s-^.- ^^'^m :/^m^.\-' ?«t?> whofe good underftanding is undebauched by metaphyfics, will fee very evidently the truth of thefe two propofitions. Firft, that, fuppofing the world we inhabit to be a fcene of as many evils, as it is reprefented to be, the arguments drawn from thence againil the wifdom, or powerj or goodnefs of God, are inconclufive. God is the creator and governor of the univerfe, not of this world alone, a fmall, and, probably, a very in- confiderable part of it : fo that, if there was really more evil than good in this part, it would conclude nothing againft the whole, wherein there might be ftill much more good than evil, nor, confe- quently, againft the divine attributes. Secondly, that there is even in this world fo much more good than evil, and the general ftate of mankind is fo happy in it, that the exaggerated defcriptions of a fuppofed contrary ftate would make no im- preflion againft thefe attributes, if men had not been induced to think moft abfurdly that God Vol. V. B ' could 2 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, could have no good reafon for creating them, but that of communicating happinefs to them, and happinefs fuch as they would have, happinefs without alloy. The accufation brought againft the goodnefs of God is founded, therefore, on a falfe reprefentation, and an arbitrary fuppofition. Modern philofophers are more to be blamed on this account, than the antients. They have a nobler view of the immenfe univerfe. They know that this planet is a part of it. How then can they affume that this part was made for one fpecies of the animals it produces, rather than for the whole fyftem ? Divines are ftill more to be blamed, than mere philofophers. A confede- racy with atheifts becomes ill the profeflbrs of theifm, and, lefs than any, thofe who pretend to teach it. No matter : they perfift ; and, having done their beft, in concert with their allies, to de- ftroy the belief of the goodnefs of God, they en- deavour to deftroy that of his juftice, which is a further article of their alliance. I have faid al- ready, that, left the bare exiftence of phyfical and moral evil (hould not afford the atheifts color enough to deny the being of God, nor the di- vines a fufficient foundation to erefl an heaven and an hell, they proceed to confider thefe evils relatively to the diftribution of them, and they pronounce this diftribution unjuft. Their decla- mations are heard on this fubjeft with a double advantage, the partiality of love, and the preju- dice of averfion. Men are apt to pafs eafily, and filently, over the good, and complain loudly of the PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 3 the evil by which they are afFedted in their own perfons, or in the perfons of thofe whom they ap- prove. As eafily, and filently, do they pafs over the evil, which they never think fufficient, and complain loudly of the good, which they always think too much, that falls to the fhare of thofe whom they difapprove, or who (land on any ac- count in oppofition to them. On fuch motives they are induced to charge the providence of God with injuftice. But here the confederacy breaks. The atheift concludes once more that there is no God. The divine ftill maintains that there is one. How well they both fupport the charge* how effedually the latter re-afTerts the juftice of the Supreme Being, we are now to enquire. And I perfuade myfelf that you will be under fome furprife to find a charge fo groundlefs, that has been fo long and fo clamoroufly brought, and aa hypothefis fo weak, that has prevailed fo long and fo generally among theifts. I know not whether the natural temper and difpofition of mankind, by which we mufl account for one, or the politi- cal and private interefts, by which we muft ac- count for the other, will take off this furprife till you have confidered them thoroughly in their rife and progrefs, and found them to be permanent caufes of permanent effects. Then, indeed, your furprife will ceafe, becaufe you will find no^ thing in this cafe, which you will not find in many others •, that is, error eftablifhed and perpetuated by afFeftions, palTions, intereft, and authority among men, in oppofition to the plaincft diftates of their reafon. B 2 4 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. That good men are often unhappy, and bad men happy, has been a fubjeft of inveflive ra- ther, than of argument, to Epicurus, to Cotta, and to others among the antients. It has been too nearly fo in the writings of fome of the mo- derns, and little lefs in thofe of fome eminent di- vines. I have quoted Clarke on feveral occa- fions. I muft quote him on this. In his Eviden- ces of natural and revealed religion *, as well as in his Demonftration of the being and attributes of God f , he prefumes to fay, " It is certain and •' neceflary, even as certain as the moral attri- '* butes of God" (and he had before affirmed the moral to be as eflentlal to the divine nature, as the natural, and therefore as certain as God's exiftence) " that there mull be, at fome time or ** other, fuch a revolution and renovation of *' things, fuch a future ftate of exiftence of the *' fame perfons, as that, by an exad diftribution *' of rewards and punifliments therein, all the pre- ** fent diforders, and inequalities, may be fet " right, and that the whole fcheme of providence ** may appear, at it's confummation, to be a de- <* fign worthy of infinite wifdom, juftice, and •« goodnefs.'* At it's confummation ; for it ap- pears, a<5lually, unworthy of them, as thefe men not only imply, but fay. The hypothetical cer- tainty and necefTity, on which the dodor is will- ing to rifque our acknowledgment of a Supreme Being, or our denial of him, is founded on this * P- 130- t P- '3«- afTertion, PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 5 aflertion, " that rewards and punifhments, in ge- " neral, are neceflary to fupport the honor of " God, and of his law and government i" and on this afllimed propofition, " that the condition *' of mankind in this prefent ftate is fuch, that the " natural order of things is perverted, and virtue " and goodnefs prevented from obtaining their *' proper and due effeds.'* Audacious and vain fophifl ! His whole chain of reafoning, from the moral attributes of God downwards, is nothing more, than one continued application of moral hu- man ideas to the defigns and condudl of God : and, in this cafe, he afllimes, moft prefumptu- oufly, that the fcheme and order of things, which God has eftablifhed in this fyftem of ours, are fuch, as cannot be reconciled even to the notions of human juftice. His terms have a very folemn air, that may impofe on the unwary, and confirm the habitual prejudices of others : but he who ana- lyfes them, and attends to the fenfe of them, will perceive that more abfurdity cannot be ftufFed into fo few words. To begin this analyfe -, let us confider the terms good and bad, happy and unhappy, as they ftand here applied. Men will be never agreed abouC the former ; the latter can never be afcertained : and, confequently, the propofition, that good men are unhappy, and bad men happy, Ihould not be advanced in the fenfe in which it is advanced, and as if the natural order of things was perverted : for what is the natural order of things ? It is that B 3 which 6 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. which the author of nature has eftabhfhed, and according to which evil may happen fometimes to the good, and good to the bad : but accord- ing to which, hkewife, virtue can never lead to unhappinefs, nor vice to happinefs. It is falfe, therefore, to fay that the natural order is adually perverted, as if unhappinefs was really become the confequence of virtue, and happinefs of vice, in the courfe of human affairs. But now, who are the good ? who are the bad ? If by the good are intended fuch as conform themfelves to the law of nature, and by the bad fuch as violate this law, the words are very equivocal, and muft ap- pear fo in their applications. Men differ in no- thing more, than in the charafters they impute to one another, even in their private thoughts ; and when they agree the mod, it is very poffible they may not judge as God judges, tho they pretend to judge by the fame rule, which they call the eternal reafon of things. Thofe whom they ad- mire for great atchievements, they call great; thofe who have done them good, they call good ; and often confound the two. So that the juftice of divine providence is condemned or acquitted Oil the fallible and interefted judgments of men. Such indeed they are. Go back to the early- ages of the world. Confider their heroes and their demi-gods, obfcrve by what goodnefs they acquired the honors of deification. They de- llroyed fometimes robbers or wild beafts. Others of them fov/cd corn, planted the vine, and in- vente4 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 7 vented uleful arts. Did thefe alone conftitute good men according to the law of nature ? By no means. Not even the laft. Of all the cardi- nal virtues, fortitude feems chiefly to have been cultivated by the heroes of antiquity j and, not- witMlanding fome good that they did, their rapes, their duels, their battles, the injuries they offered, and the vengeance they took, made them at once objefts of admiration, and plagues to mankind. When we defcend to later ages, more enlightened by philofophy, and more renowned for v^^ifdom of government, we find the charaders of good and bad men rather more equivocal, and much ho- nor done to great vices, as well as to great vir- tues, according to the modes and prevalent paf- fions of the time, which fan6lified, by the help of prepoffefTion and flattery, fuch aclions as right reafon can never approve. If we judge by this, and by this alone we Ihould judge, what fliall we think of thofe roman and greek worthies, for in- ftance, whofe names and adions have been deli- vered down by their hiftorians fo pompoufly to poflerity ? I might call in queftion the chaftity of SciPio*, and the fidelity of Regulus to his pa- role. I might doubt, on the face of their hiftory, and without any more particular anecdotes, whe- ther Drusus was a lefs fadious citizen than Sa- TURNiNus. I might bring reafons to excufe, per- haps to juftify, the Gracchi. I might prove, by fome letters of Cicero to Atticus, that the fe- * Vid. AuL. Gellium. B 4 cond 8 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, cond Brutus was the vileft of iifurers. But I wave fuch particulars, as we have not, for thef moft part, iufficient means of examining ; and I afk, whether the beft of thefe men, in the beft days of the roman or grecian commonwealths, were not the inflruments of ambition, of avarice, of in- juftice, and cruelty ? They were great men moft certainly i but their goodnefs was often problema- tical in Greece, as well as at Rome. When re- vealed religions arofe, a true one like the chriftian, a falfe one like the mahometan, the fame uncer- tainty remained, and the fame fallacious judgments were made about morality. But there arofe too a new fort of goodnefs at the fame time, for we need attempt to go no further back : and about this men can never be agreed. The Chriftians pafs for ill men among the Mahometans, the Ma- hometans among the Chriftians i the feds of Omar and Ali cenfure each other ; we tax your church with fuperftition and idolatry j fhe taxes ours with herefy and fchifm : and thus contrary judgments are pafied on one another, not only by particular men, but by whole communities. It may be faid that thefe judgments are not pafled as generally, and as raftily, as I pretend j and that the Chriftian, who condemns the mahometan, or the Mahometan, who condemns the chriftian reli- gion, may diftinguifti very truly at the fame time between the good and the bad men of the contrary party. But if it be faid, it will not hold; for the new fort of goodnefs, which has been men- tioned, is that, not only as much, but more thar^ moraj PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. "^ moral goodnefs, by a regard or difregard to which the JLiftice of God, in the difpenfations of provi- dence, is tried in every religion that claims the prerogative of a revealed fyftem, and according to which it is aflumed that men will be rewarded or punifhed hereafter. Such has been, and fuch is, the ftate of this matter. Let us confider next the terms happy and un- happy. They are more vague, and lefs eafy to be afcertained in their application, than the others. Agreeable fenfations, the feries whereof conftitutes happinefs, muft arife from health of body, tran- quillity of mind, and a competency of wealth: An abfolute privation of all thefe we are not to fuppofe. The cafe cannot happen ; or, if it could, an immediate end would be put to the miferable being. But, how fhall we judge for other men of the feveral degrees, in which they enjoy all or any of thefe ? How fhall we make up their feveral accounts of agreeable and difagreeable fenfations, and pronounce their ftate to be, according to the balance, tolerable, or happy, or very happy ? To pretend to it is at leaft as abfurd, as to pretend to meafure the degrees of goodnefs; fince neither of them confifts fo much in outward fhew, as it does in the inward fentiment : and yet, without being able to meafure both, what faucy, what pragmatical prefumption is it to pretend, in any fort, to judge of providential difpenfations, even fuppofing them to be thofe of particular pro- vidences ? >d PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. Lin. X"I7E will enter, if you pleafe, firft into fome ' ^ refleflions on the general tendency of vir- tue and vice to promote happinefs, and after that into a more particular detail. I think then that health of body is pretty equally diftributed to good men and bad, whether Jews, Chriftians, Turks, or Infidels. In this refpe6t too the good are likely td have in themfelves, and in their pofterity, much the advantage. But, befides, if health and vigor of body were to be found more commonly among the wicked, than the good, it might appear to be, like other inftances of profperity, the caufe, it will never appear to be the effect, of vice. Tranquillity of mind is the infeparable com- panion of virtue, that adds relifh and favour to all the comforts, and takes off their bitrer tafle from all the misfortunes of life. It is the health of the mind. Without this, no intelle6lual joy can be tailed, as without the other no corporeal pleafure. The virtuous man looks back with complacency, and feels the truth of that faying of Tully: " A " good confcience is the great theatre of virtue.'* The prefent fatisfies him, and the future gives him no alarm. The fecond Brutus exclaimed, that virtue was an empty name. Stoical virtue was little better; nor his, in particular, any thing more than a mafl^, that hid, under an appearance of apathy, the mof^ violent and the vileil paflionsj like the fanftity PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. it fanftity of feveral antient and modern faints who have impofed on the chriftian world. But true moral virtue is fomething very real. It is the caufc of our happinefs, it maintains the tranquilUty of human life. If happinefs be a feries of agreeable fenfations, the lefs this feries is expofed to inter- ruption, the more happy we are. But it muft be expofed to perpetual interruptions, if that which caufes, and maintains it, be not in our own power. Virtue is fo : and thus virtue may be faid, without any paradox, to be it's own reward *. If it has no reward from without, it rewards itfelf by inward, ^nd therefore independent tranquillity. Good men may have commonly a lefs fliare Iq the advantages of fortune, as they are lefs likely to ufe the means of acquiring them j but then they want them lefs: and tho it be a falfe thought, which Seneca makes the divinity employ, " that *' their happinefs confifts in wanting no happi- " nefs t," yet is it true that their happinefs is enhanced, as well as fecured, by a great independ- ence on every thing external; and the fame Seneca fays, fome where elfe, moll divinely well, that he placed the good things he enjoyed within his reach, and yet at fuch a diftance, that fortune might take, but could not tear, them from him. The good man * Hoc dabitis, ut opinor, fi modo fit aliquid, efle beatum, id oportere totum poni in poteftate fapientis. Nam fi amitti vit* beata poteft, beata efle non poteft. Tull. De fin. L. ii. f Intus omne pofui bonum. Non carere felicitate felicita* yeftra eft. De oroyid, flakes f2 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. flakes his thirfl with a moderate draught of out- ward profperity. The chalice of the wicked man is never fufficient, be it ever fo large : and to all his pafllons, as well as to his avarice, " nefcio quid " curtae femper abeft rei." There is a fragment among Plutarch's Mifcellanies, where Fortune and Vice are introduced like the contradlors, who appear and make their offers, when any public work is to be let out. Fortune boafts that fhe can take from men every outward good, and bring upon them every outward evil. Vice replies that this is true, but that it is not fufficient to make them miferable, unlefs flie gives her affiftance ; whereas Ihe is able to render them fo without the afTiftance of Fortune, and in fpight of all her endeavours to make them happy. Thus heathen philofophers taught mankind ; and there was no need of defending the providence of God againft Zeno, or Aristotle. The for- mer held that there was no real good but virtue. The latter, that health of body, and the external advantages of fortune, might be reckoned among the good things of life, but that they were fuch in a degree very far below thofe that refult from virtue. Happinefs, therefore, fell folely to the fhare of good men according to the Stoicians; or prin- cipally to them, according to the Peripatetics * : * Pugnant ftoici cum peripateticis. Alteri negant quidquam efle bonum nifi quod honeftum fit. Alteri plurimum fe, et longe longeque plurimum tribuere honeftati ; fed tamen et in corpore, ?t extra, efle quaedam bona. Certamen honeftun), et difputatio fplendida. 1 vll, De fin, L. li, and PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. f^ and this was indeed a noble contell. Chriftians are far from having any fuch. If they do not affume that health, and the advantages of fortune, conftitute happinefs folely, they alTume that it is conftituted principally by thefe ; fince on the want which good men have fometimes of thefe they accufe God of injuftice. They pretend to keep an account between God and man, to barter fo much virtue, or fo many a6ls of devotion, againft fo many degrees of honor, of power, of riches-, and to have their piety purchafed by the gratification of their paffions. If God exa6ts the duty, he muft pay the price. If he does not pay it in this life, he muR' pay it in another. Till that time, they give him credit: and if he does not pay it then, he is an unjuft and cruel being. I will crayon out a picflure on this occafion in imitation of thofe Cleanthes ufed to draw when he difputed againft the partifans of volupty. Let all good Chriftians, to denote their goodnefs and the juftice of God, be fat and jolly, like the canons in the Lutrin. Let them be feated on thrones with diadems on their heads, fceptres in their hands, and purple robes on their flioulders. Let the Virtues, like fo many Cupids in Alb ano's piftures, run about the landfchape, bufy in the fer- vice of their mafters. Let Juftice lead the wicked like flaves with retorted arms, and down-caft eyes, to their footftools. Let Temperance ferve pyra- mids of ortolans and brimmers of tockay on their tables. Let Moderation offer, and tliey receive, facks filled with gold and ftlver, and bafkets full of diamonds and rubies. la the midft, and front, of the 14 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS; the piece let the great Lama of the eafl be placed on an higher throne than the reft, if it be fent to fome tartarian temple : his younger brother of the weft, if it be fent to St. Peter's church at Rome : his grace of Canterbury, or my lord of London, if it be fent to St. Paul's; and Luther or Cal- vin-, if it be fent to any other religious aflembly of Chriftians in thefe parts of the world. Having faid thus much to fhew the general tendency of virtue to promote the inward and real happinefs of mankind, in oppofition to divines, and atheifts, who make it confift fo much in out- ward enjoyments, that every diminution of thefe, in the circumftances of every reputed good man, is an inftance brought in proof of the unjuil dif^ penfations of providence ; I proceed to take notice of fome particular inftances that have been fo brought. They will ferve, I think, to (hew that God is wife, and man a fool ; and that of all fools the moft prefumptuous, and, at the fame time, the moft trifling, are metaphyfical philofophers and divines. I NEITHER denynoraffirm particular providences. The fuppofition of fuch has given occafion to much lying, to much flattery, to much uncharitablenefs, to much fuperftition and enthuflafm. When the votive pictures of thofe who had efcaped being drowned were fhewn to Diagoras at Samothracia, he afked where the piiflures were of thofe who had periflied at fea? The atheifl: believed no providence, for PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. i^ for he believed no God. The priefts would not have been over much concerned to convince him of a creneral providence. But they would have pro- duced their legends, as well as their relics, to prove to him the particular providences by which their votaries had been faved. I enter here no furthei* into the difcuflion of this point. But this I fay, that the phyfical and moral fyftems have no need, like the bungling works and imperfe(5l inftitutions of men, to be carried on by frequent interpofitions and partial diredtions, that they may continue to anfwer the intent ot the maker. The ordinary courfe of things, preferved and condudled by a general providence, confirms what the law of reafon and of nature teaches us. The law is not only o-iven, but executed. The authority of the law- giver makes it our duty, the fandions make it our intereft to obey the law, and thefe fandions have their efFe6t fo often, that they leave no doubt con- cerning them. They have their eltedl as often as it is neceffary in terrorem. In imitation of provi- dential government, human government goes no further: and yet there are a parcel of little tyrants who find fault with the former for going no further. God punilhes to reform as far, as our nature and his fcheme permit. They are angry that he is not as angry, as they are, that every criminal is not racked on the wheel, and that he does not punifh to exterminate. Tct us defcend to particular in- ftances that are urged againft the iuftice of God, in order to prove it, and to confirm what has been faid concerning good, and bad, happy, and un- happy, men. i6 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. LIV. ' I "" U L L Y lies ftill open before me, and there •*' I find many inftances of this fort produced by CoTTA with as much confidence, as if they were decifive. Why did the two Scipios fall in Spain, and Marcellus and Paul us in Italy, making war againfl the Carthaginians ? Why did Maximus bury his fon who was of confular dignity ? Why was the emilian SciPio not fafe in his own houfe ? Why was Rutilius banifhed, Drusus affafli- nated, Scaevola (lain at the altar of Vesta, and Catulus obliged to procure his own death ? Why did Marius die in his bed, after a feventh confulfhip? Why were he, and Cinna, Diony- sius the elder, Pisistratus, Phalaris, Apol- LODORus, and even the afiaffin Varius, and the highwayman Harpalus, fufFered fo long to ex- ercife, with impunity, their cruelties ? The day would be too fhort, indeed, to enumerate inftances of any kind in this declamatory, loofe, and in- conclufive manner *. It is not unlike the proceed- ing of certain great fcholars, who crowd their text and their margin with a multitude of names, which ftand as vouchers of the fafls or opinions they advance, and impofe often on the unwary who will not, and the ignorant who cannot, examine for thcmfelves •, whilft they, who will and can ex- amine, difcover thefe pretended vouchers to be * Dies deficjat fi velim numerare quibus bonis ma^e evenerit; nee minus, fi commemorem quibus improbis optime. fometimes PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 17 fometimes of no authority, fometimes of neither, and fometimes of the contrary fide. I could point out fignal examples of this fort in the writings of ad- mired authors: and we might have feen fome fuch perhaps on this occafion, if Cicero had made Balbus reply to Cotta, as he makes him lay in a claim to do with no fmall confidence. I REGRET the want of this reply much more on account of fadls, than arguments -, for the Stoics were great logicians^ and pitiful reafoners. Their whole philofophy was little more than a perpetual play with words : and, on this occafion for inftancc^ to have replied in characfler, Balbus muft have infifted that pain is not an evil, as Posidonius did, when he roared out in a fit of the gout *. He might have owned it to be fomething rough, ab- horrent to nature, difficult to be borne, melancholy, and hard. He might have applied the definition of evil to the fenfation of pain, but muft not have have called it by that name, becaufe the Portic had decreed that there is no evil but in vice, nor any good but in virtue. No matter. He would have fet very probably the fadts, which Cotta quoted, in a different light, and would have fhewn by a fuller and more accurate ftate of them, that they * Concludunt ratiunculis ftoici cur non fit malum ; quafi de verbo, non de re laboretur. Al'perum eft, contra na- turam, difficile perpefTu, trifle, duruni. Haec copia verboruni eft ; quod omnes uno verbo malum appellamus, id tot modis pofle difcere. Definis tu mihi, non to. lis dolorem. Tafc. Difp. L. ii. Vol. V. C were i8 PHILO'SOPHICAL WORKS. Were infuflicient to his purpoie. It is very pro- bable he would have done this, fince we have good reafon, even at this time, to doubt the exadt truth of fome of thefe anecdotes, and to fufpefl both prejudice and partiality in the charafters. I KNOW not whether B albus would have called in queftion the flory of Reculus. It was pro- bably fabulous in many circumftances at leaft, and there were thofe among the Romans who thought it to be fo*. But it ferved to blacken the Cartha- ginians, to whom they bore an immortal hatred, and popular prejudice kept it in credit at Rome: as we fee that many falfe traditions about the Sa- racens and the Turks have been kept up for feveral ages, and are fo ftill, notwithftanding the detec- tion of them, in chriflian nations. Their poets, and their orators, fandified the tale for the honor of the roman name, as the moil illuftrious in- ftance of magnanimity, fortitude, and a religious attachment to engagenients taken even with an enemy, that was ever given. Balbus then might have rejected the ftory •, or, taking it for true, he might have infilled that it furniflied an example of human virtue, but none of divine injuftice. He might have made Reculus a voluntary .mar- tyr, as Seneca makes the philofopher Diogenes a confefTor, of natural religion. One of thefe Stoicians might have anticipated the anfwers which the other of them gave to fuch * Vid. AuL. Gellium. examples PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 19 examples as that of Rutilius, who was banilhed^ or that of Maximus, who loft a fon arrived to confular honors. He would have faid of fuch men as thefe, that they were unfortunate, but not unhappy -, that they were moved, but not over- come *. He might have pufhed his argument againft Cotta further, on the principles of the Portic. He might have maintained that the mis- fortunes of fome good men are defigned as lefTons to all by providence, in whofe difpenfations more regard is had to mankind, than to particular men f. In general, we place happinefs and unhap- pinefs very blindly, and very falfely. Providence endeavours to open our eyes, when things, that we efteem evils, happen to the good. But we per- vert the argument. Inftead of concluding that fuch things are not real evils, we harken to the prejudices of imagination ; we believe, and, by believing, we make them fuch, and then we ac- cufe this very providence of injuftice. Even the privation of an imaginary good is efteemed a pofitive evil, the want of riches for inftance. The man of Rofs was envied by none. Chartres and Walters, whom you have rendered immortal, were envied by many. This folly prevails fo far, that men have imagined the Supreme Being beft pleafed when his temples have glittered with gold and filver. If you was of this opinion, as moft of * Sentit ilia, fed vincit. Sen. De provid. •f Pro univerfis, quorum major diis cura eft, quam fingulorum. lb. C 2 your 20 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. your communion are, and thought God more honored on this account at St. Peter's, than at St. Paul's, I would quote to you thefe verfes: Jupiter Ammon Pauper adhuc deus eft, nullis violata per aevum Divitiis delubra tenens, morumque priorum Numen Romano templum defendit ab auro *. The iexamples of thofe good citizens of Rome, who came to untimely ends, would not have em- barrafled our Stoician. He would have afked his antagonift, what pretence could be found to ac- cufe providence of injuftice becaufe men who waged war were fometimes killed, or becaufe men who mingled in civil contefts were expofed to the mutual refentments of exafperated parties ? He would have afked, who could determine when it was beft for him to die ? Prolongation of days delivers men over, very often, to mifery they would have efcaped if they had died fooner, and changes the whole color of their lives: fo that the good or evil, that remains in ftore for us at any age, being uncertain, we can neither pronounce a man unhappy becaufe he dies, nor happy be- fore he dies. Solon -f taught this apophthegm to Croesus, who lived to fee it verified in his own cafe, and to reverence that wifdom when he was the captive of Cyrus, to which he had paid little regard while he fat on the throne of Lydia, * Lact. L. ix. f Dicique beatum Ante obitimi nemo fupremaque funera debet. Rome, PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 21 Rome, who made all the nations from the Eu- phrates to the weftern ocean tremble, trembled herfeif when Pompey fell fick at Naples. Pom- PEY recovered. " Multae urbes et publica vota •* vicerunt." But he recovered only to wage the civil war with his father-in-law, to take arms without being prepared to take them, to abandon Italy, to be beaten in Greece, and to be murdered by fervile hands in Egypt -f . Such a fubjedl as Pompey, of fuch a common-wealth as the roman, may be paired with the greateft princes. Let me mention, therefore, the late king of France, on this occafion, and to the fame purpofe. He had palled more than forty years in the greateft prof- perity when Charles the fecond of Spain died,' Had he died at the fame time, when that rich fuccellion came into his family, his death would have been thought the more deplorable on this very account. He lived ; he outlived his glory, his power, and, if I may fay fo, almoft his pof-^ terity. It might have been faid of him : renovata Semper clade domus, multis in luftibus, Inque Perpetuo moerore, et nigra vefte fenefcit. Balbus would have fhewn that the examples brought of profperous iniquity were neither more juft, nor more applicable, than thofe of the mi- fery of good men. If he had allowed that Ma- Rius had the happinefs, fuch an one as it is, of f Non enim cum focero bellum gefliffet, non ira- paratus arma fumpfiflet, etc. Tufc. Difp. L. ii. C 3 dying 22 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. dying in his bed like his rival Sylla, who took the appellation of happy very oftentatioufly and very unjuftly ; yet he would not have allowed this other man of blood the fame appellation. Not- withftanding his elevation from the plough, which he followed for hire, to the higheft dignities of the commonwealth *, notwithftanding his vic- tories and triumphs, it would be difficult to find, in the roman or any other hiftory, a man whofc crimes were more conftantly puniflied, or whofe life was a feries of more mifery. Befides his bo- dily infirmities, befides the Exilium, et career, Minturnarumque paludes, Et mendicatus vi6ta Carthagine panis, he was tofTed in all the ftorms he raifed. His blood was every moment ready to flow, and the vidlorious fword of Sylx-a hung over his head. The various fcenes of mifery, through which he made others go, were revenged by thofe through which he went himfelf. There is a lively de- fcriptiori of both in the fecond book of the Phar- falia -f- : and if we read his life, we fhall incline to think that profperity was meafured out to him for the punifhment of others, and mifery, in proportion, for his own, the executioner and the vidim, alternately, of divine jufticc, * Solebat Pofcere mercedes alieno laiTus aratro. Juv. - -f- - - - - - - Omnia pafTo, Quae pejor fortuna poteft, atque omnibus ufo (^ae m;'lior. Non PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 23 Non ille favore Numinis ingenti fuperum proteftus ab ira, Vir ferus, et Romam cupienti perdere fato Sufficiens, If he Jived to a greater age than his brother and his fon, it was in order to make him more mifer- able, as he had been more criminal, than they. But even they refembled iiim in mifery, as they had refembled him in cruelty. His brother was put to a painful death at the tomb of Catulus, and his fon fell on his fword in defpair. Let me make another obfervation. Marius laid the founda- tions of his fortune on his ingratitude and treach- ery to Metellus, whofe lieutenant general he had been in the jugurthine war. Sylla had been quaeftor to Marius in the fame war. Sylla ruined his party, defeated his defigns, and fcat- tered his afhes in the river *. Surely Cotta, when he accufed the juftice of God tor giving profperity to wicked men, could not have pro- duced a more glaring proof of the contrary. He was not more lucky In other examples of the fame fort. Our Stoician would have oppofcd to him, for inftance, the different accounts of authors concerning the elder Dionysius ; fome of whom related how this tyrant had been tormented by the Furies, and had perifhed by the treachery of his -}• Erutos cineres in Anienis alveum fparfit. Val. Max. 1, ix. c. 2. C 4 own 5?4 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. own family, "whilft all of them concurred in rc- prefenting his whole life to have been a {late of mifery. What, indeed, could be more mifer- able than the perpetual terror and univerfal dif- truft, wherein he pafTed his days ? Plutarch relates, and Balbus might know long before Plutarch wrote, that this wretched man dared not trufl: any barber to fhave him j that no one, not his brother, not his fon, was fufifered to come into his apartment till he had been flripped and fearched, and had changed his cloaths ; and that the tyrant owned himfelf afraid even of the befl of his friends: fo that if he reigned eight and thirty years, as Cotta fays, he was eight and thirty years miferable. A noble inftance truly of the profperity of the wicked ! Our Stoician would have (hewn, perhaps, that the example of Pisistratus was not pertinent. He ufed violence to gain, and, more than once, to regain, the fupreme power at Athens, as Gelo and HiERO did in Sicily, as others ufed it againft him, and as it muft always happen when parties contend for power. But when he had got this power, he ufed it well, like thofe ficilian princes : and tho he was called a tyrant, in the bad fenfe of the word, by the party oppofed to him, yet he ihewed the licentious Greeks how much a limited monarchy, for he limited his by the laws and ad- vice of Solon, was preferable to one of their tur- bulent and tyrannical democracies. Phalaris >vas a monfler in cruelty i but the people of Agri- gentum PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 25 gcntum roafted him in his own bull, after he had roafted the maker of it ; and the Orchomenians took a fevere vengeance on Apollodorus. The fame would have been obfervcd to have happened to other tyrants among the Greeks, to Cinna among the Romans, and to other inferior villains, fuch as Varius, who ftabbed Drusus and poi- foned Mf.tellus ; fuch as Harpalus, whofe long fuccefs in robbery bore teftimony againft the gods; as Diogenes the cynic, who barked againft them, and whom Cotta condefcends to quote, prefumed to fay. But the pontiff would not have been filenced by thefe anfwers. He had a reply ready. " Pro- " hiberi melius fuit impediriquc." It had been better in the gods to hinder thefe men from doing fo much mifchief, than to leave them to ven- geance afterwards. Now I think that Balbus would have treated this reply as a mere evafion, grounded on a falfe fuppofition, and, even with that help, infufficient. The men fpoken of, would he have faid, are far from enjoying inward happi- nefs, whatever outward profperity may attend the courfe of their wicked lives. They live in danger, in fear, and in perpetual anguifh of mind. Their punifhment, therefore, is not deferred : and if they are fuffered long to punifh others, they are minifters and proofs at the fame time of that di- vine juftice which I defend. Their profperity ferves to this very purpofe. A Dionysius, or a Cinna, or any other inhuman tyrant, is to be looked 26 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, looked upon like one of thofe monfters which the poets feigned. Like a minotaur fed with human flefh, or fuch a boar as executed Diana's ven- geance in Aetolia. Bolts of deftroying thunder go out of their mouths *. Their very breath fcatters defolation around. When the monfter has inflided the punifliment he was fent to inflifb, when the meafure of his iniquity, and of God's juftice, is filled, a Theseus or a Meleager is raifed up, and he perilhes. This is the general courfe of things, which in- finite wifdom has conftituted •, and the examples bf the few, who fuffer neceflarily, tho occalion- ally, according to it, are fufficient to give a warn- ing to all men, that they are inexcufable if they do not take. Cotta, who exercifes greater in- juftice towards God, than any of the tyrants he quotes did towards men, is much fcandalized that jthofe two eyes of the mediterranean coaft, Co- rinth and Carthage, were put out. Critolaus violated the refpedl: that was due to the roman le- jgates. AsDRUBAL ufed much cruelty to the ro- man captives. Thefe were the immediate caufes pf the ruin of thofe two republics, and Memmjus and Scipio were the inftruments of pride, of am- bition, and of infatiable refentment. God could have prevented thefe deftrudions no doubt; " Sub- '* venire certe potuit, et confervare urbes tantas * Ukorem fpreta per agros Mifit aprum. Fulmen 4b or? venit, frondes afflatibus ardent. Ovip. Metam. 1. viii. *' atque PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 27 *' atque tales.'* But how did the pontiff know that Memmius and Scipio were not inftruments of the juftice of providence, as well as of roman policy and paffion .'' The worft men, and the Romans were none of the beft, are employed to punifh the worft. None fo fit for the talk. They are the inftruments, and in their turns the ex- amples, of divine juftice. The weilth, the fplen- dor, the magnificence of Corinth were great; but Corinth was a fink of iniquity. Carthage was a great and powerful ftate ; but the Cartha- ginians were a faithlefs, faftious, and cruel people. Might not thefe be the remote and true caufes, whatever the immediate and apparent were, of their deftruftion ? Was God obliged to fave them by an extraordinary interpofition againft the ordinary courfe of his providence, becaufe their neighbours admired or feared them ? The Romans had no advantage in real virtue over the Carthaginians, tho they had it greatly in policy, order, difcipline, and a certain enthufia- ftic zeal for the grandeur of their empire', and the glory of the roman name. If we had Philtstus, or any of the Carthaginian hiftorians in our hands, we fhould fee very evidently, what we may collect from thofe of Rome, that romana fides was, or deferved to be, a proverbial term of reproach in Afric, as much as punica fides in Italy. Let us take then occafion to adore the wifdom and juftice of divine providence from an example brought in oppofition to the latter. The Romans deftroyed Carthage, and by her deftru6tion prepared the way 28 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, way to their own. At the very time when Cotta lamented that of Corinth and Carthage, that of Rome was coming on ; for the lofs of her liberty was connefted with that of her empire by a fcarcc interrupted fucceffion of tyrants. Under thefe fhe lay, as it were, on the rack, and died a lingering and painful death. LV. TN aflertlng the juftice of providence, I chufc •■' rather to infill on the conftant, vifibie, and un- deniable courfe of a general providence, which is fufficient for the purpofe, than to aflume a dif- penfation of particular providences. The atheift, who affumes that there ought to be fuch, complains that tl-key are wanting. The theift, who admits that there are fuch, complains that they are infuffi- cient. The former draws from what he alTumes, z pretence to cavil. The latter only grows incon- jlftent ; for I would afk him, if there are any fuch providences, why not more ? He admits enough to break through and overturn the natural order and conftitution of the phyfical and moral fyftem. How comes it to pafs that there are not enough to ftop his mouth when he complains of the mi- fery of man, and the injuftice of providence ? The truth is, that we have not in philofophical fpeculation, in any hiftory except that of the bible, nor in our own experience, fufficient grounds to eftablifh the dodlrine of particular pro- vidences, and to reconcile it to that of a general providence, which continues, and directs the courfe of things in the material and intelledual fyftems PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 29 fyftems as thefe fyftems were originally confti- tuted by the author of nature. They who have at- tempted to do this by fhewing with great, and, as I think, with too much fubtilty of wit and li- cence of imagination, in what cafes, how far, and in what manner, God may aft by particular and occafional interpofitions, confidently with the pre- fervation of that general order of caufes and ef- fects which he has conftituted, feem to me quite unintelligible. It is impoffible to conceive that the courfe of the fun, or the double revolution of the earth, Ihould be fufpended or altered by a temporary, nay, a momentary interpofition of fome particular providence, or that any thing worthy of fuch an interpofition fhould happen in the material world, without violating the mecha- nical conftitution of it, and the natural order of caufes and effeds in it. As little is it pofiible to conceive fuch occafional interpofitions in the in- telledtual fyftem, as fhall give new thoughts and new difpofitions to the minds of men, and in con^ fequence new determinations to their wills, with- out altering in every fuch inllance the ordinary and natural progrefllon of human underllanding, nor without refuming that freedom of will, which every man is confcious that he has, tho fome are abfurd enough to deny it, and to oppofe meta- phyfical dreams to intuitive knowledge. I con- fefs that I comprehend as little the metaphyfical, as the phyfical, impulfe of fpirits * ; and that tha • Relig. of nat. delineated, et alibi. words, 30 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. words, fuggeftion, filent communication, fudden influence, influx, or inje6lion of ideas, give me no determinate, clear, and difl:in6l ideas, nor even, as I fufpedt, to the perfons who talk of them the moft, and build fo much upon them. To acknowledge the fatum of antient philofo- phers, to hold with the Mahometans an abfolute predeftination of all events, with Spinoza and Calvin the neceffity of all our actions, or with Leibnitz his whimfy of a pre-eftablifhed har- mony, would be fomewhat almoft as mad, as to take the True hiflory of Lucian for fuch. On the other hand, it would be abfurd, and impious both, to aflert with Epicurus that the world was made by a fortuitous concourfe of atoms, and that, as it was made fo, it is governed by chance, without any knowledge, without any rule, with- out any providence. The truth lies between thefe extremes. The world is governed by laws, which the Creatx)r impofed on the phyfical and moral fyftems when he willed them into exiftence, which make a part of them, vv^hich mull be in force as long as they laft, and any change in which would be a change of the fyftems themfelves. Thefe laws are invariable, but they are general -, and from this generality what we call contingency ariles. The laws of matter and motion, thofe "which we know, and thofe which have not been yet difcovered, are fixed, no doubt. But, within the latitude which they allow tho nothing hap- pens which is repugnant to them, many things happen PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 31 happen which feem fo to us. Plaftic or falhion- ing nature produces fometimes monfters •, and all material beings, as they partake of the good, par- take of the evil, which matter and motion caufe; for it would be trifling to obje6l the allumed ex- iftence of beings, material indeed, like the faints in heaven, if thofe glorified bodies are material according to our idea of matter, but exiiling in fyftems that are not liable to the fame inconve- niencies or evils that arife from matter and mo- tion, fuch as pain, ficknefs, or death, forinftance, which our fyftem is. There is no need of any great fagacity to perceive that the cafe is much the fame in the moral world j nay, that it is more liable to contingency than the natural. The mo- ral world is fubjedl to the law of right reafon, fixed, invariable, promulgated in the very na- ture of things, and enforced by the fandions of rewards and punifhments, which follow often the iobfervation or the breach of it. But then, inflead of two principles, whereof one is adtive, and the other pafiive only, as in the other cafe, there are in this two adtive principles, tho one be flower than the other, reafon and paflion. Both necef- fary in the human ftate ; both ufeful when reafon, both hurtful when paffion governs. Between both ftands the freedom of our will, which can deter- mine either way : and from this conllitution arifes all that mixture of moral good and evil that we fee and feel. As little as the atheift and the divine approve the natural 32 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS; natural and moral conftitution of the world, they are unable to fhew how it might be altered in any particular inftance, except for the worfe upon the whole -, and, therefore, they muft be reduced at laft to aflert that goodnefs and juftice require the whole Ihould be altered, as they required ori- ginally that there fhould have been no fuch fyftem made. In thefirft light, theydeferve to be treated like froward children, who complain, and wifh^ and know neither what they want, nor what they defire. In the fecond, they deferve to be treated like patients, proper for do6tor Monro, and to be put under his care. Nothing lefs than meta- phyfics could have turned fo many good heads. Common fenfe and common obfervation would have hindered them from afluming, on the faith of this fantaftical fcience, that God made the world for the fake of man ; and man for this reafon alone, that he might communicate happi- nefs to his creature : which two fuppofitions are affirmed or implied in all their arguments, and thus a large field of complaint is opened to them. Without thefe they would have had no pretence to criticife the works of God, or the difpenfa- tions of his providence, to upbraid his goodnefs, or to cenfure his juftice. On the contrary, they would have found reafon to admire, thankfully and fubmiffively, that fupreme wifdom, which has provided fo amply, by a few general laws, for the well-being of all his creatures. But it is with this very inftance of fupreme wifdom that they find fault. General laws, under the diredion of a ge- neral PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 33 neral providence, do not provide fufficiently for human happinefs, according to them ; and their notions of human importance are wound up fo high, that they think there ought to be as many providences as men ; on which notion guardian- angels, and genii, and demons were ^^introduced, and are hardly yet exploded : or elfe that the im- mediate providence of God fhould be attentive to all the wants and prayers of men, tho the wants are often imaginary, and the prayers impertinent ; and fhould be ready on every occafion to prote6t and reward the good, to punilh and reclaim the wicked. Every religion boafts of many inftances, wherein the divine providence has been thus exer- cifed. We need go no further than our own ec- clefiaftical hiftorians, and other chriflian writers, to find them. The moft common events are re- prefented by exaggeration and declamation to have been extraordinary interpofitions of the hand of God. Nay, at this time, there is many an old woman who thinks herfelf as important as your and Gay's parifh clerk -, and is ready to relate, with much fpiritual pride, the particular provi- dences that have attended her and hers. Thus then the matter Hands. The fame perfons who have contributed to eflablilh this belief, have pro- pagated, and continue to propagate an opinion, that the Supreme Being deals unjuflly with man- kind in this life, becaufe the interpofitions of his providence are not as frequent as they judge that they ought to be. I fay as frequent j for v/here VoL.V. D they 34 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, they afllime that he does interpofe, they dare not fay he interpofes unjuftly. Clarke complains *, that there are not in many ages plain evidences enough of the interpofition of divine providence, to convince men of the wifdom any more, than of the juflice and goodnefs, of God. They reafon like CoTTA "h, they are difpleafed at the few par- ticular inftances of this care ; few, as they con- ceive, with refpe<5l to all the proper objeds of it : and fince he takes it in fo few inftances, his jufticc is no more acquitted at their tribunal, than if he took it in none. This belief and this opinion do not hang very well together in reafon, but they may do lb in religious policy. To keep up a be« lief of particular providences, ferves to keep up a belief, not only of the efficacy of prayer, and of the intercefllon of faints in heaven, as well as of the church on earth, but of the feveral rites of external devotion : and to keep up a belief that they are few, and that the providence of God, as it is exercifed in this world, is therefore on the whole unjuft, ferves to keep up a belief of another world, wherein all, that is amifs here, fliall be fet right. The miniftry of a clergy is thought ne- ceflary on both thefe accounts by all : and there are few, who fee how difficult it is to make the two dodlrines, which thefe reverend pcrfons maintain, appear in any tolerable manner confillent. On the whole, tho there is little credit to be given to all * Evid. p. 142. •f - - - - Non placet autem paucis a diis immortalibus efle COnfultum ; fetjuitur ergo ut nemini confuUum fit. that PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 35- that lying legends, lufpicious traditions, and idle rumors have reported concerning particular ad:s of providence, wrought on particular occa- fions, and diredled manifeftly by an immediate exercife of the divine power to the advantage of fome, and to the detriment of others ; yet will I not prefLime to deny, that there have been any fuch. This I will fay only that if any fuch have been, they muft have been fuch, as might happen fometimes in the ordinary courfe of a general providence. They could not be fuch as muft have violated the laws of nature in their produc- tion. Nothing can be lefs reconcileable to the notion of an all-perfed Being, than the imagina- tion that he undoes by his power in particular cafes what his wifdom, to whom nothing is fu- ture, once thought fufficient to be eflablifhed for all cafes. The effedts, therefore, that are afilimed of particular providences are either falfe, or they are undiftinguifhable from thofe of a general pro- vidence, and become particular by nothing more than the application which vain fuperftition or pious fraud makes of them. It is as eafy to at- tack, and it is as eafy to defend the juftice of God on one hypothefis, as on the other. But fince one is fupported by equivocal and doubtful, and the other by unqueftionable fails, I fhall borrow no help from the former, I fiiall fuppofe them not to have been, and fhall reft the caufe of God on the latter, which are likewife the moft proper to be urged againft the atheifts. P 2 LVI. 36 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. LVL T E T us confider how it appears, by the ob- '*-^ jections thefe difficult perfons make, that wc, and the fyftem we inhabit, Ihould have been framed to fatisfy them, and to anticipate their cavils-, after which it will be proper to confider further, how it is framed, and to compare God's plan with theirs. Phyfical nature then fhould have been fo conftituted, that the whole world might have been one paradife, neither fcorched by the fun, nor pinched by the cold, nor ruffled by tem- pefts. Men fhould have enjoyed in it every natural good, and have been fubjed: to no natural evil, no not to death, which they deem to be the greateft of evils. Moral nature (hould have been fo con- ftituted, that every man might be necelTarily de- termined to all the obligations of morality, that he might be good, asPATERCuLus fays of Cato*, becaufe he could not be otherwife. He Ihould have been impeccable, as well as invulnerable. No matter how all this would have unconnefted the univerfe, and have broke the harmony, and the confent of it's parts, in which we fee that the planets of our folar fyftem adt on one another, that the fun adls on all of them, and that, for ought we can tell, the feveral folar fyftems that compofe the univerfe a6t on one another likewife. No matter how all this would have accorded with Quia aliter efTe non potuit. a gradation PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 37 a gradation of fenfe and intellect ; how fenfes lefs imperfeft would have broke that proportion be- tween them and their objedls which is neceflary to make them ufeful in human life ; how fuperior faculties of the mind would have broke that fcale of intelligence which rifes up to man in this animal fyftem ; which may rife up from him, in other fy- ftems, in an higher proportion, and which one of thefe allies, the divine, allows to do fo in other created beings. No matter for fuch confiderations as thefe. Inftead of concluding from the want of all thefe advantages, which they efteem to be due to them, that man is not fo noble a creature as they have reprefented him to themfelves, they conclude that becaufe he wants them God is unjuft, Juft fo they concluded from their indeterminable notions of divine goodnefs, and of divine love, that the world was made for man, and man not to be moderately but immoderately happy in it ; inftead of concluding the very contrary from their determinate idea of wifdom, which has not pro- portioned any means to thefe ends, in making the world and man. But the dogmatical perfons who aflume fo much, and prove commonly fo little, do not only proceed on groundlefs principles -, they fhift and vary their principles of reafoning as different oc- cafions require : which is a pradlice much ufed, avowed, and approved by antient fathers, and which makes it rather tedious, than hard, very often to refute their fucceffors. In the prefent ar- D 3 gument -38 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. gument for inilance, many of their complaints and objeflions are levelled at the whole fcheme and order of things both phyfical and moral. They mean nothing, or they mean that the whole fhould have been differently conftituted, and in the manner I have hinted, to have been reconcile- able to the goodnefs and juftice of God. But they grow lefs fevere in their criticifms, and lefs ex- orbitant in their demands at other times, and feem to think that the divine attributes might have been faved even in the prefent conftitution of phyfical and moral nature, if by continual in- terpofitions of providence every good man had been protected from evils of both kinds, whilft every ill man was expofed to them all ; if the office of the angels (landing before the throne of God*, and miniitring to the favorites of God, that is, to the eled, had been more extended and more regularly performed. This may be looked upon as a fort of compofition into which they are driven by the extravagance of the other hypothefis, and by the abfurd confequences that flow from it. If the divine attributes had required that there fhould have been no fuch thing as phyfical or moral evil, man would have been vifibly the final caufe ot a world made folely for his ufe, and to be the fcene of his happinefs. This world would have been vifibly the final caufe of the univerie. All the planets would have rolled in fubferviency to ours, and the fixed flats themfelves would have ? Vid. Dan. c. vii. ferved PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 3^ ferved to no other purpofe than to twinkle by night, to adorn our canopy, and to pleafe our eyes. But this hypothelis appearing too extrava- gant to be infilled upon in it's whole extent, one part of it has been laid afide, and one retained. No one will affirm in terms, I think, at this time, that our world is the final caufe of the univerfe. Put many will affirm that man is by the goodnefs of God the final caufe of the world he inhabits ; and, therefore, if phyfical evil is infeparable from phyfical nature, and moral evil from moral nature, by the neceflary relations of things, or by the general fcheme which infinite wifdom has elta- blifhed, the confiflency of the divine attributes required that fomething more, than we obferve, fhould have been done to make the firft defign of God in the creation of this world and of man effeftual. His goodnefs required at lead that the general flate of mankind fhould not be as mife- rable, as it is, in a world made for the fake of mankind. His juflice required moll certainly, that they who feek the perfeflion of their nature, and the happinefs of their kind in virtue, fhould be diftinguifhed from thofe who deprave their own nature, pervert the order of things, and hinder virtue from having it's due effefl. What could not be effefled by a general providence, afting by general laws, might have been effedled by particular providences ailing on every occafion according to the merit or demerit of every rational creature. But this has not been done, and fuch providences are fo rare, that there is far lefs virtue D 4 th^u 46 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. than vice to be found, and that the former is, for the moft part, unhappy, and the latter profperous in this world. The j Lidice of God is, therefore, juftly condemned, unlefs there is another. Let us make a few refieftions, that will fhew how ill this charge is laid, and how ill, if it was better laid, the expedient of another life would ferve to fet right the pretended irregularities of this world, and to juftify the providence of God. LVII. 