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 Sty? Umatu* Haiti* of tlj* Har nf 1812 
 
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 Copyright, Canada, 1933 
 by Robert Sellar 
 
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 Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2017 with funding from 
 Duke University Libraries 
 
 https://archive.org/details/uscampaignof181301sell 
 
THE U.S. CAMPAIGN OF 1813 TO 
 CAPTURE MONTREAL 
 
 On the ISth June, 1812, the United States declared war 
 against Great Britain, and on the 12th July followed up its 
 declaration by invading Canada from Detroit. The invasion 
 had a disgraceful ending. From Niagara a second invasion 
 was attempted on the 13th October, which was also repulsed. 
 The results of the operations of 1812 made it plain to the 
 authorities at Washington that efforts to conquer Canada 
 by invasions west of lake Ontario must be futile, for the 
 reason that overrunning the western territory left intact 
 the source from which the supplies and reinforcements came 
 to renew resistance. It was Britain that furnished the means 
 to continue the war, and the channel through which she sent 
 them was by the St Lawrence. Block that channel and the 
 current of supply would end. There were two points at which 
 this could be done — Montreal and Kingston— and President 
 Madison’s cabinet were divided as to which should be attack- 
 ed. The preference was for Kingston, as being nearer the 
 United States and giving an opportunity for the co-operation 
 of the naval force that had been organized on lake Ontario. 
 With Kingston in American possession, no supplies could 
 filter past it to the British forces in the west. This was ad- 
 mitted, but it was also pointed out that all of Canada east 
 of Kingston would be untouched, and that while Montreal 
 was in British possession an army could be brought in by 
 sea that might retake Kingston. Quebec was the proper 
 place to strike, but it was regarded as impregnable. Mon- 
 treal came second. Once plant the stars-and-stripes over it 
 and not only would all the military stations west of it, from 
 Kingston to Niagara, and from Niagara to Sandwich, be 
 compelled to surrender from lack of supplies, but the boats 
 and ships which brought men and material from England 
 could no longer land them, for Montreal was at the head of 
 navigation. As the importance of Montreal was realized, 
 the advocates of an onward movement on Kingston included 
 the capture of the other— a combined attack would be made 
 on both Montreal and Kingston from land and water. 
 
 The weak point in the defence of Canada was the Blender 
 
2 Sackett’s Harbor 
 
 link that connected Montreal with the west. In summer it 
 was the St Lawrence, the southern bank of which, where it 
 was narrowest, was American, so that boats going up were 
 exposed to capture, and were often made spoil of. In winter, 
 the troops and material landed at Montreal had to make 
 their way westward by sleigh or wagon along a backwoods 
 road that skirted the north bank of the river. To inquire 
 why the American plan of campaign of 1812 did not include 
 a movement upon Montreal to snap that link, instead of 
 wasting strength on the shores of lakes Ontario and Erie, is 
 beyond the scope of this monograph. Having realized the 
 importance of gaining Montreal the Washington war de- 
 partment bent all its energies in preparation. These were 
 directed by Gen. Armstrong, the secretary of war, who in- 
 tended taking command of the expedition. 
 
 In 1813 Montreal was a town of small dimensions, con- 
 sisting of a few narrow streets perched on the margin of the 
 St Lawrence, in which dwelt less than 15,000 people. It had 
 no defensive works, and the worst an invader could expect 
 would be hastily thrown up batteries along the river front. 
 The strength of the little town lay in its inaccessibility. Situ- 
 ated on an island, surrounded by deep and wide stretches 
 of water, it could only be reached by boats. An army, how- 
 ever strong it might be, would be powerless to effect its cap- 
 ture unless accompanied by a fleet of boats. This Armstrong 
 fully realized, and while he issued orders to bring together 
 an army such as the Republic had never before attempted, he 
 also made preparations for the building of boats. Where 
 they should be built was maturely considered, when it was 
 decided Sackett’s Harbor, at the eastern extremity of lake 
 Ontario, was the only place that combined security from 
 attack with a commodious bay. While the snow was on the 
 ground the felling of trees was started and the sawing of their 
 truuks into plank. Attracted by high wages, carpenters 
 crowded to the little village and a beginning was made on the 
 boats. These were flat-bottomed scows of such simple con- 
 struction that they were quickly put together. Over 300 
 were to be built. Depending upon the current of the St Law- 
 rence to sweep them to the island of Montreal, the oars placed 
 in them were more for steering than rowing; crews to manage 
 them were drawn from the sailors of New England ports and 
 New York. French Canadian voyageurs, who volunteered 
 freely, were secured as pilots. What was going on was not 
 unobserved by the British, and an attack on Sackett’s Har- 
 
Hampton Commands the East Wing 
 
 3 
 
 bor was planned. On the 28th May, 1813, its garrison sight- 
 ed a fleet which had crossed from Kingston. Landing a con- 
 siderable body of troops the assault was delivered next day 
 from both land and water, and was being crowned with suc- 
 cess when the Governor, Sir George Prevost, who accompani- 
 ed the expedition, got into one of his fussy panics and, to the 
 disgust of his officers, ordered the recall of the attacking 
 forces. But for Prevost, the campaign of the Grand Army of 
 the North would have ended that day. 
 
 It was obviously unnecessary to concentrate all the soldiers 
 designed for taking Montreal at Sackett’s Harbor. It would 
 save the building of many boats were the army divided, the 
 larger part to go in the boats, which, after landing them near 
 or on the island of Montreal, would cross the St Lawrence 
 and ferry over the other portion of the army, which would 
 be waiting their arrival on the southern bank. This plan not 
 only saved the building of many boats, but had the further 
 advantage that, in menacing Canada by two separate 
 columns, the attention of the British commanders would be 
 distracted. So it was decided the invading army should go 
 in two columns, to meet at an agreed point convenient to 
 Montreal. 
 
 Hampton 
 
 The point chosen for assembling the co-operating corps, the 
 eastern column, was Burlington, on the shore of lake Cham- 
 plain. Here troops came in slowly. The war was unpopular 
 in New England, which, consequently, furnished few regiments 
 for the regular army. The militia, which each State was 
 compelled to raise, were not available for the expedition in 
 hand, for a condition of militia service is that they should 
 be sent to no foreign country. The consequence was, the 
 eastern column depended on troops raised south and west 
 of New England, the majority coming from Virginia. There 
 being no railways, these regiments had to march, so that it 
 was the end of August before the force at Burlington was con- 
 sidered large enough to take the field. The command was 
 entrusted to General Wade Hampton. His instructions were 
 specific, he was to co-operate with the army at Sackett’s 
 Harbor, and to be found waiting on the shore of the St Law- 
 rence, anywhere between Caughnawaga and the mouth of the 
 Chateauguay, when the flotilla from Sackett’s Harbor ap- 
 peared. The first step in the journey was taken early in Sep. 
 tember, when the army embarked on boats and crossed lake 
 
4 
 
 The Sortie by Lacolle 
 
 Champlain to Cumberland Head, N.Y. The British comman- 
 der, Sir George Prevost, had waited in Montreal all August* 
 expecting an attack by the army at Burlington. On hearing 
 they had crossed the lake he rashly concluded they were going 
 to join the force at Sackett’s Harbor for an assault on King- 
 ston, and thither he hurried with his available forces. Being 
 instructed to make an incursion into Canada to distract the 
 enemy, Hampton broke camp at Chazy, and taking again to 
 his boats, on the 19th September, sailed to the point where 
 the lake narrows into the Richelieu, and established his camp 
 at Champlain. From there a party crossed into Canada, sur- 
 prising the outpost at Odelltown, killing part of the inmates. 
 The first day’s march was a surprise. Their chief assailants 
 were the Indians, who kept up a fusilade from the bush on 
 either side of the road, which, however, inflicted only trifling 
 losses. What convinced the Americans that it was impos- 
 sible to go on, was their inability to find water. They were 
 crossing a black ash swamp yet it was dry as tinder. The 
 beds of brooks and small rivers were dry. Scouts report- 
 ed there was no running-water in the Lacolle. The summer 
 had been the hottest and driest on record, and even rivers of 
 considerable size had ceased to flow and only in the deeper 
 hollows of their course were pools to be found. The horses 
 had to be sent back to Champlain to be watered in the lake; 
 the rank and file were desperate with thirst. A council of 
 war was held, when it was decided to advance farther was im- 
 practicable, and that the St Lawrence would have to be reach- 
 ed by another route than the road to Laprairie. The sug- 
 gestion was made they go by the Chateauguay valley. On 
 being notified of the proposed change, Armstrong approved 
 of the Chateauguay route, expressing his regret, however, 
 that Hampton had not persevered as far as St Johns, the 
 capture of which military depot would have perplexed Pre- 
 vost. On the 22nd Sept, the march was begun to Four 
 Corners, 40 miles west of Champlain. The road was a 
 rough bush-track and the weather was hot, which joined to 
 wretched commissariat arrangements caused the march, which 
 occupied four days, to be unnecessarily severe on the men. 
 Four Corners was a hamlet situated on the eastern bunk of 
 the Chateauguay, a small river having its origin in two lakes 
 buried in the Adirondacks, and which, flowing northward, 
 empties into the St Lawrence a few miles west of Caughna- 
 waga. Running alongside the Chateauguay was a road 
 which led from Four Corners to the Basin, where the Chateau- 
 
5 
 
 The Camp at Four Corners 
 
 guay mingles its waters with the Rt Lawrence. The expecta- 
 tion of the army was that it would at once take this road, 
 and that by the time they reached the Rt Lawrence, the 
 flotilla of boats from Sackett’s Harbor would be found 
 waiting to ferry them across to Isle Perrot, which was the 
 spot chosen for uniting the two columns preparatory to ad- 
 vancing on Montreal. To cross the branch of the Ottawa 
 that separates Isle Perrot from the island of Montreal a 
 bridge was to be formed of the boats that had transported 
 the troops from Rackett’s Harbor. To the surprise and dis- 
 gust of the soldiers, they learned they would ha ve to stay 
 where they were, for word had been received that the army at 
 Sackett’s Harbor had not moved. Until notified it had em- 
 barked on its boats, Hampton was not to advance. 
 
