c,?7£^/Bk.Tifc2C Trinity College Library Durham, N. C. Rec’d C 'dc±-Q J / 9e might have been so expressed, as to exclude the idea of implied 36 powers; yet, that its omission in the present compact, could not even in that vieto, give to the present Congress, any powers which it did not possess without it. There is a distinction which is mani- fest upon the Court’s own view of the subject. In the present Con- stitution, there is an express clause, giving to Congress the power of making the necessary laws to execute its powers; and therefore re- cognizes, thus far, implied powers. In the old Confederation, there is no such express provision. How, therefore, the Court, which rears its whole superstructure of implied powers upon this express elause in the Constitution, which it regards as designed to enlarge the powers of Congress, can condescend to lay any stress upon, or even to notice the omission of a most insignificant word, is most ex- traordinary. Could such a word, if it were inserted, strip the gov- ern ment of its powers, when, according to the Chief Justice’s expo- sition of the phrase, “ necessary and proper," the Government has an unlimited choice of means under an express power — unquestion- ably it cannot. I have said that the word is insignificant. It is a word in my view, so harmless, that whether it be inserted or excluded from the tenth amendment, no possible alteration can be produced in the rights of either party. For A. to say to B. “ The power I do not give you is retained by me,” is certainly as strong and as express- ive for all purposes, as if he had said, what I do not expressly give you, I retain — The first phrase is the better of the two — it is more simple and expresses as much. In a deed of conveyance of land, would the grantor give more, or the grantee receive more, by using the words “ doth absolutely and expressly , and clearly , and unequivo- cally grant, bargain, sell and convey,” than if the words were, “doth grant, bargain, sell and convey.” — It is too plain. When the State Legislatures sent in their ratifications of the Constitution, and proposed their amendments, they expressed, their sense as to implied powers, in various ways — Massachusetts, New- Hampshire, South-Carolina and Rhode Island, used the words “ all powers not expressly delegated” — Virginia and North-Carolina left out the word — New- York expressed it thus, “all powers not clearly delegated” — Rhode-Island in the Bill of Rights has it, “ not clearly delegated ,” and in the amendments proposed by the same State, we find the word “ expressly ” used. As soon as the first Con- gress was convened under the Constitution, it considered all the amendments proposed by the States — it took the substance of them, and made out from the whole, twelve amendments to be sub- mitted to the State Legislatures, ten of which were accepted, and two rejected. At a subsequent period, two more were proposed and adopted, and thus stand the twelve amendments to the Constitution. In submitting the tenth amendment in question, it was submitted as it now reads, omitting the word “ expressly.” — Amotion was made in the lower House of Congress to reinstate the word, but lost — only seventeen votes in the affirmative. A similar motion was lost in the Senate. The omission of this word could not, and did not make the difference of a hair in the rights of Congress and the States; V 37 had it been important, the motions would not have been negatived by large majorities. From all that has been said, in this and the preceding number, it must be seen by all who are not wilfully blind, that Congress has no means of executing its implied powers, but what it derives from an express grant to that effect in the Constitution. Had there been no express grant, it might have had some ground to claim by impli- cation of law, the liberty of ranging at large into many incidental powers, which the restrictive terms of the grant decidedly forbid. — - The design of the grant, or the declaratory clause, with the restric- tive phrases, was, as 1 trust I have shewn, to forbid Congress from selecting any means but what were direct and simple. Congress has not sovereign means for executing its powers. Sovereign means are the means ordinary aud extraordinary, which belong to complete and undivided sovereignty, in the selecting of which, there is no restraint, as to the free use of any, and every measure, which bare convenience may suggest, and where the unlimited discretion of the sovereign is the only rule, and his will the only law— Congress is not that sovereign. The principle of the Supreme Court is true as a general proposition, that the grant of a sovereign power includes the grant of all sovereign means, applicable to the end of such pow- er — but it is not true in the case before us. A restriction has been placed by the Convention, upon the implied powers of Congress. It is not simply a restriction according to the plain and obvious import of the words, but it is a restriction in fact , the evidence of which fact, is to be found in the journals of the Convention. What then becomes of the decision in AT Cullocli, vs. the State of Maryland. The ground of the Supreme Court, that the declaratory clause enlarges rather than abridges the powers of Congress has failed, and thus must fall to the ground, that huge pile or pyramid of constructive powers, which the industry of the Chief Justice, with the aid of all his transcendant powers of reasoning, has been rearing to throw into the shade the sovereignty of the States. The Court, too, is wrong, decidedly wrong, when it pronounces, tliat without such a liberal construction as its own, to the clause in question, “ the Constitution would be a splendid bauble.” Expe- rience and fact boldly contradict this assertion. Abolish the Bank to-morrow, as it was abolished once before. Call in the bp.igade of Civil and Military Engineers, who have been taking their summit levels all along the great Alleghany ridge of Mountains, with a view to defend us against the British. Stop all further ap- propriations for Canals and other National works, which are draw- ing the life blood of the South, and enriching the North. Leave the great Cumberland road, upon which upwards of a million of dollars have been expended, to be hereafter repaired by Maryland, or by Pennsylvania, who have such an interest in it, and who are struggling for the trade of the West. Leave the American Negro Colony on the coast of Africa to take care of itself, or to be eaten up by the Savages. Put out of Congress, all the petitions and me- morials of Judge Washington’s Colonization, or Insurrection Soci- o 38 ety. Cast into the waters of eternal oblivion, the speeches of some of our own Statesmen on Internal Improvements and Military Roads; and all the ultra and sweeping doctrines of the “general welfare.” Repeal the Tariff Laws, and disclaim all pretence to the exercise of great substantive sovereign powers, under the flimsy pretence of their being implied means of carrying into effect other powers. In a word, proclaim from Passanmquoddy to Cape Flo- rida, that the “ means to an end,” and the whole decision of the Supreme Court is an absurdity — and who besides the Supreme Court will venture to say, that for the want of a power to do all these things, our Constitution would be a bauble. No, my fellow- citizens, the Government for thirty years was respected at home and respected abroad. Without a National or other Bank, we achieved our independence. Without a Bank, and Military Roads, and Ca- nals, and Tariffs, we waged a successful war a second time against the greatest power in the world, and we have arrived to our splend- id rank amongst the nations of the earth, by the exercise of pow- ers, which toe all agree the Government possesses, and about which, there never was, at any time, the least difference of opinion. If an adherence in good faith, to the true principles and spirit of the com- pact, (with but few exceptions,) from the foundation of the Govern- ment, (to the accession of Mr. Monroe, and the introduction of the “AMERICAN POLICY,”) was upon that construction of the in- strument, which would make it a mere bauble, it was exactly that sort of bauble, which of all others, we in the South want, and ought to have, and MUST have. Take away all the powers which Congress have usurped within the last eight or ten years, and let us go back to the time of Mr. Jefferson, and so far from the Government of the Union being em- barrassed in any way by the safe and the rational construction here contended for, against that of the Supreme Court, 1 will be embold- ened to say, that it will daily become more and more firmly rooted in the affections of the people — the peace and harmony of the Union will be more and more consolidated, and the arm of the country for commerce and defence more strengthened, and invigorated; whereas under the construction of the Supreme Court, the importance of the States will be daily diminished, as the patronage and power of the General Government shall be augmented, and their sovereignty and independence will be endangered and finally destroyed ; and thus will perish, perhaps, the best hopes of the friends of civil liberty in both hemispheres. mo. 11. That Congress in executing its delegated powers, was not to pos- sess, all the diversified means, which belong to sovereign powers ge- nerally, is not only evident from the restriction imposed on their means, as already noticed, but it may be made apparent by another consideration, which is, that had such a doctrine been entertained, many of the provisions in the Constitution, would have been rank surplusage, and from such a reproach, I presume, we all agree, the 39 Convention was exempt. But the doctrine of the Supreme Court, was not the doctrine of 17S7. The Constitution speaks no such lan- guage. On the contrary, the instrument abounds with examples, which clearly indicate an opposite purpose. Where can it be mani- fested more strongly, than when it confers, as distinctly enumerated powers, those powers, which, throughout the world, are understood and acknowledged, as only means for executing other powers already given. For example : — Let us take the power “ to make war.” Are not the “ raising of armies ,” “providing and maintaining a navy," and “ the power to call out the militia of the United States,” all incidental to the waging of war? What, in the language of the Supreme Court, can be more requisite, and “ more fairly and plainly applicable to the end of war,” than the means just stated ? All of these are every where, the usual and acknowledged means of war. According, then, to the decision of the Court, the power to declare war, carried with it every other power having a relation to war. But, the members of the Convention did not think so, for it appears, that they gave a dis- tinctly enumerated power — 1st, to raise armies ; 2dly, to provide a navy; and 3dly, to call out the militia. Again — let us take the two enumerated powers to raise an army and a navy, would we not sup- pose that such powers as these, would give also the power to dis- cipline the army and navy? Ynu yet the Convention give a separate power to “ make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.” What makes it stronger, is, that this clause was not in the reported draft of the Constitution, but afterwards solmnly introduced as a seventeenth power. Again — what can be more ine- cessary to war, and to armies and navies, than for the Government which possesses the sovereign power on such subjects, to possess, at the same time, “ exclusive authority over its forts, magazines, ar- senals, dock yards, &c.” and yet the Convention did not think that the power to the one, necessarily gave the power to do the other, for it confers this power by a separate article. Let us go farther, and take the power “ to coin money.” Would not, nine men out of ten, pronounce, that according to the decision of the Supreme Court, the power “ to protect that coin from counterfeits,” was ne- cessarily and naturally implied; but the Convention did not think so, for it gave a distinct power “ to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the current coin of the United States.” Take the power to “ borrow money on the credit of the United States” — what power is there, that can be more incidental to this power, as a means to an end , than to protect Government securities from discredit by forgery, by punishing those who counterfeit them. Ask the Chief Justice, if the Government, which is so sovereign as to borrow mo- ney, and bind the people, to any extent, can pass a law to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities of the public debt, and he would smile at your ignorance ; and yet, the sages of 1787, were so ignorant, that the one power naturally gave the other, that they unnecessarily provided for both. Let us take the power to “ re- gulate commerce with foreign nations,” &c. Here is a general 40 power susceptible of an extensive definition, if we choose to plunge head and hears into implication. Few of us, however, can cliff < r as to what was really meant by the regulation of commerce. Such a power, it is universally admitted, embraces every subject connected with the arrivals and departures of vessels, such as imports and ex- ports, navigation laws, tonnage, pilotage, light-houses, (not “of the skies,”) &c. But that the States did not, by the power to regulate commerce externally and internally, intend to surrender to Congress, a legislation over every subject connected with commerce, directly or indirectly, is evident, from their deeming it necessary, to confer distinct powers on some subjects, which are manifestly commercial. What subject, for instance, can be more purely commercial, than the subject of Bankruptcy. But that the States did not consider a Bank- rupt law as incident to the regulation of commerce, appears by their providing for such a law, by a separate power. Coining money, arid regulating its value, both domestic and foreign —fixing a stand- ard of weights and measures — defining and punishing piracies and offences against the law of nations — establishing and regulating a post-office — laying imposts — all these are naturally allied to the regulation of commerce : and yet, there is to be found in the Consti- tution, a separate power for each. Now, who can doubt, hut that, if none of these last enumerations of power were to be found in the Constitution, and the Supreme Court had been called on to decide, whether under the great sovereign power to “ regulate commerce fo- reign and domestic,” Congress could establish a post-office, or a Bankrupt law, or have a national coin, fix a standard of weights and measures, or punish pirates, &c. : but that the Chief Justice would be astounded, that the power of a Government so sovereign, should be doubted in these instances. If I have ten grains of sense, or if my readers have as many, they must forcibly see, that a post-office, or a bankrupt law, or a standard of weights and measures, has an affinity to the regulation of “commerce between the States,” as a means , fully as close as that of a Bank to the “ collection of taxes,” and for a plain reason. Taxes were gathered before the Christian era; and were collected in our country, as they now are in some coun- tries, without the aid of Banks. But it would be difficult to find a country strictly commercial in the modern sense of the term, in which there is not a bankrupt law, and a post-office, and an uni- formity in weights and measures. To say, then, that, the people of the States, when they were con- ferring sovereignty on their new rulers, entertained the opinion, now- ascribed to them, by the Supreme Court, viz : — That “ every power given by them was intended to be so sovereign, that it necessarily carried with it, every other appropriate power, which, in the discretion of Congress, it should regard as applicable to the end of such pow- er,” is not true. Had such been their meaning, there would not be found the useless provisions, with which, in such a view, the instru- ment must he pronounced to abound. Armies and navies, and forts, magazines, and dock yards, and coining arid borrowing money, &c. are all the acknowledged means of making war upon foreign States, 41 and as such, naturally involved in such a power. And yet the peo- ple made these and others, so many distinct powers, thus manifesting, as clear as the Sun is in the Heavens, that they did not intend the Federal Government to exercise any important power, as a means to other powers, which was not expressed in the enumeration I am not sensible that the foregoing view of the subject can be confuted, unless it be urged, that the use of surplus clauses, or lan- guage in the Constitution, or the circumstance of giving as special grants of power, those which necessarily were implied, from what was already given, or as resulting naturally from the whole mass of powers, ought not to be opposed to the plain axiom, that the United States Government was to be as sovereign, on every subject entrust- ed to it, as the States were to be, as to what was retained. The an- swer is this — it would be idle, worse than idle, to talk of surplus clauses in the Constitution. The men who framed it, were not ig- norant or illiterate men, who in expressing their intentions, are apt to use more words than are necessary. On the contrary, the sages who deliberately discussed and considered every article and line of this charter, were fully aware of the import of words. Amongst them, were unquestionably the first Statesmen and Orators of our country. Very many of them were professional men, and it would be a reproach to such men, assembled as they were for months and months, to mature and perfect one of the greatest works ever en- trusted to men, to imagine that there is in that instrument, called the Constitution of the United States, so many clauses, that were not designed to have a full and an explicit meaning. If there be any one important state paper, or public document, in the world, which, for the clearness of its general views, the minute arrangement of its subjects, and the exactness, with which it defines the power which it intends to confer, is more distinguished than all others, that docu- ment is the Federal Constitution. There is in it, nothing of redun- dancy, of prolixity, or of circumlocution. For brevity and perspi- cuity of expression, it is unrivalled as a composition. There pro- bably is not a sentence in it, which was not, amongst the members, the subject of conversation without, or the theme of debate within the halls of the Convention. There is certainly not a clause which has been retained, in which, by striking it out, a material alteration might not be produced, in the sense and meaning of those who penned it. When, therefore, these sages were so precise in enumerating the powers they designed to confer, some of which are so plainly in- volved in, or incidental to others, it was not because these persons were ignorant that armies, and navies, and a national mint, and a national debt, were the most obvious means of war — it was not be- cause they believed, that the power to coin money, and to borrow money, did not carry with it a power to protect their com and their securities from debasement or counterfeiting, or that they believed that post-offices, and bankrupt laws, and weights and measures, were not connected with commerce, that they provided separate powers for such subjects — but it was, because they wished to inculcate, and to have it clearly understood, that they designed, that no power should 42 be exercised for which there was not a specific grant. They designed, it is true, that all the necessary and proper laws should be passed, to execute those powers ; such laws, in fact, without which the power would he nugatory, and they added a power for such purposes: But they did not mean, that a power, as great as any of those enume- rated, should be claimed, under the poiver to make necessary laws . — Their object was, to leave little or nothing, to construction ; and, that there should be no necessity, or excuse, on the part of Congress, for passing the limits of power assigned to it, great and uncommon diligence, seems to have been used, not to omit any thing, but to pro- vide every power, which could possibly be necessary, to regulate the two great objects for which the Government was established, to Wit, COMMERCE and DEFENCE. Had they been less precise, they foresaw that the Government could not proceed in the exercise of some of the most necessary powers , without feeling the want, of an express warrant of authority in the Constitution, and that it would be induced to resort to usurpation from necessity. To guard against its early resorting to constructive powers, which they must have dreaded, and to which, as wise men, they saw, there could be no end, they judiciously conferred on Congress, an express warrant for every material power which the Government could possibly need, in all time to come, out of mind, for the happiness of the American peo- ple. And, I ask my fellow-citizens — I call upon the members of the Bar, to look at the instrument, and to designate, if they can, what power it is, that any Government can want, for the purposes of those great objects, WAR, NEGOCIATION, and COMMERCE, which has been withheld from the Federal Goverment hy the States. What power is there, 1 ask, and I ask it triumphantly, the want of which, to render us an happy and an united people, is not to be found writ- ten down in the Constitution ; or, who can say, that this Government, in its experience of forty years, (during which time it has been at war twice, and in peace has conducted us to the most unexampled prosperity) when it was about to use a power for objects, in which all the people are interested, to wit, defence and commerce, could ever point to the Constitution, and shew, that for this or that power so about to be used, it could not find an EXPRESS WARRANT. No man can say it ; and this circumstance alone evinces the wisdom, the consummate wisdom of the men who framed the Constitution. Such a fact is worth a million of arguments to strengthen my po- sition, that the new Government was never to be carried on by im- plied powers. The enumeration of so many powers, which are but as means to other powers, is TOTALLY JRRECQNCILEABLE with the principle, upon which is founded, at the present day, under the sanction of the Supreme Court, all those implied powers, which are now exercised by Congress. Our sages having thus granted every necessary power, and placed at the disposal of the Congress, all the means which it could possi- bly need to administer the government, to the happiness of the peo- ple; and having withdrawn every pretext, for the resort to usurpa- tion from necessity, which would have been the case, had they been 43 less precise, the State Legislatures were yet not satisfied. The first care of these Legislatures to prevent dispute, was, to draw around the powess of Congress, certain boundaries, beyond which, it should never, in any event, pass. “The enumeration of certain rights,” says the Constitution, “ shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” And again — “ The powers not de- legated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo- ple.” What is the meaning of these clauses in the Constitution, con- nected with the enumeration of powers and the history of the times? It is this : We, the people of thirteen States, desire a Federal HEAD to regulate our commerce, and a Federal ARM to protect us. On no other subject are our wants common, or our interests the same. To this end, and this end alone, we need a General Government, and for these two purposes, the power we give, shall be exclusive. The sword and the purse we give you ; but as we desigu the Gov eminent for an especial purpose, so we shall limit you by special powers. To confer power on you in general terms, would be to give you, with the sword and the purse in your hands, power to de- stroy the States, and to consolidate our people into a nation. In this Charter you will find yourselves called upon to regulate com- merce, and provide for the public defence. It contains every sub- stantial power which you can possibly need. As strange as it may seem to you, that when we give you the sovereign power, for war and foreign negociation, and commerce, we should specify the ob- vious means which such powers necessarily involve ; yet we have a design in this — we intend, that in your progress onward as a Gov- ernment, you shall be provided with means for your journey, and use none but what we shall give you — and that you may not reproach us with carelessness or negligence in the supply, we have made it most ample ; and that you may not wander from your path, we have prescribed the boundaries, beyond which you must never tread your way. Is not the idea an absurd one, that the same men who deemed it necessary to give to Congress by a special grant , the power to give a patent for an improved Cotton Gin , should intend that it should exercise powers, not only not named, but not even hinted at — pow- ers which belong to undivided sovereignty ? The words “ Canals” or “National Roads,” or “Internal Improvements,” are not to be found in the Constitution ; or, any words which ingenuity can tor- ture to mean any such thing, and yet Congress is projecting national works, which, whether we regard their SCALE and immensity, as to the territory upon which they are to be spread — the TIME in which they may he executed, or the COST at which they are to be completed, would not shrink in a comparison with many of the great enterprises of antient and modern times. Vast extents of roads are to penetrate our forests — an extensive peninsula is to be divided in twain — chains and chains of mountains are to be tra- versed with canals, and all the elements of power about to be de- 44 veloped, of which Imperial Rome, in her proudest days of conquest and dominion, has left us so many monuments — on which, even a Napoleon might employ his genius and his care — and which belong only to those States and Kingdoms, and those alone, which have exclusive dominion over the soil and territory , as well as over per- sons and other subjects, which are the objects of Civil Government. It is too monstrous, that a Government, so limited by the Constitu- tion, that it cannot, without the EXPRESS consent of a State pre- viously obtained, purchase and exclusively hold land for its Forts, Magazines, Dock-yards, &c. — shall dare to claim such a para- mount authority, as to have national roads and national canals, which involve the right of territorial jurisdiction, over every portion of twenty-four Sovereign States. Against such doctrines, and such foul usurpations, I protest. As acute as may be the intellects, and gigantic as are the reasoning fa- culties of those who sit upon the judgment seat of the highest tribu- nal in our land, yet I would not give the unsophisticated, and the patriotic, and the honest views which may be taken of the Constitu- tion, for all their decisions, were they ten times as learned as they are. No intelligent man, can impartially read the decision of the Supreme Court, and contemplate the proceedings of Congress of late, without pronouncing that the Constitution is A DEAD LET- TER — It may mean ANY THING, or it may mean NOTHING. If my views of the subject are unsound, and my fellow-citizens shall pronounce that Congress is in the prescribed limits of its powers, adieu, a long adieu, to the interests and the SAFETY of South- Carolina. Let us continue our subject. Amongst the enumerated powers in the Constitution, is the power “ to borrow money on the credit of the United States.” This is a power unlimited in its extent, and embracer every pos- sible mode known, or to be known amongst nations, for raising money for the exigencies of Governments. To have affixed any limitation of such a power, would be, according to the general views of the Supreme Court, to tie down Congress to provide for the public safety, not only in this, but in after ages, and to deny to them a power commensurate with the great ob- ject, to-wit, the liberty of accommodating its means to the vicissitudes, which are constantly taking place in the affairs of a country Had, there- fore, the question before the Supreme Court been in 1819, whether Con- gress could “ emit bills of credit,” or in other wotds, resort to the 11 paper emission” of the revolutionary war, who can doubt, hut that the Supreme Court would have then decided, that the Legislature had such a power . — What, “shall a Government (to use the language of the Court) which has the great powers to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regu- late commerce ; to declare and conduct a war; and to raise and support armies; having entrusted to its government the sword and the purse — all the externa! relations, and no inconsiderable portion of the industry of the nation” — shall it be pretended, that such a Government, (should the pub- lic exigencies demand it,) has not the power, to issue continental, or paper 45 money ? But why do we reason about it ? On such a question, had it occurred at that time, I would have asked no favours of the Court. I would have demanded of them to decide, that Congress could issue continental money. I would have adduced to the judges, the case of McCulloch vs. The State of Maryland , where they decide, that a corporation is but 44 a means to an end,” and that a National Bank is a means necessary and proper to the 44 collection of a tax and I would have insisted, that were such a bank an appropriate means for such a purpose, that bills of credit , were a still more appropriate means, and more plainly applicable to the end of 44 borrowing money on the credit of the United States.” and of the power to declare war, and other enumerated powers in the Constitution. — That the one, had but a distant relation to its object, whilst the other, had a direct, and an obvious connection — that the latter had been the means, by which we had conducted a successful war for our liberties and our in- dependence, and that it is a means, to which every government must resort, when it cannot raise money by other expedients. I would, more- over, have reminded the Court, that such a power must have been intend- ed to be involved in the other powers, inasmuch as an express limitation is to be found in the Constitution, that the States shall not emit bills of credit, but that no restriction of the kind, is to be seen amongst the limita- tions on the powers of Congress. The Court, under such a view, to be consistent with itself, must have decided, that Congress could issue paper money. But fortunate, most fortunate is it, for its reputation, that such a question never came before the Supreme Court, and that such a decision was never made. Had there been a decision, it would have established the extraor- dinary fact, that the Supreme Court gave to the Congress of the United States, a power which the framers of the Constitution had determined, that they ought not to possess. The fact would thus appear. In the reported draft of the committee of detail, presented to the Con- vention, the clause in question stood thus : 44 To borrow money, and emit Bills , on the credit of the United States.” On the 16th of August, when this clause was under consideration, a motion was made, to strike out the words 44 and emit bills,” which motion was carried — nine States in the affirmative, and two against the motion. Had this been a mere motion to strike out these words, there might have been room to suppose, that the opinion of the Supreme Court, prevailed amongst the members, to-wit : that the major power necessarily included the minor. But the reverse of this is the conclusion. Mr. Luther Martin, from Maryland, and others, urged, 44 that it would be improper to deprive the Congress of the power to issue paper money ; that it would be a novelty unprecedented, to es- tablish a government, which should not have such authority. That it was impossible to look forward into futurity, so far as to decide, that events might not happen, that should render the exercise of such a power abso- lutely necessary.” I will not quote the rest of his arguments ; but, says Mr. Martin to the Legislature of Maryland : — “ A majority of the Con- vention being willing to risk any political evil , rather than the idea of a paper emission , in any possible case, refused to trust this authority to a Government, to which they were lavishing the most unlimited powers of taxation, and to the mercv of which, they were willing to trust the liberty 6 46 and property of the citizens of every State in the Union, and they erased that clause from the system.”* The lesson here inculcated is a most salutary one. It ought to teach all judiciary tribunals, and particularly the Supreme Court, that on all ques- tions of constitutional law, unaided by the journals of the Convention, or other lights, the best rule of interpretation is the plain letter of the Consti- tution. That to travel beyond this, is to enter a boundless field of conjec- ture, in which there is always danger of giving to the Constitution a mean- ing, which the framers not only never had, but to which, perhaps, they would have given their most zealous opposition. In the instance before us, we have a most illustrious example. In the history of the clause just referred to, there is the most abundant evidence, that implied powers, as they are called, were never in the contemplation of the Convention. The supporters of the motion, to strike out the power to issue paper money, must have been well assured, in their own minds, (and they were from nine States,) that no power, not included in the list of enumerated powers, with the exception of the power to make the necessary laws to exet ute the particular power, could be claimed. Had they not thought so, it would be difficult to account, for their omitting to prohibit Congress from the exercise of the power in question, by adding it to the other limitations, on the powers of Congress. Their not providing for such a limitation in ex- press terms, is conclusive, that they deemed it unnecessary. It is much to be lamented, that the debates of the Convention preserved by Chief Justice Yates, do not extend to the later periods of the session of that body, when the enumerated powers were under discussion, as in that case, we should have known distinctly the views of members, as to the in- sertion and rejection of particular passages. Mr. Yates and Mr. Lan- sing, both deputies from New-York, left the Convention in disgust, as soon as the great outlines of the Government had been agreed on. The journals of the Convention, however, furnish us with some important ma- terials, as to the rise and progress of some of the powers of Congress. The first step taken by the Convention was, as to the outlines of the Government ; for the members had no sooner met, than it was discovered that there were amongst them three parties of opposite views. The first party, Mr. Martin informs us, wished to annihilate all State Govern- ments, and to establish a General Government in nature of a limited mon- archy. This party was small, but several belonged to it who did not openly avow their sentiments. The second party was “ not for the abo- lition of the State Governments, nor for the introduction of a monarchical Government under any form ; but they wished to establish such a system as would give their own States undue influence over the ether States.” A third party “ was truly Federal and Republican, and nearly equal in num- ber with the other two,” In order to test the opinions of members, as to what the new Govern- ment should be, Governor Randolph, of Virginia, very early offered his fifteen resolutions, and upon these resolutions, did the members debate and differ, in committee of the whole, and in convention, for about two months: when, together with Mr. Pinckney’s draft of a Constitution, also early submitted to the Convention, though not taken up, they were both referred. * Yates’ Debates, page 57. 