c2 PRESIDENT DAVIS HIS ADMINISTRATION. A REVIEW OF THE "RIVAL ADMINISTRATION LATELY PUBLISHED IN RICHMOND, AND WRITTEN BY E. A. POLLARD, AlTli OF THE " FIRST AND ND FEARS OF THE WAR." .A.. A.T3FLA.TSA& 7 AUTHOR OF A HI.I. ASD DKT.WLI.I) UfeTOKY OF Till ATLANTA, GEORGIA: PUBLISHED FOR THE AUTHOR. 1864. ERRATUM. ■ F"r the word ''misrepresented" on the tenth line in the preface, read 1 deemed offensive." PRESIDENT DAVIS HIS ADMINISTRATION, A REVIEW OF THE "RIVAL ADMINISTRATIONS," LATELY PUBLISHED IN RICHMOND, AND WRITTEN BY E. A. POLLARD, AUTHOR OF THE "FIRST AND SECOND YKARS OF THE WAR." ZQ-ST A.- S. ABRAMS, Urn- OR Of " A FT1.L 1ID DKTATUCP BlffTCRT or TEBtnWS Of T1CKS81BQ. ATLANTA, GEORGIA: PUBLISHED FOR THE AUTHOR. 1864, Jfcn. ^evt./W^ PREFACE The object of this pamphlet is purely to reriew the late attack on the administration, and to do justice to those who have been^placed in charge of the government, believing that Mr. Pollard has acted very unjustly towards the President and his Cabinet. It haying been said, by those who hare seen the within pages, while in manuscript, that they may be construed into a personal attack on the author of the Rival Administrations, the author of this review, while declaring that his purpose is simply to defend the admintetration from Mr. Pollai object sponsible for every word contained therein. •llanos cJjflr yg r>f inr^v^gf ^kcjj»^H^^i^o&^\thaL Ao^l^f^ druTTs work 7k'""Y:i: -r^jii^ij^, ry^To!* ninv.elf pcrsonall/r^ Atlanta, Georota, February, 196S. # /•*/• .Vfc*l\« s^ #vt^ *#~ V v ->..-. ^ 5>\* • •s -*$*» «? # «* «^» r*l • ^X $Z\ ++£* \ * PRESIDENT DAVIS up HIS ADMINISTRATION EAFIKB I. History aud historians aro generally 8tt] to be truthful and impartial; narrating events as they oceur, giving praise even to an enemy, when he deserves it, and only censuring wher voiee of the people conder*i|^ This course has been pursued by all historians prior to (he writing of the history of this revolu- tion, when we find its use^ corrupted with a view to cir the venom of a partisan spirit, and under a semblance of mng- nanimous candor, an aUejnpt«to utter sentiments, not only but utterly ignored and repudiated by the masses of the people. "We have been induced to tl i pam- phlet containing a violent attack on the administration dent Davis, which is so palpably fa] it would require no notice v djd not a pre-Rcr, regard for jthe . statesman- whom the people of th<> Confederate Si in tlie republic, demaml that such-gr truth, anti a partisan attack, such as the "Rival Administrations" undoubt- edly is, should be fully rciV i dignity laid I people. The. : folio wing, pages are not intended as a praise of the Pres- ident. We are no partisan of the administration, as the thou- sands who have read the "History of the Siege of Vicksbnrg," and "Review of the War," can testify. Ours is but to defend from a gross and unmanly assault the President who, with all his faults, is universally acknowledged to be the most able man in the Confederate States. That he has erred in some instances we will not deny, but that his errors have been so serious as to warrant the attack made on him by the author of " The Rival Administrations," we not only deny, but endeavor to prove our denial. > CHAPTER II. Let us lake a glance back at years previous to the war, and we find Jefferson Davis holding a. prominent position in the councils of the United States. Not only were his private qual- ities unimpeachable, and his literary ability of high order, but he was known as, and considered an able statesman in the Sen- ate of the United States. To deny this fact is to speak falsely. None who are acquainted with the history of the causes which led to the disruption of the Union, can fail to recollect Jefferson Davis as holding a prominent position on the Southern side of the various questions then at issue, and considered as one of the most talented statesmen of this continent. To deny it, we have said, is false, and not only false, but a perversion of history. If Jefferson Davis " had never been accounted as a statesman," how was it that the convention which met at Montgomery, Al- abama, unanimously elected him President of the Provisional government ? This question we deem sufficient to refute the statement of Mr. Pollard, that the President was never consid- ered a statesman in the old government. His election was not the result of intrigue. He was hundreds of miles away when the convention elected him. In^je quiet of his country home,, like a second Cincinnatus, he received intelligence that he had been elected to preside over the destinies of the new-born re- jDublic. If he had never been considered a statesman, would his services have been sought after by a convention composed of the first statesmen of the South? Facts show the falsity of this statement, as well as the voice of impartial history. "We now enter upon President Davis' administration of the affairs of the Confederacy. The first charge brought against him is "his choice of officers in the field." In what manner has his choice of officers proved so detrimental to the Souths when compared with the happy selections he has made^. "The President depreciated Price as a militiaman," says Mr. Pollard ; but that gentleman fails to tell us in what instance General Price has shown himself possessed of