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DUKE UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 

 
ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 BY 
 
 E. MALCOLM CARROLL 
 
 Assistant Professor of History in Duke University 
 
 O 
 
 o 
 
 75£5<o 
 
 DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 DURHAM, N. C. 
 
 1925 
 
COPYRIGHT 1925 
 DUKE UNIVERSITY 
 
 THE PRESSES OF 
 
 SEEMAN PRINTERY INCORPORATED 
 
 DURHAM, N. C. 
 
TO MY MOTHER AND FATHER 
 
 75£>*5<o 
 
PREFACE 
 
 T his study was first prepared under the direc¬ 
 tion of Professor U. B. Phillips and Professor 
 C. H. Van Tyne and was accepted by the Graduate 
 School of the University of Michigan in partial 
 fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 doctor of philosophy. Additional material has 
 since been incorporated, and it is largely new in 
 form. 
 
 The author’s tasks have been materially light¬ 
 ened by the work of other laborers in fields allied 
 to his own. Professor A. C. Cole’s monograph, 
 The Whig Party in the South, was particularly 
 helpful in this respect, for it made unnecessary an 
 exhaustive study of the party’s fortunes in that 
 section. Little more than a beginning, however, 
 has been made in tracing the history of the Whig 
 party within the various states. 
 
 Material assistance was rendered in the course 
 of the author’s researches and in the preparation 
 of their results. My colleagues, Professors W. 
 T. Laprade and W. K. Boyd, have kindly read 
 the manuscript, and many a rough passage has 
 been smoothed as a result of their stimulating 
 criticisms. Professor Laprade has undertaken 
 the arduous task of seeing the manuscript through 
 
PREFACE 
 
 viii 
 
 the press. Professor iA. C. Cole and Professor J. 
 S. Bassett, on behalf of the American Historical 
 Association, gave permission to use the maps for 
 the presidential elections of 1836 and 1840 for 
 the southern states in The Whig Party in the 
 South. Dr. C. O. Paullin of the Carnegie Insti¬ 
 tution of Washington rendered signal aid in 
 locating data for the preparation of the election 
 maps. Mr. J. C. Fitzpatrick of the Manuscripts 
 Division of the Library of Congress was untiring 
 in his efforts to assist the author in his search for 
 material. Acknowledgment is due the South 
 Atlantic Quarterly for permission to use the 
 author’s article, “Politics in the Administration of 
 John Quincy Adams,” which contains the sub¬ 
 stance of the first chapter of this study. 
 
 E. M. C. 
 
 Durham, N. C., May, 1925. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Preface. vi 
 
 Chapter I. 
 
 John Quincy Adams and the National Republican 
 
 Party. 1 
 
 Chapter II. 
 
 The Campaign of 1832 . 29 
 
 Chapter III. 
 
 The Crisis of 1833 71 
 
 Chapter IV. 
 
 Party Strategy and New Leadership.118 
 
 Chapter V. 
 
 Expediency versus Consistency.171 
 
 Conclusions.221 
 
 Bibliography.228 
 
 Index.239 
 
 Appendix.259 
 
 List of Maps 
 
 New York State Assembly, 1837 . . . opposite 151 
 
 Presidential Election of 1832 .Appendix 
 
 Presidential Election of 1836 .Appendix 
 
 Presidential Election of 1840 .Appendix 
 

ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE NATIONAL 
 REPUBLICAN PARTY 
 
 T HE names of American political parties give 
 a superficial impression of unity that rarely 
 exists in fact. Individual differences of opinion, 
 sectional interests, and conflicting personal ambi¬ 
 tions combine to make complete harmony an ideal 
 that can only be approximated by a free use of 
 compromises and adjustments. While contempo¬ 
 rary parties face these problems in aggravated 
 form, few have suffered so much from divided 
 opinions and leadership as the Whig party in the 
 Jacksonian period. Organized in 1834, it inher¬ 
 ited from diverse sources a perplexing variety 
 of opinions and a divided leadership that made 
 united action exceedingly difficult. Upon one 
 issue alone, that of opposing Jackson and the 
 Democratic party, could its various elements co¬ 
 operate with any degree of harmony, and when in 
 in 1840 it ceased to be the opposition it promptly 
 reverted to its former divisions. The difficulties of 
 
2 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 the Whig party were largely due to its necessities 
 as an opposition, which required the aid of all 
 who were dissatisfied with the administration, but 
 the experiences of its immediate predecessor, the 
 National Republican party, and the personality 
 of that party’s one president, John Quincy 
 Adams, were contributing factors that deserve 
 more attention than they have received. 
 
 In 1825 Adams and his associates had a fair 
 opportunity for the organization of a well-dis¬ 
 ciplined party if the necessary political leader¬ 
 ship had been available. The patronage was in 
 their possession, and they also had more than 
 their proportionate share of the country’s able 
 men. Moreover, given a favorable political sit¬ 
 uation, Adams’ plans of natural development had 
 much to commend them. 1 In spite of these 
 promising beginnings crushing defeat in the elec¬ 
 tion of 1828 permanently discredited Adams as a 
 presidential candidate and revealed the weakness 
 of the National Republican party. The rising 
 tide of frontier democracy in support of Jackson 
 goes far toward an explanation of this result; 
 however, it was in part due to Adams’ political 
 mistakes and to his half-hearted cooperation with 
 the leaders of his party. There is little evidence 
 that he understood, what was clear to many at the 
 
 1 Adams’ policies are given a brilliant interpretation in Henry 
 Adams, The Degradation of the Democratic Dogma (N. Y., 1920), 
 pp. 24, 25. 
 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 
 
 3 
 
 time,—that a new period of intensely partisan 
 politics was about to begin. 
 
 Party lines that had been firmly drawn between 
 Federalists and Republicans in the early years of 
 the republic were weakened during the generation 
 of control by the Virginia dynasty. So hopeless 
 was the situation of the Federalist party after 
 the second war with England that it disappeared 
 from national politics 2 and continued as a factor 
 in only a few states. 3 The disintegration of the 
 party machine did not mean, however, the disap¬ 
 pearance of the political ideas of which it had 
 been the expression. Conservatism and a prefer¬ 
 ence for a strong, centralized government, the 
 distinctive features of Federalism, remained the 
 political faith of a minority. In 1822 Jefferson 
 assured Gallatin that the old party alignment still 
 existed in fundamentals, with the Federalists 
 again in support of the old and familiar cause of 
 centralization in the government. 4 A Democratic 
 member of the New York Assembly wrote in 
 1824 that the attempt to ignore party differences 
 
 3 Noah Webster stated the reason for this as early as 1807. 
 “There is one particular in which, I think, the leading gentlemen 
 of the Washington School have uniformly erred. They have 
 attempted to resist the force of current opinion, instead of falling 
 into the current with a view to direct it.” Noah Webster to Rufus 
 King, July 6, 1807. King Correspondence, quoted by D. R. Fox, 
 The Decline of Aristocracy in the Politics of New York (N. Y., 
 1919), p. 86. 
 
 3 S. E. Morison, The Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, 
 Federalist, 1765-1848 (Boston, 1913), I. 240-243. 
 
 ‘Jefferson to Gallatin, Monticello, October 29, 1822. The Writ¬ 
 ings of Thomas Jefferson (P. L. Ford, ed., New York, 1899), X. 
 235, 236. 
 
4 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 in politics was “the last and forlorn expedient of 
 a set of politicians, who have failed in every other 
 attempt to regain the power which they lost in 
 1800. The leopard has not changed his spots 
 nor the Ethiopian his skin.” 5 Van Buren, writ¬ 
 ing in 1854 from the perspective of a long politi¬ 
 cal career, declared that the principles which had 
 been so bitterly contested as to be handed down 
 from father to son had not entirely disappeared 
 in the era of good feeling. 6 These witnesses 
 were interested in fastening the stigma of Fed¬ 
 eralism upon their opponents, and it may be 
 assumed that the transition between the Feder¬ 
 alist and National Republican parties was not so 
 direct as they believed. Webster wrote in May 
 1824: “The events of the winter, with the com¬ 
 mon operation of time, have very much mixed 
 up Federalists with some one or other of the 
 parties; and though it is true that some men 
 make great efforts to keep up old party distinc¬ 
 tions, they find it difficult.” 7 There probably 
 occurred a considerable change in party ties dur¬ 
 ing the realignment of parties in the decade from 
 1820 to 1830. Some Republicans of the Jeffer¬ 
 sonian type preferred the conservatism of Adams 
 to the democracy of Jackson while some Fed- 
 
 5 Niles’ Register, XXVI. 203. 
 
 6 The Autobiography of Martin Van Buren (J. C. Fitzpatrick, 
 ed., Annual Report of the American Historical Association, Wash¬ 
 ington, 1918,) II. 123, 124. 
 
 7 Webster to Jeremiah Mason, Washington, May 9, 1824. C. H. 
 Van Tyne, Webster Transcripts, Library of Congress. 
 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 
 
 5 
 
 eralists chose the more liberal party. A major¬ 
 ity of the old Federalists and those who thought 
 like them were, however, a force that Adams could 
 recruit should he decide to accept their aid. 
 
 New parties were about to make their appear¬ 
 ance, reflecting in their characters changed con¬ 
 ditions, but in the opening maneuvers of the 
 campaign of 1824 the personalities of candidates 
 and considerations of political expediency were 
 determining factors. A striking poverty of po¬ 
 litical principles is reflected by the ease with 
 which combinations were made between leading 
 candidates. This is nowhere more clearly seen 
 than in the favor which Adams gave to the pro¬ 
 posal that Jackson be coupled with him as a 
 candidate for the vice-presidency. When this 
 arrangement was first suggested by Calhoun in 
 January, 1824, Adams was distinctly skeptical; he 
 suspected that it was the result of a clever scheme 
 concocted by Calhoun to advance his own politi¬ 
 cal interests. 8 Two months later he had changed 
 his mind and advised his friends that they could 
 vote for Jackson “on correct principle—his fit¬ 
 ness for the place, the fitness of the place for him, 
 and the peculiar advantages of the geographical 
 association.” 0 After repeating this endorsement 
 on other occasions, Adams withdrew it when he 
 
 ' J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, VI. 241, 242. R. M. Johnson, who 
 approached Adams for this purpose, was engaged in an effort to 
 arrange a union of the candidates opposed to Crawford. Clay was 
 to be made secretary of state. 
 
 • Ibid., VI. 253, 254. 
 
6 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 saw that Jackson’s popularity had outgrown the 
 vice-presidency. 10 His dislike of Clay and an 
 appreciation of the strength Jackson would bring 
 to him from the West made this combination 
 more satisfactory than that with Clay. 
 
 The union between Adams, Clay, and Webster 
 that was to become the nucleus of the National 
 Republican party was delayed until the election 
 showed that no candidate had a majority of elec¬ 
 toral votes. The similarity of their political ideas, 
 each finding nothing to oppose in the protective 
 tariff and internal improvements, pointed to such 
 an understanding, but its consummation was for 
 a time delayed by political reasons and personal 
 dislike. A rival candidate, Clay was first of all 
 concerned with his own prospects of success, until 
 the election determined that his name would not 
 be sent to the House of Representatives. The 
 personalities of Clay and Adams were so different 
 that friendly relations were difficult. After a 
 dinner at which Clay was present, Adams wrote 
 that he “became warm, vehement, and absurd 
 upon the tariff. . . . He is so ardent, dog¬ 
 matical and overbearing that it is extremely diffi¬ 
 cult to preserve the temper of friendly society 
 with him.” 11 
 
 The timeliness of Clay’s aid in the House and 
 his acceptance of the chief office in Adams’ cabi¬ 
 net gave color to the charges of a corrupt bargain. 
 
 10 Ibid., VI. 274, 417. 
 
 11 Adams, Memoirs, VI. 258. 
 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 
 
 7 
 
 Historians of this period have on the whole ex¬ 
 onerated them, and there is no available evidence 
 that justifies dissent from this judgment. Yet 
 it is clear from his own account that Adams 
 allowed friends of Clay to believe that something 
 would be done in return for Clay’s aid. The first 
 move toward the establishment of better relations 
 between the two men came from the initiative of 
 one of Clay’s friends. 
 
 The drift of Letcher’s discourse was that Clay would 
 willingly support me if he could thereby serve himself, 
 and the substance of his meaning was, that if Clay’s 
 friends could know that he would have a prominent share 
 in the administration, that might induce them to vote for 
 me, even in the face of instruction. 12 
 
 Letcher was neither given reason to believe that 
 this would be done nor was he specifically for¬ 
 bidden to hope that it would be. When John 
 Scott, a member of the House from Missouri, 
 came to him on behalf of Clay’s interests, Adams 
 was somewhat more yielding: “I told him that 
 he would not expect me to enter into details with 
 regard to the formation of an Administration, 
 but that if I should be elected by the suffrage of 
 the West, I should naturally look to the West for 
 much of the support that I should need.” That 
 this was not unsatisfactory is clear since Scott 
 “parted from me apparently satisfied.” 13 While 
 
 u Letcher did not claim authority from Clay in making this over¬ 
 ture. Ibid,., VI. 447. Cf. F. J. Turner, The Rise of the New 
 West (1906), p. 262. 
 
 13 Adams, Memoirs, VI. 474. 
 
8 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 Adams was not committed to a definite appoint¬ 
 ment, Clay’s friends could henceforth be confi¬ 
 dent that something would be done for him. It 
 is certain that Clay was not influenced to support 
 Adams by personal preference. 14 He believed 
 that he was faced by a choice of two evils, of 
 which Jackson seemed the more dangerous to the 
 future of the country and perhaps to his own 
 political future. He assured his friends that 
 Adams would not have been his choice if he had 
 been at ^liberty to draw from the whole mass of 
 our citizens for a President.” 15 The similarity 
 between their political points of view may well 
 have been the determining factor in the end. 
 
 The enlistment of Webster’s aid, sufficiently 
 difficult because of the coolness between him and 
 Adams, 16 was further complicated by the problem 
 of establishing friendly relations between Adams 
 and his own Federalist associates. 17 Their co- 
 
 14 Adams’ support of the policy of internal improvements at 
 national expense formed a point of contact with Clay’s western 
 friends. The interests of the West were so intimately associated 
 with this issue that Jackson politicians found it most embarrass¬ 
 ing in view of their disapproval of centralized government. 
 Eugene Roseboom, “Ohio in the Presidential Election of 1824,” 
 Ohio Archaeological and Historical Quarterly, XXVI, 184. 
 
 15 Clay to Francis P. Blair, Washington, January 29, 1825. The 
 Private Correspondence of Henry Clay (Calvin Colton, ed.,) pp. 
 Ill, 112; Clay to Francis Brooke, Washington, February 18, 1825. 
 Ibid., pp. 114-116. 
 
 “Adams, Memoirs, VI. 275. Webster w r as reported to have 
 questioned Adams’ position on the tariff. As to the campaign, 
 Webster was not interested in it. April, 1824: “it seemed to him 
 that nothing was to be got with one more than with another.” 
 
 17 Differences had existed between Adams and the Massachusetts 
 Federalists since 1807 when they had divided on questions of 
 foreign policy. S. E. Morison, The Life and Letters of H. G. 
 Otis, II. 245-246. 
 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 
 
 9 
 
 operation would bring him valuable support in 
 the New England states, but it was an open ques¬ 
 tion if this added strength would compensate for 
 the advantages which an association with the rem¬ 
 nants of this discredited party would give to 
 Adams’ opponents. As in the negotiations be¬ 
 tween Adams and Clay’s friends, the first steps 
 were taken by Federalists. They had a material 
 interest in making certain that they would not be 
 excluded from the patronage in the event of 
 Adams’ success. Accordingly, he was sounded 
 on various occasions as to the treatment that 
 might be expected from him. John Reed, a mem¬ 
 ber of the House from Massachusetts, reported 
 that Federalist opposition to him was due to the 
 fear of a general exclusion from office. In reply 
 to this obvious plea for a share of the spoils, 
 Adams declared that he would be under obliga¬ 
 tion to give preference to members of the other 
 party in the event that his election should be won 
 against Federalist opposition . 18 His resentment 
 at this attempted dictation soon cooled, for he 
 assured Reed on the following day that Web¬ 
 ster’s fear of a “proscription from office” was 
 unfounded . 19 Webster was neutral, according to 
 William Plumer, a representative from New 
 Hampshire, but he suggested that Webster would 
 be pleased if something were done for Jeremiah 
 Mason and if the vice-presidency were given to 
 
 “Adams, Memoirs, VI. 312, 313. 
 
10 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 Richard Rush. 20 Assurances were given that 
 party lines would not be followed in the distribu¬ 
 tion of the offices, but, as in the negotiations with 
 Clay’s friends, no definite promises were made. 
 Efforts were renewed to commit Adams to a 
 favorable point of view on the eve of the bal- 
 lotting in the House of Representatives. In Feb¬ 
 ruary, 1825, an exchange of letters took place 
 between Henry R. Warfield, a representative 
 from Maryland, and Wester, which was probably 
 arranged as a means to accomplish this object. In 
 his first letter Warfield voiced the fears of Fed¬ 
 eralists that “should Mr. Adams be the President, 
 he will administer the government on party corn 
 siderations; that the old landmarks of party dis¬ 
 tinctions will be built up. . . .” 21 Webster im¬ 
 mediately sounded Adams by showing him a draft 
 of his reply in which he asserted that Adams 
 “would administer the government on libera 
 principles, not excluding Federalists as such, fron 
 his regard and esteem,” and that accordingly 
 Webster’s vote would be given to him. Confi 
 dence was expressed that Adams would, i 
 elected, appoint a Federalist to office as proof tha 
 party allegiance would not be followed in th< 
 disposal of the patronage. Adams replied that i 
 this confidence was founded upon an anticipate< 
 
 20 Ibid., VI. 332. 
 
 21 N. R. Warfield to Webster, Washington, February 3, 182, 
 The Private Correspondence of Daniel Webster (Fletcher Wet 
 ster, ed., Boston, 1857), I. 377. 
 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 
 
 11 
 
 appointment to a cabinet position, it was unwar¬ 
 ranted; however, the draft received his endorse¬ 
 ment when Webster explained that he had in 
 mind an office of importance such as a judicial 
 post rather than a cabinet appointment. 22 Not¬ 
 withstanding the unpopularity of the Federalists, 
 it is clear that their position at this time as an 
 independent group, unattached to either of the 
 candidates, made them an object of solicitude and 
 therefore of tolerance. According to Webster, 
 writing in February, 1824, all candidates “are 
 . . . just now, very civil towards Federalists. 
 We see and hear no abuse of us except in some 
 parts of New England.” 23 Webster’s aid went to 
 Adams, and after the election he was instrumental 
 in keeping the Federalists loyal to the adminis¬ 
 tration. 
 
 In the events leading to his election Adams 
 showed distinct skill as a politician. The cooper¬ 
 ation of Clay and Webster formed a nucleus 
 about which a party might be organized. Evi¬ 
 dence was rapidly accumulating that an early 
 renewal of partisan politics was impending and 
 that a party in support of the weak-government 
 
 22 Adams, Memoirs, VI. 492, 493. Webster’s letter to Warfield 
 is printed in Webster, Private Correspondence, I. 378, 379. 
 
 23 Webster to Jeremiah Mason, February 15, 1824. Van Tyne, 
 Webster Transcripts. This letter is inaccurately printed in The 
 Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster (National Edition, Bos¬ 
 ton, 1903), XVI. 80, 81. It was apparently copied from The 
 Memoirs and Correspondence of Jeremiah Mason (Cambridge, 
 1873), not from the MSS. 
 
12 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 theory would be formed. 24 Nevertheless, Adams 
 and Webster were agreed that an attempt should 
 be made to form an administration without refer¬ 
 ence to party divisions. As a Federalist, fearing 
 that emphasis upon party ties would work to the 
 disadvantage of his friends, Webster obviously 
 had a material interest in this point of view. “I 
 wish to see nothing like a portioning, parcelling 
 out or distributing offices of trust among men 
 called by different denominations. Such a pro¬ 
 ceeding would be to acknowledge and to regard 
 the existence of distinction; whereas my wish is, 
 that distinctions be disregarded.” 25 Adams was 
 attracted by the ideal of an administration that 
 would be without partisan bias. This aim clearly 
 was behind his ambitious plans for national 
 development which he thought should have the 
 support of all. A few days before the election in 
 the House Adams confided to his diary that ‘‘his 
 great object would be to break up the remnant of 
 old party distinctions, and to bring the whole 
 people together as much as possible.” 26 From the 
 first Clay did not definitely disapprove a partisan 
 organization, and the appearance of the charge 
 of a corrupt bargain made intolerable for him 
 association with its authors in support of the 
 administration. 
 
 24 S. R. Gammon, The Presidential Campaign of 1832 (Balti¬ 
 more, 1922), pp. 21, 22. 
 
 “Webster to Warfield, House of Representatives, February 5, 
 1825. Webster, Private Correspondence, I. 378. 
 
 “Adams, Memoirs, VI. 474; cf. Ibid., 493. 
 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 
 
 13 
 
 The most serious obstacles to the building of 
 an effective party proved to be Adams’ own per¬ 
 sonality and standards. In curious contrast with 
 his skillful maneuvers during the election, as 
 president he showed no liking for nor adaptability 
 to the requirements of party leadership. He did 
 not understand that the president must not only 
 be t he ch ief exec u tive of the nation but that he 
 must al so be the leader of his party in order to 
 assure success to his policies. His conceptions of 
 the duties of his office and the rigor of his puritan 
 conscience prevented a diversion of his energy 
 from his legitimate functions to the activities 
 of a politician and the subordination of public 
 interests to his political career or to party success. 
 Cold, reserved, critical of his associates and men 
 whom he casually met, he had few of the quali¬ 
 ties of political leadership. When Thurlow Weed 
 applied to him in June, 1825, for an appointment 
 in the interest of the party’s welfare, the Presi¬ 
 dent, due to “political impractability” as Weed 
 wrote, would do nothing. Weed’s judgment is 
 important as that of an experienced politician. 
 “Mr. Adams, during his administration, failed to 
 cherish, strengthen, or even recognize the party 
 to which he owed his election; nor as far as I am 
 informed, with the great power he possessed did 
 he make a single influential friend.” Joseph 
 Gales, editor of the National Intelligencer, as¬ 
 sured Weed that if Clay had been president his 
 
14 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 wishes in regard to the appointment would have 
 been satisfied. 27 More of an opportunist in poli¬ 
 tics, Clay was convinced that the usual weapons 
 of party warfare should be freely employed. 
 Webster soon abandoned hope of a prolonged 
 period of good feeling and was thereafter in 
 accord with Clay’s point of view. 
 
 With the appearance of a vigorous and popular 
 opposition, disciplined by its encounter with the 
 administration over, the Panama mission, Clay 
 and Webster were confirmed in their judgment 
 that organization was necessary and that news¬ 
 paper support must be cultivated. Clay paid little 
 attention to the moral significance of the use of 
 money for this purpose and to the possible 
 squeamishness of editors, and the lack of funds 
 were the only limits which he recognized in his 
 policy of subsidizing friendly newspapers. Clay 
 wrote to Webster in August, 1827: 
 
 C. Hammond’s paper at Cincinnati is ... I think 
 upon the whole, the most efficient and discreet gazette that 
 espouses our cause. He is poor, disinterested and proud. 
 . . . I think he is every way worthy of encourage¬ 
 
 ment and patronage. The only assistance he would re¬ 
 ceive would be in the extension of the subscription list. 
 Perhaps he might receive a present of a new lot of 
 types . 28 
 
 In a later letter there is reference to an agree¬ 
 ment made in the preceding year that, as a general 
 
 27 The Autobiography of Thurlow Weed (Harriet A. Weed, ed., 
 Boston, 1884), pp. 178-182. 
 
 28 Clay to Webster, Washington, August 19, 1827. Webster 
 MSS. Library of Congress. 
 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 
 
 15 
 
 policy, financial support was to be given to deserv¬ 
 ing newspapers and that a proportionate amount 
 of free circulation should by this means be 
 devoted to party purposes. 29 No evidence is avail¬ 
 able as to the methods to be used in raising a 
 fund for this purpose or as to the amount actually 
 collected and expended in this way. Leaders of 
 the party, however, were expected to aid in similar 
 enterprises, for Webster indirectly solicited a 
 contribution from Adams to be used in a state 
 campaign. John Bailey, a member of the House 
 from Massachusetts, who admitted that the sug¬ 
 gestion had originated with Webster, asked 
 Adams if he had a sum of “from five to ten thou¬ 
 sand dollars, that I was disposed to give without 
 inquiring how it would be disposed, but which 
 would be employed to secure the election of Gover¬ 
 nor Metcalf in Kentucky next August.” Unlike 
 Clay and Webster, Adams had scruples as to the 
 morality of a scheme of this kind, and he sternly 
 refused to have anything to do with it, “in a 
 manner altogether explicit.” His reflections on 
 this occasion reveal the fundamental difference 
 between his point of view in public life and that 
 of his political associates. The use of money in 
 elections, he believed, was wrong in principle. 
 Should he violate that principle “there was no rule 
 
 w Clay to Webster, Washington, October 25, 1827. Ibid. An 
 appeal, he thought, should be made to the large cities where capital 
 was to be found. Cf. Clay to Webster, Washington, October 8, 
 1827. Webster secured a contribution which was to go to J. H. 
 Pleasants, editor of the Richmond Whig. Ibid. 
 
