George Washington Flowers 
 Memorial Collection 
 
 DUKE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
 
 ESTABLISHED BY THE 
 
 FAMILY OF 
 
 COLONEL FLOWERS 
 
CAVALRY; 
 
 ITS HISTOKY AND TACTICS. 
 
 By CAPTAESr L. E. Is^OLAN, 
 
 15Ta HUSSARS. 
 
 FIRST AMERICAN, FROM THE SECOND LONDON, EDITION. 
 
 COLUMBIA, S. C: 
 
 EVANS AND COGSWKLI.. 
 
 1864. 
 
1 
 
 E7AN8 & CCM5SWEL1, PRIMTKRS, COLUMBIA. 8. C. 
 
f 
 
 
 
 TO 
 
 LIEUT.-COLONEL GEORGE WILLIAM KEY, 
 
 15th HU33ARS, 
 
 THE FUIENP OF MANY YEARS, 
 THIS WORK IS INSCRIBED, 
 
 WITH AFFECTIONATE REGARD. 
 
 BY THE ALVHOR. 
 
I 
 
PREFACE 
 
 There is, perhaps, no branch of the whole science of war which has 
 engaged so little of the attention of military writers as that which 
 refers to the formation and employment of cavalry; while at the same 
 time it, must he admitted that few branches of the service are rea,lly 
 more important than this. 
 
 On looking, however, closely at the subject, it is easy to understand 
 why this should be the case. The tactics of cavalry are not capable of 
 being reduced to rule, like the mechanical operations of the engineer, 
 or even the slower and more methodical movements of infantry. 
 
 With the ca.valry officer almost everything depends on the clearness 
 of his coup d'ceil, and the felicity with which he seizes the happy 
 moment of action, and, when once action is determined upon, the 
 rapidity with which his intentions are carried into effect. There is 
 little time for thought, none for hesitation ; and, once the movement is- 
 commenced, its successful accomplishment is the only thought allowed 
 to pass through the mind of the commander. 
 
 Much, then, must partake more of the inspiration of genius than of 
 the result of calculation and rule. Still there is a great deal in the 
 profession of a cavalry officer which can be reduced to writing, and 
 which it is most important he should know and carefully study ; many 
 things which his knowing beforehand will enable him to profit by, 
 or, having carefully thought over, will suggest to him, in the hour of 
 need, expedients that no amount of service or of thought would ever 
 enable him to perceive without previous reading and long study of the 
 subject. 
 
 Nothing, however, can well be more difficult than to attain to this in 
 the present state of the literature on the subject. Few, if any, special 
 
 A- 
 
VI PREFACE. 
 
 looks exist, as before stated, treating exclusively of cavalry, and none 
 •ertainly of any importance in the English language, so that the stu- 
 dent must pick out for himself, from the histories of campaigns and 
 battles, or from general treatises ou the art of war, those parts be 
 stands in need of; and as these are seldom written by persons inti- 
 mately acquainted with either the difficulties or advantages of this arm 
 of the service, he must elaborate his conclusions for himself, and often 
 from the most imperfect and erroneous data. 
 
 It is not pretended that the present little treatise will supply this 
 desideratum in military literature, or serve as anything but a stop-gap 
 to supply for a time the place of some more worthy treatise, which, it 
 is hoped, may before long occupy its place. Still the author, having 
 served in the continental cavalry, and with our own in India, and 
 having thought much on the subject during a tolerably extended 
 acquaintance with the cavalry of various nations, hopes that he may 
 not be deemed forward in contributing his mite toward an improve- 
 ment in the literature of cavalry, and in offering such suggestions as 
 he hopes may assist in bringing forward this important arm to the 
 level of the intelligence of the age, and to the improved condition to 
 which all branches of the service must be brought, if they are to com- 
 pete successfully with their rivals in the next great struggle that may 
 take place. 
 
 The sudden transition from peace to war is a critical moment for ail 
 armies, but more particularly to those whose officers are deficient in 
 the theory of their profession. 
 
 Take, for instance, our cavalry in the last great European war ; they 
 were superior to that of most nations in the headlong courage of the 
 men, the quality of their horses and equipments, but unfortunately 
 inferior in tactics; the published despatches of our greatest command- 
 er bear too frequent testimony to the fact that our officers often neg- 
 lected to provide reserves when they charged, or to take other necessary 
 precautions, the want of which entailed occasional defeat upon our 
 troops, in spito of the determined bravery which they displayed upon 
 all occasions. 
 
 A deficiency in the theory of war entails the necessity of gaining 
 experience at a heavy loss of life when war actually breaks out, and it 
 is, therefore, the duty of every officer to endeavor to gain a knowledge 
 
PREFACE. VI 1 
 
 of his profession before he is called upon to take part in that game 
 where every false move is attended with more or less disastrous conse- 
 quences to his country and to the soldiers under his command. 
 
 In this work I have endeavored to gather knowledge from the record- 
 ed experience of others, and to collect from various authors on cavalry 
 warfare much that may assist young ofiRccrs in gaining a knowledge of 
 their profession. At the same time, I hope it may be understood that 
 the introductory sketch of the history of cavalry is not meant to sup- 
 ply the place of what would form one of the most brilliant and inter- 
 esting works on the history of the art of war; but is merely intended to 
 suffice, by stating what has been done, to make it intelligible — what it is 
 thought may again be accomplished, when better understood tactics, 
 and better equipments, have restored the horseman to his proper posi- 
 tion in European armies. 
 
 The remarks on dress, equipment, drill, etc., are merely the appli'^a- 
 tion of the principle of common sense to objects which, though useful, 
 perhaps indispensable, when first introduced, have become positively 
 noxious in the course of time, when they have long outgrown the pur- 
 pose for which they were introduced, but arc still allowed to linger be- 
 cause change in what is so thoroughly organized is always difficult, and 
 sometimes dangerous ; but certainly neither so difficult nor so danger- 
 ous as a blind adherence to exploded theories or antiquated usages, 
 which must eventually be abandoned on the first rude shock of war. 
 
 On the tactics of the cavalry it is difficult to say much that is either 
 very definite or satisfactory; but the use of the arm is generally so lit- 
 tle understood that it is important (even to attempt) to place in a clear- 
 er light what is known and admitted on the subject than has hitherto 
 been done ; and, although the author can not flatter himself that he has 
 produced much to effect this, he hopes he has made a step in the right 
 direction, and pointed out a path which will (as in all other subjects) 
 be of suggestive interest fto many of his brother-officers, and which may 
 be followed with more effect by others who have more leisure and more 
 of those peculiar qualifications than he can pretend to, for successfully 
 handling so important and difficult a subject. 
 
 The work was written as leisure occurred in the intervals of duty and 
 of other avocations, and, as might be supposed in a book so composed 
 by a person little acquainted with the art of book-making, was some- 
 what disjointed in its arrangements. 
 
Vui PREFACE, 
 
 I am indebted to Mr. James Fergr.sson for the present mode of ar^ 
 rangement, as also for sundry hints by \vhioh I have profited in putting 
 the work together; and for bi^s candid criticism and friendly assistance 
 I shall ever feel grateful, 
 
 I also thai;kt'ully acknowledge the valuabld-assistanco I have received 
 from Mr. Charles MacJTarlane, whose loye for the service is well knowp. 
 He corrected qiany prrors in the ^S,, ci,nd saw the hook safely through 
 the press, 
 
 I have conscientiously dravyn out whatever passed under my observa- 
 tion, and in writing of the different systems prevalent in the cavalry X 
 have stated freely, and without resaryo, what I believe to be the truth ; 
 this, I trust, Avill not give offence, or hi^rt the feelings of any individu- 
 al ; and if ipy reijiarks prove useful to the service to which I have the 
 honor to belong, then niy object in \7riting this book will hay« beo^ 
 fully obtained. 
 
 Jinnj and ^(ivy Clv.h^ July 1, 185g, 
 
 \ 
 
Columbia, S. C, 3Ia\j 1, 1864. 
 Messrs. Evans & Cogswell: 
 
 Gentlemen : I take great pleasure in transmitting to you my copy 
 of CI^ptain Nolan's Avork on Cavalry, for the purpose of republication. 
 The work is one which has been warmly received by European mili- 
 tary men, and has been commended to me, no less favorably, by officers 
 of reputation in our army, among whom are some general officers of 
 the cavalry service. 
 
 It gives a concise but very correct sketch of the histor}'^ of the 
 arm ; it then goes into practical matters appertaining to horsemanship 
 and military evolutions, suggesting many new things and improve- 
 snents. Its chief aim is to show that the cavah*}' service, and espe- 
 cially what belongs to tactics, is entirely too complicated, and that all 
 that can be done by cavalry ought to be performed through three or 
 four fundamental manoeuvres. I consider this little work, in short, as 
 one of the greatest utility, and am delighted that you desire to give it 
 into the hands of the Confederate cavalry soldier. 
 
 Captain Nolan, as you may recollect, was the ofSeer who delivered 
 to the officer in command the unfortunate order which led to the 
 charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava against the Russian batte- 
 ries. Then temporarily detached from his regiment to the staff of the 
 English commander-in-chief, Captain Nolan voluntarily joined that 
 now illustrious band, and, leading a squadron, fell, pierced by many 
 wounds. He was deplored in England as one of the most promising 
 and gallant spirits of the army. 
 
 Under difficulties which can be readily understood, you have, gen- 
 tlemen, persistently endeavored to contribute your share to the great 
 work of Confederate independence, and to your excellent military pub- 
 lications the great strides which our army has made toward efficiency 
 and military intelligence must, in a great measure, b;; ascribed. Con- 
 gress has never yet done anything to supply us with military works, 
 and, after a slumber of over three yeai-s, is not very likely to do any- 
 thing. We look, then, to you to continue your efforts, and hope that 
 you may be as successful as your earnest endeavors fully merit. 
 I am, gentlemen, 
 
 Very truly and respectfully yours, 
 
 FEANK SCHALLER, Colonel, C. S. A. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Preface Page v 
 
 Preface to present sdition ix 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 HISTORICAL SKETCH. 
 
 Great cavalry actions of ancient and modern times — English cav- 
 alry under Prince Rupert and Cromwell — The Prussian cavalry 
 under Frederic the Great — The French cavalry under Napoleon. . 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE AUSTRIAN, RUSSIAN, AND PRUSSIAN CAVALRY FROM 1793 tO 1815. 
 
 Battle of Au3terlit7- — Bad cavalry tactics — Battles of Ratisbon, 
 Pultusk, Eylau, Friedland, and Liitzen — Ambuscade of Haynau 
 — Battle of Leipzig — General remarks 25 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 CAVALRY IN GENERAL. 
 
 What makes its strength — The different kinds of cavalry estab- 
 lished in Europe — Heavy, middle, and light cavalry 35 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 LIGHT AND HEAVY CAVALRY. 
 
 Their comparative value or merits — Deplorable effects of over- 
 weighting — Changes suggested for English dragoons, etc. — 
 
CONTENTS. Xi 
 
 Advantages anticipated from these changes — General Warnery's 
 opinions on heavy and light cavalry — Merits of the Prussian 
 hussars— Our cavalry charges at Waterloo, etc.— Performances 
 of the Cossacks — Heavy and light cavalry in the Hungarian 
 war of 1848 and 1849 — Letter from an Austrian officer engaged 
 in that war 39 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE ORGANIZATION OF CAVALRY. 
 
 The man, with his dress and arms, as sword, lance, carbine, pistols, 
 etc. — The horse: the bit, the bridle, the saddle — Alterations 
 suggested 57 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 MILITARY RIDING. 
 
 Early schools of horsemanship — Foreign origin of our military 
 riding — Some absurd practices on the Continent — The balance- 
 seat — Its immense disadvantages — Anecdotes — Changes pro- 
 posed — Horsemanship of the Circassians, etc 84 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 Elementary drill 101 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 On intervals 106 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 Field movements on a new system c 110 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 General rules — Examples — Cavalry versus cavalry — Cavalry with 
 
Xn CONTENTS. 
 
 an army — Attack and defence of positions — Great cavalry at- 
 tack at Eylau — The pursuit of a defeated array — Ilorse-artillery 
 ■with cavalry — The attack in skiruiisbing order — Reconnoitring. .129 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 The makch — Thk camp — The biyouac — The outpost — The 
 skirmish 145 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 The CHARGE; the pursuit, and the rally 164 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 Detached service 167 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 CAVALRY CHARGES AGAINST INFANTRY SQUARES. 
 
 Results which have been obtained — Improvement in artillery fa- 
 vorable to cavalry — Celebrated charges which have been at- 
 tended with success — Conclusion 171 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Cavalry saddle and bridle proposed by the author 187 
 
 Dress of a cavalry soldier 190 
 
 Remarks on the rank entire system 191 
 
 Proposed organization of cavalry 192 
 
 Troop-horses and officers' chargers 199 
 
CAVALRY; 
 
 ITS HISTORY AjSTD TACTICS. 
 
 Chapter I. 
 
 HISTORICAL SKETCH. 
 
 GREAT CAVALRY ACTIONS OF ANCIENT AND MOPERN TIMES. 
 
 The horse, indigenous to the countries of the East, attained at a 
 Tery early period to that development, size, strength, and beauty of 
 form, which he did not reach in any other regions until after the course 
 of many centuries, and the application of numerous artificial means, 
 and an uncommon and persevering attention. It should appear that 
 in every part of Europe the horse was but a ragged pony, or, at most, 
 a rough, stinted galloway, when the horse in Arabia, Asia Minor, the 
 vast plains of Mesopotamia and Persia, was a splendid animal, well 
 suited to the purposes of war, and much used in battle. All these 
 Eastern nations were, in fact, equestrians, and made nearly an exclu- 
 sive use of cavalry in their wars with one another. 
 
 The horses of the East were brought into Europe by the Greeks and 
 their neighbors, across the narrow straits of the Bosphorus and Helles- 
 pont, or were carried across the iEgean sea, from the Greek colonies in 
 Asia Minor. The breed was propagated extensively in Thrace, Thes- 
 saly, Macedonia, and other regions. The Athenians and most of the 
 Greeks imbibed a passion for beautiful horses and horse-racing ,• and 
 more than a century before the time of Alexander the Great the Greek 
 sculptors must have been familiarized with the forms and action of 
 high-bred horses, or they could not have left behind them the noble 
 Elgin marbles. But it does not appear that the Greeks at this period 
 made any extensive use of cavalry on the actual field of battle. 
 
Z HISTORICAL SKETCH. 
 
 The Romans subdued their neighbors by infantry. In Livy's ac- 
 count of their wars with the Samnites and other peoples, we read of 
 cavalry, and war-chariots drawn at the gallop by horses; but it should 
 seem that the horses were few in number and small in size, that their 
 war-chariots were as primitively rude and as ineffectual as those of our 
 painted ancestors in Britain, and that such cavalry never really won a 
 battle or decided a great victory. 
 
 In short, cavah-y was little used by the Greeks and Romans until 
 war brought them respectively in contact with Asia and the contiguaus 
 regions of Africa; and it was in Alexander's campaigns, and the 
 Punic wars, that these nations first learned, from their well-mounted 
 enemies, the value of good horsemen. 
 
 The first formation of the Greeks and Romans appears to ha,ve been 
 the same; they formed their horsemen in oblong squares, or in the 
 shape of a wedge, with the idea that the leading file, carried forward 
 by the mass in their rear, would break through all opposition. This 
 system of charging in a wedge has been since adopted among the 
 Turks and other nations distinguished by their equestrian qualities. 
 
 "When the great Alexander passed over into Asia for the conquest of 
 the far-spreading Persian empire, his army was composed chiefly of 
 infantry, formed into phalanges. The Macedonian phalanx will be for 
 ever memorable in military history ; but there is no distinctive Mace- 
 donian formation of cavalry to share fame with it. Once in Asia 
 Minor, a country of fine horses, and among the Greek colonies thickly 
 scattered from the mouth of the Hellespont to that of the Granicus, 
 and from the mouth of that river onward to the confines of Syria, it 
 must have been easy for the young conqueror to augment his cavalry. 
 No doubt, between his first landing in Asia and his first battle, that 
 arm was both increased and improved. 
 
 At the Battle of the Granicus he made four thousand five hundred 
 or five thousand horse ford the river. The Persians on the opposite 
 bank opposed them bravely, and fought hand to hand, but were at last 
 driven off the field, chiefly, it is said, through the exertions of the 
 Macedonian horse. Yet their manoeuvring at this battle was not in 
 keeping with the spirit of cavalry actions, for their infantry kept pace 
 with and engaged the enemy at the same time and together with the 
 horsemen. 
 
WARS OF ALEXANDER. 3 
 
 Better tactics were displayed three years later at Gaugamela, -trhea 
 the Macedonians had gained experience from the enemy. At this battle 
 the cavalry, seven thousand strong, was formed in two separate bodies, 
 and placed on the flanks of the army. The cavalry of the right wing^ 
 led by Alexander in person, manoeuvred against the left wing of the 
 Persians (composed of horse). Each tried to outflank the other, and 
 the Persians had apparentlj^ succeeded iu this, from their greater num- 
 bers, when Alexander suddenly deployed his deep columns to the right, 
 and outflanked the enemy. In their hurry to prolong the left, to 
 oppose this unexpected lengthening of the Grecian line, the Persians 
 left an opening in their centre. Alexander at once dashed in, divided 
 their forces, defeated, and pursued them off" the field. During the pur- 
 suit a message was brought to him from Parmenio (who commanded 
 the left wing) asking for assistance. Alexander at once recalled his 
 cavalry from the pursuit, and led them toward the rear of the Persian 
 right. Finding, however, that Parmenio had already defeated the ene- 
 my with the assistance of the Thessalian horse, he turned about and 
 followed up Darius. After crossing the Lykus, the men were allowed 
 to rest till after twelve o'clock at night; then, resuming the pursuit, 
 they arrived next day (the da}^ after the battle) at Arbela, a distance 
 of six hundred stadiums !* Here was the rapidity — the dash — which 
 ought to characterize cavalry operations. 
 
 The Persian horsemen greatly outnumbered their foes in this battle, 
 and they were clad in armor; yet they could not resist the close array 
 and speedy advance of the Macedonians. Alexander had his horse 
 well in hand, for in the midst of a victorious pursuit he suddenly 
 recalled and led them to the. support of the left wing, and their 
 untiring pursuit of the enemy, ajfter all the fatigues of the battle, proves 
 that they were capable of the greatest exertions. "With all this, after 
 Alexander's death, the Grecian cavalry sank into its former insignifi- 
 cance. 
 
 With the Romans, cavalry achieved even less than with the Greeks; 
 but under Hannibal the Carthaginian horse did wonders in Italy and 
 on the soil of Rome. 
 
 They first met the Romans in a cavalry skirmish by the Tleinus. 
 
 * Equal to about seventy -five English miles. 
 
 .7; 
 
4 HISTORICAL SKETCH. 
 
 The Roman skirmishers (who were on foot) were speedily driven in, 
 upon which they ran to the intervals, frightening the horses. Some of 
 the Romans were thrown j othfers dismounted to fight on foot (a common 
 practice among them). While the cavalry were engaged, Hannibal 
 sent the Kumldian light-horse to turn the flanks of the enemy and 
 attack him in rear. This gave him the victory. The Romans were 
 defeated, and their commander, P. Cornelius Scipio, was wounded. 
 
 At the Battle of the Trebia the Romans had thirty-six thousand foot 
 and four thousand horse ; the Carthaginians twenty thousand foot and 
 ten thousand horse. 
 
 How different the proportions of each arm in the two armies! 
 
 The R,oman infantry fought gloriously at this battle, as it ever did ; 
 their cavalry fled before that of the enemy. 
 
 The Roman Legions, then attacked on all sides, still succeeded in 
 cutting their way through the enemy, though ten thousand only of 
 these unconquered men reached Piacenza ; the remainder were left on 
 the field. 
 
 The Carthaginian horse won the Battle of Canna? (B.C. 216). The 
 Romans brought eighty thousand foot and six thousand cavalry into 
 the field; Hannibal had forty thousand foot and ten thousand horse. 
 
 The Roman right wing rested on the Aufidus ; both armies had their 
 cavalry on the flanks. 
 
 Hasdrubal first attacked the Roman horse with his cavalry, and drove 
 them into the river. The battle now raged along the whole line. The 
 Roman infantry, as usual, were everywhere victorious. The Numidian 
 cavalry on Hannibal's right were engaged in a doubtful contest with 
 the enemy's horse opposed to them. 
 
 Hasdrubal, who had done his work on the left, suddenly appeared on 
 the right, defeated the cavalry, and, after sending the Numidians in pur- 
 suit, threw himself on the conquering Roman Legions, and, in spite of 
 their heroic efforts, burst in among them, and defeated them with fear- 
 ful slaughter. iEmilius Paulus and more than forty thousand Romans 
 were slain, and most of the survivors made prisoners. Polybius gives 
 the loss of the Romans at seventy thousand men, but attributes their 
 defeat to the fact of the Carthaginians being so superior in cavalry j 
 and he adduces this battle in proof of his assertion, " That it is better 
 
BATTLE OP CANN^. 5 
 
 * 
 to have only half the number of infantry, if you are superior in cavalry, 
 than to be on a perfect equality of all arms with the enemy." 
 
 The wide open plain, now called the Table of Apulia, on which this 
 memorable battle took place, was admirably adapted to cavalry evolu- 
 tions. It will be remembered how -lEmilius endeavored to persuade his 
 rash and ignorant colleague Varro not to risk a battle there. After the 
 combat Varro escaped to the near town of Venusium with only seventy 
 horse. It is affirmed that in all this Battle of Cannoe, in which he made 
 such use of that arm, Hannibal lost only some two hundred horse. It 
 was mainly through his cavalry, and his skill in handling it, that this 
 truly great commander, generally cut off from all supplies from Car- 
 thage, was enabled to maintain himself in Italy for nearly sixteen long 
 years. 
 
 The Roman Legions were so weak in cavalry that, when successful 
 against the Carthaginians, they could reap no advantage from their 
 victories ; nor could they procure provisions and forage for their armies 
 while the country round them was swarming with the enemy's horse. 
 The most detgrmiued bravery on the part of their infantry could not 
 always save them from defeat, and every affair in which they were 
 worsted endangered their very existence. 
 
 Montecuculi says : " The principal act of an army is to fight a battle : 
 this generally takes place in the plains, and then the cavalry is the most 
 important arm engaged. For if the cavalry is defeated, the battle is gen- 
 erally lost; if, on the contrary, the cavalry is victorious, not only is the 
 battle safe, but the defeat of the foe is complete !" 
 
 Hence, also. Marshal Saxe's advice is to shut yourself up and tem- 
 porize when you are weak in cavalry. 
 
 Fabius andL. Plancus, not daring to appear in the field against Ilan- 
 nibal's cavalry, kept to the hills and entrenched themselves. 
 
 In the same way, in the Thirty Years' War, -G ustavus Adolphus would 
 not venture on the vast plains of Poland, but remained in Prussia till 
 reinforced in cavalry. 
 
 The want of cavalry stopped both Alexander and Csesar in their career 
 of conquest. 
 
 The Romans afterwards swelled their cavalry at the expense of their 
 infantry ; but this was at the period of their rapid decline, when dis- 
 cipline, martial spirit, and patriotism, with every other virtue, were 
 1* 
 
6 HISTORICAL SKETCH. 
 
 dying out among them. As the ancient and cherished Legion had become 
 worthless, excellence was not to be expected from the mounted soldiers. 
 The estimation in which cavalry has been held has varied according 
 to times and circumstances. There have been periods (and long ones) 
 in which it has been prized above all infantry, and there have been 
 others in which it has been considered as almost valueless when com- 
 pared with infantry. Of course both these extreme opinions are wrong. 
 Great battles have been won by each arm. But it is foreign to our pur- 
 pose to balance the merits of horse and foot. It is now admitted that 
 cavalry must form a part of every army ; and it is our business to make 
 it as good in its way as our infantry is generally admitted to be. 
 
 History sufficiently proves the necessity of having a powerful body 
 of horse with an army; and also shows that, if cavalry has not been at 
 all times equally efficient or equally successful, it has almost invariably 
 proved irresistible when well organized and properly led. 
 
 At Capua, A.D. 552, the Franks defeated the Roman infantry, but, 
 being deficient in cavalry, they were outflanked and attacked by the 
 Byzantine horse under the Eunuch Narses ; and, according to the his- 
 torian Agathias, out of thirty thousand men composing the army of the 
 Franks, /<;e soldiers only escaped from the slaughter which ensued. 
 
 At the memorable Battle of Poitiers, fought A.D. 732, by the Franks 
 under Charles Martcl against the Saracens under Abd-er-rahman, the 
 cavalry of the Franks, led by Eudo, Duke of Acquitaine, defeated the 
 Moors and entered their camp, doing great execution. Paul the Dea- 
 con (Paulus Diaconus) says three hundred and seventy-five thousand 
 Saracens were left dead in the field; other historians, among them 
 Mezeray, estimate the strength of the Moors at one hundred thousand, 
 and assert that most of these, including their king, were killed or 
 tramrjled under foot by the victors. But, in spite of these assertions, 
 the Saracens left their camp in open day, and retired after the battle 
 across the Pyrenees without being molested by the enemy. The cav- 
 alry was not sent in pursuit, from which we must infer that they could 
 not move with sufficient celerity in those days to follow their more nim- 
 ble opponents with any chance of success. 
 
 In 933, at the Battle of Merseburg, the European cavalry, under 
 Henry I, had greatly improved in organization and tactics. By their 
 compact order and discipline they gained a decisive victory over the 
 
BATTLE OF MERSEBURG. 7 
 
 Hungarian irregular horsemen, who at that time were greatly dreaded 
 in Europe. 
 
 The success of the cavalry was here due to the manner in which Hen- 
 ry had reorganized and trained them ; and it is worthy of remark that 
 light-horsemen are first mentioned in this battle. Armed with cross- 
 bows, they competed successfully with the Hungarian horsemen, and 
 distracted the enemy's attention during the battle by constant skirmish- 
 ing. 
 
 The Magyars, three hundred thousand strong, loft their entrenched 
 camp near Schkolzig and advanced into the plains north-cast of Liitzen 
 to meet King Henry. The battle was long undecided, till Henry, 
 breaking forth at the head of his cavalry, which had been concealed 
 near Schkolzig, attacked them in flank and routed them. 
 
 The enemy was at once pur.-5ued, nor was any respite given to the 
 fugitives till they had crossed the Bohemian frontier. 
 
 History affords but two examples of cavalry being thus successfully 
 reorganized and well commanded in the field, namely : under Henry I 
 in the tenth century, and under Frederic the Great in the eighteenth 
 century. Both these princes, on their accession, found the cavalry 
 badly organized, and in their first campaigns worse than useless; but 
 thej' reformed and achieved with them their most brilliant victories. 
 
 King Otto I, in the field, managed well the cavalry which had been 
 reorganized under his father Henry. At the Battle of Augsburg, in Au- 
 gust, 955, he formed them into separate corps to support each other,* 
 and while he poured his heavy horsemen in great numbers on one point 
 to strike a decisive blow, as soon as he had gained an advantage he 
 sent his light-horse in pursuit, and, gathering up his mail-clad horse- 
 men, struck again and again, till victory crowned his efi"orts. The bat- 
 tle was lost and won more than once during the day; for the Hunga- 
 rians, though their ranks were open and their files scattered, yet, like 
 all good light cavalry, worked well together in their attacks, as if each 
 individual horseman was instinctively animated with the same inten- 
 tion. Like shadows they eluded the grasp of the heavy Germans — 
 never left them — and hung on their heels when tl^ey turned back again. 
 The better generalship of King Otto alone gave him the victory. 
 
 We now go on to the thirteenth century, when the Mongolian hordes 
 invaded Poland; and we find, at the Battle of Liegnitz (April 9, 1241), 
 
8 HISTORICAL SKETCH. 
 
 that the Polish cavalry, all heavily equipped and partly clad iu armor, 
 were defeated by the more active horsemen of the Mongols. 
 
 The armies met in the plains near Wahlstatt. The Polish army, 
 under Prince Henry the Good, and Mizeslav, Prince of Upper Silesia, 
 were marshalled in five corps, of which some in reserve : their oppo- 
 nents formed much in the same way. The Polish right wing attacked 
 and defeated the Mongols opposed to them, but these soon rallied and 
 drove them back on their reserves, which, in their turn, advanced, 
 overthrew the Mongols, and pursued them. Suddenly, however, ac- 
 cording to Polish historians, " a spell, the effect of enchantment, began 
 to work," and their countrymen fled. This spell originated in the 
 quick rallying of the Mongols, and their sudden and unexpected return 
 to the charge when their enemies were exhausted in trying to catch 
 them. Such a surprise was very likely to act like magic upon the un- 
 wieldy horsemen of the West. 
 
 Prince Henry himself now advanced with a corps which had not 
 been engaged : Peta, the leader of the Mongols, came to meet him, but, 
 as before, evaded the shock of the first onset, and returned again and 
 again to the charge ; when his adversaries were fairly tired out, he 
 then, with a fresh reserve (the last one in hand), poured down and 
 swept the worn-out Christians from the field. 
 
 Here, as in the other instance, the Poles followed up their first suc- 
 cess, pursuing the Mongols when they purposely retired before themj 
 again they were spell-bound; and this time it is said that, wrapped in 
 clouds of dust, they were deprived of sight and strength. 
 
 We understand this "spell" also, and so did the Mongols; for, as 
 soon as they saw it working, as one man they turned on their Christian 
 pursuers, and slaughtered them without mercj'.* 
 
 The contact with Eastern nations has, from the earliest times, in- 
 fluenced the progress of cavalry in Europe; and the very tactics dis- 
 played by these Mongolian hordes in the thirteenth century are the rule 
 and the foundation of our cavalry tactics of the present day. 
 
 The improvement of that noble animal, the horse, is comparatively 
 of recent date in England. At least as late as the time of Charles I 
 we looked to the Continent — chiefly to Spain and Naples — for our best 
 
 *Kricgswissenschaftlichen Analectcn, by Captain Ganzauge. 
 
MODERN EUROPEAN CAVALRY. 9 
 
 horses for the manege and war. Our Edward I took cavalry with him 
 into Scotland; and we know what became of the English horse at 
 Bannockburn. The battles in France of our Edwards and Henries 
 were infantry battles, and were gained almost entirely by the English 
 bow. The French had, at times, a numerous cavalry, but it was de- 
 plorably deficient in discipline ; and when they had a few good squad- 
 rons they evidently knew not how to use them. Good horses were 
 scarce, and they had neither the patience nor the money to train the 
 mounted soldier as he must be trained ere he can be serviceable in 
 war. The knights, and some of the regular men-at-arms, rode well, 
 from being constantly in the saddle; but the rest (as we have seen it 
 said of certain modern horse-soldiers raised in a hurry), "not being 
 accustomed to horses, were always falling off." It takes threefold 
 more time to teach a man to ride and to have a perfect mastery of his 
 horse than it takes to teach a foot-soldier his complete drill; and when 
 the horse-soldier is taught so far, he has still a vast deal to learn before 
 his education can be considered as completed. This difiference alone 
 will go far to show how it has happened that the cavalry soldier has 
 been inferior in his line to the infantry soldier in his. 
 
 In modern Europe cavalry first rose into importance when the 
 nations of Germany overran the Continent, and felt the necessity of 
 having numerous bodies of horse with their invading armies; a neces- 
 sity which had not been made apparent while they remained in their 
 own country. 
 
 By degrees European cavalry were clad in armor, formed in single 
 ranks, and each horseman was expected to single out an antagonist for 
 the fight. 
 
 The select French gendarmes, who were cased in heavy armor, 
 greatly distinguished themselves in this manner of fighting. 
 
 To these heavy horsemen succeeded the Reiters, German mercena- 
 ries, who, mounted on faster horses, equipped more lightly, and armed 
 with swords and pistols, constantly beat the gendarmes in the civil 
 wars of France and Flanders. 
 
 The introduction of gunpowder had brought about a change; and 
 the cavaliers by degrees had laid aside their armor, and taken to fire- 
 arms. 
 
 Under Henry II of France cavalry was formed again in oblong 
 
10 HISTORICAL SKETCH. 
 
 squares and in ten ranks. Henry IV reduced their front, and, by de- 
 grees, the number of ranks to six. 
 
 In the sixteenth century detachments of infantry were mixed with 
 the cavalry; and both made to keep pace, and meet the enemy together 
 in battle. 
 
 At the Battle of Pavia, in 1525, the Marquis of Pcscara placed (for 
 the first time) bodies of heavy-armed Spanish musketeers in the inter- 
 vals of the Imperial cavalry, and thus (it is said) defeated the French. 
 
 The practice of mixing horse and foot gained ground ; and as the 
 infantry soldier rose in importance, so did the cavalry soldier sink 
 lower and lower in the scale. 
 
 With the introduction of gunpowder the distance at which contend- 
 ing armies engaged in battle was greatly increased : cavalry could 
 effect nothing with fire-arms, and were kept out of the reach of the 
 enemy's shot; they were of little use, because their movements were so 
 slow that the opportunity for action was generally lost before they 
 could go over the ground which separated them from the enemy. 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus reduced the unwicldly size of the squadrons at 
 the beginning of the Thirty Years' War (1630); he formed them in 
 four ranks, of which the first three charged while the fourth remained 
 in support; he stripped the men of their armor, took from thorn their 
 lances, and made them lighter, more active, and more useful. He 
 formed his cavalry in two lines, and generally placed them on the 
 flanks of the army. 
 
 In France, under Louis XIII, in 1635, squadrons were reduced in 
 front and depth, and in 1766 they were formed in two ranks; they 
 were still unwicldly and difficult to manoeuvre, though they had im- 
 proved by being organized in regiments, and having the heavy equip- 
 ments made lighter. 
 
 The practice, however, of sending cavalry into action supported by 
 bodies of musketeers placed in the intervals, took from them their im- 
 pulsive power, and deprived them of the advantage to bo derived from 
 the speed of their horses. 
 
 It was reserved for Charles XII to alter this stylo of fighting on 
 horseback, and to improve upon it. His daring and chivalrous charac- 
 ter was suited to the spirit of cavalry tactics; he led his horsemen 
 sword in hand against cavalry, against infantry, against fortified posi- 
 
CROMWELL. 11 
 
 tions, over any country ; he acknowledged no diflSculties and over- 
 threw all opposition. Untiring in pursuit, he actually followed up the 
 Saxons under Marshal Schulenburg in their retreat into Silesia for nine 
 consecutive days without unsaddling, overtook them at Sanitz, near 
 Punitz, and, with two regiments of cavalry only, charged them, though 
 ten thousand strong — rode over their infantry, who lay down to avoid 
 the impetuous rush of the Swedes — defeated and drove the Saxon 
 eavalry oflF the field — then returned to attack the infantry and guns. 
 Night alone put an end to the combat, and the enemy profited by the 
 darkness to escape across the frontier. All the guns fell into the hands 
 of the Swedes. They appear to have made a most formidable use of 
 their long straight swords when in pursuit of the cavalry, for the dead 
 Saxons had all been run through the body. 
 
 The period of our Great Civil "War witnessed the introduction of 
 many changes besides those which were merely of a political nature. 
 It was then that our horse first began really to distinguish themselves, 
 and to stand forward as the gainers or deciders of victory. 
 
 The English cavalry under Cromwell and his fiery adversary. Prince 
 Rupert, claim especial notice; for from the numerous cavalry engage- 
 ments of that period many good and useful lessons may yet be gleaned 
 by the cavalry soldier. 
 
 Cromwell, forty-four years of age when he first drew a sword, showed 
 himself a great soldier at the very outset. He himself raised, organ- 
 ized, and disciplined his troops of horse, and set his men an example 
 which they were not slow in following. His mental and bodily energy, 
 his vigorous conceptions, quick decision, and the dread vehemence with 
 which he urged his war-steed into the thick of battle, made of him a 
 cavalry leader second to none in history. Indefatigable and active, a 
 good horseman, and perfect master of the broadsword, he had unbound- 
 ed ascendancy over the minds of his followers, and led them through, 
 or over, all obstacles that human prowess could surmount. 
 
 The impetuosity and rashness of Prince Rupert were no match for 
 the cool courage and presence of mind of Cromwell. The latter often 
 turned defeat into victory; the former lost many a fair field by letting 
 his cavalry out of hand after a first success: and, during his absence, 
 his wary and more able opponent secured the prize. 
 
12 HISTORICAL SKETCH. 
 
 At Grantham tlio Royalists had one-and-twenty troops of horse, and 
 three or four of dragoons.* 
 
 Cromwell drew out about twelve troops to meet them: they formed 
 at musket-shot distance from each other, and the dragoons fired for 
 half an hour, or more. Cromwell then led his troopers on to the charge, 
 sword in hand; the Royalists received him standing, and were at once 
 overthrown ; he followed them up for some miles, each trooper killing 
 two or three men in the pursuit. 
 
 At Gainsborough, after a skirmish with the enemy's advance, Crom- 
 well gained the crest of a hill, and saw suddenly a great body of the 
 Royalist horse facing him, and close to him, with a good reserve of a 
 whole regiment of cavalry behind it. Though taken by surprise, Crom- 
 well led on his horsemen to meet the foe, who were pressing forward to 
 take him at a disadvantage. A good fight with sword and pistol en- 
 sued, till the Roundheads, pressing in upon their adversaries, routed 
 the whole body, and immediately pursued, doing execution upon them 
 for five or six miles. 
 
 Cromwell, however, who commanded the right wing, kept back Major 
 Whalley and three troops of horse from the chase; these he at once 
 formed up, and, observing the enemy's reserve, under General Caven- 
 dish, charge the Lincolners and rout them, he suddenly galloped in on 
 his rear, drove horses and men off the field at the sword's point, and 
 killed Cavendish. 
 
 At the famous and disastrous Battle of Marston Moor, fought on the 
 2d of July, 1644, Cromwell signally distinguished himself, and gave 
 Prince Rupert a taste of the steel of his Ironsides which the latter did 
 not at all relish. 
 
 A junction had been formed between the Scotch army and the Eng- 
 lish Parliamentary forces, and they invested York. Prince Rupert and 
 the Marquis of Newcastle joined their forces to raise the siege, for the 
 possession of this ancient city was of great importance to them in a 
 military point of view. 
 
 The opposing forces numbered about fifty thousand ; they were drawn 
 up with a ditch between them, and did not get into position till five iu 
 
 * The troop consisted of sixty men, one captain, a lieutenant, a cornet, and a 
 g ^quartermaster. 
 
MARSTON MOOR. lo 
 
 the evening; the King's troops f.acing the west, their opponents the east. 
 A long and bloody contest then ensued. At first neither party would 
 give up the advantage which the dam and ditch afforded to those who 
 remained on the defensive, till Lord Manchester moved forward with 
 the left wing of the Parliamentary army to the attack, seconded by 
 Cromwell, who commanded the cavalry of that wing. 
 
 The attack was successful at every point, though a desperate fight 
 took place between Cromwoirs and Rupert's horsemen. Cromwell had 
 kept part of his cavalry in reserve ; these suddenly fell upon the Royal- 
 ists whilst engaged in the melee with him, and completely defeated 
 them. 
 
 The right wing of the Royalists was now closely pursued by horse 
 and foot, and driven far back behind the left wing. 
 
 The exact counterpart to this had taken place on the opposite wings 
 of the contending armies. 
 
 The left wing of the Royalists had advanced, attacked, and driven 
 back the right wing of the Parliament, defeating their horsemen, who, 
 in galloping to the rear, spread confusion and dismay amongst the re- 
 serves of Scotch infantry. 
 
 Lord Manchester only heard of what had happened on his right after 
 Sir Thomas Fairfax's troops had fled some miles on the road to Tadcas- 
 ter; and Cromwell, at once collecting his cavalry from the pursuit, 
 turned and followed the victorious Royalists toward that place. These 
 formed to receive him, were defeated, and fled. Thus Cromwell, by his 
 energy and courage, won the day, after some of the chief generals had 
 left the field, and given the battle up as lost. The Battle of Marston 
 Moor resembles in many particulars that of Zorndorf; both were 
 brought about in the same way, both were gained by the same ma- 
 noeuvre, which Hasdrubal employed at Canute, and Scidlitz at Zorn- 
 dorf. 
 
 These three great cavalry generals were victorious first on the left 
 wings of their armies ,• from there they passed to the right wing to re- 
 establish the fight: and all three then succeeded in the same way in 
 breaking through the enemy's infantry, which, again, in all three cases, 
 fought manfully. Thus these three great battles are reckoned as cavalry 
 victories, for to the horsemen was due the success on all three occasions 
 in question. 
 2 
 
14 HISTORICAL SKETCH. 
 
 Curious that at such distant periods, under such different circum- 
 stances, the same results should have been achieved, and in almost 
 exactly the same manner ! Does this not point forcibly to the necessity 
 of consulting the past, that we may prepare for the future ? 
 
 On the 14th of June, 1645, was fought the Battle of Naseby. The 
 right wing of the Royal army was under the gallant Prince Eupert, the 
 left under Sir Marmaduke Langdalc, the main body under Lord Astloy, 
 the reserve under the King in person. 
 
 Of the Parliament, the right wing was commanded by Cromwell, the 
 left by Ireton, the main body by Fairfax and Skippon. Rupert charged 
 hotly the loft wing of the Roundheads, fairly broke them, drove them 
 through .the streets of Naseby, and continued the pursuit. Cromwell, 
 at the same time, charged and dispersed the Royal horse under Sir 
 Marmaduke Langdale. The Royal infantry, in the meantime, engaged 
 and were driving the Parliamentary foot before them. The fate of the 
 day depended upon which side should first see their cavalry return. 
 Cromwell at last appeared, at the head of his dreaded Ironsides, charg- 
 ed fiercely on the flank of the Royalist infantry, and threw them into 
 irremediable confusion. The fate of the day was sealed : Rupert rer 
 turned too late to do any goodj and the King fled the field, leaving his 
 artillery and five thousand prisoners in the hands of the victors. 
 
 Thus had Cromwell again turned defeat into victory by throwing his 
 Ironsides into the scale at the proper time; whilst Rupert, by his head- 
 long and thoughtless bravery, lost to his sovereign for ever the chance 
 of recovering his crown and kingdom. Had he returned after his first 
 success and attacked the Roundhead infantry, the issue of the whole 
 struggle would probably have turned in favor of the King, for it re- 
 quired the best efi"orts of Fairfax and Skippon to preveiit their infantry 
 from running away. 
 
 A few of the oflicers who served in this war had fought under Gusta- 
 vus Adolphus, and had charged with the Swedish cavalry in the plains 
 of Germany and on the field of LiUzen, where the hero fell. 
 
 For ages the finest cavalry seen in Europe was indisputably that of 
 the Turks. In great part, both men and horses were brought over from 
 the Asiatic provinces of the empire, and the rest of the men and horses 
 were principally of Asiatic descent. The horses, though not large 
 (seldom much exceeding fourteen hands), were nimble, spirited, and yet 
 
TURKISH CAVALRY. 15 
 
 docile, and so trained and bitted as to be perfectly under control ; the 
 hollow saddle was rather heavy, but all the rest of the appointments 
 were light; the soldier rode in the broad short stirrup to which he and 
 his ancestors had always boon accustomed, and on which they had a 
 firm and (to them) natural seat out of which it was most dilficult to 
 throw him; his scimitar was light and sharp, and, in addition to it, he 
 generally carried in his girdle that shorter slightly-curved weapon called 
 the yataghan, with an edge like that of a razor. Some of the Spahis 
 used long lances or spears, but these were always thrown aside, as use- 
 less, in the melee of battle. Their tactics were few and simple. If 
 they could not get in the small end of one wedge, they tried another 
 and another wedge; if they penetrated the hostile line, they dealt death 
 around them — their sharp weapons usually inflicting mortal wounds or 
 lopping off limbs. If the enemy gave way, they spread out like a fan, 
 and, while some pressed on the front, others turned the flanks and got 
 into the rear. Occasionally, to gain time, the Turks mounted some of 
 their infantry, en croupe, behind their Spahis. Thus, early in the Bat- 
 tle of Ryminik, when they had to contend with Marshal Suwarrow and 
 some Austrians, a body of six thousand Janissaries jumped up behind 
 au equal number of Turkish horsemen, and were carried at full speed 
 to occupy a commanding eminence, of which the Austrians were also 
 desirous of taking possession.* We have seen, quite in our own day, 
 this effective and really brilliant cavalry reduced, by the spirit of imi- 
 tation and ill-understood reform, to a condition beneath contempt. The 
 late Sultan Mahmoud must needs have his cavalry disciplined alia 
 Franca, or in Christian fashion ; and he imported a number of French, 
 Italian, and German non-commissioned ofiicers to teach his men to ride 
 with long stirrups, and to form, dress, and look like Europeans. To 
 the disgust and even dismay of his Moslems, he buttoned them up in 
 close jackets and put them into tight pantaloons. "With a most per- 
 verse determination the system has been continued and extended these 
 last twelve years, under his son and successor, the present Sultan 
 Abdul Medjid, and it may now safely be said that the Turkish cavalry 
 is no longer the best in the world. The men, always accustomed to sit 
 cross-legged, and to keep their knees near the abdomen, can not be 
 
 * Marshal Marmont. Travels in Turkey, etc. 
 
16 HISTORICAL SKETCH. 
 
 taught to rido with the long stirrup, a la Fraiuyise. They are always 
 rolling oflf, and are frequently ruptured. They are armed with the 
 lance, and have seldom any other weapon except an ill-made, hlunt, 
 awkward sabre. Their horses are now wretched rosses. The good 
 breeds have died out ; and the Imperial, centralizing tyranny — masked 
 under the names of reform and civilization — which has been raging 
 with more or less intensity these last fifty years, has not left on the sur- 
 face of the empire a man of hereditary rank and wealth, or any private 
 country gentleman, with the means of restoring the lost breeds, or of 
 supplying such good light cavalry horses as existed in abundance at 
 the commencement of the present century. The Karasman Oglus, the 
 Paswan Oglus, and all those great Asiatic feudatories, together with the 
 hereditary Spahi chiefs of Roumelia, who kept up the principal studs, 
 are all gone ! Mounted as chey are, armed as they are, and riding as 
 they do, instead of dealing with European horsemen after the summary 
 fashion of the good old Turks, any English hussar ought to be able to 
 dispose, in a minute, of half a dozen of Abdul Medjid's troopers, train- 
 ed ftlla Franca, though he (the hussar) were armed only with a stout 
 walking-stick. 
 
 The cavalry of the Russians and Austrians improved much during 
 their wars with the Turks ; and of the knowledge thus practically ob- 
 tained the Austrians made good use in their first campaigns agaiustthe 
 Prussians in the Seven Years' "War. 
 
 These Turkish horsemen, without discipline, rushed in like a whirl- 
 wind, in swarms or irregular columns, and swept over all that came in 
 their way, leaving death alone in their track, so cflfoctually did they ply 
 their scimitars.*' 
 
 Neither discipline nor the fire of artillery and infantry could save the 
 Christians from these fanatic horsemen ; their only safety lay in the 
 chevaux-de-frise with which every column was provided, and each bat- 
 talion had two light carts to carry them. 
 
 When in the neighborhood of the enemy the men took the chevaux- 
 de-frise on their shoulders, formed a skeleton column, and, when an at- 
 tack was threatened, they wheeled into lino, fixed the joints in the 
 ground, and fastened them together. 
 
 * Berenhorst. 
 
TURKISH CAVALRY. 17 
 
 To these arraugemcnts the Russians owed their first success agaiost 
 the Turks, as far back as 1711. 
 
 When General Munich marched out against the Turks in 1736 he did 
 not consider the chevaux-de-frise a sufiicient protection, and again 
 armed part of his infantry with long pikes. His troops marched in 
 large oblong squares ; these were at a moment's notice surrounded by 
 the iron spikes of the chevaux-dc-frise, and flanked by artillery. At 
 this impassable barrier tliey received their turbaned assailants, and 
 poured upon them a destructive fii-e in perfect safety. 
 
 No European cavalry, with all its tactics, large squadrons, cuirasses, 
 and lances, ever inspired such dread, or brought infantry to the neces- 
 sity of seeking safety behind impassable obstacles. The Moslems alone 
 inspired sufficient dread to call forth on the part of the infantry a hu- 
 miliating confession of their weakness in the precautionary measures 
 they adopted; for, unless surrounded by these formidable engines of 
 war, the Turks seldom failed to burst in among them, and then handled 
 the sword quick, masterly, and without cessation, until checked by the 
 reaction brought on from the excess of their own fury.* 
 
 With European cavalry they dealt in the same summary way when- 
 ever they got among them ; but to prevent this, the cavalry were formed 
 in masses, with guns and infantry on their flanks ! 
 
 Now, if the individual prowess and skill in single combat, the horse- 
 manship and sharp swords of the Turks, made them so formidable as 
 history here relates, how irresistible would cavalry be which to these 
 qualities should add that discipline and method in which they were 
 wanting, and which was the cause of the disastrous termination of all 
 their wars after the close of the seventeenth century ! 
 
 The Mamelukes of Egypt kept up their high qualities as bold horse- 
 men until they were annihilated at the commencement of the nineteenth 
 century : but they can scaroely be said to have belonged to the Turks. 
 If these brave Mamelukes, drawn from diSerent races and from diflfer- 
 ent countries, but chiefly from the ancient Thessaly and Macedonia, 
 and from the backgrounds of European Turkey which we now call Ser- 
 via, Bosnia, Albania, etc., had been backed by only a tolerable infantry, 
 the sanguinary aff'air at the Pyramids would have been a defeat and 
 
 * Berenhorst. 
 2* 
 
18 HISTORICAL SKETCH. 
 
 not a victory to the French. Single-handed, the French troopers had 
 no chance with those daring horsemen and expert swordsmen. 
 
 While the Russians and Austrians were impelled by the Turks into 
 an improvement of their cavalrj'-, pains were taken by the Prussians to 
 add to the efficiency of that arm. AVherever there was war, or a prob- 
 ability of it, it was seen and felt that cavalry must bear an important 
 part, and that there was much to change or to modify in it. Nobody 
 thought that, while infantry and artillery were improved, cavalry could 
 be left in statu quo. 
 
 Frederic William the Stadtholder and Leopold of Dessau together 
 reorganized the Prussian army, and laid the foundation of that disci- 
 pline which, under Frederic the Great, became so celebrated, and was 
 copied by almost all European nations. 
 
 Frederic William would have tall men for his army : they were kid- 
 napped by his recruiting parties wherever they were met with. 
 
 His cavalry were well drilled to fire in line, both on foot and on horse- 
 back : nothing was done to make them formidable in close combat ; 
 they charged at a walk or a trot. 
 
 When Frederic the Great ascended the throne, he found his cavalry 
 drilled in this way. The horses and men were colossal : they dared 
 not icalk on a bad pavement, or move beyond that pace on uneven 
 ground. 
 
 At the first battle against the Austrians, the Imperial cavalry, which 
 had gained experience in the Turkish wars, charged the Prussians 
 sword in hand, Moslem fashion, at speed, and drove them from the field. 
 The Great Frederic, who did not like the look of matters (at this Bat- 
 tle of Mollwitz), took the advice of his field-marshal, followed the fugi- 
 tives, and only rejoined the army next morning, on hearing that his 
 infantry had stood firm and won the day in spite of the flight of the 
 cavalry. 
 
 When the campaign closed with the conquest of Silesia, Frederic at 
 once proceeded with the organization of this arm of the service. Ho 
 began by doing away with all firing in line, and gave all his attention 
 to making them good riders. Seidlitz formed his hussars in two ranks, 
 and toward the end of the campaign the remainder of the cavalry fol- 
 lowed his example. They were all brought to do what Marshal Saxc 
 laid down as necessary, namely : to charge at their best speed for two 
 
SEIDLITZ. 19 
 
 thousand yards without breaking their array. Many of the old Prus- 
 sian generals opposed these innovations to the utmost; but the King 
 carried them through, for he was convinced of the advantage of impetu- 
 osity in the attack : and his mounted troops, which had been defeated 
 constantly in the first campaign of the Seven Years' War, when thus 
 reorganized and led by Ziethen and Seidlitz, astonished the world by 
 their deeds of arms; not only overthrowing cavalry in their headlong 
 career, but sweeping whole armies of infantry off the field. Witness 
 the Battles of Strigau, Kesseldorf, Rossbach, Leuthen, Zorndorf. This 
 last was the most glorious of all to the Prussian horsemen, who, in thir- 
 ty-six squadrons, under Seidlitz, not only turned the fortune of the day, 
 saved the infantry and artillery of their own army, but checked the 
 advance, overthrew the victorious Russian cavalry, driving it from the 
 field ; then returned to fall upon the Russian infantry, which, prepared 
 to receive the Prussians, fought with the most determined bravery ; 
 and when their masses were broken into by the furious horsemen, those 
 who escaped the sword threw themselves again into masses, and had to 
 be charged again and again. In no modern battle did so many men 
 fall by the sword as at Zorndorf, though the Prussians had been twelve 
 hours on horseback before advancing to the charge. 
 
 At no time have more glorious deeds been done by cavalry than were 
 achieved by the Prussian horsemen of those days. Their arm was the 
 sword ; their trust lay in the individual prowess and good riding of 
 their horsemen ; their tactics consisted in speed and determination : and 
 to this system is attributed not only their wonderful success, but also 
 their generally trifling loss in killed and wounded. 
 