ability to fill a higher position than he now occupies. The fact is that General Price has been an over-estimated man, and the President knows it. With respect to his "light opinion of Beauregard," this i», simply false, as the conduct of the President towards that offi- cer, after the battle of Manassas was of the most appreciative nature possible. It is true, that from some cause or other, the feeling between the President and General Beauregard has not been of as cordial a nature as could be desired, but the best ac- count of the causes which led to such disagreement, state that it was from the refusal of the President to permit an advance of the Confederate army on Washington after the battle of Manassas. So far from having a poor appreciation, the Presi- % dent, we are certaiD, has the highest possible opinion of the hero of Manassas, Shiloh and Charleston. The next favorite the President is charged with 1 General Pemberton* Of this officer we are not, prepared to say anything favorable. We have condemned him as incompe- tent before, and so consider him still. At the same time we see no reason why the President shai! ler him an able of5e#, and with that belief no one can blame him' for retaining < r< r-Hral Pemberton in his confidence. Of General Lovell no more need be said than the fact that he was 1*1 acquitted of all cba incompetency; while of General Bragcr, the President never displayed greater ability and firm- ness" than when he refused to relieve him from command, for not only are the military abiliti* - of General Bragg appreciated by a large majority of his army, and Johnston— a military authority, we think, of some important These, then, arc the "favorites" which President Davis is charged with having selected for the field, and u as unapt as his selection of political advisers in the cabinet." Mr. Pollard says that "the civil administration of Mr. Davis had fallen to a low ebb." ThU uieally false. Tlu* V ident has ever been looked npofl by tl an able and efficient servant of the Confederacy, and as the only man in the South who cOuld till the ofhYe he holds with as much success. "We -peak the scntil }>l<\ not \ho pri- vate opinions of a partisan feeling. That the administration possesses the confidence - f the | irent 01. the tour oi' tl i PK -ident through the dill 5 tatef, a short time after the battle of Chic . | tion was enthu- siastic, and «• how he would have I well 1 by them, if his administration had fallen to s<> low an ebb. Bnttheuttei ion of fa I iore glaring, when Mr. Pollard tells u that "there are certain minds which cannot see how want of capacity in our government, official sniftli M, and the mismanagement of public afl consist with * While we will never attempt to deny that progs incompetency charact of General Pembeiton, we must, nev< rtbeless, from personal know). it Yicksburg mur erer surrendered before u • naweTeexba atthe soldiers had to eat mules is not a " sehood," f r bui t> wa- really the case; th'- writer of thete lines having eaten the flesh of mules himself, for want of oilier meat." As a proof that there was no provisirns remaining, except, perhaps, what was u I itals, we would state that the Confederate forces remained without food fr< m the Sa'urday the sur- render took place until the following Monday, when they drew rations from the Federal itort* % the commissary of our army being empty. These are facts, and we dffy denial. Mr. Pollard exhibits a deplorable ignorance of the position of the two armies in Mississippi, when he 6tates that the " importunate entreaties of Bowen" were denied, on the " more unfor- tunate day of Big Black," when he (Bowen) had sent seven or eight couriers ta Pemberton for ieinforcements. This is not only false, but displays an unpardonable amount of ignorance. At the Battle of Big Black no reinforcerr ents were ever sent for, because they were not needed. At the fiist attack of the enemy, the Confederate army, which had been defeated the day be- fore, brcke i nd retreated across the river. The number of men composing Grant's army was not 50,000 but 80,000, a fact the writer learnt from the best Federal information, wink- a prisoner at Vicksburg. Fifty thousand men eculd not have defeated tlie Confederate army in the manner they did. the undeniable facts of the success of our arms, and the great achievment8 of the Confederacy." Sensible and impartial minds cannot see it. Nor is it possible that in a revolution of this nature, confronted as the South is by a foe of great numbers and energy, the " valor and determination of the people may make considerable amends for the faults of its governors." It- would be a matter of impossibility for the South to achieve a single success, were she not guided by the wisdom of a central power. The people are merely the followersjpf the rulers they have appointed to preside over the destinies ol the country, and they would have no opportunity to show their " valor and de- termination" were they not led to it by those in authority. Nor has the " history of this war proved one proposition clearly," "that in all its subjects of congratulation the 'states- manship* of Richmond had little part in it." We also " deny the justice of this historical (?) judgment, which refuses to at- tribute to the official authorities of this government, such