16 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 either of expediency or morality, which would 
 enable me to limit the amount of expenditure I 
 ought to incur. I could certainly appropriate half 
 a million dollars to the same object without tran¬ 
 scending any law, and with as much propriety as 
 I could devote five thousand to the election of a 
 governor of Kentucky.” 30 
 
 An equally sharp difference of opinion de¬ 
 veloped between Adams and his lieutenants in 
 regard to the disposal of the patronage. The rec¬ 
 ord of the civil service in his administration is on 
 the whole in striking contrast with the spoils sys¬ 
 tem inaugurated by Jackson, 31 yet political expedi¬ 
 ency encroached more and more upon the merit 
 system as his political needs became more evident. 
 The retention of John McLean as postmaster 
 general, an office he had filled under Monroe, in 
 the face of Clay’s repeated charges of disloyalty 32 
 and in spite of his refusal to use the patronage of 
 his office for the purpose of strengthening the 
 National Republican party 33 requires more than 
 
 30 Adams, Memoirs, VII. 468, 469. 
 
 31 C R. Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage (New York, 
 1905), p. 72. 
 
 32 Ibid., VII. 343, 349, 355, 364. Adams seems in the end to 
 have been convinced that McLean was secretly disloyal; neverthe¬ 
 less, he was retained in office until the end of the term. Cf. C. R. 
 Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage (N. Y., 1905), p. 72. 
 Professor Fish explains McLean’s retention as due to the reluc¬ 
 tance of Adams to take up the question of finding a successor. 
 
 33 His point of view in regard to the patronage was stated in a 
 letter to an obscure correspondent. “It is my decided opinion, 
 that the officers of the general government, and especially those 
 that reside at this place, and have no votes, ought to take no 
 step aside from their official duties to influence the election of 
 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 
 
 17 
 
 passing attention, as it is usually taken as the 
 clearest example of Adams’ loyalty to the merit 
 system. Not even Clay questioned the efficiency 
 of McLean’s management of the postal service, 
 but contemporary charges that he used the patron¬ 
 age of his office in the interest of Calhoun and 
 Jackson have been generally endorsed by histori¬ 
 ans. 34 This decision, although it is almost 
 unanimous, cannot be accepted without reser¬ 
 vation. In specific terms and on many occasions 
 he denied in his private letters any disloyalty 
 in the making of appointments. Moreover', 
 sound political reasons argued against his dis¬ 
 missal and were probably not without weight 
 in influencing Adams to retain him. The effici¬ 
 ency of the postal service under his direction had 
 made many friends for him who might have been 
 lost to the administration by his dismissal. He 
 was warned that the hand of his enemies had been 
 withheld because it was feared that otherwise 
 public opinion, especially in Ohio, would be 
 
 the President, either for or against any individual.” He thought 
 that the faithful discharge of public duties was the best support 
 which they could give any administration. McLean to Robert 
 Sweeney, Washington, August 15, 1828. McLean MSS., Library 
 of Congress. 
 
 34 F. J. Turner, Rise of the New West, p. 272. Cf. Mary Hins¬ 
 dale, History of the President’s Cabinet (Ann Arbor, 1911), p. 
 83. Professor Channing is not so positive in this opinion after 
 examining the McLean papers. Edward Channing, A History of 
 the United States (New York, 1921), V. 372, 373. Dr. W. C. 
 Ford finds in Jackson’s offer to reappoint McLean as postmaster 
 general sufficient proof that he had been useful during the cam¬ 
 paign of 1828. Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical 
 Society (Third Series, 1907) I. 359-393. 
 
18 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 adversely affected. 35 The attitude of the admin¬ 
 istration was expressed by the comment of the 
 National Intelligencer when the Democratic Rich¬ 
 mond Enquirer questioned the true character of 
 McLean’s politics; it refused to discuss his con¬ 
 duct in office, as he was “a valuable public officer, 
 and has our unfeigned personal respect.” 36 
 
 There was in fact common ground between 
 Adams and McLean as to the principles that 
 ought to govern the disposal of the patronage. 
 Both stood in theory squarely upon the merit 
 system. McLean’s point of view found expression 
 in the course of an interesting correspondence 
 with Edward Everett from August 1 to October 
 7, 1828. 37 It began when McLean charged 
 Everett with responsibility for a criticism of his 
 distribution of the patronage, 38 and in the letters 
 that followed Everett clearly aligned himself in 
 favor of a strictly partisan distribution of offices. 
 He argued that only in this way could a party be 
 effectively organized. 
 
 What then binds the mass of the parties together, I say 
 the mass, not the high minded, few patriotic individuals— 
 
 35 S. J. Richardson to McLean, Frankfort, Kentucky, October 4, 
 1828. McLean MSS. 
 
 36 National Intelligencer, September 9, 1828. 
 
 37 These letters, with an introduction and explanatory notes by 
 Dr. W. C. Ford, are printed from the MSS. in the Library of 
 Congress in the Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical 
 Society (Third Series, 1907), I. 359-393. 
 
 38 It was charged specifically that Isaac Hill of New Hampshire 
 had used his contract for the transportation of the mails in that 
 state as a means of distributing his newspaper, The New Hamp¬ 
 shire Patriot, without expense. Ibid., pp. 362, 363. 
 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 
 
 19 
 
 but the mass? Indubitably the hope of office, and its 
 honors and instruments. The consequence is, that the 
 moment any administration is formed, every man out of 
 office, and desirous of getting in, is arrayed against it. If 
 the administration then discard the principle of bestowing 
 the patronage on their political friends, they turn against 
 themselves, not only the expectants, but the incumbents. 
 
 . . . For an administration then to bestow its patron¬ 
 
 age, without distinction of party, is to court its own 
 destruction. I think, therefore, that fidelity to itself 
 requires, that every administration should have the benefit 
 of the cordial cooperation of all its members—the rule 
 ought to be that, other things being equal, the friends of 
 the administration should have the preference. Our pres¬ 
 ent chief magistrate made the experiment of the higher 
 principle; of exclusive regard to merit: what has been his 
 reward? A most furious opposition rallied on the charge 
 of corrupt distribution of office, and the open or silent 
 hostility of three-fourths of the office-holders in the 
 Union . 39 
 
 McLean acknowledged his friendship with Cal¬ 
 houn but insisted that his appointments had been 
 in no way influenced by it. The friendship would 
 end, he wrote, the moment he should believe 
 Calhoun capable of attempting to influence his 
 policies. 40 He stood squarely upon the merit sys¬ 
 tem, and he was able to convince Everett, as the 
 letters continued, that friends of the administra¬ 
 tion should at least have equal qualifications with 
 
 '"Ibid., p. 389. 
 
 40 McLean to Everett, Washington, August S, 1828. McLean 
 MSS. Great care was taken in writing this letter. A draft is 
 preserved among the McLean MSS. in which many changes and 
 interlineations are shown. 
 
20 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 those of other aspirants. 41 With this concession 
 a correspondence that may well have become 
 tiresome came to an end. 
 
 Clay and Webster, though their position appar¬ 
 ently was never so clearly stated as that of 
 Everett, were in substantial agreement. In any 
 event, Adams’ attitude in regard to the patronage 
 found little favor with them. Neither went so far 
 as to anticipate Jackson’s spoils system by urging 
 a general removal of office holders, but the extent 
 of Jackson’s activities in this respect suggests 
 that few of his friends held office under his pre¬ 
 decessor. Clay was definitely in favor of making 
 appointments for party purposes. He wrote in 
 1827: “Henceforward I think that the principle 
 ought to be adhered to is of [sic.] appointing only 
 friends to the Administration in public offices. 
 Such I believe is the general conviction in the 
 cabinet.” 42 On several occasions Webster at¬ 
 tempted to persuade Adams to use practical 
 methods in the building of a party organization. 
 Not only was he asked to contribute money for 
 use in elections, but in 1827 Webster urged the 
 importance of inducing Robert Walsh, editor of 
 the Philadelphia National Gazette, to abandon his 
 neutral attitude in favor of active support. This 
 might be accomplished by the appointment to 
 
 11 Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society (Third 
 Series, 1907), I. 389. 
 
 “Clay (?) to Webster, April 14, 1827. Webster MSS. The 
 signature to this letter has been cut out, but the text is in Clay’s 
 handwriting. 
 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 
 
 21 
 
 office of a friend who felt himself “neglected and 
 injured.” 43 Apparently nothing was done, for in 
 the following year, according to Adams, 1 Walsh 
 was but a lukewarm friend of the administra¬ 
 tion. 44 
 
 During his correspondence with McLean, 
 Everett attributed to the President a scrupulous 
 regard for the merit rule. Nevertheless, to other 
 contemporaries influenced either by disappointed 
 hopes or by political prejudices, it seemed that 
 Adams’ use of the patronage was not above sus¬ 
 picion or at least that he allowed men under him 
 to favor friends of the administration. Gales, of 
 the National Intelligencer, assured Weed in 1825 
 that Clay had already appointed many. McLean 
 was told by Isaac Hill, the powerful Democratic 
 leader in New Hampshire, that employees of the 
 post-office had been threatened with dismissal if 
 they did not work for Adams. Hill also asserted 
 that in his state “every Jacksonian, who could be 
 reached has been removed by our state executive 
 and legislature, and every place not already filled 
 by federalists has been supplied from the ranks 
 of that party or the traitors that have joined 
 
 “Webster to J. Q. Adams, Philadelphia, March 27, 1827. Web¬ 
 ster Letters (C. H. Van Tyne, ed., N. Y., 1920), pp. 123, 124. 
 Webster was confident that the appointment of Hopkinson, the 
 friend in question and a leader among the forty or fifty thousand 
 survivors of the Federalist party in Pennsylvania, “would heal 
 much of the wound, which is felt in New Jersey, and would 
 suffice even in New England to waken the activity of many 
 friends.” 
 
 M Adams, Memoirs, VIII. 491, 492. 
 
22 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 it.” 45 In a letter to Everett, McLean wrote that 
 with the single exception of Joel R. Poinsett as 
 minister to Mexico all appointments of impor¬ 
 tant offices of a political character had been made, 
 from friends of the administration. 46 However 
 favorable the judgment of history has been in re¬ 
 gard to Adams’ policy in this respect, it gave little 
 satisfaction to his contemporaries. Federalists 
 and their friends felt themselves neglected. Re¬ 
 publicans who had supported Adams believed that 
 Federalists had been given undue consideration. 
 Silas Wright of New York, a Crawford man 
 who had followed his New England predilections 
 in supporting Adams, doubtless was only one of 
 many whose enthusiasm cooled. A superannu¬ 
 ated Federalist, Rufus King, had been appointed 
 minister to England, he complained, and to the 
 survivors of the same party had gone the federal 
 offices in New York state. Webster, one of the 
 leaders of the Hartford Convention, according to 
 Wright, was in 1827 the recognized leader of the 
 administration in Congress. “All say party is 
 done away, but come to selections for office Fed¬ 
 eralists are never forgotten, and we should sup¬ 
 pose that in the doing away of party, the old line 
 of Democrats was done away by annihilation.” 47 
 
 As the campaign of 1828 approached Adams, in 
 
 • 
 
 45 Isaac Hill to McLean, Concord, N. H., November 27, 1828. 
 McLean MSS. 
 
 46 Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society (Third 
 Series, 1907), I. p. 378. 
 
 47 Silas Wright to A. C. Flagg, Washington, December 20, 1827. 
 A. C. Flagg MSS. New York Public Library. 
 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 
 
 23 
 
 fact, was more and more compelled to compromise 
 with his principles in the making of appointments 
 in order, as he phrased it, to maintain harmonious 
 relations with his associates. In spite of his 
 reluctance and acting in such a way as to impair 
 the political effect of his concessions, men were 
 appointed to office against his better judgment. 
 This was notably true in the nomination of 
 Walsh’s friend Hopkinson as district judge of 
 Pennsylvania. 48 The extent to which Adams was 
 forced to yield to political necessity is seen most 
 clearly in his remarks in regard to the appoint¬ 
 ment of General Peter B. Porter as secretary of 
 war and of W. H. Harrison as minister to 
 Colombia. 
 
 Porter is devoted to Mr. Clay, and has taken the lead 
 in the New York Legislature of the friends of the Admin¬ 
 istration. . . . Harrison wants the mission to Colom¬ 
 
 bia more than it wants him, or than it is wanted by the 
 public interest. . . . These men will all discharge 
 
 the duties of their offices faithfully to the best of their 
 ability. Nothing would induce me to compromise on that 
 point; but in all short of that the right must in this, as in 
 numberless other cases, yield to the expedient. The only 
 possibility left me is to terminate the administration in 
 harmony with itself, and for the sake of that I acquiesce 
 in these measures, against the whole tenor of my 
 judgment . 49 
 
 Making use of effective political methods reluc¬ 
 tantly and too late in the campaign to be of much 
 use, unwilling to cooperate unreservedly in the 
 
 “ C. R. Fish, Civil Service and the Patronage, p. 72. Professor 
 Fish’s reference to Adams, Memoirs, VII. 207 is incorrect. 
 
 “Adams, Memoirs, VIII. 4, S. 
 
24 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 activities of party leaders, Adams could only 
 count with certainty upon those regions which 
 were predisposed in favor of the political pur¬ 
 poses he represented. The centers of National 
 Republican strength were, for the most part, in the 
 long established communities of the eastern and 
 the middle states. 50 For a time the South was in 
 sympathy with nationalist policies, but diverging 
 interests had persuaded her leaders by 1828 that 
 a mistake had been made. Except for the die-' 
 hard survivors of Federalism 51 and the chance 
 allies provided by the fortunes of local politics 
 and dissension within the Democratic party, 
 National Republicanism found little support in 
 the South outside of Kentucky and Louisiana 
 where local interests argued effectively in favor 
 of the protective tariff. No consistent effort was 
 therefore made by the leaders to rally strength in 
 that section. The situation was somewhat more 
 favorable in the West. Earlier there had been a 
 common interest between the West and the South 
 in opposition to a strong central government, but 
 as the frontier was pushed further west the prob¬ 
 lem of internal improvements was brought into 
 prominence. Far from their markets, westerners 
 were interested in securing aid from the national 
 government for the construction of roads and 
 
 10 A. C. Cole, The Whig Party in the South (Washington, 1913). 
 
 p. 1. 
 
 51 U. B. Phillips, “The Federalists in South Carolina,” American 
 Historical Review, XIV. 776-790. 
 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 
 
 25 
 
 canals. Here was a fertile field for the expound¬ 
 ing of the American System. By stressing in¬ 
 ternal improvements in the West, protection in 
 New England, and the relations of both with the 
 commercial interests, an alliance between these 
 sections might be sealed. This was the substance 
 of Clay’s advice to Webster in 1827: 
 
 The West and Pennsylvania should be made sensible 
 of that support [of internal improvements] . . . You 
 
 have some difficulty to sustain it in New England, but I 
 hope that notwithstanding your limited territory and its 
 improved condition you will be able to sustain it by 
 prudence and discretion. You have your equivalents in 
 other forms, if not that of internal improvements. We 
 must keep the two interests of domestic manufactures 
 and internal improvements allied, and both lead to the 
 support of that other great and no less important interest 
 of navigation . 52 
 
 This frank appeal to material interests, while 
 very effective on numerous occasions in Amer¬ 
 ican politics, failed to win the new democracy then 
 stirring on the frontier. It was Adams’ failure to 
 understand this element, and above all his dislike 
 of it, that constituted his chief weakness. The 
 frontier was to a large degree emotional rather 
 than rational, and Jackson possessed the invalu¬ 
 able advantage of appealing to its imagination. 
 He was a product of the western frontier, and it 
 
 M Clay to Webster, April 14, 1827. Webster MSS. Clay ap¬ 
 parently was active in promoting the meeting of the friends of 
 protection at Harrisburg in this year. Clay to B. W. Crowin- 
 shield, Washington, March, 1827. Quarterly Journal of Eco¬ 
 nomics, II. 490, 491. 
 
26 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 saw in his candidacy a means of trying its hand 
 in national politics, while considerable minorities 
 in the East, workingmen in the cities and small 
 farmers, interpreted his career as a promise that 
 social position, wealth, or training would not con¬ 
 tinue to be necessary qualifications for political 
 leadership. Political ability, of a very practical 
 variety, to make the most of this enthusiasm was 
 not lacking among Jackson’s friends. Office 
 holders were denounced as aristocratic, and evi¬ 
 dence of the alleged luxurious tastes of Adams 
 was distributed broadcast to the ignorant. Con¬ 
 clusive proof of decadence from sound American 
 standards was seen in the billiard table charge, 
 and Adams was denounced as an Englishman at 
 heart who was ready to hand over his country to 
 the English armies. 53 In this crisis the friends of 
 the administration had little to hope for in the 
 President’s leadership. He had lacked from the 
 beginning the sanction of popular approval which 
 is given by a clear majority of the popular vote, 
 and by temperament he was unable to adapt him¬ 
 self to the changes that were taking place in 
 public opinion. Defeat became inevitable when 
 the campaign, as a result of decisions for which 
 he was probably not responsible, centered upon 
 Jackson’s personality and capacity at a time when 
 a great majority of voters did not consider that 
 
 “Francis Johnson to James Barbour, Bowling Green, Ky., 
 August 31, 1827. James Barbour MSS. New York Public 
 Library. 
 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 
 
 27 
 
 these questions were involved. That mythical 
 person, the average man, was held to be capable 
 of filling the most difficult of offices. Mistakes in 
 political tactics reveal a complete failure among 
 the National Republican leaders to understand 
 the realities of the situation. Attempts were 
 made to arouse moral disapprobation in regard to 
 certain features of Jackson’s life which were not 
 calculated to convince an unconventional West. 54 
 In a series of carefully prepared articles the 
 National Intelligencer stressed those phases of 
 Jackson’s career and personality that indicated a 
 lack of capacity to accommodate himself to the 
 constitutional restraints of the presidency and a 
 lack of training for its duties. 55 These argu¬ 
 ments might confirm the judgment of conser¬ 
 vatives, they did not convert the rank and 
 file of those whose votes were necessary for suc¬ 
 cess in the election. An admirable but a politi¬ 
 cally unfortunate reluctance to follow Democratic 
 political methods prevented Adams from making 
 use of good material against Jackson. In the 
 case of the six militiamen, 56 a favorite example 
 of Jackson’s arbitrary methods, he refused to 
 allow the decision of the court martial which had 
 
 M Truth’s Advocate and Monthly Anti-Jackson Expositor, pub¬ 
 lished at Cincinnati, stressed this scurrilous phase of the campaign. 
 
 “ These articles appeared under the title, “The Acts of Andrew 
 Jackson as a Legislature,” and had reference to his conduct as 
 governor of Florida. 
 
 “ This case was reported in a pamphlet, The Laws and the Facts, 
 and given wide circulation. Richard Peters to James Barbour, 
 Philadelphia, September 1, 1827. Barbour MSS. 
 
28 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 sentenced them to be copied from the records of 
 the War Department, alleging that it might be a 
 violation of precedent and “would be considered 
 as a measure of hostility against General 
 Jackson.” 57 
 
 Adams was permanently discredited as a party 
 leader by his crushing defeat in 1828. 58 There 
 was to be no thought of returning to him as a 
 presidential candidate in the future, though it is 
 by no means clear that any other of the National 
 Republican leaders could have made a better 
 showing against Jackson’s popularity. National 
 leadership in the party was to pass to Clay as the 
 most effective organizer and the most popular 
 candidate the party possessed. Whether the Na¬ 
 tional Republicans could become a more effective 
 party as the opposition than when in power 
 remained to be demonstrated in the course of the 
 next four years. 
 
 ” J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, VII. 275. 
 
 “ The Intelligencer was confident that the return to nationalist 
 policies under Adams would not be changed even in the event of his 
 defeat. “Revolutions never go backward. The policy of this gov¬ 
 ernment is established, and it is approved by the people; and no 
 statesman—no, nor any soldier either can ever stop it.” National 
 Intelligencer, June 5, 1828. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 
 
 T HE shock of Jackson’s overwhelming victory 
 aroused sincere pessimism among National 
 Republicans in regard to the future of American 
 institutions. Profoundly disruptive influences 
 were seen in the conduct of the crowd at Jack¬ 
 son’s inaugural, 1 changes amounting to a revolu¬ 
 tion in the government service were anticipated, 2 
 and in conservative New England it was feared 
 by some that the foundations of the country’s 
 civilization would be destroyed. 3 W. H. Seward, 
 
 ‘James Parton, Life of Andrew Jackson (N. Y., 1861), III. 170. 
 Cf. Webster to Mrs. E. Webster, Washington, March 4, 1829. 
 Webster, Private Correspondence, I. 473. In 1830, Mrs. Richard 
 Rush found Washington society so disagreeable under the Demo¬ 
 cratic regime that she left the city. Rush to Barbour, Washing¬ 
 ton, April 5, 1830. Barbour MSS. 
 
 ‘John Taliaferro to Barbour, Washington, February 2, 1829. 
 Barbour MSS. 
 
 3 C. T. Congdon, Reminiscences of a Journalist (Boston, 1888), 
 p. 25. “I had a strong belief not only that the republic would go 
 to ruin, but that general ignorance would prevail, that no new 
 books would be printed, that public schools would be abolished, 
 that universal poverty would ensue, and that the whaling business, 
 especially, would come to an end ... I doubt if any public 
 man was ever more thoroughly hated than General Jackson was 
 in Massachusetts. We even named a cutaneous complaint con¬ 
 tracted in barber shops after the much admired and much abused 
 hero. Then there was a particularly square toed boot which we 
 called the Jackson.” The significance of these gloomy reflections 
 is lessened in that Congdon was then a child of eight years. 
 
30 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 writing long after the event, foresaw the loss of 
 protection, of internal improvements, “the future 
 disunion of the states, and ultimately the uni¬ 
 versal prevalence of slavery.” 4 In less timid 
 minds this depression, if it existed at all, was 
 temporary. Even in the dark days following the 
 election Clay saw nothing that would “discour¬ 
 age the hope of a speedy restoration of the reign 
 of reason and common sense.” 5 In May, 1829, 
 Pleasants of the Richmond Whig was confident 
 that the removals from office had already re¬ 
 sulted in many desertions from the Democratic 
 party, and he predicted the overthrow of Jack- 
 son in 1832. fi Though it seemed to Francis 
 Brooke, Clay’s friend and correspondent, that all 
 but honor had been lost, he found some consola¬ 
 tion in the belief that the victory had been won 
 against Adams rather than against the cabinet. 7 
 -The party, however, had been reduced to a dis¬ 
 organized minority 8 with a dependable source of 
 power only in New England and with a precari¬ 
 ous influence in scattered areas elsewhere. 9 To 
 
 4 W. H. Seward, Autobiography (N. Y., 1877), p. 74. 
 
 5 Clay to Barbour, Ashland, Ky., November 21, 1829. Barbour 
 MSS. 
 
 °J. H. Pleasants to Barbour, Richmond, May 30, 1829. Ibid. 
 
 ' Brooke to Barbour, Richmond, January 27, 1829. Ibid. 
 