47 to a committee of detail, to report a Constitution, agreeably to the reso- lutions as amended. There is no need for our purpose, to refer to any of these resolutions as amended by the Convention, excepting the sixth, as it is this resolution alone, in which we are to look for the nature and extent of the legislative powers to be vested in Congress. It is in these words : — “Resolved, That the National Legislature ought to possess the legislative rights vested in Congress by the Confederation ; and moreover, to legislate, in all cases, for the GENERAL interests of the Union; and also, in those, to which the States are separately incompetent, or, in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.” This resolution was the basis, to which the enumerated, and other pow- ers of Congress, were to be conformed by the committee of detail. “ The general interests of the Union,” was not a new phrase. It is used in the 5th article of the old Confedeiation, and is there synonimous with the term “ general welfare” used three times in that instrument, to wit, in the third, eighth, and ninth articles. The committee, therefore, could be at no loss to understand what was meant by the term “ general interests.” It did not mean such interests, as a majority of the States might possess, as con- tra-distinguished from different and opposite interests, possessed by other States, which composed the minority, for it was not used in that sense in the Confederation, that body having no specified power on any subject whatever, in which one State was not equally, and directly interested with another. The subjects upon which the Confederation operated, were those of WAR, PEACE, INDIAN TRADE, and Foreign NEGOCIATION. The old Congress, could not meddle with the navigation interests of the New England States, nor with the great agricultural interests of the South. These were the local interests of the States, over which they had no pow- er, by any grant from the States, general or special. They had the charge only of general interests, strictly and truly so called. But there was one general interest, on which the Confederation could not legislate, and that interest was commerce with foreign nations. This was a paramount gene- ral intetest of the whole Union, not an interest of a majority of the States, but the direct interest of every State — and the want of a common head to direct which in each State, was about to involve the whole in distress and ruin. The meaning of the word “ general interests of the Union,” becomes now to be obvious to the reader. The committee of detail understood the phrase. The path, | rescribed for them, in drawing up the Constitution, was plainly marked. Their enumeration of powers, was to embrace, ac- cording to the resolution. first — The powers granted to the old Confede- ration, already referred to. Se ondl v — The general interests of the Union, amongst which, foreign commerce stands pre-eminent. In fact, it com- prises almost every other general interest, not provided for in the Confe- deration. Thirdly — The cases, to which the States are separately incompe- tent to legislate with effect. Amongst these, is the power to grant patents and copy rights ; defining felonies on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations — for which the articles of Confederation had made no provision Under this head, may properly be included, the power to de- clare the law and punishment of treason, and some others. Fourthly — The cases, in which the harmony of the States might be interrupted by indi- 48 vidual legislation ; such as, the regulation of the intercourse between the States; a national coin; naturalization and bankrupt laws. For these powers also, the Confederation had not provided. The reported draft of the Constitution, by the committee of detail, it will be seen, is in consonance with the sixth resolution, and with the out- line of power, fixed by the Convention. That the committee of detail did not regard Agriculture, or Manufac- tures, or Internal Improvements, as a general interest of the Union, appears from their reporting no specific power, in relation to these objects — nor are the words to be found either in the reported, or amended draft of the Consti- tution Indeed, how could they provide for the interests of Agriculture — Though each State had its own agriculture : yet, in those days, the States designated as the Agricultural States, were the Southern States, whose in- terests were diametrically opposite to the growing Navigation interests of the Northern and Eastern States. It would have been as wrong to pro- vide for Agricultural, (there were then no Manufacturing classes) as for Navigation interests — But as Navigation interests might be promoted, un- der the general power of “regulating commerce,” it became the care of the committee to provide a limitation on this general power, and hence a- rose that clause in the reported draft, which says, that “ No Navigation Act shall be passed without the assent of two-thirds of the members pre- sent in each House.” This clause was afterwards stricken out — by which erasure, the great Eastern Navigation interest, which is decidedly a local, and not a general interest of the Union, is the only local interest which Congress can, at this day, promote, under the Constitution. It has the unlimited and the undoubted power. The manner in which this local interest came to be protected, is this — The staple and commercial States, as the Southern States were then called, wished to retain this clause, “ lest their commerce should be placed too much under the power of the Eastern States — but which these last States were as anxious to reject. The East- ern States, however, notwithstanding their aversion to Slavery, were very willing to indulge their Southern brethren with a temporary liberty to pro- secute the Slave Trade, provided the Southern States would, in their turn, gratify them by laying no restriction on Navigation Acts.” The matter being difficult to adjust, it was referred to a large committee, consisting of a member from each State, and it resulted in this compromise — Slaves were not to be prohibited to be brought into the United States by Congress, before 1808 — and the above restrictive clause relative to Navigation Acts, was to be omitted. (See Yates’ debates.) Thus it is, that an Eastern and a local interest, is in the power of Congress to promote — But it can foster and encourage no other, under the Constitution. mo. 13 . The report of the committee of detail, as connected with the basis previ- ously fixed by the Convention, on which the enumeration of powers was to be made out, is worthy of considerable notice, and I may be pardoned, if I dwell longer on the document, even if I be chargeable with some repetition. It is conclusive, I aver, to shew, that they considered the “ general inte- rests of the Union” precisely in the sense in which I have used it, to wit, interests, in which each State directly participates, and not those interests, IB which a majority of the States, or of the people of the United States, are 49 solely or principally concerned, and in which others, at the same time, have no share. The evidence of this their construction, is very ample in their own work, submitted to the Convention. In reporting the subjects, or cases for national legislation, there is not one , which is not undeniably as much an object of general concern in the South, as well as in the North; in New-Hampshire, as well as in Georgia. All wanted a disciplined mi- litia, an army, a navy, a national coin and currency, public credit, and other means of defence — all were directly interested in foreign commerce, and in foreign negociation — all needed some provision to regulate the in- tercourse, and to preserve harmony in legislation, between the States. If there be in the reported, or the amended draft, a single subject for their legislation, w hich is not strictly a “ general interest,” in our sense of the term, (except it be the power to pass navigation laws, now included in the commercial power, which we have seen was agreed to by compromise) let the advocates for an extended government point it out. It cannot be shewn. It would have been unwise and dangerous to invest Congress, with a pow- er to legislate on subjects, in which eight States might be interested, and in which, the other five might have no interest, directly or indirectly, it would have put the minor States in the power of the larger ; it would have invested Congress with a power to legislate unequally upon the States, a species of dangerous legislation, upon which the Convention designed to exclude it. Nature, in forming these States, has not been blindly partial to any one. If she has conferred upon the Smith, the capacity to raise rich and valuable products, she has not been wanting in her magnificence to the North. They have their advantages too, which are obvious to all. — To put it in the power of Congress to legislate upon any subject, in which there is not an interest in common, between North and South, would be to suffer the majority to enjoy all the blessings given them by nature, and to take, by their influence and their power, from their weaker neighbours, all others, so as to aggrandize and build up, the prosperity' of the larger States, upon the ruins of the weaker. The whole scheme and theory' of the Constitution, is directly opposed to this, and the construction that would put five States, or a smaller number, so much in the power of the other nineteen, as to force them to contribute by money, or otherwise, to foster and raise up a manufacturing, or other prominent interest, of those nineteen States, is the construction of a TY- RANT and an usurper. There is no warrant for this in the Constitution. In the reported draft, the words “ common defence arid general welfare,” are not attached to the “ taxing power,” nor are such words to be found in any part of the draft. How they came to be inserted, will be hereafter ex- plained. In the Committee’s draft of a Constitution, the word “ canal or military roads, or manufactures,” is not mentioned, though, as will be seen, in due time, these words were in familiar use at the time, in the Convention. — Even the word “ post roads,” is omitted in this draft. It stands, “to es- tablish post offices,” not “ Post Offices and Post Roads,” as it now reads. This is the more extraordinary, as in Mr. Pinckney’s draft, referred to the Committee, there was a power “to establish Post and MILITARY Roads,” and also, a power “ to establish and provide for a NATIONAL Univer- sity, at the seat of the Government of the United States.” But the Com- mittee reported against Post Roads, Military Roads, and against the Uni- 50 versity. How could they do otherwise. The construction of Roads was a matter to which the States were separately competent ; though they were not so for a Post Office. The establishment of an University, was for the interests of science. This formed no motive for the States to enter into Union, and to give up so much of their sovereignty In fact, these propo- sitions did not fall within the meaning of Mr. Randolph’s sixth resolution. The power to establish Post roads, was afterwards restored, six States in favor, and five in the negative. If considered, it is an harmless power. — Probably, the opposition arose from the fear that it might be regarded as a power to construct roads, and such actually has been the case. Mr. Clay and others, are of this opinion. But the construction is a wrong one. To establish a post road, is nothing more than to designate the towns, or the route , by which the mail is to be carried. If there be any doubt on the subject, the acts of Congress, relative to Post Roads, from the foundation of the Government to this day, incontrovertibly establish this construction. When Congress usurped its powers in making the Cumberland and other National Roads, the phraseology used in the acts, was peculiar. — It is remarkable. In the one case, the title of the act is, “An act to estab- lish certain Post Roads.” The enacting clause is, “ The following Post Roads shall be established, viz. from Passamaquoddy, in the District of Maine , to St. Mary’s, in Georgia, by the following route and then fol- low the names of cities, towns, and villages — thus establishing the princi- ple, that to establish a post road, is, to fix upon the posts, where the mail is to be stopped and opened. But when the national roads were ordered, the titles of the acts are different, and the words are, to make and open roads, and money is appropriated for the work. There being no appro- priation when the acts passed, “to establish certain post roads,” and up- wards of a million of dollars, when the national roads were opened, >hews the substantial difference between establishing a road, and constructing a road. Congress itself, having admitted this distinction, by its own acts, and thus shewn its own sense of the meaning of the power to “establish roads,” it would be a waste of time in me, to say more on this point. The University was several times proposed. First, by Mr. Pinckney, in his draft, but never reported on, and at last, finally rejected in Conven- tion, on the 14th September, on a motion to insert a power for the pur- pose. The proposition for “ military roads,” was never renewed. When the Post Roads were only squeezed in by one vote, there could be no hope of military roads being acceptable. The proposition was put to sleep, by the committee of detail; but, after a lapse of some thirty years, the dan- gerous elements of power, buried by the Convention in 1787, are all care- fully disinterred ; and, to provide for their removal, in due and solemn state, they are placed in that splendid sarcophagus, the memorable report of Mr. Calhoun, the then Secretary of War, “ on Roads and Canals.” If there are amongst us, those who take any delight in grand Military Roads through our country, which the Government may, from time to time project and construct, let them be told, that these roads will only augment the patronage of the Government, and diminish that of the States, and that they must be constructed at an enormous expense, the principal burthen of which we must bear, and that the day may possibly come, though not in this generation, when these roads and canals, may become the means, as they will the monuments, of the subjugation of the South. 51 The vestiges of ancient roads in many parts of Europe, are the monu- ments which record the universal empire of the Romans. For my part, feeling and speaking as a Southerner, and situated as we now are, if I have any wish on the subject of roads, it would be, that the great Alleghany Ridge should diverge from our North Western limits Westwardlv, until it should intersect the Western boundary of Louisiana, thence along that boundary until it reaches the Gulf of Mexico ; and that it should again be extended with its spurs along our Northern boundary, until it reached the Atlantic ; that the five plantation or cotton growing States, those States which are bearing, and are yet to bear, the brunt of the evils of a consoli- dated and an usurped Government/ might be the SEA and MOUNTAIN girt States of the Confederacy. We want no military roads from North to South. If the roads will enable the North Carolina and Tennessee men to bring us their cotton, and their hogs, and their corn and bacon, I shall be satisfied. As to enemies, Europe has no motive, to meddle in any way with the plantation States. We are not its rivals in agriculture, trade, or manufaetures. Now, that we are independent, Nature has bound us toge- ther in cords of perpetual friendship. We raise the raw material, and they manufacture it for us. It is the people of the NORTH, 1 fear. When their industry begins to languish from the competitors they have in Eu- rope, they would invoke us in their disputes, arising from competition, this prolific source of wars and contention, and they would make us the ASS that is to bear all the burden and expense of the contest. It must not — it cannot be endured. The power to create a corporation , is not in the reported draft of the Constitution. It would have been a departure from the outline agreed upon. It was not in the enumerated powers of the Confederation. It was not a case of “ general interest,” nor was it “ a case of legislation to which the States were separately incompetent.” So far from it, the States had always exercised this power ; and who can say, that the exercise of such a power, by a State, is a case in which the harmony of the Union can be interrupted by State legislation. But there were not wanting efforts, to give to Congress this power, for on the 18th of August, amotion was made, to add to the enumerated powers, a power “ to grant charters of incorporation in cases where the public good may require them, and the authority of a single State may be incompetent.” Another proposition was general, and made on the same day, to grant charters of incorpo- ration.” If the powers to establish a National Bank was not the design of these propositions, and seen through by the opponents of the measure, why were they introduced, and particularly the first. That corporation could be, for no other than a national purpose ; to the creation of which, so as to answer all its purposes, u the authority of a single State would be in- competent.” That is precisely the case of a National Bank. A State might create a Bank, and upon a most extensive scale as to capital ; but a State could not direct that its notes should be received for taxes, or duties out of its own limits. No State could create a Bank to answer the exigen- cies of the General Government, as well as a Bank created under the au- thority of such a Government. The United States, upon an emergency, might restrain a Bank of its own creation from paying out specie. It might possess many advantages, of which it would be deprived, if confined to the Use of a local Bank. Under this power to create corporations, might be in- 52 eluded the erection of a great East-India or West-India Company, or a Company to promote manufactures. But what was the fate of these pro- positions ? They were referred to a committee, but never reported on favourably. On the 14th of September, when the Constitution had been revised, and almost ready for engrossing, the subject was again renewed by a motion to introduce amongst the enumerated powers, a power “to grant letters of incorporation for canals,’" &c. which motion was negatived, eight States to three. Here we have a FACT, and an INFERENCE, which no ingenuity can pul aside. The fact is. that a proposition was made to add to the enumerated powers of Congress, a power to create corporations for na- tional, purposes, which proposition was rejected. The inference is, that the Convention was opposed to a National Bank in any shape; for a Na- tional Bank is most prominent, amongst corporations for national pur- poses. With such evidence as we have on this subject, it would be but a poor reply to say, that the Convention, like the Supreme Court, regarded a cor- poration as a means to an end , and not a substantive power — and that this consideration alone might have caused its rejection. The reasoning in my eleventh number forbids this idea.— What a solecism in politics, that an assemblage of the wisest men in the nation, should be giving away, by se- parate and express grants, little odds and ends of power, and that they should, at the same time, intend that powers ten tunes as great, should be used as means to other powers. A National Bank, with a capital of one hundred millions of dollars, is a means to “collect a tax,” and a West- India Company by charter, may also be means. The present British East India Company, I believe, keeps in pay 250,000 troops — decent means these , with a vengeance ! This doctrine of a “ means to an end” may be the doctrine of the Supreme Court, and of the Manufacturers at Washing- ton, but it will as certainly be a means to the END OF OUR PROSPE- RITY in the South, as that the sparks will fly upwards. The word Bank is not to be found in the journals of the Convention, nor in the secret debates. Canals, and military roads, and manufactures, universities and seminaries of knowledge, all were thought of: Even a power “ to pass sumptuary laws” was not forgotten, but proposed — and yet no one proposed a Bank by that name. Can any one believe, that a National Bank was not as much in the minds of the members as a National University — doubtless it was. It was, designed to be concealed in the pro- posed power to create corporations — and the reason, probably, of its not being introduced more openly, was the conviction that such a proposition, would, with certainty, be rejected by the People, if not by the Convention. In the state of jealousy, which existed in the Convention, and out of doors, on the subject of the powers, which were to be conferred on the new Gov- ernment, there is no saying, what the consequences would have been, had such an engine in the hands of government, as a National Bank was con- sidered to be by the people at large, been added to their powers — As it was, such was the difference of opinion in the Convention, as to the extent of the powers of Congress, that at one time, in the language of Mr. Luther Martin, “they were for near two weeks, on the verge of dissolution, scarcely held together by the strength of an hair , though the public papers 53 were announcing their extreme unanimity.” Had the Convention not debated secretly, we never should have had the present Govern- ment. We are, however, wise beyond the Convention. We have discov- ered, by the keys furnished us by the Supreme Court — powers, which these men never dreamed of our possessing. There was a time, when Congress traced its steps on the ground of usurpation, with considerable caution. There is a remarkable instance of this in their usurped power in opening roads. When the first Act passed to open the great Cumberland Road, there was an express provision that on the surveys being completed, and the expence estimated, the President should not commence the work, without first obtaining the consent of the States through which the road Was to pass. But, becoming bold by impunity, these folks now direct roads to be open* ed, and they have been opened under acts of Congress, in which there is no stipulation for the previous consent of the States. They open roads now without leave or license. It might be gratifying, if we could compare the cost of the nation- al roads and canals on the North, and to the South of the Potomac. But, after all, what are these roads and canals to us! What is it to us whether the Androscoggin and other streams be examined or not examined, with a view to a communication with the St. Lawrence I Will a market that shall thus be opened for some of the most valu* able productions of the State of Maine benefit us ? What is it to us whether the great Cumberland Road be kept in repair or not! — whether the Sandusky Turnpike, and the other Road Companies fail for want of funds or not! What is the Delaware and Chesa- peake Canal Company to us, that the money of the Nation should be appropriated to aid that, and the many other schemes, for enrich- ing the citizens of the North, at our expense. Has the Government subscribed to our SANTEE CANAL COMPANY ? Think ye, that they will ever open a Canal from Winyaw Bay to Wando River, or aid a company for that purpose! Will they ever dig this Canal — a Canal, that, in time of war, would be so important! Do we hear of their extending our State Road through the Saluda Mountain, to the Western country, which will benefit five States! Is not this as much national, as the improvement of the navigation of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers ! It is only the other day that the Governor of Boston asked the Secretary of War for the United States Engi- neers, to assist in surveying the Canal from Boston to the Hudson; but the answer is, they are all so busily employed, that they cannot be spared. Where are they employed ! Are they in South-Caro- lina, or are they located North of the Potomac, or again on the Al- leghany Ridge, for FURTHER DEFENCE AGAINST THE BRITISH 1 Why not augment them, to three or four brigades of Engineers, and thus empty the National Treasury into the laps of the Northerners ? We are not yet sufficiently fleeced. The GREAT SOUTHERN GOOSE will yet bear more PLUCKING. 7 54 mo. 14 . We do not find in the proceedings of the Convention, the word “Manufactures,” or any motion relative to the encouragement of them, until the 18th of August. The Convention, having at that time, disposed of most of the clauses in the reported Constitution, as far as the end of the enumerated powers, many additional powers, were on that day proposed to be vested in Congress. Amongst them, was a power “to establish public institutions, rewards and immunities, for the promotion of AGRICULTURE, Commerce, Trades, and MA- NUFACTURES.” On the 20th of August, another proposition was made, to wit, “that a Council of State should assist the President, to be composed of the Chief Justice, and five Secretaries, to wit, of State , War,” &.e. The duty of the Secretary of DOMESTIC af- fairs, was, “ to attend to matters of general police, the state of AGRICULTURE and MANUFACTURES, the opening of ROADS and NAVIGATION, ( internal improvements) and the facilitating com- munications throughout the United States, and to recommend such measures and establishments, as might tend to promote such objects .” I do not discover in the journals, any thing else relating to Manu- factures, eo nomine, excepting the above. Both of the above propo- sitions having failed, we might reasonably conclude, that the Con- vention, refused to give to Congress the power to promote Domestic Manufactures, as well as internal improvements. But it is not from the mere failure, to have these clauses inserted in the Constitution, that we would infer a clear and unequivocal intention, that to the States alone, were to be left the regulation of the different branches of internal industry. There are other considerations which estab- lish the fact beyond doubt. The above propositions, made on the 18th and 20th of August, it seems, were referred to the committee of detail, together with sundry others; some relating to public seminaries of learning; some to the unappropriated lands of the United States ; some to the government of the new States to be created ; some to authorize the President to hold landed property for the use of forts and magazines ; and last, and not least, as we shall hereafter see, was a proposition to restrain Congress from establishing a perpetual revenue under its taxing power. On the22d of August, the committee made a short report, proposing, inter alia, that a seventeenth enumerated power, be added to the sixteenth clause, in these words, “ and to provide, as may be- come necessary, from time to time, for the well managing and se- curing, the common property, and general interests and welfare of the United States, in such manner, as shall not interfere, with the gov- ernments of individual States, in matters which respect only their internal police, or for which their individual authority may be com- petent.” Our readers may construe this report as they please, but one thing is clear, that under so general a power to provide for the general welfare, Manufactures could as well be promoted, as could any other act be done, for which there was no previous pro- vision. This part of the report, however, was not acted upon, and on the 3lst of August, we find, that all such reports as had been post- 55 j»oned, “ and such parts of reports as had not been acted upon,” were referred to a committee, to be composed of a member from each State. The next day, the 1st of September, this grand committee “ reported partially ,” but did not touch the subject of science, trades, canals, or manufactures. On the 4th, the committee again “ reported partially ,” but said nothing of manufactures. On the 5th, the com- mittee “reported further and finally," recommending alterations and additions, in live instances. The last is, to insert this clause — “To pro- mote the progress of SCIENCE and the USEFUL ARTS, by secur- ing, for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” I ought to have mentioned, that in their report of the previous day, to wit, of the 4th, this same committee did propose to add to the taxing power, these words : “ to pay the debts, and to provide for the common defence and general welfare, it was necessary that they should make some report on this head, because many motions had been previously made, as will be seen hereafter, to restrain the taxing power, one of which was so rigorous, as to confine it to the debts and the necessary expenses of the United States. I hope to shew in my next, that these words were intended as a limitation, and not an enlargement of the appro- priating power. The above clause, “ to promote the progress of science and the useful arts,” was, as I conceive, a report of the grand committee against manufactures. I am not couscious, that in any exposition of the Constitution, this clause has been relied on, as restraining the power of Congress, on the subject of Manufactures. In my view, it is very important. It is important, if considered in the abstract , but when taken in con- nection with the above proceedings of the Convention, I do regard it as conclusive. And first, let us consider the clause as it stands in the Constitu- tion. What does it amount to? It is a power to promote science and the useful arts. What are the useful arts ? They are those arts or occupations, which are carried on, with a view to profit in contra- distinction to such as are pusued for pleasure, which are called the liberal or polite, arts. Are manufactures to be classed among the useful arts? Throughout the civilized world, Agriculture and Ma- nufactures, stand at the head of the useful arts. All men must assent to this. Here then, is a clear power vested in Congress by the Con- titution, to promote Agriculture and Manufactures. But is it a gen- eral, or limited power ? It is a limited power. How is it limited ? It is limited, inasmuch, as the mode by which these arts are to be encouraged, is not left to construction, but is expressed in words, which have a clear and a definite meaning. They shall promote the useful arts, BY securing to ingenious men patents for their inventions.''' Now, if a power to promote a specific object, by a prescribed mode, does not exclude the power to promote it by a different, or other mode, there is no truth in the law maxim, “ expressio unius est ex- clusio alterius." Let us familiarly illustrate this. When the old Congress found itself inadequate to carry on the Government for the want of a direct legislation on the people, it re- 56 peatedly and earnestly solicited the States, at different times, for a power to raise a revenue by small imposts, to be limited in amount, as well as duration. Had an amendment been made to thi Confe- deration, and a power been granted to that Congress, “to regulate commerce by the imposition of certain duties on West India pro- duce, surely no one couid contend, that the words of the grant, would not exclude the power to regulate commerce, by duties on European goods, and by the various modes practised by the present Government, whose power over commerce is exclusive. So, a pow- er to raise a revenue by a capitation or other direct tax, would cer- tainly exclude the power to lay imposts, or to come at a revenue by any means, but a direct tax. In the clause before us, as in the in- stances just cited, the mode of expression is indubitably exclusive. Manufactures are to be encouraged, but they are to be promoted in one way only, to wit — bv the reward of an exclusive right, to the use of a new machine or invention. The grant of power in question, is, what lawyers would term an AFFIRMATIVE PREGNANT, that is, an affirmance of one thing, and a denial of another; an affirmance of the power of Congress, to promote the progress of science and the arts, by patents and copy rights, and a negation of their authority, to encourage them in any other way. There are in the Constitution, other articles of a nature allied to this. For instance — Congress shall have power “ to define and punish felonies on the high seas.” The power here given to de- fine a felony at sea, implies an admission, that if such a power were not given, Congress would be excluded the use of the power alto- gether ; and it further implies, that the power of defining felonies on land, solely and exclusively belongs to the States. There are, it is true, two cases in which it can define or punish felonies on land; but in these cases, there are two special grants of power, by two se- parate clauses in the Constitution. It can “ provide for the punish- ment of counterfeiting its current coin and securities and it has “ the power to declare the punishment of treason.” In the Constitution, will be found NEGATIVES PREGNANT, as well as affirmatives pregnant. The prohibition to the States lay- ing any “ duties on imports or exports,” is one of this kind. The re- striction which prevents them laying any “ duty on tonnage,” is another. The prohibition to their keeping troops or ships of war in a time of peace, is a third. The prohibition of any interference as to the slave trade, is a fourth. In all these cases, though the restric- tions amount to a negation to do the particular acts mentioned, yet there is an affirmance of the authority of Congress in the last in- stance, to prohibit the slave trade after 1808 ; and in the first instan- ces, of the States to lay a land tax, an excise, a stamp duty, or any other tax, (provided it be not an impost or export duty, or duty on tonnage); and there is the same authority to levy troops or equip frigates, during a period of war. In these positions, we must all agree. The clause for promoting manufactures by patents, is then clearly an affirmative pregnant. Under its peculiar mode of expression, it 57 cannot be conceived, that the Convention could deem it necessary to give Congress the power to promote the arts by a particular mode, , if it designed to give the liberty of adopting any, and all other modes, of effecting the same object. If the meaning tvas not, to exclude Congress from any general power of encouraging the art* and sciences, why mention the words at all. There certainly was no necessity for it. These words, are not to be found in any of the propositions, which were submitted on the subject of patents and copy-rights. One proposition was, “to secure to literary authors their copy-rights for a limited time.” A second, “to grant patents for useful inventions.” A third, “to secure to authors, exclusive rights for a certain time.” It would, therefore, have been sufficient for every purpose, to have reported the amendment to read, “to se- cure for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive rieffit to their respective writings and discoveries,” leaving out the first part of the sentence “ to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. But the reason of the committee’s using the words last mentioned, is manifest. Manufactures and the sciences had been talked of— various propositions in relation to them, were before the committee ; and a previous committee, had reported a specific power, to provide for the general welfare, so as to reach these cases. The report was not acted upon, and the subject afterwards falling into the hands of the present committee, it became their duty to report for or against science and manufactures. They do report, and recommend a power for this purpose — not, however, by seminaries of learning — not by public institutions, rewards, or immunities* as proposed, but simply by encouraging inventions to facilitate labor — as well as literary works to augment the stock of human knowledge. To promote the arts and sciences, in this way, was to confer a benefit, not upon one portion, but upon every part of the Union. It is for the benefit of each, and there- fore, to the advantage of all the States, that authors and ingenious 1 mechanics, should receive in this way, the patronage of the Govern- ment : But to give premiums and pecuniary bounties, or to prohibit the export of any material of manufactures — or to restrict the great import trade, of which the Southern States, even at that day, were so jealous, was not the intention of the Convention ; it did not choose to leave the question open, whether Congress should do what it is now doing, to wit — to restrict our trade by Tariff duties, almost amounting to prohibition. As the subject was before the Conven- tion, the members of that body, took the opportunity to express themselves, that they were averse to any national encouragement of science or manufactures, except by patents or copy-rights. The clause speaks no other language. That the friends of science in the Convention, considered this clause, as exclusive of any power to promote science in general — and, that they, moreover, could not afterwards seek for it, in the appro- priating power “ for the general welfare,” would appear, by their so- licitude upon the subject. On the i4th of September, as the Con- stitution was about to be finished and engrossed, the motion was re- newed for the third time, to add a power, to establish an University, 58 "which motion was lost, six States to four, and one divided — there not being in the Convention, the same interest for manufactures, as there was for science — there being no calico printers or tooollen weav- ers, occuping the benches of the Convention, as is the case in the present Congress ; the Convention, in fact, being composed of men, more literary than they were avaricious, is probably the reason, why the manufacturers, like the University men, did not come again to the charge, and renew their propositions for manufactures. They, however, did not. They quietly submitted to that article in the Constitution, which limits the national protection, only to patents and copy-rights. Three clear propositions result from what has been said : First — That there was an attempt made in Convention, to give Congress, power to promote science, agriculture, and manufactures. Second- ly — That a committee reported, a specific power for that purpose, to be added to those already enumerated — which report was not a- greed to. And thirdly — That an express provision was made, to pro- tect these objects, but only to a limited extent. These propositions be- ing established, upon what grounds, can a general power over the sub- ject of manufactures , be assumed"? “ Prohibitory ” duties by Congress , was a word not mentioned in Convention. The only encouragement asked for, was, public rewards and immunities Had they proposed protection by prohibitory duties, the Southern States would have taken the alarm, and expressed the same desire for a positive limi- tation on the powers of Congress, as they did for the navigation in- terests of the Eastern States: a great manufacturing interest to rise up in the States, was in truth, not much thought of in those days. But the navigation interests of the Eastern people, were before their eyes. It was this growing interest in the Colonies, of which England was so jealous, and her restrictions on which, no doubt, contributed to the revolution, more than any other cause. These local interests we have seen, by a former number, the Southern States consented to be provided for, by a special compromise. It appears by the acts of the Convention, that though it was deem- ed unadvisable to entrust Congress with a power to promote any great local interest of particular States, yet, that it was considered, that there would be a manifest impropriety, in depriving any one State, which misrht choose to encourage its own Manufactures, of the means of doing so. The usual mode, by which Domestic Ma- nufactures are encouraged, we all know, is by premiums, pecuniary bounties, and prohibitory duties; but all other modes are inexpedient and inefficient, when compared with prohibition. If Congress eould not lay prohibitory duties, except for the general purposes of the •Government, and the States could not impose them, to protect Ma- nufactures, one great motive to the Union, would have been defeat- ed, which was, that the States should not, as regarded their internal relation, or their power to regulate their own industry, be in a worse situation than before. Hence, it became necessary, that the States 59 should not be deprived of the power of laying prohibitory duties fof the convenience of their imports or exports, or for the purpose of protecting their own Manufactures. When, therefore, that clause in the Constitution came to be considered, which restricts the States from laying duties on imports or exports, the subject of Manufac- tures directly came into discussion. As this clause originally stood in the reported draft of the Con- stitution, the restriction was, only as to imposts , not exports — “No State, without the consent of Congress, shall lay imposts or duties upon imports.” By this partial restriction, each State still possess- ed