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Americas 
 
 Siberian Expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 A Study of National Policy 
 
 BETTY MILLER UNTERBERGER 
 
 1956 
 
 Duke University Press, Durham, N. C. 
 
© 1956, Duke University Press 
 Cambridge University Press, London, N.W. 1, England 
 
 Library of Congress Catalogue Card Number: 55-6531 
 
 Printed in the United States of America by 
 The Seeman Printery, Inc., Durham, N. C. 
 
 V 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 I. Background for Intervention 3 
 
 II. Wilson Says No 21 
 
 III. The Pressure Increases 39 
 
 IV. Wilson Says Yes . . . 67 
 
 V. The Allies Enter Siberia 89 
 
 VI. Rivalries over a Railroad 107 
 
 VII. New Sources of Trouble: The Cos< 118 
 
 VIII. Wanted: A Russian Policy 135 
 
 IX. Kolchak and the Allies 149 
 
 X. The Doughboys Go Home 166 
 
 XI. Japan, Sakhalin, and the Maritime Province . 184 
 
 XII. Allied Withdrawal from the Chinese Eastern Railway 204 
 
 XIII. Conclusion 230 
 
 Appendix . 235 
 
 Glossary of Names. 239 
 
 Selected Bibliography.247 
 
 Index . 261 
 
America’s Siberian Expedition, 1918-1920 
 

CHAPTER I 
 
 Background for Intervention 
 
 /^\N AUGUST 18, 1918, Major General William S. Graves and a 
 '^'contingent of American soldiers sailed from San Francisco, bound 
 for Vladivostok, Siberia. Graves had been informed in a rather un¬ 
 usual manner of the character of his mission. On August 2 he had 
 received a secret code message from Washington, directing him to 
 “take the first and fastest train out of San Francisco and proceed to 
 Kansas City.” Upon his arrival, he was to go to the Baltimore Hotel 
 and ask for the Secretary of War. Graves considered this one of the 
 most remarkable communications that had ever come out of the War 
 Department. He left immediately for Kansas City. There he met 
 Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War, who informed him that he was 
 being sent to Siberia. Baker then handed him a sealed envelope, 
 saying, “This contains the policy of the United States in Russia which 
 you are to follow. Watch your step; you will be walking on eggs 
 loaded with dynamite. God bless you and good-bye.” 1 Thus began 
 one of the strangest adventures in American military history. 
 
 Military intervention in Siberia became the most important phase 
 of American foreign policy in the Far East during and immediately 
 following World War I. Its effects were far-reaching, especially as 
 applied to American relations with two great powers, Russia and 
 Japan. Intervention initiated a trend in America’s attitude toward 
 Soviet Russia, and introduced America’s greatest offensive against 
 
 Japanese expansion on the Asiatic continent prior to WorlcTWar II. 
 
 Basically, the decision to send nn_evped itinn rn Siheria~w as~~ 3 ~con- 
 tinuation of America’s traditional foreign policy in the Far East. Dur-' 
 IngThcTnlneteentlUand twentieth centurlesUTekeynote oF that policy 
 rested upon the principle of equal commercial opportunity for all. 
 
 1 William S. Graves, America’s Siberian Adventure, 1918-1920 (New York, 193iT> 
 
 pp. 2-4. 
 
America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 This principle was supported to a limited degree by interested Euro¬ 
 pean powers until after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. China’s 
 humiliating defeat introduced a new phase in her history. In 1897-98 
 Germany and Russia took the lead in carving out naval leaseholds and 
 spheres of influence in China. John Hay, as American Secretary of 
 State, sought to protect American interests by means of the well-known 
 open-door notes in 1899, in which he asked assurances from the powers 
 addressed that equality of commercial opportunity would be maintained 
 within their “spheres of interest.” The replies of the powers were in 
 each instance qualified and grudging. Nevertheless, Hay decided to 
 accept them as indicating agreement. 2 Although the American pub¬ 
 lic was heartily in favor of the open-door policy, it had no intention 
 of upholding it by force. Japan, however, wa s in £ differ ent position. 
 She felpjhat_her_nationaT security jwas gravely threatened as Russia 
 Tontinue d~ her p olitico-economic advance into Manchuria, where she 
 
 already held important railway c on cessions and a naval leasehold at 
 Port Arthur in Liaotung. When Russia paid no heed to her protests, 
 Japan launched the Russo-Japanese War. 
 
 President Theodore Roosevelt leaned toward Japan during the war 
 in the belief that a li mited Japa nese victory~wolfld^safeguard American, 
 interests in the Far East. This wasTn line v 7 tlh“America’s Traditional 
 policy of friendship toward Japan. Having introduced Japan to the 
 modern world in 1854, the United States continued to take a maternal 
 interest in her welfare. Japan fared well in those years. By the end 
 of the century her prestige had grown enormously. Her superior po¬ 
 sition in the Far East was recognized by Great Britain in the Anglo- 
 Japanese Alliance of 1902, renewed with modifications in 1905 and 
 again in 1911. 3 However, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 marked 
 a turning point in relations between the United States and Japan. 
 Japan’s military and naval victories endowed her with a new prestige 
 and contributed to the security problem of the United States in the 
 Philippines. Moreover, tl^e war set-Japan- w e ll on the - ro ad-to-c-oftttoL 
 iji Korea, whi le by the Tre at y of Portsmouth (T9 0 5) sh ejsecuredjxom 
 Russia the Liaotung leasehold, _jLe^cuithe«i—ha 4 f--eif_the island of 
 Sakhalin, and control of what later became-the_vitaLSouth Manchuria 
 Railway. 4 Thi s was the beginning nf .serious friction betw een -the 
 
 governments of the Unit 
 
 Issues more specific in 
 
 2 Paul H. Clyde, The Far East (New York, 1948), pp. 295-296; A. Whitney Gris¬ 
 wold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York, 1938), pp. 36-87. 
 
 3 Griswold, Far Eastern Policy, pp. 88-91, 1x5-116, 165-169. 
 
 * Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War (New York, 1925), pp. 236- 
 
BACKGROUND FOR INTERVENTION 
 
 5 
 
 character soon appeared. In 1906 there was the charge by American 
 traders that Japan was closing the open door of equal commercial op¬ 
 portunity in Manchuria. 5 In the same year came the San Francisco 
 School Board incident and demands for Japanese exclusion. Addi¬ 
 tional racial problems arose to trouble Japanese-American relations dur¬ 
 ing the Wilson administration. 6 
 
 By 1909, despite a multitude of official protes ta ti o ns nn Chinese 
 sovereignty aifd’~tliFTTpnr-doorrtioth Russia and lapan had acquired 
 
 strong positions in Manchuria. Each controlled a vital railway in that 
 area! Thereupon theAmerican Secretary of State, Philander C. Knox, 
 devised an extraordinary plan for the neutralization of the Manchurian 
 railways and presented it to the interested powers. He privately con¬ 
 fessed that he was attempting to “smoke Japan” out of her dominant 
 position. Both Russia and Japan refused to consider his proposal. 7 
 Realizing their common interests in Manchuria, they had begun to 
 negotiate a series of secret conventions in 1907 which clearly defined 
 their respective spheres of interest. 8 The Knox neutralization scheme 
 only succeeded in hastening the 1910 convention, whereby both powers 
 undertook to respect each other’s special interests in Manchuria. 9 Their 
 final treaty, signed in 1916, revealed their attitude toward a p ossibl e d j 
 
 d to ^ 
 
 "American lnterWhtiorr in~the Far~East. 10 ~~TKe two nations agreed 
 
 come to each other’s aid in the event of a declaration of war by a third 
 
 power. 
 
 Japan’s entry into World War I further increased her prestige and /-< 
 position in the Far East. Early in the war she occupied the German 
 leasehold of Tsingtao, as well as the German islands in the North 
 Pacific. In addition, she took over German interests in Shantung. 
 Then, taking advantage of the world’s preoccupation with the war, 
 she presented to China a series of Twenty-One Demands which in 
 
 6 Eleanor Tupper and George E. McReynolds, Japan in American Public Opinion 
 (New York, 1937), p. 15. 
 
 6 For a detailed account of these problems, see Thomas A. Bailey, Theodore Roosevelt 
 and the Japanese-American Crises (Stanford, 1934). 
 
 7 Paul H. Clyde, International Rivalries in Manchuria, i68g-ig22 (Columbus, 1926), 
 chap, ix; C. Walter Young, Japan’s Special Position in Manchuria (Baltimore, 1931), 
 chap. v. 
 
 8 Earnest Batson Price, The Russo-Japanese Treaties of tgo7-tgi6 concerning Man¬ 
 churia and Mongolia (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 35-38, 107-108. 
 
 9 Price, Russo-Japanese Treaties, pp. 44-46, 113. 
 
 10 Price, Russo-Japanese Treaties, pp. 83-90; Foster Rhea Dulles, The Road to 
 Teheran: The Story of Russia and America, 1781-^43 (Princeton, 1944), pp. 93-94; 
 Gregory Bienstock, The Struggle for the Pacific (New York, 1937), pp. 146, 161; 
 Pauline Tompkins, American-Russian Relations in the Far East (New York, 1949), pp. 
 36-40. 
 
6 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 effect would make that nation the political and economic vassal of 
 Japan. 11 The American public regarded these demands as an amazing 
 example of Japan’s treachery and aggressiveness. 12 
 
 After the United States became a belligerent (1917) its relationship 
 with Japan was made even more difficult. The mere fact that Japan 
 had now become an ally was not sufficient to allay America’s suspicions 
 of her. Throughout the war years rumors circulated that Japan was 
 proposing to drop the British for a German alliance. 13 Great Britain 
 suggested that the United States do nothing that might push Japan into 
 German arms. 14 Apamca n distrust of Japan was cl early revealed in 
 the secret correspoiidence_^ixied-©n-J3£ljveen President Woodrow 
 \Vilson and Arthur J. Balfour, British Foreign Minister^ regarding 
 a proposecTnaval agreement, whidoTvaslu Re directecT against Japanese 
 as well as against German aggression. 15 Since it was vital to the war' 
 efforrrhat Tela fio n s between the two nations assume a friendlier tone, 
 arrangements were made for a Japanese special mission to the United 
 States under the leadership of Viscount Kikujiro Ishii. Discussions be¬ 
 tween Ishii and Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, resulted in the 
 Lansing-Ishii agreement of November 2, 1917. The agreement ac¬ 
 knowledged Japan’s “special interests” in China, and reaffirmed the 
 adherence of both powers to the open-door policy. 10 Despite its am¬ 
 biguity, the Lansing-Ishii agreement was hailed by American news¬ 
 papers as a great triumph, since Japan had been changed from a 
 
 11 J. V. A. MacMurray, ed., Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China, 
 1849-1919 (2 vols.; New York, 1921), II, 1231-1237; Thomas E. LaFargue, China 
 and the World War (Stanford, 1937), pp. 49-77; Griswold, Far Eastern Policy, pp. 
 183-193. 
 
 12 Griswold, Far Eastern Policy, p. 187. 
 
 13 Roland S. Morris (ambassador to Japan) to Robert Lansing (Secretary of State), 
 Jan. 10, 1918, Woodrow Wilson Papers, series II (collection in Division of Manuscripts, 
 Library of Congress); William G. Sharp (ambassador to France) to Lansing, May 15, 
 1918, file 861.00/6237, Department of State, National Archives; Memorandum by E. T. 
 Williams, June 13, 1918, file 861.00/2082, Department of State, National Archives. 
 Hereinafter all State Department documents will be identified by file and document 
 numbers and the abbreviation, D.S.N.A. 
 
 14 Sir William Wiseman to Edward M. House, Jan. 30, 1918. William Wiseman 
 Papers (collection in Manuscripts Division, Yale University Library). 
 
 16 Walter Hines Page (ambassador to Great Britain) to Wilson, July 6, 1917; Bal¬ 
 four to House, July 8, 1917, Wilson Papers, series II; Charles Seymour, The Intimate 
 Papers of Colonel House (4 vols.; Boston and New York, 1928), III, 67-69. 
 
 16 MacMurray, Treaties, II, pp. 1394-1396; Griswold, Far Eastern Policy, pp. 216-219. 
 Lansing’s views of the agreement are in his War Memoirs (Indianapolis, 1935), pp. 301- 
 303; Ishii’s views are in his Diplomatic Commentaries (Baltimore, 1936), chap. vi. 
 For diplomatic exchanges relating to the agreement, see United States, Papers Relating 
 to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, pp. 258-275; hereinafter cited as 
 United States, Foreign Relations. 
 
BACKGROUND FOR INTERVENTION 
 
 7 
 
 “dangerous rival” to a “trusted ally.” 17 The conciliatory attitude of the 
 press was not wholly a reflection of official opinion, for, as Lansing 
 observed, after the visiting Japanese had been shown the United States 
 fleet off the northern shore of Long Island, “I am disposed to think- 
 that the motive was not solely to give entertainment to our guests for 
 there was m'Themrrmds of some of our officials tta thought that it 
 might~aIso g ive" them so m e idea of the naval power of the United 
 “States.” 18 
 
 Russian-American relations also assumed a friendlier tone upon 
 America’s entry into the war. This was due, not to formal agreement, 
 however, but to the changes which had occurred in Russia’s internal 
 situation. In March and November of 1917 Russia was shaken by two 
 successive revolutions. The first overthrew the Romanov dynasty and 
 established a “liberal” Provisional government. This was hailed with 
 delight by the Allies, particularly the United States. American news¬ 
 paper editors rejoiced that “instead of reluctantly taking the corrupt 
 despotism of the Romanoffs as an ally, we may proudly join hands with 
 the self-governing people of Russia in a war of peoples against kings.” 19 
 Colonel Edward M. House, confidential adviser to the President, sug¬ 
 gested recognition of the new Russian government, saying, “I think 
 this country should aid in every way the advancement of democracy 
 in Russia for it will end the peril which a possible alliance between 
 Germany, Russia, and Japan might hold for us.” 20 Wilson agreed. 
 He had been loath to enter the war with an autocratic Russia. How¬ 
 ever, a democratic Ru s s ia w a s a - “fit partn er for a le a gue nf h nnord 21 
 Thu s the United^States - was- the ftrsr mat-ion to - g ra nt formal recog¬ 
 nition to the new Russian Provisional government. 22 
 
 RmssiaVwaFeffort had been steadily declining, and the Allies now 
 hoped for a renewed prosecution of the conflict. To this end they 
 desired to aid her in every way possible. The United States immedi¬ 
 ately began negotiations to establish credit for Russia in the United 
 States. 23 The United States also sent two missions to Russia. The 
 
 17 Literary Digest, LV (Oct. 13, 1917), 16-17; Literary Digest, LV (Nov. 17, 1917), 
 15-16. 
 
 18 Lansing, Memoirs, p. 279. 
 
 18 Literary Digest, LIV (March 31, 1917), 885-887. 
 
 50 House to Wilson, March 17, 1917, Wilson Papers, series II. 
 
 21 Lansing to David R. Francis (ambassador to Russia), April 3, 1917, United 
 
 States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, I, 17. » 
 
 22 Francis to Lansing, March 22, 1917, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, I, 13. 
 
 23 As a result, by May 17, 1917, the United States had agreed to loan $100,000,000 
 to Russia for war supplies, all of which was to be spent in the United States. For ne¬ 
 gotiation of the loan, see United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, III, 1-11. 
 
8 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 first mission was t o aid in the rehabili tation of the Russian railway 
 syste ms. The s econ d was to extend to Russia the Iriendshipandgood 
 will of the 
 
 te tgst Tneans^of co-opera ting 
 w ith her for a successful prosecution of the war. The latter mission, 
 headed by Elihu Root, carried outfits formal duties, filed its reports, 
 iftid then dissolved. 24 Far different was the history of the railway 
 / mission headed by John F. Stevens. In effect, it became the fore- 
 Lrunner of intervention. 2 ' 1 Thus, it is important to understand the 
 origin, organization, and activities of the railway advisory mission. 
 
 One of the most serious p robl e m s which -~4fi^-I : h^miorial gov¬ 
 ernment fac ed after_ the M arch— revolution, was t he threatened col- 
 Tapse of the Russian railway systems. J This collapse was_ctueTcTTrieffi- 
 ^c ient ()ff tniz:Trrorg'outmoded methods of operation, and lack of equip¬ 
 ment. The railways demanded instant attention. The Trans-Siberian 
 Railway, which exte nded miles from Vl adivostok to the Ural 
 
 Mountains, had almost ceased to function. As a result, the suppli es 
 purchased b y the_jLussiaa governrrient jn the United States.^ and 
 s hipp ed across the Pacific, were pi ling u p judV-ladLYOstok. The whole 
 systemoFrail transportation required reorganization and rehabilitation 
 if these supplies were to reach the Russian armies in Europe. These 
 disheartening conditions were brought to the attention of the Ameri¬ 
 can government by Ambassador David R. Francis. 26 The military 
 consequences were further emphasized by Stanley Washburn, 27 cor¬ 
 respondent of the Fondon Times, and later major in the United States 
 Army. 28 The British, the French, and the Italian governments urged 
 the United States to assist Russia with her railway problems. 29 
 
 Additional credits of $75,000,000, $100,000,000, and $50,000,000 were established on 
 July 17, Aug. 23, and Oct. 12, 1917, respectively (United States, Foreign Relations, 
 1918, Russia, III, 11-25). 
 
 24 Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters (8 vols.; New York, 
 1939), VII, 39. Root later said that Wilson did not want to accomplish anything by 
 the mission; that it was simply a “grand-stand play,” an attempt to show American 
 sympathy for the Revolution (Root to Jessup, Sept. 16, 1930; Philip Jessup, Elihu Root, 
 2 vols.; New York, 1938, II, 356). 
 
 26 Congressional Record, vol. 58, pt. 3, p. 3140. 
 
 26 Francis to Lansing, April 21, 1917, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, I, 28. 
 
 27 Washburn was one of the most effective proponents for American control of the 
 Trans-Siberian Railway. He had been in Russia since Sept., 1914, and had covered 
 over eighty battles. He believed the Trans-Siberian Railway was the key to the military 
 situation, and that its efficient operation was imperative to the winning of the war 
 (William Phillips [Assistant Secretary of State], to Lansing, March 30, 1917, file 861.00/ 
 7018, D.S.N.A.). 
 
 28 Lansing to Page, Sept. 13, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 III, 249-252. 
 
 20 Balfour to Sir Cecil Spring-Rice (British ambassador at Washington), Aug. 21, 
 
BACKGROUND FOR INTERVENTION 
 
 9 
 
 After serious and deliberate reflection, President Wilson, with the 
 knowledge and approval of the Russian Provisional gov ernment, de- 
 c ided to send a commission of five~railway experts to ins pe ct the 
 ( Trans-Siberian Railway and to offer suggestions for improvi ng its 
 efficiency/* 0 
 
 Wilson explained his conception of the railway commission’s pur¬ 
 pose as follows: 
 
 It is not going to ask What can [the] United States do for Russia? but 
 only to say We have been sent here to put ourselves at your disposal to do 
 anything we can to assist in the working out of your transportation prob¬ 
 lem. They are to report nothing back to us. They are delegated to do 
 nothing but serve Russia on the ground, if she wishes to use them, as I 
 understand she does. 31 
 
 John F. Stevens of New York City was selected to head the mis¬ 
 sion. He was one of the leading railway engineers in the country, 
 and had acquired a world-wide reputation as the man who had or¬ 
 ganized the staff for the building of the Panama Canal. Stevens had 
 been recommended by Franklyn K. Lane, the Secretary of the Interior, 
 as being the “best-qualified man for the job in the United States.” 32 
 
 The commission arrived at Vladivostok early in June, 1917. It 
 proceeded across Siberia in a special train provided by the Russian rail¬ 
 way administration. As soon as it made its survey and placed its 
 recommen dations in t tf e hands of the Ru s sian MinisteT of _ Wavs_ and 
 Communications, the commission, with the exception of Stevens, re- 
 ^ turn ed to the United States. Stevens remained in Russia and was 
 established in the Min istry oFWays and Communications as a special 
 ^adviser. He was to assIsTfin executing the measures which the com¬ 
 mission and the Russian officials had agreed were vital. In addition 
 he was to be given “absolute control of the terminals at Vladivostok.” 33 
 
 In Sep tember. 1917, the Provisional government asked for the serv¬ 
 ices of a corps ot American railway engineers. These engineers were 
 
 1917, file 861.77/156, D.S.N.A. France and Great Britain later suggested that the 
 United States assume complete control of the Russian railways (Frank L. Polk, coun¬ 
 selor to the Department of State, to Daniel Willard, chairman of the Advisory Com¬ 
 mission of the Council of National Defense, Oct. 26, 1917, Frank L. Polk Papers, 
 collection in the Division of Manuscripts, Yale University Library). 
 
 30 Lansing to Page, Sept. 13, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 III, 251. 
 
 31 Wilson to Lansing, May 17, 1917, Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VII, 55. 
 
 32 Lane to Wilson, April 14, 1917, Wilson Papers, series II. 
 
 33 Francis to Lansing, May 15, 1917, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 III, 190. 
 
10 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 Jo. b e place dJiL-aiL-adv isory capacity along the different se ctions of 
 jhe Trans^iherian line^ Russia agree d"toZmeet;_all expen ses involved. 
 Thus it was that three hundred engineers from various American 
 railways were specially commissioned by the Secretary of War as 
 officers of the Russian Railway Service Corps, and placed under the 
 command of Colonel George B. Emerson. J Thev left the United States 
 on November 1, 1917. While the corps was en route Tthe Bolshevik 
 TevoIutir?fi--«xupf€ 4 ,—As-tr'fesuTt, Vladivostok was in turmoil. There 
 . were no accommodations available for the rail wjy^rorps Moreover, 
 the foodsTTortage waTcritical. As it was m.seless^toa:f>m(^a .sTiore' until 
 some auth ority was established , the mrp s-j^+icned tn Japan. await 
 development s. There it was soon joi ned by S tevens,-whos e effnrochax L 
 alscTbeen interrupted by the revolu tion. 34 Stevens had little patience 
 Vath the revolution andliHvocated that “we should all go back shortly 
 with man-of-war and 5,000 troops. Time is coming to put the fear of 
 God into these people.” 35 
 
 The Bolshevik program demanded an immediate, general, and 
 democratic peace with the Central Powers. On November 29, 1917, 
 Ambassador Francis reported that military operations on the Russian 
 front had ceased and that preliminary peace negotiations between 
 Russia and Germany would begin on December 2. 36 All the Allies 
 were invited by Russia to participate. None accepted. 
 
 Quite apart from whatever relationship it might bear to the war 
 was the character of the new Russian government, which did not com¬ 
 mend itself to the Allies. They were naturally suspicious of a revolu¬ 
 tionary government which claimed to rule in the name of the proletari¬ 
 at and advocated class war, world revolution, and the overthrow of cap¬ 
 italism. The Soviet decree of February 3, 1918, which repudiated all 
 foreign state loans, scarcely increased Bolshevik popularity with the 
 Allies. 37 Furthermore, rumors were increasing that the Bolshevik 
 leaders, Lenin and Trotsky, were German agents who had returned 
 to Russia with the assistance of the German General Staff for the 
 
 34 Willard to Lansing, Oct. 8, 1917, file 861.77/187, D.S.N.A.; Lansing to Wilson, 
 Feb. 14, 1918, file 861.77/291, D.S.N.A.; Stevens to Lansing, Dec. 20, 1917, United 
 States, Foreign Relations, iqi8, Russia, III, 213; John K. Caldwell (consul at Vladi¬ 
 vostok) to Lansing, Jan. 9, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, III, 
 216. 
 
 33 Stevens to Lansing, Dec. 20, 1917, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 III, 213. 
 
 30 Francis to Lansing, Nov. 29, 1917, United States, Foreign Relations, 79/S, Russia, 
 I, 253. 
 
 37 United States, Foreign Relations, /9/S, Russia, I, 29-32. 
 
BACKGROUND FOR INTERVENTION 
 
 II 
 
 purpose of inciting civil war and demoralizing the Russian armies. 38 
 In these circumstances there arose among Western statesmen the 
 natural hope that somehow a great Russian leader would arise, around 
 whom the “sane” elements would rally in relief of the stricken nation. 
 The Allies placed great faith in this idea, especially since the conse- 
 miences of ^Russia’s witKdrawaTTForn the conflict were terrifying to 
 ^contemplate. Thus none ot the Allies extended recognition _to the 
 new Russian government, but continued ttTrecognize the dip lomatic 
 r epresentatives ot the defunct Proyistona Ego vernmen L There we re A 
 however, differences of opinion as to how Bolshevik Russia should be 
 treated. Naturally, the immediate policy of the Allies was to keep 
 her in the war. This objective was sought by two rather antagonistic 
 means. Some Allied representatives encouraged revolutionary groups 
 to overthrow the Bolsheviks and re-establish the Eastern Front, while 
 others conferred with Bolshevik leaders and intimated a promise of 
 Allied support if Russia continued in the war against Germany. 39 
 Ambassador Txancis himself was opposed to any t hought of inter¬ 
 vention as long_as there was a possiFiTIty~of keeping Russia in the war. 
 He was “willing to swallo\F^pnde7 _ sacrifice dignity, and with discre¬ 
 tion do all that is necessary to prevent Russia’s becoming [an] ally of 
 Germany.” 40 Balfour, the British Foreign Minister, also thought it 
 would be wise to avoid an open breach with the Russians: 
 
 Russia, however incapable of fighting, is not easily overrun. Except 
 with the active good will of the Russians themselves, German troops . . . 
 are not going to penetrate many hundreds of miles into that vast country. 
 A mere-A rmis t ice between- Russia and Germany may not for very many 
 mont hs pro m ote in any important fashion the supply of'German needs 
 from Russian sources. It must be mir business to make that period last as 
 long as possible by every means in our power, and no .policy- would be 
 more tatal~tHari to give the Russians a motive for welcoming into their 
 nFe EtTfertnan o IEcIafs artd --German -soldiers as friends and deliverers. 41 
 
 38 Francis to Lansing, June 23, 1917, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 
 I, 98; David R. Francis, Russia from the American Embassy (New York, 1921), p. 
 226; Pitirim Sorokin, Leaves From a Russian Diary (New York, 1924), pp. 41, 71; 
 
 E. A. Ross, The Russian Soviet Republic (New York, 1923), pp. 140-141; George 
 Stewart, The White Armies of Russia: A Chronicle of Counter-Revolution and Allied 
 Intervention (New York, 1933), p. 84; Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, House of 
 Commons (Hansard), 5th series, Cl, 954-956. 
 
 39 James Bunyan, Intervention, Civil War, and Communism in Russia, April- 
 December, 1918 (Baltimore, 1936), p. 61. 
 
 40 Francis to Lansing, Dec. 24, 1917, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 
 I. 325- 
 
 41 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs (6 vols.; Boston, 1933-37), V, 114. Colonel 
 House shared this viewpoint and suggested to Lansing that American newspapers re- 
 
12 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 The British F oreign ^ Offic e^soon decided to open negotiations with 
 the Bolsheviks. 42 Bruce LockhartTTormer'Ticting consul at Moscow^ 
 was sent to Petrograd to establish unofficial relations with Lenin and 
 Trotsky, while Downing Street recognized Maxim Litvinov as the 
 representative of the de facto Russian government in London. 43 
 Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Robins, head of the American Red 
 Cross in Russia, and General William V. Judson, American military 
 attache in Russia, served as go-betweens for the American Embassy, 
 while Jacques Sadoul was the personal representative of Albert Thom¬ 
 as, French Assistant Minister of War. It is significant that all of these 
 men, who had personal contact with Lenin and Trotsky, advocated 
 that the Allies enter into some kind of a working agreement with the 
 Bolsheviks for the purpose of keeping Russia in the war. 44 
 
 J«)n January 8, 1918, President W ilson made a powerful appeal to 
 the Russia n people with a memorable statement of American war aims. 
 Referring directly to the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, he praised the 
 Russian representatives for their insistence on full puETicity^for the 
 proceedings. He a lso expre ssed~Kis~cIesire to assist “the people of 
 Russia to attain their utmost ho pe of liberty and ordered peace.” 
 The President then enunciated his historic Fo urteen Points. 45 The 
 sixth point, relating to Russia, was of special interest as it represented 
 the official attitude of the American government toward Russia: 
 
 The evacuation of all Russian territory and such settlement of all 
 questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of 
 the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and 
 unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own 
 political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere wel¬ 
 come into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choos¬ 
 ing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may 
 need and may herself desire. Th e tr eatment accorded to Russia by her 
 
 frain from criticizing Russia as an enemy. He feared that this would “throw Russia 
 into the lap of Germany” (Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 281). 
 
 42 Bruce Lockhart, Memoirs of a British Agent (New York and London, 1933), p. 
 199. 
 
 43 Spring-Rice to Lansing, Jan. 9, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, I, 337. 
 
 44 Bunyan, Intervention, pp. 61-65; James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, The Bolshevi\ 
 Revolution (Stanford, 1934), p. 515; Herman Hagedorn, The Magnate: William Boyce 
 Thompson and His Times, 1867-1930 (New York, 1935), chaps, xii-xvi; William 
 Hard, Raymond Robins’ Own Story (New York, 1920), pp. 70-71, no; Francis to 
 Lansing, Dec. 2, 1917, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, I, 282. 
 
 46 See Edgar Sisson, One Hundred Red Days (New Haven, 1931), pp. 209, 211, 
 and Literary Digest, LVI (March 2, 1918), 17, for an account of how the Fourteen 
 Points were used in Russia. 
 
Km 
 
 is • 
 
 If ^ 
 
 In «o 
 
 i 
 
 « 
 
 fit • 
 
 Sb 
 
 
 
 
 r 
 
 
 
 
 Reprinted from The Testimony of Kolchak and Other Siberian Materials, edited by Elena Varneck and H. H. Fisher (Stanford University Press) 
 
BACKGROUND FOR INTERVENTION 
 
 13 
 
 sister nations in the months to co me will be the acid test of their good 
 ' , 'jptllf~o f~iheir comprehension of her needs as disting uished from their own 
 interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympa thy, 46 
 
 The next months were to indicate how this policy would be carried 
 out. 
 
 Toward the close of 1917 while the Allies were conducting their 
 unofficial negotiations at Petrograd, the Bolshevi k revo lution was 
 spreading to Eastern Siberia . There the l ongest fr ontier in polit ical 
 h istory separatecTChina Tom Siberia. This area soon became the 
 scene of recurrent border disturbances. Thousands of Russians fleeing 
 ^from the Bolsheviks sought a haven in the cities of North China and 
 Manchuria, particularly along the line of the Chinese Eastern Railway. 
 There in relative safety some of them plotted and intrigued against 
 the Bolshevik regime. 
 
 The Ch inese Eastern Railway formed a part o f the threat Trans- 
 Siberian line w hich linked Asia. wilh_ Europe. Completed in 1904, it 
 "measured 1,073 miles in length from Manchouli on the western.border 
 
 Manchuria to Pogranichnaia on the southeast border near Vladi¬ 
 vostok. The railroad jmd the zone throug h which it ran were in 
 realit y, if not legally, a Russian semicolony stretching across Manchu 
 te rritory. This extraordinary stateTif affairs had come about in an un- 
 ' usual way. When the Trans-Siberian Railway proper was nearing 
 the Chinese frontier (1896), the Russian government discovered that 
 three hundred and fifty miles of construction could be eliminated if 
 the line were run through Central Manchuria, rather than through 
 the Russian provinces to the north. Furthermore, the former route 
 would practically guarantee Russian control of Manchurian com¬ 
 merce. 4 ' A the terms of the Chinese Eastern Railway Agreement 
 of 1896 C hin a agr ee d to give Russia construction privileges across 
 "Manchu ria i n return for a defensiv e military alliance . 48 Th rough a 
 l iberal interpre tation of the agreement the Russian imperial government 
 gradually assumed complete authority wi thin the railway zone. Thus, 
 by iQ iy the railway zone had in effect become a Russian crown 
 colony in China, despite the fact that Chinese authority had never 
 been renounced within the railway area. 4 9 
 
 46 Italics inserted. Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, The Public Papers 
 of Woodrow Wilson (3 vols.; New York, 1927), III, i59-r6o. 
 
 t7 The China Yearbook (1923), pp. 613-614; Tsao Lien-en, The Chinese Eastern 
 Railway—An Analytic Study (Shanghai, 1930), pp. 1-3; Clyde, The Far East, pp. 262- 
 263. 
 
 48 MacMurray, Treaties, I, 74-82. 
 
 49 Tsao, Chinese Eastern Railway, p. 29; LaFargue, China and the World War, p. 
 

 14 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 The Bolshevik revolution introduced a period of lawlessness in the 
 zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway, particularly in the cities of 
 Harbin and Changchun. At Harbin the Bolsheviks attempted to se¬ 
 cure control of the railway from General Dmitri L. Horvat, Russian 
 governor and general manager, who maintained the pretense of repre¬ 
 senting the defunct Provisional government. 50 Unable to resist the 
 pressure, “General Horvat [ was] ready to conduct joint administra¬ 
 tion with the Bolsheviks.” At this point the Allied ministers ask ed 
 th e Chinese government to send trnnps tn support H orvat againstjhe 
 Bolsheviks. 5 1 Th^ Chin p r . e g ov ernment complied and by Decembe r 
 
 15 had sentt hree thousand troops to in sure order and to support Gen- 
 r f eral Horvat.- Sh ortly thereafter Chinese troop s ..disarmed two regi- 
 
 /.—- ments of B olshevik troop_ s^_deported_ them across the borders of Man¬ 
 churia, and took o ver the Russian barracks along the TmcTt)frThU 
 Chi nese~EasTern Railway , presumably at General ETorvat’s request. 52 
 With in the next few months the railway zone became !T”center~ of 
 rf jp Counterrevolut ionary activity against the B blshevlks 7 ~ 
 
 L ' England, France, and Japan soon extende d _jjnanUaU^dLj&_lhese 
 
 gnti-Bolshevik groups. 53 Throughout the early months of 1918 agents 
 of the Japanese government offered assistance to General Horvat 
 in return for commercial concessions and the dismantling of the 
 Vladivostok fortifications. Horvat preferred Allied support. 54 As 
 soon as he secured pro mises of assi stance from the Allied diplomats 
 at Peking, "w iththe except io n of the American minister, Horvatbegan 
 to organize and support various an'ti-BolsTevrk armed detachments 
 in the railway zone. 
 
 Jn ^farch— xoEHr-the lajjaliese-gevera ment ur ged General JTorvat 
 to organize an anti-Bolshevik government in the Far Ease 55 The 
 
 60 Charles K. Moser (consul at Harbin) to Paul S. Reinsch (minister in China) 
 Nov. 17, 1917, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 2-4. John F. Stevens 
 later pointed out that he believed that Horvat was always loyal to the Provisional 
 government, despite the intrigues of the Japanese, Chinese, and Bolsheviks at Harbin 
 (Stevens to H. H. Fisher, Jan. 28, 1931, Railway Service Corps Papers, collection in 
 Hoover War Library, Stanford University). 
 
 61 Reinsch to Lansing, Dec. 6, 1917, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 5. 
 
 52 Reinsch to Lansing, Dec. 8, 1917, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 8; New York Times, Dec. 15, 1917. 
 
 53 Griswold, Far Eastern Policy, pp. 227-288; Ludovic H. Grondijs, La Guerre en 
 Russie et en Siberie (Paris, 1922), p. 513. 
 
 64 Reinsch to Lansing, Feb. 21, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 53- 
 
 65 Moser to Lansing, March 15, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 79- 
 
BACKGROUND FOR INTERVENTION 
 
 15 
 
 All ied representative s in Harbin, including the A me ricaruc onsul, sup¬ 
 ported thi s proposal. 56 General Horvat, however, hesitated to follow 
 Japan, particularly when he learned that in return for her support, 
 Japan would probably ask for the dismantling of all the fortifications at 
 Vladivostok, fishing rights in Siberia, open navigation of the Amur 
 River, and forest and mining concessions. Horvat feared to act on 
 such a proposal “lest he be charged with selling his country to Japan.” 5 ' 
 
 While Horvat organized his cabinet, a ri v aLgovernmenl^h eaded by 
 Petr jVrhcr psr.nh lAheiLiiselfLm—railwny carsjn Harbin. Organized 
 in Western Siberia in February, 1918, the anti-Bolshevik Derber gov¬ 
 ernment had been forced to retreat to the safety of the Chinese Eastern 
 Railway zone to escape the Bolsheviks. An attempt to unite the Horvat 
 and Derber movements failed. 58 The Derber government appealed 
 directly to the American government for aid.° 9 President Wilson was 
 interested in these independent Siberian movements. He told Lansing 
 that it would give him “a great deal of satisfaction to get behind 
 the most nearly representative of them. . . .” 60 However, the Russian 
 Division of the State Department reported that “none of them could 
 make any claim to be representative of any large body of Russian 
 opinion.” 61 Therefore, despite the appeals of the American consul at 
 Harbin, the American gov e rnm ent r e fused to commit itself toward 
 the Harbin movements. 62 ^ 
 
 1 ° fKeTn~eantime~ Great Britain, Franc e, and Japan were_supporting_ 
 t he independent operat ions of Ca pt ain Grigori ijSemenov.- vyhowas 
 attempting to wrest control of the Trans-Baikal pro vince from the 
 Bolsheviks. 6 3 Although later evidence revealed that Semenov was a 
 villain capable of the most infamous crimes, nevertheless, at the height 
 
 38 Willing Spencer (secretary of Legation in China) to Lansing, March 29, 1918, 
 United States, Foreign Relations, igiS, Russia, II, 93. 
 
 37 Moser to Lansing, April 4, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igi 8 , Russia, 
 II, 97-99. 
 
 18 Moser to Lansing, April 12, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, /9/S, Russia, 
 II, 119-121. 
 
 ‘"United States, Foreign Relations, igi 8 , Russia, II, 101-102. 
 
 611 April 18, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, Lansing Papers (2 vols.; Wash¬ 
 ington, 1939-1940), II, 360, hereinafter referred to as Lansing Papers. 
 
 61 Memorandum by Basil Miles (acting chief of Russian Division), April 22, 1918, 
 file 86 i . oo / i 664'/2, D.S.N.A. 
 
 62 Lansing to Reinsch, May 1, 1918, Phillips to R'einsch, May 4, 1918, Lansing to 
 Reinsch, May 8, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igi 8 , Russia, II, 150, 152, 157. 
 
 83 Colville Barclay (British charge) to Lansing, Feb. 6, 1918, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, igi 8 , Russia, II, 38-41; LaFargue, China and the World War, p. 163; Elena 
 Varneck and H. H. Fisher, The Testimony of Kolchak, and Other Siberian Materials 
 (Stanford. 1935), pp. 114-115; British ambassador at Tokyo to Lord Reading (Rufus 
 Daniel Isaacs), March 28, 1918, file 86i.oo/i437 l /2, D.S.N.A. 
 
16 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 of his campaign he succeeded in arousing considerable enthusiasm for 
 his cause among certain American representatives in the Far East. 84 
 The American consul at Harbin spoke glowingly of Semonov’s at¬ 
 tempts to bring law and order to Trans-Baikal, while the American 
 ambassador in Tokyo believed that supporting Semenov would “be the 
 most direct way to take issue with the Bolshevik movement in Si¬ 
 beria.” 63 In contrast, both Paul S. Reinsch, the American minister 
 at Peking, and John F. Stevens regarded Semenov as a “military auto¬ 
 crat of the old order.” 66 When Stevens informed the State Depart¬ 
 ment of Semenov’s attempts to use the Chinese Eastern Railway to aid 
 his military efforts, he was told that the corps of American engineers 
 should not “be drawn in to take sides in a movement which partakes 
 of civil war, consequently their work on the Chinese Eastern Railway 
 must not have any semblance of supporting Semenov or contributing 
 to the success of his military operations. If this can only be accom¬ 
 plished by their withdrawal then they should be withdrawn. . . .” 67 
 
 At the beginning of May Admiral Al exsander V. Kolchak, former 
 Russian commander of the Black SeaZETe gt, appea r ed~in~th e zone of 
 the Chinese Eastern Rail way? 8 He reported to Prince Kudashev, 
 Russian mintsrer atCPeking^ who was planning to organize an armed 
 force in the Chinese Eastern Railway zone under the guise of a rail¬ 
 way guard. As soon as the troops were prepared, Prince Kudashev 
 planned to move them across the Chinese Eastern to Vladivostok or 
 elsewhere. 69 In order to implement this plan, Prince Kudashev or¬ 
 ganized a new board of directors for the Chinese Eastern Railway to 
 replace the one that remained in Petrograd. General Horvat was 
 
 04 For an urgent plea for intervention to aid Semenov, see George Kennan, “Can 
 We Help Russia?” Outlook, CXIX (May 22, 1918), 141. Lansing considered 
 Kennan to be the highest authority on Russia in America, and he paid carefuF attention 
 to his views. Kennan frequently wrote letters to Lansing, who placed them before 
 the President (Lansing to Kennan, May 28, 1918, Lansing Papers, collection in Di¬ 
 vision of Manuscripts, Library of Congress). Lansing was not so sure as was Kennan 
 of the wisdom of aiding Semenov. 
 
 66 United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 48, 53, 134; Morris to Lansing, 
 May 16, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 163. Thomas Gar- 
 rigue Masaryk, The Maying of a State (New York, 1927), p. 183, states: “I thought 
 the Allied support of anti-Bolshevik movements a mistake, especially when it was 
 given to out-and-out adventurers like Semyenoff and others.” 
 
 60 United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 54, 133, 138. 
 
 07 Lansing to Reinsch, May 2, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 III, 233. 
 
 08 Varneck and Fisher, Testimony of Kolchak,, pp- 108-109, 236, note 150; United 
 States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 169, 191. 
 
 09 Varneck and Fisher, Testimony of Kolcha\, P- no; M. I. Smirnov, “Admiral 
 Kolchak,” Slavonic and East European Review (London), XI (Jan., 1933), 385. 
 
BACKGROUND FOR INTERVENTION 
 
 J 7 
 
 made chairman of the board, while Admiral Kolchak was appointed 
 commander-in-chief of the railway guards Tn 'the zoneT~TKe Japanese 
 government immediately promised assistance to the new board in re¬ 
 turn for exclusive mining rights in Eastern Siberia and free navigation 
 o f the Amur Riv er. 70 ^Horvat was forced to accept Japanese support, 
 since Britain and France were absorbed in Semenov’s efforts andthe 
 ■- Uivn^cn^faterdia d ' alrcady d e cla re d -rts-rrentrafitv towa rd th e rtva-1 a n ti- 
 dBolshevik factions._ 7 r The American government was “disturbed” by 
 reports that Chinese soil was being used for conferences “looking to¬ 
 ward the establishment in Russian territory of a government opposed 
 to those in control, and as a base for possible military operations to 
 effectuate such a government.” It urged the Chinese government to 
 consider carefully the possible results of such activities. 72 The State 
 Department also advised its minister in Peking that “strict neutrality” 
 was “desirable and must be observed” toward contf’ndfng^fartfohTTn 
 Russia. Although jEnJJjiiled-States-and the Allied governments had 
 not re cognized the Soviet, they were “intere s ted in~stTmula tIng its op¬ 
 position to the Central Po wers.”' 3 
 
 Kolchak’s appearance^in the railway zone was viewed unfavorably 
 by the Russian leaders already operating in the area. Shortly after his 
 arrival, Kolchak attempted to secure Captain Semenov’s co-operation 
 for joint action in the Far East. He discovered that Semenov pre¬ 
 ferred to operate alone, supported by Japanese financial assistance. 74 
 Despite the lack of co-oper ati on between Kolchak and Sem enov, the 
 Japan ese government supported both factions. 70 Although Kolchak 
 soon learned UTat Semonov's independent 7 attitude was the direct result 
 of Japanese handiwork, he continued to organize railway guards and 
 even attempted to launch an offensive in the direction of Pogranichnaia 
 and Vladivostok. 76 His efforts met with little success, for he was op- 
 
 70 Reinsch to Lansing, April 25, 27, 30 and May 7, 1918; Moser to Lansing, 
 May 8, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 137-138, 140-141, 147, 
 154 - 155 , 155 - 156 . 
 
 71 The Japanese were also supporting Captain Ivan Kalmikov at Pogranichnaia, at 
 the eastern end of the Chinese Eastern Railway zone (Bunyan, Intervention, pp. 314- 
 316). 
 
 72 Lansing to Reinsch, May 6, 1918, file 861.00/17633, D.S.N.A. 
 
 73 Lansing to Reinsch, May 6, 1918, file 861.00/1736, D.S.N.A. 
 
 74 Varneck and Fisher, Testimony of Kolchak,, pp. 121-122; Grondijs, La Guerre 
 en Russie, pp. 513-514; Smirnov, “Admiral Kolchak,” The Slavonic and East European 
 Review, XI, 385. 
 
 73 Moser to Lansing, May 23, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 169. 
 
 78 Varneck and Fisher, Testimony of Kolchak, pp. 123-124, 127, 316; Moser to 
 Lansing, June 6, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 190. 
 
i8 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 b 
 
 $ 
 
 posed constantly by the activities of the Japanese. Thereupon Kol¬ 
 chak decided to go to Japan to plead his cause before the Japanese 
 General Staff." Shortly after his arrival in Japan, Kolchak resigned 
 as commander-in-chief of the railway guards. 78 
 
 In the meantime Semenov had not been idle. Between March and 
 June he made no less than three attempts to secure control of Trans- 
 Baikal. In each case he was repulsed, .gAfter Semenov’s J rrst attajd^ 
 the Bolshevik authorities began arming some of the German prisoners 
 TTGvnr in Siberia to def encTThe ter ritory ag ainst further intrusions^ 
 When Semenov began hisTthird offensive, his forces included Japanese 
 volunteers. 80 The failure of his third attempt forced him to cross into 
 Manchuria, where he became the center of Japanese intrigue, and a 
 source of constant irritation to China. 81 
 
 The chaos bordering on semianarchy created by the November rev¬ 
 olution had its repercussions in Siberia as well as Manchuria. The _ 
 
 Allies feared dun once the Bolsheviks secured control of Siberia, the 
 w’ar'suppires whlcK jhad piled up in Vladivostok for the Russian prose- _ 
 cution of the war would fall into the hands of the Germans. As 
 Si6erTa seemed to be th e i deal spot for mobilizing the anti-German 
 elements in Russia, the Allies early considered th e possibility of send- 
 mg~~an expetHuonary tefce~to-S tbernr tc > Hid these^elements in the re- 
 haKlIItatioir~ofThe Eastern F ront. 
 
 "The idea of Tending a military expedition to Russia was by no 
 means a result of the Bolshevik revolution alone. Throughout 19x7 
 Allied statesmen considered such a possibility. During January and 
 February, General S. Inagaki, the Japanese military attache in London, 
 and Colonel Charles a Court Repington of the British Foreign Office 
 discussed informally the possibility of using Japanese troops on the 
 Russian front. The number of troops mentioned was ten divisions, 
 or 250,000 men. 82 General Inagaki personally believed that in return 
 for this assistance Japan desired “control of the railway to Kharbin 
 
 77 Grondijs, La Guerre en Russic, p. 154; Varneck and Fisher, Testimony oj 
 Kolcha\, p. 127. 
 
 78 Varneck and Fisher, Testimony of Kolcha\, p. 154. 
 
 70 Reinsch to Lansing, April 2, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 95. 
 
 80 Moser to Lansing, June 6, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 191. 
 
 81 Moser to Lansing, June 19, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 216; Reinsch to Lansing, June 26, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 231-232. 
 
 82 Charles a Court Repington, The First World War, 1914-1918; Personal Experi¬ 
 ences (2 vols.; Boston and New York, 1920), I, 432, 437-440, 442-443, 469. 
 
BACKGROUND FOR INTERVENTION 
 
 J 9 
 
 [Harbin] and the dismantlement of Vladivostok and the Russian naval 
 base at this port. . . .” 83 Colonel Repington was left “with the im¬ 
 pression that Japan would act if the concessions named were granted.” 84 
 Nothing, however, came from these informal feelers, probably because 
 of the outbreak of the first Russian revolution. 85 Later, in the sum¬ 
 mer of 1917, Constantin Nabokov, the Russian ambassador in Lon¬ 
 don, suggested to the Russian High Command that 200,000 Japanese 
 troops be sent to the Russian front to fight against the Germans. The 
 suggestion was rejected as being impracticable. 86 
 
 r When the French began to urge the use of Jap anese tr oops to rer 
 habilitate the Russi an f ront in_Iune-oLjLQi7, pres ident Wilson w rote 
 -AmKasador Sharp: “There are v ery many reas ons why it w ould be 
 unwise even_ i f it were practicable .” 87 Later, in the fall of 1917, when 
 Russian soldiers were abandoning the Eastern Front, the French am¬ 
 bassador in Petrograd was instructed to suggest to the Provisional gov¬ 
 ernment the possibility of using Japanese troops. Both the Premier, 
 A. F. Kerensky, and the Foreign Minister, M. I. Tereschenko, re¬ 
 fused to consider the suggestion. Apparently the Provisional govern¬ 
 ment was completely opposed to having its territory traversed by its 
 “old enemy of 1905.” 88 
 
 In late 1917 the French bec ame qu i re vigorous in their demand s^ 
 for military inte rvention in Siberia . At_jux.inter-AIUed-conference at 
 P aris, Premier Clemenceau dis cusse d with G oteneL House the possi- 
 ^ hili ty of s ending a Japanese expedition ary force tq _R ussiaT Housewas 
 ^completely opposed to th eTcIe in HeT ielieved the Bolsh eviks had come 
 tg power 7 ~no t through German intrigue, but because th eyTiatisfiednie 
 r eal demands of the Russian peasants ^ He was convinced that any 
 effort at intervention except at the request of the Russian govern¬ 
 ment would be a mistake. H e so advised t he President on his return 
 to the United States. 89 In tl?e meantime the American press had been 
 
 83 Repington, First World War, I, 470. 
 
 81 Repington, First World War, I, 471. 
 
 85 Repington, First World War, I, 477, 491. 
 
 80 Constantin Nabokov, The Ordeal of a Diplomat (London, 1921), pp. 244-245. 
 Certain authorities have written that the Japanese initiated proposals for intervention 
 in the summer of 1917. See Thomas F. Millard, Democracy and the Eastern Question 
 (New York, 1919), p. 283; Foster Rhea Dulles, Forty Years of Japanese-American 
 Relations (New York, 1937), p. 134; John Spargo, Russia as an American Problem 
 (New York, 1920), pp. 236-237. 
 
 87 Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VII, 214; William G. Sharp to Wilson, June 30, 1917, 
 Wilson Papers, series II. 
 
 88 Joseph Noulens, Mon ambassade en Russie sovietique, igty-tgig (2 vols.; Paris, 
 1933), If 46 . 
 
 89 Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 386-388. Across the top of one of his letters to 
 
20 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 speculating on { he possibility_of American or Japan ese aid to Russia by 
 means of the Trans-Sib erian Railway. 90 T he A merican Naval Intelli¬ 
 gence in Russia presented a report which advised send ing To-Siberia 
 ’an A merican corps o f 8 n , nrir> mft o-- (j .r ^ngrhpnpd h v a 1 apanese~tofce ; 9jr 
 ■‘TET British government also suggested that the United States con¬ 
 sider the possibility of sending troops if Russia were agreeable 92 Am¬ 
 bassador Francis had a similar idea: 
 
 What would you think of our sending two or more army divisions via 
 Vladivostok or Sweden to her [Russia’s] aid if I could get consent of 
 Russian Government therefor or even induce Government to make such a 
 request? Moral effect of American troops on Russian front [would] be 
 more beneficial than the material assistance so rendered as millions of 
 sensible Russians only need encouragement to organize. 93 
 
 None of these suggestions was followed, t-Bv the end of 1017 the State 
 Department appeared firm in its decision to follow a policy of non¬ 
 intervention in regard to Russia and Siberia. 94 
 
 Lansing is the following notation: “This was the beginning of outside interference 
 in Russia’s internal affairs—an interference I steadily and consistently opposed" (House 
 to Lansing, Dec. i, 1917, Edward M. House Papers, collection in Division of Manu¬ 
 scripts, Yale University Library). 
 
 80 Literary Digest, LV (Sept. 15, 1917), 12; ibid., LV (Oct. 13, 1917), 25; Greg¬ 
 ory Mason, “Shall We Send an Army to Russia,” Outlook, XVII (Oct. 24, 1917), 
 292-297. 
 
 91 Office of Naval Intelligence, Oct. 31, 1917. Notes on Russian Situation as It 
 Affects the Allied Cause (Naval Records Collection in the Office of Naval Records and 
 Library, WA-6, Russian Situation, 1917-1919, in the National Archives), hereinafter 
 referred to as Naval Records Collection. 
 
 92 Reading to Lansing, Nov. 1, 1917, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 1. 
 
 93 Francis to Lansing, Nov. 6, 1917, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 I, 221. 
 
 91 Frederick Palmer, Bliss, Peacemaker: The Life and Letters of General Tasker 
 Howard Bliss (New York, 1934), p. 169; Peyton C. March, The Nation at War 
 (New York, 1932), p. 113. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 Wilson Says No 
 
 D URING the first six mont hs of iqi8 Wilson was besieged with 
 appeals for military interv ention in Siberia, . They came not only 
 from his Allies and thef Supreme War C ouncil, * 1 but also from his own 
 diplomatic staff abroad. Although the cry for intervention became 
 practically unanimous among American foreign representatives in 
 Russia and the Far East, Wilson found strong resistance to these pro¬ 
 posals among his military advisers. Wilson, indeed, was faced with 
 one of the most difficult problems of his career; he informed House 
 that he was “sweating blood” over it. As the Russo-German peac e 
 negotiations at Brest-Litovsk neared their conclusion in March, 1918, 
 and the Germans proc eede d to withdraw TuTlncreasing nu mber^ pi? 
 d ivisions from their Russian front, Britain and Franc e increased their 
 pressure f or interve n tion. The Allies faced what ap peared to be a 
 desperate military situation. In the early part of the year they were 
 ready to clutch at every straw. General Tasker H. Bliss, American 
 military representative on the Supreme War Council, later pointed out 
 that the Siberian expedition was a “sideshow born of desperation.” 
 Thus the oriffina ludea-j^dxiterventiQD was not primarily to initiate a 
 .war against B olshevism, but to bring about a renewal of the Russian 
 t hrust against Eastern Germany? 2 
 
 1 The Supreme War Council consisted of the Prime Minister and a permanent 
 military representative from each government fighting on the Western Front. Colonel 
 House represented' President Wilson. The military representatives were General 
 Maxime Weygand, France; General Sir Henry Wilson, Great Britain; General Luigi 
 Cadorna, Italy; and General Tasker H. Bliss, United States (Seymour, Intimate Papers, 
 III, 246-264). 
 
 2 General Tasker H. Bliss, Final Report on the Supreme War Council, p. 115, file 
 763.72SU/99, D.S.N.A. As Lloyd George pointed out, “We were not concerned with 
 the internal political trouble of Russia as such. What we had to consider as a war 
 problem was how best to prevent Germany from revictualling herself afresh from the 
 cornfields and the oilfields which would be laid open to her if she succeeded in pene- 
 
22 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 .Agitatio n for intervention m-Siheria -hegan_riLcame-sM©wardxhe 
 close of December, 1Q17. T he c haotic conditions which e xisted in 
 fVIacHyostok gave rise to constant rumor s_o£JLaganes£_. in tervention. * * 3 
 <On December 13, 1917, Caldwell, the American consul at Vladivostok, 
 advised the landing of an Allied force to preserve order in the city. 
 The suggestion was opposed by the State Department, which advised 
 him to refrain from “considering in any way the advisability of the 
 presence of a foreign force in Vladivostok.” 4 * The Russian ambassador 
 to Japan suspected that the persistent rumors of a Japanese landing 
 were semiofficial feelers and urged that the United States oppose such 
 action on Japan’s part. He was convinced that it would only create 
 resentment in Russia without in any way serving the cause of the 
 Allies. 0 The department concurred in this attitude. It believed that 
 the landing of troops in Vladivostok would undoubtedly result in the 
 unification of the Russians under Bolshevik control in opposition to 
 foreign intervention. This opinion was conveyed to the Japanese gov¬ 
 ernment, which professed completed agreement with it. 6 
 
 At the close of December, 1917, the French government reported 
 
 trating the Don and the rich provinces of the Caucasus. It was for this reason, and 
 not from any anti-communist motives, that we decided to give support to the loyalist 
 Russians . . .” (Lloyd George, Memoirs, V, no). John E. Weeks, later Secretary 
 of War, arrived at a similar conclusion, “Probably the principal underlying idea which 
 was held by those powers, other than the United States and Japan, responsible for the 
 sending of troops to Siberia was that a new Eastern Front might be constituted. ... In 
 case such a new front could be constituted the Germans would be forced to use troops 
 thereon and would thus be weakened on the Western Front” (Weeks to Hughes, Oct. 7, 
 
 1929, A Study of American Participation in the Siberian Expedition, 1918-1920, p. 2, 
 file 861.00/9040, D.S.N.A.). In contrast, General Graves said that “it is evident 
 England, France, and Japan went to Siberia with the distinct idea of fighting bolshevism 
 but, for some reason, they tried to cover up this design by advocating the formation 
 of an Eastern front, which they also hoped could be accomplished” (Graves, America’s 
 Siberian Adventure, pp. 334-335). The fact that Great Britain was attempting to ne¬ 
 gotiate with the Bolsheviks, even after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, to get a renewal of 
 the war against Germany tends to cast doubt on Graves’s statement. 
 
 3 Lansing to Caldwell, Dec. 12, 1917, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 7; Flag, Brooklyn to Office of Naval Operations, Dec. 14, 1917, WA-6, Siberia, Con¬ 
 ditions in Vladivostok, Naval Records Collection. 
 
 ' United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 7. 
 
 c Morris to Lansing, Dec. 16, 1917, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 9. Throughout early 1918 the Russian ambassadors abroad (representatives of the 
 defunct Provisional government) almost unanimously opposed intervention, particularly 
 by the Japanese. All were united in their suspicions of Japanese intentions (Miles to 
 Lansing, Jan. 4, 1918, file 861.00/938 ! 4 , D.S.N.A.; Memorandum of the Third As¬ 
 sistant Secretary of State, Jan. 10, 1918, Morris to Lansing, Jan. 13, 1918, Sharp to 
 Lansing, Feb. 3, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 23, 27, 
 and 37, respectively). 
 
 6 Memorandum of the Secretary of State of an Interview with the Japanese Minister, 
 Dec. 27, 1917, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 13. 
 

 WILSON SAYS NO 
 
 23 
 
 that inflamed conditions in Irkutsk, Siberia, had resulted in the death 
 of three French citizens. Accounts from that vicinity described the city 
 in flames, “while the Bolsheviki were intent on an orgy of murdering 
 and plundering the inhabitants and ravishing the women, while the 
 corpses of murdered children covered the streets.” * * * * * * 7 8 * The^ French gov¬ 
 ernment was co n sidering ser iously thc—pa ssihilitv of sending a larg e 
 expeditio nary force to aid those “Russian elements in Siberia that have 
 remained true to the cause of the Entente,” The expe^itionTwould 
 ‘■protect Siberia from Bolshevik contagion, secure the use of the Trans- 
 Siberian and South Russian Railways to the advantage of the Allies, 
 and, by isolating Vladivostok, protect the huge quantities of Allied sup¬ 
 plies stored there. Such an expedition would be in a position to pre- 
 vent German influenc e from extend mj f~to~Sibefra. in case of a se parate 
 eace. s The United States was unable to give it s asse nt to this pro- 
 
 ncnl ^ 
 
 As early as December 14, 1917, the British ambassador to Japan had 
 discussed informally with the Japanese government the problem of pro¬ 
 
 tecting the Amur and Trans-Siberian Railways and the stores and 
 munitions at Vladivostok. The American government was not in¬ 
 formed of these discussions. 10 The British Foreign Office was rather 
 concerned about the Japanese attitude: 
 
 The Japanese will not tell us what they intend to do, and are very angry 
 if anyone else proposes to do anything. If they were not too unreasonable, 
 the proper plan would undoubtedly be to land a force at Vladivostok to 
 protect our stores there, the force being in substance Japanese, with a few 
 French, Americans and British added for the sake of appearances . 11 
 
 The Anglo-Japanese discussions resulted in the dispatch of warships 
 to Vladivostok. By January 17, 1918, the Japanese had sent a total of 
 four ships, and the British, one. 12 Josephus Daniels, the American 
 Secretary of the Navy, felt this was cause for concern. He suggested 
 that Japan be informed that the United States thought “it a mistake 
 
 7 Caldwell to Lansing, Dec. 30, 1917, file 861.00/888, D.S.N.A. 
 
 8 Jean J. Jusserand (French ambassador to the United States) to Lansing, Jan. 8, 
 
 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 20-21. 
 
 8 Lansing to Jusserand, Jan. 16, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 
 Russia, II, 28. 
 
 10 Morris to Lansing, March 22, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 84-88. 
 
 11 Lord Robert Cecil to Arthur Balfour, Jan. 8, 1918, Blanche E. Dugdale, Arthur 
 ]ames Balfour, First Earl of Balfour (2 vols.; New York, 1937), II, 186-187. 
 
 13 Morris to Lansing, Jan. 17, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II. 30-31. 
 
24 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 to create the impression they intended to land.” He also advised the 
 dispatch of the Brooklyn, an American cruiser, to Vladivostok. 13 
 
 The Japanese government raised no objection to the sending of the 
 Brooklyn, but it requested “if conditions should hereafter require 
 the occupation of Vladivostok and the lines of the Chinese Eastern and 
 Amur Railways . . . that this task be left to her alone.” 14 Japan had 
 asked the British government to agree to this as evidence of the con¬ 
 fidence of the Allies in her good faith. 15 This request, in conjunction 
 with the large naval force at Vladivostok, gave Wilson an “uncom¬ 
 fortable feeling.” Since the suggestion seemed to him to be “very sig¬ 
 nificant of possible coming events,” h e insisted jfiarjapan be told very 
 clearly that the United Stares would strong ly disapprove of militar y^ 
 .-action in th at area. Accordingly, Japan was informed that the 
 
 common interests of all the powers at war with Germany demand from 
 them an attit ude of sympathy, with the Russian people in their present 
 unhappy struggle and that any movement looking towards the occupa¬ 
 tion of Russian territory would at once be construed as o ne hostile to Russia 
 and would be likely to unite alTfacXions-m- Rusilala gainst u s thus aiding 
 the German propaganda in Russia. 1 ® 
 
 xr ■— — ■' " *" ' ' 
 
 The British government was also informed of the American position. 
 Although Balfour professed agreement with the State Department, he 
 believed that events might at any time create a new situation which 
 would necessitate intervention. 17 
 
 That new situation arose very shortly. The counterrevolutionary 
 movement in south and southeast Russia was growing with the aid 
 and encouragement of the British and French governments. Con¬ 
 vinced that the Allies should do “anything and everything” to check¬ 
 mate Germany’s exploitation of Russia, Balfour believed that it was 
 obviously to the advantage of the Allies to support the counterrevolu- 
 
 13 Frank L. Polk, Confidential Diary, Jan. 18, 1918 (Division of Manuscripts, Yale 
 University Library). 
 
 14 As early as Jan. 10 a distinguished Frenchman told Colonel Repington that 
 “the Japs were ready to land at Vladivostok and save Siberia from becoming Bolshevist 
 and a granary for Germany, but they wanted to go there alone, and the Americans 
 did not approve of the plan” (Repington, First World War, II, 179). 
 
 16 Morris to Lansing, Jan. 17, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 29-30. The British government made no reply to this request, while the French 
 government acceded to it (Morris to Lansing, March 22, 1918, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 85; Morris to Lansing, Feb. 8, 1918, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 44). 
 
 16 Wilson to Lansing, Jan. 20, 1918, Lansing Papers, II, 351; Polk to Morris, Jan. 
 20, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 31. 
 
 17 Page to Lansing, Jan. 24, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 
WILSON SAYS NO 
 
 25 
 
 tionary movements. 18 He thought th is co ul d best be done by in- 
 viting Japan to occup y the Trans-Siberian Rai lway as the mandatory /W 
 of the Allies. This would keep open a line of communication with 
 the Russian forceT'in the south and sout heast who -tfes ireeflo con ¬ 
 
 t inue the war against Germ any. 
 
 that the 
 
 Tils Majesty’s government believed 
 
 Russians would welcome some form of foreign intervention in their affairs, 
 and that it would be more welcome in the shape of the Japanese, engaged 
 as mandatories of the Allies with no thought of annexation or future con¬ 
 trol than in the shape of the Germans who would make Russia orderly only 
 by making it German. . . , 19 
 
 The President was strongly opposed to the suggested Japanese expe¬ 
 dition. He believed that the Japanese themselves had originated the 
 plan for invading Siberia, and that they wished the expedition to be 
 exclusively Japanese in order to secure control of the Maritime Prov¬ 
 inces. Wilson intended to prevent such a development. 20 Evidently 
 realizing Wilson’s fears, Balfour attempted to overcome them through 
 a personal appeal: 
 
 It may be said that the aggrandizement of Japan whether territorial (as it 
 might be impossible to get her out of, say the maritime provinces when 
 once established there) or morally as consequence of her successful inter¬ 
 vention as saviour of the situation, would present grave danger from the 
 spectators point of view. There is force in this but on the other side 
 I would suggest, the Japanese occupation of the maritime provinces is a 
 question which must probably be faced in any case as the state of Russia 
 will probably soon render occupation inevitable. Japan in such circum- 
 s tances will doubtless take action on her own initiati ve^^whatever the wishes 
 ^ _of the Allies will be. As regards danger of Japanese aggrandizement the 
 ' very fact that the Japanese will be forced into the open against the Ger¬ 
 mans, and their respective interests brought into open conflict, should do 
 much to lessen Japanese pressure in other directions . 21 
 
 ( 
 
 Balfour’s appeal yielded no results. House could think of no mili¬ 
 tary advantage that would offset the harm of sending Japanese troops 
 
 18 Dugdale, Balfour, II, 187. 
 
 19 British Embassy to Department of State, Jan. 28, 1918, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 35-36. 
 
 20 Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 391; Statement of the Honorable Breckinridge 
 Long, Third Assistant Secretary of State, before the House Committee on Foreign 
 Affairs, Aug., 1919, file 861.00, vol. 39, D.S.N.A. 
 
 21 Balfour to House, Jan. 30, 1918, marked secret and urgent, Wiseman Papers. 
 Balfour often appealed to Wilson directly through Colonel House, Sir William Wiseman, 
 special British agent in America, or both. See also Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 
 390-391. 
 
2 6 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 into Siberia. 22 Wilson himself could see nothing “wise or practicable” 
 in the scheme. Said Wilson, “It seems . . . unwise to make a request 
 which would in itself give the Japanese a certain moral advantage with 
 respect to any ultimate desires or purposes she may have with regard 
 to the eastern provinces of Siberia.” 23 On February 8 the State De¬ 
 partment formally rejected th e Britis h pr opo sals. Furthermore, it in¬ 
 dicated that any future occupation of the whole or part of the Trans- 
 Siberian Railway should be done through int ernation al c o-operation 
 and not by j inv one p ower acting as the mandatory oFTfie others/** 
 
 Before the British government received this reply, it sent another 
 note reiterating its position. 25 This was followed by a personal cable 
 from Balfour, who informed House that the Japanese were sending 
 agents to Siberia to investigate conditions, and that if the danger 
 seemed imminent, Japan would take independent steps to meet it. 26 
 
 The State Department was impervious to both appeals. It ques¬ 
 tioned the advisability of antagonizing the people who controlled 
 Russia, and declared that the necessity for intervention had not yet 
 arisen. Moreover, should the necessity arise, joint military action was 
 to be preferred. In any event, that portion of the Trans-Siberian Rail¬ 
 way crossing Chinese territory should be guarded by Chinese rather 
 than Japanese troops. 27 This was the beginning of a diplomatic duel 
 between the Japanese and American governments over the control of 
 the Chinese Eastern Railway. 28 
 
 On February 15, 1918, Lord Reading, the new British ambassador 
 in Washington, had a conference with President Wilson. He came 
 away with the feeling “that the American Government was against any 
 intervention by the Japanese in Siberia with the Allies or for the Allies, 
 and would prefer if Japan should intervene at Vladivostok, that she 
 should do it on her own initiative, thus leaving it open for America 
 and the Allies to make any representation they may hereafter think 
 fit to Japan.” 29 
 
 Both the French and British governments were dissatisfied with 
 
 22 House to Wilson, Feb. 2, 1918, Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 391. 
 
 23 Wilson to Lansing, Feb. 4, 1918, file 861.00/1097, D.S.N.A. 
 
 24 Department of State to British Embassy, Feb. 8, 1918, United States, Foreign Re¬ 
 lations, 1918, Russia, II, 42. 
 
 25 British Embassy to Department of State, Feb. 6, 1918, United States, Foreign Re¬ 
 lations, 1918, Russia, II, 38. 
 
 20 Feb. 8, 1918, Wiseman Papers. 
 
 27 Lansing to Page, Feb. 13, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 45 - 
 
 28 LaFargue, China and the World War, p. 166. 
 
 20 Lord Reading to British Foreign Office, Feb. 15, 1918, Wiseman Papers. 
 
JAPAN'S RELATION TO THE EUROPEAN CONFLICT 
 
WILSON SAYS NO 
 
 27 
 
 Wilson’s stand on intervention. The British, however, assured the 
 State Department that their notes on the subject were nothing more 
 than “preliminary inquiries.” 30 The French, too, expressed an apprec*; 
 ation of the American position. Nevertheless, they believed that if ' 
 events in Russia vitally threatened Japanese interests, Japan would 
 undertake an independent expedition to Siberia without the consent of 
 the Allies. In that event the French Foreign Minister feared a possible 
 German-Japanese alliance providing for the division of Russia. 31 De¬ 
 spite this fear, the French newspapers continued to advocate Japanese 
 intervention in Siberia. 32 
 
 While British and French diplomats in Washington were attempt¬ 
 ing to persuade Wilson to agree to intervention, similar pressure was 
 being applied to General Bliss. Sir William Wiseman had informed 
 the British Foreign Office that he believed Wilson might agree to in¬ 
 tervention if Bliss could be persuaded that the military end was prac¬ 
 ticable. 33 The British Foreign Office took the hint. It sponsored a 
 scheme for Japanese intervention which was presented to the Supreme 
 War Council by Sir Henry Wilson, British military representative on 
 the Supreme War Council. The plan recommended that the Allies 
 ask Japan to occupy the Trans-Siberian Railway from Vladivostok 
 to Harbin, after first obtaining suitable guarantees from her. An 
 Allied “politics-military mission” was to accompany the expedition. 
 The question of the further occupation of the railway was to be “de¬ 
 termined by the Allied Governments concerned according as the cir¬ 
 cumstances develop.” 34 
 
 Although Bliss was not enthusiastic about the project, he agreed to 
 sign the note. It became Joint Military Note No. 16. 35 Bliss reasoned 
 that seizure of the military stores at Vladivostok and Harbin would be 
 
 30 Page to Lansing, Feb. 18, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 
 48-49. 
 
 31 Sharp to Lansing, Feb. 20 and 28, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 52, 58-59. 
 
 32 On Feb. 28 the British ambassador to France wrote in his diary, “The French 
 newspapers are booming a Japanese intervention at Vladivostok and in Manchuria. 
 If Japan go thither it will be to stay in a more or less disguised form. It would 
 be foolish of America to object” (Lady Algernon Gordon Lennox, Diary of Lord 
 Bertie of Thame, 1914-1918, 2 vols.; London, 1924, II, 271; see also Great Britain, 
 House of Commons Debates, 5th series, CVII, 482-483). 
 
 31 Wiseman to Drummond and Balfour, Feb. 4, 1918, Wiseman Papers. 
 
 34 Bliss, Final Report on the Supreme War Council, pp. 119-120, file 763.72SU/99, 
 D.S.N.A.; Bliss to March (chief of staff), Feb. 20, 1918, Tasker H. Bliss Papers (col¬ 
 lection in Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress); March, Nation at War, pp. 
 305-306; Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VII, 556. 
 
 3 ° March, Nation at War, pp. 113-115. 
 
28 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 of distinct advantage to the Allies, and could be accomplished by a 
 relatively small Japanese force. 36 The Joint Note advanced the argu¬ 
 ment that Japanese intervention would bring Japan effectively and di¬ 
 rectly into opposition with Germany and thus eliminate the danger of 
 a German-Japanese alliance. 37 
 
 ( CThe Tapanese were quite willing to consider intervention in Sibe ria, 
 but they did not wish to contend with the “humiliation” and^pin- 
 pricks” of Allied “show the flag” detachments, i n obtaining the wi lling 
 c onsent oh the -r r — peo pled Bliss believed that Allied insistence upon ob¬ 
 taining suitable guarantees from Japan before inviting her to occupy 
 the Siberian Railway would be regarded by the Japanese as a “pin¬ 
 prick” and something more. Furthermore, Japan might regard the 
 inter-Allied politics-military mission as a “show the flag” detachment. 
 As far as Bliss was concerned, the whole problem was fraught with 
 difficulties. He wrote General March that “the intervention of a large 
 Japanese army over a large portion of Siberia raises the question of how 
 and when they can be made to get out. This Japanese intervention 
 suggests a possible way in ^vjjicji another war may be brought about.” 38 
 
 By the en d of Fe bruary 'Japan appeared ready to act alone, despite 
 the disapproval of the United States and the failur e of the British gov¬ 
 ernment to consent to independent Japanese action? 5 The Japanese 
 government proposed to the Chinese government a joint military ocTCD 
 
 pation of Siberia and of the Trans rSiberjan Railway to restore order in 
 
 Siberia. The President of Chi na approved in principl e, and the 
 Chinese governme nt asked the Un ited S tates for advice. L ansing re- 
 jTe ated his earlier position. _nnmrlv th at the Chinese Ea ^temdRailway 
 be guarde d by Chinese troops. 40 
 
 Reports from Siberia indicated a growing unanimity among Ameri¬ 
 can representatives in the Far East concerning intervention in Siberia. 
 General Judson, recently returned from Russia, declared that Russia, 
 if encouraged, would make a stand against the Germans. He urged 
 
 36 Bliss, Final Report on the Supreme War Council, p. 115, file 763.72SU/99, 
 D.S.N.A. 
 
 37 Diplomatic Liaison Officer, Supreme War Council (Frazier) to the Secretary of 
 State, Feb. 19, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igi8, Russia, II, 49-50. 
 
 38 Bliss to March, Feb. 20, 1918, Bliss Papers. When March received this letter, he 
 took the opportunity to “urge upon the Secretary of War that we keep out of Siberia” 
 (March, Nation at War, p. 115). 
 
 30 Reinsch to Lansing, Feb. 21, 1918, March to Lansing, Feb. 24 and 27, 1918, 
 United States, Foreign Relations, igi8, Russia, II, 53, 56, 57, respectively. 
 
 ,0 Reinsch to Lansing, Feb. 23, 1918, Lansing to Page, Feb. 27, 19x8, United States, 
 Foreign Relations, igi8, Russia, II, 55, 57-58; Memorandum of Long, Feb. 26, 1918, 
 file 861.00/1249, D.S.N.A. 
 
WILSON SAYS NO 
 
 29 
 
 that American and Japanese troops be sent to assist her. 41 Consular 
 reports from Moscow urged similar action, while Ambassador Francis 
 advocated immediate occupation of Vladivostok, Murmansk, and Arch¬ 
 angel. 42 Minister Reinsch reported that a majority of Russians would 
 welcome Allied intervention to prevent German control, but would 
 be most “unfriendly” to the entry of Japanese troops unless accompanied 
 by Allied forces. 43 Even John F. Stevens, who had been solidly op¬ 
 posed to any kind of intervention in Russia, advised that German in¬ 
 fluence in Siberia was growing and would have to be met by force in 
 the near future. Now that German prison ers were bei ng released and 
 armed, he believed that Japanese action was necessary~ ir~ST 5 e rTa_wa^ 
 to he saved from Germ an control. 44 —— 
 
 ' On Februar y 2(TFerdinand Foch, Generalissimo of jthg_Allied- 
 Armies, advocated^ active intervention in Siberia by Japan and the 
 U nited States. 45 From Versailles General Bliss reported a feeling of - 
 “desperation” in regard to the war. He urged Washington to bear 
 this in mind as a probable explanation for such proposals as Japanese 
 
 \ 
 
 intervention 
 
 46 
 
 On February 27 Lord Reading presented President Wilson with 
 two secret messages from Balfour. The first message urged that the 
 United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy invite Japan to occupy 
 the Siberian Railway, in order to protect the Allied military stores lying 
 at Vladivostok and to prevent the enemy from obtaining access to the 
 vast stores of agricultural resources available to the west of Lake 
 Baikal. Great Britain admitted reluctantly that, although Japan de¬ 
 sired a mandatory, she would not tolerate co-operation. Since the 
 Bolsheviks had completely surrendered to the Germans , the Br itish 
 government believed that intervention had become an urgent necessity? 
 Franc e was eager for the decision. Italy approved of the project. JThe 
 
 41 Polk, Confidential Diary, Feb. 21, 1918. 
 
 42 Summers to Lansing, Feb. 23, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 53-54; Summers to Lansing, Feb. 24, 1918, file 861.00/1145, D.S.N.A.; 
 Francis to Lansing, Feb. 24, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, I, 
 387. 
 
 43 Reinsch to Lansing, Feb. 24, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II. 55 - 
 
 44 Morris to Lansing, Feb. 24, 1918, file 861.00/1148, D.S.N.A.; Scidmore (consul 
 general at Yokahama) to Lansing, Feb. 26, 1918, file 861.00/1158, D.S.N.A. 
 
 45 New York Times, Feb. 26, 1918; Stewart, White Armies of Russia, p. 127. 
 
 46 Bliss also reported that the British admitted that Japanese intervention alone was 
 undesirable, as Japan was “probably out for her own best interests.” Further, they 
 agreed that “it was not inconceivable for her to make a deal with Germany" (Bliss 
 to Baker, Frank L. Polk Papers, collection in Division of Manuscripts, Yale University 
 Library). 
 
30 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 final dedsiox Lrested with the United Stares. Furthermore, common 
 action would be impossible if a different view were taken by the United 
 States. In that event, Great Britain feared that Japan would act 
 alone, and would not then be subjected to the safeguards applied by the 
 Allies. 47 The second message dealt with the actions of German 
 prisoners in Siberia. 48 
 
 Balfour’s appeal was a powerful one. It was followed by a tele¬ 
 gram from the French Embassy, which reported that Viscount Ichiro 
 Motono, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, was willing to announce 
 publicly Japan’s disinterestedness and to pledge to carry on military 
 activities as far as the Ural Mountains, that is, to the confines of Asia. 
 Japan agreed to comply with all Allied demands. Believing that the 
 French telegram cast a new light on the problem, Lansing urged a 
 reconsideration of intervention. 49 
 
 yu AWilson f ound it veryjj ifOcuLt-to-resist- -these appea-k,—IoQ.fl .ften he 
 had fotm dTiimselFljpposing Allied schemes. There had been friction 
 betweentJTe United'States and the Allies over America’s insistence on 
 being termed an associate rather than an ally. 50 Wilson’s insistence on 
 the sep arateness of the, armies of the United States at the front had 
 been a more serious point of friction with England and France. Fur¬ 
 thermore, the United States had at first refused to send a military 
 representative to participate in the activities of th e^Supreme War Coun- 
 cil. 51 In addition, there was disagreement over the terms of the peace 
 settlemen ts Wilson was strongly opposed to the Allied eagerness for 
 tenTtory,. and the secret agreements to acquire it were particularly 
 "Sifficult for him to accept. 52 ^Now, he found himself agai n in the 
 po sition nf refusing tr> ag ree to a plan which had the supportTof alFof 
 t he Allies. ^ 
 
 Wilson decided to agree. His decision was the result of Anglo- 
 French pressure. He drafted a new declaration of policy stating that, 
 although “the United States has not thought it wise to join the gov¬ 
 ernments of the Entente in asking the Japanese government to act in 
 Siberia,” it would not object to such a request being made by the other 
 Allies. The United S tatcs-realizefi that in~puttmg~a n ^ "aim e d force -into 
 S iberia, the Tapan ese- e u vcininent was ^M oing so as -a ii ally of Ru ssia. 
 
 47 Balfour to Reading, Feb. 26, 1918, Wilson Papers, series II. 
 
 48 Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VII, 568, 569 n. 
 
 40 Lansing to Wilson, Feb. 27, 1918, Lansing Papers, II, 354-355. 
 
 60 Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VII, 221. 
 
 51 Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 306-307; Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VII, 304, 
 4 I 4 - 4 I 5 - 
 
 62 Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VII, 474-475. 
 
WILSON SAYS NO 
 
 ' 
 
 3 1 
 
 with no purpose^ hu t to save Sib eria from the invasioamf the armies 
 and mtrigueiTof Germany and with entire willingness to l eave the d ej^ /l j j 
 terminatiorTof all questionsThaF may affect the permanent fortunes of 
 Siberia to the Council of Peace.” 51 Un March i Wilson sent this 
 
 % 
 
 statement toThe State Department for the information of the Allied 
 ambassadors. 54 On that same day Frank L. Polk, counselor for the 
 Department of State, showed it to the French ambassador and the 
 British charge. The following day it was shown to the Italian am¬ 
 bassador. The statement was not given to the Japanese charge when 
 he called at the State Department on March 2. 55 .y 
 
 As soon as the - Russi a n - F.mbassy in Washington learned of the J ' / 
 proposed note, it moved quickly in an _maemp>t--to-fire¥enu ^m e rican --.-— 
 acquiescence to independent Japanese action. Boris A. Bakhmetev, the /l / 
 Russian ambassador, appealed to Colonel House, while John Sookine, 
 onetime secretary of the Russian Embassy, presented his arguments 
 against the plan to the State Department. Both men averred that 
 
 the 
 
 the Russians preferred the Germans to the Japanese, and that a 
 
 Japanese expedition aryJE^cfewvcaild throw-t hc Rus s ian s in te-fche-arms— y, . 
 
 of the Germans.-^ So ok -in e ^a dvocated_the form ation of a military-_ n) 
 
 poli tical expedition composed o L miUtar v -. i inits fromA Re -1 JniFefT States, r 
 Great Britain, France, and Japan under the political leadership of an W L , 
 Allied committee or an American diplomatic representative. 56 House j 
 
 informed Wilson of the Russian ambassador’s views, and wrote in op¬ 
 position to Japanese action: 
 
 We are treading upon exceedingly delicate and dangerous ground, and are 
 likely to lose that fine moral position you have given the Entente cause. 
 The whole structure which you have built up so carefully may be destroyed 
 over night, and our position will be no better than that of the Germans. 
 
 I cannot understand the . . . determination of the British and French 
 to urge the Japanese to take such a step. Leaving out the loss of moral 
 advantage, it is doubtful whether there will be any material gain. . . , 57 
 
 House’s letter was followed by one from William C. Bullitt sent by 
 Gordon Auchincloss (assistant counselor to the Department of State) 
 
 63 Lansing Papers, II, 393. 
 
 64 Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 1-2. 
 
 66 Polk to Lansing, March 15, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 68. 
 
 60 Memorandum of Long, March 2, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 61-63; Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 392. 
 
 67 At the top of this letter there was a note in House’s handwriting “after the 
 President received this he recalled from the State Department the note that was to have 
 been sent to Japan” (House to Wilson, March 3, 1918, House Papers; text of letter 
 in Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 393). 
 
32 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 to the President. Bullitt stressed the point that America’s position 
 would be irretrievably compromised unless the United States protested 
 publicly against Japan’s invasion of Siberia. Jde pointe d out that 
 Japan wa nted to annex E astern Siberia, and that the Allies arid - the 
 
 Unite d States realized it,_Moreover,~Ttay 'appeared willing to assist 
 
 Jap'Sn because they feared she might take it with the assistance of 
 Germany. Bullitt continued with a moving plea: 
 
 We shall have to throw Japan out of Siberia some day unless we are willing 
 to compromise on all the principles for which we are asking our soldiers 
 to die. ... If we stand aside while Japan invades Siberia with the assent 
 of the Government of England and France, the President’s moral position 
 as leader of the common people of the world will be fatally compro¬ 
 mised. . . . The President must oppose invasion of Siberia by Japan in the 
 name of democracy and liberalism. He must act, or his position as moral 
 leader of the liberals of the worlds will be lost. We cannot wash our hands 
 of this matter. Unless we oppose, we assent. 58 
 
 On March 4 Colonel House cabled a similar plea to the British 
 Foreign Secretary. He stressed the moral position of the United 
 States and argued that independent Japanese action would push Russia 
 into the arms of Germany. 59 On March 6 Balfour replied that Britain 
 had already agreed to give Japan a free hand in Siberia. He justified 
 this action on the grounds that since the Bolsheviks had surrendered 
 unconditionally at Brest-Litovsk it was of the utmost importance to 
 prevent the rich supplies in Siberia from falling into German hands. 
 Furthermore, the Japanese government was preparing to take action in 
 Eastern Siberia; and considerable resentment would be aroused in 
 Japan if the Allies refused to give her a mandate. 60 
 
 Influenc edbv the views-ofHouse and Bulfitt. Wilson revested lo-his 
 earlie r stand on intervention. 6 1 On March 5 he telephoned a new note 
 to Counselor Polk and instructed him to communicate it formally 
 to the Allied ambassadors in Washington and to the Japanese govern¬ 
 ment. 62 Td^-£L£jy__note was influenced by Wilson’s concern_£ivet_the. 
 m oral issues involved in Int ervention, It rested the case against 
 
 68 Bullitt to Polk, Man h 2, 1918, file 861.00/1290 Vi , D.S.N.A. On March 4 
 Congress discussed the matter, and Mr. Meyer London proposed a joint resolution in 
 the House of Representatives protesting against the suggested invasion of Russian terri¬ 
 tory {Congressional Record, vol. 56, pt. 3, p. 3028). 
 
 69 House to Balfour, March 4, 1918, Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 394. 
 
 60 Balfour to House, March 6, 1918, Wiseman Papers; Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 
 397 - 
 
 61 Gordon Auchincloss, Diary, March 3, 1918 (Division of Manuscripts, Yale Uni¬ 
 versity Library). 
 
 63 Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 396. 
 
WILSON SAYS NO 
 
 33 
 
 intervention upon two assumptions: first, that such_ a policy would 
 strengthen the extreme revolutiona ry elemen ts in Russia and would 
 alienate Russian opinion from faith in the Allies and America: second, 
 tji at the "course proposed was corTfrarv to America’s democratic w ar 
 
 aims and that it would fatally compromise the American moral posi¬ 
 
 tion. For these reasons~the UmtecTStates WaTopposed to Japanese in¬ 
 tervention in Siberia, even if Japan gave every assurance that she would 
 not impair the political or territorial integrity of Siberia. 63 
 
 House was pleased with the new note and sent his congratulations 
 to Wilson. Auchincloss considered it infinitely better than the first 
 one. 64 The Russian ambassador also approved. He thought it would 
 be a great mistake for anyone to go into Siberia, and particularly the 
 Japanese. 65 Polk, however, had “argued the question ... a little” with 
 the President. He felt somewhat embarrassed about transmitting the 
 new note to the Allies as he had already given the contents of the 
 earlier note to all of them except Japan. 66 Moreover, as a result of the 
 first note, the British government had agreed that Japan should take 
 independent action in Siberia as the mandatory of the Allies. 67 
 
 On March 6 Polk read the new note to the Japanese charge, who 
 wanted to know whether American opposition was based on insuffici¬ 
 ent facts. Polk told him no, and stressed the point that the United 
 States objected to the Japanese intervention in Siberia only because of 
 the bad effect it would have on Russia. 68 
 
 When Ambassador Morris read the American note to the Japanese 
 Foreign Minister on March 7, the latter “expressed his deep apprecia¬ 
 tion of the frankness and friendly spirit of the communication.” 69 
 
 63 Polk to Morris, March 5, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 67. For a sympathetic appraisal of the note, see Lincoln Colcord, “Japan in Siberia," 
 Nation, CX (Jan. 10, 1920), 36-38. John Spargo, Russia as an American Problem, 
 p. 239, hailed the note as “one of the few bright spots in our Far Eastern diplomacy. . . . 
 That refusal was one of the few decisive diplomatic acts of the war of which Americans 
 can be wholeheartedly proud.” 
 
 64 Auchincloss, Diary, March 5, 1918. 
 
 65 Polk, Confidential Diary, March 6, 1918. 
 
 06 Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 396; Polk to Lansing, March 15, 1918, United 
 States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 68. 
 
 67 Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 397. At the same time Balfour had instructed 
 Lockhart in Russia to suggest to the Bolsheviks that they invite Japan to intervene in 
 Siberia to aid them in resisting German aggression (British Foreign Office to British 
 representative in Petrograd, March 4, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, I, 391-393). The mere mention of Japanese intervention “never failed to 
 rouse the fire in Trotsky’s eyes” (Lockhart, British Agent, p. 241). 
 
 08 Polk, Confidential Diary, March 6, 1918. 
 
 00 Morris to Lansing, March 12, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 78. 
 
34 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 Since Gr e at Britain jiaid- al f cady consented to Japan ese- iiuerwention in 
 -Lib eria a s the lmandatorv of the. -Al lies. t be- 4 iipan e.se gnvernme nt^was 
 now in possession of counsel whic h advised both “yes ” and “ no.” 70 
 cA gtually, Japan chose to lollow the Uni ted States. Japan’s formal 
 reply to the American declaration was very conciliatory. The note 
 stated that Japan would refrain from taking “any action on which due 
 understanding has not been reached between the United States and 
 the other great powers of the Entente.” The reply added, however, 
 that if developments in Siberia should “jeopardize the national security 
 or vital interests of Japan she may be compelled to resort to prompt and 
 efficient measures of self-protection.” In any event, whatever action the 
 Japanese government might take in Russian territory would be 
 “wholly uninfluenced by any aggressive motives or tendencies.” 71 
 
 Whatever may have been the true temper of the official Japanese 
 mind, the American declaration of March 5 did not meet with the 
 approval of the European Allies.' 2 The British and French continued 
 to press for Japanese intervention in Siberia. 73 Sir William Wiseman 
 
 70 Japanese opinion was divided on the subject. Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and 
 Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (New York, 1935), p. 204, states: “By March, 1918, 
 keen interest was manifested on all sides, but the consensus of opinion was opposed 
 to any undertaking.” Morris, however, reported that military preparations were be¬ 
 ing completed rapidly, and that troops were concentrating in the west coast ports (Mor¬ 
 ris to Lansing, March 7, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 
 71-72; see also A. Morgan Young, Japan Under Taisho Tenno, London, 1928, pp. 126- 
 127). 
 
