3©iift(£rM^'. REP^OPtT FROM THE JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE, To investigate the management of the Navy Department. The Joint Select Committee of the Senate and House of Represent- atives, " appointed to investigate the administration of the Navy Department, under its present head, with power to send for persons and papers, and to report the result of said investigation to the tw(t Houses, respectively," ask leave to rep^rt: That, in accordance with the instructions contained in the resolution for their appointment, they huve called before them many persons en- gaged in the naval and military service, as contractors and em- ployees, as well as others in civil life, supposed to have knowledge of the matters to be inveitigated, and have examined many papers among the archives of the Navy Department, in order to inform themselves of the manner in which the department has hern administered. They have sought information wherever they supposed it could be found, and have invited it from all who could give ir. The largo number of witmesses and voluminous records examined, proiractoi their sittings until near ihe close cf the last session of Congress, when they found it necessary to print the testimony, that each meuiber might review it before making a report, and that the two Houses vnight he enable;! to decide whether the committee had formed a ju-^t judgment, and at- tained a proper conclusion. All the testimony deemed material and proper to be published v.ill be found in a volume of nearly five hun- dred pages, printed during the last recess of Congress, which they herewitli submit as part of this report. The various laws relating to the navy, the reports of the Secretary, (which have been confiden- tially communicated to Congress.) and the rules and orders given by him, although coming under the review of the committee, they did not think it necessary "r proper to j)rint. The committee confined their examination to the doniestic operations of the Navy Department. They intended to investigate its foreign operations also, and enquire who were sent as agents ro foreign coun- t; - wcic ^ivi'U liu'ui. >siiat li hoy encountered, and wliat V . ' Hut the Secretary and r . tiic public interest and the ;: '0 furniah such information, as its pub- ' f»ur Pcrv;- - ' " d, arrest their labors, us: an iniltee. concurring in >. U 16 due, in this cr>nnec- Novy offered to send before who had charge of the foreign contracts, ..v< relating to tliem, who could inform us. r character and resulti*, and that he oflerod all ' ' • 'icility for obtaining it he r I ; -; of the navy, whenever r:ili« nu cuminille«*. ^' ir in the printed testimony, herewith submitted, that have in«|uire;, the work shops or the ^^^ skilled workmen, essential to the completion of formidable ships of war. But seven steam war vessels had been built in the States now forming the Confederac J since the war of 1812. Engines for but two of these were contracted for in these States, the lieavy forgings of which were necessarily contracted for elsewhere. The entire raa- chinerv for such vessels had not been constructed in these States. Our means and resources for building a navy were so small and inconsiderable compared with the naval power and resources of the enemy, that many patriotic men doubted the wisdom of an attempt to construct a navy. While our moans of building huUh., engines and machinery, and of equipping and manning efficient sh'ps of war were thus limited, the immediate and hourly demands upon all the workshops of the country for ordnance and ordnance stores reduced them still more. Thus the shops at Norfolk navy-yard, after they came under the control of the Secretary of the Navy, were largely* engaged in the manufacture of gun-carriages, shot, shell, kc, for the army, and in mounting and supplying guns. We have had to labor under the most untoward and embarrassing circumstances. Men have been employed as ship-wrights who had never served an apprenticeship, or budt a vessel, or even worked on one, because skill and experience could not be commanded. All the labor and materials requisite to complete and equip a .. ar vessel, could not be commanded at any one point of the Confederacy ; but the machinery propelling it, or some part of it, or the ordnance or ordnance stores, had to be transported to the various and distant points, where the hulls were being built. Thus in the construction of the Mississippi at New Orleans, the labor, skill and resources of different parts of the Confederacy were necessarily invoked; her iron was rolled at Atlanta, portions of her machinery and equipments were made at Norfolk, whi!e the mam shaft and ordnance and ordnance stores were made at Richmond. In order to sheath the hulls of gun-boats, we ha\e been obliged to use such scrap iron, old and rejected sugar mills, and other discarded iron as could he gathered up ; and, to propel them have been con- strained to use the engines and boilers of dilapidated steamboats. Hence it has happened that some of our gun-boat« have