 8 Immediately after the election, Adams and J. W. Taylor, a 
 member of the House from New York, agreed that “the two 
 recent parties are virtually dissolved—and that of the administra¬ 
 tion irretrievably.” Adams, Memoirs, VIII. 89. 
 
 9 Adams was given all the electoral votes from New England ex¬ 
 cept one in Maine, but, except for sixteen in New York, he carried 
 only New Jersey and Delaware of the middle states. Maryland, 
 a border state, gave him six votes. 
 
 / 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 
 
 31 
 
 rebuild and increase its strength it would be nec¬ 
 essary to solve the problems of organization, 
 leadership, and campaign issues in such a way as 
 ^o unite all elements in opposition to Jackson and, 
 in addition, to make gains at his expense. 
 
 Factional differences barred the way to the 
 solution of these problems. Although many were 
 conscious of common ground in support of a 
 nationalist conception of government, minor 
 issues, such as anti-masonry, and the obscure 
 ramifications of personal ambition made the 
 organization of a more effective National Repub¬ 
 lican party difficult without the cement of patron¬ 
 age and power. That sense of loyalty or alle¬ 
 giance to party which is a result of definite 
 organization was not highly developed; 10 indi¬ 
 vidual rather than party standards controlled the 
 decisions of many. A beginning towards an or¬ 
 ganization was made, however, in the winter of 
 1830-1831 as a result of the formation of a con¬ 
 gressional caucus. 11 Adams was told in March 
 that members of the opposition, probably of the 
 House, had held weekly meetings during the 
 
 10 C. F. Mercer to Barbour, Washington, September 20, 1830 
 Barbour MSS. 
 
 n Materials for the study of the party from the point of view 
 of its national organization are meager. The files of the National 
 Intelligencer do not throw much light upon the subject. Adams’ 
 Memoirs give occasional hints, since he was in the confidence of 
 some of the National Republican leaders in Congress, particularly 
 in that of J. W. Taylor. His lack of interest in the details of 
 party management, except in so far as they offered food for 
 reflection upon the weaknesses of human nature, probably kept 
 him from writing all that he knew. 
 
32 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 session at the lodgings of J. W. Taylor. There 
 is a hint that Webster and Edward Everett were 
 named as a committee on publicity. Little was 
 done in the nature of propaganda, although Tay-^ 
 lor pointed out an article in the Intelligencer 
 which he thought was the work of Webster. 12 
 Early in the following session Adams reported a 
 conference of seventeen members of the House, 
 all friends of protection, for the purpose of de¬ 
 termining the line of action to be followed. Its 
 purpose was not primarily to advance the inter¬ 
 ests of the National Republican party, but its 
 membership was largely drawn from that 
 source. 13 At a later session, attended by such 
 apostles of protection as Clay, John Davis of 
 Massachusetts, and Hezekiah Niles of the Regis¬ 
 ter, Adams was convinced that Clay was inter¬ 
 ested in the revision of the tariff as a means of 
 advancing his presidential ambitions. 14 The func¬ 
 tions of this caucus broadened until they included 
 the determination of the opposition’s plan of 
 campaign. A member was appointed from each 
 state to confer with his associates, and in Janu- 
 
 u Adams, Memoirs, VIII. 337. 
 
 13 Ibid., VIII. 439. Adams attended these party conclaves as a 
 result of his interest in the tariff question and of his position as 
 chairman of the House committee on manufactures. He was not 
 however one of the party leaders. “I had never been consulted, 
 and never wished to be consulted, upon the movements of the 
 party since the 3d of March, 1829.” Ibid., VIII. 401. 
 
 11 As chairman of the committee which had the function of pre¬ 
 paring a plan of action Clay reported a bill that would reduce 
 rates to the extent of more than seven millions in one year. Ibid.. 
 VIII. 446-447. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 
 
 33 
 
 ary, 1832, these delegates met to arrange the “op¬ 
 position’s course of policy” after canvassing the 
 policies of the administration. 15 The continuation 
 «P f these meetings and the development from them 
 of a national organization was made impossible 
 by irreconcilable differences and by a reluctance 
 to incur the unpopularity of a congressional cau¬ 
 cus. 16 Difficulties in harmonizing the various 
 elements that would have to be included in a 
 rejuvenated party and the lack of coordination 
 between national and state leaders 17 were in part 
 responsible for the absence of a permanent na¬ 
 tional organization. It is possible, however, that 
 many were attracted to a party in which con¬ 
 siderable differences existed who might have been 
 repelled by one that had more exacting standards 
 of discipline. 
 
 More successful efforts were made within cer¬ 
 tain states in the construction of party machinery. 
 In New York the Democratic party under the 
 Regency provided a highly efficient model which 
 some of the National Republican leaders wished 
 to follow. Oran Follett, a Buffalo politician of 
 some importance, wrote early in 1832 in support 
 
 "Ibid., VIII. 456. 
 
 ” “Mr. Clay’s objection to the continuance of the meetings was. 
 that it would have the appearance of a permanent association to 
 dictate measures to Congress. There was a proposition for holding 
 weekly meetings; but it did not prevail.” Ibid., VIII. 448. 
 
 ” The loose connection between party leaders in Washington and 
 in the various states is illustrated by the Intelligencer’s confession 
 that it did not know the party allegiance of candidates in distant 
 states. National Intelligencer, August 27, 1830. 
 
34 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 of his recommendations that a newspaper be 
 established to serve the interests of the National 
 Republicans as the Albany Argus had served 
 those of the Regency: “It is a wrong policy $ 
 founded in a false estimate of things, that makes 
 us too wise, in any of the relations of life to learn 
 wisdom of our enemies.” He was confident that 
 there were one hundred men in the city of New 
 York who would each give one hundred dollars 
 for this purpose, and that the faithful in the 
 smaller cities of the state could be depended upon 
 to increase the total to more than three thou¬ 
 sand. 18 That anything was done in this direction 
 does not appear from the evidence, but further 
 measures were taken for the creation of an effect¬ 
 ive party. The National Republicans in New 
 York City organized in December, 1830, and ap- 
 ^pointed a committee of seventy. 19 In June of the 
 following year a state convention met in Albany, 
 named a state correspondence committee of seven 
 members, and recommended that committees be 
 appointed in each county that had not already 
 created one. 20 An active correspondence was 
 
 13 Oran Follett to Joseph Hoxie, February 6, 1832. “Follett 
 Papers” (L. Belle Hamlin, ed.), I. Quarterly Publications of the 
 Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio, V. S3, 54. 
 
 “ S. R. Gammon, The Presidential Campaign of 1832, p. 60. 
 
 20 The county correspondence committees were instructed to call 
 meetings and to inform the state committees as to local develop¬ 
 ments. Not only was the state committee to correspond with the 
 county committee, but it was directed to maintain a lively ex¬ 
 change of letters with the committees of other states. Niles’ 
 Register, XL. 279. Similar action was authorized at a meeting of 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 
 
 35 
 
 carried on, and an office was opened at Number 
 Three Broad Street where an attendant was to be 
 at all hours of the day to consult with any who 
 'came. 21 This system was apparently found de¬ 
 sirable, for a resolution was adopted by the 
 National Republican Convention at Baltimore in 
 December, 1831, recommending that organiza¬ 
 tions similar to that in New York be established 
 in states where they did not already exist. 22 
 While the party was developing a capacity for 
 organization within the states, no action was 
 taken for the creation of a permanent national 
 committee, but central leadership of a sort was 
 doubtless furnished by Clay and other party 
 leaders. The National Intelligencer by reason of 
 its wide circulation and standing with leaders of 
 the party was, in some measure, a binding in¬ 
 fluence. Nevertheless the absence of letters from 
 national leaders in the Follett Papers suggests 
 
 National Republicans in New York city as a means of preparing 
 for the National Republican Young Men’s Convention, which had 
 been called to meet in Washington. National Intelligencer, Feb¬ 
 ruary 29, 1832. 
 
 21 Hiram Ketchum to the State Corresponding Committee in 
 Buffalo, New York, August 10, 1832. Follett Papers, V. 66, 67; 
 National Republican State Corresponding Committee in Buffalo, 
 September 14, 1832. Ibid., 69, 70. The state committee recom¬ 
 mended that an office be opened in Buffalo, and for this purpose 
 the party there was authorized to draw upon National Republicans 
 in New York City for a small amount. John Youngs advised 
 the Buffalo committee that in order to bring home to the people 
 the seriousness of the situation it would be necessary to call 
 primary assemblies. John Youngs to the National Republican 
 State Corresponding Committee in Buffalo, Burdette, September 
 19, 1832. Ibid., p. 71. 
 
 ” National Intelligencer, December 16, 1831. 
 
36 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 that the party in each state was left largely to 
 its own devices. 
 
 For a time after the catastrophe of 1832 
 leaders of the opposition and the Intelligencer 
 followed a passive policy in regard to the nomi¬ 
 nation of a presidential candidate. Clay wrote 
 to Webster that, in his opinion, a colorless atti¬ 
 tude should for the time being be maintained in 
 regard to the administration. An immediate 
 declaration of hostilities would preserve unity 
 among Jackson’s friends; the events of the winter 
 of 1828-1829, the formation of a new cabinet, 
 and the inaugural address would make clear “the 
 whole ground of future operations.” It was of 
 great importance, Clay believed, that the ques¬ 
 tion of a nomination for the campaign of 1832 
 should not be prematurely agitated. 23 Similar 
 views were expressed by Webster in 1830. He 
 thought that nothing should be done in regard 
 to a nomination, that the party should for the 
 present follow a policy of obstruction. 24 The 
 administration would defeat itself, he wrote to 
 Clay, if it were given an opportunity; he immedi¬ 
 ately added however that by no means should “we 
 . . . let them disturb the tariff, or injure any 
 other existing interest.” 25 
 
 ” Clay to Webster, Washington, November 30, 1828. Webster 
 MSS. 
 
 “Webster to J. H. Pleasants, Washington, March 6, 1830. 
 Webster, Private Correspondence, I. 492. 
 
 “Webster to Clay, Washington, April 18, 1830. Colton, Private 
 Correspondence, p. 260. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 
 
 37 
 
 The result of the election of 1828 was scarcely 
 known before the Intelligencer was urging the 
 importance of delaying the discussion of a nomi¬ 
 nation for a period of at least two years. 26 In 
 August, 1829, its position was expressed in a 
 clipping from the Western Times. The appear¬ 
 ance of conflicting candidacies was to be regretted, 
 because it would revive dissension within the 
 party in regions where it had subsided. Rivalry 
 between party leaders at this stage of the cam¬ 
 paign would compromise the prospects of success. 
 “We hope, therefore, that the day of trouble will 
 be removed as far as possible, and not be brought 
 prematurely upon us, by those who ‘delight to 
 rule the tempest’ and those who love ‘unceasing 
 warfare’.” 27 
 
 It was clearly for the sake of expediency alone 
 that agitation for Clay’s nomination was delayed. 
 His support of Adams, his American System, and 
 his efforts to organize the party when it was 
 in power marked him as the logical candidate. 
 Although the Intelligencer gave him no open sup¬ 
 port during the first months of Jackson’s ad¬ 
 ministration, it was evident that he was being 
 groomed for the race. Whatever he did was 
 carefully noted, and his occasional speeches were 
 reported in full. When the Cincinnati Gazette 
 suggested that the candidate should be accepted 
 
 “ National Intelligencer, November 21, 1828. 
 
 " Ibid., August 10, 1829. 
 
38 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 whose chances for success were most promising, 
 the Intelligencer hastened to explain in August, 
 1829, that this indicated no intention of setting 
 Clay aside. “With the prominent place Mr. Clay 
 has so long maintained in the public view, and 
 with his increasing popularity, he could not keep 
 himself out of view if he would. The country 
 will probably demand his services, and he dare not 
 refuse if he would.” 28 The paper’s appearance 
 of neutrality was entirely abandoned in the sum¬ 
 mer of 1830, when it openly came out for Clay. 
 The enthusiasm which his name aroused at fourth 
 of July banquets and his nominations by local 
 meetings in various states were carefully noted. 29 
 According to the New York American the enthu¬ 
 siasm of a meeting of his friends in that city was 
 evidence of the affectionate regard of the people 
 for Clay. “It was not merely the calm, cold 
 assent of the judgment in his favor . . . but 
 the overflowing of strong personal predilections 
 on the part of thousands who had never seen the 
 man.” 30 Clay was in fact popular with great 
 numbers of the people, and the advantages of his 
 
 28 Ibid., August 26, 1829. The campaign for Clay’s nomination 
 had not been initiated by his friends because of “a proper deference 
 to public opinion, which they mean to follow, and not to attempt 
 to lead.” 
 
 “ Ibid., August 6, 21, October 2, 1830. 
 
 20 Ibid., December 17, 1830, quoting New York American, Decem¬ 
 ber 14, 1830. W. L. Stone, editor of the New York Commercial 
 Advertiser wrote to Webster that Clay’s name in itself would add 
 strength to the party. Stone to Webster, New York, December 
 14, 1830. Webster MSS. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 
 
 39 
 
 candidacy in this respect were in such striking 
 contrast with Adams’ leadership that its effective¬ 
 ness in winning votes was exaggerated. The 
 Intelligencer, for example, refused to consider 
 the possibility that the nomination might better 
 be given even to a new man if that would improve 
 the party’s prospects. 
 
 The reluctance of the Intelligencer to endorse 
 the call for a national convention was, therefore, 
 consistent with its previous stand. There was no 
 real object to be served, and it was doubtless 
 feared that a convention would bring out dif¬ 
 ferences within the party. “Convention or no 
 Convention, Henry Clay stands in full view of 
 the people as the National Republican candidate 
 for the presidency.” 31 But by August, 1831, the 
 demand for a convention was so general and the 
 alternative, a nomination by a congressional cau¬ 
 cus, so objectionable, that the Intelligencer took 
 the ground that a convention would be the most 
 effective way of securing harmonious support for 
 the party’s candidates. The nomination of a suit¬ 
 able candidate for the vice-presidency would be 
 its most immediate task. 32 In fact the conven¬ 
 tion, when it named Clay, ratified a nomination 
 that had already been made by a carefully 
 fostered public opinion. 
 
 “ National Intelligencer, December 28, 1830. 
 
 31 Ibid., August 23, 1831. 
 
40 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 The skilful maneuvers of Clay and his friends 
 made his position as the leader of the party so 
 secure that the National Republicans found it 
 impossible to consider seriously the merits of 
 another leader whose chances might have been 
 better in the difficult task of defeating Jackson. 
 In Calhoun’s opinion John McLean of Ohio had 
 no chance of success, but the movement in his 
 behalf at least contained such a possibility and 
 therefore merits notice. He had made friends in 
 both parties by his efficient administration of the 
 postal service under Monroe and Adams. A 
 member of the Supreme Court at this time, hav¬ 
 ing been appointed by Jackson after his refusal 
 to continue as postmaster general, his legal and 
 judicial experience and above all his attitude in re¬ 
 gard to the use of the patronage had removed him 
 from the field of partisan politics and had made 
 him a favorite with the dissatisfied elements of 
 both parties. His potential strength as a leading 
 politician of Ohio, an argument which later had 
 more weight, was urged in his favor. 33 The elec¬ 
 tion of 1828 was scarcely over when suggestions 
 were made to McLean that he might enter the 
 next campaign as a presidential candidate. At 
 the time he was not clear as to his attitude 
 towards Jackson; he hoped in any case that the 
 question of nominations would not be agitated 
 
 33 J. S. Barbour to James Barbour, Catalpa, (Virginia?), July 
 30, 1831. Barbour MSS. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 
 
 41 
 
 prematurely. 34 B. W. Richards, 35 probably the 
 closest of his political advisers, at first discour¬ 
 aged an open break with the administration in 
 order that McLean might be in a position to suc¬ 
 ceed Jackson, in the event of Jackson’s refusal to 
 run for a second term. 36 According to Buchanan, 
 Pennsylvania would prefer him to any other can¬ 
 didate, should Jackson withdraw; therefore it was 
 desirable that McLean should not be maneuvered 
 into a position of hostility to the President. 37 
 Elisha Whittlesey, an important National Repub¬ 
 lican leader in Ohio and a member of the House, 
 wrote that if he had not withdrawn from political 
 life by accepting a place on the Supreme Court 
 the moderates of all parties would have rallied to 
 his name. 38 McLean and his friends remained 
 in touch with the situation in the Democratic 
 party; Richards gave assurances in June, 1830, to 
 some of its leaders that McLean would be kept in 
 the center of public attention ready to take ad¬ 
 vantage of “any contingency preventing the re- 
 
 ** McLean to W. L. Pratt, Washington, December 31, 1828. 
 McLean MSS. 
 
 35 Richards had been appointed by Jackson as a government 
 director of the United States Bank; he later resigned after his 
 election as mayor of Philadelphia. 
 
 30 Richards reported an increasing confidence in Pennsylvania 
 that Jackson would decline a renomination on the grounds of ill 
 health. Richards to McLean, Harrisburg, February 4, 1830. Mc¬ 
 Lean MSS. Should Jackson be out of the race he was confident 
 that McLean would find increasing support among the people. 
 Richards to McLean, Philadelphia, May IS, 1830. Ibid. 
 
 37 James Buchanan to McLean, Lancaster, June 9, 1830. Ibid. 
 
 38 Elisha Whittlesey to McLean, Washington, May 23, 1830. 
 Imd. 
 
42 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 election of Genl. [Jackson].’ 39 In the fall of that 
 year, when it became clear that Jackson would 
 again be a candidate, Richards at first urged 
 McLean to try for the vice-presidency on the 
 Democratic ticket, 40 and similar advice came from 
 Democratic quarters. 41 Later when McLean de¬ 
 cided against this, Richards approved. “The 
 semblance of an intimate connection at this time,” 
 he wrote, “with any of the high contending parties 
 cannot be desirable and must be of doubtful 
 influence with the public.” 42 
 
 McLean was regarded by his friends as well 
 qualified to act as a fusion candidate. An Ohio 
 correspondent of some apparent influence in¬ 
 formed him that all parties there looked to him 
 as a means of healing the divisions of partisan 
 politics. 
 
 I have spoken of the very unpleasant situation of the 
 2 great political parties in Ohio, continually involved in 
 Violence and Contention, with which we are all tired and 
 disgusted, and wished to know whether we could not 
 unite on some man, and come together again, and men- 
 
 38 Richards to McLean, Philadelphia, June 17, 1830. Ibid. 
 McLean had been formally nominated for the presidency in the 
 columns of Poulson’s Daily Advertiser. Richard Rush believed 
 that the friends that McLean numbered among the Anti-Masons 
 were chiefly those who had formerly been Democrats. Rush to 
 Barbour, Washington, August 7, 1830. Barbour MSS. 
 
 40 Richards to McLean, November 1, [1830?]; November 2, 
 1830; January 31, 1831. McLean MSS. 
 
 41 Two Democrats suggested the advisability of a nomination 
 for the vice-presidency; there was a popular movement, they re¬ 
 ported, to name a strong candidate for that office in view of Jack¬ 
 son’s uncertain health. John A. Avery and James Ruside (?) tc 
 McLean, Washington, October 7, 1831. Ibid. 
 
 42 Richards to McLean, Philadelphia, March 2, 1831. Ibid. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 
 
 43 
 
 tioned your name as the most likely to have that effect in 
 Ohio, with which almost all seemed to agree, and many 
 seemed pleased with the idea that there was still hope that 
 we might come together again for you may rest assured 
 we are tired of political contentions and it is very injuri¬ 
 ous to Ohio. I do hope that not only Ohio but the South 
 and some parts of the East may yet unite in this object. 
 
 Many members of the legislature had endorsed 
 these views, and newspapers without reference to 
 their party bias were ready to support McLean. 43 
 A few weeks later a Pennsylvania politician wrote 
 that the nomination of McLean by both parties 
 was still a possibility. 44 
 
 The state election in Kentucky, August, 1831, 
 was admittedly a crisis in Clay’s candidacy, 45 for 
 a defeat in his home state would forecast a similar 
 result in the national elections. Clay’s friends 
 won a majority of eleven in a total of one hun¬ 
 dred and twenty-one members, 46 but the margin 
 was so small that it aroused doubts as to Clay’s 
 success. Andrew Stewart, long a member of the 
 House from Pennsylvania, wrote that Clay must 
 be given up in view of this result; even had he 
 been more successful in Kentucky, he could not 
 win the discontented elements in the Democratic 
 party. All parties, according to Stewart, seemed 
 
 43 Samuel H. Hale to McLean, Columbus, February 6, 1830. 
 Ibid. Had it not been for Calhoun’s unpopularity, he might have 
 been used for this purpose if McLean refused to be a candidate. 
 
 44 J. Ruside (?) to McLean, Columbus, February 26, 1830. Ibid. 
 
 46 National Intelligencer, September 17, 1831, quoting Boston 
 Daily Advertiser, September 13. 
 
 44 Niles’ Register, XLI. 1. 
 
44 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 to agree that McLean was perhaps the only man 
 who could unite all elements of the opposition and 
 thus “arrest the course of administration which 
 not only endangers the Union but threatens tht 
 subversion of everything valuable in the Republic 
 —the judiciary, tariff, internal improvements, the 
 bank and in short everything.” 47 It was sug¬ 
 gested to McLean in September, 1831, that if 
 Clay’s name should be withdrawn, joint meetings 
 of former Clay and Jackson men in his interest 
 might be called in Pennsylvania. 48 McLean and 
 his friends exaggerated the chances he would 
 have in a contest with Jackson, for the bitter 
 temper characteristic of politics in the campaign 
 of 1832 made improbable the success of a candi¬ 
 date of so little color. Nevertheless, had he been 
 nominated by the National Republicans, it is 
 probable that he would have been endorsed by a 
 part, at least, of the Bank and tariff Democrats; 
 and the support of the Anti-Masons, which he 
 had a fair chance of winning, would have com¬ 
 pleted the union of the most important elements 
 of the opposition. In neglecting to weigh the 
 political prospects of other leaders than Clay, and 
 especially in ignoring McLean, the National Re¬ 
 publican Convention refused to follow the only 
 
 47 Andrew Stewart to McLean, Union Tower, Pa., August 13, 
 1831. McLean MSS. 
 
 48 To McLean, Philadelphia, September 14, 1831. Ibid. The 
 signature of this letter has been cut out. Former Jackson men, 
 like Stewart, ought to be chairmen of these meetings according 
 to the writer. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 
 
 45 
 
 policy that had any prospect of success. This was 
 pointed out by one of McLean’s correspondents. 
 
 If the great December convention assemble to select 
 a particular individual, instead of designating him who 
 might most successfully compete with Van Buren’s Presi¬ 
 dent (or Kendall’s), it will long be regretted by the 
 Nation. I hope and pray that the person may be sup¬ 
 ported whom all circumstances considered will offer the 
 best prospect of success, for so certain as General Jackson 
 succeeds another four years so certain Van Buren follows 
 12 long years. 49 
 
 At an early period of the campaign, there was 
 discussion as to a possible combination between 
 McLean and Calhoun with the latter as the 
 presidential candidate. In December, 1829, this 
 arrangement was suggested to McLean by a Vir¬ 
 ginian. 50 A rumor to this effect was reported 
 from Ohio by Thomas L. Hamer, a Democratic 
 member of the House from that state, 51 and 
 Webster, writing to John H. Pleasants, referred 
 to this proposal as a negotiation that was in pro¬ 
 gress. 52 It was asserted by the Washington 
 Globe, the administration paper, that Duff Green 
 of the United States Telegraph was back of the 
 
 «W. Bradley to McLean, Washington, October 6, 1831. Ibid. 
 
 60 J. F. Caldwell to McLean, Lewisburg, Va., December 30, 1829. 
 Ibid. A similar proposal was made to S. L. Gouverneur, Post¬ 
 master of New York, in an anonymous undated letter from Keene, 
 New Hampshire. Gouverneur MSS., New York Public Library. 
 
 S1 Hamer to McLean, Columbus, February 16, 1830. McLean 
 MSS. 
 
 “Webster to Pleasants, Washington, March 6, 1830. Webster, 
 Private Correspondence, I. 492. 
 
