the counties wherein Bailiff. — ( Oontinued.) it is their duty to preserve the rights of the king are frequently called their bail- iwicks, a word introduced by the Norman piincesin imitation of the French, whose territory was divided into bailiwicks, as that of England is into counties. The word "bailiff," however, usually signifies sheriff's officers, who are either, (1.) Bail- iffs of hundreds, or, (2.) Special bailiffs. (1.) Bailiffs of hundreds are officers ap- pointed over those respective districts, by the sheriffs, to collect fines therein, to summon juries, to attend the judges and justices at the assizes or quarter sessions, and also to execute writs and processes in the several hundreds. (2.) Special bailiffs are that lower class of persons employed by the sheriffs for the express purpose of serving writs and making ar- rests and executions, &c. (3.) Those persons also who have the custody of the king's castles are called bailiffs, as the bailiff of Dover Castle. (4.) The chief magistrates of particular jurisdictions are also called bailiffs, as the bailiff of Westminster, for example. (5.) There are also bailiffs of courts baron, bailiffs of the forest, &c. Cowel ; Termes de la Ley. BAILMENT. This is the most general word in English law for agency, and comprises the following varieties of agency : (1.) Gratuitous bailment — in which case it is settled that a mirfeasance on the part of the bailee, i. e., agent, is ac- tionable {Ooggs V. Bernard, 1 Sm. L. C. 177) ; but that a mere non-feasance is not actionable. Ehee v. Qatwa/rd, 5 T. B. 143. (3.) Bailment for reward — in which case the bailee is of course liable as well for a non-feasance, as for a misfeasance, and cannot recover his recompense until his performance of the duty which he has undertaken. Again, bailment comprises the follow- ing varieties of agency : (1.) Bailments in which the trust re- posed is exclusively for the benefit of the bailor, and hereunder Mwndatum and Depositvm, as to which, see these two titles. (2.) Bailments in which the trust re- posed is exclusively for the benefit of the bailee, and hereunder Gommodatum (or Pret d usage), and (where gratuitous) Mutmwm (or PrU a consommaUon), as to which, see these two titles ; and 42 BAITING ANIMALS. — BANKRUPTCY. Bailment. — (OonUimed.) (3.) Bailments which are for the ben- efit of both bailor and bailee, and here- under the following varieties (as to which, see the respective titles), viz. : (1.) Pledge or Pawn — Pawnbrokbes. (3.) (7«8{o% — Lnhkebpeks; and (3.) Carriage — Cabribrs. BAITINtt ANIMALS: See Crubltt TO Animals. BALLOT, VOTE BT. Under the stat. 35 & 36 Vict. c. 33, all parliamentary and municipal elections are required to be made by ballot ; and under the Elemen- tary Education Act, 1870 (33 & 84 Vict. c. 76), the elections are similarly required to be by ballot. This mode of voting was one "of the five points advanced by the so-called Chartists, in 1839, as the People's Char- ter ; the four other points being universal BufiErage, annual parliaments, payment of members, and the abolition of the prop- erty qualification for members of parlia- ment. See, also, Reprbsbntation. BANC, OR BANCO, SITTING IN. The sittings which the respective su- perior Courts of Common Law hold during every term, and on certain appointed days after term, for the pur- pose of hearing and determining the various matters of law argued before them, are so called, in contradistinction to the sittings at Nisi Prius, which are held for the purpose of trying issues of FACT. The former are usually held be- fore four of the judges ; at the latter, one judge only presides. BANKERS. According to the decision in Fohy v. Mil, (2 H. L. C. 38), the rela- tion between a banker and a customer who pays money into the bank, is the ordinary relation of debtor and creditor, with a supei>added obligation arising out of the custom of bankers to honor the drafts of customers, and that relation is not altered by an agreement by the ban- ker to allow interest on the balances in the bank. The relation does not partake of a fiduciary relation, and, therefore, as a general rule, no bill in equity will lie against a banker for an account . ■ See, also, titles Bills of Exchange; Cheques; Cash Notes; Circular Notes ; and Letters op Credit. BANKS, JOINT STOCK. By the 39 & 40 Q-eo. 3, 0. 38, s. 15, it was forbidden Banks, Joint Stock. — (Oantinued.) to establish any corporate bank what- ever, or any bank where the^ numbej of partners exceeded six, so as to borrow, owe, or take up any sum or sums of money on their bills or notes payable on demand, or at any less time than six months, during sueh time as the Bank of England enjoyed the rights conferred by former Acts. But in 1826, the 7 Geo. 4, c. 46, was passed legalizing the formation under deeds of settlement, of banking co-partnerships, consisting of more than six persons, provided they did not carry on business in, or within sixty-five miles of, London. Afterward, in 1845, was passed the 7 & 8 Vict. 113, which for a short time enabled joint-stock banks to be established under letters patent of in- corporation. And latterly, the Joint Stock Banking Companies Act, 1857 (31 & 23 Vict c. 49), and Companies Act, 1863 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89),. have afforded every facility for constituting joint stock banks in every part of England, subject to the provisions of these Acts. BANK NOTES. These are a legal tender in England for all sums over £5 : ,See title Cash Note, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 98, s. 6. In case a bank note is lost, or is stolen, or is otherwise improperly ob- tained, the Bank of England, upon pre- sentment by a iondjide holder, is bound to cash it, although to the prejudice of the true owner. Miller v. .Soee, 1 Sm. L. C. 468. BANKRUPTCY. Under the Bank- ruptcy Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict, c, 71), which commenced as from the 1st of January, 1870, but which does not ex- tend to Scotland or Ireland, any one, whether a trader or not, and whether a member of parliament or not, maybe ad- judicated a bankrupt (s. 6) upon the pe- tition of his creditor or creditors, upon any one or other of the following six grounds — commonly designated "acts of bankruptcy: " (1.) Making a conveyance or assign- ment of all his property for the benefit of his creditors gener- ally; (2.) Making any fraudulent conveyance or assignment ; (8.) Doing any act with intent to de- feat or delay his creditors ; (4.) Piling a declaration of insolvency ; (5.) Having execution levied by seiz- ure and sale of his goods for a debt of £50, or upward ; or BANNERET, OR BANRENT. — BARRISTER. 43 Bankruptcy. — {Oontirmed.) (6.) Having, if a trader for seven days, and if a non-trader for twenty- one days, after service of a debtor's summons for a debt of not less than £50, neglected to pay or satisfy same. The petition grounded upon any one of such acts must be prese);ited within six months from the comndssion of the act. The Act constitutes two distinct juris- dictions, viz. : (1.) The London district — which com- prises the City of London and its liberties and all places sit- uated within the districts of the metropolitan County Courts ; and (2.) The country district — which com- prises the rest of England. The Court of the London Bankruptcy District has all the powers and jurisdic- tions of the superior Courts of Common Law and Equity (In re Anderson, L. R. 5 Ch. App. 473); the Judge may also re- verse, vai-y, or affirm any order of a local Bankruptcy Court, in respect of a matter either of law or of fact. When a person is adjudicated, a bank- rupt,' all his property, whether real or personal, vests in the trustee or trustees, who have the following powers : — (1.) Receiving and deciding upon proof of debts. (2.) Carrying on the business of the bankrupt. (3.) Bringing or defending actions. (4.) Selling the property of the bank- rupt, either by public auction or by private contract ; and (5.) Giving effectual receipts for money received. Upon the close of the bankruptcy, or (but only with the assent of his creditors), during its continuance, the bankrupt may apply to the Court for an order of du- eha/rge, which he will obtain if he have paid 10s. in the pound, and not unless ; if undischarged, he is protected for three years from the close of the bankruptcy proceedings, and if he should during that ■period have paid up to 10s. in the pound, he then obtains his discharge ; but other- wise, the unpaid balance becomes a judg- ment debt against him, and may be levied against his property, real or personal, in the usual way. BANNERET, OR BANRENT. A ban- neret, or banrent, is said to be a knight made in the field, with the ceremony of Banneret, or Banrent. — (Oontmued.) cutting off the point of his standard, and so making it like a banner. They are accounted so honorable that they are per- mitted to display their arms in a banner in the field as barons do. See Selden's Tit. of Hon. BARGAIN AND SALE : See title Con- VBTANCBS. BARON AND FEME : See title Hus- band AND WlFB. BARRATRY. Any act of the master or of the mariners of a ship which is of a criminal or fraudulent nature, tending to the prejudice of the owners of the ship, without their consent or privity ; as by running away with the ship, sinking her, deserting her, or embezzling the cargo. Park on Ins. 137, 138 ; Knight v. Cam- bridge, 1 Str. 581 ; Vall^o and Another v. Wheeler, Oowp. 143. BARRING ESTATE TAXI. Formerly an estate tail could only be barred by levying a fine or suffering a common re- covery (see these titles). At the present day, it can only be barred (1.) in the case of freeholds, by a disentailing deed, and (2.), in the case of copyholds, by sur- render, or (but only if the estate is equi- table) by a disentailing deed executed in accordance with the stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74. BARRISTER. A counsellor learned in the law who pleads at the bar of the Courts, and takes upon himself the advo- cacy or defense of causes. His profes- sional conduct is under the contrtfljDf the Benchers of his Inn (Hudson v. Stade, 3 F. & F. 390). His fees are an hmor- arium, and no action lies to recover them, nor can any security be taken for them (Brcncn v. Kennedy, 13 C. B. 677). But it is otherwise vd.th the fees of convey- ancers or special pleaders below the bar, who may maintain an action, or take such security (Bteadman v. Hockley, 15 M. & W. 553). A barrister is not liable for negligence or non-attendance (Fell v. .Brown., Peake, 96). He enjoys numerous privileges (which, however, he is assumed to exercise only for the benefit of his cli- ent), e. g., he may compromise the case (Smnfm v. Swinfen, 1 0. B. [N. S.] 364; 3 De G. & J 381) ; nor is he exposed to any action for Ubel or slander, in conse- quence of words written or spoken by him in the conduct of his case (Hodgson V. Scarlet, 1 B. & A. 333) ; nevertheless 44 BASE PEE. — BENEFICE C'lNVENTAIBB. Barrister. — ( CimUnued.) it seems that he is liable to be punished for contempt of Court even for words professedly spoken in the discharge of his functions as advocate (Ex parte Pat&r, 5 B, & S. 299). He is privileged from arrest while attending Court or going cir- cuit. BASE FEE. A base or quaUfled fee is an estate which hath some quaUflcation subjoined thereto, and which must cease or be determined whenever such qualifi- cation is at an end. As in the case of a grant to A. and his heirs, tmanU of the manor of Dale ; in this instance, when- ever the heirs of A. cease to be tenants of that manor, the grant is entirely de- feated. So when Henry VI. granted to John Talbot, lord, of the numor of Kings- ton-Lisle, in BerTcs, that he and his heirs, lords of the said numor, should be peers of the realm by the title of Barons of Lisle; here John Talbot had a base or qualified fee in that dignity, and the instant he or his heirs quitted the seigniory of that manor, the dignity was at an end. These estates are fees, because it is possible that they may endure for ever in a man and his heirs; yet as that duration depends on certain collateral circumstances. which qualify and debase the {hirity of the do- nation, it is therefore called a base or quaUfied fee. In a more limited sense, a base fee is used to denote a fee simple de- rived out of a fee tail, which has been barred by one whose power extends only to bar his own issue heirs in tail ; in this case, so long as such heirs in tail or their issue endure, the fee simple endures, but determines when they become extinct. BASTARD. A child born out of wed- lock ; also, a child bom during coverture when it was impossible that the husband should have been its father. He is not legitimized by the subsequent marriage of his parents (Doe d. Bvrtwhistle v. Va/r- dell, 6 Bing. N. C. 385). (But in some of the United States marriage legitimates a child bom prior thereto). Upon an order of affiliation, the putative father becomes liable to a limited extent to support his child ; but otherwise the mother must support it. The custody of the chUd be- longs also of right to the mother, not- withstanding the father is able and willing to maintain it better (Ex parte Knge, 1 N. E. 148) ; but it seems that the wishes of the child itself vsill be -consulted. In re Lloyd, 3 Man. & Q-. 547. BATTEL (from lattaOe). The trial by wager of battle was a species of trial in- troduced into England, among other Nor- man customs, by William the Conqueror, in which the pergon accused fought with his accuser, under the apprehension that Heaven- would give the victory to him who was in the right. See title Tkiai by Jukt. BATTEET: TBBY. Assault astd Bat- BAWDT-HOUSE ! See Bkothbl. , BENCH WARRANT. The process is- sued against a party against whom an in- dictment has been found for the purppse of bringing him into Court to answer the charge preferred against him. When an indictment has been found for a mis- demeanor during the assizes or sessions, it is the practice for the judge attending the assizes, or for two of the justices at- tending the sessions, to issue a bench warrant, signed by him or them, to ap- prehend the defendant. Cowp. 239; Haw. PI. Cr. ; 1 Ch. Crim. Law, 338, 339. BENCHER. A dignitary of the Inns of Court is so termed. Each Inn of Court is presided over by a certain number of benchers, who exercise the right of ad- mitting canditates as members of their society, and also of ultimately calling them to the bar. They are usually selected from those of their members who have distinguished themselves in their pro- fession ; and it is the ordinary practice, but subject to a discretion in the body of benchers, for each Inn of Court to select its member a bencher as soon as he has at- tained the rank or degree of Queen's counsel. They also exercise a general supervision over the professional conduct of all counsel that are members of the Inn. BENEFICE. Generally taken for any ecclesiastical living, or church prefer- ment, whether a dignity or not ; and it must be given for life, not for years, or at will. See title Advowson. BENEFICE D'INYENTAIRE. This, in French law corresponds to the Bene- fidvm Inventan-ii of Roman law, and substantially to the English law doctrine, that the executor properly accounting is only liable to the extent of the assets re- ceived by him. BETTERMENTS. — BILL IN EQUITY OR CHANCERY. 45 ♦BETTERMENTS. Improvements made to an estate which render it better than mere repairs. BEYOND THE SEAS. No part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, nor the Isle of Man, Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney, orSark, nor any islands adjacent to any of them (being part of the dominions of Her Majesty), are deemed beyoud'the seaS within the meaning of the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27. And yet for cer- tain purposes either or any of those places other than England may be re- garded in law as being beyond the seas. Thus it appears to have been held that Dublin, or any place in Ireland, was beyond the seas within the meaning of the Statute of Limitations (21 Jac. 1, c. 16). King v. Walker, 1 Bl. Rep. 386; Nightengale v. Adams, Show. 91 ; Shel- ford's Real Property Statutes, 181, 4th ed. BIGAMY. A criminal ofiense, which consists in going through the ceremony of marriage with another, while a former husband or wife is still alive and not di- vorced, knowing at the time, or reason- ably believing, that such former consort is still alive. The offense amounts to a felony. BILL (billa). Has various significa- tions in law proceedings. It is commonly taken for a declaration in writing, express- ing either the wrong the complainant has suffered by the defendant, or else some fault that the party complained of has committed against some law or statute of the realm. Such bills are sometimes ad- dressed or exhibited to the Lord Chan- cellor, especially where the wrongs done to the complainant are matters of con- science ; and sometimes they are addressed and preferred to others having jurisdic- tion in the matter, according as the law whereon they are grounded directs. This bill contains a statement of the fact com- plained of, and of the damages thereby suffered, and a petition that process may issue against the defendant for redress. In criminal matters, when a grand jury, upon any presentment or indictment, con- sider the same to be probably true, they write on it two words, biUa vera, in other words, they are said to find a true Mil, and thereupon the accused party is said to stand indicted of the crime, and is bound to make answer to it ; and if the crime concern the Hf e of the person in- dicted, it is then referred to another Bill. — ( Gontimied.) inquest, called the jury of life and death, by whom, should he be found guilty, he stands convicted of the crime, and is, by the judge, condemned accordingly. Bill is also a common engagement for money given by one man to another; and is some- times with a penalty, called a penal bill, and sometimes without a penalty, when it is termed a single bill. By a bill was commonly understood a single bond without a condition ; and it was formerly the same as an obligation, save that it was called bill when in English, and an obligation when in Latin. See following titles. * BILL OF ADYENTURE. A writing signed by a merchant, master or ship- owner to show that goods shipped by a vessel are at the venture of another per- son, he himself being only liable for the produce. Bouv. Diet. * BILL OF ADVOCATION. In Scotch law, a bill by which a judgment is brought from an inferior to a superior Court for review. * BILL OF CREDIT. A biU issued by a State government, on the credit of the State, designed to circulate as money. BILL FOR DISCOTERY: See title Discovert. BILL IN EQUITY OR CHANCERY. The method of instituting a suit in the Court of Chancery is by addressing a bill, in the nature of a petition to the Lord Chancellor. This bUl is neither more nor less than a statement of all the circum- stances which gave rise to the complaint, and a prayer or petition for particular relief, according to the case made by the bill, or for general relief, according as the nature of the case may require. When this bill is drawn up or prepared, it is left with the proper officer of the Court in order to be filed, and this is what is termed filing a bill in Equity. BiUs in Equity are aU of the same general character, but some of them being of a secondary nature to the principal bill, have acquired names descriptive of that secondary nature, e. g., Cross Bills, Sup- plemental Bills, BiUs of Revivor, Bills for Discovery, etc., all wliich titles see. Hitherto a bill has been a method of originating proceedings in Chancery, and indeed in oases where the summary — i. e., statutory — proceeding by petition or 46 BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. — BILIr OF LADING. Bill in Equity or Cliancery. — {Oont.) summons was not available, the bill was the only process, but at the same time a universal process, of initiating proceed- ings. However, now, under the Judica- ture Act, 1873, all actions and suits are to be commenced by a writ of summons ; but the operation of the Act has been postponed. BILL Of" EXCEPTIONS. If during a trial a judge, in his direction to the jury, or in his decision, mistakes the law, either through ignorance, inadvertence or design, the counsel on either side may require him publicly to seal a bill of " exceptions, which is a statememt in writ- ing of the point wherein he has commit- ted the error, and which statement, by fixing his seal thereto, he thus acknowl- edges (Smith's Action at Law, p. 82). This statement should be put in writing while the Court is sitting, and in the pres- ence of the judge who tried the cause, and signed by the counsel on each side ; after which it is formally drawn up and tendered to the judge to be sealed. A bill of exceptions is said to be in the nature of an appeal from the judgment or decision of the Court below to a Court of error. {WrigTit v. Sharp, 1 Salk. 288; Ga/rdner v. Bmhy, 1 Boss. & P. 32; WrigU v. Tatham, 7 A. & E. 331.) By the Judicature Act, 1878, bills of excep- tion are abolished, and an appeal to the Court of Appeals substituted for them ; but the operation of the Act has been postponed. BILL OF EXCHANGE. A bill' of ex- change is defined by Blackstone to be an ' ' open letter of request from one man to another, desiring him to pay a sum named therein to a third person on his account." The person who draws or makes the bill is called the drawer ; the person to whom it is addressed is called the drawee; and when the drawee has undertaken to pay the amount (which undertaking he signifies by writing across the bill of exchange the word " accepted " together with his name, with or without adding the place where the money is to be paid), then he is called the acceptor ; the person to whom the money is ordered to be paid is called the payee ; and if the payee transfers it over to another (which he does by simply .writing his name across the back), he is then called the indorser, and the person to whom he thus transfers it is called the indorsee, Bill «f Exchange. — (^Continued.) which latter person may also, if he pleases, in his turn transfer it to another party (by the same process of signing his name on the back, or indorsing it, as it is termed), and thus it may be transferred from one person to another ad infinitum, the party transferring it always being called the indorser, and the party to whom it is transferred the indorsee. To illustrate the subject further, a common form of a bill of exchange is here given : — £100. London, June 1, 1874. One month after date pay to George Montague, or order, the sum of one hun- dred pounds, and place the same to my account. John Smith. To Mr. John Harrison, Merchant, 50 Broad Street. Now in the above foitri, "John Smith" is the drawer of the bill, "John Harrison" is the drawee, and when he has signified his acceptance of the bill by writing across the face of it Accepted, "John Harrison," he is then also termed the acceptor ; and " George Montague " is the payee. When the acceptor of a bill of exchange is a man of substance and of good credit, it renders it easily negotiable, and conse- quently almost as valuable as a bank note. Chitty on Bills of Exchange. ,8ee,also, titles AccBPTAifCE ; Inboksb- mbnt; FoBBiaN Bill; Usajstcb; Notice op dishonok ; Pkotbst. BILL OF LADING. This is a docu- » ment which is signed and delivered by the ship-owner, or master as his agent, to the shippers in a general ship on the goods being shipped ; or, speaMng more practically, upon the goods being ship- ped, the mate gives the shipper an acknowledgment thereof, which is called the "mate's receipt," and the shipper takes that to the broker or captain of the ship, who exchanges it for the bill of lading. A similar document is used on the carriage of goods by land. Form ^ Bill of Lading: — A bill of lading is commonly made out in parts. One or more of these parts are sent by the shipper to the consignee of the goods, one is retained lay the shipper in his own BILL OF LADING. — BILL OF RiaHTS. 47 Bill of Lading. — (OonUrmed.) custody, and another is given to the master, ship-owner or captain. The bill, after mentioning the shipping of the goods in good order and condition, and their destination, undertakes to deliver same in like order and condition to the consignee or his assigns, upon payment by the latter of the agreed freight. Incidents of Bill of Lading: — A bill of lading may be indorsed, and thereafter, upon being delivered, it passes to the in- dorsee the property in the goods to which it relates; and since the Act 18 & 19 Vict. c. Ill, the indorsee may sue there- on in his own name, and not as hereto- fore, in the name of the indorser only. The actual holder of a bill of lading, although insolvent, may even defeat by a toiia fide indorsement, accompanied with delivery of the bill of lading, the right of the unpaid consignor or vendor to stop the goods in transitu, ; and for this pur- pose it is not material that the indorsee knows that the consignor has not been paid for the goods in money, if he does not know that the consignee is insolvent, or that the bills given in payment are bad {Cumming v. Brown, 9 Bast, 506). No property, however, passes by the in- dorsement if there is fraud in the trans- fer, or if there is notice by the previous indorsement that the earlier transfer is conditional only, or if the indorsee knows of the insolvency of the consignee (Vertme v. Jewell, 4 Camp. 31). Nor can the honafide indorsee for value interfere by virtue of the indorsement to him with the stoppage in i/ra/rmki, if the per- son through whom the bill of lading came to him had no authority from the shipper or consignee to put it in circula- tion {Chrnm/ V. Beh/rend, 3 E. & B. 622), the bill of lading being in this respect like an overdue bill of exchange. And it is expressly provided by the 18 & 19 Vict. c. Ill, s. 2, that the extension which that Act gives to the rights and liabilities of the indorsee shall not afEect in any way the right of stoppage m transitu. Where the bill of lading is negotiated by way of pledge, the right to stop in transitu may be gone at Law (and the better opinion seems that it is) ; but it remains in Equity, subject to the pledgee's rights in respect of his specific advance. In re Westzinthus, 5 B. & Ad. 817. A bill of lading, after indorsement, is countermandable before actual delivery thereof or of the goods to the indorsee ; Bill of Lading. — {Uontimied.) but, after an indorsement and delivery of the bill of lading and invoice of the goods as a security against bills which are to be drawn by the indorsers on the indorsees, the indorsers cannot, after having obtained the acceptances, and whilst the balance of accounts is in favor of the indorsees, countermand the de- livery of the goods, and the master of a ship would be liable in trover if he acted under any such order {HaMle v. Smith, 1 B. & P. 568). But, semble, it would be otherwise if the balance of accounts were the other way. BILL OF MIDDLESEX. A species of process by which actions were formerly commenced in the Court of Queen's Bench. It was a kind of precept directed to the sheriff of the county, commanding him to take the body of the defendant and have it, on a certain day therein-mentioned, in Court, wheresoever the lord the king should be in England (Boote's Suit at Law, 38). This mode of proceeding was abolished by the Uniformity Process Act, 2 Will. 4, c. 39. BILL OF PEACE. Bills in the nature of bills quia timet (which title see), but which are most commonly brought after the right has been tried at Law. The bill is brought for the purpose of estab- lishing and perpetuating a right claimed by the plaintifE, the right being of a na- ture to be controverted by difEerent per- sons, at different times, and by different actions. The design of the bill is to secure repose from perpetual litigation, or the fear thereof, and is justified by the doctrine of public policy that there should be an end to litigation. Thus, the lord of a manor may bring such a bill against his tenants in regard of an en- croachment ; and see SheffleM, Waterworks do. V. Teomams, L. R. 2 Oh. App. 8, and compare Ean-l of Bath v. Sherwin, Prec. Ch. 26. BILL OF BIGHTS. The statute 1 Will. & Mary, stat. 2, c. 2, is so termed because it declares the true rights of British subjects. The short contents of it are as follows : After reciting the va- rious unconstitutional and illegal acts of the preceding Stuart reigns, it goes on to enact as follows : (1.) The suspending power, when ex- ercised by the Crown without the assent of Parliament is ille- gal; 48 BILL OF SALE.— BISHOP. Bill of 'Rishta. — ^Oontinued.) (3.) The dispensing power, as of late exercised, is illegal ; (3.) Levying money by prerogative is illegal ; (4.) The subjects have a right to peti- tion the Crown, and all commit- ments for so petitioning are illegal ; (5.) Raising or maintaining a standing army within the Icingdom in time of peace is illegal, if done without the assent of Parlia- ment ; (6.) Freedom of speech in Parliament secured; and (7.) Excessive bail, excessive fines, &c., &c., discouraged. BILL or SALE. An instrument whereby one person called the assignor assigns, or purports to assign, to another person called the assignee, personal prop- erty or chattels, either conditionally, i. «., by way of mortgage, or absolutely, i. «., by way of sale or gift outright. See titles Assignment of Personal Property; CONVBYASrCKB. Under the Bills of Sale Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 56), every bill of sale re- quires to be registered within twenty-one days from the making thereof, otherwise the same is void as against execution creditors, the trustee in bankruptcy, and others. Under the Amendment Act, 1866 (29 & 30 Vict. c. 96), it requires to be re-registered every five years. And even then, without possession taken prior to an act of bankruptcy, it is void as against the trustee in bankruptcy. Badger V. Sham, 2 El. & El. 472, following Stans- Md V. G^iMtt, 27 L. J. (Ch.) 366. This strictness of the law is due to the fact that fictitious bills of sale are often given for the purpose of effectuating a fraud. In Edwards v. Harben (3 T. E. 587), following Twyne's Case (1 Sm. L. C. 1), the retention of possession by the maker was accepted as an index of fraud. The bill of sale is, however, in all cases good as between the parties. Bessey v. Wmdham, 6 Q. B. 166. BILL, PARLIAMENTARY. A par- liamentary bill has been described as the " draft or skeleton of a statute." Bills are divided into two classes, viz., public and private bills. The f onner are such as involve the interests of the public at large, and when passed by all the three branches of the Legislature, become a portion of the public statutes of the Bill, ParliamentaiT^. — {OonUmied.) realm ; the latter are such as have refer- ence to the interests of private individ- uals, and are frequently introduced to enable them to undertake works of pub- lic utility at their own risk; such, for instance, are the various bills introduced for the purpose of establishing railway companies ; such also are those of natur- alization, for change of name, for divorce, &c. BILL OF PARTICULARS. A bill of particulars, or, as it is frequently termed, a particular of plaintiff's demand, is a statement in writing of what the plaintiff seeks to recover in his action. Its object is to furnish the defendant with a better or more specific statement of the plain- tiff's cause of action than is to be col- lected from the declaration or summons. The bin of particulars " differs from the declaration, inasmuch as the one dis- closes the nature and legal effect of the plaintiff's claim, the other its component ingredients. " Lush's Pr. 374 ; PyUe v. Stevens, 6 Mee. & W. 814, per Curiam. BILL OP REVIVOR: See title Keti- TOK. *BIRRETUM. A cap or coif used formerly by judges and Serjeants at law in England. Spelman Gloss. ; Bouv. Bict. BIRTH. By the statute 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 86, it is provided that the certified copies of entries, purporting to be sealed with the seal of the Register-General's office, shall be evidence of the birth [death or marriage] to which the same relates, vpithout any further or other proof of such entry. As affidavit of identity must, however, accompany the extract as proof of the birth [death or marriage]. ParMnson v. FramxAs, 15 Sim. 160. In criminal law, the concealment of a birth is, under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 60, a misdemeanor; and as such is punisha- ble with imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labor. BISHOP. A dignitaiy of the church who has episcopal jurisdiction within Ms diocese, but which jurisdiction he com- monly exercises through his chancellor or commissary. See titles Ecolbsiastical Courts ; Arch- bishop. BLACK ACT. — BONA VACANTIA. 49 * BLACK ACT. The act of parliament 9 Geo. n., c. 22. BLASPHEMY. To revile at or to deny the truth of Christianity as by law estab- lished, is a blasphemy, and as such is punishable by the common law. Under the Stat 9 & 10 Will. 3, c. 32, cited in the Stats. Rev. as 9 Will . 3, c. 35, any pro- fessed Christian who denies the Holy Trinity, or generally the Christian re- ligion, may be indicted for the same, and p. upon conviction is liable to be deprived . y of office and incapacitated for holding ^^ future office; but the prosecution re- qa.res to be commenced within four days of the blasphemy spoken; and is to be desisted from, and all the penalties are to be removed, upon the defendant's re- nunciation of his heretical opinions. BLOCKADE. A blockade in law must be an actual or effective blockade, and ' not a paper blockade merely ; in other words, a port is blockaded when a squad- ron is in the vicinity of it for the purpose of preventing ingress into and egress from it, and not when it is merely declared to be under blockade. A violation of blockade requires three things : (1.) That the blockade be efEective ; (2.) That the accused had notice thereof ; and (3.) That he made ingress or egress in disregard of the blockade. BOARDING-HOUSE. The keeper of such a house is bound to take ordinary care of the goods of his guests therein, and will be liable for negligence occas- ioning loss (Da/ncey v. Richardson, 2 El. & Bl. 144) ; but his liability is not so ex- treme as that of an innkeeper {Holden v. aouTby, 8 W. R. 438). A contract for board and lodging is not a contract re- garding land within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds. WrigTit v. Btmart, 8 W. R. 413. BOARD OF HEALTH. Under the stats. 11 & 13 Vict. c. 63 {PvhlM Eealth Act, 1848), 31 & 23 Vict. c. 98 {Local Gov- emmeKt Act, 1858), and other Acts amend- ing same, local boards are constituted for the better securing the public health, and who for that purpose exercise certain powers as to sewers, drains, buildings, slaughter-houses, &c. BOABD OF TRADE. One of the ad ministrative departments of the Govern- ment, constituted by the Acts 23 Geo. 8, c. 83, and 24 & 35 Vict. cc. 45 & 47, and possessing under various statutes a very 7 Board of Trade. — {Oontinued.) general jurisdiction and superintendence over railways, merchant shipping and seamen, harbors, fisheries, &c. BOABD OF WORKS.. The name of a board of of&cers appointed for the better local management of the metropolis. They have the care and management of all grounds and gardens dedicated to the use of the inhabitants in the metropolis ; also, the superintendence of the drainage ; also, the regulation of the street traffic, and, generally, of the buildings of the metropolis. DOCKLAND (Sax. for bookland). An inheritance or possession held by the evi- dence of written instruments. It was one of the titles by which the English Saxons held their lands, and being always in writing, was hence called bockland, which signifies terram codidllariam, or Mbraria/m, deed land or charter land. It was the same as allodium, being descend- ible according to the common course of nature and nations, and devisable by will. This species of inheritance was usually possessed by the thanes or nobles. Spelman on Feuds. BONA NOTABILIA. Such goods as a party dying had in another diocese than that wherein he died, and as amounted at the least to £5, which, whoever had, must have had his will proved before the archbishop of that province, unless, by composition, or custom, other dioceses were authorized to do it, where tona nota- tilia were rated at a greater sum. If, however, a person happened to die in an- other diocese than that wherein he lived, while on a journey, what he had about him of the value of £5 was not hma notor WAa. Book of Canons, 1 Jac. Can. 93, 93; Cunningham. But now under the Court of Probate Act, 1857 (30 & 21 Vict, c. 77), ss. 3-4, the distinction of goods as hoTM TwtdbiUa has been abolished. 1 Wms. Exors. 279-280. * BONA PERITUBA. Perishable goods. A trustee, executor or adminis- trator is bound to use due diligence in disposing of such goods. Bacon Abr. Exrs. ; Bouv. Diet. BONA VACANTli. Goods in which no one claims a property but the king; such as royal fish, shipvrreoks, treasure trove, waifs, strays, &c. Where a person dies possessed of personal property^, intes- tate, and leaving no next of kin, the 50 BONA "WAVIATA. — BEAWLING. Bona Yacantia. — {Oontiimed.) Crown becomes entitled upon office found to all such property. This title of the Crown is in virtue of its prerog- ativCj and in this respect differs from the title of the Crown to land by escheat. See Middleton v. Spicer, 1 Bro. C.C. 301 ; I V. W?ieate, 1 Eden, 177. *BONA WAVIATA. Goods thrown away by a thief for fear of being appre- hended. Such goods go to the sovereign in England. BOND. A contract by specialty to pay a certain sum of money. It is either sin- gle, i. e., simple, in which case the money is absolutely to be paid; or double, i. e., conditional, in which case the money is only conditionally payable, and ceases to be payable, or becomes absolutely payable according to the event which is expressed in the condition. If the condition is entire and unlawful, the bond is void {OolUm V. Blantem, 1 Sm. L. C. 325) ; but if the condition is severable, and part of it is good, the bond is valid to that extent {Tale v. Bex [in error], 6 Bro. P. C. 61). In the case of alternative condi- tions, if one becomes impossible, the other, as a general rule, becomes absolute (Ba Oosta^. Dams, 1 B. & P. 342). The chief varieties of bonds are the foUovring: — Bonds of Indemnity, Post Obit Bonds, Voluntary Bonds, Administration Bonds, Bail Bonds, Bottomry Bonds, Debentures, Guaranties, Replevin Bonds, Bonds in Restraint of Trade, Resignation Bonds, and Lloyd's Bonds, most of which will be found explained under the appropri- ate titles. See, also, title OBLiOATioif. BOEOUCrH : See title Rbpebsbntation. BOBOUGH ENGLISH. The custom which prevails in certain ancient boroughs and copyhold manors, of lands descend- ing to the youngest son instead of to the . eldest. The reason of this custom seems to be, that in these boroughs people chiefly maintain and support themselves by trade and industry; and the elder children being provided for out of their father's goods, and introduced into his trade in his life-time, were able to subsist of themselves without any lajid provis- ion, and therefore the land descended to the youngest son, he being in most dan- ger of being left destitute. It is called borough English, because, as some hold, it first prevailed in England. Unlike Gavelkind, the mode of descent in bor- Borongh English. - ough English is confined to lineal de- scendants, and does not extend to col- laterals. See titles Gatblkini) ; Tendkbs. BOTTOMRY. Is in the nature of a mortgage of a ship, when the owner takes up money upon it to enable him to carry on his voyage, and pledges the keel or bottom of the ship (^pa/rtem'pro toto), as a security for the repayment thereof. In which case it is understood, that if the ship be lost, the lender loses also his whole money ; but if it return in safety, then he shall receive back his principal, and also the premium or interest aigieed upon, however it may exceed what was once the l^gal rate of interest. And this is allowed to be a valid contract in all trading nations, for the benefit of com- merce, and by reason of the extraordi- nary hazard run by the lender ; and in this case, the ship and tackle, if brought home, are answerable (as well as the per- son of the borrower) for money lent. Park on Insurance. See, also, titles Respokdbntia ; Bhip- prsTG. BOUGHT AND SOLD NOTES. These are the notes which a broker of stock or goods sends respectively to the vendor and purchaser for whom he has been en- gaged in the particular sale. They fur- nish the evidence of the contract, and, if they agree, bind the principals, the broker having authority to sign for both. Msmdm v. J&sy, 3 F. & P. 477. BOUNDARIES. The boundaries of boroughs are at present regulated by the stats. 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 64, and 6 & 7 WiU. 4, c. 103. Upon a question of boundaries, evidence of reputation, al- though in the nature of hearsay, is re- ceivable. See title Hbaesay Evidence. BOURSE DE COMMERCE. In French law, is an aggregation sanctioned by Government of merchants, captains of vessels, exchange-agents, and courtiers, the two latter being nominated by the Government in each city which has a BRAWLING. Under the 37 Geo. 8, c. 44, any suit for this offense was to be brought in the Ecclesiastical Court within eight months ; but under the stat. 38 & 24 Vict. c. 32, the Ecclesiastical Courts were deprived of all their jurisdiction in BREACH OF PRIVILEGE. — BURGAGE TENURE. 51 Brawling. — ( Continued. ) the matter in the case of lay persons, and the justices of the peace were invested with authority to punish the ofEense as a misdemeanor. BREACH OF PRIVILEGE. A breach of privilege is a contempt of the High Court of Parliament, whether relating to the House of Lords or to the House of Commons. Both branches of the Legis- lature act on the same grounds, both de- clare what are and what are not breaches of their privileges, when the question is raised, and both punish by commitment or otherwise, as the Courts of Law and Equity do for contempt of Court. Re- sistance to the oflBcers of the Houses of Parliament has, in almost all cases, been treated as a breach of the privileges of Parliament. The presence of strangers is a breach of privilege, though permitted on sufferance; and, formerly, to take a note of any of the proceedings was a high act of contempt, although now the rep- resentatives of the newspaper press are not only allowed to be present for that purpose, but have a gallery to themselves in each House, and every accommodation afforded them which the courtesy of the chief officers of both can render. See title Privileges of Parliament. BREACH OF PROMISE OF MAR- RIAGE. Under the stat. 14 & 15 Vict, c. 99, rendering the parties to a civil ac- tion competent to give evidence, the par- ties to a breach of promise case were expressly left to remain incompetent; but under the stat. 33 & 33 Vict. c. 68, that incompetency has been removed. In Sch. B. to C. C. P. Act, 1852, the following simple form of count is given: That the plaintiff and defendant agreed to marry one another, and a reasonable time for such marriage has elapsed, and the plaintiff has always been ready and willing to marry the defendant, yet the defendant has neglected and refused to marry the plaintiff. (No. 19.) It is a defense to an action of this sort, that the defendant has since his promise discovered the plaintiff to be unchaste (Irving v. Cheenwood, 1 C. & P. 350), or to have had a bastard by some one (Young V. Murphy, 3 Bing. N. C. 54), although ten or more years ago. *BREHON LAW. The ancient system of law which prevailed in Ireland: so called from the names of the judges, Brehons. BRIBERY. The crime of offering any undue reward or remuneration to any pub- lic officer of the Crown, or other person intnisted with a public duty, with a view to influence his behavior in the discharge of his duty. The taking such reward is as much bribery as the offering it. It also sometimes signifies the taking or giv- ing a reward for public office. The of- fense is not confined, as some have sup- posed, to judicial officers. Bribery at elections vitiates the same. See stat. 31 & 32 Vict. c. 125 (ParUamentary Elec- tions Act, 1868). BROKERS. These are agents of vari- ous kinds, but principally agents on the Stock Exchange. By the stat. 6 Anne, c. 16, a broker on the Stock Exchange is required to be admitted by the Court of the Lord Mayor and Aldermen, and to pay 40s. yearly for the use of the City, under a penalty of £25, increased by the stat. 57 Geo. 3, c. Ix. (local and personal) to £100. But under the stat. 33 & 34 Vict, c. 60 (London Brokers Relief Act, 1870), the jurisdiction of the Court of Alder- men over brokers has been made to cease, saving existing rights ; and brokers guilty of a fraud are disqualified from acting as brokers. It is the duty of a broker of the City of London to charge his princi- pal only with the cost price of articles purchased by him, in addition to his commission. Procter v. Brain, 2 M. & P. 284. See, also, titles Jobber; Factor. BROTHEL. A common habitation of prostitutes. The statutes for the repres- sion or regulation of houses of this char- acter are 25 Geo. 2, c. 36; 28 Geo. 3 c. 18; and 58 Geo. 3, c. 70. Any inhabitant of the parish may give any information thereof to the pantfh constable, and the overseers of the parish are to pay to the in- formant upon conviction a reward of £10. BUGGERY: '-'P°^ j which is a com- pound of x^^P) ^ hand, and ypcLtpco, I write). It signified in the Law the offi- cer of the Common Pleas who engrossed fines in that Court so as to be acknowl- edged into a perpetual record, after they had been acknowledged and fully passed by those officers by whom they were pre- viously examined. Cowel. CHIVALRY (semUzim militare). This word comes from the French chevalier ; and signifies that peculiar species of ten- ure by which lands were formerly held, called tenure by knights' service. It is of a martial and military nature, and obliges the tenant to perform some noble or mili- tary office unto his lord. CHOSE (thmg). This word is gener- ally used in combination with others. The most common combinations in which it is found are the following: — (1.) Chose local; (3.) Chose transitory; and (3.) Chose in action. (1.) Chose local is such a thing as is annexed to a place ; thus, a mill is a chose local. (3.) Chose transi- tory means any thing of a movable or transitory nature, which may be taken or carried away from one place to another. (3.) Chose in action (the most ordinary combination), is a phrase which is some- times used to signify a right of bringing an action, and at others the thing itself which forms the subject-matter of that right, or with regard to which that right is exercised ; but it more properly includes the idea both of the thing itself and of, the right of action as annexed to it. Thus, when it is said that a debt is a chose in action, the phrase conveys the idea not only of the thing itself, i. e., the debt, but also of the right of action or of recovery possessed by the person to whom the debt is due. When it is said that a chose in action cannot be assigned, it means that a thing to which a right of action is annexed cannot be transferred CHEISTIANITY.— CIRCUITY OF ACTION. 63 Cho8e> — ( OonUmied^ to another together with such right. Thus if A. owes B. £10, it is obvious that the latter has a debt, and also a right of recovering such debt against A. ; now if B. were to assign or transfer his debt, to- gether with his right of recovery, to C, this would be assigning a chose in action, which the law would not allow for the reasons stated in Co. Litt. 314 a, 266 a ; 3 Roll. 45 ; MovlsdakY. BirchaU, Sid. 312. But more recently such assignments came to be allowed in Equity, and latterly crossed in some instances from Equity to Law, until eventually, by the Judicature Act, 1873, a chose in action has been made assignable in every case. CHRISTIANITY. To bring this re- ligion into ridicule or contempt is an of- fense against the Common Law of Eng- land, and as such is indictable. Holt, Libel, 69, n. CHURCH. A place of worship, to be adjudged a church in English law must have administration of the sacraments and sepulture annexed to it (Cowel). The fab- ric of the church consists of the nave or body of the church, with the aisles, the chancel, and the steeple. See, also, titles Advowson ; Burial j Pabish ; Pbws ; and two next ti- tles. CHURCH-RATES. These were abol- ished as a compulsory assessment by the Stat. 31 & 33 Vict. c. 109, and the pay- ment of these or of any analogous assess- ment to be collected instead of them was made voluntary. The assessment while it existed was made in a vestry meeting ; it fell generally upon all such property as was rateable to the poor-rate ; it went to support the temporal necessities of the church. CHURCHWARDENS. The8e,al- though laymen, are a species of ecclesias- tical ofl5.cers, being sworn in by the arch- deacon or bishop of the diocese. They are intrusted generally with seeing to the repairs, management, and good order of the church, and to decency of conduct therein. CHURLE. Among the Anglo-Saxons a tenant at will of free condition, who held land from the thanes on condition of rent or services. They were of two sorts ; (1.), one who hired the lord's out- land or tenementary land, as our farmers do new ; (2.), the other, who tilled and Churle. — ( ConUnued.) manured the inland or demesnes (yield- ing work and not rent), and were thence called his sockmen or ploughmen. Spel- man on Feuds ; Cowel. CINQUE PORTS (quinqve partma). Five important havens, formerly esteemed the most important in the kingdom. They were Dover, Sandwich, Romney, Hastings, and Hythe; Winchelsea and Rye have since been added to the num- ber. They have similar franchises in many respects with the counties Palatine, and particularly an exclusive jurisdiction (before the mayor jurats of the ports), in which the king's ordinary writ did not run. These ports have a governor called the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, who has the authority of an admiral amongst them, and used to send out writs in his own name. But the king's writ now runs to, and is executed in, these ports in like manner as in other parts of the kingdom. See C. L. P. Act, 1853, s. 122. CIRCUITS. These are the routes taken by the several judges in holding the as- sizes. The Stat. 8 & 4 Will. 4, c. 71, reg- ulates the appointment of convenient places for holding the assizes; and the Stat. 26 & 37 Vict. c. 133, enables the Queen in Council to alter the circuits. As at present constituted, there are eight circuits in England and Wales, viz. Home, Norfolk, Midland, Northern, Oxford, Western, South Wales and North Wales, but a new arrangement is imminent. CIRCUITY OF ACTION. Is where a party to an action, by an indirect and circuitous course of legal proceeding, makes two or more actions necessary, in order to obtain that justice between all the parties concerned in the transaction, which by a more direct course might have been gained in a single action. As in an action on a contract, in which the defend- ant, instead of giving in evidence a breach of the warranty in mitigation of damages, allows the plaintifi to recover the full amount of the contract in the first action, and then subsequently com- mences against him a cross action to re- gain the amount to which the considera- tion had failed. (See title Cross Action.) Formerly indeed, he was compelled to bring a cross action, and had no other remedy, but more recently "the cases have established that the breach of the warranty may be given in evidence in 64 CIRCULAR NOTES. — CIVIL LIST. Circuity of Action. — {OonUrmed.) mitigation of damages, on the principle, it should seem, of avoiding circuity of action." Per Tenterden, C. J., 2 B. & Ad. 462. CIRCULAR NOTES. These are simi- lar instruments to Letters of Credit. (Ssethat title.) They are drawn by bank- ers in this country upon their foreign cor- respondents in favor of persons traveling abroad. The correspondents must be sat- isfied of the identity of the applicant be- fore payment ; and the requisite proof of such identity is usually furnished, upon the applicant's producing a letter with his signature, by a comparison of the sig- natures. CIRCUMSPECTE AGATIS. The ti- tle of the statute 13 Edward I, regulating the jurisdiction of the temporal and ec- clesiastical Courts. The date usually as- signed to this statute is 1285 ; but there seems to be reason to believe that it was not in existence at that period. It was, however, cited as early as 19 Edward 3. It originally was not a statute, but a writ supposed to have been issued in pursu- ance of the statute called Artiauli Oleri {see that title), of which, in the form in which it is printed both in the aiuthentic and ordinary edition of the statutes, it is a repetition and abridgement. It was probably a writ of mandate, framed for the purpose of being issued by the king to his judges in behaU of the Spiritual Courts, in or after 1315, and embodying Tvhat' were then supposed to be the legiti- mate objects of the jurisdiction of those latter Courts. Its authority as a statute is, however, no longer questioned. 12 Ad. & El. 815. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. That evidence which may be afforded by particular circumstances. It is called cir- cumstantial evidence in contradistinction to that species of evidence which is of a more positive and unequivocal nature. Whence the latter is sometimes called di- rect evidence, and in that case circum- stantial is designated indirect. Some- times, also, it is called the doctrine of presumptions; because when the fact itself cannot be proved it may be pre- sumed, by the proof of such circumstances as either necessarily or usually attend such facts, being in the former case con- clusive, and in the latter more or less cogent only. See Greenl. Ev. 13. See title Pbesumption. CIRCUMSTANTIBUS, TALES DE. Literally, like persons out of those pres- ent or standing by. This phrase is ap- plied to the m&king up the number of persons on a jury, by taking some of the casual bystanders who happen to be qual- ified for serving on a jury. This takes place when the jurors who are impan- eled, from some cause or other, do not appear, or, if appearing, are challenged by either party, and so disqualified. See title Chailbngb. CITATION. The process used in the Ecclesiastical Courts and Court of Pro- bate and Divorce, to call the party — de- fendant or respondent — before them. It is the first step which is taken in the case, and is somewhat analogous to the writ of summons at Common Law. CIVIL DEATH. If a man entered into a monastery, or abjured the realm, he was formerly, and if he is attainted of treason or felony he still is dead in law, and therefore if an estate be granted to any one for his life generally it would determine by such civil death. For which reason in conveyances the grant is usu- ually made " for the term of a man's Tiat- waZlife," which can only determine by his natural death. 3 Inst. 213; 3 P. Wms. 37, n. (B) ; 2 Rep. 48 b. CIVILITER (eimUy). In a man's civU character or position, or by civil, in oppo- sition to criminal, process; as "sheims who execute processes at their peril' are answerable cisiZiter for what they do upon it," or "a man may, without his own fault, be possessed of a horse which has been stolen, but nevertheless he is answer- able dvUiter to the true owner of it." 1 B. & P. 409j per Rooke, J. CIVIL LAW. In its general signifi- cation is the established law of every par- ticular nation, commonwealth, or city, and is the same with that which is called Municipal Law. In its particular signifi- cation, however, it usually means the Roman law, as comprised in the Insti- tutes, Code, and Digest of, the Emperor Justinian. CIVIL LIST. An annual sum granted by the English parliament at the com- mencement of each reign, for the expenses of the royal household and establishment as distinguished from the general exigen- cies of the state. CIVIL SIDE. — CLERGY, BENEFIT OP. 65 CIVIL SIDE. The legal business of the assizes is arranged according to the natural division of such cases as are D-erely civil, in which the disputes of subjects (citizens) as to property are de- cided, and those of a criminal nature, when men are charged with offenses against the welfare of society at large. In the county hall, or court in which the triiils take place, it is very usual for one side or portion of the building to be ap- propriated to the hearing of cases of the former character, and the other side or portion to the hearing of those of the lat- ter character. And hence the phrase has become common that the judge is either sitting "on the civil side" or "on the criminal side," meaning thereby that he is either presiding at Nisi Prius or tiying a prisoner, as the case may be. It is now customary for two judges to attend cir- cuit together, and then one of them sits on the " civil " the other on the " criminal side." CLAIM, CONTINUAL. When a man was entitled to enter into any lands or tenements of which another was seized in fee or in tail, and he who was so entitled made continual claim to the lands or ten- ements before he who was so seized, died seized thereof ; then even in the event of such person dying seized of the same, and the lands or tenements descending to his heir, might he who made such continual claim, or his heir, have entered into the lands or tenements so descended by virtue of his having made such continual claim. So if a man were disseized, and the disseizee made continual claim to the tenements in the life of the disseizor, and the disseizor died seized in fee, and the land descended to his heir, yet notwithstanding its hav- ing so descended, the disseizee might have entered upon the possession of the heir by virtue of such continual claim. Such a claim must always have been made within a year and a day before the death of the person holding the land, and as the claimant could not know when such death would take place, he was therefore obhged continually to be making such claim, i. e., at the expiration of every year and a day, in order that he might be sure of his claim being made within a year and a day of the tenant's death, ^nd hence it was termed conUrmal claim (Litt. 414). But no such continual claim is of any utility at the present day to preserve a right of entry, or distress, or action, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 11. 9 * CLARE CONSTANT. In Scotch law, the name of a precept for giving seizin of lands to an heir ; so called from its initial words. Burr. Diet. ; Bell Diet. ; Ersk. Inst. 6, 3, tit. 8, s. 71. CLARENDON, CONSTITUTIONS OF. In the reign of Henry II., A. d. 1164, Blackstone states that there are four things which peculiarly merit the atten- tion of the legal antiquarian, one of which is the constitutions of the parliament at Olarendon, whereby the king checked the power of the pope and his clergy, and narrowed the exemptions they claimed from the secular jurisdiction. These Constitutions enacted in substance that the king's Courts should try aU contested rights of advowson and presentation ; ec- clesiastics should obey the king's sum- mons ; appeals from the archbishop should be to the king alone ; all disputes regard- ing lands between ecclesiastics and lay- men should be tried by the king's jus- tices ; all pleas of debt, notwithstanding the same may be aflected with a trust, should be determined in the king's Courts, with other provisions of a similar char- acter. CLAUSUM FREGIT (he brohe the close). Every unwarrantable entry on another's soil the law entitles a trespass Sy ireahing his close. The words of the writ of tres- pass command the defendant to show cause, qyMre cl/mxu/m querentis /regit. See title Trbspasb. * CLEARANCE. The name of the cer- tificate given by the collector of a port from which the vessel sails, describing the vessel, cargo and destination. Burr. Diet. CLERGY, BENEFIT OF, or privilege of clergy, formerly signified certain priv- ileges which the clergy alone enjoyed. It had its origin from the pious regard paid by Christian princes to the church in its infant state; and the ill use which was soon made of that pious regard. The ex- emptions which were granted to the church were principally of two kinds: (1.) Ex- emption of places consecrated to religious duties from. criminal arrests, which was the foundation of sanctuaries; (3.) Ex- emption of the persons of clergymen from criminal process before the secular judge in a few particular cases, which was the true original meaning of the phrase "benefit of clergy." It was formerly required that those who claimed benefit of clergy should be able to read ; 66 CLERK OP THE ASSIZE. — CLERK OF THE PRIVY SEAL. Clergy; Benefit of.- but by 5 Ann. c. 6, it was enacted that the benefit of clergy should be granted to all those who were entitled to ask it, without requiring them to read by way of conditional merit ; hence persons con- victed of manslaughters, bigamies, and simple or jgrand larcenies, &c., were asked what they had to say why judgment of death should not be pronounced upon them ; and they were then told to kneel down and pray the benefit of the statute. The abuses attending the privilege grew vei-y many, and a better code of criminal law and .procedure in later days tacitly supplanted the plea, which was ultimate- ly abolished altogether by the stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 28, s. 6. CIEKK OF THE ASSIZE. A clerk whose duty it was to record all things judicially done by the justices of assize im their circuits. Cromp. Juris. 337; Cunningham ; abolished by 7 WiU. 4 & 1 tict. c. 30. GLEBE OF THE COMMONS. An offi- cer whose duty it is to attend to matters connected with the business of the House of Commons. He is assisted by two "clerks assistant," who sit at the table with him ; he signs orders of the House, indorses bills, reads any thing required to be read, and makes short noinutes of the business transacted known as the " Votes and Proceedings." He holds his office for life under the Crown, and is appointed by letters patent. CLEBK OF THE CEOWN. This is an officer of the Court of Chancery, appointed under the Royal Sign Manual. He performs the duties of the Clerk of the Hanaper {see next title) ; his office is continued by the Great Seal (Offices) Act, 1874 (37 & 38 Vict. c. 81), which also regulates the fees to be taken in the office. CLEBK OF THE HANAPEB, OB HAMPEB. An officer of the Court of Chancery, whose duty it was to receive all the money due to the king for the seals of charters, patents, commissions and writs ; and also, fees due to the offi- cers for enrolling and examining the same. Cowel. CLEBK OF THE HOUSE OF COM- MONS. An officer appointed by the Crown, whose duty it is to make a record of the proceedings of the House, which he or his deputies enter upon the jour- Clerk of House of Commons.— (Oiwi,) nals, to receive and'preserve the petitions presented to the House, and generally to assist the Speaker in the details of his very onerous duties. He is usually a banister-at-law. Similar officers are em- ployed in the House of Lords. By the 33 Geo. 3, c. 13, the clerk of Parliament is directed to indorse on every Act, im- mediately after the title thereof, the day, month and year when the same shall have passed, and shall have received the royal assent ; and such indorsement shall be taken to be part of the Act, and shall be the date of its commencement, where no other commencement shall have been provided by the Act. CLEBK OF THE PABLIAMENT BOLLS. An officer in the High Court of Parliament, who records all things done therein, and engrosses them fairly on parchment roUs, for their better preser- vation to posterity. There is one of these officers to each House of Parliament. Cowel. See, also, title Clbbk of the House OF Commons. CLEBK OF THE PABLIAMENTS. An officer of the House of Lords, whose duties are similar to those of the chief clerk in the House of Commons. See title Clebk of the House of Commons. CLEBK OF THE PEACE. An officer belonging to the sessions of the peace, whose duty it is to read indictments, to enrol the Acts, draw the process and per- form various other duties connected with the administration of justice at the ses- sians. CLEBK OF THE PETTY BAG. An officer of the Court of Chancery, whose duty it used to be to record the return of all inquisitions out of every shire; to make out patents of customers, gangers, controllers and aulnagers; all 'congSs (Pelire for bishops; the summons of the nobility, clergy and burgesses to Parlia- ment, etc. 33 Hen. 8, c. 22 ; Cowel. But most, if nbt all, of these functions have been superseded. CLEBK OF THE PEIVT SEAL. There are four of these officers, who at- tend the lord privy seal, or, in the absence of a lord privy seal, the principal secre- tary of state. Their duty is to write and make out all things that are sent by war- CLEKK OF THE SIGNET. — COGNOVIT ACTIONEM. 67 Clerk of the Privy Seal. — {Continued.) 'rant from the signet to the privy seal, and which are to be passed to the great seal; and also to make out privy seals (as they are termed) upon any special occasion of Ms majesty's affairs, as for the loan of money and such like purposes. 27 Hen. 8, c. 11. Cowel. CLERK OF THE SIGNET. An offi- cer whose duty it is to attend on his majesty's principal secretary, who always has the custody of the privy signet, as well for the purpose of sealing his majes- ty's private letters, as also grants which pass his majesty's hand by bUl signed ; there are four of these officers. 37 Hen. 8, 0. 11; CoweL * CLOSE. An interest in the soil. The law incloses a man's land with an imag- inary fence, if not actually fenced, and entitles him to damages for passing through the boundary. Hammond N. P. 151 ; Doctor and Stud, dial, 1 c. 8, p. 30 ; Bouv. Diet. CLOSE ROLLS AND CLOSE WRITS. Certain letters of the king sealed with his great seal and directed to particular persons and for particular purposes, and not being proper for public inspection, are closed up and sealed on the outside, and are thence called writs close (litercB dcmscB), and are recorded in the close roUs in the same manner as others are in the patent roUs (literce patentes), or open let- ters. CLUBS. These are companies, but not being for profit are not within the mean- ing of the Winding-up Acts (In re St. James's Glvb, 3 De G. M. & G. 383). They are essentially social, and the exclusion of a member, if not wanton, is without remedy. SopMnson v. Exeter {Marquess)^ L. E. 5 Eq. 63 ; see 5 Albany Law Jour. 336. CODICIL. A supplement to a will, or an addition made by the testator and annexed to the will, being written for the explanation or alteration or for the purpose of making some addition to, or some subtraction from, the dispositions of the testator as contained in his will. In the Roman Law, a codicil was an in- formal will; but in English Law, the formalities of execution and of attesta- tion are as strict in the case of codicils as in that of wills. See title Wills. * CO-EMPTIO. In civil law, the cere- mony of celebrating marriage by solem- nities. Bouv. Diet. The parties met and gave each other a small sum of money. The man asked the woman if she would be his mater-famiUas, and she asked him if he would be her pater-famiUas. These questions being answered in the affirma- tive they then joined. These were nup- tials by co-emptio. Boeth. Co-emptio; Calvinus Lex. COGNIZANCE or CONUSANCE. This word has several significations. 