MARCUS AURELIUS 
 •ANTONINUS* 
 
THE ETHEL CARR PEACOCK 
 
 MEMORIAL COLLECTION 
 
 Matris amori monumentum 
 
 trinity college library 
 
 DURHAM, N. C. 
 
 1903 
 
 Gift of Dr. and Mrs. Dred Peacock 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2016 
 
 X 
 
 https://archive.org/details/thoughtsofempero01marc_0 
 
I. 
 
 it' - 
 

 1 
 
 \ 
 
 i 
 
 ■ 1 
 
THE THOUGHTS 
 
 OF 
 
 THE EMPEROR 
 
 MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 
 
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS 
 
llh 
 
 THE THOUGHTS 
 
 ^ % 
 
 OF 
 
 THE EMPEROR 
 
 Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, 
 
 TRANSLATED BY GEORGE LONa 
 
 PHILADELPHIA: 
 HENRY ALTEMUS. 
 
A.LTEMUS’ BOOKBINDERY, 
 PHILADELPHIA. 
 
f 
 
 'Sy-.b 
 
 ? 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Biographical Sketch 9 
 
 Philosophy of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus . 45 
 
 The Thoughts . . - 99 
 
 Index of Terms 305 
 
 General Index • 311 
 
 Z5ZZlc 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 I HAVE carefully revised the Life and Phil- 
 osophy of Antoninus, in which I have made a 
 few corrections and added a few notes. 
 
 I have also made a few alterations in the 
 translation where I thought I could approach 
 nearer to the author’s meaning; and I have 
 added a few notes and references. 
 
 There still remain difficulties which I cannot 
 remove, because the text is sometimes too cor- 
 rupt to be understood, and no attempt to restore 
 the true readings could be successful. 
 
 George Long. 
 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
 
 OF 
 
 MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 
 
 M ANTONINUS was bom at Rome, A. d. 
 
 . 1 2 1, on the 26th of April. His father, 
 Annins Vems, died while he was praetor. His 
 mother was Domitia Calvilla, also named Lu- 
 cilla. The Emperor T. Antoninus Pius mar- 
 ried Annia Galeria Faustina, the sister of An- 
 nins Vems, and was consequently the uncle of 
 M. Antoninus. When Hadrian adopted An- 
 toninus Pius and declared him his successor in 
 the empire, Antoninus Pius adopted both L. 
 Ceionius Commodus, the son of Aelius Caesar, 
 and M. Antoninus, whose original name was 
 M. Annius Vems. Antoninus then took the 
 name of M. Aelius AureHus Verus, to which 
 was added the title of Caesar in A. D. 139: the 
 name Aelius belonged to Hadrian’s family, and 
 Anrelius was the name of Antoninus Pius. 
 When M. Antoninus became Augustus, he 
 dropped the name of Vems and took the name 
 
 (9) 
 
lo asiograpbical Sftetcb. 
 
 of Antoninus. Accordingly he is generally 
 named M. Aurelius Antoninus, or simply M. 
 Antoninus. 
 
 The youth was most carefully brought up. 
 He thanks the gods (i. 17) that he had good 
 grandfathers, good parents, a good sister, good 
 teachers, good associates, good kinsmen and 
 friends, nearly everything good. He had the 
 happy fortune to witness the example of his 
 uncle and adoptive father Antoninus Pius, and 
 he has recorded in his word (i. 16; vi. 30) the 
 virtues of the excellent man and prudent ruler. 
 Like many young Romans he tried his hand at 
 poetry and studied rhetoric. Herodes Atticus 
 and M. Cornelius Fronto were his teachers in 
 eloquence. There are extant letters between 
 Fronto and Marcus,* which show the great af- 
 fection of the pupil for the master, and the 
 master’s great hopes of his industrious pupil. 
 M. Antoninus mentions Fronto (i. ii) among 
 those to whom he was indebted for his educa- 
 tion. 
 
 When he was eleven years old, he assumed 
 the dress of philosophers, something plain and 
 coarse, became a hard student, and lived a most 
 laborious, abstemious life, even so far as to in- 
 jure his health. Finally, he abandoned poetry 
 and rhetoric for philosophy, and he attached 
 
 * M. Cornelii Frontonis Reliquiae, Berlin, 1816. 
 There are a few letters between Fronto and Antoni- 
 nus Pius. 
 
/Iftarcu 0 Hurelius 2lnton{nus. 
 
 II 
 
 himself to the sect of the Stoics. But he did 
 not neglect the study of law, which was a use- 
 ful preparation for the high place which he was 
 designed to fill. His teacher was L. Volusianus 
 Maecianus, a distinguished jurist. We must 
 suppose that he learned the Roman discipline 
 of arms, which was a necessary part of the edu- 
 cation of a man who afterwards led his troops 
 to battle against a warlike race. 
 
 Antoninus has recorded in his first book the 
 names of his teachers, and the obligations which 
 he owed to each of them. The way in which 
 he speaks of what he learned from them might 
 seem to savor of vanity or self-praise, if we look 
 carelessly at the way in which he has expressed 
 himself; but if any one draws this conclusion, 
 he will be mistaken. Antoninus means to 
 commemorate the merits of his several teachers, 
 what they taught, and what a pupil might 
 learn from them. Besides, this book, like the 
 eleven other books, was for his own use ; and 
 if we may trust the note at the end of the first 
 book, it was written during one of M. Anto- 
 ninus’ campaigns against the Quadi, at a time 
 when the commemoration of the virtues of his 
 illustrious teachers might remind him of their 
 lessons and the practical uses which he might 
 derive from them. 
 
 Among his teachers of philosophy was Sextus 
 of Chaeroneia, a grandson of Plutarch. What 
 he learned from this excellent man is told b}^ 
 himself (i. 9). His favorite teacher was Q. 
 
12 
 
 JSiOfltapbfcal Sftetcb. 
 
 Junius Rusticus (i. 7), a philosopher, and also 
 a man of practical good sense in public affairs. 
 Rusticus was the adviser of Antoninus after he 
 became emperor. Y oung men who are destined 
 for high places are not often fortunate in those 
 who are about them, their companions and 
 teachers ; and I do not know any example of a 
 young prince having had an education which 
 can be compared with that of M. Antoninus. 
 Such a body of teachers distinguished by their 
 acquirements and their character will hardly be 
 collected again ; and as to the pupil, we have 
 not had one like him since. 
 
 Hadrian died in July A. D. 138, and was suc- 
 ceeded by Antoninus Pius. M. Antoninus 
 married Faustina, his cousin, the daughter of 
 Pius, probably about A. D. 146, for he had a 
 daughter born in 147. He received from his 
 adoptive father the title of Caesar, and was as- 
 sociated with him in the administration of the 
 state. The father and the adopted son lived 
 together in perfect friendship and confidence. 
 Antoninus was a dutiful son, and the emperor 
 Pius loved and esteemed him. 
 
 Antoninus Pius died in March, A. D. 16 1. 
 The Senate, it is said, urged M. Antoninus to 
 take the sole administration of the empire, but 
 he associated with himself the other adopted 
 son of Pius, ly. Ceionius Commodus, who is 
 generally called I,. Verus. Thus Rome for the 
 first time had two emperors. Verus was an in- 
 dolent man of pleasure, and unworthy of his 
 
/Biarcue Bureltua Bntoninue. 
 
 13 
 
 station. Antoninus however bore with him, 
 and it is said Verus had sense enough to pay 
 to his colleague the respect due to his charac- 
 ter. A virtuous emperor and a loose partner 
 lived together in peace, and their alliance was 
 strengthened by Antoninus giving to Verus for 
 wife his daughter Lucilla. 
 
 The reign of Antoninus was first troubled by 
 a Parthian war, in which Verus was sent to com- 
 mand; but he did nothing, and the success that 
 was obtained by the Romans in Armenia and 
 on the Euphrates and Tigris was due to his 
 generals. This Parthian war ended in A. D. 
 165. Aurelius and Verus had a triumph (a. d. 
 166) for the victories in the East. A pestilence 
 followed, which carried off great numbers in 
 Rome and Italy, and spread to the west of 
 Europe. 
 
 The north of Italy was also threatened by the 
 rude people beyond the Alps, from the borders 
 of Gallia to the eastern side of the Hadriatic. 
 These barbarians attempted to break into Italy, 
 as the Germanic nations had attempted near 
 three hundred years before; and the rest of the 
 life of Antoninus, with some inten^als, was em- 
 ployed in driving back the invaders. In 169 
 Verus suddenly died, and Antoninus adminis- 
 tered the state alone. 
 
 During the German wars Antoninus resided 
 for three years on the Danube at Camuntum. 
 The Marcomanni were driven out of Pannonia 
 and almost destroyed in their retreat across the 
 
14 
 
 JSlograpbical Sftetcb. 
 
 Danube; and in A. d. 174 the emperor gained a 
 great victory over the Quadi. 
 
 In A. D. 175, Avidius Cassius, a brave and 
 skilful Roman commander who was at the head 
 of the troops in Asia, revolted, and declared 
 himself Augustus. But Cassius was assassi- 
 nated by some of his officers, and so the rebel- 
 lion came to an end. Antoninus showed his 
 humanity by his treatment of the family and 
 the partisans of Cassius; and his letter to the 
 Senate, in which he recommends mercy, is ex- 
 tant. (Vulcatius, Avidius Cassius, c. 12.) 
 
 Antoninus set out for the East on hearing of 
 Cassius’ revolt. Though he appears to have 
 returned to Rome in A. D. 174, he went back to 
 prosecute the war against the Germans, and it 
 is probable that he marched direct to the East 
 from the German war. His wife Faustina, who 
 accompanied him into Asia, died suddenly at 
 the foot of the Taurus, to the great grief of her 
 husband. Capitolinus, who has written the life 
 of Antoninus, and also Dion Cassius, accuses the 
 empress of scandalous infidelity to her husband, 
 and of abominable lewdness. But Capitolinus 
 says that Antoninus either knew it not or pre- 
 tended not to know it. Nothing is so common 
 as such malicious reports in all ages, and the 
 history of imperial Rome is full of them. An- 
 toninus loved his wife, and he says that she 
 was “obedient, affectionate, and simple.” The 
 same scandal had been spread about Faustina’s 
 mother, the wife of Antoninus Pius, and yet he 
 
/Iftarcu0 Burelius antoninus. 
 
 15 
 
 too was perfectly satisfied with his wife. An- 
 toninus Pius says after her death, in a letter to 
 Fronto, that he would rather have lived in exile 
 with his wife than in his palace at Rome with- 
 out her. There are not many men who w'ould 
 give their wives a better character than these 
 two emperors. Capitolinus wrote in the time 
 of Diocletian. He may have intended to tell 
 the truth, but he is a poor, feeble biographer. 
 Dion Cassius, the most malignant of historians, 
 always reports, and perhaps he believed, any 
 scandal against anybody. 
 
 Antoninus continued his journey to Syria 
 and Egypt, and on his return to Italy through 
 Athens he was initiated into the Eleusinian 
 mysteries. It was the practice of the emperor 
 to conform to the established rites of the age, 
 and to perform religious ceremonies with due 
 solemnity. We cannot conclude from this that 
 he was a superstitious man, though we might 
 perhaps do so if his book did not show that 
 he was not. But that is only one among many 
 instances that a ruler’s public acts do not al- 
 ways prove his real opinions. A prudent gov- 
 ernor will not roughly oppose even the super- 
 stitions of his people ; and though he may wish 
 they were wiser, he will know that he cannot 
 make them so by offending their prejudices. 
 
 Antoninus and his son Commodus entered 
 Rome in triumph, perhaps for some German 
 victories, on the 23d of December, A. D. 176. 
 In the following year Commodus was associated 
 
i6 
 
 JSlograpbical Sftctcb. 
 
 with his father in the empire, and took the 
 name of Augustus. This year A. d. 177 is 
 memorable in ecclesiastical history. Attains 
 and others were put to death at L,yon for their 
 adherence to the Christian religion. The evi- 
 dence of this persecution is a letter preserved 
 by Eusebius (E. H. v. i ; printed in Routh’s 
 Reliquiae Sacrae, vol. i, with notes). The 
 letter is from the Christians of Vienna and 
 Eugdunum in Gallia (Vienna and Lyon) to 
 their Christian brethren in Asia and Phrygia ; 
 and it is preserved perhaps nearly entire. It 
 contains a very particular description of the 
 tortures inflicted on the Christians in Gallia, 
 and it states that while the persecution was go- 
 ing on, Attains, a Christian and a Roman citi- 
 zen, was loudly demanded by the populace and 
 brought into the amphitheatre ; but the gover- 
 nor ordered him to be reserved, with the rest 
 who were in prison, until he had received in- 
 structions from the emperor. Many had been 
 tortured before the governor thought of ap- 
 plying to Antoninus. The imperial rescript, 
 says the letter, was that the Christians should 
 be punished, but if they would deny their 
 faith, they must be released. On this the 
 work began again. The Christians who were 
 Roman citizens were beheaded ; the rest were 
 exposed to the wild beasts in the amphithe- 
 atre. Some modern writers on ecclesiastical 
 history, when they use this letter, say nothing 
 of the wonderful stories of the martyrs’ suffer- 
 
flbarcus aurclius antoninus. 
 
 17 
 
 ings. Sanctus, as the letter says, was burnt 
 with plates of hot iron till his body was one 
 sore and had lost all human form ; but on being 
 put to the rack he recovered his former appear- 
 ance under the torture, which was thus a cm-e 
 instead of a punishment. He was afterwards 
 torn by beasts, and placed on an iron chair and 
 roasted. He died at last. 
 
 The letter is one piece of evidence. The 
 writer, whoever he was that wrote in the name 
 of the Gallic Christians, is- our evidence both 
 for the ordinary and the extraordinar}' circum- 
 stances of the story, and we cannot accept his 
 evidence for one part and reject the other. We 
 often receive small evidence as a proof of a 
 thing we believe to be within the limits of 
 probability or possibility, and we reject exactly 
 the same evidence, when the thing to which it 
 refers appears very improbable or impossible. 
 But this is a false method of inquiry, though 
 it is followed by some modern writers, who se- 
 lect what they like from a story and reject the 
 rest of the evidence; or if they do not reject 
 it, they dishonestly suppress it. A man can 
 only act consistently by accepting all this letter 
 or rejecting it all, and we cannot blame him for 
 either. But he who rejects it may still admit 
 that such a letter may be founded on real facts; 
 and he would make this admission as the most 
 probable way of accounting for the existence of 
 the letter; but if, as he would suppose, the 
 writer has stated some things falsely, he can- 
 2 
 
i8 
 
 :©iogtapbical Shctcb. 
 
 not tell what part of his story is worthy of 
 credit. 
 
 The war on the northern frontier appears to 
 have been uninterrupted during the visit of 
 Antoninus to the East, and on his return the 
 emperor again left Rome to oppose the barba- 
 rians. The Germanic people were defeated in 
 a great battle A. d. 179. During this campaign 
 the emperor was seized with some contagious 
 malady, of which he died in the camp at Sir- 
 mium (Mitrovitz), on the Save, in Rower Pan- 
 nonia, but at Vindebona (Vienna), according to 
 other authorities, on the 17th of March, A. D. 
 180, in the fift5^-ninth year of his age. His son 
 Commodus was with him. The body, or the 
 ashes probably, of the emperor were carried to 
 Rome, and he received the honor of deification. 
 Those who could afford it had his statue or 
 bust; and when Capitolinus wrote, many peo- 
 ple still had statues of Antoninus among the 
 Dei Penates or household deities. He was in a 
 manner made a saint. Commodus erected to 
 the memory of his father the Antonine column 
 which is now in the Piazza Colonna at Rome. 
 The bassi rilievi which are placed in a spiral 
 line round the shaft commemorate the victories 
 of Antoninus over the Marcomanni and the 
 Quadi, and the miraculous shower of rain 
 which refreshed the Roman ’soldiers and dis- 
 comfited their enemies. The statue of Antoni- 
 nus was placed on the capital of the column, 
 but it was removed at some time tmknown, and 
 
Marcus aurelius Bntontnus. 
 
 19 
 
 a bronze statue of St. Paul was put in the place 
 by Pope Sixtus the fifth. 
 
 The historical evidence for the times of An- 
 toninus is very defective, and some of that 
 which remains is not credible. The most curi- 
 ous is the story about the miracle which hap- 
 pened in A. D. 174, during the war with the 
 Quadi. The Roman army was in danger of 
 perishing by thirst, but a sudden storm drenched 
 them with rain, while it discharged fire and 
 hail on their enemies, and the Romans gained 
 a great victory. All the authorities which 
 speak of the battle speak also of the miracle. 
 The Gentile writers assign it to their gods, and 
 the Christians to the intercession of the Chris- 
 tian legion in the emperor’s army. To confirm 
 the Christian statement it is added that the 
 emperor gave the title of Thundering to this 
 legion; but Dacier and others, who m.aintain the 
 Christian report of the miracle, admit that this 
 title of Thundering or Lightning was not given 
 to this legion because the Quadi were struck 
 with lightning, but because there was a figure 
 of lightning on their shields, and that this title 
 of the legion existed in the time of Augustus. 
 
 Scaliger also had observed that the legion was 
 called Thundering (/cfpawo^oAof, or Kepawo(p6pog') 
 before the reigm of Antoninus. We learn this 
 from Dion Cassius (Lib. 55, c. 23, and the note 
 of Reimarus), who enumerates all the legions 
 of Augustus’ time. The name Thundering of 
 Lightning also occurs on an inscription of the 
 
20 
 
 3Bioflrapbical Sftctcb. 
 
 reign of Trajan, which was found at Trieste. 
 Eusebius (v. 5), when he relates the miracle, 
 quotes Apolinarius, bishop of Hierapolis, as 
 authority for this name being given to the 
 legion Melitene by the emperor in consequence 
 of the success which he obtained through their 
 prayers; from which we may estimate the value 
 of Apolinarius’ testimony. Eusebius does not 
 say in what book of Apolinarius the statement 
 occurs. Dion says that the Thundering legion 
 was stationed in Cappadocia in the time of 
 Augustus. Valesius also observes that in the 
 Notitia of the Imperium Romanum there is 
 mentioned under the commander of Armenia 
 the Praefectura of the twelfth legion named 
 “Thundering Melitene;’’ and this position in 
 Armenia will agree with what Dion sa}^s of its 
 position in Cappadocia. Accordingly Valesius 
 concludes that Melitene was not the name of 
 the legion, but of the town in which it was 
 stationed. Melitene was also the irame of the 
 district in which this town was situated. The 
 legions did not, he says, take their name from 
 the place where they were on duty, but from 
 the country in which they were raised, and 
 therefore what Eusebius says about the Melitene 
 does not seem probable to him. Yet Valesius, 
 on the authority of Apolinarius and Tertullian, 
 believed that the miracle was worked through 
 the prayers of the Christian soldiers in the 
 emperor’s army. Rufinus does not give the 
 name of Melitene to this legion, says Valesius, 
 
^arcu8 aurelius anton'nus. 
 
 21 
 
 and probably he purposely omitted it, because 
 he knew that Melitene was the name of a town 
 in Armenia Minor, where the legion was sta- 
 tioned in his time. 
 
 The emperor, it is said, made a report of his 
 victory to the Senate, which we may believe, 
 for such was the practice; but we do not know 
 what he said in his letter, for it is not extant. 
 Dacier assumes that the emperor’s letter was 
 purposely destroyed by the Senate or the enemies 
 of Christianity, that so honorable a te.stimony 
 to the Christians and their religion might not 
 be perpetuated. The critic has however not 
 seen that he contradicts him.self when he tells 
 us the purport of the letter, for he says that it 
 was destroyed, and even Eusebius could not 
 find it. But there does exist a letter in Greek 
 addressed by Antoninus to the Roman people 
 and the sacred Senate after this memorable 
 victory. It is sometimes printed after Justin’s 
 first Apology, but it is totally unconnected with 
 the apologies. This letter is one of the most 
 stupid forgeries of the many which exist, and 
 it cannot be possibly founded even on the gen- 
 uine report of Antoninus to the Senate. If it 
 were genuine, it would free the emperor from 
 the charge of persecuting men because they 
 were Christians, for he says in this false letter 
 that if a man accuse another only of being a 
 Christian, and the accused confess, and there is 
 nothing else against him, he must be set free; 
 with this monstrous addition, made by a man 
 
22 
 
 asiograpbfcal Sftctcb. 
 
 inconceivably ignorant, that the informer must 
 be burnt alive.* 
 
 During the time of Antoninus Pius and Mar- 
 cus Antoninus there appeared the first Apology 
 of Justinus, and under M. Antoninus the Ora- 
 tion of Tatia:i against the Greeks, which was a 
 fierce attack on the established religions ; the 
 address of Athenagoras to M. Antoninus on be- 
 half of the Christians, and the Apology of 
 Melito, bivShop of Sardes, also addressed to the 
 emperor, and that of Apolinarius. The first 
 Apology of Justinus is addressed to T. Antoni- 
 nus Pius and his two adopted sons, M. Antoni- 
 nus and L. Verus; but we do not know whether 
 they read it.f The second Apology of Justinus 
 is entitled “to the Roman Senate;’’ but this 
 
 * Eiisebius (v. 5) quotes Tertullian’s Apology to the 
 Roman Senate in confirmation of the story. Tertul- 
 lian, he says, writes that letters of the emperor were 
 extant, in which he declares that his army was saved 
 by the prayers of the Christians ; and that he “threat- 
 ened to punish with death those who ventured to ac- 
 cuse us.” It is possible that the forged letter which 
 is now extant may be one of those which Tertullian 
 had seen, for he uses the plural number, “letters.” 
 A great deal has been written about this miracle of 
 the Thundering Region, and more than is worth read- 
 ing. There is a dissertation on this supposed miracle 
 in Moyle’s Works, London, 1726. 
 
 fOrosius, vii. 14, says that Justinus the philosopher 
 presented to Antonins Pius his work in defence of the 
 Christian religion, and made him merciful to the 
 Christians. 
 
fllbarcue Surclius :Hntonlnus. 
 
 23 
 
 superscription is from some cop3'ist. In the 
 first chapter Justinus addresses the Romans. 
 In the second chapter he speaks of an affair 
 that had recently happened in the time of M. 
 Antoninus and L. Verus, as it seems; and he 
 also directly addresses the emperor, sajdng of a 
 certain woman, “she addressed a petition to 
 thee, the emperor, and thou didst grant the peti- 
 tion. ’ ’ In other passages the writer addresses the 
 two emperors, from Avhich we must conclude that 
 the Apology was directed to them. Eusebius 
 (E. H. iv. 18) states that the second Apology 
 AA'as addressed to the successor of Antoninus 
 Pius, and he names him Antoninus Verus, 
 meaning M. Antoninus. In one passage of this 
 second Apolog}^ (c. 8), Justinus, or the writer, 
 whoever he may be, saj's that even men who 
 folloAved the Stoic doctrines, when the}' ordered 
 their lives according to ethical reason, rvere 
 hated and murdered, such as Heraclitus, Muso- 
 nius in his own times, and others; for all those 
 who in any way labored to live according to 
 reason and avoided wickedness were alwaj'S 
 hated; and this was the effect of the work of 
 daemons. 
 
 Justinus himself is said to have been put to 
 death at Rome, because he refused to sacrifice 
 to the gods. It cannot have been in the reign 
 of Hadrian, as one authority states; nor in the 
 time of Antoninus Pius, if the second Apology 
 Avas AA'ritten in the time of M. Antoninus; and 
 there is evidence that this event took place 
 
24 
 
 asfograpblcal Sftetcb. 
 
 under M. Antoninus and L,. Verus, when Rusti- 
 cus was praefect of the city.* 
 
 The persecution in which Polycarp suffered 
 at Smyrna belongs to the time of M. Antoni- 
 nus. The emdence for it is the letter of the 
 church of Smyrna to the churches of Philome- 
 
 *See the Martyriuni Sanctorum Justiiii, &c., in the 
 works of Justinus, ed. Otto, vol. ii. 559. “Junius 
 Rusticus Praefectus Urbi erat sub imperatoribus M. 
 Aurelio et L. Vero, id quod liquet ex Themistii Orat. 
 xxxiv Dindorf. p. 451, et ex quodam illorum rescripto, 
 Dig. 49. I. I, ? 2 ” (Otto). The rescript contains the 
 words “Junium Rusticum amicum nostrum Prae- 
 fectum Urbi.’" The Martyrium of Justinus and others 
 is written in Geeek. It begins, “ In the time of the 
 wicked defenders of idolatry impious edicts were pub- 
 lished against the pious Christians both in cities and 
 country places, for the purpose of compelling them 
 to make offerings to vain idols. Accordingly the holy 
 men (Justinus, Chariton, a woman Charito, Paeon, 
 Liberiaiius, and others) were brought before Rusticus, 
 the praefect of Rome.” 
 
 The Martyrium gives the examination of the ac. 
 cused by Rusticus. All of them professed to be 
 Christians. Justinus was asked if he expected to as- 
 cend into heaven and to receive a reward for his suf- 
 ferings, if he was condemned to death. He answered 
 that he did not expect : he was certain of it. Finally, 
 the test of obedience was proposed to the prisoners ; 
 they were required to sacrifice to the gods. All re- 
 fused, and Rusticus pronounced the sentence, which 
 was that those who refused to sacrifice to the gods 
 and obey the emperor’s order should be whipped and 
 beheaded according to the law. The martyrs were 
 then led to the usual place of execution and beheaded. 
 Some of the faithful secretly carried off the bodies 
 and deposited them in a fit place. 
 
flbatcus aurelius Antoninus. 
 
 25 
 
 Hum and the other Christian churches, and it 
 is preserved by Eusebius (E. H. iv. 15). But 
 the critics do not agree about the time of Poly- 
 carp’s death, differing in the two extremes to 
 the amount of twelve years. The circumstances 
 of Polycarp’s martyrdom were accompanied by 
 miracles, one of which Eusebius (iv. 15) has 
 omitted, but it appears in the oldest Latin ver- 
 sion of the letter, which Usher published, and 
 it is supposed that this version was made not 
 long after the time of Eusebius. The notice at 
 the end of the letter states that it was tran- 
 scribed by Caius from the copy of Irenaeus, the 
 disciple of Poly carp, then transcribed by Socra- 
 tes at Corinth; “after which I Pionius again 
 wrote it out from the copy above mentioned, 
 having searched it out by the revelation of 
 Polycarp, who directed me to it,’’ &c. The 
 story of Polycarp’s martyrdom is embellished 
 with miraculous circumstances which some 
 modern writers on ecclesiastical history take 
 the liberty of omitting.* 
 
 In order to form a proper notion of the con- 
 
 * Conyers Middleton, An Inquiry into the Miracu- 
 lous Powers, &c. p. 126. Middleton says that Euse- 
 bius omitted to mention the dove, which flew out of 
 Polycarp’s body, and Dodwell and Archbishop Wake 
 have done the same. Wake says, “I am so little a 
 friend to such miracles that I thought it better with 
 Eusebius to omit that circumstance than to mention 
 it from Bp. Usher’s Manuscript,” which manuscript 
 however, says Middleton, he afterwards declares to be 
 so well attested that we need not any further assur- 
 ance of the truth of it. 
 
26 
 
 asiograpbical Sftetcb, 
 
 dition of the Christians under M. Antoninus we 
 must go back to Trajan’s time. When the 
 younger Pliny was governor of Bithynia, the 
 Christians were numerous in those parts, and 
 the worshipers of the old religion were falling 
 off. The temples were deserted, the festivals 
 neglected, and there were no purchasers of vic- 
 tims for sacrifice. Those who were interested 
 in the maintenance of the old religion thus 
 found that their profits were in danger. Chris- 
 tians of both sexes and all ages were brought 
 before the go^’ernor, who did not know what to 
 do with them. He could come to no other con- 
 clusion than this, that those who confessed to be 
 Christians and persevered in their religion 
 ought to be punished; if for nothing else, for 
 their invincible obstinancy. He found no 
 crimes proved against the Christians, and he 
 could only characterize their religion as a de- 
 praved and extravagant superstition, which 
 might be stopped if the people were allowed 
 the opportunity of recanting. Pliny wrote this 
 in a letter to Trajan (Plinius, Ep. x. 97). He 
 asked for the emperor’s directions, because he 
 did not know what to do. He remarks that he 
 had never been engaged in judicial inquiries 
 about the Christians, and that accordingly he 
 did not know what to inquire about, or how far 
 to inquire and punish. This proves that it was 
 not a new thing to examine into a man’s pro- 
 fession of Christianity and to punish him for it.* 
 
 *Orosius (vii. 12) speaks of Trajan’s persecution of 
 
Marcus 2lureHus Bntoninus. 
 
 27 
 
 Trajan’s rescript is extant. He approved of 
 the governor’s judgment in the matter, but he 
 said that no search must be made after the 
 Christians; if a man was charged with the new 
 religion and convicted, he must not be pun- 
 ished if he affinned that he was not a Christian, 
 and confirmed his denial b5^ showing his rever- 
 ence to the heathen gods. He added that no 
 notice must be taken of anon3'mous informa- 
 tions, for such things were of bad example. 
 Trajan was a mild and sensible man; and both 
 motives of mercy and policy' probabty also in- 
 duced him to take as little notice of the Chris- 
 tians as he could, to let them live in quiet if it 
 were possible. Trajan’s rescript is the first 
 legislative act of the head of the Roman state 
 with reference to Christianity, which is known 
 to us. It does not appear that the Christians 
 were further disturbed under his reign. The 
 martyrdom of Ignatius by the order of Trajan 
 himself is not universally admitted to be an 
 historical fact.* 
 
 the Christians, and of Pliny’s application to him hav- 
 ing led the emperor to mitigate his severity. The 
 punishment b}’ the Mosaic law for those who at- 
 tempted to seduce the Jews to follow new gods was 
 death. If a man was secretly enticed to such new 
 worship, he must kill the seducer, even if the seducer 
 were brother, sou, daughter, wife, or friend. (Dent, 
 xiii. ) 
 
 * The Martyrium Ignatii, first published in Latin by 
 Archbishop Usher, is the chief evidence for the cir- 
 cumstances of Ignatius’ death. 
 
28 
 
 asfograpbical Shetcb. 
 
 In the time of Hadrian it was no longer pos- 
 sible for the Roman government to overlook 
 the great increase of the Christians and the 
 hostility of the common sort to them. If the 
 governors in the provinces were willing to let 
 them alone, they could not resist the fanaticism 
 of the heathen community, who looked on the 
 Christians as atheists. The Jews too, who were 
 settled all over the Roman Empire, were as 
 hostile to the Christians as the Gentiles were.* 
 With the time of Hadrian begin the Christian 
 Apologies, which show plainly what the popu- 
 lar feeling towards the Christians then was. 
 A rescript of Hadrian to Minucius Fundanus, 
 the Proconsul of Asia, which stands at the end 
 of Justin’s first Apology, f instructs the gover- 
 
 * We have the evidence ofjustinus (ad Diognetum, 
 c. 5) to this effect; “The Christians are attacked by 
 the Jews as if they were men of a different race, and 
 are persecuted by the Greeks; and those who hate 
 them cannot give the reason of their enmity.’’ 
 
 t And in Eusebius (E. H. iv. 8, 9). Orosius (vii. 
 13) says that Hadrian sent this rescript to Minucius 
 Eundanus, proconsul of Asia after being instructed 
 in books written on the Christian religion by Quad- 
 ratus, a disciple of the Apostles, and Aristides, an 
 Athenian, an honest and wise man, and Serenus 
 Grauius. In the Greek test of Hadrian’s rescript 
 there is mentioned Serenius Granianus, the prede- 
 cessor of Minucius Fundanus in the government of 
 Asia. 
 
 This rescript of Hadrian has clearly been added to 
 the Apology by some editor. The Apology ends with 
 the words : 6 (ptXov tC> Oeu, tovto yeveaOu 
 
fllbarcus aurelius Zlntonfnus. 
 
 29 
 
 nor that innocent people must not be troubled, 
 and false accusers must not be allowed to extort 
 money from them; the charges against the 
 Christians must be made in due form, and no 
 attention must be paid to popular clamors; 
 when Christians were regularly prosecuted and 
 convicted of illegal acts, they must be punished 
 according to their deserts; and false accusers 
 also must be punished. Antoninus Pius is said 
 to have published rescripts to the same effect. 
 The terms of Hadrian’s rescript seem very 
 favorable to the Christians; but if we under- 
 stand it in this sense, that they were only to be 
 punished like other people for illegal acts, it 
 would have had no meaning, for that could 
 have been done without asking the emperor’s 
 advice. The real purpose of the rescript is that 
 Christians must be punished if they persisted 
 in their belief, and would not prove their re- 
 nunciation of it by acknowledging the heathen 
 religion. This was Trajan’s rule, and we have 
 no reason for supposing that Hadrian granted 
 more to the Christians than Trajan did. There 
 is also printed at the end of Justin’s first Apol- 
 ogy a rescript of Antoninus Pius to the Com- 
 mune of (rd KOIVOV Tfjq 'kaiaq), and it is also ill 
 Eusebius (E. H. iv. 13). The date of the re- 
 script is the third consulship of Antoninus 
 Pius.* The rescript declares that the Chris- 
 
 * Eusebius (E. H. iv. 12), after giving the beginning 
 of Justinus’ first Apology, which contains the address 
 
30 
 
 JSiOQrapbical Sftctcb. 
 
 tians — for they are meant, though the name 
 Christians does not occur in the rescript — were 
 not to be disturbed unless they were attempt- 
 ing something against the Roman rule ; and 
 no man was to be punished simply for being a 
 Christian. But this rescript is spurious. Any 
 mau moderately acquainted with Roman his- 
 tory will see by the style and tenor that it is a 
 clumsy forgery. 
 
 In the time of M. Antoninus the opposition 
 between the old and the new belief was still 
 
 to T. Autoniuus and liis two adopted sons, adds; 
 ‘‘The same emperor being addressed by other breth- 
 ren in Asia, honored the Commune of Asia with the 
 following rescript.” This rescript, which is in the 
 next chapter of Eusebius (E. H. iv. 13) is in the sole 
 name of Caesar Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Augustus 
 Armenius, though Eusebius had just before said that 
 he was going to give us a rescript of Antoninus Pius. 
 There are some material variations between the two 
 copies of the rescript besides the difference in the 
 title, which difference makes it impossible to say 
 whether the forger intended to assign this rescript to 
 Pius or to M. Antoninus. 
 
 The author of the Alexandrine Chronicum says that 
 Marcus, being moved by the entreaties of Melito and 
 other heads of the church, wrote an Epistle to the 
 Commune of Asia in which he forbade the Christians 
 to be troubled on account of their religion. Valesius 
 supposes this to be the letter or rescript which is con- 
 tained in Eusebius (iv. 13), and to be the answer to 
 the Apology of Melito, of which I shall soon give the 
 substance. But Marcus certainly did not write this 
 letter which is in Eusebius, and w’e know not what 
 answer he made to Melito. 
 
fliiarcus Burelius Bntoninus. 
 
 31 
 
 stronger, and the adherents of the heathen 
 religion urged those in authority to a more 
 regular resistance to the invasions of the Chris- 
 tian faith. Melito in his Apology to M. 
 Antoninus represents the Christians of Asia as 
 persecuted under new imperial orders. Shame- 
 less informers, he says, men who were greedy 
 after the property of others, used these orders 
 as a means of robbing those who were doing 
 no harm. He doubts if a just emperor could 
 have ordered anything so unjust; and if the 
 last order was really not from the emperor, the 
 Christians entreat him not to give them up to 
 their enemies.* We conclude from this that 
 
 * Eusebius, iv. 26; and Routh’s Reliquiae Sacrae, 
 vol. I, and the notes. The interpretation of this Frag- 
 ment is not easy. Mosheim misunderstood one pas- 
 sage so far as to affirm that Marcus promised rewards 
 to those who denounced the Christians ; an interpre- 
 tation which is entirely false. Melito calls the Chris- 
 tian religion “our philosophy,” which began among 
 barbarians (the Jews), and flourished among the 
 Roman subjects in the time of Augustus, to the great 
 advantage of the empire, for from that time the power 
 of the Romans grew great and glorious. He says 
 that the emperor has and will have as the successor 
 to Augustus’ power the good wishes of men, if he will 
 protect that philosophy which grew up with the em- 
 pire and began with Augustus, which philosophy the 
 predecessors of Antoninus honored in addition to the 
 other religions. He further says that the Christian 
 religion had suffered no harm since the time of Au- 
 gustus, but on the contrary had enjoyed all honor and 
 respect that any man could desire. Nero and Donii- 
 
32 
 
 asioflrapbical Sftctcb. 
 
 there were at least imperial rescripts or consti- 
 tutions of M. Antoninus which were made the 
 foundation of these persecutions. The fact of 
 being a Christian was now a crime and pun- 
 ished, unless the accused denied their religion. 
 Then come the persecutions at Smyrna, which 
 some modern critics place in A. d. 167, ten 
 
 tian, lie says, were alone persuaded by some malicious 
 men to calumniate the Christian religion, and this 
 was the origin of the false charges against the Chris- 
 tians. But this was corrected by the emperors who 
 immediately preceded Antoninus, who often by their 
 rescripts reproved those who attempted to trouble the 
 Christians. Hadrian, Antoninus’ grandfather, wrote 
 to many, and among them to Fundanus, the governor 
 of Asia. Antoninus Pius, when Marcus was asso- 
 ciated with him in the empire, wrote to the cities that 
 they must not trouble the Christians ; among others, 
 to the people of Larissa, Thessalonica, the Athenians, 
 and all the Greeks. Melito concluded thus; “We 
 are persuaded that thou who hast about these things 
 the same mind that they had, nay rather one much 
 more humane and philosophical, wilt do all that we 
 ask thee.” — This Apology was written after a. d. i6g, 
 the year in which Verus died, for it speaks of Marcus 
 only and his son Commodus. According to Melito’s 
 testimony, Christians had only been punished for 
 their religion in the time of Nero and Domitian, and 
 the persecutions began again in the time of M. 
 Antoninus, and were founded on his orders, which 
 were abused, as he seems to mean. He distinctly 
 affirms “ that the race of the godly is now' persecuted 
 and harassed by fresh imperial orders in Asia, a thing 
 which had never happened before.” But we know 
 that all this is not true, and that Christians had been 
 punished in Trajan’s time. 
 
fliatcus aucelius antonffttt^. 
 
 33 
 
 years before the persecution of Lyon. The 
 governors of the provinces under M. Antoni- 
 nus might have found enough even in Trajan’s 
 rescript to warrant them in punishing Chris- 
 tians, and the fanaticism of the people would 
 drive them to persecution, even if they were 
 unwilling. But besides the fact of the Chris- 
 tians rejecting all the heathen ceremonies, we 
 must not forget that they plainly maintain that 
 all the heathen religions were false. The 
 Christians thus declared war against the hea- 
 then rites, and it is hardly necessary to observe 
 that this was a declaration of hostility against 
 the Roman government, which tolerated all the 
 various forms of superstition that existed in 
 the empire, and could not consistently tolerate 
 another religion, which declared that all the 
 rest were false and all the splendid ceremonies 
 of the empire only a worship of devils. 
 
 If we had a true ecclesiastical history, we 
 should know how the Roman emperors at- 
 tempted to check the new religion; how they 
 enforced their principle of finally punishing 
 Christians, simply as Christians, which Justin 
 in his Apology affirms that they did, and I 
 have no doubt that he tells the truth; how far 
 popular clamor and riots went in this matter, 
 and how far many fanatical and ignorant Chris- 
 tians — for there were many such — contributed 
 to excite the fanaticism on the other side and 
 to embitter the quarrel between the Roman 
 government and the new religion. Our extant 
 3 
 
34 
 
 asioflrapbical Sftetcb. 
 
 ecclesiastical histories are manifestl}" falsified, 
 and what truth they contain is grossly exag- 
 gerated; but the fact is certain that in the time 
 of M. Antoninus the heathen populations were 
 in open hostility to the Christians, and that 
 under Antoninus’ rule men were put to death 
 because they were Christians. Eusebius, in 
 the preface to his fifth book, remarks that in 
 the seventeenth year of Antoninus’ reign, in 
 some parts of the world, the persecution of the 
 Christians became more violent, and that it 
 proceeded from the populace in the cities; and 
 he adds, in his usual style of exaggeration, that 
 we may infer from what took place in a single 
 nation that myriads of martyrs were made in 
 the habitable earth. The nation which he 
 alludes to is Gallia; and he then proceeds to 
 give the letter of the churches of Vienna and 
 Lugdunum. It is probable that he has assiged 
 the true cause of the persecutions, the fanati- 
 cism of the populace, and that both governors 
 and emperor had a great deal of trouble with 
 these disturbances. How far Marcus was cog- 
 nizant of these cruel proceedings we do not 
 know, for the historical records of his reign are 
 very defective. He did not make the rule 
 against the Christians, for Trajan did that; and 
 if we admit that he would have been willing 
 to let the Christians alone, we cannot affirm 
 that it was in his power, for it would be a great 
 mistake to suppose that Antoninus had the un- 
 limited authority which some modern sove-. 
 
Jiarcue Bureltus antonlnu0. 
 
 35 
 
 reigns have had. His power was limited by- 
 certain constitutional forms, by the Senate, and 
 by the precedents of his predecessors. We 
 cannot admit that such a man was an active 
 persecutor, for there is no evidence that he 
 was,* though it is certain that he had no good 
 opinion of the Christians, as appears from his 
 own words. t But he knew nothing of them 
 
 * Except that of Orosius (vii. 15), -who says that 
 during the Parthian -war there -were grievous perse- 
 cutions of the Christians in Asia and Gallia under the 
 orders of Marcus (praecepto ejus), and “many -were 
 crowned with the martyrdom of saints.” 
 
 t See xi. 3. The emperor probably speaks of such 
 fanatics as Clemens (quoted by Gataker on this pas- 
 sage) mentions. The rational Christians admitted no 
 fellowship with them. “Some of these heretics,” 
 says Clemens, “ show their impiety and cowardice by 
 loving their lives, saying that the knowledge of the 
 really existing God is true testimony (martyrdom), 
 but that a man is a self-murderer who bears witness 
 by his death. We also blame those who rush ta 
 death; for there are some, not of us, but only bearing 
 the same name, who give themselves up. We say of 
 them that they die without being martyrs, even if they 
 are publicly punished; and they give themselves up 
 to a death which avails nothing, as the Indian Gym- 
 nosophists give themselves up foolishly to fire.” 
 Cave, in his primitive Christianity (ii. c. 7), says of 
 the Christians: “They did flock to the place of tor- 
 ment faster than droves of beasts that are driven to 
 the shambles. They even longed to be in the arms 
 of suffering. Ignatius, though then in his journey to 
 Rome in order to his execution, yet by the way as he 
 went could not but vent his passionate desire of it ; 
 
36 
 
 aSiograpbical Sftetcb. 
 
 except their hostility to the Roman religion, 
 and he probably thought that they were dan- 
 gerous to the state, notwithstanding the pro- 
 fessions, false or true, of some of the Apologists. 
 So much I have said, because it would be un- 
 fair not to state all that can be urged against 
 a man whom his contemporaries and subse- 
 quent ages venerated as a model of virtue and 
 benevolence. If I admitted the genuineness of 
 some documents, he would be altogether clear 
 from the charge of even allowing any persecu- 
 tions; but as I seek the truth and am sure that 
 they are false, I leave him to bear whatever 
 blame is his due.* I add that it is quite cer- 
 tain that Antoninus did not derive any of his 
 
 ‘ Oh that I might come to those wild beasts that are 
 prepared for me; I heartily wish that I may presently 
 meet with them; I would invite and encourage them 
 speedily to devour me, and not be afraid to .set upon 
 me as they have been to others; nay, should they re- 
 fuse it, I would even force them to it;’ ” and more to 
 the same purpose from Eusebius. Cave, an honest 
 and good man, says all this in praise of the Christians; 
 but I think that he mistook the matter. We admire 
 a man who holds to his principles even to death; but 
 these fanatical Christians are the Gymnosophists 
 whom Clemens treats with disdain. 
 
 * Dr. F. C. Baur, in his work entitled “ Das 
 Christenthum und die Christliche Kirche der drei 
 ersten Jahrhunderte, ” &c., has examined this ques- 
 tion with great good sense and fairness, and I believe 
 he has stated the truth as near as our authorities en- 
 able us to reach it. 
 
/Iftatcu5 aurellue Bntonlnus. 
 
 37 
 
 ethical principles from a religion of which he 
 knew nothing.* 
 
 There is no doubt that the Emperor’s Re- 
 flections — or his Meditations, as they are gen- 
 erally named — is a genuine work. In the first 
 book he speaks of himself, his family, and his 
 teachers; and in other books he mentions him- 
 self. Suidas (v. Map/cof) notices a work of 
 Antoninus in twelve books, which he names 
 the “conduct of his own life;’’ and he cites 
 the book under several words in his Dictionary, 
 giving the emperor’s name, but not the title 
 of the work. There are also passages cited by 
 Suidas from Antoninus without mention of the 
 emperor’s name. The true title of the work is 
 unknown. Xy lander, who published the first 
 edition of this book (Zurich, 1558. 8vo, with a 
 Latin version), used a manuscript which con- 
 tained the twelve book^, but it is not known 
 where the manuscript is now. The only other 
 complete manuscript which is known to exist 
 is in the Vatican library, but it has no title 
 and no inscriptions of the several books: the 
 eleventh only has the inscription, yidpKov av-oKpa- 
 -opog marked with an asterisk. The other 
 Vatican manuscripts and the three Florentine 
 contain only excerpts from the emperor’s book. 
 
 * In the Digest, 48, 19, 30, there is the following ex- 
 cerpt from Modestinus: “ Si quis aliquid fecerit, quo 
 leves hominum animi superstitione numinis terreren- 
 tur, divus Marcus hujusmodi homines in insulam re- 
 legari rescripsit.” 
 
38 
 
 asiogcapbical Sftetcb. 
 
 All the titles of the excerpts nearly agree with 
 that which Xylander prefixed to his edition, 
 
 MdpKov 'Avruvivov AiiTOKparopog tuv etf iavrbv (iipTiia 
 
 This title has been used by all subsequent 
 editors. We cannot tell whether Antoninus 
 divided his work into books or somebody else 
 did it. If the inscriptions at the end of the 
 first and second books are genuine, he may 
 have made the division himself. 
 
 It is plain that the emperor wrote down his 
 thoughts or reflections as the occasions arose; 
 and since they were intended for his own use, 
 it is no improbable conjecture that he left a 
 complete copy behind him written with his 
 own hand; for it is not likely that so diligent 
 a man would use the labor of a transcriber for 
 such a purpose, and expose his most secret 
 thoughts to any other eye. He may have also 
 intended the book for Ijis son Commodus, who 
 however had no taste for his father’s philos- 
 ophy. Some careful hand preserved the 
 precious volume; and a work by Antoninus is 
 mentioned by other late writers besides Suidas. 
 
 Many critics have labored on the text of 
 Antoninus. The most complete edition is that 
 by Thomas Gataker, 1652, qto. The second 
 edition of Gataker was superintended by George 
 Stanhope, 1697, There is also an edition 
 
 of 1704. Gataker made and suggested many 
 good corrections, and he also made a new 
 Latin version, which is not a very good speci- 
 men of Latin, but it generally expresses the 
 
^arcu0 aureliue Bntoninus. 
 
 39 
 
 sense of the original, and often better than 
 some of the more recent translations. He 
 added in the margin opposite to each para- 
 graph references to the other parallel passages; 
 and he wrote a commentary, one of the most 
 complete that has been written on any ancient 
 author. This commentary contains the editor’s 
 exposition of the more difficult passages, and 
 quotations from all the Greek and Roman 
 writers for the illustration of the text. It is a 
 w'onderful monument of learning and labor, 
 and certainly no Englishman has yet done 
 anything like it. At the end of his preface 
 the editor says that he wrote it at Rotherhithe 
 near Eondon, in a severe winter, when he was 
 in the seventy-eighth year of his age, 1651 — a 
 time when Milton, Selden, and other great 
 men of the Commonwealth time were living; 
 and the great French scholar Saumaise (Salma- 
 sius), with whom Ga taker corresponded and 
 received help from him for his edition of An- 
 toninus. The Greek test has also been edited 
 by J. M. Schultz, Leipzig, 1802, 8vo; and by 
 the learned Greek Adamantinus Corais, Paris, 
 1816, 8vo. The text of Schultz was repub- 
 lished by Tauchnitz, 1821. 
 
 There are English, German, French, Italian, 
 and Spanish translations of M. Antoninus, and 
 there may be others. I have not seen all the 
 English translations. There is one by Jeremy 
 Collier, 1702, 8vo, a most coarse and vulgar 
 copy of the original. The latest French trans- 
 
40 
 
 :©iO0vapbical Sftctcb. 
 
 lation by Alexis Pierron in the collection of 
 Charpentier is better than Dacier’s, which has 
 been honored with an Italian version (Udine, 
 1772). There is an Italian version (1675), 
 which I have not seen. It is by a cardinal. 
 “ A man illustrious in the church, the Cardinal 
 Francis Barberini the elder, nephew of Pope 
 Urban VIII., occupied the last years of his life 
 in translating into his native language the 
 thoughts of the Roman emperor, in order to 
 diffuse among the faithful the fertilizing and 
 vivifying seeds. He dedicated this translation 
 to his soul, to make it, as he says in his ener- 
 getic style, redder than his purple at the sight 
 of the virtues of this Gentile” (Pierron, 
 Preface). 
 
 I have made this translation at intervals 
 after having used the book for many years. It 
 is made from the Greek, but I have not always 
 followed one text; and I have occasionally 
 compared other versions with my own. I made 
 this translation for my own use, because I 
 found that it was worth the labor; but it may 
 be useful to others also; and therefore I deter- 
 mined to print it. As the original is some- 
 times very difficult to understand and still 
 more difficult to translate, it is not possible 
 that I have always avoided error. But I be- 
 lieve that I have not often missed the meaning, 
 and those who will take the trouble to compare 
 the translation with the original should not 
 hastily conclude that I am wrong, if they do 
 
/IBarcus aurclius Bntoninus. 
 
 41 
 
 not agree with me. Some passages do give the 
 meaning, though at first sight they may not 
 appear to do so; and when I differ from the 
 translators, I think that in some places they 
 are wrong, and in other places I am sure that 
 they are. I have placed in some passages a 4-, 
 which indicates corruption in the text or great 
 uncertainty in the meaning. I could have 
 made the language more easy and flowing, but 
 I have preferred a ruder style as being better 
 suited to express the character of the original; 
 and sometimes the obscurity which may ap- 
 pear in the version is a fair copy of the obscur- 
 ity of the Greek. If I should ever revise this 
 version, I would gladly make use of any cor- 
 rections which may be suggested. I have 
 added an index of some of the Greek terms 
 with the corresponding English. If I have 
 not given the best w’ords for the Greek, I have 
 done the best that I could; and in the text I 
 have always given the same translation of the 
 same word. 
 
 The last reflection of the Stoic philosophy 
 that I have observed is in Simplicius’ Com- 
 mentary on the Enchiridion of Epictetus. 
 Simplicius was not a Christian, and such a man 
 was not likely to be converted at a time when 
 Christianity was grossly corrupted. But he 
 was a really religious man, and he concludes 
 his commentary with a prayer to the Deity- 
 which no Christian could improve. From the 
 time of Zeno to Simplicius, a period of about 
 
42 
 
 :©io0rapbical Sftetcb. 
 
 nine hundred years, the Stoic philosophy 
 formed the characters of some of the best and 
 greatest men. Finally it became extinct, and 
 we hear no more of it till the revival of letters 
 in Italy. Angelo Poliziano met with two very 
 inaccurate and incomplete manuscripts of 
 Epictetus’ Enchiridion, which he translated 
 into Latin and dedicated to his great patron 
 Lorenzo de’ Medici, in whose collection he had 
 found the book. Poliziano’s version was 
 printed in the first Bale edition of the Enchir- 
 idion, A. D. 1531 (apud And. Cratandrum). 
 Poliziano recommends the Enchiridion to- 
 Lorenzo as a work well suited to his temper, 
 and useful in the difficulties by which he was 
 surrounded. 
 
 Epictetus and Antoninus have had readers 
 ever since they were first printed. The little 
 book of Antoninus has been the companion of 
 some great men. Machiavelli’s Art of War 
 and Marcus Antoninus were the two books 
 which were used when he was a young man by 
 Captain John Smith, and he could not have 
 found two writers better fitted to form the char- 
 acter of a soldier and a man. Smith is almost 
 unknown and forgotten in England, his native 
 country, but not in America, where he saved 
 the young colony of Virginia. He was great 
 in his heroic mind and his deeds in arms, but 
 greater still in the nobleness of his character. 
 For a man’s greatness lies not in wealth and 
 station, as the vulgar believe, nor yet in his 
 
jiftarcus aureliu6 Hntonfnue. 
 
 43 
 
 intellectual capacity, which is often associated 
 with the meanest moral character, the most ab- 
 ject servility to those in high places, and arro- 
 gance to the poor and lowly; but a man’s true 
 greatness lies in the consciousness of an honest 
 purpose in life, founded on a just estimate of 
 himself and everything else, on frequent self- 
 examination, and a steady obedience to the rule 
 which he knows to be right, without troubling 
 himself, as the emperor says he should not, 
 about what others may think or say, or whether 
 they do or do not do that which he thinks and 
 says and does. 
 
THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 OF 
 
 MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 
 
THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 OF 
 
 MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 
 
 I T has been said that the Stoic philosophy 
 first showed its real value when it passed 
 from Greece to Rome. The doctrines of Zeno 
 and his successors were well suited to the grav- 
 ity and practical good sense of the Romans; 
 and even in the Republican period we have an 
 example of a man, M. Cato Uticensis, who 
 lived the life of a Stoic and died consistently 
 with the opinions which he professed. He was 
 a man, says Cicero, who embraced the Stoic 
 philosophy from conviction; not for the purpose 
 of vain discussion, as most did, but in order to 
 make his life conformable to the Stoic precepts. 
 In the wretched times . from the death of 
 .4pgustus to the murder of Domitian, there 
 was nothing but the Stoic philosophy which 
 could console and support the followers of the 
 old religion under imperial tyranny and amidst 
 universal corruption. There were even then 
 ( 47 ) 
 
48 
 
 IPbtlosopbg. 
 
 noble minds that, could dare and endure, 
 sustained by a good conscience and an elevated 
 idea of the purposes of man’s existence. Such 
 were Paetus Thrasae, Helvidius Priscus, Cor- 
 nutus, C. Musonius Rufus,* and the poets 
 Persius and Juvenal, whose energetic language 
 and manly thoughts may be as instructive to 
 us now as they might have been to their con- 
 temporaries. Persius died under Nero’s bloody 
 reign; but Juvenal had the good fortune to 
 survive the tyrant Domitian and to see the 
 better times of Nerva, Trajan, and Hadrian. t 
 His best precepts are derived from the Stoic 
 school, and they are enforced in his finest verses 
 by the unrivalled vigor of the Ratin language. 
 