the power, to encourage its own manufactures, by duties, to pro- hibit the exportation of its wool, or other raw material. On the 28th of August, a motion was made to extend the prohibition to ex- ports, which was carried ; six States to five, a bare majority. The discussion on this article, brought forth Luther Martin, the deputy from Maryland, who strenuously opposed the article in all its shapes; but he could not succeed. So determined was the Convention, that the power of the States, as to import and export duties, should not be concurrent with that of Congress, and that the General Govern- ment should exclusively possess this source of taxation, that instead of softening, it was disposed to make the prohibition more rigo- rous. On the same day, therefore, an additional restriction, was introduced into the clause, nine States to four, that even with the consent of Congress, imports and exports were not to be taxed by the States, but “for the use of the treasury of the United States.” Thus stood the clause in the revised draft of the Constitution, pre- sented to the Convention, on the 12th day of September, five days before its adjournment. On the 13th, an amendment was proposed and carried, “ that no State should be restrained from imposing the usual duties on produce, exported from such State, to pay the char- ges of inspecting that produce.” But, on the 15th, a substitute was moved, and after two other motions for amendment, the substitute was put aside, and the clause finally agreed to as follows : — “ No State shall, without the consent of Congress , lay any imposts or du- ties on imports or exports, except what may he absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws ; and the nett produce of all duties and imposts laid by any State, on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the Treasury of the United States, and all such laws, shall be subject to the revision and controul of the Congress.” Were an hundred men, to read this clause in the Constitution, I would venture to say, that ninety and nine for a while, would be ignorant of the true design of its introduction. The question, had over and over again occurred to my mind, what could the Conven- tion intend? Mr. Hamilton, in his Federalist, is almost silent on the subject. His reason may be conjectured from what is to follow. That the framers of the Constitution, who disputed so much as to the phraseology of this clause, intended something more, than to give the States the power to impose trifling duties to execute then- inspection laws for cotton, tobacco, &c. is too evident ; because, in- dependently of the power to lay duties for their inspection laws, 60 Which may be done, without the consent of Congress previously ob-* tained, there is a clear and a distinct provision, that the States may, on applying for, and obtaining such consent, impose import and export duties for other purposes. What purposes can these be? Can it be, to give the States i.ovv and then, a chance of some little reve- nue. The clause itself, decidedly gives the answer. The produce of the duties, when laid, is to go into the National , and not into a State Treasury. Then, what does it mean 1 Abstractedly consi- dered, it is inexplicable, and to me, and perhaps to others, would have remained so, had not the subject of domestic manufactures, come into discussion. The design of the clause is now at once seen. A satisfactory explanation is instantly within our reach. It was inserted, for the purpose of enabling such States as were desirous of protecting their oton manufactures , either by export duties on their raw materials, or by imposts on foreign fabrics introduced into their limits, TO DO SO, WITH THE CONSENT OF CON- GRESS. No other solution is admissible. If this was not the in- tent of the provision, I defy the Supreme Court or any expositor to explain it. In any other view, it is an useless and a stupid clause of the Constitution. It is, however, most fortunate for us, that the debates of the Con- vention, are at hand, to rescue us from further doubt, or difficulty on the point. Let us hear Mr. Martin, bitterly complaining to his own State of the total injustice, in his view, of this clause. “ By this same section,” says he, “ every State is also prohibited from laying any imposts or duties on imports and exports, without the permission of the General Government. It was urged by us, that there might be cases, in which it would be proper, for the purpose of encouraging manufactures , to lay duties, to prohibit the exportation of raw materials ; and even in addition to the duties laid by Congress, on imports for the sake of revenue , to lay a duty, to discourage the importation of particular articles into a State, or to enable the manu- facturer here , to supply us on as good terms , as they could be obtain- ed from a foreign market. But the most we could obtain, was, that this power MIGHT BE EXERCISED by the STATES with, and only with the consent of Congress, and subject to its control. And so anxious were they, to seize on every shilling of our money for the General Government, that they insisted, even the little revenue that might thus arise, should not be appropriated, to the use of the re- spective States where it was collected, but should be paid into the Treasury of the United States ; and, accordingly, it is so determin- ed.” (Secret debates, page 71 .) Thus, we have all our doubts dissipated as to this otherwise sin- gular provision in the instrument ; and thus too, we have a fresh instance of the wisdom of the Convention. A mode has been pro- vided, by which, at any time, the people of any one State or number of States, may protect their manufactures, without charging the cost of such protection, to the neighbouring States. Indeed, if we reflect upon the previous acts of the Convention, we must confess, that it could not have done otherwise, than to make the provision referred 61 to. To have confined the import and export duties, to be laid by the States, to the simple purpose of executing their inspection laws, would have been extreme injustice. Congress had previously been prohibited, from promoting manufactures, excepting by patents; and as Congress could not, for this purpose, lay a protecting or prohi- bitory duty, what would become of the States, desiring to encourage their manufactures, if they also, in no event, could keep foreign fabrics out of their limits, if it was their policy so to do, in order to protect their own. Such a provision then was indispensable, and the qualification, put upon the restraint on the power of the States to lay imposts, was most judicious, both for the States and for Con- gress. As the clause stands, the manufacturing States, may, at any time, ask for the permission of Congress, to lay duties to protect their fabrics: but, they are properly excluded the power of impos- ing these duties at pleasure, and to take the proceeds, as under the pretext of protecting their manufactures, they might collect a reve- nue, or otherwise interfere with the resources of the General Gov- ernment. But there is an inference to be deduced from this clause which is irresistible — and that is, that had the Convention believed, that in any of the enumerated powers, which it had immediately before conferred on Congress, there was included a general power to promote Manufactures , there never would have been held out to the States, that in any event, they could lay an import or export duty, except for the purpose of their inspection laws. On Mr. Martin’s urging the necessity that might arise at a future day, for the States to protect their Manufactures — and that a power ought to be at hand for such an emergency, the prompt answer would have been, the General Government is already provided with the power — and the Convention would have erased from the clause the words, “ without the consent of Congress ,” and thus have restricted the power to the simple purposes of inspection. But the clause remaining with these words, I maintain, is conclusive to shew, that there was no idea, of any general power having been given to Congress, over Manufac- tures. — Nothing but a necessity, which could not have been avoid- ed, could ever have induced the Convention, to consent to the States imposing, in any event, duties on imports. The members of the Convention were nearly unanimous on this point ; they were uni- formly opposed to any concurrence of authority respecting this fruitful source of revenue. It was early decided, that the ENTIRE Custom-House should belong to the Congress. The course prescribed by the Constitution, for the protection of Manufactures, being thus plainly marked, Congress is the more in- excusable for usurping the power in question. If, after the duties, which, previous to 1816, had been laid for revenue, and which, at the same time, encouraged Manufactures, it was found that the in- fant Manufactures of any one State, stood in need of any further protection, the Legislature of that particular State, ought to have applied to Congress, for leave to impose, in all its ports, the same duties on British goods, which are specified in the Tariffs of 1816, 1830, and 1824. To such an application, Congress might have as- 8 62 seated, as the duties would still have been paid into the National Treasury ; and I am certain, the Southern members of Congress in those three different years, would cheerfully have indulged these folks, and will still indulge them, with a protection in this way, as long as it will not too seriously affect the revenue. Whether Con- gress will now, or at any time hereafter, give up to the States the least atom of their power over imposts, I know not: But this 1 do know, that in refusing to give to the States, a chance now and then, of protecting their Manufactures in this way, (if the States choose to ask it,) Congress would not honestly execute the trust, reposed in it by the Constitution. — That, however, would not be our look out. I am not ignorant, of the difficulty that would arise in getting the majority of the people of any one State, New-York for instance, to join in any such application ; for, whilst such a scheme would suit the Manufacturers, it would interfere with other important interests: All persons in such a State, connected with commerce, such as merchants and traders, shipwrights, cordwainers, sail-makers, &c. would be seriously injured. The importation of British goods into New-York would be diminished, on account of the high and double duties, and the Custom-Houses of Charleston, and other ports, where only the national duties were to be exacted, would be filled to over- flowing, to say nothing of the ruinous effects upon the overgrown commerce of New-York, to be produced in various ways, and parti- cularly by the British taxing their produce, and exempting ours. — But the manufacturers will say, what then are we to dor Are we to have no protection, except we pay for it on these terms! The answer must be the same, as we would give to a man, who com- plains, that, whilst his neighbour, who carries on like himself, the wholesale trade in dry goods, has always all the retailers of the city dealing with him, he is without a single applicant. For this case, there is no remedy, but to quit the employment, or to bear the disap- pointment. It would not be just to say to the retailers, that they are to buy where they buy dearest. But to cease with familiar il- lustrations, there certainly does arise from this view of the subject, a position which is impregnable, to-wit : — If in any one State, or any number of States, in which there is a clamor for protection, there can be such a diversity of opinion or of interest, that the manufac- turers, cannot in any one instance, (which I do firmly believe to be the case) succeed in a Legislative application to Congress, for leave to lay imposts, and thus to avail themselves of that article in the Constitution, expressly provided to enable such State or States, to protect their fabrics, it would incontestibly prove, that in such State or States, the MANUFACTURING interest is not the predominant, or PARAMOUNT interest. If it were paramount, its influence would prevail. If then, manufactures, be not a paramount interest in any one State, where there is a cry for protection , and the promo- tion of them, would injure other interests in such State, fully as im- portant, A FORTIORI the promotion of manufactures, must injure in a greater degree, the interest of States, in which there are no ma- nufacturers. It is only on the ground, of its being a general inter- »st in the United States, that a National protection can be advocated and maintained. What is not a general , or a paramount interest in any one State of the Union, cannot, by any process of reasoning, be decided to be a general interest of the twenty-four States. This provision of the Convention, to give the States an opportu- nity, of protecting their own manufactures, is in exact accordance with the immutable principles of justice. To suffer Massachusetts, for instance, to promote the success of her manufacturing establish- ments, by means of a National Tariff, would be neither more nor less, than to give to her, greater advantages, and greater power too, than she could have had, if she had not entered into the Union.' If Massachusetts were to separate from the Union to-morrow, and were to decide, that manufactures was a general interest in the State, and ought to he promoted, what would be her course of po- licy ? She would have to do, what all other nations have done be- fore her. She would have to compel her citizens to wear the home made fabrics, by imposing high duties, so as to exclude the rival foreign articles. She could not think of demanding, that we in South-Carolina, who would be independent of her, should wear her fabrics, any more, than that England can demand of France, to use British manufactures. In England, the entire nation is enriched by manufactures, but who is it, that pays the cost and charges, by which the aggregate of British wealth, and prosperity is attained ? Do not the English themselves, pay for these great advantages of protection 1 Upon what principle, is it then, that under a Govern- ment, which is not a consolidated one, but a confederacy of States, the Eastern man should not only have the protection, but have it without scarcely any cost to himself. What State is there, that would not rapidly acquire riches, if it could thus lay its neighbours under contribution, to support its various branches of internal in- dustry. If Massachusetts then, will have manufactures, Massachu- setts must be content to have them upon the usual terms. Her own citizens must pay the cost, whether it be, directly , by taxes for pre- miums, or pecuniary bounties, or indirectly, by a tax upon consump- tion of the home fabric. To suffer any other mode of encourage- ment, would be, to violate the Constitution, and to license a system of ROBBERY upon the South. If Massachusetts, is not content, to have the full power, to adopt the same measures, which she could take, were she sovereign and independent of the whole world, she has no right to complain. She must not be permitted to tax her neigh- bours. The interest she desires to have promoted at the expense of the nation, is a LOCAL interest, not half so important, as the Cot- ton Planting interest of the South, in which there is a far greater capital embarked, than there is in manufactures. Congress cannot promote, the great Cotton Planting interest of South-Carolina, nor can it encourage the manufacturing interest of the North. And why! — Because these are local interests of the States, and not the gewerannterests of the Union. Congress can lay its imposts for revenue, and if in laying these imposts for revenue, it can at the same time encourage this, or that branch of local or internal indus- 64 try, giving at one time a little advantage to the Sugar Planters of Louisiana, and at another time, aiding the manufacturers of the North, there is no harm in this. As the impost must be laid for re- venue , there is no tax here imposed upon one section of the Union, more than upon another. On this principle, manufactures were ju- diciously encouraged, till 1812, inclusive. Commerce, thereby, was not shackled or interrupted. But, since 1812, all the Tariffs have been gross usurpations of power by Congress. HO. 16 . I proceed to say something on the subject of those general phrases in the ( onstitution which constitute in the hands of the General Government, the great lever by which the State Sovereignties are ultimately to be subverted from their foundations. Congress it seems, has power “ to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts, and pro- vide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States ” It is from these words, “ general welfare,” that a power is claimed to open navi- gation between the States, to dig canals, to construct roads, and from time, to impose Tariffs, to the extent of a total prohibition of the valuable commerce of the Southern States. It is under cover of these words that the Coloniza- tion Society, with Judge Washington at its head, with the sanction of some State Legislatures, and with the prayers of many Societies and Con- ventions, is to march to the Capitol in Decembor next, and to demand the aid of the Government for our flourishing and favorite Negro Colony at Liberia. It is under these same words, as the present President contends, that Congress can adopt any measuie whatever, which it shall judge ne- cessary to promote the general welfare. And also under this exposition is it, that the ultra fanatics and abolitionists of the North contend, that Congress can alter, whenever it pleases, the whole domestic policy of South-Carolina. In this view of the subject, these words c: general welfare” are becom- ing every clay more and more important to the folks, who are now so peaceably raising their cotton and rice, between the Little Pedee and the Savannah. The question, it must be tecollected, is not simply, whether we are to have a foreign commerce. It is not whether we are to have splendid national works, in which we have no interest, executed chiefly at our cost, and with a view to circulate money in the North. It is not whether we are to be taxed without end It is not whether we are to have our Northern brethren, as our task masters, and to make bricks for them without straw. But the'still more interesting question is, whether the in- stitutions of our forefathers, those institutions under which we have been born, and under which all of us, bondmen as well as free, have enjoyed in the whole, as much of happiness as generally fails to the lot of any one nation on earth, are to be preserved according to ancient usage, free from the rude hands of innovators and enthusiasts, and from the molestation or interference of any legislative power on earth but our own ? Or whether, like the weak, the dependant, and the unfortunate colonists of the West- Indies, we are to drag on a miserable state of political existence, constant- ly vibrating between our hopes and our fears, as to what a Congress may do towards us, without any accurate knowledge of our probable fate, and without a hope of successful resistance ? 65 This, my fellow-citizens, is an awful question, but awful as it is, it is a question on which, sooner or later, we must all pass a final judgment — We deceive ourselves if vve think, that there can be any evasion. The time advances and advances apace, when we must either be content to go as supplicants, and prostrate ouiselves before the Councils of the nation, soliciting their forbearance and their mercy, or we must there appear as freemen, demanding a recognition of our rights, with a firm and an un- alterable resolution to maintain them. There is no middle course: — Let us examine the grounds upon which the enemies of the republic would impoverish and destroy our happy country. As far as manufac- tures are implicated, it is immaterial what construction is given to the words “general welfare ;” for, if I am correct in the position 1 took in the two preceding numbers, that Congress is prohibited from giving any protec- tion excepting by patents for new inventions, the power, of coutse, cannot be claimed under this clause. No clause in the Constitution, in my view, has been more perverted in its meaning than this. But it is not surprising. When the Supreme Court of the United States solemnly adjudges that the power given to Congress to pass the “ necessary and proper laws,” to execute its enume- rated powers, is an enlargement, and not a limitation of those powers, (the contrary of which I have demonstated to be the fact, from the jour- nals of the Convention,) is it to be wondered, that the same mistake, should occur in the interpretation of the clause in question ? The term “ general welfare,” I contend, was inserted in this clause, to confine the appropriating power of Congress to the enumerated objects. Should I fail in my proof, I hope I shall have given as good reasons for my con- structions, as those on the opposite side, can for theirs. If 1 adduce facts, which even render the interpretation either way, as not conclusive, I shall have rendered some service to my country. South-Carolina is not to pay tribute money, or have her domestics insubordinate, under a dis- puted, and doubtful construction of the Constitution. When the cl i a ft of the Constitution was reported to the Convention, on the 6th of August, it was generally understood, as being in conformity with the outlines agreed upon in the amended resolutions of Mr. Randolph. If the committee did deviate, from the letter or spirit of the outlines so given, it could only be, from misconception of their instructions. It does not, however, appear, that they did in any one instance, misunderstand them. In their enumeration of powers, they were, by their instruc- tions, to provide inter alia, a special power for every subject of general interest They did so as well as they could. What escaped their notice, was afterwards provided for, by additional enumerated powers. That this committe ever intended, that the legislation of Congress should extend over any subject, which was not particularly provided I'or in their enumera- tion of powers, is contradicted by the important fact, that they used, in their reported draft, no general phrases, under which might be concealed a single latent power. The words “ common defence,” or “general welfare,” or any words of similar import, are not to be found in any part of the reported draft of the Constitution, not even in its preamble; and it appears further, that those words are not, up to that date, in any part of the journals, neither in Mr. Pinckney’s draft, nor in Mr. Randolph’s resolutions. In the Constitution reported by the committee of detail, the 66 taxing clause stood thus: “The Legislature of the United States, shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises.” In Mr. Pinckney’s draft, referred to the committee, the words are the same. When this clause, on the 1 6th of August, was in its turn, called up for consideration, a motion was made for a proviso “ to restrain Congress from taxing the exports of a State.” The consideration of the proviso was postponed, almost unanimously. It was an unnecessary amendment, because there was already amongst the limitations on the power of Con- gress, the same provision. Be this as it may, we may presume, that the clause required consideration, and that this may have been one reason for its postponement On the 18th, we find this motion, “ that a clause or clauses be prepared to restrain the Legislature of tin- United States, from establishing a perpetual revenue," the meaning of which I understand to be, that no money should be raised by taxes, unless it should be needed for the common purposes of the government. Here then we perceive, an intention to limit , and not to extend the appropriating power of the government. The committee, to whom this proposition was referred, must have understood, that there was a disposition in the Convention, to limit the appropriating power, for on the 22d, they report, that the clause should read — to lay taxes, &c. for the payment of the debts, and necessary expenses of the United States, provided, that no law for raising any branch of revenue, except it be specially appropriated for the payment of in- terest on debts, or loans, shall continue in force more than years.” This limitation of the committee, it is true, was not finally agreed to; but I introduce it to shew, that there was a jealousy in the Convention, as to the power of raising taxes, without specifying the purposes , for which they were intended. It was to guard against useless taxation, which might be followed by waste and extravagance in the public expenditure. Between the time, however, that the taxing clause was first called up for consideration, to wit, on the 16th, and the time the committee of detail re- ported as above, on the 22d, Mr. Rutledge, the chairman of that com- mittee, had moved, that “ Congress should consider the necessity, and ex- pediency of the debts of the several States, being assumed by Congress,” and a committee of eleven was appointed for this purpose. This com- mittee of eleven had reported on the 2 1st, “that the Legislature shall have power to fulfil the engagements, which had been entered into by Con- gress, and to discharge as well the d bts of the United States, as the debts incurred by the several States during the late war, for the common defence and general welfare This is the first time (the 2 1 st of August) that the words “ common defence and general welfare ,” appear on the journals of the Conventions; and no doubt it was this report, as to a provision for the public debt, which caused the other committee, in their reports on the 22d, to which we have just referred, to propose to add to the taxing clause the words, “ to pay the debts and necessary expenses of the United States,” &c. In this same report, on the 22d of August, was the specific power proposed, as a seventeenth enumerated power, (alluded to in a pre- ceding number) to enable Congress to provide for the general welfare , &c. which report I considered as made in favour of manufactures, but was never agreed to. This is the second time (the 22d) that the words “ ge neral welfare,” are mentioned. On the 23d, when the taxing power was again called up, a motion was made to amend it, so as to read, “ The 67 Legislature shall fulfil the engagements, and discharge the debts of the United States, and shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises.” This motion was carried. On the 25th it was re- considered, and a motion was made to amend it by saying, “ for toe pay- ment of the debts, and for defraying the expenses that shall be incurred for the common defence and general welfare;” which motion was lost. Thus the limitation voted for on the 23d remained. But on the 4th, the com- mittee made a report, and amongst other things recommended that the clause should read, “ to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States;” and it was thus finally agreed to. If there be one inference clearer than another, from the foregoing state- ment of facts, it is, that there existed in the Convention a clear ini ention, not to suffer the appropriating power of the government, to remain sub- ject to the possibly perverted construction, that it was to be indefinite as to purpose, as well as illimitable as to amount. Let us recapitulate : The amendment of the 18th was a limitation on the power to tax unnecessarily. It was to provide against raising a revenue which might not be needed. The proposition of the 22d was a severe limitation as to pupose, confining the appropriation to necessary expenses. In that of the 23d. the purpose is first expressed, to wit, “ to fulfil the engagements and discharge the debts ;” and then follows the power to tax. Here was a clear limitation again as to purposes. On the 25th, the taxes are to be laid to pay “ the expenses that shall be incurred for the common defence and general wel- fare.” This again is a limitation as to purpose. If such of the proposed amendments as limit the appropriating power as to its purposes, be attentively considered, it will be seen, that they aie all more or less objectionable, and therefore were properly rejected by the Convention. Forinstance — 1st. To confine the appropriation tothe“«eces- sary expenses” of the government, would be too rigorous. Every government must have some latitude of discretion, as to its expenditures for its enume- rated, or legitimate objects. 2ndly. To have limited the expenditure to the “ engagements and debts of the United States,” would have excluded the debts of the old Confederation, and the assumption of the debts of the individual States. There existed moreover, another objection to this phraseology. The taxes here, are made the means of executing this par- ticular power, whereas the taxing power must be the great means of exe- cuting all the powers. 3dly. To have limited the appropriation to the tc expenses that shall be incurred for the common defence and general wel- fare,” might possibly imply a doubt, whether Congress ought to lay its taxes prematurely, or before the wants of the Government should be ascer- tained. These last, are the words in the old Confederation. I do not recollect what the practice was in the old Congress — but I do suspect, that the States were never called upon for their supplies in money, or in flour, &c. until the expenses were ascertained, and the quota of each Slate ad^ justed. However, be the objection to this last amendment what I have stated or not, we must all agree, that if the words, now used in the Article, be words, shewing the restrictive sense of the Convention, as to the con- struction of the appropriating power, the clause is better expressed than it would have been, under any of the amendments. As it now reads, it gives Congress the necessary power to lay its taxes at its 68 pleasure, by anticipation or otherwise — but judiciously confines the pro- ceeds, to the general purposes, for which the Government was establish- ed, the public debt being provided for, by a separate article. Those who reject this rational constiuction, that the words “general welfare” were intended to restrict the appropriating power of Congress, to the enumerated objects, will find themselves reduced to the awkward di- lemma, of maintaining a very absurd position, to wit — that when a power is given to raise money, without any expression of limits, as to amount , or as to purpose , it is an augmentation of such a power, as soon as the pur- poses of the appropriation are expressed. The case before us is precisely of this kind. — Mr. Pinckney proposed, by his draft, to give Congress a power “ to raise taxes, duties, impost and excises.” The Committee re- port a simi'ar power — This power, though apparently illimitable, as to purpose or amount, was not so in fact. Under a general power to raise taxes, Congress can no more appropriate money, to any purpose foreign to the wants of the Government, than any trustee who has an unlimited power to raise money by loans or otherwise, can legally appropriate the money when borrowed, to any other than the purposes of the trust which are expressed in the deed which confers the money raising power. But, let us give the opposite argument every advantage. — Here is a power reported by the Committee, which is indefinite every way. It must occur to every mind, that to make any addition to a power to raise money, which already' is so expressed, as possibly to be construed to be unlimited as to the purpose, as well as to the amount of the appropriation, is in fact to limit that power. That which apparently is already unlimited, needs no additional words to strengthen it ; every amendment is likely to weaken it considerably. The history of the clause in question, shews this to be the case. In all the trials to which it was exposed, it was always weak- ened — sometimes more, sometimes less, according to the proposed amend- ments. As the clause originally stood, who can doubt, but that Congress might, under its phraseology, have pretended to more power than it now claims — though, substantially, there is no difference between the two claus- es. Under such an unlimited power as the words convey, the vote for the relief of the distressed emigrants from St Domingo, and that of 100,000 dollars to the inhabitants of Carracas, might have been said to be justified. When this appropriation was voted, it was unconstitutional, because it was not for the general welfare of the citizens of the United States, to whb h the restriction confines the appropriations of the Government. Under the clause too, as it originally stood, a million of dollars might, under some colour of authority, be given to the Greeks; as much more to the South- American Patriots ; millions might be voted to extend Christianity in heathen countries, or to civilize that quarter of the globe which is becom- ing so very interesting to an American Congress — the continent of Africa. But who would now contend, that we could give money to the Greeks, or to the South- American Patriots. And how is it, that we cannot be thus generous, when there is no express prohibition in the Constitution — The answer is a plain one. It is the additional words “general welfare” to the original clause. If then it is the amendment to the original taxing clause, that prevents Congress from now doing, what it might have had a pretext to do, before such an amendment was made — that amendment, must of necessity be a limitation on the appropriating power. It is the limitation is to the purposes of appropriation, which the words “general wel- fare” have affixed to a power, which, from its phraseology, might have been assumed to be unlimited, that restricts Congress to such appropriations only as can be referred to the common defence and general welfare of the States. If, then, the words constitute a limi- tation in this sense, they cannot enlarge the appropriating power* What is intended as, and operates as a limitation, cannot be con* strued into an additional or a new power. , The words “general welfare,” were in truth added to the clause, not because the members of the Convention believed, that, without such a clause, the money appropriating power would in strictness and in truth, be without limits as to the purposes for which money might be voted away. They could not have thought so, for there were amongst them too many sound lawyers. They could not be* lieve, that the words conferred a right to give away money except for national purposes. The words were inserted, ex abundante cautela. The same extreme caution here prevailed, which influenc* ed them to give a power to Congress to pass the necessary laws to execute its powers, and which also induced them to give as sub- stantive powers, those which were incidental to the execution of other powers. There was a fear, that the clause would be liable to misconstruction, if some words were not added to it, to shew the restricted sense in which they would have it considered. The jour* nals of the Convention decidedly shew this. Had these words not been inserted, to a certainty, large sums of money, or frigates, would have been voted to the Greeks a few years ago, when there was such an enthusiasm on the subject amongst the influential members of Congress. And, to a certainty also, pecuniary bounties and pre* miurns would, ere this, have been voted away by Congress, to en- courage agriculture, trade, and manufactures ; and even money might have been voted for State purposes. As the clause noW stands, no appropriation can be justified, excepting it be for the na* tional objects included in the enumeration of powers. Mr. M’Duffie, who, in his exposition, of the general phrases iff the Constitution, agrees with Alexander Hamilton, and who, in the debate in 1824, has gone so very far in his ideas, of the power of the Government, as to internal improvements, seemed to regard it as a matter of considerable triumph, when some of bis adversaries in the debate, had incautiously contended fora principle, which I agree could not be maintained, and which I regret was ever advocated.