'np O fuppofe a conftant feries of particular in- -■" terpofitions from above necelTary to this purpofe, feems to my apprehenfion little lefs ab- furd, than to fuppofe the necefTity of a perpetual and univerfal theocracy : and to complain that fuch a government of the world has not been eftablifhed, is as filly, as it would be to complain that the golden age of the poets is ended, or that the millenary year of the Apocalypfe is not begun. If all men had been determined neceflarily to virtue, there would have been certainly no moral evil, nor probably any more phyfical, than there was in paradife, or than there will be in the new Jerufalem. But there would have been no merit neither, nor, properly fpeaking, any fuch thing as virtue. Our moral obligations arife from that nature, which God willed we fhould have. They muft continue as long as this nature exifts, that is, as long as there are men ; and fo long what- ever proniotes the happinefs of the kind will be virtue PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 41 virtue at leaft in one fenfe, and whatever tends to the deftrudion of it will be vice in every fenfe. Vice and virtue mull take their denominations not only from their effefls, but from their motives. A6lions of the firft fort muft have always a bad motive as well as a bad effedl:, and muft therefore be always attended with demerit. But adions of the fecond or mere innocence may have no moral motive at all, nor confequently any true merit, as in the cafe of an abfolute and natural deter- mination ; or they may have motives, which ren- der them rather appearances of virtue than really virtuous, and deprive them in a ftrid fenfe of all merit, as in the cafe of particular and occafionai determinations of the will wrought by immediate interpofitions of the divine power, whether adting filently within, or fenfibly without. Our incon- fiftent academician confeffes thus much in the very breath, in which he affirms that mankind fhould have been determined, fome way or other, by the gods to virtue. Nay, he afTerts even more than is true J for tho we owe the pra6tice of virtue to ourfelves, to our own eledlions, and to our own free-will, in which all the merit we can have con- fifts, yet we owe to God the means of knowing, and of pradlifing it *. * Virtutem nemo unquam acceptam deo retulit. Nimirum refte. Propter virtutem enim jure laudamur, et in virtute rede gloriamur. quod non contingeret, fi id donum a deo, non a nobis haberemus. .... Debebant illi quidem omncs bonos efficere fiquidem hominum generi confulebant. Sin id minus, bonis quidein f^rje confalere debebant. 42 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. . If all men had been originally and neceflarily determined, by the conftitution of their nature, to virtue, according to Cotta's firil propofition, and had, therefore, been able to acquire no more merit in doing virtuous adions, than they acquire in drinking when they are thirfty, or in gratifying any natural appetite, what a curious fyftem might fome philofopher of the fchool of Potamo have made by joining the gods of Epicurus to the men of Cotta ? Slim, taper, tranfparent beings in heaven, indolent and unadlivei* : a fucceflion of machines on earth, wound up to go a certain time, to continue certain motions, and to ftrike at certain moments, according to their predellina- tion, or the pre-eftablilhed harmony of their fy- ftem. But, in good earnefl, is a fyflem of particular providences, in which the Supreme Being, or the angels, like his minifters to reward, and his ex- ecutioners to puniili, are conflantly employed in the affairs of mankind, much more reafonable ? Would the juftice of God be more manifefl: in fuch a ftate of things, than in the prefent ? I fee no room for merit on the part of man, nor for juftice f>n the part of God, in fuch a ftate : and a ftate of partial, not univerfal, determinations to goodnefs, inftcad of being liable to fuch cavils as we have now under confideration, would be liable to un- anfwerable objeftions. It would be produflive of effects, quite oppofite to thofe that are afllimed, •f- Exiles .... perlucislos . . . ._niQno£rammosdeos,et nihil Jig^ntes. and PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 43^ and would caufe the wildeft confufion in the judgments of mankind. If fome men were determined to goodnefs by the filent workings of the Spirit, and others not, which they muft be on the fuppofition of particular providences, and a partial not univerfal determina- tion i if the former were protected from evils of every kind, on account of this goodnefs, and if the latter were expofed, for want of it, to all thofe phy- fical evils which refult from the conftitution of the material world, as well as to all thofe moral evils which fuch men would bring on one another, what could be faid to excufe the juftice of God ? Plainly nothing. The proceeding would be that of inju^ ftice, and an arbitrary partiality, which can never be imputed, even indiredly, to him without bla- fphemy. It is not poflible for me to conceive that any thing out of himfeif could be a motive to the firft intelligent caufe of all things to create any thing, neither can I fubfcribe to the opinion, that certain general independent natures tempted God, as it were, to cloath them with exiftence. I can conceive ftiil lefs, that individual creatures, before they have done either good or evil, nay, before their aftual exiflence, can be objeds of pre- <3ile<5lion or averfion, of love or hatred, to God : and yet this muft have been, to have made fuch a fyftem of particular providences efFedual in the firft inftance of it. If we can conceive it made fo in this, we may conceive it made fo in all the reft : ^nd if God had pre- determined fome men to goodr ^efs 44 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. nefs exclufively of others, without any motive on his fide, we may eafily conceive that particular pro- vidences would have been employed to fecure hap- pinefs to them, without any merit on theirs. But " credat Judaeus Apella, Non ego." Clarke Ihall not force me into atheifm, tho I deny what he afferts concerning the moral attributes of God; nor WoLLASTON, tho I fee, not only one, but many good men unhappy, and am not convinced by his reafonings of a future ftate. I MAY be flopped here, perhaps, and may be afked with a tone of authority, " Nay, but, O *' man, who art thou that replieft againft God ?'* Ifl am fo flopped, and fo queilioned, my anfwer is both ready and fufficient. " Holy, or reverend ** fir, I am a better theifl than you, and on this *' occafion I reafon better. It is not I that reply *' againft God. It is you. Had fuch a fyflem, as ** this, been aftually eftablifhed by God, he would *' have fpoke by his works, and I fhould, for this « very reafon, have believed it agreeable to the di- ** vine attributes, tho I could not have reconciled *' it to my notions of impartiality, and juflice, nor ** even of wifdom. But fince I cannot reconcile it *' to them, and fince I have no aifu ranee but your *' word, againft all appearances, that God ele<5ls *' fome men, and rejects or negledls others, that *' he fofteneth the hearts of fome, and hardeneth " the hearts of others, I fhould reply againft God, *' indeed, if I admitted what you afTert to be true. ♦' I reafon cautioufly from what he has done, p hi^ " attributes. PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 45 ** attributes. You affirm boldly, without any re- *' gard to what he has done, or to the perfedions " of an all-perfe6l Being.'* As to the other part of the hypothefis, which fuppofes particular providences, that might pro- ted: the good and fecure their happinefs, wanting, and therefore God convidled of injuftice in the prefent conftitution of things ; it is maintained, I think, by the whole chorus of divines : and they, who do not hold the dodtrine I have mentioned, are as loud in their complaints as they who do. They who agree in little elfe agree in cenfuring the difpenfations of providence : and if fome are difTatisfied with the lot of their eled, others are fo as much with that of good men in general, however they came to be good. To fatisfy them all, therefore, and to fhew himfelf a juft governor of the world, inftead of governing by the eftablifh- ed laws of nature and by a general providence, he Ihould have corre6ted thefe laws and have governed by particular providences, whenever the fervice of good men required it. If he had not made all men good, he fhould have made all good men happy. Now fuppofe it done, fuppofe this human refor- mation of divine economy, what would be the confequences ? Would they not be fuch as thefe ? If the good, befides the enjoyment of all that happinefs which is infeparable from virtue, were exempted from all kinds of evil, and if the wicked, befides thofe evils, which are infeparable from vice, and 46 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. and thofe which happen to all men in the ordinary courfe of events, were expofed to others that the hand of God indicted on them in an extraordinary manner; in fhort if an ark was ready, at every inundation, to fave the former, and if a deftroying angel was ready on every occafion to wreak ven- geance on the latter, it is certain, as we have ob- lerved already, that fuch good men would have very little merit -, and it may be fufpecTced that the hearts of the wicked would be hardened as that of Pharaoh was by all the plagues that God brought on him and his people. Such good men would have, whilft they continued to be good, no other merit than that of children who are cajoled into their duty •, or than that of galley-flaves who ply at the oar bscaufe they hear, and fee, and fear the lafli of the boatfwain. But would there not be, at the fame time, fome further defedls in this fcheme ? I think there would. It feems to me that thefe good men, being thus di- ftinguifhed, by particular providences in their favor, from the reft of mankind, might be apt either not to contract, or to lofe, that general benevolence which is a fundamental principle of the law of na- ture, and that public fpirit which is the life and ibul of fociety. God has made the pradice of mo- rality our intereft, as well as our duty. But men, who found themfelves conftantly protefted from the evils that fell on others, might grow infenfibly to think themfelves unconcerned in the common fate : and if they relaxed in their zeal for the pub- lic PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 47 lie good, they would relax in their virtue •, for pub- lic good is the objed of virtue. They might do vvorfe. Spiritual pride might infefb them. They might become, in their own imaginations, the little flock, or the chofen fheep. Others have be- come fo by the mere force of enthufiafm, without any fuch inducements as thofe which we afllime in this cafe, and experience has.fiiewn that there are no wolves like thefe fheep. Thus forced into vir- tue, and rewarded for being virtuous, they might ceafe to delerve the reward in any fenfe or degree. On the whole -, the fcheme, oppofed to God*s fchemc, is inconfiftent with all our notions of wif- dom, as well as of juftice. It is the fcheme of men : it muft be tried, therefore, by human ideas and notions-, and fmce the juftice of providence is attacked on thefe, it may be defended, furely, on the fame. To meafure the wifdom and juftice of God by a rule fo inadequate as that of human in- telligence, is vanity and prefumption in the highefl degree. But to expofe this vanity and prefum- ption, by ftiewing the men who are guilty of them that even their own rule is fufficient to condemn them, is very confiftent with the modefty of true theifm. I WILL conclude this head by obferving that we have example, as well as reafon, for us when we rejeft the hypothefts of particular providences. If the government of a general providence was liable to the objeclions that are made to it, a go- vernn^ent by particular providences would be liable to none. But the contrary appears true from the example 48 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. example of the jewifli theocracy. God was the king of that people. He did not decline the title* nor the exercife of kingly power, as his font who came to fuffer for all mankind, and not to govern a mofl inconfiderable portion of them, did afterwards. His prefence refided among this peo- ple, and his juftice was manifefted daily in reward- ing and punifhing by unequivocal, fignal, mira- culous interpoficions of his power. The effedl of all was this, the people rebelled at one time, and repented at another. Particular providences, di- rected by God himfelf immediately, and on the fpot, if I may fay fo, had particular temporary effedls only, none general nor lafting : and the people were fo little fatisfied with this fyftem of government, that they depofed the Supreme Be- ing, and infifted to have another king, and to be governed like their neighbours. How long this theocracy may be faid to have continued, I am quite unconcerned to know, and fliould be forry to mif-fpend any time in enquiring. It is enough for my purpofe to have obferved that the juftice of God was not fo acknowledged, as to produce any fuitable effefts, at a point of time when the Ifraelites had no other king but God j and to con- clude from thence that, if he governed the whole world at prefent by particular providences, they would not have a better effefb in manifefting his juftice, nor ftop the clamor againft it, of the very men, perhaps, vvhoaccufenow the injufticeof his general providence. Nay, the cafe would be much worfe, and every particular exertion of his power would PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 49 would render his juftice more difputable : fo preg- nant is this fcheme with abfurdities. It has been faid already, that where religions, which claim to have been revealed, prevail, a new charafter of goodnefs arifes, befides that which con- fifls in obedience to the laws of nature, and com- pliance with our moral obligations. Faith in certain men, and, on their authority, in certain fafts, and certain fpeculative propofitions, how incredible fo- ever the former, how little intelligible foever the latter may be, together with the pradice of certain duties which the arbitrary will of man impofes, and the obfervation of certain forms of outward de- votion, conftitute this artificial goodnefs, which ftands often in the place of natural, and is always attended to much more. This is that kind of goodnefs which chriftian divines intend principally or folely when they complain that good men are often unhappy, and bad men happy, by the prefent conftitution cf things. They eftablifh a rule, and are not agreed about the application of it : for who are to be re- puted good Chriftians ^ Go to Rome, they are Papifts. Go to Geneva, they are Calvinifts. Go to the north of Germany, they are Lutherans, Come to London, they are none of thefe. Ortho- doxy is a mode. It is one thing at one time and in one place. It is fomething elfe at another time and in another place, or even in the fame place : for in this religious country of ours, without feek- VoL. V. £ ing 50 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. ing proofs in any other, men have been burned un- der one reign, for the very fame doftrines they were obliged to profefs in another. You damn all thofe who differ from you. We doubt much about your falvation. In what manner, now, can the juftice of God be manifefted by particular pro- vidences ? Muft the order of them change as the notions of orthodoxy change, and muft they be governed by events, inftead of governing them ? If they are favorable to thofe of your communion, they will be deemed unjuft by every good Pro- teftant, and God will be taxed with encouraging idolatry and fuperftition. If they are favorable to thofe of any of our communions, they will bedeemed unjuft by every good Papift, and God will be taxed with nurfmg up herefy and fchifm. God can do nothing more, than to furnifli arms againft him- felf, by the difpenfations of particular providences in the chriftian world •, and every one of thefe will pafs, in the minds of feme men, for a proof of injuftice, if it pafTes in the minds of others for a proof of juftice. Nay, more. If, in thefe dif- penfations, God, who knows the hearts of men, fliould judge differently from our divines, if he lliould fhew more regard to moral goodnefs, than to the reputed orthodoxy of any fide, it would fare with him, I fay it with reverence, as it fares with every honeft man in civil contefts ; he would be calumniated by all fides in the exercife of par- ticular providences, as he is in that of a general providence. Lvin. PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 51 LVIII. TTaving faid thus much to fhew the abfurdity ^ of afluming that a fyflem of particular pro- vidences is neceffary to render the government of God, in the prefent conftitution of the phyfical and moral world, a jufl government ; as it mud indeed be neceflary, if the government of a gene- ral providence, according to the eftablifhed or- der of things, is unjuft ; it feems to me that they who objedl to this are driven to the greateft of all abfurdities. They muft either give up their objeftions, or they muft infift that the whole efta- blifhed order of things ought to be changed, and that God cannot govern mankind with juftice, unlefs he undoes all he has done, and aflerts this moral attribute at the expence of his wifdom. To fay, as Clarke fays, " that the natural order " of things is fo perverted that virtue and good- '* nefs cannot obtain their proper and due effeds," is a mere fallacy. He begs the queftion : and, begging the queftion, he affirms untruly. How, and when, was the natural order of things per- verted ? What is every natural order, but that which the author of nature appoints, and how can it be changed for the better, or for the worfe, with- out a new appointment of his ? Are we to believe, then, that he has undone his work once already after the fail of Adam, and that he muft undo it again, to appear either good or juft ? To think worthily of God, we muft think that the natural E 2 order 52 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, order of things has been always the fame, and that a Being of infinite wifdom and knowledge, to whom the pad and the future are like the prefent, and who wants no experience to inform him, can have no reafon to alter what infinite wifdom and knowledge have once done, as I have hinted above. Again, what are the proper and due ef- fefts of virtue and goodnefs ? Nay, what are virtue and goodnefs themfelves ? They are not, I believe, independent, nor eternal, but they are real natures, refulting from the fyflem of rational beings to which they are agreeable, as their con- traries are repugnant -, and they muft, therefore, be as invariable as the fyftem of which they are parts. Thus I think ; for the opinion of the in- dependency of any natures on God, or of their co-eternity with him, are bugbears to me who am a child in philofophy, tho they are none to fuch full-grown metaphyfical giants as Cudworth, Clarke, and others. Now, if virtue and good- nefs be as invariable as this fyftem, their effefts in it muft be as invariable as themfelves ; and, there- fore, to fay that they cannot obtain their proper and due effecSts in it, is nothing better than cant. They may not obtain all the effefts which thefe great doftors in metaphyfics and artificial theology elleem proper and due to them ; but they may, and they certainly do, obtain all thofe which he,. who willed this fydem and them into being, de- figned that they Ibould obtain ; for if he had de- figned that they fhould have obtained more, he would have proportioned different means to a dif- ferent PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 53 ferent end, and man would have been a lefs im- perfed creature than he is. Could philofophers and divines be perfuaded to lay afide the affedlation of etching out a little real knowledge with much hypothefis, in matters where hypothefis fhould be leaft employed, many things, which are made intricate by this method, would be extremely plain. Thus, for inflance, in the prefent cafe, let them not afllime that there are natures which exift independently on God, ac- cording to which he proceeds, or Ihould proceed ; and that we may judge, by a rule common to him and us, the eternal reafon of things. Let them not aflume that the moral attributes are pre- cifely the fame in God, as they are in our ideas and notions ; that they required man fhould be the final caufe of the world, and his happinefs the final caufe of man. Inflead of reafoning from what, they imagine, thefe attributes and an eternal rea- fon of things required that God fhould do, let them be content to know what his infinite wifdom and power have done, and to reafon from thence. Let them not afTiime, in fhort, what they have no fufficient grounds to afTume, and they will accufe the Supreme Being of injuflice no longer. It may be faid, and I know it will be faid, that we mufl afTume at leafl thus much, that God a<5ls always according to the moral fitnefs of things, or we mull afTume fomething worfe, we mufl afTume that he a6ls arbitrarily i and that, on this fuppofition, we E 3 leave 54. , PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, leave ourfelves no rule, by which to judge of his proceedings, or to diftinguilh certainly between a true and a falfe revelation. Now, I am far from denying that there is an eternal reafon. God is himfelf that reafon : and there is no doubt that he proceeds with his creatures in all the exertions of his power, determined by infinite wifdom, ac- cording to the fitnefs of things. But the queftion is, what are the criterions of this moral fitnefs re- latively to man ? I think, then, that they are to us, and can be only that conftitution of things which we call the human fyftem, and the notions which arife naturally in cur minds on the confideration of it, or which we are able to deduce immediately, and obvioufly, from it. When we keep within thcfe bounds, we are in no danger of being im- pofed upon concerning the will of God, or by any falfe revelation. But when we go beyond them, we are apt to impofe on ourfelves ; for, to return fome of Clarke's words upon him, tho there is a natural and unalterable difference be- tween good and evil j yet nothing but the ex-r tremeft ftupidity of mind, or perverfenefs of fpi- rit, and difregard to tryth, can poffibly make any man affirm, like him, that moral fitnefTes and un- fitnefles are, even in their applications to our fcene of aclion (and they will be infinitely lefs fo in their applications to that of God) as manifeft as ma- thematical truths. We may difcover moral fitnefs as we difcover natural law: but then we muft be on our guard left we fhould pervert our notions of moral fitnefs and unfitnefs by wrong applica- tions PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 55 tions of them out of our fyftem, as we pervert the principles of natural law by wrong applica- tions of them within it. To fuppofe, in terms, that the laws of human are the law of divine na- ture, would be too abfurd, tho fome writers have done no lefs. But it is juft as abfurd, nay, it is jufl: the fame, to fuppofe that the moral fitnefs and unfitnefs of things mull be in every inftance, whatever it may be in fome, exadlly the fame to God as it is to man. He made our fyftem for us, not for himfelf ; and tho we are fure he cannot exadt that we fhould believe or praftife any thing repugnant to the moral fitnefs refulting from it, we muft not imagine that, by abftrafling our no- tions from it, we can render them adequate to that moral fitnefs which is the objed of omni- fcience, the omnifcience of that Supreme Being who is the author of this, and every other fyftem. The men who attempt to do this leave to God nothing more than they afllime to them- fel vcs, except a greater degree of power : and even this they aflume to be limited of right by na- tures as eternal, and as independent as his own, tho executed, in fafb, repugnantly to thefe na- tures. What thefe natures are, they know as well as he j for they foar up on platonic wings to the firft good and the firft juft. What his attri- butes muft be to be conformable to thefe natures, and what they require of him confequently, thefe perfons illuminated by an eternal reafon cannot, therefore, fail to know : and they feem to exalt them as if they meant only by exalting them to E 4 aggravate 56 PHILOSOPHICAL V/ORKS. aggravate the want of goodnefs and juftice in the coadudt of providence. Let not this pafs for any exaggeration. It is, in plain terms, the fum of a doflrine they teach in the cant of metaphyfical theology, to which they have accuftomed the ears of men, and by which they impofe on their un- derflandings. 1 defire no better proof of what is here advanced, than the twelfth fefhion of Clarke's Demonftration, and the firfl: of his Evidences. The fubjecfl has been often touched in thefe efiays, and even in fome of the laft paragraphs ; but k may be proper, however, to examine this famous ar- gumentation a priori a little more particularly. It is plaufible, for it fpeaks to the pride of the hu- man heart, and fubmits the whole economy of divine wifdom to the judgment of man. But I apprehend that it fuppofes fome things very doubt« ful, and afnrms others that imply contradi(5lion. I will enter into it, therefore, in this place, further than I have done, and Aide or leap from fubjeft to fubjecl, or revert to the fame a fecond, and a third time, in thefe ill-connecled minutes, as I ufed to do in the converfations they are defigned to recal. That there is a fitnefs and unfitnefs of things to one another, a fuitablenefs and unfuitablenefs of circumftances to perfons, no reafonable man will deny. But I fufped: that many reafonable men will doubt, whether they are founded in na- tures and qualifications independently on God, and antecedently to his will. They will find it diffi- cult PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 57 cult to conceive how fitnefles, refulting from the natures of things, or from the qualifications of perfons, can be called antecedent to thefe things, and to thefe perfons : and yet they muft be fo, if they are antecedent to that will, by the ad of which thefe things and thefe perfons firft exifted. It is faid *, that the exiftence of things, 2nd the ar- gument requires that the fame fhould be faid of perfons, depends on the arbitrary will of God. But that when they are created, and as long as they exift, their proportions, refpedts, and rela- tipns, are abftraftly of eternal neceflity, according to the different natures of things, and the different qualifications of perfons, in one common nature. 1 his I take to be the fenfe and ftrength of the argument, which will not appear in my apprc- henfion very intelligible, nor, as far as it is intel- ligible, very conclufive. We confider one thing, or one property, one perfon, or one qualification, without confidering another ; and by that we make a very real, and, I prefume, the fole kind of abftradlion our mindi are capable of making. But to confider the pro- perties of things, or the qualifications of perfons, and the fitneffes and unfitneffes refulting from them, as independent natures exifling before there were any fuch things, or any fuch perfons, any fuch natures, quahfications, circumftances, feems to me a fidlitious abftra6lion doubly. It affumes that we have ideas which we have not, and that * Evid. p. 87. the SS PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. the modes of being, by which things and pcrfoflj are what they are, may be conceived as adventi- tious to them, inflead of being conceived as (o conftitutive of them that they could not be with- out the things, and perfons, nor thefe without them. By affliming one of thefe imaginary abf- tradions, men are led to affume the other, and their miiftake about the operations of nature is connected with that about the operations of their own minds. The modes of being, and the properties of things are infeparable from them, even in imagi- nation ', which might be an argument the more to perfuade that they are the fame fpecific natures, and that his will, which conftituted thefe natures, conftituted, at the fame time, all that is eflential to them. But tho we cannot feparate in this man- ner, we can take the properties of things, both phyfical and moral, into dillinft confideration. This philofophcrs have done with honor to tliemfelves, and advantage to others. But when they have been long accuftomed to fuch abftra<5fc confiderations, and have eftablifhed certain mathe- matical and moral truths upon them, fome of thefe philofophers affume, that thefe general no- tions are natures independent on God, and in themfelves of eternal neceflity. God has made triangles and men. But triangularity, they fay, and, they might fay juft as well, humanity are in- dependent natures, antecedent to his will, and that do not owe their original to arbitrary and pofitive , i: appointment. PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. ^9 appointment. That there are necelTary truths, mathematical and moral, and that fuch they muft be, as long as there arc men, and as the prefent fyftem of things continues, is certain. But they would not be called, perhaps, erernal truths, nor would thefe notions be reprefented like eternal and independent natures, if it was more confidered that the felf-exiftent Being is the fountain of all exiftence, and that, fince every thing exifts by his will, it muft exift according to his will ; for which reafon it feems as abfurd to fay that, when he made man, he could give him no other nature than the human, which was therefore necefTarily, not arbitrarily given, as it would be to fay that, when he made a man, he did not make a tree. A man with the properties of a tree would not be a man. A tree with the properties of a man would not be a tree. The fame will which made each made the properties of each. It is one and the fame afl j and to fay that the nature of any thing, or the truths refuking from it, are independent, in any fenfe, on the will that made them, feems to me, therefore, to imply contradidion. Clarke quotes a paflage from Plato, wherein that philofopher fays^according to his tranflation, that "as in matters of fenfe the reafon, why a *' thing is vifible, is not becaufe it is feen, but it ** is, therefore, feen becaufe it is vifible : fo in •* matters of natural reafon and morality, that •* which is holy and good, is not therefore holy *' and good becaufe it is commanded to be done, *« but 6o PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. •' but it is therefore commanded by God htr- *' caufe it is holy and good." If I would cavil 3 little, I might fhew that this quotation does not ferve the dodor's purpofe, nor prove that Plato was of his mind in afferting that moral obliga- tions are, primarily and originally, antecedent to the will of God, if by will be meant his determi- nation that they (hould be obligatory, when he made a moral world : and if by will be meant a pofitive command, fignified by revelation, the quotation from Plato, who knew nothing of any fuch revelation, is flrangely abfurd. Things may be feen becaufe they are vifible, they are not vi- sible becaufe they are feen. Let it be fo. Does this prove that the philofopher thought vifibility, any more than vifion, an eternal independent na- ture ? Might he not think that God made things- to be feen, and creatures to fee, and that vifibi- lity and viiion began when he willed the phyfical fyftem into exiftence ? Thus, again, that which is good, is not fuch becaufe it is commanded, but it is commanded becaufe it is good. Will it fol- low from this expreflion, that good is, according- to Plato, an eternal independent nature ? Will it not follow as naturally, that good and evil be- gan when God willed the moral fyftem into ex- • iftence, and that he commanded the former by the laws of their nature, at the fame time when he created moral agents capable of either ? This re- mark may ferve, at lead, to (hew how apt even the beft writers are to amufe themfelves, and to impofe on others by a mere gingle of words, and to. PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 6i to quote what makes againfl: them, or does not piake for them. . But now, having made this remark, I am ready to acknowledge that Plato meaned by this pafTage in his Euthyphro the firfl good, that independent nature which refides among others in his imaginary region of eternal ideas. This Ihould be his meaning, whatever his words in this place import, to make them confiftent with his dodrine, and appofite to the prefent dilpute, wherein Plato and the Platonifts run into one ex- treme, as HoBBES and the Hobbifts into another. The former aflame ^n eternal morality antecedent not only to any fignification, but to any adual de- termination of the will of God. The latter af- fume, that there was no moral duty, no difference, no diftinclion made between juft and unjufl, mo- ral good and evil, till the will of man made this diftinftionby civil conftitutions, andpofitive laws. It feems to me, that both thefe opinions tend to weaken the authority of natural religion. By the firft, God publilhed, indeed, a moral law, when he made moral agents. But he v/as not properly the legiflator. The law exiiled before them, and it binds both him and them. By the fecond, he has not fo much as the appearance of legiflature. He made a moral world, indeed, but he made it in confufion, and he left it without any rule, till at laft his creatures made one for themfelves. He brought order out of the confufion of a phyfical, they out of that of a moral chaos. How prefer- able ^2 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, able is the middle opinion between thefe two ex- tremes, that God inftituted moral obligations when he made moral agents, that the law of their nature is the law of his will, and that, how in- different foever we may prefume every thing is to him before his will has determined it to be, it becomes, after this determination, a necefTary, tho created, nature ? Such juftice is in man, tho in God it may be nothing more than one mode of his infinite wifdom. As long as there are men, this nature mult exift. Where it will be, and what it will be, when they and this moral fyftem are at an end, let thofe able perfons, who know fo well where and what it was before they both began to exift, determine. If I infift much on this point, I do not pretend to clear it from all the difficulties that lye in the way, neither by what is faid here, nor by what has been faid elfe- where, nor by what I may fay hereafter. There are many on either fide, that have perplexed, and may continue to perplex, much better heads than mine. But, in the firft place, I feel an infuper- able repugnancy to own that any thing is inde- pendent on God ; and, in the next place, I am Ihocked at the confequences that are drawn from this do6lrine. LIX. T TE who dares to affirm that there are eternal •*• -*• felf-exiftent natures independent on God, is bold enough. But what Ihall we fay to thofe v/.ho dare PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 63 dare to affirm that thefe eternal natures, refuking from the eternal fitnefles and unfitnefles, agree- ments and difagreements, proportions and difpro- portions of things, are abfolutely and neceflarily in themfelves what they appear to be to the un- derftandings of all intelligent beings ? I do not add the exception, except thofe who underftand things to be what they are not, becaufe it is unne- cefTary to any other purpofe than that of an eva- fion, which Clarke, like a cunning difputant, forefaw he might want, and did want. What fhall we fay of thofe who think it neceflary to bring proofs to fhew that God muft know what his ra- tional creatures may know concerning thefe eternal natures independent on him, and who conclude from thence, that the rule of divine and human condudl is the fame ? God difdains not to obferve this rule, it is faid, as the law of his actions, and he appeals to men for his obfervation of it : which matter of fa6t is aflerted on the authority of a chapter in Ezechiel *, where the prophet, like a prophet and a poet, introduces God expoftulating v/ith the Jews in this ityle, and appealing to them for the equity of his proceedings. Bifhop Cum- berland, who is quoted by Clarke -|-, carries thefe notions ftill further, when he maintains in his feventh chapter Ij, with much obfcure fubtilty, not only that the rules of this law are the didtates of divine intelligence to God himfelf, but that the dominion of God over all his creatures is a right • Chap, xviii. f Evid. p. 83- |j Be leg. naturae. derived 64 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, derived from thefe very rules, and from his wif- dom which prefcribes them to him. I fhall not enter on a difcuflion, which is not immediately neceiTary to the prefent purpofe. I Ihall only fay, that the wifdom, as well as the power of God in the creation, prefervation, and government of all things is, without doubt, a true and joint foundation of his dominion over them -, and that there feems to be no need of excluding one of the two, God's irrefiftible power, in order to obviate the confe- quences which the good bifhop fufpedled that HoBB E s intended. Let us keep out of thefe mifts, and purfue our fubjedt in a clearer light. I alk then, if nothing lefs than infinite know- lege, infinite wifdom, and abfolute independency be necefiary to make it impoflible that the Supreme Being fhould be ignorant in any refpeft of the eter- nal natures, on which the eternal reafon of things is founded, how can it be faid with the leaft ap- pearance of truth that thefe aflumed natures appear juft fuch, as they are abfolutely and neceflarily in themfelves, to the underdandings of all intelligent beings, and become conftantly the rule of their adions ? Kavc we then infinite knowlege, infinite wifdom, and abfolute independency ? The human mind apprehends clearly enough the grofs diffe- rences of things in the moral fyftem, as human fenfe does in the phyfical. But in the former, as in the latter, the nicer differences are not fo perceptible. We have not any knowledge of the firft qualities of fubftances. It is enough for us to have fome knowledge PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 65 knowledge, of the fecond, of thofe which afFedt Us immediately. It is in vain that wc attempt to go higher in fearch of fcientifical knowledge : and even about thefe we are very liable to miftakes. Much in the fame manner we know fomething of moral entities, allow me the ufe of this metaphyfical word for once, as they arife in our moral fyftem ; and are able to affirm many ge- neral truths concerning them. But it is in vain that we attempt to go higher in our fearch, or to know any thing more about them than God has fhewn us in the adlual conftitution of things : and even when we judge of them thus, and make par- ticular applications of the general laws of our na- ture, we are very liable to miftakes. We are not liable to thefe miftakes in fuch cafes only as are very far from occurring frequently, which Clarke affirms j but we are liable to them in fuch as oc- cur the moft frequently, whether they relate to public or to private life. The contrary laws that legiflators have made, the contrary opinions that cafuifts daily give in matters of morality, wherein fome of them muft have been miftaken, are evident proofs of this. That there are things fit and unfit, right and wrong, juft and unjuft, in the human fyftem, and difcernible by human reafon, as far as our natural imperfeftions admit, I acknowledge moft readily. But from the difficulty we have to judge, and from the uncertainty of our judgments in a multitude of cafes which lie within our bounds, I v/ould demon- VoL. V. F ftratc 66 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. ftrate the folly of thofe who affedt to have know-^ ledge beyond them. They pretend dogmatically to deduce from abftrad eternal natures what thefe natures require of God, whilft they are at the fame time unable on many occafions to deduce from the conftitution of their own fyftem, and the laws of their own nature, with precifion and certainty, what thefe require of them, and what is right or wrong, jull or unjufl:, for them to do. Clarke employs an allufion to evade this objedlion, which would be extremely pretty, if it did not make diredly againft him in the prcfent application of it, and the only application that can make it pertinent. There is juftice, and injuftice, as certainly as there is white and black *. But as the painter can, by diluting the two colors, not make them terminate in the midft infenfibly, for thefe words are mere expletives and mean nothing ; but as he can make them run into one another till no eye can dif- tinguifh them-, fo the cafuift in law or divinity dilutes right and wrong, jufl: and unjuft, till no mind, not even his own, can unblend and dif- tinguifh them again. If white and black were co- lors as immutable as they are obvious to human light, and if juftice and injuftice were abftraft na- tures immutably obvious to the human underftand- ing, this could not be. But neither are the colors immutable, nor the natures fo fixed and fo obvious as to be always difcerned, and in every light alike. 71iis is what I fay, and what the dodor would, if he could, deny. His learned men, his men who underftand things to be what they are, not what * Evid. p. 45. they PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 67 they are not, blunder about, and contradidl one another in matters that are certainly objedls of human reafon, tho they prefume to fay that they are guided in their judgments, and direded in their condu(5t, by the eternal reafon of things, by a rule that is common to God and them. I will quote the doftor againft himfelf, on this occafion. I might do fo, perhaps, on others. If Lycurgus had made a law to authorife every man to rob, by vi- olence and murder, whomfoever he met with, fuch a law could not have been juftified. But the law which permitted the fpartan youth to fteal, as ab- furd as it was, may bear much difpute, whether it was abfolutely unjuft or no. Such an opinion delivered by one who did not reckon himfelf certainly among thofe who underlland things to be what they are not, may authorife, or excufe at leaft, many that have come out of the fchool of Loyola : and, therefore, I think it proper to re- call another fpartan inftitution in this place. The helotes or flaves were made drunk in order to cre- ate an averfion to drunkennefs in the youth by fuch ridiculous fpedacles. Far be it from me, and from every lover of truth, and of common fenfe, to wifli that the race of metaphyficians and ca- fuifts fhould encreafe, or fo much as continue : but fince there are, have been, and will be, fuch men in all ages, it is very reafonable to wilh that they may ferve to the fame good purpofe that the helotes did at Sparta, and that their delirium, in- ftead of impofmg on others, and even infefting many, may be at length laughed out of the world. F z It 6S PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. It may feem ftrange to the cool reflexions of common fenfe, that any men, who have the ufe of their reafon, and thofe efpecially who would be thought to have cultivated and improved it moft, fhould attempt to perfuade us that complex no- tions of the moral kind, for I meddle with no other, and fuch as we call mixed modes, are eternal na- tures and independent on God, when thefe per- fons muft or may know intuitively that they are dependent on man. I have faid already, and I muft repeat here, that the mind frames them as it has occafion for them, gives to each a name, and keeps them in ftore as artificial inftrumients of the underftanding. They exift varioufly in various minds, nay fometimes in the fame^ mind ; but when they exlft in no mind, thefe eternal immu- table natures exift no where. Yet fuch as they are, we are to believe them founded in the eternal fit- nelTes of things -, we are to believe the moral at- tributes of God founded in them, we are to deduce from them, and from thefe attributes, what God is under a moral neceflity of doing, and what it is his will that men ftiould do; nay we are to prove in a circle that there is a God, becaufe there are fuch natures *, and that there are fuch natures becaufe there is a God. Thefe are opinions which common fenfe will be hardly in- duced to adopt, arid yet metaphyfical and artificial theology teach them. As proud as we are of our rationality,^ Certain it is that reafon, unmixed, un- iiiflttenced, haslefs to do thaii we imagine- in fram- * Vid. CuDwoRTH of eter. moral. PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 69 ipg the opinions, and diredling the judgments, of men. Let us change the image, and obferve that it happens to reafon, as it happens to inftruments ill tuned. The firings are left fometimes too lax, and are fometimes wound up too high. In one cafe, they give no found at all, or one that is lifelefs and heavy. In the other, the noife they make is great, it fills the ear, but it carries no true harmony to the foul. By the firft we may allude to reafon weak and unimproved : by the fecond to reafon {trained into all the abftradlions of metaphyfics ; and we may difcern good fenfe between thefe ex- tremes, that is, reafon at it's proper tone. There is no fubjefl, on which it is more im- portant that reafon fhould be kept ftridly to this tone, than that of the firft philofophy •, and there is no fubje^l on which it is fo liable to be let down below it, or wound up above it. I am not to fpeak here of the firft, of that infenfibility and ftupidity wherein a great part of mankind is immerfed ; buc of that aftivity of the mind which raifes fome of them fo far above it. Now among thefe, they who apply themfelves to the firft philofophy, apply tliemfelves to the nobleft objeds that can demand the attention of their mind, to the exiftence of an ali-perfed Being, to the infinite wifdom and power that are manifefted in his works, and to the fignifications of his will concerning the duties we owe to him, and to one another. From thefe F 3 different io PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. different objefls arife two kinds of philofophy, divine philofophy or theology, moral philofophy or ethics. LiH.e different branches of the fame tree, they fpring from the fame root, and that root is the aflual fyftem of things. As high as they can be trained up from hence, they bear the genuine fruit of knowledge. But when fantaftical gardeners bend the tops of the highefl fprigs, like the ficus indica, down to earth -, if they take root, they bear it of a baftard kind, and ferve only to plant a laby- rinth wherein the gardeners themfelves are loft. Such fantaftical gardeners our metaphyficians are. When they have acquired ideas from the aftual fyftem of things, and have carried their knowledge up from the creation to that felf-exiftent, intelli- gent Being, the Creator, they difdain to reafon any longer a pofteriori. They frame an hypothefis, with much agitation of their minds, out of the ideas and notions they have acquired in this man- ner, and reafon from it without any further regard to the phaenomena. This method of philofophiiing has produced often nothing more than impudent alfertions. Such was the theology of the Epicureans, if that may be called fo : and that of the Stoics too, as much as they oppofed the former, and as good theifts as they were efteemed on this account, was little better, w LX. H I L s T the folly lafted among the antient philofophers of making univerfal fyftems, and PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 71 of explaining the whole fcheme, order, and ftate of things, he who had not given a great part of his fyftem to theology would have gained little reputation. This Plato law, and he put theology into every thing he taught. I can eafily imagine that the fame progrefs was made in compofing thefe fpiritual romances, that we fee has been made in compofing thofe of a different kind. Amadis of Gaul, and many more, which the niece, the curate, and the barber threw out of Don Quixote's windows, and burned in his yard, were writ with- out any regard to probability, and no man could read them with any attention, nor fuffer his ima- gination to wander long fo extravagantly, who was not as mad as the knight of La Mancha. After thefe writers. La Calprenade arofe, like another Plato, and by mixing fidlion ingenioufly with the truth of hiftory, he compofed romances capable of amufing, and even almoft of deceiving. But, however this may have been, all our meta- phyfical writers have rather copied, than improved, the platonic fyftems ; fo that if the founder of the academy meant to diftinguilh himfelf by his theology, he has fucceeded beyond any hopes he could conceive. It prevailed in the heathen world, and it has prevailed much more in the chriftian church. Particular men among the heathen embraced it for the fame reafon that he had to teach it, to diftinguilh themfelves, and to acquire a name in philofophy : or elfe they were determined to it, like Plotinus and Porphyry, F 4 by 7* PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, by an enthufiaftic turn of mind, which ail the religions of thofe ages and countries were very proper to give, and this theology to confirm. But as foon as an entire order of men was fet apart in the chriftian church, to inftruft the world in all matters of a divine or moral nature, and to teach a revelation little different in many inftances from platonifm, this philofophy acquired a new ftrength, and more motives concurred to maintain it than there had been to eftablilli it. The opinions of Plato were employed to illuftrate the myfteries of the gofpel, and even to recommend them to the belief of fuch apologiftsas Justin, and of fuch dodors as Austin. No wonder, therefore, that, being confecrated in this manner, they have been propagated with chriftianity in every inftance where they arc not diredly repugnant to it. No wonder that, theology becoming one of the fciences in lucrum exeuntes, that is a trade, the profefTors of it have kept up that marvellous, which is the myftery of the trade, and to which nothing could contribute more than the meta* phyfics of Plato. No wondir that the do- d;rine, which we fpeak of here, fhould ftill fub* fift, tho it does not feem agreeable to the fim* plicity of true th^ifm, nor of fervice to morality, which would not be the duty of every man if the principles of it could be underftood by none but metaphyficians, nor the obligations of it be well explained without an intricate dedudion of argu- ments a priori. This PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. ^j This the ttade, and nothing but the trade, makes neceflary: and, tho we are told that proofs a pofteriori are no more than fecondary confiderations, I muft confefs, what I have often felt, that if' I had not been convinced of all tlie great articles of natural religion by my own re- fleftions on the infinite wifdom and power dif- played in the univerfe (no part whereof, and therefore not the whole, could be conceived to be felf-exiftent, even if it were conceived to be eternal) on the conftitution of my own nature, and on that of the fyftem to which I belong, I Ihould not have been fo by all the fine-fpun argumentations a priori. The proofs that refult immediately from fuch refledions as thefe are founded in my fenfi- tive and intuitive knowledge ; and to refill them I muft renounce my cleareft and moft diftindl ideas. I muft do little lefs, I muft accept a flow of mere words, thrown into the form of ademonftration,for demonftration ', or I muft take inadequate, incom- plete, and obfcure ideas and notions for fuch as are adequate, complete, and clear, if I admit many of the proofs brought by fome of our moft famous writers. They prefent us with dim fpeflacles to fee what we fee clearly without any, and by the natural ftrength of our eyes ; or elfe to fee what is not by nature, nor can be made by art, vifible to our in- ternal fight. They prove as much as needs to be proved, and, therefore, as much as we are able to prove, in order to refute atheifm, and to efta- blifh theifm. But then they mingle this real, and connedl it with fo much fantaftical knowledge, that they ^4 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. they difgrace and weaken, as much as it is in their power, the former by the latter. It was this very pradice which hindered the Stoics from beating the Epicureans out of the field of controverfy, and from impofing filence on thofe bablers, the Acade- micians. I apprehend that our divines have brought the fame difad vantage on them felves in their difputes with atheifts, to whom they would be much more formidable, if they neither purfued the practice ipoken of here, nor made that occafionai alliance with them againft the difpenfations of providence, which is fpoken of above. To make this condu6l appear the lefs ftrange, and to take off our wonder at it, we muft not only confider that the religious fociety is compofed of as arrant men as the civil, feduced by the fame affe^ions, tranfported by the fame paflions ; and that our divines have at leaft as much the oftenta- tion of knowledge fuperior to that of other men, as thofe antient philofophers had, who pretended that philofophy was the fcience of all things divine and human, or the fchoolmen who were ready to difputede omni fcibili ; but we muft confider fur- ther, that they afiume a right which the antient philofophers did not claim, tho Pythagoras leems to have intended it, a right to inftruft man- kind in natural, as well as In revealed, religion, and have made of the exercife of this right a very lu- crative trade. To keep this trade in repute, there- fore, and them felves with it, two things have been thought neceflary, and are really fo. It has been thought- PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 75 thought necefTary to preferve the myftery which they found eftabliihed in one part by the firft pro- feflbrs of it, and to introduce myftery into the other. The method they take ferves both thefe purpofes. They Aide into the proofs of natural, what they judge necefTary to impofe their artificial, theology. From thefe principles, laid out of vul- gar fight, and, in truth, out of their own, they deduce even moral obligations : and thus the whole fum of religion falls under the direftion of the religious fociety. How this fociety dirc(5ls it, and to what purpofes principally, appears plainly enough in the inftance before us. LXL W7 H A T E V E R may be determined about the ^ ' moral fitnefles and unfitnefTes of thin gs, and the fuitablenefs and unfuitablenefs of circumftances to perfons, all of which are conceived to be eternal becaufe we cannot conceive them to have been ever otherwife than they are, certain it is that they become difcernible to us in our fyftem alone; and that altho they are immutable natures in it, from whence all our obligations arife, and may be af- jfumed to be abfolutely and in themfelves eternal as well as immutable, and therefore independent, if philofophers pleafe to call them foj yet we neither know, nor can know any more about them than what the adlual conftitution of this fyftem ^ews us. In fome other fyftem we might not h^ve had the fame ideas, or having them we