 The best two expounders of the later Stoical 
 philosophy were a Greek slave and a Roman 
 emperor. Epictetus, a Phrygian Greek, was 
 
 * I have omitted Seneca, Nero’s preceptor. He was 
 in a sense a Stoic, and he has said many good things 
 in a very tine way. There is a judgment of Gellius 
 (xii. 2.) on Seneca, or rather a statement of what 
 some people thought of his philosophy, and it is not 
 favorable. His writings and his life must be taken 
 together, and I have nothing more to say of him here. 
 The reader will find a notice of Seneca and his phil- 
 osophy in “Seekers after God,” by the Rev. F. W. 
 Farrar. Macmillan and Co. 
 
 t Ribbeck has labored to prove that those Satires, 
 which contain philosophical precepts, are not the 
 work of the real, but of a false Juvenal, a Declamator. 
 Still the verses exist, and were written by somebody 
 who was acquainted with the Stoic doctrines. 
 
flBarcu6 Hurelfue Bntonfnus. 
 
 49 
 
 brought to Rome, we know not how, but he 
 was there the slave and afterwards the freed- 
 man of an unworthy master, Kpaphroditus 
 by name, himself a freedman and a favorite 
 of Nero. Epictetus may have been a hearer 
 of C. Musonius Rufus, while he was still a 
 slave, but he could hardly have been a teacher 
 before he was made free. He was one of the 
 philosophers^ whouj„X)omitian’s order banished 
 from Rome. He retired to Nicopolis in Epi- 
 rus, and he may have died there. Like other 
 great teachers he wrote nothing, and we are 
 indebted to his grateful pupil Arrian for what 
 we have of Epictetus’ discourses. Arrian wrote 
 eight books of the discourses of Epictetus, of 
 which only four remain and some fragments. 
 We have also from Arrian’s hand the small 
 Enchiridion or Manual of the chief precepts of 
 Epictetus. This is a valuable commentary on 
 the Enchiridion by Simplicius, who lived in 
 the time of the emperor Justinian.* 
 
 Antoninus in his first book (i. 7), in which 
 he gratefully commemorates his obligations to 
 his teachers, says that he was made acquainted 
 by Junius Rusticus with the discourses of 
 Epictetus, whom he mentions also in other 
 passages (iv. 41; xi. 34, 36). Indeed, the doc- 
 trines of Epictetus and Antoninus are the same, 
 
 * There is a complete edition of Arrian’s Epictetus 
 ■with the commentary of Simplicius by J. Schweig- 
 haeuser, 6 vols. 8vo. 1799, 1800. There is also an 
 English translation of Epictetus b}' Mrs. Carter. 
 
 4 
 
Pbtlosopbi?. 
 
 and Epictetus is the best authority for the ex- 
 planation of the philosophical language of An- 
 toninus and the exposition of his opinions. 
 But the method of the two philosophers is en- 
 tirely different. Epictetus addressed himself 
 to his hearers in a continuous discourse and in 
 a familiar and simple manner. Antoninus 
 wrote down his reflections for his own use 
 only, in short, unconnected paragraphs, which 
 are often obscure. 
 
 The Stoics made three divisions of philoso- 
 phy, — Physic ((jtvaiKdv), Ethic (j’/6ik6v), and Eogic 
 (?^oyiK 6 v) (viii. 13). This division, we are told 
 by Diogenes, was made by Zeno of Citium, 
 the founder of the Stoic sect, and by Chrysip- 
 pus; but these philosophers placed the three 
 divisions in the following order, — Logic, 
 Physic, Ethic. It appears, however, that this 
 division was made before Zeno’s time, and ac- 
 knowledged by Plato, as Cicero remarks (Acad. 
 Post. i. 5). Logic is not synonymous with 
 our term lyOgic in the narrower sense of that 
 w'ord. 
 
 Cleanthes, a Stoic, snbdivided the three di- 
 visions, and made six, — Dialectic and Rhet- 
 oric, comprised in Logic ; Ethic and Politic ; 
 Physic and Theology. This division was 
 merely for practical nse, for all Philosophy is 
 one. Even among the earliest Stoics Logic, or 
 Dialectic, does not occupy the same place as in 
 Plato: it is considered only as an instrument 
 which is to be used for the other divisions of 
 
Marcus Burelius Bntoninus. 
 
 51 
 
 Philosophy. An exposition of the earlier 
 Stoic doctrines and of their modifications would 
 require a volume. My object is to explain 
 only the opinions of Antoninus, so far as they 
 can be collected from his book. 
 
 According to the subdivision of Cleanthes, 
 Physic and Theology go together, or the study 
 of the nature of Things, and the study of the 
 nature of the Deit}q so far as man can under- 
 stand the Deity, and of his government of the 
 universe. This division or subdivision is not 
 formally adopted by Antoninus, for, as already 
 observed, there is no method in his book ; but 
 it is virtually contained in it. 
 
 Cleanthes also connects Ethic and Politic, or 
 the study of the principles of morals and the 
 study of the constitution of civil society; and 
 undoubtedly he did well in subdividing Ethic 
 into two parts. Ethic in the narrower sense and 
 Politic; for though the two are intimately con- 
 nected, they are also very distinct, and many 
 questions can only be properly discussed by 
 carefully observing the distinction. Antoninus 
 does not treat of Politic. His subject is Ethic, 
 and Ethic in its practical application to his 
 own conduct in life as a man and as a gover- 
 nor. His Ethic is founded on his doctrines 
 about man’s nature, the Universal Nature, and 
 the relation of everj' man to everything else. 
 It is therefore intimately and inseparably con- 
 nected with Physic, or the Nature of Things, 
 and with Theology, or the Nature of the Deity. 
 
52 
 
 IPbilosopbg. 
 
 He advises us to examine well all the impres- 
 sions on our minds {^avraaiai) and to form a 
 right judgment of them, to make just conclu- 
 sions, and to inquire into the meanings of 
 words, and so far to apply Dialectic; but he 
 has no attempt at an}^ exposition of Dialectic, 
 and his philosophy is in substance purely 
 moral and practical. He says (viii. 13), 
 
 ‘ ‘ Constantly and, if it be possible, on the oc- 
 casion of every impression on the soul,* apply 
 to it the principles of Physic, of Ethic, and of 
 Dialectic:” which is only another way of tell- 
 ing us to examine the impression in every pos- 
 sible way. In another passage (iii. ii) he 
 sa3's, ‘ ‘ To the aids which have been men- 
 tioned, let this one still be added: make for 
 thyself a definition or description of the object 
 (76 (pavraa-dv) which is presented to thee, so as 
 to see distinctly what kind of a thing it is in 
 its substance, in its nudity, in its complete en- 
 tirety, and tell thyself its proper name, and the 
 names of the things of which it has been com- 
 
 The original is knl TTaorj^ pavractag. We have no 
 word w'hich expresses pavrama, for it is not only the 
 sensuous appearance which comes from an external 
 object, which object is called to (pavraardv^ but it is 
 also the thought or feeling or opinion which is pro- 
 duced even when there is no corresponding external 
 object before us. Accordingly everjdhing which 
 moves the soul is pavraa-dv, and produces a tpavraaia. 
 
 In this extract Antoninus says (pvacoAoyelv^ TTaOoXoyeiv, 
 (haP^KTiKEveudac. I have translated naOoXoyelv by using 
 the word Moral (Ethic), and that is the meaning here. 
 
Marcus Burelius Bntoninus. 
 
 53 
 
 pounded, and into which it will be resolved.” 
 Such an examination implies a use of Dialectic, 
 which Antoninus accordingly employed as a 
 means toward establishing his Physical, Theo- 
 logical, and Ethical principles. 
 
 There are several expositions of the Physical, 
 Theological, and Ethical principles, which are 
 contained in the work of Antoninus; and more 
 expositions than I have read. Ritter (Ge- 
 schichte der Philosophie, iv. 241), after explain- 
 ing the doctrines of Epictetus, treats very 
 briefly and insufiiciently those of Antoninus. 
 But he refers to a short essay, in which the 
 work is done better.* There is also an essay 
 on the Philosophical Principles of M. Aurelius 
 Antoninus by J. M. Schultz, placed at the end 
 of his German translation of Antoninus (Schles- 
 wig, 1799). With the assistance of these two 
 useful essays and his own diligent study, a man 
 may form a sufficient notion of the principles 
 of Antoninus; but he will find it more difficult 
 to expound them to others. Besides the want 
 of arrangement in the original and of connec- 
 tion among the numerous paragraphs, the 
 corruption of the text, the obscurity of the lan- 
 guage and the style, and sometimes perhaps 
 the confusion in the writer’s own ideas — besides 
 all this, there is occasionally an apparent con- 
 
 * De Marco Aurelio Antonino ... ex ipsius Cotn- 
 mentariis. Scriptio Philologica. lustituit Nicolaus 
 Bachius, Bipsiae, 1826. 
 
54 
 
 ff»bllosopbB. 
 
 tradiction in the emperor’s thoughts, as if his 
 principles were sometimes unsettled, as if doubt 
 sometimes clouded his mind. A man who leads 
 a life of tranquillity and reflection, who is not 
 disturbed at home and meddles not with the 
 affairs of the world, may keep his mind at ease 
 and his thoughts in one even course. But 
 such a man has not been tried. All his Ethical 
 philosophy and his passive virtue might turn 
 out to be idle words, if he were once exposed 
 to the rude realities of human existence. Fine 
 thoughts and moral dissertations from men who 
 have not worked and suffered may be read, 
 but they will be forgotten. No religion, no 
 Ethical philosophy is worth anything, if the 
 teacher has not lived the “ life of an apostle,” 
 and been ready to die ‘ ‘ the death of a martyr. ’ ’ 
 “Not in passivity (the passive effects) but in 
 activity He the evil and the good of the rational 
 social animal, just as his virtue and his vice lie 
 not in passivity, but in activity” (ix. i6). The 
 emperor Antoninus was a practical moralist. 
 From his youth he followed a laborious disci- 
 pline, and though his high station placed him 
 above all want or the fear of it, he lived as fru- 
 g'ally and temperately as the poorest philospher. 
 Epictetus wanted little, and it seems that he 
 always had the little that he wanted and he 
 was content with it, as he had been with 
 his servile station! But Antoninus after his 
 accession to the empire sat on an uneasy 
 seat. He had the administration of an em- 
 
flRarcua 2lurelius antonlnue. 
 
 55 
 
 pire whicli extended from the Euphrates to 
 the Atlantic, from the cold anountains of Scot- 
 land to the hot sands of Africa; and we may 
 imagine, though we cannot know it by expe- 
 rience, what must be the trials, the troubles, 
 the anxiety, and the sorrows of him who has 
 the world’s business on his hands, with the 
 wish to do the best that he can, and the cer- 
 tain knowledge that he can do very little of 
 the good which he wishes. 
 
 In the midst of war, pestilence, conspiracy, 
 general corruption, and with the weight of so 
 unwieldy an empire upon him, we may easily 
 comprehend that Antoninus often had need of 
 all his fortitude to support him. The best and 
 the bravest men have moments of doubt and 
 of weakness; but if they are the best and the 
 bravest, they rise again from their depression 
 by recurring to first principles, as Antoninus 
 does. The emperor says that life is smoke, a 
 vapor, and St. James in his Epistle is of the 
 same mind; that the world is full of envious, 
 jealous, malignant people, and a man might 
 be well content to get out of it. He has 
 doubts perhaps sometimes even about that to 
 which he holds most firmly. There are only 
 a few passages of this kind, but they are evi- 
 dence of the struggles which even the noblest 
 of the sons of men had to maintain against the 
 hard realities of his daily life. A poor remark 
 it is which I have seen somewhere, and made 
 in a disparaging way, that the emperor’s re- 
 
56 
 
 IPbtlosopbB. 
 
 flections show that he had need of consolation 
 and comfort in life, and even to prepare him to 
 meet his death. True that he did need comfort 
 and support, and we see how he found it. He 
 constantly recurs to his fundamental principle 
 that the universe is wisely ordered, that every 
 man is a part of it and must conform to that 
 order which he cannot change, that whatever 
 the Deity has done is good, that all mankind 
 are a man’s brethren, that he must love and 
 cherish them and try to make them better, 
 even those who would do him harm. This is 
 his conclusion (ii. 17): “What then is that 
 which is able to conduct a man ? One thing 
 and only one. Philosophy. But this consists 
 in keeping the divinity within a man free from 
 violence and unharmed, superior to pains and 
 pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose 
 nor yet falsely and with hypocrisy, not feeling 
 the need of another man’s doing or not doing 
 anything; and besides, accepting all that hap- 
 pens and all that is allotted, as coming from 
 thence, wherever it is, from whence he himseP 
 came; and finally waiting for death with a 
 cheerful mind as being nothing else than a dis- 
 solution of the elements of which every living 
 being is compounded. But if there is no harm 
 to the elements themselves in each continually 
 changing into another, why should a man 
 have any apprehension about the change and 
 dissolution of all the elements [himself]? for it 
 is according to nature; and nothing is evil that 
 is according to nature.’’ 
 
Marcus Hucellue antoninus. 
 
 57 
 
 The Physic of Antoninus is the knowledge 
 of the Nature of the Universe, of its govern- 
 ment, and of the relation of man’s nature to 
 both. He names the universe (Jj tov oXuv ovaia, 
 vi. i),* “the universal substance,’’ and he 
 adds that ‘ ‘ reason ’ ’ (Myoc) governs the uni- 
 verse. He also (vi. 9) uses the terms ‘ ‘ uni- 
 versal nature ’ ’ or “ nature of the universe. ’ ’ 
 He (vi. 25) calls the universe “ the one and all, 
 which we name Cosmos or Order’’ {Kdojxog). 
 If he ever seems to use these general terms as 
 significant of the All, of all that man can in 
 any way conceive to exist, he still on other oc- 
 casions plainly distinguishes between Matter, 
 
 * As to the word ovaia, the reader ma}' see the Index. 
 I add here a few examples of the use of the word ; 
 Antoninus has (v. 24), y avfnraaa ovaia, “the universal 
 substance.” He says (xii. 30 and iv. 40), “there is 
 one common substance” {ovaia), distributed among 
 countless bodies. In Stobaeus (tom. i. lib. i, tit. 14) 
 there is this definition, ovaiav Si <paaiv tCiv ovtuv d-dvruv 
 ryrv nparyv vkqv. In viii. ii, Antoninus speaks of to 
 ovaiaSeg koX vIikov, “the substantial and the material ; ” 
 and (vii. 10) he says that “ ever}dhing material” 
 {iwXov) disappears in the substance of the whole (r?) 
 TG)v bluv ovaia). The ovaia is the generic name of that 
 existence which we assume as the highest or ultimate, 
 because we conceive no existence which can be co- 
 ordinated with it and none above it. It is the phil- 
 osopher’s “substance:” it is the ultimate expression 
 for that which we conceive or suppose to be the basis, 
 the being of a thing. “From the Divine, which is 
 substance in itself, or the only and sole substance, all 
 and everything that is created exists” (Swedenborg, 
 Angelic Wisdom, 198). 
 
58 
 
 IPbilosopb?. 
 
 Material things {v'kri, v7uk6v), and Cause, Origin, 
 Reason (aiWa, alnCidt^, This is conform- 
 
 able to Zeno’s doctrine that there are two orig- 
 inal principles (apxai) of all things, that which 
 acts (to TToiovv) and that which is acted upon (rd 
 Trdaxov). That which is acted on is the fonu- 
 less matter (h?i?i) : that which acts is the reason 
 (?6yoc), God, who is eternal and operates 
 
 * I remark, in order to anticipate any misappre- 
 hension, that all these general terms involve a contra- 
 diction. The “one and all,” and the like, and “the 
 whole,” imply limitation. “ One ” is limited; “all” is 
 limited; the “whole” is limited. We cannot help it. 
 We cannot find words to express that which we cannot 
 fully conceive. The addition of “ absolute ” or any 
 other such word does not mend the matter. Even the 
 word God is used by most people, often unconsciously’-, 
 in such a way that limitation is implied, and yet at the 
 same time words are added which are intended to deny 
 limitation. A Christian martyr, when he was asked 
 what God was, is said to have answered that God has 
 no name like a man; and Justin says the same (Apol. 
 ii. 6), “the names Father, God, Creator, Ford, and 
 Master are not names, but appellations derived from 
 benefactions and acts.” (Compare Seneca, De Beuef. 
 iv. 8.) We can conceive the existence of a thing, or 
 rather we may have the idea of an existence, without 
 an adequate notion of it, “adequate” meaning co- 
 extensive and coequal with the thing. We have a 
 notion of limited space derived from the dimensions 
 of what we call a material thing, though of space ab- 
 solute, if I may use the term, we have no notion at 
 all; and of infinite space the notion is the same — no 
 notion at all; and yet we conceive it in a sense, 
 though 1 know not how, and we believe that space is 
 infinite, and W’e cannot conceive it to be finite. 
 
/Iftarcus Burelius Bntoninus. 
 
 59 
 
 througli all matter, and produces all things. 
 So Antoninus (v. 32) speaks of the reason 
 (Myog) which pervades all substance (omla), and 
 through all time by fixed periods (revolutions) 
 administers the universe (-6 ttov ). God is eter- 
 nal, and Matter is eternal. It is God who 
 gives form to matter, but he is not said to have 
 created matter. According to this view, which 
 is as old as Anaxagoras, G od a nd matter exist 
 independently, but God governs matter. This 
 doctrine is simply the expression of the fact of 
 the existence both of matter and of God. The 
 Stoics did not perplex themselves wim uhe in- 
 soluble question of the origin and nature of 
 matter.* Antoninus also assumes a beginning 
 
 *The notions of mattei and of space are insepar- 
 able. We derive the notion of space from matter and 
 form. But we have no adequate conception either of 
 matter or space. Matter in its ultimate resolution is 
 as unintelligible as what men call mind, spirit, or by 
 whatever other name they may express the power 
 which makes itself known by acts. Anaxagoras laid 
 down the distinction between intelligence iwiif) and 
 matter, and he said that intelligence impressed motion 
 on matter, and so separated the elements of matter 
 and gave them order; but he probably only assumed 
 a beginning, as Simplicius says, as a foundation of 
 his philosophical teaching. Empedocles said, “The 
 universe always existed.” He had no idea of what is 
 called creation. Ocellus Lucanus (i, ^ 2) maintained 
 that the Universe (ro 7rav) was imperishable and un- 
 created. Consequently it is eternal. He admitted 
 the existence of God; but his theology would require 
 some discussion. On the contrary, the Brachmans, 
 
6o 
 
 IPbtlosopbis. 
 
 of things, as we now know them; but his lan- 
 guage is sometimes very obscure. I have en- 
 deavored to explain the meaning of one difficult 
 passage (vii. 75, and the note). 
 
 Matter consists of elemental parts (aroixeia) 
 of which all material objects are* made. But 
 nothing is permanent in form. The nature of 
 the universe, according to Antoninus’ expres- 
 sion (iv. 36), “loves nothing so much as to 
 change the things which are, and to make new 
 things like them. For everything that exists 
 is in a manner the seed of that which will be. 
 But thou art thinking only”of seeds which are 
 cast into the earth or into a womb : but this is 
 a very vulgar notion.’’ All things then are in 
 a constant flux and change; some things are 
 lissolved into the elements, others come in 
 their places ; and so the ‘ ‘ whole universe con- 
 tinues ever young and perfect’’ (xii. 23). 
 
 Antoninus has some obscure expressions 
 about what he calls ‘ ‘ seminal principles ’ ’ (<77rep- 
 jiaTiKol Myoc) . He opposes them to the Epicu- 
 rean atoms (vi. 24), and consequently his 
 
 according to Strabo (p. 713, ed. Cas.), taught that the 
 universe -was created and perishable; and the creator 
 and administrator of it pervades the whole. The 
 author of the book of Solomon’s Wisdom says (xi. 
 17) : “ Thy Almighty hand made the world of matter 
 without form,” which may mean that matter existed 
 already. 
 
 The common Greek word which we translate 
 ‘‘matter ” is vlr]. It is the stuff that things are made 
 of. 
 
/Diarcus Hurelius antonlnue. 
 
 6r 
 
 ‘ ‘ seminal principles ’ ’ are not material atoms 
 which wander about at hazard, and combine 
 nobody knows how. In one passage (iv. 21) 
 he speaks of living principles, souls (ipvxal} 
 after the dissolution of their bodies being re- 
 ceived into the ‘ ‘ seminal principle of the uni- 
 verse.” Schultz thinks that by “seminal 
 principles Antoninus means the relations of the 
 various elemental principles, which relations 
 are determined by the Deity and by which 
 alone the production of organized beings is 
 possible.” This may be the meaning; but if 
 it is, nothing of any value can be derived from 
 it.* Antoninus often uses the word ‘ ‘ Nature ’ ’ 
 {(pvmg), and we must attempt to fix its meaning. 
 The simple etymological sense of <]wGig is “pro- 
 duction,” the birth of what we call Things. 
 The Romans used Natura, which also means 
 “birth” originally. But neither the Greeks 
 nor the Romans stuck to this simple meaning, 
 nor do we. Antoninus says (x. 6) : “ Whether 
 the universe is [a concourse of] atoms or 
 Nature [is a system], let this first be estab- 
 
 *Justin (Apol. ii. 8 ) has the words Kara OKepfiariKov 
 \6yov pepog, where he is speaking of the Stoics ; but he 
 uses this expression in a peculiar sense (note ii). 
 The early Christian writers were familiar with the 
 Stoic terms, and their writings show that the contest 
 was begun between the Christian expositors and the 
 Greek philosophy. Rven in the second Epistle of St. 
 Peter (ii. i, v. 4 ) we find a Stoic expression, Iva dia 
 TovTuv yevrjads de'iag Koivuvot <pvaeug. 
 
62 
 
 B^b^lo6opb2. 
 
 lished, that I am a part of the whole which is 
 governed by nature. ’ ’ Here it might seem as 
 if nature were personified and viewed as an 
 active, eflScient power ; as something which, if 
 not independent of the Deity, acts by a power 
 which is given to it by the Deity. Such, if I 
 understand the expression right, is the way in 
 which the word Nature is often used now, 
 though it is plain that many writers use the 
 word without fixing any exact meaning to it. 
 It is the same with the expres.sion Laws of 
 Nature, which some writers may use in an in- 
 telligible sense, but others as clearly use in no 
 definite sense at all. There is no meaning in this 
 word Nature, except that which Bishop Butler 
 assigns to it, when he says, ‘ ‘ The only distinct 
 meaning of that word Natural is Stated, Fixed, 
 or Settled ; since what is natural as much re- 
 quires and presupposes an intelligent agent to 
 render it so, i. e. to effect it continually or at 
 stated times, as what is supernatural or mirac- 
 ulous does to effect it at once.” This is 
 Plato’s meaning (De Leg., iv. 715) when he 
 says that God holds the beginning and end 
 and middle of all that exists, and proceeds 
 straight on his course, making his circuit ac- 
 cording to nature (that is by a fixed order) ; and 
 he is continually accompanied by justice, who 
 punishes those who deviate from the divine 
 law, that is, from the order or course which 
 God observes. 
 
 When we look at the motions of the planets. 
 
Marcus aurelius Bntoninua. 
 
 63 
 
 the action of what w^e call gravitation, the ele- 
 mental combination of unorganized bodies and 
 their resolution, the production of plants and 
 of living bodies, their generation, growth, and 
 their dissolution, which we call their death, we 
 observe a regular sequence of phenomena, 
 which within the limits of experience present 
 and past, so far as we know the past, is fixed 
 and invariable. But if this is not so, if the 
 order and sequence of phenomena, as known to 
 us, are subject to change in the course of an 
 infinite progression, — and such change is con- 
 ceivable, — we have not discovered, nor shall we 
 ever discover, the whole of the order and se- 
 quence of phenomena, in which sequence there 
 may be involved according to its very nature, 
 that is, according to its fixed order, some vari- 
 ation of what we now call the Order or Nature 
 of Things. It is also conceivable that such 
 changes have taken place, — changes in the 
 order of things, as we are compelled by the im- 
 perfection of language to call them, but which 
 are no changes; and further it is certain that 
 our knowledge of the true sequence of all actual 
 phenomena, as for instance the phenomena of 
 generation, growth, and dissolution, is and 
 ever must be imperfect. 
 
 We do not fare much better when we speak 
 of Causes and Effects than when we speak of 
 Nature. For the practical purposes of life we 
 may use the terms cause and effect conveni- 
 ently, and w'e may fix a distinct meaning to 
 
64 
 
 lPbtl09opbi2. 
 
 them, distinct enough at least to prevent all 
 misunderstanding. But the case is different 
 when we speak of causes and effects as of 
 Things. All that we know is phenomena, as 
 the Greeks called them, or appearances which 
 follow one another in a regular order, as we 
 conceive it, so that if some one phenomenon 
 should fail in the series, we conceive that there 
 must either be an interruption of the series, or 
 that something else will appear after the phe- 
 nomenon which has failed to appear, and will 
 occupy the vacant place; and so the series in 
 its progression maj^ be modified or totally 
 changed. Cause and effect then mean nothing 
 in the .sequence of natural phenomena beyond 
 what I have said; and the real cause, or the 
 transcendent cause, as some would call it, of 
 each successive phenomenon is in that which 
 is the cause of all things which are, which have 
 been, and which will be forever. Thus the 
 word Creation may have a real sense if we 
 consider it as the first, if we can conceive a 
 first, in the present order of natural phenom- 
 ena; but in the vulgar sense a creation of all 
 things at a certain time, followed by a quies- 
 cence of the first cause and an abandonment 
 of all sequences of Phenomena to the laws of 
 Nature, or to the other words that people may 
 use, is absolutely absurd.* 
 
 *Time and space are the conditions of our thought ; 
 but time infinite and space infinite cannot be objects 
 
/Iliarcus aureltus Bntonfnus. 65 
 
 Now, though there is great difficulty in un- 
 derstanding all the passages of Antoninus, in 
 which he speaks of Nature, of the changes of 
 things and of the economy of the universe, I 
 am convinced that his sense of Nature and 
 Natural is the same as that which I have 
 stated ; and as he was a man who knew how to 
 use words in a clear way and with strict con- 
 sistency, we ought to assume, even if his mean- 
 ing in some passages is doubtful, that his view 
 of Nature was in harmony with his fixed be- 
 lief in the all-pervading, ever present, and 
 ever active energy of God. (ii. 4; iv. 40; x. i; 
 vi. 40; and other passages. Compare Seneca, 
 De Benef., iv. 7. Swedenborg, Angelic Wis- 
 dom, 3497357-) 
 
 There is much in Antoninus that is hard to 
 understand, and it might be said that he did 
 not fully comprehend all that he wrote; which 
 would however be in no way remarkable, for 
 
 of thought, except in a very imperfect way. Time 
 and space must not in any way be thought of when 
 we think of the Deity. Swedenborg says, “The 
 natural man may believe that he would have no 
 thought, if the ideas of time, of space, and of things 
 material were taken away ; for upon those is founded 
 all the thought that man has. But let him know that 
 the thoughts are limited and confined in proportion 
 as they partake of time, of space, and of what is ma- 
 terial ; and that they are not limited and are extended, 
 in proportion as they do not partake of those things ; 
 since the mind is so far elevated above the things cor- 
 poreal and worldly” (Concerning Heaven and Hell, 
 169). 
 
 5 
 
66 
 
 IPbUosopb^. 
 
 it happens now that a man may write what 
 neither he nor an3^body can understand. An- 
 toninus tells us (xii. lo) to look at things and 
 see what they are, resolving them into the 
 material (iA;?), the casual (alnov), and the rela- 
 tion {ava<popa), or the purpose, by which he 
 seems to mean something in the nature of what 
 we call effect, or end. The word Cause ( aiTta) 
 is the difficulty. There is the same word in 
 the Sanscrit (/letu ) ; and the subtle philosophers 
 of India and of Greece, and the less subtle 
 philosophers of modern times, have all used 
 this word, or an equivalent word, in a vague 
 way. Yet the confusion sometimes may be in 
 the inevitable ambiguity of language rather 
 than in the mind of the writer, for I cannot think 
 that some of the wisest of men did not know 
 what they intended to say. When Antoninus 
 says (iv. 36), “that everything that exists is in 
 a manner the seed of that which will be,” he 
 might be supposed to say what some of the In- 
 dian philosophers have said, and thus a pro- 
 found truth might be converted into a gross 
 absurdity. But he says, “in a manner,” and 
 in a manner he said true ; and in another man- 
 ner, if you mistake his meaning, he said false. 
 When Plato said, “ Nothing ever is, but is al- 
 ways becoming” (ael yiyverai), he delivered a 
 text, out of which we may derive something ; 
 for he destroys by it not all practical, but all 
 speculative notions of cause and effect. The 
 whole series of things, as they appear to us, 
 
/Dbarcus aurelius Hntoninus. 
 
 67 
 
 must be contemplated in time, that is in suc- 
 cession, and we conceive or suppose inter\^als 
 between one state of things and another state 
 of things, so that there is priority and sequence, 
 and interval, and Being, and a ceasing to Be, 
 and beginning and ending. But there is noth- 
 ing of the kind in the Nature of Things. It is 
 an everlasting continuity (iv. 45 ; vii. 75). 
 When Antoninus speaks of generation (x. 26), 
 he speaks of one cause {alria) acting, and then 
 another cause taking up the work, which the 
 former left in a certain state, and so on ; and 
 we might perhaps conceive that he had some 
 notion like what has been called “ the self- 
 evolving power of nature;” a fine phrase in- 
 deed, the full import of which I believe that 
 the writer of it did not see, and thus he laid 
 himself open to the imputation of being a fol- 
 lower of one of the Hindu sects, which makes 
 all things come by evolution out of nature or 
 matter, or out of something which takes the 
 place of Deity, but is not Deity. I would have 
 all men think as they please, or as they can, 
 and I only claim the same freedom which I 
 give. When a man writes anything, we may 
 fairly try to find out all that his words must 
 mean, even if the result is that they mean what 
 he did not mean ; and if we find this contradic- 
 tion, it is not our fault, but his misfortune. 
 Now Antoninus is perhaps somewhat in this 
 condition in what he says (x. 26), though he 
 speaks at the end of the paragraph of the 
 
68 
 
 IPbllosopbB. 
 
 power which acts, unseen by the eyes, but still 
 no less clearly. But whether in this passage 
 (x. 26) he means that the power is conceived 
 to be in the different successive causes ( alrtai^y 
 or in something else, nobody can tell. From 
 other passages, however, I do collect that his 
 notion of the phenomena of the universe is what 
 I have stated. The Deity works unseen, if we 
 may use such language, and perhaps I may, as 
 Job did, or he who wrote the book of Job. 
 “In him we live and move and are,’’ said St. 
 Paul to the Athenians ; and to show his hearers 
 that this was no new doctrine, he quoted the 
 Greek poets. One of these poets was the Stoic 
 Cleanthes, whose noble hymn to Zeus, or God, 
 is an elevated expression of devotion and phi- 
 losophy. It deprives Nature of her power, and 
 puts her under the immediate government of 
 the Deity. 
 
 “Thee all this heaven, which whirls around the earth, 
 Obeys, and willing follows where thou leadest. 
 Without thee, God, nothing is done on earth. 
 
 Nor in the ethereal realms, nor in the sea. 
 
 Save what the wicked through their folly do.” 
 
 Antoninus’ conviction of the existence of a 
 divine power and government was founded on 
 his p>erception of the order of the universe. 
 Like Socrates (Xen. Mem., iv. 3, 13, etc.) he 
 says that though we cannot see the forms of 
 divine powers, we know that they exist because 
 we see their works. 
 
^arcu0 Hurelius Hntonlnu0. 
 
 69 
 
 “To those who ask, Where hast thou seen 
 the gods, or how dost thou comprehend that 
 they exist and so worshipest them ? I answer, 
 in the first place, that they may be seen even 
 with the eyes; in the second place, neither 
 have I seen my own soul, and yet I honor it. 
 Thus then with respect to the gods, from what 
 I constantly experience of their power, from 
 this I comprehend that they exist, and I ven- 
 erate them.” (xii. 28, and the note. Comp. 
 Aristotle de Mundo, c. 6; Xen. Mem. i. 4, 9; 
 Cicero, Tuscul. i. 28, 29; St. Paul’s Epistle to 
 the Romans, i. 19, 20; and Montaigne’s Apol- 
 ogy for Raimond de Sebonde, ii. c. 12.) This 
 is a very old argument, which has always had 
 great weight with most people, and has ap- 
 peared sufficient. It does not acquire the least 
 additional strength by being developed in a 
 learned treatise. It is as intelligible in its 
 simple enunciation as it can be made. If it is 
 rejected, there is no arguing with him who re- 
 jects it: and if it is worked out into innumer- 
 able particulars, the value of the evidence 
 runs the risk of being buried under a mass of 
 words. 
 
 Man being conscious that he is a spiritual 
 power, or that he has such a power, in what- 
 ever way he conceives that he has it — for I 
 wish simply to state a fact — from this power 
 which he has in himself, he is led, as Antoni- 
 nus says, to believe that there is a greater 
 power, which, as the old Stoics tell us, per- 
 
70 
 
 IPbflosopbB. 
 
 vades the whole universe as the intellect* 
 (voi'c) pervades man. (Compare Epictetus’ Dis- 
 courses, i. 14; and Voltaire a Mad^ Necker, 
 vol. Ixvii., p. 278, ed. Lequien.) 
 
 have always translated the word voi'c, “intelli- 
 gence” or “intellect.” It appears to be the word 
 used by the oldest Greek philosophers to express the 
 notion of “ intelligence ” as opposed to the notion of 
 “matter.” I have always translated the word ^6yoc 
 by “reason,” and Aoywdf by the word “rational,” or 
 perhaps sometimes “ reasonable,” as I have translated 
 voepdg by the word “intellectual.” Every man who 
 has thought and has read any philosophical writings 
 knows the difficulty of finding words to express cer- 
 tain notions, how imperfectly words express these 
 notions, and how carelessly the words are often used. 
 The various senses of the word Hdyof are enough to 
 perplex any man. Our translators of the New Testa- 
 ment (St. John, c. I.) have simply translated <5 loyoc 
 b}' “the word,” as the Germans translated it by “das 
 Wort;” but in their theological writings they some- 
 times retain the original term Logos. The Germans 
 have a term Vernunft, which seems to come nearest 
 to our word Reason, or the necessary and absolute 
 truths which we cannot conceive as being other than 
 what they are. Such are what some people have 
 called the laws of thought, the conceptions of space 
 and of time, and axioms or first principles, which 
 need no proof and cannot be proved or denied. Ac- 
 cordingly the Germans can say, “ Gott ist die hochste 
 Vernunft,” the Supreme Reason. The Germans have 
 also a word Verstand, which seems to represent our 
 word “understanding,” “ intelligence,” “ intellect,” 
 not as a thing absolute which exists by itself, but as a 
 thing connected with an individual being, as a man. 
 Accordingl}- it is the capacity of receiving impressions 
 
/Hbarcus Burelius Bntoninus. 
 
 71 
 
 God exists then, but what do we know of 
 his nature ? Antoninus says that the soul of 
 manj.s an efdux from the divinity. We have 
 bodies’ like animals, but we have reason, in- 
 telligence, as the gods. Animals have life 
 (ijjvxn), and what we call instincts or natural 
 principles of action: but the rational animal 
 man alone has a rational, intelligent soul 
 {ijvxv loytKT], voepa). Autoniiius- insists on this 
 
 (Vorstelluugen, (pavraniai), and forming from them 
 distinct ideas (Begriffe), and perceiving differences. 
 I do not think that these remarks will help the reader 
 to the understanding of Antoninus, or his use of the 
 words roi'f and Adyof. The emperor’s meaning must 
 be got from his own words, and if it does not agree 
 altogether with modern notions, it is not our business 
 to force it into agreement, but simply to find out what 
 his meaning is, if we can. 
 
 Justinus (ad Diognetum, c. vii.) says that the om- 
 nipotent, all-creating, and invisible God has fixed 
 truth and the holy, incomprehensible Logos in men’s 
 hearts ; and this Logos is the architect and creator of 
 the Universe. In the first Apology (c. xxxii.), he 
 says that the seed (urrippa) from God is the Logos, 
 which dwells in those who believe in God. So it ap- 
 pears that according to Jnstinus the Logos is only in 
 such believers. In the second Apology (c. viii.) he 
 speaks of the .seed of the Logos being implanted in 
 all mankind ; but those who order their lives accord- 
 ing to Logos, such as the Stoics, have only a portion 
 of the Logos {Kara a-eppariKov Myov pepog), and have 
 not the knowledge and contemplation of the entire 
 Logos, which is Christ. Swedenborg’s remarks (An- 
 gelic Wisdom, 240) are worth comparing with Justi- 
 nus. The modern philosopher in substance agrees 
 with the ancient ; but he is more precise. 
 
72 
 
 ff>bllosopbg. 
 
 continuallj^; God is iu man,* and so we must 
 constantl}^ attend to the divinity within us, 
 for it is onl3^ in this way that we can have any 
 knowledge of the nature of God. The human 
 soul is in a sense a portion of the divinity, and 
 the soul alone has any communication with 
 the Deity; for as he says (xii. 2): “With his 
 intellectual part alone God touches the intelli- 
 gence onljr which has flowed and been derived 
 from himself into these bodies.’’ In fact he 
 says that .which is hidden within a man is life, 
 that is, the man himself. All the rest is 
 vesture, covering, organs, instrument, which 
 the living man, the realf man, uses for the 
 
 *Conip. Ep. to the Corinthians, i. 3, 17, and James 
 iv. 8, “ Drawuigh to God and he will draw nigh to 
 you.” 
 
 jThis is also Swedenborg’s doctrine of the soul. 
 “ As to what concerns the soul, of which it is said that 
 it shall live after death, it is nothing else but the man 
 himself, who lives in the body, that is, the interior 
 man, who by the body acts in the world and from 
 whom the bod}' itself lives” (quoted by Clissold, p. 
 456 of “The Practical Nature of the Theological 
 Writings of Emanuel Swedenborg, in a Letter to the 
 Archbishop of Dublin (Whately),” second edition, 
 1859 ! 3, book which theologians might read with 
 profit). This is an old doctrine of the soul, which 
 has been often proclaimed, but never better expressed 
 than by the “ Auctor de Mundo,” c. 6, quoted by 
 Gataker in his “Antoninus,” p. 436. “The soul by 
 which we live and have cities and houses is invisible, 
 but it is seen by its works ; for the whole method of 
 life has been devised by it and ordered, and by it is 
 
Jftarcus 2luceUu8 Bntonfnue, 
 
 73 
 
 purpose of his present existence. The air is 
 universally diffused for him who is able to re- 
 spire; and so for him who is willing to partake 
 of it the intelligent power, which holds within 
 it all things, is diffused as wide and free as the 
 air (viii. 54). It is by living a divine life that 
 man approaches to a knowledge of the divin- 
 ity.^ It is by following the divinity within, 
 
 beld together. In like manner we must think also 
 about the Deity, who in power is most mighty, in 
 beauty most comely, in life immortal, and in virtue 
 supreme : wherefpre though he is invisible to human 
 nature, he is seen by his very works.” Other pas- 
 sages to the same purpose are quoted by Gataker (p. 
 382). Bishop Butler has the same as to the soul : 
 “Upon the whole, then, our organs of sense and our 
 limbs are certainly instruments, which the living 
 persons, ourselves, make use of to perceive and move 
 with.” If this is not plain enough, he also says: “It 
 follows that our organized bodies are no more our- 
 selves, or part of ourselves, than any other matter 
 around us.” (Compare Anton, s. 38). 
 
 *The reader may consult Discourse V., “ Of the ex- 
 istence and nature of God,” in John Smith’s “Select 
 Discourses.” He has prefixed as a text to this Dis- 
 course, the striking passage of Agapetus, Paraenes. 
 § 3: “He who knows himself will know God ; and he 
 who knows God will be made like to God ; and he 
 will be made like to God, who has become worthy 
 God; and he becomes worthy of God, who does noth- 
 ing unworthy of God, but thinks the things that are 
 Bis, and speaks what he thinks, and does what he 
 speaks.” I suppose that the old sa}dng, “ Know thy- 
 self,” which is attributed to Socrates and others, had 
 a larger meaning than the narrow sense which is gen- 
 
74 
 
 f>bil06opbT3. 
 
 6 atiiuv or ^£0f, as Antoninus calls it, that man 
 comes nearest to the Deity, the supreme good; 
 for man can never attain to perfect agreement 
 with his internal guide (to yye/xoiHKdv) . “Live 
 with the gods. And he does live with the 
 gods who constantly shows to them that his 
 own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned 
 to him, and that it does all the daemon (Mfiuv) 
 wishes, which Zeus hath given to every man 
 for his guardian and guide, a portion of him- 
 self And this daemon is every man’s under- 
 standing and reason ’’ (v. 27). 
 
 There is in man, that is in the reason, the 
 intelligence, a superior faculty which if it is- 
 exercised rules all the rest. This is the ruling 
 faculty (to ’^yejj.ovmdv') , which Cicero (De Natura 
 Deorum, ii. ii) renders by the Latin word 
 Principatus, “ to which nothing can or ought 
 to be superior.’’ Antoninus often uses this 
 term and others which are equivalent. He 
 names it (vii. 64) “the governing intelli- 
 gence. ’ ’ The governing faculty is the master 
 of the soul (v. 26). A man must reverence 
 only his ruling faculty and the divinity within 
 him. As we must reverence that which is 
 supreme in the universe, so we must reverence 
 that which is supreme in ourselves; and this is 
 that which is of like kind with that which is 
 supreme in the universe (v. 21). So, as 
 
 erally given to it. (Agapetus, eel. Stephan. Schon- 
 ing, Franeker, 1608. This volume contains also the 
 Paraeneses of iSfilus.) 
 
Marcus Burelius Bntoninus. 
 
 75 
 
 Plotinus says, the soul of man can only know 
 the divine so far as it knows itself. In one 
 passage (xi. 19) Antoninus speaks of a man’s 
 condemnation of himself when the diviner part 
 within him has been overpowered and yields 
 to the less honorable and to the perishable 
 part, the body, and its gross pleasures. In a 
 word, the views of Antoninus on this matter, 
 however his expressions may vary, are ex- 
 actly what Bishop Butler expresses when he 
 speaks of ‘ ‘ the natural supremacy of reflection 
 or conscience,” of the faculty ‘‘ which surve}-s, 
 approves, or disapproves the several affections 
 of our mind and actions of our lives. ’ ’ 
 
 Much matter might be collected from Anto- 
 ninus on the notion of the Universe being one 
 animated Being. But all that he says amounts 
 to no more, as Schultz remarks, than this : the 
 soul of man is most intimately united to his 
 body, and together they make one animal, 
 which we call man ; so the Deity is most inti- 
 mately united to the world, or the material 
 universe, and together they form one whole. 
 But Antoninus did not view God and the ma- 
 terial universe as the same, any more than he 
 viewed the body and soul of man as one. An- 
 toninus has no speculations on the absolute 
 nature of the Deity. It was not his fashion to 
 waste his time on what man cannot under- 
 stand.* He was satisfled that God exists, that 
 
 * “God, who is infinitely be}-ond the reach of our 
 
76 
 
 IPbilosopb^. 
 
 he governs all things, that man can only have 
 an imperfect knowledge of his nature, and he 
 must attain this imperfect knowledge by rever- 
 encing the divinity which is within him, and 
 keeping it pure. 
 
 From all that has been said, it follows that 
 the universe is administered by the Providence 
 of God (■n-povota), and that all things are wisely 
 ordered. There are passages in which Anto- 
 ninus expresses doubts, or states different pos- 
 sible theories of the constitution and govern- 
 ment of the universe ; but he always recurs to 
 his fundamental principle, that if we admit the 
 existence of a deity, we must also admit that 
 he orders all things wisely and well (iv. 27; 
 vi. I ; ix. 28; xii. 5; and many other passages). 
 Epictetus says (i. 6) that we can discern the 
 providence which rules the world, if we possess 
 two things, — the power of seeing all that hap- 
 pens with respect to each thing, and a grateful 
 disposition. 
 
 But if all things are wisely ordered, how is 
 the world so full of what we call evil, physical 
 and moral? If instead of saying that there is 
 evil in the world, we use the expression which 
 I have used, “what we call evil,’’ we have 
 partly anticipated the emperor’s answer. We 
 see and feel and know imperfectly very few 
 things in the few years that we live, and all the 
 knowledge and all the experience of all the hu- 
 
 uarrow capacities” (Locke, Essay concerning the 
 Human Understanding, ii. chap. 17). 
 
flRatcus aurellue antonfnus. 
 
 77 
 
 man race is positive ignorance of the whole, 
 which is infinite. Now, as our reason teaches 
 us that everything is in some way related to 
 and connected wdth every other thing, all 
 notion of evil as being in the universe of things 
 is a contradiction ; for if the whole comes from 
 and is governed by an intelligent being, it is 
 impossible to conceive anything in it which 
 tends to the evil or destruction of the whole 
 (viii. 55 ; x. 6). Everything is in constant 
 mutation, and yet the whole subsists; we 
 might imagine the solar system resolved into 
 its elemental parts, and yet the whole would 
 still subsist “ever young and perfect.’’ 
 
 All things, all forms, are dissolved, and new 
 forms appear. All living things undergo the 
 change which we call death. If we call death 
 an evil, then all change is an evil. Living be- 
 ings also suffer pain, and man suffers most of 
 all, for he suffers both in and by his body and 
 by his intelligent part. Men suffer also from 
 one another, and perhaps the largest part of 
 human suffering comes to man from those 
 whom he calls his brothers. Antoninus says 
 (viii. 55), “Generally, wickedness does no 
 harm at all to the universe; and particularly, 
 the wickedness [of one man] does no harm to 
 another. It is only harmful to him who has 
 it in his power to be released from it as soon as 
 he shall choose.’’ The first part of this is per- 
 fectly consistent with the doctrine that the 
 whole can sustain no evil or harm. The sec- 
 
78 
 
 pbiloBopbig. 
 
 ond part must be explained by the Stoic prin- 
 ciple that there is no evil in anything which is 
 not in our power. What wrong we suffer from 
 another is his evil, not ours. But this is an 
 admission that there is evil in a sort, for he 
 who does wrong does evil, and if others can 
 endure the wrong, still there is evil in the 
 wrong-doer. Antoninus (xi. i8) gives many 
 excellent precepts with respect to wrongs and 
 injuries, and his precepts are practical. He 
 teaches us to bear w'hat we cannot avoid, and 
 his lessons may be just as useful to him who 
 denies the being and the government of God 
 as to him who believes in both. There is no 
 direct answer in Antoninus to the objections 
 which may be made to the existence and provi- 
 dence of God because of the moral disorder and 
 suffering which are in the world, except this 
 answer which he makes in reply to the suppo- 
 sition that even the best men may be extin- 
 guished by death. He says if it is so, we may 
 be sure that if it ought to have been otherwise, 
 the gods would have ordered it otherwise (xii. 
 5). His conviction of the wisdom which we 
 may observe in the government of the world is 
 too strong to be disturbed by any apparent ir- 
 regularities in the order of things. That these 
 disorders exist is a fact, and those who would 
 conclude from them against the being and gov- 
 ernment of God conclude too hastily. We all 
 admit that there is an order in the material 
 world, a Nature, in the sense in which that word 
 
/iBarcits Bureliua Bntonmua. 
 
 79 
 
 has been explained, a constitution {KaramEwf)^ 
 what we call a system, a relation of parts to 
 one another and a fitness of the whole for some- 
 thing. So in the constitution of plants and of 
 animals there is an order, a fitness for some end. 
 Sometimes the order, as we conceive it, is in- 
 terrupted, and the end, as we conceive it, is not 
 attained. The seed, the plant, or the animal 
 sometimes perishes before it has passed through 
 all its changes and done all its uses. It is ac- 
 cording to Nature, that is a fixed order, for 
 some to perish early and for others to do all 
 their uses and leave successors to take their 
 place. So man has a corporeal and intellectual 
 and moral constitution fit for certain uses, and 
 on the whole man performs these uses, dies, 
 and leaves other men in his place. So society 
 exists, and a social state is manifestly the 
 natural state of man— the state for which his 
 uature fits him, and society amidst innumer- 
 able irregularities and disorders still subsists; 
 and perhaps we may say that the history of the 
 past and our present knowledge give us a rea- 
 sonable hope that its disorders will diminish, 
 and that order, its governing principle, may be 
 more firmly established. As order then, a fixed 
 order, we may say, subject to deviations real 
 or apparent, must be admitted to exist in the 
 whole nature of things, that which we call dis- 
 order or evil, as it seems to us, does not in any 
 way alter the fact of the general constitution of 
 things having a nature or fixed order. No- 
 
8o 
 
 lPbilo6opbs. 
 
 body will conclude from the existence of disor- 
 der that order is not the rule, for the existence 
 of order both physical and moral is proved by 
 daily experience and all past experience. We 
 cannot conceive how the order of the universe 
 is maintained: we cannot even conceive how 
 our own life from day to day is continued, nor 
 how we perform the simplest movements of the 
 body, nor how we grow and think and act, 
 though we know many of the conditions which 
 are necessary for all these functions. Know- 
 ing nothing then of the unseen power which 
 acts in ourselves except by what is done, we 
 know nothing of the power which acts through 
 what we call all time and all space; but seeing 
 that there is a nature or fixed order in all things 
 known to us, it is conformable to the nature of 
 our minds to believe that this universal Nature 
 has a cause which operates continually, and 
 that we are totally unable to speculate on the 
 reason of any of those disorders or evils which 
 we perceive. This I believe is the answer 
 which may be collected from all that Antoni- 
 nus has said.* 
 
 The origin of evil is an old question. Achil- 
 
 * Cleanthes says in his Hymn : — 
 
 “ For all things good and bad to One thou formest, 
 
 So that One everlasting reason governs all.” 
 
 See Bishop Butler’s Sermons. Sermon XV., “ Upoit 
 the Ignorance of Man.” 
 
/IC>arcu6 Burclius Bntonfnue. 
 
 8i 
 
 les tells Priam (Iliad, 24, 527) that Zeus has 
 two casks, one filled with good things, and the 
 other with bad, and that he gives to men out 
 of each according to his pleasure; and so w^e 
 must be content, for we cannot alter the will of 
 Zeus. One of the Greek commentators asks 
 how must we reconcile this doctrine with what 
 we find in the first book of the Odyssey, where 
 the king of the gods says. Men say that evil 
 comes to them from us, but they bring it on 
 themselves through their own folly. The an- 
 swer is plain enough even to the Greek com- 
 mentator. The poets make both Achilles and 
 Zeus speak appropriately to their several char- 
 acters. Indeed, Zeus says plainly that men do 
 attribute their sufferings to their gods, but they 
 do it falsely, for they are the cause of their own 
 sorrows. 
 
 Epictetus in his Enchiridion (c. 27) makes 
 short work of the question of evil. He says, 
 “As a mark is not set up for the purpose of 
 missing it, so neither does the nature of evil ex- 
 ist in the universe.’’ This will appear obscure 
 enough to those who are not acquainted with 
 Epictetus, but he always knows what he is 
 talking about. We do not set up a mark in 
 order to miss it, though we may miss it. God, 
 whose existence Epictetus assumes, has not 
 ordered all things so that his purpose shall fail. 
 Whatever there may be of what we call evil, 
 the nature of evil, as he expresses it, does not 
 exist,; that is, evil is not a part of the constitu- 
 6 
 
82 
 
 IPbilosopbg. 
 
 tiou or nature of things. If there were a prin- 
 ciple of evil (apAv) in the constitution of things, 
 evil would no longer be evil, as Simplicius 
 argues, but evil would be good. Simplicius 
 (c. 34, [27]) has a long and curious discourse 
 on this text of Epictetus, and it is amusing 
 and instructive. 
 
 One passage more will conclude this matter. 
 It contains all that the emperor could say (ii. 
 ii): “To go from among men, if there are 
 gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for the gods 
 will not involve thee in evil; but if indeed they 
 do not exist, or if they have no concern about 
 human affairs, what is it to me to live in a uni- 
 verse devoid of gods or devoid of providence ? 
 But in truth they do exist, and they do care for 
 human things, and they have put all the means 
 in man’s power to enable him not to fall into 
 real evils. And as to the rest, if there was any- 
 thing evil, they would have provided for this 
 also, that it should be altogether in a man’s 
 power not to fall into it. But that which does 
 not make a man worse, how can it make a 
 man’s life worse? But neither through igno- 
 rance, nor having the knowledge but not the 
 power to guard against or correct these things, 
 is it possible that the nature of the universe 
 has overlooked them; nor is it possible that it 
 has made so great a mistake, either through 
 want of power or want of .skill, that good and 
 evil should happen indiscriminately to the good 
 and the bad. But death certainly and life, 
 
/Ibarcus 2lureI(U5 Bntonfnus. 
 
 83 
 
 honor and dishonor, pain and pleasure, all 
 these things equally happen to good and bad 
 men, being things which make us neither better 
 nor worse. Therefore they are neither good 
 nor evil.” 
 
 The Ethical part of Antoninus’ Philosophy 
 follows from his general principles. The end 
 of all his philosophy is to live conformably to 
 Nature, both a man’s own nature and the nature 
 of the universe. Bishop Butler has explained 
 what the Greek philosophers meant when they 
 spoke of living according to Nature, aud he says 
 that when it is explained, as he has explained it 
 and as they understood it, it is ‘ ‘ a manner of 
 speaking not loose and undeterminate, but 
 clear and distinct, strictly just and true.” To 
 live according to Nature is to live according to 
 a man’s whole nature, not according to a part 
 of it, and to reverence the divinity within him 
 as the governor of all his actions. ‘ ‘ To the 
 rational animal the same act is according to 
 nature and according to reason”^ (vii. ii). 
 That which is done contrarj^ to reason is also 
 an act contrary to nature, to the whole nature, 
 though it is certainly confonnable to some 
 part of man’s nature, or it could not be done. 
 Man is made for action, not for idleness or 
 pleasure. As plants and animals do the uses 
 of their nature, so man must do his (v. i). 
 