1st. It signifies an acknowledgment. It is used in this sense when applied to fines, or those fictitious suits, by means of which estates in lands were transferred from one party to another. Thus a fine " sur cog- nizance de droit " signified a fine " upon acknowledgment of the right." 3nd. 'The word is applied to that plea or answer put in by the defendant in an action of replevin, when he acknowledges the tak- ing of the distress in respect of which the action is brought, but insists that such taking was legal, as he acted with the command of another who had a right to distrain. Here, it will be observed, the defendant makes an acknowledgment of the fact charged against him, but ofilers a legal excuse for his conduct. (See Tre- trwian v. Pyne, 1 Salk. 107 ; Ghomhers v. Donaldson., 11 East, 65.) 3rd. It is used in the sense of judicial notice of superin- tendence. Thus cognizance of pleas sig- nifies the right of privilege granted by the Crown to any person or body corpor- ate, not only to hold pleas within a par- ticular jurisdiction, but also to take cognizance of them, i. e., to take judicial notice on superintendence of them, in other words, to have jurisdiction to hear them. COGNOVIT ACTIONEM. An instru- ment signed by a defendant in an action, confessing the plaintiff's demand to be just. The defendant who signs this cog- novit thereby empowers the plaintiff to sign judgment against him, in default of his paying the plaintiff the sum due to him within the time mentioned in the cognovit. Under the stat. 1 & 3 Vict. c. 110, s. 9, every such cognovit must be at- tested by an attorney, who must also, un- der the stat. 33 & 33 Vict. c. 63, s. 34, have explained to the debtor the nature of the instrument. And under the last- mentioned statute, s. 36, every cognovit must be filed with the clerk of docquets and judgments in the Court of Queen's 68 COIF. — COLLATION TO A BENEFICE. Cognovit Actionem. — (OonUnued.) Bench within twenty-one days next after the execution thereof, otherwise the same is void as being fraudulent against cred- itors. See, also, title ATTOKiirBT, Powbb op. COIF. Our serjeants-at-law are called Serjeants of the coif, from the circum- stance of the lawn coif which they wear on their head, under their caps, when they are elevated to that rank. It was originally used to cover the crown of the head, which was closely shaved, and a border of hair left round the lower part, which made it look like a crown, and was thence called corona eUricalu, or tonmiram Cowel. COLLATERAL {collateralis^ from the Lat. laterale, that which hangs by the side. Its legal signification does not difEerfrom its common acceptation. . Thus a collat- eral assurance signifies an assurance be- side the principal one. So when a man mortgages his estates as security to a party lending him a sum of money, he also may enter into a bond, as an addi- tional or collateral security. A collateral security is, therefore, something in addi- tion to the direct security, and its nature usually subordinate to it ; and it is in the nature of a double security, so that whien one fails, the other may be resorted to. See, also, succeeding titles. COLLATERAL CONSANGUINITY, OR COLLATERAL KINDRED. That which exists between persons who are derived from the same stock or ancestors, however remote. Every person who is descended or propagated from the same stem (i. «., from the same male or female lineal ancestor) from which any other particular person is descended or propa- gated, and who is neither the immediate parent or progenitor, nor the progeny of such particular person, is properly and aptl^ denominated or defined to be a collateral relative. And when any per- son is the collateral relative of any other person, aU the descendants from such per- sons, reciprocally and respectively, are collateral relations. * COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. The collateral determination of a question by a Court having general jurisdiction of the subject. See 26 Vt. 209. COLLATERAL ISSUE. When a pris- oner has been tried and convicted, and he then pleads in bar of execution diversity Collateral Issne. — (Omtimued.) of person, i. e.,that he is not the same- person who was attainted, and the like ; this question of fact, whether or not he is the same person, is called a collateral issue, and a jury is then impaneled to try this issue, viz., the identity of his per- son. It is a general rule of evidence, that whatever would raise a collateral issue is to be excluded, unless aemble, the case is one in which the collateral issue should be settled by way of preliminary to the chief issue. ♦COLLATERAL LIMITATION. A limitation of an estate which gives an in- terest for a specified period, but makes the right of enjoyment depend on some col- lateral event. 4 Kent Com. 128. COLLATERAL WARRANTY. In alien- ating property by deedjthere was usually a clause in it called the clause of warranty, whereby the grantor, for himself and his heirs, warranted and secured to the gran- tee the estate so granted. This warranty was either lineal or collateral. Lineal war- ranty was where the heir derived, or might by possibility have derived, his title to the land warranted, either froin or through the ancestor who made the warranty ; as where a father, or an elder son in the hf e of the father, released to the disseizor of either themselves or the grandfather, with warranty, this was lineal to the youngest son. Collateral warranty was where the heir's title to the land neither was nor could have been derived from the warranting ancestor ; as where a younger brother released to his father's disseizor, with warranty, this was collateral to the elder brother. See, also, title Wabbantt. COLLATION TO A BENEFICE. Ad- vowsons are either presentative, collative, or d(fnative. (1.) An advowson presenta- tive is where the patron has a right of presentation to the bishop or ordinary, and moreover to demand of him to insti- tute his clerk, if he finds him canonically qualified, and this is the most usual kind of advowson. (2.) An advowson coUa- ti/ve is where the bishop and patron are one and the same person, in which case the bishop cannot present to himself, but in the one act of collation, or conferring of the benefice, he does all that is usually done in presentative advowsons by both presentation and institution. (3.) Regard- ing the advowson donative, see title Ad- vowson. COLLIGENDUM BONA DEFUNCTL — COMMEND ATORS. 69 COILIOENDUM BONA DEFUNCTI (Letters of). When a person dies intes- tate and leaves no representatives or creditors to administer, or leaving such representatives or creditors, they refuse to take out administration, etc., the judge of the Court of Probate may commit ad- ministration to such discreet person as he approves of, or grant him these letters ad colligendum Txma defimcti (to collect the goods of the deceased) . Such a grant is purely official, and does not constitute him executor or administrator, his only Ijusiness being to take care of the goods, and to do other acts for the benefit of those •who are entitled to the property of the cl.eceased. See title Administration, Lbttbbs op. COLLISION: 5«« title Shipping. COLLUSION. A deceitful agreement or compact between two or more persons for the one party to bring an action against the other for some evil purpose, as to defraud a third party of his right. Bro. tit. Collusion ; Les Termes de la Ley. As a general rule, collusion between the parties to an action is fatal to the success of it, e.g., in proceedings for a divorce; but in particular instances it is not so, as in the old proceedings for suffering a common recovery. COLONIES. As a general rule, a col- ony acquired by discovery and occupa- tion is to be ■ governed by the laws of England ; and if acquired by conquest, then by its own laws, so far as they are not contrary to morality, and until the conqueror sees fit to change them. But when the laws of England depend upon circumstances that are pecuUar to Eng- land, and whjch do not apply to the col- onies also, then these particular laws do not hold good in the colonies, e. g., the Law of Mortmain in the Island of Gren- ada. Attorney- Oeneral v. Stewart, 3 Mer. 143; and see Mayor of Lyons v. EaM India Co., 1 Moo. P. C. 0. 175, as to India. COLOUR. A technical term used in pleading to signify that apparent right of the opposite party, the admission of which is required in all pleadings, by way of ■ confession and avoidance. Of such pleadings it is, as the name imports, of their vei-y essence to confess the truth of the allegation which they propose to an- swer or avoid, which formerly was done by an introductory sentence — '^True it is Colour. — ( Oontmued. ) that, etc.," preceding the defense rehed upon in answer. But though this formal admission is now generally abandoned, it is still essential that the confession clear- ly appear on the face of the pleading. See Steph. PL 339, et aeq.; 1 Ch. PI. 504 ; 3 Reeves' E. L. 438. * COLOR OF OFFICE. A pretense of official right to do an act made by one who has no such right. 9 East, 364 ; Bouv. Diet. COMBINATION OF WORKMEN. The Stat. 33 Vict. c. 34, enacts in explanation of thestat. 6 Geo. 4, c. 139, that no workman, by reason merely of his combining with other workmen for the purpose of fixing the rate of wages, or for the purpose of peaceably and without threat or intimida- tion dissuading others from working with a view to fixing the rate of wages, shall be deemed or taken to be guilty of the oflense of molestation or obstruction; but the Act is not to authorize a work- man to break his contract. See, also, Trades Unions Act, 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 31), and Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 82). * COMES. A word used in pleading, which indicates the presence in court of the defendant. * COMITY, COURTESY. Courts of justice in one State will, out of comity, sometimes enforce the laws of another State. COMMANDITE: -See title Socibtb. COMMENDAM (ecelesia commendata). The holding a living or benefice in com- mendam is (where a vacancy occurs) hold- ing such living commended by the Crown until a proper pastor is provided for it. This may be temporary for one, two, or three years ; or perpetual, being a kind of dispensation to avoid the vacancy of the living, and is called a commenda retinm-e. These comrnendams are now seldom granted except to bishops. See, also, next title. COMMENDATORS. Secular persons on whom benefices or church livings are bestowed. They are so called because the benefices were commended and in- trusted to their oversight; they are not proprietors, but only a kind of trustees. Where the bishop is commendatory, the grant is usually made to him while he 70 COMMISSAKIA LEX. — COMMISSION OF THE PEACE. Commeudatorg. — {GonUn/ued.) continues bishop of the particular dio- cese, and not longer, the intention of the grant being to augment the revenues of the bishopric where it is poor. See, also, title PLtraALiTuss. * COMMISSAKIA LEX. A principle of the Koman Law relative to the forfeit- ure of contracts. 2 Kent Com. 583. COMMISSARY (oommissanus). In the Ecclesiastical Law is a title applied to those who exercise spiritual jurisdiction in those parts of the diocese which are too far distant from the chief city for the chancellor to call the people of the bish- op's principal court without occasioning them great inconvenience. These officers were ordained to supply the bishop's of- fice in the distant places of his diocese, or in such parishes as were peculiar to the bishop, and were exempted from the jurisdiction of the archdeacon (Lynde- wood's Provin. ; Cowel). But in more modem times, the commissary acts gen- erally in relief of the bishop or arch- bishop, and as his officer. COMMISSION. In our law is much the same as delegaUo with the civilians, and is commonly understood to signify the warrant, authority, or letters patent, which empower men to perform certain acts, or to exercise jurisdiction either or- dinary or extraordinary. In its popular sense it frequently signifies the persons who act by virtue of such an authority. There are various sorts of commissions, which will be found under the following titles. COMMISSIONS OP ASSIZE. Com- missions empowering the judges to sit on the circuit, for the purpose of holding the assizes. COMMISSION OF BANKRUPT. A commission or authority formerly granted by the Lord Chancellor to such discreet persons as he should think proper, to ex- amine the bankrupt in all matters relat- ing to his trade and effects, and to per- form various other important duties con- nected with bankruptcy matters; these persons were thence called cormrmsioners of icmh-upfoy, and had in most respects the powers and privileges of judges in their own Courts. But regularly consti- tuted Courts and judges in bankruptcy cases have now superseded such commis- sions and commissioners. See title Bankruptcy. COMMISSION OF CHARITABLE USES. A commission issuing out of the Court of Chancery to the bishoi and others, when lands which are given to charitable uses have been misemployed, or there is any fraud or dispute concern- ing them, to inquire of and redress the same. COMMISSION OF DELEGATES. When any sentence was given in any ec- clesiastical cause by the archbishop, this commission under the great seal was di- rected to certain persons, usually lords, bishops, and judges of the law, to sit and hear an appeal of the same to the King in the Court of Chancery. But latterly the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has supplied the place of this commission ; and the Court of Appeal will take the place of the Judicial Committee, under the Judicature Act, 1878. COMMISSION TO EXAMINE WIT- NESSES. When a caiise of action arises in a foreign country, and the witnesses reside there, or in a cause of action aris- ing in England, where the witnesses are abroad or are shortly to leave the king- dom ; or if witnesses residing at home are aged and infirm, and therefore cannot come to Court ; in any of these cases a Court of Equity will grant a commission to certain persons to attend these witnes- ses wherever they may reside, and to ex- amine them and take down their deposi- tions in writing upon the spot, and these depositions are then received in Court as valid evidence in the cause. See, also, titles EvroENCB ; Witnes- ses. COMMISSION OF LUNACY. A com- mission issuing out of Chancery author- izing certain persons to inquire whether a person represented to be a lunatic is so or not, in order that, if he is a lunatic, the king may have the care of his estate. The masters in lunacy at the present day are permanent officers appointed to dis- charge the duties of these commissions, under the lunacy Regulation Act, 1863 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 86). COMMISSION OF OYER AND TER- MINER : See title Oyer anb Terminer. COMMISSION OF THE PEACE. A commission from the king under the great seal, appointing persons therein named jointly and separately justices of the peace. ySse, title Justice. COMMISSIOK TO TAKE ANSWERS IN EQUITY. — COMMON BAR. 71 COMMISSION TO TAKE ANSWERS IN EQUITY. When a defendant in a suit lived more than twenty miles from London, there might have been a corrnim- sion granted to take his answer in the country, where the commissioners admin- istered to him the usual oath, and then the answer being sealed up, either one of the commissioners carried it up to Court, or it was sent by a messenger, who swore that he received it from one of the commis- sioners, and that the same had not been opened or altered since he received it. But now such an answer may be sworn in the country before any solicitor of the Court who is appointed a commissioner to administer oaths in Chancery. COMMITTEE. An assembly of per- sons to whom matters are referred. A committee of the House of Commons is a committee to whom a bill after the second reading is committed, that is, referred; and is either selected by the House in matters of small importance, or else upon a bill of consequence the House resolves itself into a committee of the whole house. A committee of the whole House is formed of every member; and to form it the speaker quits the chair (another member being appointed chairman), and the Speaker may in that case sit and debate as a private member. Intheae committees the biU is debated clause by clause, amendments are made, the blanks are filled up, and sometimes the bill is almost entirely remodeled. After it has gone through this committee, it is again brought before the House for re-consid- eration, after which it is read a third time, and then passed or not passed as the case may be. A committee also signi- fies the person or friend to whom the Lord Chancellor commits the care of an idiot or lunatic. * COMMODATUM. A bailment of a thing to be used by the bailee without re- ward. Story Bailm., § 331. COMMON, BIGHT OF. Is a right which one person who is not the owner has of taking some part of the produce of land belonging to another. There are four kinds of rights of common, viz. : (1.) Common of Pasture, which may be, either (a.) Appendant (see that title) ; or (&.) Appurtenant (see that title) ; or {a.) Pur cause de vicinage (see that title) ; or (d.) In Gross {see that title) ; Common, Right of. — {Continued.) (3.) Common of Piscary, as to which, see title Fishbbt. (8.) Coiomon of Estovers, as to which, see title Estovbbs ; (4.) Common of Turbary, as to which, see title Ttjkbart. As a general rule, rights of common are acquired in the same manner as ease- ments {see that title), viz., either (1.) By grant; or (3.) By prescription, which implies a grant. And the Prescription Act, "3 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71, applies to all varieties of rights of common, for the acquisition of which it appoints thirty years and sixty years, the former conferring a title defeasible other- wise than with reference to time, and the latter a title defeasible by production of written evidence only. Similarly, the remedies for disturbance of a right ot common are the same as for the denial or obstruction of an easement, viz. : (1.) Case, which is substituted for the old right of admeasurement ; (2.) Abatement; and (3.) BiU in Equity. Rights of common may be extinguished in one or other of the following ways : (1.) By unity of possession; (2.) By release ; (3.) By severance ; (4.) By enfranchisement ; or (5.) By inclosure. See, also, titles Approvement; Inclo- SUBB. COMMON BAR. A plea was so termed which was frequently" pleaded by a de- fendant in an action of trespass, quare clmmum f regit. In this action, if the plaintiff declared against the defendant for breaking his close in a certain parish, without otherwise particularizing or de- scribing the close, and the defendant himself happened to have any freehold land in the same parish, he frequently affected to mistake the close in question for his own, and pleaded what was called the common ha/r, viz., that the close in which the trespass was committed was his own freehold, which compelled the plaintiff to new assign, i. «., to assign his cause of complaint over again, alleging that he brought his action in respect of a trespass committed upon a different close from that claimed by the defendant as his own freehold. Now, however, a defend- ant cannot well afPect ignorance with re- 72 COMMON BENCH. — COMPOSITION WITH CREDITOBS. Common Bar. — (Oontinued.) gard to the real close, as by a rule of Court (HJl. Term. 4 "Will. 4), the plain- tiff is bound to pa/rUoularwe the close or place in the declaration by assigning to it its familiar name or by describing it by its abuttals or other sufBcient descrip- tion. The above-mentioned plea is also called a Iwr at lavge and a lilank bar. Steph. Plead. 350, 4th ed. COMMON BENCH. The Court of ■ Common Pleas was formerly so called because the causes of cormnon persons, i. e., causes between subjects only, and in which the Crown had no interest, were tried and determined in that Court. COMMON INTENDMENT. The plain common meaning of any writing, as ap- parent on the face of it without straining or distorting the meaning of the writer. Ba/r to common intendment is an ordinary or general bar to the declaration of a plaintiff. Co. Litt. 78; Cowel. COMMON INTENT. "Certainty in pleading has been stated by Lord Coke (Co. Litt. 303) to be of three sorts, viz., certainty to a ammwn intent, to a certain intent in general, and to a certain intent in every particular. By a common intent, I understand that when words are used which will bear a natwral sense, and also one, or one to be made by argument or inference, the natural sense shall prevail, it is simply a rule of con- struction and not of addition. Qommon intent cannot add to a sentence words which are omitted." Per BuUer, J., Bo- iiaston V. Paym, 2 H. Bl. 537 ; 3 Smith's L. C. 133. * COMMON LAW. The system of law which prevails in England and the United States of America, as distinguished from the Roman or civil law. Also the body of rules of law which do not owe their origin to legislative enactment. COMMON PLEAS {comm/u/nw, plaoita). One of the superior Courts of Common Law. The proceedings in this Court are the same as those in the other Courts of Common Law. The Court was fixed at Westminster by or in virtue of that pro-^ vision in Magna Carta requiring commwnia placita to be held in some one defnite place (aliquo certo loco teneantur). See, also, title Courts of JtrsTioB. COMMON SERJEANT. Is a judicial of&cer attached to the corporation of the Common Sergreant. — (Continued.) ■ City of London, who assists the recorder in disposing of the criminal business at the Old Bailey Sessions. COMMON TRAVERSE: See title Teavbbse. COMMUNE CONCILIUM REGNI ANGrLIJl. The general council of the reahn assembled in Parliament. Cowel. See, also, title Couets or Justice. COMMUNIA PLACITA NON TEN- ENDA IN SCACCARIO; A writ directed to the treasurer and barons of the Ex- chequer, forbidding them to hold pleas be- tween common persons in that Court ; Reg. of Writs, 187; Cowel. COMMUTATION OF TITHES: See title Tithes. COMPARISON OP HANDWRITING: Bee title Handwriting. COMPANY: See title Joint Stock Company. COMPENSATION. In French Law (as in Roman Law) is the set-off of Eng- lish Law. See that title. - COMPENSATION. In EngUsh Law, denotes the pecuniary sum awarde'd under railway and other statutes, in payment and compensation of and for lands and buildings taken campulsorily or by agreement for public purposes. The chief statute upon the matter is the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 18). * COMPERUIT AD DIEM. A plea in bar to an action of debt on a bail bond. "He appeared at the day." 3 Ch. PI. 537. COMPOSITION WITH CREDITORS. As well by the Common Law as under the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, it is lawful for a debtor in embarrassed circumstances to come to an arrangment with his creditors to pay them so much in the pound, and to be released or forgiven by them the rest. The agreement is usually canied out by means of a composition deed, but such a deed is not requisite by the Com- mon Law, there being a sufficient consid- eration to support the arrangement as a simple contract merely, in the mutual agreement of all the creditors in consid- eration of the agreements of the others to assent to the composition (Sibree v. Tripp, 15 M. & W. 33). It is necessary by the UOMPOUNDING FELONY, OR THEFTBOTE. — CONDITION. 73 Composition with Creditors. — {Oont.) Common Law that all the creditors should have assented to the composition; but under the English Bankruptcy Act, 1869, a majority in number and three-fourths in value may bind the minority. See sect. 136. See, also, titles Liquidation ; Bank- KTJPTCT. COMPOUNDING FELONY, OE THEFTBOTE. Where a person has been robbed, and he knows the felon, and receives back from him his goods that were stolen, or some other amends, upon agree&ent not to prosecute, this is a misdemeanor. See, also, title Advbbtisembnt. COMPROMISE OF SUIT. When a suit is not carried through to verdict, or decree, or judgment, but the parties agree upon certain terms, which include a stay of proceedings, they are said to compro- mise the suit. A mere doubtfulness of right is a sufficient consideration to sup- port a compromise (^Oallisher v. Bischoff- sTieim, L. R. 5 Q. B. 449). Counsel for the parties may also compromise a suit without the authority and even against the wishes of their clients. Thp parties themselves may compromise it, but with- out prejudice to their solicitor's Uen. Wright V. Burrows, 3 C. B. 344. COMPURGATORS. Persons who swear they believe the oath of another person made in defense of his own inno- cence. Such was the case with the clergy, who, when accused of any capital crime, were not jonly required to make oath of their own innocence, but also to produce a certain number of persons called compurgators, to swear that they believed the oath of the accused. It is a rude form of evidence, the modem phase of which is chwracter-emdenoe. See that title. COMPUTE, RULE TO. In cases where the plaintiff had an interlocutory judgment, and the amount of daihages was a simple matter of calculation, and no evidence was required to ascertain the amount, beyond what was apparent on the face of the pleadings, the Court, in- stead of putting the plaintiff to execute a writ of inqidry, would refer it to the master to compute principal and interest. •CONCLUSION TO THE COUNTRY. When a party m pleading traverses or de- nies a material fact or allegation advanced 10 Conclusion to the Country. — (Cont'd.) by his opponent, he usually concludes his pleading with an offer that the issue so raised may be tried by a jury ; this he does by stating that he "puts himself upon the country ; " and a pleading which so concludes is then said to conclude to the country; and the technical phrase itself is termed a "eoncVimon to the country." CONCORD (conoordia). An agreement entered into between two or more per- sons, upon a trespass having been com- mitted, by way of amends or satisfaction for the trespass. In that species of con- veyance which was formerly in use, called &fine, the word '■'concord" also occurs; and here it signifies an agreement, called the finis concordim, between the parties, who are levying the fine of lands one to another, how and in what manner the lands shall pass ; this concord is usually an acknowledgment from the deforciants that the lands in question are the right of the complainant ; and from this acknowl- edgment, or recognition of right, the party levying the fine is called the cognizor, and he to whom it is levied the cognizee. CONDEMNATION MONEY. The party who fails in a suit or action is some- times said to be condemned in the action, whence the damages to which such failure has made him liable, used to be frequently called condemnation money. Thus, in pro- ceedings to enforce a recognizance by writ of scire facias it is laid down that ' ' these persons (the bail) stipulated that if the defendant should be condemned in the action, he should pay the conde/mrm- tion money, or render himself into cus- tody." *CONDICTIO. In civil law, a personal action. Inst. 4, 6, 15. CONDITION. In French Law, the fol- lowing peculiar distinctions are made : — (1.) A condition is casuelle, when it depends on a chance or hazard ; (3.) A condition is potestative when it depends on the accomplishment of some- thmg which is in the power of the party to accomplish ; (8.) A condition is mixie, when it de- pends partly on the wUl of the party and partly on the will of others ; (4.) A condition is suspensive, when it is the future and uncertain event, or pres- ent but unknown event, upon which an obligation takes or fails to take effect ; 74 CONDITONS. — CONDITIONS PRECEDENT AND SUBSEQUENT. Condition. — {OonlAnmd.) (5.) A condition is resohitoire, when it is the event which undoes an obligation which has already had effect as such. CONDITIONS. At the Common Law, a condition, or the benefit of a condition, could only be reserved to the grantor, lessor or assignor, and his real or personal representatives, and not to a stranger; but by the stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 5, under an indenture executed after the 1st of October, 1845, the benefit of a con- dition respecting any lands or tenements may be taken, although the taker thereof be not named a party to the same in- denture. A condition affecting freehold lands must be created, if not by the same deed, at all events by a deed executed and de- livered at the same time as the deed which creates the estate ; but a condition affecting chattels, rents, annuities, and such like, may be created subsequently to the principal deed. And with reference to the Irreach of conditions : — By the Common Law, no one could take advantage by entry of the breach of a condition, except persons who were parties or privies in right and representa- tion. Therefore, by the Common Law, neither privies in law * (e. g., lords claim- ing by escheat) nor grantees and assignees of the reversion, could have such advant- age of it. But by stat. 32 Hen. 8, c. 34, grantees and assignees now possess this right, whether the grant is of the whole or only of a part of the estate of the reversion, but not so as to appportion the condition ; however, now, by stat. 33 & 33 Vict. c. 35, s. 3, such apportionment may be made where the reversion is split up into parts. Even when lands are descendible by some rule or custom to a person other than the heir by the Common Law, e. g., in gavelkind lands, none but the heir by the Common Law may enter for the breach, although after such entry, the customary heir or heirs may enter on him, and enjoy along with him, if the custom so direct. But the right of taking advant- age of a breach of condition being merely personal (1 Pres. Shep. T. 150), not even the heir at Common Law may enter for a condition broken in the life-time of his ancestor. See, also, succeeding titles. * Nevertheless If tbe condition were Implied In law, privies In law might take advantage of the breach. CONDITIONS, IMPOSSIBLE. In Roman Law, a legacy subject to an im- possible condition was vaUd, and was at once an absolute bequest ; and this is also the rule as to bequests of personal prop- erty in English Law. Again, in Roman Law, a stipulation {i. e., contract) subject to an impossible condition was void alto- gether ; and this is also the rule of the English Law as to such a contract in the general case. But a distinction has been taken, chiefiy upon the words of the con- tract, between a condition which is already impossible, and known to be so to the contracting parties at ih.e time of their contracting (in which case the con- tract is invariably void, as being simply foolish), and a condition which only sub- sequently to the contract becomes void, or the impossibility of which was un- known to the parties at the time of the contract (in which latter case the contract may or may not, according to the lan- guage, be and remain binding). See Leake on Contracts, 3S6. CONDITIONS PEjECEDENT AND SUBSEQUENT. These may be either precedent to the vesting of an estate or right of action, or aubsegymtfixBitto, and divesting the estate or right. (a.) Conditions precedent and subse- quent with reference to estates. In the construction of personal bequests, where the condition is precedent, and there is so limitation over on its non-ful- fillment, it is sufficient if it is perf owned in substance, when from unavoidable cir- cumstances it cannot be fulfilled to the letter; but when there is a limitation over of the legacy on non-fulfillment of the condition, a strict and literal performance is required (1 Wh. Rop. Leg. 769). On the other hand, when the condition is subsequent, then, as being odious, it is construed wtih strictness, and to be of any avail to defeat an estate (whether vested or contingent), it must have been fulfilled to the letter (1 Wh. .Rop. Leg. 783) ; for it is only reasonable that before a person is deprived of the benefit con- ferred upon him, the literal event on which the forfeiture is to arise should happen, more especially if the benefit is already vested in enjoyment, and it makes no difference for that matter that the con- dition which is subsequent to the one estate is precedent to another, either in- troducing a fresh conditional Umitation, or accelerating a limitation already in existence in remainder. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT AND SUBSEQUENT. 75 Conditions Precedent, etc. — (C CREDIT, LETTER OF. An instru- ment in common use among bankers for the transmission of money either within the United Kingdom, or to the colonies, or to foreign countries. It is, not nego- tiable as a cheque, but is only an authority from the banker who signs it to the banker (or other person) to whom it is addressed upon advice to honor the drafts of the person named in it upon his pro- ducing the letter. If the letter of credit is stolen or lost, the banker upon whom it is drawn is liable in case he honors the drafts or pays the amounts upon a forged signature ; and the 16 & 17 Vict, c 59, s. 98 CREEB. — CRIMINAL LAW. Credit, letter of. 19, does not apply to these letters, as it does to the drafts therein specified. CBIEK. An officer attached to the Courts of Common Law, whose duty it is to call a plaintiflf who is nonsuited at the trial (see title Gallhsgi thePlaintips'), or to call the jury, &c. His fees (as are those of the other officers of the Courts) are regulated by a table of fees sanctioned by the judges under the authority of 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 30. Bagley Pr. 8. CRIME. The distinction between a erime and a tort, or civil injury, is, that the former is a breach and violation of the pubUc rights and duties due to the whole community, considered as such, in its social aggregate capacity; whereas the latter is merely an infringement or priva^ tion of the civil rights which belong to individuals considered merely in their individ.ual capacity. See title Cbiminal Law. * CRIMEN FALSI. A fraudulent al- teration or forgery, to conceal or alter the truth to the prejudice of another. Any crime which may injuriously affect the administration of justice, by the intro- duction of falsehood. * CRIMEN LMSIM MAJESTATIS— A crime affecting the King's person. 4 Bl. Com. 75. CRIMINAL CONTERSATION. The name of an action in which a husband proceeded for damages sustained by him in his wife by the act of an adulterer of her body. It was abolished by the stat. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 59, but the husband may at the present day petition the Court of Probate for damages in such a case, without asking for a divorce also. The action still exists in America. CRIMINAL INFORMATION. A mode of proceeding available in cases of alleged libelous publications, and in some othCr matters. It is within the discretion of the Court to grant or refuse it accord- ing to the circumstances (Anon., LofFt. 333) ; and the Court will not entertain an application for it on light or trivial grounds but will leave the party to his remedy (if any) by action or indictment (Beg. v. Mead, 4 Jur. 1014). The Attorney-Gen- eral or (during the vacancy of that office) the Solicitor-JJeneral may, however, file such an information ecu officio, and without application to the Court (Rex v. Plymouth Criminal Information. — {Continued.} [Mayor], 4 Burr. 1687) ; and he may even stop the proceedings upon his first infor- mation, and file a second one {Hex v. Btrat- ton, 1 Doug. 238). To an information for a libel, the defendant may, under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, 8. 6, plead in his justifica- tion the truth of the matter pubhshed. A criminal information also lies against a magistrate who acts from corrupt mo- tives, or who improperly grants or refuses an ale-license; but the magistrate must have notice of the intention to apply for the information against him. And the party applying for an information must in all cases come with clean hands. CRIMINAL LAW. The persons con- cerned in the commission of a crime may be concerned in it either as Principals, or as Accessories, or as Abettors, as to the distinctions between whom, see these three several titles. The varieties of crimes are innumer- able; they are, however, distinguished generally into three classes, viz., Treasons, Felonies.and Misdemeanors ; as to the dis- tinction between which, see these several titles. The particular offenses (such as Arson, Bigamy, Burglary, Murder, &c.) wiU be found explained under each par- ticular head. The mode of procedure in criminal cases is various, being either (1.) by in- dictment, which is the regular course (see title Indictment); or (2.) by sum- mary proceedings before a. magistrate (see title Summabt Convictions) ; or (3.) by Criminal Information (see that title). For the evidence adduceable in support of and against the charge, see title Evi- DBNCB. And with reference to appeals and pro- ceedings in the nature thereof in criminal cases, the following is a statement of the present English law upon the subject: (1.) No new trial can be granted in cases of felony ; but with respect to mis- demeanors, it is entirely discretionary with the Court whether it will grant or refuse a new trial. Bex v. Mawbey, 6 T. R. 638. (3.) It is contrary to the policy of the English Law that there should be an ap- peal i» cases of felony (Eke parte Edidjee Byramjee, 5 Moo. P. C. C. 276); never- theless the stat. 11 & 13 Vict. c. 78 ena- bles the judge to reserve any point aris- ing on the trial for the consideration of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved, which is established l^ this Act ; but CRmiNAL LETTERS. — CROWN OFFICE. 99 Criminal Law. — {Continued.) (3.) After judgment the record may be removed by writ of error, iri any case where an error, either of law or of fact, appears on the record ; this writ of error lies from quarter sessions to the Queen's Bench, and from the Queen's Bench to the Exchequer Chamber. But, semble, in a case of misdemeanor (as distinguished from felony) the previous flat of the At- torney-General is requisite, and it is in his discretion to grant or refuse his fiat. Beg V. Newton, 4 El. & Bl. 869. * CRIMINAL LETTERS. In Scotch law, a summons issued by the lord advo- cate or his deputies as the means of com- mencing criminal proceedings. Bouv. Diet. CROSS ACTION. Where A. having brought an action against B., B. brings an action against A. upon the same sub- ject-matter, or arising out of the same transaction, this second action is called a cross action. And this double action is sometimes necessary to insure justice to both parties ; as in the case of a contract in wluch neither of the contractors is sub- jected to any condition precedent to his right to enforce performance by the other of his part; but the promises on each side are independent of what is to be done upon the other. In such a case the non- performance of the plaintiff's promises would be no defense to an action for the non-performance of the defendant's, whose sole remedy, therefore, against the plain- tiff would be by a cross action (6 T. R. 570 ; 9 B. & C. 259). However, in many cases a cross action is rendered unneces- sary, and the party may raise by answer or defense what he formerly required to raise by cross action. See, also, next title. CROSS BILL. A suit in Equity is commenced by the plaintiff filing his bill, wherein are stated aU circumstances which gave rise to the complaint; the defendant's mode of defense is then usu- ally by answer, wherein he controverts the facts stated in the bill, or some of them, &c. But when he is unable to make a complete defense to the plaittifl's bill without disclosing some facts which rest in the knowledge of the plaintiff him- self, he then files what is called a oross hill, which differs in no reject from the plaintiff's original bill, excepting that the occasion which gave rise to it proceeded from matter akeady in litigation. A cross bill is in many cases necessary in Cross Bill. — (Oonlmued.) aid of the defense, which cannot prop- erly be raised by answer merely, as in cases of alleged fraud. However, under the Judicature Act, 1873 (36 & 87 Vict, c. 66), Sch. r. 30, a cross action will hardly in any case be now necessary in aid of a defense. CROSS DEMANDS. These arise where one man against whom a demand is made by another, in his turn makes a demand' against that other, and of such oross de- mand a set-off is in law the most familiar instance, a set-off being a statutory right of balancing mutual debts between the plaintiff and defendant in an action. 1 Chit. PI. 595. See, also, preceding titles. CROSS REMAINDER: See title Re- mainder. CROWN COURT. Is the Court in which the Crown or criminal business of the assizes is transacted. See titles Civil Side ; Plea Side. CROWN DEBTS. These are debts due to the Crown, usually froi8 persons who were accountants to the Crown, but also on record, bond, or specialty, generally to the Crown. "The liability of lands to make good these debts attached to the lands even in the hands of londfide pur- chasers for value without notice, and not- withstanding the purchaser had no means of notice. But latterly, by the stats. 3 & 3 Vict. c. 11, s. 8, and 32 & 23 Vict, c. 35, s. 32, it was enacted that lands should not be charged in the hands of purchasers with Crown debts unless or until such debts were duly registered and re-registered, whether or not the pur- chaser had notice thereof. And now, by the stat. 28 & 29 Vict. c. 104, s. 4, a writ of ekecution in respect of the debt must also have been issued and registered, in order to affect a purchaser, in addition to the registration and re-registration of the debt itself under the former Acts, whether or not the purchaser have notice of the debt. CROWN OFFICE. An office of the Court of Queen's Bench, the master of which is usually called Clerk of the Crown, and in pleading and other law proceedings is styled ' ' coroner and attor- ney of our Lady the Queen." In this office the Attorney-General and Clerk of the Crown exhibit informations for crimes and misdemeanors, the former ex officio, the latter commonly by order of the Court. 100 CROWN PAPER. — CURIA ADVISARE VULT. Crown Office. — {Continued.) And by 4 & 5 W. & M. c. 18, the master of the Crown office may file criminal in- formations, with leave of the Court, upon the complaint or relation of a private sub- ject. 1 Arch. Pract. 9. CKOWN PAPER. A paper containing the list of criminal cases which await the hearing or decision of the Court. The term is commonly applied to the Court of Queen's Bench, which has an exclusive criminal jurisdiction ; and it then includes all cases arising from informations quo warranto, criminal informations, criminal cases brought up from inferior Courts by writ of certiorari, and cases from the ses- sions. Bagley Pr. 559. CUCKING-STOOL. An engine of cor- rection for common scolds, which in the Saxon language .is said to signify the scolding-stool, though now it is frequently corrupted into du(mng'-&to6i, because the judgment is that when the woman is placed 1;herein, she shall be plunged in the water for Ijpr punishment. It is also variously called a trebucket, tumbrel, and castigatory. 3 Inst. 219. cm ANTE DIVORTIUM. A writ which lay for a woman when a widow or when divorced, to recover her estate, which her husband, during her coverture {mi in mta sua, vel cui ante divortium, ipsa contradicere rum potmit), has aliened. Britton, c. 114, foL 364. cm IN VITA: See title Cm ante Di- TOBTIUM. * CUL DE SAC. A street open at one end only. Thompson Highways, 3-6. CULPRIT. Besides its popular sense of a prisoner accused of sorne crimes, it used formerly to be made use of in the following manner. When a prisoner had pleaded not guilty, rum c/ulpoMlis, or nient oiil/paMs, which used to be abbreviated upon the minutes thus, "raore (or nient) eul," the clerk of the assize, or clerk of the arraigns, on behalf of the Crown, re- plied that the prisoner is guilty, and that he was ready to prove him so. This was done by two monosyllables in the same spirit of abbreviation, "cmZ prit," which signifies, first, that the prisoner was guilty {eul, culpable or eutpabilis), and' then that the king was ready to prove him so, prit, prcesto sum, or pa/ratus veH- fiaure. This was therefore a replication on behalf of the king imd wee at the bar, Cnlprit. - which was formerly the case in all plead- ings, as Well in civil as in criminal causes. CUM TESTAMENT© ANNEXO. Where a deceased person has made a will, but without naming any executor, or has named incapable persons; or where the executors appointed refuse to act, or die intestate, in any of these cases the Court of Probate must grant administration cum testamento annew (with the will annexed) to some other person, in the choice of whom the Court usually prefers the resid- uary legatee to the next of Mn. 1 Wms. Bxors. 348. See title ADMiNisTKATioiir, Letters of. • CUMULATIVE LEGACY. Legacies are said to be cumulative as contradistin- guished from such as are merely repeated. Where the testator has twice bequeathed a legacy to the same person, it becomes a question whether the legatee be entitled to both, i. «., whether the second legacy shall be regarded as a repetition merely of the prior bequest, or as additional bounty and cumulative to the other ben- efit. On this point the intention of the testator is the rule of construction. 2 Wms. Exors. 1030. See Repetition of Legacies. * CURATOR. A guardian. CURE BV VERDICT, TO. After a cause has been sent down to trial, the trial had, and the verdict given, the Courts overlook defects in the statement of a title, which would be available on a demurrer, or if taken at an earlier period. This is what is meant by the term to cure hy v&rdicf ; and the reason of it is, that the Courts presume that all circumstances necessary in form to complete a title im- perfectly stated were proved before the verdict was given ; which reason explains the limitation laid down as to the effect of the verdict, viz., that it cures the statement of a title defectively set out, but not of a defective title; for where the plaintiff totally omits to state his title or cause of action, it need not be proved at the trial, and therefore there is no room for the usual presumption. 1 Smith, L. C. 614, Smhton v. Aapinal. See, further, title Aider by Verdict. * CURIA ADVISARE VULT. The court wishes to consider the matter. Usually contracted in the form ewr. adv. vult. CURSITOES. — GUSTOS ROTULORUM. 101 CURSITORS. Officers connected with the Court of Chancery, of very ancient institution, and twenty-four in number. They used to make out all original writs ; and the business in the several counties in England in this respect was distribu- ted among them by the Lord Chancellor, by whom they were also appointed. They were called cursitors, from the writs de curm; in stat. 18 Edw. 3, c. 5, they are called clerks of course. See, also, title "Writs. CURTESY OF ENGLAND, TENANT BY THE. When a man marries a woman seized of an estate of inheritance, i. «., of land and tenements in fee simple, or fee tail, and has by her issue born alive, which was capable of inheriting her es- tate ; in this case he shall, on the death ' of his wife, hold the lands for hi^life as tenant by the ewrtfesy of England (Litt. 35, 53 ; 2 Bl. 126). And this rightis left un- affected by the M. W. P. Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 93). CURTILAGE (curtilagium, from the Fr. cour, court, and Sax. leah, locus). A piece of ground lying near and belonging to a dwelling-house, as a court, yard, or the like. Cowel. CUSTOM ifonmetmb). A law not written, but established by long usage, and the consent of our ancestors. C%is- toms are either general ox pwrticiilar ; gen- eral customs are the universal rule of the whole kingdom, and form the Common Law in its stricter and more usual signifi- cation, e. g., primogeniture: particular customs are those which for the most part affect only the inhabitants of particular districts, such as gavelkind in Kent, and the Uke. The Courts are bound to take notice of general customs, but particular customs must be both pleaded and proved before they are judicially noticed. More- over a general custom is always good, but a particular custom, in order to be good, must present the following characteris- tics: — (1) It must be reasonable, (3) It must be certain, (3) It must be compulsory, (4) It must be immemorial, and (5) It must be possible in law. CUSTOMS OF LONDON. These are particular customs relating to the govern- ment of the City of London, and also to trade, apprentices, widows, orphans, &c., within the City. They differ from all other customs in point of trial, for if the Customs of Landon. — {OonUvAied.) existence of the custom be brought in question it shall not be tried by a jury but by certificate from the lord mayor and al- dermen by the mouth of their recorder, unless it be such a custom as the corpora- tion is itself interested in, as a right of taking toll, &c., for in this latter case the law does not permit them to certify on their own behalf. CUSTOM OP MERCHANTS Qex mer- catoria). A particular system of customs used only among one set of the king's subjects, which, however different from the general rules of the Common Law, is yet engrafted into it, and made part of it, being allowed for the benefit of trade to be of the utmost validity in all com- mercial transactions, it being a maxim of Law cuilihet in sua arte credendum est. This lex mercatoria, ox custom, of mer- chants, comprehends the laws relating to bills of exchange, mercantile contracts, sale, purchase, and barter of goods, freight, insurance, &c. The statute law has adopted many of these customs of merchants; and conversely, it has been suggested that a large part of mercantile customs have had their origin in forgot- ten statutes. CUSTOMS AND SERVICES annexed to the tenure of lands are those which the tenants thereof owe to their lords, and which, if withheld, the lord might an- ciently have resorted to a writ of customs and services to compel thenj (Cowel). But at the present day he would merely pro- ceed to eject the tenant as upon a forfeit- ure. CUSTOMARY TENANTS. Tenants who hold their estates according to the custom of the manor. A copyhold tenant is so called because he holds his estate by copy of Court roll by will of the lord ac- cording to the custom of the manor ; and although a distinction has been made be- tween a copyholder and a c/ustomary ten- ant, yet they both agree in substance, and the difference, if any, between them consists only in this, that a copyhold proper is expressly stated in the grant to be at the will of the lord of the manor, whereas a customary freehold is not so stated, but the same thing is impUed. 8ee title Copyholds. CUSTOS ROTULORUM. A special officer to whos? custody the records or rolls of the sessions are committed ; he is always a justice of the quorum, and is 102 CUSTOS OF THE SPIRITUALITIB8.— DAMAGES. Cnstos Kotalornm. — (^OonHnued.) ' usually selected for his wisdom, counte- nance, or credit; his nomination is by the king's sign manual, and to him the nomination of the clerk of the peace be- 'longs, which office he is expressly forbid- den to sell for money. 37 Hen. 8, c. 1 ; Lombard. CUSTOS OF THE SPIRITUALITIES. He who exercises spiritual or ecclesiasti- cal jurisdiction in a diocese during the vacancy of the see. Cowel. CUSTOS OF THE TEMPORALITIES. He to whose custody a vacant see or ab- bey was committed by the king as su- preme lord, and who, as steward of the goods and profits thereof, was to give an account to the king's escheator, who ren- dered an account thereof into the exche- quer. His trust continued until the va- cancy was supj)lied by a successor, who obtained the king's writ de rcstitutione temvporaUwm, which was sometimes after and sometimes before consecration, though more frequently after. Cowel. CUSTUMA ANTIQUA SITE MAGNA (asrecien* or great duties). Duties payable by every merchant, as weU native as for- eign, on wool, sheepskins, or woolfells, and leather exported; the foreign mer- chant had to pay an additional toll, viz., half as much again as was paid by the natives. See, also, title Taxation. CUSTUMA PAKTA ET NOVA (mall and new duties). Imposts of threepence in the pound, due from merchant stran- gers only, for all commodities as well im- ported as exported, and usually called the alien's duty. These customs were first granted in 13 Bdw. 1. 4 Inst. 32. See, also, title Taxation. CT.PEES (as near as, so nea/r). In cases where an attempt is made to create a perpetuity, i. e., to limit the estate to several successful lives infutwro, there is a material difference between a deed and a will; for in the case of a deed all the limitations are totally void; but in the case of a will, the Courts do not; if they can possibly avoid it, construe the devise to be utterly void, but explain the will in such a manner as to carry the testator's iijtention into efieet, as far as the rule respecting perpetuities will allow, which is called a construction cy-pres (6 Cruise, Dig. 165). For example, where a life es- tate is given by wUl to an unborn person, Cy-Pres. — ( Continued.) with remainder in tail to the child of such unborn pea-son, the Courts will give the estate tail to the first unborn person in lieu of his estate for life, and so as to leave to the second unborn the chance of the estate tail in that way descending upon him, which it wiU do if not barred. Oy-pris does not apply to personal prop- erty, there being no estate tail in such property. *CYR06RAPHUM. The name of a deed or charter among the Saxons. 1 Keeves Hist. Eng. Law, 10. D. DAMAGE-FEASANT. This means do- ing damge (da/mm/wm fado), and is com- monly*applied to the beasts of a stranger, wandering in another man's grounds, and doing him damage, i. e., hurt, by treading down his grass, eating his growing crops, and the like, in which case the owner of the land may distrain them until satisfac- tion is made him for the injury. Bee, also, titles Distkbss ; Pound ; Re- plevin. DAMAGES. A pecuniary compensa- tion recoverable by action for breach of contract or for tort. The measure of damages, or test by which the amount of damages is to be ascertained, is in gen- eral the same both in contract and in tort, with this single distinction, that the intention with which a contract is broken is perfectly immaterial, while the inten- tion with which a tort is committed may fairly be regarded by the jury in assess- ing the amount of damages ; and gener- ally the Court is not particularly careful to weigh "in golden scales" the dama- ges recoverable in tort. However, in both cases, the general rule is, that damages are, and ought to be, purely compensatory. Occasionally, there- fore, only nominal damages will be re- covered. But usually the damages are a substantial sum, and that sum is either an ascertained or an unascertained sum, but ascertainable sum, being in the former case called liquidated and in the latter case unliquidated damages. It is usual in bonds and other specialty contracts to fix the damages for breach of the contract at a liquidated sum. If, however, the sum so fixed is a penal sum, the Courts, both of Law and of Equity, wiU relieve against the full amount thereof, and allow the injured party to DAMAGES. 103 Damages. — {Gmtmued.) recover only such part thereof as will compensate -him. The Courts carry this relief so far that even if the parties to the contract expressly stipulate that the sum fixed as damages shall be regarded as liquidated damages and not as a pen- alty, the Courts wiU, it they can find any ground for doing so, hold that the amount so fixed is a penalty, notwith- standing, and will deal with it accord- ingly. Kemhle v. Farren, 6 Bing. 141. See, also, title Pbnaitt. Where the damages do not even profess to be liquidated, but are left altogether uncertain in the contract (as they neces- sarily are in cases of tort), then the amount is to be ascertained by the jury, or (in some cases), upon a reference by the referee. But by whomsoever the amount is to be ascertained there are cer- tain particular rules of law which must be observed, the principal of which are the following: — (1.) In contracts for the sale of goods, (as.) If the vendor fails to deliver, then the amount of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price of the goods at the time of the breach ; and (J.) If the vendee refuses to accept, then the amount of damages is the like difference. (2.) Upon breach of a contract to re- place stock, the amount of dam- ages is the price of the stock on the day on which it ought to have been replaced, or (at the plaintiff's option), its price on the day of the trial. (3.) In an action for the price of goods which have been delivered and received, but which are of in- ferior quality to that contracted for, (as.) If the full price has been paid, the amount of damages (to be recovered by the purchaser) is the difference between the price given and the actual value of the goods as ascer- tained by re-seUingthem; and (6.) If the price has not yet been paid, the amount of damages (to be recovered by the vendor) is the price a^eed on mmus the difference between that price and the actual value as- certained as before. Damages. — (Oontmued.) (4.) In the case of a contract of hiring and service, where the breach consists in a wrongful dismissal, the amount of damages is the usual rate of wages in the par- ticular employment, multiplied by the time that will be required for finding new employment of the same character ; and (5.) In the case of a contract for the sale of land, where the breach of con- tract arises from the vendor's failing to make a goo(^ title, then, — (a.) If the vendor was unaware at the time of contracting of the defect in his title, the amount- of damages is the expense in- curred by the vendee in inves- tigating the title, and nothing more (Flwemi v. ThomhiM, 3 W. Bl. 1078); but (6.) If the vendor was aware at that time of the defect of title, then the amount of damages is the expense incurred by the vendee in investigating the , title a-nd also damages for the loss of his bargain.' Hopkins V. Qraeebrodk, 6 B. & C. 31. The following distinctions are also taken in respect of damages, viz. : — (1.) Some damages are general and some are special; and the rule of law with respect to the latter class of damages is, that they must be both pleaded and proved, whereas neither of these things is necessary with respect to the former class of damages ; for these as being gen- eral are implied by the law ; and (3.) Some damages are direct, and some are indirect, remote, or consequential. Now the law permits no damages as a general rule to be recovered excepting such as are the natmrdl consequences, and also the legal consequences, of the breach of contract or of the tort {Vvyxrs v. Wil- cox, 3 Sm. L. C. 487) ; but under special circumstances, if those special circum- stances have been pointedly, i. «., suffi- ciently, brought to the knowledge of the offending party, then other damages of a remoter or consequential nature which have arisen from the breach of contract orfrom the tort, willbe recoverable {Hadley V. Baamdale, 9 Ex. 341) ; and it is in re- spect to this class of damages when they arise from the commission of a tort that the Court is inclined to be more liberal 104 DAMNOSA H^BEDITAS. — DEAF AND DUMB. - (OmUmied.) in the amouat whicli it awards. See gen- erally Mayne on Damages, by Lundley Smith, 1873. * DAMNOSA HJIKEDITAS. An in- heritance which was a charge instead of a benefit. Applied also to the property of a bankrupt when it is a charge to the creditors, for example, a term of years where the rent exceeds the revenue. 7 East, 342 ; 3 Oampb. 340. DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA. This phraap denotes the happening of some loss or damage" to one person, without any wrong done to him on the part of the person who has caused the loss or dam- age. A familiar instance of this is the case of a rival schoolmaster who sets up a school near to an existing school, and by so doing draws away by competition merely some or all of the scholars of the latter school. And in the case of one landowner who, by digging a well in his own ground for his own farm, thereby draws oflE the underground water which supplied a well previously dug in another person's land, we have another instance of a dLamnum, unaccompanied by an m^w- ria {Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324 ; Ohasemore v. Richa/rds, 7 H. L. Ca. 849). The converse phrase, ivguria sine damno, is, on the other hand, always actionable, upon the ground that every i?i?wm, being an interference with another person's right, necessarily and in the very nature of it importeth a dwmnv/m. AsJiby v. WMU, 3 Ld. Raym. 953. ♦DAMNUM FATALE. Damages caused by inevitable accident, or act of God. DANBT, IMPEACHMENT OF. The Earl of Danby, minister of Charles 11., was cognizant of that sovereign's secret treaty with France, and for his complicity therein was impeached. Upon his im- peachment three questions of a technical legal importance were raised : — (1.) Whether the Lords, upon a mere general charge of treason, were able to commit the accused to prison without bail: — SM, that they might. (2.) Whether a minister might plead in bar to an impeachment the fact that the king had subsequently pardoned the ofEense, if any: — Seld, that such plea was not so admissible, although the king's pardon after conviction or attainder would be a good deliverance. This opinion- was only hesitatingly arrived at on the occa- Danby; Impeachment of. — (ConUrmed.) sionof Lord Danby's impeachment, and was not finally adopted or declared by the legislature until 13 Will. 8, c. 2 (Act of Settlement). And (3.) Whether an impeachment abated by a duaohition of Parliament: — Hdd, that an impeachment did not abate upon a prorogation merely, nor yet upon a dissolution. This decision was not, however, final, for the contrary was held in 1685 ; and it was not till 1717 (in the case of the Earl of Oxford), that aproro- gation, and not until 1781 (in the case of Warren Hastings) that a dissolution was finally declared to be no abatement of an impeachment in parliament. DANE-GELT OB DANE-GELD. This means Dane-tribute, and was a tax of 1«. (afterward 2s.) upon every hide of land throughout the kingdom. It was origin- ally imposed by the Danes, and was after- ward levied for clearing the seas of Danish pirates ; sometimes it was applied by way of bribing these pirates to abstain from their invasions. The tax was re- leased by Edward,the Confessor, but was again imposed by William I. ; it was again released by Henry I., and re-imposed in the form of ship-money by Charles I. Bee title Ship-money. DAEBEIN PRESENTMENT: Sea ti- tle Assize of Dakeein Pkbsentment. DAT: 5'e« title Time. *DATS OF GRACE. Certain days al- lowed for the payment of negotiable paper after the date named in the paper. In old English Practice, three days of grace were allowed persons summoned in court, beyond the date of the writ, to make their appearance. DEAD FREIGHT. This is freight payable by the charterer of a vessel under his charterparty when the cargo has for some cause not been conveyed as in- tended. See title Chaktbeparty. DEAF AND DUMB. Such persons may lawfully intermarry {Earrod v. Ear- rod, 1 Kay & J. 4) ; and, if married wo- men, may make acknowledgments {In re Hm-per, 6 M. & G. 732). But their wills are regarded with much suspicion {In the Goods of Owaton, 2 S. & T. 461). If deaf, dumb and blind they are idiots, and have no capacity, sed gucere. DEAN. — DECBNNAKY. 105 DEAN. An ecclesiastical dignitary who presides, or originally presided, over ten (Sexd) canons or prebendaries. He is next in rank to the bishop, and is head of the chapter of a cathedral. DEATH. Where a person has not been heard of for seven years, and his absence is not explainable, the law raises a primd fatde presumption that he is dead {Row V. Hasland, 1 "W. Bl. 406) ; but that pre- sumption does not in any way fix the time of death, of which strict evidence must be given by the party who derives any in- terest therefrom. Doe v. Nepean, 2 Sm. L. C. 510. *DE JETATE PEOBANDAj A writ which lay to summon a jury to determine the age of the heir of a tenant in cwpite, who claimed his estate as being of full age. Bouv. Diet. ; Fitz. Nat. Brev. 257. * DE BENE ESSE. Well done for the present, conditionally, provisionally. For example, a witness is examined de hene esse when there is danger of losing his testimony if the party waits until the trial. If the witness be aUve; or can be present at the time of trial, his testimony de bene esse is not to be used. DEBENTURE. Is a securily issued by a public company, usually railway com- pany, and which may or may not be a mortgage of the lands and stock of the .company. If not mortgages, debentures are not an interest in land within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3), or within the Mortmain Act (9 Geo. 2, c. 36) ; but otherwise if they are mortgages (Toppin v. Zomaa, 16 C. B. 159). Debentures are usually in the form of a promissory note, subject to certain strict regulations as to the mode of trans- fer, and usually have coupons attached to them to facilitate the payment of in- terest. The interest on these coupons, although payable half-yearly, accrues de die in Siem, and is apportionable like or- dinary interest. Inre Sogers, 1 Dr. & Sm. 338. See, also, title Shabes. ♦DEBET ET DETINET. An action of debt is said to be in the debet et deUnet, it being alleged that the defeijdant owes and withholds or detains the debt or thing in suit. * DEBET ET SOLET. Words used in old writs showing both a right and a cus- tom as a ground of claim. Beg. Orig. 153. U DEBT. A sum of money due by some certain and express agreement, e. g., on a bond, bill of exchange, &c., where the amount is determinate, and for the non- payment whereof an action of (foSf will lie. Debts are of various kinds, namely : (1.) Jvdgmemi debts, as to which see title Judgment Debts; (3.) SpedaMy debts; (3.) Simple contract debts. Originally debts were not payable out of real estate, but only out of personal estate. The present liabihty of lands to the payment of debts is as follows : (1.) During the Ufe-time of the debtor — Upon entering up judgment, and duly registering same, execution may be sued out and registered, and under that exe- cution lands, whether freehold, copyhold, or leasehold, and whether legal or equi- table, may be taken possession of and sold in satisfaction of the debt. See title Judgments. (2.) After the decease of the debtor. By the stat. 8 & 4 Will. 4 c. 104, it is enacted that the lands of a deceased per- son shall be assets in Equity for payment of all his just debts, as well owing by simple contract as by specialty. See title Administration of Assets. See, also, title Ckown Debts. DECEIT. This is frcmd, as to which see title Fraud . A writ of deceit used formerly to lie, and now an action on the case in the nature of a writ of deceit lies, where the plaintiff has received injury or damage through the deceit of the defendant or of his agent, where the defendant was privy thereto. See, also, title Warranty. *DECEM TALES. A writ which issued to the sheriff commanding him to summon ten jurors to make a fuU panel. Used where ten jurors only were necessary. *DECIES TANTUM. A writ which formerly lay against a juror who had taken money for giving his verdict. So called because it was designed to recover from him against him ten times as much as he took. DECENNARY. A tithing or civil di- vision of the country composed of ten freeholders with their families. The in- stitution was introduced, it is beUeved, by the earliest Saxon settlers in England, and some say by Alfred. The members of a tithing were mutually responsible for each other's good behavior. Ten decen- naires formed a hundred. 