Duke University Libraries Review of certa Conf Pam 12mo #790 D^015S7T2 [PRINTED, BUT NOT PUBLISHED.] f REVIEW CERTAIN REMARKS THE PRESIDENT WHEN REQUESTED TO RESTORE GENERAL BEAUREGARD To THE COMMAND OP DEPARTMENT No. 2, CHARLESTON: STKAJf-l'OWE R PRESSES OF EVANS k C S W E M> 3 Hroml and 103 East Bay streets. 1863. These pages have been put in print not for general circu- lation, but for more convenient reading by the gentlemen who signed the paper printed in the Appendix, and marked A. Charleston, S. C, February 6, 1863. fftsviEW of the Remarks of his Excellency President Davis (Rich- mond, September 13, 18G2) relative to an application by many Members of the Confederate Congress for General G. T. Beauregard, C. S. A., to be returned to the command of De- partment Xo. 2, consisting of Tennessee and parts of Missis- sippi and Alabama. INTRODUCTION. Before entering on a review of the remarks of the Presi- dent,* in order to give il a correct and faithful apprehension of the facts" involved, it appears in place to furnish a brief sketch of affairs in the Western department preceding the departure of General Beauregard from Tupelo. General Beauregard left Ins army corps in Virginia and went to the West to an inferior command at the urgent solicitation of the south-western members of Congress, whose wishes were conveyed to him through Colonel R. A. Pryor, M. C. When the General reached Jackson, Tennessee, about the middle of February, 1862, after the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson, and the evacuation of Bowling Green, the following was the disposition of the troops in the West and South : 1. General Sidney Johnston's army of Kentucky, consisting of about 17,000 effective men of all arms, had fallen back, across the Cumberland river, on Nashville. 2. Major-General Polk's command, of about 14,000 effectives of all arms, was at Columbus chiefly, with troops at New Madrid and Fort Pillow, and small detachments at one or two *See Appendix, A and B. points south of Columbus. This was the command to which General Beauregard was specially assigned. 3. Major-General Bragg'a forces were at and about Pensacola and Mobile. 4. Major-General Lovell's command was at and around Xew Orleans. 5. Major-General Yau Dora's and Price's forces were west of the Mississippi, on the borders of Arkansas and Missouri. The movements of the enemy had made it apparent, mean- time, that he intended to turn the position of our forces in West Tennessee by the way of the Tennessee river, then rising to a favorable stage for navigation, and left open by the fall of Fort Henry. General Beauregard determined to frustrate this design by the immediate evacuation of Columbus, the tempo- ral occupation and fortification of Island 10, and Madrid Bend, on the Mississippi river (represented to be stronger posi- tions by nature than they proved to be), by the construction of additional works at New Madrid, and the concentration, as soon as possible, of all available forces 1 at Corinth, Miss., situ- ated at the intersection of the Memphis and Charleston and the Mobile and Ohio railroads. General Johnston was averse to giving up so important a position as Columbus, but would not interpose his authority as Department commander. Imbued with a high sense of the cardinal principle in war — concentration — a principle illustrated by the military history of all wars, General Beauregard further sought to swell his inade- quate force in all possible ways. He called on Generals Bragg and Lovell for their disposable troops. Lovell at once detached for Corinth a fine brigade under General Buggies, with certain other troops, in all quite 5,000 men, choice troops of all arms. ' General Bragg referred the matter to the War department, by whom positive orders were declined, and the responsibility was left to him. With the instincts of a good soldier, he deter- mined to withdraw his main force from Pensacola and Mobile, and join General Beauregard, which he did in person at jack- son, Tennessee, about the 1st of March, 1802. General Van Dorn, also, was strenuously urged by General Beauregard to transfer his wmole command to the east bank of the Mississippi, and was already in motion to form the junction before the battle of Shiloh. . ,. *~~ * ■ ■ . ': The Governors of Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, and Ten- nessee had also been called on by General Beauregard for five thousand men respectively, or as many as could be sent to him. It was further suggested to the War department that, for the campaign, troops might be spared from Charleston, Savan- nah; and Knoxville : and in consequence, a brigade was sent, after the battle of Shiloh, from Charleston, and several regi- ments from Chattanooga by General Kirby Smith. Further, General Sidney Johnston, whose army was now falling back along the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, was requested by General Beauregard to send forward to Corinth one or two of his brigades. Thai judicious commander sent a brigade at once, and announced his determination to make a junction. with his whole force, at Corinth, which, in the main, was effected by the last of March, L862. It will thus be seen under what circumstances, at whose instance, and by whose efforts the forces concentrated at Corinth by the 3d day of April, 1862, Avere mainly brought together at that point, namely: General Beauregard. These forces consisted of — 1. General Polk's army corps (infantry and artillery)... 