 71 Morris to Lansing, March 19, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 81-82. On March 26 Viscount Motono admitted to both houses of the Japanese 
 legislature that negotiations regarding Siberia were in progress (Takeuchi, War and 
 Diplomacy, pp. 204-205). Motono may have been referring to the Sino-Japanese negoti¬ 
 ations then in progress for action in Siberia. 
 
 72 Page reported from London that there was a great misunderstanding among 
 newspapers and the public concerning America’s attitude toward Japanese occupation 
 of Siberia. He suggested that at the earliest moment the President make clear to the 
 world “that whatever we do or not do is in no way predicated on suspicion of Japanese 
 motives” (Page to Lansing, March 7, 1918, file 861.00/1250, D.S.N.A.). As a result, 
 the State Department sent a note to Japan, begging “most” earnesdy that the Japanese 
 government understand that the attitude taken was in no way based on suspicion of 
 Japanese motives (Lansing to Morris, March 20, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 
 1918, Russia, II, 82. Lord Bertie wrote in his diary on April 5, 1918: “. . . it was more 
 than foolish of President Wilson not encouraging Japanese intervention. What sec¬ 
 tion of the Russian people will he conciliate by his attitude to the so-called ‘Russian 
 people’? There is no such thing: it is nothing but an agglomeration of different races 
 which has tumbled to pieces” (Lennox, Diary of Bertie, II, 294). 
 
 73 The following entry appears in Sir Henry Wilson’s diary: “Much talk at [War] 
 Cabinet about the Japanese joining us and going into Siberia. I have written a paper 
 saying they must come in” (Major-General Sir C. E. Callwell, Field Marshall Sir Henry 
 Wilson, 2 vols.; New York, 1927, II, 68). On March 9 Colonel Repington recorded: 
 “All attention is just now directed to the question of Japan and Siberia” (Repington, 
 
WILSON SAYS NO 
 
 35 
 
 thought it still possible to secure the assent of President Wilson to the 
 scheme, although he thought Wilson would never be enthusiastic about 
 it. He urged the Foreign Office, in its appeals, to stress the importance 
 of preventing Siberia from becoming a granary for Germany. 74 
 
 Wilson’s March 5 declaration marked the beginning of renewed 
 Allied pressure upon the United States for intervention in Siberia. On 
 March 12 the French Embassy in Washington again presented a note 
 recommending immediate Japanese action in Siberia to establish order. 
 The note played on the fear of a Ger nnan-Tapanc sa -alhancc. if Japan 
 intervened independen tly?^ Tf s he intervened as the ma ndatory of ~ 
 the Alli es, they cou ld secure pledges oT Tfisinterestedne ss from her. 
 After outlining a plan for seizing the Trans-Siberian Railway and 
 establishing an anti-Bolshevik government to resist German encroach¬ 
 ments, the note closed with a warning of Japanese sensitivity and the 
 need for quick action. 76 The State Department replied on March 16 
 that it was “unable ... to alter its opinion and attitude toward this 
 question.” “ The appeals, however, were beginning to move Wilson, 
 for Wiseman reported on March 14 tha Uffidson was trying to find a 
 way to reconcile the American people to tire heed for intervention, and 
 to allay Russia’s fearr~otTtT]He 7 was s tudying the feasibility of ajoint 
 Ja panese-American ^e nternrisfe wher eby the United States"would col¬ 
 laborate w it h the Russians in the reorganization of Russian elements 
 with Japanese military assistance. 78 
 
 The First World War, II, 241). Lord Bertie recorded on March 7, “There has been 
 too much hesitation and delay in letting loose Japan in Siberia” (Lennox, Diary of 
 Bertie, II, 278). 
 
 74 Notes for a cable from the British ambassador to the British Foreign Office, March 
 9, 1918, Wiseman Papers. 
 
 ,J Marshal Joffre in Paris expressed the same fear. See memorandum of conversa¬ 
 tion between Warrington Dawson of the American Embassy and Marshal Joffre, March 
 16, 1918, Warrington Dawson, ed., War Memoirs of William G. Sharp (London, 1931), 
 pp. 283-284. Ambassador Francis also feared a possible Japanese-German understand¬ 
 ing (Francis to Lansing, March 9, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igi8, Russia, 
 
 II, 73 - 74 )- 
 
 70 Jusserand to Lansing, March 12, 19x8, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 75-77. 
 
 77 Lansing to Jusserand, March 16, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 80. 
 
 Wiseman to Drummond, March 14, 1918, Wiseman Papers. The American 
 press generally approved of intervention, and those who vetoed the suggestions did so 
 on the grounds of immorality and inexpediency rather than fear of Japan. Only the 
 Hearst press whipped up the Japanese bogey (Literary Digest, LVI, March 16, 1918, 
 136). On March 14 Balfour had been called upon in the House of Commons to de¬ 
 fend Japanese motives regarding Siberia (Great Britain, House of Commons Debates, 
 5th series, CIV, 553-554; for further parliamentary reaction to Japanese intervention, 
 see ibid., pp. 530-556. 
 
3 6 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 In the meant ime»-Allkd--fepe>rts~drom"Rtrssia were optimist-ie-eea-- 
 
 ^ cerning the possib ility of JBolsheviUcontinua nce in the war. At the 
 height of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, Trotsky had sent a French 
 officer to ask Ambassador Francis what moral and material assistance 
 the Allies could render if peace were not ratified at Moscow. Francis 
 had assured him that he would recommend moral and material co¬ 
 operation provided organized resistance was sincerely established. 79 
 Trots ky also sent a no t e via R aAmiCHiffi-R^ins-whick-j aier.ifirally ask ed- 
 tjie kind of support R ussia.could expeet-from-the Allies in genera l-and— 
 the United States in particular, if they continued in the war. 89 
 ' President Wilson’s message to the Russian people which had been 
 sent on March 11 was considered an adequate response to Trotsky’s ap¬ 
 peal. 81 The message had been written at the request of Colonel House, 
 who was not so much concerned about Russia as he was eager to seize 
 the opportunity of clearing up the Far Eastern situation without men¬ 
 tioning Japan specifically: “What you would say about Russia and 
 against Germany could be made to apply to Japan or any other power 
 seeking to do what we know Germany is attempting.” 82 
 
 The presidential message expressed sympathy with the Russian 
 people and added that although the United States was not then “in a 
 position to render the direct and effective aid” it desired, nevertheless 
 it would utilize “every opportunity to secure for Russia once more com¬ 
 plete sovereignty and independence in her own affairs and full restora¬ 
 tion to her great role in the life of Europe and the modern world.” 83 
 
 In view of the critical peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, Am¬ 
 bassador Francis opposed any action to intervene in Russia. 84 Maddin 
 Summers, consul general at Moscow, opposed particularly the Jap¬ 
 anese moving into Siberia alone. 85 Lockhart, the British agent in 
 Russia, who had intimate contact with Trotsky, reported that Trotsky 
 
 70 Francis to Lansing, March 5, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igi8, Russia, 
 I, 392. 
 
 80 Francis to Lansing, March 12, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igi8, 
 
 Russia, I, 397-398; Graves, America’s Siberian Adventure, pp. 122-123; John A. White, 
 
 The Siberian Intervention (Princeton, 1950), pp. 90-91. 
 
 81 Lansing to Francis, March 19, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igi8, 
 
 Russia, I, 402. 
 
 82 House to Wilson, March 10, 1918, Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 399; Polk to 
 Summers, March 11, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igi8, Russia, I, 395-396. 
 
 83 Pauline Tompkins, American-Russian Relations in the Far East (New York, 
 1949), p. 61; W. A. Williams, American-Russian Relations, 1781-^47 (New York, 
 1952), pp. 140-141; Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 420. 
 
 84 Francis to Lansing, March 10, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igi8, 
 
 Russia, I, 394-395. 
 
 88 Summers to Lansing, March 18, 1918, file 861.00/1398, D.S.N.A. 
 
WILSON SAYS NO 
 
 37 
 
 really wanted a working agreement with the Allies, and that a Jap¬ 
 anese expedition would throw all of Russia into the hands of Ger¬ 
 many. 86 Similar views were reported by Sadoul, the French special 
 agent in Russia, and Raymond Robins. 8 ' 
 
 Despite these reasgwdng reports from Russia, the^Siipremr War- 
 Council, in mid-March, Adopted a resolution admitting the “principle 
 
 q £ Japanese intervention in Siberia,” 88 The French and Italian repre¬ 
 
 sentatives were anxious to send a joint note to President Wilson, ap¬ 
 pealing for his consent to Japanese intervention as the mandatory of 
 the Allies. Balfour and Lloyd George, however, advocated delay in 
 view of the recent reports from Russia. 89 During the course of the 
 meeting Clemenceau could not help expressing himself on the attitude 
 of President Wilson: 
 
 President Wilson was pursuing an extraordinary policy. He was willing 
 to fight side by side with us, but does not wish to be our political ally, 
 he wishes to reserve his action in Europe and Asia; so far as Europe is 
 concerned I understand the President’s attitude because there are shades of 
 policy unintelligible across the Atlantic; I am nevertheless not uneasy as I 
 have great confidence in the President. . . 90 
 
 Balfour finally agreed to join in a joint JiQte to Pr.esideni WiLsoa.on 
 ^ March 16. TTU Tu^umerits' for intervention were again repeated, and 
 the note concluded that without 
 
 the active support of the United States ... it would be useless to approach 
 the Japanese Government, and even if the Japanese Government consented 
 to act on the representations of France, Italy and Great Britain, such action, 
 without the approval of the United States Government, would lose half its 
 moral authority. 91 
 
 Wil son, sustained by Ijjause^epli€d--to-Trcrrd~R^a4iftg4--.‘I_ hav e not 
 changed my m ind.” 92 
 
 Wilson was fortified in his decision by Admiral Austin M. Knight, 
 
 86 Lockhart to British Foreign Office, March 5, 1918, C. K. Cumming and Walter 
 W. Pettit, Russian-American Relations (New York, 1920), pp. 82-83. 
 
 87 Jacques Sadoul, Notes sur la revolution bolshevique, octobre, igi7-janvier, igig 
 (Paris, 1926), pp. 284-285; Robins to Francis, March 27, 1918, Cumming and Pettit, 
 Russian-American Relations, p. 116. See also John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovs\, 
 the Forgotten Peace, March, tgi8 (London, 1938), pp. 288-303. 
 
 88 General Jean Jules Henry Mordacq, Le Ministere Clemenceau, journal d'un temoin 
 (4 vols.; Paris, 1931), I, 219; Palmer, Bliss, p. 290; Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 400. 
 
 80 Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 400; Lloyd George, Memoirs, VI, 167; Baker, 
 Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 29. 
 
 80 Frazier to Lansing, March 16, 1918, House Papers. 
 
 01 Text of Balfour’s dispatch in Lloyd George, Memoirs, VI, 165-166. 
 
 82 Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 33; Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 401. 
 
38 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 commander-in-chief of the Asiatic fleet, who cabled that there was 
 . absolutely no dange r that munitions at Vladivostok would j gach-the—. 
 
 of German 
 
 '’Tt is safe to say that no real necessity exists for armed intervention in Siberia 
 unless such intervention is desirable for the establishment of order. It, how¬ 
 ever, intervention should be decided upon, it is of the first importance that 
 Japan should not be permitted to act alone. This is the one point upon 
 which everybody who knows conditions and sentiment in Russia is abso¬ 
 lutely agreed. It is universally believed by Russians that Japan desires to 
 take over a large part of Siberia and no arguments can shake their belief. 93 
 
 Although rebuffed by Wilson’s opposition to the Allied joint appeal, 
 the British soon devised a new pla n of action. They proposed that an 
 inter-Allied expedition of American, British, and Japanese troops be 
 substituted for lone Japanese intervention. By this scheme they hoped 
 to overcome not only Bolshevik objections to military action in Siberia, 
 but also President Wilson’s opposition. 94 On March 26 Wiseman dis¬ 
 cussed the new proposal with House, who appeared sympathetic. 
 House believed th at mafly objections to int erventi on would disappear 
 if it co u ld h p pu 1- 1 ip rm> an jp tf>r-Ah|pd basis ancl that it was of the 
 utm ost importan ce to se cure, an invita tjon-fmm TrotskyJP— 
 
 ~~ Meanwhile, by the beginning of April it appeared that the Ameri¬ 
 can policy of nonintervention in Siberia had triumphed. President 
 Wilson had successfully resisted all Allied appeals. The Japanese gov¬ 
 ernment had agreed to follow American rather than British advice, and 
 the Allies themselves had admitted that Japanese intervention without 
 the approval of the United States “would lose half its moral authority.” 
 When Wilson was handed a stack of memoranda on the Siberian 
 question, he wrote Lansing, “I must say that none of these memo¬ 
 randa has anything in it that is at all persuasive with me. I hope that 
 you feel the same way.” 96 
 
 93 Knight to Daniels, March 18, 1918, Polk Papers. When Admiral W. S. Benson 
 received this report he was very much opposed to sending it to Bliss, as Benson was 
 so much in favor of intervention (Auchincloss, Diary, March 20, 1918). 
 
 94 Lloyd George, Memoirs, VI, 167; Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 402. 
 
 96 Reading to Balfour, March 7, 1918, Wiseman Papers; Seymour, Intimate Papers, 
 III, 402. 
 
 "Wilson to Lansing, April 4, 1918, file 86i.oo/i439‘/2, D.S.N.A. 
 
 hands of the Germans. Furtherxnor%-he-€ould- 
 
 influencesTrrvvork in sup port of the Bolsh eviks: 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 The Pressure Increases 
 
 
 O N APRIL 5, 1918, a Japanese armed force landed at Vladivostbk^ 
 and began to patrol the city. The announced reason was the mur- j 
 der of three Japanese nationals in the business district of the city the \ 
 day previous. The Japanese admiral acted immediately without wait¬ 
 ing for an investigation by the local Russian authorities. He notified 
 Russian officials that this action was taken to protect the lives of^-. 
 Japanese residents. 1 The British also landed fifty armed sailors on the 
 afternoon of April 5, ostensibly to protect the British Consulate, but 
 in reality “to ensure that any move made would be an Allied one, nof 
 an independent Japanese venture.” 2 On the next day the Japanese 
 landed two hundred and fifty additional sailors. Although the French 
 consul asked the Japanese to guard the French Consulate, the American 
 consul did not feel it necessary to ask for protection. 3 The British 
 governme nt urged the United States m LipH tr oops and thuFlo insure 
 ' Minify of actio n; but the American government was unmoved by the 
 appeal. JTheTanguage used by the British Foreign Office~vvas sig¬ 
 nificant: “It is unnecessary for me to point out the essential importance 
 of our acting together in this question.” 4 
 
 
 & 
 
 ‘Lansing to Francis, April 5, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, ioo-ioi. The Japanese admiral furnished a copy of his statement to the com¬ 
 manders of both the British and American vessels (Noulens, Mon ambassade en Russie, 
 II, 65). According to Noulens the news of the Japanese landing was greeted with 
 joy by the Allied missions in Russia. 
 
 3 Lloyd George, Memoirs, VI, 167; Caldwell to Lansing, April 6, 1918, file 861.00/ 
 1439, D.S.N.A.; London Times, April 12, 1918; C. H. Smith to H. H. Fisher, Feb. 14, 
 1931, Railway Service Corps Papers. 
 
 8 Caldwell to Lansing, April 6, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 105. 
 
 4 British Foreign Office to British Ambassador in Washington, April 7, 1918, United 
 States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 108. Ambassador Francis at Vologda also 
 urged Allied unity of action (Francis to Lansing, April 7, 1918, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 107). 
 
4 o 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 In Bolshevik circles the Ja panese-British landing was regarded as 
 d ie begmhing~~oF inte n^en^on- again s t th e 4 ^ 4 sh eviksr~n ^aresTs arose 
 immediately from both the Vladivostok Soviet, and the Soviet authori¬ 
 t ies m Moscow. They denounced the landing bitterly, stating that 
 the murder of the Japanese subjects was a part of a carefully laid 
 plan to seize Russia’s Far Eastern outlet. The Council of Peoples’ 
 Commissars called upon the “toiling masses” to resist the “imperialist 
 blow from the east.” 5 George Chicherin, the Acting Commissar for 
 Foreign Affairs, addressed a note to the French consul general in 
 Moscow, to Bruce Lockhart, and to Raymond Robins, protesting 
 against the Japanese-British descent on Vladivostok, and demanding 
 immediate withdrawal. Although the Bolsheviks indicated by their 
 fanner that they regarded the landing as a hostile act against the, 
 J Soviet government, they appeared willing to negotiate on intervention 
 in Siberia, provided it was an Allied rath er th a n an exclusively Jap¬ 
 anese affair. 6 
 
 The Soviet protest was not without effect among the Allies. The 
 British government instructed Lockhart to assure Trotsky that the 
 landing was made “solely with the object of affording security for the 
 life and property of foreign residents in Vladivostok,” and had no re¬ 
 lation to the larger question of Allied intervention in the Far East. 
 The captain of the Suffolk, British cruiser at Vladivostok, had been di¬ 
 rected to settle the difficulties with the local authorities and end the 
 incident peaceably. The Japanese government professed agreement 
 with this position. 7 The official silence maintained by the United 
 States was regarded by the British as an indication of disapproval. 8 
 
 Throughout the month of April the Allies continued their diplo¬ 
 matic appeals to President Wilson. The French government resumed 
 the offensive in a note to Lansing, April 8, 1918. The usual arguments 
 for Japanese intervention with Allied consent were repeated. Attention 
 was called to the increased activity of the prisoners of war and to the 
 importance of organizing resistance against German domination in 
 
 5 Noulens, Mon ambassade en Russie, II, 66-67; Bunyan, Intervention, pp. 68-95; 
 Cumming and Pettit, Russian-American Relations, pp. 194-195. 
 
 6 DeWitt C. Poole (consul at Moscow) to Lansing, April 6, 1918, United States, 
 Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 104-105. For selected documents on the Bolshevik 
 reaction to the Anglo-Japanese landing, see Jane Degras, ed., Soviet Documents on 
 Foreign Policy (2 vols.; London, 1951), I, 67-69. 
 
 7 Lockhart, British Agent, pp. 268-269; British Foreign Office to Lockhart, April 
 7, 1918, Morris to Lansing, April 13, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 109, 121. 
 
 8 Great Britain, House of Commons Debates, 5th series, CIV, 1611-1612; London 
 Times, April 12, 1918. 
 
THE PRESSURE INCREASES 
 
 41 
 
 Russia and Siberia. The French pointed to the possibility that the 
 Bolsheviks in Moscow might be induced to accept Japanese inter¬ 
 vention. 9 The French ambassador also indicated that independent 
 Japanese action in Vladivostok “without any guarantee to the Allies 
 or Russia . . . would seem to be a departure that may draw it away 
 from us and nearer to the Germans.” 10 
 
 [usse rand addressed a second note to Secretary Lansing on April 
 c jf , in wKlcH~~he~Te port c d thtmh'g Freffitffiambassador in Tokyo had 
 beenassured~othdre-A villingness ef -the-JaptriT ese government to guaran- 
 ’ tee noninterference in the domestic affairs of RussTa. 44 ~Two~da ys ~ la t e r—- 
 the French government _ irrformed Lansing of the views of Joseph 
 Noulens, the French ambassador to Russia, who urged Japanese mili¬ 
 tary action to prevent German control of Russia. He believed that 
 “in order to offer the required guarantees to the Entente powers as 
 well as to Russian opinion, the Japanese intervention should bear an 
 inter-allied character which of course implies the consent of the United 
 States.” 12 The State Department found nothing in the French notes 
 that necessitated a change in policy in the Far East. 13 
 „ While the French government was pressing notes upon the State __- 
 
 Department, the British did not rem ai n quiescent— TWy wer e nttempt — 
 ing througK~Bruce Lockhart to persuade the Soviet-anthorities to par- 
 
 "Tiapate in the war against Germany with Allied military assistance. 
 They desired an invitation from the Bolsheviks for military assistance 
 
 through the ports of Murmansk in North Russia and Vladivostok. 14 
 The British Foreign Office had requested earlier that Colonel Robins 
 co-operate with Lockhart in obtaining from the Soviet authorities a 
 request for Allied intervention. Lord Reading wrote Secretary Lan¬ 
 sing that Japan might intervene alone in Siberia in “self-defense,” if 
 
 -k 
 
 9 On Feb. 19, 1918, William Phillips, Assistant Secretary of State, reported that the 
 French had intimated to the Bolsheviks that they were ready to give assistance if the 
 Bolsheviks would resist the German menace and defend Russia. The French government 
 asked if the United States would give similar instructions to its ambassador in Petro- 
 
 grad. Below the note appears the following in pencil: “It is out of the question. Sub¬ 
 
 mitted to president who says the same thing” (Phillips to Lansing, Feb. 19, 1918, file 
 861.00/1125, D.S.N.A.). 
 
 10 Jusserand to Lansing, April 8, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 109-112. 
 
 11 United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 128-129. 
 
 12 Jusserand to Lansing, April 23, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 132-133. 
 
 13 Lansing to Jusserand, May 7, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 
 Russia, II, 154. 
 
 14 Reading to Lansing, April 16, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, /9/S, 
 
 Russia, I, 500. 
 
42 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 the Bolsheviks did not invite intervention. This was a possibility which 
 the British government desired to forestall. 15 
 
 On April 25 Lansing received a cable from Balfour containing a 
 new proposal for intervention. 16 Emphasizing the importance of treat¬ 
 ing Europe and Asia as a single front, Balfou r urged the re-establish¬ 
 ment of an Allied front in Russia. T his c ould best be done by sending 
 Allied nssistnn ceTr ottr^MtlTffigns^mTi Tlie ~no rth.~Transcaucasia in~the 
 south, and Siberia in the east. The eastern approach was regarded 
 as the most important, and in that theater “Japan would clearly have 
 to furnish the greater part of any considerable military force which 
 might be used.” Although the B ritish desired that all the Allie s 
 participate, th ey wanted the force sent to Siber ia t o be comp osed pre¬ 
 dominantly ofT apan es c and -Ameri ca n troops . The War Cabinet in¬ 
 quired whether President Wilson would agree to: 
 
 1. Great Britain and the United States to make a simultaneous proposal 
 to the Bolshevist government for intervention by the Allies on the lines 
 indicated, an undertaking to be given for the withdrawal of all Allied 
 forces at the conclusion of hostilities. 
 
 2. An American force, composed as described above, to be sent to the Far 
 East. 17 
 
 Balfour suggested that Japan be given the military command of 
 the proposed expedition, and that the expedition be accompanied by 
 “a mission from each Allied country, including a strong propaganda 
 detachment.” Balfour pointed out that if the President did not concur 
 with the British proposals, the British government would proceed no 
 further with them. 18 
 
 Two days later, on April 27, Lansing received another telegram from 
 the British Foreign Secretary, which indicated that Trotsky, Soviet 
 Commissar for War, appeared willing to accept military assistance 
 through Vladivostok under Japanese command, provided that Russian 
 
 15 Reading to Lansing, April 16, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igi 8 , 
 Russia, I, 499-501; Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 97-98. 
 
 16 Colonel House wrote Wilson earlier that Balfour had sent an entirely new pro¬ 
 posal regarding Russia—“one that I think you will approve.” Reading asked for an 
 appointment in order to discuss it with the President, and called at the White House 
 on April 25 (House to Wilson, April 24, 1918, House Papers; Baker, Woodrow Wilson, 
 Vin, 105). 
 
 17 Balfour to Reading, April 25, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igi 8 , 
 Russia, II, 136. 
 
 18 Balfour to Reading, April 25, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igi 8 , 
 Russia, II, 135-137; Bunyan, Intervention, pp. 73-74; Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 
 
THE PRESSURE INCREASES 
 
 43 
 
 territorial integrity was guaranteed. 19 On May Reading in¬ 
 
 formed Secretary Lansing of three omrses open to the Allies in regard 
 in Trotsky, nam ely: “to~de£y-him, to work with him, or to do noth- 
 _ing.” Balfour considered the first alternative^dangerous^and the last 7 
 fatal. Thus, only the second remained, “whatever misgivings this may 
 cause us.” 20 
 
 To this point certainly, one of the main reasons for the American 
 ref usM to interve~he~m~Siberia was - that n o invitation was forthcoming 
 from the Russians. The British, therefore, were exerting everyTTfort 
 to secure an invitation which would be acceptable to the President. 
 Lord Reading believed that since the Soviets were the de facto gov¬ 
 ernment, they should be approached and induced to extend the invita¬ 
 tion. Count Vincenzo Macchi di Cellere, the Italian ambassador in 
 Washington, feared that British negotiations might constitute a recog¬ 
 nition of the Soviet regime. Lord Reading admitted that the possi¬ 
 bility existed. However, he believed that such a course was justified 
 if it secured President Wilson’s approval of inter-Allied action in 
 Siberia. As the Assistant Secretary of State pointed out, “The British 
 are trying to create a situation in Siberia to suit the President, even 
 though in so doing, they may be obliged to come to some form of 
 agreement with the Soviets.” 21 
 
 American resistance to French and British pressure was fortified 
 by reports from the Far East during April. Viscount Ishii, newly 
 appointed Japanese ambassador to the United States, was reported to 
 advocate “a policy of no action in Siberia without the fullest under¬ 
 standing” with the United States. 22 From China, Minister Reinsch ap : 
 proved his government’s position on intervention, and added that 
 “only reactionaries want intervention at all costs even in the last resort 
 by Japan alone.” Reinsch advocated e conomic aid rather than milU 
 tary action to save~~STBeria and Russfa from TSermlin domination. 23 
 Professor Thomas (_UMasa ryk 7 Presiden t of the Czechoslovak National 
 CouncTlj also proposed economic action and emphasized the necessity' 
 
 19 Balfour to Reading, April 19F8, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 140; Lockhart, British Agent, pp. 267-269. 
 
 20 Balfour to Reading, April 29, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 148-149; Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 420-422. 
 
 21 Memorandum of a Conversation between the Italian Ambassador and the Assistant 
 Secretary of State, May 7, 1918, file 861.00/1827, D.S.N.A. At the end of April, the 
 British Foreign Office instructed its consul in Vladivostok that intervention must have 
 Bolshevik consent, as they represented the de facto government (Dugdale, Balfour, II, 
 260). 
 
 22 April 5, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 101. 
 
 23 Reinsch to Lansing, April 10, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 
44 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 o f a unifi ed^ Allied poEcw-toward-Russi a~.~ He recommended de facto 
 recognition of the Bolshevik government as well as “extensive propa¬ 
 ganda under American supervision throughout eastern Siberia.” 24 
 
 The State Department took no immediate action on these economic 
 proposals. However, it did not give up consideration of military in¬ 
 tervention. This was indicated by a significant event. The Italian 
 and Belgian governments requested the United States War Depart¬ 
 ment to aid them in transporting some of their troops from the Far 
 East to Europe. The State Department advised the withdrawal of 
 these requests. The Department deemed it advisable that “as many 
 as possible of the governments at war with Germany should be 
 temporarily represented by military forces in the Far East.” If Allied 
 troops were withdrawn “it might be embarrassing to send back there 
 other such troops.” Lansing hastened to inform the American am¬ 
 bassador in Paris that this note did not commit the United States to 
 intervention. He added that America was guided by political ex¬ 
 pediency and the possibility of intervention. 25 
 
 On April 28 Lansing had an interview with Viscount Ishii concern¬ 
 ing intervention. Ishii said that he would personally welcome Ameri¬ 
 can or Allied participation in a military expedition to Siberia. He be¬ 
 lieved his government held the same view. The ambassador added 
 “that it was evident that the presence at least of troops of the United 
 States, Japan, and China would go far to remove the suspicion of the 
 Russians as to the purpose of territorial conquest which might be in¬ 
 ferred if Japan acted alone.” He informed Lansing that Japan could 
 send 250,000 men into Siberia immediately, and could add an additional 
 150,000 men later. Although the British government desired to push 
 the Japanese forces as far as the Ural Mountains, Ishii believed 
 that it would be impractical to go further than Irkutsk, which was 
 only half the distance to the Urals. 26 When Minister Reinsch learned 
 that the Japanese government was willing to “advance only as far as 
 Irkutsk,” he reported: “So far as disclosed the Japanese plans exhibit 
 little advantage to the Allies and offer prospect of Japan’s creating for 
 herself an exclusive position in Eastern Asia.” 27 Throughout the inter- 
 
 24 Morris to Lansing, April 13, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 122; Masaryk to Charles R. Crane, April 10, 1918, Wilson Papers, series II; 
 Masaryk, The Maying of a State, pp. 192-194. 
 
 25 Lansing to Sharp, April 23, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 134 - 135 - 
 
 26 Lansing to Wilson, April 29, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 144-145. 
 
 27 Reinsch to Lansing, April 27, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II. 141. 
 
THE PRESSURE INCREASES 
 
 45 
 
 view with Lansing, Xshii expressed his government’s willingness to co¬ 
 operate with the United States in the war and to be guided by Ameri¬ 
 can policy with respect to military action in the Russian Far East. 
 
 The State Department found it difficult to accept these views at 
 face value, because of the opposing views which existed on the sub¬ 
 ject within official Japanese circles. It was well-known that Viscount 
 Motono, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the entire Japanese War O ffice, 
 and most of the leading officers of the army favored immediate inter- 
 'VenrioTTThm were hcM~back h v (kmHTMasakntn Temnrhi, Prem ier, and 
 BarorPShimpei Goto, Minister tor Home Affairs. In an authorized 
 
 m 
 
 iv, 
 
 u 
 
 interview, Terauchi pointed out that unless the German menace grew 
 considerably stronger, Japan would not intervene except with the 
 warm approval of her allies and the assurance of economic support. 
 She preferred to have no foreign troops co-operating, except possibly 
 small contingents of Chinese. However, she would consent to Allied 
 co-operation, if the Allies insisted. If she did intervene, she had no 
 intention of going beyond a limited objective, probably Irkutsk. Her 
 intervention would be taken primarily to stop the spread of anarchy 
 and German intrigue in the Far East; it would be purely a measure 
 of national self-defense for Japan. Thus, it would probably have little 
 effect toward relieving the pressure of German arms on the Western 
 Front. 28 
 
 Throughout 1918 the threatened activities of Austro-German war 
 prisoners were a vital factor in the Allied pleas for intervention. Camps 
 for war prisoners existed in the vicinity of Irkutsk, ChitaJ^Habarovsk, 
 and Nikolsk. As early as December 15, 1917, Major Walter S. Drys- 
 dale, American military attache at Peking, had reported that there 
 were about thirty thousand Austrian and German prisoners in the 
 Baikal region and in Eastern Siberia. However, he believed they con¬ 
 stituted no serious menace to Allied interests. 29 A week later Cald¬ 
 well reported that many of these prisoners were escaping. He be¬ 
 lieved that in case of a separate peace between Russia and Germany, 
 the acts of these prisoners of war would necessitate Allied control of 
 Vladivostok and the Priamur District. 30 Throughout February and 
 early March, 1918, Stevens, Colonel Emerson, Ernest L. Harris (consul 
 
 28 Gregory Mason, “Japan, Germany, Russia and the Allies; An Authorized Inter¬ 
 view with Count Masakata Terauchi, Premier of Japan,” Outloo\, CXIX (May i, 1918), 
 18-22. For the reaction of the American press to Japanese intervention, see Current 
 Opinion, LXIV (April, 1918), 234-235. 
 
 29 Drysdale to Reinsch, Feb. 5, 1918, file 861.00/1280, D.S.N.A. 
 
 30 Caldwell to Lansing, Dec. 22, 1917, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 10. 
 
46 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 general at Irkutsk), and Willing Spencer (charge at Peking) reported 
 an increased activity among German war prisoners. 31 Spencer, how¬ 
 ever, admitted that most of the news emanating from Irkutsk came 
 from the French consul general, whose views were “slightly colored by 
 his desire for immediate intervention on the part of Japan.” 32 After 
 the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, rumors increased to the 
 effect that the prisoners of war were being armed and were a dangerous 
 menace to the Allies. Some observers disagreed with these reports. 
 Admiral Knight wrote Secretary Daniels that “there was no danger 
 of German influences at work in Siberia and that there was no real 
 need for intervention.” 33 
 
 When Major Drysdale was sent on a special mission to investigate 
 the rumors, he reported that the prisoners of war were armed only in 
 certain localities. 34 Both Trotsky and Raymond Robins denied the 
 rumors. A special mission of investigation was sent from Moscow un¬ 
 der the leadership of Captain William B. Webster of the American 
 Red Cross Mission, and Captain W. L. Hicks, a member of the 
 British Mission in Moscow. 30 They reported that the activities of 
 the war prisoners did not endanger Allied interests. Yet it is to be 
 noted that the views of the Webster-Hicks Mission differed materially 
 from those of the Allied consuls and other sources of information in 
 Siberia. Webster believed the differences were due to three major 
 factors. First the Allied consuls at Irkutsk were anti-Bolshevik in 
 sympathy and had not examined Soviet sources concerning the danger. 
 Second, their information came largely from anti-Bolshevik sources. 
 Third, the consuls had little time to make proper investigations be¬ 
 cause of their limited staffs. 36 
 
 31 Morris to Lansing, Feb. 13, 1918, Spencer to Lansing, March 6, 1918, United 
 States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 45, 69-70; Morris to Lansing, Feb. 17, 
 1918, March 1, 1918, United States Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, III, 220-221, 223- 
 224; Spencer to Lansing, March 16, 1918, file 861.00/1306, D.S.N.A. 
 
 32 Spencer to Lansing, March 6, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 69-70. 
 
 33 March 18, 1918, Polk Papers. 
 
 34 United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 80, 91, 94-95. On March 
 15 the Japanese Minister of War reported that there were 94,000 German prisoners 
 in Siberia east of Lake Baikal and 60,000 to the west of the Lake (London Times, 
 March 19, 1918). 
 
 36 Francis to Lansing, March 21, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 83-84. 
 
 36 Cumming and Pettit, Russian-American Relations, p. 180. See also Lockhart, 
 British Agent, pp. 248-249, and United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 84, 
 96-97, 122. General Graves says that “subsequent events have shown that the in¬ 
 formation furnished the United States government by these investigators was absolutely 
 correct. Siberia was a great field for propaganda and even Consular Agents of the 
 
THE PRESSURE INCREASES 47 
 
 Other observers supported the views of Webster and Hicks. Min¬ 
 ister Reinsch advised that “there is no evidence of a concerted plan 
 on the part of the Germans to control Siberia through the prisoners 
 nor could such an attempt succeed. Earlier reports were exaggerated; 
 most of these reports came from one source in Irkutsk. . . .” 3 ' Masaryk, 
 who traveled through Siberia in early April en route to the United 
 States, was convinced that “there is no organized German influence in 
 eastern Siberia. [I] saw no evidence anywhere of organization of 
 German or Austrian prisoners. . . .” 38 If there were large bodies of 
 armed Austro-German war prisoners in Siberia, they were evidently 
 playing a game of hide-and-seek. 
 
 The persistent reports of armed and organized prisoners in Siberia 
 caused Lansing considerable worry. If the reports were true, he be¬ 
 lieved a change in policy was necessary. Perhaps it might even be 
 wise to sanction Japan’s entry into Siberia as the mandatory of the 
 Allies. 39 
 
 Throughout the ea rly spri ng of_i9i8_Amhasador Francis at Volog¬ 
 da, Russia, vacillated between interventio n and nonintervention. Al¬ 
 though he continued to hope that the Bolsheviks would request Allied 
 intervention, he believed the Allies should intervene immediately, if 
 evidence proved that the Bolsheviks were controlled by Germany. 40 
 However, he was willing to ignore the “mistakes and outrages” praC -1 
 ticecTEU the~Soviet gov^r nm e nt - i rr-or derTo induce them to~ask~~for 
 AlliecPassistance.” ByFThe middle of ApriT Francis had begun to 
 douEFBbfh the ability ot the BoIsHevikUto remain in power and th e 
 possibility of obtaining"an invitation to intervene from tj iem. He 
 reported, “1 think time is fast approaching for Allied intervention and 
 Allies should be prepared to act promptly.” 42 Francis, however, reg¬ 
 istered his opposition to lone Japanese intervention. Although he did 
 
 various Governments had great trouble to know what credence to give reports they 
 received. In this vast country, with a limited means of obtaining information, it was 
 a difficult problem to check the accuracy of information” (Graves, America’s Siberian 
 Adventure, p. 26). 
 
 37 Reinsch to Lansing, April 10, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 
 II, 117. 
 
 38 Masaryk to Charles R. Crane, April 10, 1918, Wilson Papers, series II; Masaryk, 
 Maying of a State, pp. 192-194. 
 
 30 Lansing to Wilson, March 24, 1918, Lansing Papers, II, 357-358. 
 
 40 Francis to Lansing, April 1, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 
 I, 490 
 
 41 Francis to Lansing, April 5, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 
 III, 228. 
 
 42 Francis to Lansing, April 13, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 
 II, 123-124. 
 
48 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 not believe Japan would intervene against American wishes, he could 
 not close his eyes “to [a] situation which gives a grasping nation a 
 magnificent opportunity.” 43 
 
 After Count Wilhelm von Mirbach, German ambassador to the 
 Soviet government, arrived in Moscow on April 26, Francis decided 
 that the Allies ought to intervene without an invitation in order to 
 prevent the extension of German domination over Russia. Francis 
 now believed that Japanese demands for compensation to intervene in 
 Siberia should be met, if they were reasonable. Doubting whether 
 the Allies could “longer afford to overlook principles which Lenin is 
 aggressively championing,” he recommended intervention as an anti- 
 Bolshevik measure. 44 Despite this advice, Francis continued to hope 
 that the Bolsheviks would invite intervention. 45 On May 29 Francis 
 repeated his recommendation for intervention without Bolshevik con¬ 
 sent. Bruce Lockhart, British unofficial representative, had also begun 
 to urge “prompt intervention regardless of Bolshevik consent.” 46 The 
 [French and Italian ambassadors at Vologda had been advocating such 
 (action for over two months. 47 
 
 Appeals for Allied action in Siberia increased throughout the 
 
 E nth of May. Even those American representatives who had opposed 
 srvention earlier now began to urge it. Both Major David P. Bar¬ 
 its, military attache in Russia and Major Drysdale, military attache 
 1 at Peking, began to advocate Allied action. This may have been due 
 to Semenov’s victories in Siberia. 48 Minister Reinsch felt that the Si¬ 
 berian situation was distinct from that in Russia, and he recommended 
 that the Allies co-operate in organizing a representative government 
 for strengthening common defense against German dominion.” 49 On 
 ay 16 he reiterated his views: “Situation in Siberia seems more favor¬ 
 able than ever for effective joint action of Allies and American initia- 
 
 43 Francis to Lansing, April 18, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 126; Noulens, Mon ambassade en Ritssie, II, 50-51. 
 
 44 Francis to Lansing, May 5, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 I, 519-520; Francis, Russia from the American Embassy, p. 302. 
 
 45 Francis to Lansing, May 20, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 
 I, 526-527. 
 
 46 Francis to Lansing, May 29, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 
 II, 179-180; Lockhart, British Agent, pp. 279-281; Noulens, Mon ambassade en Russie, 
 II, 117. 
 
 47 Sharp to Lansing, May 26, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 173. 
 
 48 Reinsch to Lansing, April 24, 1918, file 861.00/1870, D.S.N.A.; Reinsch to 
 Lansing, May 10, 1918, file 861.00/1776, D.S.N.A. 
 
 49 Reinsch to Lansing, May 10, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 158, 160. 
 
THE PRESSURE INCREASES 
 
 49 
 
 tive. A commission authorized to command moderate financial sup¬ 
 port would be able to reconstruct at least Siberia as an Allied factor. 
 Should America remain inactive longer friendly feeling is likely to 
 fail.” 50 By the end of May Reinsch began to suspect that Japan was 
 ready to act independently in the Far East. Japan had concluded sue- } 
 cessfully a military agreement with China, and was wholeheartedly sup- 
 porting Semenov. Reinsch, therefore, began to demand Allied action, / 
 fearing that delay was dangerous. 51 John F. Stevens also felt that the *1 
 need for Allied action against the “Bolsheviks in Siberia was impera¬ 
 tive.” He cabled an urgent appeal: “German propaganda, influence, oc¬ 
 cupation, increasing daily. Quick effective Allied action Siberia against 
 treacherous com bination necessary . . Tlf At hes-ex pec t t o ^save Siberia 
 they_ shou!d move.” 02 _ — 
 
 — MJurlngThefirst two weeks in May the question of intervention was 
 revived in Tokyo largely as a result of Ishii’s talk with Lansing on in¬ 
 tervention, Semenov’s success in Trans-Baikal, and the activity of the 
 French Major Jean Pichon, who was then in Japan urging immediate 
 action. The British ambassador to Japan was also advocating immedi¬ 
 ate intervention while the Japanese General Staff was urging Allied 
 intervention under Japanese command. 53 Ambassador Morris noted 
 that there was apparent satisfaction among the members of the Japa¬ 
 nese General Staff with the Sino-Japanese military negotiations for co¬ 
 operation against the Bolsheviks in Siberia. 
 
 The news that China and Japan had concluded a military agree ¬ 
 ment on Mav 16. iqi8 . was not welcome in Washington. As early 
 as February^CEB^TFfe State Department had been aware that negoti¬ 
 ations for such an agreement had been in progress. Reinsch had then 
 
 informed Lansing that Japan had prop osed to Ch iria_lhat— th e two - 
 
 nations co- operate “in restoring order in Sib eria.” Without knowledge 
 ^ of any of the detai ls, the Chinese President had approved of the 
 , measure in principle. China had then turned to the United States for 
 adviCe-e n the matt e r -A 1 " Lansing found it difficult to protest against 
 the measure since it was ostensibly aimed at a common foe. He did, 
 
 r>0 United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 162. 
 
 31 May 30, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 18 x. 
 
 52 Stevens to Lansing, May 30, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 
 II, 182. 
 
 63 Morris to Lansing, May 16, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 
 II, 162-165. 
 
 54 Reinsch to Lansing, Feb. 23, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 
 II, 55. Reinsch frankly believed that “the revolution in Russia and the rise of Bol¬ 
 shevism” were used as a pretext for the agreement by Japan (Paul S. Reinsch, An 
 American Diplomat in China, New York, 1922, p. 351). 
 
50 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 however, advise the Chinese government that if Japan deemed mili¬ 
 tary occupation a necessity that China should guard the Chinese 
 Eastern Railway alone. 55 The Sino-Japanese conversations then pro¬ 
 ceeded, and on March 25, 1918, China and Japan agreed to co-operate 
 against those “hostile influences” in Russian territory which might 
 threaten the peace and security of the Far East. The agreement was 
 to be implemented by further provisions which were to be determined 
 by the military and naval authorities of both countries. 56 Morris, who 
 had managed to secure secretly a copy of the March agreement from 
 his British colleague, pointed out that, although simple in its terms, 
 it could easily lend itself to broad interpretation. He added that China 
 was too weak to resist Japanese encroachments, while military authori¬ 
 ties in the north of China were inclined to follow Japan’s lead. Never¬ 
 theless, Japan met with great difficulties in completing the subsidiary 
 agreement as to plans for military co-operation because China felt that 
 the occasion for such joint action had not yet arisen. For obvious 
 reasons, Chinese officials were reluctant to commit themselves to the 
 full extent desired by Japan, but they did finally consent. 57 
 
 The military agre ements of Mav t 6 and iq. iqi8. sign edTn-PekirTg 
 
 by the military - authorities of J apan an fl^jChin a, in ac c o r dance with -- 
 
 rhEj^'limirnirv~Tn^TenieiirTTTja rch 2‘cpro viflefl for Sino-Ja panese mil- 
 7 fafy~and naval co-operariorTTn the event that their territories or “ the- 
 ’^general-p eace and -tfanqnillit y in TfTT'extreme QrieTIt” s h ou l d he mron—— 
 ~aCetThv- 4 he-enrmy:'“Spe aficallv, the agreements provided for joinr-de---. 
 *fense of fhe Chinese border against “the ene my” for th£ jiura^n-of~thg~ 
 .^wanJdiriT dispilldl tjj Troops ou tside Chinese temXary^. and -us&_nf 
 me uhinese EasternRail way. Japane se tro ops were to respect the sow, 
 erfi mnty of Chinn.— The jcornpacts were to remain s~ec jif ~5 
 " TinT'ChinesE^civernrnent succeeded in introducing certain limit¬ 
 ing clauses to the effect that the treaty would not be enforced unless 
 the “general situation” required Chinese-Japanese co-operation in Si¬ 
 beria and Manchuria. Furthermore, Japan agreed that the treaties 
 
 5 “ Lansing to Page, Feb. 27, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igi 8 , Russia, 
 II, 57-58. 
 
 66 Spencer to Lansing, March 29, 1918, file 861.00/1381, D.S.N.A. 
 
 67 Morris to Lansing, April 19, 1918, file 793.94/683, D.S.N.A. 
 
 58 For text of treaties, see United States, Foreign Relations, igi 8 , pp. 222-226; 
 MacMurray, Treaties, II, 1407-1412; Japan Year Boo\, igig-ig2o, pp. 473-475. These 
 two treaties were supplemented by two additional treaties signed Sept. 6, 1918, and 
 Feb. 5, 1919. They provided for Japanese control of Chinese troops operating in Si¬ 
 beria and fixed the duration of the treaties (United States, Foreign Relations, igt 8 , 
 pp. 475-476; MacMurray, Treaties, II, 1413-1414). These treaties bound China even 
 more closely to Japan. See LaFargue, China and the World War, p. 177. 
 
THE PRESSURE INCREASES 
 
 51 
 
 would terminate upon the completion of the war, and that co-operation 
 would be confined to military action. 59 Reinsch immediately informed 
 the State Department of the agreement. 60 Since the Sino-Japanese 
 agreements were in terms aimed primarily at combating German in¬ 
 trigue, they seemed to favor the anti-Bolsheviks. Kolchak, however, 
 was well-acquainted with Japanese methods, and expressed the belief 
 that Japan had obtained the “approval of China to bring Japanese forces 
 into north Manchuria and ultimately secure complete control” of 
 the region. 61 
 
 While the Sino-Japanese negotiations were in progress, the Allies 
 continued to press for action in Siberia. Sir Henry Wilson epitomized 
 the attitude of most of the Allied leaders when he wrote in his diary 
 on May 11: “From a military point of view the Japanese Army could 
 not intervene too soon nor go too far, and ... I was always impressing 
 this on my Government, and hoped that the Japanese General Staff 
 would do the same to their Government.” 62 Balfour continued to 
 
 were beginning now tn we a r do wn Amer ica n - r es i s ta nce. On May n 
 Lansing informed Balfour that the problem of intervention had in 
 reality become two problems. Lansing was quite willing to consider 
 favorably the intervention of Allied troops in North Russia because he 
 could understand the military advantage in that area. However, he 
 could see no military advantage in sending troops into Siberia._ This’ 
 attitude is explai ned in par t by the fact that General March , as we ll as^ 
 -most of the leaders in the WaF Pepartm ent, believed it impossible to 
 Send a siif firienf military fnrrp info Siberia to dn anything effertiv i ? - 
 
 69 Reinsch to Lansing, May 18, 1918, file 793.94/689, D.S.N.A. 
 
 60 The British government, however, had not received the text of the agreement by 
 May 30 (Great Britain, House of Commons Debates, 5th series, CVI, 943). 
 
 01 Moser to Lansing, May 23, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 170. According to a Chinese scholar, the Sino-Japanese agreement meant nothing but 
 permission to let Japan “occupy North Manchuria” (Shuhsi Hsu, The Manchurian 
 Question, Peking, 1929, p. 39). A Japanese scholar frankly admitted that by the 
 agreement, Japan simply “obtained the right to station guards along the northern end 
 of the Chinese Eastern Railway” (Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, p. 209). For a 
 similar view, see also George E. Sokolsky, The Story of the Chinese Eastern Railway 
 (Shanghai, 1929), pp. 33-34. 
 
 62 Callwell, Sir Henry Wilson, II, 99. 
 
 { 
 
 
 flood the State Department with telegrams pleading for intervention. 
 
 ^TJiis cont inued pressure of the Allip<^tdT^jillpgprJ rnmac'* of rh p 
 A ustrrt-Gerrri^ pTisoncr^ m Sib eria, ~ and the fear of inde pendent 
 
 Wilson, however, agreed with Lansing’s view that the Siberian and 
 
 \a 
 
52 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 North Russian questions should not be confused or discussed to¬ 
 gether. 63 
 
 The British government immediately took advantage of Lansing’s 
 admission and appealed for American intervention of North Russia, as 
 distinct from action in Siberia. Both Wilson and Secretary of War 
 Baker soon evinced their willingness to send troops to the North 
 Russian ports, where they believed a distinct military advantage could 
 be obtained. Balfour believed that the objections which the President 
 
 ern ports because in that area “t here is-no qu esLiun-ef-Lapanese~partici- 
 ’'pation. . . .” 64 By~Ju“ne PfHeTPresident consente 3 To~iliveft-Atnerican 
 -itroops fro m France to North. R ussia upon the approval oF~General 
 
 Foch, provided su ch operat ions had the"^sure sympathy o t the~R ussian 
 
 pe^?^' 
 
 Throughout May the French authorities in Paris attempted to per¬ 
 suade the American ambassador of the need for intervention in Si¬ 
 beria, in the hope that he would influence his government accordingly. 
 On May 12 General Niessel gave his eyewitness account of the sit¬ 
 uation irTRussia. His stron gest argument was based ~orrt hc fear of 
 German control in Russia. Ambassador Sharp found That Tnostprom- 
 inent French leaders were united in the belief that German control 
 of Russia could only be prevented by immediate Japanese action. At 
 the same time they feared that, unless the Allies supported and ap¬ 
 proved of that action, Japan would act independently and “in all 
 probability” come to an understanding with Germany. 66 
 
 The French appeals fell on barr^n_soiL--Wilsonjwas adamant in his 
 oppositiorPto the Siberian scheme. On May 30, 1918, he sent for Sir 
 WTHiaTiPWiseman to dlicuss the Russian problem. Wiseman reported 
 that, although Wilson appreciated the arguments presented by the 
 French and British governments, “no military man with whom he had 
 talked had been able to convince him that there was any practical 
 
 63 Lansing to Wilson, May u, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 160; Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 361; Wilson to Lansing, May 20, 1918, Lansing 
 Papers, II, 361. 
 
 64 Balfour to Reading, June 11, 1918, Wiseman Papers; Memorandum of the Secre¬ 
 tary of State, June 3, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 484- 
 485; Noulens, Mon ambassade en Russie, II, 114-115. 
 
 06 Reading to Lansing, May 29, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 476; Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 175. For the events leading to intervention 
 in North Russia, see Leonid I. Strakhovsky, The Origins of American Intervention in 
 North Russia, 1918 (Princeton, 1937). 
 
 06 United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, I, 528-529; Sharp to Lansing, May 
 15, 1918, file 861.00/6237, D.S.N.A.; Dawson, War Memoirs of Sharp, pp. 255-256. 
 
THE PRESSURE INCREASES 
 
 53 
 
 scheme which would re-create a Russian front. He remarked that he 
 would go as far as intervening against the wishes of the Russian people 
 —knowing that it was eventually for their good—providing he thought 
 the scheme had any practical chance of success.” The President point¬ 
 ed out that the Japanese refused to go any further than Omsk, and he 
 doubted “if they could get as far as that.” It was the President’s view 
 that the Japanese were eager to have an invitation from the Allies “so 
 that they might occupy the maritime provinces, but had no intention of 
 engaging in a vast military enterprise sufficient to reach even the 
 Ural mountains.” 6 ' 
 
 When General Bliss learned that the 
 
 sched¬ 
 
 uled to assemble at Versailles for its sixth session o p Jun e i. Was plan¬ 
 ning to discuss the subject of Japanese intervention in Siberia and 
 Allied policy toward Russia, he cabled for instructions. He outlined 
 the arguments to be used and ventured the thought that “perhaps 
 French interest in the Russian debt partly accounts for their unanimity 
 in favoring Japanese intervention.” Bliss reported that~-the F.nropean- 
 Allies generallvjync eded that the United S tates must finance Japanese 
 rifiIkary_o perations. Bliss admitted that he~cfistrusted everything 1 be 
 ^heard on the subject, and that France and Britain were rabid in their 
 
 that the United States 
 
 V 
 
 Tic 
 
 shouIcJ^conSenL unly _ to _ a _ recommendation that the Allied govern¬ 
 ments ascertain beyond [a] shadow of a doubt what the real attitude 
 of the Russian people will be toward this intervention.” 68 
 
 When General March replied to Bliss’s cable, he stated the Presi¬ 
 dent’s views in forceful language: “The President’s attitude is that 
 Russia’s misfortune imposes upon us at this time the obligation of un¬ 
 swerving fidelity to the principle of Russian territorial integrity and 
 political independence. Intervention via Vladivostok is deemed im¬ 
 practicable” while “the idea of compensating Japan by territory in 
 Asiatic Russia is inadmissible.” 69 
 
 Throughout the sixth session of the Supreme War Council, much 
 energy was expended “trying to get the Siberian expedition launched.” 70 
 This time the Allies tried a new approach; they determined to ask 
 
 61 Wiseman to Sir Eric Drummond, May 30, 1918, Wiseman Papers. 
 
 68 Bliss to Baker, May 27, 1918, Wilson Papers, series II. 
 
 eu March to Bliss, May 28, 1918, Wilson Papers, series II; Frederick Palmer, Newton 
 D. Ba\er, America at War (2 vols.; New York, 1931), II, 314-315; Baker, Woodrow 
 Wilson, VIII, 175. These instructions were probably responsible for the following 
 entry in Sir Henry Wilson’s Diary on June 1: ‘‘The President, U.S.A., has now ordered 
 Bliss not to back Japanese intervention” (Callwell, Sir Henry Wilson, II, 104). Sir 
 Henry Wilson was now Chief of the Imperial General Staff. 
 
 ,0 Palmer, Bliss, p. 271. 
 
54 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 Japan for certain guarantees in advance of intervention, in order to 
 remove President Wilson’s objections to the proposed expedition. The 
 ree conditions proposed to Japan were: “(1) that Japan should 
 promise to respect the territorial integrity of Russia; (2) that she would 
 take no si de in the intern aT politics of the country; (3) that she would 
 advanc e as far west as po ssifale~forn:h^pWpose~ of encountering the 
 Germans.” 71 
 
 The appeals of the Supreme War Council were supported by in¬ 
 sistent pleas for intervention from American representatives throughout 
 Asia and Europe, as well as from Allied statesmen. Non-Bolshevik 
 Russians added their entreaties to the swelling cries for action. Wilson 
 found it increasingly difficult to maintain his position of opposition. 
 And, as the month of June advanced, a new situation arose in Siberia, 
 which threatened to draw Wilson into action, despite his better judg¬ 
 ment 
 
 In'March, 1918, a force of some seventy thousand Czechoslovaks, 
 former prisoners of war and deserters from the Austrian Army, had 
 started across Siberia to Vladivostok with the consent of the Bolshevik 
 government. From Vladivostok they expected to be transported to 
 France to fight on the Western Front. 72 The French and British gov¬ 
 ernments disagreed as to the best means of utilizing the Czech forces. 
 On April 1 the British War Office suggested that Czech troops either 
 /occupy Siberia in the vicinity of Omsk, or else join Semenov’s force in 
 '"Trans-Baikal. 73 Both the Trench government, under whose leader¬ 
 ship the Czech forces were operating, and the Czechs themselves were 
 opposed to this. While the French and British governments argued, 
 the Czechs continued their eastward journey via the Trans-Siberian 
 Railway with no advance preparations made for their arrival at Vladi¬ 
 vostok. 74 Anticipating the French request for vessels to transport the 
 Czechs to France, the State Department had instructed its ambassador 
 in Paris that it could not “provide tonnage for transportation across 
 Pacific.” 75 
 
 71 Frazier to Lansing, June io, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igi8, Russia, 
 II, 202-203; Bliss to Baker, June 3, 1918, Bliss Papers. 
 
 72 For a detailed account of the Czech trek across Siberia, see Bunyan, Intervention, 
 pp. 75-101; Margarete Klante, Von der Wolga zum Amur. Die tschechische Legion 
 und der russische Biirger\rieg (Berlin, 1931); Henry P. S. Baerlein, March of the 
 Seventy Thousand (London, 1926). 
 
 73 Eduard Benes, My War Memoirs (Boston, 1928), p. 357. 
 
 74 Caldwell to Lansing, April 19, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, tgi8, 
 Russia, II, 126-127. 
 
 75 Lansing to Sharp, April 22, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igi8, Russia, 
 II, 130. 
 
THE PRESSURE INCREASES 
 
 55 
 
 Meanwhile, contingents of the Czechoslovak Army were arriving 
 at Vladivostok. By May 27 their number had reached ten thousand 
 but no preparations had been made to transport them to Europe. Ad¬ 
 miral Knight informed Secretary Daniels on May 27 that the Czechs 
 “have been approached as to willingness to conduct military opera¬ 
 tions in Siberia and Russia and they are positively opposed to this 
 believing it would bring them at least virtually into conflict [with 
 the] Russian faction. . . .” 76 
 
 The Czech problem was discussed at a Franco-British conference in 
 London on May 28. Again, the French insisted on the immediate 'N 
 transfer of the Czechs to France, while the British wanted them to 
 remain in Siberia to aid in the establishment of an Eastern Front. 
 The British finally compromised reluctantly and agreed to find some 
 means of transportation for five thousand Czechs from Vladivostok. 77 — 
 
 At the Supreme War Council meeting in early June the Allies 
 finally agreed to bring to Europe as many Czechs as possible and a reso¬ 
 lution was adopted to that effect. 78 The British were requested to ask 
 Japan to furnish tonnage for the transport of Czech troops. The 
 British were not very sympathetic to this suggestion, as they feared 
 it would interfere with the plans for a Japanese expedition to Siberia. 
 The French, however, were so insistent that the British government 
 finally made the request. Although the British Foreign Office ex¬ 
 pressed to Japan the belief that all Japanese tonnage must be used for 
 the expedition to Siberia to the “exclusion of all less important ob¬ 
 jects,” nevertheless, it hoped that Japan would help in the transport 
 of Czech troops until the expedition should take place. 79 
 
 When the Allied decision regarding the Czechs was sent to the 
 State Department, William Phillips, Assistant Secretary of State, 
 drafted a memorandum in which he suggested the advisability of “re¬ 
 taining these forces in the far east for the present, pending the develop¬ 
 ment of the situation on the eastern front where they may be needed to 
 reinforce possible Russian opposition to further encroachments by Ger¬ 
 many.” 80 His note was sent for approval to Basil Miles, acting chief 
 
 78 United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 174. 
 
 77 Dugdale, Balfour, II, 260; Benes, War Memoirs, p. 378; Masaryk, The Maying 
 of a State, p. 183. 
 
 78 Palmer, Bliss, pp. 277-278; Benes, War Memoirs, p. 392; Dugdale, Balfour, II, 
 190; Masaryk, The Malting of a State, p. 191. 
 
 79 Memorandum from the British Foreign Office to the Department of State, June 
 10, 1918, file 763.72/10309, D.S.N.A.; World War Records of the Supreme War 
 Council, 6th Session, June 1-2, 1918, Old Records Section, Department of War, Na¬ 
 tional Archives. 
 
 80 Memorandum drafted June 20, 1918, file 763.72/10309, D.S.N.A. 
 
56 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 of the Russian Division, and Joseph E. Grew, acting chief of the 
 Western European Division. The latter replied: 
 
 Mr. Miles and I agree that it would be highly desirable to have these 
 Czecho-Slovak troops remain in Siberia, but to go on record as recommend¬ 
 ing it to the British government might prove embarrassing in connection 
 with our attitude toward Japanese intervention. Would it not be better 
 to concur with the British in their plan for transporting them if and when 
 it is found practicable to spare sufficient tonnage from allied needs? Mr. 
 Miles informs me that there are now about 16,000 Czecho-Slovak troops in 
 Vladivostok, about 30,000 between Irkutsk and the sea, and another 30,000 
 to 50,000 in other parts of Russia. It seems very improbable that sufficient 
 tonnage will be available to transport all or even a great part of this number 
 in the near future. 
 
 81 
 
 Although never sent, the American memorandum, and the correspond- 
 / ence concerning it, indicated that the State Department was beginning 
 | to think along the same lines as the British Foreign Office. 
 
 1 ^ On Junj 3^x918, the military representatives of the Supreme War 
 Council discussed the utilization~c>fTiIzeclTtroops atlJiFltussxan' 7 Vrctic J 
 • -po'rtsT TEey believed that such an occupation was an indispensable 
 " corollary~oT Allied intervention in Siberia,. Ut ilization of the available 
 Serbian and Czech units would render—t-he-land defense, of The" rriari- 
 j time bases possi hlc- without -■ the tran sport oF~any considerable., expedi- 
 ' tionary force. The military representatives finally agreed on securing 
 the approvalPof the National Czechoslovak Council to retain some 
 Czech units, with the understanding that the remainder would be sent 
 to France as previously agreed. 82 
 
 While the Allied military representatives discussed the best dis¬ 
 position of Czech troops, relations between the Czechs and the Bolshe¬ 
 viks had been strained to the breaking point. On March 26, 1918, the 
 Czechs and the Soviets had signed an agreement which provided for 
 the transportation of the Czechs to Vladivostok via the Trans-Siberian 
 Railway, not as military detachments but as free citizens. They were 
 to surrender most of their arms at Penza. 83 The agreement was signed 
 by Stalin. 84 Neither side lived up to the letter of the agreement. 
 Czech detachments frequently concealed arms in excess of the permitted 
 
 81 Grew to Phillips, June 25, 1918, file 763.72/10308, D.S.N.A. 
 
 82 Joint Note No. 31, Supreme War Council, Military Representatives, June 3, 1918, 
 file 861.00/6731, D.S.N.A. 
 
 83 Klante, Von der Wolga zum Amur, pp. 137, 138; Baerlein, March of the Seventy 
 Thousand, pp. 109-110; B. O. Johnson to H. H. Fisher, April 29, 1931, Railway Service 
 Corps Papers. 
 
 81 White, The Siberian Intervention, p. 245. 
 
THE PRESSURE INCREASES 
 
 57 t 
 
 \ 
 
 quota, while the Soviet authorities often delayed the passage of thF 
 Czechs and insisted on the surrender of more arms than prescribed 
 by the Penza agreement. Suspicion and mistrust grew^rapidly be¬ 
 tween the Czechs and the Soviets, and was intensified by the dis¬ 
 orderly condition of the country and the delays in transportation. 8 ® 
 the end of M ay fighting had broken out betwe en the two groups in 
 Central and Wes tern"!? 
 
 feaTe^Torlhe safe exit of their brothers from the interior. 86 On June 
 20, 1918, the Czechs in Vladivostok decided to act. They placed 
 guards over the military stores in Vladivostok to prevent their ship¬ 
 ment to the west, and determined to return to rescue the Czechs in 
 Central and Western Siberia from the armed war prisoners and Bolshe^ 
 viks. 87 At the same time members of the Czech National Council 
 
 in Vladivostok appealed to the Allied consuls for a supporting force of 
 “irom 50 to 100,000 Allied troops to establish f a] permanent front 
 against Germany- 2188 
 
 On JunV Tcf the Czecks overthrew the Vladivostok Sovie t and 
 assumed control of the city. 89 Immediately the Allied powers, having 
 war ships in port, went into action. The British and Japanese landed 
 large arn aecLparties in the morning; the Chinesejanded marines in the 
 afternoon; and a small detachment of American marines was landed 
 to guard the American consulate in the evening. Shortly thereafter 
 the action taken by the naval commanders on the scene was sanctioned 
 by the powers. 80 
 
 Evidence indicates that the struggle which broke out between the 
 Czechs and the Bolsheviks may have been influenced by a third party. 
 Chicherin, Soviet Foreign Minister, advised Lockhart on May 28 that 
 
 
 86 Chamberlin, Russian Revolution, II, 4; Carl W. Ackerman, Trailing the Bolshevist 
 Twelve Thousand Miles with the Allies in Siberia (New York, 1919), p. 123; B. O. 
 Johnson to H. H. Fisher, April 29, 1931, Railway Service Corps Papers. 
 
 88 Caldwell to Lansing, June 1, 1918, file 861.00/1926, D.S.N.A. 
 
 87 Caldwell to Lansing, June 20, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 219. 
 
 88 Caldwell to Lansing, June 25, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 226. Caldwell reported that all of the Allied consuls agreed to recom¬ 
 mend favorable action to their respective governments. 
 
 89 Caldwell to Lansing, June 28, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 226. The Vladivostok Soviet had governed Vladivostok since April 30. 
 Allied representatives had consistently reported that it was a transitory affair, maintained 
 in power by the support of armed prisoners of war (Caldwell to Lansing, April 30, 
 1918; Knight to Daniels, May 27, 1918, June 26, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 
 1918, Russia, II, 148, 174, 230, respectively). 
 
 80 Knight to Daniels, June 3, 1918, WA-66, Siberia, Conditions in Vladivostok, Naval 
 Records Collection; Caldwell to Lansing, June 29, 1918, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 235; Bunyan, Intervention, p. 316. 
 
5 « 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 telegrams had been seized “showing the connection between this move¬ 
 ment and the counter-revolutionary plots. Now military commissaries 
 are informing us that connections have been disclosed between the 
 Czechs and British representatives.” Chicherin urged Lockhart to use 
 his “moral influence” to induce the Czechs to cease the struggle, de¬ 
 liver their weapons, and leave the country. 91 
 
 / Many Russian Whites and Siberians believed that “the return of the 
 / A , Czechoslovak units from Eastern Siberia to the Volga and the Ural 
 / / A ' front, the overthrow by them of the Soviet rule at Vladivostok, and 
 
 'M 
 
 r 
 
 v 
 
 the strengthening of their control along the Trans-Siberian, which were 
 officially explained as protective measures, were undoubtedly the exe¬ 
 cution of a part of the Allied or at least the French plans for inter¬ 
 vention.” Professor Georgii K. Guins, a member of the Kolchak 
 regime, wrote: 
 
 The secret of the Czechs’ return westward was in a decision rrffide in 
 Paris. War with Germany was not yet concluded. To provide sufficient 
 ships to carry 40,000 Czechs to. France appeared difficult. It seemed more 
 purposeful to return all the Czechs to the Volga and thus create for Ger¬ 
 many the threat of re-establishing an eastern front. President Masaryk, 
 then only president of the Czechoslovak National Committee in Paris, sent 
 the Czechoslovak Army his greetings and blessed it to continued the fight. 
 Political considerations dictated a return to the Volga . . . and the re¬ 
 establishment of a Russia loyal to the Allies. 92 
 
 Colonel George Emerson, who was on a tour of inspection along 
 
 91 Correspondance se rapportant a la descente a Vladivostok (Paris, 1919), p. 7. 
 The Bolsheviks pointed out that the direct reason for the taking of decisive and severe 
 measures for the disarming of the Czecks was their own action, which constituted 
 “counter-revolutionary armed rebellion, against the Soviets” (Cumming and Pettit, 
 Russian-American Relations, pp. 224-226; Bunyan, Intervention, pp. 102-103). 
 
 92 Varneck and Fisher, Testimony of Kolchak,, pp. 241-242. Professor H. K. Nor¬ 
 ton, Far Eastern Republic of Siberia (New York, 1927), p. 68, who spent considerable 
 time in Siberia investigating the history of this period, endorses the view of Guins, to 
 the effect that the “Czecks were prevailed upon by the Allies under the urgence of 
 France, to attack the Russians from the rear in return for recognition and assistance.” 
 He believes this hypothesis receives additional support from the fact that France 
 recognized the Czechoslovak Republic on June 30, 1918, and Great Britain on August 
 13. The United States and Japan followed this lead on September 2, and September 
 9, respectively. For similar views, see also E. A. Ross, The Russian Soviet Republic, 
 p. 135; William P. and Selda K. Coates, Armed Intervention in Russia, 1918-1922 
 (London, 1935), pp. no-m. Bruce Lockhart wrote, “But for the folly of the French 
 I am convinced that the Czecks would have been evacuated without incident. . . . How 
 I wish today that President Mazaryk had remained in Russia during this trying period. 
 I am convinced that he would never have sanctioned the Siberian revolt” ( British Agent, 
 pp. 269-270). See also Frederick L. Schuman, American Policy toward Russia since 
 1917 (New York, 1928), pp. 93-94. 
 
THE PRESSURE INCREASES 
 
 59 
 
 the Trans-Siberian Railway, became an eyewitness to the events which 
 led to the Czech revolt, and offered his services as a mediator. He 
 reported that it “was impossible to come to any understanding be¬ 
 tween Captain Kadlets [Czech Army] and the Soviet Government, as 
 the Captain advised us at that time that action of the Czechish troops 
 was a concerted movement, that all officers had instructions to act at a 
 certain time to take the towns in the vicinity that they were located.” 93 
 When the Soviet President of Marinsk learned of Czech military suc¬ 
 cess along the Trans-Siberian Railway, he exclaimed with an appar¬ 
 ently ingenuous ejaculation, ‘ Trance has, through concerted action 
 with the Czech Troops, en route, takerTSIberia in 24 hours.” 9 * I, 
 
 In the spring of 1919 the American Military Intelligence prepare® 
 a report on the activities of the Czechs in Siberia from the materials 
 which were then available to them. Although recognizing the inade¬ 
 quacy of the materials examined, the report concluded that the Czech 
 claims of a treacherous attack by Bolsheviks, German agents, and war 
 prisoners were unfounded in fact; that the Czechs could have safely 
 accomplished their original purpose to withdraw; and that the Czechs 
 did not fully abide by their promise to surrender their arms and keep 
 out of Russian internal affairs. The report also indicated that the 
 Czech diversion from their original purpose to withdraw was probably 
 due to the interference of one of the Allied powers. The one big fact 
 in the complete change of the Czechoslovak mission was the subse¬ 
 quent, and almost immediate, erection of anti-Bolshevik authorities at 
 all those points seized by the Czechoslovak echelons. 95 
 
 93 Report of Colonel George H. Emerson of the Russian Railway Service Corps, cov¬ 
 ering his movements from April 26, 1918, to Sept. 9, 1918, signed also by Major H. H. 
 Slaughter, assistant military attache to American Embassy, file 861.77/541, D.S.N.A., 
 pp. 43-44; B. O. Johnson to H. H. Fisher, April 29, 1931, George H. Emerson to H. H. 
 Fisher, May 13, 1932, Railway Service Corps Papers. 
 
 94 Emerson Report, file 861.77/541, D.S.N.A., p. 12. The report showed further 
 that the Czecks never were in danger from the aggressive acts of the Soviets, as long 
 as they maintained their original purpose of traveling to Vladivostok via the Trans- 
 Siberian Railway. General Graves believed that the Czech s, mrrr argr;sjprs. a nd 
 that the Soviets wanted to get the Czechs out of Siberia, and were willing to meet them 
 half-way in effecting their announced purpose (Graves, America’s Siberian Adventure, 
 pp. 51-52). It must be remembered that on June 3 the military representatives of the 
 Supreme War Council had already decided to retain some of the Czech troops in Si¬ 
 beria. Baerlein, March of the Seventy Thousand, p. 125, writes, “One can but wonder 
 whether the Allies really planned to remove the Czechs from Siberia. Trotsky has been 
 blamed for impeding the movement of the Czechs toward the east; but his apprehension 
 that the Entente proposed to make use of them against Soviet Russia was by no means 
 the view of a mere alarmist.” 
 
 85 Laurance Packard, Captain, U.S.A., The Czecho-Slovaks in Russia, Aug., 1914 to 
 Feb., 1919. Prepared in the Office of the Chief of Staff, Confidential, file 861.00/6052, 
 
6o 
 
 1 # 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 hether the Czech revolt was due to international intrigue or to 
 some insignificant and chance incident, the fact remains that the 
 “rescue of the Czechs” gave President Wilson a moral reason for 
 sending American troops to Siberia, and initiated the final phase in 
 he campaign which resulted in his acquiescence to intervention in Si¬ 
 beria. By early June Minister Reinsch was urging joint action and 
 the utilization of the Czechs. In regard to the Czechs he wrote: 
 
 It is the general opinion of Allied representatives here in which I con¬ 
 cur that it would be a serious mistake to remove the Czecho-Slovak troops 
 frqm Siberia. With only slight countenance and support they could con- 
 U r ol all of Siberia against the Germans. They are sympathetic to the 
 /Russian population, eager to be accessories to the Allied cause, the most 
 ; serious means [menace] to extension of German influence in Russia. Their 
 removal would greatly benefit Germany and further discourage Russia. If 
 they were not in Siberia it would be worth while to bring them there from 
 distance. 98 
 
 IS , 
 
 Wilson was profoundly influenced by the suggestion from Reinsch, 
 and wrote Lansing, “There seems to me to emerge from this sug¬ 
 gestion the shadow of a plan that might be worked with Japanese and 
 other assistance. These people [the Czecho-Slovaks] are the cousins of 
 the Russians.” 97 
 
 By the end of May both Breckinridge Long and Basil Miles were 
 convinced of the need for intervention. All the Americans in Russia, 
 Siberia, and China, with one or two exceptions, were now united in sup¬ 
 porting the call of the British, French, and Japanese for immediate 
 action. Reports also indicated that this was the desire of a large part 
 of the Russian people. Ambassador Francis had satisfied himself that 
 the Bolsheviks were accepting German domination and no longer de¬ 
 served American assistance. Both Long and Miles felt that the men 
 ih the field knew the situation better than those in Washington. 98 
 
 D.S.N.A., pp. 1-5. When Secretary Baker read this report, he wrote Wilson as follows, 
 “The paper is much too long for your reading, but I have talked with Mr. Lansing 
 about it, and indicated to him that, in my judgment, the report shows with fair con¬ 
 clusiveness that the Czecho-Slovak forces could have gotten out of Russia, but that in¬ 
 fluence was brought to bear (perhaps by the French who were interested in having them 
 remain in Russia), and that at least a part of their difficulties with the Russians grew 
 out of this changed desire on their part” (Baker to Wilson, July 31, 1919, Wilson 
 Papers, series VI). 
 
 80 Reinsch to Lansing, June 13, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 206-207. The need for action was also urged by consuls at Vladivostok and Harbin. 
 See United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 191, 208-209, 226. 
 
 97 June 17, 1918, file 86i.oo/2i45'/2, D.S.N.A.; Lansing Papers, II, 226. 
 
 88 Long to Miles, May 31, 1918, file 861.00/1900, D.S.N.A. Leading editorials also 
 
THE PRESSURE INCREASES 
 
 6l 
 
 Throughout June Ambassador Francis c ontinued to urge action in 
 Siberia. H e believed sucTT action was necessary to aid not only the 
 Czechs, b ut, also , the R ussian people" 
 
 France was evidently convinced that the Bolshevik gov¬ 
 
 ernment would soon collapse, and that if Allied intervention were not 
 forthcoming the people would turn to Germany as a last resort. Russia 
 trusted the United States, said Francis, and expected her to take the 
 lead in intervention. If she did not, Francis believed the war would 
 be prolonged by two years." 
 
 ^ The recommendations of Francis were supplemented by pressure 
 from rhe Russian reprT.s^TaiV es--f>t-4.h e.-<:lef 11 n cr Provisional gnvern- 
 
 ment who had earlier been opposed to intervent ion. Ambassador 
 Bakhmetev urged intervention of an Allied character in preference to 
 lone Japanese action, and advised the use of the Czechs in Siberia. 1 " 
 Alexander Konovalov and John Sookine, both attached to the Russian 
 Embassy at Washington, favored the participation of Czech troops, as 
 well as Japanese soldiers. Although opposed to Japanese command of 
 such an expedition, they agreed to accept such a possibility if the 
 whole Allied expedition were put under a civil high commissioner 
 of either American or French nationality. They also advocated, in 
 addition to a military expedition, a political department to publicize 
 the Allied aims and an economic department to establish trade rela¬ 
 tions and bring relief to the population of Siberia and Russia. 101 
 
 By the end of May the State Department began considering con¬ 
 crete proposals for action in Siberia. Fearing the dangers of Allied mil¬ 
 itary intervention in Russia, it considered the possibility of using the 
 Russian Railway Service Corps as the chief factor in a policy of Allied 
 
 OC 
 
 hi 
 
 preached the need for intervention urging that Bolshevism was a greater threat than 
 the menace of Japan. They insisted that the only means of helping Russia was by over¬ 
 throwing Bolshevism. See “Intervention in Russia,” New Republic, XX (June i, 1918), 
 130-133; Gregory Mason, “Japan and Bolshevism,” Outloo\, CXIX (June 12, 1918), 
 259-261; London Times, June 15, 19, 1918, July 4, 1918; New York Times, June 3, 
 4, 1918. By June of 1918 even members of Congress had begun to urge that the 
 United States adopt the policy of Siberian intervention ( Congressional Record, vol. 56, 
 pt. 8, pp. 7557, 7997-8001, 8065-8067, 8580). 
 
 99 United States, Foreign Relations, igi8, Russia, I, 561; II, 214, 220-223. For re¬ 
 ports from Consul Poole in Moscow and Consul General Harris at Irkutsk, supporting 
 these views, see United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 205-206, 210-211, 
 215-216, 239-241. 
 
 100 Memorandum of Long, June 7, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 192-193. The Central Committee of the Constitutional Democratic Party 
 passed a resolution favoring Allied intervention (United States, Foreign Relations, 19/8, 
 Russia, II, 198-199). 
 
 101 Konovalov to Lansing, June 26, 1918, Phillips to Lansing, June 27, 1918, United 
 States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 227-229, 232-233. 
 
62 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 economic assistance to Russia. The activities of the corps would be 
 protected by an Allied military force. Although it would be difficult 
 to attain numerically equal participation by the Allies in such a mili¬ 
 tary policy, the State Department felt that Japanese participation could 
 be equalized by means of American and Chinese forces, and also by 
 the immediate utilization of the “valuable Bohemian troops now gather¬ 
 ing at Vladivostok.” Lansing also informed Francis that, 
 
 while an invitation by the ‘de facto’ authorities for such Allied action might 
 reduce opposition thereto, compliance therewith might give a color of 
 recognition and thereby prove undesirable. If, however, as a result of 
 your conference and cooperation with Emerson it might be arranged that 
 any reasonable and proper suggestions or requests by the Soviet authorities 
 be favorably considered by the Embassy and the Railway Corps with the 
 distinct proviso and ‘quid pro quo’ that railway assistance in European 
 Russia should be accompanied by permission for the Corps to extend its 
 activities in Siberia, this program might immediately be commenced with 
 the advantage of the tacit acquiescence of such authorities. 102 
 
 This suggestion was followed by another from Colonel House, who ad¬ 
 vised the formation of a committee on Russian affairs to act in con¬ 
 junction with the President and the Department of State. 103 By June 
 11 the President had begun to consider the possibility of a “Russian Re¬ 
 lief Commission.” The idea evidently originated with Colonel House 
 and his son-in-law, Gordon Auchincloss. Both House and Lansing 
 urged the President to create such a commission as concrete proof of 
 American desires to stand by Russia. 104 Sir William Wiseman also 
 approved of the idea. Conferring with the President, Wiseman found 
 him still opposed to intervention by the Japanese alone. Moreover, 
 the President was also opposed to Allied intervention on the ground 
 that this would amount to the same thing as independent Japanese 
 action, as Japan would supply the greater part of the military force. 
 Furthermore, the President still desired an invitation to enter Russia 
 from either the Bolsheviks or some body really representing Russian 
 opinion. Nevertheless, things were not completely hopeless, according 
 to Wiseman, as the President had been thinking rather seriously of a 
 civil commission. Wiseman hoped that the commission might be 
 used as an entering wedge for military intervention. He advised the 
 British Foreign Office to encourage the scheme. 106 
 
 102 Lansing to Francis, May 29, 1918, file 861.00/2079 14 , D.S.N.A. 
 
 103 Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 190. 
 
 101 Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 409; Auchincloss, Diary, June 12 and 13, 1918; 
 Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 210; Lansing Papers, II, 362-363. 
 
 105 Wiseman to Drummond, June 14, 1918, Wiseman Papers. 
 
THE PRESSURE INCREASES 
 
 63 
 
 Meanwhile, British authorities were becoming impatient at the 
 delay. The military leaders insisted that a Japanese expedition to Si¬ 
 beria was an immediate necessity. On June 20 a message was dis¬ 
 patched to Washington stating that armed action in Siberia was es¬ 
 sential if the Allies desired victory in 1919. Immediate action was 
 necessary before winter set in. 106 Colonel House urged the Presi¬ 
 dent that “something must be done immediately” or Russia would be¬ 
 come the prey of Germany. He advised Wilson to make an address 
 to Congress, stating his plan for sending a relief commission to 
 Russia for the purpose of speeding up her food production and co¬ 
 ordinating the activities of the various relief agencies in that country. 
 Since the commission and its assistants would need a “safe and 
 orderly” field in which to work, the President might ask for the co¬ 
 operation and assistance of England, France, Italy, and Japan. These 
 nations would then promise not to “interfere with Russia’s political 
 affairs or encroach in any way upon her territorial integrity.” House 
 believed that the Russian people would approve of this type of inter¬ 
 vention. 107 Lord Reading was enthusiastic over the plan. Wilson, who 
 also thought well of the scheme, discussed it with his Cabinet the 
 next day. 108 
 
 Throughout the month of June the President deliberated over the 
 Russian question. Auchincloss reported that it was “the matter of most 
 interest at the present time,” and that “no one seems to know what 
 the President is going to do.” 109 The French government brought 
 increasing pressure to bear on the President by the dispatch of two 
 special emissaries, Marcel Delanney, French ambassador to Japan en 
 route to Tokyo, and Henri Bergson, the noted French philosopher. 
 Both of these men also called on Colonel House. 110 
 
 Despite the increasing pressure for intervention in Siberia, Ameri¬ 
 can military authorities remained firm in their opposition. They 
 were opposed to any diversion of American forces from France. Secre¬ 
 tary Baker told Wilson that, if he had his own way about Russia, he 
 
 100 Callwell, Sir Henry Wilson, II, 109; Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 412. 
 
 107 Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 225; Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 412-414; 
 Memorandum of J. Butler Wright (former counselor of American Embassy in Petro- 
 grad), June 3, 1918, file 861.00/2166 Vi , D.S.N.A. 
 
 108 Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 231, 235. 
 
 108 Auchincloss, Diary, June 21, 1918. 
 
 110 Noulens, Mon ambassade en Russie, II, 114; Seymour, Intimate Papers, III, 407- 
 408; Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 215, 233. President Wilson told M. Delanney that 
 he was considering “anew the entire situation, and would express his conclusions 
 within the next ten days” (Morris to Lansing, June 22, 1918, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 219). 
 
64 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 “would like to take everybody out of Russia, except the Russians, in¬ 
 cluding diplomatic representatives, military representatives, political 
 agents, propagandists and casual visitors, and let the Russians setde 
 down and settle their own affairs.” Baker continued to adhere to 
 this point of view. 111 Later, Baker said that the North Russian and 
 Siberian expeditions were practically the only decisions of a military 
 nature which President Wilson had determined personally throughout 
 America’s participation in the war. Wilson attempted to explain his 
 position to the Secretary of War: “Baker, I wholly agree with all you 
 say from a military point of view, but we are fighting this war with 
 Allies and I have felt obliged to fall in with their wishes here.” 112 
 
 General March also registered his opposition, not only because he 
 was a pronounced “western fronter,” but also because he was con¬ 
 vinced that Japanese intervention would “draw Russia together and 
 throw her into the arms of Germany.” There was no doubt in his 
 mind but that “as between Germany and Japan as their master they 
 /<vouI <5 infinitely prefer Germany.” 113 Generals Pershing and Bliss were 
 also opposed to any diversion of American troops.” 114 Their views 
 were not shared by General Foch, Generalissimo of the Allied armies, 
 who sent an appeal directly to the President urging intervention: 
 
 In my opinion the sending by you of American troops to Russia is 
 justified, for no appreciable diminution of the number of troops to be sent 
 to France will result therefrom. I conceive the expedition to Siberia as 
 having to be mainly formed with Japanese elements. The Allies’ con¬ 
 tingents would be reduced to modest numbers; some 12,000 men or there¬ 
 abouts. America could supply at once two regiments, and the Allies the 
 rest. Under those conditions the American troops sent to France would 
 only be reduced in an insignificant way. 
 
 More than ever, in the interest of military success in Europe, I con¬ 
 sider the expedition to Siberia as a very important factor for victory, pro¬ 
 vided action be immediate, on account of the season being already ad¬ 
 vanced. I take the liberty of insisting on this last point. 110 
 
 Although Great Britain and France continued to maneuver for 
 
 111 Baker to Wilson, June 19, 1918, Newton D. Baker Papers (collection in custody 
 of Baker, Hostetler, and Patterson, Cleveland, Ohio); Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 
 219. 
 
 112 Baker to Mrs. John B. Casserly, Nov. 15, 1924, Wilson Papers, Ac. 6190. See 
 also Baker, Foreword in Graves, America’s Siberian Adventure , p. viii. 
 
 113 March, A Nation at War, p. 118. 
 
 114 John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War (2 vols.; New York, 1931), 
 II, 49; Baker to Mrs. John B. Casserly, Nov. 15, 1924, Wilson Papers, Ac. 6190. 
 
 116 Foch to Wilson, June 27, 1918, Baker Papers; partially reproduced in Baker, 
 Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 235. 
 
THE PRESSURE INCREASES 
 
 65 
 
 American approval of their Siberian plans, they were not yet certain 
 of the Japanese attitude toward the three conditions set forth by the 
 Supreme War Council on June 3. Japan finally replied on June 24 that 
 she did not “feel at liberty” to express a decision on the matter before 
 a satisfactory understanding had been reached among the three Eu¬ 
 ropean powers and the United States. President Wilson “read this 
 communication with genuine pleasure.” 110 
 
 Despite this apparently friendly attitude on the part of Japan toward 
 the United States, American consuls in Siberia reported a strong anti- 
 American campaign by the Japanese, who appeared to be endeavoring 
 by every means in their power to persuade the Russians to place all 
 intervention in Japanese hands. Some attacks even suggested that 
 America meant to share with Germany in despoiling Russia. 117 
 
 The British War Cabinet feared that the Japanese reply of June 24 
 might encourage President Wilson to declare publicly his opposition 
 to military intervention in the Far East. This was to be avoided at all 
 costs. Lloyd George, therefore, immediately sent a message to the 
 President asking him to refrain from making any decision on the 
 matter until after the next meeting of the Supreme War Council. 118 
 
 Although President Wilson was still “sweating blood” over th^ 
 question of intervention, many of the policy-making members of the 
 State Department were now enthusiastic about the scheme. When 
 news reached Washington that the Czechs were favorable to the idea 
 of remaining in Siberia, and that they had become the dominating 
 factor in the Russian situation, both Basil Miles and J. Butler WrighC' 
 former counselor of the Russian Embassy, were overjoyed. Said 
 Wright to Miles, “This is a god-send. It’s just the news we want. 
 Masaryk is in town! Let’s concentrate on this with all our power at 
 once!” 119 E. T. Williams, chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, 
 told Long that “Professor Masaryk is decidedly opposed to the re¬ 
 tention of the Czech-Slovak forces in Russia and Siberia.” When 
 Joseph Grew was informed of this discussion, he penciled a notation 
 on the memorandum, “Prof. Masaryk has changed his mind.” Thus 
 between June 20 and June 24 Masaryk had evidently agreed to the re¬ 
 tention of Czech troops in Siberia. It is quite likely that this de¬ 
 cision was in part due to the influence of certain members of the State 
 
 110 Lansing Papers, II, 365. 
 
 117 Moser to Lansing, June 10, 1918, file 861.00/1996, D.S.N.A.; Moser to Lan¬ 
 sing, June 14, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 208-209. 
 
 118 Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 237. 
 
 110 Knight to Daniels, June 21, 1918, Wright to Miles, June 22, 1918, file 861.00/ 
 2165/2, D.S.N.A. 
 
$ 
 
 X 
 
 ) 
 
 66 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 Department. 120 Even Lansing believed that the Czech situation had 
 created a new condition which should receive careful consideration. 
 He asked President Wilson if it was not possible that “in this body of 
 capable and loyal troops may be found a nucleus for military occupa¬ 
 tion of the Siberian railway?” 121 Moreover, Admiral Knight had re¬ 
 ported that if the Allies contemplated the establishment of an Eastern 
 Front, they would find their plans enormously facilitated by “the 
 present condition with the notable advantage that Czech influence 
 would greatly overcome that of Japanese removing chief antagonism 
 of Russians to movement against German power and influence.” 122 
 
 As the month of June ended, events seemed to be forcing President 
 Wilson’s hand. All of his Allies as well as the vast majority of his 
 diplomatic advisers at home and abroad were urging action. In addi¬ 
 tion, the threat of independent Japanese action loomed on the horizon. 
 The machinery for such action had already been provided by the 
 Sino-Japanese Military Agreement of May 16, 1918. Moreover, al¬ 
 though Semenov had been defeated and had retired to the safety of the 
 /Chinese Eastern Railway, Japanese advisers were encouraging him to re- 
 I sist disarmament by the Chinese authorities, despite the fact that he had 
 crossed the Chinese boundary. The Chinese government was aware 
 that failure to disarm the Cossack troops entering its territory would 
 • indicate sympathy with Semenov, and might result in war with the 
 ’/Bolsheviks. Apparently, Japan was attempting to create a situation 
 which would necessitate independent Japanese action in North Man¬ 
 churia, according to the terms of the recent Sino-Japanese Military 
 /Agreement. 123 At the same time the .Czechs had taken over control 
 i/|i° of Vladivostok and strategic terminals along the Trans-Siberian Rail¬ 
 way. They appeared ready and willing to remain in Siberia, if the 
 Allies desired it. The decision apparently rested yvith the President. 
 