success as we have had in this war." No " history" of this war has yet been written. In the two volumes issued, and the pamphlet now before us, we find a narrative of the different" civil and mil- itary operations compiled together, for the purpose of covering an unmanly attack upon the President. And when the assertion is broadly made that no success achieved by the South in this contest can be attributed to the administration, we not only deny it, but come prepared to show where the administration is worthy of, and has received the heartfelt praises of the coun- try. We will take a glance back at the fall of Fort Donelson and the evacuation of Nashville, and endeavor to find out what was the conduct of the administration in this emergency. The whole South teemed with invectives against General Albert Sydney ♦Johnston. His soldiers commenced deserting him., and the people refused to enlist under his banner. In this emergency, the conduct of the administration was admirable. General Beauregard was sent to Tennessee, men and means were placed his disposal by the government in a most lavish manner, and a glorious campaign was the result. Let us look further back to the seven days of battle before Richmond. Were they solely the result of the " valor and de- termination of the people ?" Again we view the action of the administration in the retreat of Bragg from Chattanooga — the brilliant victory of Chicka- rnanga, and we ask if the people alone must receive praise for that success. On another page Mr. Pollard says : u We do not know of any real and substantial particulars in which the administration of Mr. Davis has contributed to the war." Here is another asser- tion which can be refuted without saying a great deal. Look at the position which Mr. Davis* administration has placed the Sonth in, and who can remain blind to the good it has What revolutionary pnrty, however strong, ever maintained as much territory as the South does at the present time, after three years of fighting? None! And to whom ean we attribute this " substantial" fact ? Not to the people. But if all the buoi lieved by the Sonth ai attri- buted to the people alone, why shall they not be the responsibility of defeat? "it is an outage upon justice to charge the administration v* ' ail the tcrs which have occurred, and endeavor to gain * ilarity of the people by declaring that they alone ai it the successes of oar arms. It is the pra i jogue andnot the. historian. Writers of history confii to facts, and never allow their feelings of animt > truth and commit injustice. CHAPTER III. It is generally the case that after an enigm I all parties find out how simple it wa . der at the dullness of another in not - the time that ho was one of th< re want prevented its solution. This is the rise with Mr. Poll • I he gravely tells the people that " it i ■ I to 1 K>k back upon the current* of our history, t the blin ' and littleness of min I, the conceit, the sighted management, in all which ; nto this present v 11 A war and depths of disti and littleness of mind'" the one or the other To th - mas all hope for peace had departed, a powerful ai raised and put in the Held. Jefferson Davis assnmi >1 of a gov- ernment, or rather revolutionary party, without its 1. form of government. With the skill of a statesman he mould- ed that revolutionary party into a model government, in a few short weeks. Civil and military departments were put in ope- ration wit hing energy and rapidity. He measured the necessity of the South by the strength of the North. The President saw not before him a war of indefinite duration; no one saw it. It was a gift of far-sightedness which only the craven hearted and sol disant patriots posf None else saw it. Yancey, Cobb, Stephens and Benjamin, distingnl statesmen on the civil, and Johnston, Lee and Beauregard on the military side, failed to sec an endless war. The President was not gifted with a glance into futurity. He saw seventy-five -thousand Northern men first arrayed in arms against the South, 10 and he prepared for that number. He next saw five hundred thousand, and he prepared for that number also. Did that ex- hibit " blindness" or " littleness of mind?" Surely there was no necessity for calling out the entire strength of the South at one time for the purpose of defeating a comparative handful of men. To have done so would have been short-sightedness in- deed, and totally unworthy the statesman we claim Prcsidert Davis to be. It is charged by Mr. Pollard that the administration, to have exhibited any marks of statesmanship, should have discovered that this war would be one of several years' duration, but he gives no one instance where such far-seeing statesmanship has been shown. Not on this continent, for Calhoun and Webster, the two farthest-seeing statesmen that America ever had, could never see a greater calamity occurring to this continent, than the disruption of the Union. They never saw war resulting from it. Nor can we find in European history any evidence of such far-seeing statesmanship as that desired by Mr. Pollard. Take as an instance the wars which raged during the time of Napoleon Buonaparte. Surely no far-seeing statesmanship was exhibited in Europe at that period. Noneof the statesmen of that continent saw in the ruler of France, a man who