DUKE 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2017 with funding from 
 Duke University Libraries 
 
 https://archive.org/details/peopleswarinfran01hale_0 
 
THE “PEOPLE S WAR” 
 IN FRANCE 
 
IN SAME SERIES 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN IN 
 BULGARIA 
 1877-78 
 
 BY 
 
 F. Y. GREENE (U.S. Army) 
 
 8s. 6d. net 
 
 THE ELEMENTS OF 
 STRATEGY 
 
 BY THE LATE 
 
 LT.-COL. TOYEY, R.E. 
 New Edition. 6s. net 
 
 LETTERS ON APPLIED 
 TACTICS 
 
 BY 
 
 MAJOR GRIEPENKERL 
 8s. 6d. net 
 
THE “PEOPLE’S WAR” 
 IN FRANCE 
 
 1870-1871 
 
 BY 
 
 COLONEL LONSDALE HALE 
 
 “There is for a Leader nothing more oppressive than a 
 situation that is not clear, nothing more trying than 
 bands of armed irregular troops, aided by the popula¬ 
 tion and the nature of the country, and relying for 
 support on a strong army in the neighbourhood.” 
 
 Prince Frederick Chari,es of Prussia. 
 
 LONDON 
 
 HUGH REES, Limited 
 
 124 PALL MALL, S.W. 
 1904 
 
qWtO? 
 H IblV 
 
 TO MY 
 
 MANY BROTHER-SOLDIERS OF ALL RANKS 
 
 FROM 
 
 FIELD-MARSHALS TO PRIVATES 
 
 TO WHOM I HAVE, IN VARIOUS CAPACITIES, TALKED ABOUT 
 WAR FOR NEARLY FORTY-THREE YEARS, THIS LITTLE 
 “ SOMETHING TO READ ” IS DEDICATED AS A MEMENTO OF 
 THE ENCOURAGEMENT THAT I HAVE ALWAYS RECEIVED 
 FROM THEM IN MY WORK, AND OF AN ENDURING CONNEC¬ 
 TION WITH THEM, WHICH THEY HAVE ALWAYS MADE SO 
 PLEASANT AND WHICH I VALUE DEEPLY 
 
 L. A. H 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAV. I'AGK 
 
 I. Introductory ......... 1 
 
 II. Conditions of the Second War : State of Atfairs to the 
 
 End of September . . . . . . .11 
 
 III. October .......... 33 
 
 IV. Human Nature in War and the “ Personlichkeit ” of the 
 
 German Leaders ....... 56 
 
 V. The first fortnight of November ..... 67 
 
 VI. The Grand Duke’s Detachment from November 14th 
 
 to 20th ......... 95 
 
 VII. The Second Army from November 10th to 20th . . 114 
 
 VIII. The Grand Duke’s Detachment from November 21st 
 
 to 23rd.126 
 
 IX. The Second Army from November 21st to 23rd . . 139 
 
 X. November 24th ........ 160 
 
 XI. November 25th . . . . . .173 
 
 XII. November 26th.184 
 
 XIII. November 27th ......... 195 
 
 XIV. November 28th—Battle of Beaune la Rolande . . 202 
 
 XV. November 29th.215 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 viii 
 
 CHAP. PAGE 
 
 XVI. November 30tli ......... 222 
 
 XVII. December 1st.228 
 
 XVIII. December 2nd—Battle of Loigny-Poupry . . . 236 
 
 XIX. December 3rd—First Day, Second Battle of Orleans . 251 
 
 XX. December 4th—Second Day, Second Battle of Orleans— 
 
 Capture of the City.265 
 
 XXI. Conclusion ......... 282 
 
 MAPS 
 
 General Map of the Operations in France 1870-71 
 
 To face page 1 
 
 Large Scale Map of Country round Orleans in pocket at end 
 
PREFACE 
 
 In a long course of the study of War I have acquired 
 quite enough knowledge of the subject to deter me from ever 
 making the futile attempt to write “ Military History.” That 
 work must be left to the gifted few. So in these pages I 
 am simply a narrator of some incidents of War, though in 
 my narrative I have from time to time endeavoured to lay 
 before the reader some of the lessons which seem to me 
 deducible from the incidents narrated. 
 
 Very many years ' 1 close connection with British officers of 
 all arms and branches of the Service has led me to the con¬ 
 clusion that urging them to read and study Military History 
 because Napoleon and Wellington did so, raises in them no 
 responsive echo. The examples given are far above their 
 ambitions; they aspire to become good soldiers, but not 
 Napoleons or Wellingtons. But they will all admit that the 
 more an officer, field-marshal, or subaltern, on taking the 
 field, knows of what has happened, and what may happen, in 
 War, the better practical soldier he will be; for to those who 
 know nothing of the past, everything that comes is new and 
 unexpected, and they are taken by surprise. One night about 
 Christmastide during the South African War, a piquet guard¬ 
 ing a very steep hillside was surprised by the Boers, who had 
 
X 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 clambered up, and the camp was rushed; but if whoever was 
 in charge of the piquet had ever been at Bude, on the north 
 coast of Cornwall, and, not necessarily with a volume of 
 military history in his hand, but with a threepenny guide¬ 
 book, had explored the neighbourhood, he would have learnt 
 of the incident of war at Stamford Hill in 1643, when Sir 
 Bevil Greenvil, with a band of Royalists, clambering up 
 the steep sides of the hill, surprised and defeated the 
 Parliamentarian forces on the top, with an eventual loss to 
 these forces of 2000 men, their ordnance and baggage train ; 
 and he would have been doubly watchful. 
 
 So in these pages I have narrated for the British officer 
 “ something to read ” about War. 
 
 This small book does not pretend to be an erudite work ; 
 so I hope if the aforesaid British officer takes up the book to 
 read it, he will not think it necessary to sit at a table on 
 which to rest his elbows with his head between his hands, 
 and with a pair of compasses by him to measure distances. 
 Let him repose in an arm-chair with, on his knees, the 
 excellent map thoughtfullv provided by the publishers, and I 
 think he will be able to follow the narrative quite easily. 
 He will find also that the first time a place is named I have 
 appended to the name, in rectangular brackets, the distances 
 at which the place is from important points; and further, in 
 those brackets are illustrative or explanatory remarks of my 
 own. 
 
 The English rendering of some of the many extracts from 
 the German archives will doubtless appear stiff and unpolished; 
 
PREFACE 
 
 xi 
 
 but I have most carefully endeavoured to adhere as closely as 
 possible to the originals. On active service, “ elegant ” com¬ 
 position gives way before the need for brevity and for saving 
 time,so even the best staff officers are apt to write “ inelegantly.” 
 So as v. Stiehle wrote to v. V. Rhetz that the latter was to 
 send off at once his “ intaktesten brigade,” I have designated 
 the brigade by the equally horrible English expression “ the 
 most intact brigade.” 
 
 “Qui s’excuse s’accuse,” but, nevertheless, I must say that 
 probably grammatical slips in these pages may be easy to find, 
 in spite of the efforts of a young friend who has read the proofs 
 with me, and to whom I am deeply indebted for doing her 
 best to persuade me to write English ; but after years of 
 relating the incidents of War colloquially from brief notes to 
 listeners, the transition to communicating them in cold blood 
 from a study chair by means of a pen I have found to be 
 somewhat trying. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 
 
 
 
ERRATA 
 
 The reader is requested to make the following corrections 
 ■which escaped my notice until too late for alteration of the 
 text. —L. A. H. 
 
 Page 35, line 17 from top, for " 1880 ” read “ 1870." 
 
 ,, 39, ,, 14 ,, ,, for “ on ” read “ in. ” 
 
 ,, 44, ,, 13 from bottom, should read “ When Gambetta 
 
 assunied control at Tours." 
 
 ,, 68. ,, 2 from top, after “ enemy " insert “ from." 
 
 ,, 69, ,, 15 ,, „ for “ west ” read “ east.” 
 
 ,, no, last line, for “ west ” read “ east.” 
 
 ,, 127, line 3 from top, for “ Roland ” read " Rolande.” 
 
 ,, 147, „ 7 from bottom, Note: le Grand Orme is two miles 
 
 from Orleans. 
 
 ,, 192, ,, 18 from top, for “ practise” read “practice.” 
 
 ,, 211, last line, for “ v. Stosch ” read “ v. Stiehle." 
 
 ,, 265, line 4 from top, for “ 8 p.m.” read “ 8 a.m.” 
 
 „ 273, first line, for “9 guns” read “4 guns.” 
 
THE PEOPLE’S WAP IN FRANCE 
 
 1870-71 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 In every country, even in those where the law of universal 
 liability to military service is most widely applied, there will 
 always be of the adult male population a certain portion for 
 whom no place can be found in the organised Field and Fortress 
 army, or who, for some reason or other, are exempted from 
 liability to serve. In Germany, the number of these men is 
 very small, in Great Britain it is very large. At a Conference 
 on the “Usages of War” held at Brussels in 1874, shortly 
 after the close of the Franco-German War of 1870-71, one 
 of the most important questions raised and most warmly 
 discussed was the extent to which this portion of the popula¬ 
 tion might actively participate and take a share in the defence 
 of their country against an invader. The great land Powers, 
 Russia and Germany, did their utmost to induce the Con¬ 
 ference to restrict the defence entirely and absolutely to the 
 organised army; the smaller Powers, Belgium, Holland, 
 Switzerland, and others, insisted with equal energy on 
 legalising the participation of the whole population, both 
 civil and military, in the war. Great Britain, little to her 
 credit, took a neutral position in the discussions. Eventually 
 the disputants came to a compromise; the men not included 
 in the ranks of the organised army were to be allowed to 
 
 A 
 
2 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 defend their country provided they carried some distinctive 
 mark or badge, and had been accepted as part of the defending 
 force by the Government of their country; but as regards 
 the civilians, the decision was practically shelved, and, as one 
 of the delegates, towards the close of the Conference, said: 
 “ The Conference will, then, break up without deciding 
 whether a civilian who destroys a bridge in rear of the 
 invaders may be shot for so doing.” At first sight it appears 
 almost absurd to question the right of any man to take part 
 in the defence of his country ; theoretically, active participa¬ 
 tion in that defence is not a mere right, it is a bounden duty; 
 whether he shall do so or not is, however, a question of 
 expediency. Humanitarians, whose sympathies are, of course, 
 with the invaded people, assert that with the participation of 
 the non-military population in the war, reprisals enter into 
 the war, and it becomes embittered and barbaric; they assert 
 that the sufferings resulting to the whole country in conse¬ 
 quence are not in any way counterbalanced by the value of 
 the assistance given to the general defence. There are also 
 military men who would restrict participation in a war to the 
 organised army only, and on the grounds that the population 
 outside the army is unreliable as an instrument of war, and 
 also, that the mere increase of numbers is rather a probable 
 cause of confusion in the operations than an increase of 
 defensive strength. Rut it was none of these reasons that 
 influenced the greater land Powers at the Brussels Conference ; 
 it was the knowledge of the enormous increase in the difficulties 
 to be encountered by an invader, if the resistance is not 
 confined to the organised army alone. So long as the 
 opponents are the respective organised armies only, the 
 struggle is a species of military chess, in which victory must 
 inevitably declare itself on the side where the players are the 
 better, and the pieces are the stronger. There are certain 
 data, mainly those of time and space, known to both opponents, 
 and on these are based calculations for movements ; sentiment 
 does not enter into the proceedings or influence them, and 
 the game is played by professional experts only. Moreover, 
 
INTRODUCTORY 
 
 3 
 
 every Power has for reference in the pigeon-holes of its 
 Intelligence Department the strength and composition of 
 the organised armies of its opponents ; so at the outset of a 
 campaign it knows the probable strength of its adversary, 
 and can make its plans accordingly. But if, in the course of 
 the invasion, the population outside the organised army 
 hrows itself into the fray, there comes in a disturbing 
 element, the composition of which is unknown to the in¬ 
 vader, and of which the resisting value cannot be ascer¬ 
 tained except by practical experience ; patriotism may work 
 wonders ; and, moreover, patriotism very often declines to 
 confine its action according to the rules of the game ; so 
 the situation sometimes becomes very perplexing and 
 embarrassing to the invaders. This sort of war is a war 
 of defence carried on by the whole people of the country, 
 and is therefore denominated a “ People’s War.” The 
 recent war in South Africa was a “ People’s War,” and 
 although its long duration was mainly due to the vast size 
 of the theatre of war, some of the greatest difficulties encoun¬ 
 tered by our invading army arose from the fact of it being 
 a “ People’s War.” 
 
 Most persons, if asked to name the latest “ People’s War ” 
 in Europe, would give the war in the Spanish Peninsula in 
 the early years of the last century, for it is not generally 
 known that of the seven months’ war between France and 
 Germany in 1870-71, whilst during the first seven or 
 eight weeks it was a war between only the organised armies 
 of the two countries, during the remaining five months it 
 was a “ People’s War ” for the defence of France. This great 
 campaign is usually regarded as a single war which commenced 
 with the Declaration of War by France on July 19th, 1870, 
 and terminated with the surrender of Belfort to the Germans 
 on February 16th, 1871. But in this campaign there were 
 these two phases, so different from each other as forms of 
 warfare that virtually they were two distinct wars, the second 
 commencing immediately after the conclusion of the first. 
 The first, carried on by the organised armies of the two 
 
+ THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 countries, came to a close on September 1st, 1870, with the 
 Hattie of Sedan and the surrender of the Emperor 
 Napoleon III. and of MacMahon’s army of Chalons ; the 
 second, in which the German Army found itself opposed 
 by the French people as well as the French organised Army, 
 began on the 4th of the same month, when the Germans 
 commenced their march on Paris, where, on that day, the 
 Imperial Dynasty was dethroned, and there was established 
 in its place a Republican Government, which at once assumed 
 the title, “ The Government of National Defence.” So 
 complete had been the overthrow of the original organised 
 French Army which took the field at the commencement of the 
 campaign, that when, on September 19th, Paris was invested 
 by the Germans, the only remaining organised units of the 
 regular army available for operations in France outside the 
 capital were three three-battalion infantry regiments, a single 
 battalion from each of three infantry regiments, nine regiments 
 of cavalry, and, according to de Freycinet, there was only one 
 battery of artillery complete in material and personnel. Of 
 depot troops there were a large number. With evei’y 
 battalion there was a depot company, consisting of “ the halt, 
 the maimed and the blind,” and untrained soldiers. Besides 
 these there were a number of trained soldiers who had not 
 joined the army in the first stages of the war, or who, having- 
 taken part in it, had managed to escape being captured. 
 The depot companies had, before the catastrophe of Sedan, 
 been collected into three-battalion regiments denominated 
 Marche Regiments or Regiments de Marche; but in all the 
 new formations it was in the want of good officers that their 
 deficiencies were most apparent. It was out of these indifferent 
 and insufficient regular troops that the nucleus of the French 
 armies which fought during the “ People’s War ” were formed. 
 The resources of material and men in the provinces were 
 abundant, but the men were not professional soldiers, they 
 were the People ; and even when subsequently they wore some 
 distinctive dress or badge, carried some sort of firearm in 
 their hands, and were designated by military appellations, it 
 
INTRODUCTORY 
 
 5 
 
 was as the People that they fought against the invader. And 
 besides all these, a multitude of men, ordinary civilians, and 
 of women as well, took their part in the defence. So the 
 second war was a real “ People’s War.” 
 
 The forces that the Government employed in the national 
 defence were hastily improvised ; the organisation of the 
 defence was hastily arranged, and time was wanting for its 
 completion. To these causes, and to the absence of unison 
 of views between the chief civil and military authorities in 
 the provinces, was due the eventual collapse of the national 
 defence ; but notwithstanding the disadvantageous conditions 
 under which it was carried on, it brought the invaders to the 
 verge of a catastrophe; and it is impossible to study the 
 struggle without arriving at the conclusion that a country 
 which relies for defence on its organised army alone, and does 
 not avail itself of the defensive power outside the ranks of 
 that army, deliberately deprives itself of auxiliary aid of the 
 very greatest military value to itself. On this point there 
 are two witnesses whose evidence must necessarily have great 
 weight. Baron v. d. Goltz, who was an officer of the German 
 General Staff of the Second Army during the war, says, in 
 his “ Gambettaund Seine Armeen ” : “ The war revealed the 
 existence of forces for war that, without that experience, we 
 should still to-day undervalue”; and Prince Frederick Charles 
 the commander of that army, when he was in a very difficult 
 situation during the war, spoke as follows: “The Franc- 
 tireurs, aided by the country, have done the French good 
 service. Now I am reduced to a waiting attitude. . . . There 
 is for a leader nothing more oppressive than a situation that 
 is not clear, nothing more trying than bands of armed 
 irregular troops aided by the population and the nature of 
 the country, and relying for support on a strong army in the 
 neighbourhood.” At the Brussels Conference, the leading 
 German representative was Colonel v. Voigts-Rhetz, who 
 had been the Chief Staff Officer of the Third Army Corps, 
 which took so conspicuous a part in the Franco-German War, 
 both before and after Sedan ; and he knew, by^ bitter 
 
6 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 experience,the difficulties to be overcome in a “ People’s War” ; 
 hence his energetic resistance to any legalisation of the par¬ 
 ticipation of the people in a war. From the narrative 
 recorded in the following pages will be clearly apparent 
 the great potentialities in a “ People’s War ” for defence 
 against invasion, provided that the part the people are to 
 take in the war has been as fully and carefully thought out 
 and organised beforehand as has the work of the organised 
 army. 
 
 The “People’s War” in France was mainly confined, in its 
 thoroughness and intensity, to a compai’atively small area: 
 the district bounded on the north by the Seine from its mouth 
 up to Melun; on the east by the country between its tribu¬ 
 taries, the Loing and the Yonne; on the south by the Loire 
 from Gien to Tours ; and on the west by the railway from 
 Tours through Le Mans and Alenyon to the mouth of the 
 Seine. The war may be said to have reached its climax with 
 the second occupation of Orleans by the Germans on the 
 night of December 4-5. 
 
 For many years past there has been available all the infor¬ 
 mation ever likely to be forthcoming from the French side as 
 regards this war, but for twenty-three years the Germans 
 were reticent with respect to their share in it. V. Moltke 
 was always a believer in the maintenance of “ prestige,” so in 
 the Official History of the War, drawn up under his super¬ 
 vision, there is little to lead the reader to imagine that either 
 v. Moltke himself, or any of the other leaders and Generals 
 of the German Army, ever made mistakes, or were other than 
 marvellously perfect soldiers. And undoubtedly he was, for 
 many years, right in maintaining this reticence, for at any time 
 war might have broken out again between the old foes, and 
 had the French known of the blunders and shortcomings of 
 the German leaders they would have entered on a new war 
 with but little fear of any innate superiority in their 
 opponents, whilst the faith and confidence of the German 
 soldiers in their own commanders, and even in v. Moltke 
 himself, would have been most seriously shaken, and dis- 
 
INTRODUCTORY 
 
 7 
 
 cipline might have suffered. So suppressio veri, very seldom, 
 however, carried to the length of falsificatio veri, was, when 
 expedient, one of the chief principles applied to the com¬ 
 pilation of the German Official History of the War. We 
 may be quite sure also that strict censorship must have 
 been exercised over the numerous Regimental Histories 
 of the War, which were published from time to time, and 
 that officers, who had written home from the seat of war, 
 took care when their letters contained uncomplimentary 
 criticism on the operations, that they should be kept 
 strictly confidential. Similarly, the favourite form of record, 
 the “ Tagebuch,” or diary, must have been carefully stowed 
 away under lock and key, or saw the light only after such 
 an amount of expurgation as ensured that its publication 
 would in no way injure the professional prospects of the 
 diarist. 
 
 Yet it was not necessary to apply this principle with 
 equal rigidness indiscriminately to all the operations of the 
 campaign. Any one simply following the narrative, and 
 reading between the lines, can mark the mistakes made and 
 the terrible unnecessary waste of life caused by them in the 
 period from the battle of Weissenburg to that of Sedan. 
 But in this splendid continuous series of victories, and their 
 ultimate decisive result, the shortcomings fell into the back¬ 
 ground, and were condoned by the successes achieved. It 
 was in the subsequent war, the “ People’s War,” that things 
 went so badly, that it was considered necessary to carry the 
 suppressio veri to its extreme. The reason why things went 
 wrong was that this new war was a “ People’s War,” a form 
 of warfare of which the Germans had had no previous experi¬ 
 ence, and which was quite new to them ; and in it the supreme 
 and the superior German authorities made mistakes similar 
 to those our own authorities made in the “ People’s War” in 
 South Africa, and which will be made in every “ People’s 
 War” that ever takes place. For in every such war, owing 
 to the density of the “ Fog of War ” that confronts and 
 surrounds the invader, his plans and combinations are 
 
8 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 frequently based on guesses and hypotheses only, and his opera¬ 
 tions are then those of blindfolded strategy and blindfolded 
 tactics. 
 
 For some twenty years this scrupulous care of prestige 
 lasted, and then the German military authorities came to the 
 conclusion that the suppressio veri was not only no longer 
 necessary, but was now a danger to the efficiency of their 
 army; for they argued, and rightly so, that the representa¬ 
 tion of the experiences of the “ People’s War ” of 1870-71, 
 as given in the history, was one-sided, erroneous, and incom¬ 
 plete, and yet it was this untrustworthy representation that, 
 for a score of years, had been before the younger generations 
 of the German officers as a guide and exemplar for the future. 
 To Captain Fritz Hoenig, who had served in the 57th Infantry 
 Regiment during the campaign, the compilation of a real 
 history was entrusted, and he was given access to the official 
 archives at Berlin. This history is in six volumes, of which 
 the first was published in 1893, the last in 1897, carrying the 
 history to December 6th, 1870, the account being confined to 
 the operations against the First Army of the Loire. But 
 there are certain indications in the woi'k that Hoenig was not 
 altogether free in the amount of information he was at 
 liberty to give to the public. Hoenig’s history always will 
 be, and must be, the starting-point for any study of this 
 “ People’s War,” but excellent and admirable as it is, it 
 can but serve as the introductory step to the study of the 
 inner life of the German operations, for as years go by 
 more and more information will come to light. Even since 
 the publication of Hoenig’s last volume, there have come 
 before us the Journals of General v. Blumenthal, who was 
 Chief of the Staff* of the Third Army, and these throw a 
 new light on the subject, much of which now assumes an 
 aspect very different from that it presents in the pages of 
 Hoenig. In this war, Prince Frederick Charles played, in 
 the field operations, the leading part. It is believed that for 
 many years the Prince’s Diary has been ready for publication, 
 but it is still withheld from all except the favoured few. 
 
INTRODUCTORY 
 
 9 
 
 Without that diary, and similar materials from others of the 
 leading soldiers, such as the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg- 
 Schwerin, General v. Stiehle and others, judgments on the 
 leading and on the leaders must be provisional only; and 
 even the narrative is not altogether complete. In v. Moltke’s 
 own published correspondence during the war there is some¬ 
 times a remarkable hiatus. Still, from the materials avail¬ 
 able, much may be learnt, not only of this “People’s War,” 
 but of war in the widest sense of the word, for in Hoenig’s 
 work we are presented with a striking picture of the German 
 control and command during the period of which he treats ; 
 and we see that, admirable as is their staff system, and their 
 system of devolution of responsibility, those systems some¬ 
 times failed in difficult circumstances, as every system 
 worked by falliable human beings must fail. With the 
 three great battles of this war, Beaune-la-Rolande, Loigny- 
 Poupry and the second battle of Orleans, Hoenig deals in 
 the fullest detail, and, notwithstanding the great changes 
 in modern firearms, his accounts of them are full of valuable 
 lessons. 
 
 In the following pages, Hoenig and his extracts from the 
 archives, together with v. d. Goltz’s semi-official “ History 
 of the Operations of the Second Army,” have been taken as 
 the chief sources of supply for the material of the narrative ; 
 and though many other works have been consulted and 
 utilised, there is no pretence at composing a military history 
 from even all the materials available at the present time. 
 This small work is merely an introductory sketch of a war, 
 of which the study and thorough knowledge appears to the 
 writer to be of far greater value to the British officer than 
 that of the part of the campaign of 1870-71 which alone is 
 regarded by most military men as the “ Franco-German 
 War,” and which began at Weissenburg and terminated at 
 Sedan. From it soldiers will learn the “seamy side” of 
 command and of staff work ; the regular army will form a 
 better appreciation than they at present possess of the 
 capabilities of the rank and file of even the shortest service 
 
10 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 soldiers; the auxiliary forces will be impressed with the 
 value of a highly trained army in the field, whether for 
 offence or defence; and rifle clubs will realise that whilst 
 they can be of great value in home defence, there are 
 distinct limitations to the sphere of their operations and of 
 their usefulness. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 CONDITIONS OF THE SECOND WAR : STATE OF AFFAIRS 
 TO THE END OF SEPTEMBER 
 
 In order that the situation at the commencement of the 
 second war may be better understood, a brief epitome of the 
 original organisation of the hostile Armies, and of the events 
 of the preceding war, will now be given. 
 
 The German forces were under the supreme command of 
 King William I. of Prussia, with General Baron v. Moltke as 
 the Chief of the Staff". The forces were grotiped in three 
 Armies. The First Army, under General v. Steinmetz, com¬ 
 prised the 1st, \TIth and Vlllth Army Corps and the 1st and 
 3rd Cavalry Divisions. The Second Army was under Prince 
 Frederick Charles of Prussia (a nephew of the King), with 
 General v. Stiehle as Chief Staff" Officer, and included the 
 Guard Corps, Ilnd, Illrd, IVth, IXth, Xth, and Xllth A.C. 
 (Saxon Corps), and the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions. In 
 the Third Army, under the Crown Prince of Prussia (whose 
 Chief Staff" Officer was General v. Blumenthal), were the 
 Vth, VIth and Xlth A.C., the 1st and Ilnd Bavarian A.C., 
 the Wurtemberg and Baden Field Divisions, and the 2nd and 
 4th Cavalry Divisions. 
 
 At the head of the French Army was the Emperor 
 Napoleon III. The Army was composed at first of the 
 Guard, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th A.C. Later 
 on the 12th A.C. came into existence, as also the 13th and 
 14th A.C., but the 13th took little, and the 14th no part in 
 
12 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 the first war. Besides the Army Corps there were several 
 Cavalry Divisions. 
 
 Soon after the outbreak of hostilities the 1st, 5th and 7th 
 Army Corps were formed into a separate army, under Marshal 
 MacMahon, the remainder constituting the Army of the Rhine, 
 under the Emperor. 
 
 The first serious encounter took place on August 4th, near 
 the old disused fortress of Weissenburg, where the Third 
 Army crossed the frontier, and defeated and drove away a 
 Division of the French 1st Army Corps. Two days later, on 
 the 6th, this Army defeated and routed, at Worth, the Army 
 of Marshal MacMahon, which fied west to Chalons, whilst 
 simultaneously, on the same day, at Spicheren, the French 
 2nd A.C. was defeated and compelled to retreat by parts of 
 the First and Second Armies. On the 14th, at Columbey, 
 the First Army attacked with success the rear of the main 
 French Army, retiring across the Moselle at Metz. On the 
 16th the further retreat of the French (now under the com¬ 
 mand of Marshal Bazaine) westward was intei’cepted at 
 Vionville by the Second Army, which had crossed the river 
 south of and above the fortress. On the 18th Bazaine’s 
 Army was overthrown at Gravelotte by the First and Second 
 Armies, and retired into the fortress and to the protection of 
 its guns. On the 19th Metz was completely invested by the 
 First Army and a portion of the Second Army, the command 
 of the investing forces being given to Prince Frederick 
 Charles. The remainder of the Second Army—three Army 
 Corps and two Cavalry Divisions—were formed into a Fourth 
 Army, the Army of the Meuse, under the Crown Prince of 
 Saxony, and, with the Third Army, which was now well 
 forward on its way to Chalons, moved towards that place, 
 against the reorganised and reinforced Army of MacMahon 
 (1st, 5th, 7th, and 12th Army Corps). During the march it 
 was discovered that this Army had quitted Chalons, and 
 intended to move eastward to the relief of Bazaine in Metz. 
 The Germans now wheeled north, and on the 29th struck on 
 the French flank at Nouart. On the 80th this was followed 
 
CONDITIONS OF THE SECOND WAR 
 
 *3 
 
 up by the defeat at Beaumont. MacMahon now abandoned his 
 eastward advance, and on September 1st was fought the 
 Battle of Sedan. The Baden Field Division had been sent 
 south to watch and lay siege to Strassburg immediately 
 after the Battle of Worth. 
 
 So completely did the changed attitude of the French civil 
 population towards the Germans, during the subsequent 
 operations, alter the conditions under which the invaders had 
 to carry on the campaign, and so greatly did it contribute to 
 the difficulties they encountered in the second war, that it is 
 desirable to contrast the two attitudes somewhat in detail, 
 and to show the results ensuing to the Germans. 
 
 Prior to the campaign, universal liability to service did not 
 exist in France : the Army was a sort of caste apart from the 
 rest of the nation, and was not held by it in particularly high 
 esteem. The Army was maintained and paid by the nation for 
 the purpose of carrying on the wars, and fighting the battles 
 for the nation. So, when war was declared, the nation left 
 the war to the Army, as its own special business, with which - 
 it had nothing to do; and when King William of Prussia, in 
 an Army Order from Homburg, on August 8th, said, “ We 
 are not waging war against the peaceful inhabitants of the 
 country : on the contrary, it is the duty of every honour- 
 loving soldier to protect private property, and not to suffer 
 the good name of our Army to be tarnished, even by isolated 
 instances of indiscipline,” the inhabitants willingly accepted 
 the declaration as truthful and sincere, and they determined 
 to stand aside and let the soldiers of both countries fight the 
 war out between themselves. So German cavalry patrols, in 
 search of either the French Army or information as to where 
 it was, rode miles ahead of their own troops, perfectly safe, 
 unless they came upon French soldiers ; small parties could 
 sleep in French farmhouses as safely as in their own homes; 
 quarter-masters went forward demanding food and accommo¬ 
 dation, which were given without resistance; and in some 
 cases the Germans were received with actual hospitality—as, 
 for instance, at Nancy, where, dinner being ordered by a 
 
i 4 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870 71 
 
 commander for his squadron, with which lie had ridden miles on 
 in front of the rest of the German troops into the town, the 
 dinner was prepared and laid in the square of the city, and 
 ’adies waited on the visitors. The opposition offered to the 
 Germans, and the fighting against the Germans, were almost 
 entirely on the battle-fields. Rut in the second war, patrols and 
 small parties seeking information were held back at every 
 village; they carried their lives in their hands; the patrol would 
 be shot down by a countryman behind a hedge; and to obtain 
 truthful information was extremely difficult. The officer or 
 orderly, carrying a report or an order, sometimes disappeared 
 mysteriously ; a small party of soldiers would, perhaps, be 
 surprised at night by a few inhabitants who had noted down 
 their sleeping quarters. When the hostile Armies were so near 
 to each other that their outposts were in contact, the inhabi¬ 
 tants lied freely when asked about the position of their own 
 Army ; and, observing closely that of the invaders, passed the 
 information on to their own troops. The Germans, therefore, 
 from want of the necessary knowledge, had no true data on 
 which to frame their strategical operations : these were conse¬ 
 quently based on guess work only ; and large forces were 
 marched off in wrong directions against a foe which was else¬ 
 where, or which existed in imagination only. The supplies 
 of food could be obtained only by threats and force; 
 hospitality ceased, and every man’s and every woman’s 
 hand was against the intruders. The whole country became 
 a possible battle-field, and from woods, cover, and villages the 
 advanced guards Avere met by fire, and had to make good their 
 progress by force of arms along roads and paths cut across, 
 barricaded, or partially destroyed by the inhabitants of the 
 district. 
 
 And there is one difficulty peculiar to, and encountered in 
 every “ People’s War,” and markedly in this war, namely, 
 the impossibility of ascertaining, except by the test of prac¬ 
 tical experience, the real worth of the assistance that the 
 population may give to the defence. It may, on the one hand, 
 be merely loud talking and shouting; perhaps incessant sing- 
 
CONDITIONS OF THE SECOND WAR 
 
 15 
 
 ing of the “ Marseillaise,” “ God Preserve the Emperor,” or 
 “ Rule, Britannia 11 : on the other hand, it may mean real, 
 patriotic self-devotion, self-sacrifice. The Germans, with a 
 few exceptions, believed that in France it would be of the first 
 kind; to their cost they found is was of the second kind. 
 Disbelieving in its reality, they invested Paris, confident 
 that the inhabitants would insist on its surrender in a few 
 days; the subsequent disposition of their forces was based 
 on the assumption that their corps could now traverse 
 France from one end to the other without let or hindrance. 
 So large detachments found themselves scattered wide apart 
 about the country, just at the time when they were all 
 wanted as a combined force at some point several marches 
 away. 
 
 But besides the difficulties from these sources, there was in 
 the conditions one other great change, the disadvantage of 
 which to the Germans can hardly be overrated. They had no 
 longer any Ordre de Bataille of the French Forces; of the 
 hastily-improvised and newly-organised Army. 
 
 An Ordre de Bataille, showing the grouping of the smaller 
 units into the larger ones, and giving the names of the com¬ 
 manders and staff-officers, is a necessity in any military force, 
 as much as is a catalogue of a library for the librarian and the 
 frequenters of the library. Without an Ordre de Bataille, 
 command, control, and even the conduct of the ordinary 
 military life would be impossible; but, at the same time, it is 
 a “ necessary evil.” If a force could but keep the knowledge 
 of its Ordre de Bataille to itself, the existence of documents 
 of this kind would be quite harmless to it; but, unfortunately, 
 the enemy sometimes gets hold of a copy, or he learns the 
 contents, or he even manages to construct one himself; and 
 then the Ordre de Bataille is a great assistance to him in 
 adapting his plans to meet and counteract those of his 
 opponent. The Ordre de Bataille enables him to compare 
 his resources in men and materiel with those of his foes. And 
 the capture of even a single private soldier wearing some dis¬ 
 tinctive button or badge will, perhaps, on reference to the 
 
16 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 Ordre de Bataille, reveal to him the brigade, division, or even 
 army corps in front of him. 
 
 In the first war the Germans, when entering upon it, and 
 during all the time it lasted, knew the organisation, compo¬ 
 sition, and strength of the French forces opposed to them. 
 Previous to its outbreak, the Intelligence Branch of the German 
 Army had obtained full information as to the French Army 
 that would take the field. Very few troops had, however, 
 formed part of an army or army corps in peace, but from the 
 newspapers were gathered the numbers of numerous regiments 
 coming from different parts of France, and suppositional 
 combinations of them were formed, based on the grouping of 
 the troops in the peace garrisons. On this data an Ordre de 
 Bataille was compiled, which was communicated to the Army 
 on July 24, and which was afterwards found to require but 
 few unimportant alterations to be perfectly correct- The places 
 where the several corps were collecting were soon known. 
 The names of the different corps commanders, and the strength 
 of their corps in infantry divisions were correctly known. 
 Very few mistakes were made in the names of the division and 
 brigade commanders, and in the numbers of the regiments 
 composing these units. Consequently, the German Staff, 
 knowing where the French Army was, and what it was, were 
 able to forecast its probable lines of advance, its strategy if it 
 took the offensive, and to prepare their own plans to meet it; 
 whilst if the French remained on the defensive, the Germans, 
 knowing beforehand what it was they would have to fight and 
 its position, could arrange their dispositions for attack to the 
 best advantage. 
 
 But almost the whole of the French Army that had taken 
 the field at the commencement of the war were now either 
 prisoners or in invested fortresses. One Army Corps, the 
 13th, which was formed in August, had, after advancing 
 towards Sedan, regained the capital, where had been 
 formed a little later the 14th Army Corps. 
 
 In the second war, the French Army in the field was a new 
 army that had not been in existence during the first war. It. 
 
CONDITIONS OF THE SECOND WAR 
 
 l 7 
 
 was improvised after the Battle of Sedan. From small 
 beginnings it achieved vast proportions ; and, notwithstanding 
 all the efforts of the Intelligence Branch of the German Army, 
 very little reliable information as to its strength, composition, 
 and distribution was ever obtained, at all events during the 
 critical period of the second war, the months of October and 
 November, and the first few days of December; so that, 
 contrary to the Germans’ experience of the first war, they 
 sometimes were totally ignorant of what they had to fight, or 
 where it was. The errors they committed in consequence 
 were of the gravest character. 
 
 The first war had been for the Germans a continuous and 
 uninterrupted series of successes ; the path to victory had 
 been, if not easy, at all events very smooth: in the second 
 war the whole scene changes. The first war was, so far as 
 fighting was concerned, finished in little more than a month; 
 the second war dragged on its weary course for nearly five 
 months. So intense and continuous was the fighting in the 
 former that of the total casualties of the whole campaign, 
 close on 130,000, it claimed the larger portion—73,000. The 
 leading in the first war, whether the leading of Armies, Army 
 Corps, or Divisions was plain and simple, since for the leading 
 there was always a definite and recognisable objective, the 
 enemy in front in the field ; but in the second war it was 
 not always easy or even possible to select an objective, or 
 even to be sure of the existence of the objective aimed at; so 
 the leading became difficult, and it not infrequently went 
 altogether astray, and to such an extent that even some of 
 the larger units escaped defeat and destruction by a hair’s 
 breadth only. And, as was inevitable, there came with the 
 difficulties and dangers, dissensions among the leaders. Also, 
 during the first war, there was in progress but one campaign 
 in the field, that against the Emperor’s Army ; during the 
 critical period of the second, there were being carried on 
 simultaneously, one in the North-West of France against the 
 Army of the North, one in the South-East against the Army 
 of the East, one to the South against the First Army of the 
 
 B 
 
18 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 Loire, and it may be added that the Germans carried out to 
 the West, at the same time, a campaign against an Army of 
 only a very shadowy character, the “Army of the West.” 
 Besides these campaigns, they had on their hands the siege of 
 Belfort in the East, and the Investment of Paris. Later on 
 came the campaign of le Mans, in lieu of that on the Loire, 
 but by that time the stress of danger had gone by. The 
 decisive period of the whole campaign was that dealt with 
 here; the ultimate issue of the whole campaign depended on 
 the successful course of the campaign on the Loire, and upon 
 maintaining the Investment of Paris unbroken ; failure in one 
 meant, perhaps, failure in the other. Real anxiety hardly 
 existed during the first war, it was absent hardly a day during 
 the second. 
 
 Whilst the French Army in the field during the first war 
 had been gradually undergoing the process of almost total 
 extinction, the German Army in France, notwithstanding its 
 losses in the battles, became larger and larger. At the com¬ 
 mencement of the campaign it was necessary to make 
 provision for home defence against a possible attack on the 
 North Coast, and also against possible reverses. To provide 
 for these eventualities, the 17th Infantry Division, which 
 originally belonged to the IXth Army Corps, was left in 
 Germany, as were also some Regular Infantry Regiments. 
 The Landwehr were also organised into Divisions, and thei'e 
 were also formed Reserve Divisions ; but when the uninter¬ 
 rupted course of success of the German Army rendered the 
 presence of these troops in the Home Country unnecessary 
 they were brought forward into France, thus greatly increas¬ 
 ing for further operations the numerical strength of the 
 German Forces in the field. It is necessary now to take stock 
 of the French Foi’ces available for the second war. Of the 
 remnant of the regular organised Army, as it was before the 
 war, an account has already been given. 
 
 The Imperial Government had, from the first, done its best 
 to increase its forces to meet the unexpected success of the 
 invader. And the resources-, both in men and in material, 
 
CONDITIONS OF THE SECOND WAR 
 
 l 9 
 
 were ample in numbers and quantity, but there lacked 
 that, without which numbers and quantity are of little 
 use, namely, well-considered previous organisation. Under 
 the laws in existence before the war, and those passed 
 in July and August, there were altogether no less than 
 626,114 men liable for service in the active Army. As 
 regards guns and artillery equipment, there were enough for 
 all the batteries likely to be wanted, even for a very large 
 army, but, necessarily, there was a great deficiency in person¬ 
 nel for the batteries. Of riHes there was a vast quantity. 
 Rut besides the so-called “ active Army,” there was another 
 force, only in its infancy, but which was now utilised for 
 service with the active Army: this was the Garde Mobile. 
 
 This force was instituted by Marshal Niel in 1868. The 
 institution was the application, territorially, of liability to 
 compulsory personal service to all men, from twenty-one to 
 twenty-six years of age, who had escaped being taken for 
 service in the active Army. It was very unpopular in 
 France, and had made but little progress at the outbreak 
 of the war. The training was of the most meagre charac¬ 
 ter, and the choice of officers was, at one time during 
 the war, left to the men. The military value of the Garde 
 Mobile was determined mainly by the characteristics of the 
 population whence they were drawn. Those of Paris were 
 essentially Parisian ; those of the South-East, turbulent and 
 undisciplined; but those of the Loire and Cher were the 
 peasantry, led to battle by their feudal lords : of these it has 
 been said—“The whole of the young nobility of Touraine lie 
 buried before the walls of Beaune-la-Rolande.” Hoenig 
 gives the strength of the Garde Mobile at 623,458 men, so 
 the active Army and the Garde Mobile together numbered 
 1,249,572. Forty thousand marines of no use at sea after 
 the German Fleet had been compelled to retire to safe 
 quarters, and 8,000 men in the Customs and Forest Depart¬ 
 ments, further increased the total. Of these foregoing bodies 
 of armed men Hoenig estimates that there were 180,000 
 either wholly or partly trained. 
 
20 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 The Republican Government opened, on September 15th, 
 a new source of supply by calling on all civilians from thirty- 
 one to sixty years of age to enrol themselves in the Garde 
 Nationale, subsequently mobilising them, organising them, 
 and placing them at the disposal of the Minister of War. 
 The Garde Nationale was a species of universal service for 
 local defence. From very early times this force had existed 
 in France, but not until the Great Revolution did it receive 
 its designation of Garde Nationale. Being composed of 
 citizens who were not actually soldiers, it played frequently a 
 prominent part in political dissensions. In 1855 it had been 
 almost entirely dissolved; but in 1870, when the people 
 joined in the defence, the nation demanded its revival. 
 Although some of the force took an active part in the defence 
 of Paris, and a whole division was in the Army of the 
 north, it was mainly in the defence of the localities to which 
 they belonged that they were at their best. It was here that 
 they offered real and serious resistance to the invaders. The 
 number available is given by Hoenig at no less than 
 788,800. 
 
 At the disposal of the Minister of War were, at the end of 
 September, placed the Franc-tireurs, some 40,000. The 
 value of these depended mainly on the locality of their origin. 
 Some were a terror to the population; but the Franc-tireurs 
 under Cathelineau were magnificent irregular troops, and did 
 real good service on the Loire. The Corps was from La 
 Vendee, the men were Catholics, their priest recited certain 
 offices of the Church every morning, and on Sundays Mass 
 was celebrated. Their motto was: “For God and the 
 Country,” and for God and the country they fought and 
 died. 
 
 The Franc-tireurs, the Germans regarded with bitter 
 hatred, and by every means of severity in their power strove 
 to suppress them ; and no wonder, for many of them were 
 men of daring and enterprise, and took advantage of any 
 little carelessness or want of caution on the part of small 
 German detachments, or convoy escorts, to inflict damage and 
 
CONDITIONS OF THE SECOND WAR 
 
 21 
 
 Joss on the invaders. Even while the Army was on its 
 triumphant march from Sedan to Paris, the Franc-tireurs 
 appeared in its rear and recaptured a number of horses from 
 the small German escort. It was Franc-tireurs who, on a 
 night in November, surprised the outposts of the 4th Cavalry 
 Division, obtaining possession of important documents, and 
 nearly capturing the commander of the Division. They were 
 like swarms of wasps round the smaller German detach¬ 
 ments. Of these v. Moltke in his correspondence writes, on 
 October 27th: “The audacity of the Franc-tireurs must be 
 punished-by severe reprisals, as the war is assuming a horrible 
 aspect. It is bad enough when armies have to tear each 
 other to pieces, but to set nations against each other is not 
 an advance but a lapse into barbarism.” 
 
 A total of 2,126,372 men nominally available, must yield, 
 except in a nation destitute of all patriotism and all self- 
 respect, a very fair amount of men at the colours. The 
 decrees calling up the several classes of men came into the 
 hands of the Germans ; their Intelligence Branch had at hand 
 all the works showing the human statistics of France, so it 
 was easy for them to have estimated correctly the number of 
 defenders available. The result of their studies differed 
 entirely from the actual results of the decrees, and markedly 
 were these under-estimated. It was not that the Germans 
 were bad calculators or bad arithmeticians, but most pro¬ 
 bably, disbelieving in the practical character of the proud 
 spirit of the French nation, they anticipated that the French¬ 
 men who, on hearing the call to come to aid in saving 
 their country, would do so, would be but comparatively 
 few. 
 
 The Imperial Government, immediately after the disasters 
 of Worth and Spicheren, had published an appeal to the 
 country. It ran as follows: 
 
 “Frenchmen,—We have told you the whole truth; it is 
 now for you to fulfil your duty. Let one single cry issue 
 from the breasts of all—from one end of France to the other. 
 Let the whole people rise quivering, and sworn to fight the 
 
22 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 great fight. Some of our regiments have succumbed before 
 overwhelming numbers, but our Army has not been vanquished. 
 The same intrepid breath still animates it; let us support it. 
 To a momentarily successful audacity, we will oppose a union 
 which conquers' destiny. Let us fall back upon ourselves, and 
 our invaders shall hurl themselves against a rampart of human 
 breasts. As in 1792 and at Sebastopol, let our inverses be 
 the school of our victories. It would be a crime to doubt 
 for an instant the safety of our country, and a greater still 
 not to do our part to secui’e it. Up ! then, up! and you 
 inhabitants of the Centre, the North and the South, upon 
 whom the burden of the war does not fall, hasten with 
 unanimous enthusiasm to the help of your brethren of the 
 East. Let France, united in success, be moi’e united still 
 under trial; and may God bless our arms ! ” These are words 
 and nothing moi’e. 
 
 Immediately after the new Government came into power, 
 Gambetta sent to the prefets of the eighty-nine Depart¬ 
 ments into which France is divided the following communica¬ 
 tion : 
 
 “ Our new' Republic is a Government of National Defence, 
 a Republic of battle to the last against the intruders. Gather 
 around you citizens who, like yourselves, are animated by the 
 lasting desii'e to save the countiy, and are prepared not to 
 shrink from any sacrifices.” 
 
 What a contrast, as thoroughly practical, compai’ed to the 
 emotional declamation of the Imperial Government! And 
 Gambetta showed, in addressing the prefets, and not the 
 people, that he was both wise and fai’-seeing. 
 
 He approaches the people through the local representatives 
 of the central Government, and reminds these representatives 
 that in the Pi’ovinces they ax - e the delegates who will be the 
 instruments of that Government in organising and conducting 
 in the Pi’ovinces the National Defence, and he looks forward 
 to the Provinces taking part in the campaign against the 
 invader. The idea embodied in the saying “ Paris is France” 
 was acting powerfully at this time in the minds of the leaders 
 
CONDITIONS OF THE SECOND WAR 
 
 23 
 
 on both sides. The capture of Paris was the one aim of 
 v. Moltke—as of supreme importance. Within Paris itself, 
 the defence of the capital, and the concentration there of the 
 military force of the country, took a strong hold, almost to 
 the complete exclusion of the consideration of any part that 
 the rest of the country could take in the continuation of the 
 struggle. Gambetta was always opposed to these views. He 
 said: “ Only one thing was thought of, namely, to defend 
 Paris ; and this idea became so exclusive that nothing was 
 thought of but Paris ; I even found that the rest of the 
 country was somewhat forgotten. It was believed that Paris 
 alone would not only be able to set herself free, but to drive 
 away the invader.” General Trochu, who became the head 
 of the Government in Paris, and General Chanzy, who after¬ 
 wards played a prominent part in the war, also deprecated 
 this attributing to Paris such a monopoly of the National 
 Defence. The new Government determined that it was at 
 Paris it ought to remain. It was decided, therefore, to re¬ 
 present in the Provinces the central Government by means 
 of a delegation of its members, which established itself at 
 Tours, 120 miles from Paris, on the Loire. Mons. Cremieux, 
 a barrister, who was the chief of the delegation, was seventy- 
 four years of age ; Mons. Glais-Bizoin, also a barrister, was 
 seventy years old, and Vice-Admiral Fouriehon, who com¬ 
 bined the Ministries of Marine and War, was comparatively 
 young, sixty-one years of age. This delegation could hardly 
 possess the physical and mental amount of vigour necessary 
 for governing all France, less Paris, so until Gambetta, 
 escaping from Paris in a balloon, arrived at Tours on 
 October 9th, and practically superseded the delegation, little 
 progress was made in utilising the enormous resources which 
 existed in the Provinces. 
 
 As already stated, the march to Paris began on Sep¬ 
 tember 4th, and it was on the 19th that the German Army, 
 marching with its front covered by the Cavalry Divisions, 
 arrived before the capital, and took up positions forming a 
 complete circle of investment. To the Army of the Meuse 
 
24 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 was assigned the northern semicircle ; the Third Army taking 
 charge of the southern semicircle. The Royal Headquarters, 
 and those of the Third Army were very soon established at 
 Versailles—six miles south-west of the enceinte of the forti¬ 
 fications. The artillery park was at Villacoublay, four miles 
 east of Versailles, on the main road. From the Seine below 
 Paris, the Guard and Saxon Cavalry Divisions guarded the 
 rear of the northern semicircle; and, starting from the same 
 point, the 5th, 6 th, 4th, and 2nd Cavalry Divisions guarded 
 the southern line. 
 
 But September 19th marks the close of a period, of which 
 one of the most prominent characteristics had been the 
 marvellous mobility of the German host that had entered 
 France. Immediately after the battle of Worth, as has been 
 already mentioned, the Baden Field Division was despatched 
 to Strassburg, and ceased to be a force on the move in the 
 field ; the rest of the Germans moved rapidly on; but after 
 the battle of Gravelotte, a very large portion was detached 
 from it and became an immobile force round Metz. From 
 Metz, by Sedan, the remainder tramped on to the capital, 
 and when they had completely formed the investing circle, 
 there was no longer any mobile force of Germans in France 
 —one and all of them had become immobile. For the success 
 of an invasion, no attitude that the invader may assume is 
 more fraught with possible dangers in the future than is the 
 cessation or the suspension of his onward career. Not merely 
 is time afforded to the invaded for fresh preparations for 
 defence, but the prestige inherent in the continued offensive 
 is lost; the invaded have time to recover their self-possession 
 and their moral; and they attribute to the invader either 
 exhaustion arising from his previous efforts, or an acknow¬ 
 ledgment of inability to pursue his career of victory owing to 
 the numerical weakness of his forces. 
 
 Although by degrees the Germans were able to put large 
 forces again into the field, yet, as will appear in the course of 
 this narrative, it was no less a period than ten weeks that 
 France was given to make, undisturbed by the Germans, her 
 
CONDITIONS OF THE SECOND WAR 
 
 25 
 
 preparations in the Provinces for a renewal of the struggle ; 
 and this fact alone, not merely justifies, but compels, us to 
 regard the second phase of the campaign as a new and second 
 war. There was no truce between the belligerents, but in 
 the subjugation of France, there was almost a suspension of 
 arms. Energetically and persistently did the French work 
 at their preparations for defence during the last seven of 
 those ten weeks, but of the nature, character, and extent of 
 those preparations the Germans were able to learn but little. 
 The amount of French territory in actual occupation by the 
 invader was comparatively very small, and the nation did its 
 best to prevent these Germans seeing or learning what was 
 going on outside the limits of the occupied territory ; but 
 from the large and extensive unoccupied territory, there was 
 telegraphic communication with the rest of the world through 
 Spain, Switzerland, and Belgium, whilst the outlets along the 
 coast-line were many and open. It seems strange, therefore, 
 not that the Germans on French soil should have been ignorant 
 of what was taking place close at hand, but that the German 
 Government at Berlin should not, by means of spies and 
 similar devices, have obtained from the unoccupied territory 
 itself full information of what was taking place there. When, 
 at the end of September, Strassburg fell, the German troops 
 hitherto employed in the siege took the field, but were com¬ 
 pelled to remain in Eastern and South-Eastern France to 
 guard the main German line of communication against attacks 
 from these districts. Under any circumstances, this was their 
 natural sphere of action, but it was later on when, at the end 
 of October, the surrender of Metz set free the First and Second 
 Armies, and in the middle of November, when a large force 
 from the troops investing Paris became available for service 
 in the field, that the want of knowledge told so against the 
 Germans ; and some 100,000 men were despatched in direc¬ 
 tions away from the main scene of the preparations for the 
 National Defence; mistakes only possible to be retrieved 
 through errors and misleading on the French side. 
 
 Whether the Germans were wise in determining to continue 
 
26 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 at once the invasion after Sedan, or whether Paris should 
 have been selected as the next objective is one of those deep 
 political and military problems which may afford a subject 
 for never-ending discussion among students of war. Mr. 
 O’Connor Morris, in his “ Life of v. Moltke,” deals with the 
 question with great ability. But, whether the decisions were 
 right or wrong, there cannot be the very slightest doubt that 
 the beliefs on which they were based were absolutely false, 
 and that consequently the Germans soon found themselves 
 confronted by a situation totally unexpected, and they became 
 involved in a prolonged war of a character of which they had 
 no previous experience, and with which they knew not how 
 to deal effectively. 
 
 The erroneous views with which v. Moltke entered on the 
 second war were: a disbelief that France, as a nation, would 
 continue the struggle after the terrible defeats inflicted on 
 her, and, therefore, that Paris would surrender as soon as 
 she found herself cut off from the outer world, and with 
 the prospect of hunger before her ; further, that as Paris was 
 said to be France, France without Paris would be helpless. 
 But there arose, as regards the future of this campaign, a 
 division of opinion at the Royal Headquarters of the German 
 Army, immediately after Sedan. V. Moltke and his immediate 
 associates disbelieved in French practical patriotism, and 
 anticipated a speedy ending of the war ; on the other hand, 
 Bismark, v. Roon the Minister of War, Prince Frederick 
 Charles, and the King himself, greatly doubted that the pride 
 of the French would allow them to yield a speedy submission, 
 and they anticipated therefore a prolongation of the war. 
 Mr. O’Connor Morris says: “ Like most soldiers, v. Moltke 
 had little faith in moral power in conflict with material force ; 
 he had a rooted dislike and contempt for Frenchmen, and he 
 did not believe that France would make a real effort to 
 vindicate her great name, and to oppose the invader . . . 
 Omniscience is not given to the children of men.” 
 
 On September 6 th, v. Roon wrote : “ Whether, old as I am, 
 I shall live to see the end of the war is indeed a matter of 
 
CONDITIONS OF THE SECOND WAR 
 
 2 7 
 
 indifference, but I doubt it.” But for some time after the 
 investment was completed, the optimist spirit prevailed at 
 Versailles, and there was no anxiety as to the future. Eight 
 days was the limit of endurance first accepted. V. Moltke 
 believed that the Parisians would surrender “ if they had 
 no fresh milk ”; both he and v. Roon calculated fourteen 
 days as the extremity of endurance; on September 21st, v. 
 Moltke wrote : “ Dear Adolph,—I wish that you and yours 
 could spend the winter somewhere in a warmer climate. If 
 possible I will come too. Moreover, I still hope that at the 
 end of October I shall be shooting hares in Creisau,” On 
 October 3, Lieut.-Colonel Verdy du Vernois, one of v. Moltke’s 
 principal subordinates, wrote : “ According to the information 
 at hand, Paris is said to be provisioned for six weeks— 
 fourteen days of that time have now elapsed.” But the 
 Parisians belied all expectations, and held the Germans out¬ 
 side her walls for some sixteen times eight days. It was not 
 a mere handful of soldiers, the garrison of Paris, the six line 
 battalions that kept the gates closed ; it was the Parisians, 
 this section of the French People, the French women as well 
 as the French men, that by their endurance of the terrible 
 sufferings due to famine and sickness during that bitter 
 winter kept outside but held close to the walls of the capital 
 —those 120,000 German infantry and their 600 guns, and 
 prevented them carrying devastation into the fair Provinces 
 of France. 
 
 And theProvinces, recognisingtheir patriotism,endeavoured 
 to emulate them in their practical excercise of this national 
 virtue, and to render their suffering not in vain. Ere long 
 800,000 men had flocked to the standards, on which were 
 inscribed the words: “ Paris is hungry : come and help 
 her. 1 
 
 And this obstinacy of the Parisians gave rise outside and 
 near the walls to very serious inconveniences for the Germans. 
 Food, in the early days of the investment, was not too 
 abundant, as the only line of communication to the Third 
 Army was the main railway from Nancy, alreadv broken near 
 
28 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 Nanteuil, whilst that of the Army of the Meuse was by 
 ordinary road from Pont-a-Mousson. Requisitioning became, 
 therefore, all-important. When the Germans approached 
 Paris, not only were villages found deserted, but all supplies 
 ot food had been carried away ; the French population had 
 already taken the alarm, and the earlier decrees had begun 
 to work, so the requisitioning parties of cavalry that were 
 sent out found themselves everywhere opposed, whether when 
 endeavouring to enter villages or to carry away the supplies 
 dragged from the unwilling owners. Inhabitants armed, 
 men in the uniform of Garde Mobile or Garde Nationale, and 
 Franc-tireurs acted in common against the intruders. But 
 few of the cavalry carried firearms, so detachments of infantry, 
 and even guns, were ere long added to the requisitioning- 
 parties. It was mainly in the close and difficult country 
 lying to the west of Paris that the greatest resistance was 
 encountered ; in the open country, which lies a few miles 
 south of Paris, the cavalry were able to obtain better results 
 from their work. 
 
 No doubt this requisitioning was not a congenial occupa¬ 
 tion. In v. Blumenthal’s Journal is the following entry of 
 September 27th: “ I had to talk severely to the Cavalry 
 Divisions to-day for the very indifferent supplies of provisions 
 they have requisitioned of late, owing to their dread of 
 the Franc-tireurs ” ; on the 28th : “ Again this morning I 
 had so much to do, especially in the matter of the directions 
 which had to be given to the Cavalry Divisions on the subject 
 of requisitioning supplies, that at one o’clock I was nearly 
 dead.” 
 
 Inasmuch as every day that Paris continued to hold out 
 and to keep the investing Army enchained round the city was 
 a day’s gain in the preparations for national defence in the 
 Provinces, the Royal Headquarters had necessarily to take in 
 hand at once the consideration of the possible and probable 
 result of the preparations, to ascertain whence and where the 
 effect of those preparations would first make itself apparent, 
 and what measures, pending the surrender of the capital, it 
 
CONDITIONS OF THE SECOND WAR 
 
 29 
 
 would be necessary to adopt in view of the future. A mere 
 glance at the map of France would suffice for the identification 
 of the localities most favourable for the preparations. 
 
 First and foremost, Central and South-West France, beyond 
 the river Loire, and where, covered by the river, was the 
 great arsenal of France, Bourges, having good railway com¬ 
 munication to both the East and North-West of France, and 
 Nevers, the arsenal for naval stores and equipment. Moreover, 
 the importance of this district had been increased by the 
 selection of Tours, on the river, as the seat of the Delegation 
 entrusted by the chief Government in Paris with the conduct 
 of affairs in the Provinces. Far off, in the South-East, in the 
 turbulent district of Lyon, was another probable base for 
 hostile operations. Besan^on, and the strong fortress of 
 Belfort, lay on the northern boundary of this district. It 
 was a good starting-point for any operations against the long 
 and thread-like line of communications that connected the 
 Germans round Paris with their own country. But the 
 vulnerability of the German line of communications, and the 
 great results likely to follow from even an unsuccessful 
 attempt against it, do not seem to have received from the 
 Delegation the attention they deserved until too late in the 
 war. As France had command of the sea, the district in the 
 North-West of France, with its forti’esses of Douai, Lille, 
 Valenciennes, and others, was another favourable base of 
 operation. 
 
 But the district which seems to have had special advan¬ 
 tages, not as a centre of preparation by itself, but both as a 
 centre, and as a base of operations in connection with the 
 Loire district, was that to the west of Paris—the lower Seine 
 and the country further south. Through Havre, with its 
 large docks and excellent roadstead, it is connected by sea 
 with the south of France and the rest of the world, while by 
 land there is good railway connection with the Loire district 
 by Alen^on, le Mans, and Tours, the connection being pro¬ 
 tected from the east by the close country already mentioned. 
 It lay, also, opposite to the weakest portion of the investment 
 
30 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 line, at the numerous bends of the Seine near the capital. 
 Neither of the arms—artillery and cavalry—in which the 
 Germans were so superior to the French, could utilise that 
 superiority to full advantage against an advance from this 
 quarter. 
 
 But a knowledge of the mere places of assembly was of 
 little value without a knowledge also of the strength col- 
 lecting at each, and of the extent of the preparations in 
 progress at each. And here we come to that peculiar charac¬ 
 teristic of all People’s Wars, and strikingly so of this war— 
 the dense Fog of War which the invader finds encompassing 
 him all round. Sometimes it is a Strategical Fog. He 
 cannot tell what it is behind that Fog; if there is anything 
 behind it, he knows not where it is; and, possibly, there may 
 be nothing behind it at all. So he knows not whence a blow 
 may be suddenly delivered against him ; and when he himself 
 is prepared to deliver a blow, he may strike simply en fair. 
 And the very composition of the Fog enables the forces of the 
 invaded country to see through it; in fact, it is one of the 
 instruments of vision as to the movements of the invader. 
 It is the irregular local levies and the able-bodied civilian 
 inhabitants of the locality, with arms in their hands, that 
 give to the Fog, by their stolid resistance, the density of the 
 Fog. But on the invader’s side the Fog almost insensibly 
 blends into the population on that side—the population 
 among which lie the invading troops. It is an old saying 
 that ill news flies apace, and what ill news would be of more 
 rapid flight than that in a particular area in the possession 
 of the invader there was a certain body of troops preparing 
 to move off into the Fog in some particular direction ? Hence, 
 whilst the defenders have information on which to base their 
 plan of operations, the data on which the invader forms his 
 plans are seldom reliable, and may be entirely, or at all 
 events seriously, misleading. But, on the other hand, a civilian 
 population is apt to form very exaggerated ideas of the 
 strength of the forces that may come to its notice. 
 
 Sometimes, again, it is the Tactical Fog, as when the 
 
CONDITIONS OF THE SECOND WAR 
 
 3 1 
 
 opponents are actually in contact. The invader knows not 
 aught about his opponent; but his opponent knows all 
 about him. 
 
 At the end of September there were in the Loire District 
 the 15th Army Corps, approximately 60,000 strong, but a 
 mere mob under the command of General de la Motte-Rouge. 
 In the Corps were three line regiments ; of the rest, two- 
 thirds were Marche Regiments, one-third Gardes Mobiles. 
 
 In North-West France the territorial commander, General 
 Fiereck, was assembling battalions of Garde Mobile. General 
 Gudin, with 14,000 armed men, was at Rouen and Elbceuf, 
 on the Lower Seine; General Delarue, with 4,000 men, at 
 Vernon and Dreux, protected the railway communication 
 between Rouen and the South. In the South-East General 
 Cambriels was organising for the protection of Lyon an 
 army at Besaiu^on. 
 
 But the German Staff were unable to ascertain the numbers 
 at the several centres. A correct estimate of the response of 
 France in fighting men would, however, not have in any way 
 alarmed them. At the Royal Headquarters was one General 
 v. Podbielski, the Quartermaster-General of the Forces, a 
 bluff, outspoken man, one of that invaluable class of men 
 who, though they may see the darker side of affairs, express 
 themselves in optimistic language and treat difficultieswith 
 contemptuous speech. To the new levies he applied a term 
 equivalent to “ ragamuffins,” and it was easy enough to find 
 arguments to support the optimist views propounded by the 
 general, and accepted, doubtless, by many. 
 
 Deficient in training and discipline, and with but few 
 good officers to lead or to staff them, the men could not 
 be of much value either as fighting or marching troops. 
 There were difficulties in organising and equipping the 
 large units into which, for military operations, any great 
 mass of men must be subdivided ; there were administrative 
 branches to be organised and provided for these units ; there 
 were no generals of knowledge and experience to lead Armies; 
 the Government itself, which had been created by the people, 
 
32 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 could hardly be regarded as a Government strong enough to 
 hold its own against popular anger in the event of the war 
 going against the new Annies in the field; and a single 
 disaster might wreck all authority; it could be only by 
 some lucky chance that there would exist sufficient unity of 
 thought and action among the new civil and new military 
 leaders to secure unity of aims and purposes in the employ¬ 
 ment of the new Armies in the forthcoming campaign. So 
 for the present, Versailles took matters very calmly. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 OCTOBER 
 
 In the early days of October, disquieting reports reached 
 Versailles from the direction of the Loire, where the 15th 
 Corps was known to be in course of formation. Considerable 
 activity was apparent on the hither side of the river, and out¬ 
 side the forest which surrounds the city of Orleans for some 
 miles. Orleans is only sixty-five miles from Paris. On October 
 5th, the French under General Reyau had made, with a force 
 mainly of cavalry, but in which some guns and infantry were 
 included, a reconnaissance northward from Orleans in the 
 neighbourhood of Toury, forty-seven miles from Paris. They 
 were met by the 4th Cavalry Division, under the command of 
 Prince Albrecht of Prussia (father), and after an encounter, 
 the Germans fell back to Etampes, less than thirty miles from 
 the Capital, evacuating the country north of Orleans. It was 
 just at this time that the command of the French troops in 
 Orleans and on the Loire was given to General de la Motte- 
 Rouge, a veteran from the reserve of officers, and who had 
 seen much service in Africa as well as in the Crimea and Italy. 
 At an interview he had had with the Delegation at Tours, one 
 of the Ministers, in bidding him adieu, said to him, “ For 
 God’s sake do something or other as soon as you possibly can, 
 Public opinion insists on it.” On being placed in command 
 he proceeded, therefore, at once to draw his troops forward to 
 Orleans, in view of future operations, and he took up, with 
 some of them, a position north of the forest. On the 7th he 
 visited and inspected the positions taken up, going to Tours 
 the next day in obedience to a summons from the Delegation ; 
 
 c 
 
34 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 but on his return, on the evening of the 9th, he found on his 
 hands work he had not anticipated. 
 
 The advance of Reyau to Toury, and the retreat of the 
 4th Cavalry Division, had alarmed Versailles, where the suc¬ 
 cessful reconnaissance had been misinterpreted for an advance 
 against the investing Army. It was the Third Army that 
 formed this portion of the line of investment, the 1st Bavarian 
 Corps under General v. d. Tann being the reserve. The Corps 
 was composed of two infantry divisions, each of two brigades, 
 from which several battalions were absent on detached duties, 
 a Cuirassier brigade of eight squadrons, two regiments of 
 divisional cavalry, and 112 guns. The numerical strength 
 was about 16,000 infantry and 1600 [cavalry. V. d. Tann 
 was, on the 6th, ordered to meet the threatened advance, which 
 he did by taking up a defensive position across the Orleans 
 road at Arpajon, sixteen miles south of Paris, but as at the 
 same time a sortie from Paris was anticipated, the Corps was 
 at first posted so as to be able to act in either direction. To 
 the force were now added the 22nd Infantry Division, under 
 Major-General v. Wittich, consisting of 5500 infantry, four 
 squadrons of cavalry, and 24 guns from the investing line; 
 and the 4th Cavalry Division, 24 squadrons and 12 guns. 
 The French not advancing, orders were, on the night of the 
 7th-8th, given to v. d. Tann to take the offensive south. 
 The situation had been curious; for two days the Germans 
 had remained in a defensive position, awaiting an advance of 
 a distant body of an enemy, comparatively very few in number 
 and indifferent in quality, which had not the faintest intention 
 of coming forward to attack. The orders now given to v. d. 
 Tann were to clear the country south to Orleans, and west 
 to Chartres, forty-two miles south-west of Paris, and thirty 
 miles west of the great Paris-Orleans road, to occupy Orleans, 
 and, according to circumstances, to carry on the pursuit as far 
 as Tours. The 2nd Cavalry Division of 24 squadrons and 12 
 guns under the command of Lieutenant-General Count zu 
 Stolberg, was ordered to co-operate in the intended advance, 
 so v. d. Tann had at his disposal some 21,500 infantry, 
 
OCTOBER 
 
 35 
 
 6700 cavalry, and 160 guns. General de la Motte-Rouge, on 
 his return from Tours, heard of the approach of the Germans, 
 and at once pushed forward a small force to Artenay, four 
 miles outside the forest, and twelve miles from Orleans. On 
 the 10th, this force was easily driven back by the Germans to 
 the forest, and on the next day, v. d. Tann, following up 
 the French, drove them through the city over the river, and 
 occupied Orleans. The losses of the Germans were not, 
 however, insignificant, some 1200, including 60-70 officers. 
 There was no pursuit beyond Orleans. 
 