46 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 scheme. 53 It never assumed more definite shape 
 than that of similarly nebulous proposals which 
 are not uncommon in the first phases of a cam¬ 
 paign, yet it is of interest as a tentative step in 
 a revived understanding between the South and 
 the West. The scheme found little favor even 
 with the men in whose interests it had been 
 started, in spite of the personal friendship that 
 existed between them. 54 A correspondent told 
 McLean that he had been frequently questioned 
 as to the prospects of a coalition with Calhoun; in 
 each case he had replied that if this arrangement 
 were made McLean would lose all claim to the 
 support of his friends. 55 Whittlesey had no de¬ 
 sire to injure the friendship between McLean and 
 Calhoun, but no political union must be consid¬ 
 ered. “There is not on earth a man who would 
 set in motion more efficient measures to prostrate 
 you, if you crossed his path, than Mr. Calhoun.” 56 
 Calhoun was probably just as reluctant to make 
 an arrangement with McLean. At a later time, 
 
 53 National Intelligencer, April 1830, quoting Washington Globe, 
 April 1, 1831. 
 
 M McLean had preferred Calhoun to Clay in the campaign of 
 1824. McLean to George B. Torrence, February 12, 1823. “Tor¬ 
 rence Papers,” Quarterly Publications of the Historical and Phil¬ 
 osophical Society of Ohio, 1907, II. 7. Among the McLean MSS. 
 in the Library of Congress are a number of friendly letters from 
 Calhoun. 
 
 55 W. Bradley to McLean, Washington, May 7, 1830. McLean 
 MSS. 
 
 “Whittlesey to McLean, Washington, May 27, 1830. Ibid. 
 Whittlesey was obviously interested in preventing an open break 
 between McLean and Clay. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 
 
 47 
 
 when the approaching Anti-Masonic convention 
 was arousing ambitions among opposition leaders, 
 he pointed out the dangers of McLean’s nomina¬ 
 tion. Among other things, the Judge could not 
 make a successful campaign in the South because 
 he was not widely known. Moreover his endorse¬ 
 ment of the distribution of the surplus revenue, a 
 measure that was more odious in the South than 
 the American System as it was a sugar-coated 
 bribe to secure consent for protection, made it 
 impossible for McLean to increase his popularity 
 there. 57 There was at no time a reasonable pros¬ 
 pect of an agreement between Calhoun and Mc¬ 
 Lean, but the existence of a possibility of this 
 kind constituted a danger to Clay’s undisputed 
 leadership and probably contributed to the prema¬ 
 ture agitation for his nomination. 
 
 Discussion of a union with Calhoun, like that 
 of McLean’s presidential ambitions, had no defi¬ 
 nite results, and in the end McLean apparently 
 had little or no influence in the election. The 
 influence of Elisha Whittlesey aided in the pre¬ 
 servation of at least a neutral attitude towards 
 Clay. In view of the existing political crisis, he 
 wrote in June, 1830, that the question of first 
 importance was the success of principles, not of 
 men. He was convinced that McLean and Clay 
 
 " Calhoun to Christopher Van Deventer, Fort Hill, May 25, 
 1831. “Correspondence of John C. Calhoun” (Jameson, J. F„ ed! 
 Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1899), 
 
48 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 were essentially in accord upon national policies, 
 that accordingly it would be a catastrophe if both 
 were to run, “for,” he concluded, “in that event 
 neither of you could be elected.” 58 In order to 
 remove a possible obstacle to a truce between 
 them he assured McLean that Clay had not tried 
 to ruin his political career during Adams’ admin¬ 
 istration. 59 As late as June, 1832, with a view, it 
 seems, to the campaign of 1836, Whittlesey asked 
 McLean not to array himself so decidedly 
 “against Mr. Clay, as to preclude his friends 
 generally hereafter, from uniting in your 
 support.” 60 
 
 The problems of consolidating the opposition 
 and of recruiting new strength were largely con¬ 
 cerned with a possible conciliation of the Anti- 
 Masonic party, composed as it was of deserters 
 from each of the two parties. 61 There was at 
 
 “ Whittlesey to McLean, Canfield, Ohio, June 9, 1830. McLean 
 MSS. 
 
 58 Whittlesey to McLean, Canfield, August 30, 1830. Ibid. I 
 think your information that Mr. Clay and his friends wished to 
 crush you during the late administration has been somewhat 
 exaggerated. I am aware, there was some jealousy respecting 
 your course on the part of Mr. Clay’s friends. I was in the habit 
 of having free conversation with Mr. Clay and I recollect of his 
 having spoken of you in terms of respect, and so far as the 
 conversation turned on your political course, much delicacy was 
 observed by him.” It is quite clear from the evidence in the 
 first chapter of this study that Clay in fact did attempt to discredit 
 McLean with Adams. 
 
 80 Whittlesey to McLean, Washington, June 20. 1832. Ibid. 
 
 61 The Anti-Masonic party had its origin in Western New York 
 a region settled largely by people from New England who were 
 friendly to Adams and the National Republicans. Charles Mc¬ 
 Carthy. “The Anti-Masonic Party” (Annual Report of the Ameri¬ 
 can Historical Association. 1902), I. 383. It was not long how¬ 
 ever in attracting support from the ranks of the Democratic party. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 
 
 49 
 
 least a possibility that the two important divisions 
 of the opposition might agree upon a single 
 candidate for the presidency. Welcome as Anti- 
 Masonic support would be, those National Repub¬ 
 licans who knew the party most intimately were 
 far from enthusiastic over the prospect of making 
 common cause with it. Cooperation with “this 
 demon of Anti-Masonry” was most distasteful to 
 party leaders in New York, where earlier ex¬ 
 periences had resulted unsatisfactorily. 62 Many 
 hated the “Anti-Masonic excitement,” but as in 
 the case of Hezekiah Niles their dislike was not 
 so strong as their will to defeat Jackson. “The 
 great cause is, with me, like Aaron’s rod. It 
 swallows up all other considerations.” 63 As it 
 was improbable that the National Republicans 
 would abandon Clay, the prospects for cooper¬ 
 ation in the national election depended upon the 
 Anti-Masonic convention. Unwilling to commit 
 
 03 W. B. Lawrence to Clay, New York, November 8, 1830. Clay 
 MSS. Library of Congress. Lawrence sketched in broad out¬ 
 lines the problem which existed wherever National Republicans 
 and Anti-Masons were in contact: “We have nailed your colours 
 to the mast. But what are we to do with this demon of Anti- 
 Masonry, which seems destined to blast the fairest prospects of 
 putting down a proscribing and corrupt administration. With a 
 union of all opposed to General Jackson our entire triumph in 
 this state, the electors being chosen by general ticket would be 
 certain; separated from the Anti-Masons we must be in a minority 
 . . . It has been suggested that by aiding the Anti-Masons to 
 win this State from Jackson, even in favor of a third person, 
 the success of our candidate in the House of Representatives 
 would be secured.” But Lawrence believed that another attempt 
 to cooperate with the Anti-Masons would alienate valuable mem¬ 
 bers of their own party. 
 
 ,a Hezekiah Niles to Clay, September 17, 1830. Ibid. 
 
50 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 himself to the principles of that party, by the 
 summer of 1831 Clay had abandoned hope of its 
 nomination. 64 Consideration was first given to 
 Richard Rush and J. Q. Adams, but McLean was 
 clearly the favorite among the delegates when 
 they assembled in Baltimore. His friends had 
 warned McLean that too close an association with 
 the Anti-Masons would injure his chances of 
 drawing support from any portion of the Demo¬ 
 cratic party, 6a and when he finally sent a state¬ 
 ment to Anti-Masonic leaders which satisfied that 
 party 66 he conditioned his acceptance of a possible 
 nomination upon the absence of another opposi¬ 
 tion candidate in the campaign. 67 Nevertheless, 
 when his final refusal was received, so reluctantly 
 was his name abandoned that he was given a 
 plurality of three votes on the first ballot taken in 
 the caucus that preceded the convention. 68 Albert 
 H. Tracy, a leader among the Anti-Masons of 
 New York, wrote in October, 1832, that he had 
 
 61 S. R. Gammon, Presidential Campaign of 1832, p. 43. Cf. 
 Clay to Francis Brooke, Ashland, June 23, 1831. Colton, Private 
 Correspondence , p. 304; Clay to Adam Beatty, Ashland June 25, 
 1831. Ibid., p. 305; Clay to Francis Brooke, Ashland, October 
 4, 1831. Ibid., pp. 316, 317. 
 
 “Richards to McLean, Harrisburg, February 4, 1830. McLean 
 MSS. Buchanan to McLean, June 9, 1830. Ibid, 
 
 “McLean to Francis Wyatt, Secretary of the Anti-Masonic 
 Society of Cincinnati, May 24. 1831. Ibid. Without specifically 
 endorsing Anti-Masonic principles, he made clear his disapproval 
 of “all associations designed to influence the public will’ which did 
 not have the interests of the public exclusively in mind. 
 
 S. R. Gammon, Presidential Campaign of 1832, p. 45. 
 
 68 National Intelligencer, October 19, 1831, quoting the Rhode 
 Island Republican. The editor of the Republican had acted as 
 the secretary of the caucus. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 
 
 51 
 
 always been convinced that Clay would have been 
 “driven from the field” if McLean had accepted 
 nomination of his party. 69 As a result of Clay’s 
 hostility 70 and of McLean’s withdrawal 71 the con¬ 
 vention turned as a last resort to William Wirt. 
 Convinced that an independent Anti-Masonic 
 campaign would have little weight in the elec¬ 
 tions, Wirt was ready in the interests of harmony 
 to resign in favor of McLean or any other can¬ 
 didate other than Clay whom the National Repub¬ 
 licans might nominate. 72 It was the latter party s 
 attachment to its chosen leader, and the natural 
 suspicions of a conservative for a radical party, 
 that prevented a pooling of their strength in the 
 common cause. In April, 1832, W3rt was certain 
 that the leading politicians of the opposition, both 
 of the National Republican and Anti-Masonic 
 
 m Tracy perhaps had in mind the campaign of 1836 when he 
 assured McLean that no animosity was felt by Anti-Masons 
 because of his refusal of their nomination. Mr. Clay will cer¬ 
 tainly be used up in the present contest so that I trust his most 
 hallucinated partisans will not dream of his ever again competing 
 for the presidency.” Tracy to McLean, New York, October 19, 
 1832. McLean MSS. 
 
 ,0 It was not until the Anti-Masonic nomination had been made 
 that Clay for the first time unequivocally repudiated principles 
 of that party. To a committee of Indiana Anti-Masons, Ashland, 
 October 8, 1831. Niles’ Register. XLI. 260, 261. Adams told 
 Joseph E. Sprague that Clay’s friends had “kicked and buffeted 
 the Anti-Masonic party till it was impossible they should support 
 Mr. Clay.” Adams, Memoirs, VIII. 400. 
 
 ” Niles’ Register, XLI, 259, 260. 
 
 13 Wirt decided not to withdraw at so early a stage in the cam¬ 
 paign, believing that those Anti-Masons who had formerly been 
 Democrats would return to their first allegiance rather than to sup¬ 
 port Clay. Wirt to Carr, Baltimore, January 12, 1830. J. P. 
 Kennedy, Memoirs of the Life of William Wirt (Philadelphia, 
 1860), II. 317. 
 
52 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 parties, had lost all hope of success, 73 but in the 
 event of the election going- into the House he was 
 ready to use his influence even in favor of Clay. 74 
 
 More successful efforts for an understanding 
 between the two parties were made within the 
 states, where the influence of Clay’s dislike of 
 Anti-Masonry was not so immediately felt. In 
 New York united support was given to a single 
 list of electors, 75 while in Pennsylvania the 
 National Republicans abandoned their electoral 
 ticket for that of the Anti-Masons in fear that 
 otherwise the state would return a majority for 
 Jackson. 76 The example set by Pennsylvania was 
 followed in Ohio. The National Republican can¬ 
 didate for governor withdrew his name, and the 
 party threw its strength to the Anti-Masonic 
 candidate and to the electoral ticket of the party. 77 
 In these states the Democratic party was in 
 power; to make headway against it cooperation 
 was necessary, an argument which was more 
 effective in state than in national politics. Agree¬ 
 ment proved impossible where National Republi¬ 
 cans were in control of the state administrations; 
 such was the situation in Vermont, Massachu- 
 
 73 S. R. Gammon, Presidential Campaign of 1832, p. 142. 
 
 71 Wirt to Carr, Baltimore, October 25, 1832. Kennedy, William 
 Wirt, II. 329. 
 
 75 McCarthy, Anti-Masonic Party, pp. 415, 416. It was under¬ 
 stood that if this ticket won a majority its votes would be given 
 either to Clay or to Wirt as circumstances might require in order 
 to defeat Jackson. 
 
 78 Ibid., p. 446. 
 
 77 Ibid., pp. 528-530. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 
 
 53 
 
 setts, Rhode Island, and New Jersey. 78 Clay 
 attributed the hostile feeling of Anti-Masons in 
 these states to a belief that the party in power, 
 whether National Republican or Democratic, 
 would have to be changed in order to eliminate 
 Masonic influences. 79 
 
 If a basis of common action could be found the 
 forcing of Calhoun out of the Democratic party 
 by Van Buren offered the possibility of making 
 new allies for the National Republicans. 80 Web¬ 
 ster, however, was convinced that no help could 
 be expected from the South except in Louisiana, 
 where the desire of the sugar planters for protec¬ 
 tion gave rise to interests similar to those of the 
 manufacturing states. 81 Nor was Clay more 
 optimistic as to the 'possibilities in that section. 
 Calhoun seemed to him to have so little influence 
 outside of South Carolina as to make it unprofit¬ 
 able to seek his aid. 82 From Calhoun’s point of 
 view the prospect of cooperation with Clay and 
 his party was most distasteful, 83 as an alliance 
 with men whose political ideas he thoroughly 
 disapproved. Nevertheless, a moderation appeared 
 
 78 Ibid., pp. 510, 518, 551, 555. 
 
 78 Clay to John Bailhacke, Ashland, November 24, 1830. Colton, 
 Private Correspondence, p. 289. 
 
 80 Gammon, Presidential Campaign of 1832, pp. 76-95. 
 
 81 Webster to Clay, Washington, May 29, 1830. Colton, Private 
 Correspondence, p. 289. 
 
 “Clay to Francis Brooke, Washington, April 1, 1832. Ibid., 
 332-333. 
 
 “Calhoun to James H. Hammond, Fort Hill, May 16, 1831 
 Calhoun, Correspondence, p. 291. 
 
54 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 in the opinion of both which suggests a desire 
 of each to gain the ear of the other. Clay was 
 willing to restrict the funds for internal improve¬ 
 ments in part to an occasional and problematical 
 surplus but chiefly to the proceeds from the sale 
 of public lands. 84 On this important question, 
 Calhoun conceded the use of the public lands, 
 provided that his constitutional scruples be satis¬ 
 fied by an amendment expressly authorizing in¬ 
 ternal improvements by national aid. 85 In regard 
 to the vital question of the tariff, Clay believed 
 that it should be reduced to the needs of an eco¬ 
 nomical administration, with the reservation that 
 the principle of protection should not be aban¬ 
 doned. 86 In the spring of 1832 an attempt was 
 made to arrange a basis of cooperation between 
 the friends of Clay and Calhoun in the southern 
 states. Clay was informed that Duff Green, after 
 a conference with Calhoun, had proposed that 
 their friends should unite in support of Calhoun 
 in Virginia. It was thought that if Calhoun 
 should carry three or four states the election 
 would be forced into the House where his in¬ 
 fluence could be used in favor of Clay. More¬ 
 over, the prospect of a measure of success in 
 
 M Clay to Francis Brooke, Ashland, October 4, 1831. Colton, 
 Private Correspondence, p. 315. 
 
 86 Calhoun to Christopher Van Deventer, Fort Hill, August 5, 
 1831. Calhoun, Correspondence, p. 29 7. 
 
 88 Clay to Francis Brooke, Ashland, October 4, 1831. Colton, 
 Private Correspondence, pp. 314, 315. Clay was of the same 
 opinion in the spring of 1832. Clay to James Barbour, Washing¬ 
 ton, March 10, 1832. Barbour MSS. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 
 
 55 
 
 the South would, it seemed to Clay, encourage 
 his friends elsewhere. Skeptical of Calhoun’s 
 strength outside South Carolina and doubtful of 
 the willingness of his friends in Virginia to join 
 Calhoun, he chose to allow events to take their 
 course rather than to make a definite arrange¬ 
 ment. 87 The appearance of the Bank question as 
 the dominant issue in the summer of 1832, an 
 issue in regard to which Calhoun did not take 
 his usually anti-nationalist point of view, 88 pro¬ 
 vided an additional basis of cooperation. *doali-) 
 tion was distinctly the expedient policy, but it/ 
 was defeated by differences between the political 
 ideas of the two men and by Calhoun’s growing 
 belief that a standard should be raised about 
 which the South might rally in defense of its 
 interests. 89 Calhoun would have brought Clay 
 little strength, for his candidate, Floyd, carried 
 South Carolina alone, while the rest of the sec¬ 
 tion, with the exception of Maryland and Ken¬ 
 tucky of the border states, went unanimously for 
 Jackson. 
 
 The quest of the National Republicans for an 
 effective campaign issue proved to be no more 
 fruitful in its results than the attempt to create 
 
 81 Clay to Francis Brooke, Washington, April 1, 1832. Colton, 
 Private Correspondence, pp. 332, 333. 
 
 ** Calhoun to Van Deventer, Washington, March 21, 1830. Cal¬ 
 houn, Correspondence, p. 271. 
 
 ““A. C. Cole, Whig Party in the South, p. 33. 
 
56 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 an efficient national organization and to unite the 
 various elements of the opposition. Protection , 
 nhvi nnslv would not serve the purpose, in view 
 of the desirability of gaining greater strength in 
 the South. A clear-cut division did not exist 
 upon this issue, since Jackson had not completely 
 identified himself with those who were opposed 
 to protection. The President had signed a num¬ 
 ber of bills appropriating money for internal im¬ 
 provements : 90 accordingly Adams’ favorite issue 
 was not available. The immediate effect of the 
 Maysville Road veto indicated a popular reaction 
 which might be useful, but the ultimate result 
 strengthened Jackson’s position. These consid¬ 
 erations having made the important questions 
 unavailable, Clay attempted to create an issue of 
 his own. It seemed to him that it would be 
 expedient to initiate a movement for a constitu¬ 
 tional amendment to enable Congress to pass a 
 bill over the president’s veto by a simple majority 
 in both houses; the administration by this ma¬ 
 neuver would be placed upon “the aristocratic 
 bench” in defending the more stringent require¬ 
 ment in the constitution. 91 There was merit in 
 
 90 Henry G. Wheeler, History of Congress, Biographical and 
 Political; comprising a History of Internal Improvements (N. Y. 
 1848), II. 124-140. The annual appropriations for this purpose 
 during the Jackson and Van Buren administrations were consist¬ 
 ently large. 
 
 91 Clay to Webster, Ashland. June 7, 1830. Webster. Private 
 Correspondence, I. 504. Cf. Clay to Adam Beattie, Ashland. 
 June 8, 1830. Colton, Private Correspondence, p. 277; Clay to J. 
 S. Johnston, Lexington, June 14. 1830. Ibid., p. 278. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 
 
 57 
 
 this scheme as an incident in the give-and-take 
 of party struggles, but it contained a minimum of 
 promise as a campaign issue against Jackson, the 
 unquestioned leader of the new democracy. 
 
 As a result of the failure to develop a popular 
 issue that would unite the various divisions of the 
 opposition, no formal platform was adopted when 
 the National Republican convention met at Balti¬ 
 more in December, 1831. The address, which 
 was its substitute, presented the position of the 
 party fairly enough by attacking Jackson and all 
 his works; lacking principles in common, except 
 in a conservative point of view which it was inex¬ 
 pedient to emphasize, no choice remained but a 
 deliberately negative position. The real issue, the 
 address stated, was Jackson’s administration of 
 the government. 92 Friends of protection had 
 urged the importance of a definite statement of 
 the party’s principles. This was Niles’ desire in 
 1830: 
 
 If a nomination is made without a statement of these 
 broad principles on which all nominations should be sup¬ 
 ported, we run the risk of offending friends at home, 
 whose character and talent deserve our courtesy and com¬ 
 mand our respect. ... I am in favor of meeting the 
 whole question fairly—of grasping the entire subject at 
 once, doing what I think is right, and leaving the result 
 to take care of itself, on its own just principles. 93 
 
 Fear of alienating possible allies made undesirable 
 a frank statement of the issues, implicit as they 
 
 8J Niles’ Register, XLI. 307-312. 
 
 "Niles to Clay, October 28, 1830. Clay MSS. 
 
58 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 were in Clay’s American System. More definite 
 in its position was the convention of National 
 Republican Young Men which met in Washing¬ 
 ton in May, 1832, for propagandist purposes. A 
 statement was issued which endorsed an “ade¬ 
 quate” tariff, internal improvements, the su¬ 
 premacy of the Supreme Court as the final au¬ 
 thority for the settlement for the constitutional 
 questions, and the power of the Senate as essen¬ 
 tial to the preservation of the separation of 
 powers. 94 It is improbable that this platform 
 was prepared without the consent of the party 
 leaders, and it is therefore possible that they 
 intended by this indirect means to satisfy the 
 demands of men like Niles who wished a clear 
 formulation of their principles. No mention 
 was made, it is to be noted, of the Bank issue, 95 
 which was to become the deciding factor in the 
 campaign. 
 
 Professor Catterall demonstrated a generation 
 ago that the responsibility for fastening the dead 
 weight of the Bank issue upon the opposition 
 belongs to Nicholas Biddle rather than to Clay 
 or any other National Republican leader. 96 Due 
 
 w Niles’ Register, XLII. 236, 237. 
 
 M This omission was probably intentional. Until the President 
 took a definite stand upon the question there remained a possibility 
 that a rechartering act might after all become a law. To bring 
 the issue into the campaign at this time might therefore be 
 premature. 
 
 98 R. C. H. Catterall, The Second Bank of the United States 
 (Chicago, 1903), pp. 215, 216. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 
 
 59 
 
 to the hostility of Jackson, it was certain to be¬ 
 come a political issue after the expiration of its 
 charter in 1836, but it became involved in the 
 preceding campaign when Biddle decided as a 
 result of his own opinion and the advice given 
 him by George McDuffie, 97 a member of the House 
 from South Carolina, to present his memorial 
 for a renewal of the charter early in January, 
 1832. Friends of the Bank believed that Jack- 
 son would sign the proposed bill in preference 
 to making this an issue and that in the event of 
 a veto an outraged public opinion would defeat 
 him. 98 Until 1831 Clay had opposed an appli¬ 
 cation for the renewal of the Bank’s charter prior 
 to the election. Speaking at Cincinnati in August, 
 1830, he favored the indefinite postponement of 
 the question. 
 
 Whether the charter ought to be renewed or not, near 
 six years hence, in my judgment, is a question of expedi¬ 
 ency to be decided by the then existing state of the coun¬ 
 try. It will be necessary at that time to look carefully at 
 the condition both of the bank and of the union. To 
 ascertain, if the public debt shall, in the meantime, be paid 
 off, what effect will that produce ? What will be our then 
 financial condition ? what that of our local banks, the state 
 of our commerce, foreign and domestic. . . . ? I am, 
 
 therefore, not now prepared to say whether the charter 
 ought or ought not to be renewed on the expiration of 
 
 07 McDuffie, a friend of Calhoun, was at this time Chairman of 
 the Committee on Ways and Means in the House of Repre¬ 
 sentatives. 
 
 * 8 Richards to McLean, Washington, July 19, 1832. McLean 
 MSS. 
 
60 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 its present term. The question is premature. ... It 
 belongs to posterity ... it ought to be indefinitely 
 postponed." 
 
 Only a clear majority in both houses and the cer¬ 
 tain approval of the President, he wrote to Biddle 
 in September, would justify an application. If 
 a bill to recharter the Bank were vetoed the Bank 
 would probably become the “controlling question 
 in American politics” and Jackson’s election on 
 that issue would “amount to something like a 
 popular ratification of the previous rejection of 
 the renewal of the charter of the Bank.” 100 By 
 the fall of 1831 Clay had decided that the Bank 
 ought to make an application before the elec¬ 
 tion, 101 a change of opinion which may have been 
 caused in part by the discouraging result of the 
 August election in Kentucky and by a hope that 
 the Bank issue might strengthen him. He was 
 not, however, in Biddle’s confidence at this time; 
 only three weeks before the application was made, 
 he wrote to the president of the Bank: “Have 
 you come to any decision about an application to 
 
 n Niles’ Register, XXXIX. 25, 26. 
 