would- deluge nearly every nation on that continent with blood. Is it,, then, a wonder that the administration should have failed to see that the war would extend to years ? The idea is ridiculous ; it is devoid of sound reasoning. Referring to the neglect of the Confederate Government to purchase and provide all the necessary appliances of warfare, Mr. Pollard says that "Secretary Mallory laughed off con- tractors in New Orleans, who offered to sell to the government a large amount of navy supplies." On what grounds is this assertion made ? We have good reasons for knowing, that not only was a large quantity of navy supplies purchased in New Orleans for the department, but all in fact that could be got at- that time in the city, and a large quantity, had to be sent from Memphis to New Orleans to complete the cotton clad fleet which was built there. Here then is an assertion made with- out waiting to ascertain the fact, but purely, as we suppose, on the statement of irresponsible parties. We shall, however, re- fer to the subject of the Navy Department in another chapter. Immediately below this tirade against the Secretary of the Navy, we find Judah P. Benjamin and the President charged with short-sightedness for expressing their opinion (in the Fall of 1802)' that the war would soon come to an end. The posi-< tion of the Confederacy warranted the opinion that the war would soon come to an end. The North had commenced to exhibit signs of dissatisfaction at the reverses her arms had met - during the past months. European nations were also of opin- ion that the war could not last much longer. The "great poll- 11 ticians*' of England, in pnblic speeches, expressed their convic- tions that the Xori ower over the Southern" The brilliant cami f Lee in Virginia, Bragg in Teni Lana, and the snecesful tie- fence of Vicksburg, combined t > form a: then the ' eran opinion t 1 war would soon come to an en there any "wa jht and judgment displayed l»y the Cob fed er at i p, in their calculation at the dinerenl riods of the war, of the course likely ,1 by Europe and the North." It wag never doubted that the North fi^ht, but t 1 ere wa« ubt it' s 1 ' : not be •mmereial community, devoted to the pursuit of gain," but because her • mlikc those of "Carthage, Venice, Genoa, Holland and England," shewed that their belli' gerent powers were not of the order. Take, as an in- stance, the Mexican Mar, and we find that the North, alt! two-thirds as populous as the South. - • ly one-third of the total amount of men who volunteered. These facts are, in themselves, posse s< d of great weight, and from them must Statesmen form ' the political status of a people. The history of one nation, which we find "in bo is not likely to be the history of another. It is, therefore, ab- surd to charge the' Administration with shortsightedness, be- cause it failed to see what no one saw until time had developed it. Such charges are but the emanations of a mind filled with a vain conceit of its own intellectual penetration, when in fact it only shows US wii.i • have seen developed through passing events. Mr. Pollard's l * hasty and ps Admin- istration for its "o&Igti rice and England," is tie most "ludicrous," as well tmi e ever seen in pi int. He tells us "the idea is ludicrous, now that, at the very beginning of the American revolution, Franc* England, with their centuri< peace ami war, would fling t hems eh i convulsion which their great politicians easily saw was the most tremendous of modern times." We see nothing "ludicrous" in the idea, for the past policy of England and prance, .dvan- tages which a disruption of thi -an Union gave them > made it very natural to entertain the opinion that they would be willing to recognize the independence <>t the Confederacy as soon as it had given sufficient evidence of its ability to main- tain it.* Nor was this even necessary, for when we look at the ***** It was universally acknowledged by all the great powers of Europe, that the South could never be conquered, and France went so far as to make propositions to England for an united action in regard to American affair?. Both these offers were rejected, not because England doubted the ability of the South to maintain her independence, but because her in- terest prompted a continuance of the war. The South was thus left alone, and a war allowed to continue, only to gratify the selfish spirit of an European nation. It may sound very strange fer a citif.cn of the South to accuse a foreign government of a continuation of the war, and thus implying that the Confederacy had no ability to ftop it herself. Such Lb not our idea. That t9 conduct of England toward Greece, Italy, and oilier countries which have regained or achieved independence by revolution, we find tbatshe has either recognized their nationality, or lent them material aid. Besides which, the universally acknowl- edged sovereignty of the different States, composing the Con- federacy and their claim to the right of secession, give the Ad- ministration a further right to claim recognition. We shall not, however, attempt to prove any further the claim of the Con- federacy for recognition ; President Davis has shown that in his State papers, in the most unquestionable manner possible ; suffi- cient to say, that even the press of those foreign