 The French had not shown any very great resisting power; 
 and it was perhaps in accordance with the sound principle of 
 immediately following up a success, and not allowing a beaten 
 enemy time to recover from a blow, that on the 13th, v. d. 
 Tann received from v. Moltke the following order, which is 
 here given as found in Helvig’s work : “ Das I. bayerische 
 Armee-Corps von der Tann im Kriege 13S0-71.” Captain 
 Helvig was an officer of the General Staff on the Staff of the 
 Corps. General v. d. Tann was directed “ to extend as far as 
 Bourges” [sixty miles south] “ the operations of his army and 
 of the 2nd Cavalry Division, which was now placed under his 
 orders. It appeared to be of the greatest importance, for 
 the further course of the war, to obtain possession of this 
 town and its large gun manufactories, and to render the latter 
 useless. 
 
 “ Simultaneously with the advance against Bourges, a 
 demonstration was to be made against Tours” [seventy miles 
 down stream from Orleans], “ the seat of the Government, 
 and, finally,it was mentioned in the despatches, that the only 
 depot of military wagons still in the hands of the French was 
 at Chateauroux ” [some forty miles south-west of Bourgas]. 
 
 “ It was, however, left to General v. d. Tann to act 
 according to his own judgment, as the state of affairs could 
 not be sufficiently well known at Versailles.” 
 
 The form of this ol der is that known as a “ Directive ”; it 
 gives the operation desired or recommended by v. Moltke 
 to be undertaken by the commander, but it leaves, at the same 
 
36 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1S70-71 
 
 time, full discretion to the latter as to the mode to be adopted, 
 or even as to whether it should be carried out at all. 
 
 It was a game with very high stakes that lay before v. d. 
 Tann to play, and v. Moltke had left it to his judgment 
 whether he would play it: it meant not merely the capture 
 and destruction of the enormous main arsenal of the Republic, 
 but, on the way, the destruction of Vierzon, which is forty- 
 seven miles south of Orleans, and is the great railway junction 
 from which ran lines to the north, south, east, and west of 
 France. Major-General v. Columb, the commander of a 
 brigade of the 2nd Cavalry Division, has, in his “ Diary of the 
 War,” said: “ Had the German Army been able to gain pos¬ 
 session of Vierzon and Bourges, the vital nerve of the National 
 Defence would have been cut through.” There does not 
 seem to have been in v. d. Tann any lack of determination, 
 courage, or enterprise, and yet he decided that the risk of the 
 game rendered it not worth the playing. A brief account of 
 the nature of the risk, as Helvig regards it, will therefore be 
 given. 
 
 The strength of the army in infantry had now, owing to 
 casualties and detachments, been reduced to 19,000. Chartres 
 and Chateaudun, only thirty miles west of the road to Orleans 
 from Paris, were occupied by the French; Orleans, therefore, 
 could not be left without a garrison, for which at least a 
 br igade of 4000 men was necessary, thus reducing the active 
 force still further to 15,000 ; the demonstration against Tours 
 could not be by cavali’y only. The composition of v. d. 
 Tann’s force was peculiar as regards the proportion of the 
 three arms. The number of cavalry and guns was relatively 
 very large, and these arms had found in the open plains north 
 of the forest, and between Orleans and Etampes, full play 
 against the poorly trained troops opposed to them ; but this 
 would not be the case in the country south of the Loire. 
 Bourges lay quite five days’ march from Orleans. The inter¬ 
 vening country is covered with large and small woods, ponds, 
 marshes, and brooks. The general direction of the latter is 
 from east to west, and they form, as it were, so many parallel 
 
OCTOBER 
 
 37 
 
 lines of defence. It is unnecessary for an enemy to manoeuvre 
 on such ground; he need only make use of its capabilities, 
 and follow the natural instinct of resistance, in order to 
 exhaust his adversary, unless the latter can, at once and per¬ 
 manently, break down his opposition by numerical superiority. 
 In this labyrinth of lakes and woods, and behind numerous 
 brooks, the enemy did not need, for obstinate resistance, troops 
 capable of manoeuvring ; all that was required was only partly 
 trained men, but plenty of them, and of these the French had 
 more than enough. To mass the German artillery, or to threaten 
 the enemy’s flanks by large bodies of cavalry, as at Artenay, 
 was not practicable ; an open range was wanting for the one, 
 a sufficient space on which to manoeuvre for the other. Both 
 arms were restricted to the roads, and the heaviest task fell on 
 the infantry. The enemy’s outposts 'would be first encountered 
 twelve miles from Orleans, and thence the resistance would be 
 daily and continuous, and the infantry would arrive before 
 Bourges greatly reduced in numbers. It had been ascertained 
 that at Bourges had been already thrown up works for 
 defence, armed with heavy guns; the population and the 
 workmen from the factories were armed and ready to aid the 
 troops in offering resistance, and reinforcements could be 
 brought up every hour by railroad; one hundred and thirty 
 miles would be the length of the German line of communica¬ 
 tion. So far Helvig. The expedition to Tours (seventy miles) 
 was not very promising, that to Chateauroux impracticable. 
 It is certain, however, that had the attempt against Bourges 
 succeeded, the National Defence must have taken a form 
 totally different from that of the subsequent campaign on 
 the Loire, but it by no means follows that a campaign of some 
 kind in the future would have been rendered impossible; and 
 as, in the opinion of some, the selection of the Loire as a base 
 of operations against the invaders was by no means sound, 
 there might have come about other operations with which the 
 Germans might have found it far more difficult to deal. It 
 was not until the National Defence showed, later on, how 
 powerful it was, that the effect of the non-destruction of 
 
3 « THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 Bourges and Vierzon in October was fully realised. Then it 
 was evident that for the loss of the whole Bavarian Corps in 
 a successful attempt, there would have been something like a 
 full equivalent and perhaps more. But in October, so little 
 did Versailles believe in the National Defence, that the sacri¬ 
 fice would, perhaps, at that time have seemed a useless loss of 
 combatant power. The problem is one of many of the kind, 
 furnishing food for speculation, and nothing more. 
 
 In consequence of the decision of v. d. Tann the 22nd In¬ 
 fantry Division and 4th Cavalry Division were withdrawn 
 from Orleans, and sent under the command of v. Wittich by 
 Chateaudun, twenty-seven miles north-west of Orleans, and 
 on the Loir, to Chores, twenty-six miles north of Chateaudun 
 and on the Upper”Eure. In Chateaudun were, under an 
 excellent leader, Lieut.-Colonel Lipowski, 1200 Franc-tireurs 
 and local Gardes Nationales; and when, on the 18th, v. 
 "Wittich approached the town, these irregulars, aided by the 
 inhabitants, offered a determined and splendid resistance. It 
 was the first instance in this “People’s War” of resistance 
 by what was really a part of the civil population of France. 
 The town had been thoroughly prepared for defence, in fact 
 v. Wittich states that there was a plan of the defensive 
 organisation and a report on it. The fight commenced in 
 the morning; and it was not until 8 a.m. on the morning 
 of the 19th that the defence, which had been of the house-to- 
 house character, ceased, and possession of the town was 
 gained. Terrible were the consequences of this resistance. 
 Much of the town was burnt down and pillage was freely 
 exercised. It is stated that no less than 285 houses were 
 burnt. This was the first essay of the able v. Wittich in 
 the task assigned to him by the Head-quarters of the Third 
 Army, and which is given in the order received by him at 
 Orleans on the 16th, from v. Blumenthal: 
 
 “ As the neighbourhood of Chateaudun and especially that 
 of Chartres is in the hands of Gardes Mobiles and Franc- 
 tireurs, who are continually threatening the rear of the army 
 before Paris, you are given the duty of clearing the enemy 
 
OCTOBER 
 
 39 
 
 out of those districts; for this purpose you will, as circum¬ 
 stances may require, form from your Division Hying columns, 
 which are to return generally to Paris by Chateaudun, 
 Chartres and Dreux 11 [on the Blaise, a tributary of the Eure, 
 and twenty miles north of Chartres, and forty miles west of 
 Paris]. “ Your departure from Orleans is fixed for the 17th, 
 but you have perfect freedom to halt when you please, and 
 complete liberty in your choice of action. You can go even 
 some miles further west if you consider it desirable to do so. 
 The essential thing is to clear this district entirely of the 
 enemy. To avoid any misunderstanding as to dealing with 
 any prisoners you may take, I have appended to this order 
 
 directions as regards this matter, and I have, in connection 
 ° llV ’ 
 
 with it, only to remark that localities which civilians have 
 
 taken part in a fight are to be punished with the utmost 
 
 severity, by fines or by being burnt. . . . The population 
 
 will everywhere be warned that their participation in the 
 
 war, or their treachery, will always be punished with death, 
 
 and that they must therefore remain neutral, and comply 
 
 unhesitatingly with all the necessary requisitions.” 
 
 V. Wittich does not give the directions mentioned in 
 the letter, but it is probable that as regards dealing with the 
 punishment of the inhabitants they did not differ from those 
 now given, and which aiso emanated from the Third Army: 
 
 “ All persons not forming part of the French Army, and 
 not proving their quality as soldiers by outward signs, and 
 who 
 
 “ (a) Shall serve the enemy as spies ; 
 
 “ (b) Shall mislead the German troops when charged to 
 act for them as guides ; 
 
 “ (c) Shall kill, wound, or rob persons belonging to the 
 German troops, or making part of their suite ; 
 
 “ (rZ) Shall destroy bridges or canals, damage telegraph 
 lines or railways, render roads impassable, set 
 fire to munitions or provisions of war, or troops’ 
 quarters; 
 
 “ (<’) Shall take up arms against the German troops; 
 
+o THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 “ will be punished by death. In each case the officer in 
 command will institute a council of war, with authority to 
 try the matter and pronounce sentence. These councils can 
 only condemn to death. Their sentences will be executed 
 immediately. The communes to which the culprits belong, 
 as well as those whose territory may have been the scene of 
 the offence, will be condemned in a penalty for each case 
 equalling the amount of their taxes.” 
 
 V. Wittich was a soldier who placed duty specially in 
 the foreground, and as his proceedings at Chateaudun pain¬ 
 fully showed, he never shrank from any duty however trying 
 to the feelings of humanity, so v. Blumenthal’s instructions 
 were always carried out thoroughly. Discount to the full 
 the narratives of the conduct of the Germans in Western 
 France as given by the sufferers, by eyewitnesses, and by 
 French historians, it is impossible to doubt that the severity 
 of the Germans towards the inhabitants was frequently 
 terrible. Hoenig claims for the Second Army in its advance 
 during November from Metz to the south-west, that it was 
 owing to its determination to abstain as much as possible 
 from reprisals that it had to endure much at the hands of the 
 population. No such credit can be claimed for the Third 
 Army. V. Moltke, as has been shown by his letter of 
 October 27th, approved of great severity; v. Blumenthal 
 shared his views on the matter, and as reprisals thus bore 
 the stamp of approbation of the highest authorities, the 
 generals and other commanders followed suit. It would, 
 therefore, be impossible but that when this spirit had per¬ 
 meated down to the lowest ranks, and among the ignorant, 
 these reprisals would verge on barbarism. But in justice to 
 the invaders it must be said that womanhood was respected 
 by them. 
 
 West and south-west of Paris it was a real reign of terror 
 that was inaugurated against this “ People’s War.” Helvig 
 writes as follows: “ So long as only the hostile armies are 
 fighting each other, the war remains, if the word used does 
 not seem paradoxical, civilised; but from the moment that 
 
OCTOBER 
 
 4i 
 
 the population with their brutal hatred and their passions 
 mix in our bloody work, it is 4 eye for eye 1 and 4 tooth for 
 tooth.” 1 Doubtless the reprisals acted frequently as a 
 deterrent to the population in taking their share in the 
 defence of their country, and the people remained neutral. 
 But, as a rule, the endeavour to inspire terror was not effec¬ 
 tive in this part of France during the months of October and 
 November. And if patriotism be a noble virtue, if pro 
 Patrid mori be a duty, then here French 'men and French 
 women, and some little more than children, have set posterity 
 an example. Splendid in its self-abnegation, splendid in its 
 sheer heroism, an example, which being little known outside 
 the limits of hearth and home, has never received that recog¬ 
 nition and that tribute of deep admiration it so deservedly 
 merits. Mourirpour la Paine is writ large from the Lower 
 Seine to Chateaudun. 
 
 On the 20th, v. Wittich resumed his March on Chartres, 
 which was reported to be strongly held. In the city were 
 some 7000 men and half a battery, but the only regular 
 troops were two companies of marines. During the 21st 
 there was a small amount of opposition at various points. 
 The 6th Cavalry Division was now operating from the north, 
 so that the city could be enveloped by thousands of horse¬ 
 men. What took place after the arrival of v. Wittich at the 
 village of Morancez, three miles short of Chartres, the General 
 himself shall tell. 
 
 44 Lieut.-Colonel Hendrick brought before me the Cure of the 
 village and the Maires of the localities in front of Chartres. 
 In answer to the requests of the Maires to spare their villages, 
 I replied with the threat to burn down those from which 
 there was any more firing on my troops; and to the Cure, 
 who was interceding for the city of Chartres, I said that I 
 must enter it to-day, either by force of arms or amicably. 
 If it was defended it must expect the fate of Chateaudun. 
 
 1 allowed him to £-0 to Chartres to endeavour to arrange 
 matters. . . . Before one o’clock the Prefet of the Depart¬ 
 ment of the Eure ct Loire and the Maire of Chartres 
 
42 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 came to me. The Prefet, after a vain attempt to take a 
 high tone, undertook that the Gardes Nationales of Chartres 
 should lay down their arms, and that the regular and irregular 
 troops should quit the city, which should be surrendered to 
 me. I gave them until 3 p.m. for the final arrangements; 
 otherwise, I threatened to commence the bombardment at 
 that hour.” The General, to show that he meant what he 
 said, deployed his troops and put his guns in position. The 
 Prefet and a member of the municipality came with a white 
 Hag before the expiry of the time, and the surrender was 
 concluded, the General remarking that the agreement would 
 be regarded as broken if outside or inside the city a single 
 shot was fired on his men. The city would have to feed the 
 troops and comply with all necessary requisitions. In the 
 event of compliance no money contribution would be imposed. 
 Resistance would have been hopeless and useless ; it would, 
 perhaps, have caused the destruction of one of the most 
 glorious cathedrals in the world; so the surrender may be 
 condoned. On the 23rd the 22nd Division received orders 
 the remain at Chartres. 
 
 V. d. Tann, at Orleans, had learnt that large bodies of 
 the enemy’s troops were concentrated at Gien, thirty-five 
 miles up the Loire, and he asked the Third Army Head¬ 
 quarters that, in case the French attempted to surround and 
 attack Orleans, he should be allowed to abandon the position 
 of Orleans, which, even only from a tactical point of view, was 
 extremely unfavourable for a force with little infantry, but 
 much artillery and cavalry, and to take up a position to the 
 north-east in the neighbourhood of Pithiviers, some twenty- 
 four miles from Orleans, where the ground was better adapted 
 to the use of cavalry and artillery. On October 20th, V. 
 d. Tann received an answer that the continued occupation of 
 Orleans was indispensable, and that the town was only to be 
 evacuated in the presence of far superior forces. It is difficult 
 to see how, Orleans once being occupied, any other answer 
 could have been given. For offensive operations, Orleans was 
 of no value whatever to the Germans ; but, having once been 
 
OCTOBER 
 
 43 
 
 taken, the moral effect of abandoning it would have told 
 against them. Moreover, for the French it had no incon¬ 
 siderable advantages as a bridge head on the right bank of 
 the river. 
 
 The first half of October had marked the failure of the 
 forces of the Government of National Defence in their 
 first encounter in the held with the invaders. The defeat 
 seemed almost to show that it was hopeless for France, 
 bereft of her army, to offer, except at Paris, any further 
 resistance to the subjugation of the country. There had been 
 crowds of armed men beyond the Loire, but military disci¬ 
 pline had not existed, and organisation was little more than 
 nominal. The Government in Paris expected little from them, 
 nor did it think it necessary to try to obtain from them any 
 real assistance. When General Lefort left Paris for Tours 
 with the Delegation, the Minister of War in Paris said to 
 him: “You will never do anything with the men left to 
 you.” General Lefort remarked : “ I ought to tell you that, 
 in commencing the organisation of the loth Corps, I hardly 
 see that the Corps would be called on to take part in any 
 military operation. This army is not perhaps destined to act 
 effectively, but I regard its organisation indispensable ; it will 
 have a considerable moral effect. . . . If, as we all hope, Paris 
 is to be relieved in a few months, well, then we shall have an 
 army which will be able, even if it has never fired a cartridge, 
 to give weight in the balance, if we should be called on to 
 make terms of peace.” There was a feeling of disbelief in 
 everything in France except Paris. 
 
 The Government of the Provinces had, up to October 9th, 
 been in feeble hands indeed at Tours, but on the 9th, the day 
 before Artenav, there had arrived at Tours, after a journey in 
 a balloon from Paris, Gambetta, the Minister of the Interior. 
 Gambetta at once assumed the authority of a despotic auto¬ 
 crat, and it was Gambetta to whom Germany owed the three 
 or four months of hard and severe campaigning she had to 
 carry through before France lay exhausted at her feet. 
 
 Of Gambetta v. d. Goltz writes as follows: “The figure 
 
44 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 of Gambetta is incontestably one of the most interesting that 
 the great events of 1870-71 have brought into the fore¬ 
 ground. Known but a few years, he had made his way 
 rapidly as advocate and deputy during the second Empire, 
 with the result that, after the fall of Napoleon III., it was 
 not with any surprise in his own country or in the rest of the 
 world that he appears as military organiser and General. 
 The part he played has been great enough for his name to 
 live in history for all time. Although he failed to achieve 
 his object, although his dream of becoming the saviour of his 
 country was not realised, his efforts for the salvation of France 
 do not the less deserve our admiration. By the energy of his 
 will he succeeded in animating a country without arms and 
 already tired of resistance, and in drawing it into a struggle 
 which for several months kept the German armies occupied, 
 and taught us to recognise the existence of forces which, 
 without that experience, we should still to-day undervalue. 
 To him sufficed a few weeks to form, out of the chaos of 
 armed men he found available, a well-equipped army of 
 hundreds of thousands.” At his right hand, with the title of 
 delegate, and acting as Minister of War, was de Freycinet, a 
 civil engineer, his equal in energy and determination. The 
 magnetic influence that Gambetta showed he possessed over 
 the population of France was a jmarvel power. 
 
 At the moment d£ Gambetta\ aaaasaw at Tours, France 
 seemed to be defenceless and helpless^beyond the power of 
 recovery. There were in the south beyond the Loire the 
 defeated and dispirited troops of the 15th Army Corps. In 
 the east Cambriel’s army was already falling back on Besanyon 
 before the newly formed German XIVth Army Corps. There 
 was in Normandy a small body of troops, another in the 
 north, whilst in the west some 30,000 Gardes Mobiles, poorly 
 armed and equipped, and without artillery and cavalry, and 
 without any organisation, but, nevertheless, denominated the 
 “ Army of the West,” formed a line from Evreux (fifty miles 
 west of Paris and forty miles north of Chartres) to Chartres. 
 At this time France had got together some 40,000 line troops, 
 
OCTOBER 
 
 +5 
 
 the same number of Gardes Mobiles, 5000-1)000 cavalry, and 
 100 guns. Gambetta at once issued a stirring proclamation to 
 the citizens of France. From it some extracts are here given : 
 
 “ By order of the Government of the Republic I have left 
 Paris to bring you, with the hopes of the people shut up 
 within its walls, the instructions and orders of those who have 
 accepted the mission of delivering France from the foreigner. 
 The situation imposes great duties on you. The first of all is 
 not to allow yourselves to be diverted by any preoccupation 
 that is not war, ‘ le combat a outrance 1 ; the second is, until 
 peace is secured, to accept, as brethren, the command of the 
 republican power which has come into existence by necessity 
 and right. This power, moreover, could not, without degra¬ 
 dation, work to the profit of any ambition. It has only one 
 supreme object, one title to existence: to rescue France from 
 the depths into which the monarchy has plunged it. . . . We 
 have no lack of men; what has failed us has been resolution, 
 decision, and rapidity in carrying work into execution. . . . 
 We must utilise all our resources, which are immense, shake 
 oft* the slowness of our campaigns, counteract foolish panics, 
 multiply guerilla warfare, and to an enemy so apt in ambushes 
 and surprises, oppose snares, harass his Hanks, surprise him in 
 rear, and, finally, inaugurate the national war. The Republic 
 appeals to all for help ; its Government will avail itself of all 
 zeal, of all forms of capacity. It is its tradition to call to its 
 aid young leaders; we will do it. Heaven itself will soon 
 cease to be favourable to our adversaries; the autumn rains 
 will set in, anti the Prussians, so far from home, disquieted, 
 anxious, worried by our population now awakened, will 
 gradually be decimated by our arms, by hunger, by natural 
 causes. It is impossible that the glory of France shall be 
 quenched for evei’, that the great nation will allow its place in 
 the world to be determined by an invasion of five hundred 
 thousand men. Let us rise en masse and die rather than submit 
 to the shame of dismemberment.” 
 
 This proclamation was at once followed by decrees of 
 organisation. The proclamation went home to the hearts 
 
46 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 of the French people, and there flocked to the standards of 
 France the manhood of France. V. d. Goltz says that during 
 each day of the four months Gambetta was in power as 
 Minister of War, 5000 men joined the Levies. In less than 
 six weeks Gambetta created on the Loire alone an army of 
 180,000 men, provided with all necessaries of war, with a good 
 and numerous artillery, and a force of cavalry almost in excess 
 of requirements. It is stated that by the end of four months 
 800,000 men were under arms. 
 
 Of the many decrees that Gambetta issued, only three need 
 notice here : the first two are dated October 14th. Of these, 
 one had, and was probably intended to have, a great bene¬ 
 ficial moral influence on the newly raised forces now forming 
 part of the active army. All the bodies of Gardes Nationales, 
 Franc-tireurs, or of any kind in arms against the enemv were 
 constituted the “ Armee Auxiliare,” and this army was placed 
 on exactlv the same footing as regards pay and rank and 
 command as the active army, and its officers became inter¬ 
 changeable with those of the active army. The two armies 
 together formed the great “ Army of National Defence.” 
 
 The other decree had a vast effect on the creation of the 
 strategical Fog of War which surrounded the invaders, and 
 also added greatly to its difficulties. It merits being given 
 in extenso. 
 
 Art. I. Every Department of which the boundary is at 
 any point whatever at a distance of less than 100 kilo¬ 
 metres [621 miles] from the enemy is declared in a state of 
 siege (etat dc guerre). This declaration is made by the mili¬ 
 tary chief of the Department immediately that he knows the 
 enemy is within the prescribed distance, and it is imme¬ 
 diately published through the civil and military authorities. 
 All information respecting the march of the enemy will be 
 sent direct, bv the quickest route, to the military chiefs, 
 and to the Prefets of the departments situated within at 
 least a radius of 100 kilometres in the direction of the march 
 of the enemy. 
 
OCTOBER 
 
 47 
 
 Art. II. The state of' siege involves the following conse¬ 
 quences : The Military chief of the Department putting 
 aside all other business (toute affaire cessant) will convoke a 
 military committee of five members at least, nine at most. 
 The committee will be composed of, besides the Military 
 chief who will preside, an officer of engineers or, in default, 
 of artillery; a staff' officer, an engineer of Fonts et 
 Chausees and a mining engineer. In default of these various 
 officials, the members will be selected from among persons 
 who, by reason of their aptitude and antecedents, are best 
 qualified. The committee, after having visited, if necessary, 
 the ground, will determine within fortv-eight hours, after the 
 declaration of the state of siege, the points which appear to 
 them best situated to dispute the advance of the enemy. 
 
 These points will be immediately strengthened with earth¬ 
 works and abattis and other means quickly available and 
 not expensive. These works will, according to circum¬ 
 stances, take the character of an entrenched camp of a size 
 sufficient to receive the whole or part of the disposable troops 
 of the Department, and will be provided, if needs be, with 
 artillery ( s'ihj a lieu). Each of the possible lines of advance 
 of the enemy within the limits of the Department will be 
 similarly fortified. The only exception will be when the 
 line of advance is already commanded, in the Department, by 
 a fortress. 
 
 Art. III. The Military committee, or the members 
 delegated by it, will have power to requisition direct, 
 persons and materials for the construction of the work 
 mentioned. They will pay by vouchers given by them, 
 which will be discharged from the funds of the Depart¬ 
 ment or communes, as will be laid down later on. 
 
 Art. IV. As soon as the Military chief of the Depart¬ 
 ment considers that one of the fortified posts is threatened, 
 he will direct to it the forces necessary for its defence. 
 These forces will be drawn either from the regular or 
 auxiliary troops of the Department not inquired for the 
 operations of the Army Corps in the field or from 
 
4 S THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 the sedentary Garde Nationale. For this purpose, the 
 Military chief will have the power to call out all the 
 Gardes Nationales up to forty years of age, from such 
 communes as lie may designate. He will have command of 
 all the forces thus collected, and take the control of the 
 defence. The officer next senior to him will take command 
 at some other point. 
 
 Art. V. If a passage is forced by the enemy, endeavours 
 will be made to restore the works as soon as possible, so 
 as to cut off the retreat of the enemy, and the passage 
 w ill be held until the Military chief considers the enemy far 
 enough away. 
 
 Art. VI. During the duration of the state of siege in a 
 Department, the Gardes Nationales called out are subiect 
 to military law ; if they fail to come up, or to do their duty 
 as soldiers, they are liable to be punished according to the 
 military code of the army. 
 
 In default of uniform, the Gardes Nationales called up 
 will wear the kepi as a badge showing their status as 
 soldiers. 
 
 They should, by means of vouchers, with which they will 
 be provided by the military committee, provide themselves 
 with three days' food, without regard to the supplies of all 
 kinds that the military committee will have been able to 
 collect on the spot. 
 
 Art. VII. The vouchers given bv the military committee 
 ai'e accepted as currency in the public treasury, and dis¬ 
 charged bv the means of a loan raised in the name of the 
 Department by the General Council, and, if this has been 
 dissolved, by a departmental commission nominated by the 
 Prefet. 
 
 Art. VIII. From the date of publication of this decree, the 
 preparations above described will be taken in hand at once in 
 the Departments included in the zone of war (up to J 00 
 kilometres at least from the enemy), and the Departments 
 beyond this zone will commence the preliminary study of the 
 points eventually to be defended. 
 
OCTOBER 
 
 49 
 
 The Engineer officers of all ranks, on ordinary service or 
 attached to corps in the field, but not indispensable for the 
 operations of those corps, will immediately report them¬ 
 selves to the delegate of the Minister of War, who will allot 
 them in the Departments, that they may he attached to the 
 military committees, and take in charge the works of defence 
 prescribed by the committee. 
 
 Art. IX. The Military Chiefs of the Departments are held 
 personally responsible for the organisation of the defence and 
 the resistance offered to the enemy. 
 
 No doubt the Decree is crude, but the circumstances under 
 which it was issued remove it from the sphere of criticism in 
 cold blood. That its actual results in impeding the advance 
 of the invaders fell so much below what might have been 
 hoped for from it, was in part due to want of time to get the 
 system into thorough order. Another cause may have been 
 the absence of sympathy from the regular military authorities 
 with anything outside professional war, or with any efforts 
 by others than professional soldiers, and their dislike to work 
 in concert with the civilian “ Commissaires ” deputed by the 
 Delegation to represent it in the Departments. The French 
 Official History of the War, now in course of publication, 
 throws light on this matter. In the northern theatre of war 
 the Commissaire was M. Testelin, a medical man at Lille. Of 
 this official the History tells us, “ Although his powers were 
 vaguely defined, he knew how to exert his authority and to 
 exercise it with discretion, without interfering in the details 
 of military questions, with which he was not competent to 
 deal.” But his first attempt to concert measures with the 
 General who was the Territorial Military Commander was 
 hardly encouraging. Mons. de Freycinet had, as regards the 
 local work in the districts, honestly said that to create the 
 armies must not only everything be produced in the districts, 
 but also the very instruments of production. The General 
 took so pessimistic a view that M. Testelin then turned to 
 Colonel Farre, Director of Fortifications at Lille, a man of 
 
 D 
 
50 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN ERANCE, 1870-71 
 
 great energy, who threw himself heartily into the work. 
 Little, however, was done until Gambetta arrived at Tours 
 on October 9th, and then, so writes the Official Historian, “ the 
 conviction of his patriotism, the warmth of his words gave 
 the necessary impulse, and made France conscious of her own 
 strength.” General Bourbaki now came to take the command 
 in the north, and he honestly endeavoured to carry on the 
 work begun by Colonel Farre, but differences of opinion soon 
 manifested themselves between him and the civil authorities; 
 and the Government decided to remove him to another scene 
 of action. Of Bourbaki we read, “ His professional know¬ 
 ledge had not with it either hope of success or wish to act and 
 to win. Formerly Commander of the Imperial Guard, he 
 inspired but little confidence among some of the population ; 
 his want of accord with the civil authorities complicated the 
 situation.” So it may have been elsewhere in the Provinces. 
 
 On the 24th, another very important decree was issued, 
 placing on the Sous-Prefets and Maires the duty of obtaining 
 by every means in their power, all information, however un¬ 
 important, with regard to the position, numbers and move¬ 
 ments of the enemy, and of forwarding it at once to the 
 Prefets for transmission to the Government. The whole 
 administrative work of Gambetta and de Freycinet is a 
 marvel of power, energy and ability. 
 
 And here it is desirable to notice how well suited to the 
 national needs at the time of the issue of the decrees, was the 
 system under which Governmental control has always been 
 exercised in France, no matter whether the Government were 
 Imperial, Monarchical, or Republican. This control has 
 taken a form of intense centralisation at the seat of the 
 Government, with the existence of a very numerous body 
 of Government officials, scattered over the country, who 
 receive the orders from the central authority, and ensure their 
 execution. But these officials, Prefets, Sous-Prefets and 
 Maires, powerful as they were locally, when armed with 
 authority to execute a decree, were themselves allowed but 
 little power of initiative. At each city, town or village, they 
 
OCTOBER 
 
 5i 
 
 were the representatives of the central authority to see its 
 orders obeyed, but few or no orders could they themselves 
 give without having tirst obtained its concurrence and 
 approval. It has been said that even for some insignificant 
 repair or alteration to a public building, the local repre¬ 
 sentative of the central Government has first, to obtain its 
 sanction from Paris. For generations had this system pre¬ 
 vailed, with the result that, on the one hand, there was always 
 in the provinces a feeling of dependence on Paris, and a 
 looking to Paris for guidance ; on the other hand, the orders 
 and decisions received from Paris came invested with all the 
 authority arising from custom and tradition, and were 
 accepted at once without demur. In this sense “ Paris was 
 France,' 1 but v. Moltke rendered the phrase too literally, 
 and not in the spirit; and he seems to have believed 
 that by isolating in a great country one lai'ge city, the i*est 
 of the country would be paralysed in action. He believed 
 rightly that at Paris was a power, but his mistake lay 
 in regai’ding that power as aix attribute of the place itself, 
 instead of that which was inside the place, the central 
 Government. And when, first by ordinary means of locomo¬ 
 tion before the investment, a part of that central Government 
 transferred itself to another city, Tours on the Loii-e ; and 
 when later on, by extra-ordinary means of locomotion, 
 Gambetta also went to that same city and made it the seat 
 of a really powerful central government, to v. Moltke 
 there remained only the shadow of the “Paris that is France"; 
 the substance of the “ Paris that is France” had escaped his 
 gi’asp, slipped through his fingei’s and was at Tours, exercis¬ 
 ing its control and influence as powerfully as ever it had done 
 from Paris in the history of the past. The Prefets and the 
 whole army of Government officials now simply looked to 
 the power at Tours, as before they had looked to the 
 power at Paris; and they were as active in the time of 
 war in executing the oi'ders from the former, as when in 
 the days of peace they had executed the oi'ders from the 
 latter. The right objective for the Germans at the time 
 
52 THE PEOPLES WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 was not the time-honoured Government in Paris; it was 
 the fledgling at Tours, and of this Government, not all, but 
 only two members, Gambetta and de Freycinet. Rut only 
 by a spirit of divination could this have been known. V. 
 Blumenthal, however, seems from the outset to have believed 
 Tours, and the work at Tours, to have been the right objec¬ 
 tive. Without Gambetta, all the grand self-devotion and 
 the patriotic spirit, the willing surrender to suffering and 
 death displayed in this war by the people of France might, 
 under any circumstances, have manifested itself in isolated 
 actions, but it would have been of no avail to produce any 
 real effect; it was by the great mind of Gambetta that all 
 forces which would otherwise have run to waste were gathered 
 up together, and their powers concentrated and focused ; and 
 thus was given to the rulers of the country from the people 
 of the country, a gift, a weapon so powerful in its nature that 
 only the incapacity of those rulers to wield it saved the 
 invader of “ la Patrie,” of “ la belle France ” from humilia¬ 
 tion and defeat. 
 
 One of the first acts of Gambetta was the deposition of 
 General de la Motte-Rouge, and the appointment of General 
 d’Aurelle de Paladines to the command of the 15th Corps; 
 the formation of a second corps, the 16th, was at once com¬ 
 menced. And to cover this formation and, at the same 
 time, to protect Tours were utilised the irregular levies, 
 and the men whose sole claim to be regarded as soldiers 
 was that they wore some sort of uniform or distinctive 
 badge and carried rifles, and were designated Gardes Mobiles 
 or Gardes Nationales, and also the other inhabitants willing 
 to aid. There was formed a cordon of Franc-tireurs and 
 Gardes Mobiles along the Loir from Cloyes (six miles below 
 Chateaudun) to Moree, and thence south-east along the 
 northern and eastern edges of the Forest of Marehenoir 
 (twenty miles west of Orleans) from Ecoman to Lorges, whence 
 it was prolonged due south to the Loire at Mer (twenty-two 
 miles below Orleans). 
 
 And on the 17th the so-called “Army of the West” which 
 
OCTOBER 
 
 53 
 
 has been already mentioned, and which was destined to 
 exercise an extraordinary influence on the German strategy 
 to the marked benefit of the preparations for the National 
 Defence, was placed under the command of General Fiereck, 
 the Territorial Commander in the west. It was this “Army 
 of the West,” composed of Franc-tireurs, Gardes Mobiles, 
 Gardes Nationales, and armed inhabitants, little more in fact 
 than a population armed, with a very small infusion of 
 troops of the active army, at the most seven battalions of 
 regulars, two of marines, seven mountain guns, and a sapper 
 battalion, that affords such a striking illustration how greatly, 
 in country suitable to its action, the inhabitants may co¬ 
 operate in the defence of a country against invasion. The 
 “ Army of the West ” never thought of venturing to fight 
 battles with the invader; that was far beyond its powers; its 
 offensive work was confined strictly to harassing the outlying 
 smaller parties of the invader that came within its reach, and 
 to stopping their progress ; and in its defence of localities it 
 created that Fog of War, a Fog so dense that the invader 
 could not ascertain, except by the employment of a small 
 army, what was behind it, where what might be behind it 
 was, or if anything at all was behind it; and yet full know¬ 
 ledge of the actual state of affairs was indispensable to the 
 invader as a preliminary to ulterior operations. Not only 
 had, therefore, the invader to employ force to find out the 
 real state of affairs, but in doing so he spent time urgently 
 needed for other purposes, and eventually he despatched an 
 army, at a time when its presence was pressingly needed else¬ 
 where, to a region where there was nothing to fight. A de¬ 
 scription of the theatre of war in which this “ bogus ” army 
 played so valuable a part, and rendered such excellent service 
 to the real armies of France will, therefore, now be given. 
 
 The Eastern boundary of the area may be taken as com¬ 
 mencing on the North at Pont de fArche on the Seine at 
 the junction of the Eure, fifty-five miles below Paris; 
 thence along the Eure fora distance of sixty miles to Chartres. 
 Midway it is only forty miles west of Versailles, and at 
 
54 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 Chartres it is thirty miles from the Paris-Orleans road. Here 
 it leaves the Upper Eure which comes from the west, and 
 continuing south strikes the Upper Loir twenty miles distant 
 at Bonneval, and then for ten miles follows the Loir to 
 C'hateaudun its southern point. For a breadth of thirty to 
 forty miles westward of this line the country presents the 
 aspect of what may be called a tangle of hills, valleys, rivers 
 and streams which reaches a climax at Nogent-le-Rotrou in 
 the heart of the Perehe district. The eastern boundary south 
 of Paris is not very difficult to cross from the East, but it is 
 after crossing that the invader finds his troubles begin. The 
 Blaise and the Avre, tributaries of the Eure confront him 
 to the north-west, the Upper Eure and the Upper Loir with 
 their tributaries confront him to the south-west, whilst to 
 the west he finds the most broken part of the Perehe district 
 and the Huisne River barring his advance. The system of 
 defence was the establishment of certain centres or pivots 
 from which the activity started, and the holding with groups 
 of armed men or companies all the roads running in from 
 the east, and all the principal crossings of the rivers and 
 tributaries. The district was thoroughly adapted for guerilla 
 warfare by irregular troops. The troops were constantly shift¬ 
 ing, but the three chief centres selected by General Fiereck were 
 on a line facing north-east—the left, being Nogent-le-Rotrou 
 in the valley of the Huisne, where run the railway and 
 high road from Paris by Chartres to le Mans, the centre 
 Brou on the Ozanne a tributary of the Loir, the right 
 C’hateaudun'. 
 
 The principal road junctions, which also were the principal 
 assembly points of the force, were Bonneval, Illiers on the 
 Loir, ten miles above Bonneval. Courville on the Upper 
 Eure, Chateauneuf north-west of Courville, and finally 
 Dreux. At the most important places between these were 
 also posted groups of Gardes Mobiles, supported to the 
 utmost by the population, which, generally, at this time took 
 part in the war. Companies of sappers were employed by 
 the Departmental authorities acting under the decree of 
 
OCTOBER 55 
 
 October 14th, to block the roads, or to make entrenchments 
 for the assistance of the defence. 
 
 Under these circumstances the German Cavalry were unable 
 to find out what was actually taking place on the important 
 roads from Nogent to Courville and Illiers respectively, and 
 on the important lateral road running through Brou from 
 Nogent to Chateaudun, and the network ramification of roads 
 from these roads to the rear. If the Cavalry tried to get 
 ahead by going round the villages instead of passing through 
 them, they again met with armed resistance. The Cavalry 
 could report w hat places and woods were held by the French 
 within a semi-circle of three-quarters to one and a-half days 
 march radius ; but what they could not find out was where the 
 main body of the enemy was, whether there was any main 
 body, or what this ever active army was intend.ng to do. 
 This restless enemy seemed ubiquitous; now here, now there, 
 appeared bands of armed men which hindered the larger 
 German movements, then disappeared, and appeared again 
 later on to play the same game elsewhere. For the German 
 reconnoitring parties, it was not deducing the direction of the 
 march of a large force, by the general direction of the march 
 of its units ; it was nothing more than noting small units 
 marching in every direction of the compass. It must be 
 remembered that by Gambetta’s Decree the control was 
 Departmental : and unfortunately there had not been time to 
 combine in the hands of one superior authority central control 
 over the Departmental authorities. This independence was, 
 of course, a very weak point in the general defence. There 
 was an absence of co-operation between Departments, and no 
 unity of purpose or leading. The cordon was continued from 
 the Loir south to the Loire as already described, whilst on 
 the left bank of the latter river, v. d. Tann's vision at Orleans 
 was effectually limited by the character of the country, and 
 the number of hostile troops in that district. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 HUMAN NATURE IN WAR, AND THE “ PERSONLICHKEIT ” 
 
 OF THE GERMAN LEADERS 
 
 And now to what at first sight may seem to be a somewhat 
 superfluous digression from the narrative, but a digres¬ 
 sion dealing with matters apt to be overlooked in following 
 the records of campaigns and battles, and of special im¬ 
 portance for the understanding of this second war. The 
 possession of a knowledge of the theatre of war being assumed, 
 the other items of information demanded for a full under¬ 
 standing of any operations are, the actual movements of the 
 troops, the orders for those movements, the reasons for which 
 those particular orders were issued, and, finally, the dominant 
 factor of all the operations, the extent to which the judgments 
 of the commanders who issued the orders were influenced, 
 biased, aided, or warped by the fact of those commanders 
 being human beings. For it matters not what are the 
 differences in the social scale among the leaders ; it matters 
 not that as in this war, there is on the one side the head of 
 the Hohenzolierns, with his Princes, Grand Dukes, Counts 
 and “ Vons,” and on the other side a Barrister and a Civil 
 Engineer; they are all the same in one respect, they are 
 men, human beings, with all their little strengths and little 
 weaknesses, moved by the same little or great motives and 
 desires, and the same petty likes and petty dislikes as is he 
 who writes, and he who reads these lines. And sometimes 
 when reading what military leaders have done in the field, 
 and in endeavouring to estimate approximately their work at 
 its real value, we are apt to overlook how the “ professionality ” 
 of these men is in subjection to their exceeding “ human-ness.” 
 
HUMAN NATURE IN WAR 
 
 57 
 
 We forget that the man is, as a rule—not, however, without 
 some exceptions—the same whatever the clothes he wears, but 
 that this “ human-ness ” is liable to be somewhat emphasised 
 when the coat is red or of khaki; and, as years go by, the 
 more marked, the more apparent becomes this emphasis, 
 because the older he gets in life, and the higher the rank to 
 which he rises in his profession, the more free becomes the 
 play of self, for the fewer there are in control over him, the 
 greater the number under him who have to acquiesce silently 
 and without comment in his wishes and his orders. The 
 general who is too cautious to risk anything was, it may be 
 assumed, never seen out on even a lovelv summer dav without 
 an umbrella in his hand. The general who cannot decide 
 quicklyibetween one or more courses of action, never, we may 
 be sure, arranged his railway journey for a long leave until 
 after a prolonged investigation of the railway time-tables to 
 ascertain the relative advantages and disadvantages of various 
 routes and various trains. And these habits, these little 
 harmless habits of peace show themselves at once in another 
 and less harmless form in war. Whilst of no account in peace, 
 in war they have serious consequences, for the qualities most 
 essential to a leader of high position in war are a clear, cool 
 head, the power of forming a correct judgment of the situation, 
 its real needs and requirements, and of quickly arriving at a 
 decision ; and, further, there must be in the mind of any man 
 who is a military leader, entire freedom from prejudice against, 
 or jealousy of the officers who have to co-operate with him, 
 or who have to execute his orders. When the mind which 
 is striving to arrive at a correct judgment is obscured by 
 weaknesses inherent in itself, and especially bv the weakness 
 of personal likes and dislikes, the judgment cannot poss ibly 
 be right, so armies and nations suffer. It is difficult to hit 
 off' the right English word which signifies the combined per¬ 
 sonal mental characteristics of the individual. “ Personality 11 
 has more than one meaning. The German word “personlich- 
 keit,” though somewhat untranslatable, seems to indicate 
 the combination best, and it will be employed here. This 
 
58 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 “ personlichkeit " in the enormous influence that it exercised 
 on the German side, as revealed in the Archives now pub¬ 
 lished in Hoenig’s work, the prominent part it played, and the 
 evil it wrought, is one of the most striking features of this 
 war. It prevails in all wars, but we are seldom able to unearth 
 it from their records. To the knowledge of the “ person¬ 
 lichkeit ” of soldiers in command or in positions of influence 
 in a campaign, Hoenig attaches the greatest importance for 
 the understanding of the operations of a campaign ; and a 
 study of the action and effect of it, serves as a warning to 
 those soldiers who may find themselves in these positions. In 
 an introductory chapter to the fifth volume of his work, 
 Hoenig deals with the subject; of his views a short precis 
 will therefore be given. 
 
 The character of the actors affords an extremelv important 
 assistance for writing history, but one most difficult to utilise 
 and which can only be employed if thorough and exhaustive 
 data are forthcoming. If the writer has a personal know¬ 
 ledge of the character of the individual he is portraying so 
 much the better. Stringent impartiality is indispensable. 
 Since the greatness of a leader depends mainly on the special 
 qualities of his character, so must the result of all examina¬ 
 tion of his practical work depend on that character. The 
 greatest power on earth is greatness of mind and the power 
 to exercise it. To examine into this is the first task in an 
 account of the art of war. If one strips men of all their 
 peculiarities, takes from them all the rough angles, all hard¬ 
 ness of character, smooths down all their being to one level, 
 all are mere copies of each other. Ignoring individuality 
 leads to mere uniformity in the writing of history. None of 
 the great men, whose deeds we look up to to-day as models, 
 were perfect; they had their weaknesses, and they made 
 mistakes, so this brings them close to us as men. It would 
 be untrue and most wrong if we praised everything without 
 exception, whatever they did. That is to detract from the 
 credit of others and to deal unfairly with them. There is 
 to-day, unfortunately, little inclination to recount how a 
 
HUMAN NATURE IN WAR 
 
 59 
 
 great idea and a powerful resolve have failed; who has stood 
 in the way of its realisation, and what great efforts were 
 necessary for its adoption. The feeling is utterly wrong. 
 The commander, alone, cannot, in war, think about and give 
 orders about everything; the work is too many-sided; he 
 needs counsellors and helpers who are at one with him in his 
 spirit as regards the work of the war. But with him alone 
 rests the responsibility. Therefore “ personlichkeit” must stand 
 more in the foreground. Why should young people develop 
 their characters, if we paint all individuals, because they are 
 in high positions, as all alike masters of their art and all 
 faultless t If every one is a born hero and a general, then are 
 these descriptions of no value. Surely it is evident that 
 greatness is diminished and is brought to a lower level 
 thereby. “ The men whom I have described,” writes Hoenig, 
 “ are indeed not always geniuses or great characters; but an 
 analysis of them shows that with human weaknesses there is 
 much that is edifying; and perfect men do not exist. A 
 good organisation should so provide in peace that the men 
 who are to be at the head of affairs suit each other.” 
 
 And there is yet another matter which must be noticed if 
 full profit is to be derived from a study of this war. It is 
 the real meaning of the mystic formula “ Bv Order” ; and the 
 conduct of this war we shall understand but little unless we do 
 know its meaning. In the German army will be found on the 
 staff of every division, army corps and armv, an officer whose 
 official title may be Generalstabsofficier, Chef des General 
 Stabes or Chef ties Stabes, according to the importance of the 
 unit. It will suffice for all practical purposes to designate 
 them by one common title, Chief Staff Officer, provided that 
 it is borne in mind that the officer so designated is in no way 
 the property of the General Officer to whose command he is 
 attached ; he is the Chief Staff Officer of the General, but he 
 never ceases to belong to, and to represent at the side of 
 the General that very important body, the general staff of 
 the German army, of which staff during the war, and for long 
 before and after, v. Moltke was the chief. 
 
60 THE PEOPLE’S AVAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 It is to this fact ol belonging to the General Staff that he 
 owes his influence and the high position accorded to him on 
 the staff of any commander. In our own army we have no 
 General Staff, and the resemblance between our Chief Staff 
 Officers and those of the German army is nominal only. In 
 the German army this officer is intended to be the confidante, 
 the adviser of his General, and his alter ego ; but sometimes 
 this position is not real but only nominal, owing to a fault in 
 coupling together two incompatibles. Under this system the 
 best presage for the satisfactory exercise of command and 
 control is not similis similibm , “ like to like,” or “ like to 
 unlike ; ” the Chief Staff Officer should be the mental comple¬ 
 ment of the commander with whom he serves. With an 
 over-cautious commander, a bold Chief Staff Officer full of 
 daring and enterprise; with an impulsive commander a Chief 
 Staff Officer who is cool-headed; with a commander who 
 before he acts is prone to weigh and consider long, a Chief 
 Staff Officer prompt in decision; with a commander difficult 
 owing to temper, a Chief Staff Officer of perfect tact; with an 
 ignorant commander, mistaking his ignorance for wisdom, a 
 Chief Staff Officer full of knowledge, artful in concealing from 
 his general his superiority in the possession of wisdom, but 
 tactful enough to induce him to accept it as his own. 
 Rut when the commander is a royal personage, the situation 
 of the Chief Staff'Officer is specially delicate and difficult. As 
 a General Officer in the German army who had filled high staff' 
 appointments was once heard to remark: “ If you want to 
 have your nerves tried, become Chief Staff Officer to a royal 
 personage in war.” 
 
 It is from the Chief Staff' Officer that the “ By Order ” 
 emanates, but the real authorship of the orders depends in 
 each case on the “ personlichkeit ” of the Commander and of 
 his Chief Staff Officer respectively. As regards the real 
 meaning of this “ By Order ” in the second war, it meant at 
 the supreme headquarters almost invariably, v. Moltke and no 
 one else. Not that King William was a mere figure-head ; he 
 was a very wise and far-seeing soldier, and he could take his 
 
HUMAN NATURE IN WAR 
 
 61 
 
 own line when he chose to do so ; but, as a rule, in this 
 second war, he refrained from interfering with the line of 
 action taken on any matter by v. Moltke. 
 
 With the Second Army, “ Ry Order ” seems to have meant 
 Prince Frederick Charles accentuated and emphasised always 
 by v. Stiehle; or v. Stiehle accentuated and emphasised by 
 him, so the staff of this army seems to have looked too much 
 at one side only of a subject and to have taken one view only 
 of a matter. 
 
 As regards the Third Army, Hoenig’s History throws no 
 light on this question. Possibly the reticence was intentional; 
 but in the recently published work, giving extracts from the 
 letters and diaries of v. Rlumenthal, there is a full revelation 
 of what the “ Ry Order ” meant here. Y r . Rlumenthal had 
 acted as Chief Staff Officer to the Crown Prince in the 
 Austro-Prussian War of 1866. He was, no doubt,, a very 
 able soldier, and he possessed to a full degree, that self- 
 confidence, and that faith in his own opinions, without which 
 no man is fit for positions of responsibility. Rut he had also 
 a “ temper” which, he tells us, he thinks must have come to 
 him in virtue of hereditariness; and, moreover, he does not 
 appear to have enjoyed the best of health during the war ; so, 
 as he admits, he could get into a “ real ill humour.” Though 
 he recognised v. Moltke’s ability, he was by no means disposed 
 to estimate it too highly, and, so far from being a fanatical 
 devotee, as many at Versailles were, he could openly differ 
 from v. Moltke and criticise his measures. As will be appa¬ 
 rent in the course of this narrative, it was not only the 
 “ personlichkeit ” of a man that affected the course of the 
 war, but the mutual attraction or repulsion of each “ person¬ 
 lichkeit ” on the other or the others, that were potent factors. 
 At this point, however, we have to deal only with the rela¬ 
 tions between v. Rlumenthal and the Prince, and there is no 
 doubt as to who was the predominant partner here. It was 
 not the Prince; charming and fascinating as he was, he had 
 not in him the power to hold under complete control such a 
 strong nature as that of v. Rlumenthal, for whom, however. 
 
62 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 he had a warm and sincere regard. The independent spirit 
 of v. Blumenthal is well illustrated by the account which v. 
 Blumenthal gives of a remarkable interview between himself 
 and the Prince in the early days of December. An order had 
 come in the night from the King relating to a corps of the 
 Third Army; v. Blumenthal despatched the necessary 
 telegrams. 
 
 “ In the morning the Crown Prince was very much put out 
 that I had not had him called, as he said he ought to be 
 informed of all orders as soon as they arrive. I said to him 
 that I could not think of waking him for such trifles; more¬ 
 over, that it came into my province, and not into his, to issue 
 the subsequent order. I told him that I was not in the 
 position of an adjutant who merely had to carry out orders ; 
 that I was only too willing to leave him all the honour of the 
 command and do all the work, but that my position could not 
 be reduced to that of a mere adjutant. He saw my point, but 
 he has not a very clear comprehension of his position in the 
 command. With the greatest possible kindness and geniality, 
 he replied that I could do anything I wished, and that he 
 would in no wise hinder me or raise difficulties; but he must 
 be told of everything, especially when an order had come 
 direct from the King. It is not possible for him to feel 
 offended as he is always governed by the very best intentions, 
 but he does not grasp the exact relationship in which I stand 
 to him.” And yet most people would think that the com¬ 
 mander was quite in the right and the Chief Staff Officer 
 quite ill the wrong. 
 
 As regards “ By Order ” in a force collected later on, 
 denominated the “ Detachment,” and placed under the 
 command of H.R.H. the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg 
 Schwerin, Hoenig in the chapter already referred to 
 remarks, “ The reader will perhaps notice the omission of 
 some character-sketches, for instance, of the officers of 
 the staff of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg. They 
 were not forgotten, but they could not have been drawn, 
 because it seems to me that the time for doing this has 
 
HUMAN NATURE IN WAR 
 
 63 
 
 not jet come.” So we are left to deduce from the history, 
 our own idea of these matters at the Detachment.. The 
 Grand Duke of Mecklenburg Schwerin, a wilful, deter¬ 
 mined man, but no great leader, started with a Chief Staff' 
 Officer, Colonel v. Krenski, who seems to have been little 
 more than his “ man,” but, later on at a critical moment, v. 
 Moltke took care that the Grand Duke should temporarily 
 have a Chief Staff' Officer who was his “ master.” 
 
 But although, therefore, every care is taken in the German 
 army when selecting officers as Chief Staff* Officers for com¬ 
 manders, and to avoid misfits, yet sometimes there come 
 together an ill-assorted pair, and then, either from faults on 
 one side or on both sides, the control gets out of joint, and 
 the troops in the command suffer from bad leading. The 
 following remarks of v. d. Vernois with regard to General 
 v. Steinmetz who, immediately after the Battle of Grave- 
 lotte, had been relieved from the command of the First 
 Army and sent to a post at home, are very apposite to this 
 matter. 
 
 “ The nomination (of v. Steinmetz) certainly aroused some 
 misgivings. The universal and high appreciation of the 
 merits of this gallant fighting General was merited in every 
 respect. But, however high his military capabilities were, 
 his personal qualities and his independence of character were 
 such as to make it difficult for his superiors to deal with him, 
 and made friction probable if he, at the head of an army, were 
 subordinated to a higher command. These doubts, later on, 
 proved to have been not altogether unjustified. The choice of 
 a proper Chief of Staff' may, in such cases, do much to smooth 
 matters, and the best possible was made in the person of 
 General v. Sperling, a clear-headed, circumspect and reso¬ 
 lute officer. But even his eminent military as well as per¬ 
 sonal qualities were not able to prevail with such a character 
 as that of General v. Steinmetz.” It has seemed desirable 
 to show fully the actual relations of these Commanders and 
 their Chief Staff' Officers in this war, because otherwise the 
 reader might be misled into imagining that these relations 
 
64 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 were the same as those existing between anv two officers in 
 similar positions in our own army and bearing similar titles. 
 
 Tbe German dualism has been regarded, as in itself it is, 
 a most admirable system for the control and exercise of com¬ 
 mand. So the announcement of the appointment of Lord 
 Kitchener as Chief Staff Officer to Lord Roberts, when the 
 latter went to take the command in South Africa, was received 
 generally with great satisfaction as a step in the right direc¬ 
 tion. But, as events showed, this dualism was never adopted 
 at the army headquarters in South Africa ; neither Lord 
 Roberts nor Lord Kitchener had in their previous commands 
 employed this system; they do not seem to like it; so Lord 
 Kitchener was never Chief Staff Officer to Lord Roberts in the 
 German sense, nor did Lord Roberts in this sense have any 
 Chief Staff Officer. But in the second, as in the first war of 
 1870-71, these Chief Staff Officers were living realities, and 
 their existence must alwavs be borne in mind in following the 
 histories. 
 
 From this long, but necessary, digression we now return to 
 the situation in the field at the end of October, and shall find 
 ourselves incidentally introduced at Versailles to another of 
 the manifestations of “ personlichkeit.” 
 
 At the end of October and the beginning of November it 
 was known both to v. d. Tann at Orleans, and to Moltke 
 at Versailles, that, on the Loire, there was being displayed 
 great military activity ; two corps, the 15th and the 16th, 
 were in course of organisation, and there was a general move¬ 
 ment of troops down the Loire towards Tours; the railway 
 that runs from Tours through le Mans to the north was 
 closed to private traffic, and on it trains with troops had been 
 despatched north from Tours. But as to the meaning of these 
 movements, the local General at Orleans, v. d. Tann, and 
 the supreme General at the Royal Head-quarters, v. Moltke, 
 formed completely opposite views. V. d. Tann, on the 
 spot, and in hourly contact with the population of the district, 
 regarded the movement north from Tours as a mere feint, as 
 a blind, to take the attention of the Germans away from 
 
HUMAN NATURE IN WAR 
 
 65 
 
 Orleans, the repossession of which lie believed that the Dele¬ 
 gation was determined to obtain. In v. d. Tann’s opinion, 
 it was the recapture of Orleans that would be the first objec¬ 
 tive of the newly-formed Loire army. From Toui’s, this army, 
 now apparently on its way north, would double back, utilising 
 the railways on the right bank to Vendome (forty miles west 
 of Orleans), and Blois (thirty-five miles down the Loire), and 
 take up a position of concentration under cover of the forest 
 of Marchenoir, whence, co-operating with a large detachment 
 crossing the Loire at Gien, above Orleans, it would make a 
 convergent attack on him in overwhelming numbers, cutting 
 off at the same time his retreat on Paris. 
 
 V. Moltke,on the other hand, took a different view altogether, 
 and he did so because he attributed to the French leaders the 
 intention of doing that which would be most dangerous and 
 inconvenient to their adversary, and the surest and safest for 
 themselves. The weakest and most vulnerable part of the 
 investing line at Paris was, as already explained, that opposite 
 to the western side of the Capital, and on the southern bank 
 of the Seine. Also a sortie from the western side was favoured 
 by the peculiar conformation of the ground, and if carried out 
 simultaneously with the attack of a relieving force, would 
 probably result in the compulsory withdrawal of this section of 
 the investing troops. Moreover, the approach lay farthest from 
 any reinforcements coming to Paris from the First and Second 
 Armies. Besides this, Versailles, the seat of the Royal head¬ 
 quarters and of those of the Third Army were in this section, 
 whilst Villacoubay, the site of the artillery park, was close at 
 hand. Here then was, to v. Moltke’s mind, the proper first 
 objective for the French, and few perhaps will disagree with him 
 in this opinion, and he assumed that the French would select 
 it in preference to any other. And it is remarkable how v. 
 Moltke held long and persistently to this belief, to the exclu¬ 
 sion of aught else, with the result that the Germans came ere 
 long near to disaster. The difference of views between v. 
 d. Tann and v. Moltke, and the disregard of the latter for 
 the opinion of the former on this occasion, is not the only 
 
 E 
 
66 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 instance in which in this war v. Moltke misjudged a military 
 situation at a distance from him. 
 
 And also it must be remembered that at Versailles v. 
 Moltke was a species of demi-god; he lived surrounded by 
 younger staff-officers whom he had selected and trained for 
 their work; and it would be interesting to learn how often, 
 except by Bismarck, v. Roon, and v. Blumenthal, he was 
 ever contradicted during the whole of the Second War. 
 
 It has been said truly that in judging the value of a report 
 received from a distance, it is the signature attached that 
 must be the principal factor in the formation of an estimate 
 of its value. It seems strange, therefore, that v. Moltke 
 should have given so little weight to the reports sent in at 
 this time by v. d. Tann. V. d. Tann was a general of high 
 military reputation, and in this campaign he does not appear 
 to have shown any signs of nervousness or pessimism, yet at 
 Versailles, they apparently did not believe in him. And 
 besides v. Moltke, v. Blumenthal did not agree with v. d. 
 Tann in his diagnosis of the military situation, for on 
 November 4th he believed the 16th Army Corps to be at 
 Blois and the rest of the army, 60,000, at le Mans, where 
 there was hardly a soldier. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER 
 
 But it is just at this time, the end of October and the 
 beginning of November, that it is of the greatest importance 
 for v. Moltke to form a correct view of the military situation, 
 and of the views and intentions of the enemy, for there has 
 now come before him a very important question for imme¬ 
 diate decision, namely, the disposal and employment of the 
 100,000 men and 450 guns set free by the fall of Metz on 
 October 28th, for service in the field. In v. Moltke’s opinion, 
 it is on the fall of Paris that the course and duration of the 
 war depends. But the capture will not be accelerated 
 by bringing more troops round its walls ; there are quite 
 enough there already to keep the French from breaking out 
 through the investing line, and to maintain its continuity 
 round the walls. Every additional man at the investing line 
 means an additional mouth to feed, and the supply of food is 
 neither too certain nor too plentiful. But still there must 
 he no risk ; there may be danger to the investing line from 
 without, as well as from within the capital, and it would 
 seem that for the purpose of guarding against this double 
 danger, the forces there are not too large, unless, of course, 
 the danger from without is not in any way serious. 
 
 When three weeks ago, on October 5th, General Iteyau came 
 north reconnoitring to Toury, drove back the cavalry divi¬ 
 sion, and in triumph carried off 150 head of cattle destined 
 for the German larders; and this minor operation of war had 
 been mistaken for the advance of the enemy to attack the 
 southern line of investment, a certain amount of anxiety as 
 
68 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 to the adequacy of the number of German troops to keep the 
 enemy breaking out of Paris, and to hold a relieving force at 
 a distance may have been entertained at Versailles. But, 
 probably, the French collapse at Artenay and Orleans may 
 have led v. Moltke to accept v. Podbielski’s estimate of the 
 French troops as “ ragamuffins,” and to determine not to be 
 alarmed in future by mistaking phantoms for corporeal 
 beings. And the reports now made to him by his Intelligence 
 branch were very reassuring; for at the most important 
 hostile centre, the Loire, there were given as between Blois 
 and Salbris, thirty-three miles south of Orleans, on the further 
 side of the river, only 50,000 to 60,000 men, an erroneous esti¬ 
 mate, but inevitable in this “ People’s War ” where the invader 
 cannot go and look for himself, and the population either 
 hold their tongues or lie patriotically; erroneous, inasmuch 
 as on the line from Blois below Orleans to Gien above that 
 city, were at least 100,000 men, mostly line or marche 
 troops, of which about 80,000 had completed their organisa¬ 
 tion in Army Corps, the 15th Corps in three divisions, the 
 16th Corps in two divisions ; whilst preparations were in pro¬ 
 gress for organising the surplus into a 17th Corps, and a 
 third division for the 16th Corps. But it will be always 
 more or less in the dark that the German leaders will have to 
 work in determining their strategy and their operations during 
 this second war. The simple work in open day of the first 
 war will not come again to v. Moltke on French soil. 
 
 To the First Army was assigned the occupation of the 
 north-west of France towards Amiens and Rouen, and looking 
 after the numerous northern fortresses. It would thus pro¬ 
 tect the northern line of the investment from the hostile 
 army now forming in the north. 
 
 The Second Army, under the command of Prince Frederick 
 Charles, with General v. Stiehle as his Chief Staff’ Officer, 
 consisted of the Illrd A. C. (v. Alvensleben), the IXth A. C. 
 (v. Manstein), the Xth A. C. (v. Voigts-Rhetz), and the 1st 
 Cavalry Division (v. Hartmann). The strength was approxi¬ 
 mately as follows: 
 
THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER 69 
 
 
 Inf. 
 
 Cav. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 III. Corps 
 
 . 16,500 
 
 1,100 
 
 84 
 
 IX. „ . . 
 
 . 16,600 
 
 1,800 
 
 90 
 
 X. „ 
 
 . 16,500 
 
 1,100 
 
 84 
 
 1st C.D. . . 
 
 . 
 
 3,000 
 
 6 
 
 Total 
 
 . 49,600 
 
 7,000 
 
 264 
 
 Although the II. Army Corps belonged to this Army, it 
 was now drawn to Paris to strengthen the line there. Paris 
 is one hundred and seventy miles from Metz. 
 
 The original order was, that the army should march with 
 the utmost rapidity in the general direction of Troyes on the 
 Seine and the Middle Loire, i.e., into the centre of France. 
 The Prince arranged his programme of march so that on 
 November 10th the Head-quarters, the IXth A.C. and the 
 1st Cavalry Division should be at Troyes, eighty miles south¬ 
 west of Paris; the III. A.C. at Vendeuvre, some fifteen 
 miles east of Troyes; and the Xth A. C. with its outer¬ 
 most brigade at Neufchateau, about seventy miles east of 
 Troyes. Troyes is ninety, and Neufchateau one hundred 
 and sixty miles from the great road running from Paris to 
 Orleans. 
 
 On November 1st v. Moltke wrote to v. Stiehle a letter, 
 containing a full exposition of the situation as it presented 
 itself to him. It is here given as reproduced by Hoenig 
 from the official archives, and it deserves the most careful 
 attention as giving very fully v. Moltke’s view of the future 
 of the war at this time. Emphasis must be laid on the fact 
 of the already mentioned radical difference of the views of 
 the King and v. Moltke as to the spirit which the French 
 nation would display with regard to the continuance of the 
 struggle; so although this letter is a species of “ By Order,” 
 it gives probably the views and opinions of the Chief Staff 
 Officer at the Royal Head-quarters, rather than those of the 
 supreme Commander. But it will be well, before reading 
 it, to note some of the distances between the places named 
 in it. 
 
70 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 Chalons-sur-Saone is distant from Metz one hundred and 
 seventy miles, the fortress of Langres lying on the road connect¬ 
 ing them, one hundred and eighty from Paris, one hundred and 
 fifty from Orleans, one hundred and fifteen from Boui’ges. 
 Bourges is two hundred and ten from Metz, one hundred and 
 twenty-five from Paris ; Nevers is on the Loire, thirty-five 
 miles from Boui'ges, and is at the junction of the railroads 
 from Chalons to Boui’ges, to Gien and to the south. At 
 Chalons-sur-Saone was a great iron-foundry. Nevei’s was a 
 centre of supply of naval stores ; at Boui'ges was the main 
 gun factoi’y and small arms ammunition factory. 
 
 The letter ran as follows : 
 
 “ Only the course of events will determine the tasks that 
 will have to be undertaken by the Second Army during its 
 advance. I hai'dly think that it will be necessary to give 
 suppoi’t to Genei’al v. Werder, who is provisionally in a 
 defensive position on the line Vesoul-Gray-Dijon [in south¬ 
 eastern France]. The south of France will hardly make 
 great efforts on behalf of Paris. On the other hand there 
 ai’e three points on the left flank where the most sevei'e losses 
 to military France can be inflicted, Chalons-sur-Saone, Nevers, 
 and above all, Bourges, where ai’e the great arsenals and the 
 Chassepot cartridge manufactories. . . . 
 