 120 Williams to Long, June 20, 1918, Memorandum of Grew, June 24, 1918, file 
 861.00/10309, D.S.N.A. 
 
 121 Lansing to Wilson, June 23, 1918, Lansing Papers, II, 364. 
 
 122 Knight to Daniels, June 21, 1918, file 861.00/2165/4, D.S.N.A. 
 
 123 Reinsch to Lansing, June 26, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 231-232. The Soviet government had already directed a note to China 
 asking her either to refrain from harboring Semenov, or to permit Soviet troops to 
 pursue him into Chinese territory (Francis to Lansing, May 26, 1918, United States, 
 Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 172). 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 Wilson Says Yes 
 
 A T THE beginning of July, 1918, the Allies faced a dilemma in 
 regard to Siberia. Japan refused to undertake a military expedi¬ 
 tion into Siberia as the mandate of the Allies without the approval and 
 support of the United States. The Allies, therefore, had to obtain 
 President Wilson’s consent or abandon entirely the idea of action in 
 Siberia. Refusing to consider the second alternative, the Supreme War 
 Council decided upon an urgent appeal to President Wilson. On 
 July 2 Lloyd George presented the draft of such a message to the 
 Supreme War Council. It was approved with very few corrections. 
 At the request of M. Stephen Pichon, French Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs, the word considerable was replaced by adequate in describing 
 the forces for intervention in the belief that the term considerable might 
 cause Wilson to vote against intervention. 1 
 
 The appeal of July 2 summarized in a masterly way all of the 
 reasons for immediate intervention. First, since the Czechs were 
 in control of Western Siberia and were in danger of Being cut off 
 by the organization of German and Austrian prisoners at Irkutsk, 
 the Allies were obligated to take immediate action before these “gallant 
 allies” were overwhelmed. Furthermore, intervention to save the 
 Czechs provided an excellent opportunity for gaining control of Si¬ 
 beria. Second, Allied intervention was necessary to save the Russian 
 people from domination by German autocracy. Germany must be 
 prevented from gaining control of Western Siberia and its resources, 
 for if she seized this granary, she could compel the Russian people to 
 her will by the threat of starvation. Finally, Allied intervention was 
 necessary to win the war. The re-creation of an Eastern Front would 
 prevent Germany from withdrawing her eastern divisions to fight on 
 
 1 Frazier to Lansing, July 2, 1918, file 763.72SU/61, D.S.N.A.; Bliss to March, July 
 2, 1918, Wilson Papers, series II. 
 
68 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 the Western Front, and would thus result in a decisive shortening of 
 the war. Japan had agreed to the intervention, if the United States 
 approved. Moreover, Japan had also agreed to respect Russia’s terri¬ 
 torial integrity and to maintain neutrality in Russia’s internal politics. 
 The Czech forces were already in control of Western Siberia. If action 
 were taken immediately, Allied control of the entire Trans-Siberian 
 Railway could be achieved in a few weeks. The appeal closed by 
 urging the President to approve the policy recommended before it was 
 too late. 2 
 
 Lord Reading presented the appeal to the President on July 3. He 
 found that the President’s mind was “crystallizing” in the direction of 
 an economic commission accompanied by an armed protective force. 
 Reading believed that “the addition of the Czecho-Slovak incidents in 
 Vladivostok and elsewhere and the resolution of the Supreme War 
 Council endorsed by General Foch” would “cause him to decide in 
 favour of a military force accompanying the Commission and of a more 
 important character than he had originally intended.” However, 
 Reading thought that the President would never agree to a new 
 Eastern Front. 3 
 
 On July 4 the views of the State Department were incorporated in 
 a memorandum, which emphasized the changed situation created by 
 the capture of Vladivostok by the Czechoslovaks and the success of 
 their fellow countrymen in Western Siberia. Lansing believed that 
 it was the responsibility of the United States to aid the Czechs; the 
 responsibility was increased and made almost imperative since they 
 were being attacked by released German and Austrian prisoners of 
 Lansing advised that the United States adopt a policy of aiding 
 the loyal Czech troops at Vladivostok with arms, artillery, ammuni¬ 
 tion, and supplies. Moreover, he suggested the dispatch of additional 
 troops to aid the Czechs in policing the railroad as they advanced and 
 to co-operate in disarming and dispersing the Germans and Austrians 
 who opposed them. He believed that both the United States and the 
 illies should participate with Japan in supplying the necessary troops. 
 In addition, the Secretary advised that the proposed assistance to the 
 
 2 Frazier to Lansing, July 2 and 3, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 241-248; Palmer, Bliss, pp. 298-299; Lloyd George, Memoirs, VI, 178; Bliss 
 to March, July 2, 1918, Wilson Papers, series II. 
 
 3 Reading to Foreign Office, July 3, 1918, Wiseman Papers. When Wiseman in¬ 
 formed Auchincloss of Reading’s talk with the President, Auchincloss advised “the 
 best way for Reading to act for the next few days.” He suggested that Reading get 
 the President’s permission to discuss the matter with Baker in order to ascertain 
 “whether there was not some way of reconciling the British and American military 
 opinion on the feasibility of intervention in Russia” (Auchincloss, Diary, July 3, 1918). 
 
WILSON SAYS YES 
 
 69 
 
 Czechs be preceded by a declaration pledging noninterference in the 
 internal affairs of Russia and the withdrawal of military forces as soon 
 as the danger from German and Austrian aggression was over. Lan-~ 
 sing’s final suggestion was that a peaceful commission of representa¬ 
 tives of moral, industrial, financial, commercial, and agricultural in¬ 
 terests with a High Commissioner at its head should proceed at once 
 to Vladivostok to assist the Russian people to restore normal conditions 
 of trade, industry, and social order. Lansing was convinced that “fur- _ 
 nishing protection and assistance to the Czechoslovaks, who are so 
 loyal to our cause, is a very different thing from sending an army into 
 Siberia to restore order or to save the Russians from themselves. There 
 is a moral obligation to save these men from our common enemies, if 
 we are able to do so.” 4 
 
 Basil Miles shared Secretary Lansing’s viewpoint. On July 5 he 
 wrote Lansing, “I do not believe the Allies can excuse themselves if 
 they leave these gallant men unsupported. If the U.S. and the Allies 
 are ever going to do anything in Siberia, the time is now.” A final 
 and somewhat ambiguous sentence was added in pencil, “Otherwise 
 they should get these men out of Russia.” 0 Lansing’s reply to this 
 communication was to send a preliminary telegram to the American 
 consul at Vladivostok, advising him to inform the Czech leaders ver¬ 
 bally that the American government regarded the “Czech forces in 
 Russia as an inspiring element of the military forces now engaged 
 against the Central Powers.” Furthermore, the conduct of the leaders 
 at Vladivostok and in Western Siberia was beyond criticism and “de¬ 
 serving of the support and approval of all Governments engaged in war 
 against Germany and Austria.” 8 
 
 On July 6 the President had a conference on the Russian situation 
 with Secretaries Lansing, Baker, and Daniels, General March, and 
 Admiral Benson. The President informed them of his decision to 
 embark upon an expedition to Siberia in co-operation with Japan. 
 Instead of wholly accepting the plan recommended by the Supreme 
 War Council, the President was attempting to devise a new scheme 
 for intervention, based to a large extent upon Lansing’s memorandum 
 of July 4. The conferees agreed that the establishment of an East¬ 
 ern Front was militarily unfeasible. Therefore, they refused to con¬ 
 sider any advance westward beyond Irkutsk. However, they agreed 
 
 ‘Memorandum of the Secretary of State, July 4, 1918, file 861 00/2292 14 
 D.S.N.A. ’ 
 
 6 Basil Miles to Lansing, July 5, 1918, file 861.00/2908, D.S.N.A. 
 
 8 Lansing to Caldwell, July 5, 1918, file 861.00/2181, D.S.N.A. 
 
7 ° America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 v 'te'aid the Czechoslovaks if the Japanese government would co-operate 
 in the following program: 
 
 a) The furnishing of small arms, machine guns, and ammunition to the 
 Czecho-Slovaks at Vladivostok by the Japanese Government; this 
 Government to share the expense and to supplement the supplies as 
 rapidly as possible; 
 
 (b) The assembling of a military force at Vladivostok composed of approx¬ 
 imately 7000 Americans and 7000 Japanese to guard the line of com¬ 
 munication of the Czecho-Slovaks proceeding toward Irkutsk; the 
 Japanese to send troops at once; 
 
 (c) The landing of available forces from the American and Allied naval 
 vessels to hold possession of Vladivostok and co-operate with the 
 Czechoslovaks; 
 
 (d) The public announcement by this and Japanese Governments that 
 the purpose of landing troops is to aid Czecho-Slovaks against German 
 and Austrian prisoners, that there is no purpose to interfere with 
 internal affairs of Russia, and that they guarantee not to impair the 
 political or territorial sovereignty of Russia; and 
 
 (e) To await further developments before taking further steps. 7 
 
 When President Wilson read the program to the conferees, Gen¬ 
 eral March indicated his opposition by shaking his head. The Presi¬ 
 dent then said, “You are opposed to this because you do not think 
 Japan will limit herself to 7,000 men, and that this decision will further 
 her schemes for territorial aggrandizement.” When General March 
 replied in the affirmative, the President said, “Well, we will have to 
 take, that chance.” 8 
 
 Thus it was that on July 6 the United States government decided to 
 f act in Siberia, ostensibly to save the Czechoslovaks who had started 
 for Vladivostok on their way to France. Immediately after the White 
 House conference, Admiral Knight was instructed to keep Vladivostok 
 “available as a base for the safety of Czechs and as a means of egress 
 for them should the necessity arise.” 9 On the same day the Allied 
 powers issued a proclamation taking Vladivostok and its vicinity under 
 their temporary protection. 10 
 
 
 7 Memorandum of the Secretary of State of a Conference at the White House in 
 Reference to the Siberian Situation, July 6, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 
 1918, Russia, II, 262-263; Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 256. 
 
 8 March, A Nation at War, p. 126; Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 256. 
 
 9 Lansing to Morris, July 6, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 263. 
 
 10 Bunyan, Intervention, pp. 317-318. The Czechs, assisted by British and Japanese 
 forces, had been policing the city since June 29. American marines had been guard¬ 
 ing the American Consulate (Caldwell to Lansing, July 5, 1918, United States, Foreign 
 Relations 1918, Russia. II, 261). 
 
WILSON SAYS YES 
 
 71 
 
 The State Department now faced the task of getting Japanese ap¬ 
 proval of the American policy as determined by the President at the 
 White House conference. On July 8 Secretary Lansing informed Vis¬ 
 count Ishii of the American program. Ishii approved the plan and 
 agreed to convey it to his government immediately. He “spoke as if 
 he was sure the suggestion of a small force of 14,000 men equally di¬ 
 vided between the United States and Japan would be acceptable to his 
 Government.” 11 House also had a discussion with Ishii, whom he de¬ 
 scribed as being “very receptive.” 12 
 
 Meanwhile Lansing was concerned about the secrecy of the negotia¬ 
 tions with Japan. He feared that Japan might consult the British gov¬ 
 ernment about the American proposal. If this should happen, Lansing 
 wrote Wilson, “we may be embarrassed in our relations with those 
 Governments who will consider us not frank. I am very sure that a 
 secretive attitude will deeply offend Reading and Jusserand, and, to a 
 lesser degree, Cellere and Koo. My own disposition is to be candid 
 with them, now that the Japanese government has had time to con¬ 
 sider our proposed program.” 13 
 
 Lansing’s concern was not without foundation. The Italian am¬ 
 bassador reported that the news of independent Japanese-American 
 negotiations “came as a shock” to the three Allied ambassadors, “especi¬ 
 ally after the diplomatic exchanges of the last few weeks looking to¬ 
 wards an Allied movement.” 14 When the British ambassador, together 
 with the French and Italian ambassadors, called upon Secretary Lan¬ 
 sing on the afternoon of July 9, it was Lord Reading who did the 
 talking, despite the fact that Jusserand was the doyen of the corps 
 and therefore the natural spokesman. Reading bluntly asked whether 
 it was the intention of the American government to ask the Allies 
 to participate in the “initial landing of troops at Vladivostok or 
 whether it was our purpose to confine the enterprise to Japanese and 
 American troops.” Lansing replied that he thought it useless to con- 
 
 11 Memorandum of the Secretary of State of a Conference with the Japanese Am¬ 
 bassador concerning a Siberian Program July 8, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 
 1918, Russia, II, 267-268. 
 
 12 In writing Wilson of this conversation, House said, “It has been my opinion for 
 a long time that unless Japan was treated with more consideration regarding the right 
 of her citizens to expand in nearby Asiatic undeveloped countries she would have to be 
 reckoned with and rightly so (July 6, 1918, Wilson Papers, series II). 
 
 13 Lansing to Wilson, July 8, 1918, file 861.00/2292/2, D.S.N.A. For popular 
 knowledge of American negotiations regarding Siberia, see New York Times, July 9, 
 1918. 
 
 14 Phillips to Acting Secretary of State, July 12, 1918, United States, Foreign Re¬ 
 lations, 1918, Russia, II, 276. 
 
72 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 sider the question until the Japanese government had agreed to the 
 principle of “joint equal military action.” However, Lansing indi¬ 
 cated that it had always been his purpose to confer with the Allies, 
 once the Japanese had accepted the American program. When Lord 
 Reading said that he “feared his government would not understand 
 action which did not include all parties,” Lansing expressed his regret 
 but replied that the President “had no intention of submitting the 
 questions to the Allied Governments until Japan had declared that 
 she was favorable to the general plan.” Lansing went even further 
 when he repeated that “expediency should control and that if ex¬ 
 pediency was opposed to British participation, that . . . ended it.” 
 Although the British ambassador appeared “manifestly disturbed,” 
 Lansing had the feeling that the French and Italian ambassadors ap¬ 
 proved of the American program. 15 
 
 On July 10 Lansing assured Reading that the only reason for con¬ 
 ducting independent negotiations with Japan was to save time and 
 avoid preliminary discussions with the five governments. The Presi¬ 
 dent also sent a message to Reading which emphasized the idea that 
 opportunity for consultation would be given the Allied governments 
 as soon as Japan replied. These assurances and explanations were the 
 result of Reading’s statement that he feared the “Allied Governments 
 would be surprised at the course taken by the U. S. Government.” 
 Lord Reading had informed Lansing “that it was a pity a course had 
 been pursued which was capable of being misunderstood. . . 
 
 Despite his disapproval of American methods of negotiation, Read¬ 
 ing regarded the new move as real progress, attributing it largely to 
 the Supreme War Council’s appeal of July 2 and General Foch’s per¬ 
 sonal message to the President. His conversation with Lansing led 
 Reading to believe that the expedition would eventually become the 
 means of creating a Russian front. Reading informed the Prime Min¬ 
 ister that the President was still unwilling to agree to the creation of an 
 Eastern Front, because of the disapproval of his military advisers. 
 However, a first step had been made, and Reading regarded this as a 
 
 1E Lansing to Wilson, July 9, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 269-270. Auchincloss also noted Reading’s concern about the American plan. 
 Reading feared that it involved the elimination of the English, French, and Italians 
 from participation in the expedition. Auchincloss confided to his Diary on July 9 that 
 “Lord Reading is really very nervous about the situation and particularly because he 
 feels that the President and Secretary Lansing are under the impression that the British 
 are not very particular about consulting us before they act, and consequently, wh* 
 should we be very particular about consulting them. The truth is the whole thing is 
 not very scientifically handled and there is cause for complaint on both sides.” 
 
WILSON SAYS YES 
 
 73 
 
 great triumph, suggesting “much for the future.’ 16 Wiseman was also 
 pleased that the President was “now committed to intervention,” even 
 though on a small scale. He believed that “we must now work to 
 [the] end that he commit himself finally and irrevocably, when I think 
 we will find the whole matter will go through in entire accordance 
 with our wishes.” 17 Although Lord Balfour welcomed Wilson’s de¬ 
 cision to intervene, he felt that fourteen thousand troops were entirely 
 inadequate for the purpose. 18 
 
 It was quite evident that the British government was disturbed by 
 American independence in the Siberian matter. On July io the British 
 battalion at Hong Kong was ordered to proceed immediately to 
 Vladivostok “to replace the Czechs there,” who had started back to 
 Irkutsk. 19 Balfour carefully informed the American government that 
 the British action had not been “adopted with any intention to start 
 intervention but for the sole purposes of ensuring order in Vladivostok, 
 securing the communications of the Czech forces, and safeguarding the 
 Allied stores in the city.” 20 
 
 The British continued along th eir independent course. On July 
 ii the British government decided to liseToT'Other purposes the ton¬ 
 nage which had been originally intended for transporting the Czechs 
 from Vladivostok. ^At^the samejinie-they^ withdrew their request for 
 Japanese shipping for the transportation of the Czechs. This decision 
 was made becau se the Czech com mander believed that every available 
 (^zech^soidier would be need ed to assist the other Czech forces at 
 ^Irkutsk! 21 
 
 ' 18 Heading to Lloyd George and Balfour, July io, 1918, Wiseman Papers. 
 
 17 Wiseman to Arthur Murray (British Military Intelligence), July 10, 1918, Wise¬ 
 man Papers. 
 
 18 Balfour to Reading, July 10, 1918, Wiseman Papers; New York Times, July 
 
 10, 1918. 
 
 19 Reading to Lansing, July 11, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 
 11, 274. 
 
 20 Reading to Lansing, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 275. 
 Lord Reading was disturbed over the sending of British troops from Hong Kong with¬ 
 out consulting the United States. He assured Frank L. Polk that it had nothing to do 
 with America’s proposed plan, and was not an attempt to forestall American action. 
 Reading did indicate to Polk, that “of course it looked a little bit on the surface as 
 though we intended to leave out the British, and French . . .” (Polk, Confidential 
 Diary, July 12, 1918). The Japanese ambassador also called when he heard that 
 the British had sent troops to Vladivostok. He was anxious to know whether this 
 would make any difference in the American proposal for joint action. Polk assured 
 him that it would not affect in any way any arrangement between Japan and the 
 United States (Polk, Confidential Diary, July 13, 1918). 
 
 21 Reading to Lansing, July 12, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 275; General Maurice Janin, Ma mission en Siberie, 1918-1920 (Paris, 1933), 
 p. 8; Benes, War Memoirs, p. 369. 
 
74 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 On July 16 the British asked Japan to furnish the necessary destroy¬ 
 ers for strengthening the naval patrol at Vladivostok. Lord Reading 
 expressed the hope that the State Department would support the re¬ 
 quest made by the British government. 22 On the same day the British 
 War Cabinet, despite President Wilson’s disapproval, decided to send 
 General Alfred W. F. Knox, former military attache in Petrograd, to 
 Vladivostok as head of a British military mission. 23 
 
 In the meantime the British, French, and Japanese ambassadors 
 had requested permission from the Russian railway authorities at Har¬ 
 bin to transport Czech troops by the Chinese Eastern Railway. When 
 a favorable reply was received to this request, they proposed “simply 
 to inform the Chinese Government that these forces are to pass through 
 Manchuria.” 24 Wilson was profoundly disturbed by the independent 
 action of his Allies: 
 
 I do not understand or like the way in which the governments mentioned 
 are acting independently of us in this matter, but I think that perhaps 
 it would be all right to advise Reinsch not to object, while not cooperating 
 where his cooperation is apparently not asked. It is my clear judgment, 
 however, that the Chinese Government should be much more than “in¬ 
 formed” about this business. Their acquiescence and approval should 
 be sought. Do you not think so ? 25 
 
 British actions throughout July indicated a desire to assume leader¬ 
 ship of the expedition to Siberia. Colonel John Ward, who com¬ 
 manded the British battalion at Hong Kong, later wrote that once the 
 British had agreed that a “diversion through Russia was the surest way 
 of relieving pressure on the French front, the English apparently de¬ 
 cided to be the first in.” 26 The French and Italians were also unwilling 
 to be left out of the expedition. On July 12 the Italian ambassador in¬ 
 formed the State Department that a contingent of Italian troops at 
 Tientsin was ready to proceed at once to Siberia as a part of an inter- 
 Allied expedition. 27 Jusserand, too, informed Polk that his govern- 
 
 22 Reading to Lansing, July 16, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igi8, Russia, 
 II, 284. 
 
 23 Murray to Wiseman, July 17, 1918, Wiseman Papers; Callwell, Sir Henry 
 Wilson, II, 1x6; Lloyd George, Memoirs, VI, 176-177. General Knox reached Vladi¬ 
 vostok on Sept. 5, 1918 (London Times, Sept. 9, 1918). 
 
 24 MacMurray to Lansing, July 9, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igi8, 
 Russia, II, 271-272. 
 
 25 Wilson to Polk, July 15, 1918, file 861.00/2241, D.S.N.A. Wilson’s suggestion 
 was carried out (Polk to MacMurray, July 15, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 
 tgt8, Russia, II, 283). 
 
 29 John Ward, With the Die-Hards in Siberia (London, 1920), p. 20. 
 
 27 Phillips to Polk, July 12, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igi8, Russia, 
 II, 276. 
 
WILSON SAYS YES 
 
 75 
 
 ment approved of the American plan of action and desired to co¬ 
 operate in sending troops to Siberia. 28 
 
 While Great Britain prepared for action in Siberia, the State De¬ 
 partment patiently awaited the Japanese reply to its note suggesting a 
 joint Japanese-American expedition. Despite Lansing’s plea for haste, 
 Japanese officialdom was deliberate; and while their deliberations con¬ 
 tinued, eveijts. were moving very rapidly in Siberia and Manchuria. 
 On July 7 General Horvat left Harbin for Vladivostok, where he 
 planned to p roclaim himself the head of a new Siberian gov ernment. 
 
 29 Upon 
 over 
 
 ' He frank ly admitted the guarantee of Japanese a ssistance 
 
 Horvat’s de^artme^Chiiia-inxlkated- 
 
 the~ CKinese Eastern Railway and the zone through which it ran. The 
 Chinese governor told the American consuT at Harbin that “Horvat’s 
 departure constituted Russia’s abandonment” and that Horvat could 
 not come back in any administrative capacity, but only as the railway 
 manager. Charles K. Moser, the American consul at Harbin, sus¬ 
 pected that Japan was behind China’s attitude. John MacMurray, the_ 
 
 charge in China, w as advised to t ell t he Chinese M i nister for Foreign 
 Affairs th at the American government w onld_re gret “ . -my a ttempt by 
 C hina to take advantage of Russia’s jrese nt distress_ _toj^egain control 
 of the Chinese Eastern Railway,!!^ " 
 
 On July io, 1918, Ambassador Ishii introduced a new note into 
 Japanese-American negotiations concerning a program of action in Si¬ 
 beria. He told Lansing that a decision on the matter might be ex¬ 
 pedited if some arrangement could be made regarding the high com¬ 
 mand of the joint expedition. Although Lansing made light of the 
 question, he regarded it as a very serious matter, particularly as he 
 knew the Japanese expected to have the high command. 31 The ques¬ 
 tion of command had been discussed considerably at Washington. 
 General March had made the “rather rash statement that no American 
 Officer would serve under the Japanese.” This statement had been 
 repeated and criticized. Wiseman’s solution to the problem of com- 
 
 28 Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 280. 
 
 29 MacMurray to Lansing, July 9, 1918, file 861.00/2262, D.S.N.A. Horvat issued 
 his proclamation on July 9. When the United States indicated its disapproval of 
 Japanese assistance to the new government, the Japanese Foreign Minister assured Lansing 
 that Japan would not interfere in the internal politics of Siberia (MacMurray to Lansing, 
 July 9, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igi8, Russia, II, 273). 
 
 30 Lansing to MacMurray, July 9, 1918, July 18, 1918, United States, Foreign Re¬ 
 lations, tgi8, Russia, II, 273-292; LaFargue, China and the World War, pp. 170- 
 171. 
 
 31 Lansing to Wilson, July 10, 1918, Lansing Papers, II, 373; Baker, Woodrow 
 Wilson, VIII, 272. 
 
j 6 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 mand was to appoint an American as High Commissioner in charge 
 of the whole expedition and to place a Japanese officer in command of 
 the military part of the expedition. 32 
 
 On July 15 Counselor Polk informed the President of his views 
 concerning the Japanese delay in replying to the American proposals: 
 “I think if we were disposed to tell him [Viscount Ishii] that we had 
 no objection to a Japanese officer being the senior military officer, and 
 therefore in command of the troops, we would hear very shortly that 
 the Japanese Government were willing to cooperate.” 33 Wilson evi¬ 
 dently approved of this suggestion, for on July 16, he informed Polk 
 that “the Japanese were to have the supreme command when they 
 landed in Vladivostok.” Polk was authorized to convey this informa¬ 
 tion to the Japanese ambassador. That evening, when Polk informed 
 Ambassador Ishii of the President’s decision, he “suggested that no 
 formal statement be given out, but that they send an officer of sufficient 
 rank with their forces, and it would be understood that our forces 
 would be under his command.” 34 On the next day the American 
 ambassador to Japan was informed that the Japanese would have the 
 high command of the expedition. 35 
 
 Evidently the War Department was not informed of this decision, 
 for on August 8 Secretary Baker was quoted as saying, “I should 
 suppose the ranking officer would be the Japanese General. I under¬ 
 stand they are going to send a Lieutenant General and we are sending 
 a Major General. . . . Whether there will be any more definite Com¬ 
 mander-in-chief I do not know.” 36 This confusion between the State 
 and War Departments concerning the high command in Siberia was to 
 place both General Graves and the Japanese commander in Siberia in 
 an awkward position at the very outset of the expedition. 
 
 As the month of July progressed and Japan continued to delay 
 in replying to the American proposals, President Wilson determined 
 to draft an aide memoire to the Allied ambassadors, carefully defining 
 the objectives of America’s proposed expedition to Siberia. 37 Cir¬ 
 culated on July 17, the aide memoire informed the Allied powers that 
 since the United States government was bending every effort towards 
 
 32 Wiseman to House, July 4, 1918, Wiseman Papers. 
 
 33 Polk to Wilson, July 15, 1918, Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 280. 
 
 34 Polk, Confidential Diary, July 16, 1918. 
 
 33 Polk to Morris, July 17, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igi8, Russia, 
 II, 292. 
 
 36 New York Times, Aug. 9, 1918. For General Graves’s views on the supreme 
 command, see Graves, America’s Siberian Adventure, pp. 57-59. 
 
 37 Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 285. 
 
WILSON SAYS YES 
 
 77 
 
 winning the war on the Western Front, it could not separate or di¬ 
 vert any part of its forces for military operations on a large scale in 
 other parts of the world such as Russia. Furthermore, it was op¬ 
 posed to military intervention in Russia, even in principle: 
 
 It is the clear and fixed judgment of the Government of the United 
 States, arrived at after repeated and very searching reconsiderations of 
 the whole situation in Russia, that military intervention there would add 
 to the present sad confusion in Russia rather than cure it, injure her rather 
 than help her, and that it would be of no advantage in the prosecution of 
 our main design, to win the war against Germany. It can not, therefore, 
 take part in such intervention or sanction it in principle. Military inter¬ 
 vention would, in its judgment, even supposing it to be efficacious in its 
 immediate avowed object of delivering an attack upon Germany from 
 the east, be merely a method of making use of Russia, not a method of 
 serving her. Her people could not profit by it, if they profited by it at all, 
 in time to save them from their present distresses, and their substance would 
 be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own. Military 
 action is admissible in Russia as the Government of the United States sees 
 the circumstances only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces 
 and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady 
 any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians them¬ 
 selves may be willing to accept assistance . 38 
 
 The communication added further that American troops would be 
 used only for the purposes stated, and that they would be withdrawn 
 “if the plans in whose execution it is now intended that they should 
 cooperate should develop into others inconsistent with the policy” of 
 the United States. At the same time the United States pointed duU~> 
 that in restricting its own activities, it did not mean, “even by impli- I 
 cation, to set limits to the action or to define the policies of its associ- / 
 ates.” The United States hoped to carry out its plans in close co¬ 
 operation with a small military force like its own from Japan, and'' 
 from the other Allies if necessary. It proposed to ask all nations 
 associated in the American program to unite 
 
 in assuring the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner 
 that none of the governments uniting in action either in Siberia or in 
 northern Russia contemplates any interference of any kind with the political 
 sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal affairs, or any im¬ 
 pairment of her territorial integrity either now or hereafter, but that each 
 of the associated powers has the single object of affording such aid as shall 
 
 38 The Secretary of State to the Allied Ambassadors, July 17, 1918, United States, 
 Foreign Relations, igi8, Russia, II, 288. For complete text of aide memoire, see Ap¬ 
 pendix, p. 235. 
 
78 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 be acceptable, and only such aid as shall be acceptable, to the Russian people 
 in their endeavor to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, 
 and their own destiny. 
 
 'Trie communication stated finally that the United States proposed 
 to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, 
 labor advisers, Red Cross representatives, and agents of the Young 
 Men’s Christian Association to render educational and economic aid, 
 at the earliest opportunity. 39 
 
 President Wilson’s aide memoire brought forth varying reactions 
 from Japan and Great Britain. Baron Shimpeii Goto, Japanese Min¬ 
 ister for Foreign Affairs, expressed his entire sympathy with the atti¬ 
 tude of the United States toward Russia. However, he hoped that 
 Washington “could see its way clear to co-operate for the assistance 
 of the Czecho-Slovaks in the slightly modified manner” suggested by 
 Japan. 40 The formal British reply to Wilson’s aide memoire, delivered 
 to the State Department on July 30, revealed a clear difference of 
 views between Washington and London. Although approving of aid 
 to the Czechs, the War Cabinet feared that the proposed force would 
 prove inadequate. 41 The British reply took issue with two points, one 
 military, the other political, which seemed to misconceive seriously 
 the attitude of the Entente Powers. In the first place, Washington 
 failed to appreciate the importance of establishing an Eastern Front 
 against Germany. Such a front would force Germany to withdraw 
 important bodies of troops from the Western Front and would thereby 
 relieve pressure in France. Great Britain, therefore, believed that 
 Japan should be willing to employ her unused military strength for 
 this purpose. The second misconception which pervaded the aide 
 memoire was the idea that the Allies in advocating intervention in 
 Russia were not thinking of Russia, “but solely of themselves.” The 
 British government professed the belief that by helping the Russian 
 people to free themselves from German domination it was performing a 
 
 30 The Secretary of State to the Allied Ambassadors, July 17, 1918, United States, 
 Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 287-290. See also Pauline Tompkins, American- 
 Russian Relations in the Far East, pp. 79-80. 
 
 40 Morris to Lansing, July 23, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 300-301. 
 
 41 Conveying his real opinion of the aide memoire to Lord Reading, Balfour wrote: 
 “On the other hand, we cannot pretend for ourselves, nor ought we to convey to them, 
 that we regard [the] size of American-Japanese force as in any way adequate to the 
 necessities of the case. To us it seems almost certain that either [the] Allied expedi¬ 
 tion will fail or that it will have to be largely reinforced; we hope the latter. But 
 these are hopes which you can hardly convey to [the] President” (Balfour to Reading, 
 Wiseman Papers). 
 
WILSON SAYS YES 
 
 79 
 
 signal service. The British note ended by denying the American sug¬ 
 gestion that intervention had a political as well as a military object. 
 The British government thought it necessary to deal briefly with 
 these various points in order to “remove any possible misconceptions 
 as to the attitude of His Majesty’s Government.” 42 The State De¬ 
 partment was thus aware at the very outset of the expedition of the 
 divergence in views between the two governments. 
 
 The French government accepted the American proposal without 
 question, and avoided the issue of participation by ordering troops from 
 Tientsin. 43 The Italian ambassador had already informed Polk that 
 Italy was prepared to participate in the expedition with a force of 
 two thousand men. 44 Secretary Lansing was particularly concerned 
 about the insistence of Great Britain and France in taking part in the 
 movement. Believing that it gave the affair the character of joint 
 intervention, he felt that no declaration would change this impression 
 because of the secret support given by Great Britain and France to 
 factions in various parts of Russia. He wrote of his fears to Polk: 
 
 The participation of those two Governments will give the enterprise the 
 character of interference with the domestic affairs of Russia and create the 
 impression that the underlying purpose is to set up a new pro-Ally Gov¬ 
 ernment in Siberia, if not in Russia. It is unfortunate that London and 
 Paris do not see this and let the United States and Japan handle the situa¬ 
 tion without seeking to interfere. It seems to me that the wisdom of this 
 dual action is so evident that I cannot understand why the others do not 
 keep their hands off. 45 
 
 America’s European Allies were not the only powers who desired 
 to participate in the American-Japanese expedition to Siberia. As 
 soon as the Chinese government learned of the American proposals 
 to Japan, it announced a desire to participate in the venture. Chin a. 
 
 ^ offered_ to_xcbQpera te to the ex tent of seven th ousand troops and sug¬ 
 gested that an invitation from~theHJ rYire(f'States to that effect would 
 be welcome. La ter, on the same day, the A.cting Minister for Foreign 
 A ffairs informed ^thg^Amerkan charge in Chinathat the Cabinet haH 
 decided to dispatch one thousand troops ~tO~ ^^VdafftYmto kA mmedTatery ~ 
 viaThe Chinese Eastern Railway, and to send another thousancTin the 
 hear future. Although the Japanese minister had insisted that such 
 
 ‘“British Embassy to Department of State, July 30, 1918, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 315-317. 
 
 43 Polk to Lansing, file 861.00/3055 Vi , D.S.N.A.; New York Times, Aug. 1, 1918. 
 
 44 Polk to Wilson, July 16, 1918, file 861.00/2837, D.S.N.A. 
 
 45 Lansing to Polk, Aug. 3, 1918, Lansing Papers. See also Lloyd George, Memoirs, 
 VI, 171. 
 
8o 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 participation was unnecessary, the Chinese minister at Washington 
 was instructed specially to urge upon the American government the 
 advisability of Chinese co-operation and to “bespeak . . . assistance in 
 such difficulties as may be raised by Japan.” 46 
 
 On July 23 the..State Depa rtme nt informed V. K. Wellington Koo, 
 the Chinese minister at Washington, that since the Chinese request in- 
 v olved a military matter , it would have' to be referred to the Inter- 
 Allied Military Conf erence in France. 47 Undeterred hy this reply^Koo 
 continued to pleadTor Chinese parHclpation”6n the groonds“that' 
 '^ military participation and controFlJP idre~'ChirTese Easter n Railway 
 were integral" parts'of an aggressive activity which China would like 
 tocon tribute to the Allied cause?’ - Furthermore, he believed" it" would 
 have a gottd effect~0TT - Cmn?s internal politics, and give her a better 
 standing among the nations of the world. 48 
 
 The State Department was sympathetic to Koo’s pleas, and par¬ 
 ticularly so when rumors reached Washington from Peking that “by 
 the recent military convention with Japan, China might have com¬ 
 mitted herself to delegate control of that part of the Chinese Eastern 
 Railroad which lies within Chinese territory to some other govern¬ 
 ment.” Long informed Koo that, if there should be a military opera¬ 
 tion of an Allied character in Siberia, “the Chinese Government should 
 control that part of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which lies within 
 Chinese territory, and should control it alone .’’ 49 President Wilson 
 approved emphatically of this idea. 50 
 
 The State Department’s views concerning Chinese participation 
 were conveyed to Baron Goto on July 31. He was inclined to accede 
 to the American suggestion, not because he believed the Chinese troops 
 would be effective in aiding the Czechs, but because Japan “desired 
 to act in full accord” with the views of the American government. 51 
 
 46 MacMurray to Lansing, July 20, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 298-299. 
 
 47 Memorandum of a Conversation between Long and the Chinese Minister, July 23, 
 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 299-300. 
 
 48 Memorandum of a Conversation between Long and Koo, July 26, 1918, United 
 States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 305. 
 
 40 Italics inserted. Memorandum of a Conversation between Long and Koo, July 
 26, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 304. This information 
 was conveyed to Japan, along with a statement approving China’s request to participate 
 in the international force at Vladivostok with a small contingent (Polk to Morris, July 
 29, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 314). 
 
 60 Wilson to Long, July 26, 1918, Breckinridge Long Papers (collection in Di¬ 
 vision of Manuscripts, Library of Congress). 
 
 61 Morris to Lansing, Aug. 1, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 
 321-322; Polk to Lansing, July 29, 1918, file 861.00/2403 Vi, D.S.N.A. 
 
WILSON SAYS YES 
 
 81 
 
 While the European allies of China and America hastened to par¬ 
 ticipate in the proposed expedition, Japan continued to deliberate over 
 the American proposal. Japanese imperialists regarded the invitation 
 as an excellent opportunity to improve Japan’s prestige and position in 
 Asia. The Terauchi Ministry, then in power, reflected this point of 
 Ambassador Morris later pointed out that the Terauchi Min- 
 
 view. 
 
 istry “clear ly planned to use the joint expedition to Vladivostok . . . as 
 an excus e to t ake posses sion of the Chinese Eastern Railway and thus 
 
 
 dominate northern Manchuria and eastern Siberia?’ 52 
 
 On July rTThe Japanese Cabinet, under the leadership of Premier 
 Terauchi and Baron Goto, decided not only to accept the American 
 proposal but also to send an “independent expedition” to Siberia. 53 On 
 July 13 Ambassador Morris reported that the Japanese General Staff 
 was urging th^ riohinpt to o ccupy Manchuria T mmediately. This 
 coujd^ be done without offense to China hecanse of the rece nUmilkaxV 
 The plan included taking over 
 
 a greement. 
 
 Chinese 
 
 Eastern Railway. 54 
 
 Takashi Hara, president of the Seiyukai party, and Baron Shinken 
 Makino, both influential members of the Advisory Council on Foreign 
 Relations, 55 opposed the independent expedition. Since it was neces¬ 
 sary to have the approval of the Advisory Council before making a final 
 decision, Premier Terauchi attempted to overcome their opposition 
 through personal pressure. His efforts failed. 56 Forced to alter his 
 original plans, Terauchi submitted a revised draft to the council on 
 July 16 whictfaccepted the American proposal for a joint expedition 
 tcT Vladivostok, but added that the Japanese government would dis- 
 ... patch additional troops to Siberia jbr self-protection-and for police pur¬ 
 poses! Both Harai and Makino insisted that no necessity existed for an 
 
 M 
 
 h 
 
 62 Morris to Lansing, July 30, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 II, 293. 
 
 63 Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, p. 205. 
 
 64 United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 281. The American govern¬ 
 ment protested against these reports (Polk to Morris, July 19, 1918, United States, 
 Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 297-298; LaFargue, China and the World War, 
 p. 169). 
 
 6 “ The Advisory Council on Foreign Relations was established on June 5, 1917, to 
 deliberate upon important diplomatic affairs. The object was to place questions of 
 foreign policy and national defense above partisan politics. The members of the 
 council consisted of the Prime Minister and several other members selected from among 
 cabinet ministers or former cabinet ministers. With the establishment of this council 
 the Foreign Office was reduced to a secondary position in the actual formulation and 
 execution of foreign policies. The council continued to function until Sept. 18, 1922 
 (Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, chap. v). 
 
 66 Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, p. 206; London Times, July 23, 1918. 
 
82 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 independent expedition. A compromise was finally made by which 
 Japan reserved the right to send additional troops to Siberia “in case 
 of necessity to protect the Czechoslovak soldiers.” 57 The draft reply 
 to the American proposal was finally approved on July 18, and dis¬ 
 patched to Ambassador Morris on July 19. 68 
 
 Ambassador Ishii delivered the Japanese reply orally to Acting 
 Secretary Polk on July 24. The ambassador stated that Japan could 
 not accept the limi tafior uof seven th ousand men “for political reasons, ” 
 because the J apanese people, and particula rly the opposition, would say 
 “that the limita tion was being imposed because of lack o f c onfidence 
 in _ Japan a n d its mo tives.” Since the Japanese government believed that 
 the number of troops suggested by the American government was too 
 small to protect the Czechoslovaks adequately, it proposed to send 
 a division, which would approximate twelve thousand men, with the 
 understanding that the number of troops to be sent would depend on 
 the amount of resistance given by the Bolsheviks and Austro-German 
 prisoners. Unsuccessful in persuading Ishii to limit the number of 
 troops to seven thousand, Polk referred the Japanese reply to the 
 White House for action. 59 
 
 The President was “very much put out” by the Japanese reply. He 
 instructed Polk to tell Ishii that while he did not wish to cause Japan 
 “any embarrassment,” nevertheless, their plan was so different from 
 ours that he thought it best not to act at all. 60 On July 25 Polk con¬ 
 ferred again with Ishii, informing him that “his answer was a new 
 proposal.” Washington took issue with the reference in thejapanese 
 declaration to the “special position of Japan.” This phrase was con¬ 
 sidered unnecessary in view of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement and the 
 fact that Japan would have the supreme command and a larger num¬ 
 ber of troops than all of the other powers combined. Moreover, such 
 an assertion might “create a misunderstanding in the minds of the 
 Russian people and would be seized on by the Germans as having 
 much greater significance than was intended.” Polk again attempted 
 to limit the size of the Japanese expedition, arguing that such a limi¬ 
 tation was necessary in order to create the proper impression on the 
 
 67 Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, pp. 206-207; “What Japan Thinks,” New Re¬ 
 public, XVI (Aug. 31, 1918), 124-125. 
 
 68 Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, p. 207. Communications were also approved 
 to the governments of England, France and Italy, London Times, July 23, 1918. 
 
 60 Polk to Wilson, July 24, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igiS, Russia, II, 
 301-302. Auchincloss was confident “that the President would be considerably put out” 
 by the Japanese reply (Auchincloss, Diary, July 24, 1918). 
 
 80 Auchincloss, Diary, July 25, 1918. 
 
WILSON SAYS YES 
 
 S 3 ' 
 
 Russian people. He informed Ishii that although the United States 
 would not object to a Japanese force of ten or twelve thousand soldiers, 
 he felt that the question of sending additional troops should be de¬ 
 ferred until after the original expedition had landed. If Japan and 
 the other powers then felt that additional troops were necessary, the 
 United States “could then decide whether it wished to go on or 
 withdraw.” Assuring the Japanese ambassador that Washington had 
 the “utmost confidence in Japanese motives*” Polk added that if 
 
 U/0- 
 
 Tokyo and the other Allies considered that a large expedition was a 
 military necessity that theTJmted States “would be compelled to with- 
 
 draw as that was not our plan.”® 1 
 
 rea* 
 
 While Washington awaited Tokyo’s reaction to the Polk-Ishii in¬ 
 terview, further disquieting news was received from Japan. Am¬ 
 bassador Morris reported that the Japanese Foreign Minister had called 
 upon him and 
 
 expressed his clear conviction that a patrol of troops along the line of the 
 Chinese Eastern Railway and Trans-Siberian Railway as far as Karymskaya 
 was a military necessity. He confirmed my advices that the Twelfth Di¬ 
 vision is prepared to embark for Vladivostok and the Eighth Division is 
 prepared to embark for Harbin to protect the railway. The present plan 
 is to send the Vladivostok expedition first and to follow with the Harbin 
 expedition between two and four weeks later. 62 
 
 Several days later the Japanese Embassy reported that the Japanese 
 government had sent some torpedo boats to Nikolaevsk, at the mouth 
 of the Amur River, to protect Japanese interests there. 63 These de¬ 
 velopments only served to increase anxiety in Washington. When 
 Admiral Knight questioned Secretary Daniels as to when Allied troops 
 would be sent to Vladivostok, President Wilson wrote, “I wish I^ould 
 gi ve Knight the information he desires . . . but unhappily the Japanese 
 Government is trying to alter the whole pl an in a wav to which 
 we cannot consent, and for thetime being at any rate the whole 
 
 V / 
 
 matter is in suspense.” 64 On the same day the President TequesteH 
 
 Acting SecretaryTolk to cable Ambassador Morris urging the Japanese 
 
 01 Polk to Morris, July 27, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 
 306-307; Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 297-298. 
 
 62 Morris to Lansing, July 23, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 300. 
 
 05 Polk to Morris, July 30, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 318; Varneck and Fisher, Testimony of Kolcha\, pp. 334-335. 
 
 94 Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 310-311. 
 
84 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 government to hasten its decision, or else the proposed plan of aiding 
 the Czechs would “prove abortive.” 65 
 
 The Japanese government deliberated for several days upon Vis¬ 
 count Ishii’s report of his July 25 interview with Polk. On July 31, 
 following an informal conference with Baron Goto, Ambassador Mor¬ 
 ris cabled his belief that the Japanese government would make cer¬ 
 tain changes in its declaration in accordance with Polk’s suggestions. 66 
 However, no formal statement of Japanese modifications followed Mor¬ 
 ris’s preliminary note. Therefore, Washington was quite surprised to 
 learn that Premier Terauchi had made public the Japanese declara¬ 
 tion of intervention on the evening of August 3 without previously 
 informing the American State Department. Baron Goto later ex¬ 
 plained that “this unexpected action was taken to allow public opinion 
 to accede to all the suggestions” of the American government. 67 
 
 ^ The Japa nese declaration did at tempt to meet some of Washington’s 
 "rlier objections. No reterenoTwas _m ade~either to JapafPs “special 
 position^" or to the dispatchof additional Japanese troops at a later date. 
 
 Significantly, the declaration failed to meirtiombe number of troops 
 
 ^ participating in Ibe^ernrrrf^r^Tbp statement declared t hat the “Jap - 
 anese Government . . . have decided to. proceeTlar. once-mdisparch 
 ~ su itable Txircesfor the pro posed mission .—A—certain number of thes e 
 troops w ill be sentforthwith to Vladivo stok.” The purpose of the 
 {expedition was to assist the Czechoslovaks in accordance with the 
 proposals made by the United States. It was the avowed policy of the 
 Japanese government to respect the territorial integrity of Russia and 
 to abstain from all interference in her internal politics. In conclusion, 
 the Japanese declaration stated that upon realization of the above ob¬ 
 ject, Japanese troops would be withdrawn immediately from Russian 
 territory, leaving unimpaired the political and military sovereignty of 
 Russia. 68 Significantly, the Japanese declaration made no mention 
 either of the British plan to reconstitute the Eastern Front or of the 
 American proposal to send economic aid to Siberia. 
 
 65 Polk, Confidential Diary, Aug. 2, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 322-323. On the same day General Graves received his first orders con¬ 
 cerning the Siberian expedition (Graves, America’s Siberian Adventure, pp. 2-3). 
 
 66 Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, p. 208; Morris to Lansing, Aug. 1, 1918, United 
 States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 322. Morris pointed out that the Japanese 
 government was taking unusual precautions to prevent the nature of the negotiations 
 from reaching the public. Evidently the government feared popular resentment. 
 
 67 Morris to Lansing, Aug. 5, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 330. 
 
 68 United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 324-325; Takeuchi, War 
 and Diplomacy, p. 208; Japan Year Boo\, 1919-1920, pp. 790-791. 
 
WILSON SAYS YES 
 
 85 
 
 On August 3 Ambassador Ishii assured Polk that his government 
 had no intention of sending more men than necessary to assist the 
 Czechs. However, his government still felt that a larger force was 
 necessary than that proposed by the American government. Despite 
 this difference of opinion, Ishii had been authorized to say that Japan 
 accepted the American proposals, “reserving the question as to the 
 sending of additional troops to Vladivostok or elsewhere until cir¬ 
 cumstances should arise which might make it necessary.” In explana¬ 
 tion of his last statement, Ishii pointed out that it might be necessary 
 to move out of Vladivostok, or to send reinforcements “to prevent the 
 slaughter of the Czechs.” In such an event his government intended 
 to consult the American government as well as the other Allies. How¬ 
 ever, if an emergency arose, the Japanese government “wished to say 
 frankly that they would be compelled for reasons already stated to 
 move without consultation.” When Polk repeatedly inquired as to 
 whether the Japanese forces would be limited to ten or twelve thousand 
 men, Ishii replied that since such a number had been mentioned in a 
 previous conversation, and since his government had stated that “they 
 accepted our proposal, he felt there was no question on that point.” 
 Again, when Polk questioned him as to whether his government in¬ 
 tended to send troops elsewhere, Ishii said “no, not as far as he knew, 
 and he thought that he had been fully informed on this point.” 69 
 
 On August 5 Baron Goto assured Morris that the number of troops 
 would not exceed twelve thousand, as mentioned by the American 
 government. Goto, however, expressed some doubts as to whether 
 this force would be sufficient to meet the increasingly serious condi¬ 
 tions developing in Northern Manchuria and Eastern Siberia. 70 
 
 Once Japan had made public its declaration on intervention, the 
 United States quickly announced its position to the world s Preside nt 
 
 
 W ilson had begun working on a public announce ment shortly af ter 
 the circulation of hE ai de memoire, and t Ke~announcement actually 
 
 69 Polk to Wilson, Aug. 3, 1918, United States, ForeigrTT^fat ions, 1 9 18, Russia, IT , 
 325-326; Polk, Confidential Diary, Aug. 3, 1918. On Aug. 6, 1918, MacMurray, charge 
 in China, reported that the Chinese Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs had informed 
 him that although no representations had been made through diplomatic channels, the 
 Japanese military attache, who was also attached to the Chinese General Staff, had re¬ 
 peatedly urged that China should undertake an expedition into Siberia in co-operation 
 with Japan under the terms of the recent military convention. The Chinese govern¬ 
 ment had assented in principle to such co-operation although no definite proposal had 
 yet been made by the Japanese as to when this expedition was to be undertaken (Mac¬ 
 Murray to Lansing, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 331). 
 
 70 Morris to Lansing, Aug. 5, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 330. 
 
 
86 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 paraphrased it to a large degree. 71 Released to the press on the after¬ 
 noon of August 3, the American declaration announced that the ob¬ 
 jectives of the expedition were to aid the Czechs, to guard military 
 stores which might be~needed suhsequent!yd?y-Rnssian forces,~an^ “to 
 steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the 
 Russians may be willing to accept assistance.” The declaration care¬ 
 fully pointed out that since the UnitecTStafes and Japan were the only 
 powers in a position to act in Siberia with a sufficient force to ac¬ 
 complish the stated objectives, the United States had proposed to Japan 
 that “each of the two governments send a force of a few thousand men 
 to Vladivostok, with the purpose of co-operating as a single force in 
 the occupation of Vladivostok, and in safeguarding so far as it may, 
 the country to the rear of the westward-moving Czecho-Slovaks.” The 
 British, French, and Italian governments had agreed to the American 
 plans and purposes “in principle.” The announcement also declared 
 that American actions on the matter were not intended to restrict or 
 interfere with the independent judgment of the other Allies. The 
 American government again announced its neutral position in Russian 
 affairs in strong and decisive language. 72 
 
 / T^he British issued a similar declaration on August 8, after Britisji 
 (troops had already landed in Vladivostok^ The British statement did 
 \pot mention the CJzecTT need of assistance. It stated that the Allies 
 were coming as friends to stop German penetration of Russia, and to 
 bring economic relief. The announcement concluded with a stirring 
 plea: “Peoples of Russia! Unite with us in defense of your liberties. 
 Our one desire is to see Russia strong and free and then to retire and 
 watch the Russian people work out its destinies in accordance with the 
 freely expressed wishes of the people.” 73 
 
 71 Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 286. 
 
 72 Polk to Morris, Aug. 3, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igi8, Russia, 
 II, 328-329. The British Foreign Minister had expressed a similar attitude in a some¬ 
 what more realistic manner several weeks earlier. He had written, “It is of course 
 perfectly true that, however strong and genuine be our desire to keep out of Russian 
 politics, it will probably be in practice almost impossible to prevent intervention having 
 some (perhaps a great) effect on Russian parties. . . . We can do no more than 
 attempt to the best of our ability to keep aloof from these internal divisions, and to 
 give full opportunity to the Russian people to determine the future of their country” 
 (Balfour to Lloyd George, July 16, 1918, Lloyd George, Memoirs, VI, 177-178). On 
 Aug. 5, 1918, Mr. Balfour declared in the House of Commons, “The aim of his 
 Majesty’s Government is to secure the political and economic restoration of Russia 
 without internal interference of any kind, and to bring about the expulsion of enemy 
 forces from Russian soil” (Great Britain, House of Commons Debates, 5th series, CIX, 
 904-906). 
 
 73 Barclay to Lansing, Aug. 8, 1918. United States, Foreign Relations, tgi8, Russia, 
 
 II, 334- 
 
WILSON SAYS YES 
 
 87 
 
 The public announcements brought forth varied reactions through¬ 
 out the interested countries. Ambassador Morris reported from Tokyo 
 that as far as one could observe the final decision of the Japanese gov¬ 
 ernment “to fall in with the American proposals” met with general ap¬ 
 proval, although there seemed to be no enthusiasm for the enter¬ 
 prise. 74 In the United States the policy of intervention was generally 
 supported by the American press. 75 George Kennan, the man whom 
 Lansing regarded as the highest American authority on Russia, con¬ 
 gratulated Lansing on the decision to intervene. Kennan assumed 
 that the expedition proposed to overthrow the Bolshevik government, 
 which he evidently regarded as the puppet of Germany. He pre¬ 
 dicted early success for the venture with a resulting “regeneration of 
 Russia as a true democracy.” 76 
 
 From Vladivostok the American consul cabled that the Japanese 
 declaration was “evoking favorable comment.” 77 The London Times 
 of August 13 reported that the British declaration had been “heartily 
 welcomed,” and had “increased the popularity of the Allied troops.” 
 In contrast to these statements came a report from Harbin on the 
 American declaration, which was compared unfavorably with the 
 Japanese. The Vestni\ Manchurii, the principal organ of the Horvat 
 government, declared that the American program was too narrow in 
 scope and too materialistic in its aims. 78 
 
 The public declarations of Japan, Great Britain, and the United 
 States clearly revealed the differences of opinion among the three 
 nations concerning the scope, character, and purposes of the expedition 
 to Siberia. As time went on, these differences tended to increase 
 rather than decrease, and the next months were to reveal a three-way 
 diplomatic struggle for leadership in Siberia. 
 
 Wilson’s decision to intervene in Siberia was based on several 
 reasons. He had placed the winning of rhe._war first This implied 
 no quarrel with the Allies. When the Allies insisted on going into 
 Siberia, Wilson had resisted, but had finally yielded on the theory 
 that if he participated in the venture, he would later be able to say, 
 
 71 Morris to Lansing, Aug. 5, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 330. Yamato Ichihashi, The Washington Conference and After (Stanford, 1928), 
 p. 320, later wrote that “the people of Japan had never looked with favor upon 
 Japan’s venture in Siberia.” 
 
 75 New York Times, Aug. 4, 1918; Literary Digest, LVIII (Aug. 17, 1918), 10. 
 
 78 George Kennan to Lansing, Aug. 9, 1918, Lansing Papers. For a similar view, 
 see Outloo\, CXIX (July 24, 1918), 478. 
 
 77 Caldwell to Lansing, Aug. 6, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 332. 
 
 78 Moser to Lansing, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 338-339. 
 
8 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 Now let us come ou t,” instead of , “ Now you come out.” 79 He made 
 is decision after it became evident that-intervention would take 
 
 place d espite his opposition arid probably with Japan in charge-o£-the 
 expeditiqn^_He joined it, not because he believed in it, but because 
 he thought he could "impose greater restraint on Japa n withi n rather 
 than outside it.” 80 
 
 It is quite true that the much publicized plight of the Czechs in Si¬ 
 beria gave Wilson the necessary “moral” reason for intervention, but 
 the number of troops proposed for rescuing seventy thousand Czechs 
 was ludicrously small. And by the time the United States took action 
 for their safety they had already been in possession of important points 
 on the Trans-Siberian Railway for some two months. Moreover, the 
 Supreme War Council had already decided on June 3 to retain certain 
 of the Czech units in Russia to co-operate in holding Murmansk and 
 Archangel. 81 
 
 Despite the publicized reasons for intervention, the documents re¬ 
 veal that once Japan had indicated her intentions to undertake an 
 independent expedition to Siberia and Northern Manchuria under 
 the terms of the Sino-Japanese Military Agreements of May, 1918, the 
 hand of the United States was forced. TheCooen door” in China was 
 
 f~" r ----— 
 
 at stake. IfTa pan went into Siberi a, the United States must also go. 
 
 70 Lincoln Steffens to Laura Suggett, reporting a conversation with Colonel House, 
 Oct. 16, 1918; Steffens to James H. McGill, Oct. 31, 1918; Lincoln Steffens, Letters 
 (2 vols.; New York, 1938), I, 433, 438. See also Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 284. 
 
 80 Griswold, Far Eastern Policy, p. 234; Newton D. Baker, Foreword in Graves, 
 America’s Siberian Adventure, pp. viii-ix; Schuman, American Policy toward Russia 
 since 1917, p. 103. 
 
 81 Dugdale, Arthur Balfour, II, 190; Stewart, While Armies of Russia, p. 114. Gen¬ 
 eral Graves points out that both DeWitt C. Poole and Consul General Harris in Irkutsk 
 knew that the Czechs were not in need of help at least one month before his arrival 
 (Graves, America’s Siberian Adventure, pp. 343-346). 
 
 82 Statement of the Honorable Breckinridge Long before the House Committee on 
 Foreign Affairs, Aug., 1919, file 861.00, vol. 39, D.S.N.A.; Palmer, Newton D. Ba\er, 
 II, 321. See also Tompkins, American-Russian Relations in the Far East, p. 86. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 The Allies Enter Siberia 
 
 A LLIED troops began to land at Vladi 
 ^ r XTHe~British and French landed first, followed by ''^hefapafiefeTand 
 Americans. * 1 Although the French and American troops were cheered 
 by the crowds, the British and Japanese were received in silence. It 
 was evident that the Russians felt considerable hostility toward the 
 Japanese. 2 
 
 Major General William S. Graves commanded the American troops. 
 Both Secretary Baker and General March regarded him as a loyal, self- 
 reliant, levelheaded, and highly trained soldier. 3 His only orders were —- 
 jBosg _ contained in the President’s aide memoire which had been 
 handed- to-him -hy Secretary- B aker in early August. He received no 
 further information on the social, economic, political, or military sit¬ 
 uation in Russia until a few days before his departure from San Fran¬ 
 cisco. He was then informed that Japan’s probable policy would be 
 to “keep Russian forces apart and oppose any strong Russian central 
 authority, but to support a number of weak Russian forces which could 
 not form more than a screen for Japanese action.” 4 
 
 When General Graves arrived in Vladivostok on September 3, he 
 immediately called upon General Kikuzo Otani of the Japanese Army, 
 who was the senior in rank of the Allied commanders. General Otani 
 informed Graves that he had been notified by the American State De¬ 
 partment that he, Otani, would be in command of American troops. 
 Graves replied that although he desired to co-operate with the Japanese, 
 
 1 Caldwell to Lansing, Aug. 3, 1918, Aug. 20, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 
 1918, Russia, II, 327, 352; Ward, Die-Hards in Siberia, p. 3; Graves, America’s Si¬ 
 berian Adventure, p. 55. 
 
 2 United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 352. 
 
 3 Baker, Foreword in Graves, America’s Siberian Adventure, p. ix; March, A 
 Nation at War, p. 130. 
 
 * Graves, America’s Siberian Adventure, p. 55. This proved to be an excellent 
 prognosis of Japan’s policy in Siberia. 
 
90 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 he had no orders to place American troops under Japanese command. 5 
 
 /General Graves soon found that American soldiers were confused 
 f as to their purpose in Siberia. Upon their arrival they had been given 
 "Yno information concerning their duties. Some American soldiers be¬ 
 lieved that their purpose was to aid the Czechoslovaks, who were 
 supposedly fighting their way out of Siberia. Others believed that 
 American troops were to be used to recapture the German and Austri¬ 
 an prisoners who were running loose in Siberia and were reported 
 to be gathering arms and moving back toward Germany. Still others 
 thought that the American army was to lend its assistance in the 
 establishment of an Eastern Front against Germany. Lastly, many 
 believed that the American Army had been sent to Siberia to crusade 
 against Bolshevism. 6 General Graves found that this last idea had 
 been generally accepted among American officers and men. When 
 he learned that a young American officer had arrested a Russian, simply 
 because he was a Bolshevik, Graves delivered the following statement: 
 
 Whoever gave you those orders must have made them up himself. 
 The United States is not at war with the Bolsheviki or any other faction 
 of Russia. You have no orders to arrest Bolsheviks or anybody else unless 
 they disturb the peace of the community, attack the people or the Allied 
 soldiers. The United States army is not here to fight Russia or any group 
 or faction in Russia. Because a man is a Bolshevik is no reason for his 
 arrest. You are to arrest only those who attack you. The United States 
 is only fighting the Bolsheviki when the American troops are attacked by 
 an armed force. 
 
 Carl Ackerman, correspondent for the New York Times, was 
 present during the incident, and later remarked that General Graves’s 
 
 6 United States Army War College, Order of Battle of the United States Land 
 Forces in. the World War, American Expeditionary Forces in the World War (Wash¬ 
 ington, 1937), p. 387; Graves, America’s Siberian Adventure, p. 58. Evidently the 
 War Department had not been informed of Wilson’s decision to give Japan the supreme 
 command. See above, pp. 75-76. See also Sylvian G. Kindall, American Soldiers in 
 Siberia (New York, 1945), pp. 17-18. The British government recognized that the 
 Japanese would have the supreme command in Siberia and announced that General 
 Knox would be the head of the British military mission attached to the staff of the 
 Japanese commander-in-chief ( Lansing Papers, II, 373). When the French military 
 representative on the Supreme War Council questioned General Bliss on the subject of 
 the Japanese supreme command, Bliss wrote that there had been no formal acceptance 
 of a commanding general of the Allied forces in Siberia. “The Japanese General is the 
 senior officer on the ground and the Japanese have requested that we send a liaison 
 officer to the Japanese headquarters and ask authority to send one to ours” (Bliss to 
 Permanent French Military Representative, Supreme War Council, Aug. 16, 1918, Bliss 
 Papers). 
 
 6 Kindall, American Soldiers in Siberia, p. 17. 
 
THE ALLIES ENTER SIBERIA 91 
 
 statement was his “first intimation that the United States did not 
 consider the Bolsheviki everywhere as enemies of the Allies.” As 
 Ackerman traveled into the interior of Siberia, he found that not all 
 American representatives had the same ideas as General Graves. 7 
 
 The same d ivergence of views concerning the purpose of interven¬ 
 tion which existecTTn Siberia existedaIso~amOng'AdtTeH _ and - American 
 councils at~ hom ei While Great Britain and France attempted to ex~ 
 tend the scope of military and political action in Siberia, and Japan 
 proceeded with her plans to occupy the Russian Far East, the United 
 States spent its efforts attempting to limit and restrain the independent 
 operations of its Allies. 
 
 In early August the Stale Depar tment made quite clear its opposi- 
 tion to any ex pansion of the Siberian expedition. 8 When the British 
 Foreign Officer equested th at more _ tf ocfpsTfeAe n f t 0 Siberia, the State 
 Deparment replied that it would not consider any change of plans un- 
 til Am erican troops en rou te~toATladivostok had arrived and the mili¬ 
 tary authoritiesjdierje^hiad time to consider the situation thoroughly and 
 make their own re commendations. The British government was not 
 discouraged by this opposition, for on August 12 it presented a care¬ 
 fully worded memorandum which emphasized the alleged critical 
 position of the Czech forces in Siberia, and advocated the need for 
 immediate reinforcements by the Japanese. The British government 
 hoped that American authorities would “feel it possible formally to 
 request the Japanese Government to despatch at the earliest possible 
 moment such military assistance as the military experts of the Czech 
 and Japanese forces may consider desirable and necessary.” 9 The 
 French government made a similar request, suggesting that approxi¬ 
 mately eighty thousand men would suffice. 10 
 
 The British proposal aroused no enthusiasm in Washington. Lan¬ 
 sing quickly announced American opposition to the scheme: 
 
 I am bound in candor to say that this Government would be gravely 
 embarrassed if the British Government should take the action suggested. 
 The plan of action recently proposed by the Government of the United 
 
 7 Ackerman, Trailing the Bolshevik}, pp. 188-189; Graves, America's Siberian Ad- 
 venture, pp. 91-92. 
 
 8 Reading to British Foreign Office, Aug. 9, 1918, Wiseman Papers. 
 
 9 United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 341-342. The London Times 
 of August 15 reported that the Czechs “were wholly destitute of supplies of all kinds,” 
 and were “being opposed by large bodies of prisoners armed by the Bolshevists.” 
 
 10 Jusserand to Lansing, Aug. 17, 1918, Lansing Papers, II, 376-377. The American 
 consul at Vladivostok also recommended immediate reinforcements to aid the Czechs 
 (Caldwell to Lansing, Aug. 15, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II. 346 - 348 ). 
 
92 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 States, accepted by Japan and acquiesced in principle by the Government 
 of Great Britain is now in course of execution. Only a small part of the 
 troops have reached Vladivostok. When all are assembled there they will 
 number, approximately, 25,000. It should, in the judgment of the Gov¬ 
 ernment of the United States, be left to a later time and other circum¬ 
 stances, not yet developed, to consider radical alterations of the whole scale 
 and character of action in Siberia. The President advises me that on 
 several occasions he has stated to Lord Reading the unalterable facts which 
 must of necessity limit military action and the supplying of armies in Si¬ 
 beria, and the President hopes that Lord Reading will be kind enough to 
 set those facts before his Government in London more fully than is possible 
 in a cable message. 11 
 
 Rebuffed by the State Department, the British Foreign Office at¬ 
 tempted to appeal to the President through Colonel House. Balfour 
 cabled a lengthy appeal to Wiseman urging that the facts be laid be¬ 
 fore House, who might offer suggestions which would be acceptable 
 to the President. 12 Although not fully informed about the latest 
 developments in Siberia, House suggested that since the Japanese had 
 the military direction of the expedition, they were the “right people 
 to press U.S.G. to increase the expedition to whatever size they consider 
 necessary in order to enable the Czecho-Slovaks to retire in safety.” 13 
 
 On August 23 Wiseman informed Lord Reading of the State 
 Department’s real attitude toward Britain’s request to enlarge the size 
 of the expedition in Siberia. The Department believed that the United 
 States and the Allies were at cross-purposes regarding the objects of 
 the expedition to Siberia. Although the United States government had 
 gotftented to lend its aid to help the Czechs escape from their “danger¬ 
 ous situation” and leave the country, it was beginning to think that 
 the Allies wanted to use the expedition not only to assist the Czechs, 
 but also to help them maintain and increase their position in Russia. 
 iThe State Department was concerned because the Czechs were making 
 V10 attempt to retire. Disturbed by the Department’s attitude, Wise¬ 
 man offered his advice to Lord Reading: 
 
 I have always thought that time and circumstances would modify the 
 President’s original policy regarding Russia, and I see indications even now 
 that this is so. The danger now is—to be quite frank—that he is begin¬ 
 ning to feel that the Allies are trying to rush, even trick, him into a policy 
 which he has refused to accept. He is well aware that he is committed to 
 
 II Lansing to Barclay, Aug. 14, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 344 - 345 - 
 
 12 Reading to Wiseman, Aug. 20, 1918, House Papers. 
 
 13 Wiseman to Reading, Aug. 22, 1918, Wiseman Papers. 
 
THE ALLIES ENTER SIBERIA 
 
 bfd'l 
 
 93 
 
 the task of rescuing the Czechs, but thinksgthe Allies are already trying 
 to change the character of the _ expechtiominta-a full-fledged mil itary in- 
 jervention^witTrthe obfect c>f-reconstituting lhe Eastern front. 
 
 If I may offer a suggestion it is that the Japanese Commander should 
 report that he cannot be responsible for the safety of Czech forces unless 
 further troops are despatched at once, and that message should be con¬ 
 veyed to the President together with the statement that the Japanese are 
 only awaiting his agreement to rush more troops to the rescue. 14 
 
 Balfour evidently approved of Wiseman’s suggestion, for on August 
 28 he informed the British Embassy in Washington, that he was “ask¬ 
 ing the Japanese to take the necessary action.” At the same time, 
 he was directing Dr. Benes to inform Masaryk of the seriousness of 
 the Czech position. 15 
 
 The British government desire d not only increased military strength 
 in Siberia, but also a more coh ere nt direction of-pohttcal~ affairs in that 
 area. At first the British simply suggested that the Allies establish and 
 preserve order in Vladivostok, since the Russians were “too divided 
 amongst themselves to do so effectively and impartially.” The Czech 
 force could be used for policing purposes. The French government 
 supported this view, while the American consul at Vladivostok con¬ 
 sidered that some measure of martial law was necessary. 16 
 
 Washington r ejected these suggestions. Caldwell was informed 
 that the United States governmenTtfid not believe it wise to interfere 
 in Russian local governmental affairs. 17 When the United States con¬ 
 tinued to oppose Anglo-French desires to establish a unified political 
 control of affairs in Siberia, London and Paris decided to disregard 
 Washington’s opposition. After all, Wilson himself had carefully 
 stated in his aide memoire of July 17 that, while restricting American 
 activities, he did not wish, “even by implication, to set limits to the 
 
 14 Aug. 23, 1918, Wiseman Papers. Wiseman indicated that Masaryk did not make 
 the task of the British government any easier, for he seemed quite satisfied with the 
 whole situation. 
 
 Sir William Wiseman recently pointed out that certain of the excerpts quoted from 
 his papers might, as he put it, "give the impression that we tried to trick Wilson into 
 adopting a policy in which he did not believe. This of course is not true. He was 
 always against a big military enterprise in that theatre, and I so reported to my Gov¬ 
 ernment. The thing we did persuade him to do, and which he thought was quite 
 proper, was to lend his support in the task of rescuing the Czechs” (Wiseman to Dr. 
 Charles Seymour, March 8, 1954, copy sent to present writer, March 22, 1954). 
 
 16 Balfour to Barclay, Aug. 28, 1918, Wiseman Papers. 
 
 16 Barclay to Lansing, Aug. 16, 1918, British Embassy to Department of State, Aug. 
 23, 1918, Caldwell to Lansing, Aug. 24, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 349 - 35 °, 354 , 355 - 
 
 17 Lansing to Caldwell, Aug. 30, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 361. 
 
94 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 actions or to define the policies” of his associates. Therefore, on 
 August 11 the State Department was informed that Sir Charles Eliot 
 had been appointed British High Commissioner in Siberia. He was 
 to represent Great Britain in all political matters which confronted 
 the Allies. An important part of his duties was to “promote the 
 closest possible cooperation amongst the Allied forces and their lead¬ 
 ers.” The British government hoped that the United States would fol¬ 
 low its example, so as to facilitate co-operative action by the Allies. 18 
 
 On the n ext day the French governme nt suggested that an inter¬ 
 im Allied civi lian board be set up for the^pii ipps e of sett li ng~anv po^ 
 y^-^htical, econom ic, or technical questions whi ch-migELarise in Siberia. 
 A few Russians could be admitted to the board in an advisory capacity. 
 The French government offered the chairmanship of the board to the 
 United States. 19 
 
 State Department officials were not agreed on their response to the 
 Anglo-French request. Phillips, the Assistant Secretary of State, felt 
 that the French request should be answered in the affirmative. 20 Long 
 was also in apparent agreement with the idea. He advised Lansing 
 that it seemed “really necessary that some one person be designated to 
 supervise, control and coordinate the different efforts, civil, political, and 
 humanitarian, which are being exerted for the Czechs and Siberians 
 through the State, War and Navy Departments, and the Red Cross.” 
 He pointed out that only confusion and lack of accomplishment could 
 result under the present arrangement where no one had authority. 21 
 Similar arguments were presented by Ambassador Morris and Consul 
 Caldwell. The latter suggested that he be authorized to act with the 
 Allied commissioners then in Vladivostok, pending the arrival of an 
 American commissioner. He was informed that Washington did not 
 intend to send a High Commissioner to Siberia. 22 
 
 Secretary Lansing believed it would be unwise to follow the Anglo- 
 French request, which he considered as “another move to impress our 
 action in Siberia with the character of intervention rather than relief 
 of the Czechs.” Furthermore, the suggestion that an American High 
 
 18 Barclay to Acting Secretary of State, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 339 - 340 . 
 
 19 Jusserand to Lansing, Aug. 12, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 340-341. On Aug. 22 the French government appointed Eugene L. O. 
 Regnault as representative on the board and French High Commissioner at Vladivostok. 
 
 20 Phillips to Lansing, Aug. 22, 1918, file 861.00/2659, D.S.N.A. 
 
 21 Long to Lansing, Aug. 17, 1918, file 861.00/2601 Vi , D.S.N.A. 
 
 22 Morris to Lansing, Aug. 23, 1918, Caldwell to Lansing, Aug. 29, 1918, Lansing 
 to Caldwell, Sept. 3, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, III, 139-140; 
 II, 360, 364. 
 
THE ALLIES ENTER SIBERIA 
 
 95 
 
 Commissioner be the head of the civilian board, seemed to Lansing to 
 “be a bait to draw us into a policy which has been so insistently urged 
 by Great Britain for the past six months.” 23 
 
 Wilson was in complete agreement with his Secretary of State. 
 He revealed his anxiety in a letter to Lansing: 
 
 I hope you will do just what you here suggest. The other govern¬ 
 ments are going much further than we—and much faster—are, indeed, 
 acting upon a plan which is altogether foreign from ours and inconsistent 
 with it. 
 
 Please make it plain to the French Ambassador that we do not think 
 co-operation in political action necessary or desirable in eastern Siberia 
 because we contemplate no political action of any kind there, but only the 
 action of friends who stand at hand and wait to see how they can help. 
 The more plain and emphatic that is made, the less danger will there be or 
 [of?] subsequent misunderstandings and irritations. 24 
 
 While Washington resisted Anglo-French efforts to broaden the 
 scope of the Siberian expedition, Tokyo was proceeding along its own 
 independent course. On August 5 th e Japanese Foreign Minister in - 
 formed Ambassador Morris of his concern over the “increasingly seri¬ 
 ous condition developing in northern Manchuria and eastern Siberia.” 
 
 He stated that Semenov’s def eat and “the invasion of Chinese territory —£ 
 by Bolsheviks and organizecTGerman war prisoners was giving them/'"'/ 
 more concern than the Czech sTtuaficm.’* 2 ” Ther Chinese^overnment, 
 howeve L denied repeatedly and emphatically that its borders _ had Feen* 
 Violateclby Bolshev iks nr German p risone nTof war. 26 Despite th is 
 * 3 ?rrratToirAugust 5 the Japanese Cabinet decided to station guards in 
 The~Manc houli region^ On~ A.ugust 13, Tokyo informed the Ameri¬ 
 can government that it would send an independent Japanese force to 
 Manchouli Station to protect the Manchurian border from invasion by 
 the Bolsheviks. . The action would be taken under the terms of the 
 Sino-Japanese Military Agreement of May 16, 1918. Tokyo stated that 
 the Chinese government had consented to the operation and that troops 
 would be withdrawn as soon as the temporary emergency was over. 
 
 23 Lansing to Wilson, Aug. 22, 1918, Lansing Papers, II, 378. 
 
 24 Wilson to Lansing, Aug. 23, 1918, Lansing Papers, II, 378-379. Lansing car¬ 
 ried out Wilson’s request (Lansing to Jusserand, Aug. 31, 1918, United States, For¬ 
 eign Relations, iqi8, Russia, II, 362). 
 
 25 Morris to Lansing, Aug. 5, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 33°- 
 
 26 Memorandum of a Conversation between Long and Koo, Aug. 6, 1918, MacMur- 
 ray to Lansing, Aug. 8, 1918, Aug. 15, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, II, 330-331, 334-335, 348-349- 
 
 27 Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, p. 209. 
 
96 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 (The Japanese government added that its expedition into the Chinese 
 Eastern Railway zone was “entirely different in nature from the 
 present joint intervention in Vladivostok, or from military action within 
 Russian territory, and the only nations that have interests involved are 
 Japan and China.” 28 
 
 Hhe Chinese version of the affair d iffered from the Japanese. Koo 
 . reported to Lansing that on Augu st 8~tKe~Tapa~rtese-minister at Peking 
 had as ked for China’s consent tothe exec utiorTof measureTTSf joint 
 'de fense against the enemy according to the term s of the Si no-Ja panese 
 Mi litary Agr e em e nt .—Thp P.Viinoyo Prpmipr replied that when the 
 .necessity arose C hina wnnld giv e her consent in accordance with the 
 a greement. The Japanese then proceeded to move troops into Norther n 
 Manchuria— Koo pointed out that apparently the Japanese govern¬ 
 ment had interpreted the casual reply of the Premier as China’s consent 
 to immediate co-operation. China held, however, that Article 11 of the 
 agreement provided that defensive measures must be decided upon and 
 initiated by the highest military commands of the two countries. There¬ 
 fore, an answer to a mere inquiry from the Japanese minister at Peking 
 should not be construed to be consent by the Chinese government to 
 the execution of the agreement. 29 
 
 By Au gust 21 the Japanese ha d stationed twelve ^thousand troops 
 along the line of the Chinese Eastern R ailway. 30 A . few days later 
 _,fToicycT announced its intention to send tenthousand ad ditional troops 
 ^Ttr~the-Maritime- Prfmnce: its justification for such action was the 
 critical situation of the Czechs, the increased activity of armed German 
 • war prisoners, and pressure by the European Allies as well as the 
 Czechs. 31 
 
 28 Morris to Lansing, Aug. 13, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 343-344. See also New York Times, Aug. 18, 1918. 
 
 29 Koo to Lansing, Sept. 13, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 378 . 
 
 30 Memorandum of a Conversation between Long and Koo, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 353. 
 
 31 Morris to Lansing, Aug. 26, 1918, Ishii to Lansing, Aug. 27, 1918, United States, 
 Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 356-358. America had originally announced its 
 intention of sending 7,000 men to Siberia, but the actual count was 9,000, of which 
 7,368 were combatant troops and 251 officers. When the Japanese ambassador was in¬ 
 formed of this, he replied that “he feared his Government would feel that they would 
 have to give way to the pressure which other Governments were exerting upon them 
 to send an increased military force into Siberia since the American Government had 
 sent a force in excess of the 7,000 which it had announced would be sent” (Memo¬ 
 randum of a Conversation between Long and Ishii, Aug. 15, 1918, file 861.00/2751, 
 D.S.N.A.). Ambassador Morris had warned the State Department earlier concerning 
 “the wisdom of limiting our present contingent to 7,000 as originally suggested to the 
 
THE ALLIES ENTER SIBERIA 
 
 97 
 
 The State Department was perplexed by Japan’s independ ent rnnrse 
 of"action! Long was convinced that the^hberian affair was “getting 
 "out oFcontrol.” He advocated a change in policy and wrote a long 
 memorandum on the subject to Lansing. 32 The latter introduced many 
 of Long’s views in a letter to Wilson, in which he pointed out that 
 it might be wiser to assent to the Japanese increase of troops under 
 existing conditions, since Japan was going to send such troops “whether 
 we liked it or not.” 33 
 
 Actually, the State Department made no comment to Japan on the 
 recent developments in Siberia. When Ambassador Morris requested 
 an expression of attitude on the subject, Lans i ng repl i ed that the 
 “American Government does not intend to approve or disapprove the 
 sending by J apan of forces ~to Manchoul i.”^ 4 Lansing later learned 
 that the Minister for Foreign Affairs was “greatly embarrassed by his 
 inability to report definitely on the American attitude toward recent 
 developments in Siberia.” 35 Ambassador Morris soon revealed further 
 information concerning Japan’s sudden decision to send additional 
 troops to Siberia. He learned that Ambassador Ishii was “greatly 
 shocked” by the Japanese action. Ishii felt that it was contrary to the 
 recent Japanese-American understanding on the subject. 36 Morris 
 himself believed that the recent developments in Siberia seemed to sup¬ 
 port the idea that “the General Staff has a definite policy in Siberia 
 and that it proposes to pursue this policy leaving to the Foreign 
 Office and Viscount Ishii the task of explaining after the event.” 37 
 
 Further developments seemed to justify rather than deny Am¬ 
 bassador Morris’s viewpoint. Japan continued to p our troops into 
 Siberia. By the time the Armistice was signed on November n, 1918, 
 she ha d sent three divisions, or some seventy thousand men, all of 
 them under the direct control of the General Staff in Tokyo. 38 Jap- 
 ^ anese tro opsTontinued to arrive in Siberia even after reports indicated 
 
 Japanese Government.” He pointed out that if American forces were increased beyond 
 the original number, “it would make a most unfortunate impression” (Morris to Lansing, 
 Aug. 7, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, /9/S, Russia, II, 333). 
 
 32 Long to Lansing, Aug. 17, 1918, file 861.00/2601 ! 4 , D.S.N.A. 
 
 33 Lansing to Wilson, Aug. 18, 1918, Lansing Papers, II, 374-375. 
 
 34 Lansing to Morris, Aug. 30, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, III, 240. 
 
 36 Morris to Lansing, Sept. 8, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 
 II. 371. 
 
 38 Morris to Lansing, August 27, 1918, file 861.00/2601, D.S.N.A. 
 
 37 Morris to Lansing, Sept. 8, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia 
 
 III, 245-246. 
 
 38 David P. Barrows, “Japan as an Ally in Siberia,” Asia, XIX (1919), 930. 
 
98 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 that the Czech forces were out o f danger and had been joined by a 
 ^Russian military force of equal strength.'* 0 It appealed to WiteorTtbaT 
 the object of the Japanese was "to Ho the^fighting on their own plans 
 and let the Czechs tag along, instead of acting themselves as a sup¬ 
 porting force.” 40 Actually, the_ Czechs had very easily overcome^ 
 Bolshevik opposition. By the first week in September xailway—eon^ 
 nections between Eastern and Western Siberia were re-established. 
 Tne~Czechs were thus in a position to withdraw to Vladivostok and 
 
 Lthey showed no lndication-of 
 
 retiring. "Instead, they" seemed bent on active~~participatioh”Tn the 
 threatened civil war. 41 
 
 Hy the middle of September President Wilson had become vitally 
 concerned about the disposition of Japanese and Czech troops in Si¬ 
 beria. He considered the possibility of asking Japan what she pro¬ 
 posed to do with the large army she had sent to Siberia, in view of the 
 fact that the Trans-Siberian Railway was open and controlled by 
 friends from Vladivostok to Samara. Wilson feared that there was 
 “some influence at work to pull absolutely away from the plan which 
 we proposed and to which the other governments assented, and pro¬ 
 ceed to do what we have said we would not do, namely form a new 
 Eastern front.” Wilson believed that the United States government 
 should “insist” that the Czechoslovaks be brought out eastward to 
 Vladivostok and conveyed to the Western Front in Europe. He ad¬ 
 vised Lansing to inform the Allies of the American viewpoint on this 
 subject and to emphasize the point that the United States would “not 
 be a party to any attempt to form an Eastern front.” 42 
 
 > Although Lansing concurred with the President’s views, he called 
 /Wilson’s attention to the aide memoire of July 17, which carefully 
 I pointed out that the United States government would not seek, even 
 by implication, to set limits to the action or define the policies of its 
 Associates. In these circumstances, Lansing could scarcely “insist” that 
 the Czechs be brought out to Vladivostok and conveyed to Europe. 
 
 38 Lansing to Wilson, Sept. 4, 1918, Wilson Papers, series II. 
 
 40 Wilson to Lansing, Sept. 2, 1918, Lansing Papers, II, 380. 
 
 41 Morris to Lansing, Sept. 5, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igi8, Russia, II, 
 368; Varneck and Fisher, Testimony of Kolcha\, pp. 371-372; Baerlein, March of the 
 Seventy Thousand, p. 186. For Masaryk’s criticism of this action, see Masaryk, The 
 Maying of a State, p. 281. 
 
 42 Wilson to Lansing, Sept. 17 and 18, 1918, file 861.00/3009, 861.00/3010, D.S.N.A. 
 Wilson considered the formation of an Eastern Front “absolutely impracticable from a 
 military point of view and unwise as a matter of political action. . . .” Masaryk con¬ 
 curred with this view (Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 419). 
 
THE ALLIES ENTER SIBERIA 
 
 99 
 
 He could merely restate American policy on the matter and emphasize 
 the impracticality of the restoration of an Eastern Front. 43 
 
 It was becoming extremely difficult for the State Department to 
 formulate a Siberian policy on the basis of the conflicting reports being 
 sent from the Far East. In an attempt to get firsthand information on 
 affairs in Siberia, the State Department decided to order. Ambassador 
 Morris to go to Vladivostok in an unofficial capacity. His purpose was 
 to investigate economic, social, financial, political, and military condi¬ 
 tions in Siberia and send the Department his views on the best method 
 of aiding the Russian people under existing conditions. 44 __ 
 
 Morris soon discovered that the Czechs were actively engaged in the 
 civil war in Western Siberia and~wtre~making"no real efforD-te--pro- 
 "ceecTto Vladivostok. ReporfiTTrom the Volga region showed that the 
 ~Czech forces were in serious danger from various directions. Their 
 leaders were pleading for immediate assistance. Without such assist¬ 
 ance the Czechs would be forced to retire east of the Ural Mountains. 
 They were_opposed to such a retreat because it would leave defenseless 
 th ose R ussians~wKo had supported them against the B olsh eviks/ Mor 
 ris recommended that American troops BelenUfcTtKevicinity of Omsi 
 to co-operate with British and French troops in aiding the Czechs anc 
 their Russian friends to maintain their position in European Russia*. 
 He believed that the Russian people would welcome such action. 
 Moreover, General Graves’s presence in Western Siberia would be a 
 strong influence in counteracting impracticable plans for establishing an 
 Eastern Front. Both General Graves and Admiral Knight supported 
 these views. 45 
 
 Lansing was thoroughly perplexed and distressed by Morris’s re¬ 
 port. He sympathized with “the spirit of the Czecho-Slovaks when 
 they say that they cannot abandon their helpless friends to certain 
 massacre and pillage.” Moreover, he feared that the United States 
 government would be generally criticized if it told the Czechs that it 
 was their duty, regardless of their Russian allies, to join their com¬ 
 patriots in Siberia. Revealing his perplexity to the President, Lansing 
 
 43 Lansing to Wilson, Sept. 21, 1918, file 861.00/3010, D.S.N.A. Wilson agreed 
 to Lansing’s modifications (Wilson to Lansing, Sept. 23, 1918, file 861.00/3013, 
 D.S.N.A.). Basil Miles considered the President’s query concerning Japanese forces in 
 Siberia, and suggested that the President’s views be presented to Viscount Ishii in an 
 oral conversation. This suggestion was followed (Miles to Lansing, Sept. 23, 1918, file 
 861.00/2763 Vi, D.S.N.A.). 
 
 44 Lansing to Morris, Sept. 4, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 366. 
 
 46 Morris to Lansing, Sept. 23, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 
 n, 387 - 390 - 
 
100 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 wrote, “We cannot abandon the Czecho-Slovaks on the ground that 
 they will not abandon their Russian friends. Of course that would 
 never do. And yet, what is the alternative, or is there any?” 46 Lan¬ 
 sing indicated that he would appreciate Wilson’s advice or suggestions 
 on the matter. 
 
 In conjunction with Wilson’s suggestions and the advice of his 
 counselors, Lansing dir ected a forceful reply to Morris’s proposals of 
 September 23. His note pointed ou t, in acco rdance with JWilson’s 
 earlier vie ws, that if the C zechs desired Americ an ccnoperarignTtKey 
 should retire to the eastern side of the Urals. Although the United 
 STates intended to send all availabkTsupplies to the Czechoslovaks as 
 rapidly as possible, it would not undertake to send them west of the 
 Urals. The suggestion that General Graves establish himself at Omsk 
 was disapproved. However, General Graves was to be given authority 
 to establish himself at Harbin or a similar place agreeable to the 
 Chinese government, so that he could be in touch with an open port 
 during the winter. This would enable him to make the best use of 
 his force to carry out the plans for safeguarding the rear of the Czecho¬ 
 slovaks. Lansing concluded on a confidential note: 
 
 .The ideas a nd-purposes uf LturARig-s with res pect to military operati ons 
 in Sibe ria and on the “Volga front” are ideas and purposes w ith w hich we 
 have no sympathy. We do not believe them to be practical or based upon 
 sound reason - or”good military judgment. Consequently, while we have 
 said that we do not desire to set the limits of the actions or to define the 
 policies of our associates, we are not prepared and do not intend to follow 
 their lead and do not desire our representatives to be influenced by their 
 persistent representations as to facts and as to plans for action which, to us, 
 seem chimerical and wholly impossible. You will please impress upon 
 the military, naval, and civil authorities of the United States Government 
 at Vladivostok that, notwithstanding any pressure to the contrary, they are 
 expected to be governed wholly and absolutely by the policy of this Gov¬ 
 ernment as expressed herein. 47 
 
 The policy defined in the note to Morris was sent to all the Allied 
 governments. 48 ^ThcTLfifsh ^overn ment replied that the decisi on to 
 hold- America r n -troo ps in Eastern Siberia would nora ffecUBntain’s de¬ 
 terminatio n-tec aid the Czechs. -in_ Jio 1 d i n g their position west of the 
 Urals. -Gr-eat—Britain-felt ohligaied-to-assist-those-R aissians' who had 
 
 46 Lansing to Wilson, Sept. 24, 1918, Lansing Papers, II, 386-387. 
 
 47 Lansing to Morris, Sept. 26, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, igi8, Russia, 
 II, 392 - 394 - 
 
 48 United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 394. 
 
THE ALLIES ENTER SIBERIA 
 
 IOI 
 
 Jpeen loyal to the Allies throughout thg^ war. If the Czechs withdrew 
 •to - the~east of the Urals, the “loyal” Russians would be left to the 
 mercy of their enemies. In these circumstances Great Britain intended 
 to continue her efforts in their behalf and to request the French and 
 Japanese governments to follow British policy in standing by the 
 “loyal” Russians against the Bolsheviks. Britain added that if the 
 United States was “unable to assist us beyond the point indicated, we 
 hope they will not discourage our other Allies from helping us.” 49 In 
 the face of such determination, the State Department anxiously awaited 
 Japan’s reply to the British request. Therefore, Lansing was gratified 
 to hear of Japan’s refusal to send troops to Western Siberia. 50 
 
 Having clearly defined its policy in regard to an Eastern Front, the 
 Department now turned its attention to the progresssive Japanese occu¬ 
 pation of Eastern Siberia and North Manchuria. Attempting to curb 
 Japanese actions a long the Ch inese Eastern Raflway zone, the United 
 State TTormallyrequested permi ssion frbrirChlng3o ~slation Amer ican 
 troops at Harbin for the winter. Xhc Chinese government i m medi— 
 ately granted the necessary permission, adding informally that it 
 “heartily welcomed the preseTTee~of-American troops in the railway 
 zone although it feared that any expression of that sort might be re¬ 
 sented by Japan.” 51 
 
 Despite Chinese permission, American soldiers found it almost im¬ 
 possible to establish themselves in Harbin. Japanese troops occupied 
 all available barracks. Thus, only one American company was able 
 to remain there. General Graves reported that it was evidently the 
 Japanese desire to keep American troops from being stationed alone at 
 any Siberian town. Therefore, they had occupied all important points 
 along the railway. As a result, Graves had been “practically sewed up 
 to the railway line between Vladivostok and/tffabarovsk.” 52 
 
 The Japanese occupation of Eastern Siberia was quite thorough. 
 By ths Jaeginning of November they were in full military control. 
 Fu abermore. they were also subsid i zing General H cm/qt as well as 
 
 49 Barclay to Lansing, Oct. 3, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 
 II, 403-404- 
 
 "Morris to Lansing, Oct. 27, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 418. 
 