proven inef- ficient, because of the imperfection of their machinery and sheathing. Besides the deficiencies and difliculties, we have been obstructed in our operations by the invasions of the enemy, whereby we not only lost our navy yards, and much of their machinery and ship timber, but were compelled to destroy gun-boats quite completed, and steam- boats whose machinery might have served us, to prevent them frofli being captured by the enemy. Hence the destruction of the Vir- ginia. Louisiana, Mississippi,* fthe vessels in Lake Tonchartrain, Bayou St. John, the Yazoo and Mississippi rivers, and elsewhere.) l3ut, had we been able to command all the worshops and material, * Note. — Some of the committee think the lilissisaippi was lost by want of energy and Jiligence of officer* of the navy at New Orleans. the arii/ans and seamen, requisite to construct a navy equal in size to that of our enemy, still we should have begun the war upon the most unequal terms. The enemy had a powerful navy to begin with ; we had none. Under the United States Government the southern States had mad(^ great and generous sacrifices to promote the maratime in- terest of the North, while the great resources of naval wealth and power Vy-ere ignored ; and when we entered upon our struggle for in- dependence, we found ourselves confronted, and our waters invaded by a powerful navy, which had, with our aid, been fostered and de- •velcped for over sixty years, and which, in addition to smaller vessels, readily converted to war uses, from a great commercial marine, com- prised thirty-s?ven steamships, many of them the most formidable on the ocean, and thirty-seven sailing vessels, with an aggregate of two thou- sand one hundred seventy-eight heavy guns, all under the guidance of nava} men and seamen v/hose professional attainments and nautical skill were unsurpassed. The enemy's vast naval resources, great commercial school for seamen, numerous artizans and vast workshops enabled him to augment thisformible force with a rapidity unequalled in naval history', while the naval resources of the world were also opened to him. It would hive required many years, even under the most favorable circumstances, for us to have built and equipped as many and such vessels as the enemy began the war with. The committee make these observations merely in justice to the Secretary of the Navy, but to correct the public judgment, which has been founded, at least in part, upon an exaggerated estimation of our means, or undeserved diaestimation or of the Secretary or of naval officers or of contractors with the department. The testimony does not furnish any sufficient grounds for imputing, the short-comings, failures and disasters of our navy to the Secretary. On the contrary, it shows that he has been vigilant, industrious and energetic, in era- ])loying the means within his power to purchase and to build a navy. One of hi.^ first acts, after entering upon his duties, was to call the attention of Congress. to the rapid and radical changes in naval war- fare which had taken place within a few years, in displacing the ** wooden walls" that had been lelied on for attack or defence, with gigantic iron-clads He early took means for constructing an iron- clad navy. An officer was sent throughout the Confederate States to examine and report, the means of manufacturing and preparing iron armor and heavy machinery. Others were sent to the United States, to Canadrf and Europe, to purchase or build suitable vessels for imme- diate use. The building of armored vessels was begun in the hope of compensating, by their individual strength, for ©ur great infe- riority to the enemy in the number of war vessels, and of seamen and marines. The time, labor and material necessary 1o construct a single heavy armored vessel may be judged of from the following ex- ample. The Merrimac, one of the ships sunk and partially de- stroyed by the enemy on abandoning Norfolk, was raised, and al- though the main part of the hull and the boilers and material parts of the machinery were uninjured, eight months of uninterrupted labor of as many workmen as could be advantageously be employed, aided by the workshops of Richmond, were necessary to get her in fitting condition as an iron -chid. Work upon her, nnder orders of the navy department, was commenced on the 11th of July, 1861, and she foui^ht the memorable battle of Hampton Roads — a battle which at once revolutiouizeil naval warfare — on the 18th of March of 1862, before she was entirely completed. And yet Con- structor Porter says : '* The yard at Norfolk was woti^ed up to its fullest capacity. Everything was properly organ 'zd, and the oncers were constantly on the spot directing ope.ati mm «nd [lUshing forward the work. The Secretar) of the Nav\ , in o'der to stimulate ojteration^, offered inducements, by way of additionjil piy or rv.*w.irds to wriic arter dark and on Sundays. In short. .he offeii'd <'»ery encourngeraen that was calculated to excite them to more zeal .iud energy. Bv letters and by telegrams he urge