 “The main object remains as before, the destruction of the 
 enemy’s forces in the field, and the speedy re-inforcing of the 
 forces at Paris, so as to render possible the sending out 
 detachments. 
 
 “ There appears, therefore, to be no longer any need for 
 the employment of the Second Army troops as an army ; one 
 of its corps on each of the named points will be sufficient to 
 overcome all resistance.” 
 
 With this letter was sent the following estimate of the 
 hostile situation : 
 
 1. At Lille, the Northern Army forming under General 
 Bourbaki, and said to be 30,000 strong, and composed of 
 Depot Troops, Gardes Mobiles and Franc-tireurs. 
 
 2. In the West the forces under General Briant at Rouen, 
 
THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER 71 
 
 Depot Troops, Gardes Mobiles, mobilised Gardes Nationales, 
 and Franc-tireurs ; 16,000 men protecting Rouen and Havre, 
 and harassing the rear of the army investing Paris. 
 
 3. The Army of the Loire under d’Aurelle, of 45,000 men, 
 said to have been raised to 60,000, and to contemplate an 
 attack on Orleans; “ it is the best organised, the regiments 
 drawn from Africa forming its nucleus.” 
 
 4. The Army of Lyons under General Cambriels in Bes- 
 an 9 on. Two divisions of field troops (Depots and Gardes 
 Mobiles and Garibaldi’s Detachment, a brigade of Gardes 
 Mobiles and Franc-tireurs), 35,000; objective, guarding the 
 road to Lyons; eventually advance towards the Vosges. 
 “ Besides, during the advance larger bodies of Gardes Mobiles 
 may be encountered.” 
 
 So no one was wanted at Paris, except one Army Corps, 
 the Second. The total number, 126,000, was fairly correct, 
 the distribution wrong:. In one single sentence in this letter 
 we find the source of all the difficulties and all the troubles 
 which soon beset the invaders ; the source of the prolongation 
 of the war for three months ; the real origin of the campaigns 
 of le Mans and the Lisaine in 1871. That source is the 
 belief of the man in whose hands lay the direction of the war, 
 that “ the South of France will hardly make great efforts on 
 behalf of Paris.” 
 
 Ere long will the three corps, as a united army, be 
 straining every nerve to reach the Paris-Orleans Road, to 
 protect the Investment of Paris against attack from Orleans. 
 Within twenty-eight days will these three corps, as an army, 
 be opposing the first onslaught of a portion of a force of 
 some 200,000 men, whom not only southern France, but 
 central, northern, eastern, and western France have sent to 
 exert their best efforts for the relief of Paris. 
 
 From the foregoing it will be seen that v. Moltke, v. 
 Podbielski, and their entourages, were totally in error 
 in their estimate of the moral and the spirit of the nation 
 with which their own was at war. To v. Moltke’s belief 
 that “ Southern France is hardly likely to make great efforts 
 
72 THE PEOPLE’S AVAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 on behalf of Paris ” is due the fact that ere long the Germans 
 found themselves in dire straits, from which they escaped, 
 not through the capacity and military genius of v. Moltke 
 and their other chief leaders, but through the errors and 
 misleading of their adversaries. 
 
 But in view of the obvious fact that the Army of the 
 Loire was no longer to remain quiescent, v. Moltke determined 
 to take the initiative and thus terminate the period of doubt 
 and suspense. So on November 7th the Second Army received 
 orders by telegraph to hasten the advance of its right wing 
 on Fontainebleau, thirty miles south of Paris and twenty-five 
 east of the Paris-Orleans road, whilst, south of the investing- 
 line, a large force, termed a Detachment (Armee-Abtheilung) 
 was formed, the command being given to H.R.H. the Grand 
 Duke of Mecklenburg Schwerin, the Chief Staff Officer, 
 Colonel von Krenski. 
 
 The Detachment was formed of the I. Bav. A.C., the 17th 
 Inf. Division (v. Tresckow) from the investing line, the 22nd 
 Inf. Division, and the 4th v. and 6 th (v. Schmidt) Cav. 
 Divisions, and was placed under the control of the Com¬ 
 mander of the Third Army. 
 
 The strength was approximately as follows : 
 
 
 Inf. 
 
 Cav. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 1st Bav. A.C. . . . 
 
 17,500 
 
 2,100 
 
 118 
 
 17th Inf. Div. . . . 
 
 9,800 
 
 1,200 
 
 36* 
 
 22nd Inf. Div. . . . 
 
 9,000 
 
 400 
 
 36 
 
 4th Cav. Div. . . . 
 
 — 
 
 2,800 
 
 12 
 
 6 th Cav. Div. . . . 
 
 — 
 
 2,700 
 
 6 
 
 Total . . . 
 
 36,300 
 
 9,200 
 
 208 
 
 The instructions given to the Duke were as follows: “ By 
 order of the King to march on an ‘ expedition ’ to the west.” 
 The object given was to “ break up the Army of the Loire now 
 in process of formation, and to compel it to retreat by le Mans. 
 
 Including the 17th Cav. Brig. 
 
THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER 73 
 
 [le Mans is one hundred and ten miles S.W. of Paris.] If 
 the 15th and 16th Army Corps are found north at Blois and le 
 Mans, they may perhaps be driven apart and their re-union 
 be rendered impossible. A further (subsidiary) object would 
 be the destruction of the hostile communications between 
 Tours and Rouen, as well as the utilisation of the occupied 
 territory for the supply of the army. In order to make 
 the communication with the superior command better and 
 quicker, the capture of one or two locomotives would be 
 beneficial. Reports by telegraph to be made frequently to 
 Versailles.” 
 
 The Detachment was to be on the 12th inst. facing west in 
 the following position of concentration for the subsequent 
 advance. On the right at Chartres the H.Q., the 22nd Inf. 
 Division, and the 4th Cav. Division. On the right rear at 
 Rambouillet, twenty miles from Chartres, the 6 th Cav. 
 Division. At Bonneval, the 17th Inf. Division, and at 
 Chateaudun the 1st Bav. A.C., less one Infantry Brigade, 
 with some guns and cavalry, a force to be left at Orleans and 
 which v. Moltke considered sufficient for the protection of that 
 city. But, here again, the King had shown that his view of the 
 situation and his foresight were superior to those of the Chief 
 of the Staff, for later on, as will appear in due course, he said, 
 with reference to the Detachment, “ The 22nd Infantry Divi¬ 
 sion was sent to v. d. Tann ; I have sent the 17th Infantry 
 Division after it.” On the 7th, v. Moltke sent to the Second 
 Army a letter, explaining the reason for his order sent by 
 wire ; Hoenig gives from it the following extract. “ The 
 fact that the fall of Metz has not induced the French Govern¬ 
 ment to adopt an attitude corresponding to the circumstances, 
 leaves us to conclude that, shortly, a determined attempt 
 will be made to relieve Paris. A more rapid advance of the 
 Second Army with the right wing in the direction of Fon¬ 
 tainebleau is therefore desirable . . . and the left wing of the 
 Second Army will remain free for employment according to 
 circumstances.” It was no doubt annoying to the Germans 
 that the French Government did not take the same view as 
 
74 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 they did, of what ought to be done in consequence of the fall 
 of Metz. 
 
 In the conduct of all businesses on a large scale, there is 
 bound to be some friction among ithe principals and chief 
 managers; and in the great business of war this friction will 
 make its appearance, sooner or later. Rut in war, so long as 
 success in the campaign and on the field of battle attends an 
 army, the friction is comparatively small ; it is regarded as an 
 insignificant annoyance only, and is soon forgotten ; it has 
 done perhaps little serious harm ; but if the tide turns, or is 
 adverse to the army, friction soon makes itself felt, and grows 
 to proportions of evil size- And the reason is not far to seek. 
 Take our own army in South Africa. 
 
 Any one who has met and conversed in private with 
 senior officers, staff officers, and others, who were in our 
 army in the long South African War, and has thus been 
 given a peep behind the scenes in that war, must have been 
 struck with the general testimony to the existence of constant 
 and, often, great friction, and, sometimes, of ill-feeling 
 towards each other, among the officers who held important 
 positions in that campaign. It would be difficult to find 
 any one who was really satisfied with the way in which the 
 authority, superior to that authority of which he himself 
 formed a part, exercised its control. Rarely will be met, 
 though sometimes it will be the case, a regimental staff 
 thoroughly satisfied with its brigadier and the brigade staff; 
 this, with its divisional general and his division staff; and 
 these again with the hierarchy at the supreme Head-quarters. 
 Unnecessary interference and blunder-making are common 
 indictments against the superior by the inferior. And then, 
 more unpleasant still, are the imputations of jealousy 
 among the seniors, jealousy that interfered seriously with 
 the success of the operations. The first impression derived 
 from this disagreeable phenomenon is, that war makes men 
 very censorious and queer tempered, and brings the lower 
 nature of man prominently to the front. But this view of 
 the case seems hardly correct. This phenomenon would 
 
THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER 75 
 
 seem to be due rather to realisation by soldiersjjactually 
 taking part in a war that the work of war is one of the most 
 serious, one of the gravest kinds of work that can fall 
 to individuals to perform. It is a work of life or death to 
 tens, to hundreds, to thousands of human beings. And on 
 how that work is done, whether it is done the right way 
 or the wrong way, depend consequences fateful to the workers. 
 So when things are going wrong, or seem to be going wrong, 
 it is inevitable that minds become censorious, judgments 
 harsh and severe ; mistakes are no longer condoned; blunders 
 neither forgotten nor forgiven. And this disposition of the 
 minds of soldiers is not peculiar to the army of any one 
 country or the army of any one period of history ; it prevails 
 in all armies, it has prevailed and will prevail in all periods of 
 history. And so in the second war of 1870-71. The more 
 the inner life of the military hierarchy, or rather hierarchies, 
 is revealed, the more clearly do we see that this war was, in 
 this respect, no exception to the rule. And how different 
 from the first war, when the path to victory, though not easy, 
 was very smooth. Even the cautious v. du Vernois in a 
 remark in his book, when referring to this matter as it was at 
 Versailles in the latter part of November, when difficulties 
 were gathering all round, says : 
 
 “ It lies in the nature of things that such stirring and 
 difficult times do not pass without friction. Nor did we 
 remain free from it in some respects. . . . The world need 
 not know the dark side of glorious times. There are too 
 many people who love to gloat over this, and who seek to 
 diminish our pride in the great things which have been done, 
 and detract from their well-merited acknowledgment.” 
 
 But the Editor of v. Blumenthal’s Journals does not consider 
 expurgation to this end necessary, so we learn, from the 
 extracts published, a good deal about the tone and temper of 
 mind prevalent in these matters. Even on August 11th v. 
 Blumenthal had written: “I must admit that General v. 
 Moltke has manoeuvred very cleverly so that all are concen¬ 
 trated, but I think that he has incorrect notions of what 
 
76 THE PEOPLE’S WAll IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 troops are capable of, and of what they can be called upon 
 to do without becoming disorganised.” 
 
 But so much involved was the Third Army Head-cpiarters in 
 the control of the first part of this second war, that we owe 
 a debt of gratitude to this editor for having so boldly put 
 before us such a striking picture of the highest staff life at 
 Versailles. 
 
 The first thing that seems to have ruffled the equanimity 
 of v. Blumenthal was the transfer of the Royal Head-quarters 
 to Versailles, where those of the Third Army were already 
 established. On September 29th he writes : “ I do not mind 
 that ” [giving up the present quarters], “ but the presence of 
 the King’s Head-quarters will be very inconvenient to us, 
 especially for me, as I have not sufficient command over 
 myself to deal with the many unnecessary and sudden ques¬ 
 tions and bits of advice.” On October 16th: “From the 
 presence of the King’s Head-quarters arises for me a diffi¬ 
 culty which cannot be overrated. Reports are required about 
 everything, and since every moment more or less important 
 reports arrive, I have always to be thinking whither they are 
 to be sent, so that no one can complain that this or that 
 person has received the news not as soon as or even earlier 
 than somebody else.” 
 
 But beside personal annoyance to the lower staff', there is 
 real evil in this close juxtaposition, for it would seem to be 
 invariably the case that where a superior and a lower military 
 authority are locally near each other, the lower authority 
 loses its power of independent action, and shrinks from the 
 assumption of responsibility. If the two authorities are 
 miles apart, the lower has not the slightest hesitation, when 
 difficult questions come before it, in giving a decision without 
 reference to the distant superior ; but the position of the 
 lower authority becomes very difficult when the superior is 
 close at hand, for it deems it often unwise to act when a 
 reference is easy. Moreover, if the lower does act inde¬ 
 pendently, the superior may object, that being within easy 
 reach, it ought to have been consulted. Anyhow the result 
 
THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER 77 
 
 of this reference to the superior leads to delay and waste of 
 time. On October 22nd v. Blumenthal writes: “ This endless 
 sending of news to the Head-quarters is very tiring, especially 
 with matters I can only call trifles. Everything comes to 
 me; something is wanting to be known, something to be 
 better done, and many are simply childish requests. It dis¬ 
 gusts me with my good position and often puts me in a real 
 ill humour.” 
 
 And on the 7th of the same month occurs an entry full of 
 indignation with the people at the Royal Head-quarters. 
 V. Blumenthal had, from the first, been in favour of an active 
 line being taken against the hostile army whilst it was in 
 course of formation, rather than to delay, and so allow the 
 formation to be completed. It is evident that he considered 
 General Reyau’s advance on Toury on October 5th ought to 
 have been dealt with by a quick offensive. On the 7th, when 
 v. d. Tann was in a defensive position south of Paris, near 
 Arpajon, he writes: “With regard to v. d. Tann being- 
 ordered to take the offensive, Moltke fully agreed and gave 
 his assent, in spite of the protest of various small minds who 
 always try to interfere.” 
 
 On the same day, with reference to another matter, he 
 writes: “ To-day, however, everything again has been 
 
 altered. Why, I do not know. I fancy that there are 
 many who want to give their opinions, and to have their 
 views adopted, which would not be the case if I had the 
 matter in my hands. It is really most extraordinary that, in 
 spite of the fact that Moltke and I continually come to an 
 agreement on certain points, there almost always step in 
 between us some persons, and the orders are not so drawn up 
 as I had expected. It may be that he is prevented some¬ 
 times from acting exactly as he wishes.” 
 
 To return to the “ Expedition.” From v. Blumenthal's 
 Journals, it appears that it was with him and not v. Moltke 
 that the idea originated. On October 20th he wx-ites: “ A 
 l-elief [of Paris] by a newly-formed army, we need not fear. 
 It would be months before one could be i-aised and organised 
 
78 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 that could attack us with any prospect of success. It is only 
 necessary for us to hinder and render difficult as much as 
 possible the formation of a relieving army. This would be 
 best done if we were not so anxious not to weaken ourselves 
 in front of the fortress, but sent more often distant expedi¬ 
 tions as we did to Orleans. I should regard it now as correct, 
 for instance, to send two Army Corps to Tours to drive out 
 the governing body which is there, and break up the force 
 which is being organised.” 
 
 On the 23rd, evidently referring to this plan, he writes: 
 “ The Crown Prince has consented to my plan, and now I 
 have sent Bronsart to General v. Moltke to communicate it 
 to him. He will have no objection whatever to it, but 
 it is to me like a weight on my limbs that I now may not 
 properly do anything more independently, but must always 
 first ascertain and inquire whether anything against it is 
 said in the highest places also. In a word, our wings are 
 cut and paralysed, and if anything serious has to be carried 
 out, it is only our luck and the good God that we have to 
 thank.” And at the beginning of November the immo¬ 
 bility of the troops round Paris irritates him. In waiting 
 he foresees danger. Had the two Head-quarters been 
 a hundred miles apart, he would have been able to employ 
 his army much as he chose, but here the neighbour next 
 door has to be consulted. On November 4th : “ To-day I 
 was once again very angry. Probably my cold was partly 
 to blame, but perhaps also the unsatisfactory manner in 
 which the operations of our armies are being conducted.” 
 
 But the matter apparently hung fire for a little time, and 
 immediately after the fall of Metz v. Blumenthal again 
 pressed it on v. Moltke. On November 5th he writes 
 “ Bronsart drove over to Moltke, and laid before him my 
 request regarding the expedition to le Mans. He was quite 
 of my opinion in the matter, and the Crown Prince promised 
 me, moreover, to plead pressingly with the King for sanction 
 for us to undertake an expedition of the kind under the 
 Grand Duke of Mecklenburg. The Crown Prince returned 
 
THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER 79 
 
 at 12.30, saying that it was all of no use, as all were against 
 it. . . . 
 
 “There is a limit to strength in every man, and it is not 
 at all necessary that I should work night and day and under¬ 
 take such great responsibility, while a whole crowd of military 
 idlers loaf about in dozens, doing nothing but passing worth¬ 
 less criticisms.” 
 
 And at last, on November 7th: “This afternoon I heard 
 with gratification that the expedition against the so-called 
 army of the Loire, which I have so long intended and desired, 
 has been sanctioned by tbe King, and that the command is to 
 be given, as I had wished, to the Grand Duke of Mecklen¬ 
 burg.” When v. Blumenthal saw the Duke soon afterwards, 
 he found him so smart and quick in apprehending his task, 
 that he had “ the greatest hopes of him.” 
 
 The fact that it was with v. Blumenthal the intended 
 expedition originated is an illustration of the difficulty of 
 ascertaining who is the real source of a “ why ” and a 
 “ wherefore ” in connection with military operations; and 
 seems to show that military hero-worship on the one hand, 
 and scornful condemnation on the other, if indulged in at all, 
 must for fairness’ sake be left for exercise by later generations 
 who may get low down into the deep well at the bottom of 
 which Truth lies concealed. But this is not the way of the 
 world; so in the military profession the impostor in high 
 places is less rare than he should be. 
 
 As will soon appear the idea of the “ expedition ” was 
 founded on a totally erroneous, completely mistaken view of 
 the military situation. Hoenig’s account was published in 
 1893. The reader of that work must inevitably assign to v. 
 Moltke any discredit given for a faulty judgment in the 
 matter. V. Blumenthal does not appear in those pages in 
 connection with it; but nine years later, appears v. Blumen- 
 thal’s Diary, in which we find that it was to v. Blumenthal’s 
 repeated importunity that v. Moltke eventually yielded in 
 ordering the expedition. Moreover, in Hoenig’s work, v. 
 Blumenthal, during the period that the Detachment was in 
 
8o THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 the field as a part of the Third Army, would seem to have 
 adopted towards the Grand Duke a line which savoured of 
 want of firmness in dealing with a royal personage. As 
 we shall see, however, from v. Blumenthal’s Journal, the 
 Grand Duke and the Detachment were, so to speak, v. 
 Blumenthal’s proteges, and the apparent want of firmness 
 arose from a dislike to have to act as an intermediary be¬ 
 tween his proteges and the Royal Head-quarters when the 
 latter took of the former a less complimentary view than 
 he did. This fact must be borne in mind if we would under¬ 
 stand the operations of the fortnight from the 9th to the 23rd 
 of November. 
 
 But the mystery that shrouds the Army of the Loire, and 
 the hopelessness of the efforts of the invader to choose the 
 scheme of operations best suited to the realities of the situa¬ 
 tion in a People’s War, where reconnoitring, save in force, is 
 rendered impracticable by the determination of the population 
 to shoot down, somehow or other, any hostile soldier who 
 dares to ride in among them to spy out what is going on, is 
 well illustrated by the work, at this time, of Von Wittich, 
 who, it may be remembered, had, after the occupation of 
 Orleans, gone with his Inf. Division and the 4th Cav. Division 
 to Chartres. Both the 4th and the 6th Cav. Divisions 
 were working in conjunction with v. Wittich’s Inf. Divi¬ 
 sion, and the orders for the combined operations were signed 
 by v. Wittich, so that apparently he was in command of the 
 whole force. The General had written to v. Blumenthal 
 asking whether, if occasion arose, he could rely on the co¬ 
 operation of v. d. Tann (his senior officer) at Orleans. On 
 November 2nd v. Blumenthal, who, at this time was, as we 
 know, pushing the “ expedition ” scheme through the oppo¬ 
 sition it was encountering, replied, “Fresh orders as regards 
 v. d. Tann will be sent in a few days.” Meantime, on 
 November 3rd, v. Wittich marched the whole force to Courville, 
 twelve miles west of Chartres, and occupied it. Here, how¬ 
 ever, after dark he received from v. Blumenthal the following 
 telegram : 
 
THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER 81 
 
 “ Xorember 3rd, 3.59 P. M. 
 
 “According to information, fairly reliable and just received, 
 the hostile army at le Mans is 60,000 strong. I advise you 
 to be very careful. I cannot get good intelligence agents. 
 
 “ v. Blumenthal.” 
 
 The stratagem of sending a few trains of troops from Tours 
 to le Mans had thoroughly answered its purpose. Intercepted 
 letters informed v. Wittich that troops of all arms were 
 immediately in front of him to the west, and others referred 
 to a great battle imminent in the neighbourhood ; so, by a 
 night march, the General hastily quitted his position and 
 regained the shelter of Chartres; but in front of him there 
 were only parts of the bogus “ Army of the West.” And v. 
 Blumenthal will not believe that v. d. Tann sees better on the 
 spot what is taking place, than does he himself sixty to 
 seventy miles away, and unable, as he complains, to get good 
 intelligence agents. On November 4th, v. d. Tann is certain 
 that the French are collecting in force near Marchenoir. 
 Patrols and scouts are constantly fired on by the inhabitants 
 of the villages. “ These hostilities,” says Helvig, “ occurring 
 as thev did in places where our patrols and detachments had 
 been allowed to pass quietly, were an unmistakable indication 
 of the vicinity of considex-able forces of the enemy. The popu¬ 
 lation, become fanatical,and irritated to the utmost bvthe hard 
 pressure of war, seemed hardly able to restrain the practical 
 expression of its deep and bitter anger, and thus afforded this 
 valuable information to the leadei's of the German army.” 
 
 At the Third Army Head-quarters, however,so Hoenig says, 
 v. d. Tann’s reports were regarded unfavourably as exagge¬ 
 rated. V. Blumenthal on the 7th writes: “This afternoon 
 we received information from v. d. Tann that he is expecting 
 to be attacked soon. I do not anticipate any such thing, as the 
 enemy cannot be ready for it vet.” Here, again, in view of 
 the actual facts of the situation, is an instance which should 
 serve as a warning to senior officers against that tendency, 
 already mentioned, that seems inherent in the growth towards 
 
 F 
 
82 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 seniority, to a disparagement of the judgment and opinions 
 of junior ranks. V. Moltke’s weakness in this respect has 
 already been mentioned, and here we have v. Rlumenthal, who 
 is loudly indignant because his own superiors will not accept 
 his views in preference to their own, exhibiting exactly the 
 same weakness with regard to the value of his own opinions, 
 compared to that of the opinions of a General commanding 
 an Armv Corps in his own army. 
 
 So, at Versailles, there is a feeling of perfect security so far 
 as any hostile action of the Army of the Loire is concerned. 
 On that staff were three officers, “ chiefs of sections,” of whom 
 one, Lieutenant-Colonel Bronsai't von Schellendorff, was re¬ 
 sponsible for the movement of the troops, Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Brandenstein for transport and commissariataffairs, Lieutenant- 
 Colonel V. d. Vernois for everything concerning the French 
 army. Every morning v. Moltke held a conference, at which 
 these three officers were present to receive instructions for the 
 day, so permission to be absent would necessarily imply 
 that there was no anxiety as to the immediate future. The 
 diary of Lieutenant-Colonel V. d. Vernois furnishes evidence 
 conclusive on the point. 
 
 “ Versailles, November 8th. Evening. 
 
 “ To-morrow, Bronsart, Holbein and I intend to pay a visit 
 to the Crown Prince of Saxony [on the north side of Paris]. 
 I hope that nothing will happen meanwhile to prevent our 
 going, although it is not impossible, as an advance of the 
 French Loire Army, and probably also a sortie from Paris are 
 to be expected shortly. Concerning the Army of the Loire, 
 four long days’ work has yet to be got through before we are 
 quite ready to cope with the conditions which may result 
 from its advance.” 
 
 So it might apparently lead to a little inconvenience if the 
 French were prematurely active ! 
 
 “ Versailles, November 9th. 
 
 “ The long intended drive to the Head-quarters of the 
 Meuse Army has at last come off.” 
 
THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER 83 
 
 On the 8 th v. Blumenthal had written, “ Towards evening 
 a telegram arrived from Tann, saying that strong columns of 
 the enemy are advancing by Beaugency and that he is 
 accordingly taking up a concentrated position at Ormes [five 
 or six miles north-west of the city].” And on the 9th he 
 writes to the Grand Duke, “Captain Lenke has just 
 arrived from Orleans, and I see from his report that the 
 First Bavarian Army Corps views the situation somewhat 
 too gloomily.” V. Blumenthal is still obstinately incredu¬ 
 lous. And in v. d. Goltz’s work we find a curious letter to the 
 Second Army, dated Versailles, November 10th, and signed by 
 v. Moltke, but of which, for the!present, only the first part is 
 given here. It commences as follows : “The still continuing; 
 resistance of Paris is based on the expectation that the in¬ 
 vestment will be broken by relief from the Provinces. The 
 reports received make it probable that actually large forces 
 of the enemy have been formed on j the Loire into a loosely 
 connected army deficient in equipment; and that this army 
 has already begun its advance from the line Tours-le Mans. 
 The 1st Bavarian Corps in Orleans, and the 22nd Inf. 
 Division in Chartres must therefore be reinforced from the 
 investing line. . . . The 17th Inf. Division was sent yes¬ 
 terday, and the command of all the forces to be employed 
 towards the Loire was given to the Grand Duke of Meck¬ 
 lenburg Schwerin.” The letter here breaks off as will 
 appear from the succeeding paragraphs which will be given 
 later on. Of course it by no means follows from the fact 
 that the letter bears the signature of v. Moltke, that 
 therefore he penned it himself; it may have been drafted 
 for him by some Staff Officer, but the date seems clearly 
 wrong, and shows how necessary it is to be careful in 
 dealing with even official letters as reliable records. The 
 Grand Duke was appointed to the command on the 7 th 
 (not yesterday, the 9th), and the 17th Inf. Division started 
 on the 8 th (also not yesterday, the 9th). That any officer at 
 Versailles penned these paragraphs on the 10th is in the 
 highest degree improbable, for in the evening of the 9th 
 
S 4 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 there had fallen at Versailles a veritable bolt from the blue. 
 \ . Blumenthal says that on that evening “ came a telegram 
 from General v. d. Tann reporting that after a fight which 
 lasted seven hours he had had to retire to St. Peravy.” Hoe- 
 nig states that v. d. Tann at 9.30 p.m. reported to the Third 
 Army that on the 10th he would fall back toToury to connect 
 with the 22nd Inf. Division. Also during the morning of 
 the 10th, came in another report from v. d. Tann, that the 
 enemy, some 50,000 strong, was at Coulmiers ; and the Third 
 Army in communicating this to the Grand Duke, added that 
 according to another, but not reliable, report, the enemy was 
 much stronger. The lack of belief manifested by v. Blu¬ 
 menthal and v. Moltke in the value of v. d. Tann’s views and 
 opinions is extraordinary. As we have seen, v. d. Tann 
 on the 7th tells v. Blumenthal he expects to be attacked ; on 
 the 8 th, that he is actually on the move out of Orleans to 
 meet the attack; yet away go, on the morning of the 9th, three 
 of the Royal Head-quarters Staff for a day’s pleasuring ; and 
 on the 9th v. Blumenthal believes v. d. Tann overcoloured 
 the situation at Orleans. Yet v. d. Tann and Versailles are 
 under seventy miles from each other, and the telegraph is 
 at work between them, so there is no difficulty in full and 
 complete exchange of views. 
 
 On the 7th a reconnaissance had been made down the right 
 bank of the Loire from Orleans, by a strong force of all arms 
 under zu Stolberg, the commander of the 2nd Cav. Division. 
 The force was driven back with considerable loss. On the 
 same day v. d. Tann accidentally learnt that General d’Au- 
 relle, the Commander of the Army of the Loire, had his Head¬ 
 quarters at Mer. On the 8 th, there were signs of a hostile 
 advance. For the Bavarians to have remained in Orleans 
 would have been a tactical absurdity, so on the night of the 
 8th-9th v. d.Tann, leaving a very small force in Orleans, moved 
 out and took up a position facing west, the centre at Coul¬ 
 miers, some eleven miles west of Orleans, and in the open 
 country outside the Forest. 
 
 V. d. Tann’s force numbered 14,543 Infantry, 4450 
 
THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER 85 
 
 Cavalry, and 110 guns. Early on the 9th, the French 
 army consisting of the 2nd and 3rd divisions of the 15th 
 Corps and the two divisions of the 16th Corps, numbering 
 altogether 72,000 Infantry, 7200 Cavalry and 160 guns 
 advanced to the attack. The Bavarians offered a stubborn! 
 resistance, but at nightfall, were driven off the battlefield ; 
 but onlv just off it, and the faintest semblance of a pursuit 
 would have resulted in the capture of the whole force, 
 so utterly exhausted was it. After a very short rest, the 
 
 retreat was resumed, and by the night of the 10 th the 
 
 whole force was collected at Toury. The Bavarian losses 
 
 amounted to 51 officers, 1257 men and two guns. On 
 
 the 8 th, General des Pallieres with the 1st Division of the 
 15th Corps had crossed the Loire above Orleans intending to 
 co-operate in the attack with the main body, but the co-ope¬ 
 ration miscarried, so that the line of retreat on Toury re¬ 
 mained open to v. d. Tann. Another force had advanced on 
 Orleans from the south. V. Moltke’s first diagnosis of the 
 strategy of his opponents had now shown itself to be abso¬ 
 lutely incorrect. 
 
 It was as early as October 25th, that at a conference at 
 Tours, at which Gambetta was present, it had been decided 
 to make Orleans the first objective. Orleans recaptured, was 
 then to be converted into a huge entrenched camp for 
 150,000 to 200,000 men, to serve as a base for ulterior 
 operations, and as a barrier to any offensive movements on the 
 part of the Germans. 
 
 War is, however, full of surprises, and in war, it is the un¬ 
 expected that happens, so that even the substitution of a 
 defeat for a victorious “expedition” was not likely to 
 disturb the self-possession of a v. Moltke. The first measure 
 to be adopted was blocking the road from Orleans to Paris 
 against the possible advance of the victors in the battle. 
 At 1.30 p.m. on the 10th the Third Army wrote to the Grand 
 Duke, “ According to a report of General v. d. Tann the 
 enemy, some 50,000 strong, is at Coulmiers; other information, 
 but not reliable, puts the hostile force much stronger. It is 
 
86 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 therefore most important for the Detachment to remain for 
 some days on the defensive in quarters as closely concentrated 
 as possible, until the situation becomes more clear; indeed, 
 it is questionable whether it. would not be better to retire 
 somewhat, because it is tolerably certain that on the 14th 
 Prince Frederick Charles will arrive with the IXth A. C. at 
 Fontainebleau, and then a concentric offensive advance would 
 force the enemy to retreat. This is the view of the situation 
 held at the Royal Head-quarters as well as by H.R.H. the 
 Crown Prince.” The last sentence, at first sight, reads as if 
 the Crown Prince did not feel strong enough alone to dictate 
 to a brother royalty under his command, as he would have 
 done to a commander of less exalted rank ; but another view 
 of it is that v. Blumenthal, having found his pet scheme 
 shattered and not suited to the situation, wished the Grand 
 Duke to know that also the highest authority thought, that 
 putting it into the background for the present was just as well. 
 To Prince Frederick Charles at Troyes was despatched a 
 telegram at 12.35 p.m : “ Strong hostile forces are advancing 
 from the Loire at Orleans. Increased rapidity of advance of 
 the Second Army therefore necessary. IXth A. C. cannot 
 have a rest day on the 11th, and must endeavour to reach 
 Fontainebleau on the 14th.” The scribe from whose letter of 
 November 10th, to the Second Army the opening paragraphs 
 have been given, now returned to his interrupted letter, 
 and continues it without break, as follows : “ The Bavarian 
 Corps yesterday retired from Orleans after a fight of some 
 hours’ duration. A concentration of all the troops under 
 H.R.H. the Grand Duke in the neighbourhood of Anger- 
 ville-Toury can be effected the day after to-morrow. If, 
 contrary to expectation, the hostile Army of the Loire 
 is able to advance yet further, we shall have to reckon with 
 certainty on sorties in greater strength than hitherto 
 from all sides of Paris, the main attack being against the 
 southern portion of the investment. ... In a few days 
 we shall be able to determine whether the left wing of 
 the army will not be more usefully employed on the left 
 
THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER 87 
 
 bank of the Loire than in the country between the river 
 and Paris.—v. Moltke.” 
 
 And here, on this day, we find ourselves on the threshold 
 of a period of the war which, so far as command and staff 
 work were concerned, was a period of discordant views, 
 divergent aims and incessant friction among the higher leaders. 
 It is well known that during the first war this disturbing 
 element had not been altogether absent from the German 
 Staff; but as the progress of that war was one of continuous 
 success these evils mattered little, for their consequences were 
 insignificant, and even disobedience of orders was condoned. 
 The system had worked very fairly, but it had never under¬ 
 gone any great strain, so enthusiasts, judging only from that 
 period, have held it up to admiration as an infallible model 
 for all times and places. But there are exceptions to every 
 rule. More than once even between July and September, 
 directions had been set at defiance and orders disobeyed. 
 “ General v. Steinmetz will not obey even my orders,” the 
 King is reported to have said, before any of the battles were 
 fought. Even the Crown Prince needed a polite reminder 
 conveyed to him through V. d. Vernois on the eve of Weissen- 
 burg. The Crown Prince himself found that General v. Bose 
 preferred to play at the battle of Worth a part of his 
 own choosing, rather than that assigned to him by the 
 Prince. At Gravelotte both v. Manstein and Prince Augustus 
 of Wvirtemburg, as well as v. Steinmetz, helped to upset the 
 plans of Prince Frederick Charles and v. Moltke. 
 
 Had the campaign terminated with Sedan, what heaven- 
 born generals, free from all liability to the weaknesses in¬ 
 herent in human nature would the leaders of the invading 
 hosts have appeared in military history ! But now we have 
 left the time when all was plain sailing; we are entering 
 on a period full of difficulty and doubt, and the leaders will 
 stand before us—like all leaders in all wars—as very human 
 indeed. 
 
 On the 11th, whilst the various units of the Detachment 
 were on their way to the defensive position, there was a report 
 
88 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 that the French were moving on Pithiviers, and the Bavarians 
 at once began a further retreat from Toury. The report 
 proved false, and, by order of the Grand Duke, the Bavarians 
 returned to Toury. On the evening of the 11th, v. d. Tann 
 reported strong hostile forces south of Artenay, and that two 
 corps had been engaged against him at Coulmiers. 
 
 By the evening of the 12th, the whole Detachment was in 
 a defensive position facing south across the great road from 
 Orleans to Paris, eighteen miles from the former, and forty- 
 seven from the latter. At Toury and Outarville were the 
 Bavarian Corps and the 2nd C’av. Division, with the 17th 
 Inf. Division eight miles in rear of it. At Allaines, seven 
 miles west of Toury, was the 22nd Inf. Division. Five miles 
 to the right rear of this division was the 4th Cav. Division 
 at Ymonville, on the road from Toury to Chartres, whilst at 
 Chartres, twenty-seven miles north-west of Toury, was the 6th 
 Cav. Division. There was an advanced guard three miles 
 south of Toury, at Tivernon. So on this day the actual 
 position of the Germans shows us how completely wrong even 
 wise heads may be in attempting to forecast the plan of a 
 campaign. V. Moltke’s far-reaching schemes, extending to 
 operations on a front of two hundred and thirty miles, from 
 Chalons-sur-Saone to le Mans, based on the supposition “ that 
 southern France was hardly likely to make great efforts on 
 behalf of Paris," now shrivel up to a pure defensive on one 
 single road—Paris-Orleans. Chalons-sur-Saone, Nevers, and 
 Bourges continued to ply their activities vigorously; the 
 15th and 16th Corps had not been forced to retreat or been 
 driven apart, but had advanced together to victory ; the only 
 waggon depot at Chateauroux could still send out her supplies 
 of military vehicles for French, not for German use ; the great 
 railway line of communication from Vierzon by Tours, le Mans, 
 Alen^on to Rouen was untouched, and on it were running the 
 “one or more" locomotives the possession of which would be so 
 useful for speedy communication between Versailles and the 
 Detachment. The three corps, which, separately, were to carry 
 destruction one hundred and seventy to two hundred miles 
 
THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER 89 
 
 into Centra] France, were hurrying, as an army, as fast as 
 they could march, to save the investing line at Paris from an 
 attack coming from only sixty-five miles to the south of it; 
 and for the great active expedition to the west was substi¬ 
 tuted an anxious, passive watching to the south. 
 
 The French, on the 9th, had bivouacked on the battlefield, 
 and, as they expected a renewal of the attack, fires were not 
 allowed. On the 10th, the army extended more to the east, 
 the front, about eight miles north of Orleans, running from 
 Tournoisis, twelve miles west of the main road, by Chevilly 
 on the edge of the forest, to Neuville aux Bois, eight miles 
 east of the road. On the 12th, there was a conference, at 
 which both Gambetta and de Freycinet were present, and it 
 was resolved to hold to the original plan of the formation of 
 the entrenched camp at Orleans. The army here certainly 
 numbered on this day 100,000 men. 
 
 And now we come to one of the most remarkable and inex¬ 
 plicable incidents of this war. The cavalry at the disposal 
 of the Grand Duke were very numerous, but touch with 
 the French had been completely lost; and on the 12th the 
 cavalry reported concerning this 100,000 men that Artenay 
 was unoccupied (which was true), and that between that place 
 and the Forest of Orleans no enemy was visible. In fact, to 
 German eyes, these 100,000 men had absolutely disappeared. 
 And at once rose at Versailles, and at the Grand Duke’s 
 Head-quarters, the belief that these 100,000 men had rea by 
 marched away on an offensive expedition in another direction ; 
 and for some days v. Moltke arranged his strategy on this 
 erroneous supposition. But not only did not a single French 
 soldier go from this neighbourhood, but soon vast reinforce¬ 
 ments were poured into it. Rarely lias the Fog of War been 
 so dense as here. The French knew well how to keep their 
 secrets, and the population lent its aid. 
 
 How this failure of the German cavalry on the 12th can 
 have occurred would be a very interesting problem to solve ; 
 no doubt the very peculiar character of the ground had 
 something to do with it; but the solution would require 
 
90 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 mainly in regimental records, which moreover might be incom¬ 
 plete, an extensive and close study and comparison of the 
 conduct and doings of the smaller cavalry units, such as regi¬ 
 ments and squadrons in both forces, and of officer's patrols in 
 the German forces, during the 10th, 11th and 12th of the 
 month. Here we are onlv able to deal with the general 
 result—touch was lost. 
 
 During the 12th the Grand Duke came to the conviction 
 that there was no hostile force towards Orleans, but that the 
 victors at Coulmiers were now moving round behind the 
 screen of the “ Army of the West” to unite with the forces 
 in the west, and thence to attack, by Dreux, the western side 
 of the investing line. He therefore issued orders that, on 
 the following day, the whole force should face about, and on 
 its then left, its present right, should wheel up facing north¬ 
 west towards the line Chartres-Dreux, actually with its back 
 to the enemy ; and he communicated to the Third Army his 
 intentions for the morrow. This movement was commenced 
 on the morning of the 13th, and the troops were on the 
 march, when the Grand Duke, to his utter astonishment, 
 received from the Third Army the following communication : 
 “ His Majesty the King has, at an audience to-day [the 12th], 
 given orders to the Commander-in-Chief of the Third Army to 
 inform your Roval Highness that His Majesty does not wish 
 your Detachment to take the offensive unless very special 
 reasons not known here should make it necessary. The IXth 
 A.C., under General v. Manstein, has, with special view to this, 
 been so directed that its advanced guard arrives at Fontaine¬ 
 bleau on the 14th,crosses the Seine on the 15th,and can connect 
 with you on the 16th. Success seems to be the more certain 
 thei'eby, as General v. Manstein will perhaps be able to act on 
 the Hank of the enemy, who does not expect him.” The Grand 
 Duke, when he determined to leave the.Orleans road, knew he 
 would be acting-against the directions sent to him on the 10th 
 by v. Blumenthal, to remain there for some days in a defensive 
 position; but, as already mentioned, he communicated his 
 intentions to the Third Army. This communication must 
 
THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER 91 
 
 have been made, probably, not later than midday, for the 
 letter he now received was despatched from Versailles at four 
 p.m., and in the interval there had been an audience with the 
 King. There was telegraphic communication between Ver¬ 
 sailles and the Grand Duke at Angerville, and as this place is 
 less than forty miles from Versailles, a mounted messenger 
 could have delivered the missive to the Grand Duke that 
 night. The delay in the transmission of the message is 
 unaccountable. The position taken up by the Grand Duke’s 
 force was little short of ludicrous, and all owing to the Fog 
 of War. He was marching away from the enemy, and with 
 his back to the direct road by which that enemy could most 
 easily advance, and could in the shortest time disturb the line 
 of investment. The Grand Duke had now to issue orders for 
 the following day, and these orders are remarkable. The 
 first paragraph ran as follows : “ According to information 
 received, hostile troops have advanced on the road from 
 Orleans to Etampes as far as Artenay, and on that from 
 Chateaudun to Chartres as far as Bonneval, and have halted 
 there. It is the intention of H.R.H. the Grand Duke that 
 until more full information can be obtained as to the strength 
 and intentions of the enemy, the Detachment will remain in 
 the positions reached to-day ; but to strengthen the occupa¬ 
 tion of Chartres the 22nd Inf. Division will proceed there 
 to-morrow at daybreak.” Hoenig regards the reason given 
 by the Grand Duke for the halt as a deliberate misstatement, 
 the real reason being the orders from Versailles ; nevertheless, 
 it was perfectly true that Artenay ami Bonneval had been 
 occupied that day by the French, and strong forces were 
 visible bevond Artenay ; but what the Grand Duke really 
 knew is impossible to ascertain. On the 14th the Detachment 
 with the exception of the 22nd Inf. Division remained 
 stationary. 
 
 Here, again, in the exercise of control by the Third Army 
 over the Grand Duke, we have this curious abstention of the 
 Crown Prince from dealing firmly with him. The Crown Prince 
 will not stoj) the Grand Duke’s erratic insubordinate pro- 
 
92 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 ceedings until he has the concurrence and support of the 
 King, i.c., v. Moltke. And an examination of the entries in 
 v. Blumenthars diary affords indications that on the 13th the 
 Chief of the Staff of the Third Army held opinions so different 
 from those of its Commander that possibly he left the Crown 
 Prince to deal with the matter by himself. 
 
 “ In the afternoon a telegram arrived from the Grand Duke 
 saying that to-morrow he will march to Chartres. I forgot 
 to send it to the King-—[in the Diary there is no trace of v. 
 Blumenthal being chronically short of memory]—and when 
 the Crown Prince returned in the evening from St. Germains 
 it was very unpleasant for him. It was sent on then. I have 
 become a veritable reporting machine. If this sort of thing 
 goes on we shall have a repetition of the story of the Vienna 
 Council of War at Court. 1- ’ 
 
 “ There is a very decided tendency here to dictate every 
 move to the Grand Duke, and this ought to be resisted. If 
 I were in his place I should just report nothing, and cut the 
 telegraph wire.” 
 
 On the 14th the Grand Duke kept his troops where he had 
 halted them on the 13th, except the 22nd Inf. Division, 
 which moved to Chartres. But the march of the Grand Duke 
 on Chartres was something very much like a defiance to the 
 Crown Prince and to the Royal Head-quarters as well ; so at 
 12.55 p.m. on the 14th the Prince sent to the Grand Duke 
 the following reminder as to his duty : “ General v. Manstein 
 can, on the 16th, arrive with the IXth A.C. at Etampes 
 [twenty-eight miles from Paris], to which place he has been 
 directed by the supreme Head-quarters. It is, therefore, only 
 there that the concentration of a large force can be effected 
 most quickly. The road from Orleans to Paris must not be 
 left open, if the enemy advances by Artenay. Frederick 
 William, Crown Prince.” To this telegram the Grand Duke 
 wired at 6-30 p.m. the following audacious reply: “Your 
 Royal Highness 1 despatch of midday to-day received. In 
 order that I may carry out the duty assigned to me of 
 protecting the investment line of Paris against attacks from 
 
THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER 93 
 
 Orleans and Chartres, and to have in my own hands the con¬ 
 trol for the necessary unity in the leading, I request that 
 General v. Manstein may be placed under mv orders. The 
 road from Artenay to Etampes will then be protected.” It 
 may be mentioned that although v. Manstein’s corps be¬ 
 longs to Prince Frederick Charles’ Army, he is at this time 
 receiving orders from the supreme Head-quarters, and now a 
 third superior wishes to get hold of him. Fortunately all three 
 are assigning to him the same objective, namely, Etampes. 
 
 But in the German Army there are, for even Roval 
 personages, limits to insubordination ; and the Grand Duke 
 was, even in these early stages of his career as a leader of an 
 army, for the Detachment was a small army, reminding 
 Versailles of the fact. Hoenig says : “ Anyhow, affairs from 
 the 10 th to the 14th were not so managed as to raise high 
 expectations from the Detachment, and had there been no 
 special considerations to be taken into account, it would perhaps 
 have been even at that time a question whether it might be 
 advisable upon the whole to allow the Detachment to remain 
 in existence after the arrival of the Second Army on the scene, 
 or at least to consider whether the staff work was in proper 
 hands. These matters were discussed at that time in Versailles 
 and among the General Staff, but no decisive step was taken.” 
 
 V. d- Vernois writes on the 14th : “ We can make nothing; 
 of the operations of the Grand Duke, it being not easy at 
 this distance to judge of what is going on on the spot. One 
 of us will probably have to go there.” The marginal note in 
 Hoenig is “Friction between the Third Army and the 
 Detachment.” But v. Blumenthal took a very different view 
 of the matter, and apparently is, on this occasion, letting the 
 Prince carry on alone his conflict with the Grand Duke; it 
 is with the Grand Duke that are the sympathies of the Chief 
 of the Staff of the Prince's army. No wonder there is friction. 
 
 On this day, the 14th, the entry in v. Blumenthars Diary 
 is as follows: “ Certain news arrived from the Grand Duke 
 which caused great agitation at the King’s Head-quarters. . . . 
 The march off of the Grand Duke to Chartres appears inexplic- 
 
94 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 able, though I said to the Crown Prince and to many others 
 also that they could not be judges of what was happening; 
 no doubt the Grand Duke has good reasons for his action, and 
 if he has not reported everything to us he had acted only 
 rightly and wisely. That did not please them. About 
 mid-day came to me Moltke, who looked at things more 
 calmly, but desired that I should give the Grand Duke certain 
 instructions. I could only say that that was entirely against 
 my principles; any one to whom a responsible task is 
 allotted, he must also carry it through. His hands should 
 not be tied. Moltke assented to this, and upon the other 
 points we were also one. Moltke was especially dissatisfied 
 that the Grand Duke should from the outset have disseminated 
 his forces too much. He is right there, but we do not know 
 what were the Grand Duke’s reasons for so doing.” 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE GRAND DUKE’S DETACHMENT, FROM 
 NOVEMBER 14th TO 20th 
 
 It is desirable now to learn the views which v. Moltke him¬ 
 self, on the 14th, took of the general situation and of the 
 future. These are given in his letter of that date to v. Stiehle. 
 In v. d. Goltz’s work, the letter is given apparently in extenso, 
 and, with the exception of unimportant paragraphs, is repro¬ 
 duced here. It runs as follows :— 
 
 “ It shows the resources of France and the patriotism of the 
 people, that after the whole army has been captured, yet in 
 a comparatively short time a new army, which is not to be 
 despised, has been put into the field. . . . The retreat [after 
 Coulmiers] was continued on the 10th to Toury, and although 
 there were numbers of cavalry, the touch with the enemy was 
 lost. . . . 
 
 “The reconnoitring on the 11th did not obtain sufficient 
 information; on the 12th, Pithiviers was found unoccupied, 
 and beyond Artenay there was no enemy found. According 
 to our estimate, the Orleans army consist of the 15th and 16th 
 corps, numbering 24 line (Marche) regiments, and, with 
 Gardes Mobiles, may be over 60,000 strong. The artillery 
 has presumably been got together from the fortresses; the 
 Algerian troops may he the nucleus of the army. The French 
 give their losses on the 9th as 2000, and the Army of the Loire 
 has, apparently, not considered itself strong enough to advance 
 by more fighting direct on Paris, the only mode by which 
 a real success is to be obtained. It appears that it is endea¬ 
 vouring to turn by the west, our position, which it does not 
 consider advisable to attack. On this march it would be able 
 to unite with the new formations, for which Nogent le llotrou 
 
96 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 [seventy-five miles south-west of Paris and fifty-two miles from 
 the Orleans Paris road] is the central point, perhaps even with 
 the 30-40,000 Gardes Nationales, by whom Generals Briant 
 and Bourbaki, on the line Pacy-Vernon-Les Andelys [a line 
 forty miles from Paris a cheval the Lower Seine], and as far 
 as Gournay have for a long time held our detachments in 
 check in this direction. It cannot now be doubted that an 
 attack by strong hostile forces from the west would endanger 
 us not less than from the south. The investment could be 
 completely raised for eight days, without the capital being 
 revictualled for longer than half a day; but on the left bank 
 of the Seine we have our siege artillery and the Royal Head- 
 quarters, and, above all, we have to take into account the 
 political impression. The Grand Duke has already, therefore, 
 to-day begun his march on Chartres, which place has remained 
 occupied by General von Wittich. In Toury Count Stol- 
 berg’s Cavalry Division has remained. There is no news from 
 it at present- It is possible, but not probable, that the Army 
 of the Loire is restricting itself to the passive defence of 
 Orleans, and behind the Loire. Gambetta is well aware that 
 Paris cannot hold out without relief. Should, therefore, the 
 departure of that army to the west be confirmed, the Grand 
 Duke will move parallel to this march till the possibility of a 
 decisive attack is offered to him. Then the important place 
 of Rouen will be his next objective. Subject to the foregoing, 
 the protection of the Paris-Orleans road must be undertaken 
 by the Second Army alone. The road cannot be left entirely 
 open for any time, and the Grand Duke cannot be weakened 
 bv detachments. 
 
 “ On the left bank of the Loire the destruction of Bourges 
 is, militarily, the driving the Delegation out of Tours is, 
 politically, important. I have hoped that the Second Army 
 would have been able to march direct on those places, but as, 
 unfortunately, thei'e has been no favourable decision between 
 Paris and Orleans, the only thing to be done is to continue 
 the advance from Fontainebleau and Sens [on the Yonne, a 
 tributary of the Seine, and forty miles west of Troyes, and 
 
THE GRAM) DUKE’S DETACHMENT 
 
 97 
 
 thirty miles south-east of Fontainebleau], first in a westerly 
 direction. Whether the Xth corps shall be directed on Gien 
 on the Loire, will be better determined on the 19th inst. [the 
 dav on which the corps was to arrive at Joigny, higher up the 
 Yonne, seventeen miles beyond Sens]. The recapture of 
 Orleans, and the crossing the river bv the Ilnd Army to the 
 left bank will be much facilitated thereby. For the quick 
 approach of H.R.H. Prince Frederick Charles, we are very 
 grateful; it has pulled us through a sort of crisis. . . . We 
 expect with some certainty a sortie on the 15th inst. on a larger 
 scale than hitherto. We could not dispense just now with 
 the half of the Ilnd Army Corps. The two Divisions are the 
 only reserve of the extended southern line of the Investment. 
 Fortunately, the enemy continues still quiet in the north-west,, 
 otherwise we should have to send detachments there also.” 
 Still not the slightest thought of the possible need of concen¬ 
 tration in this “People’s War”; and, for the long line Chalons- 
 sur-Soane-le Mans, facing south, which had to be abandoned, 
 is substituted another long line one hundred and seventy miles 
 long, Rouen-Bourges, facing west. 
 
 This letter reveals two predominant ideas in the mind of 
 v. Moltke ; first, a tenacious clinging to the hypothesis he had 
 adopted, at the very first, namely, at the end of October, as to- 
 the strategical intentions of the French leaders. The second 
 idea is a determined depreciation of the military value of the 
 resistance that the French nation was organising against him. 
 After the hostile army that the Grand Duke was to meet, but 
 which existed only in the imagination of v. Moltke, had been 
 decisively defeated, the Grand Duke would easily traverse 
 the difficult country along the lower Seine, and possess him¬ 
 self of Rouen some sixty-five miles down the river. V. Moltke 
 thus contemplates directing him to a place one hundred and ten 
 miles from Orleans, the scene of the decisive struggle only a 
 fortnight later. So little able had v. Moltke been to forecast 
 the decisive point that he first had sent the Second Army miles 
 away from it in one direction, and now he is sending the 
 Detachment miles away from it in another direction. That 
 
98 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 the French had already put into the field two well-equipped 
 army corps, which had proved their fighting power in the 
 open, in no way altered v. Moltke’s opinion that the recapture 
 of Orleans, and the capture of Bourges and Tours, would be 
 aught but easy work for the 50,000 Germans of the Second 
 Army. Considering the extremely defensive character of the 
 country this Army would have to traverse, v. Moltke’s 
 opinion of French fighting-power must have been poor 
 indeed, and was painfully contradicted by plain facts within 
 a very few days. But there are certainly strong indications 
 that in this war, as will appear hereafter, v. Moltke did not 
 attach to “ country ” much weight in connection with either 
 strategical or tactical operations. 
 
 During the 14th, there came in to the Grand Duke from 
 the Cavalry Divisions a number of reports, and Hoenig says 
 that on these reports he determined, in spite of all the orders 
 he had received to the contrary, to resume on the 15th, his 
 march to the north-west away from the Orleans road that he 
 had received reiterated and specific dii’ections to guard. But 
 although these l'epoi'ts are given to us by Hoenig, it is well 
 to bear in mind that they are not necessarily the whole of 
 the reports received by the Grand Duke; for soixxe may have 
 been lost or mislaid, and, moreover, with every commander 
 thei'e may be certain other sources of information, or there 
 may come to his knowledge certain unrecorded indications of 
 an enemy’s movements, all of which, taken in conjunction 
 with the formal reports preserved among the archives, ai-e the 
 real grounds on which he forms his judgment. The genei-al 
 tenour of the repoi'ts recorded, was, that towards Orleans the 
 situation was the same as already repoi’ted on the previous 
 day, but along the west and south-west lines of observation 
 there were many troops visible. A report from the 6th Cav. 
 Division seems to have had much weight. Beyond Courville, 
 on the high road from Nogent le Rotrou to Paris by Charti’es, 
 a closed body of 250 line troops had been seen on the march. 
 The presence of line troops whei’e but few of any troops 
 save Gardes Mobiles and Gai’des Nationales had hitherto been 
 
THE GRAM) DUKE’S DETAC HMENT 
 
 99 
 
 seen, was a possible indication of the arrival of a fighting 
 force. The troops were really only a part of the already 
 mentioned small infusion of line troops in the “ Army of the 
 West.” But the reports strengthened the Grand Duke so 
 much in his previous opinion that the attack from the west 
 was now really on its way, that despite orders, he deter¬ 
 mined to resume the forbidden line of march; but he did not 
 report his intentions until half-past four on the morning of 
 the 15th, when he telegraphed to the Third Army his pro¬ 
 ceedings, and during the day he brought the Detachment to 
 its prescribed halting-places. The 22nd Inf. Division and 
 the 6th Cav. Division were already at Chartres on the 14th. 
 The 17th Inf. Division went to Rambouillet, twenty miles 
 north-east of Chartres, and on the same road to Paris ; the 
 Bavarians to Auneau, ten miles in rear of the centre of the 
 line; the 2nd and 4th Cav. Divisions remained respectively at 
 Toury, and midway between Toury and Chartres at Voves. 
 And this time no one said nay to him, for there was a real 
 “scare” at Versailles. This scare deserves recounting in 
 detail. In the narrow district between Mantes, on the 
 Seine, and Dreux, on a western railway from Paris, on a 
 front of twenty-two miles, there was only the 5th Cav. 
 Division as protection to the rear of this part, the vulnerable 
 part, of the investing line; one brigade was at Mantes, another 
 brigade with a battery of Horse Artillery near Houdan, on 
 the railway, a third at St. Germain en Laye, six miles north 
 of Versailles. On the French side matters had become more 
 lively in front of Mantes ; at Dreux the forces, such as they 
 were, had been greatly re-inforced, as also at Illiers and 
 Bonneval ; on the 14th, Courville had been occupied by 
 Line Infantry; farther in rear all the villages towards Nogent 
 le Rotrou were held. The important town of Dreux lies 
 some thirty-five miles west of Versailles, and had formed a 
 centre from which guerilla warfare had been carried on for 
 weeks against the 5th Cav. Division. On the 14th, this 
 Division reported that at Bu, a village a few miles north¬ 
 east of Dreux, were collected 12,000 men, eight squadrons, 
 
100 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 and eight batteries. This village had already, on the 14th, 
 been bombarded by Horse Artillery, but, as a novelty in 
 this war, the French did not evacuate it but held on. At 
 once, on the 15th, five battalions of the Guard Landwehr, 
 and a heavy reserve battery were hurried from the investing: 
 line to support the Cavalry Division, for, presuming the 
 report to be correct, there was much more than a phantom 
 army in this direction, so that when, on this day, the news 
 came that the right of the Detachment was marching in the 
 direction whence the danger was now showing itself, there 
 must have been a great feeling of relief at Versailles, and 
 probably no one asked the question how it was that the 
 Detachment was coming there. Rut the report was not true; 
 the mountain was but a very small molehill indeed. In the 
 morning of the 14th some Uhlans had approached Bu and had 
 been fired on by Gardes Nationales and Franc-tireurs; two 
 were killed, one was wounded, and one escaped. At eleven 
 o'clock some Uhlans and artillery returned to Bu, but the 
 French commander in the district had brought from Dreux 
 two companies of marines, three battalions of Gardes Mobiles 
 and a section of artillery ; he at once advanced to the attack 
 and drove the Germans away. How this force was so 
 marvellously exaggerated in the eyes of the German Cavalry 
 is not explained. At all events little short of a panic was 
 the result. At Versailles, though doubt prevailed whether 
 the attackers were the “ Army of the West” only,or whether 
 among them was also a portion of the Army of the Loire, it 
 seemed so certain that an attack was coming that any 
 objections previously entertained to the movement of the 
 Grand Duke lost all their force, and on this day v. Moltke 
 gave the Grand Duke a perfectly free hand, releasing him 
 from the protection of Paris from the south. The- letter of 
 release was sent to the Third Army as an instruction to them ; 
 its concluding paragraphs ran as follows : “ At the same time, 
 and in accordance with the approval of the King, the 5th 
 Cavalry Division is placed under the orders of H.R.H. the 
 Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, to whom is recom- 
 
THE GRAM) DUKES DETACHMENT 
 
 IOI 
 
 mended now the concentration of his troops, and the speedy 
 offensive against the hostile forces in march perhaps from 
 Dreux and Chartres.” 
 
 Then, as if to remind the Grand Duke that his master is 
 still the Crown Prince, and at the same time to reassure the 
 latter that there is no interference with his command, 
 v. Moltke writes: “ Direct instructions from here to H.R.H. 
 the Grand Duke are not given.” In transmitting the letter, 
 the Third Army did not add anything of importance. On 
 the following day, the 16th, the Duke, still pivoting on 
 Chartres, brought forward his right, the 17th Inf. Division 
 to Nogent le Roi, on the Eure, so that the front faced 
 due west; the left was at Chartres fifteen miles away, 
 the Bavarians were at Gallardon about ten miles in rear 
 of the line and the same distance from each flank. Dreux 
 lay ten miles from Nogent le Roi down the Eure. Up 
 to this time, the Detachment had not met with any 
 opposition, and the work had been one of simple marching. 
 But now, the task before the Grand Duke was one of vast 
 difficulty, and one of which none even of the tried Generals 
 of the German Army had had any experience. With 52 
 battalions, 110 squadrons, 220 guns, and unweildy and huge 
 trains, he stood on the edge of a tract of broken, close, and 
 wooded country, totally unsuitable for guns or cavalry, 
 seamed with cross roads and lanes, and into which his cavalry 
 scouts could barely penetrate; into this he was to enter and 
 strike a decisive blow on an enemy moving unseen within, an 
 enemy of whose strength, organisation and whereabouts he 
 had not the faintest idea. Not merely to achieve success, 
 but to avoid disaster, two conditions were indispensable; 
 one, the holding the force together well in hand, the other, 
 perfect staff’ work. But, unfortunately, dissemination, not 
 concentration, was the principle guiding all the operations of 
 the Grand Duke, whilst the Staff’ work was indifferent. The 
 imaginary enemy before the Grand Duke was the “ Army of 
 the West ” reinforced possibly by some portion of the Army 
 of the Loire. The actual army was some 35,500 men, the 
 
102 
 
 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 force already described, extended on a front of more than 
 sixty miles from near the Lower Seine down to Bonneval on 
 the Loir. On the extreme left near the Seine were a group 
 of five or six battalions of Gardes Mobiles and Franc-tireurs 
 under the orders of Lieut.-Colonel Thomas. At Dreux was 
 General Temple with seven or eight battalions. Farther 
 south at Chateauneuf, twelve miles from Dreux and fifteen 
 from Chartres, was a similar force under Lieut.-Colonel 
 Marty ; other groups continued the line to Bonneval. Not 
 one single piece of artillery was there with the Army. What 
 guns had been there had been withdrawn south. 
 
 And it would seem that v. Moltke, a little bit doubtful 
 perhaps that the Grand Duke, as a soldier, could be trusted to 
 walk quite alone, thought it desirable to give him the benefit 
 of a little light and leading; so he penned on the 17th, for 
 his benefit, a memorandum which Hoenig gives us in his 
 book. The Grand Duke did not receive this memorandum, 
 which was sent through the Third Army Head-quarters, until 
 the 20th, when the situation it was intended to meet had 
 passed away ; whether it would have been of the slightest 
 use to him will be best judged by a perusal of its contents: 
 
 “ H.R.H. the Grand Duke has already been informed 
 through the Head-quarters of the Illrd Army, that from 
 this time he is completely relieved from protecting the 
 Orleans-Paris Road, and that His only duty is to prevent 
 hostile forces advancing on the western roads on the left 
 bank of the Seine. For watching in this direction to learn 
 what is taking place, there is available a very numerous 
 cavalry [probably 10-12,000], 
 
 “On the other hand, it is, naturally, not intended that to 
 offer resistance there should be a force on every one of these 
 roads, but only that the advance shall be met on those on 
 which strong hostile forces show themselves. Success on one 
 road will hinder the advance on the others; but to ensure 
 the thorough defeat of the enemy, a close concentration of the 
 force is required. Generally, the Detachment of his Royal 
 
THE GRAND DI KE'S DETACHMENT 
 
 103 
 
 Highness has to carry out a war not so much of occupation 
 as of movement, bv only which means also can the supply of 
 the troops be effected ; and the objectives of the operations 
 are not so much the gaining possession of the larger towns 
 as the destruction of the hostile forces which might have 
 taken refuge in them. I need hardly mention the important 
 role which consequently falls to the artillery. 
 
 “ On the 20th, Angerville and Pithiviers will be occupied 
 by two corps of the Ilnd Army, and the road from 
 Chateaudun will be, thereby, to a certain extent, covered ; 
 so that His attention may now be directed especially towards 
 His right wing. An advance of the enemy by Dreux-Mantes 
 would strike the investing line on its most sensitive point. 
 It was already necessary, therefore, to send from here 
 yesterday a brigade of Guard Landwehr to support General 
 v. Rheinbaben [5th Cav. Division], . . . The difficulty of His 
 task lies in detecting accurately the decisive point against 
 which a blow is to be delivered with all the concentrated 
 forces; that this will be effected I am convinced. 
 
 “(Signed) v. Moltke.” 
 
 Hoenig remarks that at the Royal Head-quarters they had 
 at this time no conception of the great extent to which the 
 population were taking part in the war, nor did they realise 
 the great difficulties that the topographical conditions of the 
 theatre of war presented to the operations of the Detach¬ 
 ment. It so happened that when, on the 20th, the letter 
 came to the Grand Duke, the main body of the enemy 
 was already in full retreat south-west to le Mans. Hoenig’s 
 remarks on this letter of v. Moltke’s, though severe, are 
 very just. 
 
 “ If a People’s War is carried on on the Cordon system, as 
 was the case here, the enemy has no real decisive point, and 
 this cannot, therefore, be ascertained, and a blow directed 
 against it. Only by an extraordinary gift of divination can, 
 under these circumstances, the best direction be determined ; 
 but even this does not necessarilv lead to the retreat of the 
 
io 4 THE PEOPLES WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 forces on the Hanks, as these are able to get awav unendangered 
 in every direction. Anyhow, the formation of the theatre of 
 war in no way lent itself to the v. Moltke Idea. The enemy 
 could he driven back, separated, destroyed at certain points, 
 but there were always open to him roads into ‘space,’and 
 by means of the telegraph, and by the help of the population, 
 he everywhere received timely warning of the movements of 
 the Detachment, which was established frontally against the 
 whole cordon. Under these conditions the greatest leader 
 could have done but little.” That Hoenig was allowed to 
 publish this letter, which certainly does not add much to the 
 military reputation of v. Moltke, shows how imperative it 
 appeared to the German authorities to put before the officers 
 of the army warnings not to rely blindly on all the strategical 
 and tactical examples furnished in this war. 
 
 But v. Blumenthal was getting very irritated at the way in 
 which the Royal Head-quarters were behaving to the Grand 
 Duke. He regarded it as “grandmotherly.” On the 16th 
 he writes : “ At midday to-day Moltke was with me, and he 
 complained that the Grand Duke reported so little ; I ought 
 to order him to take the offensive. But that is not necessary, 
 he will do it of his own accord, and up to now it seems to me 
 he has done perfectly rightly ; he stands fairly concentrated 
 between Chartres and Maintenon.” And next day he writes 
 even more strongly : he says that some days before there 
 had been a real panic at Versailles, everything packed 
 and ready for a move. It had spread to his own staff 
 without his remarking it, for they did not dare to let him 
 know because they knew his views on such chicken-hearted 
 conduct (Hasenfusslerei). “ If only the King, with his 
 Head-quarters and all the Princes, would go away, we could 
 certainly expedite matters, and peace would be near at 
 hand.” 
 