might not 76- PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. not have had the fame occafions of colledling them into the fame complex modes. This we fee happen in different countries ; and what happens in dif- ferent countries might furely happen in different fyftems. It is fufHcient, therefore, to eftablilh our moral obligations, that we confider them relatively to, pur own fyftem. From thence they arife : and: fince they arife from thence it muft be the will of that Being who made the fyftem, that we fhould obfcrve and praflife them. The affumed eternity of morality cannot make it more obligatory. Why. then are fuch pains taken to prove it eternal ? ThC; reafon is obvious. If we went no higher than our. own fyftem, the principles of it would be eafily difcovered, the criterion of moral good and evil, of juft and unjuft would be fixed, and at leaft there would be no need of confulting divines about it. They lead the minds of men, therefore, to contemplate objefts that are out of their fyftem, and renew the platonic doftrine of eternal ideas, forms, effences, natures, according to which they affume that the Supreme Being regulates his own" conduft ; and all his rational creatures are obliged to regulate theirs by the eternal reafon of things. They prove the exiftence of an all-perfe and recom- penfed with happinefs which exceeds vaftly in every inftance of it, as much as in it's duration, the fum total of all thefe calamities, that is, with happinefs infinite and eternal. Compare the great- eft human wickednefs you can imagine, accom- panied with an uninterrupted unmingled affluence of every thing which can go to the conftitution of human felicity during the fame number of years, and after that punifhed in a ftate of exceflive and never-ending torments. What proportion, in the name of God, will you find between the virtue and the recompence, between the wickednefs and the punifhment ? One of thefe perfons has amends made to him beyond all conceivable degrees of a juft reparation. The other has puniftiment inflided on him beyond all conceivable degrees of a nccef- fary terror. Again. Suppofe two men of equal virtue, but of very oppofite fortunes in this life; the one extremely happy, the other as unhappy during PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 141 during the whole courfe of it. Are thefe men recompenfed alike in the next ? If they are, there arifes fuch a difproportion of happinefs in favor of one of thefe virtuous men, as mufl appear in- confiftent with juftice, and can be imputed to nothing but partiality, which theifm will never impute to the Supreme Being, whatever artificial theology may do, and does in many inflances. Are thefe two men not recompenfed alike ? Has one of them a greater, and the other a lefs, fhare of happinefs in that heaven to which they both go ? If this be faid and allowed, the fame difproportion, nay, a difproportion infinitely greater, will remain. The difference muTt be made by the degree, it can- not be made by the duration, of this happinefs, which both of them are to enjoy eternally. Now any degree of happinefs the more, tho never fo fmall, enjoyed eternally, will exceed infinitely not only all the happinefs of earth, but all that of heaven which can be enjoyed in any determined number of years. If you fuppofe two perfons of equal guilt, one of whom has been as happy as a wicked man can be, and the other of v^hom has fuffered as much mifery in this life as a wicked man can be thought to deferve; the fame reafoning "will hold good : the difproportion of punifliments in one cafe will be like the difproportion of re- wards in the other-, and that juftice, which is faid to be the fame in God as in our ideas, will be acquitted in neither. A divine, prefled by fuch ar- guments, might have recourfe for aught I know, |o fomething like that balance, wherein it was faid that 142 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS; that WoLLASTON aflFeded to weigh happinefs and mifery even to grains and fcruples, in order to afilime that the additional degrees of happinefs in heaven, and of mifery in hell, ceafe as foon as the account between the two worlds is made even, and the difproportion taken away ; after which the two good men and the two wicked men remain, in the different ftates allotted to them, on an equal foot. This might be faid by one accuftomed to make hypothefes at random, and without any other rule than his want of them, but I cannot think it would deferve a ferious anfwer, LXX. Cometh ing elfe may be faid, that will appear more reafonable at firft, and that will be found, on examination, only to fet the injuftice of the afllimed future difpenfations of providence in a ftill ftronger light. It may be faid that altho fuch proportions, as I have mentioned, are included in our notions of juftice, ftridly taken -, yet rewards and punifhments do often exceed thefeflrift bounds, without being deemed repugnant to juftice, and marks of weaknefs, or of cruelty, in him who beftows them, or inliids them. This now is true in certain degrees, and in certain circumftances, according to which thefe degrees are to be regu- lated, Excefiive mercy may be vicious, as well as excefiive feverity, in the judgments of men j and they muft be excefiive when the particular proportions in which they are meafured out exceed by PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 143 by far what is neceflary to encourage the good, and to terrify the wicked, the two general objeds of juftice. The bounds of human juftice are ftraiter or larger, but ftill it has bounds ; and whenever the former are tranfgrefled, the circumllance which juftifies this tranfgreflion muft be fome public good. Such is the nature of human juftice, ac- cording to which we are to judge of divine juftice in our difputes with thefe men, who fay that they are the fame. For my part, who do not think that they are the fame in fuch a fenfe, as to make us adequate judges of one as well as of the other, I could eafil^ perfuade myfelf, if I admitted this hypothefis, that the mercy and goodnefs of God ftand as it were on one fide of his juftice, that his mercy pardons the offenders, who amend, confiftently with his juftice ; for elfe, as all men offend, all men would be puniftied; and that his goodnefs may carry on the work his mercy has begun, and place fuch as are the objects of both in a ftate where they will be exempt perhaps eternally from all natural, and, as much as finite creatures can be, from moral, evil. I could perfuade myfelf that they who are objeds of neither, and are not therefore pardoned, remain, if they do remain, fecluded from the hap- pinefs of the others, and reduced to a forlorn ftate. Some fuch hypothefis, where no certainty is to be had, I could admit as probable, becaufe it con- tradids none of the divine attributes, fets none of them at variance, nor breaks their harmony : for tho 144 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. tho I fear to pronounce what God will do, and am always aftoniihed at the boldnefs of thofe who pronounce not only what he will do, but what he ought to do ; yet I think myfelf obliged, among the various opinions that are, or may be, enter- tained of the divine proceedings, to embrace as probable, if I embrace any, that and that alone which comes nearell to the bed notions I can frame of moral perfeftion. It is not poflible for me, therefore, to conceive any attributes Handing on the other fide of God's juftice. No attribute can hold that place, unlefs cruelty be a divine at- tribute ; which it would be blafphemous to fup- pofe, tho the Jews, and fome other barbarous people, have fuppofed it to be fo. To reform offenders is neither the fole, nor the principal, end of punifhments. Thofe of an in- ferior kind may have this intention. Thofe that are capital muft have fome other : and it would be too ridiculous to make the hangman, who ex- ecutes a criminal, pafs for the reformer of his manners. The criminal is executed for the fake of others, and that he, who did much hurt in his life, may not only be deprived of the power of doing any more, but may do fome good too by the terror of his death. If a prince, or a ma- giftrate, tortured and put to death clandeftinely, without regard to reparation or terror, even fuch as defcrved capital punifhment, he would be deemed a tyrant ; becaufe the principal end of punifhment is not obtained by this proceeding : and PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 145 and fuch a prince, or magiftrate, could have no motive to punifh, but the pleafure of punilhing ; which no fpirit, but that of anger, vengeance, and cruelty, can infpire. A fpirit of juftice punifhes -, but the judge who has no other fpirit, puniflies with regret. If thefe notions are true, and furely they are true, how can any one, who believes that God is an all-perfe6t Being, believe at the fame time that he does what would deferve the higheft •cenfure among his imperfedt creatures ? None but thofe who accufe him of injuftice in this life, can -.believe him fo unjull in the next. They make him more unjuft, than the prince or magiftrate would be in the cafe that has been fuppofed. If the torments of hell take place before the confum^- mation of all things, he is as unjuft as this prince or magiftrate. But if fentence is not pronounced, nor judgment executed, till then, he is infinitely more fo. Clandeftine punifliments may have fome of the effeds of juftice, and may contribute in fome degree to the reformation of m.en, or at leaft to the good of fociety, by putting out of it fuch as are hurtful to it. But what effe6t of this kind can further puniftiments have, when the fyftem of human government is at an end, and the ftate of probation over j when there is no further room for reformation of the wicked, nor reparation to the injured by thofe who injured them ; in fine, when the eternal lots of all mankind are caft, and terror is of no further ufe ? You will fay perhaps, for it is commonly faid. Vol. V. L that 146 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. that altho it be too late, after the confummation of all things, or of the fyftem of this world at leaft, to obtain the ends of human jullice, yet the divine juftice remains to be fatisfied i and that this cannot be fatisfied unlefs every human crea« ture, who has finned beyond all meafure of par- don here, be punifhed eternally hereafter. Can this now be urged by any one, who has afTumed that divine and human juftice are the fame, and that God appeals to man for the equity of his pro- ceedings ; or indeed by any one elfe ? Sure I am, it cannot be fo, confiftently, by the former, nor reafonably by the latter : for tho it may be faid, to foften this bold aflumption, that juftice is truly the fame in God as it is in our ideas, but that, God being infinitely fuperior to man, an ex- treme diflference muft needs arife, in the exercife and particular applications of it, between divine and human juftice ; yet this will appear to be an evafion in the prefent cafe, and not an anfwer. A prince, or a magiftrate, may do, no doubt, very juftly, nay, it is effential to juftice that he ftiould do, what would be unjuft and criminal in a private man. The rank he holds, and the power with which he is invefted, give him this right : but neither fuperior rank, nor fuperior power, can give him a right to pervert juftice, nor to aft in oppofition to thofe laws of the fociety which ought to be the rules of his conduft. Thus the Supreme Being, whofe majefty, wifdom, and power, are elevated far above all our conceptions, may do juftly, in a multitude of inftances, what princes, and PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 147 and magiftrates, have no more the right, than the power, of doing. But then we may prefume to fay, that there is this fimihtude between the two cafes. Tho the right and power of the Supreme Being arc not delegated, they may be Hmited like theirs. This I mean : They are limited, if we believe certain divines, by eternal fitnefles and unfitneiTes of things independent on him, according to which he regulates his conduft, and all rational beings are obliged to regulate theirs, becaufe all rational beings are capable of knowing them. But if we reje(5l this do6lrine, as, I think, we ought to do, and not without horror, we mufl be con- vinced, however, that the Author of all nature, in conftituting our fyftem, conftituted certain fpe- cific phyfical and moral natures, according to which he governs the world : from whence it will follow that the reafons, on which his provi- dence ads in the prefent fyftem of things, may be known to us in fome inftances, and muft be un- known to us in others ; whilfl the whole economy of any future fyftem muft be abfolutely impene- trable. We are able to account, in great mea- fure, for the general diftribution of good and evil here, tho not perhaps for every particular in- ftance. But we are wholly unable to fay what will happen hereafter. This only we know, that nei- ther here, nor hereafter, God will deal with his creatures in dired violation of thofe natures and effences of things which he himfelf has conftituted, and has given them the means of knowing. He will not deal with them according to one rule here, and according to another hereafter, L 2 ^48 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. As we muft believe, if we think worthily of the Supreme Being, that he will not proceed with his human creatures, in any ftate, in violation of tha!t juftice which he has conftituted in the nature of things, and whereof he has made them able to ac- quire ideas and notions •, fo we muft be on our guard, left we ftiould be induced to believe that he will proceed, at any time, agreeably to thofe affe6bions and paflions which have fo great a ftiare in diredling our condu6l, and fo much influence over our thoughts. Sovereign reafon is exempt from afFeftion and paflion •, and the great caufe of error in theifm is this, we judge of it with all our affeftions and paflions about us. What the ef- fcds of this caufe were in the heathen world, we all know. But few of us confider that the fame caufe has worked ever fmce, works ftill, and, if it does not produce a crop of errors as foul and as abominable as thofe, it produces a crop not lefs abundant. W LXXI. HATEVER the vulgar religion of the heathen taught, their philofophers, even thofe of them who afllimed providence to be the moft ac- tive in directing the affairs of this world, were un- animous in their opinion, that the Supreme Being was never angry, nor ever did harm *. The firft * Num iratum timemus Jovem ? At hoc quidem com- mune eft omnium philofophorum . . . nunqu-im nee irafci Deum, nee nocere. Tull. De oiF. 1. iii. part PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 149 part needs no commentary, the fecond very little. They believed that God punifhed in this life, but they believed that his punifhments were inflidled for the general advantage of mankind •, that th& evil which happened to the virtuous was defigned by his goodnefs to try their virtue, to preferve, and to improve it by exercife ; that the evil which came on the wicked was diredledbyhis juftice, to chaftife their crimes, to terrify, and reform ; and that a being, who a6led always on motives of goodnefs and juftice, could be never faid with truth and propriety to do harm. Such was the language of heathen divines, and thus they repre- fented the proceedings of God to man. But our artificial theology holds another, which is very different. Let us mention fome of thofe doctrines which are of this kind, and begin and terminate in that which is here oppofed particularly. Ac- cording to them, God loves, and he hates, he is partial, angry, and revengeful. He creates fome rational beings with a determination to fave them, and others only to damn them. It is not fure that repentance and amendment can appeafe the wrath of God, nor any thing lefs than a facrifice. He has given a law, the law of nature and of reafon, to all his human creatures ; the fandions of it are a natural tendency of virtue to the happinefs, and of vice to the mifery, of mankind : but thcfe fanflions are fo imperfe6l, that they cannot pro- cure obedience to the law, even with the fupple- mental help of occafional interpofitions on the part of God, and of a conftant difcipline of civil laws L 3 on 150 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, on the part of man. To fupply this imperfe£lIon, therefore, there muft be neceffarily fome further fan6lions of this law, and thefe are the rewards and punifhments referved to a future ftate. Here is ample room for reflecftions. I lliall make but three. The term " imperfedion" is, in this cafe, employed equivocally ; for we may conceive an abfolute and a relative perfedion, and that which appears imperfefl in one of thefe con- fiderations, may be perfect in the other, accord- ing to the defign of the lawgiver. We may pre- fume to fay, that if it had been in the order of God*s defigns to make the ftate of mankind as happy as the univerfal and fteady obfervation of this law would make it, he would have made the fanflions of the law as perfeft as the law. But we fee by what he has done, which is the only fure way of knowing what he defigned, that we were made to live in a ftate of moderate and mixed happinefs. His law fhews us the perfeflion of our nature, in which that of our happinefs confifts. Reafon draws us to it, affedions and paflions from it ; and our free-will, inclining fometimes to one, and fometimes to the other, maintains that ftate which mankind is appointed to hold in the order of rational beings. Had the fanflions of the law of nature been ftronger, we fhould have rifen above this ftate. Had they been weaker, we fhould have funk below it. Thus they arc relatively perfecfl, relatively to the defign of the lawgiver ; and neither the goodnefs, nor the PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 151 the juflice, of God required that we Ihould be made better, nor happier, than we are. But, further, if we will fuppofe any other fanc- tions necelTary to enforce the original and univer- fal law of God, the law of our nature, they cannot be thofe of a future ftate. Future rewards and punilhments are fanflions of the evangelical, as temporal were of the mofaical, law. Sandtions muft be contained in the law, they muft be a part of it. In their promulgation they muft precede, as the law does, neceflarily all afts of obedience, or difobedience to it •, tho in their execution they are retrofpedive to thefe a6ts, and are the confe- quences of them. So like wife new fanftions may be added to an old law by the fame authority that made it. But juftice requires that the new be as public as the old, and that the authority of them be as well afcertained to every one who is bound by the law. Thefe conditions are eftential, there can be no fandtion without them : and therefore the rewards and puniftiments of a future ftate, which have not thefe conditions, are no fanftions of the natural law. Reafon and experience, that taught men this law, fhewed them the fandlions of it. But neither of them pointed out thefe. Have we any grounds to believe that they were known to the antediluvian world ? Do they ftand at the head or tail of the feven precepts given to the fons of Noah? Were they fo much as mentioned by Moses, who had need of every f4n<5tion, that his knowledge, or his imagination, L 4 could 152 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. could fuggeft, to govern the unruly people to whom he gave a law in the name of God ? Were they believed, was that of future punifhments, at leaft, believed, by any of the philofophers of Greece ? Pythagoras told flrange ftories, in- deed, of the infernal regions, where he had been in his feveral tranfmigrations from body to body 5 and Plaio had his informations from Erus the Pamphylian, who came back like a meffenger fent on purpofe to give an account of this new difco- vered world. But were they in earneft ? It would be ridiculous to think that they were. Both of them affected to be lawgivers ; and it is nO won- der that in this charader they employed an hypo- thefis, which other lawgivers had employed with fuccefs in thofe eaftern nations with which they were acquainted. From fuch religions, from fuch philofophy, and from fuch political inftitutions, the Jews, who picked up many fcraps of all thefe among the Egyptians and their neighbours in the eaft, intro- duced the do6trine of future rewards and punifh- ments mto their own, foon after the captivity of Babylon at leaft. But whenever they introduced it, this dodlrine was not of their own grow th moft certainly. It was not derived from their original, revelation : and accordingly it was not received by that feci who adhered ftridly to the law. Thus we fee that this aflfumed double fanftion, far from being coeval with the law of nature, or any po« fitive law of God, v/as unknown long to the na- tions PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 15J tions who lived under the former, and even to his chofen people who lived under the latter ; and that when it was known, and wherever it was known, it was plainly of human, not of divine, authority. My third reflexion is this. As the double fan<5tion of rewards and punifhments in a future ftate was in tact invented by men, it appears to have been fo by the evident marks of humanity that chara6terife it. The notions whereon it is founded are taken rather from the defeats, than the excellencies, of the human nature, and favour more of the human paflions, than of juilice or pru- dence ; for Seneca faid very confiftently, tho Plato, whom he quotes, very inconfiftently, *' nemo prudens punit quia peccatum eft, fed ne " peccetur." How worthily foever fome philo- fqphers might think of the Supreme Being in this, and in other refpe(5ts, who did not believe that God fpared the wicked in this world in op* pofition to his juftice, that they might have an apparent reafon to give for his punifhment of them in another world in oppofition to his mercy and juftice both ; the vulgar heathen believed their Jupiter, as well as their inferior divinities, liable to fo many human paflions, that they might be eafily induced to believe him liable, in his gor vernment of mankind, to thofe of love and hatred^ of anger and vengeance. They might attribute thefe to him in his public, as well as the others in his private, capacity ; for, according to them, he 154 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS; he a(5led in both : and it is hard to fay which of thefe pafTions could be attributed to him with greater irreverence. The Jews indeed, as often as they made God defcend from heaven, and as much as they made him refide on earth, were far from cloathing him with corporeity, and imputing corporeal vices to him. But the very firft, and almofl: every other, point of their theology, hiftory, and tradition, fhewed him in two other capacities, one not fo Ihocking as what the heathens imputed to Jupiter in one capacity, but little lefs irre-. verent ; for the Creator of all things, the one Su- preme Being, was at the fame time, according to all thefe, the tutelary local deity of a family, and a nation, with whom he entered into covenants that bound him and them mutually. I need to defcend into no further particulars. They are enough known, and extremely fuitable to the firft principle of this fyftem, which contains fuch in- ftances of partiality in love, and hatred, of fu- rious anger, and unrelenting vengeance, in a long ferics of arbitrary judgments, and bloody execu- tions, as no people on earth, but this, would have afcribed, I do not fay to God, but to the worfl: of thofe monfters who are fuffered, or fent, by God, for a fhort time, to punilh the iniquity of men. Is it any matter of wonder now, that the greateft part of a people trained up in fuch no- tions of the Supreme Being, and of his arbitrary government here, Ihould be difpofed to receive a heathenifh dodrine, which taught nothing more arbitrary, tho a little more cruel, of his proceed- ings PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 155 ings hereafter ? Is it any matter of wonder that they, who believed God inflicted punifhments to the third and fourth generation on innocent per- fons, fhould believe that he punifhed offenders themfelves eternally ; if even they did not foften this feverity by a metempfychofis, or fome other way which I do not well remember, nor think it worth my while to examine ? This dodlrine was In vogue in the church of Moses when that of Jesus began. The Saddu- cees declined, thcPharifees florifhed •, and the great fyftematifer of chriftianity was himfelf a Pharifee. He, who infifts fo fignally on an arbitrary exer- cife of the power of God, might have eftablifhed very confiftently this dodlrine of eternal rewards and punifhments, by his gofpel, if it had been eftablifhed by no other. But it was part of the original revelation : and how abfurd foever it might be in the Jews to take it from the Gentiles, who had taught it without either reafon or reve- lation to authorife them, it might feem reafonable to the Chriftians to adopt it. When the Jews afTumed it on the faith of idolatrous and fuperfti- tious people, they added a new fancftion to an old law. When the Chriftians adopted it, they re- ceived the new law, and the newfanilion together, on the faith of the fame revelation. Thus one objedlion to the dodrine was prevented, and every man, who entered into the new covenant, knew this condition of it before hand. But the other objedions remained ftill in force : and, on the whole. r56 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. whole, k was found fo impofTible to reconcile this fandion of eternal punifliments to the divine at- tributes, and thefe future invifible judgments of God to the actual proceedings of his providence, that in the early days of chriftianity it was rejedled by fome not inferior to any in knowledge or in zeal. LXXII. 'TpHE hypothefis of a rotation of fouls, out of "*' which even the foul of Christ was not, I think, excepted, at leaft by Origen, feemed pre- ferable to this. The makers of fyftems faw that the general tendency of virtue to promote the happinefs, and of vice to promote the unhappinefs, of mankind, by which God made it the common intereft of his human creatures to cultivate one, and to reftrain the other, were the fole means that his infinite wifdom had ordained to this end in the ordinary courfe of his providence 5 and that, if the wicked were fometimes punifhed, ei- ther collectively or individually, by extraordinary interpofitions real or apparent of the fame provi- dence, this happened rarely, after long forbear- ance, and not till the meafure of iniquity was full. They faw that the mercy of God was in this man- ner of proceeding as confpicuous as his juftice, and that both were diredted to maintain fuch $ inoral ftatc as the imperfe<5lion of human nature ?tdm.itted. No wonder, then, if they found it hard to believe that the fame God, who dealed thus PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 157 thus with his creatures here, dealed (o differently with them hereafter j and that he, who punifhed to a gracious end, the maintainance of a moral fyflem, with meafure and proportion here, pu- nifhed to no end at all when this fyflem was at an end, with inconceivable and eternal torments. They might think, according to the vulgar theo- logical notion, that the wrath of God againfl fin- ners for what they had done in this fyflem was not appeafed when they went out of it. But they might think too, and it is plain they did think, that wrath itfelf could not exceed all proportion fo far, as to appoint a flate of eternal torments to fucceed a very fhort flate of probation. They mingled therefore fome notions of juftice with this of wrath, and imagined feveral flates of proba- tion ; that fouls, for inftance, were fent to inform fome bodies in recompencc, or punifhment, of what they had done in others ; that the wicked fufFered for their impurity, but that in new flates of probation they would have new occafions of purification. By fome fuch hypothefes they endeavoured to foften a do6lrine that fliocked their reafon, and could not be reconciled to any moral attribute, no, nor to the phyfical attributes of God, not to his wifdom at leafl. But the general tide of artificial theology ran the other way •, and time, and dog- matical affirmation eflablifhed abfurdity in this cafe, as they have done in many. Fathers and councils decreed, and Chridians believed, that the 158 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS- the Supreme Being dooms almoft all his rational creatures, all whom thefe men do not think fit to fave, to eternal torments for what they have done in this life. He created them, in effed:, to be eternally miferable, according to this dodrine* (ince the term of this life can be reckoned for no- thing in an infinite duration, and yet is to decide their ftate to all eternity. The dodrine we fpeak of aflumes fuch a proceeding neceflfary to fatisfy divine juftice-, whereas in truth it can be afcribed to no principle, but that of anger, and to the re- venge of a being who punifhes to the full extent of his power, and merely for the pleafure of pu- nifhing, and without any regard to juftice, crea- tures who did not offend him merely for the plea- fure of offending him, creatures who had free will, and made wrong eledionsj creatures who might plead, for that plea the worft of them might make, if not in excufe for their crimes, yet in mitigation of their punifhment, their frailties, their paffions, the imperfections of their nature, and the nume- rous temptations to which they ftood expofed. Lxxin. TT is juftly matter of fcandal, and it would be '*' matter of furprife, to hear men, who acknow- ledge an all-perfedl Being, and who fpeak with fo much reverence of him on fome occafions, fpeak of him with fo little on this, and others, if we did not obferve in general that fooiifh prefumption, with which they are apt to ered themfelves into the PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 159 the ftandard and meafure of every thing ; and in particular that profane Hcence which the chriftian theology has derived from the jewifh, and which divines have rendered fo familiar and fo habitual, that men blafpheme without knowing they bla- fpheme, and that their very devotion is impious. The licence, I mean, is that of reafoning and of fpeaking, even in common converfation, of the divine, as of the human, nature, operations, and proceedings ; fometimes with, and fometimes without, the falvo of thofe diftinguifhing epithets and forms of fpeech which can in very few inftances diflinguilh enough. The jewjfh fcriptures afcribe to God, not only corporeal appearance, but cor- poreal aftion, and all the inftruments of it ; eyes to fee, ears to hear, mouth and tongue to articu- late, hands to handle, and feet to walk. Divines tell us, indeed, that we are not to underftand all this according to the literal fignification. The meaning is, they fay, that God has a power to execute all thofe a<5ts, to the efPedting of which thefe parts in us are inftrumental *. The literal fignification is indeed abominable : and the flimfy analogical veil thrown over it is ftolen from the wardrobe of Epicurus •, for he taught that the gods had not literally bodies, but fomething like to bodies, *' quafi corpus : " not blood, but fomething like to blood, " quafi fanguir.em -f-.'* * Vid. Sermon of the archbilhop of Dublin, on Rom. viii, 29, 30. f . . . . Quidni igitur fimiliter, fays Gassendi, fateatur efle in deo non paffiones, fed quafi paffiones ? atque adeo non irafci ilium, fed quafi irafci ; nee teneri gratia, fed quafi teneri ? This i6o PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. This analogy, if it could be allowed, would ju- ftify in good meafure your Homer as a philofo- pher, for as a poet he wanted no excufe : and fomething of this kind has been attempted. But who is there, philofopher, or poet, except jewifh and chriftian rabbins, that can employ in good earnefl: images taken from corporeal fubftance, from corporeal aflion, and from the inftruments of it, to give us notions in any degree proper of God's manner of being, and of that divine incon- ceivable energy in which the aflion of God con- filts, and by which the natural and moral worlds were produced, and are preferved and governed ? The more human they are, the lefs adequate they mufl be ; and whjjft they do no good one way, they do much hurt another. They cannot exalt, they mufl: debafe, our conceptions, and accuftom the mind infenfibly to confound divine with hu- man ideas and notions, God with man. This hap- pened in the cafe of the anthropomorphites, who imagined that God had an human body, becaufe it was faid by Moses that he created man in his own image. So dangerous are thefe exprefiions, whofe literal fenfe is obvious to all, whilfl the ana- logical is underllood by few, and attended to by fewer. So falfe is the reafon given in excufe for them, that we mufl know God this way, or not at all. Far from making us know him better, they lead us into error. They make us unknow him, if I may fo, and impofe an imaginary being upon us for the true God. Other pafTages of the fcriptures confirmed the error of the anthropomor- phites i PFIILOSOPHICAL WORKS. i6i phites ; and, if it was heretical in the chriftian church, it could not be deemed, one would think> very heretical by the Jews ; fince they held com- munion with them fo far, as I remember, that they ate the pafchal lamb together. Thus again, and to bring the obfervation quite home to the prefent purpofe -, the fame fcriptures, that are fo apt in many places to make thofe who read them rcprefent the Supreme Being to them- felves like an old man looking out of a cloud, as painters have reprefented him often, afcribt tc iiim, at the fame time, by the whole tenor of them, all the affedions and paffions which charafterifed the nation of the Jews, whilft they were a nation, very ftrongly, and which are not entirely worn out by their difperfion, and their commerce with others. God loves, according to their theology j but he loves with a ftrange predile6lion and par- tiality for them, who are not certainly the moft lovely of his human creatures. He loves like Deiotarus, akingofGalatia, who, for the fake of one fon, put the reft of his children to death. He is merciful too : but his mercy is arbitrary, and de* pends on mere will. " He will have mercy on " whom he will have mercy," and when he will have mercy : " and whom he will, he hardens.'* Even they who efteem themfelves his chofen people, who, we fay, have been hardened, and they fay have been chaftifed, have waited for it thefe two thoufand years, and wait ftill. To- wards mankind in general his ansier is often fu- Vol. V. M rious. i62 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, rious, his hatred inveterate, his vengeance unre- lenting. But when the wicked repent of their fins, he repents fometimes of his feverity. What a de- fcription now is this of an all-perfed Being ? What a tafk have men, feveral of whom are great matters of reafon, undertaken, when they have undertaken to reconcile fuch doflrines to his perfections, and to other do6lrines,dire(!;l:ly contrary to thefe, that are interfperfed in the fame books ? The talk is hard, indeed, but their profefTion made it neceflary ; and all the force of great learning, and of great parts, has been proftituted to conceal the ignorance, and to palliate the errors, of the moft illiterate, fuper- llitious, and abfurd race of men who ever pretended to a fyftem of things divine or human. LXXIV. A NALOGvis employed in this cafe, as it is in ** ^ the other, and indeed in every cafe where theological paradoxes, which are not a few, are to be defended. If analogy itfelf, fuch as fome di- vines affume and reprefent it, could be defended, there would be no cafe wherein it ought to be employed with all it's force more than in this : for, furely, to impute human paffions, even the worft of them, to the Supreme Being, is not further ofF from blafphemy, than it is to afcribe to him a cor- poreal form, and the fenfations, and the limbs, and the aftions, of a man. It is not true, tho it has been aflerted, that this analogy is obvious to every one, and that no one can think on refledion that any PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 163 any of thefe paflions can affeft literally the divine nature*. It is on the contrary as true, that a multitude of good chriftians, far the greateft num- ber, believe, at this hour, that the divine nature is afFe<5led by them, as it is true that a multitude of good heathens reprefented to themfelves their gods and goddefles, even the father of gods and men, under an human form, or conceived at leafl, which is much the fame, that thefe divinities took the human nature upon them, whenever either bufi- nefs or pleafure called them to converfe and aft with the children of men. Let us not imagine that any thing is too abfurd for men to believe even on refledion. Heathens, Jews, Chriftians, have be- lieved the abfurdities I have mentioned ; and great metaphyficians and divines have believed this of analogy +. It would be tedious to take notice of all * Vid. Serm. fupr. citat. -f-The lord prefident of Scotland, who is no divine by pro- feflion, but fomething better, and more ufeful to fociety, deals however too much in divinity; and the contagion ofHurcKiM- son's writings and converfation makes him really m.ad quoad hoc, for there is fuch a madnefs, notwithftanding all his faga- city, good fenfe, and knowledge. In that ftrange book, which he has writ in this delirium againfl: Tindal, and which I have quoted fomewhere, he fays very rationally, " that we ought to " be amazed at the impudence of thofe who pretend to decide •' what God is or is not, and what he can or can not do, from " the notions they have framed to themfelves of his attributes, " his nature, and perfedlion." But he hlmfelf affirms, in the fame book, a multitude of fac\s relating to the Deity, and to the whole economy of divine providence, on 'he faith of jewi(h and chrift- ian reveries, and his own or his mailer's whimfies; juft as the others do on the faith of theirs. The cenfure, therefore, which M 2 that 1^4 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, that has been faid, ftupidly enough by fome, and not without a little air of plaufible ingenuity by others, to eftablifh this notion. I fhall hy no more about it, than my fubjed requires neceffariiy : and even that will be fufficient, I think, to explode a doftrine that may be turned flrongly againft re- vealed religion, and that cuts up the very root of natural. All the knowledge that God has given us the means to acquire, and therefore all that he de- figned we Ihould have, of his phyfical and moral nature and attributes, if they may be confidered feparately, as we are apt to confider them, and if the latter, and every thing we afcribe to thefe, are not to be refolved rather into the former, into his infinite intelligence, wifdom, and power ; all this knowledge, I fay, is derived from his works, and from the tenor of that providence, by which he he pafies on them, may be juftly pafled on himfelf, unlefs it can be fhewn, which it never can be, that what he advances is better proved to be true in fad, than what they advance is demon- ftrated conformable to right reafon. Type, emblem, and ana- logy are the common means to difguife the abfurdity both of the fa£ls and reafonings they maintain ; the confequence of which is abominable : for the vulgar may very well underftand literally, what is pretended to be faid analogically only, of the Supreme Being, of his nature, and of his proceedings, in the Bible ; fmce this writer afTcrts it to be extremely plain, that the language of the fcriptures, which defcribes the Deity's at^ions, affeflions, and inclinations, in terms borrowed from the ufage, the fentiments, and refolutions of men, is not fo figurative as it is generally fuppofed to be, and that we ought to underftand it fomething more literally, than reafoners are willing to allow. o-overns PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 165 governs them. We fee him in a reflected, not in a dired, light. But, becaufe we cannot frame full and adequate ideas of this fort, nor anfwer every queftion impertinent curiofity may afk, will it fol- low that we have, properly fpeaking, no know- ledge at all of his attributes, nor of the manner in which they are exercifed ^ Every part of the im- menfe univerfe, and the order and harmony of the whole, as far as we are able to carry our obfer- vations and difcoveries, are not only conformable to our ideas or notions of wifdom and power, but thefe ideas or notions were imprefled originally and principally by them on every attentive mind ; and men were led to conclude, with the utmoft certainty, that a being of infinite wifdom and power made, preferved, and governed the fyftem. As far as we can difcern, we difcern thefe in all his works ; and where we cannot difcern them it is manifeftly due to our imperfe6lion, not to his. God cannot be in any inftance unwife or impotent. This now is real knowledge, or there is no fuch thing as knowledge. We acquire it immediately in the objefts themfelves, in God, and in nature the work of God. We know what wifdom and power are : we know, both intuitively and by the help of our fenfes, that fuch as we conceive them to be, fuch they appear in the work : and therefore we know demonftratively that fuch they are in the worker. What then could a very refpefbable * writer mean, when he faid, fpeaking of divine knowledge * Archbifhop King, ubi fupr. M 3 an i66 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. and wifdom, that God muft either have thefe, or other faculties and powers equivalent to them, and adequate to the mighty efFedts which proceed from them ? It is plain he meaned by this fuppofition, in a cafe where nothing is afcribed but what ought to be afcribed to God, to prepare the way for the f?ime fuppofition in a cafe where he was to excufe the jewifli theology, and his own, for attributing in terms to God thofe afFe(5lions and paflions, which cannot be fo attributed without impiety. The archbifliop would have had no need to run into thefe abfurdities, nor any temptation to ad- vance fome ftrange paradoxes, that he advanced on the foundation of an alTumed analogical know- ledge, if he had confined himfelf to refute one impiety, that of the predeftinarians, without at- tempting to excufe another. Our ideas of divine intelligence and wifdom may be neither fantaftic nor falfe, and yet God's manner of knowing may be fo different from ours, that foreknowledge, as we call it improperly, in him may b^ confident ,wich the contingency of events, altho that which we call properly foreknowledge in ourfelves be not fo. But he reafons about the effential natural at- tributes of God, as if he reafoned about thofe that we call moral •, in which way of reafoning there is great and rpanifeft error. The former are fixed, uniform, and fpecjfic natures, that want no equi- valent i and that are certainly adequate, fince the mighty efFeifls that are produced proceed from them. They may be perceived more or lefs in ^ifi'erent cafes, but in no cafe will they vary, even in PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 167 in appearance and in human apprehenfion, from what they are. Like the fun, they may appear fometimes in the full effulgence of their bright- nefs, and fometimes behind thofe clouds which the eye of human reafon cannot pierce. But ftill, like the light and heat of the fun, tho differently perceived, they will appear the fame. The latter are not fuch fixed, uniform, fpecific natures to human apprehenfion. They are rather affumcd nominal natures, not manifefted by God in his government of the world as clearly and as deter- minately, as the phyfical attributes of wifdom and power are in the whole fyftem of his works ; but framed into abftraft general notions by the human mind to help itfelf in the moral conlideration of human atSlions, and applied to the Supreme Being that we may reafon more diftinclly, if not more truly, about his nature and the difpenfations of his providence. We ought to attribute all conceivable perfedions, without doubt, to the fupreme all- perfeft Being. We can never raife our conceptions of this kind too high. They will remain, after all our efforts, vaftly inadequate. Nay, if we fuppofe them lefs fo, or pufh abfurdity to the utmoft and fuppofe them adequate, yet flill they will re- main very infufficient criterions by which to judge in many cafes, as men prefume to do in all, of thefe perfedions in the exercife of them. The reafon is plain. God aft according to a multitude of re- lations unknown to us. He afts relatively to his fyftem, we judge relatively to ours. Into fuch oppofite paradoxes are divines tranf- M 4 ported i68 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, ported by prefumptuous reafoning and whimfical refinements, whilft they pretend to teach us the knowledge of God and of heavenly things, that fome of them afRrm dogmatically, and without any regard to truth, which they facrifice readily to maintain an hypothefis, that the moral attri- butes are in God juft what they are in our inade- quate, fludtuating ideas, and that God himfelf ap- peals tQ man for his proceeding conformably to them : and fome again are fo far from falling into this, that they fall into a contrary extreme, and would perfuade us that the attributes of God are all alike inconceivable to us as they are in them- felves, and can be known no way except by ana- logy i which is not to know them at all : for knowledge, which refts in analogy, flops (horr, and is not knowledge. The firft of thefr opinions has done infinite hurt to all religion, and has turned it into fuperftition every where and in every age. The laft has not been of much fervice to chriltianity, as I apprehend ; and fure I am that it will leave the objedlion, made to the jewilli Icrip^ tures on account of the images under which they reprefent the Supreme Being, juft where they find it. Here let us draw one line of reparation, among others, between natural and artificial theology. By that we are taught to acknowledge and adore the infinite wifdom and powerof God, which he has ma- nitefted to us, in fome degree or other, in every part, even the moft minute, of his creation. By that too we are taught to afcribe goodnefs and juftice PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 169 juftice to him wherever he intended that we fhould (o afcribe them, that is, wherever either his works or the difpenfations of his providence do as necef- farily communicate thefe notions to our minds, as thofe of wifdom and power are communicated to us in the whole extent of both. Wherever they are not fo communicated, we may aflume very reafonably that it is on motives ftriflly conform- able to all the divine attributes, and therefore to goodnefs and juftice, tho unknown to us, from whom fo many circumftances, with a relation to which the divine providence a6ts, muft be often concealed ; or we may refolve all fuch cafes into the wifdom of God, and, refigning ourfelves to that, not prefume to account for them morally. Thus we follow God, and pretend to have knowledge of his moral charadler, no further than he gives it ; no further than thefe abftra6t or general no- tions, which we colled from the proceedings of his providence, are confirmed by the fame. LXXV. ■p U T we are taught a very different leflbn in •■-^ the fchools of artificial theology. In them all the notions of thofe obligations, under which men lye to one another by the conftitution of their na- ture, are transferred to God -, and an imaginary connexion between his phyfical and moral attri- butes is framed by very precarious reafonings a priori ; all of which are founded on that im- pertinent fuppofition, that moral fitneffes and un- fitneffes 170 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. fitnefTes are known, by the eternal reafon of thincrs, to all rational beings as well as to God. They go further. As God is perfeft, and man very imper- fed:, they talk of his infinite goodnefs and juftice as of his infinite wifdom and power, tho the latter may preferve their nature without any conceivable bounds, and the former muft ceafe to be what they are, unlefs we conceive them bounded. Their nature implies neceffarily a limitation in the exer- cife of them. Thus then the moral attributes, ac- cording to this theology, require infinitely more of God to man, than men are able, or would be ob- liged, if they were able, to exercife to one another j greater profufion in beftowing benefits and rewards, greater rigor in punifhing off'ences. This whole fy- flem of God's moral obligations, or of divine ethics, being raifed a priori, and not a pofteriori, is a fy- ftem of the duty of God to man : let the blafphemy of this exprefiion be charged to the account of thole who make it proper and neceflary to be ufed, in or- der to expofe their dodrine. It is a fyftem of what he ought, or is obliged by his attributes, to do ; and not a fcheme of what he has done. It prefcribes to God : and the difpenfations of his providence are acquitted or cenfured as they are conformable, or not conformable, to it. The makers of this fyftem have gone ftill fur- ther, and have attributed to the divinity not only the perfecStions, but the imperfedions, of humanity. Superftition, improved by philofophy, fucceeded that which was rude and unfyftematifed ; and learning PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 171 learning and knowledge finiflied what ignorance had begun. When they faw that the conftitution of things, and the order of providence, did not anfwer the notions of goodnefs and juftice in ail the extent, in which they thought it was fit to afcribe thefe notions to a Supreme Being, con- trary notions ftood ready to take the place of thefe j and, fince they could not afcribe them all to one, they afcribed them to feveral divinities. From hence a good and an evil god, the ditheifm of philofophers. From hence that univerfal poly- theifm, a principal ufe of which was to account for the phaenomena of nature, and for the govern- ment of the moral world. The moral charatflers of pagan divinities differed, like the moral characters of men : and to make thefe charafters complete, the fame pafTions were afcribed to both : one na- tion, nay one man, was favored by one god, ano- ther by another : and as there were parties on earth, there were parties in heaven. But here we muft diftinguifh between the theology of the Jews and that of other nations. The Jews, with more incon- fiftency, and not lefs profanation, drefled up the one Supreme Being in all the rags of humanity ; which compofed a kind of motley charader, fuch as foolifti fuperftition, and mad enthufiafm alone, could afcribe to him, and fuch as no man, who be- lieves him to be an all-perfed Being, can hear without horror, The moft barbarous nations had the mofi: barbarous deities generally, and the gods feem to have 172 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, have been civilifed no fafter than their adorers were, and even not fo faft, nor in the fame pro- portion : for we know by experience that fuper- llition can maintain barbarity in reHgious policy among thofe who are the furtheft from it in civil. The antient Chinefe, it is faid, reprefented the Su- preme Being, the lord of heaven and earth, for fo they called him, as the giver of all good *, as an objeft of adoration and of gratitude, to whom their emperors offered up the firft-fruits of the corn they had fowed with their own hands. But the antient nations, of whom the hiftories and tra- ditions with which we are better acquainted fpeak, reprefented the divine nature like that of their own tyrants. The divine favor was to be obtained by importunate fupplications, by magnificent prefents, and by all the external (hew of fervice, and pomp of adulation. Their gods too, like their tyrants, were prone to anger, and hard to be appeafed. Nothing lefs than bloody facrifices of beads, of men, of children, could appeafe them ; and the notion of rendering them propitious by putting other creatures to death being eftablifhed, we are not to wonder if the greateft offenders grew the mofl devout. In this refped they had better quarter from gods than men, tho Seneca fays that it coft more to affuage the wrath of their gods, than the rage of their tyrants, " ut fie dii placentur quem- " admodum ne homines quidem faeviunt.'* If we would own the truth, we Ihould be obliged * Scien. Sin. to PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 173 to own that this kind of propitiation is much more repugnant to all our notions ofjuftice, than any of thofe inftances of fuppofed injuftice which di- vines and atheifts charge on God : and yet it con- tinued to be the conftant pradice of the Jews at the fame time as they boaft that God was their king, and relate the terrible judgments that he executed, and that they executed by his command, or with his approbation, perfonally on one ano- ther, and perfonally for their own fakes on other people. Thus they blended together at once, in the moral charafter of God, injuftice, cruelty, and partiality. They made him an objed of terror more, than of awe and reverence ; and their reli- gion was a fyflem of the ranked fuperftition : for nothing can be more true than what St. Austin quotes fomewhere from Varro, that they who are religious revere, and the fuperftltious fear, God *. The faint would have done well to have applied this true maxim to certain abominable doctrines of his own, and to have learned from an heathen to corre6t his own theology. But the truth is, that chriftianity preferred in many refpefls a ftrong tang of the fpirit of judaifm, as judaifm had taken and incorporated, in the firfl inllitution of it, many of the rites and obfervances at lead of Egypt : for I will not fay that the legiflator, who was inftru6led in all the wifdom of the Egyptians* took the belief of one God from the dodtrine of the theban dynafty, as different in that refpeft * Va r ro ait, Deum a religiofo vereri, a fuperllitiofo timeri, from 174 PHILOSOPHICAL WORtCS. from the polytheifm of the other Egyptians, as that of the Jews was •, the I might fufpedt that he did fo much more reafonably, than a very able writer infinuates that the Jews might inftrudt other nations in the moll excellent philofophy, and that natural religion was originally built on the religion revealed to them *. The ceremonies of the law of MosEs in the worfhip of God were retrenched; and a more inward devotion, a more reafonable fervice, were eftablifhed : tho evert this devotion and this fervice retained an air of that enthufiafm which prevailed among the prophets or preachers of the jewifh church, on whom the Spirit of God was fup- pofed to defcend. The Supreme Being took a milder appearance feveral ways among Chriftians. His favor was confined no longer to one people ; all mankind were conftrued, by this new theology, to be of the feed of Abraham, and they were all included in the new covenant. The Meffiah came: and God did for fallen man what he would not do for fallen angels, according to a remark of arch^ bifhop TiLLOTSON. He fent his only Son, who is one and the fame God with himlelf, into the world to fuffer an ignominious death, and by that facri- fice to redeem all the fons of Adam from the con- fequences of his wrath, which the fin of Adam had entailed on the whole race of mankind. Chriftian theology difcovers, in this myllerious proceeding, the love of God to man, his infinite juftice and goodnefs. But reafon will difcover the fantaftical, • Vid, Def, of revealed rel. by Conybeare, p. 406. confufed. PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 175 confufed, and inconfiftent notions of jewifli theo- logy latent in it, and applied to ariother fyftem of religion. This love will appear partiality as great, as that which the Jews alTumed that he had Ihewn in preferring their nation to all the nations of the earth. This juftice will appear injuftice in all the circumftances of the fall, and in the re- demption of man by the propitiatory facrifice of an innocent perfon. This goodnefs will appear cruelty when it is confidered that the propitiation was made by tormenting, and fpilling the blood of the vi6tim : and, in fhort, injuftice and cruelty will appear inconfiftently united in this circum- ftance, that mankind could not have been re- deemed if the Jews had received, inftead of cru- cifying, the Mefllah -, and yet, that they were re- je(5ted then, and have been punifhed ever fince, for not receiving, and for crucifying him. On the whole, the moral charadler imputed to the Supreme Being by chriftian theology differs little from that imputed to him by the jewifh. The difference is rather apparent than real ; and, if the effedls of fudden and violent anger are imputed to him in one fyftem, thofe of flow and filent re- venge are imputed to him in the other. The God of the Old teftament rewards and punifhes vifibly, and fignally, here : he terrifies often by his anger, he reforms fometimes. The God of the New makes little difference here between thofe whom he approves, and thofe whom he difap- proves i fo little, that he is charged with injuftice for J76 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. for it : but he lies in wait to punifh the latter hereafter with unrelenting vengeance and eternal torments, when it is too late to terrify, becaufe ie is too late to reform. Divines would be there- fore under a double obligation to reconcile thefe paffions to the idea of an all-perfe6b Being, if that was poffible. But becaufe it is impoffible, they take the part of denying, againft the exprefs terms of their fcriptures, that he has any fuch pafTions. They quote contradiftory paflTages, which were defigned *, they fay, to make us underftand that thefe reprefentations are imperfect, and to keep us from imagining that the things fpoken of are in the fame manner in God, in which any of thefe pafTages exprefs them : as if inconfiftency could preferve from error, or be an excufe for it. They fay, very truly, that it would be abfurd to under- ftand the reprefentations literally : but they argue very precarioufly, when they conclude from thence that they were not intended to be fo under.ftood* Is it lefs repugnant to human reafon, to afcribe the human paffions to the divine nature, than it is to impute to God many other things which our theo- logy imputes to him ^ I recall them not in parti- cular. This only 1 will fay, and you mufb own, that it cannot be hard to conceive hov/ the Jews and the firft Chriflians came to entertain fuch ab* furd notions, by any man, who confiders that, in the mod enlightened ages, and at this hour, the greateft part of the chriftian church believes that the fame propitiatory facrifice, which Christ of- * Archb. King, ubi {i\p. fered PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 177 fered upon the crofs, is daily offered up for the li- ving and the dead on ten thoufand altars at once, and that they eat and drink the very fame body and blood. Well might the Jews and the firft Chriftians believe in contradiction to their reafon, when an infinite number of learned men and great philofophers believe in contradidtion to their rea- fon and their fenfes both. We have obfervcd above how this noflrum of analogy is applied to purge off the literal meaning of thofe paffages which afcribe to God the form of man. Like a mountebank's panacaea, it will have no better fuccefs when it is applied to purify thofe that afcribe the human paffions to him. Arch- biihop King *, for I think it worth my while to quote no other writer in favor of analogy, an- fwers the objedion made to this doftrine, " that, if it be true, all religion may be loft in mere figures," by faying *' that there is great dif- ference between this analogy and what we call figure. That the ufe of the laft is to rcprefent things, otherwife well known, fo as to magnify or lelfen the ideas we have of them, to move our paffions, and to engage our fancies j by which means they are often employed to deceive us. But that the ufe of divine analogy is to give us notions of things where we can have no dire6t knowledge.'