 Tents were pitched on the clea rings south and west of where 
 the railway-station of Chateaugay, N.Y., now stands, the old 
 name of Four Corners having been superseded. Hampton 
 and his staff found shelter in the one ta vern. His haughty 
 air repulsed the simple backwoodsmen, who, for the first time 
 saw a Routhern planter and the general of no mean army. 
 Of the thousand sla ves he was reputed to have in the Oaro- 
 linas a number waited on him as servants. Little block- 
 houses were put together as shelter for the outposts, of which 
 there was need, for Indians lurked in the woods and cut off 
 stragglers. On the 1st October they made an unexpected 
 attack on the camp, killing an officer and a private, wound- 
 ing another, and carrying off two as prisoners. Tt was not 
 a serious affair hut it had a bad effect on the morale of the 
 army, the soldiers contracting an absurd dread of a foe, who, 
 though despicable in numbers, was unseen and unsleeping. 
 The men shrank from sentry duty and not a night passed 
 without dropping shots heard from the woods. To this na- 
 tural fearwas added discomfort. No newclothing was issued, 
 and the cotton uniforms for summer wear, now threadbare 
 and ragged, were poor protection against the white frosts 
 and rains of the fall. Food had to be hauled from Platts- 
 burg, keeping 400 wagons, drawn by 1000 oxen, constantly 
 on the road, so that the supply was subject to the weather 
 and often short. To hardship was added the discontent that 
 comes from enforced inaction, with the result that sickness 
 appeared and the number of invalids increased each day. 
 Hampton was desirous of moving towards the Rt Lawrence, 
 but knew it would be to no purpose until the flotilla of boats 
 would be found awaiting him. His instructions from Arm- 
 
6 
 
 The March Along the Chateauguay 
 
 strong were precise. He was to hold fast to his camp at Four 
 Corners until “we approach you,” and Armstrong’s subordi- 
 nate in another letter told him he “must not budge” until 
 everything was matured for the start from Sackett’s Harbor. 
 The little army, posted in the bush, with an untrodden wilder- 
 ness behind them and looking down upon the forest clad 
 plains of Canada, where they knew they would find a foe, 
 chafed in idleness until the 19th October, when a messenger 
 arrived from Sackett’s Harbor with a letter ordering Hamp- 
 ton to march to the mouth of the Chateauguay as the flotilla 
 was ready. On the 2 1st October the advance brigades left 
 Four Corners, after a stay of 26 days. Altho the army was 
 small, not numbering over 4000 effective men, the road was 
 so bad that it took several days to get the whole in motion. 
 A body of militiamen, 1500 in all, who refused to cross into 
 Canada, was left to guard the stores and camp, and to pro- 
 tect the line of communication with Plattsburg. 
 
 Brig. -General Izard, who led the advance, cut a pathway 
 through the woods. Crossing the country with celerity he 
 suddenly appeared before a blockhouse erected where Orms- 
 town now stands and surprised the guard stationed in it. 
 His men prepared the adjoining clearings for a camp, and 
 next day the leading regiments with part of the baggage- 
 train appeared and occupied it. There had been a, decided 
 change in the weather. The prolonged drouth had ended and 
 heavy rains had converted the road, over which long trains 
 of wagons and a battery of artillery had to be dragged, into 
 a quagmire. The distance from Four Corners to Spears 
 (whose lot the village of Ormstown now occupies) was only 
 26 miles, yet it took the army four days to cover. The route 
 lay through a dense bush, broken at rare intervals by the 
 small clearings of recent squatters. Altho the British had 
 been promptly notified the Americans had crossed, no effort 
 was made to ha crass them on their marcli thru’ the woods. 
 From Spears downward, along the north bank of the Cha- 
 teauguay, there was a tolerably continuous succession of 
 clearings. Hampton had full and accurate information from 
 his spies of the opposition he would meet on leaving camp 
 at Spears. 
 
 General DeWatteville had been sent from Montreal to place 
 every possible obstacle to the advance of the Americans. 
 There was only one road by which they could come, the track 
 that followed the windings of the river. A number of small 
 creeks, in flowing to the Chateauguay, had worn deep chan- 
 
The British Plan of Defence 7 
 
 nels for themselves in the soft soil, so that the road crossed 
 a deep gulley wherever a creek was encountered. These gullies 
 De Watteville perceived could be converted into formidable 
 lines of defence, so he ordered that the trees that topped the 
 banks of these gullies be so felled as to form barricades and 
 afford shelter for the firing-line. Between what is now known 
 as Allan’s Corners and the foot of Morrison’s rapids, a dis- 
 tance of four miles, there are six of these gullies. The pre- 
 paration of the first three of these ravines he entrusted to 
 Major de Salaberry. The fourth, the most important, for it 
 faced the ford at Morrison’s, was assigned to Colonel Mac- 
 donell and his Glengarry Highlanders. The sixth line De 
 Watteville kept in his own charge, and here he planted his 
 artillery. Altogether he had 1600 men at his command, 
 nearly all militia or regiments of volunteers. 
 
 Hampton saw that forcing these successive barricades of 
 felled trees was going to entail sacrifice of life, which he 
 thought could be avoided by a flank movement. Dense bush 
 and swamps made attempts to turn the barricades on their 
 north side impracticable but by sending a column along the 
 southern bank of the river it could cross at Morrison’s ford, 
 and so take all the lines of defence in their rear, except the 
 main one under De Watteville, whom Hampton counted on 
 retreating on seeing his front defences had been turned. The 
 drawback to the plan was that it involved a march through a 
 dense bush, broken by swamps, hollows formed by creeks full 
 of water from the recent rains, and, worst of all. to cover 
 such ground in the dark, for to be effective in carrying the 
 ford the movement must be a surprise. The difficult task was 
 entrusted to Colonel Purdy, who was in command of the 1st 
 brigade. At dark on the evening of the 25th he led a regi- 
 ment of the line and the light corps down to the ford, where 
 the Ormstown grist mill now stands, and waded to the south 
 bank of the Chateauguay. His troubles began at once. To 
 lead a body of soldiers in daylight through an untracked 
 forest, cumbered with fallen trunks and thick with under- 
 brush. is difficult, but to do so in the dark is to attempt the 
 impossible. The men straggled, and ever and anon, there 
 were cries for help from those floundering in marsh and pool. 
 To aggravate the situation, it began to rain. Purdy blamed 
 his guides, but without cause, for it was so dark they could 
 not recognize landmarks. A halt had to be called before two 
 miles were travelled, and the little army shivering from wet 
 and cold, for they dared not betray their presence to the 
 
9 
 
 The Skirmish of Chateauguay 
 
 enemy by starting camp-fires, passed the night soaked by 
 the rain that now fell heavily. When their weary vigil 
 was broken by sunrise the march was resumed. It being 
 now light Purdy knew he could not take the ford by surprise, 
 but pushed on in the hope of forcing a passage by assault. 
 Fourteen hours had been spent in traversing six miles. On 
 stragglers from his column approaching the river-bank they 
 were recognized, and the alarm given that the Americans were 
 at hand. Macdonell ordered part of his force to cross the 
 river to meet them. They found the Americans in a thick 
 cedar swamp. The Beauharnois sedentary militia fled at the 
 first volley, but the two supporting companies the Americans 
 found to be of different metal and there was, for a few minutes, 
 a sharp conflict. What decided the affair was the rain of bul- 
 lets showered down from the opposite bank by Macdonell's 
 men Purdy, with his exhausted and discouraged men, shrank 
 from giving the order to storm the ford. He withdrew his 
 force to what he considered a safe place in the woods, and, 
 having sent a messenger to Hampton to tell of his situation, 
 awaited his orders. While thus resting, Hampton’s move- 
 ments need to be described. 
 
 The order to advance had been given early in the morning 
 of the 26th and, leaving baggage and tents in the camp at 
 Spears, the troops began their march. On the advance guard 
 nearing Allan’s Corners, the French Canadian company that 
 held the outpost, abandoned their blockhouse and fled to the 
 breastwork behind. This encouraged the Americans, who 
 yelled and cheered On the main body arriving the order to 
 halt was given, and spreading out on the clearings the men 
 lit fires and cooked dinner. Hampton confidently counted on 
 Purdy’s success, and therefore until he should hear from him 
 refrained from ordering an assault on the enemy in his front. 
 Time passed with no word from Purdy. Dinner over the men 
 fell in and at 2 p.m. Brig.-General Izard was ordered to bring 
 his brigade to the front. The Americans marched along the road, 
 turned into the clearing at Allan’s Corners and extended in line 
 within gunshot of the breastwork behind which the British 
 force was hid. Then there was a pause. While chafing at 
 not hearing from Purdy, there suddenly came the rattle of 
 musketry from the opposite side of the river. Hampton’s sus- 
 pense was ended, for he rashly concluded Purdy was pushing 
 the enemy. He sent the order to Izard to begin firing. With 
 regularity that did credit to their drill, the companies in turn 
 fired. These platoon vollies were responded to from the 
 
