MINORITY KEPOR'r 
 
 OF THE 
 
 SPECIAL COMMITTEE 
 
 To Investigate the Affairs of the Navy Department. 
 
 Concurring mainly with the report of the majority of the commit- 
 tee, I tender this, my separate report, upon the matters of- difference 
 between us. 
 
 I am compelled, in justice to the Secretary of the Treasury, to say 
 that neither the evidence before the committee, nor the correspond- 
 ence between that officer and the Secretary of the Navy, prove that 
 the former is responsible for the delays in the payments of the 
 claims agninst the Navy Department in New Orleans. The embar- 
 rassments of that Department there, were the result of the action of 
 Congress, which provided no means to pay appropriations, other than 
 Treasury bonds and notes, in the proportions of four and a half of 
 the former to one of the latter. The noUs were nearly all required 
 for the wants of the army, in providing food, clothing, <*I:c., &c., which 
 are chiefly obtained by cash payments, and it was even difficult to print 
 them as fast as they were needed. The arguments of the Secretary 
 of the Navy are conclusive as to the necessity of payments in New Or- 
 leans in Treasury notes, to facilitate the labor upon the works then 
 going on there, but ilo not remove the difficulty over which neither he 
 nor the Secretary of the Treasury had any control, for he admits, in 
 his letter to the President, at page 348, that he has repeatedly brought 
 the subject to the attention of tlie Secretary of the Treasury, and in- 
 voked prompt payment, though he has felt ihot with his limited •power to 
 produce Tr(asnry notes, and, vndr.r the rule adopted, giving priority to cer- 
 tain disbursements of the army, he was jovyerless to coriect the evil. 
 
 Again, in his letter to .^Jr, Merarninger, page 3\4, January 15th, 
 1862 : " Ycur letter of the 14th instant explaining your inability to 
 furnish pmall notes to the disbursing agents of this department ia 
 New Orleans has been received, and 1 appreciate all the difficulties i& 
 the way of complying with my suggestion." 
 
As regards the destruction of the war-steamer Mississippi, the 
 evidence shows, that it was the opinion of the officers of the navj at 
 New Orleans, (and the generally received opinion of naval oHicers,) 
 that ships ot war propelled by steam could pas3 land batteries ; that 
 the bombardment of Fort^ Jackson and St. Philip had been going on 
 for more than ten days before the morning of the 2lth of April, 
 18ti^; that the '•Missis:3ipj)i"* w.-is, tliercfore, in constant danger at 
 New Orleans iiom the moment the forts v.ere attacked; yet, notwith- 
 standing this state of things, there were only two engaged by the 
 Messrs. Tifts on the 17th and ^he 18th to assist in launching 
 the Hteamer, (an<l possibly to take her up the river s^iouldtbo enemy's 
 ships pass the forts.) It is not shown that there were no other boats 
 in the port of New Orleans, for a week preceding the coming of 
 the enemy, nor that other boats could not have been obtained had 
 proper measures been taken in time It is very evident that on the 
 morning of the 24th of April it was too 1 ite to attempt to secure any 
 other boats ; the Hartford and other v.ar vessels of the enemy had passed 
 the forts below that morning, and it is easy to conceive thc'ex(.ite- 
 inent which must have prevailed on that day in the doomed city. On 
 that d;iy, says Captain St. Clair, "I employed the Peytona and the 
 St. Charles, through the Messrs. Tifts, the only two vessels then 
 availuhk. There was great confusion in the city. No attempt was 
 made at any time before, the 2 ith of April, to secure more than two 
 boats." In his opinion it Avould have re([uired "three or four steamers 
 to have taken the Mississippi up the river." Nor were any 
 inquiries made, during the ten days' bombardment, to ascertain if 
 there were any places of safety outside of New Orleans and along 
 the river above, where she could have been taken. (See testimony 
 
 of Captain St. Clair and Tift, pages G2, G3, G4, 67, 68, and 115.) 
 
 It would appear from this evidence that no due diligence was used to 
 save that ship by those who had her in custody. Is Mr. Mallory 
 responsiijlc for her loss, when he was here, thirteen hundred miles 
 from New Orleans, having necessarily but an imperfect knov.ledge of 
 the real condition of aflairs in that port duiing the period of the bom- 
 bardment, when all information could only then be obtained by 
 telegrams ? Was he to undertake, under such circumstances, to have 
 directed the removal of the ship, when he had her future commaRder, 
 the commander of the station, and his trusted frien is and agents — 
 the Messrs. Tifts — at New Orle;ins at that time ? It seems, however, 
 that Captain Whittle, as cor.imander of the station, in the interpreta- 
 tion of his powers as such, distrusted his authority over that ship, as 
 he had no control of "anything afloat that did not appertain to 
 repairs ;"' and it was only at the last hour that he took upon himself 
 to order Captain St. Clair to save her if he could, and if not, to 
 destroy her. 
 
 In justice to these parties, I must not omit, in conclusion, to say, 
 (however unaccountable it may ?Hnv appt.-ar to us,) tliat, notwithstand- 
 ing the opinion of the officers of the navy, already referred to, and the 
 fact that there were twenty-seven vessels in fight of tlie forts on the 
 T5th of April, "preparing a formidable attack upon them," there 
 

 seemed to be an entire confidence on the part of the officers com- 
 manding these forts in their ability to defend them successfully: so 
 much so, that even to the last moment, on the evening of the 23d of 
 April, they sent to the city the most encouraging news, which must 
 have had the effect to allay all fears, and, unfortunately, to allay the 
 taking of measures for the safety of the Mississippi. These arc the 
 facts concerning the loss of that vessel, and the House can draw its 
 own conclusions. I could not do less in the discharge of my duty as 
 a member of this committee than thus speciGcally to refer to them. 
 
 LUCIUS J. DUPRB. 
 
MINORITY REPORT. 
 
 The undersigned would be highly gratified were it in his poMer 
 conscientiously to Concur in the report of the majority. He agrees 
 with them in the opinion that there would be no propriety in recom- 
 mending to Congress the adoption of a formal resolution of censure 
 upon Mr. Mallory's conduct as Secretary of the Navy, nor is he able 
 to perceive that any special advantage would accrue from such action 
 on the part of Congress. 
 
 The undersigned has never called in question Mr. Mallory's integ- 
 rity, patriotism, and general good intentions. But he is still of 
 opinion that his appointment to the Department of the Navy was 
 eminently unfortunate for the Confederate cause, and he has yet to 
 encounter testimony of a nature to show that Mr. Mallory has, in 
 any considerable degree, those peculiar qualifications which would be 
 requisite for the successful discharge of the duties which, as Secretary 
 of the Navy, he is called to perform. 
 
 The undersigned is not disposed to go, at this late period, into a 
 specification of the grounds upon which his judgment of Mr. Mal- 
 lory's official merits is based. He is content with having frankly 
 stated his own opinion upon this subject, and could almost desire that 
 the more favorable judgment of the majority ol the committee may 
 be adopted by the country, as it is most abaoluteJy certain that he 
 will retain the official position which he holds until the termination 
 of the present war, and it could not piove otherwise than advanta- 
 geous to the Confederate cause, if he, who is of necessity to be 
 Secretary of the Navy, can be secured a very large share of the pub- 
 lic confidence. 
 
 H. S. FOOTE, 
 Chairman of the Committiie of the House.