* Now, it feems to mc that analogy is figure, or it is nothing -, and that, if it is figure, it is of the kind of thofe which are em- * Ubi fupra. Vol. V. N ployed 178 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. ployed to deceive us. The ufe of figure is not only to illuftrate, and adorn things known, but to help our conceptions, and to introduce things knowable into the mind. When it is not em- ployed to any of thefe piirpofes, to the firft by orators and poets, or to the laft by philofophers, figurative ftyle is filly, unmeaning talk, or it is im- pofition, and fraud. We may be deceived by it, no doubt -, but we cannot be deceived long, if the ufe of it be confined to things that are knowable by us. He who is not able to tell us, without any figure, what he means by the figure he employs, will neither deferve, nor have, the attention of men of fenfe -, and, befides, in matters that are know- able by us, we may difcover the propriety or im- propriety of it by our own refearches. The cafe of analogy is very different. It is a fimilitude or refemblance of an objedt with fome diverfity, as the fchoolmen fay very intelligibly. But then the affertors of it fay that this objeft is not to be known otherwife by us, and that we iTiuft be content to know it this way, or not at all. If this alTumed divine analogy differs from other "figures, therefore, it differs in this, they cannot :deceive long, this may deceive always. No, fays theology : it never can deceive, becaufe thefe ana- logical notions of the divine nature are communi- cated to us by God himfclf in his word. But who does not fee that this falls into the abfurdity mentioned above ? A theift doubts of the authen- ticity of this word, becaufe fuch notions are con- tained PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 179 tained in it. A divine juftifies the notions, be- caufe they arc contained in it. To want external proof fufficient to conftitute this authenticity, and to have internal proof turned againft it, would be too much. The weaker the former is, the more necefiary it becomes to defend the latter. But then it is defended by fo many arbitrary aflump- tions, and forced interpretations, that a Bible, without a comment, can be reconciled neither to itfelf, nor to what we know of phyfical and moral jiature ; and that, with a comment, it is in a mul- titude of inftances the word of man rather, than the word of God. There are not only things myfterioully, but things untruly, exprefled in it. In one cafe, God has fo little regard to the weak- nefs of our capacities, that his language is far above all human conception : in the other, it de- fcends to that of the moft illiterate ages, and of the moft ignorant people among whom thefe fcriptures were writ, compiled, or publifhed. In the former, we are told that he defigns to exercife our faith, which is the angular ftone of every in- ftituted religion : in the latter, that he was plea- fed to fpeak according to vulgar error, that he might be the better underftood ; as if the Su- preme Intelligence, the God of truth, could ftand in need of an expedient to which no philofopher would think himfelf reduced. N 2 LXXVI. i8o PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. LXXVI. IT is flrange to obferve that fuch a writer, as archbifhop King, Ihould recommend his fa- vorite analogy as the proper and neceflary, the ufual and general, method of teaching and inftru6t- ing mankind, and of leading them to knowledge, after he has afTumed over and over, that all our knowledge of the divine nature and perfedtions refts on thefe notions folely, and can be carried no further. When we are inftrufted by analogy, by comparifon, by figure in one word, on other oc- cafions, it is in order to arrive at the knowledge of matters knowable. Knowledge, that was to reft in thefe, would not be deemed knowledge, nor even that which we might think we acquired by reafoning from them ; for demonftration cannot arife from real, and much lefs from aflumed, fimi- Htude nor figure. It muft be eftablifhed on intui- tive or fenfitive knowledge. The reafon is ob- vious. Similitudes may be afTumed, and figures employed falfely. We muft go beyond them, and reafon independently of them, to know whether they lead us to truth, or not : for the anger of God may be as improper an image, as that of his hands and feet ; and there may be, as doubtlefs there is, in one reprefentation no more propor- tion, nor refemblance, than in the other. Ana- logy confifts of fome fimilitude and fome diverfity. As faft as we perceive this fimilitude and this di- verfity, it may help us to prove -, but of itfelf, and PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. iSi and without this comparifon, which cannot be made when the objed: is unknown, it can neither prove, nor help us to prove. The right reverend author I have quoted fo often is fond of an ex- ample or two, one of which turns againft him, and the other makes nothing for him. To the man who is a ftranger to any country we produce a map of it. The map is only paper and ink. It is not the country, it has very little likenefs to the country •, yet this analogy gives him notions, and as much knowledge of the coun- try as ferves his prefent purpofe. Now, in the firft place, tho it be true that the map gives him the notion of a new country, it is equally true that the map gives him no new notion. He knew what mountains, and valleys, and lakes, and ri- vers are, before he faw the map ; and all he learns by it is, that there are fuch in this unknown country : fo that the comparifon fhews, much againft the intention of the writer, if it fhews any thing, that the human paflions, with which we were acquainted long before the analogical map was fpread before us, are the fame in God that they are in us. The ftrokes and lines of the map do not fhew us Highgate, nor the Thames j the mountains may be higher, the rivers deeper, but they are mountains and rivers ftill, and the nature and the face of the country are much the fame. In the next place, the map was made by perfons who had been on the fpot, or by the communi- cation of exad memorials from them, and they to N 3 whom i82 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. whom ic is of the utitiofl confequence to know this knowable country may refort to it, and verify or correal the map, inftead of trufting to men who know the country no better, than they do, or who may have an intereft to deceive them. Another example is taken from our fenfitive knowledge of outward objects. The fun, for in- ftance, gives us by his effects the ideas of light and heat -, but what they are in themfelves, or what the phylical nature of the fun is, we know not. Juft fo, the dired:ion of God's providence in the government of the world gives us the ideas of anger and revenge ; but what thefe are in them- felveSj or what the moral nature of God is, we know not. This eomparifon may feem plaufible perhaps to fome perfons. But it will not hold. Whatever light and heat are in themfelves, the fimpie ideas that we diftinguifh by thefe names are rdifed by the action of the fun immediately, and uniformly. But the complex ideas of anger and revenge are not fo raifed by any adl or diredlion of providence. Difagreeable fenfations, Or pain, may be immediate efFecfts of fuch ad:s or directions ; but the moral caufes of thefe are of our own in- vention. They are not uniformly afligned nei- ther, as they are not immediately nor determi- nately known ; for the fame appearances which are afcribed to God's anger or revenge by one man, and at one time, will be afcribed to his juftice, or even to his mercy, by another man at the fame time, or by the fame man at another time. PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 183 time. In all thefe cafes, the phyfical caufes are alike unknown in themfelves, and in the manner of their operations. They are determined only by their efFefts. Now, to argue, that becaufe we ad- mit thefe, which are fo determined, we ought to admit moral caufes, which are not fo determined, is fomething too fophiftical. To conclude this head by bringing an example againft analogy much more to the purpofe, than thofe that arc brought in favor of it : the man who was born blind imagined, moll analogically, a fimilitude between the found of a trumpet, and the fcarlet color. He fubftituted the idea he had for that he had not, and reafoned from thence juft as wel] about fcarlet, as fome men reafon from their ideas of anger and revenge about the moral caufes that are latent in the divine mind. It is faid that we can have no dire(5t knowledge of the nature of God : which is true in this fenfe, that all the knowledge we can have of this kind is derived originally from his works, and the pro- ceedings of his providence. All the ways of ac- quiring a more diredt knowledge by architypal ideas which we difcern in an intimate union of the human with the divine mind, by the irradiations of myftic theology, or by the inward light of quakerifm, and feveral more, which the phrenfy of metaphyfics, not very diftant from that of en- thufiafm, has invented, are too ridiculous to de- ferve the regard of common fenfe. But tho we have not, in any of thefe ways, a direct knowledge N 4 of i84 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, of the nature of God, yet we are not reduced to know nothing of him except by analogy. If the firft principles of our knowledge concerning him be reflefted, as we have juft now faid, yet it is i-eal. It is carried into demonftration, and is there- fore dire(5t likewife, if we may be allowed to call any knowledge by demonftration diredt. What we can fee of him within the extent of our hori- fon, we fee clearly. He judged this fufficient for us, he gave us to fee no further by that lamp of reafon which he has lighted up in our minds j and with this, little as it is, we ought to be content. But the divines, fpoken of here, light up their dim taper of analogy, pretend to fhew us the ihadows of objeds they cannot difcover, and bid us be content with this. They go further. They affert that this is fufficient for us : and, tho true religion be the moft reafonable fervice, they make it the moft unreafonable fervitude -, for thus they argue *. " Men honor and obey a prince " whom they never faw, and whom they could '* not diftinguilh from another man, if they met " him. Let us fuppofe God to be fuch a prince " literally, as he is reprefented analogically. Let " us fuppofe him to love thofe that obey his or- " ders, and to be in rage and fury againft the dif- " obedient. Can we doubt that he who believes *' this will be faved by virtue of that belief?" Thus you fee that they make at laft even their own analogy unneceflary. We may conceive him, by their leave, under all the grofs and repugnant * K I N G, ubi fupra. images PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. i8^ images that have been employed to reprefent him in the jewilh fcriptures. We may conceive him to be a mighty king, that fits in heaven, and has the earth for his footftool, from whence all things that can happen are in his view. Or wc may con- ceive him, like an eaftern monarch, carried about in his palanquin, neither feeing his fubjeds, nor fecn by them, familiar with a few of his favorites, terrible to all the reft of his people, and known only by the pomp with which he is ferved, and by the feverity of his government *. The man, who thinks that every circumftance in the mofaical hiftory of the creation and of the fall is to be un- derftood literally, Ihould think, indeed, that every reprefentation which the fcriptures make of God is to be underftood in the fame manner j fince there can be no reafon given againft interpreting fome of thefe circumftances literally, and fome figu- ratively, that will not hold againft interpreting fome of thefe paflages one way, and fome another. To be confiftcnt, he (hould difclaim the analogy he contends for : and then nothing more will be wanting to anfwer all the ends of artificial theo- logy, than to aflume, on fuch premifes, that they who minifter in holy things are the omrahs, the viziers, and the baflas of this mighty king, whofe commands they publilh, interpret, and execute, or caufe to be executed ; rather than his ambaffa- dors : by afiTuming which latter charader they may fecm to leflen over modeftly the dignity of their * Vid. King in his ferm. on Gen. U. i6, 17. l86 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. own order, and to raife that of the laity too high. — But I am afhamed to have faid To much on this fubjed. LXXVII. T MIGHT have concluded fooner, that an analogy "^ arbitrarily affumed is not fuiiicient to excufe the literal attribution of thofe human paflions to the divine nature, which are the diigrace of ours; that there is little or no difference in reality between one and the other of thefe attributions, whatever there may be in appearance to an inattentive or preju- diced mind •, and that anger and revenge were a- feribed by the Jews to the Supreme Being as literally as compaflion and mercy, as literally as injuftice in this life is afcribed to his providence by atheifls and divines, or the juftice of it in another is alTerted by the latter. The falfe conceptions, and the licentious reafonings about the divine nature and providence, that have been mentioned, as well as many more, proceed chiefly from the do6trine which teaches that the moral attributes are the fame in God a$ they are in our ideas ; that the eternal reafon of things by which he a6ls, is open to all rational beings •, and confequently that we are competent judges of his moral proceedings towards us, fmce we are competent to determine what his moral charadler requires. But thefe falfe conceptions and licentious reafonings may proceed likewife from I'he analogical doflrine, as contrary as it appears to the other •, for by afcribing to God not human notions and padions, but fomething, whatever it be. PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 187 be, equivalent to thefe, King might, tho he does not, realbn as dogmatically as Clarke, a priori, from what the creator and governor of the world ought to do in thofe qualities, to what he has done, which is condemned, and to what they aflume he will do, which is juftified, and rendered his folej unifica- tion. On fuch conceptions, and fuch reafonings, the do6lrine of future rewards and punilhments has been eftablifhed, as it is ftill taught. Had it been taught in terms more general and lefs defcriptive, had the punifhments been reprefented, for inftance, like the rewards, to be fimply fuch as eye never faw, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man could conceive -, it might have been maintained in credit, and have had an imiverfal and real influence perhaps, to the great advantage of religion, even fince the days of fuperftition and ignorance were over. But befides the abfurdity of fuppofing that God inflifts eternal punifhments on his creatures, which would render their non-exiftence infinitely preferable to their cxiftence on the whole, as every one who has not the rage of paradoxes about him muft admit; I apprehend that an air of ridicule has been caft on this doftrine by preferving all the idle tales, and burlefque images, which were propagated in thofe days, and have been preferved in thefe by the united labors of nurfes, pedagogues, painters, poets, and grave divines. I need not enumerate inftances. They are enough known : and they have done fo much to take off the folemnity, and to weaken the authority, of this dodrine, that the man, who was induced to difbelieve a God by ferious and igg PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. and pathetic difcourfes againft his goodnefs and juftice in the government of this world, would be hardly reclaimed to theifm by an hypothecs which refembles fo nearly that mythologia de inferis he had laughed at fo often. Since our divines have thought fit to rifque the belief of an all perfedt Being, the creator and go- vernor of all beings, on this hypothefis, they Ihould have made it at ieaft as plaufible to the reafon of mankind, as their objedtions are made in fome de- gree to his reafon, tho much more to his afFeftions and pafTions -, and on which they have appealed, in concert with the atheifts, to this reafon, and even to experience. They fhould not have fhewn themfelves fo much more concerned for this hypo- thefis, than for the fundamental demonfl:rated prin- ciple of all religion, as to make, if they could, the hypothefis pafs, in fome fort, for the demonftration, and the demonfl:r3tion for the hypothefis. They do little lefs when they attempt to prove that there is no God, if there is no future fl:ate ; infl:ead of infifting that fince there is a God there may be a future ftate. The Stoics aflerted *, that if there was a God, there was divination ; and if there was divination, there was a God. " Reciprocantur ifta: *' fi divinatio fit dii funt ; fi dii fint, divinatio eft.'* TuLLY might have added in their name, " fi divi- *' natio non fit, nee dii funt." But the heathen philofopher was on this occafion a better theiil, than fuch a chriftian divine as Ci^arke. * TuLLY De divin. Another PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 189 Another obfervation equally true, but not quite fo obvious, requires to have it's place here^ and to be a little more developed. Natural re- ligion is that original revelation which God has made of himfelf, and of his will, to all mankind in the conftitution of things, and in the order of his providence. Whatever is thus revealed is within the reach of our faculties : and the fame reafon which he has given us to improve the phy- fical, he has given us to improve the moral, fyftem of our lives. Neither of them is improved equally > of which many apparent caufes, and fome that would be thought perhaps too refined and too hypothetical, may be afligned. But they who ap- ply their reafon the moft to thefe improvements, provide the bell for their own well-being both here and hereafter on the fuppofition of a future Hate. It would not be hard to ihew one lefs in- ftru6led than you are, that human reafon is able to difcover, in this original revelation, every con- ceivable duty that we owe to God as our creator, and to man as our fellow-creature. It would be eafy to fhew that this fyftem of duty is fully pro- portioned by infinite wifdom to the human ftate, and to the end of it, human happinefs. Natural religion is therefore relatively perfed: : and if it was fo unrelatively, it would be very imperfed. It is therefore immutable as long as God and man continue to be what they are, as long as we (land in the fame relations to him, and to one another. God cannot change, and to fuppofe that the rela- tions 190 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. tions of mankind to him, or to one another, may, or have changed, is to aflume arbitrarily, and without any proof, that can be urged in a diiputation of this kind. If it does not follow necelTarily from hence, fure I am it follows pro- bably, that God has made no other revelation of himfelf and of his will to mankind. I do not af-» fert that he has made no fuch particular revela- tions, as I did not prefume to aflert that there are never any particular interpofitions of his provi- dence : but this I will aflert, that if he has made any fuch, the original and univerfal revelation: muft be the foundation and the criterion of them all. Let it be, for argument's fake, that God, who knew from all eternity what the ftate of man- kind and of every fociety of men would be at every point of time, determined to deal out his revela- tions by parcels, as legiflators are forced to make new laws, and new rules of government that are adapted to circumftances unforefeen by them •, in- ftead of making a fyftem of moral law, when he created moral agents, that might aniwer his whole purpofe in all circumliances of time, place, and perfons -, jull. as he made a phyfical fyilem of laws for the other part, the inanimate part of his cre- ation. Let this be alTumed for argument's fake, tho it be not in any degree fo agreeable to the notions of infinite knowledge and wifdom as the contrary opinion ; it muft be alTumcd, at the fame time, that there is nothing in any of thefe pofte- rior revelations inconfiLlent with the tirft, even in appearance and to our npprehenfions; or it muft be PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. igi be aflLimed that God himfelf, the fupreme wifdom, is inconfiftent, or gives occafion to his rational creatures to think that he is fo. I REASON very unwillingly, and not without a certain awe on my mind, when I prefume to fpeak of what God may, or may not do, as familiar as this pradice is to many. But if it be free from prefumption in any cafe, it is fo when we endeavour to expofe that of fuch men as thefe, and may be laid rather to refute their dodtrines than to advance dogmatically any of our own. I fpeak in this manner when I fay, agreeably to the moil clear and diflinft ideas I can frame, that as God, the fupreme truth and reafon, can neither pronounce nor imply any thing that is falfe, or abfurd, in condefcenfion to our capacities •, fo he will, in con- defcenfion to thefe capacities, make no revelation to us by his word, which fhall be even in appear- ance, and to human apprehenfion, inconfiftent with what he has revealed of himfelf and of his will by his works. This revelation, and all that is con- tained clearly in it, is an objed of knowledge. Other revelations, which we alTume to be made by his word, and which we receive on the word of man, are objefts of belief. Now it would be re- pugnant to the divine wifdom that he fliould perplex our knowledge in one cafe, or weaken our belief in the other, by fuggefting inconfiftent ideas of his nature, or his will. You will have learned, perhaps, to fay that things which appear in a pofterior revelation inconfiftent with the firft, would 192 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, would not appear fuch, if we could comprehend them clearly and fully. But you will unlearn this leilbn, if you confider that the common diftindtion, of things contrary to reafon, and things above it, cannot be employed, on this occarion,to any purpofe that will avail. If things contained in any affumed revelation are inconfiftent with the religion of na- ture, they are moft certainly contrary to reafon, (ince the religion of nature is collefted by reafon from the known conftitution and relations of things, and from the known order of providence. They are therefore to be rejedled. If the things contained in any fuch revelation be above reafon, that is, incom- prehenfible, I do not fay in their manner of being, for that alone would not make them liable to this ob- jeftion, but in themfelves, and according to the terms wherein they are communicated i there is no criterion left by which to judge whether they are agreeable, or repugnant, to the religion of nature and of reafon. They are not, therefore, to be re- ceived : and he who infills that they fhould be re- ceived independently of this criterion, falls into the abfurdity already mentioned. He fuppofes them reconcileable to the original revelation God has made in his works, becaufe they are contained in his word ; whereas it is incumbent on him to fliew that thefe very things are fo many internal proofs of the authenticity of this revelation, by fhewing that they are all reconcileable to the other. Divines themfelves agree to this, or they mean nothing, when they take fo much pains to recon- cile them to it, in order to conclude, according to their PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 193 their ufual method, that a thing is, whenever they imagine they have proved that it may be, or have faid enough to make others beHeve fo. It has been made a queftion, whether God can^ confiftently with his goodnefs, his juftice, or even with his wifdom, give fuch fecondary revelations^ as are afllimed, on particular occafions, or with- out any occafion and fufficient reafon for them ; and whether he can, confiftently with the fame attributes, after leaving his human creatures for a great number of ages under the law of their na- ture, by which nothing but morality was pre- fcribed, and nothing but immorality forbid, im- pofe new and pofitive precepts, the precepts of mere will? The queftion has been agitated with equal prefumption on both fides, perhaps j and certainly with much fophifm, and more evafion than argument, on one fide. I enter not into it. I ftand on the ground I have already made ; and infift that the law of our nature is perfect, rela- tively to our fyftcm, and muft be immutable as long as this fyftem continues. I infift, therefore, that it cannot be altered: but I may admit, for the point is not clear enough to oblige me to it necefta- rily, that things entirely and cxa6lly confiftent with it may be fuperadded to it by the fame divine autho- rity, tho not in a manner equally authentic} and that pofitive precepts may be given about things which are indifferent by the law of our nature, partaking neither of morality nor immorality, and which become obligatory as foon as they arc enjoined by" VoL.V. O ' ' fuch 194 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. i'uch pofitive precepts. Notwithftanding thefe con- ceflions, it •will remain true that every inftituted religion is dependent on natural religion, and Ihould be made fubfervient to it. They all boaft that they are fo, but experience fhews that the very contrary is true. They confift chiefly of articles of faith that go far beyond all the knowledge we can acquire •, and of external rites, ceremonies, and pofitive duties that have no relation to thofe of the moral kind, which are all included in the precepts of natural religion. Now it is true in fad that to believe thefe articles of faith, and to praftife thefe external duties, are re- puted in all thefe religions the mofl: eflential parts of them : fo that a good man and a devout man may be always different, and are often oppofite, charaders -, fo oppofite, that I fufpedt no two charafters would be found, if they could be nicely examined, in a great number of perfons to go to- gether fo feldom. This might be exemplified in many inftances, but in none more ftrongly than in that of the Jews. No nation fo exad in obferving fads and feafts, and fo fuperftitioufiy zealous in tlie pratftice of every ceremony of a law that abounded with ceremonies. But no nation fo un- hofpitable at the fame time, no people fo uncha- ritable, nor fo abfolutely ftrangers to that funda- mental principle of natural religion, univerfal benevolence. LXXVIII. PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 195 LXXVIII. TT were much to be wiflied that the fame re- •^ proach could not be made in any degree to the profeflbrs of chriftianity. But I apprehend that they too muft pafs condemnation on this head. The doftrine of a future ftate of rewards and pu- nifhments was eftabHfhed, no doubt, in the chri- ftian, as in every other fyftem of inftituted reli- gion, to enforce natural, that is, the firft, the moft authentic, and, as we may fay, the miftrefs of all religions, fince they fhould be all fubfervient to her. But this doctrine is applied, in every com- munion of Chriftians, as much to enforce matters of metaphyfical fpeculation, or pofitive duties, or forms of worfhip which are neither parts of natu- ral religion, nor have any necelTary connection with our moral obligations, as it is applied to en- force thefe. The miftrefs is fet on a level with the fervant, and the fame regard is paid to one as to the other. But why do I fay the fame, when it is manifeft that much more regard is paid in many inftances, and in the application we fpeak of here particularly, to the latter than to the former ? Metaphyfical fpeculations, pofitive duties, and forms of worfliip, can have no merit any further than they contribute to maintain and improve in our minds an awful fenfe of the majefty of the Supreme Being, of our dependence on him, of our duties to him, and of the moral obligations under which we lye to our fellow-creatures : and as far as they contribute to thefe purpofes, whe- O 2 ther ,96 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. ther they are of human or of divine inftitutlon, they have great merit, and are of great import- ance. Their merit and their importance, how- ever, cannot be equal to thofe of the religion they are defigned to maintain and improve : and yet we find them treated by the dodlors and profefTors of chriftianity as if they had more of both, as if this part of inftituted religion could be fubftituted in the place of that part of it which republirties natural religion, and could fupply the want of it. The clergy, who have taken the diftribution of Future rewards and punifhments into their own hands, diftribute them according to this rule. The man who has been a bad fon, a bad hufband, a bad father, a bad citizen, who has pafled his whole life in the pradice of private and public immorality, languifhes on a fick bed. Confcious of guilt, he apprehends punifliment, and all the terrors of hell ftare him in the face. He repents, therefore, may fignify in this cafe nothing more than this, he is afraid ; and fo will the moft har- dened villain be at the foot of the gallows. It is too late to amend, too late to repair the injuries he has done. The prieft, however, who gave the terror, is called to adminifter the comfort. The man confefles his fins, makes an orthodox pro- feflion of his faith, joins in the prayers that are faid over him, takes leave of the world with all the decorum which the difcipline of his church re- quires, and dies. We are bound to believe well of this man's falvation, and we commit his body to PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 197 to the ground, " in a fure and certain hope of his *' refurredlion to eternal life." The man who has pafled his whole life in the pradice of every moral virtue, and has lived up to the duties of natural religion in every relation, and in every ftation, has fulfilled by confequence all the obligations of revealed religion, as far as the latter is defigned to republifh and enforce the former. But the lat- ter is defigned more immediately, and preferably, for another purpofe : and therefore the hope of heaven is held out to one man, notwithftanding his wicked life -, the fear of hell is held out to an- other, notwithftanding his good life, on fcveral occafions. Faith unimpofed, and forms and ce- remonies unprefcribed, by natural religion, may atone for the violations of it j but the ftrid obfer- vance of it cannot atone, in any communion, for the want of faith even in matters that have been much difputed among Chriftians, and that are fo ftill in other communions -, nor for the negle6l of forms and ceremonies that are of mere human in- ftitution, and that have varied frequently, as all fuch infticutions muft and do vary by their own nature, and by the nature of thofe who make, and of thofe for whom they are made. To bring an in- ftance or two, that occur to me firft out of many. Read the creed of Athanasius, and then confider that the man we fiippofe in this place, who has conformed his whole life to the precepts of natu- ral religion, and of reafon, cannot be faved *, but niuft perifh without doubt everlaftingly, unlefs he * xxxix Articles. Q 3 believes 19$ PHILOSOPHICAl. WORKS. believes faithfully fuch a rhapfody of jargon as talapoins and bonzes woulcj be hardly brought to avow, as wants a fufBcient foundation in the go- fpel, as none but fadious priefts, who meaned to divide, not to unite, could have combined to pro- pagate, and as none, but the leaft reafonable and the moft implicit fet of men, could have received for truth Confider again, that the trite ceremony of baptifm, inftituted by the Heathens, pradiifed by the Jews, and adopted by the Chriftians, is made fo effential a part of religion under the vague name of a facrament, that neither the mo- ral goodnefs of men, nor the innocence of child- ren, can fecure their falvation, unlefs they have paffed through this myflical wafhing : without which, and the graces confequent to it, the good works of the former are not pleafant to God, byt have the nature of fin ; and the innocence of the other is infedted by that original taint which fpread from the tranfgreffion of Adam, and corrupted human nature in all his pofterity. These are principles of artificial theology, and fuch is the ecclefiaftical diftribution of future re- wards and punifhments in all chriftian commu- nions. I wave defcending into particular ex- amples taken from the eafl or the weft, from your church or from mine. This difference only I would obferve between the two laft. You ac- knowledge ftill a fpiritual monarch, the vicar of Jasus Christ on earth, and an infallible judge in all matters of religion, to whom you alcribe a fu- preme PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 199 preme ecclefiuftical authority. At lead the royalifts prevail amongft you, and the partifans of fpiritual liberty are few. We have thrown off this ridicu- lous but heavy yoke : and thus it is more eafy, and therefore more frequent to impofe new dodtrines, new rites, new ceremonies in your church, than in mine ; to fave, to beatify, to fanftify, whom his holinefs pleafes, and to pronounce as many ar- bitrary fentences of damnation as he thinks fit. Thus we have feen the conftitution Unigenitus, that child of jefuitical revenge, procured by fraud, and maintained by tyranny, erefted into a rule of faith in France, where a few years before, to fhew the exercife of this power in a light as ridiculous as fcandalous, not only propofitions extraded from the works of Jansenius were condemned, but even they who did not underftand the language in which the bifhop of Ipres writ, like the nuns of Port-royal, were required to believe, and affirm that thefe very propofitions were contained in his writings. Such occafional abufes of the dodrine of future rewards and punilhments, which the pope and his inferior pontiffs have applied with little regard to natural religion, and even with more regard to their artificial theology than to revealed religion, have been frequent. But there is another, which has been conftant in all the ages of the church, and by which the clergy has raifed exorbitant con- tributions on the laity. When chriftianity ap- peared firll in the world, the profeffors of it com^ O 4 pofed ioo PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, pofed a little, and in general a poor, flock. They who had fome fubftance helped to maintain thofe who had none ; aims were gathered for the faints, and every church had a common purfe. Like our quakers, they provided for their own poor ; and, like our quakers too, the teachers and the taught made one body, one undivided fociety. The former as well as the latter lived on what they had of their own, or on the common purfe, or on the bread they acquired by their induftry : and, as lu- dicrous as it may feem, it may be faid ferioufly» becaufe it may be faid truly, that if this order of things had been preferved among Chriftians, we might behold af this day, with great edification* fome of my lords the bifhops working at their leifure hours (and they have many fuch from epif- copal fundions at lead) in their trades, like St. Paul. But this order of things was changed early, and the diftinftion of clergy and laity efta- bliflied -, after which the former enjoyed, in their own right, or as truftees for the poor, all that had belonged to every church in common before. When the former came by feveral means to be confidered as a feparate fociety under the name of the church, they appropriated the wealth, which increafed daily, as well as the name, to themr felves : and when every church had a bifhop, the fuperior robbed the inferior paftors, and appro- priated to himfelf what belonged to them, to his church, and to the poor ; all of whom he threw pn the laity, to be maintained by them. LXXIX, PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 201 LXXIX. nr^HAT I may not render the dedu6lion too long •^ for this place, I content myfelf to obferve further, that, as this order of men increafed in outward dignity and riches, to neither of which they had any other claim than that which their own ufurpations, and the bigot generofity of fti- perftitious ages, gave them, they increafed in am- bition and avarice. The doftrine of a future ftate was proftituted to ferve the purpofes of both ; and as foon as they had perfuaded the laity that the power of tying and untying, which was given by Christ to his difciples, inverted the clergy with a power of determining in this world the con- dition of men in another, heaven and hell became inexhauftible fourcesof ecclefiaftical dominion and wealth, and were applied to little jlfe. The man, for inftance, who left his eftate to the church, and to pious ufes, as they are called, completed all the immoralities of his life by defrauding his family at his death. But the prieft, or monk, conveyed him to heaven direflly : and pafiports for that pur- pofe, even of modern date, are faid to have been found in the hands of the dead. The layman, who had a difpute with the church, flood expofed to the thunderbolt of excommunication, which he was prepared to believe did not only feparate him from her communion here, but would deprive him of happinefs hereafter -, fo that he might be damned eternallv for with-holding a tithe pig. It 202 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. It was left to the induftry of the clergy to im- prove thefe advantages in their feveral ftations all over the chriftian world j and it muft be owned that they improved them to the utmoft of their delegated power: for, being delegated, as extenfive as it was, it was circumfcribed. But that from which it was delegated, and which refided in the feat of this empire, the papal power, in Ihort, knew no bounds. Cafuifts have taught that the pope may by the fullnefs of it determine rightfully againft right *: as if he made things good and juft by willing them j which is, I think, the pre- rogative of God, but which no man, except a ca- fuift, will affirm to be that of his pretended vicar. The propofition will found harfhly to your ears, how catholic foever they may be •, but if you con- fider the pra<5lice of your church, and the preten- fions of your fovereign pontiff, you will be forced to confefs that they can be founded on nothing lefs than the fuppofition of fuch an exorbitant power as I have mentioned. There is no duty of natural, nor of revealed religion, nor of ecclefiaftical inili- tution, commonly much more refpedtcd than either, from the obfervation of which you may not be free by difpenfations, in the breach of which you may not be indulged, or for the breach of which you may not be Hill more eafily pardoned, at a market price: and this market price was formerly fettled and publidied in a book of rates, that every good * Ex plenitudine poteftatis jure poteft etiam contra jus de- perneie. chriftian PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 203 chriftian might know how much his favorite vice would coft him. A pafTage in the gofpel fhould have been altered on this occafion, and men fliould have been taught that it is more eafy for a camel to pafs through the eye of a needle, than for a poor man to enter into the kingdom of heaven. A CASUIST more modeft, and who thinks himfelf more fubtil, than the former, may alledge perhaps, for it has been alledged, that the pope has virtu- ally the keys of heaven fince he has thofe of the treafure of the church, that treafure of merits which cannot be exhaufted, the merits of Jesus Christ that are infinite, and that render therefore the reft of the heap unnecefTary being contained in it ; that the pope does not pretend to remit the debt which the finner owes to God, on a balance of the account of good and evil actions, but that he pays it by afligning out of this treafure as much merit as every finner, who applies to him, wants to entitle him to falvation. So father Paul reprefents the ^odrine .... ** ricompenfa il debito dd pecca- ** tore con aflegnare altretanto valor del teforo *." Thus, it may be faid, the pope decrees in all thefe cafes according to a right which God has efta- blilhed, and not again ft right by virtue of an af- fumed arbitrary unlimited power. But this whim- fical hypothefis, if it could be received, would anfwer the purpofe for which it is invented, by halves at moft, for there is fomething behind much ^Voffe than the accufation already brought. ♦ Coft. di Treh. L. I LXXX. 204 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. LXXX. VrOU^ divines, as well as ours, affirm very ■■• truly of the preceptive parts, that tho natu- ral and revealed religion are diftind, yet the dif- ference between them is not a difference of oppo- fition ; and that the latter, which enjoins pofitive duties not enjoined by the former, enjoins none that are inconfiftent with it. But now the fame men, who fay this very truly when they fpeak of the precepts of the gofpel, fay it very falfely when they fpeak of the religion which their artificial theology has impofed for chriflianity, and which is no more like to it in fome refpe6ls than tala- poifm, bonzifm, or lamaifm are. Some of them hold morality in fmall account. They place all religion in the obfervation of fuch rites and cere- monies as their church has inftituted, and in vari" ous a6ts of external devotion. They have been fpoken of already. Their whole religion is a fyftem of fuperftition, unworthy of God as the author, and unworthy to be believed and praflifed by ra- tional creatures. There are thofe again who hold morality in no account at all. Tho God has given us reafon to difcern our moral obligations, and a freedom of will to pradife them, on v/hich foun'» dation alone it can be faid either probably, or plaufibly, that we are accountable creatures, and have been fuch in every age of the world *, yet would there have been no fuch thing as moral virtue, nor as good works, if Christ had never conie PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 205 come into the world, according to thefe dodtors ; for if moral righteoufnefs was at all times alike conformable to the will of God, in which con- formity the very nature of it confifts, it muft have been at all times alike acceptable to him -, at leaft it could never be unacceptable : but we are told that it is unacceptable, unlefs it follow j unifica- tion, unlefs it be produced by faith, by grace, by infpiration, and a whole procefs of myftery. Be- fore Christ, therefore, it could not be conform- able to the will of God, it could have no merit, nay, it could have no nature, there could be no fuch thing. This furely is fanaticifm, and leads to enthufiafm. There are thofe again, and of thofe particularly I mean to fpeak in this place, who admit that there is a religion of nature and of rea- fon, that is, a primitive revelation, which ought to be the foundaiion and criterion of every other: but in fact they deny what in words they admit ; for under pretence of explaining and teaching a pofterior revelation, they contradict the firfl. Their artificial theology does not only take in much of the fuperftition and fanaticifm that have been mentioned, but impofes for doftrines and precepts of chriftianity, and enforces by the fandlions of eternal rewards and punifliments, fuch as would prove this revelation to be inconfillent and falfe, if they were really contained in it. Nothing can be more repugnant to the fpirit of chriftianity than violence, perfecution, and ty- ranny. Meeknefs, and humility, forgivenefs of injuries, 2o6 PHILOSOPHICAL WOkKS. injuries, and benevolence exalted into charity, arc the great charaderiftics of this religion. They are fo eflential to it, that many have deemed it on this account a fit profefllon for fome private fed, but a rule impradicable in the great political fo- cleties of mankind, and in the government of them*. That the clergy deemed it to be fo very early, and has a<5led on this principle ever fince, is evident to thofe who know any thing of the ecclefiaftical hiflory. The firft miflionaries of the gofpel were fent forth to preach, to perfuade, to convert, and baptife. If they did not fucceed, they had no power to call down fire from heaven -, they were to lliake off the duft of their feet, and to de- part quietly. Their commiflion extended no fur- ther. If they did fucceed, they eftablifhed a church in the place under certain orders, and regulations of difcipline ; which feemed to be a neceflary con- fequence of their original, and folely authentic, commiflion, tho not exprefly contained in it. Among thefe regulations, chat of feparating from the congregations and communion of chriftians, and of delivering over to Satan, unlefs they re- * When chriftians became nuinerous the names of eminenf biiliops alone were recited out of the diptychs ; but when they were few, all that died in' the communion of the church were commemorated in this manner. The diptychs were regifters originally of the fubjefts of Christ, who were to be here- after citizens of the new Jerulalem typified by the church on earth. Excommunication oat of one, therefore, excluded out of the other. Hence the exprefiion, that names were writ- ten in heaven and in the book of life, or that mens names wore call out. pented PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 207 pented and fatisfied the church, fuch as were guilty of notorious crimes, and fuch as prefumed to teach in thofe congregations a contrary do6lrine, was made by common confent. I fay it was made, becaufe it is plain it was executed, by common confent. But this power became foon confined, in the cxercife, to a few perfons ; and extended little by little, in the application of it, to a multitude of cafes neither intended, nor thought of in the firit inftitution. Perfons were appointed by the col- ledtive body of chriftians in every church, that is, by every church, to perform the duties which the apoftles, that founded thefe churches, and the firft pallors of them however appointed, whether by the apoflles, or by the churches, performed. The perfons thus appointed did not ceafe to be members of the fame religious fociety, for the whole con- gregation of chriftians was properly fuch, any more than perfons appointed to military or civil employments ceafe to be members of the fame political fociety. But the folemn air with which thefe fpiritual magiftrates were admitted into their offices by ordination and confecration, if thefe ceremonies are to be diftinguilhed in ho- nor of epifcopacy, gave them a pretence to af- fume, and prepared others to believe, that there was, befides the human appointment, fomething divine in their inftitution -, that they received the Holy Ghoft by impofition of hands, and could tranfmit the fame gift to others by the fame ceremony. Thus they came to be efteemed not only 2c8 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. • only a diftind order, as the priefts, the foldiers,- and the hufbandmen were in the kingdom of Egypt, but a diftincl and independent fociety too in many refpeds. This I mean. After Constan- TiNE had eftablifhed chriftianity in the empire^ the clergy were regarded as a iuperior order in the ftate, whenever it was moft advantageous for them to be reputed fuch; and as a diftind: fociety in it, whenever they thought fit, under the name of the church, to exercife powers, and to claim and procure to their order the enjoyment of immuni- ties or privileges which they could neither claim, nor have any pretence to enjoy, under the firft charader, and as members of the fame ftate. From hence arofe a double abfurdity. It was ab- furd, for it implied contradiction, that the fame order of men fliould be, and fhould not be at once a member of the fame commonwealth. It was ab- furd, for it was repugnant to all the ideas of order, to fuffer what is commonly called imperium in imperio, to fuffer a fecond fupreme legiflative power to grow up where a firft was already efla- blifhed ; and fuch a power efpecially as claimed a fuperior original, and an independent exercife : from which claims it was eafy to forefee what happened foon, that the two powers would clafh, that a confiid of jurifdidions would arife, and that the ecclefiaftical might prevail over the civil. The principal and mofl effedual weapon, which the clergy employed to make men fubmit to this tyranny, was the chimerical weapon of excommu- nication. PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 209 nication, forged in the chimerical fire of hell. They employed it firft in their fpiritual wars, for the ftate of chriftianity has been a ftate of war from the beginning. In thefe they excommunicated and damned one another, till, ignorance, fuperftition, and bigotry realifing chimeras, thefe fpiritual wars became very carnal. The clergy railed, and the laity cut throats. Ecclefiaftical quarrels difturbed the peace of the latter empire as much, and caufed the effufion of as much blood, as the invafions of barbarous nations. But things grew worfe as the church grew ftronger : and the fcene became more diforderly, and more bloody too, after Charles the great, when the weftern church was reduced into a monarchy, and the bifhop of Rome became the monarch. In this elevation, with the whole body of the clergy more united, and better difciplined under him, his own ambition increafed, and he animated and guided theirs. They had made themfelves before this time a diftinfl fociety from the civil in every country where they had been admitted. His authority over them had been very great, if it had not been entire, in every country. He abetted them in their ufurpations, and they in return abetted his. But in this age the clergy fecular and regular compofed not only a diftindt ecclefiaftical fociety in every particular ftate, they coalited into one political body, where- of the pope was the head all over the weft. The contention for fuperiority over the civil powers was avowed ; and whilft thefe defended themfslves feparately, or, which was worfe, whilft they af- VoL. V. P fifted 2!0 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. fifted the common enemy againfl: one another, they were all fubdued alike. Some of the greateft femperors were excommunicated, and in confe- quence infulted, opprelTed, dethroned. The ec- clefiaftical order, and, at the inftigation of this, all the other orders in their dominions, revolted againft them. They difcovered, as well as other princes and ftates, but they all difcovered it too late, how dangerous it is to protect, enrich, for- tify, or even to fuffer, any order of men, who, having a diftincb intereft, and ov^ing a diftin6b al- legiance, mufl of courfe become a diftin6l fociety in the ftate ; and efpecially when this order has the means ol turning the confciences, and inflam- ing the paflions, ot men by religion againft the ftate, and the legal government of it. Gregory the feventh carried thefe iifurpations and this ty- ranny to the utmoft height, by a more impudent, as well as a more fuccefsful, proftitution of the docftrine of a future ftate, than any of his prede- ceiTors. From him his fucceffors learned to diftri- bute plenary indulgencies with profufion, and to extend particular excommunications into general interdicts. By the firft, they fold heaven to the beft bidders, and lent men in ftioals to eternal happincfs. By the fecond, they condemned whole nations at once, deprived them ol the mt^ans of falvation, and fubjecfted them in one collective body to eternal mifery. The firft was a never failing fource of wealth, the fecond of power. No inftance can be produced in all thefe proceed- ings of any regard to true religion. Virtue and vice PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 2ir vice were out of the cafe. Even the opera operata of external devotion were enjoined for the fake of form alone. To be truly orthodox, and in a ft'ate of falvation, it was fufficient to fubmit blindly to the authority of the church, and to procure the advancement of it againft law, reafon, and every moral obligation. To be heretical, and in a (late of damnation, it was fufficient to refufe the fub- miffion, or to refift the ufurpation. This abufe of the dcxftrine of a future ftate grew fo common in a fhort time, that it was employed not only in the great ftruggles, which arofe between the ecclefi- aftical and civil powers, but in every paultry affair, wherein the popes had any perfonal, or family concern •, and indulgencies and excommunications were let loofe by this mitered tyrant to fate the ambition or avarice of a brother, a filler, a nephew, a niece, a whore, or a baftard. LXXXI. T T is true that this exorbitancy has been re- •*• drained within two centuries : and this reftraint is due to the reformation. We fhook off the ty- rant and his tyranny at once. You have filed the fangs, and blunted the teeth of the beafl. He may mumble and bruife •, he cannot tear, and bite, and devour as he did. But ftill the inflances that have been cited are proper, and the refiedions that have been made juft. The inflances are proper, becaufe rhey are inftances of the ufe that was made of this dodrine in the whole chriftian church during fe- P 2 vcral 212 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. veral centuries. The reflexions are juft, becaufe tho the fame ufe is not made of it now, even in yobr communion, that was made formerly, yet the fame moral arguments are employed to maintain it j arguments which cannot be reconciled, as it feems to my apprehenfion, to the belief of an all- perfed Being. To demonftrate the exiftence of fuch a being by appeals to the inward confcioufnefs of their own exiftence, to the fenfes, and to the reafon of men, is not a difficult tafk. But he who has fucceeded in it, runs the rifque of undoing what he has done, when he appeals at once to the fenfes and to the paflions of men, for the injuftice of God's difpen- fations here j and to their reafon alone prejudiced by the former, for the juftice of his difpenfations hereafter i tho the adtuality of thefe muft be always hypothetical, and the equity of them not fo much as problematical. The divines of our communion run this rifque even more than yours, becaufe when they prefume to reafon they have not the fame referve of church authority, which yours have, to ftop the mouths of gainfayers. They put the truth, or rather the belief, of God's exiftence, in all they preach, and all they write, on the caft of a dye : they may confirm their hearers and their readers in the do<5trine they teach, but they may Ihake too the fundamental principle of all religion. Nay, they may drive into abfolute atheifm the man who is weak enough to be moved by one part of what they fay, and not weak enough