 From these and the previous extracts will be at once 
 apparent the difficulties which sometimes arise in war in the 
 working of the higher command and of the higher control. 
 The difficulty hardly exists when the scene of operations of 
 
THE GRAND DUKE’S DETACHMENT 
 
 105 
 
 the armies or large detachments is a considerable distance 
 away from the supreme authority. Prince Frederick Charles 
 at Metz, v. Manteuffel on his way from Metz to the north¬ 
 west, were left to act for themselves; and v. Werder, in the 
 south-east, though more closely watched by Versailles, was 
 necessarily allowed a certain amount of freedom ; but, as we 
 have seen, there was supervision and control exercised over v. 
 d. Tann when only sixty-five miles from Versailles; and now 
 here is the commander of this 50,000 Detachment showing a 
 determined spirit of independence, and wandering about with 
 his troops within a distance of only some thirty miles from the 
 Royal Head-quarters in a manner not at all to their satisfac¬ 
 tion. No wonder v. Moltke became impatient; it must 
 have required some self-control to refrain from taking the 
 command into his own hands out of those of the Crown 
 Prince and of the Grand Duke. And the position of v. 
 Moltke was rendered still more unsatisfactory owing to the 
 attitude of v. Blumenthal. V. Blumenthal, under the existing 
 arrangement, was, as Chief Staff Officer of the Third Army, 
 the intermediary between v. Moltke and the Grand Duke; 
 and if v. Blumenthal, differing as he did in this matter with 
 v. Moltke, and favouring the Grand Duke, was not actually 
 obstructive, he seems at all events not to have given support 
 to v. Moltke; and from an incident related by v. d. Vernois, 
 v. Blumenthal was a power that had to be reckoned with even 
 by v. Moltke and v. Podbielski. The Crown Prince might be 
 amenable, but not so the Crown Prince with v. Blumenthal at 
 his elbow. In the early days of August the Royal Head¬ 
 quarters were not satisfied with the state of the preparation 
 of the Third Army for the field. Consequently, a telegram 
 containing a fresh and decided order to advance was drawn 
 up and handed by v. Podbielski to v. d. Vernois to send. 
 V. d. Vernois had been on the Crown Prince’s Staff in the 
 war of 1866, when v. Blumenthal was the Prince’s Chief 
 Staff Officer. “ When I read it,” he says, “ I said to the 
 General that the telegram ought not to be sent in its present 
 form. I added I knew that staff very well in the last war. 
 
106 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 If you wish to create strained relations with them during the 
 whole of this campaign, send it, but I feel perfectly sure they 
 will feel offended, and, I think, not without cause. For a 
 good reason of some kind there must surely be for their not 
 yet fixing the date of starting.” So the telegram was not 
 sent, and v. d. Vernois was entrusted with taking personally 
 to the Prince the expression of the wishes of the Head¬ 
 quarters. 
 
 On the 16th, the Duke had come to the conclusion that it 
 was at Dreux that the enemy was in force, so he gave orders 
 for a movement in echelon in that direction on the 17th, the 
 attack to take place on the following day, the 18th. On the 
 16th, the Detachment as already mentioned was facing west, 
 right at Nogent le Roi, left at Chartres. For the morrow, 
 the 5th Cav. Division, on the north, was to advance west 
 and drive the enemy back on Dreux; the 17th Inf. Division 
 from Nogent to advance on Dreux, and if the place were 
 only weakly held, to take it; otherwise, to establish itself in 
 front of Dreux. Fontaine-les-Ribouts lies eight miles up the 
 Blaise; it is eighteen miles from Chartres, whence the 22nd 
 Inf. Division was directed on it. In the event of strong re¬ 
 sistance, the division would connect along the Blaise with the 
 17th Inf. Division on its right. The Bavarians were directed 
 on St. Cheron, ten miles from the Blaise and the same dis¬ 
 tance from the flanks. On the left the 6 th Cav. Division, on 
 a wide front, accompanied the advance, or rather the wheel 
 to the right on the move, as it really was. Probably the 
 Grand Duke believed that there was with the enemy a portion 
 of the army from the Loire, and therefore intended whilst 
 attacking him in front at Dreux, to cut off the retreat of the 
 Loire troops to the south ; but, on the other hand, if he 
 believed, as his order stated, that the hostile army was con¬ 
 centrated in strong force at Dreux, this very disseminated 
 disposition exposed his own troops to the risk of destruction 
 in detail. Sometimes in war, the Commander states to his 
 Chief Staff Officer the object of the operation he intends 
 to carry out, and leaves him to work out the details for 
 
THE GRAND DUKE'S DETACHMENT 
 
 107 
 
 the units; sometimes the commanders do the work them¬ 
 selves. In this instance, we are unfortunately unable to 
 ascertain who was responsible for the orders for the march 
 on the 17th, the Grand Duke or Colonel v. Krenski. Helvig 
 states that the Bavarians at St. Cheron were to be available 
 not onlv to support the Divisions in front, but also for 
 employment to the south-west on the left Hank, if necessary, 
 as it was not absolutely certain that danger was not threaten¬ 
 ing from this direction. If this be correct, then, obviously, 
 the Grand Duke, instead of concentrating his efforts on the 
 achievement of one object, was trying to provide for two 
 eventualities, attack to the north-west, defence to the south¬ 
 west : and it is difficult to see how, had the hostile defence 
 been of an effective character, or the hostile attack serious, 
 success could have been achieved by the Grand Duke in 
 either direction. Hoenig remarks that the Grand Duke 
 disregarded v. Moltke’s recommendation for concentration, 
 and that in all operations carried out from a flanking 
 position, concentration is the first thing to be attended to; 
 and that the flanks must be protected by cavalry and in¬ 
 fantry pushed forward a day’s march ; the Infantry, com¬ 
 plete and ready to take their part where the encounter is to 
 take place. 
 
 The troops met with opposition everywhere in their 
 advance, but as must be apparent from the position and 
 nature of the French forces here, the opposition, though 
 bitter and determined, could not hold out against the highly- 
 trained and well-disciplined Germans. Dreux was easily 
 taken by the 17th Inf. Division, but the 22nd Inf. Division 
 failed to arrive on the Blaise, halting at Marville, some four 
 miles short of its destination. And now, in the mind of v. 
 Moltke, as well as in that of the Grand Duke, the conviction 
 must have begun to dawn, that the ideas that had ruled 
 the strategy since the 12th of the month had been baseless; 
 and that the marching had simply led to an affaire manqute. 
 The result was a striking illustration of the difficulties 
 encountered bv an invader in a country suited to a “ People’s 
 
io8 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 War,” a country where the inhabitants and local troops can 
 find scope for their employment, and the exercise of their 
 special powers, and where the population take seriously their 
 part in the National Defence. 
 
 The Grand Duke now came to the conclusion, and it was 
 correct, that he had not hit upon the main body even of the 
 nebulous “ Army of the West,” but on its extreme northern 
 flank ; and as the trend of the retreat of some of the troops 
 encountered was in the direction of le Mans to the south¬ 
 west bv Nogent le Rotrou, he determined to make, on the 
 18th, a complete change of front from north-west to south¬ 
 west, and then to advance in the first instance on Nogent le 
 Rotrou. In this determination v. Moltke acquiesced, and 
 from a letter of his of the 18th to the Second Army, given 
 by v. d. Goltz, there can hardly be any doubt that it 
 was on this day that he at last gave up the idea which had 
 dominated his mind since the latter days of October, that the 
 French would attack him on the West; and also the other 
 idea, that the whole of the Army of the Loire, which had 
 fought at Coulmiers, had gone bodily from the neighbourhood 
 of Orleans. 
 
 In his letter he says: “ On the question whether the main 
 body of the Army of the Loire is still at Orleans, or perhaps 
 in a more westerly direction at Chateaudun, light will be 
 thrown in a few days, and the information will be at once sent 
 to the Head-quarters of the Ilnd Army.” 
 
 It must be mentioned that General Fiereck had, on the 
 17th, transferred the main body of the “ Army of the West,” 
 some 16,000 men, from Chateaudun to Nogent le Rotrou; 
 and the troops from the neighbourhood of Dreux made their 
 way in the same direction with ease. The Detachment had, 
 already, since November 12th, made three wheels in mass, so 
 that, possibly, the Grand Duke imagined, that from the 
 experience acquired, there would be no difficulty in performing 
 the manoeuvre a fourth time ; but in this he was doomed to 
 bitter disappintment. The first three had been simply 
 march-manoeuvres, undisturbed by the enemy. Against the 
 
THE GRAND DUKE’S DETACHMENT 
 
 109 
 
 success of the fourth march, the enemy, the elements, and the 
 country formed an offensive alliance of such power as most 
 effectually to stultify the Grand Duke’s programme, and 
 to render the 18th a day never to be forgotten by the unfor¬ 
 tunate troops that were involved in the operation. Moreover, 
 the Detachment had now thrust himself into a veritable 
 hornet’s nest, and there would necessarily be an accompanying 
 sensation of stings. As a warning, as a reallv profitable 
 example of thoroughly bad leading and bad Staff' work, the 
 movements of the 18th are worthy of consideration in detail. 
 In the first place, the shortness of November days must be 
 recalled to mind. On November 18th the sun rises at 7.23 and 
 sets at -1.7 ; thus giving less than nine hours of daylight for 
 the work in the field. On the day of Worth when the Bavarians 
 had their first experience of marching and fighting, there had 
 been fifteen hours of daylight. During the whole of November 
 18th a dense fog, limiting vision to fifty paces ami rendering 
 artillery useless, hung over the country, which was very much 
 broken and threaded with cross-lanes and devious paths. 
 The task assigned to the 17th Inf. Division at Dreux was 
 plain and simple, and could meet with no difficulty. It was 
 to march fifteen miles west to Brezolles, clearing the country 
 to the west and north-west, and for the purpose, apparently, 
 of cutting off' the enemy’s retreat in that direction. But the 
 governing factor in the movement of the rest of the Detach- 
 ment was the 22nd Inf. Division at Boulay and Marville, some 
 four miles north of Chateauneuf. It was from Chateauneuf 
 that the Division was to move at ten o’clock, and proceed 
 south by the Dreux-Chateauneuf Road to the Eure, about la 
 Loupe, a twelve miles march from Chateauneuf. The Brigade 
 of the 6th Cav. Division, which was to the east at Chene 
 Chenu, between Chateauneuf and the Bavarians at St. Cheron, 
 was to follow the 22nd Inf. Division; whilst the 1st B.C., 
 leaving at ten a.m., St. Cheron, which is ten miles east of 
 Chateauneuf, was also to move west and proceed to canton¬ 
 ments on both sides of the Chateauneuf-la Loupe road in rear 
 of the 22nd Inf. Division. It would be an interesting War 
 
no THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 Game exercise to work out these orders, as a time and space 
 problem of units on full war strength with trains, &c. &c.; 
 but here was not a War Game but practical work in the 
 held, with any amount of possible disturbing conditions. 
 Everything depended on the 22nd Inf. Division being clear of 
 Chateauneuf at exactly the right time. 
 
 On the 17th, the enemy that was encountered was not one 
 single body, but was in two bodies; one at Dreux under 
 General Temple, whose line of retreat lay west down the 
 Lower Seine; the other under General Thomas, which, 
 though in the “ Army of the West,” was part of the 21st 
 Corps, now forming at le Mans; and whose line of retreat 
 ran therefore at right angles to that of General Temple’s 
 force. Chateauneuf was practically a defile through which 
 were to pass an Infantry Division, a portion of an Army 
 Corps, and a Cavalry Brigade ; the 22nd Inf. Division was to 
 lead, and even if time and space had been accurately calculated, 
 any delay in the passage of this Division in passing the defile 
 at the appointed time must inevitably cause a block in the 
 movements of the other troops; besides which, any portion of 
 the Bavarians that was marching south of Chateauneuf across 
 the road to gain its destination, might bring the 22nd Inf. 
 Division to a halt. And delay at once began at the very 
 first attempt of the Division to move. On the 17th the 
 Division had intruded itself into a countiy full of hostile 
 inhabitants; and the rightful occupiers, though only too glad 
 to bid “ God speed ” this morning to their unwelcome guests, 
 were determined to bid it in such a form as to impress it on 
 their memories ; so when the Division prepared to move down 
 to Chateauneuf, it found its departure in quiet so strongly 
 opposed that v. Wittich was compelled first to clear the hostile 
 troops from the direction actually opposite to that he was 
 eventually to take. Owing to the fog, the l'eceipt of informa¬ 
 tion, and the transmission of oxders was much delayed. 
 Then there was the countiy between the Division and 
 Chateauneuf to be cleared. Meantime, the Bavarians and 
 the Cavalry Brigade from the west were approaching 
 
THE GRAND DUKE’S DETACHMENT 
 
 hi 
 
 Chateauneuf and the road south. General v. Wittich suggested 
 to the Grand Duke that in order to keep his Division together 
 he should let the Bavarians pass across. The Grand Duke 
 refused to accept the suggestion, so part of the Division 
 pushed on ; then the Bavarians crossed between it and the 
 rest of the Division, some of which passed the night in 
 Chateauneuf; the head of the Division was unable to get 
 further south than some five miles from the town. The 17th 
 Inf. Division had halted when at five miles from its destination, 
 doubtful, owing to the sound of firing in the south, whether 
 it ou<>ht not to move in that direction. Although the marches 
 had been only six or seven miles, the day had been necessarily 
 most trying to the physical endurance and the moral of the 
 troops. Nowhere could they move without coming under 
 fire from an enemy quite invisible to them, and possessing a 
 knowledge of which they were absolutely deficient, a knowledge 
 of the country ; roads were found broken or barricaded, and 
 every hamlet, farmhouse and village had to be stormed. 
 
 The delays and the crossing of the Divisions had been 
 fatiguing. Many detachments had been on the march since 
 the morning; the halts had afforded no real rest, and when, 
 at night, the troops arrived at the shelter assigned to them, it 
 was as likely as not that the shelter was held by the enemy, 
 who had to be driven from it, or it had been abandoned and 
 was in flames. So the troops had to bivouac in the cold with¬ 
 out fires. Dropping shots were heard till late at night in the 
 neighbouring woods, creating a feeling of insecurity, and com¬ 
 pelling the troops to place outposts all round. As to the train 
 columns, they wandered aimlessly about, not knowing where 
 were the troops to which they were carrying the needful sup¬ 
 plies. So hopelessly entangled had the Detachment become, 
 that until disentangled no further advance was possible ; the 
 19th was ordered as a rest-day for this purpose. Either the 
 Grand Duke or Colonel v. Krenski was a master of the art 
 of converting, by well-chosen language, failure into success, 
 so the Detachment order for the 19th runs as follows: 
 
 “ In to-day’s advance the Detachment encountered hostile 
 
112 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 resistance everywhere. The advance secured, but chiefly owing 
 to the successful fight of v. Wittich’s Division, the attainment 
 of its intended purpose, namely, obtaining more information 
 as to the strength and position of the enemy. It appears 
 that the hostile troops in front of us belong to the Army 
 of the West (General Fiereck), whose head-quarters are at 
 le Mans ” [quite wrong]. “ His Royal Highness intends to 
 allow the troops to remain to-morrow in their present 
 positions and to give them rest.” 
 
 The imaginary character of v. Moltke’s appreciation of the 
 situation since the 14th had been unpleasantly brought to 
 light by the events of the 17th. The Army, to whose cir¬ 
 cuitous course the Grand Duke had been moving “ parallel,” 
 had not been marching at all, for non-existent entities do not 
 walk about the earth. The driving out of Dreux a few thou¬ 
 sand irregular troops without a single piece of artillery in 
 their possession, can hardly be regarded as a decisive engage¬ 
 ment. Rouen was hardly the next suitable objective, as not 
 the possession of any place, but the destruction of the army 
 in the field was the first aim in all v. Moltke’s operations ; and 
 so v. Moltke at once accepts the fact that he has followed the 
 red herring so cleverly drawn across the track, and, then occurs 
 to his mind the idea that the lost hostile army may be nearly 
 where it was when he first lost sight of it. 
 
 The 19th November was employed by the Detachment in 
 disentangling itself and in preparing for the advance on the 
 morrow to the south-west. The reports received during the 
 day pointed conclusively to a general withdrawal in that direc¬ 
 tion by the enemy, and also to a strong occupation of Nogent 
 le Rotrou. On the 20th the advance was continued, but for 
 only a very short distance on to the ten miles front—la 
 Loupe-Courville, with the 17th Infantry Division on the right 
 rear at Senonches. It is worthy of notice that the Bavarians 
 had not with them a single map of the country ; the Bavarian 
 W ar Office had been unable in its preparation and despatch 
 of the maps to keep pace with the movements. In this 
 advance, the advantages of cavalry and artillery altogether 
 
THE GRAND DUKE’S DETACHMENT 
 
 ”3 
 
 disappeared, and the large trains were veritable impedimenta ; 
 but the district was eminently the theatre for a national war 
 carried on by young untrained soldiers, intelligent enough to 
 utilise the advantages offered by the ground. Although the 
 information obtained on the 20th showed that there were on 
 both flanks of the Detachment not unimportant bodies of 
 troops, yet everything indicated that Nogent le Rotrou was the 
 stronghold where the French would make a determined stand 
 to arrest the further progress of the invaders. And now on 
 the 20th we must leave the Detachment for a time and go to 
 the Second Army to learn what had been taking place there 
 since, in obedience to the orders received at Troyes on 
 November 10th, it commenced its march towards the Faris- 
 Orleans road. 
 
 H 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE SECOND ARMY FROM NOVEMBER 10th TO 20th 
 
 On the night of November 10th the front of the army 
 faced south, and extended from Troyes to Neufchateau, a 
 distance of seventy miles. On the 16th the IXth Army 
 Corps, covered by the 1st Cavalry Division, arrived at Mere- 
 ville, near Angerville, on the Paris-Orleans road. The 
 Army Head-quarters and the Illrd Army Corps were at and 
 near Sens, on the Yonne, sixty miles from the road ; the 
 leading echelon of the Xth Army Corps (one brigade of 
 which was far in rear) had reached Tonnerre, forty miles 
 south-east of Sens, and ninety miles from the road. 
 
 On this day v. Stiehle replied to v. Moltke’s letter of the 
 14th ; the reply shows how completely, at this time, Prince 
 Frederick Charles concurred in the under-estimate formed by 
 v. Moltke. The writer, when he penned it, little dreamed 
 that in only five days all the ambitious plans for the army 
 would have to be abandoned, and that until the commence¬ 
 ment of the following month his chief, overwhelmed by the 
 threatening appearance of the enemy he had bearded in his 
 very den, would adopt in front of Orleans a passive attitude, 
 and hold to it so determinedly, that it would need the express 
 order of the King to move him to the attack. 
 
 The letter runs: “ His Royal Highness, in conformity 
 with the orders received, and the information communicated, 
 purposes to dispose of the army as follows: 
 
 “ The IXth Army Corps which, owing to its forced marches 
 must be somewhat exhausted, will close up at Angerville, and 
 pushing forward an advanced guard in support of the 2nd 
 Cavalry Division at Toury will rest from the 18th. On the 
 
THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 10-20 115 
 
 21st, the Corps will commence its advance on Artenay and 
 Orleans. . . . 
 
 “ The Illrd Army Corps will march from the Loing, where, 
 on the 18th, it arrives at Nemours and Chateau Landon [both 
 places thirty to thirty-five miles from the Paris-Orleans Road], 
 on the 19th to Puiseaux, Beaumont; on the 20th to Pithiviers 
 [fifteen miles from the Paris road and fifteen miles south-east 
 of Angerville] ; and on the 21st continue the advance on 
 Orleans in co-operation with the IXth Army Corps, if, as is 
 asserted by a deserter, the enemy, some 30-40,000 strong, is in 
 camp at Chevilly, south of Artenay. 
 
 “ By the capture of Orleans his Royal Highness believes 
 he can best carry out the duty assigned to him ‘ protecting 
 the investing army against Orleans.’ Afterwards, according 
 to circumstances, his Royal Highness intends to move down 
 the Loire by Blois on Tours, the IXth Army Corps on the 
 right bank, the Illrd Army Corps on the left bank of the river. 
 There is no risk in the operation, although a chcvnl the river, 
 because between Orleans and Tours there are exclusive of both 
 places five permanent bridges, and also the Illrd Army Corps 
 has with it its pontoon train. If a portion of the Ilnd Army 
 Corps could be employed to occupy Orleans, where all the 
 trains must remain, the operation would be thereby facilitated. 
 
 “The Xth Army Corps, now advancing by Tonnerre, will 
 until the 20th march direct to Montargis [twenty-five miles 
 south-east of Pithiviers, forty miles east of Orleans, and twenty 
 miles north of Gien] ; thence it can reach the Loire in two 
 marches, and eventually operate against Bourges [forty miles 
 south], render it of no further military importance, and then, 
 perhaps, advance down the Cher against Tours [eighty miles]. 
 If it happens that the enemy is decisively defeated, then, 
 perhaps, from Bourges and Tours, the converging direction 
 on Poitiers [sixty miles from Tours and one hundred from 
 Bourges]may be taken, and all railway communication between 
 northern and southern France thus destroyed. 
 
 “ His Royal Hi ghness proceeds on this plan, from the con¬ 
 viction that without a decisive victory, the French spirit will 
 
116 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 not bend, and that we shall force the enemy to fight if 
 we advance direct against his political or military chief 
 centres. 
 
 “ The Illrd and IXth Army Corps will, together, be more 
 surely equal to their work, if, before coming into contact 
 with the enemy, they have not suffered from forced marches. 
 
 “The Xth Army Corps is, momentarily, only of three 
 Infantry Brigades with seventy-two guns. His Royal High¬ 
 ness will, however, reinforce it with six or seven squadi’ons of 
 Hessian Cavalry, which are to go to Montgaris, and he will 
 bring up the mixed brigade left behind at Chaumont under 
 Gen. v. Kraatz, and leave only two battalions, one battery, and 
 a squadron watching towards Langres. . . . Since the part of 
 the Army of the Loire which is capable of carrying out 
 operations, and is provided with cavalry, is acting north of 
 the Loire, General v. Voigts-Rhetz will find opposed to him 
 only loose infantry formations, to which he must, with his 
 artillery, be superior ; but even if he does not advance rapidly, 
 the direction of this attack would greatly disturb the whole 
 of the hostile operations. . . .” 
 
 And, unknown to the Prince, the missing 100,000 men of 
 the Army of the Loire, and more, stood in his path to 
 success. 
 
 The march assigned to the Xth Army Corps led it direct 
 into districts, in which, owing to their proximity to the Army 
 of the Loire, the population would be emboldened to take an 
 active part in the defence. The corps had hardly commenced 
 its march towards Orleans than it began to experience the 
 influence on the population of the defeat at Coulmiers, and 
 the evacuation of Orleans. On the 13th, when arriving at 
 Chatillon on the Seine, thirty miles short of Tonnerre, it 
 found unmistakable signs of the “ People’s War.” So evi¬ 
 dent were these that on this day General v. V. Rhetz sent 
 back word to the 39th Brigade, which was a day’s march in 
 rear : “ Attitude of the inhabitants of Chatillon hostile ; the 
 place evacuated only early this morning by French troops ; 
 armed parties in the neighbouring woods ; casualties must 
 
THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 10-20 
 
 IX 7 
 
 not be left behind, but be brought on in waggons,” (areversal 
 of a previous order). He also ordered that men coming up 
 to join the Army should march in parties of not less than 
 3-400. On the 15th the General heard that a surprise by 
 Franc-tireurs was intended for the 16th or following days. 
 Although he knew that this might be a rumour only, he 
 deemed advisable to take special precautions for the further 
 advance. 
 
 The march was along one road and in echelon, covering a 
 length of two days’ march ; the 40th Brigade, far in rear, had 
 to march independently. The 38th Brigade, the General 
 with it, led as advanced guard : to the next, the 37th, was 
 assigned for protection the Corps Artillery and the 1st Train 
 Column ; the 39th Brigade with the 2nd Train Column, a 
 light bridge train and a Pontoon Company brought up the 
 rear. With each brigade were two batteries and two 
 squadrons of cavalry. The General determined not to 
 depend on his line of communication for supplies. The 
 leading echelon had to collect supplies on the spot for itself 
 and for those in rear. The daily destination of the troops was 
 kept secret. Each echelon looked after its own security and 
 had to find its own quarters. If necessary, a whole Division 
 and all the Corps Artillery could be concentrated in a day. 
 The packs were now carried on vehicles to save the men in the 
 trying march. Each battalion carried with it three to four 
 days’ supplies on waggons, the columns being thereby unfor¬ 
 tunately much lengthened. At night the infantry went into 
 cantonments, but the most careful precautions were taken 
 against surprise. It was found impossible to keep up com¬ 
 munication uninterruptedly between the Corps and the Army 
 Head-quarters. Infantry escorts were necessary for the field 
 post, and even for the transmission of orders. The country 
 was pretty well deserted by the able-bodied men, as these 
 had gone away south to Auxerre, a centre for the hostile 
 irregular troops. To ascertain how matters stood, an officer 
 with some dragoons was despatched in this direction. They 
 were surprised in Ablis, where they were resting for the 
 
118 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 night, the officer being killed. The few cavalry in advance 
 were constantly under fire ; and the country was so close that 
 the woods on either side of the marching columns had to be 
 cleared by infantry. The road was in many places cut 
 through or barricaded ; telegraphs were found broken, bridges 
 destroyed, and all materials for their repair removed. It 
 was in the towns and villages, not in the open country, 
 that the hostility of the population displayed itself. The 
 resistance soon took a more active form, artillery being 
 necessary to drive away the Gardes Mobiles and the Franc- 
 tireurs who now opposed the march of the column. The 
 rapidity of the advance of the Second Army, together with 
 the fighting power of the German columns, had, however, 
 disarranged the departmental plans for resistance, and, con¬ 
 sequently, all the hostile troops fell back behind the Loire. 
 
 V. d. Goltz writes of this time as follows: “ If affairs very 
 soon took a course entirely different from that which had 
 been anticipated, the reason is that the ground on which the 
 anticipations were based—namely, the estimate formed of the 
 enemy—was altered. During the following days, the Army 
 got a glimpse of the difficulties, of which it had regarded 
 even hardly any as possible, and which it soon had to 
 encounter. It could no longer be concealed that against the 
 success of the whole campaign on the Loire, a danger might 
 crop up which could be averted only by the employment of 
 all available forces. Already it had become known through 
 the outspoken remarks of the population which eyed, with a 
 certain amount of contempt, the weak marching columns of 
 the advancing Ilnd Army that, on the Loire, was assem¬ 
 bling an army numbering hundreds of thousands, well 
 equipped, and animated by the highest spirit. The expres¬ 
 sion La belle Armee de la Loire was heard here and there. 
 On the German side, this was at first regarded as mere 
 rhodoinontade, as an exaggeration due to the constitutionally 
 excitable temperament.” 
 
 But, at the very outset, the plan adopted on the 16th was 
 disarranged, owing to the altered views of the population as 
 
THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 10-20 
 
 119 
 
 to the transmission of orders and messages among the 
 invaders ; the officer carrying the order, and with a small escort, 
 from Sens to the Xth Army Corps found himself stopped 
 by Franc-tireurs; and it was not until by the chance arrival 
 of a small detachment of the IIIrd Army Corps that the road 
 was cleared, and he could proceed on his mission. The delay 
 in the delivery of the order rendered impossible the arrival of 
 the corps at Montargis at the appointed time. The Prince 
 was at Nemours on the Loing on the 18th, and there in news¬ 
 papers were found statements that the strength of the Army of 
 the Loire was from 200,000 to 300,000 ; the Prince also heard 
 there of the fortifications at Orleans, and that the hostile Army 
 was concentrated at Orleans. Another corps, not hitherto 
 mentioned, was also spoken of, the 18th ; it was asserted 
 that General Michel of the Army of the East was to take 
 command of the Cavalry Division of the corps. Also it was 
 stated that a body of troops 30-40.000 strong, under General 
 des Pallieres, which had not fought at Coulmiers, had arrived 
 from Bourges by Gien. It then occurred to the Prince that, 
 possibly, reinforcements were being drawn from the East by 
 rail to the Loire ; and at 4 p.m. on the 18th he wired to 
 Versailles a report in which he said: “Perhaps for the 
 decision troops are being drawn from the Rhone by rail to 
 the Loire, and these will act against our left flank.” 
 
 On the 19th, the Prince received from v. Moltke the 
 answer, dated 18th, to his letter of the 16th. In it, v. 
 Moltke stated that the King approved the plan of operations 
 proposed on the 16th, and he continued: “a decision, 
 whether the Xth Army Corps should move direct on 
 Bourges cannot yet be given because it cannot yet be fore¬ 
 seen whether the employment of the whole Army towards 
 Chateaudun and Orleans may not be necessary. The question 
 will mainly depend on the result of the advance of the De¬ 
 tachment on le Mans commencing to-day ” : then come the 
 words already quoted : “ On the question whether the main 
 body of the Army of the Loire is still at Orleans, or perhaps 
 in a more westerly direction at Chateaudun, light will be 
 
i2o THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 thrown in a few days and the information will be at once 
 sent to the Head-quarters of the Second Army.” With this 
 letter came copies of two despatches from London. The 
 first stated that Orleans had been fortified and armed with 
 heavy guns; that a body of 10,000 men had been em¬ 
 ployed at the work ; and that the French Army was massed 
 between Artenay and Orleans. It was alleged that on the 
 Loire, boats had been collected to facilitate crossing the 
 river, as soon as necessity arose for the destruction of the 
 bridges. The second despatch stated that the railways from 
 Vierzon and Blois to Orleans had been restored, and could be 
 used for bringing up reinforcements. 
 
 No doubt, the Prince, by his conduct of the operations of this 
 war has laid himself open to much adverse criticism as a Leader; 
 but one indispensable qualification for good leadership he 
 possessed in a mai'ked degree; he knew the importance of 
 information respecting the enemy, and he spared no pains to 
 obtain it from every possible source. Later on, just when 
 assigning its true value to the information obtained was of 
 the utmost importance, he seems sometimes to have allowed, 
 unfortunately, his personal prejudices against the informant 
 to weigh in forming his judgment with consequences that 
 were disastrous; but from the 16th to the end of this 
 month, during which period this particular manifestation of 
 “ personlichkeit ” had no opportunity of exercising its per¬ 
 nicious influence, the eagerly sought-for information, when 
 obtained, was judiciallv, though not always satisfactorily, 
 weighed and considered. 
 
 On the 17th he had sent west in advance from Sens by 
 Chateau Landon to Boynes near Pithiviers, in order to obtain 
 information, and to provide for the quartering of the Illrd 
 Army Corps a small flying column of two squadrons with two 
 rifle companies in waggons ; cavalry acting alone being useless 
 in these disturbed districts. The detachment marched on a 
 line sweeping far round to the south. The detachment and 
 also the left flank of the corps in its further advance, came 
 frequently into conflict with strong hostile forces. On the 
 
THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 10-20 
 
 I 2 I 
 
 18th, another small Hying column with two guns was also 
 sent south towards Joigny. It was this column that came 
 across the officer with the orders for the Xth Army Corps and 
 opened the road for him. On the 20th the Illrd Army Corps 
 arrived at its destination Pithiviers, and so hostile was the 
 population, that its patrols were Hred at from the fields even 
 by country people armed with Hint-lock muskets. 
 
 All this time, the 2nd Cav. Division and the IXth Army 
 Corps on the Orleans Road, had been unremitting in their 
 efforts to obtain information. The Cavalry Division had on 
 the 13th regained touch with the enemy towards Orleans, and it 
 had been placed under v. Manstein's orders on the 16th. On 
 the 18th, the Prince sent directions to v. Manstein as follows: 
 “ It is of the first importance to obtain detailed information 
 respecting the position of the enemy north of Orleans, espe¬ 
 cially as regards his strength, general dispositions, and the 
 extent and positions towards the Hanks. The Commanders of 
 the 1st and 2nd Cav. Divisions are therefore directed to clear 
 up in detail these matters, by reconnaissances which are to be 
 carried out during the following days, preferably round the 
 Hanks, and for the same purpose to capture as many prisoners 
 as possible. Your Excellency will, until further orders, send 
 an officer every day (by midday) to my Head-quarters with the 
 information obtained about the enemy, and anything that 
 may have taken place on Your Excellency’s right Hank.” 
 But v. Manstein needed no urging, for he realised the need 
 of information, and at 6.30 p.m. on the 18th he had tele¬ 
 graphed to both Versailles and the Prince: “ Enemy’s out¬ 
 posts on the line St. Germain le Grand-Ruan-Dambron ; a 
 detachment at Chilleurs aux Bois, bivouac fires on the line 
 Bougy-St. Lye [a little south) and south of Artenay. 
 According to a consensus of reports, the enemy is preparing a 
 defensive position at St. Lye* and Chevilly.” Next day, at 
 10.1 5 a.m., he reported that on the outpost line, but with the 
 right a little more forward, are line troops ; there are infantry 
 and artillery at Chilleurs ; bivouac fires as before ; according 
 to a consensus of information received, the line Bougy-St. Lye 
 
122 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 is prepared for defence. At St. Lye, which is on the edge of 
 the forest, and on an old Roman road from Orleans to 
 Etampes on the main road, workmen have been summoned 
 to prepare artillery emplacements in the woods there. On 
 the 20th at 4 p.m. “ No change since 17th, but infantry and 
 cavalry are at anti south of Orgeres[ten miles west of the main 
 road]; strong bodies at Chilleurs aux Bois and further east 
 to Chambon ; many bivouac tires south of Artenay. On this 
 day the 2nd Cav. Division reported, “ According to statements 
 of prisoners, there are 150,000 men at Orleans, one army 
 corps is at Gidy and another at Chevilly.” 
 
 On the 19th the Prince sent two of the General Staff' 
 Officers of his Army to make personal reconnaissances on 
 both sides of the Paris road. These officers rode through 
 the French outpost line, which was found to be continuous, 
 and the result of the reconnaissance was that the mass 
 of the French Army was reported to be on this road. On 
 the 20th were named in the newspapers as belonging to this 
 Army the 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th Corps, whose total 
 strength was given as from 150,000 to 200,000 men. 
 
 One failure to obtain information deserves recording. The 
 actual text of the Army Order on the 16th from Sens is not 
 given in the works that have been consulted, but v. d. Goltz 
 in his account of it says: “ In order to reinforce the Xth 
 Army Corps, and to enable it better to act independently, the 
 Hessian Cavalry Brigade of the IXth Corps was given to it. 
 This Brigade was to march by Pithiviers on Montargis, and 
 arrive at the latter place on the 19th, and seek to connect 
 with the Xth Corps in the direction of Joigny [thirty miles 
 east of Montargis].” A note runs: “ General v. Manstein 
 was ordered to give over (abzugeben) 6-7 Squadrons of this 
 Brigade and to send them to Montargis.” The strength of 
 the Brigade was eight squadrons. The note is not incon¬ 
 sistent with the Army Order; and its insertion seems as if 
 intended to account in some degree for the subsequent failure 
 in the execution of the Army Order. Hoenig, in his version 
 of the Army Order, adds another duty; the squadrons were 
 
THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 10-20 
 
 123 
 
 to march by Pithiviers in order to reconnoitre in this 
 direction and to the south, and at the same time conceal 
 from the enemy the approach of the Army Corps; but v. 
 d. Goltz says that this was not alluded to in the order. It 
 is unfortunate that all the order or orders actually received 
 by v. Manstein in connection with this march, and the sources 
 whence they originated cannot be ascertained. The Cavalry 
 Brigade had had very hard work in the March from Troyes, 
 so v. Manstein did not despatch it to Montargis on the 17th, 
 but delayed the new march until the 18th; and he left to 
 the commander, Maj.-Gen. v. Rantzau, the selection of the 
 route to be taken. The distance from Angerville to Mon¬ 
 targis by the direct road through Pithiviers is a little over 
 forty miles, so if no opposition were encountered on the 
 march, it was quite practicable for the Brigade to arrive at 
 Montargis on the 19th day named in the Army Orders. 
 V. Rantzau selected, however, a road running north of 
 Pithiviers, and after a march of some twenty miles, halted 
 for the night at Puiseaux, at 2 p.m. On the following day he 
 continued his march, not as ordered by Pithiviers, because the 
 place was reported to be held by 2-3000 Gardes Mobiles, 
 but right across the line of march of the Illrd Army Corps 
 on its way to Pithiviers, and he halted for the night eight 
 miles short of the place at Prefontaine. The Illrd Army 
 Corps declining to comply with the request for support, the 
 General on the 20th entered into negotiations with the Maire 
 for the evacuation of the town; and not until noon on the 
 following day, just before the arrival of the leading troops of 
 the Xth Army Corps, did v. Rantzau enter the place. The 
 2500 Gardes Mobiles had laid down their arms and had 
 dispersed to their homes, but the arms had been removed. 
 
 When the account of these proceedings reached the Prince 
 his anger was great. His intention in sending this cavalry had 
 been to hide the flank march of the Illrd Army Corps by the 
 cavalry moving between it and the enemy, though in the 
 reverse direction, and also by active reconnaissance to obtain 
 that most important information, namely, what was taking 
 
124 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 place on his exposed flank on the side of the enemy. Amd 
 yet since neither General v. Manstein nor v. Rantzau 
 regarded the march as anything but an ordinary route-march 
 for the transfer of a force of cavalry, it would seem probable 
 that the Head-quarters of the Army had not made clear its 
 wishes to the corps commander. V. d. Goltz admits that 
 it is doubtful whether, in the state of ferment among the 
 population, this Small body of cavalry could have made its 
 way through by Pithiviers. 
 
 Of course, it had been only by degrees that the Prince 
 came fully to realise the complete difference between the 
 character of this war and of that which had terminated at 
 Sedan. Rut the realisation was completed on the 20th, 
 when, whilst shifting his Head-quarters from Puiseaux to 
 Pithiviers, he bent away from the direct road between those 
 places to ascertain personally for himself the character of the 
 theatre of war into which his army was now moving, and also 
 the attitude of the population in this “ People’s War.” He 
 recognised at once, fully, that the whole character of the war 
 had altered; that it was not merely the hostile army that 
 was his enemy, but the whole of the population also, and that 
 from the physical nature of the country both these enemies 
 would derive great assistance. During the ride, the farms 
 and villages were found deserted; in the fields bodies of 
 armed men were visible; bullets fell all round irregularly ; 
 prisoners, some of them priests with gloomy faces, bearing 
 expressions of the deepest hatred, came befoi'e the Prince; the 
 roads were in many places cut through and destroyed, the 
 sign-posts carried away; and the bells of the churches 
 signalled from church tower to church tower the march of 
 the invaders. By this gloomy November picture the Prince 
 was so deeply impressed that he repeatedly made remarks to 
 those around him about the rising of the Spanish nation 
 against Napoleon I. And the situation could hardly appeal- 
 otherwise to him, for the French people were in an unmis¬ 
 takable state of frenzy ; aloud and openly they declared in 
 the towns that the Germans would be crushed on the Loire 
 
THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 10-20 125 
 
 by the masses full of deep hatred, and that the decision 
 was close at hand. And there were, indeed, unmistakable 
 indications of a near decision ; everything seemed to point to 
 it. Moreover, on the 20th, the Prince had received from the 
 Detachment, a report according to which there were in front 
 of it only troops of the “ Army of the West,” and there were 
 not there any of the Army of the Loire. 
 
 It was the combination of all these items of information 
 from all the various sources mentioned, that led the Prince 
 to telegraph from Pithiviers to v. Moltke at 7.15 p.m. on 
 the 20th the following important message : 
 
 “Head-quarters and Illrd Army Corps have arrived here; 
 the advanced parties drove the enemy to-day out of Nancray 
 and Beaune la Rolande. No news of the Xth Army Corps 
 since the 17th, but no ground for anxiety ; its arrival at M011- 
 targis is awaited. Our impression is that after the tight at 
 Coulmiers none of the enemy moved away to the North West.” 
 
 The Prince’s message crossed a letter of the 20th from 
 v. Moltke. “ Whether he (the Grand Duke) now has in 
 front of him in this direction the Army of the Loire, or this 
 is at Chateaudun (report has just come in that the garrison 
 of Chartres has been ‘ alarmed ’) or whether it is at Orleans, 
 or is divided with the 16th Corps still at Orleans, and the 15th 
 further west, is at the present time quite uncertain. From the 
 Illrd Army has just come in the following report: ‘ Columns 
 of the enemy have advanced from Illiers and Bonneval (Cha¬ 
 teaudun) in the night (19-20) and have compelled the 4-tli 
 Division Cav. to fall back to the neighbourhood of Chartres. 
 
 . . . Everywhere on an arc from Verneuil [well to the west 
 of Dreux] round to Bonneval, the enemy, Line Troops and 
 Gardes Mobiles, are encountered.'’ ” The Royal Head¬ 
 quarters had further stated that the strength of the Army 
 of the Loire amounted to 80-90,000 infantry, and that much 
 had been done to augment its artillery.” 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE GRAND DUKE’S DETACHMENT FROM 
 NOVEMBER 21st TO 23rd 
 
 To return to the Detachment. On the 21st the advance 
 was continued, and for a short distance on this day there was 
 encountered determined resistance, the French, however, 
 everywhere falling back. The view of the situation taken by 
 the Grand Duke on the evening of the 21st, and the orders 
 he issued for the 22nd seem thoroughly sound. 
 
 “ The enemy, who has been met with on nearly all the 
 roads during the advance to-day, was everywhere driven back, 
 and he retired in the direction of Nogent le Retrou. Since 
 the information from all quarters agree that at this place a 
 defensive position has been prepared, it is to be concluded 
 that the enemy has resolved to offer a determined resistance 
 here. His Royal Highness the Grand Duke intends to attack 
 the position.” The plan of operations was to attack Nogent 
 on the west side with the 22nd Infantry Division, and on the 
 east side with the Bavarians. The 17th Infantry Division was 
 sent towards Belleme, ten miles to the north-west of Nogent, 
 to cut off the possible retreat in that direction ; to the 
 6 th Cavalry Division was entrusted the interception of the 
 retreat south-west to le Mans. All the troops were to be in 
 position to commence the attack at midday. On the 21st, 
 however, there had occurred an incident, in no way peculiar 
 to a “ People’s War,” but an incident in the higher leading 
 of Armies in the Field, and which merits careful consideration 
 as illustrative of v. Moltke’s use of “ Directives ” in the 
 conduct of the leading in War. 
 
 On the 21st, the Grand Duke received from v. Moltke a 
 telegram despatched from Versailles at 10.50 a.m. “ Toury 
 
THE GRAND DUKE’S DETACHMENT 127 
 
 has been occupied to-day by the Ilnd Army. Yesterday, 
 the enemy was in its front, on the line Orgeres-Artenay and 
 south of Chilleurs aux Bois and Beaune la Roland [a front 
 of thirty-five miles]; the 4th Cavalry Division [the left 
 Cav. Division of the Detachment] is to establish con¬ 
 nection with the Ilnd Army, and to reconnoitre along the 
 road Chartres-Chateaudun.” It seems probable that the 
 telegram of the 20th from the Prince, already given, was the 
 reason for the despatch of this telegram ; v. Moltke sent a 
 similar telegram to the 4th Cav. Division also. These 
 telegrams did not affect, in the slightest degree, the Grand 
 Duke’s view of the situation, or of the line of action he 
 should adopt. He believed that the “ Army of the West,” 
 in quest of which he had been with v. Moltke’s full ap¬ 
 proval, was now close at hand, so close, that on the morrow 
 he could deal it a decisive blow. To its destruction, v. 
 Moltke had attached very great importance, and to stop 
 short, just when the prize lay almost within grasp, would 
 seem to be self-stultification. To turn away from it, except 
 by the direct order of v. Moltke himself, would have been 
 to ignore v. Moltke’s own wishes and desires, and to help 
 to disarrange his strategical plans. If v. Moltke had in 
 any way altered his views as to the importance of dealing 
 decisively with the “Army of the West,” a few additional 
 words in the telegram would have sufficed for the purpose. 
 
 But Hoenig takes a totally different view of this matter, 
 and he is strong in his condemnation of the Grand Duke. 
 Hoenig’s views are, therefore, given here, not as those simply 
 of a critic, but because from their publication in this semi¬ 
 official work, it is very probable that they were held at 
 Versailles. 
 
 “ What impression,” he asks, “ must be produced on the 
 Detachment ? what could v. Moltke have intended by send¬ 
 ing the telegram to both the 4th Cav. Division and the Detach¬ 
 ment at the same time ? Obviously, that at Versailles the 
 situation was regarded in a different way than hitherto, and 
 that there the question had already risen as to a change in the 
 
128 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 direction in the employment of the Detachment. This direc¬ 
 tion was here indicated to the Detachment by the mention of 
 the fact, that on the previous day, the enemy was extended 
 from Orgeres to Beaune la Rolande : and that the Detachment 
 might, at any moment, be ordered to move in this new direc¬ 
 tion, was at least probable from the 4th Cav. Division being- 
 ordered to connect with the Ilnd Army. The telegraph being 
 employed for the communication must have given rise at the 
 Detachment to the conviction that time was pressing. In short, 
 this simple telegram of General v. Moltke was a weighty and 
 clear stragetieal indication, and had been sent by wire in order 
 that the Detachment might, by proper preparations, be ready 
 for other possibilities that might occur. It must be admitted,” 
 he continues, “that for the recognition of the importance of 
 such an intimation, the penetration and intuition of a Leader 
 far-seeing and of clear judgment were necessary. In the tele¬ 
 gram the Detachment saw, however, only the order to carry 
 out the duty of connecting with the Ilnd Army by means 
 of the 4th Cavalry Division ; the mere subsidiary mechanical 
 side of it; but the rest of the contents in no way led to the 
 consideration of operative measures, so General v. Moltke 
 remained completely misunderstood. The Detachment held 
 firmly to its view of continuing in the direction hitherto taken, 
 and when entirely different important operations fell to it, 
 it was not prepared for them, and, as will be shown, could 
 not carry them out. The Leader, v. Moltke, could not on the 
 other hand say, in his telegram of the 21st, more than he said; 
 in it there is not a word too many, not a word too few ; for, at 
 present, it was essential to be sure whether strong hostile forces 
 had come to Nogent le Rotrou. If this was not the case, 
 then the Detachment must necessarily, to a certain extent, 
 use its thinking power in the spirit of v. Moltke, and at least 
 acknowledge that the military situation indicated a crisis. 
 Then it was advisable to give attention to favorable operative 
 conditions, and indeed in this case probably to the East, 
 for to this direction attention was drawn; above all, to halt , 
 to remain stationary , to watch the enemy only with cavalry, 
 
THE GRAND DUKE'S DETACHMENT 
 
 129 
 
 to advance no further to the south-west, and to wait; but, 011 
 the other hand, to think out and prepare all orders for a 
 march off to the east. Only if a command that is far off 
 thinks out matters in this way, and co-operates, can strategical 
 intimations be reckoned on to produce the intended results. 
 This telegram is one of this kind, and on account of its great 
 importance, as well also as a type of the v. Moltke strategical 
 intimations, it deserves this examination ; the more so, because 
 the Detachment soon found itself in a most unfavourable 
 operative situation owing to the telegram not having been 
 understood.” So far Hoenig. 
 
 But whatever view may be taken of the matter, it does seem 
 remarkable, even on Hoenig’s own showing, that as v. Moltke, 
 and the Crown Prince, and Versailles generally, had already 
 formed but a poor opinion of the Grand Duke as a 
 commander and of Colonel v. Krenski as a Chief of the 
 Staff, v. Moltke should have adopted in his communica¬ 
 tion so enigmatical a mode of expressing his views, a mode 
 suitable enough to big minds like those of v. Manteuffel 
 and v. Goeben, but quite beyond the comprehension of men 
 like the Leaders of the Detachment. Here, the relying on 
 the much-lauded “directive” system of command was a 
 failure. 
 
 The truth is that it is doubtful whether during the whole 
 of the Franco-German War there was a day of much greater 
 anxiety at the Royal Head-quarters than this November 21st, 
 1870. On the evening of the 20th there had been sent from 
 Prince Frederick Charles at Pithiviers the telegram already 
 given. Very threatening was the situation as on the 21st 
 it presented itself to v. Moltke. For the direct protection of 
 the main road from Orleans a force of only two Army Corps 
 (one fatigued bv a long march) and two Cavalry Divisions ; 
 a third corps missing on the left; the force confronted bv a 
 hostile army which had had time not only to complete its 
 preparations, but to be very strongly reinforced; to the 
 south-west, moving farther away day by day from the road, 
 the Detachment, and this might find in front of it the 
 
 1 
 
130 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 enemy in a strongly prepared position at Nogent, sixty 
 miles away from the road ; and lie hears also that between 
 the Detachment and the road from Orleans to Paris, the 
 enemy is now advancing so as to separate the two German 
 forces here in the held ; whilst everywhere, on the front, 
 Hanks, and rear of the Detachment there are hostile troops. 
 It is difficult to see why v. Moltke did not by telegraph give 
 some advice and counsel to the Duke. It would seem as if he 
 himself felt that he could not say what was the best thing to 
 be done, and therefore resigned himself to letting matters 
 take their course uninfluenced by him. 
 
 On the 22nd the Grand Duke moved to the attack of Nogent, 
 and, contrary to expectation, the town, which had been one 
 of the chief centres of the “ Army of the West,” a town in 
 the heart of specially defensible country, was found already 
 evacuated, a general retirement on le Mans having begun on 
 the previous day ; and the “ Army of the West ” disappears 
 from the war just at the place where such an army might have 
 offered strong resistance, just at the time when, to keep the 
 advancing Detachment in the south-west would seem specially 
 desirable. And that short-lived army, in its strength and its 
 weaknesses, offers much subject for thought to those who 
 believe in Home Defence really national in character. This 
 army was composed mainly of civilians whose sole claim to be 
 regarded as soldiers was their wearing a uniform or a distinc¬ 
 tive badge and carrying a firearm of some sort in their hands. 
 The younger men bore the title of Gardes Mobiles, and were 
 those Gardes Mobiles for whom no place could be found in the 
 larger organisations, the Army Corps; they formed small 
 independent fighting bodies of men employed irrespective of 
 the locality from which they had been drawn. The elder men 
 bore the title of Gardes Nationales, and to these was, as a rule, 
 entrusted the defence of the localities or districts in which 
 they lived. Time had not permitted the bringing this 
 organisation into thorough working order, and making the 
 regulations that would have ensured the greatest amount 
 of result being obtained from its action in the lield. There 
 
THE GRAND DUKE’S DETACHMENT 
 
 was little cohesion, little combination in the woi'k. But 
 considering the short time that those in this Army had been 
 assisting in the defence of the country, they had carried 
 out admirably and excellently the work of forming a screen, 
 raising a dense Fog of War around the invading army, 
 the only work of war for which such an army is fitted. It 
 was this army that led v. Moltke to carry out strategical 
 operations worse than unsuited to the military situation; it 
 w r as this army that had helped so greatly in luring 50,000 
 men and 200 guns away from the Loire, where their presence 
 would have been invaluable, to this district whence no danger 
 threatened; in giving to the Loire Army yet more time for 
 uninterrupted preparations for the field ; and in drawing the 
 Detachment so far away from the decisive point, that when the 
 real conflict ensued, and the decisive struggle took place, the 
 fate of the weak force of the Germans hung for hours in the 
 balance; and that the balance did not turn against them was 
 due, not to their wisdom, but to the hopelessly bad leading of 
 their opponents. No wonder that v. Moltke detested un¬ 
 professional soldiers, patriotic citizens in uniform and out of 
 uniform. But for acting as anything but a screen, the “Army 
 of the West,” as must be all “ people in arms,” was powerless; 
 for as soon as a “ People’s Army ” encounters on the field 
 of battle a trained army, its fate is sealed. And that a 
 “ People’s Army ” may give its value to the full as a screen 
 in war, most careful organisation and preparation in peace is 
 an absolutely necessary condition. So clearly had the power¬ 
 lessness of the “ Army of the West ” in battle shown itself 
 since the 17th, that the authorities at Tours determined, 
 since in it were many fighting men, no longer to sacrifice 
 them uselessly; so, on the 21st, was begun a general retreat 
 to le Mans, where the 21st Corps was in course of organisa¬ 
 tion, and into which the remnants of the “Army of the West ” 
 were to be incorporated. So it had happened that the Grand 
 Duke had to suffer a second time the mortification of dealing 
 ablowen Fair, even less hurtful to the enemy than that he had 
 delivered at Dreux. 
 
132 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 But although disappointed by having been lured to Nogent 
 by a mirage only, the Grand Duke did not lose heart; for a 
 third time did the decisive point seem to beckon him on ; this 
 time it was le Mans, only thirty-five miles distant, a place so 
 important that its abandonment by the enemy without a fight 
 was impossible, and to it the road now lay open; so onwards 
 without delay ; he at once pushed forward a Bavarian brigade 
 twelve miles to la Ferte Bernard. At night the Detachment 
 was somewhat scattered, the main body of the Bavarians and 
 the 22nd Inf. Division being in Nogent and the neighbourhood, 
 the 17th Inf. Division ten miles to the west at Belleme. The 
 6 th Cav. Division was at Authon, ten miles east of La Ferte 
 Bernard ; the 4th Cav. Division was at least twenty miles east 
 of Nogent, at Illiers and the neighbourhood. Le Mans is 
 nearly eighty miles from Orleans. Truly v. Moltke’s inti¬ 
 mation had been completely ignored. But there was much to 
 justify the Grand Duke in his independent action, for early in 
 the morning he had received a communication which must 
 have fully confirmed him in the belief that his strategy was 
 correct. At 7 a.m. had come a letter from Prince Frederick 
 Charles, which had been despatched from Pithiviers 3.30 the 
 previous afternoon, the 21 st. 
 
 “ I beg to inform your Royal Highness that the Second 
 Army is with the IXth Army Corps at Angerville,and with the 
 Illrd ArmyCorps,and my Head-quarters at Pithiviers; the 1st 
 and 2nd Cavalry Divisions are in touch with the enemy, whose 
 outposts extend from north of Artenay to Chilleurs aux Bois.” 
 [This situation certainly does not correspond with that given in 
 v. Moltke’s telegram.] “ The enemy opposite to us is, according 
 to our impression derived from all the reports received, the 
 entire Army of the Loire. I am awaiting before attacking 
 it the arrival of the Xth Army Corps, of which, by forced 
 marches, the leading troops arrive to-day at Montargis. I 
 hope to attack the enemy in four or five days, and eventually 
 to drive him to the south-west. I suggest to your Royal 
 Highness to co-operate in this purpose by an advance 
 by le Mans on Tours, if the instructions from the Head- 
 
THE GRAND DUKE’S DETACHMENT 133 
 
 quarters of his Majesty the King do not require something 
 else.” 
 
 To this the Grand Duke replied by wire: 
 
 “ Co-operation in the direction of le Mans, with the pro¬ 
 jected further advance on Tours, already prepared for by my 
 departure from the Paris-Orleans road. Advance to-day for 
 concentrated attack on Nogent le Rotrou ; 4th Cavalry Divi¬ 
 sion remains on the Chartres-Chateaudun road, and is ordered 
 to obtain connection with Stolberg’s Division, as ought already 
 yesterday to have been effected.” The Third Army received 
 on the evening of the 22 nd, bv wire, the report from the 
 Grand Duke of his movements for the morrow. 
 
 The Grand Duke had fair cause for believing that he had 
 adopted the course of action best suited to the situation. 
 The Royal Head-quarters had informed him that the enemy 
 was in front of the Prince ; and by the Prince, who was 
 on the spot, he had been told how best to help him, 
 so the only course to be taken was to comply with his 
 request. But on the 22nd, there came to hand from v. 
 Blumenthal a letter of the same date as that of Prince 
 Frederick Charles, and suggesting a totally opposite course of 
 action. 
 
 “ For some days I have wished to write to your Royal 
 Highness to offer suggestions as regards the general situation 
 as it appears to us here; but our information is so indefinite, 
 that I have always been afraid of saying something that was 
 incorrect. And even now things are so little clear, that I 
 must restrict my remarks to the following matters. As you 
 will have learnt from the telegram of General v. Moltke, the 
 Army of the Loire, apparently the 15th and 16th Army 
 Corps, was yesterday on the line Orgeres-Artenay, opposite 
 General v. Manstein. He was to-day to have advanced 
 under Prince Frederick Charles with the Illrd Army Corps 
 against Orleans. But it appears as if the Xth Army Corps is 
 still too far away, and, therefore, Prince Frederick Charles 
 will delay for some days making the attack. For your Royal 
 Highness this is inconvenient, because under these circum- 
 
134 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 stances, your line of communication can be threatened 
 through Chartres ; but it is to be hoped that the 4th Cav. 
 Division, if rightly handled, will warn you in time so that 
 you will not be taken by surprise. Meantime you may also 
 have in front of you more perhaps than there appears to be. 
 Nogent le Rotrou and also le Mans are said to be fortified, 
 and, as you will see from the newspaper cutting sent here¬ 
 with, the Army of Brittany, perhaps now 50,000 men, is said 
 to be in an entrenched camp at Conlie (apparently fourteen 
 to nineteen miles north-west of le Mans). 
 
 “ I think, therefore, that it would be desirable not to 
 advance too quickly on le Mans, but rather to defer the 
 attack for a few days, till you know with certainty about the 
 advance of Prince Frederick Charles. 
 
 “ His Royal Highness has authorised me to send this 
 letter, and desires to add only, that General v. Rheinbaben 
 may be obliged to advance further towards Evreux, unless the 
 movements of the Army of the Loire compel us to keep him 
 more within reach for the protection of Chartres and the 
 whole line of communication.” 
 
 And now what a very strange situation has arisen. It was 
 the Crown Prince that was the Grand Duke’s superior com¬ 
 mander ; the Detachment was part of the Third Army, and 
 with any portion of that Army no one but v. Moltke had the 
 slightest right to interfere ; yet here we find the commander 
 of another army, Prince Frederick Charles, sending direct 
 to a subordinate commander of the Third Army his wishes 
 as to the line of action he should take, instead of first 
 asking the Commander supreme over both for permission for 
 the co-operation. How was it possible for the King of 
 Prussia to regulate a campaign in which the commander of 
 one of his armies deliberately and independently interfered 
 directly in the operations of another of his armies ? And, as 
 a matter of fact, the result of this interference was to dis¬ 
 arrange the plan of campaign of the Royal Head-quarters. 
 Again does Hoenig find fault with the Grand Duke for acting 
 in conformity with the Prince’s wishes and against the advice 
 
THE GRAND DUKE’S DETACHMENT 
 
 *35 
 
 received from Versailles, but the Grand Duke would have 
 been more than human had he not done so. Moreover, an 
 attack on le Mans must create a panic among the delegation 
 at Tours, who, for their own safety, must at once bring from 
 the Army in front of Prince Frederick Charles strong detach¬ 
 ments, and the attack would thus give to the Prince the aid 
 specially asked for by him. In the communications from v. 
 Moltke, the Prince and v. Blumenthal, there was a discrepancy 
 on one very important matter. V. Moltke said that the front 
 of the hostile force extended from Orgeres as far east as Beaune- 
 la-Rolande. The Prince gave as the front only the centre 
 third of this line, Chilleurs aux Bois to Artenay; v. Blumen¬ 
 thal gave the western third, Artenay to Orgeres; and as the 
 Prince reported from the spot it would he probable that his 
 statement was correct. In this case, the left wing of the Second 
 Army had nothing in front of it, and would he free to attack 
 effectively the Army of the Loire, diminished by the detach¬ 
 ments sent in haste to le Mans. Neither the tone nor the 
 contents of v. Blumenthal’s letter was calculated to make much 
 impression on a Commander, who had shown that he could 
 take the hit between his teeth if he chose to do so. It had an 
 uncertain sound, was hesitating and painfully apologetic. It 
 was hardly a communication, still less an order, from his 
 commander the Crown Prince, for he had simply approved of 
 it. It seemed to he the expression of opinion of a Staff 
 Officer, of very high degree it is true, hut an expression of 
 personal opinion only. And this Staff Officer showed how he 
 misjudged the situation because there was not more, but far 
 less, in front of the Grand Duke than had been anticipated. 
 Nogent was, as v. Blumenthal stated, fortified; but as the 
 fortifications were found destitute of defenders, they were not 
 of a sort to stop an advance. So also the Army of Brittany 
 and the fortifications at le Mans might prove to be of 
 similarly little value. Then, as regards the danger to the 
 line of communications, the anxiety for these was altogether 
 a new feature in the campaign. Gravelotte, Sedan, the 
 advance on Paris, the instructions to v. d. Tann to advance 
 
136 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870 71 
 
 on Bourges and Tours, the despatch of the Second Army to 
 the South of France, all were remarkable in their disregard 
 of lines of communication; but now, suddenly, V ersailles 
 appears to he getting nervous on the matter. The Grand 
 Duke had, it is true, asked for a rest-day for the 23rd, but 
 with the fresh prospect of successful operations immediately 
 before him he abandoned the idea; he naturally ignored 
 v. Blumenthal’s weakly-framed counsel, and on the 22nd he 
 issued orders that on the 23rd the Detachment should con¬ 
 tinue the advance on le Mans, but in such a way as to 
 prevent the enemy being able clearly to see the purpose of 
 the movement. The Bavarians were to move forward to la 
 Ferte Bernard on the main road to le Mans ; the 17th 
 Infantry Division to St. Cosme ten miles to the right of la 
 Ferte, sending a detachment to Mamers, twenty miles from 
 Nogent on the road to Alen^on, to threaten that place, 
 and to draw the attention of the enemy to the north away 
 from le Mans; the 22nd Infantry Division to move to 
 Belleme. The 6 th Cavalry Division to go down to the left 
 front to Vibraye, seven or eight miles from the le Mans road. 
 The 4th Cavalry Division was to keep a sharp look-out to 
 the Loir, and destroy the railroad from Bonneval by 
 Chateaudun to Tours; this was the line of advance by which 
 the line of communications was directly threatened. The 
 orders necessarily led to the wide dissemination of the 
 Detachment, which was no longer one single manageable 
 unit, and they placed the bulk of it still further from the 
 scene of operations, the Loire at Orleans, where both 
 v. Moltke and v. Blumenthal anticipated it v r ould be 
 wanted. 
 
 On the 23rd the Detachment commenced its march on le 
 Mans, and the Grand Duke, when on the road south of 
 Nogent received, at eleven o’clock, a telegram from v. Blumen¬ 
 thal, dated 9.45 the previous evening, and despatched before 
 the Third Army was aware of the intended advance. It ran 
 as follows : “ By order of the King, the pursuit of the enemy 
 toward le Mans is to be carried on by some infantry and 
 
THE GRAND DUKE’S DETACHMENT 
 
 137 
 
 cavalrv only. The Detachment will march forthwith in the 
 direction of Beaugency [on the Loire fifteen miles below 
 Orleans, and between fifty and sixty from La Ferte], where 
 it must arrive on the 25th or 26th. Further particulars will 
 be sent by letter.” 
 
 It is apparent that, somehow or other, telegrams from 
 Versailles to the Detachment went far more slowly than those 
 going in the opposite direction ; and it would seem that the 
 measures taken at the Detachment for forwarding these 
 messages from the telegraph office were hardly satisfactory. 
 Whether this was intentional or not is difficult to say. The 
 Grand Duke was not more than an hour’s gallop from the 
 telegraph office when he received the order, so the delay is 
 inexplicable. 
 
 The Grand Duke replied at once to the telegram : “ At 
 the conclusion of to-day’s march, which cannot be stopped, 
 the Detachment will be between Vibraye, La Ferte Bernard, 
 St. Cosme, Mamers, Belleme. From this position con¬ 
 centration on the line Chateaudun-Vendome will be the 
 easiest. For this, three days march necessary. All the com¬ 
 manders are desirous of a rest-day. I ask this for to-morrow, 
 because this will be most convenient to the troops, and the 
 direction will also remain concealed.” 
 
 Meantime, there was at Versailles great anxiety, owing to 
 the non-receipt of any answer from the Grand Duke, so as at 
 9.21 in the morning there had been no reply, v. Blumenthal 
 again telegraphed : “ Has the Detachment moved off towards 
 Beaugency ? ” This telegram was also delayed in transmis¬ 
 sion ; the Grand Duke replied : “ Query of 9.20 from Ver¬ 
 sailles sent on from Nogent to Le Theil just received. The 
 march on Beaugency could not be carried out, because when 
 the telegram came to hand the troops had been on the march 
 for three hours. Order that no rest-day can be given just 
 received.” This latter sentence referred to another telegram 
 of 11.20 a.m. from v. Blumenthal : “ By order of his Majesty 
 no rest-day can be granted. The march must go on to¬ 
 morrow, much depends on it.” 
 
138 THE PEOPLE’S AVAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 And here again, for a time, we must leave the Grand Duke, 
 at the conclusion of a series of operations yielding nothing 
 but disappointment to him as the independent commander of 
 as good and effective a force of 50,000 men as ever were put 
 into the field; and we must go to both Pithiviers and Ver¬ 
 sailles, and we shall then ascertain the reason for the order 
 to march to Beaugency. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE SECOND ARMY, FROM NOVEMBER 21st TO 23rd 
 
 During the night 20th-21st more confirmatory reports came 
 in from the front to the Prince, who now saw that the task 
 before him, which on the 16th had appeared to be so easy, was 
 something very different from what he had anticipated ; and 
 he therefore determined to delay the contemplated convergent 
 attack on Orleans for a few days until the three Brigades 
 of the Xth Army Corps should have rejoined the Army. At 
 midday on the 21st v. Stiehle communicated this resolve to 
 v. Moltke in a letter, in which he embodied the information 
 obtained. In the letter he also said : “ The great length of 
 the enemy’s outpost line is only possible from the wild excite¬ 
 ment of the population since the recapture of Orleans. From 
 every place even not occupied by troops, fire opens on the 
 approach of our troops. If we send strong detachments the 
 enemy falls back to the next place and repeats the same game. 
 This is facilitated by the close cultivation. . . . These cir¬ 
 cumstances taken together have produced in us the conviction 
 that large hostile forces are south of Artenay, on the Paris- 
 Orleans road (16th Corps), and four anti three-quarter miles 
 east at St. Lye, on the Roman road to Orleans (15th Corps). 
 For the present, in view of the presumable strength of the 
 enemy, it would be unwise, before the Xth Army Corps has 
 joined the Second Army, to appeal to a decision of arms, which 
 will influence the whole course of affairs in France. Gen. v. V. 
 Rhetz arrives to-day at Montargis with the head of the corps. 
 But his closing on the left wing of the army, as will be 
 necessary for the fight will, under the most favorable circum¬ 
 stances, require three to four days, because his troops, during 
 
1+0 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 their forced marches, have been constantly in fight with the 
 insurgents, and have had no halt-day. ... In the last report 
 from Gen. v. V. Rhetz from Joigny, which is of the morning 
 of the 19th, he states that his three Infantry Brigades number 
 12,000 rifles. ... His Royal Hi ghness hopes to be able to 
 carry out the attack with concentrated forces on the 26th 
 inst., and proposes to drive the enemy towards Tours. Should 
 H.R.H. the Grand Duke advance successfully towards le 
 Mans, our operations would work very well together. Up to 
 that time the Second Army, by concentrating here, and by 
 daily reconnaissances of the enemy, will carry out the duty 
 assigned to it, ‘ the protection of the road from Orleans to 
 Paris.’ ” With the letter the Prince sent some addenda, some 
 correct, some incorrect, to the Ordre de Bataille, the German 
 staff were endeavouring to construct as regards the Army of 
 the Loire. 
 
 The Prince, in his order of the 16th to the Xth Army Corps 
 directing it on Montargis, had said that it was possible that 
 all three corps might be required for the convergent 
 attack on Orleans, but that it was more probable that, on 
 the arrival of the corps, this would be unnecessary, and the 
 corps would be given the direction of Bourges by Gien. 
 “ Reaching this point is of the greatest military importance. 
 It cannot be foreseen whether the corps will meet with any 
 serious opposition in this direction ; but, presumably, even 
 before Gen. v. Kraatz’s detachment joins the corps, this, 
 especially owing to its numerous artillei’y, will be able suc¬ 
 cessfully to deal with much larger hostile forces. If must be 
 left until the 20th, whether the Xth Army Corps goes towards 
 Bourges, and I reserve to myself the details. Meantime I 
 now request Your Excellency to be so good as to com¬ 
 municate to me your opinion on the operation mentioned.” 
 