**** He thanked them for the admission, that the words, “ general wel* fare,” were intended to limit a power, which, otherwise, would have been illimitable without them, because he thought, it led to the irre- sistible conclusion, that the discretion of the National Legislature was not to be restricted within any bounds, short of the “common defence and general welfare.” Mr. M’Duffie’s argument in support of this doctrine, is so exces- sively refined, that it is always unsafe for an antagonist, who is not his* 9 70 compeer in metaphysics, to enter the field of controversy with him. The danger is, that he may be blown “ sky high,” from the ground that he occupies. Like the Chief Justice of the United States, he so states his propositions, that they seem to be almost self-evident. In an instant, our previous impressions vanish, and for a while, we acquiesce, without knowing why or wherefore, in doctrines, which our mature judgment had always regarded as unsound. The prompt- ness too, with which Mr. M’Duffie seizes an advantage, incautiously given him by his adversary, and the dexterity with which he man- ages his subsequent movements, is most remarkable. It is the novelty of his plan of attack, and the boldness with which he pushes for- ward his game, that gives hitn his superiority in debate. His speech on internal improvements, is a master piece of the powers of rea- soning. It is by far the greatest effort which was made in Congress, during that discussion, and, it therefore is not surprising, that this speech should have been so long considered, as settling the question in favour of the power of Congress to appropriate money for roads and canals. But Mr. M’Dcfpie’s doctrines, like those of the Su- preme Court, have been orthodox, because they never have been tho- roughly examined. They were promulgated at a period, when it was deemed a kind of heresy, not to fall into the general views of our politicians at Washington, as to the character which our Gov- ernment ought to assume. It was to encourage a selfish and sec- tional feeling, to think of differing from men, who, so far from re- collecting, that the General Government was designed to be a Gov- ernment altogether external in its operations, conceived the enlarged and brilliant scheme, of making it a most splendid edifice, ivithin and without , as calculated to attract notice from its ornaments, as well as its utility. Had Mr. M’Duffie’s antagonists joined issue with him on proper pleadings, they might have insured for themselves a successful com- petition : but, as it was, they were the weak in the hands of the strong. They did not meet him on the true battle-ground, or they might have wounded this Achilles in the debate, in more places than one. The campaign was badly conducted, both by his friends and his adversaries. Whilst his colleague, Mr. Clay, was employed in contending, that the power over Internal Improvements, might justly be referred to the power “ of regulating commerce,” and Mr. M’Lane supported the construction, that to “ facilitate ” commerce, was substantially to regulate it: Whilst some would deduce the power in question, as a consequence from the right to make %oar, and others, from the “ right to establish Post Roads ;” whilst in fact, all his colleagues were contending, thai Congress could make roads, and exercise its sovereignty in this way legitimately, and whilst they were all occupying positions, from which they could ea- sily he dislodged : Mr. Archer, from Virginia, on the other side, in- stead of contending for the position taken in the preceding number, that the words “ common defence and general welfare,” were de- claratory, and inserted from extreme caution, rather to shew the re- strictive sense in which the Convention would have the taxing 71 power considered, than from any doubt, that in fairness, any power could be claimed to appropriate money, except for the enumerated objects, most unfortunately admits, that if the words had been omit- ted, the taxing power would have been unlimited in every way. — The eagle eye of Mr. M’Duffie, who, ere this, had not made a sin- gle movement to the right or to the left, perceives the opening in the enemy’s line, and it is at this critical moment, that he advances with the whole force of his mighty intellect, and occupies a new position, only hinted at by his prototype, Alexander Hamilton, presenting himself in such views, as to strike his friends and his adversaries with amazement, and with consternation. “ As the power under consideration, would have had no limit without the words “ common defence and general welfare,” it results of necessity ,” says Mr. M’Duf- fie, “ that we must look to these words alone , for the limitation ” — He therefore sets out with the proposition, that the discretion of the Legislature is within its bounds, as long as its appropriations are for the general welfare; and, that he may not be in the difficulties of his colleagues, who, if they should fail to refer the exercise of sovereign power contended for, to some or other of the enumerated objects, must surrender at discretion, he carefully disclaims all pretensions to construct roads and canals, as an exercise of sovereignty : As a so- vereign power, he considers the appropriating power as ending in it- self. When the money is raised and appropriated, sovereignty, he says, ceases ; and whatever else is to be effected, if it cannot be done by the agency of money merely , it cannot be done at all. If the aid of any sovereign power be at all necessary, to effect the object to which the money is to be applied, be admits, that in such case, the appropriation cannot be made, without such power is found amongst the enumerated objects. Mr. M’Duffie accordingly maintains, that the spending of the mo- ney, after it is appropriated by law, even if it be an hundred million of dollars, on roads to be opened with the consent of States, is no more an act of sovereignty, than the purchase of a horse, fora mes- senger of either house of Congress, would be an act of sovereignty, or the making of a road through a State by an individual, with the consent of the Legislature, would make that individual a sovereign. Now, to a man of plain sense, it would seem to be a matter of some consequence, as between a State and the United States, that when Congress opens a road through such a State, with its consent, it does not thereby exercise sovereignty, in that particular State, be- cause no State would permit its sovereignty to be interfered with; but really and truly, to the people of the United States at large, it can make no difference, if a hundred million of dollars is to be ex- pended, whether the expenditure of this vast treasure on roads, is, technically speaking, an act of sovereignty or not, because, if the appropriation can be constitutionally made, the money must come out of their pockets, if it be forthcoming at all. But to spend a hun- dred millions, under a power to appropriate it for the very purpose for which it is actually expended, is, at any rate, to possess a prodigious influence, even if it be not sovereignty. Mr. M’Duf- 72 pie's mode of stating the question, is therefore, most imposing ; and those who desire to eombat him on the ground of metaphysics, or who would not yield to him this position, that to effect any object, however important, by money merely, even if it be an hundred mil- lions, is not to exercise sovereignty, must expect to be hors du com- bat. We must meet him then on other grounds. Let us say, that he is correct, that to give a million of dollars to- wards a canal in a State, and with the consent of its Legislature, is not an exercise of sovereign power ; and let us further admit his grand position, that the appropriating power has no limits, but the common defence and general welfare. There is yet more than one sophism in his entire argument. The first sophism consists in his supposing, that an unlimited power to raise money for the general welfare, is honestly executed, if the money be applied to the pur- poses of the Government, and not to local or State purposes. The only answer to this argument which I have met with, is that given by Mr. Legare, in his speech on Mr. Prioleau’s resolutions, in our State Legislature, in 1825. Mr. Legare demonstrates, that a Gov- ernment of limited powers, has no greater right to divert the funds of the Government, beyond the enumerated objects, because it has an unlimited power to appropriate for the general welfare, than a trus- tee who has an unlimited power by deed, to raise money on the trust estate, can divert those funds to any other purposes of the estate, than are expressed in the different trusts. Every lawyer knows, that a trustee may, under a general power, in a trust deed for that pur- pose, sell part of the trust estate, and he may apply the proceeds, to purposes which he may deem generally beneficial to the estate. In such a case, though the legality of the sale, and the appropriations could not be disturbed, yet, in equity, the trustee would be adjudged to have departed from his duty, as having abused the trust, and would be compelled to refund. So is it with the Government of the United States. It is a Government of sovereign, but of limited powers, These powers are conferred on it, to enable it to perform certain trusts. These trusts are defined with the utmost precision, in an instrument called the Constitution, but which is neither more nor less, than the great Trust Deed between the States and the United Stales The General Government then, is a trustee, and the power which it receives from the States, is a power coupled with a trust. Would any lawyer say, that in construing live power of the Government, unaided by other lights to guide us, all the rules for construing powers, coupled with a trust, should be put aside ; those rules, which are not merely the rules of common law, but of com- mon sense. I should hope not. 5s it reconcileable with common sense, that a power given by deed, bv A to B. to mortgage the estate, and to apply the proceeds to the purposes of the trust estate, could authorize the appropriation to purposes, not specified or referable to auv of the numerous trusts, with which the deed may abound. I should say not. Then, upon what principle, can a Government, instituted to effect certain national objects, which are clearly de- fined, appropriate the general means, placed in its hands, for a pur- 73 pose, which it is admitted on the opposite side, has no relation to any of those objects. Such a Government may think proper to as- sume the principle, that the Government being National, it may ef- fect objects which are National, though not enumerated. What is this but to say, that when the Convention precisely defined the pur- poses, for which we should be National, the Congress shall under- take to say, we shall also be National for other purposes. To tax the people, that money may be appropriated beyond the enumerated objects, is a constitutional exercise of power, because the taxing power is unlimited. So is the sale of part of the estate by a trustee legal, because a power is given for that purpose. In either case, the money once appropriated, must remain so appropri- ated. But equity will adjudge the misapplication of the money, as an illegal act. It is an abuse of the trust. It would be no answer in Mr. M’Duffie, to repeat what he has already said, “ that construe the C onstitution as we will, our principal security must depend upon the discretion of Congress, and that we are not more exposed, by Congress appropriating its money- at its discretion, under the tax- ing power, than if it were wastefully expended, with reference to any of the enumerated objects, where the discretion is admitted to be unlimited.” The difference, however, is essential. A wasteful ex- penditure of money, in building fortifications, and raising armies and navies, when there may be no need of them, is not an unconsti- tutional act, any more than it is an illegal act, for a trustee, who is appointed to take care of an infant, to allow him so liberally, as to enable him to run through his estate, and to come to ruin before he comes of age. In these cases, there is no relief, because it is money expended upon the objects of the trust, under an unlimited discretion so to do. The manner of executing the trust, is here matter of dis- cretion, But very different is the case, where the discretion claimed to be exercised 1 , is not as to the quantity of money, which is to be applied to a specific purpose, demanding such an application of mo- ney, hut to the purpose itself of the application. Congress cannot promote objects which are not enumerated, even where money alone can effect them. It is repugnant to the whole plan and spirit of the Constitution Ts there no distinction between a discretion as to the quantity of means, or money, necessary to exe- cute a particular trust, and a discretion as to the subject or trust, upon which money is to operate ? The distinction, in my mind, is most manifest. The Constitution affords many examples of tiie one, but it furn ishes none of the other. For instance, Congress can raise money to any amount, by taxes or by loans, whether the public exi- gencies require it or not. It can, in time of peace, as well as of war, raise troops, and build and equip frigates, without number. — It can coin money without end. — It can appoint seven or seventy Judges of the Supreme Court. — It may ordain and establish a hundred new inferior tribunals of Justice. All this Congress can do. But in doing all these things, it is still strictly within its own sphere. It may do wrong, but it does so at the expense of the people at large, considered as its constituents. It cannot possibly impinge upon, or interfere with, 74 or affect in any manner, the sovereignty or concerns of the States, either directly or indirectly. Not only its powers are exercised within due bounds, and directed to their proper objects, but its infiu- cnce too. Members of Congress are not forming schemes and pro- jects to meddle with the concerns, and disturb the peace of their neighbours, indirectly, when they dare not do so directly. In short, the General Government, in thus exercising its discretion, remains what it was created for, and does not become a pragmatical, offen- sive, and dangerous power, the object of alarm and jealousy to the States. Its discretion is the only rule of its conduct. Such a dis- cretion is indispensable to it, and it has it by the terms of the grant. But who can point to any clause in the Constitution, which gives the least discretion whatever, as to the SUBJECT, upon which the na- tional legislation is to operate. The bare idea of the Government, being a Government o i limited powers of legislation, one would sup- pose, would be a sufficient discouragement to any one, from under- taking so arduous a task. If we look at the instrument, the objects or subjects of legislation, are all enumerated. The very specifi- cation of the objects, on which the legislative power is to operate, ex vi termini, excludes the idea of discretion, as to any object, not in- cluded in such specifiation. If there is to be discretion, the very object of the enumeration is defeated. It was wisely ordained by the Convention, that the subjects for the legislative powers of Con- gress, should be fixed and settled, and that there should be no dis- cretion in Congress, as to what subjects it should, or should not legislate on. For what is discretion l According to the opinion of one of the greatest men, who ever sat on the English Bench, ‘‘Discretion is the law of TYRANTS.” In the best of men, it is sometimes folly, oftentimes caprice. In the worst, it is every vice and crime, of which human nature is capable.” But our Achilles must not be permitted to drag us along in tri- umph, as he would a vanquished Hector, by saying, that amongst the specified subjects for legislation, there is one, to wit, the appro- priating power, in which, from its peculiar phraseology, a discretion as to the objects, (as well as to the amount) is implied, for that would lie to say, that whilst the whole instrument clearly manifests a de- sign, and studiously perfects a scheme, to exclude all subjects for legislation, which are not particularly specified, giving to Congress the few defined, and reserving to the State the numerous undefined powers of legislation, yet, that by certain doubtful and indefinite general phrases, the like of which, are to be found in the most com- mon power of attorney, a power of appropriating money shall be claimed by implication, which, in its exercise, shall embrace almost every object of human legislation. What is this, but to say, in the language of Mr. Legap.e, “ that whilst all other means, necessary and proper for executing the enumerated powers of the Government, arc limited by the nature of those powers, the levying and disposing of money, the UNIVERSAL means, is to be restrained by no other condition, than that it should not be thrown into the sea, or be- stowed on individuals who have no claim on the public.” Let us now show where the fallacy of this part of Mr. M’Duf- fje’s argument consists. 75 MO. 13. The fallacy of Mr. M’Duffie’s argument in this particular, lies, in his Supposing, that the promotion of the “ common defence and general welfare” by money merely, is the end for which the whole first clause was insetted. If there was no discretion, he thinks, in Congress, as to the appropriation of its revenues beyond the specific powers, “ there would have been no necessity for an express delegation of power, to raise and appropriate money ; because every one of the enumerated powers would carry with it as an incident, the power of appropriating the money neces- sary to its execution,” and that, adds he, “can hardly be a just construc- tion which would thus convert the leading clause of the Constitution, into mer.e surplusage.” In this last position, we perfectly coincide. The construction, which would cause any one of the enumerated powers in the instrument to be mere surplusage, I agree, must be faulty It is precisely on this principle of reasoning, that I have protested against the decision of the Supreme Court in M’Culloch vs The State of Maryland; for I have shewn, in my eleventh number, that not one, but nearly a dozen of clauses in the Con- stitution, must be rank surplusage, if the position taken by the Court in that case, be a sound one. But whilst we so perfectly agree in a joint protestation against a rule of interpretation so unsound, yet 1 must now turn aside, and separately pro- test against our own statesman, for the unsound inference which he has drawn, to wit, that had the intention been, to limit the appropriations within the enumerated powers, the necessity of an express delegation of power to raise money, would have been superseded. With such an inter- ference as this, it is not be wondered, that Mr. M’Duffie should fall into a snare. Mr. M’Duffie is now to be informed, that so far from the gene- ral power to tax, being inserted for the special purpose of enabling Con- gress to appropriate its revenues beyond the enumerated objects, the clause stood at the head of the enumerated powers in Mr. Pinckney’s draft, submitted to the Convention as soon as it was organized for business, and it stood also in the reported draft of the Constitution, long before the general phrases were thought of or suggested. The words “common de- fence and general welfare” were not added as an amendment to the clause, until the 4th of September; and then, as I aheady have stated in my six- teenth number, with a view to express, the sense of the Convention, that the appropriating power was to be limited to the enumerated objects. The taxing clause, was a clause, which the Convention would have retain- ed above all other clauses in the instrument, and under every variety of aspect, of which its intentions might possibly be supposed to be susceptible. The taxing power was the principle, which was to give life, and health, and vigour to the new Government. It was the want of this vital princi- ple, which caused the old Congress to possess an huge, but yet an useless mass of powers. The idea is perfectly inadmissible in any shape, that the Convention, with so much experience before its eyes, of the embarrass- ments which had been felt, for the want of this active and living power to sustain the fabric of the Confederation, would have omitted to provide by an express grant, for the most paramount of all the powers which can be conferred by a people on its rulers, and have left the new Government to claim the money raising power, by implication of law. 76 There is yet another reason, why in the enumeration of powers, such d clause could not be dispensed with — The States were about to part with a considerable portion of their sovereignty, and confer it on a Government, which, for certain purposes, was designed to be supreme, To avoid a clashing, or repugnance of authority in laying and collecting their respec- tive revenues, it was most essential to state the subjects of taxation over which die General Government should possess authority. The taxing power, therefore, became of the utmost consequence; it was a subject which was uppermost in the minds of the members — and it was a subject too, which did not admit of very easy arrangement. The Convention had to choose between two modes; one of which was, to separate the subjects of taxation, so as to give some to the Union, and the remainder to the States ; whilst the other plan proposed, was not to separate the objects of Revenue, but to give the States concurrent jurisdiction, in general, in the article of taxation. Mr. Hamilton in his Federalist (No. 35) justifies the position finally taken by the Convention, “that a concurrent juris- diction in the article of taxation, was the only admissible substitute, for an entire subordination, in respect to this branch of power, of State authority to that of the Union.” We now perceive the indispensable necessity of the taxing clause, a clause so judiciously constructed, that whilst under its phraseology, no exclu- sive grant of sovereignty over subjects of revenue can possibly be claimed by Congress — there is at the same time a reservation of State sovereignty, under that NEGATIVE PREGNANT in the Constitution — to wit: the restriction on the power of the States to lay duties on imports, exports and tonnaee. Does not Mr. M’Duffie see, that a clause, which accord- ing to Mr. Hamilton, has the “ merit of reconciling, an indefinite Consti- tutional power of taxation in the Federal Government, with an adequate and independent power in the States to provide for their own necessities,” is amongst the most important clauses in the Constitution, and that it justly merits the position it now occupies, to wit — at the head of all the other powers. Must he not confess his oversight, when he did not perceive, that the taxing power was indispensable, as the great sovereign means of executing a! the other powers, and that he was greatly in error, when he imagined, that had the intention been, to apply the proceeds of the taxes to the enumerated f towers, “ there would have been NO NECESSITY, for an express de* egation of power, to raise and appropriate money.” Had Mr. M’Duffie not indulged in the Utopian scheme, that a fundamental dissimilarity of interests between twenty four States, embracing a portion of the globe larger than Europe, and differing so much in climate, soil, and productions, and in their institutions and their laws, could ever be altered or destroyed ; but have contemplated all the schemes of internal improvement, as all ra- tional men do, merely as calculated to add influence to the Supreme Government, and to take it from the subordinate sovereignty, and thus finally to merge the one into the other; had he looked into the Constitu- tion, not with the visionary eye of an ardent enthusiast, for a splendid Government, but with that of the calm and philosophical statesman, he would have known, that it is a work so admirably contrived, as to bear upon its very face and front, the irrefragable evidence, that its whole scheme and design is opposed to constructive powers — thatjjthe giving away little odd parcels of power, which were the incidents to other powers be- 77 fore given, was purposely, to impress upon the minds of future generations, that nothing was to be claimed which was not given; and from this he would have learnt what I hope I have established to the satisfaction of all; to wit, that the taxing power was given, not as he believes, to accomplish the particular end of spending money towards the common defence and general welfare, beyond the enumerated objects, at the discretion of Con- gress ; but that it was, of necessity, given for other and higher purposes, to wit, the accomplishment of the enumerated objects, for which the Government was instituted. The fallacy of Mr M’Duffie’s argument being thus shewn, I pass over those observations of his, in which he would shew, that if his view of the appropriating power of the Government be not correct, every Congress has been guilty of habitual violation of the Constitution. No argument founded on precedents can have weight, where the question at issue is, whether the Government has, or has not usurped its powers. Mr, M'DuF- fie cannot seriously believe, that in the instances which he has cited, of the appropriations to the St. Domingo sufferers, under Gen. Washing- ton’s administration, and of that to the inhabitants of Carracas under Mr« Madison’s, there was an application of money to the ‘‘general welfare” of the people of the United States. These were remarkable instances, of the triumph of generous feelings, over sober legislative caution But there is an argument, drawn from the precedent in the case of the purchase of Louisiana by Mr. Jf.fferson, which does merit a particular reply. Mr. M’Duffie would here exultingly ride over his opponents, by sup- posing them to take a ground, which, in my view is wholly indefensible.—* “It will be said,” says he, “ that the purchase of Louisiana, was made by virtue of the Executive power to make treaties, and what follows? That there is an unlimited power in the Executive Government, not only to au- thorize Congress to appropriate money, but to impose upon it all the obli- gation, which can grow out of the treaty, to make the appropriation.”— This, Mr. M’Duffie triumphantly exclaims “ puts an end to the argu- ment, which limits the power of appropriating money to the other specific grants to Congress embraced in the enumeration of its powers;” for, says he, “it would be an extraordinary supposition, that the framers of the Constitution intended to limit, by the most jealous restrictions, the power of the popular branch of the Government, in selecting the objects calculat- ed to promote the general welfare, and at the same time, to vest in the Executive Government, the most unlimited discretion on the same sub- ject.” But the whole of this is a fallacc. Mr. M’Duffie here makes up a “ man of straw,” that he might tea'’, him into pieces. Who would contend, that every treaty made by the President, and ratified by the Senate, is ob- ligatory upon the House of Representatives, or upon the States, or the people. A treaty stands upon no better footing than a law of Congress* In either case, it is only the “ Supreme law of the Land,” when made “in pursuance of the Constitution.” If the President and Senate ratify a treaty, in which there are stipulations, which violate any express article in the Constitution, Mr. M’Duffie ought to know, that such a treaty would not be binding. Suppose a treaty to be made in which the United States ate pledged to an alliance with England or France, offensive and defensive , such a treaty would be void, because it would enable the Ease- 10 78 cutive, and the Senate to put the United States at war with a foreign pow- er, when it is Congress alone in which the power is vested. “ to declare war.” Many cases might be put, where not only express articles of the Constitution might be violated, under such a construction as this, but certain unalienable, though undefined rights of the States may be impaired and surrendered. This was clearly illustrated some years ago, in a pamphlet called “ Carolinirnsis In the debates on Mr. Jay’s treaty, a treaty in which it was not pretended, that there was any violation of the Constitu- tion, it was even there doubted, whether the House of Representatives was bound to carry it into effect. The purchase of Louisiana, is not then to be justified, on the ground of its being made by virtue ot the Executive power to make treaties. The President and Senate have the unquestion- able power to make treaties, as far as those treaties relate to subjects, w ith- in the scope of the enumerated objects, for which the General Government was established, but no farther. They have no Constitutional right, to negociate to purchase territory for the United States, as territory inert It/. Because Louisiana was pmchased by Mr. Jefferson, Mr. iVi’Di ffie concludes, that the purchase was justified, under his favourite doctrine, of “ the power to appropriate money for the general welfare, as money mere- ly ” I differ totally from Mr. M’Duffie, since the purchase of (his Ter- ritory, is to be defended on the proper, and the only ground of its being a war measure — most decidedly a war measure, J can well reci lleci the causes which led to the treaty of cession : A right of deposit was denied us at New Orleans, by the Spanish authorities, and there arose from this ag- gression, such an excitement throughout the Western country, in conse- quence of this violation of subsisting treaties, that it became necessary, that the Government should adopt immediate measures of negotiation, or war. There existed a powerful party in Congress, who were for taking New Orleans by force, at the head of which were many distinguished mem- bers, amongst whom was Mr. Ross, from Pittsburg. In this critical pos- ture of affairs, when war or submission was unavoidable, Mr. Jefferson, whose policy was that of peace, conceived the sublime project of purchas- ing it, so.as to avoid hostilities. But Spain, in the mean time, transferred the Pr >vince to Fiance, and Mr. Jefferson being still unwilling to have a colliittm with Bonaparte, and being given to understand, that it might be purchased, the purchase was accordingly made. Had we gone to war, and acquired Louisiana by conquest, and retained it after a treaty of peace, no one would have doubted our right to hold it, nor can it be denied, but that it would have cost us some blood, and tlm expenditure of treasure fully equivalent to the purchase money. It would be refining too much to say, that when we are on the eve of war with a neighbouring power, and nego- tiations are entered into, and on the one side a cession of territory takes place, and an equivalent is stipulated on the other, that there is any sub- stantial difference between such a case, and that, where, after actual war, the same treaty is made. 1 conceive the money expended foi Louisiana, as much applied to a purpose strictly national, both in its charactei and its consequences, as if it had been invested in the armies, or fleets, or other warlike preparations, which would have been indispensably requisite, had not the cession taken place. Instead of its being a cession, in a treaty of peace, after an expensive war, it was a treaty before, and IN SUBSTI- TUTION of WAR. It was a measure having a direct and natural rela- 79 tion to war. It was then substantially A WAR measure. It was clearly within the enumerated objects in the Constitution, and therefore > 'onstiiu- tional. 1 will close this | *art of my examination of Mr. M’Duffie’s doc- trines, by inserting an extract from Mr. Madison’s celebrated report of 1799, which is so much better than any thing i can urge to the same point, that, perhaps, I merit reproach for not inserting it earl er Says Mr. ‘Ma- dison, “ Whether the phrases in question be construed to authorize every measure relating to the common defence or general welfare as contended bv some, or every measure only in which there might be an application of money as suggested by at he s. the effect must substantially be the same, in destroying the import ami force of the phrases in the Constitution. For it is evident that there is not a single power whatever which may not have some reference to t l;e common defence and general welfare; nor a power of any magnitude, which in its exeicise, does not INVOKE or ADMIT an application of money. The Government, therefore, which possesses pow er. in either one nr the other of these extents, is a Government WITH- OUT THE LIMITATIONS, formed by a particular ENUMERATION of powers, and consequently the meaning and effect of this particular enu- meration is destroyed by t lie exposition given to these general phrases. — The true and fair construction of this expression, both in the original and existing federal compacts, appears to the committee too obvious to be mis- taken. In both, the Congress is authorized io provide money for the com- mon defence, and general welfare. In both, is subjoined to this authority, an enumeration of the cases, to which their power shall extend. Money cannot be applied to the general welfare, otherwise than by an application of it. to some particular measure conducive to the general welfare. When- ever. therefore, money lias been applied to a particular measure, a ques- tion arises, whether the particular measure, be within the enumerated au- thorities vested in Congress. If it be, the money requisite for it may be applied to it. If it be not, no such application can be made. This fair and obvious interpretation coincides with, and is enforced by the clause in the Constitution, which declares 4 that no money shall be drawn from the Treasury , but in consequence of appropriations bv law ’ An appropria- tion of money to the general welfare , would be deemed rather A MOCK- ERY, than an OBSERVANCE of this Constitutional injunction.” 19 . Let us now meet Mr. M’Duffie on the true ground, upon which this controversy must finally be decided. The taxing clause, it is said, gives the power to Congress, to appropriate its revenues at its discretion, “to provide for the common defence, and general welfare of the United States.” Be it so. The expenditures of the Govern- ment must still be applied to national purposes, and to no other. It cannot be pretended, that the clause, as it is now expressed, means either more or less than this. Indeed, Mr. M’Duffie’s reasoning completely establishes this point. But here the question obtrudes it- self upon us. What shall we call a national purpose? for until we can arrive at some precise definition of nationality, it will be in vain to carry on the contest. I will, therefore, give my view as to what constitutes a purpose to be national in its character, as distinguished 80 from one which is local , and I hope to sustain my definition, upon the most solid of all grounds, the grounds of the Constitution itself. We must never forget, that there is a distinction between the term “national,” as it may be used in general , and the sense in which it must be understood, with reference to American affairs.- Were all the State sovereignties abolished, and the people of the United States under one consolidated Government, there could not possibly be a dift erence of opinion, as to what is meant by the term, “the general welfare of the United States. ” But it is, because we present to the world, an anomaly in politics and in civil government, that the whole difficulty arises. We understand terms, in the sense, in which from time immemorial, we have been accustomed to use them, forgetting that, however correctly they may be applied in such a sense, to Gov- ernments in general, yet, that they can have no influence as regards a country, where has been introduced, an order of political insti- tutions, totally distinct from any thing that ever did, or probably ever will occur again, in the history of the world. In England there- fore, or in France, the term “national,” is correctly understood to be synonimous with the words “ public ” or “ general." There, any undertaking by the supreme authority, is called a national under- taking, and any money applied to public purposes, by the same au- thority, consitutes the appropriation to be “for the general welfare.” The general welfare of the f ritish Isles, is the national welfare of Great Britain, for, let the public acts of the Imperial Parliament, be what they may, they operate upon the English, Irish and Scotch, as one entire people, and are properly regarded, and felt by them, as national acts. But when we come to speak of American affairs, where the same people are partly governed as one entire nation, and partly, in twenty- four separate sovereignties or nations, terms, which hitherto have re- ceived an undisputed import, now begin not to be so definite, or so easily understood. To give a character of nationality to a measure in America, something more is requisite, than would suffice in Eng- land. To be general, or public as to its effects, throughout the United States, and to proceed from the supreme authority, the Congress, is not of itself, sufficient. It must also be adopted by that authority, within the sphere of its own prescribed poicers. If it be not done in the exercise of its lawful sovereignty, however the particular mea- sure may serve to promote the general welfare of the people, yet, in strictness and in truth, it is not a measure national in its character. It is an act of usurped authority, operating beneficially upon the great mass of the people; and so far, is a measure for the public and general welfare ; a case which sometimes occurs. A Despot may be so kind, and impartial to all his subjects, as to render his Govern- ment, a paternal and an happy one. The only mode by which we are permitted to test the character of any measure, as to nationality, is to bring it to the standard, pro- vided by the people themselves. That standard is the Constitution To this, and this alone, we must all come, for a DESCRIPTION, of the objects and measures, which are national. It is in this great 81 deed of covenant, that are expressed, the sole purposes, for which we became GIVE ENTIRE nation, and no judiciary tribunal on earth, by any ingenuity of construction, can lawfully decide, that the people of these States, are an entire nation, for any other ob- jects, than the deed itself specifies. If any one object, can be deemed a national object, which is not there expressed, any other may be equally deemed to be national, and the deed itself, becomes a piece of useless parchment. To abandon the description of the ob- jects of the Federal Government, as set forth in the Constitution, and to take up any system of construction, and thence to deduce ob- jects, and to call them national, is neither more nor less, than to make us a nation, not for the purposes agreed upon, but for any, and every purpose, which human ingenuity can suggest ; for who can affix limits to the imaginations of men? It is to be set adrift, on a perilous and boundless ocean, without a chart ora compass. We are now making seme progress towards a sensible, and a cor- rect definition of nationality. A measure to be national, must then have a reference to the expressed purposes, for which the United States Government was created as a Supreme Government. If there be in the State Legislatures, ANY CONCURRENCE of jurisdic- tion, or authority over any one of the objects, to promote which, Congress has power to legislate, THAT object cannot be a national object. To constitute any one object of civil government, in these States, to be national, it is indispensably necessary, that it be an ob- ject, to promote which, the States can no more exercise lawful au- thority, than could France or England. The MERE fact of the United States Government not being supreme as to that object, by the terms of the grant, DECIDES IT TO BE LOCAL. It would be a manifest absurdity to maintain, that the same people, could de- sire to exist as ONE nation, for an especial or a designated object, and at the same time, to exist as TWENTY-FOUR distinct nations, for the self-same object. I hope I am now fully understood. EVERY THING is national in its character, over which, by the terms of the Constitution, the United States Government can exercise exclusive sovereignty ; and NOTHING is national, which the States can legitimately make the subject of their legislation. It is impossible that any definition, more accurate than this, can be given of nationality. It is a definition, which results from the very nature of the anomalous structure of our civil Government. That it is truth itself, may be thus de- monstrated. There is no one object, which cau be mentioned, which we all agree to be decidedly national, for which there is not a provision in the Constitution, that Congress, as to that particular subject, shall be supreme ; and, on the other hand, there is not an object