 61 Lansing to MacMurray, Sept. 26, 1918, file 861.00/27913, D.S.N.A.; Mac- 
 Murray to Lansing, Sept. 28, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 
 396. 
 
 "Graves to Adjutant General, Oct. 25, 1918, Records of Adjutant General, file 
 370.22, Russian Expedition, War Records Collection. 
 
102 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 several Cossack leaders, whose actions served as a convenient screen 
 for Japanese military and commercial ventures. 53 
 
 Graves did not see the necessity for the large numbers of Japanese 
 troops in Siberia. He reported that the Japanese commanders con¬ 
 stantly exaggerated disorderly conditions in order to justify the large 
 numbers of troops in the various towns. Graves was absolutely con¬ 
 vinced that fifty soldiers would be perfectly safe in any of the towns, 
 and that he would not hesitate to station six men in the great majority 
 of them. 54 
 
 Conditions in Siberia grew worse daily. Graves described the sit¬ 
 uation graphically in his reports to the War Department. was 
 pa rticularly_ jiistnfhed-~faT General- Horvat’s app oi ntment - a s the repre — 
 s entative of the Omsk governmen t _in E asterm-Siheria. He rega rded 
 Horvat as a typical reactionary, supported by the Russian army officer 
 classTwho, if" he did not favor monarchy, was certainly in favor of some 
 form of autocratic government. Graves reported that Horvat’s views 
 were opposed by the great majority of Russians: 
 
 .The opinion j ust jio w is th at t his crowd could not rem ain in power 24 hours 
 in ea stern Siberia after all ied troops are remove d. As 1 see the situation they 
 kno w the poorer class will not art-ark them as long as allied troopTarir 
 't\ j here and they are utilizing this rn the fullest extent . . . to entrench them- 
 y selves, to get together a military force which they hope will be strong 
 enough to hold them in power when allied troops are removed. I think 
 y some blood will be shed when troops move out but the longer we stay the 
 greater will be the bloodshed when allied troops do go, as in effect each day 
 we remain here, jjowthat war with German y is over.* we a re by our mere 
 presence he lping e stablish a form of nimirmtir government which the 
 pe ople ofSiberia will not stand for andour stay.is.. r xeatlng-s ome fee ling 
 against th e allied governments because of the effec t it has. The classes 
 seem to be growing wider apart and the feeling between them more bitter 
 daily. 55 
 
 General Graves’s reports finally aroused Secretary Baker to action. 
 Confessing his anxiety to President Wilson, Baker wrote of his inability 
 to understand the necessity for keeping American troops in Siberia, 
 
 63 Graves to Adjutant General, Oct. i, 1918, Wilson Papers, series II; United States, 
 Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 427, 428, 432. 
 
 64 Graves to Adjutant General, Oct. 31, 1918, file 370.22, Russian Expedition, War 
 Records Collection. Graves’s reports sorely disturbed Secretary Baker, who told Wilson 
 that he heartily wished ‘‘it were possible ... to arrange affairs in such a way as to 
 withdraw entirely from that expedition” (Baker to Wilson, Nov. 6, 1918, Wilson 
 Papers, series II). 
 
 60 Graves to Adjutant General, Nov. 21, 1918, Wilson Papers, series II. Copy sent 
 to President Wilson. 
 
THE ALLIES ENTER SIBERIA 
 
 103 
 
 now that the war was over. He felt that the Americans were being 
 “used by the Japanese as a cloak for their own presence and operations 
 there.” Pleading for a complete and immediate withdrawal of 
 American troops from Siberia, Baker wrote: 
 
 Two reasons are assigned for our remaining in Siberia. One is that having \ 
 entered we cannot withdraw and leave the Japanese. If there be any 
 answer to this it lies in the fact that the longer we stay, the more Japanese 
 there are and the more difficult it will be to induce Japan to withdraw her 
 forces if we set the example. The second reason given is that we must 
 have a military force to act as guardians and police for any civil relief effort 
 we are able to direct toward Siberia. I frankly do not believe this, nor 
 do I believe we have a right to use military force to compel the reception 
 
 of our relief agencies. ... - I 
 
 I do not know that I rightly understand Bolshevikism. So much of it 
 as I do understand I don’t like, but I have a feeling that if the Russians 
 do like it, they are entitled to have it. . . . 
 
 I have always believed that if we compelled the withdrawal of the 
 Germans and Austrians we ought then to let the Russians work out their 
 own problem. Neither the method nor the result may be to our liking, but 
 I am not very sure that the Russians may not be able to work it out 
 better if left to themselves and more speedily, than if their primitive de¬ 
 liberations are confused by the imposition of ideas from the outside, and 
 I am especially fearful that the Japanese intervention in Siberia is growing 
 so rapidly and is so obviously beyond any interest Japan could have of a 
 humanitarian or philanthropic character that the difficulty of securing 
 Japanese withdrawal is growing every hour and I dread to think how we 
 should all feel if we are rudely awakened some day to a realization that 
 Japan has gone in under our wing and so completely mastered the country 
 that she cannot be either induced out or forced out by any action either 
 of the Russians or of the Allies. 56 
 
 American officialdom was concerned over Japan’s commercial as^ 
 well as military occupation of Siberia. Admiral Knight reported that 
 there was much speculation among all classes of the population in 
 Siberia as to the intentions of Japan. It was generally believed that if 
 Japan ever secured a foothold in Siberia she would never withdraw^ 
 This belief was strengthened by the large Japanese forces in occupation. 
 Significantly, this large military force had been accompanied and 
 followed by large numbers of civilians. The military and civil con¬ 
 tingents were apparently working in perfect harmony toward the ac¬ 
 complishment of thinly disguised commercial aims. Japanese goods 
 
 Baker to Wilson, Nov. 27, 1918, Baker Papers; partially reproduced in Palmer, 
 Baf(er, II, 394-395. 
 
104 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 were smuggled into Russia free of customs duties. Japanese merchants 
 were given every advantage, while obstacles prevented the free move¬ 
 ment of foreign goods. The whole operation was aptly described as “a 
 commercial invasion under military convoy.” 57 
 
 Although the signing of the Armistice ended hostilities on the 
 Western Front, it had no effect on the factional strife among the 
 Russians. However, it did change the status of Allied troops in Si¬ 
 beria. Their presence could-no longer he justified on the grounds o f 
 d anger from w ar prisoners, the need for forming an Eastern Front 
 against Germany 7 ~pfotectingTnITitarv stores, or alcfing the Czechs, who 
 Idhg~sm ce could have b een safely evacuated. American troops did not 
 know why they were being retained^Tn - Siberia, any more than they 
 knew why they had been sent. While England, France, and Japan had 
 already committed themselves to an anti-Bolshevik policy, General 
 Graves clung to a strict interpretation of his aide memoire and with¬ 
 drew American troops to the vicinity of Vladivostok, where they re¬ 
 mained until the spring of 1919. 58 Secretary Baker had his own solu¬ 
 tion to the problem: 
 
 My own judgment is that we ought simply to order our forces home by the 
 first boat and notify the Japanese that in our judgment our mission is fully 
 accomplished and that nothing more can be done there which will be ac¬ 
 ceptable to or beneficial to the Russian people by force of arms, and that 
 we propose to limit our assistance to Russia hereafter to an economic aid 
 in view of the fact that our armies by the armistice have been required 
 to withdraw their armed forces from Russian territory. 59 
 
 The State Department did not share Baker’s viewSv. On November 
 ^16, T9i8._ Secretarv _Lansing made the first of numerous representations 
 nTTTlr yo r conceiTdng Japanese actions in Sihen a-a nd^or ^h AdanchuTiar 
 The United States protested against the number of Japanese troops in 
 Eastern Asia and the monopoly of control which they exercised there. 
 The note stressed the need for placing Stevens and the Russian Rail¬ 
 way Service Corps in charge of operating the Siberian railways in be- 
 
 67 Knight to Daniels, Nov. 4, 1918, WA-6, Russian Situation, Naval Records Col¬ 
 lection; H. E. Ingersoll to F. Leonard, Nov. 17, 1921, file 861 A.00/131, D.S.N.A.; 
 Memorandum on the Japanese Role in the Intervention of Siberia, Oct. 15, 1918, Wise¬ 
 man Papers; Kindall, American Troops in Siberia, p. 153; Raymond L. Buell, The 
 Washington Conference (New York, 1922), p. 27. For a strongly anti-Japanese ac¬ 
 count of Japan’s economic plans and policies in Siberia, see Spargo, Russia as an Ameri¬ 
 can Problem, pp. 217-220. 
 
 58 Stewart, The White Armies of Russia, p. 329; Kindall, American Troops in Si¬ 
 beria, pp. 2i, 74-75. 
 
 60 Baker to Wilson, Nov. 27, 1918, Baker Papers; Palmer, Ba\er, II, 395 
 
THE ALLIES ENTER SIBERIA 
 
 105 
 
 half of Russia. The State Department also questioned Morris as to 
 “the effect of withdrawing from Siberia all American forces, including 
 Stevens and the Russian Railway Service Corps, as evidence of our 
 unwillingness to be associated with a policy so contrary to our de¬ 
 clared purpose regarding Russia.” 00 
 
 The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs admitted that the total 
 number of Japanese troops sent to Siberia was 72,400. This number 
 had been reduced to 58,000, who were protecting 3,400 miles of railway. 
 He did not believe this was an excessive guard. Tokyo was not the 
 “least disturbed” by Washington’s threatened withdrawal. Morris 
 feared that such action would be welcomed by Japanese military au¬ 
 thorities and interpreted as an end of American efforts to assist in the 
 reconstruction of Siberia. Morris advised against withdrawal. 61 
 
 The United States received little su pport from either- Great-Brkaia. 
 or France in jts_representation s to Japa n. This was not surprising 
 since both Great Britain aricT France hatT requested Japan to send 
 troops into Western Siberia only one month earlier. Pleading 
 ignorance of the Japanese activities to which the United States re¬ 
 ferred, the French Foreign Minister added that “France would not 
 tolerate any step toward imperialism by Japan.” 62 Great Britain did 
 not express sympathy with American representations to Japan although 
 she agreed with the American position that one nation should not 
 exercise a monopoly of control in either China or Russia JBalfour 
 stated unequivocally that “His Majesty’s Government have always been 
 'anxious for the active particip atio rT of American and Japanese troops 
 in Siberia and t hey see no reason therefore for criticizing from their 
 own point of view the mere presence of considerable bodies of Jap¬ 
 anese troops in Russian territory.” 63 
 
 110 Lansing to Morris, Nov. 16, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 433-435. Copies of the telegram were also sent to London, Paris, and Rome 
 (United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 433). 
 
 01 Morris to Lansing, Nov. 20, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 436 - 437 - 
 
 82 Sharp to Lansing, Nov. 22, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 440-441. Italy wholeheartedly supported the American cause (Page to Lansing, 
 Nov. 28, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 449). 
 
 63 Laughlin (charge in Great Britain) to Lansing, Dec. 9, 1918, United States, 
 Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 456-457. Great Britain’s apparent approval of 
 the Japanese position in Siberia gave weight to certain remarks made by Arthur Bullard 
 some weeks earlier. From Japan he wrote that American diplomacy was faced quite as 
 much by an Anglo-American as by a Japanese-American problem. The growing 
 prestige of the American ambassador had made the British representatives in the Far 
 East bitter and had probably colored all their reports home. Bullard was convinced 
 that most British representatives in Japan had the “fairly conscious desire to make 
 discord.” In an effort to show concrete gains resulting from the Anglo-Japanese Alii- 
 
io6 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 Great Britain’s attitude did not provoke a modification of America’s 
 position. When Japan failed to make a formal reply to American 
 representations, the State Department dispatched a second protest. This 
 time the Department indicated its disapproval of Japanese support of 
 local Russian factions and protested against Japan’s commercial policy 
 in Siberia and Manchuria, which jeopardized the open door. 64 
 
 Japan made no formal reply to American protests until the end of 
 December. However, about the middle of November, Premier Hara, 
 who had assumed office in September, asked Ambassador Morris to 
 discuss the Siberian situation informally with his confidential agent, 
 Viscount Kaneko, with a view to better understanding. Morris was 
 informed that the dispatch of additional forces into Manchuria and 
 Siberia was a serious mistake made by the last ministry, without the 
 knowledge of the diplomatic advisory council. H ara him sel£-was 
 tryin g to free, thejapanese go vernmen t from tKe d o mination of the 
 Gener al Staff, but was ha ving consideTahle-difficulty. Realizing the 
 necessity of co-operating with the United States in China and Siberia, 
 
 feeling. 65 On December 23 Viscoun t Ishii announced the withdrawal 
 oTTh irtv thousand t roops -from.Alanchuria. 68 A few days later Japan 
 announced its readiness to “reexamine the Siberian situation in the 
 light of changed circumstances.” Japan’s reply ended a month of 
 discussion and controversy in government circles. Morris considered 
 the results quite encouraging., 
 the' reacti onary f orces of the-GeneraL^ta 
 
 Hara had wo n an initial victory over 
 
 67 " ---- 
 
 ance, they tended to encourage extreme Japanese annexationists, promising British diplo¬ 
 matic support if the United States made trouble (Bullard to House, Oct. 21, 1918, 
 House Papers). 
 
 01 Polk to Morris, Dec. 16, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 
 462-463. 
 
 65 Morris to Reinsch, Dec. 2, 1918, file 861.00/3326, D.S.N.A.; Norton, Far Eastern 
 Republic, pp. 82-83. 
 
 00 Polk, Confidential Diary, Dec. 23, 1918. 
 
 07 Morris to Lansing, Dec. 29, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 II, 465-466. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 Rivalries over a Railroad 
 
 T HROUGHOUT the course of the Siberian intervention, the 
 United States was engaged in a struggle to prevent Japan from 
 gaining control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. When the work of 
 J[ojhn__F. Stevens and the Russian Railway Service Corps was inter¬ 
 rupted by the Bolshevik revolution, Stevens returned, t o Tapa n. There 
 he remained until the major disturbances along the Chinese Eastern 
 Railway subsided ^ In Febrpary. tqi8. he re turned to Ha rbin to confer 
 .with JSeneral Horvat on the best means of utilizing the services of 
 the Russian Railway Service Corps. * 1 
 
 The_ J apanese governme nt watched these ^conversations closely. 
 Stevens reported th at the 
 
 .endeavors, as they desired railway_controL themselves. Moser, consul at 
 Harbin, had written earlier that unless America took over direction of 
 the railroads Japan would do so. 2 As a result of the negotiations be¬ 
 tween Stevens and Horvat, jaart of the Russian Railway Servic e Cnq is 
 came to H a rbin in Mar ch. iqi8 . and began the t ask of improving the 
 .railway. Th is move was approved by Bakhmetev, wEcTproposed to 
 pay their salaries from Russian funds. 3 Stevens was further assured 
 that if the Russian funds gave out, the State Department would 
 guarantee the salaries of the railroad men as long as their services 
 lasted. 4 
 
 After a month of exasperating delays Stevens succeeded in distrib- 
 
 1 Stevens to Lansing, Feb. i, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 III, 218-219. 
 
 2 Moser to Lansing, Feb. 3, 1918, Stevens to Lansing, Feb. 10, 1918, United States, 
 Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, III, 219-222. 
 
 3 Lansing to Wilson, Feb. 19, 1918, file 861.77/309, D.S.N.A.; Morris to Lansing, 
 Feb. 21, 1918, Stevens to Lansing, March 28, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 
 1918, Russia, III, 222, 226; Sokolsky, Chinese Eastern Railway, p. 34. 
 
 * Lansing to Scidmore, Feb. 19, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918 
 Russia, III, 221. 
 
108 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 uting units of the corps along the entire line of the Chinese Eastern 
 Railway. He reported that Japan was opposing him constantly, “un¬ 
 doubtedly with the view of controlling the entire transportation system 
 of Manchuria.” 3 Despite this opposition and the disruption of service 
 caused by the anti-Bolshevik armed detachments in the railway zone, 
 the corps made many improvements in the,operation and management 
 of the railway in the months preceding armed intervention. 
 
 .This matter of effic ie nt management and nppmrinn nf the Trans- 
 Sib erian Railway became vital, n f rnijrsp, after Allied tpnnp: reached 
 Siberia. As Japanese troops began to pour into Siberia andTTorth 
 Manchuria, Stevens registered his anxiety with the State Department. 
 He reported that Japan was making every effort to control the opera¬ 
 tion of the railways and would succeed unless the United States took 
 a firm stand. He recommended that the railways be taken under 
 military control at once and lhat he and the - Russian RailwayTServfee 
 Corps be authorize d to ~operate~tK em.° 
 
 ' The State Department immediately presented Stevens’s proposal 
 to Japan and China. Lansing informed the Chinese government that 
 the suggested policy seemed to be the “only solution of a problem 
 which is very complicated and which may otherwise become most 
 embarrassing.” 7 
 
 Altho ugh favorable to t he Am erican pkiy China, .hesit ated to giv e 
 her formaTcohsent in the fear_..of antagonizing Japan, On the other 
 Tiandpthcf Japanese formally rejected the plan as “constituting inter¬ 
 vention in Russia’s domestic administration which it has always been 
 the avowed policy of Associated Governments to denounce.” 8 In a 
 confidential interview with Ambassador Morris, Baron Goto stated that 
 the Japanese government had three major objections to the American 
 proposal. First, the Allied representatives at Vladivostok and the Jap¬ 
 anese General Staff disapproved of any proposition that would mean 
 the elimination of General Horvat. Second, the representatives of 
 France and Great Britain were “very much transcended” [rh] over 
 
 6 Stevens to Lansing, April 10, 1918, Stevens to Lansing, April 29, 1918, United 
 States, Foreign Relations, Jgi8, Russia, III, 229, 231. 
 
 6 Caldwell to Lansing, Aug. 26, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 
 Russia, III, 239. As soon as the Czechs had taken over control of Vladivostok, Stevens 
 had been instructed to bring over the remainder of his men from Nagasaki, for use in 
 the administration of the railway (Lansing to Morris, July 10, 1918, United States, 
 Foreign Relations, 1918, .Russia, III, 237). , 
 
 7 Lansing to Morris, Aug. 30, 1918, Aug. 31, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 
 1918, Russia, III, 239-240, 241. 
 
 8 United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, III, 243-244, 248, 255-256, 257- 
 
 258. 
 
THE ALLIES ENTER SIBERIA 
 
 IO 9 
 
 what they called American control of the railways, and were earnestly 
 backing the Japanese group in their opposition. Third, the Chinese 
 government had expressed opposition to the operation of the Chinese 
 Eastern Railway by the Stevens mission. Goto realized the railways 
 ought to be taken out of political controversy and operated on a busi¬ 
 nesslike plan, but the “attitude of the Allies and the possible suspicion 
 that some of them might hold, as to America’s object, would make it 
 difficult to accomplish, what in fact was a very excellent purpose.” 9 
 
 The American government was unimpressed by Japan’s objections, 
 and with good reason. < Qn September 3 Stev ens had c abled that Gen- 
 eral Otani had issued a n order placing all nf the Siberia n ra ilroads un¬ 
 der military contro l. Stevens expected that a Japanese would probably 
 be placed in charge of THe~opgratiu ii uf rheTaiTways. He urged quick 
 act ion or “Ameri can railroad men~am~nttt-ftf-bu#in^Ss completely.” 10 
 From Irkutsk Harris urged that “all measures permissible be taken to 
 block any ulterior motives which Japan may have on the railway as 
 being inimical to Allied interests in Siberia.” 11 President Wilson was 
 “very much disturbed” by these reports and sent an emphatic protest 
 to the Japanese government. 12 At the same time the State Depart¬ 
 ment tried to gain support for its railway plan from Great Britain, 
 France, and Italy. Stressing the fact that Stevens and the Russian Rail¬ 
 way Service Corps were “agents of the Russian people,” the State De¬ 
 partment denied the suggestion that it was trying to obtain control 
 of the Russian railways. It was merely doing what it thought best 
 for the Russian people in a spirit of unselfishness and disinterested- 
 ness. 
 
 UThe French and Italia n governments promised to support the 
 ^American proposal. 14 However, Great BTitain appeared unwilling - to 
 follow their example. _ Refraining from taking sides on the question, 
 the Foreign Office finally replied that it “would prefer that the United 
 States and Japanese Governments should arrange the question of actual 
 control, since they are primarily interested,” and that Great Britain 
 
 9 Morris to Lansing, Sept. II, 1918, file 861.00/2663, D.S.N.A. 
 
 10 Lansing to Morris, Sept. 6, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 III, 242. 
 
 11 MacMurray to Lansing, Sept. 7, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, 
 Russia, III, 245. 
 
 12 Lansing to Morris, Sept. 6, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 HI, 243 - 
 
 13 Lansing to Page, Sept. 13, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 III, 249-252. 
 
 14 Sharp to Lansing, Sept. 18, 1918, Macchi di Cellere to Lansing, Sept. 20, 1918, 
 United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, III, 259, 261. 
 
no 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 would “fall in with any agreement which may ultimately be reached 
 by those two Governments.” 10 England thus refused to influence the 
 Japanese authorities. 
 
 While the State Department tried to secure Japan’s agreement to its 
 railway proposals through regular diplomatic channels, Ambassador 
 Morris went to Vladivostok in an effort to negotiate an agreement with 
 the Allied and Russian representatives on the spot. After a month of 
 patient and persistent effort he finally succeeded in devising an agree¬ 
 ment satisfactory to Allied, Russian, and Japanese representatives at 
 Vladivostok. T he informal agreement of October T3, iprfl. provid ed 
 ^hat the Siberian railway» r 4f^wlincr the P.hinece E astern, be placed 
 under the pro t^cfiunn-of-the^ Allied military forces in Siberia, and that 
 ~lhe tecfi mcal, administrativ ig-jmd-fi-rtanftlaJ_ managpmpnt nf jjTPj-nilways 
 fib—ent oj.sr.ed to Stevens and —the-JELitss ian Railway Service Corps? 
 Stevens was to share the supervision of the railways with an inter- 
 Allied committee composed of one representative from each of the 
 powers having military forces in Siberia, including Russia. 1 ® 
 
 Despite the approval of the Japanese representative at Vladivostok, 
 the Japanese government was reluctant to approve the scheme. Fear¬ 
 ing the establishment of American influence on the Chinese Eastern 
 Railway, Tokyo presented certain alternatives to the agreement of 
 October 13, which in effect would be a new agreement. She desired 
 sole Japanese operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, a joint man¬ 
 agement of the Siberian railways under Stevens and Kinoshita, a Jap¬ 
 anese railway expert then in Siberia, and the appointment of an Allied 
 committee to advise the Russian management. 17 
 
 Stevens was adamantly opposed to sharing the management of the 
 railways with a Japanese expert. He felt it would only lead to further 
 complications. The State Department supported this view. More¬ 
 over, the United States government was absolutely against sole Jap¬ 
 anese operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway. This, in effect, was 
 what it was seeking to prevent. 18 
 
 As the informal conversations over the operation of the Siberian 
 railways continued between Morris and Viscount Uchida, the Japanese 
 Foreign Minister, reports from Harbin indicated that to all outward 
 
 15 Barclay to Lansing, Oct. 3, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 III, 272. 
 
 16 Morris to Lansing, Oct. 13, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 III, 277. 
 
 17 Morris to Lansing, Nov. 10, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 III, 282-283. 
 
 18 Morris to Lansing, Nov. 8, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 III, 281-282. 
 
THE ALLIES ENTER SIBERIA 
 
 III 
 
 appearances the Japanese military authorities had taken over the man¬ 
 agement of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Calculations by the Russian 
 Railway Service Corps revealed that forty thousand Japanese troops 
 had passed through North Manchuria during a six weeks’ period. 
 General Horvat had frankly admitted to Stevens that the control and 
 operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway had passed entirely out of 
 his hands. Although Colonel Emerson and his railway men were 
 continuing their efforts to retain their positions as instructors to the 
 Russian personnel of the Chinese Eastern, Japanese interference was 
 daily narrowing their field. 19 
 
 Miles informed Lansing that what the State Department feared 
 had actually happened. The Japanese General Staff had practically 
 absorbed the Chinese Eastern Railway, leaving to the Japanese For¬ 
 eign Office the task of explaining the accomplished fact. 20 Vance C. 
 McCormick, chairman of the War Trade Board, informed Lansing 
 that Japanese activities were preventing American economic and rail¬ 
 way aid to Siberia. He urged the State Department to take immedi¬ 
 ate action to thwart Japan’s imperialistic plans in Siberia. 21 
 
 .The Japanese Minister ..for Foreign Affair s confidentially informed 
 Morris that the Japanese General Staff ref used to consenTln ''S tevens’s 
 operation of the Siberian railways. Having contributed so much to the 
 opening oFlhe railwaySj_jli£--Japanes£. rniEtary--airtht)rities felt they 
 'should not he force H to surrender entire c ontrol to S tevens_and his 
 corps.-- Uchida emphasized the existence of widespread suspicions 
 ~cbncern 7 hg the motives of the United States in regard to the Chinese 
 Eastern Railway. 22 Morris considered it questionable whether the 
 Japanese Ministry was strong enough to overcome the opposition of 
 the General Staff. 23 
 
 On December 3, 1918, after a bitter struggle between the Ministry 
 and the General Staff, Tokyo submitted certain informal counter¬ 
 proposals for the operation of the railways. The Japanese govern- 
 
 18 Morris to Lansing, Oct. 25, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 III, 278-280. 
 
 20 Oct. 28, 1918, Wilson Papers, series II. 
 
 21 Nov. 8, 1918, file 861.00/3214 Zi, D.S.N.A. 
 
 22 The American Naval Intelligence also reported that such suspicions persisted in 
 Japan among considerable sections of public opinion (Polk to Lansing, Dec. 7, 1918, file 
 861.00/3317, D.S.N.A.). Polk advised Morris to discuss the rumors quite frankly with 
 members of the Japanese government, and attempt to assure them that the United 
 States had “no deep policy or hidden purpose in any of the measures it is endeavoring 
 to take in order to assist Russia” (Polk to Morris, Dec. n, 1918, file 861.77/5853, 
 D.S.N.A.). 
 
 23 Morris to Lansing, Nov. 8, 1918, file 861.77/544, D.S.N.A. Morris feared that 
 the British attitude had strengthened the position of the Japanese General Staff. 
 
112 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 ment advocated the creation of a technical board composed of one 
 representative from each of the Allied powers having military forces in 
 Siberia. The technical board, with Stevens as its president, would act 
 in an advisory capacity to the Russian railway administration. 24 
 
 Although Ambassador Morris and the State Department were 
 willing to consent to the Japanese counterproposals, Stevens refused. 
 He felt that he could accomplish nothing in an advisory capacity, as 
 he would have no way of enforcing his decisions. 25 Thus, the State 
 Department was thrown into a quandary. Since Secretary Lansing and 
 President Wilson had already departed for the Paris Peace Conference, 
 Polk and Long attempted to thrash out the problem in Washington. 
 
 Morris had reported earlier that the “unsympathetic indifference” 
 of the British ambassador in Tokyo was strengthening the opposition 
 of the General Staff to American railway proposals. Morris asked 
 whether it would be expedient to indicate to the British government 
 “the broader reasons affecting the entire situation in the Far East and 
 particularly China which call for closest cooperation of our two Gov¬ 
 ernments in establishing a policy which shall limit spheres of ex¬ 
 clusive commercial or political control.” In raising this question, Mor¬ 
 ris was evidently thinking of the Twenty-One Demands, Japan’s loan 
 policy to China, the Sino-Japanese Military Agreements of May, 1918, 
 and the general tendency of Japanese policy to combine commercial 
 and political activities in such a way as to exclude all foreign interests. 
 
 Polk, also, had been concerned about the problem. He r j)elieved 
 tnatjf jv? a'-ti'-'n tak en, “the doctrine of equal opportunity for 
 
 TlFwdlj^Jj^ d i^pppar n s- t h p J n po - fw =*w» pn l itirnl nrvrl mmnrw rm] prn- 
 
 gram ex tends and that herein li£s_an actual-danger of future compli¬ 
 cations between the powers concerne d in the Far Ea st.” Both Polk ancP 
 Mbrris~Believed that the problem would be solved more easily if Great 
 Britain would co-ordinate her policy with that of the United States 
 and bring pressure to bear on Japan in Chinese and Siberian matters 26 
 
 Counselor Long was opposed to pleading for Britain’s support. 
 He felt it would be “a confession of weakness on our part and of our 
 inability to come to an understanding with Japan.” He thought that 
 
 24 Morris to Lansing, Dec. 3, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 
 III, 288-291. 
 
 25 Polk to Morris, Dec. 7, 1918, Morris to Lansing, Dec. 6 and 7, 1918, United 
 States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, III, 291-292, 292-293, 295. 
 
 26 Draft of a cable from Polk to Lansing, Dec. 21, 1918, Long Papers. Consul 
 General Harris advocated a strong collective note from England, France, Italy, and 
 America in regard to Japan’s actions in Siberia and Manchuria (Polk to Lansing, Dec. 
 27, 1918, file 861.00/36148, D.S.N.A.). 
 
THE ALLIES ENTER SIBERIA 
 
 113 
 
 England would immediately inform Japan of the proposal and thus 
 “our single influence with Japan will be decreased.” He advised a 
 continuation of the present policy in an attempt to come to an agree¬ 
 ment with Japan. If no understanding could be reached, the matter 
 could be brought to the Peace Conference, where it could be treated 
 publicly to Japan’s disadvantage. 27 
 
 While Polk and Long discussed the possibilities of seeking British 
 support, Morris succeeded in persuading the Japanese government to 
 modify its proposals to meet Stevens’s objections. The modified plan 
 was accepted by Stevens and Morris on January 9, 1919. 28 
 
 On January 15, 1919, Viscount Ishii formally submitted to the State 
 Department the plan for operating the Trans-Siberian and Chinese 
 Eastern Railways. From this time forth it was termed the Japanese 3 
 Plan. 29 On paper the plan appeared rather simple. The gen eral 1 ( { 
 
 Committee, composed of o ne representative from each of the Allied 
 powers having military forces in Rus sia , including Rus sia. The chair¬ 
 man was to be a Russian. Two ad ditional boards were created and 
 pla ced under the control of the Inter-Allied Committee. The Tech- 
 niraJ _Roar.fi , ccimposecLofjMlied^railway experts, was t o admin ister the 
 technical and economic-management of the radways-m ihe Allied 
 zone, while t he^M ilitaxw T rajispartaAon Board was to ctr-erdinate mil¬ 
 itary transportat ion. The railways were placed under the protection 
 of-the Allied military forces. 
 
 The Technical Board was authorized to elect a president, who 
 would be entrusted with the technical operation of the railways. He, in 
 turn, was to select his staff from among the nationals of Allied powers 
 in Siberia. However, a Russian manager was to remain at the head 
 of each railway. In matters of technical operation the president might 
 issue instructions to the Russian managers. The whole arrangement 
 was to cease upon the withdrawal of Allied military forces from Si¬ 
 beria, at which time all foreign railway experts appointed under the 
 arrangement would be recalled . 30 According to a previous under- 
 
 27 Long to Polk, Dec. 21, 1918, Long Papers. 
 
 28 Morris to Department of State, Dec. 27, 1918, United States, Foreign Rela¬ 
 tions, 1918, Russia, III, 301-302; Morris to Polk, January 9, 1919, United States, For¬ 
 eign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 236-237; LaFargue, China and the World War, pp. 171- 
 172. 
 
 20 Ishii to Polk, Jan. 15, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 239. 
 
 30 United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 239-240; Ken Shen Weigh, 
 Russo-Chinese Diplomacy (Shanghai, 1928), pp. 229-231; italics inserted. 
 
114 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 standing between Japan and the United States, Stevens was to be made 
 president of the Technical Board. 31 
 
 The State Department had finally succeeded in securing a railway 
 plan acceptable to both Japan and the United States. By this time, 
 however , American public op inion was becoming “extremely restive” 
 on the whole subject of Russia^ AFthe same time General March was 
 preparing to withdraw - American forces from Siberia. 32 Since the 
 railway plan provided that American troops remain in Siberia to sup¬ 
 port Stevens and guard the railway, the situation was made some¬ 
 what awkward by Secretary Baker’s insistence on adhering rigidly to 
 the policy laid down for the use of American troops in Siberia by 
 President Wilson in his aide memoire of July 17. Baker told the 
 State Department that the “War Department does not believe that 
 the small force which we now have there is large enough to give Mr. 
 Stevens support with reference to the policing of the Chinese Eastern 
 and Trans-Siberian Railroads, and cannot approve of sending any more 
 troops to Siberia for such purpose.” 33 
 
 The execution of the rai lway p lan was endangered by lack of 
 funds a s_welka s the opposition of the War Department. Since the 
 Russian ambassador had already exhaustedTTKe money set aside for 
 maintaining the Railway Service Corps, additional funds would have 
 to be appropriated either by Congress, which was unlikely, or from 
 the President’s private fund. 34 In view of this problem, Acting Secre¬ 
 tary Polk sought presidential guidance before formally accepting the 
 Japanese railway plan. 
 
 After carefully considering the whole Siberian picture, Lansing, 
 with the approval of President Wilson, cabled full instructions to Polk. 
 He was told to request a secret hearing before the appropriate commit¬ 
 tee or committees in Congress and to tell them fully and frankly about 
 the entire Siberian situation: 
 
 You will then develop the strategic importance both from the point of 
 view of Russia and of the United States of the Trans-Siberian Railway as 
 being a principal means of access to and from the Russian people and as 
 affording an opportunity for economic aid to Siberia where the people are 
 relatively friendly and resistant to Bolshevik influence and where there 
 
 31 Morris to Polk, Jan. 9, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 
 236-237. 
 
 32 Polk to Commission to Negotiate Peace, Jan. 7, 1919, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 461. 
 
 33 Baker to Department of State, Jan. 14, 1918, file 861.00/3651, D.S.N.A. 
 
 34 Polk to Commission to Negotiate Peace, Jan. 24, 1919, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 245. 
 
THE ALLIES ENTER SIBERIA 
 
 115 
 
 are large bodies of Czecho-Slovaks who rely upon our support as well as 
 large numbers of enemy prisoners of war whose activities must be watched 
 and in all cases [if necessary] controlled. The potential value of this rail¬ 
 road as a means for developing American commerce particularly from 
 the west coast of the United States to Russia might be mentioned . 35 
 
 Polk was then instructed to describe in detail the activities of Japan in 
 Siberia and Manchuria, stressing particularly the large number of 
 troops sent and Japan’s actions in practically seizing the Chinese East¬ 
 ern Railway. Polk was then to indicate how the United States, after 
 considerable effort, had finally succeeded in getting Japan to withdraw 
 a substantial number of troops from Siberia and to accept a railway 
 plan which “may be of inestimable value to the people of Russia and 
 to the United States, as well as the world in general . . . thereby giving 
 practical effect to the principle of the open door.” The purpose of 
 the hearing was to secure Congressional approval of the necessary ap¬ 
 propriations for executing the railway plan. Lansing’s instructions to 
 Polk closed on an interesting note: “We feel that it may be a wise 
 practice to take Congress more into confidence on such matters and we 
 at least desire to make the experiment in this case.” 3 ® 
 
 Polk discussed Lansing’s suggestions with other men in the State 
 Department and brought the “question up at Cabinet.” He found 
 that “everyone” advised against his going to Congress with any plan 
 having anything to do with Russia or with the acquisition of money 
 for expenditure abroad. Polk reported that it was the unanimous 
 opinion of all who had been consulted that “to get Congress to com¬ 
 mit itself to any proposal for financing the railroad—in its present 
 mood when it is badly frightened over the amount of money we are 
 spending and when it is so completely at sea as to what should be 
 done in Russia—would be hopeless.” 37 
 
 When the President received Polk’s report of the prevailing atti¬ 
 tudes in Congress, he withdrew his original proposal . However , he 
 did au thnriyp Pnlk to ac cept formally the Japanese rail way plan o n 
 hehalf of t he -United .States, reserving the question of financ ial re- 
 sponsibili ty for future discussions Secretary Baker was to inform t 
 General Graves of his duties under the railway plan. Ambassador ' 1 
 Morris was then instructed to proceed with the inauguration of the 
 plan. 
 
 30 Commission to Negotiate Peace to Polk, Jan. 31, 1919, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 246. 
 
 88 United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 246-248. 
 
 37 Polk to Lansing, Feb. 4, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 
 248-249. 
 
 I 
 
ii 6 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 Although in deference to Polk’s views the President withdrew his 
 suggestion of placing the Siberian situation frankly before Congress, 
 he requested that Polk take advantage of the appropriate opportunity 
 to advise Congress of American policy in reference to the Trans- 
 Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways. He concluded on a sig¬ 
 nificant note: 
 
 It is felt that this matter can be treated entirely apart from the general 
 Russian problem, as, irrespective of what our policy may be toward Russia, 
 and irrespective of further [ future ] Russian developments, it is essential 
 that we maintain the policy of the open door with reference to the Si¬ 
 berian and particularly the Chinese Eastern Railway. 38 
 
 "he United States formally accepted the Japanese railway plan on 
 February 10, 1919. 39 France, Great Britain, and Italy soon followed her 
 example. 40 The Chinese government held back. Early in February 
 the Chinese government had suggested that it be permitted to operate 
 the Chinese Eastern Railway as a unit. The United States had as- 
 1 sured China that her interests would be fully protected under the Inter- 
 Allied Railway Agreement. Nevertheless, the Chinese government 
 was the last to appoint a representative to the Technical Board. The 
 British, French, and Italian civil and military representatives showed 
 a fine spirit of co-operation. The Japanese military officials sought 
 every excuse for delay and endeavored to make mere questions of de¬ 
 tail matters for further diplomatic discussion. 41 Despite these various 
 delays, on March k . iqiq. the machinery for the internation al ad r 
 
 istration atic 
 
 Tfe^ ^anscSib grian anc 
 
 Railways was formally inaugurated in Vladivostok. 42 
 
 38 Lansing toPolk, JanTar, 1919, Feb. 9, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 
 1919, Russia, pp. 244, 250-251. America’s formal acceptance was probably hastened 
 by the persistent reports that Japan was making desperate efforts to maintain control 
 of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Even the Omsk government had asked that the 
 managing control of the Siberian railways be taken over by Stevens and the railway 
 mission (Reinsch to Lansing, Dec. 30, 1918, file 861.77/595, D.S.N.A.; Polk to Lansing, 
 Dec. 27, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Paris Peace Conference, II, 480; 
 Polk to Page, Jan. 3, 1919, file 861.77/588, D.S.N.A.; Polk to Morris, Jan. 11, 1919, 
 United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 237-238). 
 
 39 Polk to Ishii, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 251-252. 
 
 40 United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 254, 255. 
 
 41 Polk to Reinsch, Feb. 4, 1919, Morris to Polk, Feb. 24, 1919, files 861.77/660, 
 861.77/690, D.S.N.A.; Weigh, Russo-Chinese Diplomacy, p. 231. 
 
 42 Morris to Polk, March 5, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 
 256. At the first meeting the question was raised as to whether committee decisions 
 should be by majority vote. The Japanese and Chinese representatives insisted on un¬ 
 animity. On the grounds that nothing could be accomplished under such an arrange¬ 
 ment, Great Britain brought pressure to bear on both governments to submit to a ma- 
 
THE ALLIES ENTER SIBERIA 
 
 117 
 
 The Inter-Allied Railway Agreement completely changed the char¬ 
 acter of intervention in Siberia. The primary concern of American 
 military forces now became the restoration and protection of the rail¬ 
 ways instead of the rescue of the Czechs. The latter were now par¬ 
 ticipating in the execution of the railway plan. In effectj_the im- 
 provement of the t ransportadon situation served to ai d the anti-BoIshe- 
 vik cause, JThus^ despite its denials, the United States became an active 
 participant in the Russian civil war. President Wilson justifie d dm 
 course on the grounds of maintainffig~tHe~o peii door in Siberia and 
 North Manchuria and preserving Russia’s territoriarrntegrity.^TrrfHTs 
 respect, the conclusion of the railway agreement represented a victory 
 for the United States and the liberal civilian elements in the Jap¬ 
 anese government. 44 It was one of the few victories achieved by the 
 United States in the whole Siberian affair. 
 
 w 
 
 &A 
 
 jority vote (Reading to Polk, March 15, 1919, file 861.77/747, D.S.N.A.). Reading 
 was evidently anxious to inform Polk of British co-operation on this matter, since Polk 
 had told him earlier “rather bluntly if his government had shown more patriotism and 
 had not been neutral Japan would have come to terms long ago” (Polk, Confidential 
 Diary, Jan. 7, 1919). 
 
 43 Polk to Lansing, May 9, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 p. 494; Memorandum of John F. Stevens, Railway Service Corps Papers. 
 
 44 Benjamin Bock, “The Origins of the Inter-Allied Intervention in Eastern Asia, 
 1918-1920” (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1940), p. 297. 
 
 fifA 
 
 hi 
 
 % 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 New Sources of Trouble: The Cossacks 
 
 ' I V HE JAPANESE military were not slow in revealing their real 
 attitude toward co-operation with the United States in Siberia. 
 Despite the railway agreement and continuous efforts to avoid factional 
 strife, American forces were constantly embroiled in difficulty either 
 with Japan or with the Siberian factions which she supported. At 
 times scrapes with both almost led to actual hostilities. 
 
 B y the end of iqi 8 p o litical affa irs in Siberia revolved ab out two 
 distinct- geographic units. The j Colch ak or OmffUgovernment. est ab¬ 
 lis hed in November, 1918, was supreme in Western Siberia. Sup ¬ 
 por ted by the Czechs, th e Kolchak government maintained an arm y 
 winch was engaged in conducting a campaign against the Bolsh eviks. 
 Kolchak was supported strongly by the British and French repre¬ 
 sentativ es in Siberia, who were eager t o ha ve the Allied g overnments 
 recognize his rul gi- 
 
 American diplomatic and military representatives in Siberia recog¬ 
 nized Admiral Kolchak as an honest and courageous man of limited 
 experience in public affairs. He had served with distinction in both 
 the Russo-Japanese and the World Wars. r Consul General Harris be¬ 
 lieved that Kolchak had the best interests of all Russia at heart, while 
 Consul Moser, who knew Kolchak well, considered him a capable and 
 honest patriot. Jfcth-feare-d-that Kolchak would be helpless without 
 aid from the Alli e s. On the other hand, Kolchak was denounced by 
 many -Sibe rians her ansp nf his methods in gainin g control of the Omsk 
 govern ment and becau se he called himself “Dictator.” Although fie 
 evinced a desire to call a constituenF~asIembIy, Tiis officers always 
 spoke of this as a matter for the far distant future. Among the ex- 
 
 1 Rudolph Medek, The Czechoslovak Anabasis across Russia and Siberia (London, 
 1929), pp. 2-3. 
 
NEW SOURCES OF TROUBLE: THE COSSACKS 119 
 
 treme Russian reactionaries, Kolchak was denounced as a liberal, while 
 the middle class considered him too reactionary. 2 
 
 Governmental affairs were more complex in Eastern Siberia. There, 
 four different men claimed some degree of authority at various places 
 throughout the region. General Horvat called himself the “supreme 
 representative of the Kolchak government in the Far East,” while 
 Major General Pavel Pavlovich Ivanov-Rinov represented Admiral 
 Kolchak as commander of all the Russian troops in Eastern Siberia. 
 Although Horvat was a man of education and refinement, he had 
 absolutely no control over Ivanov-Rinov, who terrorized and pil¬ 
 laged villages throughout Eastern Siberia. Eichelberger described 
 Ivanov-Rinov as “absolutely unscrupulous.” 3 In addition to Horvat 
 and Iv anov-Rin ov, there were two independent Cossack leaders, Sem¬ 
 enov and Kalmikov, who used the chaotic conditions in Siberia solely 
 as a means of increasing their own wealth and power. Semenov was 
 a complete scoundrel. About twenty-nine years of age, he was fond 
 of carrying his hand thrust in his coat in the manner characteristic of 
 Napoleon Bonaparte. He always carried Napoleon’s Maxims in his 
 pocket. Dominated to a large extent by his mistress, he spent hun¬ 
 dreds of thousands of rubles upon her. He ruled as a dictator at 
 Chita, robbing the banks and custom houses in the area. He shipped 
 in military supplies to Chita on trains without paying freight or duty 
 and sold the goods to the civilian population in “Semenoff stores.” His 
 officers went even further. When in need of funds, they simply robbed 
 the Chinese merchants. Kalmikov was no better. He had acquired 
 his position as Ataman of the Ussuri Cossacks by killing the legitimate 
 candidate. General Graves described Kalmikov as the worst scoundrel 
 he had ever met. He seriously doubted if one could think of a crime 
 which Kalmikov had not committed. The chief difference between 
 Kalmikov and Semenov was that Kalmikov murdered with his own 
 hands, whereas Semenov ordered others to kill. 4 
 
 The confusion in Siberia was increased by the friction which existed 
 
 2 Robert L. Eichelberger, Lieutenant Colonel, to Director of Military Intelligence, 
 March 31, 1919, file 861.00/4967, D.S.N.A.; Harris to Lansing, Nov. 25, 1918, Moser 
 to Lansing, Nov. 27, 1918, United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 443- 
 444, 448. 
 
 3 Eichelberger to Director of Military Intelligence, March 31, 1919, file 861.00/4967, 
 D.S.N.A.; Varneck and Fisher, Testimony of Kolcha\, pp. 231, 233. 
 
 4 Eichelberger to Director of Military Intelligence, March 31, 1919, file 861.00/4967, 
 D.S.N.A.; Graves to Adjutant General, Dec. 1, 1918, Office of the Adjutant General, 
 file 370.22, Russian Expedition, Siberia, War Records Collection; Graves, America’s 
 Siberian Adventure, pp. 90-91; Emil Lengyel, Siberia (New York, 1943), pp. 222-228. 
 
120 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 between Kolchak and Semenov. Refusing to recognize Admiral Kol¬ 
 chak, Semenov conducted independent activities in the Trans-Baikal 
 region. He destroyed railway transportation, interrupted telegraphic 
 communications, and terrorized the eastern regions with his irresponsi¬ 
 ble activities. Kolchak wrote to the Russian ambassador in America: 
 
 By reason of such activities of Semenoff, I have dismissed him from his 
 offices and have ordered that he be brought to subordination by force, so as 
 to check his arbitrary actions and the ensuing anarchy. I have, however, 
 met opposition in this matter on behalf of Japan, which is openly sym¬ 
 pathizing with Semenoff and am prevented from rendering the necessary 
 aid to the population. The Japanese General declared that no troops could 
 be despatched for the suppressing of the bands of Semenoff . 5 
 
 Kolchak indicated that such acts represented a direct interference in 
 the internal affairs of Russia. Many American observers believed that 
 Semenov’s activities were directly encouraged and supported by Japan. 6 
 
 Since the dispute between Kolchak and Semenov had resulted in 
 the suspension of communications on the Trans-Siberian Railway, 
 Great Britain requested Japan to urge Semenov to cease his activities. 7 
 Although Japan promised her support, conditions grew worse rather 
 than better. 
 
 .Qncf- the rampaigns^ of the J apanese and Czechs had driven the. 
 Bolsh evik elements into hiding? the~~way~TVg s~~opeHedfor Cossack 
 '' miUtar v ~lpa.dp . rs an d rec oups of f o rmer nfffi Td TTif n Tegm a camp aign- 
 of their own against the more liberal parties—a nd ni- gan i-^arwtucJn 
 ^ Siberia. . ,A )though the Kolchak-go vernment did not actually support 
 this campaign, it was too jy eak to prevent it. The campaign consisted 
 "of attacks on peasant villages, the beating of women, the killing of 
 workmen and peasants alleged to have Bolshevik tendencies, and the 
 arbitrary arrest of officials whose chief fault consisted of trying to 
 establish a form of representative government. General Graves was 
 constantly receiving appeals from Zemstvo representatives, individuals 
 of liberal views, and groups of peasants, asking either for protection or 
 for assurances from the Allied commanders that if they resisted these 
 outrages Allied troops would not interfere on the ground of suppress¬ 
 ing Bolshevism. Ambassador Morris believed that these unfortunate 
 conditions could be traced almost completely to the Japanese military 
 
 6 Kolchak to Bakhmetev, Dec. 8, 1918, file 861.00/3462, D.S.N.A. 
 
 8 Reinsch to Polk, Dec. 9, 1918, Polk to Lansing, Jan. 2, 1919, Morris to Lansing, 
 Jan. 10, 1919, files 861.00/3368, 861.00/3617!), 861.00/3622, D.S.N.A.; Reinsch to 
 Polk, Jan. 3, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 460. 
 
 7 Barclay to Polk, Jan. 16, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp 
 462-463. 
 
NEW SOURCES OF TROUBLE: THE COSSACKS 
 
 121 
 
 authorities who were disappointed over the results of the railway ne¬ 
 gotiations, which they feared would seriously interfere with their own 
 plans in Eastern Siberia. 8 There was no doubt in General Graves’s 
 mind that as long as Japan continued the policy of “equipping and 
 financing unscrupulous Cossack leaders there can be no such thing 
 as security of life and property in Eastern Siberia.” 9 
 
 Morris shared Graves’s viewpoint. While investigating conditions 
 in Siberia, he discussed the problem with General Graves, Admiral 
 William L. Rodgers, then in command of the Asiatic fleet, and Consul 
 Caldwell. T he q uestion which troubled the conferees was whether 
 tJheUn it cd-Stages- could '^^maiti-ill^SibeTiaTind permit reactionary 
 gro ups in Siberia to inauguarate a campaign the purpose of which was 
 Qnpprpssinn-ofi-a lT local rrpfexm tntive imritnrtnns.” After considerable 
 discussion the group agreed thatsihee the 'United States had initiated 
 the expedition and had acquiesced in the action of both the Czechs 
 and Japanese in restoring order along the railways, American troops 
 would have to remain in Siberia for the present. Furthermore, they 
 believed that the population in the cities and townsT flong t he railway, 
 where Al lied troops were quartered, should be protected from the arbi¬ 
 trary actions of any faction] However, they feared that such a pro- 
 * posal would be unacceptableTcTthe Japanese. 10 
 
 When Morris advised the State Department of the results of this 
 consultation, a note was immediately sent to Harris at Irkutsk, in¬ 
 structing him to discuss informally with the Omsk government the 
 actions of the Cossack leaders. Thereupon, Harris informed the Omsk 
 authorities that the activities of the Cossacks were creating an unfor¬ 
 tunate effect on public opinion in America, which might result in 
 “embarrassing” the support which the United States was then lending 
 to the authorities in Siberia. 11 
 
 The Omsk government replied promptly with a confidential note. 
 It frankly admitted its failure to secure control over Eastern Siberia. 
 It was too involved in military operations against the Bolsheviks to con¬ 
 trol Semenov and Kalmikov. Moreover, a serious o bja^ek^gTrevenred 
 t he establishment of JDtosk-ftttthtniLV in Eastern Siberia:—The obstacle 
 was Japan._ jShe-was supporting Semenov, who in turn was preventing 
 Kolchak from extending his influence into the Far East. Thus the 
 
 8 Morris to Polk, March 7, 1919, file 861.77/727, D.S.N.A. 
 
 “Graves to Adjutant General, Feb. 25, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 
 1919, Russia, pp. 468-472. 
 
 10 Morris to Polk, March 8, 1919, file 861.77/736, D.S.N.A. 
 
 11 Lansing to Polk, March 23, 1919, file 861.00/4128, D.S.N.A. 
 
122 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 Kolchak government could not take complete responsibility for the 
 actions of these reactionary officials. 12 
 
 While negotiations proceeded between Omsk and Washington, 
 the Cossack leaders continued their efforts to make trouble. They 
 sought to make everyone believe that most of their difficulties were 
 due to the presence of American troops in Siberia. At the same time 
 the Ta panese and Cossacks endeavored to get the Bolshevik elements 
 
 to join the Cossack s and Japanese against the_ B.olshevi ks. In these 
 circumstances General Graves felt he had more to fear from the 
 Cossacks than from the Bolsheviks. He reported that the situation in 
 Siberia was just what the Japanese had been trying to achieve for the 
 past few months. 13 The views of General Graves were corroborated 
 by Admiral Rodgers and American consuls at various places in Si¬ 
 beria. Lansing himself admitted that “reports received from American 
 consuls at various places in Siberia seem, however, to confirm on 
 the whole General Graves’s opinion of Japanese activities as intended 
 to aid the reactionary party and as conducted with a view to the 
 eventual domination of Eastern Siberia by Japan.” 14 
 
 ? In view of t he tense ungSEtainiig S-ia Sib eria. Admiral Rodgers be - 
 if wrmlrl be wkp irt h ave a batdesKip fleeTTn jhe_Taci£g. 
 He thought it might have a beneficial effect on diplomacy. Secretary 
 Lansing opposed this suggestion: 
 
 I understand from Admiral Benson that in less than two months in the 
 natural order of events as prescribed in naval orders a substantial fleet 
 will be in the Pacific or ready to proceed there. To specifically order a 
 fleet to the Pacific at this time, when the friction is just developing, would 
 seem to tend to aggravate and intensify the situation for all concerned 
 rather than help matters . 13 
 
 Although there was no change in the attitude of the Cossack and 
 Japanese leaders in Siberia during the next few months, there was 
 considerable change in the attitude of the Omsk authorities, who began 
 
 12 Harris to Polk, March 25, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 pp. 484-485- 
 
 13 Graves to Adjutant General, March 21, 1919, file 861.00/4967, D.S.N.A. Gen¬ 
 eral Graves later pointed out that his refusal to permit American troops to be used 
 against the Bolsheviks accounted for nine-tenths of the criticism directed against him 
 in Siberia. He was told by General Leonard Wood upon his return from the Far 
 East in 1920 that if he had not had copies of his papers, he would have been “torn 
 limb from limb, in the United States,” because he had not taken part “in fighting 
 Bolshevism” (Graves, America’s Siberian Adventure, p. 93). 
 
 14 Lansing to Wilson, March 22, 1919, Wilson Papers, series VIII-A. 
 
 lc Lansing to Wilson, March 22, 1919, Wilson Papers, series II. 
 
NEW SOURCES OF TROUBLE: THE COSSACKS 
 
 123 
 
 to protest against the “unneutral policy” of American troops. The 
 « Pmsk go vernment was particularly angered because General Graves 
 persisted in treating^"the Bolsheviks as a Dolitiea hT 5 a'rtv of ordi nary 
 gc^eharafc ter. I t flatly ~stated tharATnSYican Troops were acco mplishin g no 
 useful purpose in Siberia, butTwere doing actuaTharm in tending to 
 ~dTsfufBe 3 ~conditi 6 nsr - 'The British and French governments 
 sustamed~the obiectiohySf^t he Omsk government. 1 6 
 
 In view of Omsk representations, both Consul Caldwell and Gen¬ 
 eral Graves believed that the time had come either to withdraw all 
 American troops or to support actively the Omsk government. The 
 British government was already aiding Kolchak. 17 On April 14 
 Commodore Edwards of the British cruiser Kent had notified the 
 American consul in writing of his authorization by the British ad¬ 
 miralty to give active support to the forces of the Kolchak govern¬ 
 ment when necessary. The necessity arose immediately. 18 Moreover, 
 the British government was quite displeased with the attitude and 
 actions of American troops in Siberia. It informed the State Depart¬ 
 ment of nine specific instances when General Graves had taken a stand 
 against the Omsk government. The..State_ Department was urged to 
 insist npnn r ™ npmtfmn among n il the rep i Tirntitiv i CaTTH 1 11 »i q 1 i ll h \J^j 
 —Siberia. 19 Ge neral Knox, com mand er of the B r i tish-fiorees-in . Sib eria. ' 
 
 t>f. 
 
 was also annoyed with the attitude of General Graves, pa rticu l arly ihe. _ 
 ca bles which he was sending to Washingt on. Hexriticized Graves as 
 b eing ignorant of the real situation, o utside nL-th^- Vladivostok- dis- 
 t rict, unsympath etic with the efforts of the Kolchak ahcT'British gov- 
 emments, and “hypnotized” by the cases involving mistreatment of 
 
 ■sr 
 
 jpeasantsY" On IKe other hand, General Graves considerecTKnox to 
 
 be a natural autocrat who “could not, if he had desired to do so, give 
 sympathetic consideration to the aspirations of the peasant class in 
 Russia, whom he characterized as swine.” 21 However, Knox was 
 
 16 Omsk Government to Bakhmetev, April 24, 1919, United States, Foreign Rela¬ 
 tions, 1919, Russia, pp. 494-496. 
 
 17 Caldwell to Polk, May 5, 1919, file 861.00/4435, D.S.N.A. 
 
 18 Miles to Polk, May 6, 1919, file 861.00/4976, D.S.N.A. 
 
 111 George T. Clerk to Lansing, May 19, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 
 1919, Russia, pp. 499-500. 
 
 20 Caldwell to Polk, March 3, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 pp. 473-474. Carl Ackerman had reported earlier that Knox was hostile to the United 
 States. The British general had told him at one time that “all America meant by her 
 program of economic relief was to sell more harvester machines, shows and films to the 
 Russians.” Polk declared that Knox’s attitude was injuring the Allies and making it 
 more difficult for them to work together in Russia (Polk to John W. Davis, ambassador 
 to Great Britain, Feb. 11, 1919, file 861.00/4058C, D.S.N.A.). 
 
 23 Graves, America's Siberian Adventure, pp. 18-19. 
 
124 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 speaking with conviction when he pointed out that the divergence in 
 views between the British and American military authorities in Siberia 
 was giving the Japanese a clear field. 22 
 
 Knox was not alone in his criticism of Graves. The Russian Di¬ 
 vision of the State Department, as well as other important policy¬ 
 making officials, were also opposed to his views. It was quite evident 
 that they desired Graves to help Kolchak actively against the Bolshe¬ 
 viks. Graves, however, refused to comply. His orders, which had come 
 directly from the President, instructed him not to interfere in Russian 
 domestic affairs. To Graves this meant no participation in man hunts 
 against the Bolsheviks and strict neutrality in all factional strife. 23 
 Becau sgJie-refu sed to allow his command to h emme implicated in the 
 ^ depredations agairisnlTC Bolsheviks.—Gra ves earned the-r^gutation of 
 Jaeing-a—Bolshevi k hims elf^— ^ 
 
 ^General - Graves , howev er,-fourtdAr afirrost-fimpossible to obey his 
 a ide memoire _ implici tly. By refusing to support Kolcfek—-he—'was—- 
 aiding the BolshevikJf~yeTr~by helping to guard the railway, he was 
 working to the advantage of Kolchak. 25 The War Department ex¬ 
 pected Graves to follow his instructions strictly, while the Russian Di¬ 
 vision of the State Department desired him to follow a looser interpre¬ 
 tation. The entire situation baffled even Secretary Baker, who later 
 wrote: 
 
 I cannot even guess at the explanation of the apparent conflict between 
 the War Department and the State Department of the United States with 
 regard to the Siberian venture, nor can I understand why the State De¬ 
 partment undertook to convey its ideas on Siberian policy, as it seems oc¬ 
 casionally to have done, directly to General Graves. Perhaps the State 
 Department was more impressed than I was with some of the Allied views 
 as to the desirability of cooperation beyond the scope of Aide Memoire. 
 Possibly some of these comments were mere reflections of Allied criticism, 
 forwarded for what they were worth, but without being first presented to 
 the Secretary of State or considered by him as affecting the maturely 
 formulated policy of the United States in the adventure. 26 
 
 22 Caldwell to Polk, March 3, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 p. 474. 
 
 23 Lengyel, Siberia, pp. 235-236; Graves, America’s Siberian Adventure, pp. 191- 
 192. 
 
 24 Stewart, The White Armies of Russia, p. 279. Graves himself pointed out that 
 military representatives of England, France, and Japan “not only did not deny, but 
 boasted about their efforts to destroy, what they called Bolshevism” (Graves, Ameri¬ 
 ca’s Siberian Adventure, pp. 81-82). 
 
 25 Stewart, The White Armies of Russia, p. 286. 
 
 26 Baker, Foreword in Graves, America's Siberian Adventure, p. xiv. 
 
EW SOURCES OF TROUBLE: THE COSSACKS 1 25 
 
 Throughout his stay in Siberia the attitudes, actions, and reports of 
 General Graves were constantly criticized by the State Department. 
 Typical was the comment written by Basil Miles on one of General 
 Graves’s reports: “I consider this report of little real value ... it is 
 entirely out of perspective and written with little real knowledge of 
 Russia and Russian ways of doing things.” 27 Assistant Secretary Phil¬ 
 lips shared Miles’s viewpoint. He believed that many of the difficulties 
 described by Graves were not insurmountable and might be solved by 
 an officer with exceptionally large experience and delicacy. He im¬ 
 plied that these were characteristics which Graves did not have. Polk, 
 too, considered Graves incapable of exercising discretion and lacking 
 in tact. He conveyed these sentiments to Lansing, adding, “I under¬ 
 stand one of the results is that the British regard him as apparently 
 sympathizing with the Bolsheviks rather than with the Omsk authori¬ 
 ties.” 28 
 
 On the other hand, Secretary Baker was quite “exercised” over the 
 reports from Graves. They fully justified all of his predictions con¬ 
 cerning the results of military intervention in Siberia. 29 Both General 
 March and Secretary Baker appreciated Graves’s difficulties and sup¬ 
 ported him. When the going was particularly rough, General March 
 
 wrote: “Keep a stiff upper lip, I am going to stand by you until- 
 
 freezes over.” 30 
 
 Graves’s attitude even became a subject for discussion at the Peace 
 Conference.^Wherr Lloyd George remarked that British niirhnrities 
 believed that much ot thTTloul^ s due to the at titude of 
 
 G eneral Graves, President Wilso n replied that “General Graves was a 
 man of most unprovocative character, and whereveT tHe~failfmmight 
 lie he felt sure it was not with him." 111 ' 
 
 Criticisms of Graves continued as did also the troublesome activities 
 of the Cossacks. Although American protests to the <pmsk govern¬ 
 ment finally resulted in the recall of General Ivanov-Rifiov from Vladi¬ 
 vostok, Semenov continued to stop trains, examine baggage, and collect 
 dues on any part of the Siberian railway he controlled. His actions 
 now had the substance of legality since he had recently agreed to 
 recognize Kolchak and submit unconditionally to his command. The 
 agreement, however, did not stop him from continued interference 
 
 27 March 31, 1919, file 861.00/4967, D.S.N.A. 
 
 28 Polk, Confidential Diary, May 10, 1919; Polk to Lansing, May 9, 1919, United 
 States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 493-494. 
 
 29 Phillips to Lansing, March 28, 1919, file 861.00/41748, D.S.N.A. 
 
 30 Graves, America’s Siberian Adventure, p. 160. 
 
 31 United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 496-497. 
 
126 AMERICAS SIBERIAN EXPEDITION, I918-I92O 
 
 with the Siberian railways. In an effort to restrain Semenov, Assistant 
 Secretary Phillips asked the British government to urge him to dis¬ 
 continue his activities. When Great Britain refused to take the initia¬ 
 tive in the matter, 32 the Inter-Allied Railway Committee took action. 
 
 It sent a vigorous protest to the Omsk government denouncing the 
 activities of Semenov. 33 The protest brought no remedy. On the 
 contrary, a few weeks later Kolchak promoted Semenov to a full gen¬ 
 eral. In reality K olchak had little choice in the matter. Since his 
 jupport was rapidly diminishi ng-, througho ut Siberia, he v vas c om-~ 
 pellecTto rely on the Cossacks for the mainte nance of his authority. 34 
 
 With the nominal support of Kolchak the Cossacks continued their 
 irresponsible activities. On September 5 Kalmikov arrested two Amer¬ 
 ican soldiers, a captain and a corporal, because they had no Russian 
 passports. He released the captain but had the corporal whipped. 
 Graves naturally considered the action an outrage and informed Kalmi¬ 
 kov that a repetition of the incident would result in his arrest. Sem¬ 
 enov immediately denounced Graves and declared his willingness to’ 
 assist Kalmikov in case of trouble with the Americans. 35 As a result 
 of this anti-American activityr General GravgrrefaseTd-te- deliv er one 
 
 hundred t housand rifles nrdcrpd h y Kolchak fr om the United States. 
 He feared thap Uiev-mTghrTati--muxTh e hands oF KaTmikm~'or S em- 
 -« enovi if this should happen, Graves wrote: “We will be helping to 
 
 armthe worst criminals in Siberia; we will be neglectful of the in¬ 
 terests of the people . . . and will be helping Japan to delay the settle¬ 
 ment of conditions in Siberia.” 36 Ambassador Morris approved of this 
 action^^-Badly-m-iTCed 'uf-the-riflesrthe^insk ^governmen t insisted that 
 it did not have the power to suppress the disorderly elements^ Finally T 
 ~npon-44-rgent r.epre«mt arions~Trdffl~the ST 3 TC and War~l>ep artrnents, - 
 Graves agreed to deliver the rifles directly to Kolchak. 37 
 
 Tnridtmf; oUfFrrrtsuwf--^^ to pile ti p—Gnndrrinns at Vladi¬ 
 
 vostok were made considerably worse when Kolchak appointed Gen¬ 
 eral Sergei N. Rozanov as his representative in the Far East to suc- 
 
 32 Phillips to Davis, June 28, 1919, Polk to Caldwell, Ji^Jy 17, 1919, files 861.00/4752, 
 861.00/4838, D.S.N.A. 
 
 33 July 19, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 511-512. 
 
 34 Morris to Lansing, Aug. 13, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 
 P- 5 M- f 
 
 36 Tenney to Polk, Sept. 22, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 
 516; Polk to Lansing, Oct. 5, 1919, file 861.00/5514, D.S.N.A. 
 
 30 Graves to Adjutant General, Oct. 29, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 
 1919, Russia, pp. 540-541. 
 
 37 Graves to Adjutant General, Sept. 26, 19T9, Sept. 28, 1919, United States 
 Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 519, 522. 
 
NEW SOURCES OF TROUBLE: THE COSSACKS 
 
 127 
 
 ceed Horvat. Since Rozanov was a reactionary hostile to America, 
 the State Department protested informally against his appointment. 
 
 The protest was wasted. Rozanov brought four thousand soldiers into 
 Vladivostok and assumed nominal control of the city. His rule brought 
 serious disorder. Kalmikov and his Cossacks were permitted to come 
 into Vladivostok. Shortly thereafter two men in Cossack uniforms 
 murdered a Cossack colonel in broad daylight. .This was fo llowed— 
 by the—nmc der of one Ameri^a n-a nd u t t c Creeh roldier by Russ ian— 
 officers. The- Allied- ~mili.tar. y - ..re prrsr ouui ve s immediately d emanded 
 that Ro zan ov remove-^-tmiaft-tfeo ps from Vla div ostok. They indi¬ 
 cated t h at a failure to comply by noon of September 29 would result 
 * in the- u se o f fo rce. 38 ----- 
 
 The O msk govern ment-protes ted th e-re moval of Russian tr oops-on. 
 
 -the grounds that Al lied troops did no t-exerebe airv exua»tecjdtoriaI 
 rights in Vladiv ostok. Thereupon the Alhe d-ca^mmafwlere-^ 
 
 Jtheir demand.~T he-Qmsk government later reported that an investi¬ 
 gation of the incident indicated that one of the chief promoters of the 
 affair was General Graves, “whose conduct recently has become en¬ 
 tirely incomprehensible” to Omsk. The Omsk authorities added that 
 “his remaining at Vladivostok will lead to perpetual misunderstanding 
 and to the growing of public discontent with Americans.” 39 Although 
 shifting the blame to General Graves, the Omsk government recalled 
 Rozanov from Vladivostok to explain himself. Consul General Har¬ 
 ris believed that this meant the definite elimination of Rozanov from 
 the Far Eastern situation. 40 
 
 While the United States attempted to solve its difficulties with thtf-’x 
 Omsk government, it faced another problem involving the Czechs. \ 
 As early as January, 1919, the Czechs had expressed their displeasure 
 at having to remain in Siberia after the Armistice. They were tired 
 of fighting; their morale was low Th ey h nd bernme di nnti i fird wit h 
 fte character of th gJLolchak regime, and now refused to fight f or, the , 
 m f nirpnrp nf rernring hie n fi e in Siberi a 41 Many C zechs believed that 
 by aiding Kolchak they were perpetuating a government whose ideas 
 
 38 Caldwell to Lansing, Sept. 30, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, 
 Russia, pp. 522-523. The Japanese government refused to sanction the use of force. * 
 
 39 De Bach (Russian charge) to DeWitt C. Poole (Chief of Russian Division), Oct. 
 
 3, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 530-531. 
 
 40 Tenney (secretary to American Legation in China) to Lansing, Oct. 28, 1919, 
 United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 539. 
 
 41 Harris to Department of State, Jan. 25, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 
 1919, Russia, pp. 274-275; Harris to Department of State, Feb. 3, 1919, file 861.00/ 
 3805, D.S.N.A. Harris reported that their attitude was becoming more annoying daily. 
 
128 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 were directly opposed to the democratic ideas of the Czechs. 43 Mo re¬ 
 ov er, they sa w no r eason for continuing the _£ghr against the Bolshe¬ 
 viks while the Allies were doing no fighting themselves? 3 By thef 
 encT of March friction was so intense thaTFomBartetWeefirthe Czechs 
 and Kolchak Russians seemed imminent. Major Slaughter believed 
 the Czechs could not be asked to guard the railroad because they 
 would obstruct traffic passively and permit local disorder. r-Tfee-eftfy- 
 hope-oF-p re ve n t in g disast er was to -s end them home orjjromise to send 
 ' l~hpm hnmp However, if this we re done without replacing them witfC 
 in a few months, the K olcha k gove nTfir m^ collapse. 
 
 Therefore, if the Czechs left, it would have to be slowly so that men 
 could be recruited to take their places. 44 
 
 By June, the problem had not yet been solved. The Czechs had 
 been absent from home for five years. They had been out of com¬ 
 munication with their homes and families throughout their entire 
 stay in Siberia. With the attainment of Czechoslovakian independ- 
 ,T^tnce, the soldiers felt that they were needed at home to protect the new 
 T state. When, however, the Peace Conference proposed that the Czechs 
 I fight their way out to Archangel without asking the consent of the 
 1 Bolsheviks, the suggestion was refused by the Czechs and General 
 Vjanin. 45 
 
 Stevens, in the meantime, desired to know whether the Czechs 
 were to go or stay. Unless the Czechs were replaced by Allied troops, 
 Stevens would have to withdraw American inspectors from west of 
 Lake Baikal, since they could not rerpain at their posts without military 
 protection. Even Kolchak realize d that in their present st age of de ¬ 
 morali zation the C zechsjwer e of no use^ He advised their evacuation 
 
 by sea jixim-ATadWost©k_andjffieir replacement by Allied troops. After 
 Ambassador Morris had carefully studied tKe'Czech problem he was 
 led to conclude that Allied operation of the railways would not be 
 possible beyond Irkutsk, unless the Allies were prepared to supply addi- 
 
 42 Baker to Department of State, Feb. n, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 
 1919, Russia, pp. 277-278. Masaryk wrote later, “I cannot and do not wish to defend 
 all that was done politically and strategically in our army after my departure. I per¬ 
 ceived that there was some lack of cohesion, political wavering, outbreaks of an ad¬ 
 venturous spirit and, often, fits of bewilderment in various units; and I deplore that 
 our command in Siberia should not have recognized forthwith the incapacity of Kol¬ 
 chak . . .” (Masaryk, The Maying of a State, p. 281). 
 
 43 Sharp to Department of State, Feb. 12, 1919, file 861.00/3837, D.S.N.A. 
 
 44 Phillips to Lansing, March 29, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, 
 Russia, pp. 279-280. 
 
 46 Harris to Department of State, July 6, 1919, file 861.00/4802, D.S.N.A.; Bliss 
 Diary, June 11 1919. 
 
NEW SOURCES OF TROUBLE: THE COSSACKS 
 
 129 
 
 tional troops to replace the Czechs. Morr is was convince d phat no 
 
 arrang em ent - wi t h-Tapan would prove satisfactory whic h did not pro¬ 
 vide thatj he Tlnitpd -States- m nt'i' ihn t r. a t least (w^ 4 ^ 1 C-r^hf^necessary 
 r eplacements . juHe informed the State Department that there was a 
 fundamental difference in purpose governing the Siberian policy of 
 Japan and the United States. X h £. Japanese military authorities still 
 desiccd_ta-use-the expedition to'Siberia as an excus e toTafce the uhimr se' 
 pastern Railway and domina te-jSbrtfrManchurirand Eastern Siberia. 
 Despite the failure to accomplish their object directly, the purpose still 
 remained. Although the civil party under the leadership of Hara was 
 opposed to this purpose, it was hampered by the powerful military 
 clique. Morris was convinced that Japan was pursuing in Siberia the 
 same methods which had produced “such tragic results in China. . . .” 
 He indicated the necessary remedy: 
 
 .Spminn ff ^controversy is, as I see_ it, simply a sordid conspiracy to 
 jgi^cJice-^xt©rt«nrTfp5irfhr-pc0pfenof-Siberm-thTOTighTxmtrofof-The-xmtoms 
 service ar Manch uria Station and of distribution at Ch ita. We cannot meet 
 ^huTconspiracy and enforce the “Open Door,” necessary for the economic 
 salvation of Russia, merely by frank discussions and formal protests in 
 Tokyo. We must speak our determined purpose in the only language the 
 Japanese military clique can understand. This will not lead to friction; 
 on the contrary it will bring about a better understanding. We shall not 
 only help the liberals in Russia; we shall render an even greater service 
 to the liberal and progressive movement in Japan. 
 
 The presence of a substantial number of American troops will serve to 
 impress upon the Cossack leaders and other reactionaries . . . the character 
 and extent of the protection we are prepared to give to American agencies. 48 
 
 Despite Morris’s reasoned plea and Clemenceau’s appeal on the same 
 subject, President—Wilson- re plied. ‘Iwif h the utmost regret” that- he 
 ^found it jr^ractii^Ele-^Turnish additional Ameri can troops for th e 
 - .purpose of re placing":he Czechs. 47 Thus the Czech problem continued 
 ►unsolved. — ~~ ——— - — 
 
 The problem of maintaining harmonious relations with Japan in 
 Siberia also remained unsolved. The State Department knew that 
 Japan was behind many of the outrages committed by the Cossacks. 
 Yet, whenever representations were made concerning them, Japan al- 
 
 46 Morris to Lansing, July 30, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 pp. 292-294. Polk had already informed President Wilson that all reports indicated 
 that Allied troops would probably be required to replace the Czechs when they were 
 withdrawn (Polk to Wilson, July 16, 1919, Wilson Papers, series II). 
 
 47 Lansing to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, Aug. 8, 1919, United States, 
 Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 295. 
 
130 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 ways politely and courteously disclaimed all connections with them. 
 The Japanese War Office found it more difficult to explain its actions 
 in Siberia to the Japanese Diet. 48 On March 31, after a heated debate 
 in the Diet, General Giichi Tanaka, the Minister of War, called upon 
 Morris to discuss the apparent conflict of policy between American 
 and Japanese forces in Siberia. He explained that since Japan was 
 changing its troops, substituting new divisions for old ones, the time 
 had come to redefine a joint policy in Siberia. He expressed his per¬ 
 sonal conviction that military activities should be confined thereafter to 
 the guarding of the railroad. Morris interpreted Tanaka’s friendliness 
 as an indication that the dominant influences in the General Staff had 
 abandoned their plans for independent action in Siberia and were pre¬ 
 pared to co-operate with General Graves and to modify their previous 
 policy of supporting local Cossack leaders. 49 
 
 Wilson was deliberating over the Siberian problem while Morris 
 and Tanaka conferred in Tokyo. His solution was similar to that of 
 Tanaka. -In—order to insurc-amiatermpt ed operation o f the Trans- 
 Siberian q nd Ghin es e .. .F. as ter'n Railroads, the . Pre s ide - nf prropos edThaT a 
 z one of three mil es-be-established on eirher side of fhtr iailmad and, 
 that the Allies exercise definite -p oli ce po we fc - w-khin that, region a nd 
 pr event a ny disturbance th at mig ht interfere with the operation of 
 the railways/^ 
 
 Although General March declared that the proposition was “ri¬ 
 diculous,” 51 Secretary Baker thought it might be workable if modified. 
 He pointed out that if the Allies assumed responsibility for a six-mile 
 zone along the Trans-Siberian Railway, they would need a military 
 force of perhaps five hund red thousand men. whic h_w onld necess i t ate 
 lar ge additions to the Americ an or Japanese forces. case, it 
 
 would pla ce a largg __sectioB--or-the-T~3ifwa Japanese contro l. 
 
 "Moreover, the establishment of such a long zone would tend to in¬ 
 crease the frequency of conflicts between the Allied forces and the 
 various elements of the native population. Such conflicts would appear 
 to justify assumption of civil control, and perhaps military repression, 
 which in effect would mean occupation and administration of Siberia 
 by Japan. r Therefore, Baker suggested that the objectives of Allied 
 military forces be limited to the pre servation of order in the immedi- 
 
 48 Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, pp. 210-211. 
 
 49 Morris to Polk, March 31, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 pp. 551 - 552 . 
 
 60 Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State, April 1, 1919, 
 United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 552-553. 
 
 61 Polk, Confidential Diary, April 4, 1919. 
 
NEW SOURCES OF TROUBLE: THE COSSACKS 
 
 131 
 
 ate vicinity of the railroad and its stations as those in char ge o f the 
 r ailroad might request. B aker suggested that the State Department 
 clearly indicate its disinclination to send additional troops to Siberia, 
 or to see additions made by other nations. Baker believed that this 
 plan would limit military activity to the railroad and to existing forces, 
 and give no implied sanction to the extension of military or political 
 activities by any other nation.'' 2 
 
 President Wilson approved Baker’s policy. So also did Ambassador 
 Morris, who thought it might be agreeable to Japan since Baron Ta¬ 
 naka himself had presented a somewhat similar scheme. Morris’s 
 assumption was correct. Tanaka was quite agreeable and made a real 
 effort to be cordial. Referring of his own accord to the recent news¬ 
 paper campaign in the United States and Japan which tended to dis¬ 
 turb friendly relations, Tanaka announced his intention to issue a state¬ 
 ment as War Minister emphasizing the frank and cordial relations now 
 existing between the two nations. He also planned to have an enter¬ 
 tainment in Morris’s honor and significantly asked the ambassador to 
 submit to him the names of any American writers or newspapermen to 
 whom he might extend invitations. 53 
 
 On May 2 the Japanese government transmitted to Morris a sug¬ 
 gested military policy in Siberia. It provided for the establishment of 
 a zone for the protection of railways, rivers, and waterways in Siberia. 
 Associated troops were to maintain order within the limits of the 
 zone. The Russ ians were to be respo nsible for the ma intenance of 
 order^outside the zone. However, theOmsk gov ernment was to he 
 aid ed morally and materially in its effort s~to~Te : establishorder, peace, 
 
 jmd security in Siberia. Furthermore, if the Russian troops found their 
 
 Strength inadeq n ni^crTITTr mf^ in nrdfr i t r l l i r i Fgtm m 
 
 fied zone and sought Allied assistance, the' Associated powers upon 
 
 
 Although interested in protecting the railways in Manchuria and 
 Siberia, the United States was opposed to the establishment of a definite 
 zone of military action along the rivers or waterways. The State De- 
 
 62 Baker to Wilson, April 3, 1919, file 861.77/780, D.S.N.A. 
 
 C3 Morris to Polk, April 25, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, igig, Russia, 
 pp. 556-557. The statement given to the newspapers appears quite humorous in retro¬ 
 spect: “There have recently been some rumors of unpleasant relations between Japanese 
 and American troops in Siberia. This is, however, mournful guesswork of those who 
 do not know the true conditions . . . there exists [r/r] no reasons or facilities liable 
 to harm the friendly relations between the troops of the two nations in Siberia” (Morris 
 to Polk, April 29, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, igig, Russia, p. 558). 
 
 64 Morris to Polk, May 2, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, igig, Russia, 
 P- 559 - 
 
132 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 partment felt that it would be wiser to define Allied policy in the 
 following terms: 
 
 The Governments interested in the protection of Chinese Eastern and 
 Trans-Siberian Railways and having military forces in Siberia agree that 
 the use of these military forces shall be limited to the preservation of order 
 in the immediate vicinity of the railway, its stations and trains, when those 
 in charge so request and in the suppression of local violence by conflicting 
 Russian forces only when such conflicts affect the dispatch of troops or 
 operation of the railways and even then only to the extent necessary to 
 protect the railway and those engaged in its operation. 55 
 
 Before the State Department presented its statement to Japan, it 
 had secured London’s agreement to the idea that the Inter-Allied 
 Committee “take preeminence in all matters affecting policy so that 
 both the Technical Board and the military boards may act along lines 
 consistent with attitude assumed by Inter-Allied Committee.” 56 
 
 The Japanese government did not approve of the American mod¬ 
 ification of its military plan. The American note, in effect, gave to the 
 Inter-Allied Committee the authority to determine when troops should 
 
 be used for the preservation of order along the railways. The Mi ru_ 
 
 ister for Foreign Affairs felt that the protection of the~railways_.was._ 
 
 clearly, a m atter for the Allied .-military... forces and fell outside the 
 furlctian of the I nter-Allied Commitjge^. The Japanese note~oLJlTfie^ 
 
 :fated the attitude~of~fhFTjeneral Staff quite bluntly: “The military 
 : orces should be authorized to act on their own initiative within the 
 j cope of the object above defined. It appears neither wise .nor prac¬ 
 ticable to call upon them to withhold their actions until a request for 
 it is made by those in charge of the railways.” Japan also retained 
 her idea of military protection not only for rivers and waterways, but 
 also for mines and other establishments which had a direct bearing 
 upon the supply of materials needed for the railway. 
 
 Morris was quite disappointed in the Japanese attitude. It re¬ 
 vealed to him the inherent difficulty of any real co-operation with the 
 Japanese military forces in Siberia through civilian control. As Mor- ■ 
 ris pointed out, “the General Staff insist upon retaining the initiative. 
 They can not understand and will not tolerate any arrangement which 
 would deprive them of independent action and it is this attitude, 
 adopted not only by the General Staff but by every subordinate mili- 
 
 6C Morris to Polk, May 23, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 pp. 562, 563. 
 
 66 Polk to Davis, April 26, 1919, Davis to Polk, May 3, 1919, United States, 
 Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 537, 560. 
 
NEW SOURCES OF TROUBLE: THE COSSACKS 
 
 !33 
 
 tary official, which is so exasperating to our representatives in Siberia.” 57 
 It appeared that the United States and Japan had reached an impasse 
 over th e formul ation of a policy i n SiberiaU 
 
 An equally exasperating state of affairs existed along the Trans- 
 Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways. The Japanese military authori¬ 
 ties refused to protect the representatives of the Technical Board in 
 the performance of their duties and the enforcement of their orders. 
 The Russian military authorities were constantly interfering with the 
 dispatching of trains and other technical details of operation, while 
 the Russian railway managers refused to obey the directions of the 
 Technical Board, insisting that such directions were in conflict with 
 Russian laws and regulations which had never been repealed. 58 At 
 the same time, while Semenov’s hostile acts against American in¬ 
 spectors grew worse, Japanese soldiers gave Stevens “absolutely no 
 protection.” Japanese military authorities refused to restrain Semenov 
 on the grounds thaFTu^ ~^ions^wcruld--be-dftterference i n Rus sian 
 ^ internal affairs/ ^ To Ambassador Morris the Japanese plan was per¬ 
 fectly clear: 
 
 Baffled by the railway agreement in their organized attempt to take pos¬ 
 session of the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways as far as Chita, 
 and thus dominate eastern Siberia and northern Manchuria the Japanese 
 Government is countenancing a less obvious, but a more insidious scheme 
 of operating through the Cossack organization which is the only sub¬ 
 stantial support Kolchak has east of Chita. ,It will not be difficult for 
 -Japan to dispose of the e astern Cnssarks when th ey have served t he pur - 
 pose-S®- 
 
 Whereas the Japanese military authorities refused to restrain Sem¬ 
 enov, the Omsk government was powerless to control him or prevent 
 his interference with the railroad in the territory which he dominated. 
 ^SemenrtVj emhnldened hy the passive a ttitude of Japan, defied the 
 ^ authority of the Inter-Allied representatives and terrorized the railway 
 employees. Thus, American engineers found themselves alone at 
 r widely separated stations along the railway, surrounded by hostile 
 Cossacks, and unable to rely on the protection of the Japanese soldiers. 
 
 57 Morris to Polk, June 7, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 
 
 563-565- 
 
 68 Morris to Polk, July 27, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 
 567-568. 
 
 80 Stevens to Polk, Aug. 15, 1919, Lansing to Caldwell, Aug. 21, 1919, United 
 States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 570, 572-573. 
 
 60 Morris to Polk, July 17, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, I9T9, Russia, 
 p. 567. 
 
134 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 In these circumstances Stevens and Emerson did not feel justified in 
 risking the lives of American engineers and were preparing to with¬ 
 draw them from the Semenov area. 61 Relations between Japan and 
 /fthe United States were critical. If the two nations could come to no 
 agreement, the United States was faced with two alternatives: either 
 to send more troops to protect Stevens in the execution of the railway 
 agreement or to withdraw American troops entirely. 
 
 <>1 Morris to Lansing, Aug. 15, 1919, file 861.00/1025, D.S.N.A. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 Wanted: A Russian Policy 
 
 P RESIDENT Wilson’s Russian policy received little criticism in 
 Congress or in the press as long as the war in Europe was in 
 progress. The enormousness of the task of crushing Germany pre¬ 
 vented such criticism as long as the Russian policy might be interpreted 
 as a means of stopping Germany. However, after the signing of the 
 Armistice, attitudes changed. Con gress began m show a keen interest 
 •in-what seemed--to-maay-la, be a little war with Russia. C riticism 
 of Wilson’s Russian policy grew louder and more intense as the year 
 
 wore on^-Tolideal partisans, isolationists, and constituents who 
 desired the return of their husbands and sons demanded the with¬ 
 drawal of troops from Russia. Many people found it d i fficult to rec onT~ 
 cile Wilson’s ideal ist ic phras e s c oncerning Ru s sia wid i his [Tr r ttcv of 
 ' jniiitai^iAateiwefrtionA - Many were opposed to the extent of the inter¬ 
 vention. Others condemned the vacillation in policy rather than the 
 policy itself. Time and again newspapers and periodicals urged either 
 a complete withdrawal of troops or a reinforcement sufficient to crush 
 Bolshevism. Interestingly enough, the general run of articles assumed 
 that American policy was aimed at crushing Bolshevism. Thus the^ 
 writers could not understand how a small contingent of American 
 troops could be of any value. 2 Few guessed that Wilson’s Russian 
 policy might be more concerned with keeping the open door in Siberiar.' 
 
 Throughout December, 1918, and January, 1919, a group of Repub¬ 
 lican senators assailed vigorously the policy of intervention, demanding 
 information concerning Russia and Siberia. What was most irritating 
 to the opposition was their lack of knowledge concerning the admin- 
 
 1 Congressional Record, vol. 57, part 1, p. 346. 
 
 2 For representative articles expressing these points of view, see the following: “With¬ 
 draw from Russia,” Dial, LXV (Dec. 14, 1918), 525-528; “Justice to Russia,” Nation, 
 CVIII (Jan. 4, 1919), 6-7; “American Policy in Russia,” New Republic, XVIII (Feb. 
 
 8, 1919), 37-39: Literary Digest, LXIII (Oct. 4, 1919), 17-18. 
 
