.J 4^M / ^itrC^'t^ a/^^< n ^/y^^^'^^y DUKE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY Treasure %oom •M- ».-*J^. - , THE ELEMEJS'TS -^*een contended that matter has no existence. It is al- ledged by those who contend for the existence of matter, that gravitation is produced by a physical, or secondary cause, an impression, or impulse, produced ah extra. It is believed that this operation, ab extra, is necessary to the production of gravitation, because matter, as it is said^ does not, in itself, possess the power to gravitate. It is believed, if we rightly understand this scheme, that the uniformity of the gravitation of matter, is maintained by llie immediate superintendence and energy of the Su- preme First Cause, or rreator; and that all the pheno- l 26 THE ALPHABET mena of mattev are produced in the same Avay, or tliat God is the immediate ageut in their production. This scheme implies that the Deity is the only effi cient cause in the universe, and that every operation in nature is the effect of a divine volition, and the operation of divine power. To maintain consistency, this doctrine has been carried into the philosophy of mind also, and the Supreme Being is represented as the only effi- cient agent in every action, or operation, whether intel- lectual, moral, or physical. Some have supposed that events are produced simjdy by divine volition, without any exertion of power. But it is so absurd to suppose that a simple volition can produce the effects that are pro- per only to power, that it would l)e an insult to common sense to go about to refute it. That Divine Providence controuls and directs all events, is undeniable; it is a fact that is established in revelation and in reason: but to suppose that He is the sole efilcient cause, or agent, in all operations, moral and physical, while He at the same time controuls all events, is to suppose Him to controul His own operations. It would, in fact, imply the sup- position, that the Deity controuls, or that He only sus- pends His own operations, Avhen He restrains the actions of the wicked. These are t!ie legitimate consequences of the principle that the world is made of nothing; the Deity would be the real agent in all the operations of the human mind, as well as in tlje gravitation of matter. Some pliilosophers, perceiving the absurdity of tiiis theory of gravitation, and perceiving also that it dero- gates from the dignity of the divine character,* have in- vented another scheme to account for the gravitation of •It is a heathen maxim, but a wise one, that, We should nrver make (t god appear, but on an occasion worthy of a g'Ofl. OF THOUGHT. Sr matter, which shall be noticed after a short examination of the one already before us. Let us inquire tlicn, Is it a real fact, that the gravita- tioii of matter is produced, not by matter itself, but by divine power operatiug upon matter? Has it been ascer- tained by experiment and observation, that bodies gra- vitate, not by their own inherent tendency and power, but in consequence of an impulse produced upon them from without? By no means. It has never been observed ill a single instance lliat gravitation is produced by an extraneous impulse. 13ut it is said, this extraneous im- pulse, or some extraneous cause, is necessary to the pro- duction of tlie phenomenon, for that matter possesses no power in itself, nor any necessary tendency to gravitate. Tliis is a begging of the question ; or, at best, it is a de- duction from the principle that matter is made of nothing ; a principle intirely witliout foundation. The other theory, above alluded to, invented to a.c- count for the gravitation of matter consistently with the principle, that matter is made of nothing, is this, that matter, having no efficiency of its own, is endowed with the power to gravitate, or impressed with the tendency, at its creation. But this is a mere gratuitous assumption. And it might Ije asked, What was the thing that Avas impressed with the tendency to gravitate? It was not material substance until it had that tendency; for matter is that which gravitates; What was it then before it was matter, or before it had gravity? It was notliing that was iuipressed with the tendency, or v»'hich received the pow- er to gravitate. It is nothing still if it do not gravitate really. And the difficulty returns upon us, that matter gravitates, either necessarily or vuluntarihj. That gra- vitation is a voluntary operation, as it respects matter itself, cannot be admitted — \^ ill not be believed by any 28 THE ALPHABET one: that it is the effect of divine volition, and the ope- ration of divine power, is equally inadmissahle;— ^this will appear more fully by and by ; — jiiul, if gravitation is a necessary operation of mattei', if it is the nt'ccssary consequence of its nature, how is that nature, or neces- sity, known to be ssiperinduccd, and not involved m the existence of the substance? If matter gravitates necessarily, tlien it is, apparently, and there is no good ground to sujjpose lljat it is not really the ellicient cause of gravitation. Jjut if the former theory be the true one, that matter lias no real agency in producing the phenomenon ; then matter gra- vitates neither recessarily nor voluntarily; it is not real- ly matter which gravitates. But tlien, matter has no existence that we know ; we had imagined that we ]>er- ceived matter in its phenomena, or through the medium of its operations, but we certainly perceive nothing but that vrhich gravitates, really, we perceive mechanical power, and nothing else. But matter manifests its existence so plainly through the medium of its solidity, or its phenomenon repul- sion, that it would be absurd to deny its existence, even though we give up gravitation as f»irnishing evi- dence of that existence. Is repulsion, then, the real operation of matter? Is material substance the real ef- Jicient cause of repulsion? If so, then, tliat material substance exwts, is a logical deduction from the exist- ence of the phenomenon. But if matter is the real agent in tlie one case, why not in the other? Repulsion is an energy, or operation, of the same species, or kind with gravitation, and requires the same species of ef- ficient cause; and if matter is the real cflBcient cause of this phenomenon, why not of gravitation also? But those who tell us that matter is made of nothing, are bound to OF THOUGHT, £9 conleiul" that matter is not the real efficient cause of either pljeMOiuciiou; or iliat repulsion is not necessarily cels; that is, we perceive that there must be an operator v.'.here there is an operation ; we perceive tliat there ^*must be somc- ^Hliing which gravitates and repels/''- Very good. But this perception that there must he something which gravitates and repels, ir, a deduction of reason; it is in- fering the agent from the operation. Then substances arc not perceived immediately, as has been supposed, but their existence is inferred from t!ie phenomena. It is a fact too. that avc infer a specific opes-ator, from a specific operation ; from gravitation and repulsion we infer the existence of that specidc thing w hich v/e call material substance. — If the substance were perceived immediately, or without an exercise of reason, there could then be no ground for dispute about whetlier the substance which s^ravitates, be the same with that which perceives. If these substances were perceived imme- diately, as operations are, the question wouhl be settled at once by immediate perception. We never dispute about whether blue and yelUjw are tlie same, or diiler- ent colours; or whether motion, and perception are the same, or different phenomena. In the perception of a phenomenon, or operation, there can ])c no ground for dispute about Avhat the object is; it is just what it ap- pears to ])e. The case would be just the same with •Dr. Reid. OF THOUGHT. 31 respect to substances, if tliey were perceived immedi- ately; they would then appear to be just what they really are; their appearance would ho. occidar demon- stration. It is an imperious dictate of reason, that wherever there is an operation, there is an operator, and that a specific operatiiju requires a specific operator, or a spe- cific cilicient cause, — a cause which is able, and has a direct tendency to produce that specific operation. It is in fact a specific operator that is uniformly inferred from gravitation and repulsion, and that is dcnomiuated ma- terial substance ; for it is undeniable i\v:A mankind ge- nerally perceive this substance, and that they look no deeper, nor higher than tlic substance itself, for the ef- ficient haais of the phenomena. None but philosophers of a certain school ever speculate on the efTicieucy, or inefficiency of the substance; and they do not pretend to have ascertained the alledged fact of its inefficiency, in a philosophical way ; they have not even investigated the metaphysical principle on which their doctrine is founded, the principle that the world is made of nothing. In opposition to tliese arguments it will be urged, that the substance actually perceived is not tlie efficient cause of the phenomena, but that it is something else, a thing which is made of nothing, an inert thing, which cannot of itself produce the phenomena. — It is thus that it is attempted to reconcile the metaphysical dogma, that the world is made of nothing, with the known/acf that sub- stances are perceived by the human mind. It is assert- ed that we perceive suhstances which are made of noth- ing, and which are not the efficient causes of the pheno- mena ; and, in conformity with this, it is asserted, that the perception of substance is not a deduction of reason- These alledged facts are believed to he sufficient to prop, S2 TJIR ALPHAIJET or even to support the whole of the mysterious fnhriv that is reared upon them ; among other tilings, that the metaphysical object called material substance h perceiv- ed, and yet its metaphysical character is not perceived ; that it is perceived neither hy sense, nor by reason, nor by any known faculty of the mind^ yet it is perceived. Facts are stubborn things; and it is a certain fact that v/e perceive material siU)slance; we are conscious that we perceive it. And if we are equally certain that we perceive siibfitnnces which are made aj nothing, if we were conscious of this, or if we were conscious that the perception of su!)stance is not a deduction of reason, then indeed there would be ground to conleud for tl;c nothingness of matter. But is it a real ft^t that we per- ceive substances that are made of nothing, and which are not the efficient causes of the phenomena? Are we conscious of perceiving, in material substance, a tiling which is made of nothing, and which has no necessary connexion with the phenomena? Are we couscinus of jjerceiving that the ptsenomena are connected arbitrarily with the substance; and that, if it had pleased tjje Crea- tor, we might have perceived a material substance vvhicl» did not gravitate and repel ; or that Me might have had the phenomena just the same, but unconnected with any «u])stance, or being, except the Deity ? Certainly we are not conscious of perceiving all tliis ; on the conlrary, common sense revolts from the doctrine thus carried out to its genuine results. When the phenomena of matter are addressed to the senses, Ave perceive that there must be a substance, we perceive that the operation is neces- sarily connected with a specilic operator, or with some- thing which has a tendency to produce that specific ope- ration ; and we never dream of the hand of Deity being immediately concerned. OF THOUGHT; S3 It is granted on all hands, tliat we perceive in matter something -which gravitates and repels. But if tiiat which prodnce«« these phenomena, is not, really, material sub- istance, but the hand of Deity, then it is the hand of De- ity that i? perceived — or it is the j^oicer of Deity that is perceived ; and if we do not choose to call the power of God I)y the name of material substance, then there is no material substance. There is nothing in the universe that does, or that can gravitate and repel, excepting that which is able to gravitate and repel, that is, the eflScient cause of gravitation and repulsion. Nothing but power can gravitate and repel; in fact, whatever does gravitate and repel, or produce any modification of impulse, is de- nominated iiowev. The word 'power signifies, that which moves, or impels. These phenomena are, on all hands, referred to power as their iiltlmafe cause; but one party, or sect, contends, that there is an intermediate something, called matter; something which comes between the cause and the eftect — between the operation and the real ope- rator. But this is a bare assumption ; for this interme- diate thing is not, in fact, perceived nor known to exist. The thing perceived through the medium of the pheno- mena, is the efficient cauee of the phenomena; it is that which gravitates and repels really; we are not conscious of perceiving any thing beside. It is a maxim of the Newtonian philosophy, to ^'Admit no more causes than "are true [real] and are sufficient to account for the pl>e- ••nomena.'^ If matter is not the real cause of the phe- nomena, its existence is not necessary to account for the phenomena. Before wc quit this subject, it is perhaps necessary to inquire a little further into this theory of the perception of matter. After the adoption of the principle that mat- ter is made of nothing, it was perceived to be a necessa- 5 gi THE ALPHABET ry consequence, that matter is not the real efficient cause of its pbeuomena; and that, of course, the phenomena could have no necessary connexion with the substance. Hence it became necessary further to admit, that there existed no logical evidence of the existence of material substance ; and some pursued this train of reasoning until it led to the conclusion that matter 1ms no existence. Those who still contended for the existence"of matter, in spite of philosophy, admitted all these results, (the last excepted) — they acknowledged they could not. establish the fact of the existence of matter, on rational grounds. In truth, if the fundamental principle of this theory were true— if matter w^ere made of nothing, it w ould be im- possible to prove its existence — it would be impossible to know or perceive its existence. But the modern attempt to establish this theory on fact, is perhaps the most ingenious, and is certainly the most sophistical that has been recorded. Ever since the invention of the new organ of investigation by Sir Fran- cis Bacon, the induction of facts has been considered the only legitimate method of philosophizing. Considering, very justly, that the study of metaphysics should be pro- secuted in the same method w ith that of physical science, by induction of facts, it has occurred to our modern me- taphysicians that the perception of matter should be considered an ultimate fact, or a law of the mind, just as the gravitation of matter is an ultimate fact, or a law of matter. This appears to have been intended as an application of the Baconian method in the science of Logic, to determine tlie predicament of a particular ^c/, or to induct that fact into a class; that is, to class the liercejption of matter with ultimate facts. But, unfor- tunately for the attempt, it seems to have been forgotten, that according to the Baconian metliod, investigation, or OF THOUGHT. S3 analysis, should precede induction. If tbe authors of this new theory of perception, had analysed the fact — the perception of matter— tliey would not have classed it with ultimate facts. But they seem to have considered a simple statement of the fact, and of its character, to be all that is called for by the method that they profess to follow. Professor Stewart, of Edinburg, w ho is the oracle in metaphysics, will speak for the whole sect on the theory of the perception of matter. On this sulyect the Profes- sor has the following observations. — "Singular as it may <'^appear, Dr. Reid was the fust person who had courage "to lay completely aside all the common hypothetical ^'language concerning perception, and to exhibit the dif- "ficulty in all its magnitude, by a plain statement of the "fact. To what then, it may be asked, does this state, "ment amount? — Merely to this, that the mind is so "formed, tliat certain impressions, produced on our or- "gans of sense by external o])jects, are followed by cor- '^respondent sensations ; and that these sensations (which "have no more resemblance to the qualities of matter "than the Avords of a language have to the things they "denote) are followed by a perception of the existence •'and qualities of the bodies by which the impressions "are made." The author goes on to observe, that, "for "aught Ave knoAV, the connection betAvecn the perception *'and the sensation, as Avell as that between the sensation "and the impression, may be arbitrary ; and that at any *^rate, the consideration of these sensations, which are "attributes of mind, can throw no light on the manner in "which we acquire our knowledge of the existence and "nature of bodies. And though, by the constitution of "our nature, certain sensations are rendered the constant "antecedent* of our perceptions, yet it is just as difficult 36 THE ALPHABET *^io explain how our perceptions arc obtained by tlieir ''means, as it would be upon the supposition, that we "were all at once inspired with them, without any con- '^comitant sensations whatever."* The Professor else- where tells us, that the perception of material substance, or "the belief in the existence of the material world,'" is a ^'fundamental law of human hclipf''\ Professor Stewart and Dr. lleid are intitled to much credit for having had the candour to ^'exhibit the diffi- ^^culty in all its magnitude," instead of pursuing the beaten track, and not incpiiring how our sensations and ideas are connected \a ith a substance which is made of nothing; or in what manner the mind acquires a know- ledge of such substance. But it is strange that such minds should still have been so shackled by the false principle, that matter is made of nothing and has no iiecessary connexion with the phenomena; it is strange that the very nature and magnitude of the difficulty did not lead them to analyse the subject, and to shake off their chains by a detection of tlie fallacy. Men of tran- scendent talents, professing to reject, as spurious, every thing which did not come supported by established fact, yet voluntarily, and without an investigation of its evi- dence, binding themselves down to a principle, which, like the stone of Sisyphus, is continually dragging tJiem down again from the summit which seemed to beckon their ascent. The professor proposes to himself to ''lay aside all the common liypothetical language concerning percep- tion, and to exhibit a plain statement of the fact." This fact is expanded into a pretty long paragraph ; though •Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, pages 86, 87, first vol. Amer. ed. fVol. 2, p. 55, New York ed OF THOUGHT. 37 all tliat is reaUy fact, may be expressed in a short sen- tence. ^'CerLain imprcssioivs produced on our organs "'•'of sense, are followed by correspondent sensations ; "'^and these sensations are followed by a perception of *^the existence and qualities of the bodies by which the impressions are made.'