governments, which Mr. Pollard seems so desirous of defending, have ac- knowledged the legality of the claim set up by the President. The foregoing defense of England is followed bv the remark, gr. power of England would submit to the ineffable humiliation of acknowledging its dependence on the infant Confederacy of tho South." Here we find no just and truthful statement of the causes which made cotton pronounced "King." "We are shown no grounds on which the rulers of the South based their argu- ment in favor of cotton. All that we see in this attack, is an attempt to defend England against the -well merited rebuke which President Davis has administered to that nation. It looks, in fact, more liko a desire to court popularity among the government and people of England, by defending them in a cause ^which even their own journals have declared partial and unjust. That there is any argument in this defense of the the South has the ability to briog this war to a successful issue, we not. only firmly believe, ba know it, as a fact. Still, to review the conduct of (ireat Britain, so far as it is connected with this war, no one can fail to see, that had any revolutionary party in Europe achieved half the tmccesse* that the South achieved in thejyear of lS&i, she would not only have recognised it, but have been an ally. It was not slavery alone which prevented the interference of England in this struggle. — Strongly prejudiced as she is against the " peculiar institution" of tiw South, and, great aa is the obstacle which it places before recognition, it could have been surmounted, but for the good tvhieh the war has done to the shippiug and mercantile interests of that country. Cotton was and is a great consideration with them. Its los3 has reduced to beggary thousands who de- pended on that staple for support. Of this, however, England cares but little. No matter thai this continence deluged with blood, and from every home in Manchester and Lancashire th-, ery of starvation ascends, she will never move a step to ooviate it, while such misery increases! her boasted mercantile superiority on the water, and adds so much additional gold to her revenue. Such was the political position of the Confederacy with Europe, or strictly speaking, with. England and France, in the year 1SS2. That the South had a perfect right to expect recogni- tion, no impartial mind can deny. She had just emerged from a campaign which had covered her arms with glory, and made her illustrious in history. She had driven from her soil in dis grace and humiliating rout, a foe numbering not les3 than six hundred thousand of the flower of the North. From a population of eight millions she has raised an army of four hundred thousand men— a number never before known in any nation of the same strength in population. On all sides she conironted the foe with bands of patriots flushed with recent victories, and filled with determination. It was a situation never before known in the annals of a revolution. History doe3 not show a single instance where a revolutionary party ever maintained the in- tegrity t of their soil with as much success as did the Confederacy. All these facts combined, make it apparent that the anticipations of recognition by the South, was perfectly ratiouaL, under the circumstances. She had fairly earned it, and had recognition followed after the bat- tle of Sharpsburg, the North would have been willing to recognize ths South also, but the cold- ness of foreigu countries encouraged her to further efforts at subjugation, and the result was a contlnnation of the war, with greater ftiry tban bad heretofore distinguished it.— tfewew cftho War, Chapter XII. " great and illustrious power of England," we deny ; it is writ- ten for the eyes of the English reader, and not for that of the Confederate. We will not deny that the Confederate authorities made a great mistake in not purchasing the entire cotton crop of the South at the commencement of the war. It would have given the South the command of an immense amount of specie had the ichole crop arrived safely at foreign ports, but Ve very much douht if such a thing could have Been done. Another great miscalculation of Mr. Pollard is, that it would have yielded "two shillings sterling ;" it could never have yielded much more than one. although that would have left the government a large profit. CHAPTER IV. .While we are net able to declare Mr. Memminger wholly guiltless of causing the depreciation of the currency by his mal- ndministra iou of the Treasury Department, we must, neverthe- less, insist that he is not wholly responsible for it. There aro other and equally importanl h led to its rapid depre- ciation, and these we will endeavor to point out.