to be con- vinced PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 213 vinced by the other. No matter. They not only repeat the moral arguments, and the bold affertions that have been mentioned already, but they tell us fometimes, that the rules of evangelical perfe6bion, fuch as felf-denial, mortification, and others, are of fo exalted a kind, that God gave the hope of future rewards to encourage us to the pradice of them *. According to this doftrine then he is fo cruel a being, that he will make none happy here- after, who have not made themfelves miferable here. The man who will be faved mud be initiated into the fanatical aufterities of fome religious order to make his falvation fure, for aught I can fee ; and when he is fo, he may have good rcafon perhaps to renew the queftion Diogenes afked, " num Pa- ** TROECiONi furi, quod initiatus fuerit, fors erit *' melior poft mortem, quam Epaminondae ?" They tell us fometimes, that the temporal pro- mifes made to an holy and virtuous life extend no further than to food, and raiment, and to daily- bread; and they demand, who would be contented- with fuch a fcanty provifion, when he fees the greater profperity of bad men who diflblve in eafe and luxuryf.'' The proper anfwer to this queftion is to be made ad hominem, by afking another. Who would not be contented with this fcanty provifion here on the fame terms, and why are not you, why do you, good man, repine at the greater profperity of the wicked, when you know that eter- nal happinefs is laid up in ftore for you, and eter- * Atterbury. f She R LOCK, not the righteous bifhop, but his father. P 3 nal 414 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. nal mifery for them, who will want even a drop of water to cool their tongues in the next world, after diffolving in luxury here ? They tell us fometimes, that without the hopes of another life virtue is but a dead and empty name *. Nay, there are thofe who have not fcrupled to affert that, if there is not another world, all difference between good and bad is taken away in this world f. To ileal, to poifon, to flab, to forfwear, in fhort to commit any a6lion that brings either profit, or pleafure, is reafonable : it is fo far from being a crime, that it becomes a duty, in as much as it promotes the hap- pinefs, that is, the chief end of the man who com- mits it. The two firfl of thefe do6brines are the very quinteffence of theological abfurdity, the two laft are abhorrent from all the principles of natural religion, and none of them come up td the purpofe for which they are advanced. If there is no other life, virtue is but a dead and empty name, they fay ; and yet the infinite wifdom of the Creator has conftituted the ilate of mankind, and the order of things in this world fo, that human happinefs rifes and falls, is acquired or loft, in proportion to the pra6lice or negleft of virtue. Crimes are reafon- able, vice becomes a duty on the fame fuppofition that there is no future ftate, they fay ; and yet vice is as oppofite to virtue in it's effe6ls, as in it's nature, according to the fame conftitution, and the fame order of things. Neither the immor- tality of the foul, nor future rewards and punilh- ments can be demonftrated on principles of reafon, •Til;-otson. -fWiLKiMs, cum aliis. not- PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 215 notwithftanding all the metaphyfical, theological, and even geometrical, attempts that have been made, with the fame evidence as all our moral obligations may be. The religion of nature there- fore, teaches the latter independently of the former. There may be rewards and puni(hments referved to another life ; but whether there are, or are not, the religion of nature teaches that morality is our greatift intereft, becaufe it tends to the greateft happinefs of our whole kind in this life •, and our greateft duty, becaufe it is made fuch by the will of that Supreme Being who created us and the fyftem to which we belong. It is falfe, therefore, and impious to aflert, as thefe divines do, that, if there is no other life, there are no moral obliga- tions -, or, as Paschal does, that if there were no other life, the direftions of reafon for our conduct in this world would not be fuch as they are. But to have done with fuch abfurdities for good and all. I cannot clofe thefe minutes better, than by obferving how wide a difference there is be- tween natural and artificial religion. It has been obferved *, that the difference between the things of nature and thofe of art appears to our great fur- prife fince microfcopes have been in ufe : and this furprife increafes in proportion as they are im- proved. The things of nature appear to be adapted to ufeful purpofes, wherever thefe purpofes can be difcerned -, they are elegant, they are finilhed, and the mind is ravilhed into admiration. The things * By bifhop WiLK I n s in his treatife on nat. relig. P 4 ^^ ii6 PHILOSOPHICALWORKS. of art are adapted often to purpofes that arc hurt- ful: and to whatever purpofes they are adapted, when we fee them fuch as they really are, they appear to be clumfy, bungling, coaffe, and imper- feft inftruments. A juft and eafy application of this remark might be made to things intelledual, and efpecially to thofe of a theological kind, and to the reafonings of men about them. Thus, to take an inftance of the highcft and moft important objed of human fpeculation, let us refleft once more on the notions that philofophers and divines have en- tertained and propagated concerning the Deity : for thefe are the fountains of all religions i and as they are pure, or impure, fo muft the ftreams that flow from them be. Right reafon neither flops too fhort, nor goes too far, in attempts to frame fuch notions as thefe. She frames them in that light which comes refledled from the works of God, and in which alone we may fay that he fhews himfelf to man. Imagination, on the contrary, knows no bounds, but proceeds from one hypo- thetical reafoning to another, till fhe has framed all thofe notions of the Deity, which the prepof- feflions, the habits, the profeffions, and the in- terefts of the men, who give her this loofe, require. The confequence has been, and it could be no ether, that natural religion reprefents an all-per- fe6l Being to our adoration and to our love ; and the precept, " Thou fiialt love the Lord thy God " with all thy heart," will be effeftual in this fyftem. In the other, in that of artificial theology, I apprehend that it cannot be foj for I have learned PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. fi; learned from do6tor Barrow *, that in the frame of the human foul " the perceptive part doth al- ' ways go before the appetitive : that affedlion follows opinion ; and that no objedt otherwife ' moves our defire than as reprefented by reafon, ' or by fancy, good unto us. This," he fays, " is * our natural way of ading ; and, according to it, * that we may in due meafure love God, he mud * appear proportionably amiable and defirable to * us. He muft appear to be the fountain of all * good, the fole author of all the happinefs we * can hope for." Can any man now prefume to l^y that the God of Moses, or the God of Paul, is this amiable Being ? The God of the firft is partial, unjufl, and cruel ; delights in blood, com- mands afTalTinations, malTacres, and even exter- minations of people. The God of the fecond elefts feme of his creatures to falvation, and predeftinates others to damnation, even in the womb of their mothers. This precept of the gofpel, therefore, cannot refer to fuch a God as either of thefe : and indeed, if there was not a Being infinitely more perfecSl than thefe, there would be no God at all, nor any true religion in the world. But there is moft affuredly fuch a being ; and he who propofes any fyftem of religion, wherein this all-perfe6t Being is not to be found, may fay that he is no atheift, but cannot fay with truth that he is a theift, * Serm. xxiii. The The SUBSTANCE of fomc LETTERS, Written originally in French, about the Year mdccxx, T O M^ DE P O U I L L Y. The SUBSTANCE of fome LETTERS, Written originally in French, About the Year mdccxx, TO M\ DE P O U I L L Y. SINCE you are fo curious to know what pafled in a converfation lately between one of your acquaintance and myfelf, wherein you have been told that I maintained a very lingu- lar paradox ; I will give you fome account of it, a general and Ihort account, at leaft, of the firft part, and one more particular and more full of the laft, which is called paradoxical. You led me firft, in my retreat, to abftradt philofophical rea- fonings : and, tho it be late to begin them at forty years of age, when the mind has not been accuftomed to them earlier, yet I have learned enough under fo good a guide, not to be afraid of engaging in them whenever the caufe of God and of natural religion is concerned. They 222 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. They were both concerned, very deeply, on the occafion you refer to. There had been much difcourfe, in the company that was prefent, con- cerning theablurd opinions, which many theiftical philofophers entertained of old about the Supreme Being. Many had been cited, and many reflec- tions had been made on them, by feveral, when the difpute became particular between * Damon and me, he denying, and I affirming, that there are fufficient proofs of the exiftence of one Su- preme Being, the firfl intelligent caufe of all things. You may be fure I made ufe of thofe you furnifhed me with by a geometrical applica- tion of the dodtrine of final caufes, which Ihews, in various inftances, what numberlefs chances there are againft one, that intelligence and defign were employed in the produdion of each of thefe phaenomena. When I could not filence my adverfavy by thefe proofs, tho they carry probability up to a reafon- abie, if not to an abfolute, certainty, I infifted on a proof, which muft give this certainty, I think, to every one, who acknowledges that we are capable of demonftrative knowledge. I ar- gued a pofteriori, from the intuitive knowledge of ourfelves, and the fenfitive knowledge of ob- jefls exterior to ourfelves, which we have, up to that demonftrative knowledge of God's exiftence, which we are able to acquire by a due ufe of our * I chule "0 call him by this feigned name here. reafon. PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 223 reafon. Here we ftuck a little, and he was ready to deny all fenfitive knowledge, on the chimerical notions of father Malbranche, and fome other philofophers, without confidering that he deprived himfelf, in denying the exiftence of God, of thofe expedients, by which the others pretended to ac* count for the perception of the ideas of objefbs ex- terior to the mind, independently of any fenfitive knowledge. I endeavoured to fhew him that, to renounce fenfitive knowledge, was to renounce, in fome fort, humanity, and to place ourfelvesin fome unknown rank, either above it, or below it. I endeavoured to ftate the true notion, by ftating the true bounds, of fenfitive knowledge, which is not fufficient indeed to ihew us the inward con- ftitutions of fubftances, and their real eflences ; but which is fufficient to prove to us their exift- ence, and to diftinguifh them by their effeds. I concluded this article by quoting to him a palTage in the Logic of Port-royal, wherein it is faid that no man ever doubted, in good earneft, whether there is an earth, a fun, and a moon, no more than he doubted whether the whole is bio-ger than a part ; that we may fay with our mouths that we doubt of all thefe things, becaufe we may lie ; but that we cannot oblige our minds to fay fo : from whence it is concluded, more generally than I fhall conclude, that Pyrrhonians are not a fed: perfuaded of what they fay, but a fedt of liars. He did not infift much longer, but left me to purfue my argument from intuitive and fenfitive knowledge, to a demonftrarion of God's exiftence ; which 224 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. which great and fundamental truth refults necef- farily from a concurrence of all the kinds of human knowledge employed in the proof of it. I WAS not interrupted by him in the courfe of this argument, nor did he attempt to break any links of this chain of demonftration, but followed the example of all thofe who refufe to yield to it. They are fo far from confidering the degrees, the bounds, and, within thefe, the fufficiency, of human knowledge, that they afl<. continually, and that others endeavour very often vainly to give them, knowledge concerning the divine nature and attributes particularly, which it is impoflible and unnecefTary we fhould have, even on the fup- pofition that there is a God. Unable to break through this demonftration, they hope to weaken the efFed: of it on themfelves and others, by found- ing high the difficulties that prefent themfelves whenever we reafon on the manner of God's exift- ence, on his attributes, on his providence, and on many points relative to thefe : that is, they will not receive a demonftration, made according to the cleareft and moft diftindt ideas that we have, and by the moft precife connexion of them, be- caufe there are other things, which we cannot de- monftrate, nor explain, for want of other ideas. This proceeding is fo unreafonable, that the atheift himfelf docs not hold it on any other occafion j but admits the truth of many propofitions, tho he be unable to refolve feveral difficulties that are, fome way or other, relative to them. He reafons on PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, 225 on this important article of human knowledge as he would be afhamed to reaibn on any other. I MIGHT have refted the argument here, be- caufe tho there are fecrets of the divine nature and economy which human reafon cannot pene- trate, yetfeveral of theobjedlions to them, which atheifts commonly make, even that of phyfical and moral evil, and the fuppofed unjuft diftribu- tion of good and evil, which has been made in all ages, and which is now more prevalent than ever, by the joint endeavours of atheifts and chriftian divines, are eafy to be refuted. Thefe fubjeds have been fo often treated between you and me, that I fhall fay nothing of them here, tho I did not decline them there : on the contrary, if I do not flatter myfelf, I faid enough to defeat the attack of the atheift,and to difappoint the treachery of the divine. After which I infifted, with great reafon furely on my fide, that thefe difficulties, and more of the fame fort, were fo little able to embarrafs the theift, that, inftcad of being repug- nant to his fyftem, a neceffary confequence of ic is, that fuch difficulties fhould arife. He is fo little furprifed to find them, that he would befur- prifed not to find them. In demonftrating, to him, the exiftence of God, his reafon has not demon- ftrated to him a being little raifed above humanity, and about whom he may always afllime on human ideas, fuch as the divinities of the heathen were. She has demonftrated tohim the exiftence of an all-perfecl felf-exiftent Being, the fource of all VoL.V, Q exiftence. 226 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. exiflence, invifible and incomprehenfible j the au- thor, not only of all that is vifible and compre- henfible to his creatures, but of all that is in the whole extent of nature, whether vifible or com- prehenfible to them or not. From hence he con- cludes, and well he may, that there muft be many phaenomena phyfical and moral for which he can, and many for which he cannot, account. The fyftem of God's attributes being, like the exercife of them, infinite, and our fyftem of ideas and of mental operations being very narrow and imper- fe6t, it follows neceffarily that fome few parts of the former fyftem are proportionable to the latter, and that a multitude of others are not fo. A theift may fufFer himfelf to be led into difficul- ties j but the atheift, take what fyftem of atheifm you pleafe, muft fall into abfurdity, and be obliged to aflert what implies contradidion. I CONSIDERED the Supreme Being, in all I faid, as a firft intelligent caufe, and as the creator of the univerfe. From hence my antagonift took occafion to ridicule what theiftical poets, philofo- phers, and legiflators have advanced concerning the firft principles or the beginning of things, and the operations of a divine wifdom and power in the produdion of them, as if they had been cotemporary hiftorians and fpeclators of what they related moft affirmatively and circumftanti- ally. I joined with him, for the moft part, in giving them this ridicule j and exprefled myfelf with a juft indignation againft them for attempt- ing PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 227 ing to impofe fo many fidlions on mankind, and for prefuming to account for the proceedings of infinite wifdom and power by the whimfies of their own imaginations. He did not fpare Moses, nor I Plato. But when he went fo far as to deny, on the ftrength of a very weak fophifm, that we are obliged to afcribe the creation or for- mation of the world to intelligence and wifdom, he turned, L think, the ridicule on himfelf, for he reafoned thus : When you inveftigate the proceedings of na- ture, you obferve certain means, that feem, to you, proportioned to certain ends. You perceive too that you cannot imitate nature any other way than by proportioning means to ends : and thus you frame that complex idea of wifdom, to which you afcribe the phaenomena, and the imaginary final caufes of them. But you are grofsly miftaken when you aflfume that nature adls by fuch means as feem to you proportioned to thefe ends. Here is a clock which marks the hours and minutes, and ftrikes regularly, at certain periods, a certain number of times. The inward conftrudlion of this clock is unknown to you. But you fee one made, which, by the means of certain weights, produces all the fame eff^efts. Will you afierc now that the motions of the firft clock are regu- lated by weights, becaufe thofe of the fecond are fo ? You will be much deceived if you do, for the motions of the firft clock are produced and regulated by a fpring. 0^2 This 228 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. This argument would have fonie force in oppo- fition to fuch naturalifts as Strato of Lampfa- cus, as Des Cartes, and as others who have made hypothetical worlds, and have pretended to account for all the phaenomena by fuch laws of matter and motion as they have thought fit to eftablifh. But in the prefent cafe it is a mere pa- raiogifm, and unworthy of the man who em- ployed it, fince it ferves to explain and confirm that very reafoning which it is intended to oppofe. The fame motions are produced indeed by differ- ent means ; but ftill thefe different means are pro- portioned alike to the fame end : which proves the very thing I would prove, the intelligence of a workman. When we had done fpeaking of philofophcrs who admit the beginning of the world, we pro- ceeded to thofe who deny it ; and Damon feemed to think himfelf ftrongly intrenched in the fyftem of it*s eternity. As we cannot conceive, faid he, that matter was created and brought out of no- thing, fo we cannot conceive neither that matter could of itfelf produce motion, nor that matter and motion together could produce thought. But there arifes from hence no neceflity of affum- ing that there is any fuperior being. Matter, motion, thought, are eternal ; and have been al- ways what they are. The fame nature, and the fame courfe of things, that exift adually, have always exifted. To PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 229 To this it was eafy to anfwer, that if I agreed with him in owning the eternity of the world, this conceflion would not infirm the proofs I had brought of an eternal Being, diftinfl from the world, as the workman is from his work. Wc may allow the world to be eternal, without allow- ing that it is the fole eternal Being. All that ex- ifts, has a caufe of it's exiftence, either out of it- felf, or in itfelf. It has no caufe of it*s exiftence out of itfelf, if it is the fole eternal Being. It has this caufe then within itfelf, and exifts by the necefTity of it*s own nature. The atheift affirms then that it is impoITible to conceive that this world fhould not exift ; or fhould exift any other- wife than it does exift, both in matter and in form. This feems to me infinitely abfurd ; for the atheift either has no ideas in his mind when he pronoun^ ces thefe words, " exifts by the necelTity of it's " nature •," or he underftands fuch a neceffity of exiftence, that a fuppofition of the contrary would imply contradi6tion. If the atheift fays, he has no idea of fuch a neceffity, he has then no idea of the eternity of the world. If he fays, as Damon did fay, that he can no more conceive this world not to exift, or to exift differently from it's prefent exiftence, than he can conceive the equality of twice two to four not to exift, he fays nothing to the purpofe ; fince the neceffity of exiftence, according to him, cannot be admitted till he has given us another definition of what we are to un-= derftand by thefe words : and another definition, Q^ 3 intelligible 230 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. intelligible and reafonable, I think, he never will be able to give. After having pu{hed this argument beyond reply, which I borrowed but did not weaken, I added, that Aristotle, and other antient phi- lofophers, who believed the world eternal, did not fallinto the abfurdity of believing it uncaufed. They believed it eternal in the order of time ; but they believed it the effedt of a fuperior caufe in the order of caufality. The diftindion is, per- haps, too metaphyfical : but it ferves to fhew, fmce they made it, to what fliifts they were driven in maintaining the eternity of the world, and how little reafon the modern atheift has to lean on their authority. From refuting his opinions I was led to ad- vance one of my own, and to aflert that this faft, " The world had a beginning," is a faft founded on fuch a tradition, as no reafonable man can refufe to accept. This is the paradox : in ad- vancing of which I had, not only Damon, but almoft all thofe who were prefent, againft me. I ttook up the reft of our converfation : and I will tell you, not only what I faid, to fupport my opinion then, but what has come into my thoughts upon the fame fubjefl fince. Tho we cannot have, ftriftly fpeaking, a cer- tain knowledge of any fadl whereof we have not been ourfelves witnefles, yet are there feveral fuch fadls whereof we cannot doubt. High probabi- lity PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 231 lity muft ftand often in lieu of certainty •, or we muft be, every moment, at a lofs how to form our opinions and to regulate our condu6l. Such is our condition -, and we cannot think it unrea- fonably impofed, fince we are able, by a right ufe of our reafon, to afcend through various de- grees from abfolute improbability, which is little diftant from evident fallhood, to that degree of probability which is little diftant from evident truth. Qn this principle let us proceed to confider, how high this propofition, " The world had a " beginning," ftands in the fcale of probability. We fhall find, perhaps, that it ftands too high to have the propofition pafs for a paradox, when I have told you what was faid in converfation, and what has occurred to me fince, on the fame fubjed. An hiftorical facl, which contains nothing that contradidls general experience, and our own obfer- vation, has already the appearance of probabi- lity ; and, if it be fupported by the teftimony of proper witnefl^es, it acquires all the appearances of truth ; that is, it becomes really probable in the higheft degree. A fa6t, on the other hand, which is repugnant to experience, Ihocks us from the firft ; and if we receive it afterwards for a true fad, we receive it on outward authority, not on inward convidlion. Now to do fo is extremely abfurd ; fince the fame experience, that contradicts this particular fad:, affirms this general fa;^, that men lie very often, and that their authority alone is a very frail foundation of afient. 0.4 232 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. It may feem a little extraordinary, and per- haps chimerical, to our firft thoughts, to examine which is moft comformable to experience, the eternity of the world, or the beginning of it in time •, and it would be really fo, if, to con- ftitute this conformity to experience, it were flridly neceflary, on every occafion, to cite a faft of fimilar kind. But there is no fuch neceflity in the nature of things, and this conformity may be fufficiently conftituted otherwifc. Were it not fo, our ignorance would produce very con- trary effeds, equally abfurd ; for this mother of fuperftitious credulity would be the mother like- wife of moft unreafonablc incredulity. The probability of a fad, whereof there are frequent and notorious examples, may force our aflent at once, like thofe which happen conftantly in the ordinary courfe of things. But ftill it is true that a fa6t, of which we find no precife ex- ample within our knowledge, may have a con- formity properly fo called, with our experience. The probability arifing from this fort of confor- mity will not be perceived, indeed, fo foon as the other ; but when it is perceived, will determine alike. This cafe may be compared to that of the mathematician, who arrives at truth by a long procefs of demonftration, and who can doubt of this truth afterwards, no more than he doubted of thofe felf-evident truths which carry inftantaneous conviction to the mind. A FACT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 233 A FACT may be, in the refpeft we fpeak of here, indifferent. We may difcover, in our ex- perience, none of the fame fort -, and yet none that imply contradiction with it. Such a fact, therefore, is mere J y new ; and experience will be far from teaching us to rejedt any fa6t on this ac- count alone. When fuch fads, therefore, new to us, according to the extent of our knowledge, but not fo to other men, are attefted by credible witnefTes, he muft a6t very unreafonably, who refufes to give that degree of aflent to them, which is proportionable to the credibility of the witnefles. Again, the fadt may be conformable to experience by a certain analogy phyfical or moral, if not by particular examples ; and may be admitted therefore, on proper teftimony : more eafily flill, than one of thofe which I called in- different. One refts wholly on teftimony, but experience gives to the other an indirect, if not a diredt, confirmation. Let me quote a ftory, which will ferve to il- luftrate all I have been faying. A certain king of Siam was firmly perfuaded that Sommona- CoDOM had ftraddled over the gulph of Bengal ; that the print of his right foot was feen at Pra-bat, and that of his left foot at Lanca. This pious legend was certainly repugnant to his majefty's ex- perience, the firft foundation of probability : and he fell into the abfurdity of believing it on the jnoft precarious of human authorities, the au- thority 234 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, thority of his priefts, who had taught him, per- haps, that the merit of his faith in the legend of SoMMONA-CoDOM increafcd as the probabihty of what it contained diminifhed. When the dutch ambalTador afiured the fame prince that the fur- face of the water hardened fo much in his country, during the winter, that men, and beafts, and heavy carriages pafled over it, the prince treated him as a liar. He knew no example of this kind : and the feeming nonconformity to experience, in this cafe, had the effeft which the real nonconfor- mity to experience fhould have had in the other. I call this a feeming nonconformity ; becaufe altho the good Siamefe knew no example in point of what the ambaflador told him, yet he might have refleded on feveral particular objeds of his knowledge, that would have brought it up to a real conformity. He knew, for I think the art of calling cannon was known in his country, that extreme heat could give fluidity to the hardeft metals : from whence he might have concluded, very naturally, that extreme cold was capable of producing a very contrary effecl, that of con- denfing and hardening fluid fubftances. In his country there was no ice ; but he knew that there fell fcmetimes on the neighbouring mountains of Ava, of Pegu, and of Laos, a certain white cold and folid fubfl;ance which was nothing elfe than water, condenfed and hardened in one feafon, and melting and flowing in another. He was a man of good fenfe, they fay j and therefore we may believe that thefe confiderations difcovering to h PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 235 to him a real, tho not exa6t, conformity to his experience, he gave credit to the Dutchman afterwards. Let us confider now, on our part, whether ' there are not fa6ts that contain all that is neceflary to eftablifh the higheft probability, tho there are no examples of the fame, and tho' we fhould al- low, that a bare non-repugnancy to experience, or a ftrong analogy to it, do not afford fufficient grounds of probability. Suppofe then a fadl, preferved in hiftory or tradition, which has the two conditions of non-repugnancy and of ana- logy, and the contrary to which cannot be alTerted without abfurdity. If the negative be abfurd, is it not agreeable to right reafon that we adhere to the affirmative ? It may be faid, perhaps, that the fuppofition I make cannot have place in hiftorical fadts, that thefe are in fome fort arbitrary, they may be affirmed or denied, according to the credibility of the teftimony. That Julius Caesar conquered the Britons, or that Genghiz-Can conquered China, may be true j but it may be true, like- wife, that Caesar was beat by the Britons, and that Genghiz-Can did not even march into China. It may be faid, that when fuch fa(5cs, as we meet with frequently in romances of all kinds, are concerned, we may affirm that the contrary is true, or that no fuch events ever hap- pened ; but that it will not follow that an hifto- rical 236 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. rical or traditional fa6t is true becaufe it appears to us that to fuppofe the contrary is abfurd. I enter no further into this difquifition, but I con- tent myfelf to fay that there is, at lead, one fuch fafl conveyed to us by tradition, the truth of which we muft admit becaufe it is abfurd to afllime the contrary, and becaufe one or the other muft be neceffarily true. The fadl I mean is this, that the world we inhabit had a beginning in time : and the fame may be faid of our whole folar fyftem, and of the whole fyftem of the univerfe. Now this fadl being denied very dogmatically, and there neither being,nor ever having been any living cotemporary human teftimony for it or againft it, "we muft, I think, be decided in this cafe by con- fidering whether the beginning or eternity of the world implies any contradiction with what we know, or is repugnant to our cleareft, moft di- ftinct, and beft determined ideas. One of thefe facts muft be true, fince the world exifts adtually. If it can be fhewn, therefore, that the opinion of it's eternity is an abfurd opinion, I muft be con- vinced that it had a commencement. To prove the abfurdity of the former, there feems to be a very obvious method, and an argu- ment the more conclufive, becaufe it is, in oppo- fition to the atheift, an argument ad homi- nem, an argument drawn from the only Iblu- tion of one of the greateft difficulties which the theift propofes to him. If this folution be not good, he remains without a reply : and if it be good. PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 237 good, as 1 think indeed that it is fufficient to anfwer this particular difficulty, there arifes from it an argument againft himfelf, much ftronger than that which the theift oppofed to him, and which I am ready to acknowledge that he has fully anfwered. What is here faid requires to be explained by a dedudion of particulars. He who denies the commencement, and afierts the eternity, of the world, mufl believe that this planet of ours has been, from all eternity, fuch as we fee that it is. I fay, that he muft believe it to be fo, (ince, if he admitted fuch changes in it as had overturned the whole order of phyficai nature, deftroyed all the fpecies of animals, and confounded all the elements in a new chaos, the difpute would be over, and he convided, at once, of the groffeft abfurdity, becaufe a God, a A'/ifA-ivpyo?, would be as necefTary in this cafe, as in that of an original creation. Jn fhort, fuch a renewal of the world requiring no lefs wifdom and power than the formation of it, the difpute, on the atheift's part, would link into a cavil about words. He is obliged therefore to maintain that this planet of ours has been always, upon the whole, much what it is j that there have been, from eternity, the fame general laws, and the fame order of phyficai nature ; an infinite fuccelfion of material caufes and effedls, blind caufes of uni- form efFeds, uniform in kind, if not in degree j caufes, which have been effefts j effedis, which become caufes in their turn •, and proceed in this manner 238 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. manner round the circle of eternity. When wc quote to the atheill the univerfal confent of tra- dition in affirming that the world had a begin- ning, he laughs at the proof. Whether he has any right to do fo, will be feen prefently. In the mean time, we cannot be furprifed that he, who rejedts a demonftration, fhould pay no regard to a tradition ; but we may be well furprifed, when, following the atheift on, we find him calling tra- dition to his aid, and leaning wholly upon it. If the world is eternal, why does our knowledge of it go no further back, why have we not more antient memorials, fays the divine ? The fame reafon, fays the atheift, which hinders us from having records, where we have any, beyond two or three thoufand years in a fpace of five or fix thoufand, to which, according to you, the anti- quity of the world extends, is juft as good to hinder us from feeing further backwards, in a longer, and even m an infinite, fpace of time. Now here theology comes in to the aid of atheifm, as it does upon more occafions than this. The hiftory, vv-hich is afcribed to the legiflator of the Jews, and which it is required that we fhould be- lieve implicitly, afiiures us that the world was once entirely drowned : and through the whole courfe of facred, as well as profane, fcriptures, we hear of other inundations, of earthquakes, of plagues, of devaftations of countries, and of captivities of people ; by all, or fome of which, not only num- bers of men have been deftroyed, but whole po- litical PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 239 litical focieties have been loft. Thus the atheift has it in his power to make the fame ufe of holy- writ, which the divine makes of profane hiftory ; that is, he adopts whatever makes for his purpofe, and rejeds whatever does not. He finds antient governments frequently diffolved, and new ones rifing. The records of the former, as well as their laws and cuftoms, perifli with them. The latter remain often very long in ignorance and barbarity, and have not the means, nor even the defire, of conveying the events of their own time, nor the traditions of former times, by authentic records to pofterity. He will not fail to obferve that all we know of antient hiftory, except thofe broken fcraps of it which jewifh traditions men- tion, has come down to us from the Greeks; that many centuries paffed, after the deluge, before Cadmus, or any one elfe, carried the ufe of letters to this people -, and that this people, not having employed them to write hiftory till many centuries afterwards, it is not aftoniftiing that we know as little as we do concerning times more an- tient than thofe. The atheift triumphs in this an- fwer to the divine : and tho no man abhors his caufe more than I do, I think him thus far in the right. But the fcene will foon change, if a theift interpofes. His anfwer to the divine's queftion will indeed ftand good, but out of this very an- fwer there will arife a decifive argument againft him. When' the atheift has founded the deluge of Deucalion 240 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. Deucalion high, and admitted, for the fake of his argument, that of Noah -, when he has added tothefe, all thole other deluges, of which tra- dition fpeaks, thatof XisuTHRus, that of Ogyges, that which the chinefe annals mention, that whereof the priefts of Sais informed Solon, and that, if it was not the fame, whereof the me- mory had been preferved among the people of America, befides a multitude of devaftations of other kinds, he will think himfelf very ftrong. But the theifl may afic him a very puzzling que- ftion Was there any thing fupernatural in the production of thefe terrible cataftrophes ? The divine might anfwer, that there was ; but he could not : for if he did, he would acknowledge the exiftence of a Supreme Being, which he denies. It remains then that all he has faid about the immutable order and laws of nature, which have maintained the world in much the fame ftate, and fuch as it is, from eternity, muft pafs for nothing : and the theifl: will infifl: that, if fuch events as thefe, which tend direftly to the diflb- lution of our planet, and the extermination of the whole human race, have been produced fo often, in five or fix thoufand years, by the adion of blind caufcs, matter and motion alone, it is repugnant to common fenfe to believe, either that fuch events have not happened an infinite number of times, in an infinite fpace of time ; or that, having fo happened, they fhould not have once deftroyed the world entirely, and made the fuppo- fition of a God ncccifary to reftore it to the ftate in I PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 241 in. which we fee it. The theift will infift further, againfl: the atheill, that it is abfurd to confine thefe phaenomena to fuch bounds, and to accom- pany them with juft fuch circumftances, as fuit his purpofe. The purpofe of the atheift required that thefe deftru(5lions of mankind fhould happen often enough to defend his hypothefis againft that queftion, Why have we not more antient memo- rials of the world, and of the inhabitants of it ? What his purpofe required, is exadlly anfwered by the eternal complaifance of blind material caufes. The world was never entirely deftroyed, nor mankind entirely exterminated, nor any ne- cefllty created of a God to reftore them. But there have been as many of thefe deftru6lions, as may be improved to extricate the atheill out of the difficulty which is laid in his way. The divine would fit down well fatisfied with the ftate to which, I fuppofe, the difpute is re- duced by the theifl-, if he had nothing more at heart, than to maintain the exiftence of God, by maintaining the commencement of the world. But he has fomething more at heart : it mufl have commenced, it mull have been renewed, and it mull have been repeopled, in the manner Moses relates, and juft at the time which he fixes, ac- cording to the calculations that learned men have grounded on the genealogies contained in the book of Genefis. For this purpofe a fyftem has been in- vented by crouding profane into the extent of fa- cred chronology, and by making as many anec- VoL. V. R dotes 242 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. dotes of the former, as can be fo made, feem to coincide with thofe of the latter. Divines would he thought to prove the latter by concurrent evi- dence -, but in reality they alTume it to be true : and by this affumption alone can the violence, with which they drag profane anecdotes to their purpofe, be in any fort excufed. That I may not quote to you any of thofe numberlefs heavy writers, who have taken this tafk upon them, I will bring forward on this occafion Mr. de Me aux, the honor of the gallican, or rather of the chriftian church, and the fhame of that of Rome. This writer, who poflclTed in the higheft degree the talent of feducing the imagination, when he could not convince the judgment, running over, in his Difcourfe on univerfal hiftory, thofe ages which fucceeded the deluge, in a very agreeable manner, but on very precarious authority, makes no fcruple of affirming that there is no antient hiftory, wherein the marks of a new world do not appear manifeftly in thefe early times, and long after them. Thefe endeavours to confirm the mofaic fyftem by a multitude of uncertain tra- ditions, as well as the hiftory itfelf, compiled, no doubt, from other traditions, might be fuffi- cient to take all authority from tradition, if thefe authors did not miftake the notion of it, and if a juft diftinftion, that ought to be made, did not cfcape them. Tradition is firft oral, the firft author or au- thors of it unknown: and when it comes afterwards — into PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 243 into hiftory, the genealogical defcent of it is no- thing more than tradition: and we muft fay, in general, very abfurdly, that it proves itfelf ; or, very truly, that it has no proof at all. From hence it follows that, particular circumftantial fafts, conveyed to us by particular traditions, are deftitute of hiftorical proof. But ftill it will be agreeable to nature and reafon, that the unani- mous concurrence of many traditions, to which no contrary traditions can be oppofed, may con- ftitute the truth of a general fad. Public report, as Pliny the younger obferves, relates fads in the grofs, and naked of circumftances. ,So it muft do, to defervc any credit •, and fo does this tradition, that the world had a beginning. It is rather a fa6l refulting from the concurrence of traditions, than a fact founded on the authority of any. Nothing can be lefs credible, than all that we read in antient ftory about the Afiyrians, for inftance. It is a wild heap of inconfiftent traditions, which cannot be reconciled, nor veri- fied for want of an hiftorical criterion. Ctesias, it is faid, boafted that he had extradled the ma- terials of his hiftory, whilft he was in the fervice of the king of Perfia, out of the authentic re- cords of that monarchy. But his account, thofe of other greek writers, and even thofe of the Old teftament, are fo contrary to one another, and, on the whole, fo improbable, that they may be all comprehended under the name of AfTyriacs, which Aristotle brought into proverbial ufe, and which was meant to fignify all forts of fabu- R 2 lous 344 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. lous relations. What are we now to believe in this cafe ? Not any particular tradition, to be fure ; but thus much in general, that there was an empire once founded in Afia, to which the AfTyrians gave their name. These traditions, thofe of Egypt, and many of Greece, come from thofe dark ages which may be called heroical or fabulous, after Varro the mod learned of the Romans. More modern Greeks, like echoes, repeated thefe traditions ; and, in repeating, multiplied them all, fo that the found of them rings flill in our ears, and they remain objecfts of learned curiofity. Shall we give credit now to the traditions, that came down from fabulous ages, about the expedition of the Argonauts ; about the war of Thebes, and that of Troy; about the adventures of Hercules, of Theseus, and a multitude of other romantic ilories ? No, moft certainly. It would be ridi- culous to give credit to any of them. But it is not ridiculous, it is reafonable, to be perfuaded that they had fome foundation in the truth of things. Every tradition, confidered apart, may be fafely denied •, becaufe no one of them has an hiftorical proof: but yet a truth, which may be called withlittle impropriety hiftorical, re fu Its from the combination of all thefe fabulous traditions. There were no doubt, in unknown ages, maritime expeditions, famous leagues, cruel wars, and heroes who rendered their names illuftrious. One PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 245 One tradition reports that Perseus carried a colony into the eaft ; another, that Titho;«jus did the fame '* ufque ad Aethiopas,** as far as the Indies. Is not the voyage of lo, the daughter of Inachus, into Egypt long before, and the ex- pedition of the Cimmerians into Afia long after, famous in tradition ? Many others of the fame kind might be mentioned : and tho they are all fabulous, they leave no reafon to doubt that arts and fciences, and even barbarity, were carried from the weft to the eaft, as well as from the eaft to the weft, in ages quite unknown to us ; which is enough to ftiake the authority of that particular hiftory, wherein it is reported that the world was repeopled from one fpot, and by one family, after an univerfal deluge. But 1 need infift on this head no longer. So many general truths, of which it is impoflible to doubt, refult from the concurrence of fabulous traditions, that there re- mains no reafon to doubt of the truth of this fa(5l, " The world had a beginning." - Will it be faid, that if there has been fuch a tradition, it has not been fo univerfal as to eftabliil^ this truth, according to my own rule ? Left this fliould be faid, it is neceflary that I prove the uni* verfality of it ; and that by ftiewing, particularly, for what reafons we admit other fadls to be true, tho founded only on tradition, it may appear that the beginning of the world is ftill better founded, and this important tradition advantageoufly di= ftinguilhed from all others. R 3 246 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. Whilst I am writing on this fiibjefl, to you, a diffcrtation I had never feen before is fallen into my hands. The author * of it pretends not only to prove that the world had a beginning, but alfo that this beginning was the fame which Moses gives it. He is fo fond of the fecond propofition, that he employs all his fkill and all his learning to eftablifh it. He ventures to affert that the hiftory of the world was very well known, when that of MosES became public by the fpreading of the go- fpel ; that profane hiftory agreed with facred, in this refpedl, and did not reach beyond the bounds MosES had fet. One would think that thefe writers imagine, for this writer is a divine too, that none but themfelves can read, and that they have ftill the advantage, which they had before the refur- reftion of letters, the advantage of impofing what- ever they pleafe on an ignorant world. The world had a beginning; tradition proves it had. But tradition is far from proving that it began, either in the manner Moses relates, or at the time which he is thought to have fixed. Profane and facred hiftory were as little agreed, when chriftianity was publifhed and the jewifti fcriptures were better known, as they are at this time; notwithftanding all the pains taken by Josephus, Eusebius, and others, to reconcile them ; and notwithftanding all the pains that have been taken, by modern fcholars, to confirm facred by profane anecdotes. Let us negle(5l fuch writers, therefore, who * Jac<^elot. make PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 247 make a fliew of learning, always futile, and often falfe. Let us examine and compare for ourfelves ; look into the authors they cite ; but truft neither their citations nor their reafonings. Diodorus the Sicilian, and Strabo, in the reign of Au-^ GusTUs ; Pliny and Plutarch in thofe of Ve» SPASiAN and Trajan, very refpeftable authors cer- tainly, give us a different idea of their knowledge in the hiftory of the world, from that which the author of this differtation would give us. They knew a little better, than this modern writer, what hiftories and what traditions they had of any au- thenticity. They made no great account of thofe canticles or hymns, of thofe infcriptions and other expedients, which had been employed, in more early times, to preferve the memory of paft events, and concerning which the writer we refer to enters into a chimerical and tirefome detail. Thefe antient writers looked on their hiftories to be more modern, and their traditions to be more antient, than our tribe of fcholars would make them, the laft efpecially. That profound antiquity, wherein thefe men affedt dogmatically to make great difcoverics, with very particular and critical exaftnefs, was, for the others, a dark abyfs, wherein they faw but few objedts, and thofe few rather general than particular, and on the whole very imperfeft. They acknowledged that the firft of the greek hiftorians had writ no earlier than the time about which the Perfians began to make their expeditions into Europe. They confelled that neighbouring nations had fome hiftorical monu- ments of a much greater antiquity j but they con- R 4 feffed 248 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. fefTed too, that thefe monuments were very imper- fed: and very precarious, broken into difcordant anecdotes, and mingled up with romance and po- etical fiflion. In a word, they owned themfelves able to pierce a very little way into antiquity : but none of them pretended that the bounds of their hiftorical knowledge were the bounds of antiquity. Let us fee now, whether the beginning of the world may not be, even at this time, reputed equivalent to the bell eftablifhed hiftorical fa6t, notwithftand- ing the avowed ignorance of the moft learned and curious enquirers, who wrote, two thoufand years ago, about the beginning of nations, and much more of the world. The Egyptians feem to have been reputed the moft antient, or one of the moft antient, nations of the world, by the Greeks, from whom all our knowledge of profane hiftory defcends. They gave to their nation an immenfe antiquity, and in part, perhaps, fabulous. But I am at a lofs, however, to difcover what means, arid therefore what right, the fcholars of thefe ages have to decide as dog- matically, as they have done, about the egyptian dynafties. Why, for inftance, the jefuit Petavius required that we fhould, upon his word, reje6t them all ? Or, why the author of the DifTertation, afrt-r touching the matter very lightly and very fuperficially, fhould expe(fl to be believed, when he conjedlures that there were no monuments of egyptian antiquity later than Moeris, tho he has in this the authority of as great a man as Mar- shal PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 249 SHAM on his fide ? Diceearchus, the difciple of Aristotle, who had not moft certainly infpired him with much credulity in antient traditions, had ftudied the antiquities of Egypt. Manetho had done the fame in the time of Ptolemy Philadel- PHus, and Eratosthenes, in the time of Ptole- my EvERGESTEs. Thc fitft of the two was himfelf an Egyptian, and had extracted his chronology and hiftory from the books of Mercury, that is, from the facred and moft authentic writings of the Egyptians. Why has his chronology been called in queftion, or why was it not received by chriftian writers beyond a certain epocha ? Is there any pretence to fay that he altered what he found in the books of Mercury ; as we know that Ju- lius Africanus, and E^sebius, altered and tranfpofed his dynafties, to make them, as near as they could, conformable to the mofaic chronology? With what front can we fufpecl the authenticity of books, compiled and preferved by egyptian priefts, when we receive the Old teftament on the faith of jewilh fcribes, a moft ignorant and lying race ? Were the facred books of the Egyptians taken from them, by a king of Perfia ? Diodorus fays it. But the fame Diodorus afllires us that the Egyptians purchafed their fcriptures again, and that they were reftored to them by the eunuch Bagoas : whereas the fcriptures of the Jews were loft, more than once i and how they were reco- vered, the laft time at leaft, is unknown to us : nay, whether they were recovered at all, in a ftridt fenfe may be, and has been, queflioned by fome Chriftians 250 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. Chriftians and Jews too. Is the immenfe antiquity, which Manetho afcribed to his nation, or the tales of Osiris, and Isis, and Typhon, too ridi- culous to be admitted ? I fhall not plead in favor of them. But, in truth, are the anecdotes of jewifli antiquity a whit more conformable to ex- pe'rierice, to reafoiJ, and to ail our notions of things divine or human, whatever regard we may pay to fome pafiTages in the Pentateuch, becaufe of the life to which they arc put by theology. No man, ■yvho has the leafl pretence to candor, and who dares fpeak out, will aflert fo much. But ftill, how little credit foever we may give to the particular traditions of either fort, all of them together are tiK general voice of antiquity, and extort our af- icni to this truth, " The world had a beginning.'* This truth feems to have been propagated by them in chofe hieroglyphs, and that facred language, wherein they recorded whatever was moft antient and mod refpeded. Horus, or the world, was reprefented like a youth whofe beard was not yet grown. An egg was the famous fymbol of the generation, as well as figure, of the world; and the Thebans, who were the moft antient egyptian dy- nafty, had an hieroglyphical reprefentation of the Divinity with an egg coming out of his mouth ; which fymbol of an egg was adopted by the Fhenicians, and by the Perfians, and became an objed of wprfhip in the orgia, or myfteries of Bacchu.s. Thefe monuments came down from the firft Mercury, at whofe antiquity we cannot fo PHILOSOPHICAJU WORKS. 251 fo much as guefs ; for the fecond, who followed, and probably very long after him, our chronolo- gers are obliged to place as high as the age of Moses or of Joshua. Sanchoniathon, that we may fay fomething of phenician as well as egyptian traditions of this fort, is another author that may vie, perhaps, with the moll antient for antiquity. Bochart, and all our divines, think fit to place him in the time of Gideon. It is not convenient for them that he fhould ftand backwarder. They build their aflertion on a paflage concerning him in the writ- ings of Porphyry, who fays, that Sanchonia- thon had the materials of his hillory from Je- rombal, a prieft of the god Jao. Now Jerombal founds too like to Jerubbaal, the name Gideon wears in fcripture, and Jao founds too like Jeho- vah, to leave any doubt on this fubjed: in the minds of men who can make fyftems and write volumes on the affinity of founds. Sanchonia- thon then, being cotemporary to Gideon, had ^ knowledge of the books of Moses, and took from thence all he knew concerning the beginning of the world ; fo that thefe two are but one and the fame tradition, according to this opinion. But there is great rcafon to doubt of the firfl part, and the fecond is evidently falfe. — The anachronifm of Porphyry, who fuppofed S emir amis cotem- porary with the fiege of Troy, will not make Sanchoniathon cotemporary with Gideon: fjnce the laft was, unluckily, not a prieft, and fince 252 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. tmcQ the Jerombal, from whofe writings the phenician hiftorian is faid to have borrowed, was one. The anfwers made to this objedlion are trifling. A pagan, it is faid, might take a general of an army for a prieft : and Porphyry was guilty of this blunder. The Jews called their chiefs or principal men fometimes priefts, it is faid. There- fore Porphyry, who was no more a Jew than he was a Chriflian, might make ufe of an appellation peculiar to the Jews. But, further, in what time foever Sanchoviathon lived, he did not relate what he faid concerning the commencement of the world from the mofaic hiftory, or any other jewilh traditions j fince he affirmed pofitively that he derived his cofmogony from Taaut or Mer- cury. Have we not reafon to be furprifed, a$ much as we are accuftomed to it, at the boldnefs of fcholars who prefume to oppofe their frivolous conjedlures to what an hiftorian himfelf fays of the memorials which he followed ? — The fecond part of what is faid concerning this phenician hifto- rian being falfe, it follov/s that Sanchoniathon, one of the moft antient writers whofe name is come down to us, that S anchoni athon, a lover and fol- lower of truth, according to the etymology of his name, learned and curious in fearchingthe original of things, furnifhed with the moft authentic ma- terials that Egypt and Phoenicia could afford him, and writing in an age when the authenticity of thefe materials might be known, affirmed the be- ginning of the world : and is, therefore, a voucher pf the fame truth, diftinft from Moszs. Whe- PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 253 Whether the books of the Pentateuch were writ by Moses himfelf, or whether the traditions contained in them were compiled after his time, which is not at all improbable ; Certain it is, that thefe traditions are of very great antiquity. Now thefc traditions confirm the fame general fafl, in a more circumftantial account of it, than we may fuppofe that Sanchoniathon gave. I have read that SiMPLicius laughed at the whole ftory, and at Gr AMMATicus for quoting fome paflages of it. This interpreter of Aristotle affirmed, that the whole was taken from egyptian fables. But Sim- PLicius might have confidered, as we do, that how ridiculous foever the circumftances might be, the fad, affirmed by fo many traditions, might be true, tho he was led to deny it by arguments which Aristotle himfelf owned to be very problem- atical. Aristotle, who employed logic very ab- furdly in phyfics, might employ it, as abfurdly, about hiftory and tradition. Let it be, that the account Moses gives of the creation, and the cof- mogony of Sanchoniathon, are alike fabulous; yet Itill the general fa6t, advanced by them, may be reputed true. The various fables anexed to it do, in effed:, prove it ; fince it is not likely that they would have been invented, if the foundation of them had not been laid in tradition, if there had not been a flock of truth whereon to graft them. I AM as much perfuaded, as Simplicius himfelf, that the Ifraelites might borrow fome egyptian tra- ditions. 