 Seidlitz practised his hussars at going across country, using their 
 swords and fire-arms at speed; and various were the feats to which he 
 drilled his men, in order to make them expert in the management of 
 their horses and arms. 
 
 An anecdote is related of him. When the King inspected his regi- 
 ment, and found fault with the number of deaths occasioned that sea- 
 son by accidents at drill, Seidlitz answered very drily : " If you make 
 such a fuss about a few broken necks, your majesty will never have the 
 bold horsemen you require for the field." It was one of the amuse- 
 ments of this daring cavalier to ride in at speed between the arms of a 
 
20 HISTORICAL SKETCH. 
 
 windmill while working. This feat Seidlitz often performed after he 
 had attained to the rank of a general officer. 
 
 The ancient Greeks followed much the same system as Seidlitz, being 
 convinced that neither man nor horse would be up to the work unless 
 frequently put to it beforehand. " If you wish to have a good war- 
 steed," says Xenophon, "you must try him in all those things which 
 may be required in war. These are, to leap across ditches, scramble 
 over walls, spring up ascents, and dash down descents ; and to be 
 experienced in charging on slopes, uneven ground, and traverse roads 
 or paths. Many horses fail, not for want of ability, but for want of 
 experience in these things. Let them be instructed, trained, and accus- 
 tomed, and they will excel in them all, if they are healthy horses and 
 not vicious."* 
 
 Frederic the Great divided his cavalry in the field into corps of 
 twenty, thirty, and forty squadrons, and made them stand out boldly 
 and alone to play their own part according to circumstances. He 
 wielded sword and sceptre. He directed these cavalry movements 
 with consummate skill and energy ; he let no opportunities pass with- 
 out making his enemies feel the weight of his sword; and the Prussians, 
 thus encouraged by their King, and full of confidence in their leaders, 
 plied their spurs and rode to victory. 
 
 It was a favorite saying of Frederic that three horsemen in the 
 enemy's rear do moi*e than fifty in front; and his generals always tried 
 to attack front, flank, and rear at the same time. In the two first 
 attacks, or in front and flank, they generally succeeded. Hovr they 
 did so has remained a mystery to this day. It, however, appears that 
 they generally seized the moment when the combined use of artillery 
 and infantry, or the use of either singly, had made an impression, and 
 then dashed in ; or that they rapidly gained the enemy's flank and 
 charged home. Out of twenty-two great battles fought by Frederic or 
 his generals, the cavalry, thus employed, decided the fate oi fifteen. 
 
 To his cavalry in action Frederic gave no orders beyond general direc- 
 tions as to which part of the field it was to act in. The moment for 
 attack was always left to the generals commanding the cavalry, who, 
 
 * Xenophon on Horsemanship. 
 
BATTLE OF ROSSBACH. 21 
 
 after securing their flanks and providing a reserve, spurred and start- 
 ed; and, being once started, they pushed on while there was an enemy 
 in the held. 
 
 Bereuhorst (in his Betrachtungen iibcr Kriegskunst) gives the fol- 
 lowing interesting account of the Battle of Rossbach : 
 
 '•The generals were dining with the King at Rossbach, when a cry 
 arose of 'The French arc coming!' They jumped on their horses, 
 and, as if by inspiration, gave the order to fall in, form column, and 
 take ground to the left; they must have been beaten had they awaited 
 on their own ground the well-planned attack of the enemy ; but, with- 
 out any intention of misleading the French, they left the tents stand- 
 ing — for they had no time to strike them; and this accidental circum- 
 stance deceived the enemy better than the most cunningly devised 
 scheme. 
 
 "The right wing of the Prussians stood fast; the other, marching in 
 column by its left, and screened by a rising ground from the view of 
 the French, gained their flank, while the enemy, advancing to liurround 
 the Prussians, suddenly hesitated. Revel (one of the Broglio family), 
 who led the French attack, fell mortally wounded at the first discharge, 
 and left his columns with their flanks exposed, and not knowing what 
 they were to do next. 
 
 " The Prussian army, numerically weak, were full of ardor, the fore- 
 runner of victory ; they despised the French. Those who were moving 
 toward their flank and rear looked upon the whole thing as a good 
 joke; they were delighted at the idea of catching the enemy at a dis- 
 advantage, and in this they succeeded. 
 
 " The genius of the Prussian cavalry sprang forth here from the 
 fields of Reichardtswerben, and led them to victor}'. 
 
 " When the cavalry in order of battle, like a pent-up flood, is held 
 ready, and, at the first signal, poured down in torrents, floods the field, 
 sweeping all before it, then has cavalry reached the ideal of perfection; 
 and to this ideal Seidlitz attained with the Prussian cavalry on that 
 day. Soubise and Hildburgshausen were swept from the earth." 
 
 In reviewing the deeds of the Prussian cavalry of those days, it 
 must be borne in mind that they dealt with infantry, which sought the 
 open plain, advanced in long lines — avoiding obstacles of all descrip- 
 tions, because such obstacles disturbed their array. Their fire was 
 
92 
 
 HISTORICAL SKETCH. 
 
 quick, but not true in its aim, and their squares seldom held out long 
 against the horsemen. 
 
 In those days an individual could often take in at one glance the 
 whole state of affairs at any time during a battle, and thus employ the 
 cavalry at the proper moment. But with the improvements in fire- 
 arms the extent of ground occupied by armies in position has gone on 
 increasing, and to such an extent that it is no lopger possible to over- 
 look the field, and, therefore, more diflicult for a cavalry leader to 
 achieve the same results as the Prussians did under Seidlitz and 
 Ziethen. 
 
 Cavalry must now act more in unison with other arms; for great 
 results are now achieved only by their skilful combinations. 
 
 Since the Seven Years' War cavalry has fallen in general estimation, 
 and has lost that proud pre-eminence at which it stood when it decided 
 the fate of battles. Many gallant deeds have been done in later days 
 by English and Gorman horsemen, as at Avesne le Sec, Tillers en 
 Couche, Gateau Cambresis, Emsdorf, Usagre, Salamanca, Garci-IIer- 
 nandez, and Waterloo; and by the French in many a well-contested 
 field; but they do not come up to the exploits of the horsemen of 
 Frederic the Great, who, held in hand in large numbers, till the 
 opportunity offered or necessity required them to be let loose, then 
 burst over the battle-ground, and swept down all in their impetuous 
 ccursc ; the word on their hearts, as well as lips, being "Charge 
 home !" 
 
 At the commencement of the great war of the French Revolution 
 (1792), the cavalry of our neighbors was very far from being either 
 numerous or good. In fact, as a nation, the French are not, and have 
 never been, truly equestrian. Generally they are bad riders, and with- 
 out good riding there can be no thoroughly good horse-soldier. We 
 do not think that this deficicucy is accounted for by the fact that in 
 nearly all parts of France the ground is tilled, not by horses, but by 
 oxen. We attach more importance to a second reason assigned by 
 General Foy ; the Frenchman's impatience, or what the general calls 
 vivacite {nquiete, may prevent him from identifying himself with his 
 horse, or from learning to ride as he ought. He has, besides, an hered- 
 itary superstition for the long stirrup, and for balance-riding, which 
 never yet carried a man across a rough country without disaster. In 
 
THE FRENCH CAVALRY. 23 
 
 their first campaigns the French had little chance against the German 
 heavy horse, the Hungarian hussars, or even the Walloon dragoons. 
 They seldom presented much cavalry in the open field, and when they 
 did it was usually to their disadvantage. Moreover, the French horses 
 were poor, under-sized, and under-bred. They got better remounts 
 when they conquered other countries with their infantry, artillery, 
 political propagandism, and daring strategy. But the war-horse is 
 nothing without the rider, and cavalry soldiers are not to be impro- 
 vised quite so fast as foot-soldiers.* 
 
 Before the reign of Bonaparte some regiments of heavy cavalry 
 served as a corps of reserve to each army, the rest of the horse being 
 scattered among the divisions of infantry or joined with the artillery. 
 Napoleon tried to give his cavalry the same part to act in battle as 
 Frederic the Great had given to his ; but he organized them different- 
 ly, and widely different were the results. Napoleon's horsemen were 
 not at home in their saddles; they were heavily equipped, and could 
 not move with speed; he therefore formed them into very large masses, 
 which obtained the curious name of Corjis d'Armee de Cavalerie. In 
 these large corps he attached guns to each regiment, and used deep 
 formations for attack; thus his cavalry played a secondary part to the 
 artillery ; its movements were cramped, its approach necessarily slow, 
 and, as it was always heralded by its own cannon, the enemy was 
 seldom taken by surprise (except at Marengo), but had time to prepare 
 a reception which cost the French masses of horse very dear. Still 
 his horsemen, mostly clad in defensive armor, were poured on slowly 
 but in irresistible numbers, and thus, regardless of the loss of life, 
 Napoleon by their means won many a field. Even allowing for all the 
 brilliancy of Murat, it may be doubted whether he had one cavalry 
 leader whom Frederic the Great would have called good. 
 
 Napoleon's cavalry generals often failed in bringing their troops 
 into action at the right time, and often threw them too early into the 
 scale, and so, when a reserve of cavalry might have decided the fate 
 of battle, none was forthcoming. 
 
 They often neglected to protect their flanks or to have a reserve at 
 
 *"La cavalerie u'estpas si facile d improviser que Vinfantcrie." General Foy, 
 Histoire de la Guerre do la Peninsule. 
 
24 HISTORICAL SKETCH. 
 
 hand in case of disaster. In 1813, on the I6th of Octoher, near Leip- 
 zig, the cavalry corps of Latour-Maubourg and Kellermann, about five 
 thousand horses, led by Murat in person, attacked the centre of the 
 allied army advancing by Wachau toward Gossa, overthrew the divis- 
 ion of Russian Light Cavalry of the Guard, captured thirty pieces of 
 ca,nnon, and broke through the line ; but four hundred Cossacks of the 
 Guard, gallantly led, fell upon their flank, and not only retook all the 
 guns, but drove them back in confusion, turning the whole affair to the 
 advantage of the allies. These Cossacks had to gain the flank of the 
 enemy by a path which admitted only of single files. 
 
 At the Battle of La Rothiere the same mistake, and in a greater 
 degree, was again committed by the French. 
 
 The cavalry divisions, Colbert, Guyot, and Pire, having charged and 
 overthrown the Russian division of hussars under General Lanskoy, 
 were preparing to fall upon the infantry, when General Washiltschikoff 
 brought up the Pantschulitschcff division of dragoons at a gallop, 
 attacked the French in front and flank, drove them from the field, and 
 pursued them to Alt Brienne, occasioning the loss of twenty-eight 
 guns to Napoleon's Garde; yet they had plenty of cavalry in the field 
 v/ith which to have protected their flanks, but it only made its appear- 
 ance after the affair was decided in favor of the allies. 
 
 Instances of this sort might be adduced of the English cavalry. 
 
 Charges, gallant and daring in their character, were turned into dis- 
 graceful defeats or dreadful losses by the culpable negligence of their 
 oflBcers in not having reserves in hand to protect the flanks during an 
 attack, or to oppose an enemy coming on with fresh troops. 
 
 In the Peninsula, in 1812, two regiments of English horse under 
 General Slade attacked and defeated two regiments of French dragoons 
 near Llera, pursued them madly for about eight miles, when the French 
 general, Lallemande, fell upon them with his reserves, and routed them 
 completely. 
 
 The Union Brigade under General Ponsonby, at "Waterloo, suffered 
 severely from the same cause : after riding down everything in their 
 way, entering the enemy's position, and sabreing the artillerymen at 
 their guns, they were suddenly attacked by the French cavalry reserves, 
 and driven back with great loss. 
 
 The 3d dragoons charged the Sikhs at Moodkee, and drove along the 
 
INFERIORITY OF FRENCH CAVALRY. ZD 
 
 rear of the whole of their position : not only were they not supporteil, 
 but our own artillery played upon them at one time, and occasioned 
 them some loss. This gallant regiment returned to camp in the even- 
 ing, having lost nearly two-thirds of their number in killed and wound- 
 ed, and eifectcd very little except inspiring a wholesome dread of 
 Eufflish dragoons. 
 
 Chapter II. 
 
 CAVALRY OF AUSTRIA, RUSSIA, ETC. 
 
 Let us here rapidly examine the cavalry of Austria, Russia, and 
 Prussia, as displayed in action, from the year 1792 to the end of the 
 war of the Revolution. 
 
 In their first campaigns the cavalry of the allies surpassed that of 
 the French in every particular. Thej' may not, in every case, have 
 made the best use of this advantage, but it is most indisputable that 
 this superiority existed, and that the allies had it. Their cavalry corps 
 were composed of men essentially horse-soldiers by nature and habit, 
 brave, numerous, well-mounted, and well-organized : their individual 
 superiority was made apparent in every action from 1793 to the close 
 of that century. That the advantarrcs they gained over the French in 
 these numerous engagements were never attended with any decisive 
 result on the campaign, can be attributed only to bad generalship. 
 
 The French cavalry, at last, defeated the cavalry of the Austrians at 
 the Battle of Hochstedt, in the year 1800 ; gained by degrees a complete 
 ascendancy over all other Continental cavalry; and, in spite of its 
 many inherent defects, contributed, in no small degree, to Napoleon's 
 successes in the field, until their victorious career was buried with them 
 in the snows of Russia in 1812. 
 
 The cavalry of the Austrians and English, in 1793 and 1794, achiev- 
 ed at various times the most brilliant successes in the Netherlands. 
 Neither French horses nor French men could stand against ours. If 
 3 
 
26 HISTORICAL SKETCH. 
 
 they met, tlio weaker were literally rode down or rolled over ; but, un- 
 luckily, our horsemen knew little more of their metier than how to make 
 a charge, nor did they always know how to do that in the best way. 
 
 The campaign of 1795 (on the Ehiue) was one of manoeuvres. The 
 French were defeated at Handschusheim with the loss of two thousand 
 men and ten guns, chiefly through the gallant conduct of the Austrian 
 dragoon regiment Kaiser, and the hussars of Hohenzollern and Szekler. 
 These hussars of the period have often been described by old soldiers 
 of various nations (not excluding France) as the very perfection of 
 light cavalry. The most interesting incident in the campaign was the 
 storming of the lines round Mayence, on account of the glorious part 
 taken therein by the Austrian cavalry. Three columns of attack were 
 formed, and to each a few squadrons were attached j a reserve of twen- 
 ty-two squadrons was kept in readiness, and the very moment the in- 
 fantry stormed the lines these horsemen rode in, were let loose on the 
 enemy, and achieved a complete victory, with comparatively little loss 
 to themselves. 
 
 The French lost all their guns, amounting to one hundred and thirty- 
 eight, and upwards of three thousand men; hero one might well say 
 with Suwarrow, " Vii^ent le sahre et la ba'ionnette !" 
 
 In the succeeding campaign of 1796 the Imperial cavalry did good 
 service, and were v.'ell led during the Battle uf Wiirzburg, but were 
 made no use of after they had gained the victory. 
 
 The whole of the French cavalry had been united at this battle under 
 the command of General Bonnaud; the cavalry of the Austrians met 
 them close to Emsfeld, and drove in their skirmishers; Bonnaud, see- 
 ing the Imperial cavalry gradually increasing in numbers, thought it 
 best to charge without loss of time. The French fell on with resolu- 
 tion, and drove back the left wing of the Austrians, who retired on 
 their reserves ; in the meantime fourteen squadrons of hussars burst 
 forth from behind a village, and galloped in on the rear of the French, 
 who were simultaneously attacked in front by the German cuirassiers : 
 the remainder of the French cavalry were then thrown in to the rescue, 
 but the Austrians held twelve squadrons still in reserve, and these de- 
 cided the fate of the day j the French were driven off the field, pursued 
 behind their infantry, and two battalions of the division Grcnier were 
 afterwards destroyed by the victorious Austrians. 
 
BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ. 27 
 
 After tho storming of Mayenee the Imperialists rested on their lau- 
 rels, and concluded an armistice; after Wiirzburg, instead of following 
 up Jourdan and destroying his army, they halted, satisfied with the re- 
 sults of tho day. They stopped at the point which Frederic the Great 
 would have considered only as a glorious starting point. 
 
 Never was so fair an opportunity thrown away; under the fiery spirit 
 of a Seidlitz tho cavalr}' would have swept like a flood over the retreat- 
 ing and disorganized army, and made of Wiirzburg a second Rossbach 
 for the French. 
 
 In 1797 nothing worthy of mention was eifected by cavalry on the 
 Rhine; but in Italy the Austrian cavalry distinguished itself at Man- 
 tua. They were encamped near the fortress. Napoleon, wishing to 
 di-ive them into it, determined to attack. Massena's division succeeded 
 in surprising them on the morning of the 14th of September, and had 
 already entered the camp, when the Austrian cavalry, which had gone 
 out in watering order, returned at a gallop, and (without saddles on the 
 horses) fell upon the enemy and defeated him. 
 
 The allies (in 1805), who had one hundred and seventy-two squad- 
 rons of cavalry at Austerlitz, knew nothing of the position of the 
 French army nor of Napoleon's dispositions, which might have been 
 easily unmasked by a '' reconnaissance en force." 
 
 During the battle they brought the cavalry up in front, while the 
 bulk of their infantry, in four columns, were sent to turn the French 
 right, and scattered over ten or twelve miles of country. This was the 
 cause of their total defeat ; for, after the four columns had been de- 
 tached, they found themselves in presence of the whole French army, 
 to which they could oppose only their right wing and the reserve. 
 Had their columns been victorious on the left, of what use would the 
 cavalry have been ? They could never have cut in on the fugitiA'esA 
 time to prevent the French reaching the defiles of Bellawitz and 
 Schlappanitz ; but had the infantry been in front and defeated the 
 French while the allied cavalry gained ground to their flank, not a soul 
 would have escaped from the field. The French remarks on this battle 
 are most amusing. They say : " Les Russes avaient concu un plan de 
 bataille centre une armee qu'ils ne voj'aient point; et de plus, ils ad- 
 mettaient Thypnthese que les Francais resteraieut immobiles comme 
 des termes." 
 
28 HISTORICAL SKETCH. 
 
 Some of the Russian and the French cavalry regiments of the Guard 
 met in this battle and fought with great bravery; the Russians were 
 overthrown. It is said that many cavalry engagements took place on 
 the right, where the Ru*siaus were well commanded by General Uwa- 
 row, who, with Bagration, effectually resisted the attacks of Lannes 
 and part of the French cavalry under Murat; but of these engage- 
 ments I can find no particulars. 
 
 The retreat of the allies was covered by twenty-two squadrons of 
 Austrian cavalry and some regiments of Cossacks ; these latter soon 
 left the field, but the Austrian hussars of Hesse-Hombourg, Szeckler, 
 and Oreilly, remained to the last. These brave regiments, in spite of a 
 destructive fire from the French artillery, held their ground between 
 Telnitz and Aujezd till the whole of the infantry had passed, and 
 nobly repulsed a brigade of French dragoons which tried to cut in on 
 the line of retreat. 
 
 Often did the Austrian cavalry thus gallantly cover the retreat of 
 their defeated armies, and enable them to take the field again and 
 again. 
 
 After the Battle of EckmiJhl three Austrian regiments of cavalry 
 held their ground against two French divisions. At Egolfsheim, and 
 the following day at Ratisbone, forty squadrons opposed the whole 
 French cavalry, and gave the army time to recross the Danube. For 
 three hours they held them in check by constant and repeated charges, 
 in which one thousand men were killed or wounded, and then effected 
 their retreat in safety through the town by occupying the entrance 
 with some companies of infantry. The French cavalry was command- 
 ed by Bessieres, and Napoleon was himself present, being wounded in 
 the heel at the close of the fight. 
 
 In the first campaigns of this war the Prussian cavalry did nothing 
 worthy of its former reputation. At Jena and Auerstadt it was de- 
 feated, and followed up with such untiring perseverance hj the French 
 horse that the Prussians were effectually prevented from again assem- 
 bling in the field. The French gave them no respite, and pressed on 
 to Berlin. 
 
 The campaigns of 1806 and 1807, in Prussia and Poland, show that 
 cavalry, though numerous and brave, can seldom effect anything great 
 when the armies to which they are attached are acting on the defensive. 
 
JENA AND AUERSTADT — PULTUSK. 29 
 
 When the general's object is to maintain himself in the field only, he 
 takes up positions fr^^m which it is diflicult to dislodge him, but in 
 which the cavalry can act only partially in repelling the attacks of the 
 enemy. 
 
 Beningsen, though forced bj' the plan of the campaign to act on the 
 defensive, made good use of his cavalry at Pultusk : with them he 
 masked the position of his army, and began the battle advantageously 
 on his side J but his example would be a dangerous one to follow in the 
 face of an enemy superior in that arm, for, if they succeeded in defeat- 
 ing the horse in front and followed them into the position, the destruc- 
 tion of the whole army might ensue. 
 
 The Russians were in position between the roads leading from Pul- 
 tusk to Sieroek and Nowemiastow. They had Pultusk with the Narew 
 on their left, the road to Ostrolenka in the re.ai*. 
 
 Beningsen only wished to engage the enemy partially, to retard his 
 advance, in order to gain time to fall back; but the ground was heavy 
 for the artillery, and the advance of the French so quick that he was 
 obliged to engage his whole corps to maintain his ground. 
 
 He formed his army, consisting of sixty-six battalions and ninety- 
 five squadrons (about forty-five thousand men) in two lines, between 
 Moczin and Pultusk. In front of the left wing ten battalions and 
 twenty squadrons were pushed forward under Bagawort, and twelve 
 battalions and ten squadrons in like manner in front of the right wing 
 under Barclay de Tolly.*" 
 
 Two thousand yards in front of his line of battle ho distributed the 
 cavalry by regiments, en echiquier, with wide intervals, and five hun- 
 dred yards in front of them again a line of Cossacks, who stopped the 
 enemy's skirmishers, and obliged the French to deploy their advanced 
 guards to drive them back. 
 
 Lannes advanced in six columns against the Ptussian position. The 
 numbers of the French are differently estimated, but there can be no 
 doubt that they were more numerous than their opponents. 
 
 The Russian cavalry of the left wing drove in the French cavalry 
 which preceded the columns on that flank, and charged the infantry, 
 some battalions of which were ridden over : however, their success was 
 
 * Hist, de la Cavalerie, par L. A. linger. 
 3* 
 
30 HISTORICAL SKETCH. 
 
 only partial; for, though they retarded the advance of these columns 
 of attack, they could not stop them. 
 
 In the centre General Dorochow retired slowly before the enemy, till 
 their columns were within range of the Russian batteries; then the 
 curtain was rent, the Russian cavalry withdrew, and the French found 
 themselves exposed to a murderous fire. 
 
 On the right Barclay de Tolly had been attacked, but had repulsed 
 the French cavalry. 
 
 The French had now brought up their artillery and the remainder of 
 their forces: Bcningsen withdrew the cavalry behind the infantry. 
 
 The Russian advanced corps on the flanks were driven in by the 
 French with the loss of some guns which they afterwards recovered. 
 The flanks were reinforced with cavalry and infantry, and the Russian 
 army formed in three lines: the first deployed, the second in columns, 
 the third composed of cavalry. 
 
 The left wing, supported by twenty squadrons, then advanced, 
 charged, and drove the French back. On the two sides upward of 
 three thousand men were killed and wounded, and the Russians made 
 seven hundred prisoners. 
 
 The Battle of Eylau, which succeeded in the campaign, Avas remark- 
 able for the grand charge of cavalry under Murat, who led seventy-two 
 squadrons forward against the Russian position ; but this I shall have 
 occasion to speak of hereafter. 
 
 After Eylau a cavalry engagement of some consequence took place ; 
 the French having upward of forty squadrons in the field. They were 
 defeated and driven across the Trischinz in disorder by the Russian 
 horse. 
 
 On the 5th, 6th, and 7th of June the allies had good opportunities of 
 using their numerous cavalry to advantage, but they failed to avail 
 themselves of them. 
 
 On the 10th of June, 1807, at the Battle of Heilsberg, the allies had 
 two hundred and five squadrons, of which twenty-seven squadrons 
 were Prussian, the remainder Russian. With such a numerous body of 
 horse at their command, the army took up a defensive position ; strong 
 certainly, but one in which their superiority in cavalry proved of no 
 avail. 
 
 The Russian horse were in reserve the greater part of the day. The 
 
BATTLE OF LUTZEN. 31 
 
 Prussians behaved well, and executed some gallant charges; but the 
 battle was undecided. The allies remained in position during the 11th, 
 and in the evening retired toward Bartenstein. 
 
 Then succeeded the Battle of Friedland, where the allies exposed 
 their cavalry in line to the destructive fire of the French batteries 
 during the greater part of the day ; and, when they had been well 
 shaken and pounded, the French cavalry charged and defeated them. 
 
 In these campaigns the constant system of defensive warfare, the 
 making cavalry replace infantry in battle, and uselessly exposing them 
 to the fire of artillery, so demoralized and discouraged that of the allies, 
 that in 1812 they could hardly be brought to face the French horse. 
 
 In 1813, at Liitzen, very favorable ground for the action of cavalry 
 gave Napoleon the impression that the allies were at last about to avail 
 themselves to some purpose of the eighteen thousand horsemen they 
 had in the field. To these Napoleon could only oppose five thousand 
 mounted soldiera : for his old cavalry, inured to war and accustomed to 
 victory, had been entirely destroyed the preceding 3" ear in Russia ; and 
 all his power, resources, and genius had been exerted in vain to replace 
 them ; and so conscious was he of the danger of meeting the numerous 
 cavalry of the enemy in the open field, that, on hearing that Ney had 
 been attacked, he moved up the troops to his assistance, formed in large 
 squares of several regiments of infantry, with artillery on their flanks 
 and cavalry in the rear. 
 
 When the battle began Ney was alone on the ground: he threw his 
 infantry into the villages, and maintained himself there in spite of all 
 the efforts made to dislodge him. The allies grew obstinate and perse- 
 vered, feeding the fight with more and more infantry, till their place in 
 line was obliged to be filled up with regiments of cavalry, which were 
 apparently forgotten while this contest on foot was carried on. During 
 this time Napoleon brought the whole of his army into line, and his ar- 
 tillery made great havoc among the imposing army of German and 
 Russian cavalry with which the background of the picture was filled up. 
 
 The day closed in ; the troops were tired out; all the infantry, with 
 the exception of the Russian Guard, had been engaged, while the French 
 had still fresh troops at hand for any emergenc3^ 
 
 The allies had a reserve of fifty squadrons of Russian horse, but the 
 opportunity for using them had passed away : they could do nothing 
 
32 HISTORICAL SKETCH. 
 
 against the Frouch, who were established in broken ground, with a bat- 
 tery of sixty guns ia position. 
 
 According to Frederic the Great, villages should be occupied only 
 for defensive purposes. An army acting on the offensive should lose no 
 time in contesting their possession, if they can gain their point by turn- 
 ing the enemy's position. 
 
 Had the allies done this, and pushed forward their cavalry to attack 
 the French corps in the plains while coming up to Ney's assistance, the 
 result might have been widely different; and had they been successful, 
 Ney's corps must have laid down its arms. 
 
 That the French infantry of that year were incapable of meeting the 
 German cavalry successfully in the open field, was proved by Colonel 
 DolCs, shortly afterwards, at Haynau, where, at the head of twenty 
 squadrons of Prussian cavali-y, he attacked General Maison's division, 
 formed in eight squares and protected by eighteen guns, and in less 
 than fifteen minutes swept over them, killing, wounding, or making 
 prisoners the whole force and capturing their guns. The only men that 
 escaped were a detachment of French cavalry who took care to get a 
 good start. 
 
 With all this, when the French were defeated at Leipzig, they made 
 good their retreat, though the allies had eighty thousand cavalry in the 
 field ! This is not to be satisfactorily accounted for by the intervention 
 of a petty river and the blowing up of a bridge by the French. 
 
 In 1814, when the allies, fighting on the soil of France, defeated Na- 
 poleon at LaKothiere, they allowed his army to escape again, although 
 they were themselves strong in horse. 
 
 In 1815, after the defeat at Waterloo, though the Prussian cavalry 
 started in pursuit of the French from the field, the French soldiery not 
 only escaped in large numbers, and rallied beyond Paris, but their cav- 
 alry, at Versailles, defeated and made prisoners an entire brigade of 
 Prussian horse. 
 
 Cavalry is often doomed to total inaction in battle from the manner 
 in which armies are formed for the fight. Generals attempt to use armies 
 as they would machinery, quite forgetting that such different compo- 
 nent parts as infantry, cavalry, and artillery can not always work to- 
 gether. A happy combination of the three, or a grand coup struck by 
 cavalry alone, is rather a rarity in modern warfare. Isolated gallant 
 
CONFUSION IN ACTION. 33 
 
 charges of cavalry are heard of (as, for example, the charge of the 3d 
 Dragoons at Moodkee, and that of Major Unett's squadron at Chillian- 
 wallah) ; but such charges, though executed with the greatest energy, 
 never go beyond the limits of what is expected of thoso detachments of 
 cavalry which are attached to each division of the army in the field. 
 Thus we see a display of gallantry, and even of skill, without any 
 grand result. 
 
 The fact is, modern tactics hold the cavalry in leading-strings. The 
 system is a timid one, and made up of "ifs " and " buts" — xcords which 
 ought to be unknown to cavalry soldiers. 
 
 Instead of trying at once to strike home when the opportunity oflFers — 
 instead of pouring the whole cavalry of the army on the enemy's flanks or 
 rear, they fritter away their strength, march and countermarch, advance 
 perhaps one-third of their force against the enaemy, keeping two-thirds 
 in reserve to guard against unknown dangers. They attack under 
 cover of batteries established to insure them against the ill conse- 
 quences of failure, etc. In short, examples of successful cavalry ac- 
 tions (we mean simply and purely cavalry actions) are to be found only 
 in few and isolated instances, where the horsemen, acting on the spur 
 of the moment, and forgetting their tactics altogether, were led away 
 by the bold example of some chivalrous leader. Such was the case when 
 Murat attacked the Austrians near Dresden, leading part of his cavalry 
 round their left flanks while the remainder attacked in front. Murat 
 fell upon them from both sides at once, and, sword in hand, captured 
 sixteen guns and made fifteen thousand prisoners. This was, assuredly, 
 one of the most brilliant cavalry actions of modern times. 
 
 A curious circumstance, and one worthy of remark, is, that in the late 
 wars, wherever the cavalry were made use of in large bodies, the greatest 
 confusion generally ensued: for instance, at Craonne the Russian cav- 
 alry, though successful in their first charge, got into such disorder, and 
 so mixed up together, that the whole mass was withdrawn in confusion 
 from the field, to save it from destruction. Luckily for them the French 
 cavalry, under Nansouty, were far away on the right flank when this 
 happened, or they would hardly have effected their retreat in safety. 
 
 This confusion in action may be partly accounted for by the depth of 
 the formations, the number of lines ranged one behind the other when 
 going into action, the uniformity in the dress of the different regiments 
 
34 HISTORICAL SKETCH. 
 
 engaged, and the large squadrons which, once dispersed, can rally only 
 with the greatest difliculty, and always require a long time to do so. 
 
 Lines of cavalry following each other must get into disorder if any 
 part of them be driven in by the enemy, for there are no outlets for the 
 fugitives. 
 
 The cavalry of Frederic the Great generally doubled the extent of 
 their intervals when advancing; their second line was only partly 
 deployed : it followed in echelon, or with intervals the breadth of a 
 squadron. 
 
 The infantry of those days formed in line, and brought every musket 
 into play against cavalry charging them. 
 
 We English pride ourselves on having adhered to this system: and 
 after the French had, in columns and masses, walked over every army 
 in Europe, they were defeated by our lines of infantry in the Peninsu- 
 la. The French cavalry, led on by Lasalle, Montbrun, Latour-Maubourg, 
 Valmy — all cavalry generals of high renown — drew back and shrunk 
 from their fire ; and the British foot-soldier remained unconquercd, and 
 gained many a laurel-wreath, though he did stand and fight in line ! 
 
 Yet neither lines nor masses of infantry stopped Seidlitz and his glo- 
 rious horsemen. At Kunersdorf and Zorndorf there stood opposed to 
 him, for every yard of ground, ten or twelve infantry soldiers. 
 
 The want of success on the part of cavalry in later years can not, 
 therefore, with justice be attributed to the diflferent formations of the 
 infantry : and I would fain ask whether the ground Avas less good, or 
 circumstances less favorable for the employment of cavalry, at Lutzen, 
 Dresden, Leipzig, and Craonne, than at Rossbach or at Zorndorf? 
 
 The humiliating confession is forced upon us that, if cavalry have 
 fallen from their high estate, they can blame only themselves and their 
 own tactics. 
 
CAVALRY IN GENERAL. 35 
 
 Chapter III. 
 
 CAVALRY IN GENERAL. 
 
 It must be admitted that in modern warfare we have rarely seen the 
 happy combination of excellent cavalry commanded by a perfect cavalry 
 officer. The passage is somewhat inflated, according to the genius of 
 the language in which it is written; yet General Foy scarcely exagger- 
 ates the amount and union of qualities requisite to form a first-rato 
 cavalry leader. 
 
 " Apres les qualites necossaires au commandant en chef, le talent de 
 guerre le plus sublime est celui du general de cavalerie. Eussiez-voua 
 un coup-d'oeil plus rapide etun eclat de determination plus soudain que 
 le coursier emporte au galop, ce n'est rien si vous ne joignez la vigueur 
 de la jeunesse, des bons yeux, une voix retentissantc, I'adresse d'un 
 athlete, et I'agilite d'un centaure. Avant tout, il faudra que le ciel vous 
 ait depart! avec prodigalite cette faculte precieuse qu'aucune ne rem- 
 place, et dont il est plus avare qu'on no le croit communement, la bra- 
 voure."* 
 
 Of all arms, cavalry is the most difficult to handle in the field. 
 
 It can not engage an enemy except where the ground is favorable. 
 
 It is always dependent on the condition of its horses. 
 
 It is easily dispersed, and it easily gets out of hand. 
 
 However brave and intrinsically good, it is of no use without good 
 officers. 
 
 The qualities requisite in a cavalry leader are, a good eye for country, 
 and a quick one for the enemy's movements, great energy, courageous 
 decision, and rapid execution. 
 
 No wonder, therefore, that cavalry has not always developed its power 
 and resources in the field; for, placing all other considerations aside, 
 how few examples does history aflford of cavalry being well led and 
 commanded ! When well led it has been invariably successful. 
 
 Cavaly ought to be at once the eye, the feeler, and the feeder of an 
 army. With good cavalry an army is in comparative security, and in a 
 
 * Iliatoii'e de la Guerre de la Peninsule. 
 
36 CAVALRY IN GENERAL. 
 
 condition to marcli into and subsist upon an enemy's country. It reaps 
 the fruits of victory, covers a retreat, and retrieves a disaster. 
 
 With it the effects of a defeat are not always fatal, and with it the 
 army can again resume the offensive. 
 
 In defensive warfare it has seldom achieved great deeds, for to act a 
 passive j^art in war is contrary to the spirit of cavalrj' tactics. 
 
 When badly organized and badly led, the more numerous it is the 
 more useless. [Witness the engagements of Mcdellin, Ciudad Ileal, 
 Ocafia, and Alba de Tormes, where the Spanish horse fled the field, and 
 left their infantry to be cut down by the victorious French.] It eats up 
 the supplies of the army, and is in battle a dangerous ally. It gets out 
 of hand in action, and, instead of injuring the enemy, entails defeat on 
 itself and on the army to which it belongs. 
 
 Wc have seen that individual prowess, skill in single combat, good 
 horsemanship, and sharp swords, render all cavalry formidable. 
 
 That light and active horsemen have, in the long run, prevailed over 
 heavily-equipped cavalry, and that speed and endurance are qualities to 
 be highly prized in the horseman. 
 
 Therefore, if these views be correct, then our European cavalry is not 
 organized on an efficient system. 
 
 For the present riding drill makes few good horsemen. 
 
 The swords, blunted by steel scabbards, are not efficient weapons. 
 
 Speed and endurance can not be expected from horses that are over- 
 weighted. 
 
 Celerity and precision of movement can not be attained with large, 
 unwieldy squadrons. 
 
 Nor can decision be expected on the part of the leaders, under a sys- 
 tem of " Pivot Flanks/' and "Right or Left in Front." 
 
 There are three kinds of cav.alry now established in Europe — Heavy 
 Cavalry, Dragoons, and Light Cavalry. 
 
 The different size, strength, and qualities of men and horses seem to 
 require them to be thus divided into heavy, middle, and light; for a 
 horse physically unfit to carry a cuirassier would be lost to the service 
 unless made use of in the dragoons or in the light cavalry. And where 
 
HEAVY CAVALRY. 37 
 
 there exists a difficulty in finding suflScient horses for the purposes of 
 war, a system by which the greater number of animals can be made 
 available is the one which has been generally adopted. 
 
 The nations of the European Continent, who take the field with large 
 armies, require a numerous cavalry : they can not have them all good; 
 some can not obtain horses, others can not afford the heavy expense, 
 and thus they are of necessity reduced to a system of expedients. 
 But England, rich in men, money, and, above all, in horses, should, in 
 this particular, avoid imitating foreign armies, and instead of reducing 
 her cavalry to a par with those on the Continent, she ought to make her 
 own cavalry so superior as to defy comparison and all competition. 
 
 The Heavy, Middle, and Light Cavalry have different parts assigned 
 to them in war, not one of them being fit to perform all the duties re- 
 quired of horse-soldiers in the field. 
 
 Heavy Cavalry, 
 
 Composed of large men in defensive armor, mounted on heavy, power- 
 ful horses, are held in hand for decisive charges on the day of battle, 
 and their horses are so deficient in speed and endurance (being so over- 
 weighted) that they require light horse to follow up the enemy they 
 have beaten. The greatest possible care is taken of this sort of cavalry 
 in the field. They do no outpost duty, no foraging, no reconnoitring : 
 they can not be made use of even to escort a convoy, because, if kept 
 out long on the road, their horses fall off in condition, and become in- 
 capable of carrying their riders. They are calculated only to show an 
 imposing front in the line of battle, and their history proves them to be 
 more formidable in appearance than la reality. 
 
 Dragoons 
 
 Wore originally intended to be a sort of hybrid corps, or infantry 
 mounted on horses, in order that flike the Janissaries in Suwaroff 's war) 
 they might arrive with more expedition at the position in which they 
 were to fight on foot; and in a battle they formed line and acted with 
 the infantry. At first they were denominated Arquebusiera a Cheval; 
 afterwards they were named dragoons by the famous Count of Mans- 
 feldt, in comparison with the imaginary dragons represented as spitting 
 fire and being swift on the wing. The Swedes first used them as light 
 4 
 
38 CAVALRY IN GENERAL. 
 
 horse against the Croats, a light cavalry of the Austrian Emperor. At 
 a much later period the English and ILanoverians mounted them ou 
 powerful horses, substituted trumpets for the drums then in use; and 
 thus, by degrees, the dragoons took a higher place with the cavalry. 
 Still later they were, however, expected to act both as horse and foot 
 soldiers. It was a favorite project of Napoleon thus to organize them 
 for both services ; but after much loss of time and great expense, find- 
 ing it did not answer, he took away their muskets and bayonets, and 
 gave them carbines ; and thoy were reorganized and sufficiently well 
 mounted to charge with advantage, being at the same time lightly 
 equipped, in order that they might be serviceable as skirmishers, for- 
 agers, etc. The difficulty of Napoleon's first intention is easily under- 
 stood, if we consider the time required to form a cavalry soldier and the 
 time required to form an infantry soldier. If we succeeded in bringing 
 a body of men, in time of peace, thoroughly to understand the duty of 
 both, how could we keep our regiments of dragoons complete iu time of 
 war? How could we then find time for this long double drill and 
 training ? Then, again, bring your regiment of dismounted dragoons 
 into action, and what would follow ? It would be less numerous than 
 a real infantry corps opposed to it; the long swords and spurs of the 
 dragoons would be in their way, particularly if skirmishing; and should 
 a few '^f the enemy's light horsemen make a dash at the led horses, the 
 dragoons would run a good chance of becoming only infantry for the 
 remainder of the campaign. Dismounted cavalry have done good ser- 
 vice in covering a retreat, in defending defiles and passes against caval- 
 ry, and in pushing forward to seize bridges, and halting to maintain 
 them ; but they would be quite out of place if used in storming posi- 
 tions, or if expected to take their post in line of battle with the infantry. 
 
 Light Cavalry. 
 The service required of these is the most important iu the field. They 
 are called upon to watch over the safety of the army, and they are con- 
 stantly hovering in advance, on the flanks, and iu the rear of the col- 
 umns, to prevent all possibility of surprise on the part of the enemy. 
 In enclosed countries they are supported by light infantry : in the open 
 country the light cavalry push on and keep the enemy at a proper dis- 
 tance from the army; they are constantly employed in cutting ofif the 
 
SPEED PREFERABLE TO WEIGHT. 39 
 
 enemy's supplies and communications, in reconnoitring, etc. This 
 varied and often hnpromptu work requires a combination of numerous 
 qualities in officers and men. And, in addition to all these duties, 
 peculiarly their own. they often have to perform also those expected of 
 the heavy cavalry : and with what success they have done this I shall 
 presently endeavor to show. 
 
 Chapter IY. 
 
 LIGHT and heavy CAVALRY. 
 
 "Armor protects the wearer, and prevents him from injuring others."* 
 
 The power of heavy cavalry lies in the strength and breeding of the 
 horse, and the courage and activity of the rider. The size of the rider, 
 his cuirass, defensive armor, and heavy equipments, detract from the 
 speed and lasting qualities of the horse, and only render the man help- 
 less; for they impede and unfit him for any exertion in which activity 
 and endurance are necessary. 
 
 If a heavy-armed horseman gallops and exerts himself only for a few 
 minutes, the horse is beat by the weight, and the rider is exhausted in 
 supporting himself and his armor in the saddle ; his sword-arm hangs 
 helplessly by his side; he can hardly raise his heavy broadsword : such 
 a man is at the mercy of any light horseman that may turn upon him. 
 
 Speed is more than weight : in proportion as you increase weight you 
 decrease speed, and take from your cavalry that impetus which ought 
 to be its principal element. "We are not the only military nation who 
 have committed this error. With horses far inferior to ours — inferior 
 both in size and in breed — our neighbors have gone for weight. In the 
 last war the French cuirassiers were reduced to charge at a trot, their 
 horses being unable to carry such weight at a quicker pace. In their 
 attacks on an enemy's position, the losses they sustained from the want 
 of speed were frequently awful. Under the improved fire of the artillery 
 
 * This saying is attributed to one of the German emperon. 
 
40 LIGHT AND HEAVY CAVALRY. 
 
 and infantry of the present day, these slow attacks never could be 
 carried out at all. 
 
 Heavy Russian cuirassiers, when opposed to the Turks, were obliged 
 to form in close columns or in squares, requiring artillery and infantry 
 to protect them from the sharp scimitars of the Moslem. These Turks 
 had no discipline, no lances — had nothing but their good swords and 
 steeds to trust to. 
 
 And what, in battle, is the real value of the cuirass or other ponder- 
 ous defensive armor for the body? So long as arms, legs, and heads 
 are unprotected, it signifies little that the chest be covered with armor, 
 for the moment either of the horseman's arms is wounded (it signifies 
 not which arm) he is at the mercy of bis adversary. 
 
 The weight of the armor only renders it more difficult for the cuiras- 
 sier to defend himself against a man who is free from encumbrances, 
 and who, if furnished with a proper sword, can lop off a limb or kill his 
 opponent's horse at one blow. 
 
 The nations of the Continent, as I have previously observed, can not 
 obtain sufficiently well-bred horses of the required size and power, and 
 they are therefore obliged to mount their heavy dragoons on large, 
 clumsy, and slow horses. To make the best of a bad job, when their 
 men are thus mounted they case them in armor, in order that they may 
 have a better chance of reaching the point of attack alive, that they may 
 be inspired with confidence as to the protective power of their shining 
 breastplates, and that they may work upon the nerves and imagination 
 of the enemy by their imposing appearance as " men in armor." But 
 the brave light horseman soon finds out that, whatever they may be to 
 the eye, they are in action scarcely more formidable than the men in 
 armor who ride (or used to ride) once a year in My Lord Mayor's show. 
 
 England, if reduced to mount her heavy dragoons on Barclay and 
 Perkins' dray-horses, would most likely do the same as the French, or 
 arm the men cap-a-xiied ; but, whilst no dearth of horses has yet 
 reduced her to this expedient, it \^ truly pitiful that she should copy 
 from such bad originals as the Continental cuirassiers ! The Prussian 
 major-general of hussars, Warnery, in speaking of the English cava\ry, 
 says: 
 
 "The English have everything which can be desired to form an ex- 
 cellent body of cavalry of all species j their light dragoons might, and 
 
ADVANTAGE OF LIGHT ACCOUTREMENTS. 41 
 
 do, surpass everything which we have ever seen of that nature; and, 
 as their cavalry is not numerous, they have the greater facility in being 
 select in its composition, both in men and in horses, without being 
 obliged to have recourse to other nations, or to look out of their own 
 island — an advantage which few countries possess." 
 
 If England could mount her cavalry on horses combining more power 
 and size than any in Europe, with more breed, speed, and activity than 
 any now in Asia, she ought to endeavor to adopt a system which, in 
 giving full scope to their excellence, would enable the English horse to 
 bear down and ride over the disciplined resistance of Continental troops. 
 By taking a lesson from the Asiatics, she might so arm and instruct her 
 dragoons as to make them equal to any of the people of the East in 
 single combat. 
 
 Heavy cavalry should have the largest and most powerful horses, but 
 the men and their accoutrements should be light. If you weight the 
 powerful horses with heavy men and accoutrements, you bring them 
 down to a level with smaller and weaker horses. Thus a great heavy 
 man in armor, on a fine strong horse, could not catch or ride down o 
 Cossack on a good pony; but the same horse, with a light active man 
 on his back, would ride down a dozen of such Cossacks, one after the 
 other. 
 
 In a charge, the same horses with light weights will, by their speed 
 and impulsive power, ride down or over obstacles which would certainly 
 stop them if heavily weighted. The heavier the man, the less available 
 the high qualities of the horse, and the less formidable the man on his 
 back. 
 
 What (except, perhaps, the want of opportunity) is to prevent our 
 armor-clad Household cavalry from meeting with the same fate at the 
 hands of some active and determined light horsemen, as befell the brave 
 French cuirassiers when they were shot and speared off their horses by 
 the Cossacks? 
 
 If English dragoons were properly organized, properly furnished 
 with offensive weapons, and duly impressed or imbued with confidence 
 in the strength and speed of their horses, in their own riding, and in 
 the destroying power of their swords, no numbers eould daunt them. 
 A few such men could hang like shadows round an enemy's cavalry 
 column, reconnoitre their movements, approach, dismount, and pick off 
 4* 
 
42 LIGHT AND HEAVY CAVALRY. 
 
 their officers ; while the enemy could neither catch them nor drive them 
 awaj'. Then, again, in an emergency, our Englishmen could make their 
 way across country where no foreign dragoons could ride and follow. 
 
 Arm and form your men according to the system which I propose, 
 and which will be detailed in another chapter, and, in my humble opin- 
 ion, you go far to secure the following advantages: 
 
 When acting in bodies, no rattling of swords' scabbards would an- 
 nounce their approach to the enemy, and prevent the words of command 
 of their own officers from being heard. 
 
 No unwieldly squadrons would prevent a speedy advance over diffi- 
 cult ground, or exhaust the horses by pressure in the ranks, causing 
 confusion, and occasioning breaks and gaps in the line. 
 
 No cavalry could withstand the speed and power of their charges, or 
 escape from their death-dealing blades. 
 
 No Moslem could oblige them to seek shelter behind batteries or col- 
 umns of infantry. 
 
 No light cavalry could swarm round their columns, spearing and 
 shooting the outside files. 
 
 No fire of infantry could be repeated sufficiently quick to inflict a loss 
 of an amount to check them in their charge ; for they would be upon 
 the infantry with the speed of lightning. 
 
 Finally, commanding officers, freed from the incubus of pivot flanks, 
 and right and left in front, would act boldly, resolutely, quickly ; and 
 thus lead our cavalry to gallant deeds and to almost certain victory. 
 
 There have not been wanting on the Continent military writers to 
 weigh the respective value of heavy and of light cavalry, and to point 
 out the long series of successes gained by bold riders lightly equipped, 
 well mounted, and armed with proper weapons. It is now many years 
 since the Prussian general, Warnery, published his interesting remarks 
 on these subjects. 
 
 The Albanians, whom Warnery mentions in the first instance, made 
 themselves truly formidable in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 
 They went by various names, and seem to have had little right to be 
 called Albanians, for their bands were composed of daring adventurers 
 
HUSSARS — ADVANTAGE OVER CUIRASSIERS. 43 
 
 from the Morea, from Ancient Thessaly and Thrace, from Servia, from 
 Dalmatia, and other regions, as well as from Albania, The contempo- 
 rary Italian historians generally call them Stradiotti. Apparently they 
 brought their horses as well as their arms with them into Italy, whence ' 
 their renown as an indefatigable light cavalry was spread over Europe. 
 They had, no doubt, taken lessons of the irregular Turkish cavalry. 
 
 " These Albanians," says General Warnery, " served in the field ex- 
 actly as the hussars of our own times ; and if they had the good fortune 
 to throw the powerful gendarmes into a little confusion, they soon made 
 a great carnage amongst them; for, being hand to hand, and pell-mell 
 with them, those heavy horsemen could make no use of their lances, 
 and, ill fact, could scarcely move themselves. One fact occurs in the 
 military history of the period, which appears almost incredible, but is, 
 nevertheless, true and certain : the Swiss foot, armed simply with pikes 
 and halberds, attacked and defeated the gendarmerie in the plains, and 
 particularly at Novara, where the heavy French gendarmes \Yere almost 
 annihilated. 
 
 "Philip de Comines mentions that, in his time, when the French and 
 Venetians blockaded Verona, defended by the troops of the Emperor 
 Maximilian, a party of Albanians sallied from the place and skirmish- 
 ed with the French gendarmes, and that each Albanian took one of 
 the gendarmes prisoner, and led him into the town in triumph. [At 
 present, however, this would not appear so very extraordinary, as a 
 single Russian, or Cossack, has frequently taken two cuirassiers in one 
 day.] 
 
 "In a march of ten German miles, supposing it to be commenced 
 with equal numbers, the hussars would certainly have the advantage 
 over cuirassiers. In the open country they would very much harass 
 and dishearten heavy cavalry by continual skirmishing and hanging 
 upon their flanks and rear ; and the effect would be very much increased 
 if the heavy horse should be provoked to charge, even though they 
 should be so fortunat;e as not to be in disorder after charging. 
 
 " But in such a length of march there must at last be some defilee, or 
 other obstacle, which would oblige this heavy cavalry, already much 
 fatigued, to break off; and this is the moment for the light troops to 
 act with the greatest vigor, and by continual pressing upon them in 
 Buch situations (in which they can neither prevent being attacked, nor 
 
44 LIGHT AND HEAVY CAVALRY. 
 
 take their revenge), they will at length lose confidence; and the instant 
 they either charge or disperse, they are generally certain of being 
 vanquished. 
 
 *' To remedy this disadvantage, the King of Prussia directed all his 
 cuirassiers to bo practised to the hussar exercises, which was, certainly, 
 so far useful ; but their horses are not proper for such light and active 
 service. 
 
 "Seidlitz, whose regiment ought (for the useful) to serve as a model 
 for all the cavalry in the universe, allowed that, in a march of length, 
 he should not be able, with his whole regiment, to resist six hundred 
 good hussars. 
 
 "All heavy cavalry who lose confidence, or disperse, in presence of 
 light, are lost : if they determine, by one great effort, to extricate them- 
 selves (at least for some time), the light retreat swiftly, a la dehandade, 
 in all directions. 
 
 " General Werner, with seven hundred hussars, completely destroyed 
 the dragoons of the Archduke Joseph,* afterwards Emperor, by skir- 
 mishing, harassing, and hanging upon their flanks and rear in the 
 manner above described. Those dragoons were commanded by General 
 Caramelli. 
 
 "The Prussian hussars are equally capable of every nature of ser- 
 vice. In regular battles they have rendered the service of cuirassiers; 
 they never hesitated to attack in close squadron whatever they have 
 met with, which was never known before them to have been done by the 
 hussars of any other nation ; it being the general opinion, and even of 
 the hussars themselves in those services, that the nature of that arm is 
 not proper to act in line, nor do they scarcely ever make their appear- 
 ance during an action, which could originate only in the ancient preju- 
 dice that the goodness of cavalry consisted exclusively in the 'height 
 of the man and horse.' "f 
 
 Yet the gallant cavaliers of Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII were 
 never mounted upon any other than Swedish, Friesland, or Livonion 
 nags or ponies — and nevertheless what prodigies did they not perform ? 
 
 * An Austrian dragoon regiment has fourteen hundred horses, and upwards, in 
 time of war. 
 t Major-General Warnery, " Remarks upon Cavalry Tactics." 
 