 * This is what Juveual means when he says (xiv. 
 
 321) — 
 
 “Nunquam aliud Natura aliud Sapieutia dicit.” 
 
84 
 
 IPbilosopbg. 
 
 Man must also live conformably to the uni- 
 versal nature, conformably to the nature of all 
 things of which he is one; and as a citizen of a 
 political community he must direct his life and 
 actions with reference to those among whom, 
 among other purposes, he lives.* A man must 
 not retire into solitude and cut himself off from 
 his fellow-men. He must be ever active to do 
 his part in the great whole. All men are his 
 kin, not only in blood, but still more by par- 
 ticipating in the same intelligence and by be- 
 ing a portion of the same divinity. A man 
 cannot really be injured by his brethren, for 
 no act of theirs can make him bad, and he 
 must not be angry with them nor hate them: 
 “For we are made for co-operation, like feet, 
 like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of the 
 upper and lower teeth. To act against one 
 another then is contrary to nature; and it is 
 acting against one another to be vexed and to 
 turn away” (ii. i). 
 
 Further he says: “Take pleasure in one 
 thing and rest in it in passing from one social 
 act to another social act,, thinking of God” 
 (vi. 7). Again: “Tove mankind. Follow 
 God” (vii. 31). It is the characteristic of the 
 rational soul for a man to love his neighbor 
 (xi. i). Antoninus teaches in various passages 
 the forgiveness of injuries, and we know that 
 he also practised what he taught. Bishop 
 
 *See viii. 52; and Persius iii. 66 
 
^ibatcus :aureliu6 IHntontnus. 
 
 85 
 
 Butler remarks that “this divine precept to 
 forgive injuries and to love our enemies, though 
 to be met with in Gentile moralists, yet is in a 
 peculiar sense a precept of Christianity, as our 
 Saviour has insisted more upon it than on any 
 other single virtue. ’ ’ The practice of this pre- 
 cept is the most difficult of all virtues. Anto- 
 ninus often enforces it and gives us aid towards 
 following it. When we are injured, we feel 
 anger and resentment, and the feeling is nat- 
 ural, just, and useful for the conservation of 
 society. It is useful that wrong-doers should 
 feel the natural consequences of their actions, 
 among which is the disapprobation of society 
 and the resentment of him who is wronged. 
 But revenge, in the proper sense of that word, 
 must not be practised. “The best way of 
 avenging thyself,” says the emperor, “is not 
 to become like the wrong-doer. ’ ’ It is plain 
 by this that he does not mean that we should 
 in any case practise revenge; but he says to 
 those who talk of revenging wrongs. Be not like 
 him who has done the wrong. Socrates in the 
 Crito (c. 10) says the same in other words, and 
 St. Paul (Ep. to the Romans, xii. 17). “When 
 a man has done thee any wrong, immediatel}^ 
 consider with what opinion about good or evil 
 he has done wrong. For when thou hast seen 
 this, thou wilt pity him and wilt neither won- 
 der nor be angry ’ ’ (vii. 26). Antoninus would 
 not deny that wrong naturally produces the 
 feeling of anger and resentment, for this is im- 
 
86 
 
 IPbUoeopb^. 
 
 plied in the recommendation to reflect on the 
 nature of the man’s mind who has done the 
 wrong, and then 3mu will have pit}^ instead of 
 resentment; and so it comes to the same as St. 
 Paul’s advice to be angry and sin not; which, 
 as Butler well explains it, is not a recommen- 
 dation to be angry, which nobody needs, for 
 anger is a natural passion, but it is a warning 
 against allowing anger to lead us into sin. In 
 short the emperor’s doctrine about wrongful 
 acts is this; wrong-doers do not know what 
 good and bad are: the>' offend out of ignorance, 
 and in the sense of the Stoics this is true. 
 Though this kind of ignorance will never be 
 admitted as a legal excuse, and ought not to 
 be admitted as a full excuse in any way by 
 society, there may be grievous injuries, such 
 as it is in a man’s power to forgive without 
 harm to society; and if he forgives because he 
 sees that his enemies know not what they do, 
 he is acting in the spirit of the sublime pra5?er, 
 ‘‘Father, forgive them, for they know not what 
 they do.” 
 
 The emperor’s moral philosophy was not a 
 feeble, harrow system, which teaches a man to 
 look directly to his own happiness, though a 
 man’s happiness or tranquillity is indirectly 
 promoted by living as he ought to do. A man 
 must live conformably to the universal nature, 
 which means, as the emperor explains it in 
 many passages, that a man’s actions must be 
 conformable to his true relations to all other 
 
Marcus aucellus Sntonlnus. 
 
 87 - 
 
 human beings, both as a citizen of a political 
 community and as a member of the whole 
 human family. This implies, and he often ex- 
 presses it in the most forcible language, that a 
 man’s words and actions, so far as thej" affect 
 others, must be measured by a fixed rule, 
 which is their consistency with the conserva- 
 tion and the interests of the particular society 
 of which he is a member, and of the whole 
 human race. To live conformably to such a 
 rule, a man must use his rational faculties in 
 order to discern clearly the consequences and 
 full effect of all his actions and of the actions 
 of others: he must not live a life of contempla- 
 tion and reflection only, though he must often 
 retire within himself to calm and purify his 
 soul by thought,* but he must mingle in the 
 work of man and be a fellow laborer for the 
 general good. 
 
 A man should have an object or purpose in 
 life, that he may direct all his energies to it ; 
 of course a good object (ii. 7). He who has not 
 one object or purpose of life, cannot be one and 
 the same all through his life (xi. 21). Bacon 
 has a remark to the same effect, on the best 
 means of ‘ ‘ reducing of the mind unto virtue 
 and good estate ; which is, the electing and 
 propounding unto a man’s self good and virtu- 
 ous ends of his life, such as may be in a reas- 
 onable sort within his compass to attain. ’ ’ He 
 
 *Utnemo iu sese tentatdescendere, nemo. — Persius, 
 iv-. 21. 
 
•88 
 
 IPbilosopbs. 
 
 is a happy man who has been wise enough to 
 do this when he was 3"oung and has had the op- 
 portunities; but the emperor seeing well that a 
 man cannot always be so wise in his 3'outh, 
 encourages himself to do it when he can, and 
 not to let life slip away before he has begun. 
 He who can propose to himself good and virtu- 
 ous ends of life, and be true to them, cannot 
 fail to live conformably to his own interest and 
 the universal interest, for in the nature of 
 things they are one. If a thing is not good for 
 the hive, it is not good for the bee (vi. 54). 
 
 One passage may end this matter. “ If the 
 gods have determined about me and about the 
 things which must happen to me, they 
 have determined well, for it is not easy even to 
 imagine a deity without forethought; and as 
 to doing me harm, why should they have any 
 desire towards that ? For what advantage 
 would result to them from this or to the whole, 
 which is the special object of their providence ? 
 But if they have not determined about me in- 
 dividually, they have certainlj^ determined 
 about the whole at least; and the things which 
 happen b}^ way of sequence in this general ar- 
 rangement I ought to accept Avith pleasure and 
 to be content wdth them. But if they deter- 
 mine about nothing — which it is wicked to be- 
 lie\"e, or if we do belie\"e it, let us neither sac- 
 rifice nor pra}^ nor swear bj" them, nor do 
 anything else which we do as if the gods were 
 present and Ih^ed with us; but if howe\'er the 
 
Marcus ZlureUue Hntoninue. 
 
 89 
 
 gods determine about none of the things which 
 concern us, I am able to determine about my- 
 self, and I can inquire about that which is 
 useful; and that is useful to every man which 
 is conformable to his own constitution (KaraaKev^) 
 and nature. But my nature is rational and 
 social; and my city and country, so far as I am 
 Antoninus, is Rome; but so far as I am a man, 
 it is the world. The things then which are 
 useful to these cities are alone useful to me’ ’ 
 <vi. 44). 
 
 It would be tedious, and it is not necessary, 
 to state the emperor’s opinions on all the ways 
 in which a mau may profitably use his under- 
 standing towards perfecting himself in practical 
 virtue. The passages to this purpose are in all 
 parts of his book, but as they are in no order 
 or connection, a man must use the book a long 
 time before he will find out all that is in it. 
 A few words may be added here. If we ana- 
 lyze all other things, we find how insufficient 
 they are for human life, and how truly worth- 
 less many of them are. Virtue alone is indi- 
 visible, one, and perfectly satisfying. The 
 notion of Virtue cannot be considered vague or 
 unsettled, because a man may find it difficult 
 to explain the notion full}^ to himself, or to ex- 
 pound it to others in such a way as to prevent 
 cavilling. Virtue is a whole, and no more 
 consists of parts than man’s intelligence does; 
 and yet we speak of various intellectual facul- 
 ties as a convenient way of expressing the var- 
 
go 
 
 lPbU090pbT5. 
 
 ious powers which man’s intellect shows by 
 his works. In the same way we may speak of 
 varioirs virtues or parts of virtue, in a practical 
 sense, for the purpose of showing what partic- 
 ular virtues we ought to practice in order to 
 he exercise of the whole of virtue, that is, as 
 man's nature is capable of 
 
 The prime principle in man’s constitution is 
 social. The next in order is not to yield to the 
 persuasions of the body, when they are not 
 conformable to the rational principle, which 
 must govern. The third is freedom from error 
 and from deception. “ Tet then the ruling 
 principle holding fast to these things go straight 
 on, and it has what is its own ” (vii. 55). The 
 emperor selects justice as the virtue which is 
 the basis of all the rest (x. ii), and this had 
 been said long before his time. 
 
 It is true that all people have some notion of 
 what is meant by justice as a disposition of the 
 mind, and some notion about acting in con- 
 formity to this disposition ; but experience 
 shows that men’s notions about justice are as 
 confused as their actions are inconsistent with 
 the true notion of justice. The emperor’s 
 notion of justice is clear enough, but not prac- 
 tical enough for all mankind. ‘ ‘ Let there be 
 freedom from perturbations with respect to the 
 things which come from the external cause ; 
 and let there be justice in the things done by 
 virtue of the internal cause, that is, let there be 
 movement and action terminating in this, in 
 
/ilbarcus aurelius Hntonmus. 
 
 91 
 
 social acts, for this is according to thy nature” 
 (ix. 31). In another place (ix. i) he saj^s that 
 ” he who acts unjustly acts impiously,” which 
 follows of course from all that he says in various 
 places. He insists on the practice of truth as a 
 virtue and as a means to virtue, which no doubt 
 it is : for Ij'ing even in indifferent things Aveak- 
 ens the understanding ; and lying maliciously 
 is as great a moral offense as a man can be 
 guilty of, viewed both as showing an habitual 
 disposition, and viewed with respect to conse- 
 quences. He couples the notion of justice with 
 action. A man must not pride himself on hav- 
 ing some fine notion of justice in his head, but 
 he must exhibit his justice in act, like St. 
 James’ notion of faith. But this is enough. 
 
 The Stoics, and Antoninus among them, call 
 some things beautiful (kuM) and some ugly 
 {awxpa), and as they are beautiful so they are 
 good, and as they are ugly so they are evil, or 
 bad (ii. i). All these things, go'od and evil, 
 are in our power, absolutely, some of the stricter 
 Stoics would saj^ ; in a manner only, as those 
 who would not depart altogether from common 
 sense would say ; practically they are to a great 
 degree in the power of some persons and in 
 some circumstances, but in a small degree only 
 in other persons and in other circumstances. 
 The Stoics maintain man’s free will as to the 
 things which are in his power ; for as to the 
 things which are out of his power, free will ter- 
 minating in action is of course excluded by the 
 
92 
 
 IPbUogopbg. 
 
 very terms of the expression. I hardl}^ know 
 if we can discover exactly Antoninus’ notion of 
 the free will of man, nor is the question worth 
 the inquiry. What he does mean and does say 
 is intelligible. All the things which are not in 
 our power (aTrpoa'ipeTa) are indifferent : they are 
 neither good nor bad, morally. Such are life, 
 health, wealth, power, disease, poverty, and 
 death. Life and death are all men’s portion. 
 Health, wealth, power, disease, and poverty 
 happen to men, indifferently to the good and to 
 the bad ; to those who live according to nature 
 and to those who do not.* “ Life,” says the 
 emperor, ‘‘is a warfare and a stranger’s so- 
 journ, and after fame is oblivion” (ii. 17). 
 After speaking of those men who have dis- 
 turbed the world and then died, and of the 
 death of philosophers such as Heraclitus and 
 Democritus, who was destroyed by lice, and of 
 Socrates whom other lice (his enemies) de- 
 stroyed, he* says : ‘‘What means all this? 
 Thou hast embarked, thou hast made the voy- 
 
 * “All events come alike to all: there is one event 
 to the righteous and to the wicked: to the good and 
 to the clean and to the unclean,” &c. ( Ecclesiastes, 
 ix. V. 2); and (v. 3), “This is an evil among all 
 things that are done under the sun, that there is one 
 event unto all.” In what sense “ evil ” is meant here 
 seems rather doubtful. There is no doubt about the 
 emperor’s meaning. Compare Epictetus, Enchiridion, 
 c. i., &c. ; and the doctrine of the Brachmans (Strabo 
 p. 713, ed. Cas. ) : ayadov <5f ^ kmov prjdiv etvai ruv 
 avpPaivovTOiv avdpunotg. 
 
/Iftarcus Zlurellus Hntoninue. 
 
 93 
 
 age, thou art come to shore ; get out. If in- 
 deed to another life, there is no want of gods, 
 not even there. But if to a state without sen- 
 sation, thou wilt cease to be held by pains and 
 pleasures, and to be a slave to the vessel which 
 is as much inferior as that which serves it is 
 superior : for the one is intelligence and Deity; 
 the other is earth and corruption” (hi. 3). 
 It is not death that a man should fear, but he 
 should fear never beginning to live according 
 to nature (xii. i). Every man should live in 
 such a way as to discharge his duty, and to 
 trouble himself about nothing else. He should 
 live such a life that he shall always be ready 
 for death, and shall depart content when the 
 summons comes. For what is death? ‘‘A 
 cessation of the impressions through the senses, 
 and of the pulling of the strings which move 
 the appetites, and of the discursive movements 
 of the thoughts, and of the service to the 
 flesh” (vi. 28). Death is such as generation 
 is, a mystery of nature (iv. 5). In another 
 passage, the exact meaning of which is per- 
 haps doubtful (ix. 3), he speaks of the child 
 which leaves the womb, and so he says the 
 soul at death leaves its envelope. As the 
 child is born or comes into life by leaving the 
 womb, so the soul ma3’- on leaving the 
 body pass into another existence which is per- 
 fect. I am not sure if this is the emperor’s 
 meaning. Butler compares it with a passage 
 in Strabo (p. 713) about the Brachmans’ notion 
 
94 
 
 IPbllosopbs. 
 
 of death being the birth into real life and a 
 happy life, to those who have philosophized ; 
 and he thinks Antoninus may allude to this 
 opinion.* 
 
 Antoninus’ opinion of a future life is no- 
 where clearly expre.ssed. His doctrine of the 
 nature of the soul of necessity implies that it 
 does not perish absolutely, for a portion of the 
 divinity cannot perish. The opinion is at least 
 as old as the time of Epicharmus and Euripi- 
 des; what comes from earth goes back to earth, 
 and what conies from heaven, the divinity, re- 
 turns to him who gave it. But I find nothing 
 clear in Antoninus as to the notion of the man 
 existing after death so as to be conscious of his 
 sameness with that soul which occupied his 
 vessel of clay. He seems to be perplexed on 
 this matter, and finally to have rested in this, 
 that God or the gods will do whatever is best, 
 and consistent with the university of things. 
 
 Nor, I think, does he speak conclusively on 
 another Stoic doctrine, which some Stoics prac- 
 
 * Seneca (Ep. 102) has the same, whether an ex- 
 pression of his own opinion, or. merely a fine saying 
 of others employed to embellish his writings, I know 
 not. After speaking of the child being prepared in 
 the womb to live this life, he adds, “Sic per hoc 
 spatium, quod ab infantia patet in senectutem, in 
 ahum naturae sumimur partum. Alia origo nos ex- 
 pectat, alius rerum status.” See Ecclesiastes, xii. 7; 
 and Lucan, i. 457: — 
 
 “ Longae, canitis si cognita, vitae 
 Mors media est.” 
 
Marcus Hurelius antoninus. 
 
 95 
 
 tised, — the anticipating the regular course of 
 nature a man’s own act. The reader will 
 find some passages in which this is touched on, 
 and he may make of them what he can. But 
 there are passages in which the emperor en- 
 courages himself to wait for the end patiently 
 and with tranquillity; and certainly it is con- 
 sistent with all his best teaching that a man 
 should bear all that falls to his lot and do use- 
 ful acts as he lives. He should not therefore 
 abridge the time of his usefulness by his own 
 act. Whether he contemplates any possible 
 cases in Avhich a man should die by his own 
 hand, I cannot tell; and the matter is not worth 
 a curious inquiry, for I believe it would not 
 lead to any certain result as to his opinion on 
 this point. I do not think that Antoninus, 
 who never mentions Seneca, though he must 
 have known all about him, would have agreed 
 with Seneca when he gives as a reason for sui- 
 cide, that the eternal law, Avhatever he means, 
 has made nothing better for us than this, that 
 it has given us only one way of entering into 
 life and many ways of going out of it. The 
 AA'ays of going out indeed are man5^ and that is 
 a good reason for a man taking care of him- 
 self.* 
 
 Happiness was not the direct object of a 
 Stoic’s life. There is no rule of life contained 
 in the precept that a man should pursue his 
 
 *See Plinius H. N. ii., c. 7; Seneca, De Provid. c. 
 6.; and Ep. 70; “ Nihil melius aeterna lex,” &.c. 
 
96 
 
 IPbUosopbs. 
 
 own happiness. Many men think that they 
 are seeking happiness when they are only seek- 
 ing the gratification of some particular pas.sion, 
 the strongest that they have. The end of a 
 man is, as already explained, to live conform- 
 ably to nature, and he will thus obtain happi- 
 ness, tranquillity of mind, and contentment 
 (hi. 12; viii. I, and other places). As a 
 means of living conformably to nature he must 
 study the four chief virtues, each of which has 
 its proper sphere: wisdom, or the knowledge 
 of good and evil; justice, or the giving to every 
 man his due; fortitude, or the enduring of labor 
 and pain; and temperance, which is moderation 
 in all things. By thus living conformably to 
 nature the Stoic obtained all that he wished or 
 expected. His reward was in his virtuous life, 
 and he was satisfied with that. Some Greek 
 poet long ago wrote:— 
 
 “ For virtue only of all liuman things 
 Takes her reward not from the hands of others. 
 Virtue herself rewards the toils of virtue.” 
 
 Some of the Stoics indeed expressed them- 
 selves in very arrogant, absurd terms, about 
 the wise man’s self-sufficiency; they elevated 
 him to the rank of a deity.* But these were 
 
 *J. Smith in his Select Discourses on “the Excel- 
 lency and Nobleness of True Religion ” (c. vi.) has re- 
 marked on this Stoical arrogance. He finds it in 
 Seneca and others. In Seneca certainly, and perhaps 
 something of it in Epictetus; but it is not in Antoni- 
 nus. 
 
flbarcu6 Hureliu 0 antonfnus. 
 
 97 
 
 only talkers and lecturers, such as those in all 
 ages who utter fine words, know little of human 
 affairs, and care only for notoriety. Epictetus 
 and Antoninus both by precept and example 
 labored to improve themselves and others; and 
 if we discover imperfections in their teaching, 
 we must still honor these great men who at- 
 tempted to show that there is in man’s nature 
 and in the constitution of things sufficient 
 reason for living a virtuous life. It is difficult 
 enough to live as we ought to live, difficult 
 even for any man to live in such a way as to 
 satisfy himself, if he exercises only in a moder- 
 ate degree the power of reflecting upon and re- 
 viewing his own conduct; and if all men cannot 
 be brought to the same opinions in morals and 
 religion, it is at least worth while to give them 
 good reasons for as much as they can be per- 
 suaded to accept. 
 
 7 
 

THE THOUGHTS 
 
 OF 
 
 MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 
 
THE THOUGHTS 
 
 OF 
 
 MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 
 
 I. 
 
 F rom my grandfather Verus* [I learned] 
 good morals and the government of my 
 temper. 
 
 2. From the reputation and remembrance of 
 my father, t modesty and a manly character. 
 
 * Annius Verus was his grandfather’s name. There 
 is no verb in this section connected with the word 
 “from,” nor in the following sections of this book; 
 and it is not quite certain what verb should be sup- 
 plied. What I have added may express the meaning 
 here, though there are sections which it will not fit. 
 If he does not mean to say that he learned all these 
 good things from the several persons whom he men- 
 tions, he means that he observed certain good quali- 
 ties in them, or received certain benefits from them, 
 and it is implied that he was the better for it, or at 
 least might have been for it would be a mistake to 
 understand Marcus as saying that he possessed all the 
 virtues which he observed in his kinsmen and teachers. 
 
 t His father’s name was Annius Verus. 
 
 (lOl) 
 
lo2 
 
 trbougbts, 
 
 [Book I. 
 
 3. From my mother,* piety and beneficence, 
 and abstinence, not only from evil deeds, but 
 even from evil thoughts; and further, sim- 
 plicity in my way of living, far removed from 
 the habits of the rich. 
 
 4. From my great-grandfather, f not to have 
 frequented public schools, and to have had 
 good teachers at home, and to know that on 
 such things a man should spend liberally. 
 
 5. From my governor, to be neither of the 
 green nor of the blue party at the games in the 
 Circus, nor a partisan either of the Parmular- 
 ius or the Scutarius at the gladiators’ fights ; 
 from him too I learned endurance of labor, and 
 to want little, and to work with my own 
 hands, and not to meddle with other people’s 
 affairs, and not to be ready to listen to slander. 
 
 6. From Diognetus,J not to busy myself 
 
 *His mother was Domitia Calvilla, named also 
 Lucilla. 
 
 t Perhaps his mother’s grandfather, Catilius Severus. 
 
 f In the works of Justimis there is printed a letter 
 to one Diognetus, whom the writer names “most ex- 
 cellent.” He was a Gentile, but he wished very much 
 to know what the religion of the Christians was, what 
 God they worshipped, and how this worship made 
 them despise the world and death, and neither believe 
 in the gods of the Greeks nor observe the superstition 
 of the Jews; and what was this love to one another 
 which they had, and why this new kind of religion 
 was introduced now and not before. My friend Mr. 
 Jenkins, rector of kyminge in Kent, has suggested to 
 me that this Diognetus may have been the tutor of 
 M. Antoninus. 
 
Book!.] /Iliarcus BureHus Bntonlnu0. 
 
 103 
 
 abautiriiiing things-, and not to give credit to 
 what was said by miracle-workers and jugglers 
 about incantations and the driving away of 
 daemons and such things ; and not to breed 
 quails [for fighting], nor to give myself up 
 passionately to such things; and to endure 
 freedom of speech; and to have become inti- 
 mate with philosophy; and to have been a 
 hearer, first of Bacchius, then of Tandasis and 
 Marcianus; and to have written dialogues in 
 my 5'outh; and to have desired a plank bed 
 and skin, and whatever else of the kind be- 
 longs to the Grecian discipline. 
 
 7. From Rusticus''^ I received the impres- 
 sion that my charaeter required improvement 
 and discipline; and from him I learned not to 
 be led astray to sophistic emulation, nor to 
 writing on speculative matters, nor to deliver- 
 ing little hortatory orations, nor to showing 
 myself off as a man who practises much dis- 
 cipline, or does benevolent acts in order to 
 make a display; and to abstain from rhetoric, 
 and poetr}^ and fine writing; and not to walk 
 about in the house in my outdoor dress, nor to 
 
 * Q. Junius Rusticuswas a Stoic philosopher, whom 
 Antoninus valued highl}', and often took his advice 
 (Capitol. Antonin, hi). 
 
 Antoninus says, roZf '’Si-LK-rj-uoiQ vTzoiivijfiaaiv, which 
 must not be translated, “ the writings of Epictetus,” 
 for Epictetus wrote nothing. His pupil Arrian, who 
 has preserved for us all that we know of Epictetus, 
 says, ravra e—etpadriv v~ofiv?jfj.a~a kjiavru 6ia(pv?A^ai 
 £K£ivov iiavoiaq {Ep. ad. Cell.) 
 
104 
 
 ITbougbts. 
 
 [Book L 
 
 do other things of the kind; and to write my 
 letters with simplicit}^ like the letter which 
 Rusticus wrote from Sinnessa to mj^ mother; 
 and with respect to those who have offended 
 me by words, or done me wrong, to be easily 
 disposed to be pacified and reconciled, as soon 
 as the}' have shown a readiness to be recon- 
 ciled; and to read carefully, and not to be 
 satisfied with a superficial understanding of a 
 book; nor hastily to give my assent to those 
 who talk overmuch; and- 1 am indebted to him 
 for being acquainted with the discourses of 
 Epictetus, which he communicated to me out 
 of his own collection. 
 
 8. .From Apollonius* I learned freedom of 
 will and undeviating steadiness of purpose; 
 and to look to nothing else, not even for a 
 moment, except to reason; and to be always 
 the same, in sharp pains, on the occasion of 
 the loss of a child, and in long illness; and to 
 see clearly in a living example that the same 
 man can be both most resolute and yielding, 
 and not peevish in giving his instruction; and 
 to have had before my eyes a man who clearly 
 considered his experience and his skill in ex- 
 pounding philosophical principles as the small- 
 est of his merits; and from him I learned how 
 to receive from friends what are esteemed 
 favors, without being either humbled by them 
 or letting them pass unnoticed. 
 
 * Apollonius of Chalcis came to Rome in the time 
 of Pius to be Marcus’ preceptor. He was a rigid 
 Stoic. 
 
Book I.] /iBarcus Burelius antonlnus. 
 
 105 
 
 9. :^;om Sextus,* a benevolent disposition, 
 and_ the, example of a family governed in a 
 fatherly manner, and the idea of living con-' 
 formablj" to nature; and gravity without affec- 
 tation, and to look carefully after the interests 
 of friends, and to tolerate ignorant persons, 
 and those w^ho form opinions without consid- 
 eration :+ he had the power of readily ac- 
 commodating himself to all, so that intercourse 
 wdth him was more agreeable than any flattery; 
 and at the same time he was most highly ven- 
 erated by those who associated with him; and 
 he had the faculty both of discovery and order- 
 ing, in an intelligent and methodical way, the 
 principles necessar}^ for life; and he never 
 showed anger or any other passion, but was 
 entirely free from passion, and also most affec- 
 tionate; and he could express approbation 
 without noisy display, and he possessed much 
 knowledge without ostentation. 
 
 10. From Alexander t the grammarian, to 
 refrain from fault-finding, and not in a reproach- 
 ful way to chide those who uttered any barbar- 
 ous or solecistic or strange-sounding expression; 
 but dexterously to introduce the very expres- 
 sion w'hich ought to have been used, and in the 
 
 * Sextus of Chaeronea, a grandson of Plutarch, or 
 nephew, as some say ; but more probably a grandson. 
 
 t Alexanderwas a Grammaticus, anative of Phrygia. 
 He wrote a commentary on Homer ; and the rhetori- 
 cian Aristides wrote a panegyric on Alexander in a 
 funeral oration. 
 
io6 
 
 ^Tbougbts. 
 
 [Book I. 
 
 way of answer or giving confirmation, or join- 
 ing in an inquiry about the thing itself, not 
 about the word, or by some other fit sugges- 
 tion. 
 
 11. From Fronto* I learned to observe what 
 envy and duplicity and hypocrisy are in a ty- 
 rant, and that generally those among us who 
 are called Patricians are rather deficient in pa- 
 ternal affection. 
 
 12. From Alexander the Platonic, not fre- 
 quently nor without necessity to say to any one, 
 or to write in a letter, that I have no leisure; 
 nor continually to excuse the neglect of duties 
 required by our relation to those witli whom 
 we live, by alleging urgent occupations. 
 
 13. From Catulus,t not to be indifferent 
 when a friend finds fault, even if he should find 
 fault without reason, but to try to restore him 
 to his usual disposition; and to be readj^ to 
 speak well of teachers, as it is reported of 
 Domitius and Athenodotus; and to love my 
 children trul}^ 
 
 14. From my brother J Severus, to love my 
 
 *M. Cornelius Pronto was a rhetorician, and in 
 great favor with Marcus. There are extant various 
 letters between Marcus and Pronto. 
 
 t Cinna Catulus, a Stoic philosopher. 
 
 J The word brother may not be genuine. Antoni- 
 nus had no brother. It has been supposed that he 
 may mean some cousin. Schultz in his translation 
 omits “brother,” and sa}'S that this Severus is prob- 
 ably Claudius Severus, a peripatetic. 
 
Book!.] j®arcu6 Bureliu0 Antoninus. 
 
 107 
 
 kin, and to love truth, and to love justice; and 
 through him I learned to know Thrasea, Hel- 
 vidius, Cato, Dion, Brutus;* and from him I 
 received the idea of a polity in which there is 
 the same law for all, a polity administered with 
 regard to equal rights and equal freedom of 
 speech, and the idea of a kingly government 
 which respects most of all the freedom of the 
 governed; I learned from him also + consist- 
 ency and undeviating steadiness in my regard 
 for philosophy; and a disposition to do good, 
 and to give to others readily, and to cherish 
 good hopes, and to believe that I am loved by 
 my friends; and in him I observed no conceal- 
 ment of his opinions with respect to those 
 whom he condemned, and that his friends had 
 no need to conjecture what he wished or did 
 not wish, but it was quite plain. 
 
 15. From Maximust I learned self-govern- 
 ment, and not to be led aside by an3dhing; and 
 cheerfulness in all circumstances, as well as in 
 illness; and a just admixture in the moral 
 character of sweetness and dignity, and to do 
 
 *We know, from Tacitus [Annal. xiii., xvi. 21; 
 and other passages), who Thrasea and Helvidius 
 were. Plutarch has written the lives of the two Catos, 
 and of Dion and Brutus. Antoninus probably alludes 
 to Cato of Utica, who was a Stoic. 
 
 t Claudius Maximus was a Stoic philosopher, who 
 was highly esteemed also by Antoninus Pius, Marcus’ 
 predecessor. The character of Maximus is that of a 
 perfect man. (See viii. 25,) 
 
io8 
 
 ^Cbouflbts. 
 
 [BookL 
 
 what was set before me without complaining. 
 I observ'ed that everybody believed that he 
 thought as he spoke, and that in all that he 
 did he never had any bad intention; and he 
 never showed amazement and surprise, and was 
 never in a hurry, and never put off doing a 
 thing, nor was perplexed nor dejected, nor did 
 he ever laugh to disguise his vexation, nor, on 
 the other hand, was he ever passionate or sus- 
 picious. He was accustomed to do acts of 
 beneficence, and was ready to forgive, and was 
 free from all falsehood; and he presented the 
 appearance of a man who could not be diverted 
 from right, rather than of a man who had been 
 improved. I observed, too, that no man could 
 ever think that he was despised by Maximus, 
 or ever venture to think himself a better man. 
 He had also the art of being humorous in an 
 agreeable way.+ 
 
 i6. In my father^ I observed mildness of 
 temper, and unchangeable resolution in the 
 things which he had determined after due de- 
 liberation; and no vain-glory in those things 
 which men call honors; and a love of labor and 
 perseverance; and a readiness to listen to those 
 who had anjdhing to propose for the common 
 weal; and undeviating firmness in giving to 
 everj^ man according to his deserts; and a 
 knowledge derived from experience of the oc- 
 
 * He means his adoptive father, his predecessor, the 
 Emperor Antoninus Pius. Compare vi. 30. 
 
Book I.] ^ibarcue BureUus Bntonlnus. 
 
 109 
 
 casions for vigorous action and for remission. 
 And I observed that he had overcome all pas- 
 sion for boys; and he considered himself no 
 more than any other citizen;* and he released 
 his friends from all obligation to sup with him 
 or to attend him of necessity when he went 
 abroad, and those who had failed to accompany 
 him, by reason of any urgent circumstances, 
 always found him the same. I observed too 
 his habit of careful inquiry in all matters of de- 
 liberation, and his persistency, and that he 
 never stopped his investigation through being 
 satisfied with appearances which first present 
 themselves; and that his disposition was to 
 keep his friends, and not to be soon tired of 
 them, nor yet to be extravagant in his affection; 
 and to be satisfied on all occasions, and cheer- 
 ful; and to foresee things a long way off, and to 
 provide for the smallest without display; and to 
 check immediately popular applause and all 
 flattery; and to be ever watchful over the 
 things which were necessary for the administra- 
 tion of the empire, and to be a good manager 
 of the expenditure, and patiently to endure the 
 blame which he got for such conduct; and he 
 was neither superstitious with respect to the 
 gods, nor did he court men b5" gifts or by trying 
 to please them, or by flattering the populace; 
 but he showed sobriety in all things, and firm- 
 ness, and never any mean thoughts or action, 
 
 *He uses the word Koivovorifiocvv)). See Gataker’s 
 
 note. 
 
no 
 
 ^Cbougbts. 
 
 [Book I 
 
 nor love of novelt}\ And the things which 
 conduce in any way to the commodity of life, 
 and of which fortune gives an abundant supply, 
 he used without arrogance and without excusing 
 himself; so that when he had them, he enjoyed 
 them without affectation, and when he had 
 them not, he did not want them. No one 
 could ever say of him that he was either a 
 sophist or a [home-bred] flippant slave or a 
 pedant; but every one acknowledged him to be 
 a man ripe, perfect, above flattery, able to man- 
 age his own and other men’s affairs. Besides 
 this, he honored those who were true philoso- 
 phers, and he did not reproach those who pre- 
 tended to be philosophers, nor yet was he easily 
 led by them. He was also easy in conversation, 
 and he made himself agreeable without any 
 offensive affectation. He took a reasonable 
 care of his body’s health, not as one who was 
 greatly attached to life, nor out of regard to 
 personal appearance, nor yet in a careless way, 
 but so that through his own attention he very 
 seldom stood in need of the physician’s art or 
 of medicine or external applications. He was 
 most ready to give without envy to those who 
 possessed any particular faculty, such as that 
 of eloquence or knowledge of the law or of 
 morals, or of anything else; and he gave them 
 his help, that each might enjoy reputation ac- 
 cording to his deserts; and he always acted con- 
 formably to the institutions of his country, 
 without showing any affectation of doing so. 
 
Book I.] /iRarcus Buceliu0 Britoninus. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Further, he was not fond of change nor un- 
 steady, but he loved to stay in the same places, 
 and to employ himself about the same things; 
 and after his paroxysms of headache he came 
 immediately fresh and vigorous to his usual 
 occupations. His secrets were not many, but 
 very few and very rare, and these only about 
 public matters; and he showed prudence and 
 economy in the exhibition of the public 
 spectacles and the construction of public build- 
 ings, his donations to the people, and in such 
 things, for he was a man who looked to what 
 ought to be done, not to the reputation which 
 is got by a man’s acts. He did not take the 
 bath at unseasonable hours; he was not fond of 
 building houses, nor curious about what he 
 ate, nor about the texture and color of his 
 clothes, nor about the beauty of his slaves.* 
 His dress came from Lorium, his villa on the 
 coast, and from Fanuvium generally. f We 
 know how he behaved to the toll-collector at 
 Tusculum who asked his pardon; and such was 
 all his behavior. There was in him nothing 
 harsh, nor implacable, nor violent, nor, as one 
 may say, anything ‘carried to the sweating 
 point; but he examined all things severally, as 
 if he had abundance of time, and without con- 
 
 *T-his passage is corrupt, and the exact meaning is 
 uncertain. 
 
 t horium was a villa on the coast north of Rome, 
 and there Antoninus was brought up, and he died 
 there. This also is corrupt. 
 
II2 
 
 ^Tbougbts. 
 
 [Book L 
 
 fusion, in an orderly way, vigorously and con- 
 sistently. And that might be applied to him 
 which is recorded of Socrates,* that he was able 
 both to abstain from, and to enjoy, those 
 things which many are too weak to abstain 
 from, and cannot enjoy without excess. But 
 to be strong enough both to bear the one and 
 to be sober in the other is the mark of a man 
 who has a perfect and invincible soul, such as 
 he showed in the illness of 'Maximus. 
 
 17. To the gods I am indebted for having 
 good grandfathers, good parents, a good sister, 
 good teachers, good associates, good kinsmen 
 and friends, nearly everything good. Further, 
 I owe it to the gods that I was not hurried into 
 any offence against any of them, though I had 
 a disposition which, if opportunity had offered, 
 might have led me to do something of this 
 kind ; but, through their favor, there never 
 was such a concurrence of circumstances as put 
 me to the trial. Further, I am thankful to the 
 gods that I was not longer brought up with my 
 grandfather’s concubine, and that I preserved 
 the flower of my youth, and that I did not 
 make proof of my virility before the proper 
 season, but even deferred the time ; that I was 
 subjected to a ruler and father who was able to 
 take away all pride from me, and to bring me 
 to the knowledge that it is possible for a man 
 to live in a palace without wanting either 
 
 * Xenophon, Memorab. i. 3, 15. 
 
Book I.] ^arcu0 aureliue antoninus. 
 
 113 
 
 guards or embroidered dresses, or torches and 
 statues, and such-like show ; but that it is in 
 such a man’s power to bring himself very near 
 to the fashion of a private person, without be- 
 ing for this reason either meaner in thought, 
 or more remiss in action, with respect to the 
 things which must be done for the public in- 
 terest in a manner that befits a ruler. I thank 
 the gods for giving me such a brother,* who 
 was able by his moral character to rouse me to 
 vigilance over myself, and who at the same 
 time pleased me by his respect and affection ; 
 that my children have not been stupid nor de- 
 formed in body ; that I did not make more pro- 
 ficiency^ in rhetoric, poetry, and the other 
 studies, in which I should perhaps have been 
 completely engaged, if I had seen that I was 
 making progress in them ; that I made haste 
 to place those who brought me up in the 
 station of honor, which they seemed to desire, 
 without putting them off with hope of my do- 
 ing it some other time after, because they 
 were then still young; that I knew Apollonius, 
 Rusticus, Maximus ; that I received clear and 
 frequent impressions about living according to 
 nature, and what kind of a life that is, so that, 
 so far as depended on the gods, and their gifts, 
 and help, and inspirations, nothing hindered 
 me from forthwith living according to nature, 
 
 *The emperor had no brother except L,. Verus, his 
 brother by adoption. 
 
 8 
 
tibougbte. 
 
 [Book I. 
 
 though I still fall short of it through my owu 
 fault, aud through not observing the admoni- 
 tions of the gods, and, I may almost say, their 
 direct instructions ; that my body has held out 
 so long in such a kind of life ; that I never 
 touched either Benedicta or Theodotus, aud 
 that, after having fallen into amatory passions, 
 I was cured, and, though I was often out of 
 humor with Rusticus, I never did anything of 
 which I had occasion to repent; that, though 
 it was my mother’s fate to die jmung, she 
 spent the last years of her life with me ; that, 
 whenever I wished to help any man in his 
 need, or on any other occasion, I was never 
 told that I had not the means of doing it ; aud 
 that to myself the same necessity never hap- 
 pened, to receive anything from another ; that 
 I have such a wife,* so obedient, and so affec- 
 tionate, and so simple ; that I had abundance 
 of good masters for my children ; and that 
 remedies have been shown to me by dreams, 
 both others, and against bloodspitting and 
 giddiness t . . . ; aud that, when I had an in- 
 clination to philosophy, I did not fall into the 
 hands of any sophist, and that I did not waste 
 my time on writers [of histories], or in the 
 resolution of syllogisms, or occupy myself 
 about the investigation of appearances in the 
 heavens ; for all these things require the help 
 of the gods and fortune. 
 
 * See the Life of Antonimis. 
 
 t This is corrupt. 
 
Book I.] j^iRarcua :aurellu6 Sntonlnus, 
 
 115 
 
 Among the Quadi at the Granua.* 
 
 *The Quadi lived iu the southern part of Bohemia 
 and Moravia ; and Antoninus made a campaign against 
 them. (See the Granua is probably the river 
 
 Graan, which flows into the Danube. 
 
 If these words are genuine, Antoninus may have 
 written this first book during the war with the Quadi. 
 In the first edition of Antoninus, and in the older 
 editions, the first three sections of the second book 
 make the conclusion of the first book. Gataker 
 placed them at the beginning of the second book. 
 
ii6 
 
 Q:bougbt6. 
 
 [Book II. 
 
 II. 
 
 B egin the morning by saying to thyself, I 
 shall meet with the busybody, the un- 
 grateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. 
 All these things happen to them by reason of 
 their ignorance of what is good and evil. But 
 I who have seen the nature of the good that it 
 is beautiful, and of the bad that it is ugly, and 
 the nature of him who does wrong, that it is 
 akin to me; not [only] of the same blood or 
 seed, but that it participates in [the same] in- 
 telligence and [the same] portion of the divin- 
 ity, I can neither be injured by any of them, 
 for no one can fix on me what is ugly, nor can 
 I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate him. 
 For we are made for co-operation, like feet, like 
 hands, like eyelids, like the rows of the upper 
 and lower teeth. To act against one another, 
 then, is contrary to nature; and it is acting 
 against one another to be vexed and to turn 
 away. 
 
 2. Whatever this is that I am,- it is a little 
 flesh and breath, and the ruling part. Throw 
 away thy books; no longer distract thyself: it 
 is not allowed; but as if thou wast now dying, 
 despise the flesh; it is blood and bones and 
 
 * Xenophon, Mem. ii. 3. 18. 
 
Book II.] ®qrcu6 Burelius Bntonlnus. 
 
 network, a contexture of nerves, veins, and 
 arteries. See the breath also, w'hat kind of a 
 thing it is; air, and not always the same, but 
 every moment sent out and again sucked in. 
 The third, then, is the ruling part; consider 
 thus: Thou art an old man; no longer let this 
 be a slave, no longer be pulled by the strings 
 like a puppet to unsocial movements, no longer 
 be either dissatisfied with thy present lot, or 
 shrink from the future. 
 
 3. All that is from the gods is full of provi- 
 dence. That which is from fortune is not sep- 
 arated from nature or without an interweaving 
 and involution with the things which are 
 ordered by providence. From thence all things 
 flow; and there is besides uecessit}", and that 
 which is for the advantage of the whole universe, 
 of which thou art a part. But that is good for 
 every part of nature which the nature of the 
 whole brings, and what serves to maintain this 
 nature. Now the universe is preserved, as by 
 the changes of the elements so by the changes 
 of things compounded of the elements. Bet 
 these principles be enough for thee; let them 
 always be fixed opinions. But cast away the 
 thirst after books, that thou mayest not die 
 murmuring, but cheerfully, truly, and from thy 
 heart thankful to the gods. 
 
 4. Remember how long thou hast been put- 
 ting off these things, and how often thou hast 
 received an opportunity from the gods, and yet 
 dost not use it. Thou must now at last per- 
 
ii8 
 
 tibougbts. 
 
 [Book II. 
 
 ceive of what universe thou art a part, and of 
 what administrator of the universe th}^ exist- 
 ence is an efflux, and that a limit of time is 
 fixed for thee, which if thou dost not use for 
 clearing away the clouds from thj' mind, it will 
 go and thou wilt go, and it will never return. 
 
 5. Kvery^ moment think steadilj" as a Roman 
 and a man to do what thou hast in hand with 
 perfect and simple dignity, and feeling of af- 
 fection, and freedom, and justice, and to give 
 thyself relief from all other thoughts. And 
 thou wilt give thyself relief if thou doest every 
 act of th}" life as if it were the last, laying aside 
 all carelessness and passionate aversion from 
 the commands of reason, and all hj^pocrisy, 
 and self-love, and discontent with the portion 
 which has been given to thee. Thou seest 
 how few the things are, the which if a man 
 lays hold of, he is able to live a life which flows 
 in quiet, and is like the existence of the gods; 
 for the gods on their part will require nothing 
 more from him who obsen^es these things. 
 
 6. Do wrong"’'' to thyself, do wrong to thy- 
 self, my soul; but thou wilt no longer have the 
 opportunity of honoring thyself. Every man’s 
 life is sufficient. 4- But thine is nearly flnished, 
 though thy soul reverences not itself, but places 
 thy felicity in the souls of others. 
 
 7. Do the things external which fall upon 
 
 * Perhaps it should be, “thou art doing violence to 
 thyself,” vppiCei^, not 
 
Book II.] /iftarcus aurcllue Bntoninus. 
 
 iig 
 
 thee distract thee ? Give thyself time to learn 
 something new and good, and cease to be 
 whirled around. But then thou must also 
 avoid being carried about the other wa}-; for 
 those too are triflers who have wearied them- 
 selves in life by their activit^^ and yet have no 
 object to which to direct every movement, and, 
 in a word, all their thoughts. 
 
 8. Through not observing what is in th; 
 mind of another a man has seldom been seen 
 to be unhappy; but those who do not observe 
 the movements of their own minds must of ne- 
 cessity be unhappy. 
 
 9. This thou must always bear in mind, 
 what is the nature of the whole, and what is 
 my nature, and how this is related to that, and 
 what kind of a part it is of what kind of a 
 whole, and that there is no one who hinders 
 thee from always doing and saying the things 
 which are according to the nature of which 
 thou art a part. 
 
 10. Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad 
 acts — such a comparison as one would make in 
 accordance with the common notions of man- 
 kind — says, like a true philosopher, that the 
 offenses which are committed through desire are 
 more blamable than those which are committed 
 through anger. For he who is excited by 
 anger seems to turn away from reason v\^ith a 
 certain pain and unconscious contraction; but 
 he who offends through desire, being overpow- 
 ered by pleasure, seems to be in a manner more 
 
120 
 
 ^Tbougbts. 
 
 [Book E 
 
 intemperate and more womanish in his offences. 
 Rightly, then, and in a way worthy of phil- 
 osoph}'-, he said that the offence which is com- 
 mitted with pleasure is more blamable than 
 that which is committed with pain; and on the 
 whole the one is more like a person who has 
 been first wronged and through pain is com- 
 pelled to be angry, but the other is moved by 
 his own impulse to do wrong, being carried to- 
 wards doing something by desire. 
 
 II. Since it is possible* that thou mayest 
 depart from life this very moment, regulate every 
 act and thought accordingly. f But to go away 
 from among men, if there are gods, is not a 
 thing to be afraid of, for the gods will not in- 
 volve thee in evil; but if indeed they do not 
 exist, or if they have no concern about human 
 affairs, what is it to me to live in a universe 
 devoid of gods or devoid of providence ? But 
 in truth they do exist, and they do care for 
 human things, and they have put all the means 
 in man’s power to enable him not to fall into 
 real evils. And as to the rest, if there was any- 
 thing evil, they would have provided for this 
 also, that it should be altogether in a man’s 
 power not to fall into it. Now that which does 
 not make a man worse, how can it make a man’s 
 life worse? But neither through ignorance, nor 
 
 * Or it may mean, “since it is in thy power to de- 
 part;’’ which gives a meaning somewhat different. 
 
 t See Cicero, Tuscul., i. 49. 
 
Book II] /llbarcus Hureltus Bntoninug. 
 
 121 
 
 having the knowledge but not the power to 
 guard against or correct these things, is it pos- 
 sible that the nature of the universe has over- 
 looked them; nor is it possible that it has made 
 so great a mistake, either through want of’ 
 power or want of skill, that good and evil 
 should happen indiscriminately to the good and 
 the bad. But death certainl}’, and life, honor 
 and dishonor, pain and pleasure, — all these 
 things equally happen to good men and bad, 
 being things which make us neither better nor 
 worse. Therefore they are neither good nor 
 evil. 
 
 12. How quickly all things disappear, — in 
 the universe the bodies themselves, but in time 
 the remembrance of them. What is the nature 
 of all sensible things, and particularly those 
 which attract with the bait of pleasure or terrify 
 by pain, or are noised abroad by vapor}^ fame; 
 how worthless, and contemptible, and sordid, 
 and perishable, and dead they are,^ — all this it 
 is the part of the intellectual faculty to observe. 
 To observe too who these are whose opinions 
 and voices give reputation; what death is, and 
 the fact that, if a man looks at it in itself, and 
 by the abstractive power of reflection resolves 
 into their parts all the things which present 
 themselves to the imagination in it, he will then 
 consider it to be nothing else than an operation 
 of nature; and if any one is afraid of an opera- 
 tion of nature, he is a child. This, however, 
 is not only an operation of nature, but it is also 
 
122 
 
 XTbougbts. 
 
 [Book II. 
 
 a thing which conduces to the purposes of na- 
 ture. To observe too how man comes near to the 
 Deit}^ and by what part of him, and when this 
 part of man is so disposed + (vi. 28). 
 
 13. Nothing is more wretched than a man 
 who traverses everything in a round, and pries 
 into the things beneath the earth, as the poet* 
 says, and seeks by conjecture what is in the 
 minds of his neighbors, without perceiving 
 that it is sufficient to attend to the daemon 
 within him, and to reverence it sincerely. And 
 reverence of the daemon consists in keeping it 
 pure from passion and thoughtlessness, and 
 dissatisfaction with what comes from gods and 
 men. For the things from the gods merit 
 veneration for their excellence; and the things 
 from men should be dear to us by reason of 
 kinship; and sometimes even, in a manner, 
 they move our pity by reason of men’s igno- 
 rance of good and bad; this defect being not 
 less than that which deprives us of the power 
 of distinguishing things that are white and 
 black. 
 
 14. Though thou shouldest be going to live 
 three thousand years and as many times ten 
 thousand years, still remember that no man 
 loses any other life than this which he now 
 lives, nor lives any other than this which he 
 now loses. The longest and shortest are thus 
 brought to the same. For the present is the. 
 
 * Pindar, in the Theaetetus of Plato. See xi. i. 
 
Book n.] Marcus Burelfus Bntoninus. 
 
 123 
 
 same to all, though that which perish is uot 
 the same;+* and so that which is lost appears 
 to be a mere moment. -For a man cannot lose 
 either the past or the future: for what a man 
 has not, how can an}’’ one take this from him? 
 These two things then thou must bear in mind; 
 the one, that all things from eternit}’ are of 
 like forms and come round in a circle, and that 
 it makes no difference whether a man shall see 
 the same things during a hundred 3'ears, or 
 two hundred, or an infinite time; and the sec- 
 ond, that the longest liver and he who will die 
 soonest lose just the same. For the present is 
 the only thing of which a man can be deprived, 
 if it is true that this is the only thing which he 
 has, and that a man cannot lose a thing if he 
 has it not. 
 
 15. Remember that all is opinion. For what 
 was said by the Cynic Monimus is manifest : 
 and manifest too is the use of what was said, if 
 a man receives what may be got out of it as far 
 as it is true. 
 
 16. The soul of man does violence to itself, 
 first of all, when it becomes an abscess, and, as 
 it were, a tumor on the universe, so far as it 
 can. For to be vexed at anything which hap- 
 pens is a separation of ourselves from nature, 
 in some part of which the natures of all other 
 things are contained. In the next place, the 
 soul does violence to itself when it turns away 
 
 See Gataker’s note. 
 
124 
 
 ^Tbougbts. 
 
 [Book II. 
 
 from any man, or even moves towards him with 
 the intention of injuring, such as are the souls 
 of those who are angry. In the third place, 
 the soul does violence to itself when it is over- 
 powered by plea.sure or by pain. Fourthly, 
 when it plays a part, and does or says anything 
 insincerely and untruly. Fifthly, when it al- 
 lows any act of its own and any movement to 
 be without an aim, and does anything thought- 
 lessly and without considering what it is, it 
 being right that even the smallest things be 
 done with reference to an end; and the end of 
 rational animals is to follow the reason and the 
 law of the most ancient city and polity. 
 
 17. Of human life the time is a point, and 
 the substance is in a flux, and the perception 
 dull, and the composition of the whole body 
 subject to putrefaction, and the soul a whirl, 
 and fortune hard to divine, and fame a thing 
 devoid of judgment. And, to say all in a word, 
 everything which belongs to the body is a 
 stream, and what belongs to the soul is a dream 
 and vapor, and life is a warfare and a stranger’s 
 sojourn, and after-fame is oblivion. What then 
 is that which is able to conduct a man ? One 
 thing, and only one, philosophy. But this 
 consists in keeping the daemon within a man 
 free from violence and unharmed, superior to 
 pains and pleasures, doing nothing without a 
 purpose, nor yet falsely and with hypocrisy, 
 not feeling the need of another man’s doing or 
 not doing anything; and besides, accepting all 
 
Book II, ] /Barcus aureHu 6 lEntonfnus. 
 
 125 
 
 that happens, and all that is allotted, as com- 
 ing from thence, wherever it is, 'from whence-* 
 he himself came; and, finally, waiting for death' 
 with a cheerful mind, as being nothing else 
 than a dissolution of the elements of which 
 every living being is compounded. But if there 
 is no harm to the elements themselves in each 
 continnally changing into another, wh}^ should 
 a man have any apprehension about the change 
 and dissolution of all the elements ? For it is 
 according to nature, and nothing is evil which 
 is according to nature. 
 
 This in Carnuntum.* 
 
 * Carnuntum was a town of Pannonia, on the south 
 side of the Danube, about thirty miles east of Vindo- 
 bona (Vienna). Orosius (vii. 15) and Eutropius (viii. 
 13) say that Antoninus remained three years at Car- 
 nuatum during his -war with the Marcomanni. 
 
126 
 
 ^Tbougbte. 
 
 [Book III. 
 
 III. 
 
 W B ought to consider not only that our life 
 is daily wasting away and a smaller part 
 of it is left, but another thing also must be 
 taken into the account, that if a man should 
 live longer, it is quite uncertain whether the un- 
 derstanding will still continue sufficient for the 
 comprehension of things, and retain the power 
 of contemplation which strives to acquire the 
 knowledge of the divine and the human. For 
 if he shall begin to fall into dotage, perspiration 
 and nutrition and imagination and appetite, and 
 whatever else there is of the kind, will not fail; 
 but the power of making use of ourselves, and 
 filling up the measure of our duty, and clearly 
 separating all appearances, and considering 
 whether a man should now depart from life, 
 and whatever else of the kind absolutely re- 
 quires a disciplined reason, — all this is already 
 extinguished. We must make haste, then, not 
 only because we are daily nearer to death, but 
 also because the conception of things and the 
 understanding of them cease first. 
 