 It is not certain whether the answer from v. Voigts Rhetz 
 to this request was received before or after the Prince came to 
 the decision to defer the attack until the 26th, but in either 
 case the answer was conclusive as regards the proposed march 
 on Bourges : the General wrote as follows : 
 
THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 21-23 141 
 
 “ At the present moment, owing to the absence of all 
 information, I am unable to give a decided opinion as 
 regards an operation against Bourges. I must confine my¬ 
 self therefore to considering the strength I shall have with 
 me available for the purpose.” The General then states 
 that he will have to leave behind him to hold certain 
 points and also as escorts to the trains, detachments which 
 will have reduced the corps on its arrival at Gien to fif¬ 
 teen battalions, some sixty guns and ten to twelve 
 squadrons. “ It is very probable that with this force I 
 could capture Gien and cross to the left bank if the 
 bridge is not destroyed. But I must take special care, as 
 I have no pontoon train with me, to keep hold of Gien 
 and its bridge whilst I advance beyond. In Gien, therefore, 
 
 I shall have to leave some three battalions (1500 to 1800 
 men), and two batteries even if I have the aid of entrench¬ 
 ments. Even if it should be not necessary to leave another 
 detachment at, perhaps, Aubigny, I should have with me, 
 on my arrival at Bourges, some twelve battalions, some 7000 
 to 8000 rifles and fifty guns. Whether this force would be 
 sufficient, I cannot tell, as I do not know in what strength 
 the enemy is there, or whether the reports which I have read 
 in the newspapers are correct, that Bourges has been put in a 
 state of defence. 
 
 “ If it had not been necessary to send the Xth Army Corps 
 to Montargis, it would seem to me to have been desirable pre¬ 
 paratory to an expedition to Bourges first to clear out Auxerre, 
 and this, as I believe, would have had the effect of quieting 
 the population 011 my line of march, and then of enabling me 
 to choose a crossing point somewhat higher up the Loire. 
 Gien lies nearer to Orleans which is occupied by the enemy 
 than to Bourges which I shall have to reach.” 
 
 On the 21st had come to the Prince from the 4th Cav. 
 Division an officer who informed him of the advance of the 
 Grand Duke 011 Nogent le Rotrou where, according to 
 rumour, it was anticipated the enemy was; and that the 
 enemy who had been in very large force at Dreux had been 
 
142 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 broken up by the victorious encounter of the 17th Inf. 
 Division with territorial troops. Tire officer then gave the 
 details of the intended operation. Hence the despatch to the 
 Grand Duke of the communication already given, asking him 
 to continue his advance on le Mans. 
 
 The telegram of the 20th from the Prince to v. Moltke, 
 was undoubtedly so brief, that v. Moltke may, perhaps, have 
 regarded it merely as the expression of the personal views of 
 a commander, to whose opinion he did not attach any great 
 weight; but the letter of the 21 st which was received on the 
 22nd must have been conclusive. If, however, any doubt 
 remained, as to the gravity of the situation on the Loire, it 
 must have finally been dissipated by the receipt that day of a 
 despatch from General v. Werder in the south-east stating, 
 that according to reports received, “ Michel’s Corps had gone 
 on the 16th and 17th in a westerly direction from Autun ” 
 near Chalons sur Soane and on the railway line to Gien, 
 Orleans, and Bourges. 
 
 On the 21st there had been much anxiety at Versailles 
 with regard to the action of the Grand Duke; strong forces 
 were believed to be in front of him, and the further advance 
 appeared to involve great risk to the line of communications, 
 especially as the 4th Cav. Division on the left flank was 
 not able to hold its own against some hostile force which 
 was pressing forward north, whilst the Detachment moved 
 south-west; and it was believed that v. Blumenthal’s recom¬ 
 mendation would be regarded by the Grand Duke as an 
 order. There is not in Prince Frederick Charles’ letter, as 
 given in Hoenig’s words, and which was despatched at mid¬ 
 day, any indication that he was going to communicate his 
 wishes to the Grand Duke, as he did at 3.30 p.m., and it does 
 not appear that the Grand Duke cared to be over-com¬ 
 municative to the Third Army ; in this, as we have seen, 
 v. Blumenthal regarded him as wise. Had the Prince’s 
 message been known to Versailles, its effect on the Grand 
 Duke could have been counteracted ; but where two com¬ 
 manders at a distance co-operate with each other and keep 
 
THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 21-23 143 
 
 their counsel to themselves, the supreme authority is more or 
 less helpless. Without honest, cordial, and thorough co¬ 
 operation, combined movements in war have little chance of 
 success. At Versailles, it was thought that the only hostile 
 army corps, needing to be dealt with, were the 15th and 16th. 
 They had heard of the 17th, 18th, and the 21st, but where 
 they were and the degree of organisation arrived at by them, 
 was not known. Of the 20th even less had been heard. 
 The Prince’s letter of the 21st made, on its receipt, a great 
 impression at Versailles, intensified by the news from v. 
 Werder. It was not known that the Grand Duke had 
 obtained possession of Nogent, but this success, and even a 
 march on to le Mans, v. Moltke could not regard as counter¬ 
 balancing the danger that must arise for the Second Army 
 if, whilst the enemy opposite the latter was receiving- 
 strong reinforcements from the east, the Detachment should 
 be marching away south-west, and be rendering itself every 
 mile more and more useless to the Second Army, as an aid 
 against the increase of hostile strength. Hence the audience 
 with the king, and the peremptory order to give up the 
 march on le Mans and move on Beaugency. At once had 
 been realised the imminent danger in which the Second Army 
 was. With a greatly numerically superior enemy in front and 
 in touch with it, it was extended over a front of forty miles, 
 from Angcrville to Montargis, with one of its corps fatigued 
 by long and trying marches, and only the head yet at 
 Montargis, the Detachment sixty miles to the westward and 
 intending to go still further away. 
 
 But, unfortunately, v. Moltke and the Prince differed in 
 their views as to the measures to be adopted to minimise the 
 danger. The Prince wished for such a demonstration to the 
 
 O 
 
 south-west as would force the enemy to send away part of 
 his army to protect Tours, the seat of the government of the 
 Provinces ; v. Moltke determined that a blow should be struck 
 against the left Hank of the enemy in his present position by 
 the seizure of a point on the Loire, whence co-operating 
 attacks could be made, either up the right bank against the 
 
144 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 position, or with a portion of the force on the left bank 
 against the enemy’s communications with Tours and the rest 
 of France. This difference in views was fundamental as 
 regards the future strategy of the campaign. 
 
 On the 22nd the IXth Army Corps advanced down the 
 Orleans Road as far as Toury ; and at Montargis the three 
 brigades of the Xth Army Corps completed their concentra¬ 
 tion. During the day the Prince received information leading 
 him to believe in a westward movement of the enemy. From 
 the Detachment came the report that the Grand Duke had 
 obtained possession of Nogent and would continue his advance 
 on le Mans the following day. From Versailles came at 10 
 at night the news of the despatch of Michel’s corps from the 
 east to the Loire. The actual situation on the French side 
 was therefore anything but clear. 
 
 On the 23rd the 38th Brigade, v. Wede.ll, the leading brigade 
 of the Xth Army Corps, marched from Montargis to Beaune- 
 la-Rolande and the Prince himself reconnoitred, from Pithi- 
 viers to the westward ; but the information as to a westward 
 movement of the French was conflicting. A report of the 
 22 nd, received this day, stated that on the 22nd there were 
 30,000 men in Gien. The Prince determined to remain on 
 the defensive until the arrival of the Detachment, and he 
 communicated to Versailles at midday his intention. Inhabi¬ 
 tants reported during the day that troops wei'e marching 
 north from Gien, and it was also asserted that on the 21st 
 General d’Aurelle had his Head-quarters in Gien. The Royal 
 Head-quarters informed the Prince that the attack on Orleans 
 by the Detachment could not be expected before the 28th. 
 
 It may be remembered that in the telegram 9.45 p.m. of 
 the 22nd from the Third Army to the Grand Duke, ordering 
 the march on Beaugency, it was stated that a letter would 
 follow. The letter was one from the Royal Head-quarters to 
 those of the Third Army, and it appears from v. Blumenthal’s 
 diary, that to the Third Army was left the mode of com¬ 
 municating its contents to the Grand Duke. V. Blumenthal 
 says he received the order at 9 p.m. and he adds : “ The 
 
THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 21-2:3 145 
 
 order will have to be telegraphed to-night.” In the letter, 
 which arrived at the Detachment on the 23rd we read : “ It 
 has become probable that the whole of the army of the Loire 
 is opposite F.M. H.R.H. Prince Frederick Charles and is in 
 an entrenched position. The Prince cannot concentrate 
 until the 25th his three Army Corps for an attack on the 
 following day. According to information received, reinforce¬ 
 ments have come by railway to the Loire from Autun. 
 Under these circumstances, co-operation of the Detachment 
 of H.R.H. the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg appears to be 
 necessary. As no decisive defeat of the French Army of the 
 West has taken place at Nogent le Rotrou, the pursuit in the 
 direction of le Mans is to be only bv cavalry with small 
 detachments of infantry, and His Majesty orders that the 
 Grand Duke with all the remainder of his troops shall at 
 once march in the direction of the Loire. The Detachment 
 will be able to arrive at Orleans or Blois on the day above- 
 named, the 26th, or a little later. For a simultaneous 
 attack, eventually on the left bank of the Loire, the necessary 
 arrangements must be made with the Command of the 
 Second Army. It is desirable, moreover, that the advance 
 shall by surprise gain possession of one of the permanent 
 river-crossings over the Loire ; if this does not happen, then 
 the materials lacking for a field bridge must be obtained 
 from the Second Army.” In a short addendum to the letter 
 v. Blumenthal remarked : “ It would be of great importance 
 if one of the bridges over the Loire at Beaugency or Blois 
 could be captured and kept intact for the operations.” 
 
 A comparison of the telegram and the letter shows that it 
 was the Third Army and not v. Moltke that definitely 
 determined the exact point on the Loire to which the Grand 
 Duke should direct his march. Hoenig points out also the 
 loss of time arising from its being necessary for the Royal 
 Head-quarters to communicate with the Detachment, not 
 directly, but through the Head-quarters of the Third Army. 
 
 It will be desirable, having before us the views of the 
 German Leaders as to the state of affairs on the French side 
 
1+6 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 ami the basis, therefore, of their plans of operations against 
 the French, to go over to the hostile army, and see how- 
 matters really stand there, and what has taken place since 
 the mysterious disappearance of the Army of the Loire on 
 November 12th; but before doing so, as it is Orleans and 
 the vicinity that is to be the scene of the coming decisive 
 struggle, a description of this small theatre of war is necessary, 
 the more so because without a knowledge of its peculiarities 
 ■we should hardly understand the reluctance of the Prince to 
 take the offensive; nor should we realise how much in this 
 tract of country so admirably suited for defence bv inferior 
 troops, the eventual defeat of the French was due to bad 
 leading. 
 
 The great Forest of Orleans extends noi'th of the city and 
 on both sides of the Orleans-Paris Road, from Rosieres nine 
 miles to the west, to Gien thirty-five miles to the east; and 
 although not of the same character throughout its extent, yet, 
 generally, it gave cover, so that the Germans were not able to 
 ascertain what was going on within it. The northern edge 
 on the east side ran from five to eight miles south of the 
 position of the Second Army ; the southern edge was about 
 thi-ee miles from the Loire. Chevilly, eight miles from Orleans, 
 was its northern boundary on the Paris road. On the west 
 side the northern edge lies some three miles farther south, and 
 this portion of the forest consists of separate woods, between 
 which large bodies of all arms can move w-ithout difficulty. 
 The woods had been connected by entrenchments, but, from 
 the west and north-west, the ground in front and in rear 
 could be seen, a great advantage to the attack. The x-eal forest 
 extends for a length of twenty miles, and a depth of twelve 
 to thirteen miles on the east side of the Paris road to the 
 Canal d’Orleans, which connects the Loire with the Loing at 
 Montargis. The forest consists of timber trees, with low 
 undergrowth, passable only with some difficulty by infantry 
 in extended order, and rarely in close formation. Artillery 
 could move only on the roads,cavalry only in single file through 
 the wood. The forest was not all of this character ; but for 
 
THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 21-23 147 
 
 the Germans it presented a belt of this kind four or five miles 
 broad. The roads giving access to the forest east of the Paris 
 road were : the old Roman road from Etampes passing to 
 the west of St. Germain-le-Grand and Neuville aux Bois, and 
 entering: the forest at St. Lye five miles from the road, and 
 thence to Orleans. The next road comes from Pithiviers, and 
 at eight miles from that place enters the forest at Chilleurs 
 aux Bois five miles to the east, and then running south-west 
 byLoury five miles inside the forest, strikes a road along the 
 bank of the Loire, a mile from Orleans. Near i,ourv were 
 two large clearings, one on either side of the road ; the thiro 
 road, coming also from Pithiviers, enters the forest four 
 miles further east at Courcy aux Loges, and bending south¬ 
 west crosses the Canal, recrossing at Pont aux Moines, where 
 it enters the river road six miles from Orleans. At Fav 
 aux Loges, four and a half miles short of the re-crossing, 
 a branch diverges due south to Jargeau on the Loire, three 
 and a-half' miles east of Pont aux Moines. The next point 
 of entrv is Chambon, three and a-half miles east by a road 
 running into the third road at three miles south of Courcy 
 aux Loges. There are other roads further east striking the 
 river road, at Chateauneuf, fifteen miles. Sully, twenty miles 
 from Orleans, and at Gien. Lateral communications were 
 few; all the roads could easily be obstructed and defended. 
 The edge of the forest had been prepared for defence. The 
 whole area east of the Paris road teems with hamlets, farm 
 houses and defensible localities. As regards the entrench¬ 
 ments, a bridge head had been constructed at from half a mile 
 to a mile outside the city walls. About two miles bevond was 
 a sort of intermediate entrenched position with the right Hank 
 on the river at St. Loup ; the left at le Grand Orme, on the 
 Chateaudun road. The main position ran along the edge of 
 the forest east of the Paris road ; on the west side it was 
 retired three miles in rear of Chevilly to C'ercottes, running 
 thence west to the Chateaudun road eight miles from Orleans. 
 Besides these positions, a strongly entrenched line of localities 
 gave an advanced position. There were plenty of heavy guns 
 
148 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 in the batteries. Of these entrenchments the Germans knew 
 very little. 
 
 It is desirable to give here the impression the country made 
 on the minds of the Staff of the Second Army, as recorded 
 by v. d. Goltz. North of the Forest of Orleans lies a very 
 fruitful level tract of country, offering a wide and apparently 
 a complete view. But between this and the great forest, which 
 consists of large and mostly young timber close together, lies 
 a zone of country with much on its surface, and into which 
 it is impossible to obtain a view. Villages, chateaux, farms, 
 parks, orchards, and vineyards form here a sort of labyrinth 
 which offers a striking contrast to this district of la Beauce 
 close to it. To the east this zone becomes less penetrable to 
 view, and towards Montargis, where, owing to the country 
 being hilly, the difficulty is consequently far greater, the 
 edge of the forest changes into copses, brushwood, gardens, 
 and numerous isolated farms, so that here the limit of the 
 forest can hardly be detected. 
 
 La Beauce has also its peculiarities, which must be borne 
 in mind with regard to the military operations. The soil is 
 everywhere rich and soft. In wet weather it soon becomes 
 impassable, vehicles and horses can move only on the roads, 
 and except with great difficulty, only on the Chaussees. But 
 from Orleans to Chartres the soil is better and more gravelly ; 
 and the conditions are more favourable. But the impression 
 that this country can be completely seen into is deceptive. 
 The isolated villages lying in the wide fields are certainly 
 visible for great distances. They have neither wood nor 
 gardens near them, and the observer is under the impression 
 that he completely overlooks the intervening ground between 
 the villages; but such is not the case. Everywhere are 
 peculiar depressions, which escape notice from a distance. 
 They are not marked by sharp boundaries, nor by any par¬ 
 ticular kind of cultivation, and they are, as a rule, not more 
 than eight to ten feet deep. Yet troops camping here com¬ 
 pletely escape observation, and in the depressions whole 
 divisions can be collected unknown to the enemy, who on the 
 
THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 21-23 149 
 
 open level ground, on which are the villages and the roads, 
 sees opposite to him a chain of outposts hut no masses of 
 troops. This is, of course, to a certain extent an advantage 
 to the attacker, as all his troops can be concentrated un¬ 
 noticed. . . . On the other hand there are many circumstances 
 which invite the selection of the defensive. By careful choice 
 of artillery positions on the higher ground there can be 
 obtained good and open ranges for guns. If the ground was 
 firm, the numerous cavalry of the Second Army found favour¬ 
 able opportunities for attack against the badly commanded 
 and loosely connected masses of the Army of the Loire. If 
 the ground was heavy through rain, the army could only 
 advance slowly and with difficulty to the attack, and was 
 much hampered in bringing its artillery into action. All 
 these advantages are to the benefit of the Army of the Loire 
 further south towards Orleans, if the Second Army attacks 
 him there ; in fact, with every step towards the Loire the 
 attack becomes more difficult. 
 
 The student of military history who endeavours to follow 
 the course of the war, and to view it impartially from both 
 standpoints, the French as well as the German, at once 
 encounters great difficulties the moment he changes his posi¬ 
 tion from the latter to the former. In the German Army, 
 the recording on the spot all incidents of a campaign or 
 battle, as these occurred, was a part of the ordinary duty 
 of both staff and regimental officers, and the records were 
 carefully preserved for future reference. Very many officers 
 also kept private diaries, or noted down, from time to time, 
 their own personal experiences. So the German materials 
 for a history of the Franco-German War are well nigh inex¬ 
 haustible. It has been, hitherto, merely a question of expe¬ 
 diency, as to how far these materials should be utilised for 
 publication. But on the French side the case is altogether 
 different. Record keeping was one of the last military re¬ 
 quirements which would occur to the officers of any army in 
 course of very hasty formation, and where the stress and 
 extreme urgency of other practical work would lead them to 
 
i5o THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 dispense with pen or pencil so far as possible. Moreover, 
 this Army of the Loire was never, save at the outset, on the 
 side of success. It was always striving under the adverse 
 circumstances of defeat and disaster. It was the present, not 
 the future, that occupied the minds and thoughts of the 
 French officers ; of little importance, therefore, seemed the 
 noting down of times and places for some possible reference 
 hereafter. It was not to the memorandum book, but simply 
 to the memory, that were committed the details of action, 
 the conduct of individuals, the movements of troops, the 
 words and the expressed wishes, intentions and opinions of 
 actors in the drama. Moreover, it is notorious that the 
 French temperament does not lend itself to a judicial descrip¬ 
 tion of any events of which the surroundings are those of 
 excitement and emotion. Then, again, there is the loss of 
 records that ensues when defeat and disorder occur. So the 
 French records of this war are incomplete and frequently 
 contradictory. Many were destroyed in the time of the 
 Commune. Of one French historian of the campaign, whose 
 style is very sensational and dramatic, it has been said, “ If 
 you already know what really took place, read him, for you 
 will be able to distinguish the truth from the imaginary and 
 the former is valuable ; if vou do not know what actually 
 happened leave him on one side, for vou will mix up the one 
 with the other.” Hoenig <>'oes very fully into this matter in 
 the preface to his fifth volume. He has examined and com¬ 
 pared the various sources of information, probably more 
 closely and carefully than any one else, and he states that even 
 that gigantic official work, “ Les Actes du Gouvernment de la 
 Defense National,” teems with misstatements, and the works 
 written bv the chief French actors in the war, de Freycinet, 
 d'Aurelle, Chanzv, Crouzat, and others are full of contradic¬ 
 tions. There is no doubt also that the non-employment of 
 pen and pencil at important conferences or interviews led to 
 misunderstanding of views and intentions, to misinterpreta¬ 
 tions of orders and of wishes, and therefore to disastrous 
 results. There is, however, no difficulty in following the 
 
THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 21-23 151 
 
 movements of the larger bodies of troops such as brigades, 
 etc : the accounting for the movements and fixing the responsi¬ 
 bility - for them is, however, for the reasons given, not always 
 possible. It is mainly the statements of Hoenig and Lehaut- 
 court, a French writer, that will be accepted in this narrative. 
 
 After the fight at Coulmiers, the troops remained on the 
 ground north of Orleans, and not a moment had been lost by 
 Gambetta in organising into manageable military bodies the 
 huge crowd of men who, moved by the spirit he had awakened 
 in them, came Hocking to the standards of France in obedience 
 to his summons. For the 16th Corps a third division was 
 organised. The formation of the 17th Corps was commenced 
 at Mer and Blois, below Orleans; that of the 18th Corps at 
 Nevers and Gien above Orleans; and that of the 21st Corps 
 a little later at le Mans ; whilst on November 15th or 16th, 
 some 40,000 men of the Army of the East were taken to form 
 the 20th Corps and to complete the 18th Corps. The troops 
 were brought from Chagny to Gien by rail on the 18th and 19th. 
 Of course it was the earlier formations that had secured the 
 better trained men, and to them had been posted the officers 
 remaining available after the catastrophes of the first war; so 
 that for the later formations there were but few well-trained 
 men or efficient officers. The military value of the corps 
 diminished in the order of their formation; the 15th was an 
 excellent corps, and numerically nearly double that of an 
 ordinary army corps ; the 16th nearly - equalled it in efficiency, 
 but the others were indifferent. The larger a force in the field, 
 the more essential it is that the staff should be both competent 
 and experienced ; but it was impossible to find for the large 
 Army of the Loire the number of qualified officers for the 
 provision of the correspondingly large and numerous staffs. 
 Large masses of men collected for fighting purposes are of no 
 use standing still. They have to move from one place to 
 another, and whilst on the move, the supply of food and 
 ammunition must be provided for, and the mode in which 
 they are moved, and the provision for the supply, falls to the 
 Staff Officers. The mechanism of the movements of troops in 
 
152 THE PEOPLES WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 large bodies, the amount of supplies required for them, and the 
 mechanism of securing the conveyance and the distribution 
 of these supplies, do notenter into the professional knowledge 
 of the regimental officer. It is sometimes said that a smart 
 adjutant makes the best Staff Officer; this may be to a great 
 extent true, but the best adjutant in an army will be an 
 incompetent Staff Officer until he has learnt what staff work is, 
 and has mastered its working. Not the least influential factor 
 in securing the success of the German Army in the campaign 
 of 1870-71 was the immeasurable superiority of its staff over 
 that of the French Army. 
 
 Captain Aube, a naval officer who commanded the 1st 
 brigade of the 2 nd division of the 20 th corps, has given in 
 the Revue des Deux Mondes, a very interesting account of 
 the corps; its General, Crouzat, in a small pamphlet, also has 
 given his view of his command. 
 
 The corps was for the most part composed of Gardes 
 Mobiles drawn from various parts of France—the Upper 
 Loire, Jura, Garonne, Eastern Pyrenees, Upper Rhine, Vosges, 
 Meurthe, and Corsica. 
 
 In the Gardes Mobiles and the Franc-tireurs there were 
 manv officers and even in the ranks men belonging to the 
 highest classes of society, some bearing the greatest names in 
 France, who had left behind them everything—fortune, com¬ 
 fort, families, young wives, little children—to hasten to the 
 defence of their country. They were brave fellows, facing 
 cheerfully all the discomforts, all the dangers of war, always 
 readv for any sacrifice, and deeply loving their country. The 
 corps was brave, disciplined, and patriotic. Officers and 
 soldiers had the simple and one idea—duty. The cadres, 
 especially in the lower grades, were very insufficient, and in 
 the Gardes Mobiles had not had time to learn their work. 
 It was this failure of cadres of companies, indispensable for 
 leading and for controlling young soldiers under fire, that 
 M as the chief cause of their reverses. 
 
 The corps had all the good qualities, and all the faults, of 
 young, intelligent troops, often full of ardour, but without any 
 
THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 21-23 153 
 
 experience. The Mobiles invariably obeyed orders,and endured 
 uncomplainingly the fatigues of incessant marching ; their 
 patient forgetfulness of self, their devotion, were always equal 
 to the numberless privations they had to endure ; but, whilst 
 obeying, they reasoned, asked the why and the wherefore, and 
 discussed the orders given, all the more, because the authority 
 which issued them did not, in the eyes of either the men or 
 the officers, possess the sanction of experience nor the prestige 
 of rank long possessed. Had not this General, who com¬ 
 manded a division, been only a non-commissioned officer and 
 become a General, from having served his apprenticeship for 
 command in the ranks of the Southerners in America ? 
 Another was only a captain when the war commenced, or 
 before that, perhaps, in the ranks of the army, where they 
 had known him. That these improvised Generals were fit for 
 their new position by their bravery and patriotism was not 
 the question. Were they, by their knowledge of their pro¬ 
 fession, equal to the command given them ? 
 
 Of the staff of the corps there were only two that belonged, 
 or had belonged, to the staff of the regular army. Nearly 
 all the others had been taken from a daring band of young 
 men known as les Quarante, who had made an unsuccessful 
 attempt to blow up the bridge at Saverne. Some of the 
 newly-made Generals were conspicuous by their numerous 
 escorts, and the eagerness with which their aides-de-camp got 
 hold of, for their Head-quarters, chateaux and farms, which 
 could have served as cantonments for a whole battalion, the 
 army being obliged to bivouac often without shelter, straw 
 or wood in the snow and mud. The physical privations the 
 corps had already endured in the Vosges were very great; some 
 of the men had no shoes ; very few possessed gaiters, cartridge- 
 boxes, knapsacks, or camp equipment. In a canvas ( toile ) 
 bag were stowed away promiscuously spare things, food, and 
 cartridges. The men received four days’ supply of biscuit at 
 a time, and could only carry them by passing a string through 
 them and wearing this as a sort of bandolier. The biscuits 
 crumbled away on the march owing to the rain or snow, and 
 
154 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 the men were consequently without bread. Even worse was 
 the fact that in the bags the cartridges became too damp for 
 use. The firearms were of the most varied kind, from a 
 simple rifle (model of 1815 converted) to the American 
 Remington ; this was another source of trouble and confusion. 
 
 At the conference between the Delegation and the 
 Generals that was held on the 12th November, three days 
 after the victory of Coulmiers, it was agreed that a position 
 should be taken up at Orleans as a base for future operations. 
 General d’Aurelle did not, however, regard the position with 
 much favour. On the same day General Crouzat, the Com¬ 
 mander of the Army of the East, received orders to form 
 out of that a corps of three Divisions, the 20th Corps, and a 
 Brigade for the 18th Corps, forming at Nevers. At Orleans 
 the work of preparing the position was pushed on with great 
 energy so that by the 19th the position was nearly completed. 
 On this day the disposition of the Armv of the Loire was as 
 follows: 
 
 At Gien the whole of the 20th Corps and the greater 
 portion of the 18th Corps, the remainder of the latter being 
 at Nevers. Close to and on the east of the Paris road was 
 the 1st Division of the 15th Corps, the other two Divisions 
 were west of the road ; the line was continued westward by 
 the 16th Corps, to the Conie Brook which joins the Loir 
 between Chateaudun and Bonneval; the 17th Corps was 
 between Meung on the Loire and Chateaudun on the Loir, 
 whilst the troops of the Armv of the West were falling back 
 towards Chateaudun and Nogent le Retrou to form the 21st 
 Corps, of which the rendezvous was le Mans. Nominally 
 therefore the Armv of the Loire consisted of some 200,000 
 men in six corps, but of these there were five fairly completed 
 in formation, one not completed; the front was over forty 
 miles and was covered, so far as the 20th and 18th Corps 
 were concerned, by detachments thrown forward on the roads 
 to the front; and for the rest of the Armv by a strong line 
 of outposts from Neuville aux Bois, through Artenay to the 
 Conie Brook. 
 
THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 21-23 155 
 
 It was on the 19th that the Delegation intimated to 
 d’Aurelle their opinion that the purely defensive attitude 
 must be exchanged for active operations for the relief of Paris. 
 The success of any operations of the Army of the Loire 
 was, however, from the first, very doubtful, independently 
 of the inefficiency of the Army, owing to the vital differ¬ 
 ences of opinion, which, on military questions, existed 
 between the civil government of the provinces, the Delegation, 
 and the commander-in-chief of its army, General d’Aurelle. 
 That amongst the generals themselves there was not always 
 unanimity of opinion was only in the ordinary course of 
 affairs; but the strong counter-influence of General Chanzy, 
 the advocate of active measures, must have told much against 
 d’Aurelle. The cause of the great differences of the views 
 held by the Delegation and by d’Aurelle lav in the fact that 
 the former looked at the military situation from the national 
 point of view, whilst the latter regarded it from the military 
 standpoint only. To the Delegation, the relief of Paris was 
 the supreme object to be accomplished for the salvation of 
 the country, the only purpose of the military operations of 
 the army ; and inasmuch as the duration of the resistance 
 of which Paris was capable was necessarily limited, it de¬ 
 sired the speedy initiation of measures for its relief. Even 
 if, owing to time being wanting, the army could not attain 
 the degree of efficiency desirable for the purpose, it was 
 better to make the attempt with it as it was, rather than not 
 at all, or too late. 
 
 On the other hand, d’Aurelle looked mainly to the capa¬ 
 bility of the newly raised army as determining the operations 
 to be undertaken; and instead of recognising the fact that 
 the Delegation represented the Government of the country, 
 and as such its directions must be accepted and complied with, 
 he assumed an attitude of inertia, which had the lamentable 
 result of causing, almost of compelling the Delegation to take 
 command of the Army, and not only to decide what ope¬ 
 rations should be undertaken, but also to direct how they 
 should be carried out. There can be little doubt that, in 
 
156 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 this matter, d’Aurelle’s judgment failed him, and that, in¬ 
 stead of remaining at the head of the army, in an attitude of 
 non-assistance to the Government, he should have resigned 
 his command, and have left the Government free to appoint 
 another general in his place. D’Aurelle, unfortunately, did 
 not realise that even if a faulty plan of operations was to be 
 adopted, it would be far better to accept it, and, as a soldier 
 of experience and knowledge, do the best he could with it, 
 rather than let it be controlled by civilians, absolutely 
 ignorant of the working of the machine they were setting in 
 motion. 
 
 On the 19th de Freycinet wrote to d’Aurelle “ We cannot 
 remain at Orleans forever. Paris is hungry and is calling to 
 us. Study the line of march to be taken to enable us to give 
 a hand to Trochu who would come to meet us with 150,000 
 men, whilst at the same time a demonstration would be made 
 towards the north. We are considering here a plan of 
 operations. Let me know as soon as your ideas have taken 
 shape, and we will meet at Tours or your Head-quarters to 
 discuss the plan.” To this fair suggestion d’Aurelle replied 
 on the 20th that his army was not 250,000 strong as alleged, 
 that if he was to lend a hand to Trochu he must first of all 
 know Troehu’s intentions; and, instead of making any sug¬ 
 gestion himself as to the plan of operations, he adopted the 
 extraordinary and suicidal course of assuring de Freycinet that 
 he was quite willing to consider any plan that the Delegation 
 themselves might suggest. As Lehautcourt rightly says, this 
 was taking a singular view of the duty of a Commander-in-Chief 
 and such an exchange of duties presaged no good for the future. 
 Naturally, this unexpected reply greatly irritated Gambetta, 
 who on the 20th in a severe letter directed d’Aurelle to 
 prepare at once a plan of operations for the relief of Paris. 
 He pointed out that owing to the difficulty of communicating 
 with Trochu, to delay until Trochu’s plans were known was 
 to wait for what might never be obtained, and he gave to 
 d’Aurelle as the principles on which the operations were to be 
 based: 
 
THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 21-88 157 
 
 (1) The best troops must be on the flank. 
 
 (2) The available forces numbered 250,000 men. 
 
 (3) Paris must be the objective, and d’Aurelle must draw 
 up a plan of operations accordingly. 
 
 To this letter d’Aurelle did not vouchsafe a reply until the 
 23rd, when he wrote as follows : “ The solution of the problem 
 (the march on Paris) is not the least of the matters I have to 
 consider. To solve it demands the co-operation and mutual 
 understanding between the Government and the Army as 
 represented bv the chiefs to whom vou have given your con¬ 
 fidence. So far as I am personallv concerned you may rely on 
 mv complete devotion. Mav God make my strength equal to 
 mv devotion." 
 
 But the Delegation, impatient at his delay, had already 
 taken the control into their own hands. Trochu had said 
 that Paris could hold out to the end of the year, but the 
 relief must be effected much sooner ; and in a letter of 
 November 19th from Jules Favre in Paris, that Minister had 
 said that December 15th was the limit of holding out. The 
 Delegation knew also that Trochu contemplated a sortie 
 about November 26th, so something must be done at once to 
 prepare for co-operation. 
 
 De Freycinet assumed that the Army of Paris would move 
 up to Meiun along the right bank of the Seine, which river 
 would thus protect its right flank. The Delegation deter¬ 
 mined, therefore, on the 21st. that the Army of the Loire 
 should advance on Fontainebleau; the preliminary step being 
 an advance of the 18th and 20th Corps and a Division 
 of the 15th Corps on Pithiviers and Beaune la Rolande, thus 
 clearing the way for an advance of the whole army. This line 
 is parallel to and twenty miles from the Loire, and its flanks 
 are on good roads leading north-east to Fontainebleau. 
 For the intended operation the Delegation sent the orders 
 for the movements of the several bodies of troops to 
 d'Aurelle for transmission to the commanders. The 18th 
 and 20th Corps had been constituted into an army under 
 Crouzat, but he was subordinated to d’Aurelle. Against 
 
158 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 the orders sent d’Aurelle submitted some objections, many 
 of considerable weight; so de Freyeinet modified them to a 
 certain extent, sending to d’Aurelle a reply that was both 
 fair and dignified. 
 
 “ If you gave me a better plan than mine, or even if you 
 gave me some plan or other, I would give up my own plan 
 and recall my orders. But during the twelve days that you 
 have been at Orleans you have not, notwithstanding the 
 repeated requests of M. Gambetta and myself, given us any 
 plan at all. You have confined yourself to fortifying Orleans 
 according to our recommendations after you had declared the 
 position to be untenable. I am glad to find that you have 
 greatlv modified your opinion on this point, since you no 
 longer wish to abandon your position. . . . Something must 
 be done. . . . Paris is hungry and desires to be helped.” But 
 now there was a dual authority exercising control in the Army. 
 The Delegation issued its orders for the movements of Corps 
 or Divisions, sometimes direct to the commanders, sometimes 
 through d’Aurelle; the commanders naturally turned to 
 d’Aurelle for directions, but d’Aurelle was not in the counsels 
 of the Delegation, so orders and counter-orders succeeded each 
 other in rapid succession; there was no unity of purpose or 
 action in the movements. On the 23rd the 20th Corps had 
 advanced from Gien to about eight or nine miles south of 
 Beaune la Rolande, the 18th Corps was still at Gien, the 15th 
 and 16th Corps were very much in their old positions from 
 the Paris-Orleans road to the Conie, whilst on the extreme 
 left the leading troops of the 17th Corps were as far north as 
 Bonneval and Chateaudun on the Loir. The troops of the 
 Army of the West were falling back towards Chateaudun and 
 from Nogent le Rotrou to be incorporated in the 21st Corps 
 forming at le Mans, and it had been the intention of the 
 Delegation to oppose the advance of the Detachment frontally 
 with the 21st Coi-ps, threatening with the 17th its line of 
 communications. This project came to naught. 
 
 Up to the present the movements of the two forces, the 
 Second Army and the Detachment, have been followed 
 
THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 21-23 159 
 
 separately ; this has been convenient as they had separate 
 objects, separate aims. Now, from the 23rd, they are to 
 co-operate in accordance with general instructions from one 
 source. The operations of both on each day will therefore be 
 so narrated, that it may be seen to what extent the co-opera¬ 
 tion was real or was only nominal. But it is well to bear in 
 mind that, as is evident from the extracts of correspondence 
 already quoted, neither Versailles, Prince Frederick Charles, 
 nor the Grand Duke had any but the vaguest idea of the real 
 position, strength, and intentions of that Army against which 
 they were about to operate—the Army of the Loire. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 NOVEMBER 24th 
 
 V. Moltke has now taken in hand the control of the operations 
 against the Army of the Loire. The Prince is to attack, but is 
 not required to do so before November 28th, by which time 
 the movement of the Grand Duke against the left Hank of the 
 Army of the Loire will be producing its effect. The situation 
 was very similar to that of the commencement of the campaign 
 in Bohemia in the Prussian-Austrian War of 1866. Then 
 v. Moltke remained at Berlin, whence by telegraph he moved 
 the armies of the Crown Prince and Prince Frederick Charles 
 until the time arrived when he considered it necessary to go 
 to the theatre of war. This method of control did succeed, 
 though the caution and slowness of movement of Prince 
 Frederick Charles were very noticeable. And now v. Moltke 
 is at Versailles at the apex of the triangle, and is connected 
 by wire with the Prince at Pithiviers, forty-five miles distant 
 at one angle, and with the Grand Duke at la Ferte Bernard 
 eighty miles distant at the other angle; these two leaders 
 being seventy-five miles apart. But there is a difference, 
 namely, that the “ personlichkeit ” of these leaders is far more 
 marked than was the case in 1866: each has already shown 
 the possession of a will of his own ; and with Prince Frederick 
 Charles, v. Moltke’sown relations and those of the Grand Duke 
 are somewhat strained. V. Moltke is somewhat in the position 
 of the driver of a pair of steeds, one a kicker, the other a jibber, 
 and neither of the pair is inclined to run in double harness 
 with its companion on this occasion. As on the 24th, the 
 Prince’s Army is the predominant partner in the scheme of co¬ 
 operation, the proceedings of this Army on this day will be 
 
NOVEMBER 24 
 
 considered first. The two Brigades of the Xth Army Corps at 
 Montargis marched to Beaune la Rolande by different roads, 
 the 39th (v. Valentini) by a northern road, the 37th (v. 
 Lehmann) with the Divisional General (v. Woyna) by a 
 southern road through Ladon. Here, however, this Brigade 
 met with opposition from strong hostile forces, the 20th Corps 
 and a Division of the 18th marching north, which, after a 
 short but sharp engagement, were driven back, and the three 
 Brigades were concentrated at Beaune in the evening. 
 
 The Prince, ever eager to obtain every scrap of informa¬ 
 tion procurable respecting the enemy,had, on the 23rd, ordered 
 reconnaissances along his whole front for the 24th. From 
 the right, the 2nd Cav. Division and the IXth Army Corps 
 came in reports of the presence of very strong forces in front, 
 and of the arrival, at Chevilly, of railway trains from the south, 
 apparently carrying troops. At Chevilly were some 10,000 
 men, with some batteries of artillery ; there were no signs of 
 any march to the west; on the contrary there was a move¬ 
 ment (as was the fact) of large bodies of troops towards the 
 east. Further, v. Manstein reported the ground west of the 
 Paris road to be favourable for purposes of attack. No 
 prisoners were taken. On the east of the Paris road, and near to 
 it, the Illrd Army Corps had, with a force of four battalions, 
 two squadrons, and two batteries, reconnoitred towards 
 Neuville aux Bois, where is an important junction of roads. 
 Here, however, the Germans were repulsed, losing 9 officers, 162 
 men, and 17 horses. It appears that the reconnaissance had 
 been made contrary to the warnings given by the Corps 
 Commander and his chief Staff Officer, Col. v. V. Rhetz. 
 The Prince had been persuaded by v. Stiehle to give the 
 order; and when he learnt of the disaster, and that not even 
 one prisoner had been taken, there was a lively interchange 
 of remarks between him and v. Stiehle. The Corps Staff had 
 always a poor opinion of the Army Staff, and this incident 
 increased the ill-feeling existing between the former and 
 v. Stiehle. 
 
 From the Xth Army Corps had been sent out from Beaune 
 
 L 
 
162 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 three small reconnoitring parties in different directions. Two 
 of them found strong hostile forces close in front, but did not 
 succeed in taking any prisoners. The third party was directed 
 towards Boiscommun, only three miles south-west of Beaune, 
 and its work was productive of most important results. 
 The troops here employed were three squadrons and two 
 companies, and they were accompanied by two of the Staff 
 Officers of the Corps, Captain Seebeck and Lieut, v. Kotze. 
 Of this reconnaissance Hoenig gives in the “ Volkskrieg” the 
 chief incidents, but in a small pamphlet he has narrated it 
 in detail; and so instructive is the narrative that an abstract 
 of it is here put before the reader. 
 
 The Commander of the detachment was Major v. Schoeler, 
 but although senior to Capt. Seebeck he had to act in con¬ 
 formity to the wishes of his junior officer, who, as Staff 
 Officer, represented the General Commanding the Corps. 
 Before the detachment moved off from Beaune the officers 
 were assembled, and Capt. Seebeck explained to them the 
 situation as follows: “ Of the strength, position, and inten¬ 
 tions of the enemy, whose main body is presumed to be 
 behind the Forest of Orleans, there is uncertainty ; but in 
 the neighbourhood of Bellegarde [six miles south of Beaune] 
 are strong forces, so that a hostile offensive on the line 
 Bellegarde-Boisconnnun may be expected. The front of the 
 Second Army is such that the Xth Army Corps forms its left 
 flank ; the main body of the Corps is to-day concentrated in the 
 neighbourhood of Beaune; one Brigade is still away east of 
 Montargis. Paris can hold out at the longest only three to 
 four weeks. Apparently, an Italian Division of irregular troops 
 under Garibaldi’s son has joined the Army of the Loire. To 
 clear up the state of uncertainty, reconnaissances have been 
 ordered by the Second Army for the 24th from all units of the 
 Army. From the Xth Army Corps there will be to-day one on 
 Boiscommun, a second on Bellegarde, a third on Ladon (Lorris) 
 [six miles south-east of Beaune]. If fire is heard in those 
 directions, it is at the reconnoitring detachments.” Then 
 Seebeck continued: “So, gentlemen, the cavalry has to carry 
 
NOVEMBER 24 
 
 163 
 
 out the reconnoitring; the companies will eventually take up 
 a position of support. The main and chief business is to 
 take prisoners ; for every officer captured there will he given 
 an ‘ Iron Cross.’ Be so good as to communicate this to the 
 men.” What an incentive! The most coveted decoration 
 in the German Army, the Iron Cross. 
 
 With the Cavalry at the head, the detachment moved off 
 at 8 a.m. Short of Boiscommun, the leading zug [or troop], 
 under the command of Lieut, v. Riedesel, came on a hostile 
 cavalry lancer piquet dismounted; this was driven back and 
 pursued to the entrance to the village. V. Riedesel now sent 
 scouts into and around the village, to reconnoitre, and as 
 their reports on their return did not fully satisfy him, he 
 determined to trot into the village and ascertain for himself 
 how matters stood. At the entrance was standing a peasant, 
 of whom v. Riedesel inquired whether in the village were 
 any more troops than the Lancers who had just gone into it. 
 The peasant replied that there were none. V. Riedesel now 
 caught sight of Lancers in the village, and at once ordered the 
 attack, and riding in with his men, soon found himself in a 
 real trap. A half-squadron of the 2nd Marche Lancer 
 Regiment was there, and Lieut.-Col. de Brasserie, the com¬ 
 mander of the regiment, was just entering from the south 
 with the main body. Not only did the Lancers open fire, 
 but also from the houses fire was opened on the Germans ; 
 and as these went forward, the inhabitants, after the last 
 trooper had gone by, drew carts into the street to prevent 
 their escape. The Germans were soon overpowered, v. 
 Riedesel was wounded and taken prisoner, but the greater 
 part of the troopers got back towards Montbarrois, about a 
 mile in rear, where the Infantry had now taken up a position 
 of support. Meantime, Colonel de Brasserie had arrived from 
 Bellegarde with the remainder of the regimemt, and he had 
 intended to give his squadrons a rest after their long trot. 
 His first object was to restore order in the village, but the 
 commander of the leading squadron, seeing an opportunity 
 for pursuit, had taken the initiative upon himself, and was 
 
164 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 now following up the retreating Germans. The colonel rode 
 after them to recall them, but the horse got the better of the 
 rider, and ran away with him to the front. Naturally, the 
 other squadrons followed the commander, and, consequently, 
 a considerable body of Lancers, in more or less disorderly 
 fashion, were galloping out of the village northward, whilst, 
 from the opposite direction, were coming forward the main 
 body of the German Cavalry ; and close at hand to the latter 
 was a small group of the Staff Officers and orderlies. A 
 determined melee now took place, the Lancers eventually being 
 driven back ; de Brasserie was severely wounded, and fell, a 
 most valuable prize, into the hands of the Germans. The value, 
 however, lay not in de Brasserie’s rank, but was owing to a 
 mental disqualification in him as a soldier—he was deficient 
 in reticence. So in reply to questions which he should have 
 declined to answer, he said that he had come out to recon¬ 
 noitre the Germans, that the main body of the enemy was 
 behind him, and that probably there would be a battle next 
 day ; that they wished to get round the Xth Army Corps, and 
 therefore Garibaldi had come. He said that he belonged to 
 “ Polignac’s Corps,” which had come from Besan^on [Polignac 
 was only a Divisional Commander in the 20th Corps, originally 
 under Michel, and now under Crouzat]. 
 
 Seebeck had constantly sent reports to the Corps Head¬ 
 quarters at Beaune. Col. v. Caprivi, the Chief Staff Officer, 
 possessed, to a remarkable degree, aptitude for comparing 
 and piecing together information derived from different 
 sources, and by noon he had mastered all the results obtained 
 from the Boiscommun expedition. Some one newly-arrived 
 Corps was in front here, but whether it was Michel’s or 
 Crouzat’s, or what number it bore, had not been ascertained. 
 At all events it was neither the 15th nor the 16th. 
 
 And further east at Ladon, some eight miles from Bois¬ 
 commun, more information was being obtained, not by 
 reconnoitring, but by an almost dramatic chance of war ; 
 but information which, so far from enlightening the Prince, 
 further thickened the Fog of War which now tactically, as well 
 
NOVEMBER 24 
 
 ^5 
 
 as strategically, was rapidly enveloping him. At the eastern 
 entrance to Ladon, the scene of the engagement of the 
 37th Brigade, had been picked up by Trumpeter Brosig of 
 the 9th Dragoons, a pocket-book, which he at once gave to 
 his superiors, and which was sent on the same day to the 
 Corps Head-quarters. The pocket-hook was the property of 
 an Englishman, Captain Ogilvy, who, serving on the side of 
 the French, had fallen in the fight. In the pocket-book were 
 three papers, all of great value, but as they stood they 
 increased the confusion of mind at the Army Head-quarters. 
 The least important was a document giving the orders for 
 the march of some army corps for the 24th. Of the others, 
 one was a letter in the handwriting of Gambetta; it ran as 
 follows: 
 
 “THE FRENCH REPUBLIC. 
 
 “ Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. 
 
 “The Government ok National Defence. 
 
 “ The Member of the Government of National Defence, 
 Minister of the Interior and of War. 
 
 “ In virtue of the powers delegated to him by the 
 
 Government, by Decree dated Paris, October 1st, 1870. 
 
 “ Accredits to General Crouzat, commanding the forces as¬ 
 sembled at Gien, Captain Ogilvy of the Engineers, attached to 
 the staff of the 18th Corps, and temporarily detached from it. 
 
 “ Captain Ogilvy enjoys my fullest confidence. I have 
 long been in consultation with him on the military opera¬ 
 tions. Gien is clearly the key of our position on the Loire; 
 I know that it is safe in the brave hands of General Crouzat; 
 I send Mons. Ogilvy to him to assist him in his work, and I 
 request that he may be present with a vote at the meetings 
 of the council. 
 
 “(Signed) Leon Gambetta. 
 
 “Tours, November 19th, 1870.’’ 
 
 The third document was an ordre de bataille of some army 
 corps, hut it bore no heading indicating any particular corps. 
 During the day, there came in from other sources, from 
 
166 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 newspapers, deserters, prisoners, and ordinary wayfarers, 
 information which rendered indubitable the conclusion that 
 in front of the Second Army had heen collected a very large 
 hostile force; that this force intended to take the offensive 
 immediately ; and, lastly, that the whole country for miles 
 round Orleans had been very strongly prepared as a defensive 
 position. 
 
 But from the documents of Captain Ogilvy arose other 
 serious matters for consideration. The delegation regarded 
 Gien as “ the key of our position on the Loire; ” it might 
 be the base for offensive operations; and there were opposite 
 the extreme left of the Second Army, or rather beyond it and 
 outflanking it, large forces assembled under the command of 
 Crouzat. As a matter of fact, it was these forces on their 
 way from Gien towards Beaune that had been encountered 
 this day. That Pithiviers was now directly threatened from 
 both south-east and south-west did not admit of doubt. 
 As regards the accession of strength to the enemy in front 
 of the Second Army, the evidence seemed to show that this 
 was the 18th Corps named in the newspapers of November 20th. 
 And at once had to be considered the several strategical 
 operations, any one or more of which the enemy starting from 
 his very long base, might select for an advance for the relief 
 of Paris. There were four possible lines of advance : one 
 from the right by Gien, Montargis, and thence direct north 
 between the rivers Loing and Yonne; the second against the 
 centre of the Second Army at Pithiviers, and thence either to 
 Fontainebleau, or to the Paris road at Etampes; the third 
 from the French centre along the main road to Paris, the 
 fourth from the left flank by Chateaudun and Chartres on 
 Versailles. Opposed to this enemy, now, was the Second 
 Army on a front of twenty-five miles, with the Detachment 
 some fifty miles distant. 
 
 And it was the letter from Gambetta to Crouzat, and the 
 reference in it to Gien, that determined the whole of the 
 strategy of the Prince in the immediate future. V. d. Goltz 
 says: “ If he [Gambetta] looked on Gien as the most im- 
 
NOVEMBER 24 
 
 167 
 
 portant point on the Loire, whilst up to this time Orleans 
 had been regarded as such, the intention was apparent that 
 the attack was to be commenced with the right wing of the 
 Army of the Loire. This emphasised, that the oft-promised 
 relief of Paris would not be carried out along the great road 
 from Orleans to Paris, but down the Loing towards Fontaine¬ 
 bleau. A number of advantages told in favour of this 
 direction, and soon it acquired more and more probability.” 
 
 The orders of the Prince for the 25th drew the Army a 
 little to the east, but it still held on to the Paris road. Each 
 corps was directed to be so concentrated as to be in readiness 
 for any attack by the enemy. If no combat was audible 
 before 2 p.m. the corps could then commence to go into their 
 cantonments. It seems from Iloenig that these orders may 
 be taken as the commencement of the divergence of views that 
 existed between v. Moltke and the Prince as to the strategy 
 to be employed against the Army of the Loire. On the 14th 
 v. Moltke had told the Prince that it devolved on the Second 
 Army to protect the investment from the South, and that the 
 Orleans road must not be “ left entirely open for any 
 length of time; ” but at that date the Detachment was 
 moving away to the north-west, and so the defence of the 
 road fell to the Second Army alone. This defence the 
 Prince originally had intended to carry out offensively by a 
 bold converging attack on Orleans irrespective of the Detach¬ 
 ment. Subsequently the Prince had found himself reduced 
 to a purely passive defence; v. Moltke, whilst acquiescing 
 in the change at the time, desired that it should be exchanged 
 for the offensive as soon as possible : and in his view the right 
 course for the Prince to adopt now for the defence of the 
 road was not the posting on it a portion of the army as a 
 direct physical obstacle in the path of a hostile advance, but 
 the concentration of the whole army more to the east in 
 some position whence, by manoeuvring against the flank of an 
 advancing enemy, it could arrest the advance, whether from 
 the east or the west of the enemy’s long line ; where it 
 could, in collected force, directly repel an advance from the 
 
168 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 centre, and where the troops, being well in hand, a bold 
 offensive could be taken should opportunity offer. V. Moltke 
 held that now for the defence of the Paris Road there was 
 not merely one army, the Second, but two armies, that and 
 the Detachment, so that the strategy adopted should be the 
 co-operation of convergent forces from different bases. The 
 Prince would, however, for the present, have direct passive 
 defence only, and this on a long front out of all propor¬ 
 tion to the small strength of his Army. Besides which, 
 he detested strategy of the co-operative kind. Hoenig 
 says : “ He had no opinion of combined operations, at least^ 
 unless the combination was on such a small scale that it 
 could be worked by one of the two commanders. He dis¬ 
 liked any tactical stroke, unless previously assured that there 
 would be at hand for it all forces within reach.” 
 
 The widely scattered Detachment was, on this day, moving 
 somewhat slowly to what might be called a preparatory 
 position for the march on Beaugency ; but one important 
 matter had come to the knowledge of the Grand Duke before 
 he issued his orders for the 24th, namely, that a considerable 
 hostile force [the 17th Corps] was now moving up the Loir 
 by Chateaudun interposing between him and the Second 
 Army, and directly threatening his line of communications, 
 as he had been warned by v. Blumenthal. Strangely enough, 
 the Grand Duke, when on the 23rd he sent his reports to 
 Versailles did not mention this hostile advance. Here is 
 another instance of the powerlessness of v. Moltke to deal 
 with the situation ; powerlessness due in this case to the care¬ 
 lessness or reticence of one of the chief commanders. It is 
 possible that the moral of the Grand Duke may have been 
 somewhat disturbed by the order to march on Beaugency. 
 Hoenig suggests that in the order, the Grand Duke perhaps 
 foresaw the possibility of the Detachment ceasing to be an 
 independent command, and of his being placed under the 
 orders of the Prince; or even of the Detachment ceasing to 
 exist as a unit, and its corps being incorporated in the Second 
 Army: there may have therefore been no great excess of zeal 
 
NOVEMBER 24 169 
 
 on his part in contributing a share to the compulsory co¬ 
 operation. 
 
 On the French side it had been found impossible to move 
 the 20th Corps (30,000) to the positions assigned to it for 
 this day. The 18th Corps was now on the march from Gien 
 to Montargis to create a diversion on the German left, whilst 
 des Paillieres with the 30,000 men of the 1st Division, 
 15th Corps was, in conformity to orders from Tours, struggling 
 along bad roads from Chevill v towards Crouzat; the three 
 groups were still a day’s march apart, but the 24th is marked 
 by what was practically the abandonment by d’Aurelle of the 
 functions of chief executive military commander. Crouzat in 
 a despatch to d’Aurelle concluded with the words : “ I await 
 your orders.” D’Aurelle forwarded the despatch to Tours 
 with the following addition : 
 
 “ Since I do not know fully the object of the movements, 
 it is difficult for me to give tietailed orders: Generals des 
 Paillieres and Crouzat are a long day’s march apart, and could 
 not therefore support each other. It is doubtful whether 
 General Crouzat will be able to continue his movement to¬ 
 morrow. Are the two corps to concentrate and where ? For 
 fear that General Crouzat may not receive his orders sufficiently 
 early through me, 1 request that they may be sent to him by 
 telegraph direct to Bellegarde, and that I may know what 
 they are.” As Hoenig says, d’Aurelle by this letter proved 
 to the Delegation his want of independence; it was an 
 abdication of his leadership ; Gambetta took him at his 
 word. 
 
 The actual military situation on the evening of the 24th 
 is one of paralysing over-extension everywhere. With the 
 Germans, thei’e are two bodies of troops each so widely 
 extended that each is unfit for any immediate strategical 
 operation, and they are separated from each other by an 
 intervening hostile corps; whilst in front of them is a very 
 large hostile force intent on at once taking the offensive 
 against them, but unable to do so, owing to the same cause, 
 incomplete concentration. 
 
i ;o THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 On this day, the 24th, there comes before us an incident 
 in the inner life of German command and control, of a remark¬ 
 able character, and which is also yet one more illustration of 
 the breakdown, in periods of doubt and difficulty, of that 
 system of mutual confidence and co-operation among the 
 higher leaders, which, as a rule, was a characteristic of the 
 first war. 
 
 Readers of the German Official History of the War (v. 
 Moltke’s own work) may have noted, that although v. Moltke 
 was the real chief commander of the German Armies during 
 the campaign, it is to the King of Prussia that is given all 
 the credit for the conduct of the war; and they may recall 
 to mind one remarkable passage in which the King and the 
 Emperor Napoleon III. are contrasted as supreme commanders 
 of the opposing armies. 
 
 “ The Monarch, at whose disposition lies the State with its 
 resources, is only entitled to be at the head of the Field 
 Army, when competent to command the troops in person, 
 and take upon his own shoulders the weighty responsibility 
 of all that may happen. Failing these conditions, his pre¬ 
 sence with the army cannot but have a paralysing influence. 
 
 . . . For by one will alone must the operations be controlled; 
 when influenced by several counsels, no matter how well 
 meant, this will must always lose in clearness and decision, 
 and the leading of the army which depends on it will become 
 uncertain.” 
 
 The inference intended to be drawn from this passage is 
 clear, namely, that it was King William alone that com¬ 
 manded the host of Germans in this great campaign. Now 
 to another view of the matter. 
 
 At Versailles the old King stood, as the leader, above and 
 apart from all around him, whoever they might be, and 
 though he rarely interfered, yet he had his own views on all 
 matters that came under his cognisance ; and if need be, he 
 could act on those views. For some time the King had been 
 dissatisfied with the state of affairs at both the Second Army 
 and the Detachment, and with the small amount of informa- 
 
NOVEMBER 24 
 
 171 
 
 tion he received concerning them ; yet the political situation 
 made it necessary that he should understand fully and clearly 
 what was taking place. So he determined to find out the 
 truth for himself. It was the Second Army that appeared 
 to be the pivot of the combined operations, so to this army 
 he decided to send some one whom he could trust to obtain 
 for him the information he desired. The selection of the 
 emissary w'as difficult, for on the one hand he must be an 
 officer of great professional capacity : yet, on the other hand, 
 he must not be of so senior a rank as to lead the Prince to 
 suspect that there was any dissatisfaction with the leading, 
 or that the officer sent was to exercise control either along¬ 
 side him or over him. That tact must be a gift innate in 
 the emissary, goes without saying. The officer to whom the 
 King entrusted this most delicate mission was one of his 
 personal aides-de-camp, thirty-eight years of age, Lt.-Col. 
 Count v. Waldersee, lately the Commander-in-Chief of the 
 allied expedition to China. It seems that on the 213rd the 
 King had already determined to send an officer, but not 
 until the following day did he carry his resolve into effect; 
 and then, through Colonel v. Albedyll, the chief of the 
 Military Cabinet, which corresponds to our own Military 
 Secretarial Department, he summoned v. Waldersee to his 
 presence and addressed him as follows : “ We are on the eve 
 of a decisive moment of the war. The French Army of the 
 Loire has gradually been more and more reinforced, and better 
 organised. I have foreseen that a long time and have said 
 so to many ; but these gentlemen always know r everything 
 better than I do, and they maintain that the real war is at 
 an end. The position of v. <1. Tann’s troops in and around 
 Orleans did not correspond to my views; his position was 
 too dangerous, and he was obliged to retire with loss. The 
 22nd Division was sent there, and I despatched afterwards 
 the 17th Division, and it is clear that the Grand Duke, with 
 all these troops, has not become equal to dealing with the 
 enemy. Much about the same time Metz fell, and now we 
 have succeeded in bringing up the Second Army. But it is 
 
X 72 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 very weak, and it numbers not much more than 40,000 rifles; 
 the enemy is estimated at from 150,000 to 200,000 men. I 
 know well that my troops are better than the French, but 
 that does not deceive me into supposing that we have not a 
 crisis before us. If Prince Frederick Charles is beaten, we 
 must give up the Investment of Paris. ... I have explained 
 in this letter, which you will give to the Prince, the serious 
 character of the situation; repeat to him that I have the 
 most thorough confidence in his leading and in his practical 
 knowledge of war. Start at once, for there will be a fight 
 soon. You will report to me daily, and you will remain with 
 the Prince until I recall you.” 
 
 Entrusted with this remarkable mission, which was un¬ 
 known to v. Moltke, the Count at once started for Pithiviers, 
 where he arrived on the 25th, and delivered the letter to the 
 Prince. He was received most courteously, and was a guest 
 at the Prince’s table, v. Waldersee rode about the army, 
 conversed with the Generals and the Staffs, learnt their views, 
 and daily sent his letter to the King. Substitute for these 
 personages respectively our own Sovereign, H.R.H. the Duke 
 of Connaught, Earl Roberts, and say, Col. Douglas Haig, 
 A.D.C., and we realise the curious ways of the German 
 Army. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 NOVEMBER 25th 
 
 ()\ t the 25th the slight movements ordered by the Prince were 
 carried out ; the Xth Army Corps was directed to undertake 
 the protection of the left flank of the Second Army; and to 
 v. V. Rhetz was it left to determine how far eastward the 
 Corps should extend, and also the sending detachments to 
 Montargis or Chateau Landon. From the Illrd Army Corps 
 was sent to Nemours a detachment of two companies and a 
 squadron. 
 
 Opposite the Second Army the main body of the 18th 
 Corps was pursuing its march on Montargis ; the 20th Corps 
 with a portion of the 18th Corps, remained in an entrenched 
 position about Boiscommun ; des Paillieres 1 Division has 
 reached Chilleurs aux Bois. 
 
 The Detachment, on the 25th, after a short march of nine 
 or ten miles, was pointing to the Loire, the Bavarians leading 
 and being at Montdoubleau, on the road by Vendome to 
 Blois; the two Inf. Divisions were respectively ten and 
 fifteen miles in rear ; the 6th Cav. Division was in front; 
 whilst, strangely enough, the 4th Cav. Division had been 
 withdrawn from touch with the enemy, and was brought close 
 in to la Bazoche Gouet, on the east flank of the rear of the 
 long column. From the leading cavalry to the rear-guard at 
 Nogent le Rotrou, the Detachment was extended over thirty 
 miles. The shortness of the march was viewed with disfavour 
 at Versailles, but it is probable that- this shortness was not 
 due to any remissness on the part of the Grand Duke, but was 
 owing to his experiencing the need of sparing his tired 
 troops, for whom a rest-day, pleaded for by their commanding 
 
174 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 officers, and asked for by the Grand Duke, had been refused. 
 But, on the 25th, owing partly to reports received during the 
 day, and partly to the non-receipt of a delayed report, the 
 Grand Duke found himself compelled to determine whether 
 he should continue to act strategically as ordered by v. Moltke, 
 or act according to his own judgment to meet the requirements 
 of a completely new situation, in which he now, suddenly, 
 found himself. 
 
 The Bavarians, during the last few days, had been marching- 
 on the arc of a circle, and on the 25th their ammunition 
 column and some bridge trains were moving to rejoin them 
 by its chord from Montlandon through Brou to Arville. 
 This road had been reported to v. d. Tann as quite safe ; but 
 at Brou the column was suddenly attacked by strong forces 
 of hostile infantry. With the aid of the 4th Cav. Division, 
 the escort succeeded in extricating the convoy, but the 
 French, the advanced troops of the 17th Corps, remained 
 in possession of Brou. To the Grand Duke it was now 
 evident that the enemy had not only interposed between 
 the Detachment and the Second Army, but was moving 
 across his line of communications, and that v. Blumenthal’s 
 warning was not groundless. He therefore determined to 
 abandon the march to the Loire, and on the next day to 
 turn against the threatening enemy on his flank and left 
 rear; but, unfortunately, he selected as his objective the 
 most northerly point of the enemy’s advance, Brou, so that 
 instead of moving south-east, or even east, he will move 
 north-east. Not merely did this involve a change of about 
 ninety degrees in the direction of the line of march of 
 his 50,000 men and 200 guns, with the delays, impedings 
 and blockings, its necessary accompaniments, but, as will 
 appear later on, this selection was strategically a mistake; 
 for this, however, the Grand Duke was not solely re¬ 
 sponsible ; a cavalry subaltern must share the responsibility. 
 Unfortunately, there had not come on the 24th to the 
 Grand Duke, a most important piece of information. On 
 that day Lieut, v. Busse, with ten troopers, had been sent 
 
NOVEMBER 25 
 
 1 75 
 
 from the 6th Cav. Division to reconnoitre Chateaudun. 
 He crossed the Loir by a ford south of the town, and 
 entering from that direction, found it full of hostile 
 regular troops, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and also 
 Gardes Mobiles. Returning, he found that the ford had 
 meanwhile been blocked ; he swam the river elsewhere with 
 his little party, but his own horse was so injured that he 
 had to be extricated by his troopers, the horse being left 
 behind. Through the nearest village, losing four men and 
 their horses, he forced his way under a severe fire from 
 Franc-tireurs. He then took shelter in a neighbouring wood 
 for the night, reconnoitred Chateaudun again the next day, 
 and afterwards returned to his Division. For his courage 
 and conduct v. Busse received great commendation in Army 
 Orders, and as a brave soldier he had done his duty well, but 
 as a reconnoitring officer he had let slip from his memory 
 how much the value of information obtained depends on its 
 speedy receipt by those who may have to act upon it. The 
 Grand Duke, on the 25th, knew that some French were 
 already as far north-east as Brou, and that was all he knew 
 about this alarming hostile advance ; but the cavalry subaltern 
 had learnt a great deal more about the enemy, namely, that 
 due east of the Detachment was a hostile force of all arms, 
 and, including regular troops, a force which, from its compo¬ 
 sition, was probably the main body or a portion of it; and 
 owing to a little forgetfulness, this young officer did not at 
 once communicate to the Grand Duke this invaluable 
 strategical information, but kept it to himself, thereby con¬ 
 tributing a share to the erroneous selection of an operation of 
 strategy. So the Duke struck a blow against the point of a 
 spear instead of endeavouring to break the shaft. The relative 
 situation of the Detachment and of the French 17th Corps 
 recalls to mind Hamley’s remark, that when two armies at the 
 same time threaten each other’s line of communications, that 
 army which fears most for its own will give way. How far 
 General de Sonis, the French commander, knew the exact 
 position of the Detachment we do not know, so it cannot be 
 
176 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 ascertained how he regarded the danger to his own line of 
 communications ; but, at all events, the Grand Duke believed 
 the situation to be perilous to the Detachment, for he forth¬ 
 with gave way and abandoned his own advance. It is impos- 
 to say, except ex post facto , whether the Grand Duke was 
 right or wrong; he could not have known that the enemy was 
 one of the least efficient corps of those in the Army of the 
 Loire. Perhaps nine out of ten commanders would have acted 
 as he did, whilst the tenth, a man of enterprise and decision, 
 relying on his 50,000 well-trained troops and their able 
 eaders—for in the Detachment the divisional commanders 
 were good soldiers—would have pushed on boldly, risking all 
 on this one chance of war, and knowing that at one and the 
 same time hewas threatening both theGovernment of National 
 Defence at Tours and its army at Orleans. The result of 
 such a stroke cannot be determined, as so much would have 
 depended on the moral effect produced among the French 
 Leaders, both military and civil. 
 
 So far as mere movements are concerned, November 25th is 
 in no way interesting or instructive, but otherwise it is one 
 of the most interesting days of the campaign, and certainly 
 instructive. It was one of the days, too many by far, of 
 alteration in the strategy, but as regards drawing on the 
 past for lessons for the future we must go to Beaune la 
 Rolande and Pithiviers. 
 
 At these two places the need of the moment was to 
 ascertain what this newly arrived hostile force in front really 
 was. V. Caprivi at Beaune was hard at work endeavouring 
 to solve the conundrum. How different from those August 
 days at Vionville in the first war, when a glance at the button 
 on the coat of a prisoner or a dead enemy lying on the 
 ground may have sufficed to tell him, by a simple reference 
 to the ordjre de bataille, whether it was le Boeufs corps or 
 Canrobert’s corps, or some other corps that was in front of his 
 own, which then was exhausted by battle, as now it was wearied 
 by hard marching and continuous fighting. Priceless now 
 for the Second Army, and especially for the Xth Army Corps, 
 
NOVEMBER 25 
 
 177 
 
 was a true ordre de bataille of the Army of the Loire on 
 November 25. How easy would its possession have rendered 
 the laying down on the chart the course to be steered by the 
 Corps and the Army. 
 