 100 Clay to Biddle, Ashland, September 11, 1830. The Corre¬ 
 spondence of Nicholas Biddle, dealing with National Affairs, 1807- 
 1844 (R. C. McGrane, ed., Boston, 1919) pp. 110-114. Clay 
 advised that the application be made to Congress in its first 
 session after the election. In his reply Biddle agreed that it would 
 be better to do nothing in the short session of 1830-1831. Biddle 
 to Clay, Philadelphia, November 3, 1830. Colton, Private Corre¬ 
 spondence, p. 287. 
 
 101 Clay to Brooke. Ashland, October 4, 1831. Colton, Private 
 Correspondence, p. 316. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 
 
 61 
 
 Congress at this Session for the renewal of your 
 charter?” 102 
 
 Although it is generally agreed that Clay was 
 not responsible for Biddle’s decision, it needs to 
 be demonstrated that Clay was perhaps chiefly 
 interested in the Bank issue as it affected the 
 political situation, more particularly in its bearing 
 upon his own ambitions, and that Biddle may 
 have suspected the motives of Clay’s interest in 
 his institution. There is more than a suggestion 
 of a personal interest in Clay’s earlier advice 
 against an application before the election. At 
 Cincinnati he refused to commit himself to a 
 renewal of the charter even in 1836. The cashier 
 of the branch bank at Savannah forwarded a 
 letter to Biddle that contained an inference as to 
 Clay’s motives that had probably occurred to 
 many. “The inference is obvious. He doubts 
 the result of the application for a new charter, 
 and is unwilling to hazard his popularity by 
 becoming its advocate.” 103 When Clay decided 
 
 103 Clay to Biddle, Washington, December IS, 1831. McGrane, 
 Biddle Correspondence, p. 142. Cf. Smith to Biddle, Washington, 
 December 17, 1831. Ibid., p. 143. 
 
 103 M. W. B. to Hunter, October 30, 1830. Biddle MSS. Library 
 of Congress. Hunter copied this letter, and with an enclosure of 
 his own, sent it to Biddle. He explained that the writer was a 
 prominent lawyer in Georgia, employed by the Bank in view of 
 an impending conflict with the state banks, and that he wished to 
 arrange satisfactory terms for a renewal of his employment. An 
 extract from the letter to Hunter without an explanation of its 
 presence in the Biddle MSS. is printed in McGrane, Biddle 
 Correspondence, p. 114. Hunter’s own letter is not printed, and 
 Professor McGrane is mistaken in identifying Hunter as cashier 
 of the Nashville branch at this time. 
 
62 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 to reverse his attitude, his change was perhaps 
 due to an increased confidence in the effectiveness 
 of the Bank as a political issue. In December, 
 1831, friends of the Bank noted that the opposi¬ 
 tion was chiefly concerned with the political 
 aspects of the question. Biddle’s agent in Wash¬ 
 ington, Thomas Cadwallader, reported that Web¬ 
 ster favored an application directly a favorable 
 majority was certain in the House; he believed 
 that in this event neither the Senate nor the 
 President would reject it. Webster’s opinions, 
 like those of most of Clay’s friends, were, he 
 thought, guided by party considerations. 104 The 
 Bank issue would in fact be a means of cooperat¬ 
 ing with Calhoun and his friends. 105 
 
 It was McDuffie who convinced Biddle that 
 application should be made before the election. 106 
 He was the Bank’s chief reliance in the House; 
 Biddle was informed that he “is our main stay.” 107 
 
 1<M Cadwallader to Biddle, Washington, December 25, 1831. 
 McGrane, Biddle Correspondence, pp. 155, 156. Webster and Clay 
 were said to have regarded any possibility of a reconciliation 
 between the administration and the bank as evidence of hostility 
 against themselves. Catterall, Second Bank, pp. 216, 217. 
 
 105 Roswell L. Colt to Biddle, Baltimore, January 29, 1831. 
 McGrane, Biddle Correspondence, p. 122. 
 
 108 Catterall, Second Bank, p. 220. 
 
 Cadwallader to Biddle, Washington. December 25, 1831. 
 McGrane, Biddle Correspondence, p. 158. Cf. Ibid., p. 105, note. 
 Professor McGrane suggests that the attack upon the bank was 
 planned by Van Buren, then secretary of state, in a conference 
 with Virginia politicians at Richmond as a means of covering the 
 pro-slavery agitation in the Virginia constitutional convention then 
 in session. A letter from Clay to Biddle is quoted in evidence. 
 “ ‘Unless I am deceived by information from one of the most 
 intelligent citizens of Virginia, the plan was laid at Richmond 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 
 
 63 
 
 Cadwallader was in constant communication with 
 McDuffie in the critical days of December, 1831, 
 when the final decision was made, 108 and when he 
 was uncertain as to who should sponsor the pro¬ 
 posed bill in the Senate he turned to McDuffie for 
 advice. 109 When Biddle wrote to him in Febru¬ 
 ary, 1832, he mentioned the qualities of “tact, the 
 gentleness and firmness” with which Calhoun had 
 carried the existing charter through the House 
 in 1816: “we rely that the union of the same 
 qualities will enable you to be equally successful 
 
 during a visit made to that place by the Secy, of State last autumn, 
 to make the destruction of the Bank the basis of the next Presi¬ 
 dential election. . . Clay to Biddle, Ashland, June 14, 1830. 
 McGrane, Biddle Correspondence, p. 105. Van Buren in fact did 
 go to Richmond during the sessions of the convention. National 
 Intelligencer, November 10, 1829. It is improbable, however, that 
 this debate, though it was important in other connections, could 
 have determined the course of national politics at this time. While 
 McDuffie, as a friend of Calhoun, was a representative of the 
 extreme southern point of view, his part in bringing the Bank 
 issue into politics was probably the result of a desire to find a 
 basis of cooperation with the National Republicans and a convic¬ 
 tion that the Bank should be retained. More shares of the Bank’s 
 stock were owned in South Carolina, it is to be noted, than in any 
 other state than Pennsylvania. Catterall, Second Bank, App. IX. 
 p. 508. At least one leader of the opposition in the South was 
 not in favor of making the Bank the campaign issue. Willie P. 
 Mangum of North Carolina feared that the question would “ulti¬ 
 mately take an appearance of a trial of strength between General 
 Jackson and the Bank. In that case the Bank will go down. For 
 General Jackson’s popularity is of a sort not to be shaken at 
 present.” Mangum to William Gaston, Washington, January 19, 
 1832. Mangum MSS. Library of Congress. 
 
 108 Thomas Cadwallader to Biddle, Washington, December 22, 
 1831. McGrane, Biddle Correspondence, pp. 151, 152. McDuffie’s 
 advice was that the application should be made without reference 
 to the President’s action if a majority could be depended upon 
 in both houses. 
 
 109 Cadwallader to Biddle, Washington, December 26 1831 Ibid 
 158, 159. 
 
64 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 now.” 110 The leadership of a Calhoun man on 
 behalf of an issue that had the approval of Clay 
 and Webster suggested to contemporaries that 
 Calhoun and his friends had driven a sharp bar¬ 
 gain with the tariff leaders. Elisha Whittlesey 
 thought that the price of McDuffie’s services 
 would be a tariff bill that would satisfy Cal¬ 
 houn. 111 There is no evidence that a formal 
 understanding was reached between Clay and 
 Calhoun to this effect; nevertheless, after the 
 nullification movement had reached its crisis, the 
 compromise tariff bill indicated the extent of 
 Clay’s concessions. 
 
 The Bank became a political issue when its 
 memorial was presented in Congress January 6, 
 1832, and the effect of Jackson’s veto was to 
 make it the dominant issue of the campaign. Its 
 resources were then marshalled in support of 
 Clay, 112 although Biddle continued the pretense 
 that the Bank’s activities in arousing public 
 
 uo Biddle to McDuffie, Philadelphia, February 10, 1832. Ibid., 
 178, 179. 
 
 U1 Whittlesey to McLean, Washington, June 20, 1832. McLean 
 MSS. 
 
 112 The part played by the bank in the campaign is described by 
 Jabez D. Hammond in his authoritative history of New York. 
 “The Bank, with its array of officers and debtors, constituting a 
 considerable portion of the entire population in every state of 
 the union, uniting its exertions with the National Republicans 
 and old opponents of General Jackson, while the friends of 
 Jackson and Van Buren, and, I may say, the old democratic 
 party, encouraged and cheered on by the state banks and their 
 dependents, produced a war of no ordinary character for warmth 
 and zeal.” Jabez D. Hammond, The Political History of New 
 York (Buffalo, 1850), II. 419. Cf. Biddle to Clay, Philadelpiha, 
 August 1, 1832. McGrane, Biddle Correspondence, pp. 196, 197. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 
 
 65 
 
 opinion had no direct connection with Clay’s can¬ 
 didacy. Biddle was given complete liberty by 
 his directors to spend money in order to influence 
 opinion, 113 and from Biddle’s expense account it 
 is clear that more than forty-two thousand dollars 
 were spent for this purpose. 114 The Intelligencer 
 diligently reported evidence that might suggest 
 an aroused public opinion on account of the 
 veto, 115 and it endeavored, particularly by its 
 clippings, to convince its readers that the veto 
 had resulted in disastrous economic disturbances. 
 In Cincinnati, it was said, not a bid had been 
 offered at an auction sale of choice real estate, 
 and prices offered for lots were one half what 
 they had been six months before. “What prices, 
 we will ask, may be expected next spring, if Jack- 
 son is reelected? That is the question; and let 
 those who have property look to it.” 116 Further 
 alarming information as to the trend of economic 
 conditions appeared in a letter, which had been 
 going the rounds of the press, reporting that one 
 of finest houses in Marietta had been sold for 
 one-tenth of its original cost. According to the 
 Cincinnati Advertiser other forms of business 
 had also suffered. In the preceding year citizens 
 of that city had paid three hundred thousand 
 dollars to country traders and farmers for hogs, 
 
 ” 3 Gammon, Campaign of 1832, p. 121. 
 
 114 Ibid., p. 151. 
 
 115 National Intelligencer, July 19, 20, August 9, 22, 1832. 
 
 1111 Ibid., October 4, 1832. 
 
66 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 whereas the most diligent inquiry had not shown 
 that “one dollar has been advanced this season” 
 for a similar purpose. 117 It was pointed out for 
 the particular benefit of the workingmen that the 
 Bank was useful to them in that it helped industry 
 by providing a stable currency. Economic argu¬ 
 ments, however, made little headway against the 
 popular belief, fostered by Democratic politicians, 
 that the Bank was a corrupt monopoly, dominated 
 by a few wealthy men and by foreign influences. 
 
 As the campaign progressed discontent de¬ 
 veloped among the National Republican leaders 
 and their friends in regard to the management 
 of the party. Biddle endorsed Clay after the 
 Bank issue had been taken up by his party, but 
 earlier he had worked for the nomination of 
 McLean at the Anti-Masonic convention. He ad¬ 
 vised McLean indirectly not to refuse an offer, 
 because he was convinced that the National Re¬ 
 publicans would unite in supporting him. 118 So 
 interested was Biddle that he went to Baltimore, 
 writing to Richards from there that he should 
 immediately be told what action McLean would 
 take. 119 Dissatisfaction with Clay’s leadership 
 appeared even among National Republican politi- 
 
 117 Ibid., October 8, 1832. 
 
 Richards was not convinced that Biddle’s suggestions were 
 wise. “I have much reliance on his good feelings, but am not 
 able to determine how far he may feel an active interest in the 
 matter, or how far his political sagacity may be relied upon” 
 Richards to McLean, Philadelphia, September 8, 1831. McLean 
 MSS. 
 
 119 Biddle to Richards, Baltimore, September 25, 1831. Ibid. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 
 
 67 
 
 cians. Adams did not make an effective use in 
 his favor of what influence he still had. 120 In 
 December, 1831, Oran Follett wrote to John G. 
 Camp, whom he later described as a confidential 
 friend of Clay, proposing that Clay be withdrawn 
 for the purpose of using his name under more 
 favorable auspices in 1836. The opportunity for 
 Clay’s success in the campaign then in progress 
 had been lost “in coaxing Anti-Masonry in New 
 York, and in other moonshine expedients to unite 
 the elements of the opposition.” It was Follett’s 
 opinion that Clay should refuse the National Re¬ 
 publican nomination; all were aware that Clay s 
 election as parties then stood was as “hopeless as 
 salvation without repentance.” 121 Before the con¬ 
 vention met, Timothy Pickering asked Clay to 
 withdraw so that the opposition could unite in 
 support of Wirt. 122 As a last effort to accomplish 
 the same purpose Edward and A. H. Everett 
 wrote to Clay—and the letter was sent to a num¬ 
 ber of his friends—demanding a sacrifice in the 
 
 ““J. S. Barbour to James Barbour, Washington, March 25, 
 1832. Barbour MSS. 
 
 121 Follett believed that if Clay would wait until 1836 he would 
 stand without a rival as the leader of the combination made up 
 of all parties committed to the support of a modified tariff, an 
 issue that might restore his popularity, to a rechartering act, 
 and to internal improvements. Follett to Major G. Camp. 
 Buffalo, December 13, 1831. Follett Papers, I. 50, 51. After the 
 election Follett explained to Clay that the suggestion for his 
 withdrawal had been suppressed by Clay s friends. Follett to 
 ciay, January 10, 1833. Ibid., I. p. 75. 
 
 1M Pickering to Clay, Boston, October 22, 1831. Colton, Private 
 Correspondence, p. 319. 
 
68 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 interest of unity. 123 But the party was under too 
 many obligations to Clay, and he had entrenched 
 his position as its leader too firmly for a change, 
 though many, late in the campaign, recognized 
 its desirability. 
 
 The cordiality with which Webster had ac¬ 
 cepted Clay as the party leader gradually cooled 
 as the campaign progressed. His loyalty was 
 beyond question in 1830. He assured Clay in 
 May that he would necessarily be the leader of 
 the party in support of protection and internal 
 improvements. 124 The people could not be re¬ 
 strained, he wrote in the summer of that year, 
 from making him a candidate against Jackson. 125 
 Influenced perhaps by an increasing conviction 
 that Clay would not be successful and perhaps by 
 doubt as to Clay’s loyalty to the protective tariff, 
 a change was perceptible in Webster’s attitude 
 by the fall of 1831. It was also clear that Anti- 
 Masons could not be persuaded to endorse Clay. 126 
 The election of the state legislature in Kentucky, 
 
 123 Edward Everett, A. H. Everett to Clay, Charlestown, Mass., 
 October 29, 1832. Clay MSS. Edward Everett had been cool 
 towards Clay’s candidacy at the beginning of the campaign. 
 Adams, Memoirs, VIII. 86. Abbott Lawrence, a wealthy merchant 
 of Boston, believed that Adams agreed with the Everetts but that 
 their letter did not reflect the opinion of a majority of the voters 
 in Massachusetts. Lawrence to Clay. Boston, October 30, 1832. 
 Clay MSS. 
 
 Webster to Clay. Washington, May 29, 1830. Colton, Private 
 Correspondence, p. 276. 
 
 125 Webster to Clay. Washington, June 4, 1930. Webster, Writ¬ 
 ings (National Edition), XVI. 205. 
 
 129 Ambrose Spencer to Webster, Albany, October 24, 1831. Van 
 Tyne, Webster Letters, p. 24. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 
 
 69 
 
 August, 1831, was regarded as a critical point in 
 the campaign, and its indecisive result gave a 
 convincing proof that Clay’s strength was not as 
 sound as it had been supposed. Before this elec¬ 
 tion Stephen White, a personal friend of Web¬ 
 ster, told the National Republican state central 
 committee of Massachusetts that friends of Web¬ 
 ster would continue their support of Clay except 
 in the event of his death or defeat in Kentucky, 
 “both equally fatal to his success.” Should either 
 of these contingencies occur Webster’s own can¬ 
 didacy, he believed, should be considered. 127 The 
 growth of the nullification movement in South 
 Carolina suggested that issues were at stake in¬ 
 volving constitutional theories of more funda¬ 
 mental importance than those which Clay repre¬ 
 sented. This same fact probably contributed to 
 the decline of Webster’s interest in Clay and sug¬ 
 gested to him the conception of a new party 
 organized openly in defense of nationalist princi¬ 
 ples with himself as its leader which developed 
 more fully in 1833. According to White, the 
 leaders of all parties whom he had met in his 
 travels were well disposed, and there was a 
 strong disposition to “create a constitutional party 
 and to place you at the head of it.” 128 Webster 
 feared, he wrote to Clay in October, 1831, an 
 attack upon the constitution in the approaching 
 
 ^ White to Webster, New York, August 7, 1831. Van Tyne, 
 Webster Letters, pp. 161, 162. 
 
 128 Ibid. 
 
70 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 session of Congress. “Not only the Tariff, but 
 the Constitution itself, in its elementary and 
 fundamental provisions will be assailed with 
 talent, vigor and union. Everything is to be 
 debated as if nothing had been settled.” He 
 therefore urged Clay to reenter the Senate where 
 his leadership was needed, and it is significant 
 that in this letter, written not long before the 
 convention, no mention is made of Clay’s presi¬ 
 dential aspirations. 129 All thought of a new party, 
 if indeed it had been seriously considered, was 
 of course abandoned for the duration of the 
 campaign. 
 
 The Bank issue instead of improving Clay’s 
 position was the most important factor in the re- 
 election of Jackson, a result that was made doubly 
 certain by dissensions within the opposition. 
 Adams had been defeated and eliminated as a 
 presidential candidate, partly in consequence of 
 his lack of talents as a politician; Clay suffered 
 the same fate because in his long and active 
 political career he had made too many enemies 
 and had in part lost the confidence of the people. 
 His defeat eliminated the last of the available 
 candidates who were closely identified with the 
 traditions of the party. Webster remained, but 
 at no time in this period were his chances good 
 even for a nomination by a united party. The 
 way was therefore clear for a new departure. 
 
 129 Webster to Clay, Boston, October 5, 1831. Colton, Private 
 Correspondence, p. 318. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 T HE nullification crisis in the winter of 
 1832-1833, by justifying Webster’s fear of 
 an impending attack upon the constitution as it 
 was then interpreted, threw party lines into con¬ 
 fusion. Attention was called to the fundamental 
 problem of the proper relations between the state 
 and federal governments, a question to which all 
 parties, in trying to avoid vital issues, had paid 
 perfunctory respect, or which they had entirely 
 ignored. While the greater number of the friends 
 of nullification were or had been Democrats, not a 
 few National Republicans like Clay found it ex¬ 
 pedient to be somewhat tolerant, and, on the other 
 hand, a considerable fraction of the Democratic 
 party endorsed Jackson’s vigorous policy. Out of 
 this confusion in 1833 appeared the possibility of 
 a new alignment of parties upon the issue of main¬ 
 taining the authority of the federal government. 
 The issues of the previous campaign were tempo¬ 
 rarily set aside. The attempt to secure a longer 
 lease of life for the Bank had been decisively de¬ 
 feated, internal improvement made no immediate 
 appeal, and friends of protection found much to 
 
72 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 approve in the Nullification Proclamation and in 
 Jackson’s message of January 16. Moreover, the 
 opposition was at odds within itself with reference 
 to the President’s policy as expressed in these 
 documents. Some were disposed, because of state 
 rights predilections or for political reasons, to 
 await events, but friends of federal supremacy, 
 regardless of party ties, endorsed Jackson’s policy 
 with enthusiasm, the more heartily in some cases 
 because of the consideration that the tariff laws 
 were those which were to be enforced. 
 
 A realignment of parties upon the “union” 
 issue would have involved at least a temporary 
 agreement between Webster and Jackson. 1 Diffi¬ 
 cult as it would have been to harmonize their ideas 
 in regard to specific political problems, powerful 
 influences were at work in 1833 to bring them 
 together. The way was prepared by Webster’s 
 endorsement of the proclamation. A copy of that 
 document reached Boston as he was about to leave 
 for the opening of Congress. So important did 
 he consider the occasion that he delayed his de- 
 
 1 The attention of the writer was called to this problem by a 
 discussion of the relations between party leaders at this time in 
 Van Buren, Autobiography, pp. 664 ff. A conversation with Clay 
 in 1849 suggested to Van Buren the part which Webster played in 
 the events of 1833. His remarks are not exclusively based upon 
 memory, for in certain cases he refers to historical sources. In¬ 
 formation is given bearing upon the relations between Webster and 
 Jackson which does not appear elsewhere. In regard to his own 
 motives, Van Buren’s explanations probably are not entirely 
 accurate. His distrust of Webster’s personal integrity and his 
 distinct liking for Clay (p. 665) led him to attribute Webster’s 
 actions to selfish ambitions. For these reasons his inferences from 
 facts need to be checked wherever possible by information drawn 
 from other sources. 
 
THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 73 
 
 parture in order to speak at a meeting in Faneuil 
 Hall called for the purpose of considering the 
 
 situation in South Carolina and the President’s 
 proclamation. 2 
 
 The Almighty Power only knows, [he said] whether, 
 when we meet again, it will be as citizens of Massachu¬ 
 setts only. . . . The general principles of the Pro¬ 
 clamation are such as I heartily approve. I esteem them 
 
 to be the only true principles of the constitution. . . . 
 
 In this way of meeting the crisis, I shall give the Presi¬ 
 dent my entire and cordial support. ... If the Gov¬ 
 ernment, on this first trial, shall be found not able to 
 keep all the States in their proper places, from that 
 
 moment the whole Union is virtually dissolved. What¬ 
 ever link be struck from this golden chain, breaks the 
 whole . 3 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 680. Van Buren attributed the call for this meeting to 
 Webster, but the report of its proceedings supports the con¬ 
 clusion that it was the result of a general desire among those who 
 approved Jackson’s policy. 
 
 3 National Intelligencer, December 22, 1832, quoting Boston Daily 
 Advertiser and Patriot, Extra, December 18, 1832. This speech 
 is not printed in any edition of Webster’s works, but the text is 
 given in an appendix to G. T. Curtis, Life of Webster (N. Y., 
 1872), I. 590-592. Webster was reported by March to have heard 
 of the proclamation for the first time when on his way to Wash¬ 
 ington. C. W. March, Reminiscences (N. Y., 1850), pp. 187, 188. 
 This version was used by Curtis in his first edition ( Webster. I. 
 484) but this error was later corrected in an appendix. A series 
 of resolutions, reported in the Intelligencer cited above, which 
 were adopted by this meeting, not only endorsed Jackson’s policy 
 but also read into the proclamation constitutional theories that 
 substanially agreed with those of Webster in his debate with 
 Hayne. It was probably to this interpretation that Van Buren 
 had reference in suggesting that these resolutions were not 
 entirely satisfactory to Jackson. Van Buren, Autobiography, p. 
 698. H. G. Otis, an old Federalist, also endorsed the proclamation, 
 but he was not the presiding officer as suggested by Morison, Otis, 
 II. 292. According to the report in the Intelligencer, Charles 
 Wells, who was then Mayor of Boston, acted as chairman. With 
 a view doubtless to preventing an untimely discussion of topics 
 which might have given rise to criticism of other phases of the 
 administration’s policy, the chairman restricted the speakers to 
 the two points specified in the call for the meeting. 
 
74 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 Webster was not alone among National Repub¬ 
 licans in his approval of Jackson’s position. The 
 Western Reserve Chronicle reported that the pro¬ 
 clamation “was hailed as the harbinger of glad 
 tidings by the opposers of the administration. 
 . . . It is worthy of remark that the returning 
 sanity of the President was hailed by spontaneous 
 approbation.” 4 It was the opinion of the “Spy in 
 Washington” that the proclamation had effected 
 a revolution in the personnel of parties, that it 
 had been endorsed by many “whom it was sup¬ 
 posed nothing could have reconciled to the present 
 chief magistrate.” 5 Ambrose Spencer, an in¬ 
 fluential politician in New York, thought Jack¬ 
 son’s reelection fortunate in view of the turn 
 which affairs had taken. 6 Chancellor Kent was 
 informed by his nephew in New York City. 
 