 2. We ought to observe also that even the 
 things which follow after the things which 
 are produced according to nature contain 
 something pleasing and attractive. For in- 
 stance, when bread is baked some parts are 
 
Book III.] /iibarcus Jlurelius Hntoninus. 
 
 127 
 
 split at the surface, and these parts which 
 thus open, and have a certain fashion contrary 
 to the purpose of the baker’s art, are beautiful in 
 a manner, and in a peculiar way excite a desire 
 for eating. And again, figs, wdien they are 
 quite ripe, gape open; and in the ripe olives the 
 very circumstance of their being near to rotten- 
 ness adds a peculiar beauty to the fruit. And 
 the ears of corn bending down, and the lion’s 
 eyebrows, and the foam which flows from the 
 mouth of wild boars, and many other things, — 
 though the}^ are far from being beautiful if a 
 man should examine them severally, — still, be- 
 cause they are consequent upon the things 
 w'hich are formed by nature, help to adorn 
 them, and they please the mind; so that if a 
 man should have a feeling and deeper insight 
 with respect to the things which are produced 
 in the universe, there is hardly one of those 
 which follow by way of consequence which 
 will not seem to him to be in a manner dis- 
 posed so as to give pleasure. And so he will 
 see even the real gaping jaws of wild beasts 
 with no less pleasure than those which painters 
 and sculptors show by imitation; and in an old 
 woman and an old man he will be able to see a 
 certain maturity and comeliness; and the at* 
 tractive loveliness of young persons he will be 
 able to look on with chaste eyes; and many 
 such things wdll present themselves, not pleas- 
 ing to every man, but to him only who has be- 
 come truly familiar with Nature and her works. 
 
128 
 
 ^Tbou(?bts. 
 
 [Book III. 
 
 3. Hippocrates, after curing many diseases, 
 himself fell sick and died. The Chaldaei fore- 
 told the deaths of nianj", and then fate caught 
 them too. Alexander and Pompeius, and 
 Cains Caesar, after so often completely destroy- 
 ing Avhole cities, and in battle cutting to pieces 
 many ten thousands of cavalry and infantry, 
 themselves too at last departed from life. 
 Heraclitus, after so maii}^ speculations on the 
 conflagration of the universe, was filled with 
 water internalh^ and died smeared all over with 
 mud. And lice destroyed Democritus; and 
 other lice killed Socrates. What means all 
 this? Thou hast embarked, thou ha,st made 
 the vojmge, thou art come to shore; get out. 
 If indeed to another life, there is no want of 
 gods, not even there; but if to a state without 
 sensation, thou wilt cease to be held by pains 
 and pleasures, and to be a slave to the vessel, 
 which is as much inferior as that which setwes 
 it is superior :+ for the one is intelligence and 
 deity; the other is earth and corruption. 
 
 4. Do not Avaste the remainder of thy life in 
 thoughts about others, when thou dost not 
 refer thy thoughts to some object of common 
 utility. For thou losest the opportunity of 
 doing something else when thou hast such 
 thoughts as these, — What is such a person 
 doing, and why, and what is he saying, and 
 what is he thinking of, and what is he contriv- 
 ing, and whatever else of the kind makes us 
 wander away from the observation of our own 
 
Bookiii.j ^arcu6 :aurelius Bntoninus. 
 
 129 
 
 ruling power. We ought then to check in the 
 series of our thoughts everything that is with- 
 out a purpose and useless, but most of all the 
 over-curious feeling and the malignant; and a 
 man should use himself to think of those 
 things only about which if one should sudden- 
 ly ask, What hast thou now in thy thoughts ? 
 with perfect openness thou mightest immedi- 
 ately answer. This or That; so that from thy 
 words it should be plain that everything in 
 thee is simple and benevolent, and such as be- 
 fits a social animal, and one that cares not for 
 thoughts about pleasure or sensual enjoyments 
 at all, nor has any rivalry or envy and sus- 
 picion, or anjdhing else for which thou wouldst 
 blush if thou shouldst say that thou hadst it in 
 thy mind. For the man who is such, and no 
 longer dela5^s being among the number of the 
 best, is like a priest and minister of the gods, 
 using too the [deity] which is planted within 
 him, which makes the man uncontaminated by 
 pleasure, unharmed by any pain, untouched by 
 any insult, feeling no wrong, a fighter in the 
 noblest fight, one who cannot be overpowered 
 by any passion, dyed deep with justice, accept- 
 ing with all his soul everjdhing which happens 
 and is assigned to him as his portion; and not 
 often, nor yet without great necessity and 
 for the general interest, imagining what an- 
 other says, or does, or thinks. For it is only 
 what belongs to himself that he makes the 
 matter for his activity; and he constantly 
 9 
 
130 
 
 c:bougbt6. 
 
 [Book III 
 
 thinks of that which is allotted to himself out 
 of the sum total of things, and he makes his 
 own acts fair, and he is persuaded that his own 
 portion is good. For the lot which is assigned 
 to each man is carried along with him and 
 carries him along with it.+ And he remem- 
 bers also that every rational animal is his kins- 
 man, and that to care for all men is according 
 to man’s nature ; and a man should hold on to 
 the opinion not of all, but of those only who 
 confessedly live according to nature. But as to 
 those who live not so, he always bears in mind 
 what kind of men they are both at home and 
 from home, both by night and by day, and 
 what they are, and with what men they live 
 an impure life. Accordingly, he does not value 
 at all the praise which comes from such men, 
 since they are not even satisfied with them- 
 seh^es. 
 
 5. Labor not unwillingly, nor without regard 
 to the common interest, nor without due con- 
 sideration, nor with distraction ; nor let studied 
 ornament set off thy thoughts, and be not 
 either a man of many words, or busy about too 
 many things. And further, let the deity which 
 is in thee be the guardian of a living being, 
 manly and of ripe age, and engaged in matter 
 political, and a Roman, and a ruler, who has 
 taken his post like a man waiting for the signal 
 which summons him from life, and ready to go, 
 having need neither of oath nor of any man’s 
 testimony. Be cheerful also, and seek not ex- 
 
Book III.] /iRarcus Sucellus Bntonlnus. 
 
 131 
 
 ternal help nor the tranquillity which others 
 give. A man then must stand erect, not be 
 kept erect by others. 
 
 6. If thou findest in human life anything 
 better than justice, truth, temperance, fortitude, 
 and, in a word, anything better than thy own 
 mind’s self-satisfaction in the things which it 
 enables thee to do according to right reason, 
 and in the condition that is assigned to thee 
 without thy own choice ; if, I say, thou seest 
 anything better than this, turn to it with all 
 thy soul, and enjoy that which thou hast found 
 to be the best. But if nothing appears to be 
 better than the Deity which is planted in thee, 
 wdiich has subjected to itself all thj^ appetites, 
 and carefull}" examines all the impressions, and, 
 as Socrates said, has detached itself from the 
 persuasions of sense, and has submitted itself 
 to the gods, and cares for mankind; if thou 
 findest ever^dhing else smaller and of less value 
 than this, give place to nothing else, for if thou 
 dost once diverge and incline to it, thou wilt 
 no longer without distraction be able to give 
 the preference to that good thing which is thy 
 proper possession and thy own ; for it is not 
 right that anything of any other kind, such as 
 praise from the many, or power, or enioyment 
 of pleasure, should come into competition with 
 that which is rationally and politically [or, 
 practically] good. All these things, even 
 though the}^ ma}' seem to adapt themselves 
 ‘"to the better things] in a small degree, obtain 
 
c:bougbt6. 
 
 [Book III 
 
 13 ? 
 
 the superiority all at once, and carry us awa3^ 
 But do thou, I say, simply and freely choose 
 the better, and hold to it. — But that which is 
 useful is the better. — Well, then, if it is useful 
 to thee as a rational being, keep to it; but if it 
 is only useful to thee as an animal, say so, and 
 maintain thy judgment without arrogance; only 
 take care that thou makest the inquiry- by a 
 sure method. 
 
 7. Never value anything as profitable to thy- 
 self which shall compel thee to break thy prom- 
 ise, to lose thy self-respect, to hate any man, to 
 suspect, to curse, to act the hypocrite, to desire 
 anything which needs walls and curtains: for 
 he who has preferred to everything else his own 
 intelligence and daemon and the worship of its 
 excellence, acts no tragic part, does not groan, 
 will not need either solitude or much company; 
 and, what is chief of all, he will live without 
 either pursuing or fl5dng from [death];* but 
 whether for a longer or a shorter time he shall 
 have the soul enclosed in the body, he cares 
 not at all: for even if he must depart immedi- 
 ately, he will go as readily as if he were going 
 to do anything el.se which can be done with 
 decency and order; taking care of this only all 
 through life, that his thoughts turn not away 
 from anything which belongs to an intelligent 
 animal and a member of a civil community. 
 
 8. In the mind of one who is chastened and 
 
 * Comp. ix. 3. 
 
Book III.] Marcus Surelius Hntoninue. 
 
 133 
 
 purified thou wilt find no corrupt matter, nor 
 impurity, nor any sore skinned over. Nor is 
 his life incomplete when fate overtakes him, as 
 one may say of an actor who leaves the stage 
 before ending and finishing the play. Besides, 
 there is in him nothing servile, nor affected, 
 nor too closely bound [to other things], nor yet 
 detached* [from other things], nothing worthy 
 of blame, nothing which seeks a hiding-place. 
 
 9. Reverence the faculty which produces 
 opinion. On this faculty it entirely depends 
 whether there shall exist in thy ruling part any 
 opinion inconsistent with nature and the con- 
 stitution of the rational animal. And this 
 faculty" promises freedom from hasty judgment, 
 and friendship towards men, and obedience to 
 the gods. 
 
 10. Throwing away then all things, hold to 
 these only which are few; and besides, bear in 
 mind that every man lives only this present 
 time, which is an indivisible point, and that 
 all the rest of his life is either past or it is un- 
 certain. Short then is the time which every 
 man lives; and small the nook of the earth 
 where he lives; and short too the longest post- 
 humous fame, and even this only continued by a 
 succession of poor human beings, who will very 
 soon die, and who know not even themselves, 
 much less him who died long ago. 
 
 1 1 . To the aids which have been mentioned 
 
 34. 
 
134 
 
 ^Tbougbte. 
 
 [Book III. 
 
 let this one still be added: Make for tli3'self a 
 definition or description of the thing which is 
 presented to thee, so as to see distinctl}^ what 
 kind of a thing it is in its substance, in its nud- 
 it}', in its complete entirety, and tell thyself its 
 proper name, and the names of the things of 
 which it has been compounded, and into which 
 it will be resolved. For nothing is so produc- 
 tive of elevation of mind as to be able to exam- 
 ine methodically and truly every object which 
 is presented to thee in life, and always to look 
 at things so as to see at the same time what 
 kind of universe this is, and what kind of use 
 everything performs in it, and what, value 
 everything has with reference to the whole, 
 and what with reference to man, who is a citi- 
 zen of the highest city, of which all other cities 
 are like families; what each thing is, and of 
 what it is composed, and how long it is the 
 nature of this thing to endure which now 
 makes an impression on me, and what virtue I 
 have need of with respect to it, such as gentle- 
 ness, manliness, truth, fidelity, simplicity, con- 
 tentment, and the rest. Wherefore, on every 
 occasion a man should say: This comes from 
 god; and this is according to the apportion- 
 ment + and spinning of the thread of destiny, 
 and such-like coincidence and chance; and this 
 is from one of the same stock, and a kinsman 
 and partner, one who knows not, how^ever, 
 what is according to his nature. But I know; 
 for this reason I behave towards him according 
 
Book III.] ^arcue aureliue 2lntontmis. 
 
 135 
 
 to the natural law of fellowship with benevo- 
 lence and justice. At the same time, however, 
 in things indifferent* I attempt to ascertain 
 the value of each. 
 
 12. If thou workest at that which is before 
 thee, following right reason seriousl}^ vigor- 
 ously, calmly, without allowing anything else 
 to distract thee, but keeping thy divine part 
 pure, as if thou shouldst be bound to give it 
 back immediately; if thou boldest to this, ex- 
 pecting nothing, fearing nothing, but satisfied 
 with thy present activity according to nature, 
 and with heroic truth iu every word and sound 
 which thou utterest, thou wilt live happy. 
 And there is no man who is able to prevent 
 
 , this. 
 
 13. As physicians have always their instru- 
 ments and knives ready for cases which sud- 
 denly require their skill, so do thou have prin- 
 
 ^ciples re ady for the understanding of tMligS - 
 divine and iTuman , an d for doing everything, 
 ”even~the -smallest, wifh^a' recfolle'Ctlon of 'the 
 A)crrrd which unites the, divine and human to 
 ■bne' another. For neither wilt thou do any- 
 thing well which pertains to man without at 
 the same time having a reference to things 
 divine; nor the contrary. 
 
 14. No longer wander at hazard ; for neither 
 wilt thou read thy own memoirs, f nor the acts 
 
 * Est et horum quae media appellamus grande dis- 
 crimeii. — Seneca, Ep. 82. 
 
 I Wofivriiiara: or memoranda, notes, and the like. 
 See i. 17. 
 
^rbou0bt0. 
 
 [Book III. 
 
 136 
 
 of the ancient Romans and Hellenes, and the 
 selections from books which thou wast reserv- 
 ing for thy old age.* Hasten then to the end 
 which thou hast before thee, and, throwing 
 away idle hopes, come to thy own aid, if thou 
 carest at all for thyself, while it is in thy 
 power. 
 
 15. They know not how many things are 
 signified by the words stealing, sowing, buy- 
 ing, keeping quiet, seeing what ought to be 
 done ; for this is not effected by the eyes, but 
 by another kind of vision. 
 
 16. Body, soul, intelligence: to the body be- 
 long sensation, to the soul appetites, to the 
 intelligence principles. To receive the impres- 
 sions of forms by means of appearances belongs 
 even to animals ; to be pulled by the stringsf 
 of desire belongs both to wild beasts and to 
 men who have made themselves into women, 
 and to a Phalaris and a Nero ; and to have the 
 intelligence that guides to the things which 
 appear * suitable belongs also to those who do 
 not believe in the gods, and who betray their 
 country, and do their impure deeds when they 
 have shut the doors. If then everything else 
 
 * Compare Pronto, ii. 9; a letter of Marcus to 
 Pronto, who was then consul: “ Peci tamen mihi per 
 hos dies excerpta ex libris sexaginta in quinque 
 tomis.” But he says some of them were small books. 
 
 t Compare Plato, De Legibus, i. p. 6^, bri Tavra to. 
 vkdr] etc.; and Antoninus, ii. 2; vii. 3; xii. 19. 
 
Book III.] /iBarcus Hurellus antoninus. 
 
 137 
 
 is common to all that I have mentioned, there 
 remains that which is peculiar to the good man, 
 to be pleased and content with what happens, 
 and with the thread which is spun for him ; 
 and not to defile the divinity which is planted 
 in his breast, nor disturb it by a crowd of 
 images, but to preserve it tranquil, following 
 it obediently as a god, neither saying anything 
 contrary to the truth, nor doing anything con- 
 trary to justice. And if all men refuse to be- 
 lieve that he lives a simple, modest, and con- 
 tented life, he is neither angry with any of 
 them, nor does he deviate from the way which 
 leads to the end of life, to which a man ought 
 to come pure, tranquil, ready to depart, and 
 without any compulsion perfectly reconciled to 
 his lot, 
 
^Ibou0bt0. 
 
 [Book I?. 
 
 138 
 
 IV. 
 
 T hat which rules within, when it is accord- 
 ing to nature, is so affected with respect to 
 the events which happened, that it always easily 
 adapts itself to that which is possible and is 
 presented to it. For it requires no definite 
 material, but it moves towards its purpose,* 
 under certain conditions, however; and it 
 makes a material for itself out of that which 
 opposes it, as fire lays hold of what falls into 
 it, by which a small light would have been ex- 
 tinguished; but when the fire is strong, it soon 
 appropriates to itself the matter which is heaped 
 on it, and consumes it, and rises higher by 
 means of this very material. 
 
 2. ffet no act be done without a purpose, nor 
 otherwise than according to the perfect princi- 
 ples of art. 
 
 3. Men seek retreats for themselves, houses 
 in the country, sea-shores, and mountains; and 
 thou too art wont to desire such things very 
 much. But this is altogether a mark of the 
 most common sort of men, for it is in thy 
 power whenever thou shalt choose to retire 
 
 * Trpof rd rjyovfieva, literally “towards that which 
 leads.” The exact translation is doubtful. See 
 Gataker’s note. 
 
BooklY.] /ibarcuB Hurelius SntomnuB. 
 
 139 
 
 into tli5^self. For nowhere either with more 
 quiet or more freedom from trouble does a man 
 retire than into his own soul, particularly when 
 he has within him such thoughts that by look- 
 ing into them he is immediately in perfect 
 tranquillity; and I affirm that tranquillity is 
 nothing else than the good ordering of the 
 mind. Constantly then give to thyself this 
 retreat, and renew thyself; and let thy princi- 
 ples be brief and fundamental, which, as soon 
 as thou shalt recur to them, will be sufficient 
 to cleanse the soul completely, and to send 
 thee back free from all discontent with the 
 things to which thou returnest. For with 
 what art thou discontented ? With the badness 
 of men ? Recall to thy mind this conclusion, 
 that rational animals exist for one another, and 
 that to endure is a part of justice, and that men 
 do wrong involuntarily; and consider how many 
 already, after mutual enmity, suspicion, hatred, 
 and fighting, have been stretched dead, reduced 
 to ashes; and be quiet at last. — But perhaps 
 thou art dissatisfied with that which is as- 
 signed to thee out of the universe. — Recall to 
 thy recollection this alternative; either there is 
 providence or atoms [fortuitous concurrence of 
 things]; or remember the arguments b}" which 
 it has been proved that the world is a kind of 
 political community [and be quiet at last]. — 
 But perhaps corporeal things will still fasten 
 upon thee. — Consider then further that the 
 mind mingles not with the breath, whether 
 
140 
 
 ^Tbougbts. 
 
 [Book IT. 
 
 moving gently or violently, when it has once 
 drawn itself apart and discovered its own 
 power, and think also of all that thou hast 
 heard and assented to about pain and pleasure 
 [and be quiet at last], — But perhaps the desire 
 of the thing called fame will torment thee. — 
 See how soon everything is forgotten, and look 
 at the chaos of infinite time on each side of [the 
 present], and the emptiness of applause, and 
 the changeableness and want of judgment in 
 those who pretend to give praise, and the nar- 
 rowness of the space within which it is circum- 
 scribed [and be quiet at last]. For the whole 
 earth is a point, and how small a nook in it is 
 this thy dwelling, and how few are there in it, 
 and what kind of people are they who will 
 praise thee. 
 
 This then remains : Remember to retire into 
 this little territory of thy own,* and above all 
 do not distract or strain thyself, but be free, 
 and look at things as a man, as a human being, 
 as a citizen, as a mortal. But among the 
 things readiest to thy hand to which thou shalt 
 turn, let there be these, which are two. One is 
 that things do not touch the soul, for they are 
 external and remain immovable ; but our per- 
 turbations come only from the opinion which is 
 within. The other is that all these things, 
 which thou seest, change immediately and will 
 no longer be ; and constantly bear in mind how 
 
 * Tecum babita, uoris quam sit tibi curta supellex. 
 — Persins, iv. 52. 
 
Book IT.] Marcus aurcUue Hntoninus. 
 
 HI 
 
 many of these changes thou hast already wit- 
 nessed. The universe is transformation : life is 
 opinion. 
 
 4. If our intellectual part is common, the 
 reason also, in respect of which we are rational 
 beings, is common : if this is so, common also is 
 the reason which commands us what to do, and 
 what not to do ; if this is so, there is a common 
 law also ; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens ; if 
 this is so, we are members of some political 
 community ; if this is so, the world is in a man- 
 ner a state.* For of what other common politi- 
 cal community will any one say that the whole 
 human race are members? And from thence, 
 from this common political community, comes 
 also our very intellectual faculty and reasoning 
 faculty and our capacity for law ; or whence do 
 they come ? For as my earthly part is a por- 
 tion given to me from certain earth, and that 
 which is watery from another element, and that 
 which is hot and fiery from some peculiar 
 source (for nothing comes out of that which is 
 nothing, as nothing also returns to non-exist- 
 ence), so also the intellectual part comes from 
 some source. 
 
 5. Death is such as generation is, a mystery 
 of nature; composition out of the same elements, 
 and a decomposition into the same ; and al- 
 together not a thing of which any man should 
 be ashamed, for it is not contrary to [the nature 
 
 * Compare Cicero De Legibus, i. 7. 
 
142 
 
 XTbougbts. 
 
 [Book IV. 
 
 of] a reasonable animal, and not contrary to 
 the reason of our constitution. 
 
 6. It is natural that these things should be 
 done by such persons, it is a matter of necessity; 
 and if a man will not have it so, he will not 
 allow the fig-tree to have juice. But by all 
 means bear this in mind, that within a very 
 short time both thou and he will be dead ; and 
 soon not even your names will be left behind. 
 
 7. Take away thy opinion, and then there is 
 taken away the complaint, ‘ I have been 
 harmed.” Take away the complaint, ” I have 
 been harmed,” and the harm is taken away. 
 
 8. That which does not make a man worse 
 than he was, also does not make his life worse, 
 nor does it harm him either from without or 
 from within. 
 
 9. The nature of that which is [universally] 
 u.seful has been compelled to do this. 
 
 10. Consider that everything which happens, 
 happens justly, and if thou observest carefully, 
 thou wilt find it to be so. I do not say only 
 with respect to the continuity of the series of 
 things, but with respect to what is just, and as 
 if it were done b)^ one who assigns to each 
 thing its value. Observe then as thou hast be- 
 gun ; and whatever thou doest, do it in con- 
 junction with this, the being good, and in the 
 sense in which a man is properly understood to 
 be good. Keep to this in every action. 
 
 1 1 . Do not have such an opinion of things as 
 he has who does thee wrong, or such as he 
 
Book lY.] /Dbarcus :aurelius antoninue. 
 
 143 
 
 wishes thee to have, but look at them as they 
 are in truth. 
 
 12. A man should always have these two 
 rules in readiness ; the one to do only whatever 
 the reason of the ruling and legislating faculty 
 may suggest for the use of men ; the other, to 
 change thy opinion, if there is any one at hand 
 who sets thee right and moves thee from any 
 opinion. But this change of opinion must pro- 
 ceed only from a certain persuasion, as of what 
 is just or of common advantage, and the like, 
 not because it appears pleasant or brings repu- 
 tation. 
 
 13. Hast thou reason? I have. — Why then 
 dost not thou use it? For if this does its own 
 work, what else dost thou wish ? 
 
 14. Thou hast existed as a part. Thou shalt 
 disappear in that which produced thee; but 
 rather thou shalt be received back into its semi- 
 nal principle by transmutation. 
 
 15. Many grains of frankincense on the same 
 altar: one falls before, another falls after; but 
 it makes no difference. 
 
 16. Within ten days thou wilt seem a god 
 to those to whom thou art now a beast and an 
 ape, if thou wilt return to th}" principles and 
 the worship of reason. 
 
 17. Do not act as if thou wert going to live 
 ten thousand 3^ears. Death hangs over thee. 
 While thou livest, while it is in thy power, be 
 good. 
 
 18. How much trouble he avoids who does 
 
144 
 
 ^Cbouflbts. 
 
 [Book IV. 
 
 not look to see what his neighbor says or does 
 or thinks, but only to what he does himself, 
 that it may be just and pure ; or, as Agathon+ 
 says, look not round at the depraved morals of 
 others, but run straight along the line without 
 deviating from it. 
 
 19. He who has a vehement desire for 
 posthumous fame does not consider that every 
 one of those who remember him will himself 
 also die very soon; then again also they who 
 have succeeded them, until the whole remem- 
 brance shall have been extinguished as it is 
 transmitted through men who foolishly admire 
 and perish. But suppose that those wdro will 
 remember are even immortal, and that the re- 
 membrance will be immortal, what then is this 
 to thee ? And I say not what is it to the dead, 
 but what is it to the living ? What is praise, 
 except + indeed so far as it has+ a certain 
 utility? For thou now rejectest unseasonably 
 the gift of nature, clinging to something else 
 . . . +. 
 
 20. Everything which is in any way beauti- 
 ful is beautiful in itself, and terminates in itself, 
 not having praise as part of itself. Neither 
 worse then nor better is a thing made by being 
 praised. I affirm this also of the things which 
 are called beautiful by the vulgar, for example, 
 material things and works of art. That which 
 is really beautiful has no need of anjdhing; 
 not more than law, not more than truth, not 
 more than benevolence or modesty. Which of 
 
BooklY.] /iBarcus :aurcUu« antonfnus. 
 
 145 
 
 these things is beautiful because it is praised, 
 or spoiled by being blamed ? Is such a thing 
 as an emerald made worse than it was, if it is 
 not praised? or gold, ivory, purple, a lyre, a 
 little knife, a flower, a shrub ? 
 
 21. If souls continue to exist, how does the 
 air contain them from eternity ? — But how does 
 the earth contain the bodies of those who have 
 been buried from time so remote ? For as here 
 the mutation of these bodies after a certain con- 
 tinuance, whatever it may be, and their disso- 
 lution, make room for other dead bodies, so the 
 souls which are removed into the air after sub- 
 sisting for some time are transmuted and 
 diffused, and assume a fiery nature b)^ being re- 
 ceived into the seminal intelligence of the uni- 
 verse, and in this way make room for the fresh 
 souls which come to dwell there. And this is 
 the answer which a man might give on the 
 h}*pothesis of souls continuing to exist. But 
 we must not only think of the number of 
 bodies which are thus buried, but also of the 
 number of animals which are daily eaten by us 
 and the other animals. For what a number is 
 consumed, and thus in a manner buried in the 
 bodies of those who feed on them ! And never- 
 theless this earth receives them by reason of the 
 changes [of these bodies] into blood, and the 
 transformations into the aerial or the flery 
 element. 
 
 What is the investigation into the truth in 
 this matter? The division into that which 
 10 
 
146 
 
 ^Cbougbts. 
 
 [Book IV. 
 
 is material and that which is the cause of form 
 [the formal], (vii. 29.) 
 
 22. Do not be whirled about, but in every 
 movement have respect to justice, and on the 
 occa.sion of every impression maintain the 
 faculty of comprehension [or understanding], 
 
 23. Everything harmonizes with me, which 
 is harmonious to thee, O Universe. Nothing 
 for me is too early nor too late, which is in due 
 time for thee. Everything is fruit to me which 
 thy seasons bring, O Nature : from thee are all 
 things, in thee are all things, to thee all things 
 return. The poet says. Dear city of Cecrops ; 
 and wilt not thou say, Dear city of Zeus ? 
 
 24. Occupy thj^self with few things, says the 
 philosopher, if thou wouldst be tranquil.— But 
 consider if it would not be better to say. Do 
 what is necessary, and whatever the reason of 
 the animal which is naturally social requires, 
 and as it requires. For this brings not only 
 the tranquillity which comes from doing well, 
 but also that which comes from doing few 
 things. For the greatest part of what we say 
 and do being unnece.ssary, if a man takes this 
 away, he will have more leisure and less un- 
 easiness. Accordingly, on ever}^ occasion a 
 man should ask himself. Is this one of the un- 
 necessary things? Now a man should take 
 away not only unnecessary acts, but also un- 
 necessary thoughts, for thus superfluous acts 
 will not follow after. 
 
 25. Try how the life of the good man suits 
 
Book IV.] ^arcu8 aurelius Hntoninua. 
 
 147 
 
 thee, the life of him who is satisfied with his 
 portion out of the whole, and satisfied with his 
 own just acts and benevolent disposition. 
 
 26. Hast thou seen those things ? Look also 
 at these. Do not disturb thyself. Make thy- 
 self all simplicity. Does any one do wrong? 
 It is to himself that he does the wrong. Has 
 anything happened to thee? Well ; out of the 
 universe from the beginning everything which 
 happens has been apportioned and spun out to 
 thee. In a word, thy life is short. Thou 
 must turn to profit the present by the aid of 
 reason and justice. Be sober in thy relaxa- 
 tion. 
 
 27. Either it is a well-arranged universe^' or 
 a chaos huddled together, but still a universe. 
 But can a certain order subsist in thee, and 
 disorder in the All ? And this too when all 
 things are so separated and diffused and sym- 
 pathetic. 
 
 28. A black character, a womanish char- 
 acter, a stubborn character, bestial, childish, 
 animal, stupid, counterfeit, scurrilous, fraudu- 
 lent, tyrannical. 
 
 29. If he is a stranger to the universe who 
 does not know what is in it, no less is he a 
 stranger who does not know what is going on 
 in it. He is a runaway, who flies from social 
 reason ; he is blind, who shuts the eyes of un- 
 
 * Antoninus here uses the word Kdcfiog both in the 
 sense of the Universe and of Order; and it is diiScult 
 to express his meaning. 
 
148 
 
 ?Tbou0bt0. 
 
 [Book IV. 
 
 derstanding ; he is poor, who has need of an- 
 other, and has not from himself all things 
 which are useful for life. He is an abscess on 
 the universe who withdraws and separates 
 himself from the reason of our common nature 
 through being displeased with the things 
 which happen, for the same nature produces 
 this, and has produced thee too : he is a piece 
 rent asunder from the state, who tears his own 
 soul from that of reasonable animals, which is 
 one. 
 
 30. The one is a philosopher without a tunic, 
 and the other without a book; here is another 
 half naked: Bread I have not, he sa3^s, and I 
 abide by reason — and I do not get the means 
 of living out of my learning,-!- and I abide [by 
 my reason], 
 
 31. Love the art, poor as it may be, which 
 thou hast learned, and be content with it; and 
 pass through the rest of life like one who has 
 intrusted to the gods with his whole soul all 
 that he has, making thyself neither the tyrant 
 nor the slave of any man. 
 
 32. Consider, for example, the times of Ves- 
 pasian. Thou wilt see all these things, people 
 marrying, bringing up children, sick, dying, 
 warring, feasting, trafficking, cultivating the 
 ground, flattering, obstinately arrogant, suspect- 
 ing, plotting, wishing for some to die, grumbling 
 about the present, loving, heaping up treas- 
 ure, de.siring consulship, kingly power. Well, 
 then, that life of the.se people no longer exists 
 
Book IV.] Marcus aurelius antoninus. 
 
 149 
 
 at all. Again, remove to the times of Trajan. 
 Again, all is the same. Their life too is gone. 
 In like manner view also the other epochs of 
 time and of whole nations, and see how many- 
 after great efforts soon fell and were resolved 
 into the elements. But chiefly thou shouldst 
 think of those whom thou hast thyself known 
 distracting themselves about idle things, ne- 
 glecting to do what was in accordance with their 
 proper constitution, and to hold firmly to this 
 and to be content with it. And herein it is 
 necessary to remember that the attention given 
 to everything has its proper value and propor- 
 tion. For thus thou wilt not be dissatisfied, if 
 thou appliest thyself to smaller matters no fur- 
 ther than is fit. 
 
 33. The words which were formerly familiar 
 are now antiquated: so also the names of those 
 who were famed of old, are now in a manner 
 antiquated, Camillus, Caeso, Volesus, Leon- 
 natus, and a little after also Scipio and Cato, 
 then Augu-stus, then also Hadrianus and An- 
 toninus. For all things soon pass away and be- 
 come a mere tale, and complete oblivion soon 
 buries them. And I sa}^ this of those who have 
 shone in a wondrous way. For the rest, as 
 soon as they have breathed out their breath 
 they are gone, and no man speaks of them. 
 And, to conclude the matter, what is even an 
 eternal remembrance ? A mere nothing. What 
 then is that about which we ought to employ 
 our serious pains? This one thing, thoughts 
 
O:bou0bt6. 
 
 [Book IT. 
 
 150 
 
 just, and acts social, and words which never 
 lie, and a disposition which gladly accepts all 
 that happens, as necessary, as usual, as flowing 
 from a principle and source of the same kind. 
 
 34. Willingly give thyself up to Clotho [one 
 of the fates] , allowing her to spin thy thread + 
 into whatever things she pleases. 
 
 35. Everything is only for a day, both that 
 which remembers and that which is remem- 
 bered. 
 
 36. Observe constantly that all things take 
 place by change, and accustom thyself to con- 
 sider that the nature of the universe loves noth- 
 ing so much as to change the things which are 
 and to make new things like them. For 
 everything that exists is in a manner the seed 
 of that which will be. But thou art thinking 
 only of seeds which are cast into the earth or 
 into a womb: but this is a very vulgar notion. 
 
 37. Thou wilt soon die, and thou art not yet 
 simple, nor free from perturbations, nor with- 
 out suspicion of being hurt by external things, 
 nor kindly disposed towards all; nor dost thou 
 yet place wisdom only in acting justly. 
 
 38. Examine men’s ruling principles, even 
 those of the wise, what kind of things they 
 avoid, and what kind they pursue. 
 
 39. What is evil to thee does not subsist in 
 the ruling principle of another; nor yet in any 
 turning and mutation of thy corporeal cover- 
 ing. Where is it then ? It is in that part of 
 thee in which subsists the power of forming 
 
Book IV.] Marcus Hurcliue Bntoninue. 
 
 151 
 
 opinions about evils. Let this power then not 
 form [such] opinions, and all is well. And if 
 that which is nearest to it, the poor body, is 
 cut, burnt, filled with matter and rottenness, 
 nevertheless let the part which forms opinions 
 about these things be quiet; that is, let it 
 judge that nothing is either bad or good which 
 can happen equally to the bad man and the 
 good. For that which happens equally to him 
 who lives contrary to nature and to him who 
 lives according to nature, is neither according 
 to nature nor contrary to nature. 
 
 40. Constantly regard the universe as one 
 living being, having one substance and one 
 soul ; and observ^e how all things have reference 
 to one perception, the perception of this one 
 living- being; and how all things act with one 
 movement; and how all things are the co- 
 operating causes of all things which exist; 
 observe too the continuous spinning of the 
 thread and the contexture of the web. 
 
 41. Thou art a little soul bearing about a 
 corpse, as Epictetus used to say (i. c. 19). 
 
 42. It is no evil for things to undergo change, 
 and no good for things to subsist in conse- 
 quence of change. 
 
 43. Time is like a river made up of the 
 events which happen, and a violent stream; for 
 as soon as a thing has been seen, it is carried 
 away, and another comes in its place, and this 
 will be carried away too. 
 
 44. Everything which happens is as familiar 
 
152 
 
 Cbouflbte. 
 
 [Book IV. 
 
 and well known as the rose in spring and the 
 fruit in summer; for such is disease, and death, 
 and calumny, and treachery, and whatever else 
 delights fools or vexes them. 
 
 45. In the series of things, those which follow 
 are always aptly fitted to those which have 
 gone before: for this series is not like a mere 
 enumeration of disjointed things, which has 
 only a necessary sequence, but it is a rational 
 connection: and as all existing things are ar- 
 ranged together harmoniously, so the things 
 which come into existence exhibit no mere suc- 
 cession, but a certain wonderful relationship 
 (vi. 38; vii. 9; vii, 75, note). 
 
 46. Always remember the sa5dng of Hera- 
 clitus, that the death of earth is to become 
 water, and the death of water is to become air, 
 and the death of air is to become fire, and re- 
 versely. And think too of him who forgets 
 whither the way leads, and that men quarrel 
 with that with which they are most constantly 
 in communion, the reason which governs the 
 universe; and the things which they daily meet 
 with seem to them strange: and consider that we 
 ought not to act and speak as if we were asleep, 
 for even in sleep we seem to act and speak; 
 and that + we ought not, like children who 
 learn from their parents, simply to act and speak 
 as we have been taught. + 
 
 47. If any god told thee that thou shalt die 
 to-morrow, or certainly on the day after to-mor- 
 row, thou wouldst not care much whether it 
 
Book IV.] jfflSaccus aureUus Bntoninus. 
 
 153 
 
 was on the third day or on the morrow, unless 
 thou wast in the highest degree mean-spirited; 
 for how small is the difference ! So think it no 
 great thing to die after as many years as thou 
 canst name rather than to-morrow. 
 
 48. Think continually how many physicians 
 are dead after often contracting their eyebrows 
 over the sick; and how many astrologers after 
 predicting with great pretensions the deaths of 
 others; and how many philosophers after end- 
 less discourses on death or immortality; how 
 many heroes after killing thousands; and how 
 many t3^rants who have used their power over 
 men’s lives with terrible insolence, as if they 
 were immortal; and how many cities are entirelj" 
 dead, so to speak, Helice^ and Pompeii and 
 Herculaneum, and others innumerable. Add to 
 the reckoning all whom thou hast known, one 
 after another. One man after burying another 
 has been laid out dead, and another buries 
 him; and all this in a short time. To conclude, 
 always observe how ephemeral and worthless 
 human things are, and what was yesterday a 
 little mucus, to-morrow will be a mummy or 
 ashes. Pass then through this little space of 
 time conformably to nature, and end thy jour- 
 ney in content, as an olive falls off when it is 
 ripe, blessing nature who produced it, and 
 thanking the tree on which it grew. 
 
 * Ovid, Met. xv. 293: — 
 
 “Si quaeras Helicen et Burin Achaidas urbes, 
 Invenies sub aquis. ’ ’ 
 
154 
 
 ?Tbou0bts. 
 
 [Book I?. 
 
 49. Be like the promontory against which 
 the waves continually break, but it stands firm 
 and tames the fury of the water around it. 
 
 Unhappy am I becau.se this has happened to 
 me ? Not so, but happy am I, though this has 
 happened to me, because I continue free from 
 pain, neither crushed by the present nor fear- 
 ing the future. For such a thing as this might 
 have happened to every man; but every man 
 would not have continued free from pain on 
 such an occasion. Why then is that rather a 
 misfortune than this a good fortune ? And dost 
 thou in all cases call that a man’s misfortune 
 which is not a deviation from man’s nature? 
 And does a thing seem to thee to be a deviation 
 from man’s nature, when it is not contrary to 
 the will of man’s nature ? Well, thou knowest 
 the will of nature. Will then this which has 
 happened prevent thee from being just, mag- 
 nanimous, temperate, prudent, secure against 
 inconsiderate opinions and falsehood; will it 
 prevent thee from having modesty, freedom, 
 and everything else, by the presence of which 
 man’s nature obtains all that is its own ? Re- 
 member too on every occasion which leads thee 
 to vexation to apply this principle; not that 
 this is a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is 
 good fortune. 
 
 50. It is a vulgar, but still a useful help 
 towards contempt of death, to pass in review 
 those who have tenaciously stuck to life. 
 What more then have they gained than those 
 
Book IV.] Marcus Aurelius antonfnus. 
 
 155 
 
 Avho have died early ? Certainly they lie in 
 their tombs somewhere at last, Cadicianus, 
 Fabius, Julianus, Lepidus, or any one else like 
 them, who ha-s^e carried out many to be buried, 
 and then were carried out themselves. Alto- 
 gether the interval is small [between birth and 
 death] ; and consider with how much trouble, 
 and in company with what sort of people, and 
 in what a feeble bod}^, this interval is labor- 
 iously passed. Do not then consider life a 
 thing of any value. + For look to the im- 
 mensity of time behind thee, and to the time 
 which is before thee, another boundless space. 
 In this infinity then what is the difference be- 
 tween him who lives three days and him who 
 lives three generations ?* 
 
 51. Always run to the short waj^; and the 
 short way is the natural: accordingly say and 
 do everything in conformity with the soundest 
 reason. For such a purpose frees a man from 
 trouble, + and warfare, and all artifice and 
 ostentatious display. 
 
 * An allusion to Homer’s Nestor, who was living at 
 the war of Troy among the third generation, like old 
 Parr with his hundred and fifty-two years, and some 
 others in modern times who have beaten Parr by 
 twenty or thirty years if it is true; and yet they died 
 at last. The word is rpi-yepr/viov in Antoninus. Nestor 
 is named rpcyepuv by some writers; but here perhaps 
 theie is an allusion to Homer’s Tep^vioc iTzno-a 'SeaTa^. 
 
156 
 
 ^bougbte. 
 
 [BootV. 
 
 V. 
 
 I N the morning when thou risest unwillingly, 
 let this thought be present, — I am rising to 
 the work of a human being. Why then am I 
 dissatisfied if I am going to do the things for 
 which I exist and for which I was brought into 
 the world ? Or have I been made for this, to 
 lie in the bed-clothes and keep myself warm ? 
 — But this is more pleasant. — Dost thou exist 
 then to take thy pleasure, and not at all for 
 action or exertion ? Dost thou not see the little 
 plants, the little birds, the ants, the spiders, 
 the bees working together to put in order their 
 several parts of the universe ? And art thou 
 unwilling to do the work of a human being, 
 and dost thou not make haste to do that which 
 is according to thy nature ? But it is necessary 
 to take rest also. — It is necessary. However, 
 Nature has fixed bounds to this too: she has 
 fixed bounds to eating and drinking, and yet 
 thou goest beyond these bounds, beyond what 
 is .sufficient; yet in thy acts it is not so, but 
 thou stoppest short of what thou canst do. So 
 thou lovest not thyself, for if thou didst, thou 
 wouldst love thy nature and her will. But 
 those who love their several arts exhaust 
 themselves in working at them unwashed and 
 
BookV.] fllbarcus aurclius antonfnue. 
 
 157 
 
 without food; but thou valuest thy own nature 
 less than the turner values the turning art, or 
 the dancer the dancing art, or the lover of 
 money values his money, or the vain-glorious 
 man his little glory. And such men, when 
 they have a violent affection to a thing, choose 
 neither to eat nor to sleep rather than to perfect 
 the things which they care for. But are the 
 acts which concern society more vile in thy 
 eyes and less worthy of thy labor ? 
 
 2. How easy it is to repel and to wipe away 
 every impression which is troublesome or un- 
 suitable, and immediately to be in all tran- 
 quillity. 
 
 3. Judge every word and deed which are ac- 
 cording to nature to be fit for thee; and be not 
 diverted by the blame which follows from any 
 people, nor by their words, but if a thing is 
 good to be done or said, do not consider it un- 
 worthy of thee. For those persons have their 
 peculiar leading principle and follow their pe- 
 culiar movement; which things do not thou 
 regard, but go straight on, following thy own 
 nature and the common nature; and the way 
 of both is one. 
 
 4. I go through the things which happen ac- 
 cording to nature until I shall fall and rest, 
 breathing out my breath into that element out 
 of which I daily draw it in, and falling upon 
 that earth out of which my father collected the 
 seed, and my mother the blood, and my nurse 
 the milk; out of which during so many years 
 
158 
 
 tlbouflbts. 
 
 [Book V. 
 
 I have been supplied with food and drink; 
 which bears me when I tread on it and abuse 
 it for so many purposes. 
 
 5. Thou sayest, Men cannot admire the 
 sharpness of thy wits. — Be it so : but there are 
 many other things of which thou canst not 
 say, I am not formed from them by nature. 
 Show those qualities then which are altogether 
 in thy power, sincerity, gravity, endurance of 
 labor, aversion to pleasure, contentment with 
 thy portion and with few things, benevolence, 
 frankness, no love of superfluity, freedom from 
 trifling, magnanimity. Dost thou not see how 
 many qualities thou art immediately able to 
 exhibit, in which there is no excuse of natural 
 incapacity and unfitness, and yet thou still re- 
 mainest voluntarily below the mark ? or art 
 thou compelled through being defectively fur- 
 nished by nature to murmur, and to be stingy, 
 and to flatter, and to find fault with thy poor 
 body, and to try to please men, and to make 
 great display, and to be so restless in thy 
 mind ? No, by the gods ; but thou mightest 
 have been delivered from these things long 
 ago. Only if in truth thou canst be charged 
 with being rather slow and dull of comprehen- 
 sion, thou must exert thy.self about this also, 
 not neglecting it nor yet taking pleasure in thy 
 dullness. 
 
 6. One man, when he has done a service to 
 another, is ready to set it down to his account 
 as a favor conferred. Another is not ready to 
 
BookV.] Marcus SurcHua Antoninus. 
 
 159 
 
 do this, but still in his own mind he thinks of 
 the man as his debtor, and he knows what he 
 has done. A third in a manner does not even 
 know what he has done, but he is like a vine 
 which has produced grapes, and seeks for no- 
 thing more after it has once produced its 
 proper fruit. As a horse when he has run, a 
 dog when he has tackled the game, a bee when 
 it has made the honey, so a man when he has 
 done a good act does not call out for others to 
 come and see, but he goes on to another act, 
 as a vine goes on to produce again the grapes 
 in season. — Must a man then be one of these, 
 who in a manner act thus without rbserving 
 it? — Yes. —But this ver>' thing is necessary, 
 the observation of what a man is doing ; for, it 
 may be said, it is characteristic of the .social 
 animal to perceive that he is working in a 
 social manner, and indeed to wish that his 
 social partner also shonld perceive it. — It is 
 true that thou sayest, but thou dost not rightly 
 understand what is now said : and for this 
 reason thou wilt become one of those of whom 
 I spoke before, for even they are misled b}" a 
 certain show of reason. But if thou wilt 
 choose to understand the meaning of what is 
 said, do not fear that for this reason thou wilt 
 omit any social act. 
 
 7. A prayer of the Athenians: Rain, rain, O 
 dear Zeus, down on the ploughed fields of the 
 Athenians and on the plains. — In truth we 
 ought not to pray at all, or we ought to pray 
 in this simple and noble fashion. 
 
i6o 
 
 JCboufibts. 
 
 [fiook V. 
 
 8. Just as we must understand when it is 
 said, That Aesculapius prescribed to this man 
 horse-exercise, or bathing in cold water, or go- 
 ing without shoes, so we must understand it 
 when it is said. That the nature of the universe 
 prescribed to this man disease, or mutilation, 
 or loss, or anything else of the kind. For in 
 the first case Prescribed means something like 
 this: he prescribed this for this man as a 
 thing adapted to procure health; and in the 
 second case it means. That which happens * to 
 [or suits] every man is fixed in a manner for 
 him suitably to his destiny. For this is what 
 we mean when we say that things are suitable 
 to us, as the workmen say of squared stones in 
 walls or the pyramids, that they are suitable, 
 when they fit them to one another in some kind 
 of connection. For there is altogether one fit- 
 ness [harmony]. And as the universe is made 
 up out of all bodies to be such a body as it is, 
 so out of all existing causes necessity [destiny] 
 is made up to be such a cause as it is. And 
 even those who are completely ignorant under- 
 stand what I mean; for they say. It [necessity, 
 destiny] brought this to such a person. — This 
 then was brought and this was prescribed to 
 him. I,et us then receive these things, as well 
 as those which Aesculapius prescribes. Many 
 as a matter of course even among his prescrip- 
 tions are disagreeable, but we accept them in 
 
 * In this section there is a play on the meaning of 
 cvuQa'iveiv. 
 
Book Y.] Marcus Surelfus antoninu6. 
 
 i6i 
 
 the hope of health. Let the perfecting and 
 accomplishment of the things which the com- 
 mon nature judges to be good, be judged by 
 thee to be of the same kind as thy health. 
 And so accept everything which happens, even 
 if it seem disagreeable, because it leads to this, 
 to the health of the universe and to the pros- 
 perity and felicity of Zeus [the universe]. For 
 he would not have brought on any man what 
 he has brought, if it were not useful for the 
 whole. Neither does the nature of anything, 
 whatever it may be, cause anything which is 
 not suitable to that which is directed by it. 
 For two reasons then it is right to be content 
 with that which happens to thee; the one, be- 
 cause it was done for thee and prescribed for 
 thee, and in a manner had reference to thee, 
 originally from the most ancient causes spun 
 with thy destiny; and the other, because even, 
 that which comes severally to ever}^ man is to 
 the power which administers the universe a 
 cause of felicity and perfection, nay even of its 
 very continuance. For the integrity of the 
 whole is mutilated, if thou cuttest off anything 
 whatever from the conjunction and the contin- 
 uity either of the parts or of the causes. And 
 thou dost cut off, as far as it is in thy power, 
 when thou art dissatisfied, and in a manner 
 triest to put anything out of the way. 
 
 9. Be not disgusted, nor discouraged, nor 
 dissatisfied, if thou dost not succeed in doing 
 everything according to right principles, but 
 
 II 
 
i 62 
 
 ^Cbougbts. 
 
 [Book V. 
 
 when thou hast failed, return back again, and 
 be content if the greater part of what thou 
 doest is consistent with man’s nature, and love 
 this to which thou returnest; and do not return 
 to philosophy as if she were a master, but act 
 like those who have sore eyes and apply a bit 
 of sponge and egg, or as another applies a 
 plaster, or drenching with water. For thus 
 thou wilt not fail to + obey reason, and thou 
 wilt repose in it. And remember that philos- 
 ophy requires only things which thy nature re- 
 quires; but thou wouldst have something else 
 which is not according to nature. — It may be 
 objected. Why, what is more agreeable than 
 this [which I am doing]? But is not this the 
 very reason why pleasure deceives us ? And 
 consider if magnanimity, freedom, simplicity, 
 equanimity, piety, are not more agreeable. 
 For what is more agreeable than wisdom itself, 
 when thou thinkest of the security and the 
 happy course of all things which depend on the 
 faculty of understanding and knowledge ? 
 
 lo. Things are in such a kind of envelop- 
 ment that they have seemed to philosophers, 
 not a few nor those common philosophers, alto- 
 gether unintelligible; nay even to the Stoics 
 themselves they seem difficult to understand. 
 And all our assent is changeable; for where is 
 the man who never changes? Carry thy 
 thoughts then to the objects themselves, and 
 consider how short-lived they are and worth- 
 less, and that they may be in the possession of 
 
BookV.] Marcus aurellue Jlntomnus. 163 
 
 a filthy wretch or a whore or a robber. Then 
 turn to the morals of those who live with thee, 
 and it is hardly possible to endure even the 
 most agreeable of them, to say nothing of a man 
 being hardly able to endure himself In such 
 darkness then and dirt, and in so constant a 
 flux both of substance and of time, and of 
 motion and of things moved, what there is 
 worth being highly prized, or even an object 
 of serious pursuit, I cannot imagine. But on 
 the contrary it is a man’s duty to comfort him- 
 self, and to wait for the natural dissolution, and 
 not to be vexed at the delay, but to rest in 
 these principles only: the one, that nothing 
 will happen to me which is not conformable to 
 the nature of the universe; and the other, that 
 it is in my power never to act contrary to my 
 god and daemon: for there is no man who will 
 compel me to this. 
 
 11. About what am I now employing my 
 own soul ? On every occasion I must ask my- 
 self this question, and inquire. What have I 
 now in this part of me which they call the rul- 
 ing principle? and whose soul have I now, — 
 that of a child, or of a young man, or of a 
 feeble woman, or of a tyrant, or of a domestic 
 animal, or of a wild beast? 
 
 12. What kind of things those are which ap- 
 pear good to the many, we may learn even 
 from this. For if any man should conceive 
 certain things as being really good, such as 
 prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude, he 
 
164 
 
 u:bougbts. 
 
 [Book Y. 
 
 would not after having first conceived these 
 endure to listen to anythingd- which should 
 not be in harmony with what is really good.+ 
 But if a man has first conceived as good the 
 things which appear to the many to be good, 
 he will listen and readily receive as very appli- 
 cable that which was said by the comic writer. 
 +TI1US even the many perceive the difference. -h 
 For were it not so, this saying would not offend 
 and would not be rejected [in the first case], 
 while we receive it when it is said of wealth, 
 and of the means which further luxury and 
 fame, as said fitly and wittily. Go on then 
 and ask if we should value and think those 
 things to be good, to which after their first 
 conception in the mind the words of the comic 
 writer might be aptly applied, — that he who 
 has them, through pure abundance has not a 
 place to ease himself in. 
 
 13. I am composed of the formal and the 
 material ; and neither of them will perish into 
 non-existence, as neither of them came into ex- 
 istence out of non-existence. Every part of me 
 then will be reduced by change into some part 
 of the universe, and that again will change 
 into another part of the universe, and so 0!i for- 
 ever. And by consequence of such a change I 
 too exist, and those who begot me, and so on 
 forever in the other direction. For nothing 
 hinders us from saying so, even if the universe 
 is administered according to definite periods 
 [of revolution]. 
 
BookV.] fliiarcus BureUus Bntoninus. 
 
 165 
 
 14. Reason and the reasoning art [philoso- 
 phy] are powers which are sufficient for them- 
 selves and for their own works. They move 
 then from a first principle which is their own, 
 and they make their way to the end which is 
 proposed to them ; and this is the reason why 
 such acts are named Catorthoseis or right acts, 
 w'hich word signifies that they proceed by the 
 right road. 
 
 15. None of these things ought to be called a 
 man’s, which do not belong to a man, as man. 
 They are not required of a man, nor does 
 man’s nature promise them, nor are they the 
 means of man’s nature attaining its end. 
 Neither then does the end of man lie in these 
 things, nor yet that which aids to the accom- 
 plishment of this end, and that which aids to- 
 ward this end is that which is good. Besides, 
 if any of these things did belong to man, it 
 would not be right for a man to despise them and 
 to set himself against them ; nor would a man 
 be worthy of praise who showed that he did 
 not want these things, nor would he who 
 stinted himself in any of them be good, if in- 
 deed these things were good. But now the 
 more of these things a man deprives himself of, 
 or of other things like them, or even when he 
 is deprived of any of them, the more patiently 
 he endures the loss, just in the same degree he 
 is a better man. 
 
 16. Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such 
 also will be the character of thy mind; for the 
 
^Tbougbts. 
 
 [Book V. 
 
 1 66 
 
 soul is dyed by the thoughts. Dye it then 
 with a continuous series of such thoughts as 
 these: for instance, that where a man can live, 
 there he can also live well. But he must live 
 in a palace; well then, he can also live well in 
 a palace. And again, consider that for what- 
 ever purpose each thing has been constituted, 
 for this it has been constituted, and towards 
 this it is carried ; and its end is in that towards 
 which it is carried; and where the end is, there 
 also is the advantage and the good of each 
 thing. Now the good for the reasonable ani- 
 mal is society ; for that we are made for society 
 has been shown above.* Is it not plain that 
 the inferior exists for the sake of the superior ? 
 But the things which have life are superior to 
 those which have not life, and of those which 
 have life the superior are those which have 
 reason. 
 