PRUSSIAN HUSSARS. 45 
 
 Colonel Maraiuville, the French military commissioner in the Aus- 
 trian camp, speaking of the Prussian hussars, says : " Le jour de la 
 bataille du 5eme Decembre, j'ai vu de ces hussards pousserune grande 
 garde de cavalerie (cuirassiers) jusque dans le village de Leuthen, ou 
 nous avions de I'infanterie, et un de ces hussards fendre la tele a un 
 cuirassier a trente pas de la premiere maison de ce village."* 
 
 Even in olden times, speed not weight was regarded as the first 
 quality in cavalry. Marshal Saxe said : " Cavalry which can not charge 
 at speed over a couple of thousand yards, to pounce upon the foe, is 
 good for nothing in the field." All the tendency of modern times and 
 modern experience is to impress upon us the paramount necessity of 
 speed. Even of the infantry Napoleon was accustomed to say: " Arms 
 win fewer battles than logs." 
 
 The great improvement made in fire-arms, and the increased range of 
 the infantry musket, leave but little chance for cavalry, unless the speed 
 with which they can pounce upon the infantry lessens the number and 
 the effect of the discharges to bo received during their advance. How 
 can this be done with cuirassiers ? Ere they could close upon the foe, 
 if saved themselves by their armor, most of their horses would be 
 wounded or killed, and where is then the advantage of a cuirass? 
 
 I have been assured that Captain Minie, with the "culot" ball, hit a 
 mark seven times out of ten shots at a distance of eighteen hundred 
 yards, and even at that distance it is supposed that the ball *' prima- 
 tive " would take effect through the cuirasses. 
 
 At some of the experiments made in England, a Mini6 ball passed 
 through an earthen breastwork three feet thick, and killed a soldier 
 standing behind it, smashing his skull to pieces ! What sort of cuirass 
 would resist such a bullet ? 
 
 In a melee the cuirass may save the man from a sword-cut or point 
 in the chest, but he is only the more vulnerable about the arms and 
 legs; and when either bridle or sword-arm is injured the cavalry sol- 
 dier is at the mercy of his opponent. 
 
 As fair a test of the relative efl5ciency of men in armor and those 
 without is to be found in the charges and conflicts of cavalry at Water- 
 loo. Our men had no armor, they were overmatched greatly in num- 
 
 * Extract from a work by Von Stuhr. 
 
46 LIGHT AND HEAVY CAVALRY. 
 
 bers, yet when they charged thoy drove the cuirassiers before them ; 
 and as for single combatants, if we take the life-guardsman Shaw, we 
 have a fair proof of the superiority of the man unencumbered with ar- 
 mor : it is said he killed several of his steel-clad opponents in fair 
 fight, and when set upon by four of them at once, he killed three, and 
 was then disabled by a pistol-shot from the fourth. 
 
 Captain Siborne thus describes a charge of cavalry at Waterloo : 
 " They are the far-famed cuirassiers of France, led on by Keller- 
 mann : gallant spirits that have hitherto overcome the finest troops 
 that could be brought against them, and have grown grey in glory- 
 Trumpets sound the charge; in the next instant your ears catch the low 
 thundering noises of their horses' hoofs, and your breathless excitement 
 is wound to the highest pitch, as the adverse lines dash together with a 
 shock which at the moment you expect must end in their mutual anni- 
 hilation. Observe the British, how they seem to doubt for a second in 
 what manner to deal with their opponents. Now they urge their pow- 
 erful steeds into the intervals between the necks of those of the cuiras- 
 siers. Swords, brandished high in air, gleam fitfully in rapid succession 
 throughout the lines ; here clashing together, there clanging against 
 helmet and cuirass, which ring under their redoubted strokes. See, the 
 struggle is but a moment doubtful : the cuirassiers, seemingly encum- 
 bered by their coats of mail, are yielding to superior strength, dexteri- 
 ty, and bravery combined; men and horses reel and stagger to the 
 earth; gaps open out in their line; numbers are backing out, others are 
 fairly turning round; their whole line now turns and breaks asunder 
 into fragments : in the next moment they appear, as if by a miracle, to 
 be swept off the crest of the position, and being closely and hotly pur- 
 sued by the victors, the whole, rushing down the other side of the 
 ridge, are snatched from your view." 
 
 Sergeant-major Cotton relates the following encounter : 
 *' A hussar and a cuirassier had got entangled in the melee, and met 
 in the plain in full view of our line ; the hussar was without a cap and 
 bleeding from a wound in the head, but that did not hinder him from 
 attacking his steel-clad adversary. He soon proved that the strength 
 of cavalry consists in good horsemanship and the skilful use of the 
 sword, and not in being clad in heavy defensive armor. 
 "The superiority of the hussar was visible the moment the swords 
 
ENCOUNTER OF HUSSAR WITH CUIRASSIER. 47 
 
 crossed; after a few wheels a tremendous facer made the Frenchman 
 reel in the saddle, and all his attempts to escape his more active foe be- 
 came unavailing; a second blow stretched him on the ground, amid 
 the cheers of the light horseman's comrades, the Third German Hussars, 
 who were ardent spectators of the combat/'* 
 
 Captain Ganzauge, of the Prussian lancer guard, in his " Kriegswis- 
 senschaftlichen Analecten," gives various instances in the campaign of 
 1813 of actions fought between the Cossacks and French cavalry; all 
 of them most interesting, for they show how cavalry, by its equipment 
 and system of tactics, can be made so helpless as to be unable to dis- 
 pose of such despised enemies as the Cossacks. As the work is not 
 generally known in this country, I will proceed to give a few brief 
 extracts, which I have translated from the original. 
 
 "On the 19th of August, 1813, when the armistice had expired, the 
 French troops began to push the allies back on Berlin and Potsdam. 
 Colonel Bichalow received orders to make a reconnoissance in the direc- 
 tion of the Liichenwalde with a regiment of Don Cossacks. These 
 men had bivouacked on the Treboin road, and advanced through 
 Scharfenbriick and WaltesdorflF. The French picquets retired at our 
 approach, and afforded us a full view of the fields to the north and east 
 of the Liickenwalde. Presently a large body of cavalry issued in 
 haste from the town, and formed in our front in close column of squad- 
 rons; their skirmishers fell in on their flanks, and we had this heavy 
 column only before us. The Cossacks could gain but little against so 
 large a force; but as there was no great risk in assailing it, they were 
 ordered forward. The French advanced at a trot, and, to prevent the 
 Russians getting in betwixt the squudrons, they closed up and bore 
 right down on the centre of our line, which naturally oi)cned out; the 
 Cossacks attacking the flanks and rear of the column. The French, 
 having no one in front to oppose them, halted, while their tormentors 
 kept spearing the flank files and firing into the mass, which soon got 
 into complete confusion, and could undertake no evolution of any sort. 
 The Cossacks, though they never attempted to disperse the mass by a 
 dash at them, still, conscious of their superiority in riding, continued 
 to shoot and spear them, executing partial charges when opportunity 
 
 * Cotton, " A Voice from Waterloo." 
 
48 LIGHT AND HEAVY CAVALRY. 
 
 offered. Meanwhile the flank files of the French faced outward and 
 unslung their carabines, and, thus formed in square, they kept up an 
 irregular fusillade for about half an hour. The heads of French in- 
 fantry columns were now seen advancing from Liichenwalde toward 
 the scene of strife; and as soon as their artillery opened fire, the column 
 of heavy cavalry was released from its dangerous situation. Colonel 
 Bichalow withdrew his troops by way of Scharfenbriick, without being 
 pursued by a single Frenchman. 
 
 " Soon after the Battle of Dennewitz, the Cossack regiments, named 
 before, were in the neighborhood of Konigsbriick and Dresden. Colonel 
 Bichalow was ordered to watch the French cavalry, which had been 
 pushed forward toward Grossen-Hayn, and to attack them if possible. 
 On the 18th of September we proceeded accordingly toward Estcle- 
 verda. Here we were told that the French cavalry occupied the vil- 
 lages to the south of Miihlberg, and resolved to beat up their quarters 
 at once. Before we reached the heath extending between Miihlberg 
 and Spannberg, General Slowaisky joined and assumed the command 
 of the Cossack force, which, together with the regiment he brought up, 
 amounted in all to twelve hundred men. 
 
 " I am not aware whether this meeting was the effect of design or 
 chance. When avc cleared the wood of Miihlberg, we saw the French 
 cavalry, near Borack, partly formed, while parties were trotting up 
 from the different villages to join them. The prisoners afterward told 
 us that their force on the ground was two thousand men. 
 
 " The French completed their movements while the Cossacks were 
 forming up; they were formed in one line, en muraiUe, with a small 
 reserve in rear. 
 
 " The Cossacks fell on, and were received with a discharge of cara- 
 bines,- the French did not draw swords. Their fire, at first, sent the 
 Russians to the right about; and, while they were reforming, the 
 enemy wheeled into column and opened out, so as to get their intervals 
 wheeled again into line. We expected they wei-e about to charge, 
 but their object appears simply to have been to extend their line, and 
 prevent their being outflanked — a common mode of attack with the 
 Cossacks. 
 
 " The arrangements being completed on both sides about the same 
 time, the Cossacks were strictly admonished not to shrink from tl>e 
 
EFFECTIVENESS OF COSSAGK CAVALRY. 49 
 
 enemy's fire, their officers receiving orders to cut down the first man 
 that turned. 
 
 ** Several squadrons were told off to attack the enemy in flank and 
 rear during the conflict. All these orders were steadily obeyed ; they 
 pressed in upon the French, and surrounded their squadrons : here I 
 saw, myself, many of the French dragoons cut down or speared after 
 firing oflF their carabines, before they could draw their swords. The 
 French steadily defended themselves at first, as well as cavalry stand- 
 ing still can do, against such active adversaries, who swarmed about 
 them on all sides,- however, presently some of them turned, and their 
 example was soon followed by the remaining squadrons. The reserve, 
 instead of advancing to restore the fight, joined in the flight; in a short 
 time every one was galloping toward Jacobsthal, and the entire plain 
 was covered with scattered horsemen. Not one troop was to be seen in 
 close order ; it was a regular hunt ; and most of those who were taken 
 prisoners in it had previously fallen off" their horses. At last we came 
 upon a line of cuirassiers, in emerging from the wood, and their steady 
 and imposing attitude brought us suddenly to a halt, without any word 
 being given. We were quite satisfied with our victory, and turned 
 back to Miihlberg."* 
 
 Many more striking examples of the superiority of the Cossacks as 
 cavalry are upon record, and ought not be overlooked or forgotten. I 
 will quote a few from a French cavalry officer : 
 
 "The Cossacks," says General de Brack, "were an arm which ren- 
 dered the war highly dangerons, especially to such of our officers as 
 were intrusted with making reconnoissances. Many among them, and 
 especially of the general staff", selected by the major-general, preferred 
 forwarding the reports which they received from the peasantry to 
 going to a distance and exposing themselves to the attacks of the Cos- 
 sacks. The Emperor, then, could no longer know the state of affairs." 
 
 Thus, behold even French officers not daring to expose themselves. 
 Behold the genius of Napoleon paralyzed by the activity of these semi- 
 barbarous horsemen ! Does not this single fact carry great weight 
 with it? 
 
 Again, General Moraud, another French officer, says: "But these 
 
 * Captain Qanzauge, " Kriegswiaseachaftlichen Analecten." 
 b 
 
50 LIGHT AND HEAVY CAVALRY. 
 
 rude horsemen are ignorant of our divisions, of our regular alignmente, 
 of all that order which we so ovcriceeuingli/ estimate. Their custom is 
 to keep their horse close between their legs ; their feet rest in broad 
 stirrups, which support them when they use their arms. They spring 
 from a state of rest to the full gallop, and at that gallop they make a 
 dead halt : their horses second their skill, and seem only part of them- 
 selves ; these men are always on the alert, they move with extraordi- 
 nary rapidity, have few Avants, and are full of warlike ardor. What a 
 magnificent spectacle was that of the French cavalry flashing in gold 
 and steel under the rays of a June sun, extending its lines upon the 
 flanks of the hills of the Niemen, and burning with eagerness and 
 courage ! What bitter reflections are those of the ineffectual manoeu- 
 vres which exhausted it against the Cossacks, those irregular forces 
 until then so despised, but which did more for Russia than all the reg- 
 ular armies of that empire ! Every day they were to be seen on the 
 horizon, extended over an immense line, while their daring flankers 
 came and braved us even in our ranks. We formed and marched 
 against this line, which, the moment we reached it, vanished, and the 
 horizon no longer showed anything but birch-trees and pines; but an 
 hour afterward, while our horses were feeding, the attack was resumed, 
 and a black line again presented itself; the same manoeuvres were re- 
 sumed, which were followed by the same result. It was thus that the 
 finest and bravest cavalry* exhausted and wasted itself against men 
 whom it deemed unworthy of its valoi', and who, nevertheless, were 
 sufficient to save the empire, of which they are the real support and 
 sole deliverers. To put the climax to our affliction, it must be added 
 that our cavalry was more numerous than the Cossacks ; that it was 
 supported by an artillery, the lightest, the bravest, the most formi- 
 dable, that ever was mowed down by death ! It must further bo stated 
 that its commandant, the admired of heroes, took the precaution of 
 having himself supported in every manoeuvre by the most intrepid in- 
 fantry ; and, nevertheless, the Cossacks returned covered with spoils 
 and glory to the fertile banks of the Danaetz, while the soil of Russia 
 was strewn with the carcasses and arms of our warriors, so bold, so un- 
 flinching, so devoted to the glory of our country."-}- 
 
 *But, alasl so uuwieldly, so encumbered, and, therefore, so useless. 
 t As quoted in the work of General de Brack. 
 
DISADVANTAGES OF HEAVY CAVALRY. 51 
 
 Now just contrast this account of the Cossacks — full of generous ad- 
 missions, particularly for a Frenchman — with the wretched deeds of 
 the regular cavalry of the Russian army, and then who will venture to 
 assert that the organization, the heavy, unwieldly squadrons, the puz- 
 zling tactics of the regulars, have not much to answer for ? 
 
 If Cossacks, mounted on ponies, and wretchedly armed, could thus 
 master the French regulars, in spite of their artillery, what might not 
 be expected from them if they were mounted on well-bred, powerful 
 horses, and furnished with really good weapons? In that war their 
 lances were notoriously bad: so much so that there were French sol- 
 diers who received as many as twenty lance-wounds without being 
 killed or seriously injured. 
 
 The same contrast is presented by our native irregular and our native 
 regular cavalry in India. The first, acting on usage and instinct, and 
 armed and mounted in their own Oriental way, are nearly always effec- 
 tive in the battle, or the skirmish, or the reconnoissance ; the second^ 
 cramped by our rules and regulations, and, as it were, denaturalized, 
 are rarely of any service whatever. For a long series of years the 
 only native cavalry we kept in India was the irregular. These corps 
 were formed before our infantry sepoys, and many and most important 
 were the services they rendered to us. They were always active — 
 always rapid. The names of some of the most distinguished leaders of 
 thi3 brilliant light cavalry are still revered in India. If their corps 
 had been Europeanized, and turned into regulars, assuredly we never 
 should have heard of them as heroes. 
 
 Much more recent instances of the superiority of light over heavy 
 arc to be found. 
 
 In the Magyar war of 184S and 1849 the Hungarians had nothing 
 but hussars to oppose to the Imperialists' heavy cavalry and cuirassiers, 
 and, though inferior in number, they always met the cuirassiers gallant- 
 ly, and often defeated them with great loss. Indeed, in one instance, a 
 single squadron of the tenth hussars (Frederic Wilhelm), at the Battle 
 of Teteny (3d of January, 1849), charged several squadrons of the Im- 
 perial cuirassiers, and defeated them. These heavy horsemen had a 
 few days previously made a gallant charge, under Colonel Ottinger, 
 against the Hungarian infantry, breaking two squares, and capturing 
 the guns which flanked them ; thus there could be no want of proper 
 
52 LIGHT AND HEAVY CAVALRY. 
 
 courage on the part of the heavies, and their defeat must be attributed 
 to the cumbersome equipments, and the heavy, unwieldy horses. 
 
 The seventh division of Gorgey's corps was stationed at Parendorf 
 for the purpose of covering the frontier. A few miles off, at Woolfs- 
 thal, in the Austrian territory, stood Jellachich, his outposts held by 
 the Walmoden cuirassiers. The Hungarian outposts were held by the 
 Nikolaus hussars. Some squadrons of cuirassiers were pushed across 
 the frontier by the Austriaus into the plain near Parendorf. A body of 
 hussars then first made their appearance, advancing at a trot, and 
 gradually increasing their speed as they neared the enemy ; and, though 
 but a handful compared to their opponents, they rushed upon them with 
 such speed, and in such compact order, that they broke through the 
 cuirassiers, and scattered them over the plain, where they fell an easy 
 prey to their more active pursuers. 
 
 On other occasions the gallantry and success of the lights were 
 equally conspicuous. I translate what immediately follows from Georg 
 Klaptka's " National Krieg in Ungarn und Siebenbiirgen :" 
 
 " On the 18th of December, 1848, the enemy's cavalry, led by the 
 Banns, attacked the Hungarian rear-guard near Altenburg. The ene- 
 my came from Sommerin, formed up two regiments, and opened fire 
 with the artillery. The more numerous Hungarian artillery soon had 
 the best of it, the enemy's line became unsteady, and showed symptoms 
 of turning. At this moment Major Cornel Gorgey brought up four 
 squadrons of the tenth hussars from the second line, and charged the 
 right wing of the enemy, inflicting on him a heavy loss in killed and 
 wounded, and driving him in disorder from the field. The enemy gal- 
 loped toward the reserves under Lichtenstein, which were advancing 
 to the support, and, wrapped in clouds of dust, the diifeated horsemen 
 fled across the plain far more rapidly than they had advanced. This 
 was the first time large bodies of cavalry had met during the campaign ; 
 and here, as in numerous skirmishes which had taken place previously, 
 the active hussar proved himself more than a match for the steel-clad 
 horseman and heavy-armed dragoon of the Austrians. 
 
 "At 3 p. M. on the 3d of January our left wing was attacked in front 
 of Teteny. 
 
 " Our outposts had been driven in at Hamsabeg at mid-day, and now 
 the enemy pushed forward against Teteny. Zichy's brigade, about 
 three thousand men, took up a position on the south-west of the place, 
 
EFFECT OF CUIRASSES. 63 
 
 across the high-road, with the right resting on the heights, the left on 
 the Danube, the centre on the wood along the banks of the river. The 
 enemy, after a few long shots, presuming on their success at Moor, sent 
 several squadrons of cuirassiers forward to attack the Hungarian cen- 
 tre. One squadron of the tenth Wilhelm hussars, which was posted 
 there, advanced resolutely to meet them, and, led on by their officers, 
 charged and burst into the midst of their mail-clad antagonists; a 
 bloody and desperate melee ensued, in which great part of the cuiras- 
 siers were cut down or made prisoners ; the remainder sought safety in 
 flight." 
 
 On the 26th of February, 1849, when the Magyars were reduced to 
 an almost hopeless condition, there was another brilliant light cavalry 
 aflfair at Mezokovest : 
 
 " On our retreat from Kerecsend and Macklar, the enemy sent a regi- 
 ment of cuirassiers, with a brigade of guns, in pursuit. They attacked 
 and drove in the rear-guard, about two thousand yards from our camp. 
 So daring a deed within sight of our men was not allowed to go un- 
 punished. 
 
 " The men of the 9th Nikolaus hussars sprang on their horses and 
 galloped to the rescue. A splendid sight it was to see this swarm of 
 light horsemen dashing in on the heavy cuirassiers, bursting their ranks 
 asunder, cutting down, destroying, and scattering them in all direc- 
 tions. 
 
 " The hussars captured the whole of the enemy's guns, which, with a 
 number of prisoners, they brought triumphantly into camp. 
 
 " The enemy's reserves formed on the heights opposite the camp, but 
 did not attempt to recapture the guns lost by their cuirassiers." 
 
 These accounts I have translated from Klaptka, who was thoroughly 
 a Magyar, but, as I have bad concurrent testimony from others who 
 were not of that party, I can not suspect them of much exaggeration. 
 But let me now add a few extracts out of a letter received from an old 
 cavalry officer and aide-de-camp, who served on the side of the Imperial- 
 ists, and against the Hungarians, or Magyars. 
 
 "May 23, 1852. 
 " My dear Nolan : " I will try and answer your questions about 
 our cavalry, and the effect of our cuirasses. 
 6* 
 
54 LIGHT AND HEAVY CAVALRY. 
 
 " From what the cuirassiers say, their cuirass saved them from many 
 a bullet, and many a thrust, in the melee. This may be true, and the 
 advantage of the armor probably is, that those who wear it fancy them- 
 selves safer, and are, therefore, morally stronger, and more ready to 
 look danger in the face. Of other advantages of heavy cavalry over 
 light we found none during the Hungarian campaigns : we were not in 
 a position to employ heavy cavalry as it should be employed to reap 
 advantage from it, and this for many reasons. 
 
 "We bad but few regiments of light-horse at our command; the 
 heavies had to do outpost work, skirmishing, reconnoitring, etc., and 
 their horses were knocked up with the weight they had to carry. 
 
 " As to the result of the engagements between them and the Hunga- 
 rian hussars, I must first tell you what my opinion is in general with 
 regard to charges of cavalry, and this opinion I formed upon the expe- 
 rience gained during the war. 
 
 "The success of a cavalry attack depends not so much on the de- 
 scription of cavalry or horse employed, as on the determination of the 
 men; 
 
 " On their being accustomed to victory; 
 
 " On confidence in their leader; 
 
 "And last, not least, on the charge being made at the right moment. 
 
 "Thus, in the first half of the Hungarian war, the depressing moral 
 consciousness of having abandoned their colors, together with being 
 badly commanded, greatly influenced the behavior of the Hungarian 
 regiments ; and, after their defeat at Schwechat, the only difficulties we 
 experienced during our advance to Pesth were occasioned by the cold, 
 and not by the enemy. 
 
 "At Babolna they tried to make a stand; one of their regiments 
 formed square, but was at once ridden over and destroyed by two squad- 
 rons of Walmoden cuirassiers, who advanced to the charge without the 
 assistance of artillery ; and this, as far as I remember, was the only 
 instance on our side in which cavalry broke a square without first 
 bringing artillery into play. 
 
 "The squadron of the 10th hussars, that did such good service at 
 Teteny, was led by Mezey, a subaltern in the squadron at that time ; 
 he afterwards became their colonel, and his regiment proved itself the 
 best on the Hungarian side. 
 
SUPERIORITY OF HUNGARIAN HUSSARS. 55 
 
 "Later in the campaign of 1849 (except toward its close) the Hun- 
 garians received great reinforcements in troops, their moral courage 
 rose, and then came the tug of war. 
 
 "New regiments were raised, and in numbers they were superior to 
 us ; but, of course, it was only the old hussar regiments that were for- 
 midable: indeed they behaved most gallantly, and on all occasions 
 charged home at our cuirassiers and heavy dragoons, but they never 
 liked to close with our Polish lancers. 
 
 " I quite agree with you that the strength and lasting qualities of the 
 horse make the cavalry soldier formidable, and that, therefore, the ani- 
 mal should not be made to carry any unnecessary weight, which must 
 always diminish and detract from those qualities in a greater or less 
 degree : this is not my opinion alone, but the prevailing one in this 
 service 
 
 "The Hungurian saddle has now been adopted for the whole of our 
 cavalry. 
 
 " In the bridling, saddling, packing, etc., many improvements have 
 been made, as well as in the arming of the men. 
 
 " Our artillery is much altered for the better. In Vienna you will 
 see several schools of equitation ; and also a ' squadron of instruction,* 
 composed of detachments from all the regiments in the service. 
 "Yours ever sincerely, 
 
 * » -» * " 
 
 General Sir Charles Shaw gave the following most interesting account 
 of the Circassian horsemen in a letter published in November, 1853, in 
 the " Morning Chronicle." His opinions on the subject now under dis- 
 cussion have a peculiar value from his great personal experience of 
 war, and his practical knowledge of military matters : 
 
 " The noble Circassians who have been fighting against Russia, inde- 
 pendent of Turkey, have been within this short time taken into the 
 Turkish service ; and it may be interesting to give a description^, by a 
 Prussian officer, of the Circassian cavalry, who are about to take a prom- 
 inent part in the coming conflict. He says: * The Circassian wears a 
 pointed steel helmet, with a long horsetail pendent from it ; a net of 
 steel-work hangs down from the lower part of the helmet, protects the 
 front and nape of the neck, and is looped together under the chin, un- 
 derneath a short red vest, cut in the Polish fashion. 
 
56 LIGHT AND HEAVY CAVALRY. 
 
 " * He is clad in a species of coat-of-mail, consisting of small bright 
 rings of steel intervened; his arms, from the wrist to the elbow, and 
 his legs, from the foot of the shinbone to the knee, are guarded by thin 
 plates of steel; he also wears close pantaloons and laced boots. Two 
 long Turkish pistols, as well as a poniard, are stuck into his girdle. He 
 has a leather strap with a noose, like a Mexican lasso, hanging at his 
 side, which he throws with great dexterity over the head of his enemy ; 
 a Turkish sabre and a long Turkish musket are slung behind his back, 
 and two cartridge-holders across his breast. 
 
 " ' The skill with which the Circassians use their weapons is really 
 beyond belief. I have seen them repeatedly fire at a piece of card lying 
 on the ground, at full speed, without ever missing. 
 
 " ' They will pick up a piece of money from the ground while execut- 
 ing a charge, by bending themselves round below the horse's belly, and, 
 after seizing the piece, suddenly throw themselves back into the saddle. 
 They form the choicest body of cavalry in the Turkish service, and I 
 have watched them, when charging, attack their opponents with a sabre 
 in each hand, managing their reins with their mouths ; they will spring 
 out of their saddles, take aim and fire from behind their horses, then 
 jump into their saddles again, wheel round, and reload their guns as 
 they retreat in full career. They are perfect madmen in the attack, 
 and few troops would withstand the utter recklessness of danger they 
 evince.' 
 
 "This account of the Circassian cavalry by the Prussian ofl&eer may 
 appear incredible to our Life Guards, Blues, and Heavies ; but I do not 
 forget that, while in 1851 and 1852 I first brought before the public the 
 power of what is now called 'the Minie rifle,' the admirers of old Brown 
 Boss attacked it right and left, and now there are, in 1853, upwards of 
 40,000 of this improved musket in the British army," 
 
ORGANIZATION. 57 
 
 Chapter V. 
 
 THE organization OF CAVALRY. 
 
 Without further preamble I now proceed to ofifer, in as short a space 
 as may be, all that I have to propose as a New System, or as a partial 
 improvement upon the old one, whose soundness and efficiency some of 
 our Continental neighbors have begun to doubt. I shall express my 
 convictions with the same frankness that I have hitherto used, without 
 implying any disrespect to those who may entertain different opinions. 
 After long consideration of the whole subject, I honestly believe that 
 the main principles I propose are right. Without this conviction I 
 would not publish at all, but with it I should feel it to be a dereliction 
 not to offer to my brother-officers, and the service in general, the results 
 of my practice and meditation. In spite, however, of my inward con- 
 viction. I may be wrong. Therefore, though speaking out freely, I 
 would lay down nothing dogmatically. I hope to remain open to con- 
 viction, and shall certainly entertain no ill-feeling against such as may 
 differ from me in opinion. From a comparison, and even conflict of 
 opposite opinions, the service will be sure to gain something. The most 
 hopeless condition to which an arm, or a science, or an art can attain is 
 that where its professors sit down with perfect self-satisfaction, under 
 the conviction that it has reached perfection, and is susceptible of no 
 further improvement. True also is it, that nothing in this world can 
 remain in statu quo, and that whatever does not advance must retrocede. 
 It is a law of nature. 
 
 To possess a fine cavalry the men must be good as well as the horso.s, 
 and the most delicate attention must be paid to both. Every man may 
 be taught to ride, but it is not every man that will make a good rider. 
 Many who might be turned into good foot-soldiers are far from being 
 proper materials for cavalry. It may, however, be said that, generally, 
 Englishmen have a fondness for the horse, and a natural aptitude for 
 the saddle. Though not " Abipones," we are certainly an equestrian 
 nation. Left to his own free natural seat, and the Englishman beats 
 the world in a ride after the hounds and a run across country. Since 
 the peace of 1815 this manly sport — the best of all to form bold riders — 
 
58 ORGANIZATION. 
 
 has been taken up in some of the continental nations; but it is indige- 
 nous — national and natural — to none of them; and, in spite of the 
 interruption of railroads, we may still find at some single " meet" (with- 
 out even going into Leicestershire) more riders of the right sort than 
 are to be found on the whole continent of Europe, if you deduct the 
 Englishmen who are there resident, and who get up the continental 
 hunts, steeple-chases, etc. Our very ladies would beat, on the field, all 
 their mathematical riding-masters, and take gates, fences, and ditches, 
 from which foreign ofiicers of hussars or their dragoon rough-riders 
 would turn aside in dismay to look out for a break or gap. 
 
 In our selection of men for cavalry regiments we ought to have more 
 regard to agility, alertness, and quickness of sight, than to mere size. 
 In fact, even with our good breeds, nearly all our horses are over- 
 weighted. More than half of our lights are really heavies, and would 
 be so considered in every other European army. 
 
 It is not necessary that our hussars and dragoons should be men of 
 five feet nine inches, or even five feet seven inches ; but it is quite essen- 
 tial that they should be active, intelligent, and quick-sighted. N6w, 
 these qualities, and in combination with great physical strength, you 
 may find in men not exceeding five feet four inches ; and here, while 
 your men are equal in value, you improve the value and efiiciency of 
 your horse, by lightening the burden on his back. The Hungarian 
 hussars, who continue to be esteemed as about the best light troops in 
 Europe, are composed of compact, well-set, little men. In one of their 
 finest regiments the average height did not exceed five feet four inches 
 of our measurement. 
 
 Our light cavalry, made up of big men and heavily accoutred, is an 
 inconsistency and a contradiction. When a man, with his arms and 
 horse-furniture, rides twenty stone (and we have seen them of that 
 weight), is he not out of his element in any cavalry, more particularly 
 30 in a light regiment ? A fine young recruit, measuring five feet eight 
 inches or even five feet ten inches, and being aged between eighteen 
 and twenty-one, may not weigh much more than ten stone ; but take 
 the same individual, and weigh him after seven or eight years of ser- 
 vice and regular living — or take and weigh him again when he is ap- 
 proaching the age of thirty-five : at either period you will almost 
 invariably find him too heavy for a cavalry soldier. What is to bfr 
 
EASTERN HORSEMEN. 59 
 
 done with him ? His term of service may be incomplete, or he may 
 wish to remain in the service, although conscious that ho is no longer 
 fit to be a horseman. Could not he, and such as he, be drafted into 
 the infantry or foot-guards, and room be thus made for a light recruit? 
 One regiment would gain a disciplined soldier, requiring little to be 
 taught him, and the other would gain what it wants, light weight. 
 
 Defects, Civil and Military, op the Indian Government: by 
 Lieutenant-General Sir Charles James Napier, G.C.B. 
 
 Sir Charles Napier says : " We assume, as the type of the cavalry 
 horse, the charger on a Hounslow Heath parade. "Well-fed, well- 
 groomed, well-trained, he goes through a field-day without injury, 
 although carrying more than twenty stone weight; he and his rider 
 presenting together a kind of alderman-centaur. But if in the field, 
 half-starved, they have, at the end of a forced march, to charge an 
 enemy, the biped, full of fire and courage, transformed by war-work to 
 a wiry, muscular dragoon, is able and willing; but the overloaded 
 quadruped can not gallop — he staggers ! 
 
 " This is the picture which should regulate the dross of horsemen ; 
 bearing also in mind the wasting sun which in India enervates man 
 and beast. 
 
 " Our poor horses, thus loaded, are expected to bound to hand and 
 spur, while the riders wield their swords worthily. They can not; 
 and both man and animal appear inferior to their Indian opponents. 
 
 "The active vigor of the dark Eastern horseman is known to me; 
 his impetuous speed, the sudden volts of his animal, seconding the 
 cunning of the swordsman, as if the steed watched the edge of the 
 weapon, is a sight to admire ; but it is too much admired by men who 
 look not to causes. The Eastern warrior's eye is quick, but not quicker 
 than the European's ; his heart is big, yet not bigger than the Euro- 
 pean's; his arm is strong, but not so strong as the European's; the 
 slicing of his razor-like scimitar is terrible, but an English trooper's 
 downright blow splits the skull. Why, then, does the latter fail? The 
 light- weighted horse of the dark swordsman carries him round his foe 
 with elastic bounds, and the strong European, unable to deal the cleav- 
 ing blow, falls under the activity of an inferior adversary ! 
 
60 OVERWEIGHTED HORSEMEN. 
 
 "Look at our officers, mounted or on foot! Look at the infantry 
 British soldier with his bayonet! What chance has an Eastern against 
 them in single combat ? Neville Chamberlaine, Robert Fitzgerald. 
 Montague McMurdo, Charles Marston, John Nixon, Francis McFar- 
 lane, and many more, have, hand to hand, slain the first-rate swords- 
 men of the East. Oh no ! there is no falling off in British swordsmen 
 since Richard Coeur de Lion, with seventeen knights and three hundred 
 archers, at Jaffa, defied the whole Saracen army, and maintained his 
 ground. Why, then, is the Englishman inferior to the Eastern horse- 
 man in India ? 
 
 " 1st. The black man's horse is his own property, and private inter- 
 est beats the commissary in feeding ; the Eastern's animal feeds better 
 than the Englishman's. 
 
 "2d. The hardships of war are by our dressers of cavalry thought 
 too little for the animal's strength; they add a bag with the French- 
 ified name of * valise,' containing an epitome of a Jew's old-clothes 
 shop. Notably so if the regiment be hussars, a name given to Hunga- 
 rian light horsemen, remarkable for activity, and carrying no other 
 baggage than a small axe and a tea-kettle to every dozen men. Our 
 hussar's old-clothes bag contains jackets, breeches of all dimensions, 
 drawers, snuff-boxes, stockings, pink boots, yellow boots, eau-de- 
 Cologne, Windsor soap, brandy, satin waistcoats, segars, kid gloves, 
 tooth-brushes, hair-brushes, dancing spurs; and thus, a light cavalry 
 horse carries twenty-one stone. 
 
 " Hussars our men are not ; a real hussar, including his twelfth part 
 of a kettle, does not weigh twelve stone — before he begins plundering. 
 
 " The heavy cavalry horse, strange to say, carries less than the light 
 cavalry — only twenty stone ! A British regiment of cavalry on parade 
 is a beautiful sight; give it six month's hard work in the field, and 
 while the horses fail the men lose confidence; the vanity of dress 
 supersedes efficiency. Take eight or ten stone off the weight carried, 
 and our cavalry will be the most eflloient in the world." 
 
 Having selected the proper man for the cavalry, one of the first con- 
 siderations is to furnish him with proper weapons. The good workman 
 must have good tools : the tools of the horse-soldier are his arms. 
 These ought to be of the very best quality, and of the kind best suited 
 
THE ARMING. 61 
 
 to his branch of service. Like the most perfect artisan, the best 
 trooper will lose confidence in his craft if you put the wrong imple- 
 ments into his hands. 
 
 The Arming op Cavalry. 
 
 The devices of armament have made progress in the infantry, and 
 enormous strides in the artillery ; but in the cavalry, where the subject 
 is of vital importance, nothing has as yet been suggested likely to 
 make it more formidable in action. 
 
 The frequent misbehavior of the Indian regular cavalry, which is 
 armed and equipped after our fashion, ought to have drawn attention 
 to this matter 
 
 Captain Thackwell, in his " History of the Second Sikh War," says : 
 
 •*It was incontrovertibly proved at this (Rumnugger) and other 
 subsequent actions that the troopers of the light cavalry have no con- 
 fidence in their swords as effective weapons of defence. It would have 
 been difficult to point out half a dozen men who had made use of their 
 swords. On approaching the enemy they have immediate recourse to 
 their pistols, the loading and firing of which form their sole occupation. 
 
 "That such want of confidence must very seriously impair the effi- 
 ciency of regular cavalry may be easily imagined. Very few natives 
 ever become really reconciled to the long seat and powerless bit of the 
 European dragoons. 
 
 [The native regular cavalry are made to use English saddles, and 
 ride with long stirrups. To change these saddles was beyond my 
 power; but my intent was to abolish the egregious folly of long stirrups. 
 Charles NapierJ] 
 
 " The usual seat of the native is short. 
 
 " It frequently happened during the campaign that some dragoons in 
 a charge lost all control over their horses. Picture to yourself a Brit- 
 ish or Anglo-Indian trooper dashing onward with a most uncontrol- 
 lable horse, and a Goorchurra, or Sikh horseman, after allowing his 
 enemy to pass, turning quickly round to deal him an ugly wound on 
 the back of the head." 
 
 Again, in speaking of the Indian irregulars — men of the same 
 country, but diflFerently armed, and riding in a short good seat ; 
 
 " Captain Holmes, of the twelfth Irregulars, was the admiration of 
 
62 THE ARMING. 
 
 the whole army on several occasions. In his skirmishes with the 
 enemy the mettle of his men was strikingly displayed. The irregular 
 cavalry were conspicuous in the pursuit at Goojerat, always seeking 
 opportunities of conflict. 
 
 ''Having witnessed the charge of the Scinde horse at the Battle of 
 Goojerat, against the Aflfghan force of Akram, I am convinced that no 
 cavalry could have achieved the overthrow of an enemy in a more 
 spirited or effectual manner. They had confidence in their weapons 
 and accoutrements 
 
 " The ninth Irregulars, under Crawford and Chamberlaine, earned 
 the thanks of the commander-in-chief by some gallant skirmishes with 
 the Sikh Goorchurras, who were constantly prowling about in quest of 
 unprotected camels. 
 
 " Supported by brave and skilful men, the officers of irregulars are 
 
 encouraged to gratify their noble thirst for distinction The 
 
 young heroes of the irregulars, Holmes Crawford and Neville Chamber- 
 laine, Malcolm Tait, and Christie, would rather take into action one 
 hundred and fifty of their own men than three hundred troopers of any 
 Indian light cavalry regiment." 
 
 The Sikh war showed clearly — had any proof been wanting — how 
 useless the Indian cavalry was when organized on the English model ; 
 whilst, at the same time, brilliant proofs were given of the superiority 
 of the irregulars, armed with sharp swords, and having a proper com- 
 mand over their horses. 
 
 Nothing during that campaign was more gallant and determined 
 than the behavior of the Scinde horse, whereas the distinction the 
 regulars attained was such that it is best passed over in silence. Yet 
 the only difierence between the men composing the two arms lay in 
 their organization. 
 
 The regular Indian cavalry are useless to the public service ; but the 
 men composing it behave well when they are mounted, dressed, and 
 armed after their own fashion. 
 
 " If a soldier of undoubted courage finds himself seated in a slippery 
 saddle, with long stirrups, cramped by tight clothes, and a sword in his 
 hand that is good for nothing, he will hesitate, nay, more, he will 
 refuse to charge an enemy, for if he does he goes to almost certain de- 
 struction. 
 
THE SCINDE HORSE. 63 
 
 " A cavalry soldier should find himself strong and firm in his seat, 
 easy in his dress, so as to have perfect freedom of action, and with a 
 weapon in his hand capable of cutting doicn an adversary at a blow. 
 
 " There is scarcely a more pitiable spectacle in the world than a 
 native trooper mounted on an English saddle, tightened by his dress to 
 the stiflfness of a mummy, half suffocated with a leather collar, and a 
 regulation sword in his hand, which 7nust always be blunted by the steel 
 scabbard in which it is encased. 
 
 "This poor fellow, who has the utmost difficulty in sticking to his 
 saddle and preserving his stirrups, whose body and arms are rendered 
 useless by a tight dragoon dress, and whose sword would scarcely cut 
 a turnip in two, is ordered to charge the enemy : and if he fails to do 
 what few men in the world would do in his place, courts of inquiry are 
 held, regiments disbanded, and their cowardice is commented upon in 
 terms of astonishment and bitterest reproach. This is truly ridiculous: 
 the system and not the vien is to be blamed."* 
 
 Now if this system, which has had a fair trial, has been found so 
 bad in the East, why should it be supposed to be excellent when ap- 
 plied to our own dragoons ? The color of the men can not make the 
 system : the innate courage of the British soldier carries him into the 
 midst of the enemy, not confidence in the power of the weapon he 
 wields; for, when he has got amongst the enemy he can do no execu- 
 tion — partly because he has no command over his horse, and partly 
 because his sword is not sharp enough to penetrate. 
 
 If a native horseman should not be put in a helpless seat with long 
 stirrups, and should not be tightened by his dress, or suffocated by a 
 leather stock; if it is necessary for him to have a sword that will cut 
 down an enemy at a blow — are these things less necessary to the Eng- 
 lish dragoon ? or, if not quite so necessary, would they not add greatly 
 to his efficiency in the field ? 
 
 It doubtless requires great liberality and freedom from prejudice or 
 preconceived opinion to admit that a system, on which the talent and 
 experience of practical men has been exhausted for ages, can be a bad 
 one. 
 
 Yet experience for many years has shown how deficient cavalry is, 
 
 * From a letter published in the Delhi Gazette. 
 
64 THE ARMING. 
 
 how it has fallen oflf instead of improving, and how much is required 
 to be done to render it as useful to the state and as formidable to an 
 enemy as it should be. 
 
 When I was in India an engagement between a party of the Nizam's 
 irregular horse and a numerous body of insurgents took place, in which 
 the horsemen, though far inferior in numbers, defeated the Rohillos 
 with great slaughter. 
 
 My attention was drawn particularly to the fight by the doctor's re- 
 port of the killed and wounded, most of whom had suffered by the 
 6word, and in the column of remarks such entries as the following 
 were numerous : 
 
 " Arm cut off from the shoulder. 
 
 "Head severed. 
 
 " Both hands cut off (apparently at one blow) above the wrists, in 
 holding up the arms to protect the head. 
 
 " Leg cut off above the knee," etc. 
 
 I was astounded. Were these men giants, to lop off limbs thus 
 wholesale ? or was this result to be attributed (as I was told) to the 
 sharp edge of the native blade, and the peculiar way of drawing it? 
 
 I became anxious to see these horsemen of the Nizam, to examine 
 their wonderful blades, and learn the knack of lopping off men's 
 limbs. 
 
 Opportunity soon offered, for the commander-in-chief went to Hyder- 
 abad on a tour of inspection, on which I accompanied him. After 
 passing the Kistna river, a squadron of these very horsemen joined 
 the camp as part of the escort. 
 
 And now fancy my astonishment ! 
 
 The sword-blades they had were chiefly old dragoon blades cast from 
 our service. The men had mounted them after their own fashion. The 
 hilt and handle, both of metal, small in the grip, rather flat, not round 
 like ours, where the edge seldom falls true ; they all had an edge like a 
 razor from heel to point, were worn in wooden scabbards, a short single 
 gling held them to the waist-belt, from which a strap passed through 
 the hilt to a button in front, to keep the sword steady, and prevent it 
 flying out of the scabbard. 
 
 The swords are never drawn except in action. 
 
 Thinking the wooden scabbards might be objected to as not suitable 
 
THE SWORD. 65 
 
 for campaigning, I got a return from one of these regiments, and found 
 the average of broken scabbards below that of the regulars, who have 
 steel ones. The steel is snapped by a kick or a fall ; the wood, being 
 elastic, bends. They are not in the man's way ; when dismounted they 
 do not get between his legs and trip him up ; they make no noise — a 
 soldier on sentry of a dark night might move about without betraying 
 his position to an enemy by the clanking of the rings against the scab- 
 bard. All that rattling noise in column which announces its approach 
 when miles off, and makes it so difficult to hear a word of command in 
 the ranks, is thus got rid of; as well as the necessity of wrapping straw 
 or hay round the scabbards, as now customary when engaged in any 
 service in which an attempt is to be made to surprise an enemy. 
 
 " The cavalry steel scabbard is noisy, which is bad ; heavy, which is 
 worse ; and it destroys the weapon's sharp edge, which is worst. The 
 native wooden scabbard is best." — General Sir C. Napier. 
 
 An old trooper of the Nizam's told me the old broad English blades 
 were in great favor with them when mounted and kept as above de- 
 scribed ; but as we wore them, they were good for nothing in their 
 hands. 
 
 I said, "How do you strike with your swords to cut off men's 
 limbs ?" 
 
 *'' Strike hard, sir !" said the old trooper. 
 
 " Yes, of course ; but how do you teach the men to use their swords 
 in that particular way?" {drawing it.) 
 
 "We never teach them any way, sir,- a sharp sword will cut in any 
 one's hand." 
 
 Had our men worn arms like these in the last Sikh war, the enemy's 
 horsemen would not have met them with such confidence in single com- 
 bat; their trenchant blades would have inspired respect — the use of 
 them would have carried terror into the ranks of the foe. 
 
 It is well known that, beyond the effect of the moment, severe wounds 
 inflicted in action have a depressing moral effect on the enemy. 
 
 In a pamphlet published in Berlin, on cavalry matters, it is stated 
 that, in 1812, the wounds inflicted by the Russian horsemen inspired 
 such awe that nothing but the point of honor and esprit-de-corps could 
 bring the Prussian horse to close with them. 
 
 Captain Fitzgerald, of the 14th Dragoons, received a sword-wound at 
 6* 
 
66 THE ARMING. 
 
 Rumnugger, from the eflfects of which he died. A Sikh, on foot, crouch- 
 ed under a shield, cut at him from behind. The sword exposed the 
 spinal marrow, entering the skull at the same time. 
 
 A huge dragoon, of the regiment, was found quite dead : his head 
 had dropped forward from a cut on the back of the neck, which had 
 severed the spine j and at this very action, "it is aaid," that, whilst 
 our poor fellows labored in vain to draw blood, a touch from the Sikh's 
 sword across the arm or leg left the bold Englishmen at their mercy, 
 and they soon hacked them to pieces. 
 
 One officer, who was in the campaign, said he saw an English dragoon 
 putting his hands to the reins to try and turn his horse, when a native 
 horseman, dropping his sword across them, took off both hands above 
 the wrist. 
 
 A Sikh, after the retreat of our cavalry at Chillianwalla, galloped up 
 to the horse-artillery, cut down and killed the two men on the leading 
 horses of the gun, one after the other, and approached the third, a cool 
 fellow, who, seeing how badly his comrades had come off with their 
 swords, instead of drawing his, stuck to his whip, with which he flogged 
 off his assailant's horse, and thus saved himself! 
 
 A squadron of the 3d Dragoons, under Major Unett, charged a goel 
 of Sikh horsemen, and the major himself told me that they opened out, 
 giving just sufficient room for our squadron to enter. The dragoon on 
 the left of the front rank, going in at the charge, gave point at the 
 Sikh next him; the sword stuck in the lower part of his body, but did 
 not penetrate sufficiently to disable him ; so the Sikh cut back, hit the 
 dragoon across the mouth, and took his head clean oflf. 
 
 Colonel Steinbach, in his History of the Punjaub, tells us that the 
 cavalry of the Sikh army is very inferior in every respect to the in- 
 fantry ; that, while the latter are carefully picked from large bodies of 
 candidates for the service, the former are composed of men of all sorts, 
 sizes, and ages, who get appointed solely through the interests of the 
 different sirdars. 
 
 They are mean-looking, ill-dressed, and, as already stated, wretched- 
 ly mounted. The horses are small, meagre, and ill-shaped, with the 
 aquiline nose which so peculiarly proclaims inferiority of breed. 
 
 How comes it, if our system is good, that such men, of less physical 
 and moral courage, mounted on such inferior animals, should havo been 
 
SIKH HORSEMEN. 67 
 
 able to cope with our English dragoons ? and not seldom successfully, 
 for at the Battle of Chill ianwalla they tell of a Sikh horseman chal- 
 lenging the English to single combat and unhorsing three dragoons 
 (the first, a lancei*, had the lance-pole severed and his fore-finger taken 
 oflf at one blow) before he was shot down ! And what does a charge re- 
 solve itself into, when the enemy are bold, but a melee or a series of 
 single combats ? 
 
 Let us contrast the two following gallant actions, both fought by 
 English light dragoons ; the first by three troops of the 15th Hussars 
 against five hundred French horsemen, organized and armed on the 
 model system ; the second by two troops of the 3d Light Dragoons, 
 against five hundred of these badly-mounted rabble of the Sikhs. 
 
 In the first action the 15th charged twice. 
 
 In the second the 3d Dragoons charged through, but the Sikhs open- 
 ed out to let them back again. 
 
 Thus the 15th Hussars were twice in a melee with the French horse- 
 men. 
 
 The 3d Dragoons only once with the Bikhg. 
 
 The First.— ^' In the general attack made on the 2d of October (1799) 
 on the positions occupied by the enemy at Bergen and Egmont-op-Zee, 
 the 15th Dragoons formed part of the cavalry under Colonel Lord Paget 
 (now Marquis of Anglesey), attached to the force commanded by Sir 
 Ealph Abercrombj. 
 
 " Moving along the sea-shore towards Egmont-op-Zee, this column 
 encountered a etrong force of infantry among the sand-hills, with a 
 numerous body of cavalry and artillery, to their left on the beach ; 
 when a severe contest ensued, in which the steady bravery of the 
 British infantry triumphed. 
 
 " After forcing the enemy to fall back for several miles, the cavalry 
 advancing along the beach, as the infantry gained ground among the 
 sand-hills, the column halted in front of Egmont The British artillery 
 moved forward to check the fire of the enemy's guns, and two troops of 
 the 15th Light Dragoons advanced to support the artillery. Lord Paget 
 posted the two troops in ambush behind the sand-hills; and the French 
 general, thinking the British guns were unprotected, ordered five hun- 
 dred horsemen forward to capture them. The guns sent a storm of balls 
 against the advancing cavalry ; a few men and horses fell, but the re- 
 
68 THE ARMING. 
 
 mainder pressed forward and surrounded the artillery. At this moment 
 the two troops of the 15th sallied from their concealment, and, dashing 
 among the assailants, drove them hack upon thoir reserves, and then 
 returned to the liberated guns. 
 
 "■ The opposing squadrons having rallied, and ashamed of a flight 
 before so small a force, returned to the attack. They had arrived with- 
 in forty yards of the 15th, when a third troop of the regiment came up, 
 and a determined charge of the three troops drove the enemy back 
 again with loss, the 15th pursuing above half a mile. 
 
 " The loss of the 15th was three men and four horses hilled / Lieuten- 
 ant-Colonel James Erskine, nine men, and three horses wounded.* 
 
 The Second. — The cannonade had not been of long duration, when a 
 body of Sikh horsemen moved to Sir Joseph ThackwolFs left flank, as 
 if to get into his rear. He now ordered the 5th Native Light Cavalry 
 (three squadrons), and the Gray squadron of the od Dragoons (Unett's), 
 to charge and disperse them. 
 
 The gallant general had a lively recollection of what a few squadrons 
 of British dragoons effected in the Peninsula against the French, and 
 reasonably entertained the expectation that the force would prove suf- 
 ficient to drive back the Sikh irregulars. It was his intention to hare 
 advanced the few men left at his disposal, namely, the remaining squad- 
 ron of the .3d Dragoons and 8th Light Cavalry (native), on Outar's force 
 as soon as the success of the other charge became manifest. The charge 
 was sounded, and tfnett's squadron, in line with the 5th Native Light 
 Cavalry, approached the enemy. The Sikhs commenced a desultory 
 matchlock fire. 
 
 Unett steadily advanced, but the 5th, put into confusion by this re- 
 ception, went about and fled in the greatest precipitation, in spite of 
 the most earnest entreaties of their officers, of whom several received 
 wounds. 
 
 The 3d, forcing their way through the hostile ranks, never pulled rein 
 till they had got some distance beyond the enemy. Unett, who was 
 severely wounded, found his men sadly dispersed. 
 
 The few men around him, with clenched teeth, essayed to cut their 
 way back. The Sikhs opened out, and, giving the dragoons a passage 
 through them, abused, spat, and cut at them. 
 
 * Historical Record of the 15th Hussars. 
 
FRENCH CUIRASSIERS. 69 
 
 The other parties, under their officers, the gallant Stisted and Mae- 
 queen, repassed the enemy as they could. 
 
 The casualties in this squadron were not less thabU forty-six. 
 The suspense of every one was great; Sir Joseph himself became ap- 
 prehensive that the squadron was annihilated.* 
 
 Here we see two troops of English dragoons dashing into the middle 
 of 500 victorious French horsemen, and, after a melee, driving them ofi'. 
 We then see these same live hundred French horsemen returning 
 boldly and meeting the English (now reinforced by one troop) at the 
 charge ; a second melee ensues, and in both conflicts they only killed 
 three Englishmen ; and these French dragoons are men well mounted, 
 of undoubted courage, disciplined and trained according to our own 
 system. 
 
 In the second instance, two troops of the 3d Dragoons charge with 
 great gallantry and break through the enemy's ranks ; when charging 
 back the Sikhs open out and let them through; in the melee with these 
 men, so mean-looking and wretchedly mounted, they lose forty-six men 
 and horses, and nearly' lost their gallant leader. Major Unett, who re- 
 ceived a sword-cut which divided his pouch and entered two inches 
 deep into his back. 
 
