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 September 12th, 1863. 
 
 To GrOV. M. L. BONHAM. 
 
 Sir; It is natural that I should address a communication, treating 
 of a matter in which the State has a deep interest, to }<. u dit 'aicial 
 head of the State. 
 
 " There is a time to be silent, and a time to speak." Lately it would 
 have been treason to point out publicly the weak point in the defences 
 of Charleston. That enjoined silence. Now, unhappily, there is no 
 danger of betraying to the enemy how they may approach it. That 
 allows free speech. 
 
 It may be of use to the people of South Carolina, even at this late 
 day, to know the causes that have enabled the enemy to make progress 
 in the siege : whether it be by their superior force and armament; or 
 from the deficiency of our troops in number and quality; or the 
 indefensible nature of our position; or the want of materials of war; 
 or insufficient labor employed in the construction of defensive works; 
 or else from incapacity in the use of these means of defence. What- 
 ever be the cause of our ill-success so far, it is time that we should 
 know it. The knowledge will not come too late to be useful. In 
 order to add something to the facts, on which the people of the State 
 may base a sound conclusion on this point, I make the following 
 statement : 
 
 In November, 1860, 1 was charged by Gov. Gist n 
 first measures of military preparation. I had myself advised them, 
 being convinced that secession must lead to war. Among other lutics 
 I was directed to make a topographical examination of all those points 
 which had a military bearing on Forts Sumter and Moultrie, and on 
 the defence of the harbor. On this occasion, I advised the occupation 
 of Morris' Island with a strong force in men and guns, as soon ra that 
 force could be got ready; and also the occupation of the Eastern half 
 of Sullivan's Island with a similar force. Fort Moultrie, with its 
 scanty garrison, was for certain reasons, capable of little resistance, 
 and could be easily taken when the State seceded, and we thus acquired 
 
 P41945 
 
a right to it. I was soon after employed by Gov. Pickens in some 
 similar duties, and again took occasion to urge the occupation of 
 Morris' Island with a strong force. 
 
 My reasons for laying so much stress on the occupation of both of 
 these islands were these: The first object to be aimed at in defending 
 Charleston should be to prevent the enemy from uniting their land 
 and sea forces in one attack. By so fortifying Morris' and Sullivan's 
 Islands, that they could not get a footing on either, an attack on the 
 harbor could be made only by their fleet. This we might well hope 
 V. There was no reason for fortifying the Eastern end of 
 Sullivan's Island, where Fort Marshall stands, that did not apply 
 equally strongly to the Southern end of Morris' Island. The construc- 
 tion of Fort Sumter, which was merely a brick tower, easily damaged 
 by a cannonade, and not easily reparable like an earth-work — in short, 
 a fortress of the castle kind, which the use of cannon had abolished 
 in war, except for some special purposes — rendered it essential that it 
 should not be exposed to the continuous and accurate fire of land 
 batteries. 
 
 If after we had secured these islands, the enemy had attempted to 
 approach Charleston with their land forces, either across James' 
 Island or through St. Andrew's Parish, or, what is most unlikely, by 
 Charleston Neck, they must soon have left their ships behind them, 
 and lost the support of their naval force. We could then have opposed 
 their advance with good hope of success. For these reasons the all- 
 importance of Morris' and Sullivan's Islands was obvious to me. 
 
 As soon as Major Anderson moved into Fort Sumter I advised Gov. 
 Pickens immediately to seize upon Castle Pinckney and Sullivan's 
 Island ; and a day or two after suggested the building of a battery on 
 [yJAv." :' ! l-ir.d, beyond the range- ©£ Fort Sarategfe- gm a a, t o co m man d 
 the Maffit Channel ; and another on Morris' Island, to command the 
 Ship Channel. Major Walter Gwinn and myself received jointly an 
 order to select the sites of these batteries j and a few days after the 
 Governor sent me to lay out the battery on Morris' Island. This was 
 a small work hastily thrown up to cover the only three guns we had 
 ready for that service. A few days after, it fired upon the Star of the 
 West. 
 
 Not long after this the corps of Engineers was formed, and many 
 officers from the United States army entering the service of the State, 
 I was no longer called upon by the Governor for services of this kind. 
 Not having obtained any permanent military position, and being the 
 
only member of the Board of Ordnance resident in Charle.in. f t j e _ 
 voted my time to assisting the Colonel of Ordnance. We v>2 at this 
 time alarmingly behind-hand in ordnance preparations, am lid j JO t 
 know how soon we would have to open our batteries on Fm>umter 
 My connection with these preparations gave me a good oppoiijty f 
 knowing what was going on. 
 