* Mr. Pollard tells us, with considerable bitterness, that "in February, 1862, President Davis had made the most extrava- gant congratulation to the country OH our financial condition, in comparison with that of the North," and 4t in less than eighteen months thereafter, when g^hl was quoted in York at twenty-five per cent, premium, it was selling in Rich- mond at nine hundred per cent, premium ; and by the time that the Confederate Congress met in l)< gold in Kich- mond was worth about two thousand | premium, and was -publicly sold one for twent] rale notes." The truth of this statement noi nt price of i shows; :( the same time we find that the i f this is oot us much ou ing t<> " the financial wisdom" of the Confed- erate Administration . I of the people in their tnd prodigal expei the currency.f The causes n Idea on tl it bloek- ade running ha* tided to any considerable dugll* In the deprecialiea af the currency. The f%ci in, thai \: aided in keeping it up than oth er w ioe ; whir! nade apparent from the fact, that the goods which are imported into the South are genera: procerd? of cotton i nrted. It WOuM t u< rt-nJf-r the cvrr> ■ depredating it, for the importing into th I r of Urge qnauHtici of articles nc t n. m nfacturtd in her limit?, would occa-ion a rtduction in pri Bated bjtNM of scarcity. This h.is t< • D . vrrlooked by a great many who have been so eager to denounce the fvptetn of blockade running, but if the fi inject vera piveu the consideration it deserves, they would find that it is more deserving of praise than of censure. tin Mr. P, Hard's ";?e».ond Year of the War,'' he charp-s the brokers of the Confederacy with being aiders and abetter? in depreciating the currency, and only allows exceptions to the generality, 'i: . , for thereat true and 14 I which must be laid down as the source of depreciation, are these: A superabundant amount of money afloat, being five or six times more than was necessary for the business of the country. This, Mr. Memminger endeavored to prevent by offering in- ducements to the holders of the treasury notes to fund. J This was, no doubt, a most excellent plan of keeping the currency within a prudent limit, but failed from causes which we shall hereafter relate. The next cause was -the action of the people in taking advan- tage of the necessities of the government, and the scarcity of food, to place enormous valuation on their products, and which was paid from the absolute necessity for all possessed by these speculators and extortioners. This is, without doubt, the principal cause of the deprecia- tion of Confederate treasury notes. Both the planter and the merehant must be blamed for it, and not the administration. — These two classes of the people made a necessity which never existed, and by their extortion compelled the issuance of a much larger amount of money that would have been expended, had the price of any supplies been held, at the same rates as when the war first commenced. To prove this argument does not require much words. It must be plain to all, that where the government has to pay six dollars per bushel for wheat at the present time, it throws upon the country four dollars more of the currency than would otherwise have been expended had the price continued at two dollars, which was the outside cost of wheat at the commencement of the war. The last cause was the conduct of a few traitors in our midst, who purchased gold with treasury notes as fast as they accu- mulated them, and thus caused the great advance on the price of specie. After the currency had depreciated five hundred per cent, it loyal citizens of the South. Those who sold Federal currency publicly in Richmond are trai- tors to their country, and should not cause the whole of that class, which follow the profession of brokers, to bear an ill n^me. For a broker to deal in gold and silver coin, is no more than he has been always accustomed to do, while his profits at the present time are much smaller than those of any other business. For instance, where they pay eighteen and a half dollars in Confederate currency for one in gold, they soil the same for twenty, being a profit not exceed- ing nine per cent. In making these remarks we do not intend to defend the brokers, we only desire to show a few facts. Jit may be said that if even this could have been carried out, that the number of bonds thrown on the market from the purchase of cotton, would have been so large that they would have depreciated as soon as treasury notes. We see no reason for such argument, from the fact that such bonds bearing eight per cent, interest, the man who was possessed of fifty thou- sand dollars worth, would have been more ttUposed to receive four thousand dollars per an- num from the interest, than to hare sold it for gold at a depreciated rate. It would not have been looked upon as money, but as an article of remuneratfve worth, *nd when we consider that eight per cent, was looked upon as a la'-ge profit, before the depreciation of treasury notes, we cannot fail to see that capitalists would have eagerly bought them, not only at but above par. The issuance of treasury notes, with bonds at the same time, would naturally tend to depreci- ate the value of the latter, for the constant influx of the treasury notes naturally increases the price of all ar.icles, and wi>h them the profits. Thus, when treasury notes had depreciated one hundred per cent, the profits on merchandize and labor increased in proportion, and o one who could make ten thousand dollars on an outlay of twenty thousand dollars in treasury notes, would take these same notes and purchase tweuty thousand dollars of bonds to receive an interest of only sixteen hundred in the same currency, — R&oi&v) oftha War. 15 was absolutely ridiculous to quote it at a specie valuation. Gold, silver and foreign exchange then became mere articles of merchandize, worth more than anything else ; they could not be looked upon as money, simply for the reason that they were never used as such in the Confederacy, and we had no commer- cial dealings with the outside world. The comparison between the North and South, on the finance question, is unjust to the administration, and absurd in itself.