(Jnntpll Ham ^rljnnl Uibrary 
 
Cornell University Library 
 
 KF 2346.A3 1922 
 
 Freight rates and charges.Laws, rules an 
 
 3 1924 018 725 626 
 
^^1 
 
 Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of this book is in 
 the Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924018725626 
 
l0M.MMMMMMMMMIUIfUIIUIMfUIMMfUtlUI«U«UIUIMfU«MMMMMMIUIMMMMa^MM.Ci 
 
 The book which you have been seeking 
 
 ^^ Limitation of Common Carrier^s Liability^ ^ 
 
 Laws governing the filing and settlement of 
 
 Claims against common carriers 
 
 for 
 
 Loss, damage, injury and delay 
 
 to 
 
 Property transported in interstate and foreign commerce 
 
 Covers all questions involving CLAIMS BETWEEN SHIPPERS AND CARRIERS, including status 
 of carriers' liability, and validity of limited-liability clauses in bills of lading under Section 20 of the 
 Interstate Commerce Act, as developed by the 'Carmack Aniendment," and the first and second 
 Cummins Amendments. ' ' TAe purpose of the work is to state the present law governing every proposition 
 involving carriers' liability in a manner that is readily understandable in its application to everyday problems. 
 
 All legal works heretofore published on the subject of the rights and liabilities of 
 shippers and carriers have been rendered obsolete by the interpretation and construe- 
 tion of Section 20 of the Interstate Commerce Act by the United States Supreme Court. 
 
 425 pages, size 7X ■*■ !0)i inches 
 
 Bound in lanxj buckram 
 
 The only up-to-date, complete and authoritative work on 
 this very important and much-misunderstood subjecL 
 
 Affects every shipper and carrier in the United States, whether largeorsmali. 
 Treats fully the many leading decisions of the United States Supreme 
 Court, governing this subject, including the following controlling cases: 
 McCaull-Dinsmore Co., Primrose, Lockwood, Hart, Piper, Riverside Mills, 
 Croninger, Dettlebach, Prescott, Starbird, Olivit Bros. , Carl, Harriman Bros. , 
 Blish Milling Co. , Burke, Pierce Co. , Rankin, Robinson, Ward, Leatherwood, 
 Cramer, Sealy, Neiman-Marcus Co., Hooker, Reid, Collins Produce Co., etc. 
 
 A few of the important subjects treated; 
 
 Common-law liability as modified by statute~'Extent of liability of initial, connecting and term- 
 inal carriers — Limited-liability clauses governing transportation of live stock and perishable 
 traffic — Vessel owner's liabilities in foreign commerce — Rates dependent upon declared or 
 released valuation — Liability of carriers for full actual loss, damage, or injury regardless of 
 limited-liability contract — Validity of limited-liability provisions in contracts of shipment, 
 classifications and tariffs — Time forgiving notice of and filng of claims with carriers, and 
 institution of suits — Elements and measure of recovery — "When invoice price or market price 
 controls — Interest — Refund of freight charges — Exemption of carrier from liability for act of 
 God, public enemy, negligence of shipper, public authority, inherent vice or nature of goods 
 — Liability as warehouseman — Export and import traffic — Forms of domestic and export bills of 
 lading — "Shipper's weight , load and count" — Court proceedings — Jurisdiction of Interstate Com- 
 merce Commission — "Carmack Amendment" — "Cummins Amendments" — "Harter Act," etc. 
 
 Complete Table of Contents mailed free upon request. 
 
 The Federal power under Section 20 of the Act is exclusive and supreme and supersedes all State regulations 
 upon the same subject. Therefore, each case mast be considered upon its merits and the importance of 
 ascertaining the exclusi ve holding of the United States Courts upon the particular proposition of law is apparent. 
 
 This work is an absolute necessity in the proper settlement of claims against railroads, express 
 companies, steamship lines and other common carriers, and is of exceedingly great value to business execu- 
 tives, chambers of commerce, railroad officials, claim agents, lawyers, bankers, traffic managers, shipping clerks, etc. 
 
 The work contains a comprehensive ANALYSIS, a lucid and authoritative SUBJECT MATTER with 
 copious notes and over 1500 authority citations, a detailed INDEIX, and a complete TABLE OF CASEIS. 
 Contains complet e explanation of abbreviations and terms, with key to citation reports and glossary. 
 
 The work is printed on the highest quality of paper, and the style of printing used provides maximum legibility, being clear, 
 large type. For differentiation purposes the Analysis is printed on pink paper, the Subject-Matter on luAife paper, the Index 
 on zreen paper, and the Table of Cases oayello'w paper. The original and unique construction and color scheme of the work 
 afford maximum accessibility. 
 
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 per copy, delivered, or at any book dealer. Sent on five days' approval. 
 Descriptive literature mailed free upon request. 
 
 Price $7.50 
 
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Price. $7.50. delivered 
 
 640^^7 
 
 COPYEIGHT, 1921, 1922 
 
 BY 
 
 TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE CORPORATION 
 
 CHICAGO 
 
 ARRANGEMENT OF PAGES. 
 
 First: Analysis. Pink Pages. 
 
 Second: Subject-Matter. White Pages. 
 
 Ttiird: Index. Green Pages. 
 
 Fourth: Table of Cases Yellow Pages. 
 
This work is dedicated 
 to % Metaax^ of Hy iw^aa^ii lro%r, 
 
 3uhmtk (^mv^t lartt^a. IG. 21. 1. 
 
 whose sterling character, kind and lovable disposition, 
 and sincerity as a friend endeared him to all with whom 
 he came in contact. His preparation for life prepared 
 him for an untimely death. The inscription of this work 
 is but a slight memorial of the author's affection for a 
 beloved brother, whose exemplary life has ever been an 
 inspiration to him in his work. "Quos virtue coniungit, 
 'mors non potest dividere." 
 
PREFACE 
 
 "FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES" treats of the law^, rules and regulations govern- 
 ing the construction, operation and developmeat of railroad freight rates and charges in their 
 application to interstate and foreign commerce. It covers all questions involving the legal status 
 of different kinds of rates and their usage, the establishment of rates, changes in rates, quota- 
 tion of rates, assessment of rates, payment for transportation, factors and elements in rate- 
 making, justness and reasonableness of rates, cjmparison of rates, advances and reductions in 
 rates, maintenance of rates, investigation and suspension of new rates, jurisdiction of Inter- 
 state Commerce Commission, and many other kindred subjects of vital interest. 
 
 The purpose of the work is to state the present law governing every proposition involv- 
 ing freight rates and charges in a manner that is readily understandable in its application to 
 everyday problems. Toward the accomplishment of this object, great care has been exercised in 
 the production of a comprehensive Analysis, a lucid and authoritative Subject-Matter with 
 copious notes and complete citation of cases, a detailed Index, and a complete Table of Cases. 
 
 The original unique and color scheme of the work afford maximum accessibility. For dif- 
 ferentiation purposes, the Analysis is printed on pink paper, the Subject-Matter on white 
 paper, the Index on green paper, and the Table of Cases on yellow paper. 
 
 The freight rate is the most potent factor in interstate and foreign commerce, and the 
 principles governing it constitute one of the most complex subjects in American jurisprudence. 
 In the production of the manuscript of this book, the most extensive and profound research 
 work was necessitated by reason of the fact that the evolution of the subject during recent 
 years has resulted in a state of chaos. The Transportation Act of February 28, 1920, effected 
 quite a number of revolutionary changes. 
 
 A critical examination of this work will disclose the fact that it is more than a digest of 
 decisions, as especial care has been taken to state the current law on every proposition in an 
 elucidative and orderly manner, together with full citation of authorities, thus making instantly 
 available the principles of law which govern and control this all-important subject. 
 
 The work analyzes each ease from its inception before the Interstate Commerce Commis- 
 sion, or trial court, to its disposition by the United States Supreme Court, or other appellate 
 authority. All statutory provisions governing the subject are fully treated of throughout the 
 work. 
 
 One of the most important decisions of the United States Supreme Court, construing the 
 Transportation Act of February 28, 1920, is that of Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chi- 
 cago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (Decided February 27, 1922), involving the power of the Interstate 
 Commerce Commission, in order to remove a discrimination against interstate commerce in- 
 volved in a general disparity between interstate and intrastate passenger rates of interstate 
 carriers, to raise the intrastate rates to correspond with the interstate rates. The following 
 elucidative statement by Mr. Chief Justice Taft in the above case clearly shows that in the 
 Transportation Act of 1920 Congress by legislative fiat conferred power upon the Interstate 
 Commerce Commission to deal directly with intrastate rates where they are unduly discrim- 
 inating against interstate commerce — a power theretofore indirectly exercised as to persons 
 and localities by virtue of judicial interpretation of Section 2 of the Act to Regulate Commerce 
 in the Shreveport and other cases: 
 
 "The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 24 St. 379, was enacted by Congress to prevent 
 interstate railroad carriers from charging unreasonable rates and from unjustly discriminating 
 between persons and localities. The railroads availed themselves of the weakness and cumberous 
 
.machinery of the original law to defeat its purpose, and this led to various amendments culmin- 
 ating in the amending Act of 1910, 36 St. L. 539, in which the authority of the Commission in 
 dealing with the carriers was made sumjaary and effectively complete. Wliatever the causes, the 
 fact was that the carrying capacity of the railroads did not thereafter develop proportionately 
 with the growth of the country, and it became difficult for them to secure additional investment 
 of capital on feasible terms. When the extraordinary demand for transportation arose in 1917, 
 the Congress and the President concluded to take over all the railroads into the management of 
 the Federal Government, and by joint use of facilities, which the Anti Trust Law was thought 
 to forbid under private management and by use of Government credit, to increase their effect- 
 iveness. This was done by appropriate legislation and executive action under the war power. 
 From January 1, 1918, until March 1, 1920, when the Transportation Act went into effect, the 
 common carriers by steam railroad of the country were operated by the Federal Government. 
 Due to the rapid rise in the prices of material and labor in 1918 and 1919, the expense of 
 their operation had enormously increased by the time it was proposed to return the railroads 
 to their owners. The owners insisted that their properties could not be turned back to them by 
 the Government for useful operation without provision to aid them to meet a situation in which 
 they were likely to face a demoralizing lack of credit and income. Congress acquiesced in this 
 view. The Transportation Act of 1920 was the result. It was adopted after elaborate investiga- 
 tions by the Interstate Commerce Committees of the two Houses. 
 
 ' ' Under Title II it made provision for the termination of federal control March 1, 1920, 
 for the refunding of the carriers' indebtedness to the United States, and for a guaranty for 
 six months to the carriers of an income equal to the war-time rental for their properties, and 
 directed that for two years following the termination of federal control, the Secretary of the 
 Treasury, upon certificate of the Commission might make loans to the carriers not exceeding 
 the niaximum amount recommended in the certificate, out of a revolving fund of $300,000,000. 
 
 "Under Title IV, amendments were made to the Interstate Commerce Act wliich included 
 section 13, paragraph 3 and 4, and section 15a. The former for the first time authorized the 
 Commission to deal directly with intrastate rates where they are unduly discriminating against 
 interstate commerce— a power already indirectly exercised as to persons and localities, with ap- 
 proval of this Court in the Shreveport and other cases. The latter, the most novel and most im- 
 portant feature of the act, requires the Commission so to prescribe rates as to enable the car- 
 riers as a whole or in groups selected by the Commission, to earn an aggregate annual net rail- 
 way operating income equal to a fair return on the aggregate value of the railway property 
 used in transportation. For two years, the return is to be 5^ per cent., with i/4 per cent, for 
 improvements, and thereafter is to be fixed by the Commission. 
 
 "The act sought to avoid excessive incomes accruing, under the operation of section 15a, 
 to the carriers better circumstanced by using the excess for loans to the others and for other 
 purposes. The act further put under the control of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 1st, 
 the issuing of future railroad securities by the interstate carriers ; 2nd, the regulation of their 
 ear supply and distribution and the joint use of terminals ; and 3rd, their construction of new 
 lines, and their abandonment of old lines. The validity of some of these provisions has been 
 questioned. Upon that we express no opinion. We only refer to them to show the scope of the 
 congressional purpose in the act. 
 
 "It is manifest from this very condensed recital that the act made a new departure. 
 Theretofore the control which Congress through the Interstate Commerce Commission exercised 
 •was primarily for the purpose of preventing injustice iy unreasonable or discriminatory rates 
 against persons and localities, and the only provisions of the law that inured to the benefit of 
 the carriers were the requirement that the rates should be reasonable in the sense of furnish- 
 ing an adequate compensation for the particular service rendered and the abolition of rebates. 
 The new measure imposed an affirmative duty on the Interstate Commerce Commission to fix 
 
rates and to take other important steps to maintain an adequate railway service for the people 
 of the United States. This is expressly declared in section 15a to he one of the purposes of the 
 hill. 
 
 "Intrastate rates and the income from them must play a most important part in maintain- 
 ing an adequate national railway system. Twenty per cent, of the gross freight receipts of the rail- 
 roads of the country are from intrastate traffic, and fifty per cent, of the passenger receipts. The 
 ratio of the gross intrastate revenue to the interstate revenue is a little less than one to three. 
 
 If the rates, on which such receipts are based, are to be fixed at a substantially lower level than 
 in interstate traffic, the share which the intrastate traffic will contribute will be proportionately 
 less. If the railways are to earn a fixed net percentage of income, the lower the intrastate rates, 
 the higher the interstate rates may have to be. The effective operation of the act will reasonably 
 and justly require that intrastate traffic should pay a fair proportionate share of the cost of 
 maintaining an adequate railway system. Section 15a confers no power on the Commission to 
 deal with intrastate rates. What is done under that section is to be done by the commission 'in 
 the exercise of its powers to prescribe just and reasonable rates', i. e., powers derived from 
 previous amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act, which have never been construed or used 
 to embrace the prescribing of intrastate rates. When we turn to par. 4, section 13, however, 
 and f.nd the Commission for the first time vested with a direct power to remove 'any undue, 
 unreasonahle, or unjust discrimitiation against interstate or foreign commerce', it is impossihle 
 to escape the dovetail relation between that provision and the purpose of section 15a. If that 
 purpose is interferred with hy a disparity of intrastate rates, the Commission is authorized 
 to end the disparity hy directly removing it., because it is plainly an 'undue, unreasonahle, and 
 unjust discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce', within the ordinary meaning of 
 those words. 
 
 "It is said that our conclusion gives the Commission unified control of interstate and iyir- 
 trastate commerce. It is only -unified to the extent of maintaining efficient regulation of inter- 
 state commerce under the paramount power of Congress. It does not involve general regulation 
 of intrastate commerce. Action of the Interstate Commerce Commission in this regard should he 
 directed to substantial disparity which operates as a real discrimination against, and obstruction 
 to, interstate commerce, and must leave appropriate discretion to the state authorities to deal with 
 intrastate rates as between themselves on the general level which the Interstate Commerce Com,- 
 mission has found to he fair to interstate commerce." 
 
 In this work all captions and sub-captions are stated in technical language, and each prop- 
 osition of law should be read with particular reference to the heading. It is also suggested that 
 the authority citations and notes appended to each proposition be thoroughly considei^d, inas- 
 much as they contain valuable explanatory^ statements and guiding information. Liberal use 
 should be made of the Index, Table of Cases and Analysis, and in using the Index its splendid 
 system of cross-indexing should be employed. 
 
 This work is printed verbatim from Chapter 6 of Loose-Leaf TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE, 
 the manuscript of which was produced at a great expenditure of professional time and money. 
 In offering this work to the public in bound form, at a modest price, it is with the desire that 
 the information contained therein may be disseminated as widely as possible in the hope that it 
 may prove of some assistance to the transportation world generally. 
 
 Chicago, April 15, 1922. TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE CORPORATION. 
 
ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS 
 
 KEY TO CITATION REPORTS 
 
 Abb. tl. S Abbott, U. S. Circuit aud District Courts, 1865-71. 
 
 Am. Law Reg American Law Register, (O. S.) Old Series. ( X. S.^ Xew Series. 
 
 App. D. C Appeal Cases, (D. C.) 
 
 Atl Atlantic Reporter. 
 
 Bee Bee, (U. S.) 
 
 Ben Benedict, V. S.) 
 
 Biss Bissell, (U. S.) 
 
 Black Black, (U. -S.) 
 
 Blatchf Blatchford, (U. S.) 
 
 Bond Bond, (U. S.) 
 
 C. C. A United States Circuit Court of Appeals, from 1892. 
 
 Cliff Clifford, (V. S.) 
 
 Conf. Rul. Bui Conference Rulings Bulletin of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
 
 Granch Crancb, (U. S.) 
 
 Ct. CI Court of Claims, (U. S. ) 
 
 Curt Curtis, (U. S.) 
 
 Ball Dallas, (U. S.) 
 
 Deady Deady, (tJ. S.) 
 
 Fed. Cas Federal Cases, (U. S. ) 
 
 Fed. Rep Federal Reporter, I'nited States Circuit and District Courts from 1S.80 and 
 
 all of the Circuit Courts of Appeals from their organization. 
 
 Flip FUppin, (TJ. S.) 
 
 Holmes Holmes, (U. S.) 
 
 How Howard, (U. S. ) 
 
 Hughes Hughes, ( U. S. ) 
 
 I. C. C. Rep Interstate Commerce Commission Reports. 
 
 I. C. Rep Interstate Commerce Reports. 
 
 In. Rev. Rec. Internal Revenue Record, Xew York, from iscr,. 
 
 Johns., (N.Y.) .Johnson. Xew York Supreme C«urt, etc., 1806-23. 
 
 L. Ed United States Supreme Court Reports. Lawyers' Edition. 
 
 L. R. A Lawyers' Reports, Annotated. 
 
 Mason Mason, (U. S.) ' 
 
 McAll McAllister. ( U. S. ) 
 
 McLean McLean, (U. S. ) 
 
 N. C. C. A Negligence and Corporation Cases Annotated. 
 
 Newb. Adm Newberry, U. S. District Courts in Admiralty, 1842 57. 
 
 N. B Northeastern Reporter. 
 
 N. W Northwestern Reporter. 
 
 N. Y. Leg. Obs The New York Legal Observer, 1S42-.54. 
 
 N. Y. Supp * New York Supplement Reporter. 
 
 Olcott Olcott, (U. S.) 
 
 Otto Otto, (U. S.) 
 
 Pac Pacific Reporter. 
 
 Raine Paine, (U. S. ) 
 
 Pet Peters, (U. S.) 
 
 S'awy Sawyer, (U. S. ) 
 
 S. E Southeastern Reporter. 
 
 Sou Southern Reporter. 
 
 S. W Southwestern Reporter. 
 
 Story Story, (U. S.) 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep United States Supreme Court Reporter. 
 
 Tar. Cir Tariff Circular of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
 
 U. S United States Supreme Court, from 1791. So cited from 1875. See Dall., 
 
 Cranch, Wheat.. Pet, Black, Wall, and Otto. 
 
 U. S. App United States Appeals. 
 
 U. S. C. C United States Circuit Court. 
 
 U. S. C. C. A United States Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 
 U. S. D. C United States District Court. 
 
 Wall, Jr Wallace, Junior, (U. S.) 
 
 Wall, Sr Wallace, Senior, (U. S.) 
 
 Ware Ware, (U. S. ) 
 
 Wheat Wheaton, (U. S.) 
 
 Woods Woods, (U. S.) 
 
 (GLOSSARY 
 
 Ab initio From the beginning. 
 
 Ad valorem According to the value, e. ff.. a dut.v or tax. 
 
 A fortiori By so much the stronger ; all the more. 
 
 Aliunde From elsewhere, from another source, e. </.. proof aliunde. 
 
 Amicus curiae .\ friend of the court. One who, for the assistance of the court, gives infor- 
 mation of some matter of law in regard to which the court is doubtful 
 or mistaken. This is usually done by filling a brief in the cause. 
 
 Ante Before. This word refers to a previous part of the work outside of the se('- 
 
 tion in which it occurs. 
 
 A posteriori See "Argument." 
 
 A priori .See "Argument." 
 
 Argument .\rgument is divided into (a) a priori, from the antecedent or cause to the 
 
 generally understood consequent or effect; and so in ordinary parlance 
 a priori means "at first sight;" (h) <i posteriori, from the couswiuent or 
 effect to the antecedent, or cause. 
 
Bona fide In good faith ; honestly ; Avithout fraud or unfair dealing. 
 
 Causa proxima, non remota 
 spectatur The immediate, not the remote cause is to be regarded. 
 
 Certiorari To be more fully informed. An original writ or action whereby a cause is 
 
 removed from an inferior to a superior court for trial. The record of 
 the proceedings is then transmitted to the Superior Court. 
 
 Contra Against ; contrary to. 
 
 De minimis non curat lex The law takes no account of trifles. 
 
 De novo Anew ; afresh. 
 
 Dictum Or obiter dictum. The expression by a judge of an opinion on a point of law 
 
 arising during the hearing of a case, which, however, is not necessary 
 for the decision of that case. A dictum is not, therefore, binding on 
 other judges. 
 
 Eo nomine By that name ; of itself. 
 
 Et. al Et alius; and others. This term appearing as a suffix to the name of the 
 
 plaintiff or defendant in a case signifies that there are other parties to 
 the suit not appearing in the style of same. 
 
 Et. seq B* segueter; refers to consecutive numbers immediately following. 
 
 Ex contractu Actions ex contrnctii ; those which arise out of contract. 
 
 Ex delicto Actions ex delicto, those which arise out of the tort or default of the de- 
 fendant. 
 
 Ex gratia As a matter of fator. 
 
 Ex officio By virtue of his office. 
 
 Ex parte Of the one part. An action is ex parte when it is not an adverse proceed- 
 ing against any one else. 
 
 Ex post facto Made after the occurrence ; e. g., legislation which has, or would have if 
 
 passed, a retrospective application. 
 
 Ex. rel Ex relatione : on the relation or information. 
 
 Haec verba In the exact -language ; word for word ; verbatim. 
 
 Ibid Ibidem; the same ; e. g., the same volume, case or citation immediately 
 
 preceding. 
 
 Ignorantia juris, quod quis- 
 que scire tenetur, non ex- 
 cusat Ignorance of the law, of which everyone is presumed' to know, excuses not. 
 
 Infra Below. This work refers to subsequent matter in the same section. 
 
 In limine At the outset. 
 
 In loco parentis In place of a "parent. 
 
 In re In the matter of ; used in entitling matters in court other than actions be- 
 
 , tween adverse parties. 
 
 In rem Against the thing ; actions in rem are against a thing as distinguished from 
 
 actions in personam (against a person). 
 
 Inter alia Among other things. 
 
 Inter partes Between the parties. 
 
 Inter sese Among themselves. 
 
 In toto In the whole ; altogether. 
 
 In transitu In transit, or removal from one place to another. 
 
 Ipsissimis verbis In the identical words — as opposed to substantially. 
 
 Ipso facto By the very act itself, i. e., as the necessary consequence of the act. 
 
 Mutatis-mutandis Means, "with the necessary changes in points of detail." 
 
 Nunc pro tunc A proceeding taken, judgment declared, etc., now for then. Where a pro- 
 ceeding, etc., has been delayed by the action of the court or Commis- 
 sion, or any like ground, the tribunal may allow it to be dated as if it 
 had taken place or been delivered on the earliest date. 
 
 Obiter dictum A saying by the way. An opinion of a judge, not necessary to the judgment 
 
 given of record, and consequently of less authority. 
 
 Onu§ probandi Burden of proof. 
 
 Pari materia In the same matter ; on the same subject. 
 
 Particeps criminis ' . . A partner in crime. 
 
 Pendente lite While the suit is pending. 
 
 Per contra On the other hand. 
 
 Per curiam By the court. 
 
 Per diem By the day. 
 
 Per se By itself ; in and of itself. 
 
 Post After. This word refers to a subsequent part of the work outside of the 
 
 section in which it occurs. 
 
 Pro rata In proportion. 
 
 Pro tanto For so much ; to that extent. 
 
 Quaere Inquire ; meaning that the question or proposition, to which the word is 
 
 appended, is a doubtful one. 
 
 Quantum meruit As much as he has earned. A form of action brought by one party to a 
 
 contract against the other, not founded on the contract itself, but on an 
 implied promise to pay for so much as the party suing has done. It 
 one party refuses to perform his part, the other may rescind and sue 
 on a quantum meruit. 
 
 Res A thing, or things. 
 
 Res ipsa loquitur A phrase often used in actions for injury by negligence where no proof of 
 
 negligence is required beyond the accident itself, which is such as neces- 
 sarily to involve negligence. 
 
 Res judicata A point already judicially decided ; it is conclusive until the judgment is 
 
 reversed. • 
 
 Sub silentio In silence. 
 
 Sul juris Of his own right. A person who is neither a minor nor insane, nor subject 
 
 to any other disability, is said to be sui juris, i. e., able to make contracts 
 and act in his own right. 
 
 Status quo The existing state of things at any given date. To leave in statu quo, is to 
 
 leave unaltered. 
 
 Supra Above. This word refers to preceding matter in the same section. 
 
 Ultra vires Beyond their powers. 
 
 Via fiy way of. 
 
 Vis major Irresistible force ; inevitable accident. 
 
CHAPTER 6. 
 (Sections 600-699.) 
 
 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES. 
 
 ANALYSIS. 
 
 SECTION SYNOPSIS OF SUBJECT-MATTEB. 
 
 600. Different kinds of freight rates defined and their usage. 
 
 A. Local bates. 
 
 B. Joint bates. 
 
 C. Thbough bates. 
 
 D. Pbopobtional bates. 
 
 E. Abbithabies. 
 
 F. Differentials. 
 Gr. Class bates. 
 
 H. Commodity bates. 
 
 I. Rates fob mixed shipments. 
 
 J. Rail-and-water bates. 
 
 ■ K. " Papee ' ' bates. 
 
 L. "Missionary" bates. 
 
 601. Joint rates. 
 
 A. A joint bate is a matteb of ageeement between con- 
 
 necting CABBIEBS. 
 
 B. Joint thbough bates to and fbom Fobto Rican ports. 
 
 C. A CABBIEB MAY NOT DENY THE BENEFIT OF A JOINT BATE TO 
 
 MANUFACTUBEES on connecting lines in OEDEB TO 
 FOSTEE INDXJSTBIES ON ITS OWN LINE. 
 
 D. PaBTIES who ABE NOT COMPETENT IN LAW TO ESTABLISH 
 
 JOINT RATES FOR INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION. 
 
 E. A JOINT RATE ESTABLISHED VIA ONE ROUTE IS NOT APPLICABLE 
 
 TO PROPERTY TRANSPORTED VIA ANOTHER ROUTE. 
 
 F. Legal status of a joint through rate that exceeds the 
 
 AGGREGATE OF INTERMEDIATE RATES. 
 
 G. Legal status of a joint rate that is lower than the 
 
 COMBINATION OF LOCAL RATES. 
 
 H. Legal status of tariff cabbying a joint bate which does 
 
 NOT NAME A JUNCTION POINT. 
 I. A JOINT BATE SHOULD NOT BE CANCELLED BECAUSE OF THE 
 
 FAILUBE OF INTEEESTED CABBIEBS TO AGEEE UPON DIVISIONS 
 
 THEBEOF. 
 J. A COMBINATION BATE MAY NOT BE APPLIED UNTIL A JOINT 
 
 THBOUGH BATE IS CANCELLED. 
 
 K. Duty of cabbiees to establish joint thbough bates. 
 
Chap. 6, Anal.] traffic law service 2 
 
 L. Right of carrier to demand indemnity before con- 
 curring IN the establishment of a joint through 
 
 KATE. 
 
 M. Unreasonableness op a joint through rate that ex- 
 ceeds THE combination OF A LOCAL RATE AND AN UNDE- 
 FINED PROPORTIONAL RATE. 
 
 N. Joint rates to and from foreign countries. 
 
 0. Limitation on application of joint rate. 
 
 P. . Participation merely in joint rates does not make con- 
 necting carriers partners so as to make them jointly 
 and severally responsible for unjust discrimination. 
 
 602. Through rates. 
 
 A. Only one legal rate can exist between any two points 
 
 AT ANY GIVEN TIME. 
 
 B. The legal rate applicable to an interstate shipment is 
 
 THE PUBLISHED THROUGH RATE IN EFFECT AT THE TIME 
 THE SHIPMENT IS RECEIVED BY THE CARRIER FOR TRANS- 
 PORTATION AND OVER THE ROUTE WHICH IT IS TO MOVE. 
 
 C. Carriers may specify basing points or factors for con- 
 
 structing COMBINATION RATE. 
 
 D. EaTE to apply in the absence of a JOINT BATE OR A SPE- 
 
 CIFIC METHOD OF CONSTRUCTING THROUGH RATE. 
 
 E. Right of a shipper to consign interstate traffic to an 
 
 INTERMEDIATE POINT, ASSUME CUSTODY OF THE SHIPMENT, 
 EITHER ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE, AND THEN REBILL THE 
 SAME TO DESTINATION, WHERE THE JOINT THROUGH INTER- 
 STATE RATE IS HIGHER THAN THE AGGREGATE OF THE IN- 
 TERMEDIATE RATES. 
 
 F. Com:bination of joint rate to common point and local 
 
 RATE BEYOND. 
 
 Gr. Rates that are not on file with the Interstate Com- 
 merce Commission are not lawful factors in con- 
 structing THROUGH INTERSTATE RATES. 
 
 H. TnTER-CLASSIFICATION TERRITORIES RATES AND INTER-RATE 
 TERRITORIES RATES. 
 
 1. A SHIPPER IS NOT CONCERNED WITH THE DIVISIONS OF A 
 
 THROUGH RATE. 
 J. A THROUGH ROUTE MAY NOT BE DIVIDED INTO DIVISIONS FOR 
 
 RATE-MAKING PURPOSES. 
 
 K. Commodity rates should be stated through from point 
 
 OF ORIGIN TO DESTINATION. 
 
 L. Reasonableness of through rate composed of aggregate 
 
 OF INTERMEDIATE RATES. 
 
 M. Rates between points in the United States and adja- 
 cent FOREIGN COUNTRIES. 
 
 N. Legal status of a joint through rate that exceeds the 
 
 aggregate of intermediate rates. 
 0. Right of shipper to use any through route available 
 
 under the tariff rates. 
 
 603. Establishment of freight rates. 
 
 A. Duty of carriers to initiate rates. 
 
 B. When an interstate freight rate is established. 
 
3 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [Chap. 6, Anal. 
 
 C. The shipper has a contract right in the published rate. 
 
 D. Rates are not nullified by the failure of the carriers 
 
 TO AGREE UPON THE DIVISIONS THEREOF. 
 
 E. Presumption that carrier acted in good faith in in- 
 
 itiating BATES. 
 
 F. "Paper" RATES. 
 
 G. Rules for disposition of fractions in publication of 
 
 RATES. 
 
 H. Effective date of new rates and subsequent adjust- 
 ments under Increased Rates, 1920, covered by Ex 
 Parte 74. 
 
 I. Status of pre-war intrastate rates after termination 
 OF Federal control. 
 
 604. Changes in freight rates by carriers. 
 
 A. Right of the carrier to change its rates. 
 
 B. No PRESUMPTION OF WRONG ARISES FROM A CHANGE IN RATES 
 
 BY THE CARRIER. 
 
 C. Rates in effect on February 29, 1920, to continue in 
 
 EFFECT UNTIL CHANGED BY GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY. 
 
 D. Reductions in rates until September 1, 1920, forbidden-, 
 
 UNLESS APPROVED BY INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. 
 
 605. Quotation of freight rates by carriers to shippers. 
 
 A. Duty of carriers to quote rates to shippers. 
 
 B. Quotation on shipper's application of rate for sailing, 
 
 and other accruing charges. 
 
 C. Misquotation of bate by agent does not afford lawful 
 
 charge. 
 
 D. Commission's rates treated as embodied in statute. 
 
 606. Assessment of freight rates. 
 
 A. Collection of established bate on shipment recalled 
 
 BY THE shipper. 
 
 B. Outbound charges on a shipment may not be refunded 
 
 BY THE CARRIER AND CHARGED BACK AGAINST THE CONt 
 SIGNOR. 
 
 C. Two SMALL CARS FURNISHED BY CARRIER IN LIEU OF A LARGER 
 
 CAR ORDERED BY THE SHIPPER. 
 
 D. Rates chargeable on a larger car furnished for the 
 
 CONVENIENCE OF THE INITIAL CARRIER UNDER TARIFF AU- 
 THORITY FOR APPLYING THE MINIMUM WEIGHT APPLICABLE 
 ON THE SMALLE& CAR ORDERED BY THE SHIPPER, WHERE 
 THE CONNECTING LINE DOES NOT PUBLISH SUCH A TARIFF 
 PROVISION. 
 
 E. Rates applicable on gasoline motor cars moving under 
 
 THEIR OWN POWER OVER CARRIER'S RAILS. 
 
 F. Charges to apply on a prepaid shipment that is stopped 
 
 AND DELIVERED AT AN INTERMEDIATE POINT. 
 
 Gt. Interstate freight bates must apply according to the 
 
 MOVEMENT OF THE TRAFFIC. 
 
 H. Only one legal rate can exist between any two points 
 
 AT ANY GIVEN TIME. 
 
Cliap^6, Anal.] traffic law service 4 
 
 I. The legal, rate applicable to an interstate shipment is 
 
 THE PUBLISHED THROUGH RATE IN EFFECT AT THE TIME 
 THE SHIPMENT IS RECEIVED BY THE CARRIER FOR TRANSPOR- 
 TATION AND OVER THE ROUTE WHICH IT IS TO MOVE. 
 J. EaTES APPLICABLE ON SHIPMENTS TO CoLON, PaNAMA. 
 
 K. Right of shipper with reference to the manner of ship- 
 ping A COMMODITY. 
 
 L. Conflicting rates in published tariff. 
 
 M. Rates applicable on materials for repair of cars on 
 
 foreign lines. 
 N. Special rate on shipments in foreign cars. 
 
 0. Rates on consolidated carloads of less-than-carload 
 
 SHIPMENTS. 
 P. In the ASSESSMENT OF FREIGHT RATES THE TRUE CHARACTER 
 
 OF THE COMMODITY CONTROLS. 
 
 Q. Rate to govern transportation service ^that has been 
 
 teENDERED FOR WHICH THERE IS NO TARIFF AUTHORITY. 
 
 R. Duty of shipper to observe tariff provisions. 
 
 607. Payment for transportation. 
 
 608. Factors and elements in rate-making. 
 
 A. Value of service to the shipper. 
 
 B. ^ Cost of service to the carrier. 
 
 C. Value of service versus cost op service. 
 
 D. Charging "what the traffic will bear." 
 
 E. Value of commodity. 
 
 F. Risk. 
 
 Gr. Volume of traffic. 
 
 H. Weight and bulk of article. 
 
 1. Locomotive on own wheels under power. 
 J. Distance. 
 
 K. Competition. 
 
 L. Relations of the carriers and the public. 
 
 ' M. Cost of production to the manufacturer. 
 
 N. Investment in a commercial enterprise relying upon a 
 
 CERTAIN RATE ADJUSTMENT. 
 0. A CARRIER HAS NO RIGHT TO MAINTAIN A RATE ADJUSTMENT 
 
 IN ORDER TO PRESERVE A COMMERCIAL PROFIT TO THE 
 MANUFACTURER. 
 
 P. Adjustment of rates to induce movement of traffic. 
 
 Q. The right of a railroad company to fix its rates. 
 
 R. Right of carrier to share in general prosperity of the 
 
 COUNTRY. 
 
 S. Services in the delivery and receipt of traffic at 
 
 TERMINALS. 
 T. Low RATES TO TAKE CARE OP EMPTY CAR MOVEMENT. 
 
 U. Import duties. 
 
 V. Maps officially published by railroad companies con- 
 trolling AS to tariffs. 
 
 W. Rates of water carriers. 
 
 X. Aggregate value of the railway property op the car- 
 rier HELD FOR and USED IN THE SERVICE OF TRANSPORTA- 
 TION, 
 
 Y- Rates on damaged, second hand, and used articles. 
 
5 FREIGHT KATES AND CHABGES [Chap. 6, Anal. 
 
 609. Reasonableness of freight rates. 
 
 A. Reasonableness of bates geneeally. 
 
 B. Rates and debates. 
 
 C. Mandate of statute that teanspoetation chaeges be 
 
 just and eeasonable. 
 
 D. Meaning of the teems * ' just ' ' and ' ' eeasonable. ' ' 
 
 E. Question of ebasonableness of bate one of fact. 
 
 F. Just and seasonable teanspobtation begulations and 
 
 PEACTICES EEQUIEED TO BE ESTABLISHED BY CABBIEBS. 
 
 G. Enfoecement bF bules and eeguijAtions not shown in 
 
 PUBLISHED TAEIFFS AS AFFECTING THE EBASONABLENESS OF 
 THE BATE. 
 
 H. FeEIGHT bates to be ON A BASIS THAT WILL YIELD AN AGGEB- 
 
 GATE ANNUAL NET OPERATING INCOME EQUAL, AS NEABLY AS 
 MAY BE, TO A FAIB EETUBN UPON THE AGGBEGATE VALUE 
 OF THE BAILWAY PBOPERTY OF THE CABEIEE HELD FOB AND 
 USED IN THE SEEVICE OF TEANSPOBTATION. 
 
 I. A BATE, EEASONABLE per SG, MAY BE UNLAWFUL ON OTHER 
 
 GROUNDS. 
 
 J. The REASONABLE BATE AND COST OF SEEVIOE. 
 
 K. Comparison of freight rates. 
 
 L. The public is not the geneeal managee op eaileoads re- 
 specting THEIE bates. 
 
 M. Low rates foe low-gbade tbaffic. 
 
 N. Low bates foe caeeiage of long-haul tbaffic. 
 
 0. Rates established by conceet of action between the 
 caebiebs. 
 
 p. Rate-pee-ton-pee-mile test of eeasonableness. 
 
 Q. AVBEAGE RATE PER TON ON ALL FEEIGHT. 
 
 R. CaRRIEES serving undeveloped TERRITORY ENTITLED TO 
 
 HIGHER BATES THAN OEDINAEILY. 
 
 S. Rates established to develop a paeticulae industby. 
 
 T. Tonnage shipped by a paeticulae firm. 
 
 U. Rates fixed according to the usage of the commodity, 
 OR "business motive" of the shipper aee unreason- 
 able and unlawful. 
 
 V. Agbeement between caeeiee and municipality fob main- 
 tenance OF GIVEN RATE IN CONSIDERATION OF GEANT OF 
 CEETAIN PBIVILEGBS to GABBIER BY CITY, NOT BINDING ON 
 
 Commission. 
 
 w. a careiee may not eestbict tbaffic to movement be- 
 tween points on its own lines. 
 
 X. Effect of widespeead bate adjustment. 
 
 Y. Establishment of low bates by a caeeiee to test the 
 
 TBAFFIC situation. 
 
 Z. Equalizing bates of diffebent caeeiees. 
 AA. Rates via ciecuitous boutes. 
 BB. The eight of a caeeiee to besbbve to itself the long 
 
 HAUL IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A THEOUGH ROUTE. 
 CC. HiGHEE BATE OVEB BOUTE COMPOSED OF TWO OR MORE CAB- 
 
 BIEBS THAN OVEB A SINGLE LINE. 
 
 DD. Reasonableness of bate between two points seeved by 
 
 MOBE THAN ONE CAEEIEE NOT TO BE DETEEMINED BY BATE 
 OF LINE MOST FAVORABLY SITUATED. 
 
Chap. 6, Anal. J ikaffic law sekvice 6 
 
 EE. Reasonableness of a xhbough bate composed of the ag- 
 gregate OF INTEKMjEDIATE RATES. 
 
 ff. a joint thboxjgh interstate rate which jexceeds the 
 aggregate of the intermediate rates, subject to the 
 Act, is unlawful and non-enforceable. 
 
 GG. Unreasonableness of a joint through rate that ex- 
 ceeds THE combination OF A LOCAL RATE AND AN UNDE- 
 FINED PROPORTIONAL RATE. 
 
 HH. CaNCELIjATION of a joint through RATE RESULTING IN A 
 HIGHER COMBINATION OF LOCAL BATES. 
 
 II. HiGHEE BATE SOE A SHOETEE THAN FOE A LONGER DISTANCE 
 OVEE THE SAME LINE OR BOUTE IN THE SAME DIRECTION, 
 THE SHOETEE BEING INCLUDED WITHISf THE LONGEB DIS- 
 TANCE. 
 JJ. A BATE VOLUNTABILY ESTABLISHED BY BAILEOAD COMPANY TO 
 
 MEET COMPETITION IS NOT TO BE TAKEN AS THE MEASUEE 
 OF WHAT IS EEASONABLE. 
 KK. HiGHEB RATES WHEN SHIPMENTS ARE TENDERED WITH 
 
 OTHER THAN UNIFORM BILL OF LADING. 
 
 LL. Released-valuation bates. 
 MM. A carrier may not demand a higher rate when freight , 
 IS shipped with the charges collect than when the 
 
 charges ABE PBEPAID. 
 NN. MliflMUM CHABGE FOB TRANSPORTATION OF LESS-THAN- 
 
 carload shipments. 
 00. Lower rate for carload than foe less-than-caeload 
 
 quantities. 
 PP. Tbain-load bates. 
 QQ. Higher bates on pebishable traffic than , on ordinary 
 
 freight. 
 RR. Lower rates for inland movement of export oe import 
 
 TEAFFIC THAN FOR DOMESTIC TRAFFIC. 
 
 SS. The difference between the import rate and the do- 
 mestic RATE ON A Given commodity should not be un- 
 due OR UNREASONABLE. ' 
 
 TT. An imported commodity is not entitled to an inland 
 
 PROPORTIONAL BATE WHICH IS LOWER THAN THE DOMES- 
 TIC BATE WHEN THE TEANSPORTATION FROM THE POET OF 
 ENTRY IS PURELY LOCAL. 
 
 UU. Rbquibement that impobt feeight be placed ' IS A 
 
 BONDED WABEHOUSE OB DBLIVEEED TO THE BAIL CAEEIEB 
 DIRECT FBOM SHiP's SIDE OB DOCK OF VESSEL AS CONDI- 
 TION PEECEDENT TO APPLICATION OF IMPpST RATE. , 
 VY. OaEEIEBS MAY NOT ADJUST THEIB BATES SO AS TO REGULATE 
 
 FOBEIGSr TRAFFIC THBOUGH CEBTAIN POETS. 
 
 WW. Any-quantity bates. 
 
 XX, Gboup oe "blanket" bates. 
 
 YY. GraduAjTed bates. 
 
 ZZ. Rates on mixed caeloads. 
 
 AAA. Pbopbiety'of beidge tolls or river-crossing charges. 
 
 BBB. Reshipping rates. 
 
 CCC. Rates on branch-line hauls. 
 
 DDD. Establishment op commodity rate as evidence op the 
 unreasonableness of a' prior class rate. 
 
FKEIGHT KATES AND CHARGES 
 
 [Chap. 6, Anal. 
 
 EEE. The published bate schedule is prima facie evidence 
 
 OF THE BEASONABLENESS OF THE KATES STATED THEBEIN. 
 
 FFF. Filing ifATE schedule with Interstate Commeece Com- 
 mission IS NOT conclusive OF THE BEASONABLENESS OP 
 THE RATES CONTAINED THEREIN. 
 
 GGG. Maintenance fob a long period of a rate voluntarily 
 
 ESTABLISHED BY THE CARRIER AS EVIDENCE OF ITS BEA- 
 SONABLENESS. 
 
 HHH. Presumption where long-established rate is advanced 
 
 FOR A SHORT PERIOD AND THEN REDUCED TO THE FORMER 
 BASIS. 
 
 III. Unreasonable rate not permissible merely because its 
 
 CORRECTION WILL RESULT IN THE DISTURBANCE OF OTHER 
 RATES. 
 
 JJJ. Right of carrier to (Change an unreasonably low rate. 
 KKK. No estoppel operates against the right of a carrier to 
 
 ENJOY just and REASONABLE RATES. 
 
 LLL. Burden of proof under allegation of unreasonableness. 
 MMM, Onus probandi as to reasonableness of incbeased bate 
 
 ON THE COMMON CARRIER. 
 
 NNN. Presumption that carrier's tariff pkovides reasonable 
 
 charges FOB THE SERVICES NORMALLY PERFORMED. 
 
 000. Voluntary reduction of a rate by the carrier is not 
 
 CONCLUSI\'E that THE PRIOR RATE WAS UNREASONABLE. 
 
 PPP. The fact that a rate established by a caerier does not 
 apply between the same points is not conclusive of 
 ITS unreasonableness. 
 QQQ. Doubt as to reasonableness of rate should be resolved 
 
 IN favor of the carrier. 
 ERR. Railway-mail pay. 
 
 SSS. Compensation to certain land-grant roads. 
 TTT. Errors in publication op rates. 
 UUU. Basing-point system of rates. 
 
 VW. Effect of private agreement between carrier and ship- 
 per concerning transportation charges on question 
 OF reasonableness of rate. 
 www. Equalizing rates in and out op competing jobbing 
 centers impracticable. 
 XXX. The charging of an unreasonable rate is a toet. 
 
 610. Comparison of freight rates. 
 
 A. Necessity for comparison of rates. 
 
 B. Facts to be considered in comparing rates. 
 
 C. Comparison of rates on different beanches oe lines of 
 
 THE same carrier. 
 
 D. Comparison of rates via competing lines. 
 
 E. Comparison of rates on different lines in different 
 
 sections of the country. 
 
 F. The divisions of a joint through rate are no criteria 
 
 by which to measure local rates. 
 
 G. Division of joint through rate not conclusive evidence 
 
 OF REASONABLENESS OP JOINT THROUGH RATE ITSELF. 
 H. ReL.\TIOX between water AND RAIL TRANSPORTATION. 
 
Chap. 6, Anal.] teafjfic law service 8 
 
 I. COMPABISON - BETWEEN PEESBNT BATE AND LOWER RATE 
 
 MAINTAINED IN THE PAST. 
 
 J. Comparison of rates to competitive and non-gompetiti^'e 
 
 POINTS. 
 K. COMPABISON OF LOCAL AND PEOPOBTIONAL BATES. 
 
 L. Comparison of bates in opposite dibections. 
 
 M. COMPABISON between CLASS AND COMMODITY BATES. 
 N, EbLATIONSHIP of bates on BAW MATEEIALS to COMPETING 
 
 INDUSTRIES. 
 
 0. Comparison between carload and less-than-caeload 
 
 BATES. 
 
 p. Comparisons should be made of voluntary rates. 
 
 Q. Comparison of bates unsupported by evidence of vaeious 
 ciecumstancbs and conditions. 
 
 R. Rate-pee-ton-pee-mile comparisons. 
 
 S. Terminal services in the delivery and eeceipt of traf- 
 fic as elements to be considebed in belationship of 
 
 RATES. 
 
 T. Relationship between commodities. 
 
 U. CoMPABISON OF BATES ON RAW MATERIALS AND MANUFAC- 
 
 TURED PRODUCTS. 
 
 V. Rates fixed by State authorities as standards in fixing 
 
 INTERSTATE RATES. 
 
 611. Advances in freight rates. 
 
 A. Methods of advancing rates. 
 
 B. Equalization of discriminations. 
 
 C. Advance in rate to correct erroneous prior rate. 
 
 D. Maintenance of higher intrastate bate than inter- 
 
 state bate. 
 
 E. Increase in intrastate rates to remove any undue or 
 
 unreasonable advantage, peepeeence, peejudice oe 
 disceimination against interstate or foreign com- 
 merce. 
 
 F. Peesumption wheee long-established rate is advanced 
 
 for a short period and then reduced to its former 
 
 basis. 
 Gr. Advance in rates to preserve proper relation between 
 
 commodities. 
 H. Cancellation of commodity rates because of lack of 
 
 MOVEMENT OF TRAFFIC. 
 
 1. Carriers advancing certain rates to avoid reducing 
 
 other rates. 
 J. Disputes between carriers as to divisions do not justify 
 
 increases of rates. 
 K. Carriers are not estopped from advancing rates becJause 
 
 OF A resulting INJUEY TO SHIPPEBS. 
 
 L. Increase in rates resulting in inceease in discrimi- 
 nation. 
 
 M. Right of a carrier to advance its rates. 
 N. No presumption of wrong arises feom an advance in 
 bates. 
 
9 FREIGHT KATES AND CHARGES [Chap. 6, Anal. 
 
 0. Inatestigation and suspension of new rate, charge, reg- 
 
 ulation OK practice. 
 p. 'Burden of proof as to reasonableness of increased rate 
 
 UPON COMMON CARRIER. 
 
 Q. After expiration of Commission's order suspending 
 
 tariff CONTAINING NEW RATES, CHARGES, REGULATIONS OR 
 PRACTICES, THE PROPOSED RATES CONTAINED THEREIN DO 
 NOT AUTOMATICALLY GO INTO EFFECT. 
 
 R. Maintenance of port differentials on increased rates. 
 
 S. Increased rates of boat lines. 
 
 T. Increased freight rates of electric lines. 
 
 U. Increase in minimum carload charge, minimum class 
 scale, and minimum charge per shipment. 
 
 V. Increase in joint rates to and from foreign countries. 
 
 W. Effective date of rates and subsequent adjustments 
 UNDER Increased Rates, 1920, covered by Ex Parte 74. 
 
 X. Increases in charges for special services. 
 
 Y. 'General increases in freight bates. 
 
 Z. Percentage increases versus flat increases and mainte- 
 nance OF differentials and relationships. 
 AA. Increases in rates on individual commodities. 
 
 612. Investigation and suspension of new rates, charges, regulations 
 
 or practices. 
 
 613. Jurisdiction of Interstate Commerce Commission over freight 
 
 rates and charges. 
 
 A. Control of the Commission over freight rates and 
 
 CHARGES GENERALLY. 
 
 B. Power of Commission to determine rates, and to fix 
 
 maximum, minimum, or precise rates. 
 ,C. Commission may determine and prescribe just and rea- 
 sonable REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES. 
 
 D. Commission may order carriers to cease and desist from 
 
 THE FULL EXTENT OF VIOLATIONS FOUND. 
 
 E. Power of Commission to investigate new bate, classi- 
 
 fication, REGULATION OR PRACTICE. 
 
 F. Power of Commission to restrain enforcement of new 
 
 RATE, classification, REGULATION OR PRACTICE PENDING 
 INVESTIGATION OF THE SAME. 
 
 G. Time when orders of Commission take effect. 
 
 H. Burden of proof as to reasonableness of increased rate 
 ON common carrier. 
 
 1. Primary jurisdiction of Commission to determine rea- 
 
 sonableness OR UNREASOiSTABLENESS OF AN INTERSTATE 
 RATE. 
 
 J. Finality op conclusions of Commission on questions of 
 
 FACT. 
 
 K. Power of Commission to establish joint rates and di- 
 visions thereof. 
 
 L. Commission may not establish through rates in con- 
 nection WITH STREET-ELECTBIC-PASSENGER RAILWAYS. 
 
Chap. 6, Anal.] traffic law service 10 
 
 M. Power of Commission to establish joint rates; between 
 
 STEAM RAILWAYS AND INTERURBAN-ELECTRIC RAILWAYS. 
 
 N. Commission no authority to establish joint through 
 
 bates with independent water carriers. 
 0. Power of Commission to establish joint through rates 
 
 WITH belt railroad. 
 
 p. Commission no power to establish joint through bates 
 
 BETWEEN points IN THE UnITED StATES AND POINTS IN 
 ADJACENT FOREIGN COUNTRIES. 
 
 Q. Power of Commission to establish joint through rates 
 
 IS DISCRETIONARY WITH THAT BODY AND NOT REVIEWABLIE 
 BY THE COURTS. 
 
 R. Commission may establish joint through rate if dis- 
 crimination IS FOUND TO EXIST. 
 S. Commission may order maintenance of joint through 
 
 RATE when ITS CANCELLATION WILL RESULT IN HIGHER 
 CHARGE BASED UPON COMBINATION OF LOCALS. 
 
 T. Power of Commission to relieve from the operation of 
 
 THE LONG-AND-SHORT-HAUL CLAUSE. 
 
 U. Commission may make order prescribing the same bate 
 
 FOR similar services TO OTHER SHIPPERS. 
 
 V. Commission no power to advance rates to temporabilIt 
 improve business conditions. 
 
 W. Power of Commission to consider effect on the busi- 
 ness OF AN INDUSTRY IN ADVANCING BATES. 
 
 X. Determination of nature of commodity is a judicial 
 
 QUESTION. 
 
 Y. Jurisdiction of Commission over railway-mail pay. 
 Z. Commission no power to fix rates except upon traffic 
 considerations. 
 AA. Commission no power to substitute a new rate for a 
 
 JUST AND REASONABLE RATE. 
 
 BB. Commission no power to annul a rate except by a 
 
 FORMAL ORDER MADE IN CONFORMITY WITH SECTION 15 OF 
 
 THE Act. 
 CC. Commission no power to equalize rates. 
 DD. Not within the province of the Commission to require 
 
 CARRIERS TO ADJUST THEIR RATES SO AS TO EQUALIZE 
 NATURAL OR COMMERCIAL ADVANTAGES. 
 
 EE. Commission no power to protect American manufac- 
 turers AND PRODUCERS FROM FOREIGN COMPETITION. 
 
 FF. The omission op the Commission to fix a future rate 
 
 IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH AN ORDER FOR REPARATION FOR 
 PAST INJURIES BY REASON OP THE ASSESSMENT OP AN UN- 
 REASONABLE RATE. 
 
 GrG. Jurisdiction of Commission over rates for transpor- 
 tation OP governmental materials and war traffic. 
 
 HH. Commission's "flexible limit of judgment which be- 
 longs TO THE power TO FIX RATES. ' ' 
 
 ii. judiclui, review of orders of interstate commerce 
 Commission. 
 
 JJ. Power op Commission over local state rate on through 
 
 INTERSTATE SHIPMENT. 
 
11 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [Chap, 6, Anal. 
 
 KK. Power of Commission over fixation of terms and com- 
 pensation FOR COMMON USE OF TERMINAL, FACILITIES. 
 
 LL. Jurisdiction of Commission over rates on export and 
 
 IMPORT TRAFFIC. 
 
 MM. Authority of Divisions of the Commission to determine 
 
 QUESTIONS UNDER THE AcT. 
 
 NN. Power of Commission to prescribe rate, classification, 
 regulation, or practice to govern intrastate com- 
 merce in order to remove a preference, prejudice, 
 or discrimination against interstate or foreign 
 commerce. 
 
 00. Transportation op Commission's valuation supplies. 
 
 PP. Power of .Commission over intrastate rates during the 
 PERIOD OF Federal control. 
 
 QQ. Power of Interstate Commerce Commission over rates 
 
 AND CHARGES AFTER TERMINATION OP FEDERAL CONTROL 
 AND PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 1, 1920 INTRASTATE AND INTER- 
 STATE RATES. 
 
 614. Classification of freig-ht and freight classifications. 
 
 615. Fourth section of the Interstate Commerce Act — Long-and- 
 
 short-haul clause — Fourth-section applications. 
 
 616. Weights and weighing. 
 
 617. Routes and routing. 
 
 618. Protective services in transportation of perishable traffic. 
 
 619. Transit privileges, facilities and regulations. 
 
 620. Elevation. 
 
 621. Contracts between shippers and carriers concerning transporta- 
 
 tion charges. 
 
 6^2. Terminal facilities and regulations. 
 
 623. Demurrage or ' 'car-service" and detention charges. 
 
 624. Limitation of common carrier's liability — Initial carrier's 
 
 liability. 
 
 625. Free and reduced-rate transportation of property. 
 
 626. Allowances by carriers to owners of transported property. 
 
 627. Allowances to terminal railroads and boat lines owned or con- 
 
 trolled by shippers. 
 
 628. Switching — Switch connections — Private side-tracks. 
 
 629. Discriminations, preferences and advantages. 
 
Chap. 6, Anal.] teaffic law service 12 
 
 630. Rebates ajid concessions. 
 
 631. Damages and reparation— Claims between shippers and carriers. 
 
 632. Raikoad company freight tariffs or rate schedules. 
 
 633. Publication, posting and filing of freight rates and charges, 
 
 634. Transportation of live stock. 
 
 635. Express companies and express traffic. 
 
 636. Express company freight tariffs or rate schedules. 
 
 637. Practice and procedure before the Interstate Commerce Com- 
 
 mission. 
 
 638. Civil proceedings in the Courts, 
 
 639. Water carriers — Panama Canal Act. 
 
 640. Telegraph, telephone, cable and radiotelegraph companies. 
 
 641. Penalties and forfeitures — Criminal proceedings. 
 
 ; 642, Federal control of common carriers — United States Railroad 
 Administration. 
 
 643. Railway finances — Guaranteed return on railway property. 
 
FREIGHT KATES AND CHARGES ["§600 
 
 600. Different kinds of freight rates defined and their usage. 
 
 600-A. LocaTj rates. 
 
 Bates charged between points located upon the same railroad are 
 known as "local rates." For example: a rate from Buffalo, N. Y., to 
 Binghamton, N. Y., via D. L. & W. R. R. Co., is local to that road, inas- 
 much as both points are located on that line. And this is true regard- 
 less of the fact that both points may be located on other or competing 
 lines of railroad. 
 
 In the publication of their rates, carriers often publish their local 
 rates in separate tariffs from those carrying the joint rates. 
 
 The changes in local rates are, as a rule, less frequent than in joint 
 rates. ^ 
 
 1. Sixteenth Annual Keport of I. C. (". (1903) 
 
 600-B. Joint rates 
 
 The term "joint rate" is construed to mean a rate that extends 
 over the lines of two or more carriers and that is made bj^ joint agree- 
 ment between such carriers.^ For example : a published through rate 
 from Chicago, 111., to Dallas, Texas, via Illinois Central and Frisco 
 Lines, is a joint rate over those lines, the same having been published 
 under agreement between those lines for a fixed division of the revenue. 
 
 A joint rate is simply a through rate, every part of which has been 
 made by express agreement between the carriers forming the through 
 route.^ 
 
 See "Joint Rates" Section 601, post. 
 
 1. TarifE Circular 18-A. 
 
 2. In Re Through Routes and Through Rates (1907) 12 I. C. C. Rep. 164. 
 
 600-C. Through rates 
 
 A through rate is the rate applicable from the point of origin of a 
 shipment to its destination.^ That may be (a) a local rate where 
 both points are located upon the line of one road or a combination of the 
 separately established local rates of such road, or (b) a joint rate over 
 a through route composed of two or more roads which have agreed to a 
 joint rate, or, (c) a combination of separately established rates applica- 
 ble on through business over a through route which does not enjoy a 
 joint rate.^ A through rate is a continuous line of railway formed by 
 an arrangement express or implied, between connecting carriers. It 
 must have a rate for every service it offers, and as the route is a new 
 unit, so its rate for every service is a unit, even though it be divided 
 between the several carriers arranging themselves into the through 
 route. Where a through route has been formed the rate charged is a 
 tJi rough rate. * 
 
 See "Through rates" Section 602, post. 
 
 1. Laning-Harris C!oal & Grain Co. v. Missouri P. Ry. Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. l.>4. 
 
 2. Ibid. 
 
 :;. In Re Tlirough Routes & Through Rates (1907) 12 I. C. C. Rep. 1<>1 
 
§600] TEAFFIC LAW SEKVICE ^ 
 
 600-D. Propoetional eates. 
 
 A proportional rate is a proportion o£ a tlirongli rate which is 
 lower between points when the traffic has undergone transportation be- 
 fore reaching the first point, or is to be further transported after reach- 
 ing the second than the rates charged on like traffic which originates at 
 one of such points and terminates at the other.^ 
 
 It is a part of or a remainder of the through rate, and as such must 
 be considered in relation to the whole rate.- 
 
 A proportional rate is defined as one which applies to. part of a 
 through transportation which is entirely within the jurisdiction of the 
 Act to Eegulate Commerce ; that is, the balance of the transportation to 
 which the proportional rate applies must be under a rate filed with the 
 Commission.^ 
 
 The Interstate Commerce 'Commission has provided in its tariff 
 circular that :* 
 
 Tariffs containing basing or proportional rates must specify clearly the extent 
 and manner of their use, and tariffs that are especially intended for use in connection 
 with published basing rates must show the I. C. C. numbers of tariff in which basis can 
 be found. 
 
 A "proportional rate," as the term implies, is simply a part of a 
 through rate. It is the share of the aggregate charge from origin to 
 destination which one or more of the carriers accepts for performing 
 a definite portion of the whole transportation service. It is a matter 
 of common knowledge that through rates are generally less than the 
 sum of intermediate local rates ; and when all' the participating carriers 
 do not join in establishing the through rates, it is a common practice 
 for one or more of them to name proportional rates up to some point 
 of connection with another carrier which completes or continues the 
 transportation. The propriety and lawfulness of proportional rates to 
 the points of transfer which are less than local rates to that, point have 
 frequently been affirmed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and 
 are sanctioned by considerations of public policy.^ 
 
 The idea of differing proportional rates for the same service de- 
 pending upon the origin or destination of the traffic did not originate 
 with the Interstate Commerce Commission. It originated with and has 
 been used by carrier to a greater or less extent.*' 
 
 The Panama Canal Act in authorizing the Interstate Commerce 
 Commission to establish maximum rates by rail to and from the ports 
 to which th« traffic is brought, or from which it is taken by the water 
 carrier, and to determine to what traffic and in connection with what 
 vessel and upon what terms and conditions such rates shall apply, pro- 
 vides that "by proportional rates are meant those which differ from the 
 corresponding local rates to and from the port and which apply only to 
 traffic which has been brought to the port or is carried from the port by 
 a common carrier by water. ' ''' 
 
 A proportional rate like any other rate should be open to all 
 shippers.^ 
 
 A proportional rate is nothing more or less than a separately estab- 
 lished rate, as that phrase is used in Section 6 of the amended Act, 
 applicable to through transportation. It has not been understood 
 by the Commission that a separately established rate can be other than 
 
3 FREIGHT EATES AND CHARGES [§600 
 
 an open rate available to all. The separately established or propor- 
 tional rate is simply one way of making np the through charges between 
 two points. While there is no criticism of proportional rates applica- 
 ble only to through movements from a detined territory or group of 
 points, the Commission has never recognized as valid a proportional 
 rate limited to shipments that come into the proportional rate point 
 over the lines of a particular carrier. A proportional rate, the use of 
 which is limited to shipments over a particular line, would appear to be 
 a rate that discriminates against shippers over another line.' 
 
 There is no uniform percentage relationship between local and pro- 
 portional rates, the proportional rates from one x^oint being made with 
 relation to those from a competitive point to the same markets. ^"^ 
 
 The Commission has in several instances held that a proportional 
 rate applying to through traffic might well be lower than the corre- 
 sponding local rate.^^ 
 
 A proportional rate may not be condemned simply because it ex- 
 ceeds the local rate between the same points or because it may yield 
 excessive earnings for that part of the through movement. A shipper 
 has no real grievance with respect to his through traffic unless com- 
 pelled to pay excessive charges for the through service. It frequently 
 happens, however, that the through charge for a through service is un- 
 reasonable because one of its factors is excessive ; in such a case on a 
 proper record, the excessive proportional rate maj' be reduced.^^ 
 
 A proportional rate applying on through traffic might well be less 
 than the corresponding local rate, but the Commission has not ruled 
 that such proportional rate must be, or in every case should be, less. 
 There may be, and are, many instances in which full local rates are 
 applied as proportions in the construction of through rates, and the 
 rate so established can only be condemned upon a satisfactory show- 
 ing that it is unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or otherwise in con- 
 travention of law.^^ 
 
 Under the holdings of the Commission a proportional rate can not 
 be compared with an intermediate local rate to show a violation of the 
 fourth section.!* ' 
 
 It is in essence a division of a through rate, and tlie Commission 
 has several times held that undue discrimination does not under such 
 circumstances of necessity arise where a higher rate is maintained from 
 an intermediate point.^"^ 
 
 The Commission has repeatedly held that a carrier may not law- 
 fully make rates to a given point on its line on traffic going beyond by 
 wagon or other similar conveyance, which are lower than its established 
 rates to that point as a final destination.^'^ 
 
 Example of application of proportional rates: Cincinnati, 0., is an 
 87 and Louisville is a 100 per cent point in the Trunk liine adjustment, 
 but to the Virginia Cities, the lines from liouisville have established 
 therefrom the same rates as are applicable from Cincinnati. The first- 
 class rate from Chicago to Xew York, prior to the recent general 
 increase, was 75 cents per 100 pounds, and that to Baltimore (and con- 
 se<iuently to Norfolk and other Virginia Cities) 72 cents. The first- 
 
§600] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 4 
 
 class rates from Cincinnati and Louisville were accordingly 65 cents to 
 New York and 62 cents to Baltimore and the Virginia Cities. On traffic 
 from Chicago to the Virginia Cities, the Chicago-Cincinnati lines gen- 
 erally demanded as a division their full locals to Cincinnati (40, 34, 25, 
 17, 15, and 12), and in order for the Cincinnati-Norfolk lines to par- 
 ticipate in traffic to Norfolk at an equality of rates with Baltimore, 
 it was necessary for them to establish proportionals equal to the differ- 
 ence between the Chicago-Baltimore and the Chicago-Cincinnati rate, 
 as follows : 32, 28, 22, 15, 12 and 10 ; these proportionals being applicable 
 to traffic to all of the Virginia Cities and to Ijouisville as well as Cin- 
 cinnati.^'^ 
 
 In the case of Baltimore Chamber of Commerce v. Baltimore & 
 Ohio Railroad Company, ^^ the Commission said: "It is insisted that 
 the proportional or reshipping rate from Chicago and the other points 
 named in the second table are in fact nothing but local rates ; that the 
 name 'reshipping,' as at present in use, is but a cloak to cover the real 
 nature of the rate ; that f rain in elevators at said points is local grain, 
 and the rates under which it moves out are therefore local rates. 
 
 "Undoubtedly, a movement is either through or local; there is no 
 middle ground ; but to say that movements of the character referred to 
 are local, as distinguished from through movements, would be to hold 
 that the tariffs which provide transit privileges at the points named are 
 unlawful. Such tariffs have been in recognized use too long to be con- 
 denmed on the meager evidence here presented. 
 
 "There is no substantial difference between a 'reshipping' rate and 
 what is known as a 'proportional' rate, We have held that propor- 
 tional rates are not per se unlawful, and we see no reason to condemn 
 'reshipping' rates as such." 
 
 In the case of St. Paul Board of Trade v. Minneapolis, St. Paul S 
 Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co.,^^ the defendant maintains two proportional 
 rates out of Minnesota concentrating markets to Manistee, Mich., on 
 butter and eggs destined to eastei^n points, one of 20 cents and one of 
 40 cents per 100 pounds, the former being limited in its application to 
 butter and eggs that have reached the concentrating points over de- 
 fendant's line, and the 40-cent rate being an open rate applicable on 
 butter and eggs reaching those markets over other rails: Held, That 
 the defendant may make a distinction between shipments originating 
 at the concentrating points, so far as its line is concerned, and traffic 
 upon which it has had a haul into the concentrating points ; but it may 
 do this only under proper tariff provisions connecting the inbound with 
 the outbound movement, and then only when the inbound movement to 
 the concentrating points proceeds under rates on file with the Commis- 
 sion. 
 
 A proportional rate of 11 cents on lumber from Winfield, Ala., to 
 Thebes, 111., restricted in its application to shipments destined beyond 
 Thebes, held inapplicable when the only destination indicated on the 
 bill of lading, was Thebes proper.^" 
 
 Schedules of freight rates of a designated railroad, indicating that 
 they were adopted by it "in connection with" other specified roads over 
 which shipments from the common points, if any, would be made, may 
 be applicable to a shipment over a different railroad from a city which 
 
5 FKEIGHT EATES AND CHARGES [§600 
 
 is not a common point, where such schedules do not restrict the rate to 
 shipments received from the roads specified, but indicate its applica- 
 bility to shipments received from any connecting line.^^ 
 
 A joint proportional rate made by railroad companies from the 
 Kanawha District in West Virginia to Toledo, 0., "on cargo coal when 
 for lake shipment beyond," does not apply to coal, which, although 
 originally intended for lake shipment, was sold and delivered to vessels 
 at Toledo as bunker coal.^^ 
 
 Being separate parts of through rates, proportional rates, in order 
 to be la-vvful, must be established, within the meaning of Section 6, by 
 the publication and filing with the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
 A different rule is applicable to divisions.^^ 
 
 On the question of an undefined proportional rate as a factor in 
 considering the reasonableness of a joint through rate, see "Unreason- 
 ableness of a joint through rate that exceeds the comhination of a local 
 rate and an undefined proportional rate," Section 609 — 00, post. 
 
 1. In Re Form and Contents of Rate Schedules (1894) 4 I. C. Rep. 701. 
 
 2. Kansas City Transportation Bureau v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. (1909) 16 I. 
 C. C. Rep. 195, 201: Boney & Harper Milling Co. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1913), 
 28 I. C. C. Rep. 383, 387; Becker v. Pere Marquette Rd. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 645, 651 ; In Re Export Rates on Grain from Kansas City to Port Arthur (1914), 
 21 I. C. C. Rep. 616, 619 ; Board of Trade of Kansas City v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. 
 Co. (1914) 32 I. C. C. Rep. 297, 307. 
 
 3. Fourth- Section Circular No. 1 (March 13, 1911) ; cited Crescent Coal & Mining Co. 
 V. Chicago & E. I. Rd. Co. (1912) 24 I. C. C. Rep. 149, 155. 
 
 4. Tariff Circulai- 18-A, Rule 5, b ; cited Crescent Coal & Mining Co. v. Chicago & 
 E. I. Rd. Co. (1912). 24 I. C. C. Rep. 149, 155. 
 
 5. Hocking V. Ry. Co. v. Lackawanna Coal & L. Co. (1915), 224 Fed. Rep. 930, citing 
 Kansas City Transportation Bureau v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 16 I. C. O. 
 Rep. 195, 201 ; Southwestern Shippers' Traffic Ass'n v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. 
 (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 570, 578; Boney & Harper Milling Co. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. 
 Co. (1913), 28 1. C. C. Rep. 383, 388. 
 
 6. In Re Investigation & Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers operating 
 between the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers (1911), 21 I. C. 0. Rep. 546, 551. 
 
 7. Act to Regulate Commerce, Section 6 (as amended August 24, 1912). 
 
 8. In Re Restricted Rates (1911) 20 I. C. C. Rep. 426, 436. 
 
 9. Bascom Co. v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 354, 356; Rosen- 
 baum Bros. Co. v. Louisville & K Rd. Co. (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 62; Chattanooga 
 Packet Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1915), 33 I. C. C. Rep. 384, 391; Greater Des Moines 
 Committee, Inc. v. Director General, as Agent. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1920) 
 60, I. C. C. Rep. 403, 407. 
 
 10. Indianapolis Freight Bureau v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. 0. 
 Rep. 504, 511. 
 
 11. Board of Railroad Commissioners of the State of Kansas v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. 
 Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 407, 415. 
 
 12. State of Iowa v. Chicago St. P. M. & O. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 64, 73. 
 
 13. Boney & Harper Milling Co. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1913). 28 I. C. C. Rep. 383, 
 388. 
 
 14. In Re Lumber Rates from the South to Ohio River Crossings (1912) 25 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 50, 60. 
 
 15. Southwestern Missouri MiUers' Club v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1914), 29 I. 0. 
 C. Rep. 28, 29, citing Baltimore Chamber of Commerce v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. 
 (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 596; Southern Illinois Millers' Ass'n v. Louisville & N. Rd. 
 Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 672. 
 
 16. Bayou City Rice Mills v. Texas & K. O. Rd. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 490, 493, 
 citing Gary v. Eureka Springs Ry. Co. (1897), 7 I. C. C. Rep. 286; Wylie v. Northern 
 P. Ry. Co. (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 145. 
 
 17. City of Danville v. Southern Ry. Co. (1915), 34 I. C. C. Rep. 430, 435. 
 
 18. Baltimore Chamber of Commerce v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. O. C. Rep. 
 596, 600; cited in Southern Illinois Millers' Ass'n v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1912), 
 23 I. C. C. Rep. 672, 677. 
 
 19. St. Paul Board of Trade v. Mlnneiipolis St. V. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 285. 
 
 20. Beekman Lumber Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1911), 20 1. C. C. Rep. 98. 
 
§600] TEAFFIC LAW SERVICE 6 
 
 21 Kansas City Southern Ky. Co. v. Albers Commission Co. (1912), 223 U. S. 573, 595, 
 
 32 Sup. Ot. Eep. 316, 56 L. Ed. 556. 
 22. Hocking V. Ry. Co. v. Lackawanna Coal & Lumber Co. (1915), 224 Fed. Rep. 930. 
 23 Greater Des Moines Committee, Inc. v. Director General, as Agent, Chicago, M. & 
 
 St. P. Ry. Co. (1920) 60 I. C. C. Rep. 403, 407, Citing Baseom Co. v. United States 
 
 (1909) 17 I. C. C. Rep. 354, 356. 
 
 600-E. Aebiteaeies. 
 
 The term "arbitrary" is a technical one expressing a difference 
 which does not change with the through rate. The term is used to des- 
 ignate a rate not founded on a combination of other rates or upon a per- 
 centage theory of some general rate. It may be and frequently is lower 
 than a rate established on a different basis. So long as such a rate is 
 fair and equitable it is amenable to no valid objection.^ 
 
 A proportion of a through rate charged by a carrier upon a long 
 haul of freight, whether it be called an arbitrary or by some other des- 
 ignation such as "percentage," may well be considerably less than a 
 local rate charged by the same carrier for the same distance over its 
 line.^ 
 
 Where a rate on through interstate shipment from a point on the 
 line of one carrier to a point on the line of another is made up of pro- 
 portional rates or arbitraries to and from an intermediate point, the 
 Commission may consider and pass such separately made proportions 
 or arbitraries.^ 
 
 An arbitrary sum exacted in addition to the through rate on a given 
 commodity, fOr the privilege of milling the commodity in transit, be- 
 comes a part of the aggregate through rate.* 
 
 On shipments of grain and grain products originating on lines of 
 connecting carriers, defendants exacted an arbitrary of five cents per 
 100 pounds over and above its regular local rate on like traffic. This 
 arbitrary was exacted by the defendant for the purpose of protecting 
 its local traffic. Held, That a railroad company should seldom be per- 
 mitted to charge more on through business than its regular local rate ; 
 that the imposition of the arbitrary was unjust and unreasonable." 
 
 t. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (188S), 1 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 436, 459, 1 I. C. Rep. 754. 
 
 i. New Orleans Cotton Exchange v. Illinois G. Rd. Co. (1890), 3 I. C. C. Rep. 534, 
 
 560; 2 1. C. Rep. 777. \ 
 
 3. Hilton Lumber Co. v. Wilmington & W. Rd. Co. (1901), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 17, 38. 
 
 4. Listman Mill Co. v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1898), 8 I. C. C. Rep. 47, 65. 
 
 5. Blackwell Milling & Elevator Co. v. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. O. 
 Rep. 23. 
 
 600-F. DlFFEEBNTIALS 
 
 Nothing is more certain concerning transportation in this country, 
 either as to cost of service to the carrier or value of service to the ship- 
 per, than that as the mileage increases the total cost increases, but the 
 cost per ton per mile decreases. This is true, although it cannoj; be 
 stated in exact mathematical terms. It follows, and with particular 
 force as applied to grouped points or origin and grouped points of 
 destination, that differentials either above or below the rates from any 
 given point become less and less important as distance of ultimate 
 destination increases. Stated in other words, differentials diminish 
 with increasing distance and vanish when the mileage on which the dif- 
 ferential is based becomes inconsiderable in proportion to the total 
 mileage from basing point to destination.^ 
 
7 FREIGHT EATES AND CHARGES [§600 
 
 Where, because of difference in distance, the rates are different 
 from a junction point of a carrier's own main line or branches, the dif- 
 ferential should not be higher from points beyond from which the traf- 
 fic moves through that junction than at such junction point.^ 
 
 In Chamber of Commerce v. Neiv York C. & 11. R. Rd. Co.^ the Com- 
 mission said: "It is clear that the differential agreement was originally 
 made in an attempt to equalize the total charges on import and export 
 traffic through the several ports, as gateways. We have no jurisdiction 
 of the ocean rates and must deal with this question as though the ports 
 were destinations instead of gateways. This does not mean that the 
 carriers may not take into consideration the previous or further trans- 
 portation of the traffic on the ocean and thus differentiate it, rea- 
 sonably, from domestic traffic, but the rates to and from the ports must 
 be reasonable, must be published as independent from the ocean trans- 
 portation, and are subject to all of the provisions of the act. Cosmo- 
 politan Shipping Co. v. Hamburg -American Packet Co., 13 I. C. C. 266; 
 Armour Packing Co. v. U. S., 209 U. S. 56. ' ' 
 
 In St. Louis Chamber of Commerce v. Baltimore & 0. Rd. Co.,* 
 the Commission stated : ' ' The- propriety of a difference in treatment of 
 differentials between contiguous points on long and short haul traffic 
 has been recognized by the Commission. The reason for this is that on 
 the long-haul traffic the volume of the rate is permitted by the distance 
 to increase to a point where the additional cost of the service repre- 
 sented by the differential can be spread thinly over the line haul and 
 finally absorbed without unduly encroaching upon the line-haul 
 revenues, whereas on the short-haul traffic the distance is not such as 
 to permit of a sufficient increase in the volume of the rate to warrant 
 that absorption. A reflection of this principle in the general class and 
 commodity rate adjustment to these very points, St. Louis and East St. 
 Louis, was approved in Business Men's League of St. Louis v. A. T. & 
 S. F. Ry. Co., 4:4l I. C. C. 308. Under that adjustment the differential 
 between the two cities is absorbed on traffic originating beyond a hun- 
 dred-mile zone and assessed against the shipper on traffic originating 
 within that zone. ' ' 
 
 1. Williams Co. v. Vicksburg S. & P. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 482, 487; Black 
 Mountain Coal Land Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 286; In Re 
 Advances on Cement Plaster from Oklahoma to Texas (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 
 591, 599; Sheridan Chamber of Commerce v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. (1913), 
 26 I. C. C. Rep. 638, 654. 
 
 2. Commercial Club of Superior v. Great N. Ry. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 96, 120. 
 
 3. Chamber of Commerce v. New York^C. & H. R. Rd. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 55, 
 74. 
 
 4. St. Louis Chamber of Commerce v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1920), 57 I. C. C. Rep. 
 639, 647. 
 
 600-Gr. Class rates. 
 
 For convenience, the great majority of articles move on class rates. 
 These are rates designated by numbers and letters, often bearing some 
 definite percentage relationship to one another, and generally either 
 based upon distance or made between specific points with due regard 
 for distance. These rates standing alone are meaningless. Their ap- 
 plicability is determined by the governing classification. The classifica- 
 tion is in general a list of articles that will move on the class rates, in 
 the absence of specific commodity rates. Articles are classified, ;'. e.. 
 
§600] TRAFFIC LAW SEKVICE 8 
 
 given ratings such, as, say, fourth class in less-than-carload shipments 
 and fifth class in carloads ; carload minima are usually stated, and there 
 are rules and regulations governing packing, mixed carload shipments, 
 and other matters.'^ 
 
 The Commission is disposed to encourage the making of class 
 rates wherever practicable, because of their tendency to uniformity and 
 stability.^ 
 
 It is generally recognized that class rates on heavy commodities' 
 are made to move more or less limited shipments from place to place, 
 and commodity rates to move large, steady shipments.^ 
 
 It is well understood that in the absence of commodity rates ship- 
 ments are made at class rates.* 
 
 Commodity rates are ordinarily lower than class rates. The class 
 rates, therefore, afford a reasonable test for measuring the general 
 level of the commodity rates.'"' 
 
 In the case of the United States Leather Company v. Southern 
 Railway Company,^ the Interstate Commerce Commission said: "From 
 a transportation standpoint leather is desirable freight. The loading 
 from those southern tanneries averages about 35,000 pounds per car. 
 The liability to damage is extremely slight, no special expedition in its 
 movement is required. The movement itself is uniform throughout the 
 year. The average cost of handling leather is probably below that of 
 freight in general. 
 
 "Leather is, however, a valuable article. The invoice price of a 
 carload like those shipped from the tanneries of the complainants 
 ranges from seven to ten thousand dollars per car. In official, western, 
 and southern classifications leather is rated fourth class in carloads, 
 second class in less than carloads, and considering its value it can 
 hardly be said that the classification is too high. Now, the advanced 
 rates even are less than the class rates between the points in question, 
 and the defendents insist that this shows that the former rates were 
 improper and justifies the' increase. 
 
 "It may be noted in limine that upon this theory the advanced rates 
 can not be defended, for those rates are less than, the class rates, and 
 if it be true that there is a fixed relation between commodities which 
 must be the same in all cases and that the classification determines 
 that relation, then it would be the duty of these defendants to advance 
 these leather rates to the level of the class rates. 
 
 "It may be further noted that upon this theo'ry no commodity rate 
 could be justified. While it is true that commodity rates are always 
 in the nature of a preference, not necessarily undue, and while it may be 
 true that the tendency should be to eliminate these special rates and 
 work more nearly to a class basis, still the rates of this country have 
 been built upon a different theory, and to apply that theory would be 
 revolutionary and destructive of legitimate business enterprises." 
 
 In speaking of the establishment of a common percentage rela- 
 tionship between class rates, the Commission has said:^ "The Commis- 
 sion has long realized the desirability of establishing some common 
 percentage which all classes should be to the first-class rate, so that 
 the naming of the first-class rate would automatically fix that of every 
 
9 FREIGHT EATES AND CHAKGES [§600 
 
 other class. It has not felt free, up to the present time, to establish 
 such a percentage for use in all parts of the country. The rates estab- 
 lished by the carriers themselves present endless and very wide dif- 
 ferences- in the relation between the classes. To apply the same per- 
 centage relation in every part of the country would be to throw out 
 of proportion the rates prescribed by the Commission as compared with 
 other rates in effect in that territory, and, therefore, to create con- 
 fusion and discrimination instead of securing uniformity and equal 
 treatment. 
 
 * ' The rates made by many State Commissions and by the carriers 
 themselves, vary not only between different schedules but for different 
 distances in the same schedules ; that is, the relation between the differ- 
 ent classes for 100 miles is not the same as for 200 or 300 miles." 
 
 1. First Annual Report of I. C. C. (1887) ; La Crosse Merchants & Jobbers' tFnion v. 
 Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1888), 1 I. O. C. Rep. 629, 2 I. C. Rep. 9; Railroad 
 Commission of Louisiana v. Aransas Harbor T. Rv. Co. (1918), 48 I. C. C. Rep. 312, 
 369. 
 
 2. Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 
 30, 35. 
 
 3. James & Abbott Co. v. Boston & M. Rd. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 273, 275. 
 
 4. Standard Mirror Co. v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1913), 27 I C. C. Rep. 200, 203. 
 
 5. In Re Rate Increases in Official Classification Territory (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 
 351, 401. 
 
 6. United States Leather Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 323, 325. 
 
 7. Iowa State Board of Railroad Commissioners v. Arizona E. Rd. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. 
 C. Rep. 563, 565. 
 
 600-H. Commodity eates. 
 
 Commodity rates are usually, if not invariably, lower than the 
 class rates, being special rates presumably established on account of 
 peculiar circumstances and conditions.^ The general policy of the 
 carriers is to make commodity rates somewhat lower than class rates 
 on commodities, the movement of which is regarded as necessary to the 
 development of mercantile interests and industries.^ Commodity rates 
 are in essence exceptions to the classification based upon a belief in the 
 economic expediency of such course.^ Nevertheless commodity rates 
 are special rates which ought to be made with reference to all the 
 conditions surrounding the transportation of the particular article 
 between the particular points.* 
 
 Commodity rates are ordinarily published to aid the movement of 
 trafific,, which, because of special or peculiar conditions, will not move 
 freely under the class rates. The commodity rate should be fixed with 
 a view to securing an unrestricted movement and without regard to the 
 class rates. Given commodity rates under consideration should be 
 considered with reference to their reasonableness and not in their 
 relation to the class rates, and in establishing commodity rates car- 
 riers frequently must take into consideration the peculiar require- 
 ments" of particular communities and must meet those requirements 
 by applying on certain commodities rates that are lower than would 
 otherwise be deemed necessary.^ 
 
 Commodity rates are usually made upon coarse, cheap articles 
 which are not of sufficient value to bear the numbered class rates. 
 For example, they are made on iron articles, brick, lumber, clay, 
 cement, stone, salt, coal, etc.^ The factors of value and volume of 
 tonnage are important to be considered in determining the advisability 
 and necessity of establishing a commodity rate.'' 
 
§600] TEAFFIC LAW SEEVICE 10 
 
 Where a commodity rate is made for a manufactured product, 
 capable of classification, a certain equilibrium betM^een competing 
 points of manufacture should be preserved, if possible, and only some 
 peculiar circumstances or conditions can warrant the maintenance of 
 a commodity rate from a few points of manufacture in a limited 
 locality, while the class rate basis as to the same commodity is main- 
 tained from all other points of manufacture.^ 
 
 Commodity rates as a rule are not as stable as class rates. The 
 . only purpose of making a commodity rate is to take the commodity out 
 of the classification; therefore, where there is both a class and a com- 
 modity rate contemporaneously in effect, the commodity rate is the 
 lawful rate to be applied and if the carrier does not desire to apply 
 it on all shipments it must be cancelled." 
 
 The Commission discourages the establishment of commodity rates 
 on account of their lack of uniformity and stability. It is only in 
 cases where it clearly appears that the inclusion of a given article in a 
 class results in unreasonable charges, and a lower rate will not meet the 
 demands of justice, that commodity rates are required to be estab- 
 lished." 
 
 In every instance where a commodity rate is named in a tariff upon 
 a commodity and between specified points such commodity rate is the 
 lawful rate and the only rate that may be used with relation to that 
 traffic between those points even though a class rate or some combina- 
 tion may make lower. The naming of a commodity rate. on any article 
 or character of traffic takes such article or traffic out of the classifica- 
 tion and out of the class rates between the points to Avhich such 
 commodity rate applies." 
 
 The establishment of a commodity rate upon any article removes 
 that commodity from the classification, but a commodity rate is to be 
 applied strictly; it cannot be applied upon analogous articles, and it 
 would seem to follow that only the article or articles clearly compre- 
 hended within the descriptive te'rms of the commodity rate can be 
 considered as having been so removed from the classification.^- 
 
 It should be noted, however, that while a commodity rate may be 
 a different rate from a class rate, it does not necessarily follow that it 
 must be a lower rate, nor is it obligatory upon the carrier to thereby 
 establish a lower rate.^* 
 
 The very purpose of a commodity rate is to remove the commodity 
 from the classification for special treatment, which could not be 
 accorded to it at all, or only witli difficulty, under the classification. 
 The classification generally imposes the highest rate which a particular 
 commodity should bear under normal conditions. A commodity which 
 is higher than the class rate is an abnormality which on its face requires 
 special justification.^* In the last analysis the presumption that a 
 commodity rate higher than the class rate which would otherwise 
 apply is unreasonable is predicated on the antecedent presumption that 
 the class rate is fixed at the highest reasonable figure.^" Although a 
 commodity rate in excess of the class rate is regarded as unusual, 
 special circumstances and conditions may justify such a departure from 
 the general rule. This is especially true in the case of a commodity 
 
11 FREIGHT EATES AND CHARGES [§600 
 
 rate which applies from and to a number of points that are grouped 
 or blanketed. It might exceed that class from one or more points in the 
 Ijlanket and still be reasonable.''^ In the absence of other evidence 
 that a rate is unreasonable or discriminatory, the fact that a commod- 
 ity rate bears a moderately greater or less proportion to a correspond- 
 ing class rate is not a sufficient ground for condemning the commodity 
 ]'ate as unreasonable or discriminatory.^^ 
 
 The fact that for a long time there has been no movement of a 
 particular commodity is no justification for the maintenance of an un- 
 reasonable rate ; neither is the probable effect of state prohibitory 
 laws upon the tonnage.'^ 
 
 A showing that the commodity rate on a particular article is a 
 less proportion of the corresponding class rate than that on certain 
 other articles is no more justification for an increase in the commodity 
 rate on that particular article than a shoAving that the commodity 
 rate on another article is a greater proportion of the corresponding 
 class rate is a justification for reducing the commoditj' rate on that 
 article. When a commodity rate is established, it is presumed to be 
 the result of special circumstances and conditions surrounding the 
 movement of the particular article between particular points — cir- 
 cumstances and conditions that do not inhere in or apply to the move- 
 ment of the same articles or other articles betwen all points. The 
 contention that a commodity rate should bear a fixed, different, or any 
 relation whatever to the corresponding class rate overlooks the fact 
 that the article, on which the commodity rate applies has been removed 
 from the classification and from its association with or relation to other 
 articles, so far as the movement between certain points is concerned.*' 
 
 The Commission has stated that it cannot subscribe to the con- 
 tention that the state of relativity between commodities Avhich features 
 the classification as the real foundation of its structure must neces- 
 sarily extend to commodity rates. As a matter of fact, the reason why 
 a commodity rate is established is that conditions require a departure 
 as to the particular article from this very plan of grouping together 
 certain articles. Those exceptional conditions do not necessarily apply 
 to all commodities ; otherwise the class rate would give way entirely 
 to the commodity rate. Nor is this idea of classification relationship 
 necessarily to be followed as between carload and less-than-carload 
 commodity rates on the same articles. Conditions may demand a 
 departure from the classification basis as to carload and' not as to 
 less-than-carload traffic, as apparently has been the case even with 
 res])ect to cereal products, which move on the class rates in less-than- 
 ea]-loads.-° 
 
 Commodity rates are established to meet special conditions and 
 because of special considerations which are not met by or reflected in 
 classifications or subclassifications. Those conditions may change. 
 The consideration may gain or wane in compelling force. But so long 
 as they are potent they find expressions in exceptions to that uniformity 
 and symmetry of rates which should characterize a classified system.-* 
 A commodity rate applicable to less-than-carload traffic is a pronounced 
 departure from the usual practice and the Commission should require 
 its establishment only upon a clear showing of compelling reasons.-^ 
 
§600] TEAFFIC LAW SEKVICE 12 
 
 If a commodity rate is established between certain points on a 
 particular article which ordinarily moves under class rates in the 
 territory in which such points of origin and destination are located^ it 
 is presumed to be the result of special circumstances attending the 
 transportation of that article between such points. ^^ 
 
 In the establishment of rates on a single commodity the fact that 
 the carriers are operating at a loss or on a narrow margin of profit 
 should not be given too much weight, unless it clearly appears that the 
 particular commodity constitutes the bulk of the traffic transported.^* 
 
 It cannot be said that a commodity rate must bear a fixed relation 
 to the corresponding class rate, even as between competing points.^® 
 
 The reasonableness of commodity rates is not dependent solely 
 upon regularity of movements.^® 
 
 1. Indianapolis Freight Bureau v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. 
 0. Rep. 367; Goerres Cooperage Co. v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1911), 21 I. 
 C. C. Rep. 5, 6. 
 
 2. Railroad Commission of Nevada v. Southern P. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 238, 255. 
 
 3. Railroad Commission of Nevada v. Southern P. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 329, 332. 
 
 4. State of Iowa v. Atchison T. & .S. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 47, 63. 
 
 5. In Re Des Moines Commodity Rates (1915), 34 I. C. C. Rep. 281, 284. 
 
 6. New York Board of Trade & Transportation v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1891), 3 I. C. 
 Rep. 417, 4 I. C. C. Rep. 447. • 
 
 7. Tone Bros. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 279, 281; Heldmaier v. 
 Chicago I. & L. Ry. Co. (1918), 49 I. C. C. Rep. 81. 
 
 8. In Re Westbound Lake-and-Rail Knit Goods Commodity Rates (1914), 32 I. C. O. 
 Rep. 54, 57. 
 
 9. Conf. Rul. Bui., Rule 84 (June 9, 1908). 
 
 10. Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 
 30, 35. 
 
 11. Tariff Circular 18- A, Rule 7 (a) ; Central California Traction Co. v. Chicago M. & 
 St. P. Ry. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 550, 551; Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v. Porter 
 (Texas 1913), 156 S. W. 267, 272. 
 
 12. Crombie & Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 233, 235. 
 
 13. Wheeling Corrugating Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 125, 
 Chamber of Commerce, Houston, Texas v. International & G. N. Ry. Co. (1914), 
 32 I. O. C. Rep. 247, 255; Heldmaier v. Chicago I. & L. Ry. Co. (1918), 49 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 81. 
 
 14. Rock Spring Distilling Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. 0. Rep. 18, 26, et seq. 
 
 15. New Orleans Vegetable Growers, Merchants & Shippers' Ass'n v. Illinois C. Rd. 
 Co. (1915), 34 I. O. C. Rep. 32, 34, cited Rath Packing Company v. Director 
 General, Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 427, 428. 
 
 16. In Re Rice Rates from Helena, Ark. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 614, 615. 
 
 17. Decker & iSons v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 547, 551. 
 Cited in Greater Des Moines Committee, Inc. v. Director General, Chicago, M. & St 
 P. Ry. Co., (1920), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 403, 404. 
 
 18. Scheuing v. Louisville & N. Rd. Oo. (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 550. 
 
 19. Western Trunk Line Rate Increases (1917), 43 I. C. C. Rep. 481, 489; Northern 
 Potato Traffic Association v. Chicago & A. Rd. Co. (1917), 44 I. O. C. Rep. 426, 430. 
 
 20. National Association of Macaroni and Noodle Mfrs. of America v. Alabama G S 
 Rd. Co. (1918), 50 I. C. C. Rep. 289, 292. 
 
 21 Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. 
 Oo. (1919), 52 I. C. C. Rep. 439, 448, citing Decker & Sons v. Chicago M. & St. P. 
 Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 547, 551; Samuel v. Director General, as Agent 
 Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 190, 191. 
 
 22. Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado v. Atchison T. & iS. F. Ry. Co. 
 (1919), 52 I. C. C. Rep. 439, 477, ciHng Decker & Sons v. Chicago M. & St. P. Rv 
 Co. (1914), 80 I. C. C. Rep. 547, 551. 
 
 23. Porter Mirror & Glass Co. v. Director General, as Agent, St. Louis S. F. Ry Co 
 (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 308, 311. 
 
 24. Holmes & Hallowell Co. v. Great N. Ry. Co. (1921), 60 1. C. C. Rep. 687, 702. 
 
 25. Quinton Spelter Co. v. Fort Smith & W. Rd. Oo. (1921), 61 I. O. C. Rep. 43, 44. 
 
 26. Swift & Co. V. Director General, as Agent, (1921), 62 I. 0. C. Rep. 618, 623. 
 
13 freight rates and charges [§600 
 
 600-1. Rates for mixed shipments. 
 
 Class rates or commodity rates may be made for specified mixed 
 shipments and will be the lawful rates for such mixture, even though 
 certain points of the mixture are covered by class or commodity rates 
 when shipped separately.^ 
 
 The practice of shipping mixed cars is of value to the carrier in 
 that it results in a heavier loading of the car and in fewer claims for 
 loss and damage ; it is also of value to the shipper in that they receive 
 upon less-than-carload shipment the benefit of the carload rate ; it also 
 involves a more expeditious service, and the goods arrive in better con- 
 dition ; it enables the retailer also to do a larger volume of business on 
 a smaller investment. - 
 
 1. Tariff Circular IS-A, Rule 7 (a). 
 
 2. Furniture Manufacturers Ass'n of Grand Rapids v. Ann Arbor Rd. Co. (1915), 34 
 I. C. C. Rep. 262, 265. 
 
 600-J. Rail-and-water rates. 
 
 "All-rail" means a movement entirely by rail.^ "Lake-and-rail" 
 means a movement partly by rail and partly by lake boats, which in- 
 volves break of bulk.- " Eail-lake-and-rail " means a movement by rail 
 to the lake, by boat to another lake port and from thence by rail, which 
 involves breaking bulk twice.^ "Across-lake" means a movement by 
 rail to the lake and across the lake by car ferry without break of bulk.* 
 " Across-lake-and-rail " means a movement by rail and car ferry to the 
 western lake port and from thence by rail, which may or may not involve 
 breaking bulk.'' 
 
 1. Escanaba Business Men's Ass'n. v. Ann Arbor Rd. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 11, 12. 
 
 2. Ibid. 
 
 3. Ibid. 
 
 4. Ibid. 
 
 5. Ibid. 
 
 600-K. "Paper" rates. 
 
 "Paper" rates are simply rates which have been regularly estab- 
 lished and duly published in legal tariffs, but under which there is no 
 movement of traffic. This does not mean necessarily that the rates 
 are so high as to be prohibitive to the movement of traffic. It may be 
 that the rates were established primarily to accommodate a particular 
 movement, and the traffic having moved the reason for their contin- 
 uance disappears, or else, the rates may have been established by the 
 carriers without reference \o any particular movement of traffic or 
 possibility thereof. In the latter instance, however, the publication of 
 such special rates would be done by inadvertence rather than inten- 
 tionally as special rates are seldom established in the first instance 
 without reference to the existence of tonnage. From the nature of 
 things, the term "paper" rate applies to special commodity rates. In 
 the establishment of a special rate on a given commodity between cer- 
 tain points, the carriers do not publish relative rates between all other 
 points served by their lines, inasmuch as if this method of rate making 
 were pursued to a logical conclusion the major portion of the rate 
 carried in the tariff would be "paper" rates or nominal rates under 
 
5,f)001 TEAFFIC LAW SERVICE 14 
 
 wliicli there would be no movement or possibility of movement of traffic. 
 The burden arising from the expense and uselessness from such a 
 method of tariff compilation is obvious. 
 
 > J 
 
 Although many rates published in carriers' tariffs are "paper 
 rates on which no business moves, yet carriers ask for authority to 
 continue their publication and to be allowed to apply such rates should 
 business be obtained by them. It is the duty of the Commission, there- 
 fore, to pass upon their application. ^ 
 
 A railroad company is not required to publish a rate from a cer- 
 tain mine upon a particular grade of coal, where the mine produces 
 nothing which could be shipped under that rate." 
 
 To whatever extent long previous existence of lower rates in 
 actual use may justify an inference or presumption that they are suffi- 
 ciently high, the mere publication of such rates in the general schedule, 
 when they have not been used, is not conclusive proof that they are 
 reasonably remunerative to the carrier. 
 
 While a discriminatory tariff may not directly injure a locality 
 against which it discriminates so long as tliere is no actual movement 
 of traffic, it may be a sort of indirect injury by discouraging prospective 
 industry, and should therefore be brought to conform to the law.* 
 
 A mere "paper" rate, which was never carried into effect, cannot 
 be availed of as a basis to recover damages on the theory that such rate 
 was unjustly discriminatory.' 
 
 In a proceeding based upon an infraction of section 4 of the act, 
 a merely theoretical or "paper" rate that had not been used and Avas 
 unknown to the carrier until casually discovered will not be accepted 
 as affording a just basis for an order for reparation on shipment^ made 
 to an intermediate point at a slightly higher rate.^ 
 
 While the fact that traffic moves freely has some bearing upon the 
 reasonableness of the rate, it is not true that merely because the traffic 
 does not move, the rates are therefore unreasonable. The carriers are 
 entitled to a reasonable compensation for the services they render; 
 yet this compensation might require the establishment of rates upon 
 which shippers could not do business at a profit, and in such a case the 
 Commission could not lawfully prescribe rates unremunerative to the 
 carriers.'^ 
 
 In Re Investigation & Suspension of Advances in Rates on Potatoes 
 fro)n South Dakota and Other Points to St. Louis and Other Points,^ 
 the Commission said : ' ' The carriers show that for the last three years 
 ther6 has been but very little movement of potatoes from the territory 
 of production in question to the Mississippi Eiver and points east, the 
 product of that territory having been mainly consimied in territory to 
 the west of the river. We should not ordinarily require a maintenance 
 of these rates if in point of fact no traffic was likely to move under 
 them, but this can hardly be affirmed in the present instance. The ter- 
 ritory from which these rates apply produces large quantities of 
 potatoes. Whether they will or will not move east of the Mississippi 
 River depends entirely upon the production of different parts of the 
 
15 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§§600, 601 
 
 country. The state of the crop may be such that they will move in large 
 quantities one season and possibly not at all for several succeeding 
 seasons." 
 
 1. In Re Rates on Tropical Fruits from Gulf Ports to Various Destinations (1914), 
 30 I. C. C. Rep. 621, 631. 
 
 2. MclGrew v. Missouri P. Ry. Co. (1901), 8 I. C. C. Rep. 630. 
 
 3. Shield & Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. 0. Rep. 210. 
 
 4. Kindel v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1903), 9 I. O. C. Rep. G06. 
 
 5. Lehigh V. Rd. Co. v. Rainey (1902), 112 Fed. Rep. 487. 
 
 6. Missouri & Kansas Shippers Ass'n. v. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 483. 
 
 7. Railroad Commissioners of Florida v. Southern Express Co. (1914). 28 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 634, 635. 
 
 8. In Re Investigation & Suspension of Advances in Rates on Potatoes from South 
 Dakota and other points to St. Louis and other Points (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 247, 
 
 248. 
 
 600-L. "Missionary" rates. 
 
 "Missionary" rates are rates which were originally established to 
 aid in the development of a particular industry'.' 
 
 1. Fruits & Vegetables, I. & S. Docket No. 820 (1917), 43 I. C. C. Rep. 291, 319; Rates 
 on Lumber from Southern Points to the Ohio liiver crossings and Other Points 
 (1915), 34 I. O. C. Rep. 652, 659. 
 
 601. Joint rates. 
 
 601-a. a joint rate is a matter of agreement between connecting 
 
 carriers. 
 
 The question of joint through rates is a matter of agreement be- 
 tween connecting carriers, and they may or may not enter into such. 
 agreements as they may think their interests demand.^ 
 
 However, it should be noted that this is subject to the power 
 vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission by Section 1 5 of the Act, 
 to establish through route and joint rates as the maximum to be 
 charged, and prescribe the division of sucli rate when they may be 
 necessary to give effect to any provision of the Act, and the carriers 
 complained of having refused or neglected to voluntarily establish such 
 through routes and joint rates. 
 
 Joint rates may be so divided between the carriers that each re- 
 ceives less than its established local rate, or so that the full local charg(3 
 is secured by one or more of the carriers, the other party or parties 
 accepting less than local rates ; but whatever the basis of division, the 
 essential feature of such rates is that the connecting carriers haA'o 
 agreed or mutually consented to carry traffic over the connecting line 
 for a less aggregate charge than the sum of their established local 
 rates. - 
 
 In the absence of some agreement or understanding Avith a con- 
 necting line, by which a joint tariff of rates is authorized, a given 
 carrier cannot lawfully publish or apply any other rates than those 
 which it fixes for transportation between points reached by its rail- 
 road ; and the rates so fixed are the only lawful rates which such carrier 
 can charge for any transportation sservice which it may perform. 
 
§601] TEAFFIC LAW SERVICE 
 
 16 
 
 whether the traffic carried is destined to points on its own road or to 
 points on the line of some other carrier.^* 
 
 A carrier which has published and filed its rates, as the law re- 
 quires, may combine such rates with the lawfully established rates of 
 a connecting carrier or carriers, and thus announce the aggregate 
 amount for which traffic will be transported from points on its railroad 
 to points on the line of such connecting carrier or carriers; but one 
 carrier cannot lawfully add to the duly established rates of another 
 carrier any amount it pleases less than its own local rates, and publish 
 and use that sum as a rate to points on the line of such other carrier 
 without its consent. Such a through rate is not a "joint rate," for 
 joint rates can be made only by concurrence or assent ; nor is it a com- 
 bination rate, for one of its component parts has no legal existence or 
 sanction as a separate or local charge ; there must be lawful rates upon 
 each of the roads before there can be a lawful combination of rates.* 
 
 1. Southern P. Co. y. Interstate Commerce Commission (1006), 200 U. S. 536, 26 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 330, 50 L. Ed. 5S5. 
 
 2. New York, N. H. & H. Kd. Co. v. Piatt, Receiver (1S97), 7 I. C. C. Rep. 323. 
 
 3. Ibid. 
 
 4. Ibid. 
 
 601-B. Joint thkough bates to and from Pokto Rican pobts. 
 
 The Commission has stated that without deciding whether Porto 
 Rico is to be regarded as a Territory of the United States as that 
 phrase is used in Section 1 of the Act, it will recognize the validity of 
 joint through rates from points in the United States to a port or ports 
 in Porto Rico when properly concurred in by the 'water carriers, as well 
 as the validity of joint through rates from a port or ports in Porto 
 Rico to points in the United States when likewise concurred in by the 
 water lines. ^ 
 
 1. Conf. Rul. Bui. Rule 201 (June 23, 1909). 
 601-C. A caeeiee may not deny the benefit or a joint bate to manu- 
 
 FACTXJBERS ON CONNECTING LINES IN OBDEB TO POSTEE INDTJSTEIES 
 ON ITS OWN LINE. 
 
 An interstate carrier, in order to build up enterprises of the same 
 character on its own line and to prevent the trade of its local industries 
 from being displaced by the competition of manufacturers of the same 
 commodities on connecting line, cannot deny to industries on the lines 
 of such connections the benefit of through routes and joint rates ; nor 
 is the fact that the revenues of the carrier may be reduced by estab- 
 lishing such through routes and joint rates a material consideration. 
 It may be laid down as a general rule admitting no qualifications foY 
 a manufacturer or merchant who has traffic to move and is ready to 
 pay a reasonable rate for the services has the right to have it moved 
 and to have reasonable rates established for the movement, regardless 
 of the fact that the revenues of the carrier may be reduced by reason of 
 his competition with other shippers in the distant markets ; and he 
 has the right also to have the benefit of through routes and reasonable 
 joint rates to such distant markets if no "reasonable or satisfactory 
 
17 FREIGHT EATES AND CHAKGES [§601 
 
 or through" routes already exist. While the Commission's power to 
 establish a through route and joint rate is limited to particular cases 
 where a reasonable or satisfactory through route does not already 
 exist, yet such power is not confined to cases where enforcements of the 
 other provisions of the regulating statute is sought.^ 
 
 1. Cardiff Coal Co. v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 460; BUI to 
 annul Commission's requirement transferred to Commerce Court, Chicago M. & 
 St P. Ry. Co. V. I. C. C. (C. C. N. D. 111.). Not reported; Case dismissed on motion 
 on petition of carrier, Chicago M. & St P. Ry. Co. v. I. C. C. (April 3, 1911), Com- 
 merce Court case No. 17. Not reported. 
 
 601-D. PaETIES who AEE not competent in law to ESTABLISH JOINT 
 BATES FOR INTEESTATE TEANSPOETATION. 
 
 Where a railroad company, stage line and hotel association joined 
 together to form a through route and joint rates for the transportation 
 of passengers from Eastern points to the Yellowstone National Park 
 and for providing accommodations and stage transportation at such 
 reservation, the Commission held, that such parties were not competent 
 in law to form a through route and establish joint rates as provided in 
 Section 6 of the Act to Regulate Commerce.^ 
 
 1. Wylle v. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 145; Cary v. Eureka Springs 
 Ry. Co. (1897), 7 I. C. C. Repi 286. 
 
 601-E. A JOINT EATE ESTABLISHED VIA ONE ROUTE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO 
 PEOPEETY TEANSPOETED VIA ANOTHEE ROUTE. 
 
 Section 6 of the act makes it unlawful for any. common carrier, 
 party to a joint tariff, to charge or receive a greater or less compensa- 
 tion for the transportation of persons or property, or for any services 
 in connection therewith, between any point as to which a joint rate, 
 fare, or charge has been made thereon than we specified in the sched- 
 ules on file and in force at the time. Held, that under this provision 
 where a joint rate was established between terminals in different 
 States, transportation of property between such terminals for a 
 greater or less rate than that lawfully established was forbidden, not 
 only when the property was carried over the established route, but 
 when carried over any other route between the same terminals.'^ 
 
 Where an initial carrier has established with certain connecting 
 carriers a through route and joint rate between points in 'different 
 States, it cannot thereafter lawfully transport property between such 
 points via a different route, over which no rate is published, at a less 
 rate than that established for the through route.- 
 
 1. United States v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1907), 153 Fed. Rep. 625. 
 
 2. United States v. Vacuum Oil Co. (1907), 153 Fed. Rep. 598. 
 
 601-F. Legal status of a joint through bate that exceeds the aggee- 
 
 GATE OF INTEEMEDIATE RATES. 
 
 See "A joint through interstate rate which exceeds the aggregate of 
 the intermediate rates, subject to the Act, is unlawful and non-enforce- 
 able," Section 609-FF, post. 
 
§601] TKAFFIC LAW SEHVICE 
 
 18 
 
 601-G. Legal status of a joint bate that is lower than the com- 
 bination OF LOCAL BATES. 
 
 In general, joint through rates are lower than the sum of the locals 
 between two points, and obviously there can seldom be any transporta- 
 tion reason Avhy such should not be the case.^ Through rates, higher 
 than combination of local charges, are extremely rare in railroad 
 transportation, and those which have been brought to the attention of 
 the Commission have only been approved when occasioned by extraor- 
 dinary and peculiar circumstances. They have not been justified in 
 any case by the fact of water or other competition at points of junction 
 between the connecting carriers. The reason is plain. Ordinarily, 
 through shipments are carried by connecting ]-oads at rates less in 
 amount than tliose of the combined locals, and, primarily, this is so 
 because the necessities of commerce require it, and because it is com- 
 monly less expensive to the carriers to transport through traffic than 
 to perform the services involved in two local shipments to and from 
 some intermediate station; and it is hardly conceivable that the car- 
 riers' cost of through carriage can in any case be greater than that of 
 supplying the two distinct local services." 
 
 A through rate is not necessarily reasonable, however, because it 
 does not exceed the aggregate of two reasonable local rates. ^ 
 
 As stated above, that the throtigh rate should not exceed the sum 
 of the locals is a doctrine well established, but it does not follow as a 
 corollary that the sum of the locals should always be reduced to equal 
 the through rate.* 
 
 The Commission has stated that it knows of no law, either common 
 or statutory, under which the jobber is entitled to distribute commodi- 
 ties under as low or lower total freight rates as the through rates from 
 point of origin to the point of destination.' 
 
 A joint rate may be less than the sum of the local rates or either of 
 the locals in the through route.® 
 
 1. Laning-Harris Coal & Grain Co. v. Missouri P. Ry. Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 154; 
 Flaccus Glass Co. v. Cleveland. C. C: & St. L. Ky. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 333; 
 St. Louis Hay & Grain Co. v. Mobile & O. Rd. Co. (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 90; SL 
 Louis Hay & Grain Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 486; New 
 York, N. H. & H. Rd. Co. v. Piatt, Receiver (1897), 7 I. C. C. Rep. 323; CofEeyville 
 Vitrified Brick & Tile Co. v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 498; 
 Savannah Bureau of Freight & Transportation v. Charleston & S. Ry. Co. (1898), 
 7 I. C. C. Rep. 601. 
 
 2. Hilton Lumber Co. v. Wilmington & W. Rd. Co. (1901), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 17. 
 
 3. Minneapolis & St. L. Rd. Co. v. State of Minnesota, ex. rel. Railroad and Ware- 
 house Commission (1901), 186 I'. S. 257, 46 L. Ed. 1151, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900. 
 
 4. Williams & Co. v. Vicksburg S. & P. Ry. Co. fl909), 16 I. C. C. Rep, 482; Crevys v. 
 Richmond & D. Rd. Co. (1888), 1 I. C. Rep. 703, 1 I. C. C. Rep. 401. 
 
 5. Ibid. 
 
 6. Parsons v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1894), 63 Fed. Rep. 903, 11 C. C. A. 489, 27 
 r. S. S. App. 394; Affirmed Parsons v. Chicago c& N. W. Ry. Co. (1897), 167 U. S. 447, 
 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 8S7, 42 L. Ed. 231. 
 
 601-H. Legal status of tariff carrying a joint bate which does not 
 
 NAME A JUNCTION POINT. 
 
 In computing the rate for a shipment over connecting carriers, a 
 tariff of the initial carrier, naming specific rates from designated 
 
19 FKEIGHT KATES AXD CHARGES [§601 
 
 points to other designated points, which did not include a junction point, 
 does not apply, but the rate is to be based on the local tariffs of the 
 initial carrier.^ 
 
 1. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. New Roads Oil Mill & Mfg. Co. (1915), 221 Fed. Rep. 240. 
 
 601-1. A JOINT EATE SHOULD NOT BE CANCELLED BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE 
 OF INTERESTED CARRIERS TO AGREE UPON DIVISIONS THEREOF. 
 
 The Commission has repeatedly adverted to the impropriety of the 
 cancellation of joint rates because of the failure upon the part of the 
 participating carriers to agree upon divisions. It is not just to the 
 Commission to set its machinery in motion and to create a situation 
 compelling a hearing and the making of a record only to develop the 
 fact that there is such a controversy between the carriers. The proper 
 course for carriers to pursue under such cirmumstances is to advise the 
 Commission of their inabilitj'' to agree upon divisions and to submit 
 the matter to the Commission for adjustment.^ 
 
 When carriers fail to agree upon the divisions of a joint rate the 
 Commission may prescribe the proportions of sucli rate to be received 
 by each carrier participating in such joint rate. See "Jurisdiction of 
 Interstate Commerce Commission over contracts, agreements and ar- 
 rangements hcticcen carriers affecting traffic snhject to tlie Act," Sec- 
 tion 3602, post. 
 
 1. In Re Coal from Toluca, 111. (1915), 37 I. C. C. Rep. 230. 
 
 601-J. A COMBINATION RATE MAY NOT BE APPLIED T^NTII, A JOINT THROUGH 
 
 RATE IS CANCELLED. 
 
 The Commission has ruled as follows : 
 
 "A mixed carload shipment moved under a joint mixed carload 
 rate. There was also in effect at the time of the shipment a combina- 
 tion carload rate on the heavier weighed commodity in the mixture and 
 a through less-than-carload rate on the lighter weighed commodity, 
 which made a lower charge than that based on the joint mixed carload 
 rate. The joint mixed carload had not been cancelled. Upon inquiry: 
 Held, That a refund to the basis of the lower combination could not 
 lawfully be made. ' '^ 
 
 The author cannot subscribe to this ruling of the Commission for 
 the reason that it is the writer's opinion that any joint rate that ex- 
 ceeds the aggregate of the intermediate rates subject to the Act is 
 unlawful within the meaning of the aggregate-of-intermediate-rates 
 rule of the fourth section of the act. For full explanation of this view 
 see "Legal status of a joint through rate that is higher than the aggre- 
 gate of the intermediate rates subject to the provisions of thr Act." 
 Section 711-B, post. 
 
 1. Conf. Rul. Bill. Rule 423 (June 5, 1913). 
 
•j601] TEAFFIC LAW SERVICE 20 
 
 601-K. Duty of carriers to establish joint through rates. 
 
 Carriers are required to establish through routes, keep these routes 
 open and in operation, furnish the necessary facilities for transporta- 
 tion, and make reasonable and proper rules of practice as between 
 themselves and shippers.'^ 
 
 The establishment of through rates, generally speaking, tends 
 to expand markets and facilitate trade. They have been required as a 
 result of the numerous decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commis- 
 sion since the act was amended authorizing the Commission to exercise 
 that power. The amendment in itself declares a public policy estab- 
 lished by Congress which it is the duty of the Commission to protect 
 and perpetuate.^ 
 
 See "Duty of carriers subject to the act to establish through routes, 
 make reasonable rules and regulations for their operation, and furnish 
 necessary facilities for transportation," Section 1100-D, post. 
 
 1. St. Louis S. & p. Rd. Co. v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 226, 234 
 The Commission has on a number of occasions referred to the well-recognized 
 obligation resting upon carriers to transport property tendered. Merchants Freight 
 Bureau of Little Rock v. Midland V. Rd. Co. (1908)! 13 I. C. C. Rep. 243; Cedar 
 Rapids & Iowa City Railway & Light Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1908), 13 
 I. C. C. Rep. 250; Cardiff Coal Co. v. Chicago N. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 460; Chamber of Commerce of Milwaukee v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1909), 
 15 I. C. C. Rep. 460; Standard Lime & Stone Co. v. Cumberland V. Rd. Co. (1909), 
 15 I. C. C. Rep. 620; Cedar Hill Coal & Coke Co. v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co. (1910), 
 17 I. C. C. Rep. 479. 
 
 2. Blakely Southern Rd. Co. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 344, 348. 
 
 601-L. Bight of carrier to demand indemnity before concurring in 
 
 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT THROUGH RATE. 
 
 A rail carrier would be justified, in cases where the connecting 
 carrier does not possess proper resources, in demanding financial 
 securities before entering into either joint-rate arrangements or 
 accepting freight under proportional rates, the entire freight charges 
 to be collected at destination.^ 
 
 1. Truckers Transfer Co. v. Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 I. C C Ren 275 
 279. 
 
 601-M. Unreasonableness of a joint through rate thai exceeds the 
 
 COMBINATION OF A LOCAL RATE AND AN UNDEFINED PROPORTIONAL 
 RATE. 
 
 See ''Unreasonableness of a joint through rate that exceeds the 
 combination of a local ra,te and an undefined proportional rate," Sec- 
 tion 609-GG, post. 
 
 601-N. Joint rates to and from foreign countries. 
 
 In Ex Parte 74,^ covering Increased Rates, 1920, the Commission 
 stated : "Nothing herein shall be construed as authorizing any increases 
 in the proportions of through rates to or from points in foreign coun- 
 tries accruing in such foreign countries. The proportions of such rates 
 accruing within United States may, however, be increased to the extent 
 herein approved for domestic rates in the same territory." 
 
 1. In the Matter of the Applications of Carriers in Official, Southern and Western 
 Classification Territories for authority to Increase rates Ex. Parte 74 (1920) 58 
 I. C. C. Rep. 220. ' 
 
21 FREIGHT RATKS AXD CHARGES [§601 
 
 601-O. Limitation on application of joint rate. 
 
 In thie case of McGoiviii Lumber S Eport Co. v. Director General, 
 Southern Ry. Co} the Commission said: "The applicable tariffs author- 
 ized reconsignment at the through rate provided shipments moved over 
 a route via which through rates and divisions were established. But 
 whether divisions were established is immaterial, because the tariffs 
 did not specify the routes over which divisions were in effect. In Pole 
 Stock Lumber Co. v. G. £ 8. I. R. R. Co., 26 I. C. C. 451, we stated that 
 it was within the power of carriers by proper tariff provision to limit 
 rates to routes over which there were agreed divisions. But a tariff 
 provision which makes the application of rates over particular routes 
 dependent upon the existence of divisions, without stating the routes 
 with respect to which divisional arrangements are in effect, is indefinite 
 and unlawful, and imposes uncertain and unreasonable conditions upon 
 the shipper. MarMey (& Co. y. A. C. L. R. R. Co., ^2 I. C. C. 187. Noth- 
 ing in the tariff would have precluded complainant from specifically 
 routing the shipments through Louisville to Cincinnati by any of the 
 three routes north of the Ohio River herein mentioned if it had billed 
 the shipments to final destinations in the first instance. As said in 
 Van Dusen Harrington Co. v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 47 L C. C. 59, 
 'if it was defendants' purpose to restrict the application of the joint 
 rate to any particular route and the reconsigning pri^dleges authorized 
 in connection therewith to any particular point, it should have been 
 done by clear and unequivocal language. ' ' ' 
 
 See "Right of shippers to use any through route available under 
 the tariff rates," section 602-0, post, and "Routes and Routing,"^ 
 chapter 11, post. 
 
 1. McGowin Lumber & Export Co. v. Director Genei-al, Southern Ky. Co. (1920), 59 
 I. C. C. 23S, 240; Watters-Tong Lumber Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1920), 59 
 I. G. C. 229, 231; Meeds Lumber Co. v. Director General, Alabama, T. & M. Rd. Co. 
 (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 243, 244. 
 
 601-P. Participation merely in joint rates does not make connect- 
 ing carriers partners so as to make them jointly and 
 severally responsible for unjust discrimination. 
 
 In Central Rd. Co. of N. J. v. United States'^ the United States 
 Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Brand eis, stated: "It is urged that 
 while the undue prejudice found results directly from the individual 
 acts of Southern and mid-western carriers in granting the privilege 
 locally, the appellants, as their partners, make the prejudice possible 
 by becoming the instruments through which it is applied. Discrimi- 
 nation may, of course, be practised by a combination of connecting 
 carriers as well as by an individual railroad ; and the Commission has 
 ample power under Section 3 to remove discrimination so practised. 
 See St. Ijouis Southwestern R. Co. v. United States, 245 U. S. 136, 144, 
 62 L. ed. 199, 207, 38 Sup. Ct. Kep. 49. But participation merely in 
 joint rates does not make connecting carriers partners. They can be 
 held jointly and severally responsible for unjust discrimination only 
 if each carrier has participated in some way in that which causes the 
 unjust discrimination; as where a lower joint rate is given to one 
 locality than to another similarly situated. Penn Ref. Co. v. Western 
 New York S P. R. Co., 208 IJ. S. 208, 221, 22, 225, 52 L. ed. 456, 462, 
 
§§601, 602] TEAFFIC LAW SERVICE 22 
 
 463, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 268. Compare East Tennessee, V. d G. R. Co. v. 
 Interstate Commission, 181 U. S. 1, 18, 45 L. ed. 719, 825, 21 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 516. If this were not so, the legality or illegality of a carrier's 
 practice would depend, not on its owij act, but on the acts of its con-- 
 necting carriers. If that rule should prevail, only uniformity in local 
 privileges and practices, or the cancelation of all joint rates, could 
 afford to carriers the assurance that they were not in some way violat- 
 ing the provisions of Section 3. What Congress sought to prevent by 
 that section, as originally enacted, was not differences between local- 
 ities in transportation rates, facilities, and privileges, but unjust dis- 
 crimination between them by the same carrier or carriers. Neither the 
 Transportation Act 1920, February 28, 1920, nor any earlier amen- 
 datory Legislation, has changed, in this respect, the purpose or scope 
 of Section 3. Reversed." 
 
 1. Central Ed. Co. of N. J. v. United States (1921), 66 L. Ed. 91, 94, U. S. ^ 
 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. . 
 
 602. Through Rates. 
 
 602-A. Only one legal rate can exist between any two points at 
 
 ANY GIVEN TIME. 
 
 The Commission has held that there can be but one legal rate be- 
 tween two points— a very simple enunciation of a fundamental prin- 
 ciple. This rate must be (a) the local rate if over one road, or (b) the 
 joint rate over a through route composed of two or more roads which 
 have agreed to a joint rate, or (c) a combination of separately estab- 
 lished rates applicable on through business over a through route which 
 does not enjoy a joint rate.^ 
 
 Two or more connecting carriers may establish a joint rate only 
 upon notice of thirty days or under special permission. A joint rate, 
 when duly established and in force, becomes the only lawful rate for 
 through transportation.- 
 
 A joint rate from point of origin to destination of a shipment is 
 the lawful rate applicable to that movement whether the rate be con- 
 fined to 'the Hue of one carrier or be a joint rate applying over the lines 
 of two or more carriers.^ 
 
 A specific through rate is the lawful rate for a through shipment, 
 even though some combination of rates may make lower, and the car- 
 rier may not charge the higher through rate upon one shipment and 
 the lower combination rate upon another shipment of the same kind 
 between the same points at the same time.* 
 
 The practice on the part of carriers of accepting and transporting 
 through shipments, as to which no joint rate applies, upon rates made 
 up^by combination of the rates of the several carriers participating in 
 the' movement, and of collecting, as delivering carriers, the aggregate 
 charges of the several carriers upon such shipments, and of account- 
 ing to such carriers for their several portions of such charges, is prac- 
 tically universal. That custom has the same binding effect as a joint 
 rate, both as between carriers themselves and as between carriers and 
 shippers. Therefore, carriers may apply to through shipment rates 
 
-'■i FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§602 
 
 to and from points to and from which there is no applicable published 
 joint rate, by using lawfully published bases, locals and proportionals 
 in connection with other lawfully published tariffs/' 
 
 A through rate is a unit from point of origin to destination even 
 though it is made up of separately established rates." 
 
 In the case of Horton v. Tonopah S G. R. Co.'' the Court said : " A 
 merchant doing business in distant localities is entitled to know 
 before he ships his goods what the freight charges will be. With this 
 infomiation he can decide whether to make the shipment or not. If 
 it were permissible to change the rate on such a consignment after the 
 shipper had parted with his possession, a serious and Avholly unneces- 
 sary element of uncertainty and hazard would be introduced into, the 
 business. 
 
 * *= * * *_* * * 
 
 "Unquestionably the schedule of transportation rates filed with 
 the Interstate Commerce Commission, posted and published in con- 
 formity with the statute, together with the waj^bill and the fact that 
 the lumber was shipped, constitute a contract. It is an agreement to 
 perform a certain amount of service for a definite compensation. ^ Any 
 change therein after the transportation begins, without the consent of 
 both parties, would be unjust. With respect to such contracts the 
 Interstate Commerce Commission has repeatedly said that changes in 
 the schedule of rates will not be peimitted to retroact on' freight move- 
 ments commenced before the change was made. 
 
 ^o"- 
 
 "The contract was entire and indivisible, so much so that, if 
 through any act of the shipper the shipment was not completed, the 
 carrier was entitled to his full charges; and by issuing the bill of 
 lading the carrier binds itself to deliver the goods at their desti- 
 nation." 
 
 The purpose of Congress in the enactment of the Elkins Law was 
 to secure uniform freight rates to all shippers, and its provisions are 
 violated by the giving or receiving of any rebate or concession 
 whereby any property shall be transported at a less rate by any inter- 
 state carrier than that named in the tariffs published and filed by such 
 carrier, whether by direct agreement between shipper and carrier or 
 indirectly by "any device whatever"; and whether a railroad com- 
 pany has published and filed a schedule of rates on interstate ship- 
 ments to points beyond its own line said section applies to such rates 
 equally with those between points on its own road.* 
 
 Through shipments of iron pipe were made from points in New 
 Jersey and Pennsylvania to Winnipeg, Canada, part over the Balti- 
 more & Ohio Railroad and part over the Philadelphia & Reading to 
 the Great Lakes; thence by the Mutual Transit Company, a water 
 carrier, to Duluth; and thence by the Great Northern Railway and its 
 connections. There was no through joint rate published or filed, but 
 there was a joint rate of 24i/^ cents per 100 pounds between the initial 
 points and Duluth established and filed by participating carriers, and 
 one of 25 cents per 100 pounds between Duluth and Winnepeg filed by 
 the Great Northern Railway Company. Held, That the lawful rate for 
 the through carriage was the sum of such two rates, or 49V2 cents per 
 100 pounds, and that under the interstate commerce law neither line 
 
§602] TBAFFIC LAW SERVICE 24 
 
 over which the shipments passed could lawfully charge a greater or less 
 sum than was specified in the filed and published schedule of rates to 
 which it was a party.* 
 
 When a complaint involves charges applicable to a through ship- 
 ment the through rate or charge must be brought in issue and the par- 
 ticipating carriers must be made defendants. When the through rate 
 or charge is made up of separately established rates of charges, appli- 
 cable to the through business, the through rate or charge must be 
 attacked as violative of the act, although the violation may be believed 
 to be occasioned by a particular factor or factors thereof ; in such case 
 the complainant should be prepared at the hearing to prove the unlaw- 
 fulness of the through rate itself and that this is due to a particular 
 factor or factors.^" 
 
 Proportional rates are necessarily parts of through rates and 
 differ from local rates used as parts of through rates in that before the 
 proportional rate may be attacked at all there must be an allegation 
 that the through rate is unreasonable because of the unreasonableness 
 of the particular proportional rate; whereas local rates, as such, may 
 be attacked separately when used separately." 
 
 Proportional rates as such may not be attacked as unreasonable 
 OP otherwise in violation of the act unless the through rates are also 
 attacked, whether there be a claim for reparation or not, for even in 
 cases where reparation is not demanded the proportional rate could 
 not be considered by itself, as it is necessarily always a part of a 
 through rate and can not be used alone.^^ 
 
 Local rates, however, when used as parts of through rates par- 
 take of the nature of proportional rates, and may be regarded as, in 
 effect, local and proportional rates. So far as rates are strictly local 
 they may be brought in question without questioning the propriety of 
 any other rate; in so far as they are used in through transportation 
 they should be treated as other proportional rates and may not be con- 
 sidered unless the through rates be attacked as a whole.^*' 
 
 1. Laning-Harria Coal & Grain Co. v. Missouri P. Ey Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C- Rep. 154. 
 
 2. Rule 55, Tariff Circular 18- A. 
 
 3. Ibid. 
 
 4. Morgan v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 525. 
 
 5. Rule 5, a, Tariff Circular 18-A. 
 
 6. Commercial Club of Omaha v. Anderson & S. R. Ry. Co. (1913) 27 I C C Rep 
 302, 318; cited, People's Fuel & Supply Co. v. Grand Trunk W. Ry. Co (1914) 30 
 I. O. Rep. 657, 659. See also Poeblman v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry Co (1914) ' 30 
 I. C. C. Rep. 89, 92. ^ ■ \ ^, 
 
 7. Horton v. Tonopah & G. Rd. Co. (1914), 225 Fed. Rep. 406, 410. 
 
 8. United States v. Standard Oil (3o. (1907), 148 Fed. Rep. 719. ' 
 
 9. United (States v. Wood (1906), 145 Fed. Rep. 405. 
 
 10. Stevens Grocer Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1916), 42 I. C. C. Rep. 396 398 
 citmg Commercial Club of Omaha v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1913) 27 I O C 
 
 Rep. 302; Scott-Mayer Commission Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P.' Ry. Co'. (1913)' 28 
 T S'^ T, P'o^^' Poehlman Bros. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1914)! 30 
 1. O C Rep. 89, 
 
 11. Stevens Grocer Co. v. St Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1916), 42 I. C. C. Rep 396 398 
 citing State of lovi'a v. Chicago, St P. M. & O. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 64! 
 
 12. Stevens Grocer Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1916), 42 I. C. C. Rep. 396, 398. 
 
 13. Ibid. 
 
25 FEEIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§602 
 
 602-B. The legal rate applicable to ait iisttjerstate shipment is the 
 
 PUBLISHED THROUGH KATE IN EFFECT AT THE TIME THE SHIP- 
 MENT IS RECEIVED BY THE CARRIER FOR TRANSPORTATION AND 
 OVER THE ROUTE WHICH IT IS TO MOVE. 
 
 In case a shipment has been made over two or more railroads 
 which have not, as to the journey the shipment is to take, filed with the 
 Commission a notice of through route and joint rate, as required by 
 section 6 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, does the shipment take the 
 sum of the local rates of the various lines over which it is moved, as 
 such locals may be established at the time it is received by the initial 
 carrier, or is it subject to changes in locals which may be made before 
 the shipment reaches the lines making such changes? That is to say: a 
 shipment is made over the A line to a connection with the B line, and 
 thence over the B line to destination. The B line changes its locals 
 after the shipment is billed at the point of origin, but before it was 
 passed beyond the A line. Is the shipment subject to such change in 
 rate of the B line, or does it move under rates in effect at the time it 
 began its journey? 
 
 A careful consideration of all the factors entering into this problem 
 shows that, in the last analysis, the answer must depend upon a question 
 of fact, this question being: Have the carriers over whose lines the 
 shipment is to move made an arrangement, express or implied, for a 
 through route? If a through route has been so formed, then the rate 
 charged must be a through rate, and the shipment will move upon the 
 rate existing at the time it is billed. If, however, no through route has 
 been formed, then the shipment will move, not upon one through 
 journey, but upon a succession of journeys, and will be subject to any 
 change in rates made by any carrier into whose possession the shipment 
 has not been received. 
 
 It needs no citation of authorities to prove that, at common law, a 
 carrier may confine its business entirely to its own line. It need 
 not make its line part of any through route to or from a point off its 
 line unless it so chooses. As was pointed out by the United States Su- 
 preme Court in Atchison, T. & 8. F. By. Co. v. Denver & N. 0. Rd. Co.^ 
 a carrier might, if it so pleased, receive freight from other carriers at 
 any junction point in precisely the same capacity that it would receive 
 freight from a wholesale house or other shipper doing business at such 
 junction point. In such case, under the common law, its rates would 
 apply as on the date of its billing, rather than upon the date of the 
 billing by a connecting line. 
 
 There is no question that, where a joint rate has been made, and 
 filed as such, over any through route, such rate takes effect as one 
 charge, and shipments must be carried through on the rate in force at 
 the time of the billing. 
 
 There may, however, be through routes without joint rates. A 
 joint rate is simply a through rate, every part of which has been made 
 by express agreement between the carriers making the through route. 
 The joint rate is a rate over a through route, but it is not the only 
 through rate recognized by the Act and the decisions. 
 
 Among the important amendments made in 1906 to the Interstate 
 Commerce Act was that which makes it the duty of every carrier sub- 
 
§602] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 26 
 
 ject to the Act "to establish through routes and just and reasonable 
 rates applicable thereto." (Sec. 1.) It is not necessary hei'e to at- 
 tempt to discover the full force of these words. Their significance, 
 however, is not to be grasped without consideration of that latter por- 
 tion of the Act (Sec. 6) which expressly recognizes the possibility of a 
 through route without a joint rate, and which, after directing the publi- 
 cation and filing of local rates and of joint rates, provides for still other 
 rates in the following language: "7/ no joint rate over the through 
 route has been established, the several carriers in such through route 
 shall file, print, and keep open to public inspection as aforesaid the 
 separately established rates, fares, and charges applied to the through 
 transportation." 
 
 The reasons for this rule are at least two : (1) The policy of the 
 law that every route and every service shall have a published rate 
 equally known and equally available to all patrons of the carriers ; and 
 (2) the policy of the law that carriers otherwise not subject to the Act 
 shall be, when participating in interstate business, subject to the Act to 
 Regulate Commerce. 
 
 A through route is a continuous line of railway formed by an 
 arrangement, express or implied, between connecting carriers. It 
 must have a rate for every service it offers, and, as the route is a new 
 unit — one line formed by two or more connecting lines — so its rate for 
 every service is a unit, even though it be divided between the several 
 carriers arranging themselves into the through route. As was said by 
 the Commission in Brady v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,^ "Through carriage 
 implies a through rate. " This is equally true whether the through rate 
 be published as a whole by the joint action of the connecting carriers, or 
 in the absence of a joint agreement, be published in portions by the 
 several carriers. The through route being' one, a charge for a service 
 over it is a charge for a single service, all the terms of which must be 
 fixed at one and the same time; that is, at the time the initial carrier 
 enters into the engagement for the service. The rate is either a joint 
 through rate, made by arrangement by the parties to the through route, 
 or it is a combination through rate consisting of "the separately estab- 
 lished rates, fares and charges applied to the through transportation. ' ' 
 This sum, however, is a single rate for a single service, and a contract 
 for through transportation is a contract for transportation at the 
 through rate, whether jointly or separately established, in force at the 
 time the shipment is billed.* 
 
 Tariffs cannot be given a retroactive effect; they cannot be made 
 to apply to conditions other than those existing upon the date when 
 8uch tariff's become effective. A combination through rate is as binding, 
 definite and absolute as a joint through rate; and all of the conditions, 
 regulations and privileges obtaining as to any factor in such combina- 
 tion rate for through shipment, at the time of initial shipment upon 
 such combination through rate, must be adhered to, and cannot be 
 varied as to that shipment during the period of transportation of such 
 shipment to its final destination.* 
 
 In a given case, freight was received by a carrier, and bills of lading 
 were issued therefor on December 21 and 29, 1908. The freight was 
 actually moved on January 1, 1909, on which date a lower rate went 
 into effect. Held, That the rate in effect on the date the carrier re- 
 ceived the property for transportation is the lawful rate.^ 
 
 We therefore have the following rule : 
 
-~ FREIGHT EATES AND CHAKGES [§602 
 
 ' ' If no specific rate from point of origin to destination of a through 
 shipment is provided, and no specific manner of constructing combina- 
 tion rate for it is prescribed, the lowest combination of rates applicable 
 via the route over which the shipment moves is the lawful rate for that 
 shipment.^ 
 
 ' ' Such combination through rate must be treated as a unit from the 
 date of original shipment to the date of its arrival at destination, and 
 the rate applied must be the combination of the rates which exist upon 
 the date of original shipment. All of the conditions, regulations and 
 privileges obtaining as to any factor in such combination rate for 
 through shipment, at the time of original shipment upon such combina- 
 tion through rate, must be adhered to, and cannot be varied as to that 
 shipment during the period of transportation of such shipment to its 
 final destination. A local or proportional rate 'in' cannot be absorbed, 
 diminished or affected by any 'out' rate not in effect at the time when 
 the traffic moved upon such local or proportional rate."'' 
 
 A through freight rate duly filed by the initial carrier with the 
 Interstate Commerce Commission became on its eiTective date the law- 
 ful through joint rate, and the only one which the connecting carrier 
 might lawfully receive or the shipper properly pay, where such connect- 
 ing carrier received the new tariff and stamped and filed it, and, without 
 giving any formal notice to the initial carrier of its acceptance, which 
 was not at that time required by the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
 acted upon such tariff, insisting that the new rate was the legal one, 
 although it permitted a shipper to make pajinents at the old rate.* 
 
 While reconsignment is, as a general rule, associated with the appli- 
 cation of a specific through rate, which is often less than the sum of the 
 intermediate rates in and out of the point of original destination, and 
 largely derives its value from that fact, this rule is not without ex- 
 ception. Not infrequently shipments are reconsigned on basis of the 
 sum of the local rates, under authority of tariffs which provide for 
 reconsignment at the through rate, and this may be done without viola- 
 tion of such tariffs, for the reason that no specific through rate from 
 the point of origin to the new destination is in effect. The through 
 rate in such cases is made by combining two or more rates instead of 
 l)y the use of a single rate factor, but the reconsignment rules and 
 charges apply to the same extent as if a specific through rate Avere in 
 force. In one instance where that situation existed the Commission 
 decided that the facts did not justify it in holding as unlawful a reason- 
 able reconsignment charge.® 
 
 Upon inquiry as to whether a through distance tariff rate should 
 be applied in cases where a combination rate made up of a rate to an 
 intermediate point and a distance tariff rate beyond, makes a lower 
 through charge : Held, That the through rate is the only laAvful rate.^*' 
 
 ]. Atchison. T. & S. F. Ey. Co. v. Denver & N. O. Rd. Co. (1SS3), HO U. S. 66T, 2S; 
 
 L. Ed. 291, 4 Sup. Ot. Kep. 185. 
 l'. Erad.v v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1888), 2 I. C. C, Rep. 131, .3 I. C. Rep. 78. 
 ?,. In the JIatter of Through Routes and Through Kates (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 1«4. 
 
 4. Ibid. 
 
 .-. Conf. Rul. Bui., Rule 172 (May 4, 1009). 
 
 (■>. Tariff Circular IS-A. Rvile .">, c. 
 
 7. 11)1(1. See Rutter & Co. v. Chicago & X. W. Ry. Co. (191.5). r.C, I. C. C. Rep. 272. 
 
 5. Davton Coal ^ Iron Co. v. cnncinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ky. Co. (191.1). 2;j9 U. S. 446. 
 :M\ Slip. Ct. Rep. 187. CO I-. Ed. 37."). 
 
 9. Doran & Co. v. Nashville. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1915K 3,3 I. C. C. Rep. 523, 527; 
 Less Carload Freight Reconsi.iiiimeut Privileges (I. & S. Docket, No. 434) (1914), 
 .32 1. C. C. Rep. 8.-;. 
 10. Conf. Rul. I'.ul., Rule 443 (October 7. 1913)). 
 
§602] TKAFFIC LAW SERVICE 28 
 
 602-C. Carriers may specify basing points or factors for construct- 
 ing COMBINATION RATE. 
 
 A carrier may provide in its tariffs that, in the absence of a specific 
 rate from point of origin to destination of a through shipment, com- 
 bination rate to or via certain points will be made upon specified basing 
 point or points, or by using certain specified tariffs or rates, and the 
 combination rate so specified ^vill be the lawful rate for that shipment.^ 
 
 A carrier may incorporate in a tariff the following rule :- 
 
 Rates to destinations or from points of origin not shown in this tariff will, in the 
 absence or specific rate from point of origin to destination, be made by adding to the 
 rates shown in this tariff the rates shown in other tariffs lawfully on file with the 
 Interstate Commerce Commission, but if the rate so made exceeds the rate to or from 
 a point beyond on the same direct line or route as shown in this tariff, the latter rate 
 will apply. 
 
 NOTE. — If a rate applies to or from a group or zone or blanket of points of 
 origin or of destination, such rate will be considered as "named" or "shown" from 
 each point within such properly described group, zone, or blanket. 
 
 When desired the following may be added :^ 
 
 Bates so made will apply via all routes authorized under this tariff to or from 
 contiguous points of origin or of destination. 
 
 If shipment moves to or from a point of origin or of destination 
 or via a junction point with connecting or branch line at which inter- 
 change is made directly intermediate to the base point upon which the 
 lowest combination m.akes, such combination must be applied; and it is 
 not necessary to haul the shipment to such base point and back again 
 to or through point of origin or destination or such junction point.* 
 
 1. Tariff Circular 18-A, Hole 5, b. 
 
 2. Ibid. 
 
 3. Ibid. 
 
 4. Ibid. 
 
 '502-D. Rate to apply ix the absence of a joint rate or a specific 
 
 METHOD OF CONSTRUCTING THROUGH RATE. 
 
 If no specific rate from point of origin to destination of a through 
 shipment is provided, and no specific manner of constructing combina- 
 tion rate for it is prescribed, the lowest combination of rates applicable 
 via the route over which the shipment moves is the lawful rate for that 
 shipment.^ 
 
 In the case of Chicago, B. & Q. By. Co., v. United States,^ the Cir- 
 cuit Court of Appeals, per Mr. Circuit Judge Hook, stated : 
 
 "If an initial carrier accepts traffic for transportation and issues 
 its bill of lading over a route made up of connecting roads for which 
 no joint through rate has been published and filed with the Commission, 
 the lawful rate to be charged is the sum of the established local rates 
 published and filed by the individual roads ; or if there is a local rate 
 over one road and a joint rate over the others for the remainder of the 
 route, all published and filed with the Commission, the lawful through 
 rate to be charged is the sum of the local and joint rates. By failing to 
 establish or concur in a joint through rate for traffic accepted for inter- 
 state transportation, each participating carrier impliedly asserts that 
 the rate which it has duly established, published, and filed for its own 
 line shall be a component part of the through rate to be charged. It is 
 competent for carriers, if conditions justify it, to make their propor- 
 tions of the through rate less than the local charges upon their o^vn 
 
29 FEEIGHT KATES AND CHARGES [^^602 
 
 lines, but in so doing they should observe legal methods, and if no action 
 to that end is taken they in effect adhere to the rates established, 
 published, and filed by them as applying not only to local but to 
 through traffic. The initial carrier which receives traffic and issues a 
 bill of lading to ultimate destination should be held to have done so in 
 view of the only rates which its connections are authorized by law to 
 charge. This principle was recognized by the Commission as early as 
 March 23, 1899 (2 Interst. Com. Com'n. E. 656), when it said: 
 
 " 'When no other tariff is filed, the rates on traffic carried over 
 or upon more than one line will be the sum of the local rates of the 
 individual roads, or of local and joint rates, as the case may be.' 
 
 "By routing and billing the traffic over the connecting lines the 
 initial carriers adopts and is bound by their lawful rates. In the con- 
 cert of action, in the successive receipt and movement of the traffic by 
 the connecting carriers under through bills of lading for continuous 
 carriage is manifested the 'common arrangement' contemplated by 
 the act of Congress. No previous formal contract is necessary to bring 
 the carriers under the provisions of the law. Thus, in Cincinnati, etc. 
 Railway v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 IT. S. 184, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 700, 40 L. Ed. 935, it was held that the arrangement constituting 
 participation by a local carrier in interstate commerce is effected by its 
 receipt and transportation of interstate traffic under through bills of 
 lading. ' ' 
 
 Shipments over connecting lines, even though moving on through 
 bills of lading, must, under the Interstate Commerce Act, take the law- 
 fully established local rate in force on each line, where there is no 
 established joint through rate.* 
 
 An agreement with a single shipper for shipments over connecting 
 lines having no joint through rate, at less than the established local 
 rates of each road, is void and does not prevent the collecting of the 
 established local rate by such carrier, under section 6 of the Interstate 
 Commerce Act providing the method of establishing rates and making 
 it unlawful for a carrier to depart from any rate so established and in 
 force at the time and requiring connecting carriers agreeing on joint 
 through rates to file schedules with the Interstate Commerce Commis- 
 sion, and prohibiting any deviation from an established joint rate while 
 in force.* 
 
 The Missouri Pacific Railway Company received carloads of beer 
 in St. Louis for transportation to Leadville, Colo., issuing receipts 
 therefor showing contents, weight, destination, and consignee, and that 
 the shipment was received subject to its uniform bill of lading, to be 
 delivered to the consignee and routed over the line of the Denver & Rio 
 Grande Railroad Company. At Pueblo, Colo., it turned the cars over 
 to the latter company, which moved them to Leadville on a local way- 
 bill, showing the consignor and consignee and the rate and charge of 
 each company. The two companies had an established joint rate be- 
 tween St. Louis and Leadville, but they constantly exchanged traffic 
 between such points; each charging its own local rate to and from 
 Pueblo. The total freight was collected by one, either from the con- 
 signor or consignee, and daily settlements were made between them. 
 Held, That such course of business was in fact the establishment of a 
 
§602] TEAFFIC LAW SERVICE 
 
 30 
 
 "through route" between the two points, within the meaning of section 
 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act, which requires the filing of schedules 
 of the "separately established rates" applied by a carrier on through 
 traffic, when there is a through route, but no joint rate, and that such 
 rate established by the Denver Company was within the terms of the 
 Act, and as a part of the through charge was subject to regulation by 
 the Interstate Commerce Commission under Section 15 of the Act.* 
 
 In the case of Missouri P. Rd. Co.y. Rea-Patterson Milling Co.,^ the 
 Circuit Court of Appeals, per Mr. Justice Lewis, stated: "The Mis- 
 souri Pacific Railroad Company received from defendant in erroi? at 
 Coft'eyville, Kansas, a carload of flour for shipment to Smithland, 
 Texas. The car went to destination over the Missouri Pacific, Kansas 
 City Southern, and Black Bayou Bail roads. There was disagreement 
 as to the amount to be charged by the carrier. The shipper paid 
 $166.89 ; the carrier claimed $207.74, and brought this action to recover 
 the difference. When the trial came on a stipulation settled all material 
 facts not admitted in the pleadings, and the court determined the re- 
 sultant issue of law in favor of the defendant shipper. 
 
 "There was no through rate, and it is agreed that the proper 
 charge was to be made up by a combination of the lowest intermediate 
 rates applicable to the shipment. The Kansas City Southern hauled 
 the car into, through and to a point beyond Texarkana, and a correct 
 determination of the issue turns solely on the inquiry as to what rate 
 between that station and destination should be applied in making up 
 the combination. 
 
 ' ' The stipulation of the fact recites : 
 
 " 'That the Kansas City Southern tariff published a rate of eight 
 cents per one hundred pounds on such commodities from Texarkana, 
 Arkansas, to Smithland, Texas, which tariff further provides : 
 
 " 'Rates named herein apply only on traffic Texarkana, Ark.- 
 
 Tex. (proper) ' 
 
 " 'For such commodities moving into Texarkana from other points, 
 including Coffeysdlle, and from thence to Smithland, Texas, the tariff 
 of the Kansas City Southern provided a rate of eighteen cents. ' 
 
 "It was agreed in the stipulation that if the eighteen cent rate was 
 applicable to the shipment t"he plaintiff' was entitled to judgment for 
 $40.85, and if the lower rate was applicable nothing- further was due. 
 
 ' ' We do not doubt that the eight cent rate applied only to shipments 
 originating at Texarkana, and that the eighteen cent rate A\'as unreason- 
 able. T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 27 Sup. 
 Ct. :J50, 51 L. Ed. 533, 9 Ann. Cas. 1075 : T. & P. Rv. Co. v. American T. 
 & T. Co., 234 U. S. 138, 34 Sup. Ct. 885, 58 L. Ed. 1255. The judgemnt is 
 reversed." 
 
 1. Tariff-Circular ISA, Rule 5, o; Pecns & X, T. Ky. Co. v. Porter (Tex. 1913), 156 
 S. W. 207, 272. 
 
 2. CUicago, B. & i). Ry. Co. v. Tnitert States (1007), 157 Fed, Rep, 830, 833. 
 
 3. Kansas City S. Ry. Co, y. Albers Commission Co. (1912), 223 U, S, 573, 56 L. 
 Ed. .lac. 32 Sup, Ct. Rep. SKJ. 
 
 4. Ibid, 
 
 5. Denver & R. G. Rd, Co. y. Intcistate Commeroe Commission (1912^, 195 Fed. Rep, 
 OGS; holding order of Commission to be yalid in Baer Bros. Mercantile Co. v, 
 Mis.souri P. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I, C. C. Rep. 225, in wliicb case carriers were or- 
 dered liy the Commission to reduce that portion of a combination through rate 
 wlilch apijlied to the haul from I'uelilo, Colo., to Leadyille, Colo,, on beer moving 
 from -St. Louis, Mo., on the ground that such factor of the through rate was un- 
 reasonable. 
 
 6. Missouri P, Rd. Co. v. Rea-Patterson Milling Co. (1921), 273 Fed. Rep. 518, 519, 
 
31 FHEIGHT RATES AND CH.ARGES [§602 
 
 602-E. Right of a shipper to consiux interstate traffic to ax ixter- 
 
 MEDIATE POIXT, ASSUME CUSTODY OF THE SHIP5IEXT, EITHER 
 ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE, AND TPIEX REBILI, THE SAME TO 
 DESTINATION, WHERE THE JOINT THROUGH INTERSTATE RATE IS 
 HIGHER THAN' THE AGGREGATE OF THE IXTERMEDIATE RATES. 
 
 See "Status of transportation ivithAn a State of traffic originatinf/ 
 at a point without the State, or intended for ultimate delivery at a point 
 without the State, where the State movement is under a neiv hill of 
 lading, or contract of shipment, and the tiaffic is not u)doaded at th& 
 intermediate point," Section 400-D, ante. 
 
 602-F. COMBIX^ATIOX OF JOIXT RATE TO COMMOX^ POIX'T AXD LOCAL RATE 
 
 BEYOX^^D. 
 
 In order to secure uniformity in practice and understandings, 
 and to remove the cause of many comijlaints, the Commission decided 
 that, when a joint through rate is the same to two or more points, and 
 rate on through shipment to local station, to which no specific joint 
 through rate applies, is made up by combination of such joint through 
 rate to common points, and local rate beyond, the rate for through ship- 
 ment must be determined by calculating the joint through rate to the 
 point from which the lower local rate applies to point of destination, 
 and adding thereto such local rate. For example : Joint through tariff 
 names the same rates from certain Eastern points to Chicago and Mil- 
 waukee. If shipment is destined to a point to which the local rate is 
 less from Milwaukee than from Chicago, the rate applied should be the 
 joint through rate to Milwaukee, plus the local rate from Milwaukee 
 to destination, and unless the lines of delivering carrier reach both 
 Chicago and Milwaukee, the shipment should move via Mihvaukee. If 
 the local rate from Chicago to point of destination is lower than from 
 Milwaukee, the rate should be the joint through rate to Chicago, plus 
 the local rate from Chicago to destination, and unless the lines of the 
 delivering carrier reach both Milwaukee and Chicago the shipment 
 should move via Chicago.^ 
 
 Bates for outbound through movements from such local stations 
 and under like circumstances must be applied on the same basis where 
 the joint through rates are the same from two or more points. 
 
 This does not authorize any carrier to apply to transportation over 
 its lines any rate except those stated in its own lawfully published tariffs 
 or in the lawfully published joint tariffs in which it has concurred. If a 
 carrier desires to "meet the rate" of a competitor, it must do so by 
 lawfully including in its own tariffs such specific rates, proportional 
 or otherwise, as may be necessarj'' so to do.- 
 
 The Commission suggested that shippers can assist in avoiding 
 mistakes and misunderstandings, by calling attention to the rate that 
 should apply in such cases as come under this rule by indicating it on 
 shipping bill in connection with routing instructions; for instance, 
 ' ' Rate on Milwaukee. ' ' This is, however, merely a suggestion, and does 
 not relieve the agents of carriers from the responsibility of quoting and 
 applying the'correct lawful rate.^ 
 
 This rule does not apply in case where shipment has reached its 
 destination as originallj- given by shipper and has been recognizt'd, 
 
§602] TRAFFIC LAW SEEVICE 32 
 
 except wlien tariff contains reconsignment rule that provides for such 
 application.* 
 
 This rule must not apply in any case where there is an applicable 
 specific joint through rate from point of origin to point of destination.^ 
 
 1. Conf. Rul. Bui., Rule 215 (March 18, 1907). This rule applied in Larrowe MUling 
 Co. V. CMcago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1910), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 443; same, 17 I. O. C. Rep. 
 548; ReWberg & Co. v. Erie Rd. Co. (1910), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 508. 
 
 2. Conf. Rul. Bui., Rule 215 (March 18, 1907). 
 
 3. Ibid. 
 
 4. Ibid. 
 
 5. Ibid.. 
 
 602-Gr. Rates that aee not on fh^e with the Interstate Commerce 
 Commission are not lawfitl factors in constructing 
 
 THROUGH interstate KATES. 
 
 Rates that are not on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission 
 cannot be used in constructing a through interstate charge.^ Neither 
 are such rates lawful factors to be considered by the Commission in 
 the determination of the reasonableness of a joint rate.' 
 
 1. Hagar Iron Co. v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 529. 
 
 2. Milbum Wagon Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 144. 
 
 602-H. Inteb-classification territories rates and inter-rate terri- 
 tories rates. 
 
 4 
 
 Combinations which make lower through rates should not be 
 exceeded, even though the factors comprising the combination are 
 governed by different classifications.^ It must not be assumed that a 
 basing line for rates may be established and be made an impassable 
 barrier for through rates. ^ 
 
 When through rates are published from points in one classification 
 territory to points in a territory in which a different classification ap- 
 plies they must be made subject to one or the other of such classifica- 
 tions. It will be seen from the above that where such through rates 
 are approximately equal to the sums of the intermediate rates of cor- 
 responding classes the charges computed at the through rate subject to 
 the higher classification will exceed in some instances the aggregate of 
 the charges to and from points at thfe boundaries of the classification 
 territories computed at rates subject to one classification up to the 
 boundary line and to a different one beyond. This can be avoided only 
 by reducing the through rates or increasing the intermediate rates, or 
 by both processes, so that the former will in no instance produce a 
 greater total charge on a through shipment than the aggregate of the 
 charges obtained by the use of rates to and from an intermediate point; 
 or by publishing commodity rates to apply on various articles on which 
 the charges on the basis of the through rate would not exceed the 
 aggregate of the charges based on the intermediate rates.^* 
 
 In Western Cement Rates'^ the Commission stated: "Where a 
 producing point is located upon the boundary line between territories, 
 the proper scale or scales applied depends "upon the direction of the 
 movement. In such cases the producing point, shall be considered to be 
 
33 FKEIGHT KATES AND CHARGES [§602 
 
 in that territory within which the point of destination is located except 
 that, if the point of desination is not in either of the territories whose 
 common boundary passes through the producing point, then the pro- 
 ducing point shall be considered to be within the territory which is 
 bounded by such common boundary line nearest to the point of destina- 
 tion. * * * ^ similar rule mutatis mutandis, will be applied to 
 destinations located upon boundary lines." 
 
 1. Memphis Freight Bureau v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1910), 39 I. C. C. Rep. 
 224; Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. Baltimore & O. S. W. Rd. Co. (1915), 35 I. C. 
 C. Rep. 14. 
 
 2. Burnham, Hanna, Hunger Dry Goods Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ut. Co. (1908), 14 
 I. C. C. Rep. 299, 314. 
 
 3. Through Rates to Points In Louisiana and Texas (1916), 38 L C. C Rep. 153, 159. 
 
 4. Western Cement Rates: In the Matter of Rates on Cement between Points in the 
 Western Trunk Line Territory and between Points in the Western Trunk Line Ter- 
 ritory and Adjacent Territories (1918), 48 I. C. C. Rep. 201, 24s. 
 
 602-1. A SHIPPER IS NOT CONCERNED WITH THE DIVISIONS OF A THROUGH 
 
 RATE. 
 
 A shipper has ho legal grievance with respect to his through traffic 
 unless compelled to pay excessive charges for the through service. If 
 the through charges are lawful in the sense that they are reasonable 
 charges for the through service, a shipper cannot predicate unlawful- 
 ness of one of the component parts of the through charges by alleging 
 that it is excessive compensation to that carrier for that part of the 
 through service. He pays for the completed service, and it is no con- 
 cern of his how the through charges are divided among the carriers, 
 whether by agreement or by published proportionals, so long as the 
 through charges for the through carriage are reasonable.^ 
 
 1. state of Iowa v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 64, cited. 
 Northern Pine Manufacturers' Ass'n v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1915), 53 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 360, 365; Des Moines Saw Mill Co. v. Minneapolis & St. L. Rd. Co. (1915), 35 
 I. C. C. Rep. 182, 184. 
 
 602-J. A THROUGH ROUTE MAY NOT BE DIVIDED INTO DIVISIONS FOR RATE- 
 MAKING PURPOSES. 
 
 If, in making rates, a through route is to be divided into divisions 
 and these divisions subdivided into sections, why should not the separa- 
 tion continue until the road is dissected into as many parts as there 
 are stations, or miles, or even feet of track.' Such a method was con- 
 demned by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of St. 
 Louis & 8. F. Ry. Co. v. Gill,'- where it is said : 
 
 "That the correct test was as to the effect of the act on the defend- 
 ant's entire line, and not upon that part which was formerly a part of 
 one of the consolidated roads; that the company cannot claim the 
 right to earn a net profit from every mile, section, or other part into 
 which the road might be divided, nor attack as unjust a regulation which 
 fixed a rate at which some such part would be unremunerative ; that it 
 would be practically impossible to ascertain in what proportion the 
 several parts should share with others in the expenses and receipts in 
 which they participated ; and, finally, that to the extent that the ques- 
 tion of injustice is to be determined by the effects of the act upon thij 
 earnings of the company, the earnings of the entire line must be esti- 
 
§60-1 TRAFFIC LAW SEKVICE 34 
 
 mated as against all its legitimate expenses under the operation of the 
 act within the limits of the State of Arkansas." 
 
 1. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Coal and Coke Rates (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 20, 
 30; cited, Wellington Mines Co. v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co. (1916), 39 I. C. C. Rep. 202, 
 205. 
 
 2. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gill (1S95). 156 U. S. 649, 665-666, 39 L. Ed. 567, 15 
 Sup. Ct. Kep. 484. 
 
 ] 
 
 602-K. Commodity bates should be stated through from point of 
 
 ORIGIN TO DESTINATION. 
 
 While existence of two classifications may explain the fact that 
 class rates are made by combination there is no such reason or justifica- 
 tion for commodity rates being so stated.^ 
 
 1. Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. Baltimore & O. S. W. Rd. Co. (1915), 35 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 14, 17. 
 
 602-L. Reasonableness of through rate composed of aggregate of 
 
 INTERMEDIATE RATES. 
 
 See "Reasonableness of a through rate composed of the aggregate 
 of intermediate rates," Section 609-EE, post. 
 
 602-M. Bates between points in the TJNrrED States and adjacent 
 
 FOREIGN COUNTRIES. 
 
 In the absence of a published through rate between a point in the 
 United States and a point in an adjacent foreign country, the published 
 through rate between the border gateway and the domestic point should 
 be applied in constructing the total rate. In the absence of a published 
 through rate between the border gateway and the domestic point the 
 lowest Combination of legal rates should be applied.^ 
 
 Upon a movement from a domestic point to a destination in Canada 
 charges were assessed at a combination of rates both factors of which 
 were on file with the Commission, but which made higher than another 
 combination over the same route one factor of which was on file with 
 the Canadian Commission but not with the Interstate Commerce Com- 
 mission : Held, That the Commission cannot award reparation on the 
 latter combination.^ 
 
 1. Conf. Rul. Bui. Rule 4SS (January 10, 1916). 
 
 2. Conf. Rul. Bui. Rule 256 (February 7, 1910). 
 
 602-N. Legal status of a joint through rate that exceeds the ag- 
 gregate OF intermediate rates. 
 
 See "^4 joint through interstate rate which exceeds the aggregate 
 of the intermediate rates, subject to the Act, is unlawfiil and non-en^ 
 forceable," Section 609-FF , post, and "Legal status of a joint through 
 rate that is higher than the aggregate of the intermediate rates subject 
 to the provisions of the Act," Section 111-B, post. 
 
 However, in giving consideration to this item it should be noted 
 that this proposition of law has not been judicially established and 
 
35 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§§602, 603 
 
 until passed upon by a Court of competent jurisdiction, shippers should 
 operate under the administrative rulings of the Interstate Commerce 
 Commission as herein contained. 
 
 602-O. Right of shipper to use any through route available uxder 
 
 THE TARIFF RATES. 
 
 Shippers are entitled, under the Act to Regulate Commerce, to use 
 any through route available under the tariffs. If the tariffs are so 
 worded that routes other than a direct route are possible, such routes 
 should be available alike to all shippers, whether availed under a re- 
 consignment order or upon original billing. The through route appli- 
 cable via such route should be assessed against all shipments of the 
 same kind of freight regardless of whether the shipment traveled the 
 particular route because of a reconsignment order or under original 
 billing. The haul for which this rate is assessed in the one instance is 
 identical with that in the other.^ 
 
 If the carriers intend to restrict the application of the joint rates 
 to any particular route, and to likewise restrict the reconsignment 
 service in connection therewith, they should do so in clear and une- 
 quivocal language.- 
 
 See "Limitation on application of joint rate," Section 601-O, Ante, 
 and "Routes and Routing," Chapter 11, post. 
 
 1. Reconsignment and Diversion Rules (1920), 5S I. C. C. Rep. r,6S. 57.^, 
 
 2. Watters-Tongue Lumber Co. v. Baltimore & O. S. W. Rd. Co. (3920), .50 I. C. C. Rep. 
 229, 231, citing, A'an Dusen Harrington Co. v. Cliicago, M. & St. 1'. Ry. Co.. (1017), 
 47 I. C. C. Rep. 59. 
 
 603. Establishment of freight rates. 
 
 603-A. Duty of carriers to initiate rates. 
 
 The first section of the Interstate Commerce Act provides as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 It shall be the duty of every common carrier subject to this Act engaged in the 
 transportation of * * * or property to provide and furnish such transportation 
 upon reasonable request therefor, and to establish through routes and just and reason- 
 able rates, * * * and charges applicable thereto, and to provide reasonable facilities 
 for operating through routes and to make reasonable rules and regulations with respect 
 to the operation of through routes, and providing for reasonable compensation to those 
 entitled thereto; and in case of joint rates, * * *, or charges, to establish just, 
 reasonable, and equitable divisions thereof as between the carriers subject to this Act, 
 participating therein which shall not unduly prefer or prejudice any of such participat- 
 ing carriers. 
 
 Under the operation of the Interstate Commerce Act, the right to 
 initiate interstate rates rests entirely with the railway, which may, by 
 giving thirty days ' notice, put into effect any rate or any regulation or 
 practice affecting a rates which it sees fit.^ The railroads themselves 
 must, in all cases, initiate their transportation charges. "When their 
 schedules have been filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
 any party may complain and the Commission must investigate upon 
 that complaint. The Commission may also, upon its own motion, sus- 
 pend tariffs which are filed and institute proceedings of investigation.- 
 
 There is no exact standard by which the reasonableness of a rate 
 can be measured. While there are many facts capable of precise 
 determination which bear upon that question, the final answer is a 
 
§603] TEAPFIC LAW SERVICE 
 
 36 
 
 matter of judgment. The traffic official who establishes the rate exer- 
 cises his judgment in the first instance, and the Commission when it 
 revises that rate substitutes its judgment for that of the traffic official. 
 With varying conditions the reasonableness of rate itself may vary, 
 so that the rate which is reasonable today may be unreasonable to- 
 morrow.* 
 
 Inasmuch as railways are authorized to establish in the first in- 
 stance, their transportation charges, the presumption of right doing 
 attaches to their acts in the establishment of those rates.* So long as 
 the carriers do not abuse the right conferred upon them by the statute, 
 the Commission is not justified in penalizing them." While carriers may 
 take competition into consideration and make rates to meet it, the 
 Commission has never held that it could compel them to do so. In 
 such a case the question of policy or expediency in fixing a rate which 
 is less than the maximum of what is reasonable under the law left to 
 the discretion and judgment of the carrier. The law authorizing the 
 Commission in dealing mth the amount of a rate, aside from the ques- 
 tion of discrimination, limits its authority to the fixing of that which 
 is the maximum reasonable rate for the service to be performed. The 
 Commission has no power to substitute a proposed new rate for an 
 existing just and reasonable rate on the ground that in its judgment it 
 would be wise" policy to so do." 
 
 On the question of the power of the Commission to initiate, modify, 
 establish or adjust rates so that the aggregate rates mil yield a fair 
 return upon the aggregate value of the raihvay property of the same 
 held for and used in the service of transportation, see ^'Jurisdiction of 
 Interstate Commerce Commission over freight rates and charges," 
 Section 6l3, post, and "Railway Finances — Guaranteed Return On 
 Railway Property," Chapter bb, post. 
 
 1. Twenty- First Annual Eeport of I. C. O. (1907), p. 9. 
 
 2. In the Matter of Rates, Classifications, Regulations, and Practices of Carriers 
 (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 560, 614. 
 
 3. Railroad Commission of Oregon v. Oregon Ed. & Nav. Co. (1913), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 
 675, 677. 
 
 4. Banner Milling Co. v. New Tork Central & H. R. Rd. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep 
 398, 408. 
 
 5. Poster Lumber Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 56; 
 National Hay Assn. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1902), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 264. 
 
 6. New York Produce Exchange v. New York C. & H. Rd. Co. (1914), 32 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 212, 215, citing; Southern P. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1911), 
 219 TJ. S. 433, 443, 55 L. Ed. 283, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 288. 
 
 603-B. When an interstate freight r.*te is established. 
 
 Interstate freight rates are established when schedules thereof are 
 regularly printed, filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and 
 kept open to public inspection by the carrier at its freight offices, al- 
 though such rates may not be posted in public and conspicuous places, 
 as required by section 6 of the Act to regulate Commerce, as posting is 
 not essential to make rates legally operative, but is required only as a 
 means of affording special facilities to the public for ascertaining the 
 rates actually in force.^ 
 
 1. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Albers Commission Co. (1912), 223 V. S. 573, 56 L. Ed. 
 556, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 316; Wickwire Steel Co. v. New York C. & H. R. Rd. Co. 
 1910, 181 Fed. Rep. 316, 104 C. C. A. 504. 
 
37 FKEIGHT KATES AND CHAEGES [§603 
 
 603-C. The shipper has a contract right in the published rate. 
 