 Another comparison of this kind may be of use, if only as an addi- 
 tional impress to the memory. 
 
 At th€ Battle of Ileilsberg, on the 18th of June, 1807, a good fight 
 took place between a division of the French Cuirassiers d'Espagne and 
 two regiments of Prussian horse ; one a regiment of lancers, the other 
 the dragoons of Ziethen. The French cuirassiers met the Prussians at 
 a walk and at close order : a hand-to-hand fight ensued, which termi- 
 nated in favor of the Prussians, who drove back their opponents into 
 the wood at Lavden. In that well-known French work, " Victoires et 
 Conquetes," it is mentioned that a French officer came out of this fight 
 with fifty-two new wounds upon him, and that a German officer, Cap- 
 tain Gebhardt, received upwards of twenty wounds. It appears that 
 Captain Gebhardt did yreat execution with the shaft of a broken lance, 
 knocking several cuirassiers ofi" their horses, but that he was himself 
 put hors-de-comhat by a kicking horse which rolled him over ! Imag- 
 
 *The '• Second Sikh War," by E. J. Tha«kwell. Battle of Chilliaawalla. 
 
70 THE ARMING. 
 
 ine a man receiving fifty-two sword and lanco wounds without losing 
 lifo or limb ! No wonder the Prussian Gebhardt took a big stick at 
 last (and a broken lance-sbaft is only a big stick) as the most formida- 
 ble weapon within reach — and by far a better tool than such sabres. 
 
 I have little to say about helmets, caps, jackets, and dress in general, 
 except that the most simple are the best. This opinion is now gaining 
 ground universally. But by simplicity I do not mean roughness, shab- 
 biness, or inelegance. So long as you can keep a soldier, let him bo 
 well dressed and smart in his appearance. The greatest element of true 
 elegance is the very simplicity which I would recommend. To me it 
 appears that we have too much frippery — too much toggery — too much 
 toeight in things worse than useless. To a cavalry soldier every ounce 
 is of consequence. I can never believe that our hussar uniform (take 
 which of them you please) is the proper dress in which to do hussar's 
 duty in war — to scramble through thickets, to clear woods, to open the 
 way through forests, to ford or swim rivers, to bivouac, to be nearly 
 always on outpost work, to "rough it** in every possible manner. Of 
 what use are plumes, bandoliers, sabretashes, sheepskins, shabraques, 
 etc.? 
 
 * " It aeems decreed that the hussar and the lancer is ever to be a popin- 
 jay — a show of foreign fooleries, so laced, and looped, and braided, that 
 the uninitiated bystander wonders how he can either get into his uni- 
 form or come out of it. A woman's muff upon his head, with some- 
 thing like a red jelly-bag at the top, has been substituted for the war- 
 rior's helm ; and the plume, so unlike the waving horse-hair of the 
 Roman casque, would seem better fitted for the trappings of the under- 
 taker than the horseman's brow. The first time I over saw a hussar, 
 or hulan, was at Ghent, in Flanders, then an Austrian town j and when 
 I beheld a richly decorated pelisse, waving empty, sleeves and all, frona 
 his shoulder, I never doubted that the poor man must have been re- 
 cently shot through the arm ; a glance, however, upon a tightly braid- 
 ed sleeve underneath made it still more unaccountable ; and why he 
 should not have had an additional pair of richly ornamented breeches 
 dangling at his waist, aa well as a jacket from his shoulder, has, I con- 
 
 — — ■ - y 
 
 * Notes and Recollections of a Professional Life, by William Fergusson, Eaq. 
 M.D. 
 
HEAD-PIECE. 71 
 
 fees, puzzled me from that time to the present, it being the first rule of 
 health to keep the upper portion of the body as cool, and the lower as 
 warm, as possible. Surely a horseman's water-proof cloak, made to 
 cover from head to foot the rider and his saddle, with his arms and am- 
 munition — to be his protection against the pouring deluge, his screen 
 and cover in the night bivouac — is the only equipment of the kind the 
 country should be called upon either to furnish or suffer. 
 
 " Man-milinery in any shape, is an abuse and prostitution of the 
 English character. Borrow and copy from foreigners whatever may 
 be truly valuable in arms — it is right and fitting so to do ; but let us 
 dress ourselves in serviceable garb, that /ears no stain, nor needs a host 
 o/furbUhers to keep it inorder." 
 
 Of the tight leather stock and head-piece Dr. Fergusson says : 
 
 " The circulation of the ascending arteries in the neck is by far the 
 closest of any part of the human body, and to impede its relief by the 
 returning veins, which a stiff ligature of any kind is sure to do, must 
 have a stupifying effect upon the brain. 
 
 *' It can not fail, besides, to deteriorate the sight, from the pressure 
 of congested blood upon the optic nerve, and the stock would seem to 
 be preserved only for the purpose of generating a tendency to all kinds 
 of apoplectic and ophthalmic diseases. 
 
 " It would be better, surely, to inflict an ulcer upon the soldier's 
 neck, for the discharge might then have the relieving effect of an issue : 
 but a tight ligature, not only on the neck, but anywhere else, should 
 be rejected for ever from military dress and equipment of whatever de- 
 scription. 
 
 "A heavy head-piece is everywhere a disqualification and a hin- 
 drance to the wearer; for, to heat and cumber the brain, which, being 
 the source of all our powers and faculties, ought ever to be freest, can 
 never be justified. 
 
 " Everywhere the direct rays of the sun striking upon the eye must 
 be hurtful ; but when these are refracted from a white rocky soil, the 
 immediate effect becomes distressing in the greatest degree. A shade 
 properly dropped from the cap would effectually obviate this, and it 
 ought to be furnished."* 
 
 * These extracts are from a book called " Notes and BecoUections of a Profee- 
 aional Life," by the late William Fergusson, Esq., M.D,, Imspector-Qeneral of Mil- 
 
72 THE ARMING. 
 
 Without defcnsivo armor (which brings weight to the horse and 
 cramps the man), a good uniform may afford valuable protection, while 
 a bad one may be as inconvenient as armor, and afford no protection 
 where it is most wanted. 
 
 The most vulnerable parts of a cavalry soldier are the head, the back 
 of the neck, and the arms and legs. The Asiatics, well aware of this, 
 cover those parts in their own bodies, and take immediate advantage 
 of those who are not protected in like manner. The Turkish irregu- 
 lars wore a turban, that was a better defence to the head than our hel- 
 mets of bi-ass or of steel : with them the leg was defended by the deep 
 saddle and the broad shovel-like stirrup-iron; the arms of their jackets 
 or bcneeshes were padded, and the blunt European sword seldom cut 
 through the dress, which was of silk, or of silk interwoven with cot- 
 ton. The jacket of the Russian or Austrian trooper offered no such 
 impediments to their scimitars, and short, handy, light yataghans. 
 
 *"The propensity of the Sikhs to aim their cuts at the back of the 
 
 itary Hospitals, a work so instructive and interesting to all military men that I 
 recommend it strongly to their notice. It is edited by his son, the well-known 
 Jamee J<erg\i98on, a man of distinguished ability in many ways, and one who, of 
 late, has stood prominently before the public, and created no small sensation by 
 hi^ last work, "The Perils of Portsmouth," and by his new system of Fortification. 
 Iq speaking of the foreign hussar, Dr. Fergusson was appai'ently not aware that 
 tho Hungarian hussar is actually provided "with an additional pair of richly or- 
 namented breeches," which are worn under the overalls on the line of march ; at 
 leaat they were so provided when I had the honor of serving with them. Round 
 the neck they wore a loose black handkerchief, which I should earnestly recom- 
 mend for imitation : in the copy wo have made of their dross a stock has been sub- 
 stituted. The Hungarians line their pelisses with fui-, and make them like a pea- 
 jacket to go over the doUman (dross-jacket) in cold weather; our pelisses are not 
 large or loose enough for this purpose; we therefore generally sling them, or wear 
 them instead of the jiickct. 
 
 A squadron of the loth Unssars in India marched into the Nizam's country in 
 1350, where the slung pelisses creiited tho utmost curiosity amongst the natives 
 at Hyderabad, and gave rise to many stories as to their origin. The prevailing 
 belief, however, was, that tho regiment had done such gallant deeds on one pur- 
 ticular occasion, that the king said "each individual fought as if he had four 
 arms," and gave them four arms accordingly— a comfortable belief, which we took 
 c^^e to leave them in. 
 
 * TliRckwell, " History of tho Second Sikh War." 
 
DRESS. 73 
 
 head was so unequivocally manifested on the 22d of November, that it 
 became an object of consideration to the officers of the army to provide 
 some defence, however slight, for the precious caput. 
 
 " Some officers wrapped rolls of linen cloth round the back of the 
 csako, the folds of which hung down over their backs, affording some 
 protection." 
 
 For the arms, gauntlets ought to be used, which would leave the hand 
 free and naked to grasp the sword; like those in use with the natives 
 of India, made of steel, to reach to the point of the elbow. Arms thus 
 encased can be used to parry blows aimed at the head or body — the 
 gauntlets are no weight, and the hands being free and naked, gives a 
 great advantage in action. 
 
 Overalls afford no protection in the ranks or in the melee ; they are 
 constantly getting torn, the lower parts get rotten with mud and wet, 
 the straps impede the bending of the knee in mounting, and prevent a 
 man from exerting himself when on foot. 
 
 Overalls without straps, and black leather leggings, made the shape 
 of Napoleon's boots, with a covered bar of steel running down the side, 
 fastened with straps above and below, and only worn when mounted, 
 would give the horseman the necessary protection, and enable him to 
 exert himself as long as life was in him ; for a chance blow over arm or 
 leg would not disable him.* 
 
 Colonel Ponsonby was thus disabled at Waterloo, and gives the fol- 
 lowing account of himself: 
 
 " In the melee I was almost instantly disabled in both my arms, losing 
 first my sword and then my rein ; and, followed by a few of my men, 
 who were presently cut down, no quarter being asked or given, I was 
 carried along by my horse, till, receiving a blow from a sabre, I fell 
 senseless on my face to the ground."! 
 
 With regard to fire-arms for cavalry, as accuracy of fire is what ia 
 required, not rapidity, I should give them short handy rifles: these 
 should be carried in a holster, about fourteen inches long, bell-mouthed, 
 like a tube, and open at the bottom. This holster should be fastened 
 
 * When dismounted the dragoon could leave leggings and spurs with his horse, 
 and turn out in ankle-boots and trousers without straps, 
 f Cotton, " A Voice from Waterloo." 
 
 7 
 
74 THE ARMING. 
 
 below the off wallet, pointing to the horse's shoulder. The carbine is 
 pushed through, and a strap about one yard long fastens it to the pom- 
 mel of the saddle, and prevents the man from losing the weapon if he 
 should let go his hold when firing or loading. 
 
 The cumbrous bandolier-belt, with its appurtenances, is got rid of,* 
 and the man can bring his carbine easily to his shoulder; whereas it is 
 almost an impossibility to do either whilst the carbine is attached to the 
 big awkward belt. No carbine stay-strap is required and no bucket: 
 the carbine can be drawn and returned with the same ease as a pistol. 
 It rides in much the same position as at present, with the bucket and 
 stay-strap, only it rides steadily and does not get into the way of the 
 man's sword-arm, which happens often at present when jerked forward 
 by the stay -strap. The strap I propose unbuckles from the saddle, and 
 serves as a sling when the man is dismounted. 
 
 Another good way of carrying the carbine is to sling it at the back, 
 muzzle over the left shoulder, the small of the butt fastened to the waist- 
 belt on the right side by a small strap and button to keep the carbine 
 steady. Thus the soldier has his weapons about his person, and if un- 
 horsed can effectually defend himself; and the carbine would often, in 
 action, save the wearer from a sword-cut across the back. 
 
 Many foreign regiments carry the carbine hooked to the bandolier, 
 muzale downwards, and let it dangle about loose. It is terribly in the 
 -way of the men's legs in the ranks; when galloping, the butt strikes 
 against the hip-bone, occasioning great sufiering ; encumbered with the 
 belt and hook, the man can never bring the weapon freely to his shoulder 
 to take. aim, and it is most inconvenient in mounting and dismounting. 
 
 It. appears to me that the distances for which they are now sighting 
 soldiers' carbines abroad are quite ridiculous. Few have eyes good 
 enough to see a man or even a column so far off. This custom, if not 
 altered, will lead to the men firing at everything they fancy they soe in 
 the distance, causing constant false alarms in camp. No supplies of 
 ammunition will suffice for troops firing in this manner. It may be 
 
 * The pou<ili-belt, from the manner in which it is slung across the man's back, 
 shakes the ammunition to pieces, and eoon renders it totally unfit for use. The 
 ammunition Bh»uld be in a water-proof box, fHStened to the off-side of the saddle, 
 in lieu of the present wallet, the soldier carrying six rounds in his waiet-belt for 
 immediate U8€. 
 
THE LANCE AND THE SWORD. 75 
 
 very well for some foreign troops to stand out at such long shots, and 
 so keep danger far off; but I hope and trust that an honest Englishman 
 will always like to look his enemy nearer in the faoe. I think that 
 cavalry carbines sighted up to 300 yards would more than suffice for all 
 purposes. One of the greatest difiBculties of the officer is to make his 
 men reserve their fire. Surely nothing should be done to increase this 
 difficulty, or to tempt the men to such long shots. 
 
 The Lance and the Sword. — Formerly it was a received opinion that 
 the lance was particularly formidable in single encounters, that the 
 lancer should be a light, active horseman, and that space was required 
 whereon he might manage his horse and turn him always towards the 
 object at which he was to thrust. But of late there seems to be rather 
 a disposition to take up Marshal Marmont's notion of arming heavy 
 cavalry with lances, to break infantry as well as cavalry. All seem to 
 forget that a lance is useless in a melee — that the moment the lancer 
 pulls up and the impulsive power is stopped, that instant the power of 
 the weapon is gone. 
 
 The 16th Lancers broke into the Sikh squares at Aliwal, and in the 
 melee that ensued these brave men attacked the lancers sword in hand 
 and brought many of them low, for they could eflFect nothing with the 
 lance. 
 
 In the second Sikh war, I have been told that our lanoers often failed 
 in driving their lances into a Sikh, because they had shawls wrapped 
 round them. I could tell them a better reason ; it was because those 
 who failed did not know that it requires speed to drive a lance home, 
 and that it must be carried into the object by the horse. 
 
 I have often seen, when hog-hunting, men with spears sharp as razors 
 unable to drive the weapon through the boar's hide, whereas others (old 
 hands) would send a spear in at one side and out at the other, through 
 bone and all. 
 
 This shows that the lanoe is not a dangerous weapon in all hands, 
 and therefore unfit for soldiers. 
 
 All experiments with blunt lances on fresh horses go for nothing, in 
 my opinion, for many of the thrusts would not go through a man's 
 jacket; and in a campaign, when horses are fatigued, and will not an- 
 swer the spur, even the skilful horseman is helpless with a lance in his 
 hand. 
 
 At speed you can drive a lance through anything, bat not so at a 
 
76 THE ARMING. 
 
 slower pace; and at a walk, and a stand, you become helpless, and the 
 thrust can be put aside with ease, or the pole seized with the hand. 
 
 If the advantage of the lance is in its long reach, the longer the 
 vrcapon the more formidable. The French gendarmes, whose lances 
 Averc eighteen feet long, suflfered such dreadful defeats that they gave 
 up the weapon altogether, 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus took the lances away from his cavalry in the 
 Thirty Years' War. He had practically experienced their inefficiency. 
 
 Let us allow, for the sake of argument, that a lance of a proper length, 
 handy, well poised, and held at its centre, reaches further beyond the 
 horse's head than the point of a sword held at arm's length : in what 
 way can this conduce to success, when it is universally acknowledged 
 that it is the superior impetus and speed of one of the advancing lines 
 which overthrows the other; the weapons only coming into play after- 
 wards ? 
 
 The lancers' pennons attract the fire of artillery ; in single combat 
 they betray to the adversary where the danger is, and thus enable him 
 to avoid it; and if they sometimes frighten an adversary's horse, the 
 animal shies and carries his master out of reach of the point which, if 
 not decorated, might have run him through the body. 
 
 The Asiatics carry a light spear (without pennon), which they say 
 they leave in the body of their first foe (or throw away), but take to 
 their swords when the tug of war comes fast and fierce. 
 
 I believe that the only advantage of the lance lies in the moral effect 
 produced (particularly on young soldiers), not only by its longer reach, 
 but by the deadly effect of the home thrusts. Thus, in the Seven Years' 
 War, the Prussian hussars were at first very shy of the lances used by 
 the Kussians : some of the Prussian officers rode out in front of the 
 line engaged, and cut down several of the Cossacks and lancers in sin- 
 gle combat, showing their men how easy it was to despatch them by 
 closing upon them at once; and thus encouraged, the hussars soon 
 mastered their opponents. 
 
 The Russian line of outposts formed against the Circassians is in- 
 habited by the Line Cossacks, though many Cossacks of the Don and 
 Ural are there on service. All form part of the army of the Caucasus. 
 
 Those of the Don, the Ural, and Tschernomor, are armed with the 
 lance; but the Lino Cossacks, who are in constant warfare with the 
 Circassians, have given it up, and taken to the sword. They say that 
 
THE LANCE. 77 
 
 in irregular warfare the lance is useful against bad horsemen, but that 
 it is only in the way in a contest with bold and skilful riders like the 
 Circassians, who close upon them at once. 
 
 These Cossacks contend, and often successfully, against their adver- 
 saries j but the Circassians, with their swords, make short work of the 
 other Cossacks, and look upon the Line Cossacks alone as formidable 
 antagonists. 
 
 As to the lance being a more deadly weapon than the sword, it depends 
 entirely upon uTiat swords it be compared to. If to those generally in 
 use in the European cavalry of the present day, decidedly wo must give 
 it in favor of the lance; but if we compare it to the scimitar of the 
 Turk, the sword of the Mahratta, the Sikh, the Circassian, any sword 
 with an edge to it, then, I say, the lance is comparatively but a harm- 
 less weapon. 
 
 If lances be such good weapons, surely those who wield them ought 
 to acquire great confidence in them; whereas it is well known that, in 
 battle, lancers generally throw them away, and take to their swords. I 
 never spoke with an English lancer who had been engaged in the late 
 Sikh wars that did not declare the lance to be a useless tool, and a great 
 encumbrance in close conflict 
 
 We often attribute want of success or defeat to the tactics of an ene- 
 my, or to his arms being superior-anything rather than acknowledge 
 that his more manly courage won the day. 
 
 Thus, perhaps, have the Line Cossacks thrown away their lances and 
 taken to the sword, to imitate their more successful enemies, the Circas- 
 sians. And the Prussians in 1813 copied the Russians, and adopted 
 the lance for the landwehr. 
 
 In the last Hungarian war the Hungarian hussars were (as we have 
 seen) generally successful against the Austrian heavy cavalry- cuiras- 
 siers and dragoons; but when they met the Polish lancers, the finest 
 regiments of light-horse in the Austrian service, distinguished for their 
 discipline, good riding, and, above all, for th^n csprit-de-corp, ^nd gal- 
 lantry in action, against these regiments the Hungarians were not suc- 
 cessful, and at once attributed this to the lances of their opponents 
 The Austrians then extolled the lance above the sword, and armed all 
 their light cavalry regiments with it. 
 
 Russia has armed the front ranks of her heavy cavalry with Ion- 
 
 7* '^ 
 
78 THE ARMING. 
 
 unwieldy lances, and other European powers have lately been following 
 the example. Marshal Marmont, an exile from France, was in Russia 
 when he took up his new idea. 
 
 The failure of the 7th Hussars in the retreat from Quatre-Bras, against 
 the French lancers, jammed close together in the streets of Gomappe, 
 was attributed to the lances of their opponents. 
 
 Of what use were the lances to the French a few minutes later, when 
 a regiment of life-guards (without cuirasses) went at them sword in 
 hand, and drove them through the town, and out at the other side — 
 riding them down, and cutting them from their horses in all directions ? 
 
 Yet, after the Battle of Waterloo, lancer regiments, for the first time, 
 were formed in England ! 
 
 Lancers are of no use for outpost duty ; the enemy shoot them down, 
 and they have no fire-arms wherewith to keep the enemy off. 
 
 The French lancers, in attacking lancers of other nations, often slung 
 their lances, and drew their swords. General de Brack recommends 
 swordsmen, engaged with lancers, to close upon them, and crowd them 
 together. He says : " The lancers, jammed together, can neither point 
 nor parry, and one of two things must happen : they will either throw 
 down their lances, in order to get at their swords, or they will retain 
 their lances, and in this case you will have the best of the bargain. 
 Our pivot files in the lancers of the Imperial guard did not carry lances. 
 I remember upon two occasions in 1814 (at Hoagstraten, near Breda, 
 and at Pont-a-Trecir, below Lisle) having to deal with Russian and 
 Prussian lancers, who, like ourselves, held their own upon narrow roads, 
 with deep ditches on either hand. I placed carabineers at the head of 
 my column, and made my lancers follow j and these last put their lances 
 in the bucket, and drew their swords ; and, having penetrated the ene- 
 my, our success so far surpassed our hopes, that we cut them down 
 without damage to ourselves." 
 
 A good plan, however, is often followed by the Cossacks when attack- 
 ed by swordsmen. They stand fast and receive the assailant on their 
 left, keeping the lance to the right front : when the swordsman is within 
 reach, they make a circular parry toward him (from right to left), and 
 turn the assailant aside by this movement. They then turn to the left 
 and follow, and charge home with the lance at their opponent's left side. 
 
 The Poles, by constant habit and practice, may possess a peculiar 
 
THE HORSES — THE BIT. 79 
 
 aptitude in the management of their national weapon, but with the rest 
 of the European nations the lance may be said to have had its reign. 
 At least few will now say, with Montecuculi: " La lance est la rexne deg 
 armes blanches !" 
 
 The following extract from a letter of Oliver Cromwell, giving an 
 account of the Battle of Dunbar, shows clearly that arming the front 
 ranks of cavalry with lances is but an old custom revived : 
 
 " The dispute on this right wing was hot and stiff for three-quarters 
 of an hour. Plenty of fire, from field-pieces, snaphances, match-locks, 
 entertains the Scotch main-battle across the Brock ; poor stiffened men, 
 roused from the corn-shocks with their matches all out ! 
 
 " But here on the right, their horse, with lancers in the front ranh, 
 charge desperately ; drive us back across the hollow of the rivulet — 
 back a little j but the Lord gives us courage, and we storm home again, 
 horse and foot upon them, with a shock like tornado tempests; break 
 them, beat them, drive them all adrift." * 
 
 Where shall we find, in these our modern days, a bulletin shorter, and 
 better, than this ? 
 
 The Horse. 
 
 I assume that in England, in Ireland, in Cana,da, in India, at the 
 Cape of Good Hope, and in Australia, we have always the means of 
 obtaining good remount horses for our cavalry. But as one may make 
 something of a horse of indifferent quality by skill, so the very best 
 horse may be spoiled, or greatly injured, by a bad system of accoutring 
 and training him. For the present I speak only of bridling and sad- 
 dling. 
 
 Here nothing is so important as the selection of the proper bit. This 
 is a subject upon which many have been very positive and pedantic, 
 and few very wise. 
 
 The art of suiting to each horse a bit of more or less power, accord- 
 ing to the shape of the mouth, the sensitiveness and the temper of the 
 animal, is looked upon abroad as a science ; and in Prussia it is said to 
 stand higher, and to be more difficult to learn, than riding itself. 
 
 * Carlyle's " Cromwell." 
 
80 ORGANIZATION. 
 
 They say that the best broken horse would be ruined if a bit was put 
 iu his mouth which did not suit; and so far is this carried by Germans, 
 that they will tell you seriously that to shorten the curb-chain 07}e link, 
 or to use a bit half an inch longer or shorter in the cheek, will make 
 the diflference between a well-broken horse and a restive one. 
 
 What, then, does a good hand go for ? 
 
 The Arab and the Turk ride with bits so powerful that they can break 
 a horse's jaw or pull up. 
 
 The Persians, Sikhs, and Mussulmans have a square snaffle, with 
 iron spikes; they wrap thread round this mouth-piece, so that, the 
 more the horse presses against it, the farther the spikes come out from 
 under their covering, and run into him : and farther, they have a stand- 
 ing martingale, fastened to the rings of the snaffle, which keeps the 
 horse's head down and under control. 
 
 The Cossack and the Circassian, the latter particularly famed for the 
 wonderful address with which he handles his horse at speed, and in 
 single combat, both use a common snaffle. 
 
 It is not the shape of the bit, the horse's mouth or temper, nor is it 
 the nation and peculiarities of the horseman, that render the animal 
 obedient and handy, but it is the way of riding and breaking him, and 
 the manner in which you teach the horse to obey the bit you put in his 
 mouth, whatever that maj' be. 
 
 A bit of moderate power is the best for general purposes, and if prop- 
 erly used will bring most horses under control. 
 
 The mouth-piece should be sufliciently arched to admit of the horse's 
 tongue passing freely underneath it, and the cheek rather long, to give 
 power to the lever. 
 
 But beyond the consideration of a mouth-piece, there is another 
 quality of essential importance in the bridling of cavalry. It ia, to af- 
 ford the possibility of bridling and unbridling quickly; for if there is 
 difficulty in bridling up, the soldier can not feed the horse in the near 
 neighborhood of the enemy, and this, in a campaign, becomes matter 
 of serious import, for the condition of the horses will suffer. The Cos- 
 sacks feed their horses at all times, even in the battle-field, amidst the 
 roar of cannon. Their horses kept condition in the last war, when 
 others were dying from exhaustion and want of food, and the marches 
 they sometimes made were wonderful. 
 
THE SADDLE. 81 
 
 The Russians have their bits made with a hook and link, and can. 
 take them out of their horse's mouth without taking off the bridle. 
 
 Some of the bridles in use in our cavalry (those of the Carabineers 
 and the Inniskillens) are. in my opinion, better than those of the Rus- 
 sians. They are on a more simple plan, and, with the Russian link, 
 would afford the same facility of bridling quickly. 
 
 The snaffle, however, should have half-horns, to prevent the rings from 
 being drawn into the horse's mouth ; and the reins should be sewn on, 
 for the strain is then on the breadth of the rein, instead of the tongue 
 of the buckle. 
 
 Ought not this convenient bridle to be at once made general in the 
 service? In a campaign it obviates the serious evil which I have indi- 
 cated. But, without going to the field of war, everybody in these days 
 of railway speed feels the necessity of economizing time and trouble. 
 One has often to bridle in a hurry, and sometimes, it may be, in the 
 dark. 
 
 The Saddle. — That saddle is best for cavalry which, being of a simple 
 construction, brings the soldier close to his horse, in a firm and easy 
 seat. It must be sufficiently strong to carry the necessary kit, easy to 
 repair or replace in the field j it ought to be roomy, and, above all, it 
 ought to give no sore backs. 
 
 I have cited the " Magnanimous Usurper" as an authority, and such 
 he must be considered in cavalry matters. The following brief, pointed, 
 and truly characteristic letter, will prove the attention he bestowed on 
 horse-gear and sharp swords ; 
 
 " WiSBEACH, THIS DAY, 11th NoV., 1642. 
 
 "Dear Fiiienu : "Let the saddler see to the horse-gear. I learn 
 
 from one, many are ill served. If a man has not good weapons, horee, 
 
 and harness, he is as nought. 
 
 " From your Friend, 
 
 '■ Oliver Cromwell. 
 " To Auditor Squire." 
 
 Every cavalry oflBcer will do well to remember this curt epistle. 
 
 The present hussar saddle raises the man high off his horse, because 
 the spread of the side-boards, and the upright position of the forks, re- 
 quire the wolf, or scat, to be high; for if it is not high, then the sides 
 
82 ORGANIZATION. 
 
 of the boards raise up tho thighs of the man, and prevent him from grip- 
 ping his horse. The saddle is like a wedge between the man's legs, on 
 which his body acts as a lever : thus, if he inclines or throws his weight 
 on one side or the other, he moves the saddle bodily, and by doing this 
 often he naturally causes a sore back. 
 
 In this respect a great improvement has been made in the Hungarian 
 saddles now given to our heavy dragoons ; for here the side-boards are 
 cut out like the tree of our English saddle, the seat is lowered, and the 
 man brought nearer his horse. 
 
 The Hungarian saddle is used either with a large blanket in twelve 
 folds, or with pads stuffed with horse-hair. Now both these methods 
 are faulty. The large blanket is, in the first place, very hot and oppres- 
 sive, the side-boards, being of a polished surface, have no hold on the 
 blanket, and thus it often works its way out from under the saddle. 
 With pads, a free circulation of air is indeed obtained between the saddle 
 and the horse's back j but as the condition of the horse varies, so does 
 the position of the saddle ; and as this can not easily be rectified by 
 means of the blanket, difi'erent expedients are resorted to, such as cov- 
 ering the side-boards with plaits of straw, or giving the blanket an extra 
 fold. 
 
 Every one must have had occasion to observe, on a long march, that 
 the edges of the pads stretch the horses' skins, and occasion sore backs ; 
 then they become hardened with the sweat from tho horses, and gall 
 them severely. 
 
 Instead of pads, I would recommend the use of strips of felt, put in a 
 cover, and laced on to the side-boards. For the large blanket I would 
 substitute a felt saddle-cloth, to reduce the direct strain on tho horse's 
 skin, absorb the perspiration, and prevent the edges of the pads from 
 getting hard. Tho slips of felt enable you always to keep tho saddle in 
 its proper position ,• for, if a horse falls off in flesh, you place an extra 
 slip of felt in the pad, and, if ho puts up condition, you take one out. 
 
 I have seen a trial made with a squadron that had pads and many 
 sore backs. They then used a blanket under the pads, nearly in the 
 manner I have recommended, and in spite of forced marches the sore 
 backs got well, and the squadron, after travelling four hundred miles, 
 arrived at head-quarters with only one led horso. 
 
 The Turks very generally use felt, in the manner here described. Two 
 
THE SADDLE. 83 
 
 recent English travellers found it impossible to get on in Asia Minor with 
 their English saddles, without bringing in the aid of strips of fol t ; but with 
 this aid they made several long journeys without once galling the backs 
 of the very poor creatures they rode. Good felt was cheap in the coun- 
 try. They carried a supply of strips with them, and these they applied 
 in increase, or removed, or changed, as the occasion or the condition of 
 the horses required. With a plentiful supply of this material, a Turk- 
 ish or Greek peasant, with a clumsy pack-saddle made entirely of wood, 
 will ride a horse without soring his back, or wringing, or galling him. 
 
 In Hungary, the peasants use their wooden saddles without any blank- 
 et. In the French service they have been making experiments to dis- 
 pense with the blanket altogether. This, no doubt, might answer very 
 well in time of peace, or so long as the horses can keep up their con- 
 dition; but the moment the wood comes in contact with the ribs the 
 horses must suffer, and then a very short time will suflBco to wear through 
 their skin. 
 
 A very ingenious saddle has been constructed and tried in Belgium : 
 it has movable side-boards, the front and hind forks working on an iron 
 roller, so as to allow of the side-boards always assuming a position par- 
 allel to the horse's back. But, unfortunately, this saddle is very liable 
 to get out of order, and the kit does not pack so firmly on it as it ought 
 to do. 
 
 For details about the saddle of my own invention, I must refer to the 
 Appendix of the present volume. 
 
 The seat for a horse-soldier should certainly be low, like that of a 
 hunting saddle, and the saddle should be broad and roomy, the front 
 part flush, the side-boards closer in front. If I am not deceived, the 
 saddle of my proposed construction will meet all the desiderata, and will 
 be a comfort and a security both to man and horse. 
 
84 MILITARY RIDING. 
 
 Chapter VI . 
 
 MILITARY RIDING. 
 
 Horsemanahip, like the noble animal itself, found its way into Europe 
 from the East. Though no longer for war, nor even for the manly 
 sports of thi field, the art was highly cultivated during the decline of 
 the Eastern Empire. The hippodrome of Constantinople attracted the 
 attention of Europe when no other object of admiration or of sympathy 
 was left in that demoralizing and falling state. About the year 1134 
 many companies of Byzantine circus-riders went over to Naples, at that 
 time the last state in Italy which acknowledged the authority of the 
 Eastern Empire. Thus Naples became the first school for horsemanship 
 in Western Europe. From that city the school was gradually spread 
 over the rest of Italy, and into France and Germany. For some ages 
 Naples also supplied the best horses for the manege. Down to the close 
 of the sixteenth century, and even to a later period, the Neapolitan 
 horses are frequently mentioned by writers as highly prized in England 
 as well as in most of the continental countries. They divided favor and 
 pre-eminence with the well-bred horses imported from the south of 
 Spain, where the blood of the Arab and the Barb had been liberally in- 
 fused. As stock, they tended to improve the studs of other countries. 
 It should seem that, by importation and by other means, England must 
 have had a certain supply of good nags in the fourteenth century, or as 
 early as the time of Chaucer, for that old poet frequently alludes with 
 evident gusto to choice horses and neat horsemanship. Of his lordly 
 sporting Monk he informs us that — 
 
 " Pull mfiny a dainty horse had be in stable." 
 
 Of his aged Knight he tells us that — 
 
 " His horse was good, albeit he was not gay." 
 
 Among the accomplishmenta of his young Squire he docs not forget to 
 admit that — 
 
 " Well could he Bit his horse and fairly ride." 
 
MILITARY RIDING. 85 
 
 But the most charming figure that rode with that good and merry com- 
 pany of pilgrims to the shrine at Canterbury, was the Wife of Bath — 
 
 " Upon an ambler easily she sate," etc. 
 
 Our early school of horsemanship was certainly easy and natural^ and 
 therefore good. As such it may be said to hare continued — except for 
 the cavalry of our army. Whatever case originally belonged to the 
 Neapolitan school (which, being of Eastern origin, was doubtlessly good) 
 was soon stiffened out of it in France and Germany, as also in every 
 part of Italy. 
 
 The Ironsides of Cromwell kept their national and natural seats, and 
 rode on the field of battle aa they would have ridden across country. 
 But France and Germany, by the time of Marlborough, came to be con- 
 sidered as the great emporia of military science, and thither repaired 
 all young Englishmen who aspired to glory and renown in arms, to 
 study the practice as well as the theory of war. Now the French have 
 never been an equestrian people, and the Germans must certainly yield 
 the palm of horsemanship to the English. Moreover, both French and 
 Germans fell into a very stiff and artificial mode, introducing pedantry 
 into the riding-school, and depriving both man and horse of their capa- 
 bilities and natural elan. 
 
 Yet our military riding is, to this day, imported from the Continent. 
 
 I aay vxilitary, because none of our dragoon or hussar officers would, 
 for a moment, think of riding across country in a foreign seat, or in 
 any other way in the manege fashion. Yet in the business of war our 
 cavalry ought to be able to perform whatever is done in the sport of 
 hunting, and whatever interferes with the ability of so doing must be 
 set down as a detriment and great evil. 
 
 The Russians and most other continental nations place their saddles 
 near the loins, and girth their horses round the belly instead of the 
 brisket.* The established seat is upright, the knee drawn back, and 
 the heel in a perpendicular line with the point of the shoulder; and so 
 far is this carried, that it is no uncommon thing to see spur-marks on 
 the horse's stifle. The man's legs, from the knee down, are carefully 
 
 * This is the order in our cavalry regulations, though fortunately it is not strictly 
 carried out The regulations say : " Place the saddle one hand's breadth behind the 
 play of the shoulder." 
 
86 MILITARY RIDING. 
 
 brought away from the horse, in order to prevent what is called "cling- 
 ing," and he is taught to ride by balance. If this system can be right, 
 I have thrown away many years in the study and practice of horseman- 
 ship, and all who arc bold riders at home, and all the best cavaliers of 
 the East, are wrong. 
 
 And how do foreigners treat the horse ? The system followed in their 
 riding-schools wearies out all patience, both in man and beast. The 
 simple breaking in of the horse has no end ; and if his education is to be 
 perfected by the addition of a few "airs de manege," such as croupades, 
 pirouettes, ballottades, pcsades, etc., then the horse must be long- 
 lived to be brought to execute them ! And should the veteran of the 
 manege take all his degrees with the highest credit, for what mortal 
 work is he fit? His life has been consumed in doing unnecessary things, 
 and he has no strength and no legs left to do things necessary and 
 essential. 
 
 In almost all cavalry services detachments from each cavalry regi- 
 ment are sent to the various riding establishments to learn to ride. 
 These detachments arc composed of picked men and horses, carefully 
 trained before they are sent to these establishments for instruction. 
 The detachments remain about a year, in most foreign countries still 
 longer, and do nothing but riding-school work, for two and three hours 
 a day, during all that time, and all this to go through a ride at a walk, 
 trot, and canter, when they are dismissed.* Of what possible use can 
 a system be which requires trained men and horses to ride daily in the 
 riding-school for a whole year, to enable them to go through a ride in 
 the school, which constitutes, after all, but the first step in their train- 
 ing on horseback? for the same men have never ridden once at speed, 
 or used their arms at that pace ! 
 
 The system of brute force pursued by the horsemen of the East is 
 far preferable to this ; in eight days they make their chargers canter 
 round a sixpence, and pull them up and turn thom at speed. This they 
 do by tying the horse's nose down with a standing martingale, attach- 
 ed to a spiked snaffle ; they then fasten a rope to the rings of the snaf- 
 fle and longe the animal on a very small circle, with a man on his back, 
 
 * At our riding eetabliahments they have much improved of late. They make 
 the meu perform the sword and lance exercise at a gallop, and toach them to take 
 a flight of fences put up in the bunack-liold. 
 
ESTABLISHMENTS. bi 
 
 whose spurs and whip can not be denied. After a few days at this, 
 they practice the horse at starting off at speed and pulling up on 
 the spot, and their charger is ready for the field ! True, he can neither 
 walk nor trot ; that is, he walks generally with both legs of a side at 
 the same time,* and instead of trotting he ambles ; but, nevertheless, 
 great results have been obtained, for the horse is handy and obedient. 
 
 At , on the Continent, Z. Z. showed us the royal stables, and 
 
 the horses broken in at the riding-school. One of them had no shoes 
 on ; we asked the reason. Answer. " He never works out of the riding- 
 school." Question. " How old is he?" A. " Fourteen years old." Q. 
 " Is he quite perfect in the riding-school work ?" A. " Not quit«, but 
 very good at it." 
 
 We were shown a " Springer." A groom led in a horse with his tail 
 tied on one side (I presume to give a better opening for the whip of the 
 riding-master), a cavesson on, and a young man in jack-boots riding 
 him, his legs drawn down and unnaturally far back, a cutting whip 
 held upright in one hand, and the reins divided in both hands. The 
 horse was placed against the side wall, the groom in front with the 
 cavesson line held up to prevent the horse springing forward. The ani- 
 mal was evidently uneasy, and looked back. No wonder ! for present- 
 ly the riding-master stepped up behind, and crack ! crack ! went the 
 whip into the " springer's " unprotected hind-quarters. He sprang in 
 the air and back to his place, for he could not get forward. This was 
 not enough. It appears that the perfection of this performance consists 
 in getting the horse to kick out behind at the moment he is off the 
 ground with all-fours ; and, what between the groom pulling the iron 
 band against the horse's nose with all his might, and the riding-master 
 giving him the whip with a practised hand, they succeeded in getting 
 the capriole required, sending the man in boots on to the horse's neck 
 at the same time.f The riding-master, pleased with the success of hia 
 
 * This manner of walking, as well as bridle-lameness, is common among our 
 school-horses. 
 
 t There are two airs de manage of this sort in the old school, both equally use- 
 less. The first is called the 6aHo<^ade, in which the horse jumps off the ground, 
 bending both kneos and houghs, and showing his hind shoes, without, however, 
 kicking out. The second, called the capriole, is the same, only the horse lashes 
 out while off the ground. 
 
88 MILITARY RIDING. 
 
 experiment, turned to us to explain how difficult it was to get a horse 
 to do it. I asked how long had the horse been at it. " Oh," said he, 
 "he has been a springer for several years." In fact, he was a lucky 
 beist, and had got his proniotion early in life. 
 
 We then saw the cuirassiers of the Guard at exercise. The men and 
 horses were heavy and unwieldl}'^, worked slowly and loosely, and did 
 not come up to our expectations. What amused us greatly was that 
 they all had their saddles so far back as to sit on the animal's loins, 
 and looked very much like men riding their donkeys to market. 
 
 There was an enterprising medico attached to the regiment, who, 
 without the least regard to his own safety, took his horse several times 
 over a dangerous ditch, about two feet tcide, and when he observed us 
 looking at him he repeated this feat over and over again, calling out 
 " hop !" with all his might. He little thought that we were marking 
 the rise undfall on the church-steeple in the distance, for the city it- 
 self we plainly saw at every jump between his seat and the saddle. 
 
 The result of this long and monotonous course of study is, that on 
 the uninitiated the school-rider makes a pleasing and striking impres- 
 sion; his horse turns, prances, and caracoles without any visible aid, or 
 without any motion in the horseman's upright and imposing attitude. 
 But I have lived and served with them. I have myself been a riding- 
 master for years, and I happen to know from experience what the dis- 
 advantages are of this foreign seat and system. These I shall endeav- 
 or to explain. 
 
 The balance-seat originated in necessity. It was indispensable when 
 combatants, sheathed in armor, ran a course with lance in rest. The 
 upright seat enabled them to carry the weight of the armor with more 
 ease, and the long stirrup supported the leg at that point to which the 
 weight of the armor pressed it down. They were obliged to study 
 balance on horseback, for, the equilibrium once lost, no effort of strength 
 could save them ; the weight of the armor brought them to the ground. 
 
 As a pole is balanced on its end by bringing the hand from side to 
 side, backward or forward, so were these knights balanced by their 
 horses, through the use of hand and leg. The necessity which intro- 
 duced the system has long ceased to exist, but the system is kept up 
 notwithstanding ; and the riders, accustomed easily to re-establish their 
 balance in this way, have no dependence whatever on their seat. This at 
 
ANECDOTES OF HORSEMANSHIP. 89 
 
 onco becomes apparent if you place them on horses not thus artificially 
 broken in, or in situations such as happen in war, where the artificial 
 training of the horse gives way to fear. 
 
 All experienced cavalry officers will tell us that the most docile and 
 best-tempered horses are difficult to manage in battle. They sometimes 
 go mad with excitement, and they then prove the most dangerous ene- 
 my the horseman has to contend against.* When nature thus becomes 
 more powerful than teaching, when the horse in his fright forgets his 
 education, and nature resumes its sway, then is the artificial horseman 
 lost. Balanced on his fork, it is of no use pulling at the horse if he 
 tries to bolt; for, with legs and stirrups behind him, the rider, at the 
 slightest pull, falls forward, and has the greatest difficulty in keeping 
 his balance. At the Battle of Minden two entire French regiments were 
 nearly destroyed by the horses taking fright and bolting in a charge. 
 The men fell off, and were trampled to death. 
 
 Without being ill-natured, I might relate many riding anecdotes 
 which would amuse Englishmen ; but I only mention the following to 
 show how different are the ideas of foreigners to our own. They are 
 scarcely necessary as showing the force of artificial training and invet- 
 erate habit. 
 
 Two foreign cavalry officers would not mount horses of the Royal 
 Artillery offered to them for a review at Woolwich. I asked the reason ; 
 the answer was — " These English horses are not broken in like ours, 
 and might run away with us." 
 
 An officer in the foreign regiment I once served in took his horse over 
 a low fence one day. All expressed their admiration of him as a horse- 
 man, because he had actually taken the leap in an English saddle, 
 which is supposed to be very difficult to sit in, compared to the military 
 kit in which they are accustomed to ride. 
 
 I was once showing some foreign officers an English sporting print, 
 in which the rider had his hand in his breeches-pocket, and a glass in 
 his eye, while his horse was clearing a fence. They asked me what it 
 meant ; had it any political meaning, or was it a caricature ? I said 
 no, it merely represented some one following the hounds. They all 
 
 * A disobedient servant and a disobedient soldier are equally useless ; but a dis- 
 obedient horse is not only useless, but often very traitorous and dangerous. — 
 JTenopJion cni Horsemanship. 
 8* 
 
90 MILITARY RIDING. 
 
 buret out laughing, saying, "As if we are sucli fools as to believe that 
 any man ever took a jump like that with his hand in hia pocket! No, 
 no ! Englishmen may be cool fellows, but none of them can do that." 
 
 The diflference between a school-rider and a real horseman is this : 
 the first depends upon guiding and managing his horse for maintaining 
 his seat ; the second, or real horseman, depends upon his seat for con- 
 trolling and guiding his horse. 
 
 At a " trot" the school-rider, instead of slightly rising to the action 
 of the horse, bumps up and down, falling heavily on the horse's loins, 
 and hanging on the reins to prevent the animal's slipping from under 
 him, while he is thrown up from his seat. 
 
 Foreign horses have little action compared to ours, and with them it 
 may be endurable ; but an English dragoon in marching order, trotting 
 ten miles in this way on a powerful high-actioned English horse, is al- 
 most sure to sore his horse's back and his own seat. He wears out his 
 constitution ; for the strongest chested man feels the effects of it.* He 
 tires his horse more in those ten miles than any one else would do in 
 fifty : he shakes his kit to pieces, and wears out his overalls. 
 
 Now, let me ask who can explain the advantages of this method of 
 riding ? 
 
 Foreigners will tell you it is necessary in order to collect and keep the 
 horse in hand, as well as for parade purposes. Surely there can be noth- 
 ing more distressing to the eye of a horseman than to see men holding 
 on to the reins, and bumping up and down in the saddle j which, in- 
 stead of collecting the horse and keeping him in hand, is, on the contra- 
 ry, the cause of much unsteadiness in the ranks ; for the unsteady 
 seat alone is enough to excite a spirited horse, and the constant pulling 
 at his mouth renders it in time callous. 
 
 The only two instances in which the method may be used to advan- 
 tage are, when teaching the recruit to ride without stirrups, and when 
 working a young horse up to the hand on a mouthing-bit in the riding- 
 school. 
 
 When cantering, the foreign school-rider never allows his horse to go 
 straight, but has him, in school parlance, ** placed :" which signifies, 
 
 * Our officers look upon their military seat with the bumping as part of their 
 equipments, put it on when they fall in on parade, but wisely discard it at all 
 other times. 
 
THE FOREIGN RIDING-SCHOOL. 91 
 
 when cantering to the right, the horse's head is bent to the right, and 
 his haunches are brought to the same side by applying the left leg ; 
 when cantering to the left, it is the reverse : thus either way the horse 
 is made to travel on the curve, with his head and tail drawn toward 
 each other in an unnatural position. At a walk it is the same : few 
 horses broken in on the system will walk with fore and hind feet on a 
 straight line. Fore and hind feet move on parallel lines, the haunches 
 being twisted to one side or the other ; and the amusing part of it is, 
 that the more perfect the horse is in his school education, the more pal- 
 pable is his style of travelling on two roads at once. 
 
 The advantage of this they suppose to be, that the horse is always 
 ready to turn: but why not let the horse go straight till he is wanted 
 to turn ? "What would happen in an advance in line at a gallop if all 
 the horses carried their heads and tails on one side ? 
 
 A cavalry soldier should always ride straight to his point, and know 
 how to "place" his horse, but never do so except in turning, or in 
 striking off at a canter to either hand. 
 
 Instead of copying this seat and system from the foreign riding- 
 schools, why not take example from our bold cross-country riders, 
 adding to the instruction of our dragoons that skill in the breaking in 
 and management of their horses with hand and leg, which will render 
 them formidable singly ; and that knowledge of riding pace which is so 
 necessary to ensure the steady working together of bodies of horse. 
 
 Give the man a roomy saddle, and make him sit close to his horse's 
 back. Without drawing back the thigh, let the leg be supported by 
 the stirrup in a natural position : the nearer the whole of the leg is 
 brought to the horse the better, so long as the foot is not bent below the 
 ankle-joint. Both man and horse will immediately feel the immense 
 benefit of this return to national, natural practice; and, even without 
 the adoption of any other changes, I feel assured that when next called 
 into action our cavalry will play a distinguished and decisive part. 
 
 Our cavalry now is wanting in it^ most essential qualification — 
 "riding." It is not sufficient that a dragoon can sit his horse; he 
 should be completely master over him, so as to control and direct him 
 at the slowest or fastest pace with equal ease ; he should know how to 
 quiet and subdue the hot-tempered, and put life and action into the 
 sluggish horse. 
 
92 MILITARY RIDING. 
 
 If cavalry fought only ia close bodies, if it acted like a machine, all 
 required would be to discharge it at the mark like a projectile. Then, 
 if the soldier could direct his horse anyhow to the right or left, move 
 forward, and halt when ordered, it would suffice. But charges resolve 
 themselves into melees, the dragoon is constantly exposed to the chances 
 of single combat, and the unfortunate fellow who can not manage his 
 horse is lost. 
 
 Our soldiers are never taught to turn their horses quickly or make 
 half pirouettes with them ; which is of all things the most necessary in 
 a fight. The reason it is not attempted is, that the advocates of the 
 old system suppose that it requires years to teach a horse to pirouette, 
 and they will not believe that, by the new system, horses are brought 
 to do it, both on the fore and hind legs, in a very few lessons. 
 
 A fight on horseback is like a fencing match, in which the skilful 
 horseman always presents his right side (which is under cover of his 
 sword) to his adversary, and seeks to gain his weak side, the left one. 
 Here all depends on horsemanship. 
 
 How is it, then, that so important a branch of military instruction has 
 been hitherto attended with such poor results ? 
 
 The fact is, they go on wrong ^j?-inct^/e». The instructors are not in 
 fault, as they can do nothing with the system they are obliged to 
 work on. 
 
 Now and then a cavalry officer is found that has broken away from 
 the system so far as to train his own charger in a perfect manner, and 
 to make himself a first-rate fencer and swordsman on horseback. 
 
 The Mysorean cavalry of Hyder Ali and Tippoo abounded in clever 
 horsemen and first-rate swordsmen, who used their sharp weapons even 
 with more eS"ect than that with which the Sikhs have since been found 
 to wield their tulwars. They frequently challenged our dragoons to 
 single combat, and they generally had the advantage over them in the 
 duels. But there was an officer riding with our troopers who had 
 trained himself and his steed, and who could always give a good ac- 
 count of the best of them. This was Major Dallas — afterward Lieut- 
 enant-General Sir Thomas Dallas — a cavalry hero and model — a sort 
 of English Murat. Like that dashing Frenchman he was remarkable 
 for his horsemanship and swordsmanship, for the strength, symmetry, 
 and beauty of his person, for his daring courage, and for his love of 
 
TRAINING OF YOUNG HORSES. 93 
 
 hand-to-hand combats. He was sometimes seen to cut down three or 
 four of the Mysorean champions, the one after the other, on the same 
 day. He signalized himself, in the view of admiring armies, by many 
 daring feats throughout the wars of Coote, Medows, Cornwallis, and 
 Harris j and left a name that will be long remembered in India. ^Ye 
 have many officers — ay, and men too — as brave as Dallas, and quite 
 capable of doing all that he did, if they could only be taken out of the 
 shackles of a bad system, and be properly trained to the use of 2>roper 
 swords. 
 
 We have had a variety of absurd systems in Europe within the last 
 three centuries, and each of them, while it lasted, was productive of 
 great mischief. Yet every one of them had its bigots and enthusiasts, 
 who looked upon any proposed variation or change as a shocking 
 heresy. A master of the art, the celebrated Grisone of Naples, who 
 was called the regenerator of the art of horsemanship in Europe, 
 solemnly laid down the following instructions for his pupils : " In 
 breaking in young horses put them into a circular pit; be very severe 
 with those that are sensitive and of high courage ; beat them between 
 the ears with a stick !" etc. We now laugh at his pit and repudiate his 
 stick ; but both pit and stick had their reign, as other absurdities have 
 had or still have. Grisone's followers, Pluvinel, Newcastle, La Gueri- 
 niere, Montfaucon, and others, substituted the cavesson, the longe, and 
 the whip. They tied their horses to the stake (the pillars), and beat 
 them to make them raise their forelegs, etc. I defy any one to find 
 out, from their long rambling books on equitation, where to begin, how 
 to proceed, or how to overcome by degrees each difficulty offered by the 
 horse ; and these difficulties, be it observed, arise regularly and in suc- 
 cession with every horse submitted to training. The question is, how 
 to break in a number of horses, and upon what system to conquer 
 these difficulties owe by one ? The old pedants could have given no 
 answer to this question, nor am I aware that it can be answered by 
 modern practitioners, or system-makers, or followers of existing sys- 
 tems or regulations. 
 
 It seems to me that the only man who has entered fully on the sub- 
 ject, and pointed out clearly how to attack each point in succession, in 
 order to gain the mastery over the horse, is Monsieur Baucher. But he 
 has departed from the beaten track, has disowned the old system, and 
 therefore big whole tribe have turned upon him. 
 
94 MILITARY RIDING. 
 
 I do not assert that M. Baucher's system is faultless. I practised it 
 for years, applied it to many hundred horses, and was myself obliged 
 to make some trifling alterations to adapt it to the use of cavalry sol- 
 diers. It may require further alterations to make it perfect; but what I 
 assert is, that the system is the right one : it is founded on reason and 
 common-sense, not on immemorial custom and prejudice. So convinced 
 was I of this by experience, that I wrote out and published the lessons 
 as I had carried them out with hundreds of remount horses, to assist 
 those who might be at a loss how to proceed when young horses join the 
 regiments. Without system, and a good system, it is impossible to 
 make good troopers. At present we have none. 
 