- — The cause of the currency of the United States not depreciat- ing as rapidly as that of the South, is attributable to several reasons. In the North there has always been more wheat and other cereals raised than was neeessary for her population, and which surplus was sold to the South previous to the war. After the war commenced and all commerce ceased this surplus be- came a drug on the holders, who willingly sold it at a low price for any kind of money that would purchase other articles. In this instance the supply exceeded the demand, and wherever this occurred we find that money is appreciated. Another great assistance to the currency of the United States was their largo population, as well as their free and unrestricted trade witli the world. They were in a much better condition to absorb a large amount of paper money than the South, who had no Other source of using the treasury notes circulated ju her midst, than by a system of speculation alike dishonorable and unpatriotic. While wc cannot say much in defence of Mr. Memminger, there is one thing certain, that the people have been as much to blame as the Secretary of the Treasury. We acknowledge that xhort sighted financial ability was exhibited in the administra- tion of the treasury department, but ire insist that the evils which resulted from such administration, were made doubly aggravated by the unpatriotic and suicidal conduct of those who possessed the mass of the currency, in not funding as off and the speculating and extorting spirit of the merchant and farmer in creating a necessity wh^re n< t d in reality. CHAPTER V. The next subject which comes under Mr. Pollard's notice, " is the disclosure from the Confederate Secretary of War, Mr. James Seddon, that the effective force of the army was not, more than a half, never two-thirds of the numbers in the ranks," and this fact is attributed wholly and solely to the Secretary or, to use Mr. Pollard's words, "the fault of his own administra- tion, the remissness of discipline, the weak shunning of the death penalty in our armies, and that paltry quackery which 16 proposed to treat the great evil of desertion with * proclama- tions and patriotic appeals.' " Here we have a perfect plethora of charges brought against the administration of the war department; the first of which is said to be u the fault of his non-administration." This is not correct. It is hazarding an assertion which cannot be proven. In what manner has the administration of Mr. Seddon influenc- ed desertion and absenteeism from the Confederate army ? Sure- ly, in making such, a charge, the grounds on which they are made might have been given. We see no cause to censure Mr. Seddon's administration of the War Department. On the con- trary, his conduct, since his appointment to that office, has crea- ted great satisfaction among the people, who were apprehensive that the resignation of Mr. Randolph would leave the va«ant place difficult to fill in an efficient manner. The next, charge, of "remissness- of discipline," is only par- tially correct, and must be laid to the officers and not to the administration. All orders necessary to the strict enforcement of discipline are issued by the War Department, and if the commanders of troops, by their neglect of duty, cause desertion and absenteeism from the army, and the fact of such neglect is not reported to the War Department, no blame can be attached thereto for any such remissness. Commanding Generals, and not the Secretary of War, must be held responsible, for the soldiers who are thus remiss in discipline, are under their im- mediate eye, and it is their dufcy to enforce a proper obedience of the regulations. A " weak shunning of the death penalty in our armies" fol- lows the last charge, and here Mr. Pollard again falls into error. Death has been inflicted too often, and without any effect on the comrades of those who have died thus disgracefully. What then was left to the government, when punishment failed to act asaw arning to others who deserted or absented themselves from the ranks. Appeals to their patriotism were not only needed, but served the purpose of restoring many to the ranks who would never have gone otherwise. In not one of the charges enumerated above, do we find sufficient explanation for the desertion and absenteeism from our army, while other causes, more truthful, are neglected, because they reflect direct- ly upon the people, whose good opinions is what Mr. Pollard appears most to desire. One great cause of the absenteeism and desertion from the Confederate army, can be found in the conduct of the people at home. A soldier leaves his family at home, and serves his country for the miserable pittance of eleven dollars per month.* * On a late visit to the " Army of Tennessee," we were in enru mimical ion with a soldier who had been sentenced to wear a barrel shirt as a punishment for absenting himself without leave for some weeks. On inquiring the cause which led to desertion, we htiard that his wife and children were in destitute condition, on account of the depreciation of the currency, and their inability to uiak»> asufiicieBCy of it, and had written acquainting him of her deplorable position. 