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AliG UMENT 
 
 IN TUE 
 
 Matter of the Application 
 
 1 » 
 
 FOlt THE 
 
 Release of Tobacco 
 
 Seized at Richmond, Va. 
 
 AND NOW 
 
 HELD BY THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT. 
 
 HUGHES, DENVER &. PECK, Counsel. 
 
 JANUARY , 186R. 
 
 WASHIITGTOIT : 
 
 GIBSON BROTHERS, PRINTERS. 
 
ARGUMENT. 
 
 To the Hon. Hugh McCulloch, 
 
 Secretary of the Treasury: 
 
 The undersigned, counsel for Rothschilds & Co., of Paris, 
 France, have the honor to submit for your consideration, in 
 connection with the pending application for the release of 
 certain tobacco now held by the agents of the Treasury, 
 and owned and claimed by said Rothschilds & Co., the 
 following argument: 
 
 The claimants are the subjects of a friendly foreign State, 
 domiciled in Paris, where they have remained from a time 
 antecedent to the beginning of our civil war to its close, 
 never having had even a temporary residence within the limits 
 of the late Confederate States. 
 
 There is a subsisting treaty of commerce and navigation 
 between France and the United States, which has been in full 
 force for many years past. Under the laws of nations and 
 under said treaty, the subjects of France were and are entitled 
 to all the commercial rights guarantied to neutrals, and in 
 this particular case those rights include absolute immunity 
 from the capture or detention (except under the blockade) of 
 their property, its confiscation, or its seizure under any of 
 the acts of Congress made for the purposes of the war in the 
 nature of acts of forfeiture. 
 
 The tobacco in question here, was bought before the war 
 began ; in the legitimate course of business. 
 
 A blockade was established by the United States Govern¬ 
 ment, and respected by Rothschilds & Co., therefore their 
 tobacco, of necessity, remained within the territory of the 
 States in rebellion, until the close of the war. 
 
4 
 
 It was then seized by the military authorities on the express 
 ground that it was the property of aliens, and turned over to 
 the Treasury Department. The military issued an order 
 releasing the property of citizens, hut declined to release 
 this, because the owners were not citizens. 
 
 The Attorney General having delivered an opinion to the 
 effect, that all property received by the Treasury agents from 
 the military authorities as captured or abandoned, must be 
 held under the provisions of the act of March 12, 1863, and 
 the parties confined to the remedy by suit in the Court of 
 Claims provided in that act, the question arises: Is this 
 property within the terms of the act of Congress and the 
 decision of the Attorney General? 
 
 It is to he remarked in passing, that no question upon the 
 validity of this act, by reason of its approval eight days after 
 the dissolution of Congress, was brought to the attention of 
 the Attorney General, nor has that question, though distinctly 
 raised since before the Treasury Department, yet been sub¬ 
 mitted to him for his decision. Meanwhile millions of dollars 
 of meritorious claims, are suspended and postponed upon a 
 very strict construction, and a stringent enforcement of an 
 act of Congress which one branch of the national Legislature 
 has declared void, and which cannot fail to be disregarded 
 whenever subjected to the test of judicial examination. 
 
 But accepting the rules adopted by the Treasury Depart¬ 
 ment for its guidance in cases of this kind, we proceed to 
 consider the question stated above; does the tobacco of Roths¬ 
 childs & Co. come within the terms of the act of Congress 
 as construed by the Attorney General ? That act of Congress 
 is a municipal law of this commonwealth ; its scope and opera¬ 
 tion affect only enemies and enemies’ property. It cannot, by 
 anyjustand fair intendment,be made to divestthe well-defined 
 and universally admitted rights of neutrals, founded on the 
 laws of nations. For the rights of neutrals, the United 
 States have hitherto .stood forth as the special advocate and 
 champion among nationalities. All departments of our 
 Government ought to be slow to maintain that our municipal 
 
laws are now to overrule and destroy them in their most vital 
 particulars. 
 
 The Attorney General of the United States has resorted to 
 the law of nations for authority to try citizens in time of war 
 by Military Commissions. (See Opinion on the case of the 
 assassins of President Lincoln—pamphlet—July, 1865.) His 
 opinion on that subject was followed, and, whether wisely 
 or not, is a precedent too recent and sealed with sanctions 
 too solemn to be now repudiated by the same Administration. 
 
 Out of sundry passages of similar purport, we quote the 
 following: 
 
 “Congress can declare war. When war is declared, it 
 must be, under the Constitution, carried on according to the 
 known laws and usages of war among civilized nations. 
 Under the power to define those law's, Congress cannot abro¬ 
 gate them or authorize their infraction. The Constitution 
 does not permit this Government to prosecute a w r ar as an 
 uncivilized and barbarous people.” (Opinion, pp. 4, 5.) 
 
 Let us now turn to the law of nations to ascertain the 
 rights of neutrals in time of war. 
 
 In Chancellor Kent’s chapter “Of the various kinds of 
 property liable to capture,” (1st Commentaries, p. 83, etseq.,) 
 it is laid down that the domicil of a party determines his 
 nationality as to the question of neutral rights, and he says: 
 “This same principle, that, for all commercial purposes, the 
 domicil of the party without reference to the place of birth 
 becomes the test of national character, has been repeatedly 
 and explicitly admitted in the courts of the United States. 
 If he resides in a belligerent country, his property is liable 
 to capture as enemy’s property, and if he resides in a neutral 
 country he enjoys all the privileges, and is subject to all the 
 inconveniences, of the neutral trade. He takes the advantages 
 and disadvantages, whatever they may be, of the country of 
 his residence. The doctrine is founded on the principles of 
 national law, and accords with the reason and practice of all 
 civilized nations.” 
 
 The principle insisted on by the United States in their 
 diplomatic correspondence w'ith England, w r as, that neutrals 
 
6 
 
 were of right entitled “ to trade, with the exception of block¬ 
 ades and contrabands, to and between all ports of the enemy, 
 and in all articles, although the trade should not have been 
 opened to them in time of peace.” 
 
 The trade with France, as before remarked, is regulated 
 by a commercial treaty, and it was in time of peace that the 
 property in question here was acquired. 
 
 It is not pretended that this tobacco was ever moved or 
 intended to be moved in violation of the blockade, or that it 
 was contraband of war. 
 
 The right of French subjects to trade with the people of 
 the United States being recognized and regulated by the 
 laws of nations and by treaty, cannot be taken away or 
 impaired by our municipal laws. 
 