136 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 v 
 
 istration policy in Russia. On December 12, 1918, Hiram Johnson, 
 Republican senator from California, introduced a resolution asking for 
 
 / all data, documents, and information showing or bearing upon 
 American relations with Russia as to peace or war. Said Johnson: 
 j “I have made diligent private inquiry without success and because I 
 do not know and we do not know, the situation in Russia today, what 
 we are fighting for there and what ultimately we seek to obtain, I 
 publicly now repeat the inquiries unsuccessfully made privately.” 3 
 
 ^Wilson’s supporters in Congress were able to give only a weak de¬ 
 fense roFTKe^aclmimstration as they- knew no more- ab out the pol icy 
 > than "did tile^nppo s ition. Those Congressmen who favored the policy 
 advocated sending more troops to save all the Czechs from the. “hell 
 of Bolshevism,” salvage every dollar of Allied equipment, and help 
 the people of Russia to get a government of their own choosing. Their 
 speeches generally ended with tirades against Bolshevism. 4 
 
 Although the Congressional debates resulted in no definite action, 
 they were not completely without effect. The debates disturbed Act¬ 
 ing Secretary Polk, who believed that American troops in North 
 Russia should be withdrawn. General March had been urging such 
 action upon him. And on February 17 Tpr^Sprrpr-iry Rakp r nn- 
 nounced that American troops would be withd rawn frnm. -North 
 ^ Russia at the earliest possible moment. 5 Polk, however, did not favor 
 withdrawing American troops from Siberia. There, the United States 
 had finally come to an arrangement with the Japanese on the opera¬ 
 tion of the railways. If troops were withdrawn, it would be impossible 
 to keep Stevens and his men there. Thus Siberia presented a more 
 complicated problem than North Russia. 6 
 
 On January 31, 1919, President Wilson decided that perhaps the 
 best method of dealing with Congress was to be completely frank. 
 He instructed Polk to request a hearing before certain Congressional 
 committees and explain the Siberian situation in complete and strict 
 
 3 Congressional Record, vol. 57, part 1, pp. 342-346. The Senate Committee on 
 Foreign Affairs also registered its intention to ask the State Department to explain its 
 policy in an executive session. Although Acting Secretary Polk thought it best to 
 agree to appear, he doubted the desirability of discussing at length the difficulties with 
 Japan (Polk to Commission to Negotiate Peace, Dec. 31, 1918, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, Paris Peace Conference, II, 483). 
 
 * Congressional Record, vol. 57, part 2, pp. 1391-1393. 
 
 0 Polk to Commission to Negotiate Peace, Dec. 31, 1918, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, Paris Peace Conference, II, 483; Polk, Confidential Diary, Dec. 14, 1918; 
 New York Times, Feb. 18, 1919. 
 
 6 Polk to Commission to Negotiate Peace, Dec. 31, 1918, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, Paris Peace Conference, II, 483. 
 
WANTED: a RUSSIAN POLICY 
 
 137 
 
 confidence. When Polk advised against the scheme, the plan was 
 dropped. However, Polk was told to take the first opportunity to in¬ 
 form Congress of the policy adopted in regard to the Siberian rail¬ 
 ways, and to stress the importance of maintaining the policy of the 
 open door with reference to the Siberian and particularly the Chinese 
 Eastern Railway. 7 
 
 Throughout 1919 public sentiment against the Bolsheviks grew~ito 
 intensity throughout the United States. Senators, congressmen, re-'j 
 spected government officials, and the newspapers described the bru-/ 
 talities of the Bolsheviks in lurid language. Porter J. McCumber,) 
 Republican Senator from North Dakota, favored “maintaining war 
 against Lenin and Trotsky, and . . . fighting the battles of the poor, 
 innocent Russian people, who are in the grasp of these damnable 
 beasts.” After reciting a long list of Bolshevik atrocities, McCumber 
 declared that “the civilization of the world demands the extermina¬ 
 tion of such beasts.” 8 Speeches such as these gained powerful sup¬ 
 porters for the intervention policy. In view of such propaganda and 
 despite strong isolationist sentiment in the Senate, Senator Johnson was 
 unable to secure the passage of a resolution demanding the with¬ 
 drawal of soldiers from Russia. 9 On the other hand, a resolution pro¬ 
 viding for the de facto recognition of the Omsk government and as¬ 
 sistance to it in overthrowing the “Bolshevist tyranny and anarchy” was 
 buried in the Committee on Foreign Relations. 10 
 
 The publication of the so-called “Sisson Documents” contributed to 
 the American feeling against Bolshevism. Edgar Sisson, the associated 
 chairman of the Committee on Public Information, had obtained 
 these documents under dramatic circumstances in Petrograd. 11 He 
 accepted them as proving that the Bolshevik government was not a 
 Russian government at all but a German government “acting solely 
 in the interests of Germany and betraying the Russian people as it 
 betrays Russia’s Allies, for the benefit of the Imperial German Gov- 
 
 7 Polk to Commission to Negotiate Peace, Feb. 4, 1919, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 248-249. 
 
 8 Congressional Record, vol. 57, part 4, p. 37455, part 5, pp. 4883-4887. Con¬ 
 gress conducted a full-scale investigation of such stories and emerged with some 
 1,200 pages of evidence which depicted Russia as a completely barbaric state. See U. S. 
 Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Brewing and Liquor Interests and 
 German and Bolshevi\ Propaganda (66th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document No. 
 61). 
 
 8 Congressional Record, vol. 57, part 2, p. 1313; Literary Digest, LX (March 1, 
 
 1919), 18. 
 
 10 Congressional Record, vol. 58, part 1, p. 157. 
 
 11 Sisson, One Hundred Red Days, pp. 358-369. 
 
138 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 ernment alone.” 12 Sisson’s report was placed in President Wilson’s 
 hands on May 9, 1918, and was released to the press on September 15, 
 1918, apparently with the President’s approval. The report was gen¬ 
 erally accepted at face value. 13 
 
 By the middle of May the weight of Congressional opinion had 
 begunTtoTuriTagainst the retention of troops in Siberia. Even The iri : 
 Cre asing ha t red o T Bolshevism" could not stem the tide of isolationism 
 
 11 The German-Bolshevik, Conspiracy (War Information Series, No. 20: Washington, 
 Oct., 1918), p. 3. 
 
 13 James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, Words That Won the War: The Story of the 
 Committee on Public Information 1917-1919 (Princeton, 1939), pp. 314-317; Sisson, 
 One Hundred Red Days, p. 366. Prior to publication, charges of forgery were made, 
 and George Creel, chairman of the Committee on Public Information, submitted the 
 documents to a committee of the National Board of Historical Service (Dr. J. Franklin 
 Jameson and Professor Samuel N. Harper), who upheld their authenticity in “every 
 essential particular" (The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy, p. 3; Baker, Woodrow Wilson, 
 VIII, 402). Professor Harper later wrote: “Professor Jameson and I had access to the 
 original documents where Sisson had such. . . . With respect to those documents which 
 we had in the original, we expressed the view that, as students of history, we would 
 accept them. We refused to express an opinion on those documents for which only 
 translations had been obtained. . .'. We flatly refused to comment on Sisson’s con¬ 
 clusions as to what the documents proved, namely, that Lenin not only had had contacts 
 with the German general staff when he journeyed across Germany but had been and still 
 was a German agent. . . . But the general view current at the time was that he had 
 declared all the documents genuine beyond any question” (Samuel N. Harper, The 
 Russia I Believe In: The Memoirs of Samuel N. Harper, 1902-1941, Chicago, 1945, 
 pp. m-112). Many attacks have since been made on the documents, some with evi¬ 
 dence, others without evidence. See Ross, Soviet Republic, p. 140; Schuman, American 
 Policy towards Russia since 1917, pp. 152-153; Mock and Larson, Words That Won 
 the War, pp. 316-320; E. H. Wilcox, Russia’s Ruin (New York, 1919), pp. 248-249; 
 W. A. Williams, American-Russian Relations, pp. 136, 154-155. President Masaryk is 
 quoted as saying in his Memoirs: “I do not know what the Americans, the English 
 and the French paid for these documents, but to anyone accustomed to dealing with 
 matters of this kind, their contents alone are sufficient to reveal that our friends had 
 purchased forgeries” (Boris Souvarine, Stalin, a Critical Survey of Bolshevism, New 
 York, 1939, p. 165). The Soviet authorities pronounced the documents to be forgeries 
 soon after their appearance (Van Santwood Merle-Smith, Third Assistant Secretary 
 of State, to Evan D. Young, American Commissioner to the Baltic Provinces, Oct. 21, 
 1921, file 861.00/76033, D.S.N.A.). Captain George A. Hill of the British Secret 
 Service later wrote: “I can say at once and definitely that the more important of these 
 are forgeries, for afterwards with Sidney Reilly’s help, I succeeded in running to earth 
 the man who forged them” (Hill, Go Spy the Land, London, 1932, p. 201). Early 
 in October of 1918, Balfour sent the President a confidential message “that English 
 experts and authorities had gone over the Sisson papers carefully and had come to the 
 conclusion that they were forgeries” (Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VIII, 402). A check of 
 the Sisson documents and the correspondence relating to them in the State Department 
 revealed that information concerning the authenticity of the documents was still being 
 sought by the department as late as 1921 (Secretary of State to Evan D. Young, Oct. 
 21, 1921, file 861.00/76033, D.S.N.A.; Ellis Loring Dresel to Secretary of State, Jan. 3, 
 1921, file 861.00/8014; Alvey A. Adee to Rudolph Forster, Executive Secretary of the 
 White House, May 24, 1921, file 861.00/86638, D.S.N.A.). 
 
WANTED: a RUSSIAN POLICY 
 
 139 
 
 which was sweeping the country. On May 20, 1919, Senator Johnson 
 presented a resolution directing the Secretary of State to inform the 
 Senate immediately of the reasons for sending American troops to 
 Siberia. 14 On June 27 the Senate by unanimous consent finally ap¬ 
 proved Senator Johnson’s resolution with amendments and addressed 
 the inquiry to the President. 15 
 
 In the meantime the President’s Russian policy was attacked in 
 the House. On May 22 Representative Mason of Illinois introduced a 
 resolution providing for the withdrawal of all American troops from 
 Russia. 16 Representative Wood of Indiana charged that American 
 troops were being kept in Siberia to protect the investments of pri¬ 
 vate American citizens in the Trans-Siberian Railway. 17 The dis¬ 
 cussion resulted in no official action. 
 
 On July 22 President Wilson replied to Senator Johnson’s resolu¬ 
 tion for information. Referring to the declaration of August 3, 1918,x 
 Wilson pointed out that American troops were sent to Siberia in order 
 to save the Czechoslovaks from destruction at the hands of “hostile 
 armies apparently organized by, and often largely composed of, ene¬ 
 my prisoners of war,” and to steady the efforts of the Russians at self- 
 defense and the establishment of law and order. Allied efforts had 
 succeeded in reuniting the separated Czechoslovak armies. The 
 President then indicated why American troops remained in Siberia 
 The United States had accepted the Japanese railway plan, which l 
 provided for an efficient operation of the Trans-Siberian and Chinese J 
 Eastern Railways, essential arteries of transportation for extending 
 economic aid to the vast population of Siberia. Since the line was 
 constantly menaced by Cossacks and Bolsheviks, military protection was 
 necessary for the engineers as well as the railways. Wilson stated 
 that such protection was a vital necessity, since the population of West 
 ern Siberia and Admiral Kolchak were entirely dependent upon the 
 railways. 18 The President’s explanation was generally accepted as 
 adequate. 19 
 
 Although President Wilson made no public reference to the diffi¬ 
 culties with Japan or the necessity for maintaining the policy of the 
 
 1 
 
 14 Congressional Record, vol. 58, part 1, pp. 63, 64. 
 
 16 Congressional Record, vol. 58, part 2, p. 1864. 
 
 18 Congressional Record, vol. 58, part 3, pp. 1783-1784. 
 
 17 Congressional Record, vol. 58, part 2, p. 1530. 
 
 18 Senate Document 60 (66th Congess, 1st Session), pp. 2-4; Congressional Record, 
 vol. 58, part 5, p. 4816. 
 
 19 For bitter attacks on the President’s explanation, see “The Crime against Russia,” 
 Nation, CIX (Aug. 2, 1919), 136; “President Masaryk on Intervention,” New Re¬ 
 public, XIX (July 23, 1919), 377. 
 
140 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 open door in Siberia and Manchuria, these were certainly basic reasons 
 for retaining American troops in Siberia. In August, 1919, Breckin¬ 
 ridge Long, Third Assistant Secretary of State, went before the House 
 Committee on Foreign Affairs and in careful detail described all of 
 the events which led to the sending of American troops to Siberia and 
 to their retention there. 20 He answered the questions of the commit¬ 
 tee fully and frankly. His testimony clearly revealed that the guiding 
 ! Motive of American policy in Siberia and Northern Manchuria had 
 been the maintenance of the open door free from Japanese imperialistic 
 designs. 21 
 
 X While Congress discussed the problem of Russia, so also did Allied 
 statesmen at the Paris Peace Conference. Many of the reasons which 
 had originally been given to justify intervention could no longer be 
 used. Thus, the Allies were faced with the task of adopting a com¬ 
 mon policy toward Russia. 
 
 From the very outset there was little unity in the views of the 
 Allies in regard to Russia. When the Russian problem was discussed 
 on January 12, 1919, Marshal Foc hu- immedi aiely_jjr ged a quickjpeace 
 with Orm any in ord&r m p^Tnir thp Allipc tn begin an anti-Bolshevik 
 'crusade. He wis hed to crush Bol^evism^TT or^TrrTtsiim ^Ameaeafl 
 troops primarily. 22 Wilson "objected. AlthoUgK~Communism was in—... 
 deed a Wrv-ial d-ingpr,” he doilhtpd whe ther it could be 
 
 c hecked by force of arms . 23 He believed that food wou ld . he the Be st ^ 
 weapon to stop Bolshevism. With this end in mind, he propose d to 
 "negotiate with the Russians. 24 Clemence au disagree d. _He believed 
 'that if thWAITies continued to furnish the various governments fight¬ 
 ing against the Bolsheviks with money, arms, and such military sup¬ 
 port as was practicable, the Soviet government would ultimately col¬ 
 lapse. 25 
 
 The lack of unity among the Associated powers in regard to Russia 
 was also noticeable among the various statesmen from the individual 
 
 20 This was in accordance with the President’s instructions (Commission to Ne¬ 
 gotiate Peace to Polk, Feb. 9, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 p. 251). 
 
 21 Statement of the Honorable Breckinridge Long before the House Committee on 
 Foreign Affairs, Aug., 1919, file 861.00, Vol. XXXIX, D.S.N.A. 
 
 22 Supreme War Council, 9th Session, Jan. 12, 1919, World War I Records of the 
 Supreme War Council, Old Records Section, Department of War, National Archives. 
 
 23 Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (3 vols.; New 
 York, 1922), I, 166. 
 
 24 Wilson to Lansing, Jan. 10, 1919, Wilson Papers, series VIII-A. 
 
 2E Barclay to Polk, Jan. 13, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 
 p. 7. 
 
WANTED: a RUSSIAN POLICY 
 
 141 
 
 nations, particularly the United States and Great Britain. Although 
 Britain had made the greatest contribution to the interventionist cause, 
 her Prime Minister, Lloyd George, more than once voiced his op¬ 
 position to the policy of intervention, and at times even advocated 
 coming to terms with the Bolsheviks. 26 On the other hand, War 
 Minister Churchill, a strong and steady advocate of maximum inter¬ 
 vention, was quite often directly opposed to the views of Lloyd 
 George. 27 He was supported by General Henry Wilson, who ad¬ 
 vocated arming Russian prisoners of war in Germany to fight against 
 the Bolsheviks. General Wilson could not understand why Lloyd 
 George was “such a fool” about Bolshevism. 28 The interventionist 
 policies of both Churchill and General Wilson were approved by Brit¬ 
 ish military representatives in Russia. A somewhat similar situation 
 existed in American councils. Ambassador Francis was implacably 
 opposed to the Soviet regime. Considering Bolshevism a disgrace to 
 civilization, he advocated its complete extermination. 29 He was con¬ 
 vinced that nothing but military intervention would cure the situation 
 in Russia. General Bliss found both Francis and Riggs, the American 
 military attache in Russia, thoroughly obsessed with this idea, and in 
 a state of mind to condemn as Bolsheviks all those who had different 
 views. 30 Consul General Poole in Moscow was also completely op¬ 
 posed to any dealings with the Bolsheviks, and agreed with Francis’s 
 views on intervention. In this respect he was supported by most of 
 the men who were close to the scene in Russia. However, these views 
 were not held by either Wilson or House, who were completely op¬ 
 posed to any further thought of intervention. They believed it had 
 only served to strengthen the cause of the Bolsheviks. 
 
 ^.The French statesmen ap p eared. , th^ mpq v iolent in the ir hatred 
 
 _ofjBe Sov 4 et regim e._ They firmly refused to have_ ajiw 3 iaISR^^ 
 
 - .the Bolsheviks. Both Fran ce and-Great_Britain.Titterly-resented the 
 Soviet repudiation of the Russian prewar debts and the confiscation of 
 
 26 Winston Churchill, The World Crisis (4 vols.; New York, 1923-1929), IV 
 (The Aftermath), 266-268. 
 
 27 Lloyd George wrote that “the most formidable and irrepressible protagonist for 
 an anti-Bolshevik war was Mr. Winston Churchill” (Lloyd George, Memoirs of the 
 Peace Conference, 2 vols.; New Haven, 1939, I, 214). 
 
 28 Callwell, Sir Henry Wilson, II, 163, 165. 
 
 28 Francis, Russia from the American Embassy, pp. 313-318. Apparently he be¬ 
 lieved that from the outset American policy had been aimed at exterminating Bolshevism. 
 At one point, he wrote, “It may be that our policy toward Russia is influenced by 
 threats of Japanese aggression or maybe Japanese invasion, but if so you have never ad¬ 
 vised me thereof” (Francis to Lansing, Jan. 11, 1919, Lansing Papers). 
 
 80 Bliss, Paris Peace Conference Diary, Feb. 3, 1919, Bliss Papers. 
 
142 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 tUl regarded as shame- 
 AE 
 
 foreignjjxoperty^ In addittoig-so me statesme . 
 
 TuT-Russia’s.- desertion-o£- 4 h c Allie s du r ing the war 
 
 AEESIgfa^the 
 , none would 
 
 
 A 4 -l+&s-were __all agre ed in their opposition to Bolshevism 
 pl edge to send additi onal troops to fight againsTit. 34 -- 
 
 As early as January 3, iqiq, t he British government~~had disp atched 
 notes to Paris, Rome. WashingtorL--aftd-- : ?okA4^sugg^stm g that~ 7 h~e 
 Allies propose_a tr uce to Adm iral K olchak, General A. I. Deniken, 
 commander-in-chief of the armed forces of South Russia, Nicholas 
 Tchaikovsky, President of the North Russian government, and the 
 Soviet authorities for the duration of the Peace Conference, and in¬ 
 vite them to send delegates to Paris. 32 
 
 The French Foreign Minister was outraged at the idea of negoti¬ 
 ating with the Soviets. He would make “no contract with crime.” 
 Attempting to explain the British proposal at a meeting of the Big 
 Five, Lloyd George pointed out that the scheme did not contemplate 
 recognition of the Soviet regime. It merely suggested a truce among 
 the various factions in Russia. 33 Once such a truce had been made, 
 representatives of the various Russian governments could be invited 
 to come to Paris to explain their positions and receive suggestions 
 from the Allies for the alleviation of their differences. To Lloyd 
 George this seemed to be the only solution to the problem. The idea 
 of suppressing Bolshevism by force was not only “pure madness” but 
 also militarily unfeasible, while the suggested project of a cordon 
 sanitaire was too inhumane for consideration since it would mean 
 the starvation of millions. In these circumstances the British proposal 
 seemed the only reasonable alternative. 34 
 
 .^Pre sident Wilson favored jhe proposal. He was confirmed in his 
 position by a report which he had just received from W. H. Buckler, 
 attache of the American Embassy at London. Just back from a con¬ 
 ference with Maxim Litvinov in Russia, Buckler reported that the 
 Soviet government was eager for permanent peace and was willing to 
 compromise on all points. 35 Wilson presented Litvinov’s peace pro- 
 
 31 Lansing to Polk, Jan. 27, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 P- 35 - 
 
 32 Barclay to Polk, Jan. 3, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 pp. 2-3. 
 
 33 Lord Bertie, British ambassador to France, pointed out that Lloyd George “would 
 not have had such a triumphant majority at the General Election if the public had 
 known his intentions at the Paris Peace Conference in regard to the Bolsheviks” (Len¬ 
 nox, Diary of Lord Bertie, II, 314). 
 
 34 United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 10-14. 
 
 3E Buckler to Lansing, Jan. 18, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 p. 15; Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, I, 225. 
 
WANTED: a RUSSIAN POLICY 
 
 143 
 
 posals to his colleagues and urged the French to swallow their pride 
 and repulsion and see the representatives of all organized Russian 
 groups. Later in the day, in deference to Clemenceau, Wilson sug¬ 
 gested that the British proposal be modified to permit the Russian 
 representatives to meet at some other place besides Paris. 36 On Jan¬ 
 uary 22 Wilson suggested as a site for the meeting Prinkipo or Prince’s 
 Island in the Sea of Marmora. The invitation, drafted by Wilsonf'pre— 
 posed a free and frank exchange of views so that the desires of all 
 groups of the Russian people might be made known and so .that an 
 agreement might be reached by means of which Russia could define 
 its own intentions and establish a basis of co-operation with other na¬ 
 tions. The invitation proposed a general armistice between the con¬ 
 tending forces in Russia and set February 15 as the date for the con¬ 
 ference. The French and Italians yielded very reluctantly to Wilson’s 
 insistence. 37 Neither Balfour nor Churchill approved of the scheme, 
 while General Wilson considered it absolutely “disgraceful.” 38 Lorck 
 Bertie recorded in his diary his belief that “Clemenceau found it ad¬ 
 visable to make a concession to the inexperience of President Wilson 
 and to the obstinacy of Lloyd George in the expectation that, even if 
 the Soviet Government accept the invitation and terms, they will not 
 observe the conditions of the invitation. This may prove a very 
 dangerous and costly way of demonstrating to Messrs. Wilson and 
 Lloyd George that they have been, to say the least, very foolish.” 39 
 
 The opposition of Churchill, Balfour, and General Wilson was 
 supported by certain members of the State Department, who con¬ 
 demned any policy which meant dealing with the Bolsheviks. 40 From 
 England Ambassador Francis presented a lengthy protest against the 
 proposal, 41 while Charge DeWitt C. Poole in Moscow offered his resig¬ 
 nation on the grounds that he could not serve under a Russian policy 
 which contained no word of condemnation for the “utter wickedness 
 and evilness” of the Bolsheviks. 42 
 
 When Acting Secretary Polk learned of the call for the Prinkipo 
 
 36 United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 18-25. 
 
 37 United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 31. 
 
 38 Call well, Sir Henry Wilson, II, 167. 
 
 39 Lennox, Diary of Lore! Bertie, II, 314-315. 
 
 40 New York Times, Jan. 24 and 25, 1919; United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, 
 Russia, pp. 32, 37-38, 44-46, 54-55. 
 
 41 United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 27-30. 
 
 42 Poole to Polk, Feb. 4, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 42. 
 Poole was urged not to resign because of the effect on the morale of American troops 
 in the Archangel district (Polk to Commission to Negotiate Peace, Feb. 7, 1919, United 
 States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 46). 
 
144 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 Conference, he pointed out that it would probably destroy the morale 
 of all parties opposing the Bolsheviks. He suggested that Lansing 
 consider the possibility of recognizing the Omsk government. “This 
 would undoubtedly strengthen it so it could withstand the crisis cre¬ 
 ated by the recent action of the Peace Conference.” Polk thought that 
 if recognition were not deemed wise, at least some statement should 
 be made to the Omsk government so as “not to entirely discourage” 
 
 .'From Siberia, Archangel, and Southern Russia the Prinkipo pro¬ 
 posal was indignantly rejected. “Under no circumstances whatever, 
 would there be any question of an exchange of ideas on this matter with 
 ^ the participation of the Bolshevists, in whom the conscience of the 
 Russian people sees only traitors.” 44 
 
 y w The Soviet reply to the Prinkipo proposal was quite conciliatory. 
 \ 1 The Bolsheviks expressed a desire to end hostilities and^begin-negetia- 
 -ti sms at once. They offered to make territori al and economic con- 
 . cessions in return for peace. M nreovejy-th ey pviru^rLiTrPadf r i ess m 
 
 make certain concessions- ir 
 
 s- finartciaf obligations. 
 
 ? 
 
 AlthougFTthey agreed to re frain from interferenc e in the internal affairs 
 
 of the Allied powers, they refused to “lim itthefreedom ot the revolu- 
 
 tionary - press^* 46- "Since The White Russian governments refused to 
 consider a conference with the Bolsheviks, and since the Bolsheviks, 
 although willing to confer, would make no specific pledges to stop 
 the advance of their armies, the Prinkipo proposal came to a lingering 
 end. 
 
 Aju 1 February 15, the deadline set for the final acceptance or rejection 
 -J$ of the Prinkipo plan, was also the date of President Wilson’s first 
 return to the United States. The day before Wilson left Paris, 
 Churchill came over from England specifically for the purpose of 
 getting the President’s views on the Russian problem. The confer¬ 
 ence sat long that day, and it was past seven by the time the Russian 
 
 \ ur 
 
 43 Polk to Lansing, Feb. i, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 pp. 38-39. 
 
 44 Russian Embassy in France to Secretariat-General of the Paris Peace Conference, 
 Feb. 12, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 53-54; New York 
 Times, Feb. 20, 1919. For replies of other Russian groups, see Cumming and Pettit, 
 Russian-American Relations, pp. 298-306. 
 
 46 Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Chicherin) to the Principal Allied and 
 Associated Governments, Feb. 4, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 pp. 39-42. Nabokov, Russian charge d’affaires in London, felt that White Russian pres¬ 
 tige had suffered by this refusal to accept the Prinkipo proposal when the Soviets had 
 appeared so eager to accept the invitation (Nabokov, The Ordeal of a Diplomat, pp. 
 286-287). 
 
WANTED: a RUSSIAN POLICY 
 
 145 
 
 item was reached. The President was actually ready to leave when 
 
 Churchill asked for some decision on Russia. What was to be the 
 policy, peace or war? Surely the President would not leave Paris 
 without answering so important a question. 46 
 
 The President was quite affable. He had a very clear opinion on 
 two points. First, h e be lieved that Allied intervention was doing 
 no good in Russia. Therefore he advocated the withdrawal of Allied 
 
 and Associated troops from all parts oFRussian territory. The second 
 
 point related to Prinkipo” The President was not opposed to an in¬ 
 
 formal meeting between American 
 
 t ives of the Bolsheviks for the purpose of securing information. 47 
 
 Wilson pointed out that since official and unofficial reports were con¬ 
 flicting, it was impossible to obtain a coherent picture of Russian 
 affairs. Some light might be cast on the subject by a meeting with 
 the Russian representatives. 
 
 Churchill agreed that the withdrawal of troops from Russia was a 
 logical and clear-cut policy. However, it would leave some five hun¬ 
 dred thousand non-Bolshevik troops at the mercy of the Bolsheviks. 
 Thus there would be no further armed resistance to the Bolsheviks in 
 Russia. All that remained then for Russia was “an interminable vista 
 of violence and misery.” 
 
 President Wilson replied that since the existing Allied troops in 
 Russia could not stop the Bolsheviks, and since none of the Allies 
 could reinforce its armies there, withdrawal seemed the best solution. 
 Moreover, even when the Allies supplied the non-Bolsheviks with arms, 
 they “made very little use of them.” Undeterred by Wilson's evident 
 lack of confidence in the anti-Bolsheviks, Churchill again raised the 
 question of arming them if the Prinkipo Conference proved a failure. 
 
 President Wilson replied that “he hesitated to express any definite 
 opinion on this question. He had explained to the Council how he 
 would act if alone. He would, however, cast in his lot with the rest.” 48 
 Churchill recorded the President’s concluding statement as follows: 
 “Nevertheless, if Prinkipo came to nothing, he would do his share with 
 the other Allies in any military measures which they considered neces- 
 
 48 Churchill, The Aftermath, pp. 173-174. 
 
 47 General Sir Henry Wilson recorded this conversation to the effect that the 
 President had stated that “(a) he would withdraw all Allied troops from Russia, and 
 (b) he would meet Bolsheviks alone at Prinkipo” (Callwell, Sir Henry Wilson, II, 
 170). 
 
 48 Minutes of the 14th Session of the Supreme War Council held in M. Pichon’s 
 Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, Feb. 14, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, 
 Russia, pp. 57-59. 
 
146 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 sary and practicable to help the Russian armies now in the field.” 49 
 
 On February 17, 1919, at the next meeting of the Supreme War 
 Council, Churchill submitted a resolution directing the military repre¬ 
 sentatives to report on the possibilities of joint military action by the 
 Associated powers to aid the White Russian armies to maintain them¬ 
 selves against Bolshevik coercion. They were also directed to report 
 on the measures and precautions necessary to safeguard Finland, 
 Esthonia, Livonia, Poland, and Romania. The American representa¬ 
 tives opposed the adoption of the resolution. 50 
 
 Greatly surprised by Churchill’s action, President Wilson registered 
 his immediate opposition. He pointed out that the views which he 
 had expressed on February 14 were only meant to convey the idea 
 that he would “take no separate action” himself. However, he was 
 not in favor of any course which did not mean the “earliest practicable 
 withdrawal of military forces.” 51 Wilson cabled House to make it 
 plain to the Allied statesmen that “we are not at war with Russia and 
 will in no circumstances that we can now foresee, take part in military 
 operations there against the Russians.” 52 
 
 yAj General Bliss immediately explained Wilson’s views to Churchill, 
 and the project was dropped. 53 In the notes which Bliss prepared for 
 discussing Churchill’s proposal, he used a rather significant argument: 
 “There can be no possible doubt that the United States will decline to 
 take part in any hostile action in Russia as long as the present general 
 conditions elsewhere exist.” 54 Japan was undoubtedy the elsewhere 
 referred to. 
 
 The next device adopted in dealing with the Russian problem was 
 the sending of a special emissary to the Soviet government. This 
 project was in line with Wilson’s views expressed on the last day of his 
 
 49 Churchill, The Ajtermath, p. 174. 
 
 50 Lansing to Polk, Feb. 17, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 pp. 68-69; Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, I, 242. 
 
 61 Wilson to Commission to Negotiate Peace, Feb. 19, 1919, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 71-72. 
 
 62 Seymour, Intimate Papers, IV, 348. Lloyd George also protested against 
 Churchill’s project (Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, I, 243-244). 
 
 63 Commission to Negotiate Peace to Polk, Feb. 23, 1919, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 73; Seymour, Intimate Papers, IV, 348. Lieut. General 
 Walter Bedell Smith, ambassador to Russia from 1946 to 1949, reported a conversation 
 with Stalin in which he asked why Stalin thought any power or group of powers was 
 a threat to the U.S.S.R. “Churchill,” Stalin replied. “He tried to instigate war against 
 Russia, and persuaded the United States to join him in an armed occupation against 
 part of our territory in 1919. Lately he has been at it again” (Smith, My Three Years 
 in Moscow, Philadelphia, 1950, p. 52). 
 
 54 Bliss to House, Feb. 17, 1919, Bliss Papers. Not sent. 
 
WANTED: a RUSSIAN POLICY 
 
 147 
 
 stay in Paris. The immediate idea evidently originated with Lincoln 
 Steffens, who conveyed it to his friend, Colonel House. The pro¬ 
 posal took shape on February 18, 1919, when Lansing ordered William 
 C. Bullitt, a member of the staff of the American delegation at Paris, 
 to go to Moscow. He was to make a report on the general situation 
 in Russia, and find out what peace conditions were acceptable to the 
 Soviet government. 55 The mission was to be a secret from all except 
 the British delegation. Bullitt discussed the matter with Phillip Kerr, 
 Lloyd George’s secretary, who informed him of the British point, of 
 
 view. Both Great Britain and the United States agreed on an outline 
 of peace terms for the Soviet government. The terms included cessa¬ 
 tion of hostilities on all fronts, continued occupation by the de facto 
 governments of the territory which they controlled, free right of entry 
 into Soviet Russia for Allied subjects, general amnesty to all political 
 prisoners on both sides, restoration of trade relations and the with¬ 
 drawal of Allied troops. 56 
 
 Bullitt reached Petrograd on March 8. He was accompanied by 
 Walter W. Pettit, R. E. Lynch, and Lincoln Steffens. After a week 
 in Russia he returned to Paris with a document containing the terms 
 of peace which the Soviet government pledged itself to accept. The 
 terms differed from the British desires only in a few particulars. 57 Be¬ 
 lieving that they constituted a practicable basis for peace between the 
 Soviet government and the Allied powers, Bullitt wrote a moving plea 
 to Colonel House: “You must do your utmost for it, for if you had 
 seen the things I have seen during the past week and talked with men 
 I have talked with, I know that you would not rest until you had put 
 through this peace.” 58 
 
 The American peace commissioners as well as Lloyd George seemed 
 favorably impressed. According to Bullitt’s testimony before the 
 Senate Committee, Colonel House, Secretary Lansing, General Bliss, 
 and Henry White thought it desirable to attempt to bring about 
 peace on the basis of the Moscow proposition. Bullitt was instructed 
 
 C5 William C. Bullitt, Bullitt Mission to Russia ; Testimony before the Committee on 
 Foreign Relations, United States (New York, 1919), p. 4. Steffens reported that 
 House first proposed the idea, Lloyd George planned the visit, while Bullitt's instructions 
 came from House and Lloyd George (Steffens, Autobiography, New York, 1931, pp. 
 790-791). 
 
 r ’° Bullitt, Testimony, pp. 35-37. The Commission to Negotiate Peace informed 
 Polk of the mission, describing it as unofficial and for information only (Feb. 24, 1919, 
 United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 74). Instructions for the mission 
 can be found in Senate Document 106 (66th Congress, 1st Session), p. 1234. 
 
 Gumming and Pettit, Russian-American Relations, pp. 317, 320. 
 
 68 Bullitt to House, March 18 (?), 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, 
 Russia, p. 84. 
 
148 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 by Colonel House to draft a proposal to the Soviet government similar 
 to theirs. 59 The day after Bullitt’s return he breakfasted with Lloyd 
 George, who thought Bullitt’s report of the “utmost importance.” 
 However, he did not know what to do with it in the face of British 
 public opinion, which was hysterical on the subject of Russia. He 
 admitted that all reports received from the people they had sent in for 
 information purposes were similar to Bullitt’s. If someone known 
 to the world as an archconservative made a report similar to Bullitt’s, 
 Lloyd George believed it might be accepted by the British people. 
 Balfour also favored the proposal. 60 
 
 Although Lloyd George and Balfour were sympathetic to Bullitt’s 
 report, President Wilson did not express his viewpoint to Bullitt di¬ 
 rectly. Bullitt made every effort to secure official approval to the 
 Soviet proposals but no action was taken on them. April 10, the 
 deadline set by the Soviet government, passed and Bullitt resigned in 
 disgust, bitterly criticizing both Wilson and the Peace Conference. 61 
 
 The reasons for the death of the Bullitt proposal could be seen in 
 the rise of a Soviet government in Hungary, led by Bela Kun, and 
 Kolchak’s successful advance toward the Volga in March and April. 62 
 The French government and press were overjoyed at Kolchak’s vic¬ 
 tories and joyfully predicted an early destruction of the Bolshevik 
 regime. At the same time Lloyd George attempted to convince Parlia¬ 
 ment of the necessity for sending immediate aid to the White Russi¬ 
 ans. 63 Thus was inaugurated a new program for solving Russia’s ills: 
 aid to, and recognition of the Kolchak regime. 
 
 50 Bullitt, Testimony, pp. 65-73. 
 
 60 Bullitt, Testimony, p. 67. 
 
 61 Both Phillip Kerr and Lloyd George denounced Bullitt’s testimony before the 
 Senate as a “tissue of lies.” New York Times, Sept. 16, 1919. 
 
 62 William H. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, igij-1921 (2 vols.; New 
 York, 1935), II, 60; Bullitt, Testimony, pp. 90-91. The vacillations in Allied policy 
 toward Russia were cleverly described by Churchill: “The fitful and fluid operations of 
 the Russian armies found a counterpart in the policy, or want of policy, of the Allies. 
 Were they at war with Soviet Russia? Certainly not; but they shot Soviet Russians at 
 sight. They stood as invaders on Russian soil. They armed the enemies of the Soviet 
 Government. They blockaded its ports, and sunk its battleships. They earnestly 
 desired and schemed its downfall. But war—shocking! Interference—shame! It was, 
 they repeated, a matter of indifference to them how Russians settled their own affairs. 
 They were impartial—Bang! And then—parley and try to trade” (Churchill, The 
 Aftermath, pp. 243-244). 
 
 63 Great Britain, House of Commons Debates, fifth series, CXIV, 2936-2943. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 Kolchak and the Allies 
 
 S SOON AS Kolchak established his government at Omsk in 
 
 ■*- ^-November, 1918, the State Department was besieged with pleas 
 from American representatives in Asia advocating support and assist¬ 
 ance to the new government. Many members of the State Department 
 favored the idea. President Wilson, however, still expressed opposition 
 to any active intervention in the internal affairs of Russia. France 
 and Great Britain had no such scruples to bind them. Early in 1919 
 Great Britain expressed its “warmest sympathy” with the Kolchak 
 cause, while the French government expressed to Omsk its pleasure at 
 Kolchak’s recent union with General Denikin in Southern Russia. 1 
 These sentiments pointed to the hope of eventual recognition of the 
 Omsk government. 
 
 On January 2 Consul General Harris at Irkutsk recommended that " 
 the United States government lend “friendly sympathy and assistance” 
 to the Omsk government in its attempts to “restore law and order” in 
 Siberia. 2 Harris believed that assistance to Kolchak was the best means 
 of combating Bolshevism, which he regarded as a “real world danger.” 
 He recommended that the Allies deal with Bolshevism not as a Russian 
 problem, but as a world problem. He added that “unless a systematic 
 and definite military campaign is launched against it, there can be no 
 such thing as peace. Half hearted measures will not suffice.” 3 
 
 Secretary Lansing questioned the expediency of either recognizing 
 the Kolchak government or committing the United States to an ex¬ 
 tensive military undertaking in Siberia. However, he saw nothing 
 contradictory in making a declaration which reiterated America’s re- 
 
 1 Reinsch to Polk, Jan. 23 (?), 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 PP- 327-329- 
 
 2 Polk to Commission to Negotiate Peace, Jan. 2, 1919, United States, Foreign Rela¬ 
 tions, 1919, Russia, p. 322. 
 
 3 Harris to Polk, Jan. 16, 1919, file 861.00/3666, D.S.N.A. 
 
150 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 fusal to interfere in Russian internal affairs, and at the same time 
 promised assistance to Kolchak in the form of economic and financial 
 aid and military supplies. * * * 4 Although Polk agreed with Lansing’s 
 views, he felt that before the Allies took any further steps, the United 
 States should define its attitude toward the Bolsheviks, decide how far 
 it was prepared and able to go in supporting the elements of law and 
 order, and determine what funds for military supplies could be used 
 for granting aid. The most important step was control of the rail¬ 
 roads. As soon as the railroad plan went through, the Allies could 
 decide on the next step. 5 In the meantime the State Department would 
 have to move slowly because Congress was becoming quite concerned 
 about the policy in Russia. While the State Department discussed the 
 possibility of lending assistance to Kolchak, the Red Cross, the YMCA, 
 and the War Trade Board were rendering effective aid and assistance 
 1 to the people of Siberia. The consular service was co-operating with 
 \ these three institutions. 6 7 
 
 While Harris pleaded for assistance to Kolchak, Arthur Bullard, 
 director of the Russian Division of the Committee on Public In¬ 
 formation, urged Colonel House to oppose the extension of formal 
 recognition to Kolchak, whose personality, he said, was of small sig¬ 
 nificance. Bullard reported that Kolchak was “surrounded and de¬ 
 pendent on the support of reactionary elements whose principal idea of 
 government is the reconquest of former grafts. His army is being 
 organized on old lines of Tsarist discipline. Several units have already 
 revolted against brutality of officers.” Furthermore, his vengeance 
 against the Bolsheviks was as red as the Bolshevik terror in Moscow. 1 
 These , dive rgent reports concernin g Kolchak in creased—the—difficulty 
 in formulating”a Siberian policyT_ 
 
 As the negotiations over the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern 
 
 Railways neared completion, the movement to recognize Kolchak 
 gained momentum. On February 26 the British Foreign Office ex¬ 
 
 plained its attitude. It praised the Allied intervention policy in the 
 Far East for preventing the extension of enemy activities to Siberia. 
 Unfortunately, the Armistice had not affected the Soviet government. 
 
 4 Lansing to Polk, Jan. 8, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 
 323 - 
 
 5 Polk to Lansing, Jan. 11, T919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 p. 325. 
 
 6 Reinsch to Polk, Jan. 15 (?), 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 PP- 325-326. 
 
 7 MacMurray to Polk, Jan. 23, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 p. 327. 
 
KOLCHAK AND THE ALLIES 
 
 151 
 
 “which continued their efforts to overwhelm the friendly Russian forces 
 opposed to them and to bring the whole country under their dis¬ 
 astrous sway.” Admitting that affairs in Siberia were complicated by 
 indecision on the part of the Allies, and by the divergent interests of 
 the various Russian groups in Siberia , His M ajesty’s governm ent be- 
 lieved that its paramount consideration was loyalty to the Russian 
 forces opposing the Bolsheviks. The anti-Bolsheviks ha d co-operate d 
 with the British as soon as troops had- been, dis patche d to Siberia. 
 Therefore thcTBritish could not withdraw support from their forces at 
 a critical stage in their operations simply because the primary Allied 
 objectives had been achieved. Moreover, since Great Britain had con¬ 
 sistently supported the government of Admiral Kolchak, she considered 
 it essential that whatever the eventual outcome of the deliberations in 
 Paris regarding the Russian Soviet government, the Allies should co¬ 
 operate in taking all measures necessary to support the Kolchak gov¬ 
 ernment. Both Harris and Poole supported British representations. 8 
 
 In its formal reply to the British note, the State Department ex¬ 
 pressed its sympathy with the Kolchak government but added that it 
 was not “disposed to afford formal recognition.” The note continued 
 rather vaguely: 
 
 The American Government has been glad, however, to participate in the 
 measures taken to reorganize and repair the Trans-Siberian Railway which 
 is believed will make possible the transport of needed supplies. Support 
 to this extent is being given and the American Government is disposed 
 to continue such support and desires that peace and order shall be main¬ 
 tained throughout Siberia. 9 
 
 The American reply did not satisfy all the members of the State 
 Department. The acting chief of the Russian Division, who urged 
 immediate recognition of Kolchak, wrote, “My view has not changed 
 since 1917; that we should support any reputable and sound elements 
 of order wherever they may be found. You cannot expect the Russians 
 to work out their own salvation if you refuse to give them a fair 
 start.” 10 D. C. Poole, later chief of the Russian Division, added his 
 plea for recognition of Kolchak. He pointed out: 
 
 Its main effects would be to give clear definition and therefore strength 
 to Allied policy in Russia and to deal a heavy moral blow to the Bolshe¬ 
 viks. . . . Every blow struck at the Moscow Government is a blow as 
 
 8 Davis to Lansing, March i, 1919, file 861.00/3976, D.S.N.A. 
 
 8 Commission to Negotiate Peace to Polk, April 1, 1919, file 861.00/4195, D.S.N.A. 
 
 10 Miles to Lansing, April 15, 1919, file 861.77/791 Vi, D.S.N.A. 
 
152 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 necessary and as potent for decency, justice and liberty in the world as those 
 which have been struck on the western front. 11 
 
 ,_ The ag itation for mi litary _jid-te Kulihak caused Sici e tary B aker 
 
 •gfave co ncern. He believed that “if Congress and the people want war 
 to beinaclerupon Bolshevism by force of arms,” it should be under¬ 
 taken “by such a force as would enable us to be independent of any 
 Japanese, Chinese or Russian allies.” He did not think American 
 troops should be permitted to come under the command of the Jap¬ 
 anese commander-in-chief. Of this much Baker was convinced: 
 “Either General Graves should be directed to cooperate with the 
 Kolchak government or he ought to be withdrawn.” 12 
 
 Baker’s views were not shared by the State Department, which 
 was assisting the Russian forces in its own way. Ever since American 
 troops had entered Vladivostok, the American government had been 
 lending its good offices to the Russian Embassy in shipping Russian 
 rifles and boots, railway material, and other military equipment to 
 Siberia. These materials had been consigned to General Ivanov- 
 Rinov for use on the Volga front and in Siberia. The American Peace 
 Commission was evidently unacquainted with these activities, for Polk 
 was questioned concerning the kind of military equipment being sent 
 to the authorities, and the purpose for which it was being used. The 
 Acting Secretary of State immediately answered that along with the 
 American “efforts to aid the Czecho-Slovak armies it seemed proper 
 to cooperate in measures to strengthen the Russians who were acting 
 with them.” 13 
 
 The State Department continued to consider the recognition of 
 Kolchak. Lansing instructed Consul Harris, Admiral Rodgers, Gen¬ 
 eral Graves, Consul Caldwell, and Charles H. Smith of the Railway 
 Commission to pool their views on the question. The conferees all 
 agreed that Kolchak appeared to be sincerely committed to the good 
 of Russia. Moreover, his movement was increasing in strength. Al¬ 
 though he was surrounded by a number of reactionaries, he probably 
 represented the most acceptable type of man Russia had available. The 
 conferees believed that the Siberian picture would be considerably im¬ 
 proved by some form of encouragement to Kolchak outside of actual 
 
 11 Poole to Polk, May 7, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 
 343 - 344 - 
 
 12 Bliss to Wilson, May 9, 1919, Wilson Papers, series VI 1 I-A. 
 
 13 Commission to Negotiate Peace to Phillips, March 23, 1919, Phillips to Commission 
 to Negotiate Peace, March 27, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 
 331 - 
 
KOLCHAK AND THE ALLIES 
 
 153 
 
 recognition. 14 They also urged financial and material support given 
 openly and not as the Japanese were doing through secret gifts of 
 arms to Semenov and Kalmikov. In addition, they advocated an agree¬ 
 ment on the part of the Allies to refrain from assisting or supporting 
 any of the Cossack factions embarrassing Kolchak. They felt that 
 every means short of force should be taken to weaken the strength of 
 these reactionary Cossack leaders. The conferees also expressed their 
 views on the attitude of the other powers in Siberia. Not only was 
 there a divergence of views between the Japanese military party and 
 the incumbent Japanese government, but it appeared that both the 
 English and French military representatives in Siberia personally had 
 very reactionary views on Russian politics and were not in harmony 
 with the representatives of their own governments on the Inter-Allied 
 Committee. Consequently the governments of England and France 
 did not get clear-cut views on affairs in Siberia. The American repre¬ 
 sentatives believed that “if the powers will unify the expression of 
 views by their respective representatives, the Inter-Allied Railway Com¬ 
 mittee will be able to arrive at harmonious decisions promotive of their 
 law, order, good feeling, and prosperity in Siberia.” 15 Ambassador 
 Morris was in general agreement with these views. Although he be¬ 
 lieved that Kolchak should be treated encouragingly, he hesitated to 
 suggest even a de facto recognition of the Omsk government, as he had 
 serious doubts concerning its permanency. 16 
 
 Throughout April the State Department considered the advisability 
 of a provisional recognition of Kolchak. It was encouraged in its de¬ 
 liberations by Kolchak’s recent successes. On April 29 Acting Secre¬ 
 tary Polk asked Ambassador Morris if he were willing to modify his 
 opinion concerning recognition in view of Kolchak’s substantial suc¬ 
 cesses. 17 Morris replied: 
 
 If^Great Britain and France decide to reco g ni ze the^Kolchak Govern¬ 
 ment!""think we - should do likewise and urge similar action by Japan. 
 Unity ot action in Siberia is more impor tant than the character of the 
 action. L rankly I would preter to see recognition postponed until the 
 Kolchak Government shows more willingness to define its purposes and 
 policy and less subserviency to reactionary influence. If, however, the 
 
 14 Stevens also urged some measure of recognition to the Siberian government in 
 order to strengthen its hand (Polk to Commission to Negotiate Peace, May 6, 1919, 
 United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 339). 
 
 15 Morris to Department of State, April 19, 1919, file 861.00/4332, D.S.N.A. 
 
 16 Morris to Polk, April 12, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 PP- 331 - 332 - 
 
 17 United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 337. 
 
154 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 Associated Governments decide that the general situation in Russia as a 
 whole calls for recognition of a Siberian Government, [it is] important 
 that a statement will be first obtained from Kolchak and his colleagues 
 defining their own position on the fundamental issues of the revolution, 
 the land problem, the state of self-government, freedom of speech and 
 uncensored communication and the calling as soon as practicable of a con¬ 
 stituent assembly . 18 
 
 Morris’s views in conjunction with other reports received from 
 Siberia bore out Polk’s personal opinion that all governments concerned 
 in the railway plan should recognize Omsk as the de facto government 
 in Siberia and in all other parts of Russia that might be brought under 
 its control. He felt that if the Omsk government knew recognition was 
 at hand it would willingly provide for the convening of a Constituent 
 Assembly at the earliest practicable date and provide for other demo¬ 
 cratic safeguards. 19 
 
 President Wilson apparently did not share Polk’s views. Troubled 
 by the entire Siberian situation, he presented his problem to the Coun¬ 
 cil of Four. He pointed out that although the United States did not 
 believe in Kolchak, the British and French military representatives in 
 Siberia were supporting him. Kolchak, who regarded American 
 soldiers as neutrals, was quite irritated by their presence on the rail¬ 
 way. Moreover, the Cossacks were antagonistic to American soldiers. 
 Wilson suspected that the Japanese would be glad to see a collision be¬ 
 tween the two groups. In these circumstances, Wilson believed that 
 the United States must either take sides wth Kolchak and send a 
 much stronger force to Siberia, or withdraw. If the United States 
 aided Kolchak and increased its forces in Siberia, Japan would increase 
 hers still more. If American troops continued merely to guard the 
 railroad and to maintain a neutral position, Wilson was advised that 
 collisions would occur, which might result in actual war. If American 
 troops were withdrawn, Siberia would be left to the Japanese and 
 Kolchak, who was supported by the Allies. The President’s dilemma 
 was quite evident. Although he favored a neutral policy toward 
 Russia and Siberia, at the same time he did not wish to withdraw 
 American soldiers from Siberia and leave Japan in control of the sit¬ 
 uation. This would mean an end to the cherished open-door policy. 
 Personally, Wilson had always believed that the proper policy for the 
 
 18 Polk to Commission to Negotiate Peace, May 6, 1919, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 339-340. 
 
 18 Polk to Commission to Negotiate Peace, May 6, 1919, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 340-341. 
 
KOLCHAK AND THE ALLIES 155 
 
 Allied and Associated powers was “to clear out of Russia and leave it 
 to the Russians to fight it out among themselves.” 20 
 
 On May 20 the Council of Four again attempted to devise a Russian 
 policy. Wilson pointed out that the only reason America had gone 
 into Siberia was to get the Czechs out and then they refused to go. 
 Lloyd George replied that the British had gone in to reconstitute the 
 Eastern Front and now that they had succeeded in doing this, they 
 could not leave the loyal Russians in the lurch. Wilson believed that' 
 if the Allies continued to support Kolchak, they should at least se¬ 
 cure democratic pledges from him. The Council of Four finally de¬ 
 cided to draft a letter stating the conditions under which the Allies 
 would continue to help certain of the Russian governments. 21 
 
 On May 26 the Council of Four addressed a formal note to Ad¬ 
 miral Kolchak explaining Allied policy toward Russia and making a 
 conditional offer of further assistance. Declaring that it had always 
 been a cardinal policy of the Allied governments not to interfere in 
 the internal affairs of Russia, the Council added that their original in¬ 
 tervention was for the dual purpose of aiding those Russians who 
 wished to continue the struggle against Germany andjx) rescue the 
 Czechs who faced destruction at the hands of the Bolshevrk si In di-~ 
 rect contradiction to its first statement the note then indicated that 
 since the Armistice Allied forces and supplies had been kept in various 
 parts of Russia at considerable cost. Blaming the Soviet government 
 for the failure of the Peace Conference to bring peace and food relief 
 to Russia, the note stated that the Allied and Associated powers were 
 prepared to continue their assistance to the anti-Bolsheviks under 
 certain conditions. Among the assurances requested were~pledges that 
 a freely elected cd’nstitutent assembly would be convoked as soon as 
 '"Kolchak reached MoscowKtKaFnu attempt wtmkT-be made torestore 
 the special class pr ivileg es - dFThe~C2aTrsr regfnTC7~that''Russia's debts 
 would be recognized, and that the new democratic government of 
 Russia would Ihln the League~of T^fations-and_co-operat& with it in 
 tHe~setdemenC "Of Russia's relations with the boidurTEatesancT thcTimt- 
 tation of armaments.*" 
 
 20 Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des Etats-Unis, 
 Paris, May 9, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 345-347. 
 
 21 Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House, May 20, 1919, United 
 States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 351-353. 
 
 22 United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 367-370; New York Times, 
 June 13, 1919. The proposal to force Kolchak to make certain democratic pledges 
 in return for recognition aroused considerable protest in certain Western reactionary 
 groups friendly to the Kolchak government (Coates and Coates, Armed Intervention 
 in Russia, p. 214). 
 
156 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 On June 4 Kolchak sent a carefully worded affirmative reply which 
 generally complied with the Allied conditions. He acknowledged the 
 national debt and disavowed any intention of restoring the old regime. 
 However, he added that the final sanction of all the decisions taken in 
 the name of Russia rested with the Constituent Assembly. 23 On 
 June 12 his reply was accepted by Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, 
 and Baron Nobuaki Makino. The promised aid was dispatched with¬ 
 out delay. 24 
 
 Since the joint action taken by the Supreme Council in respect to 
 Kolchak still left open the question of formal recognition, President 
 Wilson instructed Ambassador Morris to proceed to Omsk to de¬ 
 termine whether Kolchak deserved recognition. The President was 
 also “desirous that Ambassador Morris should so utilize his visit to 
 Omsk as to impress upon the Japanese Government our great interest 
 in the Siberian situation and our intention to adopt a definite policy 
 which will include the ‘open door’ to Russia, free from Japanese dom¬ 
 ination.” 25 
 
 In accordance with his instructions, Morris arrived at Vladivostok 
 on July 11, and arranged to have General Graves accompany him on 
 his mission. 26 They arrived at Omsk at a very serious moment. The 
 people and government of Omsk had evidently misunderstood the 
 nature and extent of the assistance which the Allies were willing to 
 grant. They lamented the fact that the Allies had not sent fifty 
 thousand troops to their assistance when the Czechs were in possession 
 of Samara and Kazan in October of 1918. They also criticized the 
 Prinkipo proposal, which had greatly discouraged the anti-Bolsheviks. 
 Moreover, the failure of the Allies to grant recognition had resulted in 
 
 23 United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 375-378; New York Times, 
 June 14, 1919. 
 
 24 Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House, June 2, 1919, United States, 
 Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 379. For American attempts to live up to tthe 
 agreement to support Kolchak, see United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 
 38 i- 453 - 
 
 26 Wilson to Polk, June 24, 1919, Wilson Papers, series VIII-A; Phillips to Morris, 
 June 30, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 388. On the next 
 day Wilson wrote to Lansing, “I think that we should omit no step by which we 
 can get nearer to the situation in Siberia and know more clearly what we are about” 
 (June 25, 1919, Wilson Papers, series VIII-A). The State Department had been in¬ 
 formed by Minister Reinsch in China that “one of the chief motives for Japanese sup¬ 
 port is their desire to secure extensive concessions in the mineral and other resources 
 of Manchuria. It is stated that it is believed that the gold resources of the Upper 
 Amur river alone are sufficient, if developed properly, to pay off the entire Russian Na¬ 
 tional debt” (Reinsch to Department of State, May 9, 1919, file 861.00/4726, D.S.N.A.). 
 
 28 Morris to Acting Secretary of State, July 10, 1919, United States, Foreign Rela¬ 
 tions, 1919, Russia, p. 389. 
 
KOLCHAK AND THE ALLIES 
 
 157 
 
 a depressing reaction. There was no enthusiasm among the people 
 for recruiting. The morale of the soldiers had deteriorated until they 
 were completely demoralized at the front. An order had been issued 
 to retreat, which would mean the sacrifice of several Siberian towns. 
 Omsk itself was threatened. 27 The situation was made worse by the^A 
 attitude of the Czechs, who desired to return home immediately. Mor¬ 
 ris believed that if their wish was not granted, the men might take 
 matters into their own hands and possibly negotiate with the Bolshe-^ 
 viks for a safe conduct through European Russia. At any rate, Morris 
 was convinced that they could not be relied upon for assistance after 
 November of 1919. Without the Czechs or other military guard, the 
 railway could not be operated beyond Irkutsk. 28 
 
 Morris painted a depressing picture of the conditions observed en 
 route to Omsk: 
 
 I had expected to find on approaching Omsk a considerable sentiment 
 in favor of Kolchak, or at least an anti-Bolshevik sentiment. I must re¬ 
 port, however, that the Kolchak government has failed to command the 
 confidence of anybody in Siberia except a small discredited group of re¬ 
 actionaries, Monarchists and former military officials. It is the judgment 
 of all with whom I have conferred,—representative Czechs, British and 
 French military officers, our own railway-service men, Allied Consuls, and 
 even thoughtful and moderate Russians such as the Orthodox Bishop at 
 Krasnoyarsk and Kolchak’s appointed governor of the Province of 
 Tomsk,—that the withdrawal of the Czechs would be a signal for a 
 formidable anti-Kolchak if not pro-Bolshevik uprising in every town on 
 the railway from Irkutsk to Omsk . 29 
 
 Members of the Omsk government were aware of the conditions 
 described by Ambassador Morris. Sookine, now Acting Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs of the Omsk government, admitted the extreme seri¬ 
 ousness of the military situation, but hoped for an improvement in the 
 future. Sookine referred to the “persistent scare” of Japan and to the 
 
 2 ‘ Rcinsch to Acting Secretary of State, July 14 (?), 1919, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 390-391. 
 
 28 Morris to Acting Secretary of State, July 22, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 
 1919, Russia, p. 395. 
 
 28 Morris to Acting Secretary of State, July 22, 1919, United States, Foreign Rela¬ 
 tions, 1919, Russia, p. 395. As Ambassador Morris left Tomsk, he said to General 
 Graves: ‘‘You and I have been much criticized because of our attitude towards the 
 Kolchak regime; it has been repeatedly said we have the Far Eastern orientation and 
 that if we would come West, we would find an entirely different situation after we 
 left Irkutsk; and with all the people questioned by us and, through the interpreters,, 
 we have not found a single individual who spoke a good word for the Kolchak 
 regime" (Graves, America’s Siberian Adventure, pp. 216-217). 
 

 158 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 efforts of Japanese officials to discredit American activities. Frankly 
 acknowledging that Semenov was under Japanese control, he added 
 that Kolchak had only nominal authority over him. It was the Jap¬ 
 anese representatives who had urged Semenov’s promotion to a full 
 generalship, and their “request” had to be granted immediately. Al¬ 
 though Sookine pointed out that there was bitter resentment among all 
 classes of Russians against the American policy of neutrality in Si¬ 
 beria, he expressed his personal conviction that Russia’s future must 
 be worked out in harmony with the progressive forces represented by 
 Great Britain and the United States. 30 
 
 In conducting his inquiries, Morris was proceeding on three as¬ 
 sumptions, which were not refuted by the State Department: first, that 
 the action of the Supreme Council definitely and finally placed the 
 United States and its associates in opposition to Bolshevism; second, 
 that there was still a reasonable hope that the Kolchak movement 
 would survive the present military crisis; third, that in such an event, 
 the United States was prepared to give its help and support if prac¬ 
 ticable means could be devised. 31 
 
 As Ambassador Morris continued his investigations, he conferred 
 with the British and French military leaders in Siberia, Generals Knox 
 and Janin. Both generals stated with brutal frankness the difficulties 
 mej^in delivering supplies to the Kolchak army during the last eight 
 Months. They reported that “the army staff and supply departments 
 ^vere completely disorganized, inefficient, corrupt and unsettled; that 
 /personal ambition, jealousy and intrigue prevailed; and that repeated 
 appeals to the Admiral to correct the abuses had been without result 
 because in their judgment he was powerless to act.” ^hey_|eltkwould 
 he useless tn rnntinne fn rthr r ship rnpr U ' 1 nnppliar nriTec<s thfATT ier 
 go vernments were “prepared to exercise supervision and control not 
 onlv over the distribution hnr nls p over the organization of the_ ajrmv 
 jfselfi” Admitting that the criticisms were just, if slightly exaggerated, 
 -theT 5 msk Minister for Foreign Affairs and his colleagues agreed that 
 they would not oppose in principle any plan for the supervision of dis¬ 
 tribution. All the experts present, including General Graves, agreed 
 that some plan of supervision was essential. They differed, however, 
 as/ to the nature and extent of the supervision. 32 
 
 j Morris to Lansing, July 24, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 pp. 396-398. 
 
 31 Morris to Lansing, July 27, 1919, file 861.00/4931, D.S.N.A.; Long to Lansing, 
 Aug. 14, 1919, Long Papers. 
 
 32 Morris to Lansing, July 31, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 pp. 401-402. 
 
KOLCHAK AND THE ALLIES 
 
 159 
 
 On August 4 Morris submitted his report on the personnel of the 
 Kolchak government. He believed that Kolchak was an honest, 
 courageous, and narrow-minded patriot of limited experience in public 
 affairs and small administrative ability. Although a dictator in name, 
 he exercised little influence on his Council of Ministers. Despite his 
 good intentions, he had little or no knowledge of the political and eco¬ 
 nomic dangers which threatened his government. In this respect he 
 had little help from his Council of Ministers. Although probably as 
 representative as Sibera could produce, the civilian members were all 
 young and inexperienced, while nothing favorable could be said of 
 the military members and the officers of the General Staff, who, as a 
 body, were intolerant, reactionary, and corrupt. Commenting on the 
 strength of the Kolchak government, Morris reported: “The Govern¬ 
 ment has failed in administration; has failed in the organization of 
 the army; has failed to retain the confidence of the moderate groups.” 
 Still it had elements of strength. In the first place, no one doubted the 
 Admiral’s patriotism or honesty of purpose. In spite of the intrigue 
 around him he still retained a large measure of sympathy and respect. 
 In the second place, despite its helplessness, the Kolchak government 
 was the only one around which those opposed to Bolshevism could 
 rally. The choice, therefore, which confronted every moderate in 
 Siberia was either Kolchak or Bolshevism. 33 However, Morris believed 
 that the Kolchak government was not sufficiently strong to rescue 
 Russia from the grip of Bolshevism. Furthermore, Morris was con¬ 
 vinced that “only drastic changes in its personnel and methods would 
 render it equal to such a task, no matter how much support the Allied 
 governments might give it.” 34 
 
 On August 11 Morris telegraphed his final recommendations. 
 Briefly, he believed that with Allied assistance and counsel, the Kolchak 
 government might be so strengthened as ultimately to be able to rescue 
 the Russian people from the Bolshevik tyranny. There were certain 
 steps necessary to insure that success. These included the formal recog¬ 
 nition of Kolchak and his associates as the Provisional government of 
 Russia, the extension of some two hundred million dollars in military, 
 commercial, and railway credits, the stabilization of non-Bolshevik cur¬ 
 rency, the continuation of the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement, and 
 the dispatch of forty thousand additional troops to take the place of 
 
 33 Morris to Lansing, Aug. 4, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, igig, Russia, 
 pp. 403 - 405 - 
 
 34 Morris to Lansing, Aug. 8, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, tgtg, Russia, 
 pp. 407-408. 
 
i6o America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 the Czechs. Moreover, an Allied military supply committee and a 
 committee of commercial experts were necessary to provide an honest 
 and efficient use of credits and distribution of supplies. Finally, Mor¬ 
 ris recommended that the United States appoint a diplomatic repre¬ 
 sentative and certain other experts to help and advise the Omsk gov¬ 
 ernment. In conclusion, Ambassador Morris emphasized that no plan 
 would be successful unless it included at least the formal recognition of 
 Kolchak, a grant of credits, and the dispatch of twenty-five thousand 
 American troops to assist in guarding the railway. He added, “Un¬ 
 less our policy includes all of these measures, we can do little if any¬ 
 thing to help Russia by way of Siberia and we will be forced to 
 abandon eastern Siberia to Japanese domination.” 35 
 
 On August 16 Morris, fearing that he had perhaps emphasized too 
 strongly the weaknesses of the Kolchak government, informed the 
 State Department that it was the best, perhaps the only available, agency 
 through which the United States could give its promised aid to Russia. 
 Morris elaborated further: 
 
 Perhaps I am too close to see the Russian situation clearly in its true 
 
 E portions, but I am sure that whatever the outcome of this crisis may 
 the Kolchak government cannot continue without the open support of 
 government. To come to its aid in the hour of discouragement and 
 defeat is, I admit, to take a great risk: But it is also to take advantage of a 
 great opportunity. If the Kolchak government should collapse we could 
 not be worse off than if we stood and waited for the event. On the other 
 
 : 
 
 hand, if by our timely and active service Kolchak should survive, we should 
 be in a preeminent position to assist and even to lead in the reconstruction 
 v of Russia, to maintain the “open door” now in imminent peril of being 
 closed, and to preserve the integrity of Siberia. 36 
 
 The State Department gave careful consideration to Morris’s recom¬ 
 mendations. Long pointed out that the only part of the program which 
 could be effected without going to Congress was the recognition of 
 the Kolchak government. As Long saw it, here was an opportunity 
 for the President to condemn Bolshevism and to place squarely before 
 Congress the burden of future aid for Russia. 37 The President, how¬ 
 ever, had already ac.ted on one part of Morris’s program. On August 
 8, in response to a direct inquiry by Clemenceau, the President had 
 stated that the United States would be unable to “furnish additional 
 
 36 Morris to Lansing, Aug. n, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 pp. 408-410. 
 
 38 Morris to Lansing, Aug. 16, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 p. 415. 
 
 37 Memorandum by Long, Aug. 14, 1919, Long Papers. 
 
KOLCHAK AND THE ALLIES 
 
 161 
 
 troops in Siberia to replace Czechs in guarding the railways.” 38 The 
 State Department immediately informed Morris. Believing that this 
 decision rendered his entire plan impracticable, Morris questioned the 
 wisdom of recognizing Kolchak. He thought it would be better to 
 await the outcome of the military crisis in Siberia, at which time he 
 would submit further suggestions. 39 
 
 On August 25 the State Department informed Morris of its decision\ 
 in regard to his other recommendations. It could not recognize Kol¬ 
 chak because of its inability to give him the support which Morris 
 had insisted was necessary to insure success. The United States wa$A 
 unable to assist Kolchak with credits for military supplies unless he 
 was recognized as a cobelligerent against the Central Powers, which 
 he was not, or unless the State Department received specific authoriza¬ 
 tion from Congress, which it had not. Furthermore, commercial credits 
 could not be granted without authorization of Congress. No action by 
 Congress could be urged until the ratification of the peace treaty was 
 out of the way. On the credit side of the ledger, the State Depart¬ 
 ment declared its intention to aid Kolchak through the shipment of 
 rifles and increased contracts for goods with the Siberian co-operatives. 
 British and American banks were planning a fifty-million-dollar loan 
 to Kolchak. Morris was urged to explain to Kolchak that American 
 limitations were due solely to existing legislation, to the state of public, 
 opinion, and to the lack of appropriations. 40 
 
 Morris decided to withhold this final statement from Kolchak 
 in view of the crisis at Omsk. He feared that “any formal statement 
 . . . if followed by the fall of Kolchak, might place on our Govern¬ 
 ment responsibility for a result due to entirely different causes.” 41 The 
 department approved this action 42 
 
 Morris departed to Vladivostok, leaving Harris to report the tenor 
 
 38 Lansing to Harris, Aug. 12, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 pp. 412-413. The British, French, and Italians had also refused to send additional 
 troops (Bliss, Paris Peace Conference Diary, June 11, 1919, Bliss Papers). On Au¬ 
 gust 12 Sir Charles Eliot, British High Commissioner in Siberia, had informed Morris 
 that he had received instructions which indicated the intention of his government to re¬ 
 tire entirely from the Siberian enterprise and concentrate all its attention hereafter on 
 Denikin (Morris to Lansing, Aug. 12, 1919, file 861.00/5020, D.S.N.A.). 
 
 38 Morris to Lansing, Aug. 27, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 pp. 422-423. 
 
 40 Lansing to Morris, Aug. 25, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 pp. 421-422. 
 
 41 Morris to Lansing, Aug. 30, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 p. 423. 
 
 42 Phillips to Jenkins, Sept. 5, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 
162 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 of affairs in Omsk. The air was full of rumors concerning America’s 
 threatened withdrawal from Siberia. Harris received reports from 
 Vladivostok quoting Morris to the effect that the Omsk government 
 could last only a few more days, and that a government formed of 
 the revolutionary parties was pending. 43 Despite these rumors, Ameri¬ 
 can rifles and ammunition were being shipped to Kolchak’s representa¬ 
 tives, while clothing was being sent to the co-operatives and railway 
 materials to Stevens. 44 The State Department believed that the failure 
 to assist Kolchak would not be understood in Russia and would not 
 only weaken Kolchak but also affect unfavorably America’s position 
 in Siberia to the immediate, and possibly permanent, advantage of 
 Japan. The State Department, therefore, sent an urgent note to Presi¬ 
 dent Wilson asking him to authorize the Secretary of War “to sell to 
 the Russian Ambassador or other Russian representatives in America 
 for shipment to Kolchak on a credit basis, shoes, underclothing, cloth 
 surplus, overcoats. . . .” 45 
 
 On the very day on which Wilson approved further aid to Kol¬ 
 chak, August Heid, the representative of the War Trade Board at 
 Vladivostok, reported that he considered his work fiinshed. He was 
 convinced that political, financial, military, and railway transportation 
 conditions were too unsettled to undertake any further economic relief. 
 He saw no chance for improvement. Affairs were worse than at any 
 time since Kolchak had come to power. Heid reported that the Omsk 
 government had conceded military control of the territory from Irkutsk 
 /to Vladivostok to the Cossack leaders, who aided and supported mor¬ 
 ally and materially by Japan, “insult, beat and even kill peasants and 
 civilians, obstruct and delay transportation, requisition and pilfer 
 goods in transit, in fact generally pursue a policy calculated to prohibit 
 relief reaching the masses especially if such relief be attempted by 
 Americans.” 46 
 
 While Heid was telegraphing in this vein, Harris, now at Omsk, 
 Was urging the de facto recognition of Kolchak and the fullest sup¬ 
 port possible. He urged President Wilson to send Kolchak a personal 
 
 43 Tenney to Acting Secretary of State, Sept. 14 (?), 1919, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 424. 
 
 44 Phillips to Harris, Sept. 19, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 p. 424. 
 
 45 Phillips to Wilson, Sept. 19, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 p. 425. Sookine, Kolchak’s Foreign Minister, pointed out that the “United States con¬ 
 siders her own quarrels with Japan of more importance than her relations with 
 Russia . . .” (enclosure in Baker to Lansing, Nov. 7, 1919, file 861.00/5608, D.S.N.A.). 
 
 46 Heid to Phillips, Sept. 20, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia. 
 pp. 426-427. 
 
KOLCHAK AND THE ALLIES 
 
 163 
 
 message expressing confidence in his motives and purposes, and ap¬ 
 preciation of the serious difficulties which confronted him. At the 
 same time Harris wrote that the Siberian army was making progress 
 and more than holding its own. He believed that Omsk would not 
 be captured and that the city and the front would be held through 
 the winter . 47 
 
 Harris’s military reports were in direct conflict with those of Major 
 Slaughter, who reported that Kolchak’s forces were scarcely making 
 any progress and that bad morale and desertions continued. Harris 
 was urged to confer with Slaughter and come to some agreement . 48 
 
 Ambassador Morris was quite discouraged about the entire Si¬ 
 berian picture, and particularly so in view of Kolchak’s formal recog¬ 
 nition of both Kalmikov and Semenov and the increasingly antagonistic 
 attitude of the Czechs toward the Kolchak government. Morris ex¬ 
 pressed his views aptly: 
 
 As it is impossible for our agencies to cooperate with these Atamans 
 we now find ourselves in disagreement not only with the Japanese policy 
 but also with the official representatives of the Kolchak government in 
 Eastern Siberia. We thus have the doubly anomalous situation that the 
 Czechs by their presence are responsible for the continued existence of a 
 Government against which they are now intriguing while we are en¬ 
 deavoring to find means of cooperation with a Government many of whose 
 representatives are openly hostile . 49 
 
 Morris was convinced that Kolchak did not have sufficient strength or 
 popular support to control these conditions without Allied assistance 
 of the type he had described in earlier reports. In regard to immediate 
 
 47 Tenney to Phillips, Sept. 22, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 pp. 427-430. General Graves wondered whether “President Wilson knew of the un¬ 
 neutral attitude of Consul General Harris in Siberia and approved of his attitude, but 
 the President, as all knew, was fully occupied with the questions arising in the Peace 
 Conference and could not give any of his personal attention to Siberia. It was ap¬ 
 parent to me that Consul General Harris had the full support of the Russian Section 
 of the State Department, and I believe he had the support one step higher in the 
 hierarchy of the State Department” (Graves, America's Siberian Adventure, pp. 217- 
 218). 
 
 48 United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 218. 
 
 48 Morris to Phillips, Sept. 23, 1919, file 861.00/5264, D.S.N.A. Morris had reported 
 earlier that “much of the discontent with the present Government, the demoralization 
 and panic, is . . . due to the utter insecurity of person and property. All over Siberia 
 there is an orgy of arrest without charges; of execution without even the pretense of a 
 trial; and of confiscation without color of authority. Fear—panic fear—has seized every¬ 
 one. Men suspect each other and live in constant terror that some spy or enemy will 
 cry ‘Bolshevik’ and condemn them to instant death” (Morris to Lansing, July 27 [?], 
 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 400). 
 
164 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 policy Morris advocated an agreement with the Japanese government 
 for guarding the railways and for the treatment of Semenov and 
 Kalmikov. In addition, he advised a continuation of the Railway 
 Service Corps and an Allied credit of seventy-five million dollars for 
 the purchase of required commodities. Finally, he suggested that the 
 'jport of Vladivostok be placed temporarily under an Allied economic 
 ^commission, that American military forces be continued at their pres¬ 
 ent strength, and that the Red Cross work be continued . 50 
 
 On October 1 Polk, then at Paris, was confidentially informed that 
 as soon as President Wilson was well enough to attend to business, the 
 Secretary was seriously considering asking him to grant formal recog¬ 
 nition to the Kolchak government . 61 At the same time, Phillips, the 
 Acting Secretary of State, sent a note to the American representatives 
 in Siberia urging them to give publicity to an American note which 
 emphasized the fact that the United States intended to continue its 
 support to the government of Admiral Kolchak, and that in return it 
 hoped to receive the co-operation of all elements in Russia which 
 were devoted to the establishment of democratic institutions among the 
 Russian people . 52 August Heid was told to continue his work for 
 carrying out economic aid through the co-operative societies . 53 
 
 When General Bliss heard of the trend of American policy toward 
 the Kolchak government, he reported his reaction to Secretary Baker: 
 
 Some people say that there can be no disarmament while Bolshevism 
 exists in Russia. But Bolshevism exists everywhere; and it will exist after 
 we have killed the last Bolshevik. The trouble is that we are trying to kill 
 Bolsheviks and not Bolshevism. The latter can be killed, but not by force 
 of arms. After most thinking men here have come to the conclusion that 
 a way must and can be found to combat Bolshevism otherwise than by 
 armies, I am sorry to see from statements in the American press that our 
 government has decided to lend material aid to the Koltchak Government. 
 The real trouble in Russia will begin after the Koltchak Government 
 wins out . 54 
 
 Consul General Harris continued to urge greater assistance to Kol¬ 
 chak and formal recognition. His entreaties were supported by many 
 
 60 Morris to Phillips, Sept. 23, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, tgtg, Russia, 
 pp. 432 - 434 - 
 
 61 Phillips to Commission to Negotiate Peace, Oct. 1, 1919, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, tgtg, Russia, p. 436. 
 
 32 Phillips to Caldwell, Oct. 2, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, tgtg, Russia, 
 P- 437 - 
 
 63 Lansing to Caldwell, Oct. 7, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, igig, Russia, 
 p. 439. 
 
 64 Bliss to Baker, Oct. 5, 1919, Bliss Papers. 
 
KOLCHAK AND THE ALLIES 
 
 165 
 
 Russian officials in Washington and Paris. Even Polk was urging 
 recognition of Kolchak. However, no decision on the matter could 
 be made due to President Wilson’s illness. 55 Even after Kolchak 
 had decided upon a general evacuation of Omsk, Harris continued 
 to plead for his recognition: 
 
 While there is nothing immediately alarming yet it may shortly be¬ 
 come so. I reiterate that if Kolchak falls Bolshevism will extend at least 
 to Lake Baikal. I respectfully suggest that the Department take the initia¬ 
 tive [in urging?] Prague government to issue an order for 25,000 Czechs 
 to advance to this front and save the situation. At the same time, I re¬ 
 spectfully suggest that the Allies recognize Kolchak. Such a step would 
 strengthen Kolchak in the same degree as it would dishearten the Bolshe- 
 viki. The time has now arrived to make the issue clean cut. Any delay 
 simply encourages and spreads Bolshevism and all that it stands for. All 
 other governments in Russia opposed to Bolshevism have recognized Kol¬ 
 chak. Why do the Allies delay longer? I am now satisfied that Kolchak 
 cannot last much longer unaided and the above suggestions appear the only 
 way out. The Siberian Army is fighting well, yet if the Bolsheviki con¬ 
 tinue to advance as rapidly as at present Omsk will fall in four weeks 
 time. It is believed that at least 50 per cent of the Czech soldiers are willing 
 to fight the Bolsheviki again, and thus secure their return home across 
 European Russia. The situation is extremely serious and urgent. 56 
 
 Harris was at least correct in his belief that the Kolchak govern¬ 
 ment was nearing its end. Despite this fact, as late as November 4, 
 1919, Lansing seriously considered recognizing Kolchak. 57 
 
 65 Polk to Lansing, Oct. 24, 1919, Commission to Negotiate Peace to Lansing, Oct. 
 22, 1919, Tenney to Lansing, Oct. 31, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, igig, 
 Russia, pp. 444-445. 
 
 69 Tenney to Lansing, Oct. 31, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, igig, Russia, 
 pp. 445 - 446 - 
 
 57 Lansing to Polk, Nov. 4, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, igig, Russia, p. 
 
 443 - 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 The Doughboys Go Home 
 
 \ X 7 HILE the State Department was formulating its policy in re- 
 * » gard to Admiral Kolchak, it continued its efforts to co-operate 
 with and restrain Japan in Siberia. The task grew increasingly diffi¬ 
 cult. By the end of August, 1919, affairs had reached a crisis. The 
 major points of friction involved radical differences of interpretation 
 of the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement. Thus, while the United States 
 felt that protection of the railway engineers was a vital element 
 in the protection of the railways, Japan felt that Japanese troops 
 should limit themselves to safeguarding railway property and keeping 
 the line open. If a disagreement occurred between a Russian under 
 the authority of the Omsk government and a national of any country 
 engaged in the operation or protection of the railways, Japan con¬ 
 sidered it a matter for discussion between the Omsk government and 
 the government of the other persons involved. In .practice this under- 
 standin g had re sulted 4 ma.-definite refusal on the part of JapaheseTniili- 
 ' ' '_tarv rnmmandprs to protect the EvesTmd property of the Allied in¬ 
 
 spectors in the territory control lnclhv-GenemlSemendvr'Tv the middle 
 'ctf'August the situation was so grave that Stevens advised the with¬ 
 drawal of American engineers from those sections of the railway 
 guarded by Japanese troops. 1 
 
 This crisis prompted the State Department to draft a note to Japan 
 threatening the withdrawal of American troops unless the outstanding 
 differences between the United States and Japan were settled. The 
 proposed note was not approved by all the members of the State De¬ 
 partment. Basil Miles was particularly disturbed over the sudden de¬ 
 cision of the government to withdraw, especially in view of the sym¬ 
 pathetic telegram which had been sent to Kolchak only a few days 
 
 1 Lansing to Ray Atherton (charge in Japan), Aug. 30, 1919, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 575-578. 
 
THE DOUGHBOYS GO HOME I& 7 
 
 earlier. He felt that withdrawal amounted to a “betrayal of our word.” 
 He wrote his views to Long: 
 
 We are shipping arms and ammunition to Kolchak; we have told 
 Bakhmeteff he could have the rouble notes; we are executing contracts with 
 the Cooperatives of Siberia; we are helping the Embassy in loans for 
 Kolchak, etc. etc. 
 
 I would be glad to know how these facts are to be squared with an) 
 decision to withdraw from Siberia while the present crisis lasts? 
 
 It occurs to me that if we withdraw before the future of Kolchak is 
 determined—moreover at a time when Kolchak and his outfit know that 
 our special representative, Ambassador Morris has favored formal recog¬ 
 nition—our position will be fatally vulnerable. Furthermore we shall be 
 unable to answer effectively the Japanese retort that our action in blaming 
 them is merely a cloak for our decision to quit and get out of a bad mess 
 for some more promising venture. 
 
 These points seem to me to affect the international position of the 
 Government. They certainly affect my status in the Department. I can¬ 
 not be associated with policies which I believe pernicious nor in good 
 faith continue to draw pay from the Government if they are adopted. 2 
 
 Miles’s views were taken under careful consideration as were those 
 of the Secretary of War. Although Baker did not object to the with¬ 
 drawal of American troops, he was opposed to the proposed method of 
 doing it. If withdrawal were desired, Baker advised that it be done as 
 an exercise of the discretion reserved by the President in his aide 
 memoire. Furthermore, he believed that the real explanation for with¬ 
 drawal should be made after American troops had all returned home. 
 Since the feeling between Japanese and American troops had at times 
 been hostile, Baker believed that withdrawal might provoke feelings of 
 irritation on the part of Japanese troops, especially if responsibility for 
 withdrawal were placed upon the actions of Japan. Since the force of 
 General Graves was small as compared with the Japanese force, Baker 
 thought it ought to be gotten out of the country safely “to the last man” 
 before anything was said which might be taken by the Japanese gov¬ 
 ernment as a pretext for interfering with the American withdrawal. 
 Th us, Baker recommended that the President discontinue American 
 military co-operation in Siberia on the ground that the Czech oslovak? 
 forceThad BeerTrescued and that the subsequent restoration of order in 
 ' Sibe ria was die business of the Siberian peopl e Onrp withHrnwal hnd 
 Teen completed, the question of further explanation to the Japanese 
 
 “Miles to Long, Aug. 26, 1919, Long Papers. 
 
168 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 government and further public statements in America could then be 
 considered. 3 
 
 Breckinridge Long did not agree with all of Baker’s recommenda¬ 
 tions. Believing that there were distinct advantages to America in noti¬ 
 fying Japan that publicity might be used, Long added, “It is an instru¬ 
 ment of torture under their form of Government and is the only 
 effective modern weapon short of force to combat their antiquated 
 method of diplomacy. I believe it will be productive of good—not 
 the use of it only, but the thought that we might use it.” Long also 
 disagreed with Baker’s criticism of the proposed reasons for with¬ 
 drawal. He stated his views as follows: 
 
 / First—Siberia, and all Anti-Bolshevik Russia, look to us for friendship 
 and help. We have extended both. Further help is made impracticable 
 nay the actions of Japan. If we withdraw without making known our 
 -xeason we may sacrifice the friendship of all those people. The reasons 
 actuating the decision are set forth in the note. If the people of Siberia 
 know the reasons they will appreciate what we have done up to now and 
 will blame Japan as [ric] the discontinuance of our efforts. 
 
 Second—The fear, I think is ill-founded, that Japan will harry our 
 soldiers if we tell that Government the truth about the reasons for our 
 withdrawal. It is the only moral thing to do. It may produce further 
 enmity on the part of Japan, but there is little indication we shall be over¬ 
 burdened with the real affection of Japan in the near future—and it may 
 cost us the friendship of the good citizens of all Siberia and Russia which 
 we now enjoy, if we fail to state the true reasons—out of fear of Japan, no 
 matter how well founded. 4 
 
 Long believed that the projected note was advantageous in that it gave 
 Japan an opportunity to change her tactics and prevent withdrawal. 
 
 Long’s suggestions were accepted by Lansing. However, the Secre¬ 
 tary informed Baker that the note would be phrased in such a way as 
 simply to warn Japan that publicity might be used. Baker was further 
 assured that no public statement would be issued until after the matter 
 had been discussed with him as to the possible effect on the soldiers 
 in Siberia. 5 
 
 As finally sent on August 30, 1919, the note carefully reviewed the 
 events which led to intervention and the later developments which 
 contributed to the making of the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement. 
 
 3 Baker to Lansing, Aug. 29, 1919, Baker Papers. 
 
 * Long to Lansing, Aug. 29, 1919, Long Papers. 
 
 5 Lansing to Baker, Aug. 30, 1919, Baker Papers. President Wilson approved the 
 note in principle (Lansing to Wilson, Aug. 30, 1919, Wilson Papers, series II). 
 
THE DOUGHBOYS GO HOME 
 
 169 
 
 Citing the major differences which existed between the United States 
 and Japan in regard to Siberian policy, the note frankly placed the 
 blame for the failure of the railway plan upon the lack of co-operation 
 of Japanese officials. Lansing then suggested the possibility of with¬ 
 drawing American troops and making public the reasons. He added: 
 
 —the Government of the United States has a clear appreciation of the 
 consequences of such action, especially as it is burdened with a deep sense 
 of obligation towards Russia, whose people contributed such a vital share 
 in the triumph of the Allied and Associated Governments over the Cen¬ 
 tral Powers. Moreover, my Government is firmly convinced that the future 
 welfare of all Governments is to be based upon a community of interest 
 which is about to replace permanently the former balances of power and 
 other bargains of self-interest and aggrandizement on the part of one nation 
 or group of nations at the expense of others. With the deepest regret my 
 Government finds that the attitude of Japan in this matter raises the 
 question as to whether this view of international relations is shared by the 
 Imperial Government.® 
 
 -Tf»e-Japanes e government showed l iLtle- 4 mnTCdfaTe~feaction to the 
 American protest. The Omsk government, hnwr vep wm v e ry much 
 per turbed. On September 4 the Russian ambassador called on Long 
 to ask if the note meant definite withdrawal on the part of America. 
 Replying in the negative, Long said that if Japan would live up to her 
 agreements, the United States would not necessarily withdraw; that 
 although the United States government wanted to remain in Siberia, 
 it could not be placed in the position of being responsible for a situa¬ 
 tion for which it was not actually accountable. .^Therefore, the con¬ 
 sideration of further help to Siberia would be s uspended until Japan 
 faif HfuIIy~execute d~fhp rail mod agrppmpnt 'itJUT prmr ag reements^ 
 made wit.h-the United. -State s on enterin g Sihcx i a —ILJapan refused to 
 li ve up to those agreements, the United States would withdraw all 
 of her troo ps-.- 7 The Russian ambassador communicated these - views 
 to Sazanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs under Kolchak, who was then 
 in Paris. Sazanov indicated that the withdrawal of the United States 
 “would never in the world be understood by the Russian people; that 
 it would be regarded as deserting the Russians in favor of Japan to the 
 advantage of Japan.” 8 
 
 Although the United States received no official word from Japan 
 
 "Lansing to Atherton, Aug. 30, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 PP- 573 - 578 . 
 