 When we had taken Fort Sumter, or rather when Major Jerson 
 had given it to us by leaving a combustible roof standing e: et j to 
 our fire, I was astonished to see Gen. Beauregard turn his k on _ rt . 
 Morris' Island, not leaving a man or a gun on it, as if it \v ]**«&. 
 
 no longer important to us. A gentleman, then holding an important 
 position in the service of the State, expressed even more astonishment 
 than I did. 
 
 In the summer of 1861, when Dupont and Sherman's expedition 
 was fitting out in New York, I wrote to Gov. Pickens, then absent 
 from Charleston, representing that Morris' Island was still unoccupied; 
 that the enemy might throw a large force upon it in a single calm 
 night or day; that the island would be an impregnable fortress in their 
 hands ; that the possession of it would enable them to reduce Fore 
 Sumter speedily; and that our forces about Charleston would be mere 
 spectators of the siege. The Governor at once called Gen. Ilipley's 
 attention to this matter. II is only reply is said to have been a jest, 
 not worth repeating here. 
 
 When General Lee was sent to this Department, and was about to 
 visit the posts on and near James' Island, Gov. Pickens presented me 
 to him, and told him that I would accompany him the next day in 
 order to call his attention to a locality important to the defence of 
 Charleston. I went with him, in company with two officers. But al- 
 though we were out thirteen hours, moving by land and. w;>t er. bis ^ 
 attention was so incessantly engrossed by the officer who acted as his 
 guide, that it was late in the day before I got a brief opportunity of 
 urging upon him the importance of Morris' Island, the ease with 
 which the enemy might seize upon it, and the consequences. I urged 
 the facility with which we might hold and fortify the southern, which 
 is the stronger end, the sea front being covered and naturally fortified 
 by a range of high and abrupt sand hills, with a heavy wood behind 
 them. He abruptly asked me, " With what force would you hold the 
 position ? " I answered, hastily, " A thousand men." He replied — 
 u We have not the troops. You gentlemen must exert yourselves to 
 raise troops. That is what is wanting " 
 
X was a need. He plainly wished to hear no more of the matter. 
 
 T ou2;nt t'iave persisted, and urged that what troops we had should 
 
 "be posted the most important points, and that until he had visited 
 
 Morris' lad, and especially the southern end, he was not master of 
 
 the posi.s necessary for the defence of the harbor. But the fact 
 
 was thatn. Lee had been totally deceived as to the state of military 
 
 rjreparatin South Carolina. He found so many essentials neglected, 
 
 and so V useless things done, at an immense cost and labor, that he 
 
 hg cond as well as disappointed. So many futile suggestions and 
 
 i . .^ ■ ver had been pressed upon him, that it was difficult to 
 
 fix his attention on any new matter. Certain it is that he did not stay 
 
 here long enough to solve the problem of the defence of Charleston. 
 
 Gen. Pemberton soon succeeded Gen. Lee in this Department. A 
 member of his Staff, to whom I had spoken fully on the importance of 
 Morris' Island, told me that he had spoken earnestly to the General 
 on this matter. I made no attempt myself to call his attention further 
 to it. I could hope nothing from him ; for I had seen him in wanton 
 ignorance order the abandonment of the important post commanding 
 Georgetown Inlet, he never having been within fifty miles of it ; laying 
 open the richest grain region of the State to a contemptible force of 
 the enemy, thus literally inviting devastation • and that too against the 
 clearest demonstration of the ease with which a small force could pro- 
 tect it against any expedition likely to be sent into the intricate and 
 shallow waters of that inlet. 
 
 At length Fort Pulaski was taken. This half waked up some of 
 our officers. The possibility that Morris' Island commanded Fort 
 Sumter, and not Fort Sumter Morris' Island, as some men high in the 
 army had asserted, dawned upon their minds. Gen. Pemberton was 
 y,?dr- e or two engineer officers to authorize the building of 
 
 Battery Wagner — thus taking hold of the island in a small way by the 
 wrong end. Had the labor thrown away on Cole's Island, and the 
 many heavy guns formerly mounted there, been judiciously employed 
 near the south end of Morris' Island, we would have had a fort capa- 
 ble and worthy of defence. 
 