 We are all Jackson men here . . . and really the 
 
 old gentleman does put his name to the most excellent 
 documents. Nothing could be more able than his last 
 message, and if he is not thwarted by the House he will 
 I believe preserve the Union, and what is more keep it 
 in such a state that it will be worth preserving . 7 
 
 4 National Intelligencer, January 2, 1833. 
 
 5 Morning Courier and New York Enquirer, January 21, 1833. 
 The Enquirer was in favor of settling the crisis by a compromise, 
 and was thus disposed to minimize its importance. “A temporary 
 excitement is pervading the Nation. How long will it continue? 
 Will the new friends which Gen. Jackson has acquired be faith¬ 
 ful?” It is known that Matthew L. Davis, an influential journalist, 
 wrote under the pseudonym of the “Spy in Washington.” Frederick 
 Hudson, Journalism in the United States (N. Y., 1875), p. 216. 
 
 ‘A. Spencer to Webster, Albany, February 21, 1833. Webster 
 MSS. 
 
 7 William Kent to James Kent, New York, January 30, 1833. 
 Kent MSS. Library of Congress. It was thought that Jackson, 
 assured of a second term, would follow policies more in harmony 
 with those of the opposition. 
 
THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 75 
 
 Pleasants wrote from Richmond that the few who 
 still called themselves Federalists had to a man 
 endorsed the proclamation and that some of 
 Clay’s friends had given their support to the 
 President, in order to be on the winning side or 
 because of their dislike of nullification. 8 
 
 Evidence soon began to accumulate that the 
 disorganized National Republicans were not 
 agreed in this point of view. The change which 
 occurred in the attitude of the Intelligencer, their 
 most important newspaper, toward nullification 
 and Jackson’s policy is indicative of the growing 
 divergence of opinion within the party. This 
 journal had been outspoken in its censure of nulli¬ 
 fication before that movement aroused the Presi¬ 
 dent to issue the proclamation. 9 When events indi¬ 
 cated that he would drive his former friends in 
 South Carolina into opposition, its remarks in re¬ 
 gard to the situation became milder. 10 Minor 
 flaws in the proclamation were picked out for criti¬ 
 cism, and in the way of approval it contented itself 
 with an acknowledgment of the obvious fact that 
 
 8 J. H. Pleasants to John Tyler, Richmond, January 1, 1833. L. 
 G Tyler Letters and Times of the Tylers (Richmond, 1884), I. 
 451, 452. 
 
 “The nullification movement was denounced during the summer 
 of 1831 in a series of articles under the title, “The Crisis,” as 
 the most serious danger which the country had faced since the 
 Hartford Convention. National Intelligencer, August 27, 31. 
 September 3, 7, 1831. 
 
 10 In reply to a question as to their attitude on the nullification 
 question the editors replied that it could be found in the articles 
 referred to above. Ibid., December 5, 1832. 
 
76 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 it was a powerful document. 11 In order not to give 
 offense to possible recruits only brief mention was 
 made of the progress in Congress of the “force 
 bill” and even of Clay’s compromise tariff meas¬ 
 ure. There was as yet no great difference of 
 opinion in the ranks of the party in regard to the 
 Bank issue; accordingly it was kept constantly be¬ 
 fore its readers in preference to the troublesome 
 nullification question, which was adding to the 
 popularity of the administration. 
 
 Clay, like the Intelligencer, was critical of the 
 proclamation, 12 and he found it advisable not to 
 take an active part in support of the “force bill.” 
 Webster, on the other hand, cooperated with the 
 administration in carrying out Jackson’s recom¬ 
 mendations. It is said on good authority that he 
 was asked by a member of Jackson’s cabinet to 
 
 “There are some exceptional features in it, and particularly 
 the personality which is thrown into it, even in the very caption, 
 where we find the name of the President most conspicuous. This 
 is a departure from usage, as is also the allusion to the President’s 
 nativity, both of which had been well avoided. The Proclamation, 
 however, is a powerful composition, and cannot fail to produce a 
 great sensation; whether for good or evil we have some doubt.” 
 Ibid., December 11, 1832. Later it was explained that the phase 
 “for good or evil” referred to the effect upon the relative stand¬ 
 ing of the nullification and union parties in South Carolina Ibid 
 December 13, 1833. 
 
 12 He thought there were some good things in it especially in 
 the part dealing with the power of the judiciary, but “there are 
 some entirely too ultra for me, and which I cannot stomach. A 
 proclamation ought to have been issued weeks ago, but I think it 
 should have been a very different paper from the present, which, 
 I apprehend, will irritate instead of allaying any excited feeling ’’ 
 Clay to Francis Brooke, Washington, December 12, 1832. Colton 
 Private Correspondence, p. 345. 
 
THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 77 
 
 lead the friends of the bill in the Senate, 13 and 
 that on his suggestion certain changes were 
 made. 14 Although Jackson’s friends were sup¬ 
 porting the Verplanck bill, which would reduce 
 duties by one-half in two years, Webster was not 
 convinced that the President intended to abandon 
 the principle of protection, for he believed that 
 Jackson personally did not approve the radical 
 reduction which this measure involved. Webster 
 was confident, he wrote to William Sullivan, that 
 Jackson did not wish the bill to pass and that he 
 would prefer to make a direct issue with nulli¬ 
 fication and then to revise the tariff when the 
 
 13 March, Reminiscences, p. 199. Van Buren believed that this 
 book had been endorsed by Webster. Van Buren, Autobiography, 
 
 p. 701. , , . 
 
 Ibid p 235 The “Spy in Washington” noted the important 
 role played by Webster. “The echoes from the palace announce 
 that Mr Webster is considered the staff on which reliance must be 
 
 placed in the Senate. . . . His great and commanding talents 
 
 are now to be called into action, in defences of those opinions and 
 those principles which, in early life, were the basis of his political 
 education. At a moment, the most unexpected to him, to his 
 friends, and to his country, he finds himself called upon to sustain 
 the measures of the administration, on the ground that they are 
 such as the federal party of 1798 would have sustained. . ■ • 
 
 Can Mr Webster resist these appeals? He cannot and will not. 
 
 Yet a few days, and his influence with the President and 
 his cabinet will be equalled by few; surpassed by none. . ■ • 
 
 The Federalists, with a portion of the Clay men, have taken under 
 their charge the measures of the administration. Mark what 1 
 sav Without these new allies, Gen. Jackson would stand almost 
 alone, in both Houses of Congress.” Morning Courier and New 
 York Enquirer, February 2, 1833. Webster s support of the force 
 bill was resented by many Democrats who were anxious to see 
 the question amicably settled C. C. Cambreling, an influential 
 Democratic leader from New York in the House, wrote to Van 
 Buren that “the real friends of the administration are calm and 
 anxiously desiring that all difficulties may adjusted . Cambre¬ 
 ling to Van Buren, Washington, February 5, 1833. Van Buren 
 MSS. Library of Congress. 
 
78 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 administration would not appear to be yielding to 
 force. 15 When Clay assumed responsibility for 
 an apparent abandonment of the tariff in his 
 scheme for a compromise he brought upon him¬ 
 self the opposition which Webster and his friends 
 had made to the Verplanck bill. The scheme was 
 probably introduced with full knowledge that 
 Webster would oppose its passage; a draft had 
 been shown to him, 16 and he had been present at 
 a meeting of a Senate committee at which it was 
 discussed. 17 
 
 The trend of events, indicating an unusual co¬ 
 operation between Jackson and Webster and a 
 sharp divergence of policy within the opposition, 
 gave rise to a general discussion of a possible 
 
 15 Webster to William Sullivan, January 3, 1833. Curtis, Web¬ 
 ster, I. 436, 437. Van Buren represents Jackson as sincerely in 
 favor of affording relief to South Carolina, whereas Webster 
 resisted the passage of Clay s compromise which would have this 
 effect. Van Buren, Autobiography, p. 663. 
 
 19 Webster to Hiram Ketchum, Washington, January 18 1838 
 Curtis, Webster, I. 440, 441. Webster was at this time defending 
 his record on the tariff questions of 1833 and seeking material with 
 which to attack Clay on this point. 
 
 17 Webster to Nathan Appleton, February (?), 1833. Van Tyne 
 Webster Letters, pp. 179, 180. Cf. Clay to Francis Brooke, Senate 
 18^3. Colton, Private Correspondence, pp. 
 349, 350. The friends of protection at first were generally agreed 
 in interpreting Clay’s compromise as a surrender of the principle 
 at issue. This point of view was expressed by Niles. “Mr. Clay’s 
 new tariff project will be received like a crash of thunder in the 
 winter season. . . . We . . . cannot go with him in a 
 measure which contains the surrendry of a power that is vital to 
 the influence of the United States.” Niles’ Register, XLIII. 401 
 An active campaign was inaugurated by Clay’s friends in New 
 England to convince the friends of protection that the bill was 
 not in fact destructive of the protective principle. Peley Sprague 
 t0 •^ arc * 1 19, 1833. Colton, Private Correspondence 
 
 pp. 354-356; Abbott Lawrence to Clay, Boston, March 26, 1833’ 
 Ibid., pp. 357, 358. 
 
THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 79 
 
 formation of parties upon new issues. The evi¬ 
 dence is sufficiently abundant and varied, not only 
 from newspaper editorials but also from private 
 letters, to justify the conclusion that for a time 
 in the spring- and summer of 1833 there was a 
 serious possibility that this would take place. 
 The “Spy in Washington” suggested this as a 
 probability. If his speculations in regard to the 
 effect of the proclamation were correct, “then has 
 the proclamation laid the foundation for a new 
 grouping of parties. The talented and ancient 
 leaders of federalism, are marching forth in solid 
 column from their retirement. . . . They tell 
 you—‘we rally round the Chief who now com¬ 
 mands!’” 18 Webster’s resolutions on the tariff 
 placed him at the head of the tariff forces in the 
 opinion of the Baltimore Gazette. It anticipated 
 an understanding between Webster and the ad¬ 
 ministration which would maintain the principle 
 of protection. 19 P. P. F. Degrand 20 wrote to 
 Nicholas Biddle: 
 
 Ever since the appearance of the President’s Procla¬ 
 mation, relative to South Carolina, several of my leading 
 
 18 Morning Courier and New York Enquirer, January 21, 1833. 
 
 18 Poulson’s American Daily Advertiser, February 18, 1833. This 
 newspaper was published at Philadelphia. 
 
 20 Degrand was an immigrant of French descent. Without large 
 means himself, he was active in the promotion of railroads in 
 Massachusetts. He was much ridiculed during his life for the 
 extravagance of his predictions which however “have since been 
 more than realized.” Justin Winsor, The Memorial History of 
 Boston, 1630-1880 (Boston, 1882), IV. 135, 136. The Library of 
 Congress has the files of the Boston Weekly Report of Public Sales 
 and Arrivals, 1819-1827, a publication edited by Degrand. 
 
80 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 friends, as well as myself, have had a notion that the 
 consequences of the decided stand, which the President 
 takes ‘against State Rights (so mis-called) and in favor 
 of the Judiciary,— would necessarily ultimately lead to an 
 alliance, offensive and defensive, between Jackson and the 
 Party that goes against the mis-called State Rights;—for 
 the judiciary;—for internal improvements;—for the 
 tariff; and for the bank,’— because Jackson would find 
 himself at war with many of his old friends; and as a 
 President of the United States cannot stand upon noth¬ 
 ing, he must necessarily seek and husband new ones . 21 
 
 Niles thought that the old parties did not know 
 where they stood upon the new issues. “Some 
 ‘guess’ that they are on the banks of Newfound¬ 
 land; but the fog is so thick, and the water so 
 much disturbed, that neither the quadrant nor 
 the lead line renders accustomed service.” 22 The 
 speculations of the Salem Gazette as to the cur¬ 
 rent rearrangement of parties are of particular 
 interest. As Degrand had suggested, the issues 
 which had been defeated in the two preceding 
 campaigns might be favorably affected. 
 
 Recent political events make it plain that parties must 
 be taken into a new draft. The late combinations have 
 been completely broken up—they have clubbed the batta¬ 
 lion —the front has been changed to the rear, and the 
 flanks to the center. In this pell-mell confusion, it will 
 take some time for the stragglers to rally under new 
 banners and to understand new signals. Clay and Cal¬ 
 houn have combined Nullification and National Republi¬ 
 canism—the West and the South are henceforth in close 
 
 21 Degrand to Biddle, Boston, February 15, 1833. Biddle MSS. 
 
 22 Niles’ Register, XLIV. 1 . 
 
THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 81 
 
 alliance, and the National Republicans of the Free States 
 are henceforth excluded from the communion with any 
 party. 
 
 The consequence may be that a change will take place m 
 public policy. Measures of state we have a long time 
 witnessed are merely the counters with which gambling 
 politicians keep their game. The United States Bank, 
 among other measures, may be favorably affected; for 
 those who have hitherto thought it a piece of good calcu¬ 
 lation to oppose the renewal of its charter for the sake 
 of gaining political influence may hereafter think it politic 
 to support the renewal for the purpose of gaining other 
 friends and from fear of losing the friends they already 
 have . 23 
 
 The possibility that Webster was either seeking 
 a cabinet office under Jackson or would accept 
 one if it were offered him was widely discussed. 24 
 To an objection from a Democratic source that 
 the party could not forget Webster’s past asso¬ 
 ciation with Federalism, Hammond of the Cin¬ 
 cinnati Daily Gazette thought that this would be 
 a minor difficulty. “Mr. Webster can be as easily 
 ‘dyed in wool’ as Mr. Louis McLane, if he will 
 only consent to the necessary immersion. 
 However, all rumors of a difference with Clay 
 that would drive him into an alliance with Jack- 
 son were scouted by the Intelligencer . 26 
 
 At the close of the short session in March, 
 1833, Webster and Clay were apparently upon 
 
 23 Poulson’s American Daily Advertiser, March 12, 1833. 
 
 M New York Daily Advertiser, February 15, 1833. 
 
 " Cincinnati Daily Gazette, February 21, 1833. 
 
 20 National Intelligencer, May 3, 1833. 
 
82 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 the best of terms; 27 nevertheless the differences 
 between them had not been arranged. Clay wrote 
 to Biddle: “As for your friend Mr. W[ebster] 
 (he is determined not to allow me to consider him 
 mine) nothing I can do seems right in his mind.” 
 Biddle was asked “to soothe him on his return. 
 You hold a large flask of oil and know well how 
 to pour it out.” 28 As the president of the Bank, 
 Biddle was not in a position nor was he disposed 
 to act as a disinterested mediator. His first con¬ 
 cern was to make use of every opportunity for 
 the welfare of that institution, 29 and the split 
 between the two National Republican leaders 
 might be made to serve a useful purpose. When 
 Webster rallied to the support of Jackson, a 
 claim was established to his gratitude which 
 could with careful management be used to the 
 Bank’s advantage. The removal of the deposits 
 might by this means be prevented, and a new 
 charter was not beyond the range of possibili- 
 
 27 Nathan Sargent, Public Men and Events (Philadelphia, 1875), 
 
 I. 241-243. 
 
 28 Clay to Biddle, Washington, March 4, 1833. Biddle MSS. 
 
 29 Biddle’s attachment to the Bank is best illustrated in a letter 
 
 of an earlier date, February, 1832, to C. J. Ingersoll. “Here am I, 
 who have taken a fancy to this Bank and having built it up with 
 infinite care am striving to keep it from being destroyed. . . . 
 
 To me all other considerations are insignificant—I mean to stand 
 by it and defend it with all the small faculties which Providence 
 has assigned to me. I can go for no party in politics or religion— 
 have no sympathy with Mr. Jackson or Mr. Clay or Mr. Wirt or 
 Mr. Calhoun or Mr. Ellmaker or Mr. Van Buren.” Biddle to C. 
 
 J. Ingersoll, Philadelphia, February 11, 1832. McGrane, Biddle 
 Correspondence, 179. 
 
THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 83 
 
 ties. 30 If these results could have been counted 
 upon as the certain consequences of the division 
 between Clay and Webster, Biddle probably 
 would have chosen to widen the breach rather 
 than attempt to heal it. Their realization was 
 too problematical however to warrant the burning 
 of his bridges; accordingly, while he made what 
 use he could of Webster’s services to the admin¬ 
 istration, at the same time he used his influence 
 to prevent a complete break between Webster and 
 Clay in order to preserve a political force which 
 would be available in the event of a failure to 
 conciliate Jackson. This analysis of Biddle’s 
 motives and policy is illustrated and supported by 
 the correspondence of the three men in the spring 
 and summer of 1833. 
 
 Biddle recognized, in his reply to Clay s re¬ 
 quest, the importance of avoiding a division. It 
 was of “great importance to the country not to 
 permit the difference of sentiment on the tariff to 
 produce any alienation between those who had 
 hitherto acted in harmony on all other great pub¬ 
 lic measures. . . To prevent an occasion for 
 
 “John Sargeant, a member of the House from Pennsylvania, 
 wrote to Biddle that the combination between Calhoun, Clay, and 
 their friends would cause the administration to react favorably to 
 the Bank. “Against a combination that threatens to become so 
 powerful, Van Buren will have to look for alliances in the North, 
 I think, and in so doing will be obliged to give up his hostility to 
 the Bank. It is quite possible, indeed, that he may come into 
 conjunction with some of its most decided friends. In the mean¬ 
 time, Jackson’s influence will by no means have the same weight as 
 heretofore.” Sargeant to Biddle, Washington, March 2, 1833. 
 Ibid., p. 201. 
 
84 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 this undesirable result, Biddle had chosen to en¬ 
 tertain Webster privately when he had recently 
 passed through Philadelphia rather than to ar¬ 
 range a public dinner with the inevitable speeches. 
 “In regard to the measure itself, he retains all the 
 opinions he publicly expressed; but they are, I 
 think, unaccompanied by anything of an unkind 
 or unfriendly feeling toward yourself. . 
 Your mutual friends seem to understand each 
 other perfectly .” 31 In reply Clay acknowledged 
 Biddle s efforts to prevent a further estrange¬ 
 ment, and. on second thought, he saw in Webster’s 
 opposition to the compromise tariff a means of 
 persuading the South that a decided victory had 
 been won . 32 The crisis would thus be brought to 
 a satisfactory close and his own political position 
 materially strengthened, since the victory would 
 be the fruit of his leadership. 
 
 There now began a series of obscure negoti¬ 
 ations the purpose of which was to prolong the 
 cooperation between Webster and Jackson. 
 Available evidence is not sufficient to justify an 
 accurate estimate of the various influences that 
 determined Webster’s actions at this time, but it 
 is clear that he was not only following his personal 
 inclinations but was also acting on Biddle’s ad- 
 
 31 Biddle to Clay, Philadelphia, March 25, 1833. Colton, Private 
 Correspondence, pp. 356, 357. Dr. McGrane suggests that Biddle 
 tried to change Webster’s point of view in regard to the compro¬ 
 mise. McGrane, Biddle Correspondence, pp. 202, 203. The evi¬ 
 dence in Biddle’s letter scarcely justifies this conclusion. 
 
 38 Clay to Biddle, Ashland, April 10, 1833. McGrane, Biddle 
 Correspondence, pp. 202-204. 
 
THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 85 
 
 vice. The middleman in this negotiation seems 
 to have been Edward Livingston, then Secretary 
 of State. After his conversation with Biddle in 
 Philadelphia, in the course of which the subject 
 may well have been discussed, Webster wrote to 
 Livingston suggesting that the latter “would not 
 be averse to a confidential interchange of opinions 
 upon topics that must arise, in the course of a 
 short time and on which men will be obliged to 
 act.” It was suggested that a conference be ar¬ 
 ranged to take place in New York sometime in 
 April. 33 Sufficient evidence exists to make it 
 reasonably safe to assume that the two met dur¬ 
 ing the summer of 1833, although the exact date 
 is uncertain. 34 March 35 and Curtis 36 not only as- 
 
 33 Van Tyne, Webster Letters, pp. 181, 182. Professor Van 
 Tyne notes that the MSS. is undated and has no address, but he 
 identifies it as a letter to Clay. It is also printed in Writings and, 
 Speeches of Daniel Webster (National Edition, Boston, 19U3), 
 XVI. 229, 230. It is there identified as a letter to Edward -Liv¬ 
 ingston Internal evidence, as well as the unfriendliness which 
 existed between Clay and Webster at this time, indicates that the 
 latter conclusion is probably correct. Webster refers to his corre¬ 
 spondent’s intention of going abroad. Livingston s appointment 
 as minister to France was under consideration at this tune, while 
 there is no evidence that Clay had such intentions. Moreover, 
 Clay had left Washington for the West at the time or before the 
 letter was written. National Intelligencer, March 23, 1833. tne 
 contents of the letter show that the person to whom it was 
 addressed was in Washington. 
 
 31 Webster was probably in New York April 5, but apparently 
 the interview was not held then. He was still there April 10, 
 for on that date Biddle wrote to him at his New York address 
 that Livingston would be there in a few days. Biddle to Webster, 
 April 10, 1833. Biddle MSS. Webster may have seen Livingston 
 at this time, but in any case, he wrote from Boston, April 13, that 
 he had heard nothing from Livingston, but that he would hold 
 himself in readiness to go to New York if necessary. Webster to 
 Biddle, Boston, April 13, 1833. Ibid. A week later he wrote 
 again from Boston that he had heard nothing from the elusive 
 
86 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 sume that the conversation took place, but they 
 also report that Livingston was authorized by the 
 President to take up with Webster the question 
 of his continued support of the administration, 
 and that he acted upon this instruction in an 
 interview with Webster in New York after the 
 latter’s return from his later tour of the West. 
 According to March, it was generally believed by 
 the friends of both men that a seat in the cabinet 
 was offered and that an agreement was made 
 impossible by differences upon the question of the 
 deposits. This version cannot be accepted with¬ 
 out reservation. Influenced perhaps by a desire 
 to clear Webster of all suspicion of disloyalty to 
 his party, it placed the responsibility for the nego¬ 
 tiation upon Jackson and Livingston. There is 
 reason to believe, however, that an arrangement 
 with the administration through the agency of 
 Livingston was most desirable from the point of 
 view of Biddle and Webster. Furthermore, if a 
 
 Livingston. He thought that the Secretary was occupied with 
 an inquiry in regard to the burning of the treasury building. 
 Webster to Biddle, April 20, 1833. Ibid. The fire occurred 
 March 31. National Intelligencer, April 1, 1833. These letters 
 give no precise evidence of a meeting between the two men but 
 they reveal clearly the eagerness with which it was desired by 
 Biddle and Webster. Webster had at least one opportunity to 
 talk with Livingston before he sailed for France. On Webster’s 
 return from his western tour both took the same boat from Phila¬ 
 delphia to New York. National Gazette and Literary Register, 
 July 19, 1833. National Intelligencer, July 22, 1833. 
 
 35 March, Reminiscences, pp. 249, 250. 
 
 Curtis, Webster, I. 473. There is no first hand evidence, ap¬ 
 parently, to support this conclusion. Livingston’s papers might 
 throw some light upon this question, but they are not at present 
 available. 
 
THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 87 
 
 cabinet office was offered by Livingston, it is by 
 no means certain that it faithfully represented 
 Jackson’s intentions. Van Buren wrote later that 
 Jackson agreed with his own suspicions of the 
 Secretary’s loyalty to the administration. 37 It is 
 probable that on another occasion, when he 
 sketched a plan for an act to re-charter the Bank 
 which would, he said, be approved by the Presi¬ 
 dent, he had taken an unwarranted liberty in 
 anticipating Jackson’s wishes. 38 
 
 Biddle repeatedly urged Webster in April to 
 make his peace with the administration before it 
 was too late to prevent a removal of the deposits, 
 and Webster was not opposed to the suggestion. 
 An arrangement was made with C. P. White a 
 “politician of the Van Buren type” and a member 
 of the House from the city of New York, to the 
 effect that Webster’s views upon the question of 
 the deposits would be reported to Jackson. 39 Ap¬ 
 parently this was done, for Webster wrote to 
 Biddle after White’s return that the removal had 
 been decided upon: “I am afraid that the Presi- 
 
 37 “We were well aware that he was more at his ease talking 
 and not infrequently in acting upon public questions in the company 
 of Mr. Webster and Mr. Biddle than with us. but we could 
 afford to indulge him.” Van Buren, Autobiography, p. 708. 
 