10 Hampton Returns to Camp 
 
 breastwork in a sputtering fashion. The shooting was at 
 long range and with the musket of that time such shooting 
 was almost harmless. Nobody was killed, but it was different 
 with a party of American skirmishers who tried to flank the 
 breastwork at its north end. They encountered a band of 
 Indians. There was hot work for a few minutes, ending in 
 the flight of the Americans. At this juncture a messenger, who 
 had swam theChateauguay, about a hundred feet wide, hurried 
 to Hampton to tell him that the firing he heard was caused 
 by an attack of the British on Purdy’s brigade, which he 
 had repulsed with difficulty. Instead of carrying the Morri- 
 son ford, Purdy was now on the defensive and most anxious 
 to extricate his force from what was a dangerous position. 
 Hampton sent the order for him to retreat to a point where 
 he could ford the river and rejoin the main army. Hampton 
 was crestfallen. He had depended on Purdy’s flanking move- 
 ment, and its failure disconcerted him. He sat on his horse 
 silent and irresolute. He knew it was in his power to storm 
 the rude brush barricade that faced him and the others be- 
 hind it, but that would involve loss of life. He was angry at 
 Purdy for not notifying him earlier of his failure to carry the 
 ford. Had he known that in time, he would not have broken 
 camp at Spears. The explanation of why he had not heard 
 from Purdy was simple. The messenger Purdy had sent in the 
 morning with the despatch describing his situation had, after 
 much difficulty, succeeded in reaching the camp at Spears, 
 where he naturally expected to find the General. To his sur- 
 prise, he discovered the army had moved forward, and thus 
 the despatch was not placed in Hampton’s hands until too 
 late for him to change his plans. The day had been dull and 
 now great steamy clouds were gathering that told of a 
 rainy night, and the brief light of a day in late October was 
 about spent. He would suspend operations and consider 
 what should be done on the morrow. The bugles sounded 
 his order to retire. In perfect order, undisturbed by a single 
 shot, the Americans filed into the road and marched back to 
 the field where their commissariat wagons had halted. The 
 pause before Hampton came to his dec sion was unique in 
 military history. His best brigade stood in line ready to 
 charge, yet not firing a shot, while their opponents watched 
 them from their place of concealment reserving their fire for 
 the assault that did not come. Had Hampton known that 
 among the watchers was Sir George Prevost it might have 
 spurred him to an attempt to capture him, and end the war. 
 
11 
 
 Purdy Spends a Dreadful Night 
 
 The governor-general on hearing of the Americans haring In- 
 vaded Canada left Kingston and hurried to the front, riding 
 in with his staff while the Americans were pouring their harm- 
 less volleys into the breastwork. Prevost waited until he saw 
 them execute the movements that broke their formation and 
 fall into line to march to the field where they were to pass 
 the night, when he left for DeWatteville’s headquarters. 
 
 Interest again centres on Purdy’s movements. He had 
 gathered his men on a wooded point that jutted into the 
 river On the land side he had made a barricade of brush 
 and fallen trees where a rear-guard covered him from such 
 another attack as an hour before had nearly routed his 
 brigade. His plans were made— he would send his wounded 
 across on rafts and then make a floating bridge of the logs 
 and fallen trees that lined the bank and so rescue his little 
 army. As raft9 were finished his wounded were lifted on 
 them and ferried to the north bank, while axemen were 
 rushing the floating bridge by which the troops were to 
 escape. This took time, so it was dark before fit for use. 
 Purdy sent a message to Hampton asking for a regiment to 
 cover the crossing of his men, for the Indians had crept up 
 towards him and were watching his movements, firing when- 
 ever they saw a mark. The messenger returned with the in- 
 formation that Hampton and his command had gone into 
 camp for the night a mile west of the frail bridge Purdy had 
 expected would be his path to safety. He was intensely pro- 
 voked. In his report he exclaims “I was deserted, without 
 the smallest guard to cover my landing.” About a hundred 
 had crossed the bridge when, on bullets beginning to come 
 thick its use had to be abandoned. Those who got over 
 found their way to the camp as also did the wounded. 
 There was no help for it but endeavor to reach the ford at 
 Spears, which meant repeating the dreadful ordeal of the 
 night before, with the additional horror this time of being 
 tracked by Indians. The floating bridge was torn apart, 
 and the march began, the men starving and exhausted by 
 fatigue. The march had not lasted half an hour when Purdy 
 found it was absolutely necessary to give them rest. Getting 
 them into a compact mass, and posting sentries, the wearied 
 men slept. What followed Purdy describes : ‘‘We rested undis- 
 turbed until about midnight, when the enemy came up and 
 made an attack upon us, but were soon routed. The men at 
 this time were formed, and lying on the ground they were to 
 occupy in case of an attack, and were ordered to, and did im- 
 
12 
 
 Flotilla has Not Sailed— No Use to Go On 
 
 mediately, rise, seize their arms, and remain under them the 
 remainder of the night. An excessively heavy rain prevented 
 the firing both of the enemy and ourselves, except occasional- 
 ly a single gun from the former. Our troops were ordered not 
 to fire, but, in case of a repetition of attack, to charge 
 bayonets; this was accordingly done. The enemy charged 
 several times, and as often were put to flight. It is observable 
 in its place, that, so greatly were the men overpowered by 
 fatigue, though in a situation every way dangerous, and in 
 which they had every reason to believe they should be sallied 
 upon by the enemy every moment, many were unable to con- 
 quer their disposition to sleep and it was not in the power of 
 the officers to keep them awake.” 
 
 Inability to shoot,” recalls that the muskets of those days 
 were flintlocks, therefore useless unless the priming was dry. 
 There was no more rest for the wearied men, for the Indians 
 kept up a constant alarm, yelling and shrieking, while the 
 Americans prayed for daylight. At sunrise they resumed their 
 march, and beyond an occasional shot the Indians, who were 
 only a small band, dared not come to close quarters The 
 rapid Croche was reached, the men waded across, and speedi- 
 ly found the food and rest they so sorely needed in the camp 
 at Spears. 
 
 Considering the number of Americans exposed to fire, their 
 loss was trifling, and almost wholly confined to Purdy's 
 column. Killed, wounded and missing did not exceed fifty. 
 It is a commentary on how popular honors are distributed, 
 that while deSalaberry is enshrined as the hero of the day, of 
 the men whom he commanded not one was killed, while the 
 companies that fought on the south side of the river, where 
 deSalaberry did not set foot, and who really won the day l y 
 baffling Purdy’s flank movement, are ignored. They lost 5 
 killed with 12 wounded. Of the losses of the Indians no re- 
 cord was made; it must have far exceeded that of the whites 
 for they came to close quarters with Hampton’s left flank and 
 dogged Purdy for 24 hours. 
 
 Hampton rode ahead of his troops to camp and there he 
 found a messenger who had just arrived from Ogdensburg. 
 He handed a letter to the general who found it was from Major 
 Parker of the intelligence corps, sent to inform him that the 
 army at Sackett’s Harbor had not sailed. Hampton was 
 thunderstruck. He had advanced into Canada in the full 
 belief that the flotilla was on its way and that, on reaching 
 the mouth of the Chateauguay, he would find it waiting to 
 
13 
 
 Hampton Gives Up the Campaign 
 
 ferry his army across to Isle Perrot. The purpose of his 
 movement was gone, for there was no use in pushing for the 
 St Lawrence when he knew there would be no boats to meet 
 him. He called a council-of-war, which met on the afternoon 
 of the 27th. He had obtained full information of the British 
 force that was waiting to obstruct his farther advance and 
 it was agreed it was too weak to be considered, it could be 
 brushed aside. The question the general asked them to an- 
 swer was, Is it advisable to push on knowing we will meet 
 no flotilla? The point was considered in its several lights. 
 Thus, after we have swept aside the enemy now in front of us 
 and resumed our forward march, what would the army do 
 when it reached the St Lawrence? While waiting the arrival 
 of the boats, how were 4000 men and fully 1000 animals to 
 be fed, seeing the country they occupied yielded nothing and 
 they would be separated by a road of forty miles, through a 
 wilderness, from Four Corners, their nearest base of supply? 
 It was agreed that to go on would be to court disaster, there- 
 fore the army should return to Four Corners and await ad- 
 vices of the flotilla having sailed. When the officers rose to 
 leave, they had the general order to begin the retreat at once, 
 and the march began to their old camp at Spears. Next morn- 
 ing preparations were made for the longer march before them, 
 and the baggage-train and artillery was started. In the after- 
 noon the last corps got under way and the Spears camp aban- 
 doned. These movements met with no hindran e from the 
 British force, which clung to its lines of defence. The Indians, 
 however, kept near, and on the night of the 28th surprised a 
 picket and added to the number of their scalps. The condition 
 of the road made the movement of the army slow, so that a 
 week passed before it regained its former camp at Four 
 Corners. The discontent that prevailed before the incursion 
 into Canada was increased by the hardships of its futiie 
 marchings, and the men spoke their minds in a way that 
 would not have been tolerated in any other than a republican 
 army. The officers sympathized with the rank-and-file. They 
 had lost all confidence in their general and were eager to go 
 into winter quarters, which, indeed, the increasing cold was 
 making imperative. The supply of overcoats was so small 
 that they were reserved for the men who stood sentry. 
 
 Soon after Armstrong had sent his despatch ordering Hamp- 
 ton to advance into Canada, telling him he would find the 
 flotilla waiting at the mouth of the Chateauguay to ferry his 
 army to Isle Perrot, he left Sackett's Harbor for Albany, hand- 
 
14 
 
 The Array at Saekett's Harbor 
 
 ing over his command to Wilkinson, who, on learning Hamp- 
 ton had returned to Four Corners, sent an order to him to 
 march to St Regis, where the flotilla would take his army on 
 board on the 9th of November. St Regis was less than 
 three days’ march from Four Corners, and the road to it was 
 entirely within the United States, so could be covered without 
 opposition. Hampton treated the order with indignation. 
 Wilkinson, he said, was not his superior officer, and he would 
 do as he deemed best. He wrote Armstrong that he would 
 not go to St Regis and was retiring to winter-quarters at 
 Plattsburg. The reasons he gave were, that the supply of 
 forage for the animals was exhausted at Four Corners and that 
 only half of his men were effective, and they were dispirited 
 and worn by fatigue. From Plattsburg, he said, he would 
 make a demonstration on the Canadian frontier to divert at- 
 tention from Wilkinson. Paroling all his officers who so de- 
 sired, Hampton hastened to Washington, and tendered his 
 resignation, which was accepted. Among the subalterns who 
 served in the campaign was John E. Wool, who afterwards 
 achieved celebrity. He said, “ No officer who had any regard 
 for his reputation would voluntarily acknowledge himself as 
 having been engaged in the Chateauguay encounter.” 
 