9,130 2. General Bragg's army corps, consisting of his original command from Pensacola and Mobile, and Lovell's quota, with the new Levies from Louisiana (infantry and artillery) 13,589 3. The army of Kentucky, now subdivided into Hardee's army corps and reserve division, under Breckinridge (infantry and artillery) 13,228 35,953 4. Untrained cavalry, distributed with the three corps.... 4,382 Effectives of all arms 40,335 Unfortunately, this army being deficient in genei-al officers, much precious time was lost through the defective organization of the several army coi*ps as they were assembled at Corinth, and in efforts to effect a better organization for the field; and as a consequence, the battle of Shiloh, which ought to havo been fought as early as the 1st, could not take place until the 6th of April, during the night of which Buell effected a junction with Grant. This event it was hoped might be averted even by marching from Corinth as late as the 3d of April, but untoward delays, chiefly the result again of defective organi- zation, added to bad roads, lost us one day by the wayside, otherwise the battle would have been fought on the 5th of April, and Buell must have reached the scene twenty-four hours too late. REVIEW. The object of the President's allusion to a telegram from (lcneral Beauregard t<> Governor Pickens.* to the effect that General Beauregard's presence was absolutely necessary to the army at Tupelo, was to involve the latter, at least, in an incon- sistency, inasmuch as it would appeal- that a tew days there- at! er he actually left Tupelo and his command. Will any unprejudiced mind fail to comprehend that although General Beauregard might be averse to a permanent separation from an army that he had brought together, organized.")- and handled in battle, and might look upon such a Separation as fraught with public and persona! injury, lie might nevertheless regard it as a duty, both to the country ami himself, in his situation, to withdraw for a few week's from the vexatious, distracting minor details of military administration, and seek temporary rest and respite from the cares which hamper and harass the commander of a volunteer army, especially when able to leave I he execution of his plans of organization and preparation tor offensive operations in the hands of so excellent an officer as General Bragg, his second in command, assisted by his Chief of Staff, who knew fully the details of all those plans as well as general views and expectations? Is there not in reality a wide difference hctween a permanent separation from the command of the army at Tupelo, such as was involved in the transfer to a command in Charleston, one- third of the size of the former in number, and a temporary absence of probably less than a month,;;; for obtaining health, quiet, and time for reflection upou the momentous trust com- mitted to his charge? Undoubtedly so, more especiall}- when constant telegraphic communication, and a distance easily * See Appendix, C. f See Appendix, J. i See Appendix, F and H. travelled over on a near railroad in fifteen hours, made his absence not at all hazardous. True, as the President says, Columbus, Ky., had been aban- doned; and, it may be remarked, it was a. great mistake to have strongly occupied so advanced a position, one so easily turned, and especially when left without a supporting army. True, that Island 10 had fallen, but after having served sub- stantially the purpose for which it had been occupied and held, viz : as an obstacle to any movement of the enemy by the river on Memphis. True, moreover, that Memphis was in the hands of the enemy, but not until the occupation of Corinth so long and late in the season had served to force him to mass his troops, at an enormous expense of men and money, for its reduction, and until time had been gained for the fortification of Vicksburg : then was it successfully abandoned — a mere barren waste — to the enemy. It will, however, be the prov- ince of impartial history to investigate and record whether these losses were due to the incapacity of our generals in the field, or to a want of forecast, and the neglect on the part of the government to develop the abundant resources of the country, and to provide sufficient and timely means for the effective defence of that important region. Lovell may -have telegraphed the War department that he would abandon Vieksburg if not reinforced; possibly, too, the people in that quarter had lost confidence in him after the mis- hap at New Orleans; yet when General Bragg and, subse- quently, General Van Dorn were ordered to relieve him not a soldier was detached with either. It so happened that when the telegram of the President to General Bragg was handed to General Beauregard he had just returned from riding with Surgeons Brodie and Choppin, of his Staff, who had again urged him to take advantage of the lull in military operations, while preparations were being made for the summer campaign, to take at least a brief rest from the labors incident to his immediate presence with the troops. They both assured him that, from the nature of his disease (a severe, protracted laryngitis), it was absolutely necessary for