 7 Memorandum of Conversation between Long and Bakhmetev, Sept. 4, 1919, Long 
 Papers. 
 
 8 Long to Miles, Sept. 16, 1919, file 861.00/5260, D.S.N.A. 
 
170 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 concerning the note, Katsuji Debuchi, the Japanese charge d’affaires, 
 called on Miles and discussed the protest informally. Informing Miles 
 that the note was quite unexpected, Debuchi was concerned over the 
 abruptness of the language. He felt that the difficulty lay entirely with 
 Semenov. Miles concurred but reminded Debuchi that although Japan 
 had agreed that China should protect the Chinese Eastern Railway 
 from Manchuria to Harbin, Japanese forces had remained all along 
 the line and Japanese flags had been flying for six months over every 
 station. While criticizing the Japanese military, Miles pointed out that 
 “we found by our own experience that our own military authorities 
 some times took the bit in their mouths and ran away with us during 
 the war and that, as far as I could see, the Japanese military were 
 doing the same thing with his Government.” Throughout the dis¬ 
 cussion Debuchi appeared very friendly, and closed the interview by in¬ 
 viting Miles to lunch! 9 
 
 Apparently the Japanese Foreign Office did not share the same 
 friendliness. The French ambassador to Japan informed Atherton, 
 the American charge, that the American protest was received by the 
 Japanese government with considerable resentment. The Japanese 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs apparently saw in the note nothing more 
 than a series of minor disagreements between Semenov, American 
 engineers, and certain Japanese military commanders. Although these 
 disagreements were being investigated, the Minister stated that a long 
 time must elapse before a reply could be given. The American pro¬ 
 test did not prevent the Japanese press from reporting a discussion by 
 the Diplomatic Advisory Council concerning the possibility of either 
 increasing Japanese forces in Siberia, or withdrawing to the borders 
 of Manchuria and Mongolia to prevent the spread of Bolshevik influ¬ 
 
 ence 
 
 10 
 
 Although Japan sent no formal reply to the American protest, the 
 attitude of the Japanese military in Siberia seemed to be undergoing 
 a change. General Narimoto Oi, who had succeeded Otani as com¬ 
 mander of the Japanese forces, expressed to Stevens and Morris his 
 ^ opinion that the future operation of the railway required imperatively 
 , that the representatives of the Technical Board and railway employees 
 | should be protected and supported by the military from all interference 
 \ in the performance of their duties. He said that all of his officers 
 
 0 Memorandum of a Conversation between Miles and Debuchi, Sept. 4, 1919, file 
 861.77/1097, D.S.N.A. 
 
 10 Atherton to Phillips, Sept. 16, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 pp. 580-581. 
 
THE DOUGHBOYS GO HOME 
 
 171 
 
 would be so instructed “in principle,” with orders to refer to their 
 senior commandant any doubtful or delicate cases which might arise. 11 
 The necessary orders were issued on September 28. Although Cald¬ 
 well did not approve of the phrase “in principle,” and would have pre¬ 
 ferred “in practice,” Stevens believed that the United States should 
 accept the general’s statement in good faith. 12 
 
 When no reply to the August 30 note was received by late Sep¬ 
 tember, Ambassador Morris was instructed to inform the Japanese 
 government that the United States was neither “indifferent [n]or dis¬ 
 posed to evade the issue presented by its note.” However, the State 
 Department hoped that the attitude assumed by General Oi indicated 
 a willingness on the part of Japan to co-operate in Siberia. 13 
 
 Meanwhile in Siberia local newspapers seemed to be taking it for 
 granted that American and Allied assistance would be withdrawn 
 from Russia but that Japan would remain in Siberia. One section of 
 the Russian press was actually speculating on the possible means of 
 compensating Japan for her continued assistance to the Omsk govern¬ 
 ment. 14 Anti-American propaganda was becoming more general and 
 more effective. ' vj 
 
 The British government was also concerned about America’s pro¬ 
 posed withdrawal from Siberia. It pointed out that withdrawal would 
 leave the Trans-Siberian Railway inadequately guarded, and in all 
 probability make it impossible to keep open the line. Moreover, Japan 
 would be left as the only country maintaining forces in Siberia. Great 
 Britain, therefore, expressed an “earnest hope” that American troops 
 would be retained in Siberia. 1 '’ 
 
 The Japanese press had been giving considerable space to America’s 
 desire to withdraw. It attributed that desire to a failure of American 
 policies. The newspaper comment indicated that American with¬ 
 drawal would be welcomed by Japanese “public opinion” because it 
 would leave Japan free to pursue her own purpose in Siberia. One 
 
 11 Morris to Lansing, Sept. 25, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 p. 581. Morris was unable to determine whether Tsuneo Matsudaira, Japanese mem¬ 
 ber of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, and Oi were acting under instructions from 
 Tokyo or on their own initiative. 
 
 12 Smith to Lansing, Sept. 28, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 p. 584. 
 
 13 Phillips to Morris, Sept. 27, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 pp. 582-583. 
 
 14 Jenkins to Lansing, Oct. 3, 1919, file 861.00/5324, D.S.N.A. 
 
 16 Davis to Lansing, Oct. 1, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia. 
 p. 585. 
 
172 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 of the most significant statements appeared in the Yamato, a newspaper 
 which represented the views of the military group in Japan: 
 
 Even if America withdraws Japan cannot do likewise. Not only would 
 the Omsk Government be placed in peril if we did so but the Bolsheviks 
 would create disturbances which would threaten the security of Korea and 
 Manchuria. We should therefore like to make Japan’s position clear to 
 the whole world. The population of Japan is increasing at the rate of six 
 or seven hundred thousand a year. The difficulty of living is increasing 
 more and more. We ought to seek areas of extension abroad but America 
 is violating the fundamental principles of freedom and equality and is 
 closing the door to our emigrants. Canada, Australia and Africa are also 
 standing in the way of our progress so that our people have no place to go 
 except sparsely settled Manchuria and Siberia. The same applies to China. 
 We should both assist the Russians to develop their land. Of course Japan 
 , v has no designs to control the Siberian railways as America has, nor has 
 she any territorial ambition. We cannot withdraw from Siberia because 
 we desire to preserve and make ourselves secure. We therefore want the 
 whole world to understand that we are not in the same position with 
 reference to Siberia as the United States. 16 
 
 
 Conditions in Siberia did not improve to any considerable degree 
 after the dispatch of the American note of August 30. Reports from 
 General Graves and other sources showed that subordinate Japanese 
 commanders in Siberia were continuing to support the conflicting ac¬ 
 tivities of Cossack leaders. Stevens cabled that Semenov was moving 
 troops and occupying stations along the Chinese Eastern. Further 
 reports indicated that an attempt would be made to establish inde¬ 
 pendent Russian authority under Semenov east of Lake Baikal. Sem- 
 $|iov would be supported by Japanese military commanders. More- 
 'Over, Army and Navy intelligence reports revealed that troops under 
 Kalmikov, Semenov, and Rozanov were planning to attack American 
 troops. Graves believed that they were instigated by the Japanese for 
 rhe purpose of getting American troops out of Siberia. 17 
 t In view of this critical situation, Baker urged Lansing to insist upon 
 an answer from Japan. By this time Baker was firmly convinced that 
 the United States should either send a large force to Siberia or with¬ 
 draw completely. 18 A note was sent immediately to Japan, requesting 
 a reply to the American note of August 30. Morris was also instructed 
 to bring to the attention of the Japanese government the grave condi- 
 
 16 Morris to Lansing, Oct. 8, 1919, file 861.00/5351, D.S.N.A. 
 
 17 Graves to Adjutant General, Oct. 8, 1919, file 861.00/5472, D.S.N.A.; Mac- 
 gowan to Lansing, Oct. 8, 1919, file 861.00/5360, D.S.N.A. 
 
 18 Baker to Rear Admiral Grayson, Oct. 9, 1919, Baker Papers. 
 
THE DOUGHBOYS GO HOME 
 
 173 
 
 tions which existed in Siberia due to the activities of Japanese sub¬ 
 ordinate military officers and the Cossack leaders. 19 
 
 The Japanese answer finally arrived on October 31. Although 
 vague and indirect, the note was conciliatory in spirit. It appeared to 
 be a compromise between the military and civilian groups. While re¬ 
 asserting the independence of the Japanese military, the note promise 
 close co-operation with the Inter-Allied Committee and protection of 
 the lives and property of the committee’s representatives. This was 
 a distinct gain. In addition, the Japanese government invited formal 
 discussion of specific instances in which “Japanese troops have refused 
 to protect the lives and property of Allied inspectors.” The Japanese 
 government also substantiated General Oi’s revised orders. These, 
 however, still had to stand the test of execution. The note concluded 
 with a promise to send to Siberia, as civilian High Commissioner, Am¬ 
 bassador Tsunetado Kato, a man of liberal views reputed to be anti¬ 
 militaristic. There was, however, one significant omission from the 
 reply. No reference was made to the fear suggested in the American 
 note that the Japanese government did not share the American con¬ 
 viction “that the future welfare of all governments is based upon a 
 community of interests.” 20 It was Morris’s growing conviction that 
 it is of no value to discuss at this time and in the abstract the views or 
 purposes of the Japanese Government. I see no advantage to better rela¬ 
 tions between Japan and America in reiterated statements of policy, rather 
 we should put Japan’s national purposes, so far as they touch our own 
 purposes, to the test of action. When we are prepared as a Government ' 
 and people to support constructive action in the Orient then we should seek 
 Japan’s cooperation and at the same time be ready to proceed without it. 
 Mere mutiny [r/c] and protest simply accentuate differences and may lead 
 to serious complications. In the face of crying needs such as exist in China 
 and Siberia we cannot be placed in the position of seeming to stay the 
 hand of Japan while failing to offer any alternative plan of relief. 
 
 Morris added that the Siberian problem was different. Even though 
 conditions demanded much more, the United States was not in a posi¬ 
 tion to do more. In these circumstances Morris felt that “we can only 
 make the best of our limitations and with patience continue our efforts 
 to cooperate with Japan. Such a policy may seem unsatisfactory but 
 it is, I submit, far better than entire withdrawal.” 21 
 
 10 Lansing to Morris, Oct. 10, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 pp. 586-587. 
 
 30 Morris to Lansing, Oct. 31, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 pp. 588-592. 
 
 31 Morris to Lansing, Nov. 1, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 
174 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 The American government followed Morris’s suggestion. Accept¬ 
 ing the Japanese note at its face value, Lansing expressed pleasure over 
 the Japanese desire to co-operate in forwarding the railway plan in 
 Siberia. 22 
 
 Following the American-Japanese exchange of notes the Japanese 
 Cabinet discussed the problem of formulating a definite Siberian policy. 
 Viscount Takaakira Kato, leader of the Kenseikai party, had subjected 
 the policy to severe criticism, demanding the withdrawal from Siberia 
 of a substantial portion of the Japanese troops. The military, on the 
 other hand, had been agitating for the dispatch of additional reinforce¬ 
 ments, using as an argument the possible withdrawal of American 
 troops. The civilian members of the Cabinet opposed such action. 
 Hara, the Prime Minister, thus found himself between two fires, the 
 military on the one side and Viscount Kato, leader of the opposition, 
 on the other. 23 
 
 On November 24 Viscount Uchida attempted to explain Japan’s 
 position to Ambassador Morris. Pointing to Kolchak’s retirement from 
 Omsk, Uchida expressed his concern over the continued eastward 
 advance of the Bolsheviks. ; If the RedT'trmyT^ad^ed-JBaikal^and came 
 intrOn fttacf with Japn nf s U troops. the si tuation would be serious; 
 if^&n-the-uiljierhand Japan should withdraw ^ wo uld; mean .the sur- 
 'C '‘itr^nder of Fasrf ru~~^ibe r » ;1 rn JWTrrvRm nTdnvic-wfvulrl -w once create 
 , a serene ■ra-engrp to Korea, Ma nchuria, and indirectly to Japan itself. 
 
 Morris immediately assureaTJ chidathat he did not - expecFTKeT 
 withdrawal of American troops from Siberia. He then gave his per¬ 
 sonal recommendations concerning the problem at hand. He advo¬ 
 cated that the Allies avoid all participation in local intrigue, that they 
 continue earnestly to support Kolchak, and that they maintain the 
 present force to protect and continue railway operations. Finally, 
 Morris emphasized his personal conviction that some comprehensive 
 plan of economic relief be undertaken by the two governments. Uchida 
 expressed his full accord with these views and his intention to discuss 
 them with the Cabinet. 24 
 
 A few days later Hara attained a sweeping victory over General 
 Tanaka, Minister of War, both in the Cabinet and in the Diplomatic 
 Advisory Council. Tanaka had urged the dispatch of more troops. 
 Hara, however, following the advice of Viscount Uchida, and having 
 
 22 Lansing to Morris, Nov. 12, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 191Q, Russia, 
 PP- 594 - 595 - 
 
 23 Morris to Lansing, Nov. 24, 1919, file 861.00/5742, D.S.N.A. 
 
 24 Morris to Lansing, Nov. 24, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, igig, Russia, 
 PP- 599 - 6 °!- 
 
THE DOUGHBOYS GO HOME 
 
 175 
 
 in mind Kato’s recent criticism of the military policy, advocated the 
 maintenance of the status quo pending an understanding with the 
 Allied governments, particularly the United States. 25 Thus it seemed 
 that the differences between Japan and America on the Siberian ques¬ 
 tion were about to be resolved. In the meantime Ambassador Shide- 
 hara had begun negotiations with the State Department regarding a 
 joint policy in Siberia. 26 
 
 During the next month the State Department was forced to re¬ 
 consider its entire policy in Siberia. It received suggestions from vari¬ 
 ous quarters. Lloyd George suggested that Georgia, Azerbaijan, 
 Bessarabia, the Ukraine, the Baltic Provinces, Finland, and possibly 
 even Siberia should be independent, since a unified Russia would be 
 a menace to Europe. 2 ' The American government opposed this view 
 not only on moral grounds, but also because it believed that a divided 
 Russia would be unable to cope with “existing Japanese territorial am¬ 
 bition.” 28 Minister Hapgood, telegraphing from Denmark, said that 
 only four possible courses were open. One was to give Germany a free 
 hand. He considered this politically beyond serious discussion. An¬ 
 other was to send in a big Entente Army prepared to stay two years. 
 Hapgood personally thought this also was politically impossible. The 
 third was to treat the Russian situation honestly as a civil war, favor¬ 
 ing no faction and backing none. A fourth view stated that since 
 the collapse of Judenitch and Kolchak was so complete and the 
 prospects of Denikin so poor, no civil war would be left if foreign aid 
 were withdrawn; therefore the Moscow government should actually be 
 recognized. 29 
 
 On December 8 the Japanese Embassy presented an aide memoire 
 
 25 Morris to Lansing, Nov. 28, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 pp. 601-603. A few days later Tanaka called upon Morris and gave an extended sum¬ 
 mary of his views on the Siberian situation. He stated that the Cabinet recognized 
 the necessity of reinforcements but had decided first to reach an understanding with 
 America. He had therefore telegraphed General Inouye, the military attache at Wash¬ 
 ington, to co-operate with Ambassador Shidehara in arriving at an understanding with 
 the State Department. He added that all the Japanese generals in Siberia agreed “that 
 the only purpose of sending reinforcements was to keep the means of transportation 
 protected in the hope our governments would speedily agree on some joint method of 
 economic assistance” (Morris to Lansing, Dec. 1, 1919, file 861.00/5796, D.S.N.A.). 
 
 20 Poole to Lansing, Dec. 8, 1919, file 861.00/6114. D.S.N.A. 
 
 27 Polk to Lansing, Nov. 29, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 p. 126; Davis to Lansing, Dec. 3, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, III, 
 484.^ 
 
 28 Lansing to Davis, Dec. 4, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 p. 130: Lansing to Morris, Dec. 5, 1919, file 861.00/5828, D.S.N.A. 
 
 29 Hapgood to Lansing, Nov. 30, 1919, United States, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 
 pp. 126-127. 
 
176 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 to the American government which expressed concern over the military 
 crisis confronting Kolchak and suggested three possible courses of 
 action: 
 
 r. To send a re-inforcement of sufficient strength and, acting on the 
 offensive in cooperation with the anti-Bolshevik forces, to crush the Red 
 Army; 
 
 T'-Sy 2. To avoid direct contact with the Red Army and to effect entire or 
 f partial withdrawal of the Allied troops; 
 
 3. To maintain the guarding of the districts now under Allied military 
 protection, and, without assuming the offensive, to check the continued east¬ 
 ward advance of the Red Army. 
 
 The Japanese government rejected the first idea because the Japanese 
 public opposed the dispatch of more troops to Siberia. The second 
 alternative was also opposed because it meant that Eastern Siberia 
 would become Bolshevik. Thus, the third suggestion seemed to be the 
 only practicable course to take. Under that plan the Japanese govern¬ 
 ment felt that reinforcements should be sent to those points on the 
 Railway which were inadequately guarded, so as to fortify them against 
 Bolshevik invasion. The number of reinforcements suggested was 
 five to six thousand men. The note concluded with the request for 
 information as to “whether the United States proposes to maintain the 
 status quo, or to proceed to entire or partial withdrawal of its troops, 
 or whether it is ready to send a reinforcement in case of need.” 30 
 
 Th e Japanese government had thus brought the question of with¬ 
 drawal or reinforcement to a head. Japanese officials impatiently 
 awaited the State Department’s reaction to their note of December 8. 
 The delay apparently embarrassed the Foreign Office in formulating 
 a Siberian policy and in resisting the pressure of the military authori¬ 
 ties, who were more eager than ever to send reinforcements. 31 While 
 the Foreign Office waited, the American government struggled to¬ 
 ward a decision. On December 23 Lansing presented a memorandum 
 > 1 to the President. Written as a projected note for transmission to Japan, 
 it advised withdrawal as the only reasonable course to adopt in Siberia. 
 The reasons for intervention had now been fulfilled. Lansing wrote 
 that “conditions have now entirely change d.” In the first place, t he 
 fited States Jiad--give n- - all -the^a id and enc ou£agemenr~possiblF~t& 
 
 30 Japanese Embassy to Lansing, Dec. 8, 1919, file 861.00/6109, D.S.N.A. The 
 note also suggested that the American government approach the British and French 
 governments on the question of co-operation against the activities of the Red Army. 
 
 31 Morris to Lansing, Jan. 7, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, III, 
 486-487. 
 
THE DOUGHBOYS GO HOME 
 
 177 
 
 Siberian people in their effo rts for self-governmenu _jSecQe^y, the 
 army g Tthe Czeiffj mhavaTcX-^ichJaaff-femaffleff a long time in Cerf- 
 
 . frak- Sibe ria- l^ff-4K^w__moyal_eastward and. reached Eastern Siberia'. 
 In the meantime arrangements had been made in Paris for the repatria¬ 
 tion of these soldiers, and plans were proceeding for their return to 
 their native land. The advance of the Bolsheviks had caused the 
 Allies to abandmr-fee protecti on. operarmnT iud~^ part 
 
 of the Tran s-Siberian Rail\\#y---whirfr ky-west of Lake Baikal. Of 
 those branches which lay east of Lake Baikal, the''Chinese'Eastern 
 was practically all within Chinese territory. Lansing added that the 
 forces operating under the direction of the Russian authorities in 
 control of Trans-Baikal should be numerically sufficient to protect and 
 maintain the operation of that portion of the railroad from Irkutsk to 
 Manchouli. Consequen tly, it appeared t hat the prop er joiru-artivities 
 of the United States and oF Japan TrTSiberia were at an end. The 
 only practical step left was the withdiawal of iroops from Siberia. 
 Any other plan might lead to warlike activity with the Bolsheviks. 
 Lansing added that he would not consult Britain or France on the 
 matter as suggested by Japan, since the arrangement to enter Siberia 
 was made only with the government of Japan. 32 Lansing heartily 
 recommended that Wilson approve the note. Baker had read it and 
 Was in thorough agreement. In a simple paragraph Lansing explained 
 the real reason for the note: 
 
 The truth of the matter is the simple fact that the Kolchak Govern¬ 
 ment has utterly collapsed; the armies of the Bolsheviki have advanced into 
 Eastern Siberia, where they are reported to be acting with moderation. 
 The people seem to prefer them to the officers of the Kolchak regime. 
 Further, the Bolshevik army is approaching the region where our soldiers 
 are, and contact with them will lead to open hostilities and to many com¬ 
 plications. In other words, if we do not withdraw we shall have to wage 
 war against the Bolsheviki. 33 
 
 Lansing thus indicated to Wilson that the real reason for withdrawing 
 American troops was the fear that their continued maintenance in Si¬ 
 beria might lead to conflict with the Bolsheviks. This, however, was 
 not the reason emphasized in the note to Japan. This note stressed the 
 
 32 Lansing to Wilson, Dec. 23, 1919, file 861.00/6107, D.S.N.A. 
 
 33 Lansing to Wilson, Dec. 23, 1919, Lansing Papers, II, 392. Breckinridge Long 
 had already told the Russian ambassador that “we could not get any sentiment in this 
 country for fighting the Bolsheviki. . . He further called attention to the “fact that 
 each of the anti-Bolshevik forces were fighting the Bolsheviks only a little harder than 
 they were fighting each other” (Memorandum of a Conversation between Long and the 
 Russian Ambassador, Dec. 2, 1919, Long Papers). 
 
178 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 fact that American help was no longer needed; the United States had 
 done all it could for the Russians. 34 
 
 Poole made additional suggestions which were embodied in the 
 note. He advised the elimination of any mention that reinforcements 
 sent to Siberia might lead to war with the Bolsheviks. Since the 
 United States had not declared war against them, Poole thought this 
 was a dangerous subject, and therefore did not wish any embarrassing 
 questions raised. After correcting certain errors in Lansing’s geog¬ 
 raphy, Poole added a paragraph in which he reluctantly stated that the 
 Railway Service Corps must be withdrawn with American troops. At 
 the same time, a word was included to the effect that the United States 
 was not relinquishing its interest in Eastern Siberia. 35 The note with 
 these changes was sent to Japan on January 9, i920. 3G On the same 
 day the Japanese War Minister advised the American Embassy that 
 he had received a telegram from General Oi, Japanese commander, 
 stating that General Graves had been instructed to withdraw all 
 American troops from Siberia. 37 
 
 The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs was greatly disturbed 
 over this news. He could not account for such sudden action, especially 
 since the State Department had been engaged in conversations with 
 "Ambassador Shidehara on a joint Siberian policy and had made no 
 suggestion about the immediate withdrawal of American troops. The 
 Foreign Minister observed that this action put his government in an 
 vextremely difficult position. 38 Ambassador Morris was also quite sur¬ 
 prised at this news, and immediately informed the State Department 
 that if “General Graves has interpreted his orders correctly, our sud¬ 
 den action, without any previous notice to the Japanese Government, is 
 a stunning blow to Japanese pride as well as to all Liberal and pro- 
 American influence here and will have, I fear, far-reaching effects.” 39 
 
 The State Department was thus placed in an embarrassing position, 
 
 34 See unsigned and undated note accompanying Lansing’s Memorandum to the 
 President on Dec. 23, 1919, file 861.00/6109, D.JS.N.A. 
 
 3E Poole to Polk, Jan. 2, 1920, file 861.00/6115, D.S.N.A. 
 
 315 Lansing to Shidehara, Jan. 9, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 11)20, III, 
 488-490. 
 
 37 Morris to Lansing, Jan. 9, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, III, 490. 
 On Dec. 31, General Graves had received orders to prepare for withdrawal but had 
 been instructed to keep these orders secret; he had been informed that the final de¬ 
 cision to withdraw had been reached on Jan. 5; that it was to be published in Wash¬ 
 ington on Jan. 7, and that he was authorized to make it public in Vladivostok on Jan. 
 8 (Poole to Lansing, Jan. 9, 1920, file 861.00/6126, D.S.N.A.). 
 
 38 Morris to Lansing, Jan. 9, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, /920, III, 
 491-492. 
 
 39 Morris to Lansing, Jan. 11, 1920, file 861.00/6113, D.S.N.A. 
 
THE DOUGHBOYS GO HOME 179 
 
 although the confusion of orders had evidently occurred in the War 
 Departmen t. Baker expressed his regret and informed L ajising-tbau 
 he was telegraphing Gra ves t hat American troops would not leave 
 until a substantial portion of the CzechswereT afloaE Morris read" 
 the - American~note of withdrawal to the'Japanese Foreign Minister 
 on January 12. He hoped that the wording of the note would help 
 to overcome the prevailing feeling among Japanese officials that they 
 had been treated with “scant consideration.” 40 
 
 On January 12 Lansing explained to Morris that the orders issued 
 to General Graves had been dual in character and had unfortunately 
 been misinterpreted. Morris was told to explain the error to the Min¬ 
 ister for Foreign Affairs and also to inform the public at an opportune 
 time that there had been “no purpose on the part of this government 
 to act otherwise than frankly and with the greatest possible measure 
 of coordination.” Since the State Department had assumed thatj he 
 Japanese aide m em7>7r?TrfHi>e€«M4afierTU req'uTrecTade finite answer^ it 
 had. be en forced to select one of thr ee alternatives^ namely, reinforce- 
 ment^jnai atenan ^^ffiuhe-status-crtrcrrorwrthdrTwar. Despite his illness, 
 the fVeskfchf had madcTtKeTfinal decision. TTwas then communicated 
 as promptly as possible to the Japanese government. 41 
 
 The premature announcement of withdrawal, coupled with the sub¬ 
 sequent statement that the first contingent of American troops would 
 sail on January 12, raised a storm of indignation and resentment in 
 Japan. The United States was criticized bitterly for its alleged double 
 dealing and discourtesy. The imperialistic elements in Japanese public 
 life made the most of the incident to further their views and policies. 
 However, Morris was hopeful that a policy of expedient compromise 
 would prevail. He believed that such a policy would probably include 
 the immediate dispatch of the Takata division to Siberia, and the 
 transfer of troops from the Amur Railway to the Chinese Eastern 
 Railway with such control of operations as could be secured without 
 unduly exciting Russian and Chinese feeling. Morris added that the 
 dispatch of additional troops would be called an “emergency measure,” 
 whereas the general policy would be termed “gradual evacuation.” 42 
 
 The feeling among the local Chinese officials at Peking was also 
 very bitter on the withdrawal of American troops from Siberia. They 
 contended that if American and Allied contingents were withdrawn, 
 
 40 Morris to Lansing, Jan. 12, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, III, 
 494 - 495 - 
 
 41 Lansing to Morris, Jan. 12, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, /920, III, 
 49 .U 494 - 
 
 42 Morris to Lansing, Jan. 14, 1920, file 861.00/6134, D.S.N.A. 
 
180 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 the Japanese should withdraw also. The latter, however, were send¬ 
 ing reinforcements. 43 
 
 On January 22, 1920, the Japanese government replied to the Ameri¬ 
 can memorandum announcing withdrawal. Japan expressed regret 
 that the United States had not consulted her prior to the decision to 
 withdraw. However, she accepted the American explanation that con¬ 
 ditions in the United States had made the decision urgent, leaving 
 no time for the discussion of the question with the Japanese govern¬ 
 ment. Japan was apparently mollified by Secretary Lansing’s declara- 
 tfbn to Ambassador Shidehara that the American government would 
 have no objection to Japan’s continued maintenance of troops in Si¬ 
 beria, or to the sending of reinforcements to the Trans-Siberian and 
 Chinese Eastern Railways. 44 On January 30 the American government 
 formally affirmed Lansing’s declaration to Shidehara. 45 
 
 The method of withdrawing American troops from Siberia pro¬ 
 vided another reason for friction between the State and War Depart¬ 
 ments. Graves had been given orders to concentrate his troops in 
 Vladivostok. The State Department was opposed to these orders be¬ 
 cause it feared that the strained relations existing between the Czechs 
 and General Semenov might result in serious difficulty without the 
 Americans there to guard the railway. 46 Unmoved by this plea, 
 Baker replied that the movement was a military necessity recom¬ 
 mended by General Graves himself. 47 Acting Secretary Polk then 
 sent Baker a summary of various reports from Siberia which empha¬ 
 sized the resulting serious condition of the Czechs if the American 
 troops were withdrawn. 48 Baker replied with much force: 
 
 The number of our troops remaining in Siberia is something like 
 5,000 and it is obvious that their assistance is not necessary to some 72,000 
 Czecho-Slovaks who are withdrawing toward Vladivostok. You may re- 
 
 43 Albert W. Pontius (consul general at Mukden) to Tenney, Jan. 21, 1920, file 
 861.00/6372, D.S.N.A. 
 
 44 Japanese Embassy to Lansing, Jan. 22, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 
 1920, III, 497-498. 
 
 46 A leading editorial in a national magazine pointed out that Washington was so 
 hysterical over the Bolshevik menace that it was giving Japan an excellent opportunity 
 for aggrandizing herself (“Japan and Siberia,” New Republic, XXI, Jan. 14, 1920, 
 187-188). For a similar view, see Lincoln Colcord, “Japan in Siberia,” Nation, CX 
 (Jan. 10, 1920), 37-39. The Nation had consistently attacked the State Department’s 
 policy in Siberia (Oswald Villard, Fighting Years, New York, 1939, p. 353). 
 
 46 Lansing to Baker, Jan. 22, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, III, 
 496. 
 
 47 Baker to Lansing, Jan. 23, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, III, 498. 
 
 48 Polk to Baker, Jan. 28, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, III, 498- 
 
 501 . 
 
THE DOUGHBOYS GO HOME 
 
 l8l 
 
 call that Mr. Stevens in one of his original cablegrams on this subject, 
 stated in substance that if the small detachments of Americans scattered 
 along the railroad had difficulty in getting out, they could be protected by 
 the Czecho-Slovaks. 49 
 
 The State Department was by no means happy over affairs in Si¬ 
 beria. Polk and MacMurray were particularly concerned over the 
 question of Japan’s withdrawal from Siberia. Lansing, however, had 
 no such qualms. He said that from the beginning it had been under¬ 
 stood that Japan contemplated no territorial acquisitions in Siberia; 
 that she would not have sent an expedition into Siberia except in co¬ 
 operation with the United States; and that co-operation was based 
 upon eventual and complete withdrawal. Moreover, Lansing added 
 that every Japanese diplomat with whom he had spoken had assured 
 him that Japan would withdraw completely from Siberia. Therefore, 
 Lansing felt that it was unnecessary to demand assurances from Japan 
 at that time. Polk, however, feared that the withdrawal of American 
 forces might be construed to affect this obligation on the part of Japan. 
 Lansing did not share Polk’s fears. MacMurray then raised the ques¬ 
 tion of the Chinese Eastern Railway: 
 
 I suggested that the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway was to 
 be distinguished from the case of Siberia; that this involved not a question 
 of territorial acquisitions, but one of control over the railway in Manchuria; 
 and I enquired whether the Secretary would consider it advisable to sug¬ 
 gest, in his conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, that the status quo 
 should be preserved. The Secretary pointed out, and Mr. Polk concurred, 
 that it would be necessary for Japan to maintain at least temporarily a con¬ 
 trol over the Chinese Eastern Railway, as the means of communication with 
 their troops in Siberia. I suggested that while such temporary control 
 must of course be taken for granted, it might be possible and advisable to 
 obtain from the Japanese some assurances that ultimately the status quo 
 ante would be restored so as in the end to leave unimpaired the existing 
 rights both of the Chinese and others interested. The Secretary said that 
 he proposed to have with the Ambassador a full discussion of the military 
 aspects of the situation, and that in the course of it he would take occasion 
 to ascertain the attitude of the Japanese government on this question. 50 
 
 As a result of these discussions Secretary Lansing sent a note to the 
 Japanese government on January 30, reaffirming his declaration to 
 Shidehara concerning the retention of Japanese troops in Siberia and 
 stating: 
 
 49 Baker to Polk, Feb. 19, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, /920, III, 503- 
 504. 
 
 60 MacMurray to Poole, Jan. 23, 1920, file 861.00/6735, D.S.N.A. 
 
182 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 The Government of the United States desires to record an assurance 
 of its confidence that the Imperial Japanese Government will, in the 
 exercise of the trust devolving upon it, pursue the same policy that was 
 mutually agreed upon when the two Governments determined to cooperate 
 in Siberia,—particularly in connection with the operation of the Siberian 
 Railway system (including therein the Chinese Eastern Railway), the 
 existing rights to which, it is confidently assumed, will in no way be im¬ 
 paired in the consequence of the efforts of the Japanese Government to 
 carry out the purposes which induced the two Governments to send their 
 military forces to Siberia. 51 
 
 Throughout the month of January, 1920, Hara’s ministry was under 
 fire on its Siberian policy. The policy was criticized in the Diet as 
 v \well as in the newspapers. Military authorities were accused of inter- 
 t ,/j. fering with diplomatic authorities in the conduct of foreign relations. 
 h' V Japanese representatives, as well as a large share of the informed 
 public, registered their opposition to an increase of forces in Siberia 
 and demanded that the government make public its policy there. 52 The 
 Kobe Japan Chronicle reported that no expedition had been more un¬ 
 popular with the Japanese nation. The Tokyo Ji ji opposed the rein¬ 
 forcement of troops in Siberia on the grounds that it would make the 
 powers “suspect Japan of territorial ambitions.” The Tokyo Ko\umin 
 added that “Japan would better protect Japanese interests only and 
 leave Russia’s rehabilitation to the Russians.” The Tokyo Yamato 
 differed. It felt that Japan must “make herself responsible for the 
 maintenance of order in eastern Siberia, at least.” 53 Ambassador Mor¬ 
 ris reported that many of the livelier journals advised the dispatch of 
 five thousand additional troops as a temporary measure in order to pro¬ 
 tect Japanese residents, to preserve Manchuria and Mongolia from be¬ 
 ing plunged into chaos, and to guard the Koreans from contamina¬ 
 tion by the Bolsheviks. 54 
 
 On February 3 Japan explained her Siberian policy to the United 
 States. She informed the State Department that geography made her 
 position in Siberia distinct from that of the other European powers. 
 Political conditions in Eastern Siberia not only gravely affected affairs 
 in Korea and Manchuria but also threatened the safety of the lives and 
 y a p\ v property of a large number of Japanese subjects in these regions. This 
 ' . J \ was the sole cause of Japan’s inability to withdraw her troops immedi- 
 
 51 Lansing to Morris, Jan. 30, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, III, 501- 
 
 1 Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, pp. 211-212. 
 
 'Literary Digest, LXIV (Jan. 31, 1921), 25. 
 
 'Morris to Lansing, Jan. 28, 1920, file 861.00/6368, D.S.N.A. 
 
 
 502. 
 
THE DOUGHBOYS GO HOME 
 
 l8 3 
 
 ately. Japan added that it was her sincere desire to withdraw from 
 Siberia as soon as possible after the completion of the Czechoslovak 
 evacuation and as soon as political affairs in the districts bordering on 
 her frontier became sufficiently settled to remove all danger to the 
 regions of Korea and Manchuria. 5 ’’ 
 
 The Japanese note provoked no change in the State Department’s \ 
 policy of withdrawing from Siberia. American troops remained in 
 Vladivostok until a substantial portion of the Czech troops were afloat. 
 
 The last contingent of Americans left Vladivostok on April 1, 1920. 56 
 Few tears were shed over their departure. America’s part in the Si¬ 
 berian situation had already been summed up aptly, if somewhat 
 facetiously, by the Literary Digest when it remarked that “some might 
 have liked us more if we had intervened less, that some might have 
 disliked us less if we had intervened more, but that, having con¬ 
 cluded that we intended to intervene no more nor no less than we 
 actually did, nobody had any use for us at all.”' j7 
 
 65 Memorandum of Japanese Government to Department of State, Feb. 3, 1920, 
 file 861.00/6706, D.S.N.A.; Young, Japan under Taisho Tenno, p. 179; Major General 
 Tsunekichi Kono, The Japanese Army (Tokyo, 1929), p. 29. 
 
 68 U. S. Army War College, Order of Battle, p. 389. The small British and French 
 detachments had already been withdrawn in the late summer and early fall of 1919 
 (Churchill, The Aftermath, p. 256; Moulis and Bergonier, La Guerre entre les allies 
 et la Russie, p. 131). 
 
 57 Literary Digest, LXII (Sept. 6, 1919), 60. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 Japan, Sakhalin, and the Maritime 
 Province 
 
 T .HE AMERICAN decision to leave Siberia became the signal 
 for widespread rumors of Japanese intentions in Siberia. The 
 State Department learned that there was fairly good, though not con¬ 
 clusive, evidence available in Warsaw, indicating that Germany and 
 Japan were aligning Poland on their side against Great Britain, France, 
 and the United States in an attempt to effect a virtual control of 
 Russia. * 1 On February 19 David B. Macgowan, new consul at Vladi¬ 
 vostok, cabled that an official radio from Alexandrovsk, Russian Sak¬ 
 halin, reported that Japanese warships had been trying to land troops 
 
 there for the last three days. 2 _S tev ens reportedjhatthe Japanese army 
 
 was supporting Semenov in every way to delay the movement* oTthe 
 Czechs/ 3 The Bolsheviks^ on the'other hand] were doing everything*' 
 possible to aid in the movement. Stevens urged the State Department 
 to protest agamWThUohstructlveTacfics of the Japanese. He added, 
 “They will not admit charge of obstruction but they are accomplished 
 liars.” 4 
 
 On February 22 the Bolsheviks signed an armistice with the 
 Czechs. 5 They also attempted to come to terms with the Japanese 
 through peace proposals, reminding them of their common interests in 
 the Far East. 6 These efforts were fruitless. The Japanese continued 
 
 1 Polk to American Legation at Warsaw, Jan. 28, 1920, file 861.00/62583, D.S.N.A. 
 On Feb. 3 the same rumor was reported with further evidence from Warsaw (Gibson 
 [Warsaw] to Lansing, Feb. 3, 1920, file 861.00/6293, D.S.N.A.). 
 
 2 Macgowan to Lansing, Feb. 19, 1920, file 861.00/6478, D.S.N.A. 
 
 3 Stevens to Lansing, Feb. 18, 1920, file 861.00/6382, D.S.N.A. 
 
 4 Stevens to Lansing, Feb. 20, 1920, file 861.00/6414, D.S.N.A. 
 
 B Harris to Polk, Feb. 22, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, III, 564- 
 565. 
 
 8 Minister in Sweden to Lansing, Feb. 26, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 
 J920, III, 448. 
 
JAPAN, SAKHALIN, AND THE MARITIME PROVINCE 185 
 
 their obstructing tactics against the Czechs. Stevens reported that the ' 
 Czechs would probably fight anybody or everybody to get out if such ' \ c 
 activities continued. 7 Stevens had agreed to remain in Siberia until 
 the complete evacuation of the Czechs had been accomplished, despite 
 the fact that American troops were already being evacuated. 
 
 American cruiser, remained at Vladivostok to safe¬ 
 guard American Tnfefests-t here. 8 
 
 On February 25 the Japanese-Cabinet announced its decision to 
 recommend to the Diplomatic Advisory Council the gradual with¬ 
 drawal of all Japanese troops from Siberia. 9 However, these professed 
 plans were interrupted by two “incidents” which provoked an ex¬ 
 tension rather than a reduction in the Japanese occupation of Siberia. 
 The first of these incidents resulted in the massacre of an alleged six 
 hundred Japanese residents and soldiers at Nikolaevsk, Siberia, on 
 March 15, 1920. The Russian and Japanese versions of the affair were 
 totally different. Each blamed the other for beginning the attack. 10 \ 
 News of the massacre was first given out to the press of the world on 1 
 March 28, 1920. At first the affair excited little comment. Later, \ 
 however, the Japanese government used the incident to arouse the > 
 feelings of its nationals against the Siberians. It was also used as a i 
 reason for retaining Japanese forces in Siberia. 
 
 Before the Nikolaevsk massacre occurred, the American Military 
 Intelligence in Siberia had been convinced that the Japanese would 
 shortly launch an attack in Eastern Siberia for the purpose of forcibly 
 taking possession of the Maritime Province. This conviction was 
 based on knowledge of thorough preparations at Vladivostok for an 
 attack upon the province. 
 
 The United States government was also informed of the possibility 
 of the second “incident” before it actually occurred. On April 1 
 Frank King, Associated Press correspondent in Vladivostok, told Gen¬ 
 eral Graves that he had reliable information that “the Japanese Military 
 Party in a few days would do something in Siberia to which the Civil 
 Party in Japan would be opposed” and that the Russian account of the 
 Nikolaevsk affair was the correct one. General Graves cabled this 
 statement to the United States. 11 
 
 7 Stevens to Lansing, Feb. 28, 1920, file 861.00/6474, D.S.N.A. 
 
 8 Daniels to Lansing, March 19, 1920, file 861.00/6606, D.S.N.A. 
 
 8 Morris to Acting Secretary of State, Feb. 25, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 
 1920, III, 504. 
 
 10 For the Russian and Japanese versions of the incident, see Varneck and Fisher, 
 Testimony of Kolchak., pp. 331-364; Young, Japan Under Taisho Tenno, pp. 181-187. 
 
 11 Memorandum Prepared by Military Intelligence on Fighting at Nikolaevsk, Nov. 
 10, 1921, file 861.00/9103, D.S.N.A. 
 
186 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 In accordance with King’s prediction, the second incident occurred 
 on the night of April 4, 1920. The Japanese captured the city of 
 Vladivostok. Admiral Albert Gleaves, commander-in-chief of the 
 United States Asiatic fleet, reported that the occupation “was evidently 
 done according to a preconceived plan,” and without any provocation 
 by the Russians. 12 Japan reported that her actions were defensive; the 
 Russians had begun the attack. Macgowan and Harris had no evidence 
 to indicate that the Russians had even answered the fire. Colonel 
 Winterburn of the United States Army, an eyewitness to the affair, 
 reported that the Japanese capture of Vladivostok was entirely without 
 Russian provocation. He stated that the Japanese had made elaborate 
 plans for the action. 13 
 
 On April 11 Admiral Gleaves submitted a summary of Japanese 
 activities in Siberia. He reported that after reading all naval intelli¬ 
 gence reports on the incident, he felt that “beyond question the Jap¬ 
 anese occupation of Vladivostok was premeditated and fully arranged 
 for and that it was accompanied by the practically simultaneous occupa¬ 
 tion of all important places in the Maritime District as far as Hab- 
 arovsk.” It was further apparent that Japan’s explanation of the in¬ 
 cident was untrue, and designed to “deceive the neutral nations and 
 more particularly the civilian population.” Gleaves was convinced 
 that Japan intended to control Eastern Siberia. He felt that in time 
 this action would have far-reaching effects on American prestige in the 
 Far East and would bar the extension of trade and influence in Siberia. 
 He urged the American government to prevent the extension of Jap¬ 
 anese influence before the situation becomes “so acute as to lead to war 
 between the two countries.” Opposed to halfway measures, the Ad¬ 
 miral insisted that any protest by America should be backed by ade¬ 
 quate force. 14 
 
 Ambassador Morris substantiated the views of Gleaves, adding that 
 
 12 Gleaves to Office of Naval Operations, April 5, 1920, WA-6. Siberia, Conditions 
 in Vladivostok, Naval Records Collection. The last American troops had departed on 
 April 1. 
 
 13 Memorandum by J. P. Jameson of an Interview with Colonel Winterburn, Nov. 19, 
 1920, file 861.00/7796, D.S.N.A. At the end of March General Graves had noted 
 that Japanese troops were digging trenches and filling sandbags near Vladivostok, as 
 though in preparation for a strong defense (Graves, America’s Siberian Adventure, pp. 
 326-328). On April 10 the Russian ambassador, very much alarmed over what Japan 
 was doing in Vladivostok, rushed to the State Department to find out whether the 
 United States planned to make a protest. Polk told him “that he thought not as we 
 had had an opportunity to make a protest and had let it go by” (Polk, Confidential 
 Diary, April 10, 1920). 
 
 14 Gleaves to Office of Naval Operations, April 11, 1920, Wilson Papers, series II; 
 Daniels to Colby, June 5, 1920, file 861.00/6999, D.S.N.A. 
 
JAPAN, SAKHALIN, AND THE MARITIME PROVINCE 1 87 
 
 all reports from American as well as other observers giving details of 
 Japanese military activities in Vladivostok alleged a concerted and un¬ 
 provoked attack by the Japanese followed by a general disarmament of 
 Russian soldiers and the arrest of large numbers of Koreans. There 
 were some indications that the Japanese Foreign Office was not fully 
 informed of the plans of the General Staff and was fearful of inter¬ 
 national opinion. Morris, however, had received no word either di¬ 
 rectly or indirectly from government officials. 15 
 
 The diplomatic corps in Tokyo was decidedly interested in the 
 American reaction to the Nikolaevsk massacre. The Russian ambassa¬ 
 dor could see nothing to criticize in Japan’s recent activities since they 
 had resulted “in the death of a few more Bolsheviki.” 16 Sir Charles 
 Eliot, the British ambassador, expressed a similar viewpoint. He told 
 Morris that British interest in Siberia was wholly an incident of the 
 war; the creation of the Kolchak government was simply another step 
 in the formation of a new Eastern Front. Since the Armistice made 
 further efforts of that character unnecessary, subsequent British sup¬ 
 port of Kolchak during 1919 was induced by a sense of honorable 
 obligation not to desert the movement simply because it was no longer 
 useful. The fall of Kolchak discharged this obligation. Great Britain 
 had no further political or national interest in such a remote territory 
 as Siberia. Eliot could therefore see no reason why his government 
 should interfere in the national aspirations of Japan. Differing from 
 all other countries, “the interests of Japan in Siberia were vital and 
 exciting.” Furthermore, the threat of Bolshevism was, in his judgment, 
 real. As Japanese citizens and business interests in the Maritime 
 Province were endangered, it seemed to Eliot only natural that Japan 
 should adopt rigorous measures to protect these interests. Morris was 
 concerned over Eliot’s views and expressed his anxiety to the State 
 Department. 17 
 
 Accounts from American diplomatic observers in the Far East led 
 Bainbridge Colby, the new Secretary of State, to ask Ambassador 
 Morris whether he believed that the Japanese government, despite its 
 assertions to the contrary, contemplated a permanent occupation of 
 Vladivostok and the surrounding territory. If Morris believed this to 
 be true, Colby felt that the retention of the American consular officials 
 
 10 Morris to Colby, April 13, 1920, file 861.00/6758, D.S.N.A.; Stevens to Colby, 
 April 7, 1920, file 861.00/6707, D.S.N.A. 
 
 16 Morris to Colby, April 13, 1920, file 861.00/6758, D.S.N.A. 
 
 17 Morris to Lansing, April 14, 1920, file 861.00/6762, D.S.N.A. The British gov¬ 
 ernment reported that it did not “share the views expressed by Sir Charles Eliot . . .” 
 (Davis to Colby, April 28, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, /920, I, 687-688). 
 
i88 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 in Siberia might appear to be a tacit acquiescence to Japan’s changed 
 policy. 18 Morris responded : 
 
 I regret to say I have never doubted for the past two years that the 
 Japanese General Staff has not only contemplated but has carefully laid 
 plans for the permanent occupation of Vladivostok and the Chinese Eastern 
 Railway should conditions so develop as to render such action practicable. 
 Since the armistice every development has led to the realization of this 
 ambition, cherished by the Japanese military leaders. The increasing 
 disorder and conflict in China, the collapse of anti-Bolshevik movements 
 in Russia, the failure of our Senate to ratify the peace treaty and the 
 consequent postponement of any effective League of Nations and finally 
 our withdrawal from claim on interest in Siberia have all combined to 
 create a situation peculiarly favorable to a policy of aggressive action by 
 Japan. Liberal and enlightened leaders here are opposed to this policy 
 but the trend of world events has been steadily against them and our sudden 
 withdrawal [of] cooperation in Siberia was as I stated at the time a stun¬ 
 ning blow. For the moment the military group appear to be in full con¬ 
 trol and they have lost no time in putting their plans into operation. Such 
 is my personal interpretation of the recent developments in Eastern Siberia. 
 But even if all the information received by the Department appeared to 
 confirm my interpretation of the facts I do not think we are as yet justified 
 in assuming officially that the Japanese Government has changed its previ¬ 
 ously announced policy. Such an assumption would in my judgment be 
 premature and if acted on too hastily might only serve further to strengthen 
 the military control here, alienate liberal opinion in Japan and make future 
 course even more difficult . 19 
 
 On April 25 the Japanese Foreign Office issued a statement concern¬ 
 ing the Nikolaevsk massacre which seemed to lend strength to Mor¬ 
 ris’s statement. The Japanese government had decided to dispatch a 
 contingent of soldiers to Nikolaevsk to protect Japanese residents. 
 Since ice made it impossible to go directly to the district, the con¬ 
 tingent was to be sent via Sakhalin. It would remain at Alex- 
 androvsk, Sakhalin, until the freezing season was over, in the mean¬ 
 time protecting the Japanese residents in that locality. This was the 
 first public announcement of Japanese activities in Northern Sakhalin 
 since Macgowan’s telegram to the Department from Vladivostok on 
 February 19. 20 The Foreign Office statement regarding Nikolaevsk 
 was followed on May 6 by an announcement from General Oi “that 
 
 18 Colby to Morris, April 20, 1920, file 861.00/6737, D.S.N.A. 
 
 10 Morris to Colby, April 27, 1920, file 861.00/6832, D.S.N.A. 
 
 20 Morris to Colby, April 25, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, /920, III, 
 511-512. 
 
JAPAN, SAKHALIN, AND THE MARITIME PROVINCE 1 89 
 
 with the consent of all the Allied powers the Japanese Government will 
 begin military operations in Siberia to suppress Bolshevism.”* 1 
 
 The State Department was quite concerned over both these state¬ 
 ments, particularly since the Siberian press reported that the Japanese 
 Siberian policy was not independent but had the approval of the Allies. 
 General Oi himself reported that the Japanese occupation of Man¬ 
 churia and Siberia had been made with the consent of all the Allied 
 powers. Caldwell asserted that the Russians were beginning to believe 
 this news, since no American contradiction was issued. 22 Secretary 
 Colby immediately issued a statement of denial for publication in 
 Vladivostok, Harbin, and Peking. 23 
 
 On June 9 the Japanese Foreign Office reported that the one hun¬ 
 dred Japanese residents who had survived the Nikolaevsk massacre had 
 apparently been slaughtered on May 25- 24 The first two weeks in 
 June witnessed a campaign of propaganda in the Japanese press for 
 the purpose of arousing public opinion in connection with the Nik¬ 
 olaevsk affair. The press was full of graphic accounts of the tragedy. 
 People were demanding an investigation of the facts. Many advocated 
 that Japan take over the entire Maritime Province and Northern 
 Sakhalin until a recognized Russian government provided reparation 
 for the incident. 25 In contrast to this view, other elements in Japan at¬ 
 tacked the military with the charge that the whole Nikolaevsk busi¬ 
 ness was a “frame-up” created by the Japanese War Office as an “inci¬ 
 dent” to give the military party another opportunity to emerge with 
 honor, prestige, and the renewed confidence of the public. 26 
 
 On July 3 the Japanese government informed the State Department 
 of the policy it proposed to pursue in regard to the Nikolaevsk affair. 
 Since there was no Russian government to which the Japanese govern¬ 
 ment could protest, it had “no alternative but to seize and occupy cer¬ 
 tain points in the Province of Sakhalien until a legal government shall 
 have been established in Russia and the present question satisfactorily 
 adjusted.” At the same time, the Japanese government reported tha£- 
 since the Czechoslovaks had now departed, it was withdrawing 
 Japanese forces from the region of the Trans-Baikal. However, as the 
 
 21 Stevens to Colby, May 6, 1920, file 861.00/6880, D.S.N.A. 
 
 22 Caldwell to Colby, May 1, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, /920, III, 512- 
 513; Caldwell to Colby, May 3, 1920, file 861.00/6859, D.S.N.A. 
 
 23 Colby to Morris, May 7, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, III, 513. 
 
 24 Bell to Colby, June 9, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, III, 513. 
 
 26 Bell to Colby, June 18, 1920, file 861.00/7044, D.S.N.A.; Bell to Colby, June 26, 
 
 1920, file 861.00/7169, D.S.N.A. 
 
 20 Miles M. Sherower, “The Nikolaevsk Massacre,” Nation, III (Aug. 21, 1920), 
 
 211-213. 
 
19 ° America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 situation in Vladivostok still constituted a direct menace to Korea, 
 Japanese troops would be maintained in that area as well as at Khab¬ 
 arovsk, which afforded a direct line of communication with the 
 province of Sakhalin. 27 
 
 The State Department expressed its gratification over the con¬ 
 templated withdrawal of troops from the Trans-Baikal, but reserved 
 opinion on the maintenance of Japanese forces in the vicinity of 
 Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, on the grounds that it had insufficient 
 facts to form a judgment on the military necessity of such an action. 
 The Department, however, was quite frank in its disapproval of the 
 occupation of parts of Northern Sakhalin. While deploring the 
 slaughter at Nikolaevsk, the State Department could see no reason to 
 occupy Northern Sakhalin for crimes in which the people of that area 
 had played no part. Expressing his concern over the Japanese action, 
 Secretary Colby wrote: “I should be lacking in candor if I were to 
 cphceal from you the concern with which this government learns of a 
 decision so entirely at variance with the trust which we jointly as¬ 
 sumed and have sought to discharge in behalf of the distracted and 
 oppressed people of Siberia.” In conclusion, Colby added that the 
 United States government could not “participate in the announced 
 I decision of your Government with regard to Sakhalien, nor can it 
 ' recognize the occupation of said territory by any non-Russian author- 
 
 V ” 28 
 
 On August 13 the Japanese government replied to America’s pro¬ 
 test. It upheld the retention of troops in Vladivostok and Khabarovsk 
 on the grounds that it was a measure of self-defense absolutely neces¬ 
 sary not only for the protection of Japanese residents in that area, but 
 also for the preservation of order and security in Korea. Referring 
 to the occupation of Sakhalin, it pointed out that the action was un¬ 
 avoidable since there was no other means of securing redress for the 
 injuries so painfully received. The reply added “that it would be 
 entirely beside the mark if it were construed as an act of territorial ag¬ 
 gression.” 29 
 
 By the middle of September the Japanese had ordered the immedi- 
 
 27 Japanese Embassy to Department of State, July 3, 1920, United States, Foreign Re¬ 
 lations, /920, III, 516-517. 
 
 28 Colby to Japanese Ambassador, July 16, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 
 1920, III, 517-519. The State Department did not know that Nikolaevsk had been 
 incorporated into the province of Sakhalin by a Russian imperial decree in 1914 (United 
 States, Foreign Relations, 1920, III, 518, 521, 523). 
 
 29 Memorandum of Japanese Government to Department of State, United States, 
 .Foreign Relations, 1920, III, 522-524. 
 
JAPAN, SAKHALIN, AND THE MARITIME PROVINCE I9I 
 
 ate evacuation of their troops from the territory north of Nikolsk. The 
 Japanese press speculated as to whether the action was due to American 
 protests. 30 Evidently inspired by the Foreign Office, certain Japanese 
 papers reported that since nothing had been heard from the American 
 government in answer to Japan’s explanation of the reason for occupy¬ 
 ing Sakhalin, it might be assumed that America had accepted those 
 explanations. Yet intercepted messages, presumably sent by the Jap¬ 
 anese Minister of War to his military staff in Siberia, stated: “America’s 
 desire that we leave Siberia immediately has become serious question 
 which demands caution. . . . An immature act may destroy our aims 
 hence we must temporarily abandon plan to occupy Siberia and not 
 fortify districts where troops are.” 31 
 
 Throughout the winter of 1920 the State Department received regu¬ 
 lar reports on the activities of the Japanese military in Siberia. C. H. 
 Smith, American representative on the Inter-Allied Railway Commit¬ 
 tee, was convinced that the Japanese were in Siberia to stay unless the 
 Allies took some action against them. His patience in dealing with 
 them had been tried to the breaking point. He reported that the 
 actions of the Japanese military were “almost beyond belief.” 32 Mac- 
 gowan cabled from Vladivostok that robberies and murders in that 
 city were increasing daily. 33 Admiral Gleaves reported that between 
 October 6 and November i, 1920, thirteen Japanese transports and ten 
 thousand troops had arrived in Vladivostok. 34 By January, 1921, it 
 appeared that Japan had no intention of leaving Siberia. When 
 Premier Hara was questioned in the Diet concerning the retention of 
 troops in Siberia, he replied that they would be maintained there until 
 tranquillity had been restored. 35 At the same time it appeared that 
 the Japanese military were doing everything possible to prevent the 
 establishment of the desired “tranquillity.” To this end, they contin¬ 
 ued to support Semenov at Chita. 
 
 After the collapse of the Kolchak government, Semenov faced 
 
 30 The Minister for Foreign Affairs was credited with such a statement in an inter¬ 
 view on Sept. 15 (Bell to Colby, Sept. 15, 1920, file 861.00/7367, D.S.N.A.). 
 
 31 Department of State to Ambassador in Great Britain, Sept. 17, 1920, file 861.00/ 
 7356. Japanese actions were conformable with the evidence contained in the messages. 
 
 32 Smith to Colby, Oct. 6, 1920, file 861.77/1806, D.S.N.A. 
 
 33 Macgowan to Colby, Oct. 12, 1920, file 861.00/7512, D.S.N.A. 
 
 34 Gleaves to Office of Naval Operations, Nov. 1, 1920, file 861.00/7618, D.S.N.A. 
 The Japan Chronicle, a British publication at Kobe, as well as other anti-Japanese critics 
 reported that Japan had the deliberate purpose of holding Eastern Siberia permanently 
 (Current History, The New Yor!{ Times, XII, Sept., 1920, 983-986). 
 
 36 Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, pp. 214-215; Bell to Colby, Jan. 27, 1921, United 
 States, Foreign Relations, 1921, II, 701. 
 
192 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 nfW 
 
 0 
 
 competition for the control of Eastern Siberia from at least three other 
 Siberian governments: the Verkneudinsk, the Amur, and the Vladi¬ 
 vostok governments. Of these the Vladivostok government was the 
 most stable. Calling itself the Far Eastern Republic, it claimed to 
 include the territories of Trans-Baikal, Amur, Primorskaia, Sakhalin, 
 and Kamchatka. In addition, it claimed the right of way of the 
 Chinese Eastern Railway. The new government proclaimed the calling 
 of a constituent assembly and amnesty to all the soldiers of Kolchak 
 and Semenov, if they laid down their arms. Although it emphasized 
 the necessity of stopping the Red Army in its eastern march, it was 
 opposed to any aid or support by a foreign country, particularly Japan. 
 Furthermore, it desired the immediate withdrawal of all foreign 
 expeditionary forces from Siberia. 36 
 
 On March 22 the Far Eastern Republic made a formal protest to 
 the American government in regard to Japan’s continued occupation 
 of Vladivostok. It desired to know whether intervention was at an 
 iT&hd, or whether Japanese actions in Siberia were being carried on under 
 the original agreement for intervention made between the United 
 States and Japan. It pointed out that Japan showed no intentions of 
 I withdrawal, but on the contrary had begun the occupation of Sakhalin 
 in addition to the Maritime Province. The Far Eastern Republic 
 desired to know “when the United States Government which invited 
 he Japanese government to a military cooperation in the Russian Far 
 st” would declare that intervention was at an end. 37 
 The protest from the Far Eastern Republic was followed by the 
 news that Japan was extending her activities in Siberia. On March 
 23 the Japanese Minister of War announced the temporary military 
 occupation of important districts in Sakhalin. Furthermore, peace and 
 order were to be maintained in the districts of Nikolaevsk, De Castries, 
 Mago, Sophiesk, and other important districts by the temporary estab- 
 
 36 Tenney to Colby, May 18, 1920, Jenkins to Acting Secretary of State, Jan. 21, 
 1921, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, III, 549-550, 554-561. Six months 
 after it assumed power, the Far Eastern Republic succeeded in eliminating Semenov 
 from the Chita government, and thereafter Chita became the virtual capital of the Far 
 Eastern Republic. Tompkins, American-Russian Relations in the Far East, p. 154. The 
 Far Eastern Republic was largely the result of the planning of Alexander Krasnoshchekov, 
 whose experience during the intervention convinced him that the only answer to Japanese 
 imperialism in Siberia was the establishment of a democratic, non-Communist buffer 
 state in Eastern Siberia. He was able to come to an agreement with the Soviet gov¬ 
 ernment and the eventual result was the creation of the Far Eastern Republic (Stewart, 
 White Armies of Russia, p. 379; White, The Siberian Intervention, pp. 368-369). 
 
 37 Far Eastern Republic to United States of America, March 22, 1921, United States, 
 Foreign Relations, 1921, II, 739-741. 
 
JAPAN, SAKHALIN, AND THE MARITIME PROVINCE 193 
 
 lishment of a system of civil administration. 38 On March 31, 1921, in 
 view of an attempted coup d’etat at Vladivostok, Japan disarmed all 
 warring parties and announced that Japanese troops would permit no 
 further fighting in the zone occupied by them. 39 
 
 These declarations, coupled with the protest from the Far Eastern 
 Republic, resulted in the dispatch of another American note of protest 
 to the Japanese government on May 31, 1921. Retracing the history 
 of the joint Japanese-American expedition to Siberia, the note referred 
 to the American expectation that Japanese troops would be withdrawn 
 within a reasonable period after the withdrawal of American troops. 
 The State Department disapproved of Japanese military and civil occp- 
 pation of strategic Siberian districts. It pointed out that the establish¬ 
 ment of civil administration functioning under the authority of mili¬ 
 tary occupation lent to the occupation an appearance of permanence, 
 indicating a further encroachment upon Russian political and admin¬ 
 istrative rights. Such activities tended to increase rather than allay 
 the unrest and disorder in the occupied regions. The memorandum 
 then asserted that the Nikolaevsk issue was not fundamentally a ques¬ 
 tion of the validity of procedure under international law (i.e., the 
 validity of reprisal) but of the scrupulous fulfilment of the assurances 
 originally given to the Russian people. These assurances were .in¬ 
 tended to convey to the people of Russia a promise, on the part of 
 Japan and the United States, not to use the joint expedition, or any 
 incidents which might arise out of it, as an occasion to occupy territory, 
 even temporarily. The United States then categorically informed Japan 
 that it could neither then nor thereafter recognize as valid any claims 
 or titles arising out of the existing occupation and control, and that 
 it could not acquiesce in any action taken by the government of Japan 
 which might impair existing treaty rights or the political or territorial 
 integrity of Russia. 40 ^ 
 
 Replying on July 8, 1921, the Japanese carefully drew a distinction 
 between the joint expedition to Siberia in 1918, and the conditions 
 which had arisen since the American withdrawal. Japan could not 
 withdraw because she had to protect Japanese residents in the area. 
 In addition, the geographic propinquity of the districts of Vladivostok 
 and Nikolsk was bound to affect the security of the Korean frontier. 
 
 38 Bell to Colby, March 23, 1921, United States, Foreign Relations, 1921, II, 
 701-702. 
 
 39 Bell to Colby, April 1, 1921, United States, Foreign Relations, 1921, II, 721. 
 
 10 Department of State to Japanese Embassy, May 31, 1921, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1921, II, 702-704. 
 
194 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 The Sakhalin case was entirely different. The horrible massacre at 
 Nikolaevsk gave Japan no alternative but to occupy Sakhalin until the 
 affair could be settled. The note added that Japan had refrained from 
 taking sides in Russian affairs, and was doing everything possible to 
 restore order and stable authority in the Far East. Furthermore, an 
 early and complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Maritime 
 Province was being contemplated. The note concluded: 
 
 Nothing is further from the thought of the Japanese Government than 
 to take advantage of helpless conditions in Russia for prosecuting selfish 
 designs. Japan believes that she has shown very sympathetic interest in 
 the efforts of patriotic Russians aspiring to the unity and rehabilitation of 
 their country. The military occupation of the Russian Province of Sakhalin 
 will naturally come to an end as soon as a satisfactory settlement of the 
 question shall have been arranged with an orderly Russian Government. 41 
 
 Early in August, 1921, the Japanese Vice Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs informed the American charge of Japan’s intention to evacuate 
 Vladivostok at the opportune moment. However, withdrawal could 
 not take place until satisfactory guarantees had been obtained regarding 
 the protection of Japanese interests and subjects after the departure of 
 troops. 42 This news was followed on August 22 by a memorandum 
 from the Japanese government announcing that it was conducting nego¬ 
 tiations with the Far Eastern Republic. The proposed conference had 
 “essentially in view the conclusion of commercial arrangements, the 
 removal of the existing menace to the security of Japan and to the 
 lives and property of Japanese residents in Eastern Siberia, provision 
 of guarantees for the freedom of industrial undertakings in that region 
 and the prohibition of Bolshevik propaganda over the Siberian bor¬ 
 der.” 43 Japan reported that the negotiations were not calculated to 
 give her “any right or advantage of an exclusive character.” The 
 Nikolaevsk affair would not be discussed, but reserved for a later 
 occasion. Japan concluded with the information that if the conference 
 should succeed in settling the immediate issues at hand, the Japanese 
 government would at once proceed to withdraw its troops from the 
 Maritime Province. 44 
 
 41 Japanese Embassy to Department of State, United States, Foreign Relations, 
 1921, II, 707-710. 
 
 43 Bell to Colby, Aug. 8, 1921, United States, Foreign Relations, 1921, II, 713. 
 
 43 It was Stevens’s belief that “If Japanese would take their intrigues and troops out 
 of the way the country would begin at once to return to normal conditions; Their con¬ 
 tinual howl about the Bolsheviks is only dragging herring across the trail” (Stevens to 
 Colby, July 30, 1921, file 861.00/8886, D.S.N.A.). 
 
 44 Shidehara to Hughes, Aug. 22, 1921, United States, Foreign Relations, 1921, II, 
 
JAPAN, SAKHALIN, AND THE MARITIME PROVINCE 195 
 
 Japan’s notes of July 8 and August 22 required a definite statement 
 of policy from the State Department. Poole believed that these notes 
 indicated what was already understood; namely, that Japan intended 
 to continue its military occupation of the Russian Province of Sakhalin 
 indefinitely as an act of reprisal for the massacre of Japanese at Nik- 
 olaevsk, and that she was making troop withdrawal from the Mari¬ 
 time Province the basis for bargaining for concessions. He prepared 
 a suggested memorandum for transmission to the Japanese ambassador 
 in which he briefly surveyed the history of intervention, and then 
 urged “upon the Government of Japan, in the most earnest and friend¬ 
 ly manner, that all remaining troops be unconditionally withdrawn 
 from all Russian territory.” 45 Poole hoped that Secretary Hughes 
 would see upon reading the note that the United States could not let 
 Japan proceed without serious protest. Although he had limited the 
 memorandum to the moral issue created by Japan’s refusal to live up 
 to the promise given at the outset of intervention, Poole urged that 
 the Japanese ambassador be told orally also of the practical expediency 
 of withdrawing Japanese troops unconditionally. The memorandum 
 pointed out that as long as Japanese troops remained on Siberian soil, 
 there would be disorder and discontent in the occupied region. More¬ 
 over, in so far as Korea was concerned, any frontier was best pro¬ 
 tected from within. 46 Although Poole did not believe that the note 
 would bring about the withdrawal of troops from Sakhalin, he thought 
 it might have a generally deterrent effect upon Japanese aggression in 
 Siberia. 47 
 
 Henry P. Fletcher, the Under Secretary of State, read Poole’s 
 memorandum but did not believe it would accomplish anything if it 
 were delivered on the eve of the Washington Conference. He advised 
 that a similar memorandum might be offered at the conference itself. 
 This advice was evidently followed, for there is no indication that 
 the original note was ever sent. 48 
 
 On December 20 the National Assembly of the Far Eastern Re¬ 
 public presented another protest concerning Japanese activities in the 
 
 7 1 3 ' 7 I 5 - Shortly thereafter the American government ordered Consul Caldwell to go 
 to Chita on special duty as an observer of the negotiations between Japan and the 
 Far Eastern Republic. At his discretion Caldwell was to exert his influence to protect 
 American private interests (Hughes to Bell, Sept. 9, 1921, United States, Foreign Rela¬ 
 tions, 1921, II, 745-746). 
 
 45 Draft of a note by Poole, Sept. 20 (?), 1921, file 861.00/8797, D.S.N.A. 
 
 40 Poole to Hughes, Sept. 16, 1921, file 861.00/902514, D.S.N.A. 
 
 47 Poole to Hughes, Sept. 21, 1921, file 861.00/8797, D.S.N.A. 
 
 48 Fletcher to Hughes, Sept. 23, 1921, file 861.00/8797, D.S.N.A. 
 
196 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 Russian Far East. It averred that the Japanese were aiming to seize 
 their territory and turn it into a Japanese colony. Japan’s activities in 
 Siberia since the beginning of intervention were aimed at prolonging 
 civil war, thus creating conditions warranting the continuation of in¬ 
 tervention. By ruining the economic life of the Russian Far East, 
 Japan aimed to spread her own. The note also stated that at a recent 
 conference with Japan, she had attempted to obtain the consent of the 
 Far Eastern Republic to the retention of Japanese troops in Siberia. 
 Furthermore, Japan desired the destruction of fortifications in Russian 
 cities and concessions in the territory along the Tartar Straights—all 
 of which meant a loss of Russian sovereignty, and dependence upon 
 Japan politically and economically. Failing to obtain these concessions, 
 the Japanese had rendered assistance to a certain Spiridon Merkulov 
 to launch an attack against the Far Eastern Republic, for which the 
 Japanese supplied munitions. 49 Consul Caldwell substantiated the 
 information in the Far Eastern Republic’s memorandum, adding that 
 Japan’s demands had become even more insistent since the opening 
 of the Washington Conference. He, too, believed that Japan was re¬ 
 sponsible for the recent attack in the Maritime Province. 50 Letters 
 from individuals in private capacities in Sakhalin and Siberia indicated 
 that the activity of the Japanese in those areas hardly fell short of 
 conquest and occupation. Poole again advised a strong public pro¬ 
 test against the continuance of Japanese troops in Russian territory. 51 
 
 In lieu of sending an independent protest to Japan, the State De¬ 
 partment placed the Siberian question upon the agenda of the Wash¬ 
 ington Conference. However, less than two full sessions were devoted 
 to a discussion of it. At the conference, the United States hoped to 
 secure from Japan certain guarantees in regard to Siberia. Poole listed 
 them in a memorandum to Secretary Hughes: 
 
 (1.) An expression of intention to refrain from taking advantage of 
 present conditions in order to impair the rights of the Russian people or 
 Russian territorial (or administrative) integrity in Siberia. (Mention of 
 administrative integrity may have to be omitted since the occupation of 
 Sakhalin constitutes a clear instance of the impairment, thereof.) 
 
 (2.) An expression of intention to afford the people of Siberia the 
 fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity for the establishment of 
 effective and stable government. 
 
 u 49 A. Yazikiloff to Hughes, Dec. 20, 1921, United States, Foreign Relations, 1921, 
 II, 7 I 7 - 7 I 9 - 
 
 60 Warren to Hughes, Dec. 24, 1921, United States, Foreign Relations, 1921, II, 
 719-720. 
 
 51 Poole to Hughes, Dec. 20, 1921, file 861.00/9315, D.S.N.A. 
 
JAPAN, SAKHALIN, AND THE MARITIME PROVINCE 197 
 
 (3.) An expression of intention to maintain, pending the establishment 
 of recognized and stable government, the principle of equal opportunity for 
 the commerce and industry of all nations in Siberia, and to refrain from 
 taking advantage of present conditions in order to seek special rights and 
 privileges which would abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of 
 friendly states. 52 
 
 Although Japan had already pledged herself at various times to up¬ 
 hold statements similar to those presented in Poole’s memorandum, 
 nevertheless, her note of July 8, 1921, had tended to contradict the joint 
 pledges given by the United States and Japan upon entering Siberia. 
 
 On the eve of the Washington Conference Japan seemed firmly 
 entrenched in the Maritime Province and Sakhalin. Although she had 
 asserted in her last memorandum of July 8 that she was seriously con¬ 
 templating plans for an early withdrawal from the Maritime Province, 
 there had in fact been no diminution of the number of Japanese troops 
 in that region. On the contrary, an additional division had been dis¬ 
 patched. This had been ostensibly for the purpose of relieving one of 
 the two divisions already on duty, but there were no signs that the 
 relieved division was returning to Japan. Every indication pointed to 
 the retention of all three divisions. 
 
 In Sakhalin the Japanese had taken over the local administration 
 to the most minute detail. There was complete civil and economic, 
 as well as military, domination. The most important petroleum and 
 coal resources of the province were apparently being brought into the 
 exclusive and complete control of the Japanese. The State Depart¬ 
 ment learned that foreigners were excluded from the exploitation of 
 these natural resources. Russians might travel to Sakhalin only with-^ 
 Japanese permission. 53 On January 21, 1922, Macgowan reported con¬ 
 fidentially that Japan very shortly intended to proclaim the “temporary” 
 occupation of the Maritime Province and its administration by Jap¬ 
 anese officials and courts under the laws of Japan just as Sakhalin was 
 governed. Pretexts were to be created by provoking political dis¬ 
 turbances through the medium of a certain Hetman. 54 
 
 62 Poole to Hughes, Jan. 17, 1922, file 861.00/9316, D.S.N.A. 
 
 63 Division of Russian Affairs, Summary Statement of Facts Respecting the Continu¬ 
 ance of Japanese Military Forces in Siberia, Jan. 17, 1922, pp. 11-14, file 861.00/9316, 
 D.S.N.A. 
 
 61 Macgowan to Hughes, Jan. 21, 1922, file 861A.00/171, D.S.N.A. K. K. 
 Kawakami, Japanese observer at the Washington Conference, attempted to explain 
 Japan’s activities in Siberia to the American public: “I think that nothing is the matter 
 with Japan in Siberia, except that she has appeared upon the scene of international land¬ 
 grabbing just a little too late. Nothing except that she was sleeping a saindy sleep 
 when the great nations of Christendom were busy practicing the moral code of the dying 
 
198 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 On January 23, 1922, Baron Shidehara, the Japanese delegate to 
 the Washington Conference, put Japan’s case in Siberia before the Far 
 Eastern Committee of the conference, before any other delegation had 
 an opportunity to bring up the question. Recapitulating the entire 
 history of Allied military action in Siberia and the subsequent with¬ 
 drawal of all Allied troops but the Japanese, he justified their con¬ 
 tinued presence in Siberia as a necessity for protecting Japanese resi¬ 
 dents in the area and the Korean frontier. Furthermore, he added that 
 no part of the Maritime Province was under Japan’s military occupa¬ 
 tion. It was the established policy of the Japanese government not to 
 interfere with the various factions in Siberia. He admitted that Japan 
 had supported Semenov in 1918 at the beginning of intervention, but 
 had discontinued that support when she found that it complicated the 
 internal conditions of Siberia. The Japanese government was con¬ 
 sidering withdrawal, and would do so after the successful conclusion 
 of negotiations with the Far Eastern Republic. These negotiations 
 were not intended to secure any special advantages for Japan. As soon 
 as adequate provisions for the safety of Japanese residents were ac¬ 
 quired, the Japanese planned a complete withdrawal of troops from 
 the Maritime Province. The occupation of Sakhalin would be con¬ 
 tinued until Japanese differences were settled with an established 
 Russian government. However, the occupation was only a temporary 
 measure. In conclusion, the Baron stated: 
 
 The Japanese Delegation is authorized to declare that it is the fixed 
 and settled policy of Japan to respect the territorial integrity of Russia, and 
 to observe the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of that 
 country, as well as the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce 
 and industry of all nations in every part of the Russian possessions. 55 
 
 When J. P. Jameson, expert assistant to the Washington Confer¬ 
 ence, read Baron Shidehara’s concluding statement, he commented, 
 “The last paragraph is an excellent statement, but if this has been the 
 policy of Japan, it is strange that by all indications their intentions 
 have actually been the opposite.” 56 
 
 patriarch, My son, get money—honestly, if you can, but get money! Japan’s sin, if sin 
 it be, lies in her eleventh hour entrance into the company of international freebooters, 
 who having divided among themselves all the riches of the world, are now putting forth 
 a Sunday front and preaching morals to the belated Japanese” (Kawakami, Japan's 
 Pacific Policy, New York, 1922, pp. 226-227). 
 
 EE Conference on Limitation of Armanents, pp. 1394-1400; file 861.00/9239, 
 D.S.N.A. For a sympathetic view of Shidehara’s speech, see Kawakami, Japan's Pacific 
 Policy, pp. 242-243. 
 
 C0 Memorandum of J. P. Jameson, Jan. 23, 1922, file 861.00/9239, D.S.N.A. 
 
JAPAN, SAKHALIN, AND THE MARITIME PROVINCE 199 
 
 In general, Shidehara’s statement of the Siberian question was 
 simply a compilation of the various notes which Japan had written in 
 the past on the subject of withdrawal of troops and the Sakhalin 
 Province. On the surface it seemed a reasonable statement of Japan’s 
 position in Siberia. 
 
 Jameson, who analyzed the Japanese note, made some rather sig¬ 
 nificant comments. He pointed out that, although the Japanese spoke 
 of their purpose in assisting the Czechs to evacuate, they made 
 no mention of the fact that Japanese military authorities had delib¬ 
 erately hindered that evacuation, especially through the Trans-Baikal 
 Province. Moreover, Japan had omitted Sakhalin from the list of the 
 “only” regions left to be evacuated. The Japanese neglected to note 
 that the places where Japanese residents were most endangered and 
 molested had been the places at which Japanese troops were stationed. 
 Furthermore, there was no reason why the Japanese residents should 
 not withdraw. American residents had done so or were permitted 
 to remain only at their own risk. In so far as protecting Korea was 
 concerned, the proper place for that defense was in Korean territory. 
 American reports disproved Japanese claims that she was not in 
 effective military occupation of the Maritime Province and that she 
 was neutral in Siberian affairs. These reports also indicated that 
 Japan still supported Semenov. Despite Shidehara’s conciliatory atti¬ 
 tude, he had set no definite date for Japan’s withdrawal. Japanese 
 actions did not bear out her statement that nothing was further from 
 her thought than to take advantage of the present helplessness of 
 Russia to secure any advantages. The American government had 
 facts which indicated that Japan had made outrageous demands upon 
 representatives of the Far Eastern Republic at Chita, while Japan ad¬ 
 mitted that she would occupy Sakhalin pending the establishment of 
 responsible Russian authority. 57 
 
 Jameson insisted that American acquiescence to the Japanese state¬ 
 ment would put the stamp of American approval upon Japan’s past 
 acts in Siberia. He believed that America’s failure to protest publicly 
 against Japan’s continued presence would confirm Russian suspicions 
 that America was a party to the aggressive action of Japan in Siberia 
 and approved of her continued occupation. Referring to Japan’s prom¬ 
 ise to withdraw, he pointed out that she made such a promise when 
 she first sent troops into Siberia and had been making the same state¬ 
 ment for months. Instead of fulfilling it, she had continually made 
 excuses for remaining. Her actions in Korea, Manchuria, and Shan- 
 
 67 Memorandum of J. P. Jameson, Jan. 23, 1922, file 861.00/9239, D.S.N.A. 
 
200 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 tung were excellent examples of what might be expected in Siberia. 
 Jameson believed that the present time was the crucial moment for 
 Siberia and that should the powers not oppose Japan’s aggressive ac¬ 
 tions, she would eventually occupy a position in Siberia such as she 
 occupied in South Manchuria, even though eventual annexation did 
 not occur. He added: 
 
 In a word, it will mean the closing of the “open door” of equal op¬ 
 portunity in Siberia. It will mean that the integrity of Russian territory 
 has been violated without a public protest of the United States. We can¬ 
 not escape our responsibility, not only because of our promise to the Russian 
 people on the occasion of our joint military expedition with Japan in Si¬ 
 beria, but also because the United States has assumed the moral trusteeship 
 of Russian rights at this conference. 58 
 
 Jameson was convinced that Japan would continue her aggressive 
 activities in Siberia for many years unless the other powers made a 
 concerted movement to force her to withdraw. Although he knew 
 that the United States would not go to war over the matter, neverthe¬ 
 less, he felt that since the United States had assumed the moral trustee¬ 
 ship over Russian rights, it should make a definite request for the 
 withdrawal of Japanese troops from Siberia. If Japan refused, at least 
 the United States would have made clear to the world that it was “not 
 sanctioning or participating in the betrayal of the Russian people by 
 acquiescing in Japanese aggression in Siberia.” He enclosed a draft 
 statement for the proposed resolution. 59 Although the draft was not 
 accepted, Jameson’s suggestions were incorporated into the reply which 
 Secretary Hughes delivered to the conference on January 24, 1922. 
 
 Secretary Hughes traced the history of the Siberian expedition, care¬ 
 fully indicating Japan’s agreement to respect the territorial integrity 
 of Russia and “to immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from 
 Russian territory,” as soon as the temporary exigency was over. Hughes 
 observed that after her withdrawal America had continued to be a 
 close observer of events in Eastern Siberia, maintaining extended dip¬ 
 lomatic correspondence upon the subject with the Japanese govern- 
 
 68 Jameson to Hughes, Jan. 24, 1922, file 861.00/9240, D.S.N.A. 
 
 69 Jameson to Hughes, Jan. 24, 1922, file 861.00/9240, D.S.N.A. Thomas F. 
 Millard pointed out that the United States would not lose too much if the Siberian 
 question remained unsettled. On the contrary, it might work to her advantage to have 
 the situation continued for several reasons. It kept alive antagonism between Japan 
 and Russia. It was a severe drain on Japanese finances and kept her aggressive tend¬ 
 encies occupied, thus lessening the probability of their finding expression elsewhere. 
 Finally, by exposing to the world Japan’s imperialistic designs, it weakened her moral 
 position. For these reasons, America’s position versus Japan’s would be immeasureably 
 strengthened (Millard, Conflict of Policies in Asia, pp. 286-287). 
 
201 
 
 JAPAN, SAKHALIN, AND THE MARITIME PROVINCE 
 
 ment. Hughes frankly avowed that “this correspondence has not al> 
 ways disclosed an identity of views between the two Governments.” 
 He then reiterated the views of the United States on the continued 
 occupation of the Maritime Province and Sakhalin. Since no agree¬ 
 ment could be reached on the matter, Hughes fell back upon the de¬ 
 vice of “reading into the record” the correspondence and debates that 
 had taken place. 60 - 
 
 Stevens was very much disappointed by the apparent acquiescence 
 of the conference to Japan’s continued occupation of Vladivostok and 
 the Maritime Province. Convinced that there was no possibility of an 
 open door in these circumstances, he added that further discussions 
 concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway would be fruitless as long 
 as Japan controlled the outlet of the Chinese Eastern, the port of 
 Vladivostok. If the conference intended to do no more than to write 
 its protests into the record, Stevens felt that he had no choice but to 
 turn in his resignation. 61 The Far Eastern Repub lic, on t he other^ / 
 hand, expressed its gratitude" for the position America had taken in I 
 regafdro the intervention. 62 ~~ ~ - 
 
 By the summer oF 1922 Allied censure, as well as the increasing 
 disapproval of the Japanese people, was having its effect on the plans 
 of the Japanese military party in Siberia. In June, 1922, members of 
 the House of Commons repeatedly requested the British government 
 to ask Japan to evacuate Siberia without further delay. 63 Bitter de¬ 
 nunciation of the expedition grew in Japan both within and outside the 
 Diet. On June 24, 1922, Admiral Kato announced the intended evacu¬ 
 ation of troops from Siberia at the end of October, 1922. 64 The Jap¬ 
 anese government formally announced this decision to the American 
 government on the same day. 65 
 
 Japan’s announced withdrawal from Siberia did not mention 
 
 00 Conference on Limitation of Armanents, pp. 1404-1412; Mark Sullivan, The 
 Great Adventure at Washington (New York, 1922), pp. 241-244; Tompkins, Ameri- 
 can-Russian Relations in the Far East, p. 178. 
 
 61 Stevens to Hughes, Jan. 31, 1922, file 861.77/2588, D.S.N.A. The State De¬ 
 partment dissuaded Stevens from resigning. 
 
 62 Poole to Hughes, Feb. 2, 1922, file 861A.00/265, D.S.N.A. The Peking and 
 Tientsin Times, one of the leading Chinese journals, also praised Mr. Hughes’s declara¬ 
 tion on Siberia and applauded America’s position (Poole to Hughes, March 10, 1922, file 
 861A.01/266, D.S.N.A.). 
 
 83 Phillips to George Harvey (ambassador to Great Britain), June 3, 1922, file 
 861 A.oi/277a, D.S.N.A.; Great Britain, House of Commons Debates, fifth series, CLIV, 
 685, 1410, 1570. 
 
 84 Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, p. 215. 
 
 88 Japanese charge d’affaires to Hughes, June 24, 1922, United States, Foreign Rela¬ 
 tions, 1922, II, 853. 
 
202 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 withdrawal from Sakhalin Island. Secretary Hughes therefore dis¬ 
 patched a note to Japan which, while indicating America’s gratification 
 over Japan’s proposed withdrawal from the mainland of Siberia, re¬ 
 minded her that American protests at the Washington Conference 
 against Japanese occupation of Siberian territory included Sakhalin 
 Island to an equal degree. 66 Charles Warren, the American am¬ 
 bassador to Japan, made these views known to Viscount Uchida. The 
 Foreign Office replied with a public statement to the effect that the 
 Japanese government would withdraw all troops from the districts 
 opposite the Island of Sakhalin, but would not terminate its occupation 
 of the island itself until a satisfactory settlement for the Nikolaevsk 
 affair had been obtained. 67 
 
 At a conference which was held between the Japanese and the Far 
 Eastern Republic at Changchun, on September 5, 1922, the latter also 
 protested the Japanese intention to continue the occupation of North¬ 
 ern Sakhalin, repeating the American view that there was no neces¬ 
 sary connection between the massacre at Nikolaevsk and the occupa¬ 
 tion of the adjoining Sakhalin territory. Although quite willing to 
 discuss with Japan the question of compensation for the loss of Jap- 
 : anese lives at Nikolaevsk, the Far Eastern Republic at the same time 
 if^ intended to present large counterclaims based upon the destruction of 
 Russian lives and property by the Japanese elsewhere in Siberia during 
 the military occupation. The Far Eastern Republic appealed to the 
 United States to bring pressure to bear in order to induce Japan to re¬ 
 linquish Sakhalin. The State Department felt that any action on their 
 part would simply arouse Japanese resentment. Therefore, no action 
 was taken. 68 
 
 The Changchun Conference failed primarily because of differences 
 of opinion on Sakhalin. During the conference Japan expressed a wish 
 to buy Sakhalin or lease it for a long time. Failing this, she desired 
 to secure the exclusive privilege of holding concessions in the Russian 
 part of the island. However, the Far Eastern Republic was firm in 
 refusing these demands and announced its desire to pursue the open- 
 r Ydoor policy if American capital took an active interest in developing 
 ‘ Sakhalin. 69 
 
 'Hughes to Warren, June 27, 1922, United States, Foreign Relations, 1922, II, 
 Warren to Hughes, July 14, 1922, United States, Foreign Relations, 1922, II, 
 
 854. 
 
 e', 
 
 855. 
 
 68 Poole to Phillips, Sept. 25, 1922, United States, Foreign Relations, 1922, II, 856- 
 857; Young, Japan Under Taisho Tenno, pp. 273-276. 
 
 89 Warren to Hughes, Oct. 26, 1922, file 861A.01/412, D.S.N.A. 
 
JAPAN, SAKHALIN, AND THE MARITIME PROVINCE 
 
 Despite the failure of the Changchun Conference, Japan continn 
 her withdrawal from the mainland of Siberia. On October 26 the 
 Secretary of State received news that the last Japanese transport had 
 left Vladivostok. 70 On the same day the forces of the Far Eastern 
 Republic entered the city. On November 3, 1922, the Far Eastern Re¬ 
 public conveyed its thanks to the American government for its 
 “friendly interest” in helping to bring about the Japanese evacuation 
 from the Siberian mainland. 71 On November 17 the Far Eastern 
 Republic voluntarily abolished itself and became an “inseparable and 
 integral part of Soviet Russia.”' 2 Two years later, on January 20, 1925, 
 after Japan had recognized the Soviet government, an agreement was 
 negotiated settling their outstanding difficulties, and the Japanese army 
 evacuated Northern Sakhalin. 73 ^ 
 
 70 Vice-consul at Vladivostok to Hughes, Oct. 26, 1922, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1922, III, 864; Leo Pasvolsky, “Russia Takes Over Vladivostok,” Current 
 History, XVI (Dec. 1922), 499-501. 
 
 71 Poole to Hughes, Nov. 3, 1922, United States, Foreign Relations, 1922, II, 866. 
 
 72 Poole to Hughes, Nov. 3, 1922, United States, Foreign Relations, 1922, II, 867; 
 New York Times, Nov. 18, 1922. 
 
 73 New York Times, May 13, 1925; A. L. P. Dennis, “The New Russo-Japanese 
 Treaty Explained,” Current History, XXI (May, 1925), 240-244; Victor A. Yakhontoff 
 Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East (New York, 1931), pp. 404-410. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 Allied Withdrawal from the Chinese 
 Eastern Railway 
 
 T HE DECISION to withdraw American troops from Siberia 
 initiated the final phase of America’s program to stop Japan 
 from gaining control of the Chinese Eastern Railwa y. According to 
 the In ter-Allied-Railway Agreem'e'nFof TamTarv- xs. iqiq. the assistance 
 of forHg n railway expertr in the operati on o-f-th ^ Tr ttns-Siberian and 
 Chinese Eastern Railways was to cease upon the withdrawal of the 
 forelp n irrilirarv fa ixes-inxm Siheria. ~The experiences of recent months. 
 in the operation of the railways furnished the State Department with 
 a strong reason for abiding by the terms of the original agreement. 
 It had, therefore, decided upon arrangements for the withdrawal of 
 American railway experts simultaneously with the departure of Ameri¬ 
 can military forces. 1 
 
 The projected withdrawal of American troops and railway experts 
 forced the State Department to reconsider its policy in regard to the 
 Chinese Eastern Railway. ’f^he-Chines e. gover nment^ was considering 
 the po^sibilhy-<)f‘tlMT^m¥«£TulI^pntrol_ofjh£^hinese_Ea^mTla1t- 
 Wav a nd xetaim ng John F. Stevens and a selected staff to operate it? 
 
 ,""Financial assistance was 1 
 
 sssa-ry-ter^nramplish this, andThe Ameri- 
 can Legation at Peking desired to know whether the project should 
 be encouraged. 2 Morris had already reported the disturbing news that 
 Japan would probably withdraw her troops from the Amur Railway 
 and concentrate them along the line of the Chinese Eastern Railway, 
 establishing as much control over the operation of the railway as could 
 be secured without unduly exciting Russian and Chinese feeling. 3 In 
 
 1 Lansing to Shidehara, Jan. 9, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, /920, III, 
 489. 
 
 3 Tenney to Lansing, Jan. 15, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 
 679. 
 
 3 Morris to Lansing, Jan. 14, 1920, file 861.00/6134, D.S.N.A. 
 
ALLIED WITHDRAWAL FROM THE RAILWAY 
 
 205 
 
 view of this news from Peking and Tokyo, the American government 
 was faced with an important decision. As Poole pointed out, it would 
 obviously be advantageous for future trade in Manchuria if the Chinese 
 Eastern could be brought under Chinese control and operated by an 
 American. On the other hand, such an action would bring the United 
 States into a sharp conflict of interests with the Japanese and strengthen 
 the Japanese allegation that the United States had not dealt honestly 
 with them. Poole concluded, “Moreover, I do not know where the 
 necessary financial assistance may be drawn. I believe therefore that 
 China should not be encouraged in this enterprise.” China was in¬ 
 formed accordingly. 4 
 
 Poole believed that the United States should do everything possible 
 to prevent the Japanese from establishing complete control over the 
 Chinese Eastern Railway and thus strengthening their claim to special 
 or vested interests in Northern Manchuria. Poole’s views were in¬ 
 corporated into a memorandum and sent to the Japanese ambassador. 
 The memorandum pointed out that the American government was 
 “not disposed to object to any reasonable measures which Japan may 
 decide to take in Eastern Siberia with a view to halting the advance of 
 Bolshevism and bringing about a stable economic and political situa¬ 
 tion, provided that the measures taken do not prejudice Russia’s exist¬ 
 ing rights in this region proper to the establishment of a competent 
 Russian Government.” At the same time, the Japanese ambassador 
 was informed that the “situation in Manchuria must be conside 
 somewhat apart.” This was Chinese territory, the railroad having 
 been leased to Russia. The interests of China were directly involved. 
 Thus it was necessary to avoid all measures in the railroad zone which 
 might prejudice the interests of either Russia or China. Moreovef*- 
 the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement had explicitly stated that the 
 Trans-Siberian anTp-Chinese Eas tern Kailways would jTftimarelv be 
 "returned to the parties in interest 
 "Ihg rights' 
 
 _any of th e ex ist-. 
 