 Wilkinson 
 
 The desertion of Hampton did not necessarily make the plan 
 to capture Montreal abortive. The purpose of his command 
 was more to distract the British attention than to be essen- 
 tial in the final attack. His movements, as a feint to conceal 
 the American plans, had kept Prevost on tenter-hooks for 
 three months and had been successful in causing him to de- 
 plete the garrison of Montreal to strengthen that of King- 
 ston. Hampton's retreat to Four Corners did more to help 
 the American cause than had he persevered in reaching the 
 St Lawrence, for it confirmed the commander of the King’s 
 forces in his belief that the army in waiting at Saekett’s Har- 
 bor had Kingston for its goal. Acting on that impression 
 Prevost left Montreal practically defenceless. His final guess 
 of the enemy’s intentions, was that Wilkinson would attack 
 Kingston and Hampton, at the same time, march towards 
 Montreal. Knowing the weakness of Hampton's force he 
 considered it could be easily baffled and he would attend to it 
 himself, waiting for it at Lachine. It was a rare opportunity 
 for Wilkinson, which, however, he did not realize. He whined 
 
Wilkinson Lets Time Pass 
 
 15 
 
 over Hampton’s failure to join him with his little army of 
 4000, while all the time he had a force in his hands that for 
 the purpose of capturing Montreal was overwhelming. With 
 the British strength bottled in Kingston, it was the easiest of 
 exploits to swoop down on Montreal and make it his prey. 
 Why he failed to do so, forms a remarkable page in American 
 history. 
 
 In 1813 the republic was in its infancy as regards material 
 resources, so that when it und rtook to concentrate 15,000 
 fighting men at a point on its north-western frontier it was 
 making a herculean effort. There were then no railways and 
 no steamboats. Cannon, food, material of every kind except 
 timber, had to go by tortuous rivers with many portages on 
 account of rapids, while the men had to march over roads 
 which were canals of mud. That all difficulties were over- 
 come, that a fleet of several hundred boats was built, and a 
 fully equipped army, including cavalry and an artillery-train, 
 got together at the head of the St Lawrence, told of energy, 
 ingenuity in overcoming obstacles, and financial sacrifice. 
 When, on the 19th October, Armstrong left for Washington, 
 where his authority as Secretary of War was much called for, 
 he considered the expedition ready to sail, and expected it 
 would do so when the weather, which was stormy, with ad- 
 verse winds, became favorable. As a consequence of his de- 
 parture, Wilkinson, from second in command, now became 
 chief. By profession he was a physician, but service in the 
 revolutionary war enabled him to pose as a soldier. First 
 and last he was a politician and that at a period when public 
 life was a scandal; when politician meant a man who sought 
 position and opportunity to gain wealth. What he lacked in 
 natural ability, Wilkinson made up in bluster and pretence: 
 there was no louder boaster as to what he would do, no greater 
 failure in performance. In every public position he wormed 
 himself into he left behind a record of incompetency, of quar- 
 relling with subordinates, and a flavor of dishonesty. While 
 his duties at Sackett’s Harbor consisted in visits to places 
 on lake Ontario, whence reinforcements and supplies were to 
 come, in consultations with Chauneey, the commander of the 
 lake fleet, in issuing orders and criticising subordinates, his 
 overbearing manner and bombast concealed his incompetence, 
 but when he could no longer avoid entering on active opera- 
 tions he had to find other masks. He did so by pleading ill- 
 health and throwing blame, when failures ( c:urred, on his as- 
 sistants. 
 
16 
 
 The Flotilla Sails 
 
 The first stage towards Montreal was leaving Sackett’s 
 Harbor for Grenadier island, a distance of a few miles, which, 
 owing to storms, was accomplished with difficulty. The 
 choice of that island for rendezvous was designed to confirm 
 Prevost’s belief that Kingston was to be attacked. On the 
 29th October all was ready for the next stage, to reach Bush 
 creek, 20 miles farther down the river, where the cavalry and 
 field artillery, who had gone forward by land, were to be in 
 waiting to be ferried to the north bank of the St Lawrence. 
 Again the winds were against the boats, and it was not until 
 the 2nd November that the embarkation of the army began. 
 On the evening of the next day they encamped at French creek. 
 The British were kept informed by their spies of what was 
 going on, and Lieut. Mulcaster with several small gunboats 
 was watching for an opportunity to attack when Chauncey, 
 with a much superior force, appeared. Mulcaster then sailed 
 to Kingston, confirming the news that the expedition was not 
 designed to attack that place, but was bound for Montreal. 
 
 On the 4th November the flotilla ought to have been under 
 weigh, but bungling had kept back part of the supplies and 
 the day was lost. On the 5th there was no further excuse for 
 delay. The flotilla emerged from French creek, opposite Ganan- 
 oque, and streamed downwards. Neither before nor since has 
 Qld St Lawrence been the scene of a grander spectacle. There 
 were nigh 350 boats, bearing an army of over 9000 men, with 
 a large contingent of sailors and pilots for the management 
 of the boats. The procession, five miles long, was gay with 
 flags and uniforms, the choruses of the boatmen and th e 
 music of fife and drum adding joyous exaltation to the faith 
 of all on board that this armada of the inland seas was sweep- 
 ing onward to assured victory. It was a charming day, the 
 Indian summer having set in, and such progress was made 
 that before sunset 40 miles had been covered. That night the 
 army encamped at Morristown opposite Brockville. Next 
 day was spent on the sail to Ogdensburg, which was neared 
 at dark. The batteries of Fort Wellington in Prescott were 
 greatly feared. Instead of running the gauntlet at once Wilk- 
 inson signalled the flotilla to tie up. The ammunition was load- 
 ed on carts and every man unneeded to manage the boats sent 
 to march, undercover of darkness, on the U. S. river bank, to 
 a bay 2 miles below Ogdensburg, where the boats would pick 
 them up next morning. This delay caused the 7 th to be lost 
 which was the more deplored by the U. S. staff from its be- 
 ing warm and fine. The boats remained tied up all day 
 
17 
 
 The Run Past Fort Wellington 
 
 awaiting the dark. When the moon set they rowed rapidly 
 down the stream, when it was proved the fear of the guns 
 of Fort Wellington had been unwarranted. As the long 
 procession of boats began to steal past it, hugging the 
 south shore as closely as possible, a noisy cannonade was 
 opened, but the guns were either badly pointed or the range 
 was too long for their caliber, for not a boat was hit, though 
 one chance shot killed a sailor and wounded two. Two boats, 
 laden with artillery and provisions, ran aground, and were 
 with difficulty got off next morning Having ascertained the 
 British had planted batteries wherever the river was nar- 
 row, Colonel Macomb was landed on the Canadian side with 
 1200 men to clear the bank of them. This caused skirmishes, 
 which invariably ended in the fleeing of the gunners into the 
 bush after spiking or concealing their guns. That night 
 the flotilla tied up at the narrows, 6 miles below Hamilton, 
 having made only 8 miles. Here the cavalry and artillery, who 
 had kept moving onwards on finding the flotilla did not over- 
 take them at Bush creek, was found waiting, and it took much 
 time to ferry the cavalry to the Canadian bank; the guns were 
 taken on board. The farmers living along the north side of 
 the St Lawrence, when questioned by their unwelcome visi- 
 tors, magnified the dangers they would meet — the terrors of 
 the rapids, the batteries that would rake their boats wherever 
 the river was narrow, the bands of Indians prowling in the 
 woods, the lack of forage. These stories so impressed the 
 Americans that it was decided to strengthen the cavalry, and 
 so next morning General Brown with his brigade of infantry 
 was detailed to accompany them along with two companies 
 of artillery. 
 
 This formidable force found few obstructions in their 
 march along the road that skirted the north shore of the 
 St Lawrence. Shots were occasionally exchanged with 
 riflemen hid in the woods and two or three rude block- 
 houses, erected to shelter the relief guards, were burned. 
 Trifling as their losses were, they confirmed the Americans 
 in their delusion that redcoats were concealed in the bush 
 and were there in force. Wilkinson scattered, by means 
 of the troops he landed, a proclamation assuring the Can- 
 adian farmers he had not come to make war upon them 
 but to subdue the King’s forces, and if they would remain 
 quietly at home, they would be protected in their persons 
 and property. This had no effect. The farms that lined 
 the Canadian bank of the St Lawrence were owned by 
 
18 A British Force Comes in Sight 
 
 United Empire Loyalists or their descendants, and Wilk- 
 inson’s threat, if found in arms they would be treated as 
 enemies, did not frighten them. They kept up a guerilla 
 or rather a predatory warfare on the Americans as they 
 marched along and, when the British troops finally did 
 come, joined their ranks. The promise about respecting 
 their homes was not kept, for the American soldiers, under 
 both Macomb and Brown, harried cellars, barns, and 
 stables ruthlessly, making no compensation for what they 
 took. With a few exceptions, the farmers saved their 
 horses and cattle by concealing them in the bush The 
 forage they had saved for winter feed, the U. S. cavalry- 
 men used. 
 