 The general commercial rights of neutrals have been thus 
 stated by Lord Erskine, in his speech of March 8, 1808, upon 
 the orders in council: 
 
 “The public law establishes, that countries not engaged in 
 war, not interposing in it, shall not be affected by the differ¬ 
 ences of contending nations; but to use the very words of the 
 eminent judge who now presides with so much learning and 
 ability in the Court of Admiralty, (Sir William Scott, Lord 
 Stowell,) ‘upon the breaking out of war, it is the right of 
 neutrals to carry on their accustomed trade, with an exception 
 of the particular cases of a trade to blockaded ports, or in 
 contraband articles, and of their ships being liable to visita¬ 
 tion and search.’ ” (Upton’s Maritime Warfare and Prize, 
 p. 259.) 
 
 In Marten’s Law of Nations, (p. 296,) it is said, that “ war 
 suspends all the laws of property between the belligerent 
 powers, but not between them and neutral powers, so that 
 although an enemy may seize on the property of an enemy, 
 and dispose of it with all its appurtenances, still the right of 
 the original proprietor does not cease as long as he has not 
 expressly or tacitly renounced it, or as long as he has not 
 given it up as lost.” Yattel says that there are certain rules 
 on which Europe seems to be generally agreed, and that “the 
 first is, carefully to distinguish ordinary goods which have 
 
7 
 
 no relation to war, from those that are peculiarly subservient 
 to it.” 
 
 “Neutral nations should enjoy perfect liberty to trade in the 
 former; the belligerent powers cannot with any reason refuse 
 it, or prevent the importation of such goods into the enemy’s 
 country; the care of their own safety, the necessity of self- 
 defence, does not authorize them to do it, since those things 
 will not render the enemy more formidable. An attempt to 
 interrupt or put a stop to this trade would be a violation of 
 the rights of neutral nations, a flagrant injury to them; 
 necessity, as we have observed, being the only reason which 
 can authorize any restraint on their trade and navigation to 
 the ports of the enemy.” (Vattel, Book 3d, chap. 7, sec. 112.) 
 
 “ The effects of neutrals found in an enemy’s ships, are to 
 be restored to the owners, against whom there is no right of 
 confiscation, but without any allowance for detainer, decay, 
 &c.” (Vattel, Book 3d, chap. 7, sec. 116.) 
 
 And to the same effect says Chancellor Kent: “ The two 
 distinct propositions, that enemy’s goods found on board a 
 neutral ship may lawfully be seized as prize of war, and that 
 the goods of a neutral found on board of an enemy’s vessel 
 were to be restored, have been explicitly incorporated into 
 the jurisprudence of the United States, and declared by the 
 Supreme Court to be founded in the law of nations. The 
 rule, as it was observed by the court, rests on the simple 
 principle, that war gave a right to capture the goods of an 
 enemy, but gave no right to capture the goods of a friend. 
 The neutralflag constituted no protection to enemy’s property, 
 and the belligerent flag, communicated no hostile character 
 to neutral property. The character of the property depended 
 upon the fact of ownership, and not upon the character of 
 the vehicle in which it was found.” (Kent’s Commentaries, 
 vol. 1., p. 129.) 
 
 It will not be pretended that the rights of capture on land 
 are more extended than at sea, and we assert with confidence 
 that no authority can be found in the law of nations to 
 warrant or excuse the capture and appropriation of the prop¬ 
 erty of a neutral domiciled abroad in such a case as this. 
 
8 
 
 The general principle is thus laid down by Grotius, and 
 is too well established to require argument or admit of ques¬ 
 tion: “This is plain, before the right of war can entitle us 
 to anything taken, it is requisite that our enemy had first the 
 true propriety of it; for what things may he within the 
 enemy’s garrisons, or towns, the owners thereof, being neither 
 subjects to our enemies, nor at war with us, cannot by war 
 he made lawful booty, as is proved, among others, by the 
 saying of Escliines, that Ampliipolis being a city belonging 
 to the Athenians, could not lawfully be taken by King Philip 
 in a war which he made with the Amphipolitanes; for there 
 was no reason for it; and the changing of properties by mere 
 force is too hateful to be produced.’ ’ (Grotius, Book 3d, chap. 
 6, sec. 5.) 
 
 Other authorities might be mentioned, but enough have 
 been cited to show that the property of a neutral, domiciled 
 in neutral territory, is not enemies’ property, nor the subject 
 of capture under the laws of nations. 
 
 It is to be remembered that this claim was formally pre¬ 
 sented to the Government of the United States, through the 
 legation of France, and comes to the Treasury Department 
 from the State Department, having thus been transmitted, 
 in the most orderly manner, as a claim of a foreign subject, 
 the citizen of a friendly nation. 
 
 Is the claim to be adjudicated under the law of nations? 
 If so, there can be little difficulty in arriving at a decision 
 favorable to those whom we represent. 
 
 The Attorney General of the United States has declared, 
 as I have shown above, that Congress has no power to abro¬ 
 gate or change the laws of nations. 
 
 As to the binding obligation of those laws, it may not be 
 amiss to recall what some eminent authors have said. 
 
 Blaclcstone, in speaking of the law of nature, (which is the 
 foundation of the lav/ of nations, and from whence its most 
 important principles are derived,) says : “ This law of nature 
 being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is 
 of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding 
 over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times; no 
 
9 
 
 human laws are of any validity if contrary to this; and such 
 of them as are valid derive all their force and all their 
 authority, mediately or immediately from this original.” 
 (1st Blacks. Comm., p. 41.) 
 
 The law of nations, the same author tells us, “ depends 
 entirely upon the rules of natural law, or upon mutual com¬ 
 pacts, treaties, leagues and agreements, between these several 
 communities; (independent nations,) in the construction also 
 of which compacts we have no other rule to resort to hut the 
 law of nature; being the only one to which all the commu¬ 
 nities are equally subject, and therefore the civil law very 
 justly observes, that quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines 
 constituit, vocatur jus gentium.” (Yol. 1, p. 43.) 
 
 “The law of nations,” says Chancellor Kent, “so far as 
 it is founded on the principles of natural law, is equally 
 binding in every age and upon all mankind.” (Kent’s 
 Commentaries, vol. 1, p. 4.) 
 