 On Gen. Beauregard's return to Charleston, I made no attempt to in- 
 duce him to fortify the south end of that island, for several reasons. I 
 had been abundantly obtrusive of my opinion for one who was not offi- 
 cially entitled to give it. Gen. Beauregard was of all men most bound 
 to know the value of Morris' Island. Moreover, I was at that time (Sep- 
 tember, 1862) sent by the gentleman at the head of the military officers 
 
of the State to urge the General to correct the error committed by Gen. 
 Pemberton in giving the country around Georgetown to the enemy be- 
 fore they had ever asked for it. I was to urge Gen. B. to reoccupy 
 South Island (an island more in name than fact), and thus deprive the 
 enemy of a harbor, the discontented negroes on the eastern coast of a 
 place of refuge where they could join the enemy, and at the same time 
 to protect a region which produced grain to feed 90.000 persons, the 
 cultivation of which would otherwise have to be abandoned, and the 
 produce of which was necessary to the maintenance of any considera- 
 ble number of troops east of Charleston. The enemy's force consisted 
 of a few slightly built steamers, which had always kept carefully out 
 of the range of our guns. Five hundred men and eight or ten guns 
 was all the force needed for this purpose. Gen. Beauregard, who 
 like Gen. Pemberton, had never been within fifty miles of South 
 Island, shewed, in my short conference with him, his ignorance of the 
 country and the objects to be attained. He refused to take the step 
 proposed, but afterwards adopted a poor substitute for it, establishing a 
 post in a most sickly spot, leaving the harbor to the enemy, and the 
 road open to the negroes for free resort to them. Seeing this confi- 
 dence in his own judgment, based on no knowledge of the country, 
 and the little value he put on the local knowledge of others, it would 
 have been idle in me to speak to him of Morris' Island. 
 
 Besides my efforts to call the attention of the Generals to this mat- 
 ter, I have labored to prove its importance to many individuals, who I 
 supposed had the ear of the Generals, and more address than I had in 
 urging their views. It will seem a strange thing to say, but it is my 
 belief that neither Generals Lee, Beauregard nor Pemberton ever was 
 at the south end of Morris' Island, nor was ever any consideration 
 given to it until the late absurd attempt to drive the enemy by 'few . •* 
 shells oft of Folly Island. 
 
 The blindness of our enemies was quite equal to that of our Gen 
 erals. For more than two years a strong squadron lay at anchor off 
 Morris' Island. Our enemies were racking their brains to devise the 
 means of assaulting us, yet no one saw the prize before them, until we 
 began to fortify it against them. 
 
 By the solid resistance of Battery Wagner to the progress of the 
 enemy, after they had possession of nine-tenths of the island, and 
 could push their works up almost to the ditch, we may estimate the 
 insuperable nature of the obstacle they would have met in proper 
 works near the southern end. Protected in a great measure from the 
 
fire of the enemy's ships, by the character of the ground, and separ- 
 ated from their nearest batteries by an inlet of some width, and by 
 several hundred yards of flat sands, we could there have defied assault. 
 Fort Marshall thus protects the eastern end of Sullivan's Island. 
 Where was the eye of the Engineer and the General when the corres- 
 ponding position of Morris' Island was overlooked ? 
 
 When I review the history of the military operations around Charles- 
 ton, I am forced to conclude that it is not the superior force and arma- 
 ment of the enemy that have so far commanded success of late. Nor 
 is it from any deficiency in our troops. We have always had at hand 
 an abundant force to maintain all the posts necessary for the defence of 
 the harbor; and as to their conduct, it has not only been vastly supe- 
 rior to that of the enemy, but we could not have desired them to dis- 
 play more courage, and devotion to their duty. Neither has there 
 been a deficiency of ordnance and other material, though we were not 
 as well provided as the enemy. Nor has it been from the indefensible 
 nature of our position. Nor has there been a want of labor to fortify 
 that position. The works for miles around Charleston witness how 
 freely labor has been furnished. Some of that labor has been idled 
 away. Much has been expended on work that proved useless. Some 
 on works that are absolutely injurious. For instance, while Charleston 
 was comparatively defenceless on its most accessible sides, elaborate 
 works were thrown across Charleston Neck, as if the enemy, in a 
 chivalrous spirit of fighting on equal terms, were going to leave behind 
 them all their peculiar advantages of naval power and ponderous arma- 
 ment, and approach the city by the most circuitous and disadvantageous 
 route. Were these lines built for the enemy ? Should they ever take 
 Charleston, there stand the lines ready built to their hand, to aid them 
 in meaning their conquest. If one-twentieth of the labor applied and 
 misapplied about Charleston had been laid out where it was most 
 wanted, we should have heard nothing of the want of labor, and little 
 as to its misapplication. 
 
 Money, labor and materials have been freely furnished. A large 
 force of excellent troops stand ready for the defence of Charleston, 
 wherever their arms are available. But where has been the foresight 
 anticipating contingencies, and that perception of the. relative value of 
 topographical features, which two qualities combined fit men for mili- 
 tary command ? 
 
 G. MANIGAULT. 
 
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