 17. To seek what is impossible is madness: 
 and it is impossible that the bad should not do 
 something of this kind. 
 
 18. Nothing happens to any man which he 
 is not formed by nature to bear. The same 
 things happen to another, and either because 
 he does not see that they have happened, or 
 because he would show a great spirit, he is 
 firm and remains unharmed. It is a shame 
 then that ignorance and conceit should be 
 stronger than wisdom. 
 
 19. Things themselves touch not the soul, 
 
 *ii. I. 
 
Book?.] Marcus Burelius Bntoninus. 
 
 167 
 
 not in the least degree; nor have they ad- 
 mission to the soul, nor can they turn or move 
 the soul; but the soul turns and moves itself 
 alone, and whatever judgments it maj' think 
 proper to make, such it makes for itself the 
 things which present themselves to it. 
 
 20. In one respect man is the nearest thing 
 to me, so far as I must do good to men and en- 
 dure them. But so far as some men -make 
 themselves obstacles to my proper acts, man 
 becomes to me one of the things which are in- 
 different, 110 less than the sun or wind or a wild 
 beast. Now it is true that these may impede 
 my action, but they are no impediments to my 
 affects and disposition, which have the power 
 of acting conditionally and changing: for the 
 mind converts and changes every hindrance to 
 its activity into an aid; and so that which is a 
 hindrance is made a furtherance to an act; and 
 that which is an obstacle on the road helps us 
 on this road. 
 
 21. Reverence that which is best in the uni- 
 verse; and this is that which makes use of all 
 things and directs all things. i\.nd in like 
 manner also reverence that which is best in 
 thyself; and this is of the same kind as that. 
 For in thyself also, that which makes use of 
 everything else is this, and thj^ life is directed 
 by this. 
 
 22. That which does no harm to the state, 
 does no harm to the citizen. In the case of 
 every appearance of harm apply this rule: if 
 
i68 
 
 ^Tbougbts. 
 
 [Book Y. 
 
 the state is not harmed by this, neither am I 
 harmed. But if the state is harmed, thou must 
 not be angry with him who does harm to the 
 state. Show him where his error is. 
 
 23. Often think of the rapidity with which 
 things pass by and disappear, both the things 
 which are and the things which are produced. 
 For substance is like a river in a continual 
 flow, and the activities of things are in con- 
 stant change, and the causes work in infinite 
 varieties; and there is hardly anything which 
 stands still. And consider this which is near 
 to thee, this boundless abyss of the past and of 
 the future in which all things disappear. How 
 then is he not a fool who is puffed up with 
 such things or plagued about them and makes 
 himself miserable? for they vex him only for a 
 time, and a short time. 
 
 24. Think of the universal substance, of 
 which thou hast a very small portion; and 
 of universal time, of which a short and indivis- 
 ible interval has been assigned to thee; and of 
 that which is fixed by destiny, and how small 
 a part of it thou art. 
 
 25. Does another do me wrong? Let him 
 look to it. He has his own disposition, his 
 own activity- I now have what the universal 
 nature now wills tne to have; and I do what 
 my nature now wills me to do. 
 
 26. Let the part of thy soul which leads and 
 governs be undisturbed by the movements in 
 the flesh, whether of pleasure or of pain; and 
 
Book¥.] Marcus Hurelius Bntontnue. 169 
 
 let it not unite with them, but let it circum- 
 scribe itself and limit those affects to their 
 parts. But w’hen these affects rise up to the 
 mind by virtue of that other sympathy that 
 naturally exists in a body which is all one, 
 then thou must not strive to resist the sensa- 
 tion, for it is natural: but let not the ruling part 
 of itself add to the sensation the opinion that 
 it is either good or bad. 
 
 27. Live with the gods. And he does live 
 with the gods who constantly shows to them 
 that his own soul is satisfied with that which 
 is assigned to him, and that it does all that the 
 daemon washes, which Zeus hath given to 
 every" man for his guardian and guide, a portion 
 of himself And this is every" man’s under- 
 standing and reason. 
 
 28. Art thou angry with him whose armpits 
 stink ? art thou angry with him whose mouth 
 smells foul? What good w'ill this anger do 
 thee? He has such a mouth, he has such arm- 
 pits: it is necessary, that such an emanation 
 must come from such things: but the man has 
 reason, it w"ili be said, and he is able, if he 
 takes pains, to discover wherein he offends; I 
 wish thee well of thy discovery. Well then, 
 and thou hast reason: by thy rational faculty 
 stir up his rational faculty; show him his error, 
 admonish him. For if he listens, thou wilt 
 cure him, and there is no need of anger. 
 [+ Neither tragic actor nor whore. +]* 
 
 *This is imperfect or corrupt, or both. There is 
 
XTbouabte. 
 
 [Book T. 
 
 170 
 
 29. As thou intendest to live when thou art 
 gone out, . . . so it is in thy power to live 
 here. But if men do not permit thee, then get 
 away out of life, yet so as if thou wert suffering 
 no harm. The house is smoky, and I quit it.* 
 Why dost thou think that this is any trouble ? 
 But so long as nothing of the kind drives me 
 out, I remain, am free, and no man shall hin- 
 der me from doing what I choose; and I choose 
 to do what is according to the nature of the 
 rational and social animal. 
 
 30. The intelligence of the universe is social. 
 Accordingly it has made the inferior things for 
 the sake of the superior, and it has fitted the 
 superior to one another. Thou seest how it 
 has subordinated, co-ordinated, and assigned to 
 everything its proper portion, and has brought 
 together into concord with one another the 
 things which are the best. 
 
 31. How hast thou behaved hitherto to the 
 gods, thy parents, brethren, children, teachers, 
 to those who looked after thy infancy, to thy 
 friends, kinsfolk, to thy slaves? Consider if 
 thou hast hitherto behaved to all in such a way 
 that this may be said of thee, — 
 
 “Never has wronged a man in deed or word.” 
 
 also something wrong or incomplete in the beginning 
 of S. 29, where he says ojc i^eWuv Siavo^, which 
 Gataker translates “as if thou wast about to quit 
 life;” but we cannot translate l^eWuv in that way. 
 Other translations are not much more satisfactory. I 
 have translated it literally and left it imperfect. 
 
 * Epictetus, i. 25, 18. 
 
Book¥.] /Hbarcu6 Burelius Bntonfnus. 
 
 And call to recollection both how many things 
 thou hast passed through, and how many 
 things thou hast been able to endure, and that 
 the history of thy life is now complete and th}^ 
 service is ended; and how many beautiful 
 things thou hast seen; and how many pleasures 
 and pains thou hast despised; and how many 
 things called honorable thou hast spurned; 
 and to how many ill-minded folks thou hast 
 shown a kind disposition. 
 
 32. Why do unskilled and ignorant souls 
 disturb him who has skill and knowledge? 
 What soul then has skill and knowledge? 
 That which knows beginning and end, and 
 knows the reason which pervades all substance, 
 and though all time by fixed periods [revolu- 
 tions] administers the universe. 
 
 33. Soon, verj" soon, thou wilt be ashes, or 
 a skeleton, and either a name or not even a 
 name ; but name is sound and echo. And the 
 things which are much valued in life are empty 
 and rotten and trifling, and [like] little dogs 
 biting one another, and little children quarrel- 
 ing, laughing, and then straightway weeping. 
 But fidelity and modest}^ and justice and truth 
 are fled 
 
 Up to Olympus from the wide-spread earth. 
 
 Hesiod, Works, etc. v. 197. 
 
 What then is there which still detains thee 
 here, if the objects of sense are easil}^ changed 
 and never stand still, and the organs of per- 
 
172 
 
 ITbougbte. 
 
 [Book V. 
 
 ception are dull and easily receive false im- 
 pressions, and the poor soul itself is an exha- 
 lation from blood ? But to have good repute 
 amid such a world as this is an empty thing. 
 Why then dost thou not wait in tranquillity 
 for thy end, whether it is extinction or removal 
 to another state? And until that time comes, 
 what is sufficient? Why, what else than to 
 venerate the gods and bless them, and to do 
 good to men, and to practise tolerance and 
 self-restraint ; * but as to everjdhing which is 
 beyond the limits of the poor flesh and breath, 
 to remember that this is neither thine nor in 
 thy power. 
 
 34. Thou canst pass thy life in an equable 
 flow of happiness, if thou canst go by the right 
 way, and think and act in the right way. 
 These two things are common both to the soul 
 of God and to the soul of man, and to the soul 
 of every rational being : not to be hindered by 
 another ; and to hold good to consist in the 
 disposition to justice and the practice of it, 
 and in this to let thy desire find its termina- 
 tion. 
 
 35. If this is neither my own badness, nor 
 an effect of my own badness, and the common 
 weal is not injured, why am I troubled about 
 it, and what is the harm to the common weal? 
 
 *This is the Stoic precept avizoy koI aT^exov. The 
 first part teaches us to be content with men and things 
 as they are. The second part teaches us the virtue of 
 self restraint, or the govermnent of our passions. 
 
Book V.] /iBarcuB Hutelius Antoninus. 
 
 173 
 
 36. Do not be carried along inconsiderately 
 by the appearance of things, but give help [to 
 all] according to thy ability and their fitness ; 
 and if they should have sustained loss in mat- 
 ters which are indifferent, do not imagine this 
 to be a damage ; for it is a bad habit. But as 
 the old man, when he w'ent away, asked back 
 his foster-child’s top, remembering that it was 
 a top, so do thou in this case also. 
 
 When thou art calling out on the Rostra, 
 hast thou forgotten, man, what these things 
 are? — Yes; but they are objects of great con- 
 cern to these people — wilt thou too then be 
 made a fool for these things? I was once a 
 fortunate man, but I lost it, I know not how. — 
 But fortunate means that a man has assigned 
 to himself a good fortune : and a good fortune 
 is good disposition of the soul, good emotions, 
 good actions.* 
 
 *This section is unintelligible. Many of the words 
 may be corrupt, and the general purport of the section 
 cannot be discovered. Perhaps several things have 
 been improperly joined in one section. I have trans- 
 lated it nearly literally. Different translators give 
 the section a different turn, and the critics have tried 
 to mend what they cannot understand. 
 
174 
 
 ?Tbougbt0. 
 
 [Book 71. 
 
 VI. 
 
 T he substance of the universe is obedient 
 and compliant; and the reason which 
 governs it has in itself no cause for doing evil, 
 for it has no malice, nor does it do evil to any- 
 thing, nor is anything harmed b5^ it. But all 
 things are made and perfected according to this 
 reason. 
 
 2. Let it make no difference to thee whether 
 thou art cold or warm, if thou art doing thy 
 duty; and whether thou art drowsy or satis- 
 fied with sleep; and whether ill-spoken of or 
 praised; and whether dying or doing some- 
 thing else. For it is one of the acts of life, 
 this act by which we die; it is sufficient then 
 in this act also to do well what we have in 
 hand (vi. 22, 28). 
 
 3. Look within. Let neither the peculiar 
 quality of anything nor its value escape thee. 
 
 4. All existing things soon change, and 
 they will either be reduced to vapor, if indeed 
 all substance is one, or they will be dispersed. 
 
 5. The reason which governs knows what 
 its own disposition is, and what it does, and 
 on what material it works. 
 
 6. The best way of avenging thyself is not 
 to become like [the wrong-doer]. 
 
Book¥L] Marcus Burelius Bntoninus. 
 
 175 
 
 7. Take pleasure in one thing and rest in it, 
 in passing from one social act to another social 
 act, thinking of God. 
 
 8. The ruling principle is that which rouses 
 and turns itself, and while it makes itself such 
 as it is and such as it wills to be, it also makes 
 everything which happens appear to itself to 
 be such as it wills. 
 
 g. In conformity to the nature of the uni- 
 verse ever}’ single thing is accomplished; for 
 certainly it is not in conformity to any other 
 nature that each thing is accomplished, either 
 a nature which externally comprehends this, or 
 a nature which is comprehended within this 
 nature, or a nature external and independent 
 of this (xi. i; vi. 40; viii. 50). 
 
 10. The universe is either a confusion, and 
 a mutual involution of things, and a dispersion, 
 or it is unity and order and providence. If 
 then it is the former, why do I desire to tarry 
 in a fortuitous combination of things and such 
 a disorder ? and why do I care about anything 
 else than how I shall at last become earth ? 
 and why am I disturbed, for the dispersion of 
 ni}' elements will happen whatever I do ? But 
 if the other supposition is true, I venerate, and 
 I am firm, and I trust in him who governs 
 (iv. 27). 
 
 11. When thou hast been compelled b}" cir- 
 cumstances to be disturbed in a manner, 
 quickly return to th}’self, and do not continue 
 out of tune longer than the compulsion lasts; 
 
176 
 
 ^Tbougbts. 
 
 [Book VI. 
 
 for thou wilt have more mastery over the har- 
 mony by continually recurring to it. 
 
 12. If thou hadst a step-mother and a mother 
 at the same time, thou wouldst be dutiful to 
 thy step-mother, but still thou wouldst con- 
 stantly return to thy mother. Let the court 
 and philosophy now be to thee step-mother and 
 mother: return to philosophy frequently and 
 repose in her, through whom what thou meet- 
 est with in the court appears to thee tolerable, 
 and thou appearest tolerable in the court. 
 
 13. When we have meat before us and such 
 eatables, we receive the impression that this is 
 the dead body of a fish, and this the dead body 
 of a bird or of a pig; and again, that this Faler- 
 nian is only a little grape-juice, and this purple 
 robe some sheep’s wool dyed with the blood of 
 a shell-fish: such then are these impressions, 
 and they reach the things themselves and pene- 
 trate them, and so we see what kind of things 
 they are. Just in the same way ought we to 
 act all through life, and where there are things 
 which appear most worthy of our approbation, 
 we ought to lay them bare and look at their 
 worthlessness and strip them of all the words 
 by which they are exalted. For outward show 
 is a wonderful perverter of the reason, and 
 when thou art most sure that thou art em- 
 ployed about things worth thy pains, it is then 
 that it cheats thee most. Consider then what 
 Crates says of Xenocrates himself. 
 
 14. Most of the things which the multitude 
 
Book¥l.] Marcus Sutelius Antoninus. 
 
 177 
 
 admire are referred to objects of the most gen- 
 eral kind, those which are held together by 
 cohesion or natural organization, such as 
 stones, wood, fig-trees, vines, olives. But 
 those which are admired by men, who are a 
 little more reasonable, are referred to the things 
 which are held together by a living principle, 
 as flocks, herds. Those which are admired by 
 men who are still more instnicted are the 
 things which are held together by a rational 
 soul, not however a universal soul, but rational 
 so far as it is a soul skilled in some art, or ex- 
 pert in some other way, or simply rational so 
 far as it possesses a number of slaves. But he 
 who values a rational soul, a soul universal and 
 fitted for political life, regards nothing else ex- 
 cept this; and above all things he keeps his 
 soul in a condition and in an activit3" conform- 
 able to rea.son and social life, and he co-oper- 
 ates to this end with those who are of the same 
 kind as himself 
 
 15. Some things are hurrjdng into existence, 
 and others are hurrying out of it; and of that 
 which is coming into existence part is already 
 extinguished. Motions and changes are con- 
 tinually renewing the world, just as the unin- 
 terrupted course of time is alwaj's renewing- 
 the infinite duration of ages. In this flowing 
 stream then, on which there is no abiding, 
 what is there of the things which hurr\' by on 
 which a man would set a high price ? It 
 would be just as if a man should fall in love 
 12 
 
178 
 
 ^Tbougbte. 
 
 [Book ¥1. 
 
 with one of the sparrows which fly by, but it 
 has already passed out of sight. Something 
 of this kind is the very life of every man, like 
 the exhalation of the blood and the respiration 
 of the air. For such as it is to have once 
 drawn in the air and to have given it back, 
 w'hich we do every moment, just the same is it 
 with the whole respiratory power, which thou 
 didst receive at thy birth yesterday and the 
 day before, to give it back to the element from 
 which thou didst first draw it. 
 
 1 6. Neither is transpiration, as in plants, a 
 thing to be valued, nor respiration, as in 
 domesticated animals and wild beasts, nor the 
 receiving of impressions by the appearances of 
 things, nor being moved by desires as puppets 
 by strings, nor assembling in herds, nor being 
 nourished by food ; for this is just like the act 
 of separating and parting with the u.seless part 
 of our food. What then is worth being valued ? 
 To be received with clapping of hands? No. 
 Neither must we value the clapping of tongues ; 
 for the praise which comes from the many is a 
 clapping of tongues. Suppose then that thou 
 ha.st given up this worthless thing called fame, 
 what remains that is worth valuing? This, in 
 my opinion : to move thyself and to restrain 
 thyself in confonnit}" to thy proper constitu- 
 tion, to which end both all employments and 
 arts lead. For every art aims at this, that the 
 thing w'hich has been made should be adapted 
 to the work for w^hich it has been made ; and 
 
Book Tl.] Marcus aurelius antoninus. 
 
 both the vine-planter who looks after the vine, 
 and the horse-breaker, and he who trains th« 
 dog, seek this end. But the education and the 
 teaching of youth aim at something. In thi? 
 then is the value of the education and the 
 teaching. And if this is well, thou wilt not 
 .seek anything else. Wilt thou not cease te 
 value many other things too? Then thou wilt 
 be neither free, nor sufficient for thy own hap- 
 piness, nor without passion. For of necessity 
 thou must be envious, jealous, and suspicious 
 of those who can take away those things, and 
 plot against those who have that which is 
 valued by thee. Of necessity a man must be 
 altogether in a state of perturbation who wants 
 any of these things ; and besides, he must often 
 find fault with the gods. But to reverence 
 and honor thy own mind will make thee con- 
 tent with thyself, and in harmony with society, 
 and in agreement with the gods, that is, prais- 
 ing all that they give and have ordered. 
 
 17. Above, below, all around are the move- 
 ments of the elements. But the motion of 
 virtue is in none of these : it is something 
 more divine, and advancing by a way hardly 
 observed, it goes happily on its road. 
 
 18. How strangely men act ! They will not 
 praise those who are living at the same time 
 and living with themselves ; but to be them- 
 selves praised by posterity, by those whom 
 they have never seen nor ever will see, this they 
 set much value on. But this is very much the 
 
i8o 
 
 ZTbouflbtg. 
 
 [Book VL 
 
 same as if thou shouldst be grieved because 
 those who have lived before thee did not praise 
 thee. 
 
 19. If a thing is difficult to be accomplished 
 by thyself, do not think that it is impossible 
 for man : but if anything is possible for man 
 and conformable to his nature, think that this 
 can be attained by thyself too. 
 
 20. In the gymnastic exercises suppose that 
 a man has torn thee with his nails, and by 
 dashing against thy head has inflicted a wound. 
 Well, we neither show any signs of vexation, 
 nor are we offended, nor do we suspect him 
 afterwards as a treacherous fellow ; and yet we 
 are on our guard against him, not however as 
 an enemy, nor yet with suspicion, but we 
 quietly get out of his way. Something like 
 this let thy behavior be in all the other parts 
 of life ; let us overlook many things in those 
 who are like antagonists in the gymnasium. 
 For it is in our power, as I said, to get out of 
 the way, and to have no suspicion nor hatred. 
 
 21. If any man is able to convince me and 
 show me that I do not think cr act right, I 
 will gladly change ; for I seek the truth, by 
 which no man was ever injured. But he is 
 injured who abides in his error and ignorance. 
 
 22. I do my duty : other things trouble me 
 not ; for they are either things without life, or 
 things without reason, or things that have 
 rambled and know not the way. 
 
 23. As to the animals which have no reason, 
 
Book Yi.] rtSarcus Burelius Hntoninus. 
 
 i8i 
 
 and generally all things and objects, do thou, 
 since thou hast reason and they have none, 
 make use of them with a generous and liberal 
 spirit. But towards human beings, as they 
 have reason, behave in a social spirit. And 
 on all occasions call on the gods, and do not 
 perplex thyself about the length of time in 
 which thou shalt do this ; for even three hours 
 so spent are suflScient. 
 
 24. Alexander the Macedonian and his groom 
 by death were brought to the same state ; for 
 either they were received among the same 
 seminal principles of the universe, or they were 
 alike dispersed among the atoms. 
 
 25. Consider how many things in the same 
 indivisible time take place in each of us, — 
 things which concern the body and things 
 which concern the soul : and so thou wilt not 
 wonder if many more things, or rather all 
 things which come into existence in that which 
 is the one and all, which we call Cosmos, exist 
 in it at the same time. 
 
 26. If any man should propose to thee the 
 question, how the name Antoninus is written, 
 wouldst thou with a straining of the voice utter 
 each letter ? What then if they grow angry, 
 wilt thou be angry too? Wilt thou not go on 
 with composure and number every letter ? Just 
 so then in this life also remember that every 
 duty is made up of certain parts. These it is 
 thy duty to observe, and without being dis- 
 turbed or showing anger towards those wb« 
 
i 82 
 
 tTbougbts. 
 
 [Book VI. 
 
 are angty with thee, to go on th}^ way and fin- 
 ish that which is set before thee. 
 
 27. How cruel it is not to allow men to strive 
 dfter the things which appear to them to be 
 suitable to their nature and profitable! And 
 yet in a manner thou dost not allow them to do 
 this, when thou art vexed because they do 
 wrong. For they are certainly moved towards 
 things because they suppose them to be suit- 
 able to their nature and profitable to them. 
 But it is not so. Teach them then, and show 
 them without being angry. 
 
 28. Death is a cessation of the impressions 
 through the senses, and of the pulling of the 
 strings which move the appetites, and of the 
 discursive movements of the thoughts, and of 
 the service to the flesh (ii. 12). 
 
 29. It is a shame for the soul to be first to 
 give way in this life, when thy body does not 
 give way. 
 
 30. Take care that thou art not made into a 
 Caesar, that thou art not dyed with this dye; 
 for such things happen. Keep thyself then 
 simple, good, pure, serious, free from affecta- 
 tion, a friend of justice, a worshipper of the 
 gods, kind, affectionate, strenuous in all proper 
 acts. Strive to continue to be such as philoso- 
 phy wished to make thee. Reverence the gods, 
 and help men. Short is life. There is only 
 one fruit of this terrene life — a pious disposi- 
 tion and social acts. Do everything as a dis- 
 ciple of Antoninus. Remember his constancy 
 
Book Ml] /Iftarcus Burelius Bntontnus. 
 
 183 
 
 in every act which was conformable to reason, 
 and his evenness in all things, and his piety, 
 and the serenity of his countenance, and his 
 sweetness, and his disregard of empty fame, 
 and his efforts to understand things; and how 
 he would never let anything pass without hav- 
 ing first most carefully examined it and clearly 
 understood it; and how he bore with those who 
 blamed him unjustly without blaming them in 
 return; how he did nothing in a hurry; and 
 how he listened not to calumnies, and how ex- 
 act an examiner of manners and actions he was; 
 and not given to reproach people, nor timid, 
 nor suspicious, nor a sophist; and with how 
 little he was satisfied, such as lodging, bed, 
 dress, food, servants; and how laborious and 
 patient; and how he was able on account of 
 his sparing diet to hold out to the evening, not 
 even requiring to relieve himself by any evacu- 
 ations except at the usual hour; and his firm- 
 ness and uniformity in his friendships; and how 
 he tolerated freedom of speech in those who 
 opposed his opinions; and the pleasure that he 
 had when any man showed him an3'thing beb 
 ter; and how religious he was without super- 
 stition. Imitate all this, that thou mayest 
 have as good a conscience, when thy last hour 
 comes, as he had (i. 16). 
 
 31. Return to thy sober senses and call thy- 
 self back; and when thou hast roused th^-self 
 from sleep and hast perceiv^ed that the}' were 
 only dreams which troubled thee, now in thy 
 
184 
 
 Cbougbte. 
 
 [Book VI. 
 
 waking hours look at these [the things about 
 thee] as thou didst look at those [the dreams]. 
 
 32. I consist of a little body and a soul. 
 Now to this little body all things are indiffer- 
 ent, for it is not able to perceive differences. 
 But to the understanding those things only are 
 indifferent which are not the works of its own 
 activity. But whatever things are the works 
 of its own activity, all these are in its power. 
 And of these however only those which are 
 done with reference to the present; for as to 
 the future and the past activities of the mind, 
 even these are for the present indifferent. 
 
 33. Neither the labor which the hand does 
 nor that of the foot is contrary to nature, so 
 long as the foot does the foot’s work and the 
 hand the hand’s. So then neither to a man as 
 a man is his labor contrary to nature, so long 
 as it does the things of a man. But if the 
 labor is not contrary to his nature, neither is it 
 an evil to him. 
 
 34. How many pleasures have been en- 
 joyed by robbers, patricides, tyrants. 
 
 35. Dost thou not see how the handicrafts- 
 men accommodate themselves up to a certain 
 point to those who are not skilled in their 
 craft — nevertheless they cling to the reason 
 [the principles] of their art, and do not endure 
 to depart from it? Is it not strange if the 
 architect and the physician shall have more re- 
 spect to the reason [the principles] of their 
 own arts than man to his own reason, which is 
 common to him and the gods ? 
 
Book YL] j®arcu0 Aurelius antoninus. 
 
 185 
 
 36. Asia, Europe, are corners of the uni- 
 verse; all the sea a drop in the universe; 
 Athos a little clod of the universe: all the 
 present time is a point in eternity. All things 
 are little, changeable, perishable. All things 
 come from thence, from that universal ruling 
 power, either directly proceeding or by way of 
 sequence. And accordingly the lion’s gaping 
 jaws, and that which is poisonous, and every 
 harmful thing, as a thorn, as mud, are after- 
 products of the grand and beautiful. Do not 
 then imagine that they are of another kind 
 from that which thou dost venerate, but form 
 a just opinion of the source of all (vii. 75). 
 
 37. He who has seen present things has 
 seen all, both everything which has taken 
 place from all eternity and everything which 
 will be for time without end; for all things are 
 of one kin and of one form. 
 
 38. Frequently consider the connection of all 
 things in the universe and their relation to one 
 another. For in a manner all things are im- 
 plicated with one another, and all in this way 
 are friendly to one another; for one thing 
 comes in order after another, and this is by 
 virtue of the + active movement and mutual 
 conspiration and the unity of the substance 
 (ix. i). 
 
 39. Adapt thyself to the things with which 
 thy lot has been cast: and the men among 
 whom thou hast received thy portion, love 
 them, but do it truly [sincerely]. 
 
G:boUgbt0. 
 
 [Book ?I. 
 
 1 86 
 
 40. Every instrument, tool, vessel, if it does 
 that for which it has been made, is well, and 
 yet he who made it is not there. But in the 
 things which are held together by nature there 
 is within, and there abides in them the power 
 which made them; wherefore the more is it fit 
 to reverence this power, and to think, that, if 
 thou dost live and act according to its will, 
 everything in thee is in conformity to intelli- 
 gence. And thus also in the universe the 
 things which belong to it are in conformity to 
 intelligence. 
 
 41. Whatever of the things which are not 
 within thy power thou shalt suppose to be 
 good for thee or evil, it must of necessity be 
 that, if such a bad thing befall thee, or the loss 
 of such a good thing, thou wilt not blame the 
 gods, and hate men too, those who are the cause 
 of the misfortune or the loss, or those who are 
 suspected of being likely to be the cause; and 
 indeed we do much injustice because we make 
 a difference between these things [because we 
 do not regard these things as indifferent 4 ].* 
 But if we judge only those things which are in 
 our power to be good or bad, there remains no 
 reason either for finding fault with God or 
 standing in a hostile attitude to man.f 
 
 * Gataker translates this "because we strive to get 
 these things,” comparing the use of diaifitpeadai in v. i, 
 and X. 27, and ix. 38, where it appears that his refer- 
 ence should be xi. 10. He may be right in his inter- 
 pretation, but I doubt. 
 
 t Cicero, De Natnra Deorum. iii. 32. 
 
Book VI.] flibarcus BurcHus Bntonlnus. 
 
 187 
 
 42. We are all working together to one end, 
 some with knowledge and design, and others 
 without knowing what they do; as men also 
 when they are asleep, of whom it is Heraclitus, 
 I think, who says that they are laborers and 
 co-operators in the things which take place in 
 the universe. But men co-operate after differ- 
 ent fashions: and even those co-operate abun 
 dantly, who find fault with what happens and 
 those who try to oppose it and to hinder it; for 
 the universe had need even of such men as 
 these. It remains then for thee to understand 
 among what kind of workmen thou placest thy- 
 self; for he who rules all things will certainly 
 make a right use of thee, and he will receive 
 thee among some part of the co-operators and 
 of those whose labors conduce to one end. 
 But be not thou such a part as the mean and 
 ridiculous verse in the play, which Chrysippus 
 speaks of.* 
 
 43. Does the sun undertake to do the work 
 of the rain, or Aesculapius the work of the 
 Fruit-bearer [the earth] ? And how is it with 
 respect to each of the stars — are they not differ- 
 ent and yet they work together to the same 
 end? 
 
 44. If the gods have determined about me 
 and about the things which must happen to 
 me, they have determined well, for it is not 
 easy even to imagine a deity without fore- 
 thought; and as to doing me harm, why should 
 
 * Plntarch, adversus Stoicos, c. 14. 
 
i88 
 
 ^Tbou0bt6. 
 
 [Book TL 
 
 they have any desire towards that ? for what 
 advantage wonld result to them from this or to 
 the whole, which is the special object of their 
 providence ? But if they have not determined 
 about me individually, they have certainly de- 
 termined about the whole at least, and the 
 things which happen by way of sequence in 
 this general arrangement I ought to accept 
 with pleasure and to be content with them. 
 But if they determine about nothing, — which 
 it is wicked to believe, or if we do believe it, 
 let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear by 
 them, nor do anything else which we do as if 
 the gods were present and lived with us, — but 
 if however the gods determine about none of 
 the things which concern us, I am able to de- 
 termine about myself, and I can inquire about 
 that which is useful; and that is useful to 
 every man which is conformable to his own 
 constitution and nature. But my nature is 
 rational and social; and my city and country, so 
 far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as 
 I am a man, it is the world. The things then 
 which are useful to these cities are alone use- 
 ful to me. 
 
 45. Whatever happens to every man, this is 
 for the interest of the universal: this might be 
 sufficient. But further thou wilt observe this 
 also as a general truth, if thou dost observe, 
 that whatever is profitable to any man is prof- 
 itable also to other men. But let the word 
 profitable be taken here in the common sense 
 
BookTi.] Marcus Sutelius Bntoninus. 189 
 
 as said of things of the middle kind [neither 
 good nor bad]. 
 
 46. As it happens to thee in the amphitheatre 
 and such places, that the continual sight of 
 the same things, and the uniformity, make the 
 spectacle wearisome, so it is in the whole of 
 life; for all things above, below, are the same 
 and from the same. How long then ? 
 
 47. Think continually that all kinds of men 
 and all kinds of pursuits and of all nations are 
 dead, so that thy thoughts come down even to 
 Philistion and Phoebus and Origaniou. Now 
 turn thy thoughts to the other kinds [of men]. 
 To that place then we must remove, where 
 there are so many great orators, and so many 
 noble philosophers, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, 
 Socrates; so many heroes of former days, and 
 so many generals after them, and tyrants; be- 
 sides these, Eudoxus, Hipparchus, Archimedes, 
 and other men of acute natural talents, great 
 minds, lovers of labor, versatile, confident, 
 mockers even of the perishable and ephemeral 
 life of man, as Menippus and such as are like 
 him. As to all these consider that they have 
 long been in the dust. What harm then is this 
 to them; and what to those whose names are 
 altogether unknown ? One thing here is worth 
 a great deal, to pass thy life in truth and just- 
 ice, with a benevolent disposition even to liars 
 and unjust men. 
 
 48. When thou wishest to delight thj^self, 
 think of the virtues of those who live with 
 
?Tbou0bt0. 
 
 [Book VI. 
 
 190 
 
 thee; for instance, the activity of one, and the 
 modesty of another, and the liberality of a 
 third, and some other good quality of a fourth. 
 For nothing delights so much as the examples 
 of the virtues, when they are exhibited in the 
 morals of those who live with us and present 
 themselves in abundance, as far as is possible. 
 Wherefore we must keep them before us. 
 
 49. Thou art not dissatisfied, I suppose, be- 
 cause thou weighest only so many litrae and 
 not three hundred. Be not dissatisfied then 
 that thou must live only so many years and 
 not more ; for as thou art satisfied with the 
 amount of substance which has been assigned 
 to thee, so be content with the time. 
 
 50. Tet us try to persuade them [men]. 
 But act even against their will, when the 
 principles of j ustice lead that way. If however 
 any man by using force stands in thy way, be- 
 take thyself to contentment and tranquillity, 
 and at the same time employ the hindrance 
 towards the exercise of some other virtue; and 
 remember that thy attempt was with a reser- 
 vation [conditionally], that thou didst not de- 
 sire to do impossibilities. What then didst 
 thou desire? — Some such effort as this. — But 
 thou attainest thy object, if the things to which 
 thou wast moved are [not] accomplished. + 
 
 51. He who loves fame considers another 
 man’s activity to be his own good; and he who 
 loves pleasure, his own sensations ; but he 
 who has understanding considers his own acts 
 to be his own good. 
 
Book VI.] ^ftarcu0 Sutelius antonlnus. 
 
 igi 
 
 52. It is in our power to have no opinion 
 about a thing, and not to be disturbed in our 
 soul ; for things themselves have no natural 
 power to form our j udgments. 
 
 53. Accustom thyself to attend carefull}" to 
 w^hat is said by another, and as much as it is 
 possible, be in the speaker’s mind. 
 
 54. That which is not good for the swarm, 
 neither is it good for the bee. 
 
 55. If sailors abused the helmsman, or the 
 sick the doctor, would they listen to anybody 
 else ? or how could the helmsman secure the 
 safety of those in the ship, or the doctor the 
 health of those whom he attends? 
 
 56. How many together with whom I came 
 into the world are already gone out of it. 
 
 57. To the jaundiced honey tastes bitter, 
 and to those bitten by mad dogs water causes 
 fear ; and to little children the ball is a fine 
 thing. Why then am I angrj’? Dost thou 
 think that a false opinion has less power than 
 the bile in the jaundiced or the poison in him 
 who is bitten by a mad dog? 
 
 58. No man will hinder thee from living ac- 
 cording to the reason of thy own nature : noth- 
 ing will happen to thee contrary to the reason 
 of the universal nature. 
 
 59. What kind of people are those whom 
 men wish to please, and for what objects, and 
 by what kind of acts? How soon will time 
 cover all things, and how many it has covered 
 already. 
 
192 
 
 ^boudbts. 
 
 [Book Vn. 
 
 VII. 
 
 W HAT is badness? It is that which thou 
 hast often seen. And on the occasion of 
 everything which happens keep this in mind, 
 that it is that which thou hast often seen. 
 Everywhere up and down thou wilt find the 
 same things, with which the old histories are 
 filled, those of the middle ages and those of 
 our own day ; with which cities and houses 
 are filled now. There is nothing new : all 
 things are both familiar and short-lived. 
 
 2. How can our principles become dead, un- 
 less the impressions [thoughts] which corre- 
 spond to them are extinguished ? But it is in 
 thy power continuously to fan these thoughts 
 into a flame. I can have that opinion about 
 anything which I ought to have. If I can, 
 why am I disturbed? The things which are 
 external to my mind have no relation at all to 
 my mind. — Eet this be the state of thy affects, 
 and thou standest erect. To recover thy life is 
 in thy power. Look at things again as thou 
 didst use to look at them ; for in this consists 
 the recovery of thy life. 
 
 3. The idle business of show, plays on the 
 stage, flocks of sheep, herds, exercises with 
 •spears, a bone cast to little dogs, a bit of bread 
 
Book m] /nbarcus aurellua Bntonlnus. 
 
 193 
 
 into fishponds, laborings of ants and burden- 
 carrying, runnings about of frightened little 
 mice, puppets pulled by strings — [all alike]. 
 It is thy duty then in the midst of such things 
 to show good humor and not a proud air; to 
 understand however that every man is worth 
 just so much as the things are worth about 
 which he busies himself. 
 
 4. In discourse thou must attend to what is 
 said, and in every movement thou must ob- 
 serve what is doing. And in the one thou 
 shouldst see immediatel)^ to what end it refers, 
 but in the other watch carefully what is the 
 thing signified. 
 
 5. Is my understanding sufiicient for this or 
 not ? If it is sufiicient, I use it for the work as 
 an instrument given by the universal nature. 
 But if it is not sufficient, then either I retire 
 from the work and give way to him who is 
 able to do it better, unless there be some reason 
 why I ought not to do so; or I do it as well as 
 I can, taking to help me the man who with the 
 aid of my ruling principle can do what is now 
 fit and useful for the general good. For what- 
 soever either by myself or with another I can 
 do, ought to be directed to this only, to that 
 which is useful and well suited to society. 
 
 6. How many after being celebrated by fame 
 have been given up to oblivion ; and how many 
 who have celebrated the fame of others have 
 long been dead. 
 
 7. Be not ashamed to be helped; for it is thy 
 
 13 
 
194 
 
 ^Tbougbts. 
 
 [Book VII. 
 
 business to do thy duty like a soldier in the 
 assault on a town. How then, if being lame 
 thou canst not mount up on the battlements 
 alone, but with the help of another it is pos- 
 sible ? 
 
 8. Let not future things disturb thee, for 
 thou wilt come to them, if it shall be necessary, 
 having with thee the same reason which now 
 thou usest for present things. 
 
 9. All things are implicated with one another, 
 and the bond is holy; and there is hardly any- 
 thing unconnected with any other thing. 
 For things have been co-ordinated, and they 
 combine to form the same universe [order]. 
 For there is one universe made up of all 
 things, and one god who pervades all things, 
 and one substance,* and one law, [one] com- 
 mon reason in all intelligent animals, and one 
 truth; if indeed there is also one perfection for 
 all animals which are of the same stock and 
 participate in the reason. 
 
 10. Everything material soon disappears in 
 the substance of the whole; and everything 
 formal [causal] is very soon taken back into 
 the universal reason; and the memory of every- 
 thing is very soon overwhelmed in time. 
 
 11. To the rational animal the same act »s 
 according to nature and according to reason. 
 
 12. Be thou erect, or be made erect (iii. 5). 
 
 13. Just as it is with the members in those 
 bodies which are united in one, so it is with 
 
 * “Oue substance,” p. 42, note i. 
 
BookYii,] /liiarcue BureHus Bntoninue. 
 
 195 
 
 rational beings which exist separate, for they 
 have been constituted for one co-operation. 
 And the perception of this will be more appar- 
 ent to thee if thou often sayest to thyself that 
 I am a member of the system of rational 
 
 beings. But if [using the letter r] thou sayest 
 that thou art a part [jiipog], thou dost not yet 
 love men from th}' heart ; beneficence does not 
 yet delight thee for its own sake ; * thou still 
 doest it barely as a thing of propriety, and not 
 yet as doing good to thyself. 
 
 14. Let there fall externally what will on 
 the parts which can feel the effects of this fall. 
 For those parts which have felt will complain, 
 if they choose. But I, unless I think that 
 what has happened is an evil, am not injured. 
 And it is in my power not to think so. 
 
 15. Whatever any one does or says, I must 
 be good ; just as if the gold, or the emerald, or 
 the purple, were always saying this. What- 
 ever any one does or says, I must be emerald 
 and keep my color. 
 
 16. The ruling faculty does not disturb it- 
 self ; I mean, does not frighten itself or cause 
 itself pain.-f But if any one else can frighten 
 or pain it, let him do so. For the faculty it- 
 self will not by its own opinion turn itself into 
 such wa5"S. Let the body itself take care, if it 
 can, that it suffer nothing, and let it speak, if 
 
 *I have used Gataker’s conjecture Kara?ir/KTCKog in- 
 stead of the common reading Kara?i. 7 /TrrcKoc : compare 
 iv. 20; ix. 42. 
 
196 
 
 ^bougbts. 
 
 [Book VIL 
 
 it suffers. But the soul itself, that which is 
 subject to fear, to pain, which has completely 
 the power of forming an opinion about these 
 things, will suffer nothing, for it will never 
 deviate + into such a judgment. The leading 
 principle in itself wants nothing, unless it 
 makes a want for itself ; and therefore it is 
 both free from perturbation and unimpeded, if 
 it does not disturb and impede itself. 
 
 17. Eudaemonia [happiness] is a good 
 daemon, or a good thing. What then art thou 
 doing here, O imagination ? Go away, I en- 
 treat thee by the gods, as thou didst come, for 
 I want thee not. But thou art come according 
 to thy old fashion. I am not angry with thee : 
 only go away. 
 
 18. Is any man afraid of change? Why, 
 what can take place without change ? What 
 then is more pleasing or more suitable to the 
 universal nature ? And canst thou take a bath 
 unless the wood undergoes a change? and 
 canst thou be nourished, unless the food un- 
 dergoes a change ? And can anything else 
 that is useful be accomplished without change? 
 Dost thou not see then that for thyself also to 
 change is just the same, and equally necessary 
 for the universal nature ? 
 
 19. Through the universal substance as 
 through a furious torrent all bodies are carried, 
 being by their nature united with and co-oper- 
 ating with the whole, as the parts of our body 
 with one another. How many a Chrysippus, 
 
Bookm] /iiiarcus BurcUus Zlntonfnus. 
 
 197 
 
 how many a Socrates, how many an Epictetus 
 has time already swallowed up ! And let the 
 same thought occur to thee with reference to 
 every man and thing (v. 23 ; vi. 15). 
 
 20. One thing only troubles me, lest I should 
 do something which the constitution of man 
 does not allow, or in the way which it doe^ 
 not allow, or what it does not allow now. 
 
 21. Near is thy forgetfulness of all things; 
 and near the forgetfulness of thee bj all. 
 
 22. It is peculiar to man to love even those 
 who do wrong. And this happens, if when 
 they do wrong it occurs to thee that they are 
 kinsmen, and that they do wrong through 
 ignorance and unintentionally, and that soon 
 both of you will die ; and above all, that the 
 wrong-doer has done thee no harm, for he has 
 not made th}" ruling faculty worse than it was 
 before. 
 
 23. The universal nature out of the universal 
 substance, as if it were wax, now moulds a 
 horse, and when it has broken this up, it uses 
 the material for a tree, then for a man, then for 
 something else ; and each of these things sub- 
 sists for a very short time. But it is no hard- 
 ship for the vessel to be broken up, just as 
 there was none in its being fastened together 
 (viii. 50). 
 
 24. A scowling look is altogether unnatural ; 
 when it is often assumed,* the result is that all 
 comeliness dies away, and at last is so com- 
 
 *This is corrupt. 
 
ITbougbts. 
 
 [Book VIL 
 
 198 
 
 pletely extinguished that it cannot be again 
 lighted up at all. Try to conclude from this 
 very fact that it is contrary to reason. For if 
 even the perception of doing wrong shall de- 
 part, what reason is there for living any 
 longer ? 
 
 25. Nature which governs the whole will 
 soon change all things thou seest, and out of 
 their substance will make other things, and 
 again other things from the substance of them, 
 in order that the world may be ever new (xii. 
 
 23)- 
 
 26. When a man has done thee any wrong, 
 immediately consider with what opinion about 
 good or evil he has done wrong. For when 
 thou hast seen this, thou wilt pity him, and 
 wilt neither wonder nor be angry. For either 
 thou thyself thinkest the same thing to be 
 good that he does, or another thing of the same 
 kind. It is thy duty then to pardon him. 
 But if thou dost not think such things to be 
 good or evil, thou wilt more readily be well 
 disposed to him who is in error. 
 
 27. Think not so much of what thou hast 
 not as of what thou hast : but of the things 
 which thou hast select the best, and then reflect 
 how eagerly they would have been .sought, if 
 thou hadst them not. At the same time, how- 
 ever, take care that thou dost not through be- 
 ing so pleased with them accustom thyself to 
 overvalue them, so as to be disturbed if ever 
 thou shouldst not have them. 
 
Book m] Marcus aurellus Antoninus. 
 
 199 
 
 28. Retire into thyself. The rational prin- 
 ciple which rules has this nature, that it is con- 
 tent with itself when it does what is just, and 
 so secures tranquillity. 
 
 29. Wipe out the imagination. Stop the 
 pulling of the strings. Confine thyself to the 
 present. Understand well what happens either 
 to thee or to another. Divide and distribute 
 every object into the causal [formal] and the 
 material. Think of thy last hour. Ret the 
 wrong which is done by a man stay there where 
 the wrong was done (viii. 29). 
 
 30. Direct thy attention to what is said. 
 Let thy understanding enter into the things 
 that are doing and the things which do them 
 (vii. 4). 
 
 31. Adorn thyself with simplicity and 
 modesty, and with indifference towards the 
 things which lie between virtue and vice. 
 Love riiankind. Follow God. The poet says 
 that law rules all — + And it is enough to re- 
 member that law rules all.+* 
 
 32. About death : whether it is a dispersion, 
 or a resolution into atoms, or annihilation, it is 
 either extinction or change. 
 
 33. About pain : the pain which is intoler- 
 able carries us off ; but that which lasts a long 
 time is tolerable; and the mind maintains its 
 own tranquillity by retiring into itself, and 
 the ruling faculty is not made worse. But the 
 
 * The end of this section is unintelligible. 
 
200 
 
 XTbouQbts. 
 
 [Book YU 
 
 parts which are harmed by pain, let them, if 
 thej^ can, give their opinion about it. 
 
 34. About fame : look at the minds [of 
 those who seek fame], observe what they are, 
 and what kind of things they avoid, and what 
 kind of things they pursue. And consider 
 that as the heaps of sand piled on one another 
 hide the former sands, so in life the events 
 which go before are soon covered by those 
 which come after. 
 
 35. From Plato :* The man who has an ele- 
 vated mind and takes a view of all time and 
 of all substance, dost thou suppose it possible 
 for him to think that human life is anything 
 great? It is not possible, he said. — Such a 
 man then will think that death also is no evil. 
 — Certainly not. 
 
 36. From Autisthenes : It is royal to do 
 good and to be abused. 
 
 37. It is a base thing for the countenance to 
 be obedient and to regulate and compose itself 
 as the mind commands, and for the mind not 
 to be regulated and composed by itself. 
 
 38. It is not right to vex ourselves at things. 
 For they care nought about it.f 
 
 39. To the immortal gods and us give joy. 
 
 40. Fife must be reaped like the ripe ears of 
 
 corn. 
 
 One man is born ; another dies.| 
 
 * Plato, Pol. vi. 486. 
 
 t From the Bellerophoii of Euripides. 
 
 t From the Hypsipyle of Euripides. Cicero (Tuscul. 
 
BookYiL] /Biarcue aurcHus Bntoninus. 
 
 201 
 
 41. If gods care not for me and my children, 
 There is a reason for it. 
 
 42. For the good is with me, and the just.* 
 
 43. No joining others in their wailing, no 
 
 violent emotion. 
 
 44. From Plato :f But I would make this 
 man a sufficient answer, which is this: Thou 
 sayest not well, if thou thinkest that a man 
 who is good for anything at all ought to com- 
 pute the hazard of life or death, and should 
 not rather look to this only in all that he does, 
 whether he is doing what is just or unjust, and 
 the works of a good or bad man. 
 
 45. fFor thus it is, men of Athens, in truth: 
 wherever a man has placed himself thinking it 
 the best place for him, or has been placed by a 
 commander, there in my opinion he ought to 
 stay and to abide the hazard, taking nothing 
 into the reckoning, either death or anything 
 else, before the baseness [of deserting his 
 post], 
 
 46. But, my good friend, reflect whether 
 that which is noble and good is not something 
 different from saving and being saved; for+ as 
 to a man living such or such a time, at least 
 one who is really a man, consider if this is not 
 
 iii. 25) has translated six lines from Euripides, and 
 among them are these two lines, — 
 
 “ Reddenda terrae est terra: turn vita omnibus 
 Metenda ut fruges; Sic jubet necessitas.” 
 
 * See Aristophanes, Acharnenses, v. 661. 
 
 f From the Apologia, c. 16. 
 
202 
 
 tTbougbts. 
 
 [Book Vn. 
 
 a thing to be dismissed from the thoughts 
 and there must be no love of life : but as to 
 these matters a man must intrust them to the 
 Deity and believe what the women say, that 
 no man can escape his destiny, the next in- 
 quiry being how he may best live the time that 
 he has to live.* 
 
 47. Dook round at the courses of the stars, 
 as if thou wert going along with them ; and 
 constantly consider the changes of the elements 
 into one another, for such thoughts purge 
 away the filth of the terrene life. 
 
 48. This is a fine saying of Plato :f That he 
 who is discoursing about men should look also 
 at earthly things as if he viewed them from 
 some higher place ; should look at them in 
 their assemblies, armies, agricultural labors, 
 marriages, treaties, births, deaths, noise of the 
 courts of justice, desert places, various nations 
 of barbarians, feasts, lamentations, markets, a 
 mixture of all things and an orderly combina- 
 tion of contraries. 
 
 49. Consider the past, — such great changes 
 of political supremacies; thou mayest foresee 
 also the things which will be. For they wdll 
 
 * Plato, Gorgias, c. 68 (512). In this passage the- 
 text of Antoninus has iarcov, which is perhaps right; 
 but there is a difficulty in the words fif/ -yap rovro p.ev, 
 TO ^fjv biTooovfifj xp^'^ov rdvyE wf a\rjdC>^ avdpa eareov eari, 
 ml oil, &c. The conjecture evureov for eareov does not 
 mend the matter. 
 
 t It is said that this is not in the extant writings of 
 Plato. 
 
Book VII.] Marcus :aurclius Bntoninus. 
 
 203 
 
 certainly be of like form, and it is not possible 
 that they should deviate from the order of the 
 things which take place now; accordinglj^ to 
 have contemplated human life for forty years 
 is the same as to have contemplated it for ten 
 thousand years. For what more wilt thou 
 see? 
 
 50. That which has grown from the earth to 
 
 the earth, 
 
 But that which has sprung from heavenly 
 seed. 
 
 Back to the heavenly realms returns.* 
 
 This is either a dissolution of the mutual in- 
 volution of the atoms, or a similar dispersion 
 of the unsentient elements. 
 
 51. With food and drinks and cunning magic 
 
 arts 
 
 Turning the channel’s course to ’scape 
 from death. t 
 
 The breeze which heaven has'sent 
 
 We must endure, and toil without com- 
 plaining. 
 
 52. Another may be more expert in casting 
 his opponent; but he is not more social, nor 
 more modest, nor better disciplined to meet all 
 that happens, nor more considerate with re- 
 spect to the faults of his neighbors. 
 
 53. Where any work can be done conform- 
 ably to the reason which is common to gods 
 
 * From the Chrysippus of Euripides. 
 
 t The first two lines are from the Supplices of 
 Euripides, v. iiio. 
 
204 
 
 ITbougbte. 
 
 [Bookm 
 
 and men, there we have nothing to fear; for 
 where we are able to get profit by means of the 
 activity which is successful and proceeds ac- 
 cording to our constitution, there no harm is 
 to be suspected. 
 
 54. Everywhere and at all times it is in thy 
 power piously to acquiesce in thy present con- 
 dition, and to behave justly to those who are 
 about thee, and to exert thy skill upon thy 
 present thoughts, that nothing shall steal into 
 them without being well examined. 
 
 55. Do not look around thee to discover 
 other men’s ruling principles, but look straight 
 to this, to what nature leads thee, both the uni- 
 versal nature through the things which happen 
 to thee, and thy own nature through the acts 
 which must be done by thee. But every being 
 ought to do that which is according to its con- 
 stitution; and all other things have been con- 
 stituted for the sake of rational beings, just as 
 among irrational things the inferior for the 
 sake of the superior, but the rational for the 
 sake of one another. 
 
 The prime principle then in man’s constitu- 
 tion is the social. And the second is not to 
 yield to the persuasions of the body, — for it is 
 the peculiar office of the rational and intelligent 
 motion to circumscribe itself, and never to be 
 overpowered either by the motion of the senses 
 or of the appetites, for both are animal; but the 
 intelligent motion claims superiority, and does 
 not permit itself to be overpowered by the 
 
Bookvn.] Marcus Hurelfus Sntoninus. 
 
 205 
 
 others. And with good reason, for it is formed 
 by natnre to use all of them. The third thing 
 in the rational constitution is freedom from 
 error and from deception. L,et then the ruling 
 principle holding fast to these things go 
 straight on, and it has what is its own. 
 
 56. Consider thyself to be dead, and to have 
 completed thy life up to the present time ; and 
 live according to nature the remainder which 
 is allowed thee. 
 
 57. Love that only which happens to thee 
 and is spun with the thread of th}^ destiny. 
 For what is more suitable ? 
 
 58. In everything which happens keep be- 
 fore thy eyes those to whom the same things 
 happened, and how they were vexed, and 
 treated them as strange things, and found 
 fault with them : and now where are they ? 
 Nowhere. Wlty then dost thou too choose to 
 act in the same way ? and wh}^ dost thou not 
 leave these agitations which are foreign to 
 nature to those who cause them and those who 
 are moved by them; and wh>^ art thou not al- 
 together intent upon the right way of making 
 use of the things which happen to thee ? For 
 then thou wilt use them well, and they will be 
 a material for thee [to work on]. Onl}" attend 
 to thyself, and resolve to be a good man in every 
 act which thou doest : and remember . . .* 
 
 * This section is obscure, and the conclusion is so 
 corrupt that it is impossible to give any probable 
 meaning to it. It is better to leave it as it is than to 
 patch it up, as some critics and translators have done 
 
2o6 
 
 tIbougbt6. 
 
 [Book Vn. 
 
 59. Look within. Within is the fountain of 
 good, and it will ever bubble up, if thou wilt 
 ever dig. 
 
 60. The body ought to be compact, and to 
 show no irregularity either in motion or atti- 
 tude. For what the mind shows in the face by 
 maintaining in it the expression of intelligence 
 and propriety, that ought to be required also 
 in the whole body. But all these things should 
 be observed without affectation. 
 
 61. The art of life is more like the wrestler’s 
 art than the dancer’s, in respect of this, that it 
 should stand ready and firm to meet onsets 
 which are sudden and unexpected. 
 