which, with one consent in the States, we term local, over which the States do not exercise sovereignty, by the terms of the compact, in exclusion of the power of Congress. I, of course, exclude the subject of “ tax- ation," when I am considering the objects, for which the Federal and State Governments were created. This being the vital princi- 82 pie of all Governments, must be possessed by the one, as well as the other, as a means to promote the objects of each ; and, hence, of ne- cessity, there must be a concurrence oi sovereignty over subjects for taxation in general. With this qualification to my position, which I state rather to prevent caviiting, than from any fear, that any candid reasoner would avail himself, of what might, appear to be an over- sight, let us now proceed to test our definition of nationality, by citing some few instances on each side. In “ declaring war," we constitute one consolidated nation. Why? Because Congress has the power to declare war, and no State can even “ engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.” In preparing for war , by mili- tary and naval establishments, we are an entire nation. Why ? Be- cause the States are expressly forbidden by the compact, to raise troops or build fleets, except in actual war. In “ coining money," we are a nation. Why? Because amongst the limitations on the power of the States, it is said, “No State shall coin money.''' In regzilating foreign and domestic commerce , and our intercourse with the Indian tribes, we are one nation. Why ? Congress, under the Constitution, exclusively possesses the right. In “ foreign negociation," we are one nation. Why ? “ No State shall enter into agreement or com- pact with a foreign power.” In the regulation of coin, foreign and domestic, in establishing uniformity in weights and measures , and in bankrupt and naturalization laws, and in conferring patents and copy-rights, we are one nation. Why ? Because, the necessarily exclusive nature of the grants on the subjects, sweeps away the whole power, and precludes the States from legislating on them. Thus, we see, that every object, universally admitted to be na- tional, coincides with the definition we have given of nationality, which means an ENTIRE subordination of the subject, to the undi- vided sovereignty of Congress, by the terms of the Constitution. Let us now cite, some instances on the opposite side, of subjects, which are confessedly local in their character. Let us begin with the numberless capital offences against the peace of society. — Here is a subject of legislation strictly local. Why ? The States are in the constant practice of this species of legislation — and Congress, with the exception of cases provided for in the compact, cannot define and punish felonies on land, its jurisdiction extending no further than to “define and punish felonies committed on the high seas.” Why are all laws, on the subject of free schools, descents, sale and transfer of property, of escheats, executors and administrators, and guardians, and a thousand such — why is this species of legis- lation local? Because, from time immemorial, the States have re- gulated all such objects, and Congress has no specific grant of any •such power — but on the contrary, “ all powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, shall be reserved to the States, or to the people, respectively.” If there be now, one single object of Government, universally ad- mitted amongst us to be local, or national, in its nature or charac- ter, which will not readily fall in with, and sustain the definition 83 herein given, of nationality, let the ingenuity of the Bar point it out. I cannot imagine it. When L speak, however, of what is necessary, to constitute any measure to be national, I must not be understood to mean, that the particular measure, must be written down in the Constitution, as a subject for the exclusive sovereignty of Congress — and that, if it be not there found, it is not national. All I mean to inculcate is, that the measure must have such a simple , and such a direct relation, to some one of the enumerated objects, that in its absence, that par- ticular object of the Government, could not well be accomplished. But even in this case, it is indispensably requisite, that the particu- lar non- enumerated measure is one, on which the States cannot act in any way whatever. For instance -The UNITED STATES es- tablishment at WEST POINT, is a measure national in its charac- ter , though no power for such an establishment is to be found in the Constitution. Why is it national! For the plain reason, that though a State can promote military science, yet no State can es- tablish a similar institution, conferring military rank, pay, and sub- sistence, bona fide, with a view to a regular army, without violating that part of the Constitution, which forbids the States from keeping up military and naval establishments, in time of peace. So the es- tablishment of a NATIONAL MINT is not expressed in the Con- stitution. But it is national. Why 1 Because no State “ can coin money.” So also, all legislation on the subject of privateers, fitting out in our ports, to cruise against a belligerent with whom we are at peace, is not once mentioned in the Constitution. But it is never- theless, entirely national. But what gives it this character of na- tionality ? It is the alienation of State sovereignty on the same sub- ject, under that clause in the instrument, which gives to Congress, the power to “ define and punish offences against the law of nations.” A power, which, if it were left to the States to exercise, “ might put it in the power of any indiscreet member to embroil the confederacy with foreign nations.” This is one of the cases, in which an authority is granted to the Union, “ to which, a similar authority in the States, would be abso- lutely and totally contradictory and repugnant ,” and which, accord- ing to the Federalist, is sufficient to make any power necessarily ex- clusive in its character — an exposition undeniably sound, and very properly maintained by the Supreme Court. It is on the same prin- ciple, that the power to regulate commerce, to establish uniformity in bankrupt laws, naturalization, weights and measures, &c. is ne- cessarily exclusive. There could be no FNIFGRMITY on such sub- jects, unless one Supreme Government is to prescribe the rule. (See Federalist, Nos. 31 and 42.) With so just, and so unerring a standard before our eyes, for es- timating what is national, and what is local in its character, a stand- ard purposely provided in the Constitution, the question can now at once be settled, whether CANALS, in general, are national or local in their character. Who is he that now hesitates in his opin- ion I If he cannot, after what has been said, decide in an instant. 84 he never can decide. Tell him, it CANNOT BE NATIONAL, because, so far from their being any grant to Congress, of a particle, of sovereignty , much more of exclusive sovereignty over the subject of internal improvement, such a power was proposed to be given to Congress, and refused. Is it then local? UNQUESTIONABLY IT IS LOCAL, because the States have hitherto exercised the un- disputed power, to the exclusion of Congress. But, without the aid of our unerring test, to say whether canals are in their character, national or local, we might long since have agreed with Governor Giles of Virginia, that “The peculiar character of the pow- er to make internal improvements, is LOCALITY — locality in its MOST LIMITED form, and therefore peculiarly unsuited to to the jurisdiction of the Geneial Government, which is GENERAL in its character, and peculiarly suited to the jurisdiction of the State Governments, whose jurisdiction is intended for LOCAL objects. I do not deny to the Government the power, even to construct roads and canals under peculiar circumstances. It has the right flagrante hello. But, the digging of a canal in actual war, would no more make this a measure national in its character, within the meaning of the Constitution, than to cut down trees across a road, or to burn the public bridges, or to inundate a certain district of country to stop the ravages of an enemy. The ground of justifica- tion on which such acts must rest, is, that they are as much the law- ful means of war at the time, as if the United States’ troops were to take possession of a man’s plantation or house, and to use it as an entrenchment. When the enemy is in the city, the first thing to be done is to drive him out. Salus populi suprema lex. There is then no time to talk, of this or that power under the Constitution. Silent leges inter anna. The United States’ troops may do many acts in war, which they could not do in peace, without being violators of the public peace. But, I do deny the right of the Government, to make a military road or canal, in time of peace, and for the unanswerable reason, that on a power to make military roads, and also canals, being pro- posed to be invested in Congress, the first was not agreed to, and the second rejected by the vote of the Convention. Independent, however, of this, the insertion in the enumerated powers, of all the great means of carrying on a war, and the omission of the single one of military roads and canals, would of itself shew, that the power was not designed to be given. And the power was most properly withheld, for, as undoubtedly necessary, as military roads and ca- nals may be in Europe, where, if it were not for their fortified towns, at short distances, a kingdom might be overrun in a few days. — Yet, in a country like ours, where, in most parts, every tree is a for- tification, and every hunting path a military road for our militia, it would be premature, in the present state of the country, it would be a waste of the public money to imitate Europe in this particular. — The Convention was, no doubt, well satisfied that the extent of our country, was a security against a foreign enemy, and that the prin- cipal points of attack, would be the sea coast, in the vicinity of 85 which, there would always be found roads, and that the country could be sufficiently defended by armies and navies, forts, &c. trust- ing, that as the settlements extended, and the country became more populous, the States would, from necessity, have sufficient roads and canals, for commercial purposes. But, the material objection at that day, no doubt was (and a solid objection it was) that, to grant a power to make roads and canals, even for military purposes, would involve, as a matter of course, a right of exclusive jurisdiction on Congress, over SOIL and TERRITORY, which the States were resolved not to permit, even as to their forts, & c. without their ex- press consent. They could not be ignorant, that if Congress could construct, thousands and thousands of miles of roads and canals, it could exact tolis thereon, and pass laws to punish persons who should wilfully injure the public works, and thus exercise local do- minion in the States. It is absurd to believe, as 1 have already shewn, that Congress and the States, can be copartners in Legisla- tion over any one object of Civil Government. It must belong en- tirely to Congress, or not at all. Who can read the Constitution and say, that the States ever intended, that Congress should have exclusive jurisdiction, excepting at the Seat of Government, and in its forts, dock-yards, &c. ? But the making of necessary military roads and canals, in actual war, is a very different thing. It is free from all these objections. At the conclusion of peace, it would be as strange for the Government to claim jurisdiction over such roads and canals, as it prepared for the passage of troops, as it would be for it, to hold jurisdiction over a citizen’s plantation, which its army occupied the whole war, as an entrenchment. The want of good roads, which was felt in the late war, as to the operations on the Canada frontier, is no reason, why the power ought to be claimed by Congress. Mr. M’Duffie’s argument here, if it means any thing, means this. That wherever an occasion has occurred, which proves, that the Government, in any of its operations on that occa- sion, might have done better, if it had possessed certain, or more extensive means, that such means necessarily must belong to it. — This might be an argument, on a motion to amend the Constitution, so as to give Congress a power to make military roads ; but it can have no weight, in any other point of view. Congress has limited powers. The power to make military roads and canals is as SUB- STANTIVE a power, as that of raising armies and navies. A sub- stantive power canuot be exercised by construction. If the propositions herein laid down be true: 1st. That money cannot be appropriated but for national purposes ; and 2udly, That no measure is national in its character, which refers to a subject over which the States, under the Constitution, can lawfully exercise their sovereignty, it will be for Mr. M’Duffif. now to explain, how Congress can legitimately take the subject of internal improvement, under its consideration. The error into which Mr. M’Duffie has unhappily fallen, is, that he has not been careful to distinguish those elauses in the Constitution, which declare the PURPOSES for which the people exist as one nation, from the two first clauses in 11 86 the enumeration, which simply confer the POWER to execute thosff purposes. He has not been careful to distinguish between a POW- ER coupled with a TRUST, and A NAKED power. The distinc- tion between the one and the other, is in equity, most marked and obvious. “ A mere power is never imperative. It leaves the act to be done, at the will of the party to whom it is given,” and hence full discretion is implied. “ A trust is always imperative, and is obligatory upon the consciences of the party entrusted.” But where trusts and powers are blended, as where a man may be invested with trusts to be effected by the execution of a power, as is the case where a power is given by a will to trustees to sell an estate, and to apply the money upon trust, here, though the legal estate, until the execu- tion of the power is in the heir at law ; yet, on the power being de- feated at law, by the death of the trustees, Equity acting upon the trust, will compel the heir, to join in the sale of the estate for the execution of the trusts. (See Sugden on Powers.) Mr. M’Buffie has lost sight of this, and strangely regards the levying and appro- priating power of Congress, as one of the purposes or trusts for which the Government was created ; whereas that clause, and the succeeding one, that of “borrowing money on the credit of the U. States,” is not an end, but simply the great means, by which all the enumerated objects, or trusts, are to be accomplished. It is the Power coupled with the Trusts. To be asked to demonstrate this, is as if we were called upon to prove, that any one problem in Euclid is true. I will, however, endeavour to make it plain to those wffio are not lawyers. The distinction between the levying and appropriating power of the Government, and all the other enumerated powers, is most man- ifest. In the other enumerated powers, there is not a single clause, which does not contain within itself, some one of the many definite purposes for which Civil Government generally exists ; whilst in the two money raising clauses, there is no definite purpose whatever expressed. Nothing is easier, or more natural, than to imagine, that a people should desire to constitute ONE nation for war, for foreign Negotiation and Commerce , (under which general heads all the trusts in the Federal compact may be included) but it is extremely difficult to make a man of common sense believe , that a people al- ready associated in thirteen regular Governments, should desire to be consolidated into one supreme sovereignty, merely for the plea- sure of BEING TAXED ; and to possess the power to SPEND those taxes. The laying and appropriating power, is therefore no more, than the POWER of the Government, coupled with the TRUSTS. It is only a MEANS. A means cannot be a purpose , or an end, nor can it be greater than an end. Suppose that Mr. M’Duffie, as a lawyer, was to have submitted to him a deed from A. to B. in trust for various uses, and with many limitations therein expressed, and his opinion was solicited as to the real intent of the donor ; to what part of the trust deed would he look, for the purposes for which he estate was created ? Would he look to those clauses in the in- strument, declaring the trusts, or would he read the general power in the 87 deed, enabling the trustee to raise money without limit, for the general bene- fit of the estate, by sale or mortgage of the estate, or otherwise ? The answer is, he would assuredly look to the trust clauses, as the only means, by which he could come at the objects, for which the estate was given by A and he would scarcely cast his eye on the general power to raise mo- ney, such a power being a matter of course. Precisely the same must it be with the Constitution of the United States. If we would ascertain, for what purposes we exist as one nation, so as to decide, whether any parti- cular object is a national object, or a local one , it would be as useless to look fas Mr M’Duffie does) at the two first clauses, giving the power “ to raise a revenue by taxes and loans, and to appropriate it to the gene- ral welfare,” as it would be, to look at the general power in the trust deed above referred to. These two clauses in the Constitution must then be put aside. They actually ought to have no more influence in an inquiry, as to the purposes which are meant to be embraced in “ the general wel- fare,” than that clause in the Constitution, which says, that “ each House shall be the judge of the elections of its own members.” Construe these clauses as we will, they speak no other language than that the Government shall raise money by taxes, and by loans — and that the proceeds shall be applied to the purposes, for which we became a nation, and, to no other. Where shall we seek for these purposes — In the brains of ingenious poli- ticians, or in the enumeration of the specific objects or trusts. In the lat- ter unquestionably. Id CERTUM cst quod certum REDDI potest. No part of the foregoing view can be confuted, unless some reasoner more ingenious than sound, should insist, that the words to lay taxes to pay the debts and provide for the general welfare “ of the United States ,” give to this clause a character of specification as to purposes. The answer to this is simple. The words “ to pay the debts ” here, mean no more, than to pay the expenses of the government, or debts contracted by loans, &c. to carry into execution the specified objects. Referring to the 6th Article of the Constitution, we shall see that provision is expressly made, that the new Government is to assume all the debts of the Confederation , and thus constitutes those debts, as one of the trusts to be executed. The trust being already created, and in its proper place, it would be strange to imagine that the words “ to pay the debts” mean any thing more than the contracts of the Government. We are now to consider some of the extravagances and absurdities, to which any other definition of “ nationality” than that herein given may carry us, and in this way we shall see the real difference between money applied to the “ general welfare,” and that used for the national icel- fare. mo. 20 . Mr. M’Duffie, it must be remembered, contends, that the power of Congress, to expend money for the general welfare, beyond the enume- rated objects , is unlimited As he cannot conceive “ upon what principle, the judiciary can pronounce any road unconstitutional ,” even if Con- gress, “ under the pretext of making military roads and canals, were to make them for purposes not military,” though he admits that “such would be an act of usurpation.” we are therefore to have, in the opinion of Mr. M’Duffie, no other security too, against appropriations manifest- 88 ly unconstitutional, than this, “ that the conscience of every member, is to be the tribunal before which, he must justify his vote, in each particular exercise of the power in question. Let us see how this doctrine would work. Say that Congress shall annual/)/ appropriate a million of dollars, to tire support of free schools, in every Parish of the United States, and for that of a < ollege ir. every State. As much more for a deaf and dumb institution, and a lunatic asylum, in the capital of each Slate. The same, for a splendid hospital for in- valids, in each State, upon the plan of that in Paris, and for infirmaries for the diseases of the eye, and the ear. A million for churches and chapels, from Maine to Cape Florida, for the use of all religious denomin- ations, without distinction. A million to increase the funds, and stimu- late the efforts of associations, to suppress duelling, and of societies for the suppression of gambling, drinking, profaning the Sabbath, and vice of all kinds. As much more to philanthropic societies, whose objects are to improve prison discipline, and to restore drowned persons to life : and then an appropriation of four millions, to objects of general concern, which we have not here room to enumerate. According to Mr. M’Duffte’s exposition of the Constitution, all these appropriations, can be constitutionally made by the National Legislature, though they can- not be referred to the enumerated objects of the Government. That they are all measures, which promote the general welfare and the hap- piness of the people, no one can doubt; and if we regard them, as to their effects upon the general community, they are unquestionably na- tional in this point of view. But can Congress constitutionally make these appropriations ? Let those who, in this particular, agree with Mr. M’Duffie be told, that they maintain this most extraordinary of all po- sitions; that amongst the MANY purposes, for which a people, already governed in thirteen regular State Governments, covenanted, to become one entire people under a Supreme Government, ONE GREAT END to be promoted, was, that ten millions of dollars, or ten times that sum, if deemed expedient, should be annually TAKEN from their pockets, by imposts and other taxes, with no other view, than that it should be RETURNED to them again, and under an utter imposibitify of their receiving it, in the same proportion, in which it was drawn from the several States ; and this too for the laudable purpose of accomplishing objects, to which the States were SEPARATELY COMPETENT, if the money was kept at home. Here is a most wonderful exposition of the Constitution. The Con- vention, after two months deliberation, as to the great outlines of the Government, solemnly decides, in the sixth amended resolution of Mr. Randolph, that Congress is to possess legislative rights in cases “to which the States are separately incompetent .” A committee in detail forms a Constitution under these instructions; they exclude all such cases from the enumeration of the legislative powers of Congress. An effort is made to “ give additional powers to legislate, on the subject of agri- culture, manufactures, science, and internal improvements.” Canals and Universities are proposed. All efforts to give jurisdiction over these subjects, so confessedly local, failed in the Convention ; and yet we are told AGAINST the internal evidence of the deed itself, AGAINST the lights of the public journals and secret debates of the Convention, and 89 AGAINST the written statement of Luther Martin, who may be well compared, to a witness who sits at the bedside of a testator, and takes down his words in writing; that though Congress cannot dig a canal without violating the compact and the sovereignty of a State ; though, it cannot create a great manufacturing company, with exclusive privileges as to monopoly ; though it cannot, even according to the decision of M’Cullock vs. The State of Maryland , incorporate and take under its charge, Free Schools, Deaf and Dumb Institutions, &c. because they do not refer to any of the specified objects, which Congress are to regulate; yet, that the great ends which the above are the means of accomplishing, may be promoted by Congress in other ways. Monopolies to the manu- facturers cannot be created bv an act of Congress, without a departure from the Constitution, and yet they may he given in the shape of protect- ing and prohibitory duties, because Congress “ has the power to lay im- posts” Canals cannot be dug in the States, or military roads construct- ed, because it is to exercise sovereignty over soil and territory, and yet money may be. voted for the same objects, because Congress can promote the “ general welfare.” National establishments of Deaf and Dumb in- stitutions, with incorporated powers, are unconstitutional — and yet all such institutions may be most liberally endowed out of the National Treasury. What is all this but to say, that Congress shall be permitted to approach indirectly , a subject for its legislation, which it is admitted it has no power to approach directly, contrary to that most excellent maxim of the law — il Quando aliauid prohihetur fieri Ex D1RECTO, prohibetur per OBLTQUUM ” The evils of such a construction as Mr. M’Duffie gives to the appro- priating power, may be most tremendous. For instance — The writers in the Monthly Journal of the Colonization Society, admit, that a power in Congress “ to emancipate and remove Slaves within the limits of a State, would be a most alarming interference, with the rights of a State, and of individuals,” — but yet they contend, (and they entrench themselves be- hind Mr. M’Duefie’s exposition) that an authority to create a fund, as proposed by Mr. Rufus King, to aid the gradual emancipation and re- moval of the Slaves in the United States, would be constitutional — be- cause, say they, “ the power of appropriation, is limited only by the general interests of the country ;” and the removal would not “ interfere with the rights either of the States or individuals.” Not interfere ! The purchase of the Slaves, and their transportation to Africa, would not mere- ly deprive us of the only labourers, who can cultivate our soil ; but it would have the effect, of altering the Constitution of the United States, in a most material point. It would change the whole representation of the Southern States. Remove the Slaves fiom South-Carolina — three- fifths of whom are represented in Congress — and South-Carolina instead of sending nine Members to the House of Representatives, will send five , and perhaps not two from depopulation — and the other States will lose in about the same proportion. It is to me most amazing, that Mr. M’Duffie should freely admit, “ that in determining what sovereign powers belong to Congress, Con- gress has NO DISCRETION, the Constitution being the inflexible land mark;” and yet, that he should not himself perceive, that in selecting for the appropriation of its revenues, any object whatever, which it chooses 90 to designate as an object of 4 general concern, Congress does thereby exercise, that high sovereign power, not included in its grant of powers, to wit: of legislating indirectly upon subjects, and attaining objects, which belong to the States to regulate, and which, from the very nature of the subjects, the States are not only “separately competent,” but more com- petent to manage, than the General Government. There is a strange fallacy in that reasoning, which would say, that Congress is limited as to the subjects, upon which it can exercise its utmost power of sovereignty, and yet unlimited as to objects, on which its sovereignty is to be indirectly applied. 1 say sovereignty indirectly exercised, for according to the Constitution, the purpose for which money is given, must be specified in the act of Congress, and this act of legislation, constitutes the sovereignty which is to accomplish the object. It seems then, according to this exposition, that the General Govern- ment is not Supreme within the sphere of its own powers, and when it is accomplishing the purposes for which it was created. If I understand the argument, it is substantially this. There are TWO kinds of purposes, for which we consented to become as one nation, as distinguished from twenty-four nations. First; those which are agreed upon, and particular- ly specified. These we readily comprehend. And secondly ; those which are equally agreed upon, but not enumerated This is not so easy of comprehension — it requires explanation, how a new Government is to b« created, with undefined objects, though it is easy enough to understand, that undefined powers may be reserved to an old Government, from which some powers are withdrawn. For the enumerated objects, and all mea- sures thereto appertaining, it appears, that Congress is a Supreme Govern- ment. It can approach its objects, honestly, fairly and directly. But for all the undefined (MOST WISE) purposes for which we act as one people, and which purpose are embraced in the appropriation power, under the term “ general welfare,” Congress has not the full power of a nation, over a vast variety of these, which it may choose to make the subject of its legislation. For instance — Roads and Canals. Congress is not now Supreme. If it wishes Roads and Canals, it cannot construct them — it is nut sovereign enough for this, but it can bring its inlpi rfiect sovereignty (^something new) to bear upon the measure, in some other way. Whatever is now to be accomplished, must be done, to use a vulgar adage, by whipping the Devil round the stump, unless, says Mr. M’Duffie, some “ other sovereign power besides that of appropriating the money be ne- cessary to accomplish the particular object,” in which case, I understand that partial sovereignty must not be resorted to, and the Devil is to be let alone, and the purpose cannot be accomplished. According to this theory, what becomes of the States ? I always heard, until now, that there were State Governments, as well as a Federal Gov- ernment. That we existed as one nation for certain designated purposes, and that for all other purposes, (and these are few enough, God knows) there are two express articles in the Constitution, which say, that we re- main tweDty-four separate nations. But it seems that we are all wrong. Congress can lawfully take what belongs to it, under the express grant, and it may constantly be cribbing power from the States, by imperfect sovereignty without committing a gross trespass on the rights of the people. There is no boundary line, it seems, between the defined 91 powers of Congress, and many of the undefined purposes of Civil Govern* ment, reserved to the States, for Congress can accomplish both. The one by direct, and the other by indirect sovereignty. The only two great safeguards, which we are permitted to have, for re- straining and arresting the usurpations of the Government, and preserving the liberties of the people, “ are the positive restrictions upon power; and the responsibility of those who exercise power, to the people upon whom it operates.” Our security, as to any abuse of power in Congress, when it is ranging at large, and seeking its employment and legislation, in the field of the novel and undefined purposes of the Federal Government, is not to be found, even in th e judiciary tribunals of the United States. — We are not even to have, the slight chance of a decision of the Supreme Court in our favour. According to Mr. M’Duffie, “the conscience of each member of Congress, is to be the tribunal before which, a vote” of an hundred millions of the people’s money for unenumerated purposes, is to be justified. Says Mr. M’Duffie, “ Shew me, in any of the subdivi- sions of this comprehensive scheme of representative Governments, a pow- er operating beyond its responsibility, and I will shew you a power un- known to the system. A comet, let loose from the power of gravitation, which must inevitably destroy the planetary harmony by which that sys- tem is so admirably characterized.” That unknown power, I can tell Mr. M’Duffie, does exist! It is a principle wholly unknown to our sys- tem, which distributes power between one common head, and twenty-four subordinate Governments, that there should be no other security against indirect legislation, and the consequent IMPINGEMENT upon the States, than the consciences of the national legislators. It is wholly unknown to our system, that the General Government should so legislate, as to gain by a monied influence, what it cannot lawfully accomplish, by an exercise of lawful power. Influence is power, and whenever the State sovereignties are abolished, it will be accomplished by the mass of influence, which the General Government will ultimately possess, by small but constant acces- sions, in the exercise of its constructive powers. As to political responsi- bility of public servants, as a safeguard, it exists but in the imagination. — There is a responsibility, it is true, of our own members of Congress to the people of South-Carolina. But these men can do no more than their duty. When once the people of the Northern and Western States, who consti- tute the majority, shall decide, that we shall pay tribute to them, what be- comes of that safeguard called “ political responsibility ?” Will this save us, from the usurped dominion, of the men of Sagadohock, or of the Illi- nois ? No! Mr. M’Duffie will find, that for relief against that odious Tariff, which he so fearlessly, so zealously, and so eloquently opposed, in common with the rest of his colleagues, it will be in vain ever again to look to the ballot boxes of any elections South of the Potomac. To our State Legislature alone must we look, that by its wisdom, and its firm purposes, it may avert from us the evils which encompass us. On this subject of political responsibility, which is so dazzling in its the- ory, many of our prominent politicians in Carolina, the most of them ex- cellent men too, have been running into the wildest extravagances. Instead of looking at the Constitution, with the eyes of statesmen, and with a refe- rence to the peculiar circumstances which attended its formation — instead of bearing in mind, that so far from there being any desire, in the great 92 body of the people, in those days, to have a National Government, with plenary and indefinite powers, and with increased and increasing inlluence, that the difficulty ratiier was, to get a Government at all, these gentlemen take up the compact, and examine it in most of its provisions, as lawyers would a deed, with no reference to such a thing as equity. Because it professes, in its preamble, to come from the people, and operates upon the people, it is peculiar to these gentlemen to ascribe the existence of the Gov- ernment, to be the act of the people en masse, independent of the State Legislatures, and of its being responsible to the people, and not to the State Legislatures, as if those Legislatures had not the entile agency in call- ing the Convention, and, as if they could not (had they so willed it) have frustrated all the hopes of that Convention. Hence, it is, that when our Legislature shall raise its voice against any usurped act of the Govern- ment, they would protest against any such expression of the public opinion, the Legislature not being the proper organ, without, at the same time, tell- ing us, by what other expedient, the General Government is to be kept within its own sphere of action and of influence. Should that day ever ar- rive, which God forbid, that it shall become necessary to resist the usurped power of Congress, how will the people be able to act, excepting under the authority of the State sovereignties ? Can the people act of them- | selves ? The Constitution of the United States is not a compact, between the people of the United States, as individuals. If it were, it would be on the plan of the State Governments. There would be no enumeration of powers. As is usual, in all such cases, nothing would belong to the peo- ple, but what is expressed in the limitations on the general power, or in a bill of rights. But it is, because the States, in their corporate capacities as States, are parties to the compact, that there is an enumeration of objects for the Supreme Government to operate upon. It is Mr. Hamilton who says, “it is neither a National or a Federal Government, but a compo- sition of both. In its FOUNDATION it is federal, not national. In the SOURCES from which the ordinary powers of the Government are drawn, it is partly federal, and partly national. In the OPERATION of these powers, it is national, not federal; and in the EXTENT of them, it is federal, not national.” The very Constitution of the Senate, and the mode of suffrage there practised, demonstrates the importance of preserving the State Govern- ments ; for, without them, the Government must stop. But who are to preserve the State Sovereignties, but the State Legislatures ? The fede- rative principle is not destroyed. Let only the two Senators, from each State, represented during a session of Congress, be in their seats, and the result of the votes on any question, is precisely the same, as if the Sena- tors voted by States, as was the case with the Old Congress. When the States have not their veto upon every act of the House of Representatives, in the same manner as if they were assembled in the Common Council of a pure Confederacy of States, it is only, when some one State is deprived of the services of one of its Senators, by sickness or absence ; it is only at that time, that any difference exists between voting by States, and voting per capita. And what is more, this federal feature of the Gov- ernment, cannot be obliterated A majority of three-fourths of the State Legislatures, may adopt, at their pleasure, any amendment to the Consti- tution ; but the equality of suffrage in the Senate, cannot be taken away, 93 but by the consent of every State in the Union. It is time, then, for our politicians, who have so long been astray on this subject, to come back to correct princi Jes, and to regard the Federal compact, as a covenant be- tween separate and independent States. Let us hope never again to hear the doctrine asserted, that the State Legislatures are not to express an opinion as to the violation of a compact or treaty to which the States are essentially parties. I cannot take my leave of Mr. M’Duffie, without acknowledging to him, as a citizen of the United States, my grateful sense of his untiring ef- foits in < ongress, to restore the purity of the Presidential Election, and to divest the House of Representatives of a trust, which it had