254 PHILOSOPHICAL V/ORKS. ditions, as it is notorious that they borrowed many civib and religious inftitutions from the fame peo- ple. I can believe too, on the faith of learned men, that there is fome analogy between the mofaic account of the creation and the phenician cof- mogony. There is nothing extraordinary to alter the ftate of the queftion in this. I can believe too, that the fix times, in which God made the world, according to an antient tradition of the Perfians* are relative to the fix days in which he made it, according to the jewifh traditions. The Ifraelites had been flaves to the Egyptians, captives among the Chaldeans, and fubjeds to the Perfians. They boafted their defccnt from Abraham ; and the magi acknowledged this patriarch for their legif- iator, and for the inftitutor of their religion. The reformation, which Zoroaster made in this, was made aft-er the return of fome of the Jews from Babylon into their own country. But it was made, according to Hide and other modern critics, in the reign of Darius, fon of Hystaspes, a little before Esdras and NsHEMrAs went from the court of Perfia to reftore the religion, to fettle the government, and to compile the traditions of the Jews at Jerufalem. Esdras fet out from Perfia and Babylonia when the difputes between the ma- gians and the fabians ran the higheft, and when the ne'.y doflrines of Zoroaster prevailed in the firft fervor of reformation. Esdras, therefore, and the other Jews, who could not fail to be fa- vorable to the firft fed:, and averfe to the latter, might very well take, as it is highly probable that they PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 255 they did, the names of the months, the names of angels, many ridiculous anecdotes, and, among the reft, fome concerning the creation, from the ma- gians. The tradition was common to all thefe na- tions, but they invented, and they borrowed from one another, various circumftances, in which they drefled it up differently, each hiftorian according to his fancy, and conformable to the eftablifhed fyftem of his religion. This hypothefis is fo well founded, and fo very probable, that our divines do nothing better than weaken the credibility of the fact, when they afllime, on the fimilitude of fome circumftances, that this tradition, as well as the belief of one God, was preferved by the Jews alone. They were both much more antient among the Perfians than Zoroaster or Zerdusht. We have to do here only with the firft : and as to that. Porphyry cites, in his treatife De antro nym- pharum, a certain Eubulus, who writ the hifto- ry of Mithras, and aflured in it that Zoro- aster confecrated a round grotto, fuch as nature had formed it, adorned with flowers and watered by fprings, to Mithras, the creator of all things; which grotto was the fymbol of the world, as the world is the work of Mithras. The fame re- former inftituted feftivals likewife to com.memo- rate the beginning of it : and not content with this he defcended into particulars ; fixed the number of days contained in every one of the fix times that 256 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. that had been imagined; and marked the gradual progrefs of the creation in each of them. The Chaldeans may be coupled, on this occa- fion, with the Perfians, as the Phenicians and the Ifraelites were with the Egyptians. They were all diftind nations-, they had all their diftind: reli- gions and traditions; but they all agreed in one, the beginning of the world, how many different fidtions foever they might relate concerning the time and manner of this beginning. I do not cite the chaldaic oracles. They were as much forged or corrupted, perhaps, as the fibylline verfes. But we have no need of leaning on their authority. Eitse- Bius has preferved a remarkable paffage that was in the hiftory of Berosus. An antient tradition of the Chaldeans reported, that our world was formed out of a chaos. All was night and water, til Bel cut this night in two, feparated the heavens from the earth, and formed the world. The ftars, the fun, the moon, and the planets, were the pro- dudlions, according to this tradition, of the fame Bel, by which name the Chaldeans meaned to fig- nify the Kneph of the orthodox Egyptians, their own invifible Mithras, or, in one word, the Su- preme Being. I KNOW very well that Diodorus fay?, the Chaldeans believed the world eternal by it's na- ture, and incapable of generation or corruption. But, in the firil place, the authority of Berosus feems to defcrve, on this occalion, much more credit PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 257 credit than that of Diodorus, not only becaufe he was much nearer to the timf s of which he fpeaks, but becaufe he was a baby Ionian and a prieft, and, therefore, better inllruded without doubt, than the latter, in the traditions of his own country; In the next place the difficulty of reconciling thefe two authors does not feem infuperable. The Greek, in the beginning of his firft book, fpeaks of thofe who believed the world eternal, and of thofe who were of a contrary opinion < But this difpute feems to have rifen among the naturalifts or the learned, as he calls them, and not among thofe who contented themfelves to know, about pad events, what the hiftory and tradition of their country taught them. Thus we may under- ftand, and fhould, I think, underfland, what he fays of the Chaldeans, for after having faid that they maintained the eternity of the world, and believed it incapable of generation or corruption, he adds, that they believed the world to be governed by a divine providence, and every thing, which hap- pened, to be ordered by the gods, not to happen by chance. Now the greateft part of what he fays being manifeftly an account of philofophical opinions, and not of fadls preferved in hiftory or in tradition, it feems moft natural to underftand the whole in the fame manner : befides which, it is to be confidered that there might be a tradition of the commencement, and that there could be none of the eternity, of the world. From all which it feems evident to me, that the whole of what DiODORus fays is applicable to philofophical Vol.. v. S opinions 258 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. opinions alone, which are fometimes oppofed to matters of fad fufficiently eftabUftied ; whereas every fuch hypothefis fhould have it's foundation in fad, not to be chimerical. Berosus relates what he found in the chaldaic traditions ; and DiODORUS tells us what the opinions were of fome philofophers at leaft. We fhall fee prefently, that this oppofition of a philofophical hypothefis to tradition was not confined to Egypt or Chal- daea, and that it does not affed the truth of the propofition we defend. Strabo relates, in his fifteenth book, that the brachmans in India agreed with the Greeks in many things, and particularly in this, that " the *' world had a beginning i" to which he adds, and that " it will be deftroyed." Advantage may be taken from hence to turn my own way of reafoning againft me. It may be laid, that, fince the brach- mans believed the future deftrudion of the world, which could not be the fubjecl of any tradition, and was not certainly revealed to them by pro- phecy, the aflTumed commencement of the world might be, and certainly was, merely founded, as well as it's afllimed deilrudtion, on their philofo- phical fpeculations. It may be faid, that we ought to explain this paflage of Strabo much as I have explained that of Diodorus, and to fuppofe the whole fyflem of thefe Indian brachmans philofo- phical. I SHALL have occafion to confider, more at length. PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 259 length, the true difference between a tradition of opinion, and a tradition of fa6l. But, in the mean time, I obferve, that fince the opinion of the fu- ture deftru6lion of the world, founded manifeftly in fpeculation, was entertained by the Greeks, at the fame time as the opinion of it's beginning, founded not lefs manifeftly in tradition-, and fince Strabo afiTures us that there was a great con- formity between the opinions of the Greeks, and the opinions of the Indians, we may well believe that there was the fame conformity between the principles on which their opinions were framed. Thofe among the Greeks, who believed the world had a beginning, believed it on the faith of tra- dition. They who imagined it would have an end,, were led to imagine fo both by phyfical and meta- physeal fpeculation. Since they were fure it had a beginning, they concluded from both that it would have an end, and grafted opinion on fad:. Thus it happened among the Greeks, and thus it might happen among the Indians. I OBSERVE, in the next place, that if there was any author of equal authority, who aflerted that the brachmans believed the eternity of the world, to oppofe to Strabo, as we have Berosus to oppofe to DiODORus, this circumftance might afford fome pretence to fay that the brachmans, having framed, from obfervations of the prefent ftate of the material world, an opinion that it would be fome time or other deftroyed by age or accident, were led from thence, by carrying their S 2 fpecu- 26o PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. fpeculations backwards, to the opinion that it had a beginning : but that, as there is no fuch autho- thority to oppofe to Strabo, we ought to con- clude that the knowledge they had by tradition of the beginning of the world led them to believe, on phyfical obfervation, and metaphyfical reafon- ing, it's future deftruftion j rather than to conclude this philofophical conjedlure led them to imagine, without any foundation in tradition, that the world had a beginning. So that I might very well quote the Indians, as an antient nation who con- curred in eftablifhing the truth of this fad on the faith of their traditions. I MIGHT go further on to the eaftward, and bring the teftimony of the Chinefe, on the fame fide : a moft antient nation furely, and poflefTed of more antient records, perhaps, than any other, tho we have been little acquainted till very lately with their hifhory, chronology, and traditions. But I chufe to proceed in quoting authors better known to us, and (hall therefore cite once more Strabo, whofe authority of all the antient writers, is perhaps of the greateft weight. Strabo repre- fents the Ethiopians rather barbarous than civi- lifcd i and yet this people believed a fupreme im- mortal Being, the firfl caufe of all things. This people therefore believed the beginning of the world ; and this people could not fail to have moft antient traditions, fince, as rude as they were, the ufe of letters had been known by them from a time immemorial. Enough has been faid oi the moft PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 261 moft antient nations that are mentioned in hiftory : and if we defcend to the Greeks, modern with refped to them, tho antient with relpedl to us, wc fhall find the fame tradition eftablifhed, and further reafons to perfuade that it was univerfal, alle- gorifed, difguifed, difputed, and even weakened by time -, but ftill univerfally received and ftrong- eft as we remount higheft in our inquiries after it. Such it was when the Greeks, from whom it has defcended to us, adopted and tranfmitted it. This tradition feems to rife out of the abyfs of time with the impetuofity of a great fource. But then as the water, which fpouted out with much noifc and force in the beginning, runs filently and gently on, the further it runs •, fo this tradition grew weaker, but continued to run, when the authors, whom we read at this time, began to write. The Egyptians were the firft mafters of the Greeks. Before any of thefe went into Egypt to acquire fcience, they had received much inftrudlion from thence ; principles of religion and of civil government, and anecdotes of antiquity. Orpheus may pafs for the firft of thefe egyptian miflionaries ; fince he came from Egypt, tho he was a Thracian. I abandon the vcrfes, which have gone under his name, as eafily as the chaldaic oracles ; but that I fhould believe there was no fuch man, is too much to require. Aristotle aflerted, as we learn in the firft book Of the nature of the gods, " Orpheum " poetam nunquam fuilTe." But we find, in the lame treatife, that Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod, S 3 and 262 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. and HoMZR, were reckoned among the moft antient poets. It would not be difficult, perhaps, to difcover the principle of philofophical intereft which induced Aristotle to deny the exiftence of a man fo fa* mous in all the traditions of his country, and who had been the fubjedl of fo many fables. What traditions of greater antiquity than Orpheus the Greeks might have, we know not. But he was, certainly, the principal channel, through which that of the commencement of the world pafled, from the Egyptians to Musaeus, Hesiod, and Homer, who received firft, or were confirmed in the belief of it, by this authority, and whopreferved and pro- pagated it in all their fongs. Pythagoras took it from the Egyptians likewife, and from other eaftern nations. The whole italic fchool, and all thofeofthe ionic, who did not prefer their own fpeculations to a matter of faft, and Plato, the famous founder of the academy, followed them. None of thefe invented the fad; but all of them dreffed it up and delivered it jjown in different garbs, according to their different fyftems of phi- lofophy and religion. Even the Chriftians, who came fo long afterwards, helped to corrupt this tradition, by interpolating the famous verfes, a- fcribed to Orpheus, which I have for this reafon, among others, confented to lay afide ; tho flill, if we believe thefe verfes were compoled by Onoma- critus, and not by Orpheus, they were com- pofed at lead as early as the age of Pisistratus, and contain therefore a very antient tradition- I MIGI^T PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 263 I MIGHT have named, as the prefervers of this tradition, among the Greeks, Linus, Thamyras, and others. I might quote feveral Theogonias, that, it is faid, were writ hke that of Aristeas of the ifland of Proconnefus, or that of Epimeni- DES of the ifland of CretCj all which would have been more ridiculous, than they were, if the be- ginning of the world had not been eftablillied in general belief: but I will mention, particularly, that of Hesiod only. He invokes the mufes to fing the divine race of thofe immortal gods born of the earth, of the heavens, and of night, and who have been nourifhed by the fait fea. He goes on to bid them fing, how the gods and the earth were firfl made, with the rivers and the immenfe fea, with the ftars and the heavens, with the gods ■who proceeded from them, and who were the au- thors of all good things. The fame extravagant ideas are to be found in Homer. The ocean was, according to him, the original of all things : and this notion coincides with that of Thales, who taught that all things proceeded from water as their material principle j by which he meaned, no doubt, a certain chaos, wherein all the elements were confounded, till they were reduced into or- der, that is, till the world began. The proofs of the univerfality of this tradition, muffled up almoft always in allegories and fables, are fo numerous, that we run more rifk of being loft in the inultiplicity of them, than of wanting S 4 any, 264 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. any. Abaris, the fcythian, had writ concerning thefe generations of gods. The world was not eternal in the fyftem of the druids ; and the an- tient Etrurians had their fables concerning the be- ginning of it, as well as the Egyptians and the PerAans. The magi, fays Diogenes Laertius, taught the generation of the gods : and by thefe gods they underftood fire, earth, and water. One of the magi, fays Herodotus, fung the fame ge- neration, in an hymn, at all the facrifices of the Perfians. As poetry perfonified every thing, antient phi- lofophy, which was little elfe than poetry, animated all the elements ; and every part of corporeal nature was filled with inferior divinities : for they ac- knowledged fome that were fuperior, and even a Supreme Being, who, far from being born of the world, made it, and was the father of gods and men : which puts me in mind of a paflfagc of Ci- cero, \vhere it is faid, of this Supreme Being, " deos alios in terra, alios in luna, alios in reliquas '' mundi partes fpargens Deus quafi ferebat." It would have been very convenient for all the atheiftical philofophers to have iffumed the eter- nity of the world •, but few of them durft do fo, in oppofition to this univerfality of tradition. They were obliged, therefore, either to rcjeft this tra- dition, or to find fome way of accounting for the fxiilence of our planet, without fuppofing a felf- cxiftent A»|Utap}/of, or archited, the firfl mind of Anaxa- PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 265 Anaxagoras. They chofe the laft, as the moft eafy tafk : and Epicurus feemed to think his ab- furd fyftem more Hkely to prevail, for this very reafon, becaufe it afllimed that the world had a beginning conformably to tradition. The author of the diflertation I have before me aflerts that all the philofophers, except the Epicureans, under which name he comprehends all the atomic phi- lofophers, held that the world was eternal. A paf- fage in the beginning of the fourth chapter of the treatife of Censor inus, De die natali, led him into this error. What he advances may be proved falfe by a deduction of many particulars -, but this may be faid with truth, that an opinion of the eternity of the world grew up or fpread more af- ter Aristotle. Even the latter Platonicians took part on this head with the Peripatetics. They treated their mafter, as St. Jerom accufes others, and might have been accufed himfelf, of treating the fcriptures. Whatever new opinions philofo- phers framed, they dragged in the text of their mafters to fupport them : which calls to my mind the proceedings of a Jew and of a ftoical philofo- pher. Philo found a trinity of divine hypoftafes in the writings of Pl ato. He adopted the opinion, would needs find it in the facred writings of his fathers, and reconcile the legiflator of the Jews with the founder of the academy. Juft fo Clean- THES endeavoured to make the fables of Orpheus> MusAEus, Hesiod, and Homer, agree with what he taught concerning the gods, "Ut veterrimi poe- f ' tae, qui haec ne fufpicati quidem fint, ftoici fuifle *' vide- 266 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. " videantur *." But, after all, nothing can be more llrongly aflerted, than the commencement of the world is by Plato; and even Aristotle him- felf acknowledged that this philofopher thought it senerated. a^ It may feem flrange, but it is true, that we have a right to quote Aristotle himfelf againft the eternity of the world. He falls feverely on the philofophical fyftems, that prevailed in his time, about the manner in which it began : but he ac- knowledges the uniformity of this antient tradition. How could he avoid to do fo ? Or how could it be otherwife, fince the Greeks, in his time, had found it eftabhfhed among all the nations with whom they became acquainted either by commerce or by war ? That happened to them, which has Ijappened to us, in much later ages. We have pufned our difcoveries through both hemifpheres, and have found every where the fame tradition eftablifhed in the belief of mankind. The Chinele, whom I jufb mentioned above, would pafs, like the Egyptians of old, for the mod antient race of mankind, and they have traditions and records of immenfe antiquity and very fingular authenticity. Now thefe traditions and thefe records agree, in one general fad, with all thofe that have been mentioned, " the world and mankind had a begin- " ning." Even the name of a firft man is pre- ferved, and Fohi, who was the Orhpeus of the eaft, precedes a very little their hiftorical age. If * TuLLY De nat. Deor 1, ii. WQ PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 267 we crofs the South-fea, and vifit fhe people of Peru or of Mexico, we find the fame tradition eftablifhed by univerfal confent, as they received it from their fathers. The world began, and Pacha Camac created it : the fun that enlightens the world noWj is not eternal ; there have been other funs before this. If we crofs the continent of America and proceed to the iflands, we find the inhabitants of them in the fame belief; at leaft we might have found them fo, whilft they preferved the primitive fimplicity of their manners, and the traditions of their forefathers, and till fpanifh avarice and fpanilh bigotry had exterminated the whole fpecies. After faying fo much concerning this tradition, it is neceffary, I think, to confider, more particu- larly, what thofe principles are, on which reafon determines us to receive general fads that have no foundation out of tradition, as we receive the moft authentic hiftorical truths. I have touched this fubjecl already : but, to treat it with more order and clearnefs, let us defcend into fome de- tail of the effential differences between hiftory and tradition. Let us confider what thofe attributes are which the latter wants, and for the want of which this teftimony cannot produce hiftorical probability : for if we find that there is not the fame necefllty of relation between thefe attributes an4 the general fafts, fpoken of here, as there is between thefe attributes and every hiftorical ac- count of paft events j in ihort, if we find that fuch general fj^ds are not in the cafe of thofe, in order to 268 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, to judge of which the rules of hiftorical criticifm have been eftablifhed, it will follow that thefe facls may be received for true, as well as any, and much better than feveral of thofe that are contained in hiftory, and to the truth of which we aflent. A STORY, circumftantially related, ought not to be received on the faith of tradition; fince the leaft refledion on human nature is fufficient to fhew how unfafely a fyftem of fa6ls and circum- flances can be trufted for it's prefervation to me- mory alone, and for it's conveyance to oral report alone J how liable it muft be to all thofe altera- tions, which the weaknefs of the human mind muft caufe neceffarily, and which the corruption of the human heart will be fure to fuggeft. An event that is not circumftantially, is imperfeflly related, not only with refped to the communication it fhould give, but with refpe6t to the means we fhould have to judge of it's probability. The means I fpeak of are thofe of comparing the different parts of a ftory together, and of examining how well they coincide and render the whole confiftent. In one cafe, then, different circumftances are to be compared ; in the other, all the traditions that can be collefted on the fame fubjed. Inconfiftent circumftances de- ftroy the credit of the ftory ; repugnant traditions, that of a general event. But the filence of fome hiftories or of fome traditions will deftroy the cre- dit of neither, when all thofe who fpeak of the fame thing agree. The jewifti hiftory has pre- ferved d-ie memory of a babylonian kingdom, which PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 269 which we call the fecond empire of the AiTyrians, unknown to profane hiftory and tradition, which make mention only of one. That antient monu- ment too of Rhamses, which Germanicus went to fee in his voyage into Egypt, and the infcription on it, which contained the names of all the nations whom this prince had conquered in Afia, makes no mention of the AfTyrians among thofe who be- came tributary to the egyptian empire ; as if their very name had not been known a century before the aera of Nabonassar ; tho it mentions th;; Per- fians, the Baftrians, and others, who muft have been fuch to the Aflyrians, if an alTyrian empire had been eftabliihed, as we afTume, before the aera of Nabonassar. Notwithftanding this filence, and the vain efforts of fcholars to reconcile facred and profane aflyriacs, it would be unreafonable to deny that there was an aflyrian empire in Afia. Upon the whole matter, that " the world had a " beginning,'' is a general faft, even better founded than this, *' there has been an afifyrian monarchy.'* Some antient traditions, we have feen, do not con- cur with others about the latter. But I prefume it would be hard to cite any body of antient tra- ditions, wherein the commencement of the world is not diredlly affirmed, or conftantly fuppofed. There is not even the filence of tradition againft it; and as to traditions that deny the fadb, ther» neither have been, nor could be, any. It may be thought, and it is true in general, that hiftory has this advantage over tradition. The authors 270 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, authors of authentic hiftory are known •, but thofe of tradition, whether authentic or unauthentic, are not known. The probability of fatfbs muft diminifh by length of time, and can be efti mated, at no time, higher than the value of that original authority from which it is derived. This advan- tage, then, authentic hiftory has, which no traditiort can have. The degree of allent, which we give to hiftory, may be fettled, in proportion to the number, charadlers, and circumftances of the ori- ginal witnefTes ♦, the degrees of aflent to tradition cannot be fo fettled. Let us fee, therefore, how far this difference may be thought to affedl the tra- dition of the beginning of the world. We fhall find, I thipk, that we are very liable to be deceived in all thefe refpeifls which ftiould conftitute the authenticity of hiftory, and that the difference I have cbferved cannot affeft, in any fort, the true fadt I afTert. We are deceived, grofsly, very often about the number of witnefTes, two ways. Sometimes by applying teftimonies that have no true relation to the things teftified, and fometimes by taking dif- ferent repetitions of the fame teftimony, for diffe- rent teftimonies. Both thefe ways are employed with fuccefs, artfully by fome, habitually by others i and numerous citations improperly brought, and carelefsly or ignorantly fet to account, to increafe the confufion and to promote the deception. No- thing can be more ridiculous, perhaps, than to fee a great part of what Vv'e find in profane anti- quity PHILOSOPHICAL WORK. 271 quity applied to confirm what we find in facred. ' Numerous and aftonifhing examples of this kind might be brought from ail the writers who have endeavoured to ellablifh the authenticity of jewifh, by a fuppofed concurrence of profane, traditions. But I pafs thefe over. It is full as ridiculous to fee alt the antient writers, who have fpoke of the Aflyrians and Perfians, quoted as fo many diftind: witnefles, when they did, for the mod part, no- thing more than copy Ctesias, firft, and one ano- ther, afterwards. Neither Ctesias, nor Moses himfelf, may deferve belief in all the particulars related by them; but Ctesias may be reckoned as a witnefs the more of feme general facts, as Moses may be of fome others. That the world had a beginning is a naked fad:, which neither contains nor implies any thing equivocal. It neither leans on the authority of one nation, nor of one fyftem of traditions, which many nations may adopt. Nations, the mod diftant in place, and the moft oppofite in opinions, cuftoms, and manners, concur in affirming it. All thefe traditions, therefore, have had different ori- ginals, or they ail proceed from one original tra- dition. If they had different originals, the truth of the fad: is eftablifhed by fo great a number of in- dependent teftimonies. If they all proceed from one original tradition, the truth of the fa6t is efta- bliflied juft as well ; fince fuch a tradition muft have been that of one firfl: family or fociety. As it would be abfurd to afTume that a tradition, which may 272 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, may be called that of mankind, could be founded originally in any thing elfe than the truth of a fa6t which concerned all mankind, and of which all mankind had once had a certain afllirance ; fo it would be abfurd to fuppofe that a tradition, arifing in one family or fociety alone, could fpread to all the corners of the earth, and be received alike by nations even unknown to one another, unlefs we fuppofe this family or fociety to be that from which all thefe nations, by whom this tradition was pre- ferved, proceeded. It does not feem that this argu- ment can be eluded. As there is a great difference between circum- ftantial relations and general naked fafts, fo there is, likewife, between the tradition I contend for, and every other of the fame kind. That there has been an univerfal deluge is a fave fliall never conceive that the fame lie could be PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 277 be impofed on all people ; becaufe it is impofTible that the fame lie fhould flatter them all alike, or be equally well proportioned to the intereft and defigns of a prevalent fociety in every nation. "What immediate or neceflary relation has the be- ginning of the world to the predominant folly of the Egyptians, for inftance or the Chinefe, or to the intereft of the priefts among the former, and any of the feveral fefts among the latter ? Since they believed the world to have had a beginning, it was very conformable to the folly of thefe two people to infift that they defcended from the firft men, and were the moft antient nations of the world ; but what need had they to aflume the commencement of it ? Would they not have flat- tered their vanity more to fay, that it was eter- nal, and that their race was co-eternal with it ? Once more. What neceflary relation had the be- ginning of the world to the favorite principle of the Jews, who believed themfelves a people chofen by God out of all the people of the earth ? Could the eternity of the world make it lefs likely that they defcended from Sem, or the vocation of Abraham more improbable, or deftroy the cre- dibility of any fafl that flattered their vanity ? I confefs, I think not. If it be faid, that this nation had nobler ideas of the Supreme Being than any other J and that it was more conformable to thefe ideas to believe that the world was made by God, than that it is eternal as well as he ; I might deny the firft propofltion, and ftiew that no nation had fuch mean ideas of the Divinity in many refpeds T 3 as 278 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, as this. But if I admitted it, for argument's fake, I might afk how this philofophical opinion could be pafTed for a matter of fadt on the Egyptians, who boafled fo much of their own antiquity, by a people, who had grown up among them, and who had been fo long their flaves ? If this tradition of the beginning of the world had prevailed among the Jews firft, who were known to few people, and defpifed by thofe that knew them, how came it to fpread far and wide, to the utmoft extremities of the eaft and weft ? Since I have named the weft, let me mention the Peruvians, and afk how the beginning of the world can be faid to have flattered the general folly of this people, or the particular intereft of their incas ? They thought their incas the children of the fun. To what purpofe was it to make them believe that Pacha Camac was a being fuperior to the fun, and that he created the world ? Would it not have been more agreeable to the prejudices of the Peruvians, and to the interefts of the incas, to have fuppofed the world eternal, and themfelves the offspring of an eternal father ? Lie?, that are produced by the predominant palTions of people, and by the policy of thofe who lead them, carry for the moft part on their fronts, if I may fay fo, the marks of their original : and this obfervation will hold in a multitude of inftance$ that may be brought from hiftory and tradition, both from fads circumftantially related, and from thofe that are naked, or almoft naked, of circum- ilances. But the tradition that affirms the begin- ning PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 279 ning of the world is not in this cafe. It is relative no more to the particular character of one people than of another. It favors no more one general principle of religion or policy than another. In a word, force your imagination as much as you pleafe, you will find infurmountable difficulties in your way, if you fuppofe the fad: invented : but all thefe difficulties vanifli when you fuppofe it true. The univerfal confent of mankind follows naturally and neceflarily the truth of the fadl. The antiquity of the tradition is a confequence of the antiquity of the world, and the great variety of fables, which have been invented about it, is a circumftance that accompanies every event that has defcended long in oral tradition, and that has not been afcertained by cotemporary hiftory, nay, even fome that feemed to have been fo afcertained. There remains, to be fpoken of, another con* dition of hiftorical probability, which it may be fiippofed that tradition cannot have, and which we have feen, in the cafe of numbers, and veracity, or probity of witnefTes, that hiftory itfelf does not al- ways furnifh, and for want of which we are often impofed upon by it. This condition is fo eflential, that neither the numbers nor characters of wit- nefTes will conftitute probability without it. The condition I mean is this : that the original authors were not only cotemporary but competent witnelTes. The examination whether they were fuch or no may be reckoned for another advantage, which hiftory has, or muft have, to be deemed authentic, T 4 over 28o PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, over tradition, by what paffes every day under our eyes, when we fee almoft every public fa<5t related, and even tranfmitted to pofterity, not according to truth, but according to the wrong judgments which are made by prejudice or by. paflion. What happens now, happened formerly : and no ftronger proof of it can be required than that which we find in Arrian. He had before him the memorials ofARisTOBULus and of Ptole- my, two principal captains that accompanied Alexander in all his expeditions -, and yet the hiftorian was puzzled, fometimes, by the incon- iiftency of their relations. On this head, the competency of original witnefies, it may be faid, that if hiftory wants it fometimes, tradition muft want it always, and that tradition, efpecially, which 1 defend. I may be told, and I was told, that if every thing elfe, which I have advanced, was admitted, the objeflion, arifing from the incompetency of wit- neffes, would be fufficient to refute me. It was urged, that whoever were the firft to fay there had been a monarchy of the Aflyrians, might know the truth of what they faid -, but that they, who were the firft to affirm the beginning of the world, could not know the truth of what they faid, not even on the fuppofition that they were the firft of men. This tradition, therefore, is that of an opinion, not of a fadl. The exiftence of God is a tradition too ; and theifts, very often, appeal to the univerfality of this tradition to prove (hci PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 281 the truth of an opinion, juft as you appeal to the fame univerfality to prove a fa6t. Had you proved the fad, you might have drawn from it all the arguments chat can be drawn to eftablilh, in belief, the exiftence of a fupreme Being. But you have amufed yourfelf with nothing better than proving the truth of one opinion by the tradition of another ; which is a proceeding that cannot be juftified, becaufe we are as able, and probably more able, judges of the opinion, than any of the antient nations could be wit- nefles of the fad. As different nations have their different follies, there are fome common to all mankind. As there are fidlions which favor the interefts and promote the defigns of thofe who govern in all the countries of the world, the exift- ence of one fupreme Being has been acknowledged in all ages, and, if you pleafe to fay fo, by all people. Superftition took hold, and policy profited, of this opinion, under one form or other. Superftition abounds wherever there are men, and fome kind of policy wherever there are focieties. Metaphy- fical reafonings on the nature and attributes of a fupreme Being may perfuade philofophers that this Being, whom J:hey affume to exift by the ne- ceffity of his nature, created the world, which does not feem fo to exift. Naturalifts, in parti- cular, may have adopted eafily an opinion which faves them much pains and ufelefs refearch. A firft caufe of infinite wifdom and power cuts all the gordian knots that embarrafs them, and a finglc 2S2 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. fingle fuppofition furnifhes the folution of a thou- fand difficulties. All this was urged with much vehemence by Damon, and he concluded by putting this dilemma. If the opinion of the commencement of the world is conformable to the knowledge we have of things, and propor- tioned to the human underftanding, as you aflert, there refults from thence no proof that the fadl is true, but great reafon to believe that men might afTume it, without knowing any thing of the matter. On the other fide, if this be not true, your univerfal tradition wants the firft and prin- cipal foundation of probability which you have laid down. I HAVE put thefe objections, fuch as were made, and fuch as might have been made to me, in their full force. They feem plaufible ; let us fee if they are unanfwerable. They will not appear fo, if 1 can fhew firft, that the atheift begs the queftion when he aflTumes that, fuppofing the world to have had a beginning, even the firft of men could not be competent witnefles, becaufe they could not be competent judges, of the truth of the faft : fecondly, if I can ftate fo clearly the di- ftinftion to be made between the tradition of an opinion, and the tradition of a fafl, in our judg- ments about them, as to reduce to an abfurdity the fuppofition, that the tradition we fpeak of is of the firft fort : and, thirdly, if I can prove, by reafons drawn from the human nature and from PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 2S3 from general experience, that unlefs the world had really had a beginning, the opinion of it's eter- nity would have been the opinion of all antiquity, and the cornmencernent of it would not have been eftablifhed in tradition, The atheifl begs the queflion, and by begging it he advances a foolifli and arrogant propofition : fince to be fure that the firft men could not be witnefles of the beginning of the world, he muft affume that he knows, very exadlly, how the world "We inhabit was framed, if it was framed at all. Such inconveniencies happen frequently to thofc who combat truth. They call temerity to their aid ; and they affirm, boldly, on precarious con- jedures, and when they have heated their own imagination, they hope, and not always in vain, to feduce thofe of other men. In the defence of the truth, we fhall never be reduced to any fuch ex- tremity. Tho the atheift muft pretend to know how the material world was made, and in what manner the human race began, in order to deny that the firft men were competent judges and witnefTes of both ; we pretend to no fuch know- ledge : but nothing lefs than fuch knowledge can juftify his denial ; whereas the univerfality of the tradition juftifies abundantly our affirmation. Wc may affirm, on the faith of all mankind, that the world began, much better than it can be affirmed, on the faith of a few precarious, partial, and incon- fiftent traditions, thap there was an empire of the ^ifyrians. To 284 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. To build a world is not fo eafy a thing as many a fpeculative archited has imagined. The author of the book of Genefis begins his hiftory by it ; and tho we do not fet to his account the ufe which has been made of certain paflages in his narration, yet is it impoffible to excufe all the puerile, roman- tic, and abfurd circumftances, which nothing could produce but the habit of dealing in trifling tradi- tions, and a moft profound ignorance. It is im- poflible to read what he writ on this fubjedl, with- out feeling contempt for him as a philofopher, and horror as a divine ; for he is to be confidered un- der both thefe charafters. Natural philofophy made little progrefs among the Greeks and the Romans, and a fy- ftem of the univerfe was very little known by them. The eaftern nations knew it better-, but among thefe we muft not reckon that of the Jews. It has been faid that Pythagoras was a difciple of the prophet Ezekiel, or had fome other jew- ifli mafters. If this idle conjecture were true in faft, it would not be true, however, that he took from them his mundane fyftem. Philolaus, who publiflied his doctrines, had very different no- tions of it from thofe of the Jews, and from thofe of the other Greeks. One would think too, that fome modern aftronomer had dictated the hy- pothefis which Plutarch and Diogenes Laer- Tius attribute to Cleanthes, the Samian. This, true fyftem, which accords fo little with that of Moses, PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 285 Moses, after having been long loft, was renewed in the fixteenth century by Copernicus, confirmed and improved by Galilei and Kepler, and fince demonftrated by Newton. How magnificent a fcene of the univerfe have thefe new difcoveries opened ! how much more worthy of the wifdom, the power, and the immenfity of God, than all the paultry confined fyftems of antient philofophers, and of MosES among the reft ! Tho we know much more than they did of the works of God, yet we know as little as they did concerning the produdtion of them. Antiquity had other makers of worlds befides Moses. Plato was one of thofe : and if his hypothefis be no more probable than that of the jewifh legillator, it is, at leaft, a little more reverential to the Supreme Being. The fame prefuraptuous confidence has been feen in thefe ages, wherein philofophers, hav- ing greater knowledge, fhould have had more mo- defty, and have been more fenfible how ignorant we remain, after all the improvements we are ca- pable of making. Des Cartes, for inftance, who had much of this prefumption, and employed a great deal of artifice to make his hypothefis pafs for real difcoveries, acknowledged a little more need of a God than Strato avowed. He wanted a God to create matter and to imprefs motion on it. But when he had aflfumed thus much, he thought himfelf able to proceed without this help, and to fliew how the world was formed, or how an univerfe might be formed, by the laws of mat- ter 286 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, ter and motion. I told Damon, that I thought this philofopher's ill fuccefs would hinder him from any enterprife of the fame kindj that I (hould, therefore, have ftill a right to conclude that he begged the queftion when he afierted that it im- plied contradiction to fuppofe the firft men capable of knowing that the world began ; and I defired him further to confider with me, whether, laying this prefumption afide, we may not affume, with- out any, that there might have been certain marks, by which the firft men muft neceffarily know that they were the firft men, and that the fyftem of the world began. If we find fuch marks, and find them probable, by their analogy to what we know, it will follow, I think, that the beginning of the world has fome proof a pofteriori \ whereas the eternity of it can have none ot this kind, any more than a priori. However this planet of ours was formed, the firft men could not poffibly be fpeftators of the formation of it. Both men and all other animals required an earth to walk on, food to nourifh them, and an atmofphere to breathe in, and the light of the fun to condu6l them. The prior cxiftence of the fun might be necelfary too on another ac- count, antecedently to their creation. This great luminary might be neceffary to the formation, as v/e know that it is to the prefervation, of our planet ; whether that of the moon were fo or not, and whether the Arcadians were in the right or not, when they faid that they were older than this fecondary planet. PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 287 But now, tho there could be no human witnefles of the world arifing out of a chaos, and growing into that form and order wherein we fee it, yet the firft men might know very certainly that this fyftem of things began to exift. As it would be ridiculous to aflert, like the thufcan author, whom SuiDAS mentions but does not name, that God employed twelve thoufand years in creating the univerfe ; fo is there no neceflity of believing that the foiar fyftem, or even this one planfet, was the work of fix days. Such precipitation fecms not lefs repugnant to that general order of nature, which God eftabliftied and which fhe obferves in her pro- dudions, than the day of reft, which Moses fup- pofes God to have taken, or which the Jews invented to make one of their inftitutions more refpedable, is repugnant to all the ideas we are able to frame of the Divinity. Tho it be con- formable to our notions of wifdom, that every thing neceflary to man was created, when he began to exift i yet is there nothing which obliges us to believe that mankind began to exift in all the parts of the world at once. We need put our imagination to no great efforts, to believe that all this might be : and if it might be, we may fuppofe that it was. We do not, like reafoners a priori, imagine what may have been according to our abftracl reafonings, and fo con- clude from poffibility to aduality. Wc proceed much more reafonably from aduality to poftibiiicy, " in 288 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. in a method fo often, and fo abfurdly, reverfed by philofophers. A more able naturalifl: would fuc- ceed better in finding thofe marks by which the firft men might know the commencement of this fyftem. I will mention three or four, which are obvious enough, and may ferve to explain a mat- ter that feemed paradoxical, and is not, perhaps, abfolutely eflential to my argument. The general opinion of all thofe who have reafoned about the creation or formation of the world, and that which Moses himfeif follows, af- fumes that there was originally a chaos or confufed mafs of matter, wherein all the elements or firft principles of things, which exift in the material fyftem, were contained. Whether this mafs was created or no, they thought it fo neceflary to be fuppofed, that they could not go on one ftep, in building a world, without it. As foon as it is fup- pofed, " inftant ardentes Tyrii," they all go to work. Every one feparates and difpofes thefe ma- terials in his own way i the laws of mechanifm are employed, according to the different plans of thefe architeds, and a world is foon made. In one of thefe philofophical romances, publilhed at the end of the laft century, the ingenious author affumes that our planet was, till the deluge, in a dired fituation to the fun ; that is to fay, that it's axis was parallel to the axis of the ecliptic, or, in other words, that the ecliptic was confounded with the equator. Among feveral advantages which he pretends to draw from this hypothefis, the PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 5S9 the great facility of peopling the world with inha- bitants is one. He thinks that animals could not have been brought forth, nor have grown up, if there had been any variety in the feafons by the obliquity of the ecliptic, and if thefe children of the earth, hatched, as we may fay, by the fun, had been expofed, at firft:, to the injuries of the air, and to the cold of a winter. Had this author been oppofed by his own tribe alone, and in a theological way, he might have efcaped pretty well ; but the natural philofophers and the ma- thematicians rofe up againft him, and battered down his hypothefis. I enter not into particulars. The conclufion drawn from all their arguments was this, that the prefent fituation being more ad- vantageous to the earth, in general, than any other, we ought to be perfuaded that it is now the fame wherein God placed it originally. But I doubt very much whether this conclufion be undeniable. The Supreme Being proportions always his means to his ends, and may therefore employ different means when different ends are to be attained. Let it be that the prefent obliquity of the ecliptic, which is of twenty- three degrees and twenty -nine minutes, may be in the prefent ftate of the world the moft advantageous. Nothing hinders us from affuming that another obliquity, or no obliquity at all, might be more advantageous when the prefent fyftem of things began. If that of the chevalier de Louville be true, this obliquity was of about forty-five degrees one hundred and thirty VoL.V. U thou- 290 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. thoufand years ago. On the comparifon of which two obliquities I fhall leave philofophers and ma- thematicians to difpute as long as they pleafe. What it is to my purpofe to obferve is, that no proof will arife, from all they can fay, to convince us that the prefent was the original fitu- ation of the world to the fun. Infinite wifdom does not change the means, as divines would fometimes make us believe that he does at leaft in the economy of the moral fyflem, when the ends are the fame. Nay, the fame means ferve often to accomplilh different ends. But when the ends are fo different, that the means of accomplifhing one imply contradidion with the means of ac- complifhing another, we may fay, very affuredly, that infinite wifdom changes the means : and, therefore, if the means of preferving the material and animal world are different from thofe which were neceffary to the beginning of both, the pre- fent pofition of the earth may very well be thought not to have been the firft. If alternate corruptions and generations are become neceffary, and if the former produce the latter, it could not be fo from the firft. The firft was certainly very different from thofe which we obferve. Corruption could not then be neceffary to generation. If a greater degree of heat was fo for fome produflions, that greater degree is to be found in Burnet's hypo- thefis. If kfs, and very different degrees were neceffary, thefe different degrees are to be found in PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 291 in the fame hypothefis, gradually lefTening from the equator: and this gradation, by which different climates are formed, might be neceffary for dif- ferent produftions to a certain diftance from that climate where the fun was always in the zenith. As there were no variations in thefe different cli- inates, but each enjoyed a particular and uniform feafon, the animals and plants of each were nourilhed and carried to the perfeftion of their growth, by the fame principle by which they had been produced, and in a manner fuitable to their nature, and to that of their climate. Whilst it fared thus with one part of the world, the other parts were in a very different ftate, ac- cording to this hypothefis. But, far from finding any thing here, that may feem repugnant to the wifdom of the archited, this wifdom feems more fully difplayed than in the hypothefis of Moses or of Plato, and this order to have much more analogy with the order of nature which we fee eftablifhed. Thefe different climates appear like fo many different matrices or wombs, impregnated with the original feeds of things, and wherein the firft productions were formed by the inconceivable energy of divine power. In other climates, more diftant from the equator, where the influence of the fun, the firft of fecond caufes employed in thefe generations, was gradually lefs felt, the great work of the creation might advance more fiowly. In climates ftill more diftant, this influence might become too weak to produce any confiderable ef- U 2 kas. 292 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. fedls, and the great work might proceed ftill more flowly, or not at alL Then, perhaps, the obli- quity of the ecliptic might begin, by flow de- grees, without caufing any diforder in the climates already inhabited. The firft fituation of the world to the fun having had it's efFedt, another fituation might become neceffary for two purpofes, to render thofe climates, where the fun was al- ways in the zenith, more temperate j to carry the generations of animals and of the fruits of the earth forward on both fides to the north and to the fouth ; to give a greater degree of heat where a greater was ftill wanted, and to give fome where there was none at all. We may believe that this obliquity of the ecliptic arofe much fafter, than the chevalier de LouviLLE affumed it to dccreafe. A minute in one hundred years is too little. Let us fuppofe, on the prerogative of hypothefes, a degree, and even more, if you think fit. In this manner, thofe parts of the world, which were excefTively heated, cooled •, and thofe which were frozen by cold, heated gradually. Thus a fyftem of final caufes became, it may be, complete; and the earth, having pafled through the pofitions which were of all pofiible pofitions the moft proper to create, might ftop at that which is faid to be of all others the moft proper to preferve. If the learned mafter of the charter- houfe, and the able fcotch mathematician, who writ againft him. PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 295 him, were ftill alive, I Ihould exped that they would think themfelves under fome obligation to me for having endeavoured to compromife mat- ters between them, and to unite, in one fcheme, their contrary opinions. But fince I cannot have this advantage, I muft content myfelf with the in- ward fatisfa6lion I feel in contemplating this plaufible notion, which I have advanced on grounds as good as many of thofe, that are not deemed paradoxical either by divines or philofo- phers, have been eftablifhed. They are pofTible, no doubt; and, I prefume, they will never be demonftrated falfe, nor any other ways of account- ing for the fame things, true. It is not however quite necelTary to my purpofe ; for whatever cir- cle our planet defcribed when her courfe round the fun began, we muft be perfuaded that the furface of it was warmed and cherilhed enough by the rays of the central fun to promote genera- tion and vegetation, for which it was already pre- pared. If the prefent obliquity of the ecliptic prevailed then, the torrid, the temperate, and the frozen zones, as we call them, might be ca- pable of the various productions proper to them ; or we may aflume, very confiftently, that coun- tries more diftant received, from thofe that were nearer the fun, fuch animals and fuch plants as their climates were fit to preferve, tho not fit to generate. In Ihort, we need not apprehend the want of heat, even on the received hypothefis. The fun, much older probably than our world, and who has, certainly, grown older ever fince, U 3 may 294 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. may have loft much of the force and efficacy which he had in thofe primeval days. Nay more ; aftronomers and natural philofophers agree, I think, about that perpetual expence which all the funs of the univerfe are at, to en- lighten, to warm, and nourifh their feveral fy- ftems -, of which expence we muft believe that our fun has his fhare. They aflume indeed that the atmofpheres of thefe funscomprefs fo ftrongly the exhalations that rife from them, and drive them back with fo much force and fo much econo- my, not fufFcring any more than are abfolutely neceffary to pafs, that thefe fprings of light and heat cannot be exhaufted, nor fuffer any great di- minution, in thoufands of years. But thoufands of years, and God alone knows how many, are elapfed fince our fun was firft lighted up, and he may have therefore fuffered fome diminution. These hypothetical reafonings, and others to the fame purpofe, may be, I think, maintained, whether we fuppofe this obliquity of the ecliptic to have been decreafing or increafmg : for the de- creafe of fome minutes in a century, during a fpace of time even as long as that which the Egyptians imagined, will not be found inconfiftent with our hypothecs. Our hypothefis wants to afllime little more than this, that nature, who a6ls v/ith much fimplicity and uniformity, aded much in the fime manner after her firft produc- tions, in thofe of animals for inftance: and if this be granted, it will follow, evidently, that the PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 295 the firft men were competent witnefles of the firft propagations of the animal kind ; which would be of itfelf a fufficient proof that they were fuch of the beginning of the world. 