 Another author says: “ "VVhat has been said concerning the 
 law of nations, suggests several important reflections; among 
 others, that, since the law of nations is in reality nothing 
 else hut the law of nature itself, there is hut one and the 
 same rule of justice for all mankind, to nations as well as 
 individuals. And the nation which violates this law, is 
 guilty of as great a crime as individuals, perhaps, a greater, 
 since national wrong is attended with more unhappy conse¬ 
 quences.” (Burlamaqui, p. 218.) 
 
 “Since, therefore, the necessary law of nations consists 
 in the application of the law of nature to states, which law 
 is immutable, as being founded on the nature of things, and 
 particularly on the nature of man, it follows that the neces¬ 
 sary law of nations is immutable. Whence, as this law is 
 immutable, and the obligations that arise from it necessary 
 and indispensable, nations can neither make any changes in 
 it by their conventions, dispense with it in their own conduct, 
 nor reciprocally release each other from the observance of it.” 
 (Vattel, preliminaries, secs. 8, 9.) 
 
 If it be true, that Congress cannot rightfully alter or 
 abridge the rights secured to nations or individuals by the 
 
10 
 
 laws of nations, then it is not competent for that body by a 
 municipal law to prescribe new definitions or conditions for 
 captures and lawful booty, or to make that prize of war 
 which was not so before under the laws of nations. Neither 
 is it competent for Congress to compel neutrals to part with 
 their property to the Treasury Department by seizures and 
 captures unknown to the laws of nations, and to resort for 
 redress to the Court of Claims, (within two years after the 
 rebellion,) and to seek their remedy under a law fixing the 
 measure of damages far below the compensatory standard. 
 
 It is to the executive departments of our government they 
 must go for redress, and this is to he administered directly 
 through the action of those departments themselves or indi¬ 
 rectly through joint commissions, or other tribunals appointed 
 for the purpose and governed in their adjudications by the 
 laws of nations. 
 
 “ There is no permanent and general international court, and 
 it will he found that, in general, the sovereign or government 
 of each state who has the power of declaring war and peace, 
 has also as an incident, the sole power of deciding upon ques¬ 
 tions of booty, capture, prize, and hostile seizure, though 
 sometimes that power is delegated, as in Great Britain, as res¬ 
 pects maritime seizures, by commission to the judge of the 
 Admiralty Court, with an appeal from his decision to the Privy 
 Council. In these cases, no other municipal court has cogni¬ 
 zance of any hostile seizure. Elphinston vs. Bedreechund, 
 Knapp’s reports, 316 to 361; and Hill vs. Reardon, 2 Russ, 
 reports, 608, and further, post p. 392. So there is no general 
 international court in which a treaty can he directly enforced, 
 although, collaterally, its meaning may he discussed in a 
 municipal court; therefore, no hill to enfore a treaty can he 
 sustained in equity. Nabob of Carnatic vs. East India Com¬ 
 pany, 2 Yesey, jun., 56, and Hill vs. Reardon, 2 Sim. and 
 Stu., 437, 2 Russ. Rep., 608.” (Note to Yattel, p. 4.) 
 
 The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of 
 the Venice , decided in December, 1864, settled some important 
 points as to the right of capture by the Union forces, after 
 the occupation of rebel towns and territory, which seem to 
 
11 
 
 be conclusive against any claim on the part of the government 
 to the property now in question. 
 
 The following is a statement of the points resolved, taken 
 from the official report of the case, in second Wallace’s Re¬ 
 ports, p. 258. 
 
 As we have adopted the method in this argument of quoting 
 authorities at length, we also print in an appendix, in full, 
 the opinion of the Court by Chief Justice Chase. We add, 
 also, the opinion of the Attorney General in the Savannah 
 cotton cases. The decision of the Supreme Court, will, of 
 course, overrule the opinion of the Attorney General, wherever 
 there is a conflict. 
 
 In this place, it is sufficient for our purpose to state the 
 points decided: 
 
 1. The military occupation of the city of New Orleans by the forces of 
 
 the United States, after the dispossession of the rebels from that 
 immediate region in May, 1862, may be considered as having been 
 substantially complete from the publication of General Butler’s 
 proclamation of the 6th (dated on the 1st) of that moDth ; and all 
 the rights and obligations resulting from such occupation, or from 
 the terms of the proclamation, existed from the date of that 
 publication. 
 
 2. This proclamation, in announcing, as it did, that “all rights of 
 
 property” would be held “ inviolate, subject only to the laws of the 
 United States;” and that “ all foreigners not naturalized, claiming 
 allegiance to their respective governments, and not having made oath 
 of allegiance to the government of the Confederate States,” would 
 be “protected in their persons and property as heretofore under 
 the laws of the United States,” did but reiterate the rules estab¬ 
 lished by the legislative and executive action of the national 
 Government, and which may also be inferred from the policy of the 
 war, in respect to the portions of the States in insurrection occupied 
 and controlled by the troops of the Union. It was the manifestation 
 of a general purpose, which seeks the re-establishment of the national 
 authority, and the ultimate restoration of States and citizens to 
 their national relations under better forms and firmer guarantees, 
 without any view of subjugation by conquest. 
 
12 
 
 3. Substantial, complete, and permanent military occupation and control, 
 
 as distinguished from one that is illusory, imperfect and transitory, 
 works the exception made in the act of July 13th, 1861 (§ 5), 
 which excepts from the rebellious condition those parts of rebellious 
 States “ from time to time occupied and controlled by the forces of the 
 United States engaged in the dispersion of the insurgentsand 
 such military occupation draws after it the full measure of protection 
 to persons and property consistent with a necessary subjection to 
 military government. 
 
 4. The President’s proclamation of 31st of March, 1863, affected in no 
 
 respect the general principles of protection to rights and property 
 under temporary government, established after the restoration of 
 national authority. 
 
 5. Vessels and their cargoes belonging to citizens of New Orleans, or 
 
 neutrals residing there and not affected by any attempts to run the 
 blockade, or by any act of hostility against the United States, were 
 protected after the publication of General Butler’s proclamation, 
 dated May 1st, 1862, and published on the 6th ; though such 
 persons, by being identified by long voluntary residence and by 
 relations of active business with the enemy, may have themselves 
 been “ enemies” within the meaning of the expression as used in 
 public law. 
 
 The second, third, and fifth of the above points certainly 
 are conclusive to show the illegality of the seizure of the 
 private property of neutrals; and that illegality, the court 
 say, resulted not alone from the promise of protection con¬ 
 tained in the proclamation of the military commander, hut 
 from “rules established by the legislative and executive 
 action of the national government,” and from “the policy 
 of the war.” 
 