abused, and thus to promote the welfare of the first and greatest of Republics. As a man of private incorruptible integrity, I admire Mr. M’Duffie, and there are few of his devoted friends, who are more sensible of his public merit, and of his claim to be regarded as an honest public servant, and a statesman of no ordinary stamp, than I am. He has never advocated, as 1 believe, any public measure, but from the most exalted motives of patriotism. His speech on Internal Improvements, breathes a general spirit, and a feeling, of which every American ought to be proud. Like others, I was trans- ported with the perusal of it — but sober reflection soon taught me, that the doctrines there advanced, were incompatible with the safety of the State sovereignties — and I doubt not, but that the time will come, if it has not already arrived, when Mr. M’Duffie will himself perceive, that he has attached to the general phrases in the Constitution, an importance, which it was never designed they should possess. He will, I hope, excuse me, for the liberty I have taken with his opinions, and of necessity with his name. Nothing but my conviction of the dangers that await the Southern States, and the recollection that these opinions, coming from such a man, would have prodigious influence, would, in my own view, have authorized me, to make his speech, the subject of a public examination. I trust, I have stated his positions with the utmost fairness, and my endeavour has been to controvert them. NO, 21. The boundaries of power once passed by a Government, which is limited as to its legislation, there is no saying, to what lengths, it will not carry its usurpations. How true is this, as regards the Fede- ral Government. The Government, in the commencement of its career, was as true and as honest to the principles of the Consti- tution, as could have been desired. But the Constitution was pre- served unbroken, only for the first two years of our history. When the bill for the Bank was carried in 1791, the Government then a- bandoned the clear paths of duty and propriety, and has since devi- ated, more or less, oftentimes innocently, but of late wilfully, from the views which the people entertained, when they formed the com- pact. General Washington’s motives on the Bank question, were honest and patriotic, as they uniformly were, during every portion- of his distinguished life. But General Washington was surrounded, by some of the politicians, who, in the Convention, had contended for a NATIONAL, and not a Federal Government. Alexander Hamilton, and Edmrnb Randolph, were in his confidence and in 12 94 liis Cabinet. These gentlemen, it is well known, had strenuously contended, the one that Congress should “ have a negative on al! the State Laws, interfering with its own and the other that “ a Gov- ernor in each State, should be appointed by the General Government , with a negative upon the State Legislature,” in order the better to prevent any such laws being passed in the first instance. There was in the Convention, at one time, a hot contest, whether (in one of Mr. Randolph’s resolutions) the word “ United States ,” or the word “National,” should be used. It is a truth not to be concealed, that even General Washington sided somewhat with those gentlemen in the Convention, and it certainly is not intended, to derogate an atom from his high fame, when it is said, that he was in favour of an ener- getic Government, and a strong executive arm. Nor am I disposed to blame Messrs. Hamilton and Randolph, for opinions, as I be- lieve, sincerely entertained by them. Many of the best men in the Union, at that time, thought with them, and some of them from our own State. They had all been so sensible of the defects of the Confederation, that it was natural, that they should incline to the opposite extreme, and believe a National Government as best calcu- lated for the exigencies of the Union. It appears, however, that they were all mistaken, and Gen. Washington amongst the num- ber ; and it is fortunate for us, particularly of the South, that all at- tempts to consolidate us all into one nation, failed in the Conven- tion. On the first question, therefore, which arose under the Constitu- tion, respecting the powers of the Government, it was not to be ex- pected, but that with the previous prepossessions of Gen Washing- ton on the subject, he should have decided in favour of a National Bank. But, amongst his followers, have been some, who had not his moderation, his prudence, and his sagacity, and hence it is, that during the last, and the present Administration, we have seen the Government administered in open violation of the Constitution, not by any act immaterial as to its effects upon public liberty, but by acts impairing important and vital interests of the States. When a limited Government, like that of the United States, has passed all the necessary laws, for the collection and distribution of its revenue, and entered into all the arrangements, to provide for the public debt ; happy at home, and respected abroad, it must soon find itself in need of more occupation, than the ordinary concerns of de- fence and commerce can furnish. Commerce once regulated, what else remains to be done, but to leave the rest to the industry and en- terprise of our citizens. Our policy too, being that of friendship with all nations, and entangling alliances with none, and amply furnished as we are, with the means of defence, what has the Gene- ral Government to do, but to make provision for its small army and navy, and to keep its forts and arsenals in repair. Can the mind of an American conceive a happier state of things for his country, than that Congress should sit only five or six weeks, and have as little employment as possible, and that to the local Legislatures, it should be left, to extend their care, to all the objects which con- 95 cern the INTERNAL order and improvement of the States. — When, in 17SS, the people in most of the States, were jealous of the powers conferred on the Federal Government, and were hesitating, whether they would accept the Constitution, Mr. Hamilton, by way of reconciling them to the Constitution, told them in his Fede- ralist, ( No. 45, ^ “that the operations of the Federal Government would be most extensive and important in times of WAR and danger; those of the State Governments in times of PEACE and security.” No exposition of the Constitution can be more true than this, and more calculated to shew, that in general, the State Governments, would have advantage as to legislation, over the Federal Govern- ment, the times of war in a country like America, bearing no pro- portion to the times of peace. But how stands the fact. Thirty years scarcely elapse, before the General Government commences a great plan of steady operations, by which it is to carry on a sys- tem of internal improvements, which will leave to the States, little or nothing to do on the same subject, drawing immense sums out of the pockets of the people by taxation, without a possibility, as al- ready has been elsewhere observed, of its being expended amongst them, in the same proportion, in which it is taken from the several States. It is in PEACE then, as well as in war, that we observe the operations of the General Government IMPORTANT AND EXTENSIVE, with a prospect, at the same time, rapidly opening upon us, that ere long, almost all the subjects of legislation, which the States now regard as exclusively belonging to them, will be gra- dually drawn towards Congress, under the powerful attraction of the words the “ general welfare.” Who could have believed, in 1789, that in less than forty years, that several State Legislatures, should even entreat that Congress would take under its considera- tion, measures to remove as an evil of the first magnitude, the FUN- DAMENTAL POLITY of the Southern States — that even the sub- ject of slavery, should be a fit object for the INDIRECT legislation of a Government, instituted for the purpose of attending to foreign relations. Let Congress be confined within the proper and the legitimate sphere of its action, and it is manifest, that it would not be occu- pied, half the time it now consumes in its sessions, nor cost the peo- ple half of the sum, that is annually spent at Washington. There have been periods, when it might be necessary that the sessions should be somewhat protracted. There was at one time much to do. A system of revenue laws was to be digested and perfected — the Courts of the United States were to be organized — the public debt to be provided for — treaties of commerce to be entered into, and ratified with every nation. A Government in fact, was to be put into complete operation. But, in our day, the Government is settled and established, and were the National Legislature occupied as it ought to be with its own business, and not in assuming the business of the State Legislatures, there would be little to do. Bui it is be- cause the Senate and House of Representatives are without occupa- tion, that instead of adjourning and going in proper time to their 96 homes, the members are disposed to meddle, with what is not their concern, and that they are constantly in search, for some new subject for their legislation. This is the true reason, why they expend the public money in protracted sessions, and sow the seeds oi' discon- tent and jealousy amongst the States. But this is natural. These men “ feel power and forget right,” and he must be an indifferent observer, who does not perceive, that unless some check be given to the usurpations of Congress, that there will be no end to the subjects, which, in time, it may not discuss and legislate upon. ETC, 22. No general course of proceeding can he more destructive of the rights of the States, or of the people, than that adopted by Con- gress, when it is about to construe its powers. Where real doubts exist, as has frequently been the case, whether any particular power claimed by implication, is within those intended to be .granted by the Constitution, this body does not condescend to solicit any aid from its constituents, who are represented in the State Legislatures, but it seizes at once upon the doubtful power. Certainly this is not the course which friendship and good feeling, and even policy would dictate The Government of the United States, notwithstanding all that has been said to the contrary, by the Supreme Court, is not a Government of the people, in the sense in which the Supreme Court would have it. If it were, it would be responsible to the people alone, as ifs constituents, as is the case under every consolidated Government, and there would be no other security against usurpa- tion, excepting the power of the people to change their rulers, in which case the minority must abide by the will of the majority. A doctrine such as is contended for, is subversive of the end for which the Union was formed. There is an inconsistency in admitting, that the people of the States, in their corporate capacities of States, have certain acknowledged rights under the Constitution, which are gua- ranteed to them, and also, that they are so clearly recognized in the instrument, as to be prohibited from exercising their sovereignty on certain subjects, and yet that they are not to be regarded as having the right to complain of the usurpations of the Government, as if it were ever before heard, that those who create a delegated Govern- ment, have not lawfully the same power, to restrict it, within its limits, after it is created. This doctrine, of the General Government being “truly and em- phatically a Government of the people” which has been so often relied on, as excluding the right of the State Legislatures, to protect the States against the usurpations of Congress, was first suggested by Mr. Pinckney, Counsel for the Plaintiff in Error, in M' CuUochvs. The State of Maryland , and the Chief Justice, with his usual ability and eloquence, has placed the position in so masterly an aspect, as al- most to command the universal assent of the Bar. But the position of the Court cannot be sustained. It is as unsound, as the other parts of this opinion already noticed in previous numbers. The Counsel for the Defendants in Error, in speaking of the true nature 97 of the Federal compact took this ground “That the terms of the grant, did not convey sovereign power generally, Out sovereign power limited to particular cases, and with restrictive means for ex- ecuting such powers and further, that the powers of the General Government “ were delegated, not by the people of the U. States at large , but by the people of the respective States, and, that therefore* it was a compact between the different States." The Counsel here were certainly right, and the Court as clearly wrong in not admit- ting the position. The Constitution IS a compact between the States, and there are no parties to it, excepting the people of the different States, in their corporate capacities. The Court, it is true, cautiously disclaims the assertion, that the instrument “ proceeds from the American people, as compounded into one common mass,” for that would be too untenable; but still, its reasonings do artfully carry us on to the conclusion, that the Constitution does not ema- nate from, and is not the act of sovereign and independent States, but on the contrary, is as much the act of the people of the United States, as if they were assembled in an aggregate society, to distri- bute power between the Federal and the State Governments; and that all power derived from such a source, is as sovereign, as if it had remained in the hands of the people, and that all the incidental, as well as the direct powers, are a part and parcel of any sovereignty conveyed by the instrument. Let us examine this doctrine of the Government being a Government of the people. In a former number, has been stated, the obvious distinction, be- tween the case of a people without any regular Government, form- ing a Constitution ; and that of a people already associated in so many separate sovereignties, who design to part with power to a common head ; the Legislators, in the one case, possessing all power not reserved by the people, and in the other, possessing nothing, but what is delegated. Situated as were the citizens of America, at the close of the Revolution, there were but two ways, in which the peo- ple, could have formed a Government. The first, was, by being as- sembled in the relation to each other, of individuals of one great political society. The second, as associated in separate sovereign- ties. Under one, or the other of these situations of our community* was the Constitution formed. If the powers of the Government, are not derived from the people of the United States, as individuals ag- gregated in a general society, they must then be created by the peo- ple in their corporate capacities, and so vice versa. From no other sources than these, can they be claimed. Now, it is immaterial to me, which of the two modes, the Supreme Court shall decide as having prevailed, in 1788. If it chooses the last, we agree. If the first, it is in its own language, “ a political dreamer, who is wild enough, to think of breaking down the lines, which separate the States, and of compounding the American people into one common mass.” The Chief Justice, however, thinks, he avoids a dilemma of this nature, by giving the idea, that though the people on this occa- sion, were not actually compounded into one mass ; yet, that in dis- pensing power to the new Government, they did it as effectually, aa 98 if they had constituted one great community, for on no other princi- ple, than this, can he establish the doctrine, that as to any particu- lar power conferred on Congress, it is as supreme, as the people th emseives would be on the subject; a doctrine which has been denied in these numbers. As n aware, that the assemblage of the people in their States, would imply, that the ratification in this way of the Constitution, was the act of the States, and not of the people, he justifies this mode of ratification as the most proper, under the circumstances. “ They acted upon it, in the only manner, in which they could act safely, effectively, and wisely, on such a subject, by assembling in Convention.” It is true, adds he “ they assembled in their several States, and where else should they have assembled? If they act, they must act of course in their States. But the mea- sures they adopt, do not, on that account, cease to be the measures of the people, or become the measures of the State Governments.” The answer to be given here, is, that the Constitution might have been ratified, (if the Convention had so chosen) in two other ways; but neither of them, would have comported, with the general senti- ments, in and out of the Convention, that the new Government should be Federal , and not national in its creation. What, for in- stance, could have prevented the Convention, from propooing, that the State Legislatures should divide their States into election dis- tricts, upon some equitable plan agreed upon, and that each district should send a deputy to a General Convention, or that the people in the different States, should give their assent, or dissent, by voting in districts by a general ticket, and that in either case, the votes of three fourths of the whole, should be an acceptance of the Consti- tution. To these last modes there could be no objection, because the Constitution, whether the subject of debate, or not, was to be accepted, or rejected in whole. After Napoleon had assumed the imperial purple, he was desirous to know, whether his subjects re- garded him as an usurper, and he opened books in every part of his dominions, that Frenchmen might inscribe their assent or dissatis- faction of his conduct. This was voting by general ticket, though not by ballot. It would be no answer, to say, that either mode here proprosed, would have been impracticable, because the very fact of its being impracticable to obtain the assent of the people at large, would be conclusive to shew, that the assent, if given in any other way, could not possibly be the act of the people, but of the States. That the people of the United States, were regarded, as acting in their sovereign capacities, as se- parate States, when they ratified the Constitution, clearly appears, from the rule laid dowrn in the instrument itself, for its ratification. The assent of a majority of all the inhabitants of the United States, was not made indispensable, which certainly would have been the case, had the design been that the Constitution should not emanate from the States. Under such a view, it might have so happened, that the ratification might not have been complete, though nine States should have assented Four large States, rejecting the Constitution, might have had a greater population than the other 99 nine. For instance, Massachusetts, New-York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. These four States, at the first census in 1790, one year after the Government went into operation, had 56 members out of 105, that number being the whole representation in Congress — They were the majority of fifteen States. At the second census in 1800, the same four States possessed 74 out of 141 members, and formed the majority of seventeen States. At the third census in 1810, they formed exactly one half of twenty-three States. Amongst all the modes of controverting the soundness of a po- sition, there cannot be one more effectual, than to shew the manifest absurdity to which its results would lead. If the Supreme Court is right, that the ratification was the assent of the people, and not of ihe States, the Convention is chargeable with the absurd proposal of having a Government, which is to bind all the people of the United States, to be put into operation, as soon as a minority of the same people should ratify it Now, on the other hand, if we consider the Constitution, as emanating from the State sove- reignties, and not from the people, there is no difficulty whatever, in any view of the subject. The mode proposed by the Convention, was not only the best mode, but it was the only mode, by which the people, acting as the people of separate States, could give their free and unbiassed assent to the compact. There was a manifest propriety in the Convention’s submitting the Constitution, to the assent of the people, in their State Con- ventions, and not to the Stats Legislatures, if it was the intention, that the new Government, was to be received from the States. It is only, when the people are assembled in their conventions, that they are exer- cising their utmost power of sovereignty. At no other time, do they wholly act in their sovereign capacity ; for it is then, that they can take away what they before gave , and give what they had previously retained. In the State Legislatures, the people, it is true, exercise the sovereign power of making laws, but the power is limited by the Constitution. The Court says, “ from these Conventions, the Constitution derives its whole authority.” Strange then it is, that at the very moment, when the people in the different States, are act- ing in the only possible known way of exercising complete sove- reignty, that this moment should be selected by the Court, as an oc- casion for considering their acts, not as the acts of sovereign States, but as those of the people of the United States at large. It is very plain, from the reasoning of the Chief Justice, that he regards the State Legislatures, or the State Governments , as he also terms them, essentially, as the State Sovereignties. His words are Cl The assent of the States, in their sovereign capacity, is implied, in calling a Convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the people. It required not the affirmance, and could not be negatived by the State Governments. The Constitution, when adopted, was of Complete obligation, and bound the State Sovereignties.” For the want of a distinction between a State Legislature and a State Sovereignty, it is not to be wondered, that the Court should deny the Constitution, to be the act of sovereign and independent States.. ICO as States. There is a difference, and a very material one, betweea a State Legislature, and a State Sovereignty. To speak of them as the same, is to confound two things which are opposite. It is to call the people the Government, and the Government the people. — True State Sovereignty, is that supreme power in a State, which is without limits. It resides no where but in the people. To the peo- ple it belongs, as founded on the “ original inherent RIGHTS OF MAN.” The State Legislature, on the contrary, is nothing more than that portion of the supreme power, which the people have thought proper to delegate, for the purpose of making the necessary laws, to regulate Society at home and intercourse abroad. A State Legislature is not even the State Government , but only a portion of it. If the State Legislature, which is only a part of the Civil Gov- ernment of the State, be State sovereignty, then the Executive and the judicial powers, are also State sovereignty. The only possible case, in which a State Legislature could be pretended to be a State sovereignty, would be, where, by the terms of a written Constitu- tion, all power whatever is vested in the Legislature, nothing be- ing reserved to the people. Such a written Constitution, would be comprised in one or two short sentences, and would be a novelty. — We have no such in America that I know of. As we now see the essential difference between the Legislature of a State, and that supreme power, called State sovereignty, we shall readily perceive, in the rise, progress, and final completion of the Federal Constitution, that every thing which was done, was in per- fect accordance , with those notions of Government, which we term republican, and that, had it been otherwise, the rights of the people, as States, would have been violated. The necessities of the people in every State, called for a change in the structure of the existing Governments. How was this change to be effected 1 By the State Legislatures! Certainly not. The State Le'- gislatures had no right to form a new Constitution. They were com- petent to form the Confederation, for that was in nature of a league, and it is within the scope of all legislative power, to enter into such a compact. But, when a Constitution is to be formed, Govern- ments are not to be the actors in any way. According to Mr. Paine, in his “RIGHTS OF MAN,” “ Government has no right to make itself a party, in any debate, respecting the principles, or modes of forming, or changing Constitutions. It is not for the benefit of those who exercise the powers of Government, that Constitutions, and the Governments, issuing from them, are established. In all these matters, the right of judging and acting, is in those who pay — the people ; and not in those who receive. A Constitution is the property of a nation, and not of those who exercise the Govern- ment.” But though no one State Legislature, could place its own people, under a new form of Civil Government, in which Government they were to be associated with the people of other sovereign States, yet they had a right to submit proposals to that effect, which they did by sending deputies to the General Convention. The work of the 101 Convention being finished, the next inquiry was as to the mode of ratification. There were but two modes, proposed in the Conven- tion, by which the people were to be bound as the people of sove- reign States. The first, to have the assent of the State Legislatures. The second, of the people of the States in State Conventions. The latter was preferred. Had the Convention considered, that the as- sent of the State Legislatures, could give a binding efficacy to the new Constitution, it would have betrayed an extreme ignorance of the true origin of all civil government, and of that inherent right of the people alone, to make a Constitution. The assent of the people in conventions, then, was the only way, in which their assent could be obtained, as sovereign and independent States. They do assemble. In each State, a majority of the people decide for that particular State. The vote is transmitted as one vote, out of thir- teen. Delaware, the smallest State in the Union, has the same in- fluence in making up the majority, without which the Con- stitution cannot operate, as Virginia, which is the largest State. And yet we are told by tiie Supreme Court, that the binding efficacy which the Constitution received in these proceedings, was not the act of the States, as States. But let us, for the sake of argument, pervert terms, and say, that Legislatures are States. Still the acts of the Convention, in such a view, must substantially be regarded as the acts of the States. That sovereign political body, which re- quires another body to decide for it, any question, which it has the power of itself to decide, is certainly the power, that does the act, and not the substitute. Qui facit per alium facit per se. Suppose, that instead of the present Constitution, Mr. Patter- son’s plan had been adopted in the Convention, which was so to have enlarged the power of the old Government, as to give it the additional power of imposts and stamp duties, and to regulate com- merce, and to have a Federal Executive, and a Federal Judiciary, &c. This Government, in the words of the Court, would “be the Government of all. Its powers delegated by all. Representing all, and acting for all.” But would any one say, that because it was to act directly on the people, that, on that account, it must be national in its creation. The manner in which a Government is ushered into existence, and the nature of that Government, after it is created, are two distinct things. The mode, in which a Govern- ment is to operate upon the people, has really no more to do with an enquiry, as to the source from which it emanates, than the man- ner of its origin, has to do with questions as to the operation of its powers. The only question is, who ratified it. The people, it is true, did it. Who else could ratify it. But did the people ratify it, as the people at large. The answer has been already given. The votes were not a portion of the aggregate votes of all the individuals in the United States, but the vote as one people. It was a single vote. Who, but a State can give a single vote. What is the cha- racteristic of a confederacy of States, according to our own experi- ence ? The voting by States. If South-Carolina, in giving her assent to the compact, votes precisely as she did in the confede- 13 102 ration, her influence being- one thirteenth of the whole, is it not absurd to say, that this ratification is not a federal act. The Court is at some pains to confute the plain proposition, insisted on by the Counsel for the State of Maryland, that the Constitution is a com- pact between the States in their sovereign capacities. The Govern- ment, says the Court “proceeds directly from the people;” “is or- dained and established” in the name of the people ; and is declared to be ordained, “ in order to form a more perfect union.” And what then ? Who are the people here meant 1 The people of the United States as one entire nation, or the people of the Thirteen States. The title or caption of the Constitution, as it is presented to the Conventions, announces it, “ as a Constitution framed for the United States of America, by a convention of deputies from the States of New-Hampshire,” &.c. If an argument is to he drawn from what immediately follows in the preamble, “We, the people of the U. States, do ordain and establish this Constitution,” 1 should suppose, the people here meant, must be the people of those thirteen named States of America, for which States the Constitution was formed, to wit, New-Hampshire, &c. The Government, being a compound Govern- ment, it would be difficult to say, how it could, upon the whole, be better expressed, supposing that its adoption was to be the act of in- dependent States. Again as to union. What is meant by “more perfect union,” more than an union of sovereign States upon bet- ter terms than the confederation afforded. The Court will not say, that a Consolidated Union was the end in view The best way to put an end to all argument, is to ask ourselves this simple question — Supposing that it was the real design of the whole convention, that the new Constitution was to be the act of the several States, as States, could it have adopted any other legitimate mode, than that of submitting the instrument to the State Conven- tions. This question must be promptly answered in the negative, unless we design to maintain the absurdity, that a State Legislature can make a Constitution, which is to associate its people in civil government, with the people of other States. If then, it is clear, that in a State Convention alone, the assent of the people of a State, as a State, can be givdn to a radical change in the structure of the Government, so as to bind the people of that State, the very circum- stance of calling the Convention, incontestibly proves, that its re- quired ratification was to be a State act. It is a loss of time, to at- tempt to prove what is so plain. That the Government did not emanate from the people, excepting in their sovereign capacities, as separate States, appears also to be the exposition of the Federalist. In speaking of the real character of the Government, considered in relation to the foundation, oh which it is to be established, it is said, (Federalist, No. 39) “ On the one hand, the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratifi- cation of the people of America, given by deputies, elected for the special purpose; but on the other, this assent and ratification, is to be given by the people, not as individuals, comprising one, entire nation, but, as composing the distinct and independent States, to 103 which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratifi- cation of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, the authority of the people themselves. The act, there- fore, establishing the Constitution, will not be a National, but a FEDERAL act.” The Federalist goes on to say, “ That it will be a federal, and not a national act, (as the terms are understood by the objectors) the act of the people, as forming so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, is obvious from this sin- gle consideration, that it is to result, neither from a majority of the people of the Union, nor from that of a majority of the States. It must result from the unanimous assent of the several States, that are parties to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent, than in its being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by the people themselves. Were the people regarded in this transaction, as form- ing one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of the United States, would bind the minority, in the same manner as the majority of each State, must bind the minority ; and the will of the majority must be determined, either by a comparison of the indi- vidual votes, or by considering the will of the majority of the States, as evidence of the will of a majority of the people of the U. States. Neither of these rules has been adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a SOVEREIGN BODY, indepen- dent of all others, and only to be bound by its voluntary act. In this relation, the new Constitution will, if established, be a FEDERAL, and not a National Constitution.” Having thus clearly shewn, as I conceive, that the counsel for the Defendants in Error, were right in saying, that the federal compact was the act of the State sovereignties, and that the Supreme Court was decidedly wrong in denying the position, it may not be unprofit- able, to correct some popular errors on the subject of civil govern- ment being considered as a compact ; as on the correction of these, a very important axiom is hereafter to be maintained, to wit, that to the State Legislatures, as States, and not to the people at large, as its constituents, is Congress responsible for the abuse of its powers. These Legislatures have the unquestionable right to keep Congress within the limits of its prescribed powers. It is an erroneous idea, that wherever civil government exists, that there is any compact between the people on the one side, and the the Government on the other, and that the Government in conse- quence, has any rights, except when it acts for the people. This subject is placed in an admirable, and an incontrovertible point of view, by Thomas Paine, in his “ Rights of Man.” In the American Constitutions, of which he was treating, lie maintains there is no such idea. The compact, says he, in “ each instance, was that of the people with each other, to produce and constitute a Govern- ment. To suppose, that any Government, can be a party in a com- pact, with the whole people, is to suppose it, to have existence, be- fore it can have a right to exist.” In the confederation then, we must admit, that the compact necessarily was, that of the people of the different States, with each other, in the relation of independent 104 communities. In the Federal Constitution, it is a mistake to sup- pose, that the relation is in the least altered, because the people them- selves met, to make the compact, instead of doing it through their Legislatures. The act of ratifying the compact by such a mode, so far from weakening, indubitably strengthened the ratification, as an act of an independent State, for it is done by the people themselves, in the most sovereign character, in which they can possibly be re- cognized. In no State in this Union, is the sovereignty of the State perfectly represented by its Government. The people may con- stantly be in the exercise of all the legislative, judicial, and execu- tive powers of the Government, and yet, they may not be using their utmost sovereignty. In every American Constitution, there are powers reserved to the people, which Government cannot exercise. It is in convention alone, that State sovereignty is without limits or controul. The Constitution then, being a compact, between the people of the different States, as States, and not as individuals, it results, that the U. States Government is nothing more than a great trustee, under an irrevocable power of attorney, to perform certain duties, or to exe- cute certain trusts, prescribed to it by the States. Government, says Mr. Paine, “ is not a trade, which any man, or body of men, have a right to set up, and exercise for their own emolument, but is alto- gether A TRUST, in right of those, by whom the trust is dele- gated, and by whom it is always resumeable. It has of itself NO RIGHTS. They are altogether duties. All power exercised over a nation, must have some beginning. It must be either delegated, or assumed. There are no other sources. ALL DELEGATED power is TRUST, and all assumed power is USURPATION. Time does not alter the nature and quality of either.” If this be not truth, in the name of reason, what shall we call by that name. Let us then, apply this doctrine to our subject. The power of the Federal Government, we all admit, is a delegated power, and all delegated power, we must, as freely admit, is a trust. It is the State sovereignties who confer this delegated power, and these also, are the only parties to the federal compact. In this view, what becomes of that doctrine so often advanced, that Congress is not amenable to the States, as State sovereignties, for an abuse of its powers. Was it ever heard, that the parties who create the trust, are not to see that the purposes of the trust deed are ful- filled. Who else is to complain, and to take the measures to keep a trustee to the proper discharge of his duties, if it be not the con- stituents of the trust estate. Suppose that the directors of any pub- lictrading company, were to violate certain fundamental articles of covenant, between the individuals who may compose such a com- pany, and are so supported by the majority of the stockholders, to the injury of the minority ; what is the remedy ? A Couit of Jus- tice, by its writ of prohibition or mandamus , or injunction , or other process, arrests their illegal proceedings. The only difference be- tween the abuse of a private trust, such as has been stated, and that of the great public trusts, contained in delegated sovereign powers. 