106 DECENNIBRS. — DE DONIS. DECENNIEES. Persons having the oversight of ten free burghs (Holthouse), or possibly only of ten free households (Tomlins), for the conservation of the king's peace therein, with power to try causes and give redress by judgment, and for these purposes to adimnister oaths. DECLABATION. At Law is a plead- ing which corresponds to the bill of complaint in Equity. It contains a suc- cinct statement of the plaintiff's case, and generally comprises the following parts: (1.) Title ) In the Queen's Bench, and daU ( the 10th July, 1874; (3.) Venue — Middlesex, to vrit ; (3.) Oommencement — A. B. by C. D., his attorney \or in person] sues E. F. for . . . (4.) Body of deda/raMon — consisting of the following parts (which, how- ever, are not all necessary in every form of action) viz. : (a.) iTuhieement — being introductory merely, and rarely requiring proof; (5.) Averments — being usually the allegation of the performance of all precedent conditions, &c., on the plaintiff's part; and (c.) Gownts — containing statement of defendant's breach of contract or other injury ; (5.) Oondumn — "And the plaintiff claims & " The time for the plaintiff to declare is immediately after the defendant has ap- peared; if the plaintiff do not declare within one year after the writ of sum- mons is returnable, he is deemed out of Court. But the defendant may at the end of the term next^^fter his appearance give the plaintiff four days' notice to de- clare, and thereafter, upon the default of the plaintiff's declaring within the time limited for that purpose, may sign judg- ment of nonpros, against him. See Bull. & L. PI. 1. DECLABATOE Y ACT. This is an Act which, by profession at least, declares no new law, but only the formerly existing law, removing certain doubts which have arisen on the subject; e. g.y the Statute of Treasons, 25 Bdw. 3, stat. 5, c. 2, pro- fesses to create no new treasons, but only to enumerate the already existing trea- sons. See title Statutes. DECREE. This is the judgment of a Court of Equity, and is to most intents and purposes the same as a judgment of a Court of Common Law. A decree as distinguished from an order is final, and is made at the hearing of the cause, whereas an order is interlocutory, and is made on motion or petition ; wherever an order may, in a certain event resulting from the direction contained in the order, lead to the termination of the suit in like manner as a decree made at the hearing, it is called a dearetal order . DECRETAL ORDER: 8ee title Db- CBEE. DECRETALS. These are the papal decrees of various popes as the same were collated in five books by Pope Gregory IX., whence also they are called Decre- talia Chregorii Nom, about the year 1230. A sixth book (called Sextms JDeeretaUum) was added by Pope Boniface VJUl. about the year 1298- See title Canon Law. DEDI. The proper word (give) in a deed of feoffment, and implying formerly a warranty of title, but implying no such warranty at the present day, since 8 & 9 Yict. c. 106. DEDIMUS POTESTATEM. A writ issuing out of Chancery empowering cer- tain persons therein named to perform certain acts; as when a justice of the. peace appointed unjier the king's com- mission intends to act under this com- mission, a writ of dedvmus potestatem issues, empowering certain persons therein named to administer the usual oaths to him, which being done, he is at liberty to act. Lamb. 23. DEDIMUS POTESTATEM DE AT- TORNATO FACIENDO. At Common Law the parties in an action were obliged to appear in Court in person, unless al- lowed by a special warrant from the Crown (bearing the above title). to ap- point an attorney; or unless after ap- pearance they had appointed a deputy, called a responsalis, to act for them, and which the Court allowed them to do in some instances. But now a general lib- erty is giyen to parties in an action to appear by attorney, excepting in the case of infants, idiots, and married women. F. N. B. 25; 1 Arch. Pract. 84. DE DONIS. This is the name of a cel- ebrated statute (13 Edw. 1, or Statute of Westminster the Second, c. 1), in virtue DEEDS. — DEFORCEMENT. 107 De Donis. — {GonUnued.) of which an estate is freehold lands, which was formerly known as a donvm, conditioncde (whence the name of the statute), was converted into an estate tail, and required to descend according to the formedon {formam doni), so as to be in- alienable as well against the lord in prej- udice of his reversion as against the issue in prejudice of their succession. A do- num conditionale, on the other hand, was alienable, immediately upon the birth of issue, that being construed as .the condi- tion of the gift (whence the name) ; the condition being discharged, the estate, of course, became absolute. See title Estate Tail. DEEDS. These are of two kinds, being either deeds-poll or indentures. (Is) A deed-poll was a bald or shorn deed, and was made by one person only, beginning with the words, "Know all men," &c. Under such a deed, any per- son may accept a grant. (2.) An indenture was an indepted deed, and was made between two or more parties, beginning with the words, " This indenture," &c., and stating the parties at the outset. Formerly no person who was not a party could take any 'im/mediate estate, interest, or benefit under such a deed ; but now, by the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, such an estate, interest, or benefit may now be taken under it by a person not a party to it. A deed may be made either on paper or on parchment. *DEEMSTEES. Judges in the Isle of Man who decide all msputes without process. Spelman GHoss. DEER. Deer in a park when reclaimed become personal chattels, and cease to be parcel of the inheritance. Myrd v. Tynte, 3 J. & H. 150 ; Morgan v. Abergmenny {Em-T), 8 C. B. 768. DE FACTO. A king de facto is one actually reigning, as opposed to one de jure merely, who, although having the lawful succession, has either been ousted from, or never actually taken, the posses- sion of the sovereignty. The constitu- tional statute, 11 Hen. 7, c. 1, enacts that obedience to the king for the time being de facto shall be a protection to the subject against all forfeitures under any succeeding sovereign claiming adversely. See also title Allegiance. DEFAMATION: See title Libel. DEFAULT, JUDGMENT BY. Where a defendant omits to appear, or (having ^ appeared) to plead or to put in his answer to an action or suit within the time or times limited for either of these purposes by the Courts, and he has obtained no enlargement or extension of the time for doing so, it is presumed that he has no defense, and the plaintifE is thereupon entitled to sign judgment against him. Either: (1.) For the non-appearance, if the writ has been specially indorsed; s. 37, C. L, P. Act, 1853: or, ' (3.) For want of plea, if the writ has not been specially indorsed ; s. 28, C. L. P. Act, 1852. Moreover, by s. 93, 0. L. P. Act, 1853, when the plaintifE in any action seeks to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money, judgment by default is final ; and by s. 94 of the same Act, where he seeks to recover an unliquidated sum, the ascer- tainment of which is merely matter of calculation, the Court directs the master to ascertain the amount, without refer- ence to the distinction between debt and dommgea, but the judgment is in the meantime interlocutory only. Of course, where the ascertainment of the damages is not merely matter of calculation, the jury must find the amount : and, mnhle, there is no judgment at all (by default or otherwise) untU the jury have so found. Judgment by default is also sometimes called judgment by Wil dicit. DEFEASANCE: See title Convet- ANCBS. DEFENSE: See titles Plea; Justifi- cation. DEFORCEMENT. This is the holding of any lands or tenements wrongfully as against any person who has the right thereto, but who has not as yet at any time been in the possession thereof; e. g., where a lessee for years or pii/r autre vie holds over after the determination of his interest and refuses to deliver up the pos- session to the reversioner or remainder- man. But when such a tenant holds over without any such refusal to deliver up, he is not a deforciant, but only a tenant by sufferance. The deforciant must have come in by right in the first instance ; for if the person wrongfully holding came in by wrong in the first instance, he is not a deforciant, but either, (1.) An intruder: see title Intbusion; (2. A disseisor: see title Disseisin; or, (3.) An abator : see title Abatement. 108 DEGRADATION. — DEMESNE LANDS. Deforcement. — {Omitin'ued.) • Deforcement in respe'ct that the defor- ciant comes in by right in the first in- stance is like dUoontinucmce, as to which see title DiscoNTiinjAircB. DEGRADATION. This phrase was applied: (1.) To the case of a peer de- prived of his nobility, e. g., the case of the Duke of Bedford, of Edward IV.'s reign, who was deprived by that sovereign on account of his poverty. And at the present day, a peer who becomes bank- rupt ceases for the time being to be capa- ble of sitting in the House of Lords (Bankruptcy Disqualification Act, 1871). (2.) To the case of an ecclesiastic who is divested of his holy orders ; degradation is a greater punishment than deposition, being not merely the displacing one from his office (which deposition also is) but also the divesting hrm of all his badges of honor, privileges, &c. ( which deposi- tion is not). DE INJURIA, REPLICATION. This was a form of taking issue, but which has been superseded by the C. L. P. Act, 1853, s. 79. The exact nature of the form inay be collected from Grogate^s Case (8 Rep. 66), and appears to have been in substance the following : It was a general repUcatioIi putting in issue all the mate- rial averments in the plea. Properly, therefore, it was to be replied to a plea of the defendant where, and only where, that plea consisted of matter of excuse, as that the plaintiS, e. g.,ia an action of trespass for driving the plaintiff's cattle, was himself in fault in the first instance in so doing; to which plea it is of course proper for the plaintiff to reply that the defendant's act was of his (the defend- ant's own proper wrong de injurid sud proprid), and vTithout any such ground of excuse as the defendant alleged (obHqite tali oausd). But where, as in Orogate's Case, the defendant justified under the command of his master, the replication de injwrid was held inapplicable, not being accompanied with a traverse of the command. See, also, titles New Assignment; Replication. T)iL CREDERE. In mercantile trans- actions, if a factor or agent agrees with his principal, in consideration of some additional compensation, to guarantee to the latter the debt to become due from the buyer, the excess of this compensa- tion ovier the ordinary compensation is Del Credere. — (OonUnued.) that which distinguishes a del credere com- mission from an ordinary one. Of course the del credere commission agent is liable on his guarantee in case of the purchaser's default to pay the price. * DELECTUS PERSONiE. The right of a partner to decide what new partners, if any, shall be admitted to the firm. Story Part., §§5, 105. DELICTO, ACTIONS EX. These are actions arising from a tort or wrong, being independent of contract, 0. L. P. Act, 1852. The wrong must not amount to a crime, otherwise it is no tort in English Law. The division of obligation in Roman law is the following: — Obligationes, (1.) Ex contractu. (3.) Ez delicto. (3.) Ex variis causanxm flguris. . Quasi ez Quasi ex contractu.- delicto. The same division is subtantially adopted in English Law; and the C. L. P. Act, 1852, s. 74, provides that in the case of actions which are founded upon obliga- tions which are doubtfully ex ccmtractu and dovbtfully ex delicto, the defendant may treat the declaration as framed in either he pleases, and may plead accordingly. * DE LUNATICO INQUIRENDO. A writ directing an inquiry whether a per- son is a lunatic or not. DEMESNE LANDS. These were such parts of the lands of a manor as the lord kept to himself as being necessary for his own use. Ancient demesne lands are those which were so kept by the king as lord in the reigns of Edward the Confes- sor and William 1, being the lands re- ferred to in Domesday Book as T^rce JSegis, or Terra Regis Ed/awrdi. Of such lands, one part was retained by the lord in his actual occupation for the purposes of his family; a second part was held ill viUenage, and out of it the tenures of Copyhold, Customary Freehold, and Ancient Demesne have arisen (see these three titles respectively) ; and the remain- ing part was left uncultivated, whence also it was called the Masfe lands of the manor, serving for public roads and for common of pasture to the lord and his tenants. See titles Commons ; Waste. DEMISE. — DEMURRER. 109 DEMISE. A word used in leases for terms of years, and being synonymous with lease, or let, from which it differs only in this respect, namely, that demise ex vi termini implies a covenant for title, and also a covenant for quiet enjoyment, whereas lease, or let, implies neither of these covenants. Where there are mutual leases of the same land, or of something out of the same land, made from one party to another on each side, it is said to be a conveyance by Dermae and Jfe- demise, e. g., where A. grants a lease to B. at a nominal rent and B. re-demises the same property to A. for a shorter term at a substantial rent. The word " demise " is also frequently used as a euphemism for decease or death, «. g., the demise of the king, more prop- erly, of the Crown, which means, speak- ing strictly, that in consequence of the king's natural body having by reason of the death thereof become disunited from his politic body, the kingdom is trans- ferred or demised to his successor, for the king, as a corporation sole, never dies. The word demise should not be confound- ed with the word devise. *DEMPSTEE. In Scotch Law, the- officer who pronounced the sentence of the court. 1 How. St. Tr. 927. DEMUBEAGE. This term is occasion- "ally used to signify the delay or period of delay of a vessel in port (from the Latin demora/rQ; but in law, it is more com- monly used to denote the sum which is fixed by the contract of carriage as a remuneration to the shipowner for the de- tention of his ship beyond the number of days allowed for loading or unloading. It is usual to calculate this sum at so much per day, and also to specify in the contract the allowed days of demurrage ; in which case, if the ship is delayed be- yond the agreed demurrage, the freighter becomes liable to pay damages for the excess, Which damages are usually esti- mated at the demurrage rate per day. If the ship after sailing puts back owing to contrary winds, and is detained in port by frost or bad weather, no demurrage is payable for that unavoidable delay ; and when the ship is to be unloaded in the usual and customary time, no demurrage is payable for a detention caused merely by the crowded state of the docks {Jamie- son V. Laurie, 6 Bro. P. C. 474 ; Burmes- ter V. Hodgson, 2 Camp. 438). "Where, however, the parties enter into a positive contract, that the goods shall be taken Demurrage. — ( Gontinued.) out of the ship within a specified number of days from her arrival, as such a con- tract is construed strictly, demurrage is payable for any delay beyond the speci- fied period, although the shipper is pow- erless to remove the causes of the delay, provided only the shipowner is not to blame. BamdaU v. Lynch, 2 Camp. 352 ; Besaey v. Evans, 4 Camp. 131. The contract to pay demurrage, which is contained in the charterparty, is made between the shipowner and the shipper, and the latter is therefore the person lia- ble to pay the demurrage ; but where, as is usually the case, the bill of lading mentions the demurrage, a consignee who accepts the goods under it may, and gen- erally does, become liable for it on a new contract, to be implied from his accept- ance of the goods under these circum- stances ; and such implied contract may arise, although the receiver at the time of receiving the goods states that he will not pay demurrage (Smith v. Sievehing, 4 E. & B. 945). But a mere reference in the bill of lading to the terms of the char- terparty, in which demurrage is specified, will not of itself render the consignee re- ceiving the goods liaOle for demurrage. Smith Y. Sievehing, supra. DEMURRER. In pleading, is the for- mal mode of disputing the sufficiency in law of the pleading of the other side. Before the C. L. P. Act, 1852, demur- rers were either general or special ; but by s. 51 of that Act, special demurrers were abolished. There is now therefore but one kind of demurrer, namely, the general demurrer, which is admissible under s. 50 of the C. L. P. Act, 1852, but only when the pleading of the oppo- site party is bad in substance ; for if the pleading is bad for argumentativeness, generality, repugnance, duplicity, or other like reason not also amounting to matter of substance, it is to be objected to un- der s. 52, of the C. L. P. Act, 1852, by summary application to the Court to strike out or amend. Under s. 89 of the same Act, the form, of a demurrer is this : — "The defendant [or " the plaintiff , " as the case may &ej, by his attorney \pr "in person," as the case may lei ^V^ ^^^^ ^^^ declaration [or "the plea," &c., as the case m^y be] is bad in substance." And in the margin of the demurrer book the matter of law intended to be relied on is to be stated. The other side may there- 110 DENIZEN. — DEP6t. Demurrer. — {Oontimted.) upon join in demurrer in this form: — "The plaintiff [or "the defendant," as the ease ma/y 6e] says that the declaration \w " plea, " &c. , CM *A« case may J«] is good in substance." Before the C. L. P. Act, 1862, a party was not at liberty both to plead and to demur to the same pleading; but by s. 80 of that Act, he may by leave of the Court now do so upon affidavit, which however is seldom required. In Chancery, whenever the statements contained in aplaintifl'sbill of complaint (assuming them all to be true as stated) are insufficient to entitle him to the re- lief prayed, the defendant may demur to the plaintiff's bill, either to the relief (which would include the discovery) sought, or to the discovery alone (exclu- sive of the relief). The most usual grounds of demurrer are the following : — (1.) Want of equity, whether (a.) In respect of the subject-matter ; or (J.) In respect of the plaintiff per- sonally; or (c.) In respect of the defendant per- sonally ; (3.) Want of parties ; (3.) Multifariousness; and (4.) Insufficiency in Law of case made by plaintiff. This fourth ground being analogous to the ground commonly taken at Law. The demurrer, as to its form, com- mences with a formal protestation of the falsehood of the statements in plaintiff's bill, and then demurs to the bill, or to the part of it which it specifies, for the cause which it also specifies, concluding with a general allegation of other good causes of demurrer, and praying to be dismissed from the suit with costs, and without being compelled to answer the plaintiff's bill. Twelve days after the date of his ap- pearance to the bill is allowed the defend- ant for demurring alone; and twenty- eight days if he demur as to part, and plead or answer as to the rest. The demurrer must be filed ; and within three weeks after the filing thereof, it may be set down for argument. In case the demurrer is allowed, it puts the plaintiff wholly out of Court, unless he obtains leave to amend ; on the other hand if the demurrer is overruled, the defendant is obliged to put in Ms full de- fense by answer. See titles Answer ; Plea. DENIZEN. A denizen is an alien by birth, who has obtained, ex donationeregh, letters patent making him an English subject. The king may denizenize but not naturalize a man, the latter requiring the consent of Parliament, either pro re nata or under a general Act, such as the Naturalization Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict, c. 14). A denizen holds a middle posi- tion between an alien and a natural bom or naturalized subject, being able to take lands by purchase or devise (which an alien could not until 1870 do), but not having been able to take lands by descent (which a natural bom or naturalized sub- ject may do). See, also, titles Allegiance; Aliens; Natuealization. DEODAND. Any personal chattel that is the immediate occasion of the death of any reasonable creature, and which by reason thereof precisely is forfeited to the king, to be applied to pious or charit- able uses, — ^being in Boman Catholic countries, the expiation by masses, and otherwise, of the sins of the deceased, and in Protestant countries, the relief of the deserving poor. Where the person killed is an infant under the age of dis- cretion, no deodand arises, there being in his case no sins of commission to ex- piate. DEPAKTTJRE. In pleading, where a ' man departs from one line of defense, • and has recourse to another line of de- fense either inconsistent vnth or not con- firmatory of his former defense, this is called a departure, and the effect of it is to render the entire pleading demurrable. Ban-tlett V. Wells, 1 B. & S. 836. * DEPART ATION. In Roman Law, A perpetual banishment depriving the banished of his rights as a citizen, and differing somewhat from relegation and eadle. 1 Brown Civ. Law, 135 note ; Inst. 1, 13; Dig. 48, 33, 14, 1. DEPOSIT: 5ee title Bailment. DEPOT. In French Law, is the depos- itum of Roman and the deposit of Eng- lish Law. It is of two kinds, being either (1.) DSp6t simply so called, and which may be either voluntary or neces- sarf; and (3.) Siguestre which is a de- posit made either under an agreement of the parties, and to abide the event of pending litigation regarding it, or by virtue of the direction of the Court or a judge, pending litigation regarding it. DEP.OSITION. — DESCENTS. Ill DEPOSITION. This word is used generally to denote any affidavit on oath, or solemn affirmation in lieu thereof. But it is more commonly used in a more particular sense, as meaning -7- a state- ment written down by an officer of the Court (called an examiner in Chancery), embodying the substance of the answers obtained from the deponent in the course of his examination. It is competent for either party to a suit which is intended to be heard upon motion for decree to ex- amine his own unwilling witness in this way, but only upon notice to the other side, who then and there may cross-ex- amine the deponent, the side who have called him in that case re-examining him. Also, in a suit in which repUoation has been filed, such depositions may be taken, but in this case ex parte. In either case the deposition is to be regarded as the reluctant affidavit of the deponent. Depositions are also taken before mag- istrates for the purpose of a criminal prosecution; and in case the deponent should die before the trial, or be too ill to attend, these depositions may be used in evidence, subject to certain restrictions, mentioned in the stat. 11 & 13 Vict. c. 43. DEPEIVATION: See title Degkada- TlOSf. DERELICT. Any thing thrown away or abandoned, with the intention of quit- ting the ownership thereof. Goods thrown out of a vessel to lighten same in time of distress are not derelict for want of the intention. See Just. Inst, ii, 1, 48. * DERELICTION. The gaining of land from the water, in consequence of the sea shrinking back below the usual water- mark; the opposite of alhimon. 3 Roll. Abr. 170; 3 Bl. Com. 363; Burr. Diet. DESCENDER. Writ of formedon in. This writ used to lie where a tenant in tail, having aliened the land otherwise than by fine or common recovery, or hav- ing been disseized thereof, died, and the heir in tail claimed to recover the land as against the person in possession thereof under the alienation or disseizin. DESCENT. Where the title to land vests in any one by mere operation of law, such title is said to vest in him by descent. As thus used the term is distin- guished from pu/rcJiase, which may be either demse or grant. Bee, also, next title. DESCENTS. Estates descend from an- cestor to heir, as the blood trickles. The following stages in the growth of the present law of descents may be indi- cated : — (1.) Fee simple estates were originally confined to the issue or lineal descendants of the ancestor ; (8.) By the reign of Henry II., collat- eral descendants were admitted to the succession upon the failure of lineals; (3.) By the time of Henry IH., primo- gemtwre, i. «., descent to the eld- est son in exclusion of the others, was established; (4.) By the time of Henry HI., the doc- trine of representation was estab- lished, whereby the issue of the eldest son who was dead stood in his place, to the exclusion of the other sons (being the uncles of such issue) ; (5.) In. the year 1833, the lineal ances- tors were as such rendered capa- ble of being heirs ; (6.) In the year 1833, the half-blood of the purchaser became admis- sible to succeed as heir.; and (7.) In the year 1859, the widow of the purchaser became admissible to succeed as heir. The following are the canons which at present regulate the descent of lands in England: — (1.) The inheritance is to descend to the lineal descendants of the purchaser in injmibwm (see title Pttechaser) ; (3.) And to the male issue in prefer- ence to females ; (3.) And to the eldest male issue in exclusion of the others (see title Peimoobniturb) ; but if there are no male issue, then to the female issue altogether (see title COPABCBNBRS) ; (4.) Lineal descendants in inflnitmn are to represent their ancestor (see title Representation) ; (S.) Failing lineal descendants of the purchaser, the inheritance is to go to the nearest lineal ancestor, the father succeeding before the brother or sister of the purchaser, and every more remote ancestor succeeding before his issue other than any less remote ancestor or ancestors, and his or their issue ; (6.) In the application of the 5th canon, the succession is to be 112 DB SON TORT DEMESNE.— PBTINUE. -{Oontirmed.') according to the followmg order: (as.) The father and all male paternal ancestors and their descend- ants in mfln/itfum; Q>.) AH the female paternal ancestors and their heirs ; (fi.) The mother and all male mater- nal _ ancestors, and her and their descendants in imfini- tmn; and {d.) All the female maternal ances- tors and their heirs ; (7.) The half-blood of the purchaser shall inherit: {a.) Where the common ancestor is a male, next after a kinsman in the same degree of the whole blood, and the issue of such kinsman in injmi- tum; and (6.) Where the common ancestor is a female, next after that female ; (8.) In the application . of the 6th canon : (a.) In the adraission of female pater- nal ancestors, the mother of the more remote male pater- nal ancestor and her heirs are to be preferred to the mother of the less remote and her heirs ; and (5.) In the admission of female maternal ancestors, the mother of the more remote male maternal ancestor and her heirs are to be preferred to the mother of the less remote one and her heirs ; (9.) Failing the discovery of an heir after the application of all the first eight canons, the land is to descend to the heir of the per- son last entitled, although he was not the purchaser thereof ; and such heirs will, of course, have to be ascertained by the renewed application of the first eight canons, starting only from a different point of departure, or in propodlma. For the rules of descent in the United States, see Washburn on Real Property. DESIGNS, COPYRIGHT IN : See title COPYBIOHT. DE SON TORT DEMESNE. These are words which were commonly used in the replication to a defendant's plea in an [De Son Tort Demesne. — {Gontmued.') action of trespass qvMre ckmsum f regit as thus: — A. sues B., B.' pleads that he com- mitted the alleged trespass by the com- mand of X. ; A. replies that B. did it de son tort demesne, sa/rn ceo que X. hd com- mand modo etformd. Since the cases of TreveUan v. Pyne (Balk. 107), and Ohcmr hers V. Donaldson (11 East, 65), the al- leged command has been traversable in pleading; and by the 0. L. P. Act, 1852, s. 77, a plaintifE is at liberty to traverse the whole of any plea or subse- quent pleading of the defendant by a eENBRAL denial (in the form " The plain- tiff takes issue, &c.,") or admitting some part or parts thereof to deny all the rest, or to deny any one or more allegations ; "SO that the plea d^e son tort demesne, semhle, is now superfluous. DETAINER. This word was used in two kindred sensed; firstly, it signified the forcibly keeping another out of possession of lands or tenements, an injury which was not. only of a ciTil nature, entitling the dispossessed party to damages, but also of a criminal nature, rendering the dispossessor liable to a fine to the king for his breach of the king's peace. Com- pare in Roman law the Lex Jvliade Vi. Secondly, it signified a writ which lay against persons imprisoned in the Mar- shalsea or the Fleet, and which was directed to the marshal or warden (as the case might be), and directed him to detain the prisoner in his custody until he should be lawfully discharged therefrom. In this latter sense, detainer is become obsolete, in consequence of the Debtor's Act, 1869 (33 & 33 Vict. c. 63). DETERMINATION. This word, as used in Law, denotes the ending or ex- piration of any estate or interest in prop- erty, e. g., an estate during widowhood determines upon re-marriage, and an estate during minority upon attaining twenty-one years of age, and so forth. DETINUE. An action which lies for the recovery of goods wrongfully detain- ed by any one ; e. g., for a horse lent. The judgment in this action is, that the plain- tiS (when successful) do recover the arti- cles or their value, together with the damages and costs found by the verdict, and tiie costs of increase {see title In- crease; Costs OP). Prior to the C. L. P. Act, 1854, the defendant had the option either to pay the value or restore the goods, but now, by s. 78 of that stat- DEVASTAVIT. — DILAPIDATIONS. 113 Detinue. — ( GonUnued.) ute, sucli option belongs to the plaintiff, ■who, upon application to the Court or a judge, may (at the discretion of the Court or judge) have execution for the goods detained, enforcable by distress. But Courts of Equity could always upon bill filed, order the delivery up of chattels improperly detained, e. g., deeds, court rolls; also, old family pictures, horns, snufE-boxes, &c. FeUs v. Bead, 3 Ves. 70. DEVASTAVIT. In an action against an executor or administrator, where the plaintiff has obtained judgment that he do recover his debt and costs out of the assets of the testator (if any), and failing these, do recover his costs out of the ex- ecutor or administrator's own goods, the usual writ of execution is a^. fa. de tonis testatoris; but if the sheriff return to this nulla hoTia testatoris nee propria, and a devastcmt, the plaintiff may forthwith upon the return sue out a Ji. fa. de bonis propriis, or (at his election) an elegit or a ca. sa. against the property or the person of the executor or administrator, in as full a manner as in an action against him in his own right. A deeastavit is there- fore strictly such a return by the sheriff ; however, the word is commonly employed in the general sense of wasting the goods of the deceased, or in Equity in the sense of a breach of trust or misappropriation of the assets. DE VENTRE INSPICIENDO. Where a widow is suspected of feigning herself with child, the heir may have a writ de ventre inspidendo, to examine her womb whether it be as feigned or not ; and in case her womb be as feigned, the heir may, until her delivery, keep her under DEVISAVIT VEL NON. This was an issue directed not unfrequently by the Court of Chancery, to be tried before a jury at Common Law ; and a like issue . may be tried by that Court itself at the present day in a proper case. The object of the issue is to ascertain whether or not certain properties are comprised within a devise which appears prima fade not to comprise them. A proper case for such an issue was that of Ifewhirgh v. New- hv/rgh, 5 Madd. 364. DEVISE. This word meant originally to divide or distribute property, but it is now used exclusively to signify the giv- ing of real estates by will, the testator 15 Devise. — ( OontArmed.) being called the devisor, and the object of his bounty the devisee. The word "devise" is properly applicable to real estate only, while the word " bequeath " is properly apphcable to personal estate only, and upon the strength of the word "devise" alone, an intention has been found to pass real property, which noth- ing else m the will seemed to indicate ; see Goan-d v. Roldemess, 30 Beav. 147. DICTUM. Called also obiter dictum, or "remark by the way," is a remark more or less casual dropping from a judge with respect to the law in matters like that at the time before him. * DIEM CLAUSIT EXTREMUM. A writ which lay on the death of a tenant in capite, to ascertain the lands of which he died seized and reclaim them into the hands of the king. Fitz. Nat. Brev. 251 K. A writ issuing after the death of a debtor of the king, directing an inquiry into the property of which he died pos- sessed, with a view to procuring satisfac- tion of the king's debt. 4 Steph. Com. 47, 48. DIES NON JURIDICUS. A day on which the Courts, for reasons of religion, do not sit ; e. g., Good Friday, Sunday and the like. In Roman law it is called dies nefastus. The days on which the Courts may sit are called dies juridid, and in Roman Law are called dies fotsti. Vaca- tions are non-court days for a very differ- ent reason, namely, the health of the judges, counselors and officers. DIET. A legislative assembly; e. g., the Diet of Frankfort. DIEU ET MON DROIT ("God and my right.") This is the motto of the royal family, and is said to have been first used by Richard I. It signifies that the sovereignty is subject only to the divine and not to any human law. But it is no Eretext either for absolutism on the one and, or for the subjection of the State to the Church on the other. DIGNITIES. These are _ titles of honor; and having been originally an- nexed to land, they are considered as real property. 1 Cm. 55. DILAPIDATIONS. This word denotes generally letting a house get into bad repair, and is applicable generally to all tenants who are under a covenant to repair (see title Waste). But it is more pecu- 114 DILATOET PLEAS.— DISCOVERT. Dilapidations. — {OonUnued.) liarly applicable to the bad repair of ecclesiastical residences, the Ecclesiasti- cal Law enabling a succeeding rector to bring an action for dilapidations against the executor or administrator of his pre- decessor, or (if he should be living) against the predecessor himself. DILATOBT PLEAS : See title Abate- ment, Pleas in. * DILIGENCE. An amount of care, the absence of which is negligence. Story BaU. §§ 11, 16. In Scotch Law, process by which persons, lands or goods are seized in execution or in security of debt. Ersk. Inst. 3, 11, s. 1 ; Bell Diet. Process for enforcing attendance of witnesses or the production of writings. Burr. Diet. ♦DIMINUTION OP THE BECOBD. Incompleteness pf the record of a case sent fjfcm a subordinate to a superior court, which may be rectified by a writ of certiorari. Tidd Pract. 1109. DIRECTING THE JUET : See title JURT. DISABILITY. This means any inca- pacity either of acquiring or of trans- mitting a right, or of resisting a wrong. Such disability may arise either from the act of the party, or from the act of his ancestor, or from the act of law, or from the act of God. (1.) Prom the act of the party, — as where, after having agreed upon the surrender of an old lease to grant a new one, he grants the reversion to another, whereby he incapacitates him- self to grant the new lease; (2.) Prom the act of the ancestor, — as where he was attainted or convicted of treason or fel- ony, whereby formerly he rendered his children incapable of inheriting; (3.) Prom the act of law, — as where (prior to 1870) he was an alien bom, whereby, or in consequence thereof, the law struck him with a general incapacity to hold lands; and (4.) Prom the act of God, — as where he is a lunatic or idiot, and in- capable therefore generally of contract- ing. DISBAB. To deprive a barrister per- manently of the privUeges of his position. It is analogous to striking an attorney ofi the rolls. Being an extreme measure, it is more common to suspend than to dis- bar. DISCLAIMEB: 5«« Coitvetanobs. DISCONTINUANCE. This phrase is applied to the cessation of an estate or of an action. As applied (1.) to the cessa- tion of an estate, it arises when he who hath an estate tail maketh a larger estate of the land than by law he is entitled to do, in which case the. estate is good, but so far only as his estate extends who made it, «. g., if tenant in tail makes a feoffment in fee simple, or for the life of the feoffee, or in tail — all which are be- yond his power to make — and if the feoffee having entered (as lawfully he may) during the life of the feoffor, re- tains the possession after the death of the latter, the injury which he does by such retention is a discontinuance of the legal estate of the heir in tail. As applied (3.) to the cessation of an action, it is somewhat similar to a non- suit ; for when a plaintiff makes a break in the proceedings by not continuing the process regularly from day to day or from time to time as he ought to do, the defend- ant is no longer bound to attend, but the suit is discontinued, and the plaintiff must pay the defendant his costs before he recommences his action. However, by rule 31 T.T. 1853, "no entry or continu- ances by way of imparlance, curia adim- ari vuUjidcecomes non misit breve, or other- wise, shall be made on any record or roll whatever, or in the pleadings." On the other hand , if the plaintiff finds that he has misconceived his action, or that for some defect in the pleadings, or other reason, he is not able to maintain it, he may either, upon apphcation at the proper office of the Court, or upon mo- tion to the Court itself, obtain a rule for leave to discontinue upon the terms of paying the defendant his costs. After a discontinuance, a plaintiff may commence a new action for the same cause; and therefore the Court, in many cases of hard actions, refuses leave to discontinue (SoiccJwr V. La/wson, Hardw. 360) ; as it also does after a peremptory rule for judg- ment on demurrer. Turner v. Twmer, 1 Salk. 179. * DISCONTINUOUS S E EV I T U D E. An easement made up of repeated acts instead of one continuous act, as right of way, drawing water. Bouv. Diet. DISCOVEBT. By the Common Law, neither party to an action was required to make discovery to the other of any doc- uments or circumstances which might be useful in evidence ; and an application re- quired to be made to the Court of Chan- DISENTAILING ASSURANCE. — DISSEIZIN. 115 Discovery. — {OonUniied.) eery, which woiild in certain cases, upon a Bill of Discovert being filed, decree that the defendant thereto should make a particular discovery .to the plaintiff. But, at the present day, bills of discov- ery are become unnecessary ; for, in the Court of Chancery, discovery of docu- ments may be obtained under the Juris- diction Act, 1853, by summons at Cham- bers ; and, under the stats. 14 & 15 Vict, c. 99, and 17 and 18 Vict. c. 125, discov- ery may now also be had at law. There are also numerous particular provisions in those statutes regarding (fiscovery by means of interrogatories. See title Intbbrogatokies. DISENTAILING ASSURANCE. By the Stat. 3 & 4 WiU. 4, c. 74, which abol- ished the ancient Fines and Recoveries, whereby formerly (amongst other things) an estate tail might be barred, there was substituted a new assurance, called a dis- entailing assurance, which was calculated to produce the same eflfect. By this as- surance, which is in the form of a simple indenture, but which requii-es to be en- rolled within six months of its execution in the Court of Chancery, the tenant in tail (with or without the consent of the protector, see that title, when there is any such) conveys the lands to a middle man (or man of straw), to the use of himself, the tenant in tall, his heirs and assigns, by which means, and under the Statute of Uses, he instantly emerges a legal ten- ant in fee simple. It is usual (but not apparently necessary) to add, that the ob- ject of the assurance is to dock and bar the entail and all remainders, &c. Where there is a protector, and he refuses to con- cur, the disentailing deed has the effect of a fine only, but otherwise it has the effect of a cow/mon recovery {see these two titles). DISFRANCHISE. To deprive of cer- tain privileges, freedoms, or franchises. See title Enfranchise, which is the opposite. DISHONOR, NOTICE OF : See title Bill of Exchange. DISPAUPER. When a poor person has been admitted to sue in forma pcm- peris, and through the subsequent acqui- sition of property or any other sufficient cause it is proper that he should be de- f)rived of the privilege of suing in that quality, then he is deprived of the privi- lege accordingly; in other words, he is DISPENSING POWER. The early English sovereigns, in imitation of the Popes of Rome, had assumed to dispense with the laws by issuing proclamations and making grants ' ' non obstante any par- ticular law to the contrary." This as- sumption was odious to the Common Law. The practice, notwithstanding, con- tinued to be exercised, and in some reigns more extensively than in others. In par- ticular the exercise of the power by Rich- ard II. is said to have been such as to set aside the very principles of the statutes dispensed from ; but the more usual prac- tice was to dispense in particular cases only of an exceptional character. It was the opinion of Lord Coke (Case of Mm Obstante, 13 Rep. 30), that no Act of Par- liament could bind the Iring from any prerogative that was inseparable from his person, so as that he might not dispense with the statute by non obstante. But the true nature and limits of the king's right of dispensing with statutes was not fully understood imtil the case of TJuimas v. Sowdl, decided in 1666, and reported in Vaughan. The judgment given was to the efifect that the king was able to dis- pense in some cases and not in others, and that the distinction between the two clas- ses of cases did not depend (as had at one time been said) upon whether the act prohibited by the statute was malum in se or Ttiahtm, prohibiMm only, but that it depended upon whether the king himself was the only person affected by it or whether his subjects also were affected by it. He could dispense with his own priv-- ileges, but not with his subjects' rights. In the recent Case of Eton OoUege, 1815, it was held that a d^pensation of Eliza- beth granted to the fellows of Eton Col- lege to hold ecclesiastical preferment to- gether with their fellowships, notwith- standing a statute of Henry VI. to the contrary, was a legitimate exercise of the dispensing power. DISSEIZIN. When one man invades the possession of another, and by force or surprise turns him out of the occupation of his lands, this is termed a disseizin, being a deprivation of that actual seizin or cor- poral possession of the freehold which the tenant before enjoyed. In other words, a disseizin is said to be when one enters intending to usurp the possession, and to oust another from the freehold. There- fore gucm-endwm est a judice qm animo he entered. To constitute an entry a dis- seizin, there must be an ouster of the freehold, either, first, by taking the 116 DISSENTERS. —DISTRINGAS. Disseizin. — ( ConUrmed.) profits ; or, secondly, by claiming the in- heritance (1 Cruise, 60). He who so en- ters and puts a party out of possession of the freehold is termed the disseizor. Litt. 379. DISSENTEKS. The stat. 1 WiU. & M. sess. 1, c. 18 (Toleration Act), s. 4, exempted persons taking the oaths and subscribing the declaration therein men- tioned from aU prosecutions in the Eccle- siastical Courts for nonconformity; and it was held in Barnes v. Shore (8 Q. B. 640), that this provision extended not only to lay persons, but to clergymen, who, after being ordained, dissented from the Church. For disturbing a Dissent- ing congregation each offender is liable to a penalty of £20. A Jewish synagogue is not at the present day an illegal estab- lishment. Israel v. Simrrums, 3 Stark. 356. Dissenters, in respect of their religious worship have as fuU a right as Church- men to the protection of the Courts (Bex V. Wroughton, 3 Burr. 1683) ; and a man- damus v?ill lie to register and certify a dissenting meeting-house {Bex v. Defrby [Justices], 4 Burr. 1991); also to compel the trustees of a meeting-house to admit a Dissenting teacher. Bex v. BarJeer, 3 Burr. 1365. DISSOLUTION: See titles Parlia- ment; Partnership. DISTANCE. Is to be measured in a straight line as the crow flies (Zahe v. Butler, 6 El. & Bl. 93). And where the trustees of a turnpike road were prohib- ited by a local Act of Parliament from erecting any toll-gate within three miles of Bargate in the town of Southampton, it was held that the distance was to be measured by a straight line and not by the road (JeweU v. Stead, 6 El. & Bl. 350). See, also, Duignan v. Walher, 1 Johns. 446 (an injunction case). * DISTRAIN. To take and keep the property of another as a pledge for the payment of some debt or the performance of some service. 3 Bl. Com. 331. DISTRESS. A power of distress may belong to a landlord either in virtue of express words conferring it, or in virtue of the general law. In the latter cage, the following are the requisites to the power of distress : (1.) There must be an actual demise, and not a mere agreement for a lease ; (3.) The rent must be certain; Distress. — ( GonUnued.) (3.) The rent must be in arrear, but in the case of rents payable in ad- vance, these are held to be in arrear instantly upon the com- mencement of the period for which they are payable (Buckley V. Taylor, 2 T. R. 600) ; and (4.) The distrainor must have the re- version in him, either an actual reversion or (at the least) a re- version by estoppel. Morton v. Woods, L. R. 3 Q. B. 658. DISTRESS INFINITE. In the case of a distress for fealty or suit of Court, no distress can be unreasonable, immoder- ate, or too large ; for this is the only rem- edy to which the party aggrieved is en- titled, and therefore it ought to be such as is sufficiently compulsory ; and let it be of what value it may, there is no harm done, especially as it cannot be sold or made away with, but must be restored immediately on satisfaction made. A distress of this nature, that has no bounds vsdth regard to its quantity, and which may be repeated from time to time, until the stubbornness of the party is con- quered, is called a distress infinite. For some other purposes, as in summoning jurors and the like, a distress infinite used also to be allowed. ♦DISTRIBUTION. This word is commonly used to denote the division of the effects of an intestate among those entitled to shares thereof. DISTRINGAS. A writ of distringas may be put upon stock or moneys in the Bank of England, and its eflect is exactly that of a stop-order on a fund in Chan- cery (see title Stop-order). Formerly a vrait bearing this name used to be directed to the sherifE, commanding him to dis- train upon the goods and chattels of a defendant, in order to compel his ap- pearance to a writ of summons. This distringas, however, was' only granted when the person requiring the same had shown by affidavit to the satisfaction of the Court out of which the writ of sum- mons issued, that the defendant had not been personally served with the writ of summons, and had not, according to the exigency thereof, appeared to the action, and could not be compelled so to do without some more efficacious process (1 Arch. Prac. 203). The writ in this sec- ond use of it was abolished by the C. L. P. Act, 1852. DISTRMGA8 JURAT0RB8. — DOLE. 117 DISTRINGAS JURATORES. A writ directed to the aherifl peremptorily com- manding Mm to compel the appearance of jurors in Court on a certain day therein appointed. This writ also has been abol- ished by the C. L. P. Act, 1852. 1 Arch. Prac. 365. DISTURBANCE. A species of injury to real property, commonly consisting of a wrong done to some incorporeal here- ditament by hindering or disquieting the owners in their regular and lawful enjoy- ment of it. There were five principal varieties of this injury, viz. : (1.) Disturb- ance of franchise; (3.)' Disturbance of common ; (3.) Disturbance of ways ; (4.) Disturbance of tenure ; and (5.) Disturb- ance of patronage. Finch. 187. DIVORCE (divortium). The separa- tion of husband arid wife by the operation of the law. There were two kinds of divorce, the one total, the other partial ; the one a vinculo matrimonii, the other merely d mensd et ihoro. The total di- vorce, a mneulo matn-vmonii, used to be only for some canonical cause of impedi- ment existing before the marriage, e. jr., consanguinity, and not for any impediment that was supervenient, or arising after- ward, as may be the case in affinity or cor- poreal imbecility. In these cases of a total divorce, the marriage used to be declared null, as having been absolutely unlawful ah initio ; and the parties were therefore separated 'pro salute animarum, ; for which reason no such divorce could be obtained but during the life of the parties. In these divorces the wife, it was said, should receive all again that she brought with her, because the nullity of the marriage arose through some impediment, and the goods, of the wife were given for her ad- vancement in marriage, which was now found never to have existed. (Dyer, 62.) But at the present day a divorce o vinr culo matrimonii may be obtained for a cause that is supervenient; thus, a hus- band may obtain it on account of his wife's adultery, and a wife may obtain it on account of her husband's adultery, and coupled with cruelty or desertion on his part; and such divorces are not unfre- quently granted under the provisions of the Act 31 & 23 Vict. c. 77, without the necessity (which for some time existed) of obtaining a special statute for the purpose. TT&is divorce enables the par- ties to marry again, and to do all other acts as if they had never been married. Divorce a m,eiisdet thoro used to be granted Divorce. — ( Oontinued.) when the marriage was just and lawful ah initio, and therefore the law was tender of dissolving it ; but for some superven- ient cause it might become improper or impossible for the parties to live together, e. g., in case of intolerable ill-temper, or adultery in either of the parties. But at the present day there is either a total divorce & vincnih matrim/mii for the causes mentioned above, or else a judicial sepa- ration for causes that are insufficient to justify a total divorce, e. g., cruelty or incompatibility of temper, being extreme. Parties separated in this manner cannot afterward marry again, until the one party is dead. See, also, title Alimony. * DOCKET. A brief record of judicial proceedings. DOCKET, STRIKING A. A phrase that was formerly used in the practice of bankruptcy. It referred to the entry of certain papers at the bankrupt office, pre- liminary to the prosecution of the flat against a trader who had become bank- rupt. These papers consisted of the affi- davit, the bond, and the petition of the petitioning creditor ; and their object was to obtain from the Lord Chancellor his flat, authorizing the petitioner to pros- ecute his complaint against the bank- rupt, either in Her Majesty's Court of Bankruptcy in London, or in one of the district Courts of Bankruptcy in the country. The affidavit had to be left at the office of the Secretary of Bank- rupts, who used to make an entry in the "docket book," and this seems to have been what was technically termed strik- ing a docket. The bond formerly entered into by the petitioner was by the statute 5 & 6 Vict. c. 123, no longer required ; but upon the affidavit being left at the office, the clerk prepared the petition, annexed the affidavit to it, and thereupon obtained the Lord Chancellor's fiat . The modem equivalent seems to be putting the petition in bankruptcy upon the files of the Court, no flat of the Lord Chan- cellor being now required in order to prosecute the bankruptcy. Bee Bank- ruptcy Act, 1869. DOLE. This word is derived from the Saxon dela/n, to divide, and denotes a part or portion of a meadow which is divided; and the word still retains the meaning of divide, e. g., to dole out alms is to divide or distribute alms. 118 DOLI ESrCAPAX — DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA. ' * DOLIINCAPAX. Incapable of dis- tinguishing good from evil. A child under fourteen is, ^»TOM/a(!i«, doUmcapax, but may be shown to be doli ca/pax. (3 Bl. Com. 33. Bout. Diet.) A female is sooner doli ca/pax than a male. Bract., fol. 86, 6. ♦DOLUS. Fraud or deceit. DOME, or DOOM. This is literally a judgment, and obtained at first a neutral meaning; e. g.,va. the Black Book of Hereford, fo. 46, this phrase occurs, — "So help me God at his holy dome" — meaning at the day of last judgment. But the word has more recently acquired the meaning of condem/naUon. DOME-BOOE. A book of judgments {dooms, domes). The book thus called was compiled during the time of Alfred the Grreat, and is said to have been extant so late as the reign of Edward IV., after which it was lost. It is generally assumed to have contained the principal rules of the Common Law (so far as these rules were then developed), together with the then penalties for misdemeanors, and the then forms of judicial proceedings. DOMESDAY-BOOK. The book thus called was compiled in the reign and by the direction of William I., commonly called the Conqueror, and is one of the many works of permanent utility of that sovereign. It was in two volumes, and contained the details of a great survey of the kingdom, throughout all its counties, five men in each county (called justices) having been assigned in 1081 for the pur- pose of collecting the necessary statistics, and having completed their statement thereof in 1086, when the whole returns were thrown together and formed the two volumes of Domesday-Book. This work is an authority upon certain points of real property law; e. g., upon the question whether lands of copyhold tenure are or are not of that peculiar species of copyhold which is called Andeni Demesne : see that title. DOMICILE. Is the place at which a person has his principal residence, and that is generally construed to be the place at which he usually keeps his wife and family (or household gods, vMlar et pe- nates). In the case of infants and married women, their domicile is that of their parents or husband. A domicile may be either original or acquired. The original domicile (domieiUwm originis) is that at Domicile. — ( OonUrmed.) which the parents of the person are domi- ciled at the time of his birth, and usually agi-ees (under English law) with his nationality. To acquire another domi- cile, the rule of law is that both the amitms (or intention to acquire it) and the faciMm (or actual acquisition of it) must combine. Now the acquisition of a new domicile is only complete when the former domicile is definitely abandoned, and an actual removal is made to the place of the acquired domicile. But for the re-acqui- sition of the original domicile, the defini- tive abandonment of the acquired domi- cile when followed up, or rather when evidenced, by one step toward a return to the original domicile, is sufficient. The law of a man's domicile for the time being (whether original or acquired) determines all his personal capacities and incapacities ; and to that extent it often controls the operation of the Lex loci situs (see that title), although not also the ope- ration of the Lex loci rei sitm (see that title). Further, the Lex Domicilii also regulates the distribution of his personal estate in case of his death intestate. See Story on Conflict of Laws; "Westlake's Private International Law. DOMINANT TENEMENT. In the law of easements, the tenement whose owner as such enjoys an easement over an ad- joining tenement is called by his name. See title Easements. DONATION. In French Law, every do- nation in order to be complete must be assented to by the donee, and if a married woman, with the consent of her husband. Immediately upon such assent being given, the gift is complete (just as in Koman Law) without any traditio; for a necessity is laid on the donor or Ms heirs to make troMUo. In this respect, the English Law differs from both, holding that not only is assent on the part of the donee necessary, but also delivery of the thing given. In French Law such gifts are irrevocable, excepting for one of three causes, — (1.) The non-performance of conditions when there are any such ; (2.) The ingratitude of the donee ; or (3.) The subsequent birth of oflEspring. DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA. Is a gift made in contemplation of death, and taking absolute effect upon the death. The great essential to it is a delivery actual or constructive of the thing given; and provided that requisite is observed, DORMANT PARTNER. — DOWRY. 119 Donatio Mortis Causa. — {Oontirmed.') there is nothing which may not be the subject of such a gift, excepting a cheque (inasmuch as the authority to pay that is revoked upon the death), and exceptiag perhaps real property (inasmuch as the law prescribes particular formalities for the conveyance of such). There may, however, be a donatio mortis causd of a mortgage debt charged on real property ; and such gift is made by a delivery of the mortgage deeds. DORMANT PARTNER. A sleeping partner. See title Pabtnbbship. DOTE ASSIttNANDA. The writ thus described lay for a widow whose husband held of the king in chief, and was issued to the escheators upon the widow's mak- ing oath in Chancery not to marry with- out the king's leave. Sueh widows were called the king's widows. DOTE UNDE NIHIL HABET. The writ thus described lay for a widow against a purchaser of the lands from her husband. DOUBLE COSTS. Under the statute 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97, all previous Acts of Parliament (whether pubUo or private) which awarded double or treble costs are repealed, and party and party costs only, or reasonable costs upon taxation only, are to be given, when given at all. DOUBLE PLEA. The plea thus de- scribed is faulty on the ground of du- plicity. Duplicity in pleading is a fault which may arise either in the declaration or in any subsequent pleading, and signi- fies the allegation of several d&stinct mat- ters in support of, or in answer to, a single demand, any one of which matters would be sufficient of itself to support the de- mand, or to answer it. Leave to plead several pleas may, however, be obtained under the 0. L. P. Act, 1853, s. 81. The fault of duplicity used formerly to be taken advantage of by special demurrer ; but since the C. L. P. Act, 1853, it is now to be met by application in a sum- mai-y way under s. 53 of that Act, to amend or strike out the faulty pleading. DOWAGER. A widow who is en- dowed, or who has a jointure in lieu of dower, is thus described ; but in common practice the word is confined to the widows of princes, dukes, and other like persons only. DOWER. The right of a widow during the residue of her life to one- third part of the lands late of her de- ceased husband. (1.)' In the case of widows who were married before the 1st of January, 1834, the right to dower attached to all lands of which the husband was solely seized for an estate of inheritance, and having once attached, the right was not capable of being barred or defeated excepting by a,Jine in which the wife joined. In the absence of a fine, it attached upon the lands even when m the hands of a pur- chaser. It was not necessary that she should have any issue actually bom. To exclude her dower from attaching at all was therefore the great object of every purchaser of land; and the two methods were in common use, called respectively the old method and the modem method of barring dower. Under the old method, the lands were conveyed to the grantee and his heirs, to the use of the grantee and a trustee and the heirs of the grantee, with a declaration that the estate of the trustee was in trust only for the grantee and his heirs. Under the modem method, a general power of appointment was in the first place given to the grantee, and subject thereto to the grantee for his life, with remainder to a trustee and his heirs during the purchaser's life, with an ulti- mate remainder to the heirs and assigns of the purchaser for over. See 4 Kent Com. 85 ; Waahb. Real Prop. 146. (3.) In the case of widows who have been married since the 1st of January, 1834, the right of dower attaches to all lands of wmch the husband is solely seized, or even equitably possessed, for an estate of inheritance ; but although it may have once attached, the right is of the most fragile sort, being defeated by any declaration in the will of the husband, or by his devise of the lands, or by his alienation of them during his life, and even, pro tanto, by his debts. And it is not infrequent to exclude it from attach- ing even from the first, by inserting a declaration to that effect in the deed of grant, which is also now effectual to defeat the widow's right. DOWRY. This is the proper name for the property which the wife brings to her husband upon her marriage with him, and, like the doa of Roman Law, is dis- tinguished from the dower (or jointure in lieu thereof), which corresponds to the donatio propter nuptias of Roman Law. 120 DROIT. — DYING WITHOUT ISSUE. Dowry. — ( Oontimted.) The wife's dowry is often called her mwritagium in the old statutes. DKOIT. This word signified right. Droit-d/roit signifies, therefore, a right upon a right, or a double right, and was used to denote the title of one in whom the right of possession and the right of property were combined. The phrase d/roitural was used of actions which were brought upon a writ of right, as distin- guished from that other group of actions called possessory, which were brought upon the fact of, or right to, the posses- sion merely. * DROIT D'AUBAINE. A rule by which the sovereign or the State becomes possessed of all the property of an alien on his death. Treaties relinquishing this right have been made between different countries. * DROIT DE BRIS. A right, formerly claimed by the lords of the coast of cer- tain parts of Prance, to shipwrecks, including both the persons and property cast away. It was abrogated in 1326. Laws of Oleron xxvi, note. DROITS CITILS. In French Law, denote private rights, and the exercise of which is independent of the status {guaUte) of citizen. Foreigners enjoy them, and the extent of that enjoyment is determined by the principle of reci- procity. Conversely, foreigners, although not resident in France, may be sued on contracts made by them in France, and (unless possessed of sufficient real prop- erty in France) are obliged to give security. This provision meets such a case, semMe, as that of Lerovix v. Brown, 13 C. B. 801. DRUNKENNESS. Where total, is a qualified incapacity for contracting ; and where the drunkenness, being partial, is caused by the other contracting party to the fraud of the intoxicated person, then it is also a ground for avoiding the con- tract. And with reference to crime, habitual drunkards are placed under police supervision; and persons commit- ting any crilne while in a state of tem- porary drunkenness are not excused thereby, but the circumstance at the very most goes only in extenuation of the ofiEense. 1 Hawk. c. 1, s. 6 ; Arch. Grim. PI. 18. DUCES TECUM. When a person has in his possession any written instrument Duces Tecum. — {Continued.) which is capable of being used as evi- dence at the trial or hearing, he is brought before the Court upon a subpama duces teeam, yrhich is a writ commanding him to appear at the trial and hri/ng the instrument vyifh M/m. And, notwith- standing he may have some good reason for not producing it, still he must obey the writ in the first instance, not himself judging, but leaving the Court to judge, of the sufficiency of his reason for the non-production. DUCH¥ COURT OF LANCASTER: See title Ohajncellor. DUM FUIT INFRA aiTATEM. A writ which lay for the recovery of lands which a man had alienated while vmder age. The writ lay also for the heir of the infant alienor. DUM FUIT IN prison!. A writ which lay for the recovery of lands which a man had alienated while in prison or under duress. DUM FUIT NON compos MENTIS. A writ which lay for the recovery of lands which a man had alienated while insane. DUPLICATE. Any copy or tran- script of a deed or writing is called a duplicate. DURESS. Is of two kinds, being either (1.) To the person; or (2.) To the goods. The object, of placing either the person or the goods under duress being to extort money in excess of what (if any thing) is rightfully owing, the law holds that the excess so obtained may be recovered back as money had and received; also, that duress (like fraud) vitiates all contracts made under its influence. DYING DECLARATIONS. In crimi- nal law the dying declarations of the injured person, being an adult, are ad- missible, but being an infant of very tender years are not admissible in evi- dence, the reason for the exclusion of the latter being that the clyld's mind is not affected by the prospect of death, as the adult's is supposed to be. See Greenl. Ev., §§ 156-7. DYING WITHOUT ISSUE. Formerly, if lands were given to A., and if he died without issue, then to B. in fee simple, A. took an estate tail by implication, and B. an estate in fee simple in remainder, E ALDERMAN. — EASEMENTS. 