'D* Nature has every where fixed certain feafons, at which all, or the greateft part, of them propa- gate their feveral fpecies, whilft man enjoys the noble prerogative of doing the fame all the year round. " Homini maxime coitus temporibus " omnibus opportunus eft." It is Aristotle who fays this. But then this prerogative extends no further : and a term is fixed to man, as it is to the fpecies of all other animals for the bearing their fruit. The philofopher I have cited de- fcends into a particular account of thefe different terms, in the fifth book of his Hiftory of ani- mals : and as we know that men are nine months in their mothers bellies, he affures that the camel is twelve. Thefe animals then, and all thofe who require a longer term than that of nine months, appeared later even than the fecond generation of human creatures in the ordinary manner that it has been carried on from the firft generation down- wards. Men were by confequence witneffes of the firft propagations of animals. The fame pro- pofition will hold, if we fuppofe them generated fafter and fooner in the courfe of thefe generations, or even primevally : for, if man, for example, was but three days, or three hours, in forming out of the earth, and in receiving the breath ot life, it will follow, by a very fair analogy, that U 4 the ^96 PHILOSOPHICAL XVORKS. the fame operations took up four days or four hours for the formation of a came], and eight for that of an elephant. I MIGHT exped to hear, upon this occafion, rnany common-place notions advanced, to fhew more time required, in the procefs of nature, to form this animal after the image of God, than all the others, fo vaftly inferior to him in figure and compofition. But thefe perfons ought to refle<5b, that how diftant foever animal may be from ani- mal, relatively to our notions of perfedlion and im- perfedion, there can be no difference in the di- Itance between any of them and God, who or- dered this procefs of nature for reafons that we do not know, but certainly without regard to that di- gnity of nature which we imagine. The creation of a man or of an angel, in the works of God, is not rnore confiderabic than the creation of the mcaneft infefl, nor requires that the divine energy fhould be exert ^ in a longer and more operofq procefs of nature. But if it is probable that the firft men might fee the commencement of thofe fpecies of ani- mals, ivhofe formation required longer time than their own, it is not impolTible, neither, that they might fee the commencement of thofe fpecies, whofe formation required a lefs time. We may very eafily imagine that the creation had two forts of progrefTion, as the world has two forts of mo- tip^i. Nature might follow fuch an order, as we PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 297 J^ave mentioned, in every climate ; but (he might follow a certain general order, likewife, in all cli- mates alike. As more time was neceflary for the producftion of one animal than another, in the fame climate ; fo more time might be necefiary to bring the fame animal up to the perfedtion of his nature in one climate than in another. As the hare might begin to run and the fheep to feed be- fore either man, or camel, or elephant, was fuffi- ciently formed to anfwer the ends of his creation ; fo the creation, in general, might be far advanced, or even completed, in fome climates, before it was fo in others. The feeds, or firft principles, of animal life might have more or lefs force and vigor, according to the different influences of the fun, tho they were fcattered every where alike. The firft men, therefore, who might fee no more than the laft afts, if I may fay fo, of this great drama in the countries where they themfclves arofe, might fee the very firft a6ls wherein ani- mals were brought on the ftage, in other coun- tries. They might be fpedators at twice, and in a reverfed order, of the whole piece. Creation finifhed, propagation began, and the fame inftindt urged the two fexes to the fame a6t. Inftind urged them to it firft; a fenfe of pleafure recalled them to it afterwards : and the multiplication of their fpecies was not a motive, probably, to thefe conjundlions. The revolution of fome months fhewed them the confequences of \t i and the revolutio.i of fome years Ihewed them 398 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. them that they and their ofFspring were born to die. Let us put ourfelves, for a momcat, in the place of the firfl men. Could they doubt that they were fuch ? Could they doubt that all the other animals they faw, were the firfl of their kinds likewife ? Could they fail to tranfmit to their poflerity this tradition, " the world had a *' beginning ?" He, who has a great mind to cavil, may fay that they did not know, by thefe marks, that the material world began j they only knew that the animal inhabitants of it began then to exifl. But if the firfl men could not be wit- nefies of their own creation, they might be fuch of the creation of other animals, as much as of the propagation of their own, and of every other fpecies : fo that, if they knew certainly that the animal world began, I do not fee what the atheifl will gain by afTuming that they were ignorant of the beginning of the material world. A God was necelTary for one as much as for the other : and if tradition afhrmed nothing more than the firfl, it would ferve equally well to refute the atheifl, who denies the exiflence of any fuch Being. Was it neceffary to difcover this great truth that they ihould reafon logically, and tranfmit to poflerity an opinion only ? But in all cafes they might know by other marks, fufficient to awaken the attention of a Samojede or to inform an Hot- tentot, that the whole fyflem then began. The lives of thefe men were, probably, much longer than ours ; and if you compare what they mull have feen in their youth, with what they muft have PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 299 have obferved in their old age, you will find that the experience of their whole lives was one con- tinued proof to them, that they lived in the firft age of the material world. Obferve it in one inftance. The earth, out of which they had been created, furnifhed what was neceffary for their fubfiftence. per fe dabat omnia tellus ; Contentlque cibis nullo cogente creatis, Arbuteos foetus, montanaque fragra, legebant, &c. Thefe were the fpontaneous gifts of nature -, and men had no fhare, at firft, in the produdtion or improvement of them. They learned in time to do both, to fow corn, and to make bread. Trees grew up ; and as they grew, they furnifhed a better retreat to birds, and a better fhade to men. An old oak became at length, to them, a new phaenomenon. If it was not time to finifh this article, I might cafily fhew, in a multitude of other inftances, that the firft men muft necefi^arily know that they were cotemporaries with the material world, and faw the beginning of a new order of things. But after wandering, in complaifance to the atheift, in the fpaces of imagination, and to ftiew him that altho neither the firft nor the laft of men were able to difcover how the world was made, yet the firft might know by fufficient experience, and the laft by fufficient teftimony, that it had a beginning j 300 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. beginning ; let us return into the clofer prccindls of reafon, and finifh this article, as Mr. Huygens finifhes his conjeftures about the planetary world. After fpeaking of the abfurdities contained in the phyfics of Des Cartes, he adds, " mihi ma- gnum quid confecuti videbimur fi, quemadmo- dum fefe habeant res, quae in natura exiftunt, *' intellexerimus, a quo longiflime etiam nunc *' abfumus. Quomodo autem quaeque effeftac ** fuerint, quodque fint efle coeperint, id nequa- ** quam humano ingenio excogitari, aut conjec- *' turis attingi, pofTe,'* this philofopher aflerts with great reafon. Experimental philofophy has made great progrefs already, in difcovering to us the things and the order of nature. Where it continues to be cultivated it will continue, doubt- lefs, to difcover more : and after all, human knowledge will flop far fhort of human curiofity ; for this goes beyond our means of knowledge, nay, even beyond the boldeft conjedures we can make. But how, having fhewn the atheift, ex abun* dantia, how the firft men might have certain- ty of knowledge concerning the beginning of the world, and were therefore authentic witnefles of the truth of this fafl, and authentic authors of the tradition, it is time to fliew that, without entering into fuch confiderations, we muft allow this tradition to be a tradition of fad:, and not of opinion. This is the fecond of thofe articles that we propofed to examine in anfwer to the atheift's objedions, PHILOSOPHICAL WORK. ^ai objedions. There muft be fome certain princi- ples and fome certain rule to diftinguilh between thefe two forts of tradition, as the atheift feems to allow, when he diftinguiflies one from the other. Now thefe principles are not, I think, hard to find -, and the rule that refults from them is limple and plain. Common fenfe requires that every thing pro- pofed to the underftanding fhould be accompa- nied with fuch proofs as the nature of it can fur- nifh. He who requires more, is guilty of abfur- dity. He who requires lefs, of rafhnefs. As the nature of the propofition decides what proofs are exigible and what not, fo the kind of proof determines the clafs into which the propofition is to be ranged. He, for inftance, who affirms that there is a God, advances a propofition which is an obje6l of demonftrative knowledge alone, and a demonftration is required from him. If he makes the demonftration, we are obliged to own that we know there is a God, and the propofi- tion becomes a judgment of nature, not merely an opinion, according to the diftin6lion made fomewhere in Tully ; tho demonftrations are fometimes called opinions, as opinions are often called demonftrations. If, by his fault or by ours, we have not a clear perception of the ideas or of the connexion of them which form this demonftration, or if, without troubling our- felves to follow it, we receive the propofition for true on the authority of others, it is, indeed, opinion, 302 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, opinion, not knowledge in us. But whether we receive it, or whether we rejed it, we can neither require nor employ, with propriety, any other proofs than thofe which are conformable to the nature of the proportion. Tradition is not one of them. It may prove that men have generally believed a God, but it cannot prove that fuch a Being exifts. Nothing can be more trifling, there- fore, than to infift, as theifts are apt to do, on this proof, as if the opinion proved the fad ; as if all men had been alike capable of the dcmon- ftration ; or, as if the demonftration was not ne- ceffary to eftablifh the truth of the opinion. De- monftration, indeed, is not neceflTary on the hy- pothefis, that all men have an innate idea of God. But this hypothefis has been, I think, long exploded. I do not remember, at leaft, to have heard it maintained by more than one arch- bifliop, two or three ignorant monks, and as many devout ladies. As much as I am convinced of the exiftence of a fupreme all-perfed Being, as ferioufly as I adore his majefty, blefs his goodnefs, and refign myfelf chearfully to his providence, I Ihould be forry to reft my convidlion on the authority of any man, or of all mankind : fince authority cannot be, and demonftration is, the fole proper proof in this cafe. Should I quote to the atheift, a SupHis, an Amenophis, an Orus, or any of thofe pretended contemplators of divinity, he would laugh at me with reafon ; tho he might al- low. PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 303 Jow, at the fame time, that thefe feers, who ac- knowledged inferior beings, beings little raifed above humanity, were infinitely lefs abfurd than thofe who had the front to aflert that they faw the invifible God, and converfed familiarly with him. The demonftration of his exiftence arifes from fenfitive knowledge ; fince it is a pofteriori only that we can prove the firft caufe to be an in- telligent caufe : but he is not for that an objed of fenfitive knowledge. This propofition, there- fore, " there is a God," which becomes a judg- ment of nature, an obje(51: of demonftrative know- ledge to every one who can make the demonftra- tion, or underfl:and it when it is made, conies down as an opinion only in tradition, and can pafs for nothing better on that authority. Is this now the cafe of that propofition which affirms the beginning of the world ? Reafon alone can authorife the firft, and when I fubfcribe to the truth of it, I do this without any regard to tradition. All that tradition tells me is, that men made the fame judgment four or five thou- fand years ago. If it told me that they made a contrary judgment, and believed the world eter- nal, I fliould make ftill the fame on ii fubjed con- cerning which we of this age are as competent judges, as the men who Hved at any time before us. This propofition, " the world had a begin- " ning," affirms a facl long ago pad, and which can, therefore, be received for true on no other authority than that of men who lived long ago, and 304 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. and at, or near the time when this event happened. I confult my reafon, indeed, to examine whether the fa6t impHes contradidbion ; no more : and when I find that it docs not, I receive it for true, on the faith of human teftimony, which is the proper proof to me of every fad whereof I have not been myfelf a witnefs, and without any regard to the fuppofed conformity of it to the general ideas of mankind. This fuppofed conformity, if it be real, will add nothing to the probability of the fadt, as a nonconformity will take none away. Nothing, therefore, can be more trifling than the cavil made by the atheifl, when he objeds that the more probable this tradition is, the more rea- fon we have to take it for an univerfal tradition of opinion, not of fa(5t. The cavil is not only trifling, but to the lalt degree abfurd ; for on this principle it will follow that the more probable a fad: is, the lefs reafon we have to receive it, as a true fa6l, on hifliorical or traditional authority, I confult my reafon and my experience to difcover whether the faft, I am told, may have happened poflibly, and then I confult hiilory and tradition to difcover whether it has happened aflually. Bur, according to Damon's logic, the more my reafon and my experience fhew me the firfl:, the more reafon I have to believe that hiftory and tra- dition record, in every fuch cafe, an antient opi- nion, not an antient fad:. But it is time that I (hould haften to a conclu- fion, by fliewing, in the lafl: place, that if the world PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 305 world had not really had a beginning, the opinion of it*s eternity would have been the general opinion of antiquity -, and the commencement of it would not have been tranfmitted by tradition, either as a fad, or, perhaps, as an opinion. Tho men might, in all ages, demonftrate the exiftence of God, they could not demonftrate alike, in any age, the commencement of the world: and, ac- cordingly, we fee that fome philofophers, who be- lieved there was a firft principle, a firft intelligent caufe, a Supreme Being, held, at the fame time, that the world was eternal j far from being in- duced by their theifm to believe it had a com- mencement. Others were, I doubt not, con- firmed in the opinion that there was a God, or even led to believe it, and to feek the demonftra- tion of it, by the proofs they had of this fa6t, the world had a beginning in time. It is much more probable that the received fadl gave occa- fion to, or fortified, the opinion, than that the opinion determined them to afTume the fsi6t. The atheift, who looks on both to be nothing more than traditional opinions, will be very in- different which of them pafles for the firft. He blends them together; and attributes that of God's exiftence to the fuperftition of mankind, and to the policy of legiflators. It might feem hard to attribute that of the beginning of the world to the fame principles, fince it feems ta have little or no relation to them. He contents himfelf therefore, at leaft Damon did fo with me, to infift that philofophers might eafily fail into an Vol. V. X opinion. 3o6 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. opinion, which faved them much trouble in ac- counting for the original of things, by the fuppo- jfition of an eternal Being, infinitely wife and powerful . But the atheift would do well to con- fider, that this feeming folution of a difficulty implies a very real abfurdity, for it implies that there were philofophers as foon as there were men. He would do well to confider, further, that when there were philofophers, thofe, who admitted the exiftence of fuch a Being, were not the lefs curi- ous in their refearches of the mechanical caufes of all the phaenomena. In fhort, he would do well to confider that thefe philofophers would have cut the gordian knots of all their difficulties by afluming the eternity of the world much more eafily, than they could untie them by afluming that a Being infinitely wife and power- ful had made it. They might have faid, in this cafe, once for all, things have been eter- nally as they are : to what purpofe fhould we fcek the original and cflential caufes of that which never began ? But further, if we pafs over the abfurdity of fuppofing that there were philofophers as foon as there were men, or the improbability of this fup- pofition, that the commencement of the world was not believed till philofophers taught it; I would ftill afk, and the atheift would be puzzled to tell me, how the belief of the commencement of the world could be eftablifhed, not only where philofophy and fcience floriihed ; but even uni- verfally, among nations who had no communica- 2 tion Philosophical WORKS. 307 tion with thefe, and who were, theirjfelves, the leaft civihfed and the moft ignorant ? If it be faid that, uncivilifed and ignorant as they were, this opinion might arife and fpread among them, becaufe it was agreeable to their general notions, and analogous to what daily experience fhewed them, in innumerable inftances, as well as to what they themfelves were able to do ; I mull alTert, on the contrary, this opinion was repug- nant to the natural character of the human mind, to what we may feel in ourfelves, and obferve in all other men. All men are, in one refpeft, difci- ples of Protagoras. Uninftrufted nature teaches them, like him, that man is the meafure of all things ; that our fenfations communicate certain knowledge •, that every thing is what it appears to us to be -, and that the things which do not appear to us, are not. He who fees no inequality between two objedts, affirms that they are equal : and we judge naturally of the reality of all obje(5ts by the perceptions we have of them. Antient aftronomers believed the ftars to be im- moveably fixed in a folid firmament, and never fufpefted them to incline to the pole, or to decline from it. The fea was thought to have no bounds, becaufe the bounds of it were unknown ; and the celeftial bodies to be incorruptible, becaufe no changes were difcerned in them. Philofophers reafon often, and the vulgar always, like the rofes in Fontenelle. A comparifon taken from thofe infects who live one day only, would have been more to his purpofe ; but rofes were more X 2 worthy 3o8 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. worthy than infedls to be offered to the marchionefs, and fuch a philofopher as Fontenelle might difpenfe with fome want of precifion in favor of his gallantry. Such, as I have defcribed it, is the natural charadter of the human mind. It infefls all our judgments, moral as well as phyfical, till we learn to correft it by experience and a long courfe of refledion. This the uncivilifed igno- rant people we fpeak of, could not do ; and it was, therefore, agreeable to the general difpofi- tion of their minds, to believe that things had been always fuch as they faw them to be. This muft have been univerfally the cafe, I think, in countries where the natural, unimproved charader of the human mind prevailed alone. In thofe which philofophy began to enlighten, fome might doubt of this eternity ; but fome other philofophers, and the people in general, would continue to believe it. From whence can we imagine that they fhould derive a contrary opinion ? Their experience fhewed them, in- deed, generation and corruption •, that particular things began, and then ceafed to be ; but they faw, on the whole, an uniform feries of the fame revolutions of things ; their ideas were conform- able to the experience which framed them, and the eternity of the world was conformable to thefe ideas. Such confiderations may ferve to ihew what I have advanced, that the eternity of the world might have been the univerfal tradition, but that the commencement of it could not have " been PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 309 been fo, if it had not commenced, and men had not known that it had. On this hypothefis, all the confequences of it follow naturally. One confequence is, that, fince the world and man- kind began in time, the tradition of this begin- ning; fhould be a little more or a little lefs obfcure- ly, but univerfally, known : and this confequence has followed. Another confequence is, that men, who believed the world to have been created, in the ftri6t fenfc of the word, or that the confufed matter of a chaos was reduced into a mundane fyftem, muft have believed that this ftupendous fyftem was produced by fome principle unknowa to them, and fuperior to itfelf; for they could not fail to perceive, on the firft notices of fenfe, and the firft eflays of reafon, that the idea of an efFe6t included neceflarily in it the idea of a caufe : this confequence followed likewife. Once more, altho the firft men could doubt no more that fome caufe of the world, than that the world itfelf, exifted, yet another confequence of this great event, and of the furprife, inexperience, and ignorance of mankind, muft have been much doubt and uncertainty concerning the firft caufe : and this likewife followed. Cud worth has en- deavoured to prove, many have thought, and I incline to think, that the unity of a firft intelligenC caufe was the original belief of mankind. But if it was fo, a belief foon fucceeded that gods, coadjutors to the firft in making and governing the world, as well as inferior gods and men, and the whole material world, proceeded from this X 3 eternal 310 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. eternal fource of all exiftence. I need not enu- merate any of thofe various hypothefes that arofe from fuch abfurd notions. Many of them have continued to this day, and are held even by chri- ftians, whom revelation as well as reafon enlight- ens. The tradition of the fud, that the world began, and that of the opinion, that God is, have come down to us, tho not entirely without oppo- fition, from the moft early ages. But the man- ner of God's being, and of his working in the creation, and government of the world, have been matters of difpute in all ages, ever fince prefump- tuous mortals afFedted to defcend into particulars! to know any thing at all of one, or any thing more of the other, than that he is felf-exiftent and all-perfeft, and that his will, relatively to his human creatures, is revealed to them in the con- ftitution of their fyftem. To conclude. I am far from refling the proof of God*s exiftence on the authority of this tradi- tion, that the world began. I know that we are able to demonftrate this fundamental truth of all religion, whether it began or no. But fince we cannot rejeft this tradition without renouncing almoft all we know ; and fince it leads men to acknowledge a Supreme Being, by a proof levelled to the nneaneft underftanding, I think we ought to infift upon it. I am the more confirmed in thinking fo by the eflfefb it had in the difpute of which I have given you fome account. Damon was embarrafled by it fo much, that he had re-- courfe PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 311 courfe at laft to the wild hypothefis of Democri- Tus and Epicurus, if we really know what that of the former was. This hypothefis is an abyfs of abfurdity. In that I left him, pitying from the bottom of my heart, for I love the man, his blindnefs and his obftinacy •, the blindnefs of one who fees fo clearly, and the obftinacy of one who (hews fo much candor on other occafions. X4 LETTER Occafioned by one of Archbifhop Tii, lotson's S E R M O N S. L E T T E R Occafioned by one of Archbifhop T i l l o t s o n's SERMONS. I COME from reading, in Barbeyrac's tranfla- tion of Tjllotson's fermons, the difcourfe you mentioned on a late occafion : and the effe6l of it has been to confirm me in this opinion, that the theift is a much more formidable enemy to the atheift, than the divine. The former takes all the real advantages againft a common adverfary, which the latter has it in his power to take ; but he gives none againft himfelf, as the latter is forced to do. When the divine writes or difputes on any fubjedl, relative to his profeflion, he is always embarrafled by his theological fyftem : whether his mind be fo, or not, his tongue and his pen cannot be other- wife. A theift is under no conftraint of this kind. He may fpeak the truth, fuch as it appears to him, when the divine, tho it appears the fame to him, muft 3i6 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. muft be filent. The theift may be filent, by regards of prudence, when the divine is obliged to fpeak by the obUgation of his profeflion, and to maintain what he cannot defend, as well as what he can ; and thus, if he impofes on fome, he expofes him- feif to the attacks of others. When the theift has demonftrated the exiftence of a fupreme, all-per- fe6t Being, and the moral obligations of his ra. tional creatures, he ftops where the means of human knowledge ftop, and makes no vain and prefumptu- ous efforts to go beyond them, by the help of reafon or revelation. Juft fo, when he has proved that the world had a beginning, on foundations of the higheft probability tradition can give, he ftops fhort like- wife-, becaufe, in the nature of things, we can have no other proot of the fad. Not fo the divine. His fyftem drags him on. He attempts, moft abfurdly, to fupport, in the iirft cafe, a demonftrated truth by falfc arguments; and, in the fecond, to make tradition vouch for more than any receivable tra-^ dition does or can vouch. The archbifliop himfelf feems fenfible of this in one place : for having af- ferted the univerfal aflent of mankind to this greac truth, that there is a God, and having afcribed the univerfality of this aftent to the nature of the human mind, on which God has impreffed an in- nate idea of himfelf, he tries to evade the abfurdity by adding, " or which (that is the human mind) is f^' fo difpoftd, that men may difcover, by the due ** ufe of it's faculties, the exiftence of God." He endeavours to evade the theological abfurdity, which he could not maintain j but he endeavours I it PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 317 k in vain : for it is evidently falfe that the two propofitions are in any fort the fame. The difference between affirming, that the mind of man is able, by a due ufe of it's faculties, to difcovcr the exiftence of God, and that the mind of man has an innate idea of this exiftence, which prevents and excludes the ufe of any mental faculties, except that of bare perception, is too obvious to be infifted upon. Divines reafon, fometimes, on this fubjeft with imore precaution. They Aide over the dodrinc of innate ideas, without maintaining, or renouncing it direftly, and think it fufficient to fay, that the belief of a God is founded on a certain natural pro- portion, which there is between this great truth and the conceptions of the human mind. I in- clined, as you know, to think in the fame manner, and to believe that the firft men, at leaft, who knew that they were fuch, and who faw the ma- terial world begin, would be led, by the natural conceptions of their minds to acknowledge a firft: Caufe of infinite wifdom and power, and far above all thefe conceptions. Thus it feemed to me, that the tradition of a fad, and of an opinion grounded on it, which are apt to be confounded, tho they Ihould be always diftinguifhed, might come down together. But I confefs myfelf obliged, on further refle<5tion, to abandon this hypothefis, I abandon it with the lefs regret, becaufe, whatever the firfl: men might think, nay, whether the world had a beginning in time (as Lam firmly perfuaded it had) "or not, the demonftration of God*s exiftence will remain 3x8 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, remain unfliaken. But I am obliged to abandon it becaufe a natural and intimate proportion between the exiftence of God, and the univerfal conceptions of the human mind, may appear chimerical ; and perhaps is fo. It is, 1 doubt, chimerical, even when it is applied to the firft men. The variety of the phaenomena, which llruck their fenfes, would lead the generality, moft probably, to ima- gine a variety of caufes : and more obfervations and deeper reflexions, than the firft men could make, were neceffary to prove the unity of the firft caufe. That fome made them, at leaft very early, can fcarce be doubted. So that the orthodox belief and polytheifm might grow up together, tho the latter might fpread wider and fafter than the former. If there was really fuch a proportion, or fuch a conformity, as is alTumed, particular men, philo- fophers here and there, might have held polythe- ifm notwithftanding this ; but the general opinion of mankind would have been the orthodox opinion: inftead of which we know that polytheifm and ido- latry prevailed almoft every where. Polytheifm and idolatry, therefore, feem more conformable to human ideas, abftraded from the firft appearances of things, and better proportioned, by an analogy of human conceptions, to the uncultivated reafon of mankind, and to underftandings not fufficiently informed. Our archbilhop fuppofes it objeded to him, that the general confent of mankind in ac- knowledging one God, does not prove that there is one, any more than the general confent of num- berlefs PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 319 berlefs nations in acknowledging feveral, proves that there are feveral. He anfwers the objeflion by faying, that phiiofophers and wife men, in every nation and in every age, were of a different opinion from the vulgar ; fo that the heterodox opinion cannot pretend to have general confent on it's fide, fince the opinions of the vulgar, oppofed to thofe of phiiofophers and wife men, can be received in- to this reckoning no otherwife, than like a mul- tidude of noughts without any figure. This is ftrange reafoning to fall from the pen of fo great a man. It is certain that the orthodox belief maintained itfelf in fomc minds, perhaps in fome nations, and pierced through all the darknefs of ignorant ages : but yet polytheifm, and the con- fequencc of it, idolatry, were avowed and taught by legiflators and by phiiofophers. Neither will it avail any thing to fay, that thefe men had their inward, as well as their outward, doftrine ; and that they taught, in private, the contrary of what they taught in public. On this very fuppofition it will ftill follow that polytheifm and idolatry prevailed more eafily, becaufe they were more conformable to the natural conceptions of the human mind, than the belief of one firft intelligent caufe, the fole creator, preferver, and governor of all things. It is abfurd to fay, that the confent of fome wife men, and even of fome nations, inftrudled and go- verned by them, in the acknowledgment of one Supreme Being, is a proof that this idea is innate in all men, or univerfally proportioned to the con- ceptions of all men ; and to deny that the almoft univerfal 320 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. univcrfal confent of mankind, in the acknowledg- ment of feveral gods, is a proof of the contrary. If you are not very well fatisfied with thele theological reafonings, as I think you are not, you will be no better fatisfied with the manner in which ©ur archbifhop attempts to prove that the world had a beginning. The queftion, which is com- monly put to thofe who maintain the eternity of it would be trifling, as well as trite, if it did not oblige the atheift to give an anfwer which implies, in his mouth, the greateft abfurdity, and makes him pronounce in efFe£l his own condemnation. Til- LOTsoN takes this advantage, as I have done : but he throws it away, when he has taken it, by apply- ing it againft thofe who may think the world more antient than the theological aera makes it to be, tho they do not believe it eternal. He aflerts that the moft antient hiilories were writ long after this aera -, and quotes,, to prove it, fome verfes of Lu- CRETius, finely writ, but very little to the purpofe, becaufe of no authority in this cafe. " Si nulla fuit genitalis origo " Terrarum et coeli, femperque eterna fuere ; " CurfuprabellumThebanum,etfuneraTrojae, " Non alias alii quoque res cecinere poetae ?" Men have been always fond, not only to carry the originals of their feveral nations as far back as they could, and to reprefent them, fometimes, as coeval with the world itfelf, but to eftablifh their own or the traditions which had come to them, as PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 321 as the moft antient of all traditions. Thus the roman poet employed thofe of Greece to prove that the world had not begun very long before the wars of Thebes and of Troy. The world had a beginning, fays the Jew ; for there is neither hiftory nor tradition more antient than Moses *, and we know by his writings how, and how long ago, the world was created. If we bring a Chinefe into the fcene, he will afilire us that the world had a beginning, becaufe the cycles, of threefcore years each, in the chronological tables of his nation, do not rife any higher than Hoam-Ti, who reigned about four thoufand four hundred years before our aera; that from him to Xin-num, the fuc- ceflbr of Fohi, there are not more than three hundred and eighty years ; and that Fohi was the firft that civililed mankind. It was he, will the Chinefe continue to fay, who left us the adorable, and hitherto incomprehenfible, Yekim, in the ex- plication of which our learned men have labored thefe two thoufand fix hundred years. It was Fohi and Xin-num who taught men the ufe of the plough, who invented letters, and to whom all arts and fciences owe their original. Let a learned Mexican come forward next, and he will afTure you, not only, that the world began, but that the time when it began is knovs^n •, for we had but nine kings before Montezuma, will this great chro- nologer fay. Tenuch was the firft of them, and the founder of our monarchy ; our hieroglyphical annals rife no higher ; we know nothing beyond him ; this calculation is confirmed by that of pur YoL.V. Y neigK- j22 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, neighbours, whofe traditions place the deftruftion ot the laft fun, and the beginning of this, but a little before our aera. Let a Peruvian follow the Mexican, he will afllire us that the inca Manco-Cap AC preceded Atahualpa about four hundred years ; that he and his fifter, Coya-M a- ma-Oello-Huaco, were fent, at that time, by their father, the fun, to civilife mankind, who could not have been long in being, fince they had neither civil polity nor religion, fince they knew neither how to build houfes, to fpin wool or cotton to cover their nakednefs, nor to till their lands. Thefe are the traditions of the eaft and of the weft. 1'he former make the world more antient than thofe of the Jews, as they ftand in the Hebrew, at leaft ; the latter place the commencement of it about the beginning of the twelfth century of the chriilian aera, that is about the time of your king Louis le gros, and of our firft norman princes. Our learned Europeans may laugh as much as they pleafe at thefe learned Americans : but they muil not bs offended, if they are laughed at, in their turn, by thofe v/ho think that, if Cad- 1^1 us, the cook of a certain king of Sidon, carried the u'it of letters, and his fon, or his grandfon, Bacchus, the culture of the vine, to the Greeks three thou fand years before Manco Capac civi- lifed the Peruvians, it may very well be that the atlantic, or fome other nation ftill more un- known to us, had made all thefe improvements, by a long experience, three thoufand years before the Greeks, or even their mailers, who boafted of a much greater antiquity* the Egyptians. PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 323 A CROWD of refieflions prefents itfelf : but tbefe may fcrve to fliew how ridiculous it is, whilft we receive on tiie faith of univerfal tradition this faft, " the world had a beginning," to go about to fix the aera of it according to thofe of any particular nations. The negative argument, *' we have no " memorials beyond fuch a time," proves nothing but our ignorance*, and the pofitive argument, that " we have relations of the beginning of arts " and fciences in feveral countries," proves no- thing more than what it is very ncedlefs to prove ; I mean, that there was a time, Vvhen every one of thefe nations began to be civilifed. Neither of thefe arguments is of weight againft the atheift who aflerts the eternity of the world. But they give him an advantage, fuch as it is, which bad arguments give frequently in polemical writings ; and having refuted thefe, he may triumph, as if he had refuted all the reft : which is a praiSlice very common among his adverfaries the divines. If the divine had not more at heart to eftablifh the credit of jewifh traditions, than the comm.ence- ment of the world, he would not proceed as he does. He would not negleft the univerfal tradition, of a naked fa6l, fuch as tradition may preferve, to infifl: on particular traditions of a hS. (o compli- cated with circumftances that no tradition could prefeiTe it. Thefe circumftances might make the fa6l doubtful ; the fad will never make them pro- bable. Even that of the time, when the prefenc Y 2 fyftem 324 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, lyftem of things began, has been fupported weakly, I will not, tho I think 1 might, fay fraudulently, by jewi(h rabbins and by chriftian dodors, from Julius Africanus, and Eusebius, and George the monk, down to SxiLLiNfCFLEET, whom I mention, particularly, becaufe Tillotson ventures to alTert, that he has proved, in his Origines facrae, the chronological traditions of the Egyptians, and the Chaldeans, to agree with thofe of the Bible. If he had proved this, which he has not moft cer- tainly, he would have proved nothing more than what the Mexicans alTert, that the traditions of two or three neighbouring nations, all derived probably enough from one original, are conform- able to one another. But it is, indeed, too bold an impofition to pretend to prove, by defcending into particulars ot fads and dates, any thing of this kind. Our learned antiquaries have no other ma- terials than a certain number of broken, inco- herent, and precarious traditions. Thefe they make to cohere, for the moft part, by guefs ; and then drag them to a feeming conformity with the mo- faical fyllem, which they afllime all along to be true, whilil they pretend to prove it to be fo by collateral evidence. 1 will only add, to fhew how impertinent all this admired learning ought to be deemed, that, by little differences in the arrange- ment of the fame materials, and by a no greater liberty of gueffing, diftinft, oppofite, and yet equal probabilities may be made to refult from them. I affirm this the more confidently, becaufe I tried it once, as you may remember, and we both thought that the trial fucceeded very plaufibly. PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 325 But, without infifting any longer on this head, to fhew how divines weaken the Ihort and plain proof that we have of the beginning of the world, let us grant, for argument's fake, that the mofl; antient traditions are the mofaical, and that arts and fciences have not been invented more than four or five thoufand years, or more or lefs, as they think fit. Will they prove, even by this concefTionj that the world has had a beginning ? They can- not : for the atheift will objedt that he may have reafon to think the world eternal, without being obliged to think the arts and fciences eternal like- wife. He will maintain it to be indifferent, in his hypothefis, when or where they began; fince, at whatever aera the divine places this beginning, an eternity muft have preceded this aera. The divine, therefore, will be obliged to fhew that it implies contradidbion to affert that the world is from eter- nity, and not to affert that arts and fciences are Co likewife. He will endeavour this by affuming, asTii.LOTSON does, that arts and fciences are ne- cefTary to the well-being of mankind, and even to their being -, that neceffity, the great mother of in- duflry and of invention, fet mankind to work as foon, and as fafl, as the fpecies began, and mul- tiplied ; in fome places with more, in others with lefs, of thefe, but in all with as much as their real wants required. Since you agree then, will the divine fay to the atheift, that arts and fciences began about the time we have fixed, the world muft have begun about the time we have fixed likewife. This Y 3 reafon- 326 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. reafoning is commonly employed againft thofe atheifts who afTiime that the world is eternal. But, •without being one of their number, I venture to fay that this reafoning is frivolous, and founded on a fuppofition, which the men who make it muft know to be falfe. The different aeras of arts and fciences, invented in fome countries, and car- ried into others, are fo diftant, even according to the received chronology, that the men who dif- penfed with the want of them, during fuch long intervals, might have difpenfed with it longer, and, in many cafes, always. Are there not na- tions, at this hour, whofe originals are unknown to us, who may be the Aborigines of the countries they inhabit, and who are ignorant not only of all fcience, but of many arts fuppofed neccfTary ; not only of letters, for inftance, but of thofe which ferve to defend us againft the inclemency of the air and the rigor of the feafons, by making cloaths 'and building houfes fufficient for this purpofe ? Thefe arts muft have their place, furely, among thofe which Tillotson reckons fo neceiTary, or at leaft fo ufeful, to mankind, that they could not fail to be invented, nor, when they were invented, to be preferved. But his reafoning will not hold here neither j for, if thefe arts were ever known to the people, to v/hom they are now unknown, they may be totally loft, after having been once found : nay, they may have been found, loft, and found anew, an infinite number of times, in an eternal duration. If thefe arts were never known to the people to whom they are now unknown, it follows PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 327 follov/s that mankind may difpenfe with the want of them during many ages, and, therefore, always. We may eafily conceive that Samojedes, Hotten- tots, and other nations as barbarous and ignorant as thefe, have always been, and will always remain, in the fame ftate of barbarity and ignorance. TiLLOTso^ was led by his prejudices, and by the examples of men much inferior to him, in the herd of divines, into the two abfurdities I have obferved to you already ; into that of proving the commencement of the world by the authority of particular traditions, which, confidered feparately, amount to no proof at all, inftead of refting his proofs folely on the authority of univerfal tradi- tion ; and into that of confounding traditions of opinion with traditions of fa6l. He infifts not only on traditions which concur in affirming that the world began, but on thofe which enter into a detail of circumftances concerning the manner in which it began. Nay more ; he joins the exiflence of God and the commencement of the world to- gether, as if tradition was proper alike to prove both thefe truths. His proceeding is much the iam.e with that of Maximus of Tyre; whom he cites, after Grotius. Both he and Grotius might have quoted this rhetor, tho they were far from doing ib, againft Eusebius, who was unwilling to allow that the Supreme Being was acknowledged by the heathens before chriftianity had enlightened the world : but the quotation of him, on this occa- fion, proves nothing, and ferves only to Ihevv thac y 4 our 528 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. our divines declaim as loofely as the heathen phi- lofopher. Maximus of Tyre alledges the univerfal confent of mankind in one law or tradition : fo I believe thofe words vouov x«i Xoyovy fhould be tranf- lated, legem famamque, and not, as Tillotson tranflates them, law and principle. Now this law and tradition, according to Maximus of Tyre, declares that there is one God, the king and father of all things •, and feveral other gods, the fons of the Supreme, who take their parts with liim in the government of the world. Maximus ■was a Platonician, and he meant, no doubt, to give reputation to the dogmas of his fedl, by af- fuming them all to be received in one general tra- dition by the Greek and the barbarian •, by thofe who inhabit the continent, and by thofe who live on the coafts of the fea ; by thofe who have wif- dom, and by thofe who have none. Tillotson was a Chriftian, and he meant to make the dog- mas of his fc6l, as well concerning the beginning of the world, as concerning the creator of it, to pafs for thofe of univerfal tradition. If we fuppofe that the firft men were led, inflantly, by the phaeno- mena, and without any other demonftration, to acknowledge a fupreme intelligent caufe, the opinion rofe from the fa6V, of which they were "witnefies •, but it was opinion Hill in them, tho it became afterwards demonftrated knowledge. Now divines tranfpcfe this order, and make the creation of the world, which tradition vouches primarily, to be, as it were, a fecondary tradition ; that is, they make the tradition cf h£t to follow the opinion, PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 32 \t is time to confider how Tillotson proves that We have hiftorical, as well as traditional, evidencs of the beginning of the world. This evidence is that of Moses : and, to give it the more weight, he infifts on the great antiquity of the hillorian. This antiquity will not be difputed, perhaps ; and it will be allowed that no other hiftory of the fame ailumed antiquity has come down to us. But then it will be afked, what materials Moses could have before him when he writ the book of Genefis, which is in fome fort a preface to the pentateuch, or at leaft, the firft chapters of it, wherein he re- lates moft circumftancially the creation of the world, and the whole progrefs of that great event? Divines have their anfwer ready. Mosls was not a cotemporary author, but he might write upon cote.mporary authority. Twenty- five centuries paf- fed indeed between tl>€ creation and him, but his materials 336 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. materials were, notwithftanding that, extremely frefh and authentic, fince they muft have gone through very few hands, in ages when men lived fo long, to come into his, whether we fuppofe them written or unwritten. This may be faid, it has been often faid, and always very weakly to the purpofe that is mentioned here j for, if Moses had taken his materials from the mouth of Adam himfelf, they would not have been fufficient vouch- ers of all that he relates. Adam might have related to him the paffages of the fixth day, fomething even of his own creation, at leafl from the moment that God breathed into his noftrils the breath of life : but Adam could have told him nothing that preceded this, even on the fixth day, nor, by con- fequence, on the other five, wherein the whole material world was created. Moses therefore, notwithftanding his antiquity, may afford an in- stance in proof of the univerfality of the tradition, but no more. His writings afford no hiflorical evidence. Our archbiOiop aflures us that he could have added to the antiquity of this hiftorian certain charadlers of a divine authority, and have fup- ported them by reafons which would give great weight to his teftimony in the minds of all thofe who acknowledge the exiftence of God. It is pity he did not think fit to give thefe charaders and reafons-, fince, however improper it might have been to urge them againft an atheift, who denies the exiftence of God, as well as the commence- ment PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 337 ment of the world, they would certainly have been urged very properly againft a theift, who, acknow- ledging both, believes nothing of the divine cha- rafter of Moses. But he was too much attached to a rigorous precifion, and ufed too much candor, in his reafoning, to mingle the atheift and the theift together in this difpute. All he defires is what he thinks cannot be reafonably refufed him, that we give the fame credit to Moses, as we fhould give to any other hiftorian. We will confider then, in the laft place, what charaflers of a divine authority may be found in the writings of Moses : and from this confideration we Ihall find reafon, perhaps, to be the lefs concerned that we have not thofe which Tillotson kept to him- felf on this occafion. In the mean time, let us con- tinue to judge of MosES as we lliould do of any other hiftorian, fince it is all that is defired of us. Now toconftitute the authenticity of any hiftory, thefe are fome of the conditions neceflary. It muft be writ by a cotemporary author, or by one who 'had cotemporary materials in his hands. It muft have been publifhed among men who are able to judge of the capacity of the author, and of the authenticity of the memorials on which he writ. Nothing repugnant to the univerfal experience of mankind muft be contained in it. The principal fads, at leaft, which it contains, muft be confirmed by collateral teftimony, that is, by the teftimony of thofe who had no common intereft of country, of religion, or of profelfton, tg difguife or ialfify the Vol. V. Z truth. 