17 During his absence, the short-sighted policy of the government, aided by a heartless crowd of speculators and extortioners, de- preciates the currency of the country to such a degree that it takes a large sum of it to support his family. They have no way of obtaining the required amount, and consequently great destitution ensues. The result is that the soldier desert*. Who can be blamed for this? Not the Secretary of War; it is the people — they whose property the soldier tights to protect — who cause desertion from the army. They have either caused the family of a soldier to sufter for want of food, or have instilled their cowardly fears in his breast, and thus influenced him to desert. To the people — that is those at home — must be attrib- uted the frequent desertions from the army. It is an undenia- ble fact, whatever may be said on the subject. Experience has shown it, and communication with the soldiers will prove it. The other causes which lead to desertion and absenteeism are but small, when brought in comparison with the statements above. This is the ground we have taken upon the subject, and impartial history will agree with us. The attack of Mr. Pollard on the Secretary of War, for re- commending " the supercedure of all exemptions by a system of details in the War Department," is unworthy in every re- spect. We cannot see that "such measures were finished pieces of demago not noticing it laid ; and malicious,] opportunity for heaping another paragraph of abu th< President, both undeserved by hi u aud uni ; . writer. v HAPTER VII. Few meu in public position 1 a >ed censure, and it were absurd to expect that PreiidenJ; Davis should escape what a Washington received, still, there are times when such censure becomes wholly undeserved, and pierges frpra a desin the country, into a desii va the private ends of a partisan spirit, filled with prejudice and blind to everything but a hope for the removal or defamation of the party against whom such prejudice is directed. We do not n Mr. Pollard of being actuated by a desire to have President Davis removed, or by his hasty and unjust attacks, cause him to resign, still it must be apparent, to all who have read his " First and Second Years of the War," and the " Rival Administrations," that nothing bat an undeserved prejudice actuated that gentleman. When we look on the work performed by the administration, and the successes which have attended it, all the errors com- mitted become insignificant. The formation of this government in the midst of an excitement consequent upon the secession of the different States; the organization of armies which have be- come the terror of enemies, the wonder of the world, and the pride of friends ; and last, though the most important of all, the long list of brilliant victories which have crowned the ban- ners of the Confederacy, are proof enough of the ability and energy of the administration. When the question is asked, what has the present Secretary of War done? Justice points to the present condition of our armies; their improvement, both in numbers and morale, to what they were three months ago, and the voice of censure is silent. To blame Mr. Seddon for any of the disasters which have occured during his administration, is both false and ridiculous. So far from deserving blame, just praise is due to him for the very efficient manner in which he has performed the duties of Secretary of War. The causes of this censure of Mr. Seddon becomes apparent, however, in the "little piece of history" which Mr. Pollard gives the public in his " Rival Administrations." It appears more like a feeling of unmanly jealousy at the chance afforded a literary rival, by the exemption granted. We feel certain that good reasons must have been laid before the Secretary of War to have induced him to grant an exemption to the party alluded to, and if report speaks true, that he is the author of " Causes and Contrasts," we can easily believe that the history of the war he is engaged in compiling, will be of greater service to the Confederate cause than the partial and partisan compilation of events presented to the public by the author of the u Rival Administrations." As with the Secretary of War, so with the other officers in authority, and we need say no more on the subject. At some other time we may be induced to give to the public the causes which have led to this gross abuse of President Davis and his administration ; at present we will close this brief work by ob- serving that it would be preferable for the North to overrun twice as much Southern soil as she already has, than for the Confederacy to lose the services of Jefferson Davis. With all his faults there is none in the Confederacy who possesses the high administrative talent that he does, and though the voice of malice and censure may endeavor for awhile to deprive him of that praise he has so well merited by his successful adminis- tration of the government, the time will surely come when he will receive the thanks and blessings of a free people, and he looked upon as the Seconi? Washington of the Southern States of America.