 The act of Congress of March 12, 1863, as construed by 
 the Attorney General, seems to introduce new rules whereby 
 to determine the legality of captures, whereas the laws of 
 nations must determine them, and the act of Congress must 
 he interpreted to use the terms “ captured property,” in the 
 established sense of the laws of war recognized by the civil¬ 
 ized world. If the government of the United States is 
 content to rest its title to captured property on the laws of 
 nations, its only safe foundation, then the act of March 12, 
 
13 
 
 1863, if free from other fatal objections, would have its legiti¬ 
 mate operation in the disposal of abandoned or derelict 
 property, and of property lawfully captured by the laws of 
 war, and therefore forfeited to the successful belligerent. 
 The remedy by suit in the Court of Claims, is thus easily 
 comprehended, as a provision made in view of the peculiar 
 character of the contest, to except from the penalties and 
 evils of the war the loyal citizens of the United States, and 
 friendly foreigners who, by being domiciled in rebel territory, 
 have become impressed, technically, with the character of 
 enemies. 
 
 But if the act is to be construed as making a lawful capture 
 of every taking of private property seized from citizens or 
 resident foreigners by military force, and turned over to the 
 agents of the treasury; it is unconstitutional and void, such 
 captures being unsupported except by a municipal law of the 
 United States, made in violation of the guarantee that “ no 
 person shall be deprived of his property unless by due process 
 of law,” or in other words, by judicial proceedings and 
 sentence. 
 
 But surely it will not be claimed by those who go farthest 
 to expand the powers conferred by this act of Congress ; that 
 the National Legislature has solemnly decreed that neutrals 
 domiciled within the dominions of a friendly foreign power 
 and at no time resident in rebel territory, are public enemies, 
 and their property, acquired ante-bellum under the laws of the 
 United States lawful booty! Yet, unless this position is 
 assumed, and sustained by the executive departments of our 
 government, no such claimant need ever be driven to the 
 Court of Claims, or to any other court for his redress. 
 
 We do not at all admit that the opinion of the Attorney 
 General goes any such length. We repeat, that no fail- 
 interpretation of the act of Congress of March 12, 1863, can 
 extend it to the property of neutrals, and that it embraces 
 only, and was intended only to include the property of belli¬ 
 gerents and public enemies. Among “public enemies” we 
 admit that the subjects of neutral powers, who have their 
 
14 
 
 domicil within the territory of a belligerent during the war, 
 are included by the laws of nations. 
 
 Our construction of the act is supported by the regulations 
 made in pursuance of it, and to carry it into etfect by the 
 President of the United States and the Secretary of the 
 Treasury, as well as by the terms of the act itself. The act 
 includes only such property as was “ abandoned,” or “cap¬ 
 tured” within the insurrectionary States. 
 
 In the regulations, abandoned property is thus defined: 
 
 “First. That which has been or may be deserted by the 
 owners; and second. That which has been or may be volun¬ 
 tarily abandoned by the owners to the civil or military 
 authorities of the United States.” 
 
 In the subsequent law of July, 1864, abandoned property 
 is defined by the national legislature to be such as the owner 
 shall have voluntarily abandoned, “and engaged in arms or 
 otherwise in aiding or encouraging the rebellion.” (13th 
 Stats, at large, p. 376.) 
 
 Captured property is defined in the regulations, (pamphlet, 
 p. 32,) to be “ that which has been or may be seized or taken 
 from hostile possession by the military or naval forces of the 
 United States.” 
 
 These definitions, comprehensive as is the latter, do not, 
 either of them, reach the case under consideration, as the 
 tobacco of the Rothschilds was neither abandoned property 
 nor captured property within the sense of the Treasury 
 regulations. 
 
 It is true, that in the opinion of the Attorney General, the 
 expression is used in defining captured property, property 
 “ actually and hostilely seized and taken on land by a mili¬ 
 tary officer or soldier of the United States, in a state or any 
 portion of a state designated as in insurrection against the 
 United States.” (Opinion in the Savannah cotton cases.) 
 
 It is not to be presumed, in fairness, that the Attorney 
 General intended by this language to extend the definition 
 beyond the terms employed in the Treasury regulation; as, 
 literally taken, and when the qualifying term “hostile,” is 
 applied to the taking, instead of the possession from which 
 
15 
 
 the property is taken, it becomes simply a definition of rob¬ 
 bery, nothing more. 
 
 But what is the remedy ? The Attorney-General has 
 advised the Secretary of the Treasury, that all property cap¬ 
 tured by the military forces and turned over to the Treasury 
 Agents, is to be sued for in the Court of Claims—that the 
 remedy provided in that Court is exclusive of all others, and 
 in pursuance of this opinion the Secretary has declined to go 
 into an investigation of the legality of captures, made in the 
 ordinary way. Does this exclude the Secretary from granting 
 summary relief in this case? If we have shown that the act 
 of Congress only applied to enemies’ property the question is 
 answered. But were it otherwise, in this case the very fact 
 of the illegality of the capture comes up as a part of the report 
 of the military, for the refusal to release this property, and 
 the act of turning it over to the Treasury Agent are made by 
 the military commander upon the express ground that the 
 tobacco is the property of an alien. Thus the rights of the 
 claimants are manifest from the very same source that informs 
 the Treasury of the seizure, and the question simply presents 
 itself—shall the Department consummate and continue an 
 invasion of neutral rights apparent on the face of the pro¬ 
 ceedings of the military authorities by their own report ? We 
 have already adverted to the fact that a different rule was laid 
 down for citizens than the one applied to our clients, and that, 
 in general, private property was returned to its owners at 
 Richmond. We submitted a copy of the military order to 
 that effect with our application for the release of the tobacco. 
 
 That order was entirely consistent with the standing orders 
 of our army, with the usages of civilized warfare, and with 
 the “policy of the war” as judicially recognized by the 
 Supreme Court. The military commander had full power to 
 issue it. It would present us in no very enviable light as a 
 Government, to despoil the friendly neutral of his goods, in 
 violation of law, and restore to the contumacious rebel the 
 property taken from him to which a valid claim might have 
 been made. 
 