121 Dying without Issue. — (OonUmied.) which, however, A. could defeat. But now, under 1 Vict. c. 26, under the same words, A. would take an estate in fee simple defeasible in case he left no issue when he died, and B. would take an estate in fee simple that was executory upon the same event, namely, A.'s leav- ing no issue at the time of his, A.'s death. E. EALDEBMAN. A title of oflBce in Anglo-Saxon times, and holding in those times the same position of eminency that the title of Earl held during the Danish period of occupancy. The alderman of the present day, mean- ing thereby the civic functionary so described, is clearly a derivation ety- mologically from the Anglo-Saxon Bal- derman, but with the changes in society which have intervened between the Anglo-Saxon and the present times, the eminency of the office has been comparer tively depreciated, although the alder- manlc gown is still a distinction to be aspired at. *EAR-GKASS. The grass which is upon the land after the mowing until the feast of the annunciation. Burr. Diet. 3 Leon. 313. EAB-MABE. Personal property is said to be ear-marked when it can be identified, that is, distinguished from other personal property of the same nature. As a general rule, money has no such distingiiishing feature, or ear-mark. EARNEST. In Roman Law ^called arrha, is something given as evidence of the contract in Roman Law, and for the purpose (in certain cases) of binding the bargain in English Law. As the name denotes, it is given to show that the pur- chaser is in earnest, and not either trifling or intending a deception. For this pur- pose it is not infrequently exacted by tradesmen from unknown customers giv- ing them orders to make goods; it is originally no part of the price of the goods, and, therefore, is forfeited on the customer's default; butif he duly accepts and pays for the goods when made, then the earnest counts as part of the price. The giving of an earnest is one of the three alternatives prescribed by the Statute of Frauds, 39 Car. 3, c. 3, s. 17, for the vahdity of a contract for the sale of goods of £10 or upward. Ifi EASEMENTS. An easement is a priv- ilege, 'without profit, which one neigh- bor hath of another (Termes de la Ley, 384) ; or which the owner of one tenement as such has over an adjoining tenement or the owner thereof as such, the former tenement being for this purpose called the dominant tenement, and the latter the servient tenement. Easements are in derogation of natural rights, in whatever way such rights may have arisen, whether, (1.) In respect of prieate or individual ownership; or (3.) In respect of pvbUc or common occupation, Thus, a private owner, subject only to the maxim sic utere Puo ut aUenum non Icedaa, has, in virtue purely of his owner- ship, an absolute power of using, or right to use, his property in whatever way he pleases, to the full extent that his interest therein extends, that is to say, to the fuU extent of his liie-estate if he is a tenant for life, and to an unhmited extent if he is a tenant in fee simple or in fee tail a,bsolute ; and an easement in or over that estate or interest is, to the extent that the easement extends, a restriction upon that absolute right or power of user. And again, public or common occupiers, e. g., the residents in any city, town or village, have, in virtue purely of their occu- pation, certain natural rights analogous to rights arising out of property, e. g., a right to air or to water, to the extent that their occupation-interest extends, that is to say, to the extent of natural existence; and an easement in or over that occupation-interest is, to the extent that the easement extends, a restriction upon those natural rights. Easements consist inpatiendo or in non faxiendo, and not in fadendo; in other words, easements extend thus far in their general effect, namely, that they oblige the private owner of the servient tene- ment, not in his personal capacity, but in virtue of that his connection with the servient tenement, to permit, or in no active sense impede, the owner or occupier of the dominant tenement as such in the enjoyment of his easement over the ser- vient tenement to the extent that such easement may extend ; but they oblige no further, e. g., they do not oblige the own- er of the servient tenement as such in any active sense to augment the measure of the easement, or even to facilitate the enjoyment of it, as, for example, by widen- ing or clearing out a dam or water-course, 122 EASEMENTS. Easements.-- {OorMnued.) scouring a sewer, and such like. Pomfret Y. Bioroft, 1 Wms. Saund. 557. Easements are of various kinds, being either, (1.) Easements of necessity ; or, (3.) Easements of convenience. An easement of necessity is one without which one's neighbor or the owner of the property adjoining could not pursue his trade or enjoy his property at all, and not merely with less readiness or comfort; and with referepce to easements of that kind, the law implies or assumes a grant of them, and dispenses with the produc- tion of the grant. An easement of con- venience is one by which one's neighbor, or the owner of the property adjoining, pursues his trade or enjoys his property in a readier or more comfortable way, but which he might also do without, although not so well. An easement which is merely one of convenience under certain circumstances may, under certain other circumstances, be one of necessity, or almost of neces- sity. Thus, given the natural state of land, the only easement of necessity is a road or right of access to it of the sim- plest character over the adjoining land when it is surrounded by such latter land, and there is no public highway running to it; and under such a state of circvmistances all other easements, whether in the shape of ways, or in other shape or shapes, are easements of conven- ience merely. But given an artificial state of land, e. g., land which has been and is applied to manufacturing pro- cesses, the easement of necessity in the shape of a right of access to it under the like circumstances as above continues to exist ; but that easement, instead of being now a way of the simplest character, is enlarged into a wider way, for numerous purposes other than the mere right of per- sonal access, and although to the extent of such enlargements of it, it would be an easement of convenience and not of necessity in the case of the natural state of land, yet in the supposed artificial state of the land, the easement is to its full extent an easement of necessity, or almost of necessity, and not of conven- ience merely. And similarly, rights of consuming water, rights of fouling water, rights of fouling air, may under given circumstances be easements of necessity, although in the natural state of land they would be easements of convenience merely. And such being the wavering Easements. — {Oontimted.) character of the distinction between ease- ments of necessity aild easements of con- venience, it is useless to make that dis- tinction, although a true one, the cardi- nal division in an enumeration of the varieties of easements, which are much more usefully referred to the natural rights of user, upon which they are re- strictions ; and upon that principle they may be enumerated generally as follows : I. With reference to Air. Every pri- vate owner and general occupier having a natural right, recognized by the Common Law of England, to ptjeitt of Are, the easement relative to the purity of air is the following one, namely: — (1.) A right to pollute the air (Flight V. Thomm, 10 A. & E. 590), to an extent justified by the customary business of the locality {Walter v. Selfe, 4 De G. & Sm. 315), but not further {8t. Helm's Smelting Go. V. Tipping, 11 H. L. 0. 650); and it makes no difference whether the party complaining of the pollution comes to the nuisance or not {Bliss v. Sail, 4Bing. N. C. 183) ; at any rate where material injury, as distinguished from mere per- sonal discomfort, is the result of it. St. Helen's Smelting Oo. v. Tipping, supra. Again, no private owner or general oc- cupier having a natural right recognized by the Common Law of England to the FKEB PASSAGE OF AiB, the cascments rel- ative to the passage of air are the follow- ing two, namely : — (3.) A right to the free passage of air {Traheim's Case, Godb. 383) ; but such a right seems now to be discouraged by the law. Webb v. Bird, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 268. (3.). A right to send noise through the air. Boshell v. Whiiwm^h, 19 W. B. 804. n. With reference to Idght. No pri- vate owner or general occupier having a natural right recognized by the Common Law of England to the fkeb passage of LIGHT, the easement relative to the pas- sage of light is the following one, namely ; — (4.) A right to the free passage of light {Aid/red's Case, 6 Rep. 54), which right, if it arise in virtue of the Prescription Act, is an absolute and indefeasible right as well for the present as for all possible future purposes {Taies v. Jack, L. R. 1 Oh. App. 305) ; but if it arise from express grant, the right is limited to the ambunt of light accustomed to pass at the time of the grant {Yates y. Jacle, supra); and if it arise from implied grant, as where a person sells a house with windows EASEMENTS. 123 Easements. — ( Continued.) overlooking land which he retains, the right is limited in like manner as upon an express grant. If, however, the ease- ment is exceeded, that does not entitle the servient owner to obstruct the free passage of the accustomed light, although he is unable without doing so to obstruct the passage of the excess {Ta/pling v. Jones, 11 H. L. C. 390); and the domi- nant owner, in case the accustomed light is obstructed, may in Eqmty have either damages alone, in a few rare cases {Heath V. Buoknall, L. R. 8 Eq. 1), or an injunc- tion and damages both {Straight v. Bwrn, L. R. 5 Ch. App. 166); and at Law he may always have damages, and in some cases an injunction also. See C. L. P. Act, 1854, s. 79. in. With reference to Water. Every private owner or general occupier, being a riparian owner or occupier, having cer- tain natural rights recognized by the Common Law of England in respect of natural streams, whether constant or in- termittent, of a known and definite course, and not being artificial or under- ground, that is to say, the three following natural rights, namely : — (a.) A right to the natubaii flow of the water; (J.) A right to the natural pdbitt of the water ; and (c.) A right to take the water for nat- ural USE, and whether for the entire or partial consumption of the water taken ; — The easements relative to those respect- ive natural rights are the following two, namely : — (5.) A right to divert the water {Bealey V. Shaw, 6 East, 209), including the right to a water-course ; and also a right to pen back the water ( Wright v. 3owa/rd, 1 Sim. & S. 190) ; including the right to flood another's land in penning back the water. (6.) A right to pollute the water. Hall V. Lund, 1 H. & C. 676 ; but see GtoUmnAd, V. Tunbridge WeUs Improvement Oommis- iionera, L. R. 1. Eq. 161 ; L. R. Ch. Ap. 349. IV. With reference to Support. Evei-y private owner and general occupier having certain natural rights recognized by the Common Law of England in respect of the contiguous land, whether adjacent or subjacent, that is to say, the two follow- ing-natural rights, namely: — (a.) A right to Adjacent"! suffloient SUPPORT, and 7^}^^- ^^.^ (5.) A right to SUBJACENT f ita natural SUPPORT J state ;— Easements. — ( OonUnued.) The easements which are relative to these respective natural rights are the fol- lowing three, namely : — (7.) A right of support from under- ground water {Popplewell v. Hodhinson, L. R. 4 Ex. 248) ; (8.) A right of support for land built upon, or for buildings {Hwnvphries v. Brogdm, 13 Q. B. 749), or otherwise ren- dered more liable to subside (Hams v. Ryding, 5 M. & W. 71) ; and conversely (9.) A right to cause a subsidence of land. Ohaawich v. Trower, 6 Bing. N. C. 1. V. With reference to Ways. Every private owner or general occupier having an exclusive natural right of way rec- ognized by the Common Law of England over and throughout his private property, or occupation ground, the easements rel- ative to that natural right are the follow- ing two, namely: — (10.) A private right of way, being a right of way in an adjoining private owner, or in an adjoining general occu- pier; and (li.) A public right of way, being a right of way in the king's subjects gen- erally in respect of their general occupa- tion of the country. These two easements differing in this respect, that while a public right of way, wherever it exists, is unlimited in extent, a private right of way, on the contrary, may be either limited or unlimited in ex- tent, as being either a footpath, a bridle- path, a carriage way, a drift way, or any other way. Easements being considered odious in law, because they are restrictions upon the free use of property in others, no other easements than those enumerated have been established, the following at- tempts to create new easements having failed : — (1.) A right of prospect (Aldred^s Case, 9 Rep. 58; Att.-Gen. v. Doitghty, 2 Ves. 453); (2.) A right of view to a shop-window {Smith -v. Owen, 85 L. J. [Ch.] 317); (3.) A right of undisturbed privacy {Twner v. Spomer, 30 L. J. [Ch.] 803; Re Penny amd the South-Eastem Ry. Oo., 7 E. & B. 660) ; and (4.) A right to the free passage of wind to a windmill. Webb v. Bird, 10 C. B. (N. 8.) 268. The apparent easement in these four cases, and in all such like cases, where any such exists, is in the nature of a 124 EASEMENTS. Easements. — ( Continued.) license only, particular or general, wMch is personal to the licensor and not bind- ing on Ms successors in the quasi servient tenement. See title Licbnsb. Easements must be proved either by the production of the instrument which creates them, or (in the case of its loss), by prescription, vyhether at the Common Law, or (but in certain cases only) under statute. And those two modes of proof are also the modes of the acquisition of easements. The most usual instrument whereby an easement is created is a deed of grant, which again may either in so many words expressly create the ease- ment (in which case the easement exists by reason of the express grant, and the production of such grant is the proof of its existence), or only impliedly create the easement (in which case the easement exists by reason of the implied grant, and the proof of the existence of such grant lies either in the production of an express grant involving as a necessary in- cident to it the impUed grant of the par- ticular easement, and the withholding of which easement would therefore be in derogation of the express grant, or else in the proof of circumstances rendering the particular easement indispensable or necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the land expressly granted). Also, the instrument of the creation of the ease- ment may be a will, an Act of Parlia- ment, or a custom even ; but such modes are not usually distinguished from a grant by deed. Again, the easement may arise by pre- scription, and that, either (1.) At the Common Law, that is to say, upon proof of uninterrupted user, . for twenty years {Mounmj v. lamay, 3 H. & C. 486) which is considered as imply- ing a grant, in the absence of contrary evidence; or (3.) Under the Prescription Act (3 & '3 Will. 4, c. 71), which, howiever, relates to only a limited number of easements, that is to say, the following : — (a.) Any way or other easement ^usdem generis (WM v. Bird, 13 C. B. [N. S.] 368; 13 C. B. [N. S.] 841); (J.) Any water-course ; (e.) The use of any water; {d.) Access of light; and (e.) Use of light. The statute has provided that for the acquisition of any sort of way, or of any water-course, or of the use of any water. Easements. — ( OonUnvM.) there shall be actual enjoyment thereof without interruption for the full period of twenty years , and if proof of such en- joyment is produced, any adverse proof purporting to show merely that the ease- ment had its origin in respect of time on this side of the reign of Eichard I., al- though beyond the period of twenty years, shall be excluded ; but any adverse proof of a difiEerent eflFect is admissible, unless in cases where proof of the actual enjoyment of the easement without inter- ruption for the fuU period of forty years is produced, in which latter class of cases the only adverse proof admissible is that of some consent or agreement in writing (under hand and seal, or under hand only), expressly granting the right of en- joyment (s. 3) ; and for the acquisition of any access of light, or of any use of light, there shall be actual enjoyment thereof without interruption for the full period of twenty years, and if proof of such en- joyment is produced, the only adverse proof admissible is that of some consent or agreement in. writing (under hand and seal, or under hand only), expressly grant- ing the right of enjoyment (s. 3). By the decision in Flight v. Thomas (ll A. & E. 688; 8 CI. & F. 331), taken in connection with the 4th section of the Prescription Act, the actual enjoyment for twenty years in the case of light is practically reduced to nineteen years; and the actual enjoyment for twenty years, or for forty years, in the case of any sort of way, or water-course, or water, is also practically reduced to nine- teen years or thirty-nine years, as the case may be. In all cases where the Pre- scription Act applies, the acquisition under that act should be the ground of claim [Ta/plmg v. Jems, 11 H. L. C. 390), although it does not follow that the ac- quisition by prescription at the Common Law is therefore excluded, excepting per- haps in the case of light, which depends perhaps wholly on the statute {Truscott V. Merchant Taylors Co., 11 Ex. 855; but see LanfrancM v. MacJeeneie, L. R. 4 Eq. 431). Moreover, Under the Prescription Act, the periods of twenty years and forty years respectively are to be reck- oned backward from suit or action bring- ing the easements into dispute (s. 4); and it has been determined that the ac- tual enjoyment must therefore have con- tinued to within one year at the very longest from the commencement of the suit or action (Parher v. Mitehell, 6 Ex. EASEMENTS. 125 Easements. — (GonUnmd.) 835). Where actual user before and after a period of intermission is proved, the user is taken to have been uninterrupted or continuous {Garr v. Foster, 3 Q. B. 581). The 7th and the 8th sections of the Act provide for the case of persons under the disabilities therein specified of disputing the easement during the period of its adverse acquisition. In all other respects the acquisition of an easement under the Prescription Act is regulated by the same principles as the acquisition of an easement by prescription at Com- mon Law. The varieties of adverse proof (when admissible) to the claim of an easement by prescription are the following : (1.) Proof of the legal impossibility of the grant wHch is implied ; (2.) Proof of the extinguishment of the easement by unity of seizin or otherwise ; (3.) Proof of the improbability of the grant; and (4.) Proof of the inability of the servi- ent owner to resist the user. Thus, where the grant would have been void by reason of some Act of Parliament (Rochdale Canal Co. v. Badcliffe, 18 Q. B. 287), or where the servient owner was legally incapable to make the grant {WiiisMp V. Hudspeth, 10 Exch. 5), or was ignorant of the user (Daniel v. North, 11 East, 370), e. g., in the case of an al- leged right to support from buildings (Solomon v. Vintners' Co., 13 Q. B. 739), there is no easement. In case the owner of the dominant ten- ement is hindered in his enjoyment of the easement, in other words, in the case of a distAirbance of his easement, he has the following remedies : (1.) An action on the case at Law for the disturbance, bringing damages for the disturbances that are past, but not for such as have been committed since the commencement of the action, or are yet to come, it being a rule of the Com- mon Law that the damages must not be for cause of action subsequent to the ac- tion in which they are recovered (2 Saund. 174, a, b). But now under the C. L. P. Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 125), s.' 79, an injunction against future dis- turbance may be obtained in the action. (3.) A suit in Equity upon bill filed stating the case and the damage sus- tained, and praying damages and an in- junction. Wood V. Sutcliffe, 31 L. J. (Ch.) 355; Soamies v. Edge, Johns. 669; Easements. — ( OonUmied. ) and Chancery Amendment Act (21 & 22 Vict. c. 37), s. 3. And such remedies he as well for the continuance of a disturbance as for the original creation of one, upon the anal- ogy of the principle that every continu- ing trespass is a fresh trespass. (3.) TTie remedy by abatement of the disturbance as a nuisance is also availa- ble to the person entitled to the easement (Sex V. JRoswell, 3 Salk. 459); but the abatement generally involves a trespass quare da/usum f regit (Arnold v. Jefftrson, Holt, 498) ; and is for other reasons also to be discouraged. Myne v. Qraham, 1 H. & C. 598. For the maintenance of an action for the disturbance of an easement, as also of a natural right, it is essential that actual damage should have been sus- tained (Bono/mi v. BackhoiLse, 9 H. L. C. 508), unless where the disturbance amounts to or involves a trespass, in which latter case the law presumes the damage (Smith V. Thackerah, L. R. 1 0. P. 564). And where the disturbance may be re- garded as an injury to the right of ease- ment itself, and the repetition of which in- jury would tend to destroy or prejudice the right itself, that tendency is a suffi- cient damage (Ha/rrop v. Hirst, L. R. 4 Ex. 43). But a mere possibility of dam- age at some future period, unaccompa- nied with any present damage, is insuf- ficient to sustain the action. Jackson v. Newcastle (Duke), 33 L. J. (Ch.) 698. The right of action sometimes varies according as the disturbance affects the dominant occupier only, or the dominant reversioner as well, it being sufficient in the case of the latter that there should be a reasonable probability of damage to his reversion arising from the fact of the de- nial of the right of easement generally (Metropolitan Industrial Dwellings Associ- ation V. Petch, 5 C. B. [N. S.] 504). For example, an action for the pollution of air can in general only be maintained by the person in present occupation, and not by the reversioner (Simpson v. Sa/uage, 1 C. B. [N. S.] 347), that injury being neces- sarily of a temporary nature. At the same time, if the injury is likely in any case to be of a permanent character, the rever- sioner may take proceedings for its sup- pression (Wilson V. Townsend, 1 Dr. & 8m. 334), e. g., for the locking of a gate. Eidgill v. Moor, 9 a B. 364. A defendant to an action for disturb- ance may plead in justification that the 126 EASTER TEBM. — EIGNE. Easements. — ( ContimuM^ plaintiff was exceeding tlie rightful en- joyment of his easement, and that he, the defendant, merely obstructed the plain- tiff's encroachment; and this plea is good, even although the defendant's ob- struction of plaintifif 's encroachment has obstructed also the plaintiff's lawful en- joyment {GawhweU v. Bussell, 26 L. J. [Ex.] 34), with the single exception of light, as to which the plea would be bad {Tabling v. Jones, 11 H. L. C. 390). And it seems that when an easement of light has been acquired under the Prescription Act, there can be no encroachment, inas- much as the user is for all purposes, future as well as present {Yates v. Jcuik, L. R. 1 Oh. Ap. 295), although where the easement exists under an express grant the user is measured by the words of the grant. Lastly, easements although once val- idly existing may have become extin- guished or suspended. Thus, in the event of the dominant and servient tene- ment becoming united in one owner who is legally seized thereof, the easement as such is necessarily either extinguished or suspended upon the maxim nvM res sua ser^ mt{SuryY. Pigott, Pop. 166). But in such event, if the easement is of the quality styled apparent and continuous, that is to say, if the existence of the easement is apparent to the eye, and those appear- ances continue after the unity of owner- ship, then it may be concluded from the cases of SuffieUd ■*!. Brown (33 L. J. [Ch.] 349), and Grossley v. lAghtowler (L. R. 2 Ch. Ap. 486), that if the once dominant tenement is sold, the easement revives without any fresh creation by grant or otherwise, and is taken to have been sus- pended merely, but that if the once ser- vient tenement is sold, the easement does not revive without some fresh creation by reservation or otherwise, and is taken to have been extinguished; and the like rule applies in the case of those rights or quasi easements, being apparent and con- tinuous, whieh the common owner has exercised over the one portion of his land for the benefit of the other portion of it, where the two portions, being respect- ively the quad servient and qiuisi domin- ant lands, have never been the properties of several owners. Where an easement (like a natural right) is suspended merely, it revives (iflte a natural right) upon the . removal of the cafiise of the suspension (Bower v. EiU, 2 Bing. N. 0. 339); on the other Easements. — ( Gontirmed.) hand, where an easement (unlike a nat- ural right) is extinguished altogether, it does not revive merely upon the removal of the cause of the extinguishment, but requires in addition for its revival, or rather re-establishment, a re-grant thereof. Bower v. Hill, supra. * EASTER TERM. One of the four terms of court in England, beginning on the 15th of April and ending on the 8th of May each year. EAT INDE SINE DIE. "When judg- ment is given for the defendant, and the cause is at an end, Jie may go thence with- out a day, i. e., without any further ad- journment and continuance of the cause : in effect, therefore, these words are a judgment that the king's writ command- ing the defendant's attendance has now been fully satisfied, and that his inno- cence has been publicly established. See, also, title Sine Die. * EATES DROPPING. The oflense of listening under walls, windows or the eaves of a house to hear discourse and thereupon to frame mischievous tales. 4 Bl. Com. 168. Burr. Diet. The penalty is a fine and the giving of sureties for good behavior. ECCLESIASTICAL COMMISSION. ERS. These are a body of men constitu- ted under the stats. 3 & 4 Vict. c. 86, and 29 and 30 Vict. c. 18, for the general man- agement and supervision of the estates of the Church,being either episcopal or capit- ular, and for the proper application of the revenues or produce thereof in support and extension of the Chureh. * EFFIGY. To make an effigy of a person vrith intent to ridicule him is a libel. 2 Chitty Crim. Law, 866 ; Hawk. PI. Cr. b. 1, c. 73, s. 2. Bouv. Diet. EFFLUXION OF TIME. When this phrase is used in leases, conveyances, and other like deeds, or in agreements ex- pressed in simple writing, it indicates the conclusion or expiration of an agreed term of years specified in the deed or writing, such conclusion or expiration arising in the natwral course of events, in contra- distinction to the determination of the term by the act of the parties, or by some unexpected or unusual incident or other sudden event. EIGNE. This word is a corruption of the French word a/isne or aine, meaning EIEE, OR BYRE. — ELECTION. 127 Eigne. — ( Continued.) sldest. The phrase is usually found in connection with bastard, and a iasta/rd eignS is commonly used to describe a son born before the intermarriage of his parents, in contradiction to a mulier puisne, who is the second or other son born of the same parents subsequently to their intermarriage. EIKE, or EYRE. This word is a French corruption of the Latin word iter, and means a way. The word usually oc- curs only in the phrase justiees in eyre, called also juices itinerant, a body of judges who were instituted for the first time in 1176 by an act of the Parliament held at Northampton in that year. Under that Act the kingdom was divided into six circuits, and these newly created judges were commissioned to travel through the various counties comprised in the several circuits, and therein to ad- minister justice upon writs so-called of assize (see title Assize). It is from this early institution that the present justices of assise and nisi prvua are historically derived. See title Courts of Justice. EJECTIONE CUSTODLiE. This phrase, which is the Latin equivalent for the 'EteaaYi. ejectment degan-de, was the title of a writ wMch lay for a guardian when turned out of any land of his ward during the minority of the latter. EJECTMENT. This is an action for the recovery of land. The action origi- nated as far back as the reign of Edward m., and was then a species of personal action brought to recover damages only for the ouster. But toward the end of the 15th century the possession, it was decided, might be recovered by it. From that time until the C. L. P. Act, 1852, the action was incumbered to a very large extent with fictions, being in the form of 7)(?e d. Thomas v. BicJuvrd d. Boe, the first-mentioned person, viz., Doe, being the nominal plaintiff only; the second-mentioned person, viz., Thomas, the real plaintiff, and who was commonly called the lessor of the plaintiff; the third- mentioned person, viz.,Richard, being the tenant in possession; and the fourth- mentioned person, viz., Roe, being the imaginary ejector, and who was com- monly called the casual ejector. The declaration was the first step in the action, and was framed in trespass and ejectment between Doe v. Boe; it was served upon Ejectment. — ( OoniinvM.) the tenant in possession, who or his land- lord thereupon obtained a " consent rule" of the Court to appear and defend the action, admitting the fictitious lease, entry, and ouster, and consenting to de- fend the action upon thfe strength of his Utle and nothing else. Thereafter the question came on to be tried upon its merits, and was in substance the follow- ing : — ^Whether the lessor of the plaintiff, on the day when he was alleged to have made the lease to John Doe, and from thence until the service of the declara- tion, was entitled to the property in question ; if the verdict was in the affirm- ative, the plaintiff recovered; and if in the negative, then the defendant remained in possession, and also recovered his costs of the action from the lessor of the plain- tiff. A different mode of procedure pre- vails at the present time in England, and in many of the United States. Bouv. Diet. Eng. Com. Law, Proc. Act, 1853, Washb. on Real Property. ELECTION. Is the name of a head of Equity jurisprudence, which directs as follows: — Where, by one and the same instrument, property belonging to A. is given away to B. without the consent of A., and other property of the testator's or settler's own is at the same time given to A., without any express condition that A. is only to take the latter property if he consents to give up his own property to B., then there is an implied condition to that effect; nevertheless if A. will keep his own property, he is only bound to give up to B. an equivalent for it out of the property of the testator or settlor which is given to himself, and he may thereafter keep the difference and also his own property, compensation and not for- feitnire being the rule in all cases of elec- tion. The question of election is sometimes incumbered by part of the property given being the subject of a special power of appointment among children or other limited classes of objects; but the rule in these cases, although somewhat more incumbered in its details, is in substance the same, viz. : (1.) When the intended appointees of the property are also the persons entitled in default, then in every such case : (o.) If the testator gives them some property of his own, and gives away either the whole or part of the appointment property 128 ELECTIONS, COMMONS' EIGHT IN.— ELISORS. Election. — {^Contmued.). to other persons who are not objects of the power at all, the intended appointees are put to their election {WMsfler V. Waster, 3 Ves. Jun. 367); but (6.) If the testator gives them no prop- erty of his own, under the like circumstances, they are not put to their election. Bristowe v. Wetomo habendo, for the re- turn of the things distrained; and in case the sheriff in executing this writ finds that the goods have been conveyed to places unknown to him, so that he cannot execute the writ, he makes a re- turn to the writ that the goods are eloigned, i. «., taken to a distance out of his_ jurisdiction or to some place unknown to "him. This return of the sheriff is called a return of eloignment or elongata. The defendant is thereupon entitled to sue out a writ of capias in withernam,, as to which see that title. Failing satisfac- tion by this writ, the defendant may then sue out a scire facia,s against the plaintiff's pledges, to show cause why the price of the eloigned distress should not be made good out of the lands and goods of the pledges ; and if no cause be shown, then the plaintiff has, execution against the lands and goods of the pledges, and in case the registrar of the county court who granted the replevin has not taken pledges, the defendant has an action on the case against him for his omission, and the damages arising therefrom. EMANCIPATION. In French Law, a father or mother (being a widow) may by a simple declaration emancipate a child at the age of fifteen years ; and the mar- riage of a child, at whatever age, operates an emancipation. An orphan of the age of eighteen years may be emancipated by a decision of the conseil de famiMe. The effects of emancipation are to render the child competent to act generally on his own account in all matters of a purely administrative character ; but he remains subject to aU former disabilities in respect of the alienation of capital, of real estate (ses iimneuhles) of loan transaotionSj and the like. If a trader, his capacity is un- limited. Code Nap. 1, 10, 3. EMBARGO. The hindering or deten- tion by any government of ships of com- merce in its ports. If the embargo is laid upon ships belonging to citizens of 17 Embargo. — (Continued.) the state imposing it, it is called a civil embargo, an example of which occurred in 1807 in the conduct of the United States; on the other hand, if (as more commonly happens) the embargo is laid upon ships belonging to the enemy, it is called a hostile embargo. The effect of this latter embargo is that the vessels de- tained are restored to the rightful own- ers if no war follows, but are forfeited to the embargoing government if war does follow, the declaration of war being held to relate back to the original seizure and detention. See Wheaton, pp. 373-373. EMBEZZLEMENT. May be roughly defined as stealing by clerks, servants, or agents. It is not larceny — that offense involving a taking without the will of the owner, which a clerk, servant, or agent who is intrusted to take cannot be said to do. But the offender intercepts and misapplies money or such like things ; and this constitutes the ofifense of embez- zlement under the stat. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, ss. 68-72. The offense is a felony, and is punishable precisely as larceny is (see that title) . In case a larceny is proved upon an indictment for embezzlement, the defendant may be convicted of the former offense, and vice versd. Any number of distinct embezzlements not exceeding three, committed within a period of six months, may be joined in the same indict- ment. EMBLEMENTS. These are the away- going crop, in other words, the crop which is upon the ground and unreaped when the tenant goes away, his lease hav- ing determined ; and the right to emble- ments is the right in the tenant to take away the away-going crop, and for that purpose to come upon the land, and do all other necessary things thereon. The instances In which the right to emble- ments exist are the following: — (1.) A tenant for life sowing the lands and dying before harvest, his ex- ecutors will have the right ; (3.) An under-tenant, whose tenancy is suddenly and without his own act determined before harvest, e. g., by his landlord's estate de- termining (whether by the death or re-marriage of the latter), has the right (Eingsbwry v. OolUns, 4 Bing. 207) ; (8.) A tenant at will, who is ousted by his landlord, for no cause of for- 130 EMBRACEBY. —ENFRANCHISEMENT. Emblementg. — ( OonHnued.) feiture (Co. Litt. 66 a) ; or who suddenly dies, or whose land- lord suddenly dies (Co. Litt. 55 b); (4.) A. tenant by the curtesy (3 Bl. 123) or in dower (30 Hen. 3, c. 3) — upon their deaths ; and (5.) A. tenant pur aui/re me (Co. Litt. 55 b) and a parson (38 Hen. 8, c. 11), upon the determina- tion of their estates otherwise than by their own act or de- fault. But the following persons have no right to emblements, notwithstanding the sud- den determination of their tenancy : — (1.) A tenant for life who determines the tenancy by his or her own act, e.g.,a, widow who re-marries, being only entitled during her widowhood ; (3.) A tenant at will or for years who commits a forfeiture or other- wise willfully determines his own tenancy ; (3.) A tenant at sufferance (7 M. & W. 335); (4.) Tenants at a rack rent since 1851, in virtue of the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 35, s 1, whose tenancy, but for that act, would have suddenly determined by the death or ces- ser of the estate of their land- lord, these tenants now holding on until the expiration of the then current year of their ten- ancy, and apportioning their rent between the executors of the deceased landlord and the estate of the succeeding land- lord (see Apportionment of Rent) ; (5.) Mortgagors, although to some ex- tent they are tenants at will ; (6.) A tenant in dower becoming un- chaste ; (7.) A parson who resigns his living. Sulwer V. Sulwer, 3 Bam & Aid. 470. See, generally, Taylor on Landlord and Tenant, and Wash- burne on Real Property. EMBRACERY. This offense consists in the attempt to influence a jury cor- ruptly to one side or the other, by prom- ises, persuasions, entreaties, entertain- ments, douceurs, and the hke. The person guilty of it is called an embracer, and is punishable undei 19 Hen. 7, c. 13 ; and see stat. 6 Geo. 4, c. 50. * EMENDALS. This word is said to be used in the accounts of the Inner Tem- ple ; so much in emendals at the foot of an account meaning so much in bank, in stock, for the supply of emergencies. Cunningham Diet. ; Bouv. Diet. ♦EMINENT DOMAIN. The power existing in the state to take private prop- erty for public use. See Cooley Const. Limitations, as to the nature of this pow- er and the mode of its exercise. EMPHYTEUSIS. A term of Roman Law, and which finds a near equivalent in the phrase /ee /arm of English Law, being the letting of lahds or houses to a lessee for ever, subject to the payment of a per- petual rent,ilsually of small amount. The interest of the holder (who is called the em/phyteuUcarmi) is assignable, i. e., alien- able ; and the landlord may not eject him unless for non-payment of the rent agreed. In case the entire subject-matter of the lease is destroyed, 'the loss falls upon the landlord ; but a particular loss falls upon the tenant. See title Feb Fabm. * EMPLAZAMIENTO. In Spanish Law, the citation issued by a judge order- ing a person before his tribunal at a certain day and hour. Bouv. Diet. *BNTENTRE SA MERE. For cer- tain purposes a child en ventre sa mere, in its mother's womb, is to be considered in being. * ENAJENACION. In Spanish Law, the transfer of property by gift, sale or exchange. ENCROACHMENT: ^e« titles Ap- pbovement; Common. ENDOWMENT. This term is com- monly applied to any provision for the officiating minister of a church, the pro- vision usually consisting in the setting apart of a portion of lands for his main- tenance. The assignment or bestowment of dower to, or upon, a woman. ENFEOFF. This means to vest in another by means of a feoffment the legal estate in lands. See title Feoffment. ENFRANCHISEMENT. This term is usually applied to copyhold lands, and as so applied denotes the conversion of the copyholds into freeholds. The mode of enfranchisement is regulated at the pres- ent day by the stat. 4 & 5 Vict. c. 85, BNGLESHIRE. — ENTRY. 131 Enfrauchisement. — {Continued.) and the Copyhold Acts, 1852 and 1858, under which Acts great facilities are afforded for the commutation of the lord's customary j-ights. The effect of enfranchisement is, to discharge the lands of all customary incidents, e. g., the cus- tom of descent to the customary heir, and to annex to them all the incidents of freehold lands. * ENGLESHIRE. According to a law made by Canute, when a man was killed unless it could be proved that he was an Englishman, the town should be amerced. This proof was called engleshire. 4 Bl. Com. 195. Called also englecery. ENGRATINGS : See title Coptbight. *ENGROSS. To buy up such a large quantity of an article as to obtain a mon- opoly. 4 Sharswood's Bl. Com. 159 n. ENLARGE. This tei-m is commonly used in connection with rules calling upon either party to an action or suit to do a certain thing by a specified day; the judges in such a case will, on sufficient grounds being shown for so doing, enlarge the time originally specified for doing the act, in which case the rule is said to be enUi/rged, meaning that the time specified in it has been enlarged, i. e., extended. Similarly, an arbitrator often enlarges the time for making his award ; and the Court of Chancery may, and often does, enlarge the time for filing evidence in a suit, or for taking some other step in the suit, where the Court is satisfied upon affidavit that there is good reason for so doing. * ENQUETE. In canon law, an exam- ination of witnesses taken in writing to be used in the trial of a cause. ENQUIRY, WRIT OF : 3ee Inquiky, Writ of. ENROLMENT: fi'ee Ihbolment. * ENTAIL. A fee abridged, entailed or limited to certain heirs. 3 Bl. Com. 113. ENTERING APPEARANCE : See Ap- PBAKANCB. ENTERING JUDGMENTS. The form- al entry of the judgment on the rolls of the Court, which used to be a necessai-y preliminary to suing out execution on the judgment, and which is still necessary before bringing error or an action of debt Entering Judgments. — ( Oontinued.) on scire facias on the judgment. How- ever, by the C. L. P. Act, 1852, p. 206, and r. 70, H. T. 1853, it is not necessary, before issuing execution, to enter the pro- ceedings on any roll, but an incipitur thereof inay be made upon paper, shortly describing the nature of the judgment, and judgment may thereupon be signed, costs taxed and execution issued ; but it is provided that the proceedings may be entered on the roll as heretofore, when- ever the same may become necessary for the purpose of evidence, or of bringing error, or the like. This entry of the judgment may, it seems, be made after any lapseof time. Barrow v. Croft, 4 B. & C. 388. ENTIRETY. A tenancy by entirety or (in the case of husband and wife) en- tireties, is a tenancy in which the entire or sole possession is in one person, as dis- tinguished from a joint or several posses- sion by two or more persons; in other words, tenants by entireties are seized per tout, and not also per my, whereas joint tenants are seized et per my et perr tout. Consequently, upon the death of either tenant by the entireties, the other takes the whole under the original grant, and not (as is the case in joint tenancy) by the new or independent title of surviv- orship. The effects of such a tenancy are, that neither tenant can convey the whole of his estate without the other, and neither can sever without the other ; and this curious result follows from the unity of the two persons of husband and wife, that a gift to them and a third person of lands or of goods in words which purport to make the three parties joint tenants, or even tenants in common, carries one moiety only to the husband and wife, and leaves the other moiety to the third per- son. Atcheson v. Atcheson, 11 Beav. 485; In reWylde's Estate, 2 De G. M. & G. 724; See 2 Kent Com. 132. ENTRY. The actual taking possession of lands or tenements by entering upon the same. This is a remedy which the law affords to an injured party ousted of his lands by another person who has taken possession thereof without right. This remedy (which must in all cases be pursued peaceably) takes place in three only out of the five species of ouster, viz. : abatement, intrusion and disseizin ; for as in these three cases_ the original entry of the wrong-doer is unlawful, so the wrong may be remedied by the mere entry of 132 ENTEY, WRIT OF. — ENTRY ON THE ROLL. Entry. — ( Oontinited.) the former possessor. But it is otherwise upon a disamtinuance, or deforcement, for in these latter two cases the former pos- sessor cannot remedy the wrong by entry, but must do so by action, inasmuch as the original entry being in these cases lawful, and therefore conferring an ap- parent right of possession, the law will not sufEer such apparent right to be over- thrown by the mere act or entry of the claimant. And by the Act 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 10, no person shall be deemed to have been in possession of any land with- in the meaning of that Act, merely by reason of his having made an entry thereon; and by the same Act, s. 11, no continual or other claim upon or near any land shall preserve any right of making an entry. ENTRY, WRIT OF. A writ made use of in a possessory action directed to the •sheriff, requiring him to command the tenant of the lanS. that he do render the same to the demandant, because that he the tenant had not entry into the land in question, but by or after a disseizin, in- trusion, or the like, made within the time limited by law for such actions ; or that in case of his refusal so to render the land, he do appear in Court to show the reason of his refusal. It was usual to specify in the writ the degree or degrees within which the same was brought, in this manner: (1.) If the writ was brought against the party himself who did the wrong, then it only charged the tenant himself with the injury — non halmit in- greasum niri per intrusionem quam, ipse feeit. (2.) If the writ was brought against an alienee of the wrong-doer, or against the heir of the wrong-doer, then it was said to be in the iirst degree, and charged the tenant in this manner: that he the tenant had not entry but by, i. e., through, per, the original wrong-doer who alienated the land or from whom it de- scended to him — rum habuit ingressum mm per Gktliehnvm,, qui se in iUud intrusit, et iMJud tenenti dimtisit. (3.) If the writ was brought against a tenant holding under a second alienation or descent, then it was said to be in the second degree, and charged the tenant in this manner : that 'he the tenant had not entry but by, i. e., through, per, a prior alienee, to whom mi, the original wrong-doer demised the same — raore habuit ingresavm nisi per iJi- ca/rdum cui Chdielm/us W/ud dirmsit, qui ae in illud intruait. (4.) If the writ was Entry, Writ of. — {Oontinued.) brought against a tenant holding under more than two alienations or descents, i. «., after two degrees were past, it was framed upon the Statute of Marlbridge (52 Hen. 3), c. 30, which first gave the writ in this case ; and as that statute pro- vided that when the number of aliena- tions or descents exceeded the usual degrees, i. e., two degrees, the writ should not mention the degrees at all — the writ was called a writ of entry sur disseisin in the post, and charged the tenant in this manner : that he the tenant had not entry woXeas after, post, or subsequent to the ouster or injury done by the original wrong-doer — non habuit ingressum nisi post intrusionem quwm Ouliefmus in ilhid By the Act 3 & 4 WiU. 4, c. 27, s. 36, and the C. L. P. Act, 1860, s. 26, aU real actions have been abolished. ENTRY AD COMMUNEM LEGEM. This was a writ of entry which lay for a reversioner after the alienation and death of the particular tenant for life, against him who was in possession of the land. ENTRY AD TERMINUM QUI PRiE- TERIIT. This was a writ of entry which lay for a reversioner when the possession was withheld from him by the lessee or a stranger, after the determination of a lease for years. ENTRY IN CASU PROYISO. This was a writ of entry provided by the Statute of Gloucester (6 Edw. 1), c. 7; it lay for a reversioner after the aliena- tion by tenant in dower or tenant for life, and during the hfe of such tenant. ENTRY IN CONSIMIII CASU: See title Oasu GoNSEvirLi. ENTRY ON THE ROLL. In former times, the parties to an action personally or by their counsel used to appear in open Court and make their mutual statements viva voce, instead of as at the present day delivering their mutual pleadings, until they arrived at the issue or precise point in dispute between them. During the progress of this oral statement, a minute of the various proceedings was made on parchment by an officer of the Court ap- pointed for that purpose ; the parchment then became the record, in other words, the official history of the suit. Long after the practice of oral pleading had fallen into disuse, it continued necessary to ENURE.— EQUITY FOLLOWS THE LAW. 133 Entry on the Roll. — (OmUnued.) enter the proceedings in like manner upon the parchment roll, and this was entry on the roll, or making up the issue roU, as it was othei-wise caUed. But by a rule of H. T. 4 Will. 4, the practice of making up the issvs roll was abolished. ENURE. This word means to operate or take effect. Thus, a release in fee from a reversioner to his prior tenant en- ures by way of the enlargement of the particular tenancy into a fee simple ; also a grant by one joint tenant to another will enure, i. e., operate as a release {Ohester v. WiUan, 8 Wms. Saund. 97 a), and a release as a covenant to stand seized. Boe v. Tranmourr, Willes. 633, * EPIQUETA. In Spanish Law, this word is aynonymous with the word equity. Bouv. Diet. EQUITABLE ESTATE: See title JSES. EQUITABLE MORTGAGE: Bee title Mortgage. EQUITABLE PLEAS AND REPLI- CATIONS. Under the C. L. P. Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 126), it is permit- ted to plead equitable defenses at Law, beginning the plea with the words, " For defense or equitable grounds. " Such plea required to be such as would have entitled the defendant who pleaded it to an uncon- ditional injunction upon bill filed in Equity; but that is not now the law, under the Judicature Act, 1873. Equi- table pleas make the replications and all subsequent pleadings equitable also. ~ ■ V. Effylake By. Go., L. R. 1 Ex. 9. EQUITY is the phrase commonly irsed to designate that portion of the law which is administered by the Courts of Chan- cery in Lincoln's Inn and at the Rolls. Equity in this sense is wider than Law, and narrower than Natural Justice or Nat- ural Equity, in the extent of the matters which are the subjects of its jurisdiction. Equity cannot be defined in its content, otherwise than by an enumeratioil of its various subject-matters, being trusts, mortgages, administrations, &c., &c. There are, or used to be, three jurisdic- tions in Equity, namely, the exclusive, the concurrent, and the auxiliary juris- dictions, the exclusive jurisdiction being that in which Equity had jurisdiction and Law had not ; the concurrent that in Equity. — ( Oontinued.) which Equity and Law had jurisdiction equally', and the auxiMm-y that in which Law had exclusive jurisdiction, and Equity was only the handmaid of Law therein. EQUITY DRAFTSMAN. A pleader in Equity. EQUITY FOLLOWS THE LAW. This maxim, which is expressed in Latin by the phrase Aequitas sequitur legem, signi- fies that the Courts of Chancery follow the same principles in construing docu- ments and in determining rights as the Courts of Common Law, but the rule is subject to a few inconsiderable exceptions, which the Courts of Chancery have,' for . reasons of their own, thought fit to make in their application of it. The following are some illustrations of the general rule : (1.) In constnaing the words of limita- tion of estates, the same words which at Law confer a life estate do so in Equity also ; and the phrase " heirs of the body " gives an estate tail in Equity equally as at Law ; and the phrase " heirs and as- signs " in like manner gives a fee simple in Equity as at Law. (3.) In applying the rules of descent. Equity adopts the entire nine canons of descent of real estate at Law; e. g., primo- geniture, coparcenary, &c. (3.) In applying the statutes for the limitation of actions and suits. Equity never exceeds the limits which the Law prescribes, although, for reasons of its own, it often stops short of the outside limit. See title Limitation of Actions AND Suits. The following are the exceptions which Equity has made in its application of the general rule : (1.) In the construction of executory trusts, i. e., of trusts incompletely set out in the instrument creating them, if the instiniment is either marriage articles or a will containing a reference to marriage, Equity refuses to follow blindfold the rule of Law commonly designated as the Bule in Bhelley^s Case (see that title), whereby the words " heirs of the body " following upon a freehold estate of the ancestor, confer upon the ancestor an estate tail, but chooses rather to mould these words into the form of a strict settlement, giving to the ancestor a life estate, and securing to the issue of the contemplated marriage a succession of estates, and to the intended wife a jointure or widowhood estate, over 134 EQUITY OF REDEMPTION. — ESCHEAT. Equity follows the Lsiw. — {Oontinued.) which estates the intended husband shall have no power either to defeat or to di- minish them {Trevor Y. Trevor, 1 P. "Wms. 633 ; Pavilion v. Voice, 3 P. Wms. 571) ; and (3.) In the construction of the benefi- cial or equitable estates of joint tenants, with reference to whom, if they are mortgagees, whether for equal or unequal amounts, and if they are' purchasers, for equal amounts (but not also for unequal amounts). Equity refuses to allow survi- vorship of the equitable estate, and de- crees the survivor a trustee for the de- ceased as to the share of the deceased. Lake V. Gibson, X Wh. & T. L. C. 160. . EQUITY OF REDEMPTION: See title MoETaAGB. EQUITY OF A 'STATUTE: See title Intbepbbtation. * EKEGIMUS. A word used in the creation of a corporation or a new office by the sovereign. Bacon Abr. Offices, e; 1 Bl. Com. 473. EBBOR, WRIT OF. After final judg- ment had been signed in an action, the unsuccessful party,if desirous of disputing the matters afresh, might bring a writ of error, being a writ which was sued out of the Chancery, and which was addressed to the judges of the Court in which the judgment had been given, commanding them in some cases to examine the record themselves, and in others to send it to another Court of appellate jurisdiction. The error might consist either (1.) in a matter of fact, or (3.) in a matter of lam. * ESCAMBIO. A license in the shape of a writ, formerly granted to an English merchant, to draw a bill of exchange on another in foreign parts. Burr. Diet. Reg. Orig. 194. ESCAPE. In civil cases, this was de- fined to be, in general, where any person under lawful arrest either violently or privily evaded such arrest, or was suffered to go at large before he was delivered by due course of law. If the arrest was un- lawful, as where the judgment or the writ of execution was absolutely void, then there was no escape. Such an escape might have been either negligent or voluntary : (1.) If the escape was negligent, i. e., without the knowledge or consent of the Escape. — ( Continu^.) sheriff or his officer, then the escaped per- son might be pursued and retaken any- where, and even on a Sunday; and in such a case, if the sheriff or his officer re- took the prisoner before any action was brought for the escape, he was excused. (3.) If the escape was nohtntary, i. e., with the knowledge or consent of the sheriff or his officer, then the escaped person could never be retaken, but the sheriff was liable for the escape, and also (if it should so happen) for the re- taking. For an escape, the remedy was either in debt for the full amount of the judg- ment or on the case for damages; and after the Act 5 & 6 Vict. c. 98, s. 31, the remedy was on the case only, and not in debt. But that remedy, which lay against the sherijBE, did not exclude the plaintiff from proceeding against the defendant, either by fresh writ of execution or in an action on the original judgment. It is conceived that the Law is still the same, but it must be remembered that by the Act 33 & 83 Vict. c. 63 (the Debtors Act, 1869), imprisonment for debt on a oa. sa. or on mesne process has been abol- ished with the^ exceptions in the Act men- tioned. In criminal cases there is no escape., ESCAPE-WARRANT. This was a warrant granted to re-take a prisoner committed to the custody of the Queen's Prison who has escaped therefrom. It was obtained on affidavit from a judge of the Court in which the action had been brought, and was directed to all the sher- iffs throughout England, commanding them to re-take the prisoner and to com- mit him to gaol when and where taken, there to remain until the debt was satis- fled. ESCHEAT. This word is derived from the French eehoir, to fall, and denotes that incident of feudal tenure by which the land reverts back to the lord upon the failure of a tenant to do the services. Escheat used to arise from two causes : — Either (1.) Propter defectum sangvdnis, i. «., on account of the failure of blood, i. e., heirs, of the grantee; or (3.) Propter delictum tenentis, i. e., on account of the felony or attain- der of the tenant. But by the Act 33 & 34 Vict. o. 33, no confession, verdict, inquest, conviction, or judgment of, or for any treason or fel- ESCHEATOR. —ESTATE-TAIL. 135 Escheat. — ( Gontmued.) ony ovfeh de se is to cause any attainder or corruption of blood, or any forfeiture or escheat. So that, at the present day, escheat, it appears, can only arise from the failure of heirs of the grantee . Upon an escheat, the lord used to have a writ of escheat against the person who was in possession of the lands after the death of his tenant without heirs ; and now he has an action of ejectment against him com- menced by writ of summons. ESCHEATOB. The name of an officer who was appointed by the lord treasurer in every county to look after the escheats which fell due to the king in that partic- ular county, and to certify the same into the exchequer. An escheator could con- tinue in office for one year only, and was not re-eligible until the third year from the expiration of his former year of office. There does not appear to exist any such officer at the present day. ESCROW. Where a deed is delivered conditionally and not absolutely, e. g., where it is delivered not to the grantee personally (or his agent), but to some third person pending the doing of some act which is required of the grantee to be done, such deed is said to be delivered as an escrow, i. e., a mere scroll, or writing, which becomes a good deed upon the ac- complishment of the condition. ESCUAGE. This word is from the French ecu, meaning a shield or buckler, and denotes bucklerage, or rather a pecuniary satisfaction paid in lieu thereof. It was a composition offered by knight- tenants to their lord, and accepted by him in lieu of their personal attendance on him in the wars. From being oc- casional, this composition became general, and ultimately was levied by regular as- sessments. * ESNECY. The right which the eldest coparcener of lands had to choose one of the parts of the estate after it was divided. Bouv. Diet. ; Fleta 1. 2, c. 66, s. 5. *ESPEEA. The period in Which a party is to do certain acts or make certain payments. Bouv. Diet. *ESPLEES. The products which the ground or land yields ; as the hay of the meadow, the herbage of the pastures, com of the arable, rents, &o. Jacob Diet. *ESSENDiqUIETAM DE THEOLO- NIA. A writ which lay for citizens and burgesses of a town which was usually entitled to exemption from toll, where toll was exacted of them. Fitz. Nat. Brev. Reg. Orig. 2586. ESSOIN. This was an excuse (whether on the ground of illness, deirvfi/rmitate, or on other ground), for not appearing in Court in pursuance of a summons con- tained in a writ. The first day of term was called the essoin day, or day for hear- ing excuses. But since 1 Will. 4, c. 70, the essoin day has been done away with altogether, the practice of alleging such excuses, *. e., of casting the essoin, having been discontinued previous to that Act. ESTATES. Absolute ownership is an idea quite unknown to the English Law of Real Property ; the so-caUed owner of lands can, at the most, hold only an es- tate in them. The estate which he holds may, at the present day, be of a very va- rious kind ; originally, however, an estate for the man's own life was both the larg- est and the smallest estate in lands, being in fact the only recognized estate. The various kinds of estates are called Estate^?' autre iiie; Estate in Common; Estate upon Condition ; Estate in Copar- cenary ; Estate by the Curtesy ; Estate in Dower; Estate by Elegit; Estate in Expectancy ; Estate in Fee-simple ; Estate in Fee-Tail ; Estate of Inheritance ; Estate of Joint Tenancy ; Estate for Life ; Estate inPossession; Estate in Remainder; Estate in Reversion ; Estate in Severalty ; Estate by Statute Merchant; Estate at Suffer- ance ; Estate-Tail ; Estate in Vadio ; Es- tate at Will ; Estate for Years. See Bouv. Diet., and Washb. Real Prop. ESTATE-TAIL. This is an estate given to a man and the hei/rs of his body. Growth of the Estate-Tail. The fol- lowing stages in the growth of the estate- tail may be indicated — (1.) Permission was granted to the heirs of the tenant to succeed on the de- cease of their ancestor ; (2.) The word h^i/rs having acquired, about the time of Henry II., a breadth of meaning sufficient to admit collaterals to succeed as heirs ; (3.) It became necessary in order to exclude collaterals to limit the estate ex- pressly to a man and the heirs of his body; (4.) This limitation to a man and the heirs of Ms body came to be construed in the Courts as a conditional gift, the con- dition being that the man should have 136 ESTATE-TAIL IN PERSONAL ESTATE. — ESTRATS. Estate-Tail. — {Continued.) issue, and so soon as that condition was fulfilled, the estate became an absolute estate in fee-simple ; whence (5.) The statute Be Bonis OoTidiUon- alibus, 13 Edward 1 (Statute of "West- minster the Second), c. 1, was passed, enacting that the will of the donor, ac- cording to the form of the deed of gift manifestly expressed, should be from thenceforth observed, or, that the estate should descend according to the forme- don {semindiim formMndord), so as that the ancestor should not alien it from his issue nor the donor be defeated of his rever- sion. This Act created the estate-tail as it at present exists. ESTATE-TAIL IN PERSONAL ES- TATE. There is no estate-tail in personal estate, whether chattels real or chattels personal; but the words which seem to confer an estate-tail in personalty confer in fact an absolute estate in fee-simple. This construction of these words arises from two reasons, namely: (1.) The cir- cumstance that the stat. Be Bonis (13 Edw. 1, c. 1) extended only to real estate, and (2.), the decision in LeeentTwrpe v. Ashbie, Tud. L. C. Conv. 768. ESTATE-TAIL QUASI. This is an estate-tail improper, and is derived out of an estate for life, when the tenant for life grants his estate to K., and the heirs of the body of K., these words of grant being apt and proper to create an estate- tail; but inasmuch as the estate-tail of K. cannot (as the estate-tail proper may) possibly last for ever, but can last at the most for the life of the tenant for life (or grantor), therefore it is called an estate- tail improper or quasi. It further differs from the estate-tail proper in this respect, that it may be barred without the neces- sity of any inrolment of the deed of dis- entail in the Court of Chancery (Feame's Conting. Remrs. 495). On the other hand, it agrees with the estate-tail proper in the course of descent, and also in this respect — that where there is an estate for life prior to the estate-tail quad, then the tenant for life, as being ex officio pro- tector, must consent in order to the bar being effective against the remaindermen and reversioners. Allen v. Allen, 3 D. & War. 307. ESTOPPEL. Is a term of law donat- ing that the person whom it affects is es- topped; i. «., stopped or hindered, from saying any thing difierent to what has been Estoppel. — ( Gontkmed.) already said, even although what he wishes to say is the truth, and the thing already said an error. There are three kinds of estoppels, viz. — (1.) Estoppels by record ; (3.) Estoppels by specialty ; and (3.) Estoppels by matters inpcds. The principle of, or justification for, the first of these three species of estoppel is, that no one shall aver against a record, i. e., a judgment or verdict of the Court, so long as that judgment remained unre- versed; and of the second, that a man shall not deny what he has ah-eady, with all the solemnity attaching to a deed, affirmed; and of the third, that a man shall not aver the' contrary of that which by his previous conduct he deliberately led other persons to infer, and they have inferred accordingly, and would now be prejudiced pecuniarily if the contrary averment were admitted. The operation of estoppels is personal, that is, against the party or parties who are principally affected thereby, their heirs, executors, and administrators ; but in the case of an estoppel by record, where the record is a judgment in rem, the operation of the estoppel is universal, or (as it is said) against all the world. For particular instances of estoppel of all three varieties, see 3 Sm. L. C. 679. ESTOVERS. This word which is de- rived from the French itoffer, to furnish, i. «., stuff, is used to denote certain rights enjoyed by persons who have merely a limited estate or interest in land, being rights necessary to the enjoyment of that estate or interest. There are three kinds of festovers, namely, (1.) Housebote, being a sufficient quan- tity of wood for the fuel and re- pairs of the house ; (3.) Ploughbote, being a sufficient quan- tity of wood for the making and repairing of agricultural implements; and (3.) Haybote, being a sufficient quan- tity of wood for the repair of fences. It is a rule of law, that estovers must be reasonable; also, that they must be strictly applied to their respective pur- poses, and to none other. Any excess in the enjoyment or any misapplication of the just amount would be waste. Smmrums V. Norton, 7 Bing. 640. ESTRATS. These are such animals of a tame and valuable character as are found wandering, i. e,, straying, in any ESTREAT. —EVIDENCE. 137 Estrays. — ( OonPinued.) manor or lordship, and are without any apparent owner. The law gives aU such animals to the king, but allows him to make grants of them to other persons, and he has in very many cases granted them to the lords of manors, so that they are become incident thereto by special grant. ESTREAT. This word, which is de- rived from the Latin extraetum, denotes a copy or extract from the Book of Estreats, that is to say, the rolls of any Court in which the amerciaments or fines, recogni- zances, etc., imposed or taken by that Court upon or from the accused, and which are to be levied by the bailiff or other proper officer of the Court. Recogniz- ances are said to be estreated when they are forfeited by the failure of the accused to comply with the condition of the re- cognizance, as by failure to appear or otherwise. ESTEEPEMENT, WRIT OF. This was a writ of waste, and lay in particular for the reversioner against the tenant for Ufe, in respect of damage or injury com- mitted by the latter to the lands or woods of the reversioner. ET HOC PARATUS EST VERIFI- CARE. These words were used, when the pleadings were in Latin, at the con- clusion of any pleading which contained new affirmative matter; they expressed the willingness or readiness of the party so pleading to establish by proof the matter alleged in his pleading. A plead- ing which concluded in that manner was technically said to " conclude with a verification," in contradistinction to a pleading which simply denied matter al- leged by the opposite party, and which for that reason was said to " conclude to the country," because the party merely put himself upon the country, or left the matter to the jury. But now by the C. L. P. Act, 1853, s. 67, " no formal con- clusion is necessary to any plea, avowry, cognizance, or subsequent pleading." EVICTION. This is the same as dis- possession or ouster of the possession (see title Ouster). It is usually applied to ouster from real property only, but it is not inapplicable to the dispossession from personal property also. The covenant for quiet enjoyment which is usually in- serted in deeds is in substance a covenant against emction. It is competent also for a landlord to evict his tenant for proper cause ; and a landlord may also be guilty | 18 Eviction. — (Oontinued.) of a wrongful eviction of his tenant, as where without proper cause he either actually, i. e., physically evicts him, or does any act of a permanent character with the intention of evicting the tenant, and which is inconsistent with the latter's re- turning into or continuing in possession. EVIDENCE. Is the proof of, or mode of proving, some fact or written docu- ment. It is to be considered (1.) In its Ifature, and (S.) In its Olject. (A.) With regard to its Natwre. — Evidence is either primary, or secondary, or presumptive, or hearsay. Admissions are not themselves evidence, but narrow the field which the evidence has to cover. (1.) Primary Bvidence. — This is the highest kind of evidence which the na- ture of the case admits of. Thus where a will of lands is to be proved, the pri- mary evidence of it is the vnll itself, and not the probate ; for the Court of Probate has no cognizance of real estate (B. N. P. 246). And where any contract or agreement has been reduced into writing, the primaiy evidence of it is the writing (Fenn v. ' Griffiths, 6 Bing. 633). But when the narration of an extrinsic fact, i. «., a fact which has arisen independ- ently of the writing, has been committed to writing, the fact may yet be proved by parol, i. e., extrinsic evidence, e. g., a, re- ceipt for money (Bambert v. Gohen, 4 Esp. 213). Also, parol admissions are good as evidence against the party making them, although they relate to the contents of a written instrument (Slatterie v. Poo- ley, 6 TiL. & W. 664). The proper evi- dence of all judicial proceedings is the proceedings themselves, or an examined copy of them. Thellvson v. Sheddon. 