 Under the specific and mandatory provisions of section 6 of the 
 Interstate Commerce Act, which makes it the indispensable duty of an 
 interstate railroad carrier to file and publish schedules of all rates and 
 any rules or regulations which in any wise "change, affect, or deter- 
 mine any part of the aggregate of such aforesaid rates," and prohibit 
 it from charging or receiving any greater or less or different compen- 
 sation than specified in such schedules, from extending to any shipper 
 any privilege or facilities ' ' except such as are specified in such tariffs, ' ' 
 and from making any change in such rates except by plainly changing 
 the schedule or filing or publishing new ones, after 30 days ' notice, on 
 the delivery of goods for carriage by a shipper, he has a contract right 
 to the rates named in the schedule at the time on file and published, and 
 to the benefit of all privileges and facilities specified therein which enter 
 into such published rates.^ 
 
 I. American Sugar Refining Co. v. Delaware, L. & W. Rd. Co. (1913), 207 Fed. Rep. 
 733 ; 125 0. C. A. 251, reversing American Sugar Refining Co. v. Delaware, L. & W. 
 Ry. Co. (1912), 200 Fed. Rep. 652. 
 
 603-D. Rates are not nullified by the failure of the carriers to 
 
 AGREE UPON THE DmSIONS THEREOF. 
 
 The Commission has held that the fact that the carriers, by which 
 the rate has been lawfully published and advertised to the shipping 
 world as the cost of transportation between two given points over all 
 reasonably available routes, have neglected or failed to agree upon 
 divisions of the rate over one of the routes cannot be accepted as 
 equivalent to a nullification of the published through rate over that 
 route. Divisions are matters of private agreement and for that reason, 
 generally speaking, are of no special concern to shippers, nor are they 
 essential to legalize a published through rate.^ 
 
 However, shippers may not be compelled to wait indefinitely for 
 reasonable rates which are withheld because of the inability of carriers 
 to agree as to how they will divide the earnings.-' A carrier is not en- 
 titled to withhold reasonable rates from a city on the ground that it is 
 unable to agree upon divisions with connecting carriers.^ 
 
 Disagreements among carriers relative to divisions of joint rates 
 are insufficient to justify cancellation of such rates.* A mere fact of 
 disagreement between the carriers as to divisions does not prove that 
 the joint rates are unreasonable, or that the routes over which they are 
 applied should be abandoned.^ 
 
 1. Germain Company v. New Orleans & N. E. Rd. Co. (1909). 17 I. C. C. Rep. 22. 
 
 2. Milburn Wagon Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 93. 
 
 3. Ibid.; Williamette Pulp & I'aper Co. v. Northern P. Ky. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 4. Passenger Fares from Milwaukee. Wis. (1916), 38 I. C. C. Rep. 98, 100. 
 
 5. Lake and Rail Rate Cancellations (1916), 38 I. C. C. Rep. 201, 202. 
 
 603-E. Presumption that carrier acted in good faith in initiating 
 
 RATES. 
 
 The law imposes upon the carriers the duty of initiating their 
 rates, under the injunction of the statute that they shall be reasonable 
 
§603] TEAFFIC LAW SERVICE 38 
 
 and just. In the performance of this duty by the carriers they must 
 exercise judgment and discretion by a like resort to existing facts, cir- 
 cumstances and conditions in the first instance, jtist as the Commission 
 must later do when the rates are brought in question before it. The 
 carriers are presumed to act in good faith in their exercise of discre- 
 tion and judgment under this somewhat indefinite standard of the 
 statute in its practical application, and therefore rates established by 
 the carriers can not be condemned except upon investigation and full 
 hearing. A rate reasonable in view of the circumstances and condi- 
 tions when it is established may in course of time become unreasonable 
 by virtue of changed circumstances and conditions. It is manifestly 
 impracticable for the carriers or the Commission in such a case to 
 determine at what exact time in the gradual process of changes the rate' 
 becomes unreasonable.^ 
 
 Anadarko Cotton Oil Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1910), 20 I. O. C. Rep. 
 43, 50. 
 
 603-F. "PaPEE" BATES. 
 
 A shipper is entitled to have his interstate freight moved at rea- 
 sonable rates. The fact that for a long time there had been no move- 
 ment of a particular commodity is no justification for the maintenance 
 of an unreasonable i;ate.^ So, a shipper proposing to establish an 
 industry has the right to ascertain in advance what rates will be estab- 
 lished on his particular traffic.^ In the case of Lum v. Great Northern 
 Ry. Co.^ the Commission held that it could not regard as material the 
 allegation that the complainant could not possibly ship ore within two 
 years of the effective period of an order of the Commission. That if the 
 Commission prescribes a reasonable rate today for the movement of 
 traffic which possibly may not move within two years, and the railway 
 company refuses voluntarily to continue that rate for a period longer 
 than two years, it becomes the plain duty of the Commission to insti- 
 tute a new investigation at the proper time and prescribe a rate which 
 shall be just and reasonable under the circumstances and conditions 
 prevailing at such time. That a shipper has the right to know what 
 the lawful published rate on his proposed product is and will be for a 
 reasonable period of time in the future. That the Commission cannot 
 deny the right of the complainant to secure the publication of a rate 
 in advance of far-reaching and consequential business arrangements 
 which can be profitably made when predicated upon one rate, and which 
 cannot possibly be made on a commercial basis when predicated upon 
 a higher rate. 
 
 The Commission has held that it will not consider the reasonable- 
 ness of a mere "paper" rate where there is no production of the 
 commodity covered by such rate.* 
 
 See "Paper rates," Section 600-ii:, ante. 
 
 1. Scheuing v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 550, 552. 
 
 2. Suffem Grain Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1911), 22 I. 0. C. Rep. 178, 184. 
 
 3. Lum V. Great Northern Ry. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 558. 
 
 4. Sllgo Iron Store Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 139, 142. 
 
39 FEEIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§603 
 
 603-G. Rules for disposition of fractions in publication of rates. 
 
 The Commission has held that in the publication of Central Freight 
 Association class rates that the followdng rule for the disposition of 
 fractions shown in those scales shall be observed: Fractions of less 
 than 14 or .25, to be omitted ; fraction of i^. or .25, or greater, but less 
 than % or .75, to be shown as one-half (-i/^) ; fractions of % or .75, or 
 greater, to be increased to the next whole figure." This rule for dis- 
 posing of fractions was also applied by the Interstate Commerce Com- 
 mission in computing and applying all the increased rates authorized 
 in Ex Parte 74.2 
 
 Where rates are stated in dollars per carload, including articles 
 moving on their own wheels, when not stated in amounts per 100 
 pounds or per ton, amounts of less than 25 cents will be dropped ; thus, 
 $25.24 will be stated as $25.00. Amounts of 25 cents or more but less 
 than 75 cents will be stated as 50 cents ; thus, $25.65 will be stated as 
 $25.50. Amounts of 75 cents or more but less than $1.00 will be raised 
 to the next dollar.^ 
 
 1. Central Freight Association Class Scale Case (I. & S. Docket No. 965) (1917), 45 
 I. 0. C. Eep. 254, 287. 
 
 2. In the Matter of the Applications of Carriers in OflBcial, Southern and Western 
 Classification Territories for Authority to Increase Kates, (Ex. Parte 74) (July 29, 
 1920) 58 I. C. C. Rep. 220, 255. 
 
 3. Ibid. 
 
 603-H. Effectivb date of new rates and subsequent adjustments 
 UNDER Increased Eates, 1920, co-^rEREo by Ex Parte 74. 
 
 In Ex Parte 74 entitled "In the Matter of the Applications of Car- 
 riers in Official, Southern, and We'stern Classification Territories for 
 Authority to Increase Rates"''- the Commission states: "In view of the 
 existing situation it is important that the increased rates be made 
 effective at as early a date as practicable. The increases herein ap- 
 proved may be made effective upon not less than five days' notice to 
 the Commission and to the general public by filing and posting in the 
 manner prescribed in the Interstate Commerce Act. The authority 
 herein granted will not apply to any rates, fares, or charges filed with 
 this Commission to become effective later than January 1, 1921. 
 
 "Most of the factors with which we are dealing are constantly 
 changing. It is impossible to forecast with any degree of certainty 
 what the volume of traffic will be. The general price level is chang- 
 ing from month to month and from day to day. It is impracticable 
 at this time to adjust all of the rates on individual commodities. The 
 rates to be established on the basis hereinbefore approved must nec- 
 essarily be subject to such readjustments as the facts may warrant. It 
 is conceded by the carriers that readjustments will be necessary. It is 
 expected that shippers will take these matters up in the first instance 
 with the carriers and the latter will be expected to deal promptly and 
 effectively therewith, to the end that necessary readjustments may be 
 made in as many instances as practicable without appeal to us." 
 
 1. In the Matter of the Applications of Carriers in Official, Southern and Western 
 Classification Territories for Authority to Increase Rates (Ex. Parte 74) (July 29, 
 1920), 58 I. C. C. Rep. 220, 255. 
 
§603] TEAFFIC LAW SERVICE 
 
 40 
 
 603-1. Status of prewar intrastate rates after termination of 
 Federal control. 
 
 Section 208 (a) of the Transportation Act, 1920, provides as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 All rates, fares, and charges, and all classifications, regulations and practices, in 
 any wise changing, afCecting, or determining, any part or the aggregate of rates, fares, 
 or charges, or the value of the service rendered, which on February 29, 1920, are in 
 efitect on the lines of carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act, shall contmue in 
 force and effect until thereafter changed by State or Federal authority, respectively, or 
 pursuant to authority of law; but prior to September 1, 1920, no such rate, fare or 
 charge shall be reduced, and no such classification, regulation, or practice shall be 
 changed in such manner as to reduce any such rate, fare or charge, unless such reduction 
 or change is approved by the Commission. 
 
 In Michigan C. Rd. Co. v. Michigan PtiUic Utilities Commission^ 
 the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that by- 
 Section 208 (a) of the Transportation Act of February 28, 1920, it was 
 clearly intended that the State statutes or the regulations fixing intra- 
 state rates, which were suspended during Federal control, should not 
 automatically again go into effect on the cessation of such control. Fol- 
 lowing is reproduced the decision, per curiam : 
 
 ' ' This is an application for a preliminary injunction, heard before 
 three judges pursuant to section 266 of the Judicial Code (Comp. St. 
 § 1243). 
 
 "For several years before 1919, the Michigan statute had fixed the 
 
 .rate for intrastate railroad passenger transportation (with exceptions 
 
 not now material) at the sum of 2 cents per mile. Act No. 382 of the 
 
 Public Acts of 1919, approved May 13, 1919, fixed it at 2l^ cents per 
 
 mile (with similar exceptions), but contained this proviso : 
 
 " This act shall not apply to any railroad, the control of which has been taken over 
 by the federal government, while under suA federal control. 
 
 "The Michigan Central Railroad, and each of the 12 other rail- 
 roads whose similar applications are heard with this, had passed into 
 and remained under federal control, pursuant to the act of Congress 
 approved March 21, 1918 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, 
 §§ 3115^a-3115%p), and the presidential proclamations thereunder. 
 During this period of federal control, the passenger rate for intrastate 
 transportation had been fixed at 3 cents per mile, and this was the rate 
 on February 29, 1920. On February 28, 1920, the act of Congress 
 known as the Transportation Act (41 Stat. p. 456), was approved. It 
 was thereby provided that the railroads should be returned to their 
 owners and federal control should cease on February 29 (March 1), 
 1920, but that, until September 1, 1920, the government would gua- 
 rantee the railroads a certain prescribed net return. Section 208a of 
 the Transportation Act is as follows : 
 
 " 'All rates, fares, and charges, and all classifications, regulations, and practices, in 
 any wise changing, affecting, or determining, any part or the aggregate of rates, fares, 
 or charges, or the value of the service rendered, which on February 29, 1920, are in 
 effect on the lines of carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act, shall continue in 
 force and effect until thereafter changed by State or Federal authority, respectively, or 
 pursuant to authority of law ; but prior to September 1, 1920, no such rate, fare or 
 charge shall be reduced, and no such classification, regulation, or practice shall be 
 changed in such manner as to reduce any such rate, fare or charge, unless such reduction 
 or charge is approved by the commission.' 
 
 "Upon the theory that federal control, within the meaning of the 
 Michigan act of 1919, would terminate, at the latest, on September 1, 
 1920, the Michigan Public Utilities Commission gave notice to the rail- 
 
41 FREIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [§603 
 
 roads that on and after that date the fare must be reduced to 2^4 cents. 
 The bills in these cases were filed against the commission and the 
 Attorney General and one of the prosecuting attorneys, to enjoin 
 proceedings to enforce the Michigan act. The jurisdiction of this court 
 is invoked, because the case arises under the laws of the United States, 
 and because the 2%-cent rate would be confiscatory, and because the 
 Severity of the penalties would deprive the railroad of the equal pro- 
 tection of the laws. Upon the hearing of this motion, sole reliance is 
 placed upon the effect of the Transportation Act. 
 
 ' ' 1. No question has been raised about the propriety of constitut- 
 ing a court pursuant to section 266 ; but we do not overlook some pos- 
 sible uncertainty in this matter. This injunction is not sought 'upon the 
 ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute,' in the more com- 
 mon sense in which we speak of unconstitutionality. That there is a 
 conflict between state and federal law does not always bring to mind 
 the issue of unconstitutionality of the former; yet it is prescribed by 
 the federal Constitution that it and the laws and the treaties made in 
 pursuance thereof shall be the supreme law of the land, and it seems 
 to follow that a state statute which is in conflict with a federal statute, 
 when the latter is pursuant to and within the power given by the federal 
 Constitution, is, in a very fair sense, unconstitutional. We think the 
 present situation is fully within the spirit and fairly within the letter 
 of section 266, and that the court, as now constituted, has power to 
 hear and determine the application. Even if otherwise, the District 
 Judge, in whom the power would rest if the special court were not 
 required, joins in this opinion and in directing the entry of the order 
 thereon. 
 
 ' ' 2. Prior to the taking over of federal control, a complete system 
 of intrastate rates existed in many or all of the states, and these rates 
 were fixed, sometimes directly by statute, and sometimes by regulatory 
 bodies. It was recognized that these intrastate rates were within the 
 state jurisdiction, and were not a matter of federal control, save to 
 a degree and in contingencies not here important. Undoubtedly all 
 these various state laws and regulations were suspended by the opera- 
 tion of the Federal Control Act, having been thus merely suspended, 
 and not repealed, they would automatically take effect again at the 
 end of the suspension ; that is, at the termination of the federal control. 
 Tua V. Carriere, 117 U. S. 201, 209, 6 Sup. Ct. 565, 29 L. Ed. 855. If 
 Congress, in passing the Transportation Act, intended that this auto- 
 matic reversion should occur, that is the end of the matter, and the 
 commission was right in proposing to enforce the Michigan act after 
 September 1st ; but, if Congress intended otherwise, we come to further 
 questions. The congressional intent must, therefore, be ascertained. 
 
 "To us the intent seems very clear upon the face of the statute. 
 We take notice of the orders of the Director General and of the Inter- 
 state Commerce Commission under which, during the period between 
 March 21, 1918, and February 29, 1920, the cost of railroad operations 
 had enormously increased and the rates had been advanced in an effort 
 to provide the increased cost. We take notice, also, of the general 
 change in conditions, such that, in February, 1920, perhaps no one 
 could have been found who would contend that it would be fair or 
 reasonable to reduce the railroad rates to the figures prevailing before 
 the war and leave the roads subject to the permanently fixed and great- 
 
§603] TKAFFIC LAW SERVICE 42 
 
 ly increased costs of operation. It would seem most natural and 
 reasonable that the rates, both interstate and intrastate, should remain 
 at the figures then existing until the proper authority, federal with ref- 
 erence to one and state with reference to the other, should have op- 
 portunity to investigate the situation as it might then exist, and de- 
 termine whether or not any change should occur. In apparent execu- 
 tion of this natural intent, we find the statute saying that the rates in 
 effect on February 29, 1920, shall continue in force, until thereafter 
 changed by state or federal authority, respectively, or pursuant to au- 
 thority of law, and then providing that in no event shall the rates be 
 reduced before September 1, 1920, unless with the approval of the 
 Interstate Commerce Commission. It would be a strained construction 
 of language to say that the mere automatic reversion to the pre-control 
 status, which would have occurred on February 29, if the Transporta- 
 tion Act had made no inconsistent provision, is that change, subsequent 
 to February 29, which the act contemplates when it speaks of 'there- 
 after chahged.' Not only is it plain to us, by the words of the law, 
 that Congress intended the then existing rates to continue until the 
 regulating authority should, by due action thereafter taken and in 
 view of the new situation, make a change; but, if there were doubt 
 about it, the proceedings in Congress would remove the doubt. 
 
 "It will be observed that there is no distinction in section 208a 
 between freight and passenger rates, nor between interstate and intra- 
 state rates. The latter were, at this time, within the power of Congress, 
 and the intent to reach them is clear from the reference to changes made 
 by state authority, because such changes could refer to nothing else. 
 The question whether automatic return to pre-control rates was desired 
 would be the same as to interstate and intrastate, freight and passen- 
 ger, matters. The bill, which later became the Transportation Act, was 
 reported by the House committee on interstate commerce November 
 10, 1919. Eeport 456, 66th Congress. In this report, the committee 
 refers to this clause, which then contained only the words, 'until there- 
 after changed by or pursuant to authority of law, ' and points out that 
 without such a provision all the rates would immediately revert to 
 their pre-control status, and continues : 
 
 " 'In view of the enormous increase in operating costs of carriers, due to increased 
 wages and cost of materials, restoration to former level would result in such enormous 
 decrease in revenues as would render it utterly impossible, even for the stronger rail- 
 roads, to meet operating expenses. By the insertion of the above section, the existing 
 rates, fares, charges, etc., are to continue in force and effect until changed by or pur- 
 suant to authority of law ; that is, until changed by the appropriate regulatory body.' 
 
 "The chairman of the House committee, in presenting this bill 
 (Congressional Eecord, Nov. 11, 1919, p. 8314), in speaking of this pro- 
 vision for continuing the rates in effect, said : 
 
 " 'It is apparent that, unless we put in a provision of this kind, then, as soon as the 
 federal control ended, all the rates made under federal control would cease and the rates 
 would revert to their pre-control status— both interstate and intrastate. ' It is clear to 
 all that that would be calamitous. If the rates of the federal railroads now existing as 
 fixed by the Director General, should suddenly be brought to a pre-control level Siere 
 would be scarcely a raUroad in the United States that could begin to pay operating ex- 
 penses. * * If control ceases without this section in the bill, the rates would 
 be dropped 25 per c«it. on freight and 50 per cent on passengers, with the consequences 
 I nave already stated. 
 
 "Later the section was amended by inserting the words 'state or 
 federal authority, respectively,' so that it took the form in which it 
 passed. The member of the House committee who then seemed to be 
 
43 FREIGHT KATES AND CHAEGES [§603 
 
 in charge of the bill had pointed out that this language was intended 
 to reach both the state authority and the federal authority, each within 
 its proper regulatory scope, when a member proposed to amend by 
 inserting : 
 
 " 'Provided that nothing in this section shall be construed to include intrastate ship- 
 ments.' 
 
 ' ' The member in charge of the bill replied : 
 
 " 'That is not the intention. They are continued until the proper state authorities can 
 pass upon them. Otherwise, they would come back to pre-war rates. Congressional 
 Record, p. 8451.' 
 
 "The proposed amendment then seems to have been abandoned. 
 
 "3. Eeference to committee reports, and to what is said by the 
 chairman of the committee in explaining the meaning of the bill, is 
 proper in ascertaining its intent {Duplex Co. v. Deering [U. S. S. C, 
 
 Jan. 3, 1921] 253 U. S. , 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed. ), and these 
 
 references seem to us to demonstrate that Congress intended to prevent 
 the automatic reapplication of the superseded pre-control rates, either 
 state or federal. 
 
 "4. It is true that the Michigan commission does not propose to 
 revive any pre-control rate, since the Michigan act in question was not 
 passed until May, 1919; but, while this distinction gives color of dif- 
 ference, we think there is none in principle. All pre-control state regu- 
 lations and statutes were suspended during the period of federal 
 control by the application of the familiar rule of law upon that subject. 
 The Michigan statute of 1919 was suspended during the same period of 
 federal control, but by its express words. The Transportation Act 
 speaks as of February 29, 1920, and its insistence upon a change 'there- 
 after' made is no better satisfied by a state statute passed in 1919, and 
 suspended by its terms during federal control, than by one passed in 
 1917 and suspended during the same period by operation of law. The 
 best that can be said is that the reasons of Congress for not permitting 
 the Michigan act of 1919 to come into automatic effect would not have 
 been quite so strong as the same reasons were which applied to older 
 regulations ; but the language used does not permit of any distinction. 
 Indeed, it might be said — though we are not very strongly impressed 
 with the suggestion — that since the Transportation Act expressly 
 declares that federal control of existing state rates does not cease until 
 the state thereafter takes affirmative action, the very period of suspen- 
 sion provided by the words of the Michigan statute has not yet expired. 
 
 "Being satisfied as to congressional intent, the remaining ques- 
 tion is one of power. It is urged on behalf of the railroads that under 
 the terms of other portions of the Transportation Act it has come about 
 that the fixing of an intrastate rate has such a direct effect upon the 
 interstate rates as to justify Congress in taking over absolutely and 
 permanently the whole matter of intrastate rates, and that Congress 
 has done so. The contrary is forcefully argued, on behalf of the state. 
 We find it unnecessary to consider these contentions, because we think 
 the congressional right to effectuate the intent which we have found 
 in section 208a is sufficiently based on the war power. The right to fix 
 intrastate rates during federal control and as incidental to the war, 
 power is settled. Northern Pac. Co. v. North Dalcota, 250 U. S. 135, 
 148, 39 Sup. Ct. 502, 63 L. Ed. 897. It is also beyond dispute— indeed. 
 
§603] TRAFFIC LAW SEEVICE 44 
 
 it is not denied by the Attorney General here — that the same power 
 would extend to and cover federal regulation of state rates for a reason- 
 able transition period (Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U. S. [11 Wall] 493, 506, 
 20 L. Ed. 176), as incidental to the return of the railroads to their 
 owners, covered by a shield which should prevent their immediate 
 destruction; but it is claimed that the six months from March 1st to 
 September 1st, during which the federal guaranty continued, exhausts 
 such transitional or twilight period, and it is pointed out — as is true — 
 that the effect of the construction which we give to this statute and of 
 holding it valid to that extent is not merely to embarrass temporarily 
 the state jurisdictions, but is really to abrogate the entire structure of 
 rates, charges, etc., as made by statute or by commission, in every state 
 of the Union where such structures existed. Every such state must 
 begin again. 
 
 "On the other hand, while there is, for the time being, a complete 
 abrogation, yet this is only during the acquiescence and approval of 
 the states. They may, so far as this question is concerned, restore their 
 pre-control structures at any time by a statute or an order of ten words. 
 It also may be noted that section 210 of the Transportation Act specifies 
 two years as a reasonable transition period for the retention of certain 
 collateral federal powers, and this period has not yet expired. 
 
 "We cannot think that Congress exceeded its war powers in this 
 particular. It was delivering back the railroads to their owners, sad- 
 dled with burdens which made the rates of a year or two earlier quite 
 impossible. In making this return, it was certainly proper for Con- 
 gress to fix conditions which should preserve the property temporarily 
 from the immediate destruction that would other-wdse surely result ; and 
 Congress, in effect, declared that these existing rates, which had proved 
 to be necessary during the war, were also necessary until the still exist- 
 ing war conditions should be materially modified. It turned over the 
 property to the owners, and (as we are now assuming) it returned to 
 the states the power of regulatory control, saying only that this control 
 must not be exercised without a fresh consideration of what would be 
 right and proper. We are content to rest our conclusion upon this 
 construction of the war power. 
 
 "We have been compelled to consider these questions practically 
 as matters of first impressions. We are informed that a similar court 
 in the Second Circuit has reached the contrary conclusion. Circuit 
 Judge Ward and District Judge Cooper concurring, and Circuit Judge 
 Hough dissenting, and that three judges in the Eighth Circuit, Circuit 
 Judge Sanborn, and District Judges Wade and Woodrough, have 
 reached the same conclusion we do ; but in neither case is there more 
 than a bare announcement of the result. 
 
 "The temporary injunction should issue as prayed for. We are 
 informed that a proceeding has been commenced in one of the state 
 courts to prevent the application to intrastate transportation of rates 
 fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission under the claimed 
 authority of the Transportation Act. No conflict between the jurisdic- 
 tion acquired by this court upon the filing of the bills in these cases and 
 the jurisdiction asserted by the state court in that matter has been 
 pointed out, and all counsel disclaim the existence of any such conflict. 
 The injunction to be issued is not intended to affect or embarrass the 
 progress of that litigation; although, if any conflict of jurisdiction 
 
45 FREIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [<§§603, 604 
 
 should hereafter be claimed to exist or develop, the subject will be open 
 for further consideration. 
 
 ' ' There is precedent in this circuit which suggests the requirement 
 of a bond or some other security from the railroad company that it will 
 refund to the passengers one-half cent per mile in case the 2^-cent 
 fare shall ■ eventually be held lawful; but this precedent is in a case 
 where plaintiff's right depended upon establishing the fact of confisca- 
 tion, and where it was evident that' there would be long delay. Here 
 the Attorney General has not asked for a bond or other security, the 
 controlling question is one of law, and does not seem to us doubtful, 
 and there is no reason to anticipate long delay in getting the opinion 
 of the Supreme Court upon one of the earlier cases, if not upon this. 
 Under such circumstances, we do not think it necessary to order 
 security. If any of these conditions change, an application will be en- 
 tertained at any time. 
 
 "However, in view of the suggestion in Minneapolis Co. v. Wash- 
 burn Co. (U. S. S. C, Dec. 20, 1920) 253 U. S. , 41 Sup. Ct. 140, 
 
 65 L. Ed. ■ , each railroad, as a condition of getting its injunction 
 
 issued, should file herein its consent and undertaking, in form and de- 
 tails approved by the judge of the district, that in case it shall finally 
 be adjudged that 2^ cents has been the lawful fare, an accounting 
 may be had at the foot of the decree in this case in which judgment may 
 be rendered against the railroad in favor of each passenger for the 
 excess fare wrongfully collected, and that, in such accounting, the 
 excess payments may be established by such convenient method of 
 informal proof as the court may direct. ' ' 
 
 1. Michigan C. Rd. Co. v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission (1921), 271 Fed. Rep. 
 319. The contra decision in the Second Circuit referred to in the above opinion is 
 the case of New York C. Rd. Co. v. Public Service Commission of New York (1920), 
 268 Fed. Rep. 558, wherein the District Court for the Northern District of New 
 York held that intrastate passenger rates of two cents per mile, which was by State 
 statutes, were lawfully changed to three cents per mile under the Federal Control 
 Act; it being a constitutional exercise of the war power of Congress. 
 
 In the same case the Court held that the Federal Control Act merely suspended 
 existing State laws regulating rates, and that upon the termination of Federal con- 
 trol the State laws continued to control the rates ex proprio vigore. See also, case of 
 Public Service Commission of New York v. New York C. Rd. Co. (1920), 129 N. E. 
 455, wherein it was held that the termination of federal control did not operate to 
 automatically reduce intrastate rates to the pre-war basis. 
 
 604. Changes in freight rates by carriers. 
 
 604- A. Eight ov the carrier to change its rates. 
 
 The provision of the Act that the published rate shall be the only 
 lawful rate does not mean that a rate once fixed and published may 
 never be changed, but that, when a change is made, it shall be made in 
 the manner provided by law, namely, by publication, to the end that 
 the new rate may be available to all shippers at the same time, on 
 equal terms. ^ 
 
 A Court's decree enforcing an order of the Interstate Commerce 
 Commission does not alter the administrative character of the order 
 so as to prevent the carrier from making a change in the tariff affected, 
 where necessity requires, and the provision for notice of change has 
 been complied with.- 
 
 ~1. United States v. Standard Oil Co. (1907), 148 Fed. Rep. 719. 
 2. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & X. Rd. Co. (1896), 73 Fed. Rep. 409. 
 
'§604] TBAFFIC LAW SEKVICE 46 
 
 ■604-B. No PEESTJMPTION OP WRONG ARISES FEOM A CHAKGE IN BATES BY 
 
 THE CAEKIEE. 
 
 In the case of Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago, G. W. 
 Rd. Co} the Supreme Court of the United States, per Mr. Justice 
 Brewer said : 
 
 "It must be remembered that railroads are the private property of 
 their owners ; that while, from the public character of the work in which 
 they are engaged, the public has the power to prescribe rules for, secur- 
 ing faithful and efficient service and equality between shippers and 
 communities, yet, in no proper sense, is the public a general man- 
 ager. * * * It must also be remembered that there is no presumption 
 of wrong arising from a change of rate by a carrier. The presumption 
 of honest intent and right conduct attends the action of carriers as well 
 as it does the action of othei corporations or individuals in their trans- 
 actions in life. Undoubtedly, when rates are changed, the carrier 
 making the change must, when properly called upon, be able to give a 
 good reason therefor; but the mere fact that a rate has been raised 
 carries with it no presumption that it was not rightfully done. Those 
 presumptions of good faith and integrity which have been recognized 
 for ages as attending human action have not been overthrown by any 
 legislation in respect to common carriers. ' ' 
 
 1. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago, G. W. Rd. Co. (1908), 209 U. S. 108; 
 52 L. Ed. 705, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493. 
 
 604-C. Rates in effect on Febetjaey 29, 1920, to continue in effect 
 
 UNTIL CHANGED BY GOVERNMENTAL AUTHOEITY. 
 
 The Transportation Act of February 28, 1920, provided that all 
 rates and charges and all regulations and practices, in anywise chang- 
 ing, affecting, or determining, any part or the aggregate of rates, or 
 charges, or the value of the service rendered, which on February 29, 
 1920, are in effect on the lines of carriers subject to the Interstate 
 Commerce Act, shall continue in force and effect until thereafter 
 changed by State or Federal authority, respectively, or pursuant to 
 authority of law.^ 
 
 1. Transportation Act, February 28, 1920, section 208. 
 
 604-D. Reductions in e.ites until September I, 1920, forbidden, 
 
 UNLESS APPROVED BY INTERSTATE CoMMEECE COMMISSION. 
 
 The Transportation Act of February 28, 1920, provided that prior 
 to September 1, 1920, no rate, or charge, which were in effect on the 
 lines of carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act on February 
 29, 1920, shall be reduced, and no regulation or practice shall be 
 changed in such manner as to reduce such rate, or charge, unless such 
 reduction or change is approved by the Interstate Commerce Commis- 
 sion.^ 
 
 1. Transportation Act, February 28, 1920, section 208. 
 
47 FEEIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§605 
 
 605. Quotation of freight rates by carriers to shippers. 
 
 605-A. Duty of CAERrEEs to quote rates to shippers. 
 
 Section 6 of the Act to Eegulate Commerce (as amended June 18, 
 1910), reads as follows : 
 
 If any com in on carrier subject to the provisions of this Act, after written request 
 made upon the agent of such carrier hereinafter in this section referred to, Ijy any 
 person or company for a written statement of the rate or charge applicable to a de- 
 scribed shipment between stated places under the schedules or tarifEs to which such 
 carrier is a party, shall refuse or omit to give such written statement within a reason- 
 able time, or shall misstate in v^riting the applicable rate, and if the person or company 
 making such request suffers damage in consequence of such refusal or omission or in 
 consequence of the misstatement of the rate, either through making the shipment over 
 a line or route for which the proper rate is higher than the rate over another available 
 line or route, or through entering into any sale or contract whereunder such person 
 or company obligates himself or itself to make such shipment of freight at his or its 
 cost, then the said carrier shall be liable to a penalty of two hundred and fifty dollars, 
 which shall accrue to the United iStates and may be recovered in a civil action brought 
 by the United States. 
 
 It shall be the duty of every carrier by railroad to keep at all times conspicuously 
 posted in every station where freight is receieved for transportation the name of an 
 agent resident in the city, village, or town, where such station is located, to wbom 
 application may be made for the information by this section required to be furnished 
 on written request; and in case any carrier shall fail at any time to have such name 
 so posted in any station, it shall be sufficient to address such request in substantially 
 
 the following form : "The Station Agent of the Company at Station," 
 
 together with the name of the proper post-otilce, inserting the name of the carrier com- 
 pany and of the station in the blanks, and to serve the same by depositing the request 
 so addressed, with jwstage thereon prepaid. In any post-office. 
 
 It is the understanding of the Commission that under section 6 of 
 the act carriers are required to make written statements as to rates 
 only in relation to shipments about to be made or shipments affected by 
 contracts about to be entered into, and that the provisions of that 
 section do not require carriers to expend th«ir time and labor in making 
 such statements upon demands therefor by individuals wishing to issue 
 books or notices of rates, or for other purely speculative purposes.^ 
 
 It will be noted that the law does not provide for any redress to 
 the shipper who may have suffered loss on account of an erroneous 
 quotation of the tariff rate, for the reason that it has so far seemed 
 impracticable to find any method of so doing without opening a loop- 
 hole for the allowance of secret rebates in such manner as would be 
 practically unprovable in criminal proceedings. 
 
 1. Conf. Rul. Bui. Rule 457 (March 11, 1914). 
 
 605-B. Quotation on shipper's application of rate foe sailing, and 
 
 other accruing charges. 
 
 Section 25 of the Interstate Commerce Act, {Added, February 28, 
 
 1920,) contains the following provision :^ 
 
 Upon application of any shipijer a carrier by railroad shall make request for, and 
 the carrier by water shall ui)on receipt of such request name, a specific rate applying 
 for such sailing, and upon such commodity as shall be embraced in the inquiry, and 
 shall name in connection with such rate, port charges, if any, which accrue in addition 
 to the vessel's rates and are not otherwise published by the railway as in addition to or 
 absorbed in the railway rate. Vessel rates, if conditioned upon quantity of shipment, 
 must be so stated and separate rates may be provided for carload and less-than-carload 
 shipments. The carrier by water, upon advices from a carrier by railroad, stating that 
 the quoted rate is firmly accepted as applying upon a specifically named quantity of any 
 commodity, shall, subject to such conditions as the Commission by regulation may 
 prescribe, make firm reservation from unsold space in such steam vessel as shall be 
 required for its transportation and shall so advise the carrier by railroad, in which 
 advices shall be included the latest available information as to prospective sailing date 
 of such vessel. 
 
 1. Interstate Commerce Act, section 25 (2t, added February 28, 1920. 
 
§§605, 606] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 48 
 
 605-C. Misquotation of rate by agent does not afford lawful charge. 
 
 A misquotation by an agent of a railroad company of the amount 
 of a freight charge on an interstate shipment, and its payment by the 
 shipper, held, not to relieve him from liability for the lawful rate.^ 
 
 See "Payment for Transportation," Chapter 19, post. 
 
 1. Payne, Director General of Railroads, v. Clarke (1921), 271 Fed. Rep. 525. 
 
 605-D. Commission's rates treated as embodied in statute. 
 
 Rates established in the tariff schedules filed by the railroads 
 which had been found by the Interstate Commerce Commission to be 
 reasonable, are to be treated as though they were embodied in the 
 statute, binding as such upon both railroads and shippers alike.^ 
 
 See "Payment for Transportation," Chapter 19, post. 
 
 1. Keogh V. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1921), 271 Fed. Rep. 444. 
 
 606. Assessment of freight rates. 
 
 606- A. Collection of established rate on shipment recalled by the 
 
 SHIPPER. 
 
 A shipment had moved 150 miles from the point of origin before 
 the consignor discovered that an error had been made in filling the con- 
 signee 's order. On inquiry by telephone he was informed by the car- 
 rier's clerk that the car could be returned without extra charge; and 
 thereupon the consignor requested its return for a correction of the 
 loading. A part of the carload was exchanged, the shipment was again 
 billed out and moved to destination : Held, That the Commission can 
 not relieve the carrier from the obligation of collecting the published 
 rates for all the movements actually made.^ 
 
 1. Conf. Rul. Bui. Rule 248, (January 4, 1910). 
 
 606-B. Outbound charges on a shipment may not be refunded by the 
 
 CARRIER AND CHARGED BACK AGAINST THE CONSIGNOR. 
 
 A shipment having been accepted by the consignee at destination 
 and removed to his place of business was subsequently returned to the 
 delivering carrier, the outbound charges were refunded and included in 
 the return waybill as advance charges. Upon delivery of the returned 
 shipment to the original consignor the return charges, as well as such 
 advance charges, were demanded and collected: Held, That the pub- 
 lished rate for the extra movement was the only charge that the car- 
 rier could lawfully exact from the original consignor.^ 
 
 1. Conf. Rul. Bui. Rule 249, (January 4, 1910). 
 
 606-C. Two small cars furnished by carrier in lieu of a larger CAR 
 
 ORDERED BY THE SHIPPER. 
 
 Upon informal complaints and numerous inquiries it is Held, That 
 the act of a carrier in furnishing two small cars in lieu of the larger 
 
49 FEEIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [§606 
 
 car ordered by a shipper under appropriate tariff authority is binding, 
 at the rate and minimum applicable to the car ordered, upon all the car- 
 riers that are parties to the joint rate under which the shipment moves 
 from the point of origin; the shipper is entitled to all privileges in 
 transit, to reconsignment, and to switching at the same charges as 
 Avould be applicable under the joint tariff had the shipment been loaded 
 into one car of the capacity ordered; and demurrage will likewise 
 accrue on that basis. If the shipment moves beyond the point to which 
 the joint rate applies, the connecting line or lines are entitled to and 
 should collect their transit, reconsigning, switching, and demurrage 
 charges as provided in their own tariffs. 
 
 In all cases the initial carrier will be liable for such additional 
 charges as may be imposed on the shipper by reason of its failure to 
 furnish a car of the capacity ordered. Carriers that are parties to the 
 joint rate under which the shipment commenced to move may share in 
 such additional expense so incurred by the initial carrier.^ 
 
 In case a shipment leaves a point of origin in a single car and for 
 the convenience of the carriers is transferred in transit into two cars 
 which are subsequently detained at destination beyond the free time, 
 demurrage should be assessed as for one car only, so long as either 
 car is detained ; and in such cases switching, reconsignment, and diver- 
 sion charges should be assessed as for one car only.^ 
 
 For a through shipment of an emigrant outfit the initial carrier, at 
 the request of the consignor, furnished a 40-foot car which became out 
 of order while on its line. At the junction point the connecting carrier 
 transferred the shipment into two 36-foot cars, and in that form it 
 moved to destination on the line of a third carrier. There was no joint 
 through rate, but the second and third carriers maintained a rate for a 
 .36-foot car, all weight in excess of a given minimum to be charged for 
 proportionately, the tariff, however, expressly forbidding the use of 
 larger equipment. At destination charges were collected on the basis 
 of two carloads from the point of transfer : Held, That in transferring 
 the shipment, the connecting carrier ought to have loaded the full mini- 
 mum weight into one car and to have adjusted the charges on the bal- 
 ance of the shipment in the second car at the less-than-carload rate.^' 
 
 A shipment started to move under a joint through rate and an 
 established minimum for the car of the size in which it was loaded, but 
 for the convenience of the carrier was subsequently transferred into a 
 smaller car taking a lower minimum under the same through rate. 
 Charges were collected on the actual weight, which was in excess of the 
 lower and less than the higher minimum weight : Held, That where a 
 joint through rate is in effect the through charges are not affected by 
 such a transfer of the shipment in transit from one car to another 
 whether larger or smaller; and that the through charges here should 
 have been collected at the joint through rate and on the basis of the 
 minimum weight applicable on the car ordered or accepted by the con- 
 signor for the movement.* 
 
 Where three connecting carriers publish a joint tariff under which 
 they hold themselves out to the public as prepared to transport com- 
 modities in carload lots of a certain minimum magnitude at a certain 
 specified rate, such carriers are by their tariff allowed to charge no 
 more than the rate upon such carload, no matter what equipment they 
 
§606] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 50 
 
 may provide for its transportation, except as tlie tariff in specific terms 
 provides certain minimum weights for carloads in cars of certain 
 lengths or capacities.* 
 
 1. Conf. Rul. Bui. Rule 339, (February 5, 1912); Rule 66, Tariff Circular 18-A; 
 General Chemical Co. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. O. Rep. 349; Mil- 
 waukee Falls Chair Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 
 217; Conf. Rul. Bui. Rule 59 under Chapter 10, post; Noble v. Baltimore & O. 
 Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 432; Conf. Rul. Bui. Rule 274 reaffirmed, with the 
 understanding, however, that the duty of transferring the shipment rests upon 
 the carriers and not necessarily upon the connecting carrier. (See Conf. Rul. Bui. 
 Rule 357, infra, amending Conference Ruling 250). 
 
 2. Conf. Rul. Bui. Rule 357, (May 6, 1912), amending Conference Ruling 250; Scudder 
 V. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (1910), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 60. 
 
 3. Conf. Rul. Bui. Rule 273, (March. 15, 1910). Compare Conference Ruling 357, 
 supra. 
 
 4. Conf. Rul. Bui. Rule 331, (November 14, 1911). 
 
 5. Pacific Purchasing Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 549. 
 
 606-D. Rates chaegeable on a larger car furnished for the con- 
 venience OF THE INITIAIj CAEEIKB^ UNDER TARIFF AUTHORITY FOR 
 APPLYING THE MINIMUM WEIGHT APPLICABLE ON THE SMALLER 
 CAR OEDEEED BY THE SHIPPER, WHERE THE CONNECTING LINE 
 DOES NOT PUBLISH SUCH A TARIFF PROVISION. 
 
 Complaints of alleged overcharges arise in connection with ship- 
 ments that move over the lines of two or more carriers under combina- 
 tion rates, the initial carrier having a provision in its tariff that in case 
 a car of certain dimensions or capacity is ordered by a shipper, and 
 the carrier for its own convenience furnishes a larger car, such larger 
 car may be used on the basis of the minimum weight applicable to the 
 car ordered, while the connecting carrier does not have such tariff pro- 
 vision and therefore charges for the full minimum weight applicable 
 to the car used.^ 
 
 The law imposes upon carriers the obligation of arranging to every 
 reasonable extent for through carriage and through shipment. Neither 
 the burden of following his shipment to a connecting point between two 
 carriers and there transferring it, nor of bearing the expense of such 
 transfer, can be laid upon the shipper. It is not deemed reasonable that 
 in a case of this kind the shipper should be required to pay higher 
 charges that he would have paid had the initial carrier furnished the 
 equipment that is provided for in its tarilf and that was ordered by the 
 shipper. The carriers in the different classification territories ought 
 to have, and should provide at the earliest practicable moment, a uni- 
 form rule on this subject.^ 
 
 It is believed that where the initial carrier provides in its tariffs 
 that if for its own convenience it furnishes a car larger than that or- 
 dered by the shipper, it will be used upon the basis of minimum weight 
 applicable to the car ordered, and the connecting carrier to or over 
 whose lines such shipment is moved has not such provision in its tariff, 
 the initial carrier should note upon the bill of lading and upon the way 
 biU or transfer bill, which accompanies delivery of a shipment to its 
 connections, the fact that car of certain size was ordered and car of 
 certain size was for its own convenience furnished by the carrier to be 
 used on the basis of the minimum weight applicable to the car ordered ; 
 and that connecting carrier, receiving such notice on the way bill or 
 transfer bill and not having provision in its tariff which permits the 
 
51 FKEIGHT RATES AXD CHAKGES [§606 
 
 use of the car on the basis of the lower minimum weight, should trans- 
 fer the shipment into car of the size or capacity ordered by the shipper 
 or into car to which the same minimum weig-ht applies, mthout addi- 
 tional expense to the shipper.^ 
 
 This ruling outlines the policy which the Commission will follow in 
 cases of this nature which may be brought before it. It is, of course, 
 understood that shipper may not demand any car that is not provided 
 for in the initial carrier's tariff. 
 
 1. Conf. Rul. Bill. Rule 274, a. (March 15. 1910 ( : See Rule 66, Tariff Circular 18- A. 
 
 2. Conf. Rul. Bui. Rule 274, b, (March 15, 1910). 
 
 3. Conf. Rul. Bui. Rule 274, c, (March 15, 1910) : See Conf. Rul. Bui. Rule 339 under 
 Section 606-C, supra. 
 
 606-E. Rates applicable on gasolijS'e motor cars mo\ixg u:?^deb their 
 owx power over carrier's rails. 
 
 The movement of a gasoline motor car, from the manufacturer to 
 the purchaser over the rails of a common carrier is transportation that 
 is subject to the act, when between interstate points, notwithstanding 
 the fact that it moves under its own power and is operated by employees 
 of the manufacturer. Such transportation is lawful only when a rate 
 for it has been duly published. Except on the commodities specifically 
 enumerated in Section 1 of the Act, rates can not lawfully include the 
 passage of attendants, and as gasoline motor cars are not so enumer- 
 ated the attendants must pay fares on the basis of the regularly pub- 
 lished passenger fare then in effect. In adjusting its rates the carrier 
 should take into consideration the conditions surrounding the move- 
 ment of traflSc of this kind.^ 
 
 1. Conf. Rul. Bui. Rule 334. (January 9. 1912). 
 
 606-F. Charges to apply on a prepaid shipment that is stopped and 
 delivered at an intermediate point. 
 
 Under transit tariffs requiring the payment of the full rate to final 
 destination at the time the shipment is deli^-ered at the transit point, it 
 sometimes occurs that a shipment is never forwarded to the destination 
 to which charges have been paid : Held, That it is not unlawful or im- 
 proper in such cases to refund the charges that have been paid in ex- 
 cess of what the lawful charges on the shipment would have been if the 
 transit point had been its final destination.^ 
 
 1. Conf. Rul. Bui. Rule 350 (April 1, 1912) : Clifton Sugar Refining Co. v. Chicago & 
 X. W. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 364; Pillsbury Flour Mills Co. v. Great N. 
 Ry. Co. (1916), 39 I. C. C. Rep. 353. 
 
 606-G. Interst.\te ereight rates must apply according to the move- 
 ment or THE TRAFFIC. 
 
 Upon the arrival of a shipment at the junction designated in the 
 consignor 's routing instructions it appeared that, because of a washout 
 on its lines, the connecting carrier could not accept the movement. The 
 shipper thereupon assumed custody of the shipment and forwarded it 
 
§606] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 52 
 
 by a water line. Held, That the carrier must collect its local rate to the 
 junction point, and cannot apply its proportion of the through rate.^ 
 
 In another case a mixed carload of meat, eastbound, was diverted 
 at the Ohio Eiver on account of a flood, and, by order of the shipper, 
 was taken by a roundabout route to a point east of its destination, and 
 from thence hauled westbound to destination. The mixed-carload rate 
 applied on eastbound shipments, but the tariffs provided no mixed- 
 carload rate on westbound shipments. Held, That such interruption of 
 the eastbound movements would not justify the application of a mixed- 
 carload rate on the westbound movement to destination.^ 
 
 So it is an entirely erroneous assumption that, where there are two 
 or more lines with different rates between two points, a shipper may 
 secure the application of the lowest rate by either of such lines, regard- 
 less of which one he uses.-'' 
 
 1. Conf. Rul. Bui. Rule 147, (February 9, 1909). See Conf. Rul. 83 under Section 
 1104-A, post 
 
 2. Conf. Rul. Bui. Rule 52. (March 11, 1908). 
 
 3. Hill & Webb v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 569. 
 
 606-H. Only one legal rate can exist between two points at any 
 
 GIVEN TIME. 
 
 See "Only one legal rate can exist between any two points at any 
 given time," Section 602- A, ante. 
 
 606-1. The legal rate applicable to an interstate shipment is the 
 
 PUBLISHED through RATE IN EFFECT AT THE TIME THE SHIP- 
 MENT IS RECEIVED BY THE C.4RRIER FOR TRANSPORTATION AND 
 OVER THE ROUTE WHICH IT IS TO MOVE. 
 
 See "The legal rate applicable to an interstate shipment is the pub- 
 lished through rate in effect at the time the shipment is received by the 
 carrier for transportation and over the route which it is to move," Sec- 
 tion 602-B, ante. 
 
 606- J. EaTES .-APPLICABLE ON SHIPMENTS TO CoLON. PaNAMA. 
 
 Colon, although within the geographical limits of the Canal Zone, 
 is governed by and is under the sovereignty of the Republic of Panama. 
 The Commission holds, therefore, that shipments from the United 
 States to that point are entitled to export rates.^ 
 
 1. Conf. Rul. Bui. Rule 359, (May 13, 1912). 
 
 606-K. Right of shipper with reference to the .manner of shipping 
 
 A COMMODITY, 
 
 A shipper of goods has the right to refrain from assembling its 
 ultimate product, or to disassemble the same, for shipment in any way 
 that will make the shipment take a lower tariff rate than if the articles 
 were in final form.^ 
 
 Though a manufacturer of portable railway track did not attach 
 to the rails the plates and bolts, although the sections consisted of two 
 
53 FREIG'HT BATES AND CHAEGES [§606 
 
 steel rails and steel cross-ties, which were riveted together, Held, that 
 the article was a "portable railway track set up in sections," within 
 the tariff providing for that class of articles, and that the shipper was 
 not entitled to the commodity tariff applicable on iron and steel rails 
 and cross-ties.^' 
 
 1. Lakewood Engineering Co. v. New York, C. & H. R. Kd. Co. (1919), 259 Fed. Rep. 
 61, 170 C. C. A., 121. Case dismissed. Lakewood Engineering Co. v. New York 
 C. Rd. Co. (1920), 254 U. S. 661, 65 L. Ed. 126, 4 Sup. ct. Rep. 60. 
 
 2. Ibid. 
 
 606-L. ConfIjIcting rates in pttblished takiff. 
 
 A carrier in reissuing a tariff brought forward certain rates orig- 
 inally named in a previous tariff, and also slightly increased the rates 
 named between the same points on the same commodity in a supplement 
 to the previous tariff: Held, That where a tariff contains conflicting 
 rates the lower or lowest of the rates so published is the legal rate.^ 
 
 Where conflicting rates are named in separate tariffs the rate first 
 established is the legal rate, upon the principle that lawfully established 
 rates remain in effect until specifically cancelled.^ 
 
 1. Conf. Rul. Bui. Rule 239, (December 6, 1909) ; Ireland & Rollings v. St. Louis &) 
 iS. F. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 590, 592. 
 
 2. Highland Iron & Steel Co. v. Director General, as Agent, Baltimore & O. C. T. Rd. Co. 
 (1920), 57 I. C. C. Rep. 547, 548; citing, Conf. Rul. Bui., Rule 50 (March 9, 1908) 
 Conf. Rul. Bui., Rule 70 (May 5, 1908) ; Conf. Rul. Bui., Rule 104 (Nov. 9, 1908) 
 New Albany Box & Basket Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 315 
 Sun Co. V. Toledo & O. C. Ry. Co. (1918), 52 I. C. C. Rep. 12; Dewey Portland Cement 
 Co. V. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1920), 56 I. C. C. Rep. 444. 
 
 606-M. Rates applicable on materials fok repair of cars on foreign 
 
 LINES. 
 
 A carrier on whose line a car was damaged made an order on a 
 connecting line, which owned the car, for certain castings to be deliv- 
 ered to it at the junction of the two lines. Held, That the former line 
 was a shipper over the line of the owing carrier and must pay the 
 published rate.^ 
 
 1. Conf. Rul. Bui. 373 (October 8, 1912). 
 
 606-N. Special rate on shipments in foreign g4.rs. 
 
 A carrier may not by tariff limit the application of certain pro- 
 portional rates to shipments in cars of other carriers.^ 
 
 1. Conf. Rul. Bui. Rule 470 (December 24, 1914). 
 
 606-O. Rates on consolidated carloads of less-than-carload ship- 
 ments. 
 
 Forwarding agent as consignor. 
 The less-than-carload rate usually exceeds the carload rate upon 
 the same commodity. If, therefore, several less-than-carload ship- 
 ments can be bunched together and sent at the carload rate a material 
 
§606] TEAFFIC LAW SEEVICB 54 
 
 saving results to the shippers, and this is especially true Avhere the 
 movement is over long distances and the rate considerable.^ 
 
 For the purpose of making this saving shippers have been and are 
 accustomed to combine by agreement among themse^lves their less- 
 than-carload freight into carloads, consigning the carload to some indi- 
 vidual at the destination point who makes the proper distribution. 
 There has also <3ome into existence a class of operators known as "for- 
 warders ' ' or forwarding agents whose business it is to solicit less-than- 
 carload shipments to be combined and forwarded as carloads. The 
 forwarder loads the car and ships it as a carload either in his own name 
 or to some consignee as his agent at the point of distribution in making 
 delivery to the various owners. The freight is paid to the railroad by 
 the forwarder or his agent, who charges the shippers something less 
 than the regular rate upon their less-than-carload shipments. The 
 result of the transaction is that the railroad receives its published car- 
 load rate, the shippers pay less than the published less-than-carload 
 rate, while the forwarder, for the service of assembling the freight, 
 loading the car, making the shipment, and distributing the freight at 
 destination, retains the difference between what it collects from the' 
 shippers and what it pays the railroad.^ 
 
 The carriers for the purpose of preventing the transaction of this 
 business, adopted a rule by which it was provided, in substance, that 
 the carload rate should not be applied unless all the merchandise in the 
 car was owned by one individual. Since, in point of fact, the combined 
 carload is owned by several different individuals,- and since this must, 
 in the nature of things, be indicated by the marks upon the packages, 
 the enforcement of this rule prevented the operations of the forwarder.* 
 
 One of these forwarding agents applied by complaint to the Com- 
 mission in the case of California Commercial Association v. Wells, 
 Fargo S Co.* alleging that the above rule was unlawful under the Act 
 to Regulate Commerce, inasmuch as the railroad had no business to 
 inquire whether the entire carload was or was not owned by one per- 
 son, and the Commission so held. In this case, a number of packages 
 of merchandise, aggregating 16,000 pounds in weight, were assembled 
 in New York by the complainant's agent and offered to the defendant 
 at one time and one place, consigned under one bill of lading to the com- 
 plainant, a voluntary association of San Francisco merchants. Def end- 
 ant 's tariff provided a rate of $8.00 per 100 pounds for Shipments of 
 10,000 and less than 20,000 pounds. Applying its rule as to "bulked 
 shipments intended to be distributed by the consignee, ' ' the defendant 
 charged its parcel rate against each separate package. The "Commis- 
 sion held that the rule against "bulked shipments" is illegal; that the 
 law does not justify the classification of shippers with regard to their 
 interest in the property shipped ; that the OA\Tiership of property tend- 
 ered for shipment cannot be made a test as to the applicability of the 
 carrier's rates; that in gathering several packages of goods together 
 and shipping them under the carrier's rates on large shipments, a ship- 
 per is not by device evading the law, but is legally availing himself of 
 the rates which the carrier offers; that the cost of carrying "bulked 
 shipments ' ' is not greater than the cost of carrying the same amount of 
 freight at the instance of an individual owner; that the charge must 
 therefore be the same in each case. The Commission said : 
 
55 FREIGHT BATES AXD CHAKGES [§606 
 
 "The fundamental and large question involved in this case is the right of a carrier 
 to determine what shippers may use its published rates. It is the contention of the 
 defendant that it may refuse to grant the bulk rate (which in this case is analogous to 
 the carload rate made by a railroad) to any but single owners of such' shipments; that 
 to permit any other use of the rate would be to induce many shippers of small packages 
 (less than carload shippers) to unite their shipments in order to secure the lower rate 
 applicable to large shipments, and thus the forwarding agency would come into being — 
 an agency which could cut the package rate, render such rates unstable, grant prefer- 
 ences, and effect discriminations contrary to the spirit of the Act to Regulate Commerce. 
 To protect themselves against the creation of such agencies, the rule has been drafted 
 which has been quoted above. The effect of such rule has been seen in this case — a 
 group of smaller merchants are denied a rate which a large merchant is given ; they 
 tender the same number of packages of the same weight, containing the same goods as 
 the large department store which is their rival, and they are charged a rate of 50 per cent 
 higher upon their shipments. A rule which works such a result cannot be based on solid 
 principle, even though it may have most specious and persuasive reasons to support it. 
 
 "The express companies urge that unless such a rule is permitted, shippers will 
 form such agencies and no one henceforth will be able to tell what the real package or 
 the less-than-carload rate Is. The forwarding agency will give to one shipper one rate, 
 , a second shipper another rate, a third another, and so the very purpose of the Act, the 
 uniformity of rates as between shippers, will be destroyed. We do not know that this 
 will be so, but it is theoretically possible. The one certain answer to this argument is 
 that the carrier makes but one rate and applies it without favor to each shipment that 
 is tendered — to the small shipment the rate that is applicable thereto, and to the large 
 shipment its own fixed rate. The railroad or the express company offers to the world 
 to transport a certain quantity of a certain character of freight for a certain definite 
 amount of money, and it has no fair concern with the profit of the shipper or his 
 interest in the property. It may ask that the shipment shall be what it purports to be 
 in character and In weight, for that affects the rate; it may make reasonable rules to 
 protect itself against a multiplicity of claims for loss or damage, for such claims ulti- 
 mately afi:ect the rate at which the carrier can afford to carry ; it may refuse to accept 
 the shipment except upon payment of the charges — these and, no doubt, other rules 
 are properly within the carrier's prerogative, but we look in vain for authority to justify 
 a classification of freight according to ownership. If we may hold as reasonable such 
 a rule by which the utility of a rate is limited upon the carrier's knowledge of the 
 persons to whom freight is really destined, we should, be ready likewise to approve a 
 rule which makes the right to use a rate depend upon the carrier's knowledge of the 
 use to which the article is to be put by the ultimate consignee — whether a certain 
 shipment of grain, for instance, is to be ground into flour, sown in the field, fed to 
 cattle, or converted into liquor. Where can we logically stop if we depart from the 
 simple tests which may be put by the carrier's agent at the timg of shipment: (a) Who 
 offers this shipment? (b) Of what does it consist? (c) To whom, and where, is it 
 bound? For its purposes as common carrier the railroad or the express company needs 
 no other information than may properly by elicited by these questions, and it would 
 appear improper and unreasonable that it should be permitted to go into the vague and 
 illimitable realms outside of and beyond such needs. The carrier deals with the ship- 
 ment that is tendered, not with its ownership nor with its ultimate use; and it deals 
 with the shipper who tenders it, not with the owner of the property or the last and most 
 remote person to whom it is distributed. To veer from this straight course, no matter 
 to how slight a degree or for what apparently beneficial purpose, is to lead away from 
 the policy of the law which condemns discriminations and preferences." 
 
 In the case of Export Shipping Company v. Wahash Rd. Co? the 
 complainant delivered to defendants in Chicago for transportation to 
 New York three carloads of freight consisting of a number of packages 
 of various ownership, assembled by the complainant before delivery to 
 the carrier, and each consigned under a single bill of lading to a single 
 consignee. On arrival in New York City the delivering carrier refused 
 to apply the carload rate, but in accordance with the note to Eule 5-B 
 and Eule 15-E of the Official Classification then in force, assessed the 
 less-than-carload rates. The Interstate Commerce Commission held 
 that note to Eule 5-B and Eule 15-E were unlawful, basing its opinion 
 on the case of California Commercial Club v. Wells, Fargo & Company, 
 supra. 
 
 The Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York enjoined 
 the order of the Commission,"' but the Supreme Court of the United 
 States, upon appeal, reversed the holding of the Circuit Court and sus- 
 tained the order.'^ 
 
 The Supreme Court has apparently laid down in this caso two 
 propositions : 
 
§606] TEAFFIC LAW SEKVICE 56 
 
 First: That where the order of the Commission depends upon a 
 finding of fact the finding of the Commission is conclusive upon the 
 court. 
 
 Second. That a carrier can not make the ownership of goods the 
 measure of the rate which shall be applied. 
 
 The language of the court is as follows : 
 
 "As shown by tlie opinion of the Commission and tliat of the two members who 
 dissented, there were many and wide differences in the views expressed. On their face, 
 however, when ultimately reduced, they will be found, in so far as they are here 
 susceptible of review, to rest on but a single legal proposition — that is, the right of a 
 common carrier to make the ownership of goods tendered him for carriage the test 
 of his duty to receive and carry, or, what is equivalent thereto, the right of a carrier 
 to make the ownership of goods the criterion by which his charge for carriage is to 
 be measured. We say the contentions all reduce themselves to this, because ih their 
 final analysis all the other differences, in so far as they do not rest upon the legal 
 proposition just stated, are based upon conclusions of fact as to which the judgment 
 of the Commission is not susceptible of review by the courts. (Baltimore & Ohio R. R. 
 Co. V. Pitcaim, 215 U. S. 481.) This at once demonstrates the error committed by the 
 lower court in basing its decree annulling the order of the Commission upon its 
 approval and adoption of the reasons stated in the opinion of the dissenting members 
 of the Commission. This follows, since the reasons given by the dissenting members, 
 except in so far as they rested upon the legal proposition we have just stated, proceeded 
 upon premises of fact, which, however cogent they may have been as a matter of 
 original consideration, were not open to be so considered by the court, because they 
 were foreclosed by the opinion of the Commission. Doubtless the mistake of the court 
 below this respect was occasioned by overlooking the scope of the Hepburn Act and 
 because the decision below was made in June, 1909, before the announcement of the 
 opinion in the Pitcairn case. (lb., 251-2.)" 
 
 In the case of California Commercial Association v. Wells, Fargo 
 (& Co.^ the defendant's tariff provides that under certain circumstances 
 two or more packages forwarded by one company, from the same point, 
 on the same day, to one consignee, whether from one or more shippers, 
 must be aggregated as to weights if a lower charge is thereby made. 
 Upon complaint that this rule was not applied to certain shipments to 
 which it should have been applied: Held, That the rule should have 
 been applied to those shipments, and that charges collected thereon in 
 excess of what would have been the charges if the rule had been applied 
 were in excess of the lawful tariff charges and should be refunded. 
 
 A coffee broker purchased from three different merchants in New 
 York three lots of coffee for shipment to one customer as one carload. 
 The three lots were delivered to the carrier under circumstances that 
 would have entitled them to go to destination as a carload shipment had 
 proper instructions been given. Because of the failure of the shipper's 
 agent to give such instructions the three lots went forward to destina- 
 tion as three shipments, at the less-than-carload rate. Upon inquiry 
 by the carrier whether it might assess the carload rate : Held, That 
 freight charges must be collected on the basis of the less-than-carload 
 rate." 
 
 Owner of the goods as shipper of a consolidated carload. 
 In the case of The Buckeye Buggy Co. v. Cleveland, C. G. S St. L. 
 By. Co.^" the Commission held, that before allowing a carload rating to 
 a carload shipment a carrier is entitled to require that the goods shall 
 be loaded at one time and place, that but a single bill of lading shall be 
 issued, and that the shipment shall be from one consignor to one con- 
 signee, but that when the goods are so loaded and by the terms of sale 
 become the property of the consignee upon delivery to the carrier, the 
 carrier has no right to inquire whether the consignee obtained his title 
 from one or several owners ; and that if it accords the carload rate in 
 
57 FREIGHT KATES AND CHARGES [§606 
 
 case the consignor is the owner, failure on its part to extend the same 
 privilege when the consignee is the owner, violates Sections 1, 2 and 3 
 of the Act to Regulate Commerce. 
 
 The Commission ordered that the rule in defendant's classification 
 covering the application of carload rates to carload lots should be so 
 modified as to accord the same rating to consignor and consignee when 
 the condition of ownership after the property is delivered to the«carrier 
 is the same.^^ 
 
 1. Twenty-Fifth Annual Report of I. C. C. (1911). 
 
 2. Ibid. 
 
 3. Ibid. The rule of the carriers referred to was the note to Rule 5-B and Rule 
 15-E of the Official Classification in efEect in 1908. 
 
 4. California Commercial Association v. Wells, Fargo & Company (1908), 14 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 422. Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (C. C. S. D. 
 N. Y.) Not reported. Pending the determination of the case of Export Shipping 
 Company v. Wabash Rd. Co. (14 I. C. C. Rep. 437; 166 Fed. Rep. 499; 220 U. S. 
 235), the order in this case was suspended by the Commission. There was, there- 
 fore, no action by the court. California Commercial Association v. Wells, Fargo 
 & Company (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. .300. Former order and decree adhered to. 
 
 5. Export Shipping Co. v. Wabash Rd. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 437. 
 
 6. Delaware, L. & W. Rd. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1908), 166 Fed. 
 Rep. 499. In Delaware, L. & W. Rd. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1909), 
 169 Fed. Rep. 894, in granting application of the American Forwarding Co., Trans- 
 continental Freight Co., and Rockford Manufacturers' & Shippers' Association to 
 intervene as parties defendant the court said : "It is not to be understood as 
 sanctioning a practice which would allow every interested person to intervene in 
 proceedings of this nature." 
 
 7. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Delaware, L. & W. Rd. Co. (1911), 220 U. S. 
 235 ; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 392 ; 55 L. Ed. 448. 
 
 8. California Commercial Association v. Wells, Fargo & Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 
 458. 
 
 9. Conf. Rul. Bui. Rule 175, (May 4, 1909). 
 
 10. The Buckeye Buggy Co. v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1903), 9 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 620, applied and followed in Bell Co. v. Baltimore & O. S. W. Rd. Co. (1903), 
 9 I. C. C. Rep. 637. 
 
 11. Ibid. 
 
 606-P. In the assessment of freight rates the true character of 
 
 THE COMMODITY CONTROLS. 
 
 In the case of Joseph Iron Co. v. Cornwall <& L. Rd. Co.^ the Com- 
 plainant made a shipment weighing 40,400 pounds, over defendant's 
 lines from Cordele, Ga., to Lebanon, Pa., consisting of large square 
 pieces of worn-out cotton-press machinery. It was originally billed as 
 scrap iron; but an agent of the Southern-Weighing and Inspection 
 Bureau, at Savannah, Ga., changed the billing to read "cotton-com- 
 pressed machinery" because, as noted on the way bill, the machinery 
 had not been broken into scraps or pieces, as required by a provision 
 in connection with the rating on scrap iron in the Southern Classifica- 
 tion. Charges were collected in the sum of $218.16, at a rate of 54 
 cents per 100 pounds, applicable on cotton-compressed machinery. At 
 the time the shipment moved a carload commodity rate of $5.10 per 
 net ton applied over the route of movement from point of origin to 
 destination on "scrap iron, and scrap steel, all kinds, except old rails 
 suitable for relaying purposes." This rate was published in an agency 
 tariff, which excepts the commodity rates on scrap iron and scrap 
 steel named therein from the application of the Southern Classification 
 descriptions and rules. The evidence introduced for complainant shows 
 that the material in question was damaged to such an extent that it was 
 of no value except as scrap iron ; that it was not further broken up at 
 point of origin because of lack of facilities ; that it was purchased and 
 
§606] TRAI'FIC LAW SERVICE 
 
 58 
 
 sold by complainant as scrap iron; and that it was ultimately broken 
 Tip by machinery and used for remelting purposes : Held, that the ship- 
 ment consisted of scrap iron to which the rate charged was inapplic- 
 able; that the complainant has been damaged to the extent of the 
 difference between the charges paid and those that would have accrued 
 at the applicable rate of $5.10 per net ton; and that it is entitled to 
 reparation in the sum of $115.14 with interest. 
 
 In the case of Joseph Iron Co. v. Morgan's L. & T. Rd. & S. 8. Co.^ 
 the complainant made a shipment of 207,200 pounds consisting of worn- 
 out scrap-iron rails, which were used for remelting purposes, from 
 Algiers, La. to Richmond, Va. They were purchased from Morgan's 
 Louisiana & Texas Railroad & Steamship Company, F. 0. B. New 
 Orleans, La., from which point they were transported from Algiers 
 deadhead as Company material. They were shipped from New Orleans 
 to Richmond over the Louisville & Nashville and the Atlanta & West 
 Point railroads, Western Railway of Alabama, and the Georgia and the" 
 ^Atlantic Coast Line railroads. Charges were collected in the sum of 
 $634.54, at a joint commodity rate of $6.86 per long ton. 
 
 At the time the shipment moved defendants maintained a rate of 
 $4.50 per net ton on scrap iron from New Orleans to Richmond, and 
 complainant cited a rate of $4.30 per net ton contemporaneously applic- 
 able on scrap-iron rails from New Orleans to Yoimgstown, Ohio, and 
 Sharon, Pa. The Louisville & Nashville, expressed a willingness to 
 establish a rate on old scrap iron rails, unsuitable for relaying pur- 
 poses, from New Orleans to Richmond not higher than the rate con- 
 temporaneously applicable on scrap iron from and to these points, 
 and to make reparation on that basis. 
 
 The Commission found that the rate charged was legally appli- 
 cable, but that it was, and for the future will be, unreasonable to the 
 extent that it exceeded or may exceed the rate contemporaneously 
 applicable on scrap iron, in carload, from and to the same point; that 
 the complainant had been damaged to the extent of the difference be- 
 tween the charges paid and those that would have accrued at the rate 
 herein found reasonable; and that it is entitled to reparation in the 
 sum of $168.34, with interest.. 
 
 1. Joseph Iron Co. v. CornwaU & L. Rd. Co. (191S), 49 I. C. C. Rep. HI. 
 
 2. Joseph Iron Co. v. Morgan's L. & T. Rd. & S. S. Co. (1918). 50 I. C. C. Rep. lOT. 
 See Cohen- Schwartz's Rail & Steel Co. v. Morgan's L. & T. Rd. & S. S. Co. (1920), 
 57 I. C. C. Rep. 479. 
 
 606-Q. Rate to govern teansportation' service that has been ren- 
 dered FOB WHICH there IS NO T^ARIEF AUTHORITY. 
 
 Where a transportation service has been rendered for which no 
 tariff authority whatever exists and where the shipper has paid the 
 sum claimed by the carrier for that service, the Commission has jur- 
 isdiction to inquire what was a reasonable charge for the service and 
 to order the repayment of whatever the carrier had collected over and 
 above such reasonable charge.^ 
 
 1. Memphis Freight Bureau v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 90. 
 See able dissenting opinion in this ease by Mr. Commissioner Cockrell, denying 
 jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission to fix a charge for trans- 
 
59' FREIGHT BATES AXD CHARGES [§§606, 607, 608 
 
 portation service rendered without tariff authority. - Zelnicker Supply Co. v. 
 Louisiana W. Ed. Co. (1919), 52 I. C. C. Rep. 543: Cohen-Schwartz Rail & Steel Co. 
 V. Morgan's L. & T. Rd. & S. S. Co. (1920), 57 I. C. C. Rep. 479, 480; Wharton 
 Steel Co., V. Director General, as Agent, Central Rd. Co. of N. J. (1920), '59 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 11, 22; Gateway Produce Co., Inc. v. American Railway Express Co. (1921), 
 61 I. C. C. Rep. 347, 348. 
 
 606-R. Duty of shipper to observe tariff provisions. 
 
 The law imposes upon shippers the duty of ascertaining the rates 
 and conditions under which they ship, and non-compliance by shipper 
 with tariff rules afford no basis for a finding that the rate legally appli- 
 cable is unreasonable or otherwise unlawful or for authorizing a 
 waiver of their observance.^ 
 
 For a full discussion of this subject see, " Payment for Transpor- 
 tation," Chapter 19, post. 
 
 1 
 
 1. United Verde Extension Mining Co. v. Director General, Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. 
 (1920), 57 I. C. C. Rep. 483, 484; citing, Maloney Tank Mfg. (Do. v. St. Louis & 
 S. F. Rd. Co. (1917), 42 I. C. C Rep. 605; Good-Hopkins Lumber Co. v. Great 
 Northern Ry. Co. (1918), 51 I. C. C. Rep. 99. 
 
 607. Pa3niient for Transportation. 
 
 The Interstate Commerce Act {as amended February 28, 1920), 
 contains the following provisions •} 
 
 From and after July 1, 1920, no carrier by railroad subject to the provisions of this 
 Act shall deliver or relinquish possession at destination of any freight transported by 
 It until all tariff rates and charges thereon have been paid, except under such rules and 
 regulations as the Commission may from time to time prescribe to assure prompt pay- 
 ment of all such rates and charges to prevent unjust discrimination; Provided, 
 That the provisions of this paragraph shall not be construed to prohibit any carrier 
 from extending credit In connection with rates and charges on freight transported for 
 the United States, for any department, bureau, or agency thereof, or for any State or 
 Territory or political subdivision thereof, or for the District of Columbia. 
 
 For full discussion of this subject see, "Payment for Transpor- 
 tation," Chapter 19, post. 
 
 1. Interstate Commerce Act, Section 3 (2), added by amendment of February 28, 
 1920. 
 
 608. Factors and elements in rate-making. 
 
 608-A. Vai;Ue or service to the shipper. 
 
 The value of the service to the article transported is an element 
 of highest importance in fixing rates.^ The value of the service to a 
 shipper in a general sense is the ability to reach a market and make 
 his commodity a subject of commerce. In this sense the service is 
 more valuable to a man who transports a thousand miles than to a 
 man who transports a hundred miles, so that distance is an element of 
 the value of service. In a more definite and accurate sense it consists 
 in reaching a market at a profit, being in effect what the traffic will 
 hear to be remunerative to the producer or dealer. If the charge for 
 service leaves no profit to the shipper the traSic is worthless and neces- 
 sarily ceases.- In the case of coal, for example, the intrinsic value of 
 the service to a miner forty or fifty miles farther from the common 
 market is greater in proportion to its distance tlian to the nearer mine, 
 but relativelv on account of the cost of production, or a somewhat 
 
§608] ' TKAFFIC LAW SEEVICE 60 
 
 inferior quality, it may be of no greater. If the remote mine can not 
 sell at more profit the service has the same value for it and the traffic 
 will bear no more.^ 
 
 In Re Investigation and Suspension Docket 26 to 26C* the Com- 
 mission said: "Is a rate unreasonable because it does not pay its full 
 share of taxes, fixed charges and dividends? At the end this is the 
 question to which we come in this case. The carriers themselves hav- 
 ing fixed these rates under the mandate of the law that they shall fix 
 just and reasonable rates, have they justified higher rates by showing 
 that the existing rates which they had fixed fall somewhat short of 
 meeting all the related expenses which the carrier must bear, not only 
 for transportation but to secure an adequate return upon its prop- 
 erty? Let us see 'where this doctrine would lead. If a carrier may 
 raise all rates to a basis where each will bear its share of cost, includ- 
 ing all costs, and no lower rate is reasonable, then must follow that all 
 rates are unreasonable which yield to the carrier a greater return than 
 such cost. Under such theory what would be the rate on tea or silks, 
 or high-priced horses, or delicate machines! Is there to be no classifi- 
 cation of freight excepting upon the basis of cost of transportation 
 plus insurance risk? If so the tariffs of every railroad in the United 
 States must suffer a revolutiona,ry change. In all classification con- 
 sideration must be given to what may be termed public policy, the 
 advantage to the community of having some kind of freight carried at 
 a less rate than other kinds. And this is the true meaning of the phrase 
 'what the traffic will bear.' It expresses the consideration that must 
 be shown by the traffic manager to the need of the people for certain 
 commodities. He accordingly imposes a higher rate upon what may 
 be termed luxuries as compared with that imposed upon those articles 
 for which there is a more universal demand. He also gives considera- 
 tion to the fact that the rate so imposed enters into the ultimate price 
 to the consumer to but a small degree when the article is one of high 
 value, and that those in the community who can afford to purchase 
 such articles can well afford to pay a rate greater than that which could 
 reasonably be imposed upon the general public for commodities for 
 common use. In this sense what the traffic will bear and the value of 
 the service is analogous. No one would claim that a carirer was 
 violating its duty under the law in charging three times the rate upon 
 oriental rugs that it imposed upon cotton. This Avould not be undue 
 discrimination as between commodities, even though it costs no more 
 to transport the rugs than it did the cotton, assuming both to be carried 
 at the owner's risk, for the one does not compete with the other, and 
 one may reasonably bear a higher rate than the other upon public 
 grounds." 
 
 Whether traffic will move at a given rate is always some evidence 
 as to whether the rate responds to the value of the service performed.^ 
 However, the value of the service rendered is not conclusive of the 
 reasonableness of the schedule; it must be judged in the light of its 
 general purpose.® 
 
 Rates should bear a fair and reasonable relation to the anteced- 
 ent cost of the traffic as delivered to the carrier for transportation, 
 and the average market price the freight will command; but the burden 
 is upon a party invoking this rule to establish by satisfactorv evidence' 
 such antecedent cost and maket value.' 
 
61 FREIGHT BATES AND CHAEGES [§608 
 
 Where the market price yields but a scant return the labor and 
 expense of production the cost of transportation needs to be as mod- 
 erate as may be consistent with justice to the carrier.* 
 
 If some commodities and the industries that use them can well 
 stand rates that yield a liberal profit to the carrier it can afford to 
 tr^Jisport at low rates other commodities that could not move except 
 under low rates, and so the commerce and welfare of the country is 
 promoted, as it must be, by the widest possible general diffusion and 
 exchange of the products of the mine, the forest, the farm, the mill, the" 
 furnace, and the factory." 
 
 1. Thurber v. Xew York, C. & H. Rd. Co. (1890), 3 I. C. C. Rep. 473, 2 I. C. Rep. 
 742. 
 
 2. Imperial Coal Co. v. Pittsburg & L. E. Rd. Co. (1889), 2 I. C. C. Rep. 618; 2 I. 0. 
 Rep. 436. 
 
 3. Ibid. 
 
 4. In Re Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates for Transportation of 
 Coal by Chesapeake & O. Ry Co. (1912), le I. C. C. Rep. 604, 623. See National 
 Hay Assn. v. Michigan C. Rd. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 34, 47; Memphis Cotton 
 on Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 313, 318; Interstate Commerce 
 Commission v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co. (1905), 141 Fed. Rep. 1003, 1015. 
 
 5. Southern P. Co. v. United States (1912), 197 Fed. Rep. 167, 171. 
 
 6. Wilson Produce Co. v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 170, 175. 
 
 7. Loud V. South Carolina Ry. Co. (1892), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 529: 4 I. C. Rep. 205; citing, 
 Delaware State Grange v. New York, P. & N. Rd. Co. (1891), 4 I. C. C. Rep. 588; 
 3 I. C. Rep. 554. 
 
 8. Newland v. Northern P. Rd. Co. (1893), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 131; 4 I. C. Rep. 474. 
 
 9. Coke Producers Asisn. of the Connellsville Region v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1913), 
 27 I. C. C. Rep. 125, 132. 
 
 608-B. Cost of service to the carrier. 
 
 In fixing upon a rate or rate adjustment a carrier may always con- 
 sider the cost of service and that factor should have great influence 
 with the Commission in passing upon the reasonableness of the car- 
 rier's action.^ While, however, in determining rates to be charged for 
 transportation, cost of service is one of the principal elements to be con- 
 sidered, yet it is not to be considered alone as controlling.^ ' Such cost 
 can be reached approximately but not accurately enough to make it 
 controlling.^ On that basis some articles, on account of relation of 
 commercial value to cost of service through furnishing a large volume 
 of traffic, would not be carried at all, and on others of high commercial 
 value we have a very low rate without increasing tonnage.* The 
 public interests are not to be subordinated to those of the carriers, 
 and require proper regard for the value of the service in the appor- 
 tionment of all charges upon traffic.^ 
 
 In Louisville S 'Nashville Railroad Coal and Coke Rates,^ the 
 Interstate Commerce Commission said: "We realize that there is no 
 exact method of so separating the accounts of a carrier as to determine 
 exactly what is the cost of moving any particular portion of its traffic 
 and that the best that may be accomplished is an approximation * * *. 
 'While cost is an important element in determining the reasonableness 
 of freight rates, it is not controlling, and we do not think a reasonable 
 maximum rate is ipso facto only such a rate as pays a fixed distributive 
 share of all operating expenses. 
 
 "So long as freight is classified this cannot be, and the preserva- 
 tion of that classification calls for the exercise of 'flexible limit of judg- 
 
§608] TRAFFIC LAW SEEVICE 62 
 
 ment which belongs to the power to fix rates.' Atlantic Coast Line 
 R. C. Co. V. iV. C. Corporation Commission, 206 U. S. 1, 26. While, in 
 their own way, defendants have attenipted to show the cost of trans- 
 porting coal and coke from these mines and ovens, the following ex- 
 pression of the Supreme Court in M. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 
 386 U. S. 257, 266, 267, is pertinent: 
 
 " The difficulty witli defendant's case is that it made no attempt to show the 
 cost of carrying coal in carload lots, and that even in provijng that the cost of trans- 
 porting ALL merchandise exceeded the rate fixed by the Commission on this coal, the 
 interest upon bonds and dividends upon stock were included in the operating expenses. 
 The propriety of the first is at least doubtful, the impropriety of the second is plain. 
 We do not intend, however, to intimate that the road is not entitled to something 
 more than operating expenses * * *. We do not think it beyond the power of the 
 state commission to reduce the freight upon a particular article, provided the com- 
 panies are able to earn a fair profit upon their entire business.' " 
 
 While cost of service is a most material factor to be considered in 
 the determination of the freight rates, it is not the only factor. The 
 rate cannot vary between every station according to the grades or 
 other physical incident of . the transportation.' Carriers may not 
 carry traffic at less than the cost of the service and so unduly burden 
 other traffic.^ 
 
 In Northern P. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota^ the United States Su- 
 preme Court held that the cost of the transportation of a particular 
 commodity which must be considered when determining whether the 
 maximum intrastate rates fixed by the state for the carriage of such 
 commodity are adequate or confiscatory includes all the outlays which 
 pertain to such transportation, there being no basis for distinguishing 
 in this respect between so-called " out-ofrpocket cost," or "actual" 
 expenses, and other outlays which are none the less actually made 
 because they are applicable to all traffic instead of being exclusively 
 included in the traffic in question. 
 
 In American Bound Bale Press Co. v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co.'^° 
 the Interstate Commerce Commission said: "'WTiile, as a general 
 proposition, it is true that the relative expense of different services 
 is an important factor in the determination of proper charges for 
 those services, yet there are certain limitations upon that proposi- 
 tion which we are bound to consider. Cost of service is usually so 
 difficult of accurate determination that its use as a gauge in rate mak- 
 ing must be limited; and its application is further narrowed by the 
 consideration that it is but one of a number of factors, some of which, 
 as value of service to the shipper, are of dominant importance. There 
 are, moreover, reasons why the influence of cost should be more re- 
 stricted as a factor in determining rates on different packages of the 
 same conmiodity, than when the rates are applicable to entirely dif- 
 ferent commodities. Were it allowed full play it might in the case of 
 some commodities lead to such a multiplication of rates and com- 
 plication of tariffs as would be highly undesirable, and tend to destroy 
 equality of opportunity in transportation. It was ^pointed out in the 
 Planters' Compress Co. case, that the logical and complete application 
 would lead to establishment of different rates upon cotton dependent 
 upon the density to which it was compressed. The considerable amount 
 of cotton grown near the various concentration points and brought into 
 them by wagon, which would not require concentration service, would 
 also call for a proper rate ; moreover, the blanketing of the same rate 
 over a wide territory, though a practice which is of great value and 
 
63 FREIGHT KATES AND CHARGES [§608 
 
 which has been approved by this Commission, would not be permissible 
 under the doctrine urged by complainants ; for to haul a shipment to 
 a definite point from the far side of an extensive blanket involves a 
 greater cost than from the near side. This is illustrated by the rate 
 on cotton from Texas common points to Galveston, where the same 
 rate is applied on hauls ranging from 160 to 500 miles. 
 
 "Considerations such as the foregoing lead us once more to 
 repeat what we said in the Planters' Compress Co. case., at page 405 : 
 
 " 'If the rate on a given article is reasonable to those who ship the great bulk 
 of that article in the form in which it is commonly prepared for transportation, that 
 rate in our opinion does not become unreasonable to the shipper of a small quantity 
 of the same article merely because he chooses to prepare his shipments in a form whicli 
 affords the carrier the greater profit per 100 pounds.' " 
 
 With regard to the relationship which rates on live stock should 
 bear to those on fresh meats and products, the Commission has held 
 that in fixing rates on competitive articles the relation should be 
 determined on the basis of the difference in the cost of service in the 
 transportation of such articles, and that many of the other consid- 
 erations entering into the establishment of rates upon independent 
 or isolated articles should be in large part eliminated.'^ In the case 
 of Decker & Sons v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co.^^ the Interstate Com- 
 merce Commission said : ' ' The evidence of record does not clearly ex- 
 plain why the rates on fresh meat and packing-house products are the 
 same from so many of these points. Certainly it is not the universal 
 custom to quote the same rate on both. Fresh meat is more difficult 
 to preserve in transit than packing-house products, is more difficult 
 to handle, and loads lighter by 5,000 or 6,000 pounds to the car. Not 
 only do these differences frequently result in a higher rate on fresh 
 meat than on packing-house products, but this Commission, by estab- 
 lishing higher rates on that commodity than on packing-house products 
 has repeatedly recognized the ' comparatively greater cost of trans- 
 porting fresh meat." 
 
 In the end there must be a relation between the cost of service 
 and the charge to the public for that service. If the character of the 
 service performed is so changed by public mandate as to increase the 
 expense of performing that service by 20 per cent, then the public must 
 expect to pay 20 per cent more for the performance. It is therefore 
 for the public interest that every transportation service should be 
 performed by the most economical method, since that must ultimately 
 result in the lowest transportation charge. Looking at this matter 
 exclusively from the transportation standpoint, the carload system 
 should, if possible, be retained upon the score of economj^.^* 
 
 Regulations for the transportation of dynamite and black powder 
 require examination of car before shipment, certification of absence 
 of defects, placarding of car as containing explosives, and lay down 
 certain restrictions in shifting, handling and placing the loaded car. 
 These precautions add to the cost of transporting explosives, but do 
 not attach to smokeless powder or other inflammables. The cost of the 
 maintenance of an efficient supervision over explosives and dangerous 
 articles in transportation justifies a higher rate thereon than upon 
 articles not so A'igilantly g-uarded, and reasonably a proportionate 
 amount of this extra cost should attach to the particular commodity 
 involved.^* 
 
§608] TEAFFIC LAW SERVICE 64 
 
 It probably cost the carriers as much to transport the lower grades 
 of oil as it does to transport the refined oils, but the value of the former 
 is much less, and frequently they cannot move at as high a rate.^^ 
 
 1. Business Men's League v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ey. Co. (1902), 9 I. 0. C. Rep. 318. 
 
 2. Glade Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1904), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 226; Thurber v. 
 New York, O. & H. R. Rd. Co. (1890), 3 I. C. C. Rep. 473; 2 I. C. Rep. 742; Society 
 of American Florists and Ornamental Horticulturists v. United States Express Co. 
 (1907), 12 I. 0. C. Rep. 121. 
 
 3. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co. (1905), 141 Fed. Rep. 
 1O03, 1015; aflarmed, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co. 
 1908), 209 XJ. S. 108, 52 L. Ed. 705, 20S iSup. Ct. Rep. 493. 
 
 4. Thurber v. New York C. & H. Rd. Co. (1890), 3 I. C. C. Rep. 473, 2 I. C. Rep. 742. 
 
 5. Ibid. 
 
 6. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Coal & Coke Rates (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 20, 
 27 et seq. See Pittsburgh Vein Operators' Association of Ohio v. Pennsylvania Oo. 
 (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 280, 284; reaffirmed In the Matter of Rates, Practices, 
 Rules and Regulations Governing the Transportation of Anthracite Coal (1915), 
 35 I. C. C. Rep. 220, 263. 
 
 7. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 230, 232. 
 
 8. Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York v. New York C. & H. R. Rd. Co. 
 (1912), 24, I. C. C. Rep. 55, 75. 
 
 9. Northern P. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota (1915), 236 tJ. S. 585, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 429, 
 59 L. Ed. 735. 
 
 10. American Round Bale Press Co. v. Atchison T. & S. F. By. Co. (1914), 32 I. C. 0. 
 Rep. 458, 466, et seq. 
 
 11. Dietz Lumber Co. v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 75, 81. 
 
 12. Decker & Sons v. Chicago M. & -St. P. Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 547, .548. 
 
 13. Albree v. Boston & M. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 306, 316. 
 
 14. United States v. Wharton & N. Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 309, 311. 
 
 15. American Refining Co. v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 108, 104. 
 
 608-C. Value of service versus cost of service. 
 
 In the case of Boileau y. Pittsburgh & L. E. Rd. Co} the Interstate 
 Commerce Commission said: "To be sure costs do not determine 
 rates ; yet most rates have within them as a constituent the element of 
 cost. Cost is generally an important element in arriving at a judg- 
 ment with respect to a rate. What weight shall be given to that ele- 
 ment as compared with all the other elements entering into a particular 
 rate, such as the value of the service, with its bundle of constituents, 
 and the various conditions surrounding the particular traffic, is a 
 matter to be decided in each individual case. Questions regarding 
 the calculation of the cost of service and the weight to be given to such 
 cost suggest controversies which are as old as the railway itself. As 
 between the two cardinal principles of rate making— the cost of the 
 service and the value of the service— the first is decidedly more capa- 
 ble of exact determination and mathematical expression than the lat- 
 ter. If, as some would have us believe, no measure has yet been dis- 
 covered for ascertaining the cost of the service, what measure is there 
 suggesting anything definite and tangible and sufficiently practical 
 in its application to carry conviction which can be applied to the value 
 of the service? By which, after all, we mean to say little more than 
 that the cost of the service is ascertainable with much more precision 
 and capable of more tangible expression than the value of the service. 
 Nevertheless both cost and value must lie considered as well as all 
 other elements entering into a rate. ' ' 
 
 In the proceeding entitled "Zu Re Investigation of Advances in 
 Rates by Garners in Western Trunk Lines, Trans-Missouri, and Illi- 
 nois Freight Committee Territories'"- the Interstate Commerce Com- 
 mission made the following interesting statement: "^\Tiat has be- 
 
65 FREIGHT KATES AXD CHARGES [§608 
 
 come, meantime, of the theory of the reasonable rate based on the 
 value of the service ? The carrier finds itself in a position to command 
 with supporting law a higher rate and reaches out to get it. This is 
 not the-least-possible-rate-that-the-traffic-mll-bear theory. It is the 
 abandonment. It is the recognition of the class rates as reasonable 
 rates toward which all rates should tend, and to which the carrier 
 will, when it can, bring all rates. Commodity rates are in this view 
 concessions from the reasonable rates. To press all rates upward to 
 a fixed standard is not adjusting rates to meet specific conditions, nor 
 is it 'developing traffic,' nor is it 'stimulating competition between 
 markets.' What becomes of these fine phrases if there is recognized 
 in the railroad man's mind the thought that rates should be elevated 
 when other carriers and a conserving law will support such action? 
 Can it be that the only forces which the carriers have recognized are 
 competition between each other (which has now become less intense, or 
 perhaps more rational) and the pressure of shippers to reach as far 
 from home as possible to supply wide markets ? And when this com- 
 petition is nullified or minimized, and the pressure need not be yielded 
 to — is there then a standard of rates which the carrier finds reasonable 
 and just, one which the conscience of the traffic man will approve as 
 neither oppressive to railroad nor to shipper? 
 
 "This approaches or at least looks toward a recognition of the 
 idea that rates should not be as unstable as air; that in practice they 
 cannot be without violating the canons of fair dealing as between indus- 
 tries and communities. Indeed, it is far on the way to a recognition 
 that there may be some intimate relation between cost of service and 
 rate of charge; that all markets cannot be open to every producing 
 point; that shippers must enjoy and suffer the advantages and disad- 
 vantages of their location and adjust themselves to the transportation 
 situation ; that it is not within the province of the railroad to ' make ' one 
 city as against another, or unmake one industry to satisfy the eager 
 competition of another industry, and a carrier's desire for tonnage. 
 And possibly it is not too much to hope that in some good day some 
 traffic manager will announce the principle, that a railroad's function 
 is to sell transportation at a fair rate; and that it is beside his place to 
 be the ultimate regulator of the economic condition of the country. 
 
 "To be sure we can never depart from the ad valorem principle 
 in the making of rates. No governmental railway system does. The 
 national highways may as properly tax a carload of tea with some 
 relation to its value as the state may tax an import on the same basis, 
 or the toll road distinguish between the automobile and the wheelbar- 
 row. In all charges of an arbitrary character Where public policy is 
 involved there is need that the greater burden shall fall upon those 
 best able to support it. But classification of freight cares for value in 
 the greater part. 
 
 "In a land as intimately bound together in commerce as is this, 
 where each city, village, and farm depends to large degree upon the 
 resources of a nation for its supplies, there must arise questions of 
 public welfare in the charges that the highways of the public may 
 make altogether aside from questions of discrimination. It concerns 
 us that we shall have the advantages of our varied resources; that 
 New York and Chicago shall be made accessible to the fruit of Florida 
 
§608] TRAFFIC LAW SEEVICE 66 
 
 and California; that Minneapolis and Buffalo shall serve the thickly- 
 populated eastern states with their flour; that the wide plains of 
 Texas and Wyoming shall be brought as near as possible to the cattle- 
 consuming centers; that coal and lumber shall go where fuel' and trees 
 are scarce; and that, in short, our products and our people may be 
 as mobile and as fluent as conditions may permit. Therefore, it may 
 not answer public needs to always measure rates by any fixed stand- 
 ard, but the deviations from standard should be made primarily with 
 an eye to public advantage, rather than to the volume of freight which 
 a carrier may secure. This is not a far departiire from that policy 
 which the old carriers of the more congested portions of our country 
 have in recent years adopted. First, a basic classification of com- 
 modities with relation to their relative value, bulk, fragility, and other 
 proper transportation considerations, upon which is built a wisely 
 balanced schedule of charges fixed with reference to well-defined zones 
 of distributive territory; and, beneath these, those special rates on 
 certain commodities as to which the public need demands that excep- 
 tions shall be made. 
 
 "This makes for the rigidity of rates, it is said. Unquestionably. 
 Do agreements between carriers that they will not advance or lower 
 rates without notice to each other make for easy flexibility? Yet this 
 was railroad policy for many years. Do conferences between carriers' 
 traffic managers, the establishment of common agents to, file common 
 tariffs, the mutual notification of each carrier as to what is proposed 
 by every other — are these devices of the carriers made to - promote 
 ready change and individual initiative or are they the well-designed 
 machinery of the roads to put a brake upon change, a veto on trouble- 
 some flexibility? 
 
 "It is not necessary to direct attention to the act to regulate com- 
 merce in this respect, almost every section of which is grounded on 
 the legislative belief that certainty and stability of rates are virtues 
 much to be desired. The very latest expression of this belief is, found 
 in those provisions of the Mann-Elkins bill touching rates put in to 
 meet water competition, and the nqw section 15 relating to rate suspen- 
 sions, under which we are at present acting, all of which comes to 
 this : The railroads long since sought to make rates stable by conven- 
 tions, fines, and gentlemen's agreements. They saw the evils of un- 
 restricted flexibiUty, which meant adjustment of rates to the ambitions 
 of the carrier. They could not live with each traffic manager from day 
 to day discovering by instinct the reasonable rate. The Government 
 now comes in this same path and seeks to stay the changes which 
 caprice or a carrier's selfishness may dictate. And we ask the car- 
 riers. Why is this present rate, which you fixed yourself, unreason- 
 ably low, if, as you say, cost of service is not to be considered ? The 
 answer comes that cost of service is now to be considered: that the 
 traffic will now bear a higher rate ; that its movement will not be im- 
 peded if a greater charge is made. Still seeking, we inquire again. 
 Why was not such a higher rate imposed long ago ? The answer is. 
 We could not maintain it; the pressure of shippers and carriers was 
 too strong. ]\[ay we not ask one more question, Why do you then 
 seek it now? And should not the answer be, Because we think we 
 can get it. We are united in mind and the law will safeguard our right 
 to it. 
 
07 FBEIGHT BATES AND CHAEGES [§608 
 
 "The reasonable rate was one that could be secured. That defini- 
 tion remains as the carriers' guiding star. But under regulation the 
 reasonable rate is one which the shipper should pay in justice to the 
 carrier which renders the service. Once the theory of bargain and 
 sale of transportation is abandoned the rate becomes a matter for 
 ascertainment by some method other than what the shipper can give or 
 what the carrier will take. The railroad has a service to sell. The 
 shipper wishes to buy this service. The law says these two may not 
 haggle as to price. How, then, can the value of the service to the 
 shipper in the accustomed sense of that phrase be discovered! Does 
 not frankness require the answer that no such method is now possible '? 
 The individual shipper has by the course of law been transformed into 
 the general public. The carrier has by like process been transformed 
 into a public agency. The law says to the carrier that it may as to all 
 men make its charges with relation to the value of the service it offers 
 to all, and if it fixes this value upon considerations which are outside 
 its functions as a public agency — if it seeks, for instance, to make itself 
 the beneficiary of the prosperity of private industry, the law will inter- 
 pose to correct its charges." 
 
 See "Charging 'what the traffic ivill bear' " Section 608-D, infra 
 and "Value of service versus cost of service,'' Section 507-C, ante. 
 
 1. Boileau v. Pittsburgti & L. E. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 640, 650. 
 
 2. In Re Investigation of Advances in Rates t>y Carriers in Western Trunk Liines, 
 Trans-Missouri, and Illinois Freight Committee Territories (1911), 20 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 307, 354, et seq. 
 
 608-D. Charging "what the trafeic will beae. " 
 
 In the proceeding entitled In the Matter of the Investigation and 
 Suspension of Advances in the Rates for Transportation of Coal by 
 the Chesapeake <& 0. Rd. Co. et al. and Other Connections^ the Inter- 
 state Commerce Commission said: -'Is a rate unreasonable because 
 it does not pay its full share of taxes, fixed charges, and dividends! 
 At the end this is the question to which we come in this case. The 
 carriers themselves having fixed these rates under the mandate of the 
 law that they shall fix just and reasonable rates, have they justified 
 higher rates by showing that the existing rates which they had fixed 
 fall somewhat short of meeting all the related expenses which the 
 , carrier must bear, not onl}^ for transportation but to secure an ade- 
 quate return upon its property? Let us see where this doctrine would 
 lead. If a carrier may raise all rates to a basis where each will bear 
 its share of cost, including all costs, and no lower rate is reasonable, 
 then it must follow that all rates are unreasonable which yield to the 
 carrier a greater return than such cost. Under such theory what 
 would be the rate on tea or silks, or high-priced horses, or delicate 
 machines? Is there to be no classification of freight excepting upon 
 the basis of cost of transportation plus insurance risk? If so tho 
 tariffs of every railroad in the United States must suffer a revolu- 
 tionary change. In all classification consideration must be given to 
 what may be termed public policy, the advantage to the community 
 of having some kinds of freight carried at a less rate than other kinds. 
 And this is the true meaning of the phrase 'what the traffic will bear.' 
 It expresses the consideration that must be sho^\^l by the traffic man- 
 
§608] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 68 
 
 ager to the need of the people for certain commodities. He accord- 
 ingly imposes a higher ratenipon what may be termed luxuries as com- 
 pared with that imposed upon those articles for which there is a more 
 universal demand. He also gives consideration to the fact that the 
 rate so imposed enters into the ultimate price to the consumer to but 
 a small degree when the article is one of high value, and that those 
 in the community who can afford to purchase such articles can well 
 afford to pay a rate greater than that which could reasonably be im- 
 posed upon the general public for commodities of general use. In this 
 sense what the traffic will bear and the value of service are analogous. 
 No one would claim that a carrier was violating its duty under the 
 law in charging three times the rate upon oriental rugs that it im- 
 posed upon cotton. This would not be undue discrimination as be- 
 tween commodities, even though it cost no more to transport the 
 rugs than it did the cotton, assuming both to be carried at the owner's 
 risk, for the one does not compete with the other, and one may reason- 
 ably bear a higher rate than the other on public grounds. It must be, 
 therefore, that this Commission, under the amendment to section 1 
 passed by Congress in 1910, giving to us the control of freight classi- 
 fication, has power to determine the reasonableness of the differences 
 that are made between the rates made applicable to the various kinds 
 of commodities transported. We may not say that a rate shall be fixed 
 so as to meet the requirements or needs of any body of shippers in 
 their efforts to reach a given market, nor may we establish rates upon 
 any articles so low that they will not return out-of-pocket cost. Neither 
 could we fix an entire schedule of rates which would yield an inadequate 
 return upon the fair value of the property used in the service given. 
 There is, however, a zone within which we may properly exercise 'the 
 flexible limit of judgment which belongs to the power to fix rates.' 
 These are the words of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 206 
 U. S. 26. There is no flexible limit of judgment if all rates must be 
 upon a level of cost, and out of every dollar paid to the carrier must 
 come a fixed amount of return for capital invested. The recognition 
 of such a doctrine has never been suggested either by Congress or the 
 Supreme Court. A just and reasonable rate must be one which re- 
 spects alike the carriers' deserts and the character of the trafiic. It 
 cannot be a rate that takes from the carrier a profit and thus favors 
 the shipper at the carrier's expense, nor is it one which compels the 
 shipper to yield for the transportation given a sum disproportionate 
 either to the service given by the carrier or to the service rendered 
 to the shipper. The words 'just and reasonable' imply the applica- 
 tion of good judgment and fairness, of common sense and a sense 
 of justice to a given condition of facts. They are not fixed, unalterable, 
 mathematical terms. Their meaning implies the exercise of judgment, 
 and against the improper exercise of that judgment the Constitution 
 gives protection, at least as far as the carriers are concerned. ' ' 
 
 In the case of Pittshurc/li Steel Co. v. LoJce Shore dr M., S. Ry. Cor- 
 the Commission said: "This rate may, perhaps, be more ' properly 
 viewed as one illustration of a common practice in railroad rate mak- 
 ing of charging high rates where the traflSc can easily be made to bear 
 it. To a certain extent this must be done, for if a portion of the 
 traffic of a road is carried at low rates because it will not move other- 
 wise, so that it cannot bear its full proportionate share of the interest 
 charges and common expenses, some other traffic must pay more than 
 
69 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§608 
 
 its share of such interest charges and common expenses. Coke, coal 
 and iron ore are sometimes spoken of as low-grade commodities, but 
 it should be recognized that where they constitute a large" propor- 
 tion of the entire traffic and yield a correspondingly large proportion 
 of the revenue, they should, so far as they are reasonably able to do 
 so, pay their full proportionate share of the common expenses, as 
 otherwise the relatively small tonnage of so-called high-grade traffic 
 might be unduly burdened. ' ' 
 
 The Commission cannot accept the theory that rates may be in- 
 creased by progressive advances as long as the traffic moves freely 
 and until the highest point under which traffic will move freely is 
 reached. Some traffic must move, and reasonably freely, up to the point 
 where the rate becomes prohibitive.* 
 
 Although the Commission has never accepted the doctrine that the 
 best test of the reasonableness of the rate is whether the traffic will 
 move freely under it, it has always deemed the state of the industry a 
 pertinent fact in considering the reasonableness of the rate.* 
 
 It is manifest that when additional revenues are desired and rates 
 are to be increased for that purpose a horizontal advance in all rates 
 on a fixed percentage, instead of yielding additional revenue, would not 
 improbably result in reduced revenue. Competitive and commercial 
 conditions have so important a relation to the movement of particular 
 kinds of traffic as to make such a readjustment of a rate schedule inad- 
 visable if not altogether impossible. To increase a rate on a given com- 
 modity when it is already as high as competitive or commercial con- 
 ditions will allow, means that it will cease to move, and such a rate 
 will necessarily result in a loss even of the revenue that has theretofore 
 been enjoyed on that commodity.^ 
 
 See "Value of service i-ersns cost of service," Section 507-C, ante, 
 and "Cost of service versus value of service," Section 608-C, supra. 
 
 1. In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates for the 
 Transportation of Coal by the Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. et al., and their connections 
 (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 604, 623, et seq. Cited, Rate Increases in Western Classi- 
 fication Territory (1915), 35 I. C. C. Rep. 497, 606. 
 
 2. Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1913). 27 I. C. C. Rep. 173, 
 185, 186. 
 
 3. Commercial Club of Omaha v. Anderson & S. K Ry. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 419, 
 421 ; denied petition for rehearing of Commercial Club v. Anderson & S. R. Ry. Co. 
 (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 532, 536. 
 
 4. In Re Transportation of Wool, Hides and Pelts (1912). 23 I. C. C. Rep. 151, 156. 
 
 r.. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1911), 20 I. C. C. 
 R«p. 463, 482. 
 
 608-E. Value of commodity. 
 
 The value of a commodity is one of the material considerations 
 in the adjustment of rates, and it is just as unsound to say that rates 
 upon carloads of equal tonnage and equal cost of movement, one of a 
 low-grade, cheap commodity and the other of a high-grade and valu- 
 able commodity, should be made the same, except for the difference 
 that might be allowed for the single item of increased risk, as it is to 
 say that every commodity should be charged all it can stand or bear. 
 It is alike in the public interest and just to the carriers, having regard 
 to their entire business and their right to an opportunity to earn a 
 fair return upon the property in addition to the cost of service, that 
 
§608] TKAFFIC LAW SERVICE 70 
 
 in the adjustment of rates due weight be given to differences in 
 value of the respective commodities carried and that such differences 
 be not limited by the mere measure of difference in risk. Otherwise 
 one of two results would of necessity follow : The rates as a whole' 
 would be such that it would be impossible for the carriers to earn what 
 they reasonably might and, in fact, what they of necessity should, in 
 order to enable them to perform their services, or the rates on many 
 low-grade commodities Avould have to be such that they would be' 
 prohibitory of any movement.^ 
 
 There can never be a departure from the ad valorem principle in 
 the making of rates. No governmental railway system does. The 
 national highways may as properly tax a carload of tea with sonie 
 relation to its value as the state may tax an import on the same basis 
 or the toll road distinguish between the automobile and the wheel- 
 barrow. In all charges of an arbitrary character where public policy 
 is involved there is need that the greater burden shall fall upon those 
 best able to support it. But classification of freight cares for value 
 in the greater part.^ 
 
 The element of value of the article -transported forms a proper 
 consideration to be taken into account in the establishment of a rate, 
 since the greater the value the greater the carrier's liability as an 
 insurer of the freight.^ 
 
 "Wbile, however, value is the most important element to be con- 
 sidered in fixing rates, it plainly cannot be made an arbitrary standard 
 independent of all other considerations.* 
 
 In determining what the relation should be between the rates 
 charged for transporting two different freight articles, value is often 
 an important factor, but this is not alone because of the greater risk 
 connected with. the transportation of the more valuable article. Im- 
 provements made during recent years in road-beds and equipment of 
 carriers have rendered the item of risk in many cases of little conse- 
 quence. The value of the article is important, principally, because 
 of its bearing upon the value to the shipper of the transportation 
 service, and the value of the service is, and has always been considered 
 one of the most important elements to be considered when fixing the 
 rates to be charged for transportation.^ 
 
 In establishing uniform class or commodity rates the carrier can 
 only be expected to take into account the estimated average value of 
 shipments of the class or commodity to which the rates- are applied.^ 
 
 When a carrier has established a reasonable rate for the trans- 
 portation of a given commodity it is not believed it can be required 
 to change that rate to accord with the differing values of the same 
 commodity produced by the different shippers — in other words to 
 equalize natural business conditions. If this were so that might be 
 made to fluctuate not only to meet the value of the commodity, but the 
 executive or business ability of each individual producer.'^ 
 
 See "Relation of articles transported," Section 610-B, post. 
 
 On the question of rates graduated according to value, see "Rates 
 on damaged second-hand and used articles, Section 608-Y, post, "New 
 and secondhand articles," Section 507-0, ante; "Value of article," 
 
71 FREIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [§608 
 
 Section 507-D, ante; "Limitation of Common Carrier's Liability — 
 Initial Carrier's Liability," Chapter 20, post. 
 
 .1. Union Tanning Co. v. Southern Ky. O. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 159, 163. The value 
 of the commodity as an element to be considered in fixing the rate was considered 
 in the following cases: Darling & Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I. 
 C. C. Rep. 79, 81; Beekman Lumber Co. ,-. St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 
 I. C. C. Rep. 274, 275; Mountain Ice Co. v. Delaware L. & W. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 
 I. C. C. Rep. 305, 320; James & Abbot Co. v. Boston & M. Rd. Co. (1909), 17 I. 
 C. C. Rep. 273, 274 ; League of Southern Idaho Commercial Clubs v. Oregon S. L. Rd. 
 Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 562, 564; National Refining Co. v. Cleveland C. C. & 
 St. L. Ry. Co. (1911), 20 I. 0. C. Rep. 649, 650; Maritime Exchange v. Pennsylvania 
 Rd. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 81, 85; Auto Vehicle Co. v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. 
 Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 286, 288; Railroad Commissioners of Kansas v. Atchison 
 T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 407, 410; Coke Producers Assn. of the 
 Connellsville Region v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 125, 147. 
 
 2. In Re Investigation of Advances in Rates by Carriers in Western Trunk Line, 
 Trans-Missouri and Illinois Freight Committee Territories (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 
 307, 355. 
 
 3. Howell V. New York L. E. & W.' Rd. Co. (1888), 2 I. C. C. Rep. 162, 2 I. 0. C. Rep. 272. 
 
 4. Grain Shippers' Assn. of Northwest Iowa v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1889), 8 I. C. C. Rep. 
 158. 
 
 5. Chicago Live Stock Exchange v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 
 428. See also Farrar v. Southern Ry. Co. (1906), 11 I. C. O. Rep. 632; Anthony v. 
 Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 581; Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. v. 
 Southern P. Co. (1895), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 488. 
 
 6. Duncan v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1893), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 85, 4 I. C. Rep. 385. 
 
 7. Hafley v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 245. 
 
 608-F. ElSK. 
 
 Risk is one of the elements entering into tlie present day rate 
 fabric, and innumerable classifications and tariffs throughout the 
 country contain packing and shipping requirements which can have 
 no other justification than the right of the carrier to require the use 
 of substantial and suitable containers and the elimination of hazard 
 by the secure staying of unpacked articles. Carriers are obligated 
 to furnish suitable cars and to receive and transport goods tendered to 
 them in safe shipping condition, but are not obligated to prepare 
 shipments for transportation. Standard box, stock, ventilated, and 
 refrigerator cars in good repair will accommodate all of the ordinary 
 and usual needs of shippers, and if more than this is demanded because 
 of the form, nature, or peculiar characteristics of goods tendered for 
 conveyance some obligation must attach to the shipper in connection 
 with the additional demand.^ 
 
 Ever since the inception of railroad transportation shippers have,^ 
 generally speaking, loaded and their consignees have unloaded cai*- 
 load freight. This practice or custom arose naturally because it 
 was the easiest, most economical, and satisfactory way of doing the 
 business. It is practically out of the question for railroads to provide 
 men to load and unload carload freight at all points in the country. 
 The shipper can load more satisfactorily and economically than anyone 
 else. He is able to possess himself of effective appliances, where 
 they can be used, and to employ skilled men to properly load all 
 carload traffic, whether shipped in closed or on open cars. For the 
 same reasons consignees are the best fitted to unload shipments. For 
 more than fifty years the loading by consignor and unloading by con- 
 signee has been a recognized rule of carload transportation, and this 
 rule extends to and includes commodities which yield to carriers the 
 larger part of their revenue. With this custom and as properly a part 
 of it, there has always existed another custom, which is that shippers 
 
§608] TEAFFIC LAW SEEVICE 72 
 
 are required to secure loads for safe carriage. Because the ' shipper 
 does the loading he is best situated to fasten the load upon the car. 
 He has the facilities and men at hand and can do the work more sat- 
 isfactorily and economically than anyone else. 
 
 To the extent that loss or damage is peculiar to a particular kind 
 of traffic, that fact may be properly recognized in fixing the rate.' 
 Most of the articles embraced under these classes are regarded by the 
 carriers as time freight ; that is, as freight that must be moved promptly 
 in order to serve the public, as well as to avoid claims for damage in 
 transit. Grain milled or unmilled, is liable to damage from heat or 
 moisture ; only meats and packing-house products move on fast sched- 
 ules in refrigerator cars, the refrigeration being free, and the return 
 haul frequently being empty. Most of the wheat and much of the 
 corn is milled in transit without extra charge for the privilege, and 
 the loss and damage claims in these classes, even under normal condi- 
 tions, are higher than the average of such claims on all other com- 
 modities.* 
 
 Scrap iron moves in large quantities and is hauled almost exclu- 
 sively in gondolas which have brought in the reversed direction ship- 
 ments of machinery, structural material, and coal. The railroads move 
 scrap iron at their convenience, it being considered low grade or dead 
 freight. It requires no special or expedited service, and subjects the 
 carrier to practically no risk of loss or damage.^ 
 
 The character of pig iron is such, that while it is loaded mostly in 
 box cars, their condition is a matter of no great concern, and cars 
 that would be rejected for other traffic frequently are employed in' 
 this service. Loss and damage is an unknown quantity in the trans- 
 portation of pig iron, the commodity being practically indestructible 
 and with any kind of intelligent handling, not susceptible to loss even 
 when transported by rail and water, with the usual transfer at the dock 
 incident thereto.® 
 
 In the transportation of bar iron the risk involved is negligible.'' 
 
 Eegulations for the transportation of dynamite and black powder 
 require examination of car before shipment, certification of absence 
 of defects, placarding of car as containing explosives", and lay down 
 certain restrictions in shifting, handling and placing the loaded car. 
 These precautions add to the cost of transporting explosives but do 
 not attach to smokeless powder or other inflammables. The cost of the 
 maintenance of an efficient supervision over explosives and dangerous 
 articles in transportation justifies a higher rate thereon than upon 
 articles not so vigilantly guarded, and reasonably a proportionate 
 amount of this extra cost should attach to the particular commodity 
 involved.® 
 
 Newsprint paper is a desirable article for transportation in that it 
 does not require any particular equipment or special speed in its 
 movement; the amount of claims for loss and damage is negligible, 
 and the daily movements from the mills is regular and uniform.* 
 
 Grain is generally shipped in bulk and the mill products are gen- 
 erally shipped in packages. It is a matter of common knowledge that 
 claims for loss of grain in transit are numerous and aggregate large 
 sums. It is not at all certain that heavier car loading" of grain than 
 
73 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§608 
 
 of grain products compensates the carriers for this loss. In any 
 event as the tariffs show, it is a very general practice to apply sub- 
 stantially the same rates to grain and the products thereof. In some 
 instances the grain rates are slightly higher than the products rates, 
 and in other instances the converse is true, but the statement that 
 the rates on grain and grain products are substantially the same is 
 generally and approximately correct.^"' 
 
 In the transportation of flour a somewhat better grade of equip- 
 ment is required for its transportation and a greater degree of expedi- 
 tion is required than on shipments of wheat. The loss and damage 
 claims on flour are somewhat greater than on wheat; the value of a 
 carload of flour being greater than that of a carload of wheat.^^ 
 
 Flaxseed rates, both local and proportional, are at least as high as 
 the wheat rates, and in view of the relative value, relative risk, and 
 relative volume of traffic of flaxseed as compared with coarse grain 
 and wheat, flaxseed rates may properly be as high as those on wheat." 
 
 Smoking tobacco and plug tobacco are of about the same relative 
 value, but the former is more liable to damage principally because it 
 is contained in glass jars, or cloth or paper bags, packed in ordinary 
 wooden or fibreboard cases, while the latter is pressed into substantial 
 wooden boxes.^* 
 
 In the shipment of both type and electrotype plates the liability for 
 loss and damage is negligible.^* 
 
 While carriers may adjust their rates with a view to the hazards 
 incident to the transportation of certain classes of traffic it is not 
 proper that they should advance those rates on account of damages 
 which have accrued from their own neglect and which would not have 
 accrued had the traffic been handled in a reasonably diligent and pru- 
 dent manner.^^ The United States Supreme Court has held that the 
 risk of injury, and the large amount which the railway companies are 
 called upon to pay out in damages for losses, may excuse a higher 
 freight rate on live stock than on dressed meats and packing-house 
 products.^® 
 
 There can be no question that more claims relatively arise from 
 transportation of less-than-carload business than from carload 
 freight." Manufacturers and dealers frequently ship automobiles in 
 carloads by double-decking the cars, but it is not feasible for carriers to 
 do this or to make use of the space above one or more automobiles in a 
 single car. Carload shipments are sealed and transported intact to 
 destination, and this method results in the minimum risk of pilferage 
 or damage as computed with the risk to which less-than-carload ship- 
 ments are exposed. There are perhaps but few articles of freight 
 more subject to injury and unsatisfactory to handle than automobiles 
 uhcrated. When shipped in less than carloads they must be handled 
 with the greatest care to prevent injury from other freight. It is 
 likewise true that a comparatively small injury to an average auto- 
 mobile will generally result in damages equal to or in excess of the 
 revenue received for its transportation.^^ 
 
 See "Risk," Section 507-K, ante. 
 
 1. Dunnage Allowances (1914). 30 I. C. C. Rep. 538, 542. 
 
 2. National Wholesale Lumber Dealers Assn. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1908), 14 
 I. C. C. Rep. 154, 160. 
 
§608] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 74 
 
 3. New Orleans Live Stock Exchange v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (1904), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 
 327 
 
 4. Morgan Grain Co. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 460, 469. 
 
 5. Scrap-iron Rates Between Duluth, Minnesota and Chicago, 111. and Other Points 
 (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 467, 468. 
 
 6. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 
 597, 602. 
 
 7. Norris v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 416, 423. 
 
 8. United States v. Wharton & N. Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 309, 311. 
 
 9. Lake .Superior Paper Co. Ltd. v. Duluth S. S. & O. Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 
 403, 408. 
 
 10. Superior Commercial Club of Superior, Wise. v. Great N. Ry. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 96, 118. 
 
 11. Kansas-California Flour Rates (1915), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 602, 604. 
 
 12. In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Car- 
 riers for the Transportation of Flaxseed from Minneapolis, Minn., and other points 
 to Chicago, 111., and other destinations. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 337, 340. 
 
 13. Bagley & Co. v. Pere Marquette Rd. Co. (1913), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 698, 699. 
 
 14. Bancroft- Whitney Co. v. Cincinnati N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep.- 
 557 558 
 
 15. Cattle Raisers' Assn. v. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 296; 
 New Orleans Live Stock Exchange v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (1904), 10 I. C. C. 
 327 
 
 16. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co. (1908), 209 U. S. 108, 
 52 L. Ed. 705, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493 ; affirming. Interstate Commerce Commission v. 
 Chicago G. W. Ry. Co. (1905), 141 Fed. Rep. 1008. The history of this case is as 
 follows: Chicago Live Stock Exchange v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 428. From the Missouri River to Chicago, 111., carriers ordered to dis- 
 continue charging higher rates on live stock than on packing-house products on 
 the ground that the lower rates on the products constitute an undue preference 
 in favor of the products in violation of Section 3 of the Act. Interstate Commerce 
 Commission v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co. supra. Commission's order held invalid on 
 the ground that there is no violatioTi of Section 3 of the Act on account of rail- 
 road competition and other transportation dissimilarities. Interstate Commerce 
 Commission, v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co., supra. Commission's order held invalid and 
 judgments of lower court affirmed. 
 
 17. Commercial Club of Omaha v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 397, 
 40O. 
 
 18. Keats Auto Co. v. Oregon- Washington Rd. & Nav. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 412, 
 413. 
 
 608-G. Volume of teapfic. 
 
 A trainload of coal can be transported more cheaply in proportion 
 to quantity than a single carload, and a carload more cheaply than 
 100 pounds. So if the business is large, though it be transportation of 
 many kinds of property, it can be done relatively more cheaply than if 
 it were small.'^ 
 
 However, whatever difference there may be in the cost to the 
 , carrier between traffic in trainloads and traffic in carloads, it appears 
 from the general course of legislation with respect to commerce be- 
 tween the states, from the debates and reports of the various com- 
 mittees in Congress when the Act to Eegulate Commerce was under 
 consideration, from the better considered court opinions and from the 
 reports and opinions of the Interstate Commerce Commission that to 
 give greater consideration to train-load traffic than to car-load traffic 
 would create preference in favor of large shippers and be to thf 
 prejudice of small shippers and the public.^ 
 
 An immense volume of traffic is an argument for not only reason- 
 able but comparatively low rates.^ Therefore, the greater the tonnage 
 of an article transported the lower should be the rate.* 
 
 It is well understood that freight rates should decline as a country 
 develops and as business therefor increases. Rates are and have 
 been lower in very densely populated portions of our country than in 
 those parts where the population is less dense ; and this is because with 
 the increase in traffic comes increased profit from the handling of that 
 
75 PEEIGHT BATES AND CHAEGES [§608 
 
 traffic.^ The greater volume of traffic and greater number of carriers 
 operating in a territory create a greater degree of competition, and 
 the rates generally have been adjusted with a view to meet the condi- 
 tions resulting therefrom.® Volume of traffic may excuse a lower rate 
 partly because freight can be handled more cheaper in large quantities 
 than in small, and partly because a railroad is justified in making a 
 lower rate to induce a large volume of traffic where the circumstances 
 are such that the rate will have this effect.'' 
 
 While volume of movement is not the only consideration in the 
 establishment of commodity rates, it is an important element which, 
 other considerations being equal, may and not infrequently does be- 
 come determinative.* 
 
 See "Volume of traffic," Section 507-F, Ante. 
 
 1. First Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission (1887, p. 39). 
 
 2. Anaconda Capper Mining Co. v. Cliicago & E. Rd. Co. (1910), 19 I. O. C. Rep. 592, 
 596; Carstens Packing Co. v. Oregon S. L. Rd. Co. (1909). 17 I. C. C. Rep. 324, 328. 
 
 3. Farrar v. Soutliern Ry. Co. (1906), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 632. 
 
 4. Tift V. Southern Ry. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 548. Commission's order held to 
 be valid. Carriers restrained from enforcing the advance; and reparation awarded 
 in accordance with stipulation. Tift v. Southern Ry. Co. (1905), 138 Fed. Rep. 
 753. Commission's order held to be valid. Carriers restrained from enforcing 
 the advance; and reparation awarded in accordance with stipulation. Southern 
 Ry. Co. V. Tift (1906), 148 Fed. Rep. 1021. Commission's order held to be valid. 
 Carriers restrained from enforcing the advance ; and reparation awarded in ac- 
 cordance with stipulation. Southern Ry. Co. v. Tift (1907), 206 U. S. 428, 51 L. 
 Ed. 1124, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 709. See also. Central Yellow Pine Assn. v. Illinois C. 
 Rd. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 505; New York Hay Exchange Association v. Penn- 
 sylvania Rd. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 178, 181; Moise Bros. Co. v. Chicago R. I. 
 & P. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 550, 555; Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. 
 St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1910), 18 I. C C. Rep. 1. National Hay Assn. v. 
 Michigan C. Rd. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. 0. Rep. 34, 47; Commercial Club v. Atchison 
 T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 218, 223; Hydraulic-Press Brick Co. v. 
 Mobile & O. Rd. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 530; Merchants & Manufacturers' 
 Assn. of Baltimore, Md. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 129; Rick- 
 ards V. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 239, 240; In the Matter of 
 the Investigations and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers for the 
 Transportation of Flaxseed in Carloads from Fort William, Port Arthur and West- 
 port, Ontario, to New York, N. Y., Philadelphia, Pa., and Other Points, (1912), 
 23 I. C. C. Rep. 272, 275 ; In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of 
 Advances in Rates by Carriers for the Transportation of Live Stock from Points 
 in the State of New Mexico to Kansas City, Mo., and between other points, (1912), 
 25 I. C. C. Rep. 63, 64; Wharton ;Steel Co. v. Delaware L. & W. Rd. Co. (1912), 25 
 I. C. C. Rep. 303, 308; Union Tanning Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1913), 26 1. C. C. 
 Rep. 159, 164; Tone Bros. v. IlUnois C. Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 279, 281; 
 Wisconsin Steel Co. v. Pittsburgh & L. E. Rd. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 152, 164; 
 Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Lake Shore & M. iS. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 173, 
 179; Commercial Club of Omaha v. Anderson & S. S. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 302, 317. 
 
 5. In Re Class and Commodity Rates from St. Louis to Texas Common Points 
 (1905), 11 L C. O. Rep. 238. 
 
 6. Railroad Commission of Kentucky v. Louisville c&: N. Rd. Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 
 300, 308. 
 
 7. Burgess v. Transcontinental I'reight Bureau (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 668, 675. 
 
 8. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Director General, as Agent, Philadelphia, B. & W. Rd. 
 Co. (1920), 58 I. C. C. Rep. 427, 428. 
 
 608-H. Weight and bulk' oe aeticle. 
 
 The weight and bulk of the goods transported and the convenience 
 of transportation are proper elements to be considered in fixing a 
 rate.^ For example, furniture is light and bulky freight as compared 
 with most other kinds of freight.^ 
 
 See "Weight and hulk of commodity," Section 507-J. 
 
 1. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co. (1905), 141 Fed. Rep. 
 1003; affirmed. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co. (1908), 
 
§608] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 76 
 
 209 U. S. 108. 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493, 52, L. Ed. 705 ; Grain Shippers' Assn. of Northwest 
 Iowa V. Illinois C. Rd. Co. 8 I. C. C. Rep. 158. 
 2. Montague & Co. v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 72, 74. 
 
 608-1. Locomotive o]sr owk wheels u^tder power. 
 
 The conditions presented in the transportation of a live locomotive 
 are materially different from those attendant upon the- transporta- 
 tion of a dead locomotive, for the reason that, as the carrier furnishes 
 only trackage and no motive power, weight is almost an immaterial 
 factor. It is true that such a movement is similar to the movement of 
 an entire train so far as the train dispatching is concerned, but it 
 would seem that a flat rate per mile properly might be charged in such 
 cases.^ 
 
 1. In the Matter of the Investigation and Suispension of Advances in Rates by 
 Carriers for the Transportation of Locomotives and Tenders named in a Schedule 
 filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 103, 111. 
 
 608- J. DiSTAIfCE. 
 
 As early as 1872 it had been fully demonstrated in England that 
 equal mileage as a basis for settling the difficulty was entirely imprac- 
 ticable. In that year the committee upon the amalgamation of railways 
 reported upon this subject, and the substance of this report is found 
 in the note to the case of Ransoms v. Railway Co., 1 Nev. & McN. 63, 
 which was one of the Coal Traffic Cases. In reporting against equal 
 mileage, the committee said •} 
 
 "(a) It would prevent railway companies from lowering their fares and rates 
 so as to compete with traffic by sea, by canal, or by shorter or otherwise cheaper 
 railway, and would thus deprive the public of the benefit of competition and the 
 company of a legitimate source of profit. 
 
 "(b) It would prevent railway companies from making perfectly fair arrange- 
 ments for carrying at a lower rate than usual goods brought in large and constant 
 quantities, or for carrying for long distances at a lower rate than for short distances. 
 
 "(c) It would compel a company to carry for the same rate over a line which 
 has been very expensive in construction, or which, from gradients or otherwise, is 
 very expensive in working, at the same rate at which it carries over less expensive 
 lines. In short, to impose equal mileage on the companies would be to deprive the 
 public of the benefit of much of the competition which now exists or has existed, 
 to raise the charges on the public in many cases where the companies now find 
 it to their interest to lower them, and to perpetuate monopolies in carriage, trade, 
 and manufacture in favor of those routes and places which are nearest and least 
 expensive, where the varying charges of the company now create competition. And 
 it will be found that the supporters of equal mileage, when pressed, often really mean, 
 not that the rates they themselves pay are too high, but that the rates which others 
 pay are too low." 
 
 It was the intention of the Act to Regulate Commerce to estab- 
 lish equal mileage rates that are not compulsory nor always politic ; one 
 effect of such rates would be to put an end to competition as a factor 
 in making rates, and it would Avork a revolution in the business of the 
 country, which though it might be beneficial in some instances would be 
 destructive in others." 
 
 Distance is an important and ever present element in the problem 
 of rates and in the absence of other influences it is a controlling fac- 
 tor.^ However mileage and the consequent cost of service reo-ardless 
 of other conditions cannot be made the controlling factor in deter- 
 mining the lawfulness of rates. An inflexible rule to the contrary 
 would be disastrous to the transportation business of the country 
 and would be more injurious to the public than to the railroads.* 
 
77 FREIGHT BATES AND CHABGES [§608 
 
 In dealing with the question of rates, distance is important only 
 as it affords a measure of transportation.' 
 
 To permit distance to be the sole or controUino' factor would be to 
 introduce discrimination which would create chaotic conditions under 
 which irreparable injuries would be done to individuals, firms, and 
 communities without any compensating good resulting to the people 
 or the commerce of the country as a whole. ^ 
 
 It is because of the widely varying conditions of the country that 
 the statute allows the railroads to adjust their charges to forces that 
 are compulsory in character.^ 
 
 The Commission has said: "While we are not to be understood 
 as intimating that substantial difference in distance are not to be 
 given consideration, we are not willing to accept the theory of rate 
 construction based purely on distances. Such adjustment would be 
 revolutionary and destructive to established commercial interests of 
 enormous volume in value. "^ 
 
 While it must be conceded that there is an apparent justice in 
 the claim that rate should be apportioned to distance, it is not an abso- 
 lute and unconditional righ1 from which a departure may not be justi- 
 fied by other considerations. The public benefits, the greater volume 
 of business of carriers warranting lower rates to all, and the forces 
 of competition by other lines, may furnish reasons that outweigh a 
 claim of right founded only on geographical location.^ 
 
 A rule of equal mileage rates o^'er different railroads Avould often 
 prevent legitimate competition and frequently give a monopoly to the 
 best and shortest roads. ^^ 
 
 A departure from equal mileage rates on different branches or 
 divisions of a road is not conclusive that such rates are unlawful 
 but the burden of proof is on the company making such departure to 
 show its rates to be reasonable when disputed.'^ 
 
 Where all distances brought into comparison are considerable, and 
 the difference between them is relatively small, there should be sub- 
 stantial similarity in the respective rates unless other modifying cir- 
 cumstances justify disparity.12 
 
 In Union Tanning Company v. Southern Ry. Company, ^^ the Com- 
 mission said: "While in fixing reasonable rates and relative rate 
 adjustments distance must always be considered as bearing both upon 
 cost to the carrier in performing the service and the value of the service 
 to the shipper, there are many other facts, such as density or scarcity 
 of traffic over and along the lines of movement, comparative cost of 
 construction and operation, and competitive conditions, which must be 
 given weight. In some situations the other facts and conditions are so 
 nearly uniform or similar that distance becomes the dominating factor 
 in the relative adjustment of rates, while in others distance becomes, 
 within limitations, a minor factor because of the dominating and con- 
 trolling force of other facts and conditions ; hence many striking incon- 
 sistencies would be apparent in different rate adjustments made by 
 orders of this and State commissions, as well as voluntarily by the 
 carriers, if examined and compared ^vith regard to distance alone. If 
 the Commission would dispose of these rates questions and contro- 
 
§608] TRAFFIC LAW SBEVICE 78 
 
 versies by resort alone or mainly to comparative distances, ton-mile 
 earnings, and estimated relative earnings above the estimated so-called 
 'out-of-pocket' cost to the carrier for each service performed, there 
 could always be found standards for the >reduction of every rate to the 
 basis of the lowest, whatever may have compelled or induced its estab- 
 lishment. For the Commission to adopt such a course would inevitably 
 lead to a continuous process of reducing the carriers' revenue, a result 
 which would be detrimental to the public interest as well as unjust to 
 the carriers. 
 
 "Justice and reasonableness, demanded by the law and due alike 
 to shippers and carriers and without which the public interest will 
 not best be served, can only be secured by a careful consideration of 
 all the facts, circumstances, and conditions which legitimately and 
 practically bear upon the question before us. No inflexible, theoretical 
 rule fixing the measure of weight to be given a comparison of distance 
 and other facts, which vary in degree of importance in different cases, 
 can conduce to the determination of the lawfulness of rates, which 
 must be determined by their reasonableness, and the latter is ascer- 
 tainable only as a question of fact by duly weighing all of the facts 
 standing together in each case. ' ' 
 
 In the case of Fort Dodge Commercial Club v. Illinois C. Rd. Co}* 
 the Commission said: "Unquestionably mileage is a factor in the de- 
 termination of the reasonableness of rates, but how important, or what 
 effect it should have in judging the fairness of a challenged rate is a 
 question which must be answered in the light of all the facts surround- 
 ing the exaction of the rate. Early after its organization the Commis- 
 sion held that it was not the purpose of the act to compel the establish- 
 ment of rates solely according to mileage, and that the public benefits, 
 the greater volume of business to carriers warranting lower rates to 
 all the forces of competition, and many other potent considerations 
 might far outweigh a claim of right founded only on geographic loca- 
 tion. Imperial Coal Co. v. P. & L. E. R. R. Co., 2 I. C. C. Eep. 618. 
 
 "The following excerpts are also applicable here: 
 
 " 'The words "reasonable" and "just" as applied to rates, do not mean that the 
 rates upon every railroad shall be the same or even about the same. The circum- 
 stances and conditions of each road, which enter into and control the nature and 
 character of the service performed, such as the cost of service, which involves 
 volume or lightness of traffic, expense of construction and of operation, competition 
 of carriers not subject to the act, rates made by shorter and competing lines to the 
 same points of destination, space occupied by freight, value of freight and risk of 
 carriage to the carrier, must all be considered in determining whether a given rate 
 is "reasonable" and "just." Tested by these rules, a rate may be reasonable and just 
 on one railroad and not reasonable and just on another. New Orleans Cotton Exchanae 
 V. I. 0. B. R. Go. et ai, 3 I. O. C. Rep. 534. 
 
 " 'WhUe the revenue per ton per mUe over other routes on other lines and to other 
 destinations is often suggestive in arriving at a proper estimate of the reasonableness 
 or a rate over a route complained of, it is by no means conclusive Varying con- 
 ditions existing on different lines must of necessity justify differences in rates for 
 hauls of the same distance. The real question in any such complaint is the reason- 
 ableness of the particular rate on the particular line between the particular points 
 in question In testing such a rate the rates on the same or adjacent Unes in the 
 Immediate territory where the same conditions exist are of much greater significance 
 
 TIpTv. cTelT I2 I. a a Bep.l23/ '''' '°'"''^- ''"""* ^'''''''' ^"'■«"« ^- ^^ ^• 
 
 "As previously indicated, the rate per ton per mile on coal for the 
 haul of 375 miles from Chicago to Fort Dodge is slightlv less than 
 5 mills ; certainly not a high rate. Johnston v. St. L. & S. F. R. R. Co., 
 12 I. C. C. Eep. 73. Lincoln Commercial Club v. C, R. I. & P. Ry, Co'. 
 
79 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§608 
 
 13 I. C. C. Rep. 319. OMa. & Ark. Coal Traffic Bureau v. C, R. I. & P. 
 Ry. Co., 15 I. C. C. Rep. 216. 
 
 "Coal is a low-grade freight, moving in vast quantities; it is a 
 natural product and the commercial conditions surrounding its produc- 
 tion, the competitive conditions under which it moves, and its varying 
 cost in different fields, make the rates on it such as should he given 
 more careful scrutiny, perhaps, than the rates on many other com- 
 modities." 
 
 In Page Mullins Co. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.^^ the Commission 
 said: "In any situation affecting groups of points subject to the same 
 general basis or scale of rates, we may properly, and will, inquire into 
 the conditions presented at one or more of the specific points whether 
 typical or otherwise, but we must at the same time look to the entire 
 rate structure and where, as in this case, a distance scale applies, both 
 the extreme and the mean distance rates must be considered." 
 
 1. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1896), 72 Fed. Rep. 
 409, 424. 
 
 2. First Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission (1SS7, p. 40) ; La- 
 Crosse Manufacturers' & Jobbers' Union v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1SS7), 
 1 I. C. C. Rep. 629, 2 I. O. Rep. 9; Imperial Coal Co. ^. Pittsburgh & L. E. Rd. 
 Co. (1889), 2 I. C. C. Rep. 618, 2 I. C. Rep. 436. 
 
 3. Freight Bureau of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (1897), 7 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 180; citing, Eau Claire Board of Trade v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. 
 (1892), 4 I. C. Rep. 65, 5 I. C. C. Rep. 265; Hill v. Nashville C. & St. L. Rd. Co. 
 (1895), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 343; Freight Bureau of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati N. O. & 
 T. P. Ry. Co. (1894), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 195, 4 I. C. Rep. 192; New York Produce 
 Exchange v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1898), 7 I. C. C. Rep. 612; McMorran v. 
 Grand Trunk Rd. Co. (1889), 2 I. C. Rep. 604, 3 I. C. C. Rep. 252. 
 
 4. Lehman, Higginson & Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1890), 3 I. C. Rep. 80, 4, I. C. C. 
 Rep. 1. 
 
 5. In the Matter of Differential J^eight Rates to and from North Atlantic Ports 
 (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 13. 
 
 6. WUhoit V. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 139. 
 
 7. Lehman, Higginson & Co. v. iSouthem P. Co., supra. 
 
 8. Kansas City Transportation Bureau v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 
 I. C. C. Rep. 195; cited in Inland Empire Shippers League v. Director General, 
 Oregon-Washington Rd. & Nav. Co. (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 321, 340. 
 
 9. Imperial Coal Co. v. Pittsburg & L. E. Rd. Co. (1869), 2 I. C. C. Rep. 618, 2 I. C. 
 Rep. 436; Corporation Commission of the State of North Carolina v. Norfolk & 
 W. Ry. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 303, 309; Omaha Grain Exchange v. Chicago 
 & N. W. Ry. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 424, 481; Indianapolis Freight Bureau 
 V. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. By. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 195, 205. 
 
 10. Now Orleans Cotton Exchange v. Cincinnati N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (1888), 2 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 375, 2 I. C. Rep. 289; Now Orleans Cotton Exchange v. Illinois O. Rd. Co. 
 (1890), 3 I. O. C. Rep. 534, 2 I. C. Rep. 777. 
 
 11. James & Abbott v. Canadian P. Ry. Co. (1893), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 612, 628, 4 I. C. 
 Rep. 274; Logan v. Chicago & N. W. By. Co. (1889), 2 I. C. C. Rep. 604, 612, 2 I. C. 
 Rep. 431. 
 
 12. Eau Claire Board of Trade v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1892), 4 I. C. Rep. 65, 
 5 I. C. C. Rep. 265. 
 
 13. Union Tanning Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 159, 164. 
 
 14. Fort Dodge Commercial Club v. Illinois C. Rd. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 572, 581. 
 
 15. Page MilUng Co. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 605, 608. 
 
 608-K. Competition. 
 
 See "Fourth Section of the Interstate Commerce Act — Long-and- 
 Short-Haul Clause — Fourth-Section Applications," Chapter 7, post. 
 
 608-L. Relations of the carriers and the public. 
 
 In the proceeding entitledr"Eaie Increases in Official Classification 
 Territory,"^ the Interstate Commerce Commission made the following 
 interesting survey : ' ' The relations of the shipping public and the car- 
 
§608] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 80 
 
 riers were earnestly discussed by counsel and should be briefly consid- 
 ered before we take up the main questions presented on the record. As 
 long ago as the seventeenth century Lord Chief Justice Hale announced 
 the principle that when one devotes his property, as for example, a 
 ferry, to the common use of all the king's subjects passing that way and 
 upon a common charge for the service, it becomes a thing of public 
 interest and therefore ought to be subject to public regulation. De Jure 
 Maris, 1 Harg, Law Tracts 6. This rule of the common law underlies 
 practically all our constitutional and legislative provisions respecting 
 common carriers ; and it is now firmly settled, both by the courts and 
 through legislation, that railroads, although constructed with private 
 capital, are public highways subject to public control. In constructing 
 and maintaining such a highway under public sanction the railroad 
 company really performs a function of the state. Olcott v. Supervisors, 
 16 Wall. 678, 694; L. & N. B. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677, 696; 
 L. S. & M. 8. By. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 302. 
 
 ' ' Unlike most other countries, we have committed the performance 
 of this public function to companies of private ownership. Practically 
 the entire railroad mileage of the country, aggregating more than one- 
 third the mileage of the world, has been constructed with private cap- 
 ital. But the national government in many instances has donated the 
 rights of way for railroads and in addition has made them other large 
 grants of land. States, counties and municipalities have made similar 
 grants and have otherwise aided railway companies by contributions of 
 funds, by issuing bonds, or by guaranteeing the bonds of such com- 
 panies. The public, through governmental agencies, has therefore 
 played no small part in the development of our railroad system. Never- 
 theless the great burden of creating these avenues of communication 
 and transportation has been borne by private investors ; and not in- 
 frequently they have ventured their capital in such enterprises by 
 extending through undeveloped territories lines that at the time offered 
 little prospect of substantial returns for many years to come. 
 
 "The general duties that common carriers owe to the public are 
 well understood. They must provide a prompt and safe service and 
 they are held to a .strict responsibility for injuries to travelers using 
 their facilities and for loss of or damage to property which they under- 
 take to carry. They are also under the obligations not to charge an 
 excessive rate for the service ; this was the rule at common law and it 
 has been emphasized by specific legislation. On the other hand, we can- 
 not doubt that the policy of inviting and authorizing the performance 
 of this public function by privately owned companies involves obliga- 
 tions on the part of the public to the owners of these properties. Those 
 who invest their funds in railroad shares are, of course, charged with 
 the responsibility of securing for their properties honest and capable 
 management. Investors in railroad securities, like investors in other 
 securities, must bear the consequence of dishonesty or inefficiency on the 
 part of those selected to manage the properties. No one could reason- 
 ably contend that the public should pay higher transportation rates 
 because once prosperous properties — like the New Haven, the Chicago 
 & Eastern Illinois, the Alton, the Frisco, or the Cincinnati, Hamilton & 
 Dayton— may now be in need of additional funds as a consequence of 
 mismanagement. Investors in railroad securities must also take the 
 risk of those errors of judgment which not infrequently attend even 
 the careful management of enterprises conducted for profit. But they 
 
81 FEEIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§608 
 
 should likeAv-ise be permitted to enjoy fully the profits which naturally 
 flow, under a reasonable scale of rates, from the exercise of good judg- 
 ment, integrity, and efficiency in the management of such properties. 
 While the right to demand a higher rate may be denied when the exist- 
 ing charge is reasonable, even though the particular carrier may be in 
 need of additional earnings, so a carrier may be entitled to a higher 
 rate for a particular service because the existing rate is unreasonably 
 low, although the carrier may not be in need of additional revenues. 
 This principle has found expression in the reports of this Commission. 
 In Railroad Commissioners of Iowa v. I. C. R. R. Co., we said : 
 
 •' 'But the fact that the net revenues of the Illinois Central from its ownership 
 of the bridge * * * may be greater than the returns on ordinary business enter- 
 prises is not sufficient in itself to justify a holding that the bridge tolls are excessive 
 * * *. A railroad company may be operated with a less return than it ought to 
 enjoy, or even at a loss, but neither condition of affairs would justify the exaction 
 by it of rates that are higher than they reasonably should be for the services per- 
 formed, all things beiilg considered. So also the fact that the net earnings of a 
 carrier may be large does not of itself justify us in fixing a rate at less than is reason- 
 able for the service, all other things being considered.' 
 
 "In that case we denied the prayer of the complainant for a reduc- 
 tion in rates, notwithstanding the very generous returns to the carrier 
 on its investment. 
 
 "Many railroad investments in this country are exceedingly profit- 
 able to their owners. In common justice the investors in such prop- 
 erties are entitled to share in the general prosperity and to enjoy the 
 just rewards of their foresight and wisdom so long as the rates exacted 
 are reasonable. It is not only consistent with a national policy that 
 invites the private ownership of railroads that there should be a lib- 
 eral return on a particular railroad investment, when the property 
 has been wisely planned and honestly constructed and is efficiently man- 
 aged ; but the full development of that policy, as well as justice, requires 
 that such a return should be made. The public interest demands not 
 only the adequate maintenance of existing railroads, but a constant in- 
 crease of our transportation facilities to keep pace with the growth 
 and requirements of our commerce. If, however, that development is 
 to be accomplished with private capital, in conformity with our tradi- 
 tions, nothing can be more certain than that the facilities will not be 
 provided except under such a system of regulation as will reasonably 
 permit a fair return on the money invested. 
 
 "The public owes to the private owners of these properties, when 
 well located and managed, the full opportunity to earn a fair return on 
 the investment; and the carriers owe to the public an efficient service 
 at reasonable rates. This fundamental doctrine has been recognized 
 by the Commission in the performance of its duties. The proceeding 
 before us may therefore be described as, in some sense, a controversy 
 between the consuming public which pays the rates, and the investor 
 who furnishes the facilities for moving the freight ; and our duty is to 
 ascertain from the record before us what are their respective rights. 
 That, in fact, is the real railroad question — the just balancing of the 
 mutual rights of the public and of the carriers under a national policy 
 that permits and invites the performance of this public function by pri- 
 vate interests. From that point of view the problems and difficulties 
 of our railroads become public problems of great national concern. ' ' 
 
 1. Rate Increases in Official Classification Territory (The Five Per Cent Case) (1914), 
 31 I. C. C. Rep. 351, 357, et seq. 
 
§608] TKAFFIC LAW SERVICE 82 
 
 608-M. Cost of" production to the manufacturer. 
 
 A company may not with propriety seek the establishment of lower 
 rates on its articles of manufacture because it is not in a prosperous 
 condition or because the cost of assembling its raw material may be 
 greater than that of its competitor.^ 
 
 Excess of manufacturing cost to a producer at one point over that 
 of its competitors in other localities, by reason of inferior raw material 
 and fuel, condition of its plant, cost of labor, or other like causes, is 
 not to be considered in ascertaining rightful relative adjustment of 
 rates from such places.^ 
 
 1. Pardee Works v. Central Rd. Co. of New Jersey (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 500, 502. 
 
 2. Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1895), 6 I. O. C. Rep. 488. 
 
 608-N. Investment in a commercial enterprise relying upon a cer- 
 tain RATE ADJUSTMENT. 
 
 The fact that a manufacturer has built a plant at a certain point 
 relying upon assurances from representatives of the carriers that a 
 lower rate will be established from points of origin of the required raw 
 material, will not in and of itself afford sufficient ground for finding the 
 existing rate to be unreasonable. Nor would it be material to the in- 
 quiry if it were established that such an agreement had been entered 
 into between the parties.^ 
 
 Nor would it be material if an agreement had been made betwefen 
 the shipper and the carrier that there should be established and main- 
 tained certain rates, since it is fundamental that the carriers ' duty is to 
 charge a reasonable rate for the service performed, and by that we 
 mean not only must it not charge a rate that is unreasonably high but 
 also that it would be unlawful to charge a rate so low as to be noncom- 
 pensatory or impose a burden upon other traffic.^ The reasonableness 
 of a rate must be determined irrespective of contractual obligations of 
 a particular shipper.^ 
 
 However, the Commission has frequently held that where a plant 
 has been established and money has been invested on the faith of cer- 
 tain transportation rates and conditions upon which the life of the plant 
 depends the carrier may not increase those rates and charges to the 
 serious disadvantage of such investment ivithout good cause or reason^ 
 
 In the case of Oregon S Washington Lumber Manufacturers Ass'n 
 v. Southern P. Co.^ the Interstate Commerce Commission said: "This 
 Commission has never understood that it would dictate the policy of a 
 carrier in the making of its rates, in so far as there was just room for 
 the exercise of a policy. It has several times explicitly so declared. We 
 have, however, believed that we might consider what the policy of a car- 
 rier had been in determining whether the rates resulting from a change 
 in that policy were just and reasonable. It often happens that the very 
 existence of an industry depends upon the rate accorded to it. If, now, 
 a carrier has established a particular rate for the express purpose of 
 enabling an industry to exist, and if, upon the strength of that rate, 
 money has been invested which must be destroyed if the rate is with- 
 drawn, it has been our understanding that this fact might properly be 
 considered in passing upon the reasonableness of the proposed change 
 in the rate. Such fact is not controlling, but is one of the circumstances 
 
83 FREIGHT KATES AXD CHARGES [§608 
 
 which may properly be kept in view. It has been our opinion that we 
 might, in a proper case, order the continued maintenance of a rate upon 
 which the investment of money had been induced, even though we would 
 not in the first instance, as an original proposition, have directed the 
 establishment of that rate. 
 
 "The policy of a railroad cannot be dictated entirely by its own 
 interest. It cannot arbitrarily change that policy from day to day when 
 those changes result in undue hardship to its patrons. The welfare of 
 the public, as well as its own welfare, must be considered. To that ex- 
 tent this Commission has believed that it might control the policy of 
 carriers, and to that extent alone. It is still of the opinion that this 
 must be so unless the property rights of shippers are to rest in the arbi- 
 trary whim of the carrier without the right of appeal to any tribunal." 
 
 But an unlawful rate does not become lawful simply because to 
 declare that they are lawful will work destruction to property interests 
 which have developed under the maintenance of the unlawful rate ; nor 
 should carriers or this Commission refrain from a change in rates 
 simply because it destroys property interests. It often happens, and 
 perhaps usually happens, that a departure from present methods which 
 is clearly for the public good involves an immediate loss, due to the 
 throwing away of what the change makes worthless.^ 
 
 The fact that the investments have been made in the expectation 
 that existing rates would be continued in effect cannot be considered in 
 determining the reasonableness of proposed increased rates.'' 
 
 In Chattanooga Log Rates, ^ the Commission said: "However re- 
 luctant the Commission may feel to sanction changes in rates which 
 tend to impair or destroy the value of investments made in expectation 
 of their continuance, it cannot on that ground deny to carriers the right 
 to change rates which are just and reasonable. 
 
 1. Meredian Fertilizer Factory v. Louisville & X. Rd. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Kep. 494. 
 
 2. Lumber Rates from Points in Arkansas. Lo\iislana, Missouri, Oklahoma, and 
 Texas, and also from Memphis, Tenn., to points in Iowa and Other States (1914), 
 29 I. C. C. Rep. 1, 15. 
 
 3. Straw Rates from Stations in Missouri to Alton, 111. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 562, 
 563. 
 
 4. Douglas C& Co. v. Chicago R. L & P. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 232, 237; 
 Coi-poration Commission of the State of North Carolina v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. 
 (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 303. 
 
 5. Oregon & Washington Lumber Manufacturers .\ssu. v. Southern P. Co. (1911), 21 
 I. C. C. Rep. 389, 394. 
 
 6. Albree v. Boston & M. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 303, 315. 
 
 7. Southern P. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1911), 219 U. S. 433, 55 L. 
 Ed. 283, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2SS. 
 
 8. Chattanoogk Log Rates (1915), 35 I. C. C. Rep. 163, 168; cited in Rate Increases 
 in Western Classification Territory (1915), 37 I. C. C. Rep. 114, 146. 
 
 608-O. A CARRIER HAS XO RIGHT TO MAINTAIN A RATE ADJUSTMENT IN 
 ORDER TO PRESERVE A COMMERCIAL PROFIT TO THE MANU- 
 FACTURER. 
 
 It is well settled that the Commission may not make the needs of 
 the shipper the basis for reasonable transportation rates. ^ 
 
 The Commission has often said that it cannot require of carriers 
 the establishment of rates which Avill gTiarantee to a shipper the profit- 
 
§608] TRAFFIC LAW SEKVICE 84 
 
 able conduct of his business. The railway may not impose an unreas- 
 onable transportation charge merely because the business of the ship- 
 per is so profitable that he can pay it ; nor, conversely, can the shipper 
 demand that an unreasonably low charge should be accorded him simply 
 because the profits of his business have shrunk to a point where they are 
 no longer suflScient.^ 
 
 The theory that an adjustment of rates to preserve a commercial 
 profit to manufacturers and jobbers in all cases, if accepted as a neces- 
 sary rule under the law, and generally applied, would be far reaching 
 in its consequence, and clothe common carriers with a new function, to 
 equalize at their own expense the net results of business operations, 
 without regard to location or the conditions of handling and carriage. 
 In many instances the work of the carrier would have to be done at 
 less than cost, and in some for nothing. Such a rule is not admissible, 
 therefore, as one of general application.^ 
 
 If the farmer cannot, in a given locality, raise and ship produce 
 to market at a profit upon the existing freight rate, that is no reason 
 why the carrier should be compelled to accept less than a reasonable 
 sum for its service.* 
 
 Conceding always that a carrier renders its services for hire, and 
 is entitled to fair remuneration, which must necessarily include the 
 cost of the service, a contribution to fixed charges, and something be- 
 sides in the form of profit,, the question arises, how large a carrier's 
 margin of profit should be to render its charges reasonable to the 
 patrons whom it serves. It is manifestly quite important on public 
 grounds that the citizens who furnish a carrier with business from 
 the pursuits in which they are engaged should not be oppressed with 
 rates that are disastrous to their pursuits, as that a carrier should not 
 be required to perform its service at a loss. The public good requires 
 that benefits, as well as burdens, shall be justly distributed, and that 
 one interest shall not profit unduly at the expense and to the serious 
 prejudice of another. This is the spirit of the law. A carrier has 
 the peculiar advantage of being able to apportion its aggregate ex- 
 penses upon its whole business, but a grower of fruit, or of grain, or a 
 manufacturer, cannot do so. The product he markets must alone bear 
 the transportation expense, and if this is excessive, and deprives him 
 of any return upon his investment, or from his labor or skill, his busi- 
 ness is ruined and a public injury is sustained.* 
 
 The equitable rule doubtless is that rates should bear a fair and 
 reasonable relation to the antecedent average cost of the traffic as 
 delivered to the carrier for transportation, and the average market 
 price the freight will command, or, as it is termed, the commercial 
 value of the property. Carriers for the most part are believed to 
 recognize this rule. A carrier cannot expect to absorb so much of the 
 market price in its charges that the producer will be obliged to abandon 
 his business. It is not meant by this that a carrier should transport 
 freight at a loss to itself.® 
 
 If a market cannot be reached except at a loss with freight upon 
 which only a just transportation rate is charged, it is no longer a 
 legitimate article of commerce, and a carrier is under .no duty tq 
 transport it at its own expense. But the principle intended to be 
 
85 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§608 
 
 expressed is that, if a rate is so high as to yield a large profit to a 
 carrier and to deprive its patrons of any profit, and make their busi- 
 ness ruinous, then the interests of its patrons and the general public 
 interest as well requires the carrier to remit a portion of its profits, 
 and accept a rate more equitable both to carrier and patron. This is 
 indispensable to make a rate reasonable and just.'' 
 
 1. In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Car- 
 riers for the Transportation of Cooperage from Salt Lake City, Utah, to ciiicago, 
 111., and between other points. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 656, md; citing, Southern 
 P. Co. V. Interstate Commerce Commission (1911), 219 U. S. 433, 5.5 L. Ed. 283, 31 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 288. See Rate Increases in Western Classifieation Territory (1915), 
 37 I. C. C. Rep. 114, 150. 
 
 2. Board of Railroad Commissioners of the State of Kansas v. Atchison T. & S. F. 
 Ry. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 407, 410. 
 
 3. Thurber v. New York C. & H. R. Rd. Co. (1890), 3 1. O. C. Rep. 473, 2 I. C. Rep. 
 742. 
 
 4. Grain Shippers' Assn. of NdVthwest Iowa v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1889), 8 I. C. C. Rep. 
 158; Buchanan v. Northern P. Rd. Co. (1891), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 7, 3 I. C. Rep. 655. 
 
 5. Delaware State Grange v. New York P. & X. Rd. Co. (1891), 4 I. C. C. Rep. 588, 
 3. I. C. Rep. 554 
 
 6. Ibid. 
 
 7. Ibid. 
 
 608-P. Adjustment of rates to induce movement of traffic. 
 
 If a carrier can profitably make a low rate for the purpose of 
 bringing traffic into existence, which would otherwise pass over a 
 competing line, then it may profitably, under some circumstances, make 
 a low rate for the purpose of bringing into existence traffic which 
 would not otherwise pass over any line.^ 
 
 It is undoubtedly to the interest of carriers to adjust their rates 
 so as to induce the movement of traffic, and it follows, therefore, that 
 they should keep in close touch with commercial conditions pertaining 
 to sale of commodities and the needs of communities, and adjust their 
 charges when practicable within reasonable limitations, to meet those 
 conditions and encourage sales and the movement of freight. While 
 there is a mutual interest in sales and transportation, and it is proper 
 that both seller and transporter should regard the same, the Commis- 
 sion, when called upon to determine what are just rates, must have 
 due regard to the rights of the carriers a swell as the interests of the 
 shippers. 
 
 Notwithstanding the fact that the movement of traffic is en- 
 couraged and increased when carriers adjust their charges to meet 
 mercantile interests, yet it cannot be held to be a duty of the carriers, 
 in adjusting their charges, to equalize the value of commodities in 
 their final distribution.- 
 
 1. Grain Shippers' Assn. of Northwest Iowa v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1889), 8 I. C. C. Rep. 
 158; Buchanan v. Northern P. Rd. Co. (1891), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 7. 3 I. C. Rep. 655. 
 
 2. Chicago Lumber & Coal Co. v. Tioga S. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. 0. C. Rep. Z2:i. 3:iX; 
 Chickasaw Compress Co. v. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 187. 
 
 608-Q. The right of a railroad company to fix its rates. 
 
 The right of a railroad company to fix its rates does not depend 
 upon the question whether its patrons are making or losing money in 
 their business.^ 
 
§608] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 86 
 
 Railroads have no right to graduate their charges in proportion 
 to the prosperity which comes to industries whose products they trans- 
 port.^ 
 
 To make rates for transportation based solely upon the ability of 
 the shipper to pay those rates, is to make the charge for transporta- 
 tion depend upon the cost of production rather than upon the cost 
 of carriers — to measure a pulblic service by the economies practiced 
 by the private shipper. This necessarily gives to the carrier the right 
 to measure the amount of profit which the shipper may make and fix its 
 rates upon the traffic manager's judgment as to what profit he will be 
 permitted. This theory entitles the railroad to enter the books of 
 every enterprise which it serves and raise or lower rates without 
 respect to its own earnings but solely with respect to the earnings of 
 those whose traffic it carries. This is not regulation of railroads by 
 the nation but regulation of the industries and commerce of the country 
 by its railroads.* 
 
 In Florida Fruit & Vegetable Shippers Protective Ass'n. v. At- 
 lantic C. L. Rd. Co.* the position of the growers is that such rates 
 should be established as will permit them to market their product at a 
 reasonable profit : Held, no such test of the justness of the transporta- 
 tion charge can be admitted. 
 
 The Commission has often said that it cannot require of carriers 
 the establishment of rates which will guaranty to a shipper the profit- 
 able conduct of his business. The railway may not impose an unrea- 
 sonable transportation charge merely because the business of the 
 shipper is so -profitable that he can pay it ; nor conversely, caii the 
 shipper demand that an unreasonably low charge shall be accorded 
 him simply because the profits of his business have shrunk to a point 
 where they are no longer sufficient." 
 
 The test of the reasonableness of a rate is not the amount of 
 profit in the business of a shipper or manufacturer, but whether the 
 rate yields a reasonable compensation for thei service rendered. If 
 the prosperity of the shipper is to have a controlling influence, this 
 would justify a higher rate on traffic of the prosperous manufacturer 
 than on that of one less prosperous. The right to participate in the 
 prosperity of the shipper by raising rates is simply license to the car- 
 rier to appropriate that prosperity, or, in other words, to transfer the 
 shipper's legitimate profit in his business from the shipper to the 
 carrier. The increased prosperity of shippers along the line of a 
 railway enlarges the business of those shippers, and, as a consequence, 
 both the tonnage of traffic which they receive in their business and 
 which they ship to their customers. In this way the carrier necessarily 
 and justly participates in, or is benefited by, the prosperity of the 
 shipper.® 
 
 The fact that a shipper has been prosperous, although a matter 
 to be considered, does not conclusively show that the rates are not 
 discriminatory.'' The railroad rates from various points of produc- 
 tion will determine so far as transportation is concerned the limit or 
 the extent of the consuming territory which any given commodity can 
 reach. In competition with others and in their desire for business, 
 carriers may move a commodity as far as a remunerative rate will 
 
87 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§608 
 
 permit — that is, if the' compensation is something above the actual 
 cost of the service, and it may be doubted whether carriers can go 
 to this extent if the equipment so used is thereby diverted from the 
 demands of other traffic offered to the carrier. Points producing tlie 
 same commodity may be widely separated and be served by different 
 carriers. It is manifest that the rates of the different carriers serving 
 the different points will likewise determine the limits of the common 
 competitive territory of the commodities from such points "of produc- 
 tion. Competitive rates made by several carriers serving the different 
 points of production may be lower than they could be compelled to 
 make. The law permits the making of a competitive rate to the extent 
 above mentioned, but there is no law that requires the carriers to go 
 to that extent. This controversy cannot be determined wholly upon 
 the ground that complainants have enjoyed the lower rate for many 
 years and that interests have been built up thereunder, and that loss 
 of business, investments, profits, and markets will result under the 
 increased rates. It must be determined on the justness or reasonable- 
 ness of the rates in controversy.*. 
 
 1. Union p. Ry. Co. v. Goodridge (1893), 149 U. S. 680, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 970, 37 L. Ed. 
 986; Florida Fruit & Vegetable Shippers Protective Assn. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. 
 Co. (1910), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 552, 560; Florida Fruit & Vegetable Shippers Protective 
 Assn. V. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 11, 14. 
 
 2. Tift V. Southern Ry. Co. (1905), 138 Fed. Rep. 753; enforcing order of Commission 
 in Tift V. Southern Ry. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 548; Commission's order held 
 to be valid. Southern Ry. Co. v. Tift (1906), 148 Fed. Rep. 1021; decree affirmed 
 and Commission's order held to be valid. Carriers restrained from enforcing 
 the advance; and reparation awarded in accordance with stipulation. Southern 
 Ry. Co. V. Tift (1907), 206 U. S. 428, 51 L. Ed. 1124, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 709. 
 
 3. In Re Investigation of Advances in Rates by Carriers in Western Trunk Line, 
 Trans-Missouri and Illinois Freight Committee Territories (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 
 307, 350, 351. 
 
 4. Florida Fruit & Vegetable Shippers Protective Assn. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. 
 (1910), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 552, 560; cited in Truck Growers Assn. of Charleston 
 District, Charleston, S. C. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 190, 195. 
 
 5. Board of Railroad Commissioners of the State of Kansas v. Atchison T. & S. F. 
 Ry. Co. (1912) 22 I. C. C. Rep. 407, 410; In the Matter of the Investigation of 
 Alleged T'nreasonable Rates and Practices Involved in the Transportation of 
 Wool, Hides and Pelts from Various Western Points of Origin to Eastern Des- 
 tinations (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 151, 156. 
 
 6. Central TellowiPine Assn. v. Illinois C. Ed. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 505, 535; 
 Tift V. Southern Ry. Co. (1905) 10 I. C. C. Rep. 548; Jennison v. Great N. Ry. 
 Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 113, 121. 
 
 7. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1009), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 512, 
 519. 
 
 8. Oregon & Washington Lumber Manufacturers' Assn. v. Union P. Rd. Co. (1908), 
 14 I. C. C. ^ep. 1, 14. 
 
 608-E. Right of carrier to share in general prosperity of the 
 
 COUNTRY. 
 
 The freight rate is not a commodity the price of which should ordi- 
 narily vary with the price of the articles transported. A railroad 
 may not advance its passenger fares simply because the people who 
 ride are making more money. The question is, rather, whether the 
 fare charged allows the carrier a fair return for its service. ^ 
 
 To the statement of this proposition exists a most important qual- 
 ification. Some freight rates are largely a commercial proposition, 
 and in so far they may properly vary with varying business conditions. 
 For example, the price of the product of a particular factory may de- 
 pend largely upon the price of the raw material, and in the cost of that 
 
§608] TEAFFIC LAW SEEVICE 88 
 
 material the item of transportation by rail may enter as an important 
 part. "WTien the price of the product falls, the price paid for the raw 
 material must also decline, and this necessitates a drop in the freight 
 rate. It may happen that the freight rate is a sufficiently important 
 part in the cost to the consumer, so that a reduction will stimulate con- 
 sumption. A railroad often makes, and very properly makes, a low 
 rate in times of depression, for the purpose of enabling a manufac- 
 turer to continue his business.- 
 
 To keep the factory in operation the railway may find it neces- 
 sary to transport its raw material, its coal, its oil, and even its finished 
 product, at a reduced rate. Whenever such depression has caused a 
 reduction in rates, an advance may well follow the return of pros- 
 perity, but no such rule should be applied to cases where the reduction 
 was not due to that cause.^ 
 
 1. In the Matter of Class and Commodity Rates from St. Louis and Texas Points in 
 force over the lines of Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. et al. (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 238, 271. 
 
 2. Ibid. 
 
 3. In the Matter of Proposed Advances in Freight Rates (1903), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 382, 
 406. 
 
 608-S. Sekvices in the delivery and eeceipt of traffic at terminals. 
 
 The expense of making delivery to consignees or to connections in 
 large and congested cities often exceeds the cost of transportation for 
 many miles, and must preferably be considered in determining the 
 reasonableness of freight rates.^ 
 
 The service performed on industrial sidings, as a general rule, is 
 of greater value to the shipper and expense to the carrier than team- 
 track service, but it is apparent that the receipt or delivery of car- 
 load freight on many of the' industrial tracks entails no greater service 
 or expense than would the receipt or delivery of the same cars on team 
 tracks. Moreover, the additional cost of receiving or delivering car- 
 load freight on industrial tracks does not necessarily imply that the 
 service is accessorial for which an addition may be .made to the line- 
 haul rate, or that it is other than a mere substitute^ for team-track 
 receipts and deliveries. If cost of service were a controlling test of 
 whether in a given case an additional service has been performed for 
 which increased compensation may be exacted, it is evident that the 
 terminal charge should vary as between different points in the same 
 switching district, or even as between deliveries at the same point at 
 different times. The fact that in a switching district all carload 
 freight is not received or delivered at the same point and in the same 
 manner presupposes variation in the cost of service and other minor 
 differences incident to diverse circumstances and operating condi- 
 tions.^ 
 
 In the absence of tariff provisions to the contrary the line-haul 
 rate of a particular carrier includes the receipt or delivery of carload 
 freight only at industries or other points located upon its own rails.' 
 
 The delivery and receipt on industrial spur tracks within the 
 switching limits in a city of carload freight moving in Interstate Com- 
 merce incident to a system-line haul, is not necessarily an added serv- 
 ice for which the carrier is entitled to make, or should make, a charge 
 additional to the line-haul rate to or from such city where that rate 
 
^9 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§608 
 
 imposes a receiving and delivering service at team tracks or at f reiglit 
 sheds within snch switching limits for which the spur-track ser^dce is 
 a substitute.* 
 
 In the case of Railroad Commissioners of the State of Florida y. 
 Florida E. C. Ry. Co.^ the Interstate Commerce Commission made the 
 following statement: "We now come to the further contention ad- 
 vanced by the complainants, namely, that it is the duty of a common 
 carrier by rail, as a matter of law, to deliver and receive carload 
 freight on private sidings or spurs without making a separate charge 
 for that service in addition to the line-haul rate. In using this point 
 Associated Jobbers of Los Angeles v. A. T. di S. F. Ry. Co., 18 I. C. C. 
 Eep. 310, is relied upon by the complainants, apparently, as announc- 
 ing a controlling rule of law to that effect that is of general applica- 
 tion to such a service wherever performed. Such, however, is not the 
 import of that case. A more careful reading of it will show that the 
 conclusions reached were expressly restricted to the particular situa- 
 tion there before us. We did not there undertake to reach beyond the 
 special facts of the case and to announce an administrative principle 
 intended universally to control such a service when rendered else- 
 where. When that case was on appeal before it, Los Angeles SwitcJi- 
 ing Case, 234 U. S. 294, 310, 311, the Supreme Court of the United 
 States was careful to point out that the rulings of the Commission 
 were not made as matters of law, but 'as conclusions of fact,' and 
 therefore were 'not open to review' by the court. In that connection 
 it is well to note the following observations by the court : 
 
 " 'Nor do we understand that the Commission ruled that the receipt and delivery 
 of goods at plants located upon spurs or sidetracks could not, in any circumstances, be 
 regarded as a distinct service for which separate compensation might be demanded, 
 * * * and it is apparent that the ruling of the Commission would not apply in any 
 case where by reason of the location and extent of the spur tracks and the character 
 of the movement the facts were essentially different from those upon which the decision 
 was based. 
 