 The day after he passed Ogdensburg Wilkinson received 
 a message from his agent there, that two armed schooners 
 had arrived at Prescott, accompanied by several open 
 boats filled with soldiers, and his belief was that they would 
 follow and try to do what harm they could to the flotilla. 
 Of this pursuing party more was soon to be learned. Fine 
 weather continued. The 9th was sunny but, from trivial 
 causes, the flotilla was hindered, and made only ten miles. 
 On tying up for the night reports from spies told that 
 the British had perfected arrangements to obstruct by bat- 
 teries running of the Soo rapids. Wilkinson ordered the 
 flotilla to stay where it was until the shooting of the rapids 
 was made safe, so he directed Brown to march early next 
 morning and clear the bank of the enemy. Brown, an en- 
 ergetic man, set about his task at daylight and found it 
 troublesome. The enemy, too weak to face him, placed 
 obstructions in the road and kept up a dropping fire from 
 under cover, which delayed his progress. Soon after 
 Brown left, the British schooners hove in sight and opened 
 fire. On the Americans sending ashore two heavy cannon 
 whose shot reached them, they drew out of range. In the 
 afternoon a trooper arrived from Brown, telling he had 
 cleared the bank of the enemy and was encamped at Corn- 
 wall. There was still daylight enough to have made the 
 short trip over the rapids to Cornwall, and the flotilla 
 got under weigh. Before it had sailed far Wilkinson 
 changed his mind, saying it was too late to shoot the 
 rapids, so the boats tied up at Cook’s Point, nine miles 
 from the head of the rapids. TheAmericans were nowfully 
 aware that they were being closely tracked on land and 
 water. Mulcaster with his gunboats hovered as near as 
 
Colonel Morrison and His Men 
 
 19 
 
 lie could, firing an occassional shot that always fell short, 
 for his guns were small. On the river bank redcoats were 
 several times sighted and there were skirmishes with the 
 American rearguard, entailing a few casualties. The near- 
 ness of his foe troubled Wilkinson, for a strong British 
 force could follow and attack the rear of that part of his 
 army that must march along the road on the north-bank 
 of the St Lawrence to join the flotilla at the foot of the 
 Soo rapids. Scouts reporting a considerable body of 
 British regulars encamped in a pine-grove three miles west 
 of him, every precaution was taken against a night attrek, 
 the soldiers slept on their arms and strong patrols cover- 
 ed the camp. The night, however, passed without alarm. 
 
 How this force of British regulars came needs to be told. 
 When Lieut. Mulcaster, R.N., sailed into Kingston harbor 
 on the 6th November and reported to the commander, 
 General Rottenburg, that the flotilla had sailed for Mon- 
 treal, and that Kingston was not to be attacked, prompt 
 action was taken. The sailor was asked if he would un- 
 dertake to convey a corps of observation, in pursuit of the 
 flotilla and he answered yes. Despatch was used, and, on 
 the night of the 7th, four barges, bearing detachments of the 
 49th and 89th regiments, rowed out of Kingston harbor 
 and found Mulcaster and his gunboats in waiting. The 
 little force of redcoats was under command of JosephWan- 
 ton Morrison, colonel of the 89th, he being senior officer. 
 The American fleet, under Chauncey, were blockading the 
 river with the express object of guarding Wilkinson’s rear 
 by preventing the British gunboats on lake Ontario fol- 
 lowing him. The St Lawrence, however, is wide and at 
 the foot of the lake has many islands. Mulcaster had a 
 pilot who knew all the channels, and slipt past Chauncey 
 in the darkness. Every expedition was used and next 
 evening Prescott was reached, where the discouraging news 
 awaited them that the Americans had safely run the gaunt- 
 let of Fort Wellington’s guns. Being no longer neces- 
 sary, part of its garrison was ordered to join the corps of 
 observation. This reinforcement consisted of the two flank 
 companies of the 49th, a body of militia, and thirty In- 
 dians, raising Colonel Morrison’s force to 800. Anxious 
 as he was to overtake the flotilla, he tarried long enough 
 next day at the village of Hamilton, on the U. S. bank, to 
 recover a quantity of military stores which the Americans 
 
20 Wilkinson Decides to Fight 
 
 had captured from a convoy of barges a short time before. 
 After this exploit, Mulcaster kept close on the heels of the 
 flotilla, with occasional exchanges of cannon shot. Find- 
 ing the flotilla had halted at Cook’s point, Morrison and 
 his men landed to await developments, while the gunboats 
 dropped down near enough to open fire, which the Ameri- 
 cans returned, without damage to either. The British 
 troops encamped under the pine-trees for the night. 
 
 The morning of the 11th November dawned bleak and 
 cloudy, with an east wind that told of coming storm. The 
 night having passed without sign of the enemy, Wilkinson 
 declared he was confident the British dare not attack him, 
 and ordered that the boats be got ready to sail and that 
 the troops on shore begin their march to Cornwall. The 
 movement on both land and water was in progress when 
 Mulcaster renewed his fire from the gunboats and at the 
 same time the Americans beheld a long red column issue 
 from the woods and form in line of battle on a cleared 
 field on the farm of John Crysler. Seen at a distance of 
 nigh a couple of miles, the force looked imposing, and 
 Wilkinson concluded it was necessary to disperse it. The 
 order to the flotilla to sail and to the troops to march to 
 Cornwall was countermanded and preparations made to 
 give battle. There was confusion and unpreparedness 
 that caused delay, and it was not until after dinner the 
 advance was sounded, when General Swartwout’s brigade 
 moved on the line of skirmishers thrown out by Morrison, 
 who from bush and ravine were keeping up a lively fire. 
 The skirmishers were militia and Indians who, seeing they 
 were outnumbered, fled for shelter, and the sit?ht of them 
 running evoked prolonged cheering from the American 
 spectators on the boats and the river bank, who took their 
 flight as a prelude to that of the column that stood beyond 
 them. That column was composed of well-tried soldiers. 
 The battalion of the 49oh was of Brock’s own regiment, 
 and had been with him when he fell at Queenston Heights, 
 their commander was now Lieut.-Col. Harvey, the hero of 
 Stoney Creek. Colonel Morrison and his battalion had 
 arrived in Canada a short time before from service on the 
 Continent. He was of a type of which the British service 
 has never lacked representatives — a devout Christian. 
 Duty called on him to make a stand despite his inade- 
 quate force, and he did so in simple faith that the justice 
 of the cause he was called upon to maintain, would secure 
 
The Armies Face to Face 
 
 21 
 
 victory. The men in arms before him were where they had 
 no right to be, they had come to seize a country to which 
 they had no claim, they had been sent by a government 
 that had broken the peace by declaring war against Britain. 
 If ever a righteous cause was to be upheld at risk of life, 
 it now faced him. His sense of justice impelled him to 
 drive back the invader whence he came, his love of inde- 
 pendence to scorn to yield to men intent on forcing a for- 
 eign allegiance on Canada. Satisfied in conscience of the 
 justice of the cause whose flag he bore, his knowledge as a 
 soldier told him of the risk he ran in offering battle 
 against such fearful odds. With 800 men he was challeng- 
 ing a General who had it in his power to hurl eight thou- 
 sand against him. 
 
 The field upon which the impending battle was to be 
 fought, was a stretch of clearings along the north bank of 
 the St Lawrence. The plain, broken by stumps and snake- 
 fences, with occasional trees, was nowhere of any great 
 width, for it dropped into an ash swamp that ran along- 
 side it. Morrison had chosen for his position the part, of 
 the clearance where it was narrowest, his left resting on 
 the swamp and his right on the St Lawrence, where Mul- 
 caster with his gunboats secured that flank. For the se- 
 curity of his left flank he trusted to the impassability of 
 the swamp. Narrow as the field was there were not men 
 enough, spread thinly as possible, to form a line across, 
 so that there was a wide gap between the 49th andCrysler’s 
 buildings, in and around which were posted the militia 
 and a party of sailors. In front of the column ran a ra- 
 vine, shallow where the creek issued from the swamp, but 
 deepening as it neared the St Lawrence. It was this gully 
 which made Morrison select his ground, for it would be 
 an obstacle in a charge and to the passage of cavalry 
 Morrison had three field-guns, 6-pounders, he posted one at 
 each end of his line, and one in the center. It was near- 
 ing 2 o’clock on that raw and trusty afternoon when the 
 British saw six columns advancing towards them across 
 the plain that lay between them and the flotilla, fully two 
 thousand strong. That was not all Morrison had to en- 
 counter with his 800. Behind the columns sweeping to- 
 wards him were the several thousands held in reserve on 
 the flotilla or encamped on the river bank. He was face 
 to face with the entire force Wilkinson had at his com- 
 mand. Allowing for the detachments sent to Cornwall that 
 
wnnnimmi 
 
 PLAN OF THE BATTLEFIELD OF CRYSLER 
 
 The plan shows the position of the Combatants 
 at the opening of the Battle 
 
The Battle of Cvysler 23 
 
 lorce must have numbered 7000. The Americans regarded 
 it as inconceivable that the British would make a stand. 
 They took as granted, that, when their first line drew near, 
 the redcoats would disappear among the pine trees behind 
 them. So on they marched, assured of an easy victory, 
 with waving banners, bouncingly keeping step to fife and 
 drum, laughing and shouting, confident they were about to 
 see the men who composed the thin red line that confront- 
 ed them, to use their own phrase, skoot for cover. As 
 soon as the Americans came within range they began 
 firing, shouting derisive cries to their opponents, who 
 stood silent and stock-still, firing not a shot. Not till the 
 advancing enemy neared the edge of the ravine did Morri- 
 son give the word, when a volley rolled forth. More ef- 
 fective was the small six-pounder at the head of his line. 
 The Americans came to a halt. They did not expect this. 
 They began firing by platoons across the shallow ravine, 
 which they did not attempt to cross, the British steadily 
 replying, until the American commander, General Boyd, 
 to end an indecisive long-range duel, ordered his subordi- 
 nate, Gen. Covington, to take a regiment and turn the 
 British left. The Americans wheeled northward, crossed 
 the ravine, and bore down on the end of Morrison’s line, 
 who met the attack by changing the formation of the 89th, 
 so arranging the files that they faced north instead of east. 
 This difficult movement of echelon was effected under fire, 
 yet done as steadily as if on parade. As the Americans 
 advanced, the 89th poured into their ranks a steady fire 
 while the little cannon raked them. Boyd’s order was 
 that Covington should charge, but this withering shower 
 of bullets stopped his advance. His men swung backward, 
 firing as fast as muskets could be loaded. Covington fell 
 mortally wounded, so did his successor, and the third who 
 assumed command fared likewise. It was a contest be- 
 tween discipline and numbers, between skill and inexperi- 
 ence. The combatants were of the same stock, and equal 
 in natural courage, but few of the Americans had been 
 under fire until that hour. With fit officers they would have 
 charged as their general ordered. Boyd saw how critical 
 the situation was and hurriedly sent reinforcements, and 
 they were needed, for the rank-and-file were wavering and 
 many were slinking away. For half an hour the fighting 
 went on and during that time the Americans suffered their 
 severest loss. When their firing slackened Morrison felt 
 