 The continual working at the horses' mouths now practised in the 
 service, the attempt to throw the horses on their haunches by strength 
 of arm, sawing the snaffle from side to side, teaches them to lean heav- 
 ily on the hand, ruins their houghs and mouths, and wears them out 
 before their time. 
 
 The attempting to work shoulder in, and passage, before the horse 
 has been taught to obey the pressure of the leg, is simply absurd. It 
 rouses their temper, and makes them restive. 
 
 To rein a horse back before the head is brought home, and the animal 
 has learnt to obey the log, is equally absurd ; for the horse with his 
 nose stuck out can only be backed by force or by striking his forelegs 
 with a whip, a common practice in the riding-schools : he then steps to 
 one side or the other ; you can not keep his haunches in the straight 
 line, unless he has been taught to obey the pressure of the leg : the end 
 of this generally is, that the horse gets his hind legs under him, is 
 pulled back upon them, and the whole weight of man and beast is 
 thrown on his houghs : the rider pulls again to make him go back, the 
 poor beast can not do it, no earthly power could move his hind legs, 
 and in self-defence, and to escape from pain, the horse rears, the natu- 
 ral result of trying to back him by sheer strength of arm, and before 
 he was prepared to yield to hand and leg. 
 
 The troop-horses that go through this rude treatment join the ranks 
 with their action cramped and spoiled ; they are seldom free from 
 blemish, and their capability of long service has been greatly impaired. 
 Mount any troop-horse, and you will find him hard-mouthed and stiff- 
 necked. Few, if any of them, rein up or yield to the hand; they are 
 all down on the forehand, and so accustomed to be held fast by the 
 
TRAINING OF YOUNG HORSES. 95 
 
 head, that, if you yield the rein to them in the least degree, they go off 
 into a gallop at once, and then both hands of their riders are scarcely 
 sufficient to stop them. 
 
 The system I have proposed rests on a few simple principles.-'^ 
 
 I. The hor3e is gently used, the progress is gradual but certain. 
 
 II. For a few days he is ridden on the snafSe with a loose rein, at a 
 walk and a trot. 
 
 III. Ho is then bitted, and a few simple lessons teach him to yield 
 to the feeling of the rein and the pressure of the leg. 
 
 IV. Next he is collected and got in hand, not by pulling and sawing 
 at his mouth, but by gradually pressing him with the leg till he raises 
 himself off the bit and gathers himself up at a walk, when he can be 
 collected and put together to any extent required, by the judicious use 
 of the spur. As all this is done at the halt or a walk, the horse under- 
 goes no fatigue. 
 
 V. Reining back then perfects the horse in the use of his limbs and 
 in unqualified obedience to the rider's hand and leg. This once attain- 
 ed, a few lessons will teach the animal to canter, change leg, passage, 
 and pirouette, and the horse becomes a perfect charger in a very short 
 time, without having in any way suffered from his breaking— indeed, 
 without having been once tired or overworked during the whole of his 
 education ; and from his mouth having been gently dealt with, it remains 
 fresh and good, instead of being hard and callous. 
 
 I may speak confidently of these results, as I have myself obtained 
 them from the system with horses of various descriptions and breeds — 
 Arab, Cape, Persian, Australian, and the country-bred horse of India — 
 the last the least tractable of any. I feel assured that, with patience 
 and with a firm determination never to attempt to do too much at one 
 time, any cavalry officer may command the same, if not a greater de- 
 gree of success, with our English-bred horses. 
 
 Trained, ridden, and saddled in the way I have explained, the horse 
 will carry the weight well, the man will be less liable to be pulled off 
 in the ranks, his hand is likely to be light because he will not need its 
 assistance to keep his seat, and, when required to exert his strength to 
 manage his horse, his good seat will enable him to do so. 
 
 * « The Training of Remount IIorseB. a New System." London : Parker. Fur- 
 nivall, and Parker, 1852. 
 
96 MILITARY RIDING. 
 
 He will not fatigue his horse so much, and is less likely to sore his 
 back on a march j he will sit him easily over any obstacle, and make a 
 formidable use of his sword, if, instead of standing up in his stirrup?, 
 he sits close, carrying the weight and power of his horse into each 
 blow, for in this lies the great secret. A child acting thus, in concert 
 with his horse as one body, will hit harder than a giant balanced on his 
 fork. 
 
 It is of the first necessity that a soldier's horse shall obey the press- 
 ure of the leg, otherwise he can not be made to close up in the ranks or 
 turn quickly : but it is a great mistake to suppose that this can not be 
 done without screwing back a man's legs and bringing them down 
 almost under the horse's stifle. 
 
 The habit of yielding to the pressure of the rider's leg is acquired by 
 the horse through teaching, and he will readily learn to yield to that 
 pressure wherever it be systematically applied. 
 
 All practical riders — the Cossacks, the Circassians, all Eastern na- 
 tions, our own people — a nation of horsemen than whom none more 
 bold and clever — all ride in a short seat, and keep their own legs out of 
 the way of the horse. 
 
 The Circassians are unsurpassed in the management of their war- 
 horses and arms, and so proud of their skill, that, whereas most nations 
 show wounds received in action as honorable scars, the Circassians hide 
 them as silent witnesses of their awkwardness and want of address in 
 single combat. 
 
 ' At the Russian reviews in 1852 I saw a few sheets of paper placed on 
 the ground opposite the Emperor : he gave a signal to some of the Cos- 
 sacks and Circassians formed in line a few hundred yards off. 
 
 Down they all came at speed racing with one another: the first up 
 fired at the marks either with pistol or carbine ; the sheets of paper 
 flew up in pieces : those who followed fired into the fragments that were 
 at hand, blowing them to atoms. 
 
 The object of all preparatory drill should be to bring the dragoon to 
 manage his horse thus at speed, and use sword and carbine at that 
 pace — to teach him to reach objects on the ground with his sword, else 
 an infantry soldier would only have to throw himself flat on his face, 
 and when the cavalry had passed got up and shoot them — a manoeuvre 
 not seldom practised by old soldiers in war. 
 
 The Saxons, under Marshal Schulemburg, lay down to avoid the 
 
TRAINING OF YOUNG HORSES. 97 
 
 charges of the Swedish dragoons under Charles XII, during their fa- 
 mous retreat through Poland. 
 
 The Russian infantry, at the Battle of the Trebia, in 1799, were charged 
 by the French cavalry when in line : they fired during the advance to 
 the last moment, lay down, and, letting the French horse pass over them, 
 got up and gave them a volley that emptied many a saddle. 
 
 A troop, by taking open order, should be able to go across country, 
 for any distance required, at a rattling gallop, closing to their leader to 
 charge when the signal is given. 
 
 All fighting with cavalry is generally either done at speed, or you ad- 
 vance at speed to get at your enemy. 
 
 In a pursuit of cavalry speed is the only pace at which you can catch 
 the foe and destroy him. 
 
 To attain these ends we must have a great deal more out-of-door work. 
 The soldiers ought to practice their various exercises in the open field. 
 In making use of heads and posts we ought to scatter them in a field 
 and allow the men to ride at them independently and chiefly at speed, 
 in order to teach them to measure their distances with the sword, and 
 deliver their cuts and points in proper time. As we use the posts in 
 the riding-house, the man is guided by the walls, and learns nothing 
 but to deliver the cut or point required, whereas the difiiculty always is 
 to measure distance at rapid closing ; and this should be taught in the 
 manner I have indicated. The Greeks were accustomed to train their 
 cavalry to across-country work, to hunting and leaping. Where there 
 were no animals to pursue they threw out a mounted trooper, and then 
 sent another trooper to give him chase. The foremost man galloped 
 through all sorts of places, frequently turning about, with his lance or 
 spear presented to his pursuer: the pursuer carried javelins blunted 
 and a spear of the same description; and whenever he came within 
 javelin-throw he hurled one of his blunted weapons at the person re- 
 treating, and whenever he came within spear-reach he charged at him 
 with the spear.* Here we see the counterpart of the Turkish game of 
 the Djereed, the frequent practice of which tended to make the old 
 Turkish irregulars such excellent cavalry. Since the days of European 
 reform the old Turkish game is never practised ! 
 
 * Xcnophou on Horsemansliip. 
 
^8 MILITARY RIDING. 
 
 Warncry says : " For a soldier to be really a light-horeeman he must 
 be able to turn his horse quick and short when in full speed, to raise up 
 and catch anything from the ground. 
 
 " Everything should be taught the recruit which may be requisite on 
 actual service. 
 
 " He ought to be able to turn his horse suddenly upon his haunches, 
 to run at the ring with the sword instead of the lance, which very much 
 supples the horse and forms the trooper to dexterity and firmness in his 
 seat. * 
 
 " As soon as the squadron is mounted the troopers are practised to 
 leap ditches, enclosures, poles put across for that purpose, etc. At 
 other times two troopers run together full speed, trying to got before 
 and carry off each other's hats : they are practised to swim their horses 
 across rivers, to manoeuvre in broken and intersected ground, etc. 
 
 " There are targets to be fired at by the troopers with their pistols, 
 walking, trotting, and at full speed." 
 
 An English dragoon never rides at speed once during the whole of his 
 drilling and training, nor ever afterwards, except when the squadron to 
 which he belongs is ordered to charge; and then they cry out about 
 English cavalry getting out of hand ! Let any one think of the first 
 time he rode a horse at full speed, and remember how helpless ho felt! 
 
 I have heard it said that English horses are not adapted, like the 
 Arab and other horses of Eastern breed, to skirmishing, to pulling up 
 from speed, and turning quickly. The better the horse the more adapt- 
 ed to all feats of agility and strength. No horse can compare with the 
 English — no horse is more easily broken in to anything and everything — 
 and there is no quality in which the English horse does not excel, no 
 performance in which ho can not beat all competition. 
 
 In teaching the trooper to ride I would make his first lessons almost 
 as easy and simple as those given to the horse. 
 
 When first put on horseback devote a few lessons to making his limbs 
 supple, in the same way as you begin your drill on foot with extension 
 motions. Show him how to close the thigh and leg to the saddle, and 
 then work the leg back, forwards, up, and down. 
 
 Without stirrups, make him swing a weight round in a circle from 
 
 * Vide the Training of Remount Horses, by C«pt. Nolan. 
 
MILITARY RIDING. 99 
 
 the shoulder as a centre : the other hand placed on the thigh, thumb to 
 the rear, change the weight to the opposite hand, and repeat the same * 
 
 Placing one hand on the horse's mane, make him lean down to each 
 side in succession till he reaches to within a short distance of the 
 ground. 
 
 Vaulting on to the horse, make him place the left hand high up on 
 the mane, the right hand swung back, but in the jump brought to the 
 pommel of the saddle. 
 
 OflF again in the same way. 
 
 Never when mounting with stirrups let him place the right hand on 
 the cantle, for with an unsteady horse he can not »let go his hold to 
 bring the leg over, and may be thus thrown ; whereas, by accustoming 
 the man to put his right hand forward on the pommel, the saddle is 
 always open to receive him. 
 
 These exercises give the man a firm hold with his legs on the horse, 
 and teach him to move his limbs without quitting his seat. 
 
 Then take him in the circle in the longe, and, by walking and trotting 
 alternately, teach him the necessity of leaning with the body to the side 
 the horse is turning to — this ia the necessary balance ! Then put him 
 with others and give him plenty of trotting, to shake him into his seat. 
 By degrees teach him how to use the reins, then the leg. Then put him 
 through the lessons laid down for remount drill, beginning at the first 
 lesson bitted {vide the Training of Remount Horses), and going regu- 
 larly through the course, exjilaining to him the object of each lesson as 
 you go on. In three or four months the soldier of common abilities 
 will be ready for his further education at squad drill (when he must be 
 taught to go across country). 
 
 He will learn to ride and to break in a horse at the same time — a 
 great object to attain; for that soldier will be fit the next season to 
 take a remount horse, and by pursuing this system, all dragoons being 
 rendered equally able to do so, they could, on an emergency, prepare 
 any number of horses for the field. 
 
 I would insist particularly on the propriety and necessity of explain- 
 ing everything to the man as he passes from step to step in his instruc- 
 tion. School-boys and soldiers have been too long taught by rote, or 
 
 * Baucher, 
 
100 MILITARY RIDING. 
 
 without any proper endeavor to make them understand the use and ob- 
 ject of what they arc sot to learn. Whatever the horse may bo, the 
 poor soldier is, at least, a rational being, and no good soldier will ever 
 be made without awakening his intellect and reasoning faculties. 
 
 Write up in golden letters — or in letters distinguishable, and easy to 
 read — in every riding-school, and in every stable : " Houses are 
 
 TAUGHT NOT BY HAUSIINESS BUT BY GENTLENESS." WheX'e the officerS 
 
 are classical, the golden rule may be given in Xonophon's Greek, as 
 well as in English. 
 
 The ancient Greeks had not only beautiful horses (originally import- 
 ed from the East), but they had also great skill in training and using 
 them as well for the saddle as for the raoing-car. Although that short 
 treatise is more than two thousand two hundred years old, there are ex- 
 cellent lessons in Xenophon " On Horsemanship." 
 
 " In treating a horse," says the accomplished Greek, " this precept 
 and practice will be found best — Never ill-use him through anger. For 
 anger frequently excites to such rash and inconsiderate deeds, that they 
 must be followed by repentance. 
 
 " When a horse sees anything suspicious, and does not wish to ap- 
 proach it, he should be made to see that there is nothing hurtful or 
 fearful in it, more especially if he be a high-mottled horse; and if this 
 can not be done otherwise, the horseman himself must touch the object 
 exciting terror, and lead the horse gently up to it. 
 
 " Those who force horses forward with blows inspire them with still 
 more terror. For, when they suffer punishment in such a situation, 
 the horses fancy that the suspected object is the cause of it." 
 
 The whole of this treatise of Xenophon will well repay any one the 
 trouble of an attentive perusal. This veteran soldier, historian, philoso- 
 pher, and most elegant writer, evidently loved the horse with enthusi- 
 asm. On opening the essay he says: "As it has fallen to my lot, from 
 long practice, to have become experienced in horsemanship, so do I 
 wish to point out to my younger friends how I think they can use their 
 horses most properly." 
 
ELEMENTARY DRILL, 101 
 
 Chapter V II. 
 
 ELEMENTARY DRILL. 
 
 The power of cavalry in the field depends upon the individual effi- 
 ciency of the horsemen composing it ; infinite care should, therefore, be 
 bestowed on their training and teaching. 
 
 Riding, and the use of the sword and rifle, are points which should 
 be brought as near to perfection as possible in the education of the dra- 
 goon. 
 
 The field movements depend upon the officers ; the soldier soon learns 
 to act his part in them. 
 
 The steady working of large bodies of cavalry depends entirely on 
 the steady leading of the officers, and that again depends on their thor- 
 ough knowledge of riding pace, the soldier naturally conforming to it. 
 
 After the men have been taught to ride in the riding-school, they 
 must learn to ride in the field, and to handle their horses properly in 
 the ranks. 
 
 To do this they begin work at open files ; the instructor can then 
 watch the riding of each individual, and t«ach him his work thoroughly. 
 
 A squad, working thus at open files, should not exceed twenty men, 
 and they should practice the following work : 
 
 To dress up singly and by ranks to three or four files, which have 
 been moved up from either flank for that purpose, at a walk, trot, and 
 gallop ; the distances to be varied, and the proper pace to be strictly 
 enforced ; and no hurrying allowed at any cavalry drill. 
 
 To pass through the intervals by alternate files at a walk, trot, and 
 gallop. 
 
 Right files march, halt. 
 
 Left files march through the intervals between the right files, and so on. 
 Then, facing the files toward each other, repeat the same, to accustom 
 the horses to pass through opposing lines. When practising at a gal- 
 lop in all these drills, give the word, " on the right ley" or " on the left 
 leg," "gallop march" according to the hand to which the dressing is; 
 thus you keep up the breaking of the horses. 
 
 " Sit at ease !" 
 9* 
 
102 ELEMENTARY DRILL. 
 
 Files in succession advance, and engage on the right and left rein. 
 
 Files from the opposite flanks ride forward at a walk, then, turning 
 toward each other, strike off at a gallop on the right leg, the sword at 
 the engage ; when abreast they come to the right guard, circle round 
 each other, both simultaneously ^'circle and change" to the left leg, 
 and engage in the left rein with the hanging guard ; they file outwards, 
 and the next two files follow, 
 
 "Advance in line !" The men should be taken over broken ground, 
 no hurrying allowed, and the pace always steadily adhered to. 
 
 " Wheeling at open files," etc. 
 
 Part II. — Working at close files and with two ranks. The men are 
 told off by threes,- no other telling off is necessary. 
 
 " Mounting and dismounting," Instead of having different ways of 
 doing it, as in the present system, it is best done at all times as laid 
 down in H. M. Regulations (p, 143) for dismounted service. 
 
 In the formation by threes and files I would suggest the following 
 alterations : 
 
 "Advance by threes from the right :" the leading threes should move 
 up. 
 
 "Advance by sections from the right." 
 
 Every cavalry soldier should move in the column at the same mo- 
 ment when the word " March" is given. 
 
 This is impossible according to our manner of advancing by threes 
 from the right. No man in the squadron can move till the leading sec- 
 tions have cleared the front of the following sections of threes. 
 
 The leading sections of threes alone move at the word "March," and 
 each man in the column follows when he thinks it is time, or when be 
 finds room to do so. 
 
 " Front form." The troop having gone threes right, they are to form 
 to the fronton the move. 
 
 No check of the pace should be laid down for the rear-rank sections, 
 which always reacts on the column. Rather let the front-rank sections 
 inci'ease their pace, the leading one inclining to the right in front oi' 
 the rear-rank section, and then dropping into the pace of the column. 
 Its rear-rank section having continued to move steadily on, and the 
 pace of the column having been kept up, the whole formation would 
 flow steadily on with the stream. 
 
ELEMENTARY DRILL. 103 
 
 Increasing and diminishing the front. 
 
 Advancing and retiring in line. 
 
 Inclining, passaging, and reining back. 
 
 " Dressing." Always make the cavalry soldier dress up, never back. 
 Thus he learns to halt in time, in approaching the line he is to dress on. 
 
 Piling from the right of threes to the front, performing sword exer- 
 cise on the move, at a walk, and gallop. 
 
 Ranking past by single files at a walk, trot, canter, and at full speed. 
 
 This is the best of all practice for cavalry soldiers ; it keeps up the 
 breaking of the horses, inspires emulation, brings each individual un- 
 der the notice of his officer, and makes the men skilful in the use of 
 their arms and the management of their horses. 
 
 On the caution, " Rank past by single files from the right," the troop- 
 leader places himself in front of the officer on the right. The officer 
 from the left flank rides down the front of the troop, and halts when 
 his horse's head is in a line with the flank file on the right ; his duty is 
 to make the men close well up to the point from which they rank off. 
 
 The troop-marker rides out at a gallop from the right, to take up a 
 position for the men to file to, and the troop eerrefile places himself at 
 ten yards from the right flank, facing the passing line toward the troop. 
 
 Ranking past at a walk is done at one yard distance from head to 
 croup ; at a trot and a canter at three horses' lengths ; and at full speed 
 the distance is thirty yards. 
 
 The great difficulty in ranking past at a trot and a canter is to get 
 the files sufficiently closed up to the passing line in order to feed the 
 ranking off; and for this reason they should rank off first a front-rank, 
 then a rear-rank man ; thus both ranks close to the passing line, and the 
 men follow in quick succession; but if the whole of the front rank files 
 off, followed by the whole of the rear, they come singly to the passing 
 line instead of two at a time, and have to leave their places in the ranks 
 at a trot or a canter ; and as this latter pace would entail a change of 
 leg in coming on to the passing line, the men would lose their distance, 
 a,nd the horses, instead of cantering to the right (when cantering past 
 from the right), would, most of them, be on the left leg, as they would 
 be obliged to turn to the left to get into the alignment. 
 
 On the caution to rank past at " speed," the front rank draw swordj, 
 the rear rank draw or unsling carbines. 
 
104 ELEMENTARY DRILL. 
 
 A third marker rides at twenty yards beyond the first one, and thirty 
 yards from the flank of the troop, on the passing line. 
 
 The men walk their horses the first ten yards to No. 1 marker, then 
 strike off their horses at a canter on the right leg. At the second marker 
 they let out their horses to full speed, bringing the swords to the engage ; 
 tiien perform the pursuing practice, endeavoring to reach the ground 
 with their swords. 
 
 They must be told to give the horse his head in order that he may 
 run straight, which he will do if they do not sway him from the line 
 on which ho is running, by standing in their stirrups and balancing 
 themselves to one side and the other. 
 
 They should sit well down in the saddle, their leg? well closed to the 
 horae, and neither seat nor legs should move ; the upper part of the 
 body alone moves from side to side, and leans over to enable the man 
 to reach an onomy on the ground. 
 
 The rear-rank men make use of their rifles and fire with blank car- 
 tridge at a sheet of paper placed on the ground opposite the reviewing 
 officer. 
 
 An officer who sees a regiment of cavalry rank past at a walk, trot, 
 and canter to both hands, as well as at speed, can at once tell what or- 
 der that regiment is in. 
 
 He can judge of the bridling and saddling. 
 
 The state of the appointments, 
 
 The men's seats on horseback. 
 
 Their riding and the management of their arms. 
 
 The condition and breaking of their horses ; 
 
 And nothing can escape him, for each individual in the regiment is 
 brought under his notice.^ 
 
 Formation of the Troop. 
 
 The troop is the tmit, of which a certain number form the regiment- 
 It is perfect in itself, and requires no further drill but its own to en- 
 able it to take its place in aline or column and do its part, provided the 
 officers are acquainted with the field movements. 
 
 * On tho 2d of August, 1852, 1 saw a squadron of Saxon dragoons (120 horses) 
 rank past at a trot without one horse breaking from it, and rank past at a canter 
 to the right without oue horse cantering false or disunited. 
 
ELEMENTARY DRILL. 105 
 
 The troop should be drilled by its officers. 
 
 The two divisions composing the troop form in rank entire, accord- 
 ing to the size-roll, the tallest men and horses being on that flank which 
 will be the inward one in the troop. 
 
 The officer commanding the division numbers it oflf from its inward 
 flank, tells off the rear rank, consisting of the smallest men and horsep, 
 and forms two deep by filing or reining back and passaging. If the 
 numbers are uneven, he leaves the last man but one on the outward flank 
 of the front rank uncovered. 
 
 He then places non-commissioned officers on the flanks of both front 
 and rear ranks ; all others in the ranks. 
 
 The two divisions then close in and form the troop. Divisions hav- 
 ing been equalized, the troop is told off by threes from the centre, no 
 other telling off being necessary. 
 
 Distribution of Officers and Non-commissioned Officers. 
 
 One-half a horse's length in front of the centre (troop-leader). 
 
 One officer on each flank, dressing by the front rank. 
 
 Troop sergeant-major in rear of the centre (serrefile). 
 
 Troop-marker on his left. 
 
 Two trumpeters on the flanks of the rear ranks, covering the officers. 
 
 At open order the officers on the flanks move straight out and dress 
 on the troop-leader. Trumpeters take their places. 
 
 The troop at drill should be practised at — 
 
 Ranking past by single files, at a walk, trot, canter, to both handa, 
 from the right or left ; as also at full speed doing the pursuing prac- 
 tice. 
 
 Advancing by files, from the right, of threes, and performing the 
 sword exercise at a canter : 
 
 All formations by threes and files — wheeling, increasing, and dimin- 
 ishing the front ; 
 
 Dismounted service ; 
 
 Skirmishing ; 
 
 Advancing in line and charging ; 
 
 Pursuing; and 
 
 Going across country in line. 
 
 If it be objected that I give the horses a deal of work, my answer is, 
 
106 INTERVALS. 
 
 that I have saved them a deal of work and much harsh treatment in 
 the riding-school. My chargers are not worn-out, but fresh, vigorous, 
 »ad full of work. They can go the pace, and ought to bo made to go 
 it. They must bo brought frequently into the field. Most foreign cav- 
 airy, when the gallop sounds, instead of increasing their rate of speed 
 from the trot, actually decrease it, for they ride the collected short can- 
 ter which they are taught in the riding-school, and only gallop when 
 the charge sounds. Matters are not quite so bad with us, but we shall 
 not get a proper charge out of our young soldiers if they are never 
 taught to ride at speed until brought into action. 
 
 Chapter YIII . 
 
 ON INTERVALS. 
 
 '• II faut donnor peu de front et peu de profundeur aux escadrons, pour qu'ils 
 
 »ient de la celerit6 et do I'ensemble dans la charge On est aouvent redevable 
 
 de la victoire k de tres petites divisions de I'armee, qui saisiasent I'instant favor- 
 able k la charge. 
 
 " Moins le front aura d'6tondue, moins le desordre sera grand et frfequent." — 
 Mottin dc la Balmc. 
 
 It is curious with what jealousy intervals have been admitted in cav- 
 alry, yet many charges have failed in consequence of the confusion and 
 disorder occasioned by the want of them. Horses and men, exhausted 
 by the pressure against each other in an advance, can effect nothing 
 when they join issue with the enemy. 
 
 The line, once on the move, can not alter its direction, and, if over- 
 thrown, can not get to the rear without carrying its second lino along 
 with it. 
 
 Mottin de la Balme, a very distinguished French cavalry officer, was 
 himself in a charge of horse at the Battle of Minden, and describes it 
 as follows : 
 
 "A corps of English infantry having dispersed the cavalry in its 
 front by its steady fire, the corps of gendarmerie and carabineers receiv- 
 
INTERVALS. 107 
 
 ed orders to charge. Tbey aclvauced in line at a gallop : at first the 
 centre was heavily pressed upon by the wings, then the pressure relied 
 back to the flanks, particularly to the right one. 
 
 " The infantry waited till we were close upon them, then opened af re 
 from the centi-e toward the flanks. The horses made desperate cflTorts 
 to break away outward and avoid this fire. 
 
 " The pressure became so great that men and horses upset each other 
 and rolled about in helpless confusion; few were killed by gunshot 
 wounds, but, with the exception of about ten men in each squadroB, 
 they were all torn off their horses' backs, trampled to death, or their 
 limbs broken. The few that remained mounted were carried, some right 
 through the enemy's ranks, others to the rear or off" the field. 
 
 "Had the advance been made by alternate squadrons we should have 
 had plenty of room, the advance would have been made with speed and 
 impetuosity, the horses could not have broken away to the right and 
 left, and the English infantry must have been ridden over!" 
 
 The absolute necessity of intervals was at last acknowledged, and 
 some few introduced, precautions being adopted at the same time to re- 
 inforce or close up these openings by placing mounted parties behind 
 them. 
 
 In some services these intervals vary in extent from four to twelve 
 yards between each squadron. The Austrians, however, put two squad- 
 rons together, which they call a division (nominally 300 strong), and 
 leave an interval of twelve paces between these divisions. 
 
 I have ridden in these Austrian divisions, and the pressure of the 
 horses was often so great as to lift me, with my horse, off the ground, 
 occasioning great pain, and making one and all quite helpless. A few 
 resolute horsemen dashing in on such a mass would throw it into utter 
 confusion. 
 
 Where the ground is perfectly level, where there are no undulatione, 
 no natural obstacles, an advance of squadrons with small intervals can 
 be made, though with difiiculty, particularly under fire, when the horsea 
 crowd together from fear ; but if the country is rough, broken, or in- 
 tersected (which most countries are), it is impossible to advance quick- 
 ly and preserve order. 
 
 When pressure takes place, it rolls on and on, increasing like a wave, 
 till it runs itself out at the first open interval; but squadrons expoad 
 
108 INTERVALS. 
 
 when they take flight, their intervals are thus closed, the waves meet, 
 break the line, impede its advance, and throw it int-o irremediable con- 
 fuaion. 
 
 The vicious and fiery horses contribute not a little to this result. The 
 pressure drives them mad; they throw themselves against each other, 
 burst from the ranks, or press out the weak ones from the line, and 
 many become so exhausted in the struggle as to be unable to keep up. 
 
 If in tactics you aim at the greatest precision, the consequence of the 
 smallest mistake is not leaa precision, but utter confusion. Thus, to 
 advance in line with small intervals and large squadrons is too much 
 to expect under all circumstances; for what would create confusion 
 when standing still is ten times worse when on the move. Wounded 
 men go to the rear; wounded horses fall or break from the ranks, caus- 
 ing confusion and difficulty enough without stinting the men for room, 
 which makes order an impossibility, and detracts naturally from the 
 flpeed and impulsive power of the cavalry. 
 
 If every fifty horsemen had an interval of twelve yards in the ad- 
 vance, their natural expansion would fill up one-half of the intervals ; 
 the remaining half would prevent their crowding, and give each body 
 sufficient play to ensure its freedom of movement; thus they could 
 charge over the most difficult ground close to their own centre (easily 
 done by fifty men), and dash in close array against any line opposed to 
 them. 
 
 A charge, even on good ground, is seldom executed by the whole line 
 at once; the enemy is reached in succession by different points in the 
 line more advanced than others. It is, therefore, of the greatest conse- 
 quence that those detachments which reach the enemy first shall be 
 compact, and go at him as one man, to burst through. It is easily un- 
 derstood that with fifty men this can be done ; but it becomes almost 
 an impossibility with one hundred and fifty or two hundred. 
 
 I should therefore form each troop with the tallest men and horses in 
 the centre, keep it up to twenty-five files in the field, place the captain 
 in front, the subalterns on each flank, and give tbem twelve yards inter- 
 val in line. 
 
 All formations would then proceed easily and freely. 
 
 When wheeled into oblique ec-helon they would not overlap each other, 
 nor require to incline to clear their front when forming line. 
 
INTERVALS. 109 
 
 They could act independently when necessary ; and when required lo 
 act in concert they could do so more quickly and with more energy, be- 
 cause, as they can both see and hear their leader at all times, their 
 efforts would be concentrated round him. 
 
 They could always alter the direction of the advance, if it were sud- 
 denly found necessary to do so, without breaking into column. 
 
 And when in column, they could work with greater ease, in conse- 
 quence of the additional distance which the interval of twelve yards 
 affords from the troop in front. 
 
 They would succeed against an infantry square when a large squad- 
 ron might fail, because they could advance with greater speed. The 
 oflicers on the flanks could prevent their opening out and riding round 
 the corners. The chances of being hit would be lessened (both by speed 
 and the smaller number), less confusion would ensue, and the men, con- 
 scious that their conduct must be observed by the officers, would do 
 their duty. 
 
 Again, if four such troops of fifties fell in with an enemy's squadron 
 of two hundred, whilst one or two troops attacked in front, the others 
 would fall upon his flanks or rear; or during the time that the great 
 unwieldy squadron was trying to form line, one troop of fifty, dashing 
 in, would throw it into disorder : the other troops, led independently 
 by their leaders, might then choose their own points of attack, charge, 
 and overthrow it. 
 
 They would rally more quickly, and would do good service over 
 country which would entirely disorganize large squadrons in an advance. 
 
 It is not necessary for cavalry to be numerous to achieve success, bu» 
 bold, resolute, and rapid. 
 
 Kellermann retrieved the Battle of Marengo with a few hundreds of 
 such horsemen. 
 
 On the third day of the Battle of Arcole Napoleon detached Captain 
 Hercule and fifty dragoons with orders to gain the left of the Austrian 
 army, and charge it in flank whilst he attacked in front. The charge 
 was gallantly executed, and contributed greatly to the success of the 
 day. 
 
 If Napoleon considered fifty horsemen suJBBcient to attempt a charge 
 against the wJtole Atistn'an army, surely the same number of horsemen 
 will be found sufficiently strong to take the place of a squadron in lice. 
 10 
 
no FIELD MOVEMENTS. 
 
 Chapter IX. 
 
 FIELD MOVEMENTS. 
 
 •' On doit chercher sans cesae, avec un eoin acrupuloux, & slmplifier les exercices 
 de la cavalerio, que tant d'innovatours de nos jours ont mal-Jl-propos compliqo^a. 
 Oi^ns ces Tues, il faudra n6cessairement former et faire combattre cette tronpe 8ar 
 ua front pea 6tendu." — Mottin de la Balmt. 
 
 The art of manoeuvring consists in Attacking your enemy at his 
 weak point, or falling on whilst he is in the act of deploying. 
 
 The field movements enable you to manoeuvre with large bodies of 
 men, and give you the means of forming them quickly on a given point 
 or line for the charge. 
 
 How many times might a successful charge have been executed, how 
 macy times a victory gained, but that the column was either right in 
 front when, to suit the emergency, it ought to have been left in front, 
 or the reverse ! — and on such things hangs the fate of battles. 
 
 What can bo more preposterous than the position of a commanding 
 oflScer leading a column into action, obliged to weigh his chances and 
 calculate them versus right or loft in front, or which is the pivot? 
 
 Ft must make an olRcer nervous, when told to advance, to think that 
 honor and renown, death or disgrace, may depend upon the choice he 
 makes betiveen the right flank or the left one. 
 
 De Brack, in r^peaking of some field movements, not forming part of 
 the drill-book, says : " True they are not laid down in the regulations, 
 but they are necessary, because they are simple, and fulfil the grand 
 requisite in war for cavalry, that of being able to front promptly in 
 every direction. By emergent and unexpected movements in action 
 the order of the squadrons in the regiment is upset, and circumstances 
 imperiously require you to manoeuvre in this state under penalty of 
 annihilation." 
 
 Almost every authority on cavalry warfare will tell you the same, and 
 yet you refuse to practise in peace-time what in war becomes a necessity. 
 "When," says De Brack, "by a sudden emergency, we are compelled 
 to form a line in which the squadrons and troops no longer stand as 
 thoy nave been accustomed to, we arc all abroad, and hesitation and 
 daag'?r onaue," 
 
PIVOT FLANKS. Ill 
 
 Ic Prance, Colonel Itier. of the 7th Chasseurs a ofacval, proposed » 
 eyetem by which you always worked and formed to the right: this 
 would obviate the difficulty of choosing between the one and the other; 
 and as it would bo impossible to form, except in the one way laid down, 
 there would be at least no hesitation; but it is like telling a man who 
 has two good legs to use only one. 
 
 Colonel Itier worked by divisions, and inverted them in the squadron, 
 and inverted the squadrons, or mixed them, in the brigades and divis- 
 ions. He had a close and an open column of divisions. This is 
 etrangc, for you never can close up divisions eufBciently to get your 
 distance for wheeling into line. The Anstrians, be it observed, call a 
 column of divisions a close column, for this reason. 
 
 These pivot flanks and right or left in front have been & plague, a 
 puztle, and a cause of mischief, to all military men ever since the pe- 
 riod of their first introduction. This indisputably being the ease, is it 
 not high time to see if something better can not be substituted for 
 them ? I think that here, as in every other matter connected with the 
 cavalry service, we shall find our best chances of success in a return to 
 simplicity. What is easiest is generally best in the long run. 
 
 Tacticians lay down as law, that 
 
 The component parts of a column shall always follow each other, a? 
 
 d 
 
 — and that, when brought into line, they shall stand tbua: 
 d c h a 
 
 "For instance, the column a, b, c, d, wishes to form line ^ 
 
 to the front : it can do so to the left of a, because b comes ? 
 
 on the left of a, £_ 
 
 c to the left of b, ^ 
 
 d to the left of o : and they will thus stand as required by tacticians, 
 namely : 
 
112 
 
 FIELD MOVEMENTS. 
 
 But they can not, must not, form to the right of a, not that there ia 
 any natural impediment in the way, but because they yfould then stand 
 in line thus : 
 
 abed 
 
 Let us take an example. 
 
 The army A, drawn up in two lines, expects the enemy in its front. 
 Intelligence is brought of the enemy's columns, B, moving perpendicu- 
 larly to their left flank. 
 
 The army at A immediately marches off in columns to the left, but„ 
 instead of hitting on the head of the enemy's columns at c, the enemy's 
 columns have marched so quickly, and gained so much ground to the 
 rear, that the A army strikes upon the rearmost divisions, which have 
 been brought opposite to them by the continued march of the B army. 
 
TACTICS A PUZZLE. 
 
 113 
 
 B . 
 
 A army in column, left in front 
 
 A wishes to engage B : to do so, he must form line opposite B bet-jvecn 
 E and F. Unfortunately this is impossible : he is left in front, and 
 must bring his right to G : as he can only form line to the front between 
 E and G, he can not bring the enemy to action. 
 
 The tactician wants to measure his distances, to put every individual 
 in his proper place, and to teach him what he has to do j some little 
 thing goes wrong, and the whole force is thrown out — for on the exact 
 fitting of all the parts depends the working of the system. The tacti- 
 cian is drilled and drilled till, when perfect, he can do nothing bat 
 what he is ordered ; he loses all self-reliance, and in an emergency can 
 10* 
 
114 FIELD MOVEMENTS. 
 
 Dot break from the trammels he is held in; but the less perfect tacti- 
 '•ian would act on the spur of the moment. 
 
 Tbe knowledge of tactics no more makes the general than the knowl- 
 edge of the number of syllables required in verses makes the poet. Ge- 
 nius alone can make the poet and the general. 
 
 The real general, when going into battle seizes on all the advantages 
 of a position, on the openings given by the enemy, as if by inspiration ; 
 there is no hesitation j ways and mea»s arc never wanting. 
 
 If the troops ho commands are capable of moving under fire, he 
 places them by a simple movement within reach of the foe. He quiet- 
 ly waits the result; sending reinforcements where they are required, 
 or occupying in time, and in strength, positions to cover his retreat, 
 should the day go against him. 
 
 Ziethon, who was born a general, whose intuitive perceptions always 
 led him right in battle, never got on well at the complicated sham-fighta 
 held by Frederic at Potsdam to try his generals. Frederic, thinking 
 that a little working up in tactics would do Ziethen good, sent for him, 
 tnd examined him as to what he would do with his cavalry under cer- 
 tain circumstances. Ziethen answered very quietl}' : "Well, I don't 
 know just now ; when the circumstances h.ippen in the held, and I see 
 the enemy before mo, somthoio it will be sure to occur to me." 
 
 A most curious instance of the difficulties to which this system of 
 pivot flank leads happened before the Battle of Prague, and I choose 
 it in preference to any other, because it completely puzzled Frederic 
 the (freat, himself the greatest tactician of the ago. 
 
 The night before the Battle of Prague Field-Marshal Schwerin's 
 army, formed in two lines, broke into column right in front ; the artil- 
 lery between the columns, the cavalry following the columns formed 
 by the second line. 
 
 The king marched ofi" left in front in two columns, the infantry in 
 ■jjuj, the cavalry in the other. 
 
 The king and the marshal met each other at an obtuse angle on tha 
 S^nmnd whore they wore to form : and General Winterfeldt marched iu 
 between them with his column left in front. 
 
 Marshal Schwcrin's columns wore destined to form the left of the 
 army, which was to advance by its left against the enemy : but no one 
 knew how to unravel the mass without great loss of time : at last the 
 
hi 
 
 THE DUKE OP BEVEEN. 115 
 
 Dnke of Bevern, with great presence of mind, made the rear of each of 
 the marshal's columns take ground to the reverse flanks, and move 
 forward followed in succession by each detachment in it.* Thus origi- 
 nated one of our field movements — " Rear of tho column to the front." 
 
 But if an enemy came on suddenly, this manoeuvre, like many more, 
 could not be performed, and serious consequences might ensue.f 
 
 We will, therefore, have no pivot flanks. Troops, when in line or in 
 column, shall be led by their centre, and during all formations by their 
 inward flanks. 
 
 The troops (except on parade, when they fall in by seniority) take 
 their place in the lino of battle as opportunity ofibrs or necessity re- 
 quires. No inversion is possible.^ 
 
 The troop is tho unit of any number of which the regiment may be 
 formed. These troops file or move by threes or sections from either 
 flank, and form at twelve paces interval from each other in line. 
 
 They are alike in every respect; it makes no difference where they 
 stand in the regiment. 
 
 The troops often change from one wing to another during the move- 
 ments ; as, for instance, the regiment is in lino composed of the follow- 
 ing troops — a, hf c, d, e, f — and advances in double column from the 
 centre, closes up, and deploys to the right; the troops will stand in line 
 c d h, e af. The left wing is now composed of the troops e, d, b, and 
 the right wing of the troops e a /. This makes no difference; the 
 troops are all the same : and of these troops a certain number, not 
 certain troops, form the wings. 
 
 Troops of difi'erent regiments can not mix. 
 
 Regiments fall in by seniority on parade, but take their places, when 
 manoeuvring, according to circumstances. 
 
 The commanding officer gives the word of command, and, as it is of 
 
 * Berenhorst. 
 
 t In the following field movements proposed, details are not given, for such de- 
 tails are matters for after consideration. 
 
 X Fortunatelj- the English cavalry have remained organized in troops, whilst all 
 continental troops are in squadrons, which they bring to 200 horses and upwards 
 in war-time. To be oven with them we might call four troops a squadron, and 
 two troops half a squadron. Thig would facilitate the working in the field, partic- 
 ularly if all regiments had two such squadrons, or eight troops. 
 
116 FIELD MOVEMENTS. 
 
 great consequence to have as little noise as possible, in order to avoid 
 confusion, the two majors or wing-leaders alone repeat that word of 
 command, and ride at about fifty paces in front or on the flank of their 
 wings. 
 
 Their trumpeters alone repeat the signals, except in the charge and 
 rally, when all join in. 
 
 The adjutant rides with the colonel; the superintendence of the base 
 is confided to him. 
 
 Markers take up the inward points, and, instead of dressing close up 
 to them, the line is formed at some distance behind the markers. 
 
 Troop-leaders only give a word of command when it concerns their 
 own troop. 
 
 The pivot flank is that v/hich brings the cavalry quickest upon the 
 foe. 
 
 The commanding ofiicer is hampered with no conditions, and forms 
 his line in the shortest and most simple manner to ensure success. 
 
 Paces. — From the halt the line breaks into column, or the column 
 wheels into line at a walk or a trot. 
 
 The horses are only knocked about and excited by trying to do it at a 
 gallop ; the distance is so short that it is not done one instant sooner, 
 but rather the reverse; because in doing it at a gallop they fly out, and 
 have to close in or rein back. 
 
 When on the move, all wheels are made at an increased pace. 
 
 The trot. — For manoeuvring the proper pace to use is the trot, at the 
 rate of eight miles an hour. 
 
 The canter. — A distinct line should be drawn between the canter and 
 the gallop : the former should be as collected and as short as possible. 
 It is necessary for a man to be able to collect his horse to the very 
 slowest pace without breaking into the trot, in order to handle him in 
 single combat. 
 
 They should have plenty of practice at cantering to both hands not 
 only in the riding-school but at drill, by ranking past by single files to 
 either hand, doing the sword exercise in line at open files, etc. 
 
 The gallop should be at the rate of fourteen miles an hour, and sel- 
 dom used except for forming line to the front from an open column ; 
 and in the advance, where the men must keep it up across country, 
 without pulling at their horses or hurrying. 
 
CAVALRY GETTING OUT OF HAND. 117 
 
 The great point is to get the officers to take up the pace at once, and 
 keep to it steadily throughout ; that is, in an advance at a trot or a 
 gallop, the ofl&cers ought never to allow the rate of either to be in- 
 creased as they go on, otherwise the trot would soon break into a gal- 
 lop, and the gallop would end iu the men going oflf as hard as their 
 horses could run. 
 
 Cavalry that hurries is never ready when wanted, because it is " out 
 of hand." All hurrying must therefore be checked at once, and at all 
 times, for it is the only way to prevent it getting " out of hand :" a 
 fault to which our cavalry has always had a tendency. In their charges 
 men, and even officers, would often dash forward during the advance, 
 causing the alignment to be lost, and breaking the power of the charge. 
 When a regiment is advancing under fire, men and officers get excited, 
 hurry forward, and at last, goaded on by the shots dropping among 
 them, burst from all control, and gallop madly toward the enemy. 
 
 This is nothing more than running away ; though it is running for- 
 ward inst-ead of back. It shows the same want of soldier-like endurance 
 and fortitude under trying circumstances, and often leads to defeat and 
 dishonor ; for they all get out of hand, scatter, and are driven back 
 with loss bj' the enemy's reserves. 
 
 Men and officers should therefore understand that to gallop forward 
 because the enemy are in that direction is by no means a proof of val- 
 or, but often the reverse ; and such conduct ought to be severely cen- 
 sured and checked on all occasions. 
 
 General Sohr, one of the most distinguished Prussian cavalry officers, 
 
 was keenly alive to the necessity of preventing such attempts on the 
 
 part of individuals, as the following extracts from his Life will show : 
 
 " During the advance of the Prussian army into France, on the 3d of 
 
 February, 1814 : 
 
 The 1st Dragoons 4 squadrons 
 
 The Lithuanian Dragoons and mounted Riflemen. . . .5 " 
 
 The 3d regiment of Hussars 5 *' 
 
 The Brandenburg Lancers 4 " 
 
 The Mecklenburg Hussars 4 " 
 
 Total 22 squadrons. 
 
 "This force marched at six o'clock, a. m., on the high-road to Chalons ; 
 
118 FIELD MOVEMENTS. 
 
 at seven they fell in with Sebastiani's French corps of cavalry near the 
 village of La Chaussee, consisting of seven regiments of cavalry, chief- 
 ly curiassiers and lancers, lately returned from Spain. One of the 
 greatest cavalry enagagements of the campaign now took place, called 
 the Battle of La Chaussee. 
 
 " General Katzler, seeing that the enemy (who were superior in num- 
 bers) were anxious to form this side of the village, gave orders to fall 
 upon them whilst endeavoring to form line, and we were hurried for- 
 ward to the attack, for the rumbling of the enemy's artillery was dis- 
 tinctly heard coming through the village, and our general would not 
 give them the chance of getting into position. 
 
 '' The necessity of haste and bad ground prevented all the regiment^ 
 from coming into line and charging together. It therefore resolved it- 
 self into an attack in echelon, or in succession ; but each regiment 
 was led steadily to the charge by its commander. 
 
 ** The charge was carried out with the greatest determination; each 
 regiment pushed eagerly forward to close with the foe. 
 
 '•'We had the advantage. The Brandenburg regiment of hussar? 
 was lucky enough to break through the enemy's centre (composed of 
 cuirassiers) and to make many prisoners, though they fought most gal- 
 lantly. ^Ye captured four guus and two ammunition wagons in the act 
 of preparing for action. 
 
 " The enemy, driven through the village of La Chaussee, tried to 
 make a stand on the other side, but was overthrown and pursued some 
 miles towards Paguy. 
 
 " The engagement lasted till dark. General Sohr, then in command 
 of the Brandenburg Hussars, displayed great coolness and energy in 
 the figbt; and I can not refrain from relating what took place, to prove 
 how necessary it is in warfare to show determination at all times and 
 under any circumstances in order to keep troops in hand. 
 
 "Whilst the regiment was advancing the rash behavior of one of the 
 oflScers had nearly caused the charge to fail. 
 
 "The gallop was sounded; Count v. d. S., a lieutenant who had 
 lately joined from the Saxon cavalry, wishing to distinguish himself, 
 brandished his sword on high, called to the men to follow bim, and 
 dashed forward at speed. The second squadron, which began to follow 
 him, lost its place in line. Sohr immediately ordered the trot to be 
 
THE PASS OF ROTHKRETCHAM. 119 
 
 sounded, and then, waiting till the whole regiment was steady, he 
 sounded the gallop and the charge, the only means by which he coulu 
 h'.<pe to break through the enemy's line. When the engagement was 
 over Sohr called the oflacers together, and addressing himself to Lieut- 
 enant V. S., said: 'You proved to us this day that you have lots of 
 pluck, and I honor those who have, but I am myself no " Hundsfott," 
 and if you again forget yourself as you did this day, and dare to inter- 
 fere with me in the leading of the regiment, I shall cut you down in 
 front of the line.' 
 
 " The lesson was a severe one, but such examples seldom fail in their 
 effect. 
 
 " Once more Sohr found it necessary to enforce steadiness in his 
 squadron, but on no subsequent occasion was it necessary. 
 
 '•' To check the pursuit of the enemy, a strong rear-guard was pushed 
 forward, at three o'clock, a. m., from Weissenberg to Wurschen. The 
 enemy was brought to a stand by the sudden opening of our artillery, 
 and more than an hour elapsed before he received suflBcient reinforce- 
 ments to resume the offensive and drive in our rear-guard. 
 
 " At the pass of Rothkretcham, to the eastward of Weissenberg, is 
 BJi arm of the Lobaur stream, the passage of which was hotly contested. 
 Sohr's squadron was formed in the plain in front of the defile, and the 
 enemy's troops, of all arms, were seen pressing forward on the neigh- 
 boring heights to the north and westward. When our rear-guard had 
 effected its retreat through the defile, Sohr thought it high time to do 
 the same, and gave the word * Divisions, right about wheel — march !' 
 
 •' The enemy was near at hand, and the divisions wheeled about hur- 
 riedly, and almost before the command was given. 
 
 '• The experienced leader, who had an eye to the future behavior of 
 his squadron, immediately fronted the divisions again, and, placing 
 himself at their head, said; *I '11 have you all cut down by the enemy 
 rather than see you work unsteadily.' 
 
 " Ho faced the foe ; not a sound was heard in the squadron ; the ene- 
 my pressed on; and their artillery opened with round shot on the defile 
 in his rear, cutting up the ground on both sides of the devoted band. 
 The sudden fronting and bold attitude of Sohr's squadron fortunately 
 led the enemy to suppose that supports were at hand, and they ordered 
 a flank movement to turn his position. His situation became more 
 
120 FIELD MOVEMENTS. 
 
 critical every moment be remained, for the enemy's cavalry were now 
 coming up — still not a movement was perceptible in the squadron till, 
 turning his horse toward them, he gave the word in his peculiarly 
 measured way : 
 
 " * Divisions ',...' right about wheel '....* Walk ' ' March ' 
 
 ' Threes right ! ' and in a voice of thunder he added, ' At speed ! ' 
 
 'March !* 'Ride as hard as you can !' The defile was passed almost 
 together with the enemy. Never again did his squadron hurry. In the 
 hour of danger the hussars looked with confidence to their leader, and 
 * were in band.' "* 
 
 . Field movements are of two sorts, namely : those which are made use 
 of when close to and immediately before engaging the enemy, and those 
 used when not in the immediate vicinity of danger. 
 
 The first, an open column of troops, ready to form in the shortest 
 manner to front, rear, or flanks. 
 
 The head of each column under its own commanding oflBcer. 
 
 Each separate body in the column under its own leader, and of any 
 number of such separate bodies the column is composed. 
 
 Thus, if surprised, they act for themselves, and may still win the day. 
 
 All open columns should bo formed of troops; the troops kept up to 
 twenty-five files. 
 
 Columns of smaller front have many disadvantages which are not 
 compensated for by the only real advantage they possess, namely : that 
 of saving the horses some work in the wheeling, as they cover less 
 ground than the column of troops. 
 
 In columns of divisions there is great difficulty in keeping the dis- 
 tances ; you never can get them sufficiently closed up, even on a pjjrade- 
 ground, and when they are closed up sufficiently the rear rank of the 
 preceding divisions is always in the way in wheeling into lino. 
 
 Divisions have been used in preference to fours and threes when un- 
 der fire, because no tellings off ai*e required. 
 
 The column of divisions is simply moved off its ground to disengage 
 the dead and wounded. 
 
 But it must be remembered that formerly troops were told off in four 
 
 * Aus dem Leben des K. Prexissischcn General-Lieutenant Frederick v. Sohr, by 
 H. Beitzke, Major A. J). Published in Berlin, 1846. 
 
THE OPEN COLUMN. 121 
 
 or five ways, and this by the sergeant riding down the ranks, pointing 
 with his sword to each man, and first telling him whether he was a 
 centre or left by threes, then a right or left by files, and so on : this was 
 a tedious operation. 
 
 Men tell themselves off now, and that in an instant, particularly as 
 the only necessary telling off is by threes ; and old soldiers will go 
 threes right and left without any telling off. 
 
 A column of divisions is of all columns the worst for going quickly 
 across country ; they are so close to each other that no obstacles can be 
 avoided or cleared. It is like a close column. In dry weather the dust 
 has no time to be carried away by the wind. It is most difficult to hear 
 the words of command. A sudden check throws such a column into 
 confusion, and, if attacked, the divisions, trying to form troops and 
 then squadrons to be under their legitimate leaders, would detract greatly 
 from the chances of success. 
 
 All these things considei-ed, I should prefer the column of troops, and 
 only use divisions when a troop, out skirmishing or otherwise detached, 
 requires a support to its advanced parties. 
 
 The advantages of the column of troops are numerous ; some of them 
 are set forth in the chapter on Intervals; the others will become appa- 
 rent as we proceed with our field movements. 
 
 All formations from the open column must be made toward the foe ; 
 that is, the back of no single horseman in it should be turned on the 
 enemy during the execution of the movement. 
 
 Should the enemy attack during a formation made toward him, no 
 great harm is likely to ensue; the troops would meet him in succession, 
 and charge whilst following out the line of formation. 
 