16 
 
 To sum up tlie whole matter, the ease stands thus : A 
 neutral trader, in time of peace, became the purchaser of 
 American products, which lie held under the protection of 
 American law, as well as of the laws of nations. Civil dis¬ 
 orders ensued, and our Government for a time was unable to 
 enforce its authority in the district where the property lay. 
 Instead of closing our ports, we declare and enforce a blockade, 
 and Avhile complaining of foreign powers for according bellig¬ 
 erent rights to the formidable military power of the insurgent 
 states, we, ourselves, admit them to the rights and inflict on 
 them the injuries annexed to that condition. The neutral 
 trader respects our blockade, and patiently aAvaits the termi¬ 
 nation of the war and the restoration of our authority. In 
 war he is protected from spoliation by the law of nations— 
 in peace he may claim, as his right, in which we are bound 
 to maintain him, perfect immunity from forfeiture or deten¬ 
 tion. But we seize his property by military force, committing 
 an act of spoliation, not making a lawful capture, and we 
 hold it by a void act of Congress, made only for enemies and 
 enemies’ property. This is a process by which the status of 
 an enemy in law, is made to depend, not on the voluntary 
 act of the party himself nor the relation he sustains to our 
 Government, but on the lawless acts of our own officers. 
 
 While such proceedings are very well calculated to make 
 the unhappy victims of so barbarous a policy enemies in fact, 
 they can never serve to convince enlightened reason that they 
 constitute them enemies in law at the time of our aggressions 
 upon them. We indulge the hope that a wiser and more 
 just policy will prevail ; and that a great nation, in the 
 exhibition of sublime power to compel obedience to law on 
 the part of individuals, will not forget to render the obedience 
 to law due from it as one of the family of nations. 
 
 In conclusion, we beg leave to say, that this application is 
 made to you, as Secretary of the Treasury, because you have 
 the control of the property, the Department of State having 
 formally notified the claimants that the whole matter rests 
 with you, thus washing its hands of the business ; and we 
 indulge the hope that the questions presented, since they 
 
17 
 
 have been devolved on the Treasury by the Secretary of State, 
 may be met and decided with that frankness and candor 
 which so eminently distinguish the present head of the 
 Treasury Department; and that we may not receive for an 
 answer, “that the property cannot now be released by the 
 military authorities because it has passed under the control 
 of the Treasury, aud that it cannot be released by the Treasury 
 because it was delivered over by the military,” with a refer¬ 
 ence to the learned opinion of the Attorney General to 
 demonstrate the legality and justice of the answer ! 
 
 Respectfully submitted. 
 
 HUGHES, DENVER & PECK, 
 
 Counsel for Rothschilds & Co. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
 STATES IN THE CASE OF “THE VENICE.” 
 
 The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the court. 
 
 This cause comes before us upon appeal from a decree of 
 the District Court of the United States for the Southern 
 District of Florida. 
 
 The schooner Venice, with a cargo of two hundred and 
 twenty-five hales of cotton, was captured in Lake Ponchar- 
 train by the United States ship-of-war Calhoun, on the 15th 
 of May, 1862 ; was taken to Key West; was libelled as prize 
 of war in the District Court; and was restored with her 
 cargo, to the claimant, David Gr. Cooke, by its decree. The 
 United States appealed. The claimant, Cooke, was a British 
 subject, but had resided in New Orleans nearly all the time 
 for ten years preceding the capture. He was a clerk in a 
 large mercantile establishment until June, 1861, when the 
 firm closed its affairs, and he turned his attention to other 
 business, particularly to the collection of planters’ accept¬ 
 ances which he had purchased, and to the investment of 
 their proceeds in cotton. Early in April, 1862, he bought 
 two hundred and five bales in Mississippi; and had them 
 brought to New Orleans, where he purchased the Venice on 
 the 9th of April. Finding that the two hundred and five 
 bales would not fully complete the lading of the schooner, 
 Cooke bought twenty bales more about the 12th of April. 
 The whole was put on board with as little delay as possible, 
 and on the 17th of April, the schooner was towed out into 
 Lake Ponchartrain, and taken to the head of the lake, where 
 she was anchored, and remained, with only such change of 
 position as was necessary to obtain a supply of water, until 
 
19 
 
 the capture. In the meantime the vessel was undergoing 
 repairs. 
 
 While these transactions were in progress, the war was 
 flagrant. The States of Louisiana and Mississippi were 
 wholly under rebel dominion, and all the people of each 
 State were enemies of the United States. The rule which 
 declares that war makes all the citizens or subjects of one 
 belligerent enemies of the Government and of all the citi¬ 
 zens or subjects of the other, applies equally to civil and to 
 international wars.* Either belligerent may modify or limit 
 its operation as to persons or territory of the other ; but in 
 the absence of such modification or restriction judicial 
 tribunals cannot discriminate in its application. 
 
 The vessel and the cotton at the time of purchase belonged 
 to citizens either of Mississippi or Louisiana, and was there¬ 
 fore enemies’ property. 
 
 Did the transfer to Cooke change the character in this 
 respect of both or either? 
 
 Cooke was a British subject, but was identified with the 
 people of Louisiana by long voluntary residence and by the 
 relations of active business, t Upon the breaking out of the 
 war, he might have left the Htate and withdrawn his means; 
 but he did not think fit to do so. He remained more than 
 a year, engaged in commercial transactions. Like many 
 others, he seems to have thought that, as a neutral, he could 
 share the business of the enemies of the nation, and enjoy its 
 profits, without incurring the responsibilities of an enemy. 
 He was mistaken. He chose his relations, and must abide 
 their results. The ship and cargo were as liable to seizure 
 as prize in his ownership, as they would be in that of any 
 citizen in Louisiana, residing in New Orleans, and not ac¬ 
 tually engaged in active hostilities against the Union. 
 
 This brings us to the consideration of the events which 
 transpired at New Orleans, and in its vicinity, very soon 
 after the Venice was taken into Lake Ponchartrain. 
 
 * Prize Cases, 2 Black., 666; concurred in by dissenting Justices, Id. 687-8. 
 t Prize Cases, 2 Black., 674. 
 
20 
 
 The fleet of the United States, under command of Flag- 
 officer, now Vice-Admiral, Farragut, reached New Orleans 
 on the 25tli of April, and the flag-officer demanded the sur¬ 
 render of the city, and required the authorities to display the 
 flag of the Union from the public buildings. The mayor 
 refused to surrender and refused to raise the National flag, 
 hut declared the city undefended and at the mercy of the 
 victors. The flag-officer then directed the flag to be raised 
 upon the Mint. It was raised accordingly, but was torn 
 down on the same or next day. The flag of the rebellion 
 still floated over the hall where the city authorities transacted 
 business. On the 29th, the Union flag was raised again, 
 both on the Custom House and Mint, and was not again 
 disturbed. On the 30th, the flag-officer received from the 
 mayor a note so offensive in its character, that all communi¬ 
 cation was broken off A The power of the United States to 
 destroy the city was ample and at hand, but there was no 
 surrender and no actual possession. 
 