105 is, in the nature of the remedy, to be applied. For the first, there are impartial tribunals provided in all regular Governments. For the other, as regards the anomaly in ihe American plan o; Govern- ment, it results, from the very nature, of the Government, that no Such tribunal can be found, and that relief must be sought by other means. For who is to appoint such a tribunal 1 Not surely, the dele- gated Government. It would be, to consent to allow the trustee, not merely to appoint the arbiter, who is to judge, whether he lias or has not abused his trust, but to name for that purpose, his own servants, who are fed and supported by him. In this view, the States who constituted Uie Federal Government, can never consent, that the United States tribunals should decide, whether the Federal Government had or had not usurped its powers. Such an assent would involve the absurdity just mentioned. It is to make a party the sole judge in its own cause. I am aware that it will be said, that the mode of settling all such questions, is specified in the compact, and is a part of it ; and that the second section of the third article of the Constitution, makes the United States Judges, the arbiters in all disputes between the States and Congress. I think not. The only part of the section which can be enlisted on the side of such a construction is, that which extends the judicial power of the United States, to all “ cases aris- ing under this Constitution, and the laws of the United States and also, that which speaks of “ controversies to which the United States shall be a party.” I have always thought, and do believe, that had this provision been for any other purpose, than to enable Congress to protect itself, against any exercise of power by the States, prohibited to them by the Constitution, or intended to em- brace great and vital questions of sovereignty, between the States and the United States, as to constructive powers, as well as cases of meum and tuum, that it would not have been so loosely expressed. — This view is considerably strengthened by the circumstance, that on the introduction of these passages, on the 27th and 2Sth of August, as amendments to the reported draft of the Constitution, there was no opposition, which can only be accounted for, on the supposition, that it was intended to embrace the claims of individuals against the United States, and vice versa. We cannot imagine, that so important a provision, as that, by which inherent rights of States were to be taken away, could pass unnoticed, if it were understood to refer to disputes about sovereignty ; but we can readily believe, that if the supposed controversy, was to partake of the general nature of the cases provided for in the same section, which are pecuniary suits at law and equity, that there could be no objection. — “ Controversies between two or more States.” This part of the clause was well understood, and the same reason which might warrant the insertion of this last power, to adjust ordinary controversies between two States, would apply to the exclusion of the idea, that important vital rights were to be the subject of cognizance in the Federal Courts, under the amendments. A State differing with a neighbouring State, might be perfectly willing to leave a dispute, about boundaries, &c. 106 to the decision of the United States Courts, because, as between such parties, the arbiter must be impartial, and this would be the case, in all the other cases in the section, allotted to the cognizance of the Federal Courts. But the case is materially altered, when the question to be propounded, to the servants of the Government, is, whether their masters have, or have not usurped their powers. It is requiring too much of frail mortals, (unless the usurpation be out- rageously gross; to ask of them, to decide in the affirmative. It is unreasonable, even to require of them, that if they have honest doubts on the subject, to throw those doubts into any other scale, than that of the Government, to which they are attached from interest. The absurdity and the danger of any such stipulation on the part of the States, is too apparent, to admit of the idea, of its ever having been intended, and unless it s can be shewn as clear as the sun in the firmament, that such was actually the intention of the clause, such a construction ought to be resisted by the States, upon the principle of self-preservation. They have no other recourse. If we, how- ever, look into the journals of the Convention, we shall be satisfied, that it never once entered into the minds of the members to pro- vide for any other disputes, than such as might occur between States as to boundaries or territorial jurisdiction, or between a State and Congress, where the former might be disposed (as was feared) to pass laws, clashing with the expressly delegated powers of Con- gress. It was anticipated, that disputes between States would occur, respecting territorial jurisdiction. In the confederation, a mode of adjustment had been provided. In the first draft also, of the Con- stitution, proposed by Mr. Pinckney, a power for this purpose, was invested in the Senate. In the reported draft of the Constiution, by the committee of detail, the same power is invested in the Senate. But in neither of them, nor in any of the Jive plans submitted to the Convention, is there any provision proposed for disputes, involving rights of sovereignty, between the United States and any one State. None of the proposed plans, as to the settlement of State disputes, being agreed to, it was finally judged proper to make the Federal Judiciary, the tribunal. There was a strong apprehension in the Convention, that the State laws would interfeie with those of the National Legislature, and it was upon this expectation, that Mr. Madison advocated Mr. Pinckney’s pro- position, that a Congress should have a negative upon all State laws, and because, he moreover believed, “ that no tribunal could be found, who could impartially determine the line of State powers, when drawn in doubtful ''ases.” This proposition having been thrice lost in convention, twice on the discussion of Mr. Randolph’s resolution, and once again on the 23d of August, it became necessary in the minds of some members, that provision should be made, to prevent the States passing laws, which •• might infringe the powers exclusively delegated to Congress,” for that is the expression in Mr. Pinckney’s draft. The Committee of detail not having made any such provision in their reported draft of the Constitution, because it would have been repugnant to their instructions, and the proposition having been repealed on the 23d 107 of August, ns an additional enumerated power, there arose a necessity of a different phraseology of the judiciary clause, when it was under conside- ration. The judicial power was then extended “ to all cases in law and Equity, arising under this Constitution and the laws of the United States,” and also to “ controversies to which the United States shall be a party.” — The provision evidently was intended for the cases, which might arise, from the States, interfering with the powers delegated to Congress. It is impossible to read the secret journals of the Convention, without being struck with the unfounded fears, which at that day seized the bosoms of the majority of the members, as to the danger of the State Legislatures, constantly embarrassing the new Government. Thirty-five years expe- rience has demonstrated that all their apprehensions were as “ the baseless fabric of a vision.” To prevent the evils which they anticipated from this source was the cause of those very amendments to the judiciar)' clause, which have been supposed to give the United States Courts cognizance of all disputes as to the extent of the constructive powers of Congress — how- ever vitally such disputes might affect the sovereignty and very existence of some of the States. Mr. Hamilton, ( Federalist No. 80 ) sustains this very motive for introducing the above amendments. In speaking of the necessity of some constitutional mode of enforcing the observance of the restrictions en the State Legislatures, he says, that “ the power must either be a direct negative on the State laws, or an authority in the Federal Courts to overrule such as might be in manifest contravention of the arti- cles of Union. The latter, appears to have been thought by the Conven- tion, preferable to the former, and I presume will be most agreeable to the States.” In speaking, however, of the motives of the Convention, as to the above amendments to the judiciary section, I am not to be understood, to say, that it is altogether clear, that even the construction here given or admitted, is not too liberal, but merely to contend, that whatever the words may mean, they could not mean, more than to provide a substitute for that favourite measure of some members, a negative upon such State laws, as might be passed, in repugnance to the express prohibitions in the Constitution. — There is a view of this subject, which at this moment strikes me with some force, and which would shew, notwithstanding the preceding reasoning, and Mr. Hamilton’s exposition just quoted, that all these amendments, might have been intended simply to refer to pecuniary claims, preferred by or against the United States, and also, to all suits which must necessarily or ordinarily arise, between one citizen and another, out of the general proceedings of the Government, and the conduct of its officers, agents or servants. The only way, to come at the intentions of the convention, is, to go up to the fountain head, for their first meaning, and to observe whe- ther that meaning was altered, and how far it was altered by its subsequent acts. In Mr. Randolph’s 1 6th resolution, the outline of the power of the judi- ciary, is thus given. “ To extend to cases, arising under laws, passed by the General Legislature, and to such other questions, as involve the na- tional peace and harmony.'” That by the words, “ national peace and harmony,” was intended, no more than disputes between States as to ter- ritorial jurisdiction, and hy the words, “cases arising under laws of the United States,” the clashing of jurisdiction which might take place between 108 the Federal and State Judges as to admiralty and other jurisdiction, as to piracies, captures, &c. is evident, from the simple, and yet important fact, that the committee of detail, who heard all the debates, certainly under- stood the resolution in this sense. In their reported draft of a Constitution, they make provision for the settlement of disputes between States, and for other cases connected with the national harmony, but none whatever as regards collisions between the Federal, and the State Governments, as to powers. We cannot therefore believe, that under these expressions, “ national peace and harmony,” the Convention ever did intend to include, such important disputes, as collisions about sovereignty. The most rational construction would be, that the cases arising under Legisla- tive enactments, were such only, as must ordinarily occur, under every Government, and no others. The subsequent amendment to this clause, on the 28 th of August, by adding the words “ at Law and Equity” seems to establish this exposition, and as some cases of pecuniary interest proba- bly might occur under the “ Constitution” as well as of the laws of the United States, this may have been the cause of the addition of that word “ Constitution” also to the section. The claim of Massachusetts, against Congress, for militia claims during the late war, would have been a case of Law and Equity, arising under the Constitution, had Congress not have allowed these claims. Other instances might, no doubt, be cited. In the Virginia Convention and North-Carolina Conventions, (I have not seen the debates of any other) when this clause was under consideration, great as were the objections, yet, no speaker anticipated the evil, of any such construction, that the judicial power was to decide questions of jurisdiction and sovereignty between the United States and any particular State. The whole apprehension was, that in process of time, the Federal Judiciary would sweep to its jurisdiction, almost all the subjects of litigation, so as finally to leave to the State Courts, nothing to do. Their fears are likely to be realized, by a decision of Judge Story’s in Delovio & Bait. The introduction of the words “ controversies, to which the United States shall be a party,” it is true, would countenance the supposition, that ques- tions respecting the boundaries of power, were contemplated as fit for the cognizance of the Judiciary. But, on the other hand, it is extremely diffi- cult to conceive, for the reasons already given, in this and a previous num- ber, that disputes about vital sovereignty were intended to be referred to any such tribunal. A sovereign State can never be presumed, in any com- pact which it enters into with another State, to yield inherent rights of sovereignty. The absurdity and the danger of any State agreeing to entrust the decision of disputes about sovereignty, to an arbiter, to be ap- pointed by the opposite party, is the best of all arguments to shew, that no such intention w'as ever entertained. What would become of the States, if, under indefinite phrases in the Constitution, they could, in this way, be deprived of all their rights. I have not forgotten, that as regards disputes relating to the boundary between the Federal and the State jurisdictions, Mr. Hamilton considers the Supreme Court as the tribunal, which is established for the purpose of ultimately deciding them, and in his thirty-ninth number, he justifies “such a tribunal as essential to prevent an appeal to the sword, and a dissolution of the compact.” But, against this short and transitory, or accidental notice of the subject, is to be opposed, the fact, that whenever he has 109 occasion to answer objections, to the Federal Government, as a Govern- ment, iikelv to usurp power, and thus to endanger public liberty, he never once suggests, that the remedy for such a state of things, is to be sought, elsewhere, “ than in that original right of self defence, which is para- mount to all positive forms of Government.” He calculates, invariably, that “ all schemes of usurpation, if attempted by the national rulers, will easily be defeated by the State Governments.” Nor ought there to be any other remedy It is proper that a tribunal should beat hand, to decide conti oveisies relating to the boundary of juris- diction, between Congress and the States, because till parties, raight.be willing, to have the opinion of such a tribunal, as long as it shall by its proceedings, and the conduct of its members, inspire mutual confidence. — The exposition of any particular clause in the Constitution, by such a tri- bunal, might have s > much weight, as to have the effect of preserving the harmony between both Governments. Iris in this view, and in no other that the Supreme Court, ought to be solicited for its opinion. It might also happen, that the decision of the Court might be right, upon all the princi- ples of construction, by which Courts are usually governed; and yet, there may be circumstances, which would not warrant an obedience of the States to its decrees. The General Government might so usurp power, as to be beyond the reach of any ground, on which a Court could pronounce its acts unconstitutional. In a former number, I noticed the Tariff, as an in- stance. The “ Woollens’ Bill” is perfectly constitutional, if the Court shall be called upon for its opinion in relation to it, because it must decide, according to the provisions of the Bill, and cannot enter into any notice of the motives of the Congress for passing such a bill. If it should pass, it will, in its shape, and all its provisions, bean act simply “to lay im- posts,” which is within the enumerated powers of Congress, whilst its design would be to promote a great local Th-terest in particular States. Here is a case in which a State, would commit an act of SUICIDE, were it to admit of the principle, that for so gtoss a violation of the spirit of the compact, it was to seek no redress, but in the Courts of the United States. Other illustrations might be adduced. Let one suffice. According to the letter of the Constitution, the compact may at any time be altered, with the assent of three fourths of the States. There is but one single restriction, now ex- isting, on the power to amend the Constitution, which is, that the equality of suffrage in the Senate, shall be preserved. Supposing now, that Eigh- teen States were willing, that the Constitution shoulJ be so altered, that a power be conferred on Congress to promote the objects of the Colonization Society, and to purchase and remove gradually, out of the United States, the slaves of the Southern States. This proposition is actually suggested in the last Philadelphia Quarterly Review — or suppose the proposed amendment be, a declaratory clause, that Congress has the right to abolish slavery under the Constitution, on compensation being given to individuals. Other instances might be added, such as amendments which effect a radi- cal change in the Government as to its structure, so as to make it any thing but what the States originally designed it to be. What is there in the letter of the Constitution to prevent all these things being done — Were the Supreme Court called upon to decide, as to the right to make such alterations, would it not be compelled to say, that by the terms of the grant, there is an unlimited power to amend, excepting in one solitary case, 14 110 and moreover, mieht it not also call to its assistance, that refined metaphy- sical doctrine of its own Chief Justice, that “a power to create, implies a power to preserve” and from that power to create, easily deduce pow- er to changt J .” In such an emergency as this, would any one doubt the right of the six dissentient States, to dissolve the compact, on the simple ground, that an alteration, either in the fundamental polity of a State, or in the Republican principles of the Government, would be a gross violation ot the spirit, in which the Constitution was formed. No one ran doubt it. This subject might be pursued almost without end. 1 have already stated that in all instances of abuse or usurpation of power, on the part of Congress, the State Sovereignties, being parties to the compact, it is their right to remonstrate, and to resist. But some may say, that according to my own previous reasoning, it is the people in convention , who have this right, and not the State Legislatures, who are not the people, but only a portion of the sovereign power of the State. This objection is thus remov- ed: — L T nder the State constitutions, all power, which is not reserved to the people in a bill of rights, or by positive limitations, is invested in the State Legislatures. Not so in the United States’ Government. In the exercise then, of that portion of the supreme power, winch is conferred on a State Legislature, by its Constitution, that Body possesses, without a single ex- ception, every right, not expressly forbidden, which the people them- selves could possess. Amongst those rights, stands pre-eminent, the sove- reign right of demanding that all compacts entered into, with other States, be faithfully fulfilled, and of adopting such measures to enforce such compacts as in their wisdom they shall judge fit. If the people of South- Carolina, in their collective capacity as a State, be a party to the Federal compact, (as is the fact,) they have the undoubted right, to call the Gene- ral Government to account for an abuse of its delegated powers. If the people have that right, the same right belongs to the Legislature, that body having in this particular, all the rights, and having imposed on it all the duties of the people. And it is a right, which I trust they will not only exercise, but so use it, as to preserve the State. But view the compact as we will. Let us regard the Federal Govern- ment, as it really is, a TRUST; or let us regaid it, as has been suggested, as a deed TRIPARTITE, in which the people en masse are one party, the people as States another, and the people in one great political community as a third ; or let us call it a CONFEDERACY of States; or by any other name we please, there is yet one feature in the system, which every man in the United States has always before his eyes, and that is, that we are governed, as one entire nation, and at the same time exist as twenty-four separate sovereignties, and that a common friendship, after all, is the gieat bond of our Union. On a difference of opinion then, ns to the true meaning of any particular provision in the compact, the same course ought to be adopted, as would be proper between one friendly nation and another. As in the latter case, a conference would be proposed, before any step would be resorted to. as likely to lead to serious misunderstand- ing or war; so, in the case before us, Congress, before it assumed any great substantive power, such as the power over internal improvements ought, (under that provision, in the Constitution, which empowers it to propose amendments j to have submitted to the State Legislatures, the question, whether such a power belonged to the Slates, or to Congress, and Ill thus by soliciting their aid and advice, as to the true intent of all parties, it would have gained tor itself, the contidenre and the support or the State Legislatures. To both, the power cannot belong, for I have demonstrated, I trust, satisfactorily, in my nineteenth number, ihat there can be no divi- sion of sovereignty . on the subject of internal improvements. If Congress be not exclusively sovereign, as to every purpose for which the Federal Government was created, it cannot be sovereign at all. The concurrence of authority in Legislation, is only as to taxation, which is only a means of promoting the objects, for which Civil Government exists , and not itself an end or object of Government. It cannot exist on any other subject. — The United States’ Government is supreme within its sphere of action, and the States equally sovereign as to their reserved powers. This is the deci- sion of the Supreme Court, and cannot be confuted. The fault of the Su- preme Court, is not, that it decides the United States’ Government to be sovereign for the great purposes of its creation, but because it confers on Congress, as means of executing those powers, contrary to the spirit of the league, powers which have no necessary, and appropriate connection with those expressed objects, to which their Legislation is expressly confined by the terms of the instrument Every patriot and friend to his country, must freely admit, that where there are two rules of interpretation, or two modes of adjusting difficulties, that must always be the best, and the safest, from which no inconvenience or injustice can arise to either party. The difference between the two modes is this — Under the construction here contended for, there is scarcely an object of any consequence to the States generally, which mav not be fairly referred to some one or other of the many enumerated powers, and therefore the measure may be constitutionally adopted. Shoujd it so hap- pen, that there may be an object, for which the Constitution has not pro- vided, if such an object be one of general and primary interest, the instru- ment itself, has provided the means, by which it may be accomplished. — An amendment to the Constitution, may, at any time, be proposed, and if the new power asked for, be necessary to war, foreign negotiation and commerce, (those great ends of the Union,) there is no fear, but what three-fourths of the States will agree to the amendment. The people will always have intelligence enough to discover their true interests. If the assent of three-fourths of the State Legislatures, for this purpose, cannot be obtained, it would prove that the power ought not to be exercised. It is for the happiness of the people of the States, that the Federal Govern- ment is ordained, and not for its own sake ; and the people, heard through their State Legislatures, are the best judges, whether any new contem- plated measure will, or will not, augment their happiness. If the power be necessary, and it be refused, the people will suffer, as they ought to suf- fer. By this construction, the Federal Government will be the sun, or centre of a great political system, diffusing its light and warmth, to all the State Governments, which harmoniously and beautifully revolve around it, and thus, the order and design of the Convention, will be preserved. But, under the opposite course, which is the one adopted by Congress, viz. that of seizing upon power in all doubtful cases, a discretion is given to se- lect objects for legislation, to which there is no affixing any limits, and the necessity of which may not be seen ; a door may thus be opened for ex. travagance and waste in the public expenditure; the people may be bur n 112 thened with excessive taxation ; sectional interests may be promoted by the majori y, under the pretext oi'their being national ; sectionalym/, i‘S will be fomented ; an habitual disregard to the State Legislatures will he encouraged ; no amendments to the Constitution will be thought of; and strifes and contentions, between the States and Congress, will increase and multiply, until by some great convulsion, we shall all be resolved again into our original elements. Are we not, under the intemperate measures of Congress, rapidly approaching such a crisis ? mo. 23 . If Co ngress had not regarded itself as omnipotent in legislation, it would not have ventured to name amongst its committees, “a committee on Agriculture ,” as if it possessed an atom of sove- reignty to regulate Agriculture any more than it can pass laws on the subject of Negro Slavery, or regulate descents at law. What but a sense of its own omnipotence could prompt this body to think of laying one section of the Union under tribute, to encourage the industry of another portion ? And shall we, in the Southern States, who furnish such means of commerce to the Union, by our valuable products; shall an interest so great and so paramount as the Agri- cultural interest of the South, be prostrated, that the local interests of Massachusetts or Pennsylvania may be promoted ? I would in- sult you, my fellow-citizens, were I to doubt your unanimity in the reply which must be given. From one extreme of the State to the other, your voice has already been heard, and your resolutions ex- pressed in terms not to be mistaken. As for myself, I cannot con- ceive a measure more fraught with permanent mischief and ruin to the Plantation States, than the Tariff. It is not simply to tax us to support our Northern brethren, but it is also to destroy all our means to acquire the ability to pay those taxes. In these States there are but two interests, and they cherish and support each other. The one is AGRICULTURAL; the other COMMERCIAL. Within the memory of man, and the records of history, no other interests than these ever grew up in our country, and for a century at least to come, it is not hazarding too much to assert, that no other can exist in South-Carolina. In this respect, we not only differ as to interest from the Northern States, but we differ. from every State and King- dom in Europe. The cause of the difference is obvious. In those countries the great produce of the soil is bread stuffs; the population is dense; the soil is cultivated by whites ; labour is more or less cheap; and each being likely to raise in abundance, those articles which the others need not, causes an anxiety in all to seek amongst themselves for the means of consuming the surplus produce of their own soil. That a period may occur in the future history of the Northern, Middle and Western sections of this Union, when manufactures may be properly regarded as of primary impor- tance to them, it would be as much a waste of time to deny, as it would be to assert, that in the past periods of European history, they were not sometimes most judiciously encouraged by the foster- ing care of Government. That there is an opportunity even now of 113 encouraging manufactures to a certain extent in the Northern States, so as not to interfere with others of their local interest, of equal mag- nitude, may be true. I, therefore, have not the smallest disposition to dispute the utiiity of manufactures in general, as a source of wealth and prosperity, provided all circumstances suit for their in- troduction into a country. I feel the weight of all that has been said in their favour; and believe that where they are permitted to grow up alongside of other interests, under the protecting care of a Gov- ernment which has the undoubted power to extend its patronage to them, (as is the case with every consolidated Government) they will give activity and energy, to every languishing branch of inter- nal industry. But however true it is, as a general position, that do- mestic manufactures is the true policy of nations, who abound with a dense and a crowded population, and in which there is more capi- tal than Agriculture or Commerce, or other occupations, can absorb; yet, as regards the application of the axiom to the Southern States of this Union, and particularly to the plantation or cotton growing States, there is not one word of truth, in all that has been written as to the utility of manufactures, from the beginning of the world until the present day. All the w; iters who have discussed the subject, have discussed it with the sole view to the interest and circumstan- ces of the countries in which they lived and wrote — countries, the very opposite to these Southern States, in climate, soil, population^ production, and agricultural labour. It is therefore false, under any possible light in which the subject of manufactures can be viewed, as regards the South, that any pro- tection given by Congress to the manufacturers of Pennsylvania, can operate otherwise than as an indirect tax upon the people of the Southern States, amounting exactly to the difference between ivhat they now pay, and the cheaper price at which they might obtain the article, if the three tanjfs already Imposed icere removed. It is tri- fling with the understandings of men, to tell them that the Northern manufacturer can supply us with goods upon the same terms as the foreign merchant. He now furnishes, it is true, some coarse fabrics cheaper than the English dealer; but he is protected by duties al- most amounting to prohibition of the rival article from abroad. — Take oft’ all the tariffs of 1816, 1820 and 1824, and every manufac- turer in the United States, for the protection of whose fabrics these tariffs were imposed, will be a bankrupt without a single exception. If it were otherwise, two and two could not make four ; for the pro- tection afforded by these Tariffs is not trifling. It is prodigious. All the bold assertions, therefore, of these men, and their adherents in this southern country, are to he disregarded. Any man of com- mon sense must know, that if the home manufacturer could sell his fabrics for a lower price than is demanded by the foreign dealer for the same goods, that he would not ask for protection. The ground on which further protection is now asked for woollen goods, by the Websters, Everetts &. Co. is, that the British having reduced their duty five pence or foreign wool, gives the British capitalist an ad- vantage in our market over the home manufacturer. In the name 114 of common sense, what is this hut a direct admission, that the Brit'sh are about to undersell them. With the same boldness of assertion, tl>. v also tell our folks, (and surprising to say, it is believed by some) that the Eastern people can actually undersell the British in a foreign market, whilst the British are so underselling the Web- sters, Everetts & Co. in Boston, in their own market , that they are obliged to clamour for an additional Tariff upon woollens lest they should be all ruined. No, my fellow-citizens. All that has been written on the subject of manufactures, has no more application to the Southern country, than it has to the Sandwich Islands, or any other Islands in the Pa- cific Ocean. Our policy is a peculiar one. The great produce of our soil is Cotton Wool. This material of manufactures not being raised in Europe, the foreign demand of it, never can bo partial or occasional , as is the case with bread stuffs, or the fleece of sheep, or other produce of the soil at the North — but must be steady and constant , as long as England shall continue to manufacture for the world. Even Alexander Hamilton, in his elaborate report on manufactures, admits, “that if one nation were in a condition to supply manufactured articles on better terms than another, that other might find an abundant indemification in a superior capacity to fur- nish the produce of the soil. And a free exchange, mutually bene- ficial, of the commodity each was able to supply, on the best terms, might be carried on between them — supporting in full vigor, the in dustry of each.” Mr. Hamilton had here, in his view, two coun- tries, each of whom could manufacture. His reasoning would, I think, well apply to the United States and England, for, as to the great agricultural products of the United States, which is cotton, there is a capacity to produce it only in one country. But, Mr. Ha- milton’s reasoning must be much more conclusive, where one country can manufacture, and the other cannot. This is the case as regards ■Great Britain and the Plantation States. We can raise the raw ma- terial — she cannot. She can manufacture — we cannot. But how vain are the speculations often of the wisest men. Alexander Ha- milton never committed a more egregious blunder, than when he hazarded before Congress, in his report, the opinion, “ That the EXTENSIVE cultivation of cotton in the United States, could, per- haps, hardly be expected, but from the previous establishment of do- mestic manufactories of the article.” Every Planter knows, that for his cotton, he must look to Europe, and to England particularly, fora market. England is the princi- pal customer, with whom we can expect to deal upon reciprocal terms, and to our greatest advantage. There is no rivalry, nor is there likely to be any, between Europe and the Plantation States — as there is, and always must be, between OLD England and NEW England. We are exactly in the situation of two shop-keepers, who do not vend, or deal in, the same articles — and between whom, there is no prospect of competition — and between whom, there of course, never can be jealousy. Only close the European trade against us^ and where shall we look for a market ? Not certainly to the North t 115 which does not probably consume a seventh of what we raise. No. Should that day ever arrive, that England shall not want our cot- ton — then may we despair. Our true interest, I repeat, which is a distinct interest from an. Eastern interest, is a free and uninterrupted commerce with the whole world, and particularly with England, where are the work shops of sufficient extent, to work up the raw material which we raise, and are in danger of raising in too great abundance. Take from us this market, by clogging the trade with protecting or prohibi- tory duties, and we drive our best customers to seek the raw mate- rial elsewhere, and to encourage other countries to grow cotton wool for them. With the exception of the fine brands of Sea Island cotton, it must be remembered, that a third of the globe is capable of producing cotton. To imagine, therefore, that England will take our cotton, if she is to go to South America and bring gold and sil- ver for it, and not her own manufactures, betrays extreme ignorance. The experiment once hazarded, it may be fatal to us for ever. Com- merce is a shy damsel, and must be caressed. Once slighted by a nation, she returns no more. What then will be the situation of South-Carolina 1 Will it be any consolation to us, that the time may come, in some hundred years hence, that the Eastern folks shall realize their visions of manufacturing for the world — and drive England and France entirely out of the market — when, in the mean time, we, our families and friends, shall have been impoverished — and more generations than the present, be reduced to beggary, and be involved in one common ruin. This cannot, and MUST NOT be. We have but one interest, and that is, the Agriculture that pro- duces, and the Commerce that wafts our cotton and rice to the shores of Europe. No other interest can flourish, or even take root in our land. Nature has decreed, by an immutable decree, that in foreign commerce, shall South-Carolina seek for the sources of her pros- perity, and her importance as a member of the great American fami- ly. The Government, therefore, which places upon that commerce any restraint, is not the Government that would, but the Govern- ment which ALREADY HAS RIVETED the CHAINS around the neck and the feet of Southern industry. That Government is not the Federal, but the NATIONAL Government of the United States. This is strong language, but not too strong for the crisis. Never, never since the colonization of the country, has any measure been adopted, no, not the odious stamp act of England, which demands from the Southern States, a more steady and a more determined re- sistance than this tariff ; not a resistance by resolutions of town meetings, but by such acts and measures of the local Legislatures, as shall cause the usurpers at Washington, to tremble at what they are doing, and to pause, ere they plunge this people, hitherto so happy and so united, into discord and disunion. Disunion did I say 1 Whether disunion shall approach us, rests not with ourselves, but with our Northern brethren. Forbearance and misillanimity in the South, may retard, but cannot finally prevent disunion. There 116 is a point, beyond which, we never can endure the oppression of Congress. The “ veriest worm will turn when trodden on,” and sooner or later, we must turn on those, who would lay us under per- petual tribute. It is firmness alone — the same firmness, with which as a colony, we resisted with such success, the aggressions of Bri- tain, that is to carry us triumphantly through all the perils which assail and surround us, and which in the end, will, in my humble view, lead to the regeneration of the liberties and the sovereignties of the States, as secured by the Federal Constitution. Let there be but one mind and one soul in the South, and we shall have more perfect union, and with our Northern brethren, better friendship and better feelings. There is no Congress that has yet been convened, or thatwill it in our day, that will dare to trifle with freemen, who know their rights, and know too how to maintain them ; who have within