 62. Constantly observe who those are whose 
 approbation thou wishest to have, and what 
 ruling principles they possess. For then thou 
 wilt neither blame those who offend involun- 
 tarily, nor wilt thou want their approbation, 
 if thou lookest to the sources of their opinions 
 and appetites. 
 
 63. Every soul, the philosopher says, is in- 
 voluntarily deprived of truth; consequently in 
 the same way it is deprived of justice and tem- 
 perance and benevolence and everything of the 
 kind. It is most necessary to bear this con- 
 stantly in mind, for thus thou wilt be more 
 gentle towards all. 
 
 64. In every pain let this thought be pres- 
 ent, that there is no dishonor in it, nor does it 
 make the governing intelligence worse, for it 
 does not damage the intelligence either so far 
 
Eookvii.] /Hbatcus BureUus Hntoninus. 
 
 207 
 
 as the intelligence is rational* or so far as it is 
 social. Indeed in the case of most pains let 
 this remark of Epicurus aid thee, that pain 
 is neither intolerable nor everlasting, if thou 
 bearest in mind that it has its limits, and if 
 thou addest nothing to it in imagination: and 
 remember this too, that we do not perceive 
 that many things which are disagreeable to us 
 are the same as pain, such as excessive drow- 
 siness, and the being scorched by heat, and 
 the having no appetite. When then thou art 
 discontented about any of these things, say to 
 thyself that thou art yielding to pain. 
 
 65. Take care not to feel towards the inhu- 
 man as they feel towards men.f 
 
 66. How do we know if Telauges was not 
 superior in character to Socrates ? For it is 
 not enough that Socrates died a more noble 
 death, and disputed more skilfully with the 
 sophists, and passed the night in the cold with 
 more endurance, and that when he was bid to 
 arrest LeonJ of Salamis, he considered it more 
 noble to refuse, and that he walked in a swag- 
 
 * The text has v’kiKtj, which it has been proposed to 
 alter to loytKy, and this change is necessary. We shall 
 then have in this section loyiKrj and koivuvikt/ associated, 
 as we have in s. 68 XoyiKfj and and in s. 72. 
 
 fl have followed Gataker’s conjecture ol a-rra.vdpoTroi 
 instead of the MSS. reading oi avdpunoi. 
 
 j; Leon of Salamis. See Plato, Epist. 7; Apolog. c. 
 20; Epictetus, iv. i, 160; iv. 7, 30. 
 
2o8 
 
 tlbou0bt6. 
 
 [Book Vn. 
 
 gering way in the streets* — though as to this 
 fact one may have great doubts if it was true. 
 But we ought to inquire what kind of a soul it 
 was that Socrates possessed, and if he was able 
 to be content with being just towards men and 
 pious towards the gods, neither idly vexed on 
 account of men’s villainy, nor yet making him- 
 self a slave to any man’s ignorance, nor receiv- 
 ing as strange anything that fell to his share 
 out of the universal, nor enduring it as in- 
 tolerable, nor allowing his understanding to 
 sympathize with the affects of the miserable 
 flesh. 
 
 67. Nature has not so mingled+ [the intelli- 
 gence] with the composition of the body, as 
 not to have allowed thee the power of circum- 
 scribing thyself and of bringing under subjec- 
 tion to thyself all that is thy own ; for it is 
 very possible to be a divine man and to be 
 recognized as such by no one. Always bear 
 this in mind ; and another thing too, that very 
 little indeed is necessary for living a happy life. 
 And because thou hast despaired of becoming 
 a dialectician and skilled in the knowledge of 
 nature, do not for this reason renounce the 
 hope of being both free and modest, and social 
 and obedient to God. 
 
 68. It is in thy power to live free from all 
 compulsion in the greatest tranquillity of mind, 
 
 * Aristophau. Nub. 362. ort j 3 pevdvei r’ iv ralciv- 
 b 6 olg ml rt) bfdaXjui) napa^aXksi. 
 
Book YIL] ynbarcus BurcHus Bntonlnus. 
 
 209 
 
 even if all the world cry out against thee as 
 much as they choose, and even if wild beasts 
 tear in pieces the members of this kneaded 
 matter which has grown around thee. For 
 what hinders the mind in the midst of all this 
 from maintaining itself in tranquillity and in a 
 just judgment of all surrounding things and 
 in a ready use of the objects which are pre- 
 sented to it, so that the judgment may say to 
 the thing which falls under its observation ; 
 This thou art in substance [reality], though in 
 men’s opinion thou mayest appear to be of a 
 different kind ; and the use shall say to that 
 which falls under the hand : Thou art the thing 
 that I was seeking ; for to me that which pre- 
 sents itself is alwa5^s a material for virtue both 
 rational and political, and in a word, for the 
 exercise of art, which belongs to man or God. 
 For everything which happens has a relation- 
 ship either to God or man, and is neither new 
 nor difficult to handle, but usual and apt mat- 
 ter to work on. 
 
 69. The perfection of moral character con- 
 sists in this, in passing every day as the last, 
 and in being neither violently excited nor 
 torpid nor playing the hypocrite. 
 
 70. The gods who are immortal are not 
 vexed because during so long a time they 
 must tolerate continually men such as they are 
 and so many of them bad ; and besides this, 
 they also take care of them in all ways. But 
 thou, who art destined to end so soon, art thou 
 
 14 
 
210 
 
 ^Tbougbte. 
 
 [Book VU. 
 
 wearied of enduring the bad, and this too when 
 thou art one of them ? 
 
 71. It is a ridiculous thing for a man not to 
 fly from his own badness, which is indeed pos- 
 sible, but to fly from other men’s badness, 
 which is impossible. 
 
 72. Whatever the rational and political 
 [social] faculty finds to be neither intelligent 
 nor social, it properly j udges to be inferior to 
 itself. 
 
 73. When thou hast done a good act and 
 another has received it, why dost thou still 
 look for a third thing besides these, as fools do, 
 either to have the reputation of having done a 
 good act or to obtain a return ? 
 
 74. No man is tired of receiving what is 
 u.seful. But it is useful to act according to 
 nature. Do not then be tired of receiving 
 what is useful by doing it to others. 
 
 75. The nature of the All moved to make 
 the universe. But now either everything that 
 takes place comes by way of consequence or 
 [continuity] ; or even the chief things towards 
 which the ruling power of the universe directs 
 its own movement are governed by no rational 
 principle. If this is remembered, it will make 
 thee more tranquil in many things (vi. 44 ; 
 ix. 28).* 
 
 * It is not easy to understand this section. It has 
 been suggested that there is some error in ^ aXdyiara, 
 &c. Some of the translators have made nothing of 
 the passage, and they have somewhat perverted the 
 
Book VII.] flbarcus Burelius Bntonfnus. 
 
 21 1 
 
 words. The first proposition is, that the universe was 
 made by some sufficient power. A beginning of the 
 universe is assumed, and a power which framed an 
 order. The next question is. How are things pro- 
 duced now? Or, in other words, by what power do 
 forms appear in continuous succession ? The answer, 
 according to Antoninus, may be this: It is by virtue 
 of the original constitution of things that all change 
 and succession have been effected and are effected. 
 And this is intelligible in a sense, if we admit that the 
 universe is always one and the same, a continuity of 
 identity; as much one and the same as man is one 
 and the same — which he believes himself to be, though 
 he also believes, and cannot help believing, that both 
 in his body and in his thoughts there is change and 
 succession. There is no real discontinuity then in 
 the universe; and if we say that there was an order 
 framed in the beginning, and that the things which 
 are now produced are a consequence of a previous ar- 
 rangement, we speak of things as we are compelled to 
 view them, as forming a series of succession, just as 
 we speak of the changes in our own bodies and the 
 sequence of our own thoughts. But as there are no 
 intervals, not even intervals infinitely small, between 
 any two supposed states of any one thing, so there are 
 no intervals, not even infinitely small, between what 
 we call one thing and any other thing which we speak 
 of as immediately preceding or following it. What 
 we call time is an idea derived from our notion of a 
 succession of things or events, an idea which is a part 
 of our constitution, but not an idea which we can sup- 
 pose to belong to an infinite intelligence and power. 
 The conclusion then is certain that the present and 
 the past, the production of present things and the sup- 
 posed original order, out of which we say that present 
 things now come, are one, and the present productive 
 power and the so-called past arrangement are only 
 different names for one thing. I suppose theu that 
 Antoninus wrote here as people sometimes talk now. 
 
212 
 
 ^Cbouflbte. 
 
 [BonkTIL 
 
 and that his real meaning is not exactly expressed by 
 his words. There are certainly other passages from 
 which I think that we may collect that he had notions 
 of production something like what I have expressed. 
 
 We now come to the alternate: “or even the chief 
 things . . . principle.” I do not exactly know what 
 he means by ra Kvpiurara, “the chief,” or “the most 
 excellent,” or whatever it is. But as he speaks else- 
 where of inferior and superior things, and of the infe- 
 rior being for the use of the superior, and of rational 
 beings being the highest, he may here mean rational 
 beings. He also in this alternative assumes a govern- 
 ing power of the universe, and that it acts by directing 
 its power towards these chief objects, or making its spe- 
 cial, proper motion towards them. And here he uses 
 the noun {oppr/) “movement,” which contains the 
 same notion as the verb {appy/ae) “moved,” which he 
 used at the beginning of the paragraph, when he was 
 speaking of the making of the universe. If we do not 
 accept the first hypothesis, he says, we must take the 
 conclusion of the second, that the “chief things, to- 
 wards which the ruling power of the universe directs 
 its own movement are governed by no rational prin- 
 ciple.” The meaning then is, if there is a meaning 
 in it, that though there is a governing power which 
 strives to give effect to its efforts, we must conclude 
 that there is no rational direction of anything, if the 
 power which first made the universe does not in some 
 way govern it still. Besides, if we assume that any- 
 thing is now produced or now exists without the ac- 
 tion of the supreme intelligence, and yet that this 
 intelligence makes an effort to act, we obtain a con- 
 clusion which cannot be reconciled with the nature 
 of a supreme power, whose existence Antoninus al- 
 ways assumes. The tranquillity that a man may gain 
 from these reflections must result from his rejecting 
 the second hypothesis and accepting the first — what- 
 ever may be the exact sense in which the emperor un- 
 derstood the first. Or, as he says elsewhere, if there 
 
Book VII.] fliarcus Burellus Bntoninus. 
 
 213 
 
 is no Providence which governs the world, man has 
 at least the power of governing himself according to 
 the constitution of his nature; and so he may be tran- 
 quil if he does the best that he can. 
 
 If there is no error in the passage, it is worth the 
 labor to discover the writer’s exact meaning — for I 
 think that he had a meaning, though people may not 
 agree what it was. (Compare ix. 28.) If I have 
 rightly explained the emperor’s meaning in this and 
 other passages, he has touched the solution of a great 
 question. 
 
214 
 
 Cbouflbta. 
 
 [Book VIII. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 T his reflection also tends to the removal of 
 the desire of emptj^ fame, that it is no 
 longer in thy power to have lived the whole of 
 thy life, or at least thy life from thy youth up- 
 wards, like a philosopher; but both to many 
 others and to thyself it is plain that thou art 
 far from philosophy. Thou hast fallen into 
 disorder then, so that it is no longer easy for 
 thee to get the reputation of a philosopher; and 
 thy plan of life also opposes it. If then thou 
 hast truly seen where the matter lies, throw 
 away the thought. How thou shalt seem [to 
 others], and be content if thou shalt live the 
 rest of thy life in such wise as thy nature wills. 
 Observe then what it wills, and let nothing 
 else distract thee; for thou hast had experience 
 of many wanderings without having found hap- 
 piness anywhere, — not in syllogisms, nor in 
 wealth, nor in reputation, nor in enjoyment, 
 nor anywhere. Where is it then? In doing 
 what man’s nature requires. How then shall 
 a man do this? If he has principles from 
 which come his affects and his acts. What 
 principles? Those which relate to good and 
 bad: the belief that there is nothing good for 
 man which does not make him just, temperate, 
 
BookVni.] flibarcus aurcHue Bntoninus. 
 
 215 
 
 manly, free; and that there is nothing bad 
 which does not do the contrary to what has 
 been mentioned. 
 
 2. On the occasion of every act ask th5^self, 
 How is this with respect to me ? Shall I repent 
 of it ? A little time and I am dead, and all is 
 gone. What more do I seek, if what I am 
 now doing is the work of an intelligent living 
 being, and a social being, and one who is under 
 the same law with God ? 
 
 3. Alexander and Caius* and Pompeius, 
 what are they in comparison with Diogenes 
 and Heraclitus and Socrates ? For they were 
 acquainted with things, and their causes 
 [forms], and their matter, and the ruling prin- 
 ciples of these men were the same [or conform- 
 able to their pursuits]. But as to the others, 
 how many things had they to care for, and to 
 how many things were they slaves ! 
 
 4. [Consider] that men will do the same 
 things nevertheless, even though thou shouldst 
 burst. 
 
 5. This is the chief thing : Be not per- 
 turbed, for all things are according to the 
 nature of the universal ; and in a little time 
 thou wilt be nobody and nowhere, like Had- 
 rianus and Augustus. In the next place, hav- 
 ing fixed thy eyes steadily on thy business,, 
 look at it, and at the same time remembering 
 that it is thy duty to be a good man, and what 
 
 *Caius is C. Julius Caesar, the dictator; and Pompe- 
 ius is Cn. Pompeius, named Magnus. 
 
2i6 
 
 C:bc»ugbt0. 
 
 [Book VIII. 
 
 man’s nature demands, do that without turn- 
 ing aside ; and speak as it seems to thee most 
 just, only let it be with a good disposition and 
 with modesty and without hypocrisy. 
 
 6. The nature of the universal has this work 
 to do, — to remove to that place the things 
 which are in this, to change them, to take, 
 them away hence, and to carry them there. 
 All things are change, yet we need not fear 
 anything new. All things are familiar [to us] ; 
 but the distribution of them still remains the 
 same. 
 
 7. Every nature is contented with itself 
 when it goes on its way well ; and a rational 
 nature goes on its way well when in its 
 thoughts it assents to nothing false or uncer- 
 tain, and when it directs its movements to 
 social acts only, and when it confines its desires 
 and aversions to the things which are in its 
 power, and when it is satisfied with everything 
 that is assigned to it by the common nature. 
 For of this common nature every particular 
 nature is a part, as the nature of the leaf is a 
 part of the nature of the plant ; except that in 
 the plant the nature of the leaf is part of a 
 nature which has not perception or reason, 
 and is subject to be impeded ; but the nature 
 of man is part of a nature which is not subject 
 to impediments, and is intelligent and just, 
 since it gives to everything in equal portions 
 and according to its worth, times, substance, 
 cause [form], activity, and incident. But ex- 
 
Book ¥lll,] Marcus Burelius Bntoninus. 
 
 217 
 
 amine, not to discover that any one thing 
 compared with any other single thing is equal 
 in all respects, but by taking all the parts to- 
 gether of one thing and comparing them with 
 all the parts together of another. 
 
 8. Thou hast not leisure [or ability] to read. 
 But thou hast leisure [or ability] to check arro- 
 gance: thou hast leisure to be superior to pleas- 
 ure and pain: thou hast leisure to be superior 
 to love of fame, and not to be vexed at stupid 
 and ungrateful people, nay even to care for 
 them. 
 
 9. Let no man any longer hear thee finding 
 fault with the court life or with thy own (v. 
 16). 
 
 10. Repentance is a kind of self-reproof for 
 having neglected something useful; but that 
 which is good must be something useful, and 
 the perfect good man should look after it. But 
 no such man would ever repent of having re- 
 fused any sensual pleasure. Pleasure then is 
 neither good nor useful. 
 
 11. This thing, what is it in itself, in its own 
 constitution ? What is its substance and mater- 
 ial? And what its causal nature [or form]? 
 And what is it doing in the world? And how 
 long does it subsist? 
 
 12. When thou risest from sleep with reluct- 
 ance, remember that it is according to thy con- 
 stitution and according to human nature to per- 
 form social acts, but sleeping is common also 
 to irrational animals. But that which is ac 
 
2i8 
 
 ^Tbouflbta. 
 
 [Book Vin. 
 
 cording to each individual’s nature is also more 
 peculiarly its own, and more suitable to its 
 nature, and indeed also more agreeable (v. i). 
 
 13. Constantly, and, if it be possible, on the 
 occasion of every impression on the soul, apply 
 to it the principles of Physic, of Ethic, and of 
 Dialectic. 
 
 14. Whatever man thou meetest with, im- 
 mediately say to thyself: What opinions has 
 this man about good and bad ? For if with re- ' 
 spect to pleasure and pain and the causes of 
 each, and with respect to fame and ignominy, 
 death and life, he has such and such opinions, 
 it will seem nothing wonderful or strange ta 
 me if he does such and such things; and I shall 
 bear in mind that he is compelled to do so.* 
 
 15. Remember that as it is a shame to be 
 surprised if the fig-tree produces figs, so it is to 
 be surprised if the world produces such and 
 such things of which it is productive; and for 
 the physician and the helmsman it is a shame 
 to be surprised if a man has a fever, or if the 
 wind is unfavorable. 
 
 16. Remember that to change thy opinion 
 and to follow him who corrects thy error is as 
 consistent with freedom as it is to persist in thy 
 error. For it is thy own, the activity which is 
 exerted according to thy own movement and 
 judgment, and indeed according to thy own 
 understanding too. 
 
 * Antoninus v. 16. Thucydides, iii. 10; tv yap tu 
 6ia7CkaaacfVTi rij^ yv(vpriq Kal al Siacftopal to>v epyivv KadiaTavrai. 
 
Book ¥III.] Marcus Hurelius antoninuB. 
 
 219 
 
 17. If a thing is in thy own power, why dost 
 thou do it? but if it is in the power of another, 
 whom dost thou blame, — the atoms [chance] or 
 the gods? Both are foolish. Thou must 
 blame nobody. For if thou canst, correct [that 
 which is the cause]; but if thou canst not do 
 this, correct at least the thing itself; but if thou 
 canst not do even this, of what use is it to thee 
 
 ^ to find fault ? for nothing should be done with* 
 * out a purpose. 
 
 18. That which has died falls not out of the 
 universe. If it stays here, it also changes here, 
 and is dissolved into its proper parts, which are 
 elements of the universe and of thyself. And 
 these too change, and thej^ murmur not. 
 
 19. Everything exists for some end, — a horse, 
 a vine. Why dost thou wonder? Even the 
 sun will say, I am for some purpose, and the 
 rest of the gods will say the same. For what 
 purpose then art thou, — to enjoy pleasure?’ 
 See if common sense allows this. 
 
 20. Nature has had regard in everything no 
 less to the end than to the beginning and the 
 continuance, just like the man who throws up 
 a ball. What good is it then for the ball to be 
 thrown up, or harm for it to come down, or 
 even to have fallen ? and what good is it to the 
 bubble while it holds together, or what harm 
 when it is burst ? The same may be said of a 
 light also. 
 
 21. Turn it [the body] inside out, and see 
 what kind of thing it is; and when it has 
 
220 
 
 ^Cbouflbts. 
 
 [Book Vin. 
 
 grown old, what kind of thing it becomes, and 
 when it is diseased. 
 
 Short lived are both the praiser and the 
 praised, and the rememberer and the remem- 
 bered: and all this in a nook of this part of the 
 world; and not even here do all agree, no, not 
 any one with himself : and the whole earth too 
 is a point. 
 
 22. Attend to the matter which is before ^ 
 thee, whether it is an opinion or an act or a 
 word. 
 
 Thou sufferest this justly : for thou choosest 
 rather to become good to-morrow than to be 
 good to-day. 
 
 23. Am I doing anything? I do it with 
 reference to the good of mankind. Does any- 
 thing happen to me ? I receive it and refer it 
 to the gods, and the source of all things, from 
 which all that happens is derived. 
 
 24. Such as bathing appears to thee, — oil, 
 sweat, dirt, filthy water, all things disgusting, 
 — so is every part of life and everything. 
 
 25. Ducilla saw Verus die, and then Ducilla 
 ■died. Secunda saw Maximus die, and then 
 Secunda died. Epitynchanus saw Diotimus 
 die, and then Epitynchanus died. Antoninus 
 saw Faustina die, and then Antoninus died. 
 Such is everything. Celer saw Hadrianus die, 
 and then Celer died. And those sharp-witted 
 men, either seers or men inflated with pride, 
 where are they, — for instance the sharp-witted 
 men, Charax and Demetrius the Platonist, and 
 
BookTiii.] Marcus Burelius Hntoninue. 
 
 221 
 
 Eudaemon, and any one else like them ? All 
 ephemeral, dead long ago. Some indeed have 
 not been remembered even for a short time, 
 and others have become the heroes of fables, 
 and again others have disappeared even from 
 fables. Remember this then, that this little 
 compound, thyself, must either be dissolved, or 
 thy poor breath must be extinguished, or be 
 removed and placed elsewhere. 
 
 26. It is satisfaction to a man to do the 
 proper works of a man. Now it is a proper 
 work of a man to be benevolent to his own kind, 
 to despise the movements of the senses, to form 
 a just judgment of plausible appearances, and 
 to take a survey of the nature of the universe 
 and of the things which happen in it. 
 
 27. There are three relations [between thee 
 and other things] : the one to the bod}^* which 
 surrounds thee ; the second to the divine cause 
 from which all things come to all ; and the 
 third to those who live with thee. 
 
 28. Pain is either an evil to the bod^’ — then 
 let the body say what it thinks of it — or to the 
 soul ; but it is in the power of the soul to main- 
 tain its own serenity and tranquillity, and not 
 to think that pain is an evil. For ever}^ judg- 
 ment and movement and desire and aversion is 
 within, and no evil ascends so high. 
 
 * The text has ai-iov, which in Antoninus means 
 “form," “formal.” Accordingly Schultz recom- 
 mends either Valkenaer’s emendation ay-yeiov, “body,” 
 or Corais’ aauariop. Compare xii. 13; x. 38. 
 
222 
 
 ^Ebougbts. 
 
 [Book YIII. 
 
 29. Wipe out thy imaginations by often 
 saying to thyself : Now it is in my power to let 
 no badness be in this soul, nor desire, nor any 
 perturbation at all ; but looking at all things I 
 see what is their nature, and I use each accord- 
 ing to its value. — Remember this power which 
 thou hast from nature. 
 
 30. Speak both in the senate and to every 
 man, whoever he may be, appropriately, not 
 with any affectation : use plain discourse. 
 
 31. Augustus’ court, wife, daughter, de- 
 scendants, ancestors, sister, Agrippa, kinsmen, 
 intimates, friends; Areius,* Maecenas, physi- 
 cians, and sacrificing priests, — the whole court 
 is dead. Then turn to the rest, not consider- 
 ing the death of a single man [but of a whole 
 race], as of the Pompeii ; and that which is in- 
 scribed on the tombs, — The last of his race. 
 Then consider what trouble those before them 
 have had that they might leave a successor ; 
 and then, that of necessity some one must be 
 the last. Again, here consider the death of a 
 whole race. 
 
 32. It is thy duty to order thy life well in 
 every single act ; and if every act does its duty 
 as far as is possible, be content ; and no one is 
 able to hinder thee so that each act shall not 
 do its duty. — But something external will 
 stand in the way. Nothing will stand in 
 
 *Areius {"Apeiog) was a philosopher, who was inti- 
 mate with Augustus; Suetou. Augustus, c. 89; Plu- 
 tarch, Antoninus, 80; Dion Cassius, 51, c. 16. 
 
Book VIII.] jfiRarcus Burelius Bntoninue. 
 
 223 
 
 the way of thy acting justly and soberly 
 and considerately. — But perhaps some other 
 active power will be hindered. Well, but 
 by acquiescing in the hindrance and by be- 
 ing content to transfer thy efforts to that which 
 is allowed, another opportunity of action is im- 
 mediately put before thee in place of that 
 which was hindered, and one which will adapt 
 itself to this ordering of which w'e are speak- 
 ing. 
 
 33. Receive [wealth or prosperity] without 
 arrogance ; and be ready to let it go. 
 
 34. If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or 
 a foot, or a head, lying anywhere apart from 
 the rest of the body, such does a man make 
 himself, as far as he can, who is not content 
 with what happens, and separates himself 
 from others, or does anything unsocial. Sup- 
 pose that thou hast detached thyself from the 
 natural unity, — for thou wast made by nature 
 a part, but now thou hast cut thyself off,- — }'et 
 here there is this beautiful provision, that it is 
 in thy power again to unite thyself. God has 
 allowed this to no other part, after it has been 
 separated and cut asunder, to come together 
 again. But consider the kindness by which 
 he has distinguished man, for he has put it in 
 his power not to be separated at all from the 
 universal; and when he has been separated, 
 he has allowed him to return and to be united 
 and to resume his place as a part. 
 
 35. As the nature of the universal has given 
 
224 
 
 ^Tbougbtg. 
 
 [Book VIIL 
 
 to every rational being all the other powers 
 that it has, + so we have received from it this 
 power also. For as the universal nature con- 
 verts and fixes in its predestined place every- 
 thing which stands in the way and opposes it, 
 and makes such things a part of itself, so also 
 the rational animal is able to make every 
 hindrance its own material, and ^o use it for 
 such purposes as it maj" have designed.* 
 
 36. Do not disturb thyself by thinking of 
 the whole of thy life. Let not th}^ thoughts at 
 once embrace all the various troubles which 
 thou mayest expect to befall thee : but on 
 every occasion ask thyself. What is there in 
 this which is intolerable and past bearing ? for 
 thou wilt be ashamed to confess. In the next 
 place remember that neither the future nor the 
 past pains thee, but only the present. But 
 this is reduced to a very little, if thou only cir- 
 cumscribest it, and chidest thy mind if it is 
 unable to hold out against even this. 
 
 37. Does Panthea or Pergamus now sit by 
 the tomb of Verus?t Does Chaurias or Dioti- 
 mus sit by the tomb of Hadrianus? That 
 would be ridiculous. Well, suppose they did 
 
 *The text is corrupt at the beginuiiig of the .para- 
 graph, hut the meaning will appear if the second 
 y^oyucuv is changed into oAwr: though this change alone 
 will not establish the grammatical completeness of 
 the text. 
 
 t“Verus” is a conjecture of Saumaise, and per- 
 haps the true reading. 
 
Book VIII.] /iftarcua :aurcliu6 Antoninus. 
 
 225 
 
 sit there, would the dead be conscious of it ? 
 and if the dead were conscious, would they be 
 pleased ? and if thc}^ were pleased, would that 
 make them immortal ? Was it not in the order 
 of destiny that these persons too should first 
 become old women and old men and then die ? 
 What then would those do after these were 
 dead ? All this is foul smell and blood in a 
 bag. 
 
 38. If thou canst see sharp, look and judge 
 wisely, 4 - says the philosopher. 
 
 39. In the constitution of the rational animal 
 I see no virtue which is opposed to justice; but 
 I see a virtue which is opposed to love of 
 pleasure, and that is temperance. 
 
 40. If thou takest away thy opinion about 
 that which appears to give thee pain, thou th^'- 
 self standest in perfect securitj'. — -Who is this 
 self? — The reason. — But I am not reason. — Be 
 it so. Let then the reason itself not trouble 
 itself. But if any other part of thee suffers, 
 let it have its own opinion about itself (vii. 16). 
 
 41. Hindrance to the perceptions of sense is 
 an evil to the animal nature. Hindrance to 
 the movements [desires] is equall}" an evil to 
 the animal nature. And something else also 
 is equally an impediment and an evil to the 
 constitution of plants. So then that which is 
 a hindrance to the intelligence is an evil to the 
 intelligent nature. Apply all these things 
 then to thyself. Does pain or sensuous pleas- 
 ure affect thee ? The senses will look to that* 
 
 15 
 
226 
 
 ^Tbousbts. 
 
 [Book YIII. 
 
 Has any obstacle opposed thee in thy efforts 
 towards an object ? If indeed thou wast mak- 
 ing this effort absolutely [unconditionally, or 
 without any reservation], certainly this obstacle 
 is an evil to thee considered as a rational ani- 
 mal. But if thou takest [into consideration] 
 the usual course of things, thou hast not yet 
 been injured nor even impeded. The things 
 however which are proper to the understanding 
 no other man is u.sed to impede, for neither 
 fire, nor iron, nor tyrant, nor abuse, touches it 
 in any way. When it has been made a sphere, 
 it continues a sphere (xi. 12). 
 
 42. It is not fit that I should give myself 
 pain, for I have never intentionally given pain 
 even to another. 
 
 43. Different things delight different people ; 
 but it is my delight to keep the ruling faculty 
 sound without turning away either from any 
 man or from any of the things which happen 
 to men, but looking at and receiving all with 
 welcome eyes and using everything according 
 to its value. 
 
 44. See that thou secure this present time to 
 thyself ; for those who rather pursue posthum- 
 ous fame do not consider that the men of after 
 time will be exactly such as these whom they 
 cannot bear now ; and both are mortal. And 
 what is it in any way to thee if these men of 
 after time utter this or that sound, or have this 
 or that opinion about thee ? 
 
 45 . Take me and cast me where thou wilt ; 
 
Book VIII.] Marcus 2lurcUu6 Bntoninue. 
 
 227 
 
 for there I shall keep my divine part tranquil, 
 that is, content, if it can feel and act comform- 
 ably to its proper constitution. Is this [change 
 of place] sufficient reason why my soul should 
 be unhappy and worse than it was, depressed, 
 expanded, shrinking, affrighted ? and what 
 wilt thou find which -is .sufficient reason for 
 this 
 
 46. Nothing can happen to any man which 
 is not a human accident, nor to an ox which is 
 not according to the nature of an ox, nor to a 
 vine which is not according to the nature of a 
 vine, nor to a stone which is not proper to a 
 stone. If then there happens to each thing 
 both what is usual and natural, why shouldst 
 thou complain ? For the common nature 
 brings nothing which may not be borne by 
 thee. 
 
 47. If thou art pained by any external 
 thing, it is not this thing that disturbs thee, 
 but thy own judgment about it. And it is in thy 
 power to wipe out this judgment now. But if 
 anything in thy own disposition gives thee 
 pain, who hinders thee from correcting thy 
 opinion ? And even if thou art pained be- 
 cause thou art not doing some particular thing 
 which seems to thee to be right, why dost 
 thou not rather act than complain ? — But some 
 
 * bpeyonEvr) in this passage seems to have a passive 
 sense. It is difficult to find an apt expression for it 
 and some of the other M'ords. A comparison with xi. 
 12, will help to explain the meaning. 
 
228 
 
 ^Ebouflbts. 
 
 [BookYnL 
 
 insuperable obstacle is in the way ? — Do not be 
 grieved then, for the cause of its not being 
 done depends not on thee. — But it is not worth 
 while to live, if this cannot be done.^ — Take 
 thy departure then from life contentedly, just 
 as he dies who is in full activity, and well 
 pleased too with the things which are ob- 
 stacles. 
 
 48. Remember that the ruling faculty is in- 
 vincible, when self-collected it is satisfied with 
 itself, if it does nothing which it does not 
 choose to do, even if it resist from mere obsti- 
 nacy. What then will it be when it forms a 
 judgment about anything aided by reason and 
 deliberately ? Therefore the mind which is 
 free from passions is a citadel, for man has no- 
 thing more secure to which he can fly for 
 refuge and for the future be inexpugnable. 
 He then who has not seen this is an ignorant 
 man ; but he who has seen it and does not fly 
 to this refuge is unhappy. 
 
 49. Say nothing more to thj^self than what 
 the first appearances report. Suppose that it 
 has been reported to thee that a certain person 
 speaks ill of thee. This has been reported ; 
 but that thou hast been injured, that has not 
 been reported. I see that my child is sick. I 
 do see ; but that he is in danger, I do not see. 
 Thus then always abide by the first appear- 
 ances, and add nothing thyself from within, 
 and then nothing happens to thee. Or rather 
 add something like a man who knows every- 
 thing that happens in the -world. 
 
Book Till.] /iftarcue Burellus Bntontnus. 
 
 229 
 
 50. A cucumber is bitter — Throw it away. — 
 There are briers in the road — Turn aside from 
 them. — This is enough. Do not add, And 
 wTy were such things made in the world ? 
 For thou wilt be ridiculed by a man who is 
 acquainted with nature, as thou wouldst be 
 ridiculed by a carpenter and shoemaker if thou 
 didst find fault because thou seest in their 
 workshop shavings and cuttings from the 
 things which they make. And yet they have 
 places into which they can throw these shav- 
 ings and cuttings, and the universal nature has 
 no external space ; but the wondrous part of 
 her art is that though she has circumscribed 
 herself, everything within her which appears 
 to decay and to grow old and to be useless she 
 changes into herself, and again makes other 
 new things from these ver}' same, so that she 
 requires neither substance from without nor 
 wants a place into which she may cast that 
 which decays. She is content then with her 
 own space, and her own matter, and her own 
 art. 
 
 51. Neither in thj^ actions be sluggish nor 
 in thy conversation without method, nor wan- 
 dering in thy thoughts, nor let there be in thy 
 soul inward contention nor external effusion, 
 nor in life be so busy as to have no leisure. 
 
 Suppose that men kill thee, cut thee in 
 pieces, curse thee. What then can these things 
 do to prevent thy mind from remaining pure, 
 wise, sober, ju.st? For instance, if a man 
 
230 
 
 ^Tbougbte. 
 
 [Book m 
 
 should stand by a limpid pure spring, and 
 curse it, the spring never ceases sending up 
 potable water ; and if he should cast clay into 
 it or filth, it will speedily disperse them and 
 wash them out, and will not be at all polluted. 
 How then shalt thou possess a perpetual fount- 
 ain [and not a mere well]? By forming + thy- 
 self hourly to freedom conjoined with content- 
 ment, simplicity, and modest}’. 
 
 52. He who does not know what the world 
 is, does not know where he is. And he who 
 does not know for what purpose the world 
 exists, does uot know who he is, nor what the 
 world is. But he who has failed in any one 
 of these things could not even say for what 
 purpose he exists himself. What then dost 
 thou think of him who [avoids or] seeks the 
 praise of those who applaud, of men who know 
 not either where they are or who they are ? 
 
 53. Dost thou wish to be praised by a man 
 who curses himself thrice every hour ? wouldst 
 thou wish to please a man who does not please 
 himself? Does a man please himself who re- 
 pents of nearly everything that he does? 
 
 54. No longer let thy breathing only act in 
 concert with the air which surrounds thee, but 
 let thy intelligence also now be in harmony 
 with the intelligence which embraces all 
 things. For the intelligent power is no less 
 diffused in all parts and pen^ades all things for 
 him who is willing to draw it to him than the 
 aerial power for him who is able to respire it. 
 
Book VIII.] /iftarcus aurclius :antomnu0. 
 
 231 
 
 55. Generally, wickedness does no harm at 
 all to the universe ; and particularly the wick- 
 edness [of one man] does no harm to another. 
 It is only harmful to him who has it in his 
 power to be released from it as soon as he shall 
 choose. 
 
 56. To m}^ own free will the free v/ill of my 
 neighbor is just as indifferent as his poot 
 breath and flesh. For though we are made es- 
 pecially for the sake of one another, still the 
 ruling power of each of us has its own office, 
 for otherwise my neighbor’s wickedness would 
 be my harm, which God has not willed, in 
 order that my unhappiness may not depend on 
 another. 
 
 57. The sun appears to be poured down, and 
 in all directions indeed it is diffused, j^et it is 
 not effused. For this diffusion is extension : 
 Accordingly its rays are called Extensions 
 [ami-Ef] because they are extended [d-o rov 
 eKTdveadai^.^ But one may judge what kind of a 
 thing a ra}^ is, if he looks at the sun’s light 
 passing through a narrow opening into a dark- 
 ened room, for it is extended in a right line, 
 and as it were is divided when it meets with 
 any solid body which stands in the way and 
 intercepts the air beyond ; but there the light 
 remains fixed and does not glide or fall off. 
 Such then ought to be the outpouring and dif- 
 fusion of the understanding, and it should in 
 no way be an effusion, but an extension, and 
 
 * A piece of bad et}'mology. 
 
232 
 
 ?Ebougbt0. 
 
 [Book YIIL 
 
 it should make no violent or impetuous col- 
 lision with the obstacles which are in its way ; 
 nor yet fall down, but be fixed, and enlighten 
 that which receives it. For a body will deprive 
 itself of the illumination, if it does not admit it. 
 
 58. He who fears death either fears the loss 
 of sensation or a different kind of sensation. 
 But if thou shalt have no sensation, neither 
 wilt thou feel any harm ; and if thou shalt 
 acquire another kind of sensation, thou wfilt be 
 a different kind of living being and thou wilt 
 not cease to live. 
 
 59. Men exist for the sake of one another. 
 Teach them then, or bear with them. 
 
 60. In one way an arrow moves, in another 
 way the mind. The mind indeed, both when 
 it exercises caution and when it is employed 
 about inquiry, moves straight onward not the 
 less, and to its object. 
 
 61. Enter into every man’s ruling faculty; 
 and also let every other man enter into thine.* 
 
 * Compare Epictetus, iii. 9, 12. 
 
Book IX.] fliarcus Burellus Bntomnus. 
 
 233 
 
 IX. 
 
 H e who acts unjustly acts impiously. For 
 since the universal nature has made ra- 
 tional animals for the sake of one another, to 
 help one another according to their deserts, 
 but in no way to injure one another, he who 
 transgresses her will is clearly guilty of impi- 
 ety towards the highest divinity. And he too 
 who lies is guilty of impiety to the same divin- 
 ity; for the universal nature is the nature of 
 things that are; and things that are have a re- 
 lation to all things that come into existence.* 
 
 * “ As there is not any action or natural event, which 
 we are acquainted with, so single and unconnected as 
 not to have a respect to some other actions and events, 
 so possibly each of them, when it has not an immedi- 
 ate, may yet have a remote, natural relation to other 
 actions and events, much beyond the compass of this 
 present world. ” Again; “ Things seemingly the most 
 insignificant imaginable are perpetually observ^ed to 
 be necessary conditions to other things of the greatest 
 importance, so that any one thing whatever may, for 
 aught we know to the contrary, be a necessary condi- 
 tion to any other.” — Butler’s Analogy, Chap. 7. See 
 all the chapter. Some critics take rd vndpxovTa in this 
 passage of Antoninus to be the same as rd ovra : but if 
 that were so he might have said 7rpd? oXkrfAa instead of 
 rrpdf rd vndpxovTa. Perhaps the meaning of Trpdf rd 
 i'-apxovTa may be “to all prior things.” If so, the 
 translation is still correct. See vi. 38. 
 
234 
 
 ^Tbougbts. 
 
 [Book IX. 
 
 And further, this universal nature is named 
 truth, and is the prime cause of all things that 
 are true. He then who lies intentionally is 
 guilty of impiety, inasmuch as he acts unjustly 
 by deceiving; and he also who lies uninten- 
 tionally, inasmuch as he is at variance with the 
 universal nature, and inasmuch as he disturbs 
 the order by fighting against the nature of the 
 world; for he fights against it, who is moved 
 of himself to that which is contrary to truth, 
 for he had received powers from nature through 
 the neglect of which he is not able now to dis- 
 tinguish falsehood from truth. And indeed he 
 who pursues pleasure as good, and avoids pain 
 as evil, is guilty of impiety. For of necessity 
 such a man must often find fault with the uni- 
 versal nature, alleging that it assigns things to 
 the bad and the good contrary to their deserts, 
 because frequently the bad are in the enjoy- 
 ment of pleasure and possess the things which 
 procure pleasure, but the good have pain for 
 their .share and the things which cause pain. 
 And further, he who is afraid of pain will 
 sometimes also be afraid of some of the things 
 which will happen in the world, and even this 
 is impiety. And he who pursues pleasure will 
 not abstain from injustice, and this is plainly 
 impiety. Now with respect to the things 
 towards which the universal nature is equally 
 affected — for it would not have made both , un- 
 less it was equally affected towards both — 
 towards these they who wish to follow nature 
 
Book IX.] flftarcus Surellus antonfnus. 
 
 235 
 
 should be of the same mind with it, and equally 
 affected. With respect to pain, then, and 
 pleasure, or death and life, or honor and dis- 
 honor, which the universal nature employs 
 equally, whoever is not equall5^ affected is 
 manifestly acting impiously. And I sa}" that 
 the universal nature employ's them equally, 
 instead of saying that they happen alike to 
 those who are produced in continuous series 
 and to those who come after them by virtue of 
 a certain original movement of Providence, 
 according to which it moved from a certain 
 beginning to this ordering of things, having 
 conceived certain principles of the things which 
 were to be, and having determined powers pro- 
 ductive of beings and of changes and of such 
 like successions (vii. 75). 
 
 2. It would be a man’s happiest lot to depart 
 from mankind without having had any taste 
 of lying and hypocrisy and luxur}- and pride. 
 However, to breathe out one’s life when a man 
 has had enough of these things is the next best 
 voyage, as the saying is. Hast thou deter- 
 mined to abide with vice, and hast not exper- 
 ience yet induced thee to fly from this pesti- 
 lence ? For the destruction of the understand- 
 ing is a pestilence, much more, indeed, than 
 any such corruption and change of this atmos- 
 phere which surrounds us. For this corruption 
 is a pestilence of animals so far as they are 
 animals ; but the other is a pestilence of men 
 so far as they are men. 
 
236 
 
 c:bougbts. 
 
 [Book IX. 
 
 3. Do not despise death, but be well content 
 with it, since this too is one of those things 
 which nature wills. For such as it is to be 
 young and to grow old, and to increase and 
 to reach maturity, and to have teeth and beard 
 and gray hairs, and to beget and to be preg- 
 nant and to bring forth, and all the other 
 natural operations which the seasons of thy 
 life bring, such also is dissolution. This, then, 
 is consistent with the character of a reflecting 
 man — to be neither careless nor impatient nor 
 contemptuous with respect to death, but to 
 wait for it as one of the operations of nature. 
 As thou now waitest for the time when the 
 child shall come out of thy wife’s womb, so be 
 ready for the time when thy soul shall fall out 
 of this envelope.* But if thou requirest also a 
 vulgar kind of comfort which shall reach thy 
 heart, thou wilt be made best reconciled to 
 death by observing the objects from which 
 thou art going to be removed, and the morals 
 of those with whom thy soul will no longer be 
 mingled. For it is no way right to be offended 
 with men, but it is thy duty to care for them 
 and to bear with them gently; and yet to re- 
 member that thy departure will not be from 
 men who have the same principles as thyself. 
 For this is the only thing, if there be any, 
 which could draw us the contrary way and at- 
 tach us to life, — to be permitted to live with 
 those who have the same principles as our- 
 * Note I of the Philosophy, p. 76. 
 
Book IX.] /liiarcus 2lurcliu5 :antoninu6. 
 
 237 
 
 selves. But now thou seest how great is the 
 trouble arising from the discordance of those 
 who live together, so that thou niayst say, 
 Come quick, O death, lest perchance I, too, 
 should forget myself 
 
 4. He who does wrong does wrong against 
 himself He who acts unjustly acts unjustly to 
 himself because he makes himself bad. 
 
 5. He often acts unjustly who does not do a 
 certain thing; not only he who does a certain 
 thing. 
 
 6. Thy present opinion founded on under- 
 standing, and thy present conduct directed to 
 social good, and thy present disposition of con- 
 tentment with everything which happens-f- — 
 that is enough. 
 
 7. Wipe out imagination; check desire: ex- 
 tinguish appetite: keep the ruling faculty in its 
 own power. 
 
 8. Among the animals which have not reason 
 one life is distributed; but among reasonable 
 animals one intelligent soul is distributed: just 
 as there is one earth of all things which are of 
 an earthly nature, and we see by one light, and 
 breathe one air, all of us that have the faculty 
 of vision and all that have life. 
 
 9. All things which participate in anything 
 which is common to them all, mor^e towards 
 that which is of the same kind with themselves. 
 Everything which is earthy turns towards the 
 earth, evei^dhing which is liquid flows to- 
 gether, and everything which is of an aerial 
 
238 
 
 ^bougbtB. 
 
 [Book IX. 
 
 kind does the same, so that they require some- 
 thing to keep them asunder, and the applica- 
 tion of force. Fire indeed moves upwards on 
 account of the elemental fire, but it is so ready 
 to be kindled together with all the fire which 
 is here, that even every substance which is 
 somewhat dry is easily ignited, because there 
 is less mingled with it of that which is a hin- 
 drance to ignition. Accordingly, then, every- 
 thing also which participates in the common 
 intelligent nature moves in like manner to- 
 wards that w'hich is of the same kind with 
 itself, or moves even more. For so much as it 
 is superior in comparison with all other things, 
 in the same degree also is it more ready to min- 
 gle with and to be fused with that which is 
 akin to it. Accordingly among animals devoid 
 of reason we find swarms of bees, and herds of 
 cattle, and the nurture of young birds, and in 
 a manner, loves; for even in animals there are 
 souls, and that power which brings them to- 
 gether is seen to exert itself in a superior de- 
 gree, and in such a way as never has been 
 observed in plants nor in stones nor in trees. 
 But in rational animals there are political com- 
 munities and friendships, and families and 
 meetings of people; and in wars, treaties, and 
 armistices. But in the things which are still 
 superior, even though they are separated from 
 one another, unity in a manner exists, as in the 
 stars. Thus the ascent to the higher degree is 
 able to produce a sympathy even in things 
 
Book II.] Marcus :aureliu0 Antoninus. 
 
 239 
 
 which are separated. See then, what now 
 takes place; for only intelligent animals have 
 now forgotten this mutual desire and inclina- 
 tion, and in them alone the property of flowing 
 together is not seen. But still, though men 
 strive to avoid [this union], thej’ are caught 
 and held by it, for their nature is too strong for 
 them; and thou wilt see what I say, if thou 
 only obsercest. Sooner, then, will one find 
 anything earth}" which comes in contact with 
 no earthy thing, than a man altogether sepa- 
 rated from other men. 
 
 10. Both man and God and the universe pro- 
 duce fruit ; at the proper seasons each produces 
 it. But and if usage has especially fixed these 
 terms to the vine and like things, this is noth- 
 ing. Reason produces fruit both for all and for 
 itself, and there are produced from it other 
 things of the same kind as reason itself 
 
 11. If thou art able, correct by teaching 
 those who do wrong ; but if thou canst not, re- 
 member that indulgence is given to thee for 
 this purpose. And the gods, too, are indulgent 
 to such persons ; and for some purposes they 
 even help them to get health, wealth, reputa- 
 tion; so kind they are. And it is in thy power 
 also; or say, who hinders thee? 
 
 12. Labor hot as one who is wretched, nor 
 yet as one who would be pitied or admired ; 
 but direct thy will to one thing only — to put 
 thyself in motion and to check thyself as the 
 social reason requires. 
 
240 
 
 ITbouflbts. 
 
 [Book IX. 
 
 13. To-day I have got out of all trouble, or 
 rather I have cast out all trouble, for it was not 
 outside, but within and in my opinions. 
 
 14. All things are the same, familiar in ex- 
 perience, and ephemeral in time, and worthless 
 in the matter. Everything now is just as it 
 was in the time of those whom we have buried. 
 
 15. Things stand outside of us, themselves 
 by themselves, neither knowing aught of them- 
 selves, nor expre.ssing any judgment. What 
 is it, then, which does judge about them ? 
 The ruling faculty. 
 
 16. Not in passivity but in activity lie the 
 evil and the good of the rational social animal, 
 just as his virtue and his vice lie not in pas- 
 sivity but in activity.* 
 
 17. For the stone which has been thrown up 
 it is no evil to come down, nor indeed any good 
 to have been carried up (viii. 20). 
 
 18. Penetrate inwards into men’s leading 
 principles, and thou wilt see what judges thou 
 art afraid of, and what kind of judges they are 
 of themselves. 
 
 19. All things are changing : and thou thy- 
 self art in continuous mutation and in a man- 
 ner in continuous destruction, and the whole 
 universe too. 
 
 20. It is thy duty to leave another man’s 
 wrongful act there where it is (vii. 29; ix. 38). 
 
 21. Termination of activity, cessation from 
 
 * Virtutis omnis laus in actione consistit. — Cicero, 
 De Off., I 6. 
 
Book IX.] ^liarcus Bureltus Bntoninug. 
 
 241 
 
 movement and opinion, and in a sense their 
 death, is no evil. Turn thy thoughts now to 
 the consideration of thy life, thy life as a child, 
 as a youth, thy manhood, thy old age, for in 
 these also every change was a death. Is this 
 anything to fear? Turn thy thoughts now to 
 thy life under thy grandfather, then to thy life 
 under thy mother, then to th}^ life under thy 
 father ; and as thou findest many other differ- 
 ences and changes and terminations, ask thy- 
 self, Is this anything to fear? In like manner, 
 then, neither are the termination and cessation 
 and change of thy whole life a thing to be 
 afraid of. 
 
 22. Hasten [to examine] thy own ruling 
 faculty and that of the universe and that of thy 
 neighbor : thy own, that thou ma5'-st make it 
 just ; and that of the universe, that thou mayst 
 remember of what thou art a part; and that of 
 thy neighbor, that thou mayst know whether 
 he has acted ignorantly or with knowledge, 
 and thou mayst also consider that his ruling 
 faculty is akin to thine. 
 
 23. As thou thyself art a component part of 
 a social system, so let every act of thine be a 
 component part of social life. Whatever act 
 of thine then has no reference either immedi- 
 ately or remotely to a social end, this tears 
 asunder thy life, and does not allow it to be 
 one, and it is of the nature of a mutiny, just as 
 when in a popular assembly a man acting by 
 himself stands apart from the general agreement. 
 
 16 
 
242 
 
 ^Tbougbte, 
 
 [Book IL 
 
 24. Quarrels of little children and their 
 sports, and poor spirits carrying about dead 
 bodies [such is everything]; and so what is 
 exhibited in the representation of the mansions 
 of the dead * strikes our eyes more clearly. 
 
 25. Examine into the quality of the form of 
 an object, and detach it altogether from its 
 material part, and then contemplate it; then 
 determine the time, the longest which a thing 
 of this peculiar form is naturally made to en- 
 dure. 
 
 26. Thou hast endured infinite troubles 
 through not being contented with thy ruling 
 faculty when it does the things which it is con- 
 stituted by nature to do. But enough -b [of 
 this]. 
 
 27. When another blames thee or hates thee, 
 or when men say about thee anything injurious, 
 approach their poor souls, penetrate within, 
 and see what kind of men they are. Thou 
 wilt discover that there is no reason to take 
 any trouble that these men may have this or 
 that opinion about thee. However, thou must 
 be well disposed towards them, for by nature 
 they are friends. And the gods too aid them 
 in all ways, by dreams, by signs, towards the 
 attainment of those things on which they set 
 a value. + 
 
 * -6 rfjq Ne/cw'af may be, as Gataker conjectures, a 
 dramatic representation of the state of the dead. 
 Schultz supposes that it may be also a reference to the 
 'SeKv'ia of the Odyssey (lib. xi. ). 
 
Book IX.] .®atcu6 2lutelfus antonfnus. 
 
 243 
 
 28. The periodic movements of the universe 
 are the same, up and down from age to age. 
 And either the universal intelligence puts it- 
 self in motion for every separate effect, and if 
 this is so, be thou content with that which is 
 the result of its activity; or it puts itself in 
 motion once, and everything else comes by 
 way of sequence* in a manner; or indivisible 
 elements are the origin of all things. — In a 
 word, if there is a god, all is well; and if 
 chance rules, do not thou also be governed by 
 it (vi. 44; yii. 75). 
 
 Soon will the earth cover us all: then the 
 earth, too, will change, and the things also 
 which result from change will continue to 
 change forever, and these again forever. For 
 if a man reflects on the changes and transfor- 
 mations which follow one another like wave 
 after wave and their rapidity, he will despise 
 everything which is perishable (xii. 21). 
 
 29. The universal cause is like a winter 
 torrent: it carries everything along with it. 
 But how worthless are all these poor people 
 who are engaged in matters political, and, as 
 they suppose, are playing the philosopher ! 
 All drivellers. Well then, man: do what na- 
 ture now requires. Set thyself in motion, if it 
 is in thy power, and do not look about thee to 
 see if any one will observe it; nor yet expect 
 
 * The words which immediately follow /car’ iTzano- 
 TMvdrjaLv are corrupt. But the meaning is hardly 
 doubtful. (Compare vii. 75.) 
 
244 
 
 ^Tbouflbte. 
 
 [Book IX, 
 
 Plato’s Republic:* but be content if the small- 
 est thing goes on well, and consider such an 
 event to be no small matter. For who can 
 change men’s opinions ? and without a change 
 of opinions what else is there than the slavery 
 of men who groan while they pretend to obey ? 
 Come now and tell me of Alexander and 
 Philippus and Demetrius of Phalerum. They 
 themselves shall judge whether they discovered 
 what the common nature required, and trained 
 themselves accordingly. But if they acted like 
 tragedy heroes, no one has condemned me to 
 imitate them. Simple and modest is the work 
 of philosophy. Draw me not aside to insolence 
 and pride. 
 
 30. Look down from above on the countless 
 herds of men and their countless solemnities, 
 and the infinitely varied voyagings in storms 
 and calms, and the differences among those 
 who are born, who live together, and die. 
 And consider, too, the life lived by others in 
 olden time, and the life of those who will live 
 after thee, and the life now lived among bar- 
 barous nations, and how many know not even 
 thy name, and how many will soon forget it, 
 and how they who perhaps now are prais- 
 ing thee will very soon blame thee, and that 
 neither a posthumous name is of any value, 
 nor reputation, nor anything else. 
 
 * Those who wish to know what Plato’s Republic is 
 may now study it in the accurate translation of Davies 
 and Vaughan. 
 
Book IX.] flfcarcus autclius Bntoninus. 
 
 245 
 
 31. Let there be freedom from perturbations 
 with respect to the things which come from the 
 external cause; and let there be justice in the 
 things done by virtue of the internal cause, 
 that is, let there be movement and action ter- 
 minating in this, in social acts, for this is ac- 
 cording to thy nature. 
 
 32. Thou canst remove out of the way many 
 useless things among those which disturb thee, 
 for they lie entirely in thy opinion; and thou 
 wilt then gain for thyself ample space by com- 
 prehending the whole universe in thy mind, 
 and by contemplating the eternity of time, and 
 observing the rapid change of every several 
 thing, how short is the time from birth to dis- 
 solution, and the illimitable time before birth 
 as well as the equally boundless time after dis- 
 solution ! 
 