2 N. R. 238. (2.) Sewndwry Mndenci. — This is ad- missible where primary, that is, better, evidence cannot be had, e. g., in the case of a lost deed, upon proof of the loss a copy of the deed is admissible (B. N. P. 254) ; and so also upon proof of an un- successful application to the person who has the legal custody of the deed (iJ. v. Stolce GoUing, 1 B. & A. 173). The wrongful refusal of a third person (not being a solicitor) on snibpoBrM duces to pro- duce a document in his possession, is, however, no ground for admitting sec- ondary evidence (Jesus College v. Oihbs, 1 T. & C. 156) ; but it is otherwise in the case of a solicitor who so refuses (Hibhert V. Knight, 2 Ex. 11). In some cases, sec- 138 EVIDENCB. Eridence. — ( OmUnued.) ondary evidence of oral testimony is ad- mitted, e. g. where the testimony of a wit- ness on a former trial is admitted on an- other trial without producing the witness in person, as where a witness was exam- ined in a former action on the same point between the same parties and he is since dead (B. N. P. 343), or is kept away by contrivance {Green v. Gatewiek, B. N. P. 343). So, also, upon an examination de bene esse (which see). And see title No- tice TO Pkoducb. It is commonly said that there are no degrees of secondary evidence. This means that when secondary evidence is admissible at all, upon failure to produce the original document, no restriction is put upon the party producing the evi- dence as to the kind of evidence he shall produce for that purpose ; but if it was apparent that more satisfactory evidence might be produced than is produced, the juiy or a judge will be influenced by that consideration {Doe d. Gilbert v. Moss, 7 M. & W. 103). And there is one exception to the rule, namely, where by statute a special kind of secondary-evidence is sub- stituted for the original. (3 ) Presumptive Evidence. — This kind of evidence is so called in contradistinc- tion to direct or positive proof whether oral or written ; it is not of the nature of secondary evidence, and does not there- fore require in order to its admissibility any preliminary proof that positive or di- rect evidence cannot be procured (Doe d. Welsh V. Lamgfleld, 16 M. & "W. 513). The commoner classes of presumptions are the four following, namely : — (a.) Presumptions which admit of no contradiction by contrary evi- dence, and which are thence called juris et de jv/re ; (b.) Presumptions which the Court or a judge will direct the jury to presume, although no evidence thereof has been given, and which are thence called juris only; (e.) Presumptions as to which the jury are left entirely to themselves, being cases of which direct proof of one fact is given with the in- tention that the jury may from it presume another fact {Fryer v. Gathercole, 4 Ex. 362) ; and {d.) Presumptions that the testimony of a witness who might be, but is not, called, is unfavorable to the party who omits to call him. Evidence. — ( Oontinued.) . For examples of these various kinds of presumptions, see 1 Tayl. Evidence, p. 85 ; Eosc. Evid. at N. P. p. 38. , (4.) Sear say. — As a general rule, hear- say, i. e., the declarations of persons not made upon oath when repeated, on oath by a witness who heard them, are not admissi- ble as evidence. There are, however, some exceptions to this general rule ; thus, hearsay is admissible in the following cases : — {a.) In questions of pedigree, in which questions the declaration (wheth- er oral or written) of deceased members of the family are admis- sible to prove, e. g., legitimacy, marriage, the date of marriage, the number of children, &c. Entries in a family bible fall un- der this head. Nor is it neces- sary that the declarations should be contemporaneous with the facts declared, or even that the declarant should have any per- sonal knowledge of the fact, provided he had it of a relation {Monhton v. Att.-Gen. 3 Kuss. & My. 159). But the relative whose declarations are offered must be proved to be dead before they can be admitted in evidence {Butler V. ViscoUnt Mountgarret, 7 H. L. C. 733); moreover, in proving becbnt events, such as the death, place of birth, age, &c., of a person, where that fact is directly in issue, sIHet evidence thereof is required. And any declarations made post litem mo- tam are inadmissible. Berlceley Peerage, 4 Camp. 401. (J.) In questions of public rights, being rights of a pecuniary nature ; and the reasons for the admission are various, being either that l^e or- igin of such rights is generally ancient and obscure, and conse- quently incapable of direct proof, or that in local matters persons residing in the neighborhood and interested in the rights are likely to be acquainted, with them, or that such matters are likely to be the subject of fre- quent conversation. Such evi- dence is most commonly admit- ted for the following purposes : (1.) To prove the extent of a manor. (3.) To prove the boundaries between parishes or manors. EVIDENCE. 139 ETidence. — ( Continued.) (3.) To prove the existence of a ferry, &c. . But to prove a prescriptive right which is strictly private, no such hearsay is admissible. More- wood V. Wood, 14 East, 337. (e.) As forming part of the transaction (res gestce), and as being not evi- dentiary but explanatory thereof. Thus, the accompanying declara- tions may serve to show the ani- mus of the actor, when that is material {Bateman v. Ba/iley, 5 T. R. 512); also, generally the feelings orsufiFerings of the party (^Thompson v. Trevanion, Skin. 402 ; but see the Gcwdmer Peer- age Case, Le March. Rep. 174-6). The admissibility of the decla- ration in such cases depends not alone upon its accompanying an act, but on the light which it throws upon an act which is in itself relevant and admissible evidence. Wright v. Doe d. Ta- tham, 7 Ad. & E. 313. (per or vm/proper, the fomjer class being purely military, given freely, i.e., gratis, to persons duly qualified to discharge military services, the latter class being either given in exchange for some equivalent in money or in kind, or granted free from all manner of services, or granted in return for certain determin- ate services of a non-miEtary nature. 8ee, also, title Feudal System. FEUDAL. This is the adjective from feud, e. g., the feudal law signifies the Aoctcmeot feuds. Feudal posaesdonisVcie same thing as seidn ; and feudal actions is the old name for real actions. Thus a Feudal. — {Gontiniied.) tenant for years had not the feudal pos- session, and consequently had no real ac- tion, for a man's remedies are necessarily only commensurate in extent and in qual- ity with his rights. See title Seizin. FEUDAL SYSTEM. Previously to the Norman Conquestj feudalism, strictly so called, was unknown in England, although something superficially analogous to it existed in Anglo-Saxon times. It was in- troduced into England partially in 1066 as a consequence of the acquisition or conquest of England by "William I. in that year; and the system was completely established in England in 1085 by Law 52 of that sovereign, founded on the oath taken at Salisbury in the latter year by all free men. The law is in these words: " Statuimms ut omnes Uberi homines fadere et saeramento affirmeni quod intra et extra universum regnum Angles WUhehno regi domino suo fideles esse whint; terres et honores ilUus omni fidelitate ubique serva/re cum eo et contra inirmcos et alienigenas defendere." The precise nature of the change in the law of land which was thus effected at a stroke was the entire de- struction of ownerships and the substitu- tion for them of tenures; henceforward there was no such thing as absolute own- ership in land, but only a tenwe of them ; whence also lands have ever since been, as they now also are, described as tene- ments. The principal obligations incident to the feud were the following: — (1.) Wardship {see that title), although it is certain that ' this incident could form no part of the law of feuds before these became he- reditary ; (2.) Marriage (see that title) ; (3.) Belief {see that title) ; (4.) Aids {see that title) ; ♦ (5.) Escheat {see that title) ; and (6.) Escuage (see that title). It is so absolute a maxim of the feudal law, or law of tenures, that all lands are holden mediately or immediately of the king, that even the king himself cannot give lands in so absolute and uncondi- tional a manner as to set them free from tenure ; and, therefore, in the case of such a gift, the donee ' would, prior to the 12 Car. 2, c. 24, have, held the lands of the king in capita by knight service and would, since that statute, how hold by fealty. All lands therefore being tenures, the va- FEUDATORY. — FmB JU880R. 149 Fendal System. — (Oontinued.) rieties of tenures are the following, stat- ing the same in the words of Bracton (Henry m.):— " Tenements are of two kinds, (I.) Frank tenement, and (11.) Villenage. And of Frank tenements, (I. a.) some are held freely in consideration of homage and knight-service ; (I. b.) others in free socage with the service of fealty only. Of villenages (11. a.) some are pure; and (n. b) others are privileged, he that holds in pure villenage being bound to uncer- tain services of a viUein nature, and he that holds in privileged villenage being bound to certain services of a villein na- ture, whence also the latter is often called a villein-socman." FEUDATORY. A name for a feudal tenant, or vassal. The word is to be dis- tinguished from feudoury, which denoted an officer in the Court of Wards, who was appointed by the 33 Hen. 8, c. 46, and abolished by the 13 Car. 3, c. 34, ana who, during the continuance of his office, acted as a receiver for the king of the lands of the king's wa/rds and widows. riAT. A latin word signifying " let it bedmie." Thus, upon a petition to the King for his warrant to bring a writ of error to the House of Lords, he used to vTiite the woiis Jiatjustiiia, "let justice be done, " on the top of the petition. And in like manner, it was under a fiat of the Lord Chancellor, addressed to the Court of Bankruptcy, that the petitioning cred- itor used to prosecute, and that that Court used to hear the bankruptcy petition. Both these uses of the word " fiat " have gone into disuse, but analogous uses of the word remain; and as so used, the ■word in every case denotes an authority issuing from some competent source for the doing of some legal act. FICTIONS. These are assumptions of an innocent and even beneficial character, made for the advancement of the ends of jtiatice. They secure this end chiefly by the extension of procedure from cases to which it is applicable, to other cases to which it is not strictly applicable, the ground of inapplicability being some dif- ference of an immaterial character. Thus by the strict law of Rome, a foreigner (peregrinus) who had committed or suf- fered a tort, was neither liable to be sued, nor competent to sue, for the same ; but at a very early period the peregrimis in such a case was enabled to sue, and was Fictions. — {^OonUnued.) made liable to be sued, upon the assump- tion, i. e., fiction, that he was a Roman citizen. And similarly in English Law, the procedure of the Court of Exchequer, which was strictly confined to matters af- fecting the Crown revenues, was extended by means of the fiction quo minus to gen- eral civil suits in debt, and similarly the procedure of the Court of Queen's Bench was extended by the fiction of the ac etiam clause. It was customary also at one time to lay the venue at St. Martin's-le- Grand by a fiction for the true venue in the case of murders committed abroad, e. g., in Jamaica, this being an innocent fiction, the utility of which consisted in giving the Queen's Bench in England jurisfiction to try the ofiense. And generally, the procedure of Courts of Equity, so far as the same is supplement- ary to that of Courts of Common Law, depended largely on fictions of the like sort, e. g., ttiat the cestui que trust was feudally possessed, and might sue in the absence of his trustee, in whom the legal estate in reality was. According to Maine, fictions stand mid- way between early law and modem legis- lation, as a means of advancing the law. This opinion is corroborated by what actually occurred in the Roman Law, and by what is daily occurring in English Law. Thus, the actio Rumiana, which was the result of legislation, superseded the actio Sermana, which was the product of a fiction (Gai. iv. 35) ; and in English Law, by the C. L. P. Act, 1853, the cestui que trust was empowered to proceed at Law precisely as he might have done in Equity, a provision which is now made general by the Judicature Act, 1873. FIDEICOMMISSAEIUS. TMs word denoted in Roman Law the person who in English Law is called the cestui que trust. The prmtor ^fideieommissarius was an officer who corresponded to the Lord Chancellor. Mdeicommissa was the name for trusts, which are said to have been introduced for the first time in the reign of Augustus (Just. 3, 38, 1) in the person of Lucius Lentulus. FIDEJUSSOR. A surety in Roman Law. He might be added to any obliga- tion, whether civil or natural, being in this respect (and in a few other respects) different from both a fidepromissor and a yMnsor, who were also sureties. He en- joyed a right against the principal debtor 150 FIDUCIARY. -^ FINE. Fidejussor. — (^GorMrmed.) analogous to the right of recoupment in EngUsh Law, and which was called the actio depensi; but after the JEpigt/ula Ha- d/Hani (117 A. D.), he had no right anal- ogous to the English Law right of contri- bution as between co-sureties, but he had a better right, viz., the ieneficium divi- sionis, which required the creditor to split his demand evenly among all the co-sure- ties, whom for that purpose he made co- defendants. See also title Subbtt. FIDUCIABT. This phrase is derived from the Latin fiducmrius, which in Ro- man Law denoted substantially a trustee ; and, accordingly, the word is used in Enghsh Law to denote any one who holds the character of trustee, or (more accu- rately) a character analogous to that of trustee: e. g., agents, guardians, and the like. In the Roman Law, a fiduaMrius hitor was the elder brother of an emancipated pupiUus, whose father had died leaving him still under fourteen years of age. * FIEL. In Spanish Law, An officer whose duty it is to keep things deposited by law. Las Partidas Pt. 3, tit. 9, 1. 1. *FIEEDING COURTS. Ancient Gothic courts of limited jurisdiction. 3 Bl. Com. 34. FI. FA. A writ of execution, as to the general character of which, see that title. The particular writ is in substance a com- mand to the party to whom it is directed, viz., the sheriff, that of the goods and chattels of the debtor he do cause to be made (Jierifadaa) the sum recovered by the judgment, together with interest at 4 per cent, and that he have the money and interest, and the writ itself, before the Court immediately after the execution of the writ, or on a day certain in term, to be rendered to the party who sued out the writ. Under the stat. 1 & 3 Vict. c. 110, the sheriff may, upon a fi. fa., seize any money, bank notes, cheques, bills of ex- change, promissory notes, bonds, special- ties, or other securities for money belong- ing to the debtor, in addition to things that were already seizable by the Com- mon Law; but by stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 127, the wearing apparel and bedding of the debtor or his family, and the tools and implements of his trade, to the extent of £5 in value, are protected. FIFTEENTHS. This was a tax con- sisting of one-flfteenth part of all the moveable property of the subject. It is said to have been first imposed by Hen. 3. See title Taxation. FILING OF RECORD. This means entering amongst the records of the Court. *FIN DE NON RECEIVOIR. In French Law, A plea that the plaintiff has no right to bring the action. Pothier Proc. Civ., Pt. 1, c. 3, s. 3, art. 3; Story Confl. La,ws, § 580. FINAL JUDGMENT. A judgment is either final or interlocutory. It is said to heflncH, when it is complete in itself, and entitles the party to obtain at once the fruits of Ms, judgment, without any further inquiry being requisite for the purpose of ascertaining its amount. On the other hand, a judgment is said to be interlocutory, when something further re- mains to be done in the suit before the successful party is entitled to issue exe- cution upon his judgment. For example, in an action of assumpsit, if the defend- ant suffers judgment to go by default, the judgment is interlocutory only, because the amount of the debt or damages has first to be ascertained, and possibly a jury to be summoned for the purpose, before any execution may issue on the judgment. But under the C. L. P. Act, 1853, many judgments which used to be held inter- locutory are made final, subject to the ascertainment of the amount of debt or damages, where that is a mere matter of calculation. FINAL PROCESS. As distinguished from mesne process (for which, see that title), this phrase is used to denote writs of execution, such as fi. fa. and elegit, being the steps taken at the end of a suc- cessful action for the purpose of realizing the fruits of a judgment. FINDING OF A JURY. This denotes the verdict of the jury. They, find a mixed verdict, that is, partly of law and partly of fact; and it is competent for them to find the contrary of the truth, for their finding maketh even what is false to be true, in cases of an exceptional character: see BushelPs Case, 6 St. Tr 909. FINE. A species of assurance abol- ished by the stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, but which previously to that statute was FINES ON ALIENATION. — FIXTURES. 151 Fine. — {Continued.) commonly in use for assuring estates of freehold. In criminal* law, pecuniary punishment. FINES ON ALIENATION. These were incidents, of the tenure by knight service in capite, and became payable to the king upon any aUenation by his tenant, apparently as the purchase-money for Uberty to aUene. In case such a tenant attempted to aUene without hav- ing first obtained in that manner the king's license so to do, he incurred a com- plete forfeiture of his lands. Similar fines were also exacted, and still are exacted, upon the alienation of lands of copyhold tenure. See title Copyholds. FIRE-BOTE. This is the same as hmae-hote, which title see; and see also title Estovers. FIRST FRUITS (primiim.) The first year's whole profits of a benefice or spirit- ual living. These were originally part of the papal usurpations over the clergy of this kingdom ; and as they expressed their willingness to contribute'so much of their income to the head of the church, it was thought proper, when the papal power was abolished, and the king declared head of the Church of England, to annex this revenue to the Crown, which was done by stat. 36 Hen. 8, c. 3 (confirmed by stat. 1 Eliz. c. 4), and a new i)alor heneflaiorum was then made, by which the clergy have since been rated. FISHERY. The right or privilege of fishing. It is a species of common, and is sometimes described as common of pis- cary. Free fishery is the exclusive right of fishing in a public river, and is a privi- lege of the Crown. Several fishery is a right of fishing enjoyed by the owner of the soil of the river, and which he may lease or devolve in any other manner upon a stranger. FISH ROYAL. These were the whale and the sturgeon, which, when thrown ashore, or caught near the coast, became the property of the king by virtue of his prerogative, and in recompense for his protecting the shore from pirates and robbers. FIXTURES. As the name denotes, are things fixed or affixed to other things. The rule of law regarding them is that which is expressed in the maxim Aecessio Fixtures. — ( Continued.) cedit prineipoM, ' ' the accessary goes with, and as part of, the principal subject- matter." This maxim, as applied to lands, has assumed in English Law the form "Quid-qudd plantatwr solo, eolo cedit," and in Roman Law the form " OmTis quod iwxdiflcatwr solo, solo cedit." The rule had its first application in English Law in the case of buildings erected on land for agricultural purposes, whence agricultural fixtures so-called present the operation of the maxim in its most general form. But inasmuch as that maxim was thought to operate, and undoubtedly did operate, in discourage- ment of trade, there grew up a mitiga- tion of the rule, applicable to trade fixtures as they were called, and which mitigation was to this effect, that fixtures of the lat- ter sort might be removed during the tenancy by the tenant who had put them in, but not after the determination of his tenancy. This mitigation of the rule was subsequently extended, upon the like grounds of utility, to ornamental fixtures so called, which also were permitted to be removed during the tenancy, but not af- terward. Fixtures are chattels of an amphibious character, being for some purposes and at some times interests in land and for other purposes, and at other times purely personal chattels. Thus, while fixtures are annexed to lands or houses, they are an interest in land, and are ratable as land, and trover will not lie for their con- version or detention ; and yet, even while so annexed, they ere not, mrihle, an inter- est in land within the meaning of the 4th sect, of the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3). On the other hand, fix- tures, even while annexed, are purely per- sonal chattels within the meaning of the Bills of Sale Act, 1854 (17 So 18 Vict. c. 36) ; and yet the Courts have held that where they are comprised in one testatum, together with the lands or houses to which they are attached, they are to be treated as part and parcel of the lands or houses, and that the Bills of Sale Act, 1854, intended them to be personal chat- tels only when treated in a separate tes- tatum by themselves, and when the grantee or mortgagee had the power of removal and of sale; SeeBawtreyY. But- Un, 21 W. R. 633, and JSx parte Bwrelay, Be Joyce, 23 W. R. 608-610 (reflecting on Aliens. Meitx, I. c); and see generally Brown on Law of Fixtures, 2nd ed. 1872. 152 PLEDWITE. — FORESTALLING. *PLEDWITE. Li old English Law, A. fine exacted from a fugitive or outlaw as the price of the king's pardon. Burr. Diet. FLOTSAM: See title Jetsam. _ F(ENUS NAUTICUM. This phrase literally means maritime interest, which was commonly at a higher rate of per- centage than ordinary interest, in consid- eration of the extra risks which are in- curred at sea. See, also, titles Bottomry; Respon- dentia. , FOLK-LAND. In Anglo-Saxon times, lands were divided into boc-land and folc- land, the former being held by writing, and the latter by custom merely. FOLK-MOTE. This denotes an assem- bly of the people. It was in the nature of an inferior Court,, and an appeal lay from it to the superior Courts. It is sup- posed to have been the same as the shire- gemote in counties, ,and as the burg- gemote in burghs. But it had other more general meanings, and denoted merely a popular assembly, summoned for any cause, whether permanent or occasional, and either to complain of existing mis- governments or to renew the duty of al- legiance to the sovereign. In these latter senses, it seems to have acted as that ul- timate tribunal of the Commons them- selves. To which (in the words of Aus- tin), the House of Commons and the min- isters are subject. * FOLK-BIGHT. This word occurs in the laws of King Edward I., and is thought to be the same as commum Icm. 1 Bl. Com. 65. FOBCIBLE ENTRY. This is a crim- ina,l offense, and consists of an entry or detainer made with such a number of per- sons or with such a show of force as is calculated to deter, the rightful owner from sending the persons away and re- suming his own possession (Mitner v. Modem, 3 0. & P. 17). The offense is somethmg more than a trespass {Hea) v. Smyth, 5 0. & P. 201). The entry must have been unlawful, to come within the Stat. 8 Hen. 6, c. 9. FOBECLOSUBE. This is one of the remedies of a mortgagee. Por its opera- tion and effect, see title Mortgage. *FOBEHAND BENT. A premium given by the tenant at the time of taking the lease. Crabb. Real Prop. § 155. F0BEI6N ATTACHMENT. When the defendant is sued in the Lord Mayor's Court of the City of London, it is the custom of that City and Court to issue an attachment against moneys or debts in which the defendant has a beneficial in- terest, and for which that defendant might at the time of the attachment have brought an action ( WSster v. Webster, 31 Beav. 393). It is not necessary that the debt for which the attachment issues should arise within the jurisdiction, or that the parties should be within the ju- risdiction, but only that the debt attached should be so. A foreign attachment is no bar to an action for the same debt. FOBEIGN ENLISTMENT. The stat. 59 Geo. 8, c. 69, was until recently the Foreign Enlistment Act for England ; but during the recent Franco-Prussian war that Act was repealed, and a further and more stringent Foreign Enlistment Act (38 & 34 Vict. c. 90) was passed, declar- ing illegal, and visiting with penalties, the following offenses, viz. : — (1.) Enlisting in military or naval ser- vice of any foreign state at war with an- other foreign ^state at peace with Eng- land ; (3.) Being in any manner subservient thereto or assisting therein; and (3.) Building ships or making expedi- tions in aid of either belligerent. FOBEIGN LAWS. Are often the sug- gesting occasions of changes in, or adm- tions to, our own laws, and in that respect are called jiis reeepPwm. But foreign laws sometimes prevail almost propria vigore within this country, through our Courts of Justice choosing invariably to follow them in certain cases. What those cases are, and in what cases the English Courts refuse to follow the foreign- law and ap- ply the Law of England, may be learned from a study of the "Conflict of Laws," , by Mr. Story or Mr. Wharton, or (more conveniently, perhaps) from Westlake's Priv. Inter. Law. And for some detailed information of the various laws which come in conflict, see these titles in this dictionary, viz., Lex Loci Rbi SiTio ; Lex DoMiorLn ; Lbx Loci Actus or Celebra- tionis ; Lbx Looi Situs ; Lex Loci Solu- tionis or Contractus ; and Lbx Fori. FORESTALLING. The obstructing of a way ; the intercepting of a person or thing on a road'. Also regrating or engrossing of the market, which is an offense by the Com- FOREST-LAW. —FORNICATION. 153 Forestalling. — {Continued.) mon Law; thus, spreading rumors, withi intent to enhance the price of hops, in the hearing of hop-planters, to the effect that the stock is nearly exhausted and that there will be a scarcity is an instance of this oflense. Some attempt was made by the stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 24, to regulate t^e offense, but apparently with poor ef- fect : the statute was necessary, inasmuch as the Common Law offense extends only to the necessaries of Uf e {Pettamberdara Y. Noehxrrseydas, 7 Moo. P. 0. C. 239). The Index to the Revised Edition of the Statutes, p. 407, speaks of the offense of forestalling, &c., as abolished by the last- mentioned statute, sed guan-e. FOREST-LAW. This was a particular system or body of laws relating to the forests of the Crown. It is popularly as- sociated with every thing that was cruel, — an opinion to which the frequency of that kind of statute called Oarta di For- esta seems to give some probability. The officers of the forest, who were charged to preserve the " vert and venison " there- of, were called /westers. FORFEITURE. By the stat. 33 & 84 Vict. c. 23, forfeiture or escheat of lands on the ground of felony is abolished, but of course remains for any other cause (see title Bschbat). The law of forfeiture also still apphes as between landlords and their tenants for breaches of covenants contained in leases ; and with reference to these, not being mere informal insur- ances, neither Courts of Law nor Courts of Equity have much or any power to re- lieve. See title Penalties. See, also, title Waiver. FORGERY. This is a criminal offense, existing partly by Common Law and partly by statute. Forgery at Common Law is the fraudulent mahing or alteration ef a writing to the prejudice of another man's right. Under the stat. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, and numerous other statutes, offenses analogous to forgery at Common Law are made felonies, and are punisha- ble as forgeries ; but that punishment is not now death (as formerly), but penal servitude for life, or for any term not less than five years, or imprisonment, with or without hard labor, and with or without solitary confinement, for any term not exceeding two years. FORISFAMILIATED. An antiquated word, which signifies much the same as set up in the world (see title Advanck- 20 Forisfamiliated. — (Oontinued.) MBNT). A son was said to be forisfamil- iated when in his father's life-time he re- ceived his part of the lands, and was con- tented therewith. See, also, title Hotchpot. FORMA PAUPERIS. A. person is said to sue or defend an action or suit in forma pauperis, i. e., in the character of a poor person, when, »by going through certain forms, he is admitted by the Court so to sue or defend, and has counsel and attorneys assigned to conduct his case free of charge. An order of the Court is necessary, which is to be obtained upon a petition of the party, accompanied with a certificate of counsel. The order must be served on the opposite party, and only takes effect as from the date of such ser- vice (Fray v. Voules, L. R. 3 Q. B. 214) ; but, subject to that rule, the party may be admitted to sue or defend in this ca- pacity at any stage of the proceedings. Moreover, he may appeal without making any deposit. Drennan v And/reu>, L. R. 1 Ch. 300. FORMEDON. This was an action in the nature of a writ of right. There were three species of the writ, viz. : — (1.) Formedonm the descender ; (2.) Formedon in the remainder ; and (3.) Formedon in the reioersion; these forms of writ being applicable re- spectively in the following cases: — (1.) Formedon in the descmder, where the tenant in tail aliened the land entailed or was disseized thereof and died, and the heir in tail wanted to recover the land against the then tenant of the freehold ; (2.) Formedon in the remainder, where the tenant for life or in tail with remain- der to a third person in fee or in tail died (and, in the case of tenant in tail, with- out issue), and afterward a stranger in- truded upon the land and kept the re- mainderman out of possession, and the remainderman wanted to recover the land from the intruder ; and (3.) Formedon in the reverter, where the tenant in tail died without issue, and the reversioner wanted to recover the lands against the then tenant thereof. All these forms of this writ were abol- ished by the stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 36, but it would be a mistake to suppose that the analogous remedies are abolished, which they are not. ♦FORNICATION. Unlawful carnal knowledge of an unmarried person of 154 FORPRISE. — FRAUD. Fornication. — (OorMrmed.) another, whether married or unmarried. Bouv. Diet. * FORPRISE. An exception or reser- vation. * FOURCHER. A mode of delaying an action, formerly used by defendants. FRANCHISE. An incorporeal here- ditament or rightf such as a ferry, 6r a market, entitling the owner of the fran- chise to take certain tolls or pecuniary payments. Sometimes, also, it denotes an exemption from the ordinary jurisdic- tion, coupled with the right of exercising a jurisdiction of one's own ; arid in this last signiflcation it is a royal privilege or branch of the king's prerogative, subsist- ing in the hands of a subject ; e. g., to be a county palatine, to have right to hold a Court leet, to have "waifs, wrecks, es- trays, treasure-trove, royal fish, forfeitures, and deodands. 3 Cru. 278. FRANKALMOIGN. A species of ten- ure of lands granted by the owner to the church or to any monastic body, to hold to the church or monastery for ever free (as the name denotes) of all manner of services to the donor for ever, save and except the saying of prayers and. the dis- tributing of charity to the poor for the welfare of the soul of the donor and his family for ever. FRANEMARRIAGE. A species; of tenure of lands granted by the owner to his son-in-law upon his marrying into the family, to hold to such son-in-law and the heirs of the marriage free (as the name denotes) of all manner of services to the donor until the fourth generation, the sole consideration for the gift being the marriage itself. FRAUD. Its definition and the ys^e- ties thereof: At Law fraud has been thus variously defined : ^ (1.) Falsely and fraudulently warrant- ing a specific article sold (Langridge v. Leoy, 2 M. & W. 519) ; the scienter is an essential part of the definition, and its absence dispels the fraud [Longmeid, v. HoUiday, 6 Ex. 761); (2.) Falsely and fraudulently represent- ing a man as a safe customer {Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T. B. 51), where the repre- sentation is intended to be acted upon, and is in writing under 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, s. 6; Fraud. — ( Continued. ) (3.) Recklessly asserting, without any knowledge of the matter, the existence of a certain state of circumstances, and in- ducing the plaintiff, in reliance thereon, to act upon an erroneous assumption to his loss {Evans v. Edmunds, 13 C. B. 777) [sed quceritur] ; and (4.) Asserting without any knowledge of the matter, but with a disbelief of his own assertion, the existence of a certain state of circumstances, and inducing the plaintifiE in reliance thereon to act upon an erroneous assumption to his loss. Tay- lor V. Aahtm, 11 M. & "W. 415. See iTifra, cases in which an action for fraud will lie at Law. In Equity, fraud has never been defined, the Courts fearing that new cases of fraud might arise, which if they should not fall within the definition might prove to he . irremediable ; but the Courts of Equity have distinguished many classes and varieties of frauds, namely, the foUowr ing: I. Actual Fraud, and hereunder two sub- varieties, namely: (A.) Frauds from a regard to the peculiat position of the de- frauded person. (B.) Frauds without any such regard, but arising from conduct gen- erally, as being either (1.) Stiggestio/dld; or (2.) Suppressio veri. n. Constructive Fraud, and hereunder three sub-varieties, namely: (A.) Frauds, because evasions of the rules of public policy. (B.) Frauds, because violations of trust or of confidence reposed. (C.) Frauds, because of unconscien- tious nature of acts themselves, either (1.) As against the parties; or, • (2. ) As against third persons. And see concrete instances of fraud in paragraph containing Remedies in Equity. Bemedies in cases of Frcmd. These reniedies lie either at Law or in Equity. I. The remedies available at Law are the following; (1.) An action on the case in the nature of a writ of deceit, and recover- ing damages for the fraud ; and (2.) An action on "the common indebi- tatus count for money had and received, and recovering the full amount of the debt. FRAUD. 155 Fraud. — ( Continued. ) Generally speaking, the first of these two remedies, viz., an action to recover damages arising from fraud will lie in every case of fraud ; but if the plaintifE chooses to disaffirm the contract on the ground of fraud, he may then bring the second form of action, viz., an action on the common indebitatus count {Neate v. Hcurding, 6 Ex. 349). But some act of disaffirmance must in every case precede the commencement of the latter form of action. Smith v. Bodson, 4 T. R. 311; 3 Sm. L. C. 119, and notes. A false warranty and a misrepresenta- tion being often difficult to distinguish, it is customary in practice to join a count for fraud with the count for a breach of warranty where it is doubtful whether a warranty can be proved. There is, however, a limit to the right of bringing the first action, i. e., an action on the case in the nature of deceit, it b^ing a rulg of the Common Law that such an action will not lie against a prin- cipal for the fraudulent representations of his agent, the principal not having either expressly or impliedly authorized the agent to make the representations (Corn- foot V. FowJce, 6 M. & W. 358) ; and there- fore an incorporated -company caimot as such be made liable ia this action for the false representations of its directors, the company not having authorized the di- rectors to make the representations (TF«sf- em BanJe of Scotland v. Addie, L. R. 1 S. & D. 162), the remedy (if any) being against the directors only. Gerhard v. Bates, 3 El. & Bl. 487. And there is also a limit to the right of bringing the second action, i. e., an action for money had and received, it being a rule of the Common Law that such an ac- tion will not lie if the circumstances have so far changed since the date of the con- tract that the parties cannot be restored 'to the position in which they stood before or at the time of the contract (Clarhe v. Dvekson, Bl. Bl. & El. 148) ; and therefore a contract, although induced by fraud, cannot be avoided if the rights of an in- nocent vendee have in the mean time in- tervened. Queen v. Saddhr^s Gomparvy, 10 H. L. C. 430. At Law, an action to recover damages arising from fraud, or (upon a disaffirm- ance) an action on the common indebita- tus count will lie in the following cases: (1.) Where the defendant has stated or represented as a matter of fact (and not of opinion merely) what is untrue, hnowr Fraud. — ( Continued.) ing it to be untrue, with intent to induce the plaintiff to act upon it, and has there- by induced the plaintiff to act upon it, to his loss {Paaley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 51) ; (3.) Where the defendant has stated or represented as a matter of fact (and not of opinion merely) what is untrue, with- out knowing whether it is false or true, hit Twt Relieving it to he true, with intent to induce the plaintiff to act upon it, and has thereby induced the plaintiff to act upon it to his loss {Twywr v. Aihton, 11 M. & W. 401) ; (3.) Where the defendant has stated or represented as a matter of fact (and not of opinion merely) what is untrue, know- ing it to be untrue, hut from, defect of memory idi&oing at the time that it is true, with intent to induce the plaintiff to act ' upon it, and has thereby induced the plaintiff to act upon it to his loss {BUm V. Croucher, 3 Giff. 37); (4.) Where, senihle, the defendant has stated or represented as a matter of opin- ion merely what is untrue, not heliemng it to he, true, with intent to induce the plain- tiff to act upon it, and has thereby in- duced the plaintiff to act upon it to his loss; (5.) Where the defendant has fraudu- lently concealed from the plaintiff some defect which it was his dcatj (either gen- erally, or by reason of the special circum- stances of the transaction) to disclose, with intent to induce the plaintiff to act upon the assumption of the absence of such defect, and has thereby induced the plaintiff to act upon the assumption to his loss (HorsfaU v. Thomas, 1 H. & C. 90); and (6.) Where the defendant has falsely and fraudulently warranted a specific article sold (Langridge v. Levy, 3 M. & W. 519) ; in which latter case (waiving the fraud) an action would lie for breach of warranty. But such action will not lie at Law in the following cases : (l.)Where the defendant has stated or represented as ^ matter of fact (and not of opinion merely) what is untrue, know- ing it to, be untrue, hut without intent to induce the plaintiff to act upon it, although the plaintiff may have been induced thereby to act upon it to his loss {Way v. Seam, 13 0. B. [N. B.] 292); (3.) Where the defendant has stated or represented as a matter of fact (and not of opinion merely) what is untrue, with- out knowing whether it is false or true, 156 FRAUD. Frand. — ( Continued,.') tut heUeming it to he true amd rwt hrnig under any d/wby to hww the contra/ry, with intent to induce the plaintiff to act upon it, and has thereby induced the plaintiff to act upon it to his loss (Evans v. OolMns, 5 Q. B. 804; see, also, title Fbatto, Legal WITHOUT Moral Fbaud) ; (3.) Where the defendant has stated or represented as. matter of opinion merely what is untrue, heUeoing it to be irue, with intent to induce the plaintiff to act upon it, and has thereby induced the plaintiff to act upon it to lus loss. This is an ap- plication of the maxim, Oa/eeat Mnptor ; and (4.) Where the defendant has fraudu- lently concealed from the plaintiff some defect, which it was not the duty of the defendant (either generally, or by reason of the special circumstances of the trans- action) to disclose^ but on the contrary the duty of the plamtiLS to discover, with intent to induce the plaintiff to act upon the assumption of the absence of such defect, and has thereby induced the plain- tiff to act upon that assumption, to his loss. This is another application of the maxim Oaeeat Emptor. As to pleading fraud at Law, the defense must be specially pleaded, although it is generally sufficient for the defendant to allege that he was iaduced to make the alleged contract by the fraud of the plaintiff. Where fraud is pleaded with particularity, no other fraud can be proved than that which is averred {Tu^k V. TooJee, 9 B. & C. 437). Sometimes the Court orders particulars of the fraud to be delivered. Marshall v. Emperor Life As- sitrance Society, L. R. 1 Q. B. 35. n. The remedies available in Equity are the following : — . (1.) The Rescission of the contract,and hereunder, — (a.) The cancellation and delivery up of executory agreements; (&.) The setting aside of executed agreements; (3.) The specific perfbrinance' of the contract, with or without com- 'peps9.tion; (3.) An injunction from profiting by the fraud ; and (4.) A declaration making the defraud- ing party a trustee for the party defrauded. Every such remedy is available by bUl, and by bill only. The bill must not rest upon a mere general allegation of fraud, but must state in a particular manner the Fraud. — (^Gontinued.) details of the transaction which is im- pugned as fraudulent, iii order that the Court may infer from that statement whether there was or not any fraud in the transaction. Oilhert v. Lewis, 1 De Gr. J. & S. 38. (A.) Where the remedy sought is the RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT, Whether that be for the cancellation and delivery up of executory or for the setting aside of executed agreements, the following are the general requisites to the success of the suit : — (1.) That the party against whom re- lief is sought can be remitted to his former position, the interests of third parties without notice of the fraud not having meanwhile intervened; (3.) That the contract may be rescinded in toto, unless indeed it be severable in its nature, in which latter case the rescis- sion of the fraudulent portion of it may, subject to the first requisite) be obtained (^Matiwrin v. Tredennich, 13 W. R. 740); and (3.) That the party to the contract is either himself the person who committed the fraud or is a privy of such person. Pulsford V. Richards, 17 Beav. 95. The remedy by rescission is available in the cases of the following general char- acter, «. g., where a brother or other per- son gives the intended wife a sum of money to swell her fortune, taking a bond for the repayment of the sum. Qale v. Inndo, 1 Vern. 475 ; and see the very sim- ilar case of Twrton v. Benson, 1 P. Wms. 496. The terms upon which a transaction is rescinded are in general upon the plain- tiff doing equity. Thus, fraudulent in- struments are commonly set aside on repayment by the plaintiff of the actual consideration given, with interest thereon at a reasonable rate; or they are directed to stand as a security for the moneys ac- tually advanced with the like interest,, or for what upon taking the accounts shall be ascertained to be really due. And where the transaction affects real estate, it is usual to direct a reconveyance there- of upon the repayment of the purchase- moneys and all sums laid out in improve- ments and repairs of a permanent and substantial ^nature by which the present value is improved, with interest thereon from the respective times of the actual disbursements, the party in possession accounting' on his part for deteriorations and for the rents received and profits made FBAUD. 157 Fraud. — ( Continued.) in the meantime out of the estate. But ceatuia que trust in respect of the frauds of their trustees, and principals in respect of the frauds of their agents, stand upon more favorable terms, being entitled at their option to hold the defrauding per- son to his fraud if that is more beneficial to them, and at the same time to take the profits he has made by the fraud, or at their option to have the property re-con- veyed, and'interest paid at the rate of 5 per cent, instead of 4 per cent, which is the usual rate in other cases. In the case of two or more copartners, where one of them has been induced by fraud to enter into the partnership, the terms of rescis- sion are that his copartner or copartners repay hinn whatever he has paid, with in- terest thereon, and indemnify him against all habilities incurred by him through having become and been a partner, he on his part accounting for what profits he has received out of the partnership. Where a man has been fraudulently in- duced to take shares in a company, he is entitled to recover his money and to have his name removed from the register, he accounting to the company for any divi- dends or other profits in the meantime received by him. (B.) Where the remedy sought is the SPBCIFIC PEKFOBMANCB OF THE CONTRACT with or without compensation, the fol- lowing are the general requisites to the success of the suit : — (1.) That the actual subject-matter of the contract is in substance that which it was misrepresented as being, and that the difference accordingly admits of com- pensation ; (3.) That the party who made the mis- representation, being plaintiff, offers to give compensation for the variance, or being defendant is discharged by the plaintiff from giving such compensation (see Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 365 ; 3 Wh. & Tud. L. C. 468 ; and Townshend v. 8tamr- groom, 6 Ves. 338) ; and (3.) That the plaintiff is himself uAo- cent in respect of the fraud or misrepre- sentation. This remedy is available in the follow- ing cases, and, either (1.) Against one who is a party to the contract; or (3.) Against one who is not a party to the contract. (1.) Against one who is a party to the contract : — Fraud. — (GonUnued.) (a.) Where, although the property is incorrectly described, yet the inaccuracy was known to the de- fendant at the time, or he in- spected the property before mak- ing the purchase and relied upon his own judgment (Dyer v. Ed/r- grme, 10 Ves. 505) ; (b.) Where the vendor invited further investigation on the part of the purchaser, and gave him every . facility for the same ; (c.) Where the misrepresentations are matters of opinion merely ; (aite v. Winter, (6 Ex. 644), stones got by quarrying were held to be miuerals. Therefore, gener- ally (unless we are to distinguish between mines and minerals), the materials, and MINISTERIAL POWERS. 229 Mines and Minerals. — (OonUniied.) not the mode of working, must be made the criterion ; or, speaking perhaps more accurately, mines are materials obtained by mining, and minerals are the like ma- terials obtained either by mining or by quarrying, such materials being so very numerous and various as to admit of de- scription or enumeration only, and not of definition. In strictness, mines are the openings only, and not the material ex- tracted from the earth through these openings. Where the surface of land belongs to one owner, and the mines and minerals belong to another owner, — Then (a.) If nothing appears showing their respective titles, or the measure of the respective grants of the respective here- ditaments to the two respective owners, the mine -owner cannot so mine the verti- cal strata as to destroy the surface above, or even so as to occasion a subsidence thereof, while that surface remains in its natural state {BwmpTi/nea v. Brogden, 15 Q. B. 739) ; and after buildings have stood on the surface for twenty years, the right of natural support to the land and buildings thereon from the vertical strata and also from the adjacent strata is acquired {Brovme v. Bobins, 4 H. & N. 186^: and (6.) If the mode of the acquisition of the respective titles, or even the respect- ive deeds of grant of the respective several tenements, are existing, then the words of the deed are to be regarded ; and in consequence of such words the right of natural support, as well from the vertical as from the adjacent strata, may be found to have been either abandoned or diminished; but the Court fights against that conclusion. Compare Harris V. Myding, 5 M. & W. 60; WiUiams v. BagnaU, 15 W. R. 273; and Smith v. Darby, L. R. 7 Q. B. 730. MINISTERIAL POWERS. These powers, as the name indicates, are given for the good, not of the donee himself exclusively, or of the donee himself neces- sarily at aU, but for the good of several per- sons, including or not including the donee also. They are so called because the donee of them is as a minister or servant in his exercise of them. They are of various kinds. (1.) The ministerial powers of a tenant for life are the following, viz. : — (A.) A power of leasing. This power depends upon and is regulated by the Ministerial Powers. — ( Oontinued.) Act 19 & 30 Vict. c. 120, and the Act i!l & 33 Vict. c. 77, called respectively the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act and the Act amending the same. Under these Acts it is lawful for a tenant for life who is so under a settlement dated after the 1st of November, 1856, which does not expressly exclude the Act, to demise for any term not exceeding twenty-one years any part of the settled estates (except the principal mansion- house or the demesnes thereof), provided he observes the following requisites, namely : — , (a.) Lease only in possession; (i.) Make the demise by deed; (e.) Reserve the best obtainable rent ; (A) Take no premium or fore-gift ; (e.) Make the lessee impeachable for waste ; (/.) Insert a covenant for payment of rent, and other usual and proper covenants ; (y.) Insert a condition of re-entry for non-payment of rent for twenty- eight days, or for non-observ- ance of the other covenants; and (A.) Obtain the lessee to execute a counterpart of the lease. The tenant for life may exercise the power of leasing to the extent aforesaid without any applicMion to the Court of Chancery. And in case the settlement is of a date prior to the 1st of November, 1856, or in case a longer term of demise than twenty- one years is desired to be granted, then, upon application to the Court of Chan- cery for its sanction thereto, the tenant for life may (under certain conditions, for which see the Acts) grant the following varieties of lease, namely : — (fl.) An agricultural lease for twenty- one years or under ; (J.) An occupation lease for twenty-one years or under; (c.) A mining lease for forty years or under ; (d) A water lease or other easement lease for forty years or under ; («.) A repairing lease for sixty years or under ; (/.) A building lease for ninety-nine years or under. And where it is possible to satisfy the Court that it is customary in the district and beneficial to the inheritance to grant longer leases than for the periods above mentioned, the Court will sanction the 230 MINOR. — MISBRICORDIA. Ministerial Voyyera. — ^OontiTmed.) tenant for life granting leases for longer periods than those above mentioned in all the above-mentioned varieties of lease, excepting only the agricultural lease or first variety. (B.) A power of borrowing money for the improvement of the estate, and charg- ing the loan upon the inheritance. This power was necessitated by the somewhat rigorous rule of Courts of Equity which denied any remuneration to tenants for life for the expenses they might have in- curred, even for permanent improvements, unless the improvements were absolutely indispensable for the maintenance of the estate at its accustomed value (see Dent V. Dent, 30 Beav. 363) ; and no prudent tenant for life should expend his own money on the estate, it being free to him to expend borrowed money for the pur- pose. His power of borrowing depends upon various Acts, that is to say — (as.) If, on the one hand, the money intended to be borrowed is to be expended in agrieultwral im- provements, then he may have it from Government under the Im- provement of Land Act, 1864 (37 & 38 Vict. c. 114), upon the terms of that Act ; and (J.) If, on the other hand, the money intended to be borrowed is to be expended in the improvement of a residence, then he may have it from Government in like man- ner, although to a more limited extent, under the Limited Own- ' er's Residences Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 56), and the Act amending same (34 & 85 Vict. 0. 84), upon the terms of those two Acts ; and (C.) A power of selling the settled estates and conveying the same to the purchaser for an estate in fee simple. This power depends on various Acts, principally upon the Act 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 47, which authorizes a sale or mortgage of the lands, when that is requisite for the payment of the debts of the testator, being the settlor ; the pro- visions, however, of which Act have been largely superseded by the provisions of the Trustee Act, 1850 (13 & 14 Vict, c. 60), and of the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 130). (3.) The ministerial powers of a tenant for life in right of his wife, and of a tenant by the curtesy or in dower, depend Ministerial Powers. — (OpnUnued.) as to leasing on the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act, 1856, and are gener- ally subject to the same or the like pro- visions as are above stated regarding a tenant for life in his own right ; and (3.) The ministerial powers of a tenant in tail depend partly on the stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74 (as to leasing), and partly on the Leases .and Sales of Settled Estates Act, 1856 ; but owing to the facility with which he may at the present day bar the entail and become absolute owner, the question of his ministerial powers is com- paratively insignificant. 8ee, also, title CoNVByANCES. MINOR. A person who has not at- tained his majority is usually so termed, in the Irish Reports principally ; that is, one under the age of twenty-one years. See title Inpanct. MISDEMEANOR. A misdemeanor is an act committed or omitted, in violation of a public law either forbidding or com- manding it. This general definition, however, comprehends both crimes and misdemeanors, which, properly speaking, are mere synonymous terms, though in common usage the word " crimes " is made to denote such offenses as are of a deeper and more atrocious dye, while smaller faults and omissions of less consequence are comprised under the milder term of misdemeanors only. In the English Law the word "misdemeanor" is generally used in contradistinction to felony, and misdemeanors comprehend all indictablet offenses which do not amount to felony — as libels, conspiracies, attempts and solici- tations to commit felonies, &c. 4 Chitty PI. 5, and n. 3. MISE. The issue in a writ of right, when the tenant in a writ of right pleads that his title is better than the demand- ant's, he is said to join the mise on the mere right. MISERICORDIA. This word was commonly used in our law to signify a discretionary mulct or amerciament im- posed upon a person for an offense ; thus, when the plaintiff or defendant in an action was amerced the entry was always ideo in miserieordid, and it was so called because the fine was but small (and therefore merciful) in proportion to the offense; and if a man was outrageously amerced in a Court not of record — as in a Court Baron, for instance — there was MISFEASANCE.— MITTER LE DROIT. 231 Misericordia. — (OcmUnued.) a writ called Mbderatd Misericordid, to be directed to the lord or his bailifl, com- manding them that they take moderate amerciaments in just proportion to the of- fense of the party to be amerced. When a fine was amerced on a whole county instead of an individual, it was then termed Misericordia Comm/unis. E. N. B. 75 ; Les Termes de la Ley. MISFEASANCE. Doing evil, trespass- ing, &c. ; and he who does so is sometimes called a misfeasor (Cowel). The term is used in contradistinction to a non-feascmce^ which means simply an abstention from doing altogether. An interesting appli- cation of this distinction is to be found in the Six Carpenters' Case (1 Sm. L. C. 133), where the mere refusal to pay for the wine (sc. beer) which the men had drunk in a public-house was declared not sufficient to make them trespassers ab initio in coming upon the premises at all, as breaking the pots or doing other will- ful damages and misfeasances, it was stated, would have made them. MISJOINDER. The joining of two or more persons together as the plaintiffs or defendants in an action who ought not to be joined. Non-joinder is the omitting to join one or more persons who ought to have been joined as the plaintiffs or de- fendants in an action. See, also, title NoN-JorNDBB ; and generally as to modes of remedying or taking advantage of misjoinder or nonjoinder, see title Amend- ment. MISNOMER. The mistake in a name or the using one name for another. It is a general rule of law that a misnomer has no effect if the subject-matter or person is certain or ascertainable notwithstand- ing the misnomer, ^^ Falsa demanstratio non nocet, si de corpore constat;" and in its application to legacies, Falsd demons stratione legatnm non peremi," Just. Inst, ii. 20, 30 ; and " Longe magis falsa causa non nocet." Just. Inst. ii. 30, 30.' MISPLEADING. Pleading incorrect- ly, or omitting any thing in pleading, which is essential to the support or de- fense of an action, as in the case of a plaintiff not merely stating his title in a defective manner, but setting forth a title which is essentially defective in itself; or, if to an action of debt the defendant pleaded not guilty instead of nil debet, this was mispleading (Salk. 365). Also, Mispleading. — ( OonUrmed.) in Chancery suits, it is a mispleading in certain cases if the defendant do not allege the absence of notice, see title Notice. MISPRISION (from the French mepris, neglect or contempt). IJisprision is gener- ally understood to be all such high offen- ses as are under the decree of capital but closely bordering thereon ; and it is said that a misprision is contained in every treason and felony whatsoever. Mispris- ions are generally divided into two sorts, negative and positive, the former con- sisting in the concealrnent of something which ought to be revealed, the latter in the commission of something which ought not to be done. Of the first, or negative kind, is what is called mispris- ion of treason, which consists in the bare knowledge and concealment of trea- son, without any degree of assent there- to. Of this negative kind is also mis- prision of felony, which is the conceal- ment of a felony which a man knows but never assented to. The concealment of treasure trove, which belongs to the king or his grantees by royal prerogative, is also a species of negative misprision. Positive misprisions are generally denomi- nated contempts or high misdemeanors ; such, for example, are the mal-adminis- tration of such high officers as are in public trust and employment ; the embez- zling of the public money; contempts against the king's prerogative, his person, and government, or his title, &c. 1 Hawk. P. C. 60. MITTER LE DROIT (to pass or trans- fer the right). This phrase is used in contradistinction to that of mitter I'estate, and both are employed to point out the mode in which releases of land operate. A release might be a conveyance of a right to a person in possession. Thus, where a person was disseized or put out of possession of lands, although the dis- seizor thereby acquired the possession, still the right of possession and property remained in the msseizee ; but if the dis- seizee agreed to transfer his right to the disseizor, the proper mode . of carrying such an agreement into execution was by a release, the disseizor already having the possession; and as in such cases nothing but the baVe right passed, the release was said to inure by way of mit- ter le droit, i. e., transferring the right. A release was said to inure by way of 232 MITTER L'BST ATE. — MONEY COUNTS. Slitter Le Droit. — (0(mUnued.) mitter I' estate, i. e., of passing the estate, e. g., when two or more persons become seized of the same estate by a joint title, either by contract or descent, as joint tenants or co-parceners, and one of them releases his right to the other, such release is said to inure Ijy way of mitter Vestate, i. e., transferring the estate. 4 Cru. Dig. 84, 85. And see title Convbyamcbs, sub-title MITTEK L'ESTATE : See title Mit- TBB LB Droit. MITTIMUS. A writ by which records are transferred from one Court to another, sometimes immediately, as out of the King's Bench into the Exchequers and sometimes by a certiora/ri into Chancery, and from thence by a mittmius into another Court. This word is also used to signify a precept that is directed by a justice of the peace to a gaoler for the receiving and safe-keeping of a felon or other offender committed by the said justice to the gaol. Lea Termes de la Ley. MIXED ACTIONS are such as partake of the twofold nature of real and per- sonal actions, having for their object the demand and restitution of real property, and also personal damaiges for a wrong sustained. * MODO ET FORMO. Words used in old pleadings where a party denied alle- gations not only as to their general effect but the exact manneir and form. Steph. PI. 189, 190. MODUS DECIMANDI (the mamner of UtMng, or paying titles). A discharge from the payment of tithes, by custom or prescription, is said to be either de modo dedmandi (i. e., in the iLanner of tithing or paying tithes), or de non deeimamdo {i. «., in paying no tithes). Amadua ded- mandi, commonly called by the simple name of modms only, is where there is by custom a particular manner of tithing allowed, different from the general man- ner of taking tithes in kind : and this is sometimes eflected by a pecuniary com- pensation, as twopence an acre for the tithe of land ; sometimes it is a compen- sation partly in work and labor, as that the parson shall have only the twelfth cock of hay, and not the tenth, in con- sideration of the owner's making it for him, and the like : in short, any means Modns Decimandi. — ( OonUnued.') whereby the general law of tithing is altered, and a new method of taking tithes is introduced, is called a mod'm demrumdi, or special manner of tithing. A discharge from the payment of tithes by a custom or prescription, de non deci- mando, arises either from some personal privileges which the party enjoys who is so discharged, or by a real composition made in Ueu of payment of tithes, or from some other like circumstahce. Thus, the king, by his prerogative, is discharged from all tithes ; so a vicar is discharged from paying tithes to the rector, and the rector to the vicar. A real composition is made by an agreement between the owner of lands and the parson or vicar, with the consent of the ordinary and the patron, that such lands shall for the future be discharged from payment of tithes in consideration of some land or other REAL recompense being given to the parson in lieu and satisfaction there- of. 3 Inst. 490 ; 14 M. & W. 393. 8ee, also, title Tithes. MOHATBA. In French Law, a fraudu- lent contract designed to cover a usurious loan of money. MOIETY (from the French, nMm, halt). The half or part of any thing. Thus, joint tenants are sometimes said to hold by moieties (Cowel). The shares of two joint tenants are of necessity moie- ties; but the shares of two tenants in common entitled equally would also be moieties. An inaccurate use of the word ' ' moiety " is that in which it signifies merely ^ari, aha/re or proporUan, whether equal or unequal. MOLIITER MANUS IMPOSUIT {he laid hands on him gently). When a per- son is sued for an assault, he may set forth the whole case, and plead that he laid hands on him gently, molUter manus im- pomit. From these words having been so used in pleas, several justifications in actions of trespass for assault are called by this phrase (1 Sid. 301). The degree of gentleness (or of roughness) neces- sarily varies with the degree of the resist- ance. MONET-BILLS. Bills for raising revenue or making appropriations. MONET COUNTS. These are simple forms of pleading in actions of assumpsit, and were provided by the C. L. P. Act, 1853, Sch. B. They are goods sold, work MONITION. — MONTH. 