 Most unexpectedly, however, there came to v. Caprivi a 
 stroke of real good luck. The wounded prisoner, Colonel de 
 Brasserie, had by his manner as a chivalrous soldier and 
 gentleman, so impressed the German staff, that they had 
 exercised considerable delicacy in trying to elicit information 
 from him ; but the Colonel allowed his affection for his wife 
 to get the better of his discretion, and he wrote to her a 
 letter, in which he told her that he belonged to the 20th 
 Corps (General Crouzat). This letter having necessarily to go 
 through the German Military Post Office was opened and read 
 before transmission to Madame de Brasserie, and it gave to 
 v. Caprivi the information he was seeking for in vain else¬ 
 where, namely, the numerical designation of the corps that 
 had been engaged at Boiscommun ; moreover, it supplied the 
 heading missing from the ordre de bataille found in Captain 
 OgiIvy’s pocket-book for, in that ordre de bataille was named 
 among the “1st Division, General de Polignac,” the 2nd Lancer 
 Regiment, the one engaged at Boiscommun the previous day, 
 and commanded by de Brasserie. V. Caprivi was, however, 
 not satisfied with only the information that in front was one 
 particular corps ; he believed that the force that had been 
 encountered, or whose presence had been reported on the 
 previous day, was far larger than a single army corps could 
 be; and at 9.30 a.m. he reported: “The hostile troops 
 with which the Second Army was engaged yesterday belong 
 partly to Michel’s Corps (earlier combined with Garibaldi), 
 partly to three Divisions, which were on the march from 
 Gien, and according to an order found, were yesterday to 
 arrive at Beaune, St. Loup and Juranville.” On the 25th 
 146 prisoners were brought into the Army Head-quarters at 
 Pithiviers, and were closely interrogated. In drawing infer¬ 
 ences from their statements, the Head-quarters had before them 
 v. Caprivi’s report that the strength of the French was one 
 
 M 
 
178 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 Army Corps, and, besides, three Divisions. Owing to de 
 Bi •asserie’s indiscretion, it was clear that the corps was the 
 20th. But among the prisoners were men from the 44th 
 Marche Regiment and the 73rd Gardes Mobiles, neither of 
 which appeared in the ordre de bata'dlc; they belonged, there¬ 
 fore, not to the 20th, but to another corps ; so it was evi¬ 
 dent that there were larger forces than only one corps in 
 front. Not, however, that the Head-quarters accepted this 
 conclusion. 
 
 The examination of the prisoners, many of them very 
 voluble and excited, increased the confusion of thought. 
 They had been taken in the fight not at Boiscommun, but 
 at Ladon. Some said they belonged to the 20th Corps com¬ 
 manded by General Crouzat, others that they belonged to 
 the 18th Corps, commanded by General Michel. To these 
 assertions were added others that they had come by train 
 from the east to Gien. But the places of formation of the 
 18th Corps were known not to have been in the east. But 
 from the east, as already mentioned, had come a brigade for 
 this corps ; and as parts of both the 18th and 20th Corps had 
 fought at Ladon, all these statements, though apparently 
 irreconcilable, were true. The reference to Crouzat at Gien, 
 the mention of Ogilvy being detached from the 18th Corps, 
 the uncertainty as to the names of the commanders, and the 
 original statement of v. Werder, that it was Michel’s corps 
 that had gone west, combined to increase the difficulty of 
 drawing the true deduction from the information gathered. 
 The Prince, however, believed that the prisoners were either 
 trying to deceive him, or were ignorant of the actual organi¬ 
 sation of their army. And he did not believe that there was 
 more than one corps in front of him. 
 
 During the 25th, and apparently in the forenoon, v. Stiehle 
 had written one of his long letters to v. Moltke giving his 
 view of the situation, but it is of little interest, except in 
 the concluding portion ; and here we find one of the saddest 
 illustrations of “ personlichkeit ” we meet with in this war. 
 The Prince had always, and not unnaturally, felt deeply 
 
NOVEMBER 25 
 
 179 
 
 being deprived after Gravelotte of the 5th and 6th Cavalry 
 Divisions, which had originally belonged to his army, and which 
 had played so prominent a part in his successes in the earlier 
 period of the campaign. They had been taken from his 
 army, given to the Army of the Meuse, and had led the 
 advance to Sedan. On the day of Sedan, however, they were 
 with the Third Army, and here any prestige they had gained 
 was certainly diminished by their neglect in allowing General 
 Vinoy with Blanshard’s Division of the French 13th Corps, 
 to pass through them and make his way back to Paris. With 
 the Third and Fourth Armies they went on to Paris and did 
 good work in covering towards the west and south-west the 
 line of investment. When the much diminished Second 
 Army marched from Metz there was given to it the 1st 
 Cavalry Division under General v. Hartmann. The Prince 
 regarded v. Hartmann as an indifferent cavalry leader, 
 and it is certainly possible that he was justified in his 
 opinion. The Prince, in his advance from Metz, placed 
 this Division on the right flank of the army, a position 
 in which it could be of the least value to the army, hut it 
 was the nearest to Paris; and persistently, in season and out 
 of season, he inserted in his communications to v. Moltke 
 a request for an exchange of this Division with the 5th 
 and 6th. 
 
 On this matter, however, v. Moltke had been firm, for 
 compliance with the requests was simply impracticable. 
 And now again, on the morning of the 25th, crops up the 
 same demand, a demand which, made as it was under the 
 existing circumstances, renders it difficult to avoid attri¬ 
 buting to the Prince some smallness of mind as a leader. 
 The demand ran as follows: “The 2nd Cavalry Division 
 provides for the important and difficult task of watching the 
 enemy on the right flank of the Second Army. For estimat¬ 
 ing correctly the value of the reports received a thorough 
 knowledge of the individuals from whom they come is neces¬ 
 sary : this is the principal reason why his Royal Highness 
 Prince Frederick Charles again and pressingly requests that 
 
180 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN I’RANCE, 1870-71 
 
 the 6 th Cavalry Division now nearing the Second Army 
 may be again part of it, because the regiments and their 
 officers, and their mode of doing their work in the field, 
 are fully known to his Royal Highness.” The 2nd Cavalry 
 Division under Count v. Stolbei’g had, since the 13th, been 
 closely watching the Army of the Loire, and had acquired 
 a knowledge of the country north and west of Orleans ; 
 there is no trace of inefficiency in the Division. Far 
 away to the west and north-west have been with the 
 Grand Duke the 6 th Cavalry Division, under the com¬ 
 mand of Major-General v. Schmidt, the best Cavalry General 
 in the Gennan Army. This Division, like the 2nd, had 
 also acquired an intimate knowledge of the tract of 
 country over which it had been working; that knowledge 
 so important for cavalry in all its operations. Yet now 
 at this crisis, the Prince, himself a cavalry officer, asks 
 that they may exchange duties, exchange spheres of opera¬ 
 tions, each go from country they know to country they do 
 not know, and where they will be comparatively inefficient, 
 until they have had time to learn and understand the new 
 country. 
 
 For both the Prince and the Grand Duke there was a verv 
 
 j 
 
 great surprise in store this day, as agreeable to the former as 
 it must undoubtedly have been disagreeable to the latter. 
 At about one o’clock in the afternoon had been written at 
 Pithiviers a letter for the Duke, or it was being written ; it 
 informed the Grand Duke of what had taken place on the 
 24th, and also of the arrival from the east at Gien on the 
 Loire of a Corps 30,500 strong; and that, exclusive of this 
 Corps, the Army of the Loire is some 120,000 strong. The 
 Prince will therefore defer active operations until he has the 
 co-operation of the Detachment. At ten minutes after the 
 hour there arrived from v. Moltke a telegram to the following 
 effect: “ His Majesty the King has ordered : The Detachment 
 of his Royal Highness the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg is 
 placed, until further orders, under the command of Prince 
 Frederick Charles. The Detachment is to watch by Cavalry 
 
NOVEMBER 25 
 
 181 
 
 with Infantry supports the roads from Tours and le Mans 
 to Paris, and is to march as rapidly as possible in the direc¬ 
 tion of Beaugency until further orders. The March pro¬ 
 gramme, as proposed for the following days at the Head¬ 
 quarters of his Royal Highness the Grand Duke, is to be 
 sent as quickly as possible by wire to the Head-quarters of 
 the Second Army, which is to-day at Pithiviers, and here 
 also.” A similar telegram was sent from Versailles to the 
 Grand Duke. 
 
 Here we see v. Moltke suddenly giving up the control of a 
 strategical operation which he had himself taken in hand only 
 three days previously. At first sight it seems incredible 
 that he should have counselled the King to take this step. 
 The Prince had already shown that he differed from v. Moltke 
 in the strategical employment of the Detachment; v. Moltke 
 knew already the difficulty of making the Grand Duke obey 
 the orders even of the King, and he must have foreseen the 
 improbability of his being more amenable to one who was 
 only a Royal Prince; he must probably have been also aware 
 of the ill-feeling between the Grand Duke and his new 
 commander. Putting the reins into the hands of the Prince 
 would seem therefore equivalent to letting the operations 
 against the Army of the Loire go to the wall. But although 
 there is no record of the actual reason, the circumstances of 
 the moment seem to furnish grounds for an hypothesis, 
 which is now submitted for consideration as, not improbably, 
 correct. 
 
 The task of giving the necessary amount of time and 
 thought required for the control of the operations against 
 the Army of the Loire at this period must have been, men¬ 
 tally and physically, beyond the power of any human being 
 in the position of v. Moltke—a position in which the strain, 
 already enormous, was increasing hourly. The quarter from 
 which came least anxiety was the north, where v. Manteuffel 
 with the First Army was now commencing operations. V. 
 Manteuffel was a soldier of the highest ability ; with him was, 
 as a corps commander, v. Goeben, the idol of the German 
 
182 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 soldiers, so that in the leading of that army v. Moltke justi¬ 
 fiably had the fullest confidence. There was an anxious time 
 as regards the south-east of France where v. Werder, a 
 soldier not apparently of special military ability, was in 
 command ; it was from this quarter that the German line of 
 communications was most open to attack. But it was Paris 
 itself that demanded now the closest, and at the same time, 
 unremitting watchfulness. Here Trochu was preparing for 
 the great effort, known afterwards as “ Ducrot’s sortie.” If this 
 were to succeed the consequences might be of a very serious 
 character. No wonder then that v. Moltke relieved him¬ 
 self, for a time, of some portion of his arduous work ; but 
 this relief was to be only for a season, inasmuch as, the 
 danger over, he, a week later, again took the reins into his 
 own hands from those into which he now surrendered them. 
 The surrender was somewhat akin to making of necessity 
 a virtue. 
 
 The unsatisfactory leading of the Detachment and the 
 difficulty already experienced by v. Moltke in controlling the 
 commander may further have made the operations on the 
 Loire a burden to v. Moltke. The Grand Duke’s order of the 
 24th for the 25th had given great dissatisfaction at Versailles ; 
 so much so, that the authorities were compelled to consider 
 what action should be taken in the matter. It was seriously 
 discussed on the 24th, but the decision was left over for the 
 morning conference at the Royal Ilead-quarters on the 
 following day. Very early on the 25th, befoi'e the decision 
 was arrived at, v. Blumenthal, at 9.55 a.m., wired to the 
 Grand Duke that thunder was in the air : “ It is of the 
 utmost importance that the Detachment should move for¬ 
 ward.” The decisive telegram already given was sent at 
 1.10 p.m. to the Grand Duke, by whom it was received at 
 6.16 p.m. 
 
 At Pithiviers the Prince at once made use of the freedom 
 given him to act contrary to v. Moltke’s wishes, and he 
 added to the almost finished letter to the Grand Duke, before 
 despatching it: “I may tell your Royal Highness, in con- 
 
NOVEMBER 25 
 
 183 
 
 sequence of this telegram, that I can only assume that the 
 March programme to be sent to me will give, for the move¬ 
 ment in the direction of Beaugencv, the right wing at the 
 utmost.” The letter did not reach its destination until the 
 evening of the 26th. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 NOVEMBER 26th 
 
 On the 26th nothing of importance occurred at the Second 
 Army. The Prince held to the opinion, and v. Waldersee 
 seems to have shared his belief, that only one corps, the 20th, 
 Crouzat’s, was immediately in front. At the Xth Army Corps 
 v. V. Rhetz cairied out his duty of protecting the left of the 
 Army by sending away to Chateau Landon six companies, two 
 squadrons, and two guns from his already weakened corps. In 
 a slight engagement at Lorcy, arising out of a hostile reconnais¬ 
 sance, the participation of the population in the defence again 
 displayed itself. To the German outposts came men who, 
 apparently, were well-disposed peasants, and who offered for 
 sale bread and other articles of food. Conversation naturally 
 ensued, with the stei’eotyped question, “ Are there any French 
 troops near ? ” and the equally stereotyped falsehood, “ None.” 
 The bargains concluded, and the vendors having disappeared, 
 out burst a French battalion. Among the peasants had been 
 officers and men, with one eye on the bargains, and the other 
 on the numbers and badges of the German troops. 
 
 On the French side the 18th Corps arrived at Montai’gis ; 
 the 20th remained in position, occupying Ladon on its l'ight, 
 St. Loup on its left, while des Paillieres’ division, of which 
 the centre was at Chilleui's, was guarding the edge of the 
 foi’est on a front of nearly twenty miles, Cathelineau’s Fi-anc- 
 tireurs connecting it with Ci’ouzat. 
 
 The 26th was, however, a gx-eat day for letter-writing at 
 Pithiviers, but before dealing with this most interesting and 
 important correspondence, the operative work of the day must 
 be given. Early in the morning the Prince had heard from 
 
NOVEMBER 26 
 
 185 
 
 the Grand Duke of his intended march north-east on Brou ; 
 so, now freed from control, he shook off from his feet the 
 last particle of the Beaugency dust of Versailles, and, at 
 11.16 a.m., wired to the Grand Duke, “ Your Royal Highness 
 is ordered, attacking the enemy by way of Chateaudun and 
 Bonneval, to march without loss of time to unite with the 
 Second Army, of which the right Hank is at Janville” [west 
 of and near Toury]. The Detachment meanwhile pursued its 
 way north-east, and, in the evening, extended from Brou on 
 the north (22nd Inf. Division) to Drone on the south (Bava¬ 
 rians), fifteen miles ; but as the rear corps of the previous day 
 was now the leading corps and vice versa , there could not fail 
 to be again march complications. There was not, however, 
 any fighting ; for de Sonis, alarmed by false reports to the 
 effect that the Second and Third Armies and the 4th Cav. 
 Division were closing round him, retired on the 26th to Cha¬ 
 teaudun. A somewhat alarming report had come to the 
 Germans from three prisoners, that a force of 75,000 men, 
 including three battalions from Chateaudun and ten from 
 Bonneval were on the march in a direction they could only 
 indicate as “ to the north.” The Grand Duke, although he 
 knew that he was now under the Prince, had not, during the 
 day, received any orders from him, so in a communication to 
 Versailles, he mentioned this fact, and, later on, asked by 
 telegraph the Third Army, “ Have I anything to do with the 
 Third Army ?” But now the Grand Duke was to receive a 
 serious shock to his feelings and his pride, for there came from 
 v. Moltke the following telegram : 
 
 “ His Majesty the King has, at a personal audience to-day, 
 been pleased to command, on account of the special import¬ 
 ance which now attaches to the operations of the Detach¬ 
 ment under the orders of your Royal Highness, that Lieu¬ 
 tenant-General v. Stosch, to whom has been communicated his 
 Majesty’s views, shall act, until further orders, as Chief of 
 the General Staff of the Detachment. I must not omit to 
 inform your Royal Highness, with the deepest respect, that a 
 special superior order will follow.” 
 
186 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 The step taken by v. Moltke—for ot course it was his doing 
 —was altogether exceptional in the conduct of control, and 
 this case was beset with difficulties requiring to be treated with 
 the greatest delicacy. Nominally, it was merely substitution, 
 temporarily, of one Staff Officer for another. But as the Com¬ 
 mander is the superior of the Staff Officer, and as, up to the 
 present time, the Duke does not appear to have had, or made, 
 any complaint against Col. v. Krenski, he was indirectly 
 responsible for the continued failure of the staff' work ; so the 
 change was necessarily somewhat of a reproof to him, and an 
 expression of dissatisfaction at the way in which this work had 
 been done. But in the selection of the substitute, two points 
 had to be taken into consideration : he must be, professionally, 
 of great ability, he must be of rank that in itself must carry 
 influence. The choice was, therefore, very limited, and seems 
 to have lain between v. Podbielski, the Quartermaster-General, 
 and v. Stosch, the head of the Intendance Branch. After 
 having undergone a certain amount of preliminary sounding, 
 v. Stosch, on the 26th, accepted the post, but as he could not 
 leave the Royal Head-quarters without the sanction of his 
 chief, v. Roon, the Minister of War, v. Moltke had to ask 
 personally for this. V. Roon saw the necessity of the case 
 and gave the required permission, saying that he would keep 
 v. Stosch’s appointment open, provided that he was not away 
 too long. 
 
 But, possibly, it was not merely to get better staff work that 
 it was v. Stosch who was chosen for this mission. V. Moltke 
 knew that he had now on the Loire two obstinate personalities, 
 over whom he had voluntarily given up control. V. Stosch 
 was an excellent soldier, a large-minded man, but in view of 
 the situation he was a good deal more. Owing to his high 
 position on the supreme staff' of the German forces, and his 
 close professional connection with v. Moltke, the chief Staff 
 Officer of those forces, he was, on the Loire, little less than 
 v. Moltke present by proxy. The Grand Duke must now be 
 aware that if he rebelled against his new Chief Staff' Officer 
 he would be rebelling against v. Moltke, whilst the Prince 
 
NOVEMBER 26 
 
 187 
 
 knew similarly, that although he might be determined to act 
 in future in disregard of v. Moltke’s expressed views and 
 wishes, there was present only a few miles away from him in 
 the theatre of war, v. Moltke’s personal representative, 
 endeavouring to hold him in check. Nevertheless the Prince 
 regarded the change as decidedly for the better. V. Stosch 
 (juitted Versailles on the 26th and arrived at the Detachment 
 on the following day. And now to the letter-writing. 
 
 From Pithviers at midday v. Stiehle reported to v. Moltke 
 the views and intentions of the Second Army with respect to 
 the Detachment; he wrote also that owing to the heavy 
 character of the country, due to the rain, it was impossible 
 for the French to advance to the attack ; the French would, 
 therefore, remain quiescent, hoping that the Second Army 
 would take the initiative, attack them in their well-chosen 
 and well-prepared positions in the Forest of Orleans, and 
 become engaged in a many days’ tight on a wide front; then 
 the numerical inferiority of the Germans would enable some 
 of the French forces, not engaged, to advance, compelling 
 the attackers to give up the fight and march after them ; 
 the French would not fail to claim this as a victory. So the 
 Prince would wait until the Detachment came near enough for 
 effective co-operation, and then he would determine whether 
 the right wing could secure a crossing over the Loire below 
 Orleans, whence masses of cavalry could be sent into the 
 country on the other side. An attack on Orleans from the 
 north-west would be thereby greatly facilitated. The success 
 of this plan, he added, depended, however, on whether the Xth 
 Army Corps could hold in check for several days the right wing 
 of the enemy, and also on the enemy not pushing forward large 
 bodies of troops between the Loing and the Yonne. People 
 travelling reported the force opposite the Xth Army Corps to 
 be 60,000, but this he believed to be an exaggeration. The 
 French corps opposite the army were, he said, the 20th, 15th, 
 and 16th. The 18th [at Montargis] under Bourbaki [ Billot 
 was in command, as Bourbaki had not yet arrived] was he said 
 at Tours [some eighty miles away]; the 17th [at Chateauduu] 
 
188 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 was at le Mans. A Fog of War indeed ; the French people 
 in their war kept their secrets well. 
 
 On this day the Prince replied as follows to the letter he had 
 received from the Kin" : 
 
 O 
 
 “ I am fully of opinion that I must not run any risk at 
 this period of the war, where the fall of Paris has to be con¬ 
 sidered. Looking at my position, twenty-eight miles long, 
 opposite a far numerically stronger enemy, with whose out¬ 
 posts I am in touch at several points, many would consider it 
 dangerous. Rut it must be borne in mind that the enemy 
 over-estimates my strength very much, and that the bad 
 ground away from main roads can hardly, or only with great 
 difficulty, be used for manoeuvring, so this protects me; 
 and this sort of position deceives the enemy ; so it must 
 be admitted that I can remain here until the enemy learns 
 the truth, and until the ground improves. I do not see any 
 danger to myself, only a little inconvenience. 
 
 “ The concentration of the main body of the hostile regular 
 troops in the Forest of Orleans, if my impression is correct, 
 has been well considered and well carried out. 
 
 “ Does the enemy contemplate the relief of Paris P 
 
 “ Certainly this was his intention. That it is so now, I 
 doubt. Somewhere about the 15th, orders were already given 
 for an advance on Etampes, but were recalled on the same day 
 when the approach of ‘ 200,000 men from Metz 1 was heard 
 of.” [This was not the case ; no such orders were given.] 
 “ Rut in this campaign we have had already some wonderful 
 experiences. I mean the order from Paris to MacMahon for 
 the relief of Metz, which led eventually to Sedan. So may 
 now, also Lawyers’ orders decree that the Army of the Loire 
 shall under any circumstances go to relieve Paris. 
 
 “ Will the enemy advance on the broad front, as his out¬ 
 posts stand now, or from one or both flanks ? 
 
 “ I believe that he would specially prefer the direction by 
 Pusieaux” [due north of Reaune] “to Fontainebleau, especially 
 if he still wishes to take the offensive, because the ground is 
 there on the whole most favourable for him, the direction is 
 
NOVEMBER 26 
 
 189 
 
 straight, and because he will march past my left Hank, and 
 this direction leads away from the approaching Detachment 
 of the Grand Duke. I own that it would give me much 
 pleasure to have to deal with such an advance, because the 
 operation would be new to me. I should endeavour to 
 maiKEUvre with the centre corps (the Illrd Army Corps) as 
 Napoleon did against Bluchers Army on the Marne in 1814. 
 I presume, of course, that the enemy, in order to deceive me, 
 shows the heads of columns on all the roads to Paris, without 
 prejudice to the main body which marches off to the right. 
 I would pledge myself that the enemy, at the most, advances 
 only four or Hve miles a day. 
 
 “ But far more difficult than this question is that of driving 
 the enemy out of the Forest of Orleans. If the Emperor 
 Napoleon III. said with truth he had never been able, owing 
 to the numerous cavalry which covered my advance to the 
 Moselle, to find out where the main body was, so can I say 
 the same as respects my own situation now. I know only, 
 with certainty, that this or that village or farm house is 
 occupied ; where some large bodies of troops are is also 
 occasionally known ; where the main body of the army is, 
 whether at Orleans, or on the line Gien-Bellegarde, I do not 
 know. We have not been successful in taking prisoners at 
 many places. 
 
 “ I hope that I shall know more about the enemy when 
 the Grand Duke arrives, whom, under the existing circum¬ 
 stances, I must employ tactically, not strategically, against 
 the Army of the Loire.” 
 
 This was an honest statement of his refusal to adopt v. 
 Moltke’s strategy. 
 
 It must here be remarked that v. Moltke was in complete 
 ignorance of the correspondence carried 011 between the Prince 
 and the King, so later on, in discussions with the latter, he was 
 somewhat surprised to find his Majesty meeting him with the 
 very same arguments that had been put forward to himself by 
 v. Stiehle. The letter continues : “ I know nothing of the con¬ 
 dition of the Grand Duke’s troops, nor details of the length 
 
190 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 of their marches, but I have no great objection to their 
 being given a rest day” [when v. Stosch was on his way to 
 hurry them on |. “ The arrival of this Detachment in front 
 
 of Orleans, even without this rest-day, is not concealed 
 from the enemy, who must be in touch with it; and if I 
 am compelled to make an attack, which I could not have 
 carried out before to-day, but would carry out to-day, little 
 is lost if I wait yet one day longer, and delay it to the 
 29th. 
 
 “ The fight against Orleans will probably last many days, 
 and be very bloody ; but I will undertake it unless I receive 
 other orders. 
 
 “ One must do in war what is most inconvenient to the 
 enemy, not that which he likes. To me it seems clear that 
 the enemy wishes me to attack, and wherever I may make the 
 attack I shall come on a series of small strong localities pre¬ 
 pared for defence. Since I must always so arrange as to be 
 able to get in front of an enemy who, when I am engaged 
 with him, may march past my hank on Paris, I am unfortu¬ 
 nately more restricted in the choice of the direction * of my 
 attack than I should be after the fall of Paris. Then there 
 would be disposable for Orleans, so many troops, that perhaps 
 the enemy might be again invested. How far the capture of 
 Orleans will “ throw the enemy over the Loire ” [apparently 
 a quotation from the King’s letter] I cannot say ; for that 
 will be only one part of the enemy’s army. How far it will 
 hasten the development of matters at Paris I do not know. 
 Whether it can be postponed until after that catastrophe is 
 beyond my judgment. But what I can be sure of is that I 
 will do my best for both, to hold the enemy as far from Paris 
 as possible, or to wrest Orleans from him. The loving and 
 gracious God grant that this object may be attained without 
 too severe loss.” [And then peeps out after piety, practical 
 
 * In the letter as given by Hoenig and v. d. Goltz respectively there is a 
 remarkable difference here. The latter uses (p. 101) the word “ Angriffs- 
 richtungen” ; the former (vol. i. p. 366), the word “ Angriffsbewegungen,” 
 a serious difference. 
 
NOVEMBER 26 
 
 i 9 i 
 
 tactics.] “ In all cases the artillery shall prepare the way 
 thoroughly for the infantry. 
 
 “ To day’s daily state gives 48,000 men ; but from this total 
 must be deducted, per Army Corps, at least one battalion 
 for escorts to trains and baggage, etc., against Franc-tireurs, 
 and also every dav sonic sick. In this total are included also 
 footsore men and small commands of all sorts, which have 
 been left behind on the march ; so that 40,000 rifles are cer¬ 
 tainly not exceeded. But the troops are splendid, and already 
 many wounded officei’s and men are again to the front. 
 
 “ When the war is over the infantry must have a better 
 fire-arm—that is the general desire.” 
 
 The value of this letter lies in its giving us the views of the 
 leader of 100,000 men, on the strategical and tactical aspects 
 of a military operation, on the issues of which depended 
 whether the tide of conquest had come to the full, and hence¬ 
 forth must exchange the flow for the ebb ; or whether the 
 last remaining barrier to its onward course should now be 
 swept away, and the deluge of invasion spread over the 
 whole land. Whether v. d. Golz has given the letter in 
 extenso, we do not know, but certain it is, that from his posi¬ 
 tion as one of the staff’ of the Prince, he has done justice to 
 his commander. Taken then, as a fair representation of 
 the mind of the Prince, the letter is hardly that of a really 
 great soldier; there is in it somewhat more of the student 
 of war, than of the soldier in the field. 
 
 That the French had over-estimated in an extraordinary 
 degree the Germans opposed to them, was a fact; for on the 
 23rd d’Aurelle, in a report to Tours, estimated the combined 
 strength of the Second Army and of the Detachment at 
 200,000, and stated his belief that at Pithiviers (where there 
 were only 16,000), there were 80,000 men ; but at any moment 
 it was possible that the real numerical inferiority of the 
 Germans might have been discovered. As regards the possi¬ 
 bility of working over the country, the Prince was quite mis¬ 
 taken, as he found to his cost two days later ; so the justifica¬ 
 tion for the great extension of his position was based on very 
 
192 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 weak reasoning. As regards the tactical aspect of an attack 
 on Orleans, the Prince was, on the other hand, thoroughly 
 correct in his views. Although he sarcastically spoke of 
 Lawyers’orders as governing the French ‘operations, he could 
 not possibly know that, as was actually the case, Gambetta 
 and de Freycinet, and not d’Aurelle gave the most important 
 orders ; he was bound to presume that the defence of this 
 most defensible position round Orleans would remain in 
 the hands of the military Leader; and a visit to the 
 ground cannot fail to impress on the mind, the almost 
 hopeless character of any attack on it with a numerical 
 inferiority of infantry if it is defended by troops even not 
 wholly regulars, but who are numerous and are utilised in 
 accordance with the simplest principles of military leading. 
 With respect to the Prince’s strategy, as revealed in the 
 letter, there seems to be a want of unison between theory and 
 practice ; the student of war states the case fairly, the soldier 
 fails in the application to practise. The Prince gives 
 correctly the strategical operations open to the enemy for 
 adoption ; and he is equally correct as to the only way in 
 which it is possible to deal effectually with them, and he 
 quotes as an exemplar Napoleon and the Marne ; but he seems 
 to overlook the fact that the mode in which he is dealing 
 tactically with the situation, this vast extension of front, 
 will render in the highest degree difficult, that close con¬ 
 centration of all available forces, which is the foundation- 
 stone for the subsequent strategical manoeuvring operations. 
 To place himself in a situation analogous to that of the great 
 Napoleon, much time will be required, and the enemy will 
 certainly not allow the concentration to be carried out undis¬ 
 turbed ; but the “ heads of the columns on all roads ” will do 
 a good deal more than merely “ show ” themselves ; they will 
 engage and hold to their ground no small portion of the 
 troops which the Prince will be trying to draw together 
 away from them for the strategic movement on which so 
 much depends, and for the success of which rapidity in exe¬ 
 cution is essential. 
 
NOVEMBER 26 
 
 193 
 
 It was on this day that the Prince had finally thrown aside 
 the operation of convergent strategy initiated by v. Moltke on 
 the 22nd and handed over by him on the 25th to the Prince to 
 carry out; and for it the latter now substitutes an operation of 
 convergent tactics. It is possible that v. Moltke’s scheme 
 might have succeeded, but owing to causes, of the existence of 
 which it is in the highest degree improbable that v. Moltke was 
 aware. These were the virtual abandonment by d’Aurelle of 
 the chief military command, and the assumption of this com¬ 
 mand by Gambetta and de Freycinet; the diversity of views 
 between d’Aurelle and Chanzy, the chief commander on the 
 western side of the great road ; the rawness of the left Hank 
 corps, the 17th, the little value of the 21st Corps at leMans ; 
 the nervousness of the Delegation for the safety of Tours, the 
 exaggerated estimate of the German forces, and the erroneous 
 notions as to the positions, views and intentions of the 
 invading forces in this theati’e of war. The Prince’s tactical 
 operation, however, involved an attack on a very strong and 
 well-prepared position, held by a numerically superior enemy. 
 Had the Army of the Loire, before it was actually attacked, 
 not been previously weakened by the overthrows on November 
 28th and December 2nd, and had it received that attack, not 
 outside, but secure in the position itself, it is very questionable 
 that the attack would have been successful. But, neverthe¬ 
 less, in the preference for the strategical attack v. Moltke 
 seems to have grasped the situation far better than did the 
 Prince. In the first war the first French Army had proved 
 its stubbornness in defence, and had revealed its weakness in 
 manoeuvring. Whilst it was likely that the second French 
 Army, animated by the highest spirit of patriotism, would 
 rival its predecessor in endeavouring to hold its ground when 
 attacked by the invaders, it was most improbable that it 
 would reach even the former low standard of manceuvrinir 
 power, and it was almost certain that its generals and staffs 
 would be even still less capable of utilising the little of that 
 power it possessed. That d’Aurelle, with the materials at 
 his disposal, would be able effectively to meet a hostile 
 
 N 
 
194 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 strategic operation coining on him by surprise at some 
 unexpected point in the long front of seventy miles from Gien 
 to le Mans is in the highest degree unlikely, V. Moltke 
 wished to take advantage of a weakness, the Prince ignored 
 the weakness and preferred to attack under conditions the 
 most favourable to the enemy. Mechanically worked tactics 
 were to be substituted for art-like strategy. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 NOVEMBER 27th 
 
 The period from November 27th to December 2nd is the de¬ 
 cisive period not only of this “People’s War,” or of the cam¬ 
 paign on the Loire, hut it may be regarded as the decisive period 
 of the whole Franco-German campaign of the Second War; 
 for during it the French Army in Paris made its greatest 
 effort to break through the investing line, whilst from the 
 south the Army of the Loire made its two great attempts to 
 force the investing Army to release the capital from its grip. 
 But it was on the result of any decisive encounter on the 
 Loire,and not on Ducrot’s forcinghisway through the investing 
 line with some 50,000 or 60,000 men that for the Germans 
 the future depended. If the French Army of the Loire were 
 thoroughly defeated, these 50,000 or 60,000 men would he 
 aimless wanderers, easily dealt with ; hut if Prince Frederick 
 Charles were defeated, and the Army of the Loire victorious 
 and free to move, immediate concentration of nearly all the 
 remaining German forces in France became at once a necessity 
 for self-preservation, and this would involve the abandonment 
 of the investment. Thereby the practical sympathy of the 
 whole of Europe could not fail to have been enlisted in the 
 cause of a nation that had endured such prolonged suffering, 
 and had by such endurance emerged successfully from disaster 
 and defeat; and it is possible that from political considera¬ 
 tions, Germany might have hesitated to embark on a new 
 campaign against France. Hence, at this time, the import¬ 
 ance of the campaign on the Loire. That the crisis on the 
 Loire lasted so long was due to the Fog of War, which now- 
 hid from the contending commanders on both sides what was 
 
196 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 in front of them ; so that insteadiof rapidly carrying out move¬ 
 ments which must have brought the crisis to a climax, there 
 was cautious refraining from activity, because any movement 
 seemed fraught with danger. 
 
 It is impossible to relate here all the details of the pro¬ 
 ceedings on these days, and of them only a general account 
 can be given, attention being drawn also to some matters 
 in them specially deserving notice. Rut even this account 
 may raise in the mind of the reader some not altogether 
 satisfactory reflections on the value of the study of the Art 
 of War; and this feeling would be intensified by a careful 
 perusal of the large amount of recorded details. Cui 
 bono, the study of war, if leaders blundering and giving 
 wrong orders, and if troops fighting blindfolded, can thus 
 win in campaigns and battles ? The elements of chance, 
 of luck, and fortune, seem to have had here far more weight 
 and influence on the results than did study, thought, and 
 brains. 
 
 It is impossible not to sympathise with the Prince in the 
 anxiety he felt from the earliest hours of the 27th. The 
 reports had told him that during the previous day, the enemy 
 in front of him had gained ground, slowly and not much, but 
 still, ground had been gained ; and the number of the hostile 
 forces in front of the 9000 or 10,000 men of the Xth Army 
 Corps must at the lowest estimate be 55,000. 
 
 On the previous day he had viewed, without any dis¬ 
 quietude or disapproval a rest-day for the Detachment; but 
 now, as the storm was certainly gathering, and might burst 
 on him at any moment, the sooner the Detachment came to 
 his aid the better ; but there arrived a telegram sent early by 
 the Grand Duke saying that he would reach the Loir that 
 day, but must take a rest-day on the 28th ; and at 8 f.m. came 
 from v. Stosch a confirmatory telegram ; so no help could be 
 looked for in that direction ; and also from many sources 
 came reports that the French Army was massing to the right 
 at Montargis,* beyond the German left. In Ladon, had been 
 * As the incidents are now becoming localised at and near Beaune, it 
 
NOVEMBER 27 
 
 197 
 
 found letters from French soldiers, at the camp at Montargis, 
 all referring to the march on Paris, and the certainty of success. 
 “ It is evident,” said most of the writers, “that now at last it is 
 to be an advance, for at the places where only a few days ago 
 there were Prussians, they [the French] are now advancing 
 victoriously.” Reading the reports, it is impossible to doubt 
 that the Prince was fully justified in drawing from them the 
 conclusion, that the strategical advance selected by Gambetta 
 was to be up the valley of the Loing. He therefore determined 
 for the morrow to carry out a general movement towards the 
 East, so that the army would front towards Montargis. And 
 yet the conclusion he drew was the opposite of the truth, for 
 the French had no intention whatever of taking this line of 
 advance; and they had not, on the 27th, massed forces at 
 Montargis. The 18th Corps had been there on the 26th, 
 but on the 27th it was drawn west, leaving oidy a brigade to 
 cover the right of the delayed attack on Beaune and Pitliiviers, 
 for which the final preparations were completed by Crouzat 
 this day. It will appear later on that the orders given by 
 the Prince, and an order given by v. V. Rhetz, to meet a 
 situation that did not exist, led to the successful dealing by 
 the Germans with the situation that did exist. 
 
 And now to the Detachment, which, owing to the retire¬ 
 ment of de Sonis and the 17th Corps on the night of the 
 26th, entered Chateaudun and Bonneval on the 27th, 
 encountering but little opposition. Some of the inhabitants 
 resisted to the last, and being taken with arms in their hands 
 were at once shot. 
 
 V. Stosch, in the course of his journey to Chateaudun, where 
 he expected to find the Head-quarters of the Detachment, struck 
 first on the 4th Cav. Division and the 22nd Inf. Division, north 
 of Bonneval; and by his own personal observation, as well as 
 from conversation with some of the senior officers, found how 
 widely different was the actual condition of an army that 
 
 seems desirable to warn the reader that in this book the name “ Montargis ” 
 indicates invariably the town on the Loing, and never the little village four 
 miles east of Beaune. 
 
198 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 had been struggling continuously for a fortnight against a 
 people in arms, from the idea formed of its condition, by 
 Staff Officers of high degree, including perhaps himself, who 
 had all the time been comfortably fed and lodged at Versailles. 
 The whole Detachment, including its staff, was in a state 
 of moral depi'ession. As the officers he met told him, this 
 depression was not due to the mere physical exertions, to the 
 marching off before dawn, the haltings, delays and crossings 
 on the roads ; the arrival after dark into quarters, or into 
 no quarters at all, but into wet and cold bivouacs: these 
 trials and discomforts would not have told on the men if 
 only there had been some tangible result, one battle, one real 
 encounter ; but instead of this, there had been only a perpetual 
 irritating skirmishing with guerilla bands. One big battle, 
 and the Detachment would still have been fit for any work. 
 V. Stosch soon became convinced that a rest-day was 
 absolutely necessary, and he forthwith obtained leave for it 
 from Versailles. 
 
 The Duke received v. Stosch with a somewhat distant 
 manner; the change of Chief Staff Officer without con¬ 
 sultation with him was a departure from rule, and he might 
 fairly suspect that v. Stosch had been sent to keep a watch 
 on him. But soon v. Stosch discovered that the discontent 
 of the Grand Duke arose from the same cause as did the 
 general depression, hard work with no result. Employing, 
 therefore, the utmost tact, and constantly nourishing in the 
 mind of his commander the prospect of a battle in the near 
 future, and one worthy of the Detachment, v. Stosch succeeded 
 in establishing himself in the position he had been sent to 
 occupy, namely, accepted and trusted adviser and counsellor, 
 and, not improbably, as a sort of protection against the 
 idiosyncrasies of the Prince, whose behests the Grand Duke 
 had now to obey. 
 
 V. Stosch, turning to the investigation of the way in which 
 the staff' work had been carried on, found a state of things 
 that fully accounted for much of the unsatisfactory leading,and 
 for the meagreness of the information that from time to time 
 
NOVEMBER 27 
 
 199 
 
 had been furnished to Versailles. To his surprise there was 
 no Field Bureau, the records were in disorder, precis of in¬ 
 formation received were not forthcoming, there was no proper 
 subdivision and distribution of Staff Duties; in short, there 
 was not at the Head-quarters any proper Staff Organisation. 
 All this, v. Stosch at once reformed, and he put the staff 
 work on a right footing. 
 
 The 17th Corps bad now quite disappeared from the neigh¬ 
 bourhood. On the 26th, de Sonis, at Chateaudun, had 
 received permission from d’Aurelle to retire on Orleans. But 
 in Tonrs a real panic had arisen on the receipt of the news 
 from de Sonis, that he believed two armies and a Cavalry 
 Division to be closing on him. Orders were at once sent to 
 d’Aurelle to provide for the protection of the Delegation, so 
 he ordered de Sonis not to retire on Orleans, but due south 
 on Marchenoir, and he suggested anight march; a dangerous 
 form of retreat even with good soldiers, but full of risk for 
 those here. Some hostile cavalry patrols, a few stray shots, and 
 the 17th Corps broke and fled ; a large number rallied at St. 
 Laurent des Bois, not far from Marchenoir, some did not 
 stop until they had got to the Loire at Beaugency. On the 
 27th, from the country far and wide, the scattered troops 
 were gradually collected south of the Forest of Marchenoir. 
 
 On this night of the 27th, whilst the Detachment is look¬ 
 ing forward to the well-earned rest of the morrow, and the 
 Prince is full of the strategic movement north from Montargis 
 that he is to thwart, Crouzat, within a few miles of him, is 
 at work at his plan of battle for the morrow, and has drawn 
 up his orders for the decisive stroke which, within four and 
 twenty hours shall, he hopes, have crushed at all events the Xtii 
 A.C., the left of the Second German Army. During the day 
 the 18th Corps, with the exception of a brigade that remained 
 at Montargis, had been brought to Ladon. The plan for the 
 battle was good, and in devising it Crouzat possessed an advan¬ 
 tage notusually found with an attacking force; he knew in detail 
 the positions of all the troops of the Xth Army Corps on the 
 night before the battle; whereas the defenders could only 
 
200 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 surmise in the vaguest way the dispositions of even the 
 largest units of the attacking force, and were actually doubt¬ 
 ful what those units really were. Nor could it be otherwise. 
 The area over which the Xth Army Corps was scattered in the 
 neighbourhood of the battlefield is some twenty-five square 
 miles in extent. On it are a large number of villages and 
 hamlets, and roads and tracks are in profusion ; the line of 
 German outposts was ten miles in length, and, in front of 
 Beaune, but 500 or 600 yards distant from that of the 
 French. It was, therefore, impossible for the Germans to 
 prevent the population collecting information as to the dis¬ 
 position of the troops over the whole area, and then trans¬ 
 mitting it to the French outposts, whence it went to Crouzat. 
 During the battle there were confined in the church of 
 Beaune, forty civilians who had been captured whilst taking 
 part in the previous fights, or whilst obtaining information. 
 Amongst them was the Cure of Lorcy, the Sous-Maire of 
 Montargis, and the Maire of a small village. Crouzat’s plan was 
 to envelop the Xth Army Corps, to cut it off from the rest of 
 the Second Army, and to crush it. Crouzat considered that 
 the key of the position he was to endeavour to hold after its 
 capture was the village of Beaune ; v. V. Rhetz seemed to 
 consider it also the key of his own position, though that it 
 was so, as the key of a position protecting the left flank of 
 the Second Army, his special duty, is not at all certain ; so 
 whilst he disposed his corps specially for its protection, 
 Crouzat made its capture the special object of the battle. 
 Crouzat determined that after the German outposts had been 
 driven in, the 18th Corps from Ladon should advance on the 
 east side of the village, whilst the 20th Corps advanced 
 simultaneously against its front and its west side; the 
 Germans would thus find themselves enveloped on both flanks 
 and their line of retreat threatened. If they retired, Beaune 
 must be left to its fate ; if they did not retire, they would find 
 themselves surrounded by overwhelming forces. On the left 
 of the 20th Corps were Cathelineau’s Franc-tireurs, who were 
 maintaining connection between that corps and the 1st Division 
 
NOVEMBER 27 
 
 201 
 
 (des Pallieres’) of the 15th Corps, which Division, on a very 
 wide front, was guarding the entries to the Forest of Orleans 
 east of the Paris Road. It was intended that the troops on 
 the left of the 20th Corps should deal with any German 
 reinforcements arriving from Pithiviers. As on the 27th des 
 Pallieres had been informed both by Crouzat on his right, 
 and by Chanzy on his left, that they expected to be attacked, 
 he considered it to be his duty to remain in his present posi¬ 
 tion, to look both ways, help in either direction and also 
 prevent the enemy breaking in between the two corps. It 
 must be mentioned that owing to orders being sent from 
 both Tours and d’Aurelle, there was great doubt at times 
 in the minds of the Generals as to what they were expected 
 to do. 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 
 NOVEMBER 28th—BATTLE OF BEAUNE LA ROLANDE 
 
 At eight o’clock on the morning of November 28th, there fell 
 into Beaune from the south near St. Loup, two miles south of 
 Beaune and four west of Juranville, a few shells, of which one 
 struck the house in which were the Head-quarters of the Xth 
 Army Corps. The battle of Beaune la Rolande, the effort to 
 accomplish the first stage of the advance of the Army of the 
 Loire to the relief of Paris, had begun. It was the first of the 
 three battles which in one week were fought on the Loire. A 
 detailed narrative of the battle would be beyond the scope of 
 this work, so only a general account of it will here be given. 
 
 The 2400 men forming the ten miles line of German 
 outposts were soon driven in, but the 18th Corps in 
 advancing from Ladon towards the east side of Beaune by 
 Juranville and Venouille, encountered unexpectedly strong 
 hostile foi'ces in the way. At the time when Crouzat allotted 
 this task to the corps he knew that the Germans were not in 
 force here ; but unknown to him, v. V. Rhetz, in accordance 
 with the directions from the Prince to watch towards Mon- 
 targis, had drawn in the early morning to this flank his one 
 reserve Brigade and the Corps Artillery, so these were at 
 once utilised to stop the advance. The main body of 
 the Xth Army Corps was collected hei’e about Long Cour, 
 which is two miles east of Beaune. General Billot, who was in 
 command of the 18th Corps, endeavoured in vain, after 
 having captur-ed the advanced German posts, to drive the 
 Germans from the main position ; but at 2 f.m. he abandoned 
 the attempt, and leaving some Loops in front of the enemy, 
 he marched, concealed by the close country, with the 
 
NOVEMBER 28 
 
 203 
 
 remainder to Beaune, and took part in the unsuccessful 
 attacks there later on in the afternoon. Against the German 
 right, Crouzat, with the 20th Corps, had been at first 
 decidedly successful, though the splendid attack of this Garde 
 Mobile Corps on the south-west and west side of the village of 
 Beaune failed against the well-disciplined resistance of the 38th 
 Infantry Brigade (v. Wedell). But by an enveloping attack 
 from the west the Germans were forced back on the north side 
 of the village, the defenders of which thus became isolated from 
 the rest of the corps. So bad was the outlook towards 2 p.m., 
 that v. V. Rhetz, on the receipt of an erroneous report from a 
 Staff’ Officer that Beaune had fallen into the hands of the 
 French, ordered a general retreat. But at the suggestion of 
 Colonel v. Caprivi the issue of the order was suspended, as 
 reinforcements were on their way from Pithiviers. It was 
 about 3 p.m. that the troops of the 5th Infantry Division 
 arrived near enough to influence the course of the fight, and 
 then a counterstroke against the left flank of the attack drove 
 the French back. The garrison in Beaune had held out 
 against the earlier attacks of the 20th Corps and the later 
 ones when the 18th Corps also entered on the eastern side 
 of the village into the fray. The battle was prolonged into 
 the darkness, and then the French were driven finally off the 
 battlefield, leaving the defenders of the position, however, 
 worn out and exhausted. 
 
 The initial operation for the relief of Paris had failed. Rarely 
 has an attacking force been so completely overthrown and 
 rendered so thoroughly incapable for either defence or offence : 
 rarely has the demoralisation resulting from a single defeat 
 in one theatre of war so greatly influenced the course of a 
 subsequent renewal of the struggle in another theatre of war. 
 Beaune la Rolande made itself felt on the Lisaine. Usually 
 after a battle the victor knows that he has won, but here, 
 strangely enough, whilst the losers fully realised the com¬ 
 pleteness of their own defeat, the victor not only did not 
 realise his victory, but he completely misunderstood what had 
 happened; he believed that his victory was only a narrow 
 
204 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 escape from actual defeat, and that he would have to undergo 
 a similar ordeal next day. So the fruits of victory remained 
 ungarnered. And this was owing to a very great extent to 
 the fact that the war of which this battle was an incident, 
 was a “People’s War” in a tract of country singularly 
 adapted to a war of this character. It was by the aid of the 
 people that Crouzat had been able to lie hidden close to his 
 enemy, and to place, unknown to him, his troops in position 
 whence they could burst out on him unexpectedly; it was 
 with the aid of the people that when he had failed and was 
 forced to abandon the attack, he found again the safe shelter 
 from which he had emerged, a haven of security and rest. 
 On the night following the battle, all that the Prince knew 
 was the bare fact that an attack had been made on the 
 Xth Army Corps, and had been repulsed. 
 
 No doubt to judge correctly the result of a battle, even 
 if it be a victory, is often a matter of great difficulty, and 
 it is only the commander, possessing a real military coup 
 d'ceil, who can see below the surface of that which lies before 
 him; but it is cei'tain that a leader less cautious and more 
 physically active than the Prince would have found out some¬ 
 thing of how matters stood. Until there is given to the 
 world the views and reasons of action of the Prince other 
 than those to be found in official or semi-official publications, 
 it would be both unjust and unfair to form any final opinion 
 on his capacity as the German leader of the operations against 
 the Army of the Loire; and that this information is not 
 available is the more to be regretted because his line of action 
 and his conduct during the week commencing November 28th 
 appear to be, to say the least, somewhat strange. 
 
 For the 28th, three possible courses of action that the 
 enemy might take on this day were in the mind of the Prince in 
 the early morning ; and whichever of the three Crouzat might 
 select, an attack on the Xth Army Corps at Beaune on that 
 day was cei’tain. Crouzat might elect to commence opera¬ 
 tions by throwing his whole force on the corps and crushing 
 it; or whilst attacking the corps for this purpose he might 
 
NOVEMBER 28 
 
 205 
 
 simultaneously advance from Montargis down the Loing ; or if 
 this advance was the main operation of the day, he must at the 
 same timeattack the corps strongly enough tohold it at Beaune, 
 thus preventing it either attacking him on his left Hank during 
 the advance, or retiring quickly to the north-east to intercept 
 the advance short of Fontainebleau. On the early discovery 
 of the real meaning of the indispensable attack on the corps, 
 the right and successful subsequent employment of the whole 
 of the Prince’s command depended. The Prince had told 
 v. V. Rhetz that the mission of the corps was to protect the 
 left Hank of the Second Army, but to regard this as its only 
 function, would be to take a very limited view of the situation 
 and its requirements, for on the corps the future course of 
 the campaign depended ; it was the pivot on which the future 
 strategy turned. If the corps were defeated at Beaune and 
 had to fall back, it gave to Crouzat another starting-point 
 towards the capital, for from Beaune he could make not only 
 north-east to Fontainebleau, but north-west to Toury or 
 Etampes on the Orleans-Paris road ; besides which the 
 Prince with his two unbeaten corps could not expect to hold 
 his own against a now certain general advance of the whole 
 Army of the Loire. If, concurrently, Crouzat with a real 
 attack on the corps, was sending forces north from Montargis, 
 it was indispensable to maintain the corps on its present line 
 for a time to cover the flank march of the two other corps 
 towards the east, or to enable them to concentrate ; if Crouzat, 
 really marching from Montargis, was only demonstrating 
 against the corps, every man and gun unnecessarily detained 
 in the present position was a sheer waste of power urgently 
 needed elsewhere. On November 28th it w r as at Beaune la 
 Rolande that the Oracle had established itself, and there 
 only could it be consulted as to the future. Yet the personal 
 behaviour of the Prince seems to throw great doubts on his 
 having realised the fact. 
 
 The sound of guns at Beaune was heard so plainly at 
 Pithiviers in the early morning that v. Waldersee, who was 
 engaged in writing his daily letter to the King, brought it 
 
206 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 abruptly to a close, mounted his horse and rode off towards 
 Beaune. The firing had aroused the inhabitants of Pithiviers 
 to a high pitch of excitement. At street corners, doors of 
 houses, and in market places and open spaces, they gathered 
 discussing among themselves the course affairs were taking, 
 and openly speaking of this firing as the commencement of 
 the expected decisive battle. Meanwhile the telegraph wires 
 from Beaune to Pithiviers were conveying to the Prince in¬ 
 formation and reports false as well as true. Apparently 
 about 8.80 a.m. came from v. V. Rhetz at Beaune a message 
 dated 7.4 a.m., stating that the general had, during the 
 night, been informed that on the previous evening the enemy 
 had occupied Fontenay on the Loing, four miles south of 
 Chateau Landon, and eight miles north of Montargis. The 
 general was therefore shifting his corps artillery and his 
 reserve brigade nearer to his left wing. It seems probable 
 that the French in Fontenay were only foraging parties, and 
 yet it was this erroneous information that caused this shifting 
 and led to the failure of the attack of the 18th Corps. A 
 little earlier had arrived at Pithiviers from the neighbourhood 
 of Nemours a sanitary column which reported that on the 
 previous evening Nemours, which is twenty miles north of 
 Montargis and only eight miles from Fontainebleau, had been 
 occupied by the advanced guard of the enemy. It is certain 
 that there were no French in Nemours. But these two 
 reports seemed to furnish decided indications of the advance 
 north down the Loing, though it must have seemed strange 
 that the German detachment already in Chateau Landon 
 had not sent in any report to the same effect. 
 
 Soon came in reports from Beaune as to what was taking 
 place there and in the neighbourhood, but which in no way 
 conflicted with those already received; and these latter, un¬ 
 fortunately, had led to the formation of erroneous impressions 
 at the very commencement of the work of the day. The 
 telegraph station was at the village of Beaune, but the general 
 had at about 8 a.m. left Beaune for Long Cour ; so there 
 must occasionally have been a certain amount of delay in 
 
NOVEMBER 28 
 
 207 
 
 rendering reports to Pithiviers. By a wire of 9.15 a.m., 
 v. V. Rhetz reported that a fight had commenced at 
 Maizieres (nearly three miles south of Long Cour), where the 
 enemy, the 18th Corps, had attacked the outposts.* A 
 second wire, which was received at 10 a.m., said: “There is 
 an outpost fight at Juranville [one mile nearer Long Cour], 
 which at this time, 9.15, appears to he dying out. The 
 enemy has shown some hostile infantry battalions, but no 
 artillery. At present our infantry and artillery have easily 
 repulsed them.” The Prince now came to the conclusion 
 that the Loing Valley was to be the scene of the hostile 
 operations, and he therefore determined to move his army this 
 day in that direction. To v. V. Rhetz he wrote at 9.30 a.m. a 
 letter, probably despatched about 10 a.m. : “I have received 
 your Excellency’s report that the advanced hostile troops 
 have reached Fontenay. The hostile forces advancing 
 by Montargis belong apparently to the 18th Corps” [now 
 actually engaged against the German left] “ and whose 
 advance down the Loing, especially on the right bank, must 
 be delayed. Your Excellency will, therefore, send to-day bv 
 Chateau Landon a brigade with artillery and cavalry which will 
 take up a position for this purpose, and push forward detach¬ 
 ments towards Joigny” [in the direction of the expected arrival 
 of the last, the 40th Brigade, of the corps], . . . “ The Illrd 
 Army Corps has orders to close to its left, and closely connect 
 with your Excellency at Beaune, so as to take part decisively 
 in any fight that may take place there to-day. . . . According 
 to what happens to-day, of which I must request frequent tele¬ 
 grams, I will settle whether the Xth Army Corps moves into 
 the country between the Loing and the Yonne, and the Illrd 
 Army Corps from Beaumont to Chateau Landon to occupy the 
 
 * There is sometimes great difficulty in ascertaining the meaning of the 
 times named in connection with the telegrams quoted or mentioned by 
 Iloenig and v. d. Goltz, for it is not always clear whether these times apply 
 to the writing the telegram or to its receipt in the office or to its despatch 
 thence, through the wire. This telegram is not mentioned by v. d. Goltz ; 
 Iloenig called it “ Die erste, von 9^ uhr.” An orderly well-mounted could 
 gallop from Long Cour to Beaune in a very few minutes. 
 
208 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 position there. The news of the fight developing at Maizieres 
 just received. The 5th Inf. Division Illrd Army Corps will at 
 once move towards Beaune ” [it did not do so], “ The telegram 
 of 9.30, which speaks of the outpost fight at Juranville dying 
 out, just received. I rely the more on the carrying out the 
 march of a brigade of the Xth Army Corps to the Doing to¬ 
 day.” As the IXth Army Corps was retained on the Paris road 
 pending the arrival of the Detachment, the front of the army 
 would have been between thirty and forty miles long. 
 
 Telegrams now came in rapid succession. 10.10 a.m. “The 
 enemy has brought into action at St. Loup some guns which are 
 firing slowly. Nothing fresh from the left.” It is very strange 
 if this was the first report of affairs at Beaune, inasmuch as 
 hostile artillery had been in action there from eight in the 
 morning At 11 a.m. came a wire dated 10.47 : “ The fight 
 in front is getting weaker, but on the other hand it is 
 extending towards my left Hank.” The next, 11.8, came very 
 quickly, as it arrived at 11.15. “The enemy is driving in 
 my outposts at Corbeilles and Lorcy [on the extreme left]. 
 I am bringing my corps artillery and the Brigade at disposal 
 to the crossing of the railway and Caesar’s Road [near Long 
 Cour].” Hoenig states that from the 1st Cav. Division on the 
 right came in also reports indicating that the corps must now 
 be becoming engaged in a fight. Soon the telegraph station in 
 Beaune reported it has to cease working, as the enemy is com¬ 
 mencing a heavy fire on the town, and then from the Brigade 
 Commander at Beaune came a letter, of which, unfortunately, 
 neither hour of despatch or receipt is now decipherable. “ The 
 frontal attack on Beaune from St. Loup, outflanking in strong 
 force our right wing by Batilly, is in progress. Only one 
 brigade here. Cavalry Division warned.” From this Division 
 came the report: “ The enemy is between Barville and Beaune 
 [in rear, therefore, of the right flank]. The Cav. Division is 
 obliged to fall back to Barville before infantry and artillery.” 
 Now at last, at 12.30 or 1 p.m., the Prince mounted his horse 
 and rode to the battlefield, arriving there just at the time 
 when, after some six hours of fighting, a crisis has arrived. 
 
NOVEMBER 28 
 
 209 
 
 It is, however, impossible to ascertain what other reports 
 may have come in during the morning. Hoenig and v. d. 
 Goltz are not always in accord; the former gives a most 
 important report, not given by the latter; it was sent at 
 11.45 by v. V. Rhetz to the Prince, and ran as follows: “ An 
 infantry action in the neighbourhood of Juranville and Lorcy 
 in which the enemy is showing strong lines of skirmishers but 
 no artillery. I have supported Valentini’s Brigade [in action 
 against 18th Corps] by some of Lehmann’s Brigade [the 
 reserve Brigade], and I keep in hand the rest of the latter and 
 the Corps Artillery at the Railway Station on Caesar’s Road. 
 No news from my left flank.” And he adds the important 
 remark : “ But I regard it as not impossible that the enemy 
 is masking by the engagement his march north.” Here was 
 an opinion from an experienced soldier on the spot, and it 
 must have contributed greatly to the formation of the 
 erroneous view of the battle taken later on by the Prince. 
 The exact time at which the Prince set out from Pithiviers 
 is doubtful; but it must have been after midday ; and the 
 delay in starting could not have been due to ignorance of the 
 fact that something of importance was taking place at the 
 Xth Army Corps. Hoenig criticises severely the conduct of 
 the Prince in remaining so long at Pithiviers. It is possible 
 that owing to the great length of front, Chateaudun to 
 Montargis, from which the enemy might emerge at any 
 point, he considered it advisable to remain to the last moment 
 in a central position at the end of the telegraph wires; 
 but the distance from Pithiviers to Barville, to which 
 place the 1st Cav. Division had retired, is hardly eight 
 miles, so relavs of orderlies would have ensured the rapid 
 transmission of messages sent on and their speedy delivery. 
 The Prince may have been physically somewhat lethargic; 
 Hoenig says that when mounted he never moved faster than 
 at a trot. 
 
 There had been at the Head-quarters a good deal of letter¬ 
 writing as usual. At 11 a.m. v. Stiehle wrote to v. Moltke : 
 “The enemy (we believe it to be probably part of the 18th 
 
 o 
 
2 io THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 Corps) sent forward troops by rail to Montargis yesterday [it 
 was on the 26th that this took place]. Last evening his lead¬ 
 ing troops were at Fontenay [only foraging parties]. This 
 reveals that the probable plan of the enemy is to approach 
 Paris along the Loing, avoiding the open ground of La 
 Beauce, and turning our left flank. Confirming this is the 
 report just received from the Xth Army Corps that it is being 
 attacked at Maizieres. Fortunately, the 5th Inf. Division is 
 already concentrated south-east of Pithiviers and goes as 
 support to Beaune. So soon as the course of the fight permits, 
 a strengthened Brigade of the Xth Army Corps is to go to¬ 
 day to Chateau Landon, which is already held by a mixed 
 detachment, in order to take up a position on the Loing, and 
 to reconnoitre to the east. His Royal Highness intends, further, 
 to deploy the Xth Army Corps in the district between the 
 Loing and the Yonne, to place the Illrd Arinv Corps on the line 
 Beaumont-Chateau Landon, and to concentrate the IXth Army 
 Corps at Pithiviers. Obviously, this state of affairs upsets, for 
 the time, all plans for crossing the Loire below Orleans. The 
 Detachment arrived yesterday (27th) at Bonneval and 
 Chateaudun without fighting, and is resting there. . . . His 
 Royal Highness intends to draw the Detachment to-morrow 
 (29th) towards Janville-Toury, and to hand over to it the 
 protection of the great road to Etampes and those nearest 
 and parallel to it. The Second Army will thus be freed to 
 operate against the Army of the Loire, which is advancing 
 perhaps on both banks of the Loing, ... I suggest to your 
 Excellency whether, from the troops before Pai'is a strong 
 occupation of Fontainebleau and Moret could not be carried 
 out. The fight on the left flank of the Xth Army Corps is 
 extending ; we go there ; ” but before going time was found to 
 write and send to the Detachment letters similar to that to 
 v. Moltke. These letters were despatched about noon. To 
 v. Stosch a telegram was sent at 11.30 a.m., directing the 
 Detachment to reach on the 29th the Orleans-Paris road at 
 Toury with as strong leading troops of the left wing as pos¬ 
 sible, and the rest closed up as much as possible. A short 
 
NOVEMBER 28 
 
 21 I 
 
 march was suggested for the 28th. Written orders showing 
 the pressing urgency would be sent. 
 
 It was probably between one and two o'clock that the 
 Prince arrived near Barville at the time when the 20th 
 Corps had reached the limit of their successful advance 
 against the German right; and although the tide of success 
 soon turned, leaving the flank safe, here the Prince remained, 
 and gave orders in connection with the operations on this 
 flank, beyond which any interest he took in the battle did 
 not seem to extend. There is no record of his having 
 communicated directly or indirectly with the General at 
 Long Cour, or having inquired of him what had taken 
 
 place, or learning his views on the situation; he seems 
 
 simply to have ignored his existence, yet there is no trace 
 of any ill-feeling on the part of the Prince towards v. V. 
 Rhetz or of any want of confidence in him. And when 
 at nightfall about half-past five the counterstroke had 
 succeeded the Prince prepared to ride back to Pithiviers; 
 but before he mounted his horse, v. Waldersee came to him 
 and made his report on the battle, having been present 
 the whole time and in personal communication with both 
 v. V. Rhetz and v. Alvensleben. The Count remarked to 
 
 him: “A complete victory has been won, it will be a 
 
 Rossbach for the French if there is a vigorous pursuit.” The 
 reference to the success of Frederick the Great was made 
 designedly. Gen. v. Hartmann had been urged more than 
 once to launch his Cavalry Division in pursuit, but no order 
 to do so had come to him from a senior officer, and on the 
 plea that the ground was too heavy he scornfully ignored the 
 suggestion. V. Waldersee hoped that by this allusion to 
 Rossbach the Prince would be led to give the order. The 
 Prince asked whether the 1st Cav. Division had not moved 
 to the attack ; v. Waldersee hardly liked to tell the Prince 
 of the unsuccessful efforts made for this purpose and confined 
 himself to the reply “ there may be difficulties in the way.” 
 The Prince, however, did not interfere directly in the 
 matter and turning to i’n fato>ch| said : “ According to the 
 
 V 
 
212 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 report by Count v. Waldersee, the Xth Army Corps cannot 
 be employed in pursuit. One of its brigades must, however, 
 move off to-day to the Loing. Rut a vigorous pursuit in 
 several directions by the 5th Inf. Division and the 1st Cav. 
 Di vision promises a great success. Be so good as to convey 
 my wishes to Generals v. Alvensleben and v. V. Rhetz.” 
 So any pursuit by the cavalry would not commence until the 
 order had come to v. Hartmann by a roundabout course 
 through some other senior general, and the favourable 
 moment might then have gone by. V. Stiehle rode away 
 to give the orders, and the Prince rode away towards 
 Pithiviers. At the desire of the Prince, v. Waldersee ac¬ 
 companied him on his ride back and the conversation 
 between them continued. The Prince had not seen more of 
 the battlefield than an outlying portion ; he had not been 
 near Beaune or any other part of it, where the hecatombs of 
 dead, dying and wounded, told the history of the battle. 
 V. Waldersee, from his personal observation, was convinced 
 that the fight had been far more than a demonstration or a 
 mask for strategical movements, and he endeavoured to induce 
 the Prince to accept as correct his opinion that two hostile 
 army corps had taken part in the battle, and that its issue 
 had been so decisive, that any belief in the advance down the 
 Loing Valley could no longer be entertained. But the Prince 
 firmly held to the opinion that the strength of the enemy 
 had been over-estimated; he still believed that the fight was 
 but the introduction to a powerful offensive movement, and 
 he considered it necessary to put in the Loing Valley stronger 
 forces than had been there up to the present time. The 
 Prince on his way to Pithiviers, where he arrived about seven 
 o’clock, stopped at Boynes to draw up and send a telegram to 
 the king: it ran as follows : 
 
 “To H.M. the King, Versailles. 
 
 The Xth Army Corps was from nine o’clock driven back 
 from the outpost position ; it has successfully held its position 
 at Beaune la Rolande, and was in the afternoon supported in 
 my presence by the 5th Inf. Division and the 1st Cav. 
 
NOVEMBER 28 
 
 213 
 
 Division. The fight [kampf] was to a certain extent severe 
 [zum Theil sehr ernst]. The enemy was 80,000 strong. Our 
 loss about 1000 men, many hundreds of prisoners. Eight 
 [kampf] ended about 5 p.m.” 
 
 Fred. Charles, 
 
 Prince of Prussia. 
 
 Nine thousand men not only holding their own successfully all 
 day against the onslaught of fifty thousand, but driving them 
 back off the battlefield with a loss of 8000 to 10,000, only a 
 “ Kampf zum Theil sehr ernst!” And this erroneous idea was 
 due to the want of thoroughness in the ascertainment of the 
 facts. It would not have much mattered if the misconception 
 had stood by itself and without any influence on the future, but 
 here it had evil effects on the course of the operations in the 
 days immediately following. And v. Stiehle was, as usual, 
 a mere “ ditto ” to his chief. 
 
 V. Alvensleben when he received the message had not at 
 hand forces for the pursuit; v. Stiehle rode on to give the 
 other order to v. V. lthetz, but failing to find him sent it to 
 him in writing. The order is reproduced by v. d. Goltz and 
 is worthy of transcription. 
 
 “ His Royal Highness says that it is of the utmost impor¬ 
 tance that the detaching an Infantry Brigade with Artillery 
 to Chateau Landon, in order to take up a position in the 
 valley of the Loing, as ordered to-day, shall be carried out to¬ 
 night with the Brigade most intact. If the attack at Beaune 
 is renewed to-morrow the 5th Infantry Division is there, and 
 at 7 a.m. the 6th Infantry Division and the Corps Artillery of 
 the Illrd Corps at Boynes; and also in the forenoon a Brigade 
 of the IXtli Army Corps will be available there. We can thus 
 fight with seven Brigades. His Royal Highness expects to¬ 
 night by the bearer a reply and information about to-day’s 
 fight [Gefecht].” 
 