^ These few words, and they are sufficiently prolix — express the vvhole of the /acf; the remainder of the paragraph is hypothetical. And we are compelled to observe, tiiat the /acf is stated in- correctly; there is a radical error contained in it, which it is necessary to have corrected, before it be received as A principle in pliilosophy; '•the sensation is" not uni- formly or necessarily "followed by a perception of the ^^existence and qualities of the bodies by which the im- "pressions are made."' The mind is not "so formed,'* that the impression on the external oi'gan is necessarily followed by a perception of the bodies w hich make the impression. The author's "statement of fact/' as he terms it, assumes the very point in dispute, that the per ception of substance is not a deduction of reason: but that "by the constitution of our nature," the impression on the external organ is followed by a perception of the bodies by w hich the impressions arc made. — If it be a truth, that the impression and sensation are uniformly followed l)y a jjerception of the existence and qualities of the bodies which make the impression, if in persons in- capable of reasoning, that perception uniformly follows the impression and sensation, then that perception is not a deduction of reason, it is not an inference from the im- pression. But let us analyse the "fact," and see whe- ther it is as the author has conceived and has stated it. It is a pretty plain fact, that "impressions produced on '^the external organs of sense, are followed by corre- ••p})ondent sensations." — -And yet this fact is not so plain S8 THE ALPHABEr and simple, as it may appear at first view, or as the author seems to have conceived it to be. He states, not merely, tliat the impression is followed hy a sensation — but that 'Hhe impression is followed by a correspondent ^^sensation/' He says, moreover, that ^Hhese sensations '^have no more resemblance to the qualities of matter, '•'than the words of a laaguage have to the things they '•denote." The correspondence then, of the sensation to the impression, is a mere arbitrary correspondence, like that of the words of a language to the things they denote. But if this be so, the author should have re- vealed the manner in which we acquire a knowledge of the impression, or of the qualities of body : for if the sensation has no necessary connexion with the impres- sion, if the sensation is not the efl'ect, of which the im- pression is the exciting cause; then it will be just as dif- ficult to explain how we come by a knowledge of the im- pression, as how M'e acquire a knowledge of the body which makes the impression. If the sensation is only the arbiirarif sign of the impression on the external or- gan, as words are, of the thmgs they denote, how do Avc learn the signification of the sign? how do we know that there is an impression ? the sensation is the only sign, or the only notice we have of the impression ; and if it is an arbitrary sign, and lias no necessary con- nexion with the impression, how do we learn the exist- ence of the impression? Arbitrary signs have no natural or necessary relation to the things they denote; the words of a language convey no intelligence, until we have learned their signification, by comparing them with the things signified. But how shall we compare the sensa- tion within the mind, (which is perceived by conscious- ness,) with the impression without, which is not perceiv- ed by consciousness^ and of which we know nothing, OF THOUGHT. t39 until w« learn its existence through the medium of the sensation. We know nothing of the impression, unless the sensation is the evidence of its existence. But what is the fact ? is tlie connexion of the sensa- tion with the impression, an ^'arbitrary"' connexion? Bodies, or material substances produce certain impres- sions on the external organs of sense. These impres- sions are the same that are called the piienomena, or the sensible qualities of bodies, though the Professor docs not seem to have identified in his own mind, the ^-quali- "ties of matter," and the "impressions produced on the '^external organs of sense. '^ Matter has no qualities but those which are addressed to the senses. For example, solidity, or repulsion is a quality of matter; and repul- sion produced on the organ of sense, is the 'Hmpression ^^produced on the organ of sense.'' The "qualities of "matter" then, arc ihe same with the "impressions pro- "duced on the organs of sense by external objects." But what is the sensation which follows the imjjression '^ It is simply i\\y^ 'perception of the impression; or rather, it is the perception of the change, or configuration, pro- duced within the organ by the impression. AVhen a hard body is held in the hand, the repulsion of that body produces a compression within the organ of feeling; the organ, or nerve, is conscious, or sensible of this com- pression; or it perceives the compression; this is the sense, or sensation of hardness, or of solidity; it is the perception of the impression, or quality of matter. It is thus that the sensation corresponds to the impression ; it is the perception of the impression ; this is not an ar- bitrary correspondence ; it is the correspondence of cause and effect, for the impression is the exciting cause of the sensation. 40 THE ALPHABET It certainly does appear to the common sense of man- kind, that there is a natural and necessary connexion bc- tneen the impression on the or2;an of sense and the sen- sation which follows; and tliat tlie sensation is ti;e coz- nizance, or the perception, of the impression. The way in which we obtain a knowledi;e of a substance and its qualities, is to apply it to the senses. But the Professor says, "the consideration of these sensations, which are ^'attributes of mind, can throw no lidit on the manner in '^vhich we acquire our knowle»!ge of the existence and '^nature of bodies."' And it is true that sensation, ab- stracted from its object, and considered only as it relates to the mind, will afford no light on this subject: but there is no such thing, in fact, as abstract sensation ; every sensation has an object, or exciting cause, as well as a subject, or an efficient cause. The mind is the efficient cause and subject of tiie sensation ; but the impres-ion on the organ is the exciting cause and object of the sensa- tion; — and our sensations differ from one another, only according to the differences of the exciting causes. Thus it is in considering our sensations in relation to their ex- citing causes, that we derive the light which explains the perception of substances; for when we have discovered the impression through the medium of tlie sensation, we are then naturally led by reason to perceive, that there must be something which makes the impression — that there must be a substance, or an efficient cause of the impression. Our sensations correspond to the secondary qualities of matter, in the same way that they do to the primary, to solidity and gravity. This will be the sub- ject of some further consideration by and by. But to return. It is a fact, that "impressions produced on our organs "of sense, are followed by correspontUng sensations ; and OF THOUGHT, 41 ^^ilietJe sensations are followed,'' sometimes, "by a per- '*^ce|)tion of the existence and qualities of tlie bodies by ^'uhicli the impressions are made." But, we submit the, question, Is it the fact, that tlie imjyressions are uniform- ly followed by a perception of the existence and qualities of the bodies by which the impressions arc made? Do infants jrcrceive substances as soon as the impressions are produced on their organs of sense ? Do infants per- ceive at all the existence and qitalities of the bodies by "Nvhich the impressions are made ? There is reason to believe that infants havfc no conceptions of any thing be- yond their own ideas and sensations; they certainly have no conceptions w hatever of the impressions produced on their organs, until they have acquired that knowledge by frequent experiment and observation. If impressions produced on the organs of sense, were uniformly followed, by a perception of the substances which make the impression, then the percejjtlon of mat- ter Avould appear to be altogether unaccountable ; for it is evident that the impression has no tendency to pro- duce the 2ierce2}tion nf matter , unless it be addressed, as evidence, to a reasoning mind ; and it is equally evident, that the mind has no innate tendency to jJerceive matter. If the mind were originally "^'so formed,'^ as to perceive substance whenever an impression is produced on the organ of sense, then it should perceive matter as soon as it exists, for impressions from external objects are con- tinually presenting themselves. As soon as matter ex- ists, it gravitates ; — and as soon as mind exists, it per- ceives. As soon as there is life, impressions produced on the external organs of sense .will be felt, or perceived. As soon as a sensative organ exists, it feels, or perceives the changes, or vibrations produced within itself by the impressions of external objects.' It is true, then, tjiat 6 ^ THE ALPKABET impressious produced on the organs of sense, are follow- ed by perception, or feeling; but not always by a per- ception of tlie substance or body, M'hich makes the im- pression. Perception then, simple perception is a law of mind; whenever mind is excited, or acted on, it perceives; that mind perceives, is an ultimate fact which cannot be accounted for ; that is, w^e cannot give a reason for it, we cannot tell why mind perceives, any more than we can tell why matter gravitates. We can only say, it is the nature of the one to gravitate, and of the other, to perceive. But we cannot with equal pro- priety say, that it is the nature of mind to perceive mate- rial substance, or any particular object. The mind has an innate tendency to perceive, but it has no innate ideas, or particular perceptions. Perception is its own; but ideas, or impressions, come to it from without. The gravitation of matter is an ultimate fact; it is a fact which cannot be accounted for, that is, we cannot give a reason for it; it is a universal law of nature, that matter gravitates. And it has been conceived, tliat by representing the perception of matter as an ultimate fact, or a law of the mind, that the whole difficulty re- specting the perception of matter, would be obviated ; that if it is a lata of the mind to perceive substances which are made of nothing, no farther account of the matter could reasonably be demanded. But the percep- tion of matter is not an ultimate fact, as we have seen — it is not a universal law of mind, the perception oj mat ter, is by no means a parallel to the gravitation of mat- ter. The two facts are quite dissimilar, in a logical as well as in a philosophical point of view. That matter gravitates, and that mind perceives, are facts precisely analogous, in a logical sense, they are both ultimate facts; the one is a universal law of matter, the other, of OF THOUGHT. 4S mind. But rtiat inind perceives material substance^ is quite a dift'ereiit species of fact. Perception relates to mind, in the same way that gravitation relates to matter; these are necessary relations; but the perception ofmat- ter has no necessary relation either to mind^ or to mat- ter; yet it relates to bothf to matter, as its exciting cause and object; and to mind as the efficient cause of perception. That mind perceives, is a general fact, and it is a fundamental principle of metaphysical science; but that mind perceives matter, is a particular instance of that general fact. The efficient cause of perception is every where the same, nothing but mind, or spirit, perceives ; hence the relation of perception, to mind^ is a necessary relation ; but perception is excited by an in- finite variety of objects, or exciting causes, which arc foreign to the mind, but incidentally come in contact with it; hence the relation of perception to its object is an incidental relation. Before we have done with this subject, we shall essay to trace the process in which the mind discovers the ex- istence of material substance. In the mean time we will endeavor farther to illustrate the position, that Power is the substance of matter, and the efficient cause of gravi- tation and repulsion. It may be alledged, that though it were admitted that Power is the substance of matter, still this would not re- move the difficulty respecting the gravitation of matter; it would not account for the phenomenon, without a recur- rence to mind as the ultimate cause. It will be asked, Why does matter gravitate ? Supposing the anbstance of matter to be Power, why should power uniformly act toward a center ? Why should the most distant bodies approach, or be deflected toward each other? Power possesses no faculty of choice; mailer and power, are 44 TKE ALPHABET alike incapable of choosing in what direction to act, or to vhat end. How then can it be accounted for, that mat- ter uniformly gravitates, or acts toward a center of gra- vity, unless this direction is given it by mind, unless tliis phenomenon is produced by the power and influence of the supreme first cause, the divine mind ? This appears to be the grand diificulty. Yet it is not thought necessary to inquire, Why does matter repel ? or why is it solid ? It seems to be universally aduiiUed, that repulsion is inherent in the substance. Yet repul- sion is an operation of power, as well as gravitation ; it is an energy of the same kind, and requires tlie same ef- ficient cause ; and if matter is not the efficient cause of repulsion, this phenomenon is as hard to be accounted ior, as gravitation. It is conceived, that as matter gra- vitates uniformly, that uniformity must be the effect of volition some/where, and be produced by mind. Some philosophers have attributed that volition to matter itself, and the material world was believed to liave a soul. But the more enli^ited moderns perceive that matter does not act voluntarily; yet they have fallen into the opposite error, in supposing that matter is in its nature a clog to our volitions, and to our intellectual enjoy- ments. All, however, who deny that matter has a soul, and acts voluntarily, attribute the phenomena to the dl vine will and power. But gravitation is not the elTect of volition any where. Gravitation is not a voluntary, but necessary operation of matter ; contraction is not a voluntary, but a necessa- ry operation of power. Contraction is the modus ojm- randi of power; it is the primary operation, or, that by which every modification of motion, or impulse, is ori- ginated. 8ir Isaac Newton tells us, that <*Every parti- "cle of matter is continually deflected toward every other OF THOUGHT. 45 •particle of matter." Matter uniformbj gravitates, or power uniformly contracts, simply because this operation is not voluntary, ])ut necessary ; because power has no choice, nor a capacity to originate motion in any other way. Jllind can no more than matter, choose before hand, whether it shall, or shall not, perceive — nor what it shall perceive. The appropriate operation of an ef- ficient cause, cannot be varied even by that cause; much less is it to be controulcd, or produced by any foreign, or extraneous cause. Mind or spirit, is in the same pre- dicament wilh matter, in this respect ; it is its nature to produce a specific operation ; it perceives necessarily, *nd has no choice or direction in the matter. For this reason, the simple spiritual substance ^ cannot choose at any time, whether its operation shall be perception, or some other phenomenon; its operation is jjerception necessarily; it has no power to originate motion. The supreme mind cannot choose — let it be spoken with re- verence — whether He shall, or shall not know, or per- ceive; He perceives necessarily; Spirit is a constituent element of His Being, or Essence ; and Spirit is the ef- ficient cause of perception. The Deity can no more cease to perceive, than he can cease to exist. Gravitation or contraction, or the approach of the parts toward each other, is the modey or manner in which power operates; it is the mean through which power produces all its more remote eflects, or by which it ori- ginates every degree and modification of motion or im- pulse. This fact we liave exhibited before our eyes continually: and though it may never have been stated in terms, it is continually acted on in mechanical opera- tions. If an arm is bent, or drawn toward the body, it is by means of contracting the muscles of the fore-side * That which is called rtind, is a compound of power and spirit, 40 THE ALPHABET of the arm ; if it is stretched out, it is hy contracting the antagonist muscles. If a great force is to !»e exerted, it is to be by concentrating the force, or contracting the muscles, perhaps of the whole body. In all machinery, the principle of motion is tlie same, and is recogn ized in the construction ; the force produced is by means of a contraction, somewhere ; it is either by gravitation, as the falling of water, or the preponderance of a weight ; or it is produced by animal power, the operation of which al- ways originates in contraction. Contraction then, is the mode, or manner in which power operates ; it follows, that this operation is not the effect of volition, not even of divine volition ; it is the ne- cessary operation of power. But contraction, or gravi- tation, is the mode or manner in which matter operates ; it is the universal law of matter, as well as of power. It follows, that material substance and power, are one and the same. But it is the general belief, that Mind, or Spirit, is the xiltimate cause of gravitation, and of every modification of force, or impulse. Notwithstanding this, it will be readily granted, that power is necessary to the produc- tion of impulse ; that when mind impels, or originates motion, it is by means of poMcr ; aud that, without power, mind is incapable of producing impulse. Power then is necessary to the production of impulse ; and it appears too, that it is able to produce impulse, and the only thing that is able to produce this phenomenon, for mind without power, is not able to impel. But that which is necessary to a specific operation, and is able to jn-oduce that operation, is the efficient cause of that operation. Still it will be contended, that power is an attribute of Mind, and net an independent efficient cause, that Mind OF THOUGHT. 4j' or Spirit is the ultimate efficient cause of all tilings. The principle, that Power is an attribute^ shall be inquired into again 5 at present we will consider whether or not the mind, or spiritual substance, is the efficient cause of gravitation and repulsion. If mind, or the spiritual substance, be the f fficient cause of gravitation and repul- sion, it must produce these phenomena eitiier immediate- ly, or mediately. If mind is the immediate cause of gravitation and repulsion, then it is mind which gravi- tates and repels, or mind is solid and ponderous. But this is absurd; it is confounding things which are essen- tially different; for gravity ami solidity, or gravitation and repulsion, are the characteristics of matter, and dis- tinguish matter from mind. But if mind produce gravi- tation and repulsion mediately, or by a previous opera- tion produced upon matter from without, that previous Operation must be some modification of motion or im- pulse; it must be an operation of the same kind with that to be produced by it; for neither perception nor vo lition have any tendency to produce, either primarily, or secondarily, the appropriate operation of power; to sup- pose that they could do so, would be utterly to confound, all our ideas of cause and effect. But that previous im- pulse must be, either the immediate operation of mind — > which involves the same absurdity we just exploded — or it must be the effect of another previous impulse — and that of another, and so on ad infinitum. But this is equally absurd with the former alternative. So it ap- pears, that on whatever principle Spirit is supposed to be the efficient cause of impulse, it implies an absur^ dity. Since the spiritual substance is not the efficient cause of gravitation, it follows, that Power is the sole cause «f this phenomenon ; there is no other cause concerned 48 THE ALPHABET iu its production. li' power is the efficient aausc of gravitation, then material substance is the efficient cause of gravitation; or material substance is the power to contract, or to j^ravitate. Tlie efliciency of material substance is tacitly admitted in all our rcasonini^s re- specting bodies, and in the uses we apply them to. . J3o not the walls of our houses repel the slorni? Does not the floor sustain our weight? Perhaps it will be said, that matter is an instrument employed by presiding Deity for this and other purposes, and that it is nothing more. Be it so. But must not a thing possess some power, or efficiency, to fit it for Ijelng an instiiimcnt? Must not that which is employed to repd, possess the power to repel? If it do not, it can have no instriunen- talify in producing the effect. And if matter has no real instrumentality, no real efficiency, it is absurd to sup- pose it employed as an instrument. And in this case, why should it be supposed to exist? The phenomena w ould be just the same without it. Tiie repulsion of the storm, the reflection of light; the suspension of our I)odles some thousand of miles above the cenfer of gra- vity, (if bodies we. certainly have:) these phenomena are the real operations of power, and if material sub- stance is not that power, if it do not really produce and sustain these phenomena, what office does it perform? What part does it sustain? * There is nothing really substantial excepting efficient causes. That matter is the real efficient cause of its phenomena— that is, of gravitaiion and repulsion; its es- sential phenomena is implied in the language, both of the learned and the unlearned. We may confidently appeal to the common sense of mankind, are the pheno- mena, gravitation and repulsion, exhibited to the senses by matter, or are they exhibited by mind ? By matter OF THOUGHT. 