 ".<* * * But, laying the generalization on one side, it is plain that the question 
 whether or not there is at any point an additional service in connection with industrial 
 spur tracks upon which to base an extra charge, or whether there is merely a sub- 
 stituted service which is substantially a like service to that included in the line-haul 
 rate and not received, is a question of fact to be determined according to the actual 
 conditions of operation. 
 
 . 'Such a question is manifestly one upon which it is the province of the Commis- 
 sion to pass. 
 
 " 'We must therefore take the findings of the Commission in the present case as 
 to the character and manner of use of the industrial spurs in Los Angeles — that they 
 constituted part of the carrier's terminals, and that under the conditions there existing 
 the receipt and delivery of goods on these spurs was a like service as compared with 
 the receipt and delivery of goods at team tracks and freight sheds — as conclusions of 
 fact. Assuming that they were based upon evidence, they are not open to review.' " 
 
 The varying cost to shippers of delivering their product to the 
 carrier for shipment can have no bearing in a case which has sole 
 reference to what are lawful charges from the carrier's stations.*^ 
 
 In California Citrus League v. Director General, Aberdeen S R. 
 Rd. Co.'' the Commission stated: "The reductions claimed by com- 
 plainant in the line-haul rate because of the additional charges paid by 
 it for diversion, r^consignment, increased demurrage, and track stor- 
 age cannot be allowed. These services are performed by the carriers 
 for the shippers ' convenience, and, in the case of demurrage and track 
 storage, for the purpose of releasing equipment to obviate car short- 
 age. If shippers elect to incur expenses of this character they should 
 not thereafter complain, unless the individual charges are unreason- 
 able per se." 
 
§608] TKAPFIC LAW SERVICE 90 
 
 In Wharton Steel Co. v. Director General, as Agent, Central Rd. 
 Co. of N. J.* the Commission stated: "The question presented is 
 whether the switching service between the points of loading and un- 
 loading at complainant's plant, on the one hand, and the interchange 
 tracks of the trunk lines at Wharton, on the other hand, is a transpor- 
 tation service on all proprietary traffic rather than a plant switching 
 service. Transportation rates generally include adequate compensa- 
 tion for the acceptance and delivery of traffic. It is the duty of the 
 carriers under the line-haul rate to deliver or receive carload freight 
 at the usual points of unloading or loading unless such points are so 
 located that the request for the receipt and delivery at such spots 
 could not, in view of general usage, be regarded as reasonable. The 
 line-haul rate, however, covers only one placement of the car for load- 
 ing or unloading, and an additional charge may and should be made for 
 each additional placement for that purpose. And whether such cus- 
 tomary and reasonable delivery is made on the ordinary team track, 
 switch track, or plant track of an industry it is a public transportation 
 service. In Car Spotting Charges, 34 I. C. C, 609, we said at page 619 : 
 
 "The fact is, however, that the service which the carrier renders in the movement of 
 cars over the interior tracks of the industrial plant for the purpose of receiving and de- 
 livering carload freight of the industry is a public service, and the tracks are used both 
 for that public service and for the private pui'poses of the industry." 
 
 In Pittsburgh Forge (& Iron Co. v. Director General, as Agent, 
 Pennsylvania Rd. Co.^ the Commission stated: "Complainant sought 
 to show by its cost figures that an allowance of $1.82 per car should 
 be made to it for the performance of interchange service as distin- 
 guished from intraplant service, and an award of reparation upon that 
 basis is asked. The primary purpose of the complainant is to obtain 
 an allowance from defendants rather than to require the defendants 
 to perform the spotting services. 
 
 "Defendants have never made an allowance to complainant for 
 the cost of performing the spotting services; and, except where com- 
 plainant's engine was under repair or failed temporarily to function, 
 defendants have not performed the service of placing cars at points of 
 loading or unloading within the plant but have always delivered and re- 
 ceived cars upon the interchange spur tracks indicated by complainant. 
 This is not an instance where the failure and refusal of defendants to 
 perform the spotting service or to make an allowance therefor has had 
 the effect of increasing the line-haul rates since January 1, 1910. In 
 this respect it is unlike Stewart Iron Co. v. P. Co., 47 I. C. C, 512 ; Na- 
 tional Malleable Castings Co. v. P. & L. E. R. R. Co., 51 I. C. C, 537 ; 
 and Sharon Steel Hoop Co. v. P. Co., 51 I. C. C, 545, in which it was 
 shown that following the Industrial Railway Case, 29 I. C. C, 212, 
 defendants discontinued the allowances theretofore made and caused 
 an increase in the line-haul rates which they failed to justify. 
 
 "In Associated Jobbers of Los Angeles v. A: T. & 8. F. Ry. Co., 
 18 I. C. C, 310, affirmed by the Supreme Court, 234 U. S., 294, it was 
 disclosed that the general custom of carriers in this country has been 
 to receive and deliver carload freight upon spur tracks leading to pri- 
 vate industries at convenient points for loading and unloading with- 
 out imposing a charge in addition to the line-haul rate includes the 
 service of final delivery for the reason that rates generally in this 
 country have constructed upon that basis. Consistent with the case 
 
91 FREIGHT KATES AND CHARGES [§608 
 
 cited it is necessary to consider the character of the service for which 
 allowance is here sought, the custom and general usage of the carriers 
 with respect to terminal services, and whether the spotting service 
 within the plant is in the nature of a substitute for team track service 
 included in the line-haul rate. While the size of the plant does not 
 relieve the carrier from the duty of performing the service contem- 
 plated under the line-haul rate, reasons of economy might justify the 
 carrier in permitting the industry to perform the service for an allow- 
 ance. It is well established that whatever service a carrier can be re- 
 quired to perform it may insist upon performing. Atchison Railway 
 Co. V. United States, 199. Consequently, it is also necessary to give 
 consideration to the question whether defendants may reasonably be 
 required to perform the service here in question at the line-haul rates. 
 
 "Where, as in General Electric Co. v. N. Y. C. d U. R. R. R. Co., 
 14 I. C. C, 237, the service of spotting cars within the plant is private 
 in character and is performed by the shipper over a net work of in- 
 traplant tracks for its own convenience and in its own interest, the 
 trunk lines are under no obligation to perform that service under the 
 line-haul rate or to make an allowance to the industry for the perform- 
 ance of that service. In affirming the Commission's order in Asso- 
 ciated Jobbers of Los Angeles v. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., supra, the Su- 
 preme Court said: ' 
 
 "* *■ * It is plain that the question whether or not there is at any point an ad- 
 ditional service in connection with industrial spur tracks upon which to base an extra 
 charge, or whether there is merely a substituted service which is substantially a like 
 service to that included in the line-haul rate and not received, is a question of fact to be 
 determined according to the actual conditions of operation. 
 
 "At the hearing defendants offered to perform the service of 
 spotting cars at convenient points of loading and unloading within the 
 plant, provided it is their legal duty to do so and that it is done at their 
 convenience. Complainant is willing that defendants should perform 
 the service desired, provided they 'could do it as well as we do, without 
 interfering with our plant' and 'they would do it at our convenience.' 
 It is clear from complainant's testimony, however, that it prefers to 
 do the work itself. Defendants are under no legal obligation to spot 
 cars for complainant solely at its convenience. Nor are shippers en- 
 titled to an allowance from the carrier for service which the carrier 
 is ready and willing to perform, and which the shipper performs be- 
 cause it is not convenient for it to permit the carrier to perform the 
 sei-vice. Car Spotting Charges, 34 I. C. C, 609. Furthermore, de- 
 fendants say that because of the excessive curvature in the plant tracks 
 and the general location of tracks within the plant it is impossible for 
 them to perform the spotting service for which an allowance is sought, 
 although it appears that it may be practicable to relocate or modify 
 the plant tracks sufficiently to accommodate defendant's locomotives. 
 The engines used by defendants in general switching service are larger 
 than complainant's engine. The engine used by one of defendants can 
 negotiate a 40-degree curve. One of the plant tracks has a curvature 
 of 60 degrees and another 50 degrees. Apparently it would be unsafe 
 for defendants to use the plant tracks as at present laid out. On the 
 other hand, complainant is able to perform the service more efficiently 
 and economically than defendants, and in fact would not submit to the 
 performance of the service by defendants at defendants' convenience. 
 
§608] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 92 
 
 "Defendants have never been asked by complainant to perform 
 the service of spotting cars at points of loading or unloading within 
 its plant or to make an allowance therefor. For forty years com- 
 plainant has performed with its own engine the service for which it 
 now seeks an lallowance. These facts strongly indicate that the spot- 
 ting service is more than the equivalent of a team track service, that 
 it has not been regarded by complainant as a service included in the 
 line-haul rate, and that no legal duty is imposed upon defendants to 
 perform the spotting service, and we so find. Where an industry 
 makes demand upon a line-haul carrier for an allowance for the per- 
 formance of switching or spotting service by the industry, and where 
 the line-haul carrier offers with its own power to perform the service 
 but its service is not acceptable to the industry, there is no further 
 obligation upon the line-haul carrier to perform that service. 
 
 "Though there may be no affirmative obligation upon defendants 
 to perform the spotting services under the line-haul rates, they may 
 not practice unjust discrimination or undue prejudice by making al- 
 lowances to other shippers who are competitors of complainant pro- 
 vided substantially similar circumstances and conditions at competi- 
 tors ' plants are shown to exist. ' ' 
 
 In Chicago Warehouse & Terminal Co. Terminal Charges^" au- 
 thority to establish at Chicago, 111., a terminal charge of two cents per 
 100 pounds to apply on interstate less-than-carload traffic between 
 points beyond Chicago and industries and universal freight stations 
 located on the Chicago Warehouse & Tej-minal Company, granted. 
 
 See "Switching — -Switch Connections- — Private Side Tracks," 
 Chapter 24 post. 
 
 1. Hastings Malting Co. v. Chicago M. & S. P. Rv. Co. (1906), 11 I. C. C. Kep. 675. 
 
 2. Boardman Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1915), 37 I. C. C. Rep. 81, 84. 
 
 3. Ibid. 
 
 4. Interstate Conimeree Commission v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1914), 234 U. S. 
 294, 58 L. Ed. 1319, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 814; cited in Railroad Commissioners of the 
 State of Florida v. Florida E. C. Rj. Co. (1917), 42 I. C. C. Rep. 616, 624, and, 
 United States of America v. Belt L. Rd. Co. (1919), 56 I. C. C. Rep. 121, 123. The his- 
 tory of this case, known as the "Los Angeles Switching Case," is as follows: Asso- 
 ciated Jobbers of Los Angeles v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 810. Carriers ordered to discontinue their present charge of $2.50 per 
 car, and in the future refrain from imposing any charge for delivering and receiv- 
 ing carload freight to and from industries located upon spurs and side tracks 
 within their respective switching limits at Los Angeles, Calif., when such car- 
 load freight is moving in interstate commerce incidental to a system-line haul. 
 Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (C. C. D. Kansas 
 1st D.) bill by carriers to annul Commission's order transferred to Commerce 
 Court. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce. Commission (1911), 1S8 
 Fed. Rep. 229. Commerce Court temporarily enjoined enforcement of Commission's 
 order on the ground that carriers have a right to impose a charge for this special 
 service. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1914), 
 234 U. ,S. 294, supra. Decree of Commerce Court reversed and cause remanded 
 to District Court with instructions to dismiss the bill. See, also, the "San 
 Francisco Switching Case" the history of which is as follows: Pacific Coast 
 Jobbers and Mfrs. Assn. v. Southern P. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 333. Carriers 
 ordered to discontinue their present charge of $2.50 per car, and in the future 
 refrain from imposing any charge for delivering and receiving carload freight 
 to and from industries located upon spurs and sidetracks within their respective 
 switching limits at San Francisco, Calif., when such carload freight is moving 
 in interstate commerce incidental to a system-line haul. Southern P. Co. v. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission (C. C. D. Kansas 1st D.) Bill by carriers 
 to annul Commission's order transferred to Commerce Court. Southern P. Co. v. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission (1911), 188 Fed. Rep. 241. Enforcement of 
 Commission's order temporarily enjoined on the ground that the carriers have a 
 right to impose a charge for this special switching service. Interstate Commerce 
 Commission v. Southern P. Co. (1914), 234 TJ. S. 315, 58 L. Ed. 34 Sup. Ct 
 Rep. 820. Decree of Commerce Court reversed and cause remanded to District 
 Court with instructions to dismiss the bill. 
 
93 FREIGHT KATES AND CHARGES [§608 
 
 5. Railroad Commissioners of the State of Florida v. Florida E. C. Ky. Co. (1917), 
 42 I. C. C. Rep. 616, 624. 
 
 6. Chicago Fireproof Covering Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1899), 8 I. C. C. Rep. 
 316. 330. 
 
 7. California Citrus League v. Director General, Aberdeen & R. Rd. Co. (1920), 58 
 I. C. C. Rep. 373, 380, et seq. 
 
 8. Wharton Steel Co. v. Director General, as Agent, Central Rd. Co. of N. J. (1920), 
 59 I. C. C. Rep. 11. 21. 
 
 9. Pittsburgh Forge & Iron Co. v. Director General, as Agent, Pennsylvania Rd. Co. 
 (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 29, 31, et seq. 
 
 10. Chicago Warehouse & Terminal Co. Terminal Charges (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 363. 
 
 608-T. Low RATES TO TAKE CARE OF EMPTY CAR MOVEMENT. 
 
 That a large movement of return empty cars may rightfully, under 
 certain circumstances, justify a lower rate, is undoubtedly true. When 
 articles of traffic do not move on account of a rate which constitutes 
 too great a burden, and the carrier is moving empty cars in the direc- 
 tion in which such articles would naturally move; at a lower rate, the 
 carrier may be justified in carrying at a rate sufficient to bring about 
 their movement, even at a rate barely remunerative. But no extra or 
 additional charge in consequence can justifiably be put on other articles 
 carried.^ 
 
 In the Import Rate Case^ the Supreme Court of the United States 
 held that, where the acceptance of import traffic enables carriers to 
 take advantage of the preponderance of empty car movment from 
 ports of entry, any rates which the carrier may charge may be re- 
 garded as remunerative. 
 
 1. Schumacher Milling Co. v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1893), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 61, 
 
 4 I. C. Rep. 373. 
 2 Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1896), 162 U. S. 197. 16 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 666, 40 L. Ed. 940, known as the "Import Rate Case." 
 
 608-U. Import duties. 
 
 In Florida Fruit and Vegetable Shippers' Protective Assn. v. At- 
 lantic C. L. Rd. Co.^ the Commission said: "In establishing rates from 
 Cuba in comparison with those from Florida, the carriers from Cuba 
 have apparently insisted that the duty shall be counted as a part of 
 the transportation charges. This is wrong. Congress has determined 
 the amount of protection which shall be accorded the American indus- 
 tries, and the carriers should not wipe this out by their rates of trans- 
 portation. While some slight advantage may be gained by the carrier 
 of the foreign traffic, this is more than offset by the manifest wrong 
 which results, and the irritation which it engendered. In the long run 
 it is better for all railroads to rest content with a fair adjustment of 
 rates. In this case these rates should be considered purely from a 
 transportation standpoint." 
 
 1. Florida Fruit and ^'egetable Shippers' Protective Ass'n v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. 
 (1910), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 552, 561. 
 
 608-V. Maps officially published by ratlkgad companies controlling 
 
 AS TO TARIFFS. 
 
 In the case of Crescent Coal cO Mining Co. v. Chicago cC E. I. Rd. 
 Co.^ a railroad map published by the Railroad and Warehouse Com- 
 mission of Illinois shows Depue & Northern as a steam railroad and 
 
§608] TEAFFIC LAW SERVICE 94 
 
 shows Depue, Nassau, and Howe as stations thereon. Defendant's 
 answer that the oflScial railway guide, the Eand-McNally, and the map 
 published by the Illinois Commission, although they contain informa- 
 tion fuTnished by the railroad companies, are not the official publica- 
 tion of those companies and cannot control the tariff. Held, this con- 
 tention to be sound. 
 
 1. Crescent Coal & Mining Co. v. Chicago & E. I. Ed. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 
 149, 154. 
 
 608-W. Rates of watee cabbiees. 
 
 The fact that there is a water route affording a low rate from a 
 given point to a certain destination does .not justify the Commission 
 in permitting rail carriers to charge an unreasonable rate to that given 
 point.^ 
 
 See "Water carriers," Section 320-A, ante; "Independent water 
 carriers — Inland — Ocean," Section 406, ante; "Fourth Section of the 
 Interstate Commerce Act — Long-and-Short-Haid Clause — Fourth-Sec- 
 tion Applications," Chapter 7 , post; "Water Carriers — Pa/nama Canal 
 Act," Chapter 50, post. 
 
 1. Anaconda Copper Co. v. Director General, Ann Arbor Rd. Co. (1920), 57 I. C. C. Rep. 
 723, 734, citing. Southern P. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1911), 219 U. 
 S. 433, 55 L. Ed. 283, 31, Sup. Ct. Rep. 288. 
 
 608-X. Aggeegate value of the eailway peoperty op the gabbier held 
 
 FOE AND USED IIST THE SEEVICE OF TEANSPOBTATION 
 
 Under the Interstate Commerce Act, as it existed prior to the 
 amendments effected by the Transportation Act of February 28, 1920, 
 the questions of the value of railroad investment and the cost of con- 
 struction, maintenance and operation of the road as elements to be 
 considered in determining the reasonableness of rates constantly gave 
 rise to considerable contention in rate issues when such matters were 
 advanced by the carriers as reasons for permitting increases in the 
 rates or pleaded by the carriers as a defense against the reduction in 
 rates. 
 
 The Interstate Commerce Commission consistently held that rates 
 cannot be said to be reasonable which are not reasonably remuner- 
 ative to the carrier, and that rates which do not pay their full pro- 
 portion of operating expenses, fixed charges, and reasonable divi- 
 dends, are not per se or, "in and of themselves" reasonably remuner- 
 ative.^ The United States Supreme Court held in the Nebraska Rate 
 Case'' that a carrier is entitled to earn a fair return upon the value of 
 that which it employs for public convenience and the service rendered. 
 The railways there contended that they should be allowed to earn in- 
 terest on their funded debts and dividends upon their capital stock. 
 This claim the court denied, saying that it could not affirm as a matter 
 of law, that a railroad was entitled to earn upon the basis of its cap- 
 italization. That case also established certain general principles upon 
 which the reasonableness of rates from a revenue standpoint are to 
 be decided. 
 
 It was, therefore, plain that until there be fixed, either by legisla- 
 tive or judicial interpretation, some definite basis for the valuation 
 
95 FEEIGHT RATES AXD CHABGES [§608 
 
 of railroad property and some limit up to which that property should 
 be allowed to earn upon that valuation, there could be no exact de- 
 termination of these questions. In the absence of such a standard the 
 tribunal, whether court or Commission, which was called upon to 
 consider these matters, could only do so upon the exercise of its best 
 judgment.^ 
 
 With the passage of the Transportation Act of February 28, 1920, 
 a vital change was effected in the power of the government over inter- 
 state freight rates and their effect upon the revenues of the carrier. 
 Under the old law, there rested with the carriers the sole responsibility 
 for securing sufficient revenue for the operation of their properties and 
 compensation of their stockholders. This was accomplished by the 
 initiation by the carriers of rates which were supposed to be just and 
 reasonable in obedience to the mandate of the statute. It was, there- 
 fore, proper in all cases involving interstate rates for the carriers 
 to introduce evidence in support of their claims that the rates in ques- 
 tion were necessary to preserve the revenues of the carriers. 
 
 Section 15 of the Interstate Commerce Act, which was added by 
 Section 422 of the Transportation Act of February 28, 1920, authorizes 
 the Interstate Commerce Commission to increase the revenues of the 
 carriers to a basis that will enable them to earn an aggregate net 
 railway operating income equal, as nearly as may be, to a fair return 
 upon the aggregate value of the railway property of such carriers held 
 for and used in the service of transportation. 
 
 Thereafter, therefore, in all issues involving individual rates, any 
 evidence which might be introduced on behalf of the carriers relating 
 to revenue, cost of equipment, maintenance of way, improvements, 
 betterments, etc., would be irrelevant, and the Commission would not 
 be justified in giving consideration to any such testimony. Such evi- 
 dence is only proper in issues where sufficiency of revenue is the sole 
 subject-matter of the particular inquiry. It is apparent, that inas- 
 much as the carriers are guaranteed sufficient revenue by law and a 
 special method provided in the statute for securing authority whereby 
 sufficient revenue is to be obtained, a plea of insufficient revenue does 
 not find proper place in a proceeding involving an individual rate on 
 a particular commodity. When, therefore, the issue involved is as to 
 the reasonableness of certain rates under a complaint filed by a ship- 
 ping interest, the evidence must be confined to that issue. 
 
 Testimony with reference to increased cost of operation or reduc- 
 tion in revenue is only appropriate and admissable in proceedings in- 
 itiated by the Interstate Commerce Commission to determine ques- 
 tions of sufficiency of revenue, the determination and publication of a 
 fair return percentage, and the fixing of rates to yield a fair return 
 on the value of the carriers' properties. 
 
 Section 15-a (17) of the Interstate Commerce Act, (as amended 
 February 28, 1920) reads : 
 
 The provisions of this section shall not be construed as depriving shippers of their 
 right to reparation in case of overcharges, unlavv'full.v excessive or discriminatory rates, 
 or rates excessive in their relation to other rates, but no shipper shall be entitled to 
 recover upon the sole ground that any. particular rate may reflect a proportion of excess 
 income by the carrier to the Commission in the public interest under the provisions of 
 this section. 
 
§608] TRAFFIC LAW SEEVICE 96 
 
 In its animal report to Congress for the year 1921,* the Interstate 
 Commerce Commission made the following report under the subject 
 of "Eate Readjustments:" 
 
 ' ' Perhaps the most difficult task now confronting us, and certainly 
 the one of greatest importance to the public, is the readjusment of 
 freight rates which is necessitated by the changing conditions at- 
 tendant upon the recovery of this country and others from the effects 
 of the world war. 
 
 "During the war, and for some time after the signing of the armi- 
 stice, the constantly rising operating expenses of the railroads made 
 necessary very material increases in rates. It is unnecessary to refer 
 particularly to what may be called minor readjustments, affecting only 
 one or a few commodities in a restricted territory, although many of 
 these resulted in substantial increases. 
 
 "On June 25, 1918, General Order No. 28 of the Director General 
 of Railroads, providing increases in freight rates and passenger fares, 
 certified as necessary in order to defray the expenses of Federal con- 
 trol and operation * * *j became effective. 
 
 "The Congress is familiar with the situation of the railroads at 
 the termination of Federal control, and with the various provisions in 
 the transportation act, 1920, designed to remedy that situation. Among 
 other things, the interstate commerce act was amended by adding a 
 new section, designated section 15a. In this we were directed, in the 
 exercise of our power to prescribe just and reasonable rates, to 'initiate, 
 modify, establish or adjust' rates so that carriers as a whole, or as a 
 whole in each of the rate territories established by us, under honest 
 and efficient management, will earn, as nearly as may be, a fair re- 
 turn upon the aggregate value of the railway property of such carriers 
 devoted to the public use. 
 
 "Following this enactment we instituted a proceeding. Increased 
 Rates, 1920, 58 I. C. C, 220, to determine what rates would be neces- 
 sary to give effect to the intent of Congress. This proceeding was 
 discussed in our last annual report, at pages 6, et seq., and is briefly 
 referred to as pages 7 and 8 of this report. 
 
 ' ' Since that decision was promulgated on July 29, 1920, conditions 
 throughout the country have changed to a marked degree. The gen- 
 eral trend of commodity prices and of labor costs has been downward. 
 
 "We have been confronted with the demands of shippers, on the 
 one hand, for reductions in rates which they allege are excessive and 
 out of all proportion to the fallen values of commodities and which 
 interfere with, or prevent, commodity movement; and, on the other 
 hand, with the fact that the carriers have not been receiving the fair 
 return contemplated by Congress. In this connection, we said in Rates 
 on Grain, Grain Products, and Hay, 64 I. C. C, 85, 99 : 
 
 " 'The purpose of section 15a was undoubtedly to better stabilize the credit of 
 raili-oads, reassure investors, and attract capital to the railroad industry. It Is plainly 
 our duty to do everything in our power to carry out this purpose. The experience 
 of the past 12 months, however, has shown the limitations which surround in actual 
 pn-actiee the operation of this provision of the law. The increases of 1920 were in- 
 tended to give the carriers the specified return, imd no doubt they would have done so 
 If the volume of traflSc had remained normal. Instead, it fell off sharply, and net earn- 
 ings failed by a considerable margin to reach the desired mark. Nevertheless, when it 
 
97 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§608 
 
 became apparent that this would be the case, carriers and shippers alike agreed that it 
 was not our duty, under section 15a, to raise rates to still higher levels. To have done 
 this would clearly have been a vain thing, hannful alike to the country and to the 
 Carriers. The rate adjustment can not with advantage be made dependent upon fluctua- 
 tions in trafBc. 
 
 " 'It is also to be noted that the duty cast upon us by section 15a is a continuing 
 duty and looks to the future. It does not constitute a guaranty to the carriers, nor is the 
 obligation cumulative. We are not restricted by past or present statistics of operation 
 and earnings. These are serviceable only as they illuminate the future. What is con- 
 templated by the law is that in this exercise of our rate-making power the result shall 
 reflect our best judgment as to the basis which may reasonably be expected for the fu- 
 ture to yield the prescribed return.' 
 
 "Many rate readjustments have been made since the increases 
 authorized in Increased Rates, 1920, supra, became effective on August 
 26, 1920. Some were made by the carriers voluntarily, others at our 
 suggestion, and still others under our requirement after formal hear- 
 ing. In some adjustments there were both increases and decreases 
 and in many others only decreases. It is safe to say that at least a 
 million changes in individual rates have been filed with us. The in- 
 creases were made to remove discrepancies in rate adjustments and 
 classifications. The reductions have been material, entailing reductions 
 in carrier revenue of millions of dollars. 
 
 "In Document No. 115, House of Representatives, 67th Congress, 
 1st session, is given a list of some of the more important reductions 
 and readjustments of rates made since August 26, 1920, and it is not 
 deemed desirable to burden this report with a detailed recital of the 
 action taken in this regard. The reductions embrace rates on lumber, 
 grain, hay, raw sugar, canned goods, coal, smelter products, iron ore, 
 iror^, and steel; on range cattle and other live stock; on potatoes and 
 other vegetables; on sand, gravel, and other road-building material; 
 and on other articles of commerce that move in large volume. 
 
 "The value of the service and the cost of transportation are among 
 the important elements to be considered in determining the reason- 
 ableness of freight rates. These elements are, and for some time have 
 been, in a state of flux. As a result, freight rates have not yet reached 
 a condition of equilibrium. ' ' 
 
 See "Railway Finances — Guaranteed Return on Railway Prop- 
 erty," Chapter 55, post. , 
 
 1. Board of Trade of the City of Hampton v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1900), 8 I. 
 C. C. Hep. 503. The following are the more important cases before the Interstate 
 Commerce Commission involving questions of railroad investments : Newland, et al. 
 V. The Northern P. Rd. Co., et al. (1891), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 131, 4 I. C. Rep. 474; 
 Brewster & Hanleiter v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. et al. (1897), 7 I. C. C. Rep. 
 224; Grain Shippers' Assn. of Northwest Iowa v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1899), 8 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 158; Johnson v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. Ry. Co. et al. (1902), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 
 221 ; Mayor and City Council of Wichita, Kansas v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. et al. 
 (1903), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 534; Central Yellow Pine Assn. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. et al. 
 (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 505; Tift v. Southern Ry. Co. et al. (1005), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 
 548; Brabham et al. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. et al. (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 464. 
 Shippers & Receivers' Bureau of Newark v. New York, O. & W. Ry. Co. (1909), 
 IS I. C. C. Rep. 2©4; City of Spokane, Wash, et al. v. Northern P. Ry. Co. et al. 
 (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 376; Traffic Bureau of the Merchants' Exchange of San 
 Francisco, Cal. v. Southern P. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 259; In Re Investiga- 
 tion of Advances in Rates by Carriers in Official Classification Territory (1911), 
 20 I. C. C. Rep. 243; In Re Investigation of Advances in Rates by Carriers in 
 Western Trunk Line, Trans-Missouri, and Illinois Freight Committee Territories. 
 (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 307; Boileau, et al. v. Pittsburgh & L. E. Rd. Co., et al. 
 (1912). 24 I. C. C. Rep. 129. 132; Pittsburgii Vein Operators' Assn. of Ohio v. 
 Pennsylvania Co. et al. (1912). 24 I. C. C. Rep. 280, 285; Arlington Heights Fruit 
 Exchange et al. v. Southern P. Co. et al. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 671, 672; John- 
 son v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. et al. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 698, 701; In the 
 Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 
§608] TRAFFIC LAW SEKVICE 98 
 
 for the Transportation of Live Stock from Points in, the State of New Mexico 
 to Kansas City, Mo., and between other Points, (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 63, 64; 
 Edwards & Bradford Lumber Ck). v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 93, 96; Union Tanning Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. et al. (1912), 25 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 112, 114; Multnomah Lumber & Bo.x Co. et al. v. Southern P. Co. et al. 
 (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 123, 128; North Fork Cannel Coal Co. v. Ann Arbor Rd. 
 Co. et al. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 241, 244; Taylor v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. 
 (1912), 25 I. C. Rep. 613, 615; In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension 
 of Advances in Rates by Carriers for the Transportation of Coal and Coke in 
 Carloads from points on the Louisville & Nashville Rd. to points on the Cleveland, 
 C. C. & St. L. Ry. and other Destinations, (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 20; In the 
 Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 for the Transportation of Coal from the Walsenburg District of Colorado to 
 Stations in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas (1913), 26 I. 0. C. Rep. 85, 88; Hormel 
 V. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. et al. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 112, 114; Union 
 Tanning Co. et al. v. Southern Ry. Co. et al. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 159, 164; In 
 the Matter of the Investigation and Susspension of Advances in Rates for the 
 Transportation of Cypress Lumber Laths and Shingles from Points Located on 
 the New Orleans, T. & M. Rd. to Albany, N. Y., and other Points (1913), 26 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 186, 189; United States v. Wharton & N. Rd. Co. et al. (1913), 26 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 309, 311; May Bros. v. Yazoo & M. V. Rd. Co. et al. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 
 323, 327; Memphis Freight Bureau v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. et al (1912), 26 
 I. C. C. Rep. 402, 405; Standard Mirror Co. et al. v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. et al. 
 (1913), 27 I. C. O. Rep. 200, 208; Traffic Bureau of Nashville v. Louisville & 
 N. Rd. Co. et al (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 533, 535; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
 et al. V. Pittsburgh & L. E. Rd. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rfep. 428, 435; Railroad 
 Commission of the State of Arkansas v. Missouri & N. A. Rd. Co. et al. (1914), 
 30 I. C. C. Rep. 488, 489, 491; Rental Charges for Insulated Cars, (1914), 31 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 255, 257; The Five Per Cent Case (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 351, 412; The Fifteen 
 Per Cent Ca.se (1917), 45 I. C. C. Rep. 303. 
 
 2. Nebraska Rate Case: Smythe v. Ames (1898), 169 U. S. 466, 52 L. Ed. 819, 18 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 418. The following are the most important cases before the United 
 States Courts involving questions of railroad investments : Illinois C. Rd. Co. v, 
 Interstate Commerce Commission (1907), 206 U. S. 441, 51, L. Ed. 1128, 27 Sup, 
 Ct. Rep. 700; Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co. (1909), 212 U. S. 1, 53 L. Ed. 371, 29 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148; Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. (1909), 212 U. S. 19, 29 Sup. Ct 
 Rep. 192, 53 L. Ed. 382; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union P. Rd. Co. (1912). 
 222 U. S. 541, 549, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 108 ; 56 L. Ed. 308 ; Knott v. Chicago B, & Q, 
 Rd. Co. (1913), 230 U. S. 474, 57 L. Ed. 1571, 33 Sup. Ct.' Rep. 975; Manufacturers 
 Ry. Co. V. United States (1918), 246 V. S. 457, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383, 62 L. Ed. 831 
 U. S. Ex. Rel. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1920) 
 64 L. Ed. 517, 252, U. S. 178, 40, Sup. Ct. Rep. 187; Interstate Commerce Com- 
 mission v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co. et al. (1905), 141 Fed. Rep. 1903, affirmed 209 
 U. S. 108, 28, Sup. Ct. Rep. 493 ; Jllssouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. et al. v. Interstate Com- 
 merce Commission (1908), 164 Fed. Rep. 645; St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. v. Hadley 
 et al. (1909), 168 Fed. Rep. 317; Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Love et al. (1910), 
 177 Fed. Rep. 493; Louisville & N. Rd. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Alabama 
 et al. (1912), 196 Fed. Rep. 800; Westel-n Ry. of Alabama v. Railroad Commission of 
 Alabama et al. (1912), 197 Fed. Rep. 954: Montana, W. & S. Rd. Co. v. Morley et al. 
 (1912), 198 Fed. Rep. 991; Louisville & N. Rd. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Ala- 
 bama (1912), 196 Fed. Rep. 800; same case; Louisville & N. Rd. Co. v. Railroad 
 Commission of Alabama (1913), 205 Fed. Hep. 800; Louisville & N. Rd. Co. v. Rait 
 road Commission of Alabama (1913), 208 Fed. Rep. 35; South and North Alabama 
 Rd. Co. V. Railroad Commission of Alabama (1913), 210 Fed. Rep. 465. 
 
 3. In Re Rates and Practices of Mobile & O. Rd. Co. (1903), 9 I. O. C. Rep. 373; 
 affirmed. Central Yellow Pine Assn. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1905), 10 I. C C. 
 
 Rep. 505. 
 
 4. 35th Annual Report of I. C. C. (1921), p. 5, et seq. 
 
 608-Y. Rates on damaged, second-hand, and used articles. 
 
 In several cases the Commission has found that it would be diffi- 
 cult, without affording an easy and convenient means for misbilling 
 and discrimination, and impracticable, to establish ratings on dam- 
 aged, used, or second-hand articles different from those on like arti- 
 cles new.^ 
 
 See "New and second-hand articles," Section 507, ante. 
 
 1. Carnie-Goudle Mfg. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1922), 68 I. C C. Rep. 
 
 40, 42, citing, Hirsch & Sons Iron & Rail Co. v.. Washington, B. & A E Rd Co. 
 
 (1913), 26 T. C. C. Rep. 480; Danciger v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry Co (1914) 
 
 20 L C. C. Rep. 99. v^a^t;, 
 
99 FREIGHT EATES AXD CHARGES [§609 
 
 609. Reasonableness of freight rates. 
 
 609-A. Reasonableness of rates generally 
 
 The mandate of the statute is that all rates must be just and 
 reasonable, but how the reasonableness and justice of the rate are to 
 be determined is not prescribed by the statute, nor has any satisfactory 
 test been evolved by transportation experts. Conflicts about rates arise 
 from conflicting interests of carriers and shippers. As carriers make 
 their own rates, they have primary regard for their own interests, and 
 often give less weight than they ought to the interests of those they 
 serve. This is more frequently the case in the absence of competition. 
 Under the stress of competition, or sometimes for the purpose of de- 
 veloping business, rates that are equitable or even very low are likely 
 to be made. But when a controversy arises between the public and a 
 carrier, the question of the reasonable limit of a rate usually involves 
 many considerations, and is often difficult to determine. A rate that 
 might be regarded as reasonable and just by a producer and shipper, 
 might, from a carrier's standpoint, be deemed extremely unreasonable, 
 and unjust, and so, conversely, a rate that a carrier might claim 
 to be reasonable in itself, and that it might support with strong 
 reasons based upon the cost of the service, the quantity of the business 
 and the characteristics of its line of road, might exhaust the greater 
 part of the proceeds of the producer's commodity and be destructive 
 to its interests. It is only stating a truism, therefore, to say there is 
 no recognized test of a rate mutually reasonable for a carrier and for 
 the producer of a trafiSp.^ 
 
 While, in making rates, railroad companies have a just right to 
 insist that their interests and those of their stockholders shall be con- 
 sidered, the just claims of the public and the relative rights of com- 
 munities, must also be taken into account and protected.'' Carriers 
 are not permitted in making their rates to regard only their own in- 
 terests but must respect the interests of those who may have occasion 
 to employ their services, and subordinate their own interests to the 
 rules of relative equality and justice which the Act prescribes.^ 
 
 The reasonableness of any rate must consequently be ascertained 
 in every instance in which the question arises, by its relations both to 
 the carrier and to the shipper, and by comparison with rates normally 
 charged for like or similar service.* 
 
 Every question as to the reasonableness of a rate may present 
 itself in two aspects. First, is the rate reasonable estimated by the 
 cost and value of the service, and as compared with other commodities ; 
 second, is it reasonble in the absolute, regarded more clearly as a tax 
 laid upon the people who ultimately pay it?^ 
 
 The question of the reasonableness of a rate on a single article of 
 traffic is one of almost insuperable difficulty. The carrier is entitled to 
 earn a fair return upon the value of that which it employs for the pub- 
 lic convenience. But the value of the entire property of the road sheds 
 but little light on the question whether the rate on a single article yields 
 its proper proportion of a fair return on that value. Thus the rate on 
 one article of traffic may be unreasonably low and the returns to the 
 
§609] TKAFFIC LAW SERVICE 100 
 
 carrier from its entire business reasonably high. The deficiency under 
 the rate on the single article being made up by the rates on other 
 traffic. It follows that the reasonableness of the rate on a single article 
 can only be determined by the proper tribunal upon the whole exer- 
 cise of its best judgment in view of the value, volume, and other char- 
 acteristics affecting the transportation of the particular article.* 
 
 Grreat weight should be given to the opinion of expert witnesses; 
 the effect of the rates on the growth and prosperity of the places to 
 and from which they are charged; the cost of transportation as com- 
 pared with the rates ; and the rates in force at numerous other places 
 where the circumstances are as nearly similar as may be to those pre- 
 vailing at the point in question.'^ 
 
 There is a wide difference in the character of testimony required 
 to test the reasonableness of an entire schedule of rates covering the 
 whole traffic of a particular carrier and that required to test the reason- 
 ableness of a rate on a particular commodity between two definite 
 points. Whether an attack upon an entire schedule of rates is well 
 founded or not is to be determined largely by ascertaining whether 
 the gross amount of traffic carried on those rates affords the carrier, 
 above its operating expenses and taxes, a reasonable return upon the 
 fair value of its property.' 
 
 In Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Director General, Ann Arhor 
 Rd. Co.^ the Commission stated: "While the shipper is entitled to a 
 reasonable rate the carrier is at the same time entitled to a reasonable 
 return.' Carriers are entitled to reasonable rates for the service they 
 render even though those rates may be such, that shippers cannot do 
 business at a profit. Railroad Commissioners of Florida v. Southern 
 Express Co, 28 I. C. C. 634, 635. Commercial advantages and disad- 
 vantages are not factors that can have any great consideration by us 
 in reaching conclusions as to the propriety of rate structures. Illinois 
 Coal Cases, 32 I. C. C, 659, 680." 
 
 1. Delaware State Grange v. New York P. & N. Rd. Co. (1S91), 3 I. C. Rep. 554, 4 I. C. 
 C. Rep. 588. Carriers ordered to reduce to a specified amount tlie rates on fruits 
 and vegetables and other perishable freight from Delaware and Maryland to Jersey 
 City, N. J., and Philadelphia, Pa., on the ground that existing rates were unreason- 
 able. Interstate Commerce Commission v. New York P. & N. Rd. Co. (C. C. E. D. 
 Va. ) . Not reported. Commission's orders held to be invalid. No appeal. See 
 Seventh Annual Report, p. 29; Senate Hearings, Committee on Interstate Commerce, 
 1904-5, Volume 5, p. 312. 
 
 2. Interstate Commerce Commission v. East Tennessee V. & G. Ry. Co. (1898), 85 Fed. 
 Rep. 107, 112. 
 
 3. Freight Bureau of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (1894), 6 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 195, 245, 4 I. C. Rep. 592. 
 
 4. Delaware State Grange v. New York P. & N. Rd. Co. supra. 
 
 5. In Re Proposed Advances in Freight Rates (1903), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 382, 401. 
 
 6. Central Yellow Pine Assn. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 505. 
 
 7. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Southern Ry. Co. (1902), 117 Fed. Rep. 741; 
 affirmed. Interstate Comm.erce Commission v. Southern Ry. Co. (1903), 122 Fed. 
 Rep. 800, 60 C. C. A. 540. Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals 
 dismissed. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Southern Rv. Co. (1904), 195 
 U. S. 639, 49 L. Ed. 356, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 790. 
 
 8. Frye & Bruhn, Inc. v. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 501, 507; cited, 
 The Alaska Investigation (1917), 44 I. C. C. Rep. 680, 693. 
 
 9. Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Director General. Ann Arbor Rd. Co. (1920), 57 
 I. C. C. Rep. 723, 732. 
 
 609-B. Bates and kebates. 
 
 In Western Advance Rate Case'- the Interstate Commerce Commis- 
 sion said: "Having in mind the theory presented by Mr. Ripley and 
 others as to the value of the service to the shipper being the controlling 
 
101 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 factor in the determination of a reasonable rate, let ns regard the sig- 
 nificance of the specific problem presented in this case. Here we have 
 a number of commodities which were given special rates by the carriers 
 at a time anterior to the period of regulation of rates — rates which 
 are lower than the class rates applicable to such commodities. The 
 extension of preference to these commodities M^as made when carriers 
 were proceeding upon the value-of-service theory and when there was 
 a real competition between carriers, at least in this, that the carriers bid 
 against each other for the business by giving a percentage off the pub- 
 lished rate — a rebate. To what extent this practice obtained as to those 
 particular rates does not appear, but the record clearly shows that 
 rates between Chicago and the Missouri River were deeply cut as to the 
 higher classes. The general rebate on first-class traffic between the 
 Atlantic Seaboard and Kansas City, for instance, was 40 per cent. 
 This rebate is not cited as sporadic; such deduction was given to all 
 the largest shippers of this character of traffic. And yet, be it paren- 
 thetically said, after those rebates were cut off and the full rate ex- 
 acted, and this Commission made a reduction of about 6 per cent in this 
 rate on complaint of shippers, the carriers appealed to the courts, 
 and throughout almost the entire life of our order the courts by in- 
 junction maintained in effect the higher rates, which the carriers them- 
 selves had never exacted, excepting for the unknowing or smaller ship- 
 pers. 
 
 " It is not to be thought, however, that such a rebate as 40 per cent 
 on all classes of traffic was general. The lower classes were subject 
 to a less reduction and the commodity rates were themselves too often 
 rebates. We have the word of no less an authority than Mr. Stickney, 
 the late president of the Chicago Great Western, to this effect, and 
 this suggestion is made by all the traffic men appearing in this inquiry. 
 
 "We then find this situation existing — a body of class rates which 
 were applied where no bargain was made between shipper and car- 
 rier, but always subject, as to competitive business, to a reduction 
 sufficient to secure the traffic. Supplementing these rebated class rates 
 the convenient commodity rate served as a vehicle for the preference 
 desired. These rates varied from time to time. They were unstable 
 because they were 'made to get the business.' The carriers did not 
 give them voluntarily — that is, out of any goodness of heart — but 
 rivalry between carriers made each road vie with its competitor in the 
 volume of traffic secured, for every ton carried above the most uncer- 
 tain minimum was profitable. It may have been that a sense of pro- 
 priety, of ' decency, ' had something to do in the establishment of these 
 commodity rates; that there was a feeling in the traffic manager's 
 mind that the class rates were too high in themselves to be justifiable, 
 and while admittedly they might be had from the unwary and infre- 
 quent shipper, it was unjust to exact them from regular patrons. Be 
 that as it may, however, we have the testimony of one of the best- 
 informed authorities that from 3 to 5 per cent of the total gross freight 
 earnings of these carriers were returned to the shippers as rebates. 
 In a territory, where freight earnings ran into the hundreds of nail- 
 lions each year, even so conservative an estimate as 3 per cent makes 
 evident how real the reduction in the rates which the great industries 
 and jobbers paid. This was saved to the carriers when the Elkins 
 law became enforceable, and was enforced; and all these rebates 'came 
 
§609] TKAFFIC LAW SEKVICE 102 
 
 out of the net.' Here then was a raising of rates to many shippers and 
 a Consequent increase in the net revenues of the railroads. An era of 
 reflation had come; the carriers were to be saved from a devouring 
 competition which put them in good times at the mercy of the most 
 insidious traffic buyer and in the worst of times brought peril of jrate 
 wars, which led down a steep path to the federal court and the railroad 
 receiver. In all the criticism of federal regulation — its implied ab- 
 surdity as against inspired individual regulation — to which we have 
 listened in this case, no one of the railroad men has spoken with de- 
 served appreciation of the rich harvest that the railroads have reaped 
 from the enactment and enforcement of the laws against preferential 
 rates and individual discriminations. With the whole force of the 
 Grovernment behind them the carriers have laid a burden upon the 
 shippers — and they are loath to pay tribute to the power which has 
 saved them from themselves. 
 
 "The rebate from the published rate became unfashionable; it 
 was discredited by law, and railroa:d society regarded it askance. But 
 the rates were still to be made by traffic managers who sat together 
 in conference and 'competed with each other across a table.' This 
 gave it into the hands of the most considerate of traffic men to say 
 what the rate should be ; for all must do as one insisted he would do. 
 The day of open 'scalping' of rates had passed, but the shipper who 
 for 20 years had marketed his commodity upon a more or less fixed 
 variant from the published 6harge was full of protest and perhaps of 
 threat. To meet this situation the commodity rate was always avail- 
 able. And where class rates had not been exacted in full, a commodity 
 rate could be made to care for the shipper's demands and perhaps 
 his needs. So we find many new commodity rates put into effect after 
 the Elkins Act, which represented the existing and actual rate as 
 distinguished from the paper or published rate. An effort was made 
 also to raise existing commodity rates to a higher level — toward the 
 class scale. But there was still left sufficient of vitality in the shipper 
 to compel a retreat in many of these raises. The era of competition 
 between carriers had not altogether closed; it could not end so long 
 as shippers had it in their power to route shipments as they chose 
 and the pooling of freights remained under the ban of the law. So 
 the effort to bring up the commodities of lesser volume to a higher level 
 of rates was abandoned, or at least deferred. These are the commodi- 
 ties involved in this case, on which the carriers sought to raise the 
 rates in 1905, but soon retreated to present figures. They now pro- 
 pose new rates, approximating those of 1905. 
 
 "It takes little imagination to draw a parallel between this pic- 
 ture and that which England saw, and to which we have earlier re- 
 ferred, when upon the enactment of the maximum rate law by the 
 British Parliament the British carriers were no less slow than their 
 American brethren to raise their rates. 'If we are to have regulation,' 
 said both sides of the ocean, 'we will secure its full benefits.' And 
 there soon followed in America as in England legislative restrictions 
 upon such action. Human nature, in the railroad offices of England 
 and of America, and in the legislatures of both countries, is much the 
 same, and follows along easily traceable lines of identity." 
 
 1. In Re Investigation of Advances in Rates by Carriers in Western Trunk Lines 
 Trans-Missouri and Illinois Freight Committee Territories QOll), ''0 I C C Ren 
 307, 351 et seq. ■ ^. v.. liey. 
 

 /f- 
 
 'ft .'-.''• 
 
 103 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§609^ / ^*/.' 
 
 609-C. Mandate of statute that transportation charges be just '-"'';_ 
 
 AND REASONABLE 
 
 Section 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act {as amended February 
 28, 1920), after defining the term "transportation" to include loco- 
 motives, cars, and other vehicles, vessels, and all instrumentalities 
 and facilities of carriage, irrespective of ownership, or of any contract, 
 express of implied, for the use thereof, and all services in connection 
 with the receipt, delivery, elevation, and transfer in transit, ventila- 
 tion, refrigeration or icing, storing, and handling of property trans- 
 ported declares that all charges made for any service rendered or to 
 be rendered in the transportation of property, or in connection there- 
 with shall be just and reasonable and that every unjust and unreason- 
 able charge for such service or any part thereof is prohibited and de- 
 clared to be unlawful.^ 
 
 To afford an effective means for redressing wrongs resulting from 
 unjust discrimination and undue preference was among the principal 
 purposes of the Act, and the mpans by which those purposes were to 
 be accomplished was the placing upon all carriers the positive duty of 
 establishing schedules of reasonable rates which should have a uniform 
 application to all, and which should not be departed from so long as 
 the established schedules remain unaltered in the manner provided by 
 law.^ 
 
 This provision, insofar as it inhibits carriers from the imposition 
 of unjust and unreasonable rates, is an express adoption by Congress 
 of the principles of the common law.^ Where a carrier promulgates 
 a schedule of rates, it acts under the mandate of the Act and the com- 
 mon law that all rates must be fair and reasonable, and subject to 
 the rule that it will be liable for an action in damages subject by the 
 shipper due to any unreasonable exaction.* 
 
 1. Section 1 (5) Interstate Commerce Act. 
 
 2. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. (1907), 204 U. S. 428, 439, 27 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 350, 51 L. Ed. 553; reversing, (Tex. Civ. App.) 85 S. W. 1052. 
 
 3. Tift V. Southern Ry. Co. (1903), 123 Fed. Rep. 789; affirmed, Tift v. Soutliern Ry. 
 Co. (1905), 138 Fed. Rep. 753; affirmed. Southern Ey. Co. v. Tift (1907), 206 U. S. 
 428, 51 L. Ed. 1124, 27 iSup. Ct. Rep. 709. 
 
 4. Southern P. Co. v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. (1900), 101 Fed. Rep. 779, 42 C. C. 
 A. 12. 
 
 609-D. Meaning of the terms "just" and "reasonable." 
 
 The words "reasonable" and "just," as used in the Statute as 
 applied to rates, are each relative terms. They do not mean to imply 
 that the rates upon every railroad engaged in interstate commerce 
 shall be the same or even about the same. The conditions and circum- 
 stances of each road surrounding the traffic and which enter into and 
 control the nature and character of the service performed by the car- 
 rier in the transportation of property, such as the cost of transporta- 
 tion, which involves volume or lightness of traffic, expenses of con- 
 struction and of operation, competition in some respects of carriers, 
 rates made by shorter and competing lines to the same points of des- 
 tination, space occupied by freight, value of freight and risk of car- 
 riage to carrier, all have to be considered in determining whether a 
 ^.^iven rate is "reasonable" and "just." 
 
§609] TEAFFIC LAW SERVICE 104 
 
 The standard of the law by which the validity of any rate as 
 effected by its amount is determined, is not more definite than that 
 it must be just and reasonable. The test of reasonableness can be 
 implied only by reference to and upon consideration of all pertinent 
 facts, circumstances, and conditions aflfecting the rate in effect at any 
 particular time. In the nature of the case there can be no rule or 
 process whereby the definite absolute maximum limit of reasonable- 
 ness in the amount of a rate can be fixed with the certainty of a demon- 
 stration.^ 
 
 A' just and reasonable rate must be one which respects alike the 
 carrier's deserts and the character of the traffic. It cannot be a rate 
 that takes from the carrier a profit and thus favors the shipper at the 
 carrier's expense, nor is it one which compels the shipper to yield 
 for the transportation given a sum disproportionate either to the service 
 given by the carrier or to the service rendered to the shipper. The 
 words "just and reasonable" imply the application of good judgment 
 and fairness, of common sense and a sense of justice to a given condi- 
 tion of facts. They are not fixed, unalterable, mathematical terms. 
 Their meaning implies the exercise of judgment, and against the im- 
 proper exercise of that judgment the Constitution gives protection, at 
 least as far as the carriers are concerned.^ 
 
 To be just and reasonable, within the meaning of the constitu- 
 tional guaranty, the rates must be prescribed with reasonable regard 
 for the cost to the carrier of the service' rendered and for the value of 
 the property employed therein ; but this does not mean that regard is to 
 be had only for the interests of the carrier, or that the rates must 
 necessarily be such as to render its business profitable, for reasonable 
 regard must also be had for the value of the service to the public. And 
 where the cost to the carrier is not kept within reasonable limits or 
 y?^here for any reason its business cannot reasonably be so conducted 
 as to render it profitable, the misfortune must fall upon the carrier, 
 as would be the case if it were engaged in any other line of business.* 
 
 Tested by these rules, a rate may be a very reasonable and just 
 rate on one railroad and not reasonable and just on another. For 
 example, a rate that would be reasonable and just on the New York 
 Central & Hudson River Railroad may be so low that it would force 
 the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway into bankruptcy in less than 
 thirty days; and a rate that might be reasonable and just on the 
 Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway might be so high that if attempted to 
 be enforced on the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad for 
 thirty days, it would practically destroy the business of the latter. 
 This diversity is most observable in the different portions of the 
 country, as, for instance, between lines of railroad in the Southern 
 States or the States of the far West, on the one hand, and the railroad 
 lines of the Middle and Eastern States on the other. Where, however, 
 railroad lines reach the same common points, are located in the same 
 territory, and compete with each other, as well as with other lines, for 
 the business of that territory, their rates are, in general, much the 
 same, and this is one of the necessities of the situation. Even among 
 the rail carriers where there is no opposing water competition there 
 may be occasional differences in rates that will be found substantially 
 justified by the different circumstances and conditions under which the 
 lines are operated." 
 
105 FEEIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 A reasonable rate, therefore, is one that will make just and fair 
 return to the carrier when it is charged to all who are to pay it with- 
 out unjust discrimination against any, and when the revenue it pro- 
 duces is subject to no improper reduction/ 
 
 a. New Orleans Cotton Exchange v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1890), 3 I. C. C. Rep. 534, 
 2 I. C. Rep. 777. 
 
 2. Anadarko Cotton Oil Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1910), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 
 43, 49. 
 
 3. In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advices in Rates for Trans- 
 portation of Coal by the Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. et al, and Their Connections 
 (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 604, 624. 
 
 4. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1908), 164 Fed. Rept 
 645, 648. 
 
 5. New Orleans Cotton Exchange v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. supra. 
 
 6. Fourth Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission (1890), 
 
 The question of the reasonableness of a rate is one of fact.^ That 
 is, facts as they exist when it is sought to put such rate schedule into 
 operation.^ 
 
 1. Illinois C. Rd. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1907), 206 XJ. S. 441, 51 
 L. Ed. 1128, 27 Sup. Ct Rep. 700. 
 
 2. Smyth v. Ames (1897), 171 U. S. 361, 43. L. Ed. 197, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. S88. 
 
 609-F. Just and reasonable transportation regulations and prac- 
 tices REQUIRED TO BE ESTABLISHED BY CARRIERS. 
 
 Section 1 (6) of the Interstate Commerce Act (as amended Juhj 
 18, 1910), provides as follows : 
 
 It is hereby made the duty of all common carriers subject to the provision of this 
 Act to establish, observe and enforce * * * just and reasonable regulations and 
 practices affecting classifications, rates, or tariffs, the issuance, form, and substance of 
 tickets, receipts, and bills of lading, the manner and method of presenting, marketing, 
 packing, and delivery of property for transportation, the facilities for transportation, 
 the carrying of personal, sample, and excess baggage, and all other matters relating to 
 or connected with the receiving, handling, transporting, storing, and delivery of prop- 
 erty subject to the provisions of this Act which may be necessary or proper to secure 
 the safe and prompt receipt, handling, transport, and delivery of property subject ta 
 the provisions of this Act upon just and reasonable terms, and every unjust and un- 
 reasonable classification, regulation and practice is prohibited and declared t6 be 
 unlawful. 
 
 609-G. Enforcement of rules and regulations not shown in pub- 
 lished TARIFF AS affecting THE REASONABLENESS OF THE 
 RATE. 
 
 Section 6 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act after making it the 
 duty of every common carrier subject to its provisions, to print, file, 
 and keep open to public inspection, schedule showing all the rates 
 and charges for transportation in which it is engaged, provides as 
 follows : 
 
 The schedules printed as aforesaid by such common carrier shall plainly state the 
 places between which property » * • will be carried, and shall contain the classi- 
 fication of freight in force, and shall also statd separately all tenninal charges, storage 
 charges, icing charges, and all other charges which the Commission may require, all 
 privileges or facilities granted or allowed, and any rules and regulations which in any- 
 wise change, affect, or determine any part or the aggregate of such aforesaid rates, 
 * * * and charges, or the value of the service rendered to the • * * shipper, or 
 consignee. 
 
 The main purpose of this provision is to prevent unjust discrim- 
 ination between shippers by making it possible for them to readily 
 ascertain from the tariffs just what aggregate charges are to be as- 
 sessed, and the law is specific to the effect that carriers shall not 
 
§609] TEAPFIC LAW SERVICE 106 
 
 demand "a greater or less or different compensation than tlie rates 
 and charges specified in the tariff filed and in effect at the time. ' '^ 
 
 In the case of Voorhees v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co.- the complainant 
 shipped six carloads of cabbage from St. Andrews, S. C, to New York 
 City, for the transportation of which the defendants charged their 
 less-than-carload rate, because the initial carrier performed the load- 
 ing service; Held, That these shipments having jjeen offered in car- 
 load quantities were entitled to the published carload rate, and in the 
 absence of specific tariff provisions no additional charge could be 
 lawfully collected from complainant to cover the loading service per- 
 formed by the railroad company.* 
 
 A rule providing who shall load and unload the freight trans- 
 ported (i. e., whether the shipper or carrier), directly affects the rate, 
 since it determines the value -of the service to the shipper.* 
 
 1. Voorhees v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 42. 
 
 2. Ibid. 
 
 3. Ibid. 
 
 4. Wholesale Fruit & Produce Assn. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. 
 Bep. 410. 
 
 609-H. Freight rates to be on a basis that wii^l yield an aggregate 
 
 ANNUAL NET OPERATING INCOME EQUAL, AS NEARLY AS MAY BE, 
 TO A FAIR RETURN UPON THE AGGREGATE VALUE OF THE RAIL- 
 WAY PROPERTY OF THE CARRIER HELD FOR AND USED IN THE 
 SERVICE OF TRANSPORTATION. 
 
 See J 'Railway Finances — Guaranteed Return on Railway Prop- 
 erty," Chapter 55, post, and, "Aggregate value of the railway prop- 
 erty of the carrier held for and used in the service of transportation," 
 Section 608-X, ante. 
 
 609-1. A RATE, REASONABLE per Se, MAY BE UNLAWFULL ON OTHER 
 
 GROUNDS. 
 
 The fact that a rate is per se reasonable does not prove that it 
 may not be unlawful on other grounds. If rates are relatively unjust 
 so that undue preference accrues under them to one person or locality, 
 or an undue prejudice results to another person or locality, the law is 
 violated, although the higher rates are not in themselves unreason- 
 able.i 
 
 The duty to prove that a certain rate is reasonable per se includes 
 the duty to prove that it is relatively reasonable, i. e., that it does 
 not operate to unjustly discriminate.^ 
 
 In the Matter of Chicago, St. P. S K. C. R. Co.^ Chairman Cooley, 
 in delivering the opinion of the Commission, said: "The Commission 
 is of the opinion that the phrase, 'Rates reasonable in and of them- 
 selves,' which is often made use of in similar cases to the present, is 
 very likely to be misleading. It is a phrase which seems to imply that 
 the particular rates may be considered by themselves as if they were 
 and could be affected by no others. ■^ * * g^t it is not the theory 
 of the Act to 'Regulate Commerce that the reasonableness of rates can 
 thus be separately and independently determined. On the contrary, 
 it is assumed in the Act that persons, corporations and localities are 
 
107 FREIGHT KATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 interested not only in the rates charged to them, but in the rates which 
 are charged to others also and, while the Act does not require all rates 
 to be proportional, it nevertheless makes the element of proportion 
 an important one when the rates for any locality are to be determined. 
 No rates can therefore be reasonable in and of themselves within the 
 contemplation of the Act which are made regardless of proportion." 
 
 1. Bennett & Son v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. (1916), 38 I. C. C. Rep. 310, 313; Through 
 Rates to Points in Louisiana and Texas (1916), 38 I. C. C. Rep. 153, 162; citing, 
 Board of Trade of Lynchburg v. Dominion S. S. Co., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 632; Lumber- 
 men's Exchange of St. Louis v. Anderson & S. R. Bd. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 
 220; Transcontinental Commo^ty Rates (1914), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 449. 
 
 2. San Jose Chamber of Commerce v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1914), 32 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 449, 452; cited in Drain Tile from Illinois Points (1915), 35 I. C. C. Rep. 
 83, 85. 
 
 3. In the Matter of Chicago, St. P. & K. C. Ry. Co. (188S), 2 I. C. Rep. 137. 
 
 609-J. The reasonable bate and cost of SEB\^CE. 
 
 In Western Advance Rate Case} the Interstate Commerce Com- 
 mission stated : ' ' Thus we return to the question. What is the reason- 
 able rate that shall be charged to the shipper? The legislature may 
 not make rates so as to confiscate the carrier's property. The carrier, 
 on the other hand, may not make rates which are unjust to those who 
 by economic necessity are compelled to employ its services. Here, 
 then, we have the minimum of legislative power and the maximum of 
 the carrier's power. Between these lies a zone, indefinite and variable. 
 Without question the carrier will tend toward the maximum, while 
 governmental authority will be inclined — in fact, has been created — 
 to repress this upward tendency. One moves inevitably upward to the 
 highest rate which the traffic will bear ; the other attempts to discover 
 some relation between charge for service and cost of service. 
 
 ' ' The present record is full of contrasts between these two lines of 
 tendency. The carriers, for instance, gave the following as their full 
 justification as to the reasonableness of each and all of the proposed 
 advanced rates in and of themselves: 'in making up the tariff,' said 
 the vice president of the Burlington road (and all other carriers 
 adopted this testimony as their own), 'we considered each individual 
 item, and we made no increase which in our judgment would materially 
 affect the movement of the business or place an undue burden on the 
 traffic. I think that the present rates were originally established to 
 meet in many cases conditions that no longer exist, and that the same 
 necessity from a commercial standpoint does not exist now as did 
 when the rates were originally established, and that as a rule the 
 value of the commodity is greater, and the shipper and consignee are 
 both better able to pay approximately the same rate to-day than they 
 were to pay these special commodity rates when they were originally 
 established. We, as I have stated, advanced no rate beyond a figure 
 which in our judgment it could stand and freely move. ' A full hearing 
 was extended to all carriers as to the reasonableness from its stand- 
 point of each rate involved, with no further result than this one 
 answer. 
 
 "The Supreme Court has said that one of the elements which 
 should be given consideration in the establishment of a reasonable 
 rate was the cost of the service, Smyth v. Ames, supra, but this is 
 regarded by railroad men as an almost negligible factor. 
 
§609] TKAFFIC LAW SERVICE 108 
 
 <( 
 
 'I think,' said Mr. Eipley, "that the cost of service is only one 
 of the items to be considered in the making of a reasonable rate, and 
 not a very important item at that — either the cost of service or the 
 returns made on capital. I think that while they may be considered 
 imder certain conditions they are remote.' And again, 'I think that 
 the cost of the service has very little consideration in the making of 
 rates. Bates are made without a consciousness on the part of the 
 carrier's agent of the return that these rates will bring,' 
 
 "This is the purport of more of Mr. Eipley 's testimony, and it is 
 to be remembered in this connection that Mr. Ripley's experience as 
 a traffic manager has extended from the Atlantic to the Pacific coast 
 and over several great systems of railroad. 'The maker of the rate,' 
 he says, 'in the first instance must make the rate such as to permit 
 of the freest intercourse and the freest interchange of commodities in 
 the country, regardless of capital, regardless of cost — almost regard- 
 less of cost, but entirely regardless of capital.' Then being asked as 
 to whether the Commission should make rates after this railroad 
 fashion, he said, 'I think they (the Commission) should consider the 
 value of service first and foremost and leave the cost and the value 
 of the properties to altogether secondary consideration.' He was 
 asked if he had said that the making of freight rates 'has not, never 
 did have, never will have, never ought to have, any relation to the 
 capitalization of the railroads,' to which he replied that this was a 
 correct expression of his views. 
 
 "Discarding the elements of cost and capitalization, he was asked 
 to define a reasonable rate, and replied that it was one that the traffic 
 would bear, 'and the amount that the traffic would bear,' he said, 'is 
 that amount of charge at which it will most freely move over the lines 
 of transportation.' This definition he again repeated when he was 
 asked if the phrase 'what the traffic will bear' meant the rate at which 
 the commodities would 'most freely move over the lines of the car- 
 rier,' to which he replied, 'I will qualify that by saying, "What the 
 traffic will bear and still move most freely and enable the products 
 and the manufactures of one part of the country to be used to the 
 utmost possible extent in the other. ' ' ' 
 
 "This is the latest, the most modern, and most liberal definition 
 of this much-abused phrase. Indeed, it is so liberal that it is imprac- 
 ticable unless properly qualified. Mr. Ripley would not have us under- 
 stand that a railroad is an eleemosynary institution. To say that a 
 reasonable rate is one under which the traffic will most freely move 
 is to say that is the rate which casts the least burden upon the 
 shipper. The rate that will carry the traffic farthest for the smallest 
 amount of money— the lowest possible rate. But all of the time there 
 is present in the mind the necessity of securing out of all of such rates 
 not only the cost of transportation, which Mr. Ripley regards as negli- 
 gible, but an adequate return upon the value of the property used. 
 While this definition, therefore, sounds to the ear most philanthropic, it 
 was doubtless not intended to convey any more subtle or philosophic 
 meaning than this : That an individual rate should not be made with 
 reference to the cost of the service to the railroad, nor should it be 
 made with regard to the return which it would yield to" the capital 
 invested in the plant. It sould be made so low that as great a body 
 
109 FEEIGHT BATES AND CHAKGES [§609 
 
 as possible of that character of traffic should move, but all the time 
 there must be borne in mind the fact that out of its aggregate rates 
 the property must be made to pay. This is the American system of 
 railroad rate making. 
 
 " 'What the traffic will bear' may mean 'all that the traffic will 
 bear.' If it means that the rate must be measured by the amount 
 that the shipper is willing to pay under necessity, it is extortion. On 
 the other hand it may mean the least return for which the carrier can 
 afford to transport the traffic. This theory of rate making seems to be 
 that there is a certain amount of traffic which is to be moved, or which 
 can be moved; that the rate should not be so high as to prevent any 
 of this traffic from moving, nor should it be a lower amount than the 
 carrier can obtain and still permit the freest possible movement. Such 
 definition apparently makes the rate entirely a matter of judgment 
 as to which there may be error. And, carried to its last degree, it per- 
 mits indefinite discrimination between individuals, as well as between 
 communitties, for if the rate is to be made so as to permit the freest 
 possible movement one shipper may not be able to extend his market 
 at the rate given to another. Therefore, he is entitled to a rebate. 
 And the more distant conununity may not be able to compete with the 
 nearer community for a common market. And therefore it is entitled 
 to a lower rate than its more advantageously situated competitor. 
 The experience of the commercial world led to the enactment of the 
 act to regulate commerce which interfered with the full apjplication 
 of this theory, and we, of course, assume that Mr. Eipley stated his 
 principle of rate making, not only with the limitation we have already 
 noted — that rates were to be made so that, as a whole, they yielded 
 adequate return to the carrier — but with the further limitation that 
 they must be subject to the prohibitions of the law. Manifestly, un- 
 der this principle all that stands between the shipper and extortion 
 is the wisdom and the good sense of the traffic manager who makes 
 the rates. If, in his judgment, it is advisable to carry a small volume 
 of traffic upon a higher rate, rather than a large volume of traffic 
 upon a low rate, there is nothing to interfere with this decision, and 
 all the consequences affecting the country at large, excepting now the 
 right of appeal to the Government as represented in this Commission. 
 
 "Bates being made upon this theory, the function of the traffic 
 manager is that of a statesman; he determines zones of production 
 and consumption, the profits of the producer and the cost to the con- 
 sumer; he makes his rates, if he so pleases, to offset and nullify the 
 effect of import duties and determine the extent and character of 
 our foreign markets. 
 
 "To make rates for transportation based solely upon the ability 
 of the shipper to pay those rates is to make the charge for trans- 
 portation depend upon the cost of production rather than upon the 
 cost of carriage to measure a public service by the economies prac- 
 ticed by the private shipper. This necessarily gives to the carrier the 
 right to measure the amount of profit which the shipper may make 
 and fix its rate upon the traffic manager's judgment as to what profit 
 he will be permitted. This theory entitles the railroad to enter the 
 books of every enterprise which it serves and raise or lower rates 
 without respect to its own earnings but solely with respect to the earn- 
 
§609] XRAFFIG LAW SERVICE 110 
 
 ings of those whose traffic it carries. This is not regulation of rail- 
 roads by the nation, but regulation of the industries and commerce 
 of the country by its railroads. 
 
 "That nothing stands in the way of extortion excepting the fair- 
 mindedness of the railroad traffic manager is illustrated in this case 
 by the examination of the traffic manager of one of the leading roads. 
 He was asked why the present first class rate from Chicago to Kansas 
 City should not be raised from 80 cents to $2.40, and corresponding 
 increase of 200 per cent made upon all the other class and commodity 
 rates. His first answer was that some of the commodities would not 
 move under such increased rates. Being told to assume that class 
 traffic at such rate would move, his answer was : 
 
 " 'The business conditions have adjusted themselves to the 80-cent rate. It would 
 be a wrench to ask any 300 per cent raise on that 80-cent rate, and having existed on 
 that 80-cent rate, we do not need 300 per cent of that 80-cent rate to continue to exist. 
 We do not waht to see any wrench in commercial conditions. We would ask, "Is it de- 
 cent and fair and proper," and these considerations would appeal to us.' 
 
 "Being asked, further, to assume that one man owned all of the 
 roads in that territory, could you give any reason why rates should 
 not all be raised to the class basis, or increase them 200 per cent, the 
 traffic manager answered : 
 
 " 'Yes, because the advance would be too great of itself. It would be a shock to my 
 sense of propriety — a shock to my sense of justice.' 
 
 "And that was the ultimate word. Rates are no higher than they 
 are, not because there is any maximum standard based upon the cost 
 of service or the return to the carrier, but because to increase them 
 would not be 'fair or decent or proper' — in short, would not appeal to 
 the conscience of the traffic manager. And this same witness was un- 
 willing to acknowledge that his judgment of what was proper, reason- 
 able, or just should be subject to review by this Commission or by 
 any other tribunal — a position which may fairly be characterized as 
 a modern extension of the ancient principle of divine right." 
 
 1. In Re Investigation of Advances in Eates by Carriers in Western Trunk Line, 
 Trans-Missouri and Illinois Freight Committee Territories (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 
 307, 347, et seq. 
 
 609-K. COMPAKISON OF FREIGHT BATES. 
 
 See "Comparison of freight rates," Section 610, post. 
 609-L. The public is not the general manageb of bailboads eespect- 
 
 ING THEIE bates. 
 
 In Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago G. W. By. Co} 
 the United States Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Brewer, said: 
 "It must be remembered that railroads are the private property of 
 their owners ; that while, from the public character of the work in which 
 they are engaged, the public has the power to prescribe rules for secur- 
 ing faithful and efficient service and equality between shippers and 
 communities, yet, in no proper sense, is the public a general manager. 
 As said in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland R. 
 Co., 168 U. S. 144, 172, 42 L. ed. 414, 425, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 45, 51 quoting 
 from the opinion in 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 697, 21 C. C A 59 41 U S 
 App. 466,74 Fed. 723 : ' ' 
 
Ill FKEIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 * 
 
 " 'Subject to the two leading prohibitions that their charges shall 
 not be unjust or unreasonable, and that they shall not unjustly discrim- 
 inate so as to give undue preference or disadvantage to persons or 
 traffic similarly circumstanced, the act to regulate commerce leaves 
 common carriers as they were at the common law — free to make 
 special rates looking to the increase of their business, to classify their 
 traffic, to adjust and apportion their rates so as to meet the necessitites 
 of commerce and of their own situation and relation to it, and generally 
 to manage their important interests upon the same principles which 
 are regarded as sound and adopted in other trades and pursuits.' " 
 
 1. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago G. W. Rv. Co. (1908), 209 V. S. 108, 
 118, 38 Sup. Ct Rep. 493, 52 L. Ed. 705, 712. 
 
 609-M. Low RATES FOB LOW-GRADE TRAFFIC. 
 
 It is to the interest of the carriers, as well as the public, that their 
 rates be low enough, if not below a remunerative point, to permit the 
 general movement and distribution of those commodities in general 
 demand in large quantities for construction, building, manufacturing 
 and other purposes. Reasonable freedom of such movement and dis- 
 tribution stimulates the growth and development of the country, and 
 thereby promotes all interests. The general prevalence of such lower 
 rates on that character of freight is due to the carriers' usual policy 
 of making rates that will fairly permit the traffic to move, if of such 
 value that it will bear reasonable charges.^ 
 
 In the carriage of great staples, which supply an enormous busi- 
 ness, and which in market value and actual cost of transportation are 
 among the cheapest articles of commerce, rates yielding only moderate 
 profit to the carrier are both necessary and justifiable.- For example, 
 in the case of grain, it is to the interest of both grain growers and 
 consumers that the rates on that commodity from the grain fields in the 
 West to the points of consumption should be as low as possible ;^ lumber 
 is an inexpensive freight, and only a few other commodities furnish to 
 carriers so large a tonnage; the rates thereon should therefore be 
 relatively low;* coal rates are usually highly competitive, and this 
 fact, together with its desirability as traffic, and the large quantities 
 moved, have produced on the average a very low rate f salt is an article 
 which demands and receives low rates f fertilizer is a low-grade traffic, 
 subject to no great risk in transit and requires no special service for 
 its transportation. Its free movement and use is an auxiliary tending 
 to produce and furnish a larger volume of traffic and thus promote 
 the prosperity of the carriers and their patrons, so that considering 
 both commercial and transportation conditions, it is entitled to com- 
 paratively low rates;'' soap is an article used by everybody, and of 
 necessity, therefore, should be transported at a low rate f and for sim- 
 ilar reasons pig iron, cement, stone, and various other commodities re- 
 quire and are given relatively low commodity rates. 
 
 1. Colorado i\iel & Iron Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1895), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 488. 
 2 In Re Food Products Investigation (1890), 4 I. C. C. Rep. 48, 3 I. C. Rep. 93; 
 National Hay Assn. v. Lake Shore & U. S. Ry. Co. (1902), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 204. 
 
 3. In Re Alleged I'nlawful Rates and Practices in Transportation of Grain (1897), 7 
 I. C. C. Rep. 240. 
 
 4. Central Tellow Pine Assn. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 505. 
 
■§609] TKAFFIC LAW SERVICE 112 
 
 5. Denison Light & Power C5o. v. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. (1904), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 327; 
 Fort Dodge Commercial Club v. Illinois C. Kd. Co. (1909), 16 1. C. C. Rep. 572, 5S2. 
 
 6. Anthony Salt Co. v. Missotri P. Ry. Co. (1892), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 299, 4 I. C. Rep. 33. 
 
 7. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 
 49, 52; Montgomery Freight Bureau v. Western Ry. Co. of A. (1908), 14 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 150, 152. 
 
 8. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Cincinnati H. & D. Ry. Co. (1890), 4 I. C. C. Rep. 87, 3 I. C. 
 Rep. 131. 
 
 609-N. Low EATES roK caekiage of long-haul teaffic. 
 
 The necessity for making concessions to long-iiaul traffic in the 
 case of articles whose value, in proportion to bulk or weight, is small, 
 and especially in that of the necessaries of life, which are handled in 
 large quantities, and in the supply of which the most distant counti-ies 
 compete, has long been conceded wherever railroads exist. The house- 
 hold goods of immigrants to the West have been carried for them at 
 very low rates, and the results of their agriculture have afterwards been 
 taken for seaboard and European markets in recognition of the general 
 principle that the traffic must not be charged rates beyond what it can 
 hear} 
 
 This is a just and sound principle when justly applied; and the 
 country may be said not only to have acquiesced in its recognition, but 
 to have desired and urged its application in a great variety of cases. 
 Any suggestion that it was meant by the statute to abrogate it would 
 scarcely be plausible, especially since, when not misapplied, it can 
 harm no one, but may be, and often is, of great and manifest advan- 
 tage in enabling distant sections of the country to come into closer com- 
 mercial relations, and to exchange, to their mutual benefit, their dis- 
 similar products, and to compete with each other in those which are 
 similar. However, there is a plain limit to the application of the 
 principle that property is to be carried at rates it will bear; and the 
 limit is reached when the rates charged are so low that further reduc- 
 tion would necessitate an increase of the charges oh other traffic in 
 order to make up to the carrier such loss as the reduction causes.- 
 
 1. In Re Southern Railway & Steamship Association (1887), 1 I. C. C. Rep. 31, 1 
 I. C. Rep. 278. 
 
 2. Ibid. ,. 
 
 609-O. Rajtes established by conceet of action between the caeeiebs.. 
 
 In determining an issue of unreasonableness of a rate, the Com- 
 mission should inquire into the circumstances under which the rate was 
 made.^ Where rates at a particular point are unduly influenced by 
 an agreement or combination among carriers to suppress competi- 
 tion at that point such fact maj^ properly be considered in determining 
 the question of undue discrimination and the reasonableness per se of 
 the rates at such possible competitive point.^ 
 
 While evidence of collusion or concert of action among carriers to 
 increase rates may be pertinent upon the issue of reasonableness, and 
 will be taken into consideration by the Commission;* yet evidence of 
 such concert of action is not for that reason alone conclusive of unrea- 
 sonableness of the rates so increased.* Violations of the anti-trust acts 
 are cognizable only in the courts. The Commission in' the exercise 
 of its administrative functions must weight other factors and give 
 consideration to the evidence as a whole.^ 
 
113 FKEIGHT KATES AND CHAKGES [§609 
 
 In the case of Central Yellow Pine Assn. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co.^ 
 the Commission said: "We deem it unnecessary to express an opinion 
 as to whether this concert of action in fixing the advanced rate amounts 
 to an unlawful agreement under the so-called 'Anti Trust Act' — the 
 enforcement of that act being a matter properly cognizable by the 
 courts. It is clearly, however, within the scope of our authority and 
 duty to consider this joint or concerted action of the defendants in 
 the aspect of its bearing upon the reasonableness and validity of the 
 advanced rate, the result of that action. Where rates are established 
 by concert of action, and previous understanding between the carriers, 
 it is manifest, whether or not there be a binding agreement to maintain 
 such rates, that the element of competition is eliminated. Concert 
 of action is wholly inconsistent with competition and, during the time 
 the rates fixed by concert of action are maintained, the effect, so far 
 as competition is concerned, is the same as if there was a binding 
 agreement to maintain such rates. 
 
 "Competition is favored by the laws. The object of the pooling 
 section (Section 5) of the Interstate Conunerce Act is to prevent 'any 
 contract, agreement, or combination' between otherwise competing 
 carriers by which competition between them may be done away with. 
 In East Tenn., Va. S Ga. Ry Co. v Interstate Commerce Commission, 
 it is said, 'The Interstate Commerce Law, it is conceded, was in- 
 tended to encourage normal competition. It forbids pooling for the 
 very purpose of allowing competition to have effect.' (99 Fed. Rep. 
 61.) The Supreme Court holds that the suppression of competition is 
 violative of the so-called 'Anti-Trust Act,' in that, such suppression 
 restrains trade and commerce by 'keeping rates and charges higher 
 than they might otherwise be under the laws of competition.' {Joint 
 Traffic Association Case, 111 U. S. 569, 571, 577, 4.3 L. ed. 287, 288, 290, 
 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 25; TJ. 8. v. Freight Association, 166 U. S. 341, 41 
 L. Ed. 1037, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540.) 
 
 "The ground upon which competition is favored is that it con- 
 duces to the reasonableness of rates or to the protection of the public 
 from unreasonably high or excessive rates. In United States v. - 
 Freight Association, supra, the Supreme Court says, 'competition will 
 itself bring charges down to what may be reasonable.' (166 U. S. 
 339, 41 L. ed. 1027, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540.) The Act to regulate com- 
 merce (Section 1), in prohibiting unreasonableness of rates in effect 
 forbids whatever conduces to such unreasonableness. In any event, 
 it is incumbent upon this Commission, when the reasonableness of 
 rates is in issue before it, to consider how those rates were brought 
 about — whether they are the product of untrammeled competition or 
 the result of a concert of action or combination between the carriers 
 establishing and maintaining them. The advanced rates complained 
 of cannot be claimed to be the outcome of competition because 'natural, 
 direct and immediate effect of competition is to lower' (171 
 U. S. 577, 43 L. ed. 290, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 25), rather than advance 
 rates. The advanced rates must be presumed to be higher than rates 
 which unrestrained competition would produce." 
 
 The Commission has said that if it finds that the rate was not 
 the product of free competition, but was the result of an agreement, this 
 fact would rob the rate of the presumption of reasonableness which 
 
§609] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 114 
 
 might otherwise attach, and should be considered by the Commission 
 in determining whether the advance was justifiable ;'' but if, after giving 
 due weight to that and all other circumstances, the Commission is 
 still of the opinion that the rate in effect is not too high, the mere 
 fact that it was the product of an unlawful combination will not justify 
 it in setting such rate aside.* 
 
 It is highly significant that the advance in question was the result 
 of concerted action of the various roads.'*" 
 
 The rate which is advanced as the result of an agreement among 
 carriers even if such agreement be with color of violation of the Anti- 
 Trust Act, will not on that ground alone be declared unreasonable; 
 evidence of such violation is pertinent and must be considered, but the 
 existence of such an unlawful agreement, even when proved, is not 
 conclusive of the unreasonableness of the rate so advanced.^" 
 
 The Commission has held that a rate, the highest which could 
 be maintained in the face of open competition, should not be advanced 
 by agreement or understanding of the carriers when that competition 
 has been put under check, unless some valid reason can be shown for 
 the advanee.^^ 
 
 See "Federal Antitrust Laws — Sherman Antitrust Act — Clayton 
 Antitrust Act," Chapter 43, post. 
 
 1. China & Japan Tradihg Co. v. Georgia Rd. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Kep. 326; In tie 
 Matter of .^^dvances in Rates from St. Louis to Texas Points (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 
 238; Cattle Raisers' .\ssn. of Texas v. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. (1905), 11 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 296; Central Yellow Pine Assn. v. lUinois C. Rd. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 
 505; Tift t. Southern Ry. Co. (1905). 10 I. C. C. Rep. 548. 
 
 2. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1903), 190 U. S. 273, 
 47 L. Ed. 1047, 23 Sup. Ct Rep. 687. 
 
 3. Excelsior from St. Paul, Minn. (1915), 36 I. C. C. Rep. 349, 362; citing. Central 
 Yellow Pine Assn. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 505. and, Tift v. 
 Southern Ry. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 548. 
 
 4. Excelsior from St. Paul, Minn. (1915), 36 I. C. C. Rep. 349. 362; citing. Enterprise 
 Mfg. Co. V. Georgia Rd. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 451, 455. 
 
 5. Excelsior from St. Paul, Minn., supra. 
 
 6. Central Yellow Pine Assn. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1905), 10 L C. C. Rep. 505, 540 
 et seq; reaffirmed, Tift v. iSouthern Ry. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 548, 681. See, 
 also, Warren Mfg. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 381; Railroad 
 Commission of Texas v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 463, 465. 
 
 7. China & Japan Trading Co. v. Georgia Rd. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 236. 
 
 8. Ibid. 
 
 9. Tift V. Southern Ry. Co. (1905), 138 Fed. Rep. 753; affirmed. Southern Ry. Co. v. 
 Tift (1907), 206 U. S. 428, 51 L. Ed. 1124, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 709. 
 
 10. Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Georgia Rd. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 451 ; Warren Mfg. Co. 
 V. Southern Ry. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 381; Chicago Lumber & Coal Co. v. Tioga 
 S. E. Ry. Co. (1900), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 323; Board of Major and Aldermen of Bristol 
 V. Virginia & S. W. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 453; Kiser v. Central of G. Ry. 
 Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 430, 440; Railroad Commission of Texas v. Atchison, T. & 
 S. F. Ry. Co. (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 463, 465. 
 11. In Re Proposed Advances in Fi-eight Rates (1903), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 382, 395. 
 
 609-P. R-ITE-PEE-TON-PER-MILE TEST OF REASONABLENESS. 
 
 The rule that the cost of carriage is usually in the inverse ratio 
 to distance and that therefore the charge per ton per mile should dimin- 
 ish with distance is not a requirement of the statute, and is subject to 
 qualification and exceptions.^ It is usually applied in connection with 
 continuous carriage over long through routes, but even then special 
 conditions, such as volume of business, character of route and necessary 
 
115 FREIGHT RATES AX I) CHARGES [§609 
 
 revenue from the business done so as not to perform the service at the 
 expense of traffic at other points, may materially quality it.- It is not 
 inconsistent ^\dth the law, however, for a carrier, within reasonable 
 limits, to accept less per ton per mile upon long hauls than upon short 
 hauls, and widen the disparity between such rates as the difference 
 in distance increases.* The rate-per-ton-per-mile rule brings rates to 
 the narrowest points of scrutiny, and for that purpose is valuable, but 
 it excludes consideration of other circumstances and conditions which 
 enter into the making of rates, no matter how compulsory, or im- 
 perious they may be, and it cannot, therefore, be accepted as controlling 
 in determining the reasonableness of rates.* 
 
 Ton-mile statistics reflecting as they do neither car loading, train 
 tonnage, nor car or train mileage, are far from being infallible guides 
 in fixing freight rates. A high average ton-mile revenue may be due 
 to short hauls, a preponderance of which occasions the railroad traffic 
 manager much uneasiness, while it has been repeatedly shown that 
 traffic low in ton-mile earnings, may, because of its farther carriage 
 and greater density, be the most remunerative. Per-car earnings, 
 with distance considered, are much more reliable. "Wliere the com- 
 modity moves in trainloads the earnings per train mile furnish the best 
 criterion, not only the car loading but also such physical conditions 
 as grades, etc., being here reflected. Comparisons of any kind, how- 
 ever, to be effective must be analogous, or nearly so ; that is, the rate 
 charged or gross earnings derived on any basis for the transportation 
 of a given commodity between two points furnishes a guide in arriv- 
 ing at the rate to be charged upon the same or nearly the same com- 
 modity between two other points similarly circumstanced.^ 
 
 The rate-per-ton-per-mile rule is not the generally accepted basis 
 for making rates in this country, so far at least as interstate move- 
 ments are concerned.® The mere comparison of revenue per ton per 
 mile, even when showing higher from given points is not conclusive as 
 applied in a country where nature has interposed such obstacles as to 
 make operating conditions so dissimilar.^ 
 
 The accurate presentation of per-ton-per-mile yield must include a 
 statement which will show the actual hauls and the average length 
 of the hauls.^ A high average ton-mile revenue may be due to short 
 hauls. It has been repeatedly shown that traffic low in ton-mile earn- 
 ings may, because of its farther carriage and greater density, be the 
 most remunerative." Upon a short haul the per-ton-milc test has, as 
 a rule, very little evidentiary value. ^^ Ordinarily rates for longer dis- 
 tances yield a lower per-ton-mile revenue." 
 
 The movement of freight short distances is necessarily by local 
 trains with frequent stops and is much more expensive than move- 
 ments by through trains over long lines. There are some items of cost 
 such as loading and unloading, which are common to long and short 
 hauls, which make a considerable item in the cost of carrying short 
 distances, but become very slight when apportioned on business over 
 long lines.^^ A local rate covers the expense of two terminals, but a 
 division of a through rate alloted to either of the terminal carriers 
 of the through line can only embrace the expense of one terminal. 
 Because of this difference in expense, among other reasons, local rates 
 are made as a general rule much higher in proportion to the length of 
 haul than through fates of any division thereof.^^ 
 
§609] TRAFFIC LAW SEE VICE 116 
 
 It is not the purpose of the Act to disregard the principles that 
 longer hauls involve less handling of the property transported than 
 shorter hauls, and that rates per ton per mile for longer hauls may be 
 inadequate for shorter hauls.^* 
 
 Disparity of ton-mile revenue cannot of itself justify condemna- 
 tion of the rate structure of long standing.^* 
 
 While a comparison based only on ton-mile revenue may often 
 be misleading, the Commission has frequently recognized its value. 
 When a comparison is made between rates on lines which operate 
 under like physical conditions, and when the length of the hauls are 
 substantially equal, the fact that ton-mile revenue of one carrier for 
 the transportation of a commodity greatly exceeds the ton-mile rev- 
 enue received by other carriers for the transportation of the same 
 commodity is indicative of the unreasonableness of the higher rate.^® 
 
 Ton-mile earnings are not controlling as competition between ship- 
 pers, cities and railroads may often force and justify departures from 
 a mathematical decrease in ton-mile earnings as the hauls increase.^'' 
 
 In Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Director General, Ann Arbor 
 Rd. Co}^ the Commission stated: "We have frequently had occasion 
 to comment upon the car-mile and train-mile revenue tests, and they 
 have been found of substantial probative force in many situations. 
 National Hay Ass'n. v. M. C. R. R. Co., 19 I. C. C, 34, 47. In re Ad- 
 vances on Coal to Lake Ports, 22 I. C. C, 604, 620. We have also com- 
 mented upon the limited value of ton-mile revenue comparisons, al- 
 though of much value in many cases. The process of comparing rates 
 by ton-mile figures is one by which those rates may be brought down 
 to the narrowest point of scrutiny and in this sense the ton-mile test 
 is valuable, but it is only one test and does not take into consideration 
 any of the surrounding circumstances and conditions that enter into 
 the making of the rate, regardless of how compulsory or imperious 
 they may be. Bus. Men's Asso. of Minn. v. C, 8t. P., Minn. & 0. Ry. 
 Co., 2 I. C. C, 52; Coke Producers Asso. of C onnellsville v. B. & 0. R. 
 R. Co., 27 I. C. C, 125, 140; Commercial Club of Omaha v. A. & S. R. 
 Ry. Co., 27 I. C. C. 302, 317 ; Springston Lumber Co. v. N. P. Ry. Co., 
 501. C.C, 591, 594." 
 
 1. Manufacturers and Jobbers Union v. Minneapolis & St. L. Rd. Co. (1890), 4 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 79, 3 I. C. Rep. 115; Farrar v. Southern Ry. Co. (1906), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 640; 
 Mountain Ice Co. v. Delaware, L. & W. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 305, 320; 
 Ozark Fruit Growers Assn. v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 106, 
 114; Muskogee Traffic Bureau v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 
 169, 173; Rainey & Rogers v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 88, 90; 
 Receivers & Shippers Assn. of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (1910), 
 18 I. C. C. Rep. 440, 466; National Hay Assn. v. Michigan C. Rd. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. 
 C. Rep. 34, 47; In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in 
 Rates by Carriers on Grain, Grain Products, etc. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 22, 34; Elk 
 Cement & Lime Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 84, 88; Mer- 
 chants & Mfrs.' Assn. of Baltimore v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. Rep. 467. 
 569; In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates for 
 the Transportation of Coal by the Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., Baltimore & O. Rd. 
 Co., Norfolk & W. Rd. Co., The Kanawha & M. Ry. Co. and their Connections (1912), 
 22 I. C. C. Rep. 604, 620; Nebraska State Ry. Commission v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. 
 Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 121, 126; Southern Illinois Millers' Assn. v. Louisville 
 & N. Rd. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 672, 673; Gottrom Bros. Co. v. Genesee & W. 
 Rd. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 38; Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Atchison, T. & 
 S. F. By. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 230, 232; Kansas-Iowa Brick Rates (1913), 28 
 I. C. C. Rep. 285, 287; Brick Rates from Ohio Points to Htmtington, W. Va. (1913), 
 28 I. C. O. Rep. 292, 295; Malt Rates to Texas Points (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 385, 
 3S6; Phoenix Printing Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. Rv. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep 289, 
 
117 FREIGHT KATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 291, 292; Rates on Packing-House Products from Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and Other 
 Points to St Paul, Minn., Bau Claire, Wis., and Otlier Points (1914), 31 I. C. 0. Rep. 
 308, 310; Adleta Paper Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 34T, 
 348; Rate Increases in Official Classification Territory (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 351, 
 373; Empire Coke Co. v. Buffalo & S. Rd. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. O. Rep. 573, 578; 
 Weatherford Chamber of Commerce v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 665, 668; In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in 
 Rates by Carriers for the Transportation of Hardwood and Other Kinds of Lumber 
 and Articles Manufactured Therefrom, from Points in Arkansas, Louisiana and 
 Other Points to Memphis, Tenn., St. Louis, Mo., and Other Points of Destination 
 (1915), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 521, 529; Class and Commodity Rates to Salt Lake City, 
 Utah, and Other Points (1915), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 551, 556. 
 
 2. Manufacturers & Jobbers' Union v. Minneapolis & St. L. Rd. Co. supra. 
 
 3. Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1895), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 488. 
 
 4. Business Men's Assn. v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. Rd. Co. (1888), 2 I. C. Rep. 41, 2 
 I. C. O. Rep. 52; Justin v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1899), 8 I. C. C. Rep. 277; 
 Cedar Hill Coal & Coke Co. v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 L C. C. Rep. 387. 
 
 5. Tralflc Bureau of Nashville v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 533, 
 535; Beatrice Commercial Club v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 
 173, 177. 
 
 6. Bulte Milling Co. v. Chicago & A. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 351. 
 
 7. Grand Junction Mining & Fuel Co. v. Colorado Midland Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 452, 457. 
 
 8. Lumber Rates from Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas to Oklahoma and Missouri 
 (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 471, 475. 
 
 9. Traffic Bureau of Nasbville v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 533, 
 535. 
 
 10. Hammerschmidt & Franzen Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 
 71, 7S. 
 
 11. Brownsville, Tex., Class and Commodity Rates (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 479, 485. 
 
 12. New Orleans Cotton Exchange v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (1888), 2 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 375, 2 I. C. Rep. 289. 
 
 13. Board of Trade of Troy v. Alabama M. Ry. Co. (1893), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 1, 23, 4 I. C. 
 Rep. 349. 
 
 14. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama M. Ry. Co. (1895), 69 Fed. Rep. 227, 
 231. This is known as the Troy Case, the history of which is as follows : Board 
 of Trade of Troy v. Alabama M. Ry. Co. (1893), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 1. Carriers ordered 
 to reduce to a specified amount the existing class rates and rates on cotton and 
 phosphate rock from and to Eastern and Northeastern points, which are higher from 
 the shorter haul to and from Troy, Alabama, than from the longer haul to and 
 from various points, on the ground that the existing rates are in violation of Sec- 
 tion 4. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama M. Ry. Co. (1895), 69 Fed. 
 Rep. 227. Commission's order held to be invalid on the ground that water com- 
 petition and competition between carriers subject to the act justifies existing rate 
 adjustment. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama M. Ry. Co. (1896), 74 
 Fed. Rep. 715. Commission's order held to be invalid on the ground stated by 
 the Circuit Court. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama M. Ry. Co. 
 (1897), 168 U. S. 144, 42 L. Ed. 414, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 45. Commission's order held 
 to be invalid on the ground that there is no violation of Sections 3 and 4 of the 
 Act on account of water competition and competition of carriers subject to the 
 Act, and "further on the ground that the Commission is without power to fix rates. 
 
 15. Stuarts Draft Milling Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 623, 627. 
 
 16. Weatherford Chamber of Commerce v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 31 I. C. C. Rep. 
 665, 668. 
 
 17. Decker & Sons v. Director General, as Agent, Minneapolis & St. L. Rd. Co. (1920), 
 59 I. C. C. Rep. 67, 79, cited in Decker & Sons v. Director General, as Agent, 
 Minneapolis & St. L. Rd. Co. (1922), 68 I. C. C. Rep. 34. 
 
 la. Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Director General, Ann Arbor Rd. Co. (1920), 57 I. C. 
 C. Rep. 723, 730. 
 
 609-Q. Average rate per ton on all freight. 
 
 While averages are often helpful in determining the proper rela- 
 tionship of rates or the proper basis for their construction dissimi- 
 larity of circumstances or conditions may affect the force of these 
 factors.^ 
 
 1. Victor Mfg. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 222, 229. 
 
§609] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 118 
 
 609-E.. Carriers serving undeveloped territory entitled to higher 
 
 RATES THAN ORDINARILY. 
 
 A carrier serving and dependent upon a new and undeveloped 
 territory, and unable to earn any profits for its owners, may charge 
 higher rates than would be reasonable under different conditions.^ 
 
 1. Memphis Freight Bureau v. Fort Smith & W. Ed. Co. (190T), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 1. 
 
 609-S. Rates estabijshed to develop a particular industry. 
 
 Where a rate has been established and maintained for a consid- 
 erable period for the purpose of developing a particular industry, and 
 with full knowledge that the industry could not be developed without 
 it, and where, under the influence of such rate, large amounts of money 
 have been invested in property, the value of which must be seriously 
 impaired by an advance in rates, that fact is an important considera- 
 tion in passing upon the reasonableness of such advance. '^ However, 
 a past rate is no estoppel against an advance.^ 
 
 In Oregon & Washington Lumber Manufacturers' Assn. v. South- 
 ern P. Co.^ the Commission said: "It often happens that the very ex- 
 istence of an industry depends upon the rate accorded to it. If, now, a 
 carrier has established a particular rate for the express purpose of 
 enabling an industry to exist, and if, upon the strength of that rate 
 money has been invested which must be destroyed if the rate is with- 
 drawn, it has been our understanding that this fact might properly be 
 considered in passing upon the reasonableness of the proposed change 
 in rate. Such fact is not controlling, but is one of the circumstances 
 which may properly be kept in view. It has been our opinion that we 
 might, in a proper sense, order the continued maintenance of a rate 
 upon which investment of money had been induced, even though we 
 would not in the first instance, as an original proposition, have directed 
 the establishment of that rate. ' ' 
 
 Investment made in an industrial enterprise in reliance upon 
 an existing rate, cannot act as a bar to the readjustment of the rate 
 structure.* Shippers have no interest in a rate by reason of contract 
 or class of investments made under an existing rate, and such fact 
 standing alone could not preclude the raising of an unreasonably low 
 rate.^ The fact that a new plant was built upon the assurance from 
 the carriers that a lower rate would be established is not in and of 
 itself sufiicient ground for finding the rate unreasonable." 
 
 The circumstances as to investment by a shipper on the strength 
 that a certain rate will continue is pertinent for the Commission to 
 consider and may be a strong admission upon the part of the carrier 
 that the rate is, on the whole, reasonable, but this fact is merely evi- 
 dentiary, and there is some doubt as to whether it can be considered 
 at all.'' 
 
 See "Contracts Between Carriers and Shippers and Others," 
 Chapter 15, post. 
 
 1. Western Oregon Lumber Mfrs. Assn. v. Southern P. Co. (190&), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 61. 
 Carriers ordered to reduce to a specified amount an advanced rate on green fir lum- 
 ber from Willamette Valley. Oregon, to San Francisco, Calif., on the ground that 
 
119 
 
 FREIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 such rate is unreasonable. Southern P. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (C. 
 C. N. D. Cal.). Case undecided. Certified to Supreme Court, because trial Court was 
 divided on merits. Southern P. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1909), 
 215 U. S. 22(j, 54, L. Ed. 169, 30 Sup. Ct. Kep. 89. Certificate dismissed and case 
 remanded to Circuit Court. Southern P. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission 
 (1910), 177 Fed. Rep. 963. Commission's order held to be valid. Southern P. Co. 
 V. Interstate Commerce Commission (1911), 219 U. S. 433, 55 L. Ed. 283, 31 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 288. Commission's order held to be invalid on the ground that it was based 
 upon the assumed power of the Commission to prevent railroad companies from 
 raising their rates on the theory that they were estopped to advance such rates on 
 account of having maintained it for a considerable period. Such power, it was held, 
 has not been conferred upon the Commission. 
 
 2. Southern P. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1911), 219 V. S. 483, supra. 
 
 3. Oregon & Washington Lumber Mfrs. Assn. v. Southern P. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 389, 394. Southern P. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1911), 219 V. 
 S. 433, supra, cited and distinguished. See, Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Illinois C. 
 Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 109, 128. 
 
 4. Michigan Upper Peninsula Pig-iron Rates (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 284, 285; Brant- 
 ley V. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1915), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 21, 24. 
 
 5. Rates on Crus'hed Stone from McCook and Thornton, 111., to Stations in Indiana and 
 Michigan (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 136, 137; Lumber Rates from Local Points on the 
 Alabama Great Southern Rd. to Chattanooga, Tenn. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 646, 
 647; Chattanooga Log Rates (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 36, 39; Crawford & Bunce v. 
 Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1914) 32 I. C. C. Rep. 12, 14. 
 
 6. Meridian Fertilizer Factory v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 494, 
 497. 
 
 7. Duluth, Minn. Log Rates (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 420, 421. 
 
 609-T. Tonnage sihpped by a particular firm 
 
 While tHe amount shipped by a concern has little or no bearing on 
 the question of the reasonableness of the rates, it is of some signifi- 
 cance where the shipments reach substantial proportions.^ 
 
 1. Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 30. 
 
 609-U. Rates fixed according to the usage of the commodity, or 
 
 "business motive" of the SHIPPER ARE UNREASONABLE AND 
 UNLAWFUL. 
 
 Taritfs which apply rates upon commodities according to their 
 use or "business motive" of the shipper are improper. The carrier 
 has no right to attempt to dictate the usage to which the commodities 
 transported by it shall be put. The duty of the common carrier is to 
 transport commodities at the tariff rates and on equal conditions for 
 all.i 
 
 The concurring existence of two separate and distinct rates on 
 the same commodity is condemned when the traffic moves over the 
 same route in the same direction, between the same points, and the 
 carriers, by their published tariffs, assume to charge one rate or the 
 other according to the ultimate use to which the commodity is to be 
 put.- The Commission has consistently condemned the maintenance 
 of different rates upon the same commodity depending upon the use 
 to which the article is put.^ 
 
 For example, rates proposed for coal bunker use are made de- 
 pendent upon the use to which the coal is to be put and are therefore 
 unlawful.* Carriers may not concern themselves with reference to the 
 use made of coal.^ There is no more justification for a lower rate on 
 coal used for fuel on boats than would be on coal used on railroads." 
 
 It is now well settled that the Interstate Commerce Commission 
 cannot undertake to determine whether a rate is reasonable or un- 
 
§609] TEAFFIC LAW SERVICE . 120 
 
 reasonable by ascertaining to what use the product should be and is 
 put.'' 
 
 In the proceeding In the Matter of Restricted Bates* the Com- 
 mission held that a tariff providing for reduced rates on coal used for 
 steam purposes, or that the carrier will refund part of the regular 
 tariff charges on presentation of evidence that the coal was so used, 
 is improper and unlawful — that is to say, that the carrier has no right 
 to attempt to dictate the uses to which the commodities transported 
 by it shall be put in order to enjoy a transportation rate ; that a car- 
 rier or a person or corporation operating a railroad or other trans- 
 portation and line may not, as a shipper over the lines of another 
 carrier, be given any preference in the application of tariff rates on 
 interstate shipments, but it may lawfully and properly take advan- 
 tage of legal tariff joint rates applying to a convenient junction or 
 other point on its own line, provided such shipments are consigned 
 through to such points from the point or origin and are, in good faith, 
 sent to such billed destination. 
 
 The United States Supreme Court in affirming the above hold- 
 ing of the Commission, in the case of Interstate Commerce Commis- 
 sion V. Baltimore & 0. Bd. Co.^ Held : That conditions with respect 
 to competition between coal intended for railway consumption and 
 other coal, and with respect to the manner of delivery, depending upon 
 a difference in the facilities possessed by the railroads and other 
 consignees, do not make the interstate traffic therein dissimilar in cir- 
 cumstances and conditions, within the meaning of the Interstate Com- 
 merce Act, section 2 thereof, so as to justify the giving of a lower rate 
 for the transportation of railway fuel coal than is given to shippers of 
 other coal between the same points. 
 
 However, the principles that differences in rates should not be 
 predicted solely on the use to which the commodities are put pre- 
 supposes, of course, like commodities.^" The final use to which the 
 article is put may determine whether it should be considered finished 
 or unfinished." 
 
 See '^Discriminations, Preferences and Advantages," Chapter 26, 
 post. 
 
 1. Fort Smith Freight Bureau v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 651; 
 Duncan v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1893), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 85. 
 
 2. Ibid. 
 
 3. Hardie Mfg. Co. v. Oregon Rd. & Nav. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 545, 546; Mem- 
 phis Freight Bureau v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. O. Rep. 602; 
 Catoosa Limestone Products Co. v. Western & A. Rd. Co. (1916), 38 I. C. C. Rep. 
 614, 615. 
 
 4. Bituminous Coal and Coke Rates from Mines and Ovens in Alabama, Illinois, Ken- 
 tucky, and Tennessee to Mississippi River Crossings and Various Junction Points in 
 Tennessee, Mississippi, and Louisiana (1915), 35 I. C. C. Rep. 187, 190. 
 
 5. Ibid. 
 
 6. Ibid. 
 
 7. Detroit Coal Co. v. Michigan C. Rd. Co. (1915), 37 I. C. C. 274, 278, 293. 
 
 8. In the Matter of Restricted Rates (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 426. Enforcement of 
 Commission's order temporarily enjoined. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. v. United States 
 (1912) (Commerce Court No. 39. Not reported.) Commission's order held to be 
 
 valid in all respects. The court, however, recognized the right of the Commerce 
 Court to grant a temporary injunction in the proper case. Interstate Commerce 
 Commission v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1912), 225 U. S. 326, 56 L. Ed. 1107, 32 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 742. 
 
 9. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1912). 225 U S 326. 
 56 L. Ed. 1107, 32 Sup. Rep. 742. 
 
 10. Official Classification Rates on Paper (1916), 38 I. C. C. Rep. 120, 140. 
 
 11. Commercial Club, of Salt Lake City, Utah, v. Atchison, T. & S. F Ry. Co (1915) 36 
 I. C. C. Rep. 86, 107. 
 
121 FREIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 609-V. Agreement between carrier and municipality eor mainte- 
 nance OF GIVEN rate IN CONSIDERATION OF GRANT OF CERTAIN 
 PETVrLEGES TO CARRIER BY CITY, NOT BINDING ON COMMISSION. 
 
 The fact that a carrier subject to the Interstate Commerce Act 
 and the city served by it, have contracted, in consideration of the 
 grant of certain privileges by the city to the carrier, for the mainte- 
 nance of a definite rate on coal moving in interstate commerce, lower 
 than a rate afterwards established by the carrier in the manner pro- 
 vided by the act, does not authorize the Commission in testing the 
 reasonableness of the latter and higher rate to apply considerations 
 other than those which would generally be applicable.^ 
 
 See "Contracts between Carriers and Shippers and Others," 
 Chapter 15, post. 
 
 1. Cape Girardeau Commercial Club v. Illinois O. Rd. Co. (1918), 51 I. C. C. Rep. 105. 
 
 609-W. A CARRIER MAY NOT RESTRICT TRAFFIC TO MOVEMENT BETWEEN 
 
 POINTS ON ITS OWN LINES. 
 
 A carrier may not by rate adjustments reserve territory it serves 
 for plants located on its own lines. ^ A carrier cannot expect wholly to 
 retain traffic from points into which it has first extended its line.^ Car- 
 riers cannot force customers to deal with plants on their own rails by 
 unlawful rate adjustments.^ A carrier should not be permitted to retain 
 to itself the lumber market at points on its line for the benefit of pro- 
 ducing points on its line, to the exclusion of producing points on other 
 lines.* 
 
 Eates established by a common carrier under a desire to keep upon 
 its line material for which the road itself has use, or to keep the price 
 thereof low for its own advantage, cannot be justified in morals or in 
 law. Every party who produces such a material is entitled to sell it 
 when he wishes, in the best available market, and the common carrier 
 has no right to prevent his doing so by disproportionate or unreason- 
 able rates.* 
 
 1. Hughes Creek Coal Co. v. Kanawha & M. Ry. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 671, 677; 
 Oklahoma Portland Cement Co. v. Arkansas, L. & G. Ry. Co. (1914), 32 I. C. O. Rep. 
 221 225. 1 
 
 2. Omaha Grain Exchange v. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 572, 578. 
 
 3. In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Car- 
 riers for the Transportation of Plaster, Gypsum Rock, Stucco, and Plaster Board 
 from Blue Rapids and Irving, Kas., to Points in Arkansas, Kansas and Missouri 
 
 (1913), 27 r. C. C. Rep. 67. 
 
 4. Lumber Rates from Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas to Oklahoma and Missouri 
 (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 471, 474. 
 
 5. Reynolds v. Western N. Y. & P. Rd. Co. (1888), 1 I. C. Rep. 685, 1 I. C. C. Rep. 395. 
 Low Moor Iron Co. of Virginia v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 
 615, 619. 
 
 609-X. Effect of widespread rate .adjustment. 
 
 Difficulties are always encountered when long established rate rela- 
 tionships are disturbed.^ 
 
 A long standing system of rates ought not to be disturbed without 
 considering the effect upon property interests ; but where such rate is 
 unlawful it should be corrected.^ 
 
§609] TEAFPIC LAW SERVICE 122 
 
 A change in one of a series of related rates changes the relation 
 among all of them.^ The Commission has uniformly sustained the 
 carrier's contention that percentage adjustment between Central 
 Freight Association Territory and the East ought not to be disturbed 
 without strong reasons for so doing.* 
 
 Local rates in Central Freight Association Territory are built 
 substantially on distance. This adjustment has obtained for many 
 years ; cominercial interests have grown up thereunder and it has been 
 the subject of less complaint than any other general rate adjustment. 
 Although the Commission has at various times been appealed to to 
 change it, it has declined to do so.'' Class rates, long in effect forming 
 the basis of a rate fabric, to which business has adjusted itself, are not 
 disturbed upon the mere suggestion that a better scheme might have 
 been originally devised.® 
 
 The Commission cannot deny relief on the ground that other 
 points similarly situated might therefore be induced to ask for like re- 
 lief.'' The Commission would not hesitate to reduce an unreasonable 
 rate because of threats of a reduction from competing fields.® " 
 
 While the Commission ought to consider the general effect upon 
 the revenues of carriers by the establishment of a uniform-distance 
 scale, the mere fact that some particular rate would be somewhat ad- 
 vanced or reduced in comparison with other rates is no valid objection 
 to that course.^ Justice should not be denied complainant because to 
 grant it will necessitate a change elsewhere. Equality cannot be with- 
 held because it is or will be objected to by other carriers or shippers.^" 
 
 Where rates from various fields in a coal belt are so correlated 
 that to change one may disturb the entire adjustment, the Commission 
 cannot undertake to pass upon the reasonableness of one of the rates 
 involved without considering its relation to the rates from other coal 
 fields." It is the duty of the Commission to consider rates applied over 
 the entire territory likely to be affected by a change in rates to par- 
 ticular points." It is the duty of the Commission to determine the 
 question of relative rates on coal as between competing producing dis- 
 tricts upon a basis that will permit them to compete in common markets 
 and under circumstances which their location and conditions of produc- 
 tion fairly entitle them with respect of their relation one to the other.^^ 
 
 While it is proper to consider the effect of a decision upon the gen- 
 eral rate adjustment applying over a wide scope of territory, rates 
 which discriminate against one locality upon a particular road cannot 
 be justified on the ground that they are a part of the general scheme 
 adopted by several roads entering the same territory and supplying 
 coal from different and unassociated districts.^* 
 
 Where a change in rates is demanded, which will apparently 
 throw into confusion an adjustment of rates over a large section of the 
 country and which are not claimed to be unreasonable of themselves, 
 and in respect to which any modification upon one line will result in 
 the general disturbance and friction among a large number of shippers 
 and carriers of the same product, there should be a clear right to relief 
 under some direct supervision of the law in order to justify the Com- 
 mission in Requiring it." Under such circumstances the Commission 
 
123 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 will decline to order such reduction until the matter has been fully- 
 presented and has received the fullest consideration." 
 
 1. Indianapolis Freight Bureau v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 195, 203. 
 
 2. Albree v. Boston & M. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 303, 315. 
 
 3. Boileau v. Pittsburgh & L. E. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 640, 654. 
 
 4. Schmidt & Sons v. Michigan C. Rd. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 684, 686. 
 
 5. Indianapolis Freight Bureau v. Cleveland C. 0. & St L. Ry. Co. supra. 
 
 6. In Re Advances In Rates— Eastern Case (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 243, 306. 
 
 7. Chamber of Commerce of Newport News v. Southern Ry. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 345, 356. 
 
 8. Bituminous Coal Operators of Central Pennsylvania v. Pennsvlvania Rd. Co. (1912), 
 23 I. O. C. Rep. 385, 391. 
 
 9. Florida Fruit & Vegetable Shippers' Protective Assn. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1911), 
 22 I. C. C. Rep. 11, 16. 
 
 10. Mllbum Wagon Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 93, 100. 
 
 11. Victor Mfg. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 222, 286. 
 
 12. Corporation Commission of the State of North Carolina v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.. 
 (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 303, 309, et seq. 
 
 13. Black Mountain Coal Land Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 286, 294. 
 
 14. Ibid. 
 
 15. Rend v. Chicago & N. W. Rd. Co. (1889), 2 I. C. Rep. 313, 2 I. C. C. Rep. 540; Rice 
 V. Western N. X. & P. Rd. Co. (1888), 2 I. C. Rep. 298, 2 I. C. C. Rep. 389; Freight 
 Bureau of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (189T), 7 I. C. C. Rep. 180. 
 
 16. Dallas Freight Bureau v. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 427. 
 
 609- Y. Establishment of low rates by a carrier to test the traffic 
 
 SITUATION . 
 
 It not infrequently happens that a carrier having rates in effect 
 that it regards as proper and reasonable rates desires, nevertheless, 
 to test the traffic situation by putting in lower rates, and finding that 
 the results anticipated are not realized under the experimental rates 
 it later wishes to restore the former basis. It is to the best interest 
 alike of the carrier and the shipper that traffic officials may pursue 
 such experiments freely without being met by a suspension order when 
 they seek under such circumstances to restore the former rates. An 
 apprehension on their part that the Commission will always seize such 
 opportunities to keep the rates on the lower basis will naturally tend 
 to a reluctance on the part of rate officials to make tests for that pur- 
 pose and will introduce a highly undesirable rigidity into our general 
 rate structures. In dealing with suspension matters the Commission 
 has therefore endeavored to be discriminating in cases of that kind.^ 
 
 1. In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Car- 
 riers for the Transportation of Plaster, Gypsum Rock, iStucco, and Plaster Board 
 from Blue Rapids and Irving, Kas., to Points in Arkansas, Kansas and Missouri 
 (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 67. 
 
 609-Z. Equalizing bates of different careiers. 
 
 There is no provision in law requiring that rates shall be the 
 same over all lines between the same points. A carrier with a long 
 route is not obliged, as a matter of law, to meet the rates of a short- 
 line competitor.^ Neither is a carrier via a long route obliged as a 
 matter of law, to reduce its rate because its short-line competitor 
 reduces a rate which has been the same via both routes.^ 
 
 A carrier is free to fix its rates without reference to those of 
 other carriers competing for business from the same or different 
 points of supply.^ 
 
§609] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 124 
 
 A rate is not unreasonable simply because a lower rate is in effect 
 via the lines of other carriers.* The existence of a lower rate by the 
 short line, while having some bearing, does not of itself indicate the 
 unreasonableness of a higher rate by the route actually used.^ The 
 carriers in the through route over which the traffic moves would" be 
 guilty of a penal offense under the statute, if they should rebate the 
 difference between their published rate for the longer haul and the 
 published rate of other carriers over the shorter route.® 
 
 Whatever may have been the practice in the past of "meeting the 
 rate," the Act, and the decisions of the Commission interpreting its 
 provisions, unmistakably lay down the doctrine that tariffs must now 
 be adhered to.'' 
 
 1. Commercial Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep 11; Johnson 
 V. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 73. 
 
 2. Ibid. 
 
 3. Allen & Lewis v. Oregon Rd. & Nav Co. (1899), 98 Fed. Rep. 16; Allen & Lewis t. 
 Oregon Rd. & Nav. Co. (1901), 106 Fed. Rep. 286. 
 
 4. South Canon Coal Co. v. Colorado & S. Ry. (3o. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 286. 
 
 5. Markley & Son v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (1906), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 616. 
 
 6. Ibid. 
 
 7. Menefee Lvunber Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 49. 
 
 609-AA. Eates via crRcuiTous routes. 
 
 Generally speaking, shippers are entitled to a reasonable charge 
 by the direct line of transportation, and an unreasonable rate by the 
 direct line cannot be allowed for the purpose of permitting a circuitous 
 line to engage in the business at a reasonable profit.' 
 
 The short line with two or more line hauls may meet the rate by 
 the long line and decline to establish a joint through rate by the short 
 line, unless the line is so circuitous as to be unreasonably long within 
 the definition of Section 15.^ 
 
 Where joint through rates over a circuitous route are cancelled, 
 though a shipper may still reach points of destination by a short line 
 at the same rate, he may still suffer from the fact that under the' 
 cancellation he loses the advantage of delivery upon a particular 
 line.^ 
 
 Carriers whose mileage exceeds that of the short line by not less 
 than 15 per cent should be granted authority to meet the rates of the 
 short line.* 
 
 1. Grain Rates in Central Freight Association Territory (1913), 28 I., C. C. Rep. 549, 
 
 558. 
 
 2. Iowa State Board of Railroad Commissioners v. Arizona E. Rd Co. (1913), 28 L 
 C. C. Rep. 563, 567. 
 
 3. Cement Rates from Mason City, Iowa (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 426, 428. 
 
 4. In the Matter of Rates on Tropical Fruits from Gulf Ports to Various Destinations 
 (1^14), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 621, 622. 
 
 609-BB. The right of a carrier to reserve to itself the long haul 
 
 IN THE EST.4BLISHMENT OF A THROUGH ROUTE. 
 
 Section 15 (4) of the Interstate Commerce Act {as amended June 
 18, 1910, and February 28, 1920), provides that in establishing through 
 routes the Commission shall not (except as provided in section 3, and 
 except where one of the carriers is a water line), require any carrier 
 
J 25 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 by railroad, without its consent, embrace in such route substantially 
 Jess than the entire length of its railroad and of any intermediate 
 railroad operated in conjunction and under a common management 
 or control therewith, which lies between the termini of such proposed 
 through route, unless such inclusion of lines would make the through 
 route unreasonably long as compared with another practicable through 
 route which could otherwise be established.^ 
 
 As a matter of every day fairness a carrier should not be need- 
 lessly deprived of traffic which it originates.^ The long haul is gen- 
 erally conceded to the originating line.' 
 
 The right of a carrier to maintain for itself the long haul on 
 traffic which it originates is well established.* It is the long haul that 
 ordinarily yields the carrier the best profits, and traffic involving a 
 long haul over its own rails is usually highly desirable.' Inasmuch 
 as a carrier may so construct tariffs as to hold traffic to its own line, 
 so long as the Act is not violated, or may in its own interest carry for 
 longer distance over its own line than would be necessary over the line 
 of its competitor, as the end and the resulting rate in each instance 
 is the same, it may refrain from cariying the longer distance when to 
 do so compels it to accept a less satisfactory division of the rate." 
 The Commission has no right to deprive the originating carrier of 
 its long haul.' 
 
 The right of a carrier to get the long haul out of traffic which it 
 originates is subordinate to the public interest.* A carrier cannot re- 
 serve to itself the long haul if to do so works to the detriment of ship- 
 pers.' If a railroad has traffic in its possession it shall be allowed to 
 handle it by its own line as far as it can unless the public interest will 
 suffer thereby.^" 
 
 See "Right of a carrier to the long haul in the establishment of 
 a through route," Section 1100-E, post, and "Commission may not re- 
 quire carrier to embrace substantially less than entire length of rail- 
 road in establishment of through routes," Section 1109-B, post. 
 
 1. Section 15 (4) of the Act contains the following proviso governing the establish- 
 ment of temporary through routes in emergencies: "That in time of shortage of 
 equipment, congestion of traflBc, or other emergency declared by the Commission, 
 it may (either upon complaint or upon its own initiative without complaint, at 
 once, if it so orders without answer or other formal pleadings by the interstate 
 carrier or carriers, and with or without notice, hearing, or the making or filing of a 
 report, and according as the Commission may determine) establish temporarily 
 such through routes as in its opinion are necessary or desirable in the public 
 interest." 
 
 2. Toledo Produce Exchange v. Ann Arbor Rd. Co. (1913). 27 I. C. C. R«p. 536, 543. 
 
 3. Salt Kates from Wisconsin to Iowa, etc. (1913), 27 T. C. C. Rep. 526, 529. 
 
 4. Wheeler Lumber Bridge & Supply Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1914). 30 
 1. C. C. Rep. 343, 344. 
 
 5. In the matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Car- 
 riers for the Transportation of Coal from the Walsenburg District of Colorado to 
 Stations in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 85, 88; Sheridan 
 Chamber of Commerce v. Chicago B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. 0. C. Rep, 638, 648. 
 
 6. In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of .Advances in Rates by Car- 
 riers for the Transportation of Grain, Grain Products, and Seed between Aberdeen, 
 S Dak., and Other Points, and Dviluth, Minn., and Other Points, via Chicago, St. 
 P. M. & O. Line (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 595, 598. 
 
 7. Lumber Rates from Oregon and Washington to Eastern Points (1914>, 29 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 609, 612. 
 
 8. Toledo Produce Exchange v. Ann Arbor Rd. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 536, 543. 
 
 9. Paducah Board of Trade v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 583, 591. 
 10. Marble Kates from Vermont Points (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 60^7, 60S, 
 
§609] TRAFFIC LAWi SERVICE 126 
 
 609-CC. Higher rate over route composed of two or more carriEes 
 
 THAN OVER A SINGLE LINE. 
 
 It has long been established and recognized as just and reasonable, 
 to allow two or more roads making up a through line to charge some- 
 what more than the through transportation, the earnings on which must 
 be divided among all, than would be deemed reasonable and sufficient 
 for transportation if performed wholly by a single road.^ 
 
 A mileage scale of rates ordinarily yields a much higher rate in. 
 proportion for a short haul than for the long one ; and when two short 
 hauls are combined it is usually unjust to require the two carriers to 
 accept compensation at the rate per mile applied for the entire long 
 haul. To a degree they are entitled to a higher rate in consideration 
 of the fact that their individual hauls are short.^ 
 
 The fact that transportation involves the two-line haul is of itself 
 a reason for a somewhat higher charge than if the seryices were en- 
 tirely over a single line.* 
 
 A commodity rate to one point over one line affords no basis of 
 comparison with a higher class rate to a longer distance point over two 
 lines.* 
 
 A one-line haul is no measure of reasonableness, standing alone, 
 of a higher rate over the route consisting of two lines.' 
 
 If one carrier voluntarily gives a very low rate per ton per mile 
 over a long and circuitous route in order to handle traffic entirely over 
 its own line this affords no standard of the reasonableness of a rate 
 on other traffic which passes over two or more separately owned lines 
 of railroad." 
 
 In Sheridan Chamber of Commerce v. Chicago B. <& Q. Rd. CoJ the 
 Commission said: "Each carrier participating in a two-line haul will 
 find that operating expenses for its portion of that haul are less than 
 they would be if only a one-line haul to the junction point were involved, 
 and instead of either delivering the car or receiving it from a connect- 
 ing carrier, it were necessary to deliver it to the consignee or receive it 
 from the consignor. The one-line haul involves two distinct terminal 
 services. Each carrier's share of a two-line haul involves two distinct 
 terminal services, plus the switching movement from one line to the 
 other. In large cities, where the terminal of one carrier is far re- 
 moved from that of the other, switching from one to the other often 
 involves much greater expenditure than the terminal service of de- 
 livering to consignee or receiving from consignor at that station. But 
 where the physical connection between connecting carriers is as simple 
 as in these small western towns, involving no expensive terminal 
 service, the additional cost due to the switching movement is very 
 small;^ so small, in fact, that it may not properly be made the basis of 
 an additional charge for a two-line haul of substantial length." 
 
 ^t)' 
 
 The existence of lower rates over routes other than a particular 
 route of movement and the subsequent reduction of the rate over the 
 particular route is not sufficient to establish the unreasonableness of 
 the previous rate.' 
 
 1. I,<iup Creek Cnlliery C(i. v. 'Sirtfiiiiau liy. Vo. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 471; Sheridan 
 Chamber of Commerce v. Chicago B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1913), 20 I. 0. C. Rep. 638, 647; 
 Maricopa County Commercial Club v. Southern P. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 429, 
 
127 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 431; Washington Milling Co. v. Norfolk & W. Ky. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Hep. 54t;, 
 547; American National Live StoclJ Assn. v. Soutliern P. Co. (1913), 2ii I. C. C. Rep. 
 37, 41 ; In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by 
 Carriers for Transportation of Coal from the Walsenburg District of Colorado 
 to Stations in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas (1913i, 26 I. C. C. Rep. SO, s!»; Con- 
 solidated Fuel Co. V. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 213, 21.'3; 
 Wichita Board of Trade v. Atchison, T. & .'<. P. Ry. Co. (1913), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 625, 
 633; Wharton Steel Co. v. Delaware L. & W. Rd. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 303, 
 30S; Baker Commercial Club v. Oregon- Washington Rd. & Nav. Co. (1912). 25 I. C. 
 C. Rep. 281, 283; State of Iowa v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 
 47, 59; Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Atchison, T. &S. F. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 
 I. C. C. Eep. 230, 232; Sheridan Chamber of Commerce v. Chicago B. & Q. Rd. Co. 
 (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 250, 264; Waverly Oil Works v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1913), 
 28 I. O. C. Rep. 621, 631 ; Iowa State Board of Railroad Commissioners v. Arizona 
 E. Rd. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 563, 567; Weatherford Chamber of Commerce v. 
 Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1914), 31 T. C. C. Rep. 665, 666; Meridian Fertilizer Fac- 
 tory V. Abilene & S. Ry. Co. (1915), 33 I. C. C. Rep. 160, 163. 
 
 2. In Re Investigation of Alleged Unreasonable Rates on Meat (1912), 23 I. C. C. Eep'. 
 656, 661. 
 
 3. Ontario Iron Ore Co. v. New York C. & H. R. Rd. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 204, 
 206. The Commission has held that a rate for a two-line haul from the producing 
 points of live stock to the packing houses may properly be 2i/^ cents per 100 
 pounds higher than for a one-line haul. In Re Investigation of Rates on Meat 
 (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 160, 165. 
 
 4. Wells-Higman Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1910), IS I. C. C. 175, 176. 
 
 5. Snyder-Malone-Donahue Co. v. Chicago B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1910), IS I. C. C. Rep. 498. 
 
 6. Cedar Hill Coal & Coke Co. v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co. (1910), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 479, 4S5. 
 
 7. Sheridan Chamber of Commerce v. Chicago B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1913). 26 I. C. C. 638, 
 649; affirmed, Sheridan Chamber of Commerce v. Chicago B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1913). 28 
 I. 0. C. 250, 264; Omaha Grain Exchange v. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 572, 576; Hughes Creek Coal Co. v. Kanawha & M. Ry. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 671, 678; Hughes Creek Coal Co. v. Kanawha & M. Ry. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 10, 13; Stonega Coke & Coal Co. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1916), 39 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 523, 551 ; iSeaboard 'By-Product Coke Co. v. Director General, as Agent, Dela- 
 ware L. & W. Rd. Co. (1921), 62 I. C. C. Rep. 317, 325. 
 
 8. Abel & Roberts v. Missouri P. Rv. Co. (1916), 37 I. C. C. Rep. 712; citing. Talla- 
 hatchie Lumber Co. v. Yazoo & M. Y. Rd. Co. (1916), 38 I. C. C. Rep. 501, 502. 
 
 609-DD. Eeasonablene^s op rate between two points served by jiore 
 
 THAN ONE carrier NOT TO BE DETERMINED BY RATE OF LINE 
 MOST FAVORABLY SITUATED. 
 
 In Western Rate Advance Case of 1915^ the Commission stated : 
 "We iiave been confronted on several occasions with the question of 
 setting rates upon a particular description of traffic where the same 
 rates if carried by all the roads would result in essentially different 
 earnings to the different carriers. In City of Spokane v. Northern Paci- 
 fic Ry. Co., 15 I. C. C. 376, 393-394, we said: 
 
 " 'There is a wide difference between a water system which supplies a single 
 community and a railroad which is part of a commercial and industrial whole supply 
 ing many communities. The city of Spokane could not develop if served by the Great 
 Northern Railway alone; nor can we look wholly to the interest of Spokane. The 
 whole territory sei"ved by these defendant lines must be considered and the exist- 
 ence of all these railroads to that territory is absolutely essential. These railroads 
 cannot exist unless rates are established which will yield a fair return upon their 
 property. We must, therefore, in fixing these rates, have regard not altogether to any 
 one particular railroad, but to the whole situation, and must consider the effect of 
 whatever order we make upon all these defendants. Such was the opinion formerly 
 expressed by this Commission In re Proposed Advances in Preioht Bates, 9 I. C. C, 
 382, and to that opinion we adhere.' 
 
 "In Kindel v. N. Y. N. H. (C H. R. R. Co., 15 I. C. C, 555, 561, 
 this was reiterated : 
 
 "'In the Spokane rair. 15 I. C. C. 376. we held that the reasonableness of a rate 
 between two points served by two or more carriers could not be determined by con- 
 sideration alone of that line which is shortest and most favorably situated as to 
 operations, earnings, etc.. but that the entire situation must be considered.' 
 
 "And again in the same case, at page 563: 
 
 " 'As already suggested, we cannot in determining a competitive rate select that 
 railroad which is the shortest or the most adviintageously situated and limit the rate 
 
§609] TEAFFIC LAW SERVICE 128 
 
 to what would allow that property fair earnings. We must consider this entire situa- 
 tion and determine a reasonable rate, not merely with reference to the Union Pacific, 
 but with reference to all lines serving these Colorado common points via reasonably 
 direct lines.' 
 
 "In Advances in Rates — Eastern case, 20 I. C. C, 243, 274, we said : 
 
 " 'In 9 I. C. C, 382, this Commission considered the justice of certain advances 
 ' in grain rates between Chicago and the Atlantic seaboard, and it there held that 
 whatever rate might reasonably be imposed upon these three systems must be held 
 to be a reasonable charge for that service by all lines. We hold to the same view in 
 this investigation. We do not mean that other lines should not be considered, but that 
 these systems may be taken as typical. Under rates reasonable for these three systems 
 there may be lines whose earnings will be extravagant, but that is their good fortune. 
 There may be lines which cannot make sufficient earnings, but that is their misfortune. 
 We ought not to impose upon this territory, for the purpose of allowing these defendants 
 additional revenues, higher rates than are adequate to these three systems considered 
 as a whole.' 
 
 "In Newport Mining Co. v. C. S N. W. By. Co., 33 I. C. C, 645, 
 656, we said : 
 
 " 'The rate here under consideration is a blanket rate applicable via the lines 
 of several carriers of different financial condition. While the position of the North- 
 western appears to be favorable, and while it appears from the record that its rev- 
 enues meet all its operating needs and more, yet the situation with respect to the 
 St. Paul, is far less satisfactory, as is also that of the Soo and the South Shore. The 
 reasonableness of a rate in a locality served by several carriers will not be determined 
 alone by consideration of that line most favorably situated with respect to operations, 
 traffic, and earnings, and conversely this is equally true, namely, that consideration of 
 the line of poorest traffic, earnings, etc., will not control.' " 
 
 1. Rate Increases in Western Classification Territory (1915), 35 I. C. C. Rep. 497, 560. 
 
 609-EE. Reasonableness of a thkough bate composed of the aggre- 
 gate OF INTERMEDIATE RATES. 
 
 The mere fact that through rates are composed of the aggregate 
 of intermediate rates is not sufficient to condemn them, without proof 
 that such an adjustment results in through rates which are unreason- 
 able or otherwise in violation "of the law.^ 
 
 1. Western Pine Manufacturers Assn. v. Cincinnati I. & W. Rd. Co. (1917), 46 I. C. 
 C. Rep. 650, 655; citing, Appalachia Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1912), 
 25 I. C. C. Rep. 193; Southeastern Lumber (1917), 42 I. C. C. Rep. 548, 558; Con- 
 nor Lumber & Land Co. v. Great N. Ry. Co. (1917), 43 I. C. C. Rep. 243. 
 
 609-FF. A JOINT THROUGH INTERSTATE RATE WHICH EXCEEDS THE AGGRE- 
 GATE OP THE INERMEDIATE RATES, SUBJECT TO THE ACT, IS 
 UNLAWFUL AND NON-ENFORCEABLE. 
 
 The fourth section of the Interstate Commerce Act {amended 
 June 18, 1910) provides as follows: 
 
 That it slmll 6e unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of 
 the Act to charge or receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for the trans- 
 portation of passengers, or of a like kind of property, for a shorter than for a longer 
 distance over the same line or route in the same direction, the shortest being included 
 within the longer distance, or to charge p,ny greater compensation as a through route 
 than the aggregate of the intermediate rates subject to the provisions of this Act; but 
 this shall not be construed as authorizing any common carrier within the terms of this 
 Act to charge or receive as great compensation for a shorter as for a longer distance: 
 Provided, however. That upon application to the Interstate Commerce Commission 
 such common carrier may in special cases, after investigation, be authorized by the 
 Commission to charge less for longer than for shorter distances for the transportation 
 of passengers or property; and the Commission may from time to time prescribe the 
 extent to which such designated common carrier may be relieved from the operation 
 of this section ; * « * 
 
 Prior to the amendment of June 18, 1910, the Interstate Commerce 
 Commission has consistently held that a joint through rate exceed- 
 ing the aggregate of the intermediate rates over the same line and 
 in the same direction was prima facie unreasonable and the burden 
 
129 FREIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 of proof was upon the common carrier to defend the reasonableness 
 of such a rate.^ There are a few cases of record where the carriers 
 have been able to justify such an abnormal rate. If anything, the 
 joint through rate should be less than the combination of intermediate 
 or local rates upon the theory that as the distance increases the rate 
 per ton per mile decreases. 
 
 Congress, undoubtedly, recognized the unreasonableness and un- 
 justness of a joint through rate exceeding the aggregate of intermediate 
 rates when it amended the fourth section of June 18, 1910, and de- 
 clared such higher joint through rate to be unlawful. The thing that 
 the statute inhibits is the charging by common carriers subject to the 
 provisions of the Act of a greater compensation as a through route 
 than the aggregate of the intermediate rates subject to the provisions 
 of the Act. We, therefore, have the clear and unmistakable rule that 
 a joint through interstate rate may be as high as, or lower than the ag- 
 gregate of the lowest available rates for interstate transporation, but 
 not higher than such combination. Such higher joint through rate can- 
 not be lawfully established, and if it is published and filed with the Com- 
 mission it is a vain thing and void ab initio. Such higher rate may not 
 be lawfully assessed by the carrier, and if it is used, the charge amounts 
 to a straight overcharge which may be recovered by the shipper in the 
 courts without reference to a prior action by the Interstate Commerce 
 Commission. 
 
 Since the amendment of June 18, 1910, the Interstate Commerce 
 Commission has strictly adhered to the policy pursued by it prior to 
 such date with reference to such rate situation, and has held such 
 higher joint through rate prima facie unreasonable, and has granted 
 reparation accordingly.^ 
 
 Under a power, clearly assumed but not granted to it, the Com- 
 mission entertains applications of carriers for the relief of the opera- 
 tion of the aggregate-of-intermediate-rates rule of the fourth section 
 of the Act. There is no warrant in law for the assumption of such 
 authority as the amendment of June 18, 1910, vests no discretionary 
 power in the Commission over such rates, but declares absolutely and 
 unqualifiedly against them. 
 
 This entire subject is fully treated under Chapter 7 of this work 
 under Section 705-J, "Power of the Commission under the aggregate- 
 of-intermediate-rates rule," and Section 711-B, "Legal status of a 
 joint through rate that is higher than the aggregate of the intermediate 
 rates subject to the provisions of the Act." 
 
 However, in giving consideration to this item it should be noted 
 that this proposition of law has not been judicially established, and 
 until passed upon by a court of competent jurisdiction, shippers should 
 operate under the administrative rulings of the Interstate Commerce 
 Commission as herein set forth, unless it be desired to make a test 
 case of the proposition. 
 
 1. Hope Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 696; Lindsay 
 Bros. V. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1919), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 6; Montgomery Freight 
 Bureau v. Western Ry. of A. (190S), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 150; Railroad and Warehouse 
 Commissioners v. Eureka Springs Ry. Co. (1895), 7 I. C. C. Rep. 17; Coffey viUe 
 Vitrified Brick & Tile Co. v. St. XmxAs & S. F. Rd. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 498; 
 Morgan v. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. (1907). 12 I. C. C. Rep. 525; Hardenberg, Dolson 
 & Orav V. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1907), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 579; Tariff Circular IS- A, 
 
§609J TRAFFIC LAW SEKVICE 130 
 
 ■Rule 56; MichiganBuggy Co. v. GrandKapids&I. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. O. Rep. 299; 
 Lull Carriage Co.. v. Chicago K. & S. Ry. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 15; Conf. Rul. 
 Bui. Rule 298 (November 14, 1910) ; Note to Rule 5, Tariff Circular 18-A; Apalachia 
 Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 193, 194; Jubitz v. 
 Southern P. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 44, 45, 46; Pulp & Paper Manufacturers' 
 Traffic Assn. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 83, 96; Wash- 
 ington Milling Co. v., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 546, 547; State 
 of Iowa V. Chicago St P. M. & O. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 64, 75; Boston 
 Chamber of Commerce v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. O. Rep. 230, 
 232; Corporation Commission of Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1914), 
 31 I. C. C. Rep. 532, 533; Godwin v. Yazoo & M. V. Rd. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 
 25, 27; Board of Trade of Kansas City v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1915), 34 
 I. C. C. Rep. 208, 209; Spartanburg Chamber of Commerce v. Southern Ry. Co. 
 (1915), 34 I. C. C. Rep. 484; Standard Lumber Co. v. South Georgia Ry. Co. (1916), 
 38 I. C. C. Rep. 301, 303; In Re Through Rates to Louisiana and Texas (1916), 38 
 I. C. C. Rep. 153, 164; Joseph Iron Co. v. Morgan's L. & T. Rd. andl S. S. Co. (1916), 
 40 I. C. C. Rep. 525; Windsor Turned Goods Co. v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. (1910), 
 18 I. C. C. Rep. 162 ; Great N. Ry. Co. v. Loonan Lumber Co. (S. D. 1910) , 123 N. W. 
 644, 646. 
 
 2. Orange Rice Milling Co. v. Director General, Texas & N. B. Rd. Co. (1919), 55 I. 
 C. C. Rep. 19; Partridge Lumber Co. v. Director General, Chicago, St. P. M. &,0. 
 Ry. Co. (1919 ^, 55 I. C. C. Rep. 29; Peoria Board of Trade v. Atchison, T. & S. F. 
 Ry. Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 42, 50; Inman-Poulsen Lumber Co. v. Southern P. 
 Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 357, 360; Keet & Roundtree Dry Goods Co. v. Director 
 General, Baltimore S. P. Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 400; Rio Grande Valley 
 Creamery Co. v. Wells Fargo & Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 425; Anderson Lumber Co. 
 V. Director General, Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 467; Curtis, 
 Booth & Bentley Co. v. Director General, St. Louis S. F. Ry. Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 511, 512, 513; Waccamaw Lumber Co. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1919), 55 I. 
 C. C. Rep. 595 ; Chevrolet Motor Co. of Texas v. Director General, Atchison T.&S.F.Ry. 
 Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 601; Hecbtman v. Director General, Chicago B. & Q. Rd. 
 Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 672; Du Pont De Nemour & Co. v. Director General 
 New Tork, P. & N. Rd. Co. (1919), 56 I. C. C. Rep. 233; Heider Mfg. Co. v. Balti- 
 more & O. Rd. Co. (1920), 58 I. C. C. Rep. 184; United Paperboard Co. Inc., v. 
 Louisiana W. Rd. Co. (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 151; Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana 
 V. Toledo, St. L. & W. Rd. Co. (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 154, 155; Ohio Cities Gas Co. 
 v. Director General, as Agent, Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 
 320; Cohen-Schwartz Rail & Steel Co. v. Director General, Morgan's L. & T. Rd. 
 & S. S. Co. (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 533; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Director General, 
 as Agent, Arizona E. Rd. Co. (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 561; Decker & Sons v. Di- 
 rector General, Minneapolis & St. L. Rd. Co. (1920), 50 I. C. O. Rep. 585; Birming- 
 ham Rail & Locomotive Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 602; 
 Choctaw Cotton Oil Co. v. Director General, as Agent, Yazoo & M. V. Rd. Co. (1920), 
 59 I. C. C. Rep. 725; Intermediate Rate Association v. Director General, Aberdeen 
 & R. Rd. Co. (1921), 61 I. C. C. Rep. 226, 246. 
 
 609-GGr. TJneeasonableness of a joint theoxjgh rate that exceeds 
 
 THE COMBINATION OF A LOCAL. BATE AND AN Undefined PRO- 
 POBTIONAL BATE. 
 
 In the case of Joseph Iron Co. v. Morgan's L. (& T. Rd. <& S. 
 S. Co.,^ a rate of 30 cents per 100 pounds was charged on certain ship- 
 ments of scrap iron from Houston, Texas, to Chicago, 111., via New 
 Orleans, La., in connection with the Morgans L. & T. Rd. & S. S. Co. 
 and Illinois C. Rd. Co. There was contemporaneously in effect a 
 , proportional rate of 9% cents per 100 pounds from Houston to New 
 Orleans "when destined to points beyond to which no through rates 
 are published," and a rate of $3.31 per net ton from New Orleans to 
 Chicago. The rate charged exceeded the combination rate by 79 cents 
 per ton. The Commission held as follows: "We hold that the 9i/^ 
 cent proportional rate was not so restricted or limited as to make it 
 inapplicable as a factor in constructing a through rate to Chicago had 
 there been no joint rate in effect. We find upon consideration of all 
 the facts that the joint through rate of 30 cents per 100 pounds was 
 unreasonable to the extent that it exceeded the combination of inter- 
 mediate rates concurrently in effect, i. e., $5.21 per ton. No order 
 fixing a specific rate for the future will be made at this time, but the 
 application for authority to continue to charge higher through rates 
 from Houston, through New Orleans, to Chicago, than the aggregate 
 
131 FEEIGHT BATES AND CHAKGES [§609. 
 
 of the intermediate rates contemporaneously in effect via defendants' 
 lines through New Orleans will be denied. We further find that com- 
 plainant made the shipments in question and paid charges thereon at 
 the rate therein found to have been unreasonable, that it was damaged 
 to the extent of the difference between the amounts paid and the 
 amounts that would have accrued had the rate which it is herein found 
 to have been reasonable been in effect, and- that it is therefore en- 
 titled to an award of reparation in the sum of $682.34, which includes 
 an overcharge of 30 cents, with interest from December 6, 1912. ' ' 
 
 Upon rehearing of the case the Commission adhered to the con- 
 clusions reached in the original report and stated: "In Windsor 
 Turned Goods Co. v. C. S 0. Ry. Co., 18 I. C. C, 162, we dealt with an 
 analogous situation, and said: 
 
 " 'The fair measure of the reasonableness of a joint through rate that exceeds the 
 combination between the same points via the same route is and will hereafter be held 
 to be the lowest combination that would lawfully apply if the joint through rate were 
 canceled.' 
 
 "That rule is affirmed and it applies in the instant case. We ad- 
 here to our previous decision, and will accordingly reenter the order 
 for reparation. ' '^ 
 
 In Morgan's L. & T. Rd. S 8. 8. Co. v. Joseph Iron Co.,^ the United 
 States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, in sustaining the finding 
 of the Commission and affirming the judgment of .the lower court, 
 stated: "Whether the conclusion so reached by the Commission was 
 intended to be one of law, rather than one of fact, touching the appli- 
 cation of the proportional rate of 91,^ cents, is not entirely clear. Nor 
 need we consider this feature of the case ; for it is plain that the Com- 
 mission's conclusion of fact that the 30-cent through rate was unreas- 
 onable, so far as it exceeded the sum of the proportional rate per 
 100 pounds from Houston to New Orleans and the existing local rate 
 per 100 pounds from New Orleans to Chicago (26-1/20 cents), is not 
 without support in the evidence and must be accepted by us. The 
 fact that the Railroads were willing to accept 91/2 cents to New Orleans 
 on traffic extending beyond New Orleans certainly had a tendency to 
 show that this was a reasonable rate for all such traffic regardless of 
 the destination and there was no attempt to show a good reason for 
 any distinction between Chicago and other points." 
 
 See "Joint rates/' 8ection 601, ante. 
 
 1. Joseph Iron Co. v. Morgan's L. & T. Ed. & S. S. Co. (1915), 37 I. C. C. Eep. 591. 
 
 2. Joseph Iron Co. v. Morgan's L. & T. Rd. & S. S.-Co. (1916), 40 I. C. C. Rep, r.2:j, .'52(;. 
 
 3. Morgan's L. & T. Rd. & S. S. Co. v. Joseph Iron Co. (1917), 243 Fed. Rep. 149, 1.31. 
 
 609-HH. Cancellation of a joint throu(;h kate resulting in higheh 
 
 COMBINATION OF LOCAL RATES. , 
 
 Defendants cancelled joint rates on soft coal from Springfield and 
 southern Iljinois mines to stations on the Missouri Pacific Ey. in Kan- 
 sas and Nebraska, leaving to apply combinations of intermediate rates 
 which resulted in higher charges ; Held, That the increased rates have 
 not been shown to be reasonable and that the basis in effect prior to 
 the proposed change should be restored.^ 
 
 1. In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates bv Carriers 
 for the Transportation of Soft Coal (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 4.1 
 
§609] teafpic law sekvice 132 
 
 609-11. Higher bate foe a shortee than foe a longee distance ovbe 
 the same line oe eotjte in the same direction, the shorter 
 being included within the longer distance. 
 
 See "Fourth Section of the Interstate Commerce Act — Long-and- 
 Short-Haul Clause — Fourth-Section Applications," Chapter 7, post. 
 
 609-J J. A RATE VOLUNTARILY ESTABLISHED BY A EAILEOAD COMPANY TO 
 MEET COMPETITION IS NOT TO BE TAKEN AS THE MEASURE OF 
 WHAT IS REASONABLE. 
 
 In Louisville & N. Rd. Co. v. Interstate Commerce C^ommission,^ 
 the Commerce Court, per Mr. Judge Archbald, stated: "Nor is a volun- 
 tary rate, established to meet competition, to be taken as the measure of 
 what is reasonable. Lake Shore R. R. v. Smith, 17.3 U. S. 684, 19 Sup. 
 Ct. 565, 43 L. Ed. 858 ; Frederich v. N. Y. N. E. & H. R. R., 18 Inters. 
 Comm. R. 481, 484; Breese-Trenton Mining Co. v. Wahash R. Co., 19 
 Interst. Com. Com. R. 598, 600. And yet that in effect is just what the 
 Commission did in suggesting, in defense of the reduction and restora- 
 tion which it undertook to make, that the previous rates were not 
 shown negatively not to have been compensatory. It was not incum- 
 bent on the railroad at that stage to make this out, but on the com- 
 plainant to show that the rates as they stood were unjust and unrea- 
 sonable. The position taken here, on behalf of the Commission, is that 
 a rate, however low, cannot be condemned as unjust if it yield any, the 
 most insignificant, return above the cost of ser^dce, a proposition we 
 are not prepared to accede to." 
 
 1. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1912), 195 Fed. Rep. 
 541, 558. 
 
 609-KK. Higher rates when shipmf>nts are tendeeed with othee 
 
 THAN UNIFORM BILL OF LADING. 
 
 A carrier 's tariff provided higher rates on shipments not tendered 
 with a uniform bill of lading. Held, That the tender of a shipment ac- 
 companied by other than a uniform bill of lading may not be taken by 
 the carrier as evidence of the shipper's election to use the higher rate. 
 The carrier must direct his attention to the fact that a lower rate is 
 available under a uniform bill of lading.^ 
 
 1. Con. Rul. Bui., Rule 160 (April 6, 1909). 
 
 609-LL. Released-valuation eates. 
 
 In the proceeding In the Matter of Released Rates^ the Com- 
 mission stated: "The practice of basing rates upon the condition that 
 the carrier shall not be responsible for losses due to causes beyond its 
 control has received legal sanction. Similarly we find no impropriety 
 in a graduation of rates in accordance with the actual values of specific 
 commodities. Household goods, for example, differ widely in value, 
 and it is fair to all that the man who ships goods of low value should 
 receive the benefit of a lower rate than the man who ships more ex- 
 pensive goods. Rate-making upon this principle is in every respect 
 legitimate. It is proper to say, however, that the words 'Value limited 
 
133 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 to * * *,' are misleading. The phrase 'Agreed to be of the value of 
 * * *' recently incorporated into the tariffs of the roads which are 
 members of the Southeastern Freight Association are less objection- 
 able. They are indicative of the theory upon which these rates are 
 justified — they are fixed with reference to the real value of the prop- 
 erty, and ijot because of an agreement that the amount of recovery shall 
 be limited to an arbitrary specified amount. We cannot emphasize too 
 strongly our position that these rates must not be used by the carrier as 
 a means for escaping the liability which the law absolutely forbids it 
 to cast off. The same good faith that is required of the carrier is like- 
 wise enjoined upon the shipper. The carrier's agent cannot always be" 
 expected to know the value of the goods that are tendered for trans- 
 portation. In most instances it must accept the valuation fixed by the 
 shipper; and when the amount so specified is accepted in good faith 
 and made the basis of the transportation charges, the law will not re- 
 quire the carrier to respond in damages to a greater amount." 
 
 The Interstate Commerce Commission in commenting upon the 
 limitation of the carrier's liability for loss or damage to goods con- 
 tained in iSection 20 of the Act,^ stated : ' ' The law prohibits all limita- 
 tions upon the carriers' liability for the full loss, damage, or injury 
 caused by them to property transported by them, and also all attempts 
 to so limit liability in any form or manner, except when rates dependent 
 upon the value declared in writing by the shipper or agreed upon in 
 writing as the released value of the property are authorized by us. It 
 is specifically provided that such declaration or agreement shall limit 
 the liability and recovery to an amount not exceeding the amount so 
 declared or agreed to and shall not, so far as relates to values, be held 
 to be in violation of section 10 of the Act. We have taken the view 
 that when such rates have been authorized by us shippers may properly 
 declare a value less than the actual value in order to take advantage of 
 lawfully established released rates or of rates dependent upon the 
 declared value of the property. Eates and ratings dependent upon 
 declared or agreed values are proper and desirable as to many com- 
 modities. Important among them are live stock chiefly valuable for 
 breeding, racing, show purposes, or other special uses; wild animals; 
 rugs; household goods and emigrant movables; jewelers' sweepings; 
 paintings or pictures ; china or porcelain ware ; silk ; watches ; soap ; and 
 various ores and smelter products. 
 
 "During the period covered by this report 128 applications were 
 received seeking authority to maintain rates dependent upon declared 
 or agreed values, and 101 orders granting such authority were issued." 
 
 In Orange Rice Mill Co. v. Texas & N. 0. Rd. Co} the Commission 
 stated: "At the hearing defendants took the position that the rate of 
 18.5 cents, published to both Orange and Beaumont on blackstrap the 
 ' declared value of which does not exceed 8 cents per gallon, ' was legally 
 applicable to the shipments referred to herein. The rate so limited 
 was published without our authority and, under the second Cummins 
 Amendment, the limitation was void, and the rate, while technically 
 legally applicable, was unlawful. The Cummins Amendment, 33 I. C. 
 C, 682. Express Rates, Practices, Accounts and Revenues, 43 I. C. C, 
 510. Williams Co. v. Hartford & Netv York Transportation Co., 48 I. 
 
§609] TEAFFIC LAW' SERVICE 134 
 
 C. C, 269. Commission's Circular, In the Matter of Rates Dependent' 
 Upon the Declared or Released Value of Property, of April 26, 1918." 
 
 See "Limitation of Common Carrier's Liability — Initial Carrier's 
 Liability," Chapter 20, post. 
 
 1. In the Matter of Released Bates (1908), 13 I. C. 0. Rep. 550, 564. • 
 
 2. Thirty-Fourtli Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission (1920), p. 50). 
 
 3. Orange Rice Mill Co. v. Texas & N. O..Rd. Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 661, 663. 
 
 The Interstate Commerce Commission, in its thirty-fifth. Annual 
 Report to Congress, (1921, p. 41), stated: 
 
 "Applications for authority to maintain rates on various commodities, principally 
 ores and smelter products, dependent upon declared or agreed values, in accordance 
 with section 20 of the interstate commerce act, vs^ero received to the number of 210. 
 Orders granting such authority numbered 178. Probably more applications would have 
 been made but for the promulgation of a general order, Released Bates Order No. 331, 
 which provide that where authority has been granted under section 20 of the act to 
 establish and maintain rules, regulations, rates or ratings dependent upon the value 
 declared in writing by the shipper or agreed upon in writing as the released value of 
 the property, changes in rates, ratings, or carload minimum weights may be estab- 
 lished thereafter and filed under authority of the original order without securing new 
 released rates orders, providing that rules, regulations or descriptions of the com- 
 modity or commodities to be affected or the declared or agreed value or values on 
 which the same are dependent are not changed, and, provided further, that other 
 routes or points of origin or destination are not added." 
 
 609-MM. A CAEEIBR MAY NOT DEMAND A HIGHEE EATE WHEN PEEIGHT IS 
 SHIPPED WITH THE CHAEGES COLLECT THAN WHEN THE 
 CHAEGES AEE PREPAID. 
 
 It is fundamental that there can be but one lawful rate between 
 two points, and the law takes no cognizance whatever of the distinction 
 formerly made by the express companies between prepaid and collect 
 shipments. It is a carrier's right as a public service corporation to 
 demand prepayment on all shipments, and it may not distinguish be- 
 tween persons who pay in advance and those who do not. The carrier 
 may waive its right to demand prepayment, and accept a shipment 
 with the understanding it will collect the charges upon delivery 
 to the consignee ; but if it does not collect such charges from the con- 
 signee, it must look to the consignor for payment. The collection of the 
 lawful rate is a duty imposed on the carrier by law, and it is given a 
 lien upon the property transported to enforce the paymeftt of the 
 charges. To accept a shipment without prepayment is no more than 
 to extend credit to the consig-nor, and this within reasonable and non- 
 discriminatory limits it may do. But neither a railroad, an express 
 company nor other public carrier may lawfully make rates based upon 
 the waiver of its right to collect charges at the time it receives a ship- 
 ment. For if there is any risk in the carrying of the shipment without 
 payment of charges, the carrier must, in fulfillment of its own duty 
 under the law, resolve that risk against the consignor and Collect in 
 advance. Rates may not be based on a temporary waiver of a carrier's 
 right, nor may the reasonableness of a rate turn upon the assumption 
 that some will pay the lawful charges and others will not, so long as the 
 law gives the right to collect the rate in advance and demands that the 
 carrier shall, without fail, collect its published charges.^ 
 
 1. Boise Commercial Club v. Adams Express Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 115; Railroad 
 Commission of Florida v. Savannah F. & VP. Ry. Co. (1891), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 13, 3 
 I. C. Rep. 688; Boston Fruit & Produce Exchange v. New York & N. E. Rd. Co. 
 (1891), 5 I. C. C. Bep. 1. 3 I. C. Rep. 604. 
 
135 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 609-NN. Minimum charge for transportation of less-than -carload 
 
 SHIPMENTS. 
 
 It is reasonable and proper that carriers should fix a minimum 
 weight and charge for the transportation of less-than-carload ship- 
 ments. This is justified by the necessary expense and trouble attending 
 the carriage of such shipments, large or small, which aside from the 
 actual manual labor involved, are practically the same irrespective of 
 the weight or bulk of the package.^ 
 
 Rule 13, Section 1, of Consolidated Freight Classification, No. 1, 
 provides the following rule governing the minimum charge on single 
 shipments of less-than-carload freight : 
 
 Except as otherwise provided, the minimum charge for a single shipment of less- 
 than-carload freight from one consignor to one consignee on one bill of lading shall be : 
 
 (a) If classified 1st class or lower, for one hundred (100) pounds at the class or 
 commodity rate applicable thereto; or 
 
 (b) If classified higher than 1st class, for one hundred (100) pounds at the 1st 
 class rate ; or 
 
 (c) If the shipment contains articles in two or more classes, and no article is 
 classified higher than 1st class, for one hundred (ICO) pounds at the rate applicable to 
 the article taking the highest rate; or if any one of the articles is classified higher than 
 1st class, the minimum charge shall be for one hundred (100) pounds at the 1st class 
 rate; but 
 
 (d) In no case shall the charge on a single shipment be less than fifty (50) cents. 
 When a less-than-carload shipment moves under a rate made by a combination of 
 separately established rates in the absence of a joint through rate, the minimum charge 
 of fifty (50) cents will apply to the continuous through movement and not to each of 
 the separately established factors, except that when the continuous through movement 
 is subject to a combination rate made by using separately established rates that are 
 governed by different classifications, a separate minimum charge will apply to each 
 portion of the through movement that is governed by a different classification. 
 
 1. Wrigley v. Cleveland C. O. & St. L. Kd. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 412; minimum 
 charge on less-than-carload shipments (1921), 61 I. C. C. Rep. 727. 
 
 609-00. Lower rate for carload than for less-than-carload 
 
 quantities 
 
 The transportation of freight at a lower rate in carload quantities 
 than in less-than-carload quantities is not in contravention of the Act 
 to Regulate Commerce. The circumstances and conditions of the trans- 
 portation in respect to the work done by the carrier and the revenue 
 parned are dissimilar, and may justify a reasonable difference in rate. 
 The public interests are subserved by carload classifications of property 
 that, on account of the volume transported to reach markets or supply 
 the demands of trade throughout the country, legitimately or usually 
 moves in such quantities.^' 
 
 However, a difference in rates upon carloads and less than car- 
 loads of the same merchandise between the same points of carriage so 
 wide as to be destructive to competition between large and small deal- 
 ers especially upon articles of general and necessary use and which, 
 under existing conditions of trade, furnish a large volume of business 
 to carrriers, is unjust and violates the provisions and principles of the 
 Act.^ 
 
 The differential between the carload and less-than-carload rate, 
 however, must be reasonable, fair and just.* 
 
 While, however, it is lawful for the carrier to establish carload 
 and less-than-carload rates on a particular commodity, with a reason- 
 able difference between the two rates and a reasonable carload min- 
 imum, the carrier cannot under the law be required to do so.* 
 
§609] TKAFFIC LAW SEKVICE 136 
 
 The Commission has hesitated to require the establishment of car- 
 load rates where none exist. If the normal unit of shipment is the 
 carload, as in coal, ore, etc., it is of course a public benefit to secure 
 for all the lower carload rate ; but if the accustomed traffic has a less 
 unit than a carload and ordinary shipments are by the ton or bale, or 
 hundredweight, the effect of a newer lower carload rate is to give an 
 advantage to the large shipper — a discrimination the Commission has 
 not encouraged even though its first result is to secure lower rates to 
 the large shipper, less cost to the carrier, and, in its encouragement of 
 trade, to increase the carrier's revenues.^ 
 
 1. Thurber v. New York C. & H. R. Rd. Co. (1890), 2 I. C. Rep. 742, 3 I. C. C. Rep. 473; 
 Duncan v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Rd Co. (1&93), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 85. 
 
 2. Thurber v. New York C. & H. R. Rd. Co., supra. 
 
 3. Harvard Co. v. Pennsylvania Co. (1890), 4 I. C. C. Rep. 212; 3 I. 0. Rep. 257; New 
 York Produce Exchange v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1898), 7 I. C. C. Rep. 612; 
 Brownell v. Columbus & C. M. Rd. Co. (1893), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 638, 4 I. C. Rep. 285; 
 Scofield V. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1888), 2 I. C. C. Rep. 90, 2 I. C. Rep. 67; 
 Business Men's League v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1902), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 318. 
 
 4. Planters' Compress Co. v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 382. 
 
 5. Kindel v. Boston & A. Rd Co. (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 495. 
 
 609-PP. Teain-load rates. 
 
 It is not always enough that open rates are made and strictly 
 observed, even if fair and reasonable for the service rendered ; nor is 
 it sufficient in every case that a relation of rates, just from the carrier's 
 standpoint, is maintained as between shipments of the same article by 
 different methods or in different quantities. For example, a carload 
 rate lower than the less-than-carload rate, where the difference is not 
 too great, would ordinarily be lawful; but a still lower rate for ship- 
 ments of 100 or 1,000 carloads, even though duly published and im- 
 partially applied would be wholly indefensible.^ 
 
 In repeated decisions, the Commission has held that the mere fact 
 that certain traffic is hauled in train-load lots cannot be made the basis 
 of rates different from those applied to shipments in single carloads.'' 
 
 In Planters' Compress Co. v. Cleveland, C. C. S St. L. Ry. Co.^ 
 the Commission said : ' ' Something akin to this in principle was decided 
 by the Commission during the first year of its existence. This was a 
 case where the carrier allowed a discount from its coal rates to con- 
 signees receiving not less than 30,000 tons a year. This was held to 
 be unlawful on the ground that it was a condition which most shippers 
 could not meet, and Judge Cooley in that case, speaking of the carriers' 
 offer of a lower rate on 30,000 tons yearly shipments, said that ' a dis- 
 crimination which should so limit the offer that a part of those who 
 could and might desire to accept it would be excluded from its benefits, 
 would for that very reason be unjust and indefensible.' Providence 
 Coal Co. V. Providence d W. R. Co., 1 I. C. C. Rep. 107, 1 Inters Com 
 Rep. 363. 
 
 "It is upon the same theory that a lower rate for a train load than 
 for a carload is regarded unlawful; because it is in effect allowing 
 lower rates upon a condition which only a few shippers can comply with 
 and consequently is an injustice to those unable to ship the required 
 quantity. ' ' 
 
137 FKEIGHT EATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 Whatever difference there may be in the cost to the carrier between 
 traffic in train loads and traffic in carloads, it appears from the general 
 course of legislation with respect to commerce between the states, from 
 the debates and reports of the various committees in Congress when 
 the act to regulate interstate commerce was under consideration, from 
 the better considered court opinions, and from the reports and opinions 
 of the Interstate Commerce Commission, that to give greater consid- 
 eration to trainload traffic than to carload traffic would create prefer- 
 ence in favor of large shippers and be to the prejudice of small shippers 
 and the public* 
 
 1. Carr v. Northern P. Ry. Ck). (1901), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 1. 
 
 2. Rickards v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 239; Anaconda Copper 
 Mining Co. v. Chicago & E. Rd. Co. (1910^, 19 I. C. C. Rep. 592; Carstens Packing 
 Co. V. Oregon S. L. Rd. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 324; Planters' Compress Co. v. 
 Cleveland, C. O. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 382; Woodward-Bennett Co. 
 V. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. Rd. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 664. 
 
 3. Planters' Compress Co. v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 
 382, 402; Paine Bros. & Co. v. Lehigh V. Rd. Co. (1897), 7 I. C. C. Rep. 218; Zim- 
 merman V. Great N. Ry. Co. (April 3, 1915), Unreported Opinion No. 7225; Wells 
 Lumber Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1916), 38 I. C. C. Rep. 464, 465, and 
 cases therein cited. 
 
 4. Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Chicago & E. Rd. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 
 592, 596. 
 
 609-QQ. HlGHEK EATES ON PEEISHABLE TEAFFIC 5:HAN ON ORDINAEY 
 
 FEEIGHT. 
 
 Where the carrier renders special service in the transportation of 
 perishable traffic, such as rapid transit and prompt delivery, a higher 
 rate than the carriage of ordinary freight is warranted.^ 
 
 Perishable freight requiring care, refrigeration and expedition in 
 transit and carriage in heavy refrigerator cars, is necessarily trans- 
 ported at greater cost to the carrier than that involved in the trans- 
 portation of ordinary freight.' 
 
 The handling of perishable fruit, for instance, is probably the 
 severest test of railroad transportation, so far as care, attention and 
 expense are involved. The very essence of such transportation is expe- 
 dition in addition to the speed required; there must be provided a 
 special car, loaded with ice, which has to be renewed when the trans- 
 portation is beyond certain fixed distances, or if, for any cause, there is 
 delay. It is of vital importance to the growers of perishable products 
 and the further development of the business that nothing should be 
 done which would have a tendency to decrease the efficiency of the 
 service.* 
 
 1. Loud V. South Carolina Rd. Co. (1892), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 529, 4 I. C. Rep. 205; Boston 
 Fruit & Produce Exchange v. New York & N. E. Rd. Co (1891), 4 I. C. C. Rep. 664, 
 3 I. C. Rep. 493. 
 
 2. Consolidated Forwarding Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 590. 
 
 3. Ozark Fruit Growers' Assn. v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 106. 
 
 609-E.R. Lower rates foe inland movement of export or import 
 
 TRAFFIC THAN FOR DOMESTIC TE.4FFIC 
 
 While export rates are ordinarily lower than domestic rates, this 
 is due to competitive conditions between the ports and not to the fact 
 that the cost of service on export shipments is less than on domeetio 
 
§609] TEAPFIC LAW, SERVICE 138 
 
 shipments/ Traffic is either local or export; if export, it must take 
 the export rate.^ For example, lumber from Louisiana points was 
 shipped to New Orleans, La., consigned to the shippers on consignee's 
 order. It was intended by both the carriers and the shippers that the 
 lumber should be exported. Held, That shipment from points of origin 
 to New Orleans was not intrastate so as to take the rates prescribed 
 by the Louisiana Railroad Commission, but that the shipment was 
 within the jurisdiction of the Federal government and took the rates 
 on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission.* 
 
 In fixing the charge for a terminal service on export traffic, the 
 service is considered in the nature of an additional service, for which 
 a reasonable and compensatory charge should be assessed.* 
 
 In New Orleans Board of Trade, Ltd. v. Illinois G. Rd. Co-'de- 
 dendant's export rates from Henderson and Owensboro, Ky., to New 
 Orleans, La., on tobacco are less per 100 pounds when the traffic is 
 destined to Liverpool and Bristol, England, than when destined to 
 other European ports : Held, That the different export rates are not 
 justified by any substantial dissimilarity of circumstances and condi- 
 tions. 
 