 It must have been with no little contempt for the superior 
 staff that v. V. llhetz read the missive. His reply was to the 
 point: “ The sending a Brigade to-night to Chateau Landon 
 
214 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 is impossible. All three Brigades have been engaged to-day, 
 and all three have put out outposts. All three are short 
 of ammunition and none have finished cooking. As soon 
 as possible to-morrow morning I will move a Brigade on 
 Chateau Landon, but I would remark that it is impossible 
 for only one Brigade to hold the position of Long Cour, 
 and that if I am to take a Brigade away from it, that can 
 only be on the assumption that, meanwhile, it is replaced by 
 a Brigade of the Illrd Army Corps.” So for a few hours the 
 Xth Army Corps was allowed a little peace aud rest. It must 
 be mentioned that the intention to cover on the left against 
 German reinforcements Crouzat’s advance, fell through owing 
 to the want of unity in the French leading and command. 
 
 The Detachment, on the 28th, had been resting on the Loir, 
 and in the evening there came in to Pithiviers from it in reply 
 to the Prince’s orders sent in the morning a telegram stating 
 that on the 29th the Detachment, by a march of some twenty- 
 four miles, would arrive with the 4thCavalry Division atTourv, 
 with the 22nd Infantry Division at Allaines, seven miles west 
 of Toury, the Bavarians at Orgeres, eight miles further west, 
 and the 17th Infantry Division in rear of the line, which 
 would face south in prolongation of the line of the Second 
 Army and be in touch with it; affording thereby that form of 
 co-operation already mentioned as specially agreeable to the 
 Prince. But this telegram was “ second thoughts,” and repre¬ 
 sented strict obedience to orders, and not necessarily approval 
 of the strategy ; for only shortly before had come from the 
 Detachment a telegram giving quite another position, and 
 evidently sent before the orders had been received. Accord¬ 
 ing to this, the Detachment was to move from the Loir to 
 a position of the shape of an arrowhead, pointing directly 
 south-east towards Orleans; the point being at Villam- 
 blain, on the main road from Chateaudun, and seventeen 
 miles from Orleans. This position represented v. Molke’s idea 
 of co-operative strategy, but the idea had, of course, to be 
 abandoned by v. Stosch, who took care, however, to let 
 Versailles know by wire what was being done. 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 NOVEMBER 29th 
 
 During the night 28th-29th reports, seemingly conclusive, 
 that, at all events for the time, the hostile advance down 
 the Loing had been -given up, came in from the left. From 
 the Detachment was reported the falling back of very large 
 hostile forces towards Beaugency from the Loir valley. The 
 Prince now awaited, on the 29th, the renewal of the attack. 
 And it is necessary to learn the view taken by v. Moltke of the 
 situation on the 27th, the day previous to the battle, and which 
 is given in a letter of the same date to v. Stiehle, which arrived 
 at Pithiviers apparently in the forenoon of the 29th. The 
 letter commenced with granting the Prince permission to 
 transfer the 6th Cavalry Divison from the Detachment to the 
 Second Army, a most unfortunate and ill-timed concession, as 
 will appear later on. The gravity of the import of the 
 further contents of the letter cannot be overrated: “ Our 
 communications are now threatened with serious danger from 
 the South, where General v. Werder cannot protect the 
 whole line Montbeliard-Chatillon. Therefore, the 13th 
 Inf. Division is despatched by rail to Troyes, whence 
 forces will be pushed as far as possible bv Joinville. The 
 advance of the enemy by le Mans would be inconvenient, 
 but from the movements of the enemy hitherto this is not 
 probable ; rather, defensive measures at le Mans. ... If you 
 connect with the Grand Duke it would be desirable for you to 
 attack the enemy. Whether the enemy will attack is a ques¬ 
 tion, but in the defensive he certainly cannot do anything for 
 the relief of Paris. . . . Of decisive weight is your fight in 
 the south against France’s onlv army in the field. If you 
 
216 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 are beaten, my plan would be to give up the Investment of 
 Paris, and to send the Crown Prince of Saxony [Fourth 
 Army] with .Manteuffel to the north, and the Crown Prince 
 of Prussia [Third Army] with you to the south; and, after 
 winning some victory, to resume the Investment of Paris, at 
 the surrender of which we shall recover our siege Artillery.” 
 The situation as it presents itself on the 27th to v. Moltke 
 is grave indeed ; immediately in front he has to hold 
 back the greatest sortie yet attempted from Paris, aided 
 bv small sorties from other parts of its walls; the com¬ 
 munications of all the German forces in France are threat¬ 
 ened in their most vulnerable point, and at the point farthest 
 away from any aid he could send; to his south is a huge 
 hostile army of relief faced by an inert and inactive 90,000 
 Germans, apparently awaiting the law from the enemy. The 
 meaning of the remarkably honest, open, and candid state¬ 
 ment in the letter is surely clear enough—so clear, that he 
 who runs may read ; it hardly seems to admit of misunder¬ 
 standing. What he says to v. Stiehle and to the Prince may 
 be paraphrased truthfully : “ You see the plight in which we 
 Germans, we invaders are, now that our communications with 
 the Rhine are no longer safe. Now that the Detachment 
 is nearer to you, do something' or other, and do it at once. If 
 you fail, it won’t be your fault, I know, and I won’t blame 
 you. In urging you to attack the enemy, I cannot, of course, 
 count surely on your success, but try, for goodness’ sake try• 
 I here tell you what I am ready to do and intend to do if 
 you fail, and in any case I shall hold your boldness free from 
 blame.” It was almost a counsel of despair, and had the 
 Grand Duke been in command, with v. Stosch at his elbow, 
 the offensive, it is well nigh certain, would have been taken 
 on the Loire immediately after the battle of Beaune la 
 Rolande; but on the Prince and v. Stiehle v. Moltke’s letter 
 had not the slightest effect. 
 
 The situation on the east side of the Paris Road on 
 the 29th was very peculiar, though presumably not without 
 precedent in military history. The Germans had again taken 
 
NOVEMBER 29 
 
 217 
 
 up the outpost line they held before the battle. Close in 
 front at Ladon and Boisconnnun respectively were the 18th 
 and 20th Corps, the corps that had fought against them, but 
 which are now impotent for offence and are fearing an 
 attack by the Germans; the Germans still on the defensive 
 as on the previous day, and again awaiting an attack ; and 
 with no thought of the possibility of pursuing the enemy 
 they had driven off. Troops on whom the brunt of the battle 
 has fallen are physically unfit to pursue; and here the corps 
 at the outposts, the Xth Army Corps which had done the 
 fighting, was worn out and exhausted, but the Illrd Army 
 Corps was quite fresh and was close at hand. It could well 
 have undertaken the task, whilst the Xth Army Corps 
 with a little rest and its re-supply of ammunition completed, 
 could have followed in reserve. And had the pursuit been 
 taken up in the early morning, it is possible that very great 
 results might have followed. It would have struck upon the 
 20th Corps, which was so completely demoralised by its defeat 
 that Crouzat was obliged to report to Tours, that it would 
 be absolutely unfit for any further work until after a rest of 
 several days. It was the Garde Mobile Corps ; grandly and 
 heroically it had fought, inspired by patriotic enthusiasm, 
 but without that previous training which is the best prepara¬ 
 tion to face defeat calmly ; so the deepest moral depression 
 had succeeded to the high hopes and anticipations of the 
 previous day. The 18th Corps was composed mainly of 
 regiments-de-marche, and seems to have been less affected 
 morally by the defeat. Reinforcements were during the day 
 nearing both flanks of the French line, but a blow driven 
 home on one part might have been decisive. The actual 
 condition of the defeated force was, however, unknown to 
 the Germans, for it had retired again to its previous shelter, 
 shrouded from view physically by the character of the country, 
 and among a population still intent on doing its best to give 
 it notice of the approach of danger and to put pursuers on the 
 wrong track. But there was one source from which might 
 be drawn some fairly sound conclusions as to the power of 
 
218 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 resistance to pursuit. This was the aspect presented on the 
 morning of the 29th bv the battlefield. Suspicions that the 
 overthrow of the French had been great were entertained by 
 some of the German Staff Officers even on the night following 
 the battle ; on the morning of the 29th, the Prince de¬ 
 spatched from Pithiviers to the scene of conflict Staff Officers 
 to report to him on the matter ; and in their reports there was 
 no conflict or difference of opinion ; the disaster to the French 
 had been great and overwhelming. But the Prince did not go 
 to judge for himself, and the information being second-hand 
 could not produce in his mind the same impression that 
 would have been derived from personal observation. No 
 doubt it is strange, that inasmuch as he anticipated a renewal 
 of the attack that day, and that in meeting it two of his 
 three corps would have to take part, he should not have, in 
 the early morning, taken that short ride to ascertain how 
 matters stood, and also as chief commander to supervise the 
 arrangements for the expected encounter. But the same 
 considerations as on the previous day may have induced him 
 to remain at Pithiviers ; here he was at the end of the wires 
 connecting him with other parts of the wide area, all of 
 which he had to keep under Ins observation. Had he himself 
 seen things as they were on the battlefield, he would possibly 
 have found in them a complete justification for immediate 
 compliance with v. Moltke’s urgent appeal: “ Do go on and 
 hit the Army of the Loire as hard as vou can.” 
 
 About noon this day, the Prince ordered that v. V. Rhetz’s 
 troops here should be relieved from any further participation in 
 the operations in the Loing V alley, as Major-General v. Kraatz 
 with the 40th Brigade was near enough to watch now the line 
 of hostile advance from Montargis on Fontainebleau. The 
 corps was to concentrate in the country east of Beaune : then 
 came the Illrd Army Corps, whilst at Pithiviers, and between 
 it and the Paris road, was to be the IXth Armv Corps. 
 
 The Detachment after a good march, but occasionally 
 brushing against the left of the hostile army, arrived on the 
 29th with the head of the 4th Cavalry Division at Toury, and 
 
NOVEMBER 29 
 
 219 
 
 with a small force of infantry at Allaines, five miles short of 
 Toury. The main body of the detachment was facing south¬ 
 east on a line ten miles long and six or seven miles in 
 rear; the 22nd Inf. Division on the left at Ymonville; the 
 17th Inf. Division in the centre at Germignonville; the 
 Bavarians on the right at Orgeres, with the 6th Cavalry Divi¬ 
 sion ten miles south at Villampuy. Head-quarters were at 
 Viabon in rear of the centre of the line. The Prince intimated 
 to the Grand Duke the approaching exchange of Cavalry 
 Divisions, and he ordered that whilst the Bavarians should 
 hold on to Orgeres, the left should extend right across the 
 Paris road as far as Ba/oches les Gallerandes five miles to the 
 east of it. The whole front of the Prince’s command was 
 forty miles in length and extended thinly across all the lines 
 of approach to Paris. 
 
 On the evening of the 29th, the Prince telegraphed to the 
 King : “According to French statements, the enemy yesterday 
 was 70,000 men strong, from the 20th, 18th, 15th and 16th 
 Corps, of which the whole of the 20th Corps was in the fight. 
 [None of the 16th were in the battle, there were only two 
 batteries of the 15th, whilst the 18th Corps was one brigade 
 short.] I sent some battalions of the Illrd Army Corps in 
 pursuit during the night. To-day little can take place, 
 because the state of affairs on the Loing has not yet been 
 cleared up, and because the results stated above were known 
 onlv in the course of to-day. To-morrow advanced guards 
 will pursue towards Montargis and Bellegarde.” 
 
 V. Stiehle, fully aware that v. Moltke and the Prince are not 
 in accord on the strategy for the campaign, naturally wished 
 to learn exactly what were the views held at Versailles; and 
 as a personal interview is worth a sheaf of letters, he wired 
 to v. Stosch arranging a meeting the next day at Bazoches 
 les Gallerandes. 
 
 The Prince appears not to have had sufficient self-confidence 
 to act always on his own independent judgment in arriving 
 at a decision. In his message to the King it is evident that 
 he considered pursuit, even if delayed, yet both desirable 
 
220 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 and practicable; but on finding that his chief Staff Officer 
 disagreed with him, and believing that in anv advance he would 
 find himself confronted by a prepared defence, he had sought 
 advice from another quarter without letting v. Stiehle know 
 that he was doing so ; and whilst he telegraphed in the 
 evening to the Xth Army Corps to advance in force on the 30th 
 against Montargis, he sent a Staff Officer to consult the general 
 commanding the Illrd Army Corps, v. Alvensleben, in whose 
 opinion he had great confidence. The officer was to communi¬ 
 cate the Prince’s view of the situation to v. Alvensleben, and 
 to inform him that he intended to advance the Illrd Army 
 Corps on Boiscommun, and would afterwards, according to cir¬ 
 cumstances, continue the offensive on Orleans. V. Alvensleben 
 regarded the proposed operation as an isolated operation of the 
 Army Corps, and dissented therefore from its adoption. He 
 also demurred to proposals to make a reconnaissance in force 
 with each of his divisions. Fortified by v. Alvensleben’s opinion 
 the Prince determined to remain on the defensive; but v. d. 
 Goltz states that both corps received, in the evening orders, to 
 reconnoitre in force towards Boiscommun and Montargis. 
 
 The position of Montargis and the character of the sur¬ 
 rounding country were specially unfavourable for reconnais¬ 
 sance ; and the peculiarities were skilfully turned to account 
 for purposes of deception in this “ People’s War.” The town 
 with its large population and many hiding-places, was, at this 
 time, the centre of activity of the Franc-tireurs. A great 
 wood lay in front of Montargis on the right bank of the Loing, 
 as far as Ferrieres (8 miles). The Canal d'Orleans which ran on 
 the west and south-west of the town, the Fessard stream and the 
 Loing acquired great importance because the railway bridges 
 and many others over them were barricaded and occupied by 
 the defenders. From these bridges all the German patrols 
 were met with heavy fire ; the German Cavalry had not 
 been trained in swimming, but even if they had been trained, 
 the steep canal banks would probably have formed a powerful 
 obstacle. The patrols were consequently unable to recon¬ 
 noitre the town itself; this could have been effected by a 
 
NOVEMBER 29 
 
 221 
 
 strong force onlv. Whether all these facts were known to 
 the Prince is uncertain. 
 
 As regards the exchange of the Cavalry Divisions, it is im¬ 
 possible to understand how any leader in war,especially one who 
 was himself a general of Cavalry, could even allow, still less ask 
 for, such an exchange at this time. As both the 2nd and the 
 6 th Divisions were in actual contact with the enemy, the ex¬ 
 change of these Divisions along the front of the armies was 
 impossible. The only solution practicable was that adopted ; 
 the 6th was exchanged for the 4th which was somewhat in 
 rear, at Toury ; and the two effected the exchange by a route- 
 march in rear of the Detachment. During this march both 
 divisions might as well have been non-existent for the battle 
 purposes of the Detachment, and of the Second Army ; but 
 worse than this, the 6th Division that knew the country well 
 was being replaced on the eve of, and during a great battle, 
 by the 4th Division which not only did not know the 
 country, but was tired and well-nigh exhausted. 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 
 NOVEMBER 30th 
 
 Early in the morning of the 30th came to the Prince from 
 V ersailles two telegrams stating that the expected great 
 sortie had begun towards the south. That the Army of 
 the Loire would now move to the assistance of Paris was 
 therefore in the highest degree probable. The Prince rode 
 now to the battlefield of Beaune and watched the action of the 
 numerous reconnaissances sent to the front by his order. 
 Everywhere they met the enemy, and sometimes in force, so 
 that along the whole line there was fighting. Believing, 
 therefore, a hostile advance not improbable, he held his troops 
 to the position, drawing the IXth Army Corps still nearer. 
 
 But his visit to the battlefield was anything but comfort¬ 
 ing to him, as regards his inaction in the last forty-eight 
 hours. As he was getting into his carriage on his return 
 home, v. Waldersee came to him to report and was invited to 
 accompany him in the carriage. The Prince seemed somewhat 
 dissatisfied, and to think that the day following the battle 
 had not been put to its best use. V. Waldersee turned the 
 conversation on to Beaune. The Prince remarked, “ The 
 battlefield reminds me of St. Privat. Yesterday great 
 results might have been obtained, for this corps (the 20th) 
 could not possibly be fit for a fight, and also is not so now. 
 To-day a strong offensive might have reaped its reward, 
 but—” and here the Prince suddenly broke off from this topic. 
 After a little time he resumed : “ The favourable moment for 
 the offensive is gone ; the information leads to the conclusion 
 that the French have been reinforced on the line Boiscommun- 
 Bellegarde; what is going on behind the Forest of Orleans 
 
NOVEMBER 30 
 
 223 
 
 is out of sight. The Franc-tireurs, aided by the country, 
 have done the French good service. Now I am reduced to 
 a waiting attitude. If the French attack us once more, 
 the experience of the 28th to the 30th will stand me in 
 good stead. But a soldier’s good fortune seldom comes 
 back to him with the same favour. To-dav has already gone 
 hv in justifiable doubt; the French were brought forward to 
 the attack at many points; they must have, however, other 
 plans, for it was quite clear that they did not advance bevond 
 the line they had fixed for themselves. There is for a leader 
 nothing' more oppressive than a situation that is not clear , 
 nothing' more trying; than hands of armed irregular troops, aided 
 by the population and the nature of the country, and relying 
 for support on a strong army in the neighbourhood.'" What a 
 decisive testimony is this to the aid a People may give in war. 
 
 What had not been lost bv that day of inaction in Pithiviers! 
 
 On the 30th, the conference between the two Chief Staff 
 Officers v. Stiehle and v. Stoseh took place at Bazoches les 
 Gallerandes. The purpose of v. Stiehle in meeting v. Stoseh 
 was twofold: first to learn from v. Stoseh the views held by 
 v. Moltkeas to the course of the campaign on the Loire, past, 
 present, and future; secondly, to justify the action of the 
 Prince in the past and present, and his proposed action in the 
 future. The campaign on the Loire was only one of four large 
 operations which, together, constituted at this time the cam¬ 
 paign of Germany against France; the others being the 
 operations in the north-west, those in the south-east, and the 
 investment of Paris. Each of these four was important, but 
 their relative importance necessarily varied from time to time 
 according to the aspect that the campaign, taken as a whole, 
 presented from time to time, and according to the degree in 
 which danger to the whole campaign was more or less 
 threatening at the scene of each. If danger seemed imminent at 
 one of these points, then in order that this might be warded off, 
 there might be accepted a certain amount of passivity among 
 the German forces elsewhere, so that troops might be diverted 
 to the threatened point. And it was only at Versailles that 
 
224 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 this relativity of importance could be correctly judged. From 
 v. Stosch, fresh from Versailles, v. Stiehle could learn exactly 
 the importance Versailles attached at this moment to the 
 operations on the Loire, and the result which, from those 
 operations it was considered would contribute most effec¬ 
 tively to the success of the whole war. On the other hand, it 
 was the commanders at the four scenes of operations who 
 were, or who ought to be, the best judges of the measures to 
 be adopted for obtaining the results regarded by Versailles as 
 desirable and necessary. Mental vigour depends greatly on 
 physical vigour, and it was no small gain to the counsels 
 at the Loire that there should come a counsellor like v. Stosch, 
 physically fit, and who had not suffered from the fatigues and 
 anxieties of the trying work in the field. Hoenig gives a long 
 account of the conference, but this it seems unnecessary to 
 reproduce here, inasmuch as the subjects discussed were the 
 mode of covering the road from Orleans to Paris, direct or 
 indirect cover, and the time for taking the offensive, now or 
 later on. The views put forward respectively were the same 
 as those with which the reader is already acquainted, and they 
 need not therefore be repeated. The two chiefs parted, not 
 one hair’s breadth nearer agreement than when they met. 
 
 V. Stiehle, on his return to Pithiviers, gave to the Prince an 
 account of the interview. The Prince considered it desirable, 
 especially as, whilst v. Stiehle had been away, additional infor¬ 
 mation had been gained as to the state of affairs in front of the 
 Illrd and Xth Army Corps, to send in writing to the Grand 
 Duke his own view of the situation and also his wishes. The 
 Prince informed the Grand Duke that from information gained 
 from prisoners it was clear that “ besides the 18th Corps there 
 was another corps in front. Since this did not take part in the 
 battle of the 28th, I believe that for the protection of his right 
 wing, the 15th or the 16th corps has been drawn in this 
 direction.” It is difficult to reconcile this statement with that 
 in the Prince’s telegram (7.29 p.m. 29th) to the King that 
 “ the whole of the 20th corps and also troops from the 18th, 
 15th, and 16th corps had taken part in the battle.” He then 
 
NOVEMBER 30 
 
 225 
 
 stated his intention of remaining on the defensive in prospect 
 of another attack. One brigade of the IXth Army Corps, the 
 main body of which was atPithiviers and in the neighbourhood, 
 was at Bazoches les Gallerandes. The Prince ordered, there¬ 
 fore, that on December 1st, the 22nd Inf. Division from the 
 Detachment should relieve this brigade so that it might follow 
 on to Pithiviers, and with its corps act as his own reserve ; and 
 he requested that the 22nd Inf. Division should not be em¬ 
 ployed by the Grand Duke as, if necessary, it would then serve 
 as the last reserve of the Second Army. The Prince gave his 
 opinion as to the hostile forces opposite the Detachment. “ It 
 is probable that to-morrow there will be in front of your Royal 
 Highness only the 17th Corps and a part of the 16th Corps; 
 the latter has apparently occupied the north edge of the Forest 
 of Orleans along its whole extent.” As a matte]- of fact, there 
 was on December 1st the whole of the 16th corps, two divisions 
 of the 15th, and two and a half of the 17th corps opposite 
 the Grand Duke, who was now to be deprived of about one- 
 third of his force. The Prince details the mode of withdrawal 
 of the 6th Cav. Division, which, on the following day,is to com¬ 
 mence a route-march along the rear of the Detachment, and 
 on December 2nd is to be in position in rear of the centre of the 
 whole line and east of the Paris road ; and then comes what 
 may be regarded as a reminder to v. Stosch to “ mind his own 
 business.” “ Until the situation on the enemy’s side is clearer, 
 I must reserve to myself the communication to vour Royal 
 Highness of my further plans for driving the enemy out of 
 Orleans.” How completely the Prince misconceived the 
 situation will soon appear. Specially noteworthy is it that 
 here for the first time in the Loire campaign the mere 
 regaining possession of Orleans appears as the objective of the 
 operations. V. Moltke, up to this time, certainly cannot be 
 credited, or rather discredited, with concurrence in this novel 
 idea. 
 
 Very different from the imaginative creations at Pithiviers 
 were the real views and intentions on the French side. The 
 earlier reports of Crouzat on the 28th had caused a great deal 
 
 p 
 
226 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 of excitement at Tours, and had given rise to great hopes and 
 expectations, so that when the last report was received from 
 him it caused not only deep depression, hut senseless wrath 
 and anger. The reply of de Freycinet was full of unjust un¬ 
 deserved personal charges against the General, and was totally 
 unworthy of the Delegation. 
 
 On the evening of the 29th, the Delegation demurred to 
 any movement eastward, and directed that the two corps, 
 the 18th and 20th, should be drawn to the west. On 
 November 24th and 26th there had arrived at Tours, from 
 Jules Favre at Paris, despatches in which December 15th 
 was named as the utmost limit for the endurance of the 
 capital. “ We cannot hold out beyond that time, even if 
 so long.” On November 16th the Government in Paris had 
 estimated that the power of endurance would last to January 
 8 th, 1871. What was the cause of the difference in the limits 
 assigned does not appear. Hoenig thinks that the alteration 
 in the dates may have been a misstatement intentionally made 
 to spur on the Delegation to immediate action. If so, a step 
 more likely to be fatal to success could hardly have been taken. 
 For instead of well-considered and orderly-conducted opera¬ 
 tions, were necessarily substituted operations adopted in haste 
 and carried out in hurry. And to make matters worse, there 
 came on the 30th, to the Delegation a delayed despatch from 
 Gen. Trochu, which having been sent off* from Paris by balloon 
 on the 24th, was first carried to Norway and thence telegraphed 
 to Tours. The despatch announced the intended sortie of the 
 29th by General Ducrot towards the Loire, probably in the 
 direction of Gien. On the night of the 30th, at 9 o’clock, 
 de Freycinet and the French Generals assembled, therefore, 
 at d’Aurelle’s head-quarters to confer on the measures to be 
 taken to meet the new and pressing situation that had so sud¬ 
 denly presented itself. There was no agreement as to any one 
 plan being the best to be adopted, so, finally, de Freycinet 
 produced his own as approved at Tours, and he ordered it to 
 be carried out. Again an attack on Pithiviers, this time con¬ 
 verging, and then an advance on Fontainebleau ; the 18th and 
 
NOVEMBER 30 
 
 227 
 
 the 20th corps by the former line, Beaune, the 15th corps on 
 their left against the south and south-west of Pithiviers, whilst 
 to the same objective the 16th corps, supported by the left 
 of the 15th, would move diagonally north-east across the Paris 
 road. The 17th corps, with the help of the 21st from le Mans, 
 would be entrusted with the protection of Orleans. That 
 there were many misunderstandings, arising out of this hastily 
 summoned and probably highly excited meeting, goes without 
 saying. 
 
 The discussion occupied so much time that the generals 
 separated in haste, without having had any conference among 
 themselves for mutual understanding, and they "hurried away 
 to get out their orders in the early morning at all events. 
 But Chanzy, finding the Detachment in front of his corps, 
 must, necessarily, as a first step in the movement north-east, 
 get the Detachment out of his way, to avoid being attacked 
 on his left during the advance; after submitting his pro¬ 
 posal to d’Aurelle, it was eventually agreed that the 16th 
 Corps, covered on the left by Michel’s Cavalry Division, 
 should advance north, and dislodge the enemy now there; 
 the 17th Corps to move in support. The advance would be 
 continued next day on Pithiviers. This movement on the 1st 
 must necessarily strike on the Bavarian Corps at Orgeres. 
 
CHAPTER XVII 
 
 DECEMBER 1st 
 
 On December 1st, at 1.10 a.m., the Prince received from theXth 
 Army Corps a somewhat belated report of the previous evening, 
 to the effect that according to statements of inhabitants there 
 were 20,000 French in Montargis, and according to those of 
 Prussians left behind sick at Courtenay, to the east of Mon¬ 
 targis, large supplies of provisions had lately been passing- 
 through the former place to the latter. As a matter of fact, 
 there was no truth in these statements. The Prince, however, 
 ordered reconnaissances towards Montargis and Bellegarde, 
 but as in his order he directed the reconnaissances to be made 
 after the troops had cooked, that towards Montargis could be 
 of little use; but the information generally obtained showed 
 that the French had fallen back, and that no offensive opera¬ 
 tion against the Second Army was immediately in prospect. 
 
 And now the interest shifts to the right wing, the 
 Detachment, for events are so shaping themselves here during 
 the day, that it will be the Grand Duke and v. Stosch, not 
 the Prince and v. Stiehle, who will ward off the second and 
 last effort of the Army of the Loire for the relief of Paris. 
 The Bavarians had thrown forward troops to Terminiers, 
 three miles south of Orgeres, and to the villages west of 
 Terminiers. Against this position advanced at about half¬ 
 past one, one division of the 16th Corps and a Cavalry 
 Division. After much fighting the Bavarians were driven 
 from the position, and they fell back to another at Villepion 
 Chateau. Towards nightfall their defence was broken, and 
 the Corps collected at Orgeres and in the neighbourhood. 
 In this brief encounter the Bavarians, who numbered some 
 
DECEMBER 1 
 
 229 
 
 7000 men with forty-eight guns, against 13,000 French, with 
 forty-six guns, lost forty-two officers and nearly 900 men. It 
 was, however, nine o’clock at night before a full report on the 
 encounter came to the Head-quarters of the Detachment, 
 which were at Janville, three or four miles west of Toury. 
 
 V. d. Tann had at once felt the evil effects of the exchange 
 of the Cavalry Divisions ; he needed cavalry on his front, and 
 he applied to the Grand Duke for it, but it could not be 
 given, for the cavalry was not forthcoming. The trusted and 
 trustworthy 6th Division was on its route-march in rear of 
 the Detachment; on the right had arrived the worn-out 4th 
 Division, from which its commander selected the least 
 exhausted Brigade, to move out to the right front. This 
 arrangement was but a poor substitute for the close co¬ 
 operation that had hitherto been maintained between the 
 Bavarians on the exposed flank and their protectors, the 
 6th Division. Into the Head-quarters of the Detachment at 
 half-past one had ridden v. Schmidt , the commander of the 6th 
 Division, to report himself to the Grand Duke, who bade 
 him farewell, expressing his deep sense of the value of the 
 services rendered to him by the general and his Division. And 
 then v. Schmidt betook himself to v. Stosch. The interview 
 is so interesting, and was in its consequences so important, that 
 the account of it, as recorded by Hoenig, is here given in full. 
 
 With the alert, decided, soldierlike bearing of the cavalry 
 commander, the Chief of the Staff was very sympathetic. 
 But General v. Stosch was surprised, above all, by the detailed 
 knowledge of the country, and the thorough acquaintance 
 with all its peculiarities, that he possessed. V. Stosch re¬ 
 marked that for himself under the circumstances it was very 
 unfortunate that General v. Schmidt should pass over to the 
 Second Army. “ And I also lament it,” said v. Schmidt 
 excitedly and somewhat bitterly. “ I do not grudge to 
 any of my comrades the laurels which undoubtedly are 
 immediately at hand for them, but after I have gone 
 through the Perclie country without any satisfaction, I 
 am obliged at this very moment to take a ride in rear of 
 
230 THE PEOPLE’S AVAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 the Army, when I could reap the fruit of all my previous 
 hard work ; and very hard work it was. Your Excellency 
 will see that I am speaking only the truth. The enemy 
 is on the point of attacking us. I wish only that you may 
 have an enterprising body of cavalry. In all the world 
 there is no better country for good cavalry than the great 
 district in which we are now. Everything that cavalry 
 could desire, so far as country is concerned, is here; every 
 stone’s throw there are villages, farms, small woods and wide 
 although shallow depressions, in which they can conceal 
 themselves in large bodies, and can follow up closely the 
 infantry and dash out and take them by surprise. We are 
 here,” he exclaimed, “gin the paradise of cavalry ; and, more¬ 
 over, this enemy ! His cavalry will never stand against ours, 
 nor have they|the spirit of enterprise and the dash to attack 
 our infantry. His artillery is but poorly horsed, and is 
 incapable of moving quickly. His infantry, whether Line, 
 Marche troops, or Gardes Mobiles, cannot stand the £ Prussian 
 Fanfare.’ During the last weeks my cavalry have come upon 
 them every day, and have always got the best of it, even if 
 they were well led. This infantry is fodder for good cavalry.” 
 
 As v. Stosch was still under the influence of his conference 
 with v. Stiehle the” day before, he asked General v. Schmidt, 
 without telling him of the interview, whether, in his opinion, 
 “ Corps or Divisions had marched eastward for an operation 
 towards Fontainebleau.” V. Schmidt gave a most decided 
 negative to the question, and added in his most drastic manner, 
 “ The whole lot are still round the salient point, Orleans, but 
 if you do not look out, they will be on the top of you here ; all 
 reports from my patrols, and the information from the inhabit¬ 
 ants are here in my book with days and dates, and the enemy’s 
 regimental numbers. From these, there is not the slightest 
 doubt that strong bodies of all arms have been pushed for¬ 
 ward to the road Orleans-Chateaudun; and I know that 
 the 17th Corps is on the march here from the Forest of 
 Marchenoir” [a fact]. In reply to the question how strong 
 the enemy was, v. Schmidt said : “ At least 50,000 men ; in 
 
DECEMBER 1 
 
 231 
 
 any case there are at least two Corps. The drawing forward 
 the 17th Corps to the north-east implies an immediate 
 general attack on the Orleans-Chateaudun road.” In com¬ 
 pliance with General v. Stosch’s request, v. Schmidt put 
 together the reports and information received lately ; he 
 docketed the important ones with the substance of the 
 contents. To the question whether he believed that the 
 15th and 16th Corps were on the line Boiscommun-Bellegarde, 
 he gave a negative, and he held to his opinion, even when 
 v. Stosch told him that v. Stiehle believed the contrary. 
 
 V. Schmidt’s view was prophetic ; yet it was of the invaluable 
 services of this leader, thus prepared and able to obtain every 
 possible advantage during the coming battle, that the Prince 
 deprived the Detachment, and incidentally the whole Army. 
 The interview with General v. Schmidt produced a deep and 
 immediate impression on v. Stosch’s mind. He could not 
 resist the conviction that the French had shifted their base of 
 operations, and that the second defeat, which v. Stiehle had 
 named as the transition point from the defensive to the 
 offensive, would he inflicted on the Army of the Loire this 
 time, not by the Second Army, but bv the Detachment. But 
 v. Stosch was far too enterprising to accept the doctrine that 
 it is only the defensive that should be employed to ward off' 
 an approaching attack ; like v. Moltke, v. Stosch regarded 
 the attack and the moral effect of the initiative as every¬ 
 thing ; and here, after his enlightenment by the great Cavalry 
 Leader, he saw that the long-desired chance had now come. 
 But both tact and diplomacy were necessary, and in both arts 
 he was a proficient. He now betook himself to the Duke, 
 and laid before him the situation depicted by v. Schmidt, and 
 accepted by himself as correct. He pointed out to his com¬ 
 mander that there could be no doubt that an attack by the 
 French was imminent; hut that, at the present moment, the 
 disposition of the Detachment, in conformity with the orders of 
 the Prince, was far too extended to meet an attack successfully. 
 Concentration must be the first step ; standing fast with the 
 right wing, drawing forward the left, and then concentrating 
 
232 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 to the centre. But at the present moment this was per¬ 
 missible only for the Bavarians and the 17th Inf. Division, 
 for he dared not include in the movement the 22nd Inf. 
 Division on the left, which the Prince had expressly said was 
 to be regarded as the last reserve of the Second Army, and 
 which, even now, was not as far to the east as the Prince 
 had ordered. V. Stosch proposed, therefore, to the Grand 
 Duke that, on the very next day, preparations should be 
 made for attack, without giving a thought to the idea of a 
 retreat. “ Under existing circumstances, nothing more could 
 be done than to get into line early under such favourable con¬ 
 ditions, that there should be no difficulty in closely concen¬ 
 trating if this proved to be necessary later. As matters 
 stood, the roads to Paris would best be protected, if the concen¬ 
 tration west of the Orleans-Angerville road was kept in view, 
 and pushed yet more forward. But whatever was determined 
 to be done, the power to dispose of the 22nd Inf. Division 
 must again be obtained. The Detachment could not be tied 
 to a position a cheval the roads Orleans-Angerville [the main 
 road to Paris] and Orleans- Allainville [the Paris road next to 
 it on the west, and diverging from it at Artenay]; the 
 Detachment would accomplish the duty assigned to it if at 
 the right time it brought up all its troops, even to the very 
 last man, and beat the enemy. That would be the best 
 protection of the roads, and probably also, at the same time, 
 the decisive blow for the subsequent capture of Orleans.'” 
 Provisionally, the question as to the 22nd Inf. Division 
 could be put on one side. “ Anyhow, we shall have,” 
 added the General, “ freedom of choice for the concentration 
 in the favourable position from Loigny to Lumeau. It 
 answers best for the attack and the defence according 
 to the circumstances.” The Grand Duke accepted this pro¬ 
 posal a little too eagerly to please v. Stosch, and said 
 with a sort of joyous decision: “Let it be so; we will 
 take the offensive to-morrow with our whole force in the 
 direction of Loigny-Lumeau ; do what is necessary for this 
 purpose.” The Grand Duke’s idea was a little premature; 
 
DECEMBER 1 
 
 2 33 
 
 but v. Stosch, having already gained a great deal, did not 
 deem it expedient to suggest a counter-proposal for a closer 
 concentration first as a preliminary to an attack. V. Stosch’s 
 plan, now adopted by the Grand Duke, was of vast impor¬ 
 tance, for it meant in the Loire campaign the change from 
 the defensive to the offensive ; and, incidentally, it was a 
 revolution in the control of the German forces on the Loire ; 
 it involved the employment of those forces in a direction 
 totally different from that which the Commander-in-Chief 
 considered the best suited for the overthrow of the French. 
 It was more than the substitution of one scheme of operations 
 for another; it was the negation of the scheme of a supreme 
 commander by a sub-commander. And it may be doubted 
 that any General of ordinary social rank, however distin¬ 
 guished as a soldier, and however good might be the Chief 
 Staff Officer at his side, would have dared to propose to the 
 nephew of the King such a radical alteration in the plan of 
 the campaign. But the Grand Duke was a reigning Royalty, 
 his Chief Staff Officer was v. Moltke, present by proxy ; and 
 at Versailles was his Staff Patron, the determined v. Blumen- 
 thal. Under these circumstances the leader of the Detachment 
 might “ do and dare.” 
 
 The next step that v. Stosch had to take in the matter was 
 one far more difficult to accomplish than that of securing the 
 approval and assent of his own commander. It was nothing 
 less than bringing about agreement in action, between two 
 Royal personages, whose professional views were in discord, 
 and who, personally, were not on good terms with each other; 
 moreover he knew that he himself was regarded at the Prince’s 
 Staff as somewhat of an autocratic disposition. He now 
 drew up a letter to v. Stiehle, in which he explained the 
 altered state of affairs on the French side, and requested per¬ 
 mission to attack the French, and thus in another form give 
 protection to the Paris road. The letter was sent at 6 f.m. 
 by an orderly officer, and was, it must be borne in mind, 
 written and despatched before all the events of the day at 
 the Bavarian Corps, had come to the knowledge of the 
 
234 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 Detachment Head-quarters. The principal points urged in 
 the letter were as follows: 
 
 “ 1. The enemy is still in strong force at Chevilly; a 
 deserter gives the force as 50,000. 
 
 “ 2. The enemy is occupying the road Orleans-Chateaudun 
 in greater strength, and has shown everywhere there larger 
 bodies of infantry, and also cavalry and artillery. [This in¬ 
 formation was based on the reports of Gen. v. Schmidt.] 
 
 “ 3. The enemy has advanced from Patay and Poupry in 
 the strength of about three battalions against the Bavarian 
 outposts, but he retired immediately when Bavarian battalions 
 deployed against him. 
 
 “ 4. The enemy has strongly occupied the places in front 
 of the 17th Inf. Division. 
 
 “ 5. All is quiet in front of the 22nd Inf. Division.” 
 
 In the letter it was further stated that the Grand Duke was 
 of opinion that obtaining command of the road from Orleans 
 to Chateaudun was necessary for the security of the right 
 wing and for maintaining the communications with Ver¬ 
 sailles ; and he proposed therefore pushing the outposts on the 
 left towards Artenay as far as Dambron-Poupry-Patay, and 
 taking the offensive with the right wing ; but as the enemy 
 had shown strong forces there, the employment of the 22nd 
 Inf. Division would be required for a real offensive on 
 December 3rd; on December 2nd the 17th Inf. Division would 
 suffice. In any case, however, serious encounters might take 
 place. 
 
 It is very remarkable, according to the account given, that 
 notwithstanding the vital importance of the certain and 
 speedy delivery of the request at Head-quarters, the request 
 was transmitted by one channel only, and that a single 
 mounted orderly officer. 
 
 The Prince, when he received the letter at 9 f.m., was not 
 at first disposed to grant the desired permission ; but when 
 he learnt from the reports of the Illrd Army Corps that the 
 French had evacuated Boisconnnun, he granted it. V. Stiehle 
 at 9.37 f.m. sent to the Grand Duke a telegram to this effect, 
 
DECEMBER 1 
 
 235 
 
 but the telegram did not arrive at Janville until midnight, 
 about which hour the orderly officer also returned. Before 
 v. Stosch had sent off the letter to v. Stiehle he had 
 despatched an officer to the Bavarians to ascertain the position 
 of affairs with them ; soon after 9 p.m. this officer brought 
 back to Janville his report; so alarming was it that at 
 9.30 p.m. v. Stosch sent to Pithiviers the following telegram, 
 which arrived there shortly after midnight: 
 
 “ At the advance fo-day of the 1st Bavarian Corps against a 
 hostile reconnaisance at Terminiers, resulting in the entry of 
 nearly the whole corps into the affair, the enemy showed large 
 masses, which have been estimated at one cavalry division, 
 two infantry divisions, and much artillery. The enemy 
 pressed forward strongly on the right wing. The fight ter¬ 
 minated at about 5.30, and at that time the Bavarians had 
 retired as far as the line from Nonneville in the direction of 
 Courmainville. Specially noticeable is a report of an officer 
 who was sent there from here that the retreat of a portion 
 of the Infantry was not in good order. Information from 
 Artenay states that the 15th Corps is at that place with 
 another corps behind it. It is apparently the 17th Corps 
 that has fought against the Bavarians.” At 12.20 on the 
 morning of December 2nd v. Stosch sent a second confirmatory 
 telegram giving some details. V. Stosch’s letter had been 
 received at Pithiviers with a certain amount of incredulity, 
 but all doubts as to the impending conflict and its import¬ 
 ance vanished when, after midnight, the later reports came 
 in. And now the Grand Duke, at v. Stosch’s instigation, 
 took a very bold step ; he felt that necessity knows no law, and 
 therefore, in his latest orders, he drew into his own fighting 
 line the last reserve of the Second Army, the 22nd Inf. 
 Division. 
 
CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 DECEMBER 2nd—BATTLE OF LOIGNY-POUPRY 
 
 Early on the morning of December 2nd commenced the 
 Battle of Loigny-Poupry, essentially a “ bataille de rencontre,” 
 the Bavarians, whilst moving into position, encountering the 
 French force on its way to the north-east to Toury. It was 
 thus on the German right that the hostile armies first came 
 into contact, and here the Bavarians had, for some time, great 
 difficulty in holding their ground against the impetuous 
 attacks of the 16th Corps. On this right flank also the 
 hostile cavalries were opposed to each other. When the 
 17th Inf. Division came up on the left of the Bavarians, 
 it was met to the south also by the French 16th Corps ; 
 later on the 22nd Inf. Division, when entering the battle¬ 
 field, had to march away east to stay the advance of two 
 Divisions of the 15th Corps coming up the Paris road. At 
 nightfall Loigny, on the extreme German right, where 
 the 17th Corps has entered into the battle, had been 
 wrested from the French; the Germans held Poupry on the 
 extreme left. The defeat of the French was complete. The 
 isolated character of the French attacks contributed greatly 
 to their failure, this absence of well-timed combination being 
 due to hurry in the preparations for the operation. The 
 Germans owed no small part of their success to the admirable 
 leading of the two Infantry Divisions by Generals v. Tresckow 
 and v. Wittich, who, as they came on the field, displayed 
 excellent judgment in the disposal of their troops to meet 
 the unexpected situations they found confronting them. The 
 Battle of Loigny-Poupry, like that of Beaune la Rolande, 
 is deserving of close and careful study ; the former is an 
 
DECEMBER 2 
 
 237 
 
 example of the higher leading in its best aspect, and 
 of the work of the three arms in combination; the latter 
 is rich in the experiences of the most minute incidents of a 
 battle. At the close of the battle of December 2nd, the 
 Grand Duke and v. Stosch were fully aware of the great¬ 
 ness of the success they had achieved; and they had only 
 one thought for the morrow, the reaping the fruits of that 
 success. 
 
 To the leaders of the Detachment there appeared to be 
 three courses of action open to the French; they could retire 
 to the west; they could fall back on Orleans ; or, if they 
 received reinforcements, they might offer resistance at Ter- 
 miniers, only three miles south of Loigny. The last course 
 was regarded as improbable ; it was the first course that, from 
 the strategical point of view, and for the prolongation of the 
 war, seemed to be the one which the enemy ought to adopt. 
 The Detachment orders for the next day were framed, there¬ 
 fore, to prevent this escape, and to drive the enemy back on to 
 Orleans. This done, it would be easy for the Detachment to 
 gain the Loire and carry out the strategy of v. Moltke. To 
 the Prince was sent a brief telegram giving the general result 
 of the battle, with the remark : “ If the enemy is to be pursued 
 to-morrow, it is absolutely necessary that the Second Army 
 should attack Artenay, and undertake the protection of the 
 Orleans-Paris road.'” 
 
 But the Grand Duke’s high hopes were doomed to dis¬ 
 appointment, for there came from Pithiviers the Prince’s 
 orders, which will be dealt with later on, but which commenced 
 with the sentence, “ The Second Army and the Detachment 
 of H.R.H. the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg are to advance 
 to-morrow, December 3rd, to the concentric attack against 
 Orleans,” and then, after detailing the movements of the 
 Second Army, the order ran : “ The Detachment of H.R.H. 
 the Grand Duke will, according to its own dispositions, 
 advance to-morrow west of the Artenav-Orleans road for a 
 corresponding attack.” To learn how it came about that 
 this order was given and rigidly adhered to, we must go to 
 
238 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 Pithiviers, and see what had been taking place there during 
 the day. 
 
 It was with great anxiety that Prince Frederick Charles had, 
 in the early hours of the morning, awaited at Pithiviers news 
 from the Detachment. Of his Army, the main body of theIXth 
 Army Corps was at Pithiviers, one brigade being at Bazoches 
 les Gallerandes ; the other two corps were reconnoitring as on 
 the previous day towards Montargis and Bellegarde. At 10 
 a.m. came in from the Grand Duke the first report, dated 
 8.10 a.m., informing the Prince that the whole Detachment 
 was concentrating for the attack on the line Tanon-Baigneux, 
 the 1st Bavarian Corps, and the 4th Cav. Division on the 
 right, the 17th and 22nd Inf. Divisions on the left. Up to 
 ten o’clock the Prince had not received any information as to 
 the state of affairs in front of his own Army ; he at once how¬ 
 ever, resolved to move the IXth Army Corps to the westward to 
 support the Detachment, and he telegraphed to the Duke to 
 that effect, but owing to the distance of the corps from the 
 road, fifteen miles, the earliest time at which the tactical 
 influence of the corps would be felt would be about 4 p.m. 
 At about 10.35 a.m. there came a telegram of a very alarming 
 character from Count v. Waldersee, who, believing that a 
 battle was imminent, had ridden very early to the Paris road. 
 It had been written after 9 a.m. on the Road itself, and it 
 seems to have been handed in at Leon-en-Beauce at 10 a.m., 
 and given out of the telegraph office at Pithiviers at 10.35. 
 It stated that east of the road the enemy had deployed a large 
 force, apparently fifteen battalions, eight squadrons and 
 artillery, and that an advance of all arms on Bazoches was 
 reported. This was the first news of any threatening from 
 the direction of Artenay. The reports now received from the 
 Illrd and Xth Army Corps did not make the situation more 
 clear, but at 11.30 a.m. the Prince directed General v. 
 Manstein to march his corps towards the Paris road for its 
 protection after the men had dined. He had also ordered the 
 6 th Cav. Division, now on its way from the west, to halt on 
 the Paris road. V. Manstein, before leaving, had an interview 
 
DECEMBER 2 
 
 239 
 
 with v. Stiehle, who made to him the sneering remark : “ The 
 Grand Duke is behaving somewhat in the same w r av as at a 
 Krieg-Spiel in peace time. 1 '' 
 
 And, now, the Prince, whilst engaged in contemplating 
 the situation and devising plans to meet future develop¬ 
 ments in this difficult campaign, is suddenly by one fell blow 
 deprived of his position as independent commander in this 
 theatre of war, where the fate of France is to be decided, and 
 he has to do as v. Moltke tells him; for now that the 
 failure of Ducrot’s sortie of November 30th—December 2nd 
 has relieved v. Moltke from anxiety at Paris, he is giving his 
 attention again to the Loire. At 1.30 p.m. the Prince re¬ 
 ceived from Versailles the following telegram, dated 12.30 p.m., 
 and despatched at 1.10 p.m. : 
 
 “ According to report ” [Meldung] “ received, the main body 
 of the Army of the Loire may be south of Artenay, and the 
 Grand Duke alone may perhaps not be able to prevent their 
 further advance by Toury. His Majesty therefore considers 
 it absolutely necessary that the Second Army now proceeds 
 direct to the attack on Orleans, in order by so doing to bring 
 about the decision. This morning a few of the advanced points 
 of the outpost line before Paris, lost the day before yesterday, 
 have been re-captured from the enemy.” 
 
 “ (Signed) Graf Moi.tke.” 
 
 The origin of this peremptory order must now be explained. 
 The course of affairs on the Loire was being regarded at 
 Versailles with the deepest anxiety, and news from the Second 
 Army was awaited with impatience. On the morning of the 
 2nd none had been received. V. Moltke, therefore sought an 
 audience with the King and laid before him the proposal 
 embodied in the telegram. The King gave his consent, 
 not, however, without considerable hesitation. Quite justi¬ 
 fiably the King, owing to the numbering of the four hostile 
 corps said to have been engaged at Beaune, had no reason 
 for believing that there were strong forces opposite the 
 Detachment. Hoenig states also that from private sources 
 had come to the King information which, though not 
 
2 4 o THE PEOPLE’S AVAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 accepted as thoroughly correct, was not without some truth. 
 At the audience the King had alluded to the risk of the 
 Second Army marching westward, if the enemy intended a 
 turning movement between the Loing and the Yonne. V. 
 Moltke had never mentioned to the King v. Stiehle’s ideas 
 on this turning movement : he was therefore considerably 
 surprised when at the audience the King brought forward 
 this matter in almost the very same words that v. Stiehle had 
 used in his correspondence with himself; there had been 
 wheels within wheels, revolving unknown to v. Moltke. 
 But he could now, owing to the failure of the great 
 sortie, calm the King’s anxiety by pointing out that the 
 Paris Army was no longer in a condition to make any 
 great effort outside the capital. V. Moltke advanced further 
 arguments, and the King yielded, but the King almost 
 directly afterwards heard of the report from the Xth Army 
 Corps that on the night November 30th-December 1st, 
 “ according to the assertions of the inhabitants, 20,000 
 men are in Montargis.” Thereupon he doubted the wisdom 
 of the telegram and wrote to v. Moltke: “From the 
 annexed you will see that my opinion that the great 
 Forest of Orleans keeps us in doubt as to what the enemy is 
 doing (is correct) [sic], so that moving into the forest which 
 is some twenty-eight miles long involves at least two days 
 fighting during which time the Second Army can be marched 
 round on the flank and rear if there are 20,000 men in Mon¬ 
 targis. I am doubtful whether our order of to-day is still 
 advisable.” V. Moltke held to his point and through Col. 
 v. Verdy calmed the apprehensions of the King by pointing 
 out that the report was based only on hearsay, that evi¬ 
 dently it referred to the past, and that no corroboration of it 
 had been received. This is certainly an illustration of how 
 belated information may influence judgment on the present. 
 
 As regards v. Moltke’s telegram of 12.30 f.m., it may be 
 doubted whether in the records of this campaign there exists one 
 more extraordinary in its character. The supreme authori¬ 
 ties at Versailles had in the early days of November refused 
 
DECEMBER 2 
 
 241 
 
 to accept the estimate formed of the local military situation 
 on the Loire by the General in command there, and, in con¬ 
 sequence, a heavy penalty was paid at Coulmiers ; now, in the 
 first days of the following month, the same authorities 
 intervene actively in the operations in the same theatre of 
 war, and misjudging completely the military situation, per¬ 
 emptorily order the immediate initiation of an operation 
 totally unsuited to the needs and requirements of the 
 situation. The right wing of the German forces at the very 
 moment that v. Moltke sent the order was engaged in what 
 was almost a hand-to-hand encounter at the spot where the 
 French were making their real attack; the left wing of 
 the German forces, extended and widely scattered, was 
 engaged in reconnoitring: the centre was so destitute of 
 troops that the direct line of hostile advance on Paris lay 
 almost open to the enemy. To meet these dangers there seems 
 to have been only one course of action possible, namely, to leave 
 in front of the French, east of the Paris road, a small force to 
 demonstrate and hold their own, and then with every avail¬ 
 able man and gun to hurry to the west, to support the 
 Detachment and to cover the road. But v. Moltke at this 
 critical moment steps in and says, “ March ahead all of you 
 at once and attack the city of Orleans.” Hitherto, the 
 guiding, paramount principle of v. Moltke’s strategy has been 
 the annihilation of the enemy’s forces in the field; now the 
 objective is the capture of an open town. But on the 2nd v. 
 Blumenthal writes : “ The Crown Prince told me that the 
 King has now positively ordered the Prince to attack the 
 Army of the Loire. Surely it is impossible for him to ignore 
 such an order, and he must now go forward (Fabius cunctator). 
 A Prussian Field Marshal is bound to go forward.” This is very 
 different from the order actually sent. The incompatibility of 
 the order with the military situation is so glaring, that any 
 critic, judging even inferentially only, would at once come to 
 the conclusion that v. Moltke, when he obtained the Royal 
 permission to send it, was in ignorance of the actual state of 
 affairs on the Loire, and further, had been misinformed as to 
 
 Q 
 
2+2 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 them. The latter is clear from the order itself in which v. 
 Moltke gives “south of Artenav ” as the position of the 
 main body of the enemy. As we know there was not one 
 main body in the Army of the Loire, but two main bodies, 
 one of which, the 18th and 20th Corps, was well to the east, 
 the other, the 16th and 17th Corps, was to the west, the 15th 
 Corps forming across the Paris road the connecting link be¬ 
 tween them. It is not clear as to what the words “report 
 received ” (eingegangener Meldung) referred. There is no 
 record of it in the archives or journals. Had it been derived 
 from the Intelligence Branch, the word used would have been 
 “ Nachrichten ” not “ Meldung.” Hoenig is, however, 
 inclined to believe that this must have been its source; 
 and so thick is the Fog of War that v. Moltke seems to 
 anticipate the greatest danger to lie on the Paris road. But 
 still more extraordinary and inexplicable is the fact that when 
 v. Moltke at 1.10 p.m. issued the order he was not aware of 
 the battle then raging at Poupry ; nor, although from mid¬ 
 night December 1-2, there was no longer any doubt at Pithi- 
 viers as to the critical state of affairs on the west of the road, 
 does there appear to have been any intimation to this effect 
 to Versailles, although v. Stiehle himself had on the evening 
 of the 1st told v. Waldersee he believed that there would 
 be a fight at the Detachment next day. And all this is still 
 more strange because the battlefield was little more than fifty 
 miles from Versailles. Toury, the German telegraph station 
 on the Paris road, was only six or seven miles distant from the 
 left of the battlefield. The battle commenced at about 8 a.m. 
 and lasted until dark. Yet nobody seems to have sent to 
 Versailles during the day any news whatever about what was 
 taking place, but between 5 and 6 p.m. v. Waldersee wired to 
 the King a short but very clear summary of the successful 
 encounter.* The inappropriateness of v. Mol Ike's order was 
 
 * The following extract from a letter, which I had both the pleasure and 
 honour of receiving, from Field Marshal Graf v. Waldersee nearly two years 
 ago, is conclusive : “ On the evening of Beaune la Rolande, as well as that of 
 Loigny, I telegraphed to the King William that a complete victory had been 
 
DECEMBER 2 
 
 243 
 
 clearly due to the absence of knowledge of the military situa¬ 
 tion. And now we pass to the consideration of the action 
 taken by the Prince on the receipt of this inappropriate order. 
 And here we meet the question of literal obedience versus 
 intelligent disobedience, the latter, be it remarked, a form 
 of leading in high favour in the German Army. 
 
 It certainly seems, that peremptory as was the order, there 
 was open to the Prince an alternative course to that of un¬ 
 hesitating and immediate compliance with it. The telegraph 
 wire connecting Pithiviers and Versailles could work quickly 
 enough when necessary, as shown by the fact that twenty 
 minutes had sufficed for the delivery of the order after its 
 issue. Without, therefore, any appreciable delay in the 
 execution of the order, the Prince could have assured himself 
 that the King and v. Moltke were fully aware of the situation 
 on the Loire when the order was issued. A wire, “ Detach¬ 
 ment concentrated this morning to attack on line Tanon- 
 Baigneaux. Waldersee reports hostile advance in strong 
 force along Orleans-Paris ltoad. Does your order hold 
 good ? ” would have removed at Versailles all possibility of a 
 misunderstanding of the situation ; and then if notwith¬ 
 standing, the order was confirmed, all responsibility for the 
 consequences i-ested on the right shoulders. But the Prince 
 was silent; it is said that if speech is silver, silence is gold, 
 but here the gold was coinage of the counterfeit class ; for 
 whilst it bore the stamp, “ unhesitating obedience to orders,” 
 it led eventually to results that were simply deplorable. 
 
 But even if the Prince determined, as he did, to accept the 
 order in silence, and at once to comply with it, the mode in 
 which he would comply depended obviously on his interpreta¬ 
 tion of it. “ Die II. Armee nunmehr direct zum AngrifF 
 auf Orleans schreitet, um die Entscheidung herbeizufuhren.” 
 Taken literally, it reads, “attack the city of Orleans by the 
 shortest road ” ; and the corollary reads, “ on the capture of 
 
 won. The order to Prince Frederick Charles of the 2nd December to com¬ 
 mence the attack on Orleans was given by General v. Moltke before he 
 received tidings that a battle had begun on the west of the great Chaussee.” 
 
244 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 the City of Orleans the decision of the conflict with the Army 
 of the Loire depends.” But of course the order construed 
 liberally and not literally runs, “ At once give up your 
 defensive attitude and energetically assume the offensive.” 
 The substitution of a city for the hostile forces in the field as 
 already noticed is very remarkable. Hoenig says that at this 
 time there was a general feeling, shared also by the King, the 
 Prince, and the Grand Duke, that with the recapture of 
 Orleans the war would come to an end. On what grounds 
 this assumption was based we do not know. Sometimes 
 there attaches to the possession of an open town or city 
 either on or away from a river, some strategical advantage, 
 so marked that the future course of the war will be greatlv 
 influenced by its retention or its capture. But here in the 
 case of Orleans, the importance attached by both sides to its 
 possession seems to have been to a considerable extent 
 fictitious. In November it was natural that the first objective 
 of the then newly-formed Army of the Loire should be the 
 ejection of v. d. Tann’s force from Orleans and its repossession 
 by its rightful owners. The recapture exercised a great 
 beneficial moral effect on the country, and it covered the 
 future concentration here, but the value of Orleans to the 
 French strategically may be regarded as doubtful. De Frev- 
 cinet regarded Orleans as merely a point dCappui; General 
 Borel, the Chief Staff Officer of the Army of the Loire, had 
 never assented to the alleged advantages of the position ; as 
 a Bridge Head for a force advancing from the south, it was, 
 in its prominently salient position, exposed to isolation bv 
 attacks coming from both above and below the citv ; more¬ 
 over, in the French counsels there was great diversity of 
 opinion as to which among the several theatres of war avail¬ 
 able for the Army of National Defence would be most favour¬ 
 able for its operations. Save in its proximity to Bourges, 
 the chief arsenal, Orleans had little to recommend it in 
 connection with offensive operations on a large scale. The 
 Germans had originally taken it in order to keep the country 
 between it and Paris clear of the annoyances inflicted on them 
 
DECEMBER 2 
 
 245 
 
 by the half-trained troops and the bands of irregulars, and 
 also on the erroneous supposition that it would serve as a sox-t 
 of half-way house to Bourges and Tours. And, moreover, so 
 long as Orleans and the surrounding country on the right 
 bank were in the possession of the French the occupation was 
 a standing menace to the Germans. For, as has been apparent 
 from this narrative, the Orleans position was a screen im¬ 
 penetrable to hostile observation, and therefore they could 
 not tell whether it was being used as a real cover for the con¬ 
 centration of some hundreds of thousands of the enemy, ready 
 to issue forth suddenly at the first favourable opportunity 
 for action, or whether there were there hut a few thousands, 
 sufficient however to simulate the presence of ten times their 
 number. As a strategic point for a German offensive it was 
 of no value. 
 
 It may have been that the Prince, irritated by the severe 
 censure implied in the order and by the form in which the 
 order was drawn up, determined to give vent to his resent¬ 
 ment by interpreting it according to its exact wording, 
 and with complete disregard of the consequences. “ He 
 may have said to himself, ‘ Those people at Versailles at the 
 centre of authority seem always to think they know so much 
 better what ought to he done far away from them than I do, 
 who am on the spot, that now I will give them their heads 
 and do just as they tell me, only they must not blame me 
 later on if we find ourselves in difficulties and obtain hut a 
 poor return for a huge casualty list, and are obliged to begin 
 the business all over again. 1 ” On this matter we may well 
 withhold our judgment. 
 
 The ground-work of the plan of operations selected by the 
 Prince for the literal execution of the order was to leave the 1st 
 Cav. Division and an Infantry Brigade to watch his own left 
 Hank and rear towards Montargis; to send thelllrd Army Corps 
 from the north-east to the south-west through the Forest of 
 Orleans; and with the IXth Army Corps to push back the 
 enemy along the main road to Orleans, the Detachment co¬ 
 operating with this corps bv attacking from the west the 
 
246 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 enemy’s positions on the road and in its vicinity; the Xth 
 Army Corps to form a reserve at the centre to the whole force. 
 When v. Moltke’s order was received, the dispositions on the 
 left wing were not favourable for its speedy execution, both 
 the IIIrd and Xth Army Corps being engaged in recon¬ 
 noitring to the south and south-east. Telegrams were at 
 once sent to them giving general directions, and at 2.30 p.m. 
 written detailed instructions followed. The Illrd Army 
 Corps was recalled to Pithiviers, the Xth Army Corps to 
 Beaune and Boynes. But so scattered and so distant were 
 the corps from the points named as rendezvous that it was 
 only by hard marching, prolonged into the night, that these 
 were reached. The marches were flank marches, and specially 
 difficult and dangerous owing to the proximity of the hostile 
 outposts, but this movement, of which the knowledge would 
 have been invaluable to the defenders of the forest, was 
 apparently almost unnoticed by them. 
 
 The orders for the actual advance on the 3rd were not sent 
 out until 10 p.m. Omitting some clauses not essential to the 
 consideration of the subject, they run as follows, and, it may 
 be added, they are remarkable for their terseness and incom¬ 
 pleteness. 
 
 “The Second Army and the Detachment of H.R.H. the 
 Grand Duke of Mecklenburg ai’e to [soil] advance to-morrow 
 December 3rd to the concentric attack against Orleans.” 
 
 (The word “ soli ” clearly indicates that the Prince in 
 issuing the order is carrying out one he has himself received.) 
 
 “The IXth Army Corps will move to-morrow on Artenay, 
 which place it will attack at 9.30. 
 
 “ A flank detachment from the 25th (Grand Ducal Hessian) 
 Division will march along the Roman road Bazoches-S. Lye. 
 This detachment will march into the forest as the fight on the 
 main road makes progress, endeavouring as far as possible to 
 maintain touch with the right. 
 
 “ The Illrd Army Corps will march in several columns on a 
 wide front towards Chilleurs aux Bois, proceeding to the decisi ve 
 attack on Chilleurs at 10.30, capture this place and the edge 
 
DECEMBER 2 
 
 2 47 
 
 of the forest, employing its artillery to the utmost, and will 
 push forward a strong advanced guard to Loury. The main 
 body of the corps must reach Loury to-morrow. Within the 
 forest, pioneer detachments are to lead, in order to remove 
 obstacles. 
 
 “ Headquarters, Loury. 
 
 “ The Xth Army Corps will march to-morrow out of its 
 cantonments, so that in the course of the afternoon it will 
 arrive at Villereau with its right wing, and Chilleurs aux Bois 
 with its left wing [on a front of six miles, the left six miles 
 from Loury]. It will occupy close cantonments on this line. 
 Head-quarters, Chilleurs aux Bois. 
 
 “ Hartmann’s C'av. Division with the infantry brigade 
 attached will take up a position according to the judgment 
 of the commander, so that it can watch the district between 
 the Essonne and the Loing, and the roads running along the 
 latter river. 
 
 “ All important incidents, especially any possible advance 
 of the enemy, are to be reported direct to General Count 
 Moltke at Versailles by telegraph, and also by means of 
 orderly officers. 
 
 “The Detachment of H.R.H. the Grand Duke will, accord¬ 
 ing to its own dispositions, advance to-morrow west of the 
 Artenay-Orleans road for a corresponding attack. 
 
 “The attack on the hostile position, Gidv-Cercottes, will 
 if it is occupied be aided by an infantry outflanking attack of 
 the IXth Army Corps on Cercottes in the forest. 
 
 “My Head-quarters go to-morrow after the fight to Chil¬ 
 leurs aux Bois.” 
 
 It will be remarked that no directions are given for keeping- 
 up the connection between the Illrd Army Corps and the rest 
 of the army, nor is there vouchsafed any information as 
 to the enemy. 
 
 In this plan and scheme there is no strategy, notwithstand¬ 
 ing the fact that on this long front of forty miles there is 
 plenty of scope for its employment. It is all tactics, tactics of a 
 kind almost barbaric : those of w eight and brute force. The 
 
248 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 influence of ground on tactics, and the selection of the ground 
 most suitable for a force weak in infantrv but strong in the 
 other arms are alike ignored. The Illrd Army Corps with its 
 numerous artillery is to be plunged, isolated, into the densest 
 of woodland, a theatre of war most favourable for its half- 
 trained defenders; what becomes of the enemy is a matter of 
 indifference, so long as the pressure on the main road suffices 
 to force him back ; and it is precisely on this line of advance 
 that will be found, in all probability, numerous localities well 
 prepared for defence. 
 
 Since it is difficult to suppose that any commander would 
 have issued for December 3rd orders, irrespective of what 
 had taken place at the Detachment on the 2nd, it is desirable 
 to endeavour to ascertain from the documents before us what 
 information had come to the Prince from the Detachment, and 
 at what times it had been received by him. 
 
 At 3 p.m. he received from the Grand Duke a telegram 
 informing him that at 1 p.m. the 17th and 22 nd Inf. Divisions 
 were advancing on Terminiers, and that the much-shaken 
 Bavarian corps and the 4th Cav. Division were holding the 
 right wing. The enemy appeared to be falling back in the 
 direction of Bonneval. 
 
 At 5 p.m. came another telegram from Janville, 3.51 p.m. 
 
 “ At 2.30 p.m. 17th Division captured Loignv, and is 
 successfully advancing, followed by the 1st Bav. corps, with 
 the 4th Cav. Division on the flank, direction Nonneville- 
 Orgeres ; the 16th French corps in front of it. 
 
 “Twenty-second Division advancing successfully on Ar- 
 tenay. Apparently the 15th French corps in front of it .' 1 
 
 At 9.30 p.m. came a message, 6 p.m. Janville, from v. 
 Waldersee, briefly describing the successes of the battle, and 
 concluding with the words, “ I regard the battle as a brilliant 
 victory.” 
 
 Hoenig states that it was whilst the Prince was issuing his 
 orders for the 3rd that he received from v. Stosch a telegram 
 from the battlefield. 
 
 “ At 4.30 p.m. enemy driven back on Terminiers and also 
 
DECEMBER 2 
 
 249 
 
 on Artenav. Many prisoners taken, eleven guns captured. 
 If the enemy is to be pursued to-morrow, it is absolutely 
 necessary that the Second Army should attack Artenav and 
 cover the Orleans-Paris Road.” This telegram was followed 
 by a letter which described the events of the day and was 
 received before midnight. Yet on the orders issued, with 
 these telegrams before him, the Prince absolutely ignores 
 the fact that only a few miles away a decisive victory has 
 been won on the right wing of what was actually his own 
 command. Whilst the orders were yet on their way to the 
 Detachment, v. Stosch at 11.16 p.m. sent to the Prince a 
 further telegram which arrived at Pithiviers at one in the 
 morning. It commenced with the words, “ In order to secure 
 the successful results of to-day, the pursuit will be taken up 
 to-morrow,” then followed the arrangements made in conse¬ 
 quence. Later on he telegraphed: “A comparison of the 
 information obtained with regard to the hostile troops which 
 were in the engagement yesterday shows the 16th and 17th 
 Corps against the 17th Division. It is, therefore, very 
 probable that the Detachment will have to fight again to¬ 
 day.” Hoenig says that in earlier reports the 15th Corps had 
 already been mentioned, but that the Prince did not believe 
 that these three corps would be encountered in the new 
 direction of the operations. Until four in the morning the 
 Grand Duke and v. Stosch waited in the hope that the Prince 
 would, on the later reports sent to him, modify the original 
 orders, and then, but not till then, did the Grand Duke issue 
 fresh orders in conformity with the views of the Prince. Hence 
 so far as the planning the future campaign on the Loire was 
 concerned, the Battle of Loignv-Poupry might as well not 
 have been fought. 
 