 Sirice this was one^tf the underlying principles of Ameri¬ 
 can and" 7 apanese action in Manchuria, Japan might be assured of 
 America’s confidence that the Japanese government would not depart 
 from that principle in any way. 5 
 
 On January 20 the State Department learned that Horvat had issued 
 a proclamation announcing his assumption of all the governmental 
 
 4 Poole to Lansing, Jan. 16, 1920, file 861.77/1461, D.S.N.A.; Lansing to Tenney, 
 Jan. 19, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 680. 
 
 6 Poole to Lansing, Jan. 16, 1920, file 861.77/1461, D.S.N.A.; Department of State 
 to the Japanese Embassy, Jan. 30, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, III, 
 501-502. 
 
20 6 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 powers of the Russian people within the jurisdiction of the Chinese 
 Eastern Railway. 0 The Chinese government immediately filed a pro¬ 
 test stating that as the Chinese Eastern Railway was in Chinese terri¬ 
 tory throughout its length and under Chinese territorial sovereignty, 
 no other nation could be permitted to exercise its national sovereignty 
 therein. Furthermore, the powers of General Horvat were simply 
 those of an official of the railway, and as such he was invested with 
 no national sovereign powers whatsover. Finally, the terms of the 
 Chinese Eastern Railway Agreement vested entirely in the Chinese 
 government the duty of protecting the Russian officials of the railway 
 as well as the Chinese and foreign residents of the railway zone. 7 
 
 On February 11 Horvat informed Stevens that the Japanese gov¬ 
 ernment had offered the Chinese Eastern Railway a five-year loan of 
 twenty million yen without security—simply receipt of the railway. 
 When Stevens’s advice was solicited, he told Horvat “to let it alone,” 
 pointing out that if the loan were consummated it would mean 
 Japanese domination. At the same time the Chinese government, in 
 an effort to control the Chinese Eastern Railway, was trying to appoint 
 a majority of its directors. It was also threatening covertly to take 
 charge by force. However, Stevens believed that China was helpless 
 alone. 8 Affairs were made still worse by the activities of the Japanese. 
 
 In an effort to create a chaotic situation, thereby justifying their 
 presence, they were supporting Semenov in every way to delay the 
 movement of the Czechs. They were even turning back locomotives 
 which Stevens had sent from Harbin to move the Czechs from 
 Irkutsk. 9 Stevens believed that if the United States did not take steps 
 to jitop Japan, it would have “much to regret in the future.” 10 
 - Towards the middle of April, 1920, the members of the Technical 
 Board, except for the Japanese member, drew up a formal resolution 
 protesting against the arbitrary conduct of the Japanese military repre¬ 
 sentatives within the railway zone. 11 Japan was undeterred by this 
 action. She seemed bent upon creating a situation which would give 
 \Jter an excuse to control the Chinese Eastern Railway. 12 She had 
 taken military occupation of important stations on the Chinese Eastern 
 
 8 United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 680. 
 
 7 Tenney to Lansing, Jan. 29, 1920, file 861.77/1323, D.S.N.A. 
 
 8 Stevens to Lansing, Feb. 11, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 680- 
 681. 
 
 8 Stevens to Lansing, Feb. 18, 1920, file 861.00/6382, D.S.N.A. 
 
 10 Stevens to Lansing, Feb. 11, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 
 680-681. 
 
 11 Robert T. Pollard, China’s Foreign Relations (New York, 1933), pp. 157-158. 
 
 18 Jenkins to Colby, April 16, 1920, file 861.77/1469, D.S.N.A. 
 
ALLIED WITHDRAWAL FROM THE RAILWAY 
 
 207 
 
 and had assumed complete control of the Siberian railway from Vladi¬ 
 vostok to Nikolsk. According to the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement, 
 the guarding of the Chinese Eastern Railway had been assigned to 
 the Chinese Army, which had faithfully performed its duty. Thus 
 there was no military necessity requiring Japanese intervention. Every¬ 
 thing had been moving smoothly until occupation by the Japanese mili¬ 
 tary forces. Although the Japanese justified their occupatioa~by_ the 
 terms of the Sino-Japanese Military A greemenT~of May, iqi8, th e 
 American government believed that th e acceptance of the Inter-Alli ed 
 Railway Agreement of 1919 by th e Japanese suspended for the time be- 
 ing'any treaty between China- an d Japan relative to the occup ancy *1 
 the Chinese Eastern zone Jw Japanese tr o ops. F urthermore, the State 
 Jartment believed that Japan should have notified the Allies of her 
 withdrawal from the railway agreement before placing her troops on 
 the Chinese Eastern. The Siberians assumed that the Allies must 
 certainly approve of Japan’s recent policy or she would not have 
 ventured to put such a policy in force. Stevens suggested that the 
 Allies, especially the United States, immediately ask Japan to explain 
 her action and define clearly her intentions concerning the Chinese 
 Eastern. 13 v 
 
 The chaotic situation on the Chinese Eastern Railway grew even 
 worse once the railway became intertwined in the concluding negoti¬ 
 ations for the establishment of a new four-power consortium. The 
 purpose of the new consortium was to make loans to China for eco¬ 
 nomic reconstruction and improved communications. Negotiations for 
 its organization were begun in June, 1918, but were delayed for two 
 years largely as a result of Japan’s attempt to get the other three 
 powers, Great Britain, France, and the United States, to exclude the 
 areas of Mongolia and Manchuria from the activities of the consorti¬ 
 um. 14 
 
 In February, 1920, the British government approached the United 
 States with an oral proposal that control of the Inter-Allied Board be 
 continued, that operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway be confined 
 to the Chinese, and that finances be arranged not by the Japanese but 
 by the consortium. Although the British proposal was a welcome 
 change from her earlier unco-operative attitude toward Siberian affairs, 
 
 13 Stevens to Colby, April 18, 1920, file 861.77/1470, D.S.N.A. 
 
 14 The negotiations were finally concluded in Oct., 1920. Frederic V. Field, Ameri¬ 
 can Participation in the China Consortiums (Chicago, 1931), pp. 142-166; M. J. 
 Bau, The Foreign Relations of China (New York, 1921), pp. 389-415. 
 
208 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 the American government made no response to her inquiry. 15 Lately 
 in February the British again urge d -u p o n -th^- Unired States the im- _ 
 pOrtance of taking Steps “rojwvent the rrmfrnl nf tVi p Phinpcr* Fngtprn 
 Hallway passing exclusively into the hands of any single power.” The 
 British attached the “greatest importance” to the continued exercise 
 of the functions of the Allied Technical Board at Harbin, and desired 
 them to remain at their posts as long as possible. Therefore, they 
 hoped that the United States would not withdraw the American 
 representatives from the board. 16 
 
 A few weeks later the British Foreign Office announced its in¬ 
 tention to retain General Beckett, the British representative on the 
 Technical Board, in his position as long as Stevens remained in Harbin. 
 They desired to know when Stevens would be withdrawn. The 
 State Department was unable to set a definite date. The original plan 
 had been to keep Stevens in Harbin until the Czechs had been evacu¬ 
 ated. However, a general strike on the railway made it impossible to 
 ascertain when that evacuation would be completed. 17 
 
 The British continued their inquiries. In April they tentatively 
 suggested the advisability of reiterating the principle of trusteeship 
 and arranging that China undertake to administer the trust as next 
 in interest to Russia. This could be done with the assistance of the 
 foreign technical experts. Again, the American government made 
 no formal reply. 18 
 
 While the British government was prodding the State Department 
 to action from one quarter, the Chinese government was prodding it 
 from another quarter. On March 1, 1920, the Chinese government 
 informed Charles Tenney that it was assuming full responsibility 
 for the protection of the Chinese Eastern Railway and for the main¬ 
 tenance of peace and order in the railway zone. 19 The Chinese For¬ 
 eign Office formally urged the retention of Stevens in his post on the 
 Chinese Eastern Railway. At the same time they urged Thomas 
 Lamont, American representative for the consortium, then in China, 
 to place the railway under the protection of the consortium. A loan 
 was requested. The manager of the Russo-Asiatic Bank added his 
 
 15 Davis to Colby, April 28, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 687- 
 688 . 
 
 10 Lindsay (British charge) to Lansing, Feb. 24, 1920, United States, Foreign Rela¬ 
 tions, 1920, I, 681. 
 
 17 Polk to Lindsay, March 17, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 
 683; Weigh, Russo-Chincse Diplomacy, pp. 235-236. 
 
 18 Colby to Davis, April 26, 1920, Davis to Colby, April 28, 1920, United States. 
 Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 685-687, 687-688. 
 
 10 Tenney to Colby, March 24, 1920, file 861.77/1485, D.S.N.A. 
 
ALLIED WITHDRAWAL FROM THE RAILWAY 
 
 209 
 
 support to this request. 20 Since the State Department considered 
 it unwise to bring into the consortium discussion of any issue which 
 might start a controversy, they reserved the Chinese suggestions for 
 future consideration. 21 
 
 By the middle of May the American government was still in the 
 process of deciding its future policy in regard to the Chinese Eastern 
 Railway. C. H. Smith recommended that the Railway Agreement 
 remain in effect until the Japanese withdrew. The Russian Embassy 
 proposed that the railway be internationalized through an international 
 committee with provision for its financing by one of the powers, by 
 banking interests, or by joint action of the powers, the purpose being 
 to return the railway eventually, with existing rights unimpaired, to 
 those who held an interest in it. Great Britain had expressed a desire 
 to see the continued participation by Americans in the Inter-Allied 
 Board and Committee. She was evidently very anxious to prevent 
 Japan from obtaining control of the railway. Her alternative sug¬ 
 gestions covered three possibilities: namely, that the Inter-Allied Agree¬ 
 ment be continued on the Chinese Eastern Railway, that a mandate 
 for the railway be given to China, or that the railway be financed by 
 the consortium. 
 
 At this time the State Department was also considering a proposal 
 to place the railway in the hands of the Inter-Allied Committee as it 
 was then constituted. The committee could transfer the duties of the 
 Technical Board to China under a mandate, and the technical opera¬ 
 tion of the road could be managed either by the Chinese government 
 or by a new board chosen by that government, with provision for re¬ 
 view by the Inter-Allied Committee. The Military Committee would 
 be discontinued. 22 The Department was troubled by one complica¬ 
 tion. The Inter-Allied Railway Agreement had provided that repre¬ 
 sentation in its committees and boards would be held by those who had 
 armed troops in Siberia. This seemed to indicate the exclusion of the 
 British, French, and Americans, whose troops had been withdrawn. 
 Thus the Japanese would be in a dominant position, since Chinese and 
 Russian participation was quite ineffective. Furthermore, the Depart¬ 
 ment had already announced in its note to Japan of January 9, 1920, 
 that when the Czech evacuation was completed, both American rail¬ 
 way experts and forces would be withdrawn. 23 
 
 20 United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 434. 
 
 21 Colby to Tenney, April 21, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 
 532 . 
 
 22 Colby to Bell, May 17, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 690-691. 
 
 23 United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 690-691. 
 
210 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 The former British High Commissioner in Siberia, now ambassador 
 to Japan, was well acquainted with the arrangements made when the 
 agreement regarding the railways was put into operation. His inter¬ 
 pretation of the agreement was quite different from that of the United 
 States. He had always understood that representation on the commit¬ 
 tees and boards should be given to the powers which had armed 
 forces in Siberia at the time of the making of the agreement, and that 
 such representation should continue as long as these bodies were in 
 existence. Furthermore, he believed withdrawal of troops by a power 
 implied no obligation to withdraw the railway representatives. He 
 gathered that his government shared his views since the representation 
 of Great Britain on the Inter-Allied Board, the Technical Board, and 
 the committees was continuing indefinitely. Eliot had considered the 
 various plans for the future operation of the railway and reported 
 his belief that Japan would probably object to continuing the railway 
 under the arrangement in force, with financing by the consortium. 
 Furthermore, Japan would also oppose giving China a mandate to 
 the railway. Eliot advised the continuation of the Technical Board 
 and Inter-Allied committees as they then existed with financial ar¬ 
 rangements assumed either by the consortium or jointly by the 
 powers. 24 
 
 Early in the spring of 1920 John Davis, the American ambassador in 
 Great Britain, began a series of informal conversations with the Brit¬ 
 ish Foreign Office, at their request, in regard to the Chinese Eastern 
 Railway. They proceeded on the assumption that since a consortium 
 agreement had been reached, it now could be utilized in determining 
 future policy toward the Chinese Eastern Railway. The British For¬ 
 eign Office held the following views in which they believed the French 
 would concur: namely, that Russia should be considered first in in¬ 
 terest and China second; that the Allied and Associated powers were 
 under a moral obligation to act as Russia’s trustee in maintaining the 
 status quo ante; that the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement, with its 
 organs, the Inter-Allied Railway Committee and the Inter-Allied 
 Technical Board, be continued; that British, French, and American 
 participation be continued to insure success in bringing Japan into 
 the consortium without reservations; and that, as Japan had just 
 grounds for keeping troops in Siberia because of the Bolshevik men¬ 
 ace, Chinese and Japanese military forces should jointly protect the 
 line. The British Foreign Office believed that under these provisions 
 the consortium might properly finance the line. Such a scheme would 
 
 24 Bell to Colby, May 22, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 693 
 
ALLIED WITHDRAWAL FROM THE RAILWAY 
 
 211 
 
 control Japan, stabilize China, limit the Bolshevik menace, and publicly 
 proclaim the first step of the consortium to be of broad international 
 value. The Foreign Office also pointed out that as the British bank¬ 
 ing group was delayed in completing financial arrangements for the 
 consortium, the American and Japanese might be asked to carry the 
 preliminary advance. 25 
 
 The American government was quite gratified with the British 
 views although it had several suggestions to make. 26 It agreed to joint 
 Japanese-Chinese military protection only as a practical necessity, and 
 as a temporary expedient in view of the apparent military exigency. 
 
 The American government emphasized this point as Japanese forces 
 had been placed upon the Chinese Eastern in disregard of the alloca¬ 
 tion of that line to Chinese protection by the agreement of the Allied 
 commanders at Vladivostok in April, 1919. Furthermore, while the ^ 
 American government considered that financing by the consortium 
 would be satisfactory in principle, it feared that such a suggestion 
 might be misconstrued by Japan. Therefore it desired postponement 
 of this suggestion until Lamont’s return from the Far East. 27 In thp-' v 
 meantime, the negotiations between the United States and Britain were 
 kept absolutely confidential. 28 
 
 While the British and Americans negotiated, the Japanese were ap¬ 
 parently proceeding with their own plans in regard to the Chinese 
 Eastern Railway. Intercepted messages revealed that they had ordered 
 nine hundred bandits to points on the Chinese Eastern Railway with 
 definite instructions to enter into a series of actions which would dis¬ 
 credit the Chinese army and its ability to protect the railroad, and 
 thereby, as Stevens reported, give the Japanese the opportunity to seize 
 the railway. 29 These messages also revealed that the Japanese had de^X 
 cided to take over the guarding of the Maritime Province because of the ! 
 increasing bandit raids, which they themselves had instigated. Japan 
 had so informed China in an ultimatum. 30 The British were evidently 
 
 26 Davis to Colby, May 22, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 691- 
 692. 
 
 26 Davis to Colby, May 28, 1920, file 861.77/1545, D.S.N.A. 
 
 27 Colby to Davis, May 27, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 693-694. 
 
 28 Colby to Bell, June 19, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 695. 
 
 29 Stevens to Colby, June 2, 1920, file 861.00/6967, D.S.N.A. Dr. C. S. Wang, 
 president of the Chinese Eastern Railway, confirmed the reports that the Japanese were 
 arming the bandits along the zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway and thereby causing 
 the existing disturbances (Memorandum of an Interview between Dr. C. S. Wang and 
 Mr. A. B. Ruddock, Sept. 5, 1921, file 861.77/2271, D.S.N.A.). 
 
 30 Stevens to Colby, June 9, 1920, file 861.77/1558, D.S.N.A. These bandit raids 
 continued, presumably under Japanese instigation. Macgowan reported that "Japanese 
 
212 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 in receipt of similar information, as Lindsay, counselor to the British 
 Embassy, came to the State Department and casually mentioned that 
 his government was much interested in an early decision on the 
 question of financing the railway, as “they had received disquieting 
 intimations of proposed action by Japan in reference to the Chinese 
 Eastern Railway.” The British government had conveyed its fears to 
 the Japanese government, indicating that “while they were not dis¬ 
 posed to credit these reports, they desired to express to Japan the hope 
 that as an Ally Japan would take no step affecting the status quo of 
 this railway without previously conferring fully with the British 
 Government.” 31 
 
 In the meantime Lamont had returned from China. He reported 
 a long conversation with Stevens, who had carefully described the 
 activities of the Japanese in their steady and rapid strides to get con¬ 
 trol of the entire region and block the rest of the world from the im¬ 
 mense possibilities of trade with Siberia. Stevens had said: 
 
 You may think it curious, that just for this one hour conference, I have 
 come seven hundred miles from Harbin, to and fro, to see you but I just 
 felt it my duty to leave no stone unturned to bring the situation before the 
 leading men of affairs of America so they may know the menace to Ameri¬ 
 can interest for the future that is going on. Something perhaps that does 
 not concern me very much, because I am getting to be an old man, or even 
 you twenty years younger, but does very much concern our sons and 
 ouLgrandsons and the whole future of America. 32 
 
 Lamont urged the advisability of financing the Chinese Eastern 
 through the consortium. The Chinese too had been insistent on this 
 point. 33 Although the Japanese government did not like the idea, the 
 Cabinet had agreed to consider it. 34 Uchida, the Japanese Foreign 
 'Minister, was having a bad time with the Diet and feared that if the 
 consortium arrangement went through, it would be said that “his 
 policy had begun with the Nikolaevsk massacre and ended with his 
 handling over the Chinese Eastern Railway to the Consortium.” In 
 
 aim to show what disorders follow their evacuation” (Macgowan to Department of 
 State, Oct. 4, 1920, file 861.00/7467, D.S.N.A.). 
 
 31 Memorandum of a Conversation between MacMurray and Lindsay, June 15, 
 1920, file 861.77/1569, D.S.N.A. 
 
 32 Report of a Conference with Stevens by T. W. Lamont, June 19, 1920, file 861.77/ 
 1574, D.S.N.A. 
 
 33 Norman Davis (Acting Secretary of State) to Bell, June 30, 1920, United States, 
 Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 699. 
 
 34 Bell to Colby, June 22, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 696. 
 
ALLIED WITHDRAWAL FROM THE RAILWAY 213 
 
 a few weeks Uchida thought it might be advisable to discuss the point 
 in the Diet, but he considered it inadvisable at present . 35 
 
 Since the Japanese seemed averse to including the Chinese Eastern 
 in the consortium plans, the State Department proposed another plan. 
 This provided that the Technical Board and the Inter-Allied Commit¬ 
 tee be consolidated as a new committee of international character com¬ 
 posed of representatives from China, Japan, France, Great Britain, 
 Russia, and the United States. Similar to a committee in bankruptcy, 
 it would be given authority to perform all the duties necessary for 
 carrying out the trust except that it could not borrow funds for the 
 Chinese Eastern without authorization by the governments concerned. 
 The American plan would place the railroad administration upon a 
 business footing, excluding the military and political features which 
 were inherent in the original organization set up by the Railway Agree¬ 
 ment . 36 
 
 The British were not enthusiastic about the plan. They thought 
 it was simply an involved way of doing that which the consortium was 
 best able to do. Apparently Great Britain was willing to take a strong 
 stand in favor of the original plan. She felt that although local 
 Japanese conditions were to be regretted, they could not be allowed 
 completely to break up the plan. The British suggested that if the 
 original plan did not bring the desired results, the Japanese govern¬ 
 ment might be requested to offer a substitute . 37 
 
 In the meantime Japan was attempting to precipitate China into 
 a civil war as a pretext for occupying North Manchuria. It appeared 
 to Stevens that she was succeeding. Semeaov was proposing to estab¬ 
 lish himsel f on the Chinese Eastern If •) i 
 
 Tar pte~~tKat th eTnteiTABtgd Ra iT\£uy--AgTgeme nt was a farce, respectec 
 'fey DO one~ He^addeff^TTiSVe no support frorrTthr military of any 
 nation in the enforcement of any order or instruction.” Stevens could 
 not understand why the powers could not agree on a policy toward the 
 railway, and suggested that the delay was due to the work of “a certain 
 people playing for time until they stack cards here when their real 
 plans will become clear to everyone .” 38 
 
 The State Department informed Stevens that he was in error. 
 
 35 Bell to Colby, June 30, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 699. 
 
 30 Norman Davis to John Davis (ambassador to Great Britain), June 30, 1920, 
 United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 698-699. 
 
 37 John Davis to Colby, July 8, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 
 700. 
 
 38 Stevens to Colby, July 15, 1920, file 861.77/1609, D.S.N.A.; Stevens to Colby, 
 July 19, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 701-702. 
 
214 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 The delay in reaching an agreement was due to Anglo-American ne¬ 
 gotiations. The Secretary of State added: 
 
 The Department has proposed to Great Britain that the British join with 
 us in an effort to have Japanese troops entirely withdrawn from the railway, 
 to have the system of operation and control reorganized in such a way as to 
 give you the authority which is necessary, and to secure at once for neces¬ 
 sary expenses an appropriation of $10,000,000. Great Britain is apparently 
 ready, from evidence we have, to join vigorously with us in such a pro¬ 
 gram . 39 
 
 The negotiations over the Chinese Eastern Railroad continued. 
 Ambassador Morris, now in Washington, began a series of conferences 
 with Alston, the British minister to China, who had come to Wash¬ 
 ington, en route to England for a vacation. The two men had an 
 informal conference with the Secretary and Under Secretary of State. 
 They agreed on the necessity for international control of the railway, 
 the necessity for entrusting the protection of the railroad to China, 
 and the difficulty of financing the railway through the consortium . 40 
 These conferences were reported in Japan, where they occupied an 
 important place in the newspapers, “creating a sensation.” Editorials 
 revealed a feeling of alarm lest such conferences result in an under¬ 
 standing between Great Britain and America to restrain Japan’s free¬ 
 dom of movement on the Asiatic mainland. The view was also ex¬ 
 pressed that the reported conference was a prelude to America’s 
 launching upon a strong Far Eastern policy . 41 
 
 C _ By the e nd of August negotiations for financing the Chinese East¬ 
 ern Railway through the consortium hadmme to a sta ndstilT~France 
 ^TeportecTits disinclination to go ahead with the idea in view of Japan’s 
 disapproval . 42 In reality, she had been conducting private negotiations 
 to put control of the railway in the hands of the Russo-Asiatic Bank, 
 which was owned by French interests. France was thus seeking to 
 /get a permanent hold on the line and increase her prestige in the 
 Far East . 43 Great Britain still favored the consortium idea and ex¬ 
 pressed her willingness to join in any plan having as its object inter¬ 
 national control. Nevertheless, she hesitated to exert any real pressure. 
 
 39 Colby to Stevens, July 29, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 703- 
 
 704. 
 
 40 Colby to John Davis, Aug. 5, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 
 704-705. 
 
 41 Bell to Colby, Aug. 3, 1920, file 861.00/7204, D.S.N.A. 
 
 43 John Davis to Colby, Aug. 1, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 
 706. 
 
 43 Colby to Stevens, Aug. 31, 1920, file 861.77/1689A, D.S.N.A. 
 
ALLIED WITHDRAWAL FROM THE RAILWAY 
 
 2I 5 
 
 She felt that Japan was justified in maintaining troops on some parts 
 of the railway in view of the dangerous situation caused by the Bol¬ 
 sheviks. Moreover, she felt that if Japan were allowed a share in 
 guarding the railway, negotiations on other matters might be made 
 less difficult. 44 Japan was bitterly opposed to any new international 
 arrangement and-did-not approve, of an int ernational loiuL T Howevety- 
 chJmrLn n obj f» rrion rn mntimi i ng -tfi e-armngemenrs t h en in practice, 
 and devi dn g a pnliry o f-iman cial assistance for u rg en t needs. 
 
 Meanwhile Russian representatives in Paris and Tokyo alleged that 
 the Chinese government was taking every possible means of infring¬ 
 ing Russian treaty rights, with the intention of eventually taking over 
 complete control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Russian am¬ 
 bassador in Tokyo was earnestly requesting Japanese assistance to pre¬ 
 vent this and was asking for an immediate loan of two million yen. 
 The State Department felt it was only Stevens’s continued presence at 
 Harbin that prevented the Japanese military from taking over com¬ 
 plete control of the railway. 45 
 
 The Chinese goverment maneuvered to oust the Japanese as well 
 as the Russians from the line of the Chinese Eastern. On August 7 
 the Chinese government sent a formal protest to Japan. It announced 
 its earnest intention to keep out the Bolsheviks. Since China desired 
 to assume entire responsibility in dealing with this measure, she re¬ 
 quested that Japan withdraw her soldiers from the Chinese Eastern 
 Railway. 
 
 The Japanese reply on August 18 announced the withdrawal of 
 Japanese troops west of Harbin. However, Japanese soldiers would 
 be retained south and east of Harbin, in order to keep out the Bolshe¬ 
 viks. This would place no obstacle in the way of China’s providing 
 the railway guards in accordance with the agreement of April, 1919, 
 among the Allies. 46 
 
 In the meantime China had begun independent negotiations con¬ 
 cerning the Chinese Eastern Railway. On October 2, 1920, the Min¬ 
 ister of Communications signed an agreement with the Russo-Asiatic 
 Bank providing for the joint management of the railway. The agree¬ 
 ment provided for an increase in the number of Chinese on the staff 
 
 44 Colby to Stevens, Aug. 31, 1920, file 861.77/16893, D.S.N.A.; J. B. Wright 
 (charge in Britain) to Colby, Aug. 18, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 
 708-709. 
 
 45 Stevens to Colby, Aug. 13, 1920, file 861.00/7243, D.S.N.A.; Colby to Stevens, 
 Aug. 31, 1920, file 861.77/16893, D.S.N.A. 
 
 40 Charles Crane (minister in China) to Colby, Sept. 24, 1920, United States, 
 Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 710-711. 
 
2l6 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 for joint administration of the railway. The railway was to be ad¬ 
 ministered purely as a commercial concern, with the Chinese govern¬ 
 ment assuming temporary executive control of the railway on behalf 
 of the Russian government until definite arrangements could be 
 reached with a united Russian government recognized by China . 47 
 Upon representation from the American government, the Chinese gov¬ 
 ernment informed the State Department that this arrangement con¬ 
 templated nothing contradictory to the Inter-Allied Agreement . 48 
 
 JThe agree ment between C hina and the Rus so-As iatie-Bardr-eaiased 
 Japan to increase her e ffom In mfilp llrrTiTiiitere- handits to disorder 
 along the railway zone. On October 20 the Japanese government cfis^ 
 patchecTa note of explanation to the United States. The note stated 
 that in view of increasing activities of disorder by Korean malcontents 
 in Chentao, the Japanese government had approached the Peking 
 government and the provincial authorities at Mukden and Kirin with 
 a proposition for joint efforts in the suppression of these movements. 
 The Chinese government had refused to co-operate and had organized 
 an independent expedition to cope with the difficulty. This was un¬ 
 successful and served only to increase the activities of the recalcitrant 
 Koreans who had since joined the Chinese bandits and Russian Bolshe¬ 
 viks. They had grown more truculent than ever. In order to protect 
 Japanese life and property, it had become necessary to send reinforce¬ 
 ments to Chentao for purposes of self-defense, especially in view of a 
 recent Hunchun raid, which had been responsible for the burning of 
 the Japanese consulate. Therefore, the Japanese government was con¬ 
 tinuing with the expedition in view of the menacing conditions in that 
 area. The note concluded: “It need hardly be added that the present 
 expedition being merely undertaken as a temporary measure to meet 
 the requirements of the critical situation in Chentao, the troops des- 
 
 47 Crane to Colby, Oct. 12, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 7920, I, 722; 
 Quarterly Report of the Legation in China for the Period of Oct. 1 to Dec. 31, 1920, 
 United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I, 495-497. Weigh, Russo-Chinese Diplomacy, 
 pp. 238-240; China year Book, (1923), p. 660. Weigh points out that the agree¬ 
 ment “was unquestionably a long step forward towards the vindication of China’s 
 sovereign rights, but, from the legal point of view, it was a great blunder on the 
 part of the Chinese government. Prior to the conclusion of this agreement the Bolshe¬ 
 viks had already made their overtures returning the Chinese Eastern Railway to the 
 Chinese people ‘without any compensation whatsoever.’ What China should have done 
 was to recognize the Soviet declaration as sincere and take over the whole Chinese 
 Eastern Railway. But this was not what she did. She permitted the enterprise in which 
 she alone had a paramount interest to fall into the hands of an international body of 
 control. To aggravate the situation, she entered into an agreement with a third party, 
 the Russo-Asiatic Bank . . .” (Weigh, Russo-Chinese Diplomacy, pp. 239-240). 
 
 48 Bell to Colby, Nov. 5, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, I. 725. 
 
ALLIED WITHDRAWAL FROM THE RAILWAY 
 
 2I 7 
 
 patched are to be promptly withdrawn as soon as the danger is re¬ 
 moved and peace restored in the province.” 49 
 
 As the year 1920 drew to a close, affairs along the Chinese Eastern 
 did not improve. When, on December 14, 1920, the Chinese govern¬ 
 ment requested the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Chinese 
 Eastern Railway zone, Japan declined, stating that “Bolshevik activi¬ 
 ties rendered it inadvisable at the present time to withdraw.” 50 
 
 Back in Washington, the British ambassador was continuing his 
 conversations with the State Department in regard to the Chinese 
 Eastern Railway. Stevens, who was then in Washington, discussed 
 the problem with him. They agreed on three major points; namely, 
 the enlargement of the Technical Board to increase the efficiency of 
 railway administration, the financial reorganization of the railway by 
 the consortium, and the immediate payment of all debts due the rail¬ 
 way. While the British did not desire to initiate such proposals as the 
 first two, they intimated that they would support them if they were 
 advanced by the United States. 51 
 
 In accordance with these discussions, the State Department drafted 
 a memorandum to meet the new conditions on the Chinese Eastern. 
 The memorandum’s stated object was to provide a more economical 
 operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, to place the line on a sound 
 financial basis, to restore normal traffic conditions, to provide a proper 
 trusteeship for Russian interests, and to stabilize the situation in the 
 Far East. The method recommended was an amendment of the Inter- 
 Allied Agreement of January, 1919. This contemplated the abolition 
 of the Inter-Allied Committee and the placement of the Chinese 
 Eastern Railway under the joint control of the United States, England, 
 France, Japan, and China. Supervision was to be vested exclusively 
 in a Technical Board, which would include the representatives of Eng¬ 
 land, France, United States, Japan, Russia, and China. The board 
 was to be solely responsible for the economic administration of the 
 affairs of the railway. In addition to possessing the powers of the 
 present Technical Board, the new board was to have full control over 
 the receipts and disbursements of the company’s revenues, and the 
 
 “'Japanese Embassy to Department of State, Oct. 20, 1920, file 861.00/7978, 
 D.S.N.A. Both C. H. Smith and Stevens reported that the Japanese were instigating 
 these bandit raids. Their views were substantiated by the American Naval Intelligence 
 (Colby to Crane, Nov. 6, 1920, file 861.00/7617, D.S.N.A.; Crane to Colby, Nov. 11, 
 1920, file 861.00/7655, D.S.N.A.). 
 
 60 Crane to Acting Secretary of State, Jan. 5, 1921, United States, Foreign Relations, 
 1920, I, 727. 
 
 61 Crane to Acting Secretary of State, Jan. 5, 1921, United States, Foreign Relations 
 1920, I, 726. 
 
2l8 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 power to fix all the tariffs and control all questions relating to per¬ 
 sonnel. The president of the Technical Board was to be the responsible 
 head. No political activity was to be permitted. The memorandum 
 also raised the question of debts. “Certain powers” owed the railway 
 six million dollars. If this debt were paid, and an additional six 
 million were added to the credit of the Technical Board, sufficient 
 capital would then be available. In submitting its plan, the American 
 government expressed confidence that the interested governments 
 “would be willing that Mr. John F. Stevens who has so ably filled the 
 position of President of the Inter-Allied Technical Board since its 
 inception, shall be selected as the President” of the new Technical 
 Board. 52 
 
 While the State Department awaited a reply from the British gov¬ 
 ernment, conditions along the Chinese Eastern were moving from a 
 state of confusion to one of complete chaos. B. O. Johnson, acting 
 president of the Technical Board in Stevens’s absence, reported that 
 the Chinese directors were forcing the railway^ to make illegal pay¬ 
 ments. Railway creditors were pressing the railway so that the Chinese 
 directors were trying to arrange loans from Chinese banks. If un¬ 
 successful, they would probably turn for help to the Japanese banks. 
 Johnson felt that the Technical Board could not withstand the com¬ 
 bination of Japanese and Chinese intrigue much longer. 53 Stevens’^ 
 reply to this appeal was “You must hold the situation despite in¬ 
 trigue.” 54 
 
 Johnson found this advice difficult to follow, particularly as the 
 Chinese military had begun adopting an extremely aggressive attitude 
 with reference to the Chinese Eastern Railway. They had a heavy 
 concentration of troops in North Manchuria, and disregarding the 
 Technical Board, they had assumed control of train movements. 55 
 
 Throughout the year 1921 the State Department had been receiving 
 
 52 Memorandum by the Department of State, Jan. 21, 1921, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1921, I, 564-566. The memorandum was dispatched to Great Britain on 
 March 24 (Hughes to Geddes, British ambassador, March 24, 1921, United States, 
 Foreign Relations, 1921, I, 573). 
 
 63 Johnson to Hughes, March 14, 1921, United States, Foreign Relations, 1921, I, 
 572. 
 
 34 Hughes to Johnson, March 24, 1921, United States, Foreign Relations, 1921, I, 
 573 - 
 
 C6 Johnson to Hughes, May 4, 1921, United States, Foreign Relations, 1921, I, 
 580; Bell to Colby, May 7, 1921, file 861.77/2061, D.S.N.A. Minister Crane was in¬ 
 structed to call the attention of the Chinese government to this violation of the Rail¬ 
 way Agreement. In presenting his protest, he was to attempt to secure the co-operation 
 of his British, French, and Japanese colleagues (Hughes to Crane, May 17, 1921, United 
 States, Foreign Relations, 1921, I, 583). 
 
ALLIED WITHDRAWAL FROM THE RAILWAY 
 
 219 
 
 intercepted secret messages exchanged between various Japanese 
 officials in China, Siberia, and Tokyo. A careful examination of their 
 contents had led to the belief that they were “undoubtedly authentic.” 
 The intercepted telegrams revealed that the Japanese military intended 
 to begin hostilities in Manchuria and Siberia, and contemplated the 
 seizure of control of the Chinese Eastern Railway in the near future. 
 The Japanese were collecting evidence of China’s illegal acts along 
 the railway zone as a justification for assuming control. 06 Confronted 
 with this news, the State Department desired an immediate decision 
 concerning the future control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. 
 
 When on May 14 the British government replied to the American 
 proposal of March 24, 1921, it announced its belief that both Japan 
 and China would be strongly opposed to any plan which tended to 
 increase the international control of the Railway. The British note ' 
 concluded that although “His Majesty’s Government would welcome 
 the introduction of this scheme if it could be brought into force . . . 
 they are inclined to doubt whether, practically speaking, it could be 
 so enforced in existing circumstances.” However, if the United States 
 took the lead in proposing such a scheme to the other interested 
 powers, the British agreed to follow. 57 
 
 Upon receiving this note, Hughes wrote to Fletcher: 
 
 Until a few months ago the British seemed to be inclined to cooperate 
 cordially with us, but in the last few months they have seemed rather to Ire 
 pulling away. The significance of the Chinese Eastern situation is such 
 that I think we ought to be somewhat persistent in bringing them to co¬ 
 operate with us if possible . 08 
 
 To the British government Hughes expressed his sincere regret at the 
 position taken on the matter, adding that “it seems to disappoint the 
 hopes of cooperation, in this important phase of the situation in the 
 Far East. . . .” 59 
 
 The British attitude left the Department in an unfortunate position. 
 Any formal action on THe~parr~Df■ t he Um t e d"Sfates seemed doomed 
 to failu re. T he Department believed that the British note "actively 
 and - undoubtedly” reflected the disinclination of the Japanese to 
 strengthen the control of the Technical Committee under Stevens. 
 
 c0 Memorandum by Division of Far Eastern Affairs, May n, 1921, file 861.00/8610, 
 D.S.N.A.; Memorandum by J. P. Jameson, May 26, 1921, file 861.00/7777, D.S.N.A. 
 
 57 H. G. Chilton (British charge) to Hughes, May 14, 1921, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1921, I, 580-581. 
 
 68 Hughes to Fletcher, April 15, 1921, file 861.77/2054, D.S.N.A. 
 
 EB Hughes to Chilton, May 20, 1921, United States, Foreign Relations, 1921, I, 583. 
 
220 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 Moreover, there was undoubtedly some basis for the belief that the 
 Chinese were somewhat jealous of the powers of the Technical Board 
 and would therefore hesitate to take a strong position in support of 
 the American suggestion. No co-operation could be expected from the 
 French government, whose sole concern in the matter was to protect 
 the immediate monetary interests of the French financial group which 
 controlled the Russo-Asiatic Bank, which in turn owned the Chinese 
 Eastern Railway. The attitude of the French, throughout, had been 
 entirely unsympathetic. The State Department suspected that the 
 French were conniving with the Japanese to create a situation in which 
 “Japan would have a color of justification for taking possession of the 
 railway making a financial adjustment with the French interests con¬ 
 cerned.” The chief of the Far Eastern Division sadly stated his views: 
 
 Under these circumstances, we have felt—and Mr. Stevens agrees with us— 
 that we can not hopefully undertake any international action; and that to 
 attempt any such action would not only subject us to the probability of a 
 rebuff, but bring into question the basis of authority now exercised by the 
 Technical Board. Mr. Stevens is planning to stop in Tokyo on his way 
 back to Manchuria, and urge upon his Japanese collaborators that they 
 move their government to view with favor an increase of the powers of his 
 Board. This is a somewhat forlorn hope, with nothing but the prestige 
 of Mr. Stevens to justify it. But it is really the only hope we now have for 
 bettering our position. We are frankly very close to being defeated in this 
 matter; and the only apparent hope of eventual success is that Stevens can 
 I “limp along,” as he puts it, until such time as it may be possible for us 
 
 1 to exert upon the other powers concerned—especially Great Britain and 
 
 Japan—sufficient pressure to bring them to accept our views of the matter . 60 
 
 I 
 
 hen Stevens reached Japan, he was received with high honors, 
 [e discussed the Chinese Eastern Railway situation with the Minister 
 /*#Xof Railways and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He told them that 
 the American government was extremely anxious to preserve normal 
 conditions along the Chinese Eastern Railway in co-operation with the 
 Allies, using the Technical Board for the purpose. He suggested the 
 possibility of increasing the powers of the Technical Board to include 
 complete control of finances and personnel. Stevens stated that Amer¬ 
 ica’s purpose was to preserve the open door, to aid Russia, and to sta¬ 
 bilize conditions. His suggestions were favorably received in principle 
 by the Japanese government. Stevens pointed out that the United 
 States was ready to co-operate in any reasonable and just plan which 
 Japan might desire. 
 
 60 MacMurray to Hughes, May 25, 1921, file 861.77/2426, D.S.N.A. 
 
ALLIED WITHDRAWAL FROM THE RAILWAY 
 
 221 
 
 Upon the conclusion of his discussions in Japan, Stevens urged the 
 State Department to continue the negotiations in a vigorous manner. 
 
 He added that, in view of the negative attitude of the British govern¬ 
 ment, the only alternative was direct negotiation with Japan. 61 Bell, 
 the American charge in Japan, agreed with Stevens. 62 
 
 On August 2 the State Department instructed Bell to suggest to the 
 Japanese government the reorganization of the supervision of the 
 Chinese Eastern Railway on the basis of the plan proposed to Britain 
 on March 24, 1921. 63 The British government agreed to support the 
 proposal through their ambassador in Tokyo. 64 
 
 The Chinese government was not informed of the American pro¬ 
 posal. However, it had already begun independent negotiations for 
 the issue of bonds by the Chinese Eastern Railway to an amount of 
 approximately twenty-five million taels, to be secured by railway prop¬ 
 erty. This was done without consulting the Inter-Allied Technical 
 Board, which was charged with the administration of the technical 
 and economic management of the railways. Since this was a violation 
 of the Railway Agreement, the State Department protested to the 
 Chinese government. As a result, the bond issue was dropped. 60 
 
 The Chines e Ftr^ign M i nister fieerrvH apprpVipngjy^ ohnnt thf pEns 
 of the American go vernment concerningT he- C h ine s e E astern. Rail wa y. 
 
 He r requested awritten statement of American views from A. B. Rud¬ 
 dock, American charge in China. 66 Apparently the Japanese had in¬ 
 formed the Chinese government of the recent American note to 
 Japan concerning expansion of the Railway Agreement. Thus, China 
 frit that the Unit ed S tates was taking action regarding The Chinese'"^ 
 Eastern Railw ay, while keepjjig her 'n ignorance. The""StateDe- 
 partment pointed out orally to theChrnese-minister that the object of 
 the United States regarding the railway was to continue the preserva¬ 
 tion of Chinese and Russian rights by keeping the railway running 
 and providing for its efficient operation. The Chinese minister was 
 informed that he need feel no apprehension that any ideas of the 
 United States regarding the railway would be detrimental to Chinese 
 
 01 Bell to Hughes, June 24, 1921, United States, Foreign Relations, 1921, I, 588-589. 
 
 62 Bell to Hughes, June 27, 1921, file 861.77/2167, D.S.N.A. 
 
 03 Hughes to Bell, Aug. 2, 1921, United States, Foreign Relations, 1921, I, 596. 
 
 64 Wellesley to Hughes, Aug. 16, 1921, file 861.77/2233, D.S.N.A. 
 
 63 Hughes to Chinese Legation, July 14, 1921, United States, Foreign Relations, 
 1921, I, 595; Memorandum of a Conversation between MacMurray and the Chinese 
 Counselor (Tung Kwai), July 10, 1921, file 861.77/2171, D.S.N.A. 
 
 1,0 Ruddock to Hughes, Aug. 6, 1921, United States, Foreign Relations, 1921, I, 
 
 598. 
 
222 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 rights in any way.* 7 Although the Chinese government was informed 
 of the interview, it continued to harbor suspicions of the Technical 
 Board. On September 1, 1921, Stevens reported that the Chinese Min¬ 
 ister of Communications and other officials had decided to prevent 
 financial aid to the railway by any power except China and to destroy 
 the effectiveness of the Technical Board in every way. 68 
 
 In the meantime the proposed financial negotiations for the Chinese 
 Eastern had reached what appeared to be a dead end. Strangely 
 enough, the negotiations had been halted by the American group of 
 the consortium. On June 21, 1921, the British government had re¬ 
 ported that Japan had signified her readiness to join the other in¬ 
 terested governments in a loan to the Chinese Eastern Railway. Al¬ 
 though China’s attitude was unknown, Britain felt that there were 
 reasons to believe that the prospects of a loan by the consortium were 
 
 • • fiQ 
 
 ripening. 
 
 Gratified by this news, the American government prepared to join 
 with the other interested powers in arranging such a loan to the 
 Chinese Eastern Railway. 70 The United States communicated the 
 British memorandum concerning a consortium loan to J. P. Morgan, 
 who was quite surprised at this news since it represented a decided 
 change in the Japanese attitude. He replied: 
 
 We feel that for the long future it would be altogether appropriate for 
 the Consortium, provided China finally determines that it wished the Con¬ 
 sortium to function, to undertake a financial operation covering the Chinese 
 Eastern Railway; but until such time, and until the financial position of the 
 railway itself makes a better exhibit, we think there is little immediate 
 possibility of offering in the United States a loan to this railway. The 
 American Group, in offering any Far Eastern loan to American investors, 
 must exercise the greatest caution and assure itself that such a loan shall be 
 based upon sound operation and adequate security. In these two respects 
 unfortunately at the present time the Chinese Eastern Railway does not 
 come up to specifications. It is true that in a situation of this kind Japanese 
 bankers are sometimes able to proceed, but only under a guaranty on the 
 part of their government which the American Group would deem entirely 
 unfitting to suggest to the American Government . 71 
 
 67 MacMurray to Hughes, Aug. to, 1921, United States, Foreign Relations, 1921, I, 
 599-600. 
 
 68 Stevens to Hughes, Sept. 1, 1921, file 861.77/2218, D.S.N.A. 
 
 80 Geddes to Hughes, June 2i, N i92i, United States, Foreign Relations, 1921, I. 
 587-588. 
 
 70 Hughes to Geddes, June 28, 1921, United States, Foreign Relations, 1921, 589- 
 590. 
 
 71 Morgan to Hughes, Aug. 2, 1921, United States, Foreign Relations, 1921, I, 595- 
 596. 
 
ALLIED WITHDRAWAL FROM THE RAILWAY 
 
 223 
 
 Hughes regretted deeply the decision of the American group. He 
 had hoped that the consortium would provide an opportunity to put 
 the Chinese Eastern upon a sound basis. He was even more regretful 
 in view of the British interest. Explaining his disappointment to 
 Morgan, Hughes wrote: “The international importance of the Chinese 
 Eastern Railway is quite obvious, and I had hoped that through ade¬ 
 quate financial support it might be made an important instrumentality 
 of our ‘open door’ policy.” 72 
 
 On October 29, 1921, the Japanese government replied to the 
 American proposal for the reorganization of the Inter-Allied Railroad 
 Board. The Japanese considered so radical a change as that pro¬ 
 posed unnecessary and inadmissible. They submitted a counter¬ 
 proposal, which provided that direct control of the railway be given 
 to the board of directors of the railway. The Technical Board should 
 give technical and financial assistance only in case of need. 73 
 
 Stevens refused to consider the Japanese plan, which he regarded' 
 “not worthy even of discussion.” 74 As Stevens saw the problem, it wa^ 
 necessary to preserve the integrity of the Chinese Eastern Railway if 
 the open door was to be established successfully. Japanese control of 
 the Chinese Eastern, of the Ussuri Railway, or of the port of Vladi¬ 
 vostok would bring unfair commercial discrimination. On the other 
 hand, under Chinese control, the Chinese Eastern would promptly 
 become a victim of fatal inefficiency and graft. Therefore, for tfie 
 present, he felt that international control was essential. 75 
 
 It was quite plain that Japan was opposed to the effective interna¬ 
 tional control and operation which Stevens advocated. Both the Far 
 Eastern Republic and China were also opposed to internationalization. 
 Through informal conversations with the members of the Chinese dc 
 egation at the Washington Conference, the State Department'nad 
 found a great fear in the Chinese mind of the internationalisation of 
 railroads in China generally. 76 
 
 ^The a 1 tgma tives - to --a n —in terna-t it>nal rccetvershtp^were either that 
 the railway come into effective Japanese control directly or through a 
 nominal Chinese control, or that the Far Eastern Republic assert and 
 exercise the legal rights of Russia with respect to the railway. Poole 
 believed that if a suitable international receivership proved unattain- 
 
 72 Hughes to Morgan, Aug. 8, 1921, United States, Foreign Relations, 1921, I, 
 598. 
 
 73 Warren to Hughes, United States, Foreign Relations, 1921, I, 608-610. 
 
 74 Poole to Hughes, Dec. 3, 1921, file 861.77/2465, D.S.N.A. 
 
 76 Poole to Hughes, Dec. 3, 1921, file 861.77/2465, D.S.N.A. 
 
 76 Poole to Hughes, Nov. 30, 1921, file 861.77/2447, D.S.N.A. 
 
224 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 able, the second alternative was worthy of careful consideration. Fur¬ 
 thermore, a suggestion to the effect that the United States would be 
 prepared to co-operate with the Far Eastern Republic in the operation 
 of the railway might move Japan to consent to a continuance and 
 strengthening of the existing agreement. It appeared, however, from 
 recent telegrams that there was much misunderstanding both in China 
 and the Far Eastern Republic as to the motives of the United States 
 with respect to the Chinese Eastern Railway. For this reason Poole 
 felt that it was desirable to give the utmost publicity to any proposals 
 whiah might be made regarding the railway. 77 
 
 /"Although the French government had expressed its thorough ac- 
 /cord with the plan for international control of the Chinese Eastern 
 Railway, it felt that the Russo-Asiatic Bank, which the French gov¬ 
 ernment controlled, should be appointed as the financial agent of the 
 ' railway as heretofore. Stevens did not object to such an arrangement, 
 tie felt that the choice of a bank of any other nationality would be 
 certain to create misunderstanding. 78 
 
 American financial circles also seemed to favor the idea of interna¬ 
 tional control as revealed by a letter to Hughes from Lamont. Lamont 
 wrote: 
 
 But now is the time it would appear, to put our feet down and work 
 out some solution, even though it might not be a final one. It would 
 hardly be within the province of the International Consortium actually to 
 undertake the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway, as all the 
 members of the Peking Cabinet last year desired us to do. Railway man¬ 
 agement is hardly within the function of bankers. But as for the financing 
 of the system upon any sound basis, that could readily be put within the 
 purview of the Consortium. The British are anxious to have it done; the 
 French also, I am confident would fall in line and then the Japanese would 
 be obliged to . 79 
 
 Hughes determined to make a final effort to get Chinese assent to 
 a plan for international control. This would be particularly difficult, 
 as Dr. Hawkling Yen, member of the Chinese delegation to the Wash¬ 
 ington Conference, had revealed China’s abhorrence to “internationali¬ 
 zation.” Yen was convinced that international control was unaccept¬ 
 able to Chinese public opinion. 80 Hughes decided to try a new avenue 
 of approach. He instructed Jacob G. Schurman, American minister in 
 
 77 Poole to Hughes, Dec. 2, 1921, file 861.77/2465, D.S.N.A. 
 
 78 Hughes to Harvey, Nov. 2, 1921, file 861.77/2282, D.S.N.A. 
 
 79 Lamont to Hughes, Dec. 16, 1921, file 861.77/2466, D.S.N.A. 
 
 80 Poole to Hughes, Nov. 30, 1921, file 861.77/2447, D.S.N.A. 
 
ALLIED WITHDRAWAL FROM THE RAILWAY 
 
 225 
 
 China, to have an informal and confidential talk about the Chinese 
 Eastern Railway with Chang Tso-lin, War Lord of Manchuria. He 
 was to point out the following facts: 
 
 The interest of th e Uni tec LStates is to maintain 
 Avenue of c ommerce. C hina and the United States are therefore equally 
 concerned that the railway should not fall into Japanese possession or 
 effective financial control. If the railway were confided to China at this 
 time as a trustee for Russia, financial control by Japan would certainly 
 ensue probably through the purchase by the South Manchuria Railway 
 of the new issue of bonds which would be necessary. . . . Under existing 
 circumstances and until the situation in China is more stable the railway 
 can be secured against international aggression only by instituting a tem¬ 
 porary international conservancy the purpose of which would be to pre¬ 
 serve the integrity of the railway and existing rights therein and return it as 
 soon as practicable to those in interest . 81 
 
 Hughes felt that if Chang were sufficiently impressed with the Japanese 
 danger and the possibility of a later conflict with a recuperated and 
 dissatisfied Russia, he might lend his support to a temporary plan of 
 international control. 82 
 
 In accordance with his instructions, Schurman had a long talk with 
 Chang concerning a temporary international guardianship such as 
 might be undertaken by the Inter-Allied Technical Board. The sug¬ 
 gestion was not well received by Chang. He observed that it was not 
 for him but for the Chinese government to handle the subject. Later 
 he said that the fear of American predominance in the Chinese Eastern 
 aroused the apprehensions of the Japanese. The general prejudice of 
 the Chinese against any proposal for internationalization was clearly 
 shared by Chang. Schurman found that the various Chinese official 
 circles entertained this sentiment very strongly as did also the Prime 
 Minister and the Minister of Communications. 83 
 
 The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs desired that China’s posi¬ 
 tion be understood by the powers. The Chinese government preferred 
 that the Chinese Eastern be made a state railway. If this could noi 
 be done, they desired its present status to be maintained. He said 
 that the Chinese people were unanimous in their opposition to inter¬ 
 national control, and that in no case was such control desired by the 
 government. Furthermore, he did not see why the Washington Con- 
 
 81 Hughes to Schurman, Dec. 24, 1921, file 861.77/23643, D.S.N.A. 
 
 83 Hughes to Schurman, Dec. 24, 1921, file 861.77/23648, D.S.N.A. 
 
 83 Schurman to Hughes, Jan. 1, 1922, United States, Foreign Relations, 1922, I, 
 877-878. 
 
226 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 ference should even consider the Chinese Eastern Railway, particularly 
 as the conference had no Russian representatives. When Schurman 
 told the Minister that the railway would need money to rehabilitate 
 itself financially, the Foreign Minister replied that China expected to 
 raise money by floating railway bonds in the international market and 
 that this could be done independently of the consortium. 84 
 
 China’s definite stand on international control was soon adopted 
 by the other interested powers at the Washington Conference. Dur¬ 
 ing the course of further discussions, it transpired that both France 
 and Japan, and Great Britain as well, felt that it was neither admissable 
 nor practicable to exercise anything but a general supervision over the 
 railway. It was plain that neither France nor Japan would ever con¬ 
 sent to an extension of technical control. This created a deadlock be¬ 
 tween Stevens and the powers. In these circumstances the American 
 government was forced to yield its desire for detailed technical con¬ 
 trol. 85 The best that could be obtained was the following resolution, 
 adopted at the thirtieth meeting of the Committee on Pacific and 
 Far Eastern Questions on February 2, 1922: 
 
 'Resolved, That the preservation of the Chinese Eastern Railway for 
 those in interest requires that better protection be given to the Railway and 
 the persons engaged in its operation and use; a more careful selection of 
 personnel to secure efficiency of service, and a more economical use of 
 funds to prevent waste of the property. That the subject should be dealt 
 with through the regular diplomatic channels . 86 
 
 At the same meeting a second resolution was adopted by all powers 
 other than China: 
 
 The powers, other than China, in agreeing to the resolution regarding 
 the Chinese Eastern Railway, reserve the right to insist hereafter upon 
 the responsibility of China for the performance or the nonperformance of 
 the obligations towards the foreign stockholders, bondholders, and creditors 
 of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, which the powers deem to result 
 from the contracts under which the railroad was built and the action of 
 China thereunder and the obligations which they deem to be in the nature 
 of a trust resulting from the exercise of power by the Chinese Government 
 over the possession and administration of the railroad . 87 
 
 81 Schurman to Hughes, Jan. 7, 1922, United States, Foreign Relations, 1922, I, 
 878. 
 
 88 Poole to Hughes, Jan. 20, 1922, file 861.77/2446, D.S.N.A. 
 
 80 Hughes to Schurman, Feb. 3, 1922, United States, Foreign Relations, ig22, I, 
 883; Conference on Limitation of Armaments, p. 316; Weigh, Russo-Chinese Diplomacy, 
 pp. 241-243. 
 
 87 Conference on Limitation of Armaments, p. 318; Weigh, Russo-Chinese Diplomacy, 
 
ALLIED WITHDRAWAL FROM THE RAILWAY 
 
 227 
 
 From Harbin, Jenkins reported that the Chinese had organized a 
 society to carry on a campaign against international control of the 
 Chinese Eastern Railway. Street demonstrations had taken place. 
 The movement was believed to be instigated by the authorities. 88 
 
 During the next month developments respecting the Chinese East¬ 
 ern Railway followed two courses. The American and British min¬ 
 isters at Peking reiterated to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 in a personal interview the suggestions made to the Chinese delegation 
 at Washington, namely, that China undertake to improve conditions of 
 public order in the railway zone by organizing a special railway guard, 
 and that China take the initiative in the diplomatic discussions recom¬ 
 mended by the conference by inviting the powers to aid her in main¬ 
 taining the railway. When the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 telegraphed the Chinese minister at Washington asking what the 
 United States really wanted, the minister replied that they were only 
 offering friendly advice. 
 
 Matsudaira, of the Japanese delegation, had informed Poole before 
 leaving for Japan that he intended to seek the authority of his superiors 
 in Tokyo to take up the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway with 
 the American Embassy there, in an attempt to obtain preliminary 
 Japanese-American accord. The American ambassador to Japan was 
 informed of this and instructed to maintain a purely receptive atti¬ 
 tude. 89 China continued to exhibit a reluctance to discuss any npw 
 plans regarding the railway. In a conversation with Dr. C. C. Wang, A 
 the new president of the railway, Minister Schurman gained the im¬ 
 pression that the chief reason for Chinese reluctance to seek co-opera¬ 
 tion was their desire to remain free from entering into political, terri¬ 
 torial, or other arrangements as to their rights in the Chinese Eastern, 
 which might jeopardize informal discussions with the Russians look- 
 
 • an ■> 
 
 mg to an agreement. 
 
 Chinese reluctance to discuss the Chinese Eastern situation was 
 reinforced by a new move on the part of Britain. The British Foreign 
 Office announced that since Great Britain had virtually no commercial 
 interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway, it seemed a luxury to main¬ 
 tain a British member on the Technical Board. Therefore it was felt 
 
 J 
 
 p. 243. See also C. C. Wang, “The Chinese Eastern Railway,” Annals of the American 
 Academy of Political and Social Science, CXXII (Nov., 1925), 67. 
 
 88 Jenkins to Hughes, Feb. 6, 1922, United States, Foreign Relations, 1922, I, 
 884. 
 
 80 Poole to Hughes, March 9, 1922, file 861.77/2543, D.S.N.A. 
 
 80 Schurman to Hughes, March 25, 1922, United States, Foreign Relations, 1922, I, 
 889-891. 
 
228 
 
 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 that the expenses of the Technical Board should be met by the Chinese 
 government. 91 The American government reported that it would 
 regard the withdrawal of the British member of the Technical Board 
 as most unfortunate, especially as Stevens was then returning to Har¬ 
 bin, and in view of the intimations that the Japanese government 
 intended soon to initiate discussions of future policy regarding the 
 railway. 92 
 
 In the meantime organized demonstrations in China were demand¬ 
 ing the withdrawal of the Technical Board, and leading newspapers 
 in North Manchuria were arguing that the objects for which the board 
 was created no longer existed. Various organizations and patriotic 
 societies in certain North Manchurian cities had forwarded circular 
 telegrams to the Peking government demanding that the Technical 
 Board be abolished. 93 Stevens reported that the financial situation of 
 the railroad was chaotic and that the Technical Board was being 
 ignored in every way by the Board of Directors. He predicted the 
 collapse of the railway under the present system of management. 94 At 
 the same time, Warren reported that when Uchida was told of exist¬ 
 ing conditions on the railway he replied that he had no plan to pro¬ 
 pose to remedy the situation. 95 
 
 Under these conditions Hughes had just about decided that any 
 further expenditure of American funds in connection with the Chinese 
 Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways was inadvisable. On July 17, in 
 view of Japan’s announced purpose to withdraw her troops and the 
 consequent automatic termination of the Railway Agreement, the 
 Secretary of State discussed with the Japanese and British govern¬ 
 ments, in a preliminary and confidential manner, the question of ending 
 the Inter-Allied Committee and Technical Board, and of confirming 
 the attitude of the powers toward the Chinese Eastern Railway as out¬ 
 lined at the Washington Conference. 96 
 
 The American government then directed a note to the nations 
 which had participated in the Inter-Allied Agreement. The note sug- 
 
 61 Schurman to Hughes, March 28, 1922, United States, Foreign Relations, 1922, I, 
 892. 
 
 92 Hughes to Harvey, April 8, 1922, United States, Foreign Relations, 1922, I, 
 892. 
 
 93 Memorandum by Douglas Jenkins of the Division of Russian Affairs, May 1, 1922, 
 United States, Foreign Relations, 1922, I, 892-894. 
 
 94 Stevens to Hughes, May 25, 1922, United States, Foreign Relations, 1922, I, 896. 
 
 95 Warren to Hughes, June 6, 1922, United States, Foreign Relations, 1922, I, 897. 
 
 90 Hughes to Hanson, July 17, 1922, United States, Foreign Relations, 1922, I, 
 
 905. 
 
ALLIED WITHDRAWAL FROM THE RAILWAY 
 
 229 
 
 gested that upon the abolition of the Technical Board the Allies adopt 
 the following policy in regard to the Chinese Eastern Railway: 
 
 That those powers should confirm the resolutions above quoted relating 
 to China’s responsibility; that they should, so far as there may be occasion, 
 reserve all rights with respect to advances in money or material made in 
 aid of the railway; that they reaffirm their concern in the preservation of 
 the railway, its efficient operation and its maintenance as a free avenue of 
 commerce open to the citizens of all countries without favor or discrimina¬ 
 tion, that they inform the Chinese Government that they purpose to con¬ 
 tinue to observe carefully the administration and operation of the railway 
 and the manner in which China discharges the responsibilities which she 
 has assumed; and that they apprise the Chinese Government at the same 
 time of their entire good will and readiness to assist or cooperate at any 
 time in any practicable way with a view to conserving the railway property 
 and assuring efficient operation in the interest of all concerned . 97 
 
 All the participating nations agreed to the resolution. Thus the 
 affairs of the board were brought to a conclusion. 98 The final meeting 
 of the Technical Board was held on November 1, 1922. On March 
 15, 1923, John F. Stevens filed his final report. He was quite aware 
 of the fact that it read like the “Lamentations of Jeremiah,” but he 
 pointed out that it could not be otherwise. He himself was amazed 
 at his moderation. If it had been intended for the exclusive use of 
 the State Department, it would have necessitated the use of asbestos 
 paper 99 
 
 97 Hughes to Harvey, July 17, 1922, United States, Foreign Relations, 1922, I, 
 905-906. 
 
 98 Warren to Hughes, Aug. 9, 1922, Harvey to Hughes, Aug. 24, 1922, Myron T. 
 Herrick (ambassador to France) to Hughes, Oct. 13, 1922, United States, Foreign 
 Relations, 1922, I, 909-910, 913, 919. 
 
 90 Stevens to Hughes, March 16, 1923, file 861.77/3064, D.S.N.A. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 Conclusion 
 
 (A 
 
 T HE TERMINATION of the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement of 
 1919 marked the end of Allied intervention in Siberia. A com¬ 
 plex and confused phase of American foreign policy in the Far East 
 was thus brought to a close. Throughout the intervention the United 
 States had been engaged in a lone struggle against the; intrigues of 
 Great Britain, France, and Japan.* Each nation had its own motives 
 for participating in the expedition. The British and French desired 
 to set up an Eastern Front in the belief that this was a necessary step 
 in the winning of the war. Early in 1918 they were even willing to 
 negotiate with the Bolsheviks in order to secure renewed warfare 
 against the Central Powers. At the same time both the British and the 
 French supported various revolutionary groups in Russia and Siberia 
 in the hope of enlisting their aid against the Central Powers. After 
 the Armistice was declared, the British and the French were unwill¬ 
 ing to desert the Russian friends who had aided them in Siberia. 
 They professed a conviction that the Bolsheviks were a German- 
 inspired government; and this belief, in conjunction with their hatred 
 of the principles and practices for which the Bolsheviks stood, led them 
 to a continued support of the anti-Bolsheviks after the war was over. * 1 
 
 1 Winston Churchill later said, “As it was, enough foreign troops entered Russia to 
 incur all the objections which were patent against intervention, but not enough to break 
 the then gimcrack structure of the Soviet power. When we observe the amazing ex¬ 
 ploits of the Czech Army Corps, it seems certain that a resolute effort by a compara¬ 
 tively small number of trustworthy American or Japanese troops would have enabled 
 Moscow to be occupied by National Russian and Allied forces even before the German 
 collapse took place. Divided counsels and cross-purposes among the Allies, American 
 mistrust of Japan, and the personal opposition of President Wilson, reduced Allied inter¬ 
 vention in Russia during the war to exacdy the point where it did the utmost harm 
 and gained the least advantage” (Churchill, The Aftermath, p. 285). At the end of 
 1919 Lloyd George, referring to Allied intervention, said he did not wish to criticize 
 any of his Allies, but “if there has been a failure it is not our failure” (Literary Digest, 
 LXIII, Dec. 27, 1919, 20). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 231 
 
 When public opinion demanded the withdrawal of Allied troops from 
 Russia, Britain and France urged Japan to continue the fight against 
 the Bolsheviks in Siberia. 2 
 
 Japan’s motives were inspired primarily by the military elements 
 who desired first and last to take over political, military, and economic 
 control of Eastern Siberia and the Chinese Eastern Railway. Although 
 opposed to this scheme, the civilian elements were too weak to thwart 
 it. Thus the Japanese military party supported such Russian leaders 
 as Kalmikov and Semenov, in the hope of fomenting discord in Si¬ 
 beria, thereby providing a pretext for increased military occupation 
 of the region. Japanese policy was to divide and rule. 3 
 
 American motives were far more complex. Wilson resisted Allied 
 pressure for intervention in Siberia until July, 1918. jTdis suspicions of 
 Japan led him to believe that lone Japanese intervention would probably 
 result in the alienation of Russian territory and the closing of the open 
 door in Siberia and North Manchuria. Moreover,_ he believed that 
 such an intervention was unneutral and undemocratic.! In this respect 
 he followed a Russian policy which was consistent with nis own deepest 
 convictions as enumerated in the Fourteen Points. He demanded for 
 Russia a free and unembarrassed opportunity to determine her own 
 political development and national policy, and assurance to her of a 
 “sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of 
 her own choosing.” In March, 1918, as a result of .overwhelming 
 pressure from his Allies, Wilson agreed reluctantly to permit Japanese 
 intervention in Siberia without American participation. However, 
 when confronted with the view that by such a policy he would lose 
 the moral leadership of the world, Wilson returned to his original 
 position. 
 
 In July, 1918, in the face of new and compelling circumstances, 
 Wilson changed his mind. He not only agreed to intervention, but 
 took the lead in inviting the Japanese to a joint intervention in Siberia. 
 His avowed reasons were to “rescue” the Czechs and to aid the Russian 
 people in any efforts at self-government they might desire. The 
 Czechs, however, were quite capable of taking care of themselves as 
 indicated by their amazing military successes before the Allies arrived. 
 Furthermore, Wilson’s second objective was subject to confused and 
 
 3 The American government also informed Japan that it was “not disposed to object 
 to any reasonable measures which Japan may decide to take in Eastern Siberia with 
 a view to halting the advance of Bolshevism . . .” (Department of State to the 
 Japanese Embassy, Jan. 30, 1920, United States, Foreign Relations, 1920, III, 501- 
 502). 
 
 3 D. B. Macgowan to Secretary of State, Sept. 12, 1921, file 861.77/2279, D.S.N.A.; 
 John Weeks to Secretary of State, Oct. 7, 1921, file 861.00/9040. 
 
232 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 varied interpretation, since he failed to say what Russians the Ameri¬ 
 can troops were to aid in their efforts to acquire self-government. 
 
 Wilson’s basic and unpublicized reason for intervention was to re- 
 strain Japan from imperialistic adventures and to preserve the open 
 door in Siberia and North Manchuria. Although on the surface his 
 policy appeared to be contradictory, actually it was quite consistent. He 
 agreed to intervention in July, 1918, for the very same reasons that 
 he had opposed it in the early part of the year. When it became evi¬ 
 dent that, despite his opposition, his Allies were ready to sanction 
 Japan’s lone entry into Siberia, and Japan herself was preparing to em¬ 
 bark upon an independent expedition under the auspices of the Sino- 
 Japanese Military Agreements of May, 1918, Wilson invited Japan to 
 participate in a joint expedition to Siberia. He did so, however, not 
 because he believed in the expedition, but because (he thought he could 
 control it in the interests of Russia, China, and the United States^ He 
 believed that the Czech troops in Siberia provided the nucleus of an 
 Allied army and would thereby make unnecessary the sending of 
 large numbers of Japanese troops. A further reason for Wilson’s de¬ 
 cision was his belief that he could no longer thwart the unanimous 
 desires of his Allies. 
 
 Once Wilson yielded on the major decision to intervene, the British, 
 French, and Japanese attempted to use the intervention for their own 
 purposes. Wilson had not desired the participation of either Great 
 Britain or France. He had opposed the secret support and encourage¬ 
 ment given to factions in various parts of Russia. 4 Wilson soon 
 realized that the joint expedition which he had sponsored was rapidly 
 being turned into an unneutral intervention in the internal affairs of 
 another nation. He deplored this result and attempted, within the 
 limits of diplomacy, to restrain the independent operations of his Allies. 
 
 After the Armistice was declared, the avowed reasons for inter¬ 
 vention were no longer adequate. Yet for two reasons American troops 
 continued to remain in Siberia. For all practical purposes American 
 evacuation^ would have left Japan in virtual control of North Man - 
 churia and Eastern Siberia. Moreover, Britain, France, and Japan 
 were opposed to withdrawal. President Wilsor^did not wis h to 
 -N jeopardize his program at the Peace Conference by independent action. 
 Thus, in order to block Japan and to further his League, Wilson 
 followed a policy which appeared to be totally at variance not only 
 with the principles which he had enunciated concerning Russia, but 
 also with the principles of his proposed League. As time went on, 
 these clashes between what Wilson said and what he did made the 
 
 ‘Lansing to Polk, Aug. 3, 1918, Lansing Papers. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 233 
 
 American position in Siberia even more difficult. Wilson found it 
 impossible to keep American troops in Siberia without actively aiding 
 Kolchak. Whatever may be said concerning America’s neutrality in 
 Siberia in 1918, there is little doubt that in 1919 the State Department 
 actively supported and aided Kolchak despite the fact that Wilson 
 himself admitted that the American people did not believe in Kolchak. 5 
 Wilson’s justification for this policy was his belief that it preserved 
 the open door in Siberia and Manchuria, pr eserved Russia’s territorial 
 integrity, and aided him in establishing his League of Nations. The 
 Bolsheviks themselves conceded America’s justification in following 
 such a policy, when in 1933, after being shown certain documents con¬ 
 cerning America’s policy, they agreed to drop all claims against 
 America for her part in the Siberian intervention.® As Cordell Hull 
 pointed out, “These latter documents made clear to Litvinov that 
 American forces had not been in Siberia to wrest territory from Russia, 
 but to ensure the withdrawal of the Japanese, who had a far larger 
 force in Siberia with the intent to occupy it permanently.’’ 7 
 fk would seem to be notable, however, that throughout the inter¬ 
 vention the American public was permitted to believe that the United 
 States went into Siberia to combat Bolshevism. It was difficult for 
 the State Department to refute this belief while the United States was 
 at war. Japan was an ally, and it was not considered diplomatic to 
 question publicly the motives of one’s allies^ especially when a fear 
 existed that Japan might possibly join the 'Central Powers. Even 
 after the war was over, the popular feeling persisted that intervention 
 was solely to defeat the Bolsheviks. 8 This sentiment was intensified by 
 the actions of the underlings in the State Department who assumed 
 control of America’s policy in Siberia upon Wilson’s illness, and who 
 themselves favored Kolchak and wanted him to receive the greatest 
 aid possible. 
 
 6 General Graves believed that “no well-informed man can deny Kolchak was held 
 in power by the moral and material assistance given him by the foreign governments 
 having military forces in Siberia” (Arthur Bullard’s extracts from General Graves’s Final 
 Report, Bullard to Secretary of State, Sept. 21, 1920, file 861.00/7354, D.S.N.A.). 
 Graves thought intervention a fundamental error, “an inexcusable departure from the 
 generally accepted practice of nations in their dealings with other nations . . .” (Graves, 
 America's Siberian Adventure, p. 354). 
 
 6 N. W. Graham, “Russian-American Relations, 1917-1933: An Interpretation”; 
 American Political Science Review, XXVIII (June, 1934), 408-409. 
 
 7 Cordell Hull, Memoirs, (2 vols.; New York, 1948), I, 299. 
 
 8 When General Graves reported that “ninety-eight per cent of the people in Siberia 
 are Bolsheviki” and that “they are working for peace and the good of the country and 
 in my opinion they are trying to be fair and just to the people," Colby brought the 
 “impropriety” of these remarks to the attention of Secretary Baker (Colby to Baker, 
 April 20, 1920, file 861.00/6862, D.S.N.A.). 
 
234 America’s Siberian expedition, 1918-1920 
 
 Since the attitude of the State Department had long since ceased 
 to be neutral, why did the United States withdraw its troops in 1920? 
 Why were they not maintained and reinforced? The answer would 
 appear to be that the Department feared an actual conflict with, die 
 Bolsheviks. For this reason Japanese troops were left in occupation of 
 Eastern Siberia and partial occupation of the Trans-Siberian Railway. 
 Although the State Department gave tentative approval to Japan’s 
 decision to remain in Siberia to combat Bolshevism, it continued to 
 protest for the next two and a half years against her occupation of 
 Eastern Siberia, the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the southern half 
 of Sakhalin. 9 
 
 The positive results of intervention were due largely to American 
 participation. The United States prevented Japan from going into 
 Russia alone, with a free hand. To some extent the United States 
 I restrained Japan from absorbing Eastern Siberia and the Chinese 
 Eastern Railway. Upon entering Siberia, the United States extracted 
 promises from Japan ^guaranteeing Russia’s territorial integrity and 
 promising Japanese withdrawal. America refused to support Allied 
 demands for the re-creation of an Eastern Front, which in effect would 
 have amounted to major operations against the Soviet government. 
 At various times the United States prevented political action against 
 the Soviet government. After America’s withdrawal from Siberia, 
 this country kept up a steady stream of protests to Japan concerning 
 her continued presence on Russian territory and consolidated..world 
 opinion against the Japanese activities in Siberia at the Washington 
 Conference. Thus, America’s participation in Allied intervention did 
 provide a moderating influence which tended to curb the more extreme 
 ideas of the Allies. 10 
 
 ® Professor Norton has pointed out that “if America could have invited Japan to leave 
 Siberia, and that invitation had been accepted with as great alacrity as the one to enter, 
 the story of Allied intervention in the Far East would not have been the sorry tragedy 
 it is ... . Her action, and that of the other Allies, in merely withdrawing their troops 
 and leaving Japan to make the explanations, placed the seal of approval on the con¬ 
 tinued intervention of the Japanese, and threw upon them a large share of the re¬ 
 sponsibility for the subsequent events” (Norton, Far Eastern Republic, pp. 107-109). 
 
 10 Secretary Baker stated: “If the Siberian Expedition was in fact unjustified and if it 
 really failed to accomplish substantially helpful results, this much is true of it—it was 
 justified by conditions as they appeared to be at the time, it [the United States] refrained 
 from militaristic adventures of its own, it restrained such adventures on the part of 
 others, and it created a situation which made necessary the withdrawal of all Allied 
 forces from Siberian soil when it was withdrawn, thus making impossible territorial 
 conquests and acquisitions on Russian soil by other nations whose interests in the Far 
 East might easily have induced them to take over pacification, and ultimately for 
 permanent colonial administration, vast areas of Russia’s Far East” (Baker, Foreword in 
 Graves, America’s Siberian Adventure, pp. xi-xii). 
 
Appendix 
 
 The Secretary of State to the Allied Ambassadors 
 Aide-Memoire 
 
 The whole heart of the people of the United States is in the winning 
 of this war. The controlling purpose of the Government of the United 
 States is to do everything that is necessary and effective to win it. It 
 wishes to cooperate in every practicable way with the Allied Governments, 
 and to cooperate ungrudgingly; for it has no ends of its own to serve 
 and believes that the war can be won only by common counsel and inti¬ 
 mate concert of action. It has sought to study every proposed policy or 
 „ action in which its cooperation has been asked in this spirit, and states 
 the following conclusions in the confidence that, if it finds itself obliged 
 to decline participation in any undertaking or course of action, it will 
 be understood that it does so only because it deems itself precluded from 
 participating by imperative considerations either of policy or of fact. 
 
 In full agreement with the Allied Governments and upon the unanimous 
 advice of the Supreme War Council, the Government of the United States 
 adopted, upon its entrance into the war, a plan for taking part in the 
 fighting on the western front into which all its resources of men and ma¬ 
 terial were to be put, and put as rapidly as possible, and it has carried out 
 that plan with energy and success, pressing its execution more and more 
 rapidly forward and literally putting into it the entire energy and execu¬ 
 tive force of the nation. This was its response, its very willing and hearty 
 response, to what was the unhesitating judgment alike of its own military 
 advisers and of the advisers of the Allied Governments. It is now consider¬ 
 ing, at the suggestion of the Supreme War Council, the possibility of 
 making very considerable additions even to this immense program which, 
 if they should prove feasible at all, will tax the industrial processes of the 
 United States and the shipping facilities of the whole group of associated 
 nations to the utmost. It has thus concentrated all its plans and all its 
 resources upon this single absolutely necessary object. 
 
 In such circumstances it feels it to be its duty to say that it cannot, so 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 236 
 
 long as the military situation on the western front remains critical, consent 
 to break or slacken the force of its present effort by diverting any part 
 of its military force to other points or objectives. The United States is at 
 a great distance from the field of action on the western front; it is at a 
 much greater distance from any other field of action. The instrumentali¬ 
 ties by which it is to handle its armies and its stores have at great cost 
 and with great difficulty been created in France. They do not exist else¬ 
 where. It is practicable for her to do a great deal in France; it is not 
 practicable for her to do anything of importance or on a large scale upon 
 any other field. The American Government, therefore, very respectfully 
 requests its associates to accept its deliberate judgment that it should not 
 dissipate its force by attemping important operations elsewhere. 
 
 It regards the Italian front as closely coordinated with the western 
 front, however, and is willing to divert a portion of its military forces from 
 France to Italy if it is the judgment and wish of the Supreme Command 
 that it should do so. It wishes to defer to the decision of the Commander 
 in Chief in this matter, as it would wish to defer in all others, particularly 
 because it considers these two fronts so closely related as to be practically 
 but separate parts of a single line and because it would be necessary that 
 any American troops sent to Italy should be subtracted from the number 
 used in France and be actually transported across French territory from the 
 ports now used by the armies of the United States. 
 
 It is the clear and fixed judgment of the Government of the United 
 States, arrived at after repeated and very searching reconsiderations of the 
 whole situation in Russia, that military intervention there would add to 
 the present sad confusion in Russia rather than cure it, injure her rather 
 than help her, and that it would be of no advantage in the prosecution of 
 our main design, to win the war against Germany. It can not, therefore, 
 take part in such intervention or sanction it in principle. Military inter¬ 
 vention would, in its judgment, even supposing it to be efficacious in its 
 immediate avowed object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the 
 east, be merely a method of making use of Russia, not a method of serving 
 her. Her people could not profit by it, if they profited by it at all, in time 
 to save them from their present distresses, and their substance would be 
 used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own. Military 
 action is admissible in Russia, as the Government of the United States 
 sees the circumstances, only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their 
 forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and 
 to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians 
 themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok 
 or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only legitimate object for which 
 American or Allied troops can be employed, it submits, is to guard military 
 stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render 
 such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their 
 own self-defense. For helping the Czecho-Slovaks there is immediate 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 237 
 
 necessity and sufficient justification. Recent developments have made it 
 evident that that is in the interest of what the Russian people themselves 
 desire, and the Government of the United States is glad to contribute the 
 small force at its disposal for that purpose. It yields, also, to the judgment 
 of the Supreme Command in the matter of establishing a small force at 
 Murmansk, to guard the military stores at Kola, and to make it safe for 
 Russian forces to come together in organized bodies in the north. But 
 it owes it to frank counsel to say that it can go no further than these 
 modest and experimental plans. It is not in a position, and has no ex¬ 
 pectation of being in a position, to take part in organized intervention 
 in adequate force from either Vladivostok or Murmansk and Archangel. 
 It feels that it ought to add, also, that it will feel at liberty to use the few 
 troops it can spare only for the purposes here stated and shall feel obliged 
 to withdraw those forces, in order to add them to the forces at the western 
 front, if the plans in whose execution it is now intended that they should 
 cooperate should develop into others inconsistent with the policy to which 
 the Government of the United States feels constrained to restrict itself. 
 
 At the same time the Government of the United States wishes to say 
 with the utmost cordiality and good will that none of the conclusions here 
 stated is meant to wear the least color of criticism of what the other govern¬ 
 ments associated against Germany may think it wise to undertake. It 
 wishes in no way to embarrass their choices of policy. All that is intended 
 here is a perfectly frank and definite statement of the policy which the 
 United States feels obliged to adopt for herself and in the use of her own 
 military forces. The Government of the United States does not wish it to 
 be understood that in so restricting its own activities it is seeking, even 
 by implication, to set limits to the action or to define the policies of its 
 associates. 
 
 It hopes to carry out the plans for safeguarding the rear of the Czecho¬ 
 slovaks operating from Vladivostok in a way that will place it and keep 
 it in close cooperation with a small military force like its own from Japan, 
 and if necessary from the other Allies, and that will assure it of the cordial 
 accord of all the Allied powers; and it proposes to ask all associated in this 
 course of action to unite in assuring the people of Russia in the most public 
 and solemn manner that none of the governments uniting in action either 
 in Siberia or in northern Russia contemplates any interference of any kind 
 with the political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal 
 affairs, or any impairment of her territorial integrity either now or here¬ 
 after, but that each of the associated powers has the single object of afford¬ 
 ing such aid as shall be acceptable, and only such aid as shall be acceptable, 
 to the Russian people in their endeavor to regain control of their own 
 affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny. 
 
 It is the hope and purpose of the Government of the United States to 
 take advantage of the earliest opportunity to send to Siberia a commission 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 238 
 
 of merchants, agricultural experts, labor advisers, Red Cross representatives, 
 and agents of the Young Men’s Christian Association accustomed to organ¬ 
 izing the best methods of spreading useful information and rendering edu¬ 
 cational help of a modest sort, in order in some systematic manner to re¬ 
 lieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there in every way 
 for which opportunity may open. The execution of this plan will follow 
 and will not be permitted to embarrass the military assistance rendered in 
 the rear of the westward-moving forces of the Czecho-Slovaks.* 
 
 Washington, July 17, 1918. 
 
 ‘United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, 287-290. 
 
Glossary of Names 
 
 Alston, Right Honorable Sir Beilby Francis, British deputy high com¬ 
 missioner, Siberia, 1918-1919; minister to Tokyo, 1919-1920; minister 
 to China, 1920-1922. 
 
 Atherton, Ray, secretary of embassy, assigned to Tokyo, September 6, 1917 
 —March 14, 1919; assigned to Peking, July 30, 1919. 
 
 Auchincloss, Gordon, assistant counselor to the Department of State, June 
 11, 1917; secretary of the American War Mission to England and 
 France, November, 1917; secretary to Colonel Edward M. House during 
 negotiations of Armistice, Paris, November, 1918, and during Peace 
 Conference, Paris, 1919. 
 
 Baker, Newton D., Secretary of War, March 7, 1916—March 4, 1921. 
 
 Bakhmetev, Boris A., Assistant Minister of Trade and Industry in the 
 Provisional government; ambassador to Washington, May, 1917—June 
 30, 1922. 
 
 Balfour, Arthur J., British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1916- 
 1919; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference. 
 
 Barclay, Colville A., counselor of the British Embassy at Washington, 1918; 
 charge d’affaires ad interim. 
 
 Barrows, Lieutenant Colonel David P., Chief Intelligence Officer, Depart¬ 
 ment of Philippines and A.E.F. to Siberia, 1918-1919. 
 
 Bell, Edward, assigned as counselor of the Embassy at Tokyo, December 
 11, 1919; assigned as expert assistant, Conference on the Limitation of 
 Armament, November 3, 1921. 
 
 Benes, Dr. Eduard, General Secretary of the Czechoslovak National Coun¬ 
 cil in Paris, 1917; Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovak Republic, 
 1918-1935; Premier, 1921-1922. 
 
 Benson, Admiral William S., Chief of Naval Operations, May 11, 1915— 
 September 2^. 1919; naval advisor to Commission to Negotiate Peace. 
 
24O GLOSSARY OF NAMES 
 
 Bertie, Lord (Francis Leveson Bertie), British ambassador to Paris, 1905- 
 1918. 
 
 Bliss, General Tasker H., Chief of Staff, September 22—December 31, 
 1917; member of the Allied Conference, 1917; member of the Supreme 
 War Council in France; member of the American Commission to Ne¬ 
 gotiate Peace. 
 
 Buckler, W. H., appointed special assistant in the American Embassy at 
 London, December 19, 1914—1918; attached to American Commission 
 to Negotiate Peace, Paris, June-December, 1919. 
 
 Bullard, Arthur, Director of the Russian Division of the Committee on 
 Public Information, Moscow, June, 1917; transferred to Vladivostok, 
 Siberia, September, 1918—January, 1919; appointed special assistant to 
 Department of State for work in Russian Division, December, 1919; 
 Chief of Russian Division, November, 1920—March, 1921. 
 
 Bullitt, William C., appointed a temporary clerk in the Department of 
 State, January 1, 1918; attached to the American Commission to Ne¬ 
 gotiate Peace, November 30, 1918; special mission to Russia, 1919. 
 
 Caldwell, John K., consul at Vladivostok, August 1, 1914; assigned to 
 Kobe, July 1, 1920; appointed Japanese secretary of Embassy at Tokyo, 
 July 1, 1921. 
 
 Cecil, Lord Robert, British Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
 1918. 
 
 Chang Tso-lin, War Lord of Manchuria, 1911-1928. 
 
 Chicherin, George V., Acting Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, March 
 13, 1918; Commissar for Foreign Affairs, May 30, 1918—1930. 
 
 Chilton, Sir Flenry G., secretary of British Embassy at Washington, 1918; 
 counselor of Embassy at Washington, 1921. 
 
 Churchill, Right Honorable Winston, British Secretary of State for War 
 and Air, 1918-1921. 
 
 Clemenceau, Georges E. B., French Premier and Minister for War, No¬ 
 vember 16, 1917—January 20, 1920. 
 
 Clerk, George R., private secretary to British Acting Secretary of State for 
 Foreign Affairs, 1919. 
 
 Colby, Bainbridge, member of the American Mission to Inter-Allied Con¬ 
 ference at Paris, November, 1917; Secretary of State, March 22, 1920— 
 March 4, 1921. 
 
 Crane, Charles R., appointed envoy extraordinary on special mission to 
 Russia, August n, 1917; envoy extraordinary and minister plenipo¬ 
 tentiary to China, March 22, 1920; retired June, 1921. 
 
 Daniels, Josephus, Secretary of the Navy, March 5, 1913—March 6, 1921. 
 
 Davis, John W., American ambassador to Great Britain, November 21, 
 1918—March, 1921. 
 
 Davis, Norman H., financial adviser to President Wilson and American 
 Commission to Negotiate Peace; Under Secretary of State, June 15, 
 1920—March 7, 1921. 
 
GLOSSARY OF NAMES 241 
 
 Debuchi, Katsuji, Japanese charge d’affaires in the United States, 1918- 
 1920. 
 
 Deniken, General Anton I., assistant to Chief of Staff of the Russian Army, 
 April—June, 1917; June—September, 1917, successively commander of 
 the western and southwestern fronts; after the November revolution 
 took part in the Don in the formation of the Volunteer Army; became 
 commander-in-chief of the anti-Bolshevik forces in South Russia, 1918- 
 1919. 
 
 Drummond, Sir Eric, private secretary to British Foreign Secretary, 1915- 
 1919; Secretary-General to League of Nations, 1919-1933. 
 
 Drysdale, Major Walter S., American military attache at Peking, December 
 28, 1917—October, 1921 (on detached service at Harbin, Manchuria, 
 and at Irkutsk and Vladivostok, Siberia). 
 
 Eichelberger, Lieutenant Colonel Robert L., assistant chief of staff, Opera¬ 
 tions Division Siberia and chief intelligence officer, A.E.F., 1918-1920. 
 
 Eliot, Sir Charles, British high commissioner in Siberia, 1918-1919; am¬ 
 bassador to Japan, 1920-1926. 
 
 Emerson, Colonel George, in command of the Russian Railway Service 
 Corps in Siberia, October 15, 1917—January 1, 1920. 
 
 Fisher, Harold H., vice chairman of the Hoover War Library, 1924-1944; 
 chairman since 1944. 
 
 Fletcher, Henry P., appointed Under Secretary of State, March 7, 1921; 
 appointed a member of the Advisory Committee to the American 
 Commissioners to the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, No¬ 
 vember 2, 1921. 
 
 Foch, Ferdinand, Marshal of France and Generalissimo of the Allied 
 armies, 1918. 
 
 Francis, David Rowland, ambassador to Russia, March 6, 1916—May, 1921. 
 
 Frazier, Arthur Hugh, counselor of Embassy at Paris, June 11, 1918; on 
 detail in diplomatic liaison office, Supreme War Council, November, 
 1917—November, 1918. 
 
 Geddes, Sir Auckland (Lord), president of British Board of Trade, 1919- 
 1920; ambassador to the United States, 1920-1924. 
 
 Gleaves, Admiral Albert, commander-in-chief of the United States Asiatic 
 Fleet, September 1, 1919—1921. 
 