338 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. truth. That Moses was not a cotemporary author is allowed •, and that he could have no cotemporary authority for the greateft part of what he advanced concerning the creation, is proved. Thus far then his writings have no hiftorical authenticity. Let us fee whether they have it in any of the other refpeds which I have mentioned. Were they pub- lifhed among people able to judge of them and of their author ? Huetius, who writ an Evangelical Demonftration, and died a fceptic, admits, in his demonftration, that a book, to be deemed au- thentic, mud have been received, as fuch, in the age which followed immediately the publication of it, and in all the ages which followed this. Has it been fufficiently proved that the mofaical hiftory was fo received ? I believe not. There was, it is faid, by Abbadie I think, a law of Moses, before Esdr as, before Josiah, and even before David, fince this famous prophet and king fpeaks continually of the law of God, and fmce all the other prophets quote the moft important pafTages of Deuteronomy. The pentateuch too muft have been in their hands, fince they fhew, very clearly, that they had an exaft Icnowledge of the fafls con- tained in Genefis, the lead circumftances of which are referred to by them as circumftances that no man could be ignorant of. If Moses writ the hiftory contained in the book of Genefis, he writ all the other books that compofe the pentateuch. Abbadie afllimes that this cannot be denied, and that Moses muft needs have been a good fcribe» fince it was he who recorded, in writing, the words qf the covenant made at Horeb. PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 339 It would be hard to find an example of greater trifling: for when we have allowed that the authors of the Old teftament, from David down to Es- DRAS, fpeak not only of the law, but refer to many of the fa6ls related in the pentateuch, it will not follow neceffarily that the pentateuch, which we have in our hands, was publiflied in the time of Moses or immediately after it. Much of the hiftory, and fome of the law, perhaps, contained in the writings afcribed to Moses, came down to thofe, who quote them, by traditions of uncertain original, tho they were all alike afcribed, by the Jews, to the fame legiflator. This cannot appear improbable to any one who confiders that efta- bliftiments, faid to be made according to the law of Moses when the cuftom of reading this law once in feven years to the people was ncglefted, and when they had aftually no body of law extant amongft them, are mentioned fometimes in the bible. This had been the cafe when Hilkiah found the law in the temple, which had been loft long before, and continued to be fo during the firft eighteen or twenty years of good Josiah's reign. That the book, thus found, contained no- thing but the law of Moses, ftridly fo called, or than the recapitulation of it,made in Deuteronomy, not the mofaical hiftory, we may, nay we muft, conclude from the little time that the reading the book in the prefence of the king, and before it was fent by his order to the prophetefs Huldah, took up, Z 2 The 340 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. The Jews had an oral, as well as a written, law; and the former has been deemed even more im- portant than the latter. The former however con- filled of nothing more than traditions, which the rabbin Juda Hakkodosh, or the holy, compiled, fix or feven centuries after Esdras had compiled the canon of the fcriptures. In Ihort, there feems to have been two colleftions of antient jewifh tra- ditions made at different times ; and the authors, ■who preceded Esdras, might quote thofe of one fort, as authentic fads and divine laws, juft as well as the doftors, who preceded rabbi Juda, quoted thofe of the other, as a commentary on them given by God himfelf on mount Sinai. It will be faid, I know, that the authenticity of the pentateuch given us by Esdras is fufficiently proved by the conformity it has, in moft in- Itances, with the pentateuch of the Samaritans, that is of the Cutheans, a people fent from the other fide of the Euphrates by Salmanasar to inhabit the country of Samaria, which he had de- populated. This people knew nothing of the mofaicai law till Asarhaddon, the fucceflbr of Salmanasar, fent a prieft of the Jews to in- ftru6t them in it, who might carry, for aught we know, a pentateuch written in antient hebrew charadlers with him. I enter into no exami- nation of thefe precarious accounts, left I fliould go out of my depth ; neither need I to do fo: for if we allow that the pentateuch was public before the time ofEsoRAS, Josiah, or even DAViD,will it follow, that it was fo as early as would be neceffary to PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 341 to anfwer that condition of authenticity which we fpeak of here ? Was there not time more than enough between Moses and David to make fabulous traditions pafs for authentic hiftory ? Did it take up near fo much to eftabhfh the divine authority of the Alcoran among the Arabs, a people not more incapable to judge of Mahomet and his book, than we may fup- pofe the Ifraelites to judge of Moses and his book, if he left any, whether of law alone, or of hiftory and law both ? The time, that the Ifraelites pafled from the exode under Moses, and the four centuries, that they pafTed afterwards under their judges, may- be compared well enough to the heroical age of the Greeks. Marvellous traditions defcended from both, and their heroes were much alike. Thofe of the Greeks were generally baftards of fome god or other, and thofe of the Jews were always appointed by God to defend his people, and to deftroy their enemies. But Aod, one of thefe, was an afTaflin; and Jephtha, another, was a captain of banditti, as David was, till, by the help of the priefts, he obtained the crown ; after which, under him, and his fon Solomon, the government of the Ifraelites took a better form j arts and fciences were cultivated, and their hi- ftorical age might begin. It has been urged, by thofe who fcruple little what they fay, that the four centuries which the Ifraelites pafled under their judges, were times of adverfity and op^ Z 3 prefTion, 342 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. prefllon, -wherein they had fomething elfe to do, than to invent fabulous traditions; or that, if any fuch were invented fo near the times of Moses and Joshua, they muft have been detected by the Ifraelites themfelves, who would have been far from encouraging traditions fo injurious to neigh- bouring nations, of whom they had reafon to ftand in awe. Thus it feems that times of ig- norance, barbarity, and confufion, were the moft unlikely to give rife and currency to fables, and the moft proper topreferve the truth of traditions, which muft, for this ridiculous reafon, have come down uncorrupted and unmixed. One can hardly imagine any thing fo extravagant : and yet I can quote, from Abbadie, away of reafoning that is more fo. You have thought, I doubt not, hitherto, like other men of fenfe, that the confiftency of a narration is one mark of it's truth -, but this great divine will teach you, that the inconfiftency, not the confiftency, is fuch a mark. Moses, he fays, is fo inconfiftent with himfelf, that he eftablifhes the exiftence of one God, and then talks as if there were many. He introduces Jacob wreftling againft God, and the mortal comes off viflorious. Could he have advanced fuch an apparent abfurdi- ty, if the facb had not been true .'' He advanced it, becaufe he knew it to be true, tho he did not underftand it. Juft fo he talked of feveral lords, who appeared to AbrahaiM under the forms of angels, without knowing what he faid, tho Ab- badie knew that the angel of the covenant was one of them : by which I profefs myfelf not to, know PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 343 know what Abbadie meaned, or what they mean, who fay that this angel was the Son of God. Thus a new rule is added to the canon of criti- cifm by this learned divine. Another condition of the authenticity of any human hiftory, and fuch alone we are to confider in this place, is, that it contain nothing re- pugnant to the experience of mankind. Things repugnant to this experience are to be found in many, that pafs however for authentic ; in that of LivY for inftance : but then thefe incredible anecdotes ftand by themfelves, as it were, and the hiftory may go on without them. But this is not the cafe of the pcntateuch, nor of the other books of the Old teftament. Incredible anec- dotes are not mentioned feldom and occafionally in them : the whole hiftory is founded on fuch ; it confifts of little elfe, and if it were not an hi- ftory of them, it would be an hiftory of nothing. Thefe books become familiar to us before we have any experience of our own. The ftrange ftories they relate, reprefented in pidures or in prints, are the amufements of our infancy ; we read them as foon as we learn to read, and they make their impreflions on us, like the tales of our nurfes. The latter are foon effaced, the fometimes with difficulty -, becaufe no one takes care to preferve them, and care is taken, in a good education, to deftroy them. But the others are induftrioufly renewed, and the moft fuperftitious credulity grows up along with us. We may laugh at Don Z 4 Quixote, 344 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. Quixote, as long as we pleafe, for reading ro- mances till he believed them to be true hiftories, and for quoting archbifhop Turpin with great folemnity •, but when we fpeak of the pentateuch as of an authentic hiftory, and quote Moses as folemnly as he did Turpin, are we much lefs mad than he was ? "When I fit down to read this hiftory with the fame indifference as I fhould read any other, for fo it ought to be read to comply with all that archbifhop Tillotson requires of us, I am ready to think myfelf tranfported into a fort of fairy-land, where every thing is done by magic and enchantment; where a fyftem of nature, very different from ours, prevails ; and all I meet with is repugnant to my experience, and to the cleareft and moft diftind; ideas I have. Two or three incredible anecdotes, in a decade ofLivy, are eafily paffed over : I rejedt them, and I return, with my author, into the known courfe of human affairs, where I find many things extraordinary, but none incredible. I cannot do this in reading the hiftory of the Old teftament. It is founded in incredibility. Almoft every event contained in it is incredible in it's caufes or confequences : and J muft accept or rejed; the whole, as I faid juft now. I can do no otherwjfe, if I a6l like an in-^ different judge, and if I give no more credit to Mqses than to any other hjftorian. But I need fay no more on this head. No one, except here and there a divine, will prefume to fay, that the hiftories of the Old teftament are con- formable to the experience of mankind and to the natural PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 345 natural courfe of things. I except here and there a divine, becaufe I remember one, who, fpeak- ing of the converfation of the ferpent with the firft woman, and the other circumftances of the fall of man (that he may avoid the explanations given by the rabbins of this ftory, or that of Philo, a little lefs extravagant than the others, all which turned the whole into allegory) has the front to aflert, that there is nothing incredible in this relation, literally underftood. The next condition of hiftorical authenticity is this, that the fafts, the principal fads at leaft, be confirmed by collateral teftimony. By colla- teral teftimony I mean the teftimony of thofe, who had no common intereft of country, of re- ligion, or of profelTion, to difguife or falfify the truth ; as I expreffed myfelf above. Thus too it is necefTary that we exprefs ourfelves in order to prevent a common theological fophifm. Huetius fays, in the place to which I have referred already, that an hiftory is deemed to be true, when other hiftories relate the fame fafts, and in the fame manner. But it is not enough that the fame fads are related, even in cotemporary, or nearly cotemporary, books ; fince, if the authors of thefe books were fuch as I defcribe, all thefe teftimo- nies would be in efFeft but one ; as all thofe of the Old teftament, which confirm the mofaical hiftory, are in truth but one, the teftimony of Moses hjmfelf. JOSEPHUS 346 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. JosEPHus attempts to fupport this hiftory by collateral teltitnonies, thoie of Egyptians, Phe- nicians, Chaldeans, and even Greeks. But thefe teftimonies, were they never fo full to his pur- pofe, would ceafe to be collateral teftimonies by coming through him, who had a common in- tereft of country and religion to difguife and to falfify truth. If we examine the ufe he makes of the fragments he cites from Manetho, con- cerning the fhepherd-kings, and many other cita- tions in his works, we Ihall find abundant reafon to fufpecl him of both. Eusebius is a collateral witnefs as little, as he j and yet from thefe two quivers principally have all the arrows employed to defend the authenticity of the Old teftament been drawn. They are blunt indeed ; and no- thing can be more trifling than the ufe that has been made of them by antient and modern fcho- lars. Whenever thefe men find, in profane hi- ftory or tradition, the leaft circumftance that has any feeming relation to facred hiftory, they pro- duce it as a collateral teftimony -, and fometimes even the fimilitude of founds is employed for the fame purpofe, with a great apparatus of learning. But nothing can be more impertinent than this learning. The man, who gives the leaft credit to the mofaic hiftory for inftance, will agree, very readily, that thefe fi.ve books contain traditions of 0, very great antiquity, fome of which were pre- ferved and propagated by other nations, as well as PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 347 as by the Ifraelites, and by other hiftorians, as well as by Moses. Many of them may be true too : but, I think, they will not ferve to vouch for one another in the manner they muft do to be- come fuch collateral teftimonies as are required. That the Ifraelites had a leader and legiflator called Moses, is proved by the confent of foreign, whom I call collateral, witnefles. Be it fo. But furely it will not follow that this man converfed with the Supreme Being face to face ; which thefe collateral witnefles do not affirm. The Ifraelites were an egyptian colony, and conquered Paleftine. Be it fo. It will not follow, that the red-fea opened a paflage to them, and drowned the Egyptians who purfued them. It will not follow, that the pofleflion of the land of Canaan was promifed to their father Abraham four hundred years before, as a confequence of the vocation of this patriarch, and of an alliance which God made with him and with his family, A great number of inftances might br brought of the fame kind •, and fuch inftances might ferve to prove the authenticity of thofe hiftories, which the monk of Viterbo endeavoured to impofe on the world under the names of Megasthenes and other antient writers, juft as well, as they ferve to prove the authenticity of thofe which we afcribe to MosEs, or Joshua, or any other fuppofed writers of the Old teftament. The three or four antient neighbouring na- tions, of whom we have fome knowledge, feemed to 348 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, to have had a common tund of traditions, which they varied according to their different fyflems of rehgion, philofophy, and policy. We may ob- ferve this, if we compare the traditions of the Arabs, defcended from the Ifmaeiites, with thofe of the Jews defcended from the IfraeHtes. Human tradition for human tradition, the former deferve as much credit as the latter. Why then do we put fo great a difference between them ? Have we any reafon for it, except the affirmation of one of the parties ? Abb a die will tell you that we nave, becaufe the Jews were a people of fages and philofophers. The beft excufe, that can be made for the poor man, is to fay, that he be- came, foon afterward?, mad enough to fludy the Apocalypfe, and to believe that he found a hid- den fenfe in it. The truth is, that ignorance and fuperftition, pride, injuftice, and barbarity, were the peculiar charaderiftics of this people of fages and philofophers. The principles of their reli- gion formed them to every part of this character. Their priefts, who had the care of their religion and the keeping of their records, as we are told, maintained them in it ; and whether their hiftory v;as fuch,as we fee it, before the days of Esdras and Nehemiah, or nothing more than broken traditions, collefted and put together by them in the prefent form ; thus much is certain, that the fame fpirit breathes through the whole, and that the charafter of the nation appears evidently in every part of the compofition. It has been faid, J know, of the pride of this people particularly, that PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 349 that their fcriptures were not contrived to flatter them in it, fmce their revolts, their apoflafies, and the punilhments which followed them, as well as the difcourfes of their prophets, filled with the moll mortifying reproaches, and the moft terrible threateningson the part of God, are fet forth in thefe books with every aggravating circumftance. But this evafion will ftrengthen, inftead of weakening, what I have faid. It is true that the Jews are often reprefented in them like rebellious children, but they are always re- prefented like favorite children. They abandon God's law and his worfliip ; they depofe him ; they chufe another king in his place : ftill his prediledion for this chofen people fubfifls j and if he puniflies, it is only like an indulgent parent, to reclaim them, and to fhew them the fame favor as before. In fliorr, he renews all his promifes to them ; future glory and triumph ; a Mefliah ; a kingdom that ihall deftroy all others, and Jaft eternally •, " confumet univerfa regna, et ipfum *' ftabit in eternum." Thus was the pride of this people kept up by incredible ftories about the pall, and incredible prophecies about the future ; and with their pride, even to this day, their ignorance, their enthufiaftical fuperftition, and in principle, if not in effeft for want of power, their injuflice and their barbarity. Thus we fee that the authenticity of the mofaical hiflory, and the other hiftories of the Old teflament, has no fufhcient collateral teftimony; butrefts folely, or principally, on the good faith of a people, who defervc. 350 PHILOSOPHICAL XVORRS. deferve, on many accounts, to be trufted the leaft ^ and of whom we may fay, that it is improbable their hiftory fhould have been written, and im- pofTible that it fhould have been preferved, with a ftrid regard to truth. I MIGHT reft the matter here, if it did not come into my thoughts to expofe a fophifm that has been employed by thofe who defend the authen- ticity of this hiitory. If they cannot fhew that it is confirmed by collateral and foreign teftimony, cotemporary or nearly cotemporary, they hope to confirm it by afluming that relics continued Jong among the Jews, and that feftivals and ceremo- nious inftitutions continue ftill : all which are fo many cotemporary proofs ; fince they muft have been cotemporary, in their origin, with the fa6ts to which they are relative. The proof is preca- rious, in the mouth of one of your divines, who have abufed it to eftablifh fo many pious frauds, and the belief of fo many fooliih legends : but it becomes contemptible when it is employed by one of our divines, who declaim fo much againft the ufe that has been made of it in your church. With what face can he talk to us, like Abb a die, of the rod of Aakon, of the pot of manna, or of the figures that reprefented rats and the privy parts of the Philiftines ? Would the man prove his fin- cerity to us, as he proves that of Moses, by his contradictions and inconfiltencies ? The relics, fo long preferved, exift no where out of PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 3-^1 of the books whofe hiftorical authenticity they are advanced to prove : and if they did exiii, we fhoLild be obhged to rejedl them, or to admit many of the grofleft impofitions that have pafied on popular credulity. Did not the priefts of Del- phi fhew the very ftone that Saturn fwallowed, when he intended to devour Jupiter ? Was there not an olive-tree at Troezene, or fomewhere in Greece, in the time of Pausanias, which blof- fomed and bore fruit, which had been the club of Hercules, and which this hero had planted, juft as Joseph of Arimathea planted his ftickthat became a miraculous thorn at Glaftonbury ? The inftitution of feftivals and ceremonies proves as little, as relics. Tho fuppofed cotemporary, they may owe their original to fome fabulous tra- ditions J or if really cotemporary, they ferve as well to prove all the ridiculous circumftances that have been blended with the tradition, in procefs of time, as the fadl which they were defigned to record. The Ifraelites had their fabbath of days, their fabbath of years, and their weeks of years. W^ill it follow that God was employed fix days in the laborious work of the creation, and that he refted the feventh ? The pafiover, and other in- ftitutions, ferved to commemorate the departure of the Ifraelites out of Egypt, and their tranfmigra- tion into Paleftine. But will they ferve likewiie to commemorate all the incredible circumftances which had been added to the tradition of a very credible, and, no doubt, of a very true, event ? Collateral teftimony proves the event •, but thefe fuppofed 352 PHILOSOPHtCAL tVORKS. fuppofed cotemporary inftitutions cannot Hand in lieu of collateral teftimony to prove the circum- fiances. Whether the event be true, or whether it be falfe, fuch inftitutions will confound the truth of the event with the falfhood of the cir- cumftances in one cafe, and will vouch for both alike, in the other. The death of Moses, who certainly died, is confounded with the circum- llances that accompany it in the laft chapter of Deuteronomy; circumftances abfurd and profane; and yet, if the Jews commemorate the true fad:, they muft commemorate, on this principle, all the circumftances that are related in the bible, and in their oral traditions. A good Iman believes pioufly the afcenfion of Mahomet, on the faith of his traditions, and of the ceremony by which it is annually commemorated. The afcenfion and the circumftances of it are falfe alike, the cere- mony vouches for all alike •, and he muft believe, not only the afcenfion of Mahomet, but, that the angel Gabriel brought, by night, to his fepulchre, a flying horfe, called Borak, which the prophet mounted and rode on horfeback into heaven. Shall the annual ceremony, which con- firms the whole account alike, make us believe that Mahomet went to heaven, or hinder us from placing this ftory in the fame clafs with that of AsTOLPHus and his hippogryphe ? We fhali believe no part of it: but the good Iman is obliged to believe the whole. The little I have faid makes it plain enough, and PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 353 and more particulars in fo plain a cafe would be fuperfluous, that if we take Tillotson at his word, if we give only the fame credit to Moses, which we give to every other hiftorian, and no more, his hiftory cannot pafs, according to any rule of good fenfe or true criticifm, for authentic. But other divines are not fo generous : they give up nothing; and, therefore, when they cannot maintain weak arguments of one kind, they have recourfe to another hypothefis, and affirm this hiftory to have been writ by men under the imme- diate influence of divine infpiration, and to be, therefore, of divine authority. For this they have the word of Josephus, and the unanimous atteftation of the jewifh and chriftian churches^ But all this will not amount to proof, unlefs ic may be faid that they, who cannot give- to this hiftory even the appearance of human, can give it the appearance of divine, authenticity. That famenefs of fpirit, which runs through all this hi- ftory, and which appears in all the writings of the jewifh prophets, confirms one thing that Jo- se phus fays. A diftind. order of men, priefts and prophets, among the Jews as well as the Egyptians, publifhed the facred writings of thefc people : and thefe writings were received on the faith of this order of men, who had the fame temptations to impofe, and the fame opportunities of impofing, in both countries. Josephus boafts the integrity of thefe men, and the ftrift re- gard which they paid to truth, in Egypt as well as in Paleftine: and his teftimony will be of as Vol. V. A a n^uch 354 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. much weight in favor of one, as in favor of the other, that is, of none at all. The facred writings of the Egyptians had no more authority out of Egypt than the polytheifm, fuperftition, and idolatry of other nations gave them: and the facred writings of the Jews were never re- ceived as fuch out of Judaea, till the propaga- tion of chriftianity carried them abroad. Chrifti- anity abrogated the law, and confirmed the hi- ftory, of MosES, from the time at leaft, when St. Paul undertook, like a true cabaliftical ar- chitect, with the help of type and figure, to raife a new fyftem of religion on the old foundations. No proof of this kind, therefore, affording pre- tence to fay that the fcriptures of the Ifraelites, any more than thofe of the Egyptians, are of divine authority ; our divines turn themfelves to declaim on certain undoubted marks of it, which are to be found, they afTume, in the books them- felves that the canon of the Old teftament con- tains. Let us fay fomething on this fubje<5b. It deferves our utmoft attention. Let us compare fome of thefe fuppofed marks of a divine original with thofe of an human original, which will ftare us in the face, and point out, plainly, the fraud and the impofture. I ufe thefe words with great freedom. I think my felf obliged, in confcience, to do fo : and before I conclude, you (hall judge of the reafons for which I thinkin this manner and hold this language. We are told, in fome theological declamations, that PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 355 that the revelation made to the Ifraelites, and taught in their fcriptures, corredled the falfe ideas of paga- nifnii as it appears by the examples of Socrates and Plato, who borrowed, from the writings of the Jews, the beft and foundeft parts of their phi- lofophy : which has been proved over and over by learned antiquaries *. It is a fufficient anfwer to this, to fay, that the faft is falfe. Chriflians, as well as Jews, have aflerted it ; but it is falfe to fay, that they have proved it. Neither Plato, nor Socrates, nor Pythagoras, nor the Egyptians and Chaldeans, their mafters, appear to have borrowed any thing from the Jews, tho Moses had been inftruded in all the wifdom of the Egyptians, and tho the Jews, both before and after Esdras, borrowed evidently, as evi- dently as any fuch thing can appear at this diftance of time, from the Egyptians, the Chal- deans, and even the greek, philofophers, from Plato and from Zeso for inflance. At other times we are told, that the foul of man knows neither whence it came, nor whither it is to go ; that thefe are points concerning which human reafon muft be always in doubt, and which were clearly determined by the jewifh revelation. We find this aflerted very magifterially ; but if we have recourfe to the Bible, we find no fuch thing. Moses did not believe the immortality of the foul, nor the rewards and punifhments of another life, tho it is poffible he might have learned thefe- dodtrines from the £,gyptians, who taught them * Abbadie. A a 2 very 356 PHILOSOPHICAL WOl^fCS. very early, and yet not fo early perhaps, ai they taught that of the unity of God. When I fay that Moses did not beheve the immortality of tht; foul, nor future rewards and puniftimehts, my rea- fon for it is, that he taught neither when he had to do with a people, whom even a theocracy could hot reftrain, and on whom, therefore, terrors of pu- ftifhment future as well as prefent, eternal as well as temporary, could never be too much multiplied, nor too ftrongly inculcated. Moses, the greateft of their prophets, knew nothing of this immortality ; and Solomon, the wiifefl of their kings, decides againft it. The texts in Ezekiel, and others, which are alledged to prove that this dodlrine was part of the jewifh fyftem, are too modern to prove it; and they admit, befides, of a different fenfe. In fhort, this dodrine does not appear to have prevailed amongft them till they became ac- quainted with greek philofophy, and inftead of lending to Plato borrowed from him. This pre- tended mark of divinity may be afcribed therefore, if it be one, to pagan philofophy, but it cannot be fo to jewifli theology : and, I cannot help iifing an cxpreffion of one of thefe declaimers*, who write as if they were preaching, and to apply it to the whole tribe. They would do well to think a little better beforehand, and to refpeft their readers a little more. ^ When thefe men talk of the charaders of a divine original, which are to be found in the books *Adbadie, \ • •' r>^ PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 357 of the Old teftament, they muft mean nothing, or ihey muft mean to fay that thefe books are more perfecft, according to our ideas of human perfection, whether we confider them as books of faw or pf hiftory, than any other writings that are avowedly human. Now if this be what they mean, nothing can be more falfe. They cannot deny th^t pagan philofophers enjoined a general benevolence, ^ benevolence not confined to any particular fociety of men, but extended to the great commonwealth of mankind, as a firft prin- ciple of the law of our nature. The law of the Jews exaded from them all the duties necelTary to maintain peace and good order among them^ felves : andi if this be a mark of divinity, the laws, which rapparees and banditti eftablifh in their focieties, have the fame. But the firft principles, and the whole tenor, of the jewifh laws took them out of all moral obligations to the reft of man- kind : and if Moses did not order them to have no benevolence for any who were not Jews, " erga *' nullum hominem benevolos effe, "as Lysimachus pretended, yet is it certain that their law, their hiftory, and their prophecies, determined them to think themfelves a chofen race, diftinfl from the reft of mankind in the order of God's providence, and that they were far from owing to other men, what other men owed to them and to one another. This produced a legal injuftice and cruelty in their whole condud; and there is no part of their hiftory wherein we fhall not find examples of both, authorifed by their law, and preffed upon them by their priefts and their prophets. Aa 3 358 PHILOSOPHICAL WpRKg; In the fyftems of pagan philofophy we arc ex- horted, fays another of thefe declaimers, to lovC virtue for her own fake \ but the jewilh divines, rifing much higher, exhorted us to love virtue for the fake of God. But can there be any thing fft impioufly interefted and craving, as the fentiments afcribed to the patriarchs by Moses, and the prin- ciples of his own law ? " If God will be with me, *' and will keep me in ^his way that I go, and will " give me bread to eat, and raiment to put on, fo •' that I come again to my father's houfein peace; ^* then Hiall the Lord be my God, and this ftone *' which I have fet for a pillar fhall be God's houfc, «* and of all that thou fhalt give me, I will fure- '' ly give the tenth unto thee *." This was Jacob's yow, and the conditional engagement which he took with God, If we turn to the twen- ty eighth chapter of Deuteronomy, we fhall find thatlMosESjOn the renewal of the coven ant between God and the people, employs no arguments, to in- duce the latter to a ftri<5t obfervation of it, of an higher nature than promifes of immediate good, and threatenings of immediate evil. They arc ex- horted to keep the law ; not for the fake of the law, not for the fake ofGod ; but for confiderations of another kind, and wherein not only their wants, were to be fupplied, but all their appetites and paffions to be gratified. If they hearkened dili- gently to the voice of the Lord, they were to be ^tt on high above all the nations of the earth ; * Gen. xxviii. they PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 359 they were to be the head, and not the taili to be above only and not beneath ; all the people of the earth were to fear them •, all their enemies were to be fmitten before their face, and they who came out againft them, one way, were to fly before them feven. Thefe were objects of ambition. Their bafket and their ftorc were to be blefTed, they were to grow rich, they were to lend to many na- tions, and to borrow from none. Thefe were ob- jedls of avarice. They were to be blefTed every where, in the city and in the field, in the fruit of their bodies, in the fruit of their ground, and in the fruit of their cattle, and of their flocks of Iheep. Thefe were objedls of all their other appetites and paflions. God purchafed, as it were, the obedience of a people he had chofen long before, by this mercenary bargain. It was ill kept on their part j and the law with all thefe fanflions was continually violated, fometimes rejeded, and had in no degree a force fufficient to maintain itfelf in obfervation and reverence. The mofl: excellent conftitutions of human go- vernment and fyftems of human law become often ufelefs, and even hurtful, either in a natural courfe of things, or by extraordinary conjun<5lures, which the wifdom of legiflators could not forefee. One of the mofl: conceivable perfedlions of a law is, that it be made with fuch a forefight of all poflible accidents, and with fuch provifions for the due execution of it in all cafes, that the law may be eflfectual to govern and dired thefe accidents, A a 4 inftead 36o PHILOSOPHICAL WORI^S. inftead of lying at the mercy of them. Such a law would produce it's effeft by a certain moral necefTity refulting from itfelf, and not by the help of any particular conjunflure. We are able to form fome general notions of laws thus perfe(5l : but to make them is above humanity. Another of the mofl conceivable perfections of a law confifts in the clearnefs and precifion of it's terms : and, even in this, the greateft legiflators have often failed. The terms become equivocal or obfcure, if they were not fo originally, by the endeavours of thofe> who fear the law, to elude it j and of thofe, who get by their explanations or judgments, to perplex the meaning of it. But that which is ideal per- feftion, not real, among men, will be found, no doubt, and ought to be expefted, when God is the legiflator. If it is not fo found, all that can be faid about marks of divinity in any Law, that pretends to be revealed and enacled by God, is mere cant. To apply thefe refiedions the more ftrongly, it will be proper to confider the law of Moses re- latively to the firft of the perfedions mentioned, as a law given to the Ifraelites alone : and to con- fider, relatively to the fecond, the whole body of their law, and their hiftory, which is a fort of com- mentary on their law, not only as given to them, but as given to all mankind, for purpofes the mofl important to their commjon welfare. If eterna] wifdom dictated the laws, and infpired thefe hifto- rians and prophets, in all their writings, eternal wifdom PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 361 wifdom knew from the firft all the ufes they were toferveintime; and by confequence, whether we regard the jevvilh economy alone, or that of juda- ifm arid chriftianity together, the whole fyftem of law, hiftory, and prophecy, mufl be exadly pro- portioned, as the means to all thefe ends. On the firft head, we cannot read the Bible without being convinced that no law ever operated fo weak and fo uncertain an effeft, as the law of Moses did. Far from prevailing againft accidents and conjun6lures, the leaft was fufficient to inter- rupt the courfe, and to defeat the defigns, of it ; to make that people not only neglect the law, but ceafe to acknowledge the legiflator. To prevent this, was the firft of thefe defigns : and if the fecond was, as it was no doubt, and as it is the defign or pretence of all laws, to fecure the happinefs of the people, this defign was defeated as fully as the other; for the whole hiftory of this people is one continued feries of nfra(51:ions of the law, and of national ca- lamities. So that this law, confidered as the par- ticular law of this nation, has proved more inef- fedlual than any other law, perhaps, that can be quoted. If this be afcribed to the hardnefs of heart and obftinacy of the people, in order to fave the honor of the law, this honor will be little faved, and it's divinity ill maintained. This excufe might be admitted in the cafe of any human law j but we fpeak here of a law fuppofed to be di(5lated by divine wifdom, which ought, and which would have been able, if it had been fuch, to keep in 3^2 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, in a flate of fubmifTion to it, and of national pro- fperity, even a people rebellious and obftinate enough to break through any other. If it be faid that the law became inefFeflual by the fault of thofe who governed the people, their judges and their kings ; let it be remembered that thefe judges ^nd kings were of God's appointment, for the inoft part at lead; that he himfelf is faid to have been their king during feveral ages ; that his prefence remained amongft them, even after they had depofed him ; and that the high-prieft con- fulted him, on any emergency, by the Urim and Thummim. Occafional miracles were wrought to enforce the law: but this was a (landing miracle that might ferve both to explain and enforce it, by the wifdom and authority of the legillator, as often as immediate recourfc to him was neceflary. Can it be denied that the mofl imperfed fyftem of human laws would have been rendered effectual by fuch means as thefe ? „* It may not be amifs here to compare the effecTt of this law, before the captivity of Babylon, with that which it had afterwards. Ten tribes of this chofen people had been, for their difobedience, difperfed, and, we may fay, loft in the eaft, long before the reignof Nebuchodonozor. This prince completed the ruin of the whole nation. He burned their temple, and their city, and carried the two remaining tribes into captivity. This captivity is faid to have lafted but feventy years : and the Jews had carried into it fo little refped for their law, fo little PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 363 little regard to their hiftory, and fo little truft in the prophecies, which had been publifhed both before and during this time, that they Teemed to have forgot them all when Cyrus gave them per- miflion to return to their country, and to rebuild their temple. He did more than give them per- milfion ; he gave them encouragement j and among other inftances of it, he reftored the facred vefTels which had been taken from them. What happened on this great revolution ? Zerobabel gathered, with much treuble, a fmall number of the Jews, who were willing to return into their own coun- try on this great revolution ; and even thefe were the dregs of the people. The moft confiderable of them, and, among thefe, twenty of the four and twenty orders of priefls that had been carried to Babylon, chofe rather to flay there than to return to the holy city, tho that was the place appointed by God for their facrifices, and the moft auguft ceremonies of their religion. Fourfcore years in- tervened between the return of Zerobabel and the arrival of Esdras at Jerufalem. The temple and the city, probably, had been rebuilt, but the Jaw cannot be faid to have been reftored. Many things, direflly contrary to it, were praftifed openly and without fcruple. Thus, for example, not only the people, but the Levites and thepriefts, married ftrange women, women who were not of their own country. Esdras, and Nehemiah after him, neg- lected nothing to reftore and preferve the obfer- vation of the law : and for this purpofe they took |Tiean§ very different from thofe which Moses had S64 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. had inftituted, and much more efFeftual. One of thefe means, and perhaps the moft effedual, was the inflitution of fynagogues, which becarne fo numerous, that wherever there were ten Jews, it is faid, there was a fynagogue. In thefe the law was read and explained once every week; whereas it was to be read but once in feven years, and the people were obliged to go up to Jerufalem to he^r ir, according to the mofaic inftitution. The cpa- fequence was, that, notwithftanding fome fchifms, fome apoftafies, and other revolutions which hap- pened in the church and ftate, the Jews in general fignalifed themfelves by a greater and more con- itant attachment to their reHo;ion and law. 'O* Another perfedion of law confifts in fh? clearnefs and precifion of the terms : arjd, in thefe refpecls, we propofp to confidpr this body of hi|lpT ry, of prophecy, ^i^d of law, relatively not to the Jews alone, but to tlie reft of the world likewife, Now the language, in which this law was given, «nd in which we jiiuft fuppofe that the hillprie^ and prophecies ^yere written, as well as the hwy unlefs we fuppofe thefe to have been written in, or after, the time of Esdras, is, the learned fay, of all languages the moft loofe and equivocal j and the ftyle and manner of writing of the facre4 authors, whoever they were, or whenever they lived, increafe the uncertainty and obfcurity evei^ of any other language. Hov^r Ihould it be other- wife, when the fame paflages may be taken in hifto- fif al, myftical, literal, aad_allegorical, fenfes ; and when PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 365 when thofe who writ them knew fo little what they writ, that they foretold fome future, when they imagined they were relating fome paft, event ? Lord Bacon, indeed, fays, that the facred authors had a fpecial privilege of recording the future, as well as the pafl, in hiftory. But I fuppofe his lordfhip to have been no more in earnefl when he faid this, than he was in writing his chriftian pa- radoxes. To fupply thefe defefts, the Jews have recourfe to an oral law, and ehriftians to the de- cifions of councils. Strange methods indeed! hifto- ry may explain or control tradition, but it is quite abfurd to explain or control hiftory by tradition. Councils were compofed of men whofe prctenfions to infpiration deferve nothing but our contempt : and, therefore, it is equally abfurd to explain or control the word of God by the judgment of thefe men, whether in their aflemblies, or fepa- rately. St. Jerom complains, in one of his letters*, that they dragged the text to favor their particular fentiments, how repugnant foever to it. But this text does not feem to want fo much dragging. The ambiguity of it makes it fupple enough ; and lentiments, the moft contrary to one another, are equally well fupported by it. If we add to thefe confiderations that of the infinite number of copies, of verfions, and of verfions of verfions, which have given occafion to many alterations and interpo- Jations, that are to be found, without going to Spin^oza, to HoBBES, 01" to the fanciful author pf the pre-adamiticial fyftem, we muft be, I think, * Ad Paul. con- 366 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. convinced, that the Bible, which we call the wotd of God, is as little fit, by the manner in which it has been preferved, to be an uniform foundation of univerfai religion, as by the manner in which. it was writ and firft publilhed to the world. Divines have their anfwer ready, and I hear, methinks, a great bifhop of your church aflc me, with that air of fuperiority to which no man of his age had a better claim, wh'-ther the authen- ticity of thefe books diminilhes, becaufe fome ex- planatory additions may have been inferted, be- caufe fome errors may have flipped by accident into the text, or becaufe the miftakes of copifts have given occafion to various readings ? Shew me, fays the right reverend perfon, if you can, any law, any doftrine, any ceremony, any miracle, or any prophecy, that has been added. Are not all the writings of the profane authors, whom you deem authentic, come down to you in the fame manner as thofe of the holy penmen ? I reply. My objedion and my complaint are, that the manner, in which thefe books were writ, were publifhed, and have been preferved, makes it impofllbie to do this. Could we do it, could we diftinguilh be- tween what is original and what not, the objedion would vanifh, and the complaint ceafe. But both will remain in force till then ; becaufe of the vaft difference that there is between the importance of thefe and of all other writin2;s. The laws of Pla- TO, the odes of Horace, and the hiftory of Livv, may have been corrupted without any ill confe- quence PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 367 quence to thofe who read them. But the fame cannot be faid of the laws of Moses, of the pfalms of David, and of the hiftory of the Old teilament. I HAVE been long enough on the defenfive. It is time I (hould attack in my turn, and fliew you for what reafons I cannot believe that the penta- teuch, and the other books of the Old teftament, were writ under a divine influence, and have any right to be called the word of God. There may be fome defe<5ts in human laws, fome falfities or miflakes in human hiftories, and yet both of them may deferve all the refpeft and all the credit, on the whole, that the writings of fallible men can deferve. But any one defed, any one falfity, or miftake, is fufficient to fhew the fraud and impofturc of writings that pretend to contain the infallible word of God. Now there are grofs de- fers, and palpable falfhoods, in almoft every page of the fcriptures, and the whole tenor of them is fuch, as no man, who acknowledges a fupreme, all-perfeft Being, can believe to be his word. This I mull prove •, and when I have done fo, divines may call me theift, or atheift, if they pleafe. I fhall not be afliamed of the firft character, and /hall leave them to purge themfelves of one as ab- furd as the laft. That the Jews held the unity of God is true: and that their father Abraham might have learned this doftrine among the Egyptians, tho it has been faid, very foolilhly, that he acquired great wealth by inftrufting that people in philofo- phy and the other fciences, is true likewife : but it 368 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. it will not follow that he, or his pofterity, adored the true God. There are many paffages in Job, in Ifaiah, in the Pfalms, and in other parts of the Old teftament, which give moft fublime ideas of the majefly of the Supreme Being; and which have been founded, for that reafon, very high. But it will not be hard to quote mahometan, and even pagan, writers, who have fpoke of him with as much noblenefs of ftyle, and with as much- dignity, as any of thefe : whilft, on the other hand, it will be eafy to quote many things imputed to the Supreme Being by thefe, at leaft as unworthy of him, as any which the Mahometans, or even the mofl extravagant of the pagans, invented. Sublime exprelTions concerning the Deity may ferve to Ihew that the imaginations of thofe, who ufed them, were heated by the enthufiafm of poetry and devotion : tbey will not prove the writers to have been divinely infpired i and it will become nothing lefs than blafphemy to alTert that they were fo, when they impure, at the fame time, fuch things to the Divinity as would bring difgrace oti humanity. I KNOW, for I can demonftrate by connefling the clearefi: and moft diftindt of my real ideas, that there is a God, a firft intelligent Caufe of all things, whofe infinite wifdom and power appear evidently in all his works, and to whom, therefore, I afcribe, moft rationally, every other perfection, whether conceivable or not conceivable by me. A book is put into my hands, wh'ich is, I am told, and have- been PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 369 been told from my youth, the word of this God, and wherein I Ihall find the whole fcheme of things which he has tftabliflied, and the whole economy of his providence. What I learned before by rote, I confider with more attention i and am far from finding in it the Supreme Being, whofe exiftence and attributes I demonftrate. The fcene opens, indeed, by the creation, and this creation is a- fcribed to one God ; that of the material world, at leaft : for when this God proceeds to the cre- ation of man, he calls on other Beings, we know not by the text how many, to co-operate with him, and to make man in his and their likenefs. This feems to lay a foundation for polytheifm, and I am ftartled at it, becaufe it is inconfiftent with that unity of the godhead which my reafon Ihews me, and which the general tenor even of the mofaic law and hiftory afTerts. The divine, on the contrary, triumphs in the paflage; becaufe he drags it, againft reafon, and this revelation both, to li- gnify the three co-equal perfons in one godhead, which no reafon can comprehend, which no re- velation affirms explicitly, and which has no foun- dation, except that of a theology much more mo- dern than this. The more I compare what Moses fays of this God, and by a fuppofed infpiration from him, the more repugnant I find the whole to demon- ftrated, and even to obvious, truth. Nothing can better refemble modern rabbinical traditions, than thefe antient and mofaical traditions : the fame Vol. V. B b isno- 370 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, ignorance of nature, phyfical and moral, the fame irreverent conceptions of the Supreme Being, pre- vail in both. Moses, they fay, was divinely in- Ipired : and yet Moses was as ignorant of the true fyllem of the univerfe, as any of the people of bis age. I need not defcend into particulars to (hew this ignorance. To evade the objedtion drawn from it, we are told that he conformed himfelf to that of the people. He did not write to inllrud the Ifraelites in natural philofophy, but to imprint ftrongly on their minds a belief pf one God, the creator of all things. Was it neceffary to that purpofe that he fhould explain to them the coper- nican fyftem? No moft certainly. But jt was not neceffary to this purpole, neither, that he fhould give them an abfurd account, fmce he thought lit to^give them one, of the creation of our phyficaJ, and, we may fay, of our moral, fy flcm. It was not neceffary he Ihould tell them, for inftance, that light was created, and the diftinftion of night and day, of evening and morning, were made before the fun, the moon, and the ftars, which were " fet *' in the firmament of heaven to divide the day *' from the night, and to be for figns and forfea- " fons, and for days and for years." It was not neceffary that he Ihould tell them, how this moral fyftem was deftroyed by the wiles of a ferpent> and by the eating of an apple, almoft as foon as it began, againft the intention, as well as command, ot the Creator. Btfides, Moses muft be confidered as appointed and infpire.d by God to write, not pnly for his own age, but for all future ages j for the PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 371 the moft enlightened as weJI as for the moft igno- rant : in which cafe, that his hiftory might anfwer all the defigns of eternal wifdom, it ihould have been proportioned to the ignorance of the Ifraelites, as little able to underftand one fyftem of philofo- phy as another, without giving fo much reafon to people, better informed, to believe him as ignorant as any uninfpired perfon could be. If the Ignorance and the errors, which betray themfelves very grofsly in the writings afcribed to Moses, make it impoflible to believe fuch an author divinely infpiredj the confufed, inconfiftent, and unworthy notions of a Supreme Being, which appear in his writings, fhew very evidently that the true God was unknown to him. He acknow- ledged but one God, and the people were forbid to worfhip any other. But then he put this one God to as many and as unworthy ufes, in the fer- vice of man, as the heathen put their many gods, of different orders : and he was, therefore, in this refped more inconfiftent than they were. The God of Moses creates the world, makes man, and repents of it immediately, for a reafon which he might have prevented by a little lefs indulgence to, what is called, free will. As foon as this indulgence had given an opportunity to the ferpent to tempt Eve, and to Eve to tempt Adam, who fhould have known the nature of ferpents better, fince he had juft given to all animals the names that were proper to them •, in fliort, as foon as they had eat the forbidden apple, and were fallen, they 3 b 2 heard ^72 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, heard the voice of God, who was walking in the garden in the cool of the day. He condemned them for their difobedience : he curfcd the earth, for their fakes, and the ferpcnt above all other beafts. Their eyes were then opened, they knew that they were naked, and they made themfelves aprons of fig-leaves, which fervcd to cover their nudity, till God made them coats of Ikins for that purpofe, and then drove them out of paradife. Thus death and fin entered into the world, and the crime of this unhappy pair was punilhed in their whole pofterity. This ftrange ftory, fo trifling and fo ferious, and wherein God is made a prin- cipal ador with the ferpent and Adam and Eve, has given occafion to much filly pains that have been taken both by Jews, and Chriftians, to lefTen the abfurdity of it, if that were poflible. Since it is impoffible, fome have attempted to explain the whole allegorically ; and it may not feem impro- bable that this allegory had been invented, among other egyptian myfteries, to fignify the intro- duflion of phyfical and moral evil into the world, by the fault of man, and againft the defign of God. This however cannot be admitted by Chriftians; for if it was, what would become of that famous text whereon the doctrine of our redemption is founded } The whole therefore muft be underftood literally : and in that cafe the God who made the world and man, that is the Supreme Being, is the fame God who walks in the garden to enjoy the cool of the evening, who tries this famous caufe, and infults our firft parents by irony and farcafm* PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 373 Thus again, and to fiiew in another inftance what inconfiftency, as well as abfurdity, Moses imputed to his one God, let us obferve that he makes this God repent a fecond time that he had made man on the earth, becaufe " he alfo was " flefh, every imagination of his heart was evil, " and all flefh had corrupted his way." For this reafon he refolved to drown the whole world, and every living creature in it, except one man, called Noah, his family, and as many birds, and beafts, and creeping things, as was neceffary to replenidi the earth. This refolution taken, the God of Mo- ses orders Noah to build an ark, or clumfy cheft, in the fafhion and in the proportions he prefcribes very minutely. This done, he crowds all the living creatures he intended to fave, men, and birds, and beads, and infeds, into the ark ; tho great fcholars pretend to fhew, by a fair calculation, that far from being crowded, there was ample room for them all in it. As foon as they were in, God fhut the door upon them, the deluge began, and had it's full efteft. When it was over, and as foon as God fmelled the fweet favor of a burnt offering on the altar Noah had erefted, he repented again, and refolved not to curfe the ground any more for man's fake, nor for a reafon which fhould have hindered him from doing it at all, tho he had done it twice already. He eflablifhed a covenant with Noah, with his fons, and with their pofterity ; and that he might remember this covenant, be- tween him and the earth, or every living creature B^ 3 upon 374 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. upon the earth, which he had proraifed to drown no more, he declares to them the inftitution of a rain-bow, defigned to put him in mind of his promife, whenever he fhould bring a cloud over the earth. Abraham defcended from Noah by Shem, and God made a new covenant with him and his po- llerity. The Supreme Being condefcended to be the tutelary God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and under this chara6ter he afled a part, which a ienfible heathen, not tranrported by prefumptuous notions of his own importance, nor by the impu- dence of enthufiafm, would have thought too mean and too low for any of his inferior gods or demons. The whole hiftory, from Noah to Abra- ham, and from Abraham to the exode, is a feries of tales, that would appear fit to amufe children alone, if they were found in any other book, tho they ferved two great purpofes of pride and am- bition among an ignorant and barbarous people. They ferved to give Jacob the preference, over a much better man, over his brother Esau. He ac- quired indeed this birth-right, and the prior blef- fingof a doating father, by a moft infamous fraud : but the fraud was fufficient, even in the eye of God, to give the defcendants of the younger brother, the Ifraelites, an entire preference over the defcend- ants of the elder brother, the Edomites, and to fet the former in the place of his favorite people. The fame tales fenced the ambition, as well as the p.nde, of the former, who claimed, on their autho- rity. PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 375 rlty, as the legitimate offspring of Abraham, a right to the land of Canaan, which God had given to Abraham, and to all the glorious promifes which he had made to that patriarch. The other nations of the earth were plunged in idolatry ; God left them in it ; he neglected them, and thought it enough to preferve the knowledge of himfelf and the purity of his worfhip in Paleftine: for which purpofe he gave a particular law, as well as the country of the Canaanites, to the If- raelites. If we confider his laws, as means of pre- ferving monotheifm, and the purity of worlhip, in oppofition to polytheifm and fuperftition, we fiiall find that no means could be worfe propor- tioned to this end. If we confider the manner, in which this people was conducted, by God himfelf, out of Egypt into the promifed land ; how they acquired the polTelTion of it, by his immediate af- fiflance, and by the execution of his orders, li- gnified to their leaders ; we fhall find that nothing can be conceived more unworthy of an all-perfect Being. In order to preferve the purity of his worfhip, he prefcribes to them a multitude of rites and ceremonies, founded in the fuperftitions of Egypt, from which they were to be weaned, or in fome analogy to them. He fucceeded accord- ingly. They were never weaned entirely from all thefe fuperftitions : and the great merit of the law* of Moszs was teaching the people to adore one God much as the idolatrous nations adored feveral. This may be called fanfiifying pagan rites and ceremonies in th-^ological language j but it is pro- faning 376 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. failing the pure worfhip of God, in the language of common fenfe. In order to make good his grant to Abraham of the land of Canaan, he or- ders the pofterity of this patriarch to conquer it, and to exterminate the inhabitants. Juft fo the leaders of Huns, of Goths, and Vandals, might, and did, make good their promifes with the people "who followed them. Juft fo the Spaniards made good the decree of Alexander the fixth, when they conquered America. Pizarro was not more cruel than Joshua ; nor the francifcan monk, who accompanied him in his expedition againft Ata- hualpa, fo cruel as Samuel, who fpoke in the name of the Lord. The francifcan monk excited the foldiers to kill the king of Peru in the heat of battle. The jewifh prieft hewed the king of the Amalekites to pieces *' before the Lord," in cool blood ; and Saul was depofed for the clemency he had Ihewed, tho he too had exercifed cruelty enough to fate any human ferocity. I am not ignorant of the arbitrary aflTumptions, and filly evafions, which are employed to foften and excufe fuch adlsof cruelty, by antient fathers, and modern commentators. You may remember, that we read together, not long ago, the anfwer which Cyril of Alexandria writ to the em- peror Julian, after the death of this emperor. When we laid afide the Billingfgate, and the long recriminations, by which, if he could not defend Moses, he tried to revenge himfelf on Plato, we found little, or nothing, in it ihat defcrved at- tention, PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 377 tention, except for it's abfurdity : for abfurdity deferves fome attention to warn us againfl it. The men who juftifyfuch cruelties, as I have mentioned^ and many others, which might be cited from the Old teftament, upon any hypothecs whatever, muft have very ill hearts, as well as heads ; and he, who imputes them to the Supreme Being, is worfe than an atheift, tho he pafs for a faint. It is very unnecelTary, in writing to you, that I fhould dwell upon the ftale theological artifices, that are employed to get over fuch objeci:ions as have been raifed againft the books of Moses, and the other books of the Old teftament. The moft abfurd things they contain are called, fometimes, types and figures, tho they have no more relation to the things faid to be typified and fignified by them, than to any thing that pafies now in France. Others of the fame kind are called allegories, and are explained, not by the book wherein they are found, but by fome fanciful commentary on them. Sometimes the order of allegory is inverted, • and things plain in therafelves are alTumed to be allegories, in order to eftablifh, upon them, fuch do6lrines as fuit theological hypochefes -, many examples of which may be found in the writings of St. Paul. But the great expedient they em- ploy, after him likewife, is that of myftery •, when things, that ftand in flat contradiction to the di- vine attributes, and that can be neither difguifed by allegory, nor foftened by analogy, are urged againft them. When a theift fees nothing repug- nant 378 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. nant to the wifdom and power, or any other attri- butes, of a fupreme, all-perfe6t Being, in the works of God, and therefore thinks himfelf juftified in rejeding the impiety of thofe who would impofe on him, as the word of God, a book which contains fcarce any thing that is not fo, the divine has re- courfe to exclamation. Reftrain your profane te- merity, he cries. The wifdom of God is not like the wifdom of man, nor the juftice of God like the jullice of man: and who art thou, O man ! who prefumeft to found the depths of either ? There is fomething fo impudent, as well as abfurd, in this proceeding, that, common as it is, one can fee no example of it without furprife ; for what can any man mean, who infills that I fhould receive thefe books, as the word of God, on account of the evident marks of a divine original which he pre- tends to fhew me in them, and then ftops me in this examination, by alTuming the very thing that is in queftion ? There are many appearances, no doubt, in the phyfical and moral fyftems, which may pafs for myfteries becaufe we cannot fully comprehend them ; but there is nothing in either of thefe, repugnant to any excellency which we ought to attribute to the Supreme Being. We confefs our ignorance; but we do not therefore call in queftion the divine attributes, nor difbelieve thefe fyftems to be his work, nor the law of nature to be his law. Had we the fame certainty that the jewifh fcriptures were his word, we might reafon in the fame minner about them. But we cannot believe them to be his word, tho we know that the PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 379 the phyfical and moral fyftems are his work, whilft we find in them fuch repugnancies to the nature of an all-perfe6b Being; not myfteries, but ab- furdities ; not things incomprehenfible, but things that imply, manifeftly, contradidion with his na- ture. They imply it fo ftrongly, that if we be- lieve in Moses and his God, we cannot believe in that God whom our reafon Ihews us ; nay, we muft believe againft knowledge, and oppofe the authority of jewilh traditions to demonftration. Here will I conclude, having faid enough, I think, to fhew that the beginning of the world is fufficiently proved by the univerfality of tradition; that the teftimony of Moses cannot be reputed an hiftorical teftimony, if we give no more credit to him than we fhould give to any other hiftorian ; and that we cannot admit his teftimony for di- vine without abfurdity and blafphemy. ^e end of the Fifth volume. W ' rM:;:*i, v.- __- ., '~-^.:Tf- ^ 5- ■ ^1%