 In Erickson Co. v. Chicago, M. S St. P. Ry. Co.^ defendant's inland 
 proportion of through rates on "all commodities" from Chicago, 111., 
 via Vancouver, B. C, on traffic destined to points in Australia exceeds 
 the inland proportion of through rates from the same point of origin 
 to points in Japan, China, and the Philippine Island ; Held, That the 
 different export rates are not shown of record to result in undue preju- 
 dice or disadvantage to complainant. In dismissing the complaint, the 
 Commission stated: "The Commission has never held that it is per se 
 unlawful to publish different export rates to a port, dependent on the 
 foreign destination of the traffic. In New Orleans Board of Trade v. 
 /. C. R. R. Co., 23 I. C. C. 465, the defendant maintained different export 
 rates on tobacco to the port of New Orleans, dependent upon the des- 
 tination in Europe. Upon the facts of record the Commission found 
 that the shippers who were paying the higher export rates were sub- 
 jected to undue prejudice and disadvantage, but expressed no opinion 
 as to whether the carrier might lawfully maintain export rates to 
 New Orleans on traffic destined to South America different from the 
 export rates on traffic destined to Europe. Such differences in inland 
 proportions are always subject to complaint and investigation in any 
 particular case. 
 
 "Upon the facts of record in this case we are unable to find that 
 the maintenance by defendants of export rates on traffic to Australia 
 in excess of the export rates on traffic to the Orient subjects complain- 
 ant or its traffic to undue prejudice or disadvantage within the meaning 
 of the act." 
 
 It is a matter of common knowledge that import rates lower than 
 domestic rates are frequently, if not generally, influenced by consid- 
 erations which are unrelated to, and have little, if any bearing, upon 
 the reasonableness per se of the domestic rates.'' ' ' 
 
 See "Lower rate on inland movement of im.port or export traffio 
 than on domestic commerce, unlawful unless water movement shall have 
 been or is to be in a vessel documented under the latvs of the United 
 
139 FREIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 States," Section 609-YYY, post. "Discriminations, Preferences and 
 Advantages," Chapter 26, post. 
 
 1. National Lumber Exporters' Assn. y. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 
 78, 85. 
 
 2. Mobile Chamber of Commerce v. Mobile & O. Rd. Co. (1914), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 272, 282. 
 
 3. Railroad Commission of Louisiana v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (1913), 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 837, 840, 229 TJ. S. 336, 57 L. Ed. 1215. 
 
 4. Mobile Chamber of Commerce v. Mobile & O. Rd. Co., supra. 
 
 5. New Orleans Board of Trade, Ltd. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. 0. Rep. 465; 
 New Orleans Board of Trade, Ltd., v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 32. 
 
 6. Erickson Co. v. Chicago, M. & ,St. P. Ry. Co (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 414, 416. 
 
 7. Nagase & Co. Ltd. v. IMrector General, as Agent, Great N. Ry. Co. (1921), 62 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 422, 424. 
 
 609-SS. The dutebence between the impobt rate and the domestic 
 
 BATE ON A GIVEN COMMODITY SHOULD NOT BE XTNDUE OB UN- 
 REASONABLE. 
 
 In Louisiana Sugar Planters' Assn. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co.^ the In- 
 terstate Commerce Commission stated : ' ' The complainants insist that 
 as the service rendered in transporting the imported blackstrap is 
 exactly the same as the service rendered in transporting the domestic 
 blackstrap, there can be no lower rate on imported blackstrap than on 
 domestic blackstrap. It is now too late, however, to discuss that ques- 
 tion, as the Supreme Court in Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Interstate 
 Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 197, known as the Import Rate case, 
 held that foreign traffic when carried from the port of entry to final 
 destination and domestic traffic carried from the same port to the same 
 destination are not traffic of 'like kinds,' and that the service in the 
 one case is not performed under circumstances and conditions sub- 
 stantially similar to those under which the service rendered in the 
 other case is performed, and that therefore the rates on the two kinds of 
 traffic need not be the same. Following that case we have repeatedly 
 recognized the right of carriers to maintain lower rates on import 
 traffic than on domestic traffic, and imported goods move in large vol- 
 ume on special rates which are lower than the rates charged on goods 
 of the same kind which have not been imported. It does not follow, 
 however, because an import rate which is lower than the domestic may 
 be maintained on blackstrap that the difference in the two rates may be 
 whatever the carriers may choose to establish. In the Import Rate 
 case, supra, the court held that the Commission in determining whether 
 or not the difference made by the carrier between the import rate and 
 the domestic rate was unjust should consider all the circumstances and 
 conditions, including the interests of carriers, producers, dealers, and 
 consumers. The court said : 
 
 " 'Commerce, in the largest sense, must be deemed to be one of the most important 
 subjects of legislation, and an intention to promote and facilitate it, and not to hamper 
 or destroy it, is naturally to be attributed to Congress. The very terms of the statute, 
 that charges must be reasonable, that discrimination must not be unjust, and that pref- 
 erence or advantage to any particular person, firm, corporation, or locality must not be 
 undue or unrefisonaUe, necessarily imply that strict uniformity is not to be enforced; 
 but that all circumstances and conditions which reasonable men would regard as af- 
 fecting the welfare of the carrying companies, and of the producers, shippers, and con- 
 sumers, should be considered by a tribunal appointed to carry into eflfect and enforce 
 the provisions of the act.' 
 
 "It is not the duty of the Commission to determine merely whether 
 or not some difference may be made, but to determine whether or not 
 the particular difference made is unreasonable, and if unreasonable the 
 
§609] TKAFFIC LAW SERVICE 140 
 
 extent to which it is unreasonable. The Commission, following the 
 Import Eate Case, had repeatedly said that the difference made between 
 the import rate and the domestic rate must be a reasonable difference, 
 or such as is reasonably necessary. 
 
 "In Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. 
 Co., 13 I. C. C. 87, 99, we said: 
 
 " 'Not all discriminations are unlawful, but only such as are undue or unreasonable ; 
 if based on reason and good cause, discriminations cannot be condemned as unreason- 
 able. It is well settled by the highest judicial authority that the existence and effective- 
 ness of competition between carriers, whether by rail or water, whether subject to the 
 federal act of regulation or not, and competition of markets, or the absence of such com- 
 petition, are, among other things, pertinent to the question of similarity of circum- 
 stances and conditions involved in the ultimate question of fact under sections 3 and 4, 
 and as to whether the discrimination complained of and shown is or is not undue or 
 unreasonable. Since, in view of these rulings, it is the duty of the Commission in pass- 
 ing upon these questions to look to these and other facts, wherever found, pertaining 
 to the traiflc Involved, upon the theory that the carriers may lawfully within reason 
 meet the circumstances and conditions which confront them. It follows that we must 
 recognize the due and logical effect of the situation thus presented. The necessary con- 
 clusion is that discriminations of the nature referred to in sections 3 and 4 of the act, in 
 so far as they result from hona fide action of a carrier in meeting circumstances and 
 conditions not of its own creation, and which are reasonably necessary for that purpose, 
 do not of necessity fall under the condemnation of the law.' 
 
 "Again, in Chamber of Commerce of New York v. N. Y. C. & II . R. 
 R. R. Co., 24 I. C. C. 55, 74, the Commission said: 
 
 "'We, have no jurisdiction over the ocean rates and must deal with this question 
 as though the ports were destinations instead of gateways. This does not mean that the 
 carriers may not take into consideration the previous or further transportation of the 
 traffic of the ocean and thus differentiate it, reasonably, from domestic traffic, but rates 
 to and from ports must be reasonable, must be published as Independent from the ocean 
 transportation, and are subject to all the provisions of the act' 
 
 ' ' Having concluded that there may be some difference between the 
 import rate and the domestic rate on blackstrap molasses, we must now 
 determine whether or not the difference made is a reasonable differ- 
 ence; and if not, we must determine the extent to which the existing 
 difference is unreasonable. The difference between the two rates should 
 not be so great as to materially injure a domestic industry if a smaller 
 difference would enable the imported article to move freely, and at a 
 cost to the consumer which would not be unreasonable. ' ' 
 
 See "Lower rate on inland m,ovement of import or export traffic 
 than on domestic commerce, unlatvful unless water m,ovement shall have 
 been or is to be in a vessel documented under the laws of the United. 
 States", Section 609-YYY, post. 
 
 1. Louisiana Sugar Planters' Assn. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 311, 
 317 et seq; affirmed, Louisiana Sugar Planters' Assn. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1915), 
 34 I. C. C. Rep. 253. 
 
 609-TT. An imported commodity is not entitled to an inland propor- 
 tional RATE WHICH IS LOWER THAN THE DOMESTIC RATE 
 WHEN THE TRANSPORTATION FROM THE PORT OF ENTRY IS 
 PURELY LOCAL. 
 
 An importer of flax after unloading a cargo at the ports, sold it, 
 and the purchaser some months later sold a part of the original ship- 
 ment to a manufacturing company, by which it was shipped to a point 
 in the Middle West at the regular local rate of the carrier that took the 
 movement. At the same time there was in effect an inland proportional 
 rate from the port of destination : Held, That the movement from the 
 
141 FREIGHT KATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 port was a separate and distinct transaction upon which the local rate 
 _ was the only lawfully applicable rate.^ It should be noted in this case 
 that the shipment lost its identity as an import after having been held 
 in warehouse by the purchaser at port of entrj'. 
 
 In Louisiana Sugar Planters' Assv. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co.^ in adher- 
 ing to its former report and order the Commission stated: "The only 
 finding of fact which is questioned is the ultimate conclusion that the 
 charging of rates on imported blackstrap molasses from the ports of 
 New Orleans and Mobile which are lower than the rates charged on 
 domestic blackstrap from the same ports is not unjustly discriminatory 
 against domestic blackstrap. 
 
 "Counsel for the intervener insist that this case is unlike the 
 Import Rate case, .162 U. S. 197, cited in the original report, for the 
 reason that in that case thaiimport traffic moved under a through bill of 
 lading from the foreign point of origin and would have moved to des- 
 tination wholly by water if the rail carrier had not made a lower rate 
 from an intermediate port than that it charged on domestic traffic from 
 the same port. While it is true that the import traffic involved in that 
 case could and probably would have moved all the way to destination by 
 water if the carrier had not made a lower rate than that it charged 
 on domestic traffic by rail from the same intermediate port, it is also 
 true that in the instant case the imported product could not move at all 
 from the port of entry to interior destinations in competition with the 
 domestic product but for rates somewhat lower than the domestic rates. 
 We therefore have here a case where it is to the interest of both car- 
 riers and consumers that the rate should be made low enough to make 
 it possible for the imported product to move, thus bringing the case 
 clearly within the principle of the Import Rate Case. 
 
 "It is said, however, that the mere fact that goods were imported at 
 some time in the past does not entitle them to a lower rate than that 
 charged on goods produced in this country; but conceding that to be 
 true the rates on blackstrap here involved apply only where the black- 
 strap is pumped from tank steamers into storage tanks on the rail- 
 road right of way and then pumped from those thanks into the tank cars 
 in which it is shipped by rail from the port, the identity of the imported 
 shipment being preserved. When imported goods have been mingled 
 with and have become a part of the general property of the country, 
 no difference can be made between the rates on such goods and goods of 
 domestic origin for the reason that there can in such event be no cer- 
 tainty of identity. Carriers and shippers are both responsible for 
 misapplication of the import rates to domestic shipments by com- 
 mingling the imported products with domestic, or otherwise. 
 
 "The fact that the rail transportation from the port is not under 
 a through bill of lading is not material. While the traffic involved in 
 the Import Rate case did not move under a through bill of lading, that 
 fact, as clearly appears from the reasoning of the court, did not affect 
 the conclusion. Nor should the possibility of cheating by pumping 
 domestic blackstrap into the storage tanks and thus defeating the pub- 
 lished rate on domestic blackstrap outlaw altogether a practice rea- 
 sonable and lawful in itself. No tariff is self -operative to the effectual 
 prevention of the possibility of fraud. Carriers must take the neces- 
 sary precautions to preserve the integrity of published rates." 
 
<609] TEAFFIC LAW SERVICE 142 
 
 See "Lower rate on inland movement of import or export traffic 
 than on domestic commerce, unlawful unless water movement shall 
 have heen or is to be in' a vessel documented under the laws of the 
 United States," Section 609-YYY, post. 
 
 1. Con. Eul. Bui., Rule 170, (April 13, 1909). 
 
 2. Louisiana Sugar Planters' Assn. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1915), 34 I. C. C. Rep. 253; 
 affirming, Louisiana Sugar Planters' Assn. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 311. 
 
 609-UU. Requieement that impoet feeight be blaced in a bonded 
 
 WAEEHOXJSE OE DELIVEEED TO THE EAIL CAEEIEE DIEECT FBOM 
 ship's side ok dock of vessel as CONDITION PRECEDENT TO 
 APPLICATION OP IMPOST EATE. 
 
 In Swift £ Co, V. Baltimore S Ohio*Rd. Co.^ the Commission 
 stated: "The Baltimore & Ohio Rd. Co. o-«tis the bonded warehouse 
 at Locust Point. The complainants endeavored to obtain storage for 
 this shipment, but could not, owing to the fact that the bonded ware- 
 houses of the defendant were filled with the traffic of other shippers. 
 Thereupon the complainant endeavored to obtain storage in other 
 bonded warehouses, without avail, and the consequent higher rate was 
 imposed. The traffic of the Baltimore & Ohio were not objectionable 
 for the reason that they required as a condition of according the import 
 rate that the traffic should be stored in a bonded warehouse or deliv- 
 ered to the carrier from the ship itself. The railroad not only had the 
 right but ought to protect itself by some effective means against the 
 improper application of the import rate. 
 
 "The tariff did, however, contain upon its face an unla^^'ful dis- 
 crimination, in that it provided that storage would be given when avail- 
 able. This meant that one shipper might receive this concession while 
 it was refused to another. 
 
 ' ' The practical application of the tariff in this case, therefore, has 
 been to unjustly discriminate against the complainant in that it has 
 been compelled to pay a domestic rate, and reparation will therefore be 
 awarded in the difference between that rate and the import rate. ' ' 
 
 In the case of National Doch d Storage Warehouse Go. v. Boston 
 & A. Rd. Co.,^ the. Commission stated. "The complainant, National 
 Dock & Storage Warehouse Company, is a corporation duly organized 
 and existing under the laws of the commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
 and bonded and licensed under such laws to do a general warehouse 
 business. The issue in this case is whether a certain rule of defend- 
 ants' tariffs relating to the application of rates on import traffic 
 shipped from Boston, Mass., subjects complainant to unjust discrimi- 
 nation or undue prejudice. The rule in question reads as follows : 
 
 " 'Rates named herein apply only on property coming from foreign ports (other 
 than ports in the maritime provinces and Newfoundland) into the United States and de- 
 livered to the rail carrier direct from the ship's side or dock of the vessel bringing such 
 property to Boston, or on such property received by rail carrier from customs bonded 
 warehouses or appraisers' stores (not internal revenue stores).' 
 
 "There is no substantial dispute as to the facts. Complainant 
 owns and operates a public Avarehouse at East Boston, Mass., for the 
 storage of all kinds of traffic, whether foreign or domestic. It also 
 maintains a wharf on the east side of Boston Harbor, at which steam- 
 
143 FREIGHT EATES AND CHARGES .[§609 
 
 ers unload traffic consisting chiefly of wool and hides from South 
 America. 
 
 "The defendant, Boston & Albany Railroad Company, operates a 
 warehouse on the east side of Boston harbor for the storage of import 
 and export traffic, and occasionally of domestic traffic, chiefly cotton 
 and wool, but its warehouse is operated chiefly as an adjunct to its 
 transportation service. The two warehouses are in active competition 
 with each other for storage traffic, both import and export, and domes- 
 tic cotton and wool. The rails of the Boston & Albany reach complain- 
 ant's warehouse, as well as its own, and make connection between such 
 warehouse and the docks of the harbor. 
 
 "The commodities involved in this proceeding are wool and hides, 
 which are imported free of duty and are not stored in 'customs bonded 
 warehouses or appraisers' stores.' These commodities are shipped 
 from complainant's warehouse chiefly to Montreal, Canada, and to 
 Montreal rate points, to all of which import rates are published from 
 Boston and East Boston. The import rates are considerably lower 
 than the domestic rates, and under the tariff rule in question import 
 traffic stored in the warehouse of the Boston & Albany is given the ben- 
 efit of import rates when shipped out to points that bring shipments 
 within the act, but if stored in and shipped from complainant's ware- 
 house domestic rates are applied. 
 
 "Prior to January 1, 1914, wool and some kinds of hides were duti- 
 able, and therefore generally went into 'bonded warehouses or apprais- 
 ers' stores,' and under the tariff rule were entitled to import rates 
 when shipped out. When storage is in such a warehouse the importer 
 to obtain his goods must pay the duty, which fact constitutes a protec- 
 tion against the danger of an improper application of the rate and dis- 
 tinguishes such storage from that of complainant here involved. When 
 such storage is with a carrier upon delivery direct from the incoming 
 ship the carrier can and must under the law see that the import rate is 
 properly applied. 
 
 "The storage charges of the Boston & Albany are filed with this 
 Commission and are and must be uniform as to all shipments. The 
 complainant files no tariffs and may make different cliarges to different 
 persons for like services. 
 
 "In Sivift & Co. V. B. & 0. B.. B. Co., 21 I. C C, 241, 242, we 
 said: 
 
 " The tariffs of the BaltimoRj & Ohio were not objectionable for the reason that 
 they required as a condition of according the import rate that the traffic should be stored 
 In a bonded warehouse or delivered to the carrier from the ship itself. The railroad not 
 only had the right but ought to protect itself by some effective means against the im- 
 proper application of the import rate.' 
 
 "In the operation of the warehouse here in question complainant 
 gives bond under the Massachusetts Statute, but is under no statutory 
 or contractual obligation to protect carriers against application of im- 
 port rates to domestic traffic or to foreign traffic which for various 
 reasons may not be entitled to such rates. 
 
 "From all the facts of record we find and conclude that the tariff 
 provisions here attacked are not shown to be unjustly discriminatory 
 nor unduly prejudiced. 
 
 "An order dismissing the complaint will be entered." 
 
§609] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 144 
 
 See "Lower rate on inland movement of import or export traffic 
 than on domestic commerce, unlawful imless water movement shall 
 have been or is to be in a vessel documented under the laws of the 
 United States, 609-YYY, post. 
 
 1. Swift & Co. V. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 242. 
 
 2. National Dock & Storage Warehouse Co. v. Boston & A. Rd. Co. (1915), 33 I. 0. C. 
 Rep. 330. 
 
 609-VV. Carriers may not adjust their rates so as to regulate for- 
 eign TRAFFIC through CERTAIN PORTS. 
 
 In Chamber of Commerce of the State New York v. ISiew York 
 C. (& H. R. Rd. Co.^ the Commission stated: "Boston suggests that 
 New York had little to say as to diversion of export traffic from New 
 York to Boston 'for the very good reason that the inland export rates 
 are the same to the two ports,' and that on equal export rates, inland 
 and ocean. New York 'is cutting the ground from under Boston.' It is 
 difficult to see how any unjust discrimination against Boston can be 
 found in an adjustment which for a substantially longer rail haul gives 
 it the same rates as New York, and it is equally difficult to see upon 
 what basis we would find that Boston is entitled to lower inland rates 
 on traffic to or from differential territory than is New York. 
 
 "It is said that under equal inland rates to New York and Boston 
 any change in the relative movement of this traffic caused by change m 
 the ocean rates simply manifests the need of the steamship lines which 
 have lines common to both ports for the particular traffic at the respect- 
 ive ports. Manifestly this is so and it ought to be so, and in a modified 
 degree it is true where differentials exist, for the ocean rates to and 
 from the differential ports are fluctuated in order to accommodate the 
 needs and wishes of the steamship lines. Each of the ports contends 
 that its traffic is 'diverted' to one or more of the other ports, but inas- 
 much as no fixed proportion of the traffic has been assigned to any port 
 and as the records show that the percentages of traffic moving through 
 the different ports varies from year to year and from period to period, 
 it would seem more accurate to say that the rate adjustments are made 
 for the purpose of attracting traffic to the several ports. 
 
 "In recent years certain steamship lines have arranged their 
 sailings so that their vessels land at Boston or Philadelphia on the 
 westward voyage and proceed thence to Baltimore to leave part of 
 their cargo and to secure cargo for the eastward voyage. The exporta- 
 tions of grain from Baltimore have greatly increased in recent years. 
 It may be that this is to some extent due to the differential rates, but 
 to some extent it is because of attractive port facilities for the handling 
 of that traffic, and in part it comes from the large quantities of near-by 
 grain which could not under any reasonable rate adjustment find outlet 
 through the other ports. 
 
 "Boston experiences some difficulty in getting steamers to come 
 there with imports which it needs because the vessels are unable to 
 there secure eastbound lading. But it cannot be that in law the duty 
 devolves upon the railroads to so adjust their rates as to equalize those 
 conditions, or that it is within the reasonable and proper exercise of 
 the powers of this Commission to require such adjustments. If certain 
 
145 
 
 FREIGHT EATES AND CHAEGES [§609 
 
 imports would naturally move to Boston and certain exports would 
 naturally move from Baltimore, why should the railroads or this Com- 
 mission so adjust the rail rates as "to equally divide that tonnage and 
 insure equal steamship sailings to and from those ports!" 
 
 Whether export and import traffic will move through a particular 
 port, depends upon the combined rail and water rate to the foreign 
 destination. The competition is between port and port rather than 
 between railroads to a given port." 
 
 The differential system is intended to adjust on a practical basis 
 the rivalries of the northern seabound ports on import, export and do- 
 mestic traffic.^ 
 
 1. Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York v. Xew York C. & H. R. Rd. Co. 
 (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 55, 64. 
 
 2. New England Investigation (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 560, 613. 
 
 3. Scott Paper Co. v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 601, 602. 
 
 609-WW. Any-quantity bates. 
 
 The Interstate Commerce Commission has decided that where car- 
 riers have in effect a uniform rate per 100 pounds for freight in any 
 quantities, which rate applies uniformly to all shippers, a different rate 
 applied to carloads from that applied to less-than carloads will not be 
 ordered, especially when such differential will have a tendency to in- 
 crease the rate on less-than carloads and further to cut off consumers 
 and small dealers from purchasing at distant market in less-than 
 carload lots.^ 
 
 The any-quantity rate rests upon sound public policy. It enables 
 the small shipper to compete on fairly equal terms with his powerful 
 competitor, thereby counteracting in a measure the public tendency to- 
 wards monopoly. While the Commission has consistently sustained 
 the legality of a differential between carload and less-than-carload 
 rates upon the ground that the difference in cost of service justifies a 
 reasonable difference in charge, it is highly significant that no order 
 has ever been issued requiring that an any-quantity basis be super- 
 seded.^ 
 
 When a carrier instead of providing a carload and less-than-car- 
 load rate, provides only an any-quantity rate, the presumption is that 
 it is higher than a carload rate and lower than a less-than-carload rate 
 would be.* 
 
 One of the benefits, if not one of the objects, of an "any-quantity 
 rate" is that it leaves the carrier with some freedom in the use of its 
 equipment. Such a tariff gives the shipper no right to demand a car 
 of a given size.* 
 
 Under a local any-quantity rate, the carrier may use any available 
 equipment notwithstanding the fact that the tariffs of a connecting line 
 provide a minimum weight under a carload rate.'' 
 
 The unit of transportation is one for carriers to decide as long as 
 they publish reasonable any-quantity rates, and they will not ordinarily 
 be required to apply different rates to carloads than to less-than car- 
 loads, especially if to do so would tend to increase the prevailing rates 
 for less-than carloads.^ 
 
§609] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 146 
 
 Though the Commission has often recognized the propriety of dif- 
 ferential between carload and less-than-carload rates, it does not fol- 
 low that an any-quantity rate is by reason of being such, unreasonable 
 when applied to carload traffic/ 
 
 Dairy products, dressed poultry, fresh fish, and sometimes fresh 
 meat are usually based on any-quantity rates.^ 
 
 Under conditions which exist in the cotton business an any-quan- 
 tity rate is a practical necessity, and an order requiring that it be su- 
 perseded by carload and less-than-carload rates would be detrimental 
 to the public interests." 
 
 Replacing an any-quantity rate by a carload and less-than-carload 
 rate is not unlawful/" 
 
 The Commission has approved the application of any-quantity 
 rates on traffic moving by freight in the absence of a showing that the 
 demands of the public would not be adequately served unless carload 
 rates were established/^ 
 
 The fact that an any-quantity rating is applied does not neces- 
 sarily show that the charges resulting are unreasonable or unduly 
 prejudicial to the carload shipper. If, however, the rating does result 
 in unreasonable or unduly prejudicial charges, the Commission has the 
 power and it is its duty to prescribe just and reasonable rates. ^^ 
 
 1. Duncan & Co. v. Nashville C. & St. L. Ky. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 590; Taylor 
 Dry Goods Co. v. Missouri P. Ey. Co. (1913). 28 I. C. C. Rep. 205. 
 
 2. Commercial Club of Omaha v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 397; 
 citing Brownell v. Columbus & C. M. Rd. Co. (1893), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 638, 4 I. C. 
 Rep. 2S5; Kindel v. Boston & A. Rd. (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 495, 506; Weil v. 
 Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1906), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 627; Duncan & Co. v. Nashville C. & 
 St. L. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 590; Procter & Gamble Distributing Co. v. 
 Alabama C. Ry. Co. (1921), 61 I. C. C. Rep. 700. 
 
 3. Mutual Rice Trade & Development Assn. of Houston v. International & G. N. Rd. 
 Co. (1912), 23 I. 0. C. Rep. 219, 224. 
 
 4. Falls & Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 269,V 272. 
 
 5. Ibid. 
 
 6. Stuarts Draft Milling Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 623, 631; 
 Greater Des Moines Committee v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 54; Bentley & Olmsted Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 56. 
 
 7. Wichita Business Assn. v. Atchison, T. & ,S. F. Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 45, 52. 
 
 8. Minimum Weight on Fresh Meats and Other Commodities (1914), 30 I. C. 0. Rep. 
 349. 
 
 9. American Round Bale Press Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1914), 32 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 458, 465. 
 
 ■la Jouannet v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 392. 
 
 11. Kimberly Clark Co. v American Ex. Co. (1917), 45 I. C. C. Rep. 7; citing, Stuarts 
 Draft Milling Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 623. 
 
 12. Kansas Car-Lot Egg Shippers Assn. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1919), 53 I. 0. C. 
 Rep. 59, 63. 
 
 609-XX. Group OR "blanket" RATES. 
 
 In the transportation of low-grade commodities that move in bulk 
 and in large quantities, such as coal, lumber, grain, etc., it is a long 
 established custom to group or "blanket" a number of stations or a 
 large expense of territory. Such rate adjustment, necessarily, to some 
 extent, disregards distance. In the case of grain moving from points 
 of origin, if strictly distance rates were applied, it is apparent that a 
 certain distance from a market that is prepared to purchase the sur- 
 plus the rate would be prohibitive.^ Therefore, in all cases of "blan- 
 ket" or group rates there is, of necessity, more or less disregard of 
 
147 FREIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 distance and varying degrees of inequality, but such inequalities are 
 not of necessity unreasonable or unjust when the situation is viewed 
 from every standpoint, taking into account all interests. 
 
 Absolute and demonstrable equality in all respects is not attain- 
 able. Eeasonable approximation is the most that can be expected 
 ordinarily. Though not always the case, these grouping or blanket ar- 
 rangements in many cases, especially with reference to particular com- 
 modities, are of great advantage to the public and without serious in- 
 justice to any interests.^ 
 
 In The New York Harbor Case^ the Commission stated: "The 
 practice of embracing many points within the same group or zone has 
 been so generally adopted by the carriers and so frequently recognized 
 as proper by this Commission that its general propriety can hardly be 
 challenged. Not only does this practice greatly simplify the publica- 
 tion of tariffs, to the convenience of both the carriers and the public, 
 but the application of a common rate to a number of points in the same 
 general territory effects an equality of opportunity which is usually 
 most desirable ; and this is particularly true where the points in ques- 
 tion produce and ship the same commodity or derive their raw ma- 
 terials from the same sources. Producers in all parts of the port 
 of New York are manufacturing goods for sale in common markets 
 throughout the world. 
 
 "Actual distances and actual costs are commonly disregarded in 
 the construction of rate groups, and so long as their general propriety 
 is recognized it is of course impossible to entertain the view that a rate 
 is unlawful solely because it does not reflect with approximate accuracy 
 the actual cost of performing the transportation service. 
 
 "In Stirits v. N. 0., M. S C. R. R. Co., 22 I. C. C, 578, 581, we said: 
 
 " 'The Commission has repeatedly recognized and approved the grouping of points, 
 within reasonable limits, for the purpose of malving rates, and it will not disturb such 
 groupings In the absence of proof that as to particular points in a zone the adjustment 
 results In unreasonable rates or undue prejudice and disadvantage.' 
 
 "The chief justification for a rate zone is that it places all pro- 
 ducers on the same footing in a given market. Ferguson Saw Mill v. 
 St. L., I. M. d S. Ry. Co., 18 I. C. C, 396, 398. Blanket or group rates 
 in many cases are of great advantage to the public v/ithout serious in- 
 justice to any interest, though there is of necessity more or less dis- 
 regard of distance and varying degrees of inequality. Chicago Lum- 
 ber & Coal Co. v. T. S. Ry. Co., 16 I. C. C, 323, 334. 
 
 ' ' Grouping or blanket arrangements are of great advantage to the 
 public, and, once established, groups should not be lightly or unneces- 
 sarily disturbed. Clyde Coal Co. v. P R. R. Co., 23 I. C. C, 135, 138. 
 But the Commission has never approved a group rate that resulted in 
 undue prejudice to any part of the group; and whether or not the 
 grouping of points constitutes undue or unjust discrimination must be 
 determined from the facts in each case. Soiithivestern Missouri Mil- 
 lers Club V. M. K. cC- T. Ry. Co., 22 I. C. C, 442; Muskogee Traffic 
 Rureau v. A., T. S S. F. Ry. Co., 17 I. C. C, 169, 173." 
 
 In the interest of the shipping and consuming pubhc a carrier has 
 the undoubted right to consider within proper limitations the condi- 
 tions under which industries on its lines in the same general territory 
 
§609] TRAFFIC LAW. SERVICE 148 
 
 v?ith other industries are compelled to conduct their business. One of 
 these conditions may be a handicap of higher rates on raw material. 
 Groups in rate-making are, therefore, made largely with respect of 
 business as distinguished from transportation conditions. In other 
 words, grouping is done with a reasonable disregard to commercial 
 conditions.* 
 
 For instance, as coal is one of the principal necessities of life, it 
 would not be in the public interest to enhance the cost to consumers by 
 compelling a higher rate from more distant points in a particular coal 
 district, to which a group rate is applied, for the purpose of increasing 
 the profits of miners more favorably situated with respect to a common 
 market.^ 
 
 It frequently happens that group rates are the most just, and pro- 
 mote, in the highest degree, healthy competition. Whether a coal mine 
 can sell in a particular market usually depends upon its rate of freight, 
 and it is the almost universal custom to create groups which embrace 
 certain mines, giving to all these mines the same rate, even though 
 the distance may be different.® To make such rates illegal, however, 
 they must operate to subject some shipper, locality or species of traffic 
 to undue or unreasonable disadvantage.''' 
 
 When the difference in the transportation expense from the vari- 
 ous parts of a given district is considerable and substantial group rates 
 should not be discouraged.* 
 
 There is no requirement of law that origin and, destination groups 
 shall be co-extensive in area. Except, perhaps, in the adjustment of 
 transcontinental rates it may be said to be the usual practice for origin 
 group rates to apply to destination points singly or grouped only a 
 few together. This is the general plan of the adjustment of the rates 
 applicable from the coal and lumber blanket territories of the country, 
 which present the most typical and important instances of grouping." 
 
 In Silica Sand Producers' Ass'n. v. Director General, Chicago, B. 
 & Q. Rd. Co. " the Commission stated: "In support of the contention 
 that the zone system should be replaced by a more orderly progression 
 of rates, complainants point out irregularities in ton-mile and car-mile 
 earnings to points within a given group and to points in other groups. 
 Such irregularities are to be found in any group system of rates, and 
 so long as the rates are not unreasonable, or otherwise in violation of 
 the act, the fact that the method of profession is not according to any 
 particular mathematical system, does not subject them to condemna- 
 tion." 
 
 Necessarily points on the farther edge of a' group have more favor- 
 able rates, relatively, than under a distance scale, and points on the 
 nearer edge, have less favorable rates.^^ 
 
 Of course, the propriety of the application of a group rate is open 
 to challenge in every case, and every case must be justified upon its 
 own facts and peculiar circumstances.^^ 
 
 1. Kansas City Transportation Bureau v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. C!o, (1909), 16 I. G. 
 C Rep. 195. 
 
 2. Chicago Lumber & Coal Co. v. Tioga S. E. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C C Rep 323 
 
 3. New York Harbor Case (1917), 47 I. C. C. Rep. 643, 712, 713; Goodman Drilling 
 Co. V. Director General, as Agent, Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. (1921), 61 I. C. C. Bep. 
 164, 167. 
 
149 FREIGHT BATES AND CHAKGES [§609 
 
 4. Avery Mfg. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 20; Imperial 
 Coal Co. V. Pittsburgh & L. E. Rd. Co. (18S9), 2 I. C. C. Rep. 618, 2 I. C. C. Rep. 436. 
 
 5. Imperial Coal Co. v. Pittsburgh & L. L. Rd. Co., supra. 
 
 6. In the Matter of the Investigation of Alleged Unreasonable Rates and Practices 
 Involved in the Transportation of Wool, Hides, and Pelts from various Western 
 Points of Origin to Eastern Destinations (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 151, 164; Wiscon- 
 sin & Arkansas Lumber Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1915), 33 I. C. C. Rep. 
 33. 
 
 7. Hilton Lumber Co. v. Wilmington & W. Rd. Co. (1901), 9 I. 0. C. Rep. 17; La- 
 crosse Manufacturers & Jobbers' Union v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (188&), 1 
 L C. C. Rep. 629, 2 I. C. Rep. 9; Lippman & Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1889), 2 I C. 
 C. Rep. 784, 2 I. C. Rep. 414. 
 
 8. Newland v. Northern P. Rd. Co. (1894), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 131, 4 I. C. Rep. 474. 
 
 9. St. Louis Chamber of Commerce v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1920), 57 I. C. C. Rep. 
 639, 648. 
 
 10. Silica Sand Producers Assn. v. Director General, Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1920), 
 58 I. C. C. Rep. 549, 552. 
 
 11. Corporation Commission of North Carolina v. Director General, Atlantic C. L. Rd. 
 Co. (1921), 62 I. C. C. Rep. 64, 70. 
 
 12. Howell V. New York L. E. & W. Rd. Co. (1888), 2 I. C. C. Rep. 272, 2 I. C. Rep. 162; 
 Imperial Coal Co. v. Pittsburgh & L. E. Rd. Co. supra. See following cases on the 
 question of blanket rates : Delaware State Grange v. New York, P. & N. Rd. Co. 
 (1892), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 161, 3 I. C. Rep. 828; MUk Producers Protective Assn. v. 
 Delaware, L. & W. Rd. Co. (1897), 7 I. C. C. Rep. 92; Dallas Freight Bureau v. 
 Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 427; Bovaird Supplv Co. v. Atchi- 
 son, T. & ,S. F. Ry. Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 56, 66; Black Mountain Coal Land 
 Co. V. Southern Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 286, 292; Hitchman Coal & Coke 
 Co. V. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 512, 520, 521; Saginaw Board 
 of Trade v. Grand T. Ry Co. (1900), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 128, 136; Muskogee Traffic 
 Bureau v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1900), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 169, 178; Ferguson 
 V. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1910), IS I. C. C. Rep. 391, 393; Ferguson v. St. 
 Louis, I. M. c& S. Ry. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 396, 398; Commercial Club of 
 Salt Lake City, Utah, v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 218, 
 226; Corporation Commission of the State of North Carolina v. Norfolk & W. Ry. 
 Co. (1910), 19 I. O. C. Rep. 303, 309; In the Matter of the Investigation and Sus- 
 pension of Advances in Rates by Carriers for the Transportation of Cement Plaster 
 from Stations in Oklahoma to Stations in Texas (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 591, 594; 
 Arlington Heights Fruit Exchange v. Southern P. Co. (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 149, 
 154, 156; Southwestern Missouri Millers' Club v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1912), 
 22 I. O. C. Rep. 422, 425; Stiritz v. New Orleans, M. & C. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 578, 581 ; In the Matter of the Investigation of Alleged Unreasonable Rates 
 and Practices Involved in the Transportation of Wool, Hides, and Pelts from Vari- 
 ous Western Points of Origin to Eastern Destinations (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 151, 
 164; Transportation Bureau of the City of Wichita, Kansas, v. St. Louis, & iS. F. 
 Rd. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 679, 680; Santa Rosa Traffic Assn. v. Southern P. 
 Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 46; Anadarko Cotton Oil Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. 
 Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 327, 330; Johnson v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. (1912), 
 
 24 I. C. C. Rep. 698; Multnomah Lumber & Box Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1912), 
 
 25 I. C. C. Rep. 123, 128; Southern Furniture Mfrs. Assn. v. Southern Ry. Co. 
 (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 379, 386; Switzer Lumber Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. 
 (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 611; Taylor v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 
 613; Superior Commercial Club of Superior, Wis. v. Great N. Ry. Co. (1912), ^ 
 I. C. C. Rep. 342, 345 ; Chamber of Commerce of Milwaukee v. Chicago, M. & St. P. 
 Ry. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 342; Duluth Board of Trade v. Great N. Ry. Co. 
 (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 342; In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of 
 Advances in Rates by Carriers for the Transportation of News Print Paper from 
 Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, to Various Points in the United States (1913), 26 I. O. C. 
 Rep. 13, 19 ; In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates 
 by Carriers for the Transportation of Various Commodities from Eastern Shipping 
 Points to Points in California, Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia (1913), 
 
 26 I. C. C. Rep. 456, 461; Texas Cement Plaster Co. v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. 
 (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 508; Waukesha Lime & iStone Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. 
 Ry. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 515, 518; In the Matter of the Investigation and 
 Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers for the Transportation of Certain 
 Commodities between Certain Stations located in Texas Common-Point Territory 
 and St. Louis, Mo. and Other Points (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 528, 538; West Vir- 
 ginia Rail Co. V. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 622; Betcher v. 
 Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 335; Brown v. Boston & M. 
 Rd. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 47; In the Matter of the Investigation and Sus- 
 pension of Advances in Class and Commodity Rates by Carriers operating between 
 New Orleans, La., and Other Points in the South and Points in Illinois (1913), 27 
 I. C. C. Rep. 122; Lumber Rates from Southern Mills to Certain Points in the East 
 (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 189; Chicago-Duluth Grain Rates (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 216, 
 217; Clinton Mfrs. & Shippers' Assn. v. Chicago & A. Rd. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 
 230. 232; Federal Milling Co. v. Minneapolis, (St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 
 I. C. C. Rep. 696; Victor Mfg. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 661, 
 664; In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Class and 
 Commodity Rates between Points in Iowa and Minnesota and Points in Pacific 
 Coast Territory (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 1; Iowa State Board of Railroad Commis- 
 
§609] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 150 
 
 sioners v. Arizona E. Kd. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 193, 198; Prinkey v. Baltimore 
 & O. Rd. Co. (1914), 32 I. C. C. Kep. 32, 33; Hammerschmidt & Franzen Co. v. Chi- 
 cago & N. "W. Ky Co. (1914), 30 I. C. O. Rep. 71, 81; Seattle Shingle Co. v. Chicago, 
 M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 364, 367; Coal Rates from Virginia Mines 
 (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 635, 642; Kaufman Commercial Club v. Texas & N. O. Rd. 
 Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 167, 170; Oklahoma Cottonseed Crushers Assn. v. Mis- 
 souri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1915), 35 I. C. C. Rep. 94, 106; Cape Girardeau Portland 
 Cement Co. v. St Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1915), 35 I. C. C. Rep. 109, 114; Browns- 
 ville Cotton Oil & Ice Co. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1915), 36 I. C. O. Rep. 401, 403; 
 Scott V. Cape Charles Rd. Co. (1916), 38 I. C. C. Rep. 467, 471; Pardee Works v. 
 Central Rd. of N. J. (1916), 39 I. C. C. Rep. 162, 165; Memphis Freight Bureau 
 V. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1916), 39 I. C. C. Rep. 303, 308; State of Iowa v. 
 Wabash Ry. Co. (1917), 46 I. C. C. Rep. 703, 709; National Tube Co. v. Lake Ter- 
 minal Rd. Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 469; Utilities Development Corporation v. 
 Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Rd. Co. (1920), 56 I. C. C. Rep. 694; Dothan Chamber of 
 Commerce v. Director General, Alabama G. S. Rd. Co. (1920), 58 I. C. C. Rep. 537; 
 Cambrai Steel Co. v. Director General, as Agent, Northern P. Ry. Co. (1921), 60 
 I. C. C. Rep. 459; Holmes Hallowell Co. v. Great N. Ry. Co. (1921), 60 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 687. 
 
 609- YY. Graduated rates. 
 
 The general rule contemplated by the Statute of equitably gradu- 
 ated charges on like traffic with reasonable reference to the amount of 
 the service is just in itself, and commonly most beneficial both to the 
 carriers and to the public, and is only to be departed from when justi- 
 fied by exceptional conditions, and in such'instances no longer than the 
 conditions require.^ 
 
 The Commission in considering rates to Pacific Coast Terminals 
 from points east of the Missouri River stated that nothing in the Act 
 would prevent transcontinental lines from putting into effect, if they 
 saw fit, a system of graded rates so that Chicago and other intermedi- 
 ate points would take lower rates to the Pacific Coast than points on 
 the Atlantic seaboard.^ 
 
 1. Lehman, Higginson & Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1890), 3 I. C. Rep. 80, 4 I. C. C. Rep. 1. 
 
 2. Business Men's League v. Atchison, T. & ,S. F. Ry. Co. (1902), 9 I.- C. C. Rep. 318. 
 
 609-ZZ. Rates on mixed carloads 
 
 In Lumber Rates from Southern Ry. Points to Eastern Points,^ a 
 tariff rule provides as follows : 
 
 In the absence of specific commodity rates on mixed carload shipments of two or 
 more kinds of lumber, freight charges shall be assessed on the basis of the highest 
 carload rate contained in shipments, provided the total charges must not exceed charges 
 arrived at by application of carload and minimum carload weight (actual if more than 
 minimum) on any one kind of lumber, and less-than-carload rate on actual weight on 
 other kinds. 
 
 Prior to the publication of the above rule a shipper was prevented 
 from loading mixed carloads of different kinds of lumber taking differ- 
 ent rates because no rate was in effect applicable to such a mixture. A 
 rule of that nature, however, is general throughout the southeast and 
 in other parts of the country, and is by no means uncommon when 
 applied to other commodities than lumber. Held, That such rule is not 
 objectionable. 
 
 1. Lumber Rates from Southern Railway Points to Eastern Points (1914) 31 I C 0. 
 Rep. 244, 252; citing, Florida Fruit and Vegetable Shippers' Assn. v. Atlantic C. L. 
 Rd. Co. (1910), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 552. 
 
 609- AAA.. Propriety of bridge tolls or river-crossing charges. 
 
 Charges for a bridge service may be determined upon a basis 
 somewhat different from that employed in the construction of charges 
 
151 FREIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 at a crossing where the transfer is effected by barges or other floating 
 equipment. In the former case the investment is relatively large and 
 the fixed charges thereon usually constitute the chief item of expense, 
 whereas in the latter case the investment is relatively small and the 
 principal expenses are those incurred in operating the facility.^ 
 
 The Commission has held that the expense of crossing a great river 
 like the Missouri where the cost of constructing and maintaining a 
 bridge may be equivalent to constructing and maintaining many miles 
 of railway, is a valid reason for imposing a higher charge upon that 
 traffic which must cross the river provided always that no discrim- 
 ination results. - 
 
 In Norman Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co.^ the Commission 
 stated: "However, in our opinion in the former Norman Lumber Co. 
 case (22 I. C. C. Rep. 239), we expressly reserved for future considera- 
 tion the question of bridge tolls and on page 247 use the following lan- 
 guage : 
 
 " '* * * There can be no doubt that Louisville, on the south bank of the river, 
 ought not to pay inbound rate which is sufficient to cover the transportation of traffic 
 to the north bank of the river, and then, when reshipplng the traffic to the north, again 
 pay an amount sufficient to cover the transportation across the bridge. In other words, 
 Louisville ought not to be considered on the north bank of the river on inbound ship- 
 ments and on the south bank of the river on outbound shipments.' 
 
 "It is evident that the conclusion expressed in the above quotation 
 is correct. The problem before us is to fix the responsibility for Louis- 
 ville's disadvantage and to suggest a remedy. 
 
 "At the hearing and in briefs and arguments complainants were 
 inclined to place the blame upon carriers north of the river. They 
 argue that the general tendency of carriers is to pla(3e cities on op- 
 posite banks of a river on the same basis. Complainants contend 
 further that every point on the line receives the benefits which accrue 
 from the existence of the bridge, and that the burden of constructing 
 and maintaining an expensive bridge between two cities should not be 
 imposed exclusively upon the^ traffic of those two cities or of either of 
 them, but should be distributed just as the burden of constructing and 
 maintaining any other link in the railroad system is distributed. In 
 this connection, reference is made to our decision in Traffic Bureau of 
 Merchants' Exchange v. S. P. Co., 19 I. C. C. 259, 261, where we said: 
 
 X .« * * -^g ^g jjqj. recognize the right of a carrier to single out a piece of 
 expensive road and make the local traffic thereon bear an undue portion of the expense 
 of its maintenance or of its construction. A road is built and operated as a whole, and 
 local rates are not to be made with respect to the difficulties of each particular portion, 
 charging the cost of a bridge to the traffic of one section or the cost of a tunnel to 
 traffic between its two mouths. Upon this same road millions of dollars have recently 
 been expended in building the Lucin cut-ofC just west of Ogden, a monumental bit of 
 construction which traverses the Great Salt Lake. If rates from one side of the lake to 
 the other were based upon the cost of this cut-off they would be unconscionable. If 
 the position of the defendant were followed by the carriers generally (which it is not, 
 nor even by itself ( it would result in rates that would vary from mile to mile as the 
 cost of road per mile varies.' 
 
 "It seems reasonable that. a separate charge should not be assessed 
 for crossing every costly bridge, and that ordinarily bridges must be 
 regarded as a part of the entire system. That, however, is not neces- 
 sarily true at all river crossings. 
 
 "Almost invariably where bridge tolls are added to the through 
 rate, their explanation is historical. Railroads were built to and from 
 the great rivers. Particularly the Mississippi and the Ohio served as 
 
§609] TEAFPIC LAW SEEVICE 152 
 
 natural barriers at which railroads terminated and began. At first 
 freight was unloaded at the river, and when destined to points beyond 
 was ferried across and loaded again into the cars of the carrier on the 
 opposite bank. Later either the cars themselves were ferried across 
 or bridges were built. The latter are maintained either by a separate 
 bridge company, which may be independent of the carriers serving the 
 crossing or owned by them, or maintained by one of the carriers them- 
 selves. It is evident that no matter in whom the ownership may be, 
 each carrier using the bridges should be required to contribute to its 
 maintenance in proportion to the use made of it. The charges for 
 bridges so maintained partake of the character of a fixed terminal 
 charge. They should be based upon the cost of tha service. If that 
 be their basis, their diminution with the increased length of the haul 
 would be improper. The question of the absorption of the charge then 
 becomes one of policy with the carrier and it may absorb or not, so 
 long as the alternative adopted does not place an undue burden upon a 
 shipper or locality. In Railroad Commission of Iowa v. I. C. R. R. Co., 
 20 I. C. C, 181, 188, it was urged that a bridge a mile long ought to be 
 regarded as simply a mile of the carrier's track, and ought not to be 
 the foundation for any separate or higher charge. Upon this point we 
 said : 
 
 " '* » * This, however, is not the generally accepted view. By reason of the 
 great cost of such structures a bridge has been regarded more or less generally as 
 adding a constructive mileage to the carrier's line for which an additional charge may 
 be exacted. Moreover, bridges are ordinarily built and operated by separate compa- 
 nies, although, not infrequently, as in this case, the bridge companies are owned by 
 the carrier or carriers that use the bridge. As a rule, the accounts of the bridge com- 
 panies are kept separately and the rights of the owning carrier or carriers to use 
 the bridge and the compensation therefor are established and controlled, as in this 
 instance, by formal contract. The compensation is ordinarily fixed in the form of a 
 definite toll per passenger and sometimes a more or less definite charge is assessed on 
 freight. The carriers usually lay the burden upon the traveling and shipping public 
 by adding the tolls to their regular fares and rates, and these additional charges have 
 been recognized by the Commission. Freight Bureau of Cmcinnati Chamber of Com- 
 merce V. C, N. O. <& T. P. Ry. Co., 7 I. C. C. 180; Commeroial Club v. 0. & N. Wa 
 Ry. Co., 7 I. C. C. 386. 
 
 "In Freight Bureau of Cincinnati v. C, N. 0. S T. P. Ry. Co., 
 7 I. C. C, 180, Cincinnati shippers objected to differentials against 
 them and in favor of Louisville on southbound shipments. One of the 
 defenses of the differential was that 'The location of Cincinnati upon 
 the north bank' of the Ohio River subjected its traffic to an additional 
 charge in crossing the river. ' On this branch of the case we said : 
 
 " 'We think the location of Cincinnati upon the north bank of the Ohio River justifies, 
 to some extent, a differential against her as to territory south of that river. 
 
 "In view of all these considerations we do not believe that, in so 
 far as competition with Cincinnati is concerned, the maintenance of 
 rates from Louisville to central freight association territory which 
 reflect the bridge toll for crossing the Ohio River and which in conse- 
 quence thereof are 1 cent higher than rates from Cincinnati to equi- 
 distant points constitutes an undue discrimination against Louisville." 
 
 The Commission has uniformly held that rates must be so made as 
 to avoid discrimination ; that if a bridge toll is charged at one crossing 
 it should be charged at all crossings ; that if a bridge toll is absorbed 
 at one crossing it should be absorbed at all crossings; that a transit 
 privilege granted at one point on the Ohio River should also be ac- 
 corded under substantially similar conditions at a competitive point.* 
 
 In Manufacturers <& Merchants Assn. of New Albany, Ind. v. Aber- 
 deen S A. Rd. Co.^ the Commission said: "We are therefore of opin- 
 
l53 FKEIGHT KATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 ron and find, considering all the facts, circumstances, and conditions 
 appearing, that in maintaining from the territory south of the Ohio 
 and Potomac and east of the Mississippi rivers, and on lumber from 
 Arkansas, rates to Cairo, 111., Evansville, Ind., and Cincinnati, Ohio, 
 on the north bank of the Ohio River, which include no toll or charge 
 for the bridge service from either East Cairo, Ky., Henderson, Ky., 
 Covington or Newport, Ky., on the south bank of that river, while con- 
 temporaneously maintaining from the same points of origin to New 
 Albany, Ind., on the north bank of said river, rates higher than to 
 Louisville, Ky., on said south bank, by the amount of the bridge toll or 
 charge, defendants are subjecting complainants and shippers of New 
 Albany, Ind.^ to undue and unreasonable prejudices and disadvantages 
 from which an order will be entered to cease and desist." 
 
 Carriers should either charge a bridge toll on traffic in both direc- 
 tions at every competitive crossing or not charge it at any crossing.^ 
 
 In Constructive Mileage for Bridge over Hudson River at Pough- 
 keepsie, N. Y ? the proposal in respondent's distance tariff to add 100 
 constructive miles for crossing the Hudson River by bridge at Pough- 
 keepsie, N. Y., found not justified. 
 
 1. Memphis-Southwestern Investigation (1919), 55 I. C. C. Eep. 515, 552. 
 
 2. Edwards & Bradford Lumber Co. v. Chicago B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 
 93, 96. 
 
 3. Norman Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 565, 568. 
 
 4. Paducah Board of Trade v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1916), 37 I. C. C. Rep. 743, 
 751; citing, Norman Lumher Co. v. Louisvnie & N. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Riep. 
 239; Manufacturers & Merchants' Assn. of New Albany, Ind. v. Aberdeen & A. Rd. 
 Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 331; Manufacturers & Merchants' Assn. of New Albany, 
 Ind. V. Aberdeen & A. Rd. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 116; Norman Lumber Co. v. 
 Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 565; Paducah Board of Trade v. 
 Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 583; Paducah Board of Trade v. Illinois 
 C. R(d. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 593; Metropolis Commercial Club v. Illinois C. Rd. 
 Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 40; Rates on Lumber from Southern Points to the Ohio 
 River Crossings and Other Points (1915), 34 I. C. C. Rep. 652; Henderson Com- 
 mercial Club V. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1915), 36 I. C. C. Rep. 20. The Interstate 
 Commerce Commission has considered the propriety of bridge tolls or river-crossing 
 charges in the following cases in addition to the above : Freight Bureau of the 
 Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ey. Co. (1897), 7 
 I. C. C. Rep. 180; Commercial Club of Omaha v. Chicago & X. W. Ry. Co. (1897), 
 7 I. C. C. R,ep. 386; Anthony v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 581; 
 Board of Railroad Commissioners of Iowa v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1911), 20 I. C. C. 
 
 • Rep. 181; Edwards & Bradford Lumber Co. v. Chicago B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1912), 25 I. 
 
 C. C. Rep. 93; East Dubuque Supply Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 
 425; Rock Spring Distilling Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1914), 2!3 I. C. C. Rtep. 18; 
 Manufacturers & Merchants' Assn. of New Albany, Ind. v. Aberdeen & A. Rd. Co. 
 (1915), 37 I. C. C. Rep. 350; Paducah Board of Trade v. Chicago B. & Q. Rd. Co. 
 (1916), 37 I. C. C. Rep. 743, 750; City of Memphis v Chicago, R. I. & P. By. Co. 
 (1917), 43 I. C. C. Rep. 121, 126; Natchez Chamber of Commerce v. Louisiana & A. Ry. 
 (1919), 52 I. C. C. Rep. 105, 125; Cairo Assn. of Commerce v. Butler County 
 Rd. Co. (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 519. 
 
 5. Manufacturers & Merchants' Assn. of New Albany, Ind. v. Aberdeen & A. Rd. Co. 
 (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 331, 339; affirmed, Manufacturers & Merchants' Assn. of 
 New Albany, Ind. v. Aberdeen & A. Rd. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. 0. Rep. 116 and 37 
 I. C. C. Rep. 350. 
 
 6. Paducah Board of Trade v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 583, 588 ; cited, 
 Paducah Board of Trade v. lUinois C. Rd. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 593, 597. 
 
 7. Constructive Mileage for Bridge over Hudson River at Poughkeepsie, N. Y. (1922), 
 66 I. C. C. Rep. 230. 
 
 609-BBB. Reshipping bates 
 
 A reshipping or rebilling rate is a proportional rate under which 
 after a commodity has been shipped to a distributing market and un- 
 loaded for the purpose of storage or treatment in transit, the same com- 
 
§609] TRAFFIC LAW SEKVICB 154 
 
 modity or an equivalent amount may be resMpped to final destination. 
 There is a close analogy between reshipping rates and transit. The 
 resMpping rate is usually less than the local rate from the distributing 
 or transit point to the final destination and must be regarded as part 
 of the through rate or charge from the point of origin through the 
 transit point to the ultimate destiujation.^ , 
 
 When the through rate or charge is made up of separately estab- 
 lished rates or chkrges applicable to the through business, the through 
 rate or charge must be attacked as violative of the act, although the 
 violation may be believed to be occasioned by a particular factor or 
 factors thereof ; in such case the complainant should be prepared at the 
 hearing to prove unlawfulness of the through rate itself and that this 
 is due to a particular factor or factors.^ 
 
 Proportional rates are necessarily parts of through rates and, differ 
 from local rates used as parts of through rates in that before the pro- 
 portional rate may be attacked at all there must be an allegation that 
 the through rate is unreasonable because of the unreasonableness of the 
 particular proportional rate; whereas local rates, as such, may be 
 attacked separately when used separately.^ 
 
 In Cairo Board of Trade v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co.* the 
 Commission stated: "In determining whether or not complainant has 
 been damaged by the exaction of unreasonable or unduly preferential 
 reshipping rates the total through charges paid from point of origin 
 must be considered. But this does not hold true of a determination of 
 the reasonableness or justness of the reshipping rate itself. Reship- 
 ping rates are not merely divisions of through rates, but are sep- 
 arately established rates generally published by carriers other than: 
 those engaged in the inbound movement and without the concurrence 
 of the latter ; and the point of reshipment is a rate-breaking point. A 
 change in the reshipping rates, even though it may affect the through 
 charges, will have no effect upon the inbound rates. The reasonable- 
 ness of such inbound rates is in no manner contingent upon reshipping 
 rates. Furthermore, inbound rates used in connection with reshipping 
 rates generally serve also as local rates. Hence they are subject to re- 
 view independently of the outbound rates. An excessive reshipping 
 rate might produce a reasonable through charge in connection with an 
 unduly low inbound rate and vice versa. It cannot properly be argued 
 that a proposal to increase unremunerative reshipping rates could be 
 denied upon the ground that the through charge composed of an exces- 
 sive inbound rate and the unremunerative reshipping rate is just and 
 reasonable. The converse must also be true, namely, that shippers may 
 not upon like ground be denied relief from unreasonable or unduly 
 prejudicial reshipping rates. This is also true as to proportional rates 
 that are applicable to shipments going to or from beyond and which are 
 not limited as applying only on shipments from or to designated points 
 or territory. Each of such rates must be judged upon its individual 
 merits. 
 
 "Defendants argue that the application of reshipping rates from 
 Chicago, Peoria, St. Louis, and other points is the result of competitive 
 influences, and that since these rates are made with relation to the 
 Chicago rates they are influenced by the water competition felt at Chi- 
 cago. The futility of this argument is evident when it is considered 
 
155 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 that at all of the points accorded reshipping rates the sum of the in- 
 bound rates plus the reshipping rates outbound is identical with the 
 through rate from the grain-producing region west of the Mississippi 
 River to the eastern destinations, and furthermore that it is the uni- 
 versal practice to accord transit under the through rates wherever nec- 
 essary at points along the direct line of movement. At points so lo- 
 cated defendants must either equalize in and out rates by means of re- 
 shipping rates or provide transit under through rates. In re Trans- 
 portation of Wool, Hides, and Pelts, 23 I. C. C, 151 ; Southern Illinois 
 Millers' Asso. v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 23 I. C. C, 672; Missouri-River 
 Illinois Wheat and Flour Rates, 27 I. C. C, 286; Fabrication in Transit 
 Charges, 29 I. C. C, 70; Henderson Commercial Club v. I. C. R. R. Co., 
 361. CO., 20." 
 
 In Buffalo Grain Cases^ the Interstate Commerce Commission 
 stated: "In Toledo Produce Exchange v. A. A. R. R. Co., 27 I. C. C, 
 , 536, 541, where it was shown that Toledo possessed all the attributes of 
 a rate-breaking point, and therefore was asking for reshipping rates, 
 we took occasion to point out that the line of demarcation between the 
 so-called rate-breaking points and other points was not always natural 
 or real, but purely artificial and arbitrary. Many grain centers are 
 now rate-breaking points because the carriers have made them so by 
 giving them reshipping rates and not because of special characteristics 
 which do not exist at other points. 
 
 "On the other hand, many centers possessing all the attributes of 
 rate-breaking points have been denied reshipping rates. Even Chicago, 
 the largest grain market in this country, was not a rate-breaking point 
 in the full sense of that term until the year 1910, when, by the joint 
 action of the carriers, including the defendants here, reshipping rates 
 were made on grain and its products from that point. If, because of 
 special characteristics, a market is entitled to reshipping rates, Buffalo 
 should have them. Aside, however, from the question of the right of 
 a grain market to have reshipping rates, and aside from the measure 
 of the rates into and out of the rate-breaking points, it is obvious that 
 such a system is more simple, easier of application, and less subject to 
 abuse than any system involving transit arrangements with their at- 
 tending complexities and difficulties of enforcement. 
 
 "Upon the evidence before us in respect of this question we con- 
 clude and find that Buffalo and its dealers in grain and grain products 
 are subjected to undue prejudice by the failure of the defendant car- 
 riers to maintain ex rail reshipping rates on grain and grain products, 
 both domestic and export, while such rates are contemporaneously in 
 effect from Chicago, Cleveland, Sandusky, Toledo, and Detroit." 
 
 In Toledo Produce Exchange v. Ann Arbor Rd. Co.^ the Commis- 
 sion stated: "One of the objections which through lines have from 
 time to time raised against the establishment of reshipping rates is that 
 such rates would deprive them of traffic to which they are fairly en- 
 titled. The theory of this objection is that the objecting lines originate 
 the traffic and that therefore they are entitled to the outbound haul. If 
 the reshipping rates are established, the outbound haul may be taken 
 away from them by competing carriers ; therefore, they prefer through 
 rates with transit arrangements, which serve as a sort of lien on this 
 traffic. Generally speaking, we think this attitude on the part of a car- 
 
§609] TEAFFldv LAW SERVICE 156 
 
 rier toward traffic wMch it originates is quite pi'oper. As a matter of 
 everyday fairness, a carrier should not be needlessly deprived of traflSic 
 wMph it originates. However, this doctrine can be carried too far. 
 It is sometimes urged with a persistence and dogmatic intolerance sug- 
 gestive of an attempt to apply the feudal theory to modern transpor- 
 tation. As we have said before, we fully recognize the right of a carrier 
 to get the long haul out of the traffic which it originates ; but this right 
 is strictly subordinate to the public interest, and when its assertion 
 results in unreasonable and unjust rates or restrictions on the conduct 
 of business it cannot be approved." 
 
 See "Transit Privileges, Facilities and Regulations," Chapter 13, 
 post. 
 
 1. Cairo Board of Trade v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1917), 46 I. C. C. Kep. 
 343, 348. 
 
 2. Stevens Grocer Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1916), 42 I. C. C. Rep. 396, 
 398; citing, Commercial Club of Omaha v. Anderson & S. R. Ey. Co. (1913), 27 
 I. C. C. Rep. 302; Scott-Mayer Commission Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1915), 
 28 I. C. C. Rep. 529; Poehlman Bros. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1914), 30 
 I. C. C. Rep. 89. 
 
 3. Stevens Grocer Co. case, supra ; cited in, Cairo Board of Trade v. Cleveland C. C. 
 & iSt. L. Ry. Co. (1917), 46 I. C. C. Rep. 343, 350. 
 
 4. Cairo Board of Trade v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co.' (1917), 46 L C. C. Rep. 
 343, 350. 
 
 5. Buffalo Grain Cases: Buffalo Chamber of Commerce v. Buffalo Creek Rd. Co. (1917), 
 46 I. C. C. Rep. 570, 582, and Buffalo Chamber of Commerce v. Baltimore & O. Rd. 
 Co. (1917), 46 I. C. C. Rep. 570, 582. 
 
 6. Toledo Produce Exchange v. Ann Arbor Rd. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 536, 543. 
 
 609-CCC. Rates on beanch-line hauls 
 
 Rates on a branch line of railroad may lawfully be higher than on 
 a main line through well developed territory where the density of the 
 traffic is much greater.^ It is necessary that carriers be permitted to 
 charge rates on branch lines that are fully compensatory for the service 
 they perform so long as they are not unreasonable.^ Circumstances 
 and conditions are different at main-line points than at branch-line 
 points.^ 
 
 The>e is material difference between a reasonable amount to be 
 added for additional mileage on a straight-away-long haul and a rea- 
 sonable allowance to be added for an out-of-line haul whi'ch involves 
 two and probably three terminal services.* 
 
 A new line is not required to establish as low a rate as a more 
 firmly established road.^ Rates on a branch line on traffic coming in 
 over another line may be higher than on the main line.* The Commis- 
 sion does not feel justified in requiring a newly-constructed line with 
 a comparatively meagre traffic to join in the establishment of rates on 
 a particular commodity as well as those applying from points located 
 on the rails of carriers more firmly established.'' 
 
 While carriers are justified within proper limits in making some- 
 what higher rates to branch-line points than to main-line points where 
 the same rate is applied to all points, both on main and branch lines, it 
 is to be tested as a whole.* The fact that a rate is made applicable to 
 certain destinations irrespective of whether most of them are located 
 on braaich lines does not justify an unreasonable rate to any of the 
 destinations involved, but the reasonableness of the rate is to be tested 
 
157 FEEIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 as a whole.® Commission rates are usually the same for all lines, both 
 main lines and branches. It is fair that the main line should in a degree 
 contribute to the support of the branch line for the branch-line busi- 
 ness, when it reaches the main line, is surplus traffic from which a 
 larger profit is made. It is in the public interest that rates shall be so 
 adjusted that the population and industries may freely diffuse them- 
 selves. In determining the reasonableness of rates upon the main line 
 based upon earnings, reference must be made to the earnings of branch 
 lines which contribute to it." 
 
 That rates on other parts of the carrier's system are forced down 
 by competition to a very low point, does not justify a higher rate to a 
 point located on a branch line, since such point is entitled to the reason- 
 able rate which its location and other advantages dictate without tak- 
 ing into account conditions which bring about lower rates to other 
 points.^^ 
 
 What might perhaps have been proper as between companies oper- 
 ating separate and distinct short lines may become unreasonable and 
 unjust when both are absorbed by a large system which serves an ex- 
 tensive territory. 1^ 
 
 It is almost axiomatic that rates cannot be made so as to give high 
 earnings to a poorly placed, indifferently operated, or isolated road 
 without making rates extortionate.^^ 
 
 To what extent shippers on an original and main line should bear 
 increased burdens due to the construction of an additional or branch 
 line must depend upon the particular circumstances in each case; no 
 general rule can be formulated.^* 
 
 Profit on a particular division is not controlling, as the incidental 
 benefit to other portions of the system may more than offset any loss 
 upon the particular division.^^ An originating division would appar- 
 ently not be self-supporting any. more than would the average large 
 terminal in the city.^® The carrier cannot claim the right to earn a net 
 profit from every mile section or other part into which the road might 
 be divided.^^ 
 
 Under a system of graded mileage rates it would be just and rea- 
 sonable to make rates higher from the branch-line points than from the 
 junction, but under a system of group rates based on average distances 
 and average operating conditions there is no dissimilarity of condi- 
 tions sufficiently great to justify the addition of an arbitrary at these 
 points.'^ 
 
 In a number of cases the Commission has required the extension 
 of the junction point rates to points on branch and connecting lines 
 where it appeared that the carriers had adopted such carriers with re- 
 spect to other points similarly located and circumstanced." 
 
 See "Railway Finances — Guaranteed Return on Railway Prop- 
 erty," Chapter 55, post, and "Aggregate value of the railway property 
 of the carrier held for and used in the service of transportation," Sec- 
 tion 608-X, ante. 
 
 1. Commercial Club of Omaha v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 156, 
 
 159; League of Southern Idaho Commercial Clubs y. Oregon S. L. Rd. Co. (1910), 
 
 , 18 I. C. C. Rep. 562, 504; Santa Rosa Traffic Assn. v. Southern P. Co. (1912), 24 I. 
 
§609] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 158 
 
 C. C. Eep. 46, 48 ; Board of Trade of Win^ton-Salem, N. C. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. 
 (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 146, 147, 151; Memphis Freight Bureau v. IlUnols C. Ed. Co. 
 (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 507, 511. 
 
 2. Morgan Grain Co. v. Atlantic C. L. Ed. Co. (1910),, 19 I. O. C. Rep. 460, 471. 
 
 3. Board of Trade of Winston- Salem N. C. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. 0. 
 Rep. 12, IS. 
 
 4. Kansas City Transportation Bureau v. Atchison, T. & ,S. F. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. 
 C. Rep. 491, 495. 
 
 5. Du Mee, Son & Co. v. Alabama, T. N. Ed. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Eep. 575, 57^. 
 
 6. Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ey. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Eep. 105, 
 106. 
 
 7. DuMee, Son & Co. v. Alabama, T. & N. Ed. Co., supra. 
 
 8. League of Southern Idaho Commercial Clubs v. Oregon S. L. Ed. Co. (1910), 18 I. 
 C. C. Eep. 562, 564. 
 
 9. Ibid. 
 
 10. Eeceivers and Shippers' Assn. of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. 
 (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 440, 465. 
 
 11. Board of Trade of Winston-Salem v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 
 12, 16. 
 
 12. Black Mountain Coal Land Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Eep. 286. 
 
 13. In Ee Investigation of Advances in Eates by Carriers in Western Trunk Line, Trans- 
 Missouri, and Illinois Freight Committee Territories (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 307. 
 377. 
 
 14. Florida E. C. Ry. Co. v. United States (1912), 200 Fed. Rep. 797, 805. 
 
 15. Louisville & N. Rd. Coal & Coke Bates (191.3), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 20, 29. 
 
 16. Ibid. 
 
 17. Ibid. 
 
 18. Western Petroleum Eefineries Assn. v. Director General, Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. 
 Co. (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 38, 41. 
 
 19. Caron & Campbelt v. Director General, as Agent, Chicago, R. I. & P. Ey. Co. (1920), 
 57 I. C. C. Rep. 474, 478; Fish Oil, Carloads, St. Marys, 6a. to Ohio and Mississippi 
 River Crossings (1921), 60 I. C. C. Eep. 511, 514. 
 
 609-DDD. Establishment of commodity rate as evidence of the 
 
 UNREASONABLENESS OF A PRIOR CLASS RATE. 
 
 In National Refining Co. v. Missouri K. S T. Ry. C-o.^ the rate of 
 36 cents which was applied on refined oil between Muskogee and Coffey- 
 ville was the fifth-class rate and was applicable only because no com- 
 modity rate on refined oil had been established between these points. 
 The Commission held that the unreasonableness of the class rate of 
 36 cents was clearly indicated by the fact that a few months later, one 
 of the routes established a commodity rate of 17 cents less than one-half 
 of the class rate, and the other route maintained a 17-cent rate to 
 points much more distant than Coffeyville. 
 
 1. National Eefining Co. v. Missouri K. & T. Ey. Co. (1912)-, 23 I. C. C. Eep. .■>27. 5:ia 
 
 609-EEE. The published rate schedule is prima facie evidence of 
 
 THE reasonableness OF THE RATES STATED THEREIN. 
 
 It is the intent of the Act that the schedule of rates required to be 
 adopted, printed and posted by the carrier, in accordance with section 
 6, shall be the basis for determining whether a given rate exacted from 
 a shipper is or is not unreasonable.^ 
 
 The carriers' published schedule of rates is, prima facie, the cri- 
 terion by which the reasonableness of a given charge must be judged.* 
 
 1. Van Patton v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1897), 81 Fed. Eep. 845. 
 
 2. Kimavey v. Terminal Ed. Assn. of St. Louis (1897), 81 Fed Rep. 802. 
 
159 FEEIGHT KATES AND CHARGES ["^609 
 
 609-FFF. Filing bate schedule with Inteestate Commeece Commis- 
 sion IS NOT conclusive OF THE REASONABLENESS OF THE 
 eates contained THEEEIN. 
 
 The United States Supreme Court has held that no presumption 
 of law exists that a freight rate upon a particular commodity is rea- 
 sonably low because such rate has been duly published and filed by the 
 carrier with the Interstate Commerce Commission.^ 
 
 However, the published rate governing interstate transportation 
 between two given points, so long as it remains uncancelled, is as 
 fixed and unalterable either by the shipper or by the carrier as if that 
 particular rate had been established by a special act of Congress. 
 When regularly published, it is no longer the rate imposed by the car- 
 rier, but the rate imposed by the law. . It therefore, is the obligation 
 of the carrier to collect and of the shipper or consignee to pay the law- 
 fully published tariff rate on an interstate shipment, regardless of its 
 reasonableness or unreasonableness. For a full discussion of this sub- 
 ject, see "Contracts between Carriers and Shippers and Others," 
 chapter 15, post, and "Payment for Transportation," Chapter 19, post. 
 
 The fact that a rate is published and filed in accordance with the 
 Act raises no such presumption of reasonableness as Avill preclude in- 
 quiry into that question by the Interstate Commerce Commission.- 
 
 1. Illinois C. Rd. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1907), 206 TJ. S. 441, 51 L. 
 Ed. 1128, 27 Sup. Ct. Kep. 700, holding order of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
 to be valid and directing carriers to comply therewith. Central Yellow Pine Assn. 
 V. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 505. See also San Bernardino Board of 
 Trade v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1890), 3 I. C. Rep. 138, 4 I. C. C. Rep. 104; 
 McMorran v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (1889), 3 I. C. C. Rep. 252, 261, 2 I. C. Rep. 604; 
 Knudson-Perguson Fruit Co. v. Michigan C. Rd. Co. (1906), 148 Fed. Rep. 958, 79 
 C. C. A. 46; Poor Grain Co. v. Chicago B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 418; 
 Rather & Co. v. Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (Tenn. 1915), 174 S. W. 1113, 1114. 
 
 2. Illinois C. Rd. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, supra. 
 
 609-GGG. Maintenance for a long period of a rate voluntaey es- 
 tablished BY the CAERIEE AS EVIDENCE OF ITS EEASON- 
 ABLENESS. 
 
 The Commission has often said that where a rate is voluntarily 
 established and maintained for a considerable period this fact, although 
 not conclusive, is strong evidence of the reasonableness of the rate. 
 The force of this presumption is greatly weakened and might be alto- 
 gether destroyed by the circumstances under which the rate was estab- 
 Hshed and maintained; but if no particular reason is shown for the 
 putting in of the rate, if no commercial or competitive condition pre- 
 vents the maintenance of a higher rate, if, in other words, the main- 
 tenance of the rate has been voluntary upon the part of the carrier, 
 the force of the admission becomes exceeding strong.^ 
 
 to 
 
 The Commission has often held that where, upon the strength of 
 a given rate, capital has been invested and industrial conditions have 
 become established, the rate cannot be discontinued without taking into 
 account its effect upon these commercial and industrial conditions, but 
 it has never said that there was any absolute rule requiring for any 
 reason the indefinite continuance of such a rate. It is always a ques- 
 tion of what, under all circumstances, is just and reasonable.^ 
 
§609] TKAFFIC LAW) SERVICE 160 
 
 In Eastern Fruit Growers' Assn. v. Baltimore d 0. Rd. Co? the 
 Commission said: "They rely upon extensive rate tables and contend 
 primarily that the commercial exigencies' of the growers, the mainte- 
 nance of the same rates for many years, despite changed conditions, 
 and sig-nal increase in tonnage, demand the cooperation and assistance 
 of the carriers. They disclaim any purpose to have the Commission 
 regulate thfe rates merely to enable them to market their apples at a 
 profit, but the unmistable tone of the testimony is to the contrary. 
 
 "This record does not establish fundamental error or injustice in 
 the percentage system prevailing in the east, which we have heretofore 
 had occasion to approve, or convince us that the relativity of the ad- 
 justments from the complaining territory and from the east is un- 
 justly discriminatory to complainants. In A. T. £ S. F. Ry. Co. v. 
 I. C. C, 190, Fed. 591, it was said, at page 594. 
 
 " 'The authority granted it under section 15 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, to 
 prescribe reasonable rates when it shall be of opinion that the rates fixed by carriers are 
 unreasonable, does not confer absolute or arbitrary power to act on any considerations 
 which the Commission may deem best for the public, the shipi>er, and the carrier. Its 
 orders must be based on transportation considerations. While it may give weight to 
 all factors bearing either on the cost or the, value of the transportation services, it must 
 disregard as well the demand of the shipper for protection from legitimate competition, 
 domestic or foreign, for unlimited markets or for the enforcement of equitable estoppels 
 arising from a justifiable expectation that past rates will be maintained as the demand 
 for the carrier for the maximum under which the traffic will move freely.' 
 
 "In Stuarts Draft Milling Co. v. S. Ry. Co., 31 I. C. C. 623, we 
 stated, at page 625 : 
 
 " 'The present adjustment is one of long standing, and it should be here observed 
 that if the long maintenance of rates raises a presumption of reasonableness which is 
 to be given weight in opposition to proposed increases by the carriers it must also be 
 forceful in considering reductions.' 
 
 "And at page 631: 
 
 " 'Nor will we require carriers to modify an existing arrangement of rates long in 
 effect and apparently fairly adapted to the needs of the communities and interstate 
 affected, except upon substantial proof of its unreasonableness or of unjustifiable injury 
 resulting therefrom.' " 
 
 The presumption of reasonableness arising from long existence of 
 a rate does not necessarily attach when the rate was established by 
 the carrier, in the exercise of its discretion to meet competitive con- 
 ditions.* 
 
 In Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville S N. Rd. Co.' the 
 Supreme Court held that an order of the Interstate Commerce Com- 
 mission restoring an old local rate which had been raised by the car- 
 rier in order to make the sum of the locals equal the through rate, and 
 making a corresponding reduction in such through rate, cannot be 
 said to have been made without any substantial evidence to support 
 it, where there was conflicting evidence as to the justice of the new 
 rates in themselves and by comparison with others and as to the 
 reasonableness of the old rates, which had remained in fact for some 
 years after the water competition originally compelling them had dis- 
 appeared. 
 
 1. Burgess v. Transcontinental Freight Bureau, (1,908). 13 I. C. C. Rep. 668 677- 
 Darling & Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 79, 80; Railroad 
 Commission of Florida v. Savannah F. & W. Rd. Co. (1891), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 13, 3 
 I. C. Rep. 688 ; Holmes & Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1900), 8 I. C. C. Rep. 561 ; National 
 Hay Assn. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1902), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 264, 305; Procter & 
 Gamble Co. v. Cincinnati H. & D. By. Co. (1903), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 440, 490. Defendants 
 ordered to discontinue their practice from charging more than fourth-class rates on 
 
161 FBEIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 less-than-carload shipments of common soap. An advance to third-class or to 20% 
 less than third-class was held to be unreasonable. Interstate Commerce CommiS' 
 sion V. Conclnnati, H. & D. Ey. Co. (1905), 146 Fed. Rep. 559. Commission's order 
 held to be valid. Carriers directed to comply therewith. Cincinnati, H. & D. Ky. 
 Co. V. Interstate Commerce Commission (1907), 206 U. S. 142, 51 L. Ed. 995, 27 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 648. Commission's order held to be valid. Carriers directed to comply 
 therewith. Central Yellow Pine Assn. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 
 505; Tift v. Southern Ry. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 548; Warren Mfg. Co. v. 
 Southern Ry. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 381; Quimby v. Clyde S. S. Co. (1907), 12 
 I. C. C. Rep. 392; Boise Commercial Club v. Adams Express Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. 
 Rep., 115, 121; Bartles Oil Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 146, 148; Memphis Cotton Oil Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 
 • 313, 318; Clark Co. v. Buffalo & S. Ry. Co. (1910), IS I. C. O. Rep. 380, 381; Millar 
 V. New York C. & H. R. Rd. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 78; Gamble-Robinson Com- 
 mission Co. V. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 114; Morgan Grain 
 Co. V. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 460, 468; Pabst Brewing Co. 
 V. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. O. Rep. 584, 586, 587; Arlington 
 Heights Fruit Exchange v. Southern P. Co. (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 149, 151; Fair- 
 mont Creamery Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 252, 254; 
 Chattanooga Feed Co. v. Alabama G. S. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C Rep. 480, 484; 
 Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York v. New York C. & H. R. Rd. Co. 
 (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 55, 74; Dupont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Central Rd. Co. 
 01 New Jersey (1912), 25 I. C. C. Riep. 19, 20; Advances on Ground Iron Ore from 
 Points in Alabama, (Georgia, and Tennessee to Boston, New York, Philadelphia and 
 Other Points (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 675, 676; Grain Rates to Pittsburgh, Pa. (1914), 
 30 I. C. C. Rep. 382, 383, 384; Topeka Traffic Assn. v. Alabama & V. Ry. Co. (1914), 
 30 I. C. C. Rep. 510, 515; Augusta Cotton Exchange and Board of Trade v. Southern 
 Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 704, 706; Nix & Co. v. Southern Rjr. Co. (1914), 31 
 ; I. C. C. Rep. 145, 149 ; Lumber Rates from Southern Railway points to eastern 
 points (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 244, 253; freight rates between points in Minnesota 
 via Interstate Routes and Between Points in Minnesota and Other States (1914), 
 32 I. C. C. Rep. 361, 364 ; Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Director General, Ann 
 Arbor Rd. Co. (1920), 57 I. C. C. Rep. 723, 729. 
 
 2. Green Bay Business Men's Assn. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 
 59, 63. 
 
 3. Eastern Fruit Growers' Assn. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1915), 33 I. C. C. Rep. 
 343, 353. 
 
 4. Hill & Co. V. Southern Ry. Co. (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 225; citing, Lindsay Bros. v. 
 Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 6; Commercial Club of Omaha v. 
 Southern Ry. Co. (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 631, 636. 
 
 5. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1913), 227 IT. S. 88, 
 57 L. Ed. 431, 33 Sup. Ot. Riep. 185. This case is known as the New Orleans Board 
 of Trade Case, the history of which is as follows : New Orleans Board of Trade, Ltd. 
 V. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 231. Carriers ordered to reduce 
 to a specified amount their class rates from New Orleans, La., to Mobile, Ala., and 
 Pensacola, Fla., on the ground that the present rates are unreasonable. Louisville 
 & N. Rd. Co. V. Interstate Commerce Commission (1910), (C. C. W. D. Ky.), 184 
 Fed. Rep. 118. Preliminary injunction against enforcement of Commission's order 
 denied. Bill to annul Commission's order transferred to Commerce Court. Louis- 
 ville & N. Rd. Co. V. Interstate Commerce Commission, supra. Commission's order 
 held invalid on the gi-ound that there was no basis for the Commission to hold that 
 the existing rates were unreasonable. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louis- 
 ville & N. Rd. Co. (1913), 227 U. S. 8S, supra. Commission's order held to be valid 
 in all respects. 
 
 609-HHH. Peesumption wheee long-established bate is advanced 
 
 FOB A SHOBT PERIOD AND THEN REDUCED TO THE FORMER 
 BASIS. 
 
 Where carriers voluntarily make a rate between certain points for 
 a long period of time the presumption is that such rate is reasonable, 
 and where a long-established rate is raised for a short period and then 
 voluntarily reduced to the former basis the presumption is that the 
 advanced rate is unreasonable, but this presumption may be overcome 
 by proof to the contrary.'^ 
 
 In the case of Commercial Club of Omaha v. Southern P. Co? the 
 Commission stated: "It will suffice to say that an order granting af- 
 firmative relief, and particularly in a case in which reparation is 
 awarded, must always be predicated upon a definite conviction, drawn 
 from the record or from our own investigation or from both, that the 
 
§609] TEAFFIC LAW SERVICE 162 
 
 rate exacted on shipments embraced within the complaint was an un- 
 reasonable rate." 
 
 1. SuBderland Bros. Co. v. Pere Marquette Rd. Co. (1909), 16 I. O. C. Rep. 450. 
 
 2. Commercial Club of Omaha v. Southern P. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 53. 
 
 609-III. TJneeasonable bate not pebmissible meeely because its coe- 
 
 BECTION WILL BESULT IN THE DISTUEBANCE OF OTHEE BATES. 
 
 An unreasonable rate may not be permitted to stand merely be- 
 cause if reduced other readjustments might follow. Whatever the car- 
 riers might do in this respect the duty of the Interstate Commerce 
 Comission in each case is to inquire into the reasonableuess and just- 
 ness of the rate under immediate consideration.^ 
 
 1. New Orleans Board of Trade, Ltd. v. Louisville & N. Bid. Co. (1912), 23 I C. C. Rep. 
 429, 431. 
 
 609-JJJ. Right of caeeier to change an uneeasonably low bate 
 
 It is the duty of the Interstate Commerce Commission, in passing 
 on the reasonableness of a rate, to consider the conditions affecting 
 the welfare of both shippers and carriers ; but the carrier is not to be 
 denied the right to change from an unreasonably low rate, which has 
 formerly prevailed, to a just and reasonable charge in the future, 
 merely because of the injurious consequences which would result to 
 shippers from a change in the rate.^ 
 
 1. McLean Lumber Co. v. United States (1916), 237 Fed. Rep. 460. 
 
 609-KKK. No estoppel opeeates against the eight of a caeeeeb to 
 
 ENJOY just and EEASONABLE BATES. 
 
 In Southern P. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission^ the 
 United States Supreme Court held that an order of the Commission 
 setting aside new rates on lumber from Willamette valley points to 
 San Francisco and bay points, and restoring substantially the old 
 rates, is void as beyond its powers, where, from the record and the 
 opinion of the Commission, and from the express exclusion of Portland 
 from the benefit of the reduced rate, and the reasons assigned for such 
 exclusion, it is clear that the Commission was not exercising its au- 
 thority to condemn unjust and unreasonable rates and fix reasonable 
 ones, but was acting upon the assumption that it has the right to pro- 
 tect the lumber interests from the consequences of a change in rates, 
 even if the change was from a rate which had been fixed unreasonably 
 low, for the purpose of encouraging the industry, to a higher rate which 
 is not in itself unjust or unreasonable. 
 
 1. Southern P. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1911), 219 U. S. 433, 443, 31 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 288, 55 L. Ed. 283. Willamette Valley Lumber Case : Western Oregon 
 Lumber Manufacturers' Assn. v. Southern P. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 61. Carriers 
 ordered to reduce to a specified amount an advanced rate on rough, green, flr 
 lumber from Willamette Valley, Ore., to San Francisco, Calif., on the groxmd that 
 such rate is unreasonable. Southern P. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission 
 (C. C. N. D. Cal.) Case undecided. Certified to Supreme Court, because trial court 
 was divided on the merits. Southern P. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission 
 
163 FEEIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 (1909), 215 U. S. 226, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 89, 54 L. Ed. 169. Certificate dismissed and 
 case remanded to Circuit Court. Soutliern P. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Com- 
 mission (1910), 177 Fed. Rep. 963. Commission's order held to be valid. Southern 
 P. Co. V. Interstate Commerce Commission (1911), 219 U. S. 433, 55 L. Ed. 283, 31 
 Sup. Ot. Rep. 288. Commission's order held to be invalid on the ground that it was 
 based on the assumed power of the Commission to prevent railroad companies 
 from raising their rate on the theory that they were estopped to advance such rate 
 on account of having maintained it for a considerable period. Such power, it was 
 held, has not been conferred upon the Commission. Oregon & Washington Lumber 
 Manufacturers' Assn. v. Southern P. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 389. Excluding 
 the element of estoppel from consideration, the Commission again ordered the 
 carriers to reduce to a specified amount the advanced rate on rough, green, fir 
 lumber from Willamette Valley, Ore., to iSan Francisco, Cal., on the ground that 
 such a rate was unreasonable. Southern P. Co. v. United States (1912), 197 Fed. 
 Rep. 167. Commission's order held to be valid. Southern P. Co. v. United States 
 
 (1914), 232 U. S. 736, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 605, 58 L. Ed. 820. Dismissed on motion of 
 appellants. 
 
 609-LLL. Burden of proof under allegation of unreasonableness. 
 
 An allegation that a rate is unreasonable puts the burden of show- 
 ing such unreasonableness on the complainant.^ 
 
 1. Chamber of Commerce of the City of Augusta, Ga. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1912), 22 
 I. C. C. Rep. 233, 234; Loftus v. Pullman Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 102, 103. 
 
 609-MMM. Onus probandi as to reasonableness of increased rate 
 
 ON THE common CARRIER. 
 
 Section 15 (7) of the Interstate Commerce Act {as amended June 
 18, 1910), provides that at any hearing involving a rate increased after 
 January first, nineteen hundred and ten, or of a rate sought to be in- 
 creased after the passage of that amendment, the burden of proof to 
 show that the increased rate or proposed increased rate is just and 
 reasonable shall be upon the common carrier, and that the Commission 
 shall give to the hearing and decision of such questions preference over 
 all other questions pending before it and decide the same as speedily 
 as possible.^ 
 
 1. Section 15 (7) of Interstate Commerce Act. 
 609-NNN. Presumption that carrier's tariff provides reasonable 
 
 CHARGES FOR THE SERVICES NORMALLY PERFORMED. 
 
 The carrier's tariff rates are presumed to provide reasonable 
 charges for the services ordinarily or normally required and per- 
 formed. If the shipper or receiver demands an additional service the 
 carrier has a right to assess a reasonable charge therefor. If, because 
 of the nature or condition of the shipper's freight, it becomes neces- 
 sary or appropriate to require extra precautions in connection with 
 such shipments, which precautions impose upon the carrier additional 
 service it is entitled to a reasonable compensation for that extra serv- 
 ice. All such charges in addition to being reasonable, must of course, 
 Be free from unjust discrimination.'^ 
 
 1. New Orleans Live Stock Exchange, Ltd. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 609, 612. 
 
 609-000. Voluntary reduction of a rate by the carrier is not con- 
 clusive EVIDENCE THAT THE PRIOR RATE WAS UNREASONABLE. 
 
 The voluntary reduction of a rate by the carrier is not of itself 
 suflScient evidence that the prior rate was unreasonable.^ In Virginia 
 
§609] TEAFFIC LAW SEEVICE 164 
 
 Iron, Coal & Cohe Co. v. Director General, Southern By. Co.,^ tlie Com- 
 mission stated: "They assert that while what the carriers have done 
 in the past may not be conclusive in measuring the reasonableness of 
 rates, it is persuasive, and that our determination here, while not to 
 be controlled by, must give full consideration, to, commercial effects 
 and the injury to a business built and operated upon the faith of con- 
 tinuance of special rates. It should be said that if there is disability 
 of location with respect to raw materials it is curable by complainants, 
 but not by the adjustment of rates at the hands of this Commission in 
 disregard of their reasonableness. The fact that admittedly low rates 
 claimed now to have been less than compensatory were permitted to 
 continue for a long period of time does not of itself preclude increases 
 therein; and while a presumption of reasonableness may ordinarily 
 attach to rates long maintained there is no lawful foreclosure of the 
 right to rebut that presumption. 
 
 "The principles governing have been announced by us in many 
 cases, including the following: 
 
 "However reluctant the Commission may feel to sanction changes in rates which 
 tend to impair or destroy the value of investments made in expectation of their contin- 
 uance, it cannot on that ground deny to carriers the right to charge rates which are 
 just and reasonable. Chattanooga Log Rates, 35 I. C. C, 163, 168. 
 
 "We said in Bo/ard of Railroad Commissioners of Kansas v. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 
 22 I. C. C. 407, 410: 'A narrowing market, increased cost of production, overproduction, 
 and many other conditions may render an industry unprofitable, without showing the 
 freight rate to be unreasonable,' and we repeatedly held that it was no part of our 
 duty to so adjust rates as to enable any industry to do business at a profit, to equalize 
 market conditions, or to overcome disadvantages not arising from a violation of the 
 statute. Page Milling Co. v. .V. & W. Ry. Co., 30 I. C. C, 605, 612." 
 
 1. Omaha Grain Exchange v. Mobile & O. Rd. Co. (1915), 37 I. C. C. Rep. 363, 354; 
 Seaboard By-Products Coke Co. v. Director General, Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. 
 (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 35; St. Bernard Compress Co. v. Director General, as Agent, 
 New Orleans & N. E. Rd. Co. (1920). 59 I. C. C. Rep. 232, 233; Rath Packtug Co. 
 V. Director General, Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 427. 
 
 2. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co. v. Director General, Southern Ry. Co. (1919), 53 I. 
 C. C. Rep. 583, 588. 
 
 609-PPP. The fact that a bate established by a caeeieb does not 
 APPLY between the same points is not conclusive of 
 
 ITS UNBEASONABLENESS. 
 
 It has often been recognized by the Commission that the mere fact 
 that a rate is higher one way between the same points than it is the 
 other way does not prove that the higher rate is unreasonable. And 
 this is particularly true where there is a preponderance of empty cars 
 moving in one direction.^ 
 
 1. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1912), 195 Fed. Rep. 
 541, 559; citing, Duncan v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1893), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 85, 
 103; MacLoon v. Boston & M. Rd. Co. (1903), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 642; WeU v. Pennsyl- 
 vania Rd. Co. (1906), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 627. 
 
 609-QQQ. Doubt as to eeasonableness of bate should be eesolved 
 
 IN FAVOE OF THE C.4EEIEE. 
 
 Broadly speaking, railways are entitled to impose rates which 
 will maintain their properties in condition to properly discharge the 
 functions which they undertake and to yield a fair return to their 
 owners. In consideration of the fact that the public has permitted, 
 and in some sense induced these companies to undertake this quasi 
 public duty, instead of discharging it itself, where serious doubt exists 
 
165 PBEIGHT RATES AND CHAEGES [§609 
 
 as to the reasonableness of a rate, the railway should be given the 
 benefit of that doubt. But this does not mean that railway charges 
 are subject to no revision nor that they can never be reduced except 
 upon an absolute certainty.^ 
 
 1. Mayor and City Council of Wichita, Kansas v. Atchison, T. & S. P. Ry. Co. (1908), 
 9 I. C. C. Rep. 534, 553. 
 
 609-RRR. Railway-mail pay. 
 
 The space-basis system to govern the transportation of the mails of 
 the country by railroad which was inaugurated by the Act of July 28, 
 1916, 39 Stat. L. 412, 425, 431, was found fair and reasonable, and its 
 extension to all mail routes required. Rules also prescribed with 
 respect to authorization designed to simplify and make definite the 
 procedure by the Post Office Department.^ 
 
 The space-basis system to govern the transportation of mails by 
 electric railroads found fair and reasonable.^ 
 
 1. Railway-Mail Pay (1919), 56 I. C. C. Rep. 1. This report contains interesting his- 
 tory of the railway-mail pay legislation and divides the mail service into iive kinds 
 or classes : 
 
 1. Full railway-post-ofllce-car service; 
 
 2. Storage-car service ; 
 
 3. Apartment-post-otfice-car service; 
 
 4. Storage-space service; 
 
 5. Closed-pouch service. 
 
 See also Thirty-fourth Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission to Con- 
 gress (1920, p. 73). 
 Z Electric Railway Mail Pay (1920), 58 I. C. C. Rep. 455. 
 
 609-SSS. Compensation to certain land-grant roads. 
 
 Section 208 (C) of the Transportation Act of February 28, 1920, 
 provides as follows : 
 
 Any land grant railroad organized under the Act of .July 2.S. 1866 (Chapter .300), 
 shall receive the same compensation for transportation of property and troops of the 
 United States a.s is paid to land grant railroads organized under the Land Grant Act of 
 March 3, 1863, and the Act of July 28, 1866 (Chapter 278). 
 
 The personal effects of an army officer are not the property of the 
 United States, and, therefore, when transported for the government 
 over land-grant railroads are not entitled to land-grant deductions, but 
 are subject to commercial or regular tariff rates.^ 
 
 The right of the land-grant railroad to recover from the United 
 States the difference between its commercial or general tariff rates and 
 the land-grant rates charged and accepted bj^ it for the transportation 
 for the government of the personal effects of army officers is lost by the 
 carrier's long acquiescence in the government's explicit assertion that 
 the land-grant rates were the proper ones for such service.^ 
 
 1. Oregon-Washington Rd. & Nav. Co. v. United States (1921), 65 L. Ed. 427, 
 
 U. S. . Sup. Ct. Rep. . 
 
 2. Ibid. 
 
 609-TTT. Errors in publication of rates. 
 
 A carrier should not be penalized for a purely technical omission 
 or error made in an effort to bring its tariff in conformity with the 
 Commission's regulations.^ 
 
§609] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 166 
 
 An "erroneous" rate repeatedly published, and upon which coil- 
 siderable traffic has moved for upward of two years, does not stand 
 upon the basis of ordinary " error. "^ A claim of mistake in the publi- 
 cation of rates which remain in effect for as long a period as two 
 years is not persuasive. The rate will be regarded as voluntarily and 
 knowingly made. Errors should be discovered and eliminated within 
 a reasonable time.^ 
 
 The mere insertion in the tariff of an erroneous concurrence num- 
 ber will not invalidate the rates shown therein.* 
 
 1. Highland Park Mfg. Ck). v. Southern Ky. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 67, 69. 
 
 2. In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 for the Transportation of Linseed Oil Cake, Linseed Oil Meal, and Flaxseed Screen- 
 ings in Carloads from Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minn., to Galveston, Tex., and other 
 Gulf Ports (1913), 27 I. C. C. K«p. 246, 247. 
 
 3. Reshlpping Rates on Grain and Grain Products from Omaha, Nebr., and Other 
 Points to Chicago & A. Rd. Co. Stations in Illinois and Missouri (1915), 32 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 590, 591; Wausau Advancement Assn. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. 
 C. C. Rep. 459, 460. 
 
 4. Bartlett Co. v. Chicago P. & St. L. Ry. Co. Unreported Opinion A-203. 
 
 609-UUU. Basing-point system of bates. 
 
 The system of rate making, commonly known as the "basing point" 
 or ' ' trade center ' ' system, which was prevalent throughout the south at 
 the time the Interstate Commerce Act took effect, is described as fol- 
 lows : Certain large cities and towns situated on the coast, at interior 
 river points, and at railroad junctions are called competitive and 
 receive quite low rates on all interstate traffic; all other stations are 
 called local and are charged much higher rates. The rates at local 
 points are made by adding to the competitive rate at the nearest com- 
 petitive point the local from that point. These local rates are ascer- 
 tained upon a short distance mileage basis, frequently using the table 
 established or approved by the State railroad commissioners. The 
 intermediate or local stations are "given the benefit" of what is called 
 the lowest combination — that is, if the rate to the competitive point, 
 plus the local rate to the given point beyond, exceeds the rate to the 
 next competitive point plus the local rate back to the given point, the 
 latter rate is taken.^ 
 
 The basing-point system of rates, so generally employed by car- 
 riers in the territory south of the Ohio and Potomac and east of the' 
 Mississippi rivers, under which rates to the basing points, generally 
 commercial centers, were lower than to intermediate points on the 
 same lines, was condemned by the fourth section of the original act. As 
 this section, under the construction given it by the Supreme Court of 
 the United States, did not prove efficacious in correcting the evils 
 sought to be corrected by it, the Congress under the 1910 amendment, 
 laid an absolute inhibition upon a departure from the long-and-short- 
 haul rule, subject only to the exception that the Commission might in 
 special cases authorize a departure from this rule.^ 
 
 In Board of Trade of Carrollton v. Central of Georgia By. Co.^ 
 the Commission stated: "Whatever may be said in justification of the 
 basing-point system, we do not tjiink that the basing-point system itself 
 necessarily requires that joint through rates over long distances to 
 local or noncompetitive points should now be made by adding to the 
 
167 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 basing-point rates either the full locals or high differentials. Stated in 
 other words, for fear of misapprehension, we do not wish to be under- 
 stood as passing upon the reasonableness of the local rates from the 
 various basing points to points of ultimate destination when applied 
 to local service; neither do we Avish to be understood as condemning 
 the application of differentials lower than such locals in the making of 
 joint through rates beyond or intermediate to such basing points; what 
 we do say is : that, in the making of joint through rates on long distance 
 traffic, to local or noncompetitive points, the differentials above the 
 rates to the basing points should bear some reasonable relation to the 
 total distances involved ; and that where the long-haul traffic to local 
 stations is meager these differentials may perhaps be higher than 
 otherwise they would be." 
 
 For a full treatment of the application of the long-and-short-haul 
 clause of the Act to the basing-point system of rate making, see 
 "Fourth Section of the Act to Regulate Commerce — Long-and-Short- 
 Haul Clause— F ourth Section Applicaiions," Chapter 7, post. 
 
 1. Harwell v. Columbus & W. Ed. Co. (1887), 1 I. C. C. Rep. 2.36, 1 I. C. Rep. 631; 
 Davenport v. Southern Ry. Co. (1906), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 650; Board of Trade of the 
 City of Hampton, Fla., v. NashvUle, O. & St. L. Ry. Co. (19(X)), 8 I. C. C. Rep. 503. 
 See also, In Re Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1887), 1 I. C. C. Rep. 84, 1 I. C. Rep. 278; 
 Martin v. Chicago B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1888), 2 I. C. C. Rep. 46, 2 I. C. C. Rep. .32 ; In Re 
 Tariffs and Classifications of Atlanta & W. P. Rd. Co. (1889), 3 I. C. C. Rep. 24, 
 2 I. C. Rep. 461; Charlotte (Shippers' Assn. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1905), 11 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 108; Columbia Grocery Co. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 
 502, 505; Mayor and City Council of Vienna, Ga. v. Georgia S. & F. Ry. Co. (1913), 
 28 I. C. C. Rep. 173, 174; Columbia Chamber of Commerce v. Southern Rv. Co. 
 (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 339, 344; Texarkana Freight Bureau v. St. Louis, I. M. & 
 S. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 569, 571. 
 
 2. Green v. Alabama & V. Ry. Co. (1917), 43 I. C. C. Rep. 662, 677. 
 
 3. Board of Trade of Carrollton v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. (1913), 2S I. C. C. Rep. 
 154, 165. 
 
 609- VVV. Effect of private agreement between carrier and shipper 
 
 CONCERNING TRANSPORTATION CHARGES ON QUESTION OF REA- 
 SONABLENESS OF BATE. 
 
 In case of Hood & Sons v. Delaware & H. Co} the Commission said : 
 "The Commission has no authority to approve or enforce a private 
 agreement made between shippers and carriers concerning charges for 
 transportation, nor is it bound by such agreement when the reasonable- 
 ness of such charges are challenged in the mode prescribed in the Act. 
 It follows a fortiori that the Commission will not undertake to interpret 
 or construe an agreenaent not to determine its legal effect, not to say 
 that a tariff shall be issued in compliance therewith. The force and 
 effect of such agreements as fixing obligations between the parties 
 thereto are to be determined by the Courts, but under our rules of prac- 
 tice they may be regarded and used as evidence so far as pertinent to 
 questions which the Commission may determine, and it is desirable that 
 the facts be thus agreed upon whenever practicable. When the parties 
 thereto agree upon a rate, said agreement may be regarded as an admis- 
 sion as between the parties executing it of strong evidentiary value that 
 the rate agreed upon is reasonable, and such evidence will be considered 
 by the Commission together with all other facts, circumstances, and 
 conditions that they may reasonably apply to the matters under inves- 
 tigation, keeping in view all interests involved, and its duty to establish 
 just and reasonable rates available for all shippers alike without dis- 
 
§609] TEAFFIC LAW SEKVICE 168 
 
 crimination in favor of any particular shipper by reason of an agree- 
 ment with the carrier. 
 
 "On the other hand the Commission is expressly authorized and 
 empowered to pass upon the reasonableness of a charge for transporta- 
 tion or the reasonableness of any regulation or practice affecting such 
 charge, expressed in a tariff issued by any carrier subject to the pro- 
 visions of the Act. The rates charged and collected must be in accord- 
 ance with the tariff legally effective whether in compliance with a 
 private agreement with the shipper or not, and the Commission must, 
 therefore, look to the provisions of the tariff", to ascertain the rate 
 that has been challenged or the reasonableness of any regulations or 
 practices affecting such rates, and to determine and prescribe upon 
 consideration of all the evidence what will be a reasonable charge to be 
 thereafter observed and what regulation or practice is fair to be there- 
 after followed. 
 
 "Where the language of a tariff is ambiguous in its specifications, 
 and when there is a reasonable doubt as to its true import and mean- 
 ing, the agreement may be examined and employed as a medium of ex- 
 planation of the tariff to remove the ambiguity. ' ' 
 
 1. Hood & Sons v. Delaware & H. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 1. 
 
 609- WWW. Equalizing bates in and out of competing jobbing cen- 
 
 TEES IMPEACTICABLE. 
 
 The Commission has held that the construction of rates by equal- 
 izing the rates in and out of competing jobbing centers is impracticable, 
 even if it might be assumed that the rate factors necessary to bring 
 about such equalization would always be fair and reasonable.^ 
 
 1. Wheeler Lumber Bridge & Supply Co. v. Director General, Chicago G. W. Ed. Co. 
 (1920), 59 I. C. C. Eep. 6, 10, citing Hutchinson Traffic Bureau v. Chicago, R. I. & 
 P. Ry. Co. (191T), 40 I. C. C. Rep. 689; Fort Dodge Commercial Club v. Director 
 General, Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co. (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 224, 227. 
 
 609-XXX. The chaeging of an uneeasonable eate is a toet. 
 
 In the case of International Nickel Co. v. Director Gemeral, as 
 Agent, Grand Trunk Ry. Co. of Canada^ the Commission stated: "The 
 charging of an unreasonable rate is a tort. Southern Pac. Co. v. Dar- 
 nell Taenser Co., 245 U. S. 531, 534, and the parties to such a rate are 
 jointly and severally liable for any resulting damage. Nicola, Stone & 
 Myers Co. v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 14 I. C. C. 199; Atlantic & Pacific Rail- 
 road V. Laird, 164 U. S. 393, 399. 
 
 "Section 1 (5) of the Interstate Commerce act provides: 
 
 "All charges made for any service rendered or to be rendered in the transportation 
 of passengers or property * * * or in connection therewith, shall be just and reas- 
 onable, and every unjust and unreasonable charge for such service or any part thereof 
 is prohibited and declared to be unlawful * * *. 
 
 ' ' Section 8 of the act provides : 
 
 "That in any case any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act shall do, 
 cause to be done, or permit to be done any act, matter, or thing in this Act prohibited or 
 declared to be unlawful * * * such common carrier shall be liable to the person 
 or persons injured thereby for the full amount of dnmages sustained in consequence of 
 any such violation of the provisions of this Act * * * (Italics ours)." 
 
169 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§609 
 
 See "Damages and Reparation-Claims: between Shippers and Car- 
 riers," Chapter 28, post. 
 
 1. International Xkkel Co. v. Director General, as Agent, (irand Trunk Rv. Co. of 
 Canada (1922), 66 I. C. C. Kep. 627, 628. 
 
 609- YYY. Lower rate on inland movement of import or export traf- 
 fic THAN ON domestic COMMERCE, UNLAWFUL UNLESS WATER 
 MOVEMENT SHALL HAVE BEEN OR IS TO BE IN A VESSEL DOCU- 
 MENTED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE UnITED StATES. 
 
 Section 28 of the Merchant Marine Act^ reads as follows: 
 
 That no common carrier shall charge, collect or receive, for transportation subject to 
 the Interstate Commerce Act, of persons or property, under any joint rate, fare, or charge, 
 or under any export. Import, or other proportional rate, fare, or charge, which is based 
 in whole or in part on the fact that the persons or property affected thereby is to be trans- 
 ported to, or has been transported from, any port in the possession or dependency of the 
 United States, or in a foreign country, by a carrier by water in foreign commerce, any 
 lower rate, fare or charge than that charged, collected, or received by it for the trans- 
 portation of persons, or of a like kind of property, for the same distance, in the same di- 
 rection, and over the same route, in connection with commerce wholly within the United 
 States, unless the vessel so transporting such persons or property is. or unless It was at 
 the time of such transportation by water, documented under the laws of the United States. 
 Whenever the board is of the opinion, however, that adequate shipping facilities to or 
 from any port in a possession or dependency of the United States or a foreign country are 
 not afforded by vessels so documented, it shall certify this fact to the Interstate Commerce 
 Commission, and the commission may, by order, suspend the operation of the provisions 
 of this section with respect to the rates, fares, and charges for the transportation by 
 rail of persons and property transported from, or to be transported, to such ports, for such 
 length of time and under such terms and conditions as It may prescribe in such order, 
 or in any order supplemental thereto. Such suspension of operation of the provisions of 
 this section may be terminated by order of the commission whenever the board is of the 
 opinion that adequate shipping facilities by such vessels to such ports are afforded and 
 shall so certify to the commission. 
 
 In its thirty-fifth annual report to Congress- the Interstate Com- 
 merce Commission stated : 
 
 "Section 28 of the merchant marine act, 1920, provides that no 
 lower rate, fare, or charge shall be charged, collected, or received for 
 the transportation within the United States of persons or property 
 in foreign commerce than is charged for like transportation in domes- 
 tic commerce, unless the water transportation from or to the port of 
 export or import shall have been or is to be in a vessel documented 
 under the laws of the United States. It also authorizes us, upon the 
 certification of the Shipping Board that adequate shipping facilities 
 are not afforded by vessels documented under the laws of the United 
 States,, to suspend the operation of the provisions of this section, and 
 to terminate the suspension upon further certification of the Shipping 
 Board that adequate facilities are so afforded. Upon appropriate 
 certifications received from the Board we have suspended the opera- 
 tion of the provisions of this section indefinitely. 
 
 "The effect which the operation of section 28 may have upon the 
 flow of commerce through different ports, and the possible resultant 
 injury to some ports, merit the serious consideration of the Congress. 
 Rail carriers, in making export or import rates, frequently group 
 the ports in a given region, such, for instance, as the gulf region, and 
 the lowest domestic rate to or from any port in the group upon the 
 particular description of traffic under consideration is published as 
 the export or import rate on that traffic to or from all ports within 
 the group. The grouping is of benefit to shippers as well as to the 
 
§609] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 170 
 
 ports affected, each one of which is nearer to some points of origin, 
 and more distant from others, than any of the other ports. It follows 
 that between certain origins and certain ports export or import and 
 domestic rates are on a substantial parity. Even in the absence of 
 such grouping the difference between the export or import and domestic 
 rates to and from various ports is materially greater in some instances 
 than in others. When section 28 becomes operative it is probable that 
 export and import shipments moving in foreign vessels will seek the 
 ports having the lowest domestic rates and at these ports foreign ves- 
 sels will be able to compete upon practically equal terms with the 
 United States vessels. The ultimate effect of section 28 may be merely 
 to divert traffic from certain ports to others with little or no gain in 
 tonnage for United States vessels. 
 
 "The adequacy or inadequacy of shipping facilities afforded by 
 vessels documented under the laws of the United States may vary from 
 time to time dependent upon market conditions and the hazards of 
 operation. It may become desirable, when adequate shipping facilities 
 at particular ports are afforded by vessels so documented, to terminate 
 the suspension of the operation of section 28 with respect to those ports 
 but not as to others. Subsequent developments may make renewed sus- 
 pension necessary. The construction and maintenance of port facilities 
 are costly, and if the use of ports is to be made variable and shifting 
 under the operation of this section that cost will be reflected in varying 
 proportions in the charges to be borne by the shipping public. 
 
 "Another aspect also merits careful consideration. A large part 
 of our exports of grain, for example, move by rail under transit ar- 
 rangements whicti permit of elevation, storing, grading, or other treat- 
 ment within a limited period, as for instance, 12 months, at the transit 
 point, and forwarding on the balance of the through rate in effect at 
 the time and from the place of original movement. If section 28, now 
 suspended, should become operative shipments of grain could there- 
 after be carried in the same train from the same elevator to the same 
 port for the same foreign vessel, on some of which the balance of the 
 through export rate, which was in effect perhaps a year before, will be 
 collected, and on other of which the higher domestic rate must be col- 
 lected. If for some cause the suspension should be renewed, grain 
 which had left the country elevator while section 28 was operative 
 would still take the domestic rate from the transit point and grain 
 originally shipped during the, new suspension would take the export 
 rate, although moving together from the same market to the same 
 port for the same foreign vessel. The difficulty of policing such situa- 
 tions will be great. Moreover, grain dealers at primary markets name 
 prices to foreign purchasers on grain delivered at the port. The pur- 
 chasers arange for the vessel and the dealer can not tell, in naming his 
 price, whether or not a foreign vessel will be selected by the purchaser. 
 Obviously the dealers' risk of loss will be great, and the effect upon 
 commerce most prejudical. 
 
 "In our judgment the Congress should take such action with re- 
 spect to this section as may be necessary to obviate unnecessary con- 
 flict with the needs and usages of inland transportation. ' ' 
 
 1. 41st Stat. L. 999. ~ ~~ 
 
 2. Thirty-Fifth Annual Report of I. C. C. (1921), p. 13, 14. 
 
171 pkeight bates and charges [§610 
 
 610. Comparison of freight rates 
 
 610- A. Necessity for comparison of rates. 
 
 The terms "reasonable and just," "unreasonable or unjust," "un- 
 due or unreasonable preference or advantage," "undue or unreason- 
 able prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever," and "un- 
 just discrimination," as used in the statute, imply comparison, and 
 rates must bear just relation to each other as well as to be reasonable 
 per se} 
 
 A rate can seldom be considered "in and of itself." It must be 
 taken almost invariably in relation to and in connection with other 
 rates. The freight rates of this country, both upon different commod- 
 ities and between different localities, are largely interdependent, and it 
 is the fact that they do not bear a proper relation to one another, rather 
 than the fact that they are absolutely too low or too high, which most 
 often gives occasion for complaint.^ Eates can seldom be tested even 
 as to their reasonableness, strictly by themselves, but must be consid- 
 ered to an extent in reference to their environment.^ 
 
 1. Page V. Delaware L. & W. Rd. Co. (1896), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 548, 556; citing, Eau Claire 
 Board of Trade v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1892), 4 I. C. Rep. 65, 5 I. C. O. Rep. 
 264; James & Abbott v. Canadian P. Rd. Co. (1893), 4 I. C. Rep. 274, 5 I. C. C. Rep. 
 612; Raymond v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1887), 1 I. C. Rep. 627, 1 I. C. C. 
 B«p. 230; Boards of Trade Union v. Chicago, M. and St. P. Ry. Co. (1887), 1 I. C. 
 Rep. 608, 1 I. C. C. Rep. 215 ; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. 
 (1893), 57 Fed. Rep. 948, 6 C. C. A. 653, 4 I. C. Rep. 408. Page v. Delaware L. & W. 
 Rd. Co. (1894), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 148. Carriers ordered to cease charging a higher rate 
 on window shades than on window hoUands and shade cloth, on the ground that the 
 existing classification is unreasonable ; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Delaware 
 L. & W. Rd. Co. (1894), 64 Fed Rep. 723. Commission's order held to be invalid on 
 the ground that the Commission erred in ignoring the element of value in fixing 
 the same rate on all articles of a certain kind, some of which are worth $3.00 and 
 others $10.00 ; thus denying to the carrier a remuneration for the additional risk in the 
 case of articles of greater value. Upon a certificate from the Commission stating, 
 in substance, that the Commission did not intend to make this order as broad as its 
 terms import, a rehearing was denied on the ground that the court cannot sub- 
 stitute for an order actually made such an order as the Commission might 
 or should make or such an order as the Commission intended to make. No appeal; 
 Page v. Delaware L. & W. Rd. Co. (1896), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 548. Upon rehearing, the 
 Commission entered a new order containing the same general requirements, but 
 with a proviso permitting the carriers to restrict the application of the reduced 
 rates to window shades of a certain value. Subsequently the original order was 
 substantially complied with by the lines directly interested. (Senate Hearings, 
 Committee on Interstate Commerce, 1904-5, vol. 5, p. 315). 
 
 2. Tileston Milling Co. v. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1899), 8 I. C. C. Rep. 346. 
 
 3. Southwestern Missouri Millers' Club v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 422, 427. 
 
 610-B. Facts to be considered in comparing bates. 
 
 In the case of Louisville & N. Rd. Co. v. United States'^ the Supreme 
 Court of the United States, per Mr. Justice Lamar, stated: "While 
 some elements of value are fixed, the market price of property and 
 work is affected by so many and such varying factors as to make it 
 impossible to lay down a rule by which to determine what any article or 
 service is worth. But one of the most common measures by which 
 to value the property or service of A is to compare it with the amount 
 charged for the same thing by B, C and T>. But this method, if made 
 the sole basis for ascertaining values, may often lead to improper re- 
 sults. For B, C and D may charge too much, or they may have been 
 
§610] TRAFFIC LAW SEKVICE 172 
 
 forced to charge too little. The same is true of determining, by com- 
 parison, the reasonableness of freight charges. Until some standard 
 is adopted they may prove nothing — even where twa hauls are over the 
 same mileage. For the rate attacked may tend to show that the others 
 are too low — ^while they in turn might be relied on to prove that the 
 first is too high. Both may be unreasonably low, or too low, because 
 compelled by conditions over which the carrier had no control. Water 
 competition, rail competition, and competition of markets, enter so 
 largely into the establishment of rates that mere distance is not neces- 
 sarily a determining factor; indeed, the statute itself recognizes that 
 there may be circumstances under which it is lawful to charge less for 
 a long haul than for a short haul over the same road. But while all 
 this be true, it is, nevertheless, a fact that a comparison of rates 
 between two points on the same road, or with the charges on other 
 roads, may furnish evidence of probative value. 
 
 ' ' Giving the widest possible effect to the fact that mere comparison 
 between rates does not necessarily tend to establish the reasonableness 
 of either, it is still true that, when one of many rates is found to be 
 higher than all others, there may arise a presumption that the single 
 rate is high. And when to that is added the fact that some of the 
 comparative and lower rates had been prescribed by the Commission, 
 there was at least a prima facie standard, which, after allowing for 
 dissimilarity in conditions, might be used along with all the other evi- 
 dence in order to test the reasonableness of the Nashville rate. No 
 one of these facts was conclusive, for the character of the country 
 through which the two roads had been built might differ, but neverthe- 
 less what was shown to be a reasonable rate on one, might, after allow- 
 ing for the dissimilarity in conditions, earnings, and cost, be a factor 
 in determining the reasonableness of the rate on the other. ' ' 
 
 When rate comparisons are offered in evidence in substantiation 
 of a claim of unreasonableness, they should be accompanied by such 
 testimony as is possible showing the transportation circumstances and 
 conditions incident thereto.^ 
 
 Louisville & N. Rd. Co. v. L'nited States (1915), 238 V. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 696, 59 
 
 L. Ed. 1177; affirming, Louisville & N. Rd. Co. v. United States (1914), 216 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 672; refusing to enjoin that portion of the Commission's order relating to 
 
 svcitching practices in Traffic Bureau of Nashville, Tenn., v. Louisville & X. Rd. Co. 
 
 (1913), 2S I. C. C. Rep. 533. 
 
 Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. Baltimore & O. S. Rd. Co. (1915), 35 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 14,20. 
 
 610-C. Comparison of rates on different branches or lines of the 
 
 SAME CARRIER. 
 
 Where the reasonableness of rates is in question, comparison may 
 be made with the rates on different branches or lines of the same 
 carrier; the value of the comparison being dependent in all cases upon 
 the degree of similarity of circumstances and conditions attending the 
 transportation for which the rates compared are charged.^ 
 
 1. Freight Bureau of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati, X. O. & T. P. Ry. Co- (18M), 6 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 195. 4 I. C. Rep. 592; Morrell v. Union P. Ilv. Co. (1893), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 121, 
 4 I. C. Rep. 469. 
 
^73 FKEIGHT RATES AND CHAKGES [§610 
 
 610-D. Comparison of rates via competing lines. 
 
 It does not follow as a matter of law that rates should be the same 
 for the same distance over two different roads. ^ 
 
 Transportation rates in force on lines of rival carriers are entitled 
 to consideration in connection with the question of reasonable charges 
 for transportation services rendered under like conditions. - 
 
 A rate via one route is not shown to be unreasonable by the mere 
 fact that there is a lower rate via another route.* 
 
 While, however, it is competent to compare rates and distances 
 on different roads in dealing with an alleged unreasonable rate these 
 are to be considered in connection with the many other factors that 
 enter into the adjustment of rates.* 
 
 The fact that the agent of the carrier advised the route longer 
 than another possible route, and which charged a higher route is 
 immaterial in an inquiry as to the reasonableness of the rate charges. ° 
 
 No presumption of unreasonableness attaches to a joint rate applic- 
 able over one route, which is higher than the combination of locals 
 via another route.® 
 
 Where two routes are available, it is unfair to consider only the 
 cost via the more expensive route, and when such higher cost is due 
 to betterments and improvements under way, the expenditures for 
 which were undoubtedly made to reduce the cost of operation, such 
 cost figures are not representative.^ 
 
 It cannot be said that the rate established by a short line is neces- 
 sarily excessive simply because it is no lower than a rate previously 
 in effect via a longer line, for it is possible that the rate via the longer 
 line was sufficiently low to warrant its adoption as a reasonable rate 
 ^ia the shorter line, and the traffic density of the new line must also 
 be taken into account.^ A carrier with a long route is not obliged 
 as a matter of law to meet the rate of its short line competitors, and the 
 reduction of a rate applicable via a long route to meet the rate in effect 
 via a shorter and more direct one is not of itself conclusive evidence of 
 the unreasonableness of the higher rate.' 
 
 Because the delivering carrier sees fit to state that it will protect 
 a rate made by a competitor, but fails to do so, the Commission cannot 
 hold that such lower rate is necessarily reasonable.^" In lola Portland 
 Cement Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. Rd. Co^^ the complainants shipped 
 cement from lola, Tex., to Comanche, Hasse, Brady and Stephensville, 
 Tex. Shipments moved over the M. K. & T. R. R. and F. W. & R. G. 
 R. R. Lawful combinations were assessed. At the same time there was 
 a through route via the Santa Fe and the F. W. & R. G. R. Rs., with 
 a joint rate less than the combination charged. Joint rate was knoAvn 
 to complainant. No evidence was offered that the rates assessed were 
 unreasonable and the only reason suggested for giving the traffic to 
 the M. K. & T. R. R., was an alleged assumption that the latter road 
 would be able to "protect" the rate published over another route. 
 Held, it to be obvious that such a state of facts cannot be made the 
 basis of an award of reparation under the Act, as such a result would 
 
§610] TEAFPIC LAW SEEVICE 174 
 
 be in substance an entire perversion of the fundamental provision of 
 the statute in respect to the publication of rates and adherence thereto. 
 
 1. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union P. Rd. Co. (1912), 222 TJ. S. 541, 549, 32 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 106, 56 L. Ed. 308. 
 
 2. Morrell v. Union P. Ry. Co. (1893), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 121, 4 I. O. Bep. 469. 
 
 3. Ball Lumber Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (1912), 25 I. O. C. Rep. 437, 438; Carstens 
 Packing Co. v. Union P. Rd. Co. (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 8, 10; McLean Lumber Co. 
 V. LouisviUe & N. Rd. Co. (1912). 22 I. C. C. Rep. 349, 352; Ryland & Brooks Lumber 
 Co. V. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. (1911), 21 I. 0. C. Rep. 520, 521; Cook Co. v. Wabash 
 Rd Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 563, 564; Delray Salt Co. v. Michigan C. Rd. Co. 
 (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 247 ; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1910), 
 18 I. C. C. Rep. 275, 276; Colorado Bedding Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co., (1910), 
 18 I. C. C. Rep. 403, 404; Ohio Iron & Metal Co. v. Wabash Rd. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 299, 300; Pankey & Holmes v. Central N. E. Ry. Co. (1910), 18 I. 0. C. Rep. 578; 
 South Canon Coal Co. v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 286; Menefee 
 Lumber Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 49, 51; Palmer & Miller 
 T. Lake E. & W. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 107. 
 
 4. Cannon v. Mobile & O. Rd. (1906), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 537. 
 
 5. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Tremont & G. Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 138, 
 139. 
 
 6. Paine Lumber Co. v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. 0. Rep. 626, 
 628; Snyder-Malone-Donahue Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ed. Co. (1910), 18 1. 0. C. Rep. 
 498; Menefee Lumber Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 49, 50; 
 Colorado Bedding Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 403, 404; 
 Bumham-Munger-Root Dry Goods Co. v. Director General, as Agent, Baltimore Steam 
 Packet Co. (1920), 58 I. C. C. Rep. 73; Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. Director Gen- 
 eral, as Agent, Pere Marquette By. Co. (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 411, 412. 
 
 7. In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Car- 
 riers for the Transportation of Coal and Coke in Carloads from Points on the Louis- 
 ville & Nashville Railroad to Points on the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St 
 Louis Railway and Other Destinations (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 20, 26. 
 
 8. Board of Railroad Commissioners of the State of Montana v. Butte, A. & P. Ry. Co. 
 (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 641, 648. 
 
 9. Georgia-Carolina Brick Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1911), 20 I. 0. C. Rep. 148, 149. 
 
 10. De Camp Bros. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 144. 
 
 11. lola Portland Cement Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 91. 
 
 610-E. Comparison of rates on different lines in different sections 
 
 OF the country. 
 
 While the revenue per ton per mile over other routes on other lines 
 and to other destinations is often suggestive in arriving at a proper 
 estimate of the reasonableness of a rate over a route complained of, 
 it is by no means conclusive.^ It is a matter of common knowledge 
 that freight rates are controlled by various and varying conditions, and 
 therefore the rates established in one section of the country furnish no 
 reliable standard by which to measure the reasonableness of rates 
 in another section where dissimilar conditions prevail.- Such rates 
 therefore can have no evidentiary bearing unless substantial similarity 
 in transportation conditions is shown.^ Varying conditions existing on 
 different lines must, of necessity, justify differences in rates for hauls 
 of the same distance. The real question in any such complaint is the 
 reasonableness of the particular rate on the particular line between 
 the particular points in question.'' In testing such a rate the rates on 
 the same or adjacent lines in the immediate territory where the same 
 conditions exist are of much greater significance and afford a much 
 more accurate basis for action by the Commission." 
 
 There is no reason why rates should greatly exceed similar rates 
 upon other roads in other portions of the country where density of 
 traffic and conditions of operation are analogous.^ 
 
175 FREIGHT EATES AND dHAKGES ["§610 
 
 The relatively high density of the particular traffic in the territory 
 from which the comparisons are drawn would fairly indicate the pro- 
 priety of rates on that traffic in that territory which are relatively low 
 as compared with rates applicable to other commodities transported 
 in the same territory. Likewise, a relatively low density of the par- 
 ticular traffic in the territory involved would indicate the propriety 
 of relatively high rates on that traffic.'^ 
 
 1. Dallas Freight Bureau v. Gulf, 0. & S. F. Ry. Co. (19OT), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 223. 
 
 2. Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1900), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 30; 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. Ed. Co. (1896), 73 Fed. Rep. 409; 
 Cattle Raisers' Assn. v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 296; New 
 Orleans Cotton Exchange v. IlUnois C. Rd. Co. (1890), 3 I. C. C. Rep. 534; 2 I. C. Rep. 
 777; Business Men's Assn. v. Chicagoj St. P. M. & O. Ry. Co. (1888), 2 I. C. C. Rep. 
 52, 2 I. C. Rep. 41; Dallas Freight Bureau v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1907), 12 
 I. C. C. Rep. 427; Lincoln Creamery Co. v. Union P. Ry. Co. (1892), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 
 156, 3 I. C. Rep. 794; Omaha-Oklahoma Fresh-Meati Rates (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 
 454, 457; Worn v. Boca & L. Rd. Co. (1914), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 58, 59; Crutchfield & 
 Wloodfolk V. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 558, 559; Rhinelander 
 Paper Co. v. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 633, 634. 
 
 3. Evans v. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1896), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 520. 
 
 4. Dallas Freight Bureau v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co., supra. 
 
 5. Ibid. 
 
 6. Commercial Club of Salt Lake City, Utah, v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1910), 19 
 I. C. C. Rep. 218, 223. 
 
 7. Eastern Live-Stock Case (1915), 36 I. C. C. Rep. 675, 682. 
 
 610-F. The divisions of a joint thbough bate aee no critekia by 
 
 WHICH to measure LOCAL BATES. 
 
 A part of a through rate may legally be less than the local rate 
 between the same or less distant points.^ 
 
 Where two connecting carriers unite by putting into force a 
 joint through tariff between two points such joint tariff is not the 
 standard by which the reasonableness of the local tariff is to be 
 determined.^ 
 
 The division of a joint through rate between carriers in a line of 
 transportation furnishes no fair or just criterion by which to measure 
 the intermediate local rates on the same line of transportation.^ 
 
 It is not unlawful under Section 4 of the Interstate Commerce Act 
 for a carrier to accept as its share of a joint through rate a less sum 
 than its local rate for a shorter haul.* 
 
 A carrier by electing to accept a low division of a joint through 
 rate for a long haul rather than to stay out of the business cannot be 
 held to have thereby committed itself to that division as a measure 
 of the reasonableness of other rates for transportation between the 
 same points, on business from and to different distances or of a dif- 
 ferent character."* 
 
 The United States Supreme Court has held that the fact that a dis- 
 parity between through and local rates is considerable will not, of itself, 
 be regarded as conclusive evidence of undue discrimination.* 
 
 It is consistent with the law for a carrier, within reasonable limits, 
 to accept less per ton per mile upon long hauls than upon short hauls 
 and to widen the disparity between such rates as the difference between 
 distances increases. Hence the proportion received by certain carriers 
 out of a long distance through rate is not necessarily the measure of 
 
'§610] TKAFPIC LAW SERVICE 176 
 
 the thrpugh rate wMcli such carriers are entitled to make over a 
 materially short distance, though such proportion is an important 
 consideration in determining the rightful relation of the through rates.^ 
 
 If the carrier participating in a joint through rate desires to reduce 
 or increase the separately established local rates via the same routes, 
 the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission requiring the main- 
 tenance of a joint through rate is no bar to their doing so.^ 
 
 1. Parsons v. Chicago & N. W. Ey. Co. (1897), 167 U. S. 447, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. SS7, 42 
 L. Ed. 231; affirming, Parsons v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1894), 63 Fed. Rep. 903, 
 11 C. C. A. 489; Tozer v. Tnited States (1892), 52 Fed. Rep. 917. 
 
 2. Parsons v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1894), 63 Fed. Rep. 903, 11 C. C. A. 489, 27 
 U. S. App. 394; affirming. Parsons v. Chicago &-N. W. Ry. Co. (1897), 167 U. S. 447, 
 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 887, 42 L. Ed. 231; Chicago & X. W. By. Co. v. Osborne (1892), 52 
 Fed. Rep. 912, 3 C. C. A. 347; Reversing, Osborne v. Chicago & X. W. Ry. Co. (1891), 
 48 Fed. Rep. 49. 
 
 3. McMorran v. Grand Trunk Ey. Co. (1889), 3 I. C. C. Rep. 252, 2 I. C. Rep. 604; Acme 
 Cement Plaster Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 30; Board 
 of Trade of VTinston- Salem, N. C. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 12; 
 Omaha Cooperage Co. v. Nashville C. & St. L. Ry Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 250; 
 New Orleans Cotton Exchange v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1890), 3 I. C. C. Eep. 534, 2 
 I. C. Eep. 777; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Osborne (1892), 52 Fed. Rep. 912, 3 C. 
 C. A. 347; reversing, Osborne v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1S91), 48 Fed. Rep. 49; 
 United States v. Mellen (1892), 53 Fed. Rep. 229; James & Abbott v. Canadian P. 
 Ry. Co. (1893), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 632, 4 I. C. Rep. 274; Mayor and Council Wichita, 
 Kas. V. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ey. Co. (1903), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 558; Railroad Commis- 
 sioners of Kentucky v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (1897), 7 I. C. C. Eep. 380; 
 Manahan v. Northern P. Ey. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 95, 97; Thatcher v. Fitch- 
 burg Rd. Co. (1887), 1 I. C. C. Eep. 152, 1 I. C. Eep. 356; Lippman & Co. v. Illinois 
 C. Rd. Co. (1889), 2 I. C. 0. Rep. 584, 2 I. C. Rep. 414; Jennison Co. v. Great N. Ry. 
 Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 113, 119. 
 
 4. United States v. Mellen, supra. 
 
 5. Burnham, Hanna, Munger Dry Goods Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1908), 14 
 I. C. C. R«p. 299, 310. 
 
 6. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Intrestate Commerce Commission (1896), 162 U. S. 197. 16 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 666, 40 L. Ed. 940. See Parsons v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., supra ; 
 Railroad Commission of Nevada v. Southern P. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 239, 252; 
 Jennison Co. v. Great N. Ry. Co. (1910), 18 I. C.C. Rep. 113, 121. 
 
 7. Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1895), 6 I. C. C. Eep. 488. 
 
 S. Michigan Buggy Co. v. Grand Eapids & I. Ey. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Eep. 299. 
 
 610-Gr. Division of joint through rate not conclusive evidence of 
 
 REASONABLENESS OF JOINT THROUGH RATE ITSELF. 
 
 Under the law as construed by the Commission, a joint through 
 rate is a unit, an entirety, with the divisions or component parts of 
 which the public is not concerned unless the joint rate as a whole is 
 illegal.^ 
 
 Although a shipper or consignee has no direct interest in the way 
 a joint rate is divided between the carriers, nor in the amount of the 
 division received by each carrier, he is entitled, nevertheless, to inquire 
 into such division when he complains that the joint rate is unlawful, 
 for the amount received by the different carriers may be significant 
 upon the reasonableness of the aggregate charge.^ 
 
 Only when the public or a shipper complains of the illegality of a 
 joint through rate as a whole can one or more of the divisions of such 
 rate be inquired into to determine if the illegality of the whole rate is 
 traceable to the illegality of a specific part thereof.* 
 
 While a division of a through rate long accepted by a carrier may 
 often be pertinent evidence, it is not a sound final test of the reason- 
 
177 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§610 
 
 ableness of the through rate itself;* and when an unlawful rate results 
 from some arbitrary share or division exacted by one of the carriers, 
 the Commission will find the facts and state its conclusion with respect 
 to such share or division.^ 
 
 If the through rates are not unreasonable, the Commission can not 
 condemn the same on account of the divisions thereof to the various 
 roads forming the through lines, the law and public being alike served 
 by rates in the aggregate reasonable and not affected by their dis- 
 tribution.® 
 
 In Stevens Grocer Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. By. Co.'^ upon com- 
 plaint alleging that through rates charged to Parkin and Wayne, 
 Arkansas, on certain carloads of coal from points in Kentucky, Mary- 
 land, and Alabama, by way of Memphis, Tenn., and that the local rates 
 from Memphis to the same points were unjust and unreasonable, the 
 factors of the through rates beyond Memphis and the local rates from 
 Memphis being attacked, and the complaint naming no defendant other 
 than the delivering carrier operating from Memphis to destinations. 
 Held : That where a through rate is alleged to be unreasonable all the 
 carriers which participate or participated therein should be named 
 as defendants; that a through rate is a transportation unit, although 
 its factors or component parts may be separately established; and 
 being a unit its parts, as such, may not be attacked unless the through 
 rate itself is also attacked; that nevertheless certain rates, such as local 
 rates, or joint rates, which may be used as parts of through rates may 
 be attacked as applicable to local shipments. 
 
 In Reno Grocery Co. v. Southern P. Co.^ complainant alleges that 
 the division received by the defendant of the joint rate on sirup from 
 St. Paul, Minn., to Reno, Nevado, was unjust and unreasonable. On 
 January 28, 1911, one carload of sirup was shipped from St. Paul 
 to complainant at Reno. Charges were assessed and paid on basis of 
 rate of $1.15 per 100 pounds, equivalent to the terminal rate of 75 cents 
 per 100 pounds to Sacramento, Calif., plus the rate of 43 cents per 100 
 pounds for transportation from Sacramento to Reno. Complainant 
 alleges that the defendant received out of this rate of $1.18 its propor- 
 tion of the terminal rate of 75 cents, together with the entire back-haul 
 rate of 43 cents. Reparation is asked based on the back-haul charge. 
 This shipment was received by the defendant carrier at Ogden, Utah, 
 and transported from that point to Reno. Between St. Paul and 
 Ogden the movement was over the lines of other carriers, who are 
 not made parties in this proceeding, and whose identity is not dis- 
 closed. The rate of $1.18 per 100 pounds was, at the time the shipment 
 moved, a joint rate established by the participating carriers and pub- 
 lished in a tariff in which all of these carriers joined, Held : That this 
 through rate is attacked in the pleadings only by implication, and that 
 if the purpose was to attack this rate, all of the participating carriers 
 should have been joined as parties defendant; that what is actually 
 attacked in the petition is a part of the division of the joint rate 
 received by the defendant; that the division of a joint rate is a matter 
 for agreement among the participating carriers and is not subject to 
 review by the Commission upon complaint of a shipper; that, under 
 the discretion of the Commission, be considered as evidence bearing 
 upon the reasonableness of the rate; that under the circumstances 
 
§610] TRAFFIC LAW SEEVICE 178 
 
 there is either a nonjoinder of the proper parties defendant or else 
 the issue raised is without the jurisdiction of the Commission. Com- 
 plaint dismissed. 
 
 Evidence of a through rate and the division thereof received by a 
 carrier, held to he admissible for the purpose of showing what would 
 be a fair and reasonable rate for such carrier to charge for a local 
 haul." 
 
 1. Copper Queen Consolidated Mining Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. 
 Bep. 154. 
 
 2. Warren-Ehret Co. v. Central Ed. of New Jersey (1900), 8 I. C. C. Rep. 598; Boston 
 Fruit & Produce Exchange v. New York & N. E. Ed. Co. (1891), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 1, 3 
 I. C. Rep. 604; Railroad Commission of Florida v. Savannah F. & W. Ry. Co. (1891), 
 5 I. C. C. Rep. 13, 3 I. C. Rep. 688; Florida Fruit & Vegetable Shippers' Assn. v. 
 Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Eep. 476, 487. 
 
 3. Copper Queen Consolidated Mining Co. v. Baltimore & O. Ed. Co., supra. 
 
 4. Bulte Milling Co. v. Chicago & A. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 351. 
 
 5. Warren-Ehret Co. v. Central Rd. of New Jersey, supra. 
 
 6. Charlotte Shippers' Assn. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1905), 11 I. C. C. Eep. 108. 
 
 7. Stevens Grocer Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1916), 42 I. C. C. Rep. 396. 
 
 8. Reno Grocery Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 4O0. 
 
 9. HalUday Milling Co. v. Louisiana & N. W. Ed. Co. (1906), 80 Ark. 536, 98 S. W. 374. 
 
 610-H. Relation between" watek aistd eau, teanspoetation. 
 
 When the Congress was given power to regulate commerce among 
 the States, railroads had no existence. To whatever extent the regula- 
 tion so provided for was intended to include transportation charges, 
 it must have had special reference to the then existing transportation 
 methods, which were mainly by lake, river or coastwise carriers. 
 
 The regulation for which provision is made in the Act to Regulate 
 Commerce does not apply to commerce as it was conducted when the 
 power to regulate was conferred upon Congress. The Act implies 
 to water transportation only when "used under a common control, 
 management or arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment in 
 connection with a railroad," and as part of a line or route of which 
 another part is a railroad, and leaves carriers engaged in transporta- 
 tion wholly by water independent of regulation. 
 
 The exemption of so considerable a part of transportation from 
 the operations of the law has an important bearing upon the railroad 
 rates of the country. 
 
 The construction and maintenance of the way or track is a prin- 
 cipal item in the cost of railway transportation, while the permanent 
 way over navigable waters is free from all expense, and is maintained 
 at public cost. In water transportation, carriers provide only the 
 vessel or vehicle of carriage. There is, therefore, a wide difference 
 in the cost of rail and water service, and water transportation charges 
 can be very much the lower and still be remunerative. 
 
 Carriers by water are not required to publish rates, and are under 
 no restrictions as to rebates, discriminations or preferences as to 
 charges proportional as to distance. No stability is required in their 
 charges, which may fluctuate as often as the exigencies of business 
 rivalries dictate or the necessities for traffic render expedient. When- 
 
179 FEEIGHT KATES AND CHARGES [§610 
 
 ever rail and water transportation are in direct competition, a reduction 
 of rail rates to meet the water charges is essential to secure any part 
 of the traffic.^ 
 
 See "Water carriers," Section 320, ante, "Independent water car- 
 riers — Inland — Ocean," Section 406, ante, and "Water Carriers — Pan- 
 ama Canal Act," Chapter 50, post. 
 
 1. Third Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission (1889). 
 
 610-1. Comparison between present rate and lower bate maintained 
 
 IN THE past. 
 
 The maintenance of a lower rate in the somewhat remote past does 
 not necessarily prove anything of value in ascertaining the reasonable- 
 ness of an existing rate.^ 
 
 To what extent long previous existence of lower rates in actual use 
 may justify an inference or presumption that they are sufficiently high, 
 the mere publication of such rates in the general schedule, when they 
 have not been used, is not conclusive proof that they are reasonably 
 remunerative to the carriers. " 
 
 1. Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Georgia Ed. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 230. 
 
 2. Shlel & Co. V. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 211. 
 
 610-J. Comparison op rates to competitive and non-competitive 
 
 POINTS. 
 
 Rates to competitive points are not fair standards of the reason- 
 ableness of the rates to non-competitive points.^ 
 
 1. Corporation Commission of the State of North Carolina v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. 
 (1910), 19 I. 0. C. Rep. 303, 308. 
 
 610-K. Comparison of local and proportional rates. 
 A proportional rate cannot be accepted as the standard of com- 
 parison with local rates.^ However, while local and proportional rates 
 are not ordinarily comparable, comparisons of such rates may be con- 
 sidered in connection with other evidence determining the reasonable- 
 ness of a particular rate.- 
 
 1. Baltimore Chamber of Commerce v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 
 596, 602; In the Matter of the Advance of Rates on Live Stock from Kansas City, 
 Mo., to St. Louis, Mo., and Other Mississippi River Crossings (1911), 21 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 119, 122. 
 
 2. Lindsay Bros. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 516, 517. 
 
 610-L. Comparison op rates in opposite directions. 
 
 It has often been recognized by the Commission that the mere 
 fact that a rate is higher one way between the same points than it is 
 in the other, does not prove that the higher rate is unreasonable. This 
 is particularly true where there is a preponderance of empty cars 
 moving in one direction.^ 
 
§610] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 180 
 
 A rate in one direction in excess of the rate between the same 
 points in opposite directions which has not demonstrated the unreason- 
 ableness of the higher rate, especially where it is a class rate, and the 
 
 movement of the particular traffic is not of sufficient volume to warrant 
 the establishment of a commodity rate.- 
 
 1. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1912), 195 Fed. Rep. 
 541, 559; citing, Duncan v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1893), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 85, 103; 
 MacLoon v. Boston & M. Rd. Co. (1903), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 642; Weil v. Pennsylvania 
 Rd. Co. (1906), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 627. 
 
 2. Parlln & OrendorfE Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1916), 42 I. C. C. Rep. 29, 30, citing, Hull 
 Vehicle Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 619; Meridian Cellulose Co. 
 V. Director General, Canadian P. Ry. Co. (1920), 57 I. C. C. Rep. 283, 285; Samuel 
 V. Director General, as Agent, Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 190, 
 191; Phelps Dodge Corp., v. Director General, as Agent, Arizona E. Rd. Co. (1920), 
 59 I. C. C. Rep. 561, 562. 
 
 610-M. Comparison between class and commodity rates. 
 
 Commodity rates are ordinarily lower than class rates. The class 
 rates therefore afford a reasonable test for measuring the general level 
 of the commodity rates.^ 
 
 Commodity rates are usually, if not invariably, lower than the 
 class rates, being special rates presumably established on account of 
 peculiar circumstances and conditions.^ The general policy of the 
 carriers is to make commodity rates somewhat lower than class rates 
 on commodities, the movement of which is regarded as necessary to 
 the development of mercantile interests and industries.* Commodity 
 rates are in essence exceptions to the classifications based upon the 
 belief of the economic expediency of such course.* Nevertheless, com- 
 modity rates are special rates which ought to be made with reference to 
 all the conditions surrounding the transportation of the particular 
 article between the particular points." 
 
 See "Class rates," Section 600-G, ante, and "Commodity Rates" 
 Section 600-11, ante. 
 
 1. Rate Increases in Official Classification Territory (1914). 31 I. C. C. Rep. 351. 401. 
 
 2. Indianapolis Freight Bureau v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 367; Goerres Cooperage Co. v. Chicago, M. & St P. Ry. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 5, 6. 
 
 3. Railroad Commission of Nevada v. Southern P. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 2.38, 255. 
 
 4. Railroad Commission of Nevada v. Southern P. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 329* 332. 
 
 5. State of Iowa v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 47 63 
 
 610-N. Relationship of rates on raw materiai.s to competing 
 
 INDUSTRIES. 
 
 Where an industry has been required to pay for a long period 
 of time rates of freight on raw material which bear certain relations 
 to rates charged to competitors at other points, a marked change in 
 such relations of rates in favor of competing industries cannot be made 
 without an attendant presumption of undue discrimination.^ In com- 
 paring the rates on iron ore from Lake Erie ports to the competing 
 manufacturing districts of Pittsburgh and Wheeling, the Commission 
 stated that a weighted average distance in which each distance is given 
 weight in accordance with the actual tonnage moving over it, seems 
 
181 FEEIGHT KATES AND CHAEGES ['§610 
 
 an equitable basis for comparison even though such an average varies 
 with changes in the relative consumption at various points.- 
 
 1. Detroit Chemical Works v. Northern C. Ry. Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 357, 362. 
 
 2. Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 173, 174. 
 
 610-O. Comparison between carload and less-than-carload rates. 
 
 The terminal costs on a carload are much less than on a less- 
 than-carload shipment, and for this and other reasons the cost of trans- 
 porting a carload shipment is less per unit than the cost of transport- 
 ing a less-than-carload shipment. The movement in carloads also 
 results in economy of transportation facilities and is therefore greatly 
 to be desired in the interests of the public as well as of the carriers. 
 In any-quantity rates the spread is reduced to nothing.^ 
 
 In Western Classification Case^ the Commission said: "Assum- 
 ing a proper relation between carload and less-than-carload rates, the 
 establishment of carload rating whenever carload quantities are offered 
 will, we believe, meet the needs of new and growing lines of industry 
 without discrimination." 
 
 In Southeastern Sugar Cases^ the Commission said: "A narrow 
 spread betwen the carload and less-than-carload rates, however 
 desirable from the standard of the New Orleans jobbers, tends to the 
 waste of transportation facilities without adequate compensating ad- 
 vantages to the general public and is not to be encouraged. ' ' 
 
 See ''Lower rate for carload than for less-than-carload quantities," 
 Section 609-00, ante. 
 
 1. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Chicago G. W. Rd. Co. (1920), 56 I. C. C. Rep. 340. 
 
 2. In the Matter of Saspension of Western Classification (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 442, 
 465 
 
 3. Southeastern Sugar Cases (1918), 48 I. C. C. Rep. 739. 747. 
 
 610-P. Comparisons should be made of voluntary rates. 
 
 In Southwestern Shippers' Traffic Assn. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. 
 Ry. Co.^ the Commission stated: "This argument overlooks the fact 
 that the rate via these south Atlantic ports is strictly competitive. It 
 is the rate from New York to Chicago, whether it be by rail, by rail- 
 and-water, or by all-water which fixes the charge from New York 
 through the south Atlantic port to the Mississippi River. That rate 
 must be less than the all-rail rate or business will not move via that 
 route. Hence, the rate cannot be said to be voluntary and ought not 
 to be used as a standard of comparison." 
 
 1. Southwestern Shippers' Traffic Assn. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1912), 24 I. 
 C. C. Rep. 570, 587. 
 
 610-Q. Comparison of rates unsupported by evidence of various 
 circumstances and conditions. 
 
 In the case of Wicktvire Steel Co. v. New York C. & H. R. Rd. Co.' 
 the Commission stated: "The proposition to which counsel's argument 
 
§610] TBAFriC LAW SEBVICE 182 
 
 tends, that no comparison of rates is ever justified except upon the 
 actual submission of evidence of similarity of the various circumstances 
 and conditions of transportation, would seem to be a somewhat extreme 
 one. It is well known that rates have been frequently justified or 
 condemned by this Commission upon records maintaining little else 
 than mere rate and distance comparisons; under the condition, how- 
 ever, of a known general similarity of conditions, as for example where 
 the movements compared are of the same commodity in the same ter- 
 ritory. Granting, however, that there is some dissimilarity of condi- 
 tions in the various movements involved in this and in the other related 
 coke cases and that the differences now remarked by counsel are of a 
 kind to influence the amount of the rates in question, we may say that, 
 without attempting to assign the precise weight which should be given 
 to these differences, we feel, confident that they do not sustain a valid 
 criticism of the Buffalo rate, which we have approved. The rate of 
 $1.85 to Buffalo is not only not unreasonably high, but on the contrary 
 is low when compared with the present rates to eastern Pennsylvania 
 furnaces. It is also low as compared with the other rates determined 
 to be reasonable by this Commission in the related coke-rate cases. A 
 recent examination of the comparison has served only to strenghten 
 this conclusion. Measurement of these rates by an arbitrary meas- 
 uring rate computed from the rates themselves shows that the Buffalo 
 rate, even using the distance of 314 miles urged by complainants, is 
 still somewhat out of line with the other rates and might, if established 
 solely upon the distance basis, which we do not suggest, be put as high 
 as $1.94 rather than $1.85. 
 
 "This leaves for consideration complainants' contention that in 
 justifying the increased rate the Commission must have gone, and in 
 fact, did go, outside of the record in the instant case to support its con- 
 clusion, and that in so doing it deprived complainants of the hearing 
 guaranteed them by the act. In support of their asserted rights in this 
 regard counsel cite Interstate Commerce Commission v. L. & N.- R. R. 
 Co., 227 U. S. 88, which holds that the statute gives parties a right to a 
 full hearing and imposed upon the Commission the duty of deciding in 
 accordance with the facts proved and holds, moreover, that information 
 gathered by the Commission in the exercise of its jurisdiction conferred 
 by section 12 of the act is not available where the party is entitled 
 to a hearing. A brief answer to complainants' contention is that 
 they were accorded a full hearing, that the Commission has decided in 
 accordance with the facts proved and that it did not base its conclu- 
 sion in the instant case on evidence introduced in the other coke-rate 
 case. As has already appeared in the foregoing portion of this report, 
 what the Commission did was simply to refer to its conclusions in those 
 other cases, or, in other words, it used the rates there found to be 
 reasonable after extensive examination and most careful consideration 
 as a measure of the reasonableness of the rates in the Wickwire case. 
 This is quite in accord with our ordinary practice as shown for example 
 in Rates for the Transportation of Cooperage from Salt Lake City, 
 24 I. C. C. 656, 659. To contend that the commission could make no 
 such comparison and that in deciding the Wickwire case or any par- 
 ticular case of the group it was compelled to shut its eyes to all the 
 other cases or to divide its mind into separate compartments and to 
 consider each one without any reference whatsoever to the other, 
 
183 FKEIGHT BATES AND CHAKGES [§610 
 
 and this in the face of their unavoidably necessary relation, is a 
 proposition which cannot be seriously advanced. 
 
 "A dictum in United States v. B. do 0. S. W- By. Co., 226 U. S., 
 14, 20, refers to this right of the Commission, to take notice of the 
 results reached by it in other cases. The dictum, however, stipulates 
 as a condition of this right that the facts thus noticed should be specified 
 in the record, so that matters of law may be saved. This dictum is 
 cited by complainants in their opening brief with the observation that 
 in the present case nothing has been made to appear in the record as 
 to the results reached in other cases and that a court would not be 
 enabled to review the decision of the Commission in this regard. It is 
 true that the Commission's decision does not specify with particu- 
 larity the rates in the other coke-rate cases used as the standards of 
 comparison. The Commission probably was betrayed into a lack of 
 formality in this regard because of its consciousness of the famili- 
 arity both of the defendants and the complainants with the other cases 
 which it had in mind. It- assumed that both would quite clearly under- 
 stand the reference to the other cases and would have easy access to 
 the cited comparison. If the reference was, however, as a matter of 
 record, too indefinite, it has now been corrected by the enumeration of 
 the other cases in the preceding portion of this report and further 
 cause of complaint in this regard would seem to disappear." 
 
 1. Wickwire Steel Co. v. New York C. & H. K. Rd. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 415, 423, 
 et seq. 
 
 610-R. Rate-pek-ton-pee-mile comparisons. 
 Comparison of rate-per-ton-per-mile yield on different commodities. 
 
 Comparisons of rates, revenue per ton-mile, per car-mile, per 
 train-mile, etc., are frequently illuminating and helpful. The fact that 
 the rates upon a certain commodity yield revenue per ton-mile higher 
 than the average upon all traffic cannot be accepted as conclusive of the 
 unreasonableness of such rates. If it were so accepted, the result 
 would be a continual reduction of rates that yield higher than the 
 average revenue, until all rates were on a common level. Consideration 
 must be given to the value of the service. // some commodities and 
 the industries that use them, can well stand rates that yield liberal profit 
 to the carrier it can afford to transport at low rates other commodities 
 that could not move except under low rates, and so the commerce and 
 welfare of the country is promoted, as it must be, by the widest possible 
 general diffusion and exchange of the products of the mine, the forest, 
 the farm, the mill, the furnace, and the factory.^ 
 
 Rates per-ton-per-mile based on the short haul. 
 
 On the general principle that the shorter haul governs the rate, as 
 a basis for comparison with other rates, the per-ton-per-mile revenue 
 based on such shorter route should be used.^ 
 
 Comparison of ton-mile earnings inust be under similar circumstances 
 
 and conditions. 
 
 In Board of Improvement, Ft. Smith, Ark. v. St. Louis <& S. F. 
 Rd. Co.^ the Commission stated : 
 
§610] TEAFPIC LAW SEBVICE 
 
 184 
 
 "In considering the traffic here in question Kansas City and Fort 
 Smith cannot be said to be in the same section, and in the absence of a 
 showing of substantial similarity of conditions, comparative and physi- 
 cal, surrounding the transportation thereto a comparison of rates to 
 points so far distant is not conclusive either of unreasonableness or 
 discrimination. To consider the yield per ton per mile as wholly con- 
 trolling in a particular case is equivalent to the fixing of rates on the 
 basis of distance alone. In the case of Union Tanning Co. v. S. By. Co., 
 26 I. C. C. 159, 164, the Commission said : 
 
 " 'While in fixing reasonable rates and relative rate adjustments, distance must 
 always be considered as bearing both upon cost to the carrier in performing the service 
 to the value of the service to the shipper, there are many facts, such as density or 
 sparsity of traffic over and along the lines of movement, comparative cost of construc- 
 tion and operation, and competitive conditions, which must be given weight. In some 
 situations the other facts and conditions are so nearly uniform or similar that distance 
 becomes the dominant factor in the relative adjustment of rates, while in others dis- 
 tance becomes, within limitations, a minor factor- because of the dominating and con- 
 trolling force of other facts and conditions; hence many striking inconsistencies would 
 be apparent in different rate adjustments made by orders of this and state commissions, 
 as well as voluntarily by the carriers, if examined and compared with regard to distance 
 alone. If the Commission should dispose of these rate questions and controversies by 
 resort alone or mainly to comparative distances, ton-mile earnings, and estimated rela- 
 tive earnings above the estimated so-called "out-of-pocket" cost to the carrier for each 
 service performed, there could always be found standards for the reduction of every 
 rate to the basis of the lowest, whatever may have compelled or induced its establish- 
 ment. For the Commission to adopt such a course would inevitably lead to a continuous 
 process of reducing the carriers' revenue, a result which would be detrimental to the 
 public interest as well as unjust to carriers.' 
 
 "There is no evidence that the rate to Fort Smith is out of line 
 with rates to points in the same general territory, and it is claimed by 
 defendants that any reduction therein would necessitate reductions in 
 rates to other points. 
 
 ' ' The facts presented do not convince us that the rate here in issue 
 is unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory. The complaint will there- 
 fore be dismissed and it will be so ordered." 
 
 Car-mile or train-mile basis versus per-ton-mile basis. 
 
 Much of the profitable freight carried by the railroads of the 
 United States, and perhaps this might be made broader, and it can 
 be truthfully said that most of the freight which pays the carriers the 
 best is that which yields the lowest rate per ton-mile. This arises out 
 of many facts which the Traffic Manager takes into consideration — the 
 volume of the trafiBc, the heavy load per car, and the regularity of the 
 movement.* 
 
 While a fair basis for determining the reasonableness of rates is 
 found in earnings per car-mile and per train-mile, the rate per ton per 
 mile is instructive.^ However, neither the ton-mile nor the car earnings 
 furnish an absolutely correct test of the reasonableness of rates, but 
 a better basis is to be found in the combination of the two.® 
 
 1. Coke Producers Assn. of the Connellsville Region v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1913), 
 27 I. C. C. Rep. 125, 132. 
 
 2. Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 173, 175. 
 
 3. Board of Improvement, Port Smith, Ark. v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. 0. 
 C. Rep. 541, 542. 
 
 • -4. In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates of the 
 Transportation of Coal by the Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., Baltimore & O. Rd. Co., 
 Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., The Kanawha & M. Ry. Co., and their Connections (1912), 22 
 I. C. C. Rep. 604, 620. 
 
 5. Wisconsin Steel Co. v. Pittsburgh & L. E. Rd. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. 0. Rep. 152, 162. 
 
 6. Bahrenbnrg Bros. & Co. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 560, 566. 
 
185 FKEIGHT RATES AND CHAEGES [§610 
 
 610-S. Terminal services in the delivery and receipt of traffic as 
 
 ELEMENTS TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE RELATIONSEIIF OF RATES. 
 
 In St. Louis Chamber of Commerce v. Baltimore & 0. Rd. Co} 
 the Interstate Commerce Commission, per Mr. Commissioner Aitchison, 
 said: "The clause of section 1 of the act which defines transporta- 
 tion as including terminal delivery is jurisdictional, and does not affect 
 the measure of the rate, or relationship of rates, for the terminal service 
 included within the transportation. This interpretation is reflected 
 in our own action in cases previously cited wherein we prescribed 
 higher rates for farther distant points in the Chicago switching district 
 than to nearer points on the same line in that district. The deter- 
 mination of the issue in such cases turns upon the relative services 
 rendered under the respective through-rate units as a whole, including 
 line-haul and terminal delivery, as necessarily separting the one from 
 the other." 
 
 See "Service in the delivery and receipt of traffic at terminals," 
 Section 608-S, ante, and "Terminal Facilities ai>d Regulations," Chap- 
 ter 16, post. 
 
 1. St. Louis Chamber of Commerce v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1920). 57 I. C. C. Kep. 
 639, 653 ; citing, Associated Jobbers of Los Angeles v. Atchison, T. & S. P. Ity. Co. 
 (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 310; Gilmore & Co. y. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1012), 25 
 I. C. C. Rep. 403; Hammerschmidt & Franzen Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1914), 
 30 I. C. C. Rep. 71; Illinois Coal Cases (1915), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 659; Business Men's 
 League of St. Louis v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1917), 44 I. C. C. Rep. 308; Dim- 
 mitt-Caudle-Smith Live Stock Commission Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1917), 
 47 I. C. C. Rep. 287 ; Committee on Ways and Means to Prosecute the Case of Alleged 
 Railroad Rate and Service Discrimination at the Port of New York v. Baltimore & 
 O. Rd. Co. (1917), 47 I. C. C. Rep. 643; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota Civic 
 Assn. (1918), 247 U. S. 490, 62 L. Ed. 1229, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 5.-.3. 
 
 610-T. Kelationship between commodities. 
 
 A very important factor is the relation existing between the articles 
 transported. If the relation is remote, such as that between flour and 
 silk, a charge of a few cents per 100 pounds in rates charged for trans- 
 porting one of them may not affect traffic in the other; but if the 
 relation is close, such as between raw material on the one hand and 
 goods manufactured from that material on the other, the slight change 
 in the adjustment of transportation charges between the two articles 
 may be sufficient to close manufacturing plants at some points, and 
 increase the output of plants located elsewhere, and it is because of 
 this difference that some discriminations made by carriers are justi- 
 fiable under certain conditions.^ This advantage to the shipper of one 
 product cannot be predicated upon the charges for transporting an- 
 other product differing essentially in character from the former and 
 widely dissimilar in the demands which it supplies.- 
 
 However, where articles are competitive in the same market, a fair 
 and just relation should obtain in fixing the rates for the transporta- 
 tion of such articles. The rates on wheat, for instance, should not 
 exceed the rate on flour, the manufactured product.* There is no inflex- 
 ible requirement that rates upon grain and the products of grain 
 should be, under all circumstances, the same, but rather that carriers 
 may, in just regard for their own interests, or to meet special conditions, 
 vary these rates within narrow limits. When once the relation has 
 
§610] TRAFFIC LAW SEEVICE 186 
 
 been established, business developed, and money expended upon the 
 strength of it, then the carrier cannot, in ths absence of some sufficient 
 reason, change that relation; nor would the Commission direct a 
 change.* 
 
 In BuUe Milling Co. v. Chicago S A. Rd. CoJ" the Commission 
 I stated: "The suggestion also concedes the propriety of a parity of 
 rates on wheat and flour so far as the millers of this country are con- 
 cerned, for the proposition is that export flour and wheat intended to 
 be ground into fl6ur and exported in that form should move on equal 
 terms. In other words, counsel proposes to solve the troubles of 
 the American millers by requiring the carriers to raise their rates on 
 wheat moved to the seaboard for export as wheat. It may be that 
 much may be said in favor of the suggestion, but it is one as to which 
 the American wheat growers would doubtless wish to be heard before 
 any order is entered. It is a well-established principle of transporta- 
 tion, as heretofore stated, that the rates on manufactured products 
 ought generally to be higher than the rate on the raw materials from 
 which they are made. The fostering of our flour industry in its com- 
 petition with foreign millers, by requiring the carriers to the seaboard 
 to maintain a lower rate on flour than on wheat, would not only be 
 in derogation of that principle of rate regulation, but would be a mat- 
 ter of national policy which, as we understand our duties under the 
 law, this Commission would have no authority to adopt as the basis 
 of its action until it had been accepted, in principle at least, by the 
 Congress and has been made a rule of transportation by adequate 
 legislation. ' ' 
 
 In State of Iowa v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co.^ the Commission, per Mr. 
 Commissioner Harlan, said: "It is true that in some cases we have 
 given to the product the rate fixed by the carriers on the raw material 
 from which it is made ; and in some cases we have fixed a relation by 
 approximating the rate on the product to the rate on the raw material. 
 But in all such cases the rate actually fixed by the Commission on the 
 particular commodity was the rate deemed by the Commission, under 
 all the circumstances surrounding the traffic, to be the reasonable rate. 
 And that is the extent of our authority under the law when dealing 
 with a rate on the basis of its reasonableness. There is no rule that 
 the manufactured product is entitled as a matter of right to the rate 
 on the raw material from which it is made; and confusion would 
 necessarily result from the rigid application of any such principle." 
 
 Classification must be based upon a real distinction from a trans- 
 portation standpoint. The Commission has held that there is no 
 transportation reason why different rates should be applied on fire 
 brick, building brick and paving brick. Aside from the difficulty in 
 learning to what use the bricks were to be put to upon reaching their 
 destination, the Commission stated that it cannot regard a classification 
 as scientific, or a difference of rates as well based, which is altogether 
 founded upon a distinction that has no transportation significance. 
 Such a differentiation, if permitted and extended throughout the vari- 
 ous classes of freight, would lead to an almost endless multiplica- 
 tion of rates, which could find no excuse save the use which might be 
 made of the articles transported.'' 
 
187 FREIGHT EATES AND CHAKGES [§610 
 
 Fixing rates by comparison with an article not similar in char- 
 acter, use, value or mode of shipment is not proper. Rates should not 
 be fixed for a commodity by the condition of an arbitrary over the 
 rates of other commodities having no relation to the former and being 
 wholly different in character.^ 
 
 The following treats of the more important cases where the rela- 
 tionship between commodities has been considered by the Commission : 
 
 ACID, SULPHURIC: Sulphuric acid is strictly a raw material 
 used in the manufacture of fertilizer and a distinctly lower rate should 
 be applied to its transportation than upon the manufactured fertilizer.* 
 
 BICYCLES: The proper comparison for the purpose of testing 
 the reasonableness of the rate on bicycles is with the rates on other 
 vehicles.^" 
 
 BLINDS, DOORS AND SASHES: Ordinarily the same rate as 
 applies to all lumber without reference to its value or condition, and this 
 rate frequently includes not only manufactured lumber but articles 
 made from it, like doors, sashes, and blinds." 
 
 BRICK: The Commission has held that there is no transportation 
 reason why different rates should be applied on fire brick, building 
 brick and paving brick.^^ 
 
 In the case of National Paving Brick Manufacturers' Ass'n v. 
 Alabama S V- Ry. Co}^'^ the Commission in passing upon a proposed 
 uniform brick list, made the following interesting finding with reference 
 to the production and distribution, and transportation characteristics 
 of various kinds of brick and tile : 
 
 "The production of brick and tile in 1916, estimated from the 
 values of clay products as shown in a Government publication of 
 record, was as follows : 
 
 Per cent 
 Tons. of total. 
 
 Common Brick 18,485,000 57 
 
 Paving bricls 3,700,000 12 
 
 Face brici; 2,500,000 8 
 
 Tile 3,000,000 9 
 
 Fire brick 4,500,000 14 
 
 Total 32,185,000 100 
 
 "The percentages, in thousands, of common, paving, and face 
 brick produced during that year were: Common brick, 79.2 per cent; 
 paving brick, 10.1 per cent; and face brick, 10.7 per cent. 
 
 "Brick and tile plants are usually located at or near a deposit of 
 clay or shale suitable for the manufactured product. Certain chemical 
 qualities frequently determine the product that can be made to the 
 best commercial advantage. Building tile is made from shale or clay, 
 and brick and tile are sometimes made in the same plants of the same 
 raw materials, a shift from brick to tile involving merely a change of 
 the dies and cutting machines. Face brick is frequently made from 
 the same kind of clay or shale as other brick, although certain types 
 are made from a better grade of clay, and more care is exercised in the 
 manufacture and handling of face brick than in the case of common 
 brick. The culls or seconds of paving, face, and fire brick, which are 
 not in excess of 20 per cent of the product of the kiln, are sold in com- 
 
§610] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 188 
 
 petition with common brick; and paving brick which can not stand 
 the paving-brick tests are often used as face brick in the construction 
 of large buildings. 
 
 "What is strictly known as common brick is a nonvitrified brick 
 produced from local or low-grade surface clay found practically every- 
 where. It is the cheapest brick in any locality and, unlike other 
 brick and tile, usually moves for short distances only. The large 
 producing districts for paving brick are the Ohio-Pennsylvania, 
 Illinois-Indiana, and Oklahoma-Kansas districts. The production of 
 paving brick in the South is largely in Alabama, with some in Ten- 
 nessee and Georgia. Of the total face-brick output of the country, 
 about 73 per cent is produced in central and trunk-line territories, 
 5 per cent in the South, and the remainder west of the Mississippi 
 River. Fire brick is produced at A^arious localities where fire clay 
 is available. It is made in three grades, high, intermediate, and low, 
 the grade or heat-resisting quality depending on the quality of the 
 fire clay used. About 73 per cent of the building tile is produced in 
 central and trunk-line territories, 25 per cent in the West, and 2 per 
 cent in the South. Paving, face, and fire brick have a wide distribu- 
 tion, and move long distances except where the movement is restricted 
 by competition. Building tile is both short-haul and long-haul traffic. 
 
 ' ' The standard paying brick is 2i/<; by 4 by 8 inches. Paving brick 
 is also made in two larger common sizes, 314 by 4 by 8% inches, and 3 
 by 4 by 8% inches. The general size of face and common brick is 
 8 by 21/4 by 3% inches. The average weights per 1,000 bricks are: 
 Paving, 3.5 to 5 tons; common, 2 to 2.5 tons; face, 2.75 tons; and 
 fire, 3.5 tons. An 8 by 12 by 12 hollow building tile weighs from 30 
 to 36 pounds, and displaces 14 bricks of standard size. 
 