 The transports conveying the troops under the command 
 of Major General Butler, commanding the Department of 
 the Gulf, arrived on the 1st of May, and the actual occupa¬ 
 tion of the city was begun. There was no armed resistance, 
 but abundant manifestations of hostile spirit and temper 
 both by the people and the authorities. The landing of the 
 troops was completed on the 2d of May, and on the 6th a 
 proclamation of General Butler, which had been prepared 
 and dated on the 1st, and the next day printed by some 
 soldiers, in an office seized for the purpose, was published 
 in the newspapers of the city. Some copies of the proclama¬ 
 tion had been previously distributed to individuals, but it 
 Was not made known to the population generally until thus 
 published. There was no hostile demonstration, and no dis¬ 
 turbance afterwards ; and we think that the military occupa¬ 
 tion of the city of New Orleans may be considered as sub¬ 
 stantially complete from the date of this publication ; and 
 
 * Message and Documents, 1862-3, part 3, pp. 282-288. 
 
21 
 
 that all the rights and obligations resulting from such occu¬ 
 pation, or from the terms of the proclamation, may be 
 properly regarded as existing from that time. 
 
 This proclamation declared the city to be under martial 
 law, and announced the principles by which the command¬ 
 ing general would he guided in its administration. Two 
 clauses only have any important relation to the case before 
 us. One is in these words : “All the rights of property, of 
 whatever kind, will he held inviolate, subject only to the 
 laws of the United States.” The other is thus expressed: 
 “ All foreigners, not naturalized, claiming allegiance to their 
 respective governments, and not having made oath of alle¬ 
 giance to the government of the Confederate States, will he 
 protected in their persons and property as heretofore under 
 the laws of the United States.” These clauses only reiter¬ 
 ated the rules established by the legislative and executive 
 action of the national Government, in respect to the por¬ 
 tions of the States in insurrection, occupied and controlled 
 by the troops of the Union. 
 
 The fifth section of the act of July 13th, 1861, providing 
 for the collection of duties and for other purposes, provided 
 that, under certain conditions, the President, by proclama¬ 
 tion might declare the inhabitants of a State, or any section 
 or part thereof, to be in a state of insurrection against the 
 United States. In pursuance of this act, the President, on 
 the 16th of August following, issued a proclamation declar¬ 
 ing that the inhabitants of the States of Virginia, North 
 Carolina, Tennessee, Arkansas, and the other States south 
 of these, except the inhabitants of Virginia west of the Al- 
 leghanies, and of those parts of States maintaining a loyal 
 adhesion to the Union and the Constitution, “or from time 
 to time occupied and controlled by forces of the United 
 States, engaged in the dispersion of the insurgents,” were in 
 a state of insurrection against the United States. 
 
 This legislative and executive action related, indeed, 
 mainly to trade and intercourse between the inhabitants ot 
 loyal and the inhabitants of insurgent parts of the country ; 
 
22 
 
 but, by excepting districts occupied and controlled by 
 national troops from the general prohibition of trade, it 
 indicated the policy of the Government not to regard such 
 districts as in actual insurrection, or their inhabitants as 
 subject, in most respects, to treatment as enemies. Military 
 occupation and control, to work this exception, must be actual; 
 that is to say, not illusory, not imperfect, not transient; 
 but substantial, complete, and permanent. Being such, it 
 draws after it the full measure of protection to persons and 
 property consistent with a necessary subjection to military 
 government. It does not, indeed, restore peace, or, in all 
 respects, former relations; but it replaces rebel by national 
 authority, and recognizes, to some extent, the conditions 
 and the responsibilities of national citizenship. 
 
 The regulations of trade made under the act of 1861 were 
 framed in accordance with this policy. As far as possible 
 the people of such parts of the insurgent States as came 
 under national occupation and control, were treated as if 
 their relations to the national Government had never been 
 interrupted. 
 
 It is true that the general exception from the prohibition 
 of commercial intercourse, which has just been mentioned, 
 was cancelled and revoked by the President’s proclamation 
 of the 31st of March, 1863, and, instead of it, a particular 
 exception made of West Virginia, and of the ports of New 
 Orleans, Key West, Port Royal, and Beaufort, in North 
 Carolina. But this revocation merely brought all parts of 
 insurgent States under the special licensing power of the 
 President, conferred by the act of July 13, 1861. It affected, 
 in no respect, the general principles of protection to rights 
 and property under temporary government, established after 
 the restoration of the national authority. 
 
 The same policy may be inferred from the conduct of the 
 war. Wherever the national troops have re-established order 
 under national rule, the rights of persons and of property 
 have been, in general, respected and enforced. When Flag- 
 officer Farragut, in his first letter to the rebel mayor of New 
 Orleans, demanded the surrender of the city, and promised 
 
23 
 
 security to persons and property, he expressed the general 
 policy of the Government. So, also, when Major General 
 Butler published his proclamation and repeated the same 
 assurance, and made a distinct pledge to neutrals, he made 
 no declaration which was not fully warranted by that policy. 
 There was no capitulation. Neither the assurance nor the 
 pledge was given as condition of surrender. Both w r ere the 
 manifestation of a general purpose which seeks the re-estab- 
 lishment of the national authority, and the ultimate restor¬ 
 ation of States and citizens to their national relations, under 
 better forms and firmer guaranties, without any views of 
 subjugation by conquest. Hence, the proclamation of the 
 commanding general at New Orleans must not be inter¬ 
 preted by such rules as governed the case of the Ships taken 
 at Genoa.* Vessels and their cargoes belonging to citizens 
 of New Orleans, or neutrals residing there, and not affected 
 by any attempts to run the blockade, or by any act of hos¬ 
 tility against the United States after the publication of the 
 proclamation, must be regarded as protected by its terms. 
 
 It results from this reasoning that the Venice and her 
 cargo, though undoubtedly enemies’ property at the time 
 she was anchored in Lake Pontchartrain, cannot be regarded 
 as remaining such after the 6th of May; for it is not asserted 
 that any breach of blockade was ever thought of by the 
 claimant, or that he was guilty of any actual hostility against 
 the national Government. 
 