49 certainly, it will be replied, and not by mind. Is mat- ter necessary to tlieir exhibition, or are they sometimes exliibited by something else, independently of matter? Undoubtedly matter is necessary to their exhibition; there is nothing but matter that gravitates and repels ; and whatever gravitates and repels, is matter. Can matter exist without exhibiting these phenomena, or without solidity and gravity? No, it cannot; it gravi- tates contihually and necessarily; that whicii does not gravitate, is not matter. Then matter is necessary to the production of these phenomena, and it is adequate to their production, for it cannot exist without pioducing them; in other words, matter is the efficient cause of gravitation and repulsion. But there are still objections to this doctrine, which it is necessary to investigate. It is coniideutly asserted, that Power is an attribute of mind; and it is consider- ed a self-evident truth, that Power cannot be without a subject. These assertions have an imposing aspect; the first is in the form of a definition; and the last, of an axiom, or an intuitive truth. That Power cannot be without a subject, is one of those principles, which, before tlie time of Mr. Locke, were called innate ideas; and which at the present time are believed to be per- ceived intuitively, or which Professor Stewart terms ^^fundamental laws of belief.'' But truths are not per- ceived in this way, as will be shewn hereafter. To be convinced that the above axiom, Power cannot be with- out a subject, is not perceived intuitively,, but is a deduc- tion of reason, we need only observe its relation to the definition, viz. Power is an attribute of mind. The process in which the mind arrives at the axiom, is as follows. If power is an attribute, it follows of necessi- ty, that power canuot be without a subject. Here the 50 THE ALPHABET major proposition, that is, an attribute cannot be without ft subject, is taken for granted without being expressly stated, as is frequently the case in metaphysical reason- ing. The above reasoning is plausible, indeed the in- duction is quite correct: but it proceeds on a false prin" ciple, consequently the conclusion is false, although it is fairly deduced from the premises. The process would be stated more methodically thus, An attribute cannot he without a suhject; but Power is an attribute, therefore, Power cannot he without a suhject. The conclusion so plainly and necessarily folloAvs from the premises, that we are apt, in reconsidering or applying the principle which forms the conclusion, to overlook both the major and the minor proposition, and the whole process by which we arrive at that principle, and to imagine that we perceive it intuitively, or without any exercise of rea- son. Yet it must be obvious to any one who considers the subject, that the truth of the principle, Power can- not be without a subject, depends entirely on the cor- rectness of the premises which have been stated, and more particularly on the minor proposition, that Power is an attribute. It is assumed^ that Power is an attri- bute; but this is a false definition of power; consequent- ly, the conclusion, that Power cannot be without a sub- ject, is false. If the term attribute have the same signification with the ward quality, then it cannoi be a true definition of power to say, it is an attribute. When a thing is to be defined, or when we are about to point out the genus to which any thing belongs, it is necessary, not only that the character of that tiling be clearly ascertained; but also, that the characteristic of the genus to which that thing is to be referred, be well understood; otherwise the definition may be false, and may lead to false con- OF THOUGHT. 51 elusions, even when we have a just conception of the thing to be defined. That Power has been eiToneous- ly defined, was owing, not so mucli to tlie want of a correct knowledge of the nature of power, as to the vagueness of the generical term attribute. When it is said that Power is an attribute, a precise meaning should be annexed to the word attribute ; we should not only have inquired— What is Power? but we should have ascertained with precision — What is an attribute? The word attribute is generally used as synonymous with the word quality^ but it is sometimes applied in a different sense. It frequently signifies that which belongs to, or is possessed by, some being or thing ; as when we say, Man possesses mind, or intelligence. Tliis is attribut- ing mind to man, or it represents mind as an attribute of man. In this sense of the word, an attribute may be either a substance or a quality, for mind is a substance, and an attribute of man; and power may be an attribute and at the same time a substance, a thing which subsists of itself, or without a subject. Eut in the more strict and proper sense of the word, an attribute is some action, or operation, or some species of action, or operation, as that gravitation is an attribute of matter; thought, or perception is an attribute of mind. This agrees with the signification of the word qualily / gravitation, or gravi- ty, is a quality of matter ; but it does not agree with the cliaracter of Power. Power is not an action, nor an operation of any kind ; Power is the subject of an attri- bute ; contraction is the attribute, or the quality of power. Yet the principle, that Potver is an attribute — in the latter sense of the word attribute, or that power is a quality, is the foundation of the axiom, Power can- yiot be laithout a subject. Definitions do neither good nor harm, except ^Yhen they are made principles of science. 52 THE ALPHABET It may be proper, and it may tend lo illustrate the foregoing paragraph, to inquire a little further into the general character of qualities. A correct definition, either expressed or understood, of the term quality, ■would seem to be a necessary preliminary to the deter- mination, respecting any particular object, whether or not it be a quality. Quality is a term which has ac- quired a considerable latitude; to discover what is its radical signification, we should proceed by an investiga. tion of particulars. Gravity and solidity will be allow- ed on all hands to be qualities, in the strictest sense of the word. What is gravity? and what is solidity? Gravity has been defined, a tendency to gravitate ; or a •power to gravitate. But this latter has been exjdoded; modern philosophers affirm, that matter possesses no jJower to gravitate. We have, in fact, no knowledge of a power to gravitate, diff'erent from the substance, or that which actually gravitates. Power is not an attribute. Material substance is itself the power to gravitate^ or the power to contract / the efficient cause of gravitation, is the only power to gravitate. There is no such thing as a quiescent tendency, or power, to gravitate ; the actual operation, and the efficient cause of the operation, which cannot cease to operate, are the only real objects of knowledge ; gravitation, and that which gravitates, are all that we know of, or belonging to, material substance. Whatever has a real existence belongs to the one or the other of these two genera ; it is either an efficient cause, or the operation of an efficient cause. Perhaps it is not strictly proper lo say, that an operation exists; but ope- rations are certainly real, and tliey are necessary too. — The idea which is really annexed to the term gravity, is that ^{gravitation, or of the actual force, or deflection of one body tov/ard another;. Gravity apd solidity ar.c OF THOUGHT. S6 the same willi gravitation and repulsion; the one and the other are called sensible qualities; or quaUties per- ceived by tlie senses; but the organs of sense perceive only operations ; they do not perceive latent tendencies or powers. This is the true philosophical import of the word quality ; a quality is a phenomenon, or an opcra-^ tion addressed to the senses, or to the mind. Tf tliis be the true import of the word quality, then ^ower is not a quality, it is not a phenomenon. Power is not an attribute of mind. That mind exerts an ac- tive power, is an un(lenial)le fact; but it does not follow, that Power is a quality of the mind, any more than it would follow from the operation of Spirit, that Spirit is a quality of the mind. To explain this matter more ful- ly, the subject will be resumed; but we have not done with the qualities of matter. Of the secondary qualities of matter we shall speak again ; but there are several ac- cidents which are considered to be essential and distin- guishing qualities of matter, which have no title to be so denominated. Diuisihility is certainly not a phenome- non, or an operation, it is therefore not a quality of mat- ter, nor of any thing else. Neither is extension a phe- nomenon, or an operation, or a quality of matter. It ha§ been generally set dov/n as an undeniable fact, that ex tension and divisibility belong exclusively to matter, and that they distinguish matter from mind, or from spirit. But this is an assumption without proof; no one pre- tends to have discovered by experiment and observa- tion, or by any mode of investigation, that spirit or mind, is unextended ; but it is one of those principles, which get possession of the mind by means of that native love of mystery which attaches to our natures. Matter and Spirit are dislingtiished from each other, only by tiicir phenomena : Spirit is an extended being, as will be seen 54 THE ALPHABET when the subject comes to be investigated. Extention is a word of nearly the same import with space. Space is length, breadth, and depth abstracted from body, or substance; extention is length, breadth, and depth attri- buted to body or substance. Extention, signifies the space which a substance occupies; space, is extention unoccupied. Vis inerfice has also been considered a characteristic of matter. But the terms contain a solecism. The power of inertness, is the power to be powerless. That which is obviously alluded to in this expression, is the power of gravitation, or the power to resist being mov- ed in any direction, but that in which matter uniformly tends, toward a center of gravity. Resistance is an operation of power; it is a phenomenon of the same kind with impulse, and requires the same species of efficient cause. This resistance is called inertness, because it is not a voluntary action, nor to be overcome by simple volition; it is only by organization, or by combining spirit with matter, that the latter becomes obedient to the will. Matter is morally and intellectually, but not phy- sically, inert. The power of inertness is the power of gravitation and repulsion ; and this power is not a qua- lity, but a substance. This substance, or power to gravitate, is not perceiv- ed by the senses ; but it is perceived by reason ; it is discovered in a metaphysical analysis of the nature of the phenomena. This analysis is a spontaneous opera- tion of the mind, and takes place even in children, or as soon as the child begins to observe the result of its own experiments, or the effects produced within its organs of sense by contact with external objects. In pretty early childhood we discover, that certain events, or operations, are uniformly succeeded by certain other events. We OF THOUGHT. 55 find by experiment, that by a single stroke we can send an apple or a ball rolling across the carpet. In this way we acquire the conception of a cause, and of the relation of cause and effect. The child, indeed, will not com- prehend your meaning, when you talk to him of a cause: for he has not learnt the meaning of the term ; but he will tell you that he can make the apple roll, which plainly expresses his idea of a cause. But they are only physical, or secondary causes that he first becomes acquainted with. In making farther experiments and observations, he discovers another kind of cause. When he holds a lump of clay or a ball of metal in his hand, he perceives that it forcibly presses downward, or to- ward the earth ; and as often as he repeats the experi- ment, he observes the same phenomenon. He observes also a powerful repulsion in the ball, which prevents his hand from closing. He knows that he was himself the cause of the rolling of the ball, or that the rolling was produced by the impulse which he had originated; but he discovers no external, or secondary cause of the lat- ter phenomena, of the gravitation and repulsion of the ball. But he has learned from his observations on se- condary causes, that every effect has a corresponding cause; the gravitation and repulsion of the ball, must have a cause suited to their production, and that cause must be within the thing whence the phenomena pro- ceed. That thing must of itself produce the phenomena, or it must be the efficient cause of the phenomena. And that efficient cause must have a substantial or permanent existence, for it never ceases to maintain the phenomena or sensible appearance. This is the metaphysical pro- cess in which, while children, we discover the existence of material substance, or the efiicient cause of gravitation and repulsion. Every mind discovers for itself the 65 THL ALPHABET relation of cause and effect, and the existence of efficient causes; no words, or artijlcial signs can inspire the mind with a knowledge of this relation, or wUh ilie idea of an invisible efficient cause; we pcirceive efficient causes only through their natural signs, thcii' upcra^ tions. But when the child hecomes a youth, he leanis from books, or from his preceptor, that liis reason plays him false in this matter; that she is not a proper guide in philosophy; that there are certain principles, no matter whence derived, to which reason must succumb; that the world is made of nothing, and that matter is not the ef ficient cause of the phenomena: and that the substance which he perceives has no necessary connexion v/ith the phenomena. — This appears mere jargon to his unsoplils- cated mind; for he is unconscious of perceiving any thing in, or belonging to matter, excepting the plieno- mena, and the efficient cause of the phenomena. He cannot conceive how the substance can appear to be any thing beside what it really is, for he knows that it does Qot appear at all to the senses, it discloses itself only to reason, through the evidence of the phenomena. It is in vain that he asks for the rationale of the theory pre- sented to him, the ultimate appeal is, not to reason, but to the principle— The world is made of nothing; and he is exhorted to believe, on pain of being pronounced a dunce and infidel. And after an inward struggle be- tvr'cen reason and prescription, he adopts the dogma, and enters a lal)yrinth where the farther he advances^ the more he is entangled. Wc come now to consider the secondary qualities of matter: It is an obvious fact, that there is an infinite variety of phenomena attending matter, which yet are not essential to it, or necessarily connected with it; and OF THOUGHT. 57 are therefore called secondary qualitiea. The pheno- mena which meet the senses, are not, all of them, the real operations of matter; t!iat is, simple material sub- stance, or power, is not the efficient cause of all the phenomena with which it is connected. Some bodies exhibit phenomena, which all bodies do not, and which, therefore, do not necessarily belong to body. Matter is not the real efficient cause of all the phenomena which attend it; and from this it has been too hastily conclud- ed, that matter is not the real efficient cause of any of its phenomena ; or that •vavitatioii and repulsion are not its real qualities, nor necessarily connected with it, any more than the secondary qualities. If tliere arc certain phenomena exhibited by some bodies which are not ex- hibited hy all, we may rationally conclude that these phenomena are not essential to body ; or that simple ma- terial substance does not produce, by its own efficiency, those phenomena which it does not exhibit uniformly ; hut we are not entitled to infer^ that matter does not pro- duce any operation by its own power. There are phe- nomena attending bodies, which mechanical power does not, and which it cannot produce; hut the legitimate in- ference is, that tliere are other causes present; that there are otlier, ov immaterial substances in combination with matter; substances which do not contract and repel, but which, by producing other modes of operation on the or- gans of sense, excite other sensations than those excited by contraction and repulsion. And if we shall actually find other substances — substances, the phenomena of which are essentially different from gravitation and re- pulsion; if we should find such substances in chemical combination with matter — if we should find spiritual substance concerned in producing some of the phenome- na which apparently belong to matter — we ought not to 8 58 THE ALPHa-DET recoil from tlie truth, although it may shock our preju- dices. Some one has well said, that "We should pur- sue truth whithersoever she lead, heedless of conse- quences." But we shall be told, that it is absurd to suppose mat- ter and spirit to be chemically combined. Most people are ready to pronounce absurd any doctrine or principle, which contradicts opinions which have long held posses- sion of the mind, whether these opinions are founded in reason and in fact, or are not. To be absurd, is to be incompatible with acme known truth, or established ge- neral fact. If any established truth or fact, can be pointed out, with which the allegation that material and immaterial substances are chemically combinffd, is in- compatible, then that allegation is absurd and inadmis- sible; but if no such truth, or fact can be adduced, you are not entitled to pronounce the allegation absurd. Perhaps this challenge will be met, if not by an esta- blished fact, at least by a theory which has long usurped the authority of truth. It will be asserted that the spirit or mind is an unextended thing, occupying a point some- where in the brain; that it is therefore incapable of com- ing in contact, and consequently incapable of combining chemically with matter, which is extended. But ou what does this theory rest? It is not a known fact, esta- blished in experiment and observation, that spirit is un- extended; nor is it a fair deduction from any known fact. We will not suppose that any enlightened mind will pertinaciously adhere to this theory. There is a substance well known to chemists, which does not gravi- tate; it exhibits no phenomenon that belongs essentially and properly to matter; therefore it is not a material, but an immaterial substance. Yet it enters into chemi- cal combination with all substances; it is caloric, or OF THOUGHT. 