 33. All that thou seest will quickly perish, 
 and those who have been spectators of its dis- 
 solution will very soon perish too. And he 
 who dies at the extremest old age will be 
 brought into the same condition with him who 
 died prematurely. 
 
 34. What are these men’s leading principles, 
 and about what kind of things are they busy, 
 and for what kind of reasons do they love and 
 honor? Imagine that thou seest their pool 
 souls laid bare. When they think that they 
 do harm by their blame or good by their praise, 
 what an idea ! 
 
 35. Loss is nothing else than change. But 
 
246 
 
 ^Cbouflbts. 
 
 [Book IX. 
 
 the universal nature delights iu change, and in 
 obedience to her all things are now done well, 
 and from eternity have been in like form, and 
 will be such to time without end. What, then, 
 dost thou say,- -that all things have been and 
 all things always will be bad, and that no power 
 has ever been found in so many gods to rectify 
 these things, but the world has been condemned 
 to be bound in never ceasing evil (iv. 45, vii. 
 18)? 
 
 36. The rottenness of the matter which is 
 the foundation of everything ! water, dust, 
 bones, filth: or again, marble rocks, the callos- 
 ities of the earth; and gold and silver, the sed- 
 iments; and garments, only bits of hair; and 
 purple dye, blood; and everything else is of 
 the same kind. And that which is of the na- 
 ture of breath is also another thing of the same 
 kind, changing from this to that. 
 
 37. Enough of this wretched life and mur- 
 muring and apish tricks. Why art thou dis- 
 turbed? What is there new in this? What 
 unsettles thee ? Is it the form of the thing ? 
 Look at it. Or is it the matter ? Look at it. 
 But besides these there is nothing. Towards 
 the gods then, now become at last more simple 
 and better. It is the same whether we exam- 
 ine these things for a hundred years or three. 
 
 38. If a man has done wrong the harm is his 
 own. But perhaps he has not done wrong. 
 
 39. Either all things proceed from one intel- 
 ligent source and come together as in one body. 
 
Book IX.] ^Barcue SureUus Sntonlnus. 
 
 247 
 
 and the part ought not to find fault with M'hat 
 is done for the benefit of the whole ; or there 
 are only atoms, and nothing else than mixture 
 and dispersion. Why, then, art thou disturbed ? 
 Say to the ruling faculty. Art thou dead, art 
 thou corrupted, art thou playing the hypocrite, 
 art thou become a beast, dost thou herd and 
 feed with the rest ?* 
 
 40. Either the gods have no power or they 
 have power. If, then, the}’ have no power, 
 why dost thou pray to them ? But if the}’ have 
 power, why dost thou not pray for them to give 
 thee the faculty of not fearing any of the things 
 which thou fearest, or of not desiring any of the 
 things which thou desirest, or not being 
 pained at anything, rather than pray that any 
 of these things should not happen or hap- 
 pen ? for certainly if they can co-operate with 
 men, they can co-operate for these purposes. 
 But perhaps thou wilt say the gods have placed 
 them in thy power. Well, then, is it not bet- 
 ter to use what is in thy power like a free man 
 than to desire in a slavish and abject way what 
 is not in thy power ? And who has told thee 
 that the gods do not aid us, even in the things 
 which are in our power? Begin, then, to pray 
 for such things, and thou wilt see. One man 
 
 * There is some corruption at the end of this section, 
 but I think that the translation expresses the em- 
 peror’s meaning. Whether intelligence rules all 
 things or chance rules, a man must not be disturbed. 
 He must use the power that he has and be tranquil. 
 
248 
 
 ^Tbouflbts. 
 
 [Book IX. 
 
 prays thus: How shall I be able to lie with that 
 woman ? Do thou pray thus: How shall I not 
 desire to lie with her? Another prays thus: 
 How shall I be released from this ? Pray 
 thou : How shall I not desire to be released ? 
 Another thus: How shall I not lose my little 
 son ? Thou thus: How shall I not be afraid to 
 lose him ? In fine, turn thy prayers this way, 
 and see what comes. 
 
 41. Epicurus says. In my sickness my con- 
 versation was not about my bodily sufferings, 
 nor, says he, did I talk on such subjects to 
 those who visited me; but I continued to dis- 
 course on the nature of things as before, keep- 
 ing to this main point, how the mind, while 
 participating in such movements as go on in 
 the poor fiesh, shall be free from perturbations 
 and maintain its proper good. Nor did I, he 
 says, give the physicians an opportunity of put- 
 ting on solemn looks, as if they were doing 
 something great, but my life went on well and 
 happily. Do, then, the same that he did both 
 in sickness, if thou art sick, and in any other 
 circumstances; for never to desert philosophy 
 in any events that may befall us, nor to hold 
 trifling talks either with an ignorant man or 
 with one unacquainted with nature, is a prin- 
 ciple of all schools of philosophy; but to be 
 intent only on that which thou art now doing 
 and on the instrument by which thou doest it. 
 
 42. When thou art offended with any man’s 
 shameless conduct, immediately ask thyself. 
 
Book IX.] .flBarcue Sureliue Bntonfnue. 
 
 249 
 
 Is it possible, then, that shameless men should 
 not be in the world ? It is not possible. Do 
 not, then, require what is impossible. For 
 this man also is one of those shameless men 
 who must of necessity be in the world. Let 
 the same considerations be present to thy mind 
 in the case of the knave, and the faithless man, 
 and of every man who does wrong in any way. 
 For at the same time that thou dost remind 
 thyself that it is impossible that such kind of 
 men should not exist, thou wilt become more 
 kindly disposed towards every one individually. 
 It is useful to perceive this, too, immediately 
 when the occasion arises, what virtue nature 
 has given to man to oppose to every wrongful 
 act. For she has given to man, as an antidote 
 against the stupid man, mildness, and against 
 another kind of man some other power. And 
 in all cases it is possible for thee to correct by 
 teaching the man who is gone astray; for every 
 man who errs misses his object and is gone 
 astray. Besides, wherein hast thou been in- 
 jured ? For thou wilt find that no one among 
 those against whom thou art irritated has done 
 anything by which thy mind could be made 
 worse; but that which is evil to thee and harm- 
 ful has its foundation only in the mind. And 
 what harm is done or what is there strange, if 
 the man who has not been instructed does the 
 acts of an uninstructed man ? Consider 
 whether thou shouldst not rather blame thy- 
 self, because thou didst not expect such a man 
 
250 
 
 trbougbts. 
 
 [Book II. 
 
 to err in such a way. For thou hadst means 
 given thee by thy reason to suppose that it 
 was likely that he would commit this error, 
 and yet thou hast forgotten and art amazed 
 that he has erred. But most of all when thou 
 blamest a man as faithless or ungrateful, turn 
 to thyself. For the fault is manifestly thy own, 
 whether thou didst trust that a man who had 
 such a disposition would keep his promise, or 
 when conferring thy kindness thou didst not 
 confer it absolutelJ^ nor yet in such way as to 
 have received from thy very act all the profit. 
 For what more dost thou want when thou hast 
 done a man a service ? art thou not content that 
 thou hast done something conformable to thy 
 nature, and dost thou seek to be paid for it ? 
 just as if the eye demanded a recompense for 
 seeing, or the feet for walking. For as these 
 members are formed for a particular purpose, 
 and by working according to their several con- 
 stitutions obtain what is their own;* so also as 
 man is formed by nature to acts of benevolence, 
 when he has done anything benevolent or in 
 any other way conducive to the common inter- 
 est, he has acted conformably to his constitu- 
 tion, and he gets what is his own. 
 
 * ’knex^i- TO Wlov. This sense of anexeiv occurs in 
 xi. I, and iv. 49; also in St. Matthew, vi. 2, anexovat 
 TQV fuadov, and in Epictetus. 
 
Book!.] Marcus Burelius Bntoninue. 
 
 251 
 
 X. 
 
 W ilt thou, then, my soul, never be good 
 and simple and one and naked, more 
 manifest than the body which surrounds thee ? 
 Wilt thou never enjoy an affectionate and con- 
 tented disposition? Wilt thou never be full 
 and without a want of any kind,< longing for 
 nothing more, nor desiring anything, either 
 animate or inanimate, for the enjoyment of 
 pleasures? nor yet desiring time wherein thou 
 shalt have longer enjoyment, or place, or 
 pleasant climate, or society of men with whom 
 thou mayst live in harmony ? but wilt thou be 
 satisfied with thy present condition, and 
 pleased with all that is about thee, and wilt 
 thou convince thyself that thou hast every- 
 thing, and that it comes from the gods, that 
 everything is well for thee, and will be well 
 whatever shall please them, and whatever they 
 shall give for the conservation of the perfect 
 living being,* the good and just and beautiful, 
 which generates and holds together all things, 
 and contains and embraces all things which 
 are dissolved for the production of other like 
 things ? Wilt thou never be such that thou 
 
 * That is, God (iv. 40), as he is defined by Zeno. 
 But the confusion between gods and God is strange. 
 
252 
 
 ^Tbougbts. 
 
 [Book X. 
 
 shalt so dwell in community with gods and 
 men as neither to find fault with them at all, 
 nor to be condemned by them ? 
 
 2. Observe what thy nature requires, so far 
 as thou art governed by nature only: then do 
 it and accept it, if thy nature, so far as thou art 
 a living being, shall not be made worse by it. 
 And next thou must observe what thy nature 
 requires so far as thou art a living being. And 
 all this thou mayst allow thyself, if thy nature, 
 so far as thou art a rational animal, shall not 
 be made worse by it. But the rational animal 
 is consequently also a political [social] animal. 
 Use these rules, then, and trouble thyself about 
 nothing else. 
 
 3. Everything which happens either happens 
 in such wise as thou art formed by nature to 
 bear it, or as thou art not formed by nature to 
 bear it. If, then, it happens to thee in such 
 way as thou art formed by nature to bear it, do 
 not complain, but bear it as thou art formed by 
 nature to bear it. But if it happens in such 
 wise as thou art not formed by nature to bear 
 it, do not complain, for it will perish after it 
 has consumed thee. Remember, however, that 
 thou art formed by nature to bear everything, 
 with respect to which it depends on thy own 
 opinion to make it endurable and tolerable, by 
 thinking that it is either thy interest or thy 
 duty to do this. 
 
 4. If a man is mistaken, instruct him kindly 
 and show him his error. But if thou art not 
 able, blame thyself, or blame not even thyself. 
 
Book!.] /ffi»arcus aurclius Antoninus. 
 
 253 
 
 5. Whatever may happen to thee, it was pre- 
 pared for thee from all eternity; and the impli- 
 cation of causes was from eternity spinning the 
 thread of thy being, and of that which is inci- 
 dent to it (hi. II ; iv. 26). 
 
 6. Whether the universe is [a concourse of] 
 atoms, or nature [is a system], let this first be 
 established, that I am a part of the whole 
 which is governed by nature; next, I am in a 
 manner intimately related to the parts which 
 are of the same kind with myself. For re- 
 membering this, inasmuch as I am a part, I 
 shall be discontented with none of the things 
 which are assigned to me out of the whole; for 
 nothing is injurious to the part if it is for the 
 advantage of the whole. For the whole con- 
 tains nothing which is not for its advantage; 
 and all natures indeed have this common prin- 
 ciple, but the nature of the universe has this 
 principle besides, that it cannot be compelled 
 even by any external cause to generate any- 
 thing harmful to itself. By remembering, then, 
 that I am a part of such a whole, I shall be 
 content with eveiy^thing that happens. And 
 inasmuch as I am in a manner intimately re- 
 lated to the parts which are of the same kind 
 with myself, I shall do nothing unsocial, but I 
 shall rather direct myself to the things which 
 are of the same kind with m3^self, and I shall 
 turn all my efforts to the common interest, and 
 divert them from the contrary. Now, if these 
 things are done so, life must flow on happily. 
 
254 
 
 ^Tbougbts. 
 
 [Book I. 
 
 just as thou mayst observe that the life of a 
 citizen is happy, who continues a course of 
 action which is advantageous to his fellow- 
 citizens, and is content with whatever the state 
 may assign to him. 
 
 7. The parts of the whole, everything, I 
 mean, which is naturally comprehended in the 
 universe, must of necessity perish; but let this 
 be understood in this sense, that they must un- 
 dergo change. But if this is naturally both an 
 evil and a necessity for the parts, the whole 
 would not continue to exist in a good condi- 
 tion, the parts being subject to change and 
 constituted so as to perish in various ways. 
 For whether did Nature herself design to do 
 evil to the things which are parts of herself, 
 and to make them subject to evil and of neces- 
 sity fall into evil, or have such results happened 
 without her knowing it ? Both these supposi- 
 tions, indeed, are incredible. But if a man 
 should even drop the term Nature [as an effi- 
 cient power], and should speak of these things 
 as natural, even then it would be ridiculous to 
 affirm at the same time that the parts of the 
 whole are in their nature subject to change, 
 and at the same time to be surprised or vexed 
 as if something were happening contrary to na- 
 ture, particularly as the dissolution of things is 
 into those things of which each thing is com- 
 posed. For there is either a dispersion of the 
 elements out of which everything has been 
 compounded, or a change from the solid to the 
 
BookX.] /iBarcue Hurelius Bntoninus. 
 
 255 
 
 earthy and from the airy to the aerial, so that 
 these parts are taken back into the universal 
 reason, whether this at certain periods is con- 
 sumed by fire or renewed by eternal changes. 
 And do not imagine that the solid and the airy 
 part belong to thee from the time of generation. 
 For all this received its accretion only yester- 
 day and the day before, as one may say, from 
 the food and the air which is inspired. This, 
 then, which has received [the accretion], 
 changes, not that which thy mother brought 
 forth. But suppose that this [which thy mother 
 brought forth] implicates thee verj^ much with 
 that other part, which has the peculiar quality 
 [of change], this is nothing in fact in the way 
 of objection to what is said.* 
 
 8. When thou hast assumed these names, 
 good, modest, true, rational, a man of equa- 
 nimity, and magnanimous, take care that thou 
 dost not change these names; and if thou 
 shouldst lose them, quickly return to them. 
 And remember that the term Rational was in- 
 tended to signify a discriminating attention 
 
 * The end of this section is perhaps corrupt. The 
 meaning is very obscure. I have given that meaning 
 which appears to be consistent with the whole argu- 
 ment. The emperor here maintains that the essential 
 part of man is unchangeable, and that the other parts, 
 if they change or perish, do not affect that which 
 really constitutes the man. See the Philosophy of 
 Antoninus, p. 56, note 2. Schultz supposed “thy 
 mother” to mean nature, ?/ But I doubt about 
 
 that. 
 
256 
 
 ^TbouQbts. 
 
 [Book X. 
 
 to every several tjbing, and freedom from neg- 
 ligence; and that Equanimity is the voluntary 
 acceptance of the things which are assigned to 
 thee by the common nature; and that Mag- 
 nanimity is the elevation of the intelligent part 
 above the pleasurable or painful sensations of 
 the flesh, and above that poor thing called fame, 
 and death, and all such things. If, then, thou 
 maintainest thyself in the possession of these 
 names, without desiring to be called by these 
 names by others, thou wilt be another person 
 and wilt enter on another life. For to continue 
 to be such as thou hast hitherto been, and to be 
 torn in pieces and defiled in such a life, is the 
 character of a very stupid man and one over- 
 fond of his life, and like those half-devoured 
 fighters with wild beasts, who though covered 
 with wounds and gore, still intreat to be kept 
 to the following day, though they will be ex- 
 posed in the same state to the same claws and 
 bites.* Therefore fix thyself in the possession 
 of these few names: and if thou art able to 
 abide in them, abide as if thou wast removed to 
 certain islands of the Happy. f But if thou 
 
 *See Seneca, Epp. 70, on these exhibitions which 
 amused the people of those days. These fighters were 
 the Bestiarri, some of whom may have been criminals; 
 but even if they were, the exhibition was equally 
 characteristic of the depraved habits of the spectators. 
 
 t The islands of the Happy, or the Fortunatae Insu- 
 lae, are spoken of by the Greek and Roman writers. 
 They were the abode of Heroes, like Achilles and 
 
Book I.] /iRarcus Bureliue Bntonfnus. 
 
 257 
 
 shalt perceive that thou fallest out of them and 
 dost not maintain thy hold, go courageously 
 into some nook where thou shalt maintain 
 them, or even depart at once from life, not in 
 passion, but with simplicity and freedom and 
 modesty, after doing this one [laudable] thing 
 at least in thy life, to have gone out of it thus. 
 In order, however, to the remembrance of these 
 names, it will greatly help thee if thou remem- 
 berest the gods, and that they wish not to be 
 flattered, but wish all reasonable beings to be 
 made like themselves; and if thou remember- 
 est that what does the work of a fig-tree is a 
 fig-tree, and that what does the work of a dog 
 is a dog, and that what does the work of a bee 
 
 Diomedes, as we see in the Scolion of Harmodius and 
 Aristogiton. Sertorius heard of the islands at Cadiz 
 from some sailors who had been there, and he had a 
 wish to go and live in them and rest from his troubles 
 (Plutarch, Sertorius, c. 8). In the Odyssey, Proteus 
 told Menelaus that he should not die in Argos, but be 
 removed to a place at the boundary of the earth where 
 Rhadamanthus dwelt (Odyssey, iv. 565): — 
 
 “ For there in sooth man’s life is easiest: 
 
 Nor snow nor raging storm nor rain is there 
 But ever gently breathing gales of Zephyr 
 Oceanus sends up to gladden man.” 
 
 it is certain that the writer of the Odyssey only fol- 
 lows some old legend, without having any knowledge 
 of any place which corresponds to his description. 
 The two islands which Sertorius heard of may be Ma- 
 deira and the adjacent island. Compare Pindar, Ol. 
 ii. 129. 
 
 17 
 
258 
 
 ^Tbougbts. 
 
 [Book X. 
 
 is a bee, and that what does the work of a man 
 is a man. 
 
 9. Mimi,*war, astonishment, torpor, slavery, 
 will daily wipe out those holy principles of 
 thine. + How many things without studying 
 nature dost thou imagine, and how many dost 
 thou neglect ? f But it is thy duty so to look 
 on and so to do everything, that at the same 
 time the power of dealing with circumstances 
 is perfected, and the contemplative faculty is 
 exercised, and the confidence which conies 
 from the knowledge of each several thing is 
 maintained without showing it, but yet not 
 concealed. For when wilt thou enjoy sim- 
 plicity, when gravity, and when the knowledge 
 of every several thing, both what it is in sub- 
 stance, and what place it has in the universe, 
 and how long it is formed to exist, and of what 
 things it is compounded, and to whom it can 
 belong, and who are able both to give it and 
 take it away ? 
 
 10. A spider is proud when it has caught a 
 fly, and another when he has caught a poor 
 hare, and another when he has taken a little 
 fish in a net, and another when he has taken 
 wild boars, and another when he has taken 
 bears, and another when he has taken Sar- 
 
 * Corais conjectured iilaog “hatred” in place of 
 Mimi, Roman plays in which action and gesticulation 
 were all or nearly all. 
 
 t This is corrupt. See the addition of Schultz. 
 
Book X.] ifiibarcua Surclius Bntonfnus. 
 
 259 
 
 matians. Are not these robbers, if thou ex- 
 aminest their opinions ? * 
 
 1 1 . Acquire the contemplative way of seeing 
 how all things change into one another, and 
 constantly attend to it, and exercise thyself 
 about this part [of philosophy]. For nothing 
 is so much adapted to produce magnanimity. 
 Such a man has put off the body, and as he 
 sees that he must, no one knows how soon, go 
 away from among men and leave everything 
 here, he gives himself up entirely to just doing 
 in all his actions, and in everything else that 
 happens he resigns himself to the universal 
 nature. But as to what any man shall say or 
 think about him or do against him, he never 
 even thinks of it, being himself contented with 
 these two things — with acting justly in what 
 he now does, and being satisfied with what is 
 now assigned to him; and he lays aside all dis- 
 tracting and busy pursuits, and desires nothing 
 else than to accomplish the straight course 
 through the law,t and by accomplishing the 
 straight course to follow God. 
 
 12. What need is there of suspicious fear, 
 since it is in thy power to inquire what ought 
 to be done ? And if thou seest clear, go by 
 
 * Marcus means to say that conquerors are robbers. 
 He himself warred against Sarmatians, and was a rob- 
 ber, as he says, like the rest But compare the life of 
 Avidius Cassius, c. 4, by Vulcatius. 
 
 f By the law he means the divine law, obedience to 
 the will of God. 
 
26 o 
 
 c:bou0bt6. 
 
 [Book X. 
 
 this way content, without turning back; but 
 if thou dost not see clear, stop and take the 
 best advisers. But if any other things oppose 
 thee, go on according to thy powers with due 
 consideration, keeping to that which appears 
 to be just. For it is best to reach this object, 
 and if thou dost fail, let thy failure be in at- 
 tempting this. He who follows reason in all 
 things is both tranquil and active at the same 
 time, and also cheerful and collected. 
 
 13. Inquire of thyself as soon as thou wakest 
 from sleep whether it will make any difference 
 to thee if another does what is j ust and right. 
 It will make no difference (vi. 32; viii. 55). 
 
 Thou hast not forgotten, I suppose, that 
 those who assume arrogant airs in bestowing 
 their praise or blame on others are such as 
 they are at bed and at board, and thou hast 
 not forgotten what they do, and what they 
 avoid, and what they pursue, and how they 
 steal and how they rob, not with hands and 
 feet, but with their most valuable part, by 
 means of which there is produced, when a man 
 chooses, fidelity, modesty, truth, law, a good 
 daemon [happiness] (vii. 17)? 
 
 14. To her who gives and takes back all, to 
 nature, the man who is instructed and modest 
 says. Give what thou wilt; take back what 
 thou wilt. And he says this not proudly, but 
 obediently, and well pleased with her. 
 
 15. Short is the little which remains to thee 
 of life. Live as on a mountain. For it makes 
 
SookX.] /iBarcus aureliu6 Hntoninu0. 261 
 
 no difference whether a man lives there or 
 here, if he lives everywhere in the world as in 
 a state [political community]. Let me see, let 
 them know a real man who lives according to 
 nature. If they cannot endure him, let them 
 kill him. For that is better than to live thus 
 [as men do]. 
 
 16. No longer talk at all about the kind of 
 man that a good man ought to be, but be such. 
 
 17. Constantly contemplate the whole of time 
 and the whole of substance, and consider that 
 all individual things as to substance are a grain 
 of a fig, and as to time the turning of a gimlet. 
 
 18. Look at ever^dhing that exists, and ob- 
 serv’e that it is already in dissolution and in 
 change, and as it were putrefaction or dis- 
 persion, or that everything is so constituted by 
 nature as to die. 
 
 19. Consider what men are when they are eat- 
 ing, sleeping, generating, easing themselves, 
 and so forth. Then what kind of men they are 
 when they are imperious + and arrogant, or 
 angry and scolding from their elevated place. 
 But a short time ago to how many they were 
 slaves and for what things; and after a little 
 time consider in what a condition they will be. 
 
 20. That is for the good of each thing, which 
 the universal nature brings to each. And it is 
 for its good at the time when nature brings it. 
 
 21. “The earth loves the shower;’’ and 
 “the solemn ether loves;’’ and the universe 
 loves to make whatever is about to be. I say 
 
262 
 
 ?Tbougbt0. 
 
 [Book X. 
 
 then to the universe, that I love as thou lovest. 
 And is not this too said that ‘ ‘ this or that 
 loves [is wont] to be produced ?”* 
 
 22. Either thou livest here and hast already 
 accustomed thyself to it, or thou art going 
 away, and this was thy own will; or thou art 
 dying and hast discharged thy duty. But be- 
 sides these things there is nothing. Be of 
 good cheer, then. 
 
 23. Let this always be plain to thee, that 
 this piece of land is like any other ; and that 
 all things here are the same with things on the 
 top of a mountain, or on the sea-shore, or 
 wherever thou choosest to be. For thou wilt 
 find just what Plato says. Dwelling within the 
 walls of a city as in a shepherd’s fold on a 
 mountain. [The three last words are omitted 
 in the translation.]! 
 
 * These words are from Euripides. They are cited 
 by Aristotle, Ethic. Nicom. viii. i. Athenaeus (xiii. 
 296) and Stobaeus quote seven complete lines begin- 
 ning ipa piv bpppov yaXa. There is a similar fragment 
 of Aeschylus, Danaides, also quoted by Athenaeus. 
 
 It was the fashion of the Stoics to work on the 
 meanings of words. So Antoninus here takes the 
 verb “loves,” which has also the sense of “is 
 wont,” “uses,” and the like. He finds in the com- 
 mon language of mankind a philosophical truth, and 
 most great truths are expressed in the common 
 language of life; some understand them, but most 
 people utter them without knowing how much they 
 mean. 
 
 t Plato, Theaet. 174 D. E. But compare the orig- 
 inal with the use that Antoninus has made of it. 
 
Booi X.] ^Barcus Aurelius Bntotunus. 
 
 263 
 
 24. What is my ruling faculty now to me ? 
 and of what nature am I now making it ? and 
 for what purpose am I now using it? is it void 
 of understanding ? is it loosed and rent asun- 
 der from social life ? is it melted into and mixed 
 with the poor flesh so as to move together 
 with it ? 
 
 25. He who flies from his master is a runa- 
 way; but the law is master, and he who breaks 
 the law is a runaway. And he also who is 
 grieved or angry or afraid, + is dissatisfied be- 
 cause something has been or is or shall be of 
 the things which are appointed b}" him who 
 rules all things, and he is Law and assigns to 
 every man what is fit. He then who fears or 
 is grieved or is angry is a runaway.* 
 
 26. A man deposits seed in a womb and goes 
 away, and then another cause takes it and 
 labors on it, and makes a child. What a thing 
 from such a material ! Again, the child passes 
 food down through the throat, and then an- 
 other cause takes it and makes perception and 
 motion, and in fine, life and strength and other 
 things; how many and how strange ! Observ'e 
 then the things which are produced in such a 
 hidden wa5^ and see the power, just as we see 
 the power which carries things downwards and 
 upwards, not with the eyes, but still no less 
 plainly (vii. 85). 
 
 * Antoninus is here playing on the etymology, of 
 vdfioc^ law, assignment, that which assigns {vi/^ei) to 
 every man his portion. 
 
264 
 
 ^Tbougbts. 
 
 [Book X. 
 
 27. Constantly consider how all things such 
 as they now are, in time past also were; and 
 consider that they will be the same again. 
 And place before thy eyes entire dramas and 
 stages of the same form, whatever thou hast 
 learned from thy experience or from older 
 history; for example, the whole court of 
 Hadrianus, and the whole court of Antoninus, 
 and the wdiole court of Philippus, Alexander, 
 Croesus; for all those were such dramas as we 
 see now, only with different actors. 
 
 28. Imagine every man who is grieved at 
 anything or discontented to be like a pig which 
 is sacrificed and kicks and screams. 
 
 Like this pig also is he who on his bed in 
 silence laments the bonds in which we are held. 
 And consider that only to the rational animal 
 is it given to follow voluntarily what happens; 
 but simply to follow is a necessity imposed on 
 all. 
 
 29. Severally on the occasion of everything 
 that thou dost, pause and ask thyself if death 
 is a dreadful thing because it deprives thee of 
 this. 
 
 30. When thou art offended at any man’s 
 fault, forthwith turn to thyself and reflect in 
 what like manner thou dost err thyself ; for 
 example, in thinking that money is a good 
 thing, or pleasure, or a bit of reputation, and 
 the like. For by attending to this thou wilt 
 quickly forget thy anger, if this consideration 
 i,lso is added, that the man is compelled: for 
 
Book X.] /iBarcus Hurclius Antoninus. 265 
 
 -what else could he do ? or, if thou art able, 
 take away from him the compulsion. 
 
 31. When thou hast seen Satyron* the So- 
 cratic,+ think of either Eutyches or Hymen, 
 and when thou hast seen Euphrates, think of 
 Eutj^chion or Silvanus, and w’hen thou hast 
 seen Alciphron think of Tropaeophorus, and 
 when thou hast seen Xenophon, think of 
 Critof or Severus, and when thou hast looked 
 on thyself, think of any other Caesar, and in 
 the case of every one do in like manner. Then 
 let this thought be in thy mind. Where then 
 are those men? Now'here, or nobody knows 
 where. For thus continuously thou wilt look 
 at human things as smoke and nothing at all; 
 especially if thou reflectest at the same time 
 that what has once changed will never exist 
 again in the infinite duration of time. But 
 thou, in what a brief space of time is thy ex- 
 istence? And w’hy art thou not content to 
 pass through this short time in an orderly way ? 
 What matter and opportunity [for thy activity] 
 
 * Nothing is known of Sat}’ron or Satyrion; nor, I 
 helieve, of Eutyches or Hymen. Euphrates is honor- 
 ablj’ mentioned by Epictetus (iii. 15, 8; iv. 8, 17). 
 Pliny (Epp. i. 10) speaks very highly of him. He ob- 
 tained the permission of the Emperor Hadrian to 
 drink poison, because he was old and in bad health 
 (Dion Cassius, 69, c. 8). 
 
 t Crito is the friend of Socrates ; and he was, it ap- 
 pears, also a friend of Xenophon. When the em- 
 peror says “seen ” {Iduv), he does not mean with the 
 eyes. 
 
266 
 
 ^bougbts. 
 
 [Book X. 
 
 art thou avoiding ? For what else are all these 
 things, except exercises for the reason, when it 
 has viewed carefully and by examination into 
 their nature the things which happen in life ? 
 Persevere then until thou shalt have made 
 these things thy own, as the stomach which is 
 strengthened makes all things its own, as the 
 blazing lire makes flame and brightness out 
 of everything that is thrown into it. 
 
 32. Let it not be in an}" man’s power to say 
 truly of thee that thou are not simple or that 
 thou art not good; but let him be a liar who- 
 ever shall think anything of this kind about 
 thee; and this is altogether in thy power. For 
 who is he that shall hinder thee from being 
 good and simple ? Do thou only determine 
 to live no longer unless thou shalt be such. 
 For neither does reason allow [thee to live], if 
 thou art not such.* 
 
 33. What is that which as to this material 
 [our life] can be done or said in the wa}' most 
 conformable to reason ? For whatever this 
 may be, it is in thy power to do it or to say it, 
 and do not make excuses that thou art hindered. 
 Thou wilt not cease to lament till thj" mind is 
 in such a condition that what luxury is to 
 those who enjoy pleasure, such shall be to 
 thee, in the matter which is subjected and pre- 
 sented to thee, the doing of the things which 
 are conformable to man’s constitution ; for a 
 
 * Compare Epictetus, i. 29, 28. 
 
Book X.] /iRarcue Burclius Bntonlnus. 
 
 267 
 
 man ought to consider as an enjoyment every- 
 thing which it is in his power to do according to 
 his own nature. And it is in his power every- 
 where. Now, it is not given to a cylinder to 
 move everywhere by its own motion, nor }’et to 
 water nor to fire, nor to anything else which is 
 governed by nature or an irrational soul, for 
 the things which check them and stand in the 
 way are many. But intelligence and reason 
 are able to go through everything that opposes 
 them, and in such manner as they are formed 
 b}^ nature and as they choose. Place before 
 thy e3^es this facility with which the reason 
 will be carried through all things, as fire up- 
 wards, as a stone downwards, as a cjdinder 
 down an inclined surface,- and seek for nothing 
 further. For all other obstacles either affect 
 the body only, which is a dead thing; or, ex- 
 cept through opinion and the yielding of the 
 reason itself, they do not crush nor do any 
 harm of any kind; for if they did, he who felt 
 it would immediately become bad. Now, in 
 the case of all things which have a certain con- 
 stitution, whatever harm may happen to any 
 of them, that which is so affected becomes con- 
 sequently worse; but in the like case, a man 
 becomes both better, if one may say so, and 
 more worthy of praise by making a right use 
 of these accidents. And finally remember that 
 nothing harms him who is really a citizen, 
 which does not harm the state; nor yet does 
 anything harm the state, which does not 
 
268 
 
 tTbougbts. 
 
 [Book X. 
 
 harm law [order]; and of these things which 
 are called misfortunes not one harms law. 
 What then does not harm law does not harm 
 either state or citizen. 
 
 34. To him who is penetrated by true prin- 
 ciples even the briefest precept is sufficient, and 
 any common precept, to remind him that he 
 should be free from grief and fear. For ex- 
 ample: — 
 
 “ Leaves, some the wind scatters on the ground — 
 So is the race of men.”* 
 
 Leaves, also, are thy children; and leaves, too, 
 are they who cry out as if they were worthy of 
 credit and bestow their praise, or on the con- 
 trary curse, or secretly blame and sneer; and 
 leaves, in like manner, are those who shall re- 
 ceive and transmit a man’s fame to after-times. 
 For all such things as these “are produced in 
 the season of spring,’’ as the poet says; then 
 the wind casts them down; then the forest 
 produces other leaves in their places. But a 
 brief existence is common to all things, and yet 
 thou avoidest and pursuest all things as if they 
 would be eternal. A little time, and thou 
 shalt close thy eyes; and him who has attended 
 thee to thy grave another soon will lament. 
 
 35. The healthy eye ought to see all visible 
 things and not to say, I wish for green things; 
 for this is the condition of a diseased eye. 
 
 * Homer, II., vi. 146. 
 
Book X.] /lBarcu0 Burelius Bntoninus. 
 
 269 
 
 And the healthy hearing and smelling ought 
 to be ready to perceive all that can be heard 
 and smelled. And the healthy stomach ought 
 to be with respect to all food just as the mill 
 with respect to all things which it is formed to 
 grind. And accordingly the healthy under- 
 standing ought to be prepared for everything 
 which happens: but that which says, Let my 
 dear children live, and let all men praise what- 
 ever I may do, is an eye which seeks for green 
 things, or teeth which seek for soft things. 
 
 36. There is no man so fortunate that there 
 shall not be by him when he is dying some 
 who are pleased with what is going to happen.* 
 Suppose that he was a good and wise man, will 
 there not be at least some one to say to him- 
 self, Let us at last breathe freely, being relieved 
 from this schoolmaster ? It is true that he was 
 harsh to none of us, but I perceived that he 
 tacitly condemns us. — This is what is said of a 
 good man. But in our own case how many 
 other things are there for which there are many 
 who wish to get rid of us? Thou wilt con- 
 sider this, then, when thou art dying, and thou 
 wilt depart more contentedly by reflecting thus: 
 I am going away from such a life, in which 
 even my associates in behalf of whom I have 
 striven so much, prayed, and cared, themselves 
 
 * He says kukSv, but as he affirms in other places 
 that death is no evil, he must mean what others may 
 call an evil, and he means only “what is going to 
 happen.” 
 
270 
 
 tTbougbts. 
 
 [Book X. 
 
 wish me to depart, hoping perchance to get 
 some little advantage by it. Why then should 
 a man cling to a longer stay here? Do not, 
 however, for this reason go away less kindly 
 disposed to them, but preserving thy own 
 character, and friendly and benevolent and 
 mild, and on the other hand not as if thou wast 
 torn away; but as when a man dies a quiet 
 death, the poor soul is easily separated from 
 the body, such also ought thy departure from 
 men to be, for nature united thee to them and 
 associated thee. But does she now dissolve the 
 union ? Well, I am separated as from kins- 
 men, not however dragged resisting, but with- 
 out compulsion ; for this, too, is one of the 
 things according to nature. 
 
 37. Accustom thyself as much as possible on 
 the occasion of anything being done by any 
 person to inquire with thyself. For what ob- 
 ject is this man doing this? But begin with 
 thyself, and examine thyself first. 
 
 38. Remember that this which pulls the 
 strings is the thing which is hidden within : 
 this is the power of persuasion, this is life, this, 
 if one may so say, is man. In contemplating 
 thyself never include the vessel which sur- 
 rounds thee and these instruments which are 
 attached about it. For they are like to an 
 axe, differing only in this, that they grow to 
 the body. For indeed there is no more use in 
 these parts without the cause which moves 
 and checks them than in the weaver’s shut- 
 
Book!.] iiBarcus Hureltue Hntonfnus. 271 
 
 tie, and the writer’s pen, and the driver’s 
 whip.* * 
 
 * See the Philosophy of Antoninus, p. 72, note. 
 
272 
 
 c:bougbt0. 
 
 [Book XL 
 
 XI. 
 
 T hese are the properties of the rational 
 soul: it sees itself, analyzes itself, and 
 makes itself such as it chooses; the fruit which 
 it bears itself enjoys— for the fruits of plants 
 and that in animals which corresponds to fruits 
 others enjoy — -it obtains its own end, wherever 
 the limit of life may be fixed. Not as in a 
 dance and in a play and in such like things, 
 where the whole action is incomplete if any- 
 thing cuts it short; but in every part, and 
 wherever it may be stopped, it makes what 
 has been set before it full and complete, so that 
 it can say, I have what is my own. And fur- 
 ther it traverses the whole universe, and the 
 surrounding vacuum, and surveys its form, and 
 it extends itself into the infinity of time, and 
 embraces and comprehends the* periodical 
 renovation of all things, and it comprehends 
 that those who come after us will see nothing 
 new, nor have those before us seen anything 
 more, but in a manner he who is forty years 
 old, if he has any understanding at all, has 
 seen by virtue of the uniformity that prevails 
 all things which have been and all that will be. 
 This too is a property of the rational soul, love 
 
 * TItJv nepioSiKrjv ‘Kokiyyeveaiav. See v. 13, 32 ; x. 7. 
 
Book XI.] /Bbarcue HurelUis :antonlnus. 
 
 273 
 
 of one’s neighbor, and truth and modesty, and 
 to value nothing more than itself, which is also 
 the property of Law.* Thus the right reason 
 differs not at all from the reason of justice. 
 
 2. Thou wilt set little value on pleasing 
 song and dancing and the pancratium, if thou 
 wilt distribute the melody of the voice into its 
 several sounds, and ask thyself as to each, if 
 thou art mastered by this; for thou wilt be 
 prevented b}' shame from confessing it : and in 
 the matter of dancing, if at each movement 
 and attitude thou wilt do the same; and the 
 like also in the matter of the pancratium. In 
 all things, then, except virtue and the acts of 
 virtue, remember to apply thyself to their sev- 
 eral parts, and by this division to come to 
 value them little: and apply this rule also to 
 thy whole life. 
 
 3. What a soul that is which is ready, if at 
 any moment it must be separated from the 
 body, and ready either to be extinguished or 
 dispersed or continue to exist ; but so that this 
 readiness comes from a man’s owm judgment, 
 not from mere obstinacj", as with the Chris- 
 tians, t but considerately and with dignity and 
 in a way to persuade another; without tragic 
 show. 
 
 4. Have I done something for the general 
 
 * Law is the order by which all things are governed. 
 
 t See the Life of Antoninus. This is the only pas- 
 sage in which the emperor speaks of the Christians. 
 Epictetus (iv. 7, 6) names them Galilaei. 
 
 18 
 
274 
 
 n:bougbts. 
 
 [Book XL 
 
 interest ? Well then, I have had my reward. 
 Let this always be present to thy mind, and 
 never stop [doing such good], 
 
 5. What is thy art ? To be good. And 
 how is this accomplished well except by gen- 
 eral principles, some about the nature of the 
 universe, and others about the proper constitu- 
 tion of man ? 
 
 6. At first tragedies were brought on the 
 stage as means of reminding men of the things 
 which happen to them, and that it is according 
 to nature for things to happen so, and that, if 
 you are delighted with what is shown on the 
 stage, you should not be troubled with that 
 which takes place on the larger stage. For 
 you see that these things must be accom- 
 plished thus, and that even they bear them 
 who cry out,* ‘ O Cithaeron.” And, indeed, 
 some things are said well by the dramatic 
 writers, of which kind is the following es- 
 pecially: — 
 
 “ Me and my children if the gods neglect. 
 
 This has its reason too.”f 
 
 And again, — 
 
 “ We must not chafe and fret at that which happens.’' 
 
 And, — 
 
 “ Life's harvest reap like the wheat’s fruitful ear.” 
 And other things of the same kind. 
 
 * Sophocles, Oedipus Rex. f See vii. 41, 38, 40. 
 
Book XL] /iftarcus Jlureliue Antoninus. 
 
 275 
 
 After tragedy the old comedy was intro- 
 duced, which had a magisterial freedom of 
 speech, and by its very plainness of speaking 
 w'as useful in reminding men to beware of in- 
 solence; and for this purpose too Diogenes used 
 to take from these writers. 
 
 But as to the middle comedy, which came 
 next, observe what it was, and again, for what 
 object the new comedy was introduced, which 
 gradually sank down into a mere mimic arti- 
 fice. That some good things are said even by 
 these writers, everybody knows: but the whole 
 plan of such poetr}^ and dramaturgy, to what 
 end does it look ? 
 
 7. How plain does it appear that there is not 
 another condition of life so well suited for phil- 
 osophizing as this in which thou now happen- 
 est to be. 
 
 8. A branch cut off from the adjacent branch 
 must of necessity be cut off from the whole 
 tree also. So too a man when he is separated 
 from another man has fallen off from the whole 
 social community. Now as to a branch, an- 
 other cuts it off; but a man by his own act sep- 
 arates himself from his neighbor when he hates 
 him and turns away from him, and he does 
 not know that he has at the same time cut 
 himself off from the whole social system. Yet 
 he has this privilege certainly from Zeus, who 
 framed society, for it is in our power to grow 
 again to that which is near to us, and again to 
 become a part which helps to make up the 
 
276 
 
 ^Tbougbts. 
 
 [Book XL 
 
 whole. However, if it often happens, this kind 
 of separation, it makes it difficult for that 
 which detaches itself to be brought to unity 
 and to be restored to its former condition. Fi- 
 nally, the branch, which from the first grew 
 together with the tree, and has continued to 
 have one life with it, is not like that which 
 after being cut off is then ingrafted, for this is 
 something like what the gardeners mean when 
 they say that it grows with the rest of the tree, 
 but+ that it has not the same mind with it. 
 
 9.. As those who try to stand in thy way 
 when thou art proceeding according to right 
 reason will not be able to turn thee aside from 
 thy proper action, so neither let them drive 
 thee from thy benevolent feelings toward them, 
 but be on th}^ guard equally in both matters, 
 lot only in the matter of steady judgment and 
 action, but also in the matter of gentleness to 
 those who try to hinder or otherwise trouble 
 thee. For this also is a weakness, to be vexed 
 at them, as well as to be diverted from thy 
 course of action and to give way through fear ; 
 for both are equally deserters from their post, — 
 the man who does it through fear, and the man 
 who is alienated from him who is by nature a 
 kinsman and a friend. 
 
 10. There is no nature which is inferior to 
 art, for the arts imitate the natures of things. 
 But if this is so, that nature which is the most 
 perfect and the most comprehensive of all 
 natures, cannot fall short of the skill of art. 
 
Book XL] /iRatcus Hutelius Hntonlnu6. 
 
 277 
 
 Now all arts do the inferior things for the sake 
 of the superior; therefore the universal nature 
 does so too. And, indeed, hence is the origin 
 of justice, and injustice the other virtues have 
 their foundation: for justice will not be ob- 
 served, if we either care for middle things 
 [things indifferent], or are easily deceived and 
 careless and changeable (v. 16. 30; vii. 55). 
 
 11. If the things do not come to thee, the 
 pursuits and avoidances of which disturb thee, 
 still m a manner thou goest to them. Let then 
 thy judgment about them be at rest, and they 
 will remain quiet, and thou wilt not be seen 
 either pursuing or avoiding. 
 
 12. The spherical form of the soul maintains 
 its figure when it is neither extended towards 
 any object, nor contracted inwards, nor dis- 
 persed, nor sinks down, but is illuminated by 
 light, by which it sees the truth, — the truth of 
 all things and the truth that is in itself (viii. 
 41, 45; xii. 3). 
 
 13. Suppose any man shall despise me. Let 
 him look to that himself. But I will look to 
 this, that I be not discovered doing or saying 
 anjdhing deserving of contempt. Shall any 
 man hate me ? Let him look to it. But I will 
 be mild and benevolent towards every man, 
 and ready to show even him his mistake, not 
 reproachfully, nor yet as making a display of 
 my endurance, but nobly and honestly, like the 
 great Phocion, unless indeed he only assumed 
 it. For the interior [parts] ought to be such, 
 
278 
 
 JCbougbts. 
 
 [Book XL 
 
 and a man ought to be seen by the gods neither 
 dissatisfied with anything nor complaining. 
 For what evil is it to thee, if thou art now doing 
 what is agreeable to thy own nature, and art 
 satisfied with that which at this moment is suit- 
 able to the nature of the universe, since thou 
 art a human being placed at thy post in order 
 that what is for the common advantage may be 
 done in some way ? 
 
 14. Men despise one another and flatter one 
 another; and men wish to raise themselves 
 above one another, and crouch before one an- 
 other. 
 
 15. How unsound and insincere is he who- 
 says, I have determined to deal with thee in a 
 fair way! — What are thou doing, man? There 
 is no occasion to give this notice. It will soon 
 show itself by acts. The voice ought to be 
 plainly written on the forehead. Such as a 
 man’s character is,+ he immediately shows it 
 in his eyes, just as he who is beloved forthwith 
 reads everything in the eyes of lovers. The 
 man who is honest and good ought to be ex- 
 actly like a man who smells strong, so that the 
 bystander as soon as he comes near him must 
 smell whether he choose of not. But the af- 
 fectation of simplicity is like a crooked stick. 
 
 * Instead of aKokjiri Saumaise reads There is 
 
 a Greek proverb, anafipov ^v^ov ovdsnoT’ bp66v : “ You 
 cannot make a crooked stick straight. ’ ’ 
 
 The wolfish friendship is an allusion to the fable of 
 the sheep and the wolves. 
 
Book XI.] Jftarcus Surelius Sntoninus. 
 
 279 
 
 Nothing is more disgraceful than a wolfish 
 friendship [false friendship]. Avoid this most 
 of all. The good and simple and benevolent 
 show all these things in the eyes, and there is 
 no mistaking. 
 
 16. As to living in the best waj", this power 
 is in the soul, if it be indifferent to things 
 which are indifferent. And it will be indiffer- 
 ent, if it looks on each of these things sepa- 
 rately and all together, and if it remembers 
 that not one of them produces in us an opinion 
 about itself, nor comes to us; but these things 
 remain immovable, and it is we ourselves who 
 produce the judgments about them, and, as we 
 may say, write them in ourselves, it being in 
 our power not to write them, and it being in 
 our power, if perchance these judgments have 
 imperceptibly got admission to our minds, to 
 wipe them out; and if we remember also that 
 such attention will only be for a short time, 
 and then life will be at an end. Besides, what 
 trouble is there at all in doing this? For if 
 these things are according to nature, rejoice in 
 them and they will be easy to thee: but if con- 
 trary to nature, seek what is conformable to 
 th}^ own nature, and strive towards this, even 
 if it bring no reputation; for every man is 
 allowed to seek his own good. 
 
 17. Consider whence each thing is come, 
 and of what it consists,-}- and into what it 
 changes, and what kind of a thing it will be 
 when it has changed, and that it will sustain 
 no harm. 
 
28 o 
 
 ^Tbougbts. 
 
 [Book XI 
 
 1 8. [If any have offended against thee, con- 
 sider first]: What is my relation to men, and 
 that we are made for one another; and in an- 
 other respect I was made to be set over them, 
 as a ram over the flock or a bull over the herd. 
 But examine the matter from first principles, 
 from this. If all things are not mere atoms, it 
 is nature which orders all things: if this is so, 
 the inferior things exist for the sake of the 
 superior, and these for the sake of one another 
 (ii. i; ix. 39; V. 16; iii. 4). 
 
 Second, consider what kind of men they are 
 at table, in bed, and so forth; and particularly, 
 under what compulsions in respect of opinions 
 thc3^ are; and as to their acts, consider with 
 what pride they do what they do (viii. 14; 
 ix. 34). 
 
 Third, that if men do rightly what they do, 
 we ought not to be displeased: but if they do 
 not right, it is plain that they do so involunta- 
 rily and in ignorance. For as every soul is 
 unwillingly deprived of the truth, so also is it 
 unwillingly deprived of the power of behaving 
 to each man according to his deserts. Accord- 
 ingly men are pained when they are called un- 
 just, ungrateful, and greedy, and in a word 
 wrong-doers to their neighbors (vii. 62, 63; ii. 
 i; vii. 26; viii. 29). 
 
 Fourth, consider that thou also doest man}" 
 things wrong, and that thou art a man like 
 others; and even if thou dost abstain from cer- 
 tain faults, still thou hast the disposition to 
 
Book XI.] /iftarcus Burelius Bntoninue. 
 
 281 
 
 commit them, though either through coward- 
 ice, or concern about reputation, or some such 
 mean motive, thou dost abstain from such 
 faults (i. 17). 
 
 Fifth, consider that thou dost not even 
 understand whether men are doing wrong or 
 not, for many things are done with a certain 
 reference to circumstances. And in short, a 
 man must learn a great deal to enable him to 
 pass a correct judgment on another man’s acts 
 (ix. 38; iv. 51). 
 
 Sixth, consider when thou art much vexed 
 or grieved, that man’s life is only a moment, 
 and after a short time we are all laid out dead 
 (vii. 58; iv. 48). 
 
 Seventh, that it is not men’s acts which 
 disturb us, for those acts have their foundation 
 in men’s ruling principles, but it is our own 
 opinions which disturb us. Take away these 
 opinions then, and resolve to dismiss thy judg- 
 ment about an act as if it were something 
 grievous, and thy anger is gone. How then 
 shall I take away these opinions ? By reflect- 
 ing that no wrongful act of another brings 
 shame on thee: for unless that which is shame- 
 ful is alone bad, thou also must of necessit}^ do 
 many things wrong, and become a robber and 
 everything else (v. 25; vii. 16). 
 
 Eighth, consider how much more pain is 
 brought on us by the anger and vexation 
 caused by such acts than by the acts them- 
 selves, at which we are angry and vexed (iv. 
 39, 49; \di. 24). 
 
282 
 
 ^Tbougbts. 
 
 [Book XL 
 
 Ninth, consider that a good disposition is 
 invincible if it be genuine, and not an affected 
 smile and acting a part. For what will the 
 most violent man do to thee, if thou continuest 
 to be of a kind disposition towards him, and if, 
 as opportunity offers, thou gently admonishest 
 him and calmly correctest his errors at the 
 very time when he is trying to do thee harm, 
 sa5ung. Not so, my child: we are constituted 
 by nature for something else: I shall certainly 
 not be injured, but thou art injuring thyself, 
 ni5' child. — And show him with gentle tact and 
 by general principles that this is so, and that 
 even bees do not do as he does, nor any ani- 
 mals- which are formed by nature to be gre- 
 garious. And thou must do this neither with 
 any double meaning nor in the way of re- 
 proach, but affectionately and without any 
 rancor in thy soul; and not as if thou wert 
 lecturing him, nor yet that any bystander may 
 admire, but either when he is alone, and if 
 others are present ... * 
 
 Remember these nine rules, as if thou hadst 
 received them as a gift from the Muses, and 
 begin at last to be a man while thou livest. 
 But thou must equally avoid flattering men 
 and being vexed at them, for both are un- 
 social and lead to harm. And let this truth 
 be present to thee in the excitement of 
 anger, that to be moved by passion is not 
 manly, but that mildness and gentleness, as 
 * It appears that there is a defect in the text here. 
 
Book XL] ilBarcus Zlurelius Bntonfnus. 
 
 283 
 
 they are more agreeable to human nature, so 
 also are they more manly; and he who pos- 
 sesses these qualities possesses strength, nerves, 
 and courage, and not the man who is subject to 
 fits of passion and discontent. For in thie same 
 degree in which a man’s mind is nearer to free- 
 dom from all passion, in the same degree also 
 is it nearer to strength: and as the sense of pain 
 is a characteristic of weakness, so also is anger. 
 For he who yields to pain and he who yields 
 to anger, both are wounded and both submit. 
 
 But if thou wilt, receive also a tenth present 
 from the leader of the Muses [Apollo], and it 
 is this, — that to expect bad men not to do 
 wrong is madness, for he who expects this de- 
 sires an impossibility. But to allow men to be- 
 have so to others, and to expect them not to do 
 thee any wrong, is irrational and tyrannical. 
 
 19. There are four principal aberrations of 
 the superior faculty against which thou shouldst 
 be constantly on thy guard, and when thou 
 hast detected them, thou shouldst wipe them 
 out and say on each occasion thus: This 
 thought is not necessary: this tends to destroy 
 social union: this which thou art going to say 
 comes not from the real thoughts; for thou 
 shouldst consider it among the most absurd of 
 things for a man not to speak from his real 
 thoughts. But the fourth is when thou shalt 
 reproach thyself for anything, for this is an evi- 
 dence of the diviner part within thee being 
 overpowered and yielding to the less honorable 
 
284 
 
 O:bougbt 0 . 
 
 [Book XI. 
 
 and to the perishable part, the body, and to its 
 gross pleasures (iv. 24; ii. 16). 
 
 20. Thy aerial part and all the fiery parts 
 which are mingled in thee, though by nature 
 the}^ ha've an upward tendency, still in obe- 
 dience to the disposition of the universe they are 
 overpowered here in the compound mass [the 
 bod}^]. And also the whole of the earthy part 
 in thee and the watery, though their tendency 
 is downward, still are raised up and occupy a 
 position which is not their natural one. In this 
 manner then the elemental parts obey the uni- 
 versal; for when they have been fixed in any 
 place, perforce they remain there until again 
 the universal shall .sound the signal for dissolu- 
 tion. Is it not then strange that thy intelli- 
 gent part only should be disobedient and dis- 
 contented with its own place? And yet no 
 force is imposed on it, but only those things 
 which are conformable to its nature: still it 
 does not submit, but is carried in the opposite 
 direction. For the movement towards injustice 
 and intemperance and to anger and grief and 
 fear is nothing else than the act of one who de- 
 viates from nature. And also when the ruling 
 faculty is discontented with anything that hap- 
 pens, then too it deserts its post: for it is con- 
 stituted for piety and reverence towards the 
 gods no less than for justice. For these qual- 
 ities also are comprehended under the generic 
 term of contentment with the constitution of 
 
Book XL] iHbarcue Burclius 2lntonlnu9. 
 
 285 
 
 things, and indeed they are prior* to acts of 
 j ustice. 
 