 The column forms line to either flank by wheeling into lino, or form- 
 ing in succession to either flank. 
 
 It forms to the front either right or left, as ordered, the commanding 
 oflicer always placing himself and giving the word of command on that 
 side to which the troops are to form ; one note of the trumpet signify- 
 ing " right," two notes " left," which signal should always precede the 
 word of command. 
 
 Majors shift their flank with the commanding officer. 
 
 Formations to the rear are done by wheeling troops right or left about, 
 and proceed as above. 
 11 
 
122 FIELD MOVEMENTS. 
 
 Tn forming line from column a flank is brought up or thrown back by 
 the commanding ofl5cer placing the base troop, and giving a caution, 
 before the word "March," to bring up or keep back the flank forming. 
 When the head of a column has changed direction, line may be form- 
 ed on the new alignment to either hand ; the rear of the column either 
 coming up in oblique echelon, or going threes outwards. 
 
 When not in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, line may be formed 
 on any central point of the column, the adjutant marking the troop on 
 which the formation is to take place ; all the remaining troops wheel to 
 the hand to which the formation is ordered, and those in front of the 
 base are then put threes about : thus all possibility of a mistake is ob- 
 viated. 
 
 When advancing against an enemy in the open, do so by double or 
 single contiguous open columns, either of wings of regiments or of 
 regiments ; you thus avoid the disadvantage of a single column, which 
 requires time to form line to the front. 
 
 A column of troops in passing a defile breaks into threes, and reforms 
 on coming out; breaking into threes does not lengthen the column, and 
 the interval of twelve yards will prevent any check being given, which 
 would most likely occur in breaking into divisions, and again in break- 
 ing from divisions into threes. 
 
 It would be an immense advantage to have all these things done one 
 way J of course when the passage is too narrow to admit of threes, the 
 column must halt and break off by sections or files. 
 
 Double open columns, under the existing system, have the advantage 
 over a single column that they extend over only half the ground, line 
 is more quickly formed, and words of command more easily heard. 
 
 The objections are, that their greater extent of front makes thorn 
 unwieldy, and they require more favorable ground to work on ; they 
 can not show a front to the rear without first forming line to the front, 
 and they can not break into single column. 
 
 I propose that, in order to make this column useful, it can be formed, 
 as it is now, from line or from a close column by simply opening out, 
 or from contiguous open columns by closing two such columns to each 
 other. 
 
 It forms single column by the troops on the loft halting and inclining 
 to the right, and reforms double column in the same way by the alter- 
 
DOUBLE COLUMN. 128 
 
 nate troops moving up to the left at an increased pace. They form con- 
 tiguous open columns by opening out from each other. The double 
 columns can thus suit their movements to any ground : for instance, an 
 obstacle in front of a double column obliges them to open out to avoid 
 it, the enemy suddenly appears, and they act as contiguous columns : if 
 contiguous columns closed in to each other, for the same reason they 
 are then ready to act as a double column. 
 
 A double column threatened suddenly in flank wheels the troops on 
 that side into line ; the other wing may wheel into line also, and follow as 
 a support, form in succession, or move on till clear, and form echelon, etc. 
 
 It forms line to the front, or either flank; and by wheeling troops to 
 the right or left about it is ready to form to the rear in the same way 
 as to the front. 
 
 Double columns are useful in passing defiles; but each regimenl 
 should form its own double column and follow in succession; for, by 
 forming double column from the centre of a line of cavalry the regi- 
 ments are mixed, and if attacked by the enemy before they have re- 
 formed line it will go hard with them. 
 
 On issuing from a defile it may be found necessary, after the first 
 regiment has formed, to bring the next following to form on its right 
 or left, which could not be done if what had debouched of the column 
 was composed of the half of a regiment from the right flank and of 
 half a one from the left flank. 
 
 The object must always be to get into line quickly, since the 
 "charge" follows; therefore always obviate the chances of losing 
 time, for, with the loss of time, the chances of success are alway.s 
 diminished. 
 
 In going into a defile it is impossible to give orders as to how to 
 form on the other sidej this must depend upon the enemy's arrange- 
 ments to receive you. 
 
 The formation must be made parallel to the line of attack ; circum- 
 stances are not always favorable; the ground may be bad. The officer 
 commanding has no time for consideration, but must form and charge 
 to try and keep the debouche open for those following. 
 
 This can be done very well if regiment succeeds regiment in double 
 column, the colonel leading, his majors on the right and left, each in 
 front of his wing; thus each regiment is ready to act at once in any 
 
124 FIELD MOVEMENTS. 
 
 part of the field, on either flank : and in case of disaster each regiment 
 being together is more easily rallied and reformed. 
 
 To rally quickly is of vital importance, and for this reason it is a 
 great mistake to assimilate the uniform of all regiments, for it adds 
 greatly to the difficulty of rallying in presence of an enemy. 
 
 In some of the Prussian regiments each squadron has different 
 facings, to facilitate their rallying in battle. 
 
 In the Danish service they distinguish the squadrons in the regiment 
 by a badge worn on the breast. 
 
 But, whether it be done by color of the jacket, by facings, by badges, 
 or by any other method, I certainly consider it a primary necessity 
 that our cavalry regiments should be markedly and strongly distin- 
 guishable, even at a distance, by their several uniforms, in order that 
 the rally be not impeded. 
 
 Close columns are chiefly for the assembly of troops or reserves : to 
 bring them in the neighborhood of an enemy would be dangerous, for 
 they can not show a front to their flanks, and consequently can not 
 protect them. If the enemy attacked the head of a close column, and 
 at the same time gained its flanks, the close column would be destroyed, 
 for it could not develop its strength. 
 
 Thus, when approaching the enemy in an enclosed country, where a 
 surprise might be attempted, close columns must open out and form 
 double or single open column. 
 
 The only occasions on which close columns may be used advan- 
 tageously for fighting are when a regiment is surprised in the open and 
 cut ofi" from its supports by a superior force. It should then collect 
 into a compact body, make a gap, and cut its way through. 
 
 Light cavalry regiments have acted successfully in close column 
 against lines of heavy cavalry advancing to the charge, their object 
 being to break the array and take the heavies singly in the melee : to 
 do this while the adverse lines were advancing toward each other, the 
 lights suddenly formed a close column on their centre at a gallop, and 
 at once bore down on the centre of the line : thus avoiding the charge, 
 breaking through the line of heavies, and throwing them into con- 
 fusion, they spread out on their flanks and rear, and attacked them 
 singly and with an advantage.* 
 
 * De Brack. 
 
CLOSE COLUMN. 125 
 
 Cavalry may be brought up in close column, if its flanks are pro- 
 tected and its deployment covered by a powerful artillery, but under no 
 other circumstances. 
 
 The front of a close column should be composed of two troops in 
 line, with the interval of twelve yards between them. Always keep 
 the front of the leading squadron clear both in forming and deploying, 
 except when it is necessary to form or deploy on a central squadron. 
 
 In forming close column to the right, all squadrons go in rear of the 
 right one, and vice versa to the left. 
 
 In forming on a central squadron the right squadrons form in front, 
 those on the left in rear of it, whatever the number of squadrons or 
 regiments may be. 
 
 Now, let there be any number of regiments in close column, the offi- 
 cer commanding requires a line to the right. 
 
 "Deploy to the right." All go threes right, except the squadron 
 at the head of the column, which gives the base. To the left, tiV< 
 versa. 
 
 Perhaps the general wishes to deploy from a central point, bringing 
 more squadrons to one flank than to the other : for instance, he has 
 three regiments in one close column, and wishes to deploy two regi- 
 ments to the right and one to the left. 
 
 " Deploy to the right on the second regiment." The leading squad- 
 ron of the second regiment is the base, there/ore all in rear of it go 
 threes right (the hand named). 
 
 The first regiment is in front of the base, and goes by threes to the 
 opposite flank named for the deployment, and this is the rule, namely : 
 
 All squadrons in rear of the base go by threes to the hand named 
 for the deployment. 
 
 All squadrons in front of the base go by threes to the hand not 
 named. 
 
 If the general requires two regiments on the left, and one on the 
 right— 
 
 " Deploy to the left on the second regiment." Leading squadron, 
 second regiment, is the base j all in rear of it " threes left" (the hand 
 named). 
 
 The first regiment, which is in front of the base, "threes right" (the 
 hand not named). 
 11* 
 
126 FIELD MOVEMENTS. 
 
 Thus the officer commanding requires no knowledge of how the 
 columns were formed to unravel them at once in any direction. 
 
 When a close column, composed of more than one regiment, requires 
 to front to the roar, it must be countermarched by ranks in each troop, 
 because it would take up too much time and require too much space to 
 open out such a column ; but contiguous close columns of regiments 
 are opened to double column distance, all simultaneously wheeled right 
 about by troops, and then closed up again. 
 
 Countermarching is one of those movements ne^er to be employed 
 when near an enemy. 
 
 When regiments in close column are made use of on the field tlioy 
 should never be formed in one column, but in columns of regiments 
 either contiguous, at deploying distances, in echelon or echiquier (al- 
 ternate) ; thus they at once become available for any emergency by 
 opening out to double-column distance. 
 
 Echelon and contiguous open column. — The combinations of which the 
 echelon and contiguous open column are capable greatly simplify 
 manoeuvring, and supersede the necessity of many field movements. 
 
 They should not be formed of less than wings of regiments ; when 
 .smaller they do not unite the samo advantages. 
 
 Changes of position by threes or oblique echelon of troops are ob- 
 jectionable, because the moment of formation is always a weak though 
 an unavoidable one for cavalry : the more ground the formation extends 
 over the greater the danger, and to avoid this you should bring your 
 troops in columns close to the line of formation before giving the order 
 to form. 
 
 Changes of position are best executed by a combination of the eche- 
 lon and contiguous column. 
 
 Single, double, and close column can all be formed at once from 
 either. 
 
 Changes of front should bo executed on the same principle as laid 
 down in Her Majesty's Regulations. 
 
 The advance in line. — This has generally been considered as simple 
 enough ; yet it has long appeared to me that the arrangements made 
 for the direction of an advance in line are insufficient and faulty. 
 
 All manoeuvres are preparatory only to the advance ; and when the 
 line is formed and launched forward on the enemy, if he is suddenly 
 
ADVANCE IN LINE. 127 
 
 found to be on the right or left front instead of straight before the ad- 
 vancing line, it is too late to alter the direction on the move, and to 
 halt is dangerous ,• what with the difficulty of hearing words of com- 
 mand, particularly when under fire, and the impossibility of seeing 
 what the base squadron is doing, the cavalry can not easily be brought 
 to bear straight down upon the foe. 
 
 The squadron leader often loses sight of the base altogether; it is 
 buried in the ranks, and, being on the same line with him, he can not 
 distinguish by the position of their horses whether they are inclining 
 toward him or from him. 
 
 If the base squadron changes the direction of the advance toward 
 him, he first becomes aware of it by being run into and pushed out of 
 his place in line. 
 
 If the base squadron changes direction away from him, he is left 
 suddenly a long way behind. 
 
 The constant endeavor to watch the base makes him often increase 
 the pace of the squadron unnecessarily, and obliges him to pull up as 
 suddenly when he finds that he has overshot the mark ; the constant 
 looking sideways renders it difficult for him to lead the squadron on a 
 straight line. 
 
 I think there ought to be a guiding power established independent of 
 all words of command, and so arranged that the commanding officer 
 might, through it, influence the movements and direction of the whole 
 line at once. 
 
 This could be done effectually bj' a very simple arrangement. 
 
 The adjutant places himself twenty-five to fifty paces (according to 
 the extent of the line) in front of the centre of the regiment; the two 
 troop-markers of the centre troops gallop out and place themselves at 
 five paces interval on his right and left, and raise their swords ; form- 
 ing a conspicuous group visible to all. 
 
 The adjutant (who rides with the colonel) knows what point he is to 
 lead on. He is answerable for the pace. 
 
 Troops dress to their centre, and the two centre troops of the line 
 keep exactly behind the base, conforming to their movements. 
 
 When the colonel wishes the direction altered he has only to ride up 
 and toll the adjutant, who, with his flankers, at once circles into the 
 new direction, all of them pointing to it with their swords until it has 
 been taken up by the line. 
 
128 FIELD MOVEMENTS. 
 
 The troops on the flank which is brought up increase their pace, those 
 on the pivot flank slacken the pace. 
 
 When the charge sounds, the base drops into a walk till picked up by 
 the line. 
 
 It would not do for the colonel or the field officers to lead, because 
 their services are required elsewhere. 
 
 They must watch the movements of the enemy and look after their 
 troops. 
 
 The majors ride on the prolongation of the line given by the base, 
 and repeat the signals by pointing with their swords in the new direc- 
 tion : this is done by all the officers. 
 
 Thus without a word being spoken a line could be led at once into 
 the direction required, and the principle could be carried out with bri- 
 gades and divisions. 
 
 The line is advancing at a trot — a change of direction is made half- 
 right by the base. 
 
 All the troops wheel into the new direction, and those on the right of 
 the centre drop into a walk and incline to the right. 
 
 The base troop on the left of the centre keeps up the pace of the ad- 
 vance, the trot J all troops on its left increase to a gallop, and drop into 
 the trot when in the alignment. 
 
 The base troop on the right of the centre, and all on its right, keep 
 on at a walk till the line comes up to each in succession, when they 
 resume the trot. 
 
 At a walk the troops on the right would halt, those on the left come 
 up at a trot. 
 
 In the advance in line, the direction of the advance is the important 
 point, and not the perfect alignment of the squadrons. So long as every 
 horse's head is turned straight toward the point of attack, it really 
 matters little whether one squadron be or be not a few horses' lengths 
 in advance or in rear of the line. This is the common-sense view of 
 the matter. Keep your alignment as perfect or as neat as you can, but 
 do not make sacrifices to obtain the end, and, above all, think of your 
 direction. 
 
GENERAL RULES. 129 
 
 Chapter X. 
 
 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 "Good riding and skill in the use of the 9\vord are the fundamental points of 
 all cavalry tactics." — General de Brack. 
 
 General Bides. 
 
 I. Always form so as to have your front clear as well as your flanks, 
 unless protected by woods, gardens, enclosures, etc., occupied by j'our 
 troops. 
 
 IL If you have a position to defend, form in rear of it. 
 
 III. Never attack without keeping part of your strength in reserve. 
 
 IV. Let your formations extend in depth, not in length; with large 
 bodies of cavalry, attack with one-fourth of your strength; protect 
 your flanks, follow up successes, or reti'ieve reverses with the re- 
 mainder. 
 
 V. Conceal your movements where the nature of the ground will 
 admit of it; where not, still endeavor by your speed to surprise the 
 enemy. 
 
 VI. Never put a line of cavalry threes about to retire in the face of 
 an enemy; they get out of hand, and are not easily stopped. 
 
 VII. Never attack with more troops than necessary to the object in 
 view. 
 
 VIII. When possible, always reconnoitre the ground over which you 
 are going to charge, to ascertain that there are no impassable obsta- 
 cles. 
 
 * IX. Charges on a large scale should seldom be attempted against 
 masses of troops of all arms, unless they have been previously shaken 
 by the fire of artillery. 
 
 X. Always watch for and try to seize the right moment for attack. 
 
 XI. Cavalry should not be brought into action too early in the day. 
 
 XII. Cavalry is best employed on an enemy's flanks. 
 
 N. B. Three of these rules were neglected by Brigadier Pope's 
 brigade of cavalry at the Battle of Chillianwalla, namely : Rules III, 
 IV, VL 
 
130 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 Rule III. They had no reserve. 
 
 Rule IV. The four regiments of cavalry composing the brigade were 
 all formed in one line. 
 
 Rule VI. The line was put threes about, and could not be stopped. 
 Cavalry versus Cavalry. — The most difficult position a cavalry officer 
 can be placed in is in command of cavalry against cavalry, for the 
 slightest fault committed may be punished on the spot, and a reverse 
 lead to the most disastrous consequences. 
 
 When acting against the other arms, a failure is by no means irre- 
 parable, because their movements are comparatively slow. 
 
 Cavalry caught in the act of forming must generally bo overthrown 
 if its adversary profit by the opportunity. » 
 
 Avoid, therefore, all manoeuvring when within reach ; advance in the 
 order of attack; and if forced to make a change in your dispositions, 
 do so quickly, and so as to keep the front of your leading troops clear, 
 in order that they may charge should the enemy attempt to interfere. 
 
 When precluded by the nature of the ground from forming line be- 
 fore advancing to the attack, advance in columns of little depth, in 
 order to form quickly and unexpectedly on that point where you wish 
 to strike ; but to execute a movement of this sort in the face of an 
 enemy is dangerous, and requires confidence and skill, unless supported 
 by the fire of artillery. 
 
 A cavalry officer must know how to mask his intentions, and how to 
 show a front quickly under all circumstances ; for seldom do you come 
 upon the enemy in the precise position you expected to find him; nor 
 will he easily give you an opportunity of carrying out a preconcerted 
 plan of attack; the slightest move on his part will oblige you to.make 
 a counter one, and that without hesitation. 
 
 The eye must scan the distance between you, and you must feel cer- 
 tain that you have time to carry out a movement before attempting it, 
 for to be too late would entail defeat. 
 
 And here I would observe that the eye, both of men and officers, 
 ought to be previously and assiduously practised in measuring dis- 
 tances. One man well accustomed to use his eye in this way will tell at 
 a glance the distance between himself and any given object, or will err 
 only by a few yards or feet j another man, without the habit, will make 
 the wildest guess. In the military schools of France they make this 
 
CAVALRY VERSUS CAVALRY. 131 
 
 training and practising of the eye a regular part of the officer's educa- 
 tion. So ought it to be with us, although, apparently, no one seems to 
 have given the matter a thought. To the cavalry officer the eye is the 
 most valuable of all the organs, and in him everything ought to be 
 done to develop its faculty and power. 
 
 Marching on a parallel line to that of the enemy in open column, to 
 wheel up and charge, is a simple good movement, and sometimes takes 
 the enemy by surprise; but it is not always safe for you to expose your 
 flanks. In such a case, if the enemy approaches, you must at once 
 wheel into line those troops that are opposite the foe; the rear troop? 
 continue their march behind the line and form up in succession ; or you 
 advance to the charge with the troops wheeled up, whilst the rear of 
 the column wheel into line also and form your support. 
 
 An officer leading cavalry into action should name some officers or 
 non-commissioned officers (well-mounted) to precede the column and 
 reconnoitre the ground over which the attack is likely to be made. 
 
 If the enemy is in sight, these officers should gallop straight toward 
 him, approaching as near as they can without running the risk of be- 
 ing captured, and make themselves masters of any feature in the ground 
 which may be turned to advantage, or prevent their own troops from 
 attempting to charge over obstacles which might lead them to destruc- 
 tion. 
 
 Cover your movements and protect your flanks with skirmishers, and 
 reinforce them according to circumstances when within reach of the 
 enemy. Under the protection of your skirmishers watch the adversa- 
 ries' movements. The officers with the skirmishers must keep a good 
 lookout on the flanks, so as not to overlook any movement toward them, 
 favored by the ground, or covered by a village or other enclosures. By 
 a manoeuvre of this sort the French cavalry were defeated by the Aus- 
 trians at Wurzburg. The Archduke Charles sent fourteen squadrons of 
 hussars to turn a village while the French were advancing to attack 
 his cuirassiers ; the hussars allowed the French line to pass the village 
 in their advance, then galloped in on their rear, and did great execu- 
 tion. 
 
 When ordered to attack, take the initiative, and, when advancing 
 against a superior force likely to outflank you, keep troops in reserve 
 behind your flanks with orders to act as circumstances require. Thus 
 
132 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 having secured your flanks, and being backed up by a reserve, fall on 
 without hesitation at the favorable moment — such as a change in the 
 dispositions of the enemy, when they are in unfavorable ground, or 
 when they are suffering from the fire of your artillery. 
 
 The enemy may try to take you in flank or surround you, but while 
 taking ground to the right or left for that purpose he exposes his own 
 flank, and the troops behind your flanks must take him in the fact while 
 you charge home. 
 
 "A manceuvre," says De Brack, " which is often attended with suc- 
 cess, when two lines are watching each other, is to make a squadron 
 break forth in column from behind one of your flanks (or the flank 
 squadron itself), and press forward as if to turn the enemy's flank. 
 They will immediately wheel into column to prevent this j then, at once, 
 sound the gallop, and bear down upon them. This manoeuvre is the 
 art of war in miniature." 
 
 A fine example of steadiness and resolution was shown at the Battle 
 of Blenheim (1704) by a British regiment of cavalry (the carbineers) 
 in the early part of the action, just after the great attack on Blenheim 
 village, which, though our infantry could not force it, was eventually 
 cut off, as it were, from the French line by the occupation of the line 
 outside, and a large body of French infantry was pent up within its 
 enclosure and rendered useless. 
 
 " The Duke," says Kane, " having thus secured himself on that side, 
 ordered Colonel Palmes with three squadrons to pass over the brook, who, 
 meeting no opposition, drew up at some distance from the marshy 
 ground, and gave room for our lines to form behind him. The Duke 
 followed Palmes : the mills were attacked, but those that were in them, 
 set thorn on fire and made off. Both the cavalry and infantry which 
 the Duke kept with him (not above ten squadrons and twelve battalions) 
 passed over as well as they could, and formed as fast as they got over. 
 Tallard all this while, as a man infatuated, stood gazing, without suffer- 
 ing either great or small shot to be fired at them ; only when he saw 
 Palmes advanced toward him he ordered five (some say seven) squad- 
 rons to march down, and cut those three squadrons to pieces, and to 
 return. The oflicer that commanded the French squadrons, as soon as 
 he got clear of the lino, ordered the squadrons on his right and left to 
 edge outward, and then to wheel in on the flanks of Palmes ; which 
 
CAVALRY VERSUS CAVALRY. 133 
 
 Palmes perceiving, ordered Major Oldficld, who commanded his right 
 squadron, and Major Creed, who commanded that on the left, to wheel 
 outward, and charge the squadrons coming down upon them ; and, not 
 in the least doubting their beating them, ordered them, when they had 
 done that, to wheel in upon the flanks of the othev.^. while he at the 
 same time would charge them in front. Accordingly everything suc- 
 ceeded, though with the loss of some bravo men, and Major Creed 
 among them ; so that these three squadrons drove their five, or seven, 
 back to their army. This was the first action in the field, which took 
 up some time, and gave the Duke an opportunity to form his lines."* 
 
 With a large body of cavalry it is difficult to gain an enemy's flank, 
 but with small detachments the opportunity often occurs. Cavalry offi- 
 cers, when they see a good chance given them by the enemy, should 
 never wait for a better one. 
 
 If the enemy's cavalry have to clear a ditch, a hollow way, or any 
 other obstacle in their front, let them attempt it, and fall on before they 
 have recovered their order or resumed the speed of their advance. 
 
 A cavalry engagement is seldom decided by a single charge, but the 
 advantage remains with those who have the last reserve of fresh troops 
 at their disposal : this generally turns the fortune of the day. 
 
 Large corps of cavalry are now generally formed in three lines — the 
 first line, the second line, pnd the reserve. 
 
 Now suppose a second line of cavalry deployed according to rule, 
 with intervals of twelve paces between squadrons. The first line, of 
 one thousand or twelve hundred horsemen, with horse artillery, are de- 
 feated and pursued by the enemy. Si.! outing at tho hotly pursued 
 fugitives will never make them diverge from the straight line, their short- 
 est and safest road, nor induce them to ride round the flanks, nor can 
 they by any possibility escape with guns and tumbrila through the 
 small openings left in the second line. 
 
 The second line could not advance unless its front was clear, and, 
 seeing the enemy rushing upon them without the possibility of charg- 
 ing against him, they would probably turn and gallop for it. 
 
 The first line alone should be deployed. 
 
 The second line formed in double open columns, the two flank col- 
 umns outflanking the first line. 
 
 * Lord de Ros, " The Young OfiBcer's Companion." 
 12 
 
134 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 Each column could easily clear its own front and break through the 
 crowd. Should the enemy continue the pursuit of the first line, by de- 
 taching the rear troops outward they would fall upon the enemy's rear, 
 and, galloping with thorn, destroy them in the pursuit. 
 
 These columns could act at once when they had the chance, for in the 
 confusion it would be utterly hopeless to expect one effort of the whole 
 line at once. 
 
 Reserves in columns in rear of the centre would be in the best posi- 
 tion to detach reinforcements when they were needed. 
 
 If the first line succeeds in the attack, the columns of the second are 
 ready to advance and support, whereas if in line they must first break 
 into column, and thus lose much precious time. 
 
 When a first Hue is not considered strong enough to attack the enemy, 
 the reserve joins the second line: both deploy and advance together, 
 the first line passing through their intervals to the rear and forming 
 the reserve. 
 
 The difficulty of advancing with a long line, and the danger of being 
 driven back at all points at once, make it advisable to use echelons in- 
 stead of attempting to charge on a large front in line. 
 
 Echelons are useful when debouching from a defile to support troops 
 already engaged or defeated; also to pass through intervals and attack 
 a line made unsteady by the fire of infantry or artillery, and fall on 
 without giving them time to restore order. 
 
 The echelon should not be formed of less than a wing, or it would 
 hardly take effect against an enemy's line : further, wings can break 
 into echelons, columns of troops, contiguous double and single open 
 columns, and thus become handy in every way. 
 
 Some of the advantages of an advance in echelon are: 
 
 You at once avail yourself of an opening given by the enemy, and 
 charge without waiting to form line. 
 
 You can attack one of his wings, or any other point in his line, with- 
 out engaging all your troops at once; the enemy can not attempt to 
 attack the flank of the charging echelon without exposing his own to 
 your succeeding echelon. 
 
 If the first one is defeated, you support it; whereas, if successful, 
 you arc almost sure to defeat your adversary, because, when the remain- 
 der of his line advances against you, the first victorious echelon falls 
 upon his flank and rear. 
 
ADVANTAGE IN ECHELON. 135 
 
 After a successful charge, rally forward, picking up the stragglers aa 
 you go on. If you sound the recall you lose time and bring the men 
 twice over the same ground. 
 
 When rallied, attack the flauk which has been exposed by the defeat 
 of your opponents. 
 
 General Boussard, at the Battle of Llerida, charged the Spanish 
 horse, formed on the left of the line, with the 13th regiment of cuiras- 
 siers, and overthrow them ; then bringing up his right shoulders, he fell 
 without hesitation on the Spanish infantry, which, taken in flank, was 
 ridden over, and fifty-six hundred of them were made prisoners. 
 
 Cavalry seldom meet each other in a charge executed at speed : the 
 one party generally turns before joining issue with the enemy, and this 
 often happens when their line is still unbroken and no obstacles of any 
 sort intervene. 
 
 The fact is every cavalry soldier approaching another at speed must, 
 feel that if they come in contact at that pace they both go down, and 
 probably break every limb in their bodies. 
 
 To strike down his adversary the dragoon must close, and the chances 
 are he receives a blow in return for the one he deals out. 
 
 There is a natural repugnance to close in deadly strife. How seldom 
 have infantry ever crossed bayonets ! some authors say jievcr ! and cav- 
 alry soldiers, unless they feel confident in their riding, can trust to their 
 horse, and know that their weapons aro formidable, will not readily 
 plunge into the midst of the enemy's ranks. 
 
 Lines advancing to meet each other have shown hesitation at the 
 same moment, thus : 
 
 lu the retreat of our army from Burgos, three squadrons of French 
 chasseurs charged some squadrons of our rear-guard; these advanced 
 to meet them; both lines pulled up close to each other and stood fast, 
 till one of the French made a cut at the man opposite to him, upon 
 which both lines instantly plunged forward and engaged ; the colonel 
 of the chasseurs was killed, most of his ofiBcers were wounded, and the 
 French were driven back with a heavy loss. 
 
 The flanks of each troop should be closed up by officers, for it is 
 generally from the flanks that men ride to the rear. 
 
 Cavalry with an army. — When cavalry is assembled in large bodies, 
 it is for the purpose of striking a decisive blow. 
 
136 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 Natural obstacles, as well as the diflBculty of breaking througb 
 masses of infantry, often prevent cavalry from closing with the foe. 
 
 Infantry now fight on all sorts of ground ; a level plain is no longer 
 sought for as a field of battle ; and in an enclosed country cavalry is 
 required to act as an auxiliary to infantry, or a protection to artillery, 
 and must be scattered in small bodies to effect this. 
 
 Thus, to be prepared for all emergencies, it has been customary to 
 add a regiment of cavalry to each division of infantry, to serve as a 
 support in battle, and to seize upon and follow up any advantage 
 gained. 
 
 The remainder of the cavalry is then formed in reserve, either in 
 rear of the centre or both flanks of the second line. 
 
 Cavalry must act independently once it starts for the charge; the 
 fire of infantry and artillery may pave the way before, or even during 
 the attack, but there must be no hesitation when the cavalry advances 
 to the attack; kept back till the right moment, when it breaks forth, 
 let it be to fight. 
 
 The Battle of Mockern, fought on the 16th of October, 1813, affords 
 a striking example of tho results obtained by a small body of horse- 
 men well commanded and brought forward at the proper moment. 
 
 This battle, so glorious to General Torek's corps, was more particu- 
 larly 80 to Colonel Sohr, who, while the battle raged around him, 
 waited steadily till the enemy gave him a favorable opportunity, and 
 charging that instant with determined bravery, turned the scale in 
 favor of his country, and chained victory to the Prussian standard. 
 
 The possession of the village of Mockern was desperately contested 
 on the part of the French, and though tho Prussians at last carried it, 
 they could not pass out on the other side, the enemy having established 
 powerful batteries on the heights beyond. 
 
 One battery of fifteen heavy guns spread death and destruction in 
 the village itself; fresh troops pressed forward on both sides to the 
 attack, until on the Prussian side one brigade only was available (it 
 was commanded by Colonel Steinmetz). These men General Yorck 
 threw into the scale ; they so far re-established the fight as to enable 
 the Prussians to hold their own in the village and maintain the ground 
 on the right, but they gained no decided advantage. 
 
 What was now to be done ? The only fresh troops on the ground 
 
BATTLE OF MOCKERN. 137 
 
 were the cavalry reserves under Colonel Jlirgas, in position near 
 Wahren, but it was no use ordering them up while the enemy was 
 fresh and unshaken. 
 
 Sohr, with three squadrons of hussars, had been detached early in the 
 day to support the right flank of the infantry, and stood in column 
 between two ridges to avoid the fire of the enemy's artillery ; their shells, 
 however, obliged him to shift his ground a little to the left of the road. 
 
 At this time the French again drove part of the Prussian infantry 
 back into the village, and established themselves in force in the houses 
 and enclosures. 
 
 General Yorck rode up to Sohr and said : '' If the cavalry can not 
 do something now, the day is lost ! Advance, sir, and charge." Sohr 
 drew his attention to the fact that he had no reserve to fall back upon 
 in case of defeat, the cavalry being still in rear of the centre. "An 
 aide-de-camp was sent oflf to order them up, and the general, as he 
 was riding oflf, directed Sohr to try and make our infantry hold their 
 ground till the cavalry came up; while doing so, Major Schack came 
 again with an order to charge. Sohr answered : * Toll the general I 
 am only waiting a favorable opportunity ; this he must allow me to 
 choose; I will then charge, and, on the honor of a soldier, I '11 charge 
 home.' " 
 
 The enemy had now advanced so close that a charge of bayonets 
 against the Prussian infantry was expected every moment. "Wrapped 
 in clouds of smoke they came on firing, and Sohr could tell only by 
 the whistling of the bullets that they were quite near enough. He 
 passed through the line of retreating infantry, formed, and with three 
 cheers burst upon the advancing enemy, rode over and dispersed them, 
 pursuing them into their own batteries. He captured six pieces of 
 cannon at the first onset. 
 
 The enemy's cavalry, indeed, rushed down to the rescue, but a regi- 
 ment of lancers from the reserve had now joined, and they advanced 
 together and overthrew the French, the lancers pursuing them, while 
 the hussars attacked the infantry formed in squares to receive them, 
 broke into three squares in succession, and captured nine pieces of 
 cannon; after which they joined in the pursuit and followed the enemy 
 close up to Leipzig, inflicting on him a severe loss in killed, wounded, 
 and prisoners. 
 12* 
 
138 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 An oflficer in oommand of cavalry must know what he intends doing; 
 this he mihst carry out with energy and resolution, for under vacillating 
 commanders no cavalry, however brave, will do any good in the field. 
 
 A commanding officer should not remain in the immediate neighbor- 
 hood of his corps, but ride forward to watch the progress of events, 
 and be ready to seize a favorable opportunity for employing cavalry, 
 as well as to guard against surprise ; and in either case, unless he have 
 orders to the contrary, he should act at once. 
 
 The reserves should be placed out of sight and sheltered from the 
 fire of the enemy, ready to follow up a first success ; without them no 
 pursuit can bo kept up, for, when exhausted, a handful of fresh troops 
 would destroy the pursuers and turn victory into defeat. 
 
 As a general rule, cavalry should not be brought into action too 
 early in the day, unless, indeed, a favorable opportunity offers; then, of 
 course, make the most of it. It should be held in hand to decide the 
 victory, to retrieve lost ground, to cover a retreat, and save the army 
 from the loss of artillery, etc.; and for any serious exertion fresh men 
 and horses are absolutely necessary. 
 
 Attach and defence of positions. — Before attacking an enemy's posi- 
 tion, as much artillery as can bo collected should concentrate its fire 
 on that part of the enemy's line on which the charge is to be executed, 
 and the guns placed in such a manner as to allow of their keeping xip 
 their fire during the cavalry advance. If the charge fail, they draw 
 off to the flank, and the artillery reopens its fire. 
 
 To repulse an attack of this sort, form part of the cavalry ready to 
 attack them in front, but so as to avoid crossing the lino of fire of 
 your own guns; with the remainder of the cavalry take up a position 
 to attack them in flank. "Wait till the enemy has suffered from the firo 
 of your infantry and artillery in his advance, then fall upon him in 
 front and flank simultaneously. If you succeed in overthrowing him, 
 keop him going, give him no time to reform, drive him pell-mell into 
 his own position, enter it with him, and spread confusion everywhere; 
 your second line following up the success, and detaching parties to 
 attack the gunners wherever they see an enemy's battery, while the 
 reserves follow slowly and prepare to cover your retreat in case of 
 accidents. 
 
 Throwing cavalry forward on an enemy's front succeeds when the 
 
GREAT CAVALRY ATTACK AT EYLAU. 139 
 
 enemy is disheartened by previous defeats or disorganized tbrough 
 other causes. But to throw cavalry forward against an enemy's posi- 
 tion is a dangerous experiment, particularly when they have cavalry 
 in band to let loose upon you. Should the attack fail, it may then 
 result in the total defeat and destruction of the attacking force. 
 Sometimes it may be necessary to make the attempt. For instance, at 
 tbe Battle of Eylau, Augereau's corps, formed in columns of attack, 
 and supported by a powerful artillery, advanced against the centre of 
 the Russian position. Augercau, both his generals of division, and 
 several other general officers, were wounded, some of the regiments 
 nearly annihilated by the destructive fire of the Russians and theif 
 charges of cavalry and infantry. The entire loss of this corps (th© 
 seventh) was imminent, and its total destruction was averted only by 
 the timely advance of the French cavalry. Napoleon sent them ail 
 forward, under Murat and Bessieres, to disengage Augereau, and make 
 a general attack on the Russian position. This remarkable charge 
 was executed by seventy squadrons of cavalry, the flower of th-* 
 French array. They fell straight upon the Russians, broke through 
 their two first lines; but the Russian cavalry reserves, consisting of a 
 hundred squadrons, fell upon the scattered squadrons of the French, 
 and drove them back with immense loss, while the broken lines of th«> 
 Russians at once reformed. 
 
 At Waterloo every attack of the French cavalry on our position was 
 repulsed. These attacks were preceded by a terrific fire of artillery; 
 they were continued and kept up with the greatest obstinacy and per- 
 severance, yet they never gained even a partial success during the 
 battle, and the losses they occasioned to the French were very great. 
 
 When you are the strongest in cavalry, it is then best employed on an 
 enemy's flanks; otherwise keep it in hand under the protection of your 
 infantry and guns, to be used according as opportunity offers. 
 
 When cavalry and guns can be spared, they may be sent round the 
 enemy's position to fall upon his rear, but only when their march can 
 bo concealed from the enemy (unless intended as a false attack, merely 
 to draw off his reserves in that direction); otherwise it is better to 
 bring them into play at once, for should they go round, when they do 
 reach the rear of the enemy ho will have made his dispositions to 
 receive them, and you will have gained nothing and lost time. 
 
140 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 If they succeed in surprising the enemy, his cavalry should be 
 attacked on the spot; but if his infantry be prepared, then use the 
 horse-artillery first, to ensure the result of the charge. 
 
 Cavalry in reserve behind the crest of a hill, up which the enemy is 
 pressing forward, should, when possible, form line before coming in 
 sight of the enemy, and thus be ready to fall on before he can prepare 
 to receive them. 
 
 In the pursuit of a defeated army, cavalry act in bodies, directing 
 their efforts against such of the enemy as still keep together. With 
 small detachments prepared to receive them in positions difficult of 
 approach, no time should be lost; these arc sure to fall a prey to the 
 infantrj'. The cavalry must pass on to either side, cutting in upon the 
 line of retreat and preventing order from being restored in the broken 
 masses of the enemy. 
 
 In 1796 Napoleon, at the Battle of Roveredo, by a well-concerted 
 attack threw the Austrian army in disorder iuto the defile of Galliano, 
 and routed them. One of his aides-de-camp, Laraarois, dashed through 
 the mass of fugitives with fifty dragoons, and heading them, checked 
 the retreat of the column, and thus enabled the French cavalry to 
 secure several thousand prisoners. 
 
 Artillery is the great support and rallying-point of a defeated army; 
 against this arm in particular the most strenuous efforts of the cavalry 
 should be directed. Once an army has lost its artillery it can not long 
 keep (he field. 
 
 Horse-artillery in such a pursuit not only assists the cavalry in its 
 charges, but brings the infantry and artillery of the enemy to a stand, 
 and thus they fall into the hands of the troops coming up. 
 
 Horse-artillery with cavalry is not only a powerful auxiliary in the 
 attack, but a friend in need in the hour of danger and defeat. It can 
 keep pace with the advance, and by pouring a destructive fire on the 
 enemy pave the way for the cavalry to victory. 
 
 It dislodges the enemy from positions in which the sword can not 
 reach him, or it does fearful execution where the enemy's infantry, con- 
 centrated in masses, bids defiance to the horseman. 
 
 It checks the pursuit and gives time for the cavalry to reform under 
 its fire. 
 
 It is of great use in passing defiles in the face of the enemy, in 
 
HORSE-ARTILLERY. 141 
 
 defending broken ground against odds ; and in many other ways it is 
 the cavalry's best assistant. 
 
 Horse-artillery should place itself so as not to interfere with the 
 intended formations of cavalry, and always be at hand to protect them 
 when forming. 
 
 It is advisable that the artillery should be on both flanks, or masked 
 by the flank troops during an advance, or kept together on one flank, 
 particularly if the column in forming line throws forward the opposite 
 flank or forms in succession ; the whole of the guns are then brought 
 into play on the enemy till the line is ready to charge. 
 
 When there is but one troop of horse-artillery it is best to keep it 
 together J so small a number of guns should not be subdivided without 
 an absolute necessity. 
 
 Horse-artillery can always take up positions to engage the enemy at 
 two or three hundred yards in front or on the flank of cavalry and be 
 pretty safe, but it should not venture further without an escort. 
 
 The artillery officer should, as far as possible, choose his own posi- 
 tions and open fire when he thinks proper. Non-professional officers 
 can not be such good judges of range, etc., and should not interfere ; 
 thus much ammunition will be saved to the army. 
 
 If cavalry is defeated, its horse-artillery goes to the rear as quickly 
 as possible; for it can not at first, while friend and foe are going pell- 
 mell to the rear, do anything toward restoring the fight; but as soon as 
 it finds a favorable position it should unlimber and check the foe. 
 
 When the enemy's cavalry is drawn up in battle array to await the 
 onset, and its horse-artillery is posted two hundred or three hundred 
 yards in front, the guns of the attacking force advance to within eight 
 hundred or one thousand yards and fire with round shot upon the 
 artillery until their cavalry moves forward. The moment these latter 
 come within range of grape, they direct the fire upon them — the rule 
 for artillery being to deal with the most dangerous foe for the time 
 being. 
 
 In a retreat it is usual to give the officer of artillery notice ; he then 
 chooses his own positions and avails himself of every advantage the 
 ground may ofi"er. The cavalry holds the enemy in check till the guns 
 are in position, then falls back under their protection and reforms to 
 cover the retreat of the guns to the next position, and so on. When the 
 
142 CAVALRY TACTICS, 
 
 cavalry is in motion the artillery should be in position ; when the horee- 
 artillery is in position the cavalry should be formed to repel an attack. 
 
 The retiring troops, if in good order, can not easily bo followed 
 closely by their pursuers, who must always advance with certain neces- 
 sary precautions, which take up time, and yet daro not, can not, be 
 neglected. Those retiring occupy every favorable position to stop the 
 advance of the enemy ; and this they can often effect without firing a 
 Biiot, by destroying bridges, roads, etc. 
 
 In a pursuit horse-artillery follows the cavalry steadily at first, so as 
 not to ovei'-excrt the horses, for while the cavalry are mixed up with 
 the fugitives the guns are of no use : but as soon as the enemy begin 
 to gather together for defence, or attempt to hold a position with fresh 
 troops, the guns come to the front to start them, and slip the cavalry, 
 who will keep them going. 
 
 Escort of artillery is not absolutely necessary when the guns are act- 
 ing with a column of cavalry, unless they move off to a flank or beyond 
 three hundred yards from the column ; then two troops should accom- 
 pany the battery, v.'hether consisting of one or two troops of horse- 
 artillery. 
 
 The escort protects the flanks and rear of the artillery; the guns 
 protect their own front. 
 
 It should not form directly in rear of the guns, but on the right or 
 left rear, or on cither flank: always the outward flank when the guns 
 have troops on the inner one, and (when feasible) covered from the 
 fire and view of the enemy. When the escort is necessarily exposed, 
 the commander should watch the fire of the enemy's guns, and change 
 his position from time to time to avoid being made a target of. 
 
 When the escort is not sufficient to repel a sudden attack on the 
 guns, the officer commanding the troop or squadron nearest to it should 
 at once fly to the rescue without waiting for orders ; and this principle 
 of mutual support should be encouraged under all circumstances be- 
 tween cavalry and horse-artillery. 
 
 These remarks on horse- artillery with ca,v.alry are merely intended 
 to give a general idea of the way in which these two arms support each 
 other in war, and to stimulate their spirit of enterprise by reminding 
 them that if they combine the use of these two arms skilfully, they are 
 certain of obtaining distinction in the field. 
 
SKIRMISHING ATTACKS. 143 
 
 The attack x'u ekinniehing order should be practised because it ia 
 useful in various ways. 
 
 If, when advancing toward an enemy, he turns to make off, attack 
 in skirmishing order with part of your troops, because the horses have 
 moro freedom of action when not in the ranks ; each man, acting for 
 himself, makes for his nearest foe, and is more likely to catch the 
 enemy and inflict loss upon him than if pursuing in a body. 
 
 Artillery, may be attacked advantageously in skirmishing order, and 
 with very few men. They advance straight toward the guns till within 
 range of grape, then put the steam on, gallop as quick as they can, 
 opening from the centre, and making for the flanks of the battery. 
 
 The gunners are thus obliged to alter their aim and lose time. If 
 there is much dust, or the smoke has not cleared away from the front 
 of the battery, they do not observe the change of direction, continue 
 firing straight to the front while the horsemen are pouring in upon the 
 flanks, and immediately attack the gunners to prevent them from serv- 
 ing the guns, while the cavalry reserves advance, part of them charging 
 the escort, the remainder securing the battery. 
 
 The most advantageous moment to attack is when the guns are 
 unlimbering or limbering up; a few moments gained being of the 
 greatest importance to the attacking party, who must always dash in 
 at their best speed as soon as the signal is given to charge. 
 
 If, after getting into the battery, they see a superior force of the 
 enemy coming to the rescue, they should endeavor to do as much 
 damage to the battery as possible by cutting down the drivers, sever- 
 ing the traces, etc., and then trust to the speed of their horses for 
 safety. 
 
 Reconnoitring. — This is one of the most diflBcult problems in war, 
 to know how to gain reliable and sufllcient information before it 
 becomes necessary to engage an enemy. I shall, therefore, endeavor 
 to give an outline of the duty of cavalry when employed for this pur- 
 pose, but to enter into details or go deeply into this subject would 
 carry me quite beyond the limits of this work. 
 
 General Rules. 
 1. Press forward quickly, and avoid engaging the enemy when it may 
 retard your advance. 
 
144 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 2. Drive in the enemy's picquets, and press on to the point ordered, 
 retiring as quickly as you came on. 
 
 3. Unless a favorable opportunity oflFers of surprising a party of the 
 enemy, avoid all conflicts, for it is not the object in view. 
 
 4. Where the enemy stand in your way, no danger should turn you 
 from the point aimed at. 
 
 5. Supports should always be moved up in the line of retreat, and 
 bridges or defiles occupied by infantry for the reconnoitring party to 
 fall back upon. 
 
 It is often necessary to send out powerful detachments, in order that 
 the officer commanding them may push forward far enough, or engage 
 the enemy and force a reconnoissance, and also to enable him to detach 
 patrols and exploring parties in different directions, without being so 
 much weakened by these necessary measures as to run the risk of being 
 attacked and driven in withowt attaining his object. To determine the 
 amount of force which ought to be detached on a reconnoissance is 
 always a nice point. 
 
 A large army (say of sixty thousand or seventy thousand men), 
 marching in columns near an enemy, is obliged, when short of cavalry, 
 to make one corps cover the flank of another, a third one cover the 
 flank of the second, and so on, till the army is often scattered into de- 
 tachments, and spread over so much ground, that a bold move on the 
 part of the foe is not seldom successful in beating them in detail. 
 
 Troops are more easily detached than assembled : when together they 
 have little to fear from any manoeuvres : therefore, when the nature of 
 the country admits of it, two or three thousand horsemen are detached 
 to the front and flanks to feel for the enemy, while the army continues 
 its advance in concentrated strength. 
 
 Cavalry thus employed must go well ahead of all the columns ; it 
 must not hang together, but spread for miles in all directions ; so that 
 nothing shall escape detection. 
 
 It must penetrate everywhere and look up the enemy at all points, 
 never forgetting that to fight is the means, not the object; but when 
 other means fail, then no danger should daunt them from discovering 
 what the enemy attempts to mask from their sight. 
 
 For instance, the enemy is in force behind a ridge, and occupies the 
 side toward you with skirmishers to prevent your discovering what 
 
THE MARCH. 145 
 
 troops he has. These skirmishers must be driven in, or, while they are 
 attacked, a few well-mounted men or officers should dash through, ride 
 over the ridge, and reconnoitre the enemy's position, trusting to the 
 speed of their horses to regain their party. For a dragoon with a good 
 horse under him should fear no odds in an open country. 
 
 Chapter XI. 
 
 THE MARCH— THE CAMP— THE BIVOUAC— THE OUTPOST— 
 THE SKIRMISH. 
 
 The March. 
 
 In the campaigns of the last great war in Europe it was no uncom- 
 mon occurrence to see cavalry arrive on the field quite crippled, having 
 lost half their numbers before a shot had been fired, the remaining 
 horses being in such wretched condition as to be totally unfit for active 
 service. 
 
 This arose partly from want of sufficient and good forage, as also 
 from the fact that they generally began their marches without any pre- 
 vious training; the horses, distressed at the start, never recovered 
 themselves, and died off by thousands. 
 
 It is well known that neither horse nor man can undergo fatigue 
 suddenly without suffering from the effects of it. Both should be 
 brought gradually into working condition. 
 
 Collecting large bodies of cavalry together, long before they are re- 
 quired to act on the battle-field, is a great mistake. 
 
 Such corps have to go greater distances in dispersing to their billets 
 or camps, and the same in reassembling in the morning. There is 
 great difiiculty in procuring forage for so many. Sickness is caused 
 among the horses from the mere fact of great numbers being collected 
 together. Infection spreads far and wide, and the difliculties of march- 
 ing steadily are greatly increased in consequence of the frequent chocks 
 and constant closing up of the columns of route. All this must largely 
 contribute to render cavalry inefficient for the field. 
 13 
 
i4G CAVALRY TACTIC8. 
 
 I am convinced that, by observing a few very eimple rules, the grea,ter 
 part of these serious losses might be prevented, and horses and men be 
 brought into the field of action in excellent health and condition. 
 
 Having previously got the horses into good working order by de- 
 grees, or by making the march of one day a little longer than that of 
 the preceding day, then begin your real march, moving in small bodies, 
 with an interval of one day's march between each body. If fresh from 
 cantonments, begin the marches very quietly, increasing the distances 
 by degrees,- thus having got your horses into hard-working condition, 
 when you approach the enemy they can be easily drawn together by 
 forced marches ; and if the army win the day, the cavalry will be in 
 such order that the enemy will with difficulty escape from their pursuit. 
 
 Until necessity requires it, the cavalry corps should bo detached j the 
 horses will thrive, they will be well fed, well looked after, and will not 
 be found wanting in the hour of need. 
 
 With bodies of cavalry on a march, the leader of each detachment 
 having an open interval (whether squadrons or troops) should lead at 
 a steady pace, not increasing and slackening as the rear files of the 
 squadron in front of him do ; for in that case the unsteadiness commu- 
 nicates itself to the rear, whereas it should stop at the end of each 
 squadron. 
 
 The pace a slow trot, about six or seven miles an hour, the meu 
 rising in their stirrups, and walking the horses up and down hill. The 
 horses get in early to their food, they are groomed and better looked 
 after, and have more time to refresh. 
 
 If you walk all the way, the horses are kept saddled many hours 
 more than is necessary ; the men got tired, sit unsteady in their sad- 
 dles, and the horses get sore backs. 
 
 The crawling kind of march really fatigues men and horses much 
 more than a march at a smart trot. Let any man ride a journey of 
 twelve or fifteen miles at a walk, without ever breaking into trot or 
 canter, and tell us when he dismounts how he feels. The horse is 
 always distressed by being too long under the saddle, even though he 
 stand stock still all the while. 
 
 Cavalry is often obliged to march slow in order to keep company 
 with other troops; but otherwise it should go on steadily at a quiet 
 trot, and keep the horeeB as short a time as possible under the saddle. 
 
A1 VANCED GUARDS. 147 
 
 Before starting: on a march, the shoeing of the horses must be looked 
 to, and at all times, whatever the object of the march, the proper 
 military precautious must be attended to. 
 
 The order of march should be such as to b« easily transformed into 
 the order of battle. 
 
 Advanced Guards. — All troops marching are preceded by advanced 
 guards, to cover the front of the column, give timely notice of danger, 
 and prevent surprise. 
 
 The strength of an advanced guard is in proportion to that of the 
 column it precedes; and as a large body of troops requires more time 
 to make arrangements for receiving an enemy than a small one, the 
 advanced guard should precede the column it covers at such distance 
 and in such strength as in case of attack to give time for the main 
 body to form before the enemy can bo upon them. 
 
 In time of war alwaj'-s procure a guide (by force, if necessary). 
 
 Patrols should constantly push forward to front and flanks to feel for 
 the enemy, search the side-roads, farm-houses, woods, etc., etc., and 
 look into any place likely to conceal troops. Always secure your flanks 
 before entering defiles, by taking possession of the heights or other 
 commanding positions near them. 
 
 When one army is in march to attack another, the advanced guards 
 are generally used to obtain a knowledge of the enemy's position ; this 
 they do by driving back the enemy's advanced posts the moment they 
 fall in with thera, following them up quickly, and reconnoitring the 
 enemy's position and strength from the ground his picquets have 
 abandoned. 
 
 The Hear Ouard protects the rear, makes stragglers keep up, and 
 prevents them from plundering. 
 
 The place of the officer commanding the rear guard is with the last 
 detachment of it. 
 
 During a retreat the duties of a rear guard are most important, and 
 to prevent its becoming a rout the troops must be steady and well com- 
 manded. 
 
 They should halt in all defensible positions, but never at the entrance 
 of a defile, and always on the further side, taking possession of the 
 outlet to check the enemy. 
 
148 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 The Camp. 
 Officers are often required to mark out camps for troops in the field. 
 I will endeavor to convey to them an idea of how they ought to act when 
 employed in this service; and as no camps can be traced until the out- 
 posts are taken up, it will be well to give a sketch of that duty at the 
 same time. To enter deeply into it would be superfluous, for we have 
 many good books on the subject— as, " Manual of Outpost Duties," by 
 Lord Frederick Fitzclarence ; "On Outposts and Patrols," by Major- 
 General L. B. Lovell, K.H. ; " On Outposts and Patrols," by Lieuten 
 ant-Colonel Von Arentschildt ; "Outpost Duties, abridged from the 
 German," by Lieutenant-Colonel Short, etc., etc.; and many others. 
 
 General Rules for Cam'piny. 
 