 The range of values of the various kinds of brick and hollow 
 building tile f . o. b. plant was, at the time of the hearing, as follows : 
 Common brick, $6.50 to $10 per ton, or $14 to $24 per 1,000, depend- 
 ing largely on the locality in which produced; No. 11 paving brick, 
 $7 to $7.50 per ton, or about $35 per 1,000; face brick, from $8 to 
 $13 per ton, or from $20 to $40 per 1,000, with a small proportion of 
 higher value, the difference in value depending largely on the shade 
 and texture; fire brick, $11.40 to $14.30 per ton, or $40 to $50 per 
 1,000; and hollow building tile, including segment block, silo block, 
 and condensing rings, approximately $10 per ton on the average. 
 The value of conduits is $17 per ton. The value of radial-chimney 
 block is not shown, although apparently it falls within the range of 
 values on other hollow building tile. Perhaps the lowest grade com- 
 mon brick is what is known as the Chicago common brick, produced 
 at Chicago, III, and vicinity. This brick weighs about 4 pounds each 
 and, as stated, sells for $14 per 1,000, while face brick ranges in value 
 from $20 to $40 and higher per 1,000. According to the Government 
 publication above referred to, the average value per 1,000 of the 
 common brick produced in the United States in 1916 was $6.08 ; paving 
 brick, $13 ; and face brick, $11.43. The average value of hollow building 
 tile in 1917 was $5.12 per ton. 
 
 "The brick and tile traffic moves in a wide range of equipment, 
 frequently in cars which would not be suitable for most commodities, 
 
189 FREIGHT KATES AND CHARGES [§610 
 
 and in cars, particularly stock cars, which would otherwise move 
 empty for loading. No expedited service is required on this traffic, 
 and with the exception of tire brick, it moves generally in the summer 
 months when operating conditions are favorable. It is ordinarily 
 shipped under weight agreements, thus eliminating the expense of 
 weighing. From large producing points to common junctions it moves 
 in train lots. Deliveries are ordinarily made on team tracks. Loss 
 and damage claims on brick and hollow building tile are negligible. 
 
 ' ' Brick and hollow building tile load heavily and constitute perhaps 
 the heaviest loading commodities shipped in as wide a range of equip- 
 ment. In recent years the average loading per car of these commo- 
 dities except silo block has exceeded 60,000 pounds. The general prac- 
 tice of the face-brick industry is to load 110 per cent of the marked 
 capacity of the car. About 22 tons of silo block are used in the con- 
 struction of a silo, and the actual loading of that commodity is af- 
 fected more or less by the commercial limitation, although it can readily 
 be loaded in excess of 60,000 pounds. Face brick and certain so-called 
 common brick sold for facing purposes are loaded with straw between 
 each course. Common brick are thrown into the car or loaded without 
 any protection against chipping or breaking. Straw is not ordinarily 
 used in loading hollow building tile. The tile is loaded in tiers and 
 wedged in tightly with broken pieces of tile. 
 
 "The present minimum on brick and hollow building tile is gen- 
 erally 50,000 pounds except in southern territory where the minimum 
 varies from 24,000 to 40,000 pounds and is usually 40,000 pounds where 
 commodity rates apply. Complainants offer to accept a minimum 
 of 60,000 pounds, marked capacity of car to govern if less, if the 
 increased minimum is recognized in fixing the level of the rates. Most 
 of the interveners are also agreeable to a 60,000-pound minimum if 
 hollow building tile is permitted to move under the brick classification 
 in mixed carloads with brick. The Alabama interveners, upon brief 
 and argument, oppose any increased minimum in excess of 50,000 
 pounds in southern territory. 
 
 "Complainants propose the following list of clay products for 
 universal application in all territories : 
 
 Brick or block : building or facing except enameled ; 
 Brick, fire; 
 
 Brick or block : common, solid, bollow or perforated ; 
 Brick or block : paving, shale or fire clay ; 
 
 Brick : salt glazed when shipped in same manner as building or facing brick ; 
 Ground clay, ground shale or ground fire clay ; 
 Blocks or tile: hollow building or condensing; 
 Blocks : silo, radial chimney and segment ; 
 Conduits : clay or shale, not lined ; 
 
 Slabs : clay or shale, not enameled, not roofing or ornamental, loaded loose in cars, 
 when shipped in the same manner as building or facing brick ; 
 Tile: hollow building or fireproofing. 
 
 "Complainants state that the purpose of this list is to include all 
 clay products of substantially the same transportation characteristics, 
 similar car loadings, risk, value, common raw materials, and equip- 
 ment used, but that they do not seek to exclude any commodity which 
 is fairly entitled to be in such list. 
 
 "In Stowe-Fuller Compauii v. Pevnsi/lrania Co., 12 I. C. C, 215, 
 we found that the same rates should apply on fire, building or face. 
 
§610] TEAFPIC LAW SEEVICE 190 
 
 and paving brick from certain producing points in Ohio to New York, 
 N. Y., and other eastern destinations. In Metropolitan Paving Brick 
 Co. V. Ann Arbor R. R. Co., 17 I. C. C, 197, with which was consoli- 
 dated a rehearing of the Stowe-FuUer case, supra, this question was 
 again considered on a very complete record and the same conclusion 
 reached. Thei record in this proceeding emphasizes the correctness 
 of that conclusion. Following those decisions, the carriers in the 
 eastern district have generally applied the same rates on a long list 
 of other clay products, including hollow building tile and the other 
 articles named in complainants' proposed classification. This list 
 has been modified from time to time to meet the demands of various 
 shippers for the inclusion of their products, and embraces flue lining 
 and other articles which are more fragile and do not load as heavily as 
 brick and hollow building tile, but which complainants do not ask 
 to have included in a uniform list. 
 
 "Silo, radial-chimney, and segment block, conduit, and condensing 
 rings or block, are forms of hollow building tile designed for particular 
 purposes and should take the same rate as hollow building tile. Silo 
 block, segment block, and radial-chimney block are slightly curved so 
 as to totm. a complete circle when laid. Silo block has numerous 
 apertures and a groove in the top to hold a reinforcing iron. Seg- 
 ment block is similar to silo block and is used in the construction of 
 sewers over 36 inches in diameter. Eadial-chimney block is used in 
 the construction of chimneys and stacks. Condensing blocks usually 
 weigh from 6 to 7 pounds each and are made in square or cylindrical 
 form, reinforced with partitions or spirals. They ar« used in the oil 
 and acid business for purifying purposes and were produced and 
 shipped in large quantities during the World War. The cylindrical 
 shape does not prevent loading to the capacity of the car. Conduits are 
 used by telephone companies to protect their underground wires. Im- 
 perfect conduits are used as hollow building tile for foundations. The 
 conduits are usually made of fire clay and are vitrified to render them 
 impervious to moisture. They constitute only a small percentage of 
 the hollow-tile production, and are made in various shapes and sizes, 
 ranging from a single-duct conduit of octagonal shape, 18 inches long 
 and with a circular opening of about 3% inches in diameter, to nine- 
 duct rectangular conduits 12 by 12 by 36 inches. 
 
 "While the record indicates that some forms of hollow building tile 
 are more susceptible to damage than is brick, the additional risk does 
 not appear to be sufficient to warrant a difference in rates, particularly 
 when it is considered that the average value of hollow building tile 
 falls well within the range of values of brick. In the case of standard 
 hollow building tile the chipping or even the breakage of a section does 
 not ordinarily prevent its use in walls. Samples exhibited at the 
 hearing demonstrate that no clear line of demarcation can be drawn 
 between brick with varying percentages of solidity and hollow build- 
 ing tile, and that it is difficult to say where brick ends and where til^ 
 begins. Hollow building tile is made from the same raw materials 
 as brick, frequently at the same plant. It is used largely for the same 
 purposes, and the various transportation elements are substantially 
 the same. 
 
 "In the Metropolitan BricJc Companyy case, supra, we found that 
 common building brick, namely, that produced from ordinary clay 
 
191 FEEIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§610 
 
 at kilns in practically every community, should be distinguished from 
 the higher grades of brick and that it had no place in the classification 
 with such higher grade brick. The Chicago common-brick producers, 
 interveners, earnestly insist that that doctrine should be adhered to. 
 Apparently defendants are not opposed to applying a relatively lower 
 basis of rates on common brick than on other brick if the common 
 brick can be differentiated so as to be effectively policed. The seconds 
 and culls of the higher grade brick are frequently sold in competition 
 with common brick and the apprehended difficulty in policing rests 
 largely on the assumption that such brick should take the same rates 
 as common brick. If common brick is accorded a lower basis of rates 
 and these seconds and culls of the higher grade brick are given the 
 same rates as common brick, the practical impossibility of distinguish- 
 ing the seconds or culls from the first-grade brick, so as to insure that 
 the latter will not be included, is apparent and is generally recognized 
 both by complainants and the carriers. However, if the lower basis 
 of rates is confined to what is more strictly termed common brick, 
 namely, brick not vitrified, made from low-grade surface clay, loaded 
 loose in the cars without straw or other protection against breakage, 
 and shipped for distances not in excess of 150 miles, the carriers 
 should experience no great difficulty in policing the movement. The 
 characteristics of such common brick are usually well known in the 
 territory in which they are produced and this is particularly true of 
 the Chicago common brick. While it is true that the seconds and 
 culls of the higher grade brick compete with common brick, they 
 are not necessarily to be regarded as such strictly competitive articles 
 of the same class as to entitle them to the same rate. The ordinary 
 common brick is the finished product of the kiln, while the seconds 
 and culls which are sold in competition with the common brick are 
 the waste or by-products which are produced as an incident to the 
 manufacture of the higher grade brick and must be disposed of. They 
 can and should bear a greater share of the transportation burden than 
 does ordinary common brick. Furthermore, there is a large and grow- 
 ing use of the seconds of paving brick in competition with face brick 
 and the seconds or culls of paving brick are also used to a considerable 
 extent for private paving purposes. 
 
 "While for obvious reasons we have repeatedly refused to sanction 
 different rates on the same commodity based upon the use to which 
 the article is put, it m^y be observed that the widespread use of a 
 certain kind of brick for a given purpose is a circumstance of eviden- 
 tiary value to be considered along with other facts in determining the 
 proper description to be applied. What is known as Harvard brick, 
 for example, manufactured in New England, while referred to by 
 complainants as a common brick, is used exclusively for facing pur- 
 poses. It is worth $45 per 1,000 and is properly classified as face 
 brick. In a proceeding of this general character it is impossible to 
 determine specifically the proper description to be applied to the 
 various individual makes of brick. If the shippers and carriers, fol- 
 lowing the general principles laid down herein, are unable to agree 
 as to the proper description of any particular type of brick, that 
 matter may be made the subject of a separate complaint. As stated, 
 common brick is ordinarily short-haul traffic and for abnormal move- 
 
§610] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 192 
 
 ments, or those in excess of 150 miles, we are of opinion that the car- 
 riers may reasonably charge the same rates as on face brick. 
 
 ' ' Hollow building tile is, and for many years has been, carried on 
 the brick basis in New England, trunk-line, central, and western trunk- 
 line territories, as well as from central and trunk-line territories to the 
 Southwest. In the South, where there is a comparatively small produc- 
 tion of hollow building tile, there is no fixed relationship between the 
 rates on hollow building tile and brick, and there are but few com- 
 modity rates on hollow building tile. In some instances the rates are 
 same, in others higher, and in others lower than on brick. Paving 
 brick sometimes takes lower rates than common brick. In the South- 
 west there is one basis of rates on common, face, and paving brick, 
 and a higher basis of rates on tire brick and hollow building tile, 
 which latter basis of rates also applies on flue lining and drain tile. 
 From the Kansas gas belt the rates on brick and tile to Texas points 
 are same. From St. Louis, LIo., to Texas common points the rate on 
 common brick is lower than on face and paving brick and hollow build- 
 ing tile. 
 
 "If face, fire, and paving brick and hollow building tile should, 
 from a classification standpoint, take the same rates in one territory, 
 there is obviously no good reason and none has been suggested why 
 they should not also take the same rates in other territories. We are 
 of opinion and find that it is, and for the future will be, unreasonable 
 for defendants to fail to maintain a uniform brick list under which 
 all of the articles named in complainants' proposal, except common 
 brick, shall be accorded equal rates from and to the same points for 
 interstate transportation, in carloads, within and between the terri- 
 tories involved in this proceeding, including the South and South- 
 west, said uniform brick list to be subject to a carload minimum 
 weight not exceeding 60,000 pounds, marked capacity of car to govern 
 if less than the minimum." 
 
 BROOMS: It is apparent that carriers are entitled to a somewhat 
 higher rate for the transportation of brooms, than would be justifiable 
 for the transportation of broom corn.'* 
 
 CANNED GOODS: The two commodities, canned goods and 
 canned milk, while by reason of analogy are generally given the same 
 rates and ratings, are nevertheless distinct commodities, nor competing 
 with each other.. It does not follow from the fact that the rate on one 
 of these commodities is reduced because of competitive conditions, that 
 the carrier is compelled simultaneously to place the other commodity 
 upon the same basis, or that a violation of the Act to Regulate Com- 
 merce necessarily results from the failure so to do.'* 
 
 CANTALOUPES: Cantaloupes are fairly comparable with 
 peaches. The two articles are about equally perishable, of substan- 
 tially the same value, both move uniformly under refrigeration and 
 require the same expedited service. The cantaloupe loads somewhat 
 heavier than the peach, and for this reason may properly take a lower 
 rate. '=5 
 
 CASES, EGG: The rate on egg-case material, when not manu- 
 factured further than cut to length, was found unreasonable to the 
 extent that it exceeded the rate on box lumber.'® 
 
193 • FREIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [§610 
 
 CEMENT: Comparison of cement and brick rates held not to 
 be of substantial value.^^ 
 
 CHIN AW ARE : Chinaware shipped by complainant was of little 
 greater value than crockery. Both commodities involve about tHe 
 same risk and trouble in transit. They are competitive articles. The 
 import rate which the defendant carriers apply to china and crockery 
 from the port to the interior destinations is the same irrespective of 
 the form of the package. Meld : That the two articles ought to bear 
 somewhat the same transportation charges.^* 
 
 CLEANER AND CLEANSER, WYANDOTTE: "A simple 
 commodity, advertised, sold and shipped under a trade name which 
 does not disclose the real nature of the commodity is not improperly 
 rated when rated the same as other and competing preparations of 
 similar physical character and general nature.^" 
 
 In Ford Co. v. Michigan C. Rd. Co. ^^ the Commission stated: "In 
 the argument defendant's counsel asserted that even if this commodity 
 were in fact simple soda ash, and so marked and designated when 
 tendered for shipment, the defendants could properly assess the fifth 
 class rates upon such shipments if they were intended and used for 
 cleaning and cleansing purposes. To this suggestion we cannot assent. 
 We adhere to the view that the carrier may not assesg its charges upon 
 the basis of the use to which the commodity transported is put. De- 
 fendants may not say that they will transport soda ash at a certain 
 rate but that if it is used for a certain purpose it shall bear a higher 
 rate or enjoy a lower rate. Complainant may not demand or be 
 accorded the soda-ash rate except upon shipments of soda ash desig- 
 nated as such when tendered for shipment, and so marked if marked at 
 all. We see no objection to adding the trade name to the description 
 of the commodity in marking packages tendered for shipment. For 
 example: 'Soda ash (trade name Wyandotte Cleaner & Cleanser)' 
 or 'Wyandotte soda ash,' and we see no reason for increasing the 
 transportation charges because of such marking. 
 
 "It appears that the Wyandotte Cleaner & Cleanser is used prin- 
 cipally where soap preparations are not desirable; for example, in 
 cleaning milk cans ; but it competes as far as it is able to compete with 
 cleaning and cleansing powders and preparations in general, as is 
 shown by its name and the statements made in advertising it. Com- 
 plainant states that the Wyandotte Cleaner & Cleanser competes with 
 soda ash and other alkaline preparations, which take soda-ash rates, 
 and refers especially to Soda Crystals and to Snow Flake Crystals of 
 Soda, which are stated to be soda in another form, and to be accorded 
 soda-ash rates. It appears, however, that this commodity is provided 
 for in tariffs in a group of articles taking certain rates, among which 
 are 'Soda Ash,' 'Caustic Soda,' 'Crystal Soda,' etc., and that when 
 tendered for shipment it is represented to be and is labeled 'Soda 
 Crystals ' or ' Snow Flake Crystals of Soda. ' 
 
 "The duty' rests upon the carrier to clearly and definitely state 
 its rates and charges in its tariffs, and it is prohibited from accepting 
 either more or less or different compensation for transportation than 
 that so stated. The duty rests upon the shipper to clearly state and 
 truly represent the character of his shipment, and he is entitled to no 
 
j,610] TRAFFIC LAW SEBVICE 
 
 194 
 
 rate except that shown in the carrier's schedule for the transportation 
 of the commodity as tendered for shipment." 
 
 COAL, ANTHRACITE : The conditions relating to the transpor- 
 tation of anthracite and bituminous coal have not been shown to be 
 similar to such a degree that the existence of a lower rate on bituminous 
 would warrant a conclusion that a higher rate on anthracite on a dif- 
 ferent road is unreasonable.^^ 
 
 COAL, SLACK: Reference made to slack coal rates, which are 
 on a level with rates on lump coal, are not helpful owing to difference 
 in the use of the commodities.-" 
 
 COKE: Coal and coke are seldom used for the same purposes in 
 the industrial or manufacturing fields, and this, coupled with the wide 
 difference in the cost, renders competition between them negligible.^^ 
 
 COPIERS, LETTER: The charge of one and one-half times" the 
 first class rate for the transportation of Avrapped roller letter coxjiers 
 in western classification territory found to be unreasonable, unjust 
 and unduly discriminatory in favor of the ordinary letter press which 
 takes second class rates and which is sold in competition with the first 
 named article.^* . 
 
 COPRA OIL: Copra oil and cotton seed oil are competitive com- 
 modities with similar transportation characteristics.^"' 
 
 COTTONSEED : Cottonseed held to be entitled to the same rate 
 to East St. Louis, 111., from Arkansas and other points as cottonseed 
 oil. Whether it is entitled to the same rate as cottonseed meal and 
 cake not decided.^® 
 
 DAIRY PRODUCTS: Perishable products afford no proper com- 
 parison with dairy products.-^ 
 
 DOORS: See "Blinds, Doors and Sashes:" 
 
 DRESSED MEATS AND PACKING HOUSE PRODUCTS: 
 The United States Supreme Court has held that the cost of carriage, 
 risk of injury, and the larger amount which the railway companies are 
 called upon to pay out in damages for losses, may excuse a higher 
 freight rate on live stock than on dressed meats and packing house 
 products; that a reduction of freight rates for dressed meats and 
 packing house products from Missouri River points and other points 
 similarly situated to Chicago, which makes such rates lower than those 
 charged for live stock, does not work an undue and unreasonable 
 preference, where the higher rate on live stock has not materially 
 affected any of the markets, prices, or shipments, being reasonably 
 fair to Chicago and the shippers, and the shipments of live stock from 
 the West to Chicago are as great in proportion to the bulk of the busi- 
 ness as before the change of rates, and where the lower rate given to 
 the packers was the result of competition, and does not strictly in- 
 fluence or injure shippers of live stock.^* 
 
 EGG ALBUMEN AND YOLK, DRIED : Dried egg albumen and 
 dried egg yolk are commodities separate and distinct from desiccated 
 eggs, Avhich consist of the dried whole egg.''^'' 
 
 EXCELSIOR: Excelsior in carloads from St. Paul, Minn., to 
 Chicago, 111., and other points held entitled to the same rate as flax 
 
 tOW.30 
 
195 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [^'610 
 
 FOODS, BREAKFAST: In the case of Kellogg Toasted Corn 
 Flahe Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co.^^ the Commission stated: 
 "Toasted wheat biscuit and toasted wheat krumbles are cooked cereal 
 products packed ready to serve. Cream of Avheat, Post tavern porridge, 
 and most other so-called uncooked cereal breakfast foods are subjected 
 to a heating process before packing, but require further cooking before 
 serving. The difference is not the difference between raw materials 
 and manufactured products, but rather a difference in degree or stage 
 of manufacture. 
 
 "Cooked and uncooked cereal breakfast foods compete commer- 
 cially. They are normally sold at delivered prices, and in selling to 
 jobbers, manufacturers of cooked products meet the prices of manu- 
 facturers of uncooked products. The price of one fluctuates with the 
 •price of the other. Complainant's toasted wheat biscuit, and krumbles 
 are apparently of substantially the same value as cream of wheat and 
 Post tavern porridge and are packed substantially the same. The 
 carrier's risk is also about the same for both classes of articles, and 
 the transportation conditions are substantially similar. Both classes 
 of articles are rated in the same in the official, southern, and western 
 classifications, and different ratings are maintained only in the terri- 
 tory in controversy by special commodity tariffs and exceptions to 
 the classifications. Both classes of articles move at the same rates 
 from points in central freight association territory through the terri- 
 tory in controversy to Pacific coast terminals. Defendants are parties 
 to tariffs which name the same rates on cooked and uncooked products 
 in other territories. 
 
 ' ' Upon all the facts recorded we find that the difference in carload 
 rates complained of is unjustly discriminatory against toasted wheat 
 biscuit and toasted wheat krumbles in favor of cream of wheat, Post 
 tavern porridge, and similar uncooked breakfast foods. For the 
 future defendants will be required to charge for the transportation of 
 toasted wheat biscuit and toasted wheat krumbles in carloads in the 
 territories in question rates not in excess of the rates which govern 
 the transportation of cream of wheat. Post tavern porridge, and like 
 uncooked cereal breakfast foods in carloads." 
 
 GLUCOSE: Sirup and glucose generally take the same rates. 
 Glucose competes, to some extent, with sirup and molasses. It is used 
 largely in the making of candies, but when mixed with about 20% of 
 fine sirup is used as a table sirup.^" 
 
 GRANITE, MONUMENTAL: The classification rating and rates 
 on shipments of monumental granite from quarry points in Vermont to 
 points in Nebraska, applied from the points of origin to the Mississippi 
 River crossings, held to be discriminatory upon comparison with the 
 classification rating, and rates applied by the carriers to dressed and 
 polished building granite; and it is ordered that the carriers shall 
 establish on the monumental granite a rate and rating not in excess of 
 those contemporaneously applied to the building granite.^^ 
 
 HAY AND STRAW: In National Hay Assn. v. Lalie Shore £ M. 
 S. Ry. Co.^* involved the legality of the change by the defendants in the 
 classification of hay and straw in carloads from the fifth class to the 
 sixth class, and the increased cost of transportation resulted from 
 
§610] TRAFFIC LAW SEEVICE 196 
 
 the application of the higher fifth class rates. Among other things 
 the complainant alleged the advanced classification of rates to be 
 ■unjust and unreasonable, and to give undue and unreasonable advant- 
 age to the production, sale and shipment of grain and grain products, 
 all kinds of stock foods, and other articles capable of being used in 
 place of hay or straw. The Commission ordered the defendants to 
 desist from charging the fifth class rates upon hay or straw and 
 required them to apply sixth class rates thereon, which order was not 
 obeyed by the defendants. Thereafter the Commission filed a bill in 
 the United States Circuit Court in the Northern District of Ohio, East- 
 ern Division, against four of the said original defendant railroad 
 companies to enforce its order. Most of the other railroad companies, 
 defendants to the original petition, intervened as defendants, and 
 thereafter on January 7, 1905, the court entered a decree dismissing 
 the bill of complaint, which decree was affij-med on appeal by a divided * 
 court in the Supreme Court of the United States on May 21, 1906. 
 
 Again on June 10, 1910, complaint was filed Avith the Commission 
 attacking the reasonableness of the fifth class rates on hay and straw 
 to which complaint the defendants answered and pleaded res judicata. . 
 The Commission held that fifth class rates on hay and straw are not 
 now unreasonable or discriminatory, but held that in rate matters the 
 plea of res judicata is only valid as to what preceded the final decree 
 of the court or the final order of the Commission and that it cannot 
 apply to present rates. ^^ 
 
 HEADINGS AND STAVES: Whatever may be true when staves 
 are compared with lumber of a lower grade, there is no reason why 
 staves and headings should not be accorded as low a rate as is applied 
 to hardwood lumber. ^^ 
 
 HIDES AND PELTS: The inherent characteristics of hides and 
 pelts, many of which are matters of common knowledge, are not such 
 as to justify any higher rate than on packing house products. They 
 load heavily. The risk of loss or damage is comparatively slight ; 
 they can be loaded in any kind of box cars and no expedited servicers 
 required.^'^ 
 
 ICE: In transportation, ice competes with no other commodity.^* 
 
 IRON, SCRAP : Scrap iron rates should not necessarily be fixed 
 with a definite relation to the rates on pig iron or new rails. ="' 
 
 JACKS, AUTOMOBILE: In Chevrolet Motor Co. of California, 
 Director General, as Agent, ^'^ the Commission stated: "Complainant, 
 a corporation, engaged in the automobile business at Oakland, Calif., by 
 complaint filed February 21, 1921, alleges that the third-class rates 
 charged on less-than-carload sliipments of automobile jacks from Ash- 
 land, Ohio, and Joliet, 111., to Oakland, (Melrose), Calif., since January 
 4, 1918, were and are unreasonable and unjustly discriminatory. We 
 are asked to prescribe commodity rates on this traffic and to award 
 reparation. 
 
 "The automobile jack is a mechanical contrivance made of iron 
 and used for the lifting of automobiles. Transportation charges were 
 collected on complainant's shipments upon the basis of the third-class 
 rates applicable on jacks, or jack screws, not otherwise indexed by 
 name, not mounted on trucks, less-than-carloads. During the period of 
 
197 FEEIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [§610 
 
 movement commodity rates were in effect on tools, the description 
 including jacks, wagon, boxed or crated. These commodity rates were 
 cancelled March 15, 1921. Complainant seeks to have them restored 
 and made applicable to automobile jacks, with reparation to that basis. 
 
 "At the hearing, it was stated on behalf of complainant that it did 
 not attack the class rates and rating as unreasonable, but that the issue 
 was whether the commodity rates were applicable on shipments of 
 automobile jacks. 
 
 "Defendants' witnesses contended that the tariffs naming the com- 
 modity rates on wagon jacks covered only the commodities specifically 
 named. They testified that the wagon jack is a simple contrivance made 
 of wood; that the automobile jack is more complicated in construction; 
 and that the commodity rate formerly in effect had been established for 
 the movement of jacks to be used for horse-drawn vehicles, and was 
 abnormally low. Numerous commodities which move under class rates 
 in less-than-carload quantities were mentioned. 
 
 "Complainant's shipments fall within the description jacks or 
 jack screws and not jack wagon. The commodity description w^as 
 neither misleading nor indefinite, as the term wagon is commonly ac- 
 cepted as applying to a vehicle which is not self-propelled, The evi- 
 dence is not persuasive that less-than-carload shipments of automobile 
 jacks should move under commodity rates. 
 
 "We find that the rates charged were applicable and not unrea- 
 sonable or unjustly discriminatory. The complaint will be dismissed." 
 
 LABELS, PAPER: Paper labels should take the same rate as 
 paper wrappers or printed wrapping paper.*^ 
 
 LEATHER: In the case of Chamber of Commerce, Freight 
 Bureau, Macon, Ga. v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co.*^ the Commis- 
 sion held that the existence of lower carload rates on shoe-sole leather 
 than on raw leather suitable for use in the manufacture of harness, 
 bridles, and horse collars to Macon, Ga., from the Ohio and Mississippi 
 Eiver crossings and the Gulf ports not found to result in undue preju- 
 dice and disadvantage to the shippers of the latter. 
 
 LIME-SULPHUR SOLUTION: The rate on lime-sulphur solu- 
 tion from Pulhnan Junction, 111., to Portland, Ore., found unreasonable 
 to the extent that it exceeded the rate on liquid sheep dip.*^ 
 
 In its report, the Commission said :** 
 
 "Having been recognized and approved as a sheep dip as well as an orchard spray, 
 if the shipment had been billed as 'liquid sheep dip' instead of 'lime-sulphur solution,' 
 the inspector could have changed the billing only upon knowledge of the use to which 
 the commodity was to be put. The Cominission has consistently condemned the main- 
 tenance of different rates upon the same commodity dependent upon the use thereof, 
 and in this case it is held that the same rate should apply on 'lime-sulphur solution, inv. 
 val. not exceeding 6 cents per pound,' as on 'liquid sheep dip, inv. val. not exceeding 
 (i cents per pound,' and on the same minimum basis of 30,000 pounds. The invoice value 
 of the shipment in question was considerably less than 6 cents per pound." 
 
 "LINOMEAL": "Linomeal" is made by a concern in Minne- 
 apolis out of the screenings of wheat, oats and barley purchased in var- 
 ious mills in the northwest and Canada. By a cleaning process any 
 grains or seeds of value are first removed from the screenings. The re- 
 mainder, consisting largely of weed seeds, is then ground and the 
 product is sold under the trade name mentioned. The Commission 
 
§610] TEAFFIC LAW SEKVICE 198 
 
 held that this commodity should properly be accorded the rates appli- 
 cable on grain screenings.*^ 
 
 LIVE STOCK: In National Society of Record Assn. v. Aberdeen 
 & R. Rd. Co}^ the Commission fully considered the question of the 
 standard or basic values of live stock and the question of their classi- 
 fication for transportation purposes. This subject is fully treated 
 under ^^Transportation of Live Stock," Chapter 31, post. 
 
 For a consideration of the validity of higher rates on live stock 
 than on dressed meats and packing-house products, see subject of 
 "Dressed meats and packing-house products," supra. 
 
 LUMBER: In Oregon <& Washington Lumber Manufacturers 
 Assn. V. Southern P. Co.*'' the Commission said: "Ordinarily the same 
 rate is applied to all lumber without reference to its value or conditions, 
 and this rate frequently includes not only manufactured lumber, but 
 articles made from it, like doors, sashes, blinds, etc. To this general 
 rule exceptions are sometimes made by the carriers themselves when- 
 ever the exigencies of a particular case require it: and without sug- 
 gesting that any general departure from the general rule would be 
 desirable or reasonable we see no reason why, in particular cases, lum- 
 ber may not preferably be subjected to a further classification." 
 
 "With reference to the classification of hardwoods, the Commission 
 in the case of Bluegrass Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co.*^ stated: 
 "Generally speaking, the rates on hardwoods, not including therein 
 cedar, cherry, walnut, or other woods of value, should not be much if 
 at all higher than the rates on yellow pine, white pine, or similar 
 lumber. Many of the tariffs filed with this Commission make no dis- 
 tinction in their lumber rates except as between ordinary lumber and 
 woods of value, and this seems to be a desirable classification." 
 
 LUMBER PRODUCTS AND BUILDING MATERIALS: If it 
 is just and reasonable that lumber and lumber products take the same 
 rate in one territory, it must be unjust and unreasonable or unjustly 
 discriminatory to maintain and charge a differential in the rates on 
 these respective classes of traffic in another territory, unless the differ- 
 ence in treatment of the same products in different territories has 
 been clearly established by affirmative testimony. If it is impracticable 
 to establish a lumber list, complete or partial, in one territory, it must 
 be equally impracticable to do so in another territory. In other words, 
 carriers should effect uniformity in treatment in the classification of 
 lumber and lumber products throughout the country.*'-" 
 
 In Yellow Pine Sash, Door & Blind Mfrs. Assn. v. Southern Ry. 
 Co.^" the Commission said: "Greater uniformity and a new rate rela- 
 tionship between lumber and its products, based upon more scientific 
 principles, are necessary. Following the cases cited and the principles 
 therein announced, and from all the facts and circumstances of record, 
 we are of the opinion that the rates on building material here involved 
 should bear a uniform relation to the lumber rates. 
 
 "We come now to the question of what this relationship should 
 be or what is a reasonable differential for building material over 
 lumber. The basis for this principle, as announced in the several cases 
 cited, is that the elements which determine the classification of building 
 
199 FREIGHT KATES AND CHAEGES [§610 
 
 material bear a fixed relation to the elements which determine the 
 classification of lumber. The question, therefore, necessarily resolves 
 itself into one of classification. Complainants, however, have intro- 
 duced no evidence that is of material assistance in determining this 
 issue. They have relied upon our decisions applicable in other terri- 
 tories and upon the existence of rates on building material differentials 
 over lumber in certain parts of the south. The evidence tending to 
 show the yalue, loading and volume of the movement of building 
 material as compared with lumber is very indefinite and in certain 
 instances conflicting. To justify a finding as broad as is asked by 
 complainants definite evidence must be adduced on these material 
 points. Neither complainants nor defendants have filed briefs in this 
 case, and, with no satisfactory evidence in the record as to what would 
 be reasonable differentials, it has been left to us to work out a rela- 
 tionship. This we cannot undertake. The burden is upon the com- 
 plainants not only to prove that there should be a fixed relationship 
 between rates on lumber and on building material, but to show what 
 the reasonable differentials would be. This they have not done. ' ' 
 
 MACHINES: ADDRESSING, PRINTOGRAPES, WRITER- 
 PRESSES, AND PLAINOTYPES: The Commission has held that 
 these articles from LaCrosse, Wise, and Chicago, 111., to Partland, Ore., 
 are entitled to as low a rate as multigraphs.^^ 
 
 MALT: Ordinarily the rate on malt is the same as that upon 
 grain products, and this is sometimes the same as the grain rate, and 
 sometimes slightly higher.^^ 
 
 The rate on malt may properly be higher than the rate on barley 
 from which it is manufactured.''* 
 
 MOLASSES— "BLACKSTRAP": In Molasses Rates to Knox- 
 ville, Tenn.^* the proposed domestic rate of 33 cents per 100 pounds on 
 "Blackstrap" in carloads being the same rate which governs the 
 transportation of all other molasses, from New Orleans, La. to Knox- 
 ville, Tenn. found to be justified. In this proceeding the Commission 
 stated: "Blackstrap molasses is a sugar-cane product of low grade, 
 containing less sugar than the higher grade of molasses, and is used 
 very largely as a sweetening in the manufacture of mixed feeds for 
 animal use. The protest herein is on behalf of a manufacturer of such 
 feeds at Knoxville. Blackstrap is also used to some extent for human 
 consumption interchangeably with higher grades of molasses, and as 
 an ingredient in the manufacture of certain articles of food for man. 
 Its value is less than that of the lowest grade of table molasses, and 
 not more than 25 per cent of the value of the highest table grade. 
 Whether the ordinary observer or an inspector can distinguish black- 
 strap from the other grades of molasses is in dispute in this record. 
 The practical difficulty in determining with certainty whether any 
 given shipment, when made, is of one grade or another, is a reason, 
 although not controlling, for applying the same rate to all grades," 
 
 MOTORCYCLES : There is no transportation reason for main^ 
 taining a less-than-carload rate on motorcycles in excess of that on 
 bicycles.'^ 
 
 NAPHTHA: Naphtha is a generic term referring to petroleum 
 distillates that are heavier than gasoline and lighter than kerosene, 
 and includes refined, crude, and heavy naphtha.'* 
 
§610] TKAFFIC LAW SERVICE 
 
 200 
 
 OIL, FLAXSEED : The manner of shipment, the tonnage and the 
 valne, as well as the commercial conditions affecting the shipment of 
 flaxseed oil and linseed oil are so different that their rates have no 
 necessary relation to each other.^^ 
 
 OIL, FUEL: While fuel oil may, to a certain extent, be used in 
 place of coal, the circumstances and conditions surrounding the move- 
 ment of these commodities are so dissimilar that comparisons of this 
 -nature are not of great value.^^ 
 
 In Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Atchison, T. S *S. F. Ry. Co.^^ the 
 Commission stated : ' ' The rates assailed having been increased since 
 January 1, 1910, the burden of proof to show that they are just and 
 reasonable is upon defendants. They maintain that a question of 
 classification only is involved, and their evidence, which is addressed 
 principally to that issue, shows that fuel oil is classified with the 
 higher grade oils at $fth class in the official, the western, the Illinois, 
 and the Iowa classifications ; that to Omaha from all producing points 
 except Casper, Wyo., fuel oil is rated the same as are high-grade oils ; 
 that fuel oil is a refined product similar to kerosene, which latter com- 
 modity is also used for fuel in some instances; and that road oil, a 
 residual product, and fuel oil are used for different purposes and hence 
 are not competitive. 
 
 "The physical characteristics of road oil and fuel oil, the uses 
 
 to which they may be put, and the propriety of rating them the same 
 
 as the higher grade oils have been considered in other cases. In 
 
 Central Comm.ercial Co. v. A., T. & 8. F. Ry. Co., 26 I. C. C. 373, 375, 
 
 we said : 
 
 " 'Residuum or road oil is the residue from crude petroleum, after the higher and 
 more volatile oils have been extracted. It is used by pavers and roofers for fluxing 
 solid asphalt, in road construction for dust-laying purposes, or as a binder for macadam 
 roads, and for fuel purposes v?here high-grade oils cannot be used on account of their 
 cost. It is heavy, black, and nontransparent * * *.' 
 
 "Our report in National Petroleum Asso. v. A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 
 37 I. C. C. 287, 289, 292, 293, stated: 
 
 " 'So far as this record indicates, the term "fuel oil" is applied in the trade to any 
 oil that may be used in a furnace for heating metal or under a boiler for making 
 steam. In rate cases fuel oil may be a distillate, but more frequently it is a residual 
 product ; in the latter ease it may be refined or it may consist of the dregs of residuals. 
 Oil used for fuel purposes may also be used to lay dust on streets or road, to flux asphalt, 
 and for a large number of other purposes.' 
 
 * * :!e * * 
 
 " 'As a matter of fact no product of petroleum can be singled out as being fuel oil 
 only. Only petroleum product that may be made liquid by steam and pumped from tank 
 cars for burning or that can be used in a furnace for heating metal or under a boiler for 
 making steam is a fuel oil. Oil sold for road purposes may be a fuel oil in the sense 
 that It can be used also for fuel purposes ; on the other hand, oil sold for fuel oil may 
 not infrequently be entirely suitable also for road and other purposes.' 
 
 * * * * * 
 
 " 'No line can be drawn between fuel oil and the residual products of complain- 
 ants' refineries. No inspector could determine by an examination of the complainants' 
 shipments whether the oil contained in them was fuel oil, road oil, or tailings. The 
 various oils look alike, are of the same consistency, and are produced by the same 
 method. If the use to which the tailings may be put defines what it is, then it would 
 quite as often be road oil as fuel oil, or it might prove to be any one of the numerous 
 other oils known to the trade and used for various purposes. It is now well settled by 
 our decisions, and no other finding is practicable, that we cannot undertake to determine 
 whether a rate is reasonable or unreasonable by ascertaining to wh^at use the product 
 shipped is put, and the carriers must adjust their tariffs in conformity with that prin- 
 ciple.' 
 
 "And, in Fairmont Creamery Co. v. A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 28 I. 
 C. C. 661, 662, we said: 
 
201 FREIGHT RATES AXD CHARGES [§610 
 
 " 'The tendency of the Commission in recent oases has been to classify the various 
 petroleum products to a limited extent and to establish lower rates on such low-grade 
 products as fuel oil, etc.. than are contemporaneously maintained on the higher grade 
 of products, such as j<asoline, kerosene, naphtha, etc' " 
 
 PAPER, WRAPPING: The paper stock rate which is accorded 
 to manila paper was established to apply to all articles which enter into 
 the manufacture of paper itself. Wrapping paper, the product of a 
 manufacturing operation, cannot properly be so classed.®" 
 
 PEACHES: See "Cantaloupes." 
 
 PELTS: See "Hides and Pelts." 
 
 PETROLEUM AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS: In Nashville 
 Refining Co. v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co.^'^ the Commission 
 stated: "Complainant also contends that a rate lower than 13% cents, 
 which applies to petroleum and its products, should be established 
 for the carriage of crude petroleum in accordance with the general rule 
 that raw material should be carried at a lower rate than its finished 
 product. This is a well-established theory of rate making and has been 
 generally approved by the Commission ; but there are exceptions to it, 
 a well-known instance being that of the rates on wheat and flour, 
 which commodities, because of commercial conditions, are ordinarily 
 carried at the same rate. For many years in official classification ter- 
 ritory petroleum and its products have been given the same rates. 
 Although refined oil is more valuable than crude petroleum, there are 
 a number of by-products of petroleum which are of small value, and 
 we are not now prepared to say that, on the whole, the practice of 
 charging the same rate on petroleum and its products is improper. ' ' 
 
 PIPE, IRON AND STEEL: Wrought, cast and riveted pipe can 
 be, and frequently are, used for the same purposes; riveted pipe for 
 certain uses is sold in competition with wrought pipe; but all iron or 
 steel pipe are loaded in substantially the same manner and in the same 
 kind of equipment; and there are, therefore, both commercial and 
 transportation relations between them.®^ 
 
 PLOW REAMS AND WAGON WOOD: The Commission has 
 held that it is unjustly discriminatory to force Avagon wood and plow 
 beams, in the rough, to bear higher rates than are imposed for like 
 service upon many analogous manufactured wood articles which move 
 at lumber rates.^^ Through rate charged for the transportation of a 
 carload of wagon felloes in the rough from Achille, Okla., to Florence, 
 Ala., found unreasonable to the extent that the rate charged for the 
 portion of the haul from Memphis, Tenn., to Florence exceeded the 
 rate concurrently in effect on lumber.®* 
 
 POLES, POSTS, AND PILINGS: The rule that a transportation 
 charge for posts and poles shalt not exceed that applied to sawed 
 lumber seems to grow out of the character of the commodities them- 
 selves. But there is no competitive reason why the rate upon the two 
 commodities should be the same.®^ There is no universal rule to the 
 effect that rates on poles and pilings should not exceed the lumber 
 rate.*® 
 
 POULTRY, LIVE: The relationship between the rates on live 
 and dressed poultry was relied upon to show the unreasonable and 
 prejudical character of the rates of the former. It was shown that 
 
§610] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 202 
 
 the percentage of empty-car movement was higher in the case of live 
 poultry than of dressed poultry ; that 13 per cent of the live fowl is lost 
 in dressing. Live poultry competes in the market with dressed poultry 
 and, to an extent, with all kinds of food products. There is, however, 
 a special demand for live poultry which cannot be met by dressed 
 poultrj', or by any other dressed meat. 'Eates on dressed meats and 
 live stock are lower than on live poultry, but differences in the amount 
 and character of movement are such that the rates on the former cannot 
 be used as gauges of reasonableness.**'' 
 
 RADIATORS, GAS-HEATING: Gas-heating radiators compete 
 with ordinary steam radiators and should be accorded the same rates.*** 
 
 RICE: In Rice from Texas and Louisiana^^ the Commission 
 stated: "Comparisons are made with rates on sugar and green coffee, 
 two other food products of about the same value as rice. Sugar loads 
 somewhat heavier than rice. The transportation hazard, actual or 
 relative, cannot be measured on this record. One carrier shows the 
 amount paid by it for loss and damage to rice, but this fact is of little 
 aid, as the quantity shipped is not shown. One shipper has experienced 
 nominal damage to rice shipments and greater damage to sugar. 
 
 "Comparisons of rates on these three commodities are proper and 
 were relied on by protestants as well as respondents." 
 
 Mahogany lumber, lumber, alcohol and turpentine are commodi- 
 ties not sufficiently similar to rice to justify an analysis of the same 
 in comparisons. ''° 
 
 ROSIN: Eosin moves in barrels in ordinary box cars and is 
 hauled with little risk. Owing to difference in value and tonnage it is 
 not fairly comparable with lumber and forest products. '^'^ 
 
 SASHES: See "Blinds, Doors, and Sashes." 
 
 SAND, MOLDING: Molding sand differs from ordinary sand in 
 that from 40 to 50 per cent of it consists of clay and is free from 
 gravel. There is no competition between crushed stone and molding 
 sand.'- 
 
 SHINGLES: The Commission has held that the rate on shingles 
 should not exceed rates on lumber.'* 
 
 SHOOKS, BOX: The Commission has found that the rate on box 
 shooks between certain points in excess of the current rate on yellow 
 pine lumber between the same points is unreasonable.'^* 
 
 SLAG: Comparison of rates on slag with those on crushed stone 
 is of interest because both commodities are used in road construction 
 and concrete work, and because their transportation characteristics 
 are somewhat similar.'''* 
 
 SOAP: In Andrews Soap Co. v. Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry. 
 Co.'^'^ the Commission stated: "In this case, if the soap of the com- 
 plainant, which is represented as a toilet soap, is in fact of no greater 
 value or cost of production than the common soap with which it comes 
 in competition, the discrimination complained of in respect to the 
 classification and rate could readily be obviated by putting it on the 
 market and having it transported as a common or laundry soap. But 
 
203 FREIGHT KATES AND CHARGES [§610 
 
 in answer to this suggestion it was said on the hearing that the trade 
 name of the complainant's soap is essential to the selling of the product, 
 that it must be sold as a toilet soap, and that the complainant cannot 
 afford, by extensive advertising, to create the demand for it that is 
 necessary to make its manufacture profitable, except as a toilet soap. 
 * * * A manufacturer's description of an article to induce its 
 purchase by the public also describes it for transportation, and car- 
 riers may accept his description for the purpose of classification and 
 rates. Carriers are not required to analyze freight, to ascertain 
 whether it is in fact inferior to the description or public representations 
 under which it is sold, in order to give it a lower rate corresponding to 
 its actual value. ' ' 
 
 SPELTER: Spelter rate has no bearing upon the scrap-iron 
 business. Therefore, no discrimination against scrap iron can result 
 from a lower rate on spelter, unless the rate on spelter is so low as to 
 be unremunerative.'^'' 
 
 SPOKES, CLUB-TURNED: Higher rate on club-turned spokes 
 than on lumber should not be exacted on the ground that there is a 
 great amount of waste in the manufacture of club-turned spokes, which 
 results in a great saving of freight to the consumer and a loss of ton- 
 nage to the carrier.'^ 
 
 STAVES : See "Headings and Staves. ' ' 
 
 STONE, CRUSHED: Crushed stone has about twice the value of 
 sand and gravel, and as it does not load quite as heavily, a rate on 
 that commodity slightly higher than on sand and gravel would seem 
 to be justified.''® 
 
 STRAW: See "Hay and Straw." 
 
 SUGAR: Lower rate maintained from New Orleans on refined 
 sugar which is the most valuable product obtained from cane than 
 on "blackstrap," which is the residue of least value from the manu- 
 facture of sugar, held reasonable.**" Sugar and molasses are not pref- 
 erably comparable since they differ, not only in their inherent char- 
 acteristics, but in the circumstances and conditions affecting and 
 controlling their transportation. ^^ 
 
 TAR, PETROLEUM : Coal tar is a by-product of coal, while 
 petroleum tar is a by-product of gas oil, both being obtained from gas 
 works. They are similar as to loading and other primary transporta- 
 tion factors and generally take the same rate.*- 
 
 TAR, REFINED: In Monarch Paint Co. v. Chicago, B. S Q. Rd. 
 Co.^^ the Commission stated : "Refined tar is the liquid residue of crude 
 coal tar, which has been distilled or dehydrated to the extent of 
 eliminating the light oils, ammoniacal liquors, and other substances. 
 It is chiefly used in coating metal surfaces, such as roofing, siding, 
 and pipes, and is usually shipped in steel barrels. This commodity is 
 not manufactured by complainant but is invoiced to it from Chicago 
 as refined tar and without additional process of manufacture is sold 
 by it under the trade name of 'hydrocarbonite' and described both on 
 the barrels and in advertising circulars as a 'high-grade roof and iron 
 paint' *- * *. 
 
§610] TRAFFIC LAW SBBVICE - 204 
 
 "Hydrocarbonite is extensively advertised by complainant as 
 paint. The record is not clear regarding the quantitative analysis of 
 the commodity, but complainant's advertising circular, acknowledged 
 as correct, embodies in its description of the properties of hydro- 
 carbonite the statement that 'the basic gums are thoroughly ground 
 and mixed with oil.' It competes with paint of various kinds, and it 
 appears that in reshipping it from the storage warehouses in Port- 
 land and San Francisco it is tendered to the railroads as 'paint in oil' 
 and charged the rate applicable to paint. 
 
 "Defendants insist that the commodity is in every sense a paint 
 and that the rate of 95 cents was legally applicable. They urge that 
 as complainant has represented, branded, and sold the commodity to 
 the public as paint, the carriers have a right to rely upon such facts 
 as to the nature of the commodity tendered for transportation. In 
 support of this contention they cite Andrews Soap Co. v. P., C. & St. L. 
 Ry. Co., 4 I. C. C. 41, in which we said : 
 
 " 'When a manufacturer described his article to the public for the purpose of mak- 
 ing a market for it, he also so describes it for purposes of carriage, and it seems as 
 reasonable that the carrier should have a right to accept the manufacturer's repre- 
 sentation concerning his product as that the public should be influenced by it in the 
 purchase of the article.' 
 
 "The same conclusion was in effect reiterated in Ford Co. v. M. 
 C. R. R. Co., 19 I. C. C. 507. 
 
 "Upon all the facts of record we find that refined tar or hydro- 
 carbonite, as herein described, is a form of paint falling within the 
 tariff description of articles taking the rates applicable to paint." 
 
 TIES, CROSS: Eates on hewn oak ties should not exceed rate 
 on oak lumber.^* 
 
 TURPENTINE: Turpentine moves principally in privately 
 owned tank cars for which the carrier allows three-quarters of a cent 
 per mile both ways. This commodity is inflammable, is subject to 
 considerable risk, which, under the tariffs, the owner assumes. Owing 
 to the difference in value and tonnage lumber is not comparable with 
 turpentine.*^ 
 
 VENEER: In Underwood Veneer Co. v. Ann Arbor Rd. Co.^^ 
 the Commission stated : "The record establishes that veneer loads 
 about as heavily as lumber, complainant's shipments averaging 47,000 
 pounds to the 36 foot car; that built-up wood is made by gluing to- 
 gether several layers of veneer or by covering ordinary wood with 
 one or more layers of veneer, is more valuable than veneer, and may 
 fairly carry a higher rate; that lumber, built-up wood, and veneer, 
 except that under one-sixteenth of an inch in thickness, are cut from 
 the same grade of logs ; that veneer and built-up wood move in small 
 quantities as compared with lumber; and that the veneer manufactured 
 by complainants is made from the ordinary hardwoods, such as birch, 
 maple, basswood, and ash. 
 
 "The defendants contended that, though the present line of 
 demarcation is somewhat arbitrary, to draw it just under one-sixteenth 
 of an inch, as requested by complainant, would be no less arbitrary; 
 and that, were such a change made, a manufacturer of veneer one- 
 twentieth of an inch in thickness could with equal logic ask for yet 
 
205 FKEIGHT KATES AND CHAKGES [§610 
 
 another line of division. The record does not sustain complainant's 
 contention that the line should be drawn just under one-sixteenth of 
 an inch. All that it clearly establishes is that the thicker veneers are 
 somewhat less valuable than the thinner grades. A fairer classifica- 
 tion might be to apply the same rate to all veneer made from the 
 cheaper woods, regardless of thickness. This is more nearly attained 
 in the southern and western classifications, in which the dividing line 
 is drawn at one-eighth of an inch. It is obvious, however, that such a 
 change would not benefit complainant. 
 
 "The operation of the principle that the value of an article is 
 one of the elements to be considered in the determination of a reason- 
 able rate, and articles of higher value even when derived from the same 
 raw materials as those of lower value should carry a higher rate, would 
 seem prima facie to lead to the conclusion that veneer and built-up 
 wood should take a somewhat higher rate than lumber. 
 
 ***** 
 
 ' ' That veneer load« as heavily as lumber and can be moved at the 
 same cost is not controlling. On the other hand, veneer and built-up 
 wood are more valuable than lumber, and move in much smaller quan- 
 tities. 
 
 "The Commission, in Penrod Walnut & Veneer Co. v. C. B. & Q. 
 R. R. Co., 15 I. C. C. 326, held that walnut veneers were properly classi- 
 fied in the fifth class, and that a rate thereon of 27 cents in carloads 
 from Kansas City to Chicago, a distance of 458 miles, was not unreason-, 
 able, the lumber rate between the same points being 16 cents. In this 
 case the relatively high value of walnut veneer was a material con- 
 sideration influencing the Commission. It would seem that if fifth and 
 sixth class represent, respectively, the proper classifications of veneer 
 and lumber, the spread between these rates from Wausau to points 
 in the southern peninsula of Michigan is reasonable. ' ' 
 
 WAGON WOOD: See "Flow Beams and Wagon Wood." 
 
 WOOL: The fact that the value of wool is much greater than 
 that of sheep and the rate is a thing of less relative consequence to the 
 producer might justify a somewhat higher rate on wool than on the 
 live animal.®'^ Lower rates on wool in bales than on wool in sacks 
 ordered established from far western points to the east.^^ 
 
 WOOD, PULP: A low grade of trafSc should ordinarily take a 
 lower rate than lumber.^^ Pulp wood loads heavily and can be trans- 
 ported in most any kind of cars. It moves in large quantities and helps 
 to create a great deal of other traffic and the liability to damage is 
 slight."" 
 
 1. Chicago Live Stock Excliange v. Chicago, G. W. Ry. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 428, 
 450. See, In Re Rates on Corn and Corn Products (1905), 11 I. O. C. Kep. 227; 
 Edgar & Son. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 181, 184. 
 
 2. Rice V. Cincinnati W. & B. Rd. Co. (1892), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 193, 3 I. C Rep. 841. 
 
 3. Chamber of Commerce of the City of Milwaukee v Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. 
 (1898), 7 I. C. C. Rep. 481. 
 
 4. Howard Mills Co. v. Missouri P. Ry. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 259. 
 
 5. Bulte Milling Co. v. Chicago & A. Rd. Co. (1909). 15 I. C. C. Rep. 351, 364. 
 
 6. State of Iowa v. Atlanta C. L. Rd. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 134, 137. 
 
 7. Stowe-Fuller Co. v. Pennsylvania Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 216. 
 
 8. Barnard Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1913), 2(i I. C. C. Rep. 91, 9:!. 
 
 9. International Agricultural Corp. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 
 488, 493. 
 
.<j610] TEAFFIC LAW SEKVICE 206 
 
 10. Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1912'), I. C. C. 
 Rep. 291. 
 
 11. Oregon & Washington Lumber Mfrs. Assn. v. Southern P. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 
 389 395 
 
 12. Stowe-Fuller Co. v. Pennsylvania Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 216. 
 
 121^. National Paving Brick Manufacturers' Association v. Alabama & V. Ry. Co. (1922), 
 68 I. C. C. Rep. 213, 216, et seq. 
 
 13. Broom Rates to Colorado Points (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 310, 312. 
 
 14. Carnation Milk Products Co. v. Director General, Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. 
 (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 665, 668. 
 
 15. Bahrenburg Bros. & Co. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 560, 564. 
 
 16. Anderson-Tully Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 48. 
 
 17. Cement Rates from Duluth, Minn., Mason City and Des Moines, Iowa, to Stations 
 on the Midland Continental Railroad (1915), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 540, 542; Maritime Ex- 
 change V. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 81; Ashgrove Lime & Port- 
 land Cement Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. P. Ry. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 519; Little 
 Rock Chamber of Commerce v. St. Louis, I.-M. & S. Ry. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 
 341. 
 
 18. Union Pacific Tea Co. v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 545, 547. 
 
 19. Ford Co. v. Michigan C. Rd. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 507. 
 
 20. Ibid. 
 
 2L Meeker & Co. v. Lehigh V. Rd. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 129, 150. 
 
 22. Independent Ice, Feed & Fuel Co. v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. Rd. Co. (1917), 44 
 I. C. C. Rep. 666, 667. 
 
 23. Casey-Hedges Mfg. Co. v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 63, 64. 
 
 24. Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 260. 
 
 25. Peet Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Director General, as Agent, Fort Smith & W. Rd. Co. (1921), 
 63 I. C. C. Rep. 345, 346. See Chamber of Commerce, Houston, Texas, v. Abilene & 
 S. Ry. Co. (1919), 53 I. C. C. Rep. 645; Southport Mill, Ltd., v. Director General, 
 Chicago & N. Wi. Ry. Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 154; Procter & Gamble Co. v. 
 Cincinnati, K O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (1920), 58 I. C. C. Rep. 108. 
 
 26. East St. Louis Cotton Oil Co. v. St Louis & S. F. Ed. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 
 588, 591. 
 
 27. Commercial Club of Omaha v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 397, 
 402. 
 
 28. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago, G. W. Ry. Co. (1908) 209 V. S. 108, 52 
 L. Ed. 705, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493. This case is known as the "Chicago Live Stock 
 Case," the history of which is as follows : Chicago Live Stock Exchange v. Chicago 
 G. W. Ry. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 428. From the Missouri River to Chicago, 
 111., carriers ordered to discontinue charging higher rates on live stock than on 
 packing-house products on the ground that lower rates on the products constituted 
 an undue preference in favor of the products in violation of section 3 of the Act. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co. (1905), 141 Fed. Rep. 
 1003. Commission's order held invalid on the ground that there is no violation of 
 section 3 on account of railroad competition and other transportation dissimilarities. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co., supra. Supreme Court 
 affirmed judgment of lower court and held Commission's order invalid. 
 
 29. Carlowltz & Co. v. Canadian P. Ry. Co. (1917), 46 I. C. C. Rep. 290, 291. 
 
 30. Keogh V. Chicago, B. & Q. Ed. Co (1912), 24 I C. C. Rep. 606. 
 
 31. Kellogg Toasted Com Flake Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1915), 33 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 534, 535. 
 
 32. Glucose from Chicago (1915), 36 I. C. C. Rep. 379, 381. 
 
 33. Nebraska State Railway Commission v. Central V. Ry. Co. (1914), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 41. 
 
 34. National Hay Assn. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1902), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 264; Com- 
 mission's order held invalid on the ground that it fixed a rate for the future. Inter- 
 state Commerce Commission v. Lake Shore & M. iS. Ry. Co. (1905), 134 Fed. Rep., 
 942. Commission's order held invalid. Decree of lower court affirmed by divided 
 court, there being no written opinion. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Lake 
 Shore & M. S. Ey. Co. (1906), 202 XJ. S. 613, 26 Sup. Ct Rep. 766, 50 L. Ed. 1169. 
 
 35. National Hay Assn. v. Michigan C. Rd. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 34. 
 
 36. In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Supplements No. 2 to Trans- 
 continental Freight Bureau Westbound Tariffs No. 1-L and No. 4-H (1911), 21 
 I. C. C. Rep. 397, 399. 
 
 37. Crowders Bros. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 449; Rate 
 Increases in Western Classification Territory (1915), 35 I. C. C. Rep. 497, 602. 
 
 38. City Ice & Supply Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1916), 36 I. C. C. Rep. 514, 516. 
 
 39. Scrap-iron Rates between Duluth, Minn., and Chicago, 111., and Other Points (1913); 
 28 I. C. C. Rep. 467, 470.' 
 
 40. Chevrolet Motor Co. of California v. Director General, as Agent (1922), 66 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 677, et seq. 
 
 41. Pacific Creamery Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 578, 5S0. 
 
 42. Chamber of Commerce, Freight Bureau, Macon, Ga. v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T P. Ry. 
 Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 477. 
 
 43. Hardie Mfg. Co. v. Oregon Rd. & Nav. Co. (1912). 24 I. C. C. Rep. 545, 546. 
 
 44. Bemheim & Co. v. Oregon Ed. & Nav. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 156, 158. 
 
 45. Tarkio Molasses Feed Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ed. Co. (1917), 46 I. C. C. Rep. 17, 19. 
 
 46. National Society of Record Assns. v. Aberdeen & R. Rd. Co. (1916), 40 I. G C Rep. 
 347, 351. 
 
 47. Oregon & Washington Lumber Mfrs. Assn. v. Southern P. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 389; Farrar Lumber Co. v. Nashville C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1912), 25 I C C 
 Rep. 22, 25. 
 
207 FREIGHT BATES AND CHAHGES [§610 
 
 48. Bluegrass Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N. Ed. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 438, 444. 
 
 49. Anson, Gilkey & Hurd Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1915), 33 I. C. C. Eep. 332. 
 
 50. Yellow Pine Sash, Door & Blind Mfrs. Assn. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1915), 35 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 150, 155, et'seq. 
 
 51. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. v. Oregon- Washington Rd. & Nav. Co. (1912), 24 
 I. C. C. Rep. 299, 300. 
 
 52. Grain Rates in Central Freight Association Territory (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 549, 
 551. 
 
 53. Texas Brewing Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1911); 21 I. C. C. Rep. 171, 174. 
 
 54. Molasses Rates to Knoxville, Tenn. (1914), 30 I. C. R«p. 613. 
 
 55. Rose V. Boston & A. Rd. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 427, 429. 
 
 56. Bayway Chemical Co. v. Central Rd. Co. of New Jersey (1917), 46 I. C. C. Eep. 424, 
 425. 
 
 57. In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Oarrier.s 
 for the Transportation of Flaxseed from Minneapolis, Minn., and Other Points to 
 Chicago, 111., and Other Destinations (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 337, 341. 
 
 58. Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 661, 
 662. 
 
 59. Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Atchison, T. «& S. F. Ry. Co. (1917), 43 I. C. C. Rep. 515, 
 517. 
 
 60. Paper Rates from Manitowoc and Milwaukee to Kaukauna, Wis. (1913), 28 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 305, 307. , 
 
 61. National Refining Co. v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 
 649, 650. 
 
 62. Vulcan Iron Works Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1916), 41 I. C. C. Rep. 76, 79. 
 
 63. Sligo Iron Store Co. v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 616, 618. 
 
 64. Florence Wagon Works v. Missouri, O. & G. Ry. Co. (1915), 36 I. C. C. Rep. 650. 
 
 65. Partridge Lumber Co. v. Great N. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 276, 278. 
 
 66. California Pole & Piling Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 669, 672. 
 
 67. Live Poultry & Dairy Shippers' Traffic Assn. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1918), 
 49 I. O. C. Rep. 228, 236. 
 
 68. 1 Gas & Electric Appliance Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1917), 46 I. C. C. Rep. 
 440, 441. 
 
 69. Rice from Texas and Louisiana (1916), 40 I. C. C. Rep. 285, 288. 
 
 70. Ibid. 
 
 71. Barber Agency Co. v. Kentwood & E. Ry. Co. (1917), 46 I. C. C. Rep. 524. 
 
 72. Fargo Foundry Co. v. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1916), 38 I. C. C. Rep. 693, 694. 
 
 73. Michigan Box Co. v. Flint & P. M. Rd. Co. (1895), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 335; Duluth Shingle 
 Co. V. Duluth S. iS. & A. Ry. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 489. 
 
 74. Sawyer & Austin Lumber Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1910), 19 I. 0. C. Rep. 
 141. 
 
 75. State of Maryland v. Baltimore, C. & A. Ry. Co. (1918), 49 I. C. C. Rep. 681, 688. 
 
 76. Andrews Soap Co. v. Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1890), 4 I. C. C. Rep. 31, 
 3 I. C. Rep. 77. 
 
 77. Bartlesville Salvage Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 672. 
 
 78. Eastern Wheel Mfrs. Assn. v. Alabama & V. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Eep. 370, 380. 
 
 79. Waukesha Lime & iStone Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1913), 20 I. C. C. Eep. 
 515. 
 
 80. Moiasses Rates from Mobile, Ala., (1914), 28 I. C. C Eep. 666, 670. 
 
 81. Molasses from Texas and Louisiana (1916), 40 I. C. C. Eep. 435, 443. 
 
 82. Lewis Mfg. Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1916), 41 I. C. C. Rep. 671, 673. 
 
 83. Monarch Paint Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1918), 49 I. C. C. Rep. 367, 36S, .369. 
 
 84. Mercantile Lumber & Supply Co. v. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 
 701, 702; Switzer Lumber Co. v. Alabama & M. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 471, 
 475; Continental Lumber & Tie Co. v. Texas & P. Co. (1910), 18 I. O. C. Rep. 129, 
 131. 
 
 85. Barber Agency Co. v. Kentwood & E. Ry. Co. (1917), 46 I. C. C. Eep. 523. 524. 
 
 86. Underwood Veneer Co. v. Ann Arbor Ed. Co. (1914), 32 I. C. C. Eep. 265. 
 
 87. In the Matter of the Investigation of Alleged Unreasonable Rates and Practices in- 
 volved in the Transportation of Wool, Hides, and Pelts from Various Western Points 
 of Origin to Eastern Destinations (1912), 23 I. C. O. Rep. 594, 595. 
 
 88. Ibid. 
 
 89. Wisconsin Pulp WooU Co. v. Great N. Ry. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 594, 595. 
 
 90. Pulp & Paper Mfrs. Traffic Assn. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 83, 96. 
 
 610-U. COMPAEISON OF KATES ON EAW MATERIALS AND MANUFACTURED 
 
 PRODUCTS. 
 
 The general rule is that manufactured products bear higher rates 
 of transportation than does raw material, and it is founded in reason, 
 because ordinarily there is a substantial difference between the value 
 of the one and that of the other, and frequently there is a greater 
 degree of risk incident to the transportation and care of the manu- 
 factured product than of the raw material. The practice, however, is 
 not universal, and is departed from in some instances because of the 
 
§610] TEAFFIC LAW SERVICE 208 
 
 reasons for the distinction are lacking, and in other cases because of 
 countervailing commercial and market conditions and considerations. 
 Within the last-named class of exceptions to the general rule perhaps 
 would fall the case of grain and grain products, which are for the most 
 part carried at the same rate. A frequent exception to the first named 
 class is in cases where from a single raw material like cottonseed there 
 are several resulting distinct products and by-products, widely differ- 
 ing in value, weight, bulk, and the uses to which they are put. The 
 general practice referred to more nearly universally applies with 
 respect to the primary or principal product or products than to the 
 secondary products or by-products from the same raw material. The 
 primary purpose of crushing cottonseed is to extract the oil, which is 
 by far the most valuable product, and the rates thereon are universally 
 higher than on the cottonseed from which it is produced. Cottonseed 
 meal and cake are approximately of the same value as the seed, and 
 are generally carried at the same or only slightly lower rates, whereas 
 the lower grade by-products, hulls, and linters, are transported at still 
 lower rates.^ 
 
 Sulphuric acid is purely a raw material in the manufacture of 
 fertilizer and a distinctly lower rate should be applied to its trans- 
 portation than upon manufactured fertilizer.^ 
 
 The rate on malt may preferably be higher than the rate on barley 
 from which it is manufactured.^ 
 
 1. East St. Louis Cotton Oil Co. v. St. I^uis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1910), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 37, 
 40, 41; Bulte MilUng Co. v. Ctiicago & A. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 351, 364 
 Masses & Felton Lumber Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 110, 112 
 Electric Malting Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 378, 380 
 McClung & Co. V. Louisville & N. Ed. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 414, 416; State of 
 Iowa V. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1912), 24 1. C. C. Rep. 134, 137; East St. Louis Cot- 
 ton Oil Co. V. St. Louis & S. F. Ed. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 588; Kellogg Toasted 
 Corn Flake Co. v. Michigan C. Ed. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 604, 606; In the 
 Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers for 
 the Transportation of Linseed Oil from St. Paul, Minn., and Other Points to Chi- 
 cago, 111., Kansas City, Mo., and Other Points (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 265, 270; 
 Capital Electric Co. v. Baltimore & O. C. T. Ed. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 472, 473; 
 Boldt Co. V. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 11, 13; Eastern Wheel 
 Manufacturers Assn. v. Alabama & V. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. 370, 379; Papfir 
 Rates from Manitowoc and Milwaukee to Kaukauna, Wis. (1913), 28 1. C. C. Een. 
 305. 
 
 2. International Agricultural Corporation v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. O. 
 Rep. 488, 493. 
 
 3. Texas Brewing Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Eep. 171. 174 
 
 610- V. EaTES FIXED BY StATE AUTHORITIES AS STANDARDS IX FIXTNR 
 
 INTERSTATE EATES. 
 
 A railroad is not bound to accept the schedule of rates established 
 by State authority as the measure of its charges on interstate trafiic.i 
 
 Neither is the Interstate Commerce Commission, whose jurisdic- 
 tion is exclusive over interstate rates, controlled by the rates estab- 
 lished by State Eailroad Commissions.^ 
 
 While upon general principles of comity the action of a State 
 Commission in fixing a rate on State traffic must be treated with all 
 due respect, the Commission has never felt itself bound to accept a 
 State-made rate as a necessary measure of an interstate rate.' 
 
209 FKEIGHT KATES AND CHARGES [§610 
 
 mission is asked to examine the reasonableness of an interstate rate, 
 similar rates, established by State authoi'ity in that territory, must 
 have great influence, especially when they have been acquiesced in by 
 carriers. Still these State rates have no binding force upon the Com- 
 mission. They are standards of comparison of greater or less value, 
 according as they appear to be just and reasonable.* 
 
 Rates established by State authority are presumed to be reason- 
 able, but the same presumption also attaches to rates voluntarily 
 established by carriers, and in proceedings before the Commission, no 
 greater sanctity can be presumed in favor of rates established by a 
 State commission than those voluntarily established by carriers,^ and 
 the Commission would not hesitate, upon proper evidence that a rate 
 so established would be unjust either to a carrier or a shipper, to refuse 
 to accept it as a basis for fixing an interstate rate.* 
 
 In Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, v. Atchison, T. & S. F. 
 Ry. Co.'' the Commission stated : ' * The complainants rely largely upon 
 the fact that different charges are made on intrastate and interstate 
 passenger travel, and the suggested solution would make the state 
 rates the absolute measure of the interstate rate. This proposed 
 solution of the problem presented we may not adopt under the law as 
 announced in the decision of the Supreme Court in the Shreveport 
 case, infra. 
 
 "In L.&N. R. R. Co. v. Eubanh, 184 U. S. 27, 42, the Supreme 
 Court said: 
 
 " 'Congress does not directly or indirectly interfere with local rates by adopting 
 their sum as the interstate rate.' 
 
 "As said in Pulp & Paper Mfrs. Traffic Asso. v. C, M. & St. P. 
 Ry. Co. 
 
 " 'We have always given due consideration to rates established by fetate commis- 
 sions.' 
 
 "That rates established by state laws or state authorities, prescrib- 
 ing the charge for intrastate transportation of persons and property, 
 are facts that we consider, and that we respect the authority establish- 
 ing such rates constitute no valid reason relieving us from performing 
 the duties devolving upon the Commission under the Constitution and 
 laws of the United States. The Constitution of the United States 
 reserves to Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce, and 
 Congress, under this grant of authority, has imposed upon this Com- 
 mission certain duties. If any rate for transportation wholly Avithin 
 a state may be made the measure of the rates when that transportation 
 moves from one state through or into another, the interstate rate so 
 resulting would not be regulation of interstate commerce by the author- 
 ity prescribed by the Constitution, but by the state. If the function of 
 this Commission be to compute the sum of intrastate rates and pre- 
 scribe the result as a measure of the interstate rates, actual and direct 
 regulation of interstate commerce by the states would be the result. 
 That in the regulation of interstate commerce by the general govern- 
 ment and of intrastate commerce by the state governments there result 
 inconveniences and anomalies, such as is contended to exist here, might 
 be conceded; but such facts, if they exist, neither deprive us of the 
 power nor relieve us from the duty of performing the obligations im- 
 
§610] TEAFFIC LAW SERVICE 210 
 
 posed upon us by laws of Congress authorized by the Constitution of 
 the United States. 
 
 "Were we at liberty and inclined to abdicate the authority and 
 abandon the duty iniposed upon us by accepting the sum of state 
 rates as a measure of interstate rates, the difficulty would not be 
 removed. If the contention of complainants were made effective by 
 applying the intrastate rates to interstate travel, the passenger fare 
 from New York City to Dallas, Tex., would be reduced 10 per cent, 
 though the passenger might not travel through either of the com- 
 plaining states, but through New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
 Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mis- 
 sissippi, Louisiana and Texas, and though these states might prefer 
 that passenger fares be not lowered, they desiring to get the benefit 
 of reductions, if there should be such, in the revenues of the carriers 
 by lower freight rates. The policy of Oklahoma would directly affect 
 the revenues a Virginia carrier 'would receive, though the policy of 
 Virginia might not accord with that of Oklahoma. 
 
 "The facts here of record show that in all the complaining states 
 there are roads which may charge a passenger fare in excess of 2 cents 
 a mile. No evidence is before us, unless the mere fact that such a dif- 
 ference exists should be regarded as evidence, that would enable us 
 to determine whether or not we should make the same distinction. 
 Shall we, without evidence, make the ' same difference in prescribing 
 interstate fares? To do so would be to abandon the 'possession of the 
 field' and to admit 'divided authority over interstate commerce.' This 
 we may not do under the law fixing our powers and prescribing our 
 duties. N. Y. G. c& H. R. R. R. Co. v. Hudson Co., 227 U. S., 248; 
 C, R. I. S P. Ry. Co. V. Hardwich Farmers Elevator Co., 226 U. S., 426. 
 
 "In the Minnesota Rate Cases, supra, Mr. Justice Hughes said: 
 
 " 'The power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several states is supreme 
 and plenary. It Is "complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowl- 
 edges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution." Gibbons v. Ogden, 
 9 Wheat. 1, 196. The conviction of its necessity sprang from the disastrous experiences 
 under the Confederation, when the states vied in discriminatory measures against each 
 other. In order to end these evils, the grant in the Constitution conferred upon Congress 
 an authority at all times adequate to secure the freedom of interstate commercial inter- 
 course from state control and to provide effective regulation of that intercourse as the 
 national interest may demand.' 
 
 "Without repeating the facts herebefore stated relating to the 
 contest by the carriers of these intrastate rates, and having in view 
 some adjustments that have been made, and that perhaps others are 
 in contemplation between the carriers and state authorities, it cannot 
 be claimed that these intrastate rates were voluntarily established or 
 accepted by the carriers. From a careful review of the records and 
 having considered the contentions of the respective parties we do not 
 feel justified in condemning the rates complained of as unreasonable. 
 
 "There remains the question of discrimination. The clainu of 
 discrimination as made at the hearing is based on two facts: First, 
 that an intrastate rate of 2 cents is in force on most railroads in the 
 states of Arkansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma; and, second, that some 
 of the carriers here defendants maintain a 2-cent passenger fare 
 interstate in and through Kansas and Nebraska and other states. The 
 second of these claims is not made by any allegation in the complaint. 
 
211 FREIGHT EATES AND CHARGES [§610 
 
 "The principle here applicable is that stated in Baxter & Co. v. 
 G. S. S F. Ry. Co., 21 1. C. C, 647, 648, where we said: 
 
 " 'Wihile state rates are valuable for comparative purposes in fixing a reasonable 
 charge for a transportation service, the assumption of complainant that the action of 
 the defendant In this case in maintaining higher transportation rates on interstate than 
 upon intrastate traflBc amounts t/O unlawful discrimination on the part of the carrier 
 is not sound, for upon the record it is shovrn that the condition is one over which the 
 carrier has no control.' 
 
 "See also Trier v. C. P. M. d 0. Ry. Co , 30 I. C. C. 352. 
 
 ' ' Since this case was argued the Supreme Court has announced its 
 decision in the Shreveport case, H. E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. United States, 
 234 U. S. 342. In this case the court had under consideration an order 
 of this Commission entered in a proceeding in which we had found 
 that the Texas intrastate rates maintained by the carriers serving 
 both Louisiana and Texas were violative of section three of the act 
 to regulate commerce, and which order directed such carriers to cease 
 and desist from charging higher interstate rates from Shreveport, 
 La., into Texas than were contemporaneously exacted for an equal 
 distance between local points in the state of Texas. Railroad Com. of 
 La. V. St. L. S. W. Ry. Co., 23 I. C. C. 31. In determining the question 
 thus presented, Mr. Justice Hughes, speaking for the court said : 
 
 " 'It is for Congress to supply the needed correction where the relation between 
 intrastate and interstate rates present the evil to be corrected, and this it may do com- 
 pletely by reason of its control of the interstate carrier in all its matters having such a 
 close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that it is necessary or appropriate 
 to exercise the control of the effective government of that commerce. 
 
 " 'It is also clear that, in removing the injurious discriminations against interstate 
 traffic arising from the relation of intrastate to interstate rates, Congress is not bound to 
 reduce the latter below what it may deem to be a proper standard fair to the carrier and 
 to the public. Othervrise, it could prevent the injury to interstate commerce only by the 
 sacrifice of its judgment as to interstate rates. Congress is entitled to maintain its own 
 standard as to these rates and to forbid any discriminatory action by interstate carriers 
 which will obstruct the freedom of movement of interstate traffic over their lines in 
 accordance with the terms it establishes. * * * There is no exception or qualification 
 with respect to an unreasonable discrimination against interstate traffic produced by 
 the relation of intrastate to intrastate rates as maintained by the carriers. It is appar- 
 ent from the legislative history of the act that the evil of discrimination was the prin- 
 cipal thing aimed at, and there is no basis for the contention that Congress intended to 
 exempt any discriminatory action or practice of interstate carriers affecting interstate 
 commerce which it had authority to reach.' 
 
 "From this decision of the Supreme Court it follows that if that 
 discrimination which "is prohibited by law is shown to exist here we 
 have the power to order that the carriers desist therefrom and in re- 
 moving such unlawful discrimination 'arising from the relation of 
 intrastate to interstate rates' we are 'not bound to reduce the latter 
 below what we find is a proper standard, fair to the carrier and to 
 the public. ' ' ' 
 
 In Rates on Beer and Other Malt Products^ the Commission said: 
 "Unquestionably the law of Minnesota presents a situation to the 
 carriers which makes it necessary for them either to adjust some inter- 
 state rates to the mileage rates prescribed by that law, to leave their 
 intrastate and interstate rates out of line, or to suffer material reduc- 
 tions below the intrastate rates fixed thereunder. While we may con- 
 sider this fact, ' Congress does not directly or indirectly interfere with 
 local rates by adopting their sum as the interstate rate,' L. d N. R. R. 
 Co. v. Eubank, 184 U. S., 27, 42, and we cannot say that merely because 
 a higher intrastate rate exists that an increase of an interstate rate 
 to meet the state-made rate is justified, even though the transporta- 
 
§610] TKAJTIC LAW SERVICE 212 
 
 tion conditions as to distance and territory are similar. Nor do the 
 facts here presented require that we consider the application of the 
 decision of the Supreme Court in the Shreveport case, H. E. & W. T. 
 By. Co. ^ United States, 234 U. S., 342. This conclusion makes it 
 unnecessary for us to more particularly describe the Minnesota stat- 
 ute and the situation resulting therefrom." 
 
 In Memphis Merchants Exchange v. Illinois C. Rd. Co.^ the Com- 
 mission stated: "It is now well settled by decisions of this Commis- 
 sion and the courts that if rates approved by state authority cause 
 undue discrimination against interstate commerce, it is the duty and 
 within the power of this Commission to require the removal of the 
 discrimination without at the same time requiring the reduction of 
 reasonable interstate rates. Houston d Texas Ry. v. United States, 
 234 U. S. 342; Railroad Commission of La. v. St. L. S. W. Ry. Co., 
 23 I. C. C. 31; Colonial Salt Co., v. C. R. d Q. R. R. Co., 31 I. C. C. 
 559. However the mere maintenance of a rate for movement of traflfic 
 wholly within a state lower than a rate found reasonable by this Com- 
 mission for the local state portion of a through interstate movement 
 does not of itself constitute undue discrimination within the meaning 
 of the act. The State Public Utilities Commission of Illinois, acting 
 within the scope of its authority, has the undoubted right to pre- 
 scribe rates of freight applicable to movements of traffic by railroad 
 wholly within the state of Illinois. In a case which merely calls to 
 our attention the fact that a state rate is lower than an interstate rate 
 on the same traffic from and to the same points, we have no authority 
 or power to condemn the state rate and take action which would be 
 warrant to carriers to increase it to the level of the applicable inter- 
 state rate. It is only in cases where the rates prescribed by state 
 authorities necessarily operate to unduly prefer a state over an inter- 
 state shipper, or to otherwise interfere with the proper application of 
 rates prescribed by this Commission, that the authority of the Federal 
 law is properly to be exercised. ' ' 
 
 In Rates, Fares and Charges of New York Central Rd. Co.^" the 
 Commission stated: "This case raises again the question whether in 
 regulating interstate commerce, under authority reposed in us by Con- 
 gress we have incidentally the power of regulating intrastate com- 
 merce so far as it affects interstate commerce. In the Shreveport 
 case, 23 I. C. C. 32, we held that we did possess that power by act of 
 Congress, and we pointed out : 
 
 " 'Congress passed this act with full knowledge and profound appreciation of those 
 decisions of the -Supreme Court in which it had been held that state commerce was that 
 wholly within a state " and not affecting interstate commerce," as is fully shown by the 
 Cullom Eeport of 1886, out of which grew the act to regulate commerce." 
 
 "The position that we took was sustained by the United States Su- 
 preme Court, and the principles on which we acted then continues 
 to be our guide. But since then the general obligation resting upon 
 us to exercise control over intrastate commerce so far as its affects 
 interstate commerce has been put in the form of a mandate by section 
 13 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the Transportation 
 Act, 1920."" 
 
 For a full discussion of this subject, see "Power of Commission to 
 prescribe rate, classification, regulation or practice to govern intra- 
 
213 FREIGHT EATES ASD CHARGES [§§610, 611 
 
 state commerce in order to remove a preference, prejudice, or discrim- 
 ination against interstate or foreign commerce," Section 613-NN, post. 
 
 1. In Re Freight Kates between Memphis and Arliansas Points (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 
 180. 
 
 2. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. O. C. 
 Rep. 85; Bartles Oil Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C.Rep. 146; 
 Marshall Oil Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 210. 
 
 3. Saunders & Co. v. Southern Express Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 415. 
 
 4. Corn Belt Meat Producers' Assn. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 
 376; Willman & C!o. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 405; 
 Pulp & Paper Mfrs. Traffic Assn. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 83, 96. 
 
 5. Paola Refining Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 29; Weather- 
 ford Chamber of Commerce v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C Rep. 655, 
 667; Kansas Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Ahnapee & W. Ry. Co. (1914), 32 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 139, 145 ; Freight Rates between Points in Minnesota via Interstate Routes and 
 between Points in Minnesota and Other States (1914), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 361, 363. 
 
 6. Hope Cotton Oil Co. y. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 266. 
 
 7. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1914), 31 
 I. C. C. Rep. 532, 540, et seq. 
 
 8. Beer and Other Malt Products between Stations in Iowa and South Dakota and 
 Points in Minnesota and Wisconsin (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 544, 545; Rates on Agri- 
 cultural Implements and Other Commodities between La Crosse, Wis., and Other 
 Poults and St. Paul, Minn., and Other Points (1915), 36 I. C. C. Rep. 151, 153. 
 
 9. Memphis Merchants Exchange v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1917), 43 I. C. C. Rep. 378, 387. 
 
 10. In the Matter of Rates, Fares and Charges of the New York Central Rd. Co. and 
 Other Railroad Companies in the State of New York (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 290, 291. 
 
 11. Sec. 13. (3) Whenever in any investigation under the provisions of this Act, or in 
 any investigation instituted upon petition of the carrier concerned, which petition is 
 hereby authorized to be filed, there shall be brought in issue any rate, fare, charge, 
 classification, regulation, or practice, made or imposed by authority of any State, or 
 initiated by the President during the period of Federal control, the Commission, 
 before proceeding to hear and dispose of such issue, shall cause the State or States 
 interested to be notified of the proceeding. The Commission may confer with the 
 authorities of any State having regulatory jurisdiction over the class of persons and 
 corporations subject to this Act with respect to the relationship between rate struc- 
 tures and practices of carriers subject to the jurisdiction of such State bodies and 
 of the Commission ; and to that end is authorized and empowered, under rules to be 
 prescribed by it, and which may be modified from time to time, to hold joint hear- 
 ings with any such State regulating bodies on any matters wherein the Commission 
 is empowered to act and where the rate-making authority of a State is or may be 
 affected by the action taken by the Commission. The Commission is also authorized 
 to avail itself of the cooperation, services, records, and facilities of such State au- 
 thorities in the enforcement of any provisions of this Act. 
 
 (4) Whenever in any sjich investigation the Commission, after full hearing, 
 finds that any such rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice causes 
 any undue or unreasonable advantage, preference, or prejudice as between persons 
 " or localities in intrastate commerce on the one hand and interstate or foreign com- 
 merce on the other hand, or any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination 
 against interstate or foreign commerce, which is hereby forbidden and declared to 
 be unlawful, it shall prescribe the rate, fare, or charge, or the maximum or mini- 
 mum, or maximum and minimum, thereafter to be charged, and the classification, 
 regulation, or practice thereafter to be observed, in such manner as, in its judgment, 
 will remove such advantage, preference, prejudice, or discrimination. Such rates, 
 fares, charges, classifications, regulations, and practices shall be observed while in 
 effect by the carriers parties to such proceeding affected thereby, the law of any 
 State or the decision or order of any State authority to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 
 611. Advances in freight rates. 
 
 611-A. Methods of advancing rates. 
 
 There are two ways in which an advance in rates may be accom- 
 pUshed; First, by increasing the rate eo nomine; second, by changing 
 the classification.^ 
 
 An advance in rates resulting from an increase in minimum 
 weight' cannot be condemned merely because it affects a contractive 
 sale based on the lower minimum, in the absence of any evidence that 
 the rate or minimum advanced is unreasonable.- 
 
^611] TEAFFIC LAW SEEYICE 214 
 
 1. Fourteen tb Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission (1900) ; National 
 Hay Assn. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ed. Co. (1902), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 264. 
 
 2. Barnum Iron Wbrks v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 94, 95. 
 
 611-B. Equalization of discriminations. 
 
 An' advance in a rate in order to remove a discrimination is jusfi- 
 fied.i However, no justification exists for increasing rates, which have 
 long been established and which are not claimed to be unremunera- 
 tive, simply to remove a discrimination caused by advancing rates at 
 competitive points.^ 
 
 A new increased rate might eliminate competition and yet be con- 
 demned for being unreasonably high. The fact, however, that it does 
 not eliminate competition should be given some weight in determining 
 its properiety.* 
 
 1. Lautz Bros. & Co., Inc. v. Lehigh V. Rd. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 167. 
 
 2. Rates on Bananas from New Orleans, La., Galveston, Tex., and Other Gulf Ports to 
 Topeka, Kans., Lincoln and Beatrice, Nebr. (1914), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 510, 520. 
 
 3. "Wickwire Steel Co. v. New York C. & H. R. Rd. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 415, 421. 
 
 611-C. Advance in rate to correct erroneous prior rate. 
 
 An error in the adjustment of rates is no justification for the 
 proposed increase thereof.^ 
 
 The fact that a previously existing rate was published through 
 error may be considered, however, in passing upon an advance.^ 
 
 By the inadvertent omission in a tariff of the qualifying phrase 
 a rate of 10 cents, intended to apply only on coarse salt in bulk, became 
 applicable on coarse salt in packages ; Held, That the statutory burden 
 of justifying the increased rate resulting from the subsequent cor- 
 rection of the tariff fully met by the carrier's when the circumstances 
 are explained.^ 
 
 In Wausau Advancement Assn. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.* the 
 Commission stated: "This claim of mistake in the publication of rates 
 which remained in effect for as long a period as two years is not per- 
 suasive. The Commission in such cases will regard the rate as one 
 voluntarily and knowingly made. It recognizes that errors will creep 
 into tariffs but feels that they should be discovered and eliminated 
 within a reasonable time." 
 
 The Commission has approved an advance where the tariff con- 
 taining the advance simply corrected the inadvertent act of one of the 
 carriers." 
 
 1. Wheat Rates from Oklahoma Points to Memphis, Tenn., and Other Points (1914). 
 30 I. G. C. Rep. 93, 95. 
 
 2. Chamber of Commerce, Houston, Tex. v. International & G. N. Ry. Co (1914^ 32 
 I. C. C. Rep. 247. 
 
 3. Gottron Bros. Co. v. Genesee & W. Rd. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 38. 
 
 4. Wausau Advancement Assn. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C Rep 459 
 460. , 
 
 5. In the Matter of the Investigation and Siispension of Advances in Class Rates by 
 Carriers Operating between Certain Points in Iowa and Minneapolis, Minn and 
 Other Points (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 268, 27]. 
 
215 FREIGHT HATES AND CHARGES [§611 
 
 611-D. MaINTENAKCE of higher intrastate BATE THAX INTERSTATE 
 
 BATE. 
 
 It cannot be said that merely because a higher intrastate rate 
 exists that an increase of an interstate rate to meet the state-made 
 
 rate is justified, even though the transportation conditions as to dis- 
 tance and territory are the same.^ 
 
 1. Beer and Other Malt Products between Stations in Iowa and South Dalcota and 
 Points in Minnesota and "Wisconsin (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 544. 
 
 611-E. Increase in interstate rates to remove any undue or unrea- 
 sonable ADVANTAGE, PREFERENCE, PREJUDICE OB DISCRIMINA- 
 TION AGAINST INTERSTATE OR FOREIGN COMMERCE. 
 
 See " Poire r of Commission to prescribe rate, classification, regu- 
 lation, or practice to govern intrastate traffic in order to remove a pref- 
 erence or prejudice, or discrimination against interstate or foreign 
 commerce," Section 613-NN, post. 
 
 611-F. PeESUMPTION where long-established BATE IS ADVANCED FOR A 
 SHORT PERIOD AND THEN BEDUCBD TO ITS FORMER BASIS. 
 
 See "Presumption ivhere long-established rate is advanced for a 
 short period and then reduced to the form,er basis. Section 609-HHH, 
 ante. 
 
 611-G-. Advance in rates to preserve proper relation between 
 
 COMMODITIES 
 
 A carrier may be justified in advancing rates in order to bring 
 those rates into a proper relationship.^ The Commission has re- 
 peatedly sanctioned increases of rates for the purpose of bringing such 
 rates into .harmony with the established rate structure.- 
 
 A disparity between two rates can as logically be corrected by low- 
 ering the higher rate as by increasing the lower rate. In the absence 
 of proof that the higher rate is reasonable a carrier which advances 
 the rate to the level of another rate does not sustain the burden of 
 proof imposed by the statute merely by pointing out that the object of 
 the increase was to remove the disparity. 
 
 There are cases where increased rates may be proper to secure 
 uniformity in rate relationship, but it is to be remembered that uni- 
 formity may be secured in many cases by reduced rates as well as 
 by increased rates. The mere fact that a relation of rates requires 
 readjustment in the interest of uniformity is no proof that the rates 
 increased to the level of relatively higher rates are reasonable.^ 
 
 No justification exists for increasing rates which have long been 
 established and which are not claimed to be unremunerative, simply to 
 remove a discrimination caused by advancing rates at competing 
 points.* 
 
 An increased rate on raw material of itself argues for a higher 
 rate on the finished product.^ 
 
§611] TEAFFIC LAW SEEVICE 216 
 
 In Rates on Common Brick to Canada,^ the Commission stated: 
 "Practically the sole justification for the advance is that a realign- 
 ment of brick rates from the United States to Canada was necessitated 
 by 'the decision of the Commission in the Stowe-Fuller case, 12 I. C. C. 
 215, where, it is contended, the Commission held that 'a brick is a 
 brick' and that the same rate must be applied alike to common, build- 
 ing, paving, and fire brick. At that time varying rates applied from 
 Pennsylvania and Ohio. After conferences between the American 
 and the Canadian roads a readjustment was agreed upon which gave 
 to all brick the same rates and at the same time enabled Ohio and 
 Pennsylvania shippers to reach Canada substantially on a parity. In 
 accomplishing this realignment both advances and reductions were 
 made, the advances applying principally to common and paving brick' 
 and the reductions to fire and other high-grade brick, the idea being to 
 conform to the Chicago-New York scale which, from 25 cents on fire 
 brick, 22^ cents on building brick, and 20 cents on paving brick, was 
 fixed by the Commission at 21 cents on all brick. Metropolitan Patting 
 Brick case, 17 I. C. C. 197. But Orchard Park and Jewettville man- 
 ufacture nothing but common brick, and no rates were published on 
 fire or paving brick. Consequently there were no varying rates to 
 equalize, and no advance in the rates on common brick from these 
 points can be justified on that ground. ' ' 
 
 In Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. Pittsburgh C. C. S St. L. By. Co.'' 
 the Commission stated: "Comparisons are submitted with rates on 
 automobiles, motorcycles, buggies and other vehicles. Motorcycles, 
 which are of a similar character, carry the same rating as bicycles. 
 The ratings on vehicles generally were advanced at the same time 
 bicycles were advanced. 
 
 "It is asserted that a restoration of the second-class rate on bicy- 
 cles from Dayton to Chicago would affect the entire official classifica- 
 tion and necessitate similar changes between all points in that terri- 
 tory where bicycles move in carloads. The fact that higher prices 
 now prevail than formerly in the bicycle trade is also relied upon in 
 justification of the higher rate. 
 
 "We have very carefully considered all the evidence submitted 
 at both hearings, and it is our finding and conclusion that the carriers 
 have now shown the advanced rate to be just and reasonable. The com- 
 plaint will be dismissed. ' ' 
 
 1. In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 for the Transportation of Lumber and Articles taking Lumber Rates from Stations 
 on the Alabama Great Southern Railroad and Other Points to St. Louis, Mo., and 
 Other Points (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 686. 
 
 2. Westbound Lake-and-Rall Knit Goods Commodity Rates (1914), ,32 I. C. C. Rep. 54, 
 
 57. ^ 
 
 3. Rates on Lumber from Anoka, Minn., and Other Points, to Stations in South and 
 North Dakota (1915), 32 I. C. C. Rep; 494, 496. 
 
 4. Rates on Bananas from New Orleans, La., Galveston, Tex., and Other Gulf Ports to 
 Topeka, Kans., Lincoln and Beatrice, Nebr. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 510, 520. 
 
 5. Rates on Linseed Oil (1914), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 265, 270. 
 
 6. Rates on Common Brick to Canada (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 129, 130 
 
 7. Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1913), 26 I. C C 
 Rep. 282. 
 
217 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§611 
 
 611-H. CaNCELLATIOX of commodity KATES BECAUSE OF LACK OF MOVE- 
 MENT OF TRAFFIC. 
 
 In Sandstone, Minn. — Missouri River Building Stone Rates,^ the 
 Commission stated: "Eespondent Great Northern Railway Company 
 takes the position that the clause in reference to the establishment of 
 rates from and to intermediate points does not place upon the carriers 
 the obligation of establishing the same or a lower rate from interme- 
 diate points, but is simply the permission of the Commission to estab- 
 lish such rates under authority of the Commission on one day's notice 
 to the public and to the Commission. It, therefore, declined to sub- 
 mit any testimony as to the reasonableness of the class rates from 
 Sandstone and St. Paul to Kansas City, which are 19 to 17 cents per 
 100 pounds, respectively, on the ground that as to the Sandstone rate 
 the fact that there is not and has not been for a considerable period 
 any movement thereunder is sufficient justification for the cancella- 
 tion of the commodity rate, and as to the St. Paul rate, because it is 
 not interested in traffic from St. Paul to Kansas City. The Great 
 Northern feels that unless protestants can demonstrate an interest 
 in the rates from Sandstone and Banning and desire the establishment 
 of a 12-cent or lower rate from St. Paul to Kansas City, that issue 
 must be brought to the attention of the Commission in an appropriate 
 proceeding, complaining of the unreasonableness of the 17-cent class-E 
 rate from St. Paul to Kansas City. It contends that protestants, 
 located as they are at St. Paul, have no interest in the rates on building 
 stone from Banning and Sandstone, and that the reasonableness of the 
 rate from St. Paul to Kansas City is not in issue in this proceeding. 
 The distance tariff rate of the Chicago Great Western from St. Paul 
 to Kansas City is 16 cents. 
 
 "The position taken by the Great Northern is not tenable. Rule 
 77 of the Commission's Tariff Circular 18-A was adopted solely as a 
 feasible and economical plan under which commodity rates might be 
 published from known points of production or to known points of con- 
 sumption without also publishing commodity rates from or to all inter- 
 mediate points, which perhaps, or even probably, would never forward 
 or receive shipments of that commodity. The carrier that adopts this 
 means of relief from the long-and-short-haul provision of the act is, 
 however, required to provide in its tariff, as did these respondents 
 in this instance, that upon reasonable request therefor rates will be 
 established on short notice from or to any intermediate point which 
 will not be higher than those to the next more distant point. It con- 
 stitutes the consent of the Commission to the use of the rule and to 
 the establishment of rates on short notice thereunder and in accord- 
 ance therewith, but it requires that the carrier shall incorporate in its 
 tariff the provision that upon the proper request it will establish rates 
 from the intermediate point in accord with the rule and the tariff pro- 
 vision. Manifestly a carrier may not employ this rule for the purp=ose 
 of giving a rate to a point which it desires to accommodate or favor 
 and then when it is called upon to accord to intermediate points the 
 rates to which, under the law, they are entitled, escape its obligation 
 by simply cancelling the arrangement. The use of this rule and plan 
 for publishing commodity rates does not deprive the intermediate 
 points of any of their lawful rights and its incorporation in a tariff is 
 a recognition of the rights of the intermediate points under the long- 
 
^b'll] ' TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 
 
 218 
 
 and-short-haul rule and a published guaranty that those rights will be 
 recognized and protected upon demand. That guaranty must be ob- 
 served in full and in good faith. 
 
 "It is true that the Great Northern is not particularly interested 
 in the rates from St. Paul to Kansas City, but here we have a joint 
 tariff issued by the joint agent of respondents in which they provide 
 the rate from Sandstone and Banning to Kansas City and agree to 
 establish upon request therefor a rate from any intermediate point 
 that shall not be higher. They are requested to establish the same 
 rate from the less-distant intermediate point, St. Paul, and reply that 
 rather than to live up to the assurances given by them in their tariff 
 they wiU cancel same. 
 
 ' ' The cancellation of the commodity rates has the effect of leaving 
 higher rates the only ones applicable. It is therefore an instance of 
 increased rates in which the burden is upon respondents to prove the 
 reasonableness of the increased rates. This they have not undertaken 
 to do, except by showing that traffic did not move under the lower rates. 
 They allege that building stone was included under the commodity 
 rates through error. This allegation does not impress us strongly in 
 face of the fact that the rates have been in effect for more than five 
 years." 
 
 1. Sandstone— Missouri Elver Building Stone Rates (1913), 2S I. C. C. Rep. 268, 270, 
 et seq. 
 
 611-1. Caeeiees advancing certain eates to avoid eeducing other 
 
 BATES. 
 
 / 
 
 The fact that unless the rates to several communities are in- 
 creased, another and a competing community will be entitled to a lower 
 rate than it now enjoys is no justification for the increases.^ 
 
 "Where existing rates were an exception resulting in violations of 
 sections 3 and 4 of the Act, and the making of other reductions would 
 bring about further departures, the advances wei-e held justified.^ 
 
 In Wickwire Steel Co. v. New York C. S H. R. Ed. Co.'' the Com- 
 mission stated : * ' Surely it is always open to the Commission to con- 
 sider as a part of the test of the propriety of the new rate the circum- 
 stance that it will eliminate a discrimination existing under the adjust- 
 ment which it is to supersede. This is not to say that the consideration 
 as to whether the new rate affects or eliminates a discrimination can 
 be urged in sole justification of the rate. A new increased rate might 
 eliminate discrimination and yet be condemned for being unreasonably 
 high. The fact, however, that it does eliminate discrimination should 
 be given some weight in determining its propriety." 
 
 In Lumber Rates to Knoxville, Tenn.^ the Commission said: "If 
 it be a fact, as the record indicates, that the refusal of the Commission 
 to prove the proposed increase of rates from Decatur and Sheffield to 
 Knoxville make it necessary for the respondents to reduce the rates 
 on lumber from certain intermediate points in Knoxville in order to 
 remove violations of the fourth section, that fact does not justify the 
 proposed increase." 
 
-19 FEEIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [§611 
 
 3^he mere fact that carriers may have to reduce the intermediate 
 rates if they do not increase the terminal rates cannot justify an in- 
 crease.'' 
 
 1. In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 for the Transportation of Certain Commodities between Certain Stations located in 
 Texas Common-Point Territory and St. Louis, Mo., and Other Points (1913), 26 I. 
 C. C. Eep. 528, 532. 
 
 2. Rates on Knitting-Factory products (1913), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 634, 639. 
 
 3. Wickwire Steel Co. v. New York C. & H. R. Rd. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 415, 420. 
 
 4. Lumber Rates to Knoxville, Tenn. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 524, 526. 
 
 5. Cement Rates between Points in Illinois and Points in Minnesota and Other States 
 (1914), 32 I. C. O. Rep. 369, 372. 
 
 611-J. DlSPXJTES BETWEEN CARRIERS AS TO DIVISIONS DO NOT .TUSTIFY 
 
 INCREASES OF RATES 
 
 Disagreement between carriers over divisions will not be recog- 
 nized as a justification for the withdrawal of joint rates or through 
 rates. Especially is this true if such withdrawal occasions higher 
 charges to shippers or receivers, and deprives them of the opportunity 
 to ship via reasonable through routes.^ 
 
 In Rates on Lumber and Other Forest Products from. Points in 
 Arkansas and Other States to Points in Iowa, Minnesota, and Other 
 States,"^ the Commission said: "The increase having been promul- 
 gated by the St. Louis Southwestern upon its own initiative, no at- 
 tempt was made by the northern lines to sustain the reasonableness of 
 the suspended rates, nor was any effort made by the St. Louis South- 
 western to do so. The testimony was confined entirely to the ques- 
 tion of divisions. It has been frequently held by this Commission 
 that disputes between carriers as to divisions do not justify increases 
 of rates. The respondents having failed to sustain the burden of 
 showing increased rates to be just and reasonable, the tariff in ques- 
 tion should be canceled. 
 
 "As heretofore shown, the primary purpose of the tariff was 
 not to secure for the carriers increased rates, but its avowed object 
 was to bring to the consideration of the Commission a controversy 
 between the parties thereto as to divisions. Section 15 of the act to 
 regulate commerce provides : 
 
 "Whenever the carrier or carriers, in obedience to such order of the Commission 
 or otherwise, in respect to joint rates, fares, or charges, shall fail to agree among them- 
 selves upon the apportionment or division thereof, the Commission may, after hearing, 
 make a supplemental order prescribing the just and reasonable proportion of such joint 
 rate to be received by each carrier party thereto, which order shall take effect as a part 
 of the original order. » * * 
 
 "The Commission may also, after hearing, on a complaint, or upon its own initi- 
 ative without complaint, establish through routes and joint classifications, and may 
 establish joint rates as the maximum to be charged, and may prescribe the divisions of 
 such rfltes as hereinbefore provided, and the terms and condition.^ under which such 
 through routes shall be operated, whenever the carriers themselves shall have refused 
 or neglected to establish voluntarily such through routes or joint classifications or joint 
 rates. 
 
 "The provision of the act governing the suspension of new sched- 
 ules gives to the Commission authority to make such order in ref- 
 erence to a rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice 
 as w^ould be proper in a proceeding initiated after the rate, fare, charge, 
 classification, regulation, or practice became effective." 
 
 1. Lumber Rates from Mississippi to Eastern Points (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 6. 9; 
 Advances on Ground Iron Ore from Points in Alabama, Georijia, and Tennessee to 
 Boston, New York. Phihidelphia. and Other Points (191?.), 2C. I. C. C. Itep. 07.1, 67<!; 
 
§611] TRAFFIC LAW SEEVICE 220 
 
 New Mexico Ck)al Rates (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 328; Rates on Lumber and Other 
 Forest Products from Points in Arkansas and Other States to Points in Iowa, iMin- 
 nesota, and Other States (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 371, 372. 
 2. Rates on Lumber and Other Forest Products from ' Points in Arkansas and Other 
 States to Points in Iowa, Minnesota and Other States (1914), 30 I. C. O. Rep. 371, 
 372, et seq. 
 
 611-K. CaEBIEES ABE NOT ESTOPPED FROM ADVANCING RATES BECAUSE OF 
 A BESULTING IN.TUBY TO SHIPPERS 
 
 That contracts have been entered into on the basis of a lower 
 rate does not of itself preclude the iijicreasing of such rate.^ It is 
 doubtful whether evidence of this nature is admissible.-^ 
 
 ^^ile it may be shown that the protestant's business has decreased 
 since the increase of a certain freight rate and that such increase in 
 rate may make it more difficult for the protestant to compete in a 
 given territory, these facts form no basis for requiring a carrier to 
 establish or maintain a given rate unless it should be found upon 
 all the facts appearing that such a rate is reasonable.^ 
 
 Shippers have no vested interest in the maintenance of existing 
 rates by reason of investments made under those rates which pre- 
 cludes increasing rates that are reasonably low.* 
 
 That advances made in shipping rates on certain classes of goods 
 would be severely felt by certain shippers is not a sufficient reason 
 for holding that they were not properly made, as any change in mar- 
 ket conditions which affected the cost of handling would necessarily 
 be felt.5 
 
 See "No estoppel operates against the right of a carrier to enjoy 
 just and reasonable rates," Section 609-KKK, ante. 
 
 1. Rates on Crushed Stone from McCook and Thornton, 111. to Stations in Indiana and 
 Michigan (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 136, 137. 
 
 2. Duluth, Minn., Log- Rates (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 420, 421. 
 
 3. Standard Vitrified Brick Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1914). 32 I. C. C. Rep. 
 208, 211. 
 
 4. Crawford & Bunce v. Pittsburgh, 0. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1914), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 12, 14. 
 
 5. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1912). 195 Fed. Rep. 
 541. 
 
 611-L. Inceease in bates besulting in inceease in disceimination. 
 
 In Grain Rates in Central Freight Association Territory'^, the 
 Commission said: "Where an increase in rates may operate to create 
 or to increase a discrimination it is always necessary to inquire in 
 passing upon the properiety of the increase whether the discrimination 
 be due, but in instances like the present, where the relation has not 
 been changed and where the discrimination, if one previously ex- 
 isted, has not been intensified, that question does not properly arise 
 upon the justification of the increase. The party claiming to test 
 under such discrimination should file his complaint in due form, there- 
 by bringing to the attention of interested carriers and other paries 
 the exact matter for consideration." 
 
 1. Grain Rates in Central Freight Association Territory (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 549, 557. 
 
221 TEEIGHT HATES AND CHARGES . [§611 
 
 611-M. Right of a caeeiee to advance its eates. 
 
 See "Right of the carrier to change its rates," Section 604- A, 
 ante, and, "No estoppel operates against the right of a carrier to en- 
 joy just and reasonable rates," Section 609-KKK, ante. 
 
 611-N. No peesumption of wrong arises from an advance in rates. 
 
 The reasonableness of a rate must of necessity depend upon the 
 conditions surrounding the traffic at the time it moves. The length 
 of the haul, the competition to be met, the cost of the service, the 
 value of the service, the density or volume of tonnage, as well as 
 the general transportation conditions then existing, are factors that 
 have a more or less definite relation to the rate that a carrier may 
 reasonably demand for a transportation service. And these factors, 
 except possibly the length of the haul, the grades, and other transpor- 
 tation conditions, are in their nature neither permanent or fixed, but 
 necessarily change with the general economic panorama. No pre- 
 sumption of law, therefore, can arise against an advanced rate simply 
 because a lower rate previously existed.^ 
 
 The mere fact that a rate has been raised by a carrier carries 
 with it no presumption that it was not rightfully done." 
 
 See "No presumption of wrong arises from a change in rates by 
 the carrier," Section 604-B, ante, and "Burden of proof as to reason- 
 ableness of increased rates upon a common carrier," Section 611-P, 
 post. 
 
 1. Memphis Cotton Oil Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Elep. 313, 318. 
 
 2. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago G. W. Ed. Co. (1908), 209 U. S. 108, 
 52 L. Ed. 705, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493 ; Ix)uisvllle & X. Rd. Co. t. Interstate Commerce 
 Commission (1912), 195 ;Ped. Rep. ,541. 
 
 611-0. Investigation and suspension of new rate, charge, regula- 
 tion OR practice. 
 
 'See "Jurisdiction of Interstate Commerce Commission over 
 freight rates and charges, Section 614, post. 
 
 611-P. Burden of proof as to eeasonableness of inceeased eates 
 
 UPON common caeeiee. 
 
 Section 15, (7) of the Interstate Commerce Act, {as amended June 
 18, 1910) provides as follows: 
 
 At any hearing involving a rate, fare, or charge increased after January 1, 1910, 
 or of a rate, fare, or charge sought to be increased after the passage of this Act, the 
 burden of proof to show that the increased rate, fare oi» charge, or proposed increased 
 rate, fare, or charge, is just and reasonable shall be upon the carrier, and the Commis- 
 sion shall give to the hearing and decision of such questions preference o\er all other 
 questions pending before it and decide the same as speedily as possible. 
 
 In Advance in Rates — Western Case'^ the Commission made the 
 following observation: "Stress is further laid upon the use of the 
 words 'the burden of proof shall be upon the common carrier,' and we 
 are urged to a strict interpretation of this language along lines of 
 judicial reasoning in civil and criminal cases. This language has a 
 
§611] • TRAFFIC LAW SEHVICE 222 
 
 common-sense meaning which does not need elucidation by citation of 
 authority. 
 
 "It must be borne in mind that this Commission is not a court of 
 law; its function is to apply the mandatory and restrictive provisions 
 of the act to regulate commerce to stated conditions of fact. We must 
 regard the problems presented to us from as many standpoints as 
 there are public interests involved. The making of a rate is in ulti-' 
 mate analysis the exercise of a taxing power on commerce, 73 Fed., 
 409. The reasonableness of a rate is to be ■ determined by no mere 
 mathematical calculation, though figures of cost and revenue must 
 play a not inconsiderable part in arriving at a final jud.gment. Wise 
 men may differ as to what a 'just and reasonable rate' is under given 
 conditions. The courts recognize that there is abundant play for what 
 the present Chief Justice so edmirably described as 'the flexible limit 
 of judgment which belongs to the power to make rates. ' 206 U. S. 26. 
 The unrestricted power to make rates, however, should not rest in the 
 hands of those whose tendency must be, by reason of human nature 
 to exact to the limit the highest return that can be procured. Eeasons 
 of public policy demand that there shall be a check placed upon a 
 power which may be perverted and thus brought to restrict and em- 
 barrass commerce rather than increase and develop it. Every rate 
 question, therefore, is a public question — this is the underlying prin- 
 ciple of the act to regulate commerce and of all similar legislation 
 controlling public utilities. An examination into the specific provi- 
 sions of the act, especially into those of section 13, will make clear to 
 the candid mind that a complaint before this Commission was not 
 intended to be regarded in the same strict and hard light as a com- 
 plaint in an action at law, but was to be regarded as an appeal to the 
 Grovernment against oppressive, unjust and illegal action. A shipper 
 may not dismiss his complaint without consent. The fact that he has 
 no interest in the traffic concerned in his complaint does not 'put him 
 out of court.' These and similar provisions indicate that the purpose 
 of Congress in enacting the act to regulate commerce was to establish 
 a body whose function it should be to protect the public interest and 
 not merely regard the technical rights of an individual shipper, and 
 in this view of the law the act has been administered by the Commis- 
 sion. In accepting this theory, therefore, it is not within belief that 
 Congress intended by the language noAv under consideration to con- 
 vert this Commission into a tribunal which should merely determine 
 as between two sides the preponderance of evidence and base its 
 decisions upon technical and somewhat archiac rules of evidence. 
 
 "By this, however, we are not to be understood as meaning that 
 the language of the act is without significance, or has no binding 
 authority upon us, or that it casts no burden upon the carriers. The 
 assumption of the law i^ that the railroad which increases its rates 
 takes such action knowing that the law casts upon it — if challenge 
 is made either by this Commission or otherwise — the burden of justi- 
 fying its action. Theirs, in the language of the learned Dean Wig- 
 more, is 'the risk of uonpersuasion.' Wigmure on Evidence, Sec. 
 2485. The railroad must assume to prove to this Commission that 
 the new and the increased rates are within the words of description 
 and limitation used in the act; that is, that they are just and rea- 
 sonable. And to say that they must prove this is to say that they 
 must satisfy our minds of this fact.'' 
 
223 FREIGHT BATES AXD CHARGES [§611 
 
 In Rates to the Chicafju Sivitchiufl District'- the Commission stated: 
 "For each rate, a carrier offers and obligates itself to perform a cer- 
 tain amount of service. If the service so offered and for a long time 
 performed in consideration of that rate includes taking the property 
 transported from a given point and delivering it at a given point, the 
 delivery at that point is in no sense a ' free service. ' The carrier may 
 increase the rate or it may curtail the service performed for that rate, 
 but if such action is challenged it must bear the burden of showing 
 that the new rate or service is reasonable and free from unjust dis- 
 crimination. ' ' 
 
 A carrier is entitled to reasonable compensation for switching or 
 other services, but is not justified in attempting to restrict traffic to 
 its own lines by making an excessive charge for switching to or from 
 its connections. In a proceeding to determine the propriety of switch- 
 ing charges absorbed by carriers, the Commission must consider them 
 as though they were to be charged for by the railroad rendering the 
 service and paid for by shippers.^ 
 
 1. Western Advance Rate Case : In Re Inve.stigation of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 in Westej-n Trunk IJne, Trans-Missouri, and Illinois Freight Committee Territories 
 (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 307, 314. 
 
 2. Rates to or from Certain Points in the Chicago Switching District (1915), 34 I. C. C. 
 Riep. 234, 242. Cited in, Consolidation Coal Co. v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. (1921), 
 60 I. C. C. Rep. 763, 767. 
 
 3. Interchange Switching at Wichita, Kansas. (1921), 61 I. C. C. Rep. 205, 206, citing, 
 Switching Absorptions (1917), 47 I. C. C. Rep. 583. 
 
 611-Q! After expiration of commission •'s order suspending tariff 
 
 CONTAINING NEW RATES, CHARGES, REGULATIONS OB. PRACTICES, 
 THE PROPOSED RATES CONTAINED THEREIN DO NOT AUTOM.AT- 
 ICALLY GO INTO EFFECT. 
 
 In Stonega Coke d Coal Co. v. Louisville d: N. Rd. Co} the Com- 
 mission stated: "This case was originally decided January 7, 1913, 26 
 I. C. C, 20. It was reopened November 9, 1914, on motion of respond- 
 ent, the Louisville & Nashville, and the rehearing was begTin February 
 23, 1915. In the meantime, on January 7, 1915, the two-year period 
 for which the original order was to run expired. At the rehearing 
 it was urged for respondent that since the order had expired there 
 was nothing in the case to reconsider. Counsel contended that section 
 16a, giving the Commission power to reopen and reconsider its cases, 
 contemplated a rehearing and reconsideration before the expiration 
 of the order in the particular case. The section provides : 
 
 "That after a decision, order, or requirement has been made by the Commission in 
 any proceeding any party thereto may at any time make application for rehearing of 
 the same, or any matter determined therein * * *. Xo such application shall excuse 
 any carrier from complying with or obeying any decision, order, or requirement of the 
 Commission, or operate in any manner to stay or postpone the enforcement thereof, 
 without the special order of the Commission. * * * Any decision, order, or require- 
 ment made after such rehearing reversing, changing, or modifying the original deter- 
 mination shall be subject to the same provisions as an original order. 
 
 "From this it is plain that the Commission may grant a re- 
 hearing in a case in which no order is made, there being only a 
 'decision.' In such a case no time limit upon a hearing could be con- 
 templated. No provision is made for any different treatment of a 
 rehearing on a 'decision' and a rehearing of a case where an order is 
 made, and no distinction can be drawn under this language. This 
 
§611] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 224 
 
 being true it cannot be said that this section contemplates necessarily 
 that the rehearing and reconsideration of a case in which an order is 
 made must be completed before that order expires. 
 
 "Again, under this section, an application for a rehearing may- 
 be made ' at any time. ' A case in which an order is made might there- 
 fore be reopened, and reheard after the effective period of the order 
 has expired. Incidentally, the Commission may, on a rehearing, make 
 just such an order giving effect to its views on rehearing as it may 
 make on an original hearing. This must be held to confer upon the 
 Commission the power to fix the period during which its supplemental 
 order shall be effective as well as conferring the power to draft sup- 
 plemental orders in other particulars. 
 
 "This case was reopened on respondent's motion and it cannot 
 be heard to complain of something it initiated and requested, but had 
 this not been so, the course of this procedure works no hardship upon 
 the respondent. The original hearing involved increases in rates 
 which it was found had not been justified and the existing rates were 
 ordered to be kept in effect for a two-year period. At the expira- 
 tion of such period the formerly proposed increases do not go into 
 effect automatically. To obtain the benefit of the increases the rates 
 must be lawfully published by filing tariffs in the prescribed manner. 
 Rates so published would then be subject to suspension and investiga- 
 tion again, and this is what has happened in this case. The respond- 
 ent filed tariffs substantially republishing the rates formerly carried 
 in the tariffs originally suspended and these tariffs were protested 
 and suspended in Investigation and Suspension Dockets Nos. 625 and 
 633, which cases have been consolidated herewith." 
 
 1. Stonega Coke & Coal Co. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1916), 39 I. C. C. Rep. 523, 535. 
 
 611-Ii. Maintenance of port differentials on increased rates. 
 
 In Increased Rates, 1920, the Commission stated: "The Eastern 
 carriers express of record their willingness to preserve existing rela- 
 tionships between the rates to and from eastern ports. No objection 
 to this proposal was made. This result can be readily accomplished 
 for the reason that all rates in official classification territory between 
 the ports and points west of the Buffalo-Pittsburgh line are based 
 on the New York-Chicago rates. The base rates may be increased and 
 existing port differentials maintained. It is our view that in filing 
 the increased rates here authorized a provision of this character should 
 be made." 
 
 1. In the Matter of the Applications of Carriers in Official, Southern, and Western 
 Classification Territories for Authority to Increase Rates (Ex Parte 74) (1920), 
 5S I. C. C. Rep. 220. 253. 
 
 611-S. Increased rates of boat ijnes. 
 
 In Increased Rates, 1920 the Commission stated: "There have 
 been in this proceeding applications for increased rates by a number 
 of boat lines. The record shows that the expenses of boat lines have 
 increased in general at least in the same proportion as expenses of 
 the railroads. Authority is therefore granted to boat lines subject 
 
225 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§611 
 
 to our jurisdiction to increase their rates to the same extent as in- 
 creases are herein granted to railroads operating between the same 
 points or in the same territory. In the construction of raii-and-lake 
 rates the present parity between Chicago and Duluth should be main- 
 tained. ' ' 
 
 1. In the Matter of the Applications of Carriers in OflB.clal, Southern, and Western 
 Classification Territories for Authority to Increase Rates (Ex Parte 74) (1920), 
 5& I. C. C. Rep. 220, 253. 
 
 611-T. Increased freight rates of electric lines. 
 
 In Increased Rates, 1920'^ the Commission stated: "Petitions 
 have been filed in this proceeding by a national organization of electric 
 lines, seeking permission to increase their rates in the same propor- 
 tion as. the rates of trunk lines are advanced. The operating costs 
 of these lines have, on the whole, increased in approximately the same 
 ratio as those of steam railroads. In some instances there is com- 
 petition between the electric lines and the steam railroads. We con- 
 clude that freight rates of electric lines may be increased by the same 
 percentages as are approved herein for trunk lines in the same terri- 
 tory. This is not to be construed as an expression of disapproval of 
 increases, made or proposed in the regular manner, in the passenger 
 fares of electric lines." 
 
 1. In the Matter of the Applications of Carriers in Official, Southern, and Western 
 Classification Territories for Authority to Increase Rates (Ex Parte 74) (1920), 
 5S I. C. C. Rep. 220, 253. 
 
 611-U. Increase in minimum carload charge, minimum class scale, 
 
 AND minimum CH.4.RGE PER SHIPMENT. 
 
 In Increased Rates, 1920^ the, Commission stated: "There is now 
 in effect, with certain important exceptions, a minimum charge of 
 $15.00 per car on carload traffic, applicable to line-haul movements. 
 There are also minimum class rates in the three classification terri- 
 tories. We find on the record no explanation of the underlying basis 
 of the minimum carload charge or the minimum class scales and no 
 justification for increasing them. It is our understanding that these 
 minima were imposed as a revenue measure in connection with rates 
 substantially lower than those authorized in this report. We also find 
 that the minimum charge per shipment for less-than-carload traffic 
 should not be increased." 
 
 1. In the Matter of the Applications of Carriers in Official, Southern, and Western 
 Classification Territories for Authority to Increase Rates (Ex Parte 74) (1920), 
 58 I. C. C. Rep. 220, 254. 
 
 611-V. Increases in joint rates to and from foreign countries. 
 
 Ivdncr eased Rates, 1920^, the Commission stated: "Nothing here- 
 in should be construed as authorizing any increases in the propor- 
 tions of joint through rates to or from points in foreign countries 
 accruing in such foreign countries. The proportions of such rates 
 accruing within the United States may, however, be increased to the 
 extent herein approved for domestic rates in the same territory. ' ' 
 
 1. In the Matter of the Applications of Carriers in Official. Southern, and Western 
 Classification Territories for Authority to Increase Rates (Ex Parte 74) (1920), 
 58 I. C. C. Rep. 220, 254. 
 
§611] TKAFFIC LAW SEKVICE 226 
 
 611-W. Effectrt; date of new bates axd subsequent adjustments 
 
 UNDEE InCEEASED EaTES, 1920, COVEEED BY Ex PaETE 74. 
 
 See "Effective date of new rates and subsequent adjustments 
 under Increased Rates, 1920, covered hy Ex Parte 74," Section 603-H, 
 ante. 
 
 611-X. Inceeases in chaeges foe special seevices. 
 
 In Increased Rates, 1.930,^ the Commission stated: "The carriers' 
 original petitions asked for percentage increases in freight revenue 
 only. In their report to us, revenue for switching and certain 
 other special services is stated separately from freight revenue, and 
 therefore, accepted literally, the proposal would result in no increases 
 on switching service. However, it is conceded that the submission 
 of the proposal in this form was due to a misunderstanding, and it is 
 now proposed to apply increases to switching and other special serv- 
 ices as well as to freight rates proper. 
 
 "No substantial reasons have been developed for exempting 
 charges for switching from the general increases. It is our opinion 
 that the charges for this service should be increased, together with 
 the charges for transit, weighing, diversion, reconsignment, lighter- 
 age, floatage, storage (not ''including track storage), and transfer, 
 where the carriers provide separate charges against shippers for 
 such service. The charges for other special services are not to be 
 subject to the general increases herein authorized. The percentage 
 to apply should be determined by the percentage applicable in the 
 boundary line between two groups taking ditferent percentages the 
 higher percentage should apply. 
 
 "It should be understood that Avhere tariffs now provide for the 
 absorption by one carrier of the charges of another carrier in specific 
 amounts such absorptions should be revised in harmony with the in- 
 creases in charges being authorized." 
 
 1. In the Matter of the Applications of Carriers in Official, Southern, and Western 
 Classification Territories for Authority to Increase Rates (Ex Parte 74) (1920), 
 58 I. C. C. Rep. 220, 242, et seq. 
 
 611-Y. General inceeases in feeight bates. 
 
 The following is the opinion and conclusion of the Interstate Com- 
 merce Commission with reference to general increases in freight rates 
 considered in Ex Parte 74:^ "In their original applications the car- 
 riers proposed general percentage increases in freight rates in the 
 respective groups as follows: eastern, 30 per cent; southern 31 per 
 cent ; western, 24 per cent. 
 
 "Following such general percentage increases, they indicate their 
 willingness, where necessary, to revise rates to restore in so far as is 
 deemed practicable existing recognized relationships and differentials, 
 and as to coal and grain in certain important situations such readjust- 
 ments are proposed in this proceeding. It is stated that the percentage 
 method is not only on the whole the fairest to all interests by distribut- 
 ing the burden in proportion to the haul, but that it is the only way in 
 which the desired increased revenue may be obtained without compli- 
 
227 FREIGHT KATES AND CHA.RGES '[§611 
 
 cations and delays due to tariff difficulties and to the lack of accurate 
 statistics from which to determine the amount of revenue which may 
 reasonably be expected from flat or maximum increases on particular 
 commodities. 
 
 "It would be desirable, if it were possible, to determine definitely 
 the commodities, the sections of the country, and even the individual 
 rates which can best bear the burden of increases, and the relation- 
 ships of the rates and differentials which will be disturbed by a per- 
 centage increase. This is precluded by the necessity of prompt action 
 upon the main issues presented. 
 
 "We are of the opinion and find that the following percentage in- 
 creases in the charges for freight service, including switching and spe- 
 cial services, together with the other increases hereinbefore approved, 
 would under present conditions result in rates not unreasonable in the 
 aggregate under section 1 of the act and Avould enable the carriers in 
 the respective groups, under honest, efficient, and economical manage- 
 ment and reasonable expenditures for maintenance of way, structures 
 and equipment, to earn a,n aggregate annual railway operating income 
 equal, as nearly as may be, to a return of 5i,^ per cent upon the aggre- 
 gate value, for the purposes of this proceeding, of the railway prop- 
 erty of such carriers held for and used in the service of transportation 
 and 1/2 of 1 per cent in addition ; eastern group, 40 per cent ; southern 
 group, 25 per cent ; western group, 35 per cent ; Mountain-Pacific group, 
 25 per cent. 
 
 "In view of the different percentages of increase herein approved, 
 it becomes necessary to make provision for rates between the various 
 groups. 
 
 "(1) Where rates are constructed by the use of combinations 
 upon gateways between any two groups, the through rates should be 
 increased by applying to each factor its respective percentage. 
 
 " (2) Bates between points within a group and points on the bor- 
 der line of such group should be increased according to the percentage 
 applicable to the group. Where a river constitutes a boundary line 
 between two groups, points on both banks thereof shall be considered 
 as border-line points. 
 
 "(3) Joint or single-line through rates between points in one 
 group and points in other groups should be increased 33 1-3 per cent. 
 
 "(4) In cases where the rates over different routes between the 
 same points would, by a strict application of the varying percentages 
 of increase herein approved, be subject to different percentages, the 
 lowest percentage applicable to any of the routes may be applied in 
 the rates over all of such routes. 
 
 "In the construction of rates in accordance with these findings it 
 is not intended that the group boundaries hereinbefore designated 
 should be strictly observed, but the territorial boundaries heretofore 
 recognized should be observed. For example, Eichmond, one of the 
 so-called Virginia cities, should continue on the basis which it has 
 heretofore enjoyed. 
 
§611] TRAFFIC LAW SBEVICE 228 
 
 "The above findings apply to all steam railroads subject to our 
 jurisdiction, including so-called 'short lines,' but to railroads in 
 Alaska. 
 
 "While the New England carriers are included in the eastern 
 group and are subject to the percentage for that group, the evidence 
 as to the disproportionate needs of the New England lines makes it 
 desirable that the carriers give careful consideration to the divisions 
 of joint rates accruing to these lines." 
 
 1. Ex Parte 74: In the Matter of the Applications of Carriers in Olfieial, Southern, 
 and Western Classification Territories for Authority to Increase Rates (1920), 58 
 I. C. C. Rep. 220, 243, 246, 247. 
 
 611-Z. PeECENTAGE INCEEASES ^'EESUS flat INCBEASES and MAIHrTENANCB 
 OF DIFFEEENTIALS AND EELATIONSHIPS. 
 
 In Increased Rates, 1920, the Commission stated: "Many ship- 
 pers have directed their testimony and arguments principally to the 
 method of increasing the rates rather than to the amount of the in- 
 creases. Shippers are far from unanimous in their views and may be 
 divided into three groups: (a) those who seek the preservation of 
 existing relationships and differentials either by specific or fiat in- 
 creases or by applying the percentage increase to base rates and em- 
 ploying in connection therewith differentials from and to other points ; 
 (b) those who advocate a percentage advance in all instances, contend- 
 ing that differentials should increase in the same ratio as all other 
 rates and charges and (c) those who advocate a percentage increase 
 with a maximum. 
 
 "While established or 'differential' relationships of rates are not 
 general, there are many such adjustments ; some fixed by the carriers 
 and others by us, and it is contended by some shippers that in such 
 cases it is desirable in readjusting the rates to maintain the differ- 
 entials. 
 
 "Many relationships in cents per unit were disturbed by the in- 
 creases made by the Director General, except upon a few commodities 
 of heavy movement which were subjected to specific increases in cents 
 or dollars and cents per unit. A relatively small proportion of these 
 relationships have subsequently been restored. 
 
 "It is evident that there are many competitive situations where 
 no recognized differentials have ever existed but where nevertheless, 
 the rates have been made to reflect competitive conditions. Such sit- 
 uations greatly outnumber those where 'fixed relationships' have been 
 established. 
 
 "It is generally understood that on traffic to and from western 
 trunk line territory and the southwest, Chicago enjoyed for years a 
 'differential' of 20 cents, first class, over St. Louis. This was thought 
 to be a fixed, recognized, long-standing difference, and well entitled to 
 bear the title 'differential.' Under General Order No. 28 it was in- 
 creased to 25 cents. We are now asked on behalf of certain Chicago 
 interests not to increase this differential. In this connection it is inter- 
 esting to note that on traffic to and from the east the St. Louis rates 
 
229 FREIGHT KATES AND CHARGES [§611 
 
 are made uniformly 117 per cent of the Chicago rates, so that under 
 any general increase in rates the spread between the St. Louis rates 
 and the Chicago rates is automatically widened. In 1914 the first-class 
 rate from New York to St. Louis was 13 cents higher than to Chicago. 
 The difference is now 19 cents, although the percentage relationship is 
 the same now as it was in 1914. There is apparently no more justifica- 
 tion for maintaining Chicago's differential over St. Louis on traffic to 
 the west than for maintaining the differential of St. Louis over Chicago 
 on traffic from the east. Practically all rates in official classification 
 territory are constructed upon a percentage basis, and attention is 
 directed to the important fact that not a single interest has here 
 maintained, with the possible exception of Chicago, that we should 
 depart generally from the percentage basis which has so long pre- 
 vailed. 
 
 "In favor of maintaining differentials, it is said that they have 
 been fixed in most cases after careful investigation, and that they 
 represent the proper measure of differences in the rates; that often 
 they represent the maximum differences which will permit more 
 distant shippers to compete with those in close proximity; that to in- 
 crease rates by a percentage tends to decrease the radius in which 
 goods are marketed, and thus by lessening competition prices are 
 advances ; and that in all cases the margin of profit has not increased 
 proportionately to prices. 
 
 "Those who oppose maintaining differentials at this time con- 
 tend that the value of the dollar expressed in terms of commodities 
 shipped today is in reality but one-half its former value, and, there- 
 fore, a differential which was fixed at a given amount several years 
 ago should, to have the same economic effect, be greater today; that 
 there have bfeen general increases in the prices of practically all com- 
 modities, in wages and in the charges for nearly all service, and that 
 differentials should not be made an exception to the rule ; and that as 
 increased operating costs are the underlying reason for the proposed 
 increased rates, the additional service represented by the differential, 
 being more expensive than heretofore, should pay greater rates as well 
 as other services. 
 
 "The adoption of specific increases in cents per unit instead of 
 percentage advances will, of course, maintain existing relationships. 
 However, the carriers almost uniformly oppose this method and it is 
 not generally advocated by shippers. Further, the difficulty of its 
 adoption is apparent because of the lack of reliable statistics from 
 which to determine the probable additional revenue from a given in- 
 crease. It should also be noted that everyone who advocated this 
 method insisted that flat increases be applied but once to combina- 
 tion rates. The complicated nature of tariff publication to make such 
 an arrangement effective, when different percentages of increase are 
 being made in different groups, is apparent. 
 
 "Without attempting to pass finally upon the question whether 
 in given cases differentials should or should not be maintained, it is 
 evident that no general program of maintaining differentials can be 
 made effective coincident with the increases here approved without 
 materially delaying their effective date as definite testimony covering 
 
§611] TRAFFIC LAW SEEVICB 230 
 
 individual situation is before us in only a very few cases. To main- 
 tain differentials by applying the percentage increases to basing rates 
 and adding thereto existing differentials cannot be done without ma- 
 terially lessening the amount of additional revenue to be derived by 
 the carriers, as generally differentials are added to rather than de- 
 ducted from base rates. 
 
 "After carefully considering the situation we find that with the 
 exceptions hereinafter noted general percentage increases made to 
 fit the needs of the groups of lines serving each of the four groups must 
 be considered for present purposes the most practicable. This con- 
 clusion is without prejudice to any subsequent finding in individual 
 situations." 
 
 1. In the Matter of the Applications of Carriers in Official, Southern, and Western 
 Classification Territories for Authority to Increase Rates (1920), 58 I. C. C. Rep. 
 220, 243, et seq. 
 
 611-AA. Inckeases i:s bates on individual commodities. 
 
 In Increased Rates, 1920,^ the Commission stated: "Considera- 
 ble evidence was presented with respect to the rates upon a number 
 of individual commodities, including coal, lumber, cement, fruits and 
 vegetables, petroleum, brick, sand, gravel and rock, asphalt, slag, 
 grain, live stock, packing-house products, ore, bullion, potash, salt, 
 fertilizers, and terra cotta. 
 
 "Various issues have been raised or are presented as to these 
 commodities, the principle of which are as follows : (a) Whether there 
 should be departures from the general percentage increases by main- 
 taining differentials or by the application of specific increases instead 
 of percentages; (b) whether maximum increases should be provided 
 in order to avoid the full percentage increase upon relatively high rates 
 from distant points of production to important markets; (c) whether 
 because of the high cost of production and marketing of some com- 
 modities, the percentage increases proposed by carriers will result in a 
 cost delivered at points of market or consumption so great as to cur- 
 tail production and distribution, an undesirable situation at this time 
 of world shortage of commodities; (d) whether a more general nec- 
 essary use warrants a lower transportation charge; (e) whether the 
 rates effective June 24, 1918, before General Order No. 28 became 
 effective, should be made the basis of readjustment now by applying 
 thereto a 25 per cent increase and superimposing thereon the percen- 
 tage increases now found reasonable. Our general conclusions as to 
 the impracticability of specific increases or of attempting now to main- 
 tain differentials dispose of a number of these contentions. It should 
 also be said that while we do not here sanction specific increases in 
 lieu of percentages, we are not to be understood as expressing dis- 
 approval of increases of that character made by the Director General. 
 Such increases were made under war conditions and under circum- 
 stances that do not now exist. 
 
 "Our attention was called at the hearing to a number of formal 
 complaints now pending, and we are asked to except from the general 
 increase the rates in issue in those complaints. This would have the 
 effect, during the pendency of those proceedings, of giving the rates 
 in question a preferred standing and of exempting them from the 
 
231 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§§§611, 612, 613 
 
 general increase. In our opinion, a fairer disposition will be attained 
 ^7 applying the general increase to these rates, with the understand- 
 ing that this action is without prejudice to any future findings." 
 
 1. In- the Matter of the Applications of Carriers in Official, Southern, and Western 
 Classification Territories for Authority to Increase Rates (1920), 58 I. C. C. Rep. 
 220, 247, et seq. 
 
 612. Investigation and suspension of new rates, charges, regulations 
 
 or practices. 
 
 See "Jurisdiction of Interstate Commerce Commission over freight 
 rates and charges," Section 613, post. 
 
 613. Jurisdiction of Interstate Commerce Commission over freight 
 
 rates and charges. 
 
 613-A. Control oe the Commission over freight bates and charges 
 
 GENERALLY. 
 
 The important duties of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 
 respect to railroad rates, include the duty of inquiry as to the manage- 
 ment of the business, with the right to compel complete and full infor- 
 mation concerning it, and the duty of seeing that there is no violation 
 of the long-and-short-haul clause of the Act, or any prohibited dis- 
 crimination, rebates, or other device to give undue preference, and also 
 that the publicity required by Section 6 of the Act is observed.^ 
 
 In Advances in Rates — Western Case^ the Commission stated: 
 "It is doubtless true that in its control over the charges which our 
 railroads may make this Commission exercises a power so extensive 
 as to justify the broadest consideration of the economic and financial 
 effect of its orders. By its decisions in the Abilene Cotton Oil case, 
 and in the Illinois Central case, 215 U. S. 452, the Supreme Court has 
 erected this Commission into what has been termed 'an economic 
 court, ' or to give it a more commonplace definition, but one perhaps of 
 stricter legal analogy, a select jury to pass upon the reasonableness 
 and justness of railroad rates, rules, and practices. Within broad 
 lines of discretion the courts regard the conclusions of the Commission 
 on questions of fact as final. There is an appeal upon questions of law 
 by the carriers to the courts, but unless a constitutional guaranty is 
 violated the order of this Commission is final, provided, of course, the 
 Commission does not overstep the jurisdictional limits placed upon it 
 by the statute. And as to the shipper this tribunal is his one and only 
 resort against injustice. 
 
 "We must not regard too seriously, however, the effort of railroad 
 counsel to establish this Commission in loco parentis toward the rail- 
 roads. We must be conscious in our consideration of these rate ques- 
 tions of their effect upon the policy of the railroad and, ultimately, 
 upon the welfare of the state. This country cannot afford to have poor 
 railroads, insufficiently equipped, unsubstantially built, carelessly op- 
 erated. We need the best of service. Our railroad management should 
 be the most progressive. It should have vride latitude for experiment. 
 It should have such encouragement as would attract the imagination 
 
§613] TEAFFIC LAW SEKVICE 232 
 
 of both the engineer and the investor. Nevertheless, it is likewise to 
 be remembered that the Government has not undertaken' to become 
 the directing mind in railroad management. We are not the man- 
 agers of the railroads. And no matter what the revenue they may 
 receive there can be no control placed by us upon its expenditure, no 
 improvements directed, no economies enforced." 
 
 1. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (1897), 167 
 U. S. 479, 42 L. Ed. 243, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 896. 
 
 2. In Re Investigation of Advances in Rates by Carriers in Western Trunk Line, 
 Trans-Missouri and Illinois FreigM Committee Territories (1911), 20 I. C. O. Rep. 
 307, 317. 
 
 613-B. PowEE OF Commission to detekminte eates, and to fix maximum, 
 
 MINIMUM, OE PEBOISE BATES.. 
 
 Section 15 of the Interstate Commerce Act (as amended June 29, 
 1906, June 18, 1910, and February 28, 1920) reads as follows: 
 
 (1) That whenever, after full hearing, upon a complaint made as provided in sec- 
 tion 13 of this Act, or after full hearing under an order for investigation and hearing 
 made by the Commission on its own initiative, either in extension of any pending com- 
 plaint or without any complaint whatever, the Commission shall be of opinion that any 
 mdividual or joint rate, fare or charge whatsoever demanded, charged, or collected by 
 any common carrier or carriers subject to this Act for the transportation of persons or 
 property or for the transmission of messages as defined In the first section of this Act, 
 or that any individual or -joint classification, regulation, or practice whatsoever of 
 such carrier or carriers subject to the provisions of this Act, is or will be unjust or 
 unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential or prejudicial, or 
 otherwise in violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the Commission is hereby 
 authorized and empowered to determine and prescribe what will be the just and 
 reasonable Individual or joint rate, fare, or charge, or rates, fares, or charges, to be 
 thereafter observed in such case, or the maximum or minimum, or maximum and 
 minimum, to be charged (or, in the "case of a through route where one of the carriers 
 is a water line, the maximum rates, fares, and charges applicable thereto), and what 
 individual or joint classification, regulation, or practice is or will be just, fair, and 
 reasonable, to be thereafter followed, and to make an order that the carrier or car- 
 riers shall cease and desist from such violation to the extent to which the Commission 
 finds that the same does or will exist, and shall not thereafter publish, demand, or 
 collect any rate, fare, or charge for such transportation or transmission other than 
 the rate, fare, or charge so prescribed, or in excess of the maximum or less than the 
 minimum so prescribed, as the case may be, and shall adopt the classification and shall 
 conform to and observe the regulation or practice so prescribed. 
 
 The Commission is authorized to condemn an existing rate and 
 order a reduction of that rate, or prescribe a reasonable maximum rate 
 to be charged in the future only when, upon consideration of all the 
 facts, circumstances and conditions appearing, it is of the opinion that 
 the rate complained of is unreasonable, or unjustly discriminatory, or 
 unduly preferential or prejudicial.^ 
 
 The power of the Commission to fix minimum as well as maximum 
 rates was conferred by the Transportation Act of February 28, 1920. 
 Prior to that time the Commission had authority, when declaring a 
 given rate unlawful, to fix in its place the maximum which might be 
 charged, but not to fix the minimum. Many of the most important 
 adjudications by" the Commissions involved the rate of one to another. 
 The Commission was, therefore, unable in adjusting a rate schedule 
 for the primary purpose of eliminating discrimination, to protect aax- 
 riers involved as a whole from the impairment of their total revenue.' 
 
 1. Marshall Oil Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 210; Dallas 
 Freight Bureau v. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. (1907), 12 I. O. C. Rep. 427. 
 
 2. The more important cases in which it was held that the Commission had no au- 
 thority to prescribe a minimum rate are as follows : Kent Co. v. New York C. & H. R, 
 Kd. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 439; Coal Rates from Oak Hills, Colo, (1914), 30- 
 
233 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 I. C. C. Eep. 505, 508; Boileau v. Pittsbui-gh & L. E. Rd. Co. (1912). 24 I. C. C. Rep. 
 129, 133; Rates to or from Certain Points in the Chicago Switching District (1915), 
 34 I. C. C. Rep. 234, 241 ; Memphis Freight Bureau v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1913), 
 28 I. C. C. Rep. 543, 547. 
 
 613-C. COMMISSIOK MAT DETERMINE AND PRESCRIBE JUST AND REASONABLE 
 
 REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES. 
 
 Section 15 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act {as amended June 
 29, 1906, June 18, 1910, and February 28, 1920), provides that the 
 Commission may determine and prescribe what individual or joint 
 classification, regulation, or practice is or will be just, fair, and rea- 
 sonable, to be thereafter followed. 
 
 It may, therefore, after investigation, find a particular rate to be 
 unlawful, and prohibit the exaction of that rate.^ 
 
 The Commission has authority whenever the unreasonableness of 
 the rate is in issue.^ 
 
 Upon the most restricted interpretation of the fifteenth section of 
 the statute, the Commission has jurisdiction over any rule or regula- 
 tion affecting the rate of transportation.^ 
 
 In the Transit Case* the Commission stated: "It is impossible to 
 compare the fifteenth section as it stood prior to the amendment of 
 1906 with the same section today without reaching the conclusion that 
 it was the intention of the Congress to invest this Commission with full 
 'authority over interstate rates and all regulations or practices enter- 
 ing into those rates and determining their value and availability to 
 individuals or communities. As to^ their reasonableness or discrim- 
 inatory eifect transit privileges, and all rules or regulations in connec- 
 tion therewith, are subject to the regulating authority delegated by the 
 Congress to this Commission, and in the exercise of that authority 
 rules and regulations susceptible of possible discriminatory or other 
 unlawful application may be condemned and other rules or regulations 
 prescribed, and to this end we may require a strict accounting, not only 
 of interstate transit and nontransit tonnage, but local intrastate ton- 
 nage as well. /. C. C. v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S., 194, decided 
 April 1, 1912." 
 
 The determination of the reasonableness of the rule or regula- 
 tion of a tariff is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Interstate 
 Commerce Commission and a State court is without jurisdiction to 
 pass upon that question or even to consider it.° 
 
 1. Pennsylvania Millers' State Assn. v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. (1900), 8 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 531. 
 
 2. Porter v. St Ltouis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 1. 
 
 3. In the Matter of the Investigation into the Substitution of Tonnage at Transit 
 Points (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 340, 343; Larkin Co. v. Erie & W. Transportation 
 Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 645, 647. 
 
 4. Transit Case : In the Matter of the Investigation into the Substitution of Tonnage 
 at Transit Points (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 340, 343. 
 
 5. Southern P. Co. v. Frye & Bruhn, Inc. (Wash. 1914), 143 Pac. 153, 156. 
 
 613-D. Commission may order carriers to cease and desist from the 
 
 FULL extent op THE VIOLATIONS FOUND. 
 
 The statute empowers the Commission to make an order that the 
 carrier or carriers shall cease and desist from any violations to the 
 
■§613] TRAFFIC LAW SEBVICE 234 
 
 extent to whicli the Commission finds that the same does or will exist, 
 and to not thereafter publish, demand, or collect any rate, fare or 
 charge for such transportation other than the rate, fare, or charge so 
 prescribed, or in excess of the maximum or less than the minimum so 
 prescribed, as the case may be, and to adopt the classification and to 
 conform to and observe the regulation or practice so prescribed.' The 
 authority conferred upon the Commission by section 15 of the Act 
 to notify defendant carriers to cease and desist from violating any 
 of its provisions extends to section 1 prohibiting unjust and unreason- 
 able charges.^ 
 
 Where the Commission has determined that the rates contained 
 in an established schedule are unreasonable it has the power not only 
 to award reparation, but to command the carriers to desist from viola- 
 tion of the Act in the future, thus compelling the alteration of the old, 
 and of the filing of a new schedule of rates.* 
 
 1. Section 15 (1) Interstate Commerce Act (as mentioned June 29, 1906, June IS-, 1910, 
 and February 28, 1920.) 
 
 2. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cliicago, B. & Q. Ed. Co. (1899), 94 Fed. Rep. 
 272. 
 
 3. Texas & P. Ey. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. (1907), 204 U. S. 426, 441, 27 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 350, 51 L. Ed. 553 ; reversing, 38 Tex. Civ. App. 366, 85 S. W. 1052. 
 
 613-E. Power of Commission to investigate new bate, classification, 
 
 REGULATION OR PRACTICE. 
 
 Section 15 (7) of the Interstate Commerce Act [as amended June 
 29, 1906, June J8, 1910, and February 28, 1920) provides as follows : 
 
 Whenever there shall be filed with the Commission any schedule stating a new 
 Individual or joint rate, fare or charge, or any new individual or joint classification, or 
 any new individual or joint regulation or practice affecting any rate, fare, or charge, 
 the Commission shall have, and it is hereby given, authority, either upon complaint 
 or upon its own initiative without complaint, at once, and if it so orders without 
 answer or other formal pleading by the interested carrier or carriers, but upon reason- 
 able notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate, fare, charge, 
 classification, regulation, or practice. 
 
 It is individual rates or joint rates or charges which may be in- 
 vestigated by the Commission in the exercise of its powers under the 
 Act, and not primarily systems of rates.^ 
 
 Where new rates are filed the Commission, under section 15 of 
 the Act, is authorized, on its own initiative, to determine the propriety 
 of such new rates and, pending such determination, to suspend the 
 operation of the schedules stating such new rates.- 
 
 Where proposed rates involve increases or decreases they are 
 new rates, as to which the Commission's jurisdiction is full and' com- 
 plete under section 15 of the Act; and if rates in which no change is 
 proposed be not new rates, then they are necessarily rates "demanded, 
 charged or collected," and their investigation is proper under section 
 15.' 
 
 In Wickwire Steel Co. v. New York C. & H. R. Rd. Co.* the Com- 
 mission stated: "With the contention that an issue of discrimination 
 in the sense of preference and prejudice under section 3 of the act 
 cannot be considered in a proceeding relating to a rate increased 
 since 1910 we are unable to agree. Considering that portion of section 
 
2S5 FREIGHT BATES AND CHAEGES [§613 
 
 15 relating to new schedules, which, as already indicated, was invoked 
 by complainants in argument, it will be noticed that the act provides : 
 
 "Whenever there shall be filed with the Commission any schedule stating a new 
 individual or joint rate, fare * * * the Commission shall have, and is hereby given 
 authority, eitlier upon complaint or upon its own initiative wthout complaint * * * 
 to enter upon a hearing concerning the proprUtii of such rate, fare, charge, etc. * * * 
 
 "Surely such a term as 'propriety' does not limit the Commission 
 to considering only the reasonableness of the rate without reference 
 to other considerations entering into its propriety. This term seems 
 comprehensive enough to cover all the considerations entering into a 
 rate, such as its reasonableness per se, its relative reasonableness, or 
 its preferential or prejudicial character. Complainant's attempted 
 limitation of the meaning of the act is rested on the provision as to 
 burden of proof quoted above, which follows the portion of section 
 15 last quoted. This provision would seem to mean, both from its 
 language and from its position in the paragraph, simply that when 
 the new rate is an increased rate, as to one issue only, namely, whether 
 it is just or reasonable, the burden of proof shall be on the carrier. 
 While it may be conceded that when the rate is an increased rate this 
 particular issue is one necessarily and unavoidably a part of the 
 case, it does not follow that it must be the sole issue. Even' though the 
 Commission in the case of an increased rate alwa3's is to consider 
 whether it is just and reasonable, it is not precluded from considering 
 the rate from other viewpoints, such as that of its preferential or dis- 
 criminatory character. In view of the general import of the language 
 of the paragraph taken as a whole, to argue the contrary would seem 
 to be to torture the plain meaning of the act into a restricted sense 
 in nowise necessary inferable from its terms. ' ' 
 
 1. Lehigh Valley Bd. Co. v. United States (1913). 204 Fed. Rep. 986, .990. 
 
 2. Coal Rates from Oak Hills, Colorado (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 505, 508. 
 
 3. Switching at Galesburg, 111. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Bep. 294, 297. 
 
 4. Wickwire Steel Co. v. New York C. & H. R. Rd. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 415, 419. 
 
 613-F. Power op Commission to restrain enforcement of new rate,. 
 
 CLASSIFICATION, REGULATION OE PEACTICF. PENDING INVESTIGA- 
 TION OF THE SAME. 
 
 Provisions of the statute. 
 
 Section 15 (7) of the Interstate Commerce Act {as amended June 
 18, 1910, and February 28, 1920), reads as follows: 
 
 Whenever there shall be filed with the Commission any schedule stating a new 
 individual or joint rate, fare, or charge, or any new individual or joint classification, 
 or any new individual or joint regulation or practice affecting any rate, fare, or charge, 
 the Commission shall have, and it is hereby given, authority, 'either upon complaint or 
 upon its own initiative without complaint, at once, and if it so orders without answer 
 or other formal pleading by the interested carrier or carriers, but upon reasonable 
 notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate, fare, charge, 
 classification, regulation, or practice; and pending such hearing and the decision 
 thereon the Commission, upon filing with such schedule and delivering to the carrier 
 or carriers affected thereby a statement in writing of its reasons for such suspension, 
 may suspend the operation of such schedule and defer the use of such rate, fare, charge, 
 classification, regulation, or practice, but not for a longer period than one hundred and 
 twenty days beyond the time when it would otherwise go into effect; and after full 
 hearing, whether completed before or after the rate, fare, charge, classification, regu- 
 lation, or practice goes into effect, the Commission may make such order with ref- 
 erence thereto as would be proper in a proceeding initiated after it had become effective. 
 
§613] TEAFFIC LAW SERVICE 236 
 
 ' If any such hearing can not be concluded within the period of suspension, as above 
 stated, the Commission may extend the time of suspension for a further period not 
 exceeding thirty days, and if the proceeding has not been concluded and an order made 
 at the expiration of thirty days, the proposed change of rate, fare, charge, classifi- 
 cation, regulation, or practice shall go into effect at the end of such period," but, in 
 case of a proposed increased rate or charge for or in respect to the transportation of 
 property, the Commission may by order require the interested carrier or carriers to 
 keep accurate accoupt in detail of all amounts received by reason of such Increase, 
 specifying by whom and in whose behalf such amounts are paid, and upon completion 
 of the hearing and decision may by further order require the interested carrier or car- 
 riers to refund, with interest, to the persons in whose behalf such amounts were paid 
 such portion of such increased rates or charges as by its decision shall be found not 
 justified. 
 
 The final determination of the question of the reasonableness or 
 unreasonableness of an interstate freight rate rests with the Interstate 
 Commerce Commission, and there is no disposition on the part of the 
 court to intrude upon the jurisdiction of that tribunal.^ 
 
 The Circuit Court of the United States is without jurisdiction to 
 enjoin the filing, publication, or enforcement by a railroad company 
 of an interstate rate, on the ground that it is unreasonable or discrim- 
 inatory, in advance of action thereon by the Interstate Commerce Com- 
 mission, which is vested by the Interstate Commerce Act with exclu- 
 sive jurisdiction to determine such questions in the first instance.' 
 
 In Wickwire Steel Co. v. New York C. & H. R. Rd. Co.* the Cir- 
 cuit Court of Appeals for the second circuit held that the circuit court 
 has no jurisdiction of a suit to enjoin an advance in freight rates on a 
 commodity pursuant to a conspiracy to discriminate against certain 
 shippers, though section 9 of the Act provides that one claiming dam- 
 ages by a carrier may elect to complain to the Commission or sue in the 
 federal courts. 
 
 The Commission is not concerned with the motives of the car- 
 riers which lead to an increase in rates, provided the rates which it 
 is proposed to establish, are reasonable. It does not sit as a supreme 
 traffic manager for the railroads of the country. Consideration of 
 the policy which the railroads may pursue is not a matter delegated to 
 it so long as such policy does not infringe upon the prohibitions of 
 the law.® 
 
 Importance of the power. 
 
 One of the important additions by the Mann-EUdns Act of 1910 
 is the authority conferred upon the Commission to suspend the oper- 
 ation of proposed changes in rate schedules until the propriety and 
 reasonableness thereof may be investigated. The exercise of this 
 authority results in the elimination, in many cases, not only of the vex- 
 atious and impossible undertaking of complete or approximate rep- 
 aration for damages but of the inevitable confusion and detriment to all 
 concerned which follow the exaction for a time of unreasonable in- 
 creased rates and their subsequent condemnation.® 
 
 The provision of the Act governing the suspension of new schedules 
 gives to the Interstate Commerce Commission authority to make such 
 order in reference to a rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, 
 or practice as may be proper in a proceeding initiated after the rate, 
 fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice became effective.'^ 
 
237 FREIGHT BATES AND CHAKGES [§613 
 
 Construction of the law. 
 
 In Advances in Rates — Western Case,^ the Interstate Commerce 
 Commission made the following interesting statement: "At the 
 threshold of this inquiry we are required to give interpretation to a 
 new provision of the act to regulate commerce, which reads : 
 
 "Whenever there shall be filed with the Commission any schedule stating a new 
 individual or joint rate, fare, or charge, or any new individual or joint classification, 
 or any new individual or joint regulation or practice affecting any rate, fare, or charge, 
 the Commission shall have, and it is hereby given, authority, either upon complaint oir 
 upon its own initiative without complaint, at once, and if it so orders, without answer 
 or other formal pleading by the interested carrier or carriers, but upon reasonable 
 notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning the propriety of such rate, fare, charge, 
 classification, regulation, or practice; and pending such hearing and the decision 
 thereon the Commission upon filing with such schedule and delivering to the carrier 
 or carriers affected thereby a statement in writing of its reasons for such suspension 
 may suspend the operation of such schedule and defer the use of such rate, fare, charge, 
 classification, regulation, or practice, but not for a longer period than one hundred and 
 twenty days beyond the time when such rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or 
 practice would otherwise go into effect, and after full hearing, whether completed 
 before or after the rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice goes into 
 effect, the Commission may make such order in reference to such rate, fare, charge, 
 classification, regulation, or practice had become effective. Provided, that if any such 
 hearing cannot be concluded within the period of suspension, as above stated, the 
 Interstate Commerce Commission may, in its discretion, extend the time of suspension 
 for a further period not exceeding six months. At any hearing involving a rate in- 
 creased after January first, nineteen hundred and ten, or of a rate sought to be In- 
 creased after the passage of this act, the burden of proof to show that the Increased 
 rate or proposed increased rate is just and reasonable shall be upon the common car- 
 riers, and the Commission shall give to the hearing and decision of such questions 
 preference over all other questions pending before it and decide the same as speedily 
 as possible. 
 
 "In the last sentence of this provision it is said that the burden 
 of proof to show that 'the increased rate' or proposed rate is just and 
 reasonable shall be upon the common carrier. It is urged with much 
 force and an extensive citation of authority, that the purpose of this 
 provision was to limit the investigation of the Commission to the 
 consideration of the necessity for 'the increase in the rate.' The pur- 
 pose of Congress, it is said, was to regard all rates in effect on Jan- 
 uary 1, 1910, as the maxima, which could not be increased until it was 
 shown that there was reason and necessity for the specific increase 
 made. This would limit our investigation as to all rates increased 
 since that time to the simple question, What additional expenses have 
 attached to the movement of these articles which make proper an in- 
 crease in the rate ? 
 
 "Such a construction of the statute is suggested by decisions of 
 the English courts in interpreting the railway and canal act of 1894. 
 We think, however, it is clear from the language of that statute, as 
 well as its history, that the purpose of Congress differed from the 
 purpose of Parliament. The English law was based on a legislative 
 conclusion that existing rates were already sufficiently high and should 
 not be increased excepting as transportation costs increased. There- 
 fore, the English commission was to deal with the increase itself in 
 the rate and not with the increased rate. This distinction is funda- 
 mental in the consideration of the laws of the two Grovernments. 
 
 "The British Parliament in 1891 and 1892 passed a series of public 
 acts establishing the maximum rates and charges assessable by the 
 railway and canal companies of Great Britain and Ireland. These 
 acts became effective upon December 31, 1892. On the day immediately 
 following, viz., January 1, 1893, the carriers took advantage of- the 
 liberal scale of class rates provided for in these parliamentary acts. 
 
§613]; TEAFPIC LAW SERVICE 238 
 
 and advanced a great number of such- rates wMch were lower than the 
 maxima allowed and which had obtained for many years. The Eail- 
 way and Canal Commission was without authority to check such 
 increases and restore previously existing schedules. At once, there- 
 fore, it was perceived that the effect of the new legislation by Parlia- 
 ment under which relief had been hoped for by the shippers was to 
 place it within the power of the carriers to increase all rates up to 
 the high class rates fixed by parliamentary act. 
 
 ' ' It was to remedy this situation that the railway and canal traffic 
 act of 1894 was passed providing that 'where a railway company has 
 either alone or jointly with any other railway company or companies 
 since the last day of December, 1892, directly or indirectly increased, 
 or hereafter increase, directly or indirectly, any rate or charge, then, 
 if any complaint is made that the rate or charge is unreasonable, it 
 shall lie upon the company to prove that the increase of the rate or 
 charge is reasonable, and for that purpose it shall not be sufficient 
 to show that the rate or charge is within any limit fixed by an act of 
 Parliament or by any provisional order confirmed by act of Parliament. ' 
 
 "Lord Justice Smith gave the history of this act in the Mansion 
 House case, 9 E. & C. T. Cases, p. 58, in these words : 
 
 "What the legislature did was obvious. We know how, when the new maxima 
 came in, the companies put up their rates, and as regards many of them they put them 
 up to their maxima, and it became a question for traders and the community at large, 
 and the legislature said, when they found this had happened, we will go back two 
 years and draw a line along there and say that it is probably the proper rate two years 
 ago, which they had been charging they began putting up their rates to their maxima. 
 We will just draw a line along there, and if they have increased them since that date, 
 then we will put upon the railway company the onus of justifying that increase. That 
 Is the English of that act of Parliament, and that I have no doubt about. 
 
 ' ' The effect of this enactment was to cast, upon the railway com- 
 pany the burden of proving 'that the increase of the rate was reason- 
 able.' The act to regulate commerce, on the other hand, requires the 
 carrier to show the reasonableness of the increased rate. Under the 
 act of Parliament, the carrier is called upon to justify the difference 
 between its previously existing rate and the rate established, while 
 under the act of Congress the carrier is called upon to prove that the 
 new rate as a whole is reasonable. This distinction is clearly recog- 
 nized in the opinion of Smith, L. J., in the Mansion House Case, 9 E. 
 & C. T. Cases, at page 209, wherein it is said : 
 
 "There was an ingenious point taken by Mr. Russell, namely, that if the rate in 
 the whole was reasonable, nothing more was to be inquired into. That really whittled 
 the act of 1894 down to the procedure in vogue before 1894. The question then always 
 was whether the rate or charge was reasonable, and this act, as I read it, makes the 
 question whether the increase was fair and reasonable. 
 
 "And again, in the same case, Kay, L. J., at page 201, says: 
 
 "That is where there has been an increase. If any complaint is made that the 
 rate or charge is unreasonable it shall lie on the company to prove that the Increase, 
 not that the rate or charge, but that the increase of the rate or charge, is reasonable. 
 
 * ' And on page 200 : 
 
 "What the company is bound to prove is that the increase has been reasonable, 
 and they do not show that by merely showing that the present charge is reasonable. 
 
 "There is, however, another and broader view by which we can 
 determine the meaning of Congress. For more thaii 20 years Con- 
 gress by express statutory declaration fixed the measure of the carrier's 
 charge at ' a just and reasonable rate. ' There was no check upon the 
 
239 
 
 FREIGHT KATES AND CHAEGES [§613 
 
 initiative of the carrier. Any rate filed and published in accordance 
 with the requirements of the law was presumed to be reasonable, and 
 a direct proceeding of attack upon complaint was necessary to raise 
 before this Commission the question whether or not it conformed to the 
 standard set by the law. For a period of years the tendency of rates 
 was downward, owing in great part to active competition between the 
 carriers for traffic. Eates were made from day to day, and as between 
 one shipper and another, by means of rebates from the standard pub- 
 lished rate. This led to extreme dissatisfaction on the part of the pub- 
 lic, and to the serious injury of the roads themselves. To meet this sit- 
 uation the carriers attempted to form traffic associations by which 
 under severe penalties they were bound to each other by contract to 
 exact the published rates. Under decisions of the Supreme Court of 
 the United States, however, these alliances were declared unlawful, 
 and there then followed the development of the 'community of inter- 
 est' plan by which, through the medium of one group of financiers or 
 another, the carriers of a certain territory became harmonized. They 
 no longer competed by cutting rates, because they were subject to a 
 common control, or at least were dominated by interests that were 
 sympathetic. There resulted an era of unexampled prosperity among 
 the railroads as a whole. Net revenues increased, the stronger roads 
 of higher credit absorbed the smaller; new lines were projected by 
 the greater roads; small lines were articulated into large and con- 
 nected systems ; and with the development on the part of the carriers 
 of the advantages of concord came an evident determination not only 
 to make rates stable but if possible to bring about their increase. Ac- 
 cordingly, for several years past the brief body of protest coming from 
 shippers to this Commission has been against increases in rates, and 
 the Commission being unable to stay these increases, the shippers 
 sought from the Congress the enactment of a law by which the power 
 would be given to this Commission, when public reasons made advisable 
 such a course, to lay a restraining hand upon the power and initiative 
 which hitherto had rested with tlae carrier without limitation or con- 
 straint. 
 
 "Moreover, the Federal courts found themselves embarrassed In' 
 the appeals made to their equity powers against such increases. The 
 courts differed upon the fundamental question of jurisdiction. In the 
 cases where the courts assumed jurisdiction there resulted the greatest 
 discrimination as between individual shippers and carriers, for as to 
 some the increased rate was in effect. With such a history before it 
 Congress deemed it advisable to lodge with this Commission, which 
 alone under the Abilene case, 204 U. S. 426, has power to determine the 
 reasonableness of a rate, the power to restrain for a time an increasea 
 rate until a determination can be had as to Avhether this rate conforms 
 to the requirement of the statute or is but the evidence of the exercise 
 of an arbitrary power. 
 
 "The National Legislature has not fixed, as in England, a body 
 of maximum rates. It has not been declared that the rates of Jan- 
 uary 1, 1910, are to be regarded as either above or below the old and 
 long established standard of reasonableness. The statute contains 
 no intimation that we are to gauge an increased rate which is sus- 
 pended by any other measure than that l^y which we would gauge any 
 
§613] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 240 
 
 existing rate that might be complained of. The power to suspend 
 is ancillary to the general power of investigation, it being the mind of 
 Congress that it was a healthier and wiser policy that there should 
 be a reasonable exercise of such power of suspension than that either 
 the courts should continue to inadequately deal by injunctive process 
 with a problem the ultimate solution of which did not rest within their 
 purview, or that the shipping public should be subjected to continuing 
 instability of rates and consequent commercial disturbance. Moreover, 
 the duty having been laid upon the carriers to fix reasonable rates, it 
 was neither harsh nor oppressive to require them to make justification 
 when such rates were to be increased. 
 
 "Eegarded from this point of view, we cannot but conclude that 
 Congress did not intend to say to this Commission : The rates obtaining 
 January 1, 1910, are maxima, and if a carrier attempts to increase 
 them it must give the reason for the increase, showing what new burden 
 of transportation expenses it has suffered which justifies such increase. 
 The question before the Commission is that which would have arisen 
 had these rates gone into effect and a formal complaint been made 
 against them as unjust and unreasonable. We may establish the rates 
 proposed as reasonable, one or all of them, or reduce the proposed 
 rates. We may continue in effect the present lower rates, or we may 
 reduce the existing rates. For 'the Commission may make such order 
 in reference to such rate * * * as would be proper in a proceeding 
 initiated after the rate had become effective.' The purpose of Con- 
 gress was to give this Commission the same plenary power over in- 
 creased rates that since the enactment of the Hepburn Act it has 
 enjoyed over other rates." 
 
 When Commission will exercise the power to suspend new tariffs con- 
 taining advances in rates. 
 
 In its annual report to Congress for the year 1912, the Commission 
 stated: "In the exercise of its authority to suspend the operation of 
 new tariff schedules the Commission has not understood that it was 
 the purpose of the provision of section 15 of the act of 1910 that, as a 
 matter of course, all advances in rates should be suspended ; but upon 
 the contrary has proceeded upon the idea that it was the purpose of 
 this provision that it should exercise sound discretion in these matters. 
 Therefore, upon such preliminary consideration as it has been prac- 
 ticable to give, the Commission has undertaken to distinguish between 
 current changes in rates which might be regarded as natural and 
 normal readjustments occurring in the ordinary course of business, 
 and distinct and material advances for the definite purpose of increas- 
 ing rates; and in the latter class of cases it has undertaken to scru- 
 tinize the apparent reasons therefor and has acted in the light of 
 another provision of amended section 15, which casts upon the car- 
 riers the burden of justifying rates advanced after January 1, 1910. 
 
 "In the ordinary course of business there are made during the 
 year many thousand of changes in rates, involving slight reductions and 
 advances, to which no objection is made on the part of the shipping 
 public, and which do not seem to warrant suspension and investigation 
 by the Commission, and are therefore permitted to become effective. 
 
241 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 Generally speaking, important advances in rates are made the sub- 
 ject of protest by shippers. When such protests are received by the 
 Commission the tariffs in question are at once examined to determine 
 the amount and extent of the proposed changes, and notice of the 
 protest is sent to the interested carriers by letter, if there is time to 
 conduct the correspondence in that way; if not, the carriers are noti- 
 fied by wire of the protest and requested to state their reasons for the 
 proposed change. After an examination of the tariffs and consider- 
 ation of the matters stated in the protests from the shippers, as well 
 as of the reasons given by the carriers, the Commission determines 
 whether there is a probable cause for suspending the operation of the 
 tariff pending an investigation into the propriety of the proposed 
 advances, or whether it is proper to permit the same to become effective 
 on the date fixed by the carrier, subject to later complaint by the ship- 
 per in the usual manner. 
 