24 The Americans Defeated 
 
 the decisive moment had come and ordered the 89th to 
 charge. They crossed the gulley, reformed, and advanced 
 with levelled bayonets. The foe retreated slowly at first, 
 then broke rank and crowded down to where their boats 
 lay. Boyd saw the possibility of a rout and to avert 
 that danger tried a diversion. He ordered a column of 
 fresh troops with two cannon to threaten an attack on 
 the south end of the British line. To repulse this, Morri- 
 son had to halt his advance and hasten down across the 
 field to meet this new assault. On coming up with the 
 enemy his men fired a volley and then made a bayonet 
 charge. The Americans fled, leaving one of their cannon 
 and part of their number, who were made prisoners. 
 
 General Boyd now realized the day was lost and that 
 the most he could do was to gain enough time to reach the 
 boats. During the fight a squadron of dragoons stood be- 
 side the boats as a reserve. Boyd sent the order to their 
 commander to gallop up the road that ran along the St 
 Lawrence bank and endeavor to get behind the British 
 column. On seeing them coming the 49th turned to meet 
 them and the 89th, farther away, hurried to their support. 
 The dragoons came dashingly along and the danger of 
 their succeeding was imminent. They had reached the 
 ravine which, if they were able to cross, would have left 
 them free to take the British position in the rear. The 
 leading files dashed down into the ravine and while crowd- 
 ing up the opposite bank a volley, at point-blank range 
 from the Crysler buildings, that stood on the west side of 
 the ravine, emptied so many saddles that the men were 
 seized with panic, and wheeling their horses galloped back 
 to the boats. That volley was fired by a cluster of sailors 
 and U.E. Loyalists — farmers who had volunteered to save 
 their homes. 
 
 It was now 4 o’clock. The plain in front of him was 
 strewn with dead and wounded, and everywhere Morrison 
 could see the Americans running towards their boats, and 
 leaping into them when reached. He ordered a general 
 advance, and his soldiers, now assured of victory, raised 
 a mighty shout. On they swept towards the flotilla, until, 
 on coming within range of the gunboats, Morrison had to 
 sound a halt. Protected by the big guns of the armed 
 boats the last of the Americans got on board, while the 
 routed cavalry stopped not in their flight until they reach- 
 ed Cornwall. On the British taking possession of the 
 
And Take to Their Boats 
 
 25 
 
 ground left by their foe, they found they had abandoned 
 part of their stores, which they did not stay long enough 
 to re9hip. Among the spoil were overcoats, blankets, and 
 knapsacks of which the Americans had lightened them- 
 selves before advancing to the fight, and which they did 
 not tarry long enough in their flight to recover. The 
 storm now broke, first rain, then sleet, which changed to 
 snow. The victors, cheered by their success, bore cheer- 
 fully the discomforts, the hunger and exposure, of a 
 miserable night by their camp fires. The American boats 
 found their way by the moonlight to the landing at 
 the head of the Soo rapids on the U. S. bank, which was 
 reached at 9 p.m. In the wild storm the wounded were 
 carried ashore to find such cover as barns and stables af- 
 forded. Their moans and cries in the boats and now when 
 lifted on shore increased the distress of the shivering sol- 
 diers and sailors as they faced the blast, and they clamor- 
 ed before their officers it was time to give up and go into 
 winter quarters. 
 
 Wilkinson naturally minimized his losses, reporting 102 
 killed and 237 wounded. This is certain, the British found 
 over 40 American wounded on the field of battle and the day 
 after the fight gave honorable burial to 100 of their dead, 
 Americans taken prisoners numbered 100. The British 
 had 22 killed, 147 wounded, and 12 missing, so that one 
 out of every five who took part in the engagement had 
 dropped out — an unusual percentage. 
 
 Daybreak found the crews in charge of the flotilla astir 
 and as the boats got ready they steered into the current, 
 which swept them into the Long Soo, when its mighty tide 
 hurried them swiftly to calm water at Barnhart island, 
 where they found General Brown with his brigade, and 
 who had made preparation for their camping. Shooting 
 the rapids was an expeditious method of transporting the 
 army and Wilkinson had soon his command once more 
 concentrated. There was only one sentiment in that army 
 about bim, and it was, that he was an incapable. The de- 
 feat of the previous day was due to his lack of executive 
 ability. The flotilla had spent eight days in making eighty 
 miles enabling Mulcaster and Morrison to overtake them. 
 A log, set adrift in the channel, would have 
 made the distance in two days. With proper man- 
 agement the army ought now to have been on the 
 island of Montreal. As it was, between the weather 
 
26 
 
 Wilkinson Will Go No Farther 
 
 and their pursuers, they looked for continued disasters. 
 Among those who greeted Wilkinson on his landing on 
 Barnhart island was Colonel Atkinson, who explained 
 he had come from Four Corners and had waited at St 
 Regis for the flotilla. The letter he bore from Hampton 
 stated he would have been glad to join Wilkinson at St 
 Regis but had not provisions for his men or forage for his 
 horses to make the journey. Professing to be indignant, 
 Wilkinson secretly rejoiced over the message — it gave him 
 an excuse to abandon the expedition and shoulder its 
 failure on Hampton. He called a council-of-war and laid 
 Hampton’s letter before them. On Hampton’s refusal to 
 obey his order to be at St Regis, he dwelt with voluble 
 severity. Just when the grand object of the expedition 
 was within grasp it had been snatched away by Hampton’s 
 extraordinary, unexampled and unwarrantable conduct, 
 which was an outrage on every principle of subordination 
 and discipline. He told the officers that, without Hamp- 
 ton’s army, he would not undertake to go to Montreal. 
 With two dissentients they endorsed his decision. Despic- 
 able as Hampton’s motives may have been in not march- 
 ing to St Regis, his not doing so saved the Republic from 
 another disaster to her aran. St Regis was a miserable 
 Indian village on the edge of what, in 1813, was a wilder- 
 ness. The country affording no supplies the army would 
 have been reduced tostarvation before the flotilla appeared. 
 
 Thecouncildecided the flotillashould make for the Salmon 
 river, as a safe place for it to winter, and that it go at once. 
 Wilkinson then issued a general-order to that effect in 
 which he declared “He with lively regret and the deepest 
 mortification suspends the attack on Montreal, but he as- 
 sures the army it is not abandoned.” Tne two regiments 
 of dragoons were ferried to the U. S. bank and left that 
 afternoon for Utica, and then the flotilla sailed for Salmon 
 river, where the first boats ended their career at 3 in the 
 morning of the 13th November. 
 
 There was no justification for Wilkinson’s abandoning 
 the capture of Montreal. He was within three days’ easy 
 sail of it and had an overwhelming force for the purpose. 
 On the 8th December, when the Salmon river camp had 
 been got into something like shape, a roster was taken, 
 and it showed an army of regulars of 8,143, and that after 3 
 weeks during which desertions were of nightly occurrence 
 and there had been many releases on furlough, so that 
 
The Camp at Fort Covington 27 
 
 when, at that eventful council on Barnhart island it was 
 decided to give up the advance on Montreal, Wilkinson 
 must have had nigh 10,000 apart from cavalry and boat- 
 men, and he knew full well there were not hundreds for his 
 thousands in front of him. The defeat inflicted by Colonel 
 Morrison explains his eagerness to escape further contest. 
 Morrison was about to pursue him in Mulcaster’s boats 
 when he was astounded by the surprising information that 
 the Americans had fled the scene. 
 
 Three miles above the mouth of the Salmon river, where 
 the first rapid gave power, there stood a small grist-mill 
 and a saw-mill, and clustered about them the shanties of 
 those who found employment in them, together with two 
 taverns and a store or two. On a knoll near these was a 
 blockhouse, where a small garrison was kept. Late in the 
 afternoon of the 13th a courier brought to the little hamlet 
 the surprising word that the army of the north was coming 
 and to prepare for the reception of the wounded. Hours 
 passed before the head of the melancholy procession of 
 boats was seen stealing up the moonlight waters. The 
 wounded men were carried to the blockhouse until it was 
 filled and other cover had to be sought. General Coving- 
 ton died before he could be borne ashore. His body was 
 taken to Ware’s tavern and buried with military honors 
 the following day. His name is perpetuated by the pretty 
 village of the present day, its original name, French Mills, 
 giving place to Fort Covington in 1817, when a munici- 
 pality was organized. The word “ Fort ” was prefixed to 
 distinguish the new town from Covington, Ky. The body 
 of the General with those of two other officers were, after 
 the war, exhumed for final interment at Sackett’s Harbor. 
 