 1. The object is to put many men in a small compass. 
 
 2. To give them rest and as much comfort as possible. 
 
 3. To place them in such a manner that they can get under arms with- 
 out loss of time. 
 
 To attain this the tents or huts must be raised systematically and 
 according to rule. Thus no room is lost, the men can attend to their 
 duties without confusion, and easily find their way about the camp. 
 
 Camps ought to be on the highest, or in front of the highest ground, 
 with plenty of room, an open view, with the flanks protected, with easy 
 communication from flank to flank and front to rear, and with wood and 
 water in the neighborhood. 
 
 When near an enemy you should, as far as possible, encamp in order 
 of battle, or in such a manner that you can easily get your troops into 
 position. Where circumstances do not require this precaution to be 
 taken, you then encamp with a view to the comfort of the men, and in 
 such way as to give them as much rest as possible. 
 
 Camps are, therefore, of two sorts — Marching and Fighting Camps 
 — according to the presence or absence of an enemy. 
 
 Tents are seldom used in Europe, except for forming camps of in- 
 struction : they have long since been discontinued in time of war, be- 
 cause they retard the movements of an army in the field; and also 
 because, in a highly cultivated country, shelter can generally be found, 
 or material procured with which to construct huts for the men : these 
 are much the best description of cover. 
 
THE CAMP. 149 
 
 Marshal Oudinot introduced a species of tents among the French 
 troops, which are set up on the muskets and bayonets : these can be 
 raised and struck in a moment, but give little shelter against wind and 
 weather, and add much to the weight which the soldier has to carry. 
 
 Bivouacs have the advantage over other plans of camping — that the 
 troops can be at once got under arms, and, therefore, all outpost? 
 bivouac ; but the army should not do so except in case of necessity, as 
 the exposure to the night-air, the cold, and damp, destroys the health 
 of the men. 
 
 In a camp the length of front is calculated according to the number 
 of regiments or squadrons, adding the intervals. 
 
 In hilly countries the valleys are often left as intervals between the 
 camps. This does not affect their safety, as each camp is strong in it^ 
 own position, and can protect each other from attack. 
 
 Cavalry or infantry encamp either in line or in open column. The 
 infantry pile arms in their front 
 
 Cavalry should never encamp in the front line, but either in rear, or 
 in rear and on the flanks of the infantry ; so that, in case of attack, it 
 has time to turn out and move up to the support. 
 
 The artillery encamps with the brigades to which it is attached : the 
 artillery of the army in rear of the centre of the second line. Precau- 
 tions must be strictly enforced against fire. 
 
 Artillerymen encamp fifty yards in rear of their batteries, and place 
 sentries to enforce all necessary precautions for the safety of the am- 
 munition wagons, etc. 
 
 The artillery of reserve, the parks, and ammunition, are placed in 
 rear of the army, formed in one or two lines, and surrounded by pickets 
 and sentries ; the artillerymen and horses in rear or on the flanks of the 
 line, at one hundred and fifty or two hundred yards' distance. 
 
 The forges at such a distance as to avoid all danger from the sparks 
 All camps have outposts, with outlying and inlying pickets. The main 
 body alone are allowed to rest undisturbed. Further measures must be 
 taken to provide wholesome food and water, and to keep the camp clean, 
 and free from beggars, vagrants, improper women, etc. 
 
 The Camp in time of Peace. 
 When the only object is to concentrate large bodies of troops for ex- 
 
150 THE CAMP. 
 
 ercise, you should pick out a site where all the uoccssaries can be pro- 
 cured close at hand, in order to save the men from unnecessary fatigue. 
 
 Avoid wet, sandy, or swampy ground. Pitch the camp ou a slope, to 
 carry off the rain and all impurities. Place it near villages, woods, 
 rivers, or streams, from which you can obtain wood, water, and straw. 
 
 No washing, bathing, etc., should be allowed in streams near the 
 camp, except below it, so as to keep the water pure for use. In these 
 eorts of camps the men are generally under canvas. 
 
 MARCHiNa Camps. 
 
 The same rules apply as for camps of exercise, except that, as the 
 troops pass the night only in them, they generally bivouac or shelter 
 themselves from the weather in the best way they can, with branches 
 of trees or thatches of wicker-work, straw, etc. 
 
 The ofScers who mark out these camps endeavor to have the forage, 
 wood, and straw brought in, and thus save the men the necessity of 
 going out for them after a long march. They can then cook at once, 
 and make arrangements for the night. 
 
 Fighting Camps 
 
 Are generally placed exactly in the contrary positions to those already 
 described; for instance, they should be on high ground, whereas the 
 others follow the course of the streams into the valleys, which are natu- 
 rally more thickly inhabited, better cultivated, Jind afford the necessary 
 supplies. 
 
 Camps in the field depend upon the line of operation.s and intentions 
 of the commander ; all other considerations are sacrificed to the higher 
 objects in view. 
 
 They must be placed in advantageous military positions. To choose 
 these, officers of experience are sent forward with reconnoitring parties ; 
 they ai-e guided by the following rules : 
 
 Ist. That the flanks are protected by mountains, ravines, water, or 
 villages, which oblige the enemy to go far to turn them. 
 
 2d. That the front of the camp is clear, as far as guns can range. 
 
 3d. That the camp is not intersected by water, hollow ways, woods, 
 etc., or anything which would give the enemy opportunity or cover for 
 aa attack, or the means of passing unobserved to the rear. 
 
TO MARK OUT THE CAMP. 151 
 
 4th. That according iis the army is formed in two or more linos, the 
 ground shall afford sufficient depth for them to camp with the proper 
 distance hetween each, and give room for the parks and ammunition 
 in rear of all. 
 
 6th. That the ground be dry, and have water and wood at hand. 
 
 Though often necessary, it is not always possible, to entrench a camp 
 so as to secure it from the enemy, because the time is generally too 
 short to cover the approaches with regular works. In such cases the 
 roads and the approaches are barricaded or made difficult of access, 
 and these precautions should never be neglected; they enable you to 
 hold the enemy at bay till the troops get under arms. In order to have 
 time to take these necessary precautions for the safety of the camp, it 
 should, when possible, be occupied early in the day ; this rule ought 
 not to be departed from, except after an eugagemeut or under other pe- 
 culiar and unavoidable circumstances. 
 
 Man and beast suffer if a camp is occupied at night. No one knows 
 hie whereabouts ; the men are worn out with fatigue, going in search of 
 food, wood, water, and only begin to cook when they should have been 
 at rest, to enable them to meet the fatigues of the morrow. Horses, in 
 the same way, are not fed till late in the night, from which they suffer 
 more than from long marches. 
 
 2'o mark out a Camp. 
 
 Two non-commissioned officers, with one private per troop, are sent 
 under an officer. He is furnished with a return showing the strength 
 of the regiment or regiments, and receives instructions from the quar- 
 termaster-general's office as to where the corps will encamp. 
 
 The usual way of encamping is in open column of troops, the teats 
 or huts in lines perpendicular to the front of the camp. 
 
 Cavalry camping in line requires double the extent of its front, in 
 consequence of intervals between the horses to enable the men to groom 
 and handle them; it is therefore only resorted to when the ground will 
 not admit of any other plan. 
 
 In marking out the ground for a regiment to camp on in column, the 
 front line of the camp is the exact extent of the regiment in line, with 
 intervals. 
 
 The depth of the troop lines is calculated according to the size of the 
 tontg or huts, and the strength of the troops. 
 
152 THE BIVOUAC. 
 
 The officer must see all the lines paced off and marked with flags. 
 
 The front computed for a mounted troop-horse in the ranks is one 
 yard, and when picketed four feet. 
 
 In pacing off the ground for the troops the officer will therefore cal- 
 culate the extent of front as follows : 
 
 For a regiment of four squadrons, each of 160 horses, extent of front 
 of each squadron 80 yards. Add to this three squadron intervals, each 
 computed at one-fourth the front of the squadron, namely, 20 yards. 
 TotJil front 80 X 4 = 320 
 Intervals 20 X 3 = 60 
 
 Total 380 yards, 
 the extent of the front line. 
 
 When troops are weak in numbers, the best mode of encamping will 
 be in open column of squadrons. 
 
 It is his duty then to moot the regiment and lead them into camp, 
 forming them on the front line ; it is then pointed out to the men that 
 on this line they form in case of alarm ; they are then wheeled into 
 column of squadrons, the ranks opened and filed from the inward flank? 
 to their places in camp. 
 
 The Bivouac. 
 
 When in bivouac, as soon as they have dismounted and fastened their 
 horses, each man fixes his sword in the ground, in rear of his horse, 
 placing the carbine against it ; he then takes off his belts, etc., and hangs 
 them on the sword-hilt, and behind them again he places his kit, and 
 sleeps there at night ; otherwise, if required to turn out in a dark night, 
 he could not find horse or arms. 
 
 The whole subject of the bivouac is one of vital importance. Some 
 officers have been known to ruin half the horses of a regiment in one 
 position of this sort because they knew not how to choose their ground. 
 De Brack says : " Of two leaders of pretty equal merit, one of whom 
 is a good and the other an indifferent selector of bivouacs, the first, at 
 the end of a campaign, will be able to show a numerous and well- 
 mounted body, while the other will have only a few half-starved horses." 
 
 All huts ought to be constructed with the door or opening toward the 
 horses, in order that the men may always have their eyes upon them. 
 Let it be always remembered that the fire-arms must bo removed from 
 
OUTPOST DUTY. 153 
 
 the horses the moment you dismount, for otherwise, should your horses 
 take to rolling, your fire-arms will be broken or lost. 
 
 Outpost Duty.* 
 
 Outposts have a double object: to watch over the safety of the army, 
 and to observe the movements of the enemy. 
 
 When a corps forms the advanced guard of an army, then the chain 
 of outposts is formed in front of that corps ; but where there is no ad- 
 vance guard the chain of posts is established immediately in front of 
 the position which the army has taken up. 
 
 When the outposts are at a distance, and positions lie between them 
 and the army which would be useful for them to fall back upon, or which 
 would assist the army in maintaining its ground, such places are oc- 
 cupied by detachments from the army, and not from the troops on out- 
 post duty. 
 
 The necessity of outposts to all troops in the field, whether a small 
 detachment or an army,^ must be equally obvious. Men can not stand 
 ready under arms day and night to resist an attack ; the wants of men 
 and horses must bo satisfied ,• they must have rest, or they can not ful- 
 fil their duties : thus every position, of whatever kind it may be, is 
 surrounded by a chain of guards to protect it from surprise, and to give 
 rest and security to the occupants. 
 
 Outposts must be so placed that every movement, more particularly 
 an advance on the part of the enemy, shall be at once detected ; that 
 nothing can pass unobserved between them into their own camp ; and 
 that they can hold their ground sufficiently long against an enemy to 
 prevent their troops from being taken by surprise. 
 
 Thus troops on outpost duty are disposed of according to the difi'er- 
 ent parts they have to act — namely : those who watch the enemy, and 
 those who, in case of an attack, endeavor to stop him. 
 
 * Lord Frederick Fitzclarence, in Ills excellent "Manual of Outpost Duties," 
 gives a private journal of General Crawfurd's admirable outpost operations on the 
 Coa and Agueda in 1810, by Major-General Shaw Kennedy. This journal, teach- 
 ing by example, and abounding in matter suggestive of reflection and comparison, 
 ought to be diligently studied by every young officer. But the whole of Lord 
 Frederick's concise, compact manual is of value to every man who would be really 
 a soldier. 
 
154 OUTPOST DUTY. 
 
 The first, called vedettes, are pushed forward to a post whence they 
 can overlook all roads lea<ling from the enemy's side ; they are sup- 
 ported by a non-commissioned officer's post, and by the outlying pic- 
 quet, who are supported in their turn by the reserves. 
 
 Time is the great object to gain when outposts are attacked, conse- 
 quently the reserves should be sufficiently strong to hold the enemy in 
 check and cover the approaches to camp. 
 
 Troops for outpost duty are selected according to the nature of the 
 ground : with an army they are generally composed of light troops of 
 all arms — namely : horse-artillery, light cavalry, and light infantry. In 
 an intersected country the infantry is chiefly used; in ao open country 
 the cavalry. In both, the cavalry furnishes patrols to the front and 
 flanks, and generally occupies the high-roads. The cavalry pushes ve- 
 dettes forward beyond the infantry chain, for these can gallop back, 
 whereas infantry soldiers might be cut off and made prisoners. 
 
 The reserves should be composed of infantry, cavalry, and artillery,- 
 how far the chain of outposts should extend depends upon the strength 
 of the army, the nature of the country, and other circumstanccF. 
 
 But it is so easy to go round or turn detachments composed of regi- 
 ments, brigades, or even divisions, and to attack them unexpectedly in 
 rear, that in many cases it is necessary to extend the chain of outposts 
 all round the camp. 
 
 In countries where the people were unfriendly it has often happened 
 that whole armies have thus been attacked in rcai*. 
 
 When your rear is protected by natural obstacles, then the chain of 
 outposts should extend well to both flanks : when the flanks are open, 
 then you must protect them by strong picquets, and send out parties of 
 cavalry to scour the country on both sides. 
 
 The distance of the outposts is also entirely dependent on the strength 
 of the main body and the peculiarities of the ground. The weaker the 
 main body the less strong its outposts, and consequently the nearer to 
 camp; otherwise the picquets might be destroyed before they could 
 effect their retreat. 
 
 Armies or corps push forward their outposts, sometimes six or eight 
 miles ; and this distance diminishes in proportion with divisions, bri- 
 gades, regiments, etc. 
 
 Where vedettes, for instance, are four miles from the camp, their re- 
 
A CHAIN OF OUTPOSTS. 155 
 
 serves should be half-way between the two, that ia, at two miles ; the 
 outlying })icqiiets half-way between them and the vedettes (viz: one 
 mile): and the non-commissioned ofllcer's post half-way between the 
 picquet and the vedettes. These distances diminish, as already stated, 
 according to the strengh of the detachments. 
 
 With small bodies of troops the number detached for outpost duty is 
 generally in the proportion of from one-third to one-fourth of their 
 strength ; with large bodies of troops, a fifth or sixth only. 
 
 The nature of the country has much to do with the number of men 
 employed. In open ground a few vedettes can see a long way. In in- 
 tersected country, where gardens, thickets, rows of trees, heights, and 
 other obstacles intercept the view, both vedettes and picquets must be 
 placed closer together, and therefore require to be more numerous. 
 
 Cavalrj' forming a chain of outposts in an open country can place 
 vedettes by day at from six hundred to one thousand paces, for they 
 can see each other at that distance, and also hear a shot fired. 
 
 A regiment of three hundred horses on outpost duty would keep one 
 hundred in reserve; one hundred form the support, one hundred the 
 line of outposts, of which fifty form the outlying picquet; the remain- 
 ing fifty are detached as a post, from which sixteen vedettes are sup- 
 plied for the chain. These, at seven hundred paces from each other, 
 enable you to cover eleven thousand two hundred paces of ground, or 
 about six miles ; equal to what it is calculated to require one thousand 
 infantry soldiers to do. 
 
 But all these things depend so much on circumstances that no exact 
 rules can be laid down, and much must always be left to the good sense 
 of the oflScer in command. 
 
 Thus cavalry vedettes may be plactd sometimes at greater distances, 
 and with good effect; whereas infantry vedettes are generally at one 
 hundred yards, and sometimes, in a close country, they are drawn to- 
 gether to within forty or fifty yards of each other. Both must, of 
 course, lessen their circle and draw closer together at night. 
 
 When troops encamp for any length of time in one place, in addition 
 to the common measures of security which are always ado^Jted, they 
 strengthen their outposts by abatis, redoubts, etc., and their chains of 
 outposts by fortifying farm-houses, barricading villages, bridges, de- 
 files, and in other ways render all possible approaches to the oamp both 
 difficult and dangerous. 
 
156 OUTPOST DUTY. 
 
 The outposts are under the command of some one specially appointed 
 for this service, and to him all reports are made, and from him all 
 orders received and carried out.* 
 
 Having thus endeavored to convey an idea of the general use and em- 
 ployment of troops on outpost duty, I shall now take a squadron, and, 
 considering myself detached with it on picquet, proceed accordingly. 
 
 The squadron is formed, and consists of ninety men and horses. I 
 collect the nominal rolls of the men from the non-commissioned officers, 
 then inspect the ammunition and fire-arms, and order the men to load. 
 Finding they have neither forage nor provisions, I report the deficiency 
 in writing ; and having ascertained who commands the outposts, and 
 where the reports .are to forwarded, I form an advanced guard with 
 flanking parties and a rear guard and march ofi" to the ground I am 
 directed to take up. 
 
 While on the march I ride forward and examine the country, taking 
 notes of all places where I can make a stand in case of attack. Places 
 where troops can act only on a narrow front, and where the flanks are 
 inaccessible to the enemy, can be held by a small party (determined to 
 do its duty) against almost any odds. For instance, a bridge, the road 
 through a thick wood, a causeway running through marshy ground, etc. 
 
 On arriving on the ground, I choose a spot for the picquet close to the 
 main road and behind a bridge, ravine, or wood, so that I can make a 
 stand at once when attacked. 
 
 I then divide the squadron into three equal parties of thirty men 
 each. One of these, No. 1, moves off" to the front, while the other two 
 dismount ; No. 2 remains in readiness ; while No. 3 unbridles. A dis- 
 mounted sentry is at once placed a little in advance of the pioquet, to 
 give notice of anything that takes place in front. 
 
 No. 1, having advanced to where the non-commissioned officer's post 
 is to be established, " halts." I take one-third of their number to the 
 front to be posted as vedettes. 
 
 To fix upon the requisite number, I ride up to the high ground and 
 observe the number of roads, etc. ; then give directions to the non-com- 
 missioned officers as to where to place them; and while this is being 
 
 * The troope employed on this duty form a curtain behind which the move- 
 ments of the army are carried on, concealed from the view and knowledge of the 
 enemy, and by vigilance and bravei-y they must endeavor to render that curtain 
 quite imponotrable. 
 
GENERAL RULES BY DAY. 157 
 
 done, I make a little sketch, marking roads, rivers, bridges, and fords, 
 morasses, hollow roads, woods, towns, villages, and their distances. 
 Having thus acquired a knowledge of the country, I fix upon the spot 
 where the vedettes, post, and picquet are to be placed at night, and 
 communicate my orders to the non-commissioned officer in command of 
 the post. 
 
 The non-commissioned officer of the post reports that, on comparing 
 the strength of his post with his vedettes, he has three men for « ach 
 relief, and some men to spare. His vedettes will therefore be relieved 
 every two hours ; the spare men are sent to patrol, or employed as ex- 
 tra sentries, during the night, and his post is i-elieved every six hours : 
 that is, No. 1 is followed by No. 2 ; and No. 2, having been six hours on 
 the outpost, is relieved by No. .3 from the picquet, and so on till the pic- 
 quet is relieved. The post now dismounts, and places a dismounted 
 sentry in front to watch the vedettes. 
 
 Patrols are sent from the picquet to communicate with the picquets 
 on either flank, and at uncertain hours between reliefs to visit the 
 vedettes, and patrol along the front and flanks; before daylight si 
 patrol goes to the front and on to the highest ground, then it awaitS' 
 daylight, and watches for signs of the enemy. 
 
 General Rules by Day. 
 
 If it should be found necessary to have two or more posts instead of 
 one in front of the picquet, in consequence of branch roads or heights 
 interrupting a view of the vedettes, the non-commissioned officer's 
 party is divided into so many parts, each relieving their own vedettes, 
 but all other arrangements remain as before. 
 
 If the picquet is a small one, and the country to be watched is ex- 
 tensive, then the picquet must be divided into two parties, each reliev- 
 ing the other. In auch cases the picquet should be relieved oftener 
 from the main body. The feeding of horses on picquet takes place by 
 divisions, one hour after the return of the morning patrol, at noon, and 
 an hour before dark. When the men go to water their horses, they 
 must bridle them up, and take everything with them. 
 
 The men must not bo allowed to go into houses or villages in the 
 neighborhood. 
 
 The principal object of vedettes is to notice the advance of an enemy; 
 14 
 
158 OUTPOST DUTY. 
 
 therefore they should be so posted as to give the widest scope for their 
 observations which the nature of the ground will admit of. In order 
 to spare men and horses, no more vedettes than necessary are to be 
 out. 
 
 In a fog, vedettes are taken oflf the heights and drawn closer together, 
 much in the same way as at night. 
 
 When a vedette discovers anything on the side of the enemy, be 
 moves his horse in a circle at a walk. The officer, or non-commissioned 
 officer, from the post, at once rides out to see what it is. Occurrences 
 of all kinds, relating to movements of the enemy, are reported by the 
 officer in command of the picquet. 
 
 If vedettes see troops marching toward them, but yet far off, they 
 ride the circle at a trot The officer goes out as before. 
 
 If the enemy's troops are advancing rapidly, and at no great dis- 
 tance, for instance a mile, then the vedettes circle at a gallop, and the 
 officer mounts his picquet and at once advances. 
 
 If the enemy is so near as to drive in the vedettes, they fire off their 
 carbines to give the alarm. 
 
 All strangers or deserters must be made to halt, lay down their arms, 
 and advance singly to the vedettes. When many come together, a 
 party from the post or picquet goes out to meet them. 
 
 Picquets should not be pushed across bridges or causeways, unless 
 their reserves or other troops are in position close to them. 
 
 A picquet should not be posted within musket-shot of any covered 
 ground, as, for instance, near the edge of a wood, in dells or defiles 
 where passes lead to the rear which are not occupied. 
 
 Picquets should be covered from the enemy's view. 
 
 In case of necessity, when you have not sufficient troops to organize 
 a regular chain of outposts, the best plan is to leave out the supports 
 and picquets, and merely establish small posts with vedettes beyond. 
 The main body, being then considered as the support, must be ready to 
 turn out at a moment's notice. 
 
 Gbnbral Rules by Niqht. 
 
 If the enemy is near, no fires are to be lighted. As soon as the 
 vedettes can no longer see each other distinctly, it is time to take up a 
 position for the night. Do not post vedettes near rushing water, mills, 
 
GENERAL RULES BY NIGHT. 159 
 
 or near anything where there is noise; for by night they must depend 
 upon their sense of hearing more than their sight. When near the 
 enemy part of the post and picquet must be mounted, the mounted men 
 being pushed forward to give the dismounted ones time to get on their 
 horses if attacked. 
 
 At night the vedettes should be relieved every hour. They are close 
 to the posts, and this can be easily done; the reliefs going round do 
 the duty of patrols at the same time. When any part of a picquet or 
 post is mounted, no dismounted sentry is required in their front. 
 
 Double vedettes are always best, for one man can bring in the report 
 of any occurrence to the post without loss of time. Vedettes are taken 
 off the hills or heights, and placed on the roads behind fords, bridges, 
 or ravines. In clear moonshine they should bo concealed in the shadow 
 of a tree or bush. If they hear a suspicious noise, one vedette rides 
 in and reports it; no one, whether deserter or otherwise, is allowed to 
 approach too close at night, but is ordered to dismount and wait till 
 the relief or patrol comes round. 
 
 If attacked and driven in, the vedettes must. not retire straight to 
 their post, but some hundred yards to the right or left of it. 
 
 The posts and picquet have thus time to attack the enemy's flank or 
 rear. 
 
 You do not skirmish by night, but hold every defensible position, 
 and fire as much as possible to alarm the camp. 
 
 Relieving another Picquet. — Take over all written instructions, and 
 write down the verbal orders received. Copy the sketch of the country 
 made by your predecessor. Ask to whom reports are to be made, and 
 what improvements are recommended for the security of the picquet. 
 
 Have all unknown roads, as well as the spot where the picquet and 
 posts will stand at night, pointed out to you by men of the old picquet. 
 Ride round with the oflBcer of the old picquet to the relief of the ve- 
 dettes, and hear the instructions given. 
 
 All these things must be punctually attended to, or the original or- 
 ders would vary greatly after a few reliefs had taken place. 
 
 Skirmiahing. — The skirmishing of cavalry, as now carried on, is 
 notoriously ineffective. " It is certain," says Warnery, "that hussars 
 
160 SKIRMISHING. 
 
 will sometimes keep up a scattered fire for a whole day with very little 
 efiFect." I have hoard it stated that cavalry was known to skirmish for 
 whole days in the Peninsula without having a single man or horse kill- 
 ed, or even wounded. 
 
 A man in pursuit of another, or being himself pursued and riding at 
 speed, may fire with some chance of hitting his mark, but he is not 
 likely to hit anything while moving round in a circle, as our skirmish- 
 ers do — trying to stop their horses for a moment, so that they may fire. 
 This ought to be remedied. 
 
 In an intersected country let every second or third man dismount, 
 and pick off the enemy with his rifle. 
 
 In an open country, if you are required to keep the enemy at a cer- 
 tain distance from your columns, ride out and occupy the line, but do 
 not waste your ammunition. If the enemy keep at a respectful dis- 
 tance, well and good; if they close, let your men charge sword in 
 hand, and decide the matter. 
 
 Some of the Sikh horsemen often dismounted in battle, and if you 
 charged they proved more formidable with these dismounted men 
 among them that when they were all in the saddle. If you rode at the 
 dismounted man, the mounted trooper would interpose, and, while you 
 were engaged with him, the man on foot would quickly shoot you down, 
 or knock over your horse. 
 
 Are there not easy means of securing and making something of the 
 horse from which our dragoon or hussar dismounts? If the collar- 
 chain had a hook, the right file would fasten the horse of the left file to 
 his own ; the right file would thus have the full use of both his arms, 
 and, if attacked, the led horse, instead of being in his way, would ef- 
 fectually protect his weak side (the near one) from an assailant. 
 
 There can be, therefore, no great danger in pursuing this plan ; when 
 the enemy is at a distance it is the only way to do execution with the 
 rifle. 
 
 In intersected ground it would give a decided advantage, and a few 
 active fellows, thus trained, and good shots, would at any time inflict 
 heavy loss on columns of heavy cavalry, whose pistols would be but 
 a slight protection against the rifle. 
 
 It would at least make the men active, to practice skirmishing in the 
 following manner at squad drill : On the signal to skirmish, the right 
 
DISMOUNTED. 161 
 
 files close to the left, to hold the horses ; the left files spring to the 
 ground, unsling their rifles, move a few yards to the front, or further, 
 according to the ground, and open fire till the advance or retreat, or 
 right or left, is sounded ; they then mount and take the place of the 
 right files, who dismount in their turn on the next signal to skirmish. 
 
 When retiring, take advantage of all natural obstacles — get quickly 
 behind them, and occupy them with dismounted men. 
 
 It is no easy thing to clear even a very small ditch in the face of a 
 fire of small-arms: the enemy must try to dislodge you on foot (unless 
 he can turn the obstacle), which will give your men time to inflict loss 
 upon him, and then continue the retreat. 
 
 In an open country always retire by alternate ranks with drawn 
 swords, and when the enemy presses closely turn upon him and charge. 
 
 Squads should practice against each other — advancing, retiring, etc.; 
 practising the attack and defence of bridges and defiles, drawing to- 
 gether in the advance, to be ready to charge, and scattering at the 
 signal to skirmish. 
 
 They should charge one another, each man circling round his oppo- 
 nent to the right at a gallop, crossing swords, then returning again to 
 their places. 
 
 The reserves always advance to the support. 
 
 " The Cossack skirmishers often close together for a charge, but dis- 
 perse in retreating. 
 
 "Our skirmishers almost invariably do exactly the contrary, what- 
 ever may be the facilities ofi'ered. The Cossacks are right, and we are 
 wrong. In fact, how often have we not seen our troopers, when retir- 
 ing, rush one upon another in such a manner as to deprive them in- 
 dividually of the use of their arms, hampering and arresting their 
 progress ! and this, by still further retarding that of men not so well 
 mounted as themselves and keeping them to the rear, has been the 
 means of causing these poor wretches to be cut down or taken prison- 
 ers, their backs answering as a shield to their guilty comrades. 
 
 ''*A too crowded retreat is always put to the sword, for two very 
 simple reasons : the first is, that the troopers who are retreating, by 
 crowding excessively together, paralyze their individual means of de- 
 fence, and render both the halt and the wheel about impossible j and 
 the second is, that the attacking trooper, who has only one object iu 
 14* 
 
162 SKIRMISHING. 
 
 eigbt, and who is not at nil harassed upon his flanks, hurls himself 
 forward with all his impulsive power and all his audacity upon this 
 unresisting mass, which he hacks and hews in perfect security, and can 
 drive before him as far as he chooses. 
 
 " This is not the case in a retreat in which the men scatter as they 
 go; a man who retreats in this fashion preserves all his defensive 
 power; ho is equal in all points to the attacking party, who takes care 
 not to rush recklessly upon him, because his flanks are threatened, his 
 attention diverted, and the danger equal on both sides. A retreat con- 
 ducted in this manner is never so vigorously pressed, nor so far pur- 
 sued. The slowest horses will perform it as well as the swiftest; it 
 disturbs the attacking party, stops him short just when he might have 
 obtained the advantage, and it can wheel round and resume the offen- 
 sive. Polybius tells us, in his description of the passage of the Trebia, 
 'Nevertheless Sempronius caused the retreat to be sounded, in order to 
 recall his cavalry, which did not know how to manoeuvre against the 
 enemy in its front. In fact, it had to deal with the Numidians, whose 
 custom was to retreat scattered in different directions, and to return 
 vigorously to the charge when the enemy least expected it.' "* 
 
 At Stockholm, on the 29th of June, 1852, I saw the regiment of 
 Swedish Horse-Guards, under Count Stedingk — a fine body of men, 
 but rather under mounted. 
 
 They bad four squadrons, each of about seventy-five horses, divided 
 into three divisions, which they call troops. The squadron-leader alone 
 was in front, an officer on each flank, and one in the rear: they had no 
 markers, and no one out of the ranks. 
 
 They skirmished by squadrons against each other, frequently sound- 
 ing a charge, when the men, seizing their swords, galloped toward each 
 other, each man riding round his opponent at a gallop and crossing 
 swords ; the reserves advancing to the support. 
 
 On a signal to advance at a gallop, the skirmishers drew together 
 toward the centre of their divisions, and, after the charge, resumed 
 their line. 
 
 The regiment went through a field-day. 
 
 They change front on the move in open columns of squadrons. 
 
 ♦= Do Brack. 
 
THE SWEDISH HORSE-GUARDS. 163 
 
 They always form a close column in rear of the squadron named. 
 Their open column is one of squadrons generally. They advance in 
 open column from any named squadron, and, when forming line, the 
 squadron which has lost its place in line resumes it on reforming, and 
 takes the shortest road to get there. 
 
 I was much struck with the deep silence that reigned throughout. 
 The colonel's word of command was followed by a caution from the 
 squadron-leader only; the trumpet sounded and the movement was ex- 
 ecuted. There was no noise, no shouting, no hurrying. If a halt was 
 sounded, they stood motionless; all hung on the word of command; 
 not a move was perceptible ; no dressing up, no reining back, no closing 
 in; not a word was spoken! 
 
 Their working in the field was as fast as the power of their horses 
 would admit of. In coming into line they halt the squadrons in rear 
 of the line of dressing. The squadron-leader and the officers on the 
 flanks of the squadron move up to the alignment, and then the squad- 
 ron dresses up between the officers. 
 
 Their charges were excellent and made at their utmost speed (I rode 
 with them to try it) : the flanks were always well closed up ; no flying 
 out was perceptible; and if they opened in the least during the ad- 
 vance, they closed up gradually again. There were no breaks in the 
 line at any time, and they halted at once and all together at the signal. 
 They have, instead of a cloak, a good thick great-coat with sleeves, in 
 which they can ride, fight, or do anything. 
 
 For parade purposes they have a slow canter : when marching past 
 by squadrons, and the reviewing officer is on the right, they lead with 
 the right leg; when on the left, then the horses lead off with the left 
 leg. 
 
 This is one of the best regiments of foreign cavalry I have ever seen. 
 
 I conclude these remarks on skirmishing with extracts from the letter 
 of a distinguished foreign cavalry officer : 
 
 " During great part of the last war against the French I was at- 
 tached to the Cossacks of the Don. These men were at that time bat 
 little accustomed to the use of fire-arms. While advancing into West- 
 ern Europe the advantages of fire-arms became apparent; more par- 
 ticularly when acting in intersected and difficult ground : and the Cos- 
 sacks managed to arm themselves with French infantry muskets which 
 
164 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 they picked up on the field. Then originated among them the practice 
 of dismounting by turns where the ground was favorable, and thus 
 engaging the enemy in skirmishing order. I have myself seen them 
 in this way beat cavalry very superior to them in numbers, and infantry 
 also, when either the cavah-y or the infantry attempted to attack them 
 singly. In such cases the infantry soldiers opposed to them were afraid 
 of the mounted men, Avho stuck close to their dismounted comrades 
 with the led horses; and these dismounted men were ready to jump 
 into the saddle at any moment, and rush upon the enemy, if they gave 
 way or were driven from their cover. 
 
 " To this manner of skirinishing I attribute entirely the snccess of these 
 Ooasacks during the campaigns on the Elbe and the Rhine, and the decided 
 8u2)eriurity (hey acquired over the enemy's cavalry in all outpost work and 
 detached icarfare. 
 
 " H. V. Ganzauge, 
 " Captain in the 2d Regiment of Prussian Lancers of the Guard" 
 
 Chapter XII. 
 
 THE CHARGE, THE PURSUIT, AND THE RALLY. 
 
 " Une charge en ligne n'est rSellemont qn'uue suite rapide de charges 
 
 successives, dont les bi'aves forment les point saillants; co sont ces causes qui 
 rendent le 8uc*&s des charges si iucertain, et qui doivent faire 6viter d'en entre- 
 prendre sur de grands fronts." — C. Jacquinot de Presle. 
 
 The charge must be decided promptly, and executed vigorously; 
 always made and carried out at speed. 
 
 The first object is to break through and disorder the enemy's array, 
 then make use of the sword to complete his discomfiture. 
 
 Powerful horses urged to theiv utmost speed, their heads kept straight 
 and well together, will seldom fail to attain the first object in view: 
 sharp swords, individual prowess, and skill do the rest. 
 
 Officers must bear in mind that, however successful a brave and de- 
 termined body of horsemen may be, there is a limit to everything. 
 The horses must in time get blown, the men tired out, the squadrons 
 
THE CHARGF. 165 
 
 scattered^ they are then at the mercy of any body of fresh horsemen. 
 Reserves must always be at hand to follow up steadily any success 
 achieved, or, in case the first line is brought back, which is sure to 
 happen sooner or later, to fall upon the pursuing enemy, and give the 
 fugitives time to reform. 
 
 The first line will never think of turning so long as every man in it 
 feels that the reserves are close at hand to back him up. Thus, in 
 every case, the reserves should follow closely and be ready to act when- 
 ever and wherever their action is required. When a charge has once 
 begun, carry it out whatever may be the odds that suddenly present 
 themselves against you. As your first line moves forward, your re- 
 serves, distributed in different echelons, take up in succession the posi- 
 tions which have been carried. 
 
 Innumerable reverses are attributable to the neglect of these rules 
 about reserves. 
 
 In an attack upon cavalry formed and advancing to meet you, spare 
 your horses and husband their resources for the hour of need. Bring 
 them up at a trot to within one hundred and fifty yards, then sound the 
 gallop, and immediately afterward the charge: thus brought up close 
 to the enemy fresh and well in hand, you hurl them upon him in close 
 array with irresistible speed. 
 
 Should the enemy begin galloping earlier, you must do the same, for 
 lines approaching each other close very quickly; and therefore be care- 
 ful not to be caught by the enemy's cavalry before you have put on 
 your speed to meet him. 
 
 Artillery in an emergency may use their horses to the utmost, be- 
 cause when they come into action their horses are at rest; with cavalry 
 it is the reverse, for it is then that the horses are required to exert them- 
 selves most. 
 
 If you meet the enemy's cavalry with blown horses, you are pretty 
 sure of being thrown ; but even should success attend the first rush, 
 that success would be useless, for it could not be followed up. 
 
 In heavy ground bring your men slowly as near as possible to the 
 point of attack. 
 
 If the enemy's cavalry is in column, or in the act of forming, sound 
 at once a gallop, and try to overthrow him before he has completed hi« 
 array. 
 
166 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 Against iufantry squares formed to receive you, begin to gallop as 
 soon as the first fire has been delivered, but do not let the men rush for- 
 ward at speed until they are -within fifty yards of the square. 
 
 Charges of cavalry on a large scale, against masses of troops of all 
 arms, should be carried out with the greatest impetuosity and speed ; 
 no time must bo allowed to the enemy to prepare. 
 
 No distance can be laid down at which to charge, it depends on so 
 many different circumstances. When the ground is favorable and 
 your horses are in good condition, you can strike into a gallop sooner; 
 but the burst, the charge itself, must always be reserved till within fifty 
 yards, for in that distance no horse, however bad, can be left behind, 
 nor is there time to scatter, and they fall upon the enemy with the 
 greatest eflfect. 
 
 The Pursuit and Rally. — If you have succeeded in overthrowing the 
 enemy's line, your own will be in disorder. The melee which ensues, 
 soon, however, turns into a pursuit, and this afi"ords the opportunity of 
 destroying those who have turned; for the charge and melee do not 
 last long enough to inflict or sustain a heavy loss in men or horses. 
 
 If a defile is in the rear of the enemy, the first duty of the officers 
 pursuing is to dash on with some well-mounted men to intercept and 
 cut oflf the line of retreat. When this has succeeded, then make 
 prisoners. 
 
 The pursuit must be kept up with vigor. Each man singles out his 
 foe, and woe to those who are pursued by men with better horses, 
 whose superior speed brings the avenging sword upon them ; whose 
 better blood and condition give them endurance to continue the pursuit! 
 
 In such circumstances it is difficult to recall the men : they are mad- 
 dened with the excitement of the fight, and intent only on cutting 
 down the unfortunate fugitives in front of them. This is not the time 
 to stay the slaughter, but watch over the safety of the pursuers with 
 your cavalry reserves till the flying enemy is entirely dispersed. 
 
 Then rally. If you try to reform line and pursue with flank troops 
 or reserves, you only give your enemy the opportunity of riding 
 through the intervals of his second line and there reforming. 
 
 The line rallies in the order the attack began. 
 
 Each troop rallies for itself, and, when formed, is led into line. 
 
DETACHED SERVICE. 167 
 
 Second line. — If the enemy have a second line behind the first one, 
 drive the first one upon it, giving them no time to choose the road. 
 Dash into the second line pell-mell with the fugitives, which is sure to 
 disorder it. It will probably be carried oflf with the stream ; if not, 
 detachments from your reserves must do the needful. 
 
 Should the enemy's second line be formed on the flanks, then you 
 must rally from the pursuit as quick as possible, and, together with 
 your second line or reserves, charge them instantly. 
 
 Time is here of great moment, and each troop, when rallied, should 
 at once be led against the foe. Attack in succession, in echelon, or 
 any how, the great object being to throw the second line into disorder 
 before the first one can rally again. 
 
 Once a line of cavalry hurled against the enemy, all orders from the 
 commanding officer must necessarily cease for a time. The men of 
 each troop look to their leader; the oflBcers on the flanks keep them as 
 much as possible together in order to concentrate their efforts round 
 their captain. 
 
 The captain must act with his troop, without hesitation, wherever 
 opportunity offers; he must never remain idle nor wait for orders 
 while an enemy is near. 
 
 Chapter XIII. 
 
 DETACHED SERVICE. 
 
 Events in war are so varied, that to lay down rules for all ca?e8 
 would be quite impossible; still it may be useful to point out the appli- 
 cation of a few general rules meant to assist officers in command of 
 detachments of cavalry in the field. 
 
 1st. Unless taken by surprise, never engage the enemy without having 
 reconnoitred his strength and dispositions. 
 
 2d. Never retire before an enemy without taking the same precau- 
 tion. To do the first proves temerity and want of head ; to do the 
 second shows timidity and want of heart. 
 
 Reconnoitring a superior force of cavalry requires judgment, for it is 
 
168 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 often attended with danger; but infantry may be reconnoitred in per- 
 fect security, for they can not pursue. 
 
 3d. Hesitation is always dangerous in war; decide promptly one 
 way or other. Better a wrong decision than a delay which will not 
 allow you to decide at all, and which must expose you to the will or 
 decision of your foe. 
 
 4th. When you can take an enemy by surprise, always do so. By 
 stratagem you attain your object more easily and with less loss of life 
 than by open force. 
 
 5th. A reserve, however small, appearing at a critical moment in a 
 charge, will generally decide it; therefore, however small your detach- 
 ment, always keep a few men in reserve, and, if possible, out of sight 
 of the enemy; their sudden and unexpected appearance will then have 
 more effect. Even at the risk of repetition and a little tedium, for the 
 benefit of young cavalry officers I dwell upon these vital points. 
 
 Even when supported by infantry, behind whom you can retire in 
 case of defeat, always keep a reserve (unless you have not sufficient 
 men to charge with); the probabilities are that the enemy has a 
 reserve, which, when you are engaged with him, will attack you in rear 
 or flank and cause your defeat, unless you have some men ready to 
 attack him in the same way. 
 
 6th. Always pass a defile quickly. When through, attack at once 
 with the leading detachment, and keep the outlet clear for those fol- 
 lowing. 
 
 Form the reserve at the entrance of the defile ; for if the troops are 
 driven back, it stops the pursuers and covers the retreat. 
 
 Occupy half the road only, and make the men keep the near side of 
 it to prevent the troops getting jammed up when attacked, and to keep 
 that side clear on which the cavalry soldier makes uso of his sword 
 (the right). 
 
 Before entering a defile reconnoitre it. Wooded places and defiles 
 of no great length are reconnoitred by making a man of the advanced 
 guard gallop through, followed at some distance by another single 
 horseman. If there is no direct impediment, the advanced guard 
 then gallop through and keep the outlet till the main body has passed 
 out. 
 
 When a cavalry detachment without infantry has no choice, but is 
 
DETACHED SERVICE. 169 
 
 obliged to pass a defile known to be in possession of the enemy, their 
 best chance is to attempt it at night and at a gallop. If a barricade 
 has been raised, the advanced party give notice, and a few dismounted 
 men endeavor to remove it. If the obstruction is of such a nature as 
 to be impassable on horseback and impossible to remove, the party will 
 have to turn back. 
 
 When acting with infantry, these reconnoitre the defile ; for it would 
 be dangerous for the cavalry to find an enemy's infantry posted there 
 on their flanks and out of reach of their swords. 
 
 When a defile is occupied the infantry try to force it, and the cavalry 
 endeavor to turn it. 
 
 When, in passing through a defile, you are suddenly attacked by 
 cavalry, charge at once ; if you turn, you are lost. You can not get 
 away, and are sure to be cut down ; whereas by charging you place 
 yourself on equal terms with the foe, who, whatever his numbers, can 
 not bring more men into line than the breadth of the road will admit 
 of, and you can do the same. 
 
 If you have infantry with you in a defile, and you meet the enemy, 
 let the infantry try to gain his flanks while you charge him in front. 
 
 7th. When, in pursuit, you come up to the enemy at the entrance of 
 a defile or village where he has made dispositions to receive you, then 
 leave a few men to watch him, and ride round the village, or turn the 
 defile and cut in on his line of retreat. 
 
 8th. Always attack at once any working parties left by an enemy to 
 destroy bridges or roads, etc. 
 
 9th. In covering a retreat through a defile endeavor to stop the 
 enemy's cavalry by upsetting wagons or by otherwise encumbering the 
 road, and defend these barricades with a few dismounted men. 
 
 If you have no means of barricading, form at the outlet of the defile 
 with a party on the flank, and charge the enemy in front and flank 
 simultaneously the moment he attempts to force his way out. 
 
 10th. Rivers should not stop cavalry, unless the banks be so steep 
 as to aflFord no footing for the horses to land. There are plenty of 
 examples of cavalry swimming rivers without loss. For instance, the 
 night before the Battle of Hastembeck three hundred horse, with as 
 many foot-soldiers, were detached from the camp of the Duke of 
 Broglie and swam the Weser, the foot-soldiers holding on to the horses' 
 15 
 
170 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 manes. Again, twenty-four squadrons of Austrian cuirassiers swam 
 the River Main on the 3d of September, 1796, leaving the bridge for 
 the use of the infantry. 
 
 Cavalry should swim by ranks in line, going in abreast to break the 
 current. The men ought to look to the opposite bank, not at> the 
 water; for if they do so they are very apt, insensibly, to follow the 
 current. They hold by the mane, and only use the snaffle-rein to 
 direct the horse ; both reins should be tied up short, to prevent the 
 horses putting their feet into them when swimming. 
 
 When boats are at hand and no enemy in the near neighborhood, 
 the men's kits and arms should be taken across in the boats, to keep 
 them dry and make it easier for the horses to swim. 
 
 11th. Cavalry never surrenders, under any circumstances, in the 
 open field, but must always attempt to cut its way through, or, by 
 scattering, elude pursuit. 
 
 If an eneiuy is expected to cross a river in your front, do not scatter 
 the cavalry along its banks, but concentrate it at some distance from 
 the river in different points. It can then move up in force quickly 
 with its horse-artillery to any place at which the enemy attempts the 
 passage. 
 
 In the attack and defence of entreHckments, cavalry in the defences is 
 kept out of reach of shot, and, when the enemy is in the act of storm- 
 ing, it gallops out of the entrenchments and charges them in flank — 
 going out at the right and re-entering the entrenchments by the left, or 
 vice versa. When this is not feasible, it waits inside till the enemy 
 have effected an entrance, and then charges to drive them out. When 
 the outlets are narrow and only admit of files, it does the same, because 
 in filing out it might be taken in flank, and if defeated it would not 
 escape through so narrow an entrance without sustaining heavy loss. 
 
 Jn the attack the cavalry is masked, when possible, behind the infan- 
 try columns, ready to meet a sortie on the part of the garrison, or to 
 profit by any moans of entering the entrenchments which may be 
 secured for it by the infantry. It may bo sent to turn the entrench- 
 ments, or otherwise assist in their capture j but it is out of place for 
 cavalry to attempt to take a leading part. A division of French 
 cuirassiers that tried to ride into the entrenchments at Wagram wore 
 nearly destroyed without doing any good. 
 
CAVALRY AGAINST INFANTRY. 171 
 
 hi sieges, when a place is to be invested by a rapid march, the caval- 
 ry occupy all the surrounding passes and villages in the neighborhood, 
 and hold them till the infantry come up. They then escort convoys, 
 bring in provisions to camp, etc. 
 
 When with tho besieged, they are of use in making sorties, forays, 
 etc. ; and when the outworks at last fall into tho hands of the enemy, 
 the dragoons either serve the guns or retire from the fortre33, and 
 throw themselves into the enemy's rear. 
 
 To effect their retreat the garrison make a sally at night, and tho 
 cavalry escape in the dark. 
 
 C H AFTER XI y. 
 CAVALRY CHARaES AGAINST INFANTRY. 
 
 " Zu alien Zeiten, wo die Kuust verfiel, 
 Verfiel Sie durch die Kunstler." — Schiller. 
 
 I have already spoken briefly of cavalry verstis cavalry, and of caval- 
 ry against artillery. I have purposely reserved the matter contained 
 in this chapter for the conclusion of my little work. It will show what 
 cavalry has done, and what it may do again. I will not aflBrm, with 
 Colonel Mitchell and some other military writers, that cavalry, if 
 properly armed, mounted, and led, will, under every circumstance or 
 combination of circumstances, break an infantry square — I will only 
 say that it may frequently do so. Let no infantry officer take offence 
 at my opinion. A greater respect for our own matchless foot-soldiers 
 than that which I entertain can not be felt by any man, either in the 
 service or out of it. But if I carry any of my propositions too far, 
 let it be remembered that I am a cavalry ojjicer. 
 
 Cavalry is now often reduced to "play a secondary part iu war, in 
 consequence of the greater ease with which armies in the field change 
 their positions. Tho infantry, no longer tied down to a battle-field 
 chosen for its level ground, or a position covering their encampment^ 
 more lightly armed and equipped, move off during an engagement, if 
 threatened by a powerful cavalry, and neutralize its effort by occupying 
 enclosures, or getting into a hilly or otherwise difficult country. 
 
172 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 Instead of forming long lines and open columns, they move in 
 compact masses, or throw themselves into squares, which, supporting 
 each other by a cross fire, and protected by artillery, often defy the 
 efiforts of cavalry. But can they alwaj's move in an open country, and 
 laugh at the efiforts of that arm, the thundering of whose approach was 
 Buflacient, formerly, to inspire them with awe ? 
 
 If infantry squares are impregnable and artillery safe within the 
 swoop of bold horsemen, then our cavalry is no longer indispensable to 
 the eflSciency and safety of an army. 
 
 Why then are such large sums expended by every nation in Europe 
 to organize an efficient cavalry, and raise their numbers to nearly one- 
 fifth of an army in the field ? why this expense if cavalry is hencefor- 
 ward to be used only for outpost duty, for skirmishing, for carrying 
 despatches and orders in the field? 
 
 Unfortunately, in our cavalry the general opinion is against the possi- 
 bility of infantry squares being broken. 
 
 If troops believe a thing impossible, success is not to be expected. 
 If cavalry are led to suppose that they can not break an infantry square, 
 they will add one more example to the frequeuc^'^ of such failures when- 
 ever they are next ordered to charge. 
 
 If to infantry soldiers you admit that they can not stand exposed to 
 the fire of artillery, such men will be always ripe for defeat. 
 
 Those whose duty it is to instruct the men under their command 
 should instil confidence in the power of that arm to which they belong, 
 and never allow soldiers to doubt of success when they do their duty 
 manfully. 
 
 In the Seven Years* War, as much if not a greater portion of artil- 
 lery was used than in more modern times ; for instance, at Leuthen, 
 Frederic the Great had between thirty-three thousand and thirty-four 
 thousand men in the field, and one hundred and sixty-seven guns — a 
 proportion of five guns to every thousand men ; in the more recent cam- 
 paigns the average has seldom exceeded three guns to one thousand 
 men ; but neither the numerous artillery nor well-drilled infantry stop- 
 ped the cavalry in those days. 
 
 The numerous improvements effected in the artillery are in favor of 
 tbo cavalry, not against their chances of success. 
 
 No infantry can now escape from its fire, and when subjected to it 
 
CAVALRY AGAINST INFANTRY. 173 
 
 the better practice will throw them sooner into disorder, and make tliem 
 ripe for the harvest of the sword. 
 
 Horse-artillery can move with almost equal speed and act in concert 
 with cavalry, where formerly the cavalry must have acted alone. With 
 such powerful assistance (under almost all circumstances) cavalry are 
 surely more formidable than before, and with horse-artillery they must 
 always destroy infantry, however good and tried it may be ; for, sup- 
 posing the cavalry alone can do nothing, the artillery can destroy them 
 with its fire if they keep together, and if they attempt to deploy they 
 must fall a prey to the horsemen. Both artillery and cavalry can keep 
 out of range of the infantry's fire all the time. 
 
 Thus, if the improved tactics of infantry have given them an advan- 
 tage over the cavalry, the latter have more than made up for it by the 
 improvements of the artillery, which, by keeping company with them, 
 can, by their fire, afford the cavalry those favorable moments at which 
 to charge is to conquer. 
 
 An infantry square ought to be attacked with a front smaller than 
 the side of the square charged. 
 
 If you outflank it, the men on the flanks ride round the sides, and 
 those in the centre open out and follow suit. 
 
 The officers on the flanks must look to this, the cavalry put their 
 horses to their utmost speed, ride home, and the square must go down. 
 
 Saddles will be emptied, horses killed and wounded, but no horse, un- 
 less he is shot through the brain, or has his legs broken, will fall ; though 
 stricken to the death, he will struggle through the charge.* 
 
 When the ground and other circumstances admit of it, a good plan to 
 
 * For a horse must be very much wounded to make him fall upon the spot. 
 " One without his rider, at Strigau, which had one of his hind feet carried away by 
 a cannon-ball, joined the left of the squadron, where he remained with the others 
 during all the battle, although we were several times dispersed; at the sound of 
 the call he always fell into the same place, which was, without doubt, the same 
 that he had before belonged to in the squadron. 
 
 '• Another time, a cuirassier's horse fell in the grand attack at the exercise at 
 Breslau ; the cuirassier got him up again and mounted him ; at three hundred 
 paces he fell down dead. The late General Krokow, colonel of the regiment, had 
 him opened, and it was found that the sword of the cuirassier had penetrated his 
 heart a tenth of an inch. These facts prove that a horse is not easily to be brought 
 down unless a ball should break his skull." — General WameTy. 
 15* 
 
174 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 attack a square is, for two troops to charge, one the front side, the other 
 the adjoining side, of the square; a third troop meanwhile forms oppo- 
 site the angle of the square, the two sides of which are charged at the 
 same moment by the first two, who having drawn the fire, the third 
 troop rushes down, and is upon the square before they are aware of its 
 approach. 
 