 Goto, Baron Shimpei, Japanese Minister of the Interior, October, 1916— 
 April, 1918; Minister of Foreign Affairs, April—September, 1918. 
 
 Graves, Major General William S., commander of the American expedi¬ 
 tionary forces in Siberia, 1918-1920. 
 
 Grew, Joseph E., acting chief of Western European Division, Department 
 of State, March 14, 1918—October 15, 1918. 
 
 Hara, Takashi, Japanese Prime Minister, September 30, 1918-1921; leader 
 of the Seiyukai party; first commoner to become Prime Minister and 
 the first to form a party cabinet in accordance with the principles of 
 parliamentary government. 
 
GLOSSARY OF NAMES 
 
 242 
 
 Harris, Ernest L., American consul general at Irkutsk, May 8, 1918, to 
 October 15, 1920. 
 
 Harvey, George, American ambassador to Great Britain, April 16, 1921 to 
 November, 1923. 
 
 Heid, August, representative of the War Trade Board at Vladivostok. 
 
 Horvat, Lieutenant-General Dmitri L., appointed general manager of the 
 Chinese Eastern Railway and chief administrator of the zone in 1903; 
 attempted to establish an all-Russian, anti-Bolshevik government in 
 July, 1918; served as Kolchak’s high plenipotentiary in the Far East; 
 forced to resign as manager of the railroad in late 1920. 
 
 House, Colonel Edward M., appointed representative of the United States 
 government in the Supreme War Council at Versailles, December 1, 
 1917; designated by the President on October 17, 1918, to act for the 
 United States in the negotiation of the Armistice with the Central 
 Powers; member of American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 1918- 
 1919. 
 
 Hughes, Charles Evans, appointed American Secretary of State, March 5, 
 1921; commissioned by the President October 24, 1921, commissioner 
 plenipotentiary, with the rank of ambassador extraordinary, to serve as 
 a member of the commission to represent the United States at the Con¬ 
 ference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington. 
 
 Ishii, Viscount Kikujiro, negotiated in 1917 the Lansing-Ishii agreement 
 with the United States; Japanese ambassador to the United States, 1918- 
 I9I9- 
 
 Ivanov-Rinov, General Pavel Pavlovich, appointed by Kolchak as com¬ 
 mander of Russian troops in Eastern Siberia. 
 
 Jameson, Jay P., detailed for special duty in Russia and Siberia, May 1, 
 1918; detailed to Department of State June 12, 1920; expert assistant, 
 Conference on the Limitation of Armament, November 3, 1921; re¬ 
 signed March 15, 1922. 
 
 Janin, General Maurice, supreme commander of the Czechoslovak Army 
 in Siberia. 
 
 Jenkins, Douglas, detailed to Harbin, August 16, 1918; appointed consul 
 at Harbin, September 6, 1919; detailed to Department of State, De¬ 
 cember 23, 1921. 
 
 Johnson, B. O., acting president of the Inter-Allied Technical Board super¬ 
 vising the Chinese Eastern and Siberian Railways, 1922. 
 
 Judson, General William V., with the Root Mission to Russia, 1917; re¬ 
 mained in Russia as military attache and chief of American Military 
 Mission to Russia until spring, 1918. 
 
 Jusserand, Jean Adrien Antoine Jules, French ambassador to the United 
 States, 1902-1925. 
 
 Kalmikov, Ivan, ataman of the Ussuri Cossacks. 
 
 Kato, Viscount Takaakira, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1914- 
 1916; organizer and leader of the Kenseikai party. 
 
GLOSSARY OF NAMES 
 
 243 
 
 Kato, Tsunetado, Japanese special representative in Siberia, appointed in 
 1918 to take charge of the diplomatic side of the expedition. 
 
 Kerensky, Alexander F., Minister of Justice in Provisional government, 
 March—May, 1917; Minister of War and of Marine, May to July, 1917; 
 Prime Minister, July-October, 1917. 
 
 Kerr, Phillip, secretary to Lloyd George at the Paris Peace Conference. 
 
 Knight, Admiral Austin M., commander-in-chief of the United States 
 Asiatic fleet, April, 1917, to December 9, 1918. 
 
 Knox, General Alfred W., British military attache in Petrograd, 1911-1918; 
 chief of the British Military Mission in Siberia, 1918-1920. 
 
 Kolchak, Admiral Alexsander V., commander of the Black Sea Fleet; 
 after the November revolution a leader of anti-Soviet forces in Siberia; 
 Minister of War and Navy of the All-Russian Directory; on November 
 18, 1918, at Omsk, proclaimed Supreme Governor of Russia. 
 
 Koo, Vi Kyuin Wellington, appointed Chinese minister at Washington, 
 1915; delegate to the Paris Peace Conference, 1919; minister to Great 
 Britain, 1920; delegate at the Washington Conference, 1921-1922. 
 
 Kudashev, Prince Nikolai A., Russian ambassador to China, 1916-1918. 
 
 Lamont, Thomas W., member of J. P. Morgan and Company, Bankers, 
 1911-1940; chairman of American Group International Consortium for 
 Assistance of China. 
 
 Lansing, Robert, Secretary of State, June 23, 1915—February 13, 1920; 
 member of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 1918-1919. 
 
 Lenin, Vladimir I., President of the Soviet of People’s Commissars, No¬ 
 vember 8, 1917-1924. 
 
 Lindsay, Ronald Charles, counselor of British Embassy at Washington, 
 1919-1920. 
 
 Litvinov, Maxim M., accredited Soviet diplomatic agent to Great Britain, 
 1918; member of People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, 1918-1921. 
 
 Lloyd George, David, British Prime Minister, December 1916—1922. 
 
 Lockhart, R. H. Bruce, British acting consul general at Moscow, 1914- 
 1917; head of Special British Mission to Bolshevik government, 1918. 
 
 Long, Breckinridge, Third Assistant Secretary of State, 1917-1920. 
 
 Macchi di Cellere, Count Vincenzo, Italian ambassador to the United 
 States, 1913-1921. 
 
 McCormick, Vance C., chairman of the War Trade Board, 1917-1919; 
 adviser to American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 1919. 
 
 Macgowan, David B., consul at Moscow, on special detail at Vladivostok, 
 June, 1918—July 1, 1920. 
 
 MacMurray, John Van A., assigned as counselor of the Embassy at Tokyo, 
 November 10, 1917; charge at Peking, July 1—November 30, 1918; 
 reassigned to Tokyo October 15, 1918; assigned to Department of State 
 for duty in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, July 23, 1919; appointed 
 chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, August 20, 1919; expert assistant, 
 Conference on the Limitation of Armament, November 3, 1921. 
 
GLOSSARY OF NAMES 
 
 244 
 
 March, General Peyton C., Chief of Staff, May, 1918—1921. 
 
 Masaryk, Thomas G., President of the Czechoslovak National Council, 
 1918; first President of the Czechoslovak Republic, November, 1918; 
 re-elected 1920, 1927, and 1934. 
 
 Matsudaira, Tsuneo, member of Inter-Allied Railway Commission in Si¬ 
 beria, 1919; director of the European and American Departments of 
 Japanese Foreign Affairs, 1920. 
 
 Miles, Basil, special assistant to the ambassador at Petrograd with rank of 
 minister plenipotentiary, January 4, 1917; ordered temporarily for duty 
 in the Department of State in connection with Russian affairs, Oc¬ 
 tober 16, 1917; in charge of Russian Affairs, Department of State, 1917- 
 1919; executive secretary, Washington Conference on Limitation of 
 Armament, 1921-1922, and secretary of the American delegation. 
 
 Morris, Roland S., American ambassador to Japan, August 1, 1917—March, 
 1921. 
 
 Moser, Charles K., American consul at Harbin, June 24, 1919—September 
 5, 1919. 
 
 Motono, Viscount Ichiro, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, November, 
 1916—April, 1918. 
 
 Nabokov, Constantin, Russian charge d’affaires in London, 1917-1919. 
 
 Niessel, General Henri Albert, director of French Military Mission in 
 Russia, 1917-1918, and Poland, 1919-1920. 
 
 Noulens, Joseph, French ambassador to Russia, July 1917—1919. 
 
 Oi, General Narimoto, commander of Japanese forces in Siberia, 1919-1921. 
 
 Otani, General Kikuzo, commander of the Japanese expeditionary forces 
 in Siberia; senior officer of the Allied forces in Siberia, August 9, 1918— 
 1919 - 
 
 Page, Walter Hines, American ambassador to Great Britain, April 21, 
 1913—November, 1918. 
 
 Phillips, William, Assistant Secretary of State, January 24, 1917—March 
 3, 1920. " 
 
 Pichon, Stephen, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, November 16, 1917— 
 January 20, 1920; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference. 
 
 Polk, Frank L., counselor for the Department of State, 1915-1919; Acting 
 Secretary of State, December 4, 1918—July 18, 1919; plenipotentiary at 
 the Paris Peace Conference, July 28—December 9, 1919; Under-Secretary 
 of State, 1919-1920. 
 
 Poole, DeWitt C., detailed for duty in the Consulate General at Moscow, 
 July 17, 1917; detailed to Archangel as special assistant to the ambassa¬ 
 dor, October 5, 1918; detailed to Department of State as chief of the 
 Division of Russian Affairs, October 1, 1919—March, 1920; unassigned, 
 March to October, 1920; designated acting chief of the Division of 
 Russian Affairs, April 27, 1921; expert assistant, Conference on the 
 Limitation of Armament, November 3, 1921; designated chief of the 
 Division of Russian Affairs, December 20, 1921. 
 
GLOSSARY OF NAMES 
 
 245 
 
 Reading, Marquess of (Rufus Daniel Isaacs), British special envoy to the 
 United States, 1917; high commissioner and special ambassador to the 
 United States, 1918. 
 
 Reinsch, Paul S., American minister to China, August 15, 1913—1919- 
 
 Robins, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond, head of the American Red Cross 
 Commission to Russia, December, 1917—May, 1918. 
 
 Rodgers, Admiral William L., commander-in-chief of the United States 
 Asiatic Fleet, 1918-1919. 
 
 Root, Elihu, ambassador extraordinary at the head of the special United 
 States diplomatic mission to Russia in the spring of 1917. 
 
 Ruddock, A. B., American charge d’affaires at Peking, February 26, 1920 
 to December 4, 1922. 
 
 Sazanov, Sergei D., Minister of Foreign Affairs in Kolchak government. 
 
 Schurman, Jacob G., American minister to China, 1921-1925. 
 
 Scidmore, George H., consul general at Yokohama, November 24, 1913— 
 November 27, 1922. 
 
 Semenov, Captain Gregorii, ataman of the Far Eastern Cossacks. 
 
 Sharp, William G., American ambassador to France, June 19, 1914—April, 
 1919. 
 
 Shidehara, Baron Kijuro, Japanese ambassador to the United States, 1919- 
 1922. 
 
 Sisson, Edgar, associate chairman of the Committee on Public Informa¬ 
 tion, Washington, D. C., May 13, 1917—April 1, 1919. 
 
 Slaughter, Major Homer H., American military representative and liaison 
 officer to Kolchak forces until December 20, 1919; at Headquarters, 
 A.E.F., Siberia, and with Ataman Semenov, to January 1, 1920; at Vlad¬ 
 ivostok with Headquarters, A.E.F., Siberia, to April 1, 1920. 
 
 Smith, Charles H., American representative on the Intex-Allied Railway 
 Committee for the supervision of the Chinese Eastern and Siberian Rail¬ 
 ways. 
 
 Sookine, John, attached to the Russian Embassy at Washington; later Act¬ 
 ing Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kolchak government. 
 
 Spencer, Willing, secretary of Embassy at Peking, December 29, 1917; at 
 Tokyo, June 19, 1918; reassigned to Peking, October 15, 19x8—March 
 5, 1920. 
 
 Spring-Rice, Sir Cecil Arthur, British ambassador to the United States, 
 1913—January, 1918. 
 
 Steffens, Lincoln, American editor and author. 
 
 Stevens, John F., chairman of the Advisory Commission of Railway Ex¬ 
 perts to Russia, 1917-1918; president of the Inter-Allied Technical Board 
 supervising the Chinese Eastern and Siberian Railways, 1919-1923. 
 
 Summers, Maddin, consul general at Moscow, April 21, 1917—May 4, 
 1918. 
 
 Tanaka, General Baron Giichi, assistant chief of the Japanese General Staff, 
 
GLOSSARY OF NAMES 
 
 246 
 
 October, 1915—September, 1918; Minister of War, September, 1918— 
 1921. 
 
 Tchaikovsky, Nicholas V., President of the North Russian government 
 (Archangel). 
 
 Tenney, Charles, secretary of Legation at Peking, May 1, 1914—June 26, 
 1919; counselor of Legation, July 21, 1919—February 28, 1921. 
 
 Terauchi, Count Masakata, Japanese Prime Minister, October 9, 1916— 
 September 29, 1918. 
 
 Tereschenko, M. I., Minister of Finance in Provisional government, March- 
 May, 1917; Minister of Foreign Affairs, May-October, 1917. 
 
 Trotsky, L. D., chairman of the Petrograd Soviet of Workman’s and 
 Soldiers’ Deputies, October 8, 1917; Soviet Commissar for Foreign 
 Affairs, November 8, 1917—March 13, 1918; Commissar for War and 
 Navy, March 30, 1918—1925. 
 
 Uchida, Viscount Yasuya, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, September, 
 1918—September, 1923. 
 
 Wang, C. C., representative on Inter-Allied Technical Board for control 
 of Siberian Railways, 1920-1922; director-general of the Chinese East¬ 
 ern Railway, 1922-1924. 
 
 Warren, Charles B., ambassador to Japan, June 29, 1921—March, 1923. 
 
 Willard, Daniel, appointed chairman of the Advisory Commission of the 
 Council of National Defense, March, 1917; appointed Chairman of the 
 War Industries Board, November 17, 1917. 
 
 Williams, E. T., chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of 
 State, December 31, 1913—September, 1918. 
 
 Wilson, General Sir Henry H., chief of the British military representatives 
 on Supreme War Council; chief of Imperial General Staff, 1918-1922. 
 
 Wiseman, Sir William, chief adviser on American affairs to British Dele¬ 
 gation, Paris, 1918-1919. 
 
 Wright, J. Butler, counselor of the Embassy at Petrograd, October 2, 
 1916; assigned to Department of State, May 14, 1918; counselor of the 
 Embassy at London, September 19, 1918; assigned to Department of 
 State for duty in connection with the Conference on the Limitation of 
 Armament; designated expert assistant, Conference on the Limitation 
 of Armament, November 3, 1921. 
 
 Yen, Hawkling L., chief secretary to the Chinese Delegation, Conference 
 on the Limitation of Armament, 1921. 
 
Selected Bibliography 
 
 I. MANUSCRIPT SOURCES: OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE PAPERS 
 
 Official 
 
 Department of State, National Archives, 1917-1922 
 
 The decimal files contain the official diplomatic records of Allied inter¬ 
 vention in Siberia. They constitute the most valuable single source 
 on the subject. The most useful files on intervention were 861.00, “Po¬ 
 litical Conditions in Russia,” and 861.77, “The Trans-Siberian and 
 Chinese Eastern Railways.” Files 763.72SU, “Proceedings of the Su¬ 
 preme War Council,” and 793.94, “Relations Between China and Japan,” 
 were also helpful. 
 
 Naval Records Collections in the Office of Naval Records and Library, 
 National Archives, 1917-1920 
 
 Files covering intervention are WA-6, “Russian Situation,” and WA-6, 
 “Siberia, Conditions in Vladivostok.” Uneven in value. Much of this 
 material is still restricted. 
 
 Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, War Records Collection, Na¬ 
 tional Archives, 1917-1919 
 
 Only selected documents in file 370.22, “Russian Expedition,” are avail¬ 
 able to the scholar. The major portion of the material on the Siberian 
 intervention is restricted. 
 
 World War I Records of the Supreme War Council, Old Records Section, 
 Department of War, National Archives, 1918-1919 
 Incomplete. Helpful in revealing Allied motives for intervention. 
 
 Private 
 
 Auchincloss, Gordon. Diary in Division of Manuscripts, Yale University 
 Library 
 
 Particularly helpful on events leading to intervention. Reveals changing 
 attitudes of Colonel House and President Wilson on the subject. 
 
 Baker, Newton D. Collection in the custody of Baker, Hostetler, and Pat¬ 
 terson, Inc., Cleveland, Ohio 
 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 248 
 
 Useful. The papers clearly indicate Baker’s constant disapproval of 
 the whole Siberian venture. Many of his more important letters on 
 the subject are duplicated in the Wilson Papers. 
 
 Bliss, Tasker H. Collection in Division of Manuscripts, Library of Con¬ 
 gress 
 
 The most important source on the changing attitudes of the Supreme 
 War Council toward the Siberian expedition. Paris Peace Conference 
 Diary is also helpful. 
 
 House, Edward M. Collection in Division of Manuscripts, Yale University 
 Library 
 
 Many of the important documents covering the Siberian intervention 
 in this collection are reproduced in Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel 
 House. 
 
 Lansing, Robert. Collection in Division of Manuscripts, Library of Con¬ 
 gress 
 
 Useful. Lansing’s views are more clearly revealed in the diplomatic 
 correspondence in the State Department Archives. 
 
 Long, Breckinridge. Collection in Division of Manuscripts, Library of 
 Congress 
 
 Very important, particularly on the negotiations surrounding the Trans- 
 Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways. 
 
 Polk, Frank L. Collection in Division of Manuscripts, Yale University 
 Library 
 
 Few of these letters bear upon the Siberian intervention. 
 
 Polk, Frank L. Confidential Diary in Division of Manuscripts, Yale 
 University Library 
 
 Valuable. Indicates the changing views of individual members of the 
 State Department and the President as a Siberian policy is formulated 
 and carried out. The Diary is especially useful for the negotiations con¬ 
 cerning the delegation of the High Command in Siberia to Japan. 
 Railway Service Corps Papers. Collection in Hoover War Library, Stanford 
 University 
 
 These include lengthy memoranda on the activities of the Railway Serv¬ 
 ice Corps by leading members of the group, such as John F. Stevens, 
 George H. Emerson, and B. O. Johnson. 
 
 Wilson, Woodrow. Collection in Division of Manuscripts, Library of 
 Congress 
 
 The papers are chronologically arranged in two files, Wilson’s private 
 papers and the White House files. The private papers are indispensable 
 for a study of the Siberian intervention. 
 
 Wiseman, Sir William. Collection in Division of Manuscripts, Yale Uni¬ 
 versity Library 
 
 Valuable. Clearly reveals the intense British pressure placed upon 
 American statesmen for acquiescence to intervention, and later for an 
 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 249 
 
 expansion of the expedition. The papers further indicate that many del¬ 
 icate negotiations concerning Siberian policy were conducted through 
 the unofficial channels of Sir William Wiseman and Colonel House 
 rather than through the State Department and the British Foreign 
 Office. 
 
 II. PRINTED SOURCES 
 Official Documents 
 
 The German-Bolshevi\ Conspiracy. (War Information Series, No. 20.) 
 Washington, October, 1918. 
 
 Selected excerpts from the so-called “Sisson Documents.” 
 
 Great Britain. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series, 
 1918-1919. Vols. CIII-CXXIII. 
 
 United States Army War College. Order of Battle of the United States 
 Land Forces in the World War, American Expeditionary Forces in the 
 World War. Washington, 1937. 
 
 Gives explicit information on the make-up of the American expeditionary 
 force in Siberia as well as on its activities throughout its stay in Siberia. 
 United States Congress. Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates, 
 1918-1920. (Sixty-fifth and sixty-sixth Congresses.) Washington, 1918- 
 1920. 
 
 United States Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Rela¬ 
 tions of the United States, 1917. Washington, 1926. 
 
 United States Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign 
 Relations of the United States, 1917, Supplement 2, The World War. 
 Washington, 1932. 2 vols. 
 
 United States Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Rela¬ 
 tions of the United States, 1918, Russia. Washington, 1931-1932. 3 
 
 vols. 
 
 Well-organized. Volume I covers political affairs and diplomatic rela¬ 
 tions. Volume II, entitled Disintegration and Intervention, is devoted 
 to papers dealing with the anti-Bolshevik movements in Siberia and 
 Manchuria, Murmansk, Archangel, and elsewhere, and Allied reaction 
 to them. Volume III, entitled Economic Relations, deals chiefly with 
 loans to the Provisional Government, assistance in railway transporta¬ 
 tion, and Soviet repudiation of loans. 
 
 United States Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Re¬ 
 lations of the United States, 1919. The Paris Peace Conference. Wash¬ 
 ington, 1942. Vols. I-IX, XI. 
 
 United States Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Re¬ 
 lations of the United States, 1919, Russia. Washington, 1937. 
 
 Covers the Siberian intervention in 1919. Vital, although not as well- 
 organized as the 1918 volumes on Russia. 
 
 United States Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Rela¬ 
 tions of the United States, 1920. Washington, 1936. 3 vols. 
 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 250 
 
 Selected documents in these volumes cover Allied withdrawal from 
 Siberia, Japanese expansion in the Maritime Province and Sakhalin, and 
 negotiations over the Chinese Eastern Railway. 
 
 United States Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Rela¬ 
 tions of the United States, 1 92/. Washington, 1936. 2 vols. 
 
 United States Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Rela¬ 
 tions of the United States, 1922. Washington, 1938. 2 vols. 
 
 United States Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Rela¬ 
 tions of the United States. The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920. Washing¬ 
 ton, 1940. 2 vols. 
 
 Volume II contains selected documents from the Secretary’s corre¬ 
 spondence on Siberia. Very helpful. 
 
 United States Senate Document No. 60, Sixty-sixth Congress, Second Ses¬ 
 sion. American Troops in Siberia. Washington, 1919. 
 
 Official statement of American policy in Siberia. 
 
 United States Senate Document No. 61, Sixty-sixth Congress, First Session. 
 Brewing and Liquor Interests and German and Bolshevi\ Propaganda. 
 Washington, 1919. 
 
 United States Senate Document No. 126, Sixty-seventh Congress, Second 
 Session. Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, Washington, 
 November 12, 1921-February 6, 1922. Washington, 1922. 
 
 Contains an official account of the Conference proceedings in regard 
 to Siberia and the Chinese Eastern Railway. 
 
 Official Documents Unofficially Published 
 
 — Bullitt, William C. Bullitt Mission to Russia; Testimony Before the Com¬ 
 
 mittee on Foreign Relations, United States. New York, 1919. 
 Bullitt’s own story of his mission to Russia in 1919. 
 
 — Bunyan, James. Intervention, Civil War, and Communism in Russia. 
 
 April-December 1918. Baltimore, 1936. 
 
 An excellent selection of official and unofficial documents, confidential 
 reports, decrees, proclamations, speeches, resolutions, and military de¬ 
 crees arranged in chronological order. One of the best published 
 sources on the subject. 
 
 Bunyan, James, and H. H. Fisher. The Bolshevi\ Revolution, 191^-1918. 
 Documents and Materials. Stanford, 1934. 
 
 An excellent selection of documents, well edited and well arranged. 
 Correspondance diplomatique se rapportant aux relations entre la repub- 
 lique Russe et les puissances de I’entente, 1918. Moscow, 1919. 
 
 This correspondence is particularly concerned with the Czech revolt in 
 the latter part of May, 1918. 
 
 Cumming, C. K., and W. W. Pettit, eds. Russian-American Relations, 
 March I9iy-March 1920, Documents and Papers. New York, 1920. 
 Includes some of the most important documents on the Siberian inter¬ 
 vention. 
 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 251 
 
 Degras, Jane, ed. Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy. London, 1951. 
 2 vols. 
 
 MacMurray, J. V. A., ed. Treaties and Agreements with and concerning 
 China, 1849-1919. New York, 1921. 2 vols. 
 
 Useful. Volume II covers the period from 1914 to 1919. 
 
 Varneck, Elena, and H. H. Fisher. The Testimony of Kolcha\ and Other 
 Siberian Materials. Stanford, 1935. 
 
 Well edited with excellent explanatory and supplementary notes and 
 a valuable bibliography. The first half of the book covers the testimony 
 of Admiral Kolchak at his trial before the extraordinary investigating 
 commission, January to February, 1920. Also useful were the ma¬ 
 terials on the Nikolaevsk massacre and the Vladivostok incident, April 
 4-5, 1920. 
 
 Letters, Diaries, Memoirs, Addresses, etc. 
 
 Ackerman, Carl W. Trailing the Bolshevi\i: Twelve Thousand Miles 
 with the Allies in Siberia. New York, 1919. 
 
 A journalistic account of Siberian affairs during the civil war. Not 
 always accurate. 
 
 Baker, Ray Stannard. Woodrow Wilson. Life and Letters. New York, 
 1939. 8 vols. 
 
 Volumes VII and VIII include entries on the Siberian intervention. 
 Useful, although the shortness of the entries and the lack of exact dates 
 is tantalizing. 
 
 Baker, Ray Stannard, and William E. Dodd. The Public Papers of Wood- 
 row Wilson. New York, 1927. 3 vols. 
 
 Barrows, David P. “Japan as Our Ally in Siberia,” Asia, XIX (Sept., 
 
 I 9 I 9)> 9 2 7'93 r - 
 
 Personal observations by a member of the American Military Intelli¬ 
 gence in Siberia in 1918. 
 
 Benes, Eduard. My War Memoirs; trans. Paul Selver. London, 1928. 
 Buchanan, Sir George. My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic 
 Memories. London, 1923. 2 vols. 
 
 Callwell, Major General Sir C. E. Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, His 
 Life and Diaries. London, 1927. 2 vols. 
 
 Frankly antagonistic toward President Wilson and American policy in 
 Siberia. 
 
 Channing, C. G. F. Siberia’s Untouched Treasure, Its Future Role in the 
 ' World. New York, 1923. 
 
 Chapters XI to XX cover the author’s experiences as a member of 
 the American expeditionary force in Siberia. 
 
 Churchill, Winston. The Aftermath. New York, 1929. 
 
 Chapters V and XII contain an account of intervention in Siberia and 
 elsewhere. Churchill was the British Secretary of War and an advocate 
 of maximum intervention. 
 
252 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Dawson, Warrington, ed. War Memoirs of William G. Sharp. London, 
 
 W 
 
 Contains personal observations of the French official and unofficial 
 attitude toward the Siberian intervention. Sharp was ambassador to 
 France during the war years. 
 
 Dwinger, Eric. Between White and Red. New York, 1932. 
 
 Experiences of a German war prisoner who took part in the fighting 
 against the Bolsheviks in 1919 and in the retreat of the Kolchak army. 
 Francis, David R. Russia from the American Embassy. April 1916- 
 November, 1918. New York, 1921. 
 
 An account of the ambassador’s experiences in Russia taken from his 
 notes, interviews, letters, and impressions. Strongly anti-Bolshevik. 
 Graves, William Sydney. America's Siberian Adventure 1918-1920. New 
 York, 1931. 
 
 The story of the American expeditionary force in Siberia by its com¬ 
 mander. One of the most illuminating accounts on the subject. 
 Grondijs, Ludovic H. La Guerre en Russie et en Siberie. Paris, 1922. 
 Useful account by a Dutch war correspondent sympathizing with the 
 Allies. 
 
 Harper, Samuel N. The Russia I Believe In: The Memoirs of Samuel N. 
 
 Harper, 1902-1941. Chicago, 1945. 
 
 Hill, George A. Go Spy the Land. London, 1932. 
 
 The adventures of a British secret service man in Russia. 
 
 Hodges, Phelps. Britmis. A Great Adventure of the War. Being an 
 Account of Allied Intervention in Siberia and an Escape Across the 
 Gobi to Peking. London, 1931. 
 
 By a member of the British Military Mission in Siberia. 
 
 Hull, Cordell. Memoirs. New York, 1948. 2 vols. 
 
 Chapter XXII of Volume II touches briefly on Allied intervention in 
 Siberia and its results. 
 
 Ishii, Kikujiro. Diplomatic Commentaries. Baltimore, 1936. 
 
 Illustrates the psychology of a leading Japanese diplomat and statesman 
 during an expansive period in Japanese history. 
 
 Janin, Maurice. Ma mission en Siberie, 1918-1920. Paris, 1933. 
 
 Personal account by the French commander of the Czech forces in 
 Siberia. Based on his diary. 
 
 Kindall, Sylvian G. American Soldiers in Siberia. New York, 1945. 
 Personal account of the author’s experiences as a member of the Ameri¬ 
 can expeditionary force in Siberia. Strongly anti-Japanese. 
 
 Lansing, Robert. War Memoirs. Indianapolis, 1935. 
 
 Personal narrative covering the foreign affairs of the United States from 
 June, 1915, through 1917. 
 
 Lennox, Lady Algernon Gordon. Diary of Lord Bertie of Thame, 1914- 
 1918. London, 1924. 2 vols. 
 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 253 
 
 Contains illuminating commentaries on Allied and American policy in 
 Siberia by the British ambassador to France during the war years. 
 Lloyd George, David. Memoirs of the Peace Conference. New Haven, 
 1939. 2 vols. 
 
 Chapter VII of Volume I covers Lloyd George’s account of the negoti¬ 
 ations concerning Russia and Siberia at the Peace Conference. 
 
 Lloyd George, David. War Memoirs. Boston, 1933-1937. 6 vols. 
 
 Volume V and VI contain sections on Britain’s early reactions to the 
 Bolshevik revolution, and the Siberian intervention. 
 
 Lockhart, R. H. Bruce. British Agent. New York, 1933. 
 
 Memoirs of the British unofficial agent in Moscow in the period when 
 the Allies were vacillating between intervention and nonintervention. 
 Contains the narrative of his negotiations with Lenin and Trotsky and 
 others in regard to securing a renewal of the Russian war effort against 
 Germany. 
 
 March, Peyton C. The Nation at War. New York, 1932. 
 
 War memoirs of the American Chief of Staff. Chapter IX deals with 
 Siberia. Presents some enlightening military views on the subject of 
 intervention in Siberia. 
 
 Masaryk, Thomas G. The Maying of a State: Memories and Observa¬ 
 tions. New York, 1927. 
 
 By the founder and unifier of the Czechoslovak Republic. Chapters 
 V and VI relate especially to the activities of the Czechoslovak legions 
 in Russia. 
 
 Nabokov, Constantin. The Ordeal of a Diplomat. London, 1921. 
 
 By the Russian charge d’affaires in Great Britain from January 12, 
 1917, to September 9, 1919. 
 
 Noulens, Joseph. Mon ambassade en Russie sovietique, iqij-1919. Paris, 
 1933. 2 vols. 
 
 Memoirs of the French ambassador to Russia covering the period from 
 June, 1917, to December, 1918. Noulens was an early and staunch ad¬ 
 vocate of maximum intervention. 
 
 Pares, Sir Bernard. My Russian Memoirs. London, 1931. 
 
 Pershing, John J. My Experiences in the World War. New York, 1931. 
 2 vols. 
 
 Makes only brief mention of the Siberian expedition. 
 
 Reinsch, Paul S. An American Diplomat in China. New York, 1922. 
 Repington, Charles a Court. The First World War, 1914-1918: Personal 
 Experiences. Boston and New York, 1920. 2 vols. 
 
 Sadoul, Jacques. Notes stir le revolution bolchevique, octobre, i9ij-janvier, 
 1919. Paris, 1926. 
 
 Contains valuable material on the early history of intervention, par¬ 
 ticularly on the Czechoslovak question. 
 
 Seymour, Charles, ed. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House. Boston, 
 1926-1928. 4 vols. 
 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 254 
 
 Based upon House’s journal, correspondence, and other documents. 
 Volume III is particularly valuable. 
 
 Sisson, Edgar. One Hundred Red Days. New Haven, 1931. 
 
 A highly personal account of a crucial period. Relates the acquisition 
 of certain documents purporting to show a German-Bolshevik con¬ 
 spiracy. 
 
 Smirnov, M. I. “Admiral Kolchak,” The Slavonic and East European 
 Review (London), XI (January, 1933), 373-387. 
 
 A summary of Kolchak’s career by his former Chief of Staff and a 
 member of his Omsk government. 
 
 Smith, Charles H. “What Happened in Siberia,” Asia, XXII (May, 
 19 22 )> 373'37 8 > 402-403. 
 
 By the American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee estab¬ 
 lished in January, 1919. 
 
 Smith, Charles H. “Four Years of Mistakes in Siberia,” Asia, XXII (June, 
 
 x 9 22 ), 479-4 8 3- 
 
 Smith, Charles H. “The Smoke-Screen between Siberia and Washington,” 
 Asia, XXII (August, 1922), 639-644. 
 
 Strongly anti-Japanese. 
 
 Sorokin, Pitirim. Leaves from a Russian Diary. New York, 1924. 
 Steffens, Lincoln. Autobiography. New York, 1931. 
 
 Steffens, Lincoln. Letters. New York, 1938. 2 vols. 
 
 Contains several enlightening letters on American policy toward Russia. 
 Villard, Oswald Garrison. Fighting Years; Memoirs of a Liberal Editor. 
 New York, 1934. 
 
 Autobiography of the editor of the Nation, and a constant opponent of 
 Wilson’s policy in Siberia. 
 
 Ward, John. With the Die-Hards in Siberia. London, 1920. 
 
 Memoirs of a British Colonel in Siberia, a sympathizer and supporter 
 of Kolchak. Bitterly opposed to American policy in Siberia. 
 
 III. SECONDARY WORKS 
 
 General Accounts and Special Studies 
 Baerlein, Henry. March of the Seventy Thousand. London, 1926. 
 
 A history of the Czech movement in Siberia. 
 
 Bailey, Thomas A. America Faces Russia: Russian-American Relations 
 from Early Times to Our Day. New York, 1950. 
 
 A public-opinion study primarily concerned with diplomatic problems. 
 Bailey, Thomas A. Theodore Roosevelt and the fapanese-American Crises. 
 Stanford, 1934. 
 
 Baker, Ray Stannard. Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement. New 
 York, 1922. 3 vols. 
 
 Bau, J. M. The Foreign Relations of China: A History and a Survey. 
 New York, 1922. 
 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 255 
 
 Bienstock, Gregory. The Struggle for the Pacific. New York, 1937. 
 Bisson, T. A. America’s Far Eastern Policy. New York, 1945. 
 
 Bock, Benjamin. “The Origins of Inter-Allied Intervention in Eastern 
 Asia, 1919-1920.” Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford Uni¬ 
 versity, 1940. 
 
 Buell, Raymond Leslie. The Washington Conference. New York, 1922. 
 Contains only brief mention of the Siberian and Chinese Eastern prob¬ 
 lems. 
 
 Chamberlin, William Henry. The Russian Revolution 1917-1921. New 
 York, 1935. 2 vols. 
 
 Scholarly and relatively impartial. Makes extensive use of Russian 
 sources. 
 
 The China Yearboofi. London, New York, Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, 
 1921-1924. 
 
 Issues for 1921-1922, 1923, and 1924 contain considerable information 
 on Sino-Soviet relations and events in Manchuria and Mongolia. 
 
 Clyde, Paul H. The Far East. A History of the Impact of the West on 
 Eastern Asia. New York, 1948. 
 
 Chapter XXIII contains the best brief account of the Siberian inter¬ 
 vention. 
 
 Clyde, Paul H. International Rivalries in Manchuria, 1689-1922. Co¬ 
 lumbus, 1922. 
 
 A monographic survey. Chapter XII treats the period 1915-1922. 
 Coates, W. P., and Zelda K. Coates. Armed Intervention in Russia 1918- 
 1922. London, 1935. 
 
 Deals primarily with Great Britain’s role in armed intervention. At¬ 
 tempts to justify Russia’s claims for damages due to Allied intervention. 
 Coates, W. P., and Zelda K. Coates. A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations. 
 London, 1943. 
 
 Dennett, Tyler. Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War. New York, 1925. 
 A study of American foreign policy in Eastern Asia, 1902-1905, based 
 primarily upon the private papers of Theodore Roosevelt. 
 
 Dennis, Alfred L. P. The Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia. New York, 
 1924. 
 
 A history of the international relations of Soviet Russia from the No¬ 
 vember revolution to the end of 1923. Based largely on newspaper 
 sources. Helpful. 
 
 Dugdale, Blanche E. Arthur fames Balfour, First Earl of Balfour. New 
 / York, 1937. 
 
 Makes use of material gathered by Lord Balfour for an autobiography. 
 Volume II covers the Siberian intervention. 
 
 Dulles, Foster Rhea. Forty Years of American-fapanese Relations. New 
 York, 1937. 
 
 Dulles, Foster Rhea. The Road to Teheran: The Story of Russia and 
 America 1781-1943. Princeton, 1944. 
 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 256 
 
 Field, Frederick V. American Participation in the China Consortiums. 
 Chicago, 1931. 
 
 The best single account on the subject. 
 
 Fischer, Louis. The Soviets in World Affairs: A History of Relations be 
 tween the Soviet Union and the Rest of the World. London, 1930. 
 2 vols. 
 
 The first volume contains sections dealing with Russo-Asiatic affairs 
 during the civil war. 
 
 Griswold, A. Whitney. The Far Eastern Policy of the United States. 
 New York, 1938. 
 
 Well-documented and very readable. Particularly helpful in fitting 
 the Siberian expedition into the larger picture of America’s traditional 
 Far Eastern Policy. 
 
 Hagedorn, Herman. The Magnate: William Boyce Thompson and His 
 Times, 1869-1930. New York, 1935. 
 
 A biography of the head of the American Red Cross in Russia in 1917. 
 Useful. 
 
 Hard, William. Raymond Robins’ Own Story. New York, 1920. 
 
 Robins was the head of the American Red Cross in Russia in 1918. 
 Ichihashi, Yamato. The Washington Conference and After: A Historical 
 Survey. Stanford, 1928. 
 
 The Japan Yearbook Tokyo, 1919-1924. 
 
 Contains official statements regarding intervention. 
 
 Jessup, Philip. Elihu Root. New York, 1938. 2 vols. 
 
 Kawakami, K. K. Japan s Pacific Policy. New York, 1922. 
 
 Chapter XXXIII attempts to explain Japan’s Siberian policy. 
 
 Kono, Tsunekichi. The Japanese Army. Tokyo, 1929. 
 
 LaFargue, Thomas E. China and the World War. Stanford, 1937. 
 Authoritative and comprehensive. Essential to a knowledge of Ameri¬ 
 can policy in the Far East following World War I. 
 
 Lengyel, Emil. Siberia. New York, 1943. 
 
 Popular account. Contains vivid descriptions of the major Siberian 
 leaders during the civil war. 
 
 Li, Tien-yi. Woodrow Wilson’s China Policy, 1913-1917. New York, 
 1952. 
 
 Lobanov-Rostovsky, Prince A. Russia and Asia. New York, 1933. 
 
 A historical survey of relations between Russia and Asia with chapters 
 on the revolution and the civil war. 
 
 Manning, Clarence A. The Siberian Fiasco. New York, 1952. 
 
 Millard, Thomas F. Conflict of Policies in Asia. London, 1924. 
 
 A survey of the foreign policies and interests of the nations principally 
 concerned in the Far East. Strongly anti-Japanese. 
 
 Millard, Thomas F. Democracy and the Eastern Question. New York, 
 1919. 
 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 257 
 
 Mock, James R., and Cedric Larson. Words That Won the War: The 
 Story of the Committee on Public Information 1917-1919. Princeton, 
 1939- 
 
 Moore, Frederick F. Siberia Today. New York, 1919. 
 
 Journalistic account. Strongly anti-Bolshevik. 
 
 Mordacq, Jean Jules Henri. Le Ministere Clemenceau, journal d’un temoin. 
 Paris, 1931. 4 vols. 
 
 Norton, H. K. Far Eastern Republic of Siberia. New York, 1927. 
 
 Brief account of revolution, civil war, and intervention in Siberia, and 
 in greater detail, the establishment of the Far Eastern Republic. 
 Palmer, Frederick. Bliss, Peacemaker. The Life and Letters of General 
 Taster Howard Bliss. New York, 1934. 
 
 Palmer, Frederick. Newton D. Ba\er, America at War. New York, 
 1931. 2 vols. 
 
 Pelzel, Sophia Rogoski. American Intervention in Siberia, 1918-1920. 
 Philadelphia, 1946. 
 
 Doctoral dissertation in political science. 
 
 Pollard, Robert T. China’s Foreign Relations 1917-1931. New York, 
 
 J 933- 
 
 Chapters V, VI, and IX deal with Chinese relations with the Whites 
 and the Soviets. 
 
 Price, Ernest Batson. The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concern¬ 
 ing Manchuria and Mongolia. Baltimore, 1933. 
 
 Ross, E. A. The Russian Soviet Republic. New York, 1923. 
 
 Schuman, Frederick L. American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917. 
 New York, 1928. 
 
 A careful and critical analysis. 
 
 Sokolsky, George E. The Story of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Shanghai, 
 1929. 
 
 Spargo, John. Russia as an American Problem. New York, 1920. 
 Stewart, George. The White Armies of Russia; a Chronicle of Counter- 
 Revolution and Allied Intervention. New York, 1933. 
 
 One of the best accounts on the subject. An attempt to weave to¬ 
 gether all aspects of intervention in Russia. 
 
 Strakhovsky, Leonid I. Intervention at Archangel: Story of Allied Inter¬ 
 vention and Russian Counter-Revolution in North Russia, 1918-1920. 
 Princeton, 1944. 
 
 A carefully prepared and documented study of the administration of a 
 foreign territory under military occupation. 
 
 Strakhovsky, Leonid I. The Origins of American Intervention in North 
 Russia, 1918. Princeton, 1937. 
 
 Documented. The author played an active part in many of the events 
 described. 
 
 Sullivan, Mark. The Great Adventure: The Stoi-y of the Conference. 
 New York, 1922. 
 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 258 
 
 Takeuchi, Tatsuji. War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire. New 
 York, 1935. 
 
 Chapter XVIII covers the Siberian expedition. Clearly reveals the con¬ 
 flict between the military and civilian authorities in regard to the prob¬ 
 lem. An excellent summary based upon Japanese sources. 
 
 —Tompkins, Pauline. American-Russian Relations in the Far East. New 
 York, 1949. 
 
 Valuable. Contains several chapters on the Siberian intervention. The 
 author concludes that Wilson’s decision to intervene in Siberia was 
 “right and inevitable.” 
 
 Tupper, Eleanor, and George E. McReynolds. Japan in American Public 
 Opinion. New York, 1937. 
 
 A diplomatic history based largely upon newspapers, congressional 
 debates, and expressed opinions of representative men and women. 
 Weigh, Ken Shen. Russo-Chinese Diplomacy. Shanghai, 1928. 
 Wheeler-Bennett, John. Brest-Litovsp, The Forgotten Peace, March, 1918. 
 London, 1938. 
 
 White, John Albert. The Siberian Intervention. Princeton, 1950. 
 
 An excellent survey, carefully annotated and based upon American, 
 Japanese, and Russian sources. Primarily concerned with the events 
 following the departure of American troops from Siberia. Attempts 
 to cover all phases of the intervention. 
 
 Williams, William A. American-Russian Relations, 1J81-194J. New 
 York, 1952. 
 
 Young, A. Morgan. Japan Under Taisho Tenno. London, 1928. 
 
 Young, C. Walter. Japan’s Special Position in Manchuria. Baltimore, 
 1931. 
 
 Articles 
 
 Adachi, Kinnosuke. “Concerning Japan and Siberia,” Asia, XXIII (Au¬ 
 gust, 1918), 637-639. 
 
 “America and Japan; The Swing of the Pendulum.” Far Eastern Review, 
 XVII (May, 1921), 332-335. 
 
 “American Policy in Russia,” New Republic, XVIII (February 8, 1918), 
 
 37'39- 
 
 “China’s Effort to Recover Control over the Chinese Eastern Railway,” 
 Far Eastern Review, XVI (September, 1920), 605-606. 
 
 Colcord, Lincoln. “Japan in Siberia,” Nation, CX (January 10, 1920), 
 36 " 39, 
 
 f. “The Crime against Russia,” Nation, CIX (August 2, 1919), 136. 
 
 Deane, Frederick. “The Chinese Eastern Railway,” Foreign Affairs, III 
 (September 15, 1924), 147-152. 
 
 Dennis, A. L. P. “The New Russo-Japanese Treaty Explained,” Current 
 History, XXI (May, 1925), 240-244. 
 
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 Fleming, Jackson. “A Counter-Thrust for Russia: World Democracy Must 
 Strike Germany in Asia,” Asia, XVIII (July, 1918), 537-541. 
 Gilbreath, Oliver. “The Sick Man of Siberia: The Story of the Trans- 
 Siberian Railroad,” Asia, XIX (June, 1919), 546-552. 
 
 • Graham, M. W. “Russian-American Relations, 1917-1933: An Interpre¬ 
 
 tation,” American Political Science Review, XXVIII (June, 1934), 401- 
 409. 
 
 Graves, Sidney C. “Japanese Aggression in Siberia,” Current History, 
 XIV (May, 1921), 239-245. 
 
 “Japan and Siberia,” New Republic, XXI (January 14, 1920), 187-188. 
 .“Justice to Russia,” Nation, CVIII (January, 1919), 6-7. 
 
 Keith, Orrin. “Re-birth of Industry and Commerce in Eastern Siberia,” 
 Far Eastern Review, XVIII (February, 1922), 127-129. 
 
 • Kennan, George. “Can We Help Russia?” Outloo\, CXIX (May 22, 
 
 i 9 i 8), H 1 - 
 
 Mason, Gregory. “Japan and Bolshevism,” Outloo\, CXIX (June 12, 
 1918), 259-261. 
 
 Mason, Gregory. “Japan, Germany, Russia and the Allies: An Authorized 
 Interview with Count Masakata Terauchi, Premier of Japan,” Outloo\, 
 CXIX (May 1, 1918), 18-22. 
 
 .Mason, Gregory. “Shall We Send an Army to Russia,” Outlook^, CXVII 
 (October 24, 1917), 292-297. 
 
 Pasvolsky, Leo. “Russia Takes Over Vladivostok,” Current History, XVI 
 (December, 1922), 499-501. 
 
 Peffer, Nathaniel. “Japan’s Absorption of Siberia,” Nation, CXII (Oc¬ 
 tober 5, 1921), 367-369. 
 
 “President Masaryk on Intervention,” New Republic, XIX (July 23, 1919), 
 
 377- 
 
 Reinsch, Paul S. “Manchuria, Mongolia, and Siberia,” Nation, CXIV 
 (May 3, 1922), 523-525. 
 
 Sherower, Miles M. “Japanese Imperialism,” Nation, CXII (February 2, 
 1921), 175-177. 
 
 Sherower, Miles M. “The Nikolaevsk Massacre,” Nation, CXI (August 21, 
 1920), 211-213. 
 
 Wang, C. C. “The Chinese Eastern Railway,” Annals of the American 
 Academy of Political and Social Science, CXXII (November, 1925), 
 67-75. 
 
 Wilton, Robert. “The Rush for Siberia: Causes of the Present Crisis in the 
 Pacific,” Fortnightly Review, CX (November 1, 1925), 782-805. 
 Zippin, Max. “The Far East Gets a Respite,” Nation, CXI (August 2, 
 1920), 210-211. 
 
 Newspapers and Periodicals 
 American Political Science Review. 
 
 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 
 
260 
 
 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Asia. 
 
 Current History. 
 
 Current Opinion. 
 
 Far Eastern Review (Sli^nghai). 
 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Fortnightly Review (London). 
 
 Literary Digest. 
 
 London Times. 
 
 Nation. 
 
 New Republic. 
 
 New York Times. 
 
 Outloo\. 
 
 Pacific Affairs. 
 
 Slavonic and East European Review (London). 
 
Index 
 
 Ackerman, Carl, 90-91 
 Advisory Council on Foreign Relations, 
 81, 170, 174, 185 
 origin and character of, 81 n. 55 
 aide memoire (July 17, 1918), 85, 89, 93- 
 94, 167 
 
 Allied reactions to, 78-79 
 interpretation of, 98-99, 104, 114, 124- 
 125 
 
 text of, 76-78, 235-238 
 Allies, 30, 35, 72 
 
 expansion of Siberian expedition, 96 
 policies toward 
 
 Bolsheviks, 10-12, 140-148 
 Kolchak, 149-151, 154-156 
 proposals for intervention, 40, 63, 66 
 views on intervention, 51, 87 
 Alston, Sir Beilby Francis, 214 
 Amur Railway, 24, 179, 204 
 Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, 4 
 anti-Bolsheviks, 151, 155-156 
 Armistice, 155, 232 
 Atherton, Ray, 170 
 
 Auchincloss, Gordon, 63, 72 n. 15, 82 n, 
 59 
 
 views on intervention, 33, 62, 68 n. 3 
 Austro-German war prisoners in Siberia 
 reports on, 38 
 
 threatened activities of, 45-47, 51, 96 
 
 Baker, Newton D., 69, 89, 115 
 role of, in intervention, 3, 124 
 views on 
 
 high command in Siberia, 76 
 intervention in North Russia, 52, 64 
 intervention in Siberia, 63-64, 102 n. 
 
 54, 103-104, 114, 125 
 protection of Trans-Siberian Railroad, 
 130-131 
 
 results of intervention, 234 n. 10 
 role of Czechs in intervention, 60 n. 
 95, 180-181 
 
 support of Omsk government, 152 
 withdrawal of American troops from 
 North Russia, 136 
 withdrawal of American troops from 
 Siberia, 167-168, 177, 179, 180- 
 181 
 
 (see United States War Department) 
 Bakhmetev, Boris A., 107 
 views on intervention, 31, 61 
 Balfour, Arthur J., 6, 35 n. 78, 92 
 
 attitude toward Bolshevik Russia, 11 
 Russian policy, 86 n. 72, 143 
 views on 
 
 intervention, 24-25, 29-30, 32, 33 n. 
 
 67, 37 . 42 , 51 - 52 , 73 
 Wison’s aide memoire, 78 n. 41 
 Barrows, David P. 
 
 views on intervention, 48 
 Benes, Dr. Eduard, 93 
 Benson, Admiral William S., 69 
 Bergson, Henri, 63 
 
 Bertie, Lord Francis Leveson, 142 n. 33 
 views on 
 
 intervention, 34 n. 72, 35 n. 73 
 Prinkipo proposal, 143 
 Bliss, General Tasker H., 141, 146, 147 
 views on 
 
 high command in Siberia, 90 n. 5 
 intervention, 21, 27-29, 53, 64 
 support of Omsk government, 164 
 Bolshevik program, 10 
 Bolshevik revolution, 107 
 effect on Eastern Siberia, 13 
 effects on Chinese Eastern Railway, 14- 
 18 
 
 (see Russian revolution) 
 
INDEX 
 
 262 
 
 Bolsheviks, 62, 66, 122, 124, 125, 128, 
 142 n. 33, 151, 157, 163 n. 49, 177, 
 177 n. 33, 216, 234 
 
 Allied attitude toward, 140, 141-148, 
 230 
 
 American attitude toward, 90-91, 136, 
 137, J 39 n. 19, 150, 180 n. 45 
 Chinese policy toward, 14, 215 
 relations with 
 
 Czechs, 56-59, 184 
 Germany, 137-138 
 views on 
 
 intervention, 40, 42 
 Wilson's Siberian policy, 233 
 Bolshevism, 141 n. 29, 149, 152, 158, 159, 
 160, 165, 187, 234 
 Allied attitude toward, 140-142 
 American attitude toward, 135-138, 205, 
 233 
 
 American policy toward, 231 n. 2 
 Japanese efforts to suppress, 189 
 Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, 46 
 negotiations for, 21, 36 
 Buckler, W. H., 142 
 Bullard, Arthur 
 
 views on support of Kolchak, 150 
 Bullitt, William C. 
 
 mission to Russia, 147-148 
 views on intervention, 31-32 
 
 Caldwell, John K., 94 
 views on 
 
 Austro-German war prisoners, 45 
 intervention, 22 
 
 recognition of Omsk government, 
 152-153 
 
 Central Powers, 230, 233 
 Chang Tso-lin, 225 
 
 Changchun Conference, 202-203 (see Far 
 Eastern Republic) 
 
 Chicherin, George, 40 
 China 
 
 American policy toward, 232 
 and negotiations for Consortium of 
 1920, 207, 208, 212, 222 
 and negotiations for Inter-Allied Rail¬ 
 way Agreement, 108, 116 
 and withdrawal of American troops 
 from Siberia, 179-180 
 attempts to gain control of Chinese 
 Eastern Railway, 75, 204-208, 215- 
 216, 221-222 
 
 attitude toward joint Japanese-American 
 expedition to Siberia, 79-80 
 
 policy toward Chinese Eastern Railway, 
 75> 79-81, 204, 205, 214, 217-219, 
 
 223- 227 
 
 supports Horvat against the Bolsheviks, 
 14 
 
 (see Chinese Eastern Railway; Japan; 
 Sino-Japanese Military Agreements, 
 1918; Washington Conference) 
 Chinese Eastern Railway, 24, 66, 74, 130, 
 i 3 2 > 133 . 170. 177 . 201 
 Allied resolutions concerning, 229 
 American policy toward, 28, 101, 137, 
 139, 181-182, 209-212, 220 
 and negoiations for 
 
 Consortium of 1920, 207, 212, 222- 
 223 
 
 Inter-Allied Railway Agreement, 1919, 
 no-111, 150 
 
 internationalization of, 214-215, 217, 
 
 224- 227 
 
 construction of, 13 
 financial negotiation for, 222-223 
 financial situation of, 228 
 Japanese policy toward, 96-97, 129, 
 
 179-180, 188, 231, 234 
 struggle for control of, 107-116, 172, 
 192, 204-208, 211, 211 n. 29, 213, 
 215-221 
 
 (see China; Consortium of 1920; Inter- 
 Allied Railway Agreement; Japan; 
 Stevens, John F. ; United States; 
 Washington Conference) 
 
 Chinese Eastern Railway Agreement of 
 1896 
 
 terms of, 13, 206 
 Churchill, Winston 
 
 attitude toward Bolsheviks, 141 
 Russian policy, 143-146, 146 n. 53, 148 
 n. 62 
 
 views on Siberian intervention, 230 n. 1 
 Clemenceau, Georges E. B., 19, 140 
 views on 
 
 President Wilson’s policies, 37 
 recognition of Omsk government, 156 
 Colby, Bainbridge, 187, 190 
 Communists (see Bolsheviks) 
 
 Consortium of 1920 
 
 negotiations for, 207-214, 223-224 
 Cossack leaders, 153 
 
 activities in Siberia, 120-121, 125-127, 
 133 , 139 
 relations with 
 
 Japan, 102, 130, 162, 172, 173 
 
INDEX 
 
 263 
 
 Omsk government, 126, 153, 163 
 United States, 154 
 
 (see Ivanov-Rinov, Pavel; Kalmikov, 
 Ivan; Rozanov, Sergei; Semenov, 
 Gregorii) 
 
 Council of Four (see Paris Peace Con¬ 
 ference) 
 
 Czechoslovaks, 82, 84, 117, 152, 161, 167 
 activities in Siberia, 54-55, 59, 67, 73, 
 88, 91 n. 9, 99, 177 
 American policy toward, 69, 155, 231 
 demoralization of, 157 
 relations with 
 
 Bolsheviks, 56-58, 98, 120, 184 
 Cossacks, 180, 206 
 
 Omsk government, 118, 127, 128, 163 
 role in Siberian intervention, 65, 66, 70, 
 92, 96 
 
 withdrawal of, from Siberia, 179, 183, 
 185 
 
 Daniels, Josephus, 23, 55, 69, 83 
 Debuchi, Katsuji, 170 
 Delanney, Marcel, 63, 63 n. no 
 Deniken, General A. I., 142, 149 
 Derber, Petr, 15 
 Drysdale, Major Walter S. 
 views on 
 
 Austro-German war prisoners, 45-46 
 intervention, 48 
 
 Eastern Front, 101, 104, 234 
 
 Allied efforts to re-establish, 98-99, 155, 
 230 
 
 re-creation of, as argument for inter¬ 
 vention, 18, 67-68, 72, 78, 84 
 Eliot, Sir Charles 
 
 appointed British High Commissioner in 
 Siberia, 94 
 
 interpretation of Inter-Allied Railway 
 Agreement, 210 
 
 view of Vladivostok incident, 187 
 Emerson, George B., 10, 45, in, 134 
 report on Czech role in intervention, 58- 
 59. 59 n. 94 
 
 Far East 
 
 American foreign policy in, 3-7, 214 
 Far Eastern Republic 
 
 origin and character of, 192, 192 n. 36 
 relations with 
 
 Japan, 192-196, 198-199, 202 
 United States, 193, 195 n. 44, 201, 
 202-203, 22 4 
 
 unites with Soviet Russia, 203 
 views on proposed internationalization 
 of Chinese Eastern Railway, 223 
 (see Changchun Conference; Washing¬ 
 ton Conference) 
 
 Fletcher, Henry P., 195 
 Foch, Ferdinand 
 
 policy toward Russia, 140 
 views on intervention, 29, 64, 68, 72 
 Fourteen Points, 231 
 point six of, 12-13 
 France 
 
 attitude toward 
 
 Bolsheviks, 41 n. 9, 141-142, 230 
 joint Japanese-American expedition to 
 Siberia, 71-72 
 
 extends financial aid to anti-Bolshevik 
 groups, 14, 15 
 
 motives for intervention in Siberia, 230, 
 2 3i 
 
 negotiations for Inter-Allied Railway 
 Agreement, 109, 116 
 policy in Siberia, 93-95, 232 
 policy toward Czechs in Siberia, 54-55, 
 58, 59 
 
 proposals for intervention, 19, 23, 29-30, 
 35, 40-4U 64 
 
 relations with Kolchak government, 123, 
 149 
 
 sends troops to Siberia, 74, 75, 79 
 views on 
 
 expansion of Siberian expedition, 91, 
 105 
 
 proposed internationalization of Chi¬ 
 nese Eastern Railway, 214, 217, 
 224, 226 
 
 withdrawal from Siberia, 183 
 Francis, David R., 8, 10, 62, 143 
 
 attitude toward Bolsheviks, 141, 141 n. 
 2 9 
 
 views on intervention, 20, 29, 36, 47- 
 48, 60-61 
 
 Germany, 35, 67, 137, 140, 155 
 German-Japanese Alliance 
 fear of, 27, 28, 35, 233 
 rumors of, 184 
 
 Gleaves, Admiral Albert, 186, 191 
 Goto, Baron Shimpei, 81, 84, 85 
 
 and negotiations for Inter-Allied Rail¬ 
 way Agreement, 108-109 
 views on intervention, 45 
 Graves, Major General William S., 84 n. 
 65, 99, 100, 115, 172 
 
INDEX 
 
 264 
 
 and Czech role in Siberia, 59 n. 94 
 and high command in Siberia, 76, 89, 90 
 and withdrawal of American troops from 
 Siberia, 178, 178 n. 37, 179, 180 
 attitude toward Bolsheviks, 90, 122, 
 
 122 n. 13, 233 n. 8 
 characteristics of, 89 
 criticized by 
 
 General Knox, 123 
 Omsk government, 127 
 State Department, 124-125 
 interpretation of American policy in 
 Siberia, 104, 122 n. 13, 124 
 relations with 
 
 Cossacks, 121, 126-127 
 Japanese military in Siberia, 101-102 
 role of, in intervention, 3, 120-121 
 views on 
 
 Austro-German war prisoners, 46 n. 
 
 36, 47 
 
 intervention, 233 n. 5 
 Omsk government, 102, 152, 157 n. 
 29, 158, 233 n. 5 
 
 Vladivostok incident, 185, 186 n. 13 
 Great Britain 
 attitude toward 
 
 General Graves, 123 
 joint Japanese-American expedition to 
 Siberia, 71-73 
 
 motives for intervention in Siberia, 230- 
 
 231 
 
 negotiations for 
 
 Consortium of 1920, 207, 211, 214, 
 222 
 
 Inter-Allied Railway Agreement, 1919, 
 109-110, 112-113, 116, 117 n. 42 
 policy toward 
 
 Chinese Eastern Railway, 208-209, 
 210-214, 217-220, 226-227, 22 8 
 Czechs in Siberia, 54, 58, 100, 101 
 Russia, 141, 147 
 
 Siberia, 73-75, 86, 91-95, 105, 183, 
 
 232 
 
 proposals for intervention, 23-25, 29-30, 
 
 37, 38, 41-42, 43, 64 
 
 reaction to Wilson’s aide memoire, 78, 
 79 
 
 relations with 
 
 Bolsheviks, 10-12, 42-43, 230-231 
 Japan, 4, 105 n. 63 
 Kolchak government, 123, 149, 150, 
 151, r 53 , 158, 161 
 Semenov, 15, 120, 126 
 sends troops to Siberia, 39, 73 
 
 views on withdrawal of American troops 
 from Siberia, 171 
 Grew, Joseph E. 
 
 and use of Czechs in Siberia, 56, 65 
 Guins, Georgii K. 
 
 and use of Czechs in Siberia, 58 
 
 Hara, Takashi 
 
 relations with Japanese General Staff, 
 106 
 
 Siberian policy, 81, “174-175, 182, 191 
 Harris, Ernest L., 45, 88 n. 81, 127, 163 
 n. 47, 186 
 
 and Japanese expansion in Siberia, 112 n. 
 26 
 
 policy toward Omsk government, 118, 
 121, 149, 150-151, 152, 162, 163, 
 164-165 
 
 views on intervention, 61 n. 99 
 Hay, John, 4 
 Heid, August, 162, 164 
 Hicks, Captain W. L., 46, 47 
 Horvat, General Dmitri L. 
 
 description of, 14 n. 50, 102, 119 
 policy in Chinese Eastern Railway zone, 
 14-15, 107-108, hi, 205, 206 
 relations with Japan, 15, 75, 75 n. 29, 
 101-102 
 
 House, Colonel Edward M. 
 
 and expansion of Siberian expedition, 
 71 n. 12, 92 
 
 attitude toward Bolsheviks, 19, 141 
 distrust of Japan, 7, 36 
 policy toward Russia, 7, 146, 147, 147 
 n. 55 
 
 proposals for intervention, 62, 63 
 views on intervention, 31-33, 38, 42 n. 
 16 
 
 Hughes, Charles Evans, 195, 196 
 
 and Japanese withdrawal from Siberia, 
 202 
 
 policy toward Chinese Eastern Railway, 
 219, 223-225, 228 
 
 reviews Siberian policy at Washington 
 Conference, 200-201 
 Hull, Cordell, 233 
 
 Inagaki, General S., 18 
 Inter-Allied Railway Agreement, 1919, 
 159, 168 
 
 effect on American policy, 117 
 interpretation of, 166,169-171,173,207, 
 209, 210, 213, 216 
 negotiations for, 108-110, 112, 116 
 
INDEX 
 
 265 
 
 proposed amendment of, 217 
 provisions of, 113, 114, 204, 205 
 termination of, 228, 230 
 violations of, 218 n. 55, 221 
 Inter-Allied Railway Committee, 132, 133, 
 153, i 73 > 1 9 I > 20 7 > 20 9 > 2I 3 > 2I 7 > 
 22 3 
 
 intervention in Siberia 
 
 agitation for, 22-36, 37-46, 47-68 
 Bolshevik views on, 40 
 reasons for, summarized, 67-68, 87, 231- 
 232 
 
 results of, 3, 234 
 Ishii, Viscount Kikujiro 
 
 and limiting size of Japanese expedition, 
 71, 82-83, 85, 97 
 views on 
 
 high command in Siberia, 75, 76 
 intervention, 43-45 
 {see Lansing-Ishii agreement) 
 
 Italy 
 
 and negotiations for Inter-Allied Railway 
 Agreement, 109, 116 
 attitude toward 
 intervention, 29 
 
 joint Japanese-American expedition to 
 Siberia, 71, 72 
 sends troops to Siberia, 74 
 Ivanov-Rinov, Major General Pavel Pav¬ 
 lovich, 125, 152 
 description of, 119 
 
 Jameson, J. P. 
 
 analysis of Japanese policy in Siberia, 
 199-200 
 
 {see Washington Conference) 
 
 Janin, General Maurice, 158 
 Japan, 74, 181, 224 
 
 and Siberian question at Washington 
 Conference, 198-200 
 
 efforts to gain control of Chinese Eastern 
 Railway, 81, 101, 109, 111, 204, 
 206, 211, 211 n. 29, 216-220 
 extends financial aid to anti-Bolshevik 
 groups, 14-15 
 
 internal conflict over Siberian policy, 174, 
 175 
 
 interpretation of Inter-Allied Railway 
 Agreement, 166, 169, 170, 171, 
 
 173, 205, 207 
 
 lands forces in Vladivostok, 39, 89 
 motives for intervention in Siberia, 230, 
 2 3 l 
 
 negotiations for 
 
 Consortium of 1920, 212, 222 
 Inter-Allied Railway Agreement, 1919, 
 108-110, m-113, 115-116 
 internationalization of Chinese Eastern 
 Railway, 214, 215, 217, 219, 223 
 joint Siberian expedition, 71, 82-85, 
 96, 97 
 
 Nikolaevsk incident, 185, 189 
 occupation of 
 
 Eastern Siberian, 101, 103, 104 
 Northern Sakhalin, 190, 193, 194, 
 195 . 197 , 198-199 
 policy in 
 
 North Manchuria, 213 
 Siberia, 68, 89, 106, 130, 154, 163, 
 166, 169, 175-176, 182, 186, 191, 231 
 policy toward 
 
 Czechs in Siberia, 84, 101 
 Russia, 4, 146 
 
 proposals for intervention, 24, 44 
 reaction to Wilson’s aide memoire, 78 
 relations with 
 
 Cossack leaders, 15, 120, 121, 122, 
 I2 9 > I 33 > 153, 158, 162, 172 
 Far Eastern Republic, 192, 194, 202 
 Omsk government, 157-158 
 United States, 3-7, 70, 111 n. 22, 118, 
 131 n. 53, 134, 233 
 sends ships to Vladivostok, 23 
 Sino-Japanese Military Agreements, 
 1918, 49, 50, 66, 95, 96, 232 
 Twenty-One Demands, 5-6 
 views on 
 
 intervention, 22, 24, 27, 30, 34, 43, 
 45, 65, 87 n. 74 
 
 withdrawal of American troops from 
 Siberia, 168, 171, 172, 177, 179, 
 180 
 
 Vladivostok incident, 186-187 
 withdrawal of troops from Siberia, 201, 
 203, 228 
 
 withdrawal of troops from Trans-Baikal, 
 
 189 
 
 Japan Chronicle, 182, 191 n. 34 
 Jenkins, Douglas, 227 
 Ji ji, 182 
 
 Johnson, B. O., 218 
 Johnson, Hiram, 136, 139 
 Judson, General William V., 12, 28 
 Jusserand, Jean Adrien Antoine Jules, 41, 
 7 i. 74 
 
 Kalmikov, Ivan, 119 
 
266 
 
 INDEX 
 
 relations with 
 
 General Graves, 126-127, J 7 2 
 Japan, 153, 231 
 Omsk government, 163-164 
 Kato, Viscount Takaakira, 174 
 Kato, Tsunetado, 173 
 Kawakami, K. K. 
 
 Japanese activities in Siberia, 197 
 Kennan, George, 87 
 Kerensky, A. F., 19 
 
 views on intervention, 37 
 King, Frank, 185, 186 
 Knight, Admiral Austin M., 70, 99, 103 
 views on 
 
 Austro-German war prisoners, 46 
 intervention, 37, 38 
 use of Czechs in Siberia, 55, 66 
 Knox, General Alfred W. F., 74, 90 n. 5, 
 123, 123 n. 20, 124, 158 
 Knox, Philander C. 
 
 neutralization of Manchurian railways, 
 5 
 
 Ko\umin, 182 
 
 Kolchak, Admiral Alexsander V. 
 description of, 118, 119, 150, 159 
 plan to organize an armed force in the 
 Chinese Eastern Railway zone, 16- 
 17 
 
 relations with 
 
 Czechs, 127, 128 
 Japan, 17-18, 158 
 Semenov, 17-18, 120 
 views on Sino-Japanese Military Agree¬ 
 ments, 51 
 
 (see Omsk government) 
 
 Kolchak government (see Omsk govern¬ 
 ment) 
 
 Konovalov, Alexander 
 
 views on use of Czech troops in Siberia, 
 61 
 
 Koo, V. K. Wellington, 71, 80 
 Korea, 183, 195, 216 
 Kun, Bela, 148 
 
 Lamont, Thomas 
 
 and negotiations for 
 
 Consortium of 1920, 208, 211, 212 
 internationalization of Chinese East¬ 
 ern Railway, 224 
 Lane, Franklyn K., 9 
 Lansing, Robert, 6-7, 112, 125, 147, 174, 
 180, 181 
 
 limiting size of Japanese expedition, 97- 
 98 
 
 negotiations for joint Siberian expedition, 
 44-45, 71-72, 75 
 policy toward 
 
 Czechs in Siberia, 66, 68-69, 99, 100 
 Omsk government, 149, 150, 165 
 Siberia, 94, 95, 104-105 
 proposals for Siberian intervention, 68, 
 69 
 
 views on 
 
 Anglo-French participation in Siberian 
 expedition, 79 
 
 Austro-German war prisoners, 47 
 intervention in North Russia, 51 
 Sino-Japanese Military Agreements, 
 1918, 28, 49 
 
 withdrawal of American troops from 
 Siberia, 168, 169, 176, 179 
 Lansing-Ishii agreement (November 2, 
 1917), 6-7, 82 
 
 League of Nations, 155, 188, 232, 233 
 Lenin, V. I., 10, 137 
 Literary Digest, 183 
 Litvinov, Maxim, 12, 142, 233 
 Lloyd George, David, 125, 156 
 
 policy toward Russia, 86 n. 72, 142-143, 
 148, 155 
 views on 
 
 Bullitt mission to Russia, 147, 147 n. 
 53 . 148 
 
 Siberian intervention, 37, 65, 67, 141, 
 230 n. 1 
 Lockhart, Bruce 
 
 relations with Bolsheviks, 12, 36-37, 40- 
 4i 
 
 views on 
 
 intervention, 48 
 
 use of Czechs in Siberia, 58 n. 92 
 Long, Breckinridge 
 
 negotiations for Inter-Allied Railway 
 Agreement, 1919, 112-113 
 policy toward Siberia, 94, 97, 140, 160, 
 177 n- 33 
 views on 
 
 intervention, 60 
 
 withdrawal of American troops from 
 Siberia, 168-169 
 Lynch, R. E., 147 
 
 Macchi di Cellere, Count Vincenzo, 43, 71 
 McCormick, Vance C., 111 
 McCumber, Porter J., 137 
 Macgowan, David B., 184, 186, 188, 197 
 MacMurray, John 
 
 views on Chinese Eastern Railway, 181 
 
INDEX 
 
 267 
 
 Makino, Baron Shinken 
 
 views on independent expedition to 
 Siberia, 81-82 
 Manchuria, 81, 183, 218 
 and open-door policy, 4, 5 
 in negotiations for Consortium of 1920, 
 207 
 
 March, General Peyton C., 28, 69, 130 
 relations with General Graves, 89, 125 
 views on 
 
 high command in Siberia, 75, 114 
 intervention, 51, 53, 64, 70 
 withdrawal of American troops from 
 North Russia, 136 
 
 Maritime Province, 96, 185, 189, 192, 194, 
 197, 198, 199, 201 
 Masaryk, Thomas G. 
 attitude toward 
 Bolsheviks, 43 
 Kolchak, 128 n. 42 
 views on 
 
 Austro-German war prisoners, 47 
 establishment of new Eastern Front, 
 98 n. 42 
 
 use of Czechs in Siberia, 65 
 Merkulov, Spiridon, 196 
 Miles, Basil 
 policy toward 
 
 Chinese Eastern Railway, 111 
 Czechs in Siberia, 55, 56, 65, 69 
 views on 
 
 activities of General Graves, 125 
 intervention, 60 
 
 withdrawal of American troops from 
 Siberia, 166, 167 
 Millard, Thomas F. 
 
 views on Siberian policy, 200 n. 59 
 Mongolia 
 
 in negotiations for Consortium of 1920, 
 207 
 
 Morgan, J. P. 
 
 and Consortium of 1920, 222-223 
 Morris, Ambassador Roland S., 33, 82, 83, 
 85, 87, 100, 108, 115, 170, 171, 
 172, 175 n. 25, 214 
 and open-door policy in Siberia, 156 
 and Sino-Japanese Military Agreements, 
 1918, 49-50 
 
 negotiations for Inter-Allied Railway 
 Agreement, 1919, no, 112, 113 
 policy toward Siberia, 94, 121, 126, 163- 
 164, 173, 174 
 
 report on 
 
 condition of Omsk government, 157, 
 157 n. 29, 158-163 
 conditions in Siberia, 99 
 views on 
 
 American policy toward Japan, 128- 
 I29» 173 
 
 Japanese policy in Siberia, 81, 84 n. 
 66, 97, 106, hi, 120-121, 129-130, 
 131, i33> 179, 188, 204 
 recognition of Omsk government, 153, 
 154, 160, 161 
 
 support of Omsk government, 161 n. 
 38, 163, 174 
 
 Vladivostok incident, 186, 187 
 withdrawal of American troops from 
 Siberia, 173, 178 
 Moser, Charles K., 75, 118 
 Motono, Viscount Ichiro 
 
 views on Siberian intervention, 30, 34 n. 
 7 G 45 
 
 Nabokov, Constantin, 19 
 Niessel, General Henri Albert 
 views on intervention, 52 
 Nikolaevsk massacre, 185, 185 n. 10, 187- 
 189, 193, 194, 202, 212 
 Norton, H. K. 
 views on 
 
 results of intervention, 234 n. 9 
 use of Czechs in Siberia, 58 n. 92 
 Noulens, Joseph 
 
 views on intervention, 41 
 
 Oi, General Narimoto, 170, 171, 178, 188, 
 189 
 
 Omsk government, 118, 127, 137, 151, 
 166, 171 
 
 collapse of, 166, 175, 176-177 
 condition of, 157-160 
 establishment of, 118 
 proposed, 144, 148 
 
 recognition of, considered, 148, 149, 
 
 1 5 I_I 55> 155 n. 22 > 156, 160, 161, 
 164-165 
 relations with 
 
 Cossacks, 120-121, 122, 125-127, 133, 
 163 
 
 Great Britain, 123, 126, 151, 187 
 Japan, 162 
 
 U.S.A., 123, 127, 139, 150, 154, 161, 
 163, 233 
 
 views on withdrawal of American troops 
 from Siberia, 169 
 
268 
 
 open-door notes, 4 
 open-door policy, 5-6 
 and China, 88 
 
 and Chinese Eastern Railway, 137, 201, 
 220, 223 
 
 and Far Eastern Republic, 202 
 and Manchuria, 106, 140, 231, 233 
 and Russia, 156 
 
 and Siberia, 106, 115, 116, 117, 129, 
 135, 140, 200, 231, 233 
 Otani, General Kikuzo, 89 
 
 Paris Peace Conference, 112 
 Council of Four, 154-155 
 policy toward Czechs, 128 
 Russian policy, 140, 142-145, t55 
 Pelting and Tientsin Times, 201 n. 62 
 Pershing, General John J. 
 
 views on intervention, 64 
 Pettit, Walter W., 147 
 Phillips, William, 41 n. 9 
 
 policy toward Siberia, 94, 125-126 
 views on use of Czechs in Siberia, 55 
 Pichon, Jean, 49 
 Pichon, M. Stephen, 67 
 Polk, Frank L., 31, 73 n. 20, 79, 117 n. 
 42, 129 n. 46 
 
 and negotiations for Inter-Allied Rail¬ 
 way Agreement, 1919, it2, 113 
 and negotiations with Japan for joint 
 expedition to Siberia, 82-85 
 and proposed recognition of Omsk gov¬ 
 ernment, 144, 154, 164 
 and Vladivostok incident, 186 n. 13 
 and withdrawal of American troops 
 from Siberia, 181 
 
 relations with Congress, 114-117, 136- 
 137 
 views on 
 
 high command in Siberia, 76 
 intervention, 33 
 Poole, DeWitt C., 88 n. 81 
 
 and proposed recognition of Omsk gov¬ 
 ernment, 151 
 
 and Russian policy, 143, 143 n. 42 
 and withdrawal of American troops 
 from Siberia, 178 
 
 attitude toward Bolsheviks, 61 n. 99, I4r 
 policy toward Japan, 195-196, 205, 223- 
 224 
 
 Portsmouth, Treaty of, 1905, 4 
 Prinkipo Conference, proposed, 143, 144, 
 144 n. 45, 145, 156 
 Provisional government of Russia 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Allied attitude toward, 10-11 
 recognition of, 7 
 (see Russia) 
 
 Reading, Marquess of (Rufus Daniel 
 Isaacs), 29, 43, 73 n. 20, 117 n. 42 
 reports Wilson’s views on intervention, 
 26, 68 
 
 views on intervention, 41, 63, 71-73, 74 
 Reinsch, Paul S. 
 
 and Sino-Japanese Military Agreements, 
 1918, 48-49, 51 
 views on 
 
 Austro-German war prisoners, 47 
 intervention, 29, 43, 44, 48, 49 
 Japanese policy in Siberia, 156 n. 25 
 Semenov, 16 
 
 use of Czechs in Siberia, 60 
 Repington, Colonel Charles a Court, 18, 19 
 Robins, Raymond 
 
 relations with Bolsheviks, 12, 36, 40, 
 4i 
 
 views on 
 
 Austro-German war prisoners, 46 
 intervention, 37 
 Rodgers, Admiral William L. 
 
 and recognition of Omsk government, 
 152 
 
 policy toward Siberia, 121, 122 
 Roosevelt, Theodore, 6 
 Root, Elihu 
 
 heads diplomatic mission to Russia, 8 
 Rozanov, Sergei N., 126, 127, 172 
 Ruddock, A. B., 221 
 Russia, 115, 140, 155 
 
 American policy toward, 154, 193, 220, 
 232 
 
 and Chinese Eastern Railway, 205, 217, 
 225 
 
 counterrevolutionary movement in, 24 
 (See Bolsheviks; Provisional government 
 of Russia; Soviet Russia) 
 
 Russian Railway Advisory Mission, 8-10 
 Russian Railway Service Corps, 61, 104, 
 105, 107, 109, no, in, 114, 164 
 and withdrawal of American troops from 
 Siberia, 178 
 origin of, 9-10 
 
 (see Emerson, George B.; Inter-Allied 
 Railway Agreement; Stevens, John 
 
 F.) 
 
 Russian revolution 
 March, 1917, 7-8 
 
INDEX 
 
 November, 1917, 7, 10, 18 
 (see Bolshevik revolution) 
 
 Russo-Asiatic Bank 
 
 and Chinese Eastern Railway, 208, 214, 
 215, 216, 216 n. 47, 220, 224 
 Russo-Japanese Treaties, 1907, 1910, 1916, 
 5 
 
 Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, 4 
 
 Sadoul, Jacques, 12 
 
 views on intervention, 37 
 Sakhalin, 184, 196 
 
 Japanese evacuation of, 203 
 Japanese occupation of, 188-189, 190, 
 191, 194-197, 198, 199, 201, 202 
 Sazanov, Sergei D., 169 
 Schurman, Jacob G. 
 
 and proposed internationalization of 
 Chinese Eastern Raliway, 224, 225, 
 226, 227 
 
 Semenov, Captain Gregorii, 170 
 
 activities along Chinese Eastern Rail¬ 
 way, 166, 172, 213 
 American attitude toward, 16 
 and Far Eastern Republic, 192, 192 n. 
 
 36 
 
 and Russian Railway Service Corps, 133 
 description of, 119 
 
 military activities, 15, 18, 66, 66 n. 
 
 123, 95 
 relations with 
 
 Czechs, 180, 184, 206 
 Japan, 153, 158, 191, 198, 199, 231 
 Kolchak, 17, 120, 126, 163-164 
 Sharp, Ambassador William G., 52 
 Shidehara, Baron Kijuro 
 
 reviews Japanese policy in Siberia, 198- 
 199 
 
 Siberian policy, 175, 178 
 Sino-Japanese Military Agreements, 1918, 
 112, 232 
 
 and Japanese occupation of Chinese 
 Eastern Railway, 207 
 implemented by Japan, 66, 88, 95, 96 
 negotiation of, 49, 50, 51, 85 n. 69 
 views of scholars on, 51 n. 61 
 Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, 4 
 Sisson documents, 137 
 evaluation of, 138 n. 13 
 Sisson, Edgar, 137, 138 
 Slaughter, Major Homer H., 128, 163 
 Smith, Charles H., 209 
 
 and Japanese actions in Siberia, 1920, 
 191 
 
 269 
 
 and proposed recognition of Omsk gov¬ 
 ernment, 152 
 
 Smith, Lieut. General Walter Bedell, 
 
 146 n. 53 
 
 Sookine, John, 157, 158 
 views on 
 
 intervention, 31 
 
 Japanese-American relations, 162 n. 45 
 use of Czech troops in Siberia, 61 
 Soviet Russia, 3, 140, 141, 142, 147, 203, 
 234 
 
 and Chinese Eastern Railway, 215, 216 
 (see Bolsheviks) 
 
 Spencer, Willing, 46 
 Stalin, Joseph, 56 
 Steffens, Lincoln 
 
 and Bullitt mission to Russia, 147, 
 
 147 n. 55 
 
 Stevens, John F., 45, 104, 208 
 
 and Chinese Eastern Railway, 107, 204, 
 206, 211, 215, 217, 218, 219-222, 
 226, 228-229 
 
 and evacuation of Czechs, 128, 181, 
 184, 185 
 
 and implementation of Inter-Allied Rail¬ 
 way Agreement, 213 
 and negotiations for Inter-Allied Rail¬ 
 way Agreement, 1919, 108-110, 
 
 112, 113 
 
 and open-door policy, 201 
 and proposed recognition of Omsk gov¬ 
 ernment, 153 n. 14 
 
 attitude toward Russian revolution, 10 
 heads railway mission to Russia, 8 
 qualifications of, 9 
 relations with 
 
 Japan, 166, 170-171, 194 n. 43, 212, 
 213 
 
 Semenov, 16, 133-134, 170, 172 
 views on intervention, 29, 49 
 Summers, Maddin 
 
 views on intervention, 36 
 Supreme War Council, 21, 65, 146, 156 
 and Siberian intervention, 27, 37, 53, 
 54, 65, 67-68, 69, 72 
 policy toward Czechs in Siberia, 55, 56, 
 88 
 
 Tanaka, General Giichi, 174 
 
 and Trans-Siberian Railroad, 130-131 
 Siberian policy, 175 n. 25 
 Tchaikovsky, Nicholas, 142 
 Technical Board, 217-220, 221, 223, 227- 
 229 
 
INDEX 
 
 27O 
 
 and internationalization of Chinese East¬ 
 ern Railway, 225 
 termination of, 228 
 
 (see Inter-Allied Railway Committee; 
 Inter-Allied Railway Agreement; 
 Stevens, John F.) 
 
 Tenney, Charles, 208 
 Terauchi, Count Masakata 
 
 views on intervention, 45, 81, 84 
 Tereschenko, M. I., 19 
 Trans-Baikal, 16, 177 
 
 Japan withdraws from, 189, 190 
 Trans-Siberian Railway, 139, 180, 228 
 and Inter-Allied Railway Agreement, 
 113-116, 150-151, 204-205 
 condition of, 8-10, 108, 120 
 construction of, 13 
 
 in intervention proposals, 26-29, 35, 68 
 protection of, 130-133, 171, 177 
 utilized by Czechs, 54, 66, 88 
 Trotsky, Leon, 10, 43, 137 
 views on 
 
 Austro-German war prisoners, . 46 
 intervention, 33 n. 67, 36-37, 40, 42 
 Twenty-One Demands, 5-6, 112 
 
 Uchida, Viscount Yasuya, 174 
 
 and negotiations for Inter-Allied Rail¬ 
 way Agreement, 1919, no, in 
 Siberian policy, 174, 202, 212-213 
 United States 
 
 aide memoire (July, 1918), 76-78, 235- 
 238 
 
 and establishment of new Eastern Front, 
 98, 100 
 
 and expansion of Siberian expedition, 
 91, 92, 96-97, 105-106 
 and Japanese occupation of Siberia and 
 Sakhalin, 193, 195 
 
 and proposed internationalization of 
 Chinese Eastern Railway, 217, 219, 
 227 
 
 and proposed recognition of Omsk gov¬ 
 ernment, 149, 151, 152, 153, 160, 
 161, 162 
 
 and Trans-Siberian Railroad, 131, 132, 
 133 
 
 and withdrawal of American troops from 
 Siberia, 177-180, 183 
 grants formal recognition to Russian 
 Provisional government, 7 
 interpretation of Inter-Allied Railway 
 Agreement, 166, 169-171, 173 
 
 negotiations for 
 
 Consortium of 1920, 207, 209, 211, 
 222 
 
 Inter-Allied Railway Agreement, 1919, 
 no, 112, 116, 116 n. 38, 207 
 policy toward 
 
 Chinese Eastern Railway, 80, no, 
 204, 205, 208-209, 216, 220, 221, 
 224-225, 228 
 
 Czechs in Siberia, 68, 99, 100, 129 
 
 Russia, 3, 41, 141, 147 
 
 Siberia, 69-70, 93-94, 115-117, 154, 
 160, 169, 175-176, 182, 232, 233, 
 234-238 
 
 reasons for intervention, 70, 85, 86, 230, 
 232 
 
 relations with 
 
 Cossack leaders, 121, 122, 127 
 
 Far Eastern Republic, 192, 195 n. 
 44, 202 
 
 Japan, 118, 134 
 
 Omsk government, 123, 127, 154, 158 
 results of Siberian policy, summarized, 
 
 183 
 
 Siberian question at Washington Con¬ 
 ference, 199, 200 
 views on 
 
 Allied landing at Vladivostok, 40 
 
 intervention, 23, 33 
 
 Nikolaevsk incident, 185 
 (see entries under specific events, per¬ 
 sonalities, and policies) 
 
 United States Congress 
 
 and Russian policy, 114-116, 135-137, 
 137 n. 8, 138, 140 
 views on intervention, 61 n. 98 
 United States State Department, 166 
 and support of Omsk government, 150, 
 152, 233 
 
 interpretation of American policy in 
 Siberia, 124, 180-181 
 policy toward Czechs in Siberia, 54, 56, 
 62, 68 
 
 views on intervention, 26, 35, 41, 44, 
 61, 65 
 
 (see United States) 
 
 United States War Department, 76 
 
 interpretation of American policy in 
 Siberia, 114, 124 
 
 (see Baker, Newton D.; United States) 
 
 Vestni\ Manchurii, 87 
 Vladivostok, ic 
 
INDEX 
 
 taken under protection of Allies, 70 
 troops landed in 39, 57, 89 
 Vladivostok incident, 186, 187 
 von Mirbach, Count Wilhelm, 48 
 
 Wang, Dr. C. C. 
 
 and proposed internationalization of 
 Chinese Eastern Railway, 227 
 Ward, Colonel John, 74 
 Warren, Charles, 202 
 Washburn, Stanley, 8, 8 n. 27 
 Washington Conference, 195 
 
 and proposed internationalization of 
 Chinese Eastern Railway, 223, 224, 
 225, 226 
 
 and Siberian question, 196, 198, 200, 
 201, 202, 234 
 
 resolutions concerning Chinese Eastern 
 Railway, 226 
 
 Webster, Captain William B., 46, 47 
 Webster-Hicks Mission 
 
 report on prisoners of war, 46 
 Western Front, 77, 104 
 White, Henry 
 
 and Bullitt mission to Russia, 147 
 Williams, E. T., 65 
 Wilson, Sir Henry, 53 n. 69 
 attitude toward Bolsheviks, 141 
 Russian policy, 145 n. 47 
 views on 
 
 intervention, 27, 34 n. 73, 51 
 Prinkipo proposal, 143 
 Wilson, Woodrow, 21, 29, 40, 63 n. no, 
 65, 109, 112, 125, 129 n. 46, 163 n. 
 47 
 
 aide memoire (July 17, 1918), 76-78 
 and efforts to limit size of Japanese ex¬ 
 pedition, 82, 83, 98 
 
 and establishment of new Eastern Front, 
 98 n. 42 
 
 and intervention in North Russia, 52 
 and proposed recognition of Omsk gov¬ 
 ernment, 154-156, 160, 164 
 
 271 
 
 and support of Omsk government, 149, 
 162 
 
 and Trans-Siberian Railroad, 130-131 
 and withdrawal of American troops 
 from Siberia, 168 n. 5, 177 
 attitude toward 
 
 anti-Bolshevik movements, 15 
 Bolshevism, 140, 141 
 defines policy of Russian Railway Ad¬ 
 visory Mission, 9 
 distrust of Japan, 6 
 Fourteen Points, 12 
 policy toward 
 
 Bullitt mission to Russia, 148 
 Czechs in Siberia, 60, 98, 100, 129 
 Russia, 12, 36, 135, 139, 142-146, 
 155 , 231 
 
 Siberia, 76-77, 85-87, 95, 114-117, 
 130-131, 156 n. 25, 160, 232, 233 
 Sisson documents, 138 
 proposal for Siberian intervention, 69, 70 
 reasons for intervention, 231-232 
 relations with Allies, 30, 71-73, 74 
 relationship with Congress, 114-116, 136 
 views on 
 
 high command in Siberia, 76 
 intervention, 24-25, 30, 32, 35, 37, 
 38, 52, 53 - 54 . 64 
 
 Wiseman, Sir William, 68 n. 3, 93 n. 14 
 relationship with House, 38 
 reports Wilson’s views on intervention, 
 27. 34 . 52 - 53 . 62 
 views on 
 
 expansion of Siberian expedition, 92, 
 93 
 
 joint Japanese-American expedition to 
 Siberia, 73 
 World War I, 3, 5 
 World War II, 3 
 Wright, J. Butler 
 
 views on use of Czechs in Siberia, 65 
 
 Yamato, 172, 182 
 Yen, Dr. Hawkling, 224 
 

 
 
 
 
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