themselves, the resources for empire, the same resources which give to this Union, its extended commerce, and which is con- stantly aggrandizing the Northern States, whilst it impoverishes ourselves; whose half a million ol cotton bags are a circulating me- dium, or as so many Bank of England Notes, in the marts of Europe, when the Pearl and the Pot Ashes, and Flour of the North, are dull and heavy merchandize. Let Congress then, be told distinctly , that though the “ current of the public Treasury, has always run as steadily and unceasingly to the North and East, as the Gulf Stream , and with as little prospect of its ever changing its course,” yet that, when by some great political convulsion, it shall change its course, all those regions of the North, hitherto improved by the commerce created by our products, and by the rich contents of our Custom H ouses, borne year after year, on the bosom of the fertilizing stream, will become comparatively barren and unproductive, whilst South Carolina, like a Phoenix, will rise from the ashes in which she is humbled. Let Congress beware, how it approaches us with any ex- tension of the Tariff, or it may tread upon the RATTLESNAKE of the South. “It is SLOW in its resistance, GENEROUS in its warning, but may be DEADLY in its BLOW.” MO. 24. If the power to establish a Tariff to protect manufactures, were even a power warranted by the Conslitution, still the motives for abstaining from its exercise, at the present time, are so many, and so powerful, that the mind would be at a loss to conceive, how an impartial Congress, legis- lating for the whole Union, and not a part, should be so fatally bent upon its adoption, did we not know from experience, that where suggestions of interest are at all attended to, the judgment must be in unison with that in- terst. Such is the case with the present, and I believe will, every day, be more and more the case, with the majority of every Congress, which shall hereafter be assembled at Washington. Whether an extensive protection to manufactures, will, or will not be, productive of the general good, which is anticipated, even in those parts of the Union, where the clamour for protection is so great, is not a question for us in the South to decide. It is no concern of ours. It will be enough for the purposes of our argu- 117 ment, that the great body of the people in those States, are in favour of manufactures. As long as this opinion shall prevail, and it will never sub- side, it is quite natural, that these people should, through their represent- atives in Congress, advocate “ the American Policy,” as it is termed. To expect, that with all the bright prospects of a general activity in business before their eyes, they should not combine their efforts, or that they will turn aside to ask themselves, whether the same measures, by which they are to be aggrandized, may not ruin other States, is so far from being ra- tional, that it is contrary to all experience. It is rare, to find men in pri- vate life, practising that wholesome Christian precept, to do as they would be done by. In political societies, it is still moie rare, and hence it is, that considerations of policy, so often suspend or supersede those of jus- tice. If, therefore, we desire to know, how this, or that community will act, under any particular circumstances, there is no better way of coming at the truth, than to ask ourselves, in what does the interest, or the sup- posed inteiest of such a community consist. The answer being given, it will he seen that its opinions accord with their interest. Now the opinion of the North is, (whether right or wrong is immaterial) that manufactures is their true and proper policy, and artful men have persuaded many of their good people into the happy belief, that in pro- moting their own interest, they advance at the same time, the interest of all the States. Thus we account for the majority of the members of Con- gress, voting for the tariffs, and as this opinion will prevail more and more every day, as these people shall taste the sweets of an extensive monopoly, so we in the South, must make up our minds, that in the natural course of events, there necessarily must be in every Congress hereafter, more and more of that influence, which will raise up Manufactures, at the expense of our Agriculture and our Commerce. Unless then, we resist the tariff on principle, so as to be done with it for ever, it will be a subject constantly before Congress, and we shall never have any repose. The tariff question will no more die away in our country, than Catholic Emancipation or Par- liamentary Reform will in England. It is a mistake to suppose, that the tariff question, is the measure of this or that political party. It is not got up for the purposes of the Presidential Election. It is a movement of the peo- ple in the Northern, Middle, and Western States, who feeling the depressed state of their agriculture from competition with Europe, and the want of an adequate market, are taught to look up to Manufactures, as best calculated to create a home market for their grain, wool, iron, and other products of their soil, regardless of the evil to us in the South. That political charac- ters will take advantage of this feeling at the North, and make it a stepping stone to their preferment, it would be folly to deny ; and that Mr. Adams and Mr. Clay, are using this feeling for their own purposes. I do as sin- cerely believe, as I must confess, that on the opposite side, there are also some men, who will, if they have the opportunity, use the excitement against the Tariff, for similar purposes. It is paying too great a compli- ment to the politicians on either side, to suppose that they have created these opposite feelings in the North and in the South. The knowing poli- ticians on both sides, one and all, are not leading , but they are following public opinion. Opposed as I always have been, and now am, heart and mind, to Mr. Adams, vet I would-scorn to make a charge upon his Administration, which. 118 it does not merit. The odium of the tariff belongs not to him, but to Mr. Monroe, and neither Mr. Adams, nor Gen Jackson, nor any other Presi- dent hereafter to be elected, can ever suppress the clamour at the North for domestic manufactures. The firm resolution of the South, to oppose it on principle , and at every hazard can alone exempt us from its operations. Let us then, not deal unfairly to our political antagonists. Let our op- position to Mr. Adams, be steady, manly, and honorable. There are suf- ficient grounds, on which, as Americans , we may oppose him, and 1 hope successfully. But the tariff question must not be entangled with the politics of Jackson or of Adams It may suit some crafty politicians, on both sides, who are thinking more of their own interests, than either of the North or the South, to blend two subjects, which have no connection with each other. The tariff question is a sacred question, and it belongs to the sons of the South alone, as Southern men, to consider it. The man amongst us, who would approach such a grave and solemn question, with any other feelings, than those of a South-Cat olinian, or who, before he would decide, upon this or that measure to be taken at this crisis, would ask, what effect it would have upon the Presidential election, is unfit to be a counsellor or an actor in times like these. Me may be an American , but he is not a Ca- rolinian- It is the excitement of the Presidential elections, which, hitherto, has pre- vented us from looking carefully into our own situation, and has at length brought us to the unpleasant dilemma in which we find ourselves. It is an excitement, which promises to be perpetual in our country, and if we suffer it to engross our thoughts, as we hitherto have done, South-Carolina MUST perish. Let us then give to this qustion a portion of our interest, and not our whole interest. The vote of South-Carolina is inevocabiy fixed for the Hero of New-Orieans. As Americans, let us, without noise, support him in 1828. As South-Carolinians, we may possibly have to op- pose his Administration, as we do Mr. Adams’. General Jackson may be as much a Tariff President, as is Mr. Adams. As far as the acts of an individual indicate his sentiments, he is in principle, a Tariff man. — General J ackson voted for the Tariff upon principle — Mr. Adams now supports it with a view to his men interest. We have it on the unquestion- able authority of Mr. M’Duffie, that Gen. Jackson is for the Tariff on principle, and also on the authority ol Mr, Dickerson, the respectable Senator from New-Jersey Mr. Dickerson is a friend of the General, and mentions the fact, to his praise, that his election in Pennsylvania may not suffer ft om a contrary impression. The real difference between the two can- didates is this — Mr. Adams, who in 1820, voted against the tariff and in- ternal improvements, now advocates all these measures, with a view to his re-election to the Presidency. So unstable a man as this, is not to be re lied on. General Jackson having approved of the tariff of i 824, not from motives of personal aggrandizement, but from an honest conviction of its necessity at the time, possibly, may alter that opinion. His refusal to take the Presidency from the hands of Henry < 'day, is a magnanimous instance of self denial. Such a man as this, will never administer the Government to his re-election, but solely with a view to his own honest fame, and the good of his country. From such a Ptesident there is every thing to hope and little to fear. Once convinced that an extension of the tariff would disturb the harmony of the States, he would be apt to discountenance it, by further 119 support, and this too, at all hazards to himself. This, however, is mere opinion, t ie may or may not disappoint his friends. Let us ail hope for the best, but in the mean time, let us so act, as not to be diverted from what ought to constitute our main object, which is, to oppose the tariff upon the right , and not on the ivrong grounds. It is throwing dust in the people’s eyes, to make them believe, that on Jackson’s being elected, all will certainly be right, or that South-Carolina will be benefited by the change as to her situation with the North. Such opinions are fatal, mischiev- ously fatal to us. It is not with this, or that Administration, that we are to contend. We shall have to oppose every future Administration, as we now oppose Adams’, until the tariff be put down, and put down for ever. Let us no longer be as cards in a pack, to be shuffled backwards and forwards, in a game, in which we can gain nothing, but will lose all that is valuable and dear to us. Under these circumstances, and with every prospect before their eyes, that the manufacturing policy, would acquire strength and vigour as the Government would wax older, and that in a few years more, we shall be an insignificant minority in Congiess, it has often amazed me, that the Southern Representatives should have occupied in the debate upon the Tariff, almost every ground of opposition, excepting the true and the only ground upon which South-Carolina is to stand or to fall. The Represen- tatives from this State have zealously and ably discharged their duty. — They have done as much, nay more, than the rest of the Southern minority in Congress ; but yet 1 ask, and I ask it with the most profound respect and deference to them all, what has been done, compared with what might have been done , had they brought their legal acquirements, their profound research, their knowledge of Constitutional law, and that phalanx of gene- ral talents of which they had the command, and that weight of character for which they are distinguished, to bear, not upon the secondary and to us unimportant question of expediency, but upon the great and paramount question of the Constitutional powers of Congress — a question so full of interest to us, who have no safety, but in the integrity and sovereignty of the States. The Southern members generally, urged the impolicy of the measure, as it regarded the interests even of the Northern Slates. They de- monstrated its folly in various ways, and they brought to the argument all the aids which genius, high intellect, and their profound knowledge of the subject could furnish. They failed not to entrench themselves behind such names as Huskisson in the old , and Franklin in the new worlds. — Their whole effort, was, in truth, a splendid display of talent, and a rich repast. But had all the speeches which wer e made, to the South of the Potomac, been the speeches of a Burke or a Canning; had they been “an irradiating beam of light, a continued blaze of eloquence” from the beginning to the end ; yet, the light that was shed in that discussion, was not the light, to lighten their constituents to the spot, where their liberties were violated, and their wrongs inflicted. It was not that pillar of fire, by which, in the dark and dismal night which is fast coming upon the South, we are to be guided through a wilderness of unsettled opinions as to the Constitutional right, into paths, where we might find some rock, on which we might build for our safety, and defy all the tempests, with which the constructive powers of Congress, with the fury of a desolating and over- whelming flood, are sweeping away the rights of the States. 120 To dwell so much on the impolicy of the Tariff as a national measure, and scarcely more, than to hint at its unconstitutionality, >.as. for iis, most unfortunate The tenacity too, with which the Southern members clung to this ground, implied, that in their minds, it was the strongest nd the best ground. But they were all mistaken. The inexpediency of the Tariff is a ground which must forever slip from under ns. To rely on such a ground as this, is to build upon the sands, for we are the minority, and must continue a minority, and as a minority we must submit, in such a view of the subject Why not, when the Constitution was about to be vio- lated, by a clear and unequivocal act of usurpation, as ever was pracdsed, why did not all the members South of the Potomac, with one soul and one mind, when they perceived a measure proposed so “ big with the fate’ ? of the Southern States, as is the Tariff ; why did they not, I repeat, bring all the power of their minds, in demonstrating to the world, that neither the letter, nor the s, irit of the Constitution, could authorize such a system of robbery, upon their constituents ! The unconstitutionality of the measure Alone should live Within the book and volume of their brain, Unmixed with baser matter. I declare most solemnly, that if I thought no better ground could be tak* en against the Tariff, than its impolicy, as a measure of State; or if I were inspired with no better hope of ridding my country of this mill stone an ti-sd : ts neck, than the forbearance of the North, I would yield the question in dispute, between the North and the South. 1 would yield it, and forever sit down, and be content to wear the chains, which, with our own consent in 1789, we fastened upon ourselves. If by that family compact, called the Constitution, South Carolina ever surrendered, ex- pressly or impliedly, any power to Congress, to legislate unequally upon the States, or to touch any subject, in which one State did not possess an interest in common with every other State, I would give up my State in despair. And which of us would not despair ! Take from us the ground of the unconstitutionality of the measure, and what remains for us to do, but to submit, as is the duty of every good and patriotic citizen. What are fine speeches, what the powers of argument, when they are addressed to men, whose constituents have, perhaps, an hundred millions of dollars at hazard, unless protected by Tariffs ! What are the sayings and doctrines of the political economists ! What the authorities of Smith, Say and Ricardo, when you address a body, the interest of whose constituents consists in differing from you, who Were they to assent against their will, Would be of the same opinion still. JVlen. with whom, if we except the recollections which the glories of our Revolution inspire, have not, nor never can have the feelings, the sympa- thies, or the associations that are in common with us in the South. I would as soon address myself to the Khan of Tartary, or as Mr. Jefferson says, to the marble columns of the Legislative Halls, with a hope of success, as to expect to operate upon the minds of a majority of Congress, sent from Tariff States to protect their local interests. No. If we are to be relieved 121 from the usurpations that are pressing us to the dust, we must not go to Washington, with arguments to convince the YYkbsters and the Eve- retts, that by the I ariff policy, they will injuie themselves as well as us. Such a ground is not tenable. The Bostonians desire no lights from the schuols. They understand the science of political economy better than those who have written on the subject Their sagacity in discern- ing their true interests, is b v a kind of instinct, and the success of their es- tablishments, and the activity that has been given to the industry of the country around Boston, by a spirit for manufactures, has caused even their farmers to be enamoured with the “ American Policy;” and thus, we have a signal and a splendid triumph of the intelligence and good sense of a few plain woollen weavers of Massachusetts, over the metaphysical subtleties of the school of the economists. Let us then, not think of going to Congress as suppliants for their fa- vour, but let our representatives repair thither, with the HISTORY of our Revolution in the one hand, and the DECLARATION of Independence in the other. By the ONE document, Congress may be reminded of what it has forgotten ; namely, the separation of valuable colonies from a mother country, brought about by the tyranny of a King and his Parliament, and therefrom, they may learn lessons of wisdom and moderation. By the OTHER, it will be astounded at the manner in which freemen can speak of their wrongs, and when it recollects, that the descendants of those free- men, inherit all the principles and the chivalry of their sires, such a recol- lection will be worth more than all the speeches from Maine to Florida. MO. 25 . There is another contemplated exercise of power, which sooner or later, will take place in Congress, and which, in my view, must be resisted at every cost, about which there must be no empty reso- lutions, no parleying, no compromise. That subject, is the claim of the American Colonization Society, to be supported from the Na- tional Treasury. I know, that many of my fellow-citizens, in some parts of the State, will not at once fall into the opinion here advanced ; but it is, because they have not reflected on the movements of this dan-' gerous association of individuals. 1 intreat, therefore, that they par- tially bear with me forawhile, and if I do not satisfy all, I hope at least, to shew to the greater number, that whilst internal improvements are drawing off our resources to the North, and tariffs are reducing us rapidly into colonial vassalage, here is an insidious atttack me- ditated at the domestic tranquillity of the South, which is to be re- garded in a more serious light, than if an hostile foreign army, in great force, were to invade our territory. The bold and the daring invader attacks openly. In the bravery and devoted patriotism of our citizens, we have, under the worst of circumstances, a hope of ultimate success and safety. But against the secret dagger of the midnight assassin, no precaution can guard us. He enters our pre- mises undiscovered. He advances, or he recedes in his softly steal- ing steps, as prudence would dictate, and he strikes the fatal blow, when it is too late for us to avert it. Thus it will be with the American Colonization Society. 122 This Society was established at the SEAT of Government in 1817, that in its very formation, it might be regarded as NATION- AL. Its ostensible object is the colonization of the free persons of colour of the United States, on the continent of Africa. The scheme at the outset, was thought to be so visionary, that the won- der was expressed, that so many intelligent members of Congres, at Washington, could be persuaded to attend the first meeting. The idea, that a class of people, who in the Northern and Eastern States, were enjoying in common with the white inhabitants, so great a portion of civil liberty, should voluntarily exile themselves, and en- counter all the diseases of an African climate, and the hostility of savage neighbours, was so preposterous, that many persons suspect- ed, that there was more meant by this Society, than met either the eye or the ear. It therefore became necessary to know, whether the Society had an ulterior design, not stated in its Constitution, and a question to this end, was distinctly put by some Southern gentle- men from Virginia. To all questions, as to the true design of the Society, the reply was, that colonization of the free persons of co- lour was the sole object. With many persons, however, from what accidentally transpired at the time, the suspicion still existed, that a Colonization Society was but another name for an Abolition Society ; and certainly, if there be one fact, in regard to this Society, about which there never did exist a contrariety of opinion, it is this — that from the day of its institution until the present time, the Society has been publicly assailed by some, as a Society of doubtful character, and by others, as having a favourite ulterior object, to wit, the emancipation and removal in due time, of all the slaves of the United States — a scheme so utterly impracticable for any private Society to accomplish, and to which it is doubted, whether the National Gov- erment itself, with all its resources, is competent; that it is difficult to decide, whether, in the contemplation and formation of the Colo- nization Society, folly, or fanaticism, or wickedness, has had the greatest influence. With the fact always before their eyes, that their Society was ori- ginally, and has always since been suspected by thousands and thousands, rather as intending to bring about the abolition of slavery, than of colonizing the free persons of colour, under the hope of voluntary exile, what have been the movements of the friends and members of the association ? Under these public imputations, as to their motives, constantly existing in the public prints of Virginia and elsewhere, what has been their course of conduct ? Have they been careful in their speeches at anniversary meetings, or in their annual reports, to avoid touching a subject, producing to us in the South, such exquisite sensitiveness, as the emancipation of our slaves? The coutrary of this is the truth. In less than four years, we find the true feeling and the spirit, which characterizes the Abo- lition Societies, manifesting itself in this association, in terms too strong to be misunderstood. Their speeches breathe a spirit, which if it were to become general, would soon bring to ruin the State, in which we live. Let it. not be replied, that the Colonization Society 123 is not reponsible for the sayings and the speeches of its members. — It is responsible for them all, tor it has, by its own deliberate act, circulated as part of its annual reports, all these speeches through- out the United States, together, with offensive extracts from Reviews, and other publications, and thus it recognizes the doctrines they contain. What difference can it make to us in the South, whether these inflammatory sentiments, are the sentiments of a Society, as a Society, or as those of the individuals of that Society, expressed at its meetings? What stronger proof need we require, of a Society being an Abolition Society, than when the speeches of its most dis- tinguished members, are characterized by animated pictures of the horrors of slavery, and their deep settled conviction that the whole system must be rooted out of the laud? If speeches, and toasts, and sentiments of men assembled together for business or conviviality, do not shew the spirit and character of the particular Societies, or companies, in which they are uttered ; if these be not infallible cri- teria, by which we are to come at the scope and object of these So- cieties, I know not what are. It is not necessary to introduce all that has been said against us in these Societies. Let, however, Gen. Harper be first heard at the seventh anniversary meeting. After depicting in glowing colours, the great social evil, that is eating its way to the vitals of the State, and the folly of a partial removal; and after estimating the number of slaves in the United States, at a million and an half of persons — “ How then, (says he) is that MORE EXTENSIVE operation, which alone CAN COMPLETE the SCOPE of our design, to be ultimately , or ever accomplished. How is this vast mass of a vicious population, to be safely withdrawn from among us, and with justice to those, more immediately inter- ested in their present condition.” He then proceeds to shew, the qualifying circumstances which must attend the removal of these people. General Mercer followed. He only differed from his distinguished friend, in point of time, when application ought to be made to the National Councils, as the affairs of the Society were not yet ripe for such a measure. “ The policy is AMERICAN, throughout.” (The tariff over again.) “ The North has a deep inter- est in he emancipation and colonization of the slave population of the Southern States.” Next rises George Washington Park Custis, Esq. who contends, that they must go at once, to the great Council of the Nation, as the guardians of American liberty, and he would tell them, “ You are the last of Republics : You boast that it is the seat of freedom, of justice, of honour, of high and magnanimous - feeling. The evil we would remedy, is none of ours. It was done before we were born, and it is left for us to undo Lend us your aid to strike th e fetters from the slave, and to spread the enjoyment of unfettered freedom over the whole of our favoured and happy land.” In another speech of Mr. Custis’, which I cannot lay my hands upon, he says, that “ when the Society shall see the stern of the last ship, carrying the last of the free negroes, its business will be but begun.” In all the speeches, the doctrine is inculcated, that “if they are defeated again and again, in their addresses to Congress, 124 this should not damp their ardour, but give new courage for new at- tacks." “We ought, (adds Gen. Harper,) to explain our views and plan, soon and fully ; so that they may be seen and understood by the nation. The sooner, and the more fully this is done, the better; and in no way can it be so well done, as by an application to Con- gress, and THE DISCUSSIONS (mark that) to which it will give rise.” Thus terminates the seventh Anniversary Meeting of the Coloni- zation Society. Now, I ask my fellow-citizens, if these are the sentiments which are to promote the happiness and security of the Southern States. Domestic servitude is the policy of our country, and has been so from time immemorial. It is so intimately inter- woven with our prosperity, as a member of the confederacy, and with our comfort as a society, that to talk of its abolition, is to speak of striking us out of our civil and political existence. It is to re- move from us the only labourers who can cultivate our soil. It is to cut oft' all the resources of our wealth. It is to consent to give up our valuable plantations, our tide swamps, and our prime cotton lands. In a word, it is to surrender the whole of our valuable lower country, to the “ beasts of the field” and the wild men of the forest. And how dare the people of this Society, the greater part of whom at this day, form their crude, and their undigested, and their abstract ideas in their closets, with no knowledge of our country, no ac- quaintance with the habits and pursuits of our people, no experience of our peculiar wants, no consideration of the difficulties of emanci- pation, be it sudden or gradual — how dare such men, the men of Ohio and the Wabash, &c. professing as they do, friendship and good feelings towards us, presume to discuss a subject of which they know nothing, and when their discussions can produce no other fruit than the bitter apple of discord and disunion. Do these en- thusiasts think it a trifling matter to hold out to our slave population prospects which never can be realized ; or do they believe, that when by the discussions in Congress, they shall have kindled up amongst these people dissatisfaction, discontent and insubordination, that they can at all times so regulate its heat, that it shall not come to an awful and a wide spreading conflagration ? Are they to scatter firebrands, and say they mean well. But, not content with indulg- ing in its wild and mischievous schemes of the revolution in public sentiment, which it hopes to bring about by circulating the speeches of its members, the Society employs the Press in another way, as a still more efficient means of bringing about emancipation. It causes to be published at the Seat of Government, under its immediate aus- pices, and for its exclusive emolument, a Monthly Journal, which it styles the “ African Repository,” published “ by order of the Mana- gers of the \merican Colonization Society.” It is in this periodical, that are constantly disseminated the sentiments which are to make the slave dissatisfied with his condition, and the master doubtful, whether he ought to hold in subjection his slave. It is here that we have essays, in which the system of servitude is pourtrayed in colors the most frightful and disgusting. It is this journal in which the 125 tales are to be told, and the anecdotes related, of the cruelty of own* ers to their slaves. And it is here again, that are recorded the exam- ples of those silly mortals who sacrificed their wealth upon the altars of a moral enthusiasm ; who think they aggrandize their country by manumitting their slaves, and thus letting loose beings, neither fitted by education or by habit for freedom, and who must be a walking pestilence wherever they go. It is in this journal, that are constantly expressed, those mischievous forebodings, “that the time must come when the oppressed shall rise against the oppressor with a desolat- ing vengeance.” I know that some of our citizens will be disposed to treat with contempt such predictions, as the effusions of the distempered minds of weak fanatics ; but let them not deceive themselves. The Colo- nization Society, under the specious pretext of eradicating from our country what the people of so many States regard as an evil of the first magnitude, daily acquires strength, particularly in the Middle and Western States, and it has some adherents, strange to say, even in the plantation States. It has even an “ Hieronymus”* from South-Carolina to advocate its cause in Northern journals. By means of the Press, it daily becomes more and more known to the ultra religious of all denominations, and the clergy in general, with- out being aware of what they are doing, give it their cordial support. To these last, it has been recommended to preach sermons on the anniversary of Independence ; but none have been bold enough in the South to comply with the request. The Society is not in the hands of weak men. Henry Clay is one of its patrons, and a very distinguished anniversary orator. Judge Washington, of the Su- preme Court of the United States, is its President. By his circular of the 14th of March last past, we are informed that the Society is to make application to Congress at its ensuing session. It is the Judge who transmits all over the United States “the form of a memorial to which signatures are to be solicited, and to be forwarded to the Congress.” Should a question ever be made in the Supreme Court, whether under the words “general welfare,” money can be voted to a negro society, or a negro colony on the coast of Africa, we may conjecture how this Judge will decide the question, for by his circu- lar, it appears that he has already made up his mind. He declares in it “ that the object of the Society is one of NATIONAL interest.” After so many declarations, and from a quarter so respectable, can any man doubt but that this Society will present itself before the National Legislature. These abolitionists, it is true, are not as well confederated and combined as the manufacturers. In the one case, great pecuniary interests are involved, and injudicious in- vestments to the amount of many millions of dollars are at hazard, in consequence of “ Mr. Canning’s untaxing the British nation.” In the other case, there are no millions of dollars it is true, but there are a million and a half of poor degraded human souls who need restoration to the rights of freemen. The manufacturers may excel * In the controversy in the Boston papers, this writer does m*re harm t# Soutfe- Garolina than “ Vigornius,” the open enemy of slavery, 16 126 in the talent which they will bring to their aid, but the abolition men will not be behind them in their zeal, and their perseverance to ac- complish their ends. They both wiil have their special friends in the lobbies and in the House. They all have their plans of attack well arranged, and they both design to make the South feel its pre- sent colonial dependance. The day then is at hand. The crisis approaches, when Congress is to be called upon to discuss a subject upon which no vote can be taken, which will not amount to an expression oi its opinion on the subject of domestic slavery. Are the plantation States disposed to submit to any such expression of opinion. I trust they are not pre- pared, and my sincere hope is, that should this body presume to legislate on, or discuss this subject in any way, that there may be but one heart and one mind, and that we should cut the knot for- ever that would bind us to the worst of enemies. Of the dangers of such a discussion I shall speak in my next. mo. 26 . Our Senator, Mr. Hayne, has not been an indifferent spectator of the movements of the Colonization Society. With the sagacity for which he is distinguished, lie early perceived that these movements indicated a spirit which was hostile to Southern interests. He has expressed this opinion publicly and privately. To the inhabi- tants of St. Paul’s Parish, he has recently stated “that the whole course and tendency of the Colonization Society demonstrated, (what indeed was openly acknowledged by some of its members, and is hardly now denied by any) that the colonization of the class of per- sons, whose removal was originally declared to be the exclusive ob- ject of the Society, was but the first step towards another great object, which, in his opinion, could never be attempted, (and least of all by the Federal Government) without aiming a blow at our peace aud security." To this sentiment, Mr. Hayne added his firm and unal- terable determination, to resist to the utmost of his power, the right of the General Government “ to embrace a subject which belongs exclusively to the States, and which, in his view, could never be touched by Congress, (whether with good or evil intentions) without producing the HEAVIEST calamities.” As far as Mr. Hayne has had an opportunity, he has acted in conformity v/ith this opinion. When Rufus King laid upon the table of the Senate his resolution to empowerCongress to establish a fund for purchasing and emancipat- ing slaves, our Senator submitted his protest, toget her with a counter resolution. On the petition of the Colonization Society being pre- sented to the Senate, Mr. Hayne again protested. So far has this Senator discharged his duty to his country, and further than this he could not well go under the circumstances. In the co-operation and assistance of such a colleague as Judge Smith, we have the most flattering hopes. The services of this lat- ter gentleman on the Missouri question, are universally acknowledg- ed, and the impression, which it is admitted he then made by his open and manly avowal of his sentiments, and the firmness with 127 which, on that, occasion, he stood his ground in the debate, can ue- ver be forgotten by the people of South-Carolina. The success of Judge Smith’s resolutions in our State Legislature, on the subject of State Rights, was a remarkable triumph of the good sense of the people over that most unhappy influence in favour of Messrs. Mon- roe and Calhoun’s politics, which before had been insensibly car- rying on the State, to the maintenance of doctrines, in which any thing but safety was to be sought I intend no reflections on the small minority on those resolutions. In their ranks, I count names personally known to me, and for whom I have always entertained no common respect. But the best men are often mistaken, — and far be it from me, to consider our countryman, Mr. Calhoun, as not entitled to the esteem and respect of his fellow-citizens. His ser- vices have, on some occasions, been most distinguished, and 1 feel them. But let us hope never to see the doctrines of Mr. Monroe’s administration, in which he bore so conspicuous a part, again in fashion South of the Potomac. South-Carolina, in consequence of those politics, has been the sole cause of a want of cordial Union between the Southern States, as to common interests, to the morti- fication of Virginia, North-Carol ina and Georgia ; and to this may be ascribed their apparent lukewarmness on the present question of the Tariff. It was this same influence, (with shame be it spoken) which caused, three years ago, an outcry against that first of South- ern patriots, Governor Troup, of Georgia, when, like an Ajax, he was covering the sovereign rights of his own State, and of all the Southern States, with the shield of a most unparalleled and un- daunted firmness. The venerable Patriarch of ’76, who had al- ways deplored the secession of South-Carolina from the pale of State Rights, was delighted when he heard of the movements of our Le- gislature on Judge Smith’s resolutions. It was like the dawn of a new day, opening upon the prospects of Union in the South, and in his correspondence with his friends, he hailed it as such, and antici- pated the happiest results from a beginning to be made in that very State, which had so unaccountably abandoned a principle common to all. He thought that Virginia had taken the lead long enough, and that she had better thereafter follow. But, faithful as Mr. Hayne has been in the Senate, and as certain as he is of the co-operation, heart and mind, of his colleague, it is not to be conceded, that the firebrands w