 21. He who has not one and always the 
 same object in life, cannot be one and the same 
 all through his life. But what I ha\ns said is 
 not enough, unless this also is added, what 
 this object ought to be. For as there is not the 
 same opinion about all the things which in 
 some way or other are considered by the ma- 
 jority to be good, but only about some certain 
 things, that is, things which concern the com- 
 mon interest, so also ought we to propose to 
 
 * The word npea^vrepa, which is here translated 
 “ prior,” may also mean “superior but Antoninus 
 seems to say that piety and reverence of the gods pre- 
 cede all virtues, and that other virtues are derived 
 from them, even justice, which in another passage 
 (xi. 10) he makes the foundation of all virtues. The 
 ancient notion of justice is that of giving to every one 
 his due. It is not a legal definition, as some have 
 supposed, but a moral rule which law cannot in all 
 cases enforce. Besides, law has its own rules, which 
 are sometimes moral and sometimes immoral; but it 
 enforces them all simply because they are general 
 rules, and if it did not or could not enforce them, so 
 far Law would not be Law. Justice, or the doing 
 what is just, implies a universal rule and obedience ta 
 it ; and as we all live under universal Law, which 
 commands both our body and our intelligence, and is 
 the law of our nature, that is, the law of the whole 
 constitution of a man, we must endeavor to discover 
 what this supreme Law is. It is the will of the power 
 that rules all. By acting in obedience to this will, we 
 do justice, and by consequence everything else that 
 we ought to do. 
 
286 
 
 ^Cbougbte. 
 
 [Book XI. 
 
 ourselves an object which shall be of a common 
 kind [social] and political. For he who directs 
 all his own efforts to this object, will make all 
 his acts alike, and thus will always be the 
 same. 
 
 22. Think of the country mou.se and of the 
 town mouse, and of the alarm and trepidation 
 of the town mouse.* 
 
 23. Socrates used to call the opinions of the 
 many by the name of Lamiae, — bugbears to 
 frighten children. 
 
 24. The Lacedaemonians at their public 
 spectacles used to set seats in the shade for 
 strangers, but themselves sat down anywhere. 
 
 25. Socrates excused himself to Perdiccasf 
 for not going to him, saying. It is because I 
 would not perish by the worst of all ends; that 
 is, I would not receive a favor and then be un- 
 able to return it. 
 
 26. In the writings of the [Ephesians] J there 
 was this precept, constantly to think of some 
 one of the men of former times who practiced 
 virtue. 
 
 27. The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning 
 look to the heavens that we may be reminded 
 
 * The story is told by Horace in his Satires (ii. 6), 
 and by others since but not better. 
 
 t Perhaps* the emperor made a mistake here, for 
 other writers say that it was Archelaus, the son of 
 Perdiccas, who invited Socrates to Macedonia. 
 
 f Gataker suggested ’EmKovpe'iuv for 
 
Book XI.] /iRarcus aucellu6 Bntoninu6. 287 
 
 of those bodies which continually do the 
 same things and in the same manner perform 
 their work, and also be reminded of their pur- 
 ity and nudity. For there is no veil over a 
 star. 
 
 28. Consider what a man Socrates was when 
 •he dressed himself in a skin, after Xanthippe 
 had taken his cloak and gone out, and what 
 Socrates said to his friends who were ashamed 
 of him and drew back from him when they 
 saw him dressed thus. 
 
 29. Neither in writing nor in reading wilt 
 thou be able to lay down rules for others before 
 thou shalt have first learned to obey rules thy- 
 self. Much more is this so in life. 
 
 30. A slave thou art : free speech is not for thee. 
 
 31. And my heart laughed within. 
 
 Odyssey, ix. 413. 
 
 32. And virtue they will curse, speaking harsh 
 
 •words. Hesiod, Works and Days, 184. 
 
 33. To look for the fig in winter is a mad- 
 man’s act; such is he who looks for his child 
 w^hen it is no longer allowed (Epictetus, iii. 
 24, 87). 
 
 34. When a man kisses his child, said 
 Epictetus, he should whisper to himself, ‘ ‘ To- 
 morrow perchance thou wilt die.” — But those 
 are words of bad omen. — ‘‘No word is a word 
 of bad omen,” said Epictetus, ‘‘which ex- 
 presses any work of nature; or if it is so, it is 
 
288 
 
 (Tbouflbts. 
 
 [Book XI. 
 
 also a word of bad omen to speak of the ears 
 of corn being reaped” (Epictetus, iii. 24, 88). 
 
 35. The unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the 
 dried grape, are all changes, not into nothing, 
 but into something which exists not 3'et 
 (Epictetus, iii. 24). 
 
 36. No man can rob us of our free will* 
 (Epictetus, iii. 22, 105). 
 
 37. Epictetus also said, a man must discover 
 an art [or rules] with respect to giving his as- 
 sent; and in respect to his movements he must 
 be careful that they be made with regard to 
 circumstances, that they be con.sistent with 
 social interests, that they have regard to the 
 value of the object; and as to sensual desire, 
 he should altogether keep away from it; and 
 as to avoidance [aversion], he should not show 
 it with respect to any of the things which are 
 not in our power. 
 
 38. The dispute then, he .said, is not about 
 any common matter, but about being mad or 
 not. 
 
 39. Socrates u.sed to say. What do you want, 
 souls of rational men or irrational ? — Souls of 
 rational men. — Of what rational men, sound 
 or unsound? — Sound. — Why then do you not 
 seek for them ? — Because we have them. — Why 
 then do you fight and quarrel ? 
 
Book XII.] flibarcus Burelius Antoninus. 
 
 289 
 
 XII. 
 
 A L,L those things at which thou wishest to 
 arrive by a circuitous road thou canst have 
 now, if thou dost not refuse them to thyself. 
 And this means, if thou wilt take no notice of 
 all the past, and trust the future to providence, 
 and direct the present only conformably to 
 piety and justice. Conformably to piety that 
 thou mayest be content with the lot which 
 is assigned to thee, for nature designed it 
 for thee and thee for it. Conformably to 
 justice, that thou mayst always speak the 
 truth freely and without disguise, and do 
 the things which are agreeable to law and ac- 
 cording to the worth of each. And let neither 
 another man’s wickedness hinder thee, nor 
 opinion nor voice, nor yet the sensations of the 
 poor flesh which has grown about thee; for the 
 passive part will look to this. If, then, what- 
 ever the time may be when thou shalt be near 
 to thy departure, neglecting everything else 
 thou shalt respect only thy ruling faculty and 
 the divinity within thee, and if thou shalt be 
 afraid not because thou must some time cease 
 to live, but if thou shalt fear never to have be- 
 gun to live according to nature — then thou 
 wilt be a man worthy of the universe which 
 has produced thee, and thou wilt cease to be a 
 
 19 
 
290 
 
 ^Tbouflbts. 
 
 [Book XII. 
 
 stranger in thy native land, and to wonder at 
 things which happen daily as if they were 
 something unexpected, and to be dependent on 
 this or that. 
 
 2. God sees the minds [ruling principles] of 
 all men bared of the material vesture and rind 
 and impurities. For with his intellectual part 
 alone he touches the intelligence only which 
 has flowed and been derived from himself into 
 these bodies. And if thou also usest thyself to 
 do this, thou wilt rid thyself of thy much 
 trouble. For he who regards not the poor flesh 
 which envelops him, surely will not trouble 
 himself by looking after raiment and dwelling 
 and fame and such like externals and show. 
 
 3. The things are three of which thou art 
 composed; a little body, a little breath [life], 
 intelligence. Of these the first two are thine, 
 so far as it is thy duty to take care of them; 
 but the third alone is properly thine. There- 
 fore if thou shalt separate from thyself, that 
 is, from thy understanding, whatever others do 
 or say, and whatever thou hast done or said 
 thyself, and whatever future things trouble 
 thee because they may happen, and whatever 
 in the body which envelops thee or in the 
 breath [life], which is by nature associated 
 with the body, is attached to thee independent 
 of thy will, and whatever the external circum- 
 fluent vortex whirls round, so that the intel- 
 lectual power exempt from the things of fate 
 can live pure and free by itself, doing what is 
 
Book XII.] ^ibarcus ZlurcHus Sntoninue. 
 
 291 
 
 just and accepting what happens and saying 
 the truth: if thou wilt separate, I say, from 
 this ruling faculty the things which are at- 
 tached to it by the impressions of sense, and the 
 things of time to come and of time that is past, 
 and wilt make thyself like Empedocles’ sphere, 
 
 “ All round and in its joyous rest reposing * 
 
 and if thou shalt strive to live only what 
 is really thy life, that is, the present, — 
 then thou wilt be able to pass that portion of 
 life which remains for thee up to the time of 
 thy death free from perturbations, nobly, ani 
 obedient to thy own daemon [to the god that 
 is within thee] (ii. 13, 17; iii. 5, 6; xi. 12). 
 
 4. I have often wondered how it is that 
 every man loves himself more than all the rest 
 of men, but yet sets less value on his own 
 opinion of himself than on the opinion of 
 others. If then a god or a wise teacher should 
 present himself to a man and bid him to think 
 of nothing and to design nothing which he 
 would not express as soon as he conceived it, 
 he could not endure it even for a single day.f 
 So much more respect have we to what our 
 neighbors shall think of us than to what we 
 shall think of ourselves. 
 
 * The verse of Empedocles is corrupt in Antoninus. 
 It has been restored by Peyron from a Turin manu- 
 script, thus : — 
 
 20aZpof KVK^OTcpf/g fioviy TTBpcyr/dii ya'iuv. 
 
 t iii. 4. 
 
2Q2 
 
 JTbougbts. 
 
 [Book XIL 
 
 5. How can it be that the gods, after having 
 arranged all things well and benevolently for 
 mankind, have overlooked this alone, that 
 some men, and very good men, and men who, 
 as we may say, have had most communion 
 with the divinity, and through pious acts and 
 religious observances have been most intimate 
 with the divinity, when they have once died 
 should never exist again, but should be com- 
 pletely extinguished ? 
 
 But if this is so, be assured that if it ought 
 to have been otherwise, the gods would have 
 done it. For if it were just, it would also be 
 possible; and if it were according to nature, 
 nature would have had it so. But because it 
 is not so, if in fact it is not so, be thou con- 
 vinced that it ought not to have been so: for 
 thou seest even of thyself that in this inquiry 
 thou art disputing with the Deity; and we 
 should not thus dispute with the gods, unless 
 they were most excellent and most just; but if 
 this is so, they would not have allowed any- 
 thing in the ordering of the universe to be ne- 
 glected unjustly and irrationally. 
 
 6. Practise thyself even in the things which 
 thou despairest of accomplishing. For even 
 the left hand, which is ineffectual for all other 
 things for want of practice, holds the bridle 
 more vigorously than the right hand; for it 
 has been practised in this. 
 
 7. Consider in what condition both in body 
 and soul a man should be when he is overtaken 
 
Book XII.] jflRarcue aureliue antoninus. 
 
 293 
 
 by death; and consider the shortness of life, 
 the boundless abyss of time past and future, 
 the feebleness of all matter. 
 
 8. Contemplate the formative principles 
 [forms] of things bare of their coverings; the 
 purposes of actions; consider what pain is, what 
 pleasure is, and death, and fame; who is to him- 
 self the cause of his uneasiness; how no man is 
 hindered by another: that everything is opinion. 
 
 9. In the application of thy principles thou 
 must be like the pancratiast, not like the gladi- 
 ator; for the gladiator lets fall the sword which he 
 uses and is killed; but the other always has his 
 hand, and needs to do nothing else than use it. 
 
 10. See what things are in themselves, 
 dividing them into matter, form, and purpose. 
 
 11. What a power man has to do nothing 
 except what God will approve, and to accept 
 all that God may give him. 
 
 12. With respect to that which happens con- 
 formably to nature, we ought to blame neither 
 gods, for they do nothing wrong either volun- 
 tarily or involuntarily, nor men, for they do 
 nothing wrong except involuntarily. Conse- 
 quently we should blame nobody (ii. ii, 12 , 13; 
 vii. 62; 18 viii. 17). 
 
 13. Hov/ ridiculous and what a stranger he 
 is who is surprised at anything which happens 
 in life. 
 
 14. Either there is a fatal necessity and in- 
 vincible order, or a kind providence, or a con- 
 fusion without a purpose and without a direc- 
 
294 
 
 ^bouflbte. 
 
 [Book XII. 
 
 tor (iv. 27). If then there is an invincible ne- 
 cessity, why dost thou resist? But if there is 
 a providence which allows itself to be propiti- 
 ated, make thyself worthy of the help of the 
 divinity. But if there is a confusion without 
 a governor, be content that in such a tempest 
 thou hast in thyself a certain ruling intelli- 
 gence. And even if the tempest carry thee 
 away, let it carry away the poor flesh, the poor 
 breath, everything else; for the intelligence at 
 least it will not carry away. 
 
 15. Does the light of the lamp shine without 
 losing its splendor until it is extinguished? and 
 shall the truth which is in thee and justice and 
 temperance be extinguished [before thy death] ? 
 
 16. When a man has presented the appear- 
 ance of having done wrong [say]. How then 
 do I know if this is a wrongful act ? And even 
 if he has done wrong, how do I know that he 
 has not condemned himself? And so this is 
 like tearing his own face. Consider that he 
 who would not have the bad man do wrong, is 
 like the man who would not have the fig-tree 
 to bear juice in the figs, and infants to cry, and 
 the horse to neigh, and whatever else must of 
 necessity be. For what must a man do who 
 has such a character? If then thou art irri- 
 table,+ cure this man’s disposition.* 
 
 * The interpreters translate yopydc by the words 
 “ acer, validusque,” and “skilful.” Butin Epictetus 
 (ii. 16, 20; iii. 12, 10) yopy 6 g means “vehement,” 
 “prone to anger,” “irritable.” 
 
Book XII.] /iiiarcus 2lurcUu0 Zlntonlnus. 
 
 295 
 
 17. If it is not right, do not do it: if it is not 
 true, do not say it. [For let thy efforts be — ]* 
 
 18. In everything always obser\’e what the 
 thing is which produces for thee an appear- 
 ance, and resolve it by dividing it into the 
 formal, the material, the purpose, and the time 
 within which it must end. 
 
 19. Perceive at last that thou hast in thee 
 something better and more divine than the 
 things which cause the various affects, and as 
 it were pull thee by the strings. What is 
 there now in my mind, — is it fear, or suspicion, 
 or desire, or anything of the kind (v. ii)? 
 
 20. First, do nothing inconsiderate!}', nor 
 without a purpose. Second, make thy acts 
 refer to nothing else than to a social end. 
 
 21. Consider that before long thou wilt be 
 nobody and nowhere, nor will any of the 
 things exist which thou now seest, nor any of 
 those who are now living. For all things are 
 formed by nature to change and be turned and 
 to perish, in order that other things in contin- 
 uous succession may exist (ix. 28). 
 
 22. Consider that everything is opinion, and 
 opinion is in thy power. Take away then, 
 when thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a 
 mariner who has doubled the promontory, 
 thou wilt find calm, everything stable, and a 
 waveless bay. 
 
 23. Any one activity, whatever it may be, 
 when it has ceased at its proper time, suffers 
 
 * There is something wrong here, or incomplete. 
 
2g6 
 
 ITbougbts. 
 
 [Book XII. 
 
 no evil because it has ceased; nor he who has 
 done this act, does he suffer any evil for this 
 reason, that the act has ceased. In like man- 
 ner then the whole, which consists of all 
 the acts, which is our life, if it cease at its 
 proper time, suffers no evil for this reason, that 
 it has ceased; nor he who has terminated this 
 series at the proper time, has he been ill dealt 
 with. But the proper time and the limit na- 
 ture fixes, sometimes as in old age the peculiar 
 nature of man, but always the universal nature, 
 by the change of whose parts the whole uni- 
 verse continues ever young and perfect.* And 
 everything which is useful to the universal is 
 always good and in season. Therefore the 
 termination of life for every man is no evil, be- 
 cause neither is it shameful, since it is both 
 independent of the will and not opposed to the 
 general interest, but it is good, since it is sea- 
 sonable, and profitable to and congruent with 
 the universal. For thus too he is moved by 
 the Deity who is moved in the same manner 
 with the Deity, and moved towards the same 
 thing in his mind. 
 
 24. These three principles thou must have in 
 readiness: In the things which thou doest, do 
 
 nothing either inconsiderately or otherwise 
 than as justice herself would act; but with re- 
 spect to what may happen to thee from with- 
 out, consider that it happens either by chance 
 or according to providence, and, thou must 
 *vii. 25. 
 
Book XII.] fliatcue Butelius antoninus. 
 
 297 
 
 neither blame chance nor accuse providence. 
 Second, consider what every being is from the 
 seed to the time of its receiving a soul, and 
 from the reception of a soul to the giving back 
 of the same, and of what things every being 
 is compounded, and into what things it is 
 resolved. Third, if thou shouldst suddenly 
 be raised up above the earth, and shouldst 
 look down on human things, and observe 
 the variety of them how great it is, and at 
 the same time also shouldst see at a glance 
 how great is the number of beings who dwell 
 all around in the air and the ether, consider 
 that as often as thou shouldst be raised up, 
 thou wouldst see the same things, sameness 
 of form and shortness of duration. Are these 
 things to be proud of? 
 
 25. Cast away opinion; thou art saved. 
 Who then hinders thee from casting it away ? 
 
 26. When thou art troubled about an5’thing, 
 thou hast forgotten this, that all things happen 
 according to the universal nature; and forgotten 
 this, that a man’s wrongful act is nothing to 
 thee; and further thou hast forgotten this, that 
 everything which happens, always happened 
 so and will happen so, and now happens so 
 everywhere; forgotten this too, how close is the 
 kinship between a man and the whole human 
 race, for it is a community, not of a little blood 
 or seed, but of intelligence. And thou hast 
 forgotten this too, that every man’s intelli- 
 gence is a god and is an efflux of the Deity;* 
 
 * See Epictetus, ii. 8, 9, etc. 
 
298 
 
 tCbougbts. 
 
 [Book XII 
 
 and forgotten this, that nothing is a man’s 
 own, but that his child and his body and his 
 very soul came from the Deity; forgotten this, 
 that everything is opinion; and lastly thou 
 hast forgotten that every man lives the present 
 time only, and loses only this. 
 
 27. Constantly bring to thy recollection 
 those who have complained greatly about any- 
 thing, those who have been most conspicuous 
 by the greatest fame or misfortunes or enmities 
 or fortunes of any kind: then think where are 
 they all now ? Smoke and ash and a tale, or 
 not even a tale. And let there be present to 
 thy mind also everything of this sort, how 
 Fabius Catellinus lived in the country, and 
 Lucius Lupus in his gardens, and Stertinius at 
 Briae, and Tiberius at Capreae, and Velius 
 Rufus [or Rufus at Velia]; and in fine think of 
 the eager pursuit of anything conjoined with 
 pride;* and how worthless everything is after 
 which men violently strain; and how much 
 more philosophical it is for a man in the op- 
 portunities presented to him to show himself 
 just, temperate, obedient to the gods, and to 
 do this with all simplicity: for the pride which 
 is proud of its want of pride is the most intol- 
 erable of all. 
 
 28. To those who ask. Where hast thou seen 
 the gods, or how dost thou comprehend that 
 they exist and so worshippest them, I answer, ■ 
 in the first place, they may be seen even with 
 
 ol-^aeug. OlTjcng KaiTvfoc, Lpict. i. 8, 6. 
 
Book XII.] Marcus Bureltus Bntontnus. 
 
 299 
 
 the eyes;* in the second place, neither have I 
 seen even my own soul, and yet I honor it. 
 Thus then with respect to the gods, from what 
 I constantly experience of their power, from 
 this I comprehend that they exist, and I vene- 
 rate them. 
 
 29. The safety of life is this, to examine 
 everything all through, what it is itself, that is 
 its material, what the formal part; with all thy 
 soul to do justice and to say the truth. What 
 
 *“Seen even with the eyes.” It is supposed that 
 this may be explained by the Stoic doctrine, that the 
 universe is a god or living being (iv. 40), and that the 
 celestial bodies are gods (viii. 19). But the emperor 
 may mean that we know that the gods exist, as he 
 afterwards states it, because we see what they do ; as 
 we know that man has intellectual powers, because we 
 see what he does, and in no other way do we know it. 
 This passage then will agree with the passage in the 
 Epistle to the Romans (i. v. 20), and with the Epistle 
 to the Colossians (i. v. 15), in which Jesus Christ is 
 named “the image of the invisible god and with 
 the passage in the Gospel of St. John (xiv. v. 9). 
 
 Gataker, whose notes are a wonderful collection of 
 learning, and all of it sound and good, quotes a pas- 
 sage of Calvin which is founded on St. Paul’s language 
 (Rom. i. V. 20): “God by creating the universe [or 
 world, mundum], being himself invisible, has pre- 
 sented himself to our eyes conspicuously in a certain 
 visible form.” He also quotes Seneca (De Benef. iv. 
 c. 8): “ Quocunque te flexeris, ibi ilium videbis occur- 
 rentem tibi : nihil ab illo vacat, opus suum ipse im- 
 plet.” Compare also Cicero, De Senectute (c. 22), 
 Xenophon’s Cyropaedia (viii. 7), and Mem. iv. 3 ; 
 also Epictetus, i. 6, de Providentia. I think that my 
 interpretation of Antoninus is right. 
 
300 
 
 ITbougbts, 
 
 [Book XII. 
 
 remains, except to enjoy life by joining one 
 good thing to another so as not to leave even 
 the smallest intervals between ? 
 
 30. There is one light of the sun, though it 
 is interrupted by walls, mountains, and other 
 things infinite. There is one common sub- 
 stance,* though it is distributed among count- 
 less bodies which have their .several qualities. 
 There is one soul, though it is distributed 
 among infinite natures and individual circum- 
 scriptions [or individuals]. There is one intel- 
 ligent soul, though it seems to be divided. 
 Now in the things which have been mentioned, 
 all the other parts, such as those which are air 
 and matter, are without sensation and have no 
 fellowship: and yet even these parts the intelli- 
 gent principle holds together and the gravita- 
 tion towards the same. But intellect in a pecu- 
 liar manner tends to that which is of the same 
 kin, and combines with it, and the feeling for 
 communion is not interrupted. 
 
 31. What dost thou wish — to continue to 
 exist? Well, dost thou wish to have sensa- 
 tion, movement, growth, and then again to 
 cease to grow, to use thy speech, to think ? 
 What is there of all these things which seems 
 to thee worth desiring ? But if it is easy to set 
 little value on all these things, turn to that 
 which remains, which is to follow reason and 
 God. But it is inconsistent with honoring 
 reason and God to be troubled because by death 
 a man will be deprived of the other things. 
 
 * iv. 40. 
 
Book XII.] /Dbarcus Sucellus Antoninus. 
 
 301 
 
 32. How small a part of the boundless and 
 unfathomable time is assigned to every man, 
 for it is very soon swallowed up in the eternal ! 
 And how small a part of the whole substance; 
 and how small a part of the universal soul; 
 and on what a small clod of the whole earth 
 thou creepest! Reflecting on all this, consider 
 nothing to be great, except to act as thy na- 
 ture leads thee, and to endure that which the 
 common nature brings. 
 
 33. How does the ruling faculty make use 
 of itself? for all lies in this. But everything 
 else, whether it is in the power of thy will or 
 not, is only lifeless ashes and smoke. 
 
 34. This reflection is most adapted to move 
 us to contempt of death, that even those who 
 think pleasure to be a good and pain an evil 
 still have despised it. 
 
 35. The man to whom that only is good 
 which comes in due season, and to whom it is 
 the same thing whether he has done more or 
 fewer acts conformable to right reason, and to 
 whom it makes no difference whether he con- 
 templates the world for a longer or a shorter 
 time — for this man neither is death a terrible 
 thing (hi. 7; vi. 23; x. 20; xii. 23). 
 
 36. Man, thou hast been a citizen in this 
 great state [the world] ;* what difference does 
 it make to thee whether for five years [or 
 three] ? for that which is conformable to the 
 laws is just for all. Where is the hardship 
 
 *ii. 16 ; iii. ii ; iv. 29. 
 
302 
 
 Ebougbte. 
 
 [Book XII. 
 
 then, if no tyrant nor yet an unjust judge sends 
 thee away from the state, but nature, who 
 brought thee into it ? the same as if a praetor 
 who has employed an actor dismisses him from 
 the stage.* — “ But I have not finished the five 
 acts, but only three of them.” — Thou sayest 
 well, but in life the three acts are the whole 
 drama; for what shall be a complete drama is 
 determined by him who was once the cause of 
 its composition, and now of its dissolution : 
 but thou art the cause of neither. Depart 
 then satisfied, for he also who releases thee is 
 satisfied. 
 
 * iii. 8 ; xi. i. 
 
INDEXES. 
 
5 
 
 5 
 
 
 '5 
 
 "■X 
 
 )■ 
 
INDEX OF TERMS. 
 
 a6idd>opa (indifferentia, Cicero, Seneca, Epp. 82) ; 
 things indifferent, neither good nor bad ; the same 
 as piaa. 
 
 aiaxpdc (turpis, Cic.), ugly ; morally ugly. 
 alr'ia, cause. 
 
 aiTiUdeg, alriov, t6, the formal or formative principle, 
 the cause. 
 
 aKoivavr/Tog. unsocial. 
 
 dvatfiopd, reference, relation to a purpose. 
 dvvTie^aiptTUQ, unconditionally. 
 aiToppoia^ efflux. 
 
 aTTpoaipera, rd, the things which are not in our will or 
 power. 
 
 dpx^, a first principle. 
 aropoL (corpora individua, Cic.), atoms. 
 avrdpK.ua est quae parvo contenta omne id respuit quod 
 abundat (Cic.) ; contentment. 
 avrdpKTig, sufficient in itself ; contented. 
 dfoppai, means, principles. The word has also other 
 significations in Epictetus. Index ed. Schweig. 
 yiyvdpeva, rd, things which are produced, come into 
 existence. 
 
 daipuv, god, god in man, man’s intelligent principle. 
 6/ddeciic, disposition, affection of the mind. 
 dtaipEcng, division of things into their parts, dissection, 
 resolution, analysis. 
 
 6ia?[£KTiKp, ars bene disserendi et vera ac falsa dijudic- 
 andi (Cic.). 
 
 didXvm^, dissolution, the opposite of avyKpiaiQ. 
 
 (305) 
 
 20 
 
3o6 
 
 UnOcE. 
 
 <'iiavoia, understanding ; sometimes, the mind generally, 
 the whole intellectual power. 
 
 ^o'/fiara (decreta, Cic.), principles. 
 
 6'vvafu^ voepd, intellectual faculty. 
 iyKpnreia, temperance, self-restraint. 
 fMof in divisione formae sunt, quas Graeci eldr/ vocant ; 
 nostri, si qui haec forte tractant, species appellant 
 { Cic. ). But sldoc is used by Epictetus and Antoninus 
 less exactly and as a general term, like genus. 
 Index Epict. ed. Schweig. — 6i ye ai Trpurac ovaiai 
 Tipbg rd ciXAa exovaiv, ovt(j Kal rb elSog Trpdf to yevog exei' 
 v7TOK.elTai yap to elSog ro yevei. (Aristot. Cat. c. 5 .) 
 elpappevrj (fatalis necessitas, fatum, Cic.), destiny, 
 necessity. 
 
 cKKAiaeig, aversions, avoidance, the turning away from 
 things ; the opposite of bpe^ecg. 
 ipTpvxa., Ta, things which have life. 
 hepyeia, action, activity. 
 
 evvoia, evvotai, notio, notiones (Cic.), or “notitiae 
 rerum notions of things. (Notionem appello 
 quam Graeci turn hvoiav, turn npoAjjfiv, Cic.). 
 ivoxn^, r), the unity. 
 iKWTpof^, attention to an object. 
 evdvfi'ia, animi tranquillitas (Cic.). 
 
 evpeveg, t 6, evpeveia, benevolence ; evfievric sometimes 
 means well-contented. 
 evvoia, benevolence. 
 i^ovcia, power, faculty. 
 enaKoXovO'/jaiv, Kara, by way of sequence. 
 
 TjyepovLKdv, to, the ruling faculty or part ; principatus 
 (Cic.). 
 
 6eap?/paTa, percepta (Cic.), things perceived, general 
 principles. 
 
 KaOr/KEiv, t6, duty, “officium.” 
 
 KaMg, beautiful. 
 
 KaTalrjipig, comprehension ; cognitio, perceptio, com- 
 prehensio (Cic.). 
 naTaanevri, constitution. 
 
ITn&ej. 
 
 307 
 
 Karopduasic, Karopdo/iara ; recta, recte facta (Cic.) ; right 
 acts, those acts to which we proceed by the right or 
 straight road. 
 
 Koapoc, order, world, universe. 
 
 Kdapoc, 6 blog, the universe, that which is the One and 
 the all (vi. 25). 
 
 Kp'ipa, a judgment. 
 
 KvpiEvov, TO iviov, that which rules within (iv. i), the 
 same as rb pyepovindv. Diogenes Daertius vii., Zeno. 
 7/yEpovtKov 6 e Elvai to avpiurarov Tijg 'tpvxpg. 
 loyiKo, -a, the things which have reason. 
 loyiKog, rational. 
 loyog, reason. 
 
 ?Myog a-nEppariKbg, seminal principle. 
 pEca, TO, things indifferent, viewed with respect to 
 virtue. 
 
 voEpbg, intellectual. 
 vdpog, law. 
 
 vovg, intelligence, understanding. 
 
 olrjcng, arrogance, pride. It sometimes means in An- 
 toninus the same as rv^og ; but it also means “ opin- 
 ion.” 
 
 oiKovopia (dispositio, ordo, Cic.) has sometimes the 
 peculiar setjse of artifice, or doing something with 
 an apparent purpose different from the real purpose. 
 blav, TO, the universe, the whole : p tC>v bluv (pvcng. 
 bvTa, TO., things which exist ; existence, being. 
 bpE^ig, desire of a thing, which is opposed to SKulwig, 
 aversion. 
 
 bpprj, movement towards an object, appetite ; appetitio, 
 naturalis appetitus, appetitus animi (Cic.). 
 ovaia, substance (vi. 49). Modern writers sometimes 
 incorrectly translate it “ essentia.” It is often used 
 by Epictetus in the same sense as vlp. Aristotle 
 (Cat. c. 5) defines ovaia, and it is properly translated 
 “substantia” (ed. Jul. Pacius). Porphyrins (Isa^. 
 C. 2 ) p ovaia avuTaTO) ovaa Tip ppdiv irpb avTfjg yivog rp> 
 rb yeviKoiTaTov. 
 
3o8 
 
 1In5ej. 
 
 ■jrapaKo^vdTjTtK^ 6 vva/uc, 7 /, the power which enables us 
 to observe and understand. 
 irelcHi, passivity, opposed to evlpyeta : also, affect. 
 Treptardaeig, circumstances, the things which surround 
 us ; troubles, difficulties. 
 
 TeTTpupivrij 7}, destiny. 
 
 iTpoaipemg, purpose, free will (Aristot. Rhet. i. 13). 
 ■Kpoa'iptra, to., things which are within our will or power. 
 irpoaipETiKdv, rd, free will. 
 
 TTpddtcng, a purpose, proposition. 
 
 ■rrpdvoia (providentia, Cic.), providence. 
 
 OKondg, object, purpose. 
 aroixtlov, element. 
 
 avyKarddeaig (asseusio, approbatio, Cic.), assent; avyKara- 
 Seaeig (probationes, Gellius, xix. i). 
 avyKpipara, things compounded (ii. 3). 
 avyKpiaig, the act of combining elements out of which 
 a body is produced, combination. 
 cvvdeaig, ordering, arrangement (compositio). 
 avGTripa, system, a thing compounded of parts which 
 have a certain relation to one another. 
 vlr/, matter, material. 
 vXck6v, t6, the material principle. 
 
 vne^aipEGLg, exception, reservation ; ped' vne^aipkaeug, 
 conditionally. 
 
 vnodeaig, material to work on ; thing to employ the 
 reason on ; proposition, thing assumed as matter for 
 argument and to lead to conclusions. (Quaestionum 
 duo sunt genera ; alterum iufiuitum, definitum 
 alterum. Definitum est, quod imddeaiv Graeci, nos 
 causam : infinitum, quod diciv illi appellant, nos 
 propositum possumus nominare. Cic. See Aristot. 
 Anal. Post. i. c. 2). 
 
 vTTOKe'tpem, rd, things present or existing, vi. 4 ; or 
 things which are a basis or foundation. 
 vTiS'krjptg, opinion. 
 
 v-KoGTaaig, basis, substance, being, foundation (x. 5). 
 Epictetus has to inroaraTiKov koX ovaiCideg. (Justin us 
 ad Diogn. c. 2.) 
 
•ffnDcs. 
 
 309 
 
 {xpiaraadai, to subsist, to be. 
 
 <pavramai (visus, Cic.) ; appearances, thoughts, impres- 
 sions (visa animi, Gellius, xix. i) : (pavraaia tarl 
 TvituaiQ iv ipvxy. 
 
 <j)dvTaana, seems to be used by Antoninus in the same 
 sense as <pavTaa'ia, Epictetus uses only (pavraaia. 
 (pavraarov, that which produces a (jiavraaia : davraarov rd 
 TeTrai7)Kdc rrjv (pavraaiav alaOrirdv. 
 
 (pvai^, nature. 
 
 (pvaic ij rav 6 ?lov, the nature of the universe, 
 soul, life, living principle. 
 
 XoyiK^, voepd, a rational soul, an intelligent soul 
 
A' 
 
 s 
 
 
 
 J 
 
 % 
 
 • j 
 
 ■•V 
 
 4 -: 
 
GENERAL INDEX. 
 
 *** The paragraphs (par.) and lines (1.) are those of the sections. 
 
 Active, man is by nature, ix. i6. 
 
 Advice from the good to be taken, vii. 21; viii. 16. 
 Affectation, vii. 60; viii. 30; xi. 18 (par. 9), 19. 
 
 Anger discouraged, vi. 26, 27; xi. 18. 
 
 Anger, offenses of, ii. 10. 
 
 Auger, uselessness of, v. 28; viii. 4. 
 
 Appearances not to be regarded, v. 36; vi. 3, 13. 
 Astonishment should not be felt at anything that hap- 
 pens, viii. 15; xii. i (sub fine), 13. 
 
 Attainment, what is within every one’s, vii. 67; viii. 8. 
 Attention to what is said or done, vi. 53; vii. 4, 30; 
 viii. 22. 
 
 Bad, the, ii. i. 
 
 Beautiful, the, ii. i. 
 
 Casual. See Formal. 
 
 Change keeps the world ever new, vii. 25; viii. 50 ( 1 . 
 13); xii. 23 (1. 10). 
 
 Change, law of, iv. 3 (sub f.), 36, v. 13, 23; vi. 4, 15, 
 36; vii. 18; viii 6; ix. 19, 28 (par. 2), 35; x. 7, 18; 
 xii. 21. 
 
 Change, no evil in, iv. 42. 
 
 Christians, the xi. 3. 
 
 Circle, things come round in a, ii. 14. 
 
 Comedy, new, xi. 6. 
 
 (311) 
 
312 
 
 ©encral 1Tn5cj. 
 
 Comedy, Old, xi. 6. 
 
 Complaining, uselessness of, viii. 17, 50. 
 
 Connection. See Universe. 
 
 Conquerers are robbers, x. 10. 
 
 Contentment. See Resignation. 
 
 Co-operation. See Mankind and Universe. 
 
 Daemon, the, ii. 13, 17; iii. 6 (1. 8), 7, 16 (1. 18); v. 10 
 (sub f.) 27; xii. 3 (sub. f.). 
 
 Death, ii. Ji, 12, 17; iii. 3, 7; iv. 5; v. 33; vi. 2, 24, 28; 
 
 vii. 32; viii. 20, 58; ix. 3, 21; x. 36; xii. 23, 34, 35. 
 Death inevitable, iii. 3; iv. 3 (l. 22), 6, 32, 48, 50; v. 
 
 33; vi. 47; viii. 25, 31. 
 
 Desire, offenses of, ii. 10. 
 
 Destiny, iii. ir (1. 19); iv. 26; v. 8 (1. 13, etc.), 24; 
 vii. 57; X. 5. 
 
 Discontent. See Resignation. 
 
 Doubts discussed, vi. 10; vii. 75; ix. 28, 39; xii. 5, 14. 
 Duty, all-importance of, vi. 2, 22; x. 22. 
 
 Earth, insignificance of the, iii. 10; iv. 3 (par. i, sub 
 f.); vi. 36; viii. 21; xii. 32. 
 
 Earthly things, transitory nature of, ii. 12, 17; iv. 32, 
 33. 35. 48; V. 23; vi. 15, 36; vii. 21, 34; viii. 21, 25; 
 X. 18, 31; xii. 27, 
 
 Earthly things, worthlessness of, ii. 12; v. 10, 33; vi. 
 
 15; vii. 3; ix. 24, 36; xi. 2; xii. 27. 
 
 Equanimity, x. 8. 
 
 Example, we should not follow bad, vi. 6; vii. 65. 
 Existence, meanness of, viii. 24. 
 
 Existence, the object of, v. i; viii. 19. 
 
 External things cannot really harm a man, or affect 
 the soul, ii, ii (1. 22); iv. 3 (par. 2, sub f.); 8, 39, 49 
 (par. 2); V. 35; vii. 64; viii. i (sub f.); 32, 51 (par. 
 2j; ix. 31; X. 33. 
 
 Failure, x. 12. 
 
 Fame, worthlessness of, iii. 10; iv. 3 (1. 45), 19, 33 (1. 
 10); V. 33; vi. 16, 18; vii. 34; viii. i, 44; ix. 30. 
 
©eneral ITnOcj. 
 
 313 
 
 Fear, what we ought to, xii. i (1. 18). 
 
 Fellowship. See Mankind. 
 
 Few things necessar}' for a virtuous and happy life, 
 ii. 5; iii. 10; vii. 67; x. 8 (1. 22). 
 
 Flattery, xi. 18 (par. 10). 
 
 Formal, the, and the material, iv. 21 (par. 2); v. 13; 
 
 vii. 10, 29: viii. ii; ix. 25; xii. 8, 10, 18. 
 
 Future, we should not be anxious about the, vii. 8; 
 
 viii. ii; ix. 25; xii. i. 
 
 Gods, perfect justice of the, xii. 5 (par. 2). 
 
 Gods, the, vi. 44s xii. 28. 
 
 Gods, the, cannot be evil, ii. ii; vi. 44. 
 
 Good, the, ii. i. 
 
 Habit of thought, v. 16. 
 
 Happiness, what is true, v. 9 (sub f.), 34; viii. i; x. 
 33- 
 
 Help to be accepted from others, xii. 7. 
 
 Heroism, true, xi. 18 (par. 10). 
 
 Ignorance. See Wrong-doing. 
 
 Independence. See Self-reliance. 
 
 Indiferent things, ii. ii (sub f.l; ix. 39; vi. 32; ix. i; 
 (1- 30). 
 
 Individual, the. Interests. 
 
 Infinity. See Time. 
 
 Ingratitude. See Mankind. 
 
 Injustice, ix. i. 
 
 Intelligent soul, rational beings participate in the 
 same, iv. 40; ix. 8, 9; x. i (1. 15); xii. 26, 30. 
 Interests of the whole and the individual identical, iv. 
 23; V. 8 (1. 34); vi. 45, 54; X. 6, 20, 33 (sub f.); xii. 
 23 (1. 12). 
 
 Justice, V. 34; X. ii; xi. 10. 
 
 Justice and reason identical, xi. i (sub f.). 
 
 Justice prevails everywhere, iv. 10. 
 
314 
 
 Ocneral ITnDcj. 
 
 Leisure, we ought to have some, viii. 51. 
 
 Life, a good, everywhere possible, v. 16. 
 
 Life can only be lived once, ii. 14; x. 31 (1. ii). 
 
 Life, shortness of, ii. 4, 17; iii. 10, 14; iv. 17, 48 (sub 
 f.), 50; vi. 15, 36, 56; X. 31, 34. 
 
 Life to be made a proper use of, without delay, ii. 4; 
 
 iii. I, 14; iv. 17, 37; vii. 56; viii. 22; x. 31 (1. 14); 
 xli I (1. 18). 
 
 Life, whether long or short, matters not, vi. 49; ix. 33; 
 xii. 36. 
 
 Magnanimity, x. 8. 
 
 Mankind, co-operation and fellowship of, one with 
 another; ii. i (1. ii), 16; iii. 4 (sub f.); ii (sub f.k 
 
 iv. 4, 33 (sub f.); V. 16 (1. ii), 20; vi. 7, 14 (sub f.), 
 23. 39; vii. 5, 13. 22, 55; viii. 12, 26, 34, 43, 59; ix. i, 
 9 (sub f.), 23, 31, 42 (sub. f.); X. 36,(1. 16); xi. 8, 21; 
 xii. 20. 
 
 Mankind, folly and baseness of, v. lO (1. 9); ix. 2, 3 
 (1. 13), 29; X. 15, 19. 
 
 Mankind, ingratitude of, x. 36. 
 
 Material, the. See Formal. 
 
 Nature, after products of, iii. 2; vi. 36. 
 
 Nature, bounds fixed by, v. i. 
 
 Nature, man formed by, to bear all that happens to 
 him, V. 18; viii. 46. 
 
 Nature, nothing evil, which is according to, ii. 17 (sub 
 f ); vi. 33. 
 
 Nature of the universe. See Universe, nothing that 
 happens is contrary to the nature of the. 
 
 Nature, perfect beauty of, iii. 2; vi. 36. _ 
 
 Nature, we should live according to, iv. 48 (sub. f.),5i; 
 
 V. 3, 25; vi. 16 (1. 12); vii. 15, 55; viii. i, 54; x. 33.^ 
 New, nothing, under the sun, ii. 14 (1. ii); iv. 44; vi. 
 37, 46; vii. I, 49; viii. 6; ix. 14; x. 27; xi. i. 
 
 Object, we should always act with a view to some, iL 
 7, 16 (1. 12) ; iii. 4 ; iv- 2 ; viii. 17 ; x. 37 ; xi. 21 i 
 xii. 20. 
 
General ITnDej. 
 
 31 
 
 Obsolete, all things become, iv. 33. 
 
 Omissions, sins of, ix. 5. 
 
 Opinion, iv. 3 (par. 2) (sub f.), 7, 12, 39; vi. 52, 57; 
 vii. 2, 14, 16, 26, 68 ; viii. 14, 29, 40, 47, 49 ; ix. 13, 
 29 (1. 12), 32, 42 (1. 21); X. 3 ; xi. 16, 18 ; xii. 22, 25. 
 Others’ conduct not to be inquired into, iii. 4 ; iv. 18 ; 
 V. 25. 
 
 Others, opinion of, to be disregarded, viii. i (1. 12); x. 
 8 (1. 12), II ; xi. 13 ; xii. 4. 
 
 Others, we should be lenient towards, ii. 13 (sub f.) ; 
 
 iii. II (sub f.) ; iv. 3 (1. 16) ; v. 33 (1. 17) ; vi. 20, 27 ; 
 vii. 26, 62, 63, 70; ix. II, 27 ; X. 4; xi. 9, 13, 18; 
 xii. 16. 
 
 Others, we should examine the ruling principles of. 
 
 iv. 38 ; ix. 18, 22, 27, 34. 
 
 Ourselves often to blame for expecting men to act 
 contrary to their nature, ix. 42 (1. 31). 
 
 Ourselves, reformation .should begin with, xi. 29. 
 Ourselves, we should judge, x. 30 ; xi. 18 (par. 4). 
 
 Pain, vii. 33, 64 ; viii. 28. 
 
 Perfection not to be expected in this world, ix. 29 
 (1- 7)- 
 
 Perseverance, v. 9 ; x. 12. 
 
 Persuasion, to be used, vi. 50. 
 
 Perturbation, vi. 16 (sub f.) ; viii. 58 ; ix. 31. 
 Pessimism, ix. 35. 
 
 Philosophy, v. 9 ; vi. 12 ; ix. 41 (1. 15). 
 
 Pleasure, he who pursues, is guilty of impiety, ix. i 
 (1. 24). 
 
 Pleasures are enjoyed by the bad, vi. 34 ; ix. i (1. 30). 
 Power, things in our own, v. 5, 10 (sub f. ) ; vi. 32. 41, 
 52, 58 ; vii. 2, 14, 54, 68 ; x. 32, 33. 
 
 Power, things not in our own, v. 33 (sub f.) ; vi. 41. 
 Practice is good, even in things which we despair of 
 accomplishing, xii. 6. 
 
 Praise, worthlessness of, iii. 4 (sub f.) ; iv. 20 ; vi. 16, 
 59 ; vii. 62 ; viii. 52. 53 • ix. 34- 
 
 I 
 
General IlnDcE. 
 
 316 
 
 Present time the only thing a man really possesses, ii. 
 
 14; iii. 10; viii. 44; xii. 3 (sub f . ). 
 
 Procrastination. See Life to be made a proper use of, 
 etc. 
 
 Puppet pulled by strings of desire, ii. 3 ; iii. 16 ; vi. 
 16, 28 ; vii. 3, 29 ; xii. 19. 
 
 Rational soul. See Ruling part. 
 
 Rational soul, spherical form of the, viii. 41 (sub f.); 
 
 xi. 12 ; xii. 3 (and see Ruling part). 
 
 Reason, all-prevailing, v. 32; vi. i, 40. 
 
 Reason and nature identical, vii. ii. 
 
 Reason the, can adapt everything that happens to its 
 own use, v. 20 ; vi. 8 ; vii. 68 (1. 16) ; viii. 35 ; x. 31 
 (sub f ). 
 
 Reason, we should live according to. See Nature. 
 Repentance does not follow renouncement of pleas- 
 ure, viii. 10. 
 
 Resignation and contentment, iii. 4 ( 1 . 27, etc.), 16 ( 1 . 
 10, etc.) ; iv. 23, 31, 33 (sub f.), 34 ; v. 8 (sub f.), 33 
 (1. 16); vi. 16 (sub f.), 44, 49 : vii. 27, 57 ; ix. 37 ; x. 
 I, II, 14, 25, 28, 35. 
 
 Revenge, best kind of, vi. 6. 
 
 Rising from bed, v. i; viii. ii. 
 
 Ruling part, the, ii. 2; iv. ii, 19, 21, 26; vi. 14, 35; 
 vii. 16, 55 (par. 2); viii. 45, 48, 56, 57, 60, 61 ; ix. 15, 
 26; X. 24, 33 ( 1 . 21), 38; xi. I, 19, 20; xii. 3, 14. 
 
 Self-reliance and steadfastness of soul, iii. 5 (sub f.), 
 12 ; iv. 14, 29 (1. 5), 49 (par. i) ; v. 3, 34 (1. 5); vi. 
 44 (1. 15); vii. 12, 15; ix. 28 (1. 8), 29 (sub f.); xii. 14. 
 Self-restraint, v. 33 (sub f.). 
 
 Self, we should retire into, iv. 3 ( 1 . 4 and par. 2) ; 
 vii. 28, 33, 59 ; viii. 48. 
 
 Senses, movements of the, to be disregarded, v. 31 ( 1 . 
 10) ; vii. 55 (par. 2) ; viii. 26, 39 ; x. 8 (1. 13) ; xi. 
 19; xii. I ( 1 . 18). 
 
 Sickness, behavior in, ix. 41. 
 
 Social. See Mankind. 
 
(Bencval 1 fnC»ej. 
 
 317 
 
 Steadfastness of soul. See Self-reliance. 
 
 Substance, the universal, iv. 40 ; v. 24 ; vii. 19, 23 ; 
 xii. 30. 
 
 Suicide, v. 29 ; viii. 47 (sub f.) ; x. 8 ( 1 . 35). 
 
 Time compared to a river, iv. 43. 
 
 Time, infinity of, iv. 3 ( 1 . 35), 50 (sub f.) ; v. 24 ; ix. 
 
 32 ; xii. 7, 32. 
 
 Tragedy, xi. 6. 
 
 Tranquillity of soul, iv. 3 ; vi. ii ; vii. 68 ; viii. 28. 
 
 Ugly, the, ii. i. 
 
 Unintelligible things, v. 10. 
 
 Universe, harmony of the, iv. 27, 45 ; v. 8 ( 1 . 14). 
 Universe, intimate connection and co-operation of all 
 things in the, one with another, ii. 3, 9 ; iv. 29 ; v. 
 8 30 : vi. 38, 42, 43 ; vii. 9, 19, 68 (sub f.) ; viii. 7 y 
 ix. I ; X. I. 
 
 Universe, nothing that dies falls out of the, viii, 18, 
 50 ( 1 . 13) : X. 7 ( 1 . 25). 
 
 Universe, nothing that happens is contrary to the 
 nature of the, v. 8, 10 (sub f.) ; vi. 9, 58; viii. 5;, 
 xii. 26. 
 
 Unnecessary things, v. 45. 
 
 Unnecessary thoughts, words, and actions, iii. 4 ; iv. 
 24. 
 
 Vain professions, x. 16 ; xi. 15. 
 
 Virtue, vi. 17. 
 
 Virtue its own reward, v. 6 ; vii. 73 ; ix. 42 ( 1 . 47) * 
 xi. 4. 
 
 Virtue, omnipotence of, iv. 16. 
 
 Virtue, pleasure in contemplating, vi. 48. 
 
 Whole, integrity of the, to be preserved, v. 8 (sub f. ). 
 Whole, the. See Interests. 
 
 Wickedness has always existed, rii. i. 
 
 Wickedness must exist in the world, viii. 15, 50 ; ix. 
 42 ; xi. 18 (par. iij ; xii. 16. 
 
©eneral 1In^eE. 
 
 318 
 
 Worst evil, the, ix. 2 (1. 9.) 
 
 Worth and importance, things of real, iv. 33 (sub f.l ; 
 V. 10 (1. 16) ; vi. 16, 30 (1. 7), 47 (sub f.) ; vii. 20, 44, 
 46, 58, 66; viii. 2, 3, 5; ix. 6, 12; x. 8 (1. 27), ii; xii 
 I- 27, 31, 33. 
 
 Wrong-doiug cannot really harm any one, vii. 22 ; 
 
 viii. 55; ix. 42 (1. 25); X. 13 (par. i); xi. 18 (par. 7). 
 Wrong-doing injures the wrong-doer, iv. 26; ix. 4, 38,; 
 xi. 18 (par. 3). 
 
 Wrong-doing owing to ignorance, ii. i, 13; vi. 27; 
 
 vii. 22, 26, 62, 63 ; xi. 18 (par. 3); xii. 22. 
 Wrong-doing to be left where it is, vii. 29 ; ix. 20. 
 
 THE END. 
 
Zbc aitemue Xibrarij. 
 
 A choice collection of Standard and Popular books, 
 handsomely printed on fine paper, from large clear type, 
 and bound m faultless styles in handy volume size : 
 
 1. Sesame and Lilies. 3 Lectures. By John Ruskin. 
 
 I. Of King’s Treasuries. 
 
 II. Of Queen’s Gardens. 
 
 III. Of the Mystery of Life. 
 
 2. The Pleasures of Life. By Sir John Lubbock. 
 
 Complete in one volume. (Contains the list of 
 The 100 Best Books.) 
 
 3. The Essays of Lord Francis Bacon, with Memoirs 
 
 and Notes. 
 
 4. Thoughts of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Anto- 
 
 ninus. Translated by George Long. 
 
 5. A .Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus, with 
 
 the Encheridion. Translated by George Long. 
 
 6. Essays, First Series. Py Ralph Waldo Emerson. 
 
 7. Second Series . By Ralph Waldo Emerson. 
 
 8. Cranford. By Mrs Gaskell. 
 
 9. Of the Imitation of Christ. Four books com- 
 
 plete in one volume. By Thomas A’Kempis. 
 
 10. The Vicar of Wakefield. By Oliver Goldsmith. 
 
 11. Letters, Sentences and Maxims. By Lord Ches- 
 
 terfield. “ Masterpieces of good taste, good 
 writing, and good sense.” 
 
 12. The Idle Tl oughts of an Idle Fellow. A book 
 
 for an Idle Holiday. By Jerome K. Jerome. 
 
 13. Tales from Sliake.speare. By Charles and Mary 
 
 Lamb, with an introduction by Rev. Alfred 
 Ainger, M. A. 
 
 (375) 
 
Ubc aitemuB X{!;rar^. 
 
 X4. Natural Law in the Spiritual World. Hy Henry 
 Drummond, F. R. S. K., F. G. S. The rela- 
 tions of Science aud Religion clearly expounded. 
 
 15. Addresses. By Henry Drummond, F. R. S. E., 
 
 F. G. S. The Greatest Thing in the World ; 
 Pax Vobiscum; The Changed Life; How to 
 Learn How; Dealing with Doubt; Prepara- 
 tion for 1 -earning ; What is a Christian ? '1 he 
 Study of the Bible; A Talk on Books. 
 
 16. “My Point of View.” Representative selections 
 
 from the works of Professor Drummond. By 
 William Shepard, 
 
 17. The Scarlet Letter. By Nathaniel Hawthorne. 
 
 18. Representative Men. Seven lectures. By Ralph 
 
 Waldo Emerson. 
 
 19. My King and His Service. By Frances Ridley 
 
 Havergal. Containing — My King; Royal 
 
 Commandments ; Royal Bounty ; Royal Invi- 
 tation ; Loyal Responses. 
 
 20. Reveries of a Bachelor. By Ik Marvel. A Book 
 
 of the Heart. 
 
 21. The House of the Seven Gables. By Nathaniel 
 
 Hawthorne. 
 
 22. Dream Life. By Ik Marvel. A Companion 
 
 volume to Reveries of a Bachelor. 
 
 23. Rab and His Friends, Marjorie Fleming, etc. 
 
 By John Brown. 
 
 24. Essays of Elia. By Charles Lamb. 
 
 25. Sartor Resartus. By Thomas Carlyle. 
 
 26. Heroes and Hero Worship. By Thomas Carlyle. 
 
5 
 
 

OCT 2- 1905 
 
 Duke University Libraries 
 
 D00525375R 
 
 TRANS. FROWP'-' 
 
 199 3 
 
 1S8.8 A92;7 
 
 2 , 5 ^ 6 ' 
 
 ‘♦V 
 
 Vo*£