 Not all the boats found moorings in the Salmon river. 
 A few openly rowed to the Canada shore, the soldiers 
 preferring desertion to the hardships before them. Worse 
 still was the conduct of many officers, who sold the 
 stores on their boats and pocketed the money. With 
 what boards were in the millyard flimsy sheds were run 
 up, but they were far too few and the majority of the men 
 had to live in tents. On the 1st December winter set in. 
 The wretchedness of their condition can hardly be exag- 
 gerated. The country was a wilderness, with no store of 
 provisions to draw upon except what had been brought in 
 the boats and that was speedily exhausted. Before a fort- 
 night rations had been reduced to barely enough to main- 
 
28 
 
 The Order to Disband 
 
 tain life, and there were regiments that went without bis- 
 cuits for four days, and, what made it worse, were of a 
 quality that even starving men loathed them. The biscuits 
 were mouldy and had been made from the flour of sprouted 
 wheat. The meal designed as poultices for wounds, the 
 doctors had to order to be cooked as food for the sick 
 and they reported that, without proper food and medicines, 
 it was impossible for those under their care to recover. 
 Dysentery, inflammation of the lungs, and typhus-fever 
 soon became prevalent, but, more frightful than these 
 dread diseases, was a paralysis of the limbs — a dry rot or 
 withering of the extremities. The physicians ascribed its 
 cause to the biscuits made from smutty flour, and were 
 happy, in prescribing opium to relieve the pain of the 
 sufferers, to find that the drug also counteracted the dis- 
 ease. Before Christmas one-third of the army was unfit 
 for duty; how many died during those six dismal weeks is 
 unknown. By that time, lumber had been obtained and 
 huts were erected for those who had been under canvas, 
 and the sick and wounded had been conveyed to Malone, 
 which village was converted into an hospital. The con- 
 duct of many of the captains of companies was shameful. 
 In the sufferings of their men they saw an opportunity of 
 making money. They did not revise the rolls they sent to 
 headquarters and drew pay and rations for men who had 
 deserted or found graves on the banks of the Salmon river. 
 The pay they pocketed, the rations they sold to the sur- 
 vivors. That there were honorable and patriotic men in 
 the army is undeniable, but the majority of the officers 
 were ignorant and unscrupulous; 9chool-district and ward 
 politicians, who owed their position to the influences of 
 caucus and partyism, and who viewed the campaign as a 
 means of enriching themselves. As depicted by those who 
 served under them, a more despicable 9et of men never 
 officered an army; blatant a9 to their patriotism and hat- 
 red of Great Britain, yet defrauding their own govern- 
 ment and making secret offers to the British of the pro- 
 visions and war-material they meanly purloined. On 
 getting their pay, which was only a month, the soldiers 
 spent it in buying food from the settlers, who came in 
 sleighs from a great distance to find a market for their 
 produce in the stricken camp. When the St Lawrence froze 
 desertions increased, for it was known the British garrison 
 at Cornwall was ready not only to welcome them but to 
 
Wilkinson 
 
 29 
 
 make up any arrears of pay due them by the U. S. govern- 
 ment. As the weary winter days passed discontent in the 
 camp grew into mutiny, so that one morning a big crowd 
 of them actually started to march to Sackett’s Harbor and 
 were with difficulty persuaded by the commanding general 
 to return. Their only excuse was, that anything was bet- 
 ter than the hardships they were enduring. 
 
 While his army was in this dreadful state, Wilkinson 
 was living in comfort at the residence of a leading citizen 
 of Malone, whither, the day after his troops went into 
 camp, he had been borne in a litter on the shoulders of 
 eight men. Whether his illness was the result of unavoid- 
 able causes or arose from drink is in doubt, but it certain- 
 ly had no effect in checking his boastful inclinations. He 
 kept writing to Washington advising what ought to be 
 done to capture Montreal, speaking as if his army were 
 intact and ready for service and he was the general to 
 direct the campaign. The disappointment of the American 
 people at the failures of Hampton and Wilkinson was in- 
 tense and their expressions of indignation loud. Had the 
 army on the Salmon river been kept intact it could, when 
 spring came, have taken again to its boats and occupied 
 Montreal before reinforcements arrived by sea, but its dis- 
 organization went on so rapidly that to save the remnant 
 the order was sent from Washington to divide what was 
 left of it, 2000 to march to the barracks at Sackett’s Har- 
 bor and the remainder to those at Plattsburg. On the 3rd 
 February preparations for abandoning camp were begun. 
 The masts of part of the boats were cut and the hulls then 
 sunk. The remainder were set fire to and burned to the 
 water’s edge. In all, 328 boats were destroyed. The huts 
 and stores that could not be moved were burnt or dumped 
 into the river. 
 
 The grand campaign to capture Montreal and with it all 
 Canada west of the fortress of Quebec thus ended in defeat 
 and disaster, in mutiny and shame. Wilkinson was court- 
 marshaled and Armstrong was compelled to resign, but 
 neither they nor any responsible for the miscarriage of the 
 campaign were punished. While Hampton, Wilkinson, 
 and Armstrong were primarily responsible, the cause of 
 failure lay with the American public. The success of the 
 revolution of 1776 had intoxicated them with pride and to 
 those who took part in it they attributed qualities to which 
 they could lay no claim. Men were rated as heroes who 
 
30 
 
 Cause of the Failure 
 
 were mere blusterers; self-sacrifice attributed to men who 
 took advantage of the disorders that prevailed during the 
 revolution to enrich themselves, and patriotism ascribed 
 to bosoms where selfishness reigned. That the triumph of 
 the revolution was due to assistance from abroad, to 
 French money, fleets, and armies, was ignored, and ascrib- 
 ed to Washington and his generals. So it came, when war 
 was declared in 1812, the men who were embalmed in the 
 public mind as the personification of every military virtue 
 were given command. The result was disastrous. Hull, 
 Dearborn, Hampton, Wilkinson, Armstrong were all 
 veterans of the revolution, and in their respective failures 
 throw a side-light on the quality of the leaders of the 
 revolution. The war lasted another year, and there was 
 fierce fighting along the Niagara frontier, but there was 
 no renewal of the attempt to capture Montreal. The cam- 
 paign which ended on Crysler’s farm ensured its safety. 
 
 Wilkinson declared it was not the event of the 11th Nov- 
 ember that caused his abandonment of the campaign. It 
 is self-evident, however, that had Morrison’s little army 
 been routed he would have had no excuse to give up his 
 advance on Montreal. He would have met no opposition 
 to give him concern until the spires of that city met his 
 sight, and, even then, its paltry garrison of 200 sailors 
 and 400 marines, drawn from the fleet at Quebec, and a 
 mob of militiamen dragged from their homes by compul- 
 sion to shoulder a gun, could not have withstood him. 
 With Montreal in U. S. possession all the British troops 
 west of it, cut off from their base of supply, would have 
 had to surrender, and the stars-and-stripes would have 
 flown over all Canada west of Quebec. It was the battle of 
 Crysler that saved Canada. At the distance of a century 
 we perceive events in their right proportion, and recog- 
 nize Crysler to be the decisive battle of the war of 1812. 
 So long as Canadians rejoice in being Britons they ought 
 to cherish the memory of Morrison and his eight hundred. 
 
 Robert Sellar 
 
 Huntingdon, Que., May 1, 1913. 
 
31 
 
 Addenda 
 
 Colonel Joseph Winton Morrison 
 
 Was the son of an officer in the British army, who was 
 stationed in New York during the period before the war of 
 Independence. He was born in 1773. On the family re- 
 turning to England he was educated there, and, while still 
 a stripling, got a commission in the army. He was moved 
 about a gi'eat deal, seeing some service in the field, and 
 rose to be Lieut. -Colonel. On the war of 1812 breaking 
 out, he was sent with his battalion of the 89th regt. to 
 Halifax, and the following summer was ordered to Upper 
 Canada. While in garrison at Kingston he was detached, 
 as told in the foregoing narrative, to follow the flotilla of 
 Wilkinson. For his victory of Crysler he received no 
 official recognition, beyond being awarded, with the other 
 officers who fought with him, a medal. The summer of 
 1814 he and his battalion served on the Niagara frontier. 
 At Lundy’s Lane he was so severely wounded that his life 
 was despaired of. He was sent to England, making a 9low 
 recovery. In 1822 he was ordered to India, and in the 
 wars with the natives greatly distinguished himself. Ex- 
 posure to an unhealthy climate broke down his constitu- 
 tion, compelling*him to return homeward. While the ship 
 was making her way to England he died, aged 57 years. 
 Efforts to secure a portrait of him for this monograph 
 were futile. The following is the official despatch in which 
 he reported the battle of Crysler — 
 
 The enemy’s force, consisting of two brigades of infantry 
 and a regiment of cavalry, amounting to between three and 
 four thousand men, moved forward about two o’clock in 
 the afternoon, from Cook’s Point, and attacked our ad- 
 vance, which gradually fell back to the position selected 
 for the detachment to occupy, the right resting on the river 
 and the left on a pine-wood, exhibiting about seven hun- 
 dred yards. The ground being open, the troops were thus 
 disposed — 
 
 The flank companies of the 49th regiment, and the de- 
 tachment of the Canadian regiment, with a field-piece, on 
 the right ; under Lieut. -Colonel Pearson. A little ad- 
 vanced up the road, three companies of the 89th regiment, 
 formed in echellon, with a gun; under Captain' Barnes, with 
 the advance on its left, supporting it. The 49th and 89th, 
 thrown more to the rear .with a gun, formed the main body 
 and reserve, extending to the woods on the left; which 
 were occupied by the Voltigeurs, under Major Herriot, and 
 the Indians under Lieut. Anderson. — At about half-past 
 two the action became general, when the enemy endeavored, 
 by moving forward a brigade from his right, to turn our 
 left, but was repulsed by the 89th regiment forming en 
 potence with the 49oh regiment, and by moving forward, 
 occasionally firing by platoons. His efforts were next direct- 
 ed against our right, and to repulse this movement, the 
 49th regiment took ground in that direction, in echellon, 
 followed by the 89th. When within half musket shot, the 
 