59 lieat; its modus operandi is e.vpansiony the reverse of contraction. — It will be demonstrated in the next chapr tcr, that the substance of heat or fire, is neither more nor less than the elementary spiritual substance. There is another immaterial substance, the phenomena of whicli we shall find blended with those of matter. But it will l)e thought inconceivable, that the opera- tions of immaterial substances should affect the senses; that they should be seen, or felt, or tasted. But if the operations of immaterial substances are not the excitins; causes of some of our sensations, then all the variety of ideas and sensations which \Te experience, are produced simply by the operations upon our organs, of contraction and repulsion. But this is much harder to conceive, than that the operations of immaterial substances should be seen with the eyes, or tasted with the palate. And we would ask, Why may it not be true, that immaterial substances affect the senses ? What is matter, that it should have more elBciency than spirit in affecting the organs of sense ? Or are the organs of sense adapted only to contraction and repulsion ? There are several facts to be ascertained, before it can be asserted on good ground, that the senses are incapable of discerning the operations of immaterial substances; or that these sub- stances have, and can have, no share in producing the phenomena of nature. There can be but one simple mate- rial substance, or one simple basis of contraction and re- pulsion; and it would be absurd in the extreme to sup- pose, that this one simple principle can be the basis of all the endless variety of phenomena which meet the senses; or that it can produce at the same time contrac- tioiif expansion, bitter, sweet, red, blue and yellow. There are a variety of minute operations produced on the organs of sight and of iaste, which have not been 6a THE ALPHABET ascertained to consist of contraction and repulsion : wc know tlirtt the senses lake cognizance of oilier modes of operation exhi')iled on a I)road scale, such as the ascen- sion of vapour, the expansion of bodies by heat, the harmony of sound ; and when these operations arc mi- nute, and are produced in contact with the organs of sense, may tliey not produce that variety of sensation which v.e experience ? It is unphilosophical, and con- trary to common sense, to suppose that all our different sensations have only one exciting cause ; which must be the case, if the senses perceive only the phenomena of matter. There is a two-fold classiiicalion of phenomena, "which arises out of the nature of things, but which ren- ders this subject much more complex and entangled ap- parently, than it is really. The classification we allude to, is not a scientific, or artificial one; it is to be collect- ed from the common language of mankind; it is founded in common sense, and common observation, and in the obvious dijferencps and analogies, of the phenomena of nature, and of the organs of sense. And first, the phenomena are classed according to the different organs affected. There are colors, or objects of sight; sounds, or objects of hearing; tastes and odours, or objects of taste and smell ; and all the differ- ent degrees and modes of repulsion, as hardness, rough- ness, §;*c. the objects o( feeling. But each organ of sense perceives different phenomena, or different modes of operation. A.nd it is a fact worthy of observation, that several of the organs of sense, perhaps all of them, excepting that of feeling, distinguish three simple modes of operation, or experience three distinct kinds of sen- sation. Of the objects belonging to the organ of vision, ■we, have the three primary colours, red, blue and yel- OF THOUGHT. 61 loic;^' corresponding, numerically, and essentially too, as will appear — to the simple elementary plienomena, motion, perception and harmony — and to the simple ef- .ficient causes. Power. Spirit and Truth. The organ of hearing distinguishes three distinct operations; first, simple 50 M??c?; secondly, harmony of sound, a phenome- non distinct from simple sound; and thirdly, the j7a/Aos of sound, distinct frour either of the former. Everv sound that differs at all from simple sound, partakes of one. or both of the two latter modifications of sound. — The organ of taste also distinguishes three simple phe- nomena, the sweety the pungent^ and the astringentf or acid. But again, the common sense, and common language of mankind, recognize an analogy between the sensa- tions of the different organs, or rather between the phe- iiomena addressed to the different organs; which pheno- mena are the objects and exciting causes of our sensa- tions. Thus we have siceet sounds, and sweet colours, as well as sweet tastes and sweet odours. Theu we have lively and dull colours, lively and dull sounds, lively and dull, or insipid tastes, &c. This analogy, or sirail^^ty, which is so plainly recognized in the pheno- mena, is obviously inferred from the analogy, or simi- larity of the sensations excited in the different organs by the phenomena. It is obviously taken for granted, that the sensation excited in one organ by any mode of operation, is analogous to the sensation excited in any of the other organs, by the same mode of operation. The same simple mode of operation, that is harmony, is beauty to the eye, melody to the ear, and sweetness to • The remaining four of the colours somellmes numbered with the demcntary, arc evj«JemIy compounds. 62 THE ALPHABET the taste and smell. A harmonious vibration produced in the organ of sight, or in that of taste, similar, or cor- responding to the vibrations produced in the organ of hearing by musical sounds, Avill of course produce in those organs sensations, analogous to that excited by music; for a sensafiov is nothing else than a perception of the vibration or change, produced within the organ of sense, l)y the operation of the external object upon that organ. The eye has the advantage of perceiving harmony in a variety of different situations and relations, from v/hich circumstantial differences the same phenomenon takes different names. There is harmony or proportion of form or figure, otherwise called beauty; harmony of movements, called grace; and one of the primary co- lours will of course consist of a harmonious vibration produced upon, and within the organ of vision. "So the glad impulse of congenial powers, "Or of sweet sound, or f\iir proportion'd form, "The grace of motion, or the bloom of light, "Thrills through imagination's tender frame, "From nerve to nerve." Which of the primary colours it is that consis^ of a harmonious vibration, whether it is the red, the blue, or the yellow, it would be hazardous, perhaps, to decide ; but there is reason to conjecture that it is the red. This conjecture is founded, partly on fact, and partly on the analogy of our sensations. It will probably be granted, that the sensation excited in the organ of sight by the co- lour of yAloic, is not analogous to that excited in the or, gan of hearing by harmony of sound- Oiir appeal in this case, is to the consciousness, and the discriminating taste of the reader. But there is external evidence in support of the conjecture, that hliie is not the colour of OF THOUGHT. 63 htiimoay. It is a known fact, that blue is the most re- fraiii;ible of the elementary colours; but refraction is a particular case of 2;ravitation, it is the approach of the parts; and gravitation or contraction is a phenomenon distinct from harmony, aud excites a sensation peculiar to itself, whicli will l)e noticed just now. That the co- lours are all refrangible in some degree, is evidence that no one of them is quite pure, or unmixed, excepting tlie blue, or that they all contain a portion of the gravitating substance. Again, the same simple mods of operation, that is, contraction, is acidity, or astrivgency to the taste; sim- ple sound to the ear ,. and to the eye the colour blue. When the Material substance in its pure elementary state, enters the organ of sight, as light in general enters and passes through any other chrystaline body, it pro- duces its own mode of operation, a contraction in the' nerve. This contraction is, in the first place, the opera- tion of the substance wiiich enters the organ ; this ojjera- tion is the colour blue ; w hen it has entered tlie organ, it excites a like operation, a contraction in the organ it- self, or the nerve; this is called the idpa of the colour blue. The idea, is the colour itself, or it is contraction produced wilhiii the organ. Further, the feeling or per- ception of the idea, or the perception of the contraction within the organ, is that which is called the sensation of the colour blue. The organ does not perceive what is the mode of operation by which it is affected, but it perceives that a peculiar idea or change, is produced within it ; it perceives the differences of the colours, or of the ideas produced within it, but it does not perceive in Avhat these differences consist. There is a third simple mode of operation which, with those before mentioned, complete the circle of the phe- 04 THE ALPHABET nomcnji, or of llie objects of our sensations. IX contrac- tion constitutes the colour of blue and harmony, the red, the only remaining simple mode of operation, tliat is, ex- pansion, will form the colour yelloiv. It will be shewn in the next chapter, that expansion is the modus opeTun- di of spiritual substance ; or that it is the manner in which spirit operates upon, and inlluences matter. It is probably this mode of operation or expansion, that ex- cites the idea and sensation of warmth or pungency in the organ of taste, and the same >\ hich pi-oduces or con- stitutes, the pathos of sound. Pathetic, or penetrating sounds, issue from a relaxation of the muscles produc- ing sound, or producing the human voice, and operate by sympathy upon the hearer. This relaxation in the voice, arises from internal distress, or is imitated where there is no real distress, eitlier by the iiuman voice, or by a musical instrument. Thus expansion, the modus operandi of Spirit, is patiios to the ear, pungency to the taste, and to the eye the colour yelloiv ; wliile harmony, the modus operandi of Truth, is music to the ear, sweetness to the taste, and beauty, or the colour red to the eye ; and contraction, the modus operandi of Power, is astringency to the taste, simple sound to the ear, and sublimity, or the colour blue to the eye. The phenomena of Power constitute the sublime ; those of Truth, the beautiful ; and those of Spirit, the pathetic. This is an outline of a theory which cannot be fully developed, except in a detailed investigation of the nature of the human mind. It is merely intended as an illus tration of the position, that there is a natural and ne- cessary relation between our sensations and perceptions, and the antecedent impressions produced on our organs of sense by external objects ;, and that the qualities of OF THOUGHT. 65 bodies, or the phenomena, which are the immediate ob- jects of our sensations, are logical evidences of the ex- istence, and Df the various natures of the substances with which they arc connected. The most formidable obstacle in the'way of conceiv- ing and establisliing the true dcfmitiou of matter, or of power, viz. Power is the substance and efficient cause of Ihe phenomena of matter, is the prejudice that lin- gers in the mind respecting the nature cf Mind. It is an undeniable fact, that Mind exerts an active power, that it originates motion, or gives the first impulse to muscular action. Hence it is inferred, that power is aa attribute or quality of mind. Yet it is not from this simple fact — Mind originates motion, taken by itself, that the inference is deduced; for a much plainer and more natural conclusion would be, that Power is com- bined with spirit in constituting the substance of the mind. P»ut it is tacitly assumed, that Jlind is a sim- pie substance ; and it is on this principle, taken in con- junction with the fact just mentioned, that it is so bold- ly asserted, that Power is an attribute of mind. If mind were a simple substance, it would seem that either the power to impel, or the, j^ower to perceive^ must be a quality, or that both might be qualities; for if they are both substances, and both belong to mind, then mind is a compound. But admitting mind to be a simple es- sence, and considering that the phenomena of spirit are they which distinguish mind from matter, it follows that the simple spirit is that essence, or constitutes the sub- stance of the mind ; and that power is an attribute or quality of spirit. That mind originates motion, is a known fact. Mo- iion then is an attribute of mind, or it is an operation of Blind. But power certainly is not an operation. Power Q 66 THE ALPHABET is not the operation of a cause, but the efficient cause of an operation. Motion is the operation of power, not of spirit. Mind must possess power, that is, mechanical power, or the power to impel, otherwise it could not originate motion; the spirit or power to perceive, is not the power to impel. The energy of the mind is in proportion to its mechanical power, and not to its in- tellectual, as distinguished from its mechanical power; it is in proportion to the tension of the nerve, not to the intensity of feeling, nor to the acuteness of perception. Strength of mind does not consist in sensaiiveness ; it consists even less in the clearness and quickness of perception, than in the power to repel thoughts that ar« painful, or troublesome, and to confine the attention to a subject which requires labor. The labor of the mind is a mechanical operation, as really as the labor of the body ; the first consists of a continued effort to pro- duce those trains of ideas, or successive configurations in the brain, which are the signs, or evidences of the things which the mind is investigating. The only lo- gical inference that can be deduced from the fact, that Mind exerts an active power, is, that Power is a consti- tuent element of the substance of the mind. We have the same kind of evidence for the existence of j)oiverj in the mind, that we have for the existence of spirit in the mind ; each exhibits its peculiar pheno- menon; Spirit perceives, and Power impels. From the phenomenon, we infer the existence of the sub- stance; and from the species, or kind of phenomenon^ we infer the species, or kind of substance ; that is, from perception, we infer the existence of spirit; and from motion, power. Power and spirit, or matter and spirit, are in the same predicament as to their generic characters ; they are both substances ; or they are both OF THOUGHT. 67 invisible efficient causes, of visible, or perceived opera- tions. Mind contains a principle of action, or of impulse, as well as a principle of perception; but it is just as rational to suppose, that the principle of action, me- chanical power, is the agent, or efficient cause, of per. cejjfion, as that the principle of perception, or the power to perceive, is the agent, or efficient cause, of impulsion. It is just as reasonable to suppose that the material substance, or that power, perceives, as that the spiritual substance impels. Whenever motion, or impulse, 18 exhibited to the senses, the thing which impels is, without hesitation, called body, or matter; but when the operation is hidden from the senses, and we ar« left to infer it from the more remote effects, that is, where the impulse perceived by the senses has been communicated, or produced by a previous impulse — for instance, where the action of the muscles is produced by an impulse originating in tlie mind, in this case, the primary cause, or thing which moves, is called power. When the senses perceive the primary, or immediate operation of power, as in gravitation and repulsion, we pronounce the operator to be matter; but when the senses perceive only the secondary effect, we pronounce the originating cause to be power. If we could see with our eyes, or feel with our hands the operation of mind in originating muscular motion, we should have no hesitation in determining that mind is in part mate- rial. But we can only infer the operation of the mind in this transaction from what follows, from the action of the muscles ; and this is in fact the only evidence we have, that there is an action, or impelling operation, in the mind as distinguished from tlie rest of the sys- tem; for we are not covtscious of au exertion of power 6» THE ALPHABET any where except in the muscles. And if from the action of the muscles we infer that an impulse is given by the mind, it is in plain terms applying the law^s of matter and motion, to explain the phenomena of th© miii9 in the external organs, is the consciousness or percep- ccptioii of what takes plicc witliin tlie external organs. Setise and consciousness perceive phenomena, or opera- tions, but do not take cognizance of substances. If the internal organ of consciousness, or sensation per- ceives the phenomena of spirit, why may not the exter- nal organ of sensation, or consciousness perceive the phenomena of spirit? Is spirit less efScient than mat- ter? Is it matter only that has the pov.cr to awaken the sentient organ ? Or has the sentient principle in the the. external organs the power to perceive the pheno- mena of matter; and not the power to perceive the phe- nomena of spirit? The organ of feeling; perceives gravitation and re- pulsion; and reason infers an invisible cause, a some- thing which gravitates and repels ; and this something is called matter. The external organ of feeling per- ceives heat also; that is, the phenomenon called heat ; and it is inferred, that there is a suhstancBj or mat- ter of heat; we do not refer this phenomenon to the same cause, or substance which produces gra\ita(ion. Thougli the sulistance of heat is, improperly, termed matter of heat, it is notorious that it does not gravitate or repel. The substance of heat is immaterial. ITeat is capable of being accumulated to an unknown extent, by means of its chemical attjj, Action for material sub- stance; but this is quite d-lTerent from gravitation^ which is the necessary operation of matter, independ- ently of chemical affinities. Heat radiates, or ex[)and.''; but this is diflcrent from the repulsion of matter, for while heat radiates, it penetrates solid bodie«, it does not repel them. By means of its chemical attraclion, heat imparts to bodies its own mode of operation, ex- j)ansion, and causjes matter to exhibit phenomena essen- 12 ^0 THE ALPHABET tially different fi'om contraction, or gravitation. It is in consequence of this tendency to expand, together with its chemical attraction for material suhstance, that heat produces solution and decomposition in unori^auized bodies; and it is in consequence of the same tendencies, physical and cliemical, that it i;ives to organized bodies a peculiarity of character called life. — It is a known fact, that tlje living principle is continually counteract- ing the contracting, or gravitating tendency of the ma- terial part of the animal system. Many of the animal functions are performed by means of expansion ; and it is this mode of operation tljat distinguishes the living from the dead body; — or the phenomena of life, from simple gravitation and repulsion. It is by expanding the chest that we breathe ; it is by alternate contractions and expansions of the heart and arteries, that the blood is circulated, &c. It has been shewn, that the nwde of vjperation of the material substance, or of power, is con- traction; that in all animal actions, the primary opera- tion is contraction. But when a muscle has contracted, the material part has nat any power nor tendency again to expand; consequently its actions Avould be at an end, if there were not another species of energy, or power, to expand the contracted muscle. The contractions of matter cannot l)e counteracted but by direct expansion. But what is it that is 1^ pwn to counteract and controui the contracting tendency pf matter in the animal con- stitution ? It is the spirit, ^r the principle of life. Expansion then is the mode, or manner in which spirit operates upon, and controuls matter. — But expan- sion is the mode or manner in which heat, arjlre ope- rates upon and controuls matter; therefore, heat and sjnritj are t£e same substance. — It is probable that heat causes bodies to expand, not hy force, whicli is the kind OF THOUGHT. &1 of energy exhibited by power, or matter, but by its owu tendeacy to expand, united with its chemical attraction for material