 "For. the purpose of securing the fullest possible information to 
 guide the Commission in the exercise of a sound discretion in dealing 
 with protests against proposed increases or changes in tariff schedules 
 it has given publicity to a rule to the effect that ordinarily it will not 
 suspend the operation of a new schedule in consequence of protests 
 where same are not presented, when practicable, at least 10 days 
 prior to the effective date of such schedule. This rule, however, is 
 not for the purpose of indicating that the Commission may not upon 
 its own initiative suspend the operation of new tariff schedules, even 
 without the receipt of protests, when in its judgment the ends of justice 
 seem to require it; nor has the Commission strictly enforced or ob- 
 served this rule in cases where it seemed certain that the proposed 
 changes should be suspended pending the investigation. ' '" 
 
 Sometimes the protest and request for suspension relates to re- 
 duced rates, or to a tariff which contains both increased and reduced 
 rates, the changes proposed being an effort to correct a misalignment 
 of rates. The Commission has declined to suspend proposed reduced 
 rates except in an instance where resulting undue discrimination would 
 apparently follow the establishment of those rates." 
 
 In Switching at Galeshurg, III}^ the Commission stated: "The 
 respondent raises a jurisdictional question. It refers to that portion 
 of section 15 of the act relating to the Commission's jurisdiction re- 
 garding new schedules, which reads in part as follows : 
 
 "Whenever there shaU be filed With the Commission any schedule stating a new 
 Individual or joint rate, fare, or charge, or any new individual or joint classification, 
 or any new individual or joint regulation or practice affecting any rate, fare, or 
 charge, the Commission shall have, and is hereby given, authority * * • to enter 
 upon a hearing concerning the propriety of such rate, fare, charge, classification, 
 regulation, or practice; and pending such hearing, and the decision thereon the Com- 
 mission * * * may suspend the operation of such schedule. 
 
 "Reference is also made to that portion of the same paragraph of 
 the act which provides that in a hearing involving a rate increased 
 since January 1, 1910, the burden of proof to show that the increased 
 rate is just and reasonable shall be on the common carrier. It is con- 
 tended that under these provisions the Commission was without power 
 to suspend the tariff in question for the reason, first, that it did not in- 
 crease any rates, and, secondly, that it did not state any new ' regula- 
 tion or practice affectirg any rate, fare or charge,' within the meaning 
 
§613] TKAFFIC LAW SERVICE 242 
 
 of the provision. The argument that the cancellation of the Burling- 
 ton switching rate did not increase any rates within the meaning of the 
 act is that while a shipment over the Kock Island Southern destined to 
 industries on the Burlington would, with the switching rate canceled, 
 have to pay a draying charge greater than the switching charge, such 
 a consequence would not involve an increase in 'rates' as the phrase is 
 used in the act. We are of the opinion that the question whether or 
 not the proposed schedule would effect an increase in rates is imma- 
 terial. We fail to perceive anywhere in the paragraph relating to the 
 Commission's suspension power, the material portions of which are 
 quoted above, or elsewhere in section 15, either in terms or by impli- 
 cation, any limitation of this power to rates, regulations or practices 
 effecting increases in rates. The only reference to increases is con- 
 tained in the portion of the section dealing with the burden of proof, 
 and this surely cannot have the effect of limiting the general terms of 
 the preceding portion of the section dealing with the suspension power. 
 In practice the Commission has frequently suspended schedules where 
 no increases were proposed, but where the new rates threatened to 
 create discrimination. ' ' 
 
 In Wickwire Steel Co. v. New York C. & R. R. Rd. Co}- the Com- 
 mission stated: "Passing to the practice under this section, it is the 
 fact that it is the Commission's custom to suspend new rates when it 
 appears from protest or check of the tariff's that they will create un- 
 lawful discrimination. Many tariffs have been suspended solely for 
 this reason. Some tariffs providing for reduced rates to many points 
 and not publishing a single increased rate have been suspended solely 
 upon the ground of discrimination. Moreover, the Commission has in 
 investigation and suspension proceedings decreed the cancellation of 
 suspended tariffs because the rates proposed therein were found to 
 create unjust discrimination. Jn the Matter of Advances in Charges 
 for Switching Ice at Chicago, 24 I. C. C, 660. Surely it is also open 
 to the Commission to consider as a part of the test of the propriety 
 of the new rate the circumstance that it will eliminate a discriminatioji 
 existing under the adjustment which it is to supersede. This is not to 
 say that the consideration as to whether the new rate effects or elim- 
 inates a discrimination can be urged in sole justification of the rate. 
 A new increased rate might eliminate discrimination and yet be con- 
 demned for being unreasonably high. The fact, however, that it does 
 eliminate discrimination should be given some weight in determining 
 its propriety." 
 
 In Coal Rates from Oak Hills, Colo}^ the Commission stated: 
 "Under section 15, paragraph 1, of the act, the Commission, on its 
 own initiative whenever it is of the opinion that any rates demanded, 
 charged, or collected are in any way unlawful, m&j enter upon an in- 
 vestigation, hold full hearings, and determine and prescribe just and 
 reasonable rates. Where new rates are filed the Commission, under 
 section 15, paragraph 2, is authorized by similar means to determine 
 the propriety of such new rates and, pending such determination, to 
 suspend the operation of the schedules stating such new rates. In 
 connection with the latter hearing the statute casts upon the carrier 
 the burden of justifying any increased rates. 
 
 "As has already been observed, the proposed rates include some 
 increases over and some decreases under the present rates, while in 
 
^43 FREIGHT EATES AND CHAEGES [§613 
 
 other cases tlie proposed rates are the same as the present. The 
 order herein shows plainly the intent of the Commission to enter upon 
 a hearing concerning the propriety of the increases and the lawful- 
 ness of the rates under suspension, and provides that the operation of 
 all schedules contained in the proposed tariff be suspended. Clearly, 
 when the proposed rates involve increases or decreases they are new 
 rates, and as to them the Commission's jurisdiction in this proceed- 
 ing is full and complete by virtue of the second paragraph of section 
 15. If the rates in which no change is proposed be not new rates, 
 then they are necessarily rates 'demanded, charged or collected,' and 
 their investigation in this proceeding is proper under the first para- 
 graph of section 15. And certainly there can be no doubt under the 
 second paragraph of the Commission's power to suspend in its entirety 
 the schedule stating these rates. ' ' 
 
 Detailed rules of Commission in the suspension of rates. 
 
 In Oklahoma Traffic Assn. v. Abilene & S. Ry. Co.'^* the Com- 
 mission stated: "An unsuspended tariff item modifying a suspended 
 item and published under special permission from the Commission 
 takes effect on its lawfully proposed effective date, provided that the 
 existing rates from and to the same points are properly canceled. At 
 least this was the rule prior to June 14, 1915. Our order promulgated 
 June 14, 1915, prohibits any increase in rates, fares, or charges, or any 
 change in the classification, regulation, or practice temporarily con- 
 tinued in effect by the suspension of tariffs proposing to increase exist- 
 ing rates, fares, or charges, or to alter existing classifications, regula- 
 tions, or practices. Item 2916-b in supplement No. 14 to Leland's tariff 
 I. C. C. No. 1048 was authorized only to replace item 2916-a in supple- 
 ment No. 10. Item 2916-a in supplement No. 10 was nugatory because 
 only a reissue and repetition of item 2916-a in supplement No. 9, which 
 was under suspension. The authority granted to correct item 2916-a in 
 supplement No. 1 — therefore cannot be construed as a vacation of the 
 order suspending item 9 and was therefore nugatory. It is somewhat 
 technical, perhaps, to distinguish between permission granted by the 
 Commission to correct a suspended tariff item and permission to cor- 
 rect a nugatory reissue of the same item, but the danger of inadvertent 
 vacations of suspensions of tariff items requires the observance of the 
 distinction. Our rule promulgated June 14, 1915, subsequent to the 
 transaction involved is intended to prevent just such complications as 
 are presented in these proceedings. ' ' 
 
 When rates are suspended the status quo is to he maintained. 
 
 AVhen the Commission suspends the operation of a tariff it is con- 
 templated that rates sought to be increased or otherwise changed are to 
 be continued in effect pending the investigation. In other words, it is 
 expected that the status quo would be maintained until the proposed 
 change therein can be fully investigated.^" 
 
 Commission has no power to suspend a schedule after it takes 
 effect. 
 
 The Commission is not empowered to suspend the operation of a 
 schedule after it has gone into effect.^® 
 
1^613] TKAFFIC LAW SERVICE 244 
 
 ■ Power of Commission to suspend tariff on own motion. 
 
 The Commission may upon its own motion suspend tariffs which 
 are filed with it and institute proceedings of investigation.^'' 
 
 Original exclusive jurisdiction of Interstate Comm.erce Commission 
 over suspension of a published interstate classification or rate 
 schedules. 
 
 In the case of Director General of Railroads, et al. v. Viscose Co.^^ 
 United States Supreme Court held that the Interstate Commerce Com- 
 mission must be deemed to have had initial jurisdiction, exclusive of the 
 Federal district courts, of a controversy presented by the contention of 
 a shipper that an amendment or supplement to the appropriate freight 
 tariff schedule, authorized by the Director General of Railroads, which 
 became effective after the adoption of the Transportation Act of Feb- 
 ruary 28, 1920, and by which the published classification and rates on 
 silk were cancelled and the freight classification rule amended so as to 
 include silk among the articles that would not be accepted for shipment 
 as freight, was invalid, in view of the provisions of the Interstate Com- 
 merce Act, as that statute is amended to date. Mr. Justice Clarke, in 
 delivering the opinion of the court, stated : 
 
 ' ' Silk, artificial and natural, had been accepted by the railway car- 
 riers of the country for transportation as freight for many years prior 
 to the action which gave rise to the question which the circuit court 
 of appeals for the third circuit has certified herein to this court, and it 
 had been classified in tariffs as first class. On January 21 , 1920, Walker 
 D. Hines, as Director General of Eailroads, authorized an amendment 
 or supplement to the appropriate freight tariff" schedule so as to cancel 
 the published classification and rates on such silk, and to so amend rule 
 3 of 'Consolidated Freight Classification No. 1,' as to include it among 
 the articles ' that will not be accepted for shipment, ' 
 
 ' * On the 28th of January, 1920, the supplement thus authorized was 
 ficial or fiber silk for transportation under classifications which existed 
 the 29th day of February following, and if no other action had been 
 taken the result would have been to have excluded such silks from ship- 
 ment as freight after the effective date, for after that date there would 
 not have been any published rate applicable to them. 
 
 "The appellee, the Viscose Company, is an extensive manufacturer 
 of artificial silk, 80 per cent of which 'it maintains' must be shipped as 
 freight, and, claiming that it would suffer great and irreparable damage 
 if the supplement to the tariff proposed by the appellants were allowed 
 to become effective, on February 26th, three days before it would have 
 taken effect, the company applied for and obtained a temporary, and 
 later on a permanent, injunction from the district court of the IJnited 
 Stales for the eastern district of Pennsylvania, restraining the Director 
 General of Eailroads and the other appellants : 
 
 "(1) 'From putting into effect and enforcing the provisions of 
 the said supplement No. 2 to " Consolidated Freight Classification No. 
 1," designed to cancel the existing classification of artificial silk as a 
 commodity of freight, ' and 
 
 "(2) 'From refusing to accept from the Viscose Company arti- 
 ficial or fibre silk for transportation under classifications which existed 
 
245 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 prior to the effective date of said supplement, or under such other 
 classification as may be put into effect thereafter.' 
 
 "An appeal from the district court carried the case to the circuit 
 court of appeals, which certifies to this court the question : 
 
 " 'Did the district court have jurisdiction to decide the matter 
 raised by the complainant's bill, and thereupon to annul the said action 
 of the Director General of Eailroads, and enjoin the carriers from com- 
 plying therewith?' 
 
 "Appellants contend that exclusive initial jurisdiction over the 
 controversy here involved is in the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
 and that the appellees should have applied to that tribunal for relief. 
 It is argued that the proposed supplement, striking silks from the first 
 class in the tariffs filed, was a change in classification, and that the 
 change in rule 3, adding them to the list of commodities which would 
 not be accepted for shipment as freight, was a change of regulation, 
 and that over the reasonableness of both of these the Interstate Com- 
 merce Commission is given exclusive initial jurisdiction by § § 1, 3, 6, 
 13, and 15 of the Interstate Commerce Act, (June 29, 1906, 34 Stat, at L. 
 584, chap. 3591, as amended June 18, 1910, 36 Stat, at L. 539, chap. 309, 
 Comp. Stat. § 8563, 4 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 337). 
 
 "On the other hand, it is argued by the appellees that for a com- 
 mon carrier to exclude a commodity from the tariffs and to refuse to 
 accept it for shipment is neither classification nor regulation ; and that 
 an attempt to do such a thing presents a question of law for the courts, 
 — that exclusion is not classsification nor regulation. 
 
 "Section 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act makes it the duty of all 
 carriers subject to its provisions to provide and furnish 'transportation 
 upon reasonable request therefor * * "" to establish, observe, and 
 enforce just and reasonable classifications of property for transporta- 
 tion * * * and just and reasonable regulations and practices affecting 
 classifications, rates, or tariffs * * * and all other matters relating to 
 or connected with the receiving, handling, transporting, storing, and 
 deUvery of property.' 36 Stat, at L. 539, 545, 546, chap. 309, Comp. 
 Stat. § 8563, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. pp. 351, 359. 
 
 ' ' Section 3 of the act makes it unlawful for any carrier * * * to 
 subject * * * 'any particular description of traffic to any undue or 
 unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.' 
 February 4, 1887, 24 Stat, at L. 379, 380, chap. 104, Comp. Stat. § 8565, 
 4 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d. ed. p. 379. 
 
 "Section 6 requires every carrier to print and file with the Com- 
 mission schedules in form prescribed, showing * * * the classifica- 
 tion of freight in .force * * * and any rules or regulations which in 
 any wise change, affect, or determine * * * the value of the service 
 rendered to the shipper. 34 Stat, at L. 584, 586, chap. 3591, Comp. Stat. 
 § 8569, 2 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 406. 
 
 "Section 13 gives to any person or corporation the right to apply 
 to the Commission for relief on account of 'an}i;hing done or omitted 
 to be done' by any common carrier subject to the provisions of this 
 act, 'in contravention of the provisions thereof.' 36 Stat, at L. 539, 550, 
 chap. 309, Comp. Stat. § 8581, 4 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d. ed. p. 453. 
 
§613] TRAFFIC LAW SKKVICE 246 
 
 "And § 15 declares that whenever there is filed 'a new individual or 
 joint classification, or any new individual or joint regulation or prac- 
 tice,' the Commission shall have power to suspend the operation of such 
 schedule, classification, regulation, or practice until, upon complaint or 
 upon its own initiative, an investigation shall be made, and if the pro- 
 posed classification or regulation is found to be unreasonable or other- 
 wise in violation of the act, the Commission may find what will be just 
 and reasonable in the premises, and may require the carrier thereafter 
 to conform to its finding. 36 Stat, at L. 539, 552, chap. 309, Comp. Stat. 
 '§ 8583, 4 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 458. 
 
 "The power to suspend classifications or regulations when issued 
 by the President was taken away from the Interstate Commerce Com- 
 mission by the 'Act to Provide for the Operation of Transportation 
 Systems While Under Federal Control,' etc. (March 21, 1918, 40 Stat, 
 at L. 451, 456, chap. 25, Comp. Stat. § 311 5%a, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 
 1918, p. 757) ; but the power oyer them after hearing remained, and the 
 power to suspend was restored when 'The Transportation Act, 1920,' 
 approved February 28, 1920, became effective (41 Stat, at L. 456, 487). 
 The action of the Director General of Railroads, luider consideration in 
 this case, may, therefore, be treated as if it had been taken by a carrier 
 subject to the act. 
 
 "Without more, these references to the Interstate Commerce Act 
 are sufficient to show that if the proposed change in the tariffs and in 
 the rule, which we are considering, constituted a change of classification 
 or of regulation within the meaning of the Commerce Act, there was 
 ample and specific provision made therein for dealing with the situation 
 through the Commission, — -for suspending the supplement or rule, or 
 annulling either or both if investigation proved the change to be un- 
 reasonable, and for providing for just treatment of shippers in the 
 future. Strangely enough, it is a shipper, not a carrier, which here 
 seeks to exclude the latter from this extensive jurisdiction of the Com- 
 mission. 
 
 "The certificate does not state what the purpose of the Director 
 General of Railroads was in attempting to make the proposed change, 
 but whether it was to permanently refuse to carry artificial silk as 
 freight because of its value or of the risk involved, or for any other 
 reason, or whether the action was taken to clear the way for putting 
 into effect a commodity rate higher than the first-class rate (as might 
 be done under appropriate conditions, Chamber of Commerce v. Inter- 
 national & G. N. R. Co. 32 Inters. Com. Rep. 247, 255 ; Wheeling Corru- 
 gating Co. V. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. 18 Inters. Com. Rep. 125, 126), in 
 either case it was necessary that the published classification of rates 
 should be withdrawn by change of the tariffs on file, and that notice 
 should be given, through rule or regulation, that the silk would not 
 be accepted for shipment in the future. Thus the supplement involved 
 a change in the contents of previously filed classification lists, and in a 
 rule or regulation of the carriers. 
 
 "That 'exclusion is not classification' is an arresting but illusory 
 expression. Classification in carrier rate-making practice is group- 
 ing,-— the associating in a designated list, commodities which, because 
 of their inherent quality or value, or of the risks involved in shipment, 
 or because of the manner or volume in which they are shipped or loaded, 
 
247 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 and th.e like, may justly and conveniently be given similar rates. To 
 exclude a commodity from all classes is classification of it in as real a 
 sense and with as definite an effect as to include it in any one of the 
 usual classes. To strike artificial silk from the first class and to include 
 it in the 'prohibited list,' which, for any cause, the carrier refuses to 
 accept as freight, classifies it and sets it apart in a group subject to 
 special treatment, as much as if it had been changed to the second class. 
 We cannot doubt that the 'exclusion' in this case was an attempted 
 'classification,' and that the proposed change in rule 3 was an attempted 
 change of regulation, applicable to artificial silks, and that, when chal- 
 lenged by the shipper, the reasonableness of both presented a question 
 for decision within the exclusive initial jurisdiction of the Interstate 
 Commerce Commission. 
 
 "Confirmation of this conclusion may be found in Re Lake-and- 
 Rail Butter & Egg Rates, 29 Inters. Com. Rep. 45. There carriers on 
 the Great Lakes issued a supplement to their tariffs (as was done here), 
 adding to the list of commodities which would not be accepted for ship- 
 ment, among other articles, butter, poultry, and eggs. This was de- 
 fended on the ground that such traffic required refrigeration at a cost 
 greater than it would bear. Upon complaint by shippers to the Inter- 
 state Commerce Commission that the proposed action was unreason- 
 able, the supplement was promptly suspended, and, upon full hearing, 
 it was held that the refusal to carry such commodities in the past, and 
 the attempt to fortify such refusal for the future by filing tariffs declin- 
 ing in terms to receive them, were unduly prejudical to the traffic in- 
 volved, and, the request of shippers for such transportation being held 
 reasonable, an order that it be furnished was authorized. 
 
 "The contention of the carriers, faintly made, that the common 
 law, and not the Interstate Commerce Act, furnished the measure of 
 their obligation to the public, was promptly overruled by the Commis- 
 sion, informed, as it was, by wide experience in traffilc affairs and in the 
 administration of the act. 
 
 "The importance to the commerce of the country of the exclusive 
 initial jurisdiction which Congress has committed to the Interstate 
 Commerce Commission need not be repeated and cannot be overstated 
 [Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 51, L. ed. 553, 
 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350, 9 Ann. Cas. 1075 ; Baltimore & Q, R, Co. v. United 
 States, 215 U. S. 481, 54 L. ed. 292, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 164; Morrisdale 
 Coal Co. V. Pennsylvania B. Co., 230 U. S. 304, 57 L. ed. 1494, 33 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 938; Minnesota Rate Cases {Simpson v. Shepard), 230 U. S. 
 352, 57 L. ed. 1511, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1151, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729, Ann. 
 Cas. 1916A, 18 ; Texas & P. R. Co. v. American Tie & Timber Co., 234 
 U. S. 138, 146, 58 L. ed. 1255. 1258, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 885 ; Pennsylvania 
 R. Co. V. Clark Bros. Coal Min. Co., 238 II. S. 456, 469, 59 L. ed. 1406, 
 1412, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 896; and Loomis v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 240 U. 
 S. 43, 49, 60 L. ed. 517, 519, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 228) ; and, concluding, as we 
 do, that this case falls plainly within that jurisdiction, the question 
 asked by the Circuit Court of Appeals must be answered in the negative. 
 
 "Question answered, No." 
 
 1. The Interstate Commerce Commission in proposing to Congress that legislation 
 be passed 'changing the periods for suspension of proposed new schedules of rates. 
 
§613] TEAFFIC LAW SERVICE 248 
 
 stated ; "We call attention to the advisability of changing the periods for which 
 the Commission can suspend the operation of a proposed new schedule, suggesting 
 that in lieu of the two periods now provided, the first being too short within 
 which to dispose of any important case, thus necessitating in most eases the 
 preparation and service of supplemental suspension orders, there be provided one 
 period of one year. 
 
 "If the above-mentioned change is made it should, we think, be supplemented 
 by a provision requiring the carriers to give not less than 60 days' notice of in- 
 creased rates or charges. Under such a notice those who are affected by the 
 charges would have more opportunity to ascertain accurately the effect of the 
 proposed new schedule and to determine whether or not they ought to protest 
 it; they would have more opportunity within -which to properly prepare their 
 protests and the reasons ' therefor ; the carriers would have more time within 
 which to present their • reasons in support of the proposed schedules ; and the 
 Commission would have more time within which to determine whether or not it 
 would suspend the schedules. It not infrequently happens now that schedules are 
 suspended on the strength of protests filed a short time before the schedule is to 
 become effective, and later protestant learns he was not fully Informed or advised 
 and withdraws his protest. It has been our practice, in important cases and 
 where the time before the effeptive date of the schedule permitted, to hear the 
 parties informally on the question of whether or not the schedules should be 
 suspended, but in the great majority of cases there is not time for such progeed- 
 ing." (30th Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission, 1916, p. 65.) 
 
 2. Arlington Heights Fruit Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1909), 17.5 Fed. Rep. 141, 142, re- 
 versed on other grounds and cause remanded, with directions to dismiss the suit. 
 Southern P. Co. v. Arlington Heights Fruit Co. (1911), 191 Fed. Rep. 101, 111 C. 0. 
 A. 581. 
 
 3. Columbus Iron & Steel Co. v. Kanawha & M. Ry. Co. (1910), 178 Fed. Rep. 261, 
 101 C. C. A. 621. 
 
 4. Wlickwire Steel Co. v. New York C. & H. R. Rd. Co. (1910), 181 Fed. Rep. 316, 104 
 C. C. A. 504. 
 
 5. In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates for the 
 Transportation of Coal by the Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. et al. and Their Connec- 
 tions (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 604, 612. 
 
 6. Twenty-fifth Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission (1911) ; Twenty- 
 fourth Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission (1910). The Inter- 
 state Commerce Commission in recommending to Congress that there be granted 
 to it the power to restrain advances in rates pending investigation as to their 
 reasonableness gave the following reasons as to why such authority should be 
 granted : 
 
 "Under the operation of the Interstate Commerce Act the right to initiate 
 interstate rates rests entirely with the railway, which may, by giving thirty days' 
 notice, put into effect any rate or any regulation or practice affecting a rate which 
 it sees fit The Commission is not required to approve these rates and has no 
 authority whatever to condemn them. It can only act upon a rate so established 
 by the railway in case a formal complaint is filed attacking , that rate and after 
 a full hearing. This is the express provision of the statute. 
 
 "It is certainly just that carriers should not be required to reduce their trans- 
 portation charges, nor to alter their rules or practices affecting such charges, 
 without opportvmity to be heard upon their part, for these charges are, in essence, 
 the property of the railway. It seems therefore ordinarily a just provision to 
 require that formal notice shall be given the railway, with opportunity to justify 
 its rates, before a reduction is ordered. 
 
 "When, however, the carrier advances a rate or so changes a regulation or 
 practice as to Impose upon the shipping public a higher charge or some more 
 onerous condition an entirely different question is presented. Railway rates 
 enter to a greater extent than might at first thought be supposed into the business 
 operations of this country. The contracts of the coal operator, for example, run 
 for a year, frequently for two years, and the margin of profit is such that an 
 advance in the transportation charge of no more than 5 or 10 cents per ton may con- 
 vert a profitable contract into a losing one. Engagements for the sale of grain are 
 made upon the basis of the present rate, and an advance of 1 cent per 100 pounds 
 may entail a loss la the transaction. The lumber manufacturer may arrange for 
 his season's cut upon the basis of the existing tariff, and a change may mean dis- 
 aster to his business. 
 
 "The above examples are not fancied cases. They have all been brought to 
 the attention of the Commission within the past year in such a form as to pre- 
 sent strong grounds for relief. Assuming that the advanced rate would be perfecOy 
 just in the end, it may nevertheless be entirely unjust to suffer it to go into effect 
 at the time named by the carriers. 
 
 "In the majority of instances, perhaps, advances may properly be made before 
 the reasonableness of the advanced rate has been finally passed upon by this 
 Commission; but there are also many instances where great injustice must result 
 unless matters can be kept in statu quo while proceedings are pending to test 
 the reasonableness of the advance. Where a rate has been maintained for a con- 
 siderable time and where business interests will be seriously affected by its 
 change it is no undue hardship to require the carrier to continue that rate in 
 effect until the propriety of the advance can he passed upon, and to finally make 
 he advance itself at such time as will work no unnecessary injury. Certainly 
 
249 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 there ought to be some tribunal to which shippers can appeal, with authority, It 
 such a course seems just, to prohibit the advance or the change until the general 
 question can be considered. 
 
 "At the present time it is not very clear whether such authority anywhere 
 exists. Certainly the Commission does not possess it. It cannot Itself by any 
 order restrain the advance, nor can it, apparently, apply to the courts for such 
 a restraining order unless the advance works of such a discrimination as is forbidden 
 by the so-called Elkins Act, and this is not usually true of a mere Increase in the 
 rate. In several instances courts of equity have interfered to prohibit advances 
 pending proceedlugs before the Commission. In these cases an Injunction has 
 been issued In favor of the complainants alone, so that at the present time the 
 general public is paying the advanced rate, while the complainants are being 
 charged the old rate. These Injunctions were granted upon the filing of a bond — 
 $10,000 in one case and $250,000 in the other. It is evident that the application 
 of any such practice must result in discrimination and hardship to the general 
 public. 
 
 "We therefore recommend that when an advance in rates or a change in any 
 regulation or practice is attacked by a complainant to this Commission, the Com- 
 mission shall have the power, in its discretion, after notice to and hearing of the 
 parties, to prohibit the taking eflfect of the advance or change until the matter has 
 been finally heard and determined. 
 
 "At all events Congress should definitely understand that we, under the pres- 
 ent law, are powerless to act in reference to these advances except upon the filing 
 of a formal complaint and after a full hearing of the case." (21st Annual Report 
 of Interstate Commerce Commission, 1907, p. 9.) 
 
 • * * * • 
 
 "In our last annual report attention was called to the fact that this Commis- 
 sion had no authority to restrain an advance in rates or a change in rule or 
 regulation which imposes an additional burden. Railways may establish what- 
 ever interstate rates they choose. No proceeding can be begun before this Com- 
 mission until the schedule establishing the rate has been filed. The order of the 
 Commission, when made, cannot take effect in less than thirty days. If the investi- 
 gation is to be one in reality as well as in name, if all parties are to be fully heard, 
 as they should be, several weeks, and usually several months, must elapse before 
 a conclusion resulting in an order can be reached. Meantime the rate established 
 by the carrier remains in effect. 
 
 "No carrier should be required to reduce its rates without a fair hearing; 
 neither, in our opinion, should the public be required to pay advanced rates without 
 opportunity for a fair hearing. 
 
 "For some years carriers in Ofliclal Classification territory have prohibited 
 by tariff regulation the consolidation at carload rates of shipments belonging to 
 different individuals. The Commission has recently held that this rule is unlaw- 
 ful, and has directed those carriers to remove it from their tariffs. These carriers 
 applied to the circuit court for an injunction suspending the order of the Com- 
 mission during the pendency of suit to determine its lawfulness, and such injunc- 
 tion has been granted, thus holding in statu quo conditions as they have been until 
 a final determination of the question. 
 
 "Carriers in Southern and Western Classification territory have not in the 
 past prohibited such consolidation, but transcontinental lines now file tariffs, 
 establishing January 1 this rule. The Commission is in receipt of earnest pro- 
 test from shippers against such action. It is asserted that over 80,000 shippers 
 are affected by it, and that business conditions will be seriously Interfered with. 
 There is every reason why that tariff' should not take effect until the Supreme 
 Court of the United States has passed upon the lawfulness of this regulation ; and 
 it ought not, in our opinion, be left to the grace of the carriers themselves to say 
 whether such postponement shall or shall not be granted. 
 
 "Courts have in some instances interfered by injunction to prevent such ad- 
 vances, but their jurisdiction to do so is most vigorously combatted by the rail- 
 ways. While this authority, if upheld, may prevent the exaction of unreasonable 
 rates in some cases, its exercise must, in the nature of things, result in more or less 
 confusion, and is quite likely to produce the very discriminations which the law is 
 designed to prevent. 
 
 "For example, carriers filed notice of an advance in rates on boots and shoes 
 from New England to Atlanta. Certain shippers made application to the circuit 
 court for an injunction prohibiting such advance, which was granted upon condi- 
 tion that the shippers immediately apply to the Commission for a ruling upon 
 the reasonableness of the proposed advanced rates. Thereupon the carriers, 
 understanding that they could not publish one rate and collect another, withdrew 
 their schedules, leaving in effect the old rate. Since complaint cannot be filed 
 with the Commission against a rate which is not in effect, or at least which has 
 not been duly published, it was impossible for the complainants to apply to the 
 Commission. To meet this situation the court permitted a modification of its in- 
 junction so that carriers were allowed to publish the advanced schedule, but were 
 restrained from collecting it. At the present time these carriers have established 
 one rate by their tariff and under order of court are collecting another. 
 
 "It often happens that these tariffs are joint, being concurred in by connect- 
 ing lines. The initial line is in one injunction and the delivering line in another. 
 
^613] TEAFriC LAW SERVICE 250 
 
 In a suit brought to restrain an advance the court can only act upon the carrier 
 within its jurisdiction. When a tariff has once been filed it cannot be changed 
 without the consent of all parties to it. It may happen, therefore, that the initial 
 carrier is enjoined from charging the rate named in the published schedule, while 
 the statute makes it incumbent upon the delivering carrier to collect that rate 
 under severe penalty. If the shipment is prepaid, what through rate shall the 
 initial line receive and what part of that rate can it retain? If the shipment 
 moves collect, what rate shall the delivering line insist upon and what is its divis- 
 ion of the total charge? 
 
 "As was suggested in our previous report, these injunctions frequently run 
 only in favor of the petitioners in the suit in which they are granted, and only 
 in their favor upon the giving of a bond. It results, therefore, that carriers are 
 are collecting one rate of one shipper and a different rate of another shipper for the 
 performance of the same service. It may be said that if the advanced rate is 
 sustained the petitioner will be compelled to make up the balance of his payment 
 under the bond, while if the advance is held unreasonable, the one who has paid 
 it may recover reparation. But as a practical matter, the smaller shipper who 
 cannot file the bond cannot and does not continue in business under the higher rate. 
 "It would be easy to multiply instances and illustrations showing the confusion 
 and discrimination which now exist. We renew our recommendation of one year 
 ago that this Commission be given authority to restrain the advance of a rate or 
 the change of a rule, regulation, or practice pending proceedings before it to deter- 
 mine the reasonableness of the advance or the change, and we earnestly call atten- 
 tion to the necessity for immediate action." (22d Annual Report of Interstate 
 Commerce Commission, 1908, p. 10, 11. 12.) 
 7 Rates on Lumber and Other Forest Products from Points in Arkansas and Other 
 States to Points in Iowa, Minnesota and Other States (1914). 39 I. C. 0. Rep. .371, 
 373. 
 
 8. Advances in Rates — Western Case : In Re Investigation of Advances of Rates by 
 Carriers in Western Trunk Line, Trans-Missouri, and Illinois Freight Committee 
 Territories (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 307, 310, et. seq. 
 
 9. Twenty-sixth Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission (1912). 
 
 iO. Twenty-seventh Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission (1913). 
 
 11. Switching at Galesburg, 111. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 294. 296. 
 
 12. Wickwire Steel Co. v. New York C. & H. R. Rd. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 415, 
 420. et seq; In the Matter of the Request for Suspension of Reduced Rates on 
 Packing-House Products and Fresh Meats from Fort Worth, Tex., to Mississippi 
 River Crossings and Points East Thereof (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 68, 70. 
 
 13. Coal Rates from Oak Hills. Colo. (1914), 30 1. C. C. Rep. 505, 508. 
 
 14. Oklahoma Traffic Assn. v. Abilene & S. Ry. Co. (1915), 36 I. C. C. Rep. 329, 332. 
 
 15. Lafayette Chamber of Commerce v. Alabama & V. Ry. Co. (1915), 33 I. C. C. Rep. 
 302, 303; Lumber to Texas Ports (1917), 44 I. C. C. Rep. 275. 
 
 16. Wickwire Steel Co. v. New York C. & H. R. Rd. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 415, 416. 
 
 17. New England Investigation: In the Matter of Rates, Classifications, Regulations, 
 and Practices of Carriers (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 560, 614. 
 
 18. Director General of Railroads, et al. v. Viscose Co. (1921), 65 L. Ed. 170, 254 V. S. 
 498, — Sup. Ct. Rep. — . 
 
 613-G. Time whek orders of Commission take effect. 
 
 Section 15 (2) of the Interstate Commerce x\ct (as amended June 
 29. 1906, June 18, 1910, and February 28, 1920), reads as follows: 
 
 Except as otherwise provided in this Act, all orders of the Commission, other 
 than orders for the payment of money, shall take effect within such reasonable time, 
 not less than thirty days, and shall continue in force until its further order, or for a 
 specified period of time, according as shall be prescribed in the order, unless the same 
 shall be suspended or modified or set aside by the Commission, or be suspended or set 
 aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
 
 Under the law, as it existed prior to the amendment of February 
 28, 1920, the Commission was empowered to prescribe rates for futrue 
 periods of not exceeding two years.^ 
 
 1. Pacific Coast Lumber Mfrs. Assn. v. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 
 465. 
 
 The provision of Section 15 of the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906, relating to the 
 orders of the Commission read as follows: 
 
 "'All orders of the Commission, except orders for the payment of money, shall 
 take effect within such reasonable time, not less than 30 days, and shall continue 
 
251 FKEIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 in force for such period of time, not exceeding two years, as shall be prescribed 
 in the order of the Commission unless same shall be suspended or modified or 
 set aside by the Commission, or be suspended or set aside by a court of competent 
 jurisdiction." 
 
 Under the provisions of the original act of February 4, 1887, the United States 
 Supreme Court had held that the Commission possessed no power to prescribe 
 rates for the future. The following are the controlling decisions on this sub- 
 ject: 
 
 The power of the Interstate Commerce Commission to pass upon the reason- 
 ableness of existing rates of carriers does not necessarily imply a right on the 
 part of the Commission to prescribe rates for carriers in advance of any issue 
 made in the subject, but the function of the Commission is to consider and give 
 proper weight to the facts on which the reasonableness of a rate in a given case 
 depends when such a case is presented. (Cincinnati N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission (1896), 162 U. S. 184, 40 L. Ed. 935, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 700.) 
 
 An inquiry whether rates of carriers are reasonable or not is a judicial act; 
 but to prescribe rates for the future is a legislative act. (Interstate Commerce 
 Commission V. Cincinnati N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (1897), 167 U. S. 479, 42 L. Ed. 
 243, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 896.) 
 
 Incorporating into the Interstate Commerce Act the common law obligation 
 resting upon the carrier to make all its charges reasonable and just, and directing 
 the Commission to execute and enforce the provisions of the act, do not by impli- 
 cation carry to the Commission or invest it with power to exercise the legislative 
 function of prescribing rates which shall control in the future. Section 6 of such 
 statute expressly recognizes the right of the carrier to establish, increase, or 
 reduce rates, on condition of publishing and filing them with the Commission. 
 The Interstate Commerce Commission has no power to prescribe a tariff of rates 
 which shall control in the future, and therefore cannot invoke a judgment in 
 mandamus from the courts to enforce any such tariffs by it prescribed. (Ibid.) 
 
 Congress has not conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission the 
 legislative power to prescribe rates, either maximum or minimum or absolute, 
 nor has it authorized the Commission to obtain from the courts a peremptory 
 order that in the future the railroad companies shall follow the rates which it has 
 determined to have been in the past reasonable and just. (Interstate Commerce 
 Commission v. Alabama M. Ry. Co. (1897), 168 U. S. 144, 42 L. Ed. 414, 18 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 45.) 
 
 613-H. Burden of proof as to reasonableness of increased rate on 
 
 COMMON carrier. 
 
 Section 15 (7) of the Interstate Commerce Act {as amended June 
 18, 1910) provides as follows : • 
 
 At any hearing involving a rate, fare, or charge increased after January 1, 1910, 
 or of a rate, fare or charge sought to be increased after the passage of this Act, the 
 burden of proof to show that the increased rate, fare, or charge, or proposed increased 
 rate, fare, or charge, is just and reasonable shall be upon the carrier, and the Com- 
 mission shall give to the hearing' and decision of such questions preference over all 
 other questions pending before it and decide the same as speedily as possible. 
 
 See "Burden of proof as to reasonableness of increased rates upon 
 common carrier," Section 611 -P, ante. 
 
 613-1. Primary jurisdiction of Commission to determine reasonable- 
 ness OE UNREASONABLENESS OF AN INTERSTATE RATE. 
 
 The United States Supreme Court in the case of Texas & P. Ry. 
 Co. V. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.^ decided the important question that re- 
 lief from unreasonable freight rates on interstate shipments is by 
 action before the Interstate Commerce Commission only. This was a 
 suit to obtain relief in a state court from an alleged unreasonable inter- 
 state freight rate exacted by a common carrier from a shipper. The 
 oil company alleges that the railway company has exacted from it on 
 shipments of cotton seed from various points in Louisiana to Abilene, 
 Tex., the payment of an unjust and unreasonable rate, and there were 
 averments that such rate was discriminatory, constituted undue pref- 
 erence, and amounted to charging more for a shorter than for a longer 
 
§613] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 252 
 
 haul The railway company resisted, on the ground that the shipments 
 were interstate and were covered by the Act to Kegulate Commerce. It 
 was averred that, as the rate complained of was the one fixed in the 
 rate sheets which the company had established and filed as required 
 by the act, the State court was without jurisdiction to entertain the 
 cause, and, even if such court had jurisdiction, it could not, without 
 disregarding the act, grant relief upon the basis that the established 
 rate was unreasonable when it had not been found to be so by the Inter- 
 state Commerce Commission. The averments of discrimination, undue 
 preference, and greater charge for a shorter haul than for a longer haul 
 were eliminated in the course of the trial. The judgment of the trial 
 court was for the railway company; but the Court of Civil Appeals of 
 Texas reached the conclusion that jurisdiction to grant relief existed in 
 the State Court, and that to do so was not repugnant to the Act to Regu- 
 late Commerce. 
 
 The railway company obtained writ of error to the Supreme Court 
 of the United States. The assigned errors were addressed exclusively 
 to the operation of the Act to Regulate Commerce upon the jurisdiction 
 of the courts below to entertain the controversy, and its power in 
 any event to afford relief to the oil company, based upon the alleged 
 unreasonableness of the rate under the circumstances disclosed. The 
 Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court below, and decided 
 that the shipper cannot maintain such an action without reference to 
 any previous action by the Interstate Commerce Commission, where 
 such rate has been filed with the Commission and promulgated as pro- 
 vided by the act. 
 
 The court said that the independent right of an individual orig- 
 inally to maintain action to obtain pecuniary redress for violations of 
 the act, conferred by section 9, must be confined to such wrongs as can, 
 consistently with the context of the act, be redressed without previous 
 action by the Commission, and that the provision of section 22, that 
 nothing therein "shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now 
 existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this act are 
 in addition to such remedies," cannot be. construed as continuing in 
 shippers a common-law right, the continued existence of which would 
 be absolutely inconsistent with the provisions of the statute. 
 
 In arriving at this conclusion the court said : 
 
 "If, without previous action by the Commission, power might be exerted by 
 courts and juries 'generally to determine the reasonableness of an established rate, 
 it would follow that, unless all courts reached an identical conclusion, a uniform 
 standard of rates in the future would be impossible, as the standard would fluctuate 
 and vary, dependent upon the divergent conclusions reached as to reasonableness by 
 the various courts called upon to consider the subject as an original question. In- 
 deed, the recognition of such a right is wholly inconsistent with the administrative 
 power conferred upon the Commission, and with the duty, which the statute casts 
 upon that body, of seeing to it that the statutory requirement as to uniformity and 
 equality of rates is observed. Equally obvious Is it that the existence of such a power 
 in the courts, independent of prior action by the Commission, would lead to favor- 
 itism, to the enforcement of one rate in one jurisdiction and a different one in another, 
 would destroy the prohibitions against preferences and discrimination, and afford more- 
 over, a ready means by which, through collusive proceedings, the wrongs which the 
 statute was Intended to remedy could be successfully restricted. Indeed, no reason 
 can be perceived for the enactment of the provision endowing the administrative tribunal 
 which the act created with power, on due proof, not only to award reparation to a par- 
 ticular shipper, but to command the carrier to desist from violation of the act in the 
 future, thus compelling the alteration of the old or the filing of a new schedule, con- 
 formably to the action of the Commission, if the power was left in the courts to grant 
 relief on complaint of any shipper, upon a theory that the established rate could be 
 disregarded and be treated as unreasonable, without reference to prevous action by the 
 
253 FREIGHT KATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 (Commission in the premises. This must be because, if tlie power existed in both courts 
 and the commission to originally hear complaints on this subject, there might be a di- 
 vergence between the action of the Commission and the decision of a court. In other 
 words, the established schedule might not be found reasonable by the Commission in the 
 first instance and unreasonable by a court acting originally, and thus a conflict would 
 arise which would render the enforcement of the act impossible." 
 
 A Circuit Court of the United States is without jurisdiction to 
 enjoin the filing, publication, or enforcement by a railroad company of 
 an interstate rate, on the ground that it is unreasonable or discrimina- 
 tory, in advance of action thereon by the Interstate Commerce Commis- 
 sion, which is vested by the Act to Regulate Commerce with exclusive 
 jurisdiction to determine such questions in the first instance.^ 
 
 Congress did not contemplate such a result as the vesting of admin- 
 istrative authority in the courts in the absence of a clear intention that 
 it was so intended. On the contrary, Congress has committed the 
 power and imposed the duty to ascertain facts and determine what is 
 reasonable in regard to rates and charges in view of such facts on the 
 Commission.* 
 
 The effect of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended, as con- 
 strued by the Supreme Court, is not merely to suspend the right of a 
 shipper to maintain an action at law to recover damages resulting 
 from an unreasonable rate or discriminating regulation or practice es- 
 tablished by an interstate carrier while the rate or regula.tion remains 
 in force, but to supersede such right entirely and to substitute therefor 
 the remedy provided by the Act itself; and a shipper's independent 
 right of action in a court is not revived by the abolition of the unlawful 
 rate or regulation. A party claiming to be injured by a discriminatory 
 rule for the distribution of coal cars by an interstate railroad cannot 
 maintain in a court of law an action for the recovery of damages 
 before the Interstate Commerce Commission has investigated the case, 
 and determined by its report that the rule is or was discriminatory.* 
 
 There is no necessary connection between the subjects of repar- 
 ation for unreasonable interstate freight rates charged and collected, 
 and the fixing of new and just rates for the future, as will render void 
 a reparation order of the Interstate Commerce Commission because 
 of the error, if ajiy, in omitting any concurrent provision fixing future 
 rates.^ 
 
 In Southern Express Co. v. Long^ the Circuit Court of Appeals 
 for the fifth circuit held that the allegations that the defendant com- 
 pany was carrying intrastate shipments of liquors at lower rates than 
 those charged for interstate shipments from Jacksonville, Fla., to 
 points in Georgia cannot be looked to as giving the bill equity because 
 the district court had no jurisdiction to pass on the question of rates 
 till the Interstate Commerce Commission had passed on them. 
 
 In National Pole Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.'' decided by the 
 Circuit Court of Appeals for the seventh circuit, it appeared that an 
 interstate railroad company published a tariff on poles, providing that 
 the poles might be dressed, sawed, concentrated in transit, and ship- 
 ped from origin to concentration point and then to destination at 
 through rates, which were less than the sum of the locals, but only on 
 condition that the shipping bill issued at the point of origin specified 
 the ultimate destination. This condition, having been submitted to the 
 Interstate Commerce Commission on the complaint of other shippers, 
 
§613] TEAFFIC LAW SERVICE 254 
 
 was declared void and an order passed that it should be disregarded. 
 The court held that the complainant was entitled to sue in the Federal 
 court to recover the difference in rates paid on shipments of poles on 
 which it was not accorded through rates because of the enforcement 
 of such condition prior to its being declared void by the Commission 
 without itself presenting its cause of action to the Commission and 
 obtaining a reparation order on which to sue. 
 
 The power conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission 
 by the statute to award damages to a shipper for violation of the Act 
 by an interstate carrier is not limited to cases where damages arise 
 from an excessive rate or charge, but extends to all cases where the 
 shipper's common-law remedy is abrogated, and he is required to 
 apply for redress in the first instance to the Commission, and such 
 damages may be awarded on a finding of unjust and discriminatory 
 regulations and practices in the distribution of coal cars in times of 
 shortage.^ 
 
 A consignee of property shipped in interstate commerce, cannot 
 maintain an action in the courts to recover because of excessive freight 
 charges exacted on such shipments, except for the enforcement of an 
 award of damages made by the Commission, and a court is not given 
 primary jurisdiction of such an action by the fact that the Commission, 
 on complaint of shippers, to which proceeding plaintiff was not a 
 party, has made a finding that the rate was excessive and awarded 
 damages to such shippers.^ 
 
 In an action against a telegraph conipany for an alleged negligence 
 in the transmission of a telegram, the unreasonableness of a rule as to 
 repetition of messages cannot be first considered in the district court 
 but must be first raised before the Interstate Commerce Commission.^" 
 
 Since the Interstate Commerce Commission is primarily charged 
 with the duty of passing on the validity of a contract between a railroad 
 company and a corporation operating a wharf for transferring freight 
 from cars to vessels, the Federal courts would not take jurisdiction of 
 a friendly suit by the corporation against the railroad company to 
 recover compensation under its contract which involved no actual con- 
 troversy and was brought merely to obtain a judgment which might 
 be pleaded in defense of a disapproval of the railway company's allow- 
 ance by the Commission.^^ 
 
 In Geraty v. Atlantic C. L. B.d. Co}- the court held that since, under 
 the Act to Regulate Commerce, the Commission has the primary right 
 to fix rates, the courts and a shipper as well are bound to treat rates 
 charged by carriers in interstate commerce as lawful so long as they 
 are acquiesced in by the Commission. 
 
 The acts of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the exercise of 
 its administrative functions must, in order to be effective, strictly con- 
 form to those provisions and requirements of the statutes by which its 
 authority is prescribed and defined, and this is especially true as to 
 those provisions relating to rate-making and rate-changing.^^ 
 
 Under the specific and mandatory provisions of section 6 of the 
 Interstate Commerce Act, which make it the indispensable duty of 
 an interstate railroad carrier to file and publish schedules of all rates 
 
255 FREIGHT BATES AND CHAKGES [§613 ^ 
 
 and any rules or regulations wliicli in any wise "change, affect, or de- 
 termine any part or the aggregate of such aforesaid rates," and pro- 
 hibit it from charging or receiving any greater or less or different 
 compensation than that specified in such schedules, from extending to 
 any shipper any privileges or facilities "except such as are sepcified in 
 such tariffs," and from making any change in such rates except by 
 plainly changing the schedules or filing br publishing new ones, after 
 thirty days ' notice, on the delivery of goods for carriage by a shipper, 
 he has a contract right to the rates named in the schedule at the time 
 on file and published, and to the benefit of all privileges and facilities 
 specified therein which enter into such published rates.^ ' 
 
 The Interstate Commerce Commission has no power to annul or 
 change a rate, regulation or practice established by a railroad company 
 by its filed and published schedules, except by a formal order made in 
 conformity to section 15 of the Interstate Commerce Act.^' 
 
 1. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. (1907). 204 U. S. 426. 51 L. Ed. 553, 
 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350 : reversing 38 Tex. Civ. App. 366, 85 S. W. 1052. The ease of 
 Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Cisco Oil Mills (1907), 204 TJ. S. 449, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 358, 
 51 L. Ed. 562, was decided upon substantially the same grounds as the Abilene 
 case, but the Supreme Court held further in the Cisco Oil Mills' case that inter- 
 state freight rates are established when a schedule thereof is filed by a carrier 
 with the Commission and copies are furnished by a railway company to its freight 
 otfices, although such rates may not be "posted" as required by section 6 of the Act. 
 
 2. Columbus Iron & Steel Co. v. Kanawha & M. Ry. Co. (1910), 178 Fed. Rep. 261. 
 
 3. Louisville &. X. Rd. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1910), 184 Fed. Rep. 
 118. 
 
 4. Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1910). 183 Fed. Rep. 929, 106 C. C A. 
 269. 
 
 5. Baer Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Denver & R. G. Rd. Co. (1914), 233 V. S. 479, 34 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 641. 58 L. Ed. 1055. The history of the Baer Bros, case is as follows: 
 Baer Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Missouri P. Ry. Co. (1908). 13 I. C. C. Rep. 329. 
 Reparation awarded on account of unreasonable rates collected for the transporta- 
 tion of beer from Pueblo, Colo., to Leadville, Colo., originating in St. Louis, Mo. 
 Baer Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Missouri P. Ry. C<o. (C. 0. D. Col.) (not reported.) 
 Action brought to enforce order of the Commission on award of reparation. At 
 the trial the court directed a verdict and rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. 
 Denver & R. G. Rd. Co. v. Baer Bros. Mercantile Co. (1911), 187 Fed. Rep. 485. 
 Lower court reversed. Order prescribing maximum rate for future should have 
 been entered as condition precedent to an award of reparation. Baer Bros. Mer- 
 cantile Co. v. Denver & R G. Rd. Co. (1914), 233 U. S. 479, supra. Circuit Court 
 of Appeals reversed and decision of Circuit Court affirmed. 
 
 6. Southern Express Co. v. Long (1913), 202 Fed. Rep. 462. 120 C. C. A. 568. 
 
 7. National Pole Co. v. Chicago & X. W. Ry. Co. (1914). 211 Fed. Rep. 65, 127 C. C. A. 
 561, reversing National Pole Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1912), 200 Fed. Rep. 
 185. 
 
 8. Jacoby v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1912), 200 Fed. Rep. 989. 
 
 9. Franklin v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. (1913), 203 Fed. Rep. 134. 
 
 10. Williams v. Western I'nion Telegraph Co. (1913), 203 Fed. Rep. 140. 
 
 11. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. (1913), 204 Fed. Rep. 476; 
 affirming, Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. (1915), 228 Fed. 
 Rep. 335. 
 
 12. Geratv v. AUantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1914), 211 Fed. Rep. 227; Baltimore & O. Rd. 
 Co. V." Carnegie Steel Co. (1918), 251 Fed. Rep. 682. 
 
 13. American Sugar Refining Co. v. Delaware L. & W. Ry. Co. (1913). 207 Fed. Rep. 
 733, 125 C. C. A. 251 ; reversing, American Sugar Refining Co. v. Delaware L- & 
 W. Ry. Co. (1912), 200 Fed. Rep. 652. 
 
 14. Ibid. 
 
 15. Ibid. 
 
 613-J. Finality of conclusions of Commission on questions of fact. 
 
 The courts cannot, under the guise of exerting judicial power usurp 
 merely aciministrative functions by setting aside an order of the Inter- 
 state Commerce Commission within the scope of the power delegated 
 
§613] TEAFFIC LAW SERVICE 256 
 
 to such Commission upon the ground that such power was unwisely 
 or inexpediently exercised.^ 
 
 Evidence cannot be weighed by the Supreme Court, as a matter 
 of first impression, in a suit to enforce an order of the Interstate Com- 
 merce Commission, for the purpose of ascertaining whether it estab- 
 lishes such substantial and material competition as justified a carrier in 
 concluding that dissimilarity of circumstance and condition was 
 brought about. ^ 
 
 The findings of the Interstate Commerce Commission that certain 
 through rates are unreasonable in themselves carry with them a pre- 
 sumption of correctness.* 
 
 In Advances in Rates — Western Case* the Commission stated: "It 
 is doubtless true that in its control over the charges which our railroads 
 may make this Commission exercises a power so extensive as to justify 
 the broadest consideration of the economic and financial effects of its 
 orders. By its decisions in the Abilene Cotton Oil Case, 204 U. S. 42.6, 
 and in the Illinois Central case, 215 U. S. 452, the Supreme Court has 
 erected this Commission into what has been termed 'an economic court,' 
 or to give it a more commonplace definition, but one perhaps of stricter 
 legal analogy, a select jury to pass upon the reasonableness and just- 
 ness of railroad rates, rules and practices. Within broad lines of 
 discretion the courts regard the conclusions of the Commission on 
 questions of fact as final. There is an appeal upon questions of law 
 by the carriers to the courts, but unless a constitutional guaranty is 
 violated the order of this Commission is final, provided, of course, the 
 Commission does not overstep the jurisdictional limits placed upon it 
 by the statute. And as to the shipper this tribunal is his one and only 
 resort against injustice." 
 
 1. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1910), 215 V. S. 452, 54 
 L. Ed. 280, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 155. 
 
 2. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. v. Behlmer (1900), 175 U. S. 649, 44 L. Ed. 309, 20 Sup. Ct 
 Rep. 209. 
 
 3. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1910), 218 U. S. 
 88, 54 li. Ed. 946, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 651 ; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago 
 B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1910), 54 L. Ed. 959, 218 U. S. 113, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 660. 
 
 The history of the Denver Rate case is as follows : Kindel v. New York, N. 
 H. & H. R. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 555. Carriers ordered to reduce certain 
 rates from the Missouri River, Chicago, 111. and St. Louis, Mo. to Denver, Colo., 
 and from Denver to Utah common points on the ground that the rates are un- 
 reasonable and unduly prejudicial to Denver. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. v. Inter- 
 state Commerce Commission (1909), 171 Fed. Rep. 680. Commission's order held 
 invalid on the ground that it arbitrarily created trade zones. Interstate Com- 
 merce Commission v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1911). 21S V. S. 118, supra. Com- 
 mission's order held to be valid in all respects. It did not, it was held, arbitrarily 
 create trade zones. 
 
 4. Advances in Rates — Western Case : In Re Investigation of Advances in Rates by 
 Carriers in Western Trunk Line, Trans-Missouri, and Illinois Freight Committee 
 Territories (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 307, 317. 
 
 613-K. Power of Commission to estabijsh joint hates and divisions 
 
 THEREOF. 
 
 Section 15 (3) of the Interstate Commerce Act {as amended June 
 29, 1906, June 18, 1910 and February 28, 1920) reads as follows: 
 
 The Commission may, and it shall whenever deemed by it to be necessary or 
 desirable in the public interest, after full hearing upon complaint or upon its own 
 initiative without a complaint, establish through routes, joint classifications, and joint 
 rates, fares, or charges, applicable to the transportation of passengers or property, or 
 
257 FREIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 the maxima or minima, or maxima and minima, to be cliarged (or, in the case of a 
 through route where one of the carriers is a water line, the maximum rates, fares, 
 and charges applicable thereto), and the divlsons of such rates, fares, or charges as 
 hereinafter provided, and the terms and conditions under which such through routes 
 shall be operated ; and this provision, except as herein otherwise provided, shall apply 
 when one of the carriers is a water line. 
 
 The law does not require the Commission in all cases where no 
 through routes and joint rates exist to establish them, but only em- 
 powers it to do so in proper cases with the manifest intent of giving 
 effect to the general purposes of the Act to Eegulate Commerce by 
 securing reasonable facilities to the public and preventing unreason- 
 able and unjust rates, practices and discriminations, and in the exer- 
 cise of this authority the Commission is bound by the same consider- 
 ations of justice and fairness as it is in the exercise of the rate-making 
 power in other respects. Where neither the interest of the public, 
 nor the ends of justice as between parties directly interested will be 
 prompted by the establishment of through routes and joint rates and 
 divisions thereof, a proper case for the exercise of the authority in- 
 voked has not been shown.^ 
 
 Originally the statute contained no provision permitting the es- 
 tablishment of a joint rate between two carriers by public authority, 
 and the courts held that, notwithstanding the provisions of the third 
 section, railroads were free to select their connections and to make 
 such arrangements for the handling of through business with those 
 connections as they saw fit. To make such arrangements with one rail- 
 road and exclude another was not an undue discrimination. Later the 
 act was amended so as to give this Commission authority to establish a 
 through route between points where no "reasonable and satisfactory 
 route" already existed. If a railroad has provided one satisfactory 
 route for the transaction of business either all the way by its own line 
 or by its own line in connection with some other line, this Commission 
 had no authority to establish an additional route. The manifest intent 
 of this provision was to permit a railroad to handle by such route as 
 it saw fit traffic which it could obtain, provided it offered a satisfactory 
 route and therefore protected the public interest. Still later this pro- 
 vision for joint rates was changed so as to allow the establishment be- 
 tween two points of an indefinite number of routes, but it was now 
 provided that in the establishing of a through route no railroad should 
 be required to haul traffic over less than the entire length of its line 
 unless such route was unduly circuitous. The purpose of Congress 
 here again is plain. If a railroad has traffic in its possession, it shall 
 be allowed to handle it by its own line as far as it can unless the public 
 interest will suffer thereby.- 
 
 It is competent for the Commission and the courts to deal with the 
 through rate over connecting lines, no matter how such rate may be 
 made up as between the carriers.^ 
 
 Where the division of a through rate received by an initial car- 
 rier is increased, without a corresponding decrease in the division 
 received by connecting carrier, the result being that the through rate 
 is made unreasonable, the Commission may restrain the enforcement 
 of such increase.* 
 
 While the Commission cannot compel the reduction of a joint 
 through rate unless all the carriers uniting in the rate have been made 
 
§613] TRAFFIC LAW SEBVICE 258 
 
 parties to the proceeding, it may order the initial carrier to bill the 
 merchandise in a particular class, although the connecting carrier have 
 not been joined as parties.® , 
 
 1. Loup Creek Colliery Co. v. Virginia Ry. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 471; Enter- 
 prise Transportation Co. v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 326. 
 
 2. Waverly Oil Works Co. v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 621, 629, 
 et seq. 
 
 3. Illinois C. Rd. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1907), 206 U. S. 441, 27 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 700, 51 L. Ed. 1128. 
 
 4. Ibid. 
 
 5. Hurlbut V. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1888), 2 I. C. C. Rep. 122, 2 I. C. Rep. 81. 
 
 613-L. Commission may not establish through rates in connection 
 WITH street-electric-passenger railways. 
 
 Section 15 (3) of the Interstate Commerce Act {as amended June 
 18, 1910) provides that the Commission shall not establish any through 
 route, classification, or practice, or any rate, fare, or charge, between 
 street-electric-passenger railways not engaged in the general business 
 of transporting freight in addition to their passenger and express 
 business, and railroads of a different character. 
 
 613-M. Power of Commission to establish joint rat:^s between 
 steam railways and interurban-electbic railways. 
 
 In Chicago, 0. & P. Ry. Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.^ the Com- 
 mission stated: "The defendants challenge our jurisdiction to enter 
 the order prayed for on the ground that because of the limitations in 
 franchises which, as hereinbefore explained, prevent the movement of 
 carload freight over its entire line, the complainant is not engaged in 
 the general business of transporting freight within the meaning of sec- 
 tion 15 of the act. The case of Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry. Co. v. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission, 230 IT. S. 324, is cited and relied 
 upon. That company did not hold itself out to carry freight of any 
 kind and has never engaged in the transportation of freight. It was 
 not constructed for the purpose of carrying freight, and under the 
 facts of the case the Supreme Court held that it was not engaged in 
 the general business of transporting freight as contemplaed by the act. 
 It is obvious that the case is not controlling here. The complainant is 
 engaged in transporting carload and less-than-carload freight and has 
 joint rates with certain steam roads for both intrastate and interstate 
 shipments. Our authority upon a proper showing to require the 
 establishment by steam railroads of through routes and joint rates 
 with interurban electric railroads engaged in the interstate transpor- 
 tation of freight has long been settled. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. 
 Co. V. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 13 I. C. C. 250: Chicago & Milwaukee Elec- 
 tric R. R. Co. V. 7. C. R. R. Co., 13 I. C. C. 20: St. Louis, Springfield & 
 Peoria R. R. v. P. & P. 11. Ry. Co., 26 I. C. C. 226. It is the needs of the 
 shipping and receiving public that the act was intended primarily to 
 serve ; and if a public necessity therefor is shown, our right in the case 
 to require the establishment of the through routes and joint rates 
 prayed for seems to be clear. The details with respect to equipment 
 and facilities for the interchange of traffic devolve upon the carriers 
 that are parties to the routes and rates after they are established. 
 
^59 FREIGHT BATES AND CHAKGES [§613 
 
 Flour City S. S. Co. v. Lehiffh V. R. R. Co., 24 I. C. C. 170; St. Louis, 
 Springfield & Peoria R. R. v. P. & P. U. Ry. Co., siipra.'' 
 
 1. Chicago, O. & P. Ry. Co. v. Chicago & N. Wu Ry. Co. (1915), 33 I. C. C. Rep. 573, 575. 
 
 613-N. Commission no authority to establish joint through rates 
 
 WITH independent WATER CARRIERS. 
 
 Section 15 (3) of the Interstate Commerce Act (as amended June 
 18, 1910), provides that the Commission shall not have the right to 
 establish any route, classification, or practice, or any rate, fare, or 
 charge when the transportation is wholly by water, and that any trans- 
 portation by water affected by the Act shall be subject to the laws 
 and regulations applicable to transportation by water. 
 
 In Chamber of Commerce of State of New York v. Neiv York C. & 
 H. R. Rd. Co.^ the Commission said: "We have no jurisdiction of the 
 ocean rates and must deal with this question as though the ports were 
 destinations instead of gateways. This does not mean that the car- 
 riers may not take into consideration the previous or further trans- 
 portation of the traffic on the ocean and thus differentiate it, reason- 
 ably, from domestic traffic, but the rates to and from the ports must be 
 reasonable, must be published as independent from ocean transpor- 
 tation, and are subject to all of the provisions of the act. Cosmopolitan 
 Shipping Co. v. Hamburg -American Packet Co., 13 I. C. C, 266; Ar- 
 mour Packing Co. v. U. S. 209 U. S. 56." 
 
 See "Water carriers," Section 320, ante; "Independent water 
 carriers — Inland — Ocean," Section 406, ante, and "Water Carriers — 
 Panama Canal Act," Chapter 50, post. 
 
 1. Chamber of Commerce of State of New York v. New York C. & H. R. Rd. Co. 
 (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 55, 74; aflBrmed, Louisiana Sugar Planters' Assn. y. Illinois 
 C. Rd. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 311, 319. 
 
 613-0. Power of Commission to establish joint through rates with 
 
 BELT railroad. 
 
 In St. Louis, Springfield S P. Rd. Co. v. Peoria S P. U. Ry. Co.^ 
 Mr. Commissioner Prouty, in a concurring opinion, stated: "The 
 Peoria & Pekin Union is properly a belt railroad. It was constructed 
 for the express purpose of giving main-line railroads access to the 
 various industries in and about Peoria. It has no main line, and it is 
 entirely immaterial to it by what connecting railroad the main-line 
 haul is performed. 
 
 "In my opinion the Commission may properly establish through 
 rates to and from industries upon a terminal railroad of this character. 
 Such a road obtains the full use of its property when it is allowed fair 
 compensation for the handling of business from the junction point 
 with the main line to the industry or team track. It has no terminals, 
 as that word is used in the third section, which are entitled to pro- 
 tection. 
 
 " I somewhat doubt whether in this case there is, properly speak- 
 ing, a physical connection between the lines of the complainants and 
 the defendant, since, while it is physically possible to transfer a car 
 
§613] TEAFFIC LAW BEBVICE 260 
 
 from one railroad to the other, still that cannot be done in a practical 
 way, and the connection, such as it is, seems to have beqn made with- 
 out the knowledge or consent of the defendant. 
 
 "It does appear, however, that there was formerly an entirely 
 practical physical connection at another point and that this could be 
 readily restored. Under these circumstances we may, perhaps, order 
 the through service, leaving the parties to provide the necessary con- 
 nection. At any rate it is clear to me that the defendant should be 
 required to handle the business of the complainant upon fair terms, 
 and this Commission should at least attempt to compel this. If we 
 mistake in the making of our order the defendant has ample pro- 
 tection in the courts, while if we err by denying the petition of the 
 complainants it is not clear that this error can be corrected." 
 
 1. St. Louis, S. & p. Ed. Co. v. Peoria & P. TJ. Ry. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 226, 
 238, et seq. 
 
 613-P. Commission no power to estabtjsh joint theough bates be- 
 tween POINTS IN THE UnITED StATES AND POINTS IN ADJACENT 
 FOEEIGN COUNTRIES. 
 
 In Black Horse Tobacco Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co.,^ the Commission 
 stated: "The Act to Regulate Commerce confers jurisdiction over 
 common carriers engaged in transportation of persons or property 
 from any place in the United States to an adjacent foreign country. 
 That Act further provides that 'All charges made for any service ren- 
 dered or to be rendered, in the transportation of passengers or prop- 
 erty, as aforesaid,' shall be just and reasonable. These American car- 
 riers are therefore under requirement to impose reasonable charges 
 for the transportation before us. 
 
 "If the American line saw fit, it might doubtless name a rate to the 
 Mexican border, and in that event we could deal only with the service 
 up to the Mexican line. Instead of adopting that course the American 
 carriers, in connection with the Mexican carrier, established a joint 
 charge for the entire service from the point in the United States to the 
 point in Mexico, and gave no information as to the part of that charge 
 which would accrue to the American roads. This does not relieve the 
 American carriers from obligation to impose a reasonable charge for 
 their service ; it does make it impossible for the Commission to deter- 
 mine the reasonableness of that charge, except by examining the entire 
 through rate. 
 
 "Clearly, we have no authority to establish a rate of transportation 
 in Mexico ; nor to order the maintenance of a rate for the future from 
 a point in the United States to a point in Mexico; but we may require 
 the American carriers to cease and desist from continuing to apply 
 a joint through rate or any rule, regulation, or practice in connection 
 with that joint through rate, and we may, where such rate has been 
 voluntarily maintained, inquire whether it has been reasonable, and if 
 found unreasonable, award damages in that behalf." 
 
 The Commission has no more power to require the issuance of 
 through bills of lading to foreign destinations than it has to establish 
 through routes or rates to such destinations, but it does have power 
 
261 FEEIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 to remove unjust discriminations and may require the discontinuance 
 of practices which create such discriminations. - 
 
 In Rates on High Explosives to Grand Trunk Railway System 
 Stations^ the Commission said: "A sharp issue is made on behalf of 
 the Grand Trunk Railway of Canada, the Canadian member of the 
 Grand Trunk System, as to the legal power of this Commission to 
 require it to continue to participate in this traffic under the present 
 joint rates. Its rails lie within the Dominion of Canada, and its cor- 
 porate life and operation as a railroad are carried on under the au- 
 thority of the laws of Canada. It is contended, therefore, that this 
 Commission has no authority to require the Grand Trunk Railway 
 of Canada without its consent either to establish or to continue to 
 maintain joint arrangements with our domestic carriers for the through 
 movement of any traffic, and especially for the carriage of dynamite 
 and other high explosives. The Canadian Commission in dealing 
 with movements from the United States into Canada has recently held 
 that the only practicable course for that Commission was not to inter- 
 fere with the rates published by carriers within the jurisdiction of 
 this Commission, and that upon a parity of reasoning our jurisdiction 
 should be similarly limited with respect to rates published by Ca- 
 nadian carriers for movements into the United States. Some such un- 
 derstanding as between the two regulating bodies is desirable, and in 
 International Paper Co. v. D. & U. Co., 33 I. C. C. 270, as well as in 
 other cases, this Commission has announced the same principle as a 
 reasonable working basis in dealing with such, traffic. It is there said 
 (p. 274) : 
 
 "The Canadian board has held that It should not consider the reasonableness of 
 joint rates from points in the United States to points In Canada, published by United 
 States carriers and concurred in by Canadian carriers. It has taken the position that 
 this Commission, having jurisdiction over the carriers primarily responsible for the 
 making and publication of such rates, is the proper tribunal to consider the reason- 
 ableness thereof. Continental Prairie & Winnipeg Oil Co. v. C. P. Ey. Co., 13 Can. Ry. 
 Cas. 156 ; C. N. Ry. Co. v G. T. Ry. Co., 10 Can. Ry. Cas. 139. 
 
 "We added that, in view of the careful investigation that had 
 been made by the Canadian Commission, we would not require the car- 
 riers subject to our jurisdiction to withdraw their concurrences in the 
 rates there under consideration, namely, from points in the Dominion 
 of Canada to points in the state of New York. 
 
 "In the case before us here, however, we are called upon to con- 
 sider the rights of shippers with respect to rates for the movement of 
 traffic, not to or from points in Canada, but from a point in the United 
 States through Canada to another point in the United States. While 
 our powers respecting the through charges on such traffic seem not to 
 have been considered in any previous formal proceeding before us, 
 we had been under the impression that section 1 of the act imposes 
 upon all the carriers participating in such traffic some control with 
 respect to their charges for the service and particularly when the 
 charges take the form of joint through rates. Such joint rates obvi- 
 ously are not under the control of the Canadian Commission, and, 
 under the principle referred to in the cases last cited, seem necessarily 
 to fall within our jurisdiction. 
 
 "It is doubtless true that this Commission could not require a 
 Canadian line not engaged in such traffic to accept shipments against 
 its will or in violation of any Canadian policy or other lawful regula- 
 
§613] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 262 
 
 tiom. But the Grand Trunk Railway of Canada does not propose to 
 retire from traffic between domestic points in this country that may 
 move over its rails. It does not propose even to retire from the 
 traffic in high explosives between such points; on the contrary, as 
 heretofore stated, we gather from the record that it proposes to con- 
 tinue to participate in the movement of high explosives from points 
 in the United States to other points in the United States. It will 
 continue to accept through billing on such traffic, so far as this record 
 advises us, even if the joint through rates are permitted to be can- 
 celed; but the policy announced by it is simply that it no longer 
 desires to maintain joint rates on such commodities and hereafter will 
 apply its materially higher local rates on all such through shipments. 
 While proposing to continue in general traffic between our domestic 
 points and in the movement of high explosives, the Grand Trunk Rail- 
 way • of Canada nevertheless denies that this Commission has any 
 power to review or control its course in the premises with respect to 
 the matter of its rates for the through movement. 
 
 "There may be that limitation upon our powers respecting the 
 rates and practices of carriers moving traffic between domestic points 
 over intermediate Canadian rails. But obviously no definite ruling 
 upon questions involving a possible conflict of authority as between 
 the rate-regulating bodies of this country and of Canada should be 
 announced in such a case as this and upon such a record and without 
 the most ample consideration of the matter in all its phases. We 
 shall therefore express no final conclusions at this time respecting the 
 questions of our jurisdiction and the application of our act under the 
 terms of section 1 to the rates and practises of the carriers moving 
 traffic between domestic points over intermediate Canadian rails. The. 
 domestic member of the Grand Trunk system is clearly subject to all 
 the provisions of our act, both in the matter of its rates and routes, 
 and under our law, may- inaugurate no such policy with respect to 
 this particular traffic that has been announced hy the Canadian mem- 
 ber of that system. The points in Michigan on the rails of the domes- 
 tic member of the system may be reached over reasonably convenient 
 routes, lying wholly within the United Statess ; and a number of the 
 carriers operating south of the lakes in our own territory are parties to 
 the tariffs in question. The protestants are entitled to through routes 
 and reasonable joint rates on this traffic to such destinations, and we 
 shall expect the respondents to withdraw the tariffs under suspension 
 until such routes have been established over the rails of our own lines 
 at the through rates now in effect in connection with the Grand Trunk 
 system. In such rates and routes to local points on its rails the Grand 
 Trunk Western, Railway will be expected to join." 
 
 The extent of the Commission's jurisdiction in connection with the 
 transportation to or from an adjacent foreign country is over that 
 portion of the transportation within the confines of the United States. 
 The Commission cannot prescribe joint through rates from points in 
 an adjacent or nonadjacent foreign country to points in the United 
 States, but it can control the charges for that portion of the service 
 rendered by the carriers in the United States.* 
 
 1. Black Horse Tobacco Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1910), 17 I. C. C. Rep. .5.SS. 
 
 2. Arkansas Pass Channel & Dock Co. v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 I. 
 C. C. Rep. 403, 415. 
 
263 FREIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 3. Kates on High Explosives to Grand Trunk Railway System Stations (1915), 33 
 I. C. C. Rep. 567, 568, et seq; Carey Mfg. Co. t. Grand Trunk W. Ry. Co. (1915), 
 36 I. C. C. Rep. 203. 
 
 4. Carlowitz & Co. v. Canadian P. Ry. Co. (1917), 46 I. C. C. Rep. 290, 292; citing. 
 International Paper Co. v. Delaware & H. Co. (1915), 33 I. C. C. Rep. 270 and 
 Carey Mfg. Co. v. Grand Trunk W. Ry. Co. (1915), 36 I. C. C. Rep. 203; Good v. 
 Great N. Ry. Co. (1918), 48 I. C. C. Rep. 435. 
 
 613-Q. Power of Commissjox to establish joint through rates is 
 
 DISCRETIONARY WITH THAT BODY AND NOT REVIEWABLE BY THE 
 COURTS. 
 
 The power conferred on the Interstate Commerce Commission by 
 section 15 of the Act to establish joint rates, is discretionary, and its 
 refusal to establish such a rate is within its discretion and not review- 
 able by the court. ^ 
 
 1. Crane Iron Works v. Vnited States (1912). 209 Fed. Rep. 238; Crane Rd. Co. v. 
 Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 24S. Held, That complainant is 
 not entitled to the establishment of through routes and joint rates with defendant 
 on the ground, among others, that it is not shown that the complainant is a 
 common carrier. Complaint dismissed. Crane Iron Works v. Central R. R. of N. J. 
 (1910), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 514. Complainant seeking establishment of through routes 
 and joint rates in connection with the Crane Rd. Co. (an industrial road performing 
 a plant facility service), dismissed. Crane Iron Works v. Interstate Commerce 
 Commission (Sup. Ct. D. C.) (1911) not reported. Petition for mandamus to com- 
 pel Commission to grant relief asked. Suit discontinued upon motion of plaintiff's 
 attorhey. Crane Iron Works v. United States (1912), 209 Fed. Rep. 238. Commerce 
 Court held Commission's order of dismissal to be valid on the ground that Com- 
 mission is vested, by section 15, with discretion in the matter of establishing joint 
 through route and that the refusal of the Commission to establish such a route in 
 this case was a lawful and proper exercise of that discretion. Crane Iron Woi-ks v. 
 United States (Commerce Court No. 55) (1912). Following Procter & Gamble Co. 
 V. United States, (1912), 225 U. S. 282, 56 L. Ed. 1091, 32 Sup. Ct Rep. 76, to the 
 effect that a denial of relief by the Commission is not an order of which the Com- 
 merce Court had jurisdiction, case dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 
 
 613-R. Commission may establish joint through bate if discrimina- 
 tion IS FOUND TO EXIST. 
 
 In St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. United States,^ the petitioners operate 
 railroads extending into the yellow pine lumber district lying west of 
 the Mississippi and south of the Rock Island line from Memphis to 
 Little Rock and make a blanket rate on lumber from such territory to 
 Cairo, 111., of 16 cents per 100 pounds, and to Paducah, Ky., about 40 
 miles east of Cairo on the Ohio, of 22 cents. The two cities are com- 
 petitors in the manufacture and sale of lumber and its products. None 
 of petitioners reach Paducah with their own lines, but two of them 
 reach Cairo by lines crossing the Mississippi a few miles above, and 
 the Paducah rate is based on the rate to Cairo with the local rate from 
 there to Paducah added. All of petitioners can reach both Cairo and 
 Paducah through connecting lines by way of Memphis by a shorter 
 route, that to Paducah being shorter than that to Cairo, but in order 
 to do so some of them, especially those whose lines reach Cairo, would 
 have a much shorter haul on their own lines. The rate to Cairo is 
 reasonable. Held, That a finding by the Interstate Commerce Commis- 
 sion that the rate to Paducah is unjustly discriminatory against that 
 point and in favor of Cairo was sustained by the facts, and that an 
 order based thereon requiring petitioners and their connecting^ lines 
 to establish through routes and joint rates to Paducah not higher than 
 those now charged to Cairo, by way of Memphis or Cairo in the alter- 
 native, was within the powers of the Commission; that under the 
 
§613] TBArFIC LAW SERVICE -264 
 
 Interstate Commerce Act, which authorized the Interstate Commerce 
 Commission to correct unjust practices, and also provides that the 
 Commission may, after hearing, with or without a complaint, establish 
 through routes and joint rates does not depend upon the finding that 
 all of the carriers affected have been guilty of unjust discrimination, 
 but such power may be exercised if discrimination in fact existed ; that 
 an order of the Interstate Commission requiring the establishment of 
 a through route and joint rates is not invalid, as beyond its powers, 
 because it compels some of the carriers affected, which do not reach the 
 terminal point with their own lines, to accept a shorter haul, or in the 
 alternative to make a reduction in their rate to another connecting point 
 which in itself is reasonable. 
 
 1. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. United States (1916), 234 Fed. Rep. 668. 
 613-S. Commission may oedee maintenance of joint through rate 
 
 WHEN its cancellation WHjL RESULT IN HIGHEE CHARGE 
 BASED UPON combination OF LOCALS. 
 
 Where the withdrawal of the through jates, leaving in operation 
 the lowest combination of local rates, would increase the charges on 
 a particular commodity moving over that route, the carriers wQre under 
 the burden of justifying their course and of showing that the resulting 
 charges would be just and reasonable. Where, therefore, the Commis- 
 sion finds the rates in excess of those now in effect would be unjust 
 and unreasonable, it will require the defendant carriers to maintain the 
 present through routes and joint rates between the points in question.^ 
 
 1. In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Car- 
 riers for the Transportation of Soft Coal from Illinois Mines to Stations on the 
 St. Louis & Hannibal Railway (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 518. See Pine Bluff Traffic 
 Bureau v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1915), 37 I. C. C. ReFP2lS. 
 
 613-T. Power or Commission to relieve from the operation of the 
 
 LONG-AND-SHORT-HAUL CLAUSE. 
 
 See "Fourth Section of the Interstate Commerce Act — Long-and- 
 Short-Eaul Clause — Fourth-Section Applications," Chapter 7, post. 
 613-U. Commission may make order prescribing the same rate for 
 
 similar service to other shippers. ' 
 
 It is one of the primary purposes of the Interstate Commerce Law 
 to remove discriminations in rates; and under the broad power con- 
 ferred on the Interstate Commerce Commission "to execute and enforce 
 the provisions of this Act ' ' and ' ' to make an order that the carrier shall 
 cease and desist from such violation to the extent to which the Com- 
 mission find the same to exist, ' ' where it has found that discrimination 
 exists against a shipper or commodity, it may prescribe a reasonable 
 rate, and that the charge shall be the same as that for a similar service 
 to other shippers or on another similar commodity, instead of fixing an 
 absolute maximum rate, which would enable the carrier to continue 
 the discrimination by reducing the rate to the shippers or on the other 
 commodity.^ 
 
 1. New York C. & H. H. Rd. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1909), 168 Fed. 
 Rep. 131. . 
 
265 FKEIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 613-V. Commission no power to advance rates to temporarily improve 
 
 BUSINESS conditions. 
 
 In Advance in Rates — Eastern Case,^ the Commission stated: 
 "This Commission must stand for the entire public, including the rail- 
 ways. It cannot accede to the mere wish of any class ; it must recognize 
 the just demands of all classes; and it must have in mind those who 
 do jiot appear as well as those who are presented before it. 
 
 "A somewhat different question is presented by those who urge 
 that to permit these advances in freight rates would immediately stim- 
 ulate all kinds of business. The assumption appears to be that busi- 
 ness conditions are unsatisfactory, and that some special effort is 
 necessary to restore satisfactory conditions. 
 
 ' ' Next to agriculture our railroads are the greatest single industry. 
 In their ordinary maintenance and operation great numbers of labor- 
 ers and vast quantities of supplies are used. Eailroad extension would 
 mean the employment of additional laborers and the purchase of addi- 
 tional material and equipment. Now, the thought seems to be that 
 to permit these advances would induce larger expenditures in the main- 
 tenance of our present roads, and would lead to extensions and im- 
 provements which would in turn employ additional labor, put into 
 cirulation additional money, and thereby improve general business 
 conditions. 
 
 "So far as such expenditures are legitimate, they ought to be en- 
 couraged. Our railroads should be kept in a high state of efficiency, 
 and railroad charges should be sufficient to permit this. Necessary 
 extensions and improvements should be made, and the treatment of 
 our railroads by the public should be such as would inspire that con- 
 fidence in the investing public necessary to obtain the funds for such 
 additions. But to the extent that an artificial impetus might be given to 
 railroad building and kindred industries, the effect would be in the end 
 baneful, even though the temporary result might seem beneficial. 
 
 "It appeared upon this hearing that the freight tonnage of 1907 
 was larger than ever before, that this led to an unprecedented demand 
 for railway equipment and railway supplies and that factories were 
 then provided to meet this demand, which cannot now be fully utilized. 
 It was admitted by the representatives of supply houses that the pro- 
 ductive capacity for railway equipment and supplies much exceeded 
 that required for the ordinary upkeep of our railways, and that these 
 facilities could only be utilized to their full and most profitable extent 
 in case additional railroads were constructed and additional equip- 
 ment required. We ought not to impose upon the public rates, other- 
 wise unreasonable, for the mere purpose of temporarily providing 
 business for these factories, even though the effect might be to stim- 
 ulate, for the time being, other kinds of industry. 
 
 "Just and reasonable rates should be allowed, but we should not 
 be justified in permanently imposing rates unduly high in order that 
 business conditions might be temporarily improved." 
 
 1 Advances in Rates— Eastern Case: In Ke Investigation of Advances in Rates by 
 ' Carriers in Official Classification Territory (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 243, 250, et seq. 
 
§613] TRAFFIC LAW SBKVICE 266 
 
 613-W. POWEK OF COMMISSIOK TO CONSIDER EFFECT ON THE BUSINESS OF 
 AN INDUSTRY IN ADVANCING RATES. 
 
 The Interstate Commerce Commission cannot be said to have or- 
 dered a reduction in the rates on lumber because of the effect upon 
 the lumber industry of the carriers' action in advancing the rates, 
 where, although the Commission considered that subject, its opinion, 
 taken as a whole, affirmatively shows that it confined itself to the 
 exercise of its statutory power to condemn unjust and unreasonable 
 rates and fix reasonable ones.^ 
 
 1. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union P. Rd. Co. (1912), 222 V. S. 541, 56 
 L. Ed. 308, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 108. 
 
 613-X. Determination of nature of commodity is a judicial question. 
 
 What rate shall be established for the hauling of a specified com- 
 modity is an administrative or legal question, and therefore properly 
 determined by the Commission ; what a given commodity is is a judicial 
 question, over which, obviously, the Commission has no jurisdiction.^ 
 
 In Lahewood Engineering Co. v. Neiv York C. Rd. Co.- the Circuit 
 Court of Appeals, sixth circuit, per Mr. Circuit Judge Denison, stated : 
 "A duly published tariff, in many respects, approximates a statute. 
 Parties have no power to vary it by their express contract, much less 
 merely by those implications arising from their conduct. Severe pen- 
 alties are provided for its infraction or for any differential treatment 
 of different shippers; and it cannot be permitted that the conduct of 
 the railroad, by different agents at different times, should cause a 
 tariff to mean one thing for one shipper and a different thing for 
 another. We have no occasion to deny that there may be cases of 
 ambiguity where a general or universal course of conduct may support 
 one or the other construction ; but in this case we think it the duty of 
 the court to ascertain and declare the true respective meanings of these 
 two tariffs as applied to the article here shipped. ' ' 
 
 1. In Re Independent Sewer Pipe Co. (1918), 248 Fed. Rep. 547, 554. 
 
 2. Lakewood Engineering Co. v. New York C. Rd. Co. (1919), 259 Fed. Rep. 61, 61, 
 170 C. C. A. 121. Case dismissed. Lakewood Engineering Co. t. New York C. Rd. 
 Co. (1920), 254 I'. S. 661, 65 L. Ed. 126, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 60. 
 
 613-Y. Jurisdiction of Commission over railway-mail pay. 
 
 Since 1873 rates for mail transportation have been prescribed by 
 Congress. On July 28, 1916, Congress enacted a law under which the 
 control of rates, charges, and the methods for the determination of 
 the same covering railway mail was transferred to the -Interstate 
 Commerce Commission.^ 
 
 1. Railway-Mail-Service Pa.v Act (Jul.v 28, 1916),. 39 Stat. L. 425. For a history of 
 railway-mail pay legislation, see Proceeding No. 9200 before Interstate Commerce 
 Commission, Railway-Mail Pay (1919), 56 I. C. C. Rep. 1. 
 
 613-Z. Commission no power to fix rates except upon traffic con- 
 siderations. 
 
 In Atchison, T. & 8. F. By. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commis- 
 sion^ the Commerce Court stated : "Authority granted it (the Commis- 
 
267 
 
 FREIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 sion) under section 15 of the Act to Regulate Commerce to prescribe 
 reasonable rates when it shall be of the opinion that the rates fixed by 
 the carrier are unreasonable does not confer absolute or arbitrary 
 power to act on any consideration which the Commission may deem best 
 for the public, the shipper and the carrier. Its order must be based on 
 transportation considerations. While it may give weight to all factors 
 bearing either on the cost of the value of the transportation services, it 
 must disregard as well the demand of the shipper for protection from 
 legitimate competition, domestic or foreign, for unlimited markets, or 
 for the enforcement of equitable estoppels arising from a justifiable 
 expectation that past rates will be maintained, as the demand of the 
 carrier for the maximum rate under which the traffic will move freely." 
 
 It is one thing for carriers to voluntarily reduce rates not exces- 
 sive for the service performed, solely to meet competitive conditions, 
 but it is quite a different thing for the Commission to undertake to 
 compel them to make such reductions regardless of the transportation 
 conditions.^ 
 
 In Advance in Rates — Eastern Case,^ the Commission stated: 
 "The railroad rates of this country have not been constructed as a rule 
 upon any scientific basis, and this is especially true of the interstate 
 rates. The traffic officials who have established these rates have gen- 
 erally done so without any special inquiry as to the total amount of 
 revenue which ought to be produced or as to the part of that burden 
 which a particular commodity ought to bear. This Commission is called 
 upon to deal with rates as they exist, and in so doing we ordinarily 
 reconsider them, not from the revenue standpoint but rather from the 
 commercial and traffic standpoint. At the same time it is now the 
 settled law that there is a limit below which the revenue of railways 
 cannot be reduced by public authority, and if there were no such con- 
 stitutional limitation it would nevertheless behoove every regulating 
 body to permit the existence of such rates, when possible, as will yield 
 just earnings to the railways. The question of revenue is therefore 
 fundamental and ever-present in all considerations as to the reason- 
 ableness of railroad rates, although it may not be and seldom is, where 
 single rates are presented, the controlling question. 
 
 "While the authority of this Commission only extends to the 
 passing upon the reasonableness of the rate presented for its considera- 
 tion, it is not confined to single rates." 
 
 1. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Interstate ("ommerce Commission (1911), 190 Fed. 
 Kep. 591, 564. This is known as the Lemon Case, the history of which is as follows : 
 Arlington Heights Fruit Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1909), 175 Fed. Rep. 141. Pending 
 determination by the Commission of the reasonableness of such rate, defendant 
 carriers were enjoined from putting into effect a proposed advanced rate on lemons 
 from California to the East Southern P. Co. v. Arlington Heights Fruit Co. (1911), 
 191 Fed. Rep. 101, 11 C. C. A. 581. Lower court reversed on the ground that the 
 suit was not brought in the proper district. Arlington Heights Fruit Exchange v. 
 Southern P. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C Rep. 14S. Carriers ordered to reduce the ad- 
 vanced rate to the basis of the former rate on the ground that the advanced rate 
 is unreasonable. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission 
 (1910), 182 Fed. Rep. 189. Pending determination of case by the United States 
 (Commerce Court, enforcement of Commission's order enjoined. Case transferred to 
 Commerce (3ourt. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ity. Co. ^ . Interstate Commerce Commission 
 (1911), 190 Fed. Rep. 591; 1 C C. Rep. Kj. Commission's order held invalid on the 
 ground that it was based primarily on the assumed authority to protect the lemon 
 industry in this country against foreign competition. The Commission, it was held, 
 is vested with no such authority. Arlington Heights Fruit Exchange v. Southeni 
 P. Co. (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 149. Disclaiming any authority to attempt to exer- 
 
§613] TEAFFIC LAW SEEVIOE 268 
 
 cise an authority to reduce rates to protect the domestic industry against foreign 
 competition, the Commission again ordered the carriers to reduce the advanced 
 rate to the basis of the former rate on the ground that the advanced rate is un- 
 reasonable. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. United States (1913), 203 Fed. Rep. 56. 
 Commission's order held to be valid. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. United States 
 (1913), 231 U. S. 736, 34 Sup. a. Rep. 316, 58 L. Ed. 460. Decree of Commerce 
 Court affirmed and Commission's order held to be valid. 
 
 2. Chicago Lumber & Coal Co. v. Tioga S. E. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 323, 334. 
 
 3. Advances in Rates — ^Eastern Case: In Re Investigation of Advances in Rates by 
 Carriers in Official Classification Territory (1911), 20 I. O. C. Rep. 243, 248. 
 
 613-AA. Commission no powee to substitute a new eate foe a just 
 
 AND SEASONABLE EATE. 
 
 An order of tlie Interstate Commerce Commission setting aside 
 new rates on lumber from Willamette Valley points to San Francisco 
 and bay points, and restoring substantially the old rates, is void as 
 beyond its powers, where, from the record and the opinion of the Com- 
 mission, and from the express exclusion of Portland from the benefit of 
 the reduced rate, and the reasons assigned for such exclusion, it is clear 
 that the Commission was not exercising its authority to condemn unjust 
 and unreasonable rates and fix reasonable ones, but was acting upon 
 the assumption that it had the right to protect the lumber interests 
 from the consequences of a change in rates, even if the change was from 
 a rate which had been fixed unreasonably low, for the purpose of en- 
 couraging the industry, to a higher rate which is not in itself unjust or 
 unreasonable.^ 
 
 A carrier is entitled to a finding by the Commission that any par- 
 ticular charge is unreasonable and unjust before it is required to change 
 such charge.^ 
 
 1. Southern P. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1911), 219 U. S. 433, 443, 
 31 Sup. Ct Rep. 288, 55 L. Ed. 283. The Interstate Commerce Commission in 
 reviewing the decision of the Supreme Court In the Willamette Valley case (Southern 
 P. Co. V. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 433) stated: "This case con- 
 cerns an order of the Comiflission establishing rates for the transportation of green 
 fir lumber, in carloads, from the Willamette Valley to San Francisco Bay points. 
 
 "With but a brief interval the Southern Pacific had maintained for six years for 
 this service a rate of $3.10 per ton from certain points and $3.35 per ton from 
 certain other points. In April, 1907, a rate of $5.00 per ton vras established from 
 all points. This rate the Commission held to be unreasonable in so far as it 
 exceeded $8.40 from tho^e points at which the $3.10 rate had been maintained and 
 $3.65 from those points to which the $3.35 rate had been applied. It will be seen 
 that an advance of about 10 per cent was allowed above the rates voluntarily estab- 
 lished and for six years maintained by the carrier itself. 
 
 "It appeared upon the hearing that the $3.10 rate had been established after 
 investigation by the Southern Pacific Co. and upon the understanding by that 
 company that a lumber business in the Willamette Valley could not be success- 
 fully conducted upon a higher basis of rates. It was claimed that in case of one 
 large operation there was an agreement to the effect that this rate should not be 
 exceeded but no such contract was found by the Commission. It did appear, how- 
 ever, that extensive mills had been constructed during these six years, involving 
 the outlay of great sums of money, and that large tracts had been bought upon 
 the assumption that this rate was regarded by the iSouthern Pacific as, on the 
 whole, a fair one, and that it would be maintained. It conclusively appeared that 
 the action of the Southern Pacific in advancing that rate to $5 seriously impaired 
 the value of all this property and in some instances amounted to virtual confisca- 
 tion. 
 
 "These facts were developed in the testimony and were referred to by the 
 Commission in its opinion, but the case was not decided upon this ground alone, 
 nor, indeed, was this the principal subject of consideration. We carefully exam- 
 ined the method in which this lumber was handled, the cost of its transportation, 
 and the financial condition of the line between San Francisco and Portland. From 
 this examination we reached the conclusion that the handling of this traffic at the 
 old rate was remunerative and that upon the whole situation, while the original 
 rate might be somewhat advanced, it should not exceed the figures stated above. 
 
269 FREIGHT EATES- AND CHAKGES [§613 
 
 "Upon proceedings to enjoin the enforcement of tliis order the circuit court 
 refused an injunction, but the Supreme Court reversed the court below and held that 
 the order of the Commission was unlawful. 
 
 "The carrier attacked the order upon the ground that it was not an attempt 
 upon the part of the Commission to establish a reasonable rate of transportation, 
 but was rather In the nature of a decree enforcing an equitable estoppel between 
 these parties. Below is given the language of the Supreme Court stating the ques- 
 tion presented to it and its conclusion : 
 
 " 'It is clear therefore, as we have said at the outset, that the result of the 
 ■ contentions and concessions of the respective parties is to reduce the controversy 
 to a single issue, which is : What was the nature and character of the order made 
 by the Commission? That is, what, in substance, was the power which the Com- 
 mission exerted in making the order? 
 
 " 'Coming to the consideration of that subject, we are of the opinion that the 
 court below erred in not restraining the enforcement of the order complained of, 
 because we see no escape from the conclusion that the order was void because it 
 was made in consequence of the assumption by the Commission that it possessed 
 the extreme powers which the railroad companies insist the order plainly mani- 
 fests.' 
 
 "It is impossible to say exactly what significance should attach to this de- 
 cision. The court did not find that the rate established was too low. It appar- 
 ently held that the Commission was not undertaking to establish a reasonable rate, 
 but, rather, to enforce the contracts and understandings between the parties under 
 vyhlch the old rate had been put in and maintained. Of course, the Commission 
 has no such power, and if it attempted to exercise that power its order was clearly 
 unlawful. 
 
 "If, upon the other hand, this is to be interpreted as a holding that in passing 
 upon the justice of an advance in a rate of transportation this body cannot consider 
 those rates which have been voluntarily established and maintained by carriers, the 
 investments which have been made, the development which has occurred upon the 
 strength of such rates, and the efCect upon business and financial interests which 
 the advance involves, then that decision would be a most important and a most 
 unfortunate one. This Commission has never understood that it was a court of 
 equity, with power to enforce by its orders the law of equity, but it has supposed 
 that it was an administrative tribunal, whose duty it was to do equity between the 
 carrier and the shipper in so far as might properly be done. 
 
 "If, in passing upon the advances in freight rates like that involved in the 
 Willamette case, this Commission could only consider the cost of the service, and 
 if, therefore, subject to that limitation, carriers were free to manipulate their rates 
 as they saw fit, this Commission would be without power to prevent the most 
 glaring injustice. The rates of this country have not been and are not based 
 upon the cost of service, and to confine the regulating body to that consideration, 
 while carriers were left free to vary their rates for other causes, would be to put 
 the property interests of this country at the mercy of its railroads, without that 
 restraint which, in our opinion, the Congress by the act to regulate commerce in- 
 tended to impose." (Twenty-fifth Annual Report of I. C. C, 1911.) 
 
 2. Interstate Commerce Commissiou v. Stickney (1909), 215 V. S. 98, 105, 30 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 66, 54 L. Ed. 112. 
 
 613-BB. Commission no powee to annul a bate except by a formal 
 
 OEDEE MADE IN CONFOEMITY WITH SECTION 15 OF THE AcT. 
 
 The Interstate Commerce Commission has no power to annul or 
 change a rate, regulation, or practice established by a railroad com- 
 pany by its filed and published schedules, except by a formal order 
 made in' conformity with section 15 of the Interstate Commerce Act.^ 
 
 The carrier is entitled to have a finding that any particular charge is 
 unreasonable and unjust before it is required to change such charge." 
 
 1. American Sugar Refining Co. v. Delaware L. & W. Rd. Co. (1913),. 207 Fed. Rep. 
 733, 125 C. C. A. 251, reversing, American Sugar Refining Co. v. Delaware L. & W. 
 Ry. Co. (1912), 200 Fed. Rep. 652. 
 
 2. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Stickney (1909), 215 U. S. 9S, 105, 30 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 665, 54 L. Ed. 112. 
 
 613-CC. Commission no powee to equalize e.a.tes. 
 
 The Commission cannot equalize commercial disparities or nat- 
 ural advantages by an adjustment of freight rates.' The Commission 
 
§613] I TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 270 
 
 cannot overcome by an adjustment of freight rates natural advan- 
 tages, suck as water competition and climatic conditions, which one 
 competing locality has over another.^ 
 
 It is no part of the Commission's duty or right to equalize markets, 
 except as that result may be incident to the correction of a substantial 
 injustice in rates, in whatever form published at the respective com- 
 petitive points.* 
 
 V 
 
 It is not within the power of the Commission to equalize economic 
 conditions or to place one market in a position to compete on equal 
 terms with another as against natural advantages. Nor has it power 
 to require railroads in the face of varying trade conditions, to adjust 
 their rates in such a manner as to assure to a market the continuance 
 to a trade it hate once enjoyed.* 
 
 In Ponchatoula Farmers Assn., v. Illinois C. Rd. Co.^ the Commis- 
 sion said: "The Commission cannot lawfully base rates upon the 
 profits derived in a particular business. It might be that in a favor- 
 able season the farmers of Ponchatoula would receive large and gen- 
 erous returns from their labors, but this fact would not justify the 
 carriers in charging for transporting the vegetables to market more 
 than a reasonable rate for the service performed. In another season 
 the market prices might be such that there would be little or no profit 
 in the business, yet such fact would not justify the Commission in re- 
 quiring the carriers to transport the produce at a less rate than would 
 be reasonable for the service performed. The law does not require the 
 carriers to regulate the price of transportation upon the basis of profits 
 to the shipper, and in authorizing the Commission to fix reasonable 
 rates the law presumes that the measure of reasonableness will be 
 based upon all the many elements of the particular traffic involved." 
 
 1. In the Matter of the Investigation of Alleged Unreasonable Bates and Practices 
 involved in the Transportation of Live Stock, Packing-House Products, and Fresh 
 Meats from Various Southwestern Points to Packing Houses, and from Thence to 
 Various Destinations (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 160, 16.S; Carstens Packing Co. v. 
 Oregon & W. Rd. Co. (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 77, 81; In the Matter of the Investiga- 
 tion and Suspension of Advances in Rates for the Transportation of Coal by the 
 Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., et al., and Their Connections (1912), 22 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 604, 613; Douglas & Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 
 541, 543. 
 
 2. Truck Growers Assn. of Charleston District, Charleston, S. C, v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. 
 Co. (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 190. 
 
 3. Sioux City Terminal Elevator Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. By. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 98, 109; Association of Bituminous Coal Operators of Central Pennsylvania v. 
 Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 385, 391. 
 
 4. Baltimore Chamber of Commerce v. Baltimore & O. Bd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 
 596, 608; Ashland Fire Brick Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 115, 
 121; Elk Cement & Lime Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 84. 
 
 5. Ponchatoula Farmers' Assn., Ltd. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 513, 
 515; Florida Fruit & Vegetable Shippers' Protective Assn. v. Atlantic 0. L. Rd. Co. 
 (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 11, 14. 
 
 613-DD. Not within the province of the Commission to require 
 
 CARRIERS TO ADJUST THEIR BATES SO AS TO EQUALIZE NATURAL 
 OR COMMERCIAL ADV.iNTAGES. 
 
 The Commission has repeatedly held that it is not its function to 
 equalize commercial conditions or natural disadvantages or to neutral- 
 
271 FBEIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 ize geographical advantages by such adjustments in rates as will en- 
 able a shipper to compete in markets otherwise closed to him.^ 
 
 1. Great Western Sand & Gravel Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1917). 4.5 I. C. 
 C. Rep. 529, 530; Connor Lumber & Land Co. v. Akron, C. & Y. Ry. Co. (1916), 
 40 I. C. C. Rep. Ill; In the Matter of Import and Domestic Rates— Clay (1916), 
 39 I. C. C. Rep. 132, 135; Louisville Cotton Seed Products Co. v. Louisville & N. 
 Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Itep. 607; Pulp & Paper IStfrs. Traffic Assn. v. Chicago, 
 M. & St P. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep.' S3; Port Arthur Board of Trade v. 
 Abilene & S. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 388; Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. 
 Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1915), 34 I. C. C. Rep. 414; Interstate Commerce Com- 
 mission V. Diffenbaugh (1911), 222 U. S. 42, 46, 32 Sup. Ct Rep. 22, .50 L. Ed. 
 83; Western Pine Mfrs. Assn. v. Cincinnati, I. & W. Rd. Co. (1917), 46 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 650, 653; Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1917), 
 46 I. C. C. Rep. 558, 562, 563. 
 
 613-EE. Commission no power to protect American manufacturers 
 
 AND producers FROM FOREIGN COMPETITION. 
 
 In Big Basin Lumber Co. v. Southern P. Co} the Commission 
 stated: "The Commission has repeatedly held that it cannot equalize 
 commercial or industrial conditions. And it is, of course, without 
 power to pass upon the reasonableness of the rate from Madera to El 
 Paso. The protection of American manufacturers and producers from 
 foreign competition is not within the powers of this Commission. In 
 A. T. & S. F. Ry. v. Interstate C. Commission, 190 Fed, 591, the court 
 said, page 594: 
 
 " 'As early as 1896 * * * the Supreme Court said in T. & P. Ry. Co. v. /. C. C, 
 162 U. ,S. 197, at page 221 : 
 
 " ' "Our reading of the act does not disclose any purpose or intention on the part 
 of Congress to thereby reenforce the provisions of the tariff laws. These laws differ 
 wholly in their objects from the law to regulate commerce. Their main purpose is to 
 collect revenues with which to meet the expenditures of the government, and those of their 
 provisions whereby Congress seeks to so adjust rates as to protect American manufac- 
 turers and producers from competition by foreign low-priced labor operate equally in 
 all parts of the country." 
 
 " 'Whatever, therefore, the rights of the carrier may be to give reduced rates for 
 
 the purpose of fostering a new or an established industry or for granting to it a higher 
 
 measitre of protection against foreign competition than Congress through the revenue 
 
 laws has given it, no such power can lawfully be exercised by the Commission.' " 
 
 1. Big Basin Lumber Co. >. Southern P. Co. (1916), 37 I. C. G. Rep. 730, 737. et seq. 
 
 613-FF. The omission of the Commission to fix a future rate is not 
 
 INCONSISTENT WITH AN ORDER FOR REPARATION FOR PAST IN- 
 JURIES BY REASON OF THE ASSESSMENT OF AN UNREASONABLE 
 RATE. 
 
 In Baer Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Denver & R. G. Rd. Co.^ the 
 United States Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Lamar, stated: "In 
 proceedings before the Commerce Commission the plaintiff secured 
 an order requiring the defendant to pay it $3,438.27 as reparation for 
 unreasonable freight rates charged and collected, the fixing of a new 
 and just rate being left for future decision. The carrier failed to 
 make the payment required and the plaintiff thereupon brought suit 
 and recovered judgment for the sum awarded, together with interest 
 and attorneys ' fees. This judgment was reversed by the circuit court 
 of appeals, which held that the order was void on its face, and could 
 not be basis of a recovery for the reason that, while reparation had 
 been awarded on the ground that the old rate was unreasonable, the 
 Commission had not fixed a new and just rate for the future. 
 
§613] TEAFFIC LAW SEEVICE 272 
 
 "1. That the two subjects of reparation and rates may be dealt 
 with in one order is undoubtedly true. Texas <& P. R. Co. v. Abilene 
 Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 446, 51 L. Ed. 561, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350, 9 
 Ann Cas. 1075; Robinson v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 222 U. S. 509, 56 
 L. Ed. 289, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 114. But awarding reparation for the past 
 and fixing rates for the future involve the determination of matters 
 essentially different. One is in its nature private and the other public. 
 One is made by the Commission in its quasi judicial capacity to mea- 
 sure past injuries sustained by a private shipper, the other, iu its quasi- 
 legislative capacity, to prevent future injury to the public. But tes- 
 timony showing the unreasonableness of a past rate may also furnish 
 information on which to fix a reasonable future rate, and both subjects 
 can be, and often are, disposed of by the same order. This, however, 
 is not necessarily so. Indeed, under the original commerce act, the 
 two matters could not possibly be combined in a single order for the 
 reason that, while at that time the Commission could order the carrier 
 to desist from unreasonable practices and award damages, it could 
 not fix rates. This brought about an anomalous state of affairs. For 
 if the shipper obtained his order of reparation because of unreason- 
 able charges which the railroad company was ordered to discontinue, a 
 sUghtly different, but still unreasonable, rate might be put in for the 
 future, which the shipper had to pay and again institute proceedings 
 for reparation. 24 Stat, at L. 384, §15, chap. 104, U. S. Comp. Stat. 
 1901, p. 3165. 
 
 "2. This situation was dealt with by the Hepburn act, which, in 
 addition to the existing power to make reparation, conferred upon the 
 Commission the new power to make rates for the future. But the two 
 matters were treated as different subjects and were dealth with in 
 separate sections. Section 4 conferred the power of making rates. 
 Section 5 gave the Commission power to make reparation orders. 34 
 Stat, at L. 589, 590. §§4, 5, chap. 3591, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, 
 pp. 1297, 1301. Not only were the two functions separately treated, 
 but an analysis of the act shows that there is no such necessary con- 
 nection between them as to make the quasi judicial order for repara- 
 tion depend for its validity upon being joined wdth a quasi legislative 
 order fixing rates. Persons entitled to one may have no interest in 
 the other. Persons interested in both may be entitled to reparation, 
 and not to a new rate; or to a new rate, and not to reparation. For 
 example, §13 permits 'any mercantile, agricultural, or manufacturing 
 society or anybody politic or municipal organization to make com- 
 plaints against the carrier.' On the application of such bodies, old 
 rates might be declared unjust and new rates established; but, of 
 course, no reparation would be given, for the reason that such com- 
 plainants were not shippers, and therefore not entitled to an award 
 of pecuniary damages. CF. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Interstate Com- 
 merce Commission, 227 U. S. 89, 57 L. Ed. 431, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185. 
 Then, too, there are cases in which a rate, reasonable when made, be- 
 comes unreasonable as the result of a gradual change in conditions, 
 so that no reparation is ordered even though a new rate be estab- 
 lished for the future. Anadarko Cotton Oil Co. v. Atchison, T. & 8. F. 
 R. Co., 20 Inters. Com. Rep. 43. Conversely, there may be cases where 
 what was an unreasonable rate in the past is found to be reasonable 
 at the date of the hearing. In such a case reparation would be awarded 
 
273 FREIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 for past unreasonable charges collected, but no new rate would be es- 
 tablished for the future. 
 
 "3. It may, however, be said that even in such a case, the order, 
 while condemning the rate for the past, should contain a provision 
 validating it for the future. But while this consideration might show 
 that it was erroneous not to name the new rate, it would not follow that 
 the order awarding reparation was void. The Hepburn Act treats the 
 two subjects as related, but independent. The two grounds of com- 
 plaint may be joint or separate, and the very fact that they may some- 
 times be separate shows that the presence of both is not jurisdictional, 
 and that the absence of a provision for one need not operate to in- 
 validate an order as to the other. 
 
 "This conclusion is strengthened by considering the hardships 
 that would result from nullifying a reparation order for error in 
 omitting a provision for the future rate. It would punish the shipper 
 for the failure of the Commission. It would deprive him of his award 
 of damages for his private injury, because of the Commission's omis- 
 sion to make a rate for the benefit of the public. The shipper might 
 or might not intend to remain in business. He might or he might not 
 be interested in future rates. He might have been able to prove un- 
 reasonableness as to the past without being able to furnish evidence 
 as to what would be reasonable for the future. Or, the Commission 
 might be in a position to say with certainty that the rates had been un- 
 reasonable, and award reparation accordingly, but it might require 
 a protracted and lengthy hearing to establish Avhat would be just for 
 the future. To make the shipper wait on such a finding, and deprive 
 him of his present right of reparation, until the determination of an 
 independent question, would work a hardship not contemplated by the 
 act and not required by any of its provisions. ' ' 
 
 1. Baer Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Denver & R. G. Rd. Co. (1914), 233 U. S. 479, 58 
 L. Ed. 1055, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641. The history of this case is as follows: Baer 
 Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Missouri P. Ry. Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 329. Repara- 
 tion awarded on account of unreasonable rates collected for the transportation of 
 beer from Pueblo, Colo, to Leadville, Colo., originating in St. Louis, Mo. Baer 
 Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Missouri P. Ry. Co. (0. C. D. Col.) (not reported). Action 
 brought to enforce order of Commission on award of reparation. At the trial 
 the court directed a verdict and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 
 Denver & R. G. Rd. Co. v. Baer Bros. Mercantile Co. (1911), 187 Fed. Rep. 485. 
 Lower court reversed. Order prescribing maximum rate for future should have 
 been entered as condition precedent to an award of reparation. Baer Bros. Mer- 
 cantile Co. v. Denver & R. G. Rd. Co. (1914), 233 U. S. 479, supra. Circuit Court 
 of Appeals reversed and decision of Circuit Court aflBrmed. 
 
 613-GG. Jurisdiction of Commission over rates for transportation 
 
 OF GOVERNMENTAL MATERIALS AND WAR TRAFFIC. 
 
 In United States v. Alabama & V. Ry. Co.^ the Commission stated: 
 "Section 22 of the act to regulate commerce provides 'That nothing in 
 this act shall prevent the carriage * * * of property free or at 
 reduced rates for the United States * * *.' No rates are published 
 on the articles involved by any of the defendants, and only the southern 
 classification provides a rating for them. 
 
 "Defendants challenge our power to require the establishment of 
 ratings, on the ground that they are not 'common carriers' of govern- 
 ment stamped articles, but are essentially private carriers under special 
 
§613] TRAFFIC LAW SEEVICE 274 
 
 contracts. They have been and are, however, ready and willing to 
 transport these articles for the government at rates satisfactory to 
 them, and we are not asked to prescribe ratings for the benefit of the 
 general public. Under the circumstances we think we have authority 
 to prescribe reasonable ratings for the traffic in question, although, 
 under section 22 of the act, the carrier and the government may agree 
 upon some other rate. Conference Euling 36. The tariff rate or 
 classification rating is the maximum which the carriers may demand 
 from the government. Conference Euling 218." 
 
 Section 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act, providing for preference 
 and priority for the transportation of trafiic during the period of war, 
 provides as follows : 
 
 For the transportation of persons or property in carrying out the orders and 
 directions of the President, just and reasonable rates shall be fixed by the Interstate 
 Commerce Commission. 
 
 1. United States v. Alabama & V. Ry. Co. (1916), 40 I. C- C. Rep. 405, 406. 
 
 613-HH. Commission's "flexible limit of judgment which belongs 
 
 TO THE power TO FIX RATES." 
 
 In Arlington Heights Fruit Exchange v. Southern P. Co.^ one of 
 the assignments of error was, to-wit: The Commission erred in assum- 
 ing that it has discretion to award or refuse reparation unthout regard 
 to the fact that the charges collected may have been unreasonable or 
 otherwise unlawful and in denying complainants' claim for reparation 
 under such erroneo^is assumption. In this connection, the Commission 
 stated: "To enable us to prescribe reasonable rates the Congress has 
 delegated to us a quasi legislative or administrative power in the exer- 
 cise of which there inheres necessarily and admittedly a wide but sound 
 discretion aptly termed the 'flexible limit of judgment belongs to the 
 power to fix rates.' Atlantic Coast Line v. N. Car. Corp. Com'n., 206 
 U. S., 1, 26. We are of the opinion that this 'flexible limit of judgment' 
 obtains equally whether the rate to be fixed is to apply as of thft past, 
 for the present. Or for the future. The discretion is just as wide and as 
 broad in respect of a past as of a future rate, but in exercising the 
 function the end to be attained in its exercise must be kept in mind. For 
 the future we are endeavoring to prevent a public M^rong, as to the past 
 we have to look only to the remedying of a private injury by awarding 
 damages. Baer Bros. v. Denver & R. G., 233 U. S. 479. The only effect 
 of finding a rate attacked unreasonable or otherwise unlawful as of the 
 past is to afford a basis upon which to predicate an award of damages. 
 Moreover, section 16 of the act provides 'that if * * * the Commission 
 shall determine that any party complainant is entitled to an award of 
 damages,' etc., we shall make an order directing the carrier to pay the 
 complainant the sum to which he is entitled. In this case we were of 
 the opinion that complainants had not been damaged, and we were 
 therefore not impressed with the necessity of a finding that the charge 
 assessed in the past was unreasonable. It was not an exercise of an 
 arbitrary discretion to award or not award- reparation." 
 
 1. Arlington Heights Fruit Exchange v. Southern P. Co. (1917). 45 I. C. C. Rep. 248. 
 250, et seq. 
 
275 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 613-11. JUDICIAJ^ REVIEW OF ORDERS OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE COM- 
 MISSION. 
 
 In Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois C. Rd. Co} the 
 United States Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice White, stated: "Be- 
 yond controversy, in determining whether an order of the Commission 
 shall be suspended or set aside, we must consider (a) all relevant 
 questions of constitutional power or right; (h) all pertinent questions 
 as to whether the administrative order is within the scope of the dele- 
 gated authority under which it purports to have been made; and (c) 
 a proposition which we state independently, although in its essence it 
 may be contained in the previous one, viz., whether, even although the 
 order be in form within the delegated power, nevertheless it must be 
 treated as not embraced therein, because the exertion of authority 
 which is questioned has been manifested in such an unreasonable 
 manner as to cause it, in truth, to be within the elementary rule that 
 the substance, and not the shadow, determines the validity of the exer- 
 cise of the power. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 
 698, 39 L. Ed. 311, 316, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 1, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 268, 
 360. Plain as it is that the powers just stated are of the essence of 
 judicial authority, and which, therefore, may not be curtailed, and 
 whose discharge may not be by us in a proper case avoided, it is equally 
 plain that such perennial powers lend no support whatever to the 
 proposition that we may, under the guise of exerting judicial power, 
 usurp merely administrative functions by setting aside a lawful ad- 
 ministrative order upon our conceptions as to whether the adminis- 
 trative power has been wisely exercised. 
 
 ' ' Power to make the order, and not the mere expediency or wisdom 
 of having made it, is the question. ' ' 
 
 . In Southern Ry. Co. v. Tift- the United States Supreme Court, per 
 Mr. Justice McKenna, stated: "In the case at bar, however, there are 
 assignments of error based on the objections to the jurisdiction of the 
 circuit court. These might present serious questions in view of our 
 decision in Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 
 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350, upon a different record than that before us. We 
 are hot required to say, however, that because an action at law for 
 damages to recover unreasonable rates which have been exacted in 
 accordance with the schedule of rates as filed, is forbidden by the inter- 
 state commerce act, a suit in equity is also forbidden to prevent a filing 
 or enforcement of a schedule of unreasonable rates or a change to 
 unjust or unreasonable rates. The circuit court granted no relief 
 prejudicial to appellants on the original bill. It sent the parties to the 
 Interstate Commerce Commission, where, upon sufficient pleadings, 
 identical with those before the court, and upon testimony adduced 
 upon the issues made, the decision was adverse to the appellants. This 
 action of the Commission, with its findings and conclusions, was pre- 
 sented to the circuit court, and it was upon these, in effect, the decree 
 of the court was rendered. There was no demurrer to that petition, 
 and the testimony taken before the Commission was stipulated into 
 the case, and the opinion of the court recites that, 'with equal meri- 
 torious purpose, counsel for the respective parties agreed that this 
 would stand for and be the hearing for final decree in equity. ' 
 
§613] ' TBAFFIC LAW SEKVICE 276 
 
 "It was certainly competent for the appellees to proceed in the 
 circuit court under §16 of the interstate commerce act (24 Stat, at L., 
 379, chap. 104, U. S.^ Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3154) and to apply by peti- 
 tion to the circuit court, 'sitting in equity,' and issue an injunction 
 'or other proper process, mandatory or otherwise,' to enforce the 
 order of the Commission. We think that, under the broad powers 
 conferred upon the circuit court by §16 and the direction there given 
 to the court to proceed with efficiency, but without the formality of 
 equity proceedings, 'but in such manner as to do justice in the prem- 
 ises, ' and in view of the stipulation of the parties, recited in the decree 
 of the court, the appellants are precluded from making the objection 
 that the court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition and 
 grant the relief prayed for and decreed. ' ' 
 
 In Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co.^ 
 the United States Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Lamar, stated : "On 
 the appeal here, the government insisted that while the act of 1887 
 to regulate commerce (24 Stat, at L. 379, §§ 14-16, chap. 104, U. S. 
 Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1284) made the orders of the Commission 
 only prima facie correct, a different result followed from the provision 
 in the Hepburn act of 1906 (34 Stat, at L. 584, §4, chap. 3591, U. S. 
 Comp. Stat. Sup. 1911, p. 1297) that rates should be set aside if after a 
 hearing the 'Commission shall be of the opinion that the charge was 
 unreasonable.' In such case it insisted that the order based on such 
 opinion is conclusive, and (though Interstate Commerce Commission 
 V. Union P. R. Co., 222 U. S. 547, 56 L. Ed. 311, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 108, 
 was to the contrary) could not be set aside, even if the finding was 
 wholly without substantial evidence to support it. 
 
 ' ' 1. But the statute gave the right to a full hearing, and that con- 
 ferred the privilege of introducing testimony, and at the same time 
 imposed the duty of deciding in accordance with the facts proved. A 
 finding without evidence is arbitrary and baseless. And if the govern- 
 ment's contention is correct, it would mean that the Commission had 
 a power possessed by no other officer, administrative body, or tribunal 
 under our government. It would mean that, where rights depended 
 upon facts, the Commission could disregard all rules of evidence, and 
 capriciously make findings by administrative fiat. Such authority, 
 however beneficiently exercised in one case, could be injuriously ex- 
 erted in another, is inconsistent with rational justice, and comes under 
 the constitution's condemnation of all arbitrary exercise of power. 
 
 "In the comparatively feW cases in which such questions have 
 arisen it has been distinctly recognized that administrative orders, 
 quasi judicial in character, are void if a hearing was denied; if th^t 
 granted was inadequate or manifestly unfair; if the finding was con- 
 trary to the 'indisputable character of the evidence,' {Tang Tun v. 
 Edsell, 223 U. S. 681, 56 L. Ed. 610, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 359; Chin Yow 
 V. United States, 208 U. S. 13, 52 L. Ed. 370, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 201; 
 Low Wah Suey v. Bachus, 225 U. S. 468, 56 L. Ed. 1167, 32 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 734; Zahonaite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272, 33, Sup. Ct. Rep. 31), or if 
 the facts found do not, as a matter of law, support the order made 
 {United States v. Baltimore & 0. S. W. R. Co., 226 U. S. 14, 33 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 5, Cf. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. North Carolina Corp. 
 Commission, 206 U. S. 20, 51 L. Ed. 942, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585; Wis- 
 
277 FREIGHT EATES AND CHAEGES [§613 
 
 consin, M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 301, 45 L. Ed. 201, 21 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 115 ; Washington ex rel. Oregon R. <& Nav. Co. v. Fair- 
 child, 224 U. S. 510, 56 L. Ed. 863, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 535; Interstate 
 Commerce Commission v. Illinois C. Rd. Co., 215 U. S. 470, 54 L. Ed. 
 287, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 155; Southern P. Co. v. Interstate Commerce 
 Commission, 219 U. S. 433, 55 L. Ed. 283, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 288 ; Muser 
 V. Magone, 155 U. S. 247, 39 L. Ed. 137, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77). 
 
 "2. The government's claim, is not only opposed to the ruling in 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union P. R. Co., 222 U. S. 547, 56 
 L. Ed. 311, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 108, and the cases there cited, but is con- 
 trary to the terms of the act to regulate commerce, which in its present 
 form provides (25 Stat, at L. 861, §6, chap. 382, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 
 p. 3168), for methods of procedure before the Commission that 'con- 
 duces to justice.' The statute, instead of making its orders conclusive 
 against a direct attack, expressly declares that they may 'be suspended 
 or set aside by the court of competent jurisdiction. ' 36 Stat, at L. 551, 
 §12, chap. 309. Of course, that can only be done in cases presenting a 
 justifiable question. But whether the order deprives the carrier of a 
 constitutional or statutory right, whether the hearing was adequate 
 and fair, or whether for any reason the order is contrary to law, — are 
 all matters within the scope of judicial power. 
 
 "3. Under the statute the carrier retains the primary right to 
 make rates, but if, after hearing, they are shown to be unreasonable, 
 the Commission may set them aside and require the substitution of 
 just for unjust charges. The Commission's right to act depends upon 
 the existence of this fact, and if there was no evidence to show that the 
 rates were unreasonable there was no jurisdiction to make the order. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Northern P. R. Co., 216 TJ. S. 544, 
 54 L. Ed. 609, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 417. In a case like the present the 
 courts will not review the Commission's concljisions of fact {Interstate 
 Commerce Commission v. Delaware, L. & TF. R. Co., 220 U. S. 251, 55 
 L. Ed. 456, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 392), by passing upon the credibility of 
 witnesses or conflicts in the testimony. But the legal effect of evidence 
 is a question of law. A finding without evidence is beyond the power of 
 the Commission. An order based thereon is contrary to law, and must, 
 in the language of the statute, be 'set aside by a court of competent 
 jurisdiction.' 36 Stat, at L. 551, chap. 309." 
 
 In Missouri K. <£ T. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission* 
 the Circuit Court, eastern district Missouri, per Curiam, stated: "1. 
 Neither Congress nor any legislative or administrative board acting 
 by its authorization can competently establish rates for the transporta- 
 tion of property in interstate commerce that will not admit of the car- 
 rier earning such compensation for the service rendered as under all 
 the circumstances is just and reasonable to it and to the public, for that 
 would be depriving the carrier of its property without due process of 
 law, and would be taking its property for public use without just com- 
 pensation, in violation of the fifth amendment to the Constitution. 
 
 "2. Power to determine and prescribe what are just and reason- 
 able maximum rates to be charged in interstate commerce, is, in a lim- 
 ited way, conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission by ex- 
 isting statute law; but as the Commission acts only as a legislative or 
 
§613] TRAFFIC LAW SEKVICE 278 
 
 administrative board, and not judicially (WesterH Union Telegraph 
 Co. V. Myott [C. C] 98 Fed. 335, 355), its determination or action does 
 not, and cannot, preclude judicial inquiry into the justness and reason- 
 ableness of the rates, within the meaning of the constitutional guaranty, 
 for that is a judicial question. 
 
 "4. Eeasonably interpreted, the statute, by which alone the Inter- 
 state Commerce Commission derives its power, unmistakably requires 
 that all rates prescribed thereunder shall be just and reasonable, 
 within the constitutional guaranty, and also that they shall not be 
 unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential; and these require- 
 ments plainly operate as limitations upon the power of the Commis- 
 sion. 
 
 "5. The power conferred upon the commission is at most one 
 that is merely regulatory of existing vested rights, and is therefore 
 quite distinguishable from the powers conferred upon the General 
 Land Office, the Pension Office, and other like departmental bureaus; 
 for the latter are not engaged in administering laws which are regu- 
 latory of existing vested rights, but in executing laws relating to the 
 disposal of the public lands of the nation, to the distribution of its 
 bounty, and the other subjects in respect of which the power of Con- 
 gress is not subject to the constitutional restrictions before named, but 
 is sufficiently comprehensive to enable it competently to devolve the 
 execution of such laws, including the final determination of all ques- 
 tions of fact, upon any agency it may select for the purpose. 
 
 "6. The statute under which the Interstate Commerce Commis- 
 sion derives its power to prescribe rates at all unequivocally recog- 
 nizes, and, if there be need therefor, it plainly declares, that the Circuit 
 Courts, sitting in equity, are vested with jurisdiction to entertain, hear, 
 and determine suits to compel obedience of orders of the commission 
 prescribing rates, and also suits to annul or enjoin the enforcement of 
 such orders. This is shown (a) by the provision in section 15 (Act 
 Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 384 (IT. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3165), as 
 amended by Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, H, '-^4 Stat. 589 (U. S. Comp. 
 St. Supp. 1907, p. 900) that 'all orders of the Commission, except orders 
 for the payment of money, shall take effect * * * and shall continue 
 in force * * * not exceeding two years, * * * unless the same 
 shall be * * * suspended or set aside by a court of competent juris- 
 diction'; (b) by the provision in section 16 that when any carrier fails 
 or neglects to obey 'any order of the commission, other than for the 
 payment of money,' while the same is in effect, any party injured 
 thereby, or the commission in its own name, may apply to the Circuit 
 Court for an enforcement of such order, and 'the court shall prosecute 
 such inquiries and make such investigations, through such means as 
 it shall deem needful iVi the ascertainment of the facts at issue, or which 
 may arise upon the hearing of such petition'; (c) by the further pro- 
 vision in section 16 that 'the venue of suits brought in any of the Cir- 
 cuit Courts of the United States against the commission to enjoin, set 
 aside, annul, or suspend any order or requirement of the commission 
 shall be in' designated districts, 'and jurisdiction to hear and determine 
 such suits is hereby vested in such courts'; and (d) by the still further 
 provision in section 16 that the provisions of the expedition act (Act 
 
279 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 Feb. 11, 1903, c. 544, 32 Stat. 823-U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907, p. 951) 
 'are hereby made applicable to all such suits, including the hearing on 
 an application for a preliminary injunction, and are also made applic- 
 able to any proceeding in equity to enforce any order or requirement of 
 the commission. ' It is not conceived that the scope of the inquiry which 
 the court is authorized to make, or the effect to be given to the com- 
 mission's findings or determination upon which its order is based, is 
 intended to be in any wise different when the suit is one to annul or 
 enjoin the enforcement of the order than when it is one to enforce 
 obedience thereto. 
 
 "7. It is not intended that the hearing in such a suit, whether it 
 be of the one Idnd or the other, shall be confined to an ascertainment of 
 what was determined by the commission and to a consideration of the 
 sufficiency of the facts as determined by it to sustain the order; but, 
 on the contrary, the hearing may be de novo, and may include the taking 
 and consideration of evidence other than before the commission. 
 
 "8. Whether, if it should appear that in the proceedings before 
 the commission the carrier declined or neglected fairly to avail itself 
 of the opportunity to be heard in opposition to the order, the court, 
 in the exercise of a sound discretion, ought to refuse to grant equitable 
 relief to the carrier upon a showing which could have been but was not, 
 made before the commission, and ought to require that the same be 
 first presented to the commission for its consideration, is a question 
 which does not arise in this case, and it is mentioned now only to 
 indicate that it is not decided by anything said herein. 
 
 "9. In approaching the consideration of a case like this the court 
 should start with the presumption that the order is valid, and was made 
 after a careful consideration and a correct determination of every 
 question of fact underlying it, and it should be accorded that respect 
 and influence which ought to attend, and does attend, the action of a 
 legislative or administrative board, whose members are in point of 
 ability, learning and experience specially qualified to determine such 
 matters. In short, the burden of showing that the facts are such as to 
 render the order invalid rests upon the carrier assailing it, and unless 
 the case made on behalf of the carrier is a clear one the order ought to 
 be upheld." 
 
 1. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois- C. Rd. Co. (1910), 215 V. S. 452, 54 
 L. Ed. 280, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 155. 
 
 2. Southern Ry. Co. v. Tift (1907), 206 U. S. 428, 51 L. Ed. 1124, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 709. 
 The history of the yellow pine lumber case is as follows: Tift v. Southern Ry. 
 Co. (1903), (C. C. S. D. Ga.) (not reported.) Temporary injunction restraining 
 carriers from making an advance of 2 cents per 100 pounds in the rate on 
 yellow pine lumber from Georgia to Chattanooga, Tenn. and other points, and 
 dissolved for the reason that the proposed advance had not been made effective. 
 Tift V. Southern Ry. Co. (1903), 123 Fed. Rep. 789. The advanced rates being in 
 effect an injunction restraining the enforcement of the advance was denied for 
 the reason that a complaint against the advance had been filed with the Com- 
 mission. It was held that judicial action should be withheld until the Commis- 
 sion acted. Tift v. Southern Ry. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 548. The advance 
 was held to be unreasonable and the carriers were ordered to discontinue it. 
 Tift V. Southern Ry. Co. (1905), 138 Fed. Rep. 753. Commission's order held to be 
 valid. Carriers restrained from enforcing the advance ; and reparation awarded 
 in accordance with stipulation. Southern Ry. Co. v. Tift (1906), 14S Fed. Rep. 
 1021. Commission's order held to be valid. Carriers restrained from enforcing' 
 the advance; and reparation awnideil in accordance with stipulation. Southern 
 Ry. Co. V. Tift (1907), 206 T'. .^i. 42S. .supra. Commission'.s order held to be valid. 
 Carriers restrained from enforcing the .ndvance: and reparation awarded in nc- 
 cordance with stipulation. 
 
^613] TKAFFIC LAW SEBVICB 280 
 
 3. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1913), 227 XJ. S. 
 88, 57 L. Ed. 431, 33 ;Sup. Ct. Eep. 185. The hisf^ry of the New Orleans Board 
 of Trade case is as follows: New Orleans Board of Trade v. Louisville & N. Rd. 
 Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 231. Carriers ordered to reduce to a specified amount 
 their class rates from New Orleans, La. to Mobile, Ala., and Pensacola, Fla., on 
 the ground that the present rates are unreasonable. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. v. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission (1910), 184 Fed. Rep. 118. Preliminary injunc- 
 tion against enforcement of Commission's order denied. Bill to annul Commis- 
 sion's order transferred to Commerce Court. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. v. Inter- 
 state Commerce Commission (1912), 195 Fed. Rep. 541. Commission's order held 
 invalid on the ground that there was no basis for the Commission to hold that 
 the existing rates are unreasonable. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louis- 
 ville & N. Ed. Co. (1913), 227 U. S. 88, supra. Commissions order held to be valid 
 in all respects. 
 
 4. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1908), 164 Fed. Rep. 
 645, 647, et seq. 
 
 613-JJ. Power of Commission over local state rate on through 
 
 INTERSTATE SHIPMENT. 
 
 In Baer Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Denver S R. G. Rd. Co.^ the 
 United States Supreme Court held that the Interstate Commerce Com- 
 mission has jurisdiction to pass upon the reasonableness of the Denver 
 & Eio Grande Eailroad Company's freight rate from Pueblo to Lead- 
 ville, both in the state of Colorado, on beer received at St. Louis by the 
 Missouri Pacific Railroad Company to be delivered in Leadville, al- 
 though no through rate or through route had been established, and 
 although the freight was received by the first-named carrier at Pueblo 
 as an independent shipment originating at that point, and was for- 
 warded as an intrastate shipment on a local waybill, where all this was 
 in accordance with a long-continued course of dealing between the two 
 carriers under which they divided the freight according to their local 
 rates, with the knowledge that it had been paid as compensation for 
 the single haul. 
 
 1. Baer Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Denver & R. G. Ed. O. (1914), 233 U. S. 479, 58 L. 
 Ed. 1055, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641. 
 
 613-KK. Power of Commission over fixation of terms and compen- 
 sation FOR COMMON USE OF TERMINAI> FACILITIES. 
 
 The Interstate Commerce Act, as amended Feb. 28, 1920, contains 
 the following provisions with reference to the power of the Commis- 
 sion to require the common use of terminals and the fixing of the terms 
 and compensation for the use thereof.^ 
 
 If the Commission finds it to be in. the public interest and to be 
 practicable, without substantially impairing the ability of a carrier 
 owning or entitled to the enjoyment of terminal facilities to handle its 
 own business, it shall have power to require the use of any such term- 
 inal facilities, including main-line track or tracks for a reasonable dis- 
 tance outside of such terminal of any carrier, by another carrier or 
 other carriers, on such terms and for such compensation as the car- 
 riers affected may agree upon, or, in the event of a failure to agree, as 
 the Commission may fix as just and reasonable for the use so required, 
 to be ascertained on the principle controlling compensation in con- 
 demnation proceedings. Such compensation shall be paid or adequately 
 secured before the enjoyment of the use may be commenced. If under 
 this paragraph the use of such terminal facilities of any carrier is re- 
 
281 FREIGHT BATES AND CHAKGES [§613 
 
 quired to be given to another carrier or other carriers, and the carrier 
 whose terminal facilities are required to be so used is not satisfied 
 with the terms fixed for such use, or if the amount of compensation so 
 fixed is not duly and promptly paid, the carrier whose terminal facili- 
 ties have thus been required to be given to another carrier or other 
 carriers shall be entitled to recover, by suit or action against such other 
 carrier or carriers, proper damages for any injuries sustained by it as 
 the result of (Compliance with such requirement, or just compensation 
 for such use, or both, as the case may be. 
 
 1. Interstate Commerce Act, Section 3 (4), added by Transportation Act of February 
 28, 1920. 
 
 613-LL. JuEisDiCTiON OF Commission over bates on export and im- 
 port TRAFFIC. 
 
 The jurisdiction of the Commission over export business is limited 
 to Jibe rail haul from the interior point to the port of export, and on 
 import traffic from the port of entry to the interior destination. It 
 follows that the rail carrier must publish and maintain only its charges 
 between the interior points and the port and cannot make and publish 
 through export rates applying from the interior point, where the traffic 
 was taken up by the rail carrier, to the foreign port of destination.^ 
 
 In Texas & N. 0. Rd. Go. v. Sabine Tram Co.^ the United States 
 Supreme Court held that a shipment of lumber destined b}^ the pur- 
 chaser for export, made by the seller under a local bill of lading from 
 an interior point in Texas to a Texas gulf port at which the lumber was 
 unloaded without delay by the purchaser's order into slips or docks 
 in reach of the ship's tackle and was then loaded into chartered ships, 
 by which it was carried to foreign ports^such shipment not being 
 an isolated one but typical of many others — constitutes foreign com- 
 merce and as such is governed by the tariffs on file with the Interstate 
 Commerce Commission to the exclusion of the rates established by the 
 state railroad commission, although the seller had no connection with 
 the lumber after it reached the railway terminus, and had no concern 
 with its destination after it came into the hands of the purchaser, and 
 no knowledge thereof, and although the lumber had no definite foreign 
 destination at the time of the initial shipment. 
 
 In Railroad Commission of Louisiana v. Texas & P. Ry. Co.^ the 
 United States Supreme Court held that shipments of freight under 
 local bills of lading calling for transportation from interior points in 
 Louisiana to New Orleans, there to be delivered to the shipper's or con- 
 signee's order, but intended by the shippers to be exported to foreign 
 countries, and treated accordingly by both shippers and carriers, con- 
 stitute foreign commerce, and as sach are governed as to the intrastate 
 transportation by the tariffs on file with the Interstate Commerce Com- 
 mission, to the exclusion of the rates established by the state railroad 
 commission. 
 
 In Southern P. T. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission* the 
 United States Supreme Court held that an order of the Interstate Com- 
 merce Commission forbidding a carrier to give an undue preference 
 in the use of its wharves at a seaport to an exporter of cotton-seed 
 
§613] TEAFFIC LAW SERVICE 282 
 
 products is not a regulation of purely intrastate or purely foreign com- 
 merce, which would be beyond the power of the Commission, where the 
 cotton-seed products purchased by him, whether at points within or 
 without the state, are all destined for export, and the concentration and 
 manufacture of cotton-seed cake into meal on the wharves are but inci- 
 dents in the transshipment of the products in export trade. 
 
 1. Galveston Commercial Assn. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 
 216; citing, Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. Hamburg-American Packet Co. C1908), 
 13 I. C. C. Rep. 266. 
 
 2. Texas & N. O. Rd. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co. (1913), 227 V. S. Ill, 57 L. Ed. 443, 33 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229. 
 
 3. Railroad Commission of Louisiana v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (1913), 229 V. S. '336, 
 57 L. Ed. 1215, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 837. 
 
 4. Southern P. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1911), 219 U. S. 
 498, 55 L. Ed. 310, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 279. The history of the Galveston Wharfage 
 case is as follows: Eichenberg v. Southern P. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. '250. 
 Carriers ordered to discontinue their practice of granting to one Young ex- 
 clusive wharfage facilities at Galveston, Tex., and exempting him from payment 
 1 of wharfage charges, while denying similar facilities to other shippers .and 
 exacting wharfage charges from them on the ground that the existing practice - 
 constitutes an undue preference under section 3. Southern P. T. Co. v. Interstate 
 Commerce Commission (1908), 166 Fed. Rep. 134. Preliminary injunction against 
 enforcement of Commission's order denied. Application to certify case to Su- 
 preme Court denied. Southern P. T: Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission 
 (1909), (C. C. S. D. Tex.) (not reported). Commission's order held to be valid. 
 Southern P. T. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1911), 219 U. iS. 498, 
 supra. Commission's order hffld to be valid on the ground that the practice of the 
 carriers constitute an undue preference. Eichenberg t. Southern P. Co. (1913), 
 28 I. C. 0. Rep. 584. Reparation awarded. 
 
 613-MM. AuTHOEiTY OF Divisions of the Commission to determine 
 
 QUESTIONS UNDER THE AcT. 
 
 Section 17 of the Interstate Commerce Act (as amended Axigust 
 9, 1917), provides as follows: 
 
 In conformity with and subject to the order or orders of the Commission in the 
 premises, each division so constituted shall have power and authority by a majority 
 thereof to hear and determine, order, certify, report, or otherwise act as to any of 
 said work, business, or functions so assigned or referred to it for action by the Com- 
 mission, and in respect thereof the division shall have all the jurisdiction and powers 
 now or then conferred by law upon the Commission, and be subject to the same duties 
 and obligations. Any order, decision, or report made or other action taken by any 
 of said divisions in respect to any matters so assigned or referred to it shall have 
 the same force and effect, and may be made, evidenced, and enforced in the same 
 manner as if made, or taken by the Commission, subject to rehearing by the Com- 
 mission, as provided in section sixteen-a hereof for rehearing cases decided by the 
 Commission. The secretary and seal of the Commission shall be the secretary and seal 
 of each division thereof. 
 
 Nothing in this section contained, or done pursuant thereto, shall be deemed to 
 divest the Commission of any of its powers. 
 
 613-NN. Power of Commission to prescribe rate, classification, reg- 
 ulation OR practice to govern intrastate commerce in or- 
 der TO remove a preference, prejudice, of discrimination 
 
 AGAINST interstate OR FOREIGN COMMERCE. 
 
 The Shreveport Cases'^ involved an order of the Interstate Com- 
 merce Commission requiring the carriers to remove a discrimination 
 against Shreveport, La., Avhich resulted from the action of the carriers 
 in charging higher rates, according to distance, on interstate trafiSc 
 from Shreveport than on intrastate traffic from Dallas and Houston, 
 Texas, to destination points in Texas. 
 
283 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 The proceeding was brought before the Commission by the rail- 
 road commission of Louisiana under direction of the legislature of that 
 state, and had two objects: (1) To secure an adjustment of rates that 
 would be just and reasonable from Shreveport into Texas; and (2) to 
 end, if possible, the alleged unjust discrimination practiced by these 
 interstate railroads in favor of Texas state traffic and against similar 
 traffic between Louisiana and Texas. 
 
 With regard to the alleged discrimination, the Commission in its 
 report, 23 L C. C. Eep. 3], said: 
 
 The railroads deny that the rates put out of Shreveport are unreasonable, but place 
 their defense mainly upon the proposition that they are compelled by the railroad 
 commission of Texas to effect the discrimination liere involved. * * * There 
 appears to be little question as to the policy of the Texas commission. It is franlily 
 one of protection to its own industries and communities. * * * Passing, then, to 
 the question of discrimination, has this Commission the power to say that whatever 
 rates an interstate carrier malses between points in Texas shall not be exceeded for 
 the same distance under like conditions between Shreveport and Texas points? In 
 other words, may a carrier engaged in interstate commerce discriminate against a 
 city beyond the border of a state by imposing upon that city's traffic rates which deny 
 its shippers access upon equal terms to the communities of an adjoining state? 
 
 This Is an appeal to the powers lodged in this Commission under the third sec- 
 tion of the act — that provision which is aimed at the destruction of undue preference 
 and advantage. We thus meet direct the most delicate problem arising under our dual 
 system of government. Congress asserts its exclusive dominion over interstate com- 
 merce ; the state asserts its absolute control over state commerce. The state for its 
 own purposes establishes rates designed to protect its own communities and promote 
 the development of its own industries. These rates are adopted by the interstate car- 
 riers upon state traffic, but are not adopted upon interstate traffic. Thus arises a 
 discrimination in favor of communities within the state, and interstate commerce suf- 
 fers a corresponding disadvantage. May this Commission end such discrimination by 
 saying to the interstate carrier. "You may not distinguish between state and inter- 
 state traffic transported under similar conditions. If the rates prescribed for you by 
 state authority are not compensatory upon this specific traffic as to which discrimina- 
 tion is found, the burden rests with you, irrespective of your obligation to the state, 
 to so adjust your rates that justice will be done between communities, regardless of 
 the invisible state line which divides them." To which we are compelled to answer 
 that the effective exercise of its power regarding interstate commerce makes necessary 
 the assertion of the supreme authority of the National Government, and that the Con- 
 gress has appropriately exercised this power in the provisions of the act to regulate 
 commerce touching discrimination. 
 
 The Supreme Court described the situation substantially as fol- 
 lows : / 
 
 ■Shreveport, La., is about 40 miles from the Texas state line and 23J. miles from 
 Houston, Tex., on the line of the Houston, East & West Texas and Houston & Shreve- 
 port Companies (which are affiliated in interest) ; it is 189 miles from Dallas, Tex. on 
 the line of the Texas & Pacific. Shreveport competes vrith both cities for the trade of 
 intervening territory. The rates on these lines from Dallas and Houston, respectively, 
 eastward to intermediate points in Texas were much less, according to distance, than 
 from Shreveport westward to the same points. It is undisputed that the difference 
 was substantial, and injuriously affected the commerce of Shreveport. It appeared 
 for example, that a rate of 60 cents carried first-class traffic ii distance of 100 miles to 
 the eastward from Dallas, while the same rate would carry the same class of traffic 
 only 55 miles into Texas from Shreveport. The first-class rate from Houston to Luf- 
 kin, Tex., 118.2 miles, was 30 cents per 100 pounds, while the rate from Shreveport 
 to the same point, 112.5 miles, was 69 cents. The rate on wagons from Dallas to Marshall, 
 Tex., 147.7 miles, was 36.8 cents, and from Shreveport to Marshall, 42 miles, 56 cents. 
 The rate on furniture from Dallas to Longview, Tex., 124 miles, was 28.8 cents, and that 
 from Shreveport to Longview, 65.7 miles, was 3'> cents. These instances of differences 
 in rates are merly illustrative; they serve to indicate the character of the rate ad- 
 justment. 
 
 The Commission found that interstate class rates from Shreveport 
 to such Texas points were unreasonably high, and it established maxi- 
 mum class rates to be substituted therefor. These rates were substan- 
 tially the same as the class rates fixed by the railroad commision of 
 Texas, and charged by the carriers, for transportation for similar 
 distances in the state of Texas. The Commission also found that the 
 carriers maintained higher commodity rates, according to distance, 
 
§613] TEAFFIC LAW SERVICE 284 
 
 from Slireveport to the Texas points than were in force from, cities in 
 Texas to such Texas points, and that thereby an unlawful, and undue 
 preference was given to the Texas cities and a discrimination that was 
 undue and unlawful was effected against Shreveport. 
 
 In order to correct this discrimination the carriers were directed 
 to desist from charging higher rates for the transportation of any 
 commodity from Shreveport toward Dallas and Houston, respectively, 
 and intermediate points than were contemporaneously charged for the 
 carriage of such commodity from Dallas and Houston toward Shreve- 
 port for equal distances. 
 
 In their petition in the Commerce Court to annul the Commission's 
 order, the carriers assailed the order in its entirety, but subsequently 
 they withdrew their opposition to the fixing of maximum class rates 
 and these rates were put in force. The attack was continued upon that 
 portion of the order which prohibited higher rates for carrying articles 
 from Shreveport into Texas than those charged for eastbound traffic 
 from Dallas and Houston, respectively, for equal distances. 
 
 The point of objection was that as the discrimination found by the 
 Commissioin to be unjust arose out of the relation of intrastate rates, 
 maintained under state authority, to interstate rates, upheld by it as 
 reasonable, its correction was beyond the power of the Commission. 
 The point was urged in a twofold aspect: (1) That Congress is im- 
 potent to control the intrastate charges of an interstate carrier even to 
 the extent necessary to prevent unjust discrimination against interstate 
 traffic; and (2) that, if it be assumed that Congress has this power, still 
 it has not been exercised or delegated to the Commission, and hence the 
 action of the Commission exceeded the limits of the authority which had 
 been conferred upon it. 
 
 The Commerce Court sustained the Commission's order and dis- 
 missed the petition, 205 Fed. 380. The carriers appealed. 
 
 In affirming the decree of the Commerce Court and sustaining the 
 Commission's order the Supreme Court held that — • 
 
 Wherever the interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers are so related that 
 the government of the one involves the control of the other it is Congress, and not the 
 State, that is entitled to prescribe the final and dominant rule, for otherwise Congress 
 would be denied the exercise of its constitutional authority, and the State, and not the 
 Nation, would be supreme in the national field. 
 
 The power to deal with the relation between intrastate and inter- 
 state rates, the court held, lies exclusively with Congress, and in the 
 exercise of that power Congress can remove, directly or through the 
 aid of a subordinate body, a discrimination arising from the relation of 
 intrastate to interstate rates. 
 
 After quoting section 3 of the act making unlawful ahy undue or 
 unreasonable preference or advantage, also any undue or unreasonable 
 prejudice or disadvantage, and the proviso of section 1, to the effect 
 that the act to regulate commerce shall not apply to commerce, wholly 
 within one state, the court held that the Commission was authorized and 
 empowered to deal with the situation before it in these cases. 
 
 Mr. Justice Hughes, speaking for the court, concluded the decision 
 with these words : 
 
 The further objection is made that the prohibition of Section 3 is directed against 
 unjust discrimination or undue preference only when it arises from the voluntary act 
 
285 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 of the carrier and does not relate to acts whicti are the result of conditions wholly 
 beyond its control. East Tennessee, etc., Rwy. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commis- 
 sion, 181 U. S. 1, 18. The reference is not to any inherent lack of control arising out 
 of traffic conditions, but to the requirements of the local authorities which are as- 
 sumed to be binding upon the carriers. The contention is thus merely a repetition 
 in another form of the argument that the Commission exceeded its power; for it 
 would not be contended that local rates could nullify the lawful exercise of Federal 
 authority. In the view that the Commission was entitled to make the order, there is 
 no longer compulsion upon the carriers by virtue of any inconsistent local require- 
 ment. We are not unmindful of the gravity of the question that is presented when 
 State and Federal views conflict. But it was recognized at the beginning that the 
 Nation could not prosper if interstate and foreign trade were governed by many 
 masters, and where the Interests of the freedom of interstate commerce are involved 
 the judgment of Congress and of the agencies it lawfully establishes must control. 
 
 Section 13 of the Interstate Conunerce Act {as amended February 
 28, 1920) contains the following provisions : 
 
 Whenever in any investigation under the provisions of this Act, or in any investi- 
 gation instituted upon petition of the carrier concerned, which, petition is hereby 
 authorized to be filed, there shall be brought in issue any rate, fare, charge, classifica- 
 tion, regulation, or practice, made or imposed by authority of any State, or initiated 
 by the President during the period of Federal control, the Commission, before pro- 
 ceeding to hear and dispose of such issue, shall cause the State or States interested 
 to be notified of the proceeding. The Commission may confer with the authorities of 
 any State having regulatoTy jurisdiction over the class of persons and corporations 
 subject to this Act with respect to the relationship between rate structures and prac- 
 tices of carriers subject to the jurisdiction of such State bodies and of the Commis- 
 sion ; and to that end is authorized and empowered under rules to be prescribed by 
 It, and which may be modified from time to time, to hold joint hearings with any such 
 State regulating bodies on any matters wherein the Commission is empowered to act 
 and where the rate-making authority of a State is or may be affected by the action 
 taken by the Commission. The Commission is also authorized to avail itself of the 
 cooperation, .services, records, and facilities of such State authorities in the enforce- 
 ment of any proposition of this Act. 
 
 Whenever in any such investigation the Commission, after full hearing, finds 
 that any such rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice causes any 
 undue or unreasonable advantage, preference, or prejudice as between persons or 
 localities in intrastate commerce on the one hand and interstate or foreign commerce 
 on the other hand, or any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against 
 interstate or foreign commerce, which is hereby forbidden and declared to be unlaw- 
 ful, it shall prescribe the rate, fare, or charge, or the maximum or minimum, or 
 maximum and minimum, thereafter to be charged, and the classification, regulation, 
 or practice thereafter to be observed, in such manner as, in its judgment, will re- 
 move such advantage, preference, prejudice, or discrimination. Such rates, fares, 
 charges, classifications, regulations, and practices shall be observed while in effect by 
 the carriers parties to such proceeding affected thereby, the law of any State or the 
 decision or order of any State authority to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 
 In The Matter of Intrastate Rates Within the State of Illinois'^ 
 certain intrastate fares of the respondent steam railroads in Illinois, 
 lower than the corresponding interstate fares and charges authorized 
 by the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission in Ex Parte 74, 
 Increased Rates, 1920, 58 I. C. C, 220 and 302, and maintained through 
 action of state authority, found to be unduly preferential of intrastate 
 passengers, unduly prejudicial to interstate passengers, and unjustly 
 discriminatory against interstate commerce. Fares and charges pre- 
 scribed which will remove such preference, prejudice, and discrimina- 
 tion. 
 
 A verbatim copy of the Commission's report in this case is found 
 in the footnotes. 
 
 In the Matter of Rates, Fares and Charges of the New York Cen- 
 tral Railroad Company and Other Railroad Companies in the State of 
 New York^ certain fares, charges, and rates required by state authority 
 to be maintained by the respondents within the state of New York 
 found to be lower than the corresponding interstate fares, charges, 
 and rates authorized by the order in Ex Parte 74, Increased Rates, 
 1920, and to be unduly prejudicial to Interstate passengers and ship- 
 
§613] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 286 
 
 pers, unduly preferential of intrastate passengers and Shippers, and 
 unjustly discriminatory against interstate commerce. 
 
 A verbatim copy of the Commission's report in this case is found 
 in the footnotes. 
 
 In the Matter of Intrastate Rates within the State of Illinois* cer- 
 tain rates and charges for freight services in the transportation of 
 milk and cream, required by State authority to be maintained by the 
 respondent carriers within the State of Illinois, were found to be lower 
 than the corresponding rates and charges authorized in Ex Parte 74, 
 Increased Rates {1920), 58 I. C. C. Eep. 220 and 302, and to be unduly 
 preferential of intrastate traffic and shippers and of localities, within 
 the State, unduly prejudicial to interstate traffic and shippers and to 
 localities outside the States, unduly, unjustly and unreasonably dis- 
 criminatory against interstate commerce, x^mong other things, the 
 Commission stated: "Upon this record, we find no conditions within 
 Illinois so different from those affecting interstate traffic to justify 
 the present differences in rates. Illinois intrastate traffic is not con- 
 tributing its just proportion of the revenues of the carriers, measured 
 by the statutory rate of return '■upon the aggregate value of the rail- 
 way property of such carriers held for and used in the service of 
 transportation.' " 
 
 In the case of Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago B. £ 
 Q. Rd. Co.^ the United States Supreme Court held as follows : 
 
 1. That a showing that intrastate passenger fares work an undue 
 discrimination against travelers in interstate commerce and against 
 localities in typical instances numerous enough to justify a finding 
 against a large class of fares is not sufficient evidence of discrimination 
 against persons and localities, within the meaning of the Transporta- 
 tion Act of February 28, 1920, to justify a state-wide order of the 
 Interstate Commerce Commission making a horizontal increase of all 
 intrastate passenger fares to correspond with interstate rates, where 
 it is clear that such order will include many rates not witihin the proper 
 class, or the reason of the order; and a saving clause by which ex- 
 ceptions are permitted cannot give the order validity. 
 
 2. That intrastate passenger fares fixed by state authority, which, 
 if maintained, will reduce the net income of the interstate carriers of the 
 state millions of dollars below what it would be under intrastate fares 
 on the same level with interstate rates, constitute an "undue, unreason- 
 able, and unjust discrimination against interstate or foreign com- 
 merce, ' ' within the meaning of the Transportation Act of February 28, 
 1920, which the Interstate Commerce Commission may remove by a 
 state-wide order making a horizontal increase of aU intrastate passen- 
 ger fares to correspond with interstate rates, in the exercise .of its 
 authority under that section to remove any such discrimination, and, 
 under Section 422, to prescribe just and reasonable rates which shall 
 yield a fair return upon the aggregate value of the railway property 
 used in transportation, to the end that an adequate railway service be 
 maintained for the people of the United States ; 
 
 3. That the aggregate value of the railway property of interstate 
 carriers used in transportation, which, under the Transportation Act of 
 
287 FKEIGHT EA-TES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 February 28, 1920, the Interstate Commerce Commission is to make 
 the basis of the just and reasonable rates which it is its duty to pre- 
 scribe, is not confined to that part of the property and equipment of the 
 carrier which is used in interstate commerce, and the Commission is 
 not charged with the duty of separating the property used in intrastate 
 and interstate commerce ; 
 
 4. That orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission which, in 
 order to remove a discrimination against interstate commerce, involved 
 in a general disparity between intrastate and interstate passenger rates 
 of interstate carriers, raise the intrastate rates to correspond with the 
 interstate rates, do not violate the specific proviso of the original In- 
 terstate Commerce Act of February 4, 1887, repeated in the amending 
 acte, that the Commission is not to regulate traffic wholly within the 
 state, since such orders as to intrastate traffic are merely incidental to 
 the regulation of interstate commerce, and necessary to its efficiency; 
 
 5. That committee reports and explanatory statements of mem- 
 bers of Congress in charge, made in presenting a bill for passage, while 
 a legitimate aid in the interpretation of a statute when its language is 
 doubtful or obscure, cannot control such interpretation when, taking 
 the act as a whole, the effect of the language used is clear to the coiirt. 
 Such aids are only admissible to solve doubt, and not to create it ; 
 
 6. That Congress, in the exercise of its control over interstate 
 commerce, could, as it did in the Transportation Act of February 28, 
 1920, empower the Interstate Commerce Commission to remove a dis- 
 crimination against interstate commerce involved in a general disparity 
 between intrastate and interstate passenger rates by ordering a state- 
 wide increase of intrastate rates to correspond with the interstate 
 rates ; 
 
 7. That in developing interstate commerce agencies Congress can 
 impose any reasonable condition on a state's use of interstate carriers 
 for intrastate commerce that it deems necessary or desirable ; 
 
 8. That the action of the Interstate Commerce Commission in re- 
 moving, under the Transportation Act of February 28, 1920, a discrim- 
 ination against interstate commerce involved in a general disparity 
 between interstate and intrastate rates, by ordering an increase in the 
 latter to correspond with the interstate rates, should be directed to 
 substantial disparity which operates as a real discrimination against, 
 and obstruction to, interstate commerce, and must leave appropriate 
 discretion to the state authorities to deal with intrastate as between 
 themselves, on the general level which the Interstate Commerce Com- 
 mission has found to be fair to interstate commerce. 
 
 Following is a statement of the case and opinion of the Court de- 
 livered by Mr. Chief Justice Taft : 
 
 "The proceedings out of which this case has grown, known as the 
 Wisconsin Passenger Fares, began in an investigation by the Inter- 
 state Commerce Commission, under |[^ 3 and 4 of § 13 of the Interstate 
 Commerce Act, as amended by § 416 of the Transportation Act of Feb- 
 ruary 28, 1920, into alleged undue and unreasonable discrimination • 
 against interstate commerce arising out of intrastate railroad rates in 
 Wisconsin. The interstate carriers by steam railroad of the state 
 
§613] TRAFFIC LAW SEKVICE 288 
 
 were made respondents, and the governor and State Railroad Com- 
 mission were duly notified. The Interstate Commerce Commission 
 made its report and order November 27, 1920. Wisconsin Passenger 
 Fares, 59 Inters. Com. Rep. 391. 
 
 "The Commission had investigated the interstate rates of carriers 
 in the United States, in a proceeding known as Exparte 74, Increa^sed 
 Rates, 58 Inters. Com. Rep. 220, for the purpose of complying with 
 § 15a of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by § 422 of the 
 Transportation Act of 1920. That section requires that the Commis- 
 sion so adjust rates that the revenues of the carriers shall enable them 
 as a whole or by groups to earn a fixed net income on their railway 
 property. The Commission ordered an increase for the carriers in the 
 group of which the Wisconsin carriers were a part, of 35 per cent in 
 interstate freight rates, and 20 per cent in interstate passenger fares 
 and excess baggage charges, and a surcharge upon passengers in sleep- 
 ing cars amounting to 50 per cent of the charge for space in such cars, 
 to accrue to the rail carriers. Thereupon the carriers applied to the 
 Wisconsin Railroad Commission for corresponding increases in intra- 
 state rates. The state commission granted increases in intrastate 
 freight rates of 35 per cent, but denied any in intrastate passenger 
 fares and charges on the sole ground that a state statute prescribed 
 a maximum for passengers of 2 cents a mile. 
 
 "In the Wisconsin Passenger Fares, the Interstate Commerce 
 Commission found that all of the respondent carriers of "Wisconsin 
 transported both intrastate and interstate passengers on the same 
 train, with the same service and the same accommodations; that the 
 state passenger, paying a lower rate, rode on the same train, in the 
 same car, and perhaps in the same seat with the interstate passenger, 
 who paid the higher rate; that the circumstances and conditions were 
 substantially similar for interstate as for intrastate passenger service 
 in Wisconsin; that travelers destined to, or coming from, points 
 outside the state, found it cheaper to pay the intrastate fare within 
 Wisconsin and the interstate fare beyond the border than to pay the 
 through interstate fare; that undue preference and prejudice were 
 shown by the falling otf of sales of tickets from border-line points 
 in Minnesota and Michigan to stations in Wisconsin, and by a marked 
 increase in sales of local tickets from corresponding border-line points 
 in Wisconsin to stations in Wisconsin ; that the evidence as to the prac- 
 tice with respect to passenger fares applied in like manner to the sur- 
 charge upon passengers in sleeping and parlor cars and to excess bag- 
 gage charges. 
 
 "The Commission further found that the fare necessary to fulfill 
 the requirement as to net income of this interstate railroad group under 
 § 15a was 3.6 cents per mile, and that this was reasonable, that the, di- 
 rect revenue loss to the Wisconsin carriers, due to their failure to se- 
 cure the 20 per cent increase in intrastate fares, would approximate 
 $2,400,000 per year if the 3-cent fare fixed by the President under Fed- 
 eral war control were continued, and $6,000,000 per year if the 2-cent 
 fare named in the state statute should become effective. 
 
 "The Commission found that there was undue, unreasonable, and 
 unjust discrimination against persons traveling in interstate commerce, 
 and against interstate commerce as a whole; and ordered that the 
 
289 FEEIGHT RATES AXD CHARGES ['§613 
 
 undue discrimination should be removed by increases in all intrastate 
 passenger fares and excess baggag-e charges, and by surcharges cor- 
 responding with the increases and surcharges ordered in interstate 
 business. 
 
 ' ' The order Avas made without prejudice to the right of the author- 
 ities of the state or of any other party in interest to apply in the proper 
 manner for a modification of the order as to any specified intrastate 
 fares or charges if the latter were not related to the interstate fares 
 of charges in such a way as to contravene the provisions of the Inter- 
 state Commerce Act. 
 
 "The carriers filed bills in equity, of which the present is one, in 
 the district court, to enjoin the State Railroad Commission and other 
 state officials from interfering with the maintenance of the fares thus 
 ordered and published. 
 
 "Application for interlocutory injunction was made to the district 
 court under § 266 of the Judicial Code. After a hearing before three 
 judges, they granted an interlocutory injunction, from which this ap- 
 peal was taken. 
 
 "The Commission's order, interference with which was enjoined 
 by the district court, effects the removal of the unjust discrimination 
 found to exist against persons in interstate commerce, and against 
 interstate commerce, by fixing a minimum for intrastate passenger 
 fares in Wisconsin at 3.6 cents per mile per passenger. This is done 
 under tf 4 of § 13 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the 
 Transportation Act of 1920, which authorizes the Interstate Commerce 
 Commission, after a prescribed investigation, to remove 
 
 "Any undue or unreasonable advantage, preference, or prejudice 
 as between persons or localities in intrastate commerce on the one 
 hand and interstate or foreign commerce on the other hand, or any 
 undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate or 
 foriegn commerce. 
 
 ' ' We have two questions to decide. 
 
 "First. Do the intrastate passenger fares work undue prejudice 
 against persons in interstate commerce, such as to justify a horizontal 
 increase of them all? 
 
 "Second. Are these intrastate fares an undue discrimination 
 against interstate commerce as a whole which it is the duty of the Com- 
 mission to remove? 
 
 "We shall consider these in their order. 
 
 "First. The report and findings of the Commission undoubtedly 
 show that the intrastate fares Avork an undue discrimination against 
 travelers in interstate commerce and against localities {Houston E. (0 
 W. T. R. Co. V. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 58 L. ed. 1341, 34 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 833) in typical instances numerous enough to justify a general 
 finding against a large class of fares. In a general order thus sup- 
 ported, possible injustice can be avoided by a saving clause allowing 
 anyone to except himself from the order by proper showing. This prac- 
 tice is fully sustained by precedent in what was done as a sequence of 
 the Shreveport Case {Houston, E. & W. T. R. Co. v. United States, 
 
§613] TRAFFIC LAW SEEVICE 290 
 
 supra). Sec. 34, Inters. Com. Rep. 472; 41 Inters. Com. Rep. 83; Eas- 
 tern Texas B. Co. v. Railroad Commission, P. U. R. 191 7F, 554, 242 
 Fed. 300; Looney v. Eastern Texas R. Co. 247 U. S. 214, 62 L. ed. 1084, 
 38 Sup. Ct, Rep. 460. In Illinois C. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commis- 
 sion,245 U. S. 493, 508, 62 L. ed. 425, 437, P. IT. R. 1918C, 1279, 38 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 170, this court indicated its approval of such practice, which 
 was adopted by the Commission. Business Men's League v. Atchison, 
 T. & S. F. R. Co. 49 Inters. Com. Rep. 713. Any rule which would re- 
 quire specific proof of discrimination as to each fare or rate and its 
 effect would completely block the remedial purpose of the statute. 
 
 "The order in this case, however, is much wider than the orders 
 made in the proceedings following the Shreveport and Illinois C. R. Co. 
 Cases. There, as here, the report of the Commission showed discrim- 
 ination against persons and localities at border points,' and the orders 
 were extended to include all rates or fares from all points, in the state 
 to border points. But this order is not so restricted. It includes fares 
 between all interior points, although neither may be near the border, 
 and the fares between them may not work a discrimination against 
 interstate travelers at all. Nothing in the precedents cited justifies an 
 order affecting all rates of a general description when it is clear that 
 this would include many rates not within the proper class or the reason 
 of the order. In such a case, the saving clause by which exceptions are 
 permitted cannot give the order validity. As said by this court in the 
 Illinois Central R. Co. Case, "It is obvious that an order of a subordi- 
 nate agency, such as the Commission, should not be given a precedence 
 over a state rate statute, otherwise valid, unless, and except so far as, 
 it conforms to a high standard of certainty. ' ' See also American Exp. 
 Co. V. South Dakota, 244 U. S. 617, 627, 61 L, ed. 1352, 1359, P. U. R. 
 1917F, 45, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 656. 
 
 ' ' If, in view of the changes, made by Federal authority, in a large 
 class of discriminating state rates, it is necessary from a state point of 
 view to change nondiscriminating state rates to harmonize with them, 
 only the state authorities can produce such harmony. We cannot sus- 
 tain the sweep of the order in this case on the showing of discrimina- 
 tions against persons or places alone. 
 
 "Second. The report of the Commission shows that if the intra- 
 state passenger fares in Wisconsin are to be limited by the statute of 
 that state to 2 cents per mile, and charges for extra baggage and sleep- 
 ing car accommodations are to be reduced in a corresponding degree, 
 the net income of the interstate carriers of the state will be cut six 
 millions of dollars below what it would be under intrastate rates on the 
 same level with interstate rates. Under ^Tf 3 and 4 of § 13 and § 15a, as 
 enacted in §§416 and 422, respectively, of the Transportation Act of 
 1920 * * * are such reductions and disparity an "undue, unreason- 
 able, and unjust discrimination against interstate or foreign com- 
 merce" which the Interstate Commerce Commission may remove by 
 raising the intrastate fares? A short reference to the circumstances 
 inducing the legislation, and a summary of its relevant provisions, will 
 aid the answer to this question. 
 
 "The Interstate Commerce Act of February 4, 1887, was enacted 
 by Congress to prevent interstate railroad carriers from charging un- 
 
291 FREIGHT KATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 reasonable rates and from unjustly discriminating between persons 
 and localities. The railroads availed themselves of the weakness and 
 cumbrous machinery of the original law to defeat its purpose, and this 
 led to various amendments, culminating in the amending Act of June 
 18, 1910, in which the authority of the Commission in dealing with the 
 carriers was made summary and effectively complete. Whatever the 
 causes, the fact was that the carrying capacity of the railroads did 
 not thereafter develop proportionately with the growth of the country, 
 and it became difficult for them to secure additional investment of 
 capital on feasible terms. When the extraordinary demand for trans- 
 portation arose in 1917, the Congress and the President concluded to 
 take over all the railroads into the management of the Federal govern- 
 ment, and by joint use of facilities, which the Anti-Trust Law was 
 thought to forbid under private management, and by use of government 
 credit, to increase their effectiveness. This was done by appropriate 
 legislation and Executive action under the war power. From January 
 1, 1918, until March 1, 1920, when the Transportation Act went into 
 effect, the common carriers by steam railroad of the country were 
 operated by the Federal government. Due to the rapid rise in the 
 prices of material and labor in 1918 and 1919, the expense of their oper- 
 ation had enormously increased by the time it was proposed to return 
 the railroads to their owners. The owners insisted that their proper- 
 ties could not be turned back to them by the government for useful 
 operation without provision to aid them to meet a situation in which 
 they were likely to face a demoralizing lack of credit and income. Con- 
 gress acquiesced in this view. The Transportation Act of 1920 was the 
 result. It was adopted after elaborate investigations by the Interstate 
 Commerce Committees of the two Houses. 
 