233 Money Counts. — (Oontinued.) done and materials provided, money lent, money paid, money received, and such like other counts, which are also some- times called the common indebitatus count. See title AsstrMPsiT ; and Ikdbbita- TTjs Assumpsit. MONITION. An order, or admonitory epistle, issuing from a spiritual C6urt, and addressed to some person or persons offending against the laws ecclesiastical, advising or monishing them to act in obedience to those laws. When a party has been duly served with a monition, he is technically said to have been "mon- ished. " See Rog. Ecc. Law ; Bum's Ecc. Law, tit. "Monition." MONK. The profession of a religious person of this character made him dead in law, or civilly dead (see titles CrviL Death ; Clerotmah) ; but since the Ref- ormation, the monkish profession is not recognized by law in England; and amounting, therefore, to no religious pro- fession at all, it no longer renders the monk civilly dead, tn re Metcalfe^ 33 L. J. (Ch.) 308. MONOPOLY. The sole right of selling a particular article of manv3acture. The power to grant such a right was in early times claimed as a prerogative of the Crown. Its exercise was in many cases most beneficial, as ingenious foreign workmen were from time to time drawn to England by the expectation of sub- stantial commercial advantages being se- cured to them by royal letters patent (being, in fact, these grants of monopoly) ; and enterprising Englishmen were also induced by the like expectation to travel abroad and acquire a practical knowledge of trades and arts. But the Crown expe- riencing in those days the evUs of no regular taxation — the chief of which was a perpetually-recurring want of money to conduct the affairs of Govern- ment — the prerogative was exposed to, and its exercise soon became affected with, many abuses, principally in this respect, — that the monopoly was sold at a ruinous price, usually to the highest bidder, whether or not he was the true and first inventor of the process of manufacture, and latterly without any regard at all to his capacity or ability as an inventor or manufacturer, and frequently indeed to courtiers, who made it a means of gain exclusively, and did not assist the na- 30 Monopoly. — (Oontmued,.') tional industry at all. The evils arising from this abuse of the prerogative were become so great by the latter end of the reign of Elizabeth, that the Courts of Common Law, in the Qme of MonopoUes (JDwrcey v. Allen, 11 Rep. 84), 44 Eliz., adjudged monopolies to, be illegal ; and parUament took up the matter as early as 1601, and, in the next reign, succeeded in regulating the abuse by enacting the Patent Act (31 Jac. 1, c. 3), which is the basis of the Patent Law at the present day. See title Patents. MONSTER. One who has. not the shape of a human being, and, although bom in lawful wedlock, cannot be heir to any land. But mere deformity of per- son does not make any one a monster. MONSTRANS DE DROIT {showing of right). One of the Common Law meth- ods of obtaining possession or restitution from the Crown, of either real or per- sonal property, is by monstrams de droit, manifestation or plea of right, which may now be preferred or prosecuted either in the Chancery or in any of the Common Law Courts, although originally in the Chancery and Exchequer only (see Peti- tions of Right Act, 1860, 23 & 24 Vict, c. 34). A moMtroms de droit Ues when the right of the party, as well as the right of the Crown, appears upon record, wMch is putting in a claim of right, grounded on facts already acknowledged and estab- lished, and praying the judgment of the Court whether, upon those facts, the king or the subject has the right. Skin. 609 ; Day's Common Law Pro. 563. ♦MONSTRANS DE FAITS. A kind of profert or showing of deeds or rec- ords. Jacob Diet. * MONSTR.ATERUNT. A writ which lay for tenants in ancient demesne when they distrained to do other services and customs, unto their lord, than their an- cestors used to do. Jacob Diet. MONTH. In English Law, a lunar month, or twenty-eight days, unless other- wise expressed. Hence a lease for twelve months is for forty-eight weeks only; but if it be for a "twelve-month," it is good for the whole year. In a con- tract, if the parties obviously intended that a month should be a calendar month, the law will give effect to that intention. If money be lent for nine months, it must 234 MORATEN m LEGE. — MORTGAGE. Month. — {Oontin/usd.) be understood calendar months (Str. 446) ; similarly in the case of bills of exchange and promissory notes. In legal proceed- ings, as in time to plead, a month is four weeks (3 Burr. 1455), but is to denote in future a calendar month, see Order li., r. 1, Proposed Rules under Judicature Act, 1873. But where a statute speaks of a year, it shall be computed by the whole twelve months (2 Cro. 167) ; and so generally in all statutes. " *MOKATENINLEGE. This phrase was used when a party did not go forward in pleading, but rested or abided by the decision . of the Court, as to the suffi- ciency of the adverse party's pleading. * MORGANATIC MARRIAGE. A marriage between a man of superior and a woman of inferior rank, in which it was stipulated that the wife and children should not enjoy the rank, or inherit the possessions of the husband and father. MORT CIVILE in French Law deno- ted civil death, as upon conviction for felony. It was nominally abolished by a law of the 31st of May, 1854, but some- thing very similar to it, in effect at least, still remains. Thus, the property of the condemned possessed by him at the date of his conviction goes and belongs to his successors (Tieritiers), as in case of an in- testacy; and his future acquired property goes to the State by right of its preroga- tive (peer d/roit de desJierence), but the State may, as a matter of grace, make it over in whole or in part to the widow and children. MORT D'ANCESTOR. An assize of inort d'anceitor was a writ which lay for a person whose ancestor died seized of lands, &c., that he had in fee simple, and after his death a stranger abated; and this writ directed the sheriff to summon a jury or assize, who should view the land in question,' and recognize whether such ancestor were seized thereof on the day of his death, and whether the de- mandant were the next heir. MORTGAGE (rrwrtgagium; from mort, death, and gage, pledge). A mortgage may be described to be a conveyance of lands by a debtor to his creditor, as a pledge' or security for the repayment of a sum of money borrowed. The. debtor who so makes a conveyance of his lands, or so puts them in pledge, is termed the mortgagor, and the creditor to whom the Mortgage. — ( Oontinued.) lands are so conveyed as a security fdr the money lent is termed the mortgagee. The mortgagee, with respect to the tenure which he acquires in the lands so con- veyed to him, is also termed a tenant in mortgage. Mortgages of freehold lands are of two sorts: either the lands are conveyed to the mortgagee and his heirs in fee simple, with a proviso that if the mortgagor pays the money borrowed on a certain day, the mortgagee will reconvey the lands ; or else the lands are conveyed to the mort- gagee, his executors, administrators and. assigns, for a long term of years, with a proviso that if the money borrowed is repaid on a certain day, the term shaU cease and become void. There is also another kind of mortgage, where the pro- viso for redemption does not oblige the mortgagor to pay the money on a partic- ular day, but allows him to do it at any indefinite time ; and this is called a Welsh mortgage. 3 Cruise, 81 ; 2 Bl. 152. Mortgages of leasehold lands are like- wise of two sorts, being either (1) by assign- ment, in which case the mortgagee coming into legal privity with the lessor becomes liable to the latter on the rents and cove- nants ; or (2) by underlease, in which case the mortgagee by reason simply of the absence of that privity with the lessor does not become liable to the latter on the rents and covenants. In either case there is the usual proviso for the re-assign- ment or surrender of the premises upon repayment of the principal money lent and interest and costs. Mortgages of copyhold lands, where they constitute the principal or entire se- curity, are usually made by surrender without admittance, subject to a proviso making void the surrender upon repay- ment of the principal, interest, and costs; but where they are only a subordinate part of the security, the mortgagee is fre- quently satisfied with a covenant to sur- render, which he takes from the mort- gagor, subject to the usual proviso that the covenant shall be discharged and be- come void upon repayment of the mort- gage debt and interest and costs. A mortgagee may realize the mortgage debt in various ways, — (1.) By foreclos- ure, which he efleotuates by means of a suit in Equity; (3.) By Sale, which he carries out either by exercising his power of sale (if any) contained in the mort- gage deed, in which case he must care- fully conform to the terms of the power. MORTMAIN ACTS. — MOVEABLES. 235 Mortgage. — ( Continued.) or by exercising the statutory power of sale, which is to be taken (in the absence of an express one) to be imphed in every mortgage deed (23 & 24 Vict. c. 145), in which case he must carefully comply with the words of the enabling statute. The mortgagor's remedy against his mort- gagee is, — By Redemption, which in the ordinary case he exercises by simply pay- ing back the borrowed money, and in all cases of peculiarity or of unsettled ac- counts by means of a suit in Equity. Where an estate is mortgaged for success- ive debts to successive mortgagees, if any mesne mortgagee wishes to realize his mortgage debt he files a biU in Equity oflEering to redeem the prior mortgagees, and praying to foreclose those that are posterior to himself, according to the rule of practice, — "Redeem up, foreclose down." See, also, titles Notice ; Tacktng, &c. MORTMAIN ACTS. These Acts had for their object the prevention of lands getting into the possession or control of religious corporations, or, as the name in- dicates, in mortvA manu. After numer- ous prior Acts dating from the reign of Edward I., it was enacted by the stat. 9 Geo. 2, c. 36 (called the Mortmain Act par excellence), that no lands should be given to charities unless certain requisites should be observed. MORTUARY. A mortuary is that beast or other moveable chattel which, upon the death of the owner thereof, by the custom of some places, becomes due to the parson, vicar, or rector of the par- ish in which the person so dying resided, in Ueu or satisfaction of tithes or other ecclesiastical offerings which such party may have forgotten or have neglected to pay while alive. 21 H. 8, c. 6; Les Termes de la Ley. MOTION. An application to the Court by the plaintiff or defendant in an ac- tion, or by the counsel for either, in order to obtain some rule or order of Court which may become necessary in the course of the proceedings ; and the act of mak- ing such an application is termed moving the Court. The word also signifies in- stance, desire, will, &c. Thus a person is said to do a thing of his own motion, i. e., voluntarily, without being required to do it. See, also, the next following titles. MOTION OF COURSE. Is a motion which is granted as a matter of course, and which, therefore, is not usually made in open Court, but is granted by the mas- ter or officer of the Court when the paper containing the direction to move is laid before him, with a barrister's signature attached. Almost every thing that may be done on motion of course can also be done, and is ordinarily done, by petition of course at the Rolls. See that title ; and 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., Appendix. MOTION IN PARLIAMENT. Making a motion in either House of Parliament is simply the act of submitting a propo- sition. In the House of Commons a mem- ber desirous of making a motion is de- sired to give previous notice thereof, and having done so, it is entered in terms upon the notice paper or order book. In the Lords this notice is not required by the rules of the House, but, for the sake of general convenience, the same practice ordinarily prevails. In the House of Commons there are certain fixed days ap- pointed for motions of which notice has previously been given, as contradistin- guished from "orders of the day," which latter are questions which the House has already agreed to consider, or has partly considered and adjourned for further consideration or debate. On an " order " day the orders have precedence of mo- tions, and on a " motion " day the motions have precedence of orders ; but in either case if the one can be disposed of in time, the House will proceed to the other. MOVEABLES. Moveable and im- moveable is one of the commonest, be- cause the most apparent and natural, of the modern divisions of things, as the subjects of property. It is not coinci- dent, however, with the historical divis- ions which have obtained most extensively in ancient or in modern times, not agree- ing with the Roman Law division into Res Mandpi and Res Nee Marwipi (agricul- tural and non-agricultural) on the one hand, nor with the EngUsh Law division into lands and chattels, or real and per- sonal property, on the other. For ex- ample, a leasehold house is an immoveable, and yet is personal property ; and a dig- nity or title of honor is a moveable, and yet is real property. Nevertheless, just as the division into Res Mandpi and Res Neo Mancipi gradually gave way before the industrial development of Roman greatness, so also the division into real and personal property is more and more 236 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.— NATIVO HABENDO. Moveables. — (OonMrmed.) giying way before the advancing diversi- ties of English wealth. For example, a leasehold house is now for many purposes looked upon as land, and is even declared to be such in the interpretation clause of most modern statutes. But the division into moveable and immoveable, finding its basis in nature, promises to be perma- nent ; and it may grow to be as fertile in consequences as the other divisions have been. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION: See title CoRPOBATioiir. MUNIMENTS. Deeds, evidences, and writings in general, whether belonging to public bodies or private individuals, are called muniments ; and in cathedral and collegiate churches, and generally in all offices there is a strong rorom or compart- ment provided for the keeping of the muniments relating to their property, &c., which is thence termed a muniment house or strong room. Les Termes de la Ley ; 3 Inst. 170. MURDER. The act of a person of sound memory, and of discretion, unlaw- fully killing any person under the king's peace, with malice aforethought, either express or implied. Express malice is signified by one person killing another with a deliberate mind and formed de- sign, and which formed design is evi- denced by external circumstances discov- ering that inward intention, as by- lying in wait, antecedent menaces, former grudges, and concerted schemes to do him some bodily harm. Implied malice is signified by one person voluntarily killing another without any provocation ; for when such deliberate acts are com- mitted, the law implies or presumes mal- ice to have urged the party to the com- mission of them, although no particular enmity can be proved (3 Inst. 4 ; 1 Hale, 455) ; and in case a person trespassing in pursuit of game fires at a bird, and, with- out any intention at all of doing so, hits and kills a man, that is murder, inasmuch as the act of poaching is felonious, and the felony therein couples itself to the death, and supplies the intention which was lacking. R. v. Grispe, 1 B. & Aid. 283. * MURDRUM. In old English Law, the kilUng of a man iu a secret manner. * MUTATION OF LIBEL. An amend- ment to a libel. Dunlap Admr. Pr. 313. MUTE. A prisoner is said to stand mute, when being arraigned for treason or felony, he either makes no answer at all, or answers foreign to the purpose, or with such matter as is not allowable, and will not answer otherwise ; or upon hav- ing pleaded not guilty refuses to put him- seB upon the country. MUTINY ACT. An Act of Parliament to punish mutiny and desertion, and for the better regulation of the army, and their quarters. The Mutiny Act, properly so called, relates to the army only ; the Marine Mutiny Act relates to the navy. Bach Act is passed annually, the jealousy of the constitution for the individual's liberties being such as not to tolerate that such Acts, or the jurisdictions which they establish, should become perpetual or per- manent. This necessity for their annual re-enactment secures the annual re-as- sombling of Parliament. MUTUAL CREDIT: See title Set- off. MUTUAL PROMISES. In a declara- tion in special assumpsit the plaintiff usually alleges that, in consideration that he, at the request of the defendant, had then prpmised tlie defendant to observe, perform, and fulfill all things in the agreement on his, the plaintiff's, part, the defendant promised the plaintiflE that . he would perform and fulfill all things in the said agreement on his, the defendant's, part to be observed and per- formed,* which is thence termed the alle- gation or statement of mutual promises. * MYSTIC TESTAMENT. A will under seal. Bouv. Diet. ; La. Civ. Code, art. 1867. N. *NAMARE. To take or distrain. Used in old records. NANTISSEMENT. In French Law is the contract of pledge ; if of a moveable, it is called gage, and if of an immoveable it is called antichrese. * NARR. The abbreviation of narratio; a declaration in a cause. NATITO HABENDO. A writ which lay for a lord when his villein had run away from him ; it was directed to the shenffl, and commanded him to apprehend the villein, and to restore him together with his goods to the lord. But if a vil- lein had tarried in a town or ancient de- NATURAL-BORN SUBJECTS. — NEGLIGENCE. 237 Native Habendo. — (Continued.) mesne lands for the period of a year and a day without having been claimed by his lord, then the lord could not seize him in either of such places (Les Termes de la Ley). It was a writ of right raising the title of the lord, upon whom, therefore, the onvs prdbandi was laid ; and such a provision was also m favor of liberty, the proof of villenage, or neifty, going back as far as 1 Ric. 1. See, also, title Villbnage. NATURAL.BORN SUBJECTS. Those who are born within the dominions, or rather within the allegiance of the King of England. See, also, title AiLEGiANCB. NATURALIZATION. The making a foreigner a lawful subject of the state, or, as it is sometimes termed, the king's nat- ural subject. Formerly an Act of Parlia- ment was required in each particular case to naturalize an alien ; the king by his letters patent might denizenize but not naturahze. However, by the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 66, which was a General Act, it was enacted that aliens of friendly states might become naturalized British sub- jects upon complying with the requisites of the Act. And now, by the Naturali- zation Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 14), further facilities of naturalization are afforded, and the important privilege of expatriation is conferred; also, the evil or inconvenience of a " double allegiance " is remedied. See, also, title Allegiance. NAVIGATION. The right of the pub- lic to navigate a public river is para- mount to any right of property in the Crown, which never had the power, e. g., to grant a weir in obstruction of the navigation {WiMa/ms v. WiUcox, 3 N. & P. 608). As to what is evidence of a public river, the flux and reflux of the tides is prima, fcuAe evidence of its being so; but the evidence is not conclusive, because a public right of navigation in such a river may have been extinguished either (as.) By legal means; e. g., an Act of Parliament, a writ of ad quod damnum {see that title), or an order of conunission- ers of rivers; or (S.) by natural causes, e. g., a retreat of the sea or a deposit of silt and mud {Rex v. Montague, 6 D. t his deed). A plea which occurs in the action of debt on bond or other specialty, and also in covenant. In this plea the defendant de- nies that the deed mentioned in the decla- ration is his deed (Steph. on Plead. 169, 172). By r. 10, T. T. 1853, in actions on specialties and covenants, the plea of non est factum shall operate as a denial of the execution of the deed in point of fact only, and all other defenses shall be specially pleaded,including matters which make the deed absolutely void as well as those which make it voidable. NON EST INVENTUS (he isnot found). When a writ is directed to the sheriff commanding him to arrest the defendant,, and he is unable to do so because he can- not find him, he returns the writ with an indorsement on it to that effect, and this is technically called a return of non est inventus. However, this return is neces- sarily now little in use, since the facility of imprisonment for debt, and almost the practice itself of such imprisonment, have been done away with. See title Impbibonmbnt for Debt. NON-FEASANCE (non-performance). The omitting to do what ought to be done, e. g., where a gratuitous bailee sim- ply refuses to enter upon the agency, and for which mere non-feasance he is held to be not liable. Bcdfe v. West, 13 0. B. 466. ' See, also, title Mibfeabaitcb. 31 NON-JOINDER. The not joining of any person or persons as a co-defendant or co-plaintiff. It may be further illus- trated by the following passage from Tidd'g Practice : "In actions upon con- tracts, where there are several parties, the action should be brought by or against all of them. If living, or if some are dead, by or against the survivors ; and if an action be brought by one of several parties on a joint contract made with all of them, the non-joinder may be pleaded in bar," i. e., the fact of all the parties to the contract not having been joined in the action may be pleaded in bar. Tidd's NewPract. 318. NON OBSTANTE VEREDICTO (not- withstanding the verdict). When the de- fense of the defendant in an action put upon the record is not a legal defense to the action in point of substance, and the defendant obtains a verdict, the Court, upon motion, will give the plaintiff leave to sign judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided the merits of the case be very clear; and this is called judg- ment non obstante veredicto. 3 Arch. Pract. 1551. NON PROS, or NON PROSEQUITUR (he does not prosecute or follow v/p). If in the proceedings of an action at law the plaintiff neglects to take any of those steps which he ought to take within the time prescribed by the practice of the Courts for that purpose, the defendant may enter judgment of non pros, against him, whereby it is adjudged that the plaintiff does not follow up (non prose- quibwr) his suit as he ought to do, and therefore the defendant ought to have judgment against him. Smith's Action at Law, 96. NONSUIT (non est proseautus). A re- nunciation or giving up the suit by the plaintiff; and this is usually done on his discovering some error or defect, or when he fipds that his evidence is not suffi- cient to maintain his case. The stage of the proceedings at which a plaintiff is nonsuited is usually just Before the judge has summed up, but it may be done at any time before the jury have delivered their verdict. It is, however, entirely optional with the plaintiff, in England, whether he will submit to a nonsuit or not ; he cannot be compelled to do so, but may insist on the case going to the jury, and take his chance of the ver- dict. In cases, however, where it is doubtful whether the verdict will be a fa- 242 NON SUM INF0RMATU8. — NOTICE. Nonsuit. — ■) vorable one, it is usual for the plaintiff to choose (or elect, as it is termed) to be nonsuited, because after a nonsuit he iday conunence another suit against the de- fendant for the same cause of action, which may be advisable if he can come better prepared with evidence, or can otherwise repair the defect which was the cause of his failure ; but if a verdict be once given, and the judgment follow thereon, he is forever barred from suing the defendant upon the same ground of complaint. 1 Arch. Pract. 409, 444; Staph, on Plead. 120. NON SUM INF0RMATUS {lam not informeS) . Judgment by default is either by nil dAcit, that is, where the defendant is stated to have appeared, but to have said nothing in bar or preclusion of the action ; or by Tum sum informatus, where he is said to appear by attorney, but the attorney says that he is not informed by the defendant of any answer to be given. This latter is used only in cases where judgment is entered in pursuance of a previous agreement between the parties. Leg Termes de la Ley. NOTARY. In ancient times a notary was a scribe or scrivener, who took min- utes and made short drafts of writings and instruments, both of a public and a private nature. In the present day, how- ever, he is called a notary publie, who confirms and attests the truth of any deeds or writings, in order to render the same available as evidence of the facts therein contained in any other country. Some of the chief duties of notaries are connected with mercantile transactions, as in noting bills of exchange and promissory notes which have been presented for pay- ment and dishonored, the noting of a foreign bill being, like the notice of dis- honor of an inland bill, a necessary pre- hminary to bringing an action upon it against the indorsers and (usually) against the drawer. NOTE OF A FINE. The note of a fine was an abstract of the writ of cove- nant and concord, naming the parties, the parcels of land, and the agreement. See, also, title Fink. NOTEjPROMISSOKT: ;See title Pkom- issoBT Note. NOT GUILTY. A plea which occurs in the action of trespass or trespass on the case ex delicto, by which the defendant Not Guilty. — {ConUmued.) denies being guilty of the trespasses, &c., laid to his charge in the plaintiff's decla- ration. When a defendant pleads not guilty in a criminal charge he thereby puts himself upon trial, and is entitled to all the chances of escape from conviction which the rules of law afford him in case of the evidence being doubtful, or from any other cause, notwithstanding he may in fact have committed the act wliich is usually taken to constitute the offense. An accused person is, therefore, in all cases justified in pleading not guilty to a criminal charge. On the other hand, in civil cases, when a defendant pleads not guilty, he is said to plead the general issue, whereby he is taken to deny the gist of the action only. For example, in actions for torts the plea of not guilty operating as a denial only of the breach of duty or wrongful act alleged to have been committed by the defendant, it fol- lows that in an action for a nuisance to the occupation of a house by carrying on an offensive trade, the plea of not guilty will operate as a denial only that the de- fendant carried on the alleged trade in such a way as to be a nuisance to the oc- cupation of the house, but wiU not ope- rate as a denial of the plaintiff's occupa- tion of the house. And again, in an ac- tion for slander of a plaintiff in his office, or profession, or trade, the plea of not guUty will operate as a denial of speaking the words, of speaking them maliciously and in the defamatory sense imputed, and with reference to the plaintiff's office, or profession, or trade, but will not ope- rate as a denial of the fact of the plain- tiff holding the office, or profession, or trade alleged. See Smith's Action at Law, p. 533. NOTICE. This is a head of equity of great importance in the two principal re- spects following, namely : — (1.) As perfecting the assignment of choses in action ; and (3.) As affecting or not affecting nibse- qimht interests. But in regard to both these branches notice may be either actual or construct- ive, with this difference, that actual no- tice is the more common of the two in respect of the former branch, and con- structive notice the more common in re- spect of the latter. For, firstly, actual notice is any express intimation given by a person interested, or claiming to be in- terested, in the chose in action to the per- NOTICE. 243 Notice. — ( Gontinued. ) son having present control over it, on purpose to bind him as to such control, and thereby to complete, as far as possi- ble, the rights of the person giving the notice. And, secondly, constructive no- tice is notice impHed or inferred from the proof of surrounding circumstances, — an insecure form of notice, which the person claiming a chose in action should in no case rely upon. Notice has been inferred from two states of circumstances in particular, viz., (1.) Where actual notice of some general charge has been given, and if the fact had been inquired into, the person receiving such notice would have been naturally led on to notice of other things, but he has neglected all inquiry, where- fore of these latter he is taken to have constructive notice; and (3.) Where the circumstances are such as show the per- son charged with constructive notice to have willfully, and not negligently merely, abstained from inquiry for the purpose of avoiding notice. For the first species of constructive notice see Biscoe V. Banbury (Ea/rl) (1 Ch. Ca. 387) ; and for the second species, Birch v. Sllames (2 Anstr. 427). And there is a third spe- cies of constructive notice arising from the relation of the parties, as being that of principal and agent, client and solic- itor, and such like, where the transaction is either contemporaneous with, or shortly subsequent to, another transaction com- municating notice (Fuller v. .Bennett, 3 Hare, 394), the subject-matter of the no- tice having been a material part of the earlier transaction. Wyllie v. Pollen, 32 L. J. (Ch.) N. 8. 782. Considering the subject of Notice in its two branches, — and, Firstly, Notice as perfecting the assignment of chases in ao- tion. In order that third persons may be bound it is necessary, with regard to a chose in action, to give notice to the per- son in whose hands it is, or when realizing itself will be, such notice being, in the case of a chose in action which does not admit of actual delivery, precisely equiv- alent in its effect to the actual delivery of a chattel in possession which admits of delivery {Ryall v. Bowles, 1 Ves. 348). Therefore, (a.) In order to take a chose in aetion out of the order and disposition of the creditor in case of his bankruptcy it is necessary to give notice to the debtor. ByaU V. Bowles, supra. (J.) In the case of a policy 'of assur- ance notice must be given to the insur- Notice. — ( Continued.) ance office. Thompson v. TowMns, 3 Dr. & Sm. 8. (<;.) In the case of an assignment of freight notice must be given to the char- terer. Browne v. Tanner, L. R. 3 Eq. 806. {d.) In the case of an assignment of a legacy, general or specific, the executors not having yet assented to it, notice to the executors must be given. Browne v. Souo- age, 4 Dr. 635. (e.) In the case of an assignment of the costs of a suit not yet ordered to be paid notice should be given to the trustees, or other the parties to whom they will be payable. Day v. Bay, 1 D. & J. 144. (/.) In the case of an assignment of shares in a company, notice must be given to the company. Bx parte Bovlton, 1 D. & J. 163 ; and see generally the cases of Dearie v. Mall, Loveridge v. Cooper, 3 Russ. 1, 30. If such notice has been given, as soon as the assignee knows to whom the same is to be given, the assignee^ if not other- wise in default, will not lose the benefit of it (Feltham v. Cla/rh, 1 De G. & Sm. 307), upon the maxim, lex neminem cogit ad vana seu inutilia pa/ragenda. Where for any reason notice cannot be given then the assignee must perfect his title in some other way ; e. g., where the sole trustee of stock has died without legal representatives a dis^ngas should be served on the Bank of England {Etty V. Bridges, 1 Y. & C. Ch. 486); and where a fund is in Court, a stop-order over it should be left at the Paymaster- General's Office (Greening v. Bechford, 5 Sun. 195 ; Chancery Funds Act, 1873 [35 & 36 Vict. c. 44], and rules thereunder), a mere notice to the Paymaster-General being iasufficient ( Wan-hwton v. Sill, Kay, 470) ; but a notice to the trustees (if any) before payment into Court would be good' against a stop-order subsequently ob- tained. Livesey v. Barding, 23 Beav. 141. Chattel interests in real estate, being equitable, are not chases in action within the meaning of the rules above stated (Wiltshire v. Babbits, 14 Sim. 76); and being legal, the law will of course prevail without regard to the question of notice. But the proceeds of the sale of real es- tate are not a chattel interest in real es- tate. Lee V. HowUtt, 3 K. & J. 531. And, Secondly, Notice as affecting or not affecting sulssequent interests. A purchaser for value vnthout notice of a prior equitable estate or interest, and, d fortiori, of a mere equity, obtaining the 244 NOTICE. Notice. — ( GonUnued.) legal estate either at the time of his pur- chase or subsequently thereto, and appa- rently, whether by fair means or by a fraud {Ovlpepper^g Oaae, Freem. 123; Pitcher v. RmoUns, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 359), is entitled to priority in Equity as well as at Law ; but not in case of a breach of trust (Bcmnders v. Dehew, 2 Vern. 271). But the legal estate, where it is obtained fraudulently, must have been actually ob- tained, — i. e., conveyed {Eyre^. Burmei- ter, 10 H. L. C. 90) j although where it may be obtained by fair means and with- out fraud the right of a conveyance of it is sufficient {WUougKnj v. WillougKby, 1 T. R. 763). And even where a purchaser for value without notice neither has the legal estate nor the best right to call for it, Equity will do nothing to prejudice him upon the application of an adverse party asking the aid of Equity (auxiliary jurisdiction) {BaHace v. Oooh, Ereem. 34) ; although, upon the application of an adverse party q|kinghis legal rights (con- current jurisdiction), and not merely the assistance of the Court of Chancery toward establishing these rights of Law, Equity is bound and compellable to de- clare and decree him his rights, however much to the prejudice of the purchaser for value ( Williornis v. Lamhe, 3 Bro. C. C. 264 ; OoUins v. Archer, 1 Russ. & My. 284) ; and with reference to the rights of a prior legal mortgagee see FinchY. Shorn, Gollyer v. Finch (19 Beav. 500). And as between persons who are successive equi- table claimants. Equity takes them ac- cording to their priorities of date, with- out regard to notice or the absence of notice (PMJips v. Phillips, 31 L. J. [Oh.] 325), unless in the case of the gross neg- ligence of a prior claimant being the oc- casion of the prejudice sustained by a subsequent one. Mice v. Sice, 3 Dr. 73. On the other hand, a purchaser for value with notice of a prior equitable es- tate, or interest, or even of an equity, can- not, by getting in the legal estate, whether at the time of, or subsequently to, his purchase, and whether by fair means or fraudulent, obtain priority over such prior claim, but the purchaser will in such a case be held a trustee for the prior claimant to the extent of such prior claim {Birch v. EUames, 2 Anst. 437); And notice will bind the subsequent purchaser, even although the prior charge is defective, or would even (as from neglect to register or re-register) be void at Law {Le Nefoe v. i« Nme, Amb. 436); although conversely Notice. — {Contimied.) the absence of notice will save him, even although the prior charge be registered {Moreooch v. Dickens, Amb. 678), unless ia Ireland (6 Anne, c. 3), or vnth reference to British ships {BMghex v. Morris, 3 De Q. M. & Gr. 349) ; the same rules apply to subsequent mortgagees; but with refer- ence to judgment "creditors the following peculiar rules have been established : — (a.) Judgment creditors, as between themsehes, take rank according to the or- der of the dates of their several registra- tions, without regard to the question of notice, which as between them is imma- terial. Benham v. Keane, 1 J. & H. 685 ; 3 & 4 Vict. c. 83, s. 3. (&.) An unregistered judgment does not afiect a subsequent purchaser for value or mortgagee, and here also without regard to the question of notice. Berh- ham V. Keane, IJ. & H. 685 ; 18 & 19 Vict, c. 15, s. 5. (c.) An unregistered judgment afEeots a subsequent cestui que irust having notice of it. Bmham v. Keajtve, s/upra. (A.) A registered judgment which has been also duly re-registered affects a sub- sequent purchaser for value or mortgagee having notice of it {Simpson v. Morley, 3 K. & J. 71) ; but not a subsequent pur- chaser for value or mortgagee not having notice of it. BoMnson v. Woodwa/rd, 4 De G. & Sm. 563. (e.) A registered judgment which has been otherwise duly perfected does not aflect a purchaser whose contract is prior in date to the judgment, although -the conveyance should be subsequent {Brown Y. Perrott, 4 Beav. 585), without reference to the question of notice. (/.) A registered judgment which has been otherwise duly perfected does not affect a prior voluntary settlement (.Beo- vam v. Oxford [JSlar^, 6 De G. M. & G. 507) ; and, a fortiori, does not affect a prior purchase for value or mortgage, without reference to the question of notice. And see title Judgment Debts. And with reference to taakmg the fol- lowing peculiar rules have been estab- lished as between mortgagees and judg- ment creditors : — (as.) If one who is a judgment creditor to begin with buys in a first mortgage, he shall not tack the judgment to that mort- gage so as to gain a priority-over a second mortgagee who was such at the date of ■ his judgment, and without reference to the question of notice. Brace v. Marl- lorough {Dutchess), 3 P. Wms. 491. NOTICE. 245 Notice. — ( Continued.) (J.) If one who is a first legal mort- gagee to begin with buys in or obtains a judgment for a further sum, and had no notice of any subsequent charge at the time of getting hold of such judgment, he shall tack the judgment to his mort- gage and obtain priority over the subse- quent charge. Brace v. MwrlJborough {Dutchess), supra. And with reference to the successive assignees of eTu>seg in action the following rules have been estabhshed : — (a.) As between two or more particular assignees (being of course equitable). (aa.) If both or aU the notices are given before the cTiose in action has real- ized itself, so as to be ready to be deliv- ered actually, in the form of money or other proceeds, then priority of notice gives no priority of title. Buller v. Plunkett, IJ. i& H. 441. But (hb.) If otherwise, the successive dates of the successive notices estabUsh the successive priorities, or the one priority, as the case may be, this being the general effect of notice in such cases. (b.) As between the trustee in bank- ruptcy or a general assignee on the one hand, and a particular assignee on the other, by the Bankruptcy Act, 1869 (32 & 38 Vict. c. 71), s. 15, the property of the bankrupt which vests in his trustee for division among the creditors of the bank- rupt comprises (among other things) (1.) All such property as may belong to, or be vested in, the bankrupt at the com- mencement of the bankruptcy, or may be acquired by or devolve upon him during its continuance ; and (2.) All goods and chattels being, at the commencement of the bankruptcy, in the possession, order, or disposition of the bankrupt, being a trader, by the consent and permission of the true owner, of which goods and chat- tels the bankrupt is reputed" owner, or of which he has taken upon himself the sale or disposition as owner; but it is pro- vided that things in action other than debts due to the bankrupt in the course of his trade or business shall not be deemed goods and chattels within the meaning of this order and disposition clause ; and in the first schedule to the Act the word ' ' trader " is made to in- clude the occupations specified in that schedule. Now, subject to that section, and so far as it may not have altered the previous law, the following rules have been established as between a trustee in bankruptcy or general assignee on the Notice. — ( OonbinvM.) one hand, and a particular assignee on the other: — {aa.) If the particular assignee were of a date prior to the bankruptcy of the debtor, and had also given notice prior thereto, he retained his priority, but fail- ing such notice lost it, in favor of the trustee in bankruptcy or general assignee who gave notice, the particular assign- ment not being fraudulent ; (bb.) If the particular assignee was of a date posterior to the bankruptcy of the debtor, but had given notice of his assignment before the trustee in bank- ruptcy or general assignee had given notice of the bankruptcy or general assignment, the particular assignee (the particular assignment not being fraudu- lent) acquired priority over the trustee in bankruptcy, or general assignee, who had omitted to give such notice {In re Ba/rr''s Trusts, 4 K. & J. 319 ; Jti re Atkinson, 3 De G. M. & G. 140) ; but by the Bank- ruptcy Act, 1849, s. 141, and the decision in Be Ma/ry Ooombe (1 Giff. 91), he was deprived of such priority over the trustee in bankruptcy; but having regard to ss. 92, 94 and 95 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, the same general rules as applied before the Bankruptcy Act, 1849, and the last-mentioned decision seem to have been restored in all cases where the par- ticular assignment, although subsequent to the commencement of the bankruptcy, is prior to the date of the order of adjudi- cation, subject only to the limitation im- posed by s. 15 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, stated above. The subsequent par- ticular assignee who gives notice still has priority over a prior general assignee who oniits to ^ve notice; but in Lhyd v. Banks (L. R. 3 Ch. 488), where the trustee of a fund had notice of an insolvency from the newspapers merely, and acted on the information thereby obtained, a subsequent particular assignee of the cesiwi que trust was held not to acquire priority over the general assignee in in- solvency. And in all these cases notice before actual payment of the purchase-money, whether or not the notice be also before the contract, and whether before or after the conveyance is executed, is binding upon the subsequent purchaser or mort- gagee {Tounnlle v. Naish, 3 P. Wms. 307) ; and even where notice is not given until after payment of the purchase-money, provided the conveyance has not yet been executed, the purchaser or mortgagee i? 246 NOTICE OF ACTION.— NOVATION. Notice. — {Continued^ equally bovmd {Wigg v. Wigg, 1 Atk. 382). Therefore, the only notice which the pur- chaser or mortgagee may disregard is notice coming to him both after payment of the purchase or mortgage money and after execution of the conveyance. But a subsequent purchaser or mort- gagee of lands with notice of a prior voluntary settlement may safely disregard it, such settlement being void against him under the 37 Eliz. c. 4 (Doe v. Mcm- ning, 9 East, 59) ; and the purchaser may even compel a specific performance of the contract {Ddhing v. Whimper, 26 Beav. 568). The benefit of the stat. 37 Eliz. c. 4, does not, however, extend to one who purchases or takes a mortgage of lands from the heir-at-law or devisee of the voluntary settlor, or from a person claim- ing under a subsequent voluntary settle- ment, or indeed from any person other than the voluntary settlor himself. Doe V. Rasham, 17 Q. B. 723 ; Lewis v. Bees, 3 K. & J. 132; BicTuwdsY. Lewis, 11 C. B. 1035. NOTICE OP ACTION. When it is intended to sue certain particular indi- viduals it is sometimes, as in the case of actions against justices of the peace, necessary to give them notice of the action some time, usually one month, before. NOTICE TO PRODUCE. In general, notice to produce any document in the possession or power of the opposite party is required; and such notice must be given in order to the admission of second- ary evidence of the contents of the docu- ment (Beg. V. MwortJiy, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 105). But where, from the nature of the proceedings, as in the case of trover for a bond, the party in possession of the document necessarily has notice that he is to be charged with the possession of it, a notice to produce is unnecessary (How V. Sail, 14 East, 374). Also, a counter- pMt executed by the defendant may be read by the plaintiff without a notice to produce the original (Burleigh v. Stibbs, 5 T. R. 465) ; and iu an action for seamen's wages, secondary evidence of the ship's articles is admissible under 17 & 18 Vict, c. 104, s. 164, without any notice to pro- duce them. Generally, however, a notice to produce any notice on which the action is founded is unnecessary ; but it is usual iu business to have two copies of the notice to pro- duce, and to serve one and retain, the Notice to Produce. — (ConMnvM.') other, indorsing on the latter the time and mode of the service of the former. And now by the C. L. P. Act, 1852, s. 119, where there has been a notice to admit the notice to produce, an affidavit of the attorney or his clerk of the service of the notice to produce and of the time when served, with a copy of it annexed, is, sufficient evidence of the service of the original and of the time of service. NOTICE TO QUIT. As between land- lords and tenants, where there is no express stipulation as to the length of notice to quit the tenements occupied by the tenant, it is a general presumption of law that in the case of tenancies from year to year a half-year's notice must be given, such notice to expire at the end of the current year of the tenancy (Bridge v. Potts, 17 C. B. [N. S.] 383). And in the case of quarterly, monthly, and weekly tenancies, the safest course is to give a notice corresponding to the tenancy, but there is hardly any rule of law upon the subject. The like mles apply as to the tenant giving notice to determine Ms tenancy, which also is sometimes abusively called a notice to quit. The notice may be afterward waived, e. g., by the landlord's subse- quently distraining for rent. NOVATION. The acceptance of a new debt or obligation in satisfaction of a prior existing one. Thus, it is said that a surety is discharged by the novation of the debt; for he can no longer be bound for the first debt, for wMch ' he was surety, since it no longer subsists, having been extinguished by' the novation; neither can he be bound for the new debt into which the first has been converted, since this new debt was not the debt to which he acceded. A novation may arise in either of two ways: (1.) As in the case of a renewal bill, where the person of the debtor remains the same, but the amount or terms are in- creased or altered ; (3.) As in the case of an amalgamation of companies, where the person of the debtor is altered, but the other terms of the contract remain the same, the new company which is substituted for the old one, taking over all the liabilities (together with the rights) of the latter. It is essential to every novatio that the creditor should have assented thereto. NOVEL DISSEIZIN.— NUNCUPATIVE WILL. 247 NoTation. — ( OonUntied.) Justinian (in his Institutes, iii. 29 [30], Qu&tis Modis Obligatio Tollitwr, s. 3) en- acted that, unless the parties expressly stated in the writing that their intention ■was to make a novatio, the new obligation, although substituted for, should not put an end to the old obligation, but the creditor should have the benefit oi both securities. But this is not the rule of the English Law. NOVEL DISSEIZIN (a new or recent disseizin, or dispossession) : See title Assize OP NovBL Disseizin. * NOVELLAE LEONIS. " The ordin- ances of the Emperor Leo, made from 887 to 893. They were originally written in Greek, but afterward, in 1560, were trans- •lated into Latin by Agilaeus. Burr. Diet. NUDUM PACTUM {a bare agreement). An agreement to do or pay any thing on one side, without any consideration or compensation therefor on the other. This is thence called a nude or naked contract (nudum paetwm), and when not under seal is totally void in law, and a man cannot be compelled to perform it upon the max- im, ^^ Ex nvdo pacta mm oritur actio." Pacts performed a great part in Roman Law, and it was a rule of that law that a nudum pactum, although not sufficient (in general) to support an action, was always sufficient to furnish an exception, i. e., plea or defense. See title Pacts. NUISANCE (from the Pr. nwire, to hurt). Every enjoyment by one of his own property which violates the rights of another in an essential degree is a nuisance and actionable as such at the suit of the party injured thereby. Wood on Nuisance, p. 3. See, also, id., p. 14 et seq., for a criticism of the definitions of nuisance. A nuisance is either pub- lic or private. A public or common nuisance is such as affects or interferes with the king's subjects in general; a private nuisance is only such as affects or interferes with an individual in his individual capacity. A private' nuisance may be remedied by action, or in some instances by abatement (see that title) ; a public nuisance producing private damage by action, or (making the At- torney-General a party) by information in Chancery, or by indictment at Com- mon Law. NUL TIEL RECORD (no such record). A plea pleaded in that form of trial which is called trial by the record. This form of trial is only used in one particular in- stance,and that is where a matter of record is pleaded in any action, as a fine, a judg- ment, or the like, and the opposite party pleads ^'nultiel record," i. e., that there is no such matter of record existing; whereupon issue is joined, which is called an issue of nul tiel record, and in such cases the Court awards a trial by inspec- tion and examination of the record. Stephen on Pleading, 113. NUNC PRO TUNC (now for then). When a party has omitted to take some step which he ought to have taken, as to file an affidavit, or to enter up judgment, for instance, the Court will sometimes permit him to do it after the proper time has passed by for that purpose, and will allow it to have the same effect as if it had been regularly done ; and this in the case of the affidavit is called filing it nunc pro Punc; or, in the case of entering up judgment, is called- entering it nunc pro tunc ; i. «., doing it now for (or in- stead of) then. By r. 56, H. T. 1853, all judgments, whether interlocutory or final, shall be entered of record of the day of the month and year, whether in term or vacation, when signed, and shall not have relation to any other day; but it shall be competent to the Court or a judge to order a judgment to be entered nunc pro tunc. Under this rale a judgment is frequently allowed to be entered nunc pro tunc, where the signing of it has been de- layed by the act of the Court, and usually in the case of the death of a party, e. g., if a party dies after special verdict, or after a special case has been stated for the opin- ion of the Court, or after a motion in arrest of judgment, or for a new trial, or after a demurrer set down for argument and pending the time taken for argument, or whilst the Court is considering of its judgment. No such indulgence is given where the neglect to enter up judgment is attributable to the lach^es of the plaintiff or of those representing him, or by reason of any proceeding in error or the like. The right to order judgment to be enter- ed nunc pro tunc belongs, even at Common Law, to the Court. NUNCUPATIVE WILL (testamentum nuncupatwm). A will which depends merely upon oral evidence, ha,ving been declared or dictated by the testator pre- vious to his death, before a sufficient 248 NUPER OBIIT. — OCCUPANCY. NuncupatiTe Will. — (^Continued.) number of witnesses, and afterward re- duced to writing. All wills, however, must now be reduced into writing at the time they are made (1 Vict. c. 36, s. 1). In the interval between the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. %, c. 3) and the New "Wills Act (1 Vict. 0. 36) nuncupative wills were good for estates not exceeding £30 in all, where the will was pronounced before three witnesses, and was reduced into writing, within six days after it was made or was proved within six months of the making ; but before the Statute of Frauds they were valid without limi t as to estate, just as they always were in Roman Law if made in the presence of seven witnesses. Just. ii. 10, 14. NUPER OBIIT (he died lately). A writ that lay for a co-heir who had been de- forced by her co-parcener of lands or ten- ements, of which their grandfather, father, brother, or other common ances- tor had died seized in fee simple. F. N. B. 197 ; Cowel. NUETUBE, guardians for, are the father or mother until infants attain the age of fourteen' years ; and ia default of father or mother, the ordinary in former times usually assigned some discreet per- son to take care of the infant's personal estate, and to provide for its maintenance and education. But this duty is now dis- charged by the Court of Chancery, which appoints a guardian for that purpose. \ See titles Guakdians ; Infants. o. OATHS. Have been very generally in use as a security that a witness vrill speak the truth ; but in recent times, in the case of persons holding conscientious views of the impropriety of oaths, a solemn prom- ise or declaration that they will speak the truth, and the whole truth, has been sub- stituted for them (33 & 34 Vict. c. 49). Since the case of Omy6hu7id v. Barker (1 Atk. 31) it has been usual in England to swear each witness according to the forms of his own religion, the English form being upon the Holy Gospels. Be- fore an oath can be administered it must be shown (if any doubt of the fact should exist) that the witness is aware of the sanctity of the oath, or generally that God will punish falsehood. Oaths have, how- ever, been the subject of considerable abuse in law, particularly the so-called Deeiaory Oath, which, in the absence of Oaths. — ( OontAmied.') other evidence to the contrary, was per- mitted to settle the question in dispute ; also, the so-called Suppletory Oath, which was administered by the judge, and was allowed to have a similar eSect. * OBITER DICTUM. An opinion of a judge delivered hythe was^andnot upon the precise question involved. Burr. Diet. OBLIGATION {dbligaUo). An obliga- tion or bond is a deed whereby a person obliges himself, his heirs, executors, and administrators, to pay a certain sum of money to another at an appointed day; and he who so obliges himself, or enters into such a bond, is termed the obligor, and the party to whom he so obliges, or binds himself, is termed the obligee. Such is the use of the term ' ' obligaj tion " in English Law ; but the word is commonly used in a much more general sense in jurisprudence as denoting any liability incurred by one person to another in virtue either of an agreement of the parties or their disagreement; and an obligation is said to arise either ex am- tracPu, or qvad so, or ex delicto, or quasi so. Again, obligations are of many varie- ties, being either, first, perfect {i. e., ac- tionable, amies) according to the laws of the particular country, or, secondly, im- perfect (i. e., natwcdes, or moral) accord- ing to the same laws. And as a general rule, aU systems of law (other than the English Law) allow to such latter varie- ties of obligation a partial legal efficacy, e. g., making them good by way of de- fense to an action at any rate. For the effects which the Roman Law allowed them, see Brown's Savigny, title NaturaUa Obligatio. OBLIGATION SOLIDAIBE. This, in French Law, denotes joint and several liability in English Law, but is applied also to the joint and several rights of the creditors parties to the obligation. *OBEOGATION. The alteration or annulling of a law. Bouv. Diet. OCCUPANCY is defined to be the " taking possession of those things which before belonged to nobody ; " hence the title which a person so acquires in things is called title by occupancy. Occupancy is frequently divided into general and special occupancy. General occupancy occurred where a person was tenant per oMbre vie, and died during the life of the cestui qui vie, in which case the person who first OCTO TALES. — OFFICIAL, OR OFFICIAL PRINCIPAL. 249 Occnpancf . — ( Continued.) entered on the land after Ms death might lawfully retain possession thereof, as long as the cestui que vie lived by right of oc- cupancy, because it belonged to nobody. Special occupancy occurred where an estate was Umited to a man and his heirs, or the heirs of his body, during the life of another person, by which the heir or heirs of the body of such grantee might enter on the death of the ancestor, and hold possession as special occupant, hav- ing an exclusive right, by the terms of the original contract, to occupy the lands during the residue of the estate granted. General occupancy, in the sense before described, was- abolished by the Statute of Frauds, and the remnant of the estate was made distributable among the credi- tors (if any), and the surplus remaining over was (aiter 14 Geo. 3, c. 20) to be distributed among the next of Mn of the deceased grantee. The whole law is now regulated by the 1 Vict. 3, c. 26, which re- enacts the provisions of both the last- mentioned two statutes as regards occu- pancy. Oceupaney, in a larger sense, has played a great part in international law and in jurisprudence. In internationar law, it is regarded as the title to the ownership of newly-discovered countries, and also (under the particular name of hostile cap- ture) as the title to the ownership of newly-conquered countries. In juris- prudence, it is put forward, at least very commonly, as the foundation and origin of all property, whether in lands or in goods; but an objection is taken to it as such in Maine's Ancient Law, upon the ground that occupancy, in order to be a foundation of property, is an advised taking possession of a thing, and the notion of advisedness is too abstract for an early age. Probably, this objection refutes itself; and, after all, to quote the words of Savigny, property has had its origin in " adverse possession ripened by prescription." *OCTO TALES. A writ which was formerly issued to the sherifiE, to summon tight men to make up a deficiency in jurors. 3 Bl. Com. 864. *ODHAL BIGHT. AUodial right. Jacob Diet. ODIO ET ATIA. An old writ which was directed to the sheriff to inquire whether a man committed to prison on suspicion of murder was committed on Odio et Atia. — (Continued.) just cause of suspicion, or only out of malice. And if upon an inquisition it were found that he was not guilty, then another writ was directed ' to the sheriff to bail him. Les Termes de la Ley, OFFENSE (deUcPwm). Offenses are either capital or not capital ; capital of- fenses are such as draw down the pun- ishment of death on the offender, such as high treason, felony, &c. Offenses not capital are those of a less important nature, and which are generally termed misdemeanors. OFFICE {pffidum). An office is de- fined to be the right to exercise a public or private employment, and to take the fees and emoluments belonging thereto; and it is considered in law a species of incorporeal hereditament. * OFFICE-POUND : See next title. OFFICE, INQUEST OF. An inqui- sition or inquest of office is an inquiry made by the king's officer, his sheriff, coroner, or escheator, by virtue of his office (viirtmte officii), or by writ sent to him for that purpose, or by commission- ers specially appointed, concerning any matter that entitles the king to the pos- session of lands or tenements, goods, or chattels, &c. This inquiry is made by a jury formed of an indefinite number of persons; it used frequently to be made during the existence of the military tenures, but is now grown almost out of use. For further information on this subject, see titles Inquest ; and Inqtjisi- TiON OP Office. OFFICIAL, or OFFICIAL PRINCI- PAL. This was the name given to a judi- cial officer of high ecclesiastical authority in the province of Canterbury, and who was appointed by and under the authority of the archbishop. He had extraordi- nary jurisdiction in almost all ecclesiasti- cal causes, and all appeals from bishops ahd their surrogates were directed to him. His ordinary jurisdiction extended throughout the whole province of Canter- bury ; but his citation, except upon ap- peal, or by letters of request, was con- fined to his own diocese. This office was at one time separate from that of the Dean of the Arches Court of Canterbury ; but as the two Courts met at the same place (formerly Bow Church, de Arcvinis), and the Dean of the Arches frequently performed the duties of the official, in 250 OFFICINA JUSTITLE. — OPENmG A COMMISSION. Official, or Official Principal. — (Ciw*.) the course of time they became, and ever afterward remained, completely united and identified. The Court of the OfiBcial Principal was therefore called the Arches Court of Canterbury, and was of very ancient origin, having subsisted before the time of Henry II. It was held in the hall belonging to the College of Civilians, or Doctors of the Civil Law, at Doctors' Commons. The duties of the OflB.cial Principal, or Dean of Arches, are now discharged by the Judge of the Court for Ecclesiastical Causes, and oflEice which is at present combined with that of the Judge of the High Court of Admiralty. 8ee title CtotnaT op Akchbs. * OFFICINA JUSTITI J;. The work shop or office of justice ; chancery is so- called. OFFICIO, OATH EX. An oath for- merly administered to persons by which they might be compelled to confess, accuse, or purge themselves of any crimi- nal matter or thing by which they might be liable to any censure or punishment. This oath was made use of in the Spirit- ual Court as well in criminal cases of ec- clesiastical cognizance, as in matters of civil right, but was abolished with the High Commission Court by stat. 16 Car. 1, c. 11. See title High Commission Cottet. *OLD NATURA BREVIUM. A trea- tise written in the reign of Edward III., and containing the writs then in use with comments. It is to be distinguished from Eitzherbert's work entitled Natura Brevium. OLERON, lAWS OF. The laws made by Richard I., when at Oleron, relating to maritime affairs. Les Termes de la Ley; Co. Litt. 260. * OLOGRAPH : See title Holograph. * ONERIS FERENDI. In Civil Law, a servitude by which the waU of one house is required to sustain that of another. *ONEMASTIC. A signature in a dif- ferent handwriting from the body of the instrament. 2 Bent. Jud. Ev. 460, 461. ONUS PROBANDI. This means the Burden of Proof. It is a general rule that he who asserts a fact is bound to prove it ; and it is not ordinarily required to prove a negative, ei qui didt rum qui negat incumbit probatio. But what is at first Onus Proband!. — ( Oontinued.) sight a negation may be in reality an affirmative assertion, and in respect of it the arms probandi would rest on the per- son asserting it (Williams v. U. I. Oo., 3 Bast, 193), unless the matter was peculi- arly within the knowledge of the other party, e. g., killing game without being duly qualified (Spieres v. Parher, 1 T. R. 144), or selling beer without a license. a. V. Smrison, Paley, Conv. 45, n. The oniis probandi may be shifted by some presumption of law, e. g., by the presumption of innocence {WilUams v. R I. Oo., supra) ; or of legitimacy {Ban- bury Peerage Case, 2 Selw. N. P. 709) ; or of value in the case of an acceptance to a bill (Mills V. Ban-ber, 1 M. & W. 425) ; or of sanity (Sutton v. Sadler, 26 L. J. [0. P.] 384) ; however, in numerous cases of a criminal nature, the Legislature, has expressly enacted that the burden of proving authority, consent, la/wful excuse, and the like, shall lie on the defendant, e. g., in the case of a person being found by night with implements of house- breaking. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 58. A test frequently, but not always, available for determining upon whom the burden of proof rests, is, to ask which party would succeed if no evidence were given on either side, and then the onus probandi will rest upon the other party (Mills V. Ba/rber, 1 M. & W. 427). For example, in an action for not executing a contract in a workmanlike manner, the onus rests on the plaintifl (Amos v. Hughxs, 1 M. & Rob. 464). Wherefore, usually, the party on whom the ontis probandi lies, as developed on the record, must begin; and the right to begin is conversely a test of the party on whom the onus probandi rests. And yet in certain cases tiie right to begin is in the plaintiff, while the onus probandi lies on the defendant, or ra» versd, as in cases where a plaintiff seeks unliquidated damages in an action for libel or slander, or even of covenant or assumpsit. Mercer v. WhaM, 5 Q. B. 447. * OPEN LAW. Trial by ordeal. See title Ordeal. OPENING A COMMISSION. Enter- ing upon the duties under a commission, or commencing to act under a commis- sion, is so termed. Thus the judges of assize and nisi prius derive their authority to act under or by virtue of commis- sions directed to them for that purpose ; arid, when they commence acting under the power so committed to them, they OPENING A RULE. — ORDINANCE OP PARLIAMENT. 251 Opening a Commission. — (GmUnued.) are said to open the commissions, and tlie day on which they so commence their proceedings is thence termed the com- mission day of the assizes. OPENING A RULE. The act of re- storLag or recalling a rule, which has been made absolute, to its conditional state, as a rule nisi, so as to re-admit of cause being shown against the rule. Thus, when a rule to show cause has been made absolute under a mistaken impression that no counsel had been instructed to show cause against it, it is usual for the party at whose instance the rule was obtained to consent to have the rule opened, by Tfhich all the proceedings subsequent to the day when cause ought to have been shown against it are in efEect nullified, and the rule is then argued in the ordi- nary way. OPENING PLEADINGS. In trials at 2H»i JfVius it is the practice for the plain- tiff's counsel to state briefly the substance and effect of the pleadings in the cause, in order that the jury may know what are the issues about to be tried, and this is termed "opening the pleadings." OPTION. The archbishop has a cus- tomary prerogative when a bishop is con- secrated by him, to name a clerk or chap- lain of his own to be provided for by the bishop, in Ueu of which it is now usual for the bishop to make over by deed to the archbishop, his executors and assigns, the next presentation of such dignity or benefice in the bishop's disposal within that see, as the archbishop himself shall choose, which is, therefore, called his option. Cowel. ♦OPTIONAL WRIT. A writ framed in the alternative. Called also proecvpe. 3 Bl. Com. 374. ORATOR. The plaintiff in a cause or matter in Chancery, when addressing or petitioning the Court, used to style him- self "orator," and when a woman, "ora- trix." But the phrase has long gone into disuse, and the customary phrases are now plaintiff and petitioner. ORDEAL. The most ancient species of titel was that by ordeal, which was distinguished by the appellation of judi- eiwm Dei, and sometimes by vulgaris pii/r- gatio, to distinguish it from the canonical purgation which was by the oath of the party. It was of two kinds : fire erdeal Ordeal. — {Gontinued.) and water ordeal ; the former being con- fined to persona of rank, the latter to the common people. Fire ordeal was per- formed either by taking up in the hand a piece of red-hot iron of one, two, or three pounds' weight, or else by walking bare- foot and blindfold over nine red-hot plough-shares laid lengthwise, at unequal distances, and if the party escaped un- hurt he was adjudged innocent, if other- wise, he was condemned as guilty. Water ordeal was performed either by plunging the bare arm up to the elbow in boiling water, or by casting the sus- pected person into a river or pond of cold water ; and if in the former instance his arm was unburnt, or if in the latter in- stance he floated without any effort to swim, it was deemed evidence of his in- nocence ; if otherwise, of his guilt. The ordeal was abolished in the reign of Henry HI., when the more rational pro- cess of trying the guilt or innocence of an accused person by means of evidence laid before the jury was substituted fqr it. See title Jtjry, Trial by. * ORDER NISI. A conditional order which is to be confirmed unless something be done, which has been requii-ed, by a time specified. Bouv. Diet. ORDERS OF THE DAT. Any mem- ber of the House of Commons who wishes to propose any question, or to "move the House, " as it is termed, must, in order to give the House due notice of his inten- tion, state the form or nature of his mo- tion on a previous day, and have it entered in a book termed the order book ; and the motions so entered, the House arranges, shall be considered on particular days, and such motions or matters, when the day arrives for their being considered, are then termed the "orders of the day." May on Pari. ORDINANCE OP PARLIAMENT. Sir Edward Coke says that an ordinance of Parliament is to be distinguished from an Act of ParUament, inasmuch as the latter can be only made by the king and a three-fold consent of the State, whereas the former may be ordained by one or two of them. At the time that the right of the Commons to participate in legisla- tion was yet only in growth, a distinction was taken, for the first time, in the reign of Edward HI., between ordinances and statutes, the former being experimental 252 OKDINART — OUVERTURE DES SUCCESSIONS. Ordinance of Parliament. — (Cont'd.) Acts passed for a time only, and, as it were, on trial, and which might after- ward be, and often were, converted into statutes, i. e., permanent Acts, or else might be continued for a time, or dis- charged altogether. OEDINAET. In the Civil Law signi- fies any judge who has authority to take cognizance of causes in his own right, and not by deputation. But in the Com- mon Law it signifies the bishop of a dio- cese, though more frequently a commi- sary or official of the bishop or other ecclesiastical judge who has judicial au- thority within his jurisdiction. ORDINARY OF NEWGATE. A di- vine who is appointed to attend the con- demned criminals in that prison to prepare them for death, &c. =► ORE TENUS. Anciently the plead- ings in Court were ore tenui, that is, ver- bal, oral. Pract. 