substance. The force exhibited by ex- panding bodies, is the energy of power; but the direc- tion of that force, that is, from a center, is the operation of spirit, and the material substance is carried along with tlie spiritual by chemical attraction. There are certain mclaphors in the language of cul- tivated nations, wliicli plainly indicate a common senti- ment, or apprelicnsion among mankind, that external fire, and the internal spirit, arc analogous, or that they are essentially tlic same. When the mind exhibits mudi excitement it is said to be heated, or fired. The mind isjired with a thirst of glory; Jired with a thirst of revenge, &c. Then there is the^re of genius; thej^re of anger; the fire of ambrik)n; the^rc of devotion. — Prometheus stole ^'re from heaven, to animate his man of clay. — ''Wiien I mused, the fire burned,'' said the royal poet. The following, from the same pen, is an expression without any metaphor of the sameness of spirit and tire. ^*^Wlio maketli sjririts his angels, — a ^"'flame o^ fire his ministers." — Passion is said to be a combustion, in wSiicli the body is consumed by internal fires. Animal life is a slow combustion, in which the body is exhaled by the operations of the spirit, and if not constantly replenished, would cease to furnish fuel for tlie vital tlame. But metaphor, it may he said, is not a proper vehicle of philos(»phical truth. Yet metaphor is founded in analo2;y, and analogy certainly is one species of philo- phical evidence. Anah)gy consists in the samencsn of the mode of operation, or of some circumstance attend- hig some two things. There is a loose analogy, where the circumstances which correspond in the two things 92 THE ALPHABET winch ai-c analogous, are remotely connected with ihn^o thin<;s, or are the remote eJfectSj and not the immediate necessary operations of those things. The following melaplior presents an instance of this loose analogy. "If any man seem to be religious, and bridlcth not his tongue," &c. This metaphor is founded in the analogy between a bridle and a moral precept^ or truth, Thft point of analogy is the restraint imposed by the bridle, and by tbc precept; but the G^ect is remote from either cause: and the mode of operaiion of the one cause is different from that of the other. A bridle restrains by force, and by tlie pain it inflicts ; but a moral precept, or truth restrains by its beauty, and by the pleasing sen- sation it excites in the mind. — It would be improper to rest the proof of a principle in philosophy on this vague analogy. But there is a strict and philosophical ana- logy, which consists in the sameness of the immediate effects, or of the modes of operation of the analogous causes, and which indicates the sameness of the causes themselves. This strict analogy subsists between spi- ritual substance, and the substance of heat; the mode of operation of the one, and of the other, is the same; it is expansion ; and this is the point of analogy between them. Spirit, or the substance of bP*t, pervades all bodies animate, and inanimate. ^"^Whjther shall I go from thy ^'Spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence." The S[)hit of God is every where, it extends through- out all space, through that which is occupied by body, as well as that which is not. So it is with the substance of heat. From its inherent tendency to expand, it dis- seminates itself universally ; it cannot be excluded from any part of space, nor totally abstracted from body. Bnt the phenomena of spiritual substance, that is, OP THOUGHT. '.V5 josrceptiott and sensation, as they appear to our internal consciousness, and as they exhibit themselves through ilic external sigus of feeling, and of enlargement of mind, are mucJi more o1>vious, or discoverable in th« animal and rational worlds, tlian in the vegetable and mineral. Hence the common opinions taken up with- out investigation, that the spiritual substance belongs exclusively to those liii^her parts of creation. Eut if spirit operate by expansion, if it expand in perceiving, and if it is l)y this mode of operation that it influences and coutrouls matter, tiieu wherever we observe this phenomenon, ex[jansion, we are bound in reason to in- fer the presL'nce and agency of spirit. But when we seek the phenomena of spirit in othei* beings beside (mrselvcs, we look not for expansion; for we are not conscious of this mode of operaiion in per- ceiving ; and if we were, we could not see the cx})an- sion of other minds, which arc invisible; in ail orga- nized bodies, tlie sensative part of the system is furnish- ed with a covering, at all points sufficient to conceal and protect the immediate suliject of sensation, though not to exclude all impressions from without. But where we expect to discover tlie sensative substance, we look for its secondary effects in tlie actions of the beings or things wherein we expect it to reside ; we look for the external signs, of perce[)(iou, or feeling, and of choice or volition, in the actions of other beings, and wlien wc perceive a train of actions wliich manifestly tend to a desirable end, and which are too complex to be the eflect of accident, we always infer, tiiat they spring frcur ;!e- «ign, or volition, and that the spiritual substance is pre- sent. That is, where these external signs are exhibited by animal beings, we fail not to recognize llie spiritual substance through them. And if we can trace the §4 THE ALPHABET same external signs in the vegetable and mineral king- clums, will it not be a fair induction to refer them to the same invisible causes, or to infer that tliey originate in sensation and volition, the operations of sjn ritual sub- stance. It is not necessary that sjiirit exhibit the high- est attribute of mind, in onler to manifest its existence. Heasoning implies, not only perception, the simple o{)c- ration of spirit, it implies also the presence of ideas^ or of a subject on which reason is exercised, aiid ideas re- quire bodily organs; reasoning also implies some know- ledge of truth, or of the necessary relations of things. Let us tlien endeavour to trace those external signs of sensation and vcdition, in the gradation from a man, to a mineral, and see whether there is a point at which these signs entirely disa[jpear, and at which spirit ceasesr to exhibit her influence. In man these signs of percep- tion and volition shine forth with superior lustre, for they are blended with the signs of reason, and of high resolve. — Take away reason from man, or take away that internal organ of thought and perception, in which all the external organs meet, and which, being enlarged and extended as the mind acquires new ideas, has the power to reflect, or repeat the ideas at pleasure, and, by comparing and analysing, to discover the relations of things, — take away this organ, and fliere remains a mere animal, a sensitive system, but without the apjju- ratus f«r reasoning. The sim{de spirit, or power to perceive, is tlie same in tliis as in the former, the same in the mere animal that it is in the rational being; but the organ of comparison, the store house of assorted ideas is gone. Still the organs of sense remain, and the principle of sensation and volition. — Take a^vay then the external organs of seeing, hearing, tasting and smelling, and take away the muscles of locomotion, and OF THOUGHT. fys we shall no longer have an animal, hut we shall have a ves;e.tal)le ; the system that remains may still vegetate. Does the perceiving substance, or principle of sensation and volition (lc})enfl on the animal ors; • n i zation ? and is it gone with the organs of sense — so called? No, there is an organic system of vegptaUe. life, resemhltng that of animal life. The veii;etahle has its secretory organs, it has its circulatory, respiratory and nutritive systems, as well as the animal. Secretion implies seUvtion, or choice, or volition; and this implies perception. Tlic spirit, or perceiving substance still attends us; the vege- table exhibits the external signs of internal feeling and Selection, or choice; circulation, respiration and nutri- tion, cannot be accounted for from the laws of matter; they cannot be resolved into contraction and repulsion. Now destroy the organic system of vegetable life, and the vegetable dies; there remains no organized part t© supply the want created by the continual exhalation from all bodies that vegetate. After death the exhala- tion, or decomposition goes on, for a sliort time, just as it had done before; presently it becomes more rapid, and at last the earth returns to the earth aft it n'ns, and the spirit, or principle of vegetable life, ascent'is to its native element in air; for it is notorious, that after the abstraction of reason, of animal organization, and of vegetable organization, that which remains is not all matter; it does not all gravitate and return to dust; a part ascends by its own elevating, or expanding power, — carrying with it a portion of the gravitating subsject of knowledge, but it expres- ses neither truth nor falsehood. It is only when words aflfirm, or deny some relation of things, that they are either true or false. Every proposition affirms some relation of things; and a proposition is true, when it expresses the real, and. none but the real relations of things, the relations as to time, place, action, cause, ef- fect, &c. "When we say power produces motion^ we affirm a specific relation, the relation of cause and effect, between power and motion. The truth affirmed, or ^^ expressed*^ in this proposition^ is that relation of cause and effect, between power and motion ; but the truth of the proposition, is its relation of conformity to that relation of cause and efiect as it really is. The truth of the proposition, and the truth expressed by the proposition, are different truths; the last, viz. that power produces motion, is a necessary eternal truth; but the first, the conformity of the proposition to the eternal relation, is an incidental truth; as words are only the conventional and arbitrary signs of things, they can have no natural or necessary conformity to the things they express. Hence words, and even propositions may have a "conformity'' to things, and yet be false ; if this were not so, there could be no such thing as falsehood. I may say, matter perceives. The words of this proposition have a conformity to the things they express, and to the relation also which they ex^ press ; they affirm the relation of cause and effect, or of agent and operation, between matter and perception. But though matter, and perception are both real objects, no such relation subsists between them, therefore the 108 THE ALPHABET proposition is false. Words have always a conformity. an artificial conformity, to the things they express ; otherwise they would not be the signs of those things; but they sometimes affirm relations Avhich do not exist, or which do not belons; to the thinsrs of which thev arc aflBrraed ; and it is then they are false. Dr. Beattie's remarks apply, almost exclusively, to general and necessary truths; for it is only this class of tmths of which it may in some sense be said, that '^the constitution of our nature determines us to believe'* them ; that is, when the evidence of a truth is presented to a mind unbiassed, and capable of appreciating, or of perceiving the nature of evidence, that mind necessarily believes, or perceives the truth. But the mind in its best state, is not determined by its oonstitution alone, and independently of evidence, to the belief, or percep- tion of any specific truth ; if it were, it should have that perception, or a knowledge of that truth, from the ear- liest moment of its existence. As soon as mind exists, li jpercpives ; ^'the constitution of its nature" absolutely determines it to perception, but not to the perception of truth, or of any particular object. The perception of a particular object depends on external circumstances, as well as on the constitution of the mind. Every truth is a relation of some two things; and when the mind has a knowledge of those things, and perceives some necessary relation arising from the nature of the things, then it perceives a necessary truth. But the Doctor^s remarks are not universally true even of general or necessary truths. The ^^constitution of our nature" is not so infallible, as uniformly, or necessarily to exclude the belief of falsehood; hence, lelief is not the criterion of truth, nor disbelief, of false- hood. The Doctor's definition of truth seems to imply, OF THOUGHT. 109 tbaf, (he constitution of the mind is such, that it will necessarily believe truth, and reject falsehood. But if henomenou different from either motion, or perception, and rerjuires a distinct eiTicient r:ause. Truth is the only cause which is adequate to tlie [iroduction of harmony; neither power, nor sj)ii'it, unconnected with truth, ])roduccs this phenomenon. The operation of power is motion ; tliat of spirit, percep- tion; harmony is an operation distinct from eitiier, and requires a distinct efficient cause. In fact the liuman mind, wherever it is capal)le of reasoning, or of the exercise of common sense, assi2;ns a distinct efficient cause to this plienomenon. Wherever harmony, or beauty is exhibited to the senses, or to the mind, it is referred to truth as its ultimate cause, or that which is necessarily at the foundation of the phenomenon. — Har- mony indeed never exhibits itself to the senses but in connexion with the phenomena of power; the writing of a proposition, and the sound of the words which convey a truth, are operations of mechanical power; !)ut no one confounds tlie trutli of a proposition with the sound of the words, or with the written characters. Yet though common sense distinguishes practically the sound from the sense, when philoso[)iiy comes to investigate the distinctive character of truth, she is apt to confound that character v/ith its .adjuncts ; she invariably brings along v/ith her some dogma which she throws over truth, and then judg^.'s of her character through this false medium. — In music, harmony is connected with sound, but the harmony is a phenomenon distinct from the sound ; the efficient cause, or principle of the sound, is mechanical power; but the principle of the harmony, or the first principles of music, are certain immutable rides, or truths. No one ever thinks of ascribing music OF THOUGHT. 115 to power as its sole, or as its efficient cause ; when tlie foundation, or first principles of music is sought for, it is sought among the truths. We practically recognize the necessary relation of truth and harmomj, both in common life, and in the sciences; the harmony of a truth which is sought, with a truth aUeady known, is the evidence, or the test of the genuineness of the former. Truth is always consistent with truth, or in harmony with truth. Truth is the foundation of beauty, or of harmony of parts in form, or figure ; such as beauty of architecture, beauty of person, &:c. Architecture is an art founded on certain principles, or truths, and never could be brought to any degree of perfection independently of those principles; neither is personal beauty produced by its divine author at random, or without truth and science. ^'The Lord possessed me in the beginning of •'his way, before his works of old. When he prepared "the heavens I was there." — Truth is the foundation of moral beauty ; it is the basis of honour, integrity, jus- tice, &c. Harmony constitutes demonstrative evidence, or it is the criterion of mathematical and metaphysical truth. Every demonstration in geometry proceeds upon the harmony, or agreement of the iiroposition, with tlie de- finition, or diagram to which the proposition relates. Thus, if it is to be demonstrated that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; the mathe- matician proceeds to analyse the two angles and the three angles, and when it is found that from their na- ture tbey necessarily harmonise with what is affinned in the proposition, then the proposition is demonstrated to be a universal truth. The axioms are establiv*hed ©n the same species of evidence, their harmony with the 15 114 THE ALPHABET definitions. Two straight lines canvot intersect each other in more points than one. Tliis truth is said to be perceived intuitively, or without reasoning and with- out evidence. But this is not the fact. This negative principle may be resolved into the positive fact, that when two straight lines intersect each other, the farther they are produced the farther they diverge. This ge- neral fact is immediately founded in the definition — A straight line is the shortest that can be draicn between two points. Every negative principle, if genuine, is founded in some positive principle, which is ultimately founded in the definition, or predicament of the thing to which the principle relates. And it is the harmony of the axiom with the definition, or predicament of the thing to which the axiom relates, that is the evidence of the truth of the latter, and establishes it beyond con- tradiction. It is the same in metaphysics. Definition. Matter is the efficient cause of gravitation. Hence the axiom — Gravitation is a universal law of matter, or, matter gravitates uniformly, and nothing but matter gravitates. This axiom has no other foundation than m that defini- tion, or in the nature of material substance ; and it evi- dently implies, and is implied in that definition, that matter is the efficient cause of gravitation. If matter is the efficient cause of gravitation, and if like causes pro- duce like effects, then gravitation is a universal law of matter : but if matter is not the efficient cause of gravi- tation, and if it is not a universal truth, that like causes produce like ejfiects, then the axiom that matter gravi- tates uniformly, or at all times and all places and cir- cumstances, is a groundless assumption. But the defi- nition is in fact recognized in the axiom; and it is the perfect harmony of the axioms with the definition, OF THOUGHT. 115 or with the known and tacitly recognized predicament of matter, that demonstrates the genuineness of the axiom. In any syllogism, it is the harmony of the con- clusion, with the premises, that constitutes the emdencc, or proves the truth of the conclusion. Every invisible object of knowledge manifests itself to the mind through the evidence of some phenomenon, or of an operation which is immediately perceived ; gravitation is the evi- dence of the existence of matter, or of power ; percep- tion is the evidence of the existence of spirit; and har- mony is the evidence of the reality of truth. But it may be asked. If harmony is the infallible cri- terion of truth, and is generally recognized as such, how do we ever come to be deceived? If harmony is neces- sarily connected with truth, and if it uniformly excite the belief, or perception of truth, what is it that excites llie belief of that which is false? How is it that we sometimes imagine that we perceive a trutli, when no truth, but a falsehood is presented to the mind? — ■ This anomaly does not arise from the nature of truth, nor from the nature of demonstrative evidence ; but from the imperfection of human knowledge; it does not arise from the want of an infallible criterion of truth, but from the fallibility of the human mind. Without entering into any elaborate discussion of the causes and consequences of this imperfection, we will simply slate a few facts. Although harmony uniformly attends truth, and uniformly produces the perception of trutli in the reasoning mind, yet the mind, as well as the ear, is sometimes deceived by an imperfect harmony; — or, though truth must harmonize with truth, so falsehood may harmonize with falsehood, while from the limited- ness of our knowledge, we may not be possessed of the fundamental truths with which those falsehoods do not 116 THE ALPHABET harmonize, aiitl ^vhicb wouhl prove their fallacy. Heuce, a superficial knowUulsie of a subject, sometimes leads to greater absurdities than perfect ignorance ; and hence the necessity for ascending to first principles when any difficulty is to be solved. Every real truth will be found in harmony, and false- hood will be discordant, with the true definition of the thing to which they relate, or of which they are affirm- ed. An instance of tliis has been given in the chapter on material substance. That ^'Pow^er cannot be with- out a subject," is a principle very similar to the axiom, two straight lines cannot intersect each other in more points than one. That is, these principles are similar in a logical point of view, or considered as principles of reasoning; they difl'er in the subjects they relate to, the one relating to the nature of power, the other to the na- ture of a straight line. They are both axioms; and they are both negatives; and each is resolvable into the definition of the thing to which it relates. They both appear intuitively certain, or they appear certain from their harmony with the definitions to wlilch they respec- tively relate. Harmony is intuitive evidence. That two straight lines cannot intersect each other in more points than one, is a genuine truth, because it is found- ed in, or harmonizes with the true definition of a straight line. But the metaphysical axiom is false, because it is founded in a false definition of power. The axiom, power cannot be without a subject, takes for granted that power is an attribute, a quality, or the ojjeration of a cause. It supposes that power is con- nected with spirit in the relation of cause and eifect ; it supposes power to have the same relation to spirit, that perception has to spirit, or the same that motion has to power. But all this is false and absurd; power is, OF THOUGHT. 