32 
 
 Addenda 
 
 line wa9 formed under a heavy but irregular fire from the 
 enemy. The 49th wa9 directed to charge their gun9, pogted 
 oppo9ite to our9, but it became necessary, when within a 
 short distance of them, to check this forward movement, in 
 consequence of a charge from their cavalry on the right, 
 lest they should wheel about, and fall upon our rear, but 
 they were received in so gallant a manner by the com- 
 panies of the 89th under Captain Barnes, and the well 
 directed fire of the artillery, that they quickly retreated, 
 and by a charge from those companies, one gun was gain- 
 ed. — The enemy immediately concentrated his force to 
 check our advance, but such was the steady countenance 
 and well directed fire of the troops and artillery, that 
 about half-past four, they gave way at all points from an 
 exceeding strong position, endeavoring by their light in- 
 fantry to cover their retreat, who were driven away by a 
 judicious movement made by Lieut. -Colonel Pearson. 
 The detachment, for the night, occupied the ground from 
 which the enemy had been driven. 
 
 It is now my grateful duty to point out to your honor 
 the benefit the service has received from the ability, judg- 
 ment, and active exertions of Lt.-Col. Harvey, the deputy 
 adjutant-general, for sparing whom to accompany the de- 
 tachment I must again publicly express my acknowledge- 
 ments. To the cordial co-operation and exertions of Lt.- 
 Col. Pearson, commanding the detachment from Prescott; 
 Lt.-Col. Penderleath, 49th regt. ; Major Clifford, 89th regt. ; 
 Major Herriot of the Voltigeurs, and Captain Jackson of 
 the royal artillery, combined with the gallantry of the 
 troops, our great success may be attributed. Every man 
 did his duty, and, I believe, I cannot more strongly speak 
 their merits than in mentioning our small force did not 
 exceed eight hundred rank and file. 
 
 To Captains Davis and Skinner, of the quarter-master 
 general’s department, I am under the greatest obligations 
 for the assistance I have received from them; their zeal 
 and activity have been unremitting. Lieut. Haggerman of 
 the militia and Lieut. Anderson of the Indian department 
 have also, for their services, deserved my public acknow- 
 ledgments. 
 
 Wilkinson’s Official Report of the Battle 
 
 A variety of reports of the British movements and coun- 
 ter movements were brought to me in succession, which 
 convinced me of their determination to hazard an attack 
 when it could be done to the greatest advantage; and there- 
 fore I resolved to anticipate them. Directions were ac- 
 cordingly sent by that distinguished officer, Col. Swift, of 
 the engineers, to Brig. Gen. Boyd, to throw the detach- 
 ments of his command assigned to him in the order of the 
 preceding day, and composed of his own, Covington’s and 
 Swartwout’s brigades, into three columns, to march upon 
 the enemy, outflank them, if possible, and take their ar- 
 tillery. The action soon after commenced with the ad- 
 vanced body of the enemy, and became extremely sharp 
 and galling, and with occasional pauses, but sustained 
 with great vivacity in open space and fair combat, for up- 
 wards of two and a half hours, the adverse lines alternate- 
 ly yielding and advancing. It is impossible to say with 
 
Addenda 
 
 33 
 
 accuracy what was our number on the field, because it con- 
 sisted of indefinite detachments taken from the boats to 
 render safe the passage of the rapids. Gens. Covington and 
 Swartwout voluntarily took part in the action, at the head 
 of detachments from their respective brigades, and ex- 
 hibited the same courage that was displayed by Brig. Gen. 
 Boyd, who happened to be the senior officer on the ground. 
 Our force engaged might have reached 1,600 or 1,700 men, 
 but actually did not exceed 1,800; that of the enemy was 
 estimated from 1,200 to 2.000, but did not probably amount 
 to more than 1,500 or 1,600, consisting, as I am informed, 
 of detachments from the 49tb, 84th and 104th regiments of 
 the line, with three companies of the Voltigeur and Glen- 
 garry corps, and the militia of the country, who were not 
 included in the estimate. 
 
 It would be presumptuous in me to attempt to give a de- 
 tailed account of the affair, which certainly reflects high 
 honor on the valor of the American soldier, as no ex- 
 amples can be produced of undisciplined men with inex- 
 perienced officers, braving a fire of two hours and a half, 
 without quitting the field, or yielding to their antagonist. 
 The information is derived from officers in my confidence, 
 who took active parts in this conflict; for though I was en- 
 abled to order the attack, it was my hard fortune not to 
 be able to lead the troops I commanded. The disease with 
 which I was assailed on the 2nd of September, on my 
 journey to Fort George, has, with a few short intervals 
 of convalescence, preyed on me ever since, and at the 
 moment of this action, I was confined to my bed, and em- 
 aciated almost as a skeleton, unable to sit on my horse, 
 or move ten paces without assistance. I must, however, 
 be pardoned for trespassing on your time a few remarks 
 in relation to the affair. 
 
 The objects of the British and Americans were precisely 
 opposed; the last being bound by the instructions of the 
 government, and the most solemn obligations of duty, to 
 precipitate their designs on the St Lawrence byevery prac- 
 ticable means; because this being effected, one of the 
 greatest difficulties opposed to the American arms would 
 be surmounted, while the first, by duties equally imperious, 
 to retard and if possible, prevent such descent. He is to 
 be counted victorious who effected his purpose! Ths Brit- 
 ish commander having failed to gain either of his objects, 
 can lay no claim to the honors of the day. The battle 
 fluctuated, and seemed at different times inclined to the 
 contending corps. The front of the enemy were at first 
 forced back more than a mile, and though they never re- 
 gained the ground they lost, their stand was permanent 
 and their courage resolute. Amidst these charges and 
 near the close of the contest, we lost a field piece by the 
 fall of an officer, who was serving it with the same cool- 
 ness as if he had been at a parade or a review. This was 
 Lieut. Smith, of the light artillery, who, in point of merit, 
 stood at the head of his grade. The enemy having halted 
 and our troops being again formed into battalion, front 
 to front, we resumed our position on the bank of the river, 
 and the infantry being much fatigued, the whole were re- 
 embarked and proceeded down the river without any fur- 
 ther annoyance from the enemy or their gun-boats, while 
 the dragoons, with five pieces of light artillery, marched 
 down the Canada shore without molestation. 
 
Addenda 
 
 34 
 
 It is due to his rank, to his worth, and his services, that 
 I shouldmake particular mention of Brig. Gen. Covington, 
 who received a mortal wound directly through the body 
 while animating his men and leading them to the charge. 
 He fell where he fought, at the head of his men, and sur- 
 vived but two days. 
 
 The dead rest in honor, and the wounded bled for their 
 country and deserve its gratitude. 
 
 Hampton’s Account of The Skirmish of Chateauguay 
 
 The army was put in motion on the morning of the 26th 
 October, leaving its baggage, etc., on the ground of en- 
 campment. On advancing near the enemy it was found 
 that the column I had sent (the previous evening to cross 
 by a ford and take the enemy in the rear) was not as far 
 advanced as anticipated. The guides had misled it, and 
 finally failed in finding the ford. We could not communi- 
 cate with it, so waited the sound of attack from below. At 
 2 o’clock firing was heard on the south side of the Chateau- 
 guay river, when our troops advanced rapidly to the at- 
 tack. The enemy’s light troops commenced a sharp fire, 
 but Brig.-Major Izard, advancing with his brigade, drove 
 him everywhere behind his defenses and silenced the fire 
 in front. This brigade would have pushed forward as far 
 as courage, skill, and perseverance could have carried it, 
 but, while advancing, the firing on the south bank of the 
 river ceased, and word came the ford had not been gained. 
 The enemy retired behind his defenses, but a renewal of his 
 attack was expected, and our troops remained some time 
 in their position to meet it. The troops on the south bank 
 of the river were excessively fatigued. Its purpose having 
 failed, Colonel Purdy was ordered to withdraw his col- 
 umn to a ford 4 or 5 miles above and cross over. The day 
 was spent and Gen. Izard was ordered to withdraw his bri- 
 gade to a position three miles in the rear, to which place 
 the baggage was ordered forward. The slowness and order 
 with which Gen. Izard retired with his brigade must have 
 inspired the enemy with respect. They presumed not to 
 venture a shot at him during his movement. The unguard- 
 edness of some part of Purdy’s command exposed him to 
 a rear attack from the Indians, which was repeated after 
 dark, entailing some loss These attacks were always re- 
 pelled and must have cost the enemy as many lives as we 
 lost. Our entire loss in killed, wounded, and missing does 
 not exceed fifty. In its new position, within three miles of 
 the enemy’s post, the army encamped on the night of the 
 26th and remained until 12 o’clock of the 28th. All the 
 deserters, of whom there were four, concurred in the infor- 
 mation that Sir George Prevost, with three other general 
 officers, had arrived with the whole of his disposable force 
 and lay in rear of the defenses. 
 
 Gleaner Print, Huntingdon, Q. 
 
Morven 
 
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 became and has remained British, and why her people 
 are to-day so intensely loyal, should read Morven. — 
 Toronto Globe. 
 
 If your Bookseller has not got it, send 50c to The 
 Gleaner Office, Huntingdon, Que. 
 
 The Tragedy of Quebec 
 
 Third Edition— Revised and Enlarged 
 
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