3736. ORIGINAL WRIT. An original writ was the process formerly in use for the commencement of personal actions. It was a mandatory letter from the king, issuing out of Chancery, sealed with the great seal, and directed ta the sheriff of the county wherein the injury was com- mitted, or who was supposed to have been committed, requiring him to command the wrong-doer or accused party either to do justice to the plaintiff, or else to appear in Court and answer the accusation against him. This writ is now disused, the writ of summons being the process prescribed by the Uniformity of Process Act for commencing personal actions; and under the Judicature Act, 1873, all suits, even in the Court of Chancery, are to be commenced by such writs of sum- mons. ORPHANAGE PART. That portion of an intestate's effects which his children are entitled to by the custom of London. This custom appears to be a remnant of what was once a general law all over England, namely, that a father should not by his will bequeath, the entirety of his personal estate away from his family, but shall leave them a third part at least, called the children's part, corresponding to the "bairns' part" ovlegitimoi Scotch Law, and also (although not in amount) to the legitima qua/rta of Roman Law. Just. ii. 18. ♦OSWALD'S LAW. The law which effected the ejecting of married priests and the introduction of monks into the churches, promulgated by Oswald Bishop of Worcester in 964. OUSTED (from the Fr. ouster, to put out). To be removed or put out ; thus, ouster of the freehold signifies being put out of possession of the freehold ; ousted of an estate for years, signifies being turned out from the occupation of the land during the continuance of the term. OUSTER LE MAIN {to remove the hand). When the male heir arrived at the age of twenty-one, or the heir female at the age of sixteen, they might sue out their livery of ouster le main; that is, tke delivery of their lands out of their guar- dian's hands. See, also, title Livbbt. OUT OF COURT. He who has no le- gal status in Court is said to be "out of Court," i. «., he is not before the Court. Thus, when the plaintiff in an action, by some act of omission or commission, shows that he is unable to maintain his action, he is frequently said to puthimseU "out of Court." Sometimes a person who is out of Court is said to have no hem standi, OUTER BAR. Barristers at law are divided into two classes, viz., queen's counsel, who are admitted within the bar of the Courts, in seats specially reserved for themselves ; and junior counsel, who sit without the bar ; and the latter are thence frequently termed barristers of the "outer bar," or "utter bar," in contra- distinction to the former class. See, also, title Utter Babbistbrs. OUTLAWRY. The process of putting a man out of the protection of the laWj so that he is incapable of bringing any action for redress of injuries ; and it is also at- tended with a forfeiture of the party's goods and chattels, a consequence which is in no way affected by the Forfeiture for Felony and Treason Abolition Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 23). OUTSTANDING TERMS: See title Tebm. OUVERTURE DES SUCCESSIONS. In French Law denotes the right of suc- cession which arises to one upon the death, whether natural or civil, of another. Such successor must not be either as yet uncon- ceived, or a child non mahle, or one civilly OVERCYTED.— PAINE, PORT ET DURE. 253 Ouverture Des Successions. — (Gont^d.) dead ; and he must also be clear of cer- tain moral delinquencies, for which see Code Civil, 737. Bastards have no rights of succession ; but in case their parent leaves legitimate oflEspring, they have one- third of the goods which, as a legitimate child, they would have received ; and if tlie parent leaves no legitimate offspring, but ascendants and collaterals (being brothers or sisters), then one-half; and and if the parent leaves neither legitimate offspring nor ascendants nor collaterals (being brothers or sisters), then three- fourths ; -and in case of a total failure of inheritable relations, then the whole. The widow surviving takes the succession where the parent leaves no inheritable relations or bastards, and failing her, the state. * OVERCYTED. Proved guilty or con- victed. A word found in the laws of Edward. Jacob Diet. *OVERHEMISSA. Contempt of Court, used in old Saxon Law. Spelman. OYERT (Fr. open, &o.). Thus an overt act signifies an open or manifest act, such as can be manifestly proved. In charges of treason it is necessai-y in order to a conviction to substantiate either one overt act by at least two wit- nesses, or two overt acts of the same char- acter by one witness apiece. See title Treason. ♦OWELTY. The difference paid or secured by one co-parcener to another to equalize a partition. Plowd. 134 ; Bouv. Diet. *OXGANG. In old English Law, as much land as an ox could till, from 13 to 15 acres. Crompt. Juris. 220. OYER (to Tiea/r). This word, says Dr. Cowel, seems formerly to have signified what our word assize does now, sed giitere, as to the oyer of deeds, and oyer and ter- miner. See the two following titles. OYER OF DEEDS AND RECORDS. Hearing of deeds and records. Thus, when either party in an action alleges any deed, he is in general obliged to make profert of such deed ; that is, to produce it in Court simultaneously with the plead- ing in which it is alleged. "When oral pleading was in practice, the deed was actually produced in Court; but after- Oyer of Deeds and Records. — {OonVd.) ward profert consisted merely of a fonnal allegation that the party showed the deed in Court, it being, in fact, retained in his own custody. When profert was thus made by one of the parties, the other, before he pleaded in answer, was entitled to demand oyer, that is, to hear it read ; and this, either for the purpose of enab- ling him to ascertain the genuineness of the alleged deed, or of founding on some part of its contents (not set forth by the adverse party), some matter of answer. Oyer of records was of the same nature, being a demand to hear any record read which had been alleged in the pleading of the opposite party. By the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, s. 55, it shall not be necessary to make profert of any deed or other document mentioned or re- lied on in any pleading ; and if profert shall be made, it shall not entitle the op- posite party to crave oyer of, or set out upon (/yer such deed or other document. But this provision affects the form of pleading only, and not also the rules of evidence, or the modes of proving any deed or other docimient. OYER AND TERMINER (from the Pr. mviir, to hear, and terminer, to deter- mine). A commission of oyer and ter- miner is a commission under the king's great seal, directed to certain persons, among whom two Common Law judges are usually appointed, empowering them to hear and determine treasons, felonies, robberies, murders, and criminal offenses in general. See title Justices of Oyer and Ter- miner. Oj YES. It is said to be a corruption of the French oy«z, i. e., hear ye; and is sometimes used in Courts by the pubUc crier, to command attention when a proc- lamation is going to be made. P. PAINE, FORT ET DURE (Pr., punish- ment, strong and severe). A special pun- ishment for those who, being arraigned for felony, refused to put themselves on the ordinal^ trial of God and the country, and were, therefore, considered as mute in the interpretation of the law. This punishment was vulgarly called pressing to death. See, also, title Mute. 254 PAIS. — PAEAPHEENALIA. PAIS (Pr. eounl/ry). A trial' per pais signifies a trial by the country, or, as it is more commonly called, by jury. An as- surance by matter m pais is an assurance transacted between two or more private persons in pom (in the country), i. e., upon the very spot to be transferred. Matter in pais seems to signify matter of fact, probably so called because matters of fact are triable by the country, i. e., estoppels in pais are estoppels by conduct, as dis- tinguished from estoppels by deed or by record. See title Estoppels. PALACES, BO YAL. The privilege of palace is attached to any place which is de facto the sovereign's residence. Hamp- ton Court Palace was formerly a royal residence, but has not been personally oc- cupied by the sovereign since 10 Geo. 2. The State departments have for many years past been used as a picture gallery, open, within certain hours, to the public gratuitously; the other apartments are occupied partly by officers of the palace, partly and chiefly by private persons, by the permission and at the pleasure of the Crown. The palace is under the control of a housekeeper of the Crown, who (the housekeeper) has apartments in the pal- ace. A writ of Ji. fa. having been execu- ted in one of the suites of apartments occupied by private persons, an informa- tion of intrusion was filed against the sheriffs and their officers in a case of Att.- Oen. V. Dahin and Others (L. R. 3 Ex. 390). It was held^er CWMsm,.that actual personal residence of the sovereign at the time is not necessary to confer the privi- lege, if there is no intention to resume residence. PANDECTS. The books of the Civil Law compiled by Justinian are so called. The word literally translated means a universal collection or compilation of pas- sages, and denotes the universality of the subjects* treated of in the Corpus Juris Givilis; whereas the word Digest, which in England is the more common of the two words, means a methodical arrange- ment, and denotes the method or order which is so perfectly observed in the ar- rangement of the same compilation. PANEL. The slip of parchment on which the sheriff returns the name of the jurors to serve on a jury is so called. See, also, title Impanbl. PANIEB. Is an attendant or domes- tic, who waits at table and gives bread Panier. — {Oorvtirmed.') (panis), wine, and other necessary things to those who are dining. The phrase was in familiar use amongst the Knights Temp- lars, and from them has been handed down to the learned societies of tlie Inner and Middle Temples, who at the present day occupy the halls and buildings once belonging to that distinguished order, and who have retained a few of their cus- toms and phrases. " From the time of Chaucer to the present day, the lawyers have dined together in the ancient hall, as the military monks did before them, and the rule of their order reqtiiring two and two to eat together, and all the frag- ments to be given in brotherly charity to the domestics, is observed to this day, and has been so from time immemorial. The attendants at table, moreover, are still called ' paniers,' as in the days of the Knights Templars." Addison's Knight Templars. PANNAGE or PAWNAGE. Words used by our law writers to signify the money which the agistors of the forest collect for the feeding of swine within the forest, and sometimes it is used for the food itself. £ies Termes de la Ley. ♦PARAGE. Equality of blood, name, rank, and especially of land in partition. In feudal law, equality of condition be- tween persons holding unequal portions of a fee. PARAMOUNT (from the French par and monter). The supreme lord of a fee, in contradistinction to the mesne lord, who held of some superior under certain services (F. N. B. 135; Cowel). The sovereign is the universal lord paramount, of whom all lands are held in England. See title Fbudal Tenures. PARAPHERNALIA (from the Greek TtapoL, besides, and ut to constitute a legal park, or rather a park in the eye of the law, it must have been made so by the king's grant, or at least by immemorial prescription. Lei Termes de la Ley. See titles Chase ; Waebbn. * PARLE OR PARLING HILL. A hiU where courts were held in old times. PARLIAMENT — lU dwigion into two Bouses. The year assigned by Carte for this division is 17 Edward 3, and that is the most probable date. But Hallam ar- gues for a much earlier date, and he in- stances 11 Edward 1 as a year in which the Houses were divided ; the Commons and Spiritual Peers having in that year sat at Acton Bumell, while the Temporal Peers sat at Shrewsbury. It appears, however, that the separation in 11 Edward 1 was due to a special cause, that is to say, the temporal peers in their sitting at Shrewsbury were trying David Prince of Wales (otherwise caUed" Llewellyn), on a charge of treason ; and upon such a trial Parliament. — (OmUnued.) the Spiritual Peers, and dforUwi the Commons, were not entitled to be present. The other instances which Hallam puts forward might possibly be explained in like manner upon their special circum- stances;' and therefore any such occa- sional separations must not be suffered to impugn the authority of Carte, or the cor- rectness of the date which he assigns. But, in fact, an earlier separation of Lords and Commons was not needed ; for the Commons, even when they met under the same roof as the Lords, always sat apart from the Lords in the lower end of the hall, and not then assuming to dis- charge any duties beyond the grant of money or supplies, there was no urgent reason in early times why they should sit in a separate house. PARLIAMENTARY AGENTS. Per- sons who act as solicitors in promoting and carrying private bills through Parlia- ment. They are usually attorneys or so- licitors, but who do not usually confine their practice to this particular depart- ment. PARLIAMENTARY TAXES. Such taxes as are imposed directly by Act of Parliament, i. «., by the Legislature itself, as distinguished from those which are im- posed by private individuals or bodies under the authority of an Act of Parlia- ment. Thus, a sewers rate, not being im- posed directly by Act of ParUament, but by certain persons termed commissioners of sewers, is not a parliamentary tax; whereas the income tax, which is directly imposed, and the amount also fixed, by Act of Parliament, is a parliamentary tax. See title Taxation. * PARLIAMENTUM INDOCTUM. The unlearned or lack-learning parlia- ment. A parliament held in the reign of Henry PV., to which no lawyer or person skilled in the law was allowed to come. 1 Bl. Com. 177. PAROL (Pr., signifying word, speech, &c.). This word signifies verbal, in con- tradiction to that which is written. Thus, a parol agreement signifies an agreement by word of mouth, in contradistinction to a written agreement. The pleadings in an action are also, in our old law French, de- nominated the parol, because they were formerly actual vwa voce pleadings in Court, and not mere written allegations as at present. A remnant of this latter use of the word occurs in the phrase, "the 256 PAROL DEMURRER.— PARTNERSHIP. Parol. — {CmUnued.') parol shall not demur " (as to which, see next title). Parol evidence is also the phrase commonly used to denote extrin- sic evidence, i. e., evidence outside of the written document which it is used to ex- plain. See title Extbinsic Evipenob. PAROL DEMURRER. A plea to stop or stay the pleadings in an action. In many real actions brought by or against an ijafant under the age of twenty-one years, and also in actions of debt brought against him, as heir to any deceased an- cestor, either party may suggest the non- age of the infant, and pray that the pro- ceedings maybe deferred till his full age, or (in our legal phrase) that the infant may have his age, and that " the parol may demur, " that is, that the pleadings may be stayed ; and then they shall not pro- ceed till his full age, unless it be apparent that he cannot be prejudiced thereby. This plea of parol demurrer was abolished by the stat. 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 47, as to proceedings under that statute, being chiefly decrees for the sale of real estate to pay debts. But since the Trus- tee Act, 1850, and Trustee Extension Act, 1853, "a resort to the last-mentioned statute is seldom necessary. * PARS ENTITIA. The part or share of the eldest daughter in the partition of land by lot. Co. Litt. 166 b. ; Burr. Diet. PARSON (^pereona), in its legal ac- ceptation, si^ifies the rector of a paro- chial church. He is called parson, persona, because, by his person, the church, which is an invisible body, is represented. Co. Litt. 300 a, s. 538. PARSON IMPERSONEE. When a clerk is not only presented, but instituted and inducted into a rectory, he is then, and not before, in full and complete pos- session, and is called in law persona im- pe/rsonata, or parson impersonee. Co. Litt. 300. PARTAGE. This is, in French Law, the partition of English Law, and is demandable as of right. PARTICULAR ESTATE. A limited legal interest or property in lands or tene- ments, as distinguished from the absolute property or fee simple therein, is usually so termed ; and he who holds or enjoys such a limited interest therein is thence Particular Estate. — ( Continued. ) sometimes called the particular tenant. Thus, if A. has the absolute property or fee simple in certain lands, and he de- mises them to B. for a term of seven years, or life, the legal interest which B. would thus acquire therein would be called the particular estate with reference to A.'s estate' in fee simple; i. «., it would be a particle or portion carved or cut out of A.'s fee simple. See, also, titles Rbmadtobr ; Revbk- SION. PARTICULARS OF DEMAND: See title Bill op Pakticulaes. PARTICULARS OF OBJECTIONS: See title Notice ob Objbctions. PARTIES, or PRIVIES. " Parties " . to a deed or contract are those with whom the deed or contract is actually made or entered into. By the term "privies," as applied to contracts, is frequently meant those between whom the contract is mutually binding, although both are not literally parties to such con- tract. Thus, in the case of a lease, the lessor and lessee are both parties and privies, the contract being literally made between the two, and also being mutually binding; but if the lessee assign his interest to a third party, then a privity arises between the assignee and the origi- nal lessor, although such assignee is not literally a party to the original lease. See, also, title Privies. PARTITION (parUUo). The dividing of lands held by joint tenants, co-par- ceners, or tenants in common, into dis- tinct portions, so that they may hold them in severalty ; and the instrument by which this partition or division is effected is called a deed of partition (4 Cruise, 83). A partition is usually eflected upon bUl filed in the Court of Chancery, after the decree on which the parties execute to each other the requisite mutual con- veyances of each other's shares (see title CoNTBYANCEs). But if the parties can agree among themselves to make a parti- tion, there is no occasion to resort to the Court at all. Since the Partition Act, 1868 (81 & 32 Vict. c. 40), the Court may, in certain cases specified in the Act, decree a sale in lieu of partition. PARTNERSHIP. This is a voluntary contract, whereby two or more persons agree to put their money and labor, or either, together in some lawful business, PARTNERSHIP. 257 Partnership. — ( Oontmued.) and to divide the profits arising from the business. No third party can be intro- duced into the partnership without the consent of all ; but he may be taken as a sub-partner of one or more of the partners (Ex parte Barrow, 3 Rose, 255). Upon the death of a partner, he pay not by his will introduce a successor to bis share {Peource v. Ohamberlami, 2 Ves. 33), unless the partnership agreement authorizes him to' do so. Stuart v. Bute {Earl), 3 Vea. 212; 11 Ves. 657. In the absence of stipulation, the shares of the partners, both in the capital and in the profits, are presumed to be equal, and the losses to be similarly divisible {Pea- coch V. Peacoch, 16 Ves. 49) ; but the pre- sumption is rebuttable {Stewart v. Forbes, 1 Mac. & G. 137). A partner is not en- titled to interest on the capital which he brings in {EM v. King, 1 N. R. [L. C] 161), but he is entitled to interest on advances made in excess of his share of capital {Mc paHe GTiippendale, 4 De G. M. & G. 36), five per cent being the custom- ary rate. Ex pa/rte Bignold, 22 Beav. 167. The true criterion of a partnership is, that each member of it stands in the rela- tion of a principal to the other members, who in that regard are his agents {Oox v. Hkleman, 8 H. C. 268); consequently a person may share profits without being a partner, as well by the Common Law, as under the Act 28 Ss 29 Vict. c. 86, and may in that manner escape all liability for losses. On the other hand, a person who is not a partner may, by holdfag himself out as one, become liable for losses, although not entitled to share in profits {Ex parte Watson, 19 Ves. 461); but merely continuing the name of a deceased partner in the style does not charge the executor with liability on contracts made since the death of his testator by the surviving partners. Desayriea v. Noble {SouUon's Case), 1 Mer. 616. The liability of a partner extends to all acts of his co-partners reasonably within the scope of the partnership business {Sandilcmd v. Ma/rsh, 2 B. & Aid. 672), although beyond the agreed powers of the co-partners {MawJcen v. Bourne, 8 M. & W. 710) ; and such liability commences with the de facto commencement of the partnership, notwithstanding the partner- ship articles may not be signed till after- ward {Battley v. Lewis, 1 Han. & G. 155), but it does not commence sooner as to third parties, notwithstanding by special Partnership. — ( Oontmued.) agreement it commences sooner as be- tween the co-partners {Vere v. AaMy, 10 B. & C. 288). However, no contract of one or more partners will bind the other or others if it be in a matter wholly un- connected with the partnership {Ex pa/rte Agace, 2 Cox, 312) ; and no partner can bind the partnership by executing a deed {Harrison v. Jackson, 7 T. R. 207), unless he have been authorized by deed to execute it {Horsley v. Rush, 7 T. R. 209), or, unless the deed be one of release as distinguished from one of grant {Aspinall V. London and Northwestern By. Go.^ 11 Hare, 325), the transaction being, of course, one within the scope of the part- nership {Ex pa/rte Bosanqwet, 1 De G. 432). Also, ordinarily, one partner cannot bind the firm by a guarantee for collateral purposes {Brettel v. WilUams, 4 Ex. 623), unless the other partners are proved to have sanctioned it {Sandilands v. Ma/rsh, 2 B. & Aid. 672) ; also, one partner's part payment of the principal or interest of a debt does not save the Statute of Limita- tions, as against the other partners, M. L. A. Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 97), s. 14, altering the former law {Whitcomb v. Whiting, Doug. 651) ; also, one partner cannot bind the firm by a submission to arbitration {Stead v. Salt, 10 Moo. 389). Neither can a partner in a non-mercantile firm ordinarily draw or accept bills or notes, or give a receipt for money so as to bind the firm {Ha/rman v. Johnson, 2 El. & Bl. 61 ; DicUnsm, v. VaJpy, 10 B. & C. 128) ; and a partner in a mercantile firm even cannot borrow money for the purpose of increasing the fixed capital of the firm. Fisher v. Tayler, 2 Hare, 218. And with reference to the duration of the liability of partners,, the liability of a retiring or deceased partner ceases with the cessation of the partnership as to him, provided notice by circular letter and in the Gazette has been given {Kirwan v. Kvrwan, 2 C. & M. 617 ; Newsome v. Oohs, 2 Camp. 617), but only as to contracts subsequent to the date of his interest ceasing {Wood v. Braddick, 1 Taunt. 104; Finder v. Wilhs, 5 Taunt. 612) ; a dormant partner does not require to give such notice, excepting to the customers who knew his connection with the firm {Evans V. Drwmmwnd, 4 Esp. 89). And it is competent for the creditors (although not also for the continuing partners, vmless with the consent of the creditors) to accept the liability of the continuing partner and to discharge the ceasing 258 PARTNERSHIP. Partnership. — {OmMnued.') partner. Lyfh v. AuU, 7 Ex. 669, over- ruling Tiodffe V. IHcaa, 3 B. & Aid. 611. Partnerships are usually carried on under agreements in writing (-whether under hand and seal or under hand only), but a mere parol agreement suffices, and may even be substituted at any time for the written one (^England v. OurUng, 8 Beav. 139); and where a partnership is continued after the term specified in the writing, it is a partnership at will upon the old footing, so far as applicable {Olarh V. Leach, 1 De Qt. J. & S. 490) ; and the same is the case when a new partner is taken in without any fresh writing. AvMen v. Boys, 84 Beav. 598. One partner cannot sue another at Law in respect of a partnership matter, and therefore can have no account there {Bo- mil V. Eamvmond, 6 B. & 0. 149), unless upon a special covenant for breach thereof {Broim V. Tapscott, 6 M. & W. 119), or for a balance of account upon an implied promise to pay ( Wrwy v. MUeatone, 5 M. & W. 31). But even at Law one partner may sue another for a matter dehors the partnership {Freinch v. Styring, 3 C. B. [N. 8.] 357), for example, for money ad- vanced or work done before the partner- ship, although toward the formation of the partnership {Verming v. Lechie, 13 East, 7). But in Equity the partner has the following remedies against his co- partner: L Specific performance, — (a.) Of contract for partnership 'for a term of years, when there have been acts of part performance (8ooU V. Bayment, L. R. 7 Eq. 113) ; but not (J.) Of agreement for reference (Btreet V. Righy, 6 Ves. 818. IL Injunction, ^ (a.) Against willfully excluding a co- partner's name from the style, contrary to agreement (Mar- shall V. Col/man, 2 Jao. & W. 266); (6.) Against one partner engaging in another business, contrary to agreement (SomerviUe v. Mac- hay, 16 Ves. 382) ; (o.) Against willfully excluding a co- partner from the exercise of his rights as such (JMetrichsen V. Cdbtmm, 2 Ph. 59) ; (d.) Against a sudden dissolution working irreparable damage. 1 Lindl. Partnership, 332, 3d ed. Partnership. — ( GonUnwed,.') in. Decree for dissolution,including the taking of the accounts and the appointment of a receiver, with a view to the dissolution ; (o.) Where the co-partnership origin- ated in fraud (Ba/mlins v. WielkJiam, 1 Giff. 355) ; (&.) Where a co-partner is guilty of gross misconduct in partner- ship matters (Smdth v. Jeyes, 4 Beav. 503) ; (c.) Where a co-partner is continually breaking the partnership agreement ( Waters v. Taylor, 2 V. & B. 299) ; (d) Where the incompatibility of tempers is extreme (Baxter v. West, 1 Dr. & Sm. 173); («.) Where a co-partner whose per- sonal skill was indispensable to the partnership becomes in- sane. JoTies V. Jafoy, 2 My. & K. 125. IV". Receiver, — ^toward dissolution. HaU V. Sail, 3 Mac. & &. 79. v. Accounts, — ^without dissolution; (a.) Where a partner has been ex- cluded ; (6.) Where the partner complaining would be entitled to ask for a dissolution. Fairthorrm v. Westmi, 3 Hare, 387. VI. Discovery, — in aid of an action at law, and even of a .compulsory reference to arbitration (British B. I. Go. V. Sorms, 5 W. R. 813). Moreover the jurisdiction in Equity is, in general, much more available, and also more advantageous than that at Law, as will be seen from the following instances : (1.) Upon the decease of a co-partner the creditors can only proceed against the survivors, but in Equity they may proceed against the estate of the de- ceased (YuUiaamy v. Noble, 3 Mer. 593) ; (3.) In the case of two firms having a common partner, neither firm can sue the other at Law (Bosanquet v. Wray, 6 Taunt. 597) ; but in Equity each may sue the other (MainwaHng v. Newman, 3 B. & P. 130) ; . (8.) In the case of a co-partner pur- chasing a share in the partaer- ship, he cannot at Law sue his co-partners to recover it, but in Equity he may ( Wright v. Hunter, 5 Ves. 793) ; PARTNEESHIP. 259 Partnership. — {Gontiniied.) (4.) The lands of a co-partnership are at Law liable only as lands, but in Equity they are liable as personal estate {Baring v. Nolle, 3 Ry. & M. 495); and (5.) Generally, a co-partner cannot obtain either specific perform- ance, an injunction, a decree for dissolution, the appoint- ment of a receiver, or an order to account at Law, although he may (as is above mentioned) have all of these in Equity. A partnership depending for its com- mencement upon the consent of the part- ners, depends upon the same consent for its contiiiuance ; and therefore the disso- lution of a partnership may be brought about by any sufficient dissent of the part- ners to its continuance, namely, in the following variety of ways : L Dissolution by act of the partners themselves, — (1.) Consent of all to dissolve {Hall V. Hall, 13 Beav. 414) ; (3.) Dissent of one, where partner- ship .is at will {Master v. Kir- ton, 3 Ves. 74; Glumany v. Tan Somer, 3 Wood. Lect. 416, n); (3.) Efflux of term of co-partnership. irFeatheratonhaugh v. fenwidi, 17 Ves. 378. n. Dissolution by operation of law, — (1.) By conviction of a partner for felony; (3.) By the marriage of a partner, being a female {Nerot v. Ber- Tumd, 4 Buss. 347) ; (8.) By the partner's general assign- ment {Seath V. Sanson, 4 B. & Ad. 173); (4.) By execution creditor of a part- ner seizing his share or part thereof {Fox y.Sanbury.Ooyrp. 445); (5.) By bankruptcy of a partner {Grawsha/y v. GolUns, 15 Ves. 318), the dissolution taking efEect upon adjudication, but dating backward to act of bankruptcy {Button v. Morri- son, 17 Ves. 193) ; (6.) By hostilities between two coun- tries of co-partners, where they are foreigners to each other {Cfriswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. [Am.] 438) ; (7.) By the death of a partner {CHlles- pie V. Hamilton, 3 Madd. 354) ; Partnership. — ( GonUmued.) III. Dissolution by decree of Court of Equity, for the reasons enu- merated above. ■ Immediately upon a dissolution being made, the power of the partners, either together or individually, to enter into any ra«w engagjements ceases {Ex parte Wil- liams, 11 Ves. 5); nevertheless each part- ner may actively assist in the winding-up of the iBusiness, and therefore may give a valid receipt for any debt of the partner- ship received by him {Fox v. Hanbury, Cowp. 445), and may even compound debts, provided the composition be fair and honorable {BeaJe v. Beak, Ca. t. Pinch, 190). And in case of a dissolu- tion by death or bankruptcy, the surviv- ing or solvent partners cannot insist upon taking the partnership effects at a valua- tion {Goole V. Collingridge, Jac. 607), but all the property of the firm as well real as personal must be sold {OroMshay v. Maule, 1 Sw. 495), although at the sale the partners may bid {OJiambera v. Howell, 11 Beav. 6), having first obtained the leave of the Court, where the sale is by direc- tion of the Court. JRowland v. Evans, 30 Beav. 303. The creditors of the partnership, not being execution creditors, have no direct Uen on the partnership effects, but have an indirect lien through the direct lien of the partners themselves thereon {Ex parte Buffin, 6 Ves. 119), consequently the partneriship (or, as they are called, joint) creditors have the first claim on the part- nership (i. e., joint) property for the pay- ment of their debts, the partners them- selves having that right, in exoneration pro tern, or pro tanto of their respective private {i. e., separate) estates, and on the other hand the separate creditors of each partner have the first claim on the separate estate of that partner; then, if the partnership is solvent and the indi- vidual partners also solvent, there is an end of the rights of creditors, their debts being paid. But if, on the one hand, the partnership is insolvent, the joint credit- ors may thereafter come down on the re- spective separate estates of the individual partners whether living or dead ; and if, on the other hand, any one or more of the individual partners are insolvent, his or their respective separate creditors may thereafter come down upon the partner- ship estate to the extent of his or their respective shares therein; and it makes no difference whether the estate is ad- ministered out of Court or in Court, and 260 PARTNEBSHIP.— PAKTT AND PARTY, , BETWEEN. • Partnership. — {Gmtinued.) if in Court whether in a Court of Equity or in a Court of Bankruptcy (Btdgway v. Glare, 19 Beav. 111). But, although the order above described is the natural order of payment, yet any joint creditor may in the absence of a bankruptcy proceed in the first instance against the separate es- tate, and any separate creditor against the joint estate, occasioning a certain amount of disorder thereby, which disorder, how- ever, is afterward removed in the general settlement of the accounts {WilMnson v. Henderson, 1 My. & K. 583), the princi- ple of settlement being the principle of marshalling derived from the nat- ural order of payment mentioned above and the whole doctrine resting upon the principle of Equity, that every partner- ship debt is not only a joint but also a several debt {Bum v. Bwm, 3 Ves. 573), unless it be the result of some arbitrary joint convention of the partners. Bvm,- ner v. Powell, 2 Mer. 30. By the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, s. 37, if any bankrupt is at the date of the order of adjudication liable in respect of dis- tinct contracts as member of two or more distinct firms, or as a sole contractor and also as member of a firm, the circumstance that such firms are in whole or in part composed of the same individuals, or that the sole contractor is also one of the joint contractors, shall not prevent proof in re- spect of such contracts against the prop- erties respectively liable upon such con- tracts ; and by the Rules in Bankruptcy made in pursuance of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, G. R. 76, any separate cred- itor of any bankrupt is at liberty to prove his debt under any adjudication of bankruptcy made against such bank- rupt jointly with any other person or persons; and under every such adjudi- cation distinct accounts are to be kept of the joint estate and also of the separate estate or estates of each bankrupt, and the separate estate is to be applied in the . first place in the satisfaction of the debts of the separate creditors; and in case there is an overplus of the separate estate, such overplus is to be carried to the account of the joint estate. And in case there is an overplus of the joint estate, such overplus is to be carried to the ac- counts of the separate estates of each bankrupt in proportion to the right and interest of each bankrupt in the joint estate. So that the principles of the Common Law as evolved from the decisions have been followed mwplieiter Partnership. — ( Continued.) in the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869. But where a retiring partner, upon the dissolution of a partnership, assigns all his interest in the partnership property to the remaining partner, and the assign- ment is iond flde, that assignment con- verts the joint property of the partner- ship into the separate property of the re- maining partner, so as that so much of the then partnership property as remains in specie upon the subsequent bankruptcy of the surviving partner vests in the trus-. tee in bankruptcy of the latter as his sepa- rate estate, and is liable accordingly (Ex pmte Buffln, 6 Ves. 119). But the assign- ment must be complete {Ex parte Williams, 11 Ves. 3), for if any thing remains still to be done to render it complete, the con- version of joint into separate property does not take effect {Ex pa/rte Wheeler, Buck. 35) ; moreover, the property must not be suffered to remain in the order and disposition of the old partemership {Ex parte Bti/rtm, 1 Glyn & J. 207). The ef- fect of the conversion is of course to give the separate creditors a prior claim upon the property {Ex parte Freeman, Buck. 473) ; it does not deprive the joint credit- ors of their right to be paid somehow {Ex parte Peake, 1 Madd. 358). Moreover, the assignment requiring to be hma fde, the insolvency of the partners, either col- lectively or individually, at the date of the assignment would render it fraudu- lent {Ex pa/rte Mayen, In re Edwards, Woods & Greenwood, 34 L. J. [Bkcy.] 25), unless the hona fides of it is otherwise proved. Expojrte Peake, In re LiglvtolleT, 1 Madd. 346. PARTY AND PAKTT, BETWEEN. This phrase signifies between the contend- ing parties in an action, i. e., the plaintifl and defendant, as distinguished from the attorney and his client. These phrases are commonly used in connection with the subject of costs ; and in order to give a precise idea of their scope and meaning, it will be- necessary to consider briefly the nature of costs. Such of these charges and expenses as are necessarily incurred in the prosecuting and defending the ac- tion, and which arise as it were out of the proceedings themselves, are denomi- nated costs in the cause, the payment of which usually devolves upon the defeated or unsuccessful party. In addition to these, there are others which, though not arising directly out of the proceedings PARTY- WALL. —PAWNBROKERS. 261 Party and Party, Between. — (Gonffd.) themselves, are usually paid by each party to his own attorney, whatever raay have been the result of the cause, and these are commonly called costs as between attor- ney and client, as distinguished from the costs in the cause, or as the latter are sometimes called, costs as betweenparty and party. The scale upon which costs as between solicitor and client are calculated is more liberal than that upon which costs as be- tween party and party are calculated ; and the Court in a proper case will direct all the costs of a proceeding to be paid out of the estate as between solicitor and client, but more often the direction for payment is as between party and party only. See Morgan and Davey on Costs. PARTY-WALL. A partition wall ; i. e., a wall dividing two messuages. Peculiar provisions exist under statute regarding party walls within the metropoUs. See title Mbtkpolitan BurLDrnGS and stat- utes there cited. * PASCHA. In old English practice, the term of Easter. PASS, TO. To go, to be transferred, to be conveyed, e. g., by a conveyance of a house, do the fixtures pass? i. e., do they go, or are they conveyed as part and par- cel of the house ? Again, does the fee pass under the word "estate? " i. e., does the fee simple in land become transferred or pass away under the term "estate? " PASSING ACCOUNTS. When an auditor appointed to examine into any accounts certifies to their correctness, he is said to "pass " them; i. e., they pass through the examination without being detained or sent back for inaccuracy or imperfection. PASSING RECORD. When the pro- ceedings are entered upon the nisi prius record, it used to be taken to the master's office and there examined by the proper officer, who then signed it; and the rec- ord was then said to be " jpassed." But by the C. L. P. Act, 1853, s. 103, the record of ram privs shall not be sealed or passed, but may be delivered to the proper officer of the Court in which the cause is to be tried, to be by him entered as at present and remain until disposed of. See title Entry fob Trial. PATENT AMBIGUITY. This is an ambiguity which arises upon the words of the will, deed, or other instrument, as Patent Ambiguity. — (OonUrwed.) looked at in themselves, and before they are attempted to be. applied to the object or to the subject which they describe. The term is opposed to the phrase Latent Ambiguity (which title see). The rule of law is, that extrinsic or parol evidence, although admissible in all cases to remove a latent ambiguity, is admissible in no case to remove a patent one. See title Extrinsic Evidence. PATENTS. In consequence of the abuse of the prerogative in granting mo- nopolies {see that title), the statute 31 Jac. 1, c. 3, was passed, which, after declar- ing that the letters patent theretofore granted were contrary to the laws of this realm, and therefore utterly void and of none efiect, went on to provide and enact that any declaration in the Act before mentioned should not extend to any let- ters patent for the term of one and twenty years or under theretofore made, or there- after to be made, of the sole working or making of any manner of new manufac- ture within this realm to the first and true inventor or inventors of such manufac- tures, which others at the time of the granting of such letters patent did not use, so they be not contrary to the law nor mischievous to the state by raising of the prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient. Upon this statute the whole patent law is to the present day substantially founded ; but it is competent upon petition to the Crown to obtain an extension of this patent right after the expiration of the fourteen years allowed by the statute of James for such further period as the Privy Council shall think is fit or proper for the due remuneration of the inventor. This extension is permitted under the statutes 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 83, and the Patent Law Amendment Act, 1853 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 83). . See, also, titles Notice op Objec- tions; and Specification. PATRON (patronut). He who has the right, title, power, or privilege of pre- senting to an ecclesiastical benefice. See title Advowson. PAUPERIS FORMA : See title Forma Pauperis. PAWNBROKERS. Are a species of paid bailees, and their liabilities in re- spect of negligence are determined ac- cordingly (see title Negligence). If left 262 PAYMENT.— PECUNIARY CAUSES. Pawnbrokers. — {Continued.) to the Common Law, the rights of pawn- brokers would be the rights of ordinary pawnees or pledgees" (see title Pledge) ; but owing to certain abuses to which the trade of pawnbroking is exposed, the leg- islature has thought fit to control it by statutory provision. By the Common Law {Morley v. Atterif- hyrough, 3 Ex. 500), a pawnbroker could not retain goods illegally pawned, e. g., stolen goods, nor could the purchaser from him retain same, as against the tnie owner ; but under s. 30 of the Act of 1873, upon conviction of the thief, the Court may (in its discretion) either allow the pawn- broker to retain the goods as a security for the money advanced or order the res- titution thereof to the true owner. PAYMENT. This is the normal mode of discharging any obligation. In the case of several distinct debts owing be- tween the same creditor and debtor, if the debtor makes a general payment, the doctrine of the Appkopkiation of Pay- ments is called into activity (see that title). PAYMENT OF MONEY INTO COURT. When the defendant, in an action brought for a given sum, admits either the whole or a part of the plaintiff's claim, he often, with the view of preventing the plaintiff from further maintaining his action, pleads what is termed a " plea of payment into Court," by which he alleges that he brings a sum of money into Court ready to be paid to the plaintiff if he will accept the same, and that the plaintifE has no claim to a larger amount ; and this plea is accompanied by an actual payment of the specified sum into the hands of the proper officer of the Court, where the plaintiff, or usually his attorney, may, upon appli- cation, obtain it. Should the plaintiff, after this, proceed with the action, he does so at the peril of being defeated, and having the costs to pay, unless he should, upon the trial, prove that a further sum still remains due to him from the defendant. By the C. L. P. Act, 1853 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 76), s. 70, in ex- tension of a similar provision contained in the 3 & 4 "Will. 4, c. 42, s. 21, it is lawful for the defendant in all actions (except actions for assault and battery, false imprisonment, libel, slander, mali- cious arrest or prosecution [criminal con- versation], or debauching of the plaiu- tifE's daughter or servant), and, by leave of the Court or a judge, upon such terms Payment of Money into Court. — (01m.) as to the latter shall seem fit, for one or more of several defendants, to pay into Court a sum of money by way of com- pensation or amends. Such payment into Court admits the plaintiff's ground of action, and the plaintiff is entitled to have the money in any event; but, semble, the Court may control or direct the ap- pUcation of the money. Om-l v. Boyal Exchange Ins. Oo., 84 L. J. (Q. B.) 31. PEACE, ARTICLES OF THE. Where a person says that his life is endangered through the hostility of some 'one, he may exhibit articles of the peace (being a formal statement of the danger) to the Court or a magistrate, who will thereupon require the party informed against to give security to keep the peace. But the Court must satisfy itself that there is on the face of the articles a reasonable ground of fear. The articles are put in upon oath, and the defendant cannot controvert the allegations contained therein, even by affidavit. Bex v. Dolierty, 18 Bast, 171. PEACE OF GOD AND THE CHURCH. Anciently meant to signify that rest and cessation which the king's subjects had from trouble and suit of law between the teiTns. Cowel. PECULIAR. This was the phrase used to designate a particular parish or church that had jurisdiction within itself for granting probates of wills, &c., except from the Ordinary or Bishop's Courts. The Oowrt of PeavMa/rs was a Court an- nexed to the Court of Arches, and had jurisdiction over all those parishes dis- persed through the province of Canter- bury, in the midst of other dioceses, which were exempt from the ordinary jurisdiction and subject to the metropoh- tan only, in which Court all ecclesiastical causes arising with these peculiar or exempt jurisdiction were originally cog- nizable. Les Teirmes de la Ley. *PECULIUM. In Civil Law, a limited amount of money or property which a son or servant was allowed to have sepa- rate from that of his father or master. Burr. Diet. PECUNIARY CAUSES. These were causes arising either from the withholding ecclesiastical dues, or the doing or neg- lecting some act relating to the church whereby some damage accrued to the plaintiff; toward obtaining satisfaction for which he was permitted to institute a PEERS. — PENALTY OP A BOND. 263 Pecuniary Causes. — (Gontirmed.) suit in the Spiritual Court. Such, for instance, were the subtraction and with- holding of tithes from the parson or vicar; the non-payment of ecclesiastical dues to the clergy, as pensions, mortu- aries, compositions, and the like. PEERS' Those who are impaneled in an inquest upon any man for the con- victing or clearing him of any offense for which he is called in question. The jury was so called from the Latin pares, i. e., equals, because it is the custom of this country to«try every man by his equals, that is to say, by his peers (jvdicio parium suorum). The word " peer " seems also not merely to have signified one of the same rank; but it was also used to signify the vassals or tenants of the same lord, who attended him in his Courts and adjudicated upon matters arising out of their lord's fees, and were thence called peers of fees (Cowel; Zes Termes de la Ley). Whence also apparently the king's barons, who sit in the House of Lords, are called his peers, being (or having at any rate been) to some extent and for some purposes the equals of the sover- eign. See, also, titles Babony ; and Lobdb, House oi' ; and next title. PEERS, QUALITY OF SPIRITUAL. For the general nature of Barony, in the case of the Temporal Peers or Lay Lords, as they may be called, see title Babont. With reference to the SpiriPiial Peers, or Bishops, as they now are, their title of peerage seems to rest upon the following bases or basis : — In early times the title of the prelates to sit in the House of Peers was cumula- tive, resting on one or more of the follow- ing grounds : — (1.) Their learning ; (2.) The custom of Western Europe (inclusive of England) to admit the clergy to their supreme coun- cils; and (3.) The tenure of lands by barony. Probably, however, the third of these three grounds was the chiefest, as the absence of it is in some instances (e. g., that of the Prior of St. James, at North- ampton, in 13 Edw. 2, and that of the Abbot of Leicester in 25 Edw. 3) made a ground of exemption to the prelate from attendance in Parliament; it is certain, however, that the third ground was not a sme qud non in the Spiritual Peerage, as many spiritual peers were in the House Peers, Quality of SpirituaL — (Oonfd.) upon the grounds of their learning and of the custom of Europe alone, or upon one of such grounds ; and that, or those, are the present titles of the spiritual peers to sit in the House of Lords. To all intents and purposes the spiritual peers were (with one exception) upon a level with the temporal peers for the time being, but they must necessarily have been (in most if not in all cases) like peers only. The one exception to this general equality consisted ia the following pecu- liarity, namely, the spiritual had not (nor have they) the right of being present dur- ing the trial or (at any rate) upon the judgment (whether of condemnation or of acquittal) of a temporal peer, or of being themselves tried (like a temporal peer) by their peers. This point of inferi- ority, however, has never been assented to by the spiritual peers themselves ; e. g., in 25 Edw. 3, upon the trial of a certain temporal peer, the spiritual peers, upon retiring, remonstrated that they had full right to remain ; and again, e.g., in 1357, the Bishop of Ely claimed to be tried by the Lords, but that claim was disallowed, and he went before a jury ; and the same was the case with Bishop Fisher in the reign of Heni^ VIH., which latter case settled the law. ♦PEINE PORTE ET DURE. See title Padtb Porte, &c. PENAL BILL. An instrument form- erly in use by which a party bound him- self to pay a certain sum or sums of money, or to do certain acts, or in default thereof to pay a certain specified sum by way of penalty, thence termed a penal sum. These instruments have been super- seded by bonds in a penal sum, with con- ditions. PENAL STATUTES. Statutes impos- ing certain penalties on the commission of certain offenses ; and actions brought * » for the recovery of such penalties are denominated penal actions. Inasmuch as a penal statute is, to the extent of the penalty, a money bill, the Commons claim the exclusive right as to all such enact- ments, the Lords and Crown having merely an assenting vote. See title Monbt-Bills. PENALTY OF A BOND. The sum of money which the obligor of a bond under- takes to pay by way of penalty, in the event of his omitting to perform or carry out the terms imposed upon him by the 264 PENDENTE LITE.— PEREMPTORY MANDAMUS. Penalty of a ^onA.~~ {Continued.) conditions of the bond. The distinction between a penalty and a sum payable as liquidated damages is this, that the penal sum is generally or always double the amount of the debt secured by the bond, whereas liquidated or ascertained dam- ages,, as the name indicates, are intended to denote, and usually denote, the exact amount of the debt. The Courts of Law and also of Equity relieve against penal- ties upon payment of the principal debt, and interest, and costs ; nor will this right to relief be excluded by the parties merely designating that as liquidated damages which is in reality a penalty {Kemble v. Fa/rren, 6 Bing. 141), unless where the damages are altogether unascertainable, otherwise than by the amount fixed by the instrument. Athyna v. Kinnier., 1 Ex. 659. PENDENTE LITE. Pending the suit, whilst the suit is pending. See, also, title Lis Pendens. PENSION (permo). That which in the Inner and the Middle Temple is called a parliament, and in Lincoln's Inn a coun- cil, is in Gray's Inn termed a pension ; that is, an assembly of the members of the society to consult of their afEairs. Certain annual payments of each member of the Inns of Court are also so termed. There is also a writ called a pension writ, which seems to be a sort of peremptory order against those members of the society who are in arrear with their pensions and other dues. Cowel. See, also, titles Civn, List ; Pension List. PENSION LIST. This is the list of persons receiving pensions from the royal bounty. As to the limits of such bounty, see title Civil List. PEPPERCORN RENT. Where only a nominal rent is wished to be reserved, the reservation is frequently confined to "one peppercorn." PER AUTER TIE. For or during the life of another, for such a period as another person shall live. See title Pus 'Autre Vie. PER cm ET POST "Writ of Entry. See title Entry, "Writ op. PER CURIAM {By the Court). A fig- urative phrase commonly used in_ the reports, and meaning that the presiding Per Cnriam. — {Continued.) judge or judges spoke to this or that effect. PER, IN THE : See title Entry, Writ OP. PER MT ET PER TOOT {iy the half amd hy all). This phrase is applied to joint tenants who are said to be seized per m/y et per tout ; that is, by the halt or moiety and by all ; that is, they each have the entire possession as well of every par- cel or pie6e of the land as of the whole considered in the aggregate. For one of them has not a seizin of one-lialf or moi- ety, and the other, of the other half or moi- ety ; nor can one be exclusively seized of one acre and his companion of another, but each has an undivided half or moiety of the whole, and not the whole of an undivided moiety. PERAMBUIATIONE FACIENDA. A writ which lies where two lordships lie near each other, and some encroachments are supposed to have been made, by which writ the pa'rties consent to have their bounds severally known. It is directed to the sheriff, commanding him to make perambulation and to set down their cer- tain limits. F. N. B. 133. PER TOTAM CURIAM is a similar ex- pression, meaning that the whole Court, i. e., all the presiding judges, were unan- imous in the judgment, dictum, or ex- pression of opinion ; e. g., " and it was resolved per tptam CuHam that it could not be attached." PEREMPTORY. In Law this word signifies absolute, final, determinate, &c. The meaning of the word in its different applications maybe collected from perus- ing the following titles : PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE. Is a privilege allowed to a prisoner in criminal cases, or at least in capital ones, infavorem mtm, to challenge a certain number of jurors, without showing any cause for so doing. See title Chaxlbnge. PEREMPTORY MANDAMUS. When a mandamus has issued commanding a party either to do a certain thing or to signify some reason to the contrary, and the party to whom such writ is directed returns or signifies an insufficient reason, then there issues in the second place an- other mandamus, termed a peremptory mandamus, commanding the party to do PEKEMPTORY PAPER. — PER JURY. 265 Peremptory Mandamus. — (^Continued.) the thing absolutely, and to which no other return will be admitted but a cer- tificate of perfect obedience and due ex- ecution of the writs. See, also, title Mandamus. PBREMPTOET PAPER. A Kst of the causes which are enlarged at the request of the parties, or which stand over from press of business in Court. PEREMPTORY PLEAS. Pleas in bar are so termed in contradistinction to that class of pleas called dilatory pleas. The former, viz., peremptory pleas, are usual- ly pleaded to the merits of the action with the view of raising a material issue be- tween the pai-ties ; whilst the latter class, viz., dilatory pleas, are generally pleaded with the view of retarding the plaintiff's proceedings, and not for the purpose of raising an issue upon which the parties may go to trial and settle the point in dis- pute. Peremptory pleas are also called pleas in ba/r, while dilatory pleas are said to be in abatement only. See title Abatement, Pleas In. PEREMPTORY RULE TO DECLARE. When the plaintiff in an action was not ready to declare within the time limited and the defendant wished to compel the plaintiff to declare, he procured what was termed a peremptory rule to declare, which was in the nature of an order from the Court, compelling the plaintiff to declare peremptorily under the pain of judgment of non pros., being signed against him. But by the C. L. P. Act, 1852, s. 53, rules to declare, or declare per- emptorily, shall not be necessary, but in- stead thereof a notice shall be given re- quiring the opposite party to declare, otherwise judgment. If the plaintiff is not prepared to declare within the four days, he may obtain from the judge an extension of time upon sufficient grounds. PEREMPTORY WRIT. This was an original writ called a,site fecerit seowrvm from the words of the writ; which di- rected the sheriff to cause the defendant to appear in Court without any option given him, provided the plaintiff gave the sheriff security effectually to prose- cute his claim ; this writ was in use where nothing was specifically demanded, but only a satisfaction in general ; as in the case of writs of trespass on the case, wherein no debt or other specific thing is sued for, but only damages to be assessed by a jury. 1 Arch Pract. 205. 34 PERFECTING BAIL. Certain qual- ifications of a property character being required of persons who tender themselves as bail, when such persons have justified, i. e., established their sufficiency bjr sat- isfying the Court that they possess the requisite qualifications, as a rule of Court is made for their allowance, and the bail is then said to be perfected, i. e., the pro- cess of giving bail is finished or com- pleted. . • See, also, titles Bail; Jubtipting Bail. PERFORMANCE. This, Uke pay- ment, is the normal and natural mode of discharging an obligation. In Equity practice it has acquired a somewhat ex- tended and peculiar development. Thus, when a person covenants to do an act, and without making any express reference to the covenant, he does an act which may either wholly or partially be taken as or toward a performance of the covenant. Equity imputes to him the intention, i. e., impUes an intention, on his part to per- form the covenant. Cases of performance in Equity fall under two divisions, viz. : (1.) Covenants to purchase and settle lands, and lands are, in fact, purchased, but no settlement thereof is made (Willcocia v. WiUcocJcs, 3 Vem. 558) ; and (2.) Covenants to leave personal prop- erty, and the covenantee in fact receives property left by reason of the covenantor's intestacy. Bhm3/y v. WOmore, 1 P. Wms. 323.- The rules applicable to both these groups of cases are the same, viz. : (1.) When the lands purchased or per- sonal property left by intestacy are of less value than the intention of the covenant, they go in part toward a performance of the covenant {Lechmere v. Ca/rlMe [^Earl], 3 P. Wms. 211); and (2.) The omission of immaterial requi- sites to the due performance of the cove- nant will count for nothing, e. g., the omissipn or neglect to obtain the trustee's consent to the purchase, or even to pur- chase the lands through the trustees as agents (Bowden v. Sowden, 1 Bro. C. C. 582); but (3.) There is no performance in these cases, if the covenant is broken in the life-time of the covenantor. Oliver v. BrieUmA, 3 Atk. 420. See, also, title Satisfaction. PERJURY is defined by Coke to be a crime committed when a lawful oath is 266 PERNANCY. — PERPETUITY. Perjury. — (^GonUnued.) administered in some judicial proceeding to a person -who swears willfully, abso- lutely, and falsely in a matter material to the issue or point in question. And un- der various modem statutes offenses against veracity of the lite sort, although not on oath, are rendered indictable and punishable as perjury, e. g., in the case of the declarations substituted for oaths. The Common Law penalty for perjury was fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the Court ; the statute law penalty is under 2 G-eo. 3, c. 35, s. 3, transportation or imprisonment with hard labor in the house of correction, for any term not ex- ceeding seven years ; and now penal ser- vitude is, under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 3, and 27 & 28 Vict. c. 47, substituted for trans- portation. Two witnesses are required to insure a conviction for perjury. PEENANCT. Pernancy signifies tak- ing, receiving, enjoying, &c. Thus the pernancy of the profits of an estate means the receipt or enjoyment of the profits, e. g., " estates in possession are those where the tenant is entitled to the actual per- nancy of the profits " (2 Cruise, tit. " Re- mainder," s. 1) ; and he who is so in re- ceipt of the profits is termed the perner of the profits. PFRPETUATING TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES. When a party in a suit in equity is desirous of preserving the evidence of witnesses concerning a matter which cannot be immediately investiga- ted in a Court of Law, or when he is likely to be deprived of the evidence of material witnesses by their death or de- parture from the realm, it is usual to file a bill in equity to perpetuate and preserve the testimony of such witnesses ; and the Court then usually empowers certain per- sons to examine such witnesses, and to take their depositions. The evidence so taken is then available on any future trial, if the witness or witnesses should in the meantime have died, but not other- wise. PERPETUITY. Various attempts have from time to time been made to keep land in a certain line or family in perpe- tuity, but the law disliking a perpetuity has frustrated every such attempt. The most noteworthy attempts have been the following: (1.) Restraints imposed upon tenants in tail to prevent them from suffer- ing a common recovery or a fine, Perpetuity. — ( Contirmed.) — an attempt which was tms- trated in Jft'MMOy'g Gase (6 Rep. 40); (2.) Successive life estates, with a pro- viso for the creation of an ever- fresh succession of them — an attempt which was frustrated in Mwrlborough (Duke) v. OodoVphin (1 Eden, 404); and (S.) The creation of executory interests under the Statutes of Uses and of WiUs (27 Hen. 8, c. 10, and 32 Hen. 8, c. 5) — an attempt which was frustrated in Cadell v. Palmer (1 CI. & F. 372), which case also established the Rule of Perpe- tuities in its present form, and which is in these words, — Rule of Perpetuities or of Bemoteneas. — An executory interest cannot be created so as to take effect unless within a life or lives in being, twenty-one years after- ward, and (but only where gestation actually exists Gadell v. Palmer, swpra) the period of gestation ; or (where no life or number of lives is mentioned) within twenty-one years alone and (but only where gestation actually exists) the period of gestation {Pahner v. Holford, 4 Russ. 403). Moreover, all interest subsequent to and depending upon an executory interest which exceeds the limits of the rule are also void, notwithstanding in themselves they may be within the limits of the rule. Pal/nm' v. Bblford, supra ; Bobinaon v. Ha/rdcaBtle, 2 Bro. C. C. 32. The rule is applicable to personal as well as to real estate. In the application of the rule possible and not actual events are to be consid- ered; so that if the executory interest which is given might by possiSnlMy exceed the limits of the rule, in other words would not necessarily take effect as a vested interest (if at all) within these limits, and whether as to all or as to one even of the beneficiaries, the interest is void. And not only must the interest vest, but the respective vested interests of the respective takers (where they are more than one) must also be ascertainable,* within the limits of the rule, otherwise the gift is void (Gurtis v. ImMn, 5 Beav. 147); but it is not necessary that the interest having vested should also be in possession (Murray v. Adderibrohe, 4 Buss. 407), the possession, if arbitrarily post- *Mogg v. Mogg, 1 Mer. 654, cannot be con- sidered law. PEEPETUITY.