 At 11 p.m. v. Stiehle sent to v. Moltke a letter with the 
 orders issued by the Prince and a brief account of the events 
 of December 1st and 2nd, and in the last paragraph we read : 
 “The offensive movement of the Detachment of H.R.H. the 
 Grand Duke had been so arranged with General v. Stosch 
 that an endeavour should be made to secure a crossing over 
 
250 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 the Loire below Orleans, but as to-day’s telegram seems to 
 make great haste necessary, the endeavour will be made to 
 reach the objective Orleans by the direct road.” There is 
 nothing in v. Moltke’s published correspondence nor in 
 Hoenig’s work to show what effect was produced on the mind 
 of the Chief of the Staff of the German forces by the perusal 
 of this letter. If v. Moltke had abandoned his strategy of 
 the first war in favour of a second form of strategy; if for 
 the annihilation of the hostile forces in the field he had 
 substituted the capture of an open town, it must have 
 rejoiced his heart to find his order interpreted to the very 
 letter; if not, and if he still held to the old faith, then the 
 letter must have foreshadowed to him the beginning of the 
 great blunder of tbe whole struggle, the initiation of a course 
 of action that might prolong the war, involve the Germans in 
 fresh campaigns, and cost them dearly in blood and life. Some 
 day the truth may be revealed. 
 
CHAPTER XIX 
 
 DECEMBER 3rd—FIRST DAY, SECOND BATTLE OF ORLEANS 
 
 It sometimes happens when the line of action taken in war 
 by a leader appears to have been dangerous and even fool¬ 
 hardy, and yet has resulted in a brilliant success, that there 
 is attributed to him a species of marvellous insight into the 
 state of affairs on the side of the enemy and his moral con¬ 
 dition. But though the Prince achieved his aims on 
 December 3rd and 4th, the success of the dangerous and 
 hazardous operation adopted was in no way due to his 
 possessing any insight of this kind. Rarely has any leader 
 entered so completely blindfolded into a battle as did 
 Prince Frederick Charles into the second battle of Orleans. 
 Of even the general disposition of the enemy he knew 
 very little; of the position of even the larger hostile units, 
 such as the Army Corps, he was equally in ignorance, and 
 he refused to accept as correct the approximately correct 
 information furnished to him bv the Detachment. He 
 was aware that, for at least a fortnight, a vast amount of 
 labour had been expended in putting into a state of defence 
 the position he was about to attack, and that in it were 
 heavy guns; but of the system of works, he could see only 
 the fringe, and he was not certain even whether on the river 
 itself there was or was not a Bridge Head. As regards the 
 morul of the enemy he was equally in the dark, except as 
 regards the 15th Corps, the best in the French Army, the 
 corps that had fought victoriously at Coulmiers and was in no 
 way shaken ; the battle of December 2nd must have seriously 
 injured the morul of the 16th and 17th Corps, but this had 
 no influence on his judgment, because he refused to believe 
 
252 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 that that encounter had been of the serious character attri¬ 
 buted to it by both v. Stoseh and v. Waldersee. That the 
 18th and 20th Corps, his opponents at Beaune la Rolande, 
 had been very severely shaken, he did not even admit until 
 his delayed visit to the battlefield on the 30th, and then he 
 believed that the opportunity for taking advantage of the 
 demoralisation of the corps had gone by. With respect to 
 the leaders and the leading of the French, the enemy was 
 to him 200,000 men under one supreme commander only, 
 General d’Aurelle, who had already, as a tactician, made his 
 mark at Coulmiers. No doubt an early gallop to the battle 
 field of Loigny-Pouprv, and a personal conference with the 
 Grand Duke and v. Stoseh, might have enabled him to get 
 nearer the truth, but the Prince of December 3rd does not 
 seem to have been the same man as the Prince of August 16th, 
 who had hurried in two hours from Pont-a-Mousson to 
 Vionville; and, possibly, the prospect of an interview with a 
 royal Prince he personally disliked, and with a Chief Staff 
 Officer who held views opposite to his own, was not specially 
 attractive. 
 
 On the morning of December 3rd began the two days battle. 
 No doubt, if war be a science and an art, it ought to be carried 
 on in conformity with the principles derived from the experi¬ 
 ences of the past; and, as a rule, war thus conducted is far more 
 likelv to be successful than is war carried on in disregard of 
 those principles ; but the so-called “ game ” of war, like all 
 other games, is one of probabilities, and a disregard of pro¬ 
 babilities may sometimes result in pulling off a great coup; 
 and so it was here in the attack on Orleans, and in no part of 
 the widely extended battlefield more markedly so than on the 
 east of the Paris road, in the great Forest of Orleans, when, 
 during the thirty-six hours from 9 a.m. on December 3rd the 
 Illrd Army Corps was, according to probabilities, marching to 
 certain destruction; when the dangerssurroundingit were appa- 
 rentlvoverwhelming: and yet the corps not only issued from the 
 perils unscathed, but succeeded in depriving the defenders of 
 the city of Orleans of the aid of some 40,000 to 50,000 men, 
 
DECEMBER 3 
 
 253 
 
 simply bv frightening them away. It is on this side of the 
 road during the two days that we gain experience of how 
 deeply indebted to sheer good fortune may sometimes be 
 even the ablest generals. The day's work of the Illrd Army 
 Corps will be dealt with first, and as a preliminary step, 
 the position of the French must be given. At and north of 
 Artenay were the second and third Divisions of the 15th 
 Corps, and when during the 3rd they fell back towards 
 Orleans, their line of retreat lay on and near to the Paris 
 road. The village of Chevilly is on this road at the north¬ 
 west angle of the forest. No troops had been specially told 
 off to protect the five miles of front between this road and 
 the Roman road ; but the protection of some portion of it 
 would naturally fall to the retiring troops. The Roman road 
 was guarded outside the forest, but near to the edge by the 
 fortified localities of Villereau, St. Germain-le-Grand, and 
 Neuville aux Bois. At Neuville were some 8400 rifles and 
 twelve guns; at Villereau 1850 rifles and eight guns; these 
 troops were the left of the first Division of the 15th Corps, and 
 were under General Minot. Chilleurs aux Bois, the next point 
 of entry, and assigned for attack to the Illrd Army Corps, lies 
 a good mile outside the forest; the village of Santeau is the 
 same distance further towards Pithiviers. At this entrance was 
 des l’allieres with 8500 rifles and thirty-eight guns. At Courcy 
 aux Loges, on the next road from Pithiviers, was the right of 
 the Division, 2070 rifles and six guns. The front of this Divi¬ 
 sion of some 20,000 men was eleven to twelve miles. At 
 Chambon, three and a half miles east, and also on a road, was 
 the left flank of the 20th Corps, which, with the 18th on its 
 right, faced north-east towards Beaune and Montargis. 
 
 As the Prince, when despatching the Illrd Army Corps on 
 its mission, believed that the French were in very strong force 
 on its left, with troops also in strength at Chilleurs, the course 
 he adopted was certainly a departure from his usual caution. 
 In fact, his whole leading during the two days was that of a 
 man who, forced by superior authority to adopt a line of 
 action he regarded as both dangerous and hazardous, went 
 
2 5+ THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 recklessly ahead, regardless of possible consequences. The 
 task set to the Corps, namely, after a severe night march to 
 march ten miles to the edge of a forest, drive back the enemy 
 from this edge which had been prepared for defence, and on 
 narrow and obstructed roads to force him back five miles on 
 his natural line of retreat, was a tolerably large bit of work 
 for a short November day ; yet grand old v. Alvensleben 
 managed to accomplish the wishes of the Prince, the ten 
 years’ commander of the Corps in old days. Nothing, during 
 the whole campaign, was beyond the Brandenburgers. V. 
 Alvensleben was fully aware of the difficulties confronting 
 him, but it was only to his Chief Staff Officer, Colonel v. V. 
 Rhetz, that he spoke of them. Outwardly, to others, he 
 appeared quite unmoved. In the march of the previous night 
 he had brushed against the hostile outposts, and, for aught he 
 knew, the enemy might, in consequence, be specially on the 
 alert; that if he arrived at Loury in rear of the enemy, his 
 presence there on the night of the 3rd would be known to 
 them, he could not doubt ; and in front of him at Loury would 
 be the Loire and the fortified Orleans. In the Army Orders 
 there was no mention of the provision of any connecting link 
 between him and the IXth Army Corps on his right, so in the 
 intervening forest the enemy might, unknown to him, be. And 
 what an encumbrance were his own eighty-four guns. To take 
 all these with him along the forest roads, obstructed as they 
 were sure to be, would be great labour; whilst, also, the 
 teams could easily be crippled by a few shooters concealed in 
 the underwood. To leave the guns in rear needed a strong 
 escort, and a consequent diminution of the comparatively few 
 infantry (14,750) of his force. He remarked, somewhat in 
 the spirit of raillery, “ We are ordered to beat the enemy, so 
 we will beat him ; the position of the General is not usually 
 with the outposts, at least not in wooded country of this kind, 
 but since we cannot command unless we are at the out-posts, 
 we will go there.” He also said “the General in command 
 should not be under the fire of the enemy, and I shall only go 
 there if necessary, but if I find myself there by chance it will 
 
DECEMBER 3 
 
 255 
 
 not be proper for me to ride away.” V. Alvensleben estimated 
 the strength of the enemy at one Division on the Loury road 
 and one and a-half to two corps to the east of it—a very 
 close estimate. “ I went,” he afterwards said, “ I was fully 
 aware, into a den, of which the door closed of itself after 
 mv last man had passed Chilleurs. With every step for¬ 
 ward diminished any chance of support, and also the possi¬ 
 bility of withdrawing or of sending any news about myself, 
 or of receiving news ; and if I did fortunately succeed in 
 arriving at the southern edge the situation of my corps 
 before the city could become very unpleasant. No use was 
 there in previous calculations and speculations. I knew 
 nothing as to the state of affairs south of the forest: of only 
 one thing was I sure, the impossibility of employing all my 
 guns. And was it quite out of the question that the Prince’s 
 attack might be repulsed, that I should be for one or two 
 days in front of the Bridge Head, and with the enemy on 
 my line of retreat ? In this case we should certainly hold 
 out, but my corps could hardly escape a catastrophe.” 
 
 It was at Santeau that des Pallieres determined to first 
 oppose the German advance. An artillery duel of great 
 vivacity commenced at 10.30 a.m. and the issue was greatly 
 to the advantage of the Germans. So severely did the French 
 artillery suffer that about midday des Pallieres ordered it back 
 to Orleans; the infantry were to cover the retreat and fall 
 back to the edge of the forest, holding the edge on both sides 
 of the road ; but the Germans did not allow the retirement 
 to be made undisturbed, and the retreat of the rear-guard 
 became a flight. Chilleurs soon fell into the hands of the 
 pursuers, who also captured the edge of the forest. 
 
 Three miles within the forest at this point there is met a 
 perfectly straight cross road, the Allee de Nibelle, running 
 from east to west, and striking the Paris-Orleans road at 
 rather more than a mile on the Orleans side of Chevilly ; it 
 cuts the Loury road two miles north of the village. Des 
 Pallieres now led his troops back to the Alice, sent his heavy 
 batteries to Orleans by Loury, and turned westward along 
 
256 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 the Allee with the rest of his column. The road to Loury 
 was thus left completely open to the Illrd Army Corps. 
 
 An explanation of this conduct of des Pallieres is necessary. 
 General d’Aurelle, on becoming acquainted with the result 
 of the battle of Loigny-Poupry, determined to give up the 
 offensive and to commence a retreat on Orleans, and, in con¬ 
 sequence, issued, among other orders, one 4.50 a.m., 3rd, 
 to des Pallieres, which he received at 5.20 a.m. on the 3rd, 
 ordering him to retire west on S. Lye and Chevilly. Al¬ 
 though there was a field telegraph station at Neuville in con¬ 
 nection with d’Aurelle, the latter does not appear to have been 
 informed by des Pallieres of the attack of the Illrd Army Corps. 
 It seems somewhat remarkable that des Pallieres should have 
 interpreted the order purely according to the letter. But 
 although he removed, thus voluntarily, all bars and locks 
 on the gate opening into the den at Loury, the advance 
 into it and passing the night there was in the highest degree 
 dangerous. With unity of control on the French side, the 
 giving up the door would have been the luring the corps into 
 a trap, and its sure capture. 
 
 It must have been half-past three on this short November 
 day that the last of the defenders of the wood edge disap¬ 
 peared. V. Alvensleben had given his troops a short rest 
 whilst he drew up orders for the further advance. In this 
 advance guns would be of little use, so the General left 
 outside the wood the six batteries of the Corps artillery, and 
 the four batteries of the 5th Division, under an escort of five 
 battalions, taking with him only the twenty-four guns of the 
 6 th Infantry Division. From the entrance into the wood a 
 glade, diverging slightly from the road, led direct south, 
 striking at the level of Loury, and at one and three-quarter 
 miles east of the village, on a cross road to Sully la Chapelle, 
 which is on the road from Courey ; at the crossing is a 
 large clearing. The 6 th Infantry Division advanced down 
 the main road, the 5th down to the clearing. The march 
 began soon after three o’clock. V. Alvensleben was in a 
 state of great anxiety, but he completely concealed it from 
 
DECEMBER 3 
 
 257 
 
 the officers round him, few of whom understood the perilous 
 position in which the corps was. During the march the 
 sound of rifle-fire from the dispersed fugitives was heard 
 around. Very soon darkness came on in the dense wood, but 
 the men, elated by the success of the morning, marched on in 
 high spirits. The pioneers and leading troops had to clear 
 away the paving-stones, purposely torn up and strewn about 
 the road ; they had to make cuttings passable and to clear 
 away barricades in the glade. The work in the dark was 
 difficult ; nevertheless, the troops came stumbling onwards by 
 degrees. Two hours were needed for the fii’st three miles ; 
 and now, as the advance continued, heavy rifle-fire suddenly 
 resounded to the right rear in the direction of Neuville aux 
 Bois. V. Alvensleben considered it inadvisable to halt until 
 the meaning of the firing could be ascertained, though it was 
 too heavy to be merely an outpost affair, so he contented 
 himself with sending cavalry for information, and at the same 
 time covering by infantry his flank and rear. The rifle-fire 
 increased in intensity, and guns were also heard. In total 
 darkness the village of Loury was reached ; not a light was to 
 be seen ; the onlv thing to be done was to place outposts on 
 the approaches from the west, south, and east. Meantime, 
 at 6.15 p.m. the firing to the north-west had died out, but 
 the approach of hostile parties from the east had been re¬ 
 ported. After the outposts had taken up their ground a fight 
 suddenly broke out between those towards Neuville and 
 hostile troops who, at eight o’clock, coming from that direc¬ 
 tion, collided with them ; but the French, after creating at 
 first a certain amount of confusion, were driven off. 
 
 The rest of the night passed quietly, and when day broke there 
 was not any enemy in view, but there were found close at hand 
 five guns that had been abandoned by the hostile troops. And 
 now to show how it was that the perils to which the Illrd Army 
 Corps had been exposed during these twelve hours had remained 
 only perils. The march ordered by the Prince had been found 
 practicable so far, but this did not show any foresight on the 
 part of the Prince. V. Alvensleben had done his best to prepare 
 
 R 
 
2 5 8 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 to ward off the dangers by which he was encompassed, and that 
 was the utmost that the General on the spot could do to con¬ 
 tribute towards success. The credit for the success must be 
 given to the French commanders only. It has been mentioned 
 that the left Hank of des Palliere’s division Avas, in the morning, 
 at Neuville aux Bois under Minot. It was against this detach¬ 
 ment that the left flanking foixe of the IXth Army Corps and 
 later the Xth Army Corps, had struck in their ad\ T ance south ; 
 Minot had received orders from des Pallieres to hold on to the 
 last extremity to cover thewestAvard flank marchof the division, 
 and then to fall back south-west on S. Lye. When des Pal¬ 
 lieres arrived in rear of Neuville aux Bois, at four o’clock, a 
 peasant came to him from Neuville and undertook to take any 
 orders to General Minot. Des Pallieres, knowing how bad was 
 the road from Neuville to S. Lye, and fearful that Minot 
 during the march might be attacked in flank, told the peasant 
 to tell the General that he might retreat south-east through 
 Rebrechien, by the road which runs into the Loury-Orleans 
 road, tAvo and a half miles on the Orleans side of Loury, and 
 he expressed to him the hope that the enemy, who had been 
 fighting during part of the day, would not have passed Loury. 
 It is doubtful whether the message was received. Minot had, 
 hoAvever, already selected the Rebrechien line of retreat. Of 
 the fight at Chilleurs he had received no information, and he 
 was not aware that the Germans had penetrated into the 
 wood. Not far from Neuville the road he folloAved bifurcates, 
 the left, the better road, going to Loury, the right, a forest 
 track, to Rebrechien. It was quite dark, and there was a heavy 
 snowstorm, and at the bifurcation the wrong branch, that to 
 Loury, was followed. At the head of the column were tAvo 
 batteries. It Avas this column that, marching without any pre¬ 
 cautions for security, struck on the outposts of the Illrd Army 
 Corps at eight o’clock, as already described. At first there was 
 alarm and confusion on both sides, but with the well-disciplined 
 troops this was only temporary; with the less Avell-disciplined 
 troops it developed into panic. In spite of the heroic and 
 desperate efforts of the French gunners, it Avas impossible to 
 
DECEMBER 3 259 
 
 save more than seven of the twelve guns. The column itself 
 broke, and the men fled through the wood to Orleans. 
 
 The small detachment on the right flank at Courcy seems 
 to have been forgotten by des Pallieres. The colonel sent for 
 orders, but finding Chilleurs in the possession of the Germans, 
 he retreated to Orleans, by the outer of the four roads. It 
 was this detachment that had been reported to Alvensleben as 
 coming from the east. And there had been also peril impend¬ 
 ing from the north-east from the 20th and 18th corps. Since 
 November 30th these two corps had been receiving their orders, 
 not from d’Aurelle, but from Tours ; but in order to carry 
 out the schemes which now emanated from the Delegation, 
 there was sent, on the 2nd, bv Gambetta to d’Aurelle the fol¬ 
 lowing order of 4 f.m., which, however, d’Aurelle did not 
 receive until the night of the 3rd: “From to-day, December 
 2 nd,it is necessary that for the operations now undertaken, you 
 issue your strategical orders to the 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, and 
 20th corps. I have, until yesterday, December 1st, myself 
 directed the 18th and 20 th corps,and for a time the 17th; I now 
 hand over to you this duty. From earlier reports, I do not 
 believe that serious opposition will be encountered by you either 
 at Pithiviers or at the other points. In my opinion, the enemy 
 is only attempting to mask his movement to the north-east to 
 meet Ducrot. The column with which you had to deal yes¬ 
 terday, and perhaps have to deal with to-day, is doubtless 
 only an isolated detachment which is endeavouring to defain 
 us. But the main body must be, I repeat, on the way to Corbeil 
 [fifteen miles from Paris, on the Seine]. At this moment we 
 have reoccupied Chateaudun.” 
 
 Very intricate is the controversy that has arisen on the ques¬ 
 tion of responsibility for the leading of the two eastern corps at 
 this critical period. De Freycinet maintains that this telegram 
 is not to be taken “ a la lettre des mots employes par lui,” 
 and that d’Aurelle was already in command of them ; d’Aurelle 
 declines to accept the responsibility earlier than the receipt of 
 this telegram. Anyhow, it was not until 7 p.m. on the 3rd that 
 Bourbaki, who had superseded the very recently appointed 
 
260 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 Billot in command of the two corps, received from d’Aurelle 
 orders to concentrate to his left, and to support des Pallieres, 
 who at this time had, as we know, totally disappeared from 
 the scene ; so during the two critical days of the 2 nd and 3 rd,, 
 the two corps remained quiescent, quite ignorant of what was 
 taking place on their own side, or on that of the enemy. It 
 must be mentioned here that at night the Xth Army Corps had 
 arrived with its left at Chilleurs, and had failed to wrest 
 with its right Neuville from Minot’s troops. 
 
 On the main road, in the centre, the IXth Army Corps had 
 since morning progressed some five miles, after a series of com¬ 
 bats for the possession of villages, commencing at Assas, north 
 of Artenay, and capturing La Croix Briquet about four in the 
 afternoon, when it began to darken. But at a quarter before 
 three the Prince had issued a remarkable order: “ I shall 
 consider to-day’s work finished when, after a thorough pre¬ 
 paration by artillery, the village of Chevilly and the angle of 
 the forest east of it are in possession of the IXth Army Corps, 
 and are, under all circumstances, held by them. The 17th 
 and 22nd Inf. Divisions will similarly, after a bombardment, 
 capture the Chevilly chateau and the angle of the forest 
 south of the village, and hold firmly on to them. If the day 
 is not long enough the attacks must be continued after dark.” 
 A night attack through a forest, on strongly fortified 
 localities, yet two miles distant! 
 
 It has already been mentioned that in front of the main 
 position prepared round Orleans, there was also a prepared 
 advanced position. It was at the localities in the latter that 
 the IXth Army Corps had hitherto been engaged. Chevilly was 
 one of the most important localities in the main position. 
 D’Aurelle did not intend that his retirement should go further 
 than this position, and he expected that at Chevilly, des 
 Pallieres would arrive during the day with his Division. 
 
 And now we shall again come on the old factor in war, some¬ 
 times friend, sometimes foe, “personlichkeit.” During the day 
 the Detachment had been pushing its way on, by constant 
 fighting against the French Army on the west of the Paris 
 
DECEMBER 3 
 
 201 
 
 road somewhat into the front of that army, and also at 
 the same time guarding its own right from any attack on 
 that flank, and, with its left, outflanking the French posi¬ 
 tions on the Paris-Orleans road, which were being attacked in 
 front by the IXth Army Corps. General Chanzy,the French 
 leader, opposite the Detachment, was a bold, enterprising and 
 competent commander, and both to cover the retreat of the 
 16th and 17th Corps ordered by d’Aurelle, and also as a 
 ■diversion to relieve the pressure on the 15th Corps, he kept 
 v. d. Tann on the right fully occupied. 
 
 The Prince had not intimated to the Grand Duke where 
 he was to be found during the 3rd ; he apparently did not 
 know until one o’clock in the afternoon what alterations 
 the Grand Duke had made in the original orders to comply 
 with those issued by himself, and so little interest did he 
 take in the proceedings of the Detachment on either this 
 or the preceding day, that though at one o’clock the two 
 commanders were very little more than a mile apart no 
 interview took place between them during the day. About 
 this time the Prince sent to v. St.osch an order intimating to 
 him the way in which the two Infantry Divisions should be 
 employed ; and in his mind there was still the “ idee fixee 
 that the Detachment had made much ado about very little. 
 That on the 2nd it was the main body of the French left 
 wing that the Grand Duke had encountered he still dis¬ 
 believed. “ Believe me,” he said, “ the Grand Duke has 
 nothing of any importance in front of him.” The prepara¬ 
 tions for the attack on Chevilly had been almost completely 
 carried out when, suddenly, there came a counter order. 
 About five o’clock, when it was getting dark, v. Stosch, who, 
 with the approval of the Grand Duke had gone to seek a 
 personal interview with the Prince, came to him at the little 
 vdlage of Creuzy, some three miles from Chevilly, to put 
 before him the state of affairs at the Detachment, and also 
 because he thought that the night attack on a position that 
 was fortified, but of which little was known, was a great risk. 
 V. Stosch informed the Prince that a hostile force of one Divi- 
 
262 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 sion was threatening the right Hank of the Detachment, and 
 that the Bavarians had now their 1st Division in action against 
 it, and the Hght was not yet ended ; and he mentioned that on 
 the previous day there had been in front of the Grand Duke the 
 16th and 17th Corps, and strong forces of the 15th Corps ; he 
 also added that the whole Bavarian Corps was hardly as strong 
 as a weak Division, and that the 17th Inf. Division must be 
 left out of consideration ; the 3rd Division of the 15th Corps 
 was opposite to it. The Prince listened with marked attention 
 and then said : “ Many prisoners of many regiments of the 
 3rd Div. of the 15th Corps have been captured in Artenay” 
 [they were stragglers from the Division on December 2nd] ; 
 “ the Grand Duke has made a mistake, this Division cannot 
 be opposite to him ; he has nothing much opposed to him, 
 and he has been deceived by a demonstration, and has again 
 allowed himself to be drawn away from the real point for 
 attack.” This reference was to the conduct of the Detachment 
 on the 2nd, the day of Loigny-Poupry. As time was of import¬ 
 ance, v. Stosch did not carry on the discussion, but said that it 
 was impossible to tell whether it would be possible to continue 
 on the morrow the convergent attack on Orleans ; that must 
 depend on the news from v. d. Tann about the strong hostile 
 forces showing themselves at l’Encorme * on the right rear; 
 the Detachment might be compelled to move with the main 
 body westward. To the Prince the words “ strong hostile 
 forces ” seemed unworthy of credit. “ They are only franc- 
 tireurs and Gardes Mobiles,” he said, and with marked 
 emphasis he added, “ Orleans is the parole ; the Detachment 
 will advance against it to-morrow with all its forces.” To 
 this v. Stosch made no reply. The force at l’Encorme was not 
 “ franc-tireurs ” : it was Barry’s Division of the 16th Corps 
 which comprised more Marche troops than Gardes Mobiles, 
 and was making a diversion against the flank of the Detach¬ 
 ment, whilst the 3rd Division of the 15th Corps was resisting 
 its advance. But, apparently, in the Prince’s mind, the 
 Detachment was always in the wrong. 
 
 * A hamlet one mile south-west of Sougy. 
 
DECEMBER 3 
 
 263 
 
 V. Stosch felt it, however, to be his duty to suggest to the 
 Prince the danger of the night attack. The Prince, without 
 in any wav replying, turned to v. Stiehle and counter-ordered 
 the attack. Then in a quieter manner he said to v. Stosch : 
 “ Night attacks are always bad, they should only he under¬ 
 taken when success is certain ; I dare not run any risk. Under 
 the present circumstances I am not certain of success. I had 
 relied on the flanking movement of the w hole of the Detach¬ 
 ment. The Grand Duke will remain for the night in his present 
 position.” V. Stosch was already riding away when the Prince 
 repeated the words, “ But to-morrow we must be in Orleans ” ; 
 v. Stosch replied, “ It will not be our fault if we are not.” Such 
 is the account given of the interview by Hoenig, and subse¬ 
 quently endorsed by v. Stosch himself. And yet v. d. Goltz, 
 the writer of the semi-official history of the Second Army, has 
 another and a very different tale to tell. He says : “ After it 
 had already begun to get dark, General v. Stosch, the Chief 
 of the Staff* of the Detachment, came to the Conunander-in- 
 Chief and represented to him that the Grand Duke’s troops, 
 exhausted by the severe fight of the previous day, and tired 
 out by to-day’s marching with fighting, were hardly able to 
 take part in a determined attack on the Chevilly position. 
 The Field-Marshal felt himself compelled to postpone to the 
 next day the capture of Chevilly and the edge of the forest.” 
 
 To the truth of this account v. Stosch has given a direct 
 denial and he furnished Hoenig with a statement of the con¬ 
 versation. V. d. Goltz must have obtained his version second¬ 
 hand, as only three persons were present at the interview, the 
 Pi •ince and the two Chief Staff* Officers. What inferences are 
 to be drawn from this extraordinary discrepancv must be left 
 to the reader. 
 
 And now' the fighting came to an end for the day, and at 
 Chevilly occurred an incident illustrative of the saving “ seeing 
 is believing.” The orders to the Detachment were that it 
 was to remain on its present ground; v. Wittich did not see 
 the force of the order : “ there was nothing for my men,” he 
 w r rites, “ but the bare plain covered with wet snow, a bivouac 
 
264 THE PEOPLE’S WAR LN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 without straw, wood, water or food. My troops had been 
 fighting during the whole of December 2nd ; the leading 
 troops had arrived at 10 o’clock that night, the last at one in 
 the morning, in the icy bivouac at Anneau, where they had 
 little to eat; they had fallen in before daybreak, and had 
 been in fighting formation all day, without taking into account 
 the duty that must now fall to the advanced guard ; so I 
 had determined to go back to Poupry [five miles] for the 
 night and come back next morning. I waited, however, for 
 the receipt of information from my cavalry regiment, which 
 I had ordered to reconnoitre towards Chevilly and the Chateau 
 after the artillery fire had ceased. Reports came in from it 
 that the enemy had evacuated both the village and the 
 chateau.” The result was that both the Infantry Divisions 
 passed the night under shelter there. 
 
 D’Aurelle had come to Chevilly at 2 p.m. and awaited there 
 the arrival of des Pallieres. But no news of him came, and 
 d’Aurelle saw the chance of being able to hold on at Chevilly 
 gradually diminish. Towards 4.30 p.m. he accepted the needs 
 of the situation and gave orders that Chevilly should be 
 held till darkness set in and then the troops should fall back 
 to the next prepared locality, Cercottes, three miles nearer 
 Orleans. The last French infantry left the village just at 
 the moment that the German infantry, about to advance to 
 storm it, were held back owing to the counter-order. 
 
CHAPTER XX 
 
 DECEMBER 4th— SECOND DAY, SECOND BATTLE OF 
 ORLEANS—CAPTURE OF THE CITY 
 
 The Prince’s orders for December 4th were sent out from 
 Artenav at 9 p.m. and ran as follows: “The attack will be 
 
 J 
 
 continued to-morrow, December 4th. The IXth Army Corps 
 will advance at 8 p.m. by the village of Chevilly, occupied by 
 our troops to-day, and will extend with infantry into the 
 wood eastward in order to co-operate later on in an enveloping 
 movement on Cercottes. 
 
 “ The left flank detachment of the IXth Corps will con¬ 
 tinue at 7 a.m. its advance by S. Lye on the Roman Road 
 as ordered. 
 
 “ The Illrd Army Corps will advance along the Chilleurs- 
 Loury road towards Orleans, covering itself on its left flank 
 against any forces coming perhaps from Bellegarde, and has, 
 as objective, to bring artillery into action as much as possible 
 against the town of Orleans. The Corps will move off at 7 a.m. 
 
 “ The Xth Army Corps will march in several columns 
 towards Chevilly, where the head is to arrive at 1 p.m. and 
 will take up, as reserve, a position north of the place. The 
 artillery columns will accompany the corps in order to be 
 able to assist in the supply of the other corps if required. 
 
 “The 6th Cav. Division will be south of Artenayat 8 a.m., 
 and follow behind the right wing of the IXth Army Corps. 
 
 “ The Detachment of H.R.H. the Grand Duke proceeds at 
 8 a.m. to-morrowin the first instance to the enveloping attack on 
 Gidy in co-operation with the attack by the IXth Army Corps. 
 
 “ Reports to be sent to me on the right flank of the 
 IXth Army Corps.” 
 
266 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 This order is a remarkable illustration of how even ex¬ 
 perienced soldiers are liable to fail in drawing up orders. 
 The Prince had set his heart on the capture of Orleans on the 
 4-th. “ To-morrow we must be in Orleans,” he had with 
 
 marked emphasis told v. Stosch in the early evening. As 
 Hoenig remarks, it was the capture of Orleans on this day 
 that was the purpose of all the movements ordered, and yet 
 in the order there is not even an indication of this purpose. 
 It is quite possible that v. Manstein, being near the Prince, 
 may have received from him a verbal intimation similar to 
 that given thi’ough v. Stosch to the Grand Duke, but v. Al- 
 vensleben was left completely in the dark on the matter; and 
 he cannot learn from the order more than the fact that the 
 other Corps are to advance against a series of positions, and 
 also that for some purpose not communicated to him he is to 
 endeavour to shell Orleans. 
 
 When this order was issued, the Prince knew nothing what¬ 
 ever as to the progress actually made bythe Illrd Army Corps. 
 At 7 p.m. had come in to Artenay a message sent at 1 p.m. 
 by v. Alvensleben. “ The enemy has had in action the 
 15th Corps 1st Division in front of Santeau in a strongly 
 fortified position, and has shown three batteries and two 
 mitrailleuse batteries. He has been driven back from 
 Santeau, and he retired to the position of Chilleurs, and has 
 also abandoned this. The wood is being attacked. One 
 gun taken, 200 prisoners. Our loss small up to the present.” 
 The delay in the delivery of the message was due to v. Alvens¬ 
 leben not being aware that the Prince, instead of making 
 Chilleurs aux Bois his headquarters, as notified in the final 
 paragraph of the Army Orders of the previous evening, had 
 shifted them to Artenay. The orderly officer who brought 
 the message had had much difficulty in finding the Prince. 
 As regards the left flank detachment of the IXth Army Corps, 
 the Prince knew that it had encountered serious opposition. 
 From the Xth Army Corps no news had arrived. 
 
 Again, as on the 3rd, we will begin with the left wing of 
 the attackers. 
 
DECEMBER 4 
 
 267 
 
 Owing to the bad weather and a heavy snowstorm, the 
 officer carrying the message to the Illrd Army Corps lost his 
 way, so it did not come to hand in time for the corps to move 
 off at 7 a.m., the hour named ; but the General had everything 
 in readiness for the march. The 6th Division was to follow 
 the main road to Orleans, protecting its right by a flanking 
 detachment ; the 5th Division protecting itself on the left by 
 a flanking detachment, and by officers’ patrols, was to take a 
 side road a little to the east to Checy on the Loire. On 
 arriving at the south edge of the wood the Divisions would 
 halt and await further orders. The sixty guns left at C'hilleurs 
 were to follow on the main road. They had, however, to be 
 brought up before the march commenced, and since, in the forest, 
 were numerous dispersed French soldiers, the protection of this 
 long line of guns from a sudden dash on them at some point 
 or other was no easy task. A peculiarity in the Army order 
 was, as just mentioned, that in it the Illrd Army Corps alone 
 was directed to attack Orleans on this dav. But to v. Alvens- 
 leben there was something ridiculous about the order; in one 
 respect the carrying it out was impracticable, as a glance at 
 the map showed. “Armchair(salon)strategy,”he remarked : 
 this order to bring artillery into action against Orleans 
 further decreased the little value he attached to the strategy 
 of the Second Army. The danger from Bourbaki on his left 
 rear he thoroughly understood, and the left flank detachment 
 was, therefore, intended to act, if necessary, as a rearguard ; 
 it would be supported by the 5th Division. The divisions 
 arrived about noon at and near Boignv, five to six miles from 
 Loury, and halted. The 6th Division was directed to continue 
 its march on Orleans, the 5th to march by Bourgneuf to the 
 river road, a little west of Checy, and thence to proceed to 
 Orleans. The 6th Division, soon after moving off*, was met 
 with infantry fire. The hostile troops were from the 1st 
 Division of the 15th Corps that had fallen back on the 
 previous day. They were good troops, and occupied the 
 village of Vaumainbert 24 miles from Orleans ; and here, at 
 2 p.m., they offered a determined resistance. Not until 
 
268 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN ERANCE, 1870-71 
 
 nearly four o’clock, after a tough fight, did the Germans 
 capture the village ; and then, v. Alvensleben, learning that 
 in front of him was a real Bridge Head, determined to defer 
 the attack to the next day. He was urgently pressed on all 
 sides to continue the attack so that the Illrd Corps might 
 be the first in Orleans, but he wisely refused to allow such a 
 foolhardy attempt in the dark. In order, if possible, to let 
 the centre column know of his arrival before the city, he 
 ordered his artillery commander to bring a battery into 
 action somewhere or other, and to throw some shells into 
 Orleans. The sound of the guns would thus signal to the 
 troops on the main road his arrival. So close was the 
 country, that only with difficulty was found a place for a 
 whole battery to come into action. At last, a grass plot in 
 front of a villa was discovered; a heavy battery was un¬ 
 limbered and twelve shells were fired, and then the battery 
 limbered up just in time, for hardly had it gone, than eleven 
 heavy shells, fired from Orleans, fell on the lawn. 
 
 From the left had come in to v. Alvensleben very alarming 
 reports. The left flank detachment, consisting of two 
 battalions and one squadron under the command of Lieut.- 
 Colonei v. 1’Estocq, had, at 2 p.m., arrived at Checy, and was 
 about to go into cantonments, the main body of the Division 
 having arrived at Bourgneuf about a mile to the north, when 
 a report came in to Colonel v. i’Estocq of the approach of an 
 enemy from Pont aux Moines, at a canal-crossing two miles 
 to the east. Soon the hostile infantry skirmishers, followed 
 by several columns, made their appearance. 
 
 The enemy was the 20th Corps led by General Crouzat. 
 A position somewhat in advance of the village was at first 
 taken up by two companies of the detachment, but gradually 
 the French came forward to the attack in increasing force so 
 that the Germans had to confine themselves to the defence 
 of Checy itself. At about three o’clock a battalion and a 
 battery arrived from the 5th Division, and the battery came 
 into action. The French now began to break off the fight 
 and to fall back towards Pont aux Moines ,• the Germans 
 
DECEMBER 4 
 
 269 
 
 reinforced by another regiment followed. The French barri¬ 
 caded the further portion of the village as well as the bridge 
 by which they had recrossed the canal, and then gradually 
 disappeared eastward. The good star of the Germans had 
 been in the ascendant, for it was a whole corps that was 
 advancing toward this small detachment, and it was a whole 
 corps that retired when this handful of men opposed its 
 advance. In compliance with an order of the previous 
 evening from de Freycinet, Bourbaki, with the 20th Corps 
 under Crouzat and the 18th Corps, was marching to Orleans 
 from the position of the previous day, and had been moving 
 along roads almost parallel to the march of the Illrd Armv 
 Corps. The march had commenced at four in the morning. 
 After the troops had begun to move off, Bourbaki received 
 from d’Aurelle the following despatch: “We have been 
 fighting for three days in succession against large forces. 
 Our losses in the 15th, 16th, and 17th Corps are very large. 
 We have gone back to our line in front of Orleans. The 
 enemy has captured one of the most important points. I am 
 ja-i afraid now that it will be impossible for the Army of the 
 Loire to hold on to the right bank of the Loire. There is no 
 bridge between Orleans and Gien [a mistaken statement, 
 there was one at Sully]. The 18th and 20th Corps under 
 your command must, if they have to cross the Loire, do so at 
 the last-named place. Give your orders, therefore, for the 
 eventuality that the retreat by Gien may be necessary.” 
 During the last twenty-four hours orders and counter-orders 
 had been showered on Bourbaki from de Freycinet and 
 d’Aurelle. Crouzat had during the day been fully aware of 
 the march of the Illrd Army Corps, which he had watched 
 carefully. At eleven o’clock an orderly officer came to him and 
 said, “ We are in the midst of the Prussian Army,” and gave 
 to him a report received from the Maire of a village that the 
 whole Prussian Army was around Orleans : at 2 p.m. Crouzat 
 arrived at Fay aux Loges, four or five miles short of Pont aux 
 Moines, and whence a road leads direct to Jargeau on the 
 Loire. After a conference with his Generals, he determined 
 
270 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 to march by the right bank to Orleans, sending his trains and 
 artillery by the left bank after crossing at Jargeau. The 
 leading brigade, soon after passing Pont aux Moines, found 
 themselves attacked by the two German companies. Crouzat 
 had sent an officer to report on the bridge at Jargeau. This 
 bridge had been destroyed, but the inhabitants had restored 
 it and made it practicable. Crouzat now believed the 
 Germans were behind him, and as the Loire was in front of 
 him, his mind was much relieved bv the report. He now 
 caused the corps to retire to opposite Jargeau, and by the 
 folio wing morning it had crossed to the left bank. The 
 18th Corps had followed a road further east, and also 
 turned south, reaching the Loire higher up and crossing on 
 the night 5th-6th. So the Illrd Army Corps escaped in a 
 marvellous way being captured in the very den of the lion. 
 
 In the centre on the Paris road, the tactics adopted were 
 those of sheer weight in a concentrated form, and in complete 
 disregard of both the strategical and tactical situation on 
 either the extreme right or the extreme left. Chevilly, 
 which had been abandoned on the previous evening by the 
 French, and occupied by the 22nd Inf. Division, was the 
 starting-point for the attack bv the IXth Army Corps down 
 the main road. 
 
 The road and the railroad run parallel to each other at a 
 distance of two to three hundred yards apart. On leaving 
 Chevillv they enter a wood defile, two miles long, caused by 
 the projecting of an angle of the forest to the west, the woods 
 on either side being very close and with dense undergrowth. 
 At half a mile beyond the end of the defile is the strongly 
 fortified village of Cercottes, connected by entrenchments 
 with Gidy, a village, two miles west, and also fortified, whilst 
 in front of this line were outlying posts bearing on the 
 exits from the wood. These entrenchments were the right 
 of the main fortified position of the entrenched camp west 
 of the Paris road, and were occupied by the French. Along the 
 main road went into the defile the 36th Inf. Brigade, a regi¬ 
 ment of Cavalry and the Division Artillery; along the railroad, 
 
DECEMBER 4 
 
 271 
 
 advancing pari passu , the other column, the 35th Inf. Brigade 
 and a battalion. The corps artillery followed along the main 
 road. Fighting went on all day,and at seven o’clock, after dark, 
 the French had been driven back, or had fallen back, so far 
 that the rail wav station, les Aubrais, close to the walls of the 
 city, was in the hands of the Germans. The Prince had, even 
 late into the afternoon, held to the belief that on this day 
 he would enter the city ; but at 7.15 p.m. v. Manstein, very 
 heavy-hearted, reported that in face of the determined 
 opposition and the great difficulties of the locality, he must 
 abandon for the night any further attempt to advance, so here 
 the IXth Army Corps came to a standstill, close to the city, 
 for the night, as the Illrd Army Corps had already done. 
 
 And now to the right flank. At last, the Prince has 
 had a personal interview with the Grand Duke, for at 
 9 a.m. to the surprise of the latter, the Prince came to 
 him at Chevilly chateau where he was. The interview is 
 described by an eye-witness as short, stiff and frigid. The 
 Prince listened coldly to the Grand Duke, and gave him his 
 instructions in the most distant manner. The Grand Duke 
 expressed his belief that the enemy was retreating over the 
 Loire. The Prince held a contrary opinion, that the retreat 
 was on Orleans. Both seem to have regarded the surrounding 
 the Army of the Loire as the end to be attained, but, unfor¬ 
 tunately, the orders of the Prince, which involved the whole 
 Detachment in the struggle on the Paris-Orleans road, 
 rendered the envelopment of the French left wing very im¬ 
 probable. Before the brief interview came to a close, the 
 Prince repeated to the Grand Duke the words of the previous 
 evening that Orleans must, under all circumstances, be occupied 
 this day. This injunction must be borne in mind in view of 
 after events. 
 
 It would seem to have been the Prince’s plain duty to have 
 learnt fully from the Grand Duke the work of this and the 
 preceding day on the west of the road ; to have ascertained 
 his view of the situation, and the grounds on which it was 
 based. But the Prince’s “ personlichkeit ” exercised baneful 
 
272 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 influence here, and the two leaders, on whose thorough and 
 cordial co-operation so much in the future depended, had 
 parted after a few words. 
 
 Chanzy will soon be withdrawing, not on Orleans, but 
 down the right bank of the Loire clear of the net the 
 Grand Duke would throw round him, but of which the 
 Prince does not seem to understand the manipulation; 
 and the Grand Duke has to confine himself to making his 
 way westward of the road and down to the Loire, aiding the 
 advance of the IXth Army Corps. All the numerous localities 
 here in front of the Detachment had been prepared for 
 defence so that the French when falling back could find at 
 every step shelter whence to delay their pursuers. But the 
 retreating force, containing as it did very many poorly 
 trained and indifferent troops, was already nearly worn out by 
 hard marching, fighting, defeat, want of food and rest, exposure 
 to bitter winter weather, and by being sent about hither and 
 thither by orders and counter-orders. These are conditions 
 most favourable to panic, or rather, under them panic was 
 sure to come sooner or later, and so it came to pass here. At 
 this time the general direction of the retreat was on Orleans. 
 V. Stolberg with the 2nd Cav. Division had been in close obser¬ 
 vation of this ground for more than a fortnight and must 
 therefore have formed a fairly correct opinion of its character. 
 The Grand Duke, soon after midday, was with his left flank 
 nearing Ormes, which village is at the junction of the two 
 roads leading to Orleans, from Chateaudun north-west, and 
 Coulmiers west, and is five miles from the city. There was now 
 in front some open ground suitable for cavalry action. The 
 2nd Cavalry Division was brought forward; the 4th Hussars as 
 advanced guard, the 3rd Brigade on the right, the 4th on the 
 left, and the two Horse Artillery batteries in the centre. Very 
 soon the advanced squadron saw ahead troops standing dis¬ 
 mounted behind some entrenchments. The squadron at once 
 charged, and found the enemy to be a battery of Horse Artil¬ 
 lery, with its guns laid fortunately in another direction. There 
 was not time to swing the guns round, and the whole battery,. 
 
DECEMBER 4 
 
 273 
 
 9 guns and 4 waggons, with 4 officers, 75 men, and 
 79 horses fell into the hands of this handful of Cavalry, 
 only 65 sabres. Now, south of Ormes, was seen by the 
 5th Hussars of the 4th Brigade, another battery limbering 
 up. Three squadrons of the regiment at once made for 
 the battery, but on the Chateaudun road they came upon 
 three hostile squadrons, which they completely routed, 
 taking many prisoners and pursuing the remainder towards 
 the Loire. 
 
 The wide-reaching effect and decisive consequences of this 
 charge, this overthrow of merely three squadrons, would be, 
 incredible did not the French and the German historians 
 alike concur in their narratives. The scene of the charge 
 was between Orleans and the troops falling back from the 
 north-west on to Orleans and to the prepared entrenchments 
 outside it. 
 
 The remnants of two French Divisions retreating were 
 already at the road junction, but panic had set in and it spread 
 at once in all directions. The French now strove to stem 
 v. Stolberg’s advance by bringing artillery into action, but 
 these were soon driven off by the German Horse Artillery, 
 which was well to the front. The French in their wild flight 
 completely broke up two of the Gardes Mobiles Regiments, 
 a Marche Regiment, and a battery. Owing to the converging- 
 character of the retreat of the French Corps, strong bodies 
 of no less than four Divisions were involved in the disaster. 
 Lehauteourt says: “ The retreat which commenced in 
 great disaster is continued in the midst of ever-increasing- 
 confusion. Demoralisation quickly assumes terrible propor¬ 
 tions. There is no longer any command, any direction ; 
 isolated parties of infantry and entire bodies of troops are 
 mixed up with trains and batteries. Some make for Orleans, 
 most gain Meung, Beaugency, Mer, or even Blois.” Under 
 these circumstances the occupation of the prepared position 
 was no longer possible, and for all purposes of holding off the 
 Germans, or even of delaying their progress, it might have 
 been non-existent. It was between one and half-past one 
 
 s 
 
274 the PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 when the charge was made, and the panic continuing to the 
 evening and into the night set in. 
 
 The Grand Duke, finding now that the defences of Ormes 
 were unoccupied, directed the Bavarians to march on south 
 towards the Loire to Ingre, and assigned to the 17th Inf. 
 Division the road from Ormes to Orleans. V. Stolberg’s Cav. 
 Division had collected at Ormes, and at about 2 f.m. a 
 Bavarian General Staff Officer, with two squadrons and two 
 guns arrived there on their way south to the Loire to harass 
 the French in their passage over the river. In compliance 
 with his request for support, v. Stolberg at 2.15 moved off 
 with his whole Division towards the river, and turning to 
 advantage the knowledge he had acquired of this ground 
 during v. d. Tann’s occupation of Orleans, he struck an hour 
 later on the Orleans-Blois road close to the river, and at about 
 two miles from the city. Protected by some dismounted 
 cavalry pushed forward, he at once opened fire on the 
 westernmost boat bridge, one of the four bridges over the 
 river, and also on hostile columns moving from Orleans down 
 the opposite bank; the bridge was at once cast free by 
 the French and drifted under shelter. 
 
 Along the Ormes-Orleans road had proceeded the 17th Inf. 
 Division, with an advanced guard of two and three-quarter 
 battalions and two batteries under Colonel v. Manteuffel. At 
 4.15 p.m. v. Manteuffel arrived at le Grand Orme, 2 miles from 
 Orleans, without having met any serious opposition. It 
 began to get dark, and in this close country view over the 
 ground was no longer possible. At 5.30 p.m. the Grand Duke, 
 whose knowledge of the actual state of affairs with the De¬ 
 tachment at this time seems to have been limited to those of 
 the 17th Division, ordered a halt for the night, as his view of 
 the situation was similar to those held by the commanders of 
 the Illrd and IXth Army Corps as to the madness of a night 
 attack on the City. For cantonments the road was assigned 
 to the 17th Division, of which the head was to be at Orleans. 
 So, whilst the main body of the Division remained at the 
 railway embankment, one mile from the city, v. Manteuffel 
 
DECEMBER 4 
 
 275 
 
 resumed his onward march, and at six o’clock the point of the 
 advanced guard found itself at the entrance gate to Orleans. 
 It was a closed gate of trellis work. As soon as v. Manteuffel 
 had received the report from Lieut, v. Liicken, who now with 
 sixteen men was standing outside the gate, he proceeded 
 thither; he saw a guard behind the gate. There was a 
 lantern alight at the gate. The street beyond was badly 
 lighted, but French soldiers were visible in the street and 
 houses. V. Manteuffel ordered the guard to open the 
 gate, but they declined as they had no orders to do so. 
 V. Manteuffel directed therefore the Commander to be sent 
 for, and at the same time reported to v. Tresckow in rear. 
 But now he had to go away, having been sent for by the 
 Grand Duke, who was at a house between the advanced 
 guard and the railway. 
 
 It is necessary, however, in order to understand the tran¬ 
 sactions at this gate and the subsequent course of events, to 
 learn the action of the leaders of the French Army during 
 the day, because that action affected the whole course of the 
 operations. During the night, December 3rd-4th, to General 
 d’Aui’elle there had come in such overwhelming evidence of 
 the demoralisation and distressful condition of his army, that 
 sadly he came to the conclusion that it was impossible to 
 hold on to the right bank of the Loire; and at four o'clock 
 in the morning he telegraphed to Tours to that effect. In 
 the message he said ; “ I must therefore tell you that I regard 
 the defence of Orleans as impossible. Painful as it is to me to 
 say this, it is my duty to tell you so, because thereby a great 
 catastrophe may be averted. If we had time to restore order, 
 so as to enable us to take the field anew, resistance might 
 be again resorted to, but the enemy will attack us again to¬ 
 morrow,* and with grief, but deep conviction, I repeat to you 
 that our troops, exhausted and demoralised by the last two 
 days, will not make a stand. There is only one course open 
 to us, and that is retreat. I have arranged it as follows: 
 
 * The telegram appears, therefore, to have been written before midnight, 
 but held back in the hope of news from des Palli£res. 
 
276 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN ERANCE, 1870-71 
 
 the 16th and 17th Corps to fall back on Beaugency and 
 Blois, the 18th and 20th on Gien, the 15th will cross at 
 Orleans and march into the Sologne. Thus there will not be 
 any blocking of roads, and the subsistence of the Army is 
 easily provided for.” At the same time the General intimated 
 his decision to the Intendant-General in Orleans. Hardly 
 had the telegram been despatched to Tours, when from 
 de Freycinet came a telegram, 10.50 p.m., December 3rd, 
 criticising the disposition of the troops, and directing a con¬ 
 centration of the whole Army at Orleans. At 5 a.m. on the 
 4th, de Freycinet sent an objectionably worded telegram, 
 refusing to endorse d’Aurelle’s views of the necessity of a 
 retreat, and reiterating the orders for a general concentration. 
 At 8 a.m. on the 4th d’Aurelle replied: “ I am here on the 
 spot, and am better able to judge the situation than are you. 
 With not less sorrow than you have I resolved on this extreme 
 measure. The enemy has surmounted all obstacles up to 
 Cercottes, he has mastered all the issues from the forest: 
 the position of Orleans is, therefore, no longer what it was. 
 It is now surrounded, and has lost the support of the forest, 
 it can no longer be defended with troops exhausted by three 
 days fighting and hardships, and who, owing to their great 
 losses, are demoralised. Besides, the strength of the enemy 
 exceeds all my anticipations, also the figures you gave me. 
 Time presses, and will not enable me to carry out the con¬ 
 centration you speak of. Good resistance cannot be organised. 
 In spite of all efforts which could be made, Orleans will, 
 it is fated, be in the enemy’s hands this evening or to¬ 
 morrow. That will be a great misfortune; but the only means 
 to avoid a greater catastrophe is to have the courage to make 
 a sacrifice whilst there is time. The Army of the Loire can 
 be of great service to the National Defence, but on the 
 condition that it can collect at those points where it can 
 have time to get into order again. The attempt to con¬ 
 centrate at Orleans is to invite useless destruction. I be¬ 
 lieve, therefore, that the orders issued must be adhered to. 
 As to the orders you have given to Bourbaki [to concentrate 
 
DECEMBER 4 
 
 2 77 
 
 towards Orleans] it is not for me to alter them. I leave it to 
 you to hold to them or to recall them. I must, however, draw 
 your attention to the fact that this movement towards Orleans, 
 in front of the enemy, who is master of the forest, may turn out 
 still more dangerous, because Bourbaki can cross only at 
 Orleans and Gien [not correct]. The restoration of the bridge 
 at Chateauneuf is not yet completed.” D’Aurelle, for the 
 present, maintained his determination. This accounts for 
 much of the falling back of the French before the Germans 
 during this day. At 11.15 a.m. the Delegation sent to 
 d’Aurelle its sanction for the evacuation of Orleans. 
 
 But now d’Aurelle, coming to Orleans before he received 
 at Saran this sanction, learnt that des Pallieres had arrived, 
 and having great confidence in this general, and knowing that 
 his Division was the best in the army, suddenly changed his 
 plans. He was aware of Minot’s disaster, and of the real con¬ 
 dition of the Division, but he seems to have lost his judgment; 
 he telegraphed at 11.55 a.m. to Tours, “I am altering my 
 plans, directing the 16th and 17th corps to Orleans, calling 
 here the 18th and 20th, I am organising the defence, I am 
 at Orleans.” Counter-orders were at once issued. The con¬ 
 fusion arising from this change of plans was one of the most 
 powerful aids to the success of the Germans. 
 
 Naturally the Delegation at Tours was delighted at the 
 change of intentions, and wired at once to d’Aurelle the 
 expression of its great satisfaction. But events proved too 
 strong for d’Aurelle, and he gradually came to the conclusion 
 that he must revert to the original idea of abandoning Orleans 
 and the right bank of the Loire; at 4 i*.m. his mind was made up, 
 and orders were issued accordingly. To des Pallieres was left 
 the covering the retreat. The operation required both time 
 and organisation, for there were some 8000 waggons in the city 
 which, moreover, had been a principal store depot for the army 
 of the Loire. During the night all was to be sent away. 
 
 It was at half-past five in the afternoon that the Prince 
 began to be anxious as to the possibility of Orleans not being 
 captured on this day. Of the illrd Army Corps he had heard 
 
278 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 nothing. To v. Manstein he sent an officer to ascertain whether 
 the General thought he could enter the city on that day. By 
 6 i*.M. the officer returned with the answer that it was doubtful. 
 So at 6.45 the Prince issued orders for the cessation of the fight 
 and its renewal next morning. Subsequently there arrived a 
 report, 7.15, from v. Manstein, and later on, at 9 p.m., one 
 from v. Alvensleben, 4.30, both to the same effect that their 
 attacks on the city had been broken off*. Toi Versailles the 
 Prince reported that the Army would stand ready to take 
 Orleans next day. But storming the city was precisely what 
 the Royal Head-quarters were anxious should be avoided. 
 
 At 7 p.m. there were in Orleans some thousands of troops; 
 the number is almost impossible to ascertain : it was at that 
 hour that a Zouave came to des Pallieres and informed him that 
 he had been sent by a Prussian officer [v. Manteuffel] who 
 wished to speak with the commandant. The Zouave added 
 that the enemy was in possession of the St. Jean suburb, and 
 that there were but few of the 3rd Division of the 15th corps in 
 front of him. There had been some 1500 men here, but under 
 cover of the darkness they had stolen away. A Staff' Officer, 
 Captain Pendezec, was sent to learn what the German General 
 wanted. A battalion was also despatched in this direction to 
 keep the enemy back. Some 300 yards outside the gate was 
 a Prussian officer, who conducted Pendezec to General v. 
 Tresckow in a house close by. Pendezec estimated the 
 Germans he saw at four to five battalions [there were only 
 two]. After Pendezec had given his name v. Tresckow spoke 
 to the following effect: “ I have occupied the St. Jean suburb, 
 as you yourself see; in the north, on the road from Artenay 
 Prince Frederick Charles has advanced as far as the gate on the 
 railroad in the Bannier suburb. If you wish, I will have you 
 taken there to convince yourself. I intend to occupy Orleans 
 to-day, but would like to avoid a street fight, which will injure 
 much both the city and the inhabitants; so for that reason I 
 have halted here. Be so good as to convey to your Command¬ 
 ing Officer my summons that he evacuates the city by half-past 
 eleven. I shall then occupy the city as far as the Artenay 
 
DECEMBER 4 
 
 279 
 
 road. If the commandant refuses, my batteries, which are 
 now in position, will immediately open fire.” 
 
 This was a game of bluff indeed. And to avoid mistake, 
 the General took out his watch, and requested the officer to 
 compare the time with his own watch. 
 
 Des Pallieres, on the return of the envoy, seems to have at 
 once believed all that v.Tresckow had said,and to have regarded 
 the terms offered as an unexpected piece of good fortune, 
 for, after a little thought, he told Pendezec to go back to him 
 and tell him that at the hour named the portion of the city 
 specified would be given up to him. And the French were 
 quite content with the agreement,for they knew what v. Tresc- 
 kow did not know, that there were hardly any troops in front 
 of him, and that by following the river bank he could probably 
 without firing a shot gain access to the centre of the city, and 
 possession of the main bridge over the Loire, along which 
 were now hurrying the waggons and the troops from other 
 quarters. 
 
 But now came in from d’Aurelle, to whom des Pallieres had 
 reported what he had done, an order which, whilst approving 
 of the capitulation, directed that the entry of the Germans 
 should not take place until ten o’clock the following morning. 
 Soon the almost hopeless mission to gain an extension of time. 
 General d’Aries was despatched to confer with v. Tresckow, 
 whom d’Aries met now on foot in the street. V. Tresckow 
 repeated his threat of bombardment, but eventually agreed 
 to give an extra hour, but curiously enough, owing to his 
 own watch having stopped he really gave an hour and a half. 
 The Grand Duke approved of v. Tresckow’s action in the 
 matter. Meantime had come in the Prince’s orders to defer 
 the attack until the next day; but the Grand Duke deter¬ 
 mined to defer sending an answer until the negotiations were 
 finished. And at 10.30 he despatched a report that the 
 city would be given up to him at 11.30. And at 1 a.m. the 
 Duke at the head of the 17th Infantry Division and a 
 Bavarian Brigade marched with bands playing into the 
 surrendered city. Great amount of controversy has arisen as 
 
280 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 to the conduct of the Grand Duke, on his having taken so 
 serious a step on his own responsibility without submitting 
 the question for the decision of the Prince his commander. 
 It is unnecessary to discuss the matter here. The Grand 
 Duke had carried out the Prince’s injunctions almost to the 
 letter, but when at three in the morning the report arrived 
 at the Army Head-quarters, there was a scene, over which 
 Hoenig draws but the thinnest of veils. V 7 . Waldersee said: 
 “ It was a thunderbolt. The Prince was beside himself. 
 He had intended to make a formal entry into Orleans ; 
 his joy had vanished, and all owing to the Grand Duke, of 
 whom he had an enduring dislike.” 
 
 It was from the Grand Duke that the King first heard the 
 news. And the reply to the Grand Duke could have been 
 hardly pleasing to the Prince. “ It is with the greatest 
 pleasure that I tell you how I appreciate your threefold vic¬ 
 tory. I send you my thanks and bestow on you my order 
 ‘ pour le merite ’ with oak leaves. To Generals v. Wittich 
 and v. Tresckow the same decoration without oak leaves. 
 What important consequences these victories, and the re¬ 
 occupation of Orleans.” 
 
 To Queen Augusta at Berlin the King telegraphed : 
 “ Orleans has been occupied to-night without storming. 
 God be thanked.” 
 
 On the German side there was no real thought of pursuit, 
 the objective had been the capture of the city, not the 
 destruction of the hostile army in the field ; so the enemy was a 
 secondary consideration. At 6.30 in the morning of the 5th 
 the Prince had ordered the Detachment to march down the 
 right bank of the Loire and to occupy Beaugency, but on the 
 Grand Duke representing to him the tired condition of the 
 troops, the Prince allowed the advance to be postponed until 
 the following day ; a general rest-day was therefore given, 
 although in the HIrd, Xth, and even the IXth Army Corps 
 were plenty of troops fresh enough to follow up the enemy. 
 V. Waldersee was under the impression that both the Prince 
 and the Grand Duke believed that with the capture of 
 
DECEMBER 4 
 
 281 
 
 Orleans the campaign was at an end. V. Moltke on the 
 other hand, considered a rapid pursuit of great importance, 
 but when his orders were received the favourable opportunity 
 had gone by. The mistake had been made and was beyond 
 recall. The Army of the Loire had been most severely 
 shaken and a large portion of it utterly demoralised; but 
 the Army still existed ; it was now in two bodies. The 
 16th and 17th Corps, that the Prince had been mainly 
 instrumental in allowing to escape, fell back down the right 
 bank only a few miles, to Meung and Beaugency, where 
 joined by the 21st Corps, their leader Chanzy opposed with 
 them the advance of the Detachment. On the 7th at 
 Meung, and on the 8th, 9th, and 10th, at Beaugency, Chanzy, 
 before retiring further, held his enemy at bay; then he went 
 west, and on the 16th commenced his retreat to le Mans, 
 having in these operations inflicted on the Germans a loss of 
 nearly 200 officers and 4000 men. Later on this portion of 
 the Army of the Loire compelled the Germans to undertake 
 the campaign of le Mans. The other body, the 15th, 18th, 
 and 20th Corps under Bourbaki, went eastward, where with 
 the 24th Corps they carried on the campaign on the Lisaine. 
 
CHAPTER XXI 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 The power shown by the hardened soldiers of Germany to 
 hold their own successfully in the field against numerically 
 superior forces, the failure of the leading of the French impro¬ 
 vised army when those soldiers had simply marched straight 
 against it, the demoralisation produced by the profitless 
 endurance of suffering and misery, and the exaggerated 
 importance attached to the possession of Orleans, all com¬ 
 bined to completely take the heart out of the future National 
 Defence so far as the participation of the People in it was 
 concerned. Henceforth it is almost solely a matter of relative 
 manoeuvring power in the opposing forces in the field. But 
 the more, and the more closely and in detail the history of the 
 French National Defence from October 11th to December 
 4th-5th is studied, the more convincing become the ill-fated 
 but grand efforts of Gambetta and de Freycinet as proofs of 
 the soundness of the principle, that in every defensive land-war 
 against invasion, the whole People should take their part. 
 
 The foundation-stone on which every such National Defence 
 rests, the pivot on which such defence turns, is the highly- 
 trained, thoroughly equipped, thoroughly disciplined, and well- 
 staffed Field Army ; supplemental to this are the formation of 
 the dense Fog of War, the local hand-to-hand defence of every 
 yard of ground, and the determined holding out in every 
 village, town, or city which is an objective of the invader. It 
 is with the manhood, aye, and with the womanhood of each 
 particular territory that it rests to determine whether this sup¬ 
 plementary, but vitally-important, aid to the work of the Field 
 Army shall be given or not given. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 283 
 
 And when we call to mind the fact that after having organ¬ 
 ised our Field and Fortress Armies, there w ill still be available 
 a vast number of men, either volunteers, ex-volunteers, or 
 members of rifle-clubs, besides a multitude who know how to 
 pull a trigger, and all of whom are desirous, yes, and absolutely 
 determined to do their best to defend their country and their 
 homes, w r e must feel it would be little short of suicidal not to 
 utilise their services. The national wealth of fighting men in 
 this country is enormous; all that is necessary to enable the 
 country to profit by the possession of this wealth is simply 
 carefully-considered and thoroughly-completed territorial 
 organisation. Prince Frederick Charles, as we know, regarded 
 suitability of country as a necessary condition for the suc¬ 
 cessful employment of irregular troops in connection with a 
 Field Army. It will not be vid Salisbury Plain, but through 
 the close country that extends down to the sea coast, south¬ 
 west, south, south-east, east, and north-east from London, the 
 main objective of the invader, that the hostile army will 
 advance; and here, especially, and to a great extent in many 
 other parts of our Island, this necessary condition is forth¬ 
 coming. Smokeless powder and the repeating rifle have 
 increased greatly the power of defence of this kind, for, para¬ 
 doxical as it may sound, the absence of smoke thickens the Fog 
 of W ar both on and away from the battlefield. And, more¬ 
 over, as the cyclist manoeuvres carried out under the super¬ 
 vision of Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice in Sussex in 
 1901 clearlv showed, the numerous good roads and lanes in 
 England lend themselves to the very rapid concentration of 
 riflemen from distant parts either to reinforce local defence 
 or to thicken the Fog of War. But organisation, sound, 
 fully-completed, and practically-tested, is the indispensable, 
 the necessary basis for participation of the People in the War. 
 Most of the country which was the scene of the “ People’s 
 W r ar” in France I have visited, more than once; the country 
 which would be the scene of the principal “ People’s W ar ” 
 against invasion in England I also fairly know . What French¬ 
 men and Frenchw omen did for their own country in the dark 
 
284 THE PEOPLE’S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71 
 
 days of October and November 1870, Englishmen and 
 Englishwomen will, with no less courage and patriotic self- 
 devotion, assuredly do in any dark days that may lie before 
 us, though at present hidden in the dim future. Let us be 
 wise in time during the day whilst we can work, and not delay 
 until the night cometh when work can be done only with 
 trouble and confusion. 
 
 On February 29th, 1804, Mr. Pitt, in the House of Com¬ 
 mons during the debate on the Defence of the Nation, spoke 
 the wise words that follow: 
 
 “ A great mass of our population may be made fit to serve 
 many useful purposes in the hour of danger, and I should be 
 therefore glad that previous measures, calculated to call it into 
 action with effect, were concerted and carried into execution 
 . . . ; but I wish to give to the Lord Lieutenant of each 
 county, and to a General Officer, the power of calling forth, 
 and arming at a moment’s notice, the whole of the active 
 population. This measure should, however, be arranged 
 beforehand ; leaders should be appointed, companies formed, 
 
 AND NO MAN SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO RUN ABOUT IN CONFUSION, 
 CRYING OUT, ‘ Oh, THAT I COULD BE ANY WAY USEFUL TO MY 
 COUNTRY ! ’” 
 
 Let us of this generation, a century later, apply to practice 
 the words of wisdom of this great statesman. 
 
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