 It is hardly necessary to add that nothing, in this opinion, 
 touches the liability of persons for crimes or of property to 
 seizure and condemnation under any act of Congress. 
 
 Decree Affirmed. 
 
 * 4 Robinson, 387. 
 
 [See supra , p. 135, The Circassian: a ease, in some senses, suppletory or 
 coniplemcntal to the present one.] 
 
OPINION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED 
 STATES IN THE SAVANNAH COTTON CASES. 
 
 Attorney General’s Office, 
 July 5 th, 1865. 
 
 To the Hon. Hugh McCulloch, 
 
 Secretary of the Treasury: 
 
 Sir — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
 letter of 17th ult., submitting for my opinion the questions 
 that have arisen in your Department in the case of the 
 “Savannah Cotton.” 
 
 The circumstances under which the property in question 
 came into the possession of the Government, are stated in 
 your letter substantially as follows: 
 
 On the occupation of the city of Savannah, in December 
 last, by the United States forces under Major General Sher¬ 
 man, some thirty-eight thousand bales of cotton were found 
 stored there. This property was seized and taken possession 
 of by the military authorities, and by them turned over to 
 agents of the Treasury Department, as “ captured property,” 
 pursuant to the provisions of the Acts of Congress of March 
 12, 1863, and July 2, 1864, (12 Stat. at large, 820; 13 Id., 
 375.) After it was thus received by the appropriate agents, 
 the property was forwarded to New York, and there sold at 
 auction, as provided by law. 
 
 You state that a number of claims for the proceeds of the 
 sales are now being presented to your Department, some of 
 the claimants being residents of Savannah, who aver that 
 they have been loyal to the Government during the Rebellion ; 
 others being subjects of foreign governments, resident in 
 Savannah or abroad, averring that they were neutral during 
 the late conflict; others again being Northern merchants, 
 stating that they came into possession of the cotton claimed 
 by them in payment of, or as security for, debts contracted 
 prior to the Rebellion; and still others claiming restitution 
 of their property, or its proceeds, on the ground that the 
 
25 
 
 cotton in question was not capturable, or properly “ captured 
 property,” and should not be held and treated as such. 
 
 The first question arising on this state of facts that you 
 submit, is, whether the property to which reference has been 
 made should or should not be regarded as “captured” 
 under the acts of Congress of March 12, 1863, and July 2, 
 1864. 
 
 I do not perceive that either of the statutes provides what 
 property shall be regared as “captured property,” within 
 the meaning of the law. 
 
 A definition of “ abandoned” property, however, is con¬ 
 tained in the 1st section of the act of 1864. That statute 
 provides that il property, real or personal, shall be regarded 
 as abandoned when the lawful owner shall be voluntarily 
 absent therefrom, and engaged, either in arms or otherwise, 
 in aiding or encouraging the Rebellion.” (13 Stat. at large, 
 376.) 
 
 But I apprehend that there need be no difficulty in deter¬ 
 mining, for our present purposes, what property is compre¬ 
 hended by the phrase “ captured property,” as used in these 
 Statutes; for the phrase is its own sufficient explanation. I 
 suppose that all movable property, other than that species 
 described by the proviso to the 1st section of the act of 1863, 
 actually and hostilely seized and taken on land, by a military 
 officer or soldier of the United States, in a State or any por¬ 
 tion of a State designated as in insurrection against the 
 United States, may be regarded as “captured,” within the 
 meaning of the Statutes of 1863 and 1864. I do not intend 
 to say that no other property than that I have thus endea¬ 
 vored to describe, may be denominated and treated as “ cap¬ 
 tured property,” under these Statutes. It would seem by the 
 7th section of the act of 1864, that certain property seized 
 and taken by naval forces, viz: property seized by the Navy 
 “ upon any of the inland waters of the United States,” may 
 be dealt with in the mauner provided by the laws under 
 consideration, (13 Stat. at large, 377.) Whether this section 
 takes away the prize jurisdiction of the Courts in all cases 
 of seizure of water-borne property on the inland waters of 
 
the United States, effected there by naval commissioned cap- 
 tors, and commits all jurisdiction over such cases to the 
 Court of Claims and to Congress, must remain for judicial 
 determination. But the Supreme Court has recently decided 
 that private property seized by a naval force on land border¬ 
 ing upon one of the inland waters of the insurrectionary 
 South, was not the subject of prize jurisdiction, and was 
 receivable by the Treasury agents under the Statute of 1863. 
 (W. S. v. 72 Bales of Cotton, Dec. S., 1864, No. 360.) This 
 decision was rendered in a case to which the act of 1864 did 
 not apply, the capture then considered having been made 
 prior to the passage of that Statute. I refer to it for the 
 purpose of showing that certain cases of purely naval capture 
 must pursue the course indicated in the Statute for the col¬ 
 lection of abandoned and captured property. I have said 
 that property seized or taken by any military person in the 
 insurrectionary territory is denominable as “ captured;” but 
 the 6th section of the act of 1863 would seem to affix that 
 character to “cotton , sugar, rich, and tobacco,” received by 
 any United States officer or soldier within insurrectionary 
 districts. The section provides that it shall be the duty of 
 every officer or private soldier, who may take or receive 
 abandoned property, or any cotton, sugar, rice, or tobacco, 
 from persons in insurrectionary'districts, or have such property 
 under his control, to turn the same over to an agent of the 
 Treasury Department; and it further provides that refusal 
 or neglect to do so shall subject such an officer or soldier to 
 trial and punishment. (12 Stat. at large, 821.) 
 
 Property of the foregoing character thus turned over to a 
 Treasury agent, and in that manner “ received” by him, 
 must be dealt with as the 2d section of the act provides ; 
 that is, it must be sold, and its proceeds paid into the Trea¬ 
 sury, there to await the action of the Court of Claims, when 
 duly invoked. 
 
 Thus it appears that all cotton, received by, or that may 
 have come under the control of any military officer or soldier, 
 whether it was actually seized or captured by him or not, 
 must be dealt with as “ abandoned or captured property.” 
 
27 
 
 I may have occasion hereafter to comment upon the effect of 
 this provision. 
 
 The Statute, it may be said, thus affixes to all cotton, as 
 well as all the other articles above stated, that may be under 
 the control of a military or naval officer in the insurrectionary 
 districts, the de jure character of “ captured” property, and 
 when such property is received by a Treasury officer, appointed 
 to execute the provisions of the Acts of 1863 and 1864, it 
 becomes, it may be said, de facto “ captured” property, and 
 must be disposed of accordingly. 
 