him to have repose and relaxation. He being in more pain than usual, owing to the great quantity of dust on the road upon which he had been riding, had then agreed to follow their advice, and seek, if possible, the restoration of his health, until General Bragg should inform him the army was ready in all things for the offensive. Made aware of the telegram of the President detaching that officer, General Beauregard tele- graphed at once* the necessity for General Bragg's presence with the army, in consequence of his own urgent, absolute need of respite for " a while" from duty during the period of reorganization and preparation then going on. General Bragg also telegraphed his inability to leave under the circumstances. It is pertinent here to state that there seemed to be an in- comprehensible desire on the part of the government to deprive General Beauregard of the assistance of General Bragg, whose services had been reported to the War department on a former occasion as indispensable to the army in consequence of the physical condition of General Beauregard. The latter officer was considered by his physicians ami his friends (from the time he arrived in Jackson, Tenn., February 17, 1862, until he left Tupelo, Miss., June 17, 1S0^) more fit for a hospital than for the field; but when urged by them to retire lor a. while from the command of the department, he invariably answered: ".The condition of affairs did not permit it; that he had entered in this contest with the firm determination of sacrificing, if necessary, not only all he possessed, hut his life also; and whether he died from sickness, or on the battle- field, the country was welcome to the sacrifice." When, how- ever, he found the possibility of recruiting his health by an absence of only a few weeks, he did not hesitate to do so, for the purpose of soon resuming offensive operations; and had the President awaited the explanatory letters to the Adjutant-Gen- eral of the 15th and 25th June, already referred to, instead of acting on the spur of the moment, after misreading an impor- tant telegram, he would, doubtless, have adopted a different course. It was General Beauregard, be it here noted, who had under- taken the fortifications of Vicksburg, who had sent his engi- neers thither with plans and instructions to execute the work; it was he, also, who had (while at Corinth) urged its defence to the last. "|" General Beauregard, therefore, knew the defensive * See Appendix, E. ■(■See bis letter on files of the War department relative to defences of Vicksburg, September 24, 1862. 10 resources of the position; and, at the time, probably better than the War department, the offensive capacities of the enemy : moreover, he was then in constant communication with General Lovell, whom he expected at that very moment to see and confer with at Tupelo (in consequence of informa- tion received from him to that effect) as to the summer's operations, with a view to a co-oj>cration of forces. And it ma}* be further stated that General Lovell did reach Tupelo that same evening. Under the circumstances, it is but fair to suppose General Beauregard knew better than any one in Eichmond or distant from the theatre of war, the precise con- dition of affairs and the needs of Vicksburg, as compared with those of his own department; hence his assumption of the responsibility of retaining General -Bragg until further orders. The President says (according to the committee) the latter officer stated in his dispatch that General Beauregard had left on sick certificate fov four months; this must be an error; and the President assuredly must have confounded what General Bragg wrote with the terms of* General Beauregard's dispatch of 14th June, misreading the latter, as ma}' be seen; that is, misplacing the punctuation, as the context ought to have shown to any one reading it with care. The passage misconstrued is as follows : " I am leaving for awhile on surgeons' certificate — for four months I have delayed obeying their urgent rcconi- mendations." From this it is plain thut the absence was to. be but temporary, that it is "for a while," and not "for four months," or one-third of a year. The opinions of the surgeons, and the manifest physical needs of General Beauregard, were bettor standards, it is sub- mitted, of what he should have done than the opinion of airy one far from his head-quarters, and not well informed of the circumstances bearing on the case. The President was pleased to say that "General Beauregard should have remained at Tupelo, even if he had to be carried about on a litter," until General Bragg' 6 return, or for at least two or three weeks. Probably the President is not aware that General Beaure- gard has already shown his devotion to the service by going to the immediate scene of the battle of Shiloh in E(fARD, Q neral 0. S. A. General Sam. COOPER, Adjutant-General C. S. A., Richmond, Va. I. General Beauregard to General Braxton Bragg. [Confidential.] Cullum Springs. Bladon, Ala., July 2S, 1862. My pear General: Your letter of the 22d inst. was received only last night. 