— PERPETUITY OP THE KING. 267 Perpetuity. — ( Continued.) poned beyond the vesting, being simply accelerated and brought up to the period of vesting. The following are the chief examples of interests attempted to be created, but void as being against the rule, — (1.) An executory interest to arise after an indefinite failure of issue, unless the prior interest can be construed as an estate tail by implication from the words describing the failure of issue, in which latter case the executory interest over would be good (Doe d. SUis v. Ellia, 9 East, 383; Grumble v. Jones, "Will. 166, n), the reason for the validity of the exception being that the gift over may be defeated by the estate taU being barred at any time before the event occurs on which the executory interest is to spring into being. NicoUs v. Sheffield, 2 Bro. C. C. 315 ; Morse v. Lord Ormonde, 5 Madd. 99. (2.) An executory bequest, after a life estate in A. to the children of A. attain- ing any age which exceeds twenty-one years {Leake v. Sobinson, 3 Mer. 368) ; and in such a case the whole bequest over is void, although some of the children may have attained the prescribed age within twenty-one years from the death of A., unless indeed the individual shares of the respective children can be ascertained within the limits of the rule of perpetui- ties, in which latter case the gift over would be valid as to those children who are within the rule and void only as the others. Storrs v. Benbow 2 My. & K. 46. (3.) A devise to a child (not in esse) of A. who is in esse upon that child attaining some qualification which is not neeessanh/ attainable within the limits of the rule, e. g., succeeding to a barony {Tollemache V. Ea/rl of Gmenbry, 3 CI. & F. 611), or being in holy orders. Proctor v. Bishop of Bath and WeOs, 3 H. Bl. 858. (4.) A gift of leaseholds to trustees upon trusts corresponding with lands in strict settlement, and expressed as not to vest in any tenant in tail in possession till he shall attain the age of twenty-one years (JMetson v. Tbbetson, 5 My. & Cr. 26; Lord Dungannon v. Smith, 12 CI. & F. 546) ; but it is otherwise if the gift is expressed not to vest in any tenant in tail 6y pwrehase under the settlement till such tenant attain the age of twenty-one years, and this latter is the common limi- tation. (5.) The literal exercise of powers of appointment (not being general) in favor Perpetuity. — {GonUnited.) of objects who if inserted (as they must be considered as being) in the instrument (whether deed or will) creating the power, would take interests beyond the limits of the rule, as calculated from the date of the operation of the creating in- strument {Devonshire [DuJce] v. Lord G. Cavendish, 4 T. B. 741) ; nevertheless such a power is not void in its creation, and the donee of it may, by using dis- cretion, exercise it in a valid manner. Attenborough v. AUemhorough, 1 K. & J. 296. (6.) The creation of powers of sale or management of estates exercisable gene- rally during the minorities of persons entitled to the settled estates {Werrand v. Wilson, 4 Hare, 373), such persons not being expressed to be entitled hy pur- chase under the settlement ; nevertheless, such powers, if intended for the payment off of incumbrances on the settled estates, would be valid. Briggs v. Oxford {Earl), 1 DeG. M. & G. 363. The rule of perpetuities does not apply to executory trusts, or rather the Coui-t of Chancery, in moulding such trusts, will take care not to exceed the limits of the rule {HumberstonY. Humherston, 1 P. Wms. 332) ; neither does it apply to cases of ay pris, and for the like reason, that the Court coops up the excess within the lawful period of limitation {NichoU v. Nicholl, 3 W. Bl. 1159). And there are also the following further exceptions to the application of the rule : — (1.) Gifts to charities, e. g., contingent limitations over from one charity to another charity ( Ghrisfs Hospital v. Grain- ger, 1 Mac. & G. 460) : but not of course a gift or gift over in the like case from a charity to an individual. Mope\. Gldster {Corporation), 7 DeG. M. & G. 647. (3.) Lands whereof the reversion or remainder subsists in the Crown (84 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 30), not being put into the Crown in fraud of the rule. Johnson d. Angleaea {Ea/rl) v. Derby {Ea/rl), 2 Show. 104. (3.) Any provision for the payment of the debts of the settlor {Briggs v. Oxford [Ea^l], supra), including therein a pro- vision to indemnify a purchaser against an incumbrance. Massey v. O'Dell, 10 Ir. Ch. Rep. 22. See, also, title AccuMULATiosfs. PERPETUITY OF THE KING. That fiction of the law which for certain politi- cal purposes ascribes to the king in his 268 PER QUiE SERVITIA. — PETITION IN CHANCERY. Perpetuity of the Kiug. — (Continued.) political capacity the attribute of immor- tality; for though the reigning -monarch may die, yet by this fiction the king never dies ; that is, the office is supposed to be re-occupied for all political purposes im- mediately on his death. PEE QU* SERVITIA, A judicial writ that issued out upon the note of a fine ; and which lay for the conusee of a manor or seigniory to compel the tenant of the land at the time the fine was levied to attorn to him. Zes Termes de la Ley. PERQUISITES. Such advantages and profits as come to a manor by casualty, and not yearly ; as escheats, heriots, re- liefs, estrays, and such like -things. The word " perquisite " is also used by some of our old law writers to signify anything obtained by industry, or purchased vidth money, in contradistinction to that which descends from an ancestor (Cowel; Les Termes de la Ley). It is also, at the present day, used of the casual profits of any office. PER QUOD. When an action is brought by a person for defamation of character, and the offensive words do not apparently and upon the face of them import such defamation as will of course be injurious, it is necessary that the plain- tifiE should aver some particular damage to have happened, which is called laying his action with a per quod: as if I say that such a clergyman is a bastard, he cannot for this bring any action against me, unless he can show some special loss by it ; in which case he may bring his action against me for saying he was a bastard, per quod he lost the presentation of such a living. In all actions for slander, other than for slander to a person in his or her profession, trade, or occupation, it is necessary to add this per quod clause in effect, although no longer in form, inas- much as damage is an essential part of the ground of action. PERSONAL (pertonaUs). Any thing connected with the person, as distin- guished from that which is connected with land. Another characteristic of personal property (or personalty, as it is sometimes called) is, that it is usually of a transitory or moveable nature, and capable of being taken away by the owner whenever he pleases to go ; whereas real property (or realty, as it is sometimes termed) is of a local and not transitory Personal. — ( Continued. ) nature, and does not possess the attnuute of mobility, or the capacity of being moved about with the person of the owner; and hence, from its substantial and permanent nature, it is termed real. Having stated thus much, it would be advisable further to illustrate the word by explaining it in conjunction with other words with which it is usually associated. Personal AePions, for instance, signify such actions as are brought for recovery of some debt, or for damages for some personal injury; in contradistinction to the old real actions, which related to real or landed property, &c. Personal Estate, property, things, or chattels, &c., signify any moveable things of whatever denomination, whether alive or dead ; as furniture, money, horses, and other cattle, &c., for all these things may be transmitted to the owner wherever he thinks proper to go, and may therefore be said to attend his person, according to the maxim Mbbilia ossibus inhoerent. See, also, following titles. PEESONAI PROPERTY. Property of a personal or moveable nature, as opposed to property of a local or im- moveable character, such as land, or houses, and which are termed real prop- erty. This term is also applied to the right or interest less than a freehold which a man has in realty. See, also, title Pbesonal. PERSONALTY. Signifies generally any personal property, in contradistinction to realty, which signifes real property. In our old law, an action was said to be in the personalty when it was brought for damages out of the personal estate of the defendant. But see Cowel under this title. PETITION IN CHANCERY. During the progress of a suit in Chancery the in- terference of the Court is frequently re- quired in order to the regular and efiectual prosecution or defense of the suit, and in order to the immediate attainment of many objects connected with it. When such interference is required, an order of Court, embodying the particular object, is applied for, and such application is fre- quently made by what is termed a petition which is a statement in writing made to the Lord Chancellor, or the Master of the Rolls, showing the cause which the peti- tioner has for some order of Court. Peti- tions to the Court of Chancery are either PETITION OF RIGHT.— PIN-MONEY. 269 Petition in Cha.ncerj. — ^OonUntied.) made in a suit or under a statute, or both ; but where no suit is pending and no stat- ute gives the right of proceeding upon petition, then a Dill is the only course open to the suitor, unless in certain mat- ters regarding infants, which may be done on petition without either suit or enabling statute. PETITION or RIGHT : See title Mon- STBAHS DE DROIT. PETITION OF RIGHTS. A parlia- mentary declaration of the liberties of the people assented to by King Charles I., in 1629. It is to be distinguished from the Bill of Rights, 1689, which was passed into a permanent constitutional statute. See title Bill of Rights. PETITIONING CREDITOR. The creditor at whose instance an adjudica- tion of bankruptcy is made against a bankrupt. The debt of the creditor so petitioning required formerly to amount to £100, but if it amount to £50 that is now sufficient. Bankruptcy Act, 1869. ♦PETITORY SUIT OR ACTION. In Admiralty Law, a suit in which the mere title to property is litigated as dis- tinguished from possession. 5 Mason R. 465 ; 1 Kent Com. 371. PETTY BAG OFFICE. Is an office which belongs to the Common Law Courts in Chancery, and out of which all writs in matters wherein the Crown is inter- ested do issue. Such writs, and the re- turns to them, were in former times pre- served in a little sack or bag (in parvd iagd), whereas other writs, relating to the business of the subject, were origi- nally kept in a hamper (inJianaperio), and thence has arisen the distinction of the Hanaper Office and Petty Bag Office, which both belong to the Common Law side of the Court in Chancery. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 103. PETTY LARCENY : See title Larceny. PETTY SERJEANTY: See title Sbr- JBAUTY. PETTY SESSION. A special or petty session is sometimes kept in corporations and counties at large by a few justices, for dispatching smaller business in the neighborhood between the times of the general sessions; as for licensing ale- houses, passing the accounts of the parish officers, and so forth. PETTY TREASON : ;See title Treason. *PIED POUDRB (dmty foot). The term applied to a court held at fairs to administer justice to buyer and sellers, and to redress disorders. Jacob Diet. PILOTAGE. The act of steering or guiding a ship by the pilot or helmsman, either during an entire voyage, or on the departure from, or on the approach to, port. The dangerous navigation of the coasts and of the rivers of England has led to the appointment of qualified per- sons, who receive a license to act as pilots within a certain district, and who enjoy the monopoly of conducting vessels out of, and up, the various rivers, and to and from the various ports of the country. By diflferent Acts of Parliament the mas- ter of every ship engaged in foreign trade must put his ship under the charge of a local pilot so licensed, both in his outward and homeward voyage. The power of appointing these " duly Ucensed" pilots is mainly vested in the corporation of the Trinity House, Deptford, whose jurisdiction extends from Orfordness to London Bridge, from London Bridge to the Downs, from the Downs westward to the Isle of Wight ; and all bodies or per- sons having the power of appointment in other places (as the commissioners of the Cinque Ports, the Trinity Houses of Hull, Newcastle, and Liverpool) are, to some extent, subject to their authority. Where the master is bound by Act of Parliament to place his ship under the command of a licensed pilot, he is reUeved from the lia- bility of any damage which is done by it while so under the pilot's command. The rates of charge for pilotage are regulated partly by statute and partly by usage, but also by the corporation of the Trinity House. See Maude and Pollock on Mer- chant Shipping. PIN-MONEY. An allowance set apart by a husband for the personal expenses of the wife ; i. e., for the dress and pocket- money of the wife. It is that money which the husband allows to the ■^ife for the purpose of decking or attiring her person, or to pay her ordinary personal expenses: It is not a gift from the hus- band to the wife out and out ; it is not to be considered like money set apart for the sole and separate use of the wife during coverture excluding the jus mariti ; but is a sum set apart for a specific pur- pose; it is due to the wife in virtue of a particular arrangement, and is payable by 270 PISCARY.— PLEAD. Pin-Money. — ( Gontmied.) the husband by force of that arrangement only, and for that specific purpose and no other (JSoward v. IHgby, 8 Bligh's Eep. N. E. 269). Consequently, if pin-money should not be duly paid by the husband, and should be found to be in arrear at his death, his wife surviTing him can claim only one year's arrears of it (Aston V. Aston, 1 Ves. Sen. 367) ; also the hus- band may find his wife in apparel, in- stead of paying her this apparel-rnoney, as it may be called. Mowa/rd v. Digby, supra. PISCARY (^pisca/ria vel primlegiwm pis- candi.) The right or privilege of fiahing, Thus free fishery, which is a royal fran- chise, is the exclusive right of fishing in a pubUc river. Cgmmon of piscary is the right of fishing in another man's water. Several fishery resembles free fishery, only that he who has a several fishery must also be (or at least derive his right from) the owner of the soil, which in a free fishery is not requisite. See, also, title Fishery. PIX JUKY (from Lat. PyxU, a box made of the box-tree \Pyxac%, or wherefore, he hinders). The action of Qwar* vmpedAt was the remedy by which a party whose light to a benefice was obstructed recov- ered the presentation, and was the form of action constantly adopted to try a dis- puted title to an advowson. But Sy the C. L. P. Act, 1860, 8. 26, no <^an-e impe- dit shall be brought after the commence- ment of that Act, but the action may be commenced by the ordinary writ of sum- mons, with an indorsement thereon that the plaintiff intends to declare in Qum-e impeddt. 1 Arch. Prac. 3. QUARREL (querela d querendo). This word is said to extend not only to real and personal actions, but also to the causes of actions and suits ; so that by the release of all quarrels, not only actions pending, but also causes of action and suit are released; and quarrels, contro- versies, and debates are in law considered to have one and the same signification. Co. Litt. 8, 153 ; Les Termes de la Ley. QUARTER SESSIONS: See title Ses- sion. 290 QUASH. — QUIA EMPTOEES. QUASH {foimmfaeer^. To make void, to cancel, to abate. Thus, to quash a plea, an order of sessions, minus suffleiens exsUtit, by which he was th^ less able to pay the king his debt or rent. It was also a writ which formerly lay for one who had a grant of house-bote and hay-bote in an- other man's woods against the grantor for making such waste as interfered with ,ihe grantee's enjoyment of his grant. Cowel. QUO WARRANTO. A writ which lies for the king against any one who claims or usurps any office, franchise, or liberty, to inquire by what authority he supports his claim, in order to determine the right. It lies also in case of non-user or long neglect of a franchise, or misuser or abuse of it, being a writ commanding the defendant to show by what warrant he exercises such a franchise, having never had any grant of it, or having for- feited it by neglect or abuse (Finch's L. 823). An information in the nature of a qiu) wa/rranto may also be laid under the stat. 9 Anne, c . 30, but it is in the dis- cretion of the Court to grant it or not (Bex V. Trecener, 3 B. & A. 479). The information will generally be granted where the right in dispute depends upon a doubtful point of law, in order to its being finally determined {Bex v. darter, Lofft. 516). And generally a jMO Morrasrato will lie for usurping any office, whether created by charter of the Crown alone, or by the Crown with the consent of Parlia- ment, provided the office is of a public nature, and a substantive office, not mere- ly a function discharged at the will or pleasure of others (see Da/rley v. Beg. [in error], 13 01. & F. 530), which was a case regarding the office of treasurer of the public money of the county of the city of Dublin. QUO WARRANTO, CASE OF. The case which is pre-eminently so-called was a case brought in 1681 by the Attorney- General, on behalf of the king against the corporation of the City of London, alleg- ing breaches of trust iu the officers of the corporation' and seditious opposition to the Crown, and requiring the City to show the tenure of its liberties, with a view to the justification of its proceed- ings. The offenses alleged were : (1.) That the City had imposed taxes without authority ; and (3.) That the City had concocted sedi- tious petitions to the king. Judgment was given for the Crown, and against the City ; and the corporation not submitting within the time limited for their so doing, their liberties were taken from them, and their charter was forfeited. These liberties, together with their char- ter, were not restored until 1688, when James 11., under the immediate fear of his own expulsion, restored them. WOXH {asto, coneemiTijg, &e.). A pro- hibition quoad is a prohibition as to cer- tain things amongst others. Thus, where 292 QUOD EI DEFORCEAT. — RAPPOETS. Quoad. — ( Ooritinued.) a party was complained against in the Ecclesiastical Court for matters cogniza- ble in the temporal Courts, a prohibition quoad these matters issued, i.e., as lomich maUerrs the party was prohibited prosecut- ing his suit in the Ecclesiastical Court. The word is also frequently applied to other matters than to prohibitions. See 2 Roll. Abr. 315, b. 10; Vin. Abr. tit. "Prohib."E. a. 7. QUOD EI DEFORCEAT. A writ that lay for a tenant in tail, tenant in dower, or tenant for life, who had lost their lands by default, against him who recov- ered them, or against his heir. Reg. Orig. 171. QUOD PEKMITTAT. A writ that lay for the heir of him who was disseized of his common of pasture against the heir of the deceased disseizor. Cowel. QUOD PERMITTAT PROSTERN- ERE. A writ which lay against any per- son who erected a building, though on his own ground, so near to the house of another that it overhung it, and became a nuisance to it. Tomlins. QUORUM ifif whom). Among the jus- tices of the peace appointed by the king's commission, there were some who were more eminent for their skill and discre- tion than others, one, or some of whom, on special occasions the commission ex- pressly required should be present, and without whose presence the others could not act; and who were thence termed justices of the quorum, from the language of the commission, which ran thus: '■^quorum aUquem 'eeatrum A. B., 0. D., &c., unwn esse volurmis'" (i. e., of whom we wish some one of you, A. B., 0. D., &c., to be present). The word is used in a similar sense in the following passage : "By charter 3 Edw. 4, the mayor, re- corder, and aldermen that have been mayors, shall be conservators of the peace within the city ; and they, or four of them, quorum, the mayor to be one, shall be justices of oyer and terminer there." Com. Dig. tit. London (0.), Mayor. QUOUSQUE {wiUl). Thus a seizure quouique by the lord of a manor on de- fault of the heir coming in to be admit- ted, means a seizure until the heir so comes in ; the lord being entitled to do this after three proclamations made at three consecutive Courts (Watkins on Qnousqne. — (OorMrmedj.) Copyholds, 330, tit. "Admission;" Carth. 41; 1 Lev. 63; 3 T. R. 163). A prohibition quouaque is a prohibition by which something is forbidden or prohib- ited until a certain time. Thus, if in trying temporal incidents in the Ecclesi- astical Courts, they rejected a mode of proof sufficient at Common Law, they might have been prohibited qwmsque (until) they submitted to a legal mode of trial. Telv. 93. RACHAT. In French Law is the right of re-purchase which the vendor in English Law may reserve to himself. It is also called remire (see that title). RACK-RENT. A rent of the full annual value of the tenement, or near it. * RAGEMAN. A statute of justices assigned by Edward I. and his councU, to hear and determine all complaints of injuries done throughout the realm, within the five years next before Michaet- mas, in the fourth year of his reign. Jacob Diet. RAISING A USE. Creating, estab- lishing, or calling a use into existence. Thus, ii a man conveyed land to another in fee, without any consideration. Equity would presume that he meant it to the use of himself, and would therefore raise an implied'use for his benefit. See title Use ; also Saunders on Uses and Trusts, c. 1, s. 9, 5th edit. ; 1 Cru. Dig. 443. RANSOM. In law this word is fre- quently used to signify a sum of money paid for the pardoning of some great offense : and the distinction made between a ransom and an ameroiament is, that a ransom is the redemption of a corporal punishment, whereas an amerciament is a fine by way of penalty for an offense committed. Litt. 137; Cowel. RAPE. A criminal offense, consisting in the penetration of a female's parts against her will or without her consent. It is punishable in England with penal servitude for life, or for any period not under five years, or with imprisonment not exceeding two years, and with or without hard labor. See, generally. Arch. Crim. Pleading. RAPPORTS. This is in French Law the duty incumbent upon a legatee to RATES.— KEAL. 293 Bapports. — (OovMimieB,^ bring into hotchpot such part of the legacy as he has akeady received by gift intev vivos. RATES; I title Taxation ; Taxes. RATIONABILI PARTE BONORUM. A writ that lay for the mfe against the executors of her husband, to have the third part of his goods after his just debts and funeral expenses had been paid. F. N. B. 133 ; Les Termes de la Ley. See, also, title Rbasonablb Part. RATIONALIBUS DITISIS. A writ that lay for the lord of a seigniory, when he found that any portion of his seigniory or his waste had been encroached upon by the lord of an adjacent seigniory, ° against him who had so encroached, in order to settle their boundaries. Cowel; F. N. B. 138. RATIONALIBUS ESTOVERUM. A phrase anciently applied to alimony. Jacob Diet. RATIFICATION. This is authorizing subsequently what has been already done without authority ; in contract law it is equivalent to a prior request to make the contract ; and in the law of torts it often has the eSect of purging the tort. MaU V. Piakershia, 1 B. & B. 383. RAVISHMENT DE GARD (rcmishr ment of Ward). A writ that lay for the guardian by knight service or in socage against him who took away from him the body of his ward. 13 Car. 3, c. 24; Cowel. RE (in. the matter of). Thus, Re- Vivian signifies In the matter of Vivian, or in Vivian's case. READERS. In the Middle Temple those persons are so called who are ap- pointed to deliver lectures or readings at certain periods during the term. The clerks in holy orders who read prayers and assist in the performance of divine service in the chapels of the several inns of court are also so termed. See 5 Reeve's Eng. Law, 347 (1st edit.). READING IN. A new incumbent of a benefice is to read, within two months of actual possession, the morning and evening prayers, and declare his un- feigned assent and consent thereto pub- licly in the church, before the congre- gration. He is also to read the thirty-nine articles in the church in the time of com- Reading In. — {OonUnued.) mon pi:ayer, and to delare his unfeigned assent thereto, within two months after induction; and to read in his church, within three months after institution or collation, the declaration appointed by the Act of Uniformity, and also the certi- ficate of his having subscribed it before the bishop. The obseijyance of the above forms by a new incumbent constitutes what is termed " reading in.?' Rog. Ecc. Law ; Burns' Ecc. Law. REAL. Real and personal property is the most fertile division of things which are the subjects of property in English law. The division is substantially co-in- cident with that into lands, tenements, and hereditaments, on the one hand, and goods and chattels on the other. In the case of each division, the principle under- lying the division is feudal ; it is directly so in the case of the division into lands and chattels, and indirectly so in the case of the division into real and personal property. As law and society progressed, it became more and more apparent that the essential difference between lands and goods was to be found in the remedies for the deprivation of either; that as to the one, the real land, i. e., the land itself could be recovered, and that as to the other, proceedings could be had against the person only. The two great classes of property accordingly began to acquire two other names that were characteris- tic of this difference, and with reference to the remedies for the recovery of each were called respectively real and personal property. The circumstance that a lease- hold interest in land is personal property, is a striking illustration both of the origin and of the principal of this division. It is an illustration of the origin, because originally all leases were farming leases, and the farmer was only the bailifif or agent of his landlord, who warranted him in the quiet possession of the land, and against whom, in the case of an eject- ment, the farmer had his only remedy in a personal action for damages ; it is also an illustration of the principle of (^le division, because the farmer in the like case of an ejectment had no action for the recovery of the land itself, but at the most (as already stated) an action against his landlord personally, whereby he com- pelled the latter either to take proceed- ings for the restitution of the land or else to compensate in damages for the disturbance of the quiet possession. 294 KBAL REPKESENTATTVE.— RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS. REAL REPRESENTATIVE. He who represents or stands in the place of another with respect to his real property, is so termed, in contradistinction to him who stands in the place of another with regard to his personal property, and who is termed the personal representative. Thus, the heir is the representative of his deceased ancestor. See, also, title*BEPKESBNTATioN. REALTY. That which relates to real Eroperty (i «., to lands, tenements, and ereditaments), in contradistinction to that which relates to personal property (i. e., to moveable things in general), which is termed personalty. REASONABLE PART. The shares to which the wife and children of a deceased person were entitled, were called their reasonable parts; and the writ de raUori- dMU pa/rte bonorwn was given to recover them. F. N. B. 132. RE-ATTACHMENT. A second attach- ment, or an attachment of a person who has been previously attached, and has been dismissed the Court without day, from the happening of some casual cir- cumstance. Cowel. REBUTTER (from the Er. bouter, that is, to repel, to put back, to bar, &c.). In an action at law the alternate allegations of fact (i. «., the pleadings) are denomi- nated as follows : declaration, plea, repli- cation, rejoinder, surrejoinder, rebutter, and surrebutter. The declaration is the statement of the plaintifi's cause of com- plaint ; the plea is the defendant's answer to the declaration ; the replication is the plaintifiE's answer or reply to the plea; the rejoinder is the defendant's answer to the replication; the surrejoinder, the plaintiff's answer to the rejoinder; the rebutter the defendant's answer to the surrejoinder; and the surrebutter the plaintiff's answer to the rebutter. RECAPTION. Recaption' or reprisal, is a species of remedy by the mere act of the party injured ; and is resorted to when any one has deprived another of his prop- erty in goods or personal chattels, or wrongfully detains one's wife, child, or servant, in which case the owner of the goods, and the husband, parent, or master, may lawfully claim and retake them wherever he happens to find them, so that it be not in a riotous manner, or attended with a breach of the peace, which retaking is termed "recaption." Recaption. — ( OovMnued.) There is also a writ of recaption to recover damages against a person who (pending a replevin for a former distress) distrains a man again for the same rent or service. RECEIVER. He who receives stolen goods from thieves, and conceals them. There are also other kinds of receivers, as the receiver of the fines, who was an offi- cer who received the money of all such as compounded with the king upon original writs in Chancery: the Receiver-General of the Buchy of Lancaster, who is an officer belonging to Duchy Court, who gathers in all the revenues and fines of the lands belonging to that duchy, and all forfeitures and assessments belonging to the same. There is also a person who is appointed by the Court of Chancery to receive the rents, issues and profits of lands, and the produce and profits of other property which may be the subject- matter of proceedings in that Court, who is called a receiver; this officer has also to manage and take care of such lands and property during the pendency of the suit, and he is appointed by the Court in various cases where it is doubtful to what party the property will ultimately belong ; or where a party from incapacity, such as infancy^ &c.,is incapacitated from receiv- ing the profits of or managing the estate, and the property is in any danger of suf- fering damage from neglect or otherwise in the meantime. See, also, next title. RECEIVERS AND TRIERS OF PE- TITIONS. The mode of receiving and trying petitions to Parliament was for- merly judicial rather than legislative ; and the triers were committees of prelates, peers, and judges; but their functions have long given way to the authority of Parliament at large. By the House of Lords, however, receivers and triers of petitions are still appointed at the open- ing of every session, as in ancient times. But petitions are, by both houses, con- sidered now in the first instance, and only referred to triers or committees in certain cases. RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS. Re- ceiving any chattel, money, valuable se- curity, or other property whatsoever, obtained by felony, knowing the same to have been so feloniously obtaiUed, is a felony, for which the receiver may be in- dicted and convicted either as an acces- sory after the fact to the principal felony, JIECIDIVB. — RECORD, COURTS OF. 295 BeceiTing Stolen Goois. — (Continued.) or as for a substantive felony, and, in the latter case, whether or not the principal felon shall have been previously convicted. The offense is punishable -with penal servi- tude for any period between five and fourteen years, or with imprisonment for two years or under, with or without hard labor, and with or without soUtary con- finement, and (if a male under the age of sixteen years) with or without whipping. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 91. *KECIDITE. The case of one who commits an ofiense after having once been condemned for a previous one. Bouv. Diet. BECITAL. The formal statement or setting forth of some matter of fact in any deed or writing, in order to explain the reasons upon which the transaction is founded. The recitals are situated in the premises of a deed ; that is, in that part of a deed between the date and the ha- bendum ; and they usually commence with the formal word "whereas." 4 Cruise. RECITE, TO. To state or set forth in any deed or other writing such matters of fact as may be necessary to explain the nature of the transaction, or the reasons upon which it is founded. As used in the practice of conveyancing it is some- what analogous to the word "induce" as used in the practice of pleading. See, also, title Recital. RECOGNITORS (recofirmfewes.) A word which was frequently used to signify a jury impaneled upon an assize ; so called because they aclmowledge, e. g., a dis- seizin, by their verdict. Cowel; Bract, lib. 5, tract 3, c. 9. 8ee title Jxmv, Tbial by. RECOGNIZANCE. A recognizance is an acknowledgment upon record of a former debt ; and he who so acknowledges such debt to be due is termed the recog- nizor, or cognizor; and he to whom, or for whose benefit, he makes such acknowl- edgment is termed the recognizee, or cog- nizee. A recognizance is in most respects similar to a bond; the difference being chiefly that a bond is the creation of a new debt; whereas a recognizance is merely an acknowledgment upon record of a debt which was previously due. The form of a recognizance runs thus: — " That A. B. doth acknowledge to owe to C. D. the sum of £100 " ; and it is also conditioned to be void on performance of Recognizance. — (^Oontmmed.) the thing stipulated. It is certified to and witnessed by an officer of some Court, and not by the seal of a party, as in the case of deeds strictly so called (4 Cruise, 103). Recognizances are also frequently taken from persons, either to secure their prosecution of a suit or their presence in Court upon a certain day, or to secure their careful administration of property intrusted to them in some official capacity, e. g., in the cases of administrators, and also of receivers appointed by the Court of Chancery. * RECONVENTION. A cross demand. A term in use in Louisiana and Texas. Burr. Diet. RECORD. An authentic testimony in writing contained in rolls of parchment, and preserved in Courts of record. The record of niai prius is an official transcript or copy of the proceedings in an action entered on parchment and sealed and passed, as it is termed, at the proper office ; it serves as a warrant to the judge to try the cause, and is the only document at which he can judicially look for informa- tion as to the nature of the proceedings, and the issues joined between the parties. RECORD, COURTS OF. Courts whose acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled ia parchment, called the records of such Courts, and are ^ preserved as a perpet- ual memorial and testimony thereof. All Courts of record are the King's Courts in right of his crown and dignity, and they usually possess, as incident to them, the power to fine and imprison. Several of the King's Courts, however, are not Courts of record ; as the Courts of Equity and the Admiralty Courts, which are at best only quasi of record, or of record to themselves. The distinction between Courts of record and Courts not of record, was introduced soon after the Conquest ; for by an edict of the Conqueror's it was ordained that all proceedings in the King's Courts should be carried on in the Norman instead of the English language, in con- sequence of which the influence of the County Courts, Courts Baron, and other inferior jurisdictions, was much narrowed, for as the judges and suitors of such Courts were ignorant of that language, they were prohibited from recording their acts (3 Ch. Bl. Com. 34 ; Com. Dig. tit. " Chancery "). One of the privileges which attaches to a Court being a Court of record, is the high authority which 296 KECORD, TRIAL BY.— RECTO DE DOTE UNDj; NIHIL HABET. Becord, Courts of. — {Contimied.) their records are allowed to possess, their truth not being permitted to be called in question; it being an almost invariable rule that nothing shall be averred against a record, and that no plea, or even proof, shall be admitted to the contrary. Also, a plea of matter of record need not be put in on oath, but is sufficient without oath ; and a decree even of the Court of Chancery, when it has been signed and enrolled (but not sooner), stands on the same footing, at least for all purposes of litigation in .that Court itself. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr. ^95. RECORD, TRIAL BY. A species of trial adopted for the purpose of ascertain- ing the existence or non-existence of a record. When a record is asserted by One party to exist, and the opposite party denies its existence under the form of traverse, that there is no such record re- maining in Court as alleged, and issue is joined thereon, this is called an issue of rml tiel record ; and in such case the Court awards a trial by inspection and examina- tion of the record. Upon this the party affirming its existence is bound to pro- duce it in Court on a day given for the purpose ; and if he fail to do so, judg- ment is given for his adversary. This mode of trial is not only that specially appropriated to try an issue of the above kind, but is, in fact, the only legitimate mode of trying such an issue. Co. Litt. 117 b, 360 a. See, also, title Ntjl Tiel Record. BECORDARI FACIAS LOQUELAM. An original writ directed to the sheriff to remove a cause pending in an inferior Court to one of the superior Courts ; as from a County Court or Court Baron to the Court of Queen's Bench or Common Pleas. It seems to be called a recordcuri from the circumstance of its commanding the sheriff to whom it is directed to make a record of the proceedings in the Court below, and then to send it up to the su- perior Court. Reg. Orig. ; Cowel. RECORDER. A barrister or other person learned in the law, whom the mayor or other magistrate of any city or corporate town (having a jurisdiction, or a Court of record within his precincts) doth by the ^ng's grant associate to him for his better direction in the judicial pro- ceedings of such Court (Cowel). Thus the Recorder of the City of London is practically the judge in the LordMayor's Recorder. — ( Oontinued. ) Court of the City, although in theory the Lord Mayor and Aldermen are the judges therein. * RECOUPMENT. Reduction of damages in' an action on contract from breach of warranty, or defects in per- formance. See Bonier v. Ohapin, 38 Vt. 413, 415; Burr. Diet. RECOVERY. A recovery in its most extensive sense is the restoration of a former right by the solemn judgment of a Court of justice. A common recovery was one of the modes of transferring property from one party to another, and is said to have been introduced by the ecclesiastics, in order to avoid the stat- utes of Mortmain, by which they were prohibited from purchasing or receiving, under pretense of a free gift, any lands or tenements whatever. RECTO DE ADVOCATIONE ECCLE- SI-3E. A writ of right which lay when a man had right of advowson, and the par- son of the church dying, a stranger pre- sented his clerk to the church, and the real patron did not bring his action of gua/re impedit or darrein preiembment within six months, but permitted the stranger to. usurp on him, and so was left to his writ of right only to recover his right. This writ lay only where the patron was enti- tled to the fee in the advowson. Reg. Orig. 39; Cowel. RECTO DE DOTE. A writ of right of dower, which lay for a woman who had received part of her dower, and proposed demanding the remainder, against the heir of her husband, or his guardian if he were a ward (Old Nat. Brev. 5 ; Cowel). Under the C. L. P. Act, 1860, s. 26, no writ of right of dower shall be brought after the commencement of that Act in any Court whatsoever ; but instead thereof an action may be commenced by the ordi- nary writ of summons, with an indorse- ment thereon to the effect that the plain- tiff intends to declare in dower ; and all subsequent proceedings therein are, as nearly as may be, to be taken in accord- ance with the C. L. P. Acts, 1852 and 1854. RECTO DE DOTE UNDE NIHIL HABET. A writ of right of dower, which lay when a man who had divers lands and tenements had assigned no dower to hia wife, and she was thereby driven to sue for her thirds against the heir or his RECTO DE RATIONABILI PARTE.— RE-DISSEIZIN. 297 Becto De Dote, etc. — (^Contimted.) faardian (Reg. Orig. 170 ; Cowel). Un- er the C. L. P. Act, 1860, the like provisions are made regarding this action as are stated in' the title last preceding to have been made by the same Act regarding the writ of right of dower. BECTO DE RATIONABILI PARTE. A writ that lay between privies in blood, as brothers in gavelkind, or sisters, co- heiresses, or other co-parceners, for land in fee simple. As for instance, if a man leased his land for life, and afterward died, leaving issue two daughters, and after that, the tenant for life died also, and then one sister entered upon the whole of the land, and so deforced the other, then the sister so deforced might have had this writ to recover part. F. N. B. 9; Cowel. BECTO QUANDO DOMINUS BE- MISIT. A writ of right, which lay where lands or tenements that were in the seign- iory of any lord were in demand by a writ of right ; for if in such case the lord held no court, or otherwise, at the prayer of the demandant, sent to the King's Court his writ, to put the cause thither for that time (reserving to him at other times the right of his seigniory), then this writ issued out for the other party. Reg. Orig. 4; Cowel. RECTO SUB DI8CLAIMEB. A writ that lay for a lord who had avowed upon his tenant in the Court of Common Pleas, and such tenant had disclaimed to hold of him, on which disclaimer the lord might have this writ ; and if he averred and proved that the land was holden of him, he should recover the land forever. Old Nat. Brev. 150; Cowel. BECTOB. A governor. Rector eccle- sicB pa/rocMalu is he who has the cure or charge of a parish church, qvi tantwmjvs in eacledd parocJiiaM habet^qmmPwm praAo/- tus in eccleHd collegiatd. It appears that when dioceses were divided into parishes, the clergy who had the charge in those places were called rectors; afterward, when their rectories were appropriated to monasteries, &c., the monks kept the great tithes, but the bishops were to take care that the rector's place should be sup- plied by another, to whom he was to allow the small tithes for his maintenance ; and this was the vicar. See title Advowson. BECTOBT. This word appears to be used for an entire parish church, with all its rights, glebes, tithes, and other profits (Spelm). The word was often used to signify the rector's manse, or parsonage house. Ken. Par. Antiq. 649. See title Adtowson. BECUSANTS. This word, as used in the statutes, has been expounded to mean all those who separate from the church as established by the laws of this realm (Les Termea de la Ley). Numerous laws against recusants were passed in the per- secuting times of Charles 11., in which reign these recusants were chiefly non- conformists. The term does not, in fact, appear to have ever been applied to Ro- man Catholics or Jews, but only to Prot- estant Dissenters. See title Statutes Ecclesiastical. BEDDENDUM. The reddendum is a clause in a deed by which the grantor reserves something to himself out of what he has granted before. It is situated between the habendum and the covenants in deeds, and usually begins either with the word ' ' yielding " or the word ' ' ren- dering ; " thus in a lease, that clause which commences with the words ' ' yielding and paying " is the reddendum. 4 Cruise, 26. BEDDITION. A judicial confession and acknowledgment that the land or thing in demand belongs to the demand- ant, and not to the person surrendering. 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 34; Cowel. BEDDITUS SICCUS {d/ry rent, hwrren rent). A rent for the recovery of which no power of distress is given by the rules of the Common Law (3 Cru. Dig. 314). It is also sometimes called rent-seek (Litt. sec. 217, 218. See, also, Co. Litt. 143 a, 143 B, 153 a, n. [1] ). But a power of distress for this rent was given by stat. 4 Geo. 3, c. 38. For the other varieties of rent, see title Rent. REDEEMABLE BIGHTS. Such rights as return to the grantor of lands, &c., on repayment of the sum for which such rights were granted. Jacob ; Tom- lins. BE.DEMISE : See title Demise. BEDEMPTION, EQUITY OF : See ti- tles Equity op Redemption, and Mokt- GAGE. BE-DISSEIZIN. A disseizin made by a person who had once before been ad- judged to have disseized the same man of 298 REDUCTION.— REGIME EN COMMTJNAUTE. Be-Diaseizin. — {Omtinued.) his lands or tenements, for which there •lay a special writ, termed a writ of re- disseizin. Reg. Orig. 304; Cowel. REDUCTION. In French Law, when a parent gives away, whether by gift inter moos or by legacy, more than his portion disponible {see that title), the donee or legatee is required to submit to have his gift reduced to the legal proportion. Bee, also, title Hotchpot. BE-ENTRT« The entering again into or resuming possession of premises. Thus in leases there is a proviso for re-entry of the lessor on the tenant not paying the rent, or not performing the covenants contained in the lease ; and by virtue of such proviso the lessor may take the premises into his own hands again if the rent be not paid, or the covenants be not observed by the lessee ; and this taking possession again is termed re-entry. 3 Cruise, 8; Cowel. See, also, title Entkt. RE-EXCHANGE. The like sum of money payable by the drawer of a bill of exchange, which is returned protested back again to the place whence it was drawn, for the exchange of the sum men- tioned in the biU. Lex M&rcat. 98. RE-EXTENT. A second extent made on lands and tenements on complaint being made that the former extent was only partially performed. Cowel. See title Extbnt. REFERENCE. The fact of something being referred. Thus in the proceedings in a suit in equity, or in an action at law, matters frequently arise which would take up too much of the time of the Court to be brought before it for its decision ; and such matters are therefore referred to the masters of the respective Courts, or to special referees, to be inquired into by them. The order of the Court author- izing such a reference is termed an order of reference. See title Arbitkation . REFERRING A CAUSE. When a case or action involves matters of account or other intricate details which require minute examination, and for that reason are not fit to be brought before a jury, it is not unusual to refer all matters in dif- ference between the parties to the decis- ion of an arbitrator, and in such a case the cause is said to be referred. See, also, title Rkpbkencb. REFRESHER. It frequently happens that after the briefs in a cause have been delivered to counsel, the cause, from a press of business or some other reason, is adjourned, or allowed to stand over from one term or sittings to another, which imposes upon counsel the necessity of re- perusing their briefs, in order to refresh their memory upon the various points of the cause ; in consideration of which it is usual for the attorney to mark on the briefs which have so been delivered a small additional fee, thence termed a refresher fee. REGALIA. The royal rights of a king, the kilig's prerogative ; and regalia faeere is to do homage or fealty when he is in- vested with the regalia (Cowel). The word is also occasionally used to denote the emblems of sovereignty. REGARDANT (Fr. looking at). Thus, a villein regardant was called regardant to the manor, because he was charged with doing all base services within the same, and with seeing that the same was freed from all things that might annoy it. Co. Litt. 130 ; Cowel. See, also, title Villbnagb. REGE INCONSULTO. A vmt issued from the king to the judges, command- ing them not to proceed in a cause which may prejudice the king without the king being advised. 18 Vin. Abr. 375, 380. REGIME DOTAL. In French Law, the dot, being the property which the wife brings to the husband as her contribution to the support of the burdens of the mar- riage, and which may either extend as well to future as to present property, or be expressly confined to the present prop- erty of the wife, is subject to certain regulations which are summarized in the phrase regime dotal. The husband has the entire administration during the mar- riage ; but as a rule where the dot consists of immoveables, neither the husband nor the wife, nor both of them together, can either sell or mortgage it. The dot is returnable upon the dissolution of the marriage, whether by death or other- wise. REGIME EN COMMUNAUTE. In French Law is the community of interests between husband and wife which arises upon their marriage. It is either (1) legal or (3) conventional, the former existing in the absence of any agreement properly so called and arising from a mere declara- REGISTER.— RE-HEARING. 299 • Beg'ime En Commnnaute. — {Omfd.) tion of community, the latter arising from an agreement properly so called. Legal community extends to all the moveable and immoveable property of both parties (and the profits thereo:^ ** the time of and during the marriage, and also to all the debts with -which either spouse is burdened at the date of the marriage, or which the husband or the wife (vdth his consent) contracts during the marriage. Under such a community, the husband has the sole management and disposal of the property, but he cannot give them away for nothing, unless it should be for the advancement of the children of the marriage. This conununity is destroyed by a judicial separation de corps et de Mens, and the wife recovers the free ad- ministration of her goods. Conventional community may be as diverse as the parties choose by their conventions to make it, these conventions most com- monly regulating the amount of property which shall be held in common, exclud- ing the after-acquired property from it, or making other such restrictive regula- tions. KEGISTEE. A book wherein things are registered for the preservation of the same ; that a parish register is that book wherein the baptisms, marriages and burials are registered in the respective parishes; there is also a book wherein are entered the various forms of original and judicial writs, which is termed the register of writs. Co. Litt. 159 ; Cowel. See, also, the two following titles. REGISTRAR. An officer who has the custody or keeping of a registry. There are several officers of this kind connected with the law. The principal are the registrars of the Courts of Chancery and Bankruptcy and the registrars of births, deaths, and marriages. The registrar of the Court of Chancery is an officer with whom, in certain cases, the defendants are compelled to enter their appearances ; and by him the decrees of the Court are drawn up, signed, and passed. As to the duties of the registrars of the Court of Bankruptcy, the reader is referred to the Bankruptcy Act, 1869. The registrars of births, deaths, and marriages are officers appointed under the 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 86, 7 Will. 4. and 1 Vict. c. 32, and 3 & 4 Vict. c. 93, for the purpose of keeping in their respective districts an exact register of every birth, death, and mar- Registrar. — ( OonUrmed. ) riage which may take place therein. The registrars of each union are subjected to the supervision of their "superintendent registrar," and these again are subject to the authority of a superior officer ap- pointed under the great seal, and holding office during the pleasure of the Crown, called the ' ' Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages in England. " See the statutes above referred to. REGISTRY OF DEEDS. By certain Acts of Parliament all deeds and con- veyances (with some exceptions) which aflfect lands in the counties of Middlesex and York, are required to be registered ; that is, an abstract of their substance is required to be entered in a registrar kept for that purpose. The object of this is that purchasers and mortgagees of lands in these counties by referring to this reg- ister may have an opportunity of ascer- taining whether the lands they are about to purchase are in any way incumbered or otherwise affected by any prior transac- tions; and therefore by these statutes, deeds and conveyances are void against subsequent purchasers or mortgagees, unless registered before the conveyances under which such purchasers or mortga- gees claim, unless, indeed, the subsequent purchaser or mortgagee had notice of the prior charge (Ze Neve v. Le Neoe, 2 Wh. & Tud. L. C. 28). By a Bill of the pres- ent session it was proposed to make the registration of titles to land universal; but the Bill has fallen through for the present. REGRATING (from re, again, and the Fr. grater, to scrape). In one sense this word signifies the scraping or dressing of cloth or other goods for the purpose of sell- ing them again. But in its more ordinary sense it means the offense of buying or getting into one's hands at a fair or market any. provisions, com, or other dead victual vfith the intention of selling the same again in the same fair or market, or in some other within four miles there- of, at a higher price ; and he who com- mits this offense is termed a regrator. 3 Inst. 195 ; 5 Edw. 6, c. 14. See, also, title Forestalling. RE-HEARING. When a party seeks to have a decree of the Court of Chancery reversed or altered he may petition for a re-hearing; that is, for the cause to be heard again. Such re-hearing is usually had before the same judge that previously 300 REJOINDER. —REMAINDER. Re-Hearing. — (Contimted.) heard the case. It is obtained upon a petition to the Lord Chancellor, accom- panied with the certificate of two coun- sel, one of whom, at least, must have been engaged on the occasion of the former hearing; and the usual ground of it is that there has been an oversight on the part of the judge, resulting in a miscar- riage of justice. The certificate is, how- ever, in the most general form, merely stating that the cause is a proper one to be re-heard. In case the re-hearing is that of an order made on motion, then no certificate of counsel is required, and neither is any petition of appeal necessary, but counsel merely moves the Court of Appeal on motion with notice. See, also, title Appbai,. REJOINDER: See title Rbbottek. REJOINING GRATIS. Rejoining voluntarily, or without being required to do so by a rule to rejoin. It would seem that when a defendant is under terms to rejoin gratis, it means that he must de- liver a rejoinder, without putting the plaintiff to the necessity of obtaining a rule to rejoin. AtMna v. Anderson, 10 M. & W. 13; Lush's Pr. 396. RELATOR. A rehearser or teller. It is sometimes used to signify an informer; as in the case of an information being filed by the Attorney-General at the rela- tion of some informant, such informant is termed a relator, and the information is said to be at the relation of such person. Such informations are usually laid in the Court of Chancery for the abatement of a public nuisance ; the corresponding pro- ceeding in the Courts of Common Law is called an indictment. RELEASE. A release is a discharge or conveyance of a man's right in lands or tenements to another who already has an estate in possession; as if A. has a lease of lands for a term of years, and B. has the remainder or reversion in fee; here the fee siniple of the lands may be- come vested in A. by B. executing a re- lease of them to A. (4 Cruise, 84). Such a release is said to operate by enlarge- ment of the estate of A. For the other varieties of a release, and the incidents attaching thereto, see title Conykyancbs. RELEASE TO USES. The conveyance by a deed of release to one party to the use of another is so termed. Thus, when a conveyance of lands was effected, by Release to Uses. — (Oontmaed.) • those instruments of assurance termed a lease and release, from A. to B. and his heirs, to the use of C. and his heirs, in such case C. at once took the whole fee simple in such lands ; B., by the opera- tion of the Statute of Uses, being made a mere conduit pipe for conveying the estate to C. See title Convbtahces. RELIEF. A fine or acknowledgment, which, during the f eodal system, tite heir paid to the lord on being admitted to the feud which ■ his ancestor possessed ; it generally consisted of houses,arms,money, and the like; it was called a relief, either because it raised up and re-established the inheritance, or because by it the heir took up or Ufted up the inheritance, or in the words of the f eodal writers, 'Hneertam et caducam hereditatem relevaiat" (Knight, 14). It seems that a relief is still paya- ble, if demanded. Wms. R. P. p. 130. REM, IN : See title In Pebsonam. REMAINDER. A remainder is defined to be an estate limited to take effect and be enjoyed after another estate is deter- mined. As if a man who is seized of lands in fee simple grants them to A. for twenty years, and after the determination of that term to B. and his heirs forever; in this case the estate of A. (that is, the interest which A. has in the lands for the twenty years) is termed an estate for years ; and the estate of B. (that is, the interest which B. has in the lands after the end of the twenty years) is termed a remainder. In order to constitute or to create a remainder, it is a rule that there must be some particular estate (as it is termed) to support it, that is, at the time of creating a remainder there must be some estate (in the same lands to which the remainder applies) created at the same time to precede the remainder, which preceding estate is teimed the par- ticular estate. Thus, in the above in- stance (of a man who is seized of lands in fee simple granting them to A. for twenty years, and after the determination of that term to B. and his heirs for ever), the estate of A. is termed the particular estate, because it is only a small part, or particule, of the inheritance, the residue or remainder of which is granted over to B. The necessity of creating this pre- ceding particular estate, in order to make a good remainder, arises from this plain reason, that the word "remainder" is a REMANET. — REMITTITUR. 301 Remainder. — {Omtinued.) relative expression, and implies that some part of the thing is previously disposed of ; for where the whole is conveyed at once, there cannot possibly exist a re- mainder. Remainders are said to be either vested or contingent. Vested re- mainders (or remainders executed) are those on the creation of which a present interest passes to the party, though to be enjoyed at a future time, and by which the estate is invariably fixed to remain to a determinate person after the particular estate is spent. As if an estate is con- veyed to A. for twenty years, remainder to B. in fee ; here B.'s is a vested remain- der, which nothing can defeat or set aside ; so that a person entitled to a vested remainder has an immediate fixed right of future enjoyment, that is, an estate in prcBsenti, though it is only to take effect in possession and receipt of the profits at a future period. Contingent (or execu- tory) remainders are such as are limited to take effect in favor of a dubious and uncertain person ; as if an estate is con- veyed to A. for life, with the remainder to B.'s eldest son (then unborn) in tail; this is a contingent remainder, for it is quite uncertain whether B. will have a son or not ; but the instant that a son is bom, the remainder is no longer contin- gent, but vested (2 Cruise, 331). These two varieties of remainder are defined in WiUiama' Real Property as follows : — (1.) A vested remainder is one which is always ready from its creation to its close to come into possession the moment the prior estate determines ; (2.) A contingent remainder is one wmch is not always so ready. BEMANET. A remnant, that which remains. Thus the causes which are de- ferred being tried from one term to another, or from one sittings to another, are termed remanets. 1 Arch. Praot. 375. BEMEMBBANCEBS. Were three o&- cers, or clerks, of the Exchequer, who were formerly called clerks of the remem- brance. One was called the king's re- membrancer ; the second, the lord treas- urer's remembrancer ; and the third, the re- membrancer of the first fruits. The king's remembrancer entered in his office all recognizances taken before the barons for any of the king's debts, or for appearances, or for observing of orders ; he wrote pro- cess against the collectors of customs, Bemembrancers. — (ConUwued.) subsidies, and fifteenths for the accounts, &c. The lord treasurer's remembrancer made process against all sheriffs, escheat- ors, receivers, and bailiffs, for their ac- count ; also of fieri facias and extent for any debts due to the king either in the pipe or with the auditors, &c. The re- membrancer of the first fruits took all compositions and bonds for the first fruits and tenths, and made process against such as did not pay the same. Cowel. BEMEBE: /See title Rachat. BEMISE DE LA DETTE. In French Law is the release of a debt. BEMITTEE (rmnittere, to send back). In real property law is a restitution of one who has two titles from the latter defect- ive title, in respect of which he is in possession, to the former complete title which he has to the lands, but in respect of which he is not in possession. It is necessary in order to the principle of re- mitter taking effect, that the latter title should have come to the party by the act of law; for if- it came to him by his own act, he is taken to have waived his former or more ancient title. Co. Litt. 858. BEMITTITUB {it is remitted). This word is ordinarily used in two senses ; first, for an entry or minute which a plain- tiff sometime makes expressive of his in- tention to give up or waive the damages which he has originally demanded in his declaration, whence the entry is called a remittitur damna ; secondly, to signify the returning or sending back by a Court of Appeal the record and proceedings to the Court whence the appeal came. A com- mon instance of the first description of r&mittitw is afforded in an action of re- plevin, wherein the defendant, having pleaded and estabUshed an avowry, cog- nizance or justification, is entitled to damages ; but as that action is generally brought merely to estabUsh a right, the defendant often excuses or remits the pay- ment of those damages to which he would be otherwise entitled, and when he does so, it is thus recorded in the judgment : " And hereupon the said C. D. freely here in Court remits to the said A. B. his dam- ages aforesaid ; therefore let the said A. B. be acquitted thereof." The second sort of remittitur is used when for instance, the House of Lords having affirmed the judgment on a writ of error from the Queen's Bench, returns or remits the record, so that that Court may carry its 302 RENDER. — REPLEADER. Remittitur. — ( Continued.) sentence (so confirmed) into execution. The form is thus entered in the judgment : " Thereupon the record aforesaid, and also the proceedings aforesaid in the same Court of Parliament had in the premises, are remitted by the same Court of Parliar ment to the Court of our said Lady the Queen, before the Queen herself, where- soever, &c., to the end that execution may be done thereupon," &c. Tidd's Forms, 574, 615, &c. RENDER (from the Fr. rmdre, to re- turn). To give up, to yield, to surrender. Thus, when a defendant who has been arrested, and has obtained his liberty by procuring bail, yields himself up again into custody, in order that the bail may be discharged from their obligation and UabUity, he is said to render himself in discharge of his bail. 1 Arch. Pract. 873. ^ RENOUNCING PROBATE. Refusing to take upon oneself the office of executor or executrix. Refusing to take out pro- bate under a will wherein one has been appointed executor or executrix. RENT (reddiius). Defined to be an annual return made by the tenant to the landlord, either in labor, money, or pro- visions, in consideration of the lands or tenements which such tenant holds of his landlord; from which it follows, that though rent must be a profit, yet there is no occasion that it should consist of money. There are three principal kinds of rents, viz., rent-service, rent-charge, and rent-seek. Rent-service consisted of fealty and a certain rent, and this was the only kind of rent originaUy known to the Common Law ; it was called rent- service, because it was given as a compen- sation for the services to which the land was originally liable. When a rent was granted out of lands by deed, the grantee had not power to distrain for it, because there was no fealty annexed to such grant. To remedy this inconvenience an express power of distress was commonly inserted in the grant. Rent-seek, or barren-rent, is nothing more than a rent for the re- covery of which no power of distress is given either by the rules of the Common Law or the agreement of the parties. This third variety of rent arises where a landlord grants away his rent without at the same time granting his reversion to which that rent was incident. But by fltat. 4 Geo. 3, c. 38, a power of distress Rent. — ( OonUrmed.) has been made incident both to rents- charge and to rents-seek. There are the following other minor varieties of rent, viz: — (4.) Quit Rbnts, see that title; (5.) Gkound Rents, see that title ; (6.) Feb Fakm Rents, «ee that title; and (7.) Rents of Assize, see that title. RENTAL (said to be corrupted from rent-roll). A roU on which the rents of a manor, or other estate are registered or set down, and by which the landlord's bailiS collects the same. It contains the lands and tenements let to each tenant, the names of the tenants, and other par- ticulars connected therewith. Cunning- ham. RENT-ROLL : See title Rental. RENTS OP ASSIZE (redditm asdsos). The certain and determined rents of the freeholders and ancient copyholders of manors are called rents of assize, appar- ently because they were assized or made certain, and so distinguished from reddiUM motnUs, which was a variable or fluctuat- ing rent. 3 Cruise, 314-. REPARATIONE FACIENDA. A writ which lay in various cases ; as if, for in- stance, there were three tenants in com- mon, joint tenants, or pro indiviso, of a mill or house which had fallen into decay, and one of the three was willing to re- pair it, and the other two not ; in such case the party who was willing to repair it might have this writ against the other two. Reg. Orig. 153; Cowel. REPLEADER. To plead again. When, after issue has been joined in an action and a verdict given thereon, the pleading is found (on examination) to have mis- ca,rried, and failed to effect its proper object, viz., of raising an apt and material question between the parties, the Court 'win, on motion of the unsuccessful party, award a repleader, that is, will order the parties to plead ystamders or of persons present in the Court, to be joined to the other jurors to try the cause, who, how- ever, are liable to the same challenges as the principal jurors. This is usually done tattes quaties till the legal number of twelve is completed. 1 Inst. 155. TALITER PEOCESSUM EST. When pleading the judgment of an inferior Court the proceedings preliminary to such judgment, and on which the same was founded, must, to some extent, appear in the pleading ; but the rule is that they may be alleged with a taliter processum est, i. «., with a general assertion that "such proceedings were had," instead of a de- tailed account of the proceedings them- selves; thus, "that A. B. at a certain Court, &c., held at, &c., levied his plaint against C. D. in a certain plea of, &c., for a cause of action arising within the juris- diction, and thereupon such proceedings were had that afterward, &c., it was considered by the said Court that A. B. Taliter Frocessnm Est. — {Oontimied.) should recover against the said C. D." (1 Wms. Saund. 113, 113; Steph. PI. 369, 5th ed.) A like concise mode of stating former proceedings in a suit is adopted at the present day in Chancery proceed- ings upon Petitions and in BUls of Re- vivor and Supplement. See Pemberton on that subject. TALLAGE. This word is said to be used metaphorically for a share of a man's substance, paid by way of tribute, toU or tax ; being derived from the French tail- ler, which signifies a piece cut out of the whole. Cowel. See title Taxation. * TAEDE VENIT. A return to a writ when it came into the sheriff's hands too late to be executed. TAXATION. In early Anglo-Norman times, taxation was twofold : (1.) Taxes upon land, and being either (a.) On military tenants; or (&.) On socage; tenants, thereof; and (3.) Taxes upon persons other than landowners, being the taxes com- monly called tallages. The taxes of the first class were noth- ing more than the incidents of tenure, viz., aids, reliefs, wardships, marriages, escheats, and the like, the amounts of which were regulated by Magna Charta, 1215. The taxes of the second class were granted by the Commons in Parliament ; and it is regarding these latter' taxes that most of the statutes protecting the sub- jects' property against illegal taxation have been made, chief amongst which is the Statutum de Tallagio non Goneedmdo (35 Edw. 1). But the king also derived a large revenue from his hereditary 'do- mains. In later times fresh sources of revenue were opened up, namely : (1.) The custuma antiqua sive magna, being customs granted for the first time in 35 Edw. 1, and fall- ing upon wool, woolfels, and leather, exported and imported ; (3.) The embrniM nova sme pan-va, being customs granted for the first time in 31 Edw. 1, and falling upon merchant strangers exclusively, and being in addition to their assessment under the c^Mit^ma ain- tigua sii)e magna ; (3.) Butlerage, being a charge of 2». on every ton of wine imported by merchant strangers ; and 350 TAXING COSTS. — TELLERS IN PAELLiMENT. Taxation. — ( Omtinued.) (4.) Prisage, being a charge of 20s. for one t