 I am of opinion, therefore, that the cotton found by our 
 army at Savannah, taken possession of there by the military 
 authorities, and received from them by the agents of the 
 Treasury Department, is, and should be, regarded as de facto 
 and de jure “captured” property, under the Statutes of 
 1863 and 1864. 
 
 The second question which you propound is, whether, if 
 this property be of the character that I am of opinion it is, 
 the power rests with the Secretary of the Treasury or the 
 President to appoint a commission to examine the claims, 
 and restore to loyal claimants the proceeds of so much of the 
 property in question, as they can show to have been legally 
 theirs. 
 
 I am of opinion that neither the President, nor any other 
 Executive Officer, can restore, or authorize such a commission 
 as you suggest, to make restoration of the proceeds of their 
 captured property to these loyal claimants. Congress, by 
 the legislation under consideration, has reserved to itself the 
 power of finally disposing of the claims of the alleged owners 
 of this property ; and so long as that legislation exists, the 
 claimants must pursue the remedy which it indicates for the 
 establishment and enforcement of their rights. By the Con¬ 
 stitution, Congress has exclusive power “to make rules con¬ 
 cerning captures on land and water.” The present legislation, 
 I apprehend, is clearly an exercise of that power. This is a 
 general and comprehensive sovereign prerogative. Under 
 other systems of Government, the authority to make such 
 rules may be exercised by the political department. But in 
 
28 
 
 this country the Legislative Department of the Government 
 possesses exclusive authority both to establish rules for the 
 regulation of the right of capture in time of war, and also to 
 provide the method by which all questions touching captures 
 may he determined. 
 
 The present legislation is not so much a regulation of the 
 right of capture, though the 6th section of the Act of 1863 
 may he interpretable as authorizing, if not commanding, the 
 seizure of certain kinds of property found by our military 
 forces within the hostile districts of the South—as it is a pro¬ 
 vision for the judicial ascertainment of the rights of persons 
 affected by captures that may have been, or may be, made in 
 the progress of our belligerent operations set on foot for the 
 reduction of the rebellious Southern country. Congress took 
 notice of the fact that captures of private property on land 
 had been made, and would continue to be made, by the armies 
 operating in and against that terrritory, as a necessary and 
 proper means of diminishing the wealth, and thus reducing 
 the power of the insurgent rulers. It was not expected that 
 such captures had been, or would be, in all cases, well and 
 wisely made, or that in the course of such predatory hostility 
 the innocent would not sometimes suffer as well as the guilty. 
 Nor was it thought well that the administration, so to speak, 
 of so much of the property within the enemies’ territory as 
 might be reduced into the the possession of the military 
 forces, should be controlled by or under Executive authority. 
 
 In this view of existing facts and of just policy, the system 
 provided by the act of 1863, was devised for the adjudication 
 and decision of the cases contemplated by the Statute. 
 
 The Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to appoint 
 agents to “collect all abandoned or captured property” in the 
 enemies’ country. To secure faithful and honest performance 
 of their duty, the Secretary was authorized to require such 
 agents to give bonds in such amounts as he might deem 
 necessary. The duty of the agents was to receive all prop¬ 
 erty in the insurgent States, which was, in fact, captured or 
 seized out of the enemies’ possession by the military authorities. 
 They had no duty or power to inquire whether or not such 
 
29 
 
 property had been rightfully captured—whether the Generals 
 who reported it to them for collection had observed, in 
 effecting the captures, what are called the “ recognized usages 
 of war,” or had violated all the principles of writers on what 
 is styled the Law of Nations, supposed to tend against the 
 right of seizing private property on land, but it was the duty 
 of the Treasury agents simply to receive all property reported 
 to them as having been captured, irrespective of any consid¬ 
 erations touching the legal exemption of any of it from 
 seizure, and to dispose of it in the manner provided by the 
 law. Alter the conversion of the property into money, the 
 proceeds were directed to be paid into the Treasury. The 
 words of the Statute are “the proceeds thereof shall be paid 
 into the Treasury of the United States.” But these proceeds 
 do not pass into the Treasury as proceeds of property sold 
 under a judicial sentence of confiscation. They are not 
 sequestered or condemned, but simply held by the United 
 States, so to speak, in trust for those who may, in the man¬ 
 ner provided and in the time limited by the law, ultimately 
 establish a legal right to receive them after pacification. 
 When the insurrection has been suppressed, the owners are 
 authorized to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, 
 and obtain there an adjudication of their respective claims. 
 The proceeds of the property are thus in the possession of the 
 United States, subject to the adjudications of that Court; and 
 when it shall have passed upon the claimants’ rights, and 
 decreed in their favor, Congress has solemnly declared that 
 they shall receive restitution of their property. In the 
 presence of such legislation—covering, as it does, the entire 
 subject matter ; providing for the safe custody of the property 
 in question pending hostilities, and for the final judicial 
 determination of the rights of the parties in interest—I 
 cannot see that the Executive has power to make a different 
 disposition of the property from that provided by Congress, 
 or authorize any one to determine the questions which Con¬ 
 gress has entrusted to the decision of another forum. I am, 
 therefore, of opinion, in reply to your inquiry, that jurisdic¬ 
 tion cannot be conferred upon a commission, appointed either 
 
30 
 
 by the President or [Secretary of the Treasury, to examine 
 the claims in question, and to make restoration of the pro¬ 
 ceeds of so much of this cotton as may belong to legal 
 claimants. 
 
 The third and last question, you propound, is what dis¬ 
 position should be made of the proceeds of the sales of the 
 property. 
 
 I think that it is your duty to see that the direction of the 
 act of Congress is obeyed by those in whose hands these pro¬ 
 ceeds may be. The Statute says that after the sale of any 
 abandoned or captured property, “ the proceeds thereof shall 
 he paid into the Treasury of the United States.” 
 
 I am of opinion, therefore, that the proceeds of the prop¬ 
 erty in question should be paid into the Treasury, there to 
 await the action of the Court of Claims, and of Congress. 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 JAMES SPEED, 
 
 Attorney General. 
 
Panrohlets. 
 
 
 
 
 L15W1 
 
 Vol.905 
 
 DATE 
 
 ISSUED TO 
 
 L.I'SWI Ool-HoS'