1 give you with pleasure the following views on your propose) operations from Tupelo, for I wish you the amplest sr both on your and the country's account. You have evidently but one of four things to do: First, to attack lialleck at Corinth ; second, to attack Buell at or about Chattanooga; third, to attack Grant at or about Memphis ; fourth, to remain idle at Tupelo. From what you state the first is evidently inadmissible, and the last cannot be entertained for one moment, for action — action — action is what we require. Now, with regard to the other two propositions, it in evident 24 that unless you reinforce General E. K. Smith, at Chattanooga, he will be overpowered by Buell, and that our communication with the East, and our supplies at Atlanta, Augusta, etc., will be cut off; also, that a partial reinforcement would so weaken you at Tupelo, as to paralyze you for any other movements from there ; hence you have adopted the wisest course in send- ing to Smith all 3-0111* available forces, except just enough to guard your depots, etc., to the rear of your present position at Tupelo. The third proposition would have afforded you some success, but not as brilliant and important in its results as the second one, if the newspapers will permit you to carry it successfully into effect; for Hal leek and Buell, occupying the base of a long isosceles triangle, of which Mobile is the apex, could get to Chattanooga before you if they should become awarej of your movements, and then you would have to contend again with superior forces, as usual to us. The moment 3 t ou get to Chat- tanooga you ought to take the offensive, keeping in mind B the following grand principles of the art of war: First, always bring the masses of your army in contact with the fractions of the enemy; second, operate as much as possi- ble on his communications without exposing your own ; third, operate always on interior or shorter lines. I have no doubt that with anything like equal numbers you will always meet with success. I am happy to see that my two lieutenants, Morgan and For- rest, are doing such good service in Kentucky and Tennessee. When I appointed them I thought they would leave their mark wherever they passed. By the way, I think Ave ought hereafter, in our official pa- pers, to call the " Yankees" " Abolitionists" instead of " Fed- erals," for they now proclaim not only the abolition of slavery, but of all our constitutional rights; and that name will have a stinging effect on our Western enemies. I intend to issue a general order on the subject whenever I assume a command. Sincerely your friend, G. T. BEAUREGARD. General Braxton Bragg, Commanding Department No. 2, Mobile, Alabama. 25 General Beauregard to Adjutant- General Cooper. .[Confidential.] Mobile, Ala, September 5, 1862. Gkneral: Under the supposition that on the restoration of my health I would bo returned to tin- command of Department Xo. 2, I had prepared while at Bladon. Ala., a plan of operations in Tennessee and Kentucky, baaed on my knowledge of that part of the theatre of war; but hearing thai my just expectations are to he disappointed, I have the honor to communicate it t» the War department, in the hope that it may be of service to our arms and to our cause. It was submitted by me to General Bragg on the 2d inst. By looking at the map it will be seen that the fqrces operat- ing in that section of country will be separated at first by one river (the Tennessee), and afterward by two (the Tennessee and Cumberland), hence they will be unable to support each other, being unprovided with pontoon trains; but their opera- tions must be more or less dependent on or connected wit h each other. 1 will first refer to those in East Tennessee and then to those west of it. In the first case, our objective points must be. first Louisville, and then Cincinnati. How best to reach them from Chatta- nooga, with Buell at Huntsville and Stevenson, is the question. It is evident he has the advantage of two bases of operations, the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers, and that if we advance toward our objective points without getting rid of him, we would expose our lines of communication with Chattanooga. We must, then, give him battle first, or compel him to retire before us. Should he retire on Nashville (as the newspapers say he is now doing), we will be advancing toward Louisville; but should he venture on Florence or Savannah, to unite his forces with Ivosecrans and Grant, we will have to concentrate enough of our forces from Middle and East Tennessee to follow him rapidly and defeat him in a great battle, when we would be able to resume our march as before indicated. We must, how- ever, as soon as practicable, construct strong works to com- mand the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, for otherwise our 2fi communication would be cut off by the enemy as soon as those two rivers shall have risen sufficiently to admit the entrance of their gun-boats and transports. The best positions for said works are ahout forty miles below Forts Donelson and Henry, not far from Eddysville, where those two rivers come within one and a half mile of each other, i am informed there is at that point a commanding elevation where a strong field-work could be constructed for a garrison of about twenty-five hundred or three thousand men, who could hold out (with ample provisions and ammunition) againat & large army. Under the guns of this work, and along the bank of each river, a series of batteries, armed with the heav- iest guns (eight, nine, ten inch, and rifled