117 not the operation of .a cause, but the efficient cause of an operation. So tliat instead of real and perfect harmony, this axiom, power cannot be without a subject, has pro- duced confusion and "harsh discord'' in metaphysical science. But when it is brought to the touchstone of genuine fact, it betrays its unsubstantiality, it vanishes like the shadows of the night at the approach of the morning. Thus mathematics and metaphysics proceed upon the principle that harmony is the characteristic of truth. Prophets and poets recognize the same princi- ple. Truth and harmony, or beauty, are associated in their writings, iia a way that plainly indicates a convic- tion in the minds of the writers, that those two things are necessarily connected. The prophets and apostles claim the first notice. The song of Solomon contains a variety of rapturous expressions of the heaiity of the church and its King, of both which truth is the foundation and distinguish- ing characteristic. Many of those expressions are highly figrn-ative ; but some of them are jilain, and the sense incontrovertible. — '"Thou art beautiful, O my '•love, as Tirza ; cumehj as Jerusalem." — "Behold, "thou art fair, my love ; behold, thou art fairJ' — ""1 hou art all/azV, my love; there is no spot in thee." — "My beloved is white and ruddy, the chief among ten "thousand, — yea, he is altogether lovely^^ — King Da- vid w^ho is a prophet and a poet says, "Thou uri fairer ^'than the children of men, grace is poured into thy "lips." St. Paul associates trutli, with beauty tlius : "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things ai*e "honest, just, pure, whatsoever things are lovely,^^ or heautful, and "of good report." 118 THE ALPHABET The works of poets fiirnis]! the most ample testimony in favor of the connexion between Truth and UarmoDy. "Goddess of the lyre, "Wliicli rules the accents of the moving' spheres, "Wilt thou, eternal Harmoni) descend "And join this festive train ? for with thee comes *'The guide, the guardian of their lovely sports, "Majestic Truth ,•"• "Thus was beauty sent from heaven, "The lovely ministress of Truth and good "In this dark world ; for Truth and good are one. "And beauti) dwells in them, and they in her, ••With like participation."* "Alas ! how faint, "How slow the dawn, of beauty and of truth "Breaks the reluctant shades of gothic night '•Which yet involve the nations !"* "Blest be the day I 'scaped the wrangling crew, "Of Pliyro's maze, — — ''And held high converse with the god-like iew, "Who to th' enraptur'd heart, and ear, and eye, "Teach beauty, virtue, truth, and love, and melody.''-^ In these stanzas the connexion of truth with beauty, or with harmony, is affirmed in direct terms : and there are innumerable instances in the works of the poets^ in which this connection is implied. AVe will notice a few. "Is there a lieart which music cannot melt r "Alas ! how is that rugged heart forlorn ! "He needs not woo the Muse, he is her scorn, "77w sophists rope of cobiueb he shall ttviiie / "Mope ov'r the schoolman's peevish page, and mourn."t " Song is but the eloquence of Truth."l| ♦ Akepslde. f Beattie's Minstrel, t Minstrel. O^ampbell. OF THOUGHT. 119 ••The only amaranthine flow'r on earth "Is virtitv.* the only lasting treasure trulh."f "Where now that gloom which hid "Fair Truth from vulgar ken. — i: The epithets fair, loveli/, beautiful, and siceet, are applied to truth;, but never to power, nor to spirit. Power is sublime; spirit, or mind is interestiiigj or is the object of benevolence; but truth is fair, beautiful, or lovely. Truth is a substance, a being, or thing which has a permanent existence, and is the basis of a specific phe- nomenon. In many minds the general term substance is associated with the idea of a particular species; that is, with the idea of material substance. To these minds the general term conveys no general meaning; it con- veys only the ideas of gravitation and repulsion, or of solid ponderous being; — they can hardly conceive of substance that is not tangible. Yet we have tlie same kind of evidence for the existence %id substantiality of truth, that we have for the existence and substantiality of matter, or of spirit ; truth, like these other things, is the subject of a quality, or the basis of a phenomenon. A specific phenomenon is acknowledged both by the senses and by the mind ; reason, or common sense as- signs to this phenomenon a specific efficient cause, or invisible basis; and that basis we denominate truth. But as in the perception of gravitation and of matter, we are apt to confound the perception of the phenome- non, with the perception of the substance ; so it is with respect to truth and harmony, we are apt to confound tiie perception of harmony, with the perception of truth. * Virtue, moral becuttf, fCowper. * More. 120 THE ALPHABET But truth is too shadowy a thin*; to be conceived of as a suhstaucc ; we cannot handle it with our hands, or shape it into form, figure. Very right; truth is a subborn thing; it will give an impression, but receive none. Is it then more shadowy tlian spirit, which re- ceives, but does not give impressions? Would not power, or matter appear as shadowy, if we were in the habit of withdrawing the senses from the observation of its phenomena? But it is hard to conceive of truth as exercising an efficiency, as being an operative cause. It is true, we cannot conceive icky truth operates, or why it produces harmony, but we do conceive the fact, we know that harmony is the offspring and evidence of truth. But this does not satisfy us, our metaphysical predilections demand something more ; we are not content with the knowledge of an efficient, unless we can also discover a final cause, a reason for every phenomenon. There is a rooted prejudi|[b in tlie mind which supposes, that every operation, whether simple or complex, is, in some way or other, the effect of volition; that mind, or spirit is the only ultimate efficient cause in existence, and power, and truth are secondary causes, or attributes, (Equalities. J But we cannot tell why truth harmonizes, any more than we can tell why matter gravitates. — We shall hereafter consider of the reason why, or the manner in which truth affects the external organs of sense; it will be shewn, that truth affects the senses by means of its harmony, or its sweetness ; but this is a different thing from giving a reason why, or accounting for the fact;, that truth produces harmony. We can give the causes of gravitation and of harmony, but we can give no rea- son why the one cause produces gravitation, or why the OF THOUGHT. 121 other protluces harmouy. These are ultimate facts ; they cannot be accounted for, otherwise than by attri- buting the phenomena to their respective ultimate causes. Gravitation antl harmony are not voluntary operations, considering each with respect to its proper efficient cause ; power contracts, or matter gravitates — necessari- ly, not voluntarily; and truth harmonizes, not voluntari- ly, but necessarily. Harmony, or beauty is the idea, the image, or visible form of the invisible substance called truth. Though it may be thought difficult to comprehend, or extravagant to aflirra a universal and necessary relation between truth, and harmony, there is nevertheless a vague belief of the fact universal among mankind. And it is not so much the fact, as it is the ground, or evidence of the necessity and universality of the fact, that we sometimes puzzle ourselves about. Some are of opinion that demonstration belongs exclusively to the mathema- tical sciences ; yet there is nothing more common than to talk of demonstration, and to eflect it too, in mural and natural philosophy. But there is much greater diversity of opinion about what it is that constitutes demonstrative evidence, or what is the criterion of truth. Ta the philosophy of matter and spirit, we proceed by investigating facts ; and we judge of the nature or character of these invisi- ble objects, by their phenomena. Their phenomena constitute their character. And in the philosophy of truth, is it not proper to proceed in a similar manner? This, too, is confessedly an invisible object of know- ledge ; and the way to arrive at a philosophical defini- tion of this object, is to investigate the facts relating to it, the manner in which the mind acquires a knowledge of it, or to inquire what is the/orw; the dress f the visible 16 1£2 THE ALPHABET operation, or the iilienomenon through, or in which this invisible object presents itself to the mind. All are agreed that there is such a thing as demon- strative evidence, or an appropriate medium, a sjjecies of evidence which renders the truth perfectly certain. The question is, what is, precisely, that species of evi- dence? Some seem to suppose, that in any act of rea- soning, the premises is the evidence of the truth of the conclusion, or that one truth is evidence of another. But how is the truth of the premises perceived ? It is an invisible object as well as the truth of the conclusion. To say that one truth is evidence of another truth, or that one truth causes another to bo perceived, is just about as correct as to say, that one body causes another to move, when it is well known, that it is not the one body at rest, or simply, because it is body, that causes the other to move, but that it is the one body in motion that impels, or causes the other to move. So it is with truth; the one truth does not cause the other to be per- ceived, or to manifest itself to the mind, but it is the phenomenon, it is the harmony of the truth of the con- clusion, with the truth of the premises, that demonstrates the former. Evidence in its very nature is something perceived immediately; but truth is not perceived im- mediately; it is tlierefore not one truth that demon- strates another truth, or causes it to be perceived ; any more than a body at rest, makes an impression upon another body, or causes it to move ; but it is the pheno- menon, the harmony of truth with truth, that demon- strates its reality. The simple fact, that harmony is connected with truth, is discovered in the first place by observation, or in the same way that we discover that gravitation is connected with matter; but the ground of the univer- OF THOUGHT. 123 sality of that connexion, or of that fact, is to be found only in the nature of tlie things themselves. In an analysis of the natures of truth, and harmony, we find that the one is an effect, of which the other is the ef- ficient cause, or is that, without which the effect cannot be produced; hence they are universally connected. The unsophisticated mind goes directly to this result ; common sense, in the pursuit of truth, takes for granted her necessary connexion with harmony, and whatever is found in this garb, is received as truth. But when the philosopher comes to define truth, he thinks it necessary to assign her some metaphysical character, or some in- visible dress; and thus places her out of sight altogether, and beyond the reach of inquiry. It is hard to conceive of power as being the eflficient cause of certain phenomena of matter, because these phenomena are sometimes associated with the pheno- mena of mind ; and because of the long cherished belief that power is an attribute of mind, and that all the phenomena of matter some way or other depend on mind. And for a similar reason it is hard to conceive of truth as being tlie efficient cause of harmony; it is because harmony is associated with the phenomena of both matter and spirit. Because harmony of sound is produced under the direction of mind, there is a vague belief that mind, or spirit is the ultimate cause of har- mony in general, and of truth also. But tlie mind that hath music in itself must have been previously possess- ed of truth ; it must have acquired, in an analysis of the phenomena, those mathematical principles of quan- tity and number, whicii constitute the first principles of music. Even a child who performs a regular tune, must in some measure comprehend these principles, and must in some sort have performed this analysis; else I £4 THE ALPHABET how should he make his quantities aad uumhers con- form to the rules of harmony. Beauty of architecture consists in the havmomj, or right proportion of parts, and tiiis we are wont to ascribe to the mind of the architect, as the ultimate cause of the phenomenon, the beauty; and it is just to dp so; but it is to a mind informed, or possessed of the first truths, or rules of the art. A mind uninlbrmed of those first truths, has no capacity to create beauty; as soon should we expect impulse where there is no power, as beauty, or harmony where there is no truth. Truth is essential to all the arts, as much so to painting, and to poetry, as to music or to architecture. Truth is not an attribute of mind, nor is it essential to the existence of mind; yet truth is undoubtedly a constituent element of every reasoning mind ; for reason is employed only in the acquisition of truth, or in dis- covering the relations of things. The spiritual sub- stance is also a constituent element of the substauce of the mind ; it is a distinct thing from truth, and exists without it ; as truth may, and does exist independently of spirit. It will not be denied that truth is indepen- dent of mind. That two and two are equal to four, is a truth though it be not perceived. Truth is not an at- tribute, or operation of the mind ; it is not an operation at all. It is only by confounding the jjercejition of truthn with truth itself, that we come to call the latter an attribute of mind. Percejttion is the attribute of mind ; truth is the subject of the attribute of harmony. If truth is not the efllcient cause of harmony, there is no adequate cause of this phenomenon, that has been discovered; or, contrary to the habitual proceeding of reason, she has not assigned a specific ultimate cause, to this specific phenomenon. If truth were not that OF THOUGHT. 125 cause, or were not recognized as siicb, we should then have a phenonieuon, or quality, without a substance, or basis, — an operation, without an adequate cause ; we shouhl liave truth, a thing independent in its nature, nnd eternally existent, yet producing no eflcct in nature, suslaiuing no part in the universe of being. We should have a being, or thing invisible in itself, and exhibiting no visible operation, no evidence of its existence, and yet perceived by the mind; perceived neither mediately, nor immediately, yet perceived. We should have a cause without an cflect, and an effect without a cause; or rather, an effect and its cause disjoined — uncon- nected. Truth is but a name, if it be not an efficient cause. We have no powers, or organs, of perception, except- ing tiiose of sense and consciousness, and that of rea- soning. Sense and consciousness perceive effects, ope- rations ; reason perceives causes ; reason infers the ex- istence of efficient causes, from the operations perceived by sense and consciousness. If truth is neither cause nor effect — substance nor phenomenon — it has no ex- istence. Trutii is a self-existent efficient cause, and its mode of operation is harmony. Its more remote effect is to jjlease^ and to govern mind ; the former, that is har- mony, is the effect which truth produces in itself, it is involved in its nature ; the latter, that is, to please and to govern, are the effects it produces in other beings, or substances, beside itself; the former is a necessary ef- fect, the latter is incidental. — Power moves, or impels by means of its primary operation, contraction ; spirit perceives in expansion ; and truth governs, or influences the mind by means of its harmony. The mi:id govern- ed by power, or force, is a slave; ungoverned, or 126 THE ALPHABET governed by passion, is a demon ; governed by truth, is divine. In a treatise on truth it would be unpardonalile not to notice the doctrine of Professor Stewart, respecting the nature of truth and evidence. The Professor's re- marks are rather vague and general, and somewhat de- sultory. The most condensed and determinate form in "wliich liis theory of truth is to be found, is in the second volume of ^'Elements of Philosophy,'' and in chapter first, entitled "Of the fundamental Laws of human Be- lief, or primary Elements of human Reason," and is contained in the following paragraphs. ^'I begin," says the Professor, "with a review of *^some of those primary truths, a conviction of which is "necessarily implied in all our thoughts and in all our ^^actions ; and which seem, on that account, rather to ^^form constituent and essential elements of reason, than ^'objects with which reason is conversant." The primary truths to which I mean to confine my attention at present are: 1. Mathematical Axioms; S. Truths (or more properly speaking, Laws of Belief,) inseparably connected with tke exercise of conscious- ness, perception, memory, and reasoning.* The following passage contains a few specimens of the "Laws of Belief* Avith the author's own observa- tions concerning them. From such propositions as these, ^^i exist; I am the ^^same person to-day that I was yesterday; the material ^^world has an existence independent of my mind ; the ^'general laws of nature will continue^ in future, to ^(operate uniformly as in time past, no inference can "be deduced, any more than from the intuitive truths ♦ Elements of Philosophy, p. 25. 2d Vol. New York cd. OF THOUGHT. 127 ^^preflxed to the elements of Euclid. Abstracted from '^other data, they are perfectly barren in themselves ; '^nor can any possible combination of them help the ^^rnind forward, one single step in its progress. It is ^'for this reason, that instead of calling them, with ^^other writers, first principles, I have distinguished ^^thera by the title of fundamental laws of belief; the "former word seeming to denote, according to common "usage, some fact, or some supposition, from which a '•^series of consequences may be deduced."* In the chapter throughout from which these para- graphs are extracted, the author's design is to prove, that the "laws of belief,'" or the "primary truths" of philosophy, are neither the result of reasoning, nor a foundation for reasoning, that they are not discovered, as facts are, in an investigation of the phenomena, and that unlike facts, they afford no data from which a con- clusion can be drawn. — He labors to prove that truths are perceived intuitively, or independently of reasoning and of evidence. He seems to consider the knowledge of truth as innate ; for he says it "seems rather to be "a constituent element of reason, than an object with "which reason is conversant." Aud he contends far- ther, that first truths, or "elements of reason," are not principles of reasoning, that "abstracted from other ^'data, they are perfectly barren in themselves, nor can "they help the mind forward one single step in its pro- "gress." — In the first section the author labors to prove, that the principles of mathematical science "are, not the "axioms, but the definitions.