 38 C. J. Ingersoll to Biddle, Washington, February 23, 1832. 
 McGrane, Biddle Correspondence, pp. 184, 185. Cf. J. S. Bassett, 
 Life of Andrew Jackson (N. Y., 1911), II. 616. However, Cat- 
 terall asserts that Livingston probably reported Jackson correctly. 
 Catterall, Second Bank, pp. 224-228. 
 
 “Webster to Biddle, New York, Wednesday morning. Biddle 
 MSS. This letter is undated but internal evidence identifies it as 
 having been written in the latter part of March or the first part 
 of April. 
 
88 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 dent has settled it as a thing to be done.” 40 Biddle 
 immediately replied: 
 
 I have no information of the intended removal of the 
 deposits, though my opinion is that they will not dare to 
 remove. Nevertheless it is very desirable that whatever 
 is done in the way of pacification should be done soon— 
 for if the deposits are withdrawn, it will be a declaration 
 of war which cannot be recalled . 41 
 
 Two days later urgent advice to the same effect 
 was sent to Webster. 42 After his return to Bos¬ 
 ton Webster wrote, April 21, that the political 
 consequences which would probably result from 
 the removal had been brought to the attention of 
 the President by an influential friend of the Presi¬ 
 dent. It would “create warm opposition of the 
 North, and drive those, who would support Gen¬ 
 eral Jackson in all just measures, back to the arms 
 of C. [lay] and C. [alhoun].” 43 Thus, by means of 
 Democratic channels, even assuming the doubtful 
 character of the Livingston interview, Webster 
 adroitly brought to Jackson’s attention the price 
 which would have to be paid for a continuation of 
 his services. His motives, however, were not 
 restricted to a desire to serve the interests of 
 Nicholas Biddle and the Bank, for he considered 
 the possibility of cooperating with the adminis¬ 
 tration after the removal of the deposits in Sep- 
 
 40 Webster to Biddle, New York, April 7, 1833. Ibid. 
 
 11 Biddle to Webster, Philadelphia, April 8, 1833. McGrane, 
 Biddle Correspondence, p. 202. 
 
 42 Biddle to Webster, Philadelphia, April 10, 1833. Ibid., p. 205. 
 
 43 Webster to Biddle, Boston, April 21, 1833. Biddle MSS. 
 
THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 89 
 
 tember had eliminated Biddle’s interests in the 
 premises. 
 
 Circumstances attending the extensive journeys 
 of party chieftains in the summer of 1833 fur¬ 
 nish further evidence that a possible realignment 
 of parties was~ contemplated. The opportunity 
 offered by the adjournment of Congress was 
 seized for the purpose of mending political fences 
 that had weakened or perhaps of building new 
 ones. Especially important for present purposes 
 were the tours of Jackson and Webster which 
 made possible an expression of mutual esteem by 
 their friends. The reception given to Jackson by 
 Webster’s associates in New England and that ac¬ 
 corded to Webster by Jackson’s in the West could 
 not fail to strengthen the feeling of good-will be¬ 
 tween them. Webster had at first planned to be in 
 Boston in order to welcome Jackson personally. 
 His absence, he wrote to Secretary Cass, would 
 be open to misrepresentation; he would therefore 
 cut short his own tour in order to be in Boston 
 at the proper time. 44 For unexplained reasons 
 his plans did not materialize in this respect; he 
 was still in the West when Jackson appeared in 
 Boston. 45 National Republican newspapers saw 
 
 44 Webster to Cass (undated). Webster, Private Correspondence, 
 I. 536, 537. This letter was in reply to one from Cass in which 
 it was said that Jackson would be in New England about June 
 20. Cass to Webster, April 17, 1833. Curtis, Webster, I. 460, 461. 
 
 ‘“According to Van Buren, Webster’s absence was intentional. 
 It would be easier to approach Jackson’s friends in the West than 
 as the chief of a reception committee in Boston. Moreover, Web¬ 
 ster knew that he could not lead his party in New England to sup¬ 
 port Jackson. Van Buren, Autobiography, pp. 690-694. 
 
90 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 in Van Buren’s presence in Jackson’s party a 
 move on his part to strengthen himself with New 
 England Democrats in view of the campaign of 
 1836, 46 but Webster was informed that his true 
 motive was to watch Jackson in order to prevent 
 a suspected effort by Federalists “to coax and 
 cajol the president.” 47 Preparations were made in 
 Boston to give Jackson’s reception a non-partisan 
 character, 48 and the Washington Globe frowned 
 upon any attempt on the part of overzealous 
 Democrats in New England to keep the President 
 to themselves. 49 Degrand informed Biddle that 
 Jackson’s reception was in fact the work chiefly 
 of Webster’s friends. The resolution to invite 
 Jackson had been introduced in the House by 
 
 49 New York Daily Advertiser, May 3, 1833. Cf. New Hamp¬ 
 shire Patriot in the United States Telegraph, July 12, 1833. 
 
 47 D. B. Ogden to Webster, New York, April 27, 1833. Webster 
 MSS. 
 
 48 The New York American, a newspaper that took pride in 
 having opposed Jackson at every turn since 1823, reported that his 
 reception in New York, and “we believe it was so in Philadelphia” 
 was distinctly a party affair under the management of Demo¬ 
 cratic leaders. “The mass of citizens, the clergy, the learned pro¬ 
 fessions, and the great middle class could not approach him at all.” 
 New York American, June 15, 1833. 
 
 49 Quoting the Boston Post, the Intelligencer at first attributed 
 to Massachusetts Democrats an intention to make the President’s 
 reception a partisan affair. National Intelligencer, April 23, 
 1833. The next day it acknowledged that such was not the 
 desire of the Democratic authorities in Washington. In this 
 connection was quoted a statement of the Globe of April 23. “If 
 Massachusetts through her legislature deems it proper to mark 
 the visit of the President to that State with any token of personal 
 respect, we should consider an attempt, on the part of those assum¬ 
 ing to be exclusive party friends, to repeal such kind intentions 
 upon the ground that they proceed from political opponents, not 
 only as illiberal to those proffering the courtesy, but derogatory 
 to the object of it.” Ibid., April 24, 1833. 
 
THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 91 
 
 Stephen White, who moreover had left Webster 
 in the West in order to act as a chairman of the 
 legislative committee appointed in the President’s 
 honor. He was welcomed not only as chief 
 executive but as one who had expressed New 
 England principles jn the proclamation. As a 
 result, 
 
 Jackson is very much pleased with his visit to this 
 quarter and grateful for these attentions and quite grati¬ 
 fied that his ‘Union must be preserved’ is fully sustained 
 here. ... In fact, it cannot be denied that a sympa¬ 
 thy is excited in his breast and between him and those 
 who approached him here and this sympathy pervades 
 both. 
 
 The conclusion was, in Degrand’s opinion, clear 
 that Webster “no longer supports Clay:—but 
 stands forth as ‘the defender of the constitution,’ 
 i.e. ‘of the administration’ while the ‘administra¬ 
 tion hold the Proclamation as their standard’.”" 0 
 Fears were aroused among Democrats that Jack- 
 son was approaching the Federalist point of view. 
 These fears were expressed in the vernacular of 
 the famous Downing letters in a report of an 
 imaginary conversation with “Jack Downing.” 
 
 We told him ‘we knew a thing or two; and as there 
 wasn’t a better Fed. in the country than Old Hickory we 
 should give him a gun perhaps.’ Jack looked grave, and 
 nodded, and said he had warned ‘the Gineral,’ but it made 
 
 " p. p. F. Degrand to Biddle. Boston, July 4, 1833. Biddle 
 MSS. According to Degrand, “True Blue Jackson” men had co¬ 
 operated with National Republicans in the election of Benjamin 
 Gorham to congress, and it had been suggested that this cooper¬ 
 ation be continued in the next gubernatorial election. 
 
92 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 his heart ache to see the old man so budge with H. G. 
 Otis and Bill Sullivan. ‘But I’ll tell you what’ continued 
 Jack, . . . ‘I’ll fix myself in Downingville, and I’ll 
 
 stay the torrent of Federalism! Thunder and mittens, 
 there is strange things going on in the world. Van Buren 
 is chucking the Hero into the bosoms of the Feds .’ 51 
 
 The Intelligencer, true to its policy of covering 
 up all traces of division within the party, inter¬ 
 preted Jackson’s enthusiastic reception in New 
 England as evidence of a sincerely national spirit, 
 not as an expression of restlessness on the part 
 of Webster and his friends. 52 National Republi¬ 
 cans in Boston met, immediately after Jackson’s 
 departure, to repair whatever damage had been 
 done to the party by his visit. A dinner was 
 held, as Rufus Choate informed Webster, the 
 immediate purpose of which “was to keep our 
 own ranks; and to see that none of our members 
 were carried away by the recent flow of good 
 feeling.” Choate thought there had been no 
 “particular unfriendliness to the President”; but 
 Webster was warned that “Our Jackson men here 
 are Van Buren men.” 53 The result of Jackson’s 
 excursion into territory that had formerly been 
 enemy country was a practical demonstration of 
 the support which New England gave to his 
 nationalist policy. Nothing definite was appar- 
 
 51 National Intelligencer, July 8, 1833, quoting the Portland 
 Advertiser. 
 
 “ Ibid., July 1, 1833. 
 
 63 Choate to Webster, Salem, August 12, 1833. Van Tyne, 
 Webster Letters, p. 184. 
 
THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 93 
 
 ently done, however, to bind his relations with 
 Webster more closely. 
 
 While Webster’s friends were giving Jackson 
 a friendly reception in New England, the favor 
 was being returned by Jackson men in the West. 
 The Intelligencer reported that “Mr. Webster has 
 wrought little less than a miracle upon the feuds 
 and divisions in the western country. He has 
 fairly extinguished the one and obliterated the 
 other.” 54 A correspondent of the United States 
 Telegraph wrote from Cincinnati, June 18, that 
 Webster was there “gladdening all hearts. To¬ 
 morrow he partakes of a public dinner, in which 
 all parties unite, but in which the Jackson party 
 have taken the lead. Their enthusiasm has been 
 as great as ours.” 55 The Louisville Journal 
 noticed the friendliness of Democrats: “Wher¬ 
 ever he goes, the friends of the administration 
 are peculiarly zealous to do him honor. The very 
 men, who, a year ago, were daily denouncing him 
 as a'Hartford convention traitor and the corrupt 
 hireling of the Bank, are now proud of the privi¬ 
 lege of touching but the hem of his garment.” 56 
 W. T. Barry, postmaster general under Jackson, 
 sent to Van Buren a report of Webster’s welcome 
 by the Jackson men of Cincinnati. He believed 
 
 M National Intelligencer, July 11, 1833. Cf. J. B. McMaster, 
 Daniel Webster (N. Y„ 1902), pp. 221-225. Professor McMaster 
 made no attempt to interpret the political significance of the wel 
 come given Webster in the West. 
 
 “ United States Telegraph, July 8, 1833. 
 
 M Ibid., July 5, 1833. 
 
94 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 that Webster was aware that the Democrats were 
 responsible for his warm reception. “Mr. Clay’s 
 friends and especially his bank friends, were 
 cold, and are dissatisfied with the speech of Mr. 
 Webster at the dinner. It was a patriotic affair 
 in which the present administration was highly 
 complimented.” 57 At Pittsburg he was again 
 cordially received by at least a part of Jackson’s 
 friends. He was welcomed, according to the 
 Pittsburg Advocate, as the defender of the con¬ 
 stitution. The editor knew no higher praise than 
 to compare his services with those of Jackson at 
 New Orleans. 
 
 Mr. Webster now occupies a station before the Amer¬ 
 ican people, very similar to that in which Gen. Jackson 
 found himself after the battle of New Orleans. [When 
 nullification had been met by the President], what did 
 Daniel Webster do? Did he respond to the call of the 
 Executive, or did he cling to party ? With the Constitu¬ 
 tion in his hand, he flung defiance in the teeth of his 
 assailants. . . . It is this that has attached so many 
 
 of the President’s friends to Mr. Webster . 58 
 
 Other Democratic newspapers in Pittsburg, how¬ 
 ever, did not join the chorus of praise. One 
 thought his reputation much exaggerated and 
 confessed a preference for certain members of the 
 city bar as models of true eloquence. It was 
 noted that his audience, which had evidently been 
 drawn from all classes, had not been responsive: 
 
 57 W. T. Barry to Van Buren, July 7, 1833. Van Buren MSS. 
 
 68 New York American, July 22, 1833. Cf. United States Tele¬ 
 graph, July 23, 1833. 
 
THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 95 
 
 “if we except a faint attempt to cheer him which 
 ‘proved no go’. The Jacksonites would not join 
 in and they are the only boys that can cheer a man 
 properly.” 59 Another recognized his ability, but 
 it was careful to explain that he was welcomed 
 “not as a political partisan, but as a fellow citizen. 
 
 . . . In his reception everything of a political 
 tendency was carefully avoided.” 60 
 
 The trend toward a friendly understanding 
 between Webster and Jackson was regarded with 
 alarm by certain groups within the Democratic 
 party, as newspaper comment indicates. Demo¬ 
 cratic opinion in New England was especially 
 hostile. 61 The Pennsylvanian, a Democratic 
 journal, predicted that the party in that section 
 would refuse to cooperate with Webster. 62 Isaac 
 Hill charged him with hypocritical motives in his 
 support of the proclamation because he had con¬ 
 demned Jackson’s administration not long before 
 that document was published. Moreover, he had 
 cooperated with Calhoun in the campaign of 
 
 59 New Hampshire Patriot, July 29, 1833, quoting the Pittsburg 
 Manufacturer. 
 
 00 Poulson’s American Daily Advertiser, July 22, 1833, quoting 
 the Pittsburg Democrat. 
 
 01 Boston Statesman, January 12, 1833. 
 
 63 Pennsylvanian, July 23, 1833. This editorial offered advice to 
 Webster which was not without a serious significance in spite of 
 its humorous tone. “Curl your hair, coquette a little—be cool, 
 cautious and roundabout—talk of patriotism, piety, and purity— 
 don’t touch anti-masonry—don’t go where cholera is—avoid 
 crowded places—vote for our friend Blair for next printer—cut 
 Clay and all his clan—and to conclude, spend the month of August 
 at Nahant, and take a peep at the sea serpent.’’ 
 
96 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 1832, 63 a charge which was not without founda¬ 
 tion. On another occasion Hill wrote that the 
 enthusiastic reception which the National Repub¬ 
 licans in Massachusetts had given Jackson indi¬ 
 cated a complete want of principle on the part of 
 men who had opposed Jackson in the last two 
 elections. 64 There were certain material advan¬ 
 tages in remaining in the minority while the 
 national party retained power which a politician 
 like Hill could appreciate. The control of the 
 federal patronage for that section was in the 
 hands of Hill and his fellow politicians, and an 
 alliance with Webster would involve a division 
 of the spoils with new allies. Most important of 
 all was the intense hostility which the New Eng¬ 
 land Democrats, the workers in the towns and 
 the poor farmers far from markets or tilling an 
 infertile soil, felt for their more fortunate neigh¬ 
 bors. 65 Finding his interest to be in opposition 
 to a realignment of parties, Hill made effective 
 use of the cry of “Federalist” to deter any mem¬ 
 bers of his party who looked favorably upon a 
 union with Webster. 66 
 
 The position of the United States Telegraph 
 and its editor, Duff Green, as the mouthpiece of 
 the “southern rights” section of the opposition 
 
 “ Boston Statesman, September 7, 1833. 
 
 64 New Hampshire Patriot, July IS, 1833. 
 
 “ A. B. Darling, “Jacksonian Democracy in Massachusetts, 1824- 
 1848,” American Historical Review, XXIX, 271-278. 
 
 M New Hampshire Partiot, July 12, 1833. 
 
THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 97 
 
 made it an interested commentator upon evidence 
 pointing- to a possible understanding between 
 Jackson and Webster. Two purposes apparently 
 influenced Green’s editorials dealing with this 
 subject: a desire to discredit Webster as a leader 
 of the National Republican party by arousing 
 suspicion of his party loyalty and a reluctance to 
 see Jackson’s position strengthened by the addi¬ 
 tion of Webster and his friends. The attainment 
 of both objects would be aided by exposing on 
 every occasion information or rumors of a rap- 
 prochment to the searching light of a pitiless 
 publicity. The Telegraph persistently asserted 
 that the real purpose of Jackson’s tour was to 
 secure the support of Webster’s friends for Van 
 Buren in the next campaign. While the Presi¬ 
 dent was on his way to New England, the charge 
 was made that the Globe, on behalf of the admin¬ 
 istration, had made advances to New England 
 interests by hinting that the tariff might be modi¬ 
 fied for the purpose of protecting the growers 
 of wool and the manufacturers of the finer grades 
 of woolen cloths. 67 The tour had been a failure, 
 it was announced after Jackson’s return, and in 
 due time the Telegraph reported that the Albany 
 Argus had attempted to explain away the Globe’s 
 apparent concession to protection in order to con¬ 
 ciliate the southern wing of the party. Like the 
 Federalists of the North, the Globe was urging 
 
 m United States Telegraph, May 28, 29, 1833. 
 
98 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 “since the quasi-assent of the northern Demo¬ 
 crats to the Proclamation, that there was no dif¬ 
 ference between the parties, and that they should 
 go share and share alike.” 68 
 
 A pronounced change promptly occurred in the 
 political situation when the order for the removal 
 of deposits was made in September. Conditions 
 no longer favored a far-reaching reorganization 
 of parties. The motive disappeared which had 
 caused Biddle to attempt, through Webster, a 
 reconciliation with the administration. The re¬ 
 moval of the deposits emphasized the fiscal policy 
 of the administration and thereby brought for¬ 
 ward an issue in regard to which Webster was 
 irreconcilably at odds with Jackson. Accord¬ 
 ingly, when the new Congress assembled in De¬ 
 cember, Biddle at once became vitally interested 
 in consolidating the opposition in support of an 
 attempt to administer a rebuke to the President. 
 
 The new interests evident in the editorial policy 
 of the National Gazette, a newspaper that was 
 generally known as the “bank organ,” were indi¬ 
 cative of the desires of the Bank and its friends. 
 In July, before it was known that the removal 
 had been definitely adopted as the policy of the 
 
 68 According to Green, northern Democrats had pretended to 
 have a certain interest in state rights for a time following the 
 proclamation in order to maintain their strength in the South. 
 “Finding their mistake, they are now willing to cast aside all 
 disguise, and abandon State Rights in all its forms and features, 
 and rush into consolidation.” This policy had been adopted to 
 enable Van Buren to compete with Webster for the support of 
 the Federalists. Ibid., June 1, 1833. 
 
THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 99 
 
 administration, great advantages for nationalist 
 policies were seen in a possible realignment of 
 parties. 
 
 The main and very serious distinction of American 
 parties will ere long be, that of the Unionists, on the one 
 hand, defending the supremacy and integrity of our Na¬ 
 tional and Federal System, under the plain text and spirit, 
 and old apprehension of the Constitution; and, on t e 
 other, the disaffected Nullifiers and half-Nullifiers, rally¬ 
 ing under all sorts of real and spurious State-rights. 
 
 The Unionists (now in the great majority of the 
 people) will have something more to do for the final 
 triumph of their cause than to resist the theory and prac¬ 
 tice of nullification; it will be essential on their side, that 
 the national defenses and plans of internal improvement, 
 and the establishments which secure an independent judi¬ 
 ciary, a sound currency, and abundant revenue, and a 
 domestic supply of manufacturers, should be preserved. 
 
 The removal of the deposits convinced the Gazette 
 that it had mistaken the source of the real danger 
 to the country. The nullification movement and 
 even the disorganized condition of the currency 
 “though evils of magnitude that require attention 
 and deserve solicitude, yet are of considerably 
 less moment and urgency than the recent meas¬ 
 ures and general doctrines of the Executive 
 branch at Washington, in which we include the 
 two cabinets of the President, and the Globe, the 
 official organ and champion.” 70 With the open¬ 
 ing of the Congress a still more immediate need 
 was felt for the aid of the southern wing of the 
 
 “ National Gazette and Literary Register, July 27, 1833. 
 
 '"'Ibid., November 26, 1833. 
 
100 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 opposition; accordingly, the menace of nullifica¬ 
 tion was discounted. Association with Calhoun 
 was no longer objectionable after the tariff ques¬ 
 tion had been arranged by means of the compro¬ 
 mise. “There is no longer immediate danger 
 from Southern nullification—but that which is 
 enthroned at Washington is instant, active and 
 formidable to the highest degree.” 71 Alleged 
 excesses on the part of Jackson and his cabinet 
 had deadened the enthusiasm aroused by the 
 proclamation, and a majority of those who had 
 opposed Calhoun and his southern friends were 
 now forced to regard them as “only secondary or 
 venial delinquents, dangerous to the Union in but 
 a remote and inferior degree, even as desirable or 
 necessary auxiliaries to combat much more guilty 
 offenders and leaguers against the constitution 
 and the essential weal of the Union.” 72 
 
 The removal of the deposits did not immedi¬ 
 ately convince Webster that there should no 
 longer be any thought of cooperating with Jack- 
 son. No reconciliation had been made with Clay. 
 Webster had abandoned his plans to include 
 Kentucky in the itinerary of his western tour on 
 account of the prevalence of cholera. 73 There is 
 
 ” Ibid., December 18, 1833. 
 
 72 Ibid., December 30, 1833. 
 
 "Webster to Clay. Columbus, June 10, 1833. Colton, Private 
 Correspondence, p. 366; Webster to Clay, Chillicothe, June 22, 
 1833. Ibid., pp. 366, 367. A journey to Kentucky, presumably for 
 the purpose of a conference with Clay, had been planned by Biddle 
 and Webster. Biddle to Clay, Philadelphia, March 25, 1833. Ibid 
 p. 357. 
 
THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 101 
 
 no evidence that they had met when Clay, follow¬ 
 ing Jackson’s example, journeyed to New Eng¬ 
 land. Webster’s friends apparently took little or 
 no part in the reception given to Clay in Boston. 74 
 That differences still existed between them and 
 that there was still a possibility of an under¬ 
 standing between Webster and the President was 
 evident at the beginning of the new session of 
 Congress in December, 1833, when a question 
 arose in the Senate over a point of organization. 
 
 The formation of the Senate committees had 
 political significance at this time, especially the 
 choice of the committee on finance, for it was cer¬ 
 tain that Jackson’s attack upon the Bank would 
 be referred to it. Both Webster and Clay saw in 
 the organization of this important committee a 
 means of advancing their political interests. As 
 a result of Clay’s influence, Webster was selected 
 as its chairman and was thereby forced to take a 
 positive position. It was to Clay s interest that 
 this choice should be made at an early date and 
 upon the question of the deposits; almost cer¬ 
 tainly Webster would thereby be compelled to 
 make common cause with the opposition. Seeing 
 a chance to make political capital from his 
 chairmanship of the finance committee, Webster 
 took advantage of the situation to approach the 
 administration again. 
 
 T4 A comparison between the names of those prominent in the 
 reception of Jackson and Clay indicate that Webster’s friends 
 while actively participating in the first were not involved in the 
 second. 
 
102 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 Since 1823, the Senate committees had been 
 appointed by the president pro tempore, who was 
 customarily chosen for this purpose by the Senate 
 at the end of the preceding session, the vice- 
 president absenting himself in order that the 
 committees might be named by an official re¬ 
 sponsible to the majority. 75 The presiding officer 
 at this time, Hugh L. White, an anti-Bank Demo¬ 
 crat of Tennessee, would not serve the purpose 
 of the opposition in its desire to control the 
 membership of the finance committee in the 
 interest of the Bank. 76 Accordingly, Peleg 
 Sprague of Maine, a friend of Clay, moved, De¬ 
 cember 5, 1833, that “the 34th rule of the Senate 
 shall be so amended as to read and stand as it 
 did prior to the 24th day of November, 1823.” 77 
 The purpose of this resolution was to take the 
 power of naming the committees out of the hands 
 of Judge White and place it in the Senate as 
 a whole. Clay supported the motion with the 
 argument that the committees should be so 
 constituted that they would carry out the will of 
 the majority. It finally passed by a strict party 
 vote.‘ s According to Van Buren, this power was 
 
 ' 5 Van Buren, Autobiography, pp. 673, 674. 
 