guns), could be con- structed, bearing directly on obstructions placed in each of said rivers. When Louisville shall have fallen into our possession, I would construct a work there tor the command of the Ohio and the canal, and I would destroy the latter as soon as possible, so completely that future travellers would hardly know where it was. This I would do as a return for the Yankee vandalism in attempting to obstruct forever the harbors of Charleston and Savannah. A detachment of our army could, I think, take Louisville, while the main body would be marching to Cincin- nati; but if we could get boats enough it would be shorter to go up the Ohio in them. To keep the command of Cincinnati I would construct a strong work, heavily armed, at Covington. Now, for the operation of Western Tennessee. The object should be to drive the enemy from there and resume the com- mand of the Mississippi river. For these purposes I would concentrate rapidly at Grand Junction Price's army, and all that could be spared from Vicks- bur<»- of Van Dora's. From there I would make a forced march to Fort Pillow, which I would take with probably only a very small loss. It is evident that the forces at Memphis and Yazoo river would then have their line of communication by the river with the North cut off, and they would have either to surrender or cross without resources into Arkansas, where General Holmes would take good care of them. From Fort Pillow I would compel the forces at Corinth, and Jackson, Tennessee, to fall back precipitately to Humboldt and Columbus, or their 27 lines of communication would be cut off also. We would then pursue them vigorously beyond the Mississippi at Columbus, or the Ohio at Paducah. We would thus compel the enemy to evacuate the State of Mississippi and Western Tennessee, with probably the loss on our part of only a few hundred men. General Price could then bo detached into Missouri to support his friends, where his presence alone would be worth an army to the Confederacy-. % The armament and ammunition of the works referred to should be collected as soon as possible at Meridian and Chatta- nooga. Such are the operations which I would carry into effect, with such modifications as circumstances might require, if the Pres- ident had judged proper to order me back to the command of that army which 1 had, with General Bragg's assistance, col- lected together and organized, and which I had only left to recover my shattered health, while 1113' presence could be spared from it, and until he informed me that it was ready to take the offensive. Hoping for its entire success, I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant, G. T. BEAUREGAKD, General C. S. A. .1. [GENERAL ORDERS.] IIkah-quartrrs of the Forces, Corinth, Miss. % March 29, 1862. I. The undersigned assumes the command and immediate direction of the armies of Kentucky, and of the Mississippi, now united, and which, in military operations, will be known as the army of the Mississippi. II. General G. T. Beauregard will be second in command to the commander of the forces. III. The army of the Mississippi will be subdivided into three army corps, and reserves of cavalr}*, artillery, and in- fantry, as follows : 1. The first corps, under the command of Major-General L. Polk, to consist of the grand division now under his com- 28 mand, as originally organized, less the artillery and cav- alry herein after limited and detached as reserves, and the garrison of Fort Pillow, and the works for defence of Madrid bend, already detached from that command. 2. The second corps, under Major-General Braxton Bragg, to consist of the second grand "division of the army of the Mississippi, less the artillery and cavalry herein after lim- ited and detached as reserves. 3. The third corps, under Major-General W. J. Hardee, to con- sist of the army of Kentucky, less the cavalry, artillery, and infantry herein after limited and detached as reserves. 4. The infantiy reserve, under command of Major-General G. B. Crittenden, shall be formed of a division of not less than two brigades. • IV. The brigades of each army corps, and of the reserve y will be so formed as to consist severally of about 2,500 total, infantiy, and one light battery of six pieces if practicable. V. Divisions shall consist of not less than two brigades, and of one regiment of cavalry. VI. All cavalry and artillery not herein before assigned to divisions and brigades will be held in reserve — the cavalry under Brigadier-General ITaices, the artillery under an officer to be subsequently announced. VII. All general orders touching matters of organization, discipline, and conduct of the troops, published by General G. T. Beauregard to the army of the Mississippi, will continue in force in the whole army until otherwise directed, and copies thereof will be furnished to the third army corps and the reserves. VIII. Major-General Braxton Bragg, in addition to his duties as commander of the second army corps, is announced as " Chief of the Staff" to the commander of the forces. (Signed) A. S. JOHNSTON, General C. S. A. Note. — The above organization of the forces at Corinth was submitted by General G. T. Beauregard, second in command, and adopted by Gen- eral A. S. Johnston, first in command, without any alteration whatever. THOMAS JORDAN, A. A. G. April 15, 1862. pH 8.5