 "Under title 2 it made provision for the termination of Federal 
 control March 1, 1920, for the refunding of the carriers' indebtedness to 
 the United States, and for a guaranty for six months to the carriers of 
 an income equal to the wartime rental for their properties, and directed 
 that for two years following the termination of Federal control, the 
 Secretary of the Treasury, upon certificate of the Commission, might 
 make loans to the carriers not exceeding the maximum amount recom- 
 mended in the certificate, out of a revolving fund of $.300,000,000. 
 
 "Under title 4, amendments were made to the Interstate Commerce 
 Act which which included § 13, 1I1I3 and 4, and § 15a, already quoted in 
 the margin. The former for the first time authorizes the Commission 
 to deal directly with intrastate rates where they are unduly discrim- 
 inating against interstate commerce,— a power already indirectly exer- 
 cised as to persons and localities, with approval of this court, in the 
 Shreveport and other cases. The latter, the most novel and most im- 
 portant feature of the act, requires the Commission so to prescribe 
 rates as to enable the carriers as a whole, or in groups selected by the 
 Commission, to earn an aggregate annual net railway operating income 
 equal to a fair return on the aggregate value of the railway property 
 used in transportation. For two years, the return is to be 51/2 per cent, 
 with % per cent for improvements, and thereafter is to be fixed by the 
 Commission. 
 
 "The act sought to avoid excessive incomes accruing, under the 
 operation of § 15a, to the carriers better circumstanced, by using the 
 
§613] TEAFFIC LAW SEEVICE 292 
 
 excess for loans to the others and for other purposes. The act further i 
 put under the control ,of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 1st, the 
 issuing of future railroad securities by the interstate carriers ; 2d, the 
 regulation of their car supply and distribution and the joint use of 
 terminals ; and, 3d, their construction of new lines, and their abandon- 
 ment of old lines. The validity of some of these provisions has been 
 questioned. Upon that we express no opinion. We only refer to them 
 to show the scope of the congressional purpose of the act. 
 
 "It is manifest, from this very condensed recital that the act made 
 a new departure. Therefore the control which Congress, through the 
 Interstate Commerce Commission, exercised, was primarily for the 
 purpose of preventing injustice by unreasonable or discriminatory 
 rates against persons and localities, and the only provisions of the law 
 that inured to the benefit of the carriers were the requirement that the 
 rates should be reasonable in the sense of furnishing an adequate com- 
 pensation for the particular service rendered, and the abolition of re- 
 bates. The new measure imposed an affirmative duty on the Interstate 
 Commerce Commission to fix rates and to take other important steps 
 to maintain an adequate railway service for the people of the United 
 States. This is expressly declared in § 15a to be one of the purposes of 
 the bill: 
 
 "Intrastate rates and the income from them must play a most 
 important part in maintaining an adequate national railway system. 
 Twenty per cent of the gross freight receipts of the railroads of the 
 country are from intrastate traffic, and 50 per cent of the passenger re- 
 ceipts. The ratio of the gross intrastate revenue to the interstate rev- 
 enue is a little less than one to three. If the rates, on which such re- 
 ceipts are based, are to be fixed at a substantially lower level than in 
 interstate traffic, the share which the intrastate traffic will contribute 
 will be proportionately less. If the railways are to earn a fixed net per- 
 centage of income, the lower the intrastate rates, the higher the inter- 
 state rates may have to be. The effective operation of the act will rea- 
 sonably and justly require that intrastate traffic should pay a fair 
 proportionate share of the cost of maintaining an adequate railway 
 system. Section 15a confers no power on the Commission to deal with 
 the intrastate rates. What is done under that section is to be done by 
 the Commission 'in the exercise of its powers to prescribe just and 
 reasonable rates ; ' i. e., powers derived from previous amendments to 
 the Interstate Commerce Act, which have never been construed or used 
 to embrace the prescribing of intrastate rates. "^^Tien we turn to T[ 4, 
 § 13, however, and find the Commission for the first time vested with a 
 direct power to remove ' any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimin- 
 ation against interstate or foreign commerce,' it is impossible to escape 
 the dovetail relation between that provision and the purpose of § 15a. 
 If that purpose is interfered with by a disparity of intrastate rates, the 
 Commission is authorized to end the disparity by directly removing it, 
 because it is plainly an 'undue, unreasonable, and unjust discrimina- 
 tion against interstate or foreign commerce,' within the ordinary 
 meaning of those words. 
 
 "Counsel for appellants, not able to satisfy their meaning hj the 
 suggestion of any other discrimination to which they apply, are forced 
 to the position that the words are tautological and a mere repetition 
 
293 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 of any undue or unreasonable advantage, preference or prejudice as 
 between persons and localities in intrastate commerce on the one hand 
 and interstate or foreign commerce on the other hand, which precede 
 them. In view of their apt application to the most important purpose 
 of the legislation, we are not at liberty to take such a view. If 'undue, 
 unreasonable and unjust discrimination against interstate or foreign 
 commerce' are tautological, why are they followed by the phrase 
 ' which is hereby prohibited and declared to be unlaM'ful?' To ac- 
 company a meaningless phrase with words of such special emphasis 
 would be unusual. 
 
 "It is urged that in previous decisions, notably the Minnesota Rate 
 Cases {Simpson v. Shepard) 230 U. S. 352, 57 L.'ed. 1511, 48 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 1151, the Shreveport Case, 234 U. S. 342, 58 L. ed. 1341, 34 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 833, supra, and the Illinois C. R. Co. Case, 245 U. S. 493, 62 L. 
 ed. 425, P. U. R. 1918C, 1279, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 170, supra, the expression 
 unjust discrimination against interstate commerce was often used 
 when, as the law then was, it could only mean discrimination as be- 
 tween persons and localities, and therefore that it is to be given the 
 same limited meaning here. But, here, the general words are used after 
 discrimination against persons and localities have been specifically 
 mentioned. The natural inference is that, even if they include what 
 has gone before, they mean something more. When we find that they 
 aptly include a kind of discrimination against interstate commerce 
 which the operation of the new act for the first time makes important, 
 and which would seriously obstruct its chief purpose, we cannot ignore 
 their necessary effect. 
 
 "Counsel for appellants are driven by the logic of their position to 
 maintain that the valuation required for the purposes of § 15a to be 
 ascertained pursuant to § 19a of the Interstate Commerce Act (March 
 1, 1913, 37 Stat, at L. 701, chap. 92, Comp. Stat. §8591, 4 Fed. Stat. 
 Anno. 2d ed. p. 495 ; amended February 28, 1920, 41 Stat, at L. 493, chap. 
 91) is to be only of that part of the property and equipment of the Inter- 
 state carriers which is used in commerce among the states, and must bo 
 segregated from that used in intrastate commerce. This is contrary to 
 the construction which, since the enactment of § 19a, March 1, 1913, the 
 Commission has put upon that section in carrying out its injunction. 
 It is inadmissable. The language of § 15a, refutes such interpretation. 
 The percentage is to be calculated on ' the aggregate value of the rail- 
 way property of such carriers held for and used in the service of trans- 
 portation. ' To impose on the Commission the duty of separating prop-, 
 erty used in the two services when so much of it is used in both, and to 
 do this in a reasonably short time for practical use, as comtemplated by 
 the statute, would be to assign it a well-nigh impossible task. This, of 
 itself, prevents our giving the words such a construction unless they 
 clearly require it. They certainly do not. 
 
 "It is objected here, as it was in the Shreveport Case, that orders 
 of the Commission which raise the intrastate rates to a level of the in- 
 terstate structure violate the specific proviso of the original Interstate 
 Commerce Act, repeated in the amending acts, that the Commission is 
 not to regulate traffic wholly within a state. To this the same answer 
 must be made as was made in the Shreveport Case (234 U. S. 342, 358, 
 58 L. ed. 1341, 1351, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 833), that such orders as to intra.- 
 
^613] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 294 
 
 state trafi&c are merely incidental to tlie regulation of interstate com- 
 merce, and necessary to its efficiency. Effective control of the one must 
 embrace some control over the other, in view of the blending of both in 
 actual operation. The same rails and the same cars carry both. The 
 same men conduct them. Commerce is a unit and does not regard state 
 lines, and while, under the Constitution, interstate and intrastate com- 
 merce are ordinarily subject to regulation by different sovereignties, yet 
 when they are so mingled together that the supreme authority, the 
 nation, cannot exercise complete, effective control over interstate com- 
 merce without incidental regulation or intrastate commerce, such inci- 
 dental regulation is not an invasion of state authority or a violation of 
 the proviso. 
 
 "Great stress is put on the legislative history of the Transporta- 
 tion Act to show that the bill was not intended to confer on the Com- 
 mission power to remove any discrimination against interstate com- 
 merce involved in a general disparity between interstate and intrastate 
 rates. Committee reports and explanatory statements of members in 
 charge, made in presenting a bill for passage, have been held to be a 
 legitimate aid to the interpretation of a statute where its language is 
 doubtful or obscure. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Beerinq, 254 U. S. 
 443, 475, 65 L. ed. 354, 16 A. L. R. 196^ 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 172.^ But when, 
 taking the act as a whole, the effect of the language used is clear to the 
 court, extraneous aid like this cannot control the interpretation. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Inter-national Coal Min. Co. 230 U. S. 184, 198, 
 57 L. ed. 1446, 1451, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 893, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 315 ; Cam- 
 inetti v. United States, 242 V. S. 470, 490, 61 L. ed. 442, 455, L. R. A. 
 1917F, 502, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1168. Such aids are 
 only admissable to solve doubt, and not to create it. For the reasons 
 given, we have no doubt in this case. 
 
 "Counsel for the appellants have not contested the constitutional 
 validity of the statute, construed as we have construed it, although the 
 counsel for the state commissions, whom we permitted to file briefs as 
 amici curite, have done so. The principles laid down by this court in the 
 Minnesota Rate Cases {Simpson v. Shepard) 230 U. S. 352, 432, 433, 57 
 L. ed. 1511, 1555, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1151, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729, Ann. 
 Cas. 1916A, 18, the Shreveport Case, 234 U. S. 342, 351, 58 L. ed. 1341, 
 1348, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 833, and the Illinois C. R. Co. Case, 245 U. S. 493, 
 506, 62 L. ed. 425, 437, P. U. R. 1918C, 1279, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 170, which 
 are rate cases, and in the analogous cases of Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612, 618, 55 L. ed. 878, 882, 
 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 621; Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 26, 
 27, 56 L. ed. 72, 74, 75, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2, 3 N. C. C. A. 822; Second Em- 
 ployers' Liability Cases {Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.) 
 223 U. S. 1, 48, 51, 56 L. ed. 327, 345, 347, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44, 32, Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 169, 1 N. C. C. A. 875, we think, leave no room for discussion 
 on this point. Congress, in its control of its interstate commerce sys- 
 tem, is seeking in the Transportation Act to make the system adequate 
 to the needs of the country by securing for it a reasonably compensa- 
 tory return for all the work it does. The states are seeking to use that 
 same system for intrastate traffic. That entails large duties and ex- 
 penditures on the interstate commerce system which may burden it 
 unless compensation is received for the intrastate business reasonably 
 
295 FREIGHT BATES AKD CHARGES [§613 
 
 proportionate to that for the interstate business. Congress, as the 
 dominant controller of interstate commerce, may, therefore, restrain 
 undue limitation of the earning power of the interstate commerce sys- 
 tem in doing state work. The affirmative power of Congress in develop- 
 ing interstate commerce agencies is clear. Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U. S. 
 24, 51 L. ed. 351, 27 Sup. Ct. Eep. 233 ; Lnxton v. North, River Bridge Co. 
 153 U. S. 525, 38 L. ed. 808, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 891; California v. Central 
 P. R. Co. 127 U. S. 1, 39, 32 L. ed. 150, 157, 2. Inters. Com. Eep. 153, 8 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1073. In such development, it can impose any reasonable 
 condition on a state 's use of interstate carriers for intrastate commerce 
 it deems necessary or desirable. This is because of the supremacy of 
 the national power in this field. 
 
 "In Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. supra, where revelant cases 
 were carefully reviewed, it was said, p. 399: The authority of Con- 
 gress extends to every part of interstate commerce, and to every in- 
 strumentality or agency by which it is carried on ; and the full control 
 by Congress of the subjects committed to its regulation is not to be 
 denied or thwarted by the commingling of interstate and intrastate 
 operations. This is not to say that the nation may deal with the in- 
 ternal concerns of the state, as such, but that the execution by Congress 
 of its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce is not lim- 
 ited by the fact that intrastate transactions may have become so inter- 
 woven therewith that the effective government of the former inci- 
 dentally controls the latter. The conclusion necessarily results from 
 the supremacy of the national power within its appointed sphere. 
 
 "It is said that our conclusion gives the Commission unified con- 
 trol of interstate and intrastate commerce. It is only unified to the ex- 
 tent of maintaining efficient regulation of interstate commerce under 
 the paramount power of Congress. It does not involve general regula- 
 tion of intrastate commerce. Action of the Interstate Commerce Com- 
 mission in this regard should be directed to substantial disparity which 
 operates as a real discrimination against, and obstruction to, inter- 
 state commerce, and must leave appropriate discretion to the state 
 authorities to deal with intrastate rates as between themselves on the 
 general level which the Interstate Commerce Commission has found 
 to be fair to interstate commerce. 
 
 ' ' It may well turn out that the effect of a general order in increas- 
 ing all rates, like the one at bar, will, in particular localities, reduce 
 income instead of increasing it, by discouraging patronage. Such cases 
 would be within the saving clause of the order herein, and make proper 
 an application to the Interstate Commerce Commission for appropriate 
 exception. So, too, in practice, when the state commissions shall 
 recognize their obligation to maintain a proportionate and equitable 
 share of the income of the carriers from intrastate rates, conference 
 between the Interstate Commerce Commission and the state commis- 
 sions may dispense with the necessity for any rigid Federal order as to 
 the intrastate rates, and leave to the state commissions power to deal 
 with them and increase them or reduce them in their discretion. 
 
 "The order of the District Court, granting the interlocutory in- 
 junction, is affirmed." 
 
§613] TEAFFIC LAW SEKVICB 296 
 
 In the case of State of New York, et al. v. United States, et al^ the 
 United States Supreme Court, per Mr. Chief Justice Taft, stated : 
 
 "This was a bill in equity against the United States and the Inter- 
 state Commerce Commission and others, brought by the state of New 
 York and its attorney general, to annul and enjoin the enforcement of 
 an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, requiring the inter- 
 state railroads operating in intrastate commerce in the state of New 
 York to charge in such commerce 3.6 cents a mile for all passengers, 20 
 per cent increase over the then excess baggage rates to intrastate pas- 
 sengers, a surcharge of 50 per cent of the charges for space in sleeping 
 cars to such passengers, and 20 per cent increase in intrastate rates on 
 milk, all for the purpose of bringing the intrastate rates to the level of 
 the interstate rates previously fixed by the Commission. The bill was 
 filed under and by virtue of the statute repealing the Commerce Court 
 Act and conferring jurisdiction on the district court. October 22, 1913, 
 38 Stat, at L. 219, chap. 32. The application for an interlocutory in- 
 junction was heard by a circuit judge and two district judges. Then a 
 final hearing was had, and the court entered a final decree dismissing 
 the complaint, from which this appeal has been taken. The railroad 
 companies affected by the order were, on their petition, permitted to 
 intervene, and are here as appellees. 
 
 "It appears from the record that, in the proceeding by the Inter- 
 state Commerce Commission to fix interstate commerce rates, to com- 
 ply with the requirements of § 15a of the Transportation Act of Feb- 
 ruary 28, 1920, (41 Stat, at L. 488, chap. 91), — a proceeding known as 
 Ex parte 74, Increased Rates, 58 Inters. Com. Eep. 220, — the Commis- 
 sion, after conference with a committee representing all the state com- 
 merce commissions and authorities, directed the group of interstate 
 railroads, of which the railroads operating in New York were a part, to 
 raise their freight rates 35 per cent, their passenger rates and excess 
 baggage charges 20 per cent, and to add a surcharge of 50 per cent for 
 passengers on sleeping cars. As soon as the order in Ex parte 74 was 
 made, the railroads concerned applied to the Public Service Commis- 
 sion of the State of New York for similar increases in intrastate raies. 
 That commission granted the increase in freight rates, but denied it as 
 to milk and passenger fares. The passenger intrastate fares were 3 
 cents a mile under the order of the President during the war control, 
 but when that should become ineffective, a statute of New York, fixing 
 passenger fares on the New York Central Eailroad from Albany to 
 Buffalo at 2 cents a mile, would come into force and operation. As 
 soon as the state commission made its ruling, the railroads applied to 
 the Interstate Commerce Commission under ^. 13, of which proceeding 
 notice was given to the state of New York, the attorney general, and 
 the Public Service Commission,. all of whom appearedj^ for an order 
 directing the railroads to put intrastate passenger fares, excess bag- 
 gage charges, sleeping car surtaxes, and milk rates on the same level 
 with interstate rates. Proof was offered by the railroads to show that 
 conditions of operation in state and interstate passenger traffic were 
 alike, and there was no showing otherwise. The record in Ex parte 74 
 was put in evidence. There was evidence also to show that at Buffalo 
 and other border points the difference between the interstate and intra- 
 state fares would divert business from the interstate lines between New 
 
297 FEEIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 York city and Buffalo to the New York Central lines, and that the same 
 difference would break up interstate journeys to the West into intra- 
 state journeys to Buffalo from New York, and an interstate journey 
 beyond, thus reducing interstate travel and discriminating against pas- 
 sengers carried therein. Evidence was adduced to shdw the injury to 
 interstate business in the transportation of milk from the country to 
 New York city from points outside of the state, in compstition with 
 intrastate traffic in this necessity of life. No investigation was made 
 into suburban commuter travel, and it is excluded by the Commission 
 from the scope of the order which it made. The order was state-wide 
 in its effect, and required all interstate carriers to bring their intra- 
 state passenger fares, except commuters' rates, excess baggage charges, 
 and sleeping car surcharges to a level with interstate fares and rates, 
 as ordered in Ex parte 74. The Commission introduced a saving clause 
 in its findings by which the New York authorities or any other inter- 
 ested parties were given leave to apply for modification of its order or 
 findings as to any intrastate fares, charges or rates included therein, 
 on the ground that the latter were not related to interstate fares, 
 charges or rates in such a way as to contravene the provisions of the 
 Interstate Commerce Act. Under this clause, at least one petition has 
 been filed by a railroad, and the railroad excepted from the order. 
 
 ' ' The district court dismissed the bill. 
 
 "This case differs from the Wisconsin Rate Case just decided [ — 
 U. S. — , ante, 236, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. — ] , in that it is a direct proceeding 
 to annul or set aside the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
 complained of, brought against the United States and the Commission 
 under the statute. Skinner & E. Corp. v. United States, 249 U. S. 557, 
 63 L. ed. 772, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 375. The Wisconsin Case was a suit by a 
 railroad against the state authorities to prevent the latter from penal- 
 izing the railroad for complying wth the order of the Commission. To 
 this suit the United States and the Commission were not parties. The 
 defense of the state authorities was a collateral attack upon the order, 
 to prevail in which, they were obliged to show that the order was void 
 on the face of the findings without regard to the evidence or the absence 
 of it. In the case before us, the complainants are entitled to rely on 
 the absence of any substantial evidence to sustain a material finding as 
 a basis for attacking the order. 
 
 ' ' The first objection of the appellants is that there was not sufficient 
 evidence of discrimination against persons and localities under § 13, 
 1j 4, § 416 of the Transportation Act of 1920, to justify a state-wide 
 order of the kind here made. We have considered this objection in the 
 Wisconsin Case on a similar showing on the findings. Here we consider 
 it on the evidence. We reach the same conclusion here and sustain the 
 objection. 
 
 "The next objection is that the state has a charter contract with 
 the New York Central Railway Company by which the latter is bound 
 not to charge more than 2 cents a mile for passenger carriage between 
 Albany and Buffalo, and that if the Transportation Act permits the 
 Interstate Commerce Commission, l)y such an order, to enable the rail- 
 road company to violate its contract, it impairs the obligation of a 
 contract, in violation of §10, article 1, of the Federal Constitution. 
 
§613] TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE 
 
 298 
 
 That section provides a law that no 'state shall . . . pass a law 
 . . . . impairing the obligation of the contracts,' and does not in 
 terms restrict Congress or the United States. But it is said that it de- 
 prives New York and her people of property without due process of the 
 law. We said in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 
 211, 230, 44 L. ed. 136, 143, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 96: 'Anything which di- 
 rectly obstructs and thus regulates that commerce which is carried on 
 among the states, whether it is state legislation or private contracts 
 between individuals or corporations, should be subject to the power of 
 Congress in the regulation of that commerce. ' Louisville & N. R. Co. 
 V. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 55 L. ed. 297, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 671, 31 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 265. See also Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 162, 163, 45 
 L. ed. 126, 137, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 48; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 
 204 U. S. 364, 400, 51 L. ed. 523, 539, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367. 
 
 "The main objections to the order are the same as those presented, 
 considered, and overruled in the Wisconsin Rate Case, just decided. 
 The evidence in this case shows that if the passenger and other rates 
 here in controversy were to continue in force as ruled by the Public 
 Service Commission of New York, the annual gross revenues of the in- 
 terstate railroads operating in the state of New York from both inter- 
 state and intrastate passenger and milk business would be less, by 
 nearly twelve millions of dollars, than those revenues if the intrastate 
 fares and rates were on the same level as the interstate rates, as fixed 
 by the Interstate Commerce Commission. If the lower level of intra- 
 state fares and rates is to be maintainedj it will discriminate against 
 interstate commerce, in that it will require higher fares and rates in the 
 interstate commerce of the state to secure the income for which the 
 Interstate Commerce Commission must attempt to provide by fixing 
 rates under § 15a of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by § 422 
 of the Transportation Act of 1920 (41 Stat, at L. 456,488, chap. 91), in 
 carrying out the declared congressional purpose 'to provide the people 
 of the United States with adequate transportation.' As we have just 
 held in the Wisconsin Case, this constitutes 'undue, unreasonable, and 
 unjust discrimination against interstate commerce,' which is declared 
 to be unlawful and prohibited by § 13, ^ 4, of the Interstate Commerce 
 Act, as amended by § 416 of the Transportation Act of 1920 (41 Stat, at 
 L. 456, 484, chap. 91), and which the Interstate Commerce Commission 
 is authorized therein to remove by fixing intrastate rates for the pur- 
 pose. We need not repeat our reasons for our ruling. Nor need we 
 consider and give again the grounds upon which we hold § 13, TJ 4, as 
 thus construed, to be valid under the Constitution of the United States. 
 
 "The decree of the District Court, dismissing the bill of complaint, 
 is affirmed." 
 
 1. Shreveport Cases: Houston, East & West Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, and 
 Tevas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States (1913), 234 U. S. 342, 58 L. Ed. 1341, 
 34 Sup. Ct Rep. 833; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. State Public Utilities Com- 
 mission (111., 1915), 108 N. E. 729, 731; American Express Company v. State of 
 South Dakota (1917), 244 U. S. 657, 61 L. Ed. 1352, 37 Sup. Ot. Rep. 656. But 
 see Illinois C. Rd. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Illinois (1917), 62 L. Ed. 
 425, 245 U. S. 493, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 170, wherein the Supreme Court held that an 
 order of the Interstate Commerce Commission requiring a readjustment of intra- 
 state rates prescribed by state authority, made for the purpose- of removing a dis- 
 crimination against interstate commerce found to result from a disparity between 
 intrastate and interstate rates, is invalid for uncertainty where it has no definite 
 field of operation and leaves uncertain the territory or points to which it applies. 
 
299 
 
 FREIGHT RATES AXD CHARGES ["^SIS 
 
 2. In the Matter of Intrastate Kates within the State of Illinois (1920), 59 I. C. C. Bep. 
 350, et seq. The Commission, per Mr. Commissioner McChord, stated : 
 
 "This is a proceeding under the interstate commerce act to determine, among 
 other things, whether the present passenger fares for intrastate travel in Illinois 
 result in any undue or unreasonable advantage, preference, or prejudice as between 
 persons or localities in intrastate commerce on the one hand and interstate or foreign 
 commerce on the other, or any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against 
 interstate of foreign commerce; and if so. what fares or what maximum or min- 
 imum, or maximum and minimum, fares shall be prescribed to be charged to eui-e 
 the situation. Similar questions relating to freight rates and other charges made 
 by 'common carriers are also involved, but they are reserved for later determination, 
 as the case has not yet been submitted as to them. 
 
 "In 1907 the legislature of the state of Illinois enacted a law providing, subject 
 to certain qualifications, that on and after July 1 of that year it would be unlawful 
 for any common carrier to charge for intrastate travel in that state a fare in excess 
 of 2 cents per mile for adults and 1 cent per mile for children under 12 years of age. 
 
 "Except as to commutation fares, which were lower, this basis of charge was 
 applied until June 10, 191K. On that date the Director General of Railroads 
 provided by General Order No. 28 that the minimum fares, not including commuta- 
 tion fares, both state and interstate, throughout the country should be based on 3 
 cents per mile for adults and 1.5 cents per mile for children under 12 years. Com- 
 mutation fares were increased 10 per cent by that order. This action, of course, 
 superseded the state law, and the figures named became the recognized basis of 
 charge. Later, by Sec. 208 (a)'' of the transportation act, 1920, Congress provided, 
 subject to certain qualifications, that all rates, fares and charges in effect on' Feb- 
 ruary 29, 1920, should continue in effect until September 1, 1920. 
 
 "In Ex Parte 74, Increased Rales, 1920, 58 I. C. C, 220 and 302, we authorized 
 substantial increases in the charges for freight and passenger service of common 
 carriers subject to our jurisdiction throughout the country, concluding that such 
 increases would, under the existing conditions, result in rates, fares, and charges 
 'not unreasonable in the aggregate under section 1 of the act and would enable the 
 carriers * * * under honest, efficient, and economical management and reason- 
 able expenditures for maintenance of way, structures, and equipment, to earn an 
 aggregate annual railway operating income equal, as nearly as ma.y be, to a return 
 of 5% per cent upon the aggregate value, for the purposes of this proceeding, of 
 the railway property of such carriers held for and used in the service of transporta- 
 tion and % of 1 per cent in addition.' We decided that the carriers might increase 
 their passenger fares and charges 20 per cent, the term passenger fares including 
 standard local or interline fares ; excursion, convention and other fares for special 
 occasions ; commutation and other multiple forms of tickets ; extra fares on limited 
 trains ; and club-car charges. Also, that a surcharge upon passengers in sleeping 
 and parlor cars might be made, amounting to 50 per cent of the charge for space 
 in such cars, such charge to be collected in connection with the charge for space 
 and to accrue to the rail carriers. These increased charges were established by the 
 carriers, interstate, effective August 26, 1920. 
 
 "In the meantime the carriers operating in tlie state of Illinois had applied to 
 the Public I'tilities Commission of that state for like increases in their intrastate 
 rates, fares and charges. In a decision rendered August 10, 1920, the Illinois 
 commission allowed no increases in passenger fares, holding that they had no jur- 
 isdiction to authorize fares in excess of those prescribed by the statute, and that 
 the statute, though temporarily in state of suspense, was still in existence and 
 would again become operative September 1, 1920. Accordingly, the commission 
 ordered that, effective that date, the existing schedules of passenger fares for intra- 
 state travel be canceled, the effect of which would have been the reestablishment 
 of the statutory fares. The commission also did not authorize increases in com- 
 mutation and excursion fares, and other charges for passenger travel, except excess 
 baggage rates, on which increases of 20 per cent were authorized. Increases in the 
 charges for freight service were authorized less than those allowed by us, but this 
 matter, as previously indicated, will be dealt with separately. 
 
 "The Illinois carriers at once applied to the United States r)istrict Court for 
 the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, for an injunction against the 
 enforcement of the statute. The court, upon preliminary hearing, August 24, took 
 the position that the statutory fares could probably be shown to be confiscatoi-y, 
 and accordingly granted an interlocutory injunction restraining the enforcement 
 of the statute and otherwise preserving the status quo until the matter could be 
 fully heard and the law questions determined by the court. 
 
 "Promptly after the issuance of the Illinois commission's decision the steam 
 railroads of the state subject to our jurisdiction and the Chicago, Lake Shore & 
 South Bend Railway Company, an interstate electric line, filed a petition under sec- 
 tion 13 of the interstate commerce act, complaining of the action of that commission 
 and alleging that the resulting intrastate rates, fares, and charges would be pro- 
 ductive of undue prejudice and unjust discrimination, and asking for an investiga- 
 tion of the matter. We thereupon instituted this proceeding and assigned it for 
 hearing giving the Governor of Illinois and the Illinois commission due notice. 
 The roccixer of the Aurora, Elgin & Chicago Railroad Company, an electric line, 
 intervened and asked that, as to its third rail division, from Chicago to Batavia and 
 Aurora, that company be in<hided in any relief granted the petitioners. 
 
§613] 
 
 TRAFFIC LAW SEKVICE 300 
 
 "All the carriers in Illinois are engaged in the handling of both state and in- 
 terstate passengers and such passengers are carried on the same trains. 
 
 "Evidence offered by the carriers indicates that, if the present intrastate rates 
 are continued for one year and there is the same intrastate passenger travel dur- 
 ing that year was in the calendar year 1919, the loss to the carriers, due to their 
 failure to secure the 20 per cent increase in intrastate fares, will approximate 
 $7,000,000, and if the 2-cent intrastate fare should become effective the loss would be 
 $15,000,000. 
 
 "Near the borders of the state of Illinois are such points as St. Louis and Han- 
 nibal, Mo. ; Keokuk, Davenport, Muscatine, Burlington, Dubuque and Clinton, Iowa : 
 Beloit, Janesville, Madison and Milwaukee, Wis. ; Gary, Indiana Harbor, Hammond, 
 Whiting, La Fayette, Terre Haute and Evansville, Ind. ; and Paducah, Ky. All such 
 points are in constant competition, more or less, with cities in Illinois for popula- 
 tion, industrial development and business growth. The record affords examples of 
 how the lower fares in Illinois affect these localities, and also interstate travelers. 
 
 "Quincy, 111., is in keen competition with Burlington aod Keokuk, Iowa. A 
 branch line of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad runs between Burlington 
 and Quincy. Trains leave both points in the forenoon and return in the afternoon, 
 carrying people from Quincy and Burlington out Into country to sell goods and also 
 carrying the country people into Quincy and Burlington to buy goods. The time 
 of the trains is fixed so that Quincy and Burlington are on an approximate equality 
 as to service, but passengers to and from Quincy ride on a basis of 3 cents per 
 mile, while those to and from Burlington pay 20 per cent more, or on a basis of 3.6 
 cents per mile. Danville, 111., has a country trade coming into it from Indiana for 
 distances of perhaps as much as 50 miles. Illinois people also come into Danville 
 to trade. Those from Illinois pay the lower fare. Chicago competes with St. Louis, 
 Evansville and Paducah in doing business in interior Illinois. Passengers to and from 
 Chicago, of course, have an advantage in fares over the other points. These in- 
 stances are given of record as typical. Similar situations maj' be found all around 
 the borders of the state. In Illinois Classification, 5."> I. C. C, 290, which was a 
 proceeding instituted by us under section 8 of the Federal control act upon request 
 of the Director General for advice, and which involved the question of discrimina- 
 tion as against Indiana and in favor of Illinois in the matter of freight rates, it 
 appeared that Indiana jobbers were shipping, or seeking to ship, into Illinois in 
 competition with Illinois industries, but that they were confronted with relatively 
 higher rates than were paid by their Illinois competitors to points in the same 
 state. With regard to the competition we said : 
 
 " 'Jobbers and manufacturers of many different articles at Indianapolis, Terre 
 Haute. LaFayette, LaPorte, Port Wayne, and other points in Indiana and at Louis- 
 ville, Ky., distribute in less than carloads to points in Illinois. In so doing they must 
 sell against competitors located at Chicago, Peoria, Bloomington, and other points in 
 Illinois, and also at St. Louis, Mo., which is accorded substantially , the Illinois .scale 
 of rates. To successfully meet the competition of those who enjo^- the Illinois rates 
 the Indiana shippers must in many instances absorb the differences in freight rates. 
 Some have noticed a substantial falling off in business done by them in Illinois, al- 
 though their business in other directions has increased ; and the evidence strongly 
 indicates that to a considerable extent the loss has been due to the freight rate situa- 
 tion. Especially is this true of the heavier and lower grade articles as to which the 
 freight rates constitute a large proportion of the delivered value. Perhaps most of 
 the business done by the Indiana shippers in Illinois is along the eastern border, 
 but there is also a substantial amount done to some of them throughout the state. 
 What we have said has particular reference to less-than-carload traffic moved at class 
 rates. However, as to carload traffic also, some examples were cited wherein the 
 existing rate situation operates to the disadvantage of Indiana shippers. Such in- 
 stances generally arise out of commodity rates and minimum weights rather than out 
 of differences in carload ratings and class rates.' 
 
 "As is commonly known, .lobbers send their salesmen to visit the trade. Those 
 in Illinois pay the lower basis of charge. That the differences referred to are in- 
 jurious to those who must pay the higher fares is obvious. 
 
 "Just across the river from Rock Island, 111., is Davenport, Iowa. The total rail- 
 road and sleeping car fare from Chicago to Rock Island is $8.04, and from Chicago 
 to Davenport $10.36. The difference of $2.32 against Davenport is not due to the light 
 additional haul incurred in crossing the bridge between the two cities, but is in the 
 main the result of the failure of the Illinois authorities to permit the same basis of 
 charge as we have fixed. Passengers for Davenport are carried in the same train and 
 by the same railroad as those for Rock Island. The train carries one sleeping car 
 which runs to Rock Island and another which goes across to Davenport. Passengers 
 to Rock Island pay on the basis of the Intrastate fare of 3 cents per mile, plus the 
 intrastate sleeping car fare, without a surcharge, plus 8 per cent war tax; while 
 passengers to Davenport psiy on the basis of 3.0 cents per mile, plus a sleeping car 
 fare the same as is charged to Rock Island, but with a surcharge for sleeping car 
 accommodations, plus the war tax of 8 per cent on the greater total fare. Except for 
 the crossing of the bridge, as previously indicated, there is no difference in the char- 
 acter of the service. Until the increases in interstate fares became effective August 
 26 both cars were equally well patronized, but since that date passengers for Daven- 
 port ride to Rock Island and walk across the bridge. No one familiar with the condi- 
 tions buys a ticket to Davenport cr rides in the Davenport car unless the Rock Island 
 car is full. Situations almost identical with that described above are found as be- 
 
'^01 FEEIGHT KATES AND CHAEGES [§613 
 
 tween St. Louis, Mo., and East St. Louis, 111., and as between Paducah, Ky., and 
 Metropolis, 111., and It is testified that there are other instances. Any incidental 
 benefits that may accrue to an Illinois point, like Rock Island, by reason of having 
 passengers leave their trains at such points rather than at the Interstate point, their 
 real destination would be at the expense and to the detriment of that Interstate point. 
 Davenport and Rock Island are In competition with each other for local retail and 
 perhaps some wholesale trade in Illinois, Iowa and Missouri. Moreover, by reason 
 of these disparities intrastate passenger traffic Increases and interstate passenger 
 traflSc decreases. The result Is Increased intrastate and decreased interstate reve- 
 nues, or, otherwise expressed, based on the number of pa.ssengers carried. Is equiva- 
 lent to a decreased intrastate operating cost at the expense of the interstate service. 
 
 "There is reason to believe that in general, measured per passenger carried, it 
 cost more to handle the intrastate than the Interstate traffic. The interstate passen- 
 ger Is generally a long-haul passenger, while the Intrastate passenger generally goes a 
 much shorter distance. It is testified that there Is relatively the same amount of 
 service for pick-up and delivery, for ticket sales, for accounting, etc.. In connection 
 with the intrastate traffic as there Is In connection with interstate traffic. In other 
 words, the terminal costs are about the same whether the passenger Is intrastate or In- 
 terstate. Coaches used In Interstate traffic generally are In use at night as well as in 
 the daytime, but the coaches used for intrastate movements are usually idle during 
 the night. Although old and second-grade coaches are often used in intrastate traffic, 
 which tends to reduce the cost, the density of the traffic Is said to be much lighter. 
 An Intrastate coach Is said ordinarily to carry fewer passengers and to make much 
 less mileage than the average interstate coach. 
 
 "The record shows how the lower intrastate fares affect the revenue that should 
 accrue from interstate traffic in another manner. Certain carriers between given 
 points operate intrastate while others between the same points riin Interstate. Com- 
 petition generally compels the maintenance of the same fares via all lines. The inter- 
 state carriers must either meet the Illinois intrastate fares or lose the traffic to lines 
 within the state. In either event the total revenue from interstate traffic is adversely 
 affected. 
 
 "The Illinois intrastate fares have the effect of otherwise reducing the earnings 
 on interstate traffic, or rather on what would be Interstate traffic if it were not for the 
 differences in fares. Travelers destined to or coming from points outside the state 
 find it cheaper to pay the Intrastate fare within Illinois and the interstate fare beyond 
 the border than to pay the through Interstate fare. It is a common practice for trav- 
 elers to buy their tickets to the slate line, leave the train, immediately buy a ticket 
 thence to destination, and then resume their .iourney on the same train. Technically 
 they break their journey, making part of it Intrastate, but practically they resort to a 
 device which defeats the through fare. This practice is likely to result In delayed 
 trains, especially when there are a number of people taking advantage of it. In 
 addition, it may require the carriers to provide additional employees to sell tickets 
 or receive fares. It may result in certain border points being favored as gateways 
 unless the can-Iers via other routes reduce their charges to meet the situation. It 
 is testified that the practice has had these results in other states in the past. Also 
 that the pracice has made it impossible in some parts of the country to maintain 
 reasonable Interstate fares ; that is, the practice became such a nuisance that the 
 carriers found it advlsal)le to publish through fares based upon the factors to and 
 from state borders. Principally as a matter of general interest, an instance was cited 
 in which the authorities of one state went so far as to require the carriers to post 
 notices at their stations to the effect that through fares could be defeated by resort- 
 ing to the device above described. 
 
 "The state authorities take the position that we have no power to act with respect 
 to intrastate rates or fares except to remove discriminations found to exist which in- 
 juriously affect persons or localities in Interstate commerce. They urge that the evi- 
 dence in this case does not warrant a finding that the fares generally throughout the 
 state subject Interstate commerce to unjust discrimination within the meaning of the 
 statute. 
 
 "Section 3 of the act provides as follows : 
 
 "That it shall be vmlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions 
 of this Act to make or give any undue or unreasonal^le preference or advantage to 
 any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular de- 
 scription of traffic. In any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, 
 company, firm, corporation, or locality or any particular description of traffic to any 
 undue or unreasonable prejudice of disadvantage In any respect whatsoever. 
 
 "This particular provision of the act stands unamended by the transportation 
 act, 1920. It was this provision which gave rise to what is commonly known as the 
 Shreveport doctrine, laid down by the Supreme Court In Houstun &■ Texas Rij. v. 
 United t^tiitcs, 2.34, I'. S.. 342, commonly known as the Shreveport Cfise. That case 
 involved the validity of our order prescribing maximum reasonable rates from 
 Shreveport, La., to points In Texas and requiring the removal of undue prejudice 
 against Shreveport as to traffic to Texas points found to result from lower state com- 
 mission-made rates from Dallas and Houston, Tex., toward Shreveport for equal dis- 
 tances. The Supreme court there said, p. 3."i() et xiij : 
 
 " 'It is unnecessary to repeat what has frequently been said by this court with 
 respect to the complete and paramount character of the power confided to Congress 
 to regulate commerce among the sexeral states. It is of the esseuic of this power 
 
§613.1 
 
 TKAFFIC LAW SEBVICE 302 
 
 that, where it exists, it dominates. Interstate trade was not left to be destroyed or 
 impeded by the rivalries of local governments. The purpose was to make impossible 
 the recurrence of the evils which had overwhelmed the Confederation and to provide 
 the necessary basis of national unity by insuring "Uniformity of regulation against 
 conflicting and discriminating state legislation." By virtue of the comprehensive 
 terms of the grant, the authority of Congress is at all times adequate to meet the 
 varying exigencies that arise and to protect the national interest by securing the free- 
 dom of interstate commercial intercourse from local control. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 
 Wheat. 1, 196, 224 ; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat 419, 446 ; County of Mobile v. Kim- 
 ball, 102 U. S. 691, 696, 697; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 45, 473; Second Employers' 
 Liability Oases, 223 U. S. 1, 47, 53, 54; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 398, 399. 
 
 " 'Congress is empowered to regulate, that is, to provide the law for the govern- 
 ment of interstate commerce ; to enact "all appropriate legislation" for its "protection 
 and advancement" (The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 564) ; to adopt measures "to pro- 
 mote its growth and insure its safety" (County of Mobile v. Kimball, supra) ; "to 
 foster, protect, control and restrain" (Second Employers' Liability Cases, supra). Its 
 authority, extending to these interstate carriers as instruments of interstate com- 
 merce, necessarily embraces the right to conti'ol their operations in all matters hav- 
 ing such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the control is 
 essential or appropriate to the security of that traffic, to the efficiency of the interstate 
 service, and to the maintenance of conditions under which interstate commerce may 
 be conducted upon fair terms and without molestation or hindrance. As it is com- 
 petent for Congress to legislate to these ends, unquestionably it may seek their attain- 
 ment by requiring that the agencies of interstate commerce shall not be used in such 
 manner as to cripple, retard or destroy it. The fact that carriers are instruments 
 of intrastate commerce, as well as of interstate commerce, does not derogate from 
 the complete and paramount authority of Congress over the matter or preclude the 
 Federal power from being exerted to prevent the intrastate- operations of such car- 
 riers from being made a means of inju,ry to that which has been confided to Federal 
 care. Wherever the interstate arid intrastate transaction of carriers are so related 
 that the government of the one involves the control of the other, it is Congress, and 
 not the State, that is entitled to prescribe the final and dominant rule, for otherwise 
 Congress would not be denied the exercise of its constitutional authority and the 
 State, and not the Nation, would be supreme within the national field. Baltimore & 
 Ohio Railroad Co. i-. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612, 618 ; Southern 
 Railway Co. v. United States, 222 TJ. S. 20, 26, 27 ; Second Employers' LiabiUty Cases, 
 supra, pp. 48, 51 : Interstate Commerce Commission -v. (Goodrich Transit Co. 224 U. S. 
 194. 205, 213; Jlinnesota Rates Cases, supra, p. 431; Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. 
 Belirens, 233 V. S. 473. 
 
 * -It * .* * 
 
 "'While these decisions (referring to cases cited) sustaining the Federal power 
 relate to measures adopted in the interest of the safety of persons and property, 
 they illustrate the principle that Congress in the exercise of its paramount power may 
 prevent the common instrumentalities of interstate and intrastate commercial inter- 
 course from being used in their intrastate operations to the injury of interstate com- 
 merce. This is not to say that Congress possesses the autt^ority to regulate the 
 internal commerce of a State, as such, but that it does possess the power to foster and 
 protect interstate commerce, and to take all measures necessary or appropriate to 
 that end, although intrastate transactions of Interstate carriers may thereby be 
 controlled. 
 
 " 'This principle is applicable here. We find no reason to doubt that Congress 
 is entitled to keep the highways of interstate communication open to interstate traffic 
 upon fair and equal terms. Tliat an unjust discrimination in the rates of a common 
 carrier, by which one person or locality is unduly favored as against another under 
 substantially similar conditions of traffic, constitutes an evil is undeniable ; and where 
 this evil consists in the action of an interstate carrier in unreasonably discriminating 
 against interstate traffic over its line, tlie authority of Congress to prevent it is 
 equally clear. It is immaterial, ?o far as the protecting power of Congress is con- 
 cerned, that the discrimination arises from intrastate rates as compared with inter- 
 state rates. The use of the instrument of interstate commerce in a discriminatory 
 manner so as to inflict injury upon that commerce, or some part thereof, furnishes 
 abundant ground for Federal intervention. Nor can the attempted exercise of state 
 authority alter the matter, where Congress has acted, for a State may not authorize 
 the carrier to do that which Congress is entitled to forbid and has forbidden. 
 
 '■ 'It is also to be noted — as the Government has well said in its argument in 
 support of the Commission's order— that the power to deal with the relation between 
 the two kinds of rates, as a relation, lies exclusively with Congress. It is manifest 
 that the State can not fix the relation of the carrier's interstate and intrastate 
 charges without directly interfering with the former, unless it simply follows the 
 standard set by Federal authority. This question was presented with respect to the 
 long-and-short provisions of the Kentucky constitution, adopted in 1891, which the 
 court had before it in Louisville fy Nashville R. R. Go. v. Eubank, 184 U. S. 27. The 
 state court had construed this provision as embracing a long haul, from a place out- 
 side to one within the State, and a shorter haul on the same line and in the same 
 direction between points within the ^tate. This court held that, so construed, the 
 provision was invalid as being a regulation of interstate commerce because "it linked 
 the interstate rate to the rate for the shorter haul and thus the interstate charge 
 was directly controlled by the state law." See 230 IT. S. 42S. 429. It is for Congi-ess 
 to supply the needed correction where the relation between intrastate and interstate 
 
303 FREIGHT EATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 rates present the evil to be corrected, and this it may do completely by reason of its 
 control over the interstate carrier in all matters having such a close and substantial 
 relation to interstate commerce that it is necessary or appropriate to exercise the 
 control for the effective government of that commerce. 
 
 ***** 
 
 " 'It is also clear that, in removing the injurious discriminations asainst inter- 
 state traffic arising from the relation of intrastate to interstate rates. Congress is not 
 bound to reduce the latter below what it may deem to be a proper standard fair to 
 the carrier and to the public. Otherwise, it could prevent the injury to interstate 
 commerce only by the sacrifice of its judgment as to the interstate rates. Congress is 
 entitled to maintain its own standard as to these rates and to forbid any discrim- 
 inatory action by interstate carriers which will obstruct the freedom of movement 
 of interstate traffic over their lines in accordance with the terms it establishes. 
 
 "Having this power. Congress could provide for its execution through the aid of 
 a subordinate body ; and we conclude that the order of the Commission now in 
 question can not be held invalid upon the ground that it exceeded the authority which 
 Congress could lawfully confer.' 
 
 "In American Express Co. v. Caldwell, 244 U. S., 617, and Illinois Central R. R. 
 Co. v. I'liUic Utilities Comm., 245 TJ. S., 493, the principles announced in the Shreve- 
 port case, supra, were reaffirmed, but it was also held that in each such case our 
 order must ha\e a definite field of operation and not leave uncertain the territory or 
 points to which it applies. 
 
 "The State authorities contend that paragraph 4, section 13, of the act is merely 
 a restatement of the effect of section 3 of the act as interpreted by the Supreme 
 Court in the Shreveport Case, supra. The provision in question reiterates in effect 
 what is stated in section 3, but in it Congress has gone further than declaring that 
 there shall be no undue or unreasonable advantage, preference or prejudice as be- 
 tween persons and localities, as in section 3, and has forbidden and declared unlawful 
 'any vindue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate or foreign 
 commerce.' The term 'commerce' covers the entire field of transportation — the trafBc 
 itself and all the instrumentalities and means of carrying it on. The language used 
 is certainly broad enough to cover every discrimination growing out of the relation 
 between intrastate and interstate commerce which injuriously affects the latter. 
 
 "Legislatures do not enact laws for the purpose of construing a previous act 
 unless a construction has been placed upon the prior act which was not intended by 
 the legislature. There is certainly nothing in paragraph 4 of section IS which in- 
 dicates any purpose of construing section 3 of the act. 
 
 "The Supreme Court, in the Minnesota Rate Cfises, 230 Ti. S. .•').^2, recognizes the 
 power of the federal government to supervise the rates of intrastate commerce ^^hen 
 they are so intermingled with interstate commerce on roads' engaged in both that 
 in the interest of interstate commerce such regulation becomes necessary. In that 
 case the court said, page 432 : 
 
 " 'The intet'blending of operations in the conduct of interstate and local business 
 by interstate carriers is strongly pressed upon our attention. It is ui-ged that the 
 same right-of-way. terminals, rails, bridges, and stations are provided for both 
 classes of traffic; that the iiroportion of each sort of bii'^iness varies from year to 
 vear and, indeed, from day to day; that no division of the plant, no apportionment 
 of it between interstate and local traffic, can be made to-day, which will hold to- 
 morrow; that terminals, facilities, and connections in one State aid the carrier's 
 entire business and are an element of value with respect to the whole property and 
 the business of other States ; that securities are issued against the entire line of the 
 carrier and can not be divided by States; that tariffs should be made with a view 
 to all the traffic of the road and should be fair as between through and short-haul 
 business; and that, in substance, no regulation of rates can be just which does not 
 take into consideration the whole field of the carrier's operations, irrespective of 
 state lines. The force of these contentions is emphasized in these cases, and in others 
 of like nature, by the extreme difficulty and intricacy of the calculations which must 
 be made in the effort to establish a segregation of intrastate business for the puiijose 
 of determining the return to which the carrier is properly entitled therefrom. 
 
 " 'But these considerations are for the practical judgment of Congress in deter- 
 mining the extent of the regulation necessary under existing conditions of trans- 
 portation to conserve and promote the interests of interstate commerce. If the sit- 
 uation has become such, by reason of the interlilending of the interstate and intra- 
 state operations of interstate carriers, that adequate regulation of their interstate 
 rates cannot be maintained without imposing requirements with respect to their 
 intrastate rates which substantially affect the former, it is for Congress to de- 
 termine within the limits of its constitutional authority over interstate commerce 
 and its instruments the measure of the regulation it should supply. It is the function 
 of this^ court to interpret and supply the law already enacted, but not under the guise 
 of construction to provide a more comprehensive scheme of regulation than Congress 
 has decided upon. Nor, in the absence of Federal action, may we deny effect to the 
 laws of the State enacted within the field which it is entitled to occupy until its 
 authority is limited through the exertion by Congress of its paramount constitutional 
 power." 
 * 
 
 "The terms of the act are sufficiently broad to forbid unjust discrimination 
 against Interstate commerce without reference to particular persons or localities. 
 
§613] 
 
 TKAFFIC LAW SEEVICE- 304 
 
 Considering tlie conditions existing at tlie time of tlie passage of tlie act, the purpose 
 of the act to correct tliose conditions, and the legislative scheme adopted by Congress 
 to carry out that purpose, we have no doubt that Congress meant to give full import 
 to the language used, and that the prohibition against 'undue, unreasonable, or un- 
 just discrimination against interstate of foreign commerce' is not limited to par- 
 ticular persons or localities, but is applicable to such discrimination against inter- 
 state or foreign commerce in their broad definitions. 
 
 "This construction of the act can not be said to be an encroachment on states' 
 rights. The power to regulate interstate commerce was granted Congress chiefly as a 
 means of protection against commercial hostilities and reprisals between the various 
 states which overwhelmed the Confederation and threatened the commercial de- 
 struction of some of the states. The existence of that exclusive power in Congress is 
 of greater importance now than at the time of the adoption of the constitution, for 
 the protection of the states themselves. Today railroads run the length and breadth 
 of the country. Many of the roads traverse with their own lines a number of states. 
 Even though a carrier's rails may be confined wholly within a state, it is ordinarily 
 an important link in the transportation of commerce from and to other states. Each 
 state, therefore, is vitally interested in the transportation conditions in the other. A 
 narrow or selfish policy with respect to the transportation instrumentalities within 
 a state may cripple or suppress the commerce of the other states. 
 
 '^^Ye find that there are no conditions within Illinois justifying maintenance of 
 lower intrastate passenger fares therein than the fares applicable to the interstate 
 transportation of passengers to, from or through the^state; and that the maintenance 
 of such intrastate fares lower than the just and reasonable interstate fares and 
 charges established by the carriers pursuant to Ex Parte 74 gives an undue pref- 
 erence and advantage to persons traveling in intrastate commerce in Illinois and 
 subjects persons traveling in interstate commerce to, from or through the state to 
 undue prejudice and disadvantage, and unjustly discriminates against interstate 
 commerce ; which undue prejudice and unjust discrimination should be removed. 
 
 "We are of opinion and further find that, to remove the undue prejudice and 
 unjust discrimination found to exist, the present fares for the intrastate transporta- 
 tion of passengers in Illinois should be increased in amounts which shall correspond 
 with the increases heretofore made as aforesaid in interstate passenger fares ; and 
 that surcharges upon the contemporaneous charges for space occupied by passengers 
 traveling in intrastate commerce in sleeping cars and parlor cars in Illinois, amount- 
 ing to 50 per cent of such charges, should be established, such surcharges to accrue 
 to the rail lines." 
 
 The following proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission involve 
 the intrastate rates and charges of the several states: ARIZONA — In the Matter of 
 Rates, Fares, and Charges Applicable between Points in the State of Arizona (1921), 
 61 I. C. C. Rep. 572: ARKANSAS— In the Matter of Rates. Fares ana Charges of the 
 Missouri P. Ry. Co. and other Carriers in the State of Arkansas (1920), 59 I. C. 0. 
 Rep. 471 ; FLORIDA— In the JIatter of Intrastate Rates, Fares, and Charges of the 
 Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. and other Carriers in the State of Florida (1921), 60 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 551; GEORGIA— In the Miatter of Intrastate Rates, Fares, and Charges of the 
 Atlanta & W. P. Rd. Co. and other Carriers in the State of Georgia, (1921), 60 I. C. 
 C. Rep. 527; ILLINOIS— In the Matter of Intrastate Rates within the State of 
 Illinois (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 350; In the Matter of Intrastate Rates within the 
 State of Illinois (1921), CO I. C. C. Rep. 92; In the Matter of Intrastate Rates with- 
 in the State of Illinois (1922), €6 I. C. C. Rep. 350; INDIANA— In the Matter of 
 Rates. Fares, and Charges applicable between Points in the State of Indiana (1921), 
 60 I. C. C. Rep. 337 ; In the Matter of Rates, Fares, and Charges, applicable between 
 Points in the State of Indiana (1921), 64 I. C. C. Rep. 645; KANSAS— In the Matter 
 of Intrastate Rates, Fares, and Charges in the State of Kansas (1921), 62 I. C. O. 
 Rep. 440; In the Matter of Intrastate Rates, Fares, and Charges in the State of 
 Kansas (1921), (H I. C. C. Rep. 679; LOUISIANA— In the aiatter of Intrastate 
 Rates. Fares, and Charges of the Morgan's L. & T. Rd. & S. S. Co. and Other Car- 
 riers in the State of Louisiana (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 467; MISSOURI— In the 
 Matter of Intrastate Rates and Charges in the State of Missouri (1921), 64 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 2.33 ; MONTANA— In the Matter of Intrastate Rates and Fares 'of the Chicago, 
 B. & Q. Rd. Co. and Other Carriers in the State of Montana (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 
 61 ; In the Matter of Intrastate Rates, and Fares of the Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. and 
 other Carriers in the State of Montana (1921), 61 I. C. C. Rep. 500; NEBRASKA— 
 In the Matter of Intrastate Rates, Fares, and Charges of the Union P. Rd. Co. and 
 other Carriers in the State of Nebraska (1921). 60 I. C. C. Rep. 305: NEVADA— In 
 the Matter of .Intrastate Rates, Fares, and Charges of the Southern P. Co. and other 
 Carriers in the State of Nevada (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 623; NEW YORK— In the 
 Matter of Rates, Fares and Charges of the New York Rd. Co. and other Railroad 
 Companies in the State of New York (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 290; Lehigh V. Rd. Co. 
 V. Public Service Commission of New York (1921), 272 Fed. Rep. 758; State of New 
 York V. United States (1922). 66 L. Ed. 244, — U. S. — , — Sup. Ct. Rep. — : NORTH 
 DAKOTA— in the JIatter of Intrastate Rates, Fares and Charges of the Chicago, M. 
 & St. P. Ry. Co. and other Carriers in the State of North Dakota (1921), 61 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 504; OHIO — In the ilatter of Passenger and Pullman Fares. Charges for ex- 
 cess Baggage, and Rates on Milk and Cream applicable between Points in the State 
 of Ohio (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 78; In the Matter of Rates, Fares and Charges of 
 the Pennsylvania-Ohio Power & Light Company within the States of Ohio and Penn- 
 
305 FREIGHT KATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 sylvania (1921), 64 I. C. 0. Rep. 493; In the Matter of Rates, Fares, -aud Charges of 
 the SteubenvUIe, East Liverpool & Beaver Valley Traction Co. within the States of 
 Ohio and Pennsylvania (1921), m I. C. C. Rep. 517; SOUTH CAROLINA— In the 
 Matter of Intrastate Passenger Fares and Charges and Certain Charges for special 
 Services within the State of South Carolina (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 290; TENN- 
 ESSEE — In the Matter of Intrastate Rates and Charges in the State of Tennessee 
 (1921), 63 I. C. C. Rep. 160; TEXAS— In the Matter of Intrastate Rates within the 
 State of Texas (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 421; In the Matter of Intrastate Rates within 
 the State of Texas (1921), 62 I. C. C. Rep. 591; In the Matter of Intrastate Rates 
 withm the State of Texas (1922), 68 I. C. C. Rep. 25; WISCONSIN— In the Matter 
 of Intrastate Passenger Fares on the line of the Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. and other 
 Carriers between Points in the State of 'VVlsconsln, (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 391; Rail- 
 road Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1922), 66 L. Ed. 236, 
 — U. S. — , — Sup. Ct. Rep. — . 
 
 3. In the Matter of Rates, Fares and Charges of the New York Central Railroad 
 Company and other railroad companies in the State of New York (1920), 59 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 290, et seq. The Commission, per Mr. Commissioner Ford, stated : 
 
 "In pursuance of our findings in Ex Parte 74. Increased Bates, ,1920, 58 I. C. C. 
 220, we authorized within a region that includes the state of New York an increase 
 of 40 per cent in the interstate freight rates ; 20 per cent in the interstate passenger 
 fares, baggage charges, and rates on milk and cream; and also a surcharge amount- 
 ing to 50 per cent of the charge for space in sleeping and parlor cars, to accrue to 
 the rail carriers. 
 
 "Thereupon the steam railroad companies serving the state of New York m^de 
 formal application to the Public Service Commission of the State of New York, 
 Second District, for permission to file effective on five days' notice tariff supplements 
 providing increases in the rates, fares, and charges applicable to intrastate traffic 
 in the state of New York corresponding with those authorized in our report. So far 
 as the application related to rates and charges for the transportation of freight ex- 
 cept milk it was granted by the Public Service Commission, by an order entered 
 August 19, 1920, and the increases became effective August 26, 1920, contemporan- 
 eously with the increases in interstate rates. But so far as it related to passenger 
 fares, sleeping-car and parlor-car fares, baggage charges, and rates on milk and 
 cream, the application was denied by the Public Service Commission. Thereafter the 
 principal steam railroads serving the state of New York filed with us a petition for 
 relief in accordance with the provisions of section 13 of the interstate commerce act. 
 A hearing upon the petition has been held, and the views of parties in interest have 
 been presented to us on brief and by oral argument. 
 
 "This case raises again the question whether in regulating interstate commerce, 
 under authority reposed in us by Congress, we have incidentally the power of reg- 
 ulating intrastate commerce so far as it affects interstate commerce. In the Shreve- 
 port Case, 23 I. C. C. 31, we held that we did possess that power by act of Congress, 
 and we pointed out : 
 
 " 'Congress passed this act with full knowledge and profound appreciation of 
 those decisions of the Supreme Court in which it had been held that state commerce 
 was that wholly within a state "and not affecting interstate commerce." as is fully 
 shown by the OuUom report of 1886, out of which grew the act to regulate com- 
 mence.' 
 
 "The position we took was sustained by the United States Supreme Court, and 
 the principle on which we acted then continues to be our guide. But since then the 
 general obligation resting upon us to exercise control over intrastate commerce so 
 far as it affects interstate commerce has been put in the form of a mandate by sec- 
 tion 13 of the interstate commerce act, as amehded by the transportation act, 1920. 
 
 "It has been urged in opposition to the application of this principle to the pend- 
 ing case that such incidental jurisdiction as we may possess over intrastate rates is 
 contingent upon proof that discrimination exists affecting particular persons or 
 localities. But inasmuch as the basis of our jurisdiction is our power to regulate in- 
 terstate commerce, it follows that the decisive factor is whether the rates under con- 
 sideration injuriously affect interstate commerce. It is no answer to say that if this 
 conclusion be admitted it may have the effect of completely displacing state juris- 
 diction over state commerce. There may be cases in which intrastate rates affect 
 Interstate commerce injuriously in ways so manifest as to make them subject to our 
 control. There may be cases in which the connection of intrastate rates with the 
 movement of interstate commerce is so remote and unimportant that we may properly 
 disregard it. But in every case which puts in question intrastate rates, the decisive 
 factor is whether or not they affect interstate commerce injuriously to a considerable 
 extent. If they do they are brought under our jurisdiction and made subject to our 
 control, even although the whole rate structure of a state should be involved. 
 
 "It has not happened heretofore that we have had occasion to make such an ex- 
 tensive exercise of our authority as is now contemplated, and we could not be moved 
 to do so save by the most cogent reasons. Such reasons have been supplied by the 
 situation in which the transportation interests of the country were placed and the 
 action taken by Congress to relieve that situation. 
 
 "Our findings in Increased Rates, 1920, supra, were responsive, as the report 
 shows, to legislation enacted by the Congress as part of the transportation act, 1920. 
 
§613] 
 
 TKAPFIC LAW SEKVICE 306 
 
 approved February 29, 1920, now incorporated in tlie interstate commerce act as part 
 of section 15a tliereof, paragraph 2 and 3 reading as follows: 
 
 "'(2) In the exercise of its power to prescribe just and reasonable rates the 
 Commission shall initiate, modify, establish or adjust eticli rates so that carriers as 
 a whole (or as a whole in each of sneh rate groups or territories as the Commission 
 may from time to time designate) will, under honest, efficient and economical man- 
 agement and reasonable expenditures for maintenance of way, structures and 
 equipment, earn an aggregate annual net railway operating income equal, as nearly 
 as may be, to a fair return upon the aggregate value of the railway property of such 
 carriers held for and used in the service of transportation : Provided, That the Com- 
 mission shall have reasonable latitude to modify or adjust any particular rate which 
 it may find to be unjust or unreasonable, and to prescribe different rates for different 
 sections of the country. 
 
 " '(3) The Commission shall from time to time determine and make public what 
 percentage of such aggregate property value constitutes a fair return thereon, and 
 such percentage shall be uniform for all rate groups or territories which may be desig- 
 nated by the Commission. In making such determination it shall give due considera- 
 tion among other things, to the transportation needs of the country and the necessity 
 (under honest, efficient and economical management of existing transportation facili- 
 ties) >of enlargtog such facilities in order to provide the people of the United States 
 with adequate transportation : Provided, That during the two years beginning March 
 1, 1920, the Commission shall take as such fair return a sum equal to 5% per centum 
 of such aggregate value, but may, in its discretion, add thereto a sum not exceeding 
 one-half of one per centum of such aggregate value to make provision in whole or 
 in part for improvements, betterments of equipment, which, according to the account- 
 ing system prescribed by the Commission, are chargeable to capital account.' 
 
 "In accordance with these statutory provisions we designated four rate groups, 
 one of which embraces the territory bounded on the west by the Mississippi River 
 and on the south by the Ohio Kiver and the main line of the Norfolk & Western 
 Railway; and we authorized increased rates, fares, and charges that were designed 
 to enable the carriers as a whole in that group, 'under honest, efficient, and economi- 
 cal management and reasonable expenditures for maintenance of way, structures, 
 and equipment,' to earn an aggregate annual net railway operating Income equal, as 
 nearly as may be, to 5% per cent upon the aggi'egate value of the railway property 
 of such carriers in that group, plus one-half of 1 per cent of that aggregate value 
 for improvements, betterments, or equipment, chargeable to capital account. 
 
 "Congress has taken, as the basis for determining a fair return for the railroads, 
 the aggregate value of the railway properties in each group held for and used in the 
 service of transportation. In making a tentative finding of the value of the railway 
 properties in each group, for the purpose of our report, we included all the railway 
 property of each carrier held for and used in the service of transportation. This 
 should not be construed as holding that jurisdiction over intrastate rates and fares 
 has been taken away from the states and reposed in us. We find nothing in the law 
 to indicate that such was the intent of Congress. But Congress has directed that we 
 allow rates that will yield in the aggregate a return of 5% or 6 per cent upon the 
 value of the railway property in each of the groups. There can be no doubt of the 
 power of Congress to devise and provide for carrying into effect a plan for assuring 
 to p^e nation's interstate railroads a fair return upon the value of their property ; 
 and the full control by Congress of this matter is not to be denied on the ground that 
 the carrier's aggregate earnings are a commingling of intrastate revenue. In The 
 Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S., 399, the Supreme Court said : 
 
 " 'This reservation to the State manifestly is only of that authority which is 
 consistent with and not opposed to the grant of Congress. There is no room in our 
 scheme of government for the assertion of state power in hostility to the authorized 
 exercise of Federal power. The authority of Congress extends to every part of inter- 
 state commerce, and to every instrumentality or agency by which it is carried on; 
 and the full control by Congress of the subjects committed to its regulation is not to 
 be denied or thwarted by the commingling of interstate and intrastate operations. 
 This is not to say that the Nation may deal with the internal concerns of the State, 
 as such, but that the execution by Congress of its constitutional power to regulate 
 interstate commerce Is not limited by the fact that intrastate transactions may have 
 become so interwoven therewith that the effective government of the former inci- 
 dentally controls the latter. This conclusion necessarily results from the supremacy 
 of the national power within its appointed sphere.' 
 
 "The record shows that the refusal of the state of New York to permit the car- 
 riers to increase the rates and fares here in controversy to the extent approved by us 
 is costing the railroads between $11,000,000 and $12,000,000 annually. In other words, 
 the annual earnings of the interstate carriers operating in New York are now between 
 $11,000,000 and $12,000,000 less than they would be if the general level of rates and 
 fares approved by us had become effective on intrastate traffic; and to that extent 
 the declared purpose of Congress is defeated by a preferential basis of rates and 
 fares maintained by authority of the state of New York. 
 
 "This proceeding presents a practical question which we have endeavored to deal 
 with in a practical way. The needs of these interstate carriers for revenue to enable 
 them to provide adequate transportation service and facilities are immediate and, in 
 the interest of the public, can not be permitted to await the consideration in detail 
 of individual fares, charges and rates. The record shows that the respondent carriers 
 
307 FBEIGHT HATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 perform the services here in question under substantially similar circumstances and 
 conditions, whether In respect of interstate or intrastate transportation ; and that the 
 lower basis of intrastate fares, charges, and rates results in undue prejudice against 
 interstate passengers and shippers and unjust discrimination against interstate com- 
 merce. The present record warrants the finding hereinafter made. Those findings are 
 without prejudice to the right of the authorities of the state of New York or of any 
 other interested party, to apply in the proper manner for a modification of our find- 
 ings and order as to any fares, charges, or rates in such a way as to contravene the 
 provisions of the interstate commerce act. 
 
 "Subject to the above resen'ation in the matter of commutation fares and com- 
 mutation baggage charges, we are of the opinion and find that the increases made by 
 the carriers under Ex Parte 74, relating to passenger fares and baggage charges, and 
 now in effect, result in reasonable passenger fares and baggage charges for interstate 
 transportation within the territory involved in this proceeding, and that the failure 
 of the carriers within the state of New York to increase the standard Intrastate fares 
 and charges correspondingly has resulted in the past and will result in the future : 
 In intrastate fares and charges lower than the corresponding interstate fares and 
 charges ; in undue prejudice to persons traveling in interstate commerce within the 
 state of New York and between points in the state of New York and points in other 
 states ; In undue preference and advantage to persons traveling Intrastate in New 
 York, and in unjust discrimination against interstate commerce. 
 
 "We further find that said undue prejudice and unjust discrimination should be 
 removed by making Increases in said Intrastate passenger fares and baggage charges 
 which shall correspond with the increases heretofore made as aforesaid In Interstate 
 passenger fares and baggage charges. 
 
 "We further find that the Increases made by the carriers under Ex Parte 74. re- 
 lating to space occupied by passengers In sleeping and parlor cars, result in reasonable 
 charges for the occupancy of such space by passengers traveling in Interstate com- 
 merce in the territory Involved in this proceeding, and that the failure of the carriers 
 within the state of New York to increase correspondingly the charges for like space 
 for passengers traveling in intrastate commerce has resulted in the past and will re- 
 sult in the future : In intrastate charges lower than the corresponding interstate 
 charges ; in undue prejudice to persons traveling in interstate commerce within the 
 state of New York and between points in the state of New York and points in either 
 states ; in undue preference and advantage to persons traveling Intrastate in Ncav 
 York, and In unjust discrimination against Interstate commerce. 
 
 "We further find that said undue prejudice and unjust discrimination should be 
 removed by making increases in said intrastate charges which shall correspond with 
 the increases heretofore made as aforesaid in interstate charges. 
 
 "We further find that the increases made by the carriers under Ex Parte 74, re- 
 lating to rates on milk and creain, and now in effect, result In reasonable rates on milk 
 and cream for interstate transportation within the territory involved in this proceed- 
 ing, and that the failure of the carriers within tlie state of New York to Increase the 
 intrastate rates on milk and cream correspondingly has resulted in the past and will 
 regult in the future : In intrastate rates lower than the corresponding interstate 
 rates ; in undue prejudice to shippers of milk and cream in interstate commerce 
 within the state of New York and between points in the state of New York and points 
 in other states ; in undue preference and advantage to shippers of milk and cream in 
 Intrastate commerce in New York, and in unjust discrimination against Interstate 
 commerce. 
 
 "We further find that said undue prejudice and unjust discrimination should be 
 removed by making increase in said intrastate rates on milk and cream which shall 
 correspond with the increases heretofore made as aforesaid In the rates on milk and 
 cream shipped in interstate commerce. 
 
 "We further find that, whether the aforesaid passenger fares, baggage charges, 
 surcharges, or rates on milk and cream pertain to transportation in interstate com- 
 merce or to transportation in intrastate commerce, the ti'ansportation services, in 
 each instance, are performed by the carriers under substantially similar circum- 
 stances and conditions." 
 
 In the New York case Mr. Commissioner Eastman rendered the following able 
 dissenting opinion (59 I. C. C. Rep. 290, 300, et seq.) : 
 
 "I am miable to join in the decision of the majority, because I believe it goes 
 beyond our lawful power. The objection is more than technical, for It concerns the 
 basic relations between the state and federal governments, a matter of great mo- 
 ment. 
 
 "In essence, the carriers' position is that when we authorize an increase in inter- 
 state rates imder section 15 (a) of the Interstate commerce act a corresponding in- 
 crease must be made in intrastate rates ; otherwise jmjust discrimination against 
 Interstate commerce results, which It Is om* duty under section 13 to correct. State 
 commissions may be asked to authorize intrastate increases but they need be offered 
 no evidence except the fact of our decision and have no real discretion. The carriers 
 accept the logical consequence of this view and 1 understand them correctly, by hold- 
 ing that applications to the state commissions are in substance a matter of courtesy 
 an^l that we could, under section 13, either upon complaint or upon our own motion 
 
§613] 
 
 TEAFFIC LAW SEEVICE 308 
 
 prescribe the intrastate rates desired even though no such application had been made. 
 If this be so it follows that we would practically at will deprive any and all of the 
 states of authority over intrastate rates, for when such rates are once prescribed by 
 our order under section 13 they cannot thereafter be changed without our consent. 
 "The record in the instant case is based upon and conforms to the general theory 
 of our i)ower, and it is the only theory it seems to me, upon which the majority of 
 the Commission can in full measure be supported. I am unable to believe that it is 
 sound. The Supreme Court of the United States has said: 
 
 " 'In construing Federal statutes enacted under the power conferred by the com- 
 merce clause of the Constitution, the rule is that it should never be held that the 
 Congress intends to supersede or suspend the exercise of the reserved powers of a 
 state, even where that may be done, unless and except so far as its purpose to do so 
 is clearly manifested.' {IlKnois C. R. R. v. PuhUc Utilities Commission, 245 U. S. 
 493, 510.) 
 
 "It is in the light of this wise and salutary rule that we should approach the 
 issue before us, construing the provisions of the Act with scrupulous respect for State 
 authority. It is, I think, our duty to include that when the Congress expects us to 
 exercise new powers at the expense of a State, we shall be told to do so in plain and 
 unmistakable terms. 
 
 "In defining our jurisdiction, at the very beginning of the Interstate Commerce 
 Act, paragraph 2 of section 1, states that the provisions of the Act shall not apply — 
 
 " 'To the transportation of passengers or property, or to receiving, delivering, 
 storage or handling of property, wholly within one State, and not shipped to or from 
 a foreign country from or to any place in the United States as aforesaid.' 
 
 "The language is unequivocal and there is no subsequent provision which runs 
 counter to the limitation. It is interstate and not Intrastate transportion with which 
 the Act has to do. Under paragraph 4 of section 13 it is true that we may prescribe 
 intrastate rates, but only for the purpose of removing unjust discrimination against 
 interstate commerce. Plainly this power springs from and is merely an incident of 
 the duty to regulate and protect interstate traffic. 
 
 "Turning to section 15 (a), our duty to establish rates which will enable carriers 
 to earn a fair return upon the aggregate value of the railway property relates and is 
 confined to interstate rates. Without regard to the limitation of section 1, there Is 
 no 'clearly manifested purpose' to extend our authority over intrastate rates, and 
 certainly there is none in view of this limitation. Nor is such a conclusion incon- 
 sistent with a reasonable interpretation and practical application of this section. A 
 rule is laid down for our guidance, but our duty is confined to interstate rates and 
 it is a duty merely to maintain such rates at tlie level which will yield the return 
 desired, assuming that the states will exercise their own power justly and taking 
 into consideration our right to correct intrastate rates which unjustly discriminate 
 against interstate commerce. 
 
 "At this point we may consider for a moment whether or not there is reason to 
 believe that the Public Service Commission of New York is disposed to deal justly 
 with the carriers. Following our decision in Increased Rates, 1920, supra, applica- 
 tions were filed with that Commission for authority to make like increases in intra- 
 state rates, fares and charges. With a few minor exceptions the freight increases 
 sought were permitted at once to become effective, as was possible under the state 
 statutes, without Indication of approval or disapproval and subject to complaint or 
 investigation in the future. The situation was difl:erent as to passenger fares. By a 
 provision of the New Xork law these are limited to a maximum of 3 cents per mile, 
 but the state commission pointed out that it could permit fares in excess of this limit 
 upon a showing that existing fares were insufficient to afford reasonable compensation 
 for the service rendered. Notwithstanding this intimation the carriers Offered no 
 evidence that did not assert that the fares were insufficient, but relied upon the fact 
 that we had permitted an increase of 20 per cent in the interstate fares. Under the 
 circumstances no course seemed open to the New York commission except to deny 
 the application, and this it did upon the sole ground of lack of evidence. 
 
 "There is no basis for a belief that the New York commission is disposed to deal 
 other than justly with the carriers, or that it would have been unduly exacting if 
 they had undertaken to show insufficiency of compensation. Ui>on the facts before 
 us and in a spirit of comity the carriers might well be remitted to the state tribunal 
 to exhaust their remedies before coming to us for action which will deprive the state 
 of all authority over intrastate fares so long as our order remains in effect. In this 
 view of the matter \^hatever losses in revenue the carriers may have suffered are 
 chargeable to their own default. 
 
 "But approaching the matter solely from the viewpoint of our own jurisdiction, 
 it is clear, I think, that for such authority as we possess over intrastate rates we 
 must now look to the provisions of section 13. The question at once arises whether 
 by reason of this section we have an essentially different issue before us than has 
 frequently been considered under section 3 of the act to regulate commerce in so- 
 called 'Shreveport cases.' The carriers assert that the issue is different because 
 section 13 not only prohibits 'any uu^ue or unreasonable advantage, preference, or 
 prejudice as between persons or localities in intrastate commerce on the one hand 
 and interstate or foreign commerce on the other hand,' but also prohibits 'any undue, 
 unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce.' Their 
 view, as I understand it, is that the word 'discrimination' is this latter phrase Is 
 equivalent to the word 'burden,' and that the effect is to prohibit what was not pro- 
 
309 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 hibited by section 3, namely, an unduly low level of rates within the state which is 
 yet not alleged or shown to be unduly preferential of or unduly prejudicial against 
 any particular person or community. 
 
 "This conclusion I find It difficult to accept. X'pon protest the conference com- 
 mittee of the iSenate and House of Representatives .struck from section 13 the words 
 'undue burden' and wrote in their place the words 'undue, unreasonable, or unjust 
 discrimination,' which now are there. I hesitate to believe, as the carriers urge that 
 no change in meaning was intended or accomplished by this change in words. More- 
 over, in speakinf; of section 3 of the act to regulate commerce in the consideration 
 of the original Shreveport Case, the Supreme Court of the United States said: 
 
 " 'It is apparent from the legislative history of the act that the evil of discrimi- 
 nation was the principal thing aimed at, and there is no basis for the contention that 
 Congress Intended to exempt any discriminatory action or practice of Interstate car- 
 riers affecting interstate commerce which it had authority to reach.' {Houston East 
 &■ West Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 V. S. 342, 356.) 
 
 "Surely this language is quite as broad as the words in section 13 to which our 
 attention is now directed. 
 
 "If the issue before us is not essentially different from the issue which has been 
 considered in prior 'Shreveport Cases,' it will, I think, be conceded that while the 
 evidence may be sufficient to justify action against certain intrastate fares and 
 charges, it is not sufficient to justify the all-embracing action which the majority ap- 
 prove. This is indicated by the fact that the carriers have not seen fit to rely upon 
 preference to persons or communities, none of which are complaining, but have rested 
 their case chiefly upon the allegation that the Intrastate rates are upon a lower level 
 than the Interstate and fail to contribute their fair share of the railway operating 
 Income to which we have foiuid that the carriers in the eastern group are entitled. 
 For the reasons above stated I doubt our power to change state rates upon this 
 ground. It falls nothing" short of an appellate power to substitute our judgment as 
 to ^he reasonableness of such rates for the judgment of the states. But assuming 
 that we possess this power, is the evidence sufficient to justify us In exercising It? 
 
 "Stating the question differently, is there evidence that the intrastate fares and 
 charges In question are not producing their fair share of railway operating income 
 and, if they are not, that the percentage increase desired is necessary to bring them 
 to the proper level. That is not, It seems to me, an inevitable conclusion from our 
 decision in Increased Rates, 1920, supra, and In this connection it is desirable to 
 understand clearly the purport and effect of that decision. We were there faced 
 with the necessity of providing without delay the additional revenue needed to 
 bring the aggregate Income of the carriers to the level prescribed by the act, and we 
 adopted the expedient of authorizing horizontal percentage increases in rates, fares, 
 and charges within and between certain territorial groups. This expedient was 
 nesessary. for any detailed consideration of individual rates was impracticable in 
 the time available. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the act does not prescribe 
 this method of Increasing rates, that our duty under section 15 (a) is a continuing 
 duty, and that our finding was only that the method employed would 'result in 
 rates not unreasonable in the Aggregate.' It rested upon the assumption that ex- 
 tensive readjustment would probably be necessary. It is not equivalent to a finding 
 that Individual rates, fares, and charges or classes of rates, fares, and charges, so 
 increased and now in effect, are just and reasonable. Still less does it follow as a 
 necessary conclusion, where state authority is Involved, that the passenger fares 
 within any particular state must be increased 20 per cent In order to produce their 
 fair share of railway operating income. But if our decision in Increased Rates, 
 1920, is not evidence of that fact, certainly there is no other evidence of record upon 
 which such a conclusion can be based. 
 
 "No doubt it may be unnecessary that the individual fares and changes within 
 the state should all be considered separately or that the value of the property used 
 In the intrastate transportation should be established and the return now earned 
 upon that value estimated by elaborate computations. But I am unable to escape 
 the conclusion that even if the theory of the carriers as to our power under section 
 13 be accepted, at least it should be shown, by evidence sufficient to justify a valid 
 opinion, that the intrastate fares and charges in question are not now furnishing 
 adequate compensation for the service rendered judged by the standard which the 
 Congress has set forth, and that an increase of 20 per cent is necessary to this end. 
 
 "Summing the matter up, without going into further detail, I am of the opinion 
 that upon the record before us the decision of the majority involves the exercise of a 
 power which goes beyond and 'clearly manifested purpose' of the Congress, and 
 which we ought not to attempt to exercise until it is conferred upon us in plain and 
 unmistakable terms. Nor would such a conclusion leave the carriers without a rem- 
 edy, if they are prepared to bring the necessary evidence to the attention of the New 
 York commission." 
 4. In the Matter of Intrastate Rates within the State of IlUnols (1920), 59 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 350. 
 
 5 Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1922), 66 L. Ed. 
 236, et seq. — U. S. — , — Sup. Ct. Rep. — . 
 
 6 State of New York, et al., v. United States, et al. (1922), 66 L. Ed. 244, et seq. 
 
 US Sup. Ct. Rep. — , affirming judgment in the Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
 in Lehigh V. Rd. Co. v. Public Service Commission of New York (1921), 272 Fed. 
 Rep. 758. 
 
§613] traffic law sekvice 310 
 
 613-00. Teanspoetation of Commissiojst 's valuation supplies. 
 
 It shall be the duty of every common carrier by railroad whose 
 property is being valued under the Act of March first, nineteen hun- 
 dred and thirteen, to transport the engineers, field parties, and other 
 employees of the United States who are actually engaged in making 
 surveys and other examinations of the physical property of said car- 
 rier necessary to execute said Act from point to point on said railroad 
 as may be reasonably required by them in the actual discharge of their 
 duties ; and, also, to move from point to point and store at such points 
 as may be reasonably required the cars of the United States which are 
 being used to house and maintain said employees; and, also, to carry 
 the supplies necessary to maintain said employees and the other prop- 
 erty of the United States actually used on said railroad in said work 
 of valuation. The service above required shall be regarded as a special 
 service and shall be rendered under such forms and regulations and 
 for such reasonable compensation as may be prescribed by the Inter- 
 state Commerce Commission and as will insure an accurate record 
 and account of the service rendered by the railroad, and such evidence 
 of transportation, bills of lading, and so forth, shall be furnished to 
 the Commission as may from time to time be required by the Com- 
 mission.'^ 
 
 1. Provision in Sundry Civil Appropriations Act (August 1, 1914). 
 
 613-PP. PowEB OF Commission ovee inteastate rates dueing the 
 PEEiOD OF Federal control. 
 Section 10 of the Federal Control Act^ reads as follows : 
 
 That carriers while under Federal control shall be subject to all laws and liabili- 
 ties as common carriers, whether arising under State or Federal laws or at common 
 law, except in so far as may be inconsistent wdth the provisions of this Act or any 
 other Act applicable to such Federal control or with any order of the President. Actions 
 at law or suits in equity may be brought by and against such carriers and judgments 
 rendered as now provided by law; and in any action at law or suit in equity against the 
 carrier, no defense shall be made thereto upon the ground that the carrier is an instru- 
 mentality or agency of the Federal Government Nor shall any such carrier be entitled 
 to have transferred to a Federal court any action heretofore or hereafter instituted by 
 or against it, which action was not so transferable prior to the Federal control of such 
 carrier; and any action which has heretofore been so transferred because of such Fed- 
 eral control or of any Act of Congress or official order or proclamation relating thereto 
 shall upon motion of either party be retransferred to the court in which it was originally 
 instituted. But no process, mesne or final, shall be levied against any property under 
 such Federal control. 
 
 That during the period of Federal control, whenever in his opinion the public in- 
 terest requires, the President may initiate rates, fares, charges, ■ classifications, regula- 
 tions, and practices by filing the same with the Interstate Commerce Commission, which 
 said rates, fares, charges, classifications, regulations, and practices shall not be sus- 
 pended by the Commission pending final determination. 
 
 Said rates, fares, charges, classifications, regulations, and practices shall be reason- 
 able and just and shall take effect at such time and upon such notice as he may direct, but 
 the Interstate Commerce Commission shall upon complaint, enter upon a hearing con- 
 cerning the justness and reasonableness of so much of any order of the President as 
 establishes or changes any rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practices or 
 changes therein, the Interstate Commerce Commission shall give due consideration to 
 the fact that the transportation systems are being operated under a unified and coordi- 
 nated national control and not in competition. 
 
 After full hearing the Commission may make such findings and orders as are author- 
 ized by the Act to regulate commerce as amended, and said findings and orders shall be 
 enforced as provided in said Act: Provided, however, That when the President shall 
 find and certify to the Interstate Commerce Commission that in order to defray the 
 expenses of Federal control and operation fairly chargeable to railway operating ex- 
 penses, and also to pay railway tax accruals other than war taxes, net rents for joint 
 facilities and equipment, and compensation to the carriers, operating as a unit, it is 
 necessary to increase the railway operating revenues, the Interstate Commerce Com- 
 mission in determining the justness and reasonableness of any rate, fare, charge, classifi- 
 cation, regulation, or practice shall take into consideration said finding and certificate 
 by the President, together with such recommendations as he may make. 
 
311 FREIGHT KATES AND CHARGES [§613 
 
 Under Section 10 of the Federal Control Act, the jurisdiction of 
 the Interstate Commerce Commission over intrastate rates is limited to 
 determining the justness and reasonableness of such rates during the 
 period of Federal control.- 
 
 By Section 10 of the Federal Control Act the duty of determining 
 the justness and reasonableness of rates so initiated is laid upon the 
 Interstate Commerce Commission.* 
 
 By Section 10 of the Federal Control Act the authority to deter- 
 mine upon complaint the justness and reasonableness of such rates and 
 to award reparation on shipments moving thereunder is vested in the 
 Interstate Commerce Commission.* 
 
 In State of New York, Commissioner of Highways v. Director Gen- 
 eral, West Shore Rd. Co.^ the Commission stated : "While complainant 
 asks for reparation on certain shipments which moved prior to June 
 25, 1918, the date rates in accord with General Order No. 28 of the 
 Director General of Railroads became effective, the rates charged on 
 such shipments made were not initiated by the President within the 
 meaning of the Federal control act, and we are without jurisdiction 
 to consider them. Solvay Process Co. v. D. L. dt W. R. R. Co., 55 I. C. 
 C. 280." 
 
 The jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission over 
 intrastate rates, except under certain circumstances, terminated with 
 the relinquishment of the carriers from Federal control.® 
 
 The period of Federal control of common carriers terminated on 
 March 1, 1920.'^ 
 
 1. Federal Control Act : An Act to provide for the operation of transportation sys- 
 tems while under Federal control, for the just compensation of their owners, and 
 for other purposes, approved March 21, 1918, (40 Stat. L. 451), as amended by an 
 Act approved March 2, 1919, (40 Stat. L. 1209). 
 
 2. Alden Coal Co. v. Rock Island S. Ry. Co. (1920), 50 I. C. C. Rep. 223, 225. 
 
 3. Solvay Process Co. v. Delaware L. & W. Rd. Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 280, 281. 
 
 4. Swift & Co. V. Director General (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 324, 326, citing, Solvay 
 Process Co. v. Delaware L. & W. Rd. Co., supra ; Voldt Paper Mills v. Director Gen- 
 eral (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 331, citing, Solvay Process Co. v. Delaware, L. & W. Rd. 
 Co., supra. 
 
 5. State of New York, Commissioner of Highways, v. Director General, West Shore 
 Rd. Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 619, 620. 
 
 6. Western lime & Cement Co. v. Director General, as Agent, Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. 
 Co. (1920), 58 I. C. C. Rep. 508, 509. 
 
 7. Transportation Act, 1920, Section 200 (a) ; Miller v. Director General, as Agent, 
 Northern P. Ry. Co. (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 162, 165. 
 
 613-QQ. Power of Interstate Commerce Commission over rates and 
 
 CHARGES AFTER TERMINATION OF FeDERAIj CONTROL AND PRIOR 
 
 TO September 1, 1920. Intrastate and interstate rates. 
 Section 208 (2) of the Transportation Act^ provides as follows: 
 
 ah rates, fares, and charges, and all classifications, regulations, and practices, in 
 any wise changing, affecting, or determining, any part or the aggregate of rates, fares, 
 or charges, or the value of the service rendered, which on February 29, 1920, are in 
 effect on the lines of carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act, shall continue 
 in force and effect until thereafter changed by State or Federal authority, respectively, 
 or pursuant to authority of law; but prior to September 1, 1920, no such rate, fare, or 
 charge shall be reduced, and no such classification, regulation, or practice shall be 
 changed in such manner as to reduce any such rate, fare, or charge, unless such re- 
 duction or change is approved by the Commission. 
 
 1. Transportation Act. 1920. Section 208 (a). 
 
[§§614 to 624 TRAFPIC LAW SEKVICE 312 
 
 614. Classification of freight and freight classifications. 
 
 See Classification of Freight and Freight Classifications," Chap- 
 ter 5, ante. 
 
 615. Fourth section of the Interstate Commerce Act — Long-and-short- 
 haul clause — Fourth-section applications. 
 
 See "Fourth Section of the Interstate Commerce Act — Long-and- 
 Short-Eaul Clause— Fourth-Section Applications," Chapter 7, post. 
 
 616. Weights and weighing. 
 
 See "Weights and Weighing," Chapter 9, post. 
 
 V 
 
 617. Routes and routing. 
 
 See "Roxites and Routing," Chapter 11, post. 
 
 618. Protective services in transportation of perishable traffic. 
 
 See "Protective Services in Transportation of Perishable Traffic/' 
 Chapter 12, post. 
 
 619. Transit privileges, facilities and regulations. 
 
 See "Transit Privileges, Facilities and Regulations," Chapter 13, 
 post. 
 
 620. Elevation. 
 
 See "Elevation," Chapter 14, post. 
 
 621. Contracts between shippers and carriers concerning transporta- 
 tion charges. 
 
 See "Contracts befiveen Carriers and Shippers and Others," Chap- 
 ter 15, post. 
 
 622. Terminal facilities and regulations. 
 
 See "Terminal Facilities and Regulations," Chapter 16, post. 
 
 623. Demurrage or "car-service" and detention charges. 
 
 See "Demurrage or 'Car-Service' and Detention Charges," Chap- 
 ter 17, post. 
 
 624. Limitation of common carrier's liability — Initial carrier's 
 
 hability. 
 
 See "Limitation of Carrier's Liability — Initial Carrier's Liabil- 
 ity," Chapter 20 post. 
 
313 FREIGHT KATES AND CHARGES [§§625 tO 635 
 
 625. Free and reduced-rate transportation of property. 
 
 See "Free and Reduced-Rate Transportation of Property," Chap- 
 ter 21, post. 
 
 626. Allowances by carriers to owners of transported property. 
 
 See "Allowances by Carriers to Oivners of Transported Prop- 
 erty," Chapter 22, post. 
 
 627. Allowances to terminal railroads and boat lines owned or con- 
 trolled by shippers. 
 
 See "Allowances to Terminal Railroads or Boat Lines Owned or 
 Controlled by Shippers'," Chapter 23, post. 
 
 628. ^witching — Switch connections — Private side-tracks. 
 
 See "Switching — Sivitch Connections — Private Side-Tracks," 
 Chapter 24, post. 
 
 post. 
 
 629. Discriminations, preferences and advantages. 
 
 See "Discriminations , preferences and Advantages," Chapter 26, 
 
 630. Rebates and concessions. 
 
 See "Rebates and Concessions," Chapter 27 post. 
 
 631. Damages and reparation — Claims "between shippers and carriers. 
 
 See "Damages and Reparation — Claims between Shippers and 
 Carriers," Chapter 28, post. 
 
 632. Railroad company freight tariffs or rate schedules, 
 
 ' See "Railroad Company Freight Tariffs or Rate Schedules," 
 'Chapter 30, post. 
 
 633. Publication, posting and filing of freight rates and charges. 
 
 See "Railroad Company Freight Tariffs or Rate Schedides," 
 Chapter 30, post. 
 
 634. Transportation of live stock. 
 
 See "Transportation of Live Stock," Chapter 31, post. 
 
 635. Express companies and express traffic. 
 
 See "Express Companies and Express Traffic," Chapter 41, post. 
 
§§636 to 643] TRAFFIC LAW SEEVICE 314 
 
 636. Express company freight tariffs or rate schedules. 
 
 See "Express Company Freight Tariffs or Rate Schedules," Chap- 
 ter 42, post. 
 
 637. Practice and procedure before the Interstate Commerce 
 
 Commission. 
 
 See "Practice and Procedure before the Interstate. Commerce 
 Commission," Chapter 46, post. 
 
 638. Civil proceedings in the Courts. 
 
 See "Civil Proceedings in the Courts," Chapter 47, post. 
 
 639. Water carriers — Panama Canal Act. 
 
 See "Water Carriers — Panama Canal Act," Chapter 50, post. 
 
 640. Telegraph, telephone, cable and radiotelegraph companies. 
 
 See "Telegraph, Telephone, Cable and Radiotelegraph Com- 
 panies," Chapter 51, post. 
 
 641. Penalties and forfeitures — Criminal proceedings. 
 
 See "Penalties and Forfeitures — Criminal Proceedings," Chapter 
 52, post. 
 
 642. Federal control of common carriers — United States Railroad 
 
 Administration 
 
 See "Federal Control of Common Carriers — United States Rail- 
 road Administration," Chapter 54, post. 
 
 643. Railway finances — Guaranteed return on railway property. 
 
 See "Railway Finances — Guaranteed Return on Railway Prop- 
 erty," Chapter 55, post. 
 
INDEX— CHAPTER 6. 
 (SECTIONS 600-699.) 
 
 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES. 
 
 [References are to sections and paragraphs.] 
 
 Absolute Kates. 
 
 power of Commission to determine and fix, 613-B. 
 
 AcroBS-Lake Rate, 
 defined, 600-J. 
 
 Across-Lake-and-Rail Rate, 
 defined 600-J. 
 
 Adjacent Foreign Countries, 
 
 Commission no power to establish joint through rates between points in the 
 
 States and points in, 613-P. 
 rates between and points in United States, 602-M. ' 
 
 Advances in Freight Rates, 
 
 advance in rate to correct erroneous prior rate, 611-C. 
 
 after expiration of Commission's order suspending tariff, proposed new rates do 
 not automatically go into effect, 611-Q. 
 
 boat lines, increased rates of, 611-S. 
 
 burden of proof as to reasonableness of increased rates upon common carrier, 
 611-P, 613-H. 
 
 cancellation of commodity rates because of lack- of movement of trafiic, 611-H. 
 
 carriers advancing certain rates to a.void reducing other rates, 611-1. 
 
 carriers not estopped from advancing rates because of resulting injury to ship- 
 pers, 611-K 
 
 Commission no power to advance rates to temporarily improve business condi- 
 tions, 613-V. 
 
 disputes between carriers as to divisions do not justify increases of rates, 611-J. 
 
 effective date of new rates and subsequent adjustments covered byTIx Parte, 74, 
 603-H. 
 
 electric lines increased freight rates of, 611-T. 
 
 equalization of discriminations, 611-B. 
 
 general increases, 611-Y. 
 
 increase in charges for special services, 611-X. 
 
 increase in intrastate rates to remove any undue or unreasonable advantage, pref- 
 erence, prejudice or discrimination against interstate or foreign 
 commerce, 611-E. 
 
 increase in rates resulting in increase in discrimination, 611-L. 
 
 individual commodities, 611-AA. 
 
 investigation and suspension of new rate, charge, regulation or practice, 611-0. 
 
 joint rates to and from foreign countries, 611-V. 
 
 maintenance of higher intrastate rate than interstate rate, 611-D. 
 
 methods of advancing rates, 611-A. 
 
 minimum carload charge, 611-U. 
 
 minimum charge per shipment, 611-U. 
 
 minimum class scale, 611-U. 
 
 no presumption of wrong arises from an advance in rates, 611-N. 
 
 percentage increases versus flat increases and maintenance of differentials and 
 relationships, 611-Z. 
 
 port differentials on increased rates, maintenance of, 611-R. 
 
 power of Commission to consider effect on business of an industry in advancing 
 rates, 613-W. 
 
 preservation of proper relationship between commodities, 611-G. 
 
 presumption where long established rate is advanced for a short period, and then 
 reddced to former basis, 611-F. 
 
 right of carrier to advance its rates, 611-M. 
 
 Aggregate Annual Net Operating Income, 
 
 freight rates to be on basis that will yield an aggregate annual net operating in- 
 come equal, as nearly as may be, to a fair return upon the 
 aggregate value of the railway properties of the carrier held for 
 and used in the service of transportation, 609-H. 
 
 Aggregate of Intermediate Rates, 
 
 joint through interstate rate which exceeds the aggregate of the intermediate 
 rates, subject to the Act, is unlawful and non-enforceable, 609-FF. 
 reasonableness of through rate composed of, 609-EE. 
 
Chap. 6, Index] tkapfic law service 2 
 
 Aggregate Value of Railway Properties, 
 
 See "Aggregate Annual Net Operating Income." 
 
 Allowances by Carriers to Owners of Transported Property, 
 
 See, "Allowances by Carriers to Owners of Transported Property", Chapter 22, 
 post. 
 
 Allowances to Boat Lines Owned by Shippers, 
 
 See, "Allowances to Terminal Railroads or Boat Lines Owned or Controlled by 
 Shippers", Chapter 23, post. 
 
 Allowances to Terminal Railroads Owned by Shippers, 
 
 See, "Allowances to Terminal Railroads or Boat Lines Owned or Controlled by 
 Shippers", Chapter 23, post. 
 All-Rail Rates, 
 
 defined, 600-J. - 
 
 Annual Net Operating Income, 
 
 See, "Aggregate Annual Net Operating Income." 
 
 Any-Quantity Rates, 
 
 reasonableness of, 609-WW. ' 
 
 Application of Rates, 
 
 fact that a rate established by a carrier does not apply between the same points is 
 
 not conclusive of its unreasonablesness, 609-PPP. 
 limitation on application of joint rate, 601-O. 
 
 Arbitraries, 
 
 defined and usage, 600-E 
 
 Assessment of Freight Rates, 
 
 charges to apply on prepaid shipment that is stopped and delivered at an inter- 
 niediate point, 606-F. ^ 
 
 Colon, Panama, rates applicable on shipment to, 606-J. 
 
 conflicting rates in published tariff, 606-L. 
 
 consolidated carloads of less-thah-carload shipments; 606-O. 
 foi-warding agent as consignor, 606-O. 
 owner of goods as shipper of consolidated carload, 606-O. 
 
 duty of shipper to observe tariff provisions,, 606-R. 
 
 forwarding agent as consignor of consolidated carload, 606-O. 
 
 in assessment of freight rates the true character of the commodity controls, 
 606-P7 
 
 interstate freight rates must apply according to the movement of the traffic, 
 606-G. 
 
 legal rate applicable to an interstate shipment is the published through rate in 
 effect at the time the shipment is received by the carrier for 
 transportation and over the route which it is to move, 606-1. 
 
 only one legal rate can exist between any two points at any given time, 606-H. 
 
 outbound charges on shipment may not be refunded by carrier and charged back 
 against consignor, 606-B. 
 
 payment for transportation. Chapter 19, post. 
 
 prepaid shipment that is stopped and delivered at intermediate point, charges 
 applicable, 606-F. 
 
 rates applicable on gasoline motor cars moving under own power- over carrier's - 
 rails, 606-E. 
 
 rates applicable on materials for repair of cars on foreign lines, 606-M. 
 
 rates applicable on shipment to Colon, Panama, 606-J. 
 
 rates chargeable on larger car furnished for the convenience of initial carrier 
 under tariff authority for applying the minimum weight applic- 
 able on smaller car ordered by shipper, where connecting line 
 does not publish such tariff provision, 606-D. 
 
 rates to govern transportation service in the absence of tariff authority, 606-Q. 
 
 recalled shipment by shipper, collection of established rate on, 606-A. 
 
 repair materials for cars on foreign line, 606-M. 
 
 right of shipper with reference to manner of shipping a commodity, 606-K. 
 
 special rate on shipments in foreign cars, 606-N. 
 
 tariff authority, rate to govern transportation service, in absence of, 606-Q. 
 
 two small cars furnished by carrier in lieu of a larger car ordered by shipper, 
 606-C. 
 Basing Points, ~" 
 
 carriers may specify factors for constructing through rates, 602-C. 
 
 Basing-Point System, 
 
 reasonableness of basing-point system of rates, 609-UUU. 
 
 Belt Railroads, 
 
 power of Commission to establish joint through rates with, 613-0. 
 
 Bills of Lading, 
 
 See, "Uniform Bill of Lading." 
 
 "Blanket" Rates, 
 
 reasonableness of, 609-XX. 
 
•^ FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [Chap. 6, IlldoX 
 
 Boat Lines, 
 
 increased rates of, 611-S. 
 
 Branch-Line Haul, 
 
 reasonableness of rate, 609-CCC. 
 
 Bridge Tolls, 
 
 propriety of, 609- AAA. 
 
 Bulk of Article, 
 
 factor in rate-making, 608-H. 
 
 -Burden of Proof, 
 
 as to reasonableness of increased rate on common carrier, 609-MMM, 611-P, 
 
 613-H. 
 under allegation bf unreasonableness, 609-LLL. 
 
 Business Conditions, 
 
 Commission no power to advance rates to temporarily improve, 613-V. 
 
 "Business Motive", 
 
 rates according to, unreasonable and unlawful, 609-U. 
 
 Cable Companies, 
 
 See, "Telegraph, Telephone, Cable and Radiotelegraph Companies", Chapter 51, 
 post. 
 
 Cancellation of Freight Rates, 
 
 cancellation of commodity rates because of lack of movement of traffic, 611-H. 
 Commission may order maintenance of joint through rate when its cancellation 
 will result in higher charge based upon combination of locals, 
 613-S. 
 
 Carload Rates, 
 
 comparison with less-than-carload rates, 610-O. 
 
 Carload Shipments, 
 
 lower rate for carload than for less-than-carload quantities, 609-00. 
 
 Changes in Freight Rates, 
 
 no presumption of law arises from change in rates by carriers, 604-B. 
 
 rates in effect on February 29, 1920, to continue until changed by governmental 
 
 authority, 604-C. 
 reductions in rates until September 1, 1920, forbidden, unless approved by Com- 
 mission, 604-D. 
 right of carrier to change itfa rates, 604-A.. 
 
 Character of Commodity 
 
 in assessment of freight rates the true character of commodity controls, 606-P. 
 
 Charging "What the Traffic Will Bear", 
 meaning of the term, 608-D. 
 
 Circuitous Routes, 
 
 rates via, 609-AA. 
 
 Civil Proceedings in the Courts, 
 
 See, "Civil Proceedings in the Courts," Chapter 47, post. 
 
 Claims Between Shippers and Carriers, 
 
 See, "Damages and Reparation"; "Damages and Reparation — Claims Between 
 Shippers and Carriers", Chapter 28, post. 
 
 Classification of Freight, 
 
 See, "Classification of Freight and Freight Classifications", Chapter 5, ante. 
 
 Class Scale, 
 
 See, "Minimum Class Scale." 
 
 comparison with commodity rates, 610-M. 
 
 defined and usage, 600-G. 
 
 Collection of Charges, 
 
 carrier may not demand higher rate when freight is shipped with charges collect 
 than when charges are prepaid, 609-MM. 
 
 Colon, Panama, 
 
 rates applicable on shipments to, 606-J. 
 
 Combination of Local Rates, ... 
 
 cancellation of joint through rate resulting in higher combination of local rates, 
 
 609-HH. 
 joint through rate that exceeds the combination of a local rate and an undefined 
 
 proportional rate, 609-GG. 
 
 Commercial Advantages, .., . ■ ^ .■ ^ j., ■ ^ 
 
 not within the province of the Commission to require carriers to adjust their rates 
 so as to equalize natural or commercial advantages, 613-DD. 
 
Chap. 6, Index] traffic law service 4 
 
 Commercial Profit, 
 
 carrier no right to maintain rate adjustment to preserve commercial profit to 
 '- manufacturer, 608-O. 
 
 Commodities, 
 
 nature of commodity, determination of, is a judicial question, 613-X. 
 relationship between, in comparison of freight rates, 610-T. 
 
 Commodity Kates, 
 
 cancellation of, because of lack of movement of traffic, 611-H. 
 
 comparison with class rates, 610-M. 
 
 defined and usage, 600-H. 
 
 establishment of commodity rate as evidence of unreasonableness of prior class 
 
 rate, 609-DDD. 
 increases in rates on individual commodities, 611-AA. 
 should be stated through from point of origin to destination, 602-K. 
 
 Comparison of Freight Rates, 
 
 carload and less-than-carload rates, 610-O. 
 
 class and commodity rates, 610-M. 
 
 commodities, relationship between, 610-T. 
 
 comparison between present rate and lower rate maintained in past, 610-1. 
 
 division of joint between rate not conclusive evidence of reasonableness of joint 
 
 through rate, 610-G. 
 divisions of joint through rate no criteria to measure local rates, 610-F. 
 facts to be considered in coAiparing rates, 610-B. 
 local and proportional rates, 610-K. 
 necessity for, 610-A. 
 
 rate-per-ton-per-mile comparisons, 610-R. 
 
 rates fixed by State authorities as standards in fixing interstate rates, 610-V. 
 rates_in opposite directions, 610-L. - • 
 
 rates on (Afferent branches, or lines of same carrier, 610-C. 
 rates to competitive and non-competitive points, 610-J. 
 rates via competing lines, 610-D. 
 raw materials and manufactured products 610-U. 
 relation between' water and rail transportation, 610-H. 
 relationship between commodiies, 610-T. 
 
 relationship of rates on raw materials to competing industries, 610-N. 
 terminal services in delivery and receipt of traffic as elements in relationship of 
 
 rates, 610-S. 
 unsupported by evidence of various circumstances and conditions, 610-Q. 
 voluntary rates only should be compared 610-P. 
 
 Competition, 
 
 See, "Fourth Section of the Interstate Commerce Act — Long-and-Short-Haul 
 
 Clause — Fourth- Section Application", Chapter 7, post, 
 rate voluntarily established by carrier to meet competition not to be taken as 
 -measure of reasonableness," €09- J J. 
 
 Competitive Points, 
 
 comparison of rates to competitive and non-competitive points, 610-J. 
 
 Concerted Action, 
 
 See, "Concert of Action Between Carriers." 
 
 Concert of Action Between Carriers, 
 rates established by, 609-O. 
 
 Conclusions of Commission, 
 
 See, "Findings of Commission." 
 
 Conflict of Rates, 
 
 conflicting rates in published tariff, 606-L. 
 
 Consolidated Carload, , 
 
 less-than-carl6ad shipments as consolidated carload, 606-O. 
 forwarding agent as consignor, 606-O. 
 owner of goods as shippei- of, 606-O. 
 
 Contracts, Agreements and Arrangements Between Carriers, 
 
 joint rate is matter of agreement between connecting carrier, 601-A. 
 joint rates should not be cancelled because of failure of carriers to agree upon 
 divisions, 601-1. 
 
 Contracts Between Carriers and Shippers and Others, 
 
 See, "Contracts Between Carriers and Shippers and Others", Chapter 15, post, 
 effect of price agreement between carrier and shipper concerning transportation 
 charges on question of reasonableness of rate, 609-VW. 
 
 Contractural Obligations, 
 
 shipper has contract right in published rate, 603-C. 
 
 Cost of Production to Manufacturer, 
 
 consideration in rate-making, 608-M. 
 
^ FEEIGHT RATES AND CHAKGES [Chap. 6, IlldeX 
 
 Cost of Service to Carrier, 
 
 reasonable rate and, 609-J. 
 
 factor and element in rate-making, 608-B. 
 
 Court Review, 
 
 See, "Judicial Review." 
 
 Criminal Proceedings, 
 
 See, "Penalties and Forfeitures^-Criminal Proceedings", Chapter 52, post. 
 
 Damaged Articles, 
 
 rates on, 608-Y. 
 
 Damages and Reparation, 
 
 See, "Damages and Reparation — Claims Between Shippers and Carriers," Chapter 
 28, post. 
 
 omission of Commission to fix a future rate is not inconsistent with an order for 
 reparation for past injuries bv reason of assessment of unrea- 
 sonable rate, 613-FF. 
 
 Definitions, 
 
 See, "Terminology." 
 
 Delivery of Traffic, 
 
 services at terminals, 608-S 
 
 terminal services as elements to be considered in relationship of rates, 610-S. 
 
 Demurrage or "Car-Service" and Detention Charges, 
 
 See, "Demurrage or 'Car-Service' and Detention Charges", Chapter 17, post. 
 
 Development of Industry, 
 
 rates established to develop a particular industry, 609- S. 
 
 Differentials, 
 
 See, "Port Differentials." 
 defined and usage, 600-F. 
 
 Discriminations, Preferences and Advantages, 
 
 See, "Discriminations, Preferences and Advantages", Chapter 26, post. 
 
 Commission may establish joint through rates if discrimination found to exist, 
 613-R. 
 
 equalization of discrimination by advances in rates, 611-B. 
 
 increase in rates resulting in increase in discrimination, 611-L. 
 
 intrastate commerce, power of Commission to prescribe rate, classification, regu- 
 lation, or practice to govern intrastate traffic in order to remove 
 a preference or prejudice, or discrimination against interstate or 
 foreign commerce, 613-NN. 
 
 Distance, 
 
 factor in rate-making, 608-J. 
 
 Divisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
 
 authority to determine questions under the Act, 613-MM. 
 
 Divisions of Through Rates, 
 
 disputes between carriers as to divisions do not justify increases of rates, 611-J. 
 division of joint through rate not conclusive evidence of reasonableness of joint 
 
 through rate itself, 610-G. 
 for rate-making purposes, consideration of not proper, 602-J. 
 no criteria lay which to measure local rates, 610-F. 
 power of Commission to establish, 613-K. 
 rate not nullified by failure of carriers to agree upon, 603-D. 
 shipper not concerned with, 602-1. 
 
 Effective Date, 
 
 new rates and subsequent adjustments covered by Ex Parte 74, 611-W» 
 
 Electric Lines, 
 
 increased freight rates of, 611-T. 
 
 Electric Railway-Mail Pay, 
 
 reasonableness of, 609-RRR. 
 
 Elevation, 
 
 See, "Elevation", Chapter 14, post. 
 
 Empty Car Movement, 
 
 low rates to take care of, 608-T. 
 
 Equalization of Rates, 
 
 of different carriers, 609-Z. 
 
 Commission no power to equalize rates, 613CC. 
 
 Erroneous Prior Rate, ^ „.. ,-, 
 
 corrected by advance m rate, 611-C 
 
Chap. 6, Index] teaffic law seevice 6 
 
 Establishment of Freight Rates, 
 
 duty of carriers to initiate rates, 603-A. * 
 
 effective date of new rates and , subsequent adjustments under increased rates, 
 
 1920, covered by Ex parte 74, 603-H. 
 fractions, rules for disposition of, 603-G. 
 
 "paper" rates, 603-F. - ^- 
 
 presumption that carrier acted in good faith in initiating rates, 603-E. 
 rates not nullified by failure of carriers to agree upon divisions thereof, 603-D. 
 shipper has contract right in published rate, 603-C. 
 
 status of prewar intrastate rates after termination of Federal control, 603-1. 
 when interstate freight rate is established, 603-B. 
 
 Estoppel, ^ 
 
 carriers not estopped from advancing rates because of resulting injury to shippers, 
 
 611-K. 
 none operates against the right of a carrier to enjoy just and reasonable rates, 
 
 609-KKK. 
 
 Ex Parte 74, ■ . 
 
 effective date of new rates and subsequent adjustments under increased rates, 
 1920, 603-H, 611-W. 
 
 Export Rates, 
 
 See, "Export Traffic." 
 
 Export Ti-affic, 
 
 jurisdiction of Commission over rates on, 613-LL. 
 
 lower rates for inland movement of export or import traffic than for domestic 
 
 traffic, 609-RR. 
 lower rates on inland movement of import or export traffic than on domestic 
 
 commerce, unlawful unless later movement shall have been or 
 
 is to be in a vessel documented under the laws of the United 
 
 States, 609-YYY. 
 
 Express Companies, 
 
 See, "Express Companies and Express Traffic", Chapter 41, post. 
 
 Express Companies and Express Traffic, 
 
 See, "Express Companies and Express Traffic", Chapter 41, post. 
 
 Express Company Freight Tariffs or Rate Schedules, ' 
 
 See, "Express Company Freight Tariffs or Rate Schedules", Chapter 42, post. 
 
 Express Traffic, 
 
 See, "Express Companies and Express Traffic", Chapter 41, post. 
 
 Fact, 
 
 See, "Question of Fact." 
 
 Factors and Elements in Rate-Making, 
 
 adjustments of rates to induce movement of traffic, 608-P. 
 
 aggregate value of railway property held for and used in the transportation 
 
 service, 608-X. 
 bulk of article, 608-H. 
 carrier no right to graduate its charges in proportion to prosperity of shipper, 
 
 608-Q. 
 carrier no right to maintain rate adjustment to, preserve commercial profit to 
 
 manufacturer, 608-O. 
 charging "what the traffic will bear", 608-D. 
 competition, 608-K. 
 
 cost of production to manufacturer, 608-M. 
 cost of service to carrier, 608-B. 
 cost of service versus value of service, 608-C. 
 damaged articles, rates on, 608- Y. 
 distance, 608-J. 
 import duties, 608-U. 
 investment in commercial enterprise relying upon a certain rate adjustment, 
 
 608-N. 
 locomotive on own wheels under power, 608-1. 
 low rates to take care of empty car movement, 608-T. 
 
 maps officially published by railroad companies controlling as to tariffs, 608-V. 
 rates on water carriers, 608-W. 
 relations of the carriers and the public, 608-L. 
 right of carrier to share in general prosperity of country, 608-R. 
 risk, 608-F. 
 
 second-hand articles, rates on, 608-Y. 
 
 services in the delivery and receipt of traffic at terminals, 608-S. 
 used articles, rates on, 608-Y. 
 value of commodity, 608-E. 
 value of service to the .shipper, 608-A. 
 value of service versus cost of service, 608-C. 
 volume of traffic, 608-G. 
 weight of article, 608-H. 
 
7 FKEIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [Chap. 6, IlldeX 
 
 Fair Return upon Aggregate Value of Railway Properties, 
 See, "Aggregate Annual Net Operating Income." 
 
 Federal Control of Common Carriers, 
 
 power of Commission over intrastate rates during the period of Federal control, 
 613-PP. 
 
 power of Interstate Commerce Commission over rates and charges after termi- 
 nation of Federal control and prior to September 1, 192(J — Intra- 
 state rates, 613-QQ. 
 
 United States Railroad Administration, Chapter 54, post. 
 
 Filing of Freight Rates and Charges, 
 
 See. "Railroad Company Freight Tariffs or Rate Schedules", Chapter 30, post. 
 
 Findings of Commission, 
 
 finality of conclusions of Commission on questions of fact, 613-J. 
 
 Foreign Cars, 
 
 special rate on shipments in, 606-N. 
 
 Foreign Commerce, 
 
 See, "Export Traffic"; "Import traffic." 
 
 carriers may not adjust their rates so as to regulate foreign traffic through 
 certain ports, 609-W. 
 
 Foreign Competition, 
 
 Commission no power to protect American manufacturers and producers from, 
 613-EE. 
 
 Foreign Countries, 
 
 joint rates to and from, increase in, 611-V. 
 
 Foreign Tra.ffic, 
 
 See "Foreign Commerce." 
 
 Formal Orders of Commission, 
 
 See "Orders of Commission." 
 
 Forwarding Agent, 
 
 consignor of consolidated carload of less-than-carload shipments, 606-O. 
 
 Fourth- Section Applications, 
 
 See, "-Fourth Section of the Interstate Commerce Act — Long-and-Short-Haul 
 Clause — Fourth-Section Applications", Chapter 7, post. 
 
 Fourth Section of Interstate Commerce Act, 
 
 See, "Fourth Sectidn joi the Interstate Commerce Act — Long-and- Short Haul 
 Clause — Fourth-Section Applications", Chapter 7, post. 
 
 Fractions, 
 
 rules for disposition of in establishment of freight rates, 603-G. 
 
 Free and Reduced-Rate Transportation of Property", Chapter 21, post. 
 
 Freight Classifications, 
 
 See "Classification of Freight and Freight Classifications", Chapter 5, ante. 
 
 Freight Rates and Charges, 
 
 advances in freight rates, 611, , 
 
 advance in rate to correct erroneous prior rate, 611-C. 
 
 after expiration of Commission's order suspending tariff, proposed new 
 rates do not automatically go into eflfect, 611-Q. 
 
 boat lines, increased rates of, 611-S. 
 
 burden of proof as to reasonableness of increased rates upon common 
 carrier, 611-P. 
 
 cancellation of commodity rates because of lack of movement of traffic, 
 611-H. 
 
 carriers advancing certain rates to avoid reducing other rates, 611-1. 
 
 carriers not estopped from advancing rates because of resulting injury to 
 shippers, 611-K. 
 
 disputes between carriers as to divisions do not justify increases of rates, 
 611-J. 
 
 effective date of new rates and subsequent adjustments covered by Ex 
 Parte 74. 
 
 electric lines, increased freight rates of, 611-T. 
 
 equalization of discriminations, 611-B. 
 
 general increases, 611-Y. 
 
 increase in charges for special services, 611-X. 
 
 increase in intrastate rates to remove any undue or unreasonable ad- 
 vantage, preference, prejudice or discrimination against inter- 
 state or foreign commerce, 611-E. 
 
 increase in rates resulting in increase in discrimination, 611-L. 
 
 individual commodities, 611-AA. 
 
 investigation and suspension of new rate, charge, regulation or practice, 
 611-0. 
 
Chap. 6, Index] traffic law service S 
 
 joint rates to and from foreign countries, 611-Y. 
 
 maintenance of higher intrastate rate than interstate rate, 611-D. 
 
 methods of advancing rates, 611-A 
 
 Minimum carload charge, 611-U. 
 
 Minimum charge per shipment, 611-U. 
 
 minimum class scale, 611-U. 
 
 no presumption of wrong arises from an advance in rates, 611-N. 
 
 percentage increases versus flat increases and maintenance of differentials 
 and relationships, 611-Z. 
 
 preservation of proper relationship between commodities, 611-G. 
 
 presumption where long established rate is advanced for a short period, 
 and then reduced to former basis, 611-F. 
 
 port differentials on increased rates, maintenance of, 611-E. . 
 
 right of carrier to advanc& its rates, 611-M. 
 allowances by carriers to owners of transported property, 630. 
 allowances to terminal railroads and boat lines owned or controlled by ship- 
 pers, 631. 
 assessment of freight rates, 606. 
 
 charges to apply on prepaid shipment that is stopped and delivered at &n 
 intermediate point, 606-F. 
 
 Colon, Panama, rates applicable on shipments to, 606-J. 
 
 conflicting rates in published tariff, 606-L. 
 
 consolidated carloads of less-than-carload shipments, 606-O. 
 forwarding agent as consignor, 606-O. 
 owner of goods as shipper of consolidated carload, 606-O. 
 
 duty of shipper to observe tariff provisions, 606-R. 
 
 forwarding agent as consignor of consolidated carload, 606-O. 
 
 in assessment of freight rates the true character of the commodity con- 
 trols, 606-P. 
 
 interstate freight rates must apply according to the movement of the traf- 
 fic, 606-G. 
 
 legal rate applicable to an interstate shipment is the published through 
 
 rate in effect at the time the shipment is received by the carrier 
 
 for transportation and over the route which it is to move,606-I. 
 
 / only one legal rate can exist between any two points at anj' given time, 
 
 606-H. 
 
 outbound charges on shipment may not be refunded by carrier and charged 
 back against consignor, 606-B. 
 
 payment for transportation. See* "Payment for Transportation", Chapter 
 19, post. 
 
 prepaid shipment that is stopped and delivered at intermediate point, 
 charges applicable, 606-F. 
 
 rates applicable on gasoline motor cars moving under own power over car- 
 rier's rails, 606-E. 
 
 rates applicable on material for repair of cars on foreign lines, 606-M. 
 
 rates applicable on shipments to Colon, Panama, 606-J. 
 
 rates chargeable on larger car furnished for convenience of initial carrier 
 under tariff authority for applying minimum weight applicable 
 on smaller car ordered by shipper, where connecting line does 
 not publish such tariff provision, 606-D. 
 
 rate to govern transportation service that has been rendered for which 
 there is no tariff authority, 606-Q. 
 
 recalled shipment by shipper collection of established rate on, 606-A. 
 
 repair materials for cars on foreign line, 606-M. 
 
 right of shipper with reference to manner of shipping a commodity, 606-K. 
 
 special rate on shipments in foreign cars, 606-N. \ 
 
 /tariff authority, rate to govern transportation service, in absence of, 606-Q. 
 
 two small cars furnished by carrier in lieu of a larger car ordered by ship- 
 per, 606-C. 
 changes in freight rates by carriers, 604. 
 
 no 'presumption of wrong arises from change in rates by carriers, 604-B. 
 
 right of carrier to change its rate, 604-A. 
 civil proceedings in the Courts, Chapter 47, post, 
 claims between shippers and. carriers. Chapter 28, post, 
 classification of freight and freight classifications, Chapter B, ante, 
 comparison of freight rates, 610. 
 
 carload and less-than-carload rates, 610-O. 
 
 class and commodity rates, 610-M. 
 
 commodities, relationship between, 610-T. 
 
 comparison between present rate and lower rate maintained in past, 610-1. 
 
 division of joint through rate not conclusive evidence of reasonableness of 
 joint through rate itself, 610-G. 
 
 divisions of joint through rate no criteria to measure local rates, 610-F. 
 
 facts to be considered in comparing rates, 610-B. 
 
 local and proportional rates, 610-K. 
 
 necessity for comparison of rates, 610-A. 
 
 rate-per-ton-per-mile comparisons, 610-R. 
 
 rates fixed by State "authorities, as standards in fixing interstate rates, 
 610-V. 
 
 rates in opposite directions, 610-L. 
 
 rates on different branches, or lines of same carrier, 610-C. 
 
FREIGHT BATES AND CH.4.KGES [Chap. 6, IllcleX 
 
 rates on different lines in different sections of the country, 610-E. 
 
 rates to competitive and non-competitive points, 610-J. 
 
 rates via competing lines, 610-D. 
 
 raw materials and manufactured products, 610-U. 
 
 relation between water and rail transportation, 610-H. 
 
 relationship of rates on raw materials to competing industries, 610-N. 
 
 terminal services in delivery and receipt of traffic as elements in relation- 
 ship of rates, 610-S. 
 
 unsupported by evidence of various circumstances and conditions, 610-Q. 
 
 voluntary rates only should be compared, 610-P. 
 criminal proceedings, Chapter 52, post, 
 damages and reparation. Chapter 28, post. 
 
 demurrage or "car-service" and detention charges. Chapter 17, post, 
 different kinds of freight rates defined and their usage, 600. 
 
 arbitraries, 600-E. 
 
 class rates, 600-G. 
 
 commodity rates, 600-H. 
 
 differentials, 600-F. 
 
 joint rates, 600-B. 
 
 local rates, 600-A 
 
 "missionary" rates, 600-L. 
 
 '«^paper" rates, 600-K. 
 
 proportional rates, 600-D. 
 
 rail and water rates, 600-J. 
 
 rates for mixed shipments, 600-1. 
 
 through rates, 600-C. 
 ( discriminations, preferences and advantages. Chapter 26, post, 
 elevation, Chapter 14, post, 
 establishment of freight rates, 603. 
 
 duty of carriers to initiate rates, 603-A. 
 
 effective date of new rates and subsequent adjustments under increased 
 rates, 1920, covered by Ex Parte 74, 603-H. 
 
 fractions, rules for disposition of, 603-G. 
 
 '^paper" rates, 603-P. 
 
 presumption that carrier acted in good faith in initiating rates, 603-E. 
 
 rates not nullified by failure of carriers to agree upon divisions thereof, 
 603-D. 
 
 shipper has contract right in published rate, 603-C. 
 
 status of prewar intrastate rates after termination of Federal control, 
 603-1. 
 
 when interstate freight rate is established, 603-B. 
 express companies. Chapter 41, post, 
 express companies and express traffic. Chapter 41, post, 
 express company freight tariffs or rate schedules, Chapter 42, post, 
 express traffic, Chapter 41, post, 
 factors and elements in rate-making, 608. 
 
 adjustment of rates to induce movement of traffic, 608-P. 
 
 aggregate value of railway property held for and used in the transporta- 
 tion service, 608-X. 
 
 bulk, 608-H. 
 
 carrier no right to graduate its charges in proportion to prosperity of 
 shipper, 608-Q. 
 
 carrier no right to maintain rate adjustment to preserve commercial 
 profit to manufacturer, 608-O. 
 
 charging "what the traffic will bear", 608-D. 
 
 competition, 608-K. 
 
 cost of production to manufacturer, 608-M. 
 
 cost of service to the carrier, 608-B. 
 
 cost of service versus value of service, 608-C. 
 
 damaged articles, rates on, 608- Y. 
 
 distance, 608- J. 
 
 import duties, 608-U. 
 
 investment in commercial enterprise relying «pOn a certain rate adjust- 
 ment, 608-N. 
 
 locomotive on own wheels under power, 608-1. 
 
 low rates to take care of empty car movement, 608-T. 
 
 maps officially published by railroad companies controlling as to tariffs, 
 608-V. 
 
 rates of water carriers, 608-W. 
 
 relations of the carriers and the public, 608-L. 
 
 right of carrier to share in general prosperity of country 608-R. 
 
 risk, 608-F. 
 
 second-hand articles, rates on, 608- Y. 
 
 services in the delivery and receipt of traffic at terminals, 608-S. 
 
 used articles, rates on, 608- Y. 
 
 value of commodity, 608-E. 
 
 value of service to the shipper, 608-A. 
 
 value of service versus cost of service, 608-C. 
 
 value of traffic, 608-G. 
 
 weight and bulk of article, 608-H. 
 Federal control of common carriers. Chapter 54, post. 
 
Chap. 6, Index]' traffic law service 10^ 
 
 foiirth-section applications, Chapter 7, post. 
 
 fourth-section of the Interstate Commerce Act, Chapter 7, post. 
 
 free and reduced-rate transportation of property. Chapter 21, post. 
 
 initial carrier's liability. Chapter 20, post.> , 
 
 joint rates, 601. 
 
 carrier may not deny benefit of, to manufacturers on connecting lines, in 
 
 order to foster own industries, 601-C. 
 combination rate may not be applied until joint rate is cancelled, 601- J. 
 defined, and usage, 600-B, 601-A. 
 duty of carriers to establish, 601-K. 
 
 established via one route not applicable via another route, 601-E. 
 legal status of joint rate that exceeds aggregate of intermediate rates, 
 
 601-F. 
 legal status of joint rate that is lower than combination of local rates, 
 
 601-G. 
 legal status of tariff carrying joint rates not naming junction points, 
 
 601-H. 
 limitation on application of joint rate, 601-O. 
 matter of agreement between connecting carriers, 601-A. 
 parties not competent in law to establish, for interstate transportation, 
 
 601-D. 
 right of carrier to demand indemnity before concurring in establishment 
 
 of, 601-L. 
 should not be cancelled because of failure of carrier to agree upon 
 
 divisions, 601-1. 
 to and from Porto Eican points, 601-B. 
 unreasonableness of joint rate that exceeds the combination of a local 
 
 rate ^nd an undefined proportional rate, 601-N. 
 jurisdiction of Interstate Commerce Commission, 613. 
 
 adjacent foreign countries. Commission no power to establish joint through 
 
 rates between points in the United States and points in, 613-P. 
 authority of divisions of the Commission ^;o determine questions under the 
 
 Act, 613-MM. 
 burden of proof as to reasonableness of "increased rate on common carrier, 
 
 613-H. 
 Commission may establish joint through rates if discrimination found to 
 
 exist, 613-R. 
 Commission may take order prescribing same rate for similar services to 
 
 other shippers, 613-U. 
 Commission no power to advance rates to temporarily improve business 
 
 conditions, 613-V. . ' 
 
 Commission no power to annul a rate except by a formal order made in 
 
 conformity with section 15 of Act, 613-BB. 
 Commission no power to equalize rates, 613-CC. 
 
 Commission no power to fix rates except upon traffic considerations, 613-Z. 
 Commission no power to protect American manufacturers and producers 
 
 from foreign competition, 613-EE. ,^ 
 
 Commission no power to substitute new rate for just and reasonable rate, 
 
 613- AA. 
 control over freight rates and charges generally, 613-A. 
 effective time of orders of Commission, 613-G. ' 
 
 establishment of joint rates and divisions thereof, 613-K. 
 establishment of joint through rates discretionary with Commission and 
 » not reviewable by the courts, 613-Q. 
 
 establishment of through rates in connection with street-electric-passenger 
 
 railways forbidden, 613-L. 
 export and import traffic, rates on, 613-LL. 
 
 finality of conclusions of Commission on questions of fact, 613-J. 
 "flexible limit of judgment which belong to the power to fix rates," 
 ■ 613-HH. > 
 
 governmental materials and war traffic rates for transportation of, 613-GG. 
 
 import and export traffic, rates on, 613-LL. 
 
 independent water carriers, Commission no authority to establish joint 
 
 through rate with, 613-N. 
 interurban-electric railways, power of Commission to establish joint rates 
 
 between steam railways and, 613-M. 
 intrastate commerce, power of Commission to prescribe rate, classification, 
 
 regulation, or practice to govern intrastate traffic in order to 
 
 remove a preference or prejudice, or discrimination against 
 
 interstate or foreign commerce, 613-NN. 
 judicial review of Commission's orders, 613-11. 
 maintenance of joint through rates may be ordered when its cancellation 
 
 will result in higher charge based upon combination of locals, 
 
 613-S. 
 may determine and prescribe just and reasonable regulations and practices. 
 
 613-C. 
 may order carriers to cease and desist from full extent of violations found. 
 
 613-D. 
 nature of commodity, determination of, is a judicial question, 613-X. 
 new rate, regulation or practice, power of Commission to investigate, 
 
 613-E. 
 
11 FREIGHT KATES AND CHAHGES [Chap. 6, IndeX 
 
 not within the province of the Commission to require carriers to adjust 
 their rates so as to equalize natural or commercial advantages, 
 613-r)D. 
 
 omission of Commission to fix a future rate is not inconsistent with an 
 order for reparation for past injuries by reason of assessment of 
 unreasonable rate, 613-FF. 
 
 original exclusive jurisdiction of Commission over suspension of published 
 interstate classification or rate schedule, 613-F. 
 
 power of Commission over fixation of terms and compensation for common 
 use of termina) facilities, 613-KK. 
 
 power of Commission over intrastate rates during the period of Federal 
 control, 61,3-PP. 
 
 power of Commission over local state rate on through interstate shipment, 
 613-JJ. 
 
 power of Commission over rates and cliarges after termination of Federal 
 control and prior to September 1, 1920 — Intrastate and interstate 
 rates, 613-QQ. 
 
 power of Commission to consider effect on business of an industry in ad- 
 vancing rates, 613-'W. 
 
 power of Commission to establish joint through rates with, 613-0. 
 
 power to determine and fix maximum, minimum, or precise rates, 613-B. 
 
 primary jurisdiction of Commission to determine reasonableness or unrea- 
 sonableness of ititerstate rate, 613-1. 
 
 railway-mail pay, 613-Y. 
 
 restraining enforcement of new rate, regulation or practice pending in- 
 vestigation, 613-F. 
 
 valuation supplies of Commission, transportation of, 613-00. 
 limitation of carrier's liability, Chapter 20, post, 
 live stock, transportation of. Chapter 31, post, 
 long-and-short-haul clause. Chapter 7, post. 
 Panama Canal Act, Chapter 50, post. i 
 
 payment for transportation. Chapter 19, post, 
 penalties and forfeitures. Chapter 52, post. 
 
 practice and procedure before the Interstate Commerce Commission, Chapter 46, 
 post. 
 
 protective services in transportation of perishable traffic. Chapter 12, post, 
 publication, posting and filing of, 618 
 quotation of freight rates by carriers to shippers, 605. 
 
 duty of carrier to quote rate to shippers, 605,-A. 
 railroad company freight tariffs. or rate schedules. Chapter 34, post, 
 reasonableness of freight rates, 609. 
 
 agreement between carrier and municipality for maintenance of given 
 rates in consideration of certain privileges to carrier by city, not 
 binding on Commission, 609-V. 
 
 any-quantity rates, 609-'WW. 
 
 average rate per ton on all traffic, 609-Q. 
 
 basing-point system of rates, 609-UUU. 
 
 between points served by more than one carrier not to be determined by 
 rate of line most favorably situated, 609-DD. 
 
 "blanket" rates, 609-XX 
 
 branch-line haul, 609-CCC. 
 
 bridge tolls, propriety of, 609-AAA. 
 
 "business motive," rates fixed according to, are unreasonable and unlawful, 
 ■ 609-U. 
 
 burden of proof as to reasonableness of increased rate on common carrier, 
 609-MMM. 
 
 burden of proof under allegation of unreasonableness, 609-LLL. 
 
 cancellation of joint through rate resulting in higher combination of local 
 rates, 609-HH. 
 
 carrier may not adjust its rates so as to regulate foreign traffic through 
 certain ports, 609- W. 
 
 carrier may not demand higher rate when freight is shipped with charges 
 collect than when charges are prepaid, 609-MM. 
 
 carrier may not restrict traffic to movements between points on its own 
 lines, 609-W. 
 
 circuitous routes, rates via, 609-AA. 
 
 comparison of freight rates. See "Comparison of freight rates," Section 
 610, post. 
 
 compensation to certain land-mark roads, 609-SSS. 
 
 concert of action between carriers, rates established by, 609-O. 
 
 cost of service and reasonable rate, 609-J. 
 
 development of particular industry, rates established for, 609-S. 
 
 difference between import rates and domestic rates should not be undue or 
 unreasonable, 609-SS. 
 
 doubt as to reasonableness of rate resolved in favor of carrier, 609-QQQ. 
 
 effect of private agreement between carrier and shipper concerning trans- 
 portation charges on question of reasonableness of rate, 609- WV. 
 
 equalizing rates of different carriers, -609-2. 
 
 enforcement of rules and regulations not shown in published tariffs as 
 affecting, 609-G. 
 
 errors in publication of rates, 609-TTT. 
 
 establishment of commodity rate as evidence of unreasonableness of prior 
 class rate, 609-DDD. 
 
 establishment of low rates by carrier to test traffic situation, 609— Y. 
 
Chap. 6, Index] teafpic law sebvice 12 
 
 fact that a rate established by carriers does not apply between the same 
 
 points is not conclusive of its unreasonableness, 609-PPP. 
 filing schedule with Commission not conclusive of reasonableness of rates 
 contained therein, 609-FFF. 
 
 freight rates to be on basis that will yield an aggregate annual net oper- 
 ating income equal, as nearly as may be, to a fair return upon the 
 aggregate value of the railway properties of the carrier held for 
 and used in the service of transportation, 609-H. 
 
 generally, 609- A. 
 
 graduated rates, 609-YY. 
 
 group rates, 609-XX. 
 
 higher rates for shorter than longer distance over the same line or route in „ 
 , same direction, the shorter being included with the longer dis- 
 tance, 609-11. 
 
 higher rates on perishable traffic than on ordinary freight, 609-QQ. 
 
 higher rate over route composed of two or more carriers than over a single 
 route, 609-CC. 
 
 higher rates when shipments are tendered with other than uniform bill of 
 lading, 609-KK. 
 
 import^ed commodity not entitled to inland proportional rate which is lower 
 than domestic rate when transportation from port of entry is 
 purely local, 609-TT. 
 
 joint through interstate rate which exceeds the aggregate of the inter- 
 mediate rates, subject to the Act, is unlawful and non-enforceable, 
 609-FF. 
 
 joint through rate that exceeds the combination of a local rate and an unde- 
 fined proportional rate, 609-GG. 
 
 "Just," meaning of term, 609-D. 
 
 long-haul traffic, low rates for carriage of, 609-N. 
 
 lower rate for carload than for less-than-carload quantities, 609-00. 
 
 lower rates for inland movement of export or import traffic than for 
 domestic traffic, 609-ER. 
 
 lower rate on inland movement of import or export traffic than on domestic 
 commerce, unlawful unless water movement, shall have been or is 
 to be in a vessel documented under the- laws of the United States, 
 609-YYY. 
 
 low-grade traffic, low rates for, 609-M. 
 
 maintenance for long^ period of rate voluntarily established by carrier as 
 evidence of its reasonableness, 609-GGG. 
 
 mandate of statute transportation charges be just and j:easonable, 609-C. 
 
 minimum charge for transportation of less-than-carload shipment, 609-NN. 
 
 no estoppel operated against the right of a carrier to enjoy just and reason- 
 able rates, 609-KKK. 
 
 on mixed carloads, 609-ZZ. 
 
 per se reasonable, rate may be lawful on other ground, 609-1. 
 
 presumption that carrier's tariff provides reasonable charges for the service 
 normally performed, 609-NNN. 
 
 presumption where long-established rate- is advanced for short period and 
 then reduced to former basis, 609-HHH. 
 
 public not the general manager of railroads respecting their rates, 609-L. 
 
 public rate schedule is prima facie evidence of the reasonableness of the 
 rates stated therein, 609-EEE. 
 
 question of reasonableness of rates one of fact, 609-E. 
 
 railway-mail pay, 609-RER. 
 
 rate-per-ton-per-mile test, 609-P. 
 
 rate voluntarily established by carrier to meet competition not to be taken 
 as measure of reasonableness, 609-JJ. 
 
 rates and rebates, 609-B. 
 
 "Reasonable," meaning of term, 609-D. 
 
 reasonable rate and cost of service, 609-J. 
 
 rebates and rates, 609-B. 
 
 regulations and practices required to be established by carriers, just and 
 reasonable, 609-F. 
 
 requirement that import freight be placed in bonded warehouse or delivered 
 rail carrier direct from ship's side or dock of vessel as con- 
 dition precedent to application of import rate, 609-UU. - 
 
 released-valuation rates, 609-LL. 
 
 reshipping rates, 609-BBB. 
 
 right of carrier to change an unreasonably low rate, 609-JJJ. 
 
 right of carrier to reserve to itself the long haul in establishment of 
 through route, 609-BB. 
 
 river-crossing charges, propriety of, 609-AAA. 
 
 through rate composed of aggregate of intermediate rates, 609-EE. 
 
 tonnage shipped by particular firm, 609-T. 
 
 train-load rate, 609-PP. 
 
 undeveloped territory, carriers ser\'ing, entitled to higher rates than ordi- 
 narily, 609-R. 
 
 unreasonable rate note permissable merely because its correction will result 
 in the disturbance of other rates, 609-III. 
 
 usage of commodity, rates fixed according to, are unreasonable and unlaw- 
 ful, 609-U. 
 
-13 FEEIGHT BATES AND CHAKGES [Chap. 6, IlldeX 
 
 voluntary reduction of a rate by the carrier is not conclusive that the prior 
 
 rate was unreasonable, 609-000. 
 widespread rate adjustment, effect of, 609-X. 
 rebates and concessions, Chapter 27, post, 
 routes and routing, Chapter 11, post. 
 
 switching — switch connections — 'private side-tracks. Chapter 24, post, 
 terminal facilities and regulations, Chapter 16, post, 
 through rates, 602. 
 
 carriers may specify basing points or factors for constructing combination 
 
 rates, 602-C. 
 combination of joint rate to common point and local rate beyond, 602-F. 
 commodity rate should be stated through from point of origin to destina- 
 tion, 602-K. 
 defined, and usage, 600-C. 
 
 division of, for rate-making purposes, not proper, 602-J. 
 division of, shipper not concerned with, 602-1. 
 inter-classification territories rates, 602-H. 
 , inter-rate territories rates, 602-H. 
 legal rate applicable to an interstate shipment 4s the published through 
 rate in effect at the time the shipment is received by the carrier 
 for transportation and over the route which it is to move, 602-B. 
 legal status of joint through rate that exceeds aggregate of intermediate 
 
 rates, 602-N. 
 only one legal rate can exist between any two points at any time, 602-A. 
 rate to apply in absence of a joint rate or a specific method of constructing 
 
 through rate, 602-D. 
 rates between points in the United States and adjacent foreign countries, 
 
 602-M. . 
 rates that are not on file with Interstate Commerce Commission are not 
 
 lawful factors in constructing through interstate rates, 602-G. 
 reasonableness of through rate composed of aggregate of intermediate 
 
 rates, 602-J. 
 right of shipper to consign interstate traflRc to an intermediate point, 
 assume custody of the shipment, either actual or constructive, and 
 then rebill the same to destination, where the joint through inter- 
 state rate is higher than the aggregate of the intermediate 
 rates, 602-E. 
 transit privileges, facilities and regulations, Chapter 16, post. 
 United States Railroad Administration, Chapter 54, post, 
 water carriers, see "Water Carriers — Panama Canal Act," Chapter 50, post, 
 weights and weighing, Chapter 9, post. 
 
 Freight Tariffs or Rate Schedules, 
 
 See, "Express Company Freight Tariffs or Rate Schedules", Chapter 42, post; 
 "Railroad Company Freight Tariffs or Rate Schedules", Chap- 
 ter 30, post, 
 duty of shipper to observe tariff provisions, 606-R. 
 
 rate to govern transportation service that has been rendered in absence of 
 tariff authority, 606-Q. 
 
 Governmental Materials, 
 
 jurisdiction of Commission over rates for transportation of,613-GG. 
 
 Graduated Rates, 
 
 reasonableness of, 609-YY. 
 
 Group Rates, 
 
 reasonableness of, 609-XX. 
 
 Guaranteed Return on Railway Property, 
 
 See, "Railway Finances— rGuaranteed Return on Railway Property", Chapter 55, 
 post. 
 
 Heated-Car Service Charges, 
 
 See, "Protective Services in Transportation of Perishable Traffic", Chapter 12, 
 post. 
 
 Icing Charges, 
 
 See, "Protective Services in Transportation of Perishable Traffic", Chapter 12, 
 post. 
 
 Import and Export Traffic, 
 
 jurisdiction of Commission over rates on, 613-LL. 
 
 Import Duties, 
 
 factor in rate-making, 608-U. 
 
 Import Rates, 
 
 Import Traffic, . ^iuu^,. 
 
 difference between import rates and domestic rates should not be undue or unrea- 
 sonable, 609-SS. 
 
Chap. 6, Index] traffic LAyv^ service 14 
 
 imported commodity not entitled to inland proportional rate which is lower than 
 domestic rate when transportation from port of entry is purely 
 local, 609-TT. 
 
 jurisdiction of Commission over rates on 613-LL. 
 ^ lower rates for inland movement of export or import traffic than for domestic 
 traffic, 609-RR. 
 
 lower rate on inland movement of import or export traffic than on domestic com- 
 merce, unlawful unless water movement shall have heen or is to 
 be in a vessel documented under the laws of the United States, 
 609- YYY. 
 
 requirement that import freight be placed in bonded warehouses or delivered to 
 rail carrier direct from ship's side or dock, of vessel as condition 
 precedent to application of import rates, 609-UU. 
 
 Income, 
 
 See, "Aggregate Annual Net Income." 
 
 Increases in Freight Rates, / 
 
 See, "Advances in Freight Rates." 
 
 Indemnity Bond, 
 
 right of carrier to demand indemnity before concurring in establishment of 
 joint rates, 601-L. 
 
 Informal Orders of Commission, 
 
 See, "Orders of Commission." 
 
 Initial Carrier's Liability, 
 
 See "Limitation of Common Carrier's Liability — Initial Carrier's Liability," Chap- 
 ter 20, post. 
 
 Initiation of Rates, 
 
 See "Establishment of Freight Rates." 
 
 Inland Proportional Rates, 
 
 imported commodity not entitled to inland proportional rate which is lower than 
 domestic rate when transportation from port of entry is purely 
 local, 609-TT. 
 
 / 
 
 Inter-Classification Territories Rates, 
 
 through rates between classification territories, 602-H. 
 
 Intermediate Rates, 
 
 legal status of joint through rate that exceeds aggregate of, 602-N. 
 
 reasonableness of through rate composed of aggregate, 602-L. 
 
 fight of shipper to coinsign interstate traffic to an intermediate point, assume 
 custody of the shipnient, either actual or constructive, and then 
 rebill the same to destination, where the joint through rate is 
 higher than the aggregate" rates, 602-E. 
 
 Inter-Rate Territories Rates, 
 
 through rates between rate territories, 602-H. 
 
 Interstate Commerce^Act, 
 
 See, "Long-and-Short-Haul Clause." 
 
 Interstate Commerce Commission, 
 
 See "Divisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission"; "Jurisdiction of Inter- 
 state Commerce Commission." 
 
 filing schedule with Commission not conclusive of reasonableness of rates con- 
 tained therein, 609-FFF. 
 
 practice and procedure before. Chapter 46. post. 
 
 rates that are not on file with, are not lawful factors in constructing through 
 interstate rates, 602-G. 
 
 interurban-Electric Railways, 
 
 power of Commission to establish joint rates with steam railways, 613-M. 
 
 Intrastate Commerce, 
 
 power of Commission to prescribe rate, classification, regulation, or practice to 
 govern, in order to remove a preference or prejudice or dis^ 
 crimination against interstate or foreign commerce, 613-NN. 
 
 Intrastate Rates, 
 
 increase in intrastate rates to remove any undue or unreasonable advantage, 
 
 preference, prejudice or discrimination against interstate or 
 
 foreign commerce, 611-E.. 
 maintenance of higher intrastate rate than interstate rate, 611-D. 
 power of Commission over intrastate rates during the period of Federal control, 
 
 613-PP. 
 power of Commission over rates and charges after termination of Federal control 
 ' and prior to September 1,1920— Intrastate and interstate rates, 
 
 613-QQ. 
 
15 FKEIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [Chap. 6, ludex 
 
 Intrastate Traffic, 
 
 See "Intrastate Commerce." 
 
 Investigation and Suspension of Freight Rates, 
 
 after expiration of Commission's order suspending tariff, proposed new rates do 
 
 not automatically go into effect, 611-Q. 
 investigation and suspension of new rate, charge, regulation or practice, 611-Q 
 original exclusive jurisdiction of Commission over suspension of published inter- 
 state classification or rate schedule, 613-F. 
 
 Investment in Commercial Enterprise, 
 
 relying upon a certain rate adjustment, 608-N. 
 
 Joint Rates, 
 
 See "Through Rates." 
 
 adjacent foreign countries. Commission no power to establish joint through rates 
 
 between points in the United States and points in, 613-P. 
 belt railroads, power of Commission to establish joint through rates with, 613-0. 
 cancellation of joint through rate resulting in higher combination of local rates 
 
 609-HH. 
 ^carrier may not deny benefit of, to manufacturers on connecting lines, in order to 
 
 foster own industries, 610-C. 
 combination rate may not be applied until joint rate is cancelled, 601- J. 
 / Commission may establish, if discrimination found to exist, 613-R. 
 
 Commission may order maintenance of joint through rate when its cancellation 
 
 will result in higher charges based upon combination of locals, 
 
 613-S. 
 defined and ugage, 600-B, 601-A. 
 divisions of joint through rate nbt conclusive evidence of reasonableness of joint 
 
 through rate itself, 610-G. 
 divisions of, no criteria by which to measure local rates, 610-F. 
 duty of carriers to establish, 601-K. 
 
 established via one route not applicable via another route, 601-E. 
 independent water carriers. Commission no authority to establish joint through 
 
 rates with, 613-N. ' 
 interurban-electric railway, power of Commission to establish joint rates with 
 
 steam railway, 613-M. 
 joint through interstate rate which exceeds the aggregate of the intermediate 
 
 rates, subject to the Act, is unlawful and non-enforceable, 609-FF. 
 joint through rate that exceeds the- combination of a local rate and an undefined 
 
 proportional rate, 609-GG. 
 legal status of joint rate exceeds aggregate of intermediate rates, 601-F. 
 legal status of joint rate that is lower than combination of local rates, 601-G. 
 legal status of tariff carrying joint rates not naming junction points, 601-H.' 
 limitation on application of, 601-O. 
 
 matter" of agreement between connecting carriers, 601-A. 
 participation merely in joint rates makes them jointly and severally responsible 
 
 for unjust discrimination, 601-P. 
 parties not competent in law to establish, for interstate transportation, 661-D. 
 power of Commission to establish, 613-J. 
 
 right of carrier to demand indemnity before concurring in establishment of, 601-L. 
 should not be cancelled because of failure of carriers to agree upon divisions, 
 
 601-1. 
 street-electric-passenger railways. Commission may not establish through rates 
 
 in connection with, 613-L. 
 to and from foreign countries, increase in, 611-Y. 
 to and from foreign countries under Ex Parte 74, 601-N. 
 to and from Porto Rican ports, 601-B. 
 unreasonableness of joint rate that exceeds the combination of a local rate and 
 
 an undefined proportional rate, 601-M. 
 
 Judicial Question, 
 
 See "Question of Law." 
 
 Judicial Review, 
 
 establishment of joint through rates discretionary with Commission and not 
 
 reviewable by the courts, 618-Q. 
 orders of Commission, 613-11. 
 
 Jurisdiction of Interstate Commerce Commission, 
 
 adjacent foreign, countries. Commission no power to establish joint through rates 
 befjween points in the United States and points in, 613-P. 
 
 authority of divisioTis of the Commission to determine questions under the Act, 
 613-MM. 
 
 belt railroads, power of Commission to establish joint through rates with, 613-0. 
 
 burden of proof as to reasonableness of increased rate on common carrier, 613-H. 
 
 Commission may establish joint through rates if discrimination found to exist, 
 613-R. 
 
 Commission may make order prescribing same rate for similar services to other 
 shippers, 613-U. 
 
 Commission no power to advance rates to temporarily improve business condi- 
 tions, 613-V. 
 
Chap. 6, Index] traffic law seevlce 16 
 
 Commission no power to. annul a rate except by a formal order' made in con- 
 formity with section 15 of Act, 613-BB. 
 
 Commission no power to equalize rates, 613-CC. • 
 
 Commission no power to fix rates upon traffic consideration, 613-Z. 
 
 Commission no power to protect' American Manufacturers and producers from 
 foreign competition, 613-EE. 
 
 Commission no pt)wer to substitute new rate for just and reasonable rate. 613-AA. 
 
 control over freight rates and charges generally, 613- A. 
 
 effective time of orders of Commission, 613-G.' 
 
 establishment of joint rates and divisions thereof, 613-K. 
 
 establishment of joint through rates discretionary with Commission and not 
 
 reviewable by the courts, 613-Q. 
 -establishment of through rates in connection with street-electric-passenger rail- 
 ways forbidden, 613-L. 
 
 export and import traffic, rates on 613-LL. 
 
 finality of conclusions of Commission on questions of fact, 613- J. 
 
 "flexible limit of judgment which belongs to the power to fix rates," 613-HII-. 
 
 governmental materials and war traffic, rates for transportation of, 613-GG. 
 
 import and export traffic, rates on, 613-LL. 
 
 independent water carriers. Commission no authority to establish joint through 
 rate with, 613-N. 
 
 interurban-electric railways, power of Commission to establish joint rates be- 
 tween steam railways and, 613-M. 
 
 intrastate commerce, power of Commission to prescribe rate, classification, regu- 
 lation, or practice to govern intrastate traffic in order. to re- 
 move a preference or prejudice, or discrimination against inter- 
 state or foreign commerce, 613-NN. 
 
 judicial review of Commission's order, 613-11. 
 
 maintenance of joint through rates may Ije- ordered when its cancellation will 
 result in higher charge based upon combination of locals, 613-S. 
 
 ma.y determine and prescribe just and reasonable regulations and practices, 613-C. 
 
 may order carriers to cease and desist fvfll extent of violations found, 613-D. 
 
 nature of commodity, determination of, is a judicial question, 613-X. 
 
 new rate, regulation or practice, power of Comniission to investigate, 613-B. 
 
 not within the province of the Commission to require carriers to adjust their 
 rates so as to equalize natural or commercial advantages, 613-DD. 
 
 omission of Commission to fix a future rate is not inconsistent with an order 
 for reparation for past - injuries by reason -of assessment of 
 unreasonable rate, 613-FF. 
 
 original exclusive jurisdiction of Commission over suspension of published inter- 
 state classification or rate schedule, 613-F. 
 
 power of Commission over fixation of terms and' compensation for common use 
 of terminal facilities, 613-KK. 
 
 power of Commission over intrastate rates during the period of Federal control, 
 613-PP. 
 
 power of Commission over rates and charges after termination of Federal control 
 and prior to September 1, 1920 — Intrastate and interstate rates, 
 613-QQ. 
 
 power of Commission over local state rate on through interstate shipment, 613- J J. 
 
 power of Commission to consider effect on business of an industry in advancing 
 rates, 613-W. 
 
 power to determine and fix maximum, minimum, or precise rates, 613-B. 
 
 primary jurisdiction of Commission to determine reasonableness or unreason- 
 ableness of interstate rate, 613-1. 
 
 railway-mail pay, 613-Y. 
 
 restraining enforcement of new rate, regulation or practice pending investigation. 
 613-F. 
 
 valuation supplies of Commission, transportation of, 613-00. 
 
 Justness of Kates, 
 
 See "Reasonableness of Freight Rates." 
 
 Lake-and-Rail Rate, 
 defined, 600-J. 
 
 Land-Grant Roads, 
 
 reasonableness of compensation to certain, 609-SSS. 
 
 Lawfulness of Rates, 
 
 See "Reasonableness of Rates." 
 
 Legal Question, 
 
 See "Question of Law." 
 
 Legal Rate, 
 
 applicable to an interstate shipment is the published through rate in effect at 
 the time the shipment is received by the calTder for tlransporta- 
 tion and over the route which it is to move, fl02-B, 
 
 only one can exist between any two rates at any given time, 602-A. 
 
 Less-than-Carload Rates, 
 
 comparison with carload rates, 610-O. 
 
17 FEEIGHT RATES AND CHAEliES [Cliap. 6, IlldeX 
 
 Less-than-Carload Shipments, 
 
 ' lower rate for carload than for, 609-00. 
 minimum charge for transportation of, 609-NN. 
 
 Limitation of Common Carrier's Liability, 
 
 See "Limitation of Common Carrier's Liability — Initial Carrier's Liability," 
 Chapter 20, post. 
 
 Live Stock, 
 
 See "Transportation of Live Stock", Chapter 31, post. 
 
 Local Rates, 
 
 comparison with proportional rates, 610-K. 
 
 defined and usage, 600A. 
 
 divisions of joint through rates no criteria by which to measure, 610F. 
 
 Locomotive, 
 
 on own wheels under power, 608-1. 
 
 Long-and-Short-Haul Clause, 
 
 See "Fourth Section of the Interstate Commerce Act — Long-and-Short-Haul 
 Clause — Fourth-Section Applications," Chapter 7, post. 
 
 Long-Established Rate, 
 
 maintenance for long period of rates voluntarily established by carrier as evi- 
 dence of its reasonableness, 609-GGG. 
 
 presumption where long-established rate is advanced for short period and then 
 reduced to former basis, 609-HHH. 
 
 Long Haul, 
 
 right of carrier to reserve to itself, in establishinent of through route, 609-BB. 
 
 Long-Haul Traffic, 
 
 low rates for carriage of, 609-N. 
 
 Low-Grade Traffic, 
 
 low rates, 609-M. 
 
 Low Ratees, 
 
 establishment of, by carrierito test traffic situation, 609 Y. 
 
 long-haul traffic, 609-N. 
 
 low-grade trafflc,609-M. 
 
 right of carrier to change an unreasonably low rate, 609-JJJ. 
 
 Manufactured Products, 
 
 comparison of rates on raw materials, and manufactured products, 610-U. 
 
 Maps, 
 
 officially published by railroad companies controlling as to tariff^s, 608-V. 
 
 Maximum Rates, 
 
 power of Commission to determine and fix, 613-B. 
 
 Minimum Carload Charge, 
 increase in, 611-U. 
 
 Minimum Charge, 
 
 See "Minimum Carload Charge." 
 
 less-than-Carload shipment, minimum charge for transportation of, 609-NN. 
 
 per shipment, increase in, 611-U. 
 
 Minimum Class Scale, 
 
 increase in, 611-U. 
 
 Minimum Rates, 
 
 power of Commission to determine and fix, 613-B. 
 
 Misquotation, 
 
 rate misquoted by agent does not afford lawful charge. 
 
 'Missionary" Rates, 
 
 defined and usage, 600-L. 
 
 Mixed Carloads, 
 
 reasonableness of rates on, 609-ZZ. 
 
 Mixed Shipments, 
 
 rates on, 600-1. 
 
 Movement of Traffic, 
 
 adjustment of rates to induce, 608-P. 
 
 Natural Advantages, 
 
 not within the province of the Commission to require carriers to adjust their 
 rates so as to equalize natural or commercial advantages, 613-DD. 
 Net Operating Income, 
 
 See "Aggregate Annual Operating Income." 
 
Chap. 6, Index] tbaffic law service 18 
 
 Non-Competitive Points, 
 
 comparison of rates to competitive and non-competitive points, 610-J. 
 
 Onus Probandi, •' 
 
 See "Burden of Proof." 
 
 Operating Income, 
 
 See "Aggregate Annual Net Operating Income." 
 
 Orders of Commission, 
 
 See "Findings of Commission." 
 
 Commission may make order prescribing same rate for similar services -to other 
 shippers, 613-U. 
 
 Commission may order carriers to cease and desist from full extent of violations 
 found, 613-D. 
 
 Commission ho power to annual a rate except by a formal order made in con- 
 formity with section 15 of Act, 618-BB. 
 
 effective time of, 613-G. 
 
 judicial review of Commission's orders, 613-H. 
 
 Panama Canal Act, 
 
 See, "Water Carriers— Panama Canal- Act," Chapter 50, post. 
 
 "Paper" Rates, 
 
 defined and usage, 600-K. 
 
 Payment for Transportation, 
 
 See "Payment for Transportation," Chapter 19, post. 
 
 provision of statute requiring payment of charges before delivery of property, 607. 
 
 Penalties and Forfeitures, 
 
 See, "Penalties and Forfeitures — Criminal Proceedings," Chapter 52, post. 
 
 Percentage Increases, 
 
 versus flat increases and maintenance of differentials and relationships, 611-Z: 
 
 Perishable Traffic, 
 
 higher rates on, than on ordinary freight, 609-QQ. 
 
 Per Se Reasonableness, 
 
 See "Reasonableness of Rates." 
 
 Per-Ton Rate, 
 
 average on all traffic, 609-Q. 
 
 rate-per-ton-per-mile test of reasonableness, 609-P. 
 
 Port Differentials, 
 
 maintenances of, on increased rates, 611-R. 
 
 Port of Entry, 
 
 See "Import Traffic." 
 
 Port of Transhipment, 
 
 See "Export Traffic." 
 
 Porto Rico, 
 
 joint through rates to and from Porto Rican ports, 601-B. 
 
 Posting of Freight Rates and Charges, 
 
 See, "Railroad Company Freight Tariffs or Rate Schedules," Chapter 30, post. 
 
 Practice Before Interstate Commerce Commission, 
 
 See, "Practice and Procedure before the Interstate Commerce Commission," Chap- 
 ter 46, post. 
 
 Practices, 
 
 See "Rules, Regulations and Practices." 
 
 Precise Rates, 
 
 See "Absolute Rates." 
 
 Prepayment of Charges, I 
 
 carrier may not demand higher rate when freight is shipped with charges collect 
 than when charges are prepaid, 609-MM. 
 
 Presumptions, 
 
 no presumption of wrong arises from an advance in rates, 611-N. 
 no presumption of wrong arises from change in rates by carriers, 604-B. 
 that carrier acted in good faith in initiating rates, 603-E. 
 
 where long established rate is advanced for short period and then reduced, to 
 former basis, 609-HHH, and 611-F. 
 
 Proportional Rates, 
 
 See "Inland Proportional Rates." 
 comparison with local rates, 610-K. 
 defined and usage, 60p-B. 
 
 joint through rate that exceeds the combination of a local rate and an undefined 
 proportional rate, 609-GG. 
 
19 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [Chap. 6, Index 
 
 Prosperity of Country, 
 
 right of carrier to share in generally, 60S-R. 
 
 Prosperity of Shipper, 
 
 carrier has no right to graduate its charges in proportion to, 608-Q. 
 
 Protective Services on Perishable Traffic, 
 
 See, "Protective Services in Transportation of Perishable Traffic," Chapter 12, 
 post. 
 
 Public, 
 
 not the general manager of railroads respecting thsir rates, 609-L. 
 
 Publication of Freight Rates and Charges, 
 
 See, "Railroad Freight Tariffs or Rate Schedules," Chapter 30, post. 
 
 Question of Fact, 
 
 finality of conclusions of Commission on, 613-J. 
 
 Question of Law, 
 
 nature of commodity, determination of, is a judicial question, 613-X. 
 
 Quotation of Rates, 
 
 Commission's rates treated as embodied in statute, 605-D. 
 
 duty of carriers to quote rates to shippers, 605-A. 
 
 misquotation of rate by agent does not afford lawful charge, 605-C. 
 
 quotation on shipoei-'s application of rate for sailing, and other accruing charges, 
 
 605-B. 
 reservation of space by water carrier for railroad, 605-B. 
 vessel rate condition on quantity of shipments, 605-B. 
 
 Radiotelegraph Companies, 
 
 See, "Telegraph, Telephone, Cable and Radiotelegraph Companies." 
 
 Rail-and-Water Rates, 
 
 defined and ^sage, 600-J. 
 
 Rail-Lake-and-Rail Rate, 
 defined, 600-J. 
 
 Railroad Company Freight Tariff's or Rate Schedules, 
 
 See, "Railroad Company Freight Tariffs or Rate Schedules," Chapter 30, post, 
 errors in publication of rates, 609-TTT. 
 
 presumption* that carrier's tariff provides reasonable charges for the service nor- 
 mally performed, 609-NNN. 
 published rate schedule is prima facie evidence of the reasonableness of the 
 rates stated therein, 609-EEE. 
 
 Railroad Investment, ' 
 
 aggregate value of railway property held for and used in the transportation 
 service, 608-X. 
 
 Railway Finances, 
 
 See "Railway Finances — Guranteed Return on Railway Property," Chapter 55, 
 post. 
 
 Railway-Mail Pay, 
 
 jurisdiction of Commission over, 613-Y. 
 reasonableness of, 609-RRR. 
 
 Rate-Per-Ton-Per-Mile Rule, 
 
 comparison of freight rates, 610-R. 
 test of reasonableness, 609-P. 
 
 Rates Must Be Just and Reasonable, 
 
 See "Reasonableness of Freight Rates." 
 
 Raw Materials, 
 
 comparison of rates on raw materials and manufactured products, 610-U. 
 relationship of rates on, to competing industries, 610-N. 
 
 Reasonableness of Freight Rates, 
 
 agreement between carrier and municipality for maintenance of given rates m 
 
 consideration of certain privileges to carrier by city, not binding 
 
 on Commission, 609-V. 
 any-quantity rates, 609-WW. 
 average rate per ton on all traffic, 609-Q. 
 basing-point system of rates, 609-UUU. 
 between points served by more than one carrier not to be determined by rate of 
 
 line most favorably situated, 609-DD. 
 "blanket" rates, 609-XX.- 
 branch-line haul, 609-CCC. 
 bridge tolls, propriety of, 609-AAA. 
 
 "business motive," rates fixed according to, are unreasonable and unlawful, 609-U. 
 burden of proof as to reasonableness of increased rates upon common carrier, 
 
 611-P. 
 
Chap. 6, Index] traffic law sekvicf 20 
 
 burden of proof as to reasonableness of increased rate on common carrier, 613-H. 
 burden of proof as to reasonableness of increased rate on common carrier, 
 
 609-MMM. 
 burden of proof under allegation of unreasonableness, 609-LLL. 
 cancellation of joint through rate resulting in higher combination of local rated, 
 
 609-HHH. 
 
 carrier may not adjust rates so as to regulate foreign traffic through certain 
 ports, 609- W. 
 
 carrier may riot demand higher rates when freight is shipped with charges collect 
 than when charges are prepaid, 609-MM. 
 
 carrier may not restrict traffic to movements between points on its own lines, 
 609-W. 
 
 charging of an unreasonable rate is a'tort, 609-XXX. 
 
 circuitous routes, rates via, 609-AA. 
 
 Commission no power to substitute new rate for just and reasonable rate, 613- AA. 
 
 comparison of freight rates. See "Comparison of Freight Eates." 
 
 compensation to certain land-grant roads, ~609-SSS. 
 
 concert of action between carriers, rates established by, 609-O. 
 
 cost of service and reasonable rate, 609-J. 
 
 development of particular industry, rates established for, 609-S. 
 
 difference between import rates and domestic rates should not be andue or un- 
 reasonable, 609-SS. 
 
 doubt as to reasonableness of rate resolved in favor of carrier, 609-QQQ. 
 
 effect of private agreement between carrier and shipper concerning transporta- 
 tion charges, 609-WV. 
 
 equalizing rates in and out of competing jobbing centers impracticable, 
 609-WWW. 
 
 equalizing rates of different carriers, 609-Z. 
 
 errors in publication of rates, 609^TTT. 
 
 establishments of commodity rate as evidence of unreasonableness pi prior class 
 rate, 609-DDD. 
 
 establishment of low rates by carrier to test traffic situation, 609-Y. 
 
 fact that a rate established by carriers does not apply between the same points 
 is not conclusive of its unreasonableness, 609-PPP. 
 
 filing schedule with Commission not conclusive of reasonableness of rates con- 
 tained therein, 609rFFF. , 
 
 freight rates to be on basis that will yield an aggregate annual net operating 
 income equal, as nearly as may be, to a fair return upon the 
 aggregate value of the railway properties of the carrier held 
 for and used in the service of transportation, 609-H. 
 
 generally, 609- A. 
 
 graduated rates, 609- YY. / 
 
 group rates, 609-XX. 
 
 higher rate for shorter than longer distance over same line or route in same 
 direction, the shorter being included within the" longer distance, 
 609-11. 
 
 higher rate on perishable traffic than on ordinary freight, 609-QQ; 
 
 higher rate over route composed of two or more carriers than over a single route, 
 609-CC. 
 
 higher rates when shipments are tendered with other than uniform bill of lad- 
 ing, ,609-KK. 
 
 imported commodity not entitled to inland proportional rate which is lower than 
 domestic rate when transportation from port of entry is purely 
 local, 609-TT. 
 
 joint through interstate rate which exceeds the aggregate of the intermediate, 
 609-FF. 
 
 joint through rate that exceeds the combination of a local rate and an undefined 
 proportioned rate, 609-GG. 
 