^^ — The second section is intended to shew, that the "laws of belief" are pre- cisely analogous to mathematical axioms in this respect, that from them no inference can be deduced. * Page 55. 128 THE ALPHABET If it be true, that the pei-ception, or belief of truth, is not the result of rcasouini;, theu that belief is not a ra- tional; or philosophical belief; — and it is not then ne- cessary to be endowed with reason, to com[)rcheiid, or perceive truth, for rationality is not requisite to the per- ception of that which is perceived without reasoning, — And if it be true that first truths are not a fofuulation for reasoning, then truth has no efficiency, and no influence over mind; it is not a guide in the pursuit of know- ledge, nor in distinguishing between right and wrong : it is not, either in science or in morals, "a lamp to our •^'feet, and a light to our path.'' If fundamental truths have so little character, and so little authority, other truths cannot have more. But if indeed first truths do not "help the mind forward one single step,"' what is the value of truth? What is its use? If truth is with- out efficiency and without influence or operation, it would seem to be about as useless a thing as matter would be if made of nothing. But if first truths, or "fundamental laws of belief,*' are not princi})les of rea- soning, in Avhat sense are ih^y f and amental? The Professor's theory of the ])erce]jtion of truth is a refinement on Dr. Beattie's definition of truth. "I ac- "count that to be truth," says the Doctor, "which the "constitution of our nature determines us to believe.*' The Professor says, "primary truths — seem rather to be "constituent and essential elements of reason, than oh- 'Ejects with which reason is conversant." — There are certain propositions which the Professor instances as "truths, or fundamental laws of belief;" such as that *^^the material world has an existence independent of <^my mind ; — I am the same to-day, that I was yester- "day ;" &c. But it is sometimes the belief of one of those propositioas;, that he speaks of as being a "law of OF THOUGHT. 129 •'belief.'^ "The belief/' says he, ^"'which all men eii- '•[ertain of the existence of the material world, be- •'lougs to the same class of ultimate or elemental laws •'of thought.'"* — Thus according to the Professor, that matter exists, is a "law of belief/' and that matter is perceived, is a "law of belief;" — or in other words, the existence of matter, is a "law of belief/' and the belief in the existence of matter, is a "law of belief/' and "laws of belief" are '^'truths'' analogous to mathema- tical tixioms.f In this Avay the author has woven a web, whieh catches many a fly. His idea of truth has evi- dently been obscured, by being blended, in his mind, with the idea of the perception, or belief of truth. The Professor's grand aim is to establish a system of logic, or to point out the most proper method of in- vestigation and reasoning in philosophy and metaphy- sics. To this end he is laboring to shew what is the characteristic of truth; or rather, he labors to prove that truth has no criterion, no decided characteristic, — excepting the circumstance that it is believed. Accord- ingly he says, that truths are "more properly" termed ^•laws of Ijelief /' by which term be seems to signify, that e\ ei V truth is a law of the mind, in the same sense that perception is a law of the mind, or that gravitation is a law of matter, — for he says, '"'truths seem rather to "be elements of reason, than objects with which reason "is conversant." In giving this title — "laws of belief," to truths, the author seems not to have distinguished between the jperception, or belief of truth, and the truth perceived, or to have confounded truths, with the phenomena of mind ; which is the same error into which • El. rhU. Vol, 2. p. 53. t P. 52. 17 130 THE ALPHABET Dr. Tatham has fallen, when he says ^'trulh is an attri- bute of mind.'^ To make good his theory of truth and evidence, the Professor attempts to establish a distinction, and a j7a- rallel; a distinction between princijiles of reasonivg^ and '^elements of reasoning/' or ^'fundamental laws of belief:'' and a parallel between /acis, as first principles of philosophy, and definitions^ as first principles of mathematical science; — a parallel also, between ^^fundamental laws of belief," and mathematical axioms. He observes, that "from such propositions as these, I ^'exist; the material world has an existence indejjen- ''dent of my mind ; &c. no inference can be deduced, "any more than from the intuitive truths prclixed to the "Elements of Euclid." — He observes also, that "Defini- "tions hold, in mathematics, precisely the same place "that is held in natural philosophy by such general facts ^^as have now been referred to."* The general facts referred to are "the gravity and elasticity of the ai?'."j- It is astonishing that the Professor should have over- looked so obvious a distinction, as that between /«cf^, and definitions. They agree, indeed, ia being both principles of reasoning, but they arc different kinds of principle ; and they are not distinguished from triitki^ and axioms by this character, for these also are princi- ples of reasoningy as we shall see just now. The lo- gician must use different terms in defining facts, from those in which he would define definition ; and if the Professor had defined his terms, he had, without doubt, detected his own error. The character of a definition is, that it points out the genus of some (one) thing de- fined, and the specific difference by which that thing is ♦ El. Phil. p. 37. t Page 36, OF THOUGHT. 131 (iistinguished, 8^'c. But the character of a fact is, that it affirms or denies some relation between some two things. The fact of the gravitation of the air does not resemble, either iu a lo2;ical or philosophical point, the definition of a right angle or of a square ; nor can any dctininition, either in mathematics or in philosophy, have a reseml)lance to tiiat or to any other fact. That the air gravitates — is a fact; it affirms a specific rela- tion — the relation of cause and effect, or of agent and action — between the substance of the air, and the phe- nomenon, gravitation. But if we define gravitation, we say gravitation is a j^henomenon ; this is the genus — and that it is produced by material substance — this is the specific difference. In like manner, in mathematics, that all right angles are equal — is a fact; the proposi- tion affirms the relation of equality among all right an- gles. But when we define the figure, we point out the genus by saying it is an angle, and the species, or spe- cific difference, by sayiug it is a right angle, or an an- gle of ninety degrees. But the Professor's design was to establish the doc- trine, that truths are not principles of reasoning. Hence he tells us that, in mathematics, definitions are principles of reasoning, but that the axioms are not ; that in philosophy, facts are principles of reasoning, but ••truths, or laws of belief," are not; and farther, that general facts hold the same place in philosophy, that de- finitions hold iu mathematics; and th^i truths hold no place in either science. Wc shall inquire by and by into the fact — what place in actually held in mathematics and philosoi)hy, re- spectively, by definitions, and axioms, facts, and "laws of belief." And we trust it will appear, that in phi- losophy, truths, and general facts iiold the same place 1S2 THE ALPHABET in pliilosopliy, that truths or axioms held in mathema- tics. In the mean time we shall endeavor to shew that ih^ facts of philosophy are analogous, not to the defini- tions, but to the axioms of mathematics — in a word, that truths, and axioms, avt general facts, both in mathe matics and in philosophy ; and farther, that those pro positions which the author terms '^•fundamental laws of belief," and which the author says, are not principles of reasoning, because they are neither facts nor defini- tion^, are some of them reaWy facts ; and some of them express the universality of certain facts. One of the "laws of belief" enumerated by the author is, that 'Hhe material world has an existence indejjen- ^^dent of my mind.^' This is a fact. A fact or truth affirms, or denies somewhat. This one, or this "law "of belief" affirms existence of the material world, and denies its dependence on ^'my mind." That ^-7 am ^*the. same to-day that I was yesterday, ^^ is also a fact, it affirms the relation of sameness^, or similarity, of that which I am to-day, to that which I was yesterday. This is a simple fact; the following '^law of belief" is more complex; "T7te general laws of nature will con- ••timie to operate uniformly, as in time past.^' This proposition merely affirms universality of the '^'general * ^aws" of nature, or of certain facts observed in nature. That matter gravitates, is one of these facts ; awd wlien a fact, or law of nature, is perceived to be universally true, and because that universality is established in a metaphysical investigation of things, the fact is termed a truth; the Professor terms it a "law of belief." Mathematical axioms are, strictly, general facts, and are of the same nature with those just mentioned, only that they relate to different things. When it is said of two rijght angles, that tliey Tvre eqiial^ this is the OF THOUGHT. 133 expression of an mdividual fact; tliat all right angles are equal, is a general, or universal fact ; and because of its universality, it is termed a truth, or axioin. — If in the way of experiment it is discovered, thtat A is equal to B, and that C is equal to B, and that, consequently, A and C are equal, this is the discovery of a fact ; but when in farther conteraphating the subject, it is perceiv- ed to he necessarily and universally true, that things equal to the same thing are equal among themselves, — this is termed an axiom, or truth. So it appears tiiat the "laws of belief are essential- ly the same with general facts, and that general, or uni- versal facts, are metapliysical truths, and are analogous to mathematical axioms. We will novr inquire into the fact, wliat place is actually held in mathematics and philosophy respectively, by definitions, and axioms, facts, and "laws of belief.*' It is certainly true, that, as the Professor observes, Xio inference can be deduced from a truth, or law of belief, nor from mathematical axioms, taken singly, or "abstracted from the data.^' But the same is true of facts, and tlic same is true of definitions, whether mathematical or metaphysical. From no one principle, either axiom, or definition, fact, or "la\v of belief,*' can any inductive inference be de- duced. In a process of inductive reasoning, either an axiom, or a general fact, or a definition — any general principle, may form the major proposition; but we de- duce no inference without the minor also — either ex- pressed, or tacitly recognized. For example, matter gravitates : what inference can b« drawn, inductively, from this general fact? None at all. But add the minor proposition, the moon is a material substance ; and directly we come to the conclusion, th.it the moon gravitate?. Or if we take for the viajov [uoposition. 134 THE ALPHABET the definition — matter is the e^^cient cause of gravi- tation ^ no inductive infcrcucc follows from this; but add the minor, the moon gravitates, then it follows that the moon is a material substance. It is the same in matliematics. Definition. A straight line is the short- est that can be drawn between two points. "Abstract- '^ed from other data^* this is barren of consequence ; but add the individual fact, here is a line stretched from A to B, the shortest that can be drawn between the two points. It is then a straight line. The axioms like- wise form major propositions. Major. Two straight lines cannot inclose a space. Minor. Here are two lines inclosing a space. Inference. They cannot both be straight lines. Take now for major proposition the following -'law of belief.*' ^^The laics of nature will continue to operate uniformly, in future, as in time jpast.''^ Minor. Here is a fountain of water which has ever flowed as it does now. Inference. It will con- tinue to flow, in future, as in times past. Thus it appears, that in a process of inductive reason- ing, any general principle, w hether axiom, or definition, may form the major proposition, and an individual fact, the minor; though from no single principle, whether fact, or axiom, or definition, docs any consequence fol- low, inductively. Truths, then, are principles of rea- soning as well as definitions ; and it lias been seen too, that definitions are sound principles, or real guides in the path of science, only so far as they are true— or as they are in harmony with the real predicaments of things. Definition is the polar star, but truth is the sun of science. We trust it has also already been proved, or made appear, that truths are not perceived intuitively, or without evidence and the exercise of reason 5 but that OF THOUGHT. 135 general principles, or universal truths, both in philoso- phy and in mathematics are unfolded in a metaphysical analysis of the nature of the subjects of which the truths arc affirmed. Analysis and induction are apt to be confounded, the one with the other, in the attempts of logicians to de- scribe them, prol)ably because that analysis is frequent- ly succeeded by induction, and induction ought to be preceded by analysis. We analyse a particular fact, with a view to discover its character, or, to induct it into some general principle; or we analyse a phenome- non, with a view to bring it under some definition, or to refer it to some class. Analysis implies e.vjieriment, — even in metaphysical subjects, it is impossible to analyse witliout adducing, or exhibiting to the mind a particular instance of the thing to be analysed, and of the decom- position, or separation of its component parts, and of its necessary relations. This is technically termed analy- sis, and abstraction : while the bringing an individual subject under some definition, or referring a particular fact to some general fact, is termed induction. Thus when we analyse a particular fact, for instance, the jiercepiion of matter, we exhibit, or bring that particu- lar fact before tlie mind, in idea; we then abstract the phenomenon — simple perception, from its object, or ex- isting cause, that is, matter, and view the former by it- self, or in its own native character; this is analysis ; in viewing the phenomenon thus, we perceive that it is an operation — a thing which is produced, and passes away, this is induction, this single act of referring the particu*. lar object to a class of objects, to operations, is that which is termed induction. — In this process we establish the definition, or the general character of the phenome- non perception ; we discover that it belongs to the pre- 136 THE ALPHABET tlicameiit of operations. A2;aiu, in further analysing Ibis particular phenomenon, iierce-ptiony with a \iew to discover its source, aiid its necessary relations^ wo, ab- stract its geuerical character, as an operation, from itn species, or particular character, as perception. In con- templatiog the first, its character as an operation, it will be perceived, that it has no stability in itself, that as soon as it exists, it passes away, and is succeeded by another of the same, and that by another, continually ; that it must therefore relate to some invisible substantial being which produces it, — it is evidently the product of some cause which is able to sustain the operation conti- nually. Thus we discover the universal truth, that every phenomenon requires a cause able to produce i(, or an efficient cause. By pursuing the analysis of the phenomenon perception, several other general princi- ples would disclose themselves, but this will suffice for the present. Although it is performed mentally, this process is properly experimental; but it is certain that when experiment is addressed to the senses, it is most efficacious in throwing light on a subject. But this is simply because the external organs of sense arei more exercised than tlie internal organs, or faculties of the raind, or rather, that the mind is more exercised on sen sible, than on metaphysical subjects. It is, pcrJiaps. for this reason, that the first principles of mathematical science, which relate to sensible objects, have long ago been fixed beyond dispute, while those of metaphysics still wander as a glimmering light in a dark and vast expanse. It is by means of analysis, or by experiment on lines, angles, &c. that the elementary principles, or first truths of matliematics are originally discovered. In compar- ing two right angles, it is discovered that they arc equal. OF THOUGHT. 137 Tljis is Si fact discovered by experiment. But in farther contemplating these angles, and comparing them with others, we discover that no one right angle can be greater, or less, than any other right angle; m other words, that all right angles are equal. This process involves and fixes the definition of a right angle, at the same time that it unfolds the axiom ; for unless the term right angle have a definite signification, the uni- versality of the fact does not appear. The definition and the axiom are established at the same time, in the analysis of the simple ffict, that two right angles are equal. The simple fact ascertained by observation is tlie ground^ or that which leads to the discovery of the definition ; and the definition, in its turn, is the ground of the axiom f or of the universality of the fact. The axiom — things equal to the same thing are equal to one another — is discovered and proved in the same way. In experiment it is observed, that A is equal to B, and that C is equal to B, and that A and C are also equal. This is a simple fact. But in farther considering the sub- ject, it is discovered, that whatever is equal to B, must be equal to A, and to C, and that it cannot be other- wise. Hence the axiom, things equal to the same thing, are equal to one another. It appears to be the general belief that these axioms are perceived intuitively as soon as they are announced, and without experiment or inquiry. But this is not thel fact, except where we have previously made the experi- ment, or been conversant about lines and angles, or about the things to which the axioms relate. It is im- possible for any one to comprehend the axiom, unless he have a pretty clear conception of the things to which it relates, or of which it is affirmed. These indeed, are 18 1S8 THE ALPHABET very simple processes, but they form the infant science. Hercules in his cradle. We have now to consider the physical character, or sensible form of ti-uth, if the expression is allowable, or the manner in which truth influences other substances, and in which it presents itself to the external organs of sense. We have seen that harmony is the characteris- tic of truth, in the metaphysical world ; or that it is the form in which truth presents itself to the mind. But Jiav- mony exists in the physical or external world also, and is perceived by the senses. But like causes produce like eifects. Therefore truth is the efficient cause of harmony, in the pliysical, as well as in the metaphysical world. W^herever this phenomenon is perceived to ex- ist, and whatever are the avenues through which it ex- hibits itself to the mind, it is always the product of the same invisible efficient cause or substance. Harmony is the eifect and evidence of truth in the physical, as well as in the moral and metaphysical worlds. But this simple phenomenon is modified in a variety of ways, by being associated with other pheno- mena, from which circumstance it takes a variety of names, as music, beauty, order, siveetness, ^*c. It has already been suggested, in treating of material substance, that truth addresses itself to the external organs of sense in the phcnomenoa harmony, and that, beside harmony of sound, which is addressed to the ear, beauty is harmony addressed to the eye, and siveetness is the same phenomenon addressed to the organs of tasting and smelling. Harmony never exhibits itself to the senses but in connexion with other phenomena, the ope- rations of causes, dilfereut from truth. There can be no OF THOUGHT. 