 A favorite manoeuvre of the great Frederic, and one executed with 
 great success by his cavalry under Seidlitz at Zorndorf, under Marshal 
 Gesler at Strigau, and under General Liideritz at Kesseldorf, was to 
 form a close column at some distance in front of the centre of a line of 
 cavalry, and thus bear down on the enemy's infantry and attack them 
 at speed. When they broke through the line, the two rear squadrons 
 of the column wheeled outward and rolled up the broken infantry, while 
 the cavalry in line rode over them and followed the leading column to 
 be ready to fall on the enemy's cavalry should it press forward to the 
 rescue. The Prussian cavalry were ordered to shout and make as much 
 noise as possible when attacking infantry, to prevent their hearing the 
 whistling of the bullets ; but when charging cavalry the deepest silence 
 was preserved, and all hung in breathless suspense on the word of com- 
 mand which was to hurl them simultaneously on the foe. 
 
 I will now adduce some instances of successful charges of cavalry 
 against infantry squares, namely : 
 
 At the Battle of Frauenstadt the Swedish dragoons cut down tbe 
 whole of the Saxon infantry formed in squares. 
 
 At Ilohen/riedberg the dragoon regiment of Bairouth rode over twen- 
 ty-one battalions of infantry, took four thousand prisoners, eixty-sis 
 stands of colors, and five pieces of artillery. 
 
 Zorndorf. — See ante, page 19. 
 
 Combat of Avesne-le-Sec. — Three thousand French infantry, with 
 twenty guns, formed in squares to receive the charge of four Austrian 
 cavalry regiments, under Prince Liehtenstein and Count Belgarde, and 
 were overthrown at the first onset : two thousand men, five stands of 
 colors, and twenty guns fell into the hands of the victors ; the remain- 
 der of the French were cut down, with the exception of a few hundred 
 stragglers, who reached Cambray and Bonchain. 
 
 Villiers-en-Conche. — The French, fifteen thousand strong, were de- 
 feated by ten British and four Austrian squadrons : part of this force 
 
CJAVALRY AGAINST INFANTRY. 175 
 
 dispersed the French cavalry, while two British and two Austrian squad- 
 rons broke through the French square, killed nine hundred, and took 
 four hundred men prisoners, together with five pieces of cannon. 
 
 Cdteaii Cambreais. — One i-egiment of Austrian cuirassiers and nine 
 British squadrons defeated General Chappuis' army, twenty-seven 
 thousand strong, inflicting a loss of three thousand men, and capturing 
 twenty-two guns and twenty-nine ammunition wagons. 
 
 A fairs of Edesheim and Kaherlautern. — Marshal Blucher defeated 
 the French at Edesheim with two cavalry regiments ; and at Kaiserlau- 
 tern charged six hundred French infantry soldiers with eighty hussars : 
 though they were prepared to receive him, he broke in, killed, wounded, 
 or captured the whole party. 
 
 Nordlingen. — On the retreat of the Austrian cavalry from Ulra, in 
 the year 1800, they broke and defeated three regiments of French in- 
 fantry, belonging to the division of General Montrichard. 
 
 Au&terlitz. — The Russian cavalry broke the squares of French infan- 
 try formed by the brigade of General Schinner, division Vandamme of 
 Soult's corps ; and a regiment of their lancers broke the square form- 
 ed by the fourth regiment of the line, and captured their eagle. 
 
 AueratadL — The Prussian dragoon regiment of Irving destroyed a 
 square of French infantry, which stood firmly to the last, and gave thero 
 a. volley at fifteen paces which brought down nine officers and many 
 men j but the dragoons wex*e not to be stopped : they rushed in and cut 
 them to pieces. 
 
 Waltersdorf, the 5th of February, 1807. — The French cavalry over 
 took the Prussian rear-guard, consisting of five battalion?, ten squad- 
 rons, and a battery of horse-artillery. They charged and overthrev? 
 the cavalry, and, after a gallant resistance, nearly destroyed the whole 
 of the infantry. The remains of some battalions alone were saved by 
 the charge of the Prussian hussars of Prittwitz. 
 
 At the Battle of Pidtusk th.Q Russian General Koschin charged and 
 overthrew the right wing of the French. 
 
 On the 5th of May, 1809, the Prussian Major Schill, with six hun- 
 dred hussars, attacked eighteen hundred French infantry, who were 
 posted with two guns in broken ground. Their commander, General 
 Michaud, wrote as follows to the Minister of War, Eble : " Ces hussards 
 ne se battcnt pas comme des soldats ordinaires, maia comme dcs en- 
 
176 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 rages : ayant romjiu et sabre mes quarres, ils fireut Ics rcstes prisoa- 
 niers. Venez a mon sccour,*' etc. 
 
 Action of Gdrci Hernandez, 22>d July, 1S12. — Three French squares 
 were broken by the King's German Legion, 
 
 Combat of the Goerdt, Iflf/i Se^ncv.iher, 1813. — Here a corps of nine 
 thousand French with fifteen pieces of artillery, partly posted in broken 
 ground and partly in the open, after defying the attacks of the Cos- 
 sacks and the cavalry of the Russian-Gernaan legion, were charged by 
 the 3d Hanoverian hussars, and those squares which were in the open 
 were completely defeated with the loss of their guns. 
 
 Ambuscade of Jloynan, 26fh of April, 1813. — Here General Maison's 
 division of the victorious French army, eight battalions, with eighteen 
 pieces of artillery, were ridden over and captured by Colonel Dolfs at 
 the head of twenty Prussian squadrons. (Seepage 32.) 
 
 It is impo.ssible for the infantry soldier physically to resist the power 
 of a horse when at speed ; that the horse will face both fire and bay- 
 onet is proved by the many examples given. 
 
 The horse often feels the man's unwillingness to go on, and turns, 
 but then it is in obedience to the bridle hand. 
 
 The following is a translation from Berenhorst's " BetrachtungeQ 
 iiber Kriegskunst." His reputation as a writer on military matters^ 
 and his personal experience in war, must entitle his views to some con- 
 sideration : 
 
 ''Against cavalry, it is the rule for infantry to fire steadily by word 
 of command, and not to begin too soon Here again it is assumed that 
 the cavalry will turn. All regulations are silent as to what is to be done 
 when they do not turn after the last shot has been fired and the horses 
 arc on the bayonets. 
 
 '• To demonstrate the matter better, we will examine, measure out, 
 and calculate the chances of a charge of cavalry against infantry, con- 
 ducted according to rule. 
 
 " Let one-sixth of the horses be shot down (the riders are not taken 
 into consideration), this does not stop the advance of the remainder. 
 Suppose the infantry in the situation as above, for which no instruc- 
 tions are given, namely : the volley has been delivered and the muskets 
 are brought to the charge. 
 
 " The second and third rank may have their muskets at the charge, 
 
CAVALRY AGAINST INFANTRY. 177 
 
 or be busy loading ; but the front rank have their muskets thrown for- 
 ward ; the right hand grasps the small of the stock ; in this position 
 the musket and bayonet reach only three feet beyond the man's elbow. 
 Is the infantry soldier now to aim at the dragoon or his horse ? He 
 can not reach the man : it is four feet from the horse's nose to the 
 man's belly, and three and a half from the horde's forehead to the man's 
 breast.* 
 
 '< The man is further protected by the head and neck of his horse.f 
 and, if the infantry soldier tries to thrust at him, he comes in contact 
 with the horse and is thrown down. 
 
 "But let us admit an impossibility. Every bayonet has been buried 
 in the stomach or breast of the horsemen ; still, the horses alone will 
 break the ranks of the infantry. 
 
 " The infantry soldier can only try and aim his bayonet at the horse's 
 breast, and let him spit himself like a wild boar. In this case he must 
 hit the heart to kill him, for any other wound would be quite useless at 
 the moment; and even reaching the horse's heart can not save him, for 
 the horse, with his great weight and the impulse of his speed, will dash 
 the whole rank to the ground in his fall. 
 
 ^' Infantry can therefore depend only on its fire : it has time to de- 
 liver two volleys, no more, and therewith barely the power to knock 
 over every sixth horse. 
 
 " Experience shows that the effect of musketry is very trifling at 
 more than three hundred yards ; within that distance it would not be 
 advisable to try more than two discharges. 
 
 '* The calculation is that the fusileer can discharge his piece five times 
 in the minute, thus for each shot twelve seconds of time are required, j 
 
 ^* The cavalry soldier will pass over six hundred paces in thirty sec- 
 onds, to each one hundred paces five seconds. 
 
 " If the fusileer delivers his first fire at three hundred paces, and 
 twelve seconds later the second, he has only three seconds left, can not 
 load again, and will be ridden over in the interim. 
 
 * Berenhorst. — This measurement is taken on horses of a small stamp. 
 
 •f The horao's neck and the soldier's musket act like two swords crossed : if the 
 one turns the point of the othtsr from the straight line the thrust goes off side- 
 ways. — Berenhorst. 
 
 t Note hy Berenhorst. — " We wish to be generous, for with ball-cartridge the 
 soldier could not reload under fifteen seconds. 
 
178 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 " A battalion whicli dolivere its fire at sixty paces, aud wants to re- 
 load, is ripe for mowing down. As sixty yards is quite far enough to 
 miss at, particularly when the rushing in of the cavalry shakes the earth 
 and men's nerves at the same time, it would bo far better to order one 
 discharge only at thirty paces, and bring the bayonets to the charge 
 without attempting to reload. 
 
 " Then the infantry are still in the position already alluded to, and 
 in which the superiority of the cavalry has been demonstrated.* 
 
 *•' In speculating, however, on this subject, the advantage is entirely 
 on the side of the infantry. Assume that each file fire true, and thus 
 send their bullets into the breasts of the front rank horses ; those of 
 the rear rank fall over them, and it is all up with the cavalry ; the men 
 are stretched on the ground among a whole line of dead and dying 
 horses, and all they can do is to pick themselves up and surrender. 
 
 ''In the battles of civilized nations among the too sober warriors of 
 the West, the probabilities are that the horsemen will gallop slowly ; in- 
 stead of plying their spurs within the last three hundi-ed or four hun- 
 dred paces, they will pull at the reins, and when the bullets begin to 
 whistle they will turn and gallop to the rear by whole squadrons.f 
 
 " The infantry will fire too soon, fire badly, lose its presence of mind, 
 and sometimes its order ; both sides much alike. 
 
 " The success or failure will depend on those unlooked-for circum- 
 stances which in war generally decide between victory and defeat. 
 
 "Still, on carefully comparing the chances, the balance is in favor of 
 the horsemen : the misfortune is, that they are seldom anxious to avail 
 themselves of it. The cavalry of Charles XII and Frederic the Great 
 alone used their advantage to some purpose." 
 
 At the Battle of the Pyramids many single Mameluke horsemen 
 dashed right through the French squares, and out at the other side. If 
 
 * By the author. — It ninst be a very fast horse to go over six hundred paces In 
 thirty secondfl. Cavalry could not well do it under forty seconds. With the pres- 
 ent musket the soldier could not deliver more than two volleys against an advan- 
 cing Hue, for it would be useless to fire at more than one hundred and fifty yards. 
 The long-range gun is therefore not to be despised : and the needle gun of the 
 Prussians, which can be loaded quicker and fired with greater accuracy, and with 
 these advantages combines the long-range, is a formidable projectile in the handi* 
 of a steady soldier 1 
 
 t Note by BerenJiorst.—'* The author saw this happen himself." 
 
CAVALRY AGAINST INFANTRY. 179 
 
 only twenty of them, with the same determination evinced by these in- 
 dividual horsoinen, had charged the French squares together, they mu?t 
 have succeeded ; but they exhausted their horses in irregular charges, 
 each man coming on in his turn to be shot down, till at last their cour- 
 age was tamed by repeated failure, and they fled the field. 
 
 * In the pursuit, after the Battle of Salamanca, at Garci Hernandez, 
 where the English cavalry (German legion) rode over three squares of 
 French infantry, five dragoons actually charged one square by them- 
 selves, broke in, and two of them cut their way through and got out at 
 the other side. 
 
 At the Battle of Aliwal a squadron of the 16th Lancers, under Capt. 
 Pearson, rode through the Sikh infantry : the gallant leader, dashing in 
 alone, went through them first. 
 
 (Japtain Bere, of the same regiment, with a squadron, went right 
 through a Sikh square, wheeling about and re-entering it again. 
 
 But our infantry have stood unconqucred against the best cavalry of 
 France in many a bloody field ; they marched against them, and int-o 
 the midst of them, at Quatre-Bras, under General Picton. 
 
 The Sikh infantry were not wanting either in discipline or valor ; 
 they also at Aliwal advanced against the British cavalry .f 
 
 But infantry squares that stood firm and undaunted, that delivered 
 their fire with good effect, have nevertheless been overthrown and total- 
 ly destroyed by the charge of a few gallant horsemen. 
 
 Contrast the two following instances, which show that the safety of 
 the infantry does not depend upon the courage, upon the steady dis- 
 cipline, and firm behavior of the square, but rather, solely, on the for- 
 bearance of the cavalry. 
 
 1. In the expedition to Russia in 1812, while endeavoring to save 
 the wounded at Mojaick, fifty of the light company of the 33d (French) 
 clambered up a height, the summit of which was occupied by the ene- 
 my's cavalry and artillery. The French army, halted under the walls 
 of Mojaick, looked on with astonishment at this handful of men, who, 
 dispersed over the unprotected declivity, annoyed thousands of the 
 
 ♦GeschichtederSpaniscfaen Monarchie, v. 1810 bis 1823, v. Obersten v. Schee- 
 seler. 
 t Sir H. Smit-h'a despatches. 
 
180 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 Russian cavalry. The consequence, which might have been anticipat- 
 ed, soon appeared: several Russian squadrons were seen in motion, 
 who, the next moment, surrounded these brave men. They instantly 
 formed a square; but they were too few, among so many horsemen, and 
 "in so vast a plain, and were soon lost to the view of the French army. 
 Some smoke, which arose from the centre of the mass, prolonged the 
 uncertainty ; the anxiety lasted for some moments, when all at once 
 the army gave a shout of admiration on seeing the Russian cavalry 
 disperse, in order to escape the well-directed fire of that handful of he- 
 roes, who were thus left masters of a large field of battle, of which they 
 barely occupied a few feet.^ 
 
 2. At the Siege of Trichinopoli, in the month of February, 1763, a 
 company of British infantry held a fortified post at some distance from 
 the town : they were attacked by a party of Mahratta horsemen, and 
 beat them off with great loss. When relieved at their post, they had to 
 march across the plain to return to cantonments. The Mahrattas were 
 waiting for them. The English soldiers marched out full of confidence ; 
 they were repeatedly attacked, but formed in square, and, reserving 
 their fire each time till they could deliver it with deadly effect, they 
 strewed the plain with men and horses, and continued their march, 
 taunting the cavalry, and daring them to come on. 
 
 The Mahrattas, much reduced in numbers, but still determined to 
 have their revenge, formed in two ranks, the second at some distance 
 behind the first ; they then advanced steadily up to the bayonets j the 
 English took a deliberate aim, poured upon them a most deadly fire, 
 and down went the leading ranks, men and horses : the Mahrattas had 
 drawn the fire, as had been agreed among them ; but over their pros- 
 trate bodies rushed the rear rank like infuriated fiends, to avenge their 
 fall, and, dashing in through the bayonets, these horsemen killed every 
 man in the detachment. 
 
 Near Augsburg, and between that place and Sulzbach, the French 
 20th regiment of light infantry, formed in square, was attacked by some 
 Austrian cavalry, and beat them off twice ; but the third charge was 
 successful J the Austrians rode over them, and killed or captured the 
 whole regiment. 
 
 ♦ Segur, Exped. de Russie. 
 
 : 
 
CAVALRY AGAINST INFANTRY. 181 
 
 At Rh'oli the French cavalry did great execution on the Austrian in- 
 fantry. Near San Giovanni the Cossacks attacked the French infantry 
 nnder General Dombrowski with comijlete success, and destroyed sev- 
 eral battalions. 
 
 At "Wertingen, in 1805, Murat, at the head of three divisions of cav- 
 alry, surprised and defeated General AufFenberg's Austrian corps of 
 nine battalions, four squadrons : the infantry was formed in square, 
 and made a gallant resistance. Many fell under the sword ; two 
 thousand prisoners, of whom fifty-two were officers, eight guns, and 
 three standards, fell into the hands of the French. 
 
 Many more instances can be found by referring to the Battles of Me- 
 dellin, Ciudad-Rcal, Margaleff, Todendorf. The French say that their 
 seventh and ninth regiments of chasseurs broke three squares of Eng- 
 lish infantry at the Battle of Fuentes de Oiloro. 
 
 I now proceed to my last cxaiQples, taken from the Hungarian war, 
 to show that neither the improved fire of artillery nor the long-range 
 muskets could save the squares when the cavalry did their duty. 
 
 " On the 28th of December, 1848, at eight o'clock, a. m,, General 
 Gorgey's rear-guard, consisting of two battalions of infantry and a 
 small detachment of hussars, were attacked by the cavalry brigade (of 
 the Austrians) under Colonel Ottinger, who, in spite of several dis- 
 charges of musketry from the squares, continued their steady advance, 
 charged, broke the first square completely (formed by the regiment of 
 the line Preussen), and partly destroyed the second square, inflicting 
 on us a loss of three hundred to four hundred killed and wounded, and 
 taking seven hundred prisoners ; among the latter, Major Szel, who 
 defended himself to the last, and received sixteen wounds l)efore he 
 could be captured."* 
 
 Battle of Moor, SOth of December, 184t8.—" In front of Moor, about 
 twelve hundred or fifteen hundred yards from the wood, a line of 
 heights intersects the road at right angles; on these Perczel formed his 
 troops, and placed his guns so as to command the outlets from tlie 
 forest. 
 
 "He had five thousand men under his orders, consisting of four bat- 
 talions of infantry, four squadrons of cavalry, and ten guns. His ob- 
 
 <■■ Klaptka, Hist, of the Magyar Wan 
 16 
 
182 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 ject was to prevent the enemy from getting out of the wood, and give 
 Gorgey time to bring up the left wing of the army (the brigade Karger) 
 from Csakvar, then attack the enemy at a disadvantage. 
 
 " The enemy had, at first, but one brigade up, yet they made many 
 gallant but fruitless attempts to gain the open country, but the Hun- 
 garian artillery, playing constantly on the outlets, rendered all their 
 attempts abortive. After two hours' fighting, however, one of the 
 enemy's batteries established itself on a height to the right of the 
 road, and by a well-directed fire did much execution ou the Hungarian 
 left. At this moment Ottiuger aiTived with his cavalry brigade (con- 
 sisting of two or three regiments), dashed at the Hungarian position, 
 and swept all before him. In an instant our bravest infantry regiments 
 were broken and in full flight along the road to Stuhlweissenburg and 
 Csakvar ; one of our batteries was in the hands of the enemy. 
 
 " Our hussars (the regiment Nikolaus), with the greatest contempt 
 for death, threw themselves upon the enemy's horse, though six times 
 more numerous, and saved what they could from the wreck. A des- 
 perate hand-to-hand fight ensued, but the brave sons of the Pusta* 
 devoted their lives to stem the tide of the enemy's advance till the re- 
 maining infantry, with four guns, made good their retreat. The hus- 
 sars left half their number ou the field. We lost, altogether, fourteen 
 hundred or fifteen hundred men killed, wounded, and prisoners, and six 
 guns."t 
 
 If cavalry (without artillery) have boon repulsed more than once in 
 charging a square, they should not be led against the same sides of the 
 square, or brought forward over the same ground, because the fallen 
 horses and men form a rampart for the infantry. 
 
 Let us now consider how a cavalry officer should iuit to support in- 
 fantry which is attacked by a numerous cavalry. 
 
 The infantry, formed in squares or columns, will rest its flanks on 
 any available obstacle or cover which may be within reach, and such 
 cover will further bo occupied by flanking parties, who fire in on the 
 flanks of the advancing horsemen. 
 
 If the cover on the flanks of the infantry intercept the view of the 
 enemy's movements, they must be watched by mounted men, while the 
 
 * The Prairioe.of Hungary. t Klaptka. 
 
CAVALRY AGAINST INFANTRY. 183 
 
 cavalry, formed in small columns behind, or opposite the intervals of 
 the infantry squares, are held in readiness to act. Should artillery 
 play on the squares, the cavalry is, as far as possible, kept out of range, 
 or out of the line of fire. But as soon as the enemy's cavalry advance, 
 they do the same ; and when the infantry has given them a few dis- 
 charges, or beat-en them ofif, they break forth between the intervals, 
 form, and charge, but without pursuing too far. The object is to de- 
 fend the position, and thev must return to their place to be ready to 
 repeat the same manoeuvre as often as it becomes necessary. 
 
 If the object is, however, to cover a retreat, the infantry then take 
 advantage of the repulse of the enemy's cavalry to move off; their ar- 
 tillery follow with the prolonge, and are protected by the cavalry. 
 
 In an open plain, where there is no cover for the infantry, the caval- 
 ry forms from three hundred to four hundred yards in rear and on the 
 flanks, so as to charge the enemy's cavalry in flank when they are 
 thrown into disorder by the fire of the squares. 
 
 This is a difl5eult position in which to be placed when inferior to the 
 enemy in cavalry. They will of course try to turn the flanks, and the 
 cavalry must then take refuge in the intervals of the squares, and wait 
 for a favorable opportunity to charge. 
 
 When retiring along a road the cavalry keeps the road, the infantry 
 moves on both flanks ; when they reach a pass or defile the cavalry 
 moves on and takes up a position to cover the retreat of the columns. 
 
 We have not sought to conceal the difficulties that cavalry has to 
 contend with when brought ia contact with good infantry : they are 
 often so great that the best cavalry, though well led, will fail to make 
 an impression; still, at equal chances, the physical superiority of the 
 cavalry ought to give them the advantage. 
 
 Nothing is more trying to infantry than a charge of cavalry ; nor is 
 anything more formidable to cavalry than an infantry fire in square. 
 The infantry soldier knows well that if the horsemen break in nothing 
 can save him; the dragoon again is well aware that neither riding nor 
 manoeuvring can save him from the bullets of his antagonists. 
 
 Success on either side depends so much on the moral courage of the 
 parties engaged, and that success has been so varied, that numberless 
 examples might be cited to prove the case against the cavalry as well 
 as for it. 
 
184 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 Good infantry will generally hold its own against cavalry if these 
 are badly led, if their horses are tired and worn-out with fatigue, if the 
 ground is heavy and deep, and the charge can not bo made with speed 
 and well together, or if artillery scatters the squadrons in their ad- 
 vance. 
 
 It would be ridiculous to infer from such examples that cavalrj' can 
 not break infantry squares; when we lock into the defeats of cavalry 
 we can often trace their want of success to circumstances of the sort 
 just mentioned, winch are generally passed over unnoticed by historians. 
 
 For our purpose let it suffice that we have shown to our cavalry that 
 it can be done, and we leave it to them to remove all doiibt oii the sub» 
 ject 50 soon as thej sht^M hstve a.n opportunity. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 16* 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 THE SADDLE AND BRIDLE. 
 
 The bridle I propose has only four buckles, namely : two on the head- 
 collar, one on the bit head-stall, and one on the bridoon head-stall. 
 
 The bit, bridoon, and their head-stalls are provided with hooks and 
 Sinks, by which means the bits can be slipped out of the horse's mouth, 
 for the purpose of feeding, without taking the bridle off the horse's 
 <5iead. 
 
 The bridoon has half-horns to prevent its being drawn through th* 
 'horse's mouth, which often happens when they have the ring only. 
 
 The head-stalls are fastened to the collar by a stmp and button on 
 ■'he brow-band, like the bridles in use with the regiment of carabineers 
 4ind others in the service. 
 
 The Saddle. 
 
 The tree is constructed to combine the adxantages of a hunting sad- 
 -dle with the simplicity of the Hungarian troop-saddle. 
 
 The side-boards are cut away under the man's leg, they then spread 
 out under his seat, and are feathered and bronght well ofiT the horse'is 
 back in rear. 
 
 The hind fork is broad at the base, where it joins the side-boards, 
 vand is bevelled off to add length to the seat. 
 
 The front fork is constructed with a peak, and with points to give 
 the tree a firm hold on the horse's back, and prevent it from turning 
 .Tound, as well as to bring the man's bridle-hand low. 
 
 Both forks are strengthened with iron plates. 
 
 The holes cut for the stirrup-leathers leave a lohoU hack, to prevent 
 
188 APPENDIX. 
 
 the atirrup-leather from bulging or embedding itself in the panel, and 
 pressing on the horse's back. 
 
 Oyer this tree a seat of blocked leather is stretched, like that of a 
 hunting saddle, and fastened with screws to the forks. 
 
 For the Pads. 
 
 Three strips of felt are slipped into a cover of serge, and put on to 
 the side-boards with leather pockets; more of theae slips of felt can be 
 put in should tho horse fall off in condition, or Ihey can be taken out 
 should the harse put up condition f and thus the saddle always ridea 
 even, and the tree never requires to be altered. Leather flaps are theii 
 screwed on to the tree, and the saddle is complete. 
 
 The Saddle-Ci-oth 
 
 Is cut to lit the horse's back, and to the outline of the saddle. It 
 has pockets for the points to fit into,, and is made of felt one inch thick, 
 to protect the horse's back, absorb the perspiration, and prevent the 
 edges of the pads from getting hard and occasioning sore backs. 
 
 The breastplate is attached to ditto, let into the side-boards (not, as 
 now, to the peak), and is made with a loop in front to slip in case of a 
 fall. 
 
 The crupper is attached to a central point,, to avoid tho friction 
 caused by a split crupper. 
 
 The under girth buckles on both sides, because it will wear longer, 
 as the soldier is not obliged to girth up always in tho same holes. 
 
 The girth-straps should be joined together with web girthing, to 
 protect the seat of tho saddle when put on the pegs in the stable. 
 
 The shoe-cases have loops, the strap being made a fixture to the 
 hind-fork; the reason for this is, that the soldier in passing the strap 
 under the hind-fork is apt to leave a twist in it, which is sure to give a 
 sore back. 
 
 ' The wallets are made flat, because they hold more and sit closer; 
 they are slanted forward to give room for the mun's leg. 
 
 Under the off wallet the carbine is run through a holster; it can 
 thus be got at, and returned, in an instant. It is fastened to the peak 
 by a strap about a yard long, which serves as a sling for the carbine 
 when dismounted. 
 
THE SADDLE. 189 
 
 The valise has tho troop letter and the man's number on the near 
 side, to enable him to recognize it, and the number of the regiment on 
 the other side, as the 10th Hussnrs have. 
 
 I consider a shabraque a useless encumbrance; but if worn, it should 
 be made of cloth not water-proof. Water-pro.of cloth is less durable, 
 and confines the heat to the horse's back. 
 
 Those parts which cover the valise and eloak might be lined with 
 water-proof, but the scat should be of cloth only, and cut to fit the 
 saddle without skirts. 
 
 Sheepskins are, bad, because once wet they take many days to dry, 
 iind the heat of them is bad for man and beast. 
 
 In packing, the dragoon should be instructed to take every hard 
 substance out of his valise. His brushes, hold-all, rubbers, sponges, 
 and forage-cap should go in his wallets, where he can get at them at 
 once on dismounting. 
 
 • The valise should be packed so as to be quite hollow in the centre, 
 and the centre baggage-strap shortened, in order to enable the soldier 
 to draw it tight, and bring the kit well off the horse's back. 
 
 Boots or high-lows should bo packed under the flap of the valise 
 \Tith the heels outward (not inward). 
 
 The saddle I have proposed would be much better for the men li-ith- 
 <Mit flaps. With horsemen everything depends on their having confi- 
 dence in the firmness of their seat on horseback. 
 
 Leather flaps are slippery, and do not give a firm hold to the leg ; 
 iwhereas, take them away altogether, substitute a double felt saddle- 
 cloth cut square, and the men will have a stronger seat ; the horses will 
 be more under control on that account, as well as because they feel 
 and must obey more quickly, the pressure of the riders* legs. 
 
 The whole of the Austrian cavalry ride without flaps to their sad- 
 dles,- but boots or leather overalls are then indispensable on account o 
 the sweat from the horse. 
 
 The saddles without flaps would be lighter, and far more handy for 
 saddling. 
 
 My attention has been directed for a long time to the constructing of 
 
190 APPENDIX. 
 
 a saddle for military purposes. With this end in view, I have for years 
 past taken notes of what came under my observation, and put every- 
 thing to the test of a trial when I had the opportunity. 
 
 On my return from the Russian camps last year, being ordered to 
 join the depot troop of my regiment at Maidstone, I there construct/ed 
 the first of these saddles which I now propose.* 
 
 Many hints and improvements I had from Colonel Key, 15th Hus- 
 sars j for instance, the manner of joining the hind fork to the side, 
 boards I copied from a saddle which Colonel Key obtained from an 
 ofiScer of Danish hussars at Copenhagen. The addition of points to 
 the front fork was a suggestion of Sergeant Johnson, saddler at Maid- 
 stone, a very intelligent, clever man, with whose assistance I also con- 
 trived to improve upon the hooks and links of the bit and snaffle which 
 I had brought from Russia. 
 
 One of the greatest improvements suggested I believe to be the felt 
 aaddle-cloth. The blankets accumulate dirt and dust in their folds; 
 they constantly work out from under the saddle. In camp they must 
 always be kept ready folded, and, in case of surprise at night, they 
 are most inconvenient, for if a man drops one he can not refold it 
 without assistance. 
 
 In this saddle the man can be put in a proper seat, he will have^ 
 greater control over his horse, and I do think that with them sore backs 
 in the cavalry will be of rare occurrence. 
 
 DRESS OF A CAVALRY SOLDIER. 
 
 The dragoon should be supplied annually with one good suit of ser- 
 vipeable clothes, which be should be made to wear. 
 
 At present he has too many things ; the full dress is seldom wornj, 
 and never worn-out; the man does all his duty in bis stable-dress, 
 while the kit is swelled out with unnecessary things, and the horse is 
 overweighted. 
 
 One pair of overalls. 
 
 * Meeers. Gibson & Son, 6, New (Coventry street, constructed all those subsequent- 
 ly made, and improved much upon the original one> 
 
RANK ENTIRE SYSTEM. 191 
 
 One waistcoat, say red. with sleeves and pockets. 
 
 One surcoat of blue cloth, made loose, with the sleeves to unbutton to 
 the elbow (like those in use with Spanish soldiers), and turn up when 
 the gauntlets are put on. This, with a good great-coat or cloak, a low 
 head-dress properly ventilated, would answer all purposes for the 
 cavalry soldier. 
 
 REMARKS ON THE RANK ENTIRE SYSTEM. 
 
 The rank entire S3'stem has been again brought before the public in 
 an article in the "United Service Gazette" of March 12, 1853, and 
 recommended by some of the very highest authorities, including the 
 lat-e Duke of Wellington, and several of our most distinguished' cavalry 
 officers. Under these circumstances it would be presumptuous in me 
 to attempt to give an opinion of my own, but I shall adduce what I 
 think may be considered a^ arguments against the rank entire system, 
 founded on the authority of other distinguished ofiScers of cavalry. 
 
 Seidlitz and Ziethen fixed upon tioo ranlcs, on small squadrons, on 
 ioide intervals. 
 
 Single-rank men have no backers sufficiently near to inspire them 
 with confidence and perseverance; and this confidence is as necessary 
 in the horses as in the men to induce them to rush into fire. 
 
 However good your cavalry soldiers may be, they are not all fit for 
 the front rank; neither are all horses fit to lead, though all will 
 follow. 
 
 Broken up in a melee, the single ranks (men being equal) would be 
 overpowered before they could get assistance, and the single-rank 
 reserves would be again overmatched by the double-rank reserves. 
 
 A single rank, if successful, can not spread like a double one in the 
 pursuit, sweeping up all before them, but they will be so much scat- 
 tered that, in riding in between the retreating dragoons, their own flanks 
 will be exposed, and the retreating horsemen, on their left, will imme- 
 diately close upon them and cut them down while they are endeavor- 
 ing to assail the men on their right front ; thus the chase will become 
 more perilous to the pursuers than to the pursued. 
 
192 APPENDIX. 
 
 A squadron of the First Lancers (British legion), formed in rank 
 entire, consisting of sixty horses, charged three hundred Carlist caval- 
 rj-, pursued them three miles, and killed nearly one hundred of them. 
 "Would the same sixty Englishmen have failed to do the same had they 
 been formed in two ranks ? 
 
 To add that great essential, rapidity, to the movement of cavalry, 
 keep the squadrons small, and give them plenty of ©ibow-room-— thatis, 
 sufficient intervals. 
 
 There was no want of speed shown by the Prussian cavalry under 
 Seidlitz. 
 
 The advantage of having an officer to command each detachment of 
 the rank entire system can be equally shared by the two-rank system- 
 This is simply a question of expense^ and must depend upon how 
 many officers you would attach to each one hundred men. 
 
 Those nations whose cavalry formerly acted on the rank entire sys- 
 tem have given it up. Take the Cossacks for example. 
 
 However, whether it be in txco ranks or in one, let your cavalry be 
 formed in small, distinct bodies, with sufficient intervals between each. 
 
 Let there be no pivot flanks, and no rifjTit and left in front, and? 
 doubtlessly, cavalry will prove much more efficient in the field. 
 
 PROPOSED ORGANIZATION OP CAVALRY. 
 
 From the " United Service Gazette," March 12, 1S53. 
 
 In the " United Service Gazette " of the 8th May last wo noticed a 
 very interesting pamphlet by Colonel Kinloch, on the subject of the 
 constitution of a Yeomanry Eorce, and especially in reference to the 
 organization of cavalry in "rank entire." We have now the pleasure 
 of publishing a letter from Colonel Kinloch, embracing the opinions of 
 the late Duke of Wellington, Lord Yivian, Lord William Russell, and 
 General Bacon, upon that momentous subject. It ia pecixliarly well- 
 timed, as at the present moment great interest is taken in the question 
 of increasing the efficiency of our present weak regiments of cavalry, 
 and of rendering the yeomanry fit for active home service. 
 
PROPOSED ORGANIZATION. 193 
 
 " To the Editor of the United Service Gazette. 
 
 "Sin: la a pamphlet I published last year on 'the defence of the 
 country by means of a volunteer force,' I ventured to recommend cav- 
 alry, and yeomanry in particular, to be formed in 'rank entire/ instead 
 of in two ranks, as is usual in most armies. 
 
 "I have lately found copies of the opinions of the Duke of Welling- 
 ton and several cavalry officers on this subject, which I could not lay 
 my hand on at the time I wrote the pamphlet. These opinions were 
 addressed to General Anthony Bacon (who commanded the cavalry of 
 Don Pedro, in Portugal, in 1833-34), and who was good enough to give 
 me copies of them." 
 
 I. 
 
 From F. M. the Duhe of Wellington, K.G. 
 
 "Stratfieldsaye, 20th November, 1833. 
 
 " Cavalry is essentially an offensive arm, whose use depends upon 
 its activiti/, combined with its steadiness and good order. 
 
 " I think that the second rank of cavalry, at the usual distance of 
 close order, does not increase the activity or the cavalry. The rear 
 rank of the cavalry does not strengthen the front rank, as the centre 
 and rear ranks do the front rank of the infantry. The rear rank of 
 the cavalry can augment the activity or even the means of attack of 
 the front rank only by a movement of disorder. 
 
 " If the front rank should fail, and it should be necessary to retire, 
 the second or rear rank is too close to be able to sustain the attack or to 
 restore order. The second rank must be involved in the defeat and 
 confusion, and the whole must depend upon some other body, whether 
 of cavalry or infantry, to receive and protect the fugitives. 
 
 " I have already said that the rear rank can only augment the 
 means of the first rank by a movement of disorder. 
 
 " This is peculiarly the case if the attack should be successful. In 
 
 all these cases the second rank, at a distance sufficiently great to avoid 
 
 being involved in the confusion of the attack of the front rank, whether 
 
 successful or otherwise, could aid in the attack, or, if necessary, cover 
 
 17 
 
194 APPENDIX. 
 
 the retreat of the attacking party, and thus augment the steadiness 
 and good order of the cavalry as a body ; while, by the absence of all 
 impediments from the closeness of the rear rank, the activity of the 
 front rank would be increased. 
 
 "It can not bo denied that, till required for the actual attack, the 
 less cavalry is exposed the better. My notion of the distance of the 
 lines of cavalry was as much as a cavalry horse could gallop in a 
 minute ; the second line should pull up at a walk when the first charges; 
 the third and other lines in columns should deploy, or be used accord- 
 ing to circumstances. 
 
 "I conceive that the one-rank system would require a change, not 
 only in the discipline, but in the organization, of the cavalry. If I am 
 not mistaken, it would render the use of cavalry in an army mtich more 
 general than, it is at 2>res€nt. 
 
 "Wellington." 
 
 II. 
 
 Extract from a letter to General Bacon from Lieutenant-General Sir 
 Hussey Vivian, G.C.B. [afterwards Lord Vivian, and 3f aster- Getieral 
 of the Orrfnojice). 
 
 '' I rejoice to find Don Pedro's cavalry has fallen under the orders of 
 a man so capable of leading them. I again congratulate you on your 
 very high and honorable station. In short, I feel confident you will 
 do credit to yourself, your cavalry, and to your Peninsular education. 
 
 "I quite entirely agree with you in all you say of the value of the 
 lance. 
 
 " As to the rank entire system, I am by no moans certain that it 
 would not always be a good thing, if, on advancing to an attack, or 
 standing in line, the rear ranks were to form a reserve at the distance, 
 say of eighty or one hundred yards ; when so circumstanced they 
 would be much better able to follow up an advantage gained by, or to 
 repel a successful attack of, the enemy on the first rank. The fact is, 
 that the second rank is of little use but to fall over the first. 
 
 " Let me congratulate you on your brilliant success and gallant con- 
 duct at Leyria. I will run over and pay you a visit. 
 
 "R. HussEY Vivian." 
 
PROPOSED ORGANIZATION. 195 
 
 III. 
 
 Extract from a letter to General Bacon from Lord William Russell, 
 Colonel commanding Eighth Hussars. 
 
 "I wish you joy of your promotion and command. The cavalry 
 will, I have no doubt, be in excellent order in your hands ; but don't 
 be rash — they are too numerous for you to cope with, and their horses 
 are better fed. 
 
 "Anything that proves the efificiency of the single-rank system is 
 interesting to me ; and it certainly was thoroughly proved on the 16th 
 of October (1833), when your force of cavalry imposed on more than 
 treble your numbers ; this quite destroys the argument that a single 
 rank 'looks so weak,' and 'invites the enemy to charge.' Your adver- 
 saries were not to be tempted on the 16th. Keep notes of all the oc- 
 currences ; we will one day put them in print. 
 
 "I am delighted to find that Vivian (Sir Hussey) looked with a more 
 favorable eye on the system. Depend upon it they will all come round- 
 He wants to get off on the mezzo termine of leaving the rear rank be- 
 hind. This I entirely disapprove, because the rear rank eo left would 
 have no one to command it, and cavalry depends entirely on its ojDivers. 
 
 " There is no doubt that, if cavalry is to act in one rank, a different 
 organization is necessary. You must turn your mind to this, as the 
 end of the war brings to your aid the practical reflections you can 
 make now. The Duke of Wellington is in our favor, but the prejudices 
 of the cavalry officers are difficult to be overcome. 
 
 "I send you up , and if you can convert him you will do won- 
 ders. He never in his life gave up a once formed opinion. 
 
 " Try Head's (Sir Francis) plan with the lasso for your guns. 
 
 ""William Russell." 
 
 IV. 
 
 Extract from a letter from General Bacon. 
 
 "11th Septkmbkr, 1835. 
 "My dear Kinloch : I hope you stick to it 'rank entire.' Depend 
 upon it, it is the most efficient way of using cavalry. You are quicker, 
 
196 APPENDIX. 
 
 and have more reserves. Enclosed are some extracts* respecting my 
 system with cavalry. Lord Anglesea, Brotherton, and many other 
 oflScers I could name, agree ^with me. As I am the only man who has 
 tried it, I give you a few of my reasons. 
 
 " In one rank all movements are made with greater precision and 
 more rapidly than in two. 
 
 "When cavalry has to reform after a charge it is efiected more 
 readily and far quicker, for each man gets at once to his own troop, 
 and, if such formation be required under fire, the YsduG of quickness 
 will admit of no argument against it. 
 
 "I have tried this in presence of a superior enemy very frequently, 
 and at times when hotly pressed, and under a heavy fire of artillery 
 and musketry. 
 
 " A charge in one rank will bo more rapid, consequently more likely 
 to succeed, than one in two ranks, because the horses are more at 
 liberty, not likely to be cramped by the endeavors of the rear rank to 
 get to the front, and the men will have a more free use of their arms j 
 every one will do his duty j slcidkers can not so easily pull up, and such 
 are found in all armies. 
 
 "In advancing in line for any distance (and before an enemy you 
 have rarely a fine open country) the intervals are never preserved be- 
 tween squadrons, and it frequently happens that a line of two ranks 
 toward the centre becomes a disordered column ; in reforming, a rear 
 rank is never sure of its ' telling ofi".' 
 
 ''In all columns I should form my second rank in a column in rear 
 of my first, that is, as a second regiment; and this will always be easy 
 by keeping, when in line, a distance equal to the depth of a close col- 
 umn ; you may always close your lines if you think it desirable, and, 
 when about to form columns, it is only t^ open your ranks, or, instead 
 of a column of squadrons, to form on the centre a contiguous close 
 column of half-squadrons. 
 
 "Another great advantage in the system is, that all your ranks are 
 commanded by officers. Whenever you are asked for a squadron, re- 
 member it is a troop, and if you send two troops they are two squad- 
 rons, and they become a proper command for a major. 
 
 * The above from the Duke of Wellington, etc. 
 
PROPOSED ORGANIZATION. 197 
 
 " I could give you many other reasons for the system, but I hope to 
 be with you, and perfect that which I have begun, and with a fair por- 
 tion of success. 
 
 "Believe me, etc., 
 
 "A. Bacox." 
 
 A squadron of the First Lancers of the British legion in Spain, under 
 the command of Major Hograve, and consisting of only sixty hoi-ses, 
 charged three hundred of the Carlist cavalry (after they had defeated 
 several squadrons of Christino cavalry), pursued them above three 
 miles, and killed nearly one hundred of them. The squadron of the 
 First Lancers was formed in " rank entire," the Carlists in two ranks, 
 and thus proved triumphantly the efficiency of that system. 
 
 From the above opinions of distinguished and experienced officers, 
 supported as they are by facts on the few occasions the "rank entire" 
 formation has been tried, it appears worthy of consideration whether it 
 should not now be acted upon in the British army. 
 
 I find that, in the Regulations for the Drill and Exercise of the 
 Yeomanry Cavalry, they are recommended to adopt the " rank entire " 
 system, which I was not aware of when I wrote my pamphlet last year. 
 This formation is particularly suitable for yeomanry and all irregular 
 and half-disciplined cavalry, on account of its great simplicity and 
 freedom of action. As the Duke of Wellington "conceived that it 
 would render the use of cavalry in an army much more general than it 
 is at present;" as Sir Hussey Vivian said "that the second rank is 
 of little use but to fall over the first;" and as General Bacon observes, 
 "a troop becomes a squadron, and each rank is commanded by offi- 
 cers;" it appears that the eigfective strength of our cavalry maybe 
 greatly incrensed, if not fully vovb^kt), by adopting the rank entire 
 system. The principal change in the organization called for by this 
 alteration appears to be a small and economical addition to the otiicers. 
 
 Captains commanding troops will, when in line, command squadrons, 
 for a troop will occupy the same front in single rank that a squadron 
 does in two. (The interior economy of the troop remains as before.) 
 The officer who commands two troops or squadrons when in line will 
 have a fit command for a field-officer. 
 17* 
 
198 APPENDIX. 
 
 I would therefore suggest that, in order to carry out the advantages 
 of the "rank entire" system, and render it thoroughly efficient, a 
 second major should be restored to each cavalry regiment; and ae a 
 half-troop will become a half-squadron, there should be another subal- 
 tern to each troop. 
 
 Perhaps the two or three senior captains should have a higher rank 
 than merely captain, as they may sometimes command two troops or 
 gquadrons; the higher rank of chef d'escadron, as in other armies, or 
 brevet major, might be given to them. 
 
 The only additional expense, therefore, would be a second major for 
 each regiment, and a second lieutenant to each troop. A very small 
 expense certainly, if, as it is assumed, the cavalry will be greatly in- 
 creased in efficiency. 
 
 Let the troops be increased to fifty horses per troop, with the above 
 addition to the officers, and adopt the "rank entire " formation; then 
 our cavalry will be ready for any service that might be required of 
 them; but at present the regiments are verj' weak in horses, and in 
 double ranks are only about two good squadrons strong. 
 
 I must apologize for troubling you so long; but as the economical 
 increase of the army is the great question of the day, and cavalry ap- 
 pears not much noticed, I trust the foregoing remarks and opinions on 
 the organization and efficiency of that chivalrous and important arm 
 of the service will not be considered uninteresting to your military 
 readers. 
 
 I have the honor to be your obedient humble servant, 
 
 John Kinloch. 
 
 Logie, 7th March, 1853. 
 
 P. S. — The following sentences are extracted from my pamphlet, 
 before referred to. — J. K. 
 
 "It was on his (General Bacon's) recommendation that I adopted 
 this, which appeared to me to be the proper and common-sense forma- 
 tion of cavalry (and raw cavalry in particular), in the first or 'Reyna 
 Ysabel' regiment of lancers in the British legion in Spain, which I 
 had the honor to organize and command in 1835-36; and to that simple 
 
TROOP-HORSES AND OFFICERS' CHARGERS. 199 
 
 formation I attribute tbc very creditable and efficient manner in which 
 they could go through the manoeuvres of a field-day, and do their duty 
 in the field, after very little practice and drilling. After being broken 
 in a charge, or dispersed in pursuit, a squadron in rank entire may 
 ' rally ' and 'tell off' in much less time than the front and rear ranks 
 would take to scramble into their places; and thus much timo, ao val- 
 uable in cavalry movements, would be gained. 
 
 '' Many smart soldiers dislike being in the rear ranks, and feel them- 
 selves thrown in the background; they arc apt to become careless, and 
 merely to follow their front-rank files, without knowing or caring wha; 
 is going on; whereas in rank entire every man is under the eye of his 
 officers, and must be on the qui vive and wide awake. Every man has 
 an equal share in the attack, which is not the case with two ranks. 
 Rank entire may apxtear loose, and show more ' daylight ' between the 
 files, but is not in realiUj more loose; on the contrary, cavalry accus- 
 tomed to work in rank entire will be found to be better cloeod together 
 than with two, though the two ranks help to 'fill up ' better, and make 
 them appear closer and more solid. 
 
 " I consider that a charge of cavalry in rank entire, on fair ground, 
 fit for a good gallop, will 'hit harder,' and every man and horse 'tell' 
 with greater effect, than if the rear rank were treading on their heels. 
 The rear rank can not give much assistance to the front, but they may 
 actually incommode them. In the rank entire system young and un- 
 trained horses will be quiter and steadier, and not so likely to be lamed 
 by the rear rank treading on the front rank horses' heels, and they, in 
 turn, 'lashing out' and laming those behind. It may be said that the 
 two ranks have answered very well on former occasions, but it may 
 be a fair question to ask, whether half the number would not have done 
 as well ? or whether the same number in two lines, instead of two ranks, 
 would not have done better?" 
 
 TROOP-HORSES AND OFFICERS' CHARGERS. 
 
 Before I left India some very interesting trials were made at Madras, 
 by order of the Commander-in-chief, General Sir George Berkeley, the 
 
200 APPENDIX. 
 
 object of which was to test the csipabilities of the troop-horses, as well 
 as the relative merits of entire horses and geldings for the purposes of 
 war. 
 
 Three trials were made. 
 
 The first with two regiments of Native Eegular Cavalry, one of stall- 
 ions, one of geldings. 
 
 The next with two troops of Horse-Artillery. 
 
 The third, and last, with two hundred English dragoons (15th Hus- 
 sars) — one hundred riding stallions, and one hundred mounted on geld- 
 ings. This squadron marched upwardsof eight hundred miles — namely, 
 from Bangalore to Hyderabad, where they remained a short time to 
 take part in the field-days, pageants, etc. They then returned to Ban- 
 galore, four hundred miles, by forced marches: only one rest-day was 
 allowed them, and the last six marches in wei'e made at the rate of 
 thirty miles a day. They brought in but one led horse; stallions and 
 'geldings did their work equally Avell, and were in equally good condition 
 on their return. The question was, however, decided in favor of the 
 latter, because they had been cut without reference to age, and only sis 
 months before the trial took place. 
 
 The English cavalry in India is well mounted. On an emergency 
 any one of these Indian regiments would gallop fifty miles in a pursuit, 
 leave few horses behind, and suffer but little from the effects of such 
 exertion. The horses on which they are mounted are small but power- 
 ful. The Arab, the Persian, the Turcoman, the horses from the banks 
 of the Araxes, are all unrivalled as war-horses. I have seen a Persian 
 horse fourteen hands three inches carrying a man of our regiment of 
 gigantic proportions, and weighing, in marching order, twenty-two and 
 a half stone : I have seen this horse on the march above alluded to, of 
 eight hundred miles, carrying this enormous weight with ease, and 
 keeping his condition well; at the crossing of the Kistna, a broad, rapid, 
 and dangerous river, the owner of this horse (Private Heme, of troop) 
 refused to lead the animal into the ferry-boat to cross, but, saying, 
 "An hussar and his horse should never part company," he took the 
 water in complete marching order, and the gallant little horse nobly 
 stemmed the tide, and landed his rider safely on the opposite bank. 
 
 An otlicer in India made a bet that he would himself ride his charger 
 (an Arab, little more than fourteen hands high) four hundred measured 
 
TROOP-HORSES AND OFFICERS' CHARGERS. 201 
 
 miles in five consecutive days, and he won the match; the horse per- 
 formed his task with ease, and did not even throw out a windgall. The 
 owner, an officer of the Madras Artillery, died shortly afterwards. 
 
 General Daumas relates that the horses of the Sahara will travel dur- 
 ing five or six days from seventy-five to ninety miles a day, and that in 
 twenty-four hours they will go over from one hundred and fifty to one 
 hundred and eighty miles, and this over a stony desert. Diseases of 
 the feet and broken wind are almost unknown among them. 
 
 What would become of an English cavalry regiment if suddenly re- 
 quired to make a few furced marches, or to keep up a pursuit for a few 
 hundred miles ! Their want of power to carry the weight, and want of 
 breeding, makes them tire after trotting a few miles on the line of 
 march. 
 
 Our cavalry horses are feeble ; they measure high, but they do so from 
 length of limb, which is weakness, not power. The blood they require is 
 not that of our weedy race-hox'se (an animal more akin to the greyhound, 
 and bred for speed alone), but it is the blood of the Arab and Persian, 
 to give them that compact form and wiry limb in which they are wanting. 
 
 The fine Irish troop-horses, formerly so sought for, are not now to be 
 procured in the market. Instead of the long, low, deep-chested, short- 
 backed, strong-loined horse of former days, you find nothing now but 
 long-legged, straight-shouldered animals, prone to disease from the 
 time they are foaled, and whose legs grease after a common field-day.* 
 These animals form the staple of our remount horses. 
 
 Decked out in showy trappings, their riders decorated with feathers 
 and plumes, they look well to the superficial observer; but the English 
 cavalry are not what they should be. If brought fresh into the field of 
 battle, the speed of the horses and the pluck of the men would doubt- 
 less achieve great things for the moment ; but they could not oxhtre, 
 they could not follow up, they could not come a<jain. 
 
 All other reforms in our cavalry will be useless unless this important 
 point be looked to. It is building a house on the sand to organize cav- 
 alry without good horses. Government alone could work the necessary 
 reform by importing stallions and mares of Eastern blood, for the pur- 
 pose of breeding troop-horses and chargers for the cavalry of England. 
 
 * " On the Condition of our Saddle-Horsea :" T. Ilatchard, Piccadilly. 
 
202 APPENDIX. 
 
 It is said that a goA'ernment stud is opposed to the principle of com- 
 petition. What competition can there be among breeders for the price 
 of a troop-horse, when, by breeding cart-horses, they obtain forty pounds 
 for them when two years old ? How could they possibly afford to rear 
 animals with the necessary qualifications for a cavalry horse of the first- 
 class? To breed such horses a cross must first be obtained with our 
 race-horses: this would entail a large outlay of capital; and when the 
 good troop-horse was produced, the breeder could not obtain his price 
 for him. 
 
 The rules of our Turf encourage speed only, and that for short dis- 
 tances. Horses are bred to meet these requirements, and from theso 
 weeds do our horses of the present day inherit their long legs, straight 
 shoulders, weak constitutions, and want of all those qualities for which 
 the English horse of former days was so justly renowned.* 
 
 I had heard of fine horses in Russia, but I complacently said to my^ 
 self, '•'Whatever they are, they can not be as good as the English." 
 However, I went to Russia — and seeing is believing. Their horse-ar- 
 tillery and cavalry are far better mounted than ours; and their horses are 
 immeasurably superior in those qualities which constitute the true war- 
 horse — namely: courage, constitutional vigor, strength of limb, and 
 great power of endurance under fatigue and privation. 
 
 The excellent example set by Sir George Berkeley in India might be 
 followed up at home with groat advantage to the service ; the capabili- 
 ties of our cavalry horses of the present day should be severely tested, 
 and the saddles should be tried, and experiments made to ascertain how 
 sore backs may be avoided. 
 
 * "On the Condition of our Saddle-Horses." 
 
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