 "just," meaning of term, 609-D. 
 
 long-haul traffic, low rates for carriage of, 609-N. 
 
 lower rate for carload than for less-than-carload quantities, 609-00. 
 
 lower rate for inland movement of export or import traffic than for domestic 
 traffic, 609-RR. 
 
 lower rate on inland movement of import or export traffic than on domestic com- 
 merce, unlawful unless water movement shall have been or is 
 to be in a vessel documented under the laws of the United 
 States, 609-YYY. 
 
 low-grade, low rates for, 609-M. 
 
 maintenance for long period of rate voluntarily establi-shed by carrier as evidence 
 of its reasonableness, 609-GGG. 
 
 mandate of statute that transportation charges be just and reasonable, 609-C. 
 
 minimum charge for transportation of less-than-carload shipment, 609-NN. 
 
 mixed carloads, 609-ZZ. 
 
 no estoppal operated against the right of a carrier to enjoy just and reasonable 
 rates, 609-KKK. 
 
 per se reasonable rate, may be unlawful on other ground, 609-1. 
 
 presumption that carrier's tariff provides reasonable charges for the service nor- 
 mally perfowned, 609;NNN. 
 
 presumption where long-established^rate is advanced for short period and then 
 reduced to former basis, 609-HHH. 
 
21 FREIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [Chap. 6, IndeX 
 
 primary jurisdiction of Commission to determine reasonableness or unreason- 
 ableness of interstate rate, 613-1. 
 
 public not the general manager of railroads respecting their rates, 609-L. 
 
 published rate schedule is prima facie evidence of the reasonableness of the 
 rates stated therein, 609-EEK. 
 
 question of reasonableness of rates one of fact, 609-E. 
 
 railway-mail pay, 609-RRR. 
 
 rate-per-ton-per-mile test, 609-P. 
 
 rate voluntarily established by carrier to meet competition not to be taken as 
 measure of reasonableness, 609-JJ. 
 
 rates and rebates, 609-B. 
 
 "reasonable," meaning of term, 609-D. 
 
 rebates and rates, 609-B. 
 
 regulations and practices required to be established by carriers, just and reason- 
 able, 609-F. 
 
 released-valuation rates, 609-LL. 
 
 requirement that import freight to be placed in bonded warehouse or delivered to 
 rail carrier direct from ship's side or dock of vessel as con- 
 dition, precedent to application of import rate, 609-U. 
 
 reshipping rates, 609-BBB. 
 
 right of carrier to change an unreasonably low rate, 609-JJ. 
 
 right of carrier to reserve to itself the long haul in establishment of through 
 route, 609-BB. 
 
 river-crossing charges, propriety of, 609-AAA. 
 
 rules and regulations not shown in published tariffs, enforcement of, 609-G. 
 
 through rate composed of aggregate of intermediate rates, 609-EE. 
 
 tonnage shipped by' particular firm, 609-T. 
 
 train-load rate, 609-PP. 
 
 undeveloped territory, carriers serving, entitled to higher rates than ordinarily, 
 609-R. 
 
 unreasonable rate not permissable merely because its correction will result in 
 the disturbance of other rates,, 609-III. 
 
 usage of commodity, rates fixed according to, are unreasonable and unlawful, 
 609-U. 
 
 voluntary reduction of a rate by the carrier is not conclusive that the prior 
 rate was unreasonable, 609-000. 
 
 widespread rate adjustment, effect of, 609-X. 
 
 Rebates and Concessions, 
 
 See, "Rebates and Concessions," Chapter 27, post. 
 
 rates and rebates, 609-B. 
 
 services at terminals, 608- S. 
 
 terminal services as elements to be considered in relationship of rates, 610-S. 
 
 Reductions in Rates, 
 
 presumption where long-established rate is advanced for a short period and then 
 
 reduced to former basis, 609-HH. 
 voluntary reduction of a rate by the carrier is not conclusive that the prior rate 
 
 was unreasonable, 609-000. 
 
 Refrigeration Charges, 
 
 See, "Protective Service in Transportation of Perishable Traffic," Chapter 12, 
 post. 
 
 Regulations, 
 
 See "Rules, Regulations and Practices." 
 
 Relations of the Carrier and the Public, 
 considered in rate-making, 608-L. 
 
 Relationship of Freight Rates, 
 
 See "Comparison of Freight Rates." 
 
 advances in rates to preserve proper relation between commodities, 611-G. 
 
 Released Valuation Rates, 
 
 reasonableness of, 609-LL. 
 
 Reparations, 
 
 See, "Damages and Reparation." 
 
 Reshipping Rates, 
 
 reasonableness of, 609-BBB. 
 
 Restraining Power of Commission, 
 
 power of Commission to restrain enforcement of new rate, regulation or prac- 
 tice pending investigation of same, 613-F. 
 
 Restricted Movement of Tariff, 
 
 carrier may not restrict traffic to movements between pomts on its own lines, 
 609-W. 
 
 Risk, , . _„„ _, 
 
 factor in rate-makmg, 608-1' . 
 
Chap. 6, Index] traffic law seevxce- ; 22 
 
 River-Crossing Charges, 
 
 propriety of, 609-AAA; 
 
 Routes and Routing, 
 
 See, "Routes and Routing," chapter 11, post. 
 
 right of shipper to use any through route available under tariff rates, 602-O. 
 
 Rules, Regulations and Practices, 
 
 after expiration, of Commission's order suspending tariff, , proposed new rd,tes 
 
 do not automatically go into effect, 611-Q. 
 Commission may determine and prescribe just and reasonable, 613-C. 
 investigation and suspension of new rate, charge, regulation or practice, 611-0. 
 just and reasonable transportation regulations and practices required to be 
 
 established by carriers, 609-F. 
 not shown in published tariffs, enforcement of, as affecting reasonableness of 
 
 rates, 609-G. 
 power of Commission to investigate, new, 613-E. 
 power of Commission to restrain enforcement of, pending investigation, ^13-F. 
 
 Second hand articles, 
 rates on, 608- Y. 
 
 Ship's Side, 
 
 requirement that import freight to placed in bonded warehouse or delivered to 
 rail carrier direct from ship's side or dock of vessel as condition 
 precedent to application of import rate, 609-UU. 
 
 Special Services. 
 
 increases in charges for, 611-X. 
 
 State Authorities, 
 
 See "Interstate Rates." 
 
 rates iixed by State authorities as standards in fixing interstate rates, 610-V. 
 
 State Rates, 
 
 See "Interstate Rates." 
 
 power of Commission over local state rate on through interstate shipment, 613-JJ. 
 
 State Traffic, 
 
 see "Intrastate Conimerce." 
 
 Street-Electric-Passenger Railways, 
 
 Commission may not establish through rates in connection with, 613-L. 
 
 Suspension of Rates, 
 
 See "Investigation and Suspension of Freight Rates.'' 
 
 Switching — Switch Connections — Private Side-Tracks. 
 
 See, "Switching — Switch Connections — Private Side-Tracks," Chapter 24, post. 
 
 Telegraph Companies, 
 
 See, "Telegraph, Telephone, Cable and Radiotelegraph Companies," Chapter 51, 
 post. 
 
 Telephone Companies, 
 
 See, "Telegraph, Telephone, Cable and Radiotelegraph Companies," Chapter 51, 
 post. 
 
 Terminal Facilities and Regulations, 
 
 See, "Terminal Facilities and Regulations," Chapter 16, post. 
 
 power of Commission over fixation of terms and compensation for common use 
 of, 613-KK. 
 
 Terminal Services, 
 
 in delivery and receipt of traffic as elements to be considered in relationship of 
 rates, 610-S. 
 
 Terminology, 
 
 "arbitraries," 600-E. 
 
 "differentials," 600-F. 
 
 "just," meaning of term, 609-D. 
 
 "missionary rates," 600-L. 
 
 "paper rates," 600-K. 
 
 "proportional rates," 600-D. 
 
 "unreasonable," meaning of term, 600-D. 
 
 Test Rates, 
 
 ' establishment of low rates by carrier to test traffic, 609-Y. 
 
 Through Rates, 
 
 See, "Joint Rates." 
 
 carriers rnay specify basing points or factors for constructing combination rate. 
 
 602-C. 
 combination of joint rate to common point and local rate beyond, 602-F. 
 commodity rates should be stated through from point of origin to destination, 
 
 602-K. 
 
23 FKEIGHT BATES AND CHAKOES [Chap. 6, Illdcx 
 
 defined and usage, 600-C. 
 
 division of, for rate-making purposes., not proper, 602-J. 
 
 division of, shipper not concerned with, 602-1. 
 
 inter-classification territories rates, 602-H. 
 
 inter-rate territories rates, 602-H. 
 
 legal rate applicable to an interstate shipment is the published through rate 
 
 in effect at the time the shipment is received by the carrier for 
 
 transportation and over the route which it is to move, 602-B. 
 legal status of ioint through rate that exceeds aggregate of intermediate rates, 
 
 602-N. 
 only one legal rate can exist between any two points at any given time,, 602-A. 
 rate to apply in absence of a joint rate or a specific method of constructing 
 
 through rate, 602-D. 
 rates between points in United States and adjacent foreign countries, 602-N. 
 rates that are not on file with Interstate Commerce Coinmission are not lawful 
 
 factors in constructing throiigh interstate rates, 602-G. 
 reasonableness of through rate composed of aggregate of intermediate rates, 
 
 602-L, 609-EE. 
 right of shipper to consign interstate traffic to an intermediate point, assume 
 
 custody of the shipment, either actual or constructive, and then 
 
 rebill the same ^o destination, where the joint through interstate 
 
 rate is higher than the aggregate of the intermediate rates, 602-E. 
 street-electric-passenger railways, Commission may not establish in connection 
 
 with, -613-L. 
 
 Through Routes, 
 
 right of shipper to use any through route available under tariff rates, 602-O. 
 
 Tonnage, 
 
 shipped by particular firm, as affecting reasonableness of rates, 609-T. 
 
 Tort, 
 
 The charging of an unreasonable rate is a tort, 609-XXX. 
 
 Trade-Center System, 
 
 reasonableness of, 609-UUU. 
 
 Train-Load Rate, 
 
 reasonableness of, 609-PP. 
 
 Transit Privileges, Facilities and Regulations, 
 
 See "Transit Privileges, Facilities and Regulations," Chapter 13, post. 
 
 Transportation of Live Stock, 
 
 See "Transportation of Live Stock," Chapter 31, post. 
 
 Undeveloped Territory, 
 
 carriers serving, entitled to higher rates than ordinarily, 609-R. 
 
 Uniform Bill of Lading, 
 
 higher rates when shipments are tendered with other than uniform bill of lading, 
 609-KK. 
 
 United States Railroad Administration, 
 
 Federal Control of Common Carriers, Chapter-54, post. 
 
 Unjustness of Rates, 
 
 See "Reasonableness of Rates." 
 
 Unlawfulness of Rates, ^ 
 
 See "Re^cSonableness of Rates." 
 
 Unreasonableness of Rates, 
 
 See "Reasonableness of Rates." 
 
 Usage of Commodity, 
 
 rates fixed according to, unreasonable and unlawful, 609-U. 
 
 Used Articles, 
 
 rates on, 608-Y. 
 
 Valuation Supplies, 
 
 transportation of 613-00. 
 
 Value of Commodity, 
 
 factor in rate-making, 608-E. 
 
 Value of Service to the Shipper, 
 
 factor and element in rate-making, 608-A. 
 versus cost of service to carrier, 608-C. 
 
 Ventilation Charges, 
 
 See, "Protective Services in Transportation of Perishable Traffic," Chapter 12, 
 post. 
 
Chap. 6, Index] tkaffic law sekvice 24 
 
 Volume of Traffic, 
 
 factor in rate-making, 608-G. 
 
 War Traffic, 
 
 jurisdiction of Commission over rates for transportation of, 613-GG. 
 
 Water Carriers, 
 
 See, "Water Carriers. .Panama Canal Act," Chapter 50, post. 
 
 Commission no authority to establish joint through rate with independent, 613-N. 
 
 quotation on shippers, application of rate for sailing, and" other accruing charges 
 
 605-B. 
 rates of, 608- W. 
 
 rates of, as factor in rate-making, 608-W. 
 reservation of space by water carrier for railroad, 605-B. 
 vessel rate condition on quantity of shipments, 605-B. 
 
 Water Transportation, 
 
 lower rate on inland movement of import or export traffic than on domestic com- 
 merce, unlawful unless water movement shall have been or is to 
 be in a vessel documented undpr the laws of the United States, 
 609-YY. 
 
 relation between water and rail transportation, 610-H. 
 
 Weight of Article, 
 
 factor in rate-making, 608-H. 
 
 Weights and Weighing, 
 
 See, "Weights and Weighing," Chapter 9, post. 
 
 Widespread Rate Adjustment, 
 
 effect of, on reasonableness of rates, 609-X. 
 
TABLE OF CASES— CHAPTER 6. 
 (SECTIONS 600-699.) 
 
 FREIGHT RATES AND CHARGES. 
 
 [Black face figures refer to sections and paragraphs] 
 
 Abel & Roberts v. Missouri P. Ry. Co. (1916), 37 I. C. C. Rep. 712, 609-CC. 
 
 Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 105, 
 
 609-CCC. 
 Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. Director General, as Agent, Pere Marquette Ry. Co. (1920), 
 
 59 I. C. C. Rep. 411, 412, 610-D. 
 Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 30, 
 
 600-G, 600-H, 609-T, 610-F. 
 Advances on Ground Iron Ore from Points in Alabama, Georgia and Tennessee to Boston, 
 
 New York, Philadelphia, and Other Points (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 675, 
 
 609-GGG, 611-J. 
 
 Alaska Investigation (1917), 44 I. C. C. Rep. 680, 609-A. 
 
 Albree v. Boston & M. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 303, 608-B, 608-N, 609-X. 
 Alden Coal Co. v. Rock Island S. Ey. Co. (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 223, 613-PP. 
 Allen & Lewis v. Oregon Rd. & Nav. (1890), 98 Fed. Rep. 16, 609-Z. 
 Allen & Lewis v. Oregon Rd. & Nav. Co. (1901), 106 Fed. Rep. 265, 609-X. 
 Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1915), 34 I. C. C. Rep. 414, 
 613-DD. 
 
 American Express Co. v. State of South Dakota (1917), 244 U. S. 657, 61 L. Ed. 1352, 
 
 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 656, 613-NN. 
 American National Live Stock Assn. v. Southern P. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 37, 
 
 609-CC. 
 American Refining Co. v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. 103, 608-B. 
 American Round Bale Press Co. v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1914), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 458, 608-B, 609-WW. 
 American Sugar Refining Co. v. Delaware L. & W. Ry. Co. (1912), 200 Fed. Rep. 652, 
 
 603-C, 613-1, 613-BB. 
 American Sugar Refining Co. v. Delaware L. & W. Rd. Co. (1913), 207 Fed. Rep. 733, 
 
 125 C. C. A. 251, 603-C, 613-1, 613-BB. 
 Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Chicago & E. Rd. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 592, 
 
 , 608-G, 609-PP. 
 Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Director General, Ann Arbor Rd. Co. (1920), 57 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 723, 608-W, 609-A, 609-P, 609-GGG. 
 Anadarko Cotton Oil Co. v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1910), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 43, 
 
 603-E, 609-D. 
 Anadarko Cotton Oil Co. v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 327, 
 
 609-XX. 
 Anderson Lumber Co. v. Director General, Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 467, 609-FF. 
 Anderson-Tully Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 48, 610-T. 
 Andrews Soap Co. v. Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1890), 4 I. C. C. Rep. 31, 3 I. C. 
 
 Rep. 77, 610-T. 
 Anson, Gilkey & Kurd Co v. Southern P. Co. (1915), 33 I. C. C. Rep. 332, 610-T. 
 Anthony v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 581, 608-E, 609- AAA. 
 Anthony Salt Co. v. Missouri P. Ry. Co. (1892), 4 I C. Rep. 33, 5 I. C. C. Rep. 299, 
 
 609-M. 
 Appalachia Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 193, 609-EE, 
 
 609-FF. 
 Arizona Intrastate Rates: In the Matter of Rates, Fares, and Charges applicable 
 
 between Points in the State of Arizona (1921), 61 I. C. C. Rep. 572, 613-NN. 
 Arkansas Intrastate Rates: In the Matter of Rates, Fares, and Charges of the Missouri 
 
 P Ry. Co. and Other Carriers in the State of Arkansas (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 471, 613-NN. 
 Arkansas Pass Channel & Dock Co. v. Galveston H. & S. A. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. 
 
 403, 613-P. 
 Arlington Heights Fruit Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1909), 175 Fed. Rep. 141, 613-F, 613-Z. 
 Arlinffton Heights Fruit Exchange v. Southern P. Co. (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 149, 
 
 609-XX, 609-GGG, 613-Z. 
 
Chap. 6, Cases] teaffic laav seevicf. 2 
 
 Arlington Heights Fruit Exchange v. Southern P. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 671, 608-X. 
 Arlington Heights Fruit Exchange v. Southern P. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 148, 613-Z. 
 Arlington Heights Fruit Exchange v. Southern P. Co. (1917), 45 I. C. C. 248, 613-HH. 
 
 Ashgrove Lime & Portland Cement Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. 
 
 • Rep. 519, 610-T. 
 Ashland Fire Brick Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 115, 613-CC. 
 Associated Jobbers of Los Angeles v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 310, 608-S, 610-S. 
 Association of Bituminous Coal Operators of Central Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania Rd. 
 
 Co. (1912), 23 L C. C. Rep. 385, 613-CC. 
 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Denver & M. O. Rd. Co. (1883), 110 U. S. 667, 28 L. Ed. 
 
 291, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185, 602-B. 
 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1910), 182 Fed. Rep. 
 
 189,613-Z. 
 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1911), 188 Fed. Rep. 
 
 229, 608-S. 
 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1911), 190 Fed. Rep. 
 
 591, L C. C. Rep. 83, 613-Z. 
 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. United States (1913), 203 Fed Rep. 56. 
 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. United States (1913), 231 U. S. 736, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 316, 
 
 58 L. Ed. 460, 613-Z. 
 Augusta Cotton Exchange and Board of Trade v. Southern Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 704, 609-GGG. 
 Auto Vehicle Co. v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 286, 608-E. 
 Avery Mfg. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 20, 609-XX. • 
 Baer Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Denver & R. G. Rd. Co. (1914), 233 U. S. 479, 34 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 641, 58 L. Ed. 1055, 613-1, 613-FF, 613-JJ 
 Baer Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Missouri P. Ry. Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 329, 613-1, 
 
 613-FP. 
 
 Baer Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Missouri P. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 225, 602-D. 
 
 Bag-ley & Co. v. Pere Marquette Rd. Co. (1913), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 698, 608-F. 
 
 Bahrenburg Bros & Co. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 560, 610-R, 
 610-T. 
 
 Baker Commercial Club v. Oregon-Washington Rd. & Nav. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep, 
 
 281, 609-CC. 
 Ball Lumber Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 437, 610-D. 
 Baltimore & 0. Rd. Co. v. Carnegie Steel Co. (1918), 251 Fed. Rep. 682, 613-1. 
 Baltimore Chamber of Commerce v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 596, 
 
 600-D, 610-K, 613-CC. 
 
 Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Cincinnati N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 557, 
 608-F. 
 
 Banner Milling Co. v. New York, C. & H. R. Rd. Co. (1908), 14 L C. C. Rep. 398, 603- A, 
 
 Barber Agency Co. v. Kentwood & E. Ry. Co. (1917), 46 I. C. C. Rep. 524, 610-T. 
 
 Barnard Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep 91, 610-T. 
 
 Bamum Iron Works v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 94, 
 611-A. 
 
 Bartles Oil Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 146, 609-GGG, 
 
 610-V. 
 Bartlesville Salvage Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 672, 610-T. 
 Bascom Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 354, 600-D. 
 Bayou City Rice Mills v. Texas & N. O. Rd. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 490, 600-D. 
 Bayway Chemical Co. v. Central Rd. Co. of New Jersey (1917), 46 I. C. C. Rep. 424, 
 
 610-T. 
 
 Beatrice Commercial Club v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 173, 609-P. 
 Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I C. C. Rep. 109, 609-S. 
 Becker v. Pere Marquette Rd. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 645, 600-D. 
 Beekman Lumber Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 98, 600-D. 
 Beekman Lumber Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 274, 608-E. 
 Beer and Other Malt Products between Stations in Iowa and South Dakota and Points 
 
 in Minnesota and Wisconsin (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 544, 610-V, 61-D. 
 Bell Company v. Baltimore & O. S. W. Rd. Co. (1903), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 632, 606-O. 
 Bennett & Son v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. (1916), 38 I. C. C. Rep. 310, 609-1. 
 Bentley & Olmsted Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep 56 
 
 609-WW. 
 Bemheim & Co. v. Oregon Rd. & Nav. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 156, 610-T. 
 Betcher v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co (1913), 26 I C. C. Rep. 335, 609-XX. 
 Big Basin Lumber Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1916), 37 L C. C.Rep. 730, 613-EE. 
 Birmingham Rail & Locomotive Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 602 
 
 609-FF. 
 
3 FREIGHT BATES AND CHAKGLS [Cliap. 6, CaSeS 
 
 Bituminous Coal and Coke Rates from Mines and Ovens in Alabama, Illinois, Kentucky 
 and Tennessee to Mississippi River Crossings and Various Junction Points in 
 Tennessee, Mississippi, and Louisiana (1915), 35 I. C. C. Rep. 187, 609-U. 
 
 Bituminous Coal Operators of Central Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania Red. Co., (1912), 
 
 23 I. C. C. Rep. 385, 609-X. 
 Black Horse Tobacco Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1910), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 588,613-P. 
 Black Mountain Coal Land Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 286, 600-F, 
 
 609-X, 609-XX, 609-CCC. 
 Blackwell Milling & Elevator Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 28, 600-E. 
 Blakely Southern Rd. Co. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 344, 601-K. 
 Bluegrass Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 438, 610-T. 
 Boardman Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1915), 37 I. C. C. Rep. 81, 608-S. 
 Board of Improvement, Fort Smith, Ark, v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 541, 610-R. 
 Board of Mayor & Aldermen of Bristol v. Virginia & S. W. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 L C. C. 
 
 Rep. 453, 609-O. 
 Board of Railroad Commissioners of Iowa v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 181, 609-AAA. 
 Board of Railroad Commissioners of the State of Kansas v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. 
 
 (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 407, 600-D, 608-O, 608-Q. 
 Board of Railroad Commissioners of the State of Montana v. Butte A. & P. Ry. Co. 
 
 (1914), 31 L C. C. Rep. 641, 610-D. 
 Board of Trade of CarroUton v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 154, 
 
 609-UUU. 
 Board of Trade of Kansas City v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1915), 34 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 208, 609-FF. 
 Board of Trade of Kansas City v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1914), 32 L C. C. Rep. 297, 
 
 600-D. 
 Board of Trade of Lynchburg v. Dominion S. S. Co., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 632, 609-1. 
 Board of Trade of the City of Hampton v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1900), 8 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 503, 608-X, 609-UUU. 
 Board of Trade of Troy v. Alabama M. Ry. Co. (1913), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 1, 4 L C. Rep. 349, 
 
 609-P. 
 Board of Trade of Winston-Salem, N. C. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. 
 
 12, 609-CCC, 610-F. 
 Board of Trade of Winston-Salem, N. C. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 146, 609-CCC. 
 Boards of Trade Union v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1887), 1 L C. Rep. 608, 1 L C. C. 
 
 • Rep, 215, 610-A 
 Boileau v. Pittsburgh & L. E. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 640, 608-C. 
 Boileau v. Pittsburgh & L. E. Rd Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 129, 609-X, 613-B. 
 Boise Commercial Club v. Adams Express Co. (1909), 17 L C. C. Rep. 115, 609-MM, 
 
 609-GGG. 
 Boldt Co. V. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 L C. C. Rep. 11, 610-U. 
 Boney & Harper Milling Co v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep 383, 600-D. 
 Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1913),, 28 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 230, 608-B, 609-P, 609-CC, 609-FF. 
 Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1888), 1 I. C. C. Rep. 436, 
 
 600-E. 
 Boston Fruit & Produce Exchange v. New York & N. E. Rd. Co. (1891), 4 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 664, 3 I. C. Rep. 493, 609-QQ. 
 Boston Fruit & Produce Exchange v. New York & N. E. Rd. Co. (1891), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 1, 
 
 3 I. C. Rep. 604, 609-MM, 610-F. 
 Bovaird Supply Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 56, 609-XX. 
 Brabham v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 464, 608-X. 
 Brady v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1888), 2 I. C. C. Rep. 131, 2 I. C. Rep. 78, 602-B. 
 Brantley v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1915), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 21, 609-S. 
 Brewster & Hanleiter v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1897), 7 I. C. C. Rep. 224, 608-X. 
 Brick Rates from Ohio Points to Huntington, W. Va. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 292, 609-P. 
 Broom Rates to Colorado Points (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 310, 610-T. 
 Brown v. Boston & M. Rd. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 47, 609-XX. 
 Brownell v Columbus & C. M. Rd. Co. (1893), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 638, 4 I. C. Rep. 285, 
 
 609-00, 609-WW. 
 Brownsville Cotton Oil & Ice Co. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1915), 35 I. C. C. Rep. 401, 
 
 609-XX. 
 Brownsville Tex., Cla.ss and Commodity Rates (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 479, 609-P. 
 Brunswick-Balke-CoUender Co. v. Chicago G. W. Rd. Co. (1920), 56 I. C. C. Rep. 340, 
 
 610-O. 
 Buchanan v. Northern P. Rd. Co. (1891), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 7, 3 I. C. Rep. 655, 608-O, 608-P. 
 
Chap. 6, Cases] teab'ii'ig law service 4 
 
 Buckeye Buggy Co. v. Cleveland, C. C. & St L. Ry. Co (1903), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 620, 606-O. 
 Buffalo Chamber of Commerce v Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1917), 46 I. C. C. Rep. 570, 
 609-BBB. 
 
 Buffalo Chamber of Commerce v. Buffalo Creek Rd. Co. (1917), 46 I. C. C. Rep. 570, 
 
 609-BBB. 
 Business Men's League of St. Louis v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1917), 44 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 308, 610-S. 
 Bulte Milling Co. v. Chicago & A. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 351, 609-P, 610-G, 
 
 610-T, 610-U. 
 Burgess v. Transcontinental Freight Bureau (1908), l3 L C. C. Rep. 668, 608-G, 
 
 609-GGG. 
 Bumham, Hanna, Munger Dry Goods Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1908), 14 I. G. 
 
 C. Rep. 299, 602-H, 610-F. 
 Burnham-Munger-Root Dry Goods Co. v. Director General, as agent for Baltimore 
 
 Steam Packet Co. (1920), 58, I. C. C. Rep. 73, 610-E. 
 Business Men's Assn. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Rd. Co. (1888), 2 I. C. Rep. 41, 2 I. C. 
 
 C. Rep 52, 609-P, 610-E. 
 Business Men's League v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1902), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 318, 608-B, 
 
 609-00, 609-YY. 
 Cairo Assn. of Commerce v. Butler County Rd. Co. (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 519, 609-AAA. 
 Cairo Board of Trade v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1917), 46 I. C. C. Rep. 343, 
 
 609-BBB. 
 California Citrus League v. Director General, Aberdeen & R. Rd. Co. (1920), 58 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 373, 380 et seq., 608-S. 
 California Commercial Association v. Wells, Fargo & Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 422, 
 
 6061O. 
 California Commercial Association v. Wells, Fargo & Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 458, 
 
 606-O. 
 California Commercial Association v. Wells, Fargo & Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 300, 
 
 606-O. 
 California Pole & Piling Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 669, 610-T. 
 Cambria Steel Co. v. Director General, as agent. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1921), 60 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep 459, 609-XX. 
 Cannon v. Mobile & O. Rd. Co. (1906), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 537, 610-D. 
 Cape Girardeau Commercial Club v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1918), 51 I. C. C. Rep. 105, 
 
 609-V. 
 Cape Girardeau Portland Cement Co. v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1915), 35 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 109, 609-XX. 
 Capital Electric Co.. v. Baltimore & 0. C. T. Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 472, 610-U. 
 Cardiff Coal Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 460, 601-C, 601-K. 
 Carey Mfg. Co. v. Grand Trunk W. Ry. Co. (1915), 36 I. C. C. 203, 6I3-P. 
 Carlowitz & Co. v. Canadian P. Ry. Co. (1917), 46, I. C. C. Rep. 290, 610-T, 613-P. 
 Carnation Milk Products Co. v. Director General, Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1919), 
 
 55 I. C. C. Rep. 665, 610-T. 
 Camie-Goudie Mfg. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1922), 68 I. C. C. Rep. 40, 42, 
 
 608-Y. 
 Caron & Campbell v. Director General, as Agent, Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1920), 57 
 
 I. C. C. Rep. 474, 609-CCC. 
 Carr v. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1901), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 1, 609-PP. 
 Carstens Packing Co. v. Oregon & W. Rd. Co. (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 77, 613-CC. 
 Carstens Packing Co. v. Oregon S. L. Rd. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 324, 608-F, 609-PP. 
 Carstens Packing Co. v. Union P. Rd. Co. (1911), 22 I C. C. Rep. 8, 610-D. 
 Gary v. Eureka Springs Ry. Co. (1897), 7 I. C. C. Rep. 286, 601-D. 
 
 Casey-Hedges Mfg. Co. v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. (1913), 26 L C. C. Rep. 63, 610-T. 
 Catoosa Limestone Products Co. v. Western & A. Rd. Co. (1916), 38 I. C. C. Rep. 614, 
 
 609-U. 
 Cattle Raisers' Assn. v. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 296, 608-F, 
 
 610-E. 
 Cedar Hill Coal & Coke Co. v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 L C. C. Rep. 387, 609-P. 
 Cedar Hill Coal & Coke Co. v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co. (1910), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 479, 601-K. 
 Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 260, 601-K. 
 Cement Rates between Points in Illinois and Points in Minnesota and Other States 
 
 (1914), 32 L C. C. Rep. 369, 611-L 
 Cement Rates from Duluth, Minn., Mason City and Des Moines, Iowa, to Stations on 
 
 the Midland Continental Rd. (1915), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 540, 610-T. 
 Cement Rates from Mason City, Iowa (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 426, 609- AA. 
 Central California Traction Co. v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 550, 600-H. 
 Central Freight Association Class Scale Case (I. & S. Docket No. 965) (1917), 45 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 254, 603-G. 
 
5 FREIGHT KATES AND CHARCiLS [Chap. 6, CaSeS 
 
 Central Ed. Co. of N. J., v. United States (1921), 66 L. Ed. 91, 94, —U.S. Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. . 601-P. 
 
 Central Yellow Pine Assn v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 505, 608-G, 608-Q, 
 
 608-X, 609-A, 609-M, 609-O, 609-FFF, 609-GGG. 
 Chamber of Commerce, Freight Bureau, Macon, Ga. v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. 
 
 (1914), 30 I. C. 0. Rep. 477, 610-T. 
 Chamber of Commerce of the City of Augustana, Ga. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. 
 
 C. Rep. 233, 609-LLL. 
 Chamber of Commerce, Houston, Texas, v. Abilene & S. Ry. Co. (1919), S3 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 645, 610-T. 
 Chamber of Commerce, Houston, Texas v. International & G. N. Ry. Co. (1914), 32 I. C. 
 
 C. Rep. 247, 600-H, 611-C. 
 Chamber of Commerce of the City of Milwaukee v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1898), 
 
 7 I. C. C. Rep. 481, 610-T. 
 
 Chamber of Commerce of Milwaukee v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 342, 609-XX. 
 
 Chamber of Commerce of Milwaukee v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 460, 601-K. 
 
 Chamber of Commerce of Newport News v. Southern Ry. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 
 345, 609-X. 
 
 Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York v. New York C. & H. R. Rd. Co. (1912), 
 
 24 I. C. C. Rep. 55, 600-F, 608-B, 609-VV, 609-GG, 613-N. 
 Charlotte Shippers' Assn. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 108, 609-UUU, 
 
 610-G. 
 Chattanooga Feed Co. v. Alabama G. S. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 480, 609-GGG. 
 Chattanooga Log Rates (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 36, 609-S. 
 Chattanooga Log Rates (1915), 35 I. C. C. Rep. 163, 608-N. 
 
 Chattanooga Packet Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1915), 33 I. C. C. Rep. 384, 600-D. 
 Chevrolet Motor Co. of Calif, v. Director General, as Agent (1922), 66 I. C. C. Rep. 677, 
 
 610-T. 
 Chevrolet Motor Co. of Texas v. Director General, Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1919), 
 
 55 I. C. C. Rep. 601, 609-FF. 
 Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Osborne (1892), 52 Fed. Rep. 912, 3 C. C. A. 347, 610-F. 
 Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1909), 171 Fed. Rep. 
 
 680, 613-J. 
 Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. v. United States (1907), 157 Fed. Rep. 830, 602-D. 
 .Chicago-Duluth Grain Rates (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 216,609-XX. 
 Chicago Fireproof Covering Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1899), 8 I. C. C. Rep. 316, 
 
 608-S. 
 Chicago Live Stock Exchange v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 428, 
 
 608-E, 608-F, 610-T. 
 Chicago Lumber & Coal Co. v. Tioga S. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 323, 608-P. 609-O, 
 
 609-XX, 613-Z. 
 Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois State Public Utilities Commission (111. 1915), 108, 
 
 N. E. 729, 613-NN. 
 Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota Civic Assn. (1918), 247 U. S. 490, 62 L. Ed. 
 
 1229, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 553, 610-S. 
 Chicago, O. & P. Ry. Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1915), 33 I. C. C. Rep. 573, 613-M. 
 Chicago Warehouse & Terminal Co., Terminal Charges (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 363, 
 
 608-S. 
 Chicksaw Compress Co. v. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 187, 608-P. 
 China & Japan Trading Co. v. Georgia Rd. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 326, 609-O. 
 Choctaw Cotton Oil Co. v. Director General, as Agent, Yazoo & M. V. Rd. Co. (1920), 
 
 59 I. C. C. Rep. 725, 609-FF. 
 Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1907), 206 U. S. 142, 
 
 51 L. Ed. 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 648, 609-GGG. 
 Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1896), 162 U. S. 
 
 184, 40 L. Ed. 935, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 700, 613-G. 
 City Ice & Supply Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1916), 36 I. C. C. Rep. 514, 6l0-T. 
 City of Danville v. Southern Ry. Co. (1915), 34 I. C. C. Rep. 430, 600-D. 
 City of Memphis v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1917), 43 I. C. C. Rep. 121, 609-AAA. 
 City of Spokane, Wash. v. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 376, 608-X. 
 Clark Co. V. Buffalo & S. Ry. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 380, 609-GGG. 
 Class and Commodity Rates to Salt Lake City, Utah, and Other Points (1915), 32 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 551, 609-P. 
 Clinton Mfrs. & Shippers' Assn. v. Chicago & A. Rd. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 230, 
 
 609-XX. 
 Clinton Sugar Refining Co. v. Chicago & N.-W. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 364, 
 
 606-F. 
 Coal Rates from Oak Hills, Colo. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 505, 613-B, 613-E. 613-F. 
 
Chap. 6, Cases] traffic law service , 6 
 
 Coal Rates from Virginia Mines (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 635, 609-XX. 
 
 Coffeyville Vitrified Brick & Tile Co. v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 498, 601-G, 609-FF. 
 Cohen-Schwartz Rail & Steel Co. v. Morgan's L. & T. Rd. & SS. Co. (1920), 57 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 479, 606-P, 606Q. 
 Cohen-Sdhwartz Rail & Steel Co. v. Director General, Morgan's L. & T. Rd. & S. S. Co. 
 
 (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 633, 609-FF. 
 Coke Producers Assri. of the Connellsville Region v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1913), 
 
 27 I. C. C. Rep. 125, 608-A, 608-E, 610-S. 
 Colorado Bedding Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 403, 610-D. 
 Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1895), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 488, 608-E, 608-M, 
 
 608-M, 609-P, 610-F. 
 Columbia Chamber of Commerce v. Southern Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 339, 
 
 609-UUU. 
 Columbus Grocery Co. v. Louisville &. N. Rd. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 502, 609-UUU. 
 Columbus Iron & Steel Co. v. Kanawha & M. Ry. Co. (1910), 178 Fed. Rep. 261, 101 C. C. 
 
 A. 621, 613-F, 613-1. 
 Commercial Club of Mitchell v. Ahnapee & W. Ry. Co. (1917), 46 I. C. C. Rep. 1, 600-H. 
 Commercial Club of Omaha v. Anderson & S. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 302, 602- A, 
 
 608-G, 609-BBB. 
 Commercial Club of Omaha v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 397, 608-F, 
 
 609-WW, 610-T. 
 Commercial Club of Omaha v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1897), 7 I. C. C. Rep. 386, 
 
 609-AAA. 
 Commercial Club of Omaha v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1897), 7. I. C. C. Rep. 156, 
 
 609-CCC. 
 Commercial Club of Omaha v. Southern P. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep 53, 609-HHH. 
 Commercial Club of Omaha v. Southern Ry. Co. (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 631, 609-GGG. 
 Commercial Club of Salt Lake City, Utah v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1910), 19 
 
 I. C. C. Rep. 218, 608-G, 609-XX, 610-E. 
 Commercial Club of Salt Lake City, Utah, v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1915), 36 
 
 I. C. C. Rep. 86, 609-U. 
 Commercial Clubs of Southern Idaho v. Oregon S. L. Rd. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 562, 
 
 608-E, 609-CCC. 
 Commercial Club of Superior v. Great.N. Ry. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 96, 600-F. 
 Commercial Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 11, 609-Z. 
 Committee on Ways and Means to Prosecute the Case of Alleged Railroad Rate and 
 
 Service Discrimination at the Port of New York v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. 
 
 (1917), 47 I. C. C. Rep. 643, 610-S. 
 Connor Lumber & Land Co. v. Akron C. & Y. Ry. Co. (1916), 40 I. C. C. Rep. Ill, 
 
 613-DD. 
 
 Connor Lumber & Land Co. v. Great N. Ry. Co. (1917), 43 I. C. C. Rep. 243, 609-EE. 
 Consolidated Forwarding Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 590, 609-QQ. 
 Consolidated Fuel Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 213, 609-CC. 
 Consolidation Coal Co. v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. (1921), 60 L C. C. Rep. 763, 611-P. 
 Constructive Mileage for Bridge over Hudson River at Poughkeepsie, N. Y. (1922), 66 
 
 I. C. C. Rep. 230, 609-AAA. 
 Continental Lumber & Tie Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 129, 610-T. 
 Cook Co. V. Wabash Rd. Co. (1911), 21 I. C C. Rep. 563, 610-D. 
 Copper Queen Consolidated Mining Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 154, 610-G. 
 Com Belt Meat Producers' Assn. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 376, 
 
 610-V. 
 Corporation Commission of North Carolina v. Director General, Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. 
 
 (1921), 62 I. C. C. Rep. 64, 609-XX. 
 Corporation Commission of the State of North Carolina v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (1910), 
 
 19 I. C. C. Rep. 303, 608-J, 608-N, 609-X, 609-XX, 610-J. 
 Corporation Commission of the State of Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. 
 
 (1914), 31 1. C. C. Rep. 532, 609-FF, 610-V. 
 Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. Hamburg-American Packet Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 266, 613-LL. 
 Crane Iron Works v. Central R. R. of N. J. (1910), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 514, 613-Q. 
 Crane Iron Works v. United States (1912), 209 Fed. Rep. 238, 613-Q. 
 Crane Rd. Co. v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. (1909) 15 I. C. C. Rep. 248, 613-Q. 
 Crawford & Bunce v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1914), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 12, 
 
 609-S, 611-K. 
 Crescent Coal & Mining Co. v. Chicago & E. I. Rd. Co. (1912), 24 L C. C. Rep. 149, 
 
 600-D, 608-V. 
 Crews v. Richmond & D. Rd. Co. (1888), 1 I. C. Rep. 703, 1 I. C. C. Rep. 401, 601-G. 
 Crombie & Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 233, 600-H. 
 
7 FREIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [Cliap. 6, CaseS 
 
 Crowders Bros. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1914), 29 I C. C. Rep. 449, 610-T. 
 Crutchfield & Woolfolk v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 558, 610-E. 
 Curtis, Booth & Bentley Co. v. Director General, St. Louis S. F. Ry. Co. (1919), 55 
 
 I. C. C. Rep. 511, 609-FF. 
 Dallas Freight Bureau v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 223, 610-E. 
 Dallas Freight Bureau v. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 427, 609-X, 
 
 609-XX, 613-B. 
 
 Danciger v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 99, 608-Y. 
 
 Darling & Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 79, 608-E, 609-GGG. 
 
 Davenport v. Southern Ry. Co. (1906), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 650, 609-UUU. 
 
 Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 
 291, 610-T. 
 
 Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 282, 611-G. 
 Dayton Coal & Iron Co. v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (1915), 239 U. S. 446, 36 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 137, 60 L. Ed. 375, 602-B. 
 DeCamp Bros v. Southern Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 144, 610-D. 
 Decker & Sons v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 547, 600-H, 608-B. 
 Decker & Sons v. Director General, as Agent, 'Minneapolis & St. L. Rd. Co. (1920), 59 
 
 I. C. C. Rep. 67, 69, 609-P. 
 Decker & Sons v. Director General, Minneapolis & St. L. Rd. Co. (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 585, 609-FF. 
 Decker & Sons v. Director General, as Agent Minneapolis & St. L. Rd. Co. (1922), 68 
 
 I. C. C. Rep. 34, 609-P. 
 Delaware, L. & W. Rd. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1908), 166 Fed. Rep. 
 
 499, 606-O. 
 Deilaware, L. & W. Rd. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1909), 169 Fed. Rep. 
 
 984, 606-O. 
 Delaware State Grange v. New York, P. & N. Rd. Co. (1891), 4 I. C. C. Rep. 588, 3 I. C. 
 
 Rep. 554, 608-A, 608-O, 609-A. 
 Delaware State Grange v. New York, P. & N. Rd. Co. (1892), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 161, 3 
 
 I. C. Rep. 828, 609-XX. 
 Delray Salt Co. v. Michigan C. Rd. Co. (1920), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 247, 610-D. 
 Denison Light & Power Co. v. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. (1904), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 327, 
 
 609-M. 
 Denver & R. G. Rd. Co. v. Baer Bros. Merc. Co. (1911), 187 Fed. Rep. 485, 613-1, 613-FF. 
 Denver & R. G. Rd. Co. v Interstate Commerce Commission (1912), 195 Fed. Rep. 968, 
 
 602-D. 
 DesMoines Saw Mill Co. v. Minneapolis & St. L. Rd. Co. (1915), 35 I. C. C. Rep. 182, 
 
 602-L 
 Detroit Chemical Works v. Northern C. Ry. Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 357, 610-N. 
 Detroit Coal Co. v. Michigan C. Rd. Co. (1915), 37 I. C. C. Rep. 274, 609-U. 
 Dewey Portland Cement Co. v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1920), 56 I. C. C. Rep. 444, 
 
 606-L. 
 Dietz Lumber Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 75, 608-B. 
 Dimmitt-Caudle- Smith Live Stock Commission Co. v. Chicago B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1917), 
 
 47 I. C. C. Rep. 287, 610-S. 
 Director General of Railroads, et al. v. Viscose Co. (1921), 65 L. Ed. 170, 254 U. S. 498, 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. , 613-F. 
 
 Doran & Co. v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1915), 33 I. C. C. Rep. 523, 602-B. 
 Dothan Chamber of Commerce v. Director General, Alabama G. S. Rd. Co. (1920), 58 
 
 I. C. C. Rep. 537, 609-XX. 
 Douglas & Co. V. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 232, 608-N. 
 Douglas & Co. V. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 541, 613-CC. 
 Drain Tile from Illinois Points (1915), 35 I. C. C. Rep. 83, 609-1. 
 Duluth Board of Trade v. Great N. Ry. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 342, 609-XX. 
 Duluth, Minn., Log Rates (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 420, 609-S, 611-K. 
 Duluth Shingle Co. v. Duluth S. S. & A. Ry. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 489, 610-T. 
 DuMee Son & Co. v. Alabama T. & N. Rd. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 575, 609-CCC. 
 Duncan v. Atchison, T. & S. F Ry. Co. (1893), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 85, 4 I. C. Rep. 385, 
 
 608-E, 609-U, 609-00, 609-PPP, 610-L. 
 Duncan & Co. v. Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 590, 609-WW. 
 Dunnage Allowances (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 538, 608-F. 
 DuPont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Central Rd. Co. of New Jersey (1912), 25 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 19, 609-GGG. 
 DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Director General, New York, P. & N. Rd. Co. (1919), 56 
 
 I. C. C. Rep. 233, 609-FF. 
 DiiPnnt De Nemours & Co. v. Director General, as Agent, Philadelphia, B. & W. Rd. Co. 
 
 (1920), 58 L C. C. Rep. 427, 428, 608-G. 
 
Chap. 6, Cases'! traffic law sekvice 8 
 
 East Dubuque Supply Co. v. Illinois C. Ed. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 425, 609-AAA. 
 Eastern Fruit Growers' Assn. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1915), 33 I. C. C. Rep. 343, 
 
 609-GGG. 
 Eastern Live Stock Case (1915), 36 I. C. C. Rep. 675, 610-E. 
 Eastern Wheel Mfrs. Assn. v. Alabama & V. Ry. Co (1913), I. C. C. Rep. 370, 610-T, 
 
 610-U. 
 East St. Louis Cotton Oil Co. v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1910), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 37, 
 
 610-U. 
 East St. Louis Cotton Oil Co. v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Ren. 588, 
 
 610-T 610-U. 
 Eau Claire Board of Trade v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1892), 4 I, C. Rep. 65, 
 
 5 I. C. C. Rep. 265, 608-J, 610-A. 
 Edgar & Son v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C Rep. 181, 184, 610-T. 
 Edwards & Bradford Lumber Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1912), 25 I.C. C. Rep. 93, 
 
 608-X, 609-AAA. 
 
 Eichenberg v. Southern P. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 450, 613-LL. 
 
 Eichenberg v. Southern P. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 584, 613-LL. 
 
 Electric Malting Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 378, 610-U. 
 
 Electric Railway-Mail Pay, (1920), 58 I. C. C. Rep. 455, 609-RRR. 
 
 Elk Cement & Lime Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 84, 609-P, 
 
 613-CC. 
 Empire Coke Co. v. Buffalo & S. Rd. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 573, 609-P. 
 Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Georgia Rd. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 451, 609-O, 610-1. 
 Enterprise Transportation Co. v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 326, 
 
 613-K 
 Erickson Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 414, 609-RR. 
 Escanaba Business Men's Assn. v. Ann Arbor Rd. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 11, 12, 
 
 600-J. 
 
 Evans v. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1896), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 520, 610-E. 
 
 Excelsior from St. Paul, Minnesota (1915), 36 I. C. C. Rep. 349, 609-O. 
 
 Export Shipping Co. v. Wabash Rd. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 437, 606-O. 
 
 Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 661, 
 
 610-T. 
 Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1917). 43 I. C. C. Rep. 515, 
 
 610-T. 
 Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 252, 
 
 609-GGG. 
 Falls & Co. V. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 269, 609-WW. 
 Fargo Foundry Co. v. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1916), 38 I. C. C. Rep. 693, 610-T. 
 Farrar Lumber Co. v. Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 22, 610-T. 
 Farrar Lumber Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1906), 11 I. C. C. Rep, 632, 608-E, 608-G, 609-P. 
 Federal Milling Co. v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 696, 
 
 609-XX. 
 
 Ferguson v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 391, 609-XX. 
 
 Fish Oil, Carloads, St. Marys, Ga., to Ohio and Mississippi River Crossings (1921), 60 I. 
 
 C. C. Rep. 511, 514, 609-CCC. 
 Fifteen Per Cent Case, The (1917), 45 L C. C. Rep. 303, 608-X. 
 Five Per Cent Case, The (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 351, 608-X. 
 
 Flaccus Glass Co. v. Cleveland C. C. <% St. L. Ry. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 333, 601-G. 
 Florence Wagon Works v. Missouri, O. & G. Ry. Co. (1915), 36 I. C. C. Rep. 650, 610-T. 
 Florida E. C. Ry. Co. v. United States (1912), 200 Fed. Rep. 797, 609-CCC. 
 Florida Fruit & Vegetable Shippers' Assn. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 476, 610-G. 
 Florida Fruit & Vegetable Shippers' Protective Assn. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1910), 
 
 17 L C. C. Rep. 552, 608-Q, 608-Z, 609-ZZ. 
 Florida Fruit & Vegetable Shippers' Protective Assn. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1911), 
 
 22 I. C. C. Rep. 11, 608-Q, 609-X, 613-CC. 
 Florida Intrastate Rates: In the Matter of Intrastate Rates, Fares, and Charges of the 
 
 Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. and Other Carriers in the State of Florida (1921), 60 I. 
 
 C. C. Rep. 551, 613-NN. 
 
 Ford Co. V. Michigan C. Rd. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 507, 610-T. 
 Fort Dodge Commercial Club v. Director General, Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Rv Co 
 (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 224, 227, 609-WWW. 
 
 Fort Dodge Commercial Club v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 572, 608-J. 
 
 609-M. 
 Fort Smith Freight Bureau v. St. Louis & S. P. Rd. Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 651 
 
 609-U. 
 Foster Lumber Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 56, 603-A. 
 Franklin v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. (191?), 203 Fed. Rep. 134, 613-1. 
 
9 FREIGHT HATES ASD CHARGES [Chap. 6, CaseS 
 
 Freight Bureau of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (1894), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 195, 4 I. C. Rep. 592, 608-J, 609-A, 610-C. 
 Freight Bureau of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (1897), 7 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 180, 608-J, 609-X, 609-AAA. 
 Freight Rates Between Points in Minnesota via Interstate Routes and Between Points 
 
 in Minnesota and Other States (1914), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 361, 609-GGG, 610-V. 
 Fruits & Vegetables, I. & S. Docket No. 820 (1917), 43 I. C. C. Rep. 291, 319, 600-L. 
 Prye & Bruhn, Inc. v. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 50*1, 609-A. 
 Furniture Manufacturers Association of Grand Rapids v. Ann Arbor Rd. Co. (1915), 
 
 34 I. C. C. Rep. 262, 600-1. 
 Galveston Commercial Association v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 216, 613-LL. 
 Gambel-Robinson Commission Co. v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 114, 609-GGG. 
 Gas & Electric Appliance Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1917), 46 I. C. C. Rep. 440, 
 
 610-T. 
 Gateway Produce Co., Inc. v. American Ry. Exp. Co. (1912), 61 I. C. C. Rep. 347, 606-Q. 
 General Chemical Co. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 349, 606-C. 
 Georgia-Carolina Brick Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 148, 610-D. 
 Georgia Intrastate Rates: In the Matter of Intrastate Rates, Fares, and Charges of the 
 
 Atlantic & W. P. Rd. Co. and Other Carriers in the State of Georgia (1921), 
 
 60 I. C. C. Rep. 527, 613-NN. 
 
 Geraty v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1914), 211 Fed. Rep. 227, 613-1. 
 
 Germain Company v. New Orleans & N. E. Rd. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 22, 603-D. 
 
 Gilmore & Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 403, 610-S. 
 
 Glade Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1904), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 226, 608-B. 
 
 Glucose from Chicago (1915), 36, I. C. C. Rep. 379, 610-T. 
 
 Godwin v. Yazoo & M. V. Rd. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 25, 609-FF. 
 
 Goerres Cooperage Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 5, 610-M. 
 
 Good V. Great N. Ry. Co. (1918), 48 I. C. C. Rep. 435, 613-P. 
 
 Goodmen Drilling Co. v. Director General as Agent, Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. (1921), 
 
 61 I. C. C. Rep. 164, 609-XX. 
 
 Good-Hopkins Lumber Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (1918), 51 I. C. C. Rep. 99, 606-R. 
 Gottron Bros. Co. v. Genesee & W. Rd. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 38, 609-P, 611C. 
 Grain Rates in Central Freight Assn. Territory (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 549, 609-AA, 
 
 610-T, 611-L. 
 Grain Rates to Pittsburgh, Pa. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 382, 609-GGG. 
 Grain Shippers' Assn. of Northwest Iowa v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1899), 8 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 158, 608-E, 608-H, 608-O, 608-P, 608-X. 
 Grand Junction Mining & Fuel Co. v. Colorado M. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 452, 
 
 609-P. 
 Greater Des Moines Committee v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 54 609-WW. 
 Greater Des Moines Committee, Inc. v. Director General, as Agent, Chicago, M. & St. 
 
 P. Ry. Co. (1920), 60 I. C. C. Rep, 403, 600-D, 600-H. 
 Great N. Ry. Co. v. Loonan Lumber Co. (S. D. 1910), 123 N. W. 644, 609-FF. 
 Great Western Sand & Gravel Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1917), 45 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 529, 613-DD. 
 Green v. Alabama & V. Ry. Co. (1917), 43 I. C. C. Rep. 662, 609-UUU. 
 'Green Bay Business Men's Assn. v. Baltimore & 0. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 59, 
 
 609-GGG. 
 Gulf Refining Co. of Lousiana v. Toledo, St. L. & W. Rd. Co. (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 154, 609-FF. 
 Gustin v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1899), 8 I. C. C. Rep. 277, 609-P. 
 Hafley v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 L C. C. Rep. 245, 608-E. 
 Hagar Iron Co. v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep, 529, 602-G. 
 Halliday Milling Co. v. Louisiana & N. W. Rd. Co. (1906), 80 Ark. 536, 98 S. W. 374, 
 
 610-G. 
 Hammerschmidt & Franzen Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 71, 
 
 609-P, 609-XX, 610-S. 
 Hardenberg, Delson & Gray v. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 579, 609-FF. 
 Hardie Mfg. Co. v. Oregon Rd. & Nav. Co. (1912), 24 L C. C. Rep. 545, 609-U, 610-T. 
 Harvard Co. v. Pennsylvania Co. (1890), 4 I. C. C. Rep. 212, 3 I. C. Rep. 257, 609-00. 
 Harwell v. Columbus & W. Rd. Co. (1887), 1 I. C. C. Rep. 236, 1 I. C. Rep. 631, 609-UUU. 
 Hastings Malting Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1906), 11 L C. C. Rep. 675, 608-S. 
 Hechtman v. Director General, Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 672, 
 
 609-FF. 
 Heider Mfg. Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1920), 58 I. C. C. Rep. 184, 609-FF. 
 Heldmaier v. Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. (1918), 49 I. C. C. Rep. 81, 600-H. 
 
Chap. 6, Cases] traffic law seevice • 10 
 
 Henderson Commercial Club v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1915), 36 I. C. C. Rep. 20, 609-AAA. 
 Highland Iron & Steel Co. v. Director General, as Agent, Baltimore & O. C. T. Rd. Co. 
 
 (1920), 57 I. C. C. Rep. 547, 606-L. 
 Highland Park Manufacturing Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 67, 
 
 609-TTT. 
 Hill V. Nashville C. & St. L. Rd. Co. (1895), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 343, 608-J. 
 Hill & Co. V. Southern Ry. Co. (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 225, 609-GGG. 
 Hill & Webb v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 569, 606-G. 
 Hilton Lumber Co. v. Wilmington & W. Rd. Co. (1901), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 17, 600-E, 601-G, 
 
 •609-XX. 
 Hirsch & Sons Iron & Rail Co. v. Washington, B. & A. E. Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 480, 608X. 
 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 512, 608-Q, 
 
 609-XX. 
 Hocking V. Ry. Co. v. Lackawanna Coal & Lumber Co. (1915), 224 Fed. Rep. 930, 600-p. 
 Holmes & Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1900), 8 I. C. C. Rep. 561, 609-GGG. 
 Holmes & Hallowell Co. v. Great N. Ry. Co. (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep, 687, 702, 600-H, 
 
 e09-FF. 
 Hope Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 696, 609-FF. 
 Hope Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 266, 610-V. 
 Hormel v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 112, 608-X. 
 Horton & Tonapah & G. Rd. Co. (1914), 225 Fed. Rep. 406, 602- A. 
 Houston E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. United States (1913), 234 U. S., 342, 58 L. Ed. 1841, 34 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 833, 613-NN. 
 Howard Mills Co. v. Missouri P. Ry. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 259, 610-T. 
 Howell V. New York L. E.. & W. Rd. Co. (1888), 2 I. C. Rep. 162, 2 I. C. C. Rep.. 272, 
 
 608-E, 609-XX. 
 Hughes Creek Coal Co. v. Kanawha & M. Ry. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 671, 609-W, 
 
 609-CC. 
 Hughes Creek Coal Co. v. Kanawha & M. Ry Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 10, 13, 609-CC. 
 Hull Vehicle Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 619, 610-L. 
 Hurlbut V. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1888), 2 I. C. C. Rep. 122, 2 I. C. Rep. 81„ 613-K. 
 Hutchinson Traffic Bureau v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1917), 40 I. C. C. Rep. 689, 
 
 609-WWW. 
 Hydraulic-Press Brick Co. v. Mobile & O. Rd. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 530, 608-G. 
 Illinois C. Rd. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1907), 206 U. S. 441, 51 L. ed. 
 
 1128, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 700, 608-X, 609-E, 609-FFF, 613'-K. 
 Illinois C. Rd. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Illinois (1917), 245 U. S. 493, 38 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 170, 62 L. Ed. 425, 613-NN. 
 Illinois Coal Cases (1915), 32 L C. C. Rep. 659, 610-S. 
 Illinois Intrastate Rates: In the Matter of Intrastate Rates within the State of Illinois 
 
 (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 350; In the Matter of Intrastate Rates within the 
 
 State of State of Illinois (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 92; In the Matter of Intra- 
 state Rates within the State of Illinois (1922), 66 I. C. C. Rep. 350, 613-NN. 
 Imperial Coal Co. v. Pittsburgh & L. E. Rd. Co. (1889), 2 I. C. C. Rep. 618, 2 I. C; Rep. 
 
 436, 608-A, 608-G, 608-J, 609-XX. 
 Independent Ice, Feed & Fuel Co. v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. Rd. Co. (1917), 44 I. C. 
 
 C. Rep. 666, 610-T. 
 Indiana Intrastate Rates: In the Matter of Rates, Fares, and Charges applicable be- 
 tween Points in the State of Indiana (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 337; In the 
 
 Matter of Rates, Fares, and Charges applicable between Points in the State 
 
 of Indiana (1921), 64 I. C. C. Rep. 645, 613-NN. 
 Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1920), 60 I. 
 
 C. C. Rep. 67, 613-NN. 
 Indianapolis Freight Bureau v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 367, 600-H. 
 Indianapolis Freight Bureau v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 504, 600-D, 610-M. 
 Indianapolis Freight Bureau v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 195, 608-J, 609-X. 
 Inland Empire Shippers' League v. Director General, Oregon-Washington Rd. & Nav. 
 
 Co. (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 321, 608-J. 
 
 Inman-Poulsen Lumber Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 357, 609-FF. 
 
 In Re Advances in Rates— Eastern Case (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 243, 609-X. 
 
 In Re Advances on Cement Plaster from Oklahoma to Texas (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 
 591, 600-F. 
 
 In Re Alleged Unlawful Rates and Practices in Transportation of Grain (1897), 7 I. 
 C. C. Rep. 240, 609-M. 
 
 In Re Class and Commodity Rates from St. Louis to Texas Common Points (1905), 
 11 I. C. C. Rep. 238, 608-G. 
 
11 FEEIGHT iKATES AND CHAEGES [Chap. 6, CaSGS 
 
 In Re Coal from Toluca, 111. (1915), 37 I. C. C. Rep. 230, 601-1. 
 
 In Re Des Moines Commodity Rates (1915), 34 I. C. C. Rep. 281, 600-H. 
 
 In Re Export Rates on Grain from Kansas City to Port Arthur (1914), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 616, 600-D. 
 In Re Food Products Investigation (1890), 3 I. C. Rep. 93, 4 I. C. C. Rep. 48, 609-M. 
 In Re Form and Contents of Rate Schedules (1894), 4 I. C. C. Rep. 701, 600-D. 
 In Re Freight Rates between Memphis and Arkansas Points (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 180, 610-V. 
 In Re Independent Sewer Pipe Co. (1918), 248 Fed. Rep. 547, 613-X. 
 In Re Investigation of Advances in Rates by Carriers in Official Classification Territory 
 
 (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 243, 608-X, 613-V, 613-Z. 
 In Re Investigation of Advances in Rates by Carriers in Western Trunk Line, Trans- 
 Missouri, and Illinois Freight Committee Territories (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 
 307, 608-C, 608-E, 608-Q, 608-X, 609-B, 609-J, 609-CCC, 611-P, 613-A, 613-F, 
 613-J. 
 In Re Investigation & Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers operating between 
 
 the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 546, 600-D. 
 In Re Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates for Transportation of Coal 
 
 by Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 604, 608-A, 608-D. 
 In Re Investigation & Suspension of Advances in Rates on Potatoes from South Dakota 
 and other Points to St. Louis and Other Points (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 247, 
 600-K. 
 In Re Investigation of Alleged Unreasonable Rates on Meat (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 656, 609-CC. 
 In Re Investigation of Rates on Meat (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 160, 609-CC. 
 In Re Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1887), 1 I. C. C. Rep. 84, 1 I. C. Rep. 278, 609-UUU. 
 In Re Lumber Rates from the South to Ohio River Crossings (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 50, 600-D. 
 In Re Rate Increases in Official Classification Territory (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 351, 
 
 600-G. 
 In Re Rates and Practices of Mobile & 0. Rd. Co. (1903), 9 I. C. Q. Rep. 373, 608-X. 
 In Re Rates on Corn and Corn Products (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 227, 610-T. 
 In Re Rates on Tropical Fruits from Gulf Ports to Various Destinations (1914), 30 
 
 I. C. C. Rep. 621, 600-K. 
 In Re Restripted Rates (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 426, 600-D. 
 In Re Rice Rates from Helena, Ark. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 614, 600-H. 
 In Re Southern Railway & Steamship Association (1887), 1 I. C. C. Rep. 31, 609-N. 
 In Re Tariffs and Classifications of Atlanta & W. P. Rd. Co. (1889), 3 I. C. C. Rep. 24, 
 
 2 I. C. Rep. 461, 609-UUU. 
 In Re Through Rates to Louisiana and Texas (1916), 38 I. C. C. Rep. 153, 609-FF. 
 In Re Westbound Lake-and-Rail Knit Goods Commodity Rates (1914), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 54, 600-H. 
 Interchange Switching at Wichita, Kansas (1921), 61 I. C. C. Rep. 205, 611-P. 
 Intermediate Rate Association v. Director General, Aberdeen & R. R. D. Co. (1921), 61 
 
 I. C. C. Rep. 226, 246, 609-FF. 
 International Agricultural Corp. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 488, 
 
 610-T, 610-U. 
 International Nickel Co. v. Director General, as Agent, Grand Trunk Ry. Co. of Canada 
 
 (1922), 66 I. C. C. Rep. 627, 628, 609-XXX. 
 International Paper Co. v. Delaware & H. Co. (1915), 33 I. C. C. Rep. 270, 613-P. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama M. Ry. Co. (1895), 69 Fed. Rep. 227, 
 
 609-P. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama M. Ry. Co. (1897), 168 U. S. 144, 42 L. 
 
 Ed, 414, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 45, 609-P, 613-G. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland Ry. Co. (1896), 74 Fed. Rep. 715, 
 
 609-P. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1914), 234 U. S. 294, 
 
 58 L. Ed. 1319, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 814, 608-S. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1912), 225 U. S. 326, 56 
 
 L. Ed. 1107, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 742, 609-U. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1899), 94 Fed. Rep. 272, 
 
 613-D. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1910), 218 U. S. 113, 54 
 
 • L. Ed. 959, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 660, 613-J. 
 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago, G. W. Ry. Co. (1905), 141 Fed. Rep. 1003, 
 
 608-A, 608-B, 608-F, 608-H, 608-X, 610-T. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago, G. W. Rd. Co. (1908), 209 U. S. 108, 52 
 interstate ^o^ 705, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493, 604-B,608-B, 608-F, 608-H, 609-L, 610-T, 611-X. 
 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Hy. Co. (1910), 218 U. S. 88, 
 54 L. Ed. 946, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 651, 613-J. 
 
Chap. 6, Cases] teatfic law service 12 
 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati H. & D. Ry. Co. (1905), 146 Fed. Rep. 
 
 559, 609-GGG. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (1897), 167 U. 
 
 S. 479, 42 L. Ed. 243, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 896, 613-A, 613-G. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Delaware L. «& W. Rd. Co. (1894), 64 Fed. Rep. 723, 
 
 610-A. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Delaware, L. & W. Rd. Co. (1911), 220 U. S. 235, 
 
 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 392, 55 L. Ed. 448, 606-O. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Diffenbaugh (1911), 222 U. S. 42, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 22, 56 L. Ed. 83, 613-DD. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry. Co. (1898), 85 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 107, 609-A. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1910), 215 U. S. 452, 54 L. Ed. 
 
 280, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 155, 613-J, 613-11. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1905), 134 Fed. Rep. 
 
 942, 610-T. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1906), 202 U. S. 613, 
 
 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 766, 50 L. Ed. 1169, 610-T. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1896), 73 Fed. Rep. 409, 
 
 604-A, 608-J, 610-E. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1903), 190 U. S. 273, 47 
 
 L. Ed. 1047, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 687, 609-O. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1913), 227 U. S. 88, 57 
 
 L. Ed. 431, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185, 609-GGG, 613-11. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Southern P. Co. (1914), 234 U. S. 315, 58 L. Ed. 
 
 1329, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 820, 608-S. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Southern Ry. Co. (1902), 117 Fed. Rep. 741, 609-A. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Southern Ry. Co. (1903), 122 Fed. Rep. 800, 60 
 
 C. C. A. 540, 609-A. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Southern Ry. Co. (1904) 195 U. S. 639, 49 L. Ed. 
 
 356, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 790, 609-A. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Stickney (1909), 215 U. S. 98, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 66, 
 
 54 L. Ed. 112, 613-AA, 613-BB. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (1893), 57 Fed. Rep. 948, 
 
 6000, 653 4 I. C. Rep. 408, 610-A. 
 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union P. Rd. Co., (1912), 222 U. S. 541, 32 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 108, 56 L. Ed. 308, 608-X, 610-D, 613-W. 
 In the Matter of Advances in Rates from St. Louis to Texas Points (1905), 11 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 238, 609-O. 
 In the Matter of the Advance of Rates on Live Stock from Kansas City, Mo., to St. 
 
 Louis, Mo., and Other Mississippi River Crossings (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 119, 
 
 610-K. 
 In the Matter of Alleged Unreasonable Rates and Practices Involved in the Transporta- 
 tion of Wool, Hides, and Pelts from Various Western Points of Origin to East- 
 em Destinations (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 151, 608-Q. 
 In the Matter of Chicago, St. P. & K. C. Ry. Co. (1888), 2 I. C. C. Rep. 231, 2 I. C. Rep. 
 
 137, 609-1. 
 In the Matter of Class and Commodity Rates from St. Louis and Texas Points in force 
 
 over the Lines of Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. et al. (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep.' 238, 
 
 608-R. 
 
 In the Matter of Differential Freight Rates to and from North Atlantic Ports (1905), 
 11 I. C. C. Rep. 13, 608-J. 
 
 In the Matter of Import and Domestic Rates— Clay (1916), 39 I. C. C. Rep. 132, 613-DD. 
 In the Matter of Intrastate Fares and Charges of the Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. and 
 Other Carriers in the State of Iowa (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 55, 613-NN. 
 
 In the Matter of Intrastate Fares and Charges of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Rd. 
 Co. and Other Carriers between Points in the State of Minnesota (1920), 59 
 L C. C. Rep. 502, 613-NN. 
 
 In the Matter of Intrastate Passenger Pares and Charges and Certain Charges for 
 
 special services within the State of South Carolina (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 290, 613-NN. 
 In the Matter of Intrastate Passenger Fares on the Line of the Chicago & N. W. Ry. 
 
 Co. and Other Carriers between Points in the State of Wisconsin, (1920), 
 
 59 I. C. C. Rep. 391, 613-NN. 
 In the Matter of Intrastate Rates and Charges in the State of Tennessee (1921), 63 
 
 L C. C. Rep. 160, 613-NN. 
 In the Matter of Intrastate Rates and Fares of the Chicago B. & Q. Rd. Co. and Other 
 
 Carriers in the State of Montana (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 61, 613-NN. 
 In the Matter of Intrastate Rates and Fares of the Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. and Other 
 
 Carriers in the State of Montana (1921), 61 I. C. C. Rep. 500, 613-NN. 
 In the Matter of Intrastate Rates, Fares, and Charges in the State of Kansas (1921), 
 
 62 L C. C. Rep. 440, 613-NN. 
 
13 FKEIGHT RATES AND CHAItGES [Chap. 6, CaseS 
 
 In the Matter of Intrastate Rates, Fares, and Charges in the State of Kansas, (1921), 
 
 64 I. C. C. Rep. 679, 613-NN. 
 In the Matter of Intrastate Rates and Charges in the State of Missouri, (1921), 64 
 
 I. C. C. Rep. 233, 613-NN. 
 In the Matter of Interstate Rates, Fares, and Charges, of the Atlanta & W. P. Rd. Co. 
 
 and Other Carriers in the State of Georgia, (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 527 613-NN. 
 In the Matter of Intrastate Rates, Fares, and Charges, of the Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. 
 
 and Other Carriers in the State of Florida (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 551, 613-NN. 
 In the Matter of Intrastate Rates, Fares and Charges of the Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. 
 
 Co. and Other Carriers in the State of North Dakota, (1921), 61 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 504, 613-NN, 
 In the Matter of Intrastate Rates, Fares, and Charges of the Morgan's L. & T. Rd, 
 
 & S. S. Co. and Other Carriers iln the State of Louisiana (1921), 60 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 467, 613-NN. 
 In the Matter of Intrastate Rates, Fares and Charges of the Southern P. Co. and Other 
 
 Carriers in the State of Nevada (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 623, 613-NN. 
 In the Matter of Intrastate Rates, Fares, and Charges of the Union P; Rd. Co. and 
 
 Other Carriers in the State of Nebraska (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 305, 613-NN. 
 In the Matter of Intrastate Rates within the State of Illinois (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 350, 613-NN. 
 In the Matter of Intrastate Rates within the State of Illinois (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 92, 613-NN. 
 In the Matter of Intrastate Rates within the State of Illinois (1922), 66 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 350, 613-NN. 
 In the Matter of Intrastate Rates within the State of Texas (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 421, 613-NN. 
 In the Matter of Intrastate Rates within the State of Texas (1921), 62 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 591, 613-NN. 
 In the Matter of Intrastate Rates within the State of Texas (1922), 68 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 25, 613-NN. 
 In the Matter of Passenger and Pullman Fares and Charges for Excess Baggage, and 
 
 Rates on Milk and Cream applicable between Pofnts in the State of Ohio 
 
 (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 78, 613-NN. 
 In the Matter of Proposed Advances in Freight Rates (1903), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 382, 
 
 608-R, 609-A, 609-O. 
 In the Matter of Rates, Classifications, Regulations and Practices of Carriers (1913), 
 
 27 I. C. C. Rep. 580, 603-A, 613-F. 
 In the Matter of Rates, Fares, and Charges applicable between Points in the State of 
 
 Arizona (1921), 61 I. C. C. Rep. 572, 613-NN. 
 In the Matter of Rates, Fares, and Charges applicable between Points in the State of 
 
 Indiana (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 337, 613-NN. 
 In the Matter of Rates, Fares, and Charges applicable between Points in the State of 
 
 Indiana (1921), 64 I. C. C. Rep. 645, 613-NN. 
 In the Matter of Rates, Fares, and Charges of the Missouri P. Ry. Co. and Other 
 
 Carriers in the State of Arkansas (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 471, 613-NN. 
 
 In the Matter of Rates, Fares and Charges of the New York C. Rd. Co. and Other 
 Railroad Companies in the State of New York (1920), 59 I. C C. Rep. 290, 
 610-V, 613-NN. 
 
 In the Matter of Rates, Fares and Charges of the Pennsylvania-Ohio Power & Light 
 Company within the States of Ohio and Pennsylvania (1921), 64 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 493, 613-NN. 
 
 In the Matter of Rates, Fares, and Charges of the Steubenville, East Liverpool & 
 Beaver Valley Traction Co. within the States of Ohio and Pennsylvania (1921), 
 64 I. C. C. Rep. 517, 613-NN. 
 
 In the Matter of Rates on Cement between Points in the Western Trunk Line Ter- 
 ritory and between Points in the Western Trunk Line Territory and Adjacent 
 Territories (Western Cement Rates), (1918), 48 I. C. C. Rep. 201, 602-H. 
 
 In the Matter of Rates on Tropical Fruits from Gulf Ports to Various Destinations 
 (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 621, 609-A A. 
 
 In the Matter of Rates, Practices, Rules and Regulations Governing the Transporta- 
 tion of Anthracite Coal (1915), 35 I. C. C. Rep. 220, 608-B. 
 
 In the Matter of Released Rates (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 550, 609-LL. 
 
 In the Matter of Restricted Rates (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 426, 609-U. 
 
 In the Matter of Suspension of Western Classification (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 442, 
 610-O. 
 
 In the Matter of the Applications of Carriers in Official, Southern, and Western Clas- 
 sification Territories for Authority to Increase Rates (Ex Parte 74) (1920), 
 58 I C. C Rep. 220, 601-N, 603-G, 603-H, 611-R, 611-S, 611-T, 611-0, 611-V, 
 6H-X, 611-Y, 611-Z, 611-AA. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Class and Commodity 
 Rates between Points in Iowa and Minnesota and Points in Pacific Coast 
 Territory (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 1, 609-XX. 
 
Chap. 6, Cases] TEAmc law service 14 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Class and Commodity 
 Rates by Carriers Operating Between New Orleans, La., arid Other Points in 
 the South and Points in Illinois (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 122, 609-XX. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Class Rates by Car- 
 riers operating between Certain Points in Iowa and Minneapolis, Minn., and 
 Other Points (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 268, 611-C. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 for the Transportation of Cement Plaster from Stations in Oklahoma to Sta- 
 tions in Texas (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 591, 609-XX. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 for the Transportation of Certain Commodities between Certain Stations Lo? 
 , cated in Texas Common Point Territory and St. Louis, Mo., and Other Points 
 (1917), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 528, 609-XX, 611-1. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 for the Transportation of Coal and Coke in Carloads from Points on the Louis- 
 ville & N. Rd. to Points on the Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. and other Des- 
 tinations (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 20, 608-X, 610-D. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates for Trans- 
 portation of Coal by the Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. et al. and Their Connections 
 (1912), 22 L C. C. Rep. 604, 609-,D, 609-P, 610-R. 613-F, 613-CC. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 for the Transportation of Coal from the Walsenburg District of Colorado to 
 Stations in Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas (1913), 26 L C. C. Rep. 85, 608-X, 
 609-BB, 609-CC. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 for the Transportation of Cooperage from Salt Lake City, Utah, to Chicago, 
 111., and between Other Points (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 656, 608-O. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates for Trans- 
 portation of Cypress Lumber, Laths and Shingles from Points located on the 
 New Orleans, T. & M. Rd. to Albany, N. Y., and Other Points (1913), 26 I. C. 
 C. Rep. 186, 608-X. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 
 . for the Transportation of Flaxseed from Minneapolis, Minn., and Other Points 
 
 to Chicago, 111., and other Destinations (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 337, 608-F, 610-T. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 for the Transportation of Flaxseed in Carloads from Fort William, Port 
 Arthur and Westport, Ont., to New York, N. Y., Philadelphia, Pa., and Other 
 Points (1912), 23 L C. C. Rep. 272, 608-G. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 of Grain, Grain Products, etc. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 22, 609-P. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 for the Transportation of Grain, Grain Products, and Seed between Aberdeen, 
 S. Dak., and Other Points, and Duluth, Minn., and Other Points, via Chicago, 
 St. P., M. & O Line (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 595, 609-BB. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 for the Transportation of Hardwood and Other Kinds of Lumber and Articles 
 Manufactured Therefrom, from Points in Arkansas, Louisiana and Other 
 
 Points, to Memphis, Tenn., St. Louis, Mo., and Other Points of Destination 
 (1915), 32 L C. C. Rep. 521, 609-P. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 . for the Transportation of Linseed Oil from St. Paul, Minn., and Other Points 
 to Chicago, 111., Kansas City, Mo., and Other Points (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 265, 
 270, 610-U. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 for the Transportation of Linseed Oil Cake, Linseed Oil Meal, and Flaxseed 
 Screenings in Carloads from Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minn., to Galveston, 
 Texas, and Other Gulf Ports (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 246, 609-TTT. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 for the Transportation of Live Stock from Points in the State of New Mexico 
 to Kansas City, Mo., and between Other Points (1912), 25 I C. C. Rep 63 
 608-G, 608-X. / p. , 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 for the Transportation of Locomotives and Tenders named in a Schedule filed 
 with the Interstate Commerce Commission (1911), 21 I. C. C. 103, 608-G. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 for the Transportation of Lumber and Articles taking Lumber Rates from 
 Stations on the Alabama Great Southern Rd. and Other Points to St Louis 
 Mo. and Other Points (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 686, 611-G. ' ' 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 
 for the Transportation of News Print Paper from Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario 
 
 ' to Various Points in the United States (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 13, 609-XX. ' 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 for the Transportation of Plaster, Gypsum Rock, Stucco, and Plaster Board 
 from Blue Rapids and Irving, Kas., to Points in Arkansas, Kansas and Mis- 
 souri (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 67, 609-W, 609-Y. 
 
15 FREIGHT RATES AND CHAHGES [Chap. 6, CaSeS 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 for the Transportation of Soft Coal (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 43, 609-HH. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 for the Transportation of Soft Coal from Illinois Mines to Stations on the St. 
 Louis & Hannibal Railway (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 518, 613-S. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Advances in Rates by Carriers 
 for, the Transportation of Various Commodities from Eastern Shipping Points 
 to Points in California, Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia (1913), 26 
 I. C, C. Rep. 456, 609-XX. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation of Alleged Unreasonable Rates and Practices in- 
 volved in the Transportation of Live Stock, Packing House Products, and 
 Fresh Meats from Various Southwestern Points to Packing Houses, and from 
 Thence to Various Destinations (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 60, 613-CC. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation of Alleged Unreasonable Rates and Practices in- 
 volved in the Transportation of Wool, Hides and Pelts from Various Western 
 Points of Origin to Eastern Destinations (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 151, 609-XX, 
 610-T. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation and Suspension of Supplements No. 2 to Trans- 
 continental Freight Bureau Westbound Tarifles No. 1-L and No. 4-H (1911), 21 
 I. C. C. Rep. 397, 610-T. 
 
 In the Matter of the Investigation into the Substitution of Tonnage at Transit Points 
 (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 340, 613-C. 
 
 In the Matter of the Request for Suspension of Reduced Rates on Packing House 
 Products and Fresh Meats from Fort Worth, Tex., to Mississippi River Cross- 
 ings and Points East thereof (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 68, 613-F. 
 
 In the Matter of Through Routes and Through Rates (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 164, 
 600-B, 6D0-C, 602-B. 
 
 lola Portland Cement Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 91, 610-D. 
 
 Iowa State Board of Railroad Commissioners v. Arizona E. Rd. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 563,-600-G, 609-AA, 609-CC, 609-XX. 
 
 Ireland & Rollings v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 590, 606-L. 
 
 Jacoby v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1912), 200 Fed. Rep. 989, 613-L 
 
 James & Abbott Co. v. Boston & M. Rd. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 273, 600-G, 608-E. 
 
 James & Abbott v. Canadian P. Ry. Co. (1893), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 612, 4 I. C. Rep. 274, 
 608-J, 610-A, 6610-F. 
 
 Jennison Co. v. Great N. Ry. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 113, 608-Q, 610-F. 
 
 Johnson v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 698, 608-X, 609-XX. 
 
 Johnson v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. Ry. Co. (1902), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 221, 608-X. 
 
 Johnson v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 73, 609-Z. 
 
 Joseph Iron Co. v. Cornwall & L. Rd. Co. (1918), 49 I. C. C. Rep. Ill, 606-P. 
 
 Joseph Iron Co. v. Morgan's L. & T. Rd. & S. S. Co. (1915), 37 I. C. C. Rep. 591, 
 609-GG. 
 
 Joseph Iron Co. v. Morgan's L. & T. Rd. & S. S. Co. (1916), 40 I. C. C. Rep. 525, 
 609-FF, 609-GG. 
 
 Joseph Iron Co. v. Morgan's L. & T. Rd. & S. S. Co. (1918), 50 I. C. C. Rep. 107, 606-P. 
 
 Jouannet v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 392, 609-WW. 
 
 Jubitz V. Southern P. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 44, 609-FF. 
 
 Kansas-California Flour Rates (1915), 39 I. C. C. Rep. 602, 608-F. 
 
 Kansas Car-Lot Egg Shippers' Assn. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1919), 53 I. C. C. Rep. 
 59, 609-WW. 
 
 Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Albers Commission Co. (1912), 223 U. S. 573, 56 L. Ed. 536, 
 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 316, 600-D, 602-D, 603-B. 
 
 Kansas City Transportation Bureau v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 491, 609-CCC. 
 
 Kansas City Transportation Bureau v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 195, 600-D, 608-J, 609-XX. 
 
 Kansas Intrastate Rates: In the Matter of Intrastate Rates, Fares, and Charges in 
 the State of Kansas (1921), 62 I. C. C. Rep. 440; In the Matter of Intrastate 
 Rates, Fares, and Charges in the State of Kansas (1921), 64 I. C. C. Rep. 
 679, 613-NN. 
 
 Kansas-Iowa Brick Rates (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 285, 609-P. 
 
 Kansas Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Ahnapee & W. Ry. Co. (1914), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 139, 
 610-V. 
 
 Kaufman Commercial Club v. Texas & N. O. Rd. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 167, 
 609-XX. 
 
 Keats Auto Co. v. Oregon-Washington Rd. & Nav. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 412, 608-F. 
 
 Keet & Roundtree Dry Goods Co. v. Director General, Baltimore S. P. Co. (1919), 55 
 I. C. C. Rep. 400, 609-FF. 
 
 Kellogg Toasted Com Flake Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1915), 33 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 534, 610-T. 
 
 Kellogg Toasted Corn Flake Co. v. Michigan C. Rd. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 604, 
 610-U. 
 
Chap. 6, Cases] teaffic law service 16 
 
 Kent Co. v. New York C. & H. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 439, 613-B. 
 
 Keogh V. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 606, 610-T. 
 
 Keogh V. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1921), 271 Fed. Rep. 444, 605-D. 
 
 Kimavey v. Terminal Rd. Assn. of St. Louis (1897), 81 Fed. Rep. 802, 609-EEE. 
 
 Kimberly Clark Co. v. American Express Co. (1917), 45 I. C. C. Rep. 7, 609-WW. 
 
 Kindel v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1903), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 606, 600-K. 
 
 Kindel v. Boston & A. Rd. Co. (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 495, 609-00, 609-WW. 
 
 Kindel v. New York N. H. & H. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 555, 613- J. 
 
 Kiser v. Central of G. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 430, 609-O. 
 
 Knotty. Chicago B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1913), 230 U. S. 474, 57 L. Ed. 1571, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 975, 608-X. 
 Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co. (1909), 212 U. S. 1, 53 L. Ed. 371, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148, 
 
 608-X. 
 Knudsen-Ferguson Fruit Co. v. Michigan C. Rd. Co. (1906), 148 Fed. Rep. 958, 79 C. 
 
 C. A. 46, 609-FFF. 
 La Crosse Manufacturers & Jobbers' Union v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1888), 1 
 
 I. C. C. Rep. 629, 2 I. C. Rep. 9, 600-G, 608-J, 609-XX. 
 Lafayette Chamber of Commerce v. Alabama & V. Ry. Co. (1915), 33 I. C. C. Rep. 302, 
 
 613-F. 
 Lake Superior Paper Co. Ltd. v. Duluth S. S. & O. Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 403, 
 
 608-F. 
 Lakewood Engineering Co. v. New York C. & H. R. Rd. Co. (1919), 259 Fed. Rep. 61, 
 
 170 C. C. A. 121, 606-K, 613-X. 
 Lakewood Engineering Co. v. New York C. Rd. Co. (1920), 254 U. S. 61, 658 L. Ed. 126, 
 
 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 60, 606-K, 613-X. 
 Laning-Harris Coal & Grain Co. v. Missouri P. Ry. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 154, 600-C, 
 
 601-G, 602-A. 
 Larkin Co. v. Erie & W. Transportation Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 645, 613-C. 
 Larrowe Milling Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1910), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 443, 602-F. 
 Larrowe Milling Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1910), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 548, 602-F. 
 Lautz Bros. & Co. Inc. v. Lehigh V. Rd. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 167, 611-B. 
 League of Southern Idaho Commercial Club v. Oregon, S. L. Rd. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 562, 608-E, 609-CCC. 
 Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. Baltimore & O. S. W. Rd. Co. (1915), 35 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 14, 602-H, 602-K, 610-B. 
 Lehigh V. Rd. Co. v. Public Service Commission of New York (1921), 272 Fed. Rep. 
 
 758, 613-NN. 
 Lehigh V. Rd. Co. v. Rainey (1902), 112 Fed. Rep. 487, 600-K. 
 Lehigh V. Rd. Co. v. United States (1913), 204 Fed. Rep. 986, 613-E. 
 Lehman, Higginson & Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1890), 3 I. C. Rep. 80, 4 I. C. C. Rep. 1, 
 
 608-J, 609-YY. 
 Less Carload Freight Reconsignment Privileges (I. & S. Docket No. 434), (1914), 32 
 
 I. C. C. Rep. 85, 602-B. 
 Lewis Mfg. Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1916), 41 I. C. C. Rep. 671, 610-T. 
 Lincoln Creamery Co. v. Union P. Ry. Co. (1892), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 156, 3 I. C. Rep. 794, 
 
 610-E. 
 Lindsay Bros. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 6, 609-FF, 609-GGG. 
 Lindsay Bros. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 516, 517, 610-K. 
 Lippman & Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1889), 2 I. C. C. Rep. 784, 2 I. C. Rep. 414, 609-XX, 
 
 610-F. 
 
 Listman Mill Co. v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1898), 8 I. C. C. Rep. 47, 600-E. 
 Little Rock Chamber of Commerce v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C 
 
 Rep. 341, 610-T. 
 Live Poultry & Dairy Shippers' Traffic Assn. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1918), 
 
 49 I. C. C. Rep. 228, 610-T. 
 Loftus V. Pullman Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 102, 609-LLL. 
 
 Logan V. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1889), 2 I. C. C. Rep. 604, 2 I. C. Rep. 431, 608-J. 
 Loud V. South Carolina Ry. Co. (1892), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 529, 4 I. C. Rep. 205, 608-A, 
 
 609-QQ. 
 Ijouisiana Intrastate Rates: In the Matter of Intrastate Rates, Fares, and Charges of 
 
 the Morgan's L. & T. Rd. & S. S. Co. and Other Carriers in the State of 
 
 Louisiana (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 467, 613-NN. 
 Louisiana Sugar Planters' Assn. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep 311 
 
 609-SS, 609-TT, 613-N. 
 Louisiana Sugar Planters' Assn. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1915), 34 I. C. C. Rep. 253 
 
 609-TT. 
 Louisville & Nashville Railroad Coal & Coke Rates (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 20, 602- J 
 
 608-B, 609-CCC. 
 Louisville & N. Rd. Co. v. Behlmer (1900), 175 U. S. 649, 44 L. Ed. 309, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep 
 
 209, 613-J. 
 
17 FEEIGHT EATES AND CHAKGES [Chap. 6, CaseS 
 
 Louisville & N. Rd. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1910), 184 Fed. Rep. 118, 
 
 609-GGG, 613-1, 613-11. 
 Louisville & N. Rd. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1912), 195 Fed. Rep. 541, 
 
 609-JJ, 609-PPP, 610-L, 611-K, 6H-N, 613.11. 
 Louisville & N. Rd. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Alabama (1912), 196 Fed. Rep. 800, 
 
 608-X. 
 
 Louisville & N: Rd. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Alabama (1913), 205 Fed. Rep. 800, 
 608-X. 
 
 Louisville & N. Rd. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Alabama (1918), 208 Fed. Rep. 35, 
 608-X. 
 
 Louisville & N. Rd. Co. v. United States (1914), 216 Fed. Rep. 672, 610-B. 
 Louisville & N. Rd. Co. v. United States (1915), 238 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 696, 59 
 L. Ed. 1177, 610-B. 
 
 Louisville Cotton Seed Products Co. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 
 607, 613-DD. 
 
 Loup Creek Colliery Co. v. Virginian Ry. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 471, 609-CC, 613-K. 
 
 Low Moor Iron Co. of Virginia v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 615, 
 
 609-W. 
 Lull Carriage Co. v. Chicago K. & S. Ry. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 15, 609-rF. 
 Lum V. Great Northern Ry. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C, Rep. 558, 603-F. 
 Lumbermen's Exchange of St. Louis v. Anderson & S. R. Rd. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 220, 609-1. 
 Lumber Rates from Local Points on the Alabama Great Southern Rd. to Chattanooga, 
 
 Tenn. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 646, 609-S. 
 Lumber Rates from Mississippi to Eastern Points (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 6, 611-J. 
 Lumber Rates from Oregon and Washington to Eastern Points (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 609, 609-BB. 
 Lumber Rates from Points in Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas, and 
 
 also from Memphis, Tenn., to Points in Iowa and Other States tl914), 29 I. 
 
 C. C. Rep. 1, 608-N. 
 Lumber Rates from Southern Mills to Certain Points in the East (1913), 27 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 189, 609-XX. 
 Lumber Rates from Southern Ry. Points to Eastern Points (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 244, 
 
 609-ZZ, 609-GGG. 
 Lumber Rates from Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas to Oklahoma and Missouri (1913), 
 
 28 I. C. C. Rep. 471, 609-P, 609-'W. 
 Lumber Rates to Knoxville, Tenn. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 524, 611-L 
 Lumber Rates to Texas Ports (1917), 44 I. C. C. Rep. 275, 613-F. 
 MacLoon v. Boston & M. Rd. Co. (1903), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 642, 609-PPP, 610-L. 
 Maloney Tank Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1917), 42 I. C. C. Rep. 605, 606-R. 
 Malt Rates to Texas 'Points (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 385, 609-P. 
 Manahan v. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 95, 610-F. 
 Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Tremont & G. Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 138, 
 
 610-D. 
 Manufacturers & Jobbers' Union v. Minneapolis & St. L. Rd. Co. (1890), 4 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 79, 3 I. C. Rep. 115, 609-P. 
 Manufacturers & Merchants' Assn. of New Albany, Ind. v. Aberdeen & A. Rd. Co. 
 
 (1912), 24 L C. C. Rep. 331, 609-AAA. 
 Manufacturers & Merchants' Assn. of New Albany, Ind. v. Aberdeen & A. Rd. Co. 
 
 (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 116, 609-AAA. 
 Manufacturers & Merchants' Assn. of New Albany, Ind. v. Aberdeen & A. Rd. Co. 
 
 (1915), 37 I. C. C. Rep. 350, 609-AAA. 
 Manufacturers Ry. Co. v. United States (1918), 246 U. S. 457, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383, 62 
 
 L. Ed. 831, 608-X. 
 Marble Rates from Vermont Points (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 607, 609-BB. 
 Maricopa County Commercial Club v. Southern P. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 429, 
 
 609-CC. 
 Maritime Exchange v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 81, 608-E, 610-T. 
 Markley & Son v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (1906), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 616, 609-Z. 
 Marshall Oil Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 210, 610-V, 613-B. 
 Martin v. Chicago B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1888), 2 I. C. C. Rep. 46, 2 I. C. Rep. 32, 609-UUU. 
 Massee & Felton Lumber Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 110, 610-U. 
 May Bros. v. Yazoo & M. V. Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 323, 608-X. 
 Mayor and City Council of Vienna, Ga. v. Georgia S. & F. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 173, 609-UUU. 
 
 Mavor and City Council of Wichita, Kans. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1903), 9 I. 
 Mayor a^ ^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ 609-QQQ, 610-F. 
 
 McClung & Co. V. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 414, 610-U. 
 McGowin Lumber & Export Co. v. Director General, Southern Ry. Co. (1920), 59 I. C. 
 C. 238, 601-O. 
 
Chap. 6, Cases] teaffic law sebvice 18 
 
 McGrew v. Missouri P. Ey. Co. (1901), 8 I. C. C. Eep. 630, 600-K. 
 
 McLean Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N. Ed. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Eep. 349, 610-D. 
 
 McLean Lumber Co. v. United States (1916), 237 Fed. Eep. 460, 609- JJ J. 
 
 McMorron v. Grand Trunk Ed. Co. (1889), 2 I. C. Eep. 604, 3 I. C. C. Eep. 252, 608- J, 
 
 609-FFF, 610-F. 
 Meeds Lumber Co. v. Director General, Alabama, T. & M. Ed. Co. (1920), 59 I. C. C. 
 
 Eep. 243, 244, 601-O. 
 Meeker & Co. v. Lehigh V. Ed. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Eep. 129, 610-T. 
 Memphis Cotton Oil Co. v. Illinois C. Ed. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Eep. 313, 608- A, 
 
 609-GGG, 611-N. 
 Memphis Freight Bureau v. Baltimore & O. Ed. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. -Eep. 543, 613-B. 
 Memphis Freight Bureau v. Fort Smith & W. Ed. Co. (1907), 13 I. C. C. Eep. 1, 609-R. 
 Memphis Freight Bureau v. Illinois C. Ed. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Eep. 507, 609-CCC. 
 Memphis Freight Bureau v. Kansas City S. Ey. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Eep. &0, 606-Q. 
 Memphis Freight Bureau v. Louisville & N. Ed. Co. (1912), 26 I. C. C. Eep. 402, 608-X. 
 Memphis Freight Bureau v. St. Louis & S. F. Ed. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Eep. 602, 
 
 609-U. 
 Memphis Freight Bureau v. St. L. I. M. & S. Ey. Co. (1916), 39 I. C. C. Eep. 224, 
 
 602-H. 
 
 Memphis Freight Bureau v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ey. Co. (1916), 39 I. C. C. Eep. 303, 
 
 609-XX. 
 Memphis Merchants Exchange v. Illinois C. Ed. Co. (1917), 43 I. C. C. Eep. 378, 610-V. 
 Memphis-Southwestern Investigation (1919), 55 I. C. C. Eep. 515, 609-AAA. 
 I Menefee Lumber Co. v. Texas & P. Ey. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Eep. 49, 610-D. 
 Mercantile Lumber & Supply Co. v. St. Louis S. W. Ey. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Eep. 701, 
 
 610-T. 
 
 Merchants & Manufacturers' Assn. of Baltimore v. Atlantic C. L. Ed. Co. (1912), 
 
 22 i. C. C. Eep. 467, 609-P. 
 
 Merchants & Manufacturers' Assn. of Baltimore v. Atlantic C. L. Ed. Co. (1912), 
 
 23 I. C. C. Eep. 129, 608-G. 
 
 Merchants Freight Bureau of Little Eock v. Midland V. Ed. Go. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Eep. 
 
 243, 601-K. 
 Meridian Cellulose Co. v. Director General, Canadian P. Ey. Co. (1920), 57 I. C. C. Eep. 
 
 283, 285, 610-L. 
 Meridian Fertilizer Factory v. Abilene & S. Ey. Co. (1915), 33 1. C. C. Eep. 160, 609-CC. 
 Meridian Fertilizer Factory v. Louisville & N. Ed. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Eep. 494, 
 
 608-N, 609-S. 
 Metropolis Commercial Club v. Illinois C. Ed. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Eep. 40, 609-AAA. 
 Michigan Box Co. v. Flint & P. M. Ed. Co. (1895), 6 I. C. C. Eep. 335, 610-T. 
 Michigan Buggy Co. v. Grand Eapids & I. Ey. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 299. 609-FF, 
 
 610-F. 
 
 Michigan C. Ed. Co. v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission (1921), 271 Fed. Eep. 319, 
 603-1. 
 
 Michigan Upper Peninsula Pig-iron Eates (1913), 26 I. C. C. Eep. 284, 609-S. 
 
 Milbum Wagon Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ey. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 144, 602-G. 
 
 Milbum Wagon Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ey. Co. (1911), 22 I. C. C. Eep. 93, 603-D, 
 609-X. 
 
 Milk Producers Protective Assn. v. Delaware, L. & W. Ed. Co. (1897). 7 I. C. C. Eep. 92, 
 609-XX. 
 
 Millar v. New York C. & H. E. Ed. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Eep. 78, 609-GGG. 
 Miller v. Director General, as Agent, Northern P. Ey. Co. (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 162, 
 613-PP. 
 
 Milwaukee Falls Chair Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 217, 
 606-C. 
 
 Minimum Charge on Less than Carload Shipments (1921), 61 I. C. C. Rep. 727, 609-NN. 
 Minimum Weight on Fresh Meats and Other Commodities (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 349, 
 
 609-WW. 
 Minneapolis & St. L. Rd. Co. v. State of Minnesota Ex. Eel. Eailroad & Warehouse 
 
 Commission (1901), 186 U. S. 257, 46 L. Ed. 1151, 22 Sup. Ct. Eep. 900, 601-G. 
 Missouri & Kansas Shippers' Ass'n v. Missouri K. & T. Ey. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 483, 600-K. 
 Missouri Intrastate Rates: In the Matter of Intrastate Rates and Charges in the 
 
 State of Missouri (1921), 64 I. C. C. Rep. 233, 613-NN. 
 Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1908), 164 Fed. Rep. 645, 
 
 608-X, 609-D, 613-11. 
 Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Love (1910), 177 Fed., Rep. 493, 608-X. 
 Missouri P. Rd. Co. v. Rea-Patterson Milling Co. (1921), 273 Fed. Rep. 518, 519, 602-D. 
 Missouri River Building Stone Rates (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 268, 611-H. 
 Mobile Chamber of Commerce v. Mobile & O. Rd. Co. (1914), 32 I. C. C. Eep. 272, 
 
 609-RR. 
 
19 FEEIGHT BATES AND CHARGES [Chap. 6, CaSeS 
 
 Moise Bros. Co. v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 550, 608-G. 
 
 Molasses from Texas and Louisiana (1916), 40 I. C. C. Rep. 435, 610-T. 
 
 Molasses Rates from Mobile, Ala. (1914), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 666, 610-T. 
 
 Molasses Rates to Knoxville, Tenn. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 613, 610-T. 
 
 Monarch Paint Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1918), 49 I. C. C. Rep. 367, 610-T. 
 
 Montague & Co. v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 72, 608-H. 
 
 Montana Intrastate Rates: In the Matter of Intrastate Rates and Fares of the Chi- 
 cago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. and Other Carriers in the State of Montana (1921), 60 
 I. C. C. Rep. 61; In the Matter of Intrastate Rates and Fares of the Chicago, 
 
 B. & Q. Rd. Co. and Other Carriers in the State of Montana (1921), 61 I. C. 
 
 C. Rep. 500, 613-NN. 
 
 Montana, W. & S. Rd. Co. v. Morley (1912), 198 Fed. Rep. 991, 608-X. 
 
 Montgomery Freight Bureau v. Western Ry. Co. of A. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 152, 
 
 609-M, 609-FF. 
 Morgan v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Tlep. 525, 602-A, 699-FF. 
 Morgan Grain Co. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. •460, 608-F, 609-C, 
 
 609-GG(;. 
 Morgan's L. & T. Rd. & S. S. Co. v. Joseph Iron Co. (1917), 243 Fed. Rep. 149, 609-GG. 
 Morrell v. Union P. Ry. Co. (1893), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 121, 4 I. C. Rep. 469, 610-C, 610-D. 
 Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1910), 183 Fed. Rep. 929, 106 C. C. A. 
 
 269, 613-1. 
 Mountain Ice Co. v. Delaware L. & W. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I. C.C. Rep. 305, 608-E, 609-P. 
 Multnomah Lumber & Box Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 123, 608-X, 
 
 609-XX. 
 Muskogee Traffic Bureau v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1909),' 17 I. C. C. Rep. 169, 
 
 609-P, 609-XX. 
 Mutual Rice Trade & Development Assn. of Houston v. International & G. N. Rd. Co. 
 
 (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 219, 609-WW. 
 Nagase & Co. Ltd. v. Director General, Great N. Ry. Co. (1921), 62 I. C. C. Rep. 422, 
 
 609-RR. 
 Natchez Chamber of Commerce v. Louisiana & A. Ry. Co. (3 915), 52 I. C. C. Rep. 105, 
 
 609- AAA. 
 National Association of Macaroni & Noodle Mfrs. of America (1918), 50 L C. C. Rep. 
 
 289, 292, 600-H. 
 National Hay Assn. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1902), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 264, 603-A, 
 
 6fl9-GGG, 610-T, 611-A. 
 National Hay Assn. v. Michigan C. Rd. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 34, 608-A, 608-G, 
 
 609-P, 610-T. 
 National Lumber Exporters' Assn. v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 78, 
 
 609-RR. 
 National Paving Brick Manufacturers' Association v. Alabama & V. Ry. Co. (1922), 
 
 68 I. C. C. Rep. 213, 216, et. seq., 610-T. 
 National Pole Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1912), 200 Fed. Rep. 185, 613-1. 
 National Pole Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1914), 211 Fed. Rep. 65, 127 C. C. A. 
 
 561, 613-L 
 National Refining Co. v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 649, 
 
 608-E, 610-T. 
 National Refining Co. v. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 527, 609-DDD. 
 National Society of Record Assns. v. Aberdeen & R. Rd. Co. (1916), 40 I. C. C. Rep. 347, 
 
 610-T. 
 National Tube Co. v. The Terminal Rd. Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 469, 609-XX. 
 National Wholesale Lumber Dealers' Assn. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 154, 608-F. 
 Nebraska Intrastate Rates: In the Matter of Intrastate Rates, Fares, and Charges 
 
 of the Union P Rd. Co. and Other Carriers in the State of Nebraska (1921), 
 
 60 I. C. C. Rep. 305, 613-NN. 
 Nebraska Rate Case: Smythe v. Ames (1898), 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. Ed. 819, 18 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 418, 608-X. 
 Nebraska State Railway Commission v. Central V. Ry. Co. (1914), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 41, 
 
 610-T. 
 Nebraska State Railway Commission v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 121, 609-P. 
 Nnvada Intrastate Rates: In the Matter of Intrastate Rates, Fares, and Charges of the 
 jNovaaa ^^^"^^^^ p ^^ ^^^ q^^^^ Carriers in the State of Nevada, (1921), 60 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 623, 6i3-NN. 
 New Albany Box & Basket Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 315, 606-L. 
 New England Investigation (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 560, 609-VV. 
 Newland v. Northern P. Rd. Co. (1894), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 131, 4 I. C. Rep. 474, 608-X, 
 
 609-XX. 
 New Orleans Board of Trade, Ltd. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 465, 
 
 609-RR. 
 
Chap. 6, Cases] traffic law service 20 
 
 New Orleans Board of Trade, Ltd. v. Illinois C. Ed. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Eep. 32, 
 609-RR. 
 
 New Orleans Board of Trade, Ltd. v. Louisville & N. Ed. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 231, 609-GGG, 613-11. 
 New Orleans Board of Trade, Ltd. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 429, 609-III. 
 New Orleans Cotton Exchange v. Concinnati N. O. T. P. Ry. Co. (1888), 2 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 375, 2 I. C. Eep. 289, 608-J, 609-P. 
 New Orleans Cotton Exchange v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1890), 3 I. C. C. Rep. 534, 2 I. C. 
 
 Rep. 777, 600-E, 608-J, 609-D, 610-E, 610-F. 
 New Orleans Live Stock Exchange, Ltd. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. 
 
 Eep. 609, 609-NNN. 
 New Orleaps Vegetable Growers Merchants & Shippers Assn. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. 
 
 (1915), 34 L C. C. Rep. 32, 600-H. 
 New Mexico Coal Rates (1913), 28 L C. C. Rep. 328, 611-J. 
 New York Board of Trade & Transportation v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1891), 3 I. C 
 
 Rep. 417, 4 I. C. C. Rep. 447, 600-H. 
 New York C. Ed. Co. v. Public Service Commission of New York (1920), 268 Fed. Rep. 
 
 558, 603-1. 
 New York C. & H. R. Rd. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1909), 168 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 131, 613-U. 
 New York Harbor Case (1917), ^7 I. C. C. Rep. 643, 609:XX. 
 New York Hay Exchange Assn. v. Pennsylvania Ed. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Eep. 178, 
 
 608-G. 
 New York Intrastate Eates: In the Matter of Eates, Fares, and Charges of the New 
 
 York C. Ed. Co. and Other Eailroad Companies in the State of New York 
 
 (1920), 59 I. C. C. Eep. 290; Lehigh V. Ed. Co. v. Public Service Commission of 
 
 New York (1921), 272 Fed. Eep. 758; State of New York v. United States 
 
 (1922), 66 L. Ed. 244, — U. S. — , — Sup. Ct. Eep. — , 613-NN. 
 New York N. H. & H. Ed. Co. v. Piatt, Receiver (1897), 7 I. C. C. Rep. 323, 601-A, 
 
 601 -G. 
 New York Produce Exchange v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1898), 7 I. C. C. Rep. 612, 
 
 608-J, 609-00. 
 New York Produce Exchange v. New York C. & H. E. Ed. Co. (1914), 32 I. C. C. Eep. 
 
 212, 603-A. 
 Nix & Co. V. Southern Ey. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Eep. 145, 609-GGG. 
 Noble V. Baltimore & O. Ed. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Eep. 432, 606-C. 
 Norman Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N. Ed. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Eep. 239, 609-AAA. 
 Norman Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 565, 609-AAA. 
 Norris v. St. Louis & S. F. Ed. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Eep. 416, 608-F. 
 
 North Dakota Intrastate Rates: In the Matter of Intrastate Rates, Fares, and Charges 
 
 of the Chicago, M. & St. P. Ey. Co. and Other Carriers in the State of North 
 
 Dakota (1921), 61 I. C. C. Eep. 504, 613-NN. 
 Northern P. Ey. Co. v. North Dakota (1915), 236 U. S. 585, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 429, 59 L. 
 
 Ed. 735, 608-B. 
 Northern Pine Manufacturers' Assn. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1915), 53 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 360, 602-1. 
 North Fork Cannel Coal Co. v. Ann Arbor Ed. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Eep. 241, 608-X. 
 Official Classification Eates on Paper (1916), 38 I. C. C. Rep. 120, 609-U. 
 Ohio Cities Gas Co. v. Director General, as Agent, Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. (1920), 
 
 59 I. C. C. Rep. 320, 609-FF. 
 Ohio Intrastate Eates: In the Matter of Passenger and Pullman Fares, Charges for 
 
 excess Baggage, and Rates on Milk and Cream applicable between Points in 
 
 the State of Ohio (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 78, 613-NN. 
 
 Ohio Iron & Metal Co. v. Wabash Rd. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep., 299, 610-D. 
 
 Oklahoma Cotton Seed Crushers' Assn. v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1915), 35 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 94, 609-XX. 
 Oklahoma Portland Cement Co. v. Arkansas, L. & G. Ey. Co. (1914), 32 I. C. C. Eep. 221, 
 
 609-W. 
 Oklahoma Traffic Association v. Abilene & S. Ry. Co. (1915), 36 I. C. C. Rep. 329, 613-F. 
 Omaha Cooperage Co. v. Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1907, 12 I. C. C. Rep. 250, 610-F. 
 Omaha Grain Exchange v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 424, 608-J. 
 Omaha Grain Exchange v. Mobile & O. Rd. Co. (1915), 37 I. C. C. Rep. 363, 609-000. 
 Omaha Grain Exchange v. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. 572, 609-W, 609-CC. 
 Omaha-Oklahoma Fresh-Meat Rates (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 454, 610-E. 
 Ontario Iron Ore Co. v. New York C. & H. R. Rd. Co. (1911), 21 1. C. C. Rep. 204, 609-CC. 
 
 Orange Rice Mill Co. v. Texas & N. 0. Rd. Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 661, 663, 609-PF, 
 
 609-LL. 
 Oregon & Washington Lumber Manufacturers' Assn. v. Southern P. Co. (1908), 14 I. 
 
 C. C. Rep. 1, 608-Q. 
 
21 FKEIGHT KATES AND CHABGES [Cliap. 6, CaSeS 
 
 Oregon & Washington Lumber Manufacturers' Assn. v. Southern P. Co. (1911), 21 I. 
 
 C. C. Eep. 389, 608-N, 609-S. 609-KKK, 610-T. 
 Oregon-Washington Rd. & Nav. Co. v. United States (1921), 65 L. Ed. 427, — U. S. — , 
 
 — Sup. Ct. Eep. — , 609-SSS. 
 Osborne v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1891), 48 Fed. Rep. 49, 610-F. 
 Ozark Fruit Growers' Assn. v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 106, 
 
 609-P, 609-QQ. 
 Pabst Brewing Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 584, 609-GGG. 
 Pacific Coast Jobbers and Mfrs'. Assn. v. Southern P. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 333, 
 
 608-S. 
 Pacific Coast Lumber Mfrs'. Assn. v. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 465, 
 
 613-G. 
 Pacific Creamery Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 578, 610-T. 
 Pacific Purchasing Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 549, 606-C. 
 Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. v. Oregon- Washington Rd. & Nav. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. 
 
 C. Rep. 299, 610-T. 
 
 Paducah Board of Trade v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1916), 37 I. C. C. Rep. 743, 
 609-AAA. 
 
 Paducah Board of Trade v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 583, 609-BB, 
 609-AAA. 
 
 Paducah Board of Trade v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 593, 609-AAA. 
 
 Page V. Delaware L. & W. Rd. Co. (1894), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 148, 610- A. 
 
 Page V. Delaware L. & W. Rd. Co. (1896), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 548, 610-A. 
 
 Page Milling Co. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 605, 608-J. 
 
 Paine Bros. & Co. v. Lehigh V. Rd. Co. (1S97), 7 I. C. C. Rep. 218, 609-PP. 
 
 Paine Lumber Co. v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 626, 610-D. 
 
 Palmer & Miller v. Lake E. & W. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 107, 610-D. 
 
 Pankey & Holmes v. Central N. E. Ry. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 578, 610-D. 
 
 Paola Refining Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I, C. C. Rep. 29, 610-V. 
 
 Paper Rates from Manitowoc and Milwaukee to Kaukauna, Wis. (1913), 28 l.,C. C. Rep. 
 
 305, 610-T, 610-U. 
 Pardee Works v. Central Rd. Co. of N. J. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 500, 608-M. 
 Pardee Works v. Central Rd. Co. of N. J. (1916), 39 I. C. C. Rep. 162, 609-XX. 
 Parlin & Orendorff Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1916), 42 I. C. C. Rep. 29, 30, 610-L. 
 Par!3ons v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1894), 63 Fed. Rep. 903, 11 C. C. A. 489, 27 U. S. 
 
 App. 394, 601-G, 610-F. 
 Parsons v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1897), 167 U. S. 447, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 887, 42 L. 
 
 Ed. 231, 601-G, 610-F. 
 Partridge Lumber Co. v. Director General, Chicago, St. P. M. & O. Ry. Co. (1919), 55 I. 
 
 C. C. Rep. 29, 609-FF. 
 Partridge Lumber Co. v. Great N. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 276, 610-T. 
 Payne, Director General of Railroads v. Clarke, (1921), 271 Fed. Rep. 525. 
 Peet Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Director General, as Agent, Fort Smith & W. Rd. Co. (1921), 
 
 63 I. C. C. Rep. 345, 346, 610-T. 
 Pennsylvania Intrastate Rates: In the Matter of Rates, Fares, and Charges of the 
 
 Pennsylvania-Ohio Power & Light Co. within the States of Ohio and Penn- 
 sylvania (1921), 64 I. C. C. Rep. 493; In the Matter of Rates, Fares, and 
 
 Charges of the Steubenville, East Liverpool and Beaver Valley Traction Co. 
 
 within the States of Ohio and Pennsylvania (1921), 64 I. C. C. Rep. 517, 
 
 613-NN. 
 Pennsylvania Millers' State Assn. v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. (1900), 8 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 531, 613-C. 
 People's Fuel & Supply Co. v. Grand Trunk W. Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 657, 
 
 602-A. 
 Peoria Board of Trade v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 42, 
 
 609-FF. 
 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Director General, as Agent, Arizona E. Rd. Co. (1920), 59 I. C. 
 
 C. Rep. 561, 562, 609-FF, 610-L. 
 Phoenix Printing Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 289, 609-P. 
 Pillsbury Flour Mills Co. v. Great N. Ry. Co. (1916), 39 I. C. C. Rep. 353, 606-F. 
 Pine Bluff Traffic Bureau v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1915), 37 I. C. C. Rep. 218, 613-S. 
 Pittsburgh Forge & Iron Co. v. Director, as Agent, Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1920), 59 
 
 L C. C. Rep. 29, 31, et seq. 608-S. 
 Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 173, 608-D, 
 
 608-G, 610-N, 610-R. 
 Pittsburgh Vein Operators' Assn. of Ohio v. Pennsylvania Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 280, 608-B, 608-X. 
 Planters' Compress Co. v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 382, 
 . 609-00, 609-PP. 
 
Chap. 6, Cases] traffic law service 22 
 
 Poehlman v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ey. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 89, 602- A, 609-BBB. 
 Ponchatoula Farmers' Association, Ltd. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 513, 613-CC. 
 Poor Grain Co. v. Chicago B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 418, 609-FFF. 
 Port Arthur Board of Trade v. Abilene & S. Hy. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 388, 613-DD. 
 Porter v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 1, 613-C. 
 Porter Mirror & Glass Co. v. Director General, as Agent, St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. 
 
 (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 308, 311, 600-H. 
 Prinkey v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1914), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 32, 609-XX. 
 Procter & Gamble v. Cincinnati H. & D. Ry. Co. (1890), 3 I. C. C. Rep. 131, 4 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 87, 609-M. 
 Procter & Gamble v. Cincinnati H. & D. Ry. Co. (1903), 9 I. C. C. Rep. 440, 609-GGG. 
 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Cincinnati,. N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co. (1920), 58 I. C. C. Rep. 108, 
 
 610-T. 
 Procter & Gamble Distributing Co. v. Alabama C. Ry. Co. (-1921), 61 I. C. C. Rep. 700, 
 
 609-WW. 
 Public Service Commission of New York v. New York C. Rd. Co. (1920), 129 N. E. 455, 
 
 603-L 
 Pulp & Paper Manufacturers' Traffic Assn. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 
 
 I, C. C. Rep. 83, 609-FF, 610-T, 610-V, 613-DD. 
 Quimby v. Clyde S. S. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 392, 609-GGG. 
 Quinton Spelter Co. v. Fort Smith & W. Rd. Co. (1921), 61 I. C. C. Rep. 43, 44, 600-H. 
 Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners v. Eureka Springs Ry. Co. (1895), 7 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 17, 609-FF. 
 Railroad Commission of Arkansas v. Missouri & N. A. Rd. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 255, 608-X. 
 Railroad Commissioners of Florida v. Florida E. C. Ry. Co. (1917), 42 I. C. C. Rep. 616, 
 
 608-S. . 
 Railroad Commission of Florida v. Savannah F. & W. Ry. Co. (1891), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 13, 
 
 3 I. C. Rep. 688, 609-MM, 609-GGG, 610-G. 
 Railroad Commissioners of Florida v. Southern Express Co. (1914), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 634, 
 600-K. 
 
 Railroad Commissioners of Kansas v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 407, 608-E. 
 
 Railroad Commissioners of Kentucky v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (1897), 7 I. 
 
 C. C. Rep. 380, 610-F. 
 Railroad Commission of Kentucky v.' Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep, 300, 
 
 608-G. 
 Railroad Commission of Louisiana v. Arkansas Harbor T. Ry. Co. (1918), 48 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 313, 600-G, 600-H. 
 Railroad Commission of Louisiana v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (1913), 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 837, 
 
 229 U. S. 336, 57 L. Ed. 1215, 609-RR, 613-LL. 
 
 Railroad Commission of Nevada v. Southern P. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 238, 600-H, 
 610-F, 610-M. 
 
 Railroad Commission of Nevada v. Southern P. Co. (1911), 21 L C. C. Rep. 329, 600-H, 
 610-M. 
 
 Railroad Commission of Oregon v. Oregon Rd. & Nav. Co. (1913), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 675, 
 603-A. 
 
 Railroad Commission of Texas v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1911), 20 I. C C. Rep. 
 
 463, 609-O. 
 Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 85, 610-V. 
 Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & O. Rd. Co. (1922), 66 L Ed. 36, 
 
 — U. S. — , — Sup. Ct. Rep. — , 613-NN. 
 Railway Mail Pay (1919), 56 I. C. C. Rep. 1, 609-RRR, 613-Y. 
 Rainey & Rogers v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 88, 609-P. 
 Rate Increases in Official Classification Territory (The Five Per Cent Case) (1914), 31 
 
 L C. C. Rep. 351, 608-L, 609-P, 610-M. ' 
 
 Rate Increases in Western Classification Territory (1915), 35 I. C. C. Rep. 497, 608-D, 
 609-DD, 610-T. 
 
 Rate Increases in Western Classification Territory (1915),, 37 I. C. C. Rep. 114, 608-N, 
 608-O. 
 
 Rates on Agricultural Implements and Other Commodities between LaCrosse, Wis., and 
 Other Points and St. Paul, Minn, and Other Points (1915), 361. C. C. Rep. 151, 
 610-V. 
 
 Rates on Bananas from New Orleans, La., Galveston, Tex., and Other Gulf Ports to 
 Topeka, Kans., Lincoln, and Beatrice, Nebr. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 510, 611-B, 
 611-G. 
 
 Rates on Common Brick to Canada (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 129, 611-G. 
 
 Rates on Crushed Stone from McCook and Thornton, 111., to Stations in Indiana and 
 Michigan (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 136, 609-S, 611-K. 
 
23 FEEIGHT RATES AND CHARGES [Cliap. 6, CaSeS 
 
 Rates on High Explosives to Grand Trunk Railway Systems Stations (1915), 33 I. C. 
 
 C. Rep. 567, 613-P. 
 Rates on Knitting-Factory Products (1913), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 634, 611-1. 
 Rates on Linseed Oil (1914), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 265, 611-G. 
 Rates on Lumber and Other Forest Products from Points in Arkansas and Other States 
 
 to Points in Iowa, Minnesota, and Other States (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 371, 
 
 611-J, 613-F. 
 Rates on Lumber from Anoka, Minn., and Other Points to Stations in South and North 
 
 Dakota (1915), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 494, 611-G. 
 Rates on Lumber from Southern Points to the Ohio River Crossings and Other Points 
 
 (1915), 34 I. C. C. Rep. 652, 600-L, 609-AA^. 
 Rates on Packing-House Products from Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and Other Points to St. 
 
 Paul, Minn., Eau Claire, Wis., and Other Points (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 308, 
 
 609-P. 
 
 Rates to or from Certain Points in Chicago Switching District (1915), 34 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 234, 611-P, 613-B. 
 Rath Packing Co, v. Director General, Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1920), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 427, 
 
 600-H, 609-000. 
 Rather & Co. v. Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (Tenn. 1915), 174 S. W. 1113, 609-FFF. 
 Raymond v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1887), I. C. Rep. 627, 1 I. C. C. Rep. 230, 
 
 610-A. 
 Receivers & Shippers' Assn. of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (1910), 
 
 18 I. C. C. Rep. 440, 609-P, 609-CCC. 
 Reconsignment and Diversion Rules (1920), 58 I. C. C. Rep. 568, 573, 602-O. 
 Rehberg & Co. v. Erie Rd. Co. (1910), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 508, 602-F. 
 Rend v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1889), 2 I. C. Rep. 313, 2 I. C. C. Rep. 540, 609-X. 
 Reno Grocery Co. v. Southern P. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 400, 610-G. 
 Rental Charges for Insulated Cars (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 255, 608-X. 
 Reshipping Rates on Grain and Grain Products from Omaha, Nebr., and Other Points 
 
 to Chicago & A. Rd. Co. Stations in Illinois and Missouri (1915), 32 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 590, 609-TTT. 
 Reynolds v. Western N. Y. & P. Rd. Co. (1888), 1 I. C. Rep. 685, 1 I. C. C. Rep. 395, 
 
 609-W. 
 Rhinelander Paper Co. v. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1908), 13 I. C. C. Rep. 633, 610-E. 
 Rice from Texas & Louisiana (1916), 40 I. C. C. Rep. 285, 610-T. 
 
 Rice v. Cincinnati W. & B. Rd. Co. (1892), 5 I. C. C. Rep. 193, 3 I. C. Rep. 841, 610-T. 
 Rice v. Western N. Y. & P. Rd. Co. (1888), 2 I. C. Rep. 298, 2 I. C. C. Rep. 389, 609-X. 
 Rickards v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 239, 608-G, 609-PP. 
 Rio Grande Valley Creamery Co. v. Wells Fargo & Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 425, 
 
 609-FF. 
 Rock Spring Distilling Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 18, 600-H. 
 
 609- AAA. 
 Rose v. Boston & A. Rd. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 427, 610-T. 
 Rosenbaum Bros. Co. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 62, 600-D. 
 Rutter & Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1915), 36 I. C. C. Rep. 272, 602-B. 
 Ryland & Brooks Lumber Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 520, 
 
 610-D. 
 Saginaw Board of Trade v. Grand T. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 128, 609-XX. 
 St Bernard Compress Co. v. Director General as Agent. New Orleans & N. E. Rd. Co. 
 
 (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 232, 233, 609-000. 
 St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. v. Gill (1895), 156 U. S. 649, 39 L. Ed. 567, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 484, 602-J. 
 St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. v. Hadley (1909), 168 Fed. Rep. 317, 608-X. 
 St Louis Chamber of Commerce v. Baltimore & 0. Rd. Co. (1920), 57 I. C. C. Rep. 639, 
 
 600-F, 609-XX, 610-S. 
 St. Louis Hay & Grain Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 486, 601-G. 
 St Louis Hay & Grain Co. v. Mobile & O. Rd. Co. (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 90, 601-G. 
 St Louis S. & P. Rd. Co. V. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 226, 601-K, 
 
 613-0. 
 St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. United States (1916), 234 Fed. Rep. 668, 613-R. 
 St Paul Board of T?ade v. Minneapolis St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 285, 600-D. 
 Salt Rates from Wisconsin to Iowa, etc. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 526, 609-BB. 
 Sammel v. Director General, as Agent, Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. (1920), 59 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 190, 191, 600-H, 610-L. 
 San Bernardino Board of Trade v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1890), 3 I. C. Rep. 138, 
 
 4 I. C. C. Rep. 104, 609-FFF. 
 Sandstone— Missouri River Building Stone Rates (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 268, 611-H. 
 San Jose Chamber of Commerce v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1914), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 449, 609-1. 
 
Chap. 6, Cases] thafhc law seevice 24 
 
 Santa Rosa Traffic Assn. v. Southern P. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 46, 609-XX, 609-CCC. 
 Saunders & Co. v. Southern Express Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 415, 610-V. 
 Savannah Bureau of Freight v. Savannah & C. Ry. Co. (1898), 7 I. C. C. Rep. 601, 601-G. 
 Sawyer & Austin Lumber Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 141, 610-T. 
 Scheuing v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 550, 600-H, 603-F. 
 Schmidt & Sons v. Michigan C. Rd. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep. 684, 609-X, 
 Schumacher Milling Co. v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1893), 6 I. C. C. Rep. 61, 4 I. C. 
 
 Rep. 373, 608-T. 
 Scofleld V. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1888), 2 I. C. C. Rep. 90, 2 I. C. Rep. 67, 609-00. 
 Scott V. Cape Charles Rd. Co. (1916), 38 L C. C. Rep. 467, 609-XX. 
 Scott-Mayer Commission Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Rv. Co. (1915), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 529, 
 
 602-A, 609-BBB. 
 Scott Paper Co. v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 601, 609-VV. 
 Scrap-iron Rates Between Duluth, Minn., and Chicago, 111., and other Points (1913), 
 
 28 I. C. C. Rep. 467, 608-F, 610-T. 
 Scudder v. Teaxs & P. Ry. Co. (1910), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 60, 606-C. 
 Seaboard By-Product Coke Co. v. Director General, as Agent, Delaware, L. & W. Rd. 
 
 Co. (1921), 62 I. C. C. Rep. 317, 325, 609-CC. 
 Seaboard By-Product Coke Co. v. Director General, Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. (1920), 59 
 
 I. C. C. Rep. 35, 609-000. 
 Seattle Shingle Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 364, 609-XX. 
 Sheridan Chamber of Commerce v. Chicago B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 638, 
 
 600-F, 609-BB, 609-CC. 
 Sheridan Chamber of Commerce v. Chicago B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 250, 
 
 609-CC. 
 Shiel & Co. V. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 211, 600-K, 610-1. 
 Shippers & Receivers' Bureau of Newark v. New York, 0. & W. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. 
 
 C. Rep. 264, 608-X. 
 Shreveport Cases: Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. United States, and Texas & P. Ry. 
 
 Co. V. United States (1913), 234 U. S. 342, 58 L. Ed. 1341, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 833, 
 
 613-NN. 
 Silica Sand Producers Ass'n. v. Director General, Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1920), 58 
 
 L C. C Rep. 549, 609-XX. 
 Sioux City Terminal Elevator Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 98, 613-CC. 
 Sligo Iron Store Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 139, 603-F. 
 SligJ Iron Store Co. v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 616, 610-T. 
 Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 597, 
 
 608-F. 
 
 Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1917), 46 I. C. C. Rep. 562, 
 613-DD. 
 
 Smyth V. Ames (1897), 171 U. S. 361, 43 L. Ed. 197, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 888, 609-E. 
 Snyder-Malone-Donahue Co. v. Chicago B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 498, 
 
 609-CC, 610-D. 
 Society of American Florists and Ornamental Horticulturists v. United States Express 
 
 Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 121, 608-B. 
 
 Solvay Process Co. v. Delaware, L. & W. Rd. Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 280, 613-DD. 
 
 South & North Alabama Rd. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Alabama (1913), 210 Fed. 
 Rep. 465, 608-X. 
 
 South Canon Coal Co. v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co. (1909), 17 I. C. C. Rep. 286, 609-Z, 610-D. 
 
 South Carolina Intrastate Rates: In the Matter of Inti-astate Passenger Fares and 
 
 Charges and Certain Charges for Special Services within the State of South 
 
 Carolina (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 290, 613-NN. 
 
 Southeastern Lumber (1917), 42 I. C. C. Rep. 548, 609-EE. 
 
 Southeastern Sugar Cases (1918), 48 I. C. C. Rep. 739, 610-O. 
 
 Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 275, 610-D. 
 
 Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Central of G. Ry. Co. (1913), 204 Fed. Rep. 476, 613-1. 
 
 Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Central of G. Ry. Co. (1915), 228 Fed. Rep. 335, 613-1. 
 
 Southern Express Co. v. Long (1913), 202 Fed. Rep. 462, 120 C. C.«A.. 568, 613-1. 
 
 Southern Furniture Mfrs'. Assn. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep 379 
 
 609-XX. 
 Southern Illinois Millers' Ass'n. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1912), 23 I. C. C. Rep 672 
 
 600-D, 609-P. 
 Southern P. Co. v. Arlington Heights Trust Co. (1911), 191 Fed. Rep. 101, 111, CCA 
 
 581, 613-F, 613-Z. 
 Southern P. Co. v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. (1900), 101 Fed. Rep. 779, 42 C. C. A 12 
 
 609-C. 
 Southern P. Co. v. Frye & Bi-uhn, Inc. (Wash. 1914), 143 Pac. 153, 613-C. 
 
-5 FREIGHT RATES A'SD CHARGES [Chap. 6, CaSeS 
 
 Southern P. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1906), 200 U. S. 536, 26 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 330, 50 L. Ed. 585, 601 -A. 
 Southern P. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1909), 215 U. S. 226, 54 L. Ed. 
 
 169, 30 Sup. Ct. Eep. 89, 609-S, 609-KKK. 
 Southern P. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1910), 177 Fed. Rep. 963, 609-S, 
 
 609-KKK. 
 Southern P. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1911), 188 Fed. Rep. 241, 608-S. 
 Southern P. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1911), 219 U. S. 433, 55 L. Ed. 
 
 283, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 288, 603-A, 608-N, 608-O, 608-W, 609-P, 609-KKK, 613-AA. 
 Southern P. Co. v. United States (1912), 197 Fed. Rep. 167, 608-A, 609-KKK. 
 Southern P. Co. v. United States (1914), 232 U. S. 736, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 605, 58 L. Ed. 
 
 820, 609-KKK. 
 Southern P. T. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1908), 166 Fed. Rep. 134, 
 
 613-LL. 
 Southern P. T. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1911), 219 U. S. 498, 55 L. Ed. 
 
 310, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 279, 613-LL. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Tift (1906), 148 Fed. Rep. 1021, 608-G, 608-Q. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Tift (1907), 206 U. S. 428, 51 L. Ed. 1124, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 709, 
 
 608-G, 608-Q, 609-C, 609-O, 613-IL 
 Southport Mill, Ltd. v. Director General, Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 154, 610-T. 
 Southwestern Missouri Millers' Club v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 422, 609-XX, 610-A. 
 Southwestern Missouri Millers' Club v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 28, 600-D. 
 Southwestern Shippers' Traffic Assn. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 570, 610-P. 
 Spartanburg Chamber of Commerce v. Southern Ry. Co. (1915), 34 I. C. C. Rep. 484, 
 
 609-FF. 
 Standard Lime & Stone Co. v. Cumberland V. Rd. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 620, 601-K. 
 Standard Lumber Co. v. South Georgia Ry. Co. (1916), 38 I. C. C. Rep. 301, 609-FF. 
 Standard Mirror Co. v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 200, 600-G, 608-X. 
 Standard Vitrified Brick Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1914), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 208, 
 
 611-K. 
 State of Iowa v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 47, 600-H, 609-CC, 
 
 610-M. 
 State of Iowa v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Eep. 134, 610-T, 610-U. 
 State of Iowa v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I.'C. C. Rep. 64, 600-D, 
 
 602-A, 602-1, 609-FF. 
 State of Iowa v. Wabash Ry. Co. (1917), 46 I. C. C. Rep. 703, 609-XX. 
 State of Maryland v. Baltimore, C. & A. Ry. Co. (1918), 49 I. C. C. Rep. 681, 610-T. 
 State of New York, Commissioner of Highways, v. Director General, West Shore Rd. 
 
 Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. Rep. 619, 613-PP. 
 State of New York v. United States (1922), 66 L. Ed.. 244, — U. S. — , —Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 — , 613-NN. 
 Stevens Grocer Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1916), 42 I. C. C. Rep. 396, 602-A, 
 
 609-BBB, 610-G. 
 Stiritz V. New Orleans, M. & C. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 578, 609-XX. 
 Stonega Coke & Coal Co. v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1916), 39 I. C. C. Rep. 523, 609-CC, 
 
 611-Q. 
 Stowe-Fuller Co. v. Pennsylvania Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 216, 610-T. 
 Straw Rates from Stations in Missouri to Alton, 111. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 562, 608-N. 
 Stuarts Draft Milling Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 623, 609-P. 
 
 609-WW. 
 Suffem Grain Co. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1911), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 178, 603-F. 
 Sun Co. v. Toledo & O. C. Ry. Co. (1918), 52 I. C. C. Rep. 12, 606-L. 
 
 Sunderiand Bros. Co. v. Pere Marquette Rd. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 450, 609-HHH. 
 Superior Commercial Club of Superior, Wis. v. Great N. Ry. Co. (1912), 24 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 96, 608-F. 
 Superior Commercial Club of Superior, Wis. v. Great N. Ry. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 342, 609-XX. 
 Swift & Co. V. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 241, 609-UU. 
 Swift & Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1915), 33 I. C. C. Rep. 330, 609-UU. . 
 Swift & Co. V. Director General, as Agent (1921), 61 I. C. C. Rep. 618, 623, 600-H. 
 Switching Absorptions (1917), 47 I. C. C. Rep. 583, 611-P. 
 Switching at Galesburg, 111. (1914), 31 I. C. C. Rep. 294, 613-E, 613-F. 
 Switzer Lumber Co. v. Alabama & M. Rd. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 471, 610-T. 
 Switzer Lumber Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 11, 609-XX. 
 Tallahatchie Lumber Co. v. Yazoo & M. V. Rd. Co. (1916), 38 I. C. C. Rep. 501, 609-CC. 
 
Chap. 6, Cases] teaffic law service 26 
 
 Tarkio Molasses Feed Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1917), 46 I. C. C. Rep. 17, 610-T. 
 Taylor v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 613, 608-X, 609-XX. 
 Taylor Dry Goods Co. v. Missouri P. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 205, 609-WW. 
 Tennessee Intrastate Rates: In the Matter of Intrastate Rates and Charges in the 
 
 State of Tennessee (1921), 63 I. C. C. Rep. 160, 613-NN. 
 Texarkana Freight Bureau v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 569, 
 
 609-UUU. 
 Texas & N. O. Rd. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co. (1913), 227 U. S. Ill, 57 L. Ed. 443, 83 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 229, 613-LL. 
 Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. (1907), 204 U. S. 428, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 350, 51 L. Ed. 553, 609-C, 613-D, 613-1. 
 Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1896), 162 U. S. 197, 16 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 666, 40 L. Ed. 940, 608-T, 610-F. 
 Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. New Roads Oil Mill & Mfg. Co. (1915), 221 Fed. Rep. 246, 601-H. 
 Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. United States (1913), 234 U. S. 342, 58 L. Ed. 1341, 34 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 833, 613-NN. 
 Texas Brewing Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1911), 21 I.C. C. Rep. 171, 610-T, 
 
 610-U. 
 Texas Cement Plaster Co. v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 508, 
 
 609-XX. 
 Texas Intrastate Rates: In the Matter of Intrastate Rates within the State of Texas 
 
 (1921), 60 I. C. C. Rep. 421; In the Matter of Intrastate Rates within the State 
 
 of Texas (1921), 62 I. C. C. Rep. 591; In the Matter of Intrastate Rates within 
 
 the State of Texas (1922), 68 I. C. C. Rep. 25, 613-NN. 
 Thatcher v. Fitchburg Rd. Co. (1887), 1 I. C. C. Rep. 152, 1 I. C. Rep. 356, 610-F. 
 Through Rates to Points in Louisiana and Texas (1916), 38 I. C. C. Rep. 153, 602-H, 
 
 609-1. 
 Thurber v. New York C. & H. Rd. Co. (1890), 3 I. C. C. Rep. 473, 2 I. C. Rep. 742, 608- A, 
 
 608-B, 608-O, 609-00. 
 Tift V. Southern Ry. Co. (1903), 123 Fed. Rep. 789, 609-C, 613-11. 
 Tift. V. Southern Ry. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 548, 608-G, 608-X, 609-O, 609-GGG, 
 
 613-11. 
 Tift. V. Southern Ry. Co. (1905), 138 Fed Rep. 753, 608-Q, 609-C, 609-O, 613-n. 
 Tileston Milling Co. v. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1899), 8 I. C. C. Rep. 346, 610-A. 
 Toledo Product Exchange v. Ann Arbor Rd. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 536, 609-BB. 
 Tone Bros. v. Illinois C. Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 279, 600-H, 608-G. 
 Topeka Traffic Assn. v. Alabama & V. Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I.-C. C. Rep. 510, 609-GGG. 
 Tozerv. United States (1892), 52 Fed. Rep. 917, 610-F. 
 Traffic Bureau of Nashville v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 533, 
 
 608-X, 609-P, 610-B. 
 Traffic Bureau of the Merchants' Exchange of San Francisco, Cal. v. Southern P. Co. 
 
 (1910), 19 I. C. C. Rep. '259, 608-X. 
 Transcontinental Commodity Rates (1914), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 449, 609-1. 
 Transportation Bureau of the City of Wichita, Kans. v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. (1912), 
 
 23 I. C. C. Rep. 679, 609-XX. 
 
 Truckers Transfer Co. v. Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 275, 601-K. 
 
 Truck Growers Assn. of Charleston District, Charleston, S. C. v. Atlantic C L. Rd. Co 
 (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 190, 608-Q, 613-CC. 
 
 Undei-wood Veneer Co. v. Ann Arbor Rd. Co. (1914), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 265, 610-T. 
 
 Union P. Ry. Co. v.Goodridge (1893), 149 U. S. 680, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 970, 37 L. Ed. 986, 
 608-Q. 
 
 Union Pacific Tea Co. v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 545, 610-T. 
 
 Union Tanning Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. R?p. 112, 608-X. 
 
 Union Tanning Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 159, 608-E, 608-G, 608- J, 
 608-X. 
 
 United Paperboard Co., Inc. v. Louisiana W. Rd. Co. (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 151, 609-FF. 
 
 United States v. Alabama & V. Ry. Co. (1916), 40 I. C. C. Rep. 405, 613-GG. 
 
 United States v. Belt Line Rd. Co. (1919), 56 I. C. C. Rep. 121, 608-S. 
 
 United States v. Mellen (1892), 53 Fed. Rep. 229, 610-F. 
 
 United States v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1907), 153 Fed. Rep. 625, 601-E. 
 
 United States v. Standard Oil Co. (1907), 148 Fed. Rep. 719, 602- A, 604-A. 
 
 United States v. Vacuum Oil Co. (1907), 153 Fed. Rep. 598, 601-E. 
 
 United, States v. Wharton & N. Rd. Co. .(1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 309, 608-B, 608-F, 
 608-X. 
 
 United States v. Wood (1906), 145 Fed. Rep. 405, 602- A. 
 
 United States Ex. Rel. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission 
 
 (1920), 64 L. Ed. 517, 252 Sup. Ct. Rep. 178, 40 U. S. 187, 608-X. 
 United States Leather Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 323, 60e-G. 
 
27 • FEEIGHT EATES AND CHANGES [Chap. 6, CaseS 
 
 United Verde Extension Mining Co. v. Director General, Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1920), 
 
 57 I. C. C. Rep. 483, 606-R. 
 Utilities Development Corp. v. Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Rd. Co. (1920), 56 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 694, 609-XX. 
 Van Dusen Harrington Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1917), 47. I. C. C. Rep. 59, 
 
 602-O. 
 Van Patten v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1897), 81 Fed. Rep. 845, 609-EEE. 
 Victor Mfg. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1911), 21 I. C. C. Rep. 222, 609-Q, 609-X. 
 Victor Mfg. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 661, 609-XX. 
 Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 1, 
 
 608-G. 
 
 Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 49, 
 609-M. 
 
 Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co. v. Director General, Southern Ry. Co. (1919), 53 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 583, 609-000. 
 Voldt Paper Mills v. Director General (1919), 55 L C. C. Rep. 331, 613-PP. 
 Voorhees v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 42, 609-G. 
 Vulcan Iron Works v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1916), 41 I. C. C. Rep. 76, 610-T. 
 Waccamaw Lumber Co. v. Atlantic C. L. Rd. Co. (1919), 55 L C. C. Rep. 595, 609-FF. 
 Warren-Ehret Co. v. Central Rd. of New Jersey (1900), 8 I. C. C. Rep. 598, 610-G. 
 Warren Mfg. Co. v. Southern Ry Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 381, 609-O, 609-GGG. 
 Washington Milling Co. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 546, 609-CC, 
 
 609-FF. 
 Watters-Tong Lumber Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 229, 601-O, 
 
 602-O. 
 Waukesha Lime & Stone Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 515, 609-XX, 610-T. 
 Wausau Advancement Assn. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 459 
 
 609-TTT, 611-C. 
 Waverly Oil Works v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1913), 28 I. C. C. Rep. 621, 609-CC, 613-K. 
 Weatherford Chamber of Commerce v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (1914), 31 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 665, 609-P, 609-CC, 610-V. 
 Weil v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1906), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 627, 609-WW, 609-PP, 610-L. 
 Wellington Mines Co. v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co. (1916), 39 I. C. C. Rep. 202, 602- J. 
 Wells-Higman Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 175, 609-CC. 
 Wells Lumber Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1916), 38 I. C. C. Rep. 464, 609-PP. 
 Westbound Lake-and-Rail Knit Goods Commodity Rates (1914), 32 I. C. C. Rep. 54, 
 
 611-G. 
 Western Advance Rate Case: In Re Investigation of Advances in Rates by Carriers in 
 
 Western Trunk Line, Trans-Missouri, and Illinois Freight Committee Terri- 
 tories (1911), 20 I. C. C. Rep. 307, 611-P. 
 Western Cement Rates (1918), 48 I. C. C. Rep. 201, 602-H. 
 Western Lime & Cement Co. v. Director General, as Agent, Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. 
 
 (1920), 58 L C. C. Rep. 508, -613-PP. 
 Western Oregon Lumber Mfrs'. Assn. v. Southern P. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 61, 
 
 609-S, 609-KKK. 
 Western Petroleum Refiners Ass'n. v. Director General, Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. 
 
 (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 38, 609-CCC. 
 Western Pine Manufacturers' Assn. v. Cincinnati I. & W. Rd. Co. (1917), 46 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 650, 609-EE, 613-DD. 
 Western Ry. of A. v. Railroad Commission of Alabama (1912), 197 Fed. Rep. 954, 608-X. 
 Western Trunk Line Rate Increases (1917), 43 I. C. C. Rep. 481, 600-H. 
 West Virginia Rail Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1913), 26 I. C. C. Rep. 622, 609-XX. 
 Wharton Steel Co. v. Delaware L. & W. Rd. Co. (1912), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 303, 608-G, 
 
 609-CC. 
 Wharton Steel Co. v. Director General, as Agent, Central Rd. Co. of N. J. (1920), 59 
 
 I. C. C. Rep. 11, 608-S, 611-Q. 
 Wheat Rates from Oklahoma Points to Memphis, Tenn,, and Other Points (1914), 30 
 
 I. C. C. Rep. 93, 611-C. 
 Wheeler Lumber Bridge & Supply Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. 
 
 Rep. 343, 609-BB. 
 
 Wheeler Lumber Bridge & Supply Co. v. Director General, Chicago, G. W. Rd. Co. 
 Wheeiei ^i.u^^^^ ^^ ^ ^ ^ ^^^ ^^ 609-WWW. 
 
 Wheeling Corrugating Co. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 125, 600-H. 
 Wholesale Fruit & Produce Assn. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 410, 609-G. 
 Wichita Business Assn. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 45, 
 
 609-WW. 
 Wichita Board of Trade v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1913), 25 I. C. C. Rep. 625. 
 
 609-CC. 
 
Chap. 6, Cases] teaffic law service • 28 
 
 Wickwire Steel Co. v. New York C. & H. R. Rd. Co. (1910), 181 Fed. Rep. 316, 104 C. C. 
 A. 504, 603-B, 613-F. 
 
 Wickwire Steel Co. v. New .York C. & H. R. Rd. Co. (1914), 30 I. C. C. Rep. 415, 610-Q, 
 611-B, 611-1, 613-E, 613-F. 
 
 Wilhoit V. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. (1907), 12 I. C. C. Rep. 139, 608- J. 
 
 WUlamette Pulp & Paper Co. v. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 388, 603-D. 
 
 Willcox Consolidated Gas Co. (1909), 212 U. S. 19, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192, 58 L. Ed. 
 382, 608-X. 
 
 Williams Co. v. Vicksburg S. & P. Ry. Co. (1909), 16 I. C. C. Rep. 482, 600-F, 601-G. 
 
 Williams v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (1913), 203 Fed. Rep. 140, 613-1. 
 
 Willman & Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 405, 610-V. 
 
 Wilson Produce Co. v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1908), 14 I. C. C. Rep, 170, 608-A. 
 
 Windsor Turned Goods Co. v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. (1910), 18 I. C. C. Rep. 162, 
 609-FF. 
 
 Wisconsin & Arkansas Lumber Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1915), 33 I. C. C. 
 Rep. 34, 609-XX. 
 
 Wisconsin Intrastate Rates: In the Matter of Intrastate Passenger Fares on the Line 
 of the Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. and Other Carriers between Points in the 
 State of Wisconsin (1920), 59 I. C. C. Rep. 391; Railroad Commission of Wis- 
 consin V. Chicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co. (1922), 66 L. Ed. 236, — U. S. — , — Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. — , 613-NN. 
 
 Wisconsin Wood Pulp Co. v. Great N. Ry. Co. (1912), 22 I. C. C. Rep. 594, 610-T. 
 
 Wisconsin Steel Co. v. Pittsburgh & L. E. Rd. Co. (1913), 27 I. C. C. Rep. 152, 608-G. 
 610-R. 
 
 Woodward-Bennett Co. v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. Rd. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Rep. 664. 
 
 609-PP. 
 Worn V. Boca & L. Rd. Co. (1914), 32 L C. C. Rep. 58, 610-E. 
 Wrigley v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Rd. Co. (1905), 10 I. C. C. Rep. 412, 609-NN. 
 Wylie V. Northern P. Ry. Co. (1905), 11 I. C. C. Rep. 145, 601-D. 
 Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1909), 15 I. C. C. Rep. 260, 
 
 610-T. 
 Yellow Pine Sash, Door & Blind Mfrs'. Assn. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1915), 35 I. C. C. Rep. 
 
 150, 610-T. 
 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Pittsburgh & L. E. Rd. Co. (1914), 29 I. C. C. Re». 
 
 428, 608-X. 
 Zelnicker Supply Co. v. Louisiana W. Rd. Co. (1919), 52 I. C. C. 543, 606-Q. 
 Zimmerman v.Great N. Ry. Co. (1915), Unreported Opinion No. 7225, 609-PP 
 
 CONFERENCE RULINGS BULLETIN OF I. C. C. 
 Rule 50, 606-L. 
 Rule 52, 606-G. 
 Rule 59, 606-C. 
 Rule 70, 606-L. 
 Rule 83, 606-G. 
 Rule 84, 600-H. 
 Rule 104, 606-L. 
 Rule 147,606-G. 
 Rule 160, 609-KK. 
 Rule 170, 609-TT. 
 Rule 172, 602-B. 
 Rule 175, 606-O. 
 Rule 201, 601 -B. 
 Rule 215, 602-F. 
 Rule 239, 606-L. 
 Rule 248, 606-A. 
 Rule 249, 606-B. 
 Rule 250, 606-C. 
 Rule 256, 602-M. 
 Rule 273, 606-C. 
 Rule 274-a, 606-D. 
 Rule 274-b, 606-D. 
 Rule 274-c, 606-D. 
 Rule 298, 609-FF. 
 Rule 331, 606-C. 
 Rule 334, 606-E. 
 Rule 339, 606-C, 606-D. 
 •Rule 350, 606-F. 
 Rule 357, 606-C. 
 
29 FREIGHT BATES AXD CHARGES [Chap. 6, CaSeS 
 
 Rule 359, 606-J. 
 Rule 373, 606-M. 
 Rule 423, 601-J. 
 Rule 443, 602-B. 
 Rule 457, 605-A. 
 Rule 470 606-N. 
 Rule 488, 602-M. 
 
 TARIFF CIRCULAR IS-A OF I. C. C. 
 
 Rule 5-a, 602-A. 
 
 Rule 5-b, 600-D, 602-C. 
 
 Rule 5-c, 602-D. 602-B. 
 
 Rule 7, 600-H, 600-1. 
 
 Rule 55, 602-A. 
 
 Rule 66, 606-C, 609-FF. 
 
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 55 CHAPTERS TREATING AS MANY SEPARATE 
 SUBJECTS AND EMBRACING EVERY PHASE OF 
 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION JURIS- 
 DICTION. EACH CHAPTER IS COMPLETE IN 
 AND OP ITSELF AND CONSISTS OF 
 
 Comprehensive Analysis 
 Authoritative Subject-Matter 
 Detailed Index 
 Complete Table of Cases 
 Copious Notes 
 Complete Citation of Cases 
 . Lucid Exposition 
 
 Table of Contents of Loose-Leaf Work 
 
 and 
 Synopsis and Scope of the Service 
 
 Chapter 
 Number. 
 
 SUBJECT-MATTER. 
 
 Abbreviations and Terms 
 
 8. 
 
 9. 
 10. 
 11. 
 12. 
 
 13. 
 
 14 
 15. 
 
 16. 
 17. 
 
 18. 
 19. 
 20. 
 
 21. 
 
 22. 
 
 23. 
 
 24. 
 
 25. 
 26. 
 
 {Key to Citations 
 Glossary. 
 
 Consolidated Tables of Cases. 
 
 Introduction — Historical Antecedents. 
 
 Power of Congress to regulate the Internal 
 and Foreign Commerce of the United 
 States. 
 
 Interstate Commerce Commission. 
 
 Transportation and Common Carriers sub- 
 ject to the Jurisdiction of the Interstate 
 Commerce Commission. 
 
 Transportation and Common Carriers not 
 subject to the Jurisdiction of the Inter- 
 state Commerce Commission. 
 
 Classification of Freight and Freight Classi- 
 fications. 
 
 Freight Rates and Charges. 
 
 Fourth Section of the Interstate Commerce 
 Act — Long-and-Short-Haul C 1 a u s e — 
 Fourth-Section Applications. 
 
 Bills of Lading and Contracts of shipment. 
 
 Weights and Weighing. 
 
 Equipment — Car Supply and Distribution. 
 
 Routes and Routing. 
 
 Protective Services in Transportation of 
 Perishable Traffic. 
 
 Transit Privileges, Facilities and Regula- 
 tions. 
 Elevation. 
 
 Contracts between Carriers and Shippers 
 and Others. 
 
 Terminal Facilities and Regulations. 
 
 Demurrage or "Car-Service" and Detention 
 Charges. 
 
 Car-Per-Diem Charge. 
 
 Payment for Transportation. 
 
 Limitation of Common Carrier's Liability — 
 Initial Carrier's Liability. 
 
 Free and Reduced-Rate "Transportation of 
 Property. 
 
 Allowances by Carriers to Owners of 
 Transported Property. 
 
 Allowances to Terminal Railroads and Boat 
 Lines Owned or Controlled by Shippers. 
 
 Switching — Switch Connections — Private 
 Side-Tracks. 
 
 Embargoes. 
 
 Discriminations, Preferences and Advan- 
 tages. 
 
 Chapter 
 Number. 
 
 SUBJECT-MATTER. 
 
 27. Rebates and Concessions. 
 
 28. Damages and Reparation — Claims between 
 
 Shippers and Carriers. 
 
 29. Transportation of Explosives and Other 
 
 Dangerous Articles. 
 
 30. Railroad Company Freight Tariffs or Rate 
 
 Schedules. 
 
 31. Transportation of Live Stock. 
 
 32. Passenger Service, Fares and Tickets. 
 
 33. Free and Reduced-Rate Transportation of 
 
 Passengers. 
 
 34. Passenger Tariffs or Fare Schedules. 
 
 35. Interchange of Traffic between Connecting 
 
 Carriers and Through or Continuous 
 Transportation. 
 3fi. Contracts, Agreements and Arrangements 
 between Carriers. 
 
 37. Pooling Contracts and Agreements. — Con- 
 
 solidation of Railway Properties into 
 Systems. 
 
 38. Accounts, Records and Memoranda of Car- 
 
 riers. 
 
 39. Reports of Carriers to the Interstate Com- 
 
 merce Commission. 
 
 40. Commodities Clause. 
 
 41. Express Companies and Express Traffic. 
 
 42. Express Company Freight Tariffs or Rate 
 
 Schedules. 
 
 43. Federal Antitrust Laws — Sherman Anti- 
 
 trust Act — Clayton Antitrust Act. 
 
 44. Telegraph Lines operated by Government- 
 
 Aided Railroads. 
 
 45. Interstate Commerce Act. 
 
 46. Practice and Procedure before the Inter- 
 
 state Commerce Commission. 
 
 47. Civil Proceedings in the Courts. 
 
 48. Sleeplng-Car Companies. 
 
 49. Pipe Lines. 
 
 50. Water Carriers — Panama Canal Act. 
 
 51. Telegraph, Telephone and Cable Companies. 
 
 52. Penalties and Forfeitures — Criminal Pro- 
 
 ceedings. 
 
 53. State Regulation of Interstate Commerce 
 
 and Common Carriers. 
 
 54. Federal Control of Common Carriers — 
 
 United States Railroad Administration. 
 
 55. RailVay Finances — Guaranteed Return on 
 
 Railway Property. 
 General Index. 
 Appendices — Reprints of Acts of Congress. 
 
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E.i5M^^ 
 
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 CLIENTELE 
 
 That TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE has proven to be a departmental facility of inestimable and universal 
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 includes, among many other, the following industrial concerns, railroad counsel and officers, lawyers, 
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 about this Service: 
 
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 United States Steel Corp. 
 McKinney Steel Co. 
 Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. 
 Highway Iron Products Co. 
 Norton Iron Wks. 
 Hess Steel Corp. 
 
 United Shoe Machinery Corp. 
 
 Otis Elevator Co. 
 
 Buffalo Bolt Co. 
 
 Art Metal Construction Co. 
 
 Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. 
 
 Chapman Valve Mfg. Co. 
 
 Walter A. Zeinlcker Supply Co. 
 Republic Supply Co. 
 Pacific Coast Supply Co. 
 Advance-Rumely Co. 
 
 Inspiration Con. Copper Co. 
 Aluminum Goods Mfg. Co. 
 Hungerford Brass & Copper Co. 
 
 Baldwin Locomotive Wks. 
 Standard Steel Car Wits. 
 Standard Tank Car Co. 
 
 Dering Coal Co. 
 Consumers Company 
 Northern States Power Co. 
 Milwaukee Coke & Gas Co. 
 
 Southern P. Co. 
 Western P. Ry. Co. 
 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. 
 Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. 
 Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. 
 Chicago, R. I. & P. Rd. Co. 
 St. Louis S. W. Rd. Co. 
 Oregon S. L. Rd. Co. 
 New York, N. H. & H. Ry. Co. 
 Louisiana & A. Ry. Co. 
 Detroit & M. Ry. Co. 
 Charlotte H. & N. Ry. Co. 
 Duluth, M. & N. Ry. Co. 
 Ulster & D. Rd. Co. 
 Bush Terminal Company 
 Oklahoma Ry. Co. 
 Illinois Traction System 
 
 New York Shipbuilding Co. 
 Pacific Coast Shipbuilding Co. 
 
 Illinois Commerce Commission 
 Montana Railroad Commissioners 
 
 Ford Motor Co. 
 Studebaker Corporation 
 
 Standard Oil Co. 
 The Texas Company 
 General Petroleum Corp. 
 Sinclair Refining Co. 
 Transcontinental Oil Co. 
 Magnolia Petroleum Co. 
 Keystone Oil & Refining Co. 
 Texas Refining Co. 
 Cosden & Co. 
 
 The Parafine Companies, Inc. 
 American Creosoting Co. 
 International Creosoting & Con. ,Co. 
 
 Western Pine Lumber Co. 
 Weyerhaeuser Sales Co. 
 National Lumber Co. 
 Blackwell Lumber Co. 
 Standard Lumber Co. 
 Potlatch Lumber Co. 
 Trexler Lumber Co. 
 Wood Mosaic Co. 
 
 Mid-West Box Co. 
 Nashville Hardwood Flooring Co. 
 El Paso Sash & Door Co. 
 United States Gypsum Co. 
 Central Wisconsin Supply Co. 
 
 Lehigh Portland Cement Co. 
 Peninsular Portland Cement Co. 
 Palmer Lime & Cement Co. 
 Cape Girardeau Portland Cement 
 Co. 
 
 Haeger Brick & Tile Co. 
 Trenton Potteries Co. 
 
 United Drug Co. 
 Dow Chemical Co. . 
 Mathieson Alkali Works 
 Robeson Process Co. 
 Mennen Chemical Co. 
 Paris Medicine Co. 
 
 E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 
 Diamond Match Co. 
 Western Cartridge Co. 
 
 International Paper Co. 
 Union Bag & Paper Corp. 
 American Writing Paper Co. 
 A. P. W. Paper Co. 
 The Consolidated Paper Co. 
 Hinde & Dauoh Paper Co. 
 West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. 
 Ford Roofing Products Co. 
 Certain-Teed Products Corp. 
 Canadian Export Paper Co. 
 G. H. Mead Co. 
 Crown-Willamette Paper Co. 
 Oxford Paper Co. 
 
 Washburn-Crosby Co. 
 Pillsbury Flour Mills Co. 
 American Maize Products Co. 
 Albers Bros. Milling Co. 
 Amendt Milling Co. 
 Marshall Milling Co. 
 Banner Milling Co. 
 Fisher Flouring Mills Co. 
 Aunt Jemima Mills Co. 
 Grain Belt Mills Co. 
 Royal Milling Co. 
 Larabee Flour Mills Corp. 
 
 Swift & Co. 
 Acme Packing Co. 
 John Morrell & Co. 
 
 Proctor & Gamble Co. 
 
 Czarnikow-Rionda Co. 
 Sugerland Industries 
 Amalgamated Sugar Co. 
 
 California Associated Raisin Co. 
 
 Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co. 
 
 Joseph Campbell Co. 
 
 Nestle's Food Co. 
 
 Chero-Cola Company 
 
 Temtor Com & Fruit Products Co. 
 
 Welch Grape Juice Co. 
 
 Regal Shoe Co. 
 Bndicot-Johnson Corp. 
 Geo. B. Keith Co. 
 
 Latham-Bradshaw Cotton Co. 
 Southwest Cotton Co. 
 
 Montgomery Ward & Co. 
 Arbuckles & Co. 
 Strawbridge & Clothier 
 The Emporium 
 
 ttohawk Valley Cap Factory 
 Pittsburgh Dry Goods Co. 
 A. Stein & Co. 
 
 American Fruit Growers, Inc. 
 
 Chatterton & Son 
 
 E. H. Wiener Co. 
 
 The A M. Penny Co. 
 
 The Farr Produce Co. 
 
 Colton Bros. Co. 
 
 C. M. McMahen & Son 
 
 Eastman Kodak Co. 
 Columbia Graphophone Co. 
 A. G. Spaulding & Bros. 
 Stevens & Sons Co. 
 Carr Fastener Co. 
 Ensign-Bickford Co. 
 Lockwood, Greene & Co. 
 The Stanley Worlcs 
 
 Detroit Board of Commerce 
 Greater Des Moines Committee 
 Toledo Commerce Club 
 Rockford Mfrs. & Shippers Assn. 
 Kalamazoo Board of Commerce 
 Iowa State Manufacturers' Assn. 
 Davenport Commercial Club 
 Omaha Grain Exchange 
 Atchinson Chamber of Commerce 
 Spokane Merchants' Ass'n. 
 Little Rock Board of Trade 
 Houston Chamber of Commerce 
 Beaumont Chamber of Commerce 
 Trafiic Bureau of Knoxville 
 Tennessee Manufacturers' Ass'n. 
 Clarksburg Chamber of Commerce 
 Flint Chamber of Commerce 
 Port Arthur Chamber of Commerce 
 Providence Chamber of Commerce 
 
 Illinois Agricultural Ass'n. 
 Illinois Coal Traffic Bureau 
 Southern Ohio Coal Exchange 
 Northwestern Coal Dock Op. Ass'n. 
 Northern W. Va. Coal Op. Ass'n. 
 Logan Coal Operators' Assn. 
 Southern Traffic & Acct. Bureau 
 Pacific Car Demurrage Bureau 
 Retail Furniture Assn. of California 
 National Assn. of Retail Clothiers 
 
 Traffic Adjustment Co. 
 
 Western Freight Traffic Assn. 
 
 Clifton, Mortimer & Kievit, Inc. 
 
 Vaughan & Co. 
 
 Merchants Railway Traffic Assn. 
 
 Arizona Traffic Ass'n. 
 
 Lent Traffic Co. 
 
 Northwest Traffic Service Bureau 
 
 Chippewa Valley Traffic Bureau 
 
 Wilmington Traffic Ass'n. 
 
 Tulsa Traffic Ass'n. 
 
 Midwest Commerce-Traffic Bureau 
 
 U. S. Freight Traffic Ass'n. 
 
 Indiana Freight Traffic Ass'n. 
 
 Winston, Strawn & Shaw 
 Stevenson, Carpenter, Butzel & 
 
 Backus 
 Reed, Smith, Shaw & Beal 
 Ahny, Van Gordon & Evans 
 Cottingham & Hayes 
 Carey & Kerr 
 S. C. Bates 
 R. W. Ropiequet 
 Templeton, Whiteman & Rowley 
 Charles Donley 
 Chicago Law Institute 
 Detroit Bar Association Library 
 AUegheney County Law Library 
 Wisconsin State Library 
 
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 Write at once for FKEE DESCRIPTIVE UTERATURE, tising firm letter-liead 
 
!J8?48!«l*j!«;41Sgissaw!«tWi4l*&»>t'aw 
 
 Loose-Leaf Traffic Law Service 
 
 Other People's Opinions 
 
 That TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE Is being enthusiastically received throughout transportation circles is 
 evidenced by the following commendatory and unsolicited statements from subscribers: 
 
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 "TRAFFIC LAW SERVICE should be on the 
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 traffic library. They are sales managers, general 
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 Cement Co., Cement City, Mich. 
 
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 Mr. G. L. Wakeman, T. M., Detroit & Mackinac Ry. 
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 Des Moines, Iowa. 
 
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 Texas. 
 
 "This is really a wonderful piece of work and will 
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 We cannot emphasize too strongly the value of this 
 work to an Industrial Traffic Manager." — Mr. E. 
 T. Foxenherg, Mgr. of Transportation, Mohawk 
 Valley Cap Factory, XJtica, N. Y. 
 "We were so enthusiastic when we read through 
 Chapter 6, covering 'Freight Rates and Charges,' 
 the first time that we could not refrain from com- 
 plimenting you on the masterly fashion in which 
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 explained that we think each Traffic Manager of 
 all the industrial concerns should have a copy of 
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 recom,mend this work to any traffic man who has 
 had some experience with traffic work, and wishes 
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 Mr. H. W. Chapman, Transportation Commissioner, 
 Jamestown Board of Commerce, Jamestown, N. Y. 
 
 "1 am very much of the opinion that your work 
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 merce Attorney and Counselor, Springfield, Mo. 
 
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 "Referring to opinions rendered on Oct. 16, 1920, 
 and letter of March 14, 1921, regarding liability of 
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 "* * * I am convinced it is the most comprehen- 
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 "We acknowledge your letter of the 2Bth, also 
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 Y^nteaf once /or FREE DESCRIPTIVE UTERATURE, using firm letter-head 
 
i2iMKjiisasm iii!LmJSiyffi:ffiysi :j^^ 
 
 Loose-Leaf Traffic Law Service 
 
 Salient Features of the Service 
 
 LOOSE-LEAF work is kept continuously up-to- 
 date by amendatory and supplementary pages. 
 The work contains nothing but living law at all 
 times. The binder never contains obsolete matter. 
 Always up-to-date and always at your service. 
 
 OCCASIONALLY the annotation takes the form 
 of a monograph or small treatise. The com- 
 plete history of every important case is shown from 
 its inception before the Interstate Commerce 
 Commission to its final disposition by the United 
 States Supreme Court. "Traffic Law Service" 
 notes analyze and review all the cases in point. 
 
 OTHER works do not give such clear and concise 
 statements of law and facts in a case, together 
 with its development. 
 
 ^TYLE of printing provides maximum legibility, 
 O being clear, large type on white paper. The 
 eyesight of the traffic man is overtaxed by tariff 
 reading, but the pages of "Traffic Law Service" 
 can be read with ease and pleasure. 
 
 TpACH chapter complete in itself, consisting of 
 XI/ Analysis — Subject-Matter — Index — Table of 
 Cases. Each chapter constitutes an elaborate 
 treatise on one particular subject, treating the 
 same fully and exhaustively from every viewpoint. 
 
 LIMITATION and scope of subjects shown in 
 detailed Analysis prefixed to each chapter 
 which presents an orderly and systematic exposi- 
 tion of subject-matter. 
 
 JTI VERYTHING in a decision that can be of service 
 J2j is fully and clearly stated. 
 
 A NAL YSES are printed on old rose colored pages; 
 ./x the Subject-Matter on white pages; the In- 
 dices on green paper; and the Table of Cases on 
 canary colored paper for differentiation purposes, 
 thereby facilitating the use of the work. 
 
 JpiFTY-FIVE chapters covering current law on 
 " every phase of subject. 
 
 " rwiRAFFIC Law Service" quotes liberally from 
 A opinions, and the reason of the law is given 
 in the exact language of the judges themselves. 
 Copious excerpts are given from decisions of United 
 States Supreme Court. The value of verbatim 
 statements from judicial opinions is apparent. 
 
 DEPORTS of United States Supreme Court give 
 J\ parallel citations to three sets. 
 
 A NALYSES, Indices and Table of Cases are 
 XM. corrected to cover changes in and additions to 
 the work. 
 
 FACTS in the more important cases like the 
 "Shreveport Case," "Intermountain Case," 
 "Tap Line Case," etc., are elaborately stated. 
 
 FLEXIBLE system of sections and paragraphs is 
 one of the unique features of the work, and 
 permits of its free expansion to meet the de- 
 velopment of the subject. 
 
 TN addition to the General Index to the work, 
 JL each chapter contains a detailed and alpha- 
 betical Index with elaborate cross-references, 
 which soon becomes the first resort of the searcher 
 for light and authority. 
 
 CONSOLIDATED Table of Cases is appended to 
 the work. A table of cases is appended to 
 each chapter, consisting of an alphabetical list of 
 all cases and authorities cited therein. 
 
 LA W development on a particular subject is care- 
 fully given, showing each progressive step. 
 Vital matters emphasized in italics. 
 
 A LL propositions are indexed fully and com- 
 -/x pletely by sections and paragraphs, thereby 
 furnishing a quick aitd exact reference to the item 
 sought. 
 
 TTtTORK is amended by reprinted pages which are 
 
 fV inserted in lieu of the old pages. The pages 
 
 are numbered at the inside corners for convenience 
 
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 01ECTION numbers are shown in the outside 
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 poses. The Indices and Tables of Cases always 
 refer to section numbers and subdivisions thereof, 
 
 TpACH chapter has appropriated to it 100 section 
 IJJ numbers of the same series as the chapter 
 number, for example: Chapter 7 contains Sections 
 700-799. This novel system permits of unlimited 
 and continuous expansion of the work. 
 
 nSPORTS of citations in this work give the date 
 1\ of each decision, which is often of great value 
 in determining its present authority and appli- 
 cation. 
 
 FALUABLE Consultation Services place Com- 
 merce Counsel always at your command. 
 "Traffic Law Service' is the legal complement of 
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 /N the Table of Cases the exact section aiui para- 
 graph is given where each authority cited in 
 the work may be found. The Table of Cases, 
 therefore, furnish ready access to every proposition 
 of law embodied in such cases. 
 
 CAPTIONS and subdivisions thereof are set forth 
 in novel and effective style. The main cap- 
 tions are numbered consecutively and printed in 
 heavy black type, while the subdivisions thereof 
 are arranged alphabetically and printed in a dis- 
 tinguishing style of type. 
 
 171 ACH paragraph is complete in and of itself, 
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 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^p 
 
 ^^^^^^K 
 
Commerce Attorney and Counselor 
 HON. HARRY C. BARNES 
 
 of the CHICAGO BAR 
 
KF 23^6 A3 1922 
 
 Author 
 
 Barnes, Harry Cleveland 
 
 Title 
 
 Freight rates & charges;