139 «iusic^ without sound ; no beauty, without bodily form; no sweetness without something solid, liquid, or airi- form. But tlie music, the beauty, and the sweetness are phenomena quite distinct from the sound, the solidi- ty, or the bodily form. But music it may be said, or harmony of sound, requires mind for its production ; that tiiough it mny be admitted that music is necessarily produced according to certain rules, or truths, although mind, to produce liarmony, must possess truth, yet the truth is not able uf itself to produce this phenomenon, harmony of sound, or is not the efficient cause of it. It is very certain that truth is not the efficient cause of harmony of sound, or of the complex phenomenon called music ; but truth is the efficient and sole cause of simple harmony. Harmony of sound is a complex phe- nomenon ; the efficient cause of sound, is power ; but power can no more produce harmony, than truth can produce sound. Harmony of sound requires mind for its production, but simple harmony exists independently of mind, though it is not, in its simple state, perceived by the senses. Truth is always consistent, or in har- mony with itself. The harmony of truth with truth, depends on nothing 1)ut truth itself. Though the direc- tion of mind is required to combine liarmony with sound, simple harmony is the offspring of simple truth. AVhen harmony is perceived by the organ of hearing, it is necessarily combined with sound ; but harmony is also perceived by the organ of taste, and then it is com- bined with the phenomena of bodies, in the complex form of sweetness. Can this be so? Can we taste truth, or smell it? Why not? If the substance of har- mony cannot be tasted, what substance, or what efficient cause can ? Can jjower lie tasted, or matter ? Power is the efficient cause of a phenomenon which, when pro- 140 THE ALPHABET duced oa the organ of taste, excites the sensation of acidity ; another pheDomenoii produced on the organ of taste excites the sensation of sweetness ; and this too must have its efficient cause. But it is hard to conceive this to be the same thing that metaphysicians call triith. Why ? Have Ave not truth in the productions of human art? Is not truth essential to a fine picture, or a fine piece of music?, and are the productions of the divine artist less true, and less divine than those of the human artist? Human art produces music, — divine art produces sweetness, or that combination of substance, the opera- tion of \yhich is termed sweetness. Undoubtedly there is some mystery in these things ; we can understand but a part of the ways of the great architect who builds, and adorHs, and amply stores this world of ours. But wc are permitted to see, and all the world of mankind do perceive^ the several distinct elementary efficient causes of the phenomena which present themselves to the or- gans of sense. Sweetness is doubtless the product of a combination of the efficient cause of harmony, with an- other substance as a vehicle. The divine artist certainly forms these combinations in nature with the design of exciting the pleasing sensation of sweetness; but is this more incredible than that the human artist should create harmony of sound. The divine mind does not work without rule, or without regard to truth: He forms those combinations according to the eternal rules of harmony. ^Tlie Lord possessed me in the beginning of His way, ^'before his works of old." We have already hazarded the opinion, that material substance, or hydrogene is the efficient cause of contrac- tion, and that contraction is the object and exciting cause of the sensation, called the sensation of acidity ; also, that spiritual substance is the same with caloric, and is OF THOUGHT. 141 tlie basis of tbe phenomenon called imngency, or tcarmthf wLen addressed to the osgaH of taste. Nei- ther of tiresc simple substances then is tbe basis of sweetness. We aie not sufBciently versed in chemistry (o be able to discuss this subject with perfect success, or to identify with certainty the basis of sweetness in the laboratory, but may hazard an expression of the belief that the base of the alkalies is the basis of sweetness. — Tbe alkalies are sweet to the taste: they are the purl- liers of the exiernal world, dduted with water they take away the foulness of the skin and the cloatliing ; they oppose decomposition, or putrefaction in animal matter; they oppose the acetous fermentation in liquids; and they neutralize the acids, forming with them a variety of chrystaline compounds. The base of the alkalies is probably the cause of that regular harmoni- ous disposition of particles, called chrystalization. Me- tals and minerals, beside tlie chrystaline form of their particles, exhibit other evidence that they contain tins base. They have the property of neutralizing the acids, and of forming compound salts, having a general reseml)lance to those formed by the alkalies with the acids. The same effect requires the same cause, the metals, and all substances forming salts with acids must contain the base of the alkalies, or tlie basis of sweetness. If the alkalies oppose decomposition in animal mat- ter, they are doubtless tbe cause of the strong resistance to decomposition in some other bodies. Tbe precious stones and metals will owe the stability of their exist- ing forms, and consequently their value, (o this same principle, the base of the alkalies. The material sub- stance, or gravitating principle is one, it is t'je same in all tbe metals, and if each metal were a simple sub. 142 THE ALPHABET stance, there coulil be no variety, there could then be but one metal. But there are a variety of phenomena attcndins; them, some of wliicli necessarily "depend ou other substances than simple matter. Such arc their brilliaucy, their various colors, their diflcrcnt degrees of malleability, solubility, and fusibility. — Their attrac- tion for the acids, and for caloric, while they are not ailected by the alkalies, is presumptive evidence that they already possess the alkaline base. We will hazard a few more remarks with a view to trace tliis substance through some other of its forms, or combinations. There is reason to believe, that the simple principle called iiitrogene is the same with the ])asc of the alkalies. The facts on which this conjec- ture is founded are these : nitro^ene combined with hjdrogene forms anwioma, one of the alkalies ; but hydrogene has no alkaline properties, therefore the base of this alkali, or that on an hicli its alkalescence de- pends, is t)je nltrogene. Another fact which strength- ens this conjecture is, that nitrate of potash^ which is compounded of an alkali, with nitrogene and oxijgene^ is among the most powerful antiseptics known. If mtrogevc is the base of alkalies, then both the consti- tuents of nitrate of potash contain this base. The base of the alkalies, or the basis of sweetness, is of course an immaterial substance, or a principle essen- tially dift'erent from that of gravitation and repulsion, its distinguishing qualities are not gravity and solidity. Hence it is obvious that this substance cannot be mea- sured by its weighty but that, like caloric, it will require a peculiar instrument for ascertaining its comparative quantities. It is obvious, too, that v/henever it appears, in a solid form, it is necessarily combined with matter, or hydrog^ne. And it farther appears from the caustir OF THOUGHT. 143 city of the alkalies, that they contain oxijs^ene^ which substance wouUl seem to be a peculiar compound of liydrogene aucl caloric^ and perhaps it is one of the primitive creations, or combinations, which never is de- composed. It is to all these various circumstances, and perliaps some others, that the alkalies owe their variety of forms. If these conjectures are well founded, it is highly probable that the nitrogene as well as the oxygeiie gas of the atmosphere, is decomposed in breathing, and may be necessary te animal life, notwithstanding that, alone, it is deleterious. This has been already conjectured by some Ciiemists. As the nxygene supplies the principle of life, the nitrogene will tend to maintain health ; it will regulate the action of the principle of life ; it w ill oppose putrescence in the blood, and in the system ge- nerally. In all this, the basis of sweetness in the phy- sical world, is analogous to the basis of harmony, or to truth in the moral and metaphysical w orlds ; or to speak more correctly, the basis of sweetness belongs to the metaphysical world as really as truth; they are both invisible to the senses, and to the mind also, and are perceived only in, or through their phenomena. — And they are alike in their effects; sweet substances are not liable to putrescence, or decomposition ; and truth is imperishable, and transmits to future ages what- ever is connected with it. Divine truth is the tree of life, "its leaves are for the healing of the nations."^ — "Wliosoever heareth my words, and belie vest them, "shall never die.*' This was said by him who is truth itself. Truth, it has been s:tid, exists only when perceived. The same doctrine has been held respecting the jjheno- mena perceived by the senses; it reduces all the pheno- 144 THE ALPHABET meua of nature to sensations. Sweetiiiiss, say these philosophers, is a sensation, and can exist no \\ here but in the mind. This is confounding the sensation, with the object of the sensation. A certain philosopher has told us, that the heat which burns the finger, is not in the fire, but in the finger. lie reasons thus, "The pain "produced by holding the finger in tlie fire, is not in the **fii'e, for pain is a sensation, and sensation exists no "where but in the mind. But heat also is a sensation, "and therefore is not in the fire, but in the mind.'' But, with deference, heat is not a sensation : heat is the ob- ject and exciting cause of a sensation. The sensntion is not heat, but the perception of the heat. Pain is a general term for a class of sensations ; the sensation of heat is a particular sensation, and the heat exists inde- pendently of the sensation, or of being perceived. — Nei- ther is sweetness a sensation, but it is the object of a sensation. Sweetness is a phenomenon, an operation perceived by the organ of sense. The sensation of sweetness, is the perception of sweetness. Every one knows what perception is, and that perception is not sweetness, nor sweetness, perception. Does truth exist when it is perceived? then it must exist always, and every where, independently of being perceived; for at what time, or in what place does it cease to be a truth, that two and two are erpial to four. CHAPTER V. OF THE ESSENCE OF GOD. We approach this subject Avith profound awe. ' O thou who touched Isaiah's lips with a live coal from off thy altar, guide my pen.-^Sooncr, "let my "'^right hand forget its cunning," than it give utterance to error, or to an impious thought. Perhaps the title of this chapter may displease or alarm the sensitive christian, if he has not entered fully into the spirit of what has gone before: if he has, his inferences respecting the constitution of the divine Es- sence will accord with what follows. But some will exclaim, "Who can by searching find out God : who "can find out the Almighty unto perfection ? His way is "in tiie deep, — His path in the deep waters, — His judg- "ment5 are a mighty deep, — His counsels arc unsearch- "able." — We bow a sincere and solemn assent. — But although these are solemn truths, they are not intended to preclude inquiry respecting the nature^ or essence of God; on the contrary, the holy scriptures themselves make it an imperious duty to know God. "For this is "life eternal, to know thee the only true God, and Jesus "Christ whom thou hast sent." There arc the most fearful denunciations against those who know not God. It appears then, that in one respect we cannot "find out "the Almighty unto perfection ;" and that in another we can, and do know the "living and true God." 19 146 THE ALPHABET The inquiry then is, in what respect is it that we, can- not find out the Almighty; and in what sense is it that the kno\y ledge of God can he acquired? In pursuing this inquiiy we shall take the holy scriptures for our guide ; for though it is through the senses and tlie facul- ty of reason that we discover originally the simple ele. mcnts of all things, it is to revelation we owe the know- ledge of the constitution of the Creator of all things. And we trust it w ill appear, or that it has already ap- peared, that Power, Siiirit^ and Truth constitute the Essence of God. We desire to have it clearly understood, that we do not pretend to any pliilosophical discovery, or to know any thing respecting the constitution of the divine Es- sence, more than is revealed in sacred writ. All that is intended here, is to point out the/«cf, that the know- ledge actually possessed, or derived from revelation, in- cludes a knowledge of the Essence, or Substance of the Divine Being. In what respect then is it that we cannot ^'find out the ^^Almighty?" — The things relating to God which wc cannot find out or comprehend, are His "thoughts'' — His *^ways" — His ^'judgments" — His counsels" — His ^^path." — "As the heavens are high above the earth, so "are my thoughts above your thoughts, and my wai/s "above your ways." "His path is in the deep waters." "His counsels are not known." "His judgments are a "mighty deep." Neither can we comprehend the ex- tent, or the immensity of the being and operations of God, nor the infinity of His duration. "Where wast "thou when I laid the foundations of the earth." "Hast ^'thou perceived the breadth of the earth? declare if ^^thou knowest it all." "Where is the w^ay where OF THOUGHT. 147 "liclit dwelleth? and as for darkness^ where is the place thereof?"* But in what respect is it that God can be, and is,, known to the liiiman mind ? What is it to know God? Is it to know tliat infinite Power, Intelligence, and Truth belong to Hiin, but without daring to know the meaning of the terms, without presnming to inqnire what is the precise character, or predicament of these tilings, without inquiring, whether Poicer and Truth, are constituents of His Kssence, or are only attributes^ and either may, or may not be exercised in conjunction Avith Spirit ? Is it to acquiesce in the metaphysical dogmas of the schools, as to Avhat may be affirmed of the constitution of the divine Essence, without inquu'ing whether, or not, those dogmas arc in accordance with revelation and with reason ? It is in the exercise of reason that we discover tiie existence and the predica- ment of the elementary substances, power, spu'it, and truth ; but it is certainly not from reason, nor from [)hi- losophy, but from the sacred scriptures that we derive the knowledge of the constitution of the divine Es- sence. Some things relating to God, some of His thoughts, nmj/s, S^c. are not revealed, and if they were, probably we could not comprehend tliem. His thoughts are too high, and His counsels too deep, to be reached by onr limited capacities. — Some things are revealed — His in- finity, and immensity — but we are nnable to compre- hend them. But some things are revealed which we can and do comprehend. The constitution of the di- vine Being or Essence is revealed, and though we can- not comprehend the iniquity or immensity of the con- ♦ Job. 148 THE ALPHABET stituents of that Essence^ wc cau and do compiTliend their nature. It is revealed in sacred writ, that Power, Spirit^, and Truth belong essentially to God ; but it has been de- monstrated that Power, Spirit, and Truth arc suh- stanceSf or essences; therefore these elementary es- sences constitute, or enter into the constitution of the divine Essence. But human reason is ade(juale to the comprehension of the nature of these simple essences. Though we do not comprehend tlie infinity or immen- sity of power, we do knoAV very well the nature of power, or the essence of power. It is the essence of power to contract and repel. The efficient cause of contraction and repulsion is the essence of power. And though we cannot comprehend the eternity of the divine Spirit, nor how that Spirit fills all space, yet it is known that the power to perceive is the essence of Spirit. And we do know or clearly conceive of the nature, or essence of Truth ; though we do not, nor shall we ever arrive at the knowledge of all trutli. To know God, is to know His nature ; it is to know the dispositions, or tendencies of His Mind, or Being ; it is to know what are the phenomena, or the necessary operations of His Mind or Being, if we may so speak. It is to know that He does what he pleases "in the ar- "mies of heaven, and amongst the inhabitants of the "earth ;" that He knows all things, past, present, and to come ; that He abhors iniquity ; that He loves truth and uprightness ; that He compassionates the unliappy ; and that He despises the proud. These are the opera- tions, or the phenomena of the divine Mind, — and when the phenomena of any being are Jaiown, the nature, the essence of that being is known. If God does ivliat He will, in the ai-mies of heaven, — He must possess OF THOUGHT. 149 almighty foicer; if He kuow all things, Repossesses spirit, or intelligence ; if he love truth, then truth must ])e a part of Himself, or a constituent of His Essence. if every action of divine power, is directed by spirit, or intelligence, and governed by truth, then Power, Spirit, and l^-uth constitute the divine Essence. — But if, as it seems to be believed, Spirit were the only sub- stance, or essence in the divine Being, and power, and truth were attributes, tlicn it would seem that the operation of Spirit would be the only necessary opera- tion of tlie divine Being, tiiat Spirit may exercise power at pleasure, and that truth may, or may not, influence (he operation. This direful consequence is implied in the principle, that God is a simple Essence. If Spirit were the only essence of the divine Being, He would not then be essentially or necessarily holy and true. Whenever the divine Essence is spoken of, that which is meant is either the Power, the Spirit, or the Truth of God, or all these united ; or there is no mean- ing, nor specific idea annexed to the terms. The essence of any being or thing, is that which makes that being or thing to e what it is. It may be affirmed without fear of contradiction, that Power, Spirit, and Truth, make the Supreme God to be what He is. We speak with reverence. In fiict, these substances, and their operations constitute all that is known of God. If there is any other Essence of Deity, if there is any substratum of Power, Spirit, and Truth, that subatratum must be the efficient cause of these thin"-s, for this is the idea of a substratum. But is it actually known that there is an efficient cause of Power, Spirit, and Truth ? Is any one of these things of sucIj a char- acter as to require a cause, or to indicate that a. cause is necessary to its existence. No, certainly. Who ever 150 THE ALPHABET ihoiiglit of a cause of tlje Spirit of God, or a cause of Truth, or a cause of Almiglity Power? But it is often asserted tliat the human mind is inca- pable of comprehending the nature of the divine Es- sence, or of discovering, or understanding what is (he divine Essence. This musl, or should, be predicated on some priuciple already known. For one who knows nothing, or professes to know nothing of a matter, to pretend to point out what can, or what cannot be known of that matter, is preposterous. If it has actually been ascertained that human reason is inadequate to compre- hend the nature of the divine Essence, tliat discovery must have been made by a comparison of the thing to be comprehended, with the human faculty f