 '* Van Buren believed that Clay was willing to intrust the 
 appointment of the committee to \Vhite if political considerations 
 had not interfered. Ibid., p. 674. 
 
 " Congressional Globe, 23 Congress, 1 Session, p. 12. 
 
 8 With Clay’s support, White’s motion to be excused from 
 voting was passed in the face of Grundy’s opposition. Ibid., p. 19. 
 Van Buren thought that in this there was evidence of a growing 
 friendship between Clay and White. Van Buren Autobiography, 
 
THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 103 
 
 taken from White in order to prevent a loss of 
 his availability as an opposition candidate in the 
 South through animosity aroused by a distribu¬ 
 tion of committee appointments. White, how¬ 
 ever, had not left the Democratic party, and in 
 November had a conversation with Jackson which 
 left the President confident of his loyalty. 79 
 Moreover, the opposition had not yet reconciled 
 itself to the necessity of running more than one 
 presidential ticket in the next campaign. 
 
 On the date fixed for the election of the com¬ 
 mittees, Thursday, December 12, Felix Grundy 
 of Tennessee moved that action be delayed until 
 the following Monday in order to wait for the 
 arrival of three or four absentees. 80 This was 
 obviously a Democratic maneuver to bring the 
 party in the Senate to its full strength on this 
 crucial test. Determined that the committees 
 should be named while he was in command of a 
 safe majority, Clay opposed the motion on the 
 ground that the Senate was as complete as it ever 
 would be. Definite evidence of Webster’s inde¬ 
 pendence came to light when he supported this 
 
 p 675. Clay evidently had a political object in mind in making 
 this move, for upon his own initiative four years later the new 
 rule was discarded, and the appointment of the committees was 
 again placed in the hands of the president pro tempore. Con¬ 
 gressional Globe, 25 Congress, I Session, p. 14. 
 
 70 Andrew Jackson to Van Buren, Washington, November 16, 
 1833. Van Buren MSS. 
 
 60 Congressional Globe. 23 Congress, 1 Session, p. 23. This 
 motion, according to Van Buren, was the result of instructions 
 from Jackson to delay action until the arrival of Van Buren 
 December 15. Van Buren, Autobiography, pp. 677, 678. 
 
104 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 motion and when, in explanation of his position, 
 he said that he had in fact voted for Sprague’s 
 motion with great reluctance. When the final vote 
 was taken, with his friends six of whom were 
 from the New England states, he joined forces 
 with the administration. His desertion of the op¬ 
 position caused the passage of Grundy’s motion by 
 a vote of twenty-three to nineteen, 81 thus delaying 
 action as the Democrats had desired until the six¬ 
 teenth. It was therefore by no means certain 
 that the control of the committees would be in 
 the hands of Clay and his friends if this defection 
 should be repeated. Clay was well aware of this 
 possibility for he wrote post-haste from the Sen¬ 
 ate chamber to John M. Clayton, a National 
 Republican Senator from Delaware: 
 
 Until today, we have gone on swimmingly in the Sen¬ 
 ate. On Tuesday last this day was assigned to proceed 
 to the appointment of the committees by the Senate itself. 
 We came prepared ... to carry them, if all proved 
 faithful. To my surprise a motion was made by Mr. 
 Grundy and supported by Mr. Webster to postpone the 
 appointment until Monday next and it was carried. If 
 you are here, I believe we shall be safe, even if there be 
 defection. For God’s sake then come to us. And do not 
 let anything keep you away . 82 
 
 The “Spy in Washington’’ wrote the next day 
 that Clay had been exceedingly angered by the 
 
 81 Only one member from a New England state, Sprague, voted 
 with Clay. Congressional Globe, 23 Congress, 1 Session, p. 23. 
 
 82 Clay to Clayton, Senate Chamber, December 12, 1833. Clay¬ 
 ton MSS. Library of Congress. Clay told Van Buren in 1849 
 that he had on this occasion for the first time seriously doubted 
 Webster’s loyalty to the party. Van Buren, Autobiography, p. 671. 
 
THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 105 
 
 delay in the selection of the committees and 
 that his plans for their composition, though 
 undoubtedly arranged in detail, might not 
 succeed. 83 
 
 The danger that Webster’s intransigent atti¬ 
 tude would be continued was averted by his 
 failure to arrange satisfactory terms with the 
 administration. According to Van Buren, the 
 question of accepting Webster’s cooperation was 
 canvassed at a conference on December 15 be¬ 
 tween Jackson, Grundy, and himself. 84 After 
 stressing the importance of controlling the fi¬ 
 nance committee, Grundy asserted that arrange¬ 
 ments could be made to secure Webster’s support 
 in the Senate elections. 85 Jackson is reported to 
 have then turned to Van Buren for his opinion. 
 If his explanation is trustworthy, he urged Jack- 
 son not to accept Webster’s aid for the reason 
 that it would be impossible to cooperate with him 
 without arousing “in the then excited state of 
 public feeling . . . the suspicion of being dis¬ 
 posed to favor such a coalition. . . .” The ad¬ 
 ministration’s strength was founded upon the 
 
 83 Albany Argus, December 21, 1833. 
 
 84 Van Buren, Autobiography, pp. 677-679. A search of the 
 Jackson, Van Buren, and Webster papers in the Library of Con¬ 
 gress and of their published correspondence failed to reveal cor- 
 robative evidence of this meeting. Van Buren’s detailed account, 
 however, is sufficient proof that it took place. 
 
 85 Ten days later Grundy told Adams that he was not disposed 
 to defend the administration against Clay’s resolutions censuring 
 the President. Adams explained this coolness by reference to the 
 favor which Jackson had shown to John H. Eaton, his opponent, in 
 the Tennessee senatorial election. Adams, Memoirs, IX. 60. 
 
106 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 conviction that Jackson was unalterably opposed 
 to the Bank, while Webster “was regarded by all 
 sides as one of its most unscrupulous supporters. 
 
 . . Jackson thought this advice was good 
 and accordingly urged Grundy to drop the subject. 
 
 The failure of this negotiation resulted in the 
 return of Webster and his friends to the opposi¬ 
 tion when, on December 16, the committees were 
 chosen. 86 Clay, perhaps, was not informed before 
 the first vote was taken that Webster had made 
 this decision. It was noted by the correspondent 
 of the Albany Argus that he betrayed great 
 excitement at this time. 
 
 Mr. Clay began to assume a kind of playfulness and 
 indifference among the senators. It was an evident effort 
 to seem to relieve himself of the embarrassment he labored 
 under; as a person sometimes laughs to cover a confusion 
 of ideas. He overacted. His conduct was unusual and 
 was observed by many. His attempts to conceal his 
 emotion were the means of exposing them the more 
 to public view . 87 
 
 It was soon observed by Democratic and opposi¬ 
 tion newspapers alike that neither Clay nor Cal¬ 
 houn was chairman of a committee and that 
 Webster was chairman of the finance commit¬ 
 tee. The Intelligencer thought that these things 
 would puzzle the uninitiated, but in its opinion 
 the opposition’s plans had been successful. 88 It 
 
 86 Congressional Globe, 23 Congress, 1 Session, p. 33. 
 
 87 Albany Argus, December 23, 1833. The report was written, 
 however, on the day that the vote was taken, December 16. 
 
 88 National Intelligencer, December 19, 1833. 
 
THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 107 
 
 was suggested by the New York American that 
 the selection of William Wilkins, a tariff Demo¬ 
 crat, as chairman of the committee on foreign 
 affairs and of Felix Grundy in the place of Clay¬ 
 ton as the chief of the post-office committee were 
 further evidence of skilful maneuvers on the 
 part of the opposition. 89 The “Spy in Washing¬ 
 ton” reported that Clay and Calhoun had both 
 asked that they should not be given the chairman¬ 
 ship of any committee. 90 Democratic newspapers 
 interpreted their absence from important places 
 as evidence of a defeat. The Pennsylvanian be¬ 
 lieved that the administration had checked Clay’s 
 plan to take charge of some of the committees. 91 
 The Washington correspondent of the New York 
 Journal of Commerce thought that the opposi¬ 
 tion’s plan had been nullified by the absence of 
 harmony between the northern and southern 
 wings. 92 The Albany Argus was more accurately 
 informed when it represented the formation of 
 the committees “as the perfect drill of the coali¬ 
 tion.” 93 The multiplicity of newspaper specula¬ 
 tions upon this subject testifies to a general 
 appreciation of its importance; happily it is 
 unnecessary to sift them carefully for the key to 
 the Senate elections. Clay wrote the same day 
 they were held: 
 
 ™New York American, December 19, 1833. 
 
 80 Morning Courier and New York Enquirer, December 20, 1833. 
 
 81 Pennsylvanian, December 19, 20, 1833. 
 
 83 Albany Argus, December 21, 1833. 
 
 83 Ibid., December 23, 1833. 
 
108 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 We were highly gratified today in the Senate. We 
 carried the appointment of every chairman of the com¬ 
 mittees as we wished; and as far as we have proceeded, 
 every member of the several committees with one unim¬ 
 portant exception . 94 
 
 It was good politics from Clay’s point of view 
 to place Webster at the head of the finance com¬ 
 mittee, even if he had known that the negotiations 
 between Webster and the administration had 
 failed. 95 In that position, he would be compelled 
 in dealing with the question of the deposits to 
 take a definite stand. His association with Bid¬ 
 dle and the Bank made probable his return to the 
 opposition. 96 There is evidence in Webster’s let¬ 
 ters that the possibility of using his strategic 
 position as a means of securing concessions for 
 the Bank from the administration was a factor in 
 his calculations at this time. 
 
 From various quarters pressure was brought to 
 bear to maintain the union between Webster and 
 the opposition achieved in the elections of the 
 Senate committees. The Baltimore Patriot denied 
 that there was any foundation for the current 
 rumor of a break between Clay and Webster and 
 protested against the publicity given to this 
 
 91 Clay to Francis Brooke, Washington, December 16, 1833. Col¬ 
 ton, Private Correspondence, p. 375. 
 
 95 In 1849 Clay told Van Buren that his account of the meeting 
 between Grundy, Jackson, and himself explained to him for the 
 first time the reasons for the defeat of the plans which he knew 
 Webster had arranged. Van Buren, Autobiography, pp. 672, 673. 
 
 98 Webster had suggested that Biddle submit the question of the 
 removal of the deposits to Congress. Webster to Biddle, Boston, 
 October 29, 1833. McGrane, Biddle Correspondence, pp. 216, 217. 
 
THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 109 
 
 rumor . 97 The National Gazette, with the interests 
 of the Bank in mind, wrote two days after the 
 election that there was no reason to doubt the con¬ 
 tinuance of good relations between Webster and 
 Clay: 
 
 Seeing the republican system itself and other vital pub¬ 
 lic interests assailed by the executive branch of the gov¬ 
 ernment, he will, we presume, exert all his energies to 
 defend or rescue them, glad to find such political leaders 
 as Mr. Clay and Mr. Calhoun engaged in the same noble 
 and pressing cause . 98 
 
 Before the removal was ordered, Biddle was ready 
 to sacrifice the unity of the opposition if by that 
 means Jackson’s hostility could be moderated; 
 but his influence, after the deposits had been 
 removed, was directed to the maintenance and 
 strengthening of the opposition. Webster had a 
 long conversation with him while on his way to 
 Washington in the course of which the political 
 situation was probably canvassed . 99 Webster’s 
 
 87 Poulson’s American Daily Advertiser, December 24, 1833. 
 
 88 National Gazette and Literary Advertiser, December 18, 1833. 
 
 88 Webster to Biddle, New York, November 27, 1833. Biddle 
 
 MSS. If Van Buren’s suggestion is correct, Webster was told in 
 the course of this conversation that Clay would be the leader of 
 the Bank’s forces during the approaching session and that this 
 information and his own political ambitions prepared him for "an 
 act of strong mark, the least effect of which would be to cripple 
 if not altogether neutralize Mr. Clay’s promised leadership by 
 securing a complete umpirage over the action of the standing 
 committees of the Senate.” Van Buren, Autobiography, pp. 663, 
 664 That Webster’s relations with the Bank at this time were 
 not as close as they had been, is evident from the fact that he 
 found it necessary, December 21, 1833, to apply for a renewal of 
 his retainer’s fee. Webster to Biddle, Washington, December 21, 
 1833. McGrane, Biddle Correspondence, p. 218. He assured 
 
110 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 future course of action in regard to his relations 
 with Clay was discussed, it may be inferred, but 
 it is improbable that a definite engagement was 
 made. Since Biddle’s interest in the premises 
 had changed, Webster would scarcely confide to 
 him his hopes for a continued codperation with 
 Jackson. It is clear, however, that Biddle tried 
 to keep Webster in line with the opposition, and 
 he criticised his former agent in his negotiations 
 with Jackson for his desertion, December 12, to 
 the administration. Three days after the com¬ 
 mittees had been chosen Webster wrote to 
 Biddle: 
 
 I am much obliged to you for your sermon, and will 
 hope to profit by it. I mean to keep extremely cool my¬ 
 self, but I fear the temperature of others will rise, higher 
 and higher. At present, there is no coolness whatever, 
 between those whom you would expect to see acting to¬ 
 gether. Some little difficulties were found, in arranging 
 the committees, but they were settled by mutual and 
 friendly arrangements . 100 
 
 When the administration rejected a possible un¬ 
 derstanding with Webster, the inevitable result 
 was to drive him back into his former political 
 association with Clay and his friends. He was 
 
 Biddle in a letter accompanying his formal application that be 
 had no intention of identifying himself in a cause against the Bank, 
 that the enclosed note was intended merely to arouse the board of 
 trustees to action. Webster to Biddle, Washington, December 21, 
 1833. Biddle MSS. Having failed in his attempt to arrange 
 favorable terms for the Bank with Jackson through the instru¬ 
 mentality of Webster, Biddle with good reason asked Clay to lead 
 the opposition on the question of the deposits. 
 
 100 Webster to Biddle, Washington, December 19, 1833. Biddle 
 MSS. 
 
THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 111 
 
 still, however, in a most sensitive mood, as Biddle 
 was informed in the last days of the year by his 
 representative in Washington: 
 
 I have seen Mr. Webster three times. At first, I was 
 exceedingly alarmed at the ground he took. I found out 
 subsequently that he considered himself deeply compro¬ 
 mised by Mr. Clay’s premature movement. He even told 
 me that at one time he had determined to send back the 
 memorial and request the Bank to get some one else to 
 present it. I entered at large on the subject, told him of 
 the public anxiety and dependence upon him—particularly 
 of yourself and your friends . 101 
 
 The political advantages of continuing to sup¬ 
 port the administration were brought to Webster’s 
 attention by a Pennsylvania Democrat. The 
 party in that state had appreciated his policy on 
 the nullification question, and Van Buren’s in¬ 
 fluence there was not so strong that it might not 
 be overcome by subsequent events. Webster was 
 told that the “discontented part of the Jackson 
 party in our State are looking up to you, that they 
 are watching your course this winter with the 
 utmost anxiety.” 102 
 
 For a time Webster’s friends advised that a 
 neutral policy should be followed rather than 
 one of complete surrender to the opposition. 
 Stephen White wrote in December that “the mad 
 
 101 J. Q. Watmough to Biddle, Washington, December 30, 1833. 
 Ibid. Webster’s displeasure, mentioned in this letter, was aroused 
 by the resolutions introduced by Clay, December 26, 1833, censuring 
 the President. 
 
 m N. W. Conrad to Webster, Philadelphia, December 17, 1833. 
 Webster MSS. 
 
112 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 pranks of old Jackson under the influences of 
 Cabinet impulses and of his natural recklessness” 
 had placed Webster in a difficult position. How¬ 
 ever, it was desirable that he should not be com¬ 
 mitted upon important issues to either party. 
 “The Jackson people here, the best class of them 
 I mean, lament deeply the course taken by the 
 General as tending to drive into opposition those 
 whose talents and influence would have been a 
 tower of strength to the Administration.” 103 
 Later, Webster was informed from the same 
 source that a portion of the Democratic party in 
 Boston had expressed “a strong desire that you 
 may be able to maintain your neutrality,” 
 although they were aware that the removal of the 
 deposits in spite of his reluctance might force him 
 into opposition. 104 Even White soon became con¬ 
 vinced that the administration’s attitude left 
 Webster no choice short of a close union with 
 Clay. This decision was necessary in spite of the 
 fact that 
 
 . . . your resolution had been made up not to arouse 
 
 if possible, in the course you should adopt in the Senate, 
 any opposition on mere party or local grounds to the 
 measures of the administration: that the opinions and 
 measures of the nullifiers were of so dangerous and mon- 
 
 103 White to Webster, Boston, December 27, 1833. Van Tyne, 
 Webster Transcripts. Webster’s friends in Massachusetts resented 
 keenly Clay’s association with Calhoun. White wrote in this 
 letter: “Mr. C. must and will commit himself ere long. He cannot 
 touch pitch without being defiled and the moment the union between 
 himself and Calhoun is more distinctly seen your friends will move 
 here in solid column.” 
 
 1W White to Webster, Boston, December 30, 1833. Ibid. 
 
THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 113 
 
 strous a character that the preservation of the union and 
 the maintenance of the legitimate powers of the general 
 government were with you paramount objects . . . 
 
 moderation and a conciliatory course would have secured 
 the acquiescence if not the support of many powerful and 
 patriotic minds . 105 
 
 When the speculation aroused by the formation 
 and composition of the Senate committees was 
 exhausted, opposition newspapers judiciously 
 avoided all reference to Webster’s past or present 
 relations with the administration. The Tele¬ 
 graph, however, was distinctly interested in a dis¬ 
 position to conciliate him on the part of the 
 Democratic press. It was probably mistaken in 
 pointing to this as the motive when the New 
 Hampshire Patriot for a time was unexpectly 
 moderate in its references to Webster. 106 As evi¬ 
 dence of the Democratic point of view, the New 
 York Standard was quoted to the effect that 
 Webster would not act with Clay and Calhoun. 
 “An independent position in which he can control 
 a majority of the Senate, is so easy of attainment 
 and so much more honorable than to follow the 
 lead of two disappointed and desperate politicians 
 that I think he will not fail to seize upon it.” 107 
 Green was of course far from the mark when he 
 asserted that Van Buren was willing to reverse 
 the administration’s policy in removing the 
 deposits in order to conciliate Webster. 108 
 
 105 White to Webster, Boston, January 9, 1834. Ibid. 
 
 1M United States Telegraph, December 27, 1833. 
 
 107 Ibid., December 28, 1833. 
 
 108 Ibid., December 30, 1833. 
 
114 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 The hostile report on the removal presented in 
 the Senate by Webster’s committee marked the 
 definite end of a possible realignment of parties. 
 Webster henceforth was in complete agreement 
 with the opposition upon the currency question, 
 and Webster’s old political associates were thus 
 reassured of his loyalty to the party. The reac¬ 
 tions of many, both North and South, were 
 doubtless similar to those expressed by a corre¬ 
 spondent of Willie P. Mangum. Webster’s re¬ 
 port had demonstrated his political honesty as 
 beyond suspicion. 
 
 If Mr. Webster could have been induced to forget what 
 was due his country here was ample opportunity to have 
 sold himself with advantage. Pressed as the administra¬ 
 tion is, beset on all sides by the ablest and most eloquent 
 men of the nation, driven to depend on talent of an 
 inferior grade, and for safety, to the ignorance and blind 
 passions of the mob, what a triumph it woud have been to 
 have enlisted the Briarius of the North in its cause, what 
 office could or would have been denied, and I think I have 
 heard a gentleman not very far from the honorable 
 Senator who is now reading this, hint that such things 
 might be . 109 
 
 According to the Washington correspondent of 
 the New York Daily Advertiser, Webster had 
 been loyal to his party in the face of the manifest 
 
 109 F. Nash to W. P. Mangum, Hillsboro, February 21, 1834. 
 Mangum MSS. Mangum was a member of the finance commit¬ 
 tee under Webster. The sectional affiliations of the members of 
 this committee are interesting. New England was represented by 
 Webster, the West by Ewing of Ohio, the South by Mangum of 
 North Carolina. The opposition was learning by experience that 
 resistance to the financial policy of the administration was the 
 most effective issue upon which to unite its heterogeneous members. 
 
THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 115 
 
 anxiety of the administration to retain him. He 
 might have had anything and _ everything the 
 party could bestow, if he had laid the Senate at 
 the feet of the President. Mr. Van Buren would 
 have cut off his mustaches ... if that would 
 have moved him.” 110 Webster explained his 
 policy to the Senate in the spring of 1834. 
 
 I ardently hoped that nothing might occur to place me 
 in an attitude of opposition. In all respects, and 
 in every way, it would have been far more agreeable. to 
 have found nothing in the measures of the administration 
 which I could not cheerfully support. The present oc¬ 
 casion of difference has not been sought or made by me 
 It is thrust upon me, in opposition to strong opinions an 
 wishes, on my part not concealed. The interference with 
 the public deposits dispelled all hope of continued con¬ 
 currence with the administration; and was a measure so 
 uncalled for, so unnecessary, and, in my judgment, so 
 illegal and indefensable, that, with whatever reluctance 
 it might be opposed, opposition was unavoidable . 111 
 
 Nothing was said or perhaps could have been said 
 in regard to his negotiations with the admims 
 tration. 
 
 In view of the exigencies of practical politics 
 the influences working toward a realignment of 
 parties upon the “union” issue in 1833 could not 
 be permanently successful. There was first and 
 always the sharp contrast between the training 
 and traditions of Webster and Jackson; only a 
 serious crisis, like the nullification movement, was 
 
 1,0 New York Daily Advertiser, January 24, 1834. 
 
 «» Mr. Webster's Speech on the President’s Protest, Senate, 
 May 7, 1834. Pamphlet. Library of Congress. 
 
116 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 able momentarily to bring them together. In 
 order to make this temporary agreement a perma¬ 
 nent understanding it was necessary that the ad¬ 
 ministration reverse its policy towards the Bank. 
 This the leaders of the Democratic party would 
 never do. The attack upon the Bank as a princi¬ 
 ple of political strategy was not an experiment to 
 be readily discarded. Its effectiveness had been 
 so thoroughly demonstrated by the results of the 
 preceding campaign that the politicians were 
 wedded to it. Open acceptance of the “union” 
 issue would have been inconsistent with the state 
 rights traditions of the larger number of Jack¬ 
 son’s friends and would have driven many, espe¬ 
 cially in the South, into opposition. It was 
 equally undesirable from the point of view of 
 the opposition’s leaders, since nullification had 
 brought Calhoun as a welcome ally. Politicians 
 in both camps were therefore concerned with 
 maintaining the distinctions between parties as 
 they had existed in the last campaign. 
 
 /"The nullification crisis was not sufficiently 
 serious nor did it last long enough to overcome 
 the inertia of politicians. The movement for 
 southern rights, of which it was an early episode, 
 had not made sufficient progress at this time to 
 convince more than a few that there was a real 
 danger to the preservation of the union. At no 
 time was there more than a small minority even 
 in the South that supported South Carolina in 
 
THE CRISIS OF 1833 
 
 117 
 
 its extreme theories. Nullification had lost its 
 importance as a national issue by the fall of 
 1833; politics and politicians thereupon promptly 
 dropped the union issue, to Webster’s apparent 
 regret, and raised again less embarrassing ques¬ 
 tions. Public interest thus became centered upon 
 the currency question upon which Webster and 
 Jackson had no basis of agreement. 
 
 The crisis in party relations of 1833 had im¬ 
 portant consequences upon the future of the 
 National Republican party. Its organiaztion had 
 been disrupted, and the divisions between Clay 
 and Webster made improbable a renewal of\ 
 friendly cooperation. Discredited by his defeat l 
 in 1832, by his apparent abandonment of the pro¬ 
 tective tariff, and by his association with Calh oun, 
 Clay was succeeded by Webster as thfe logical 
 candidate of the nationalists. His support of the 
 proclamation and the force bill gave Webster 
 additional strength in the North, but he was 
 thereby eliminated as the leader of the opposition 
 in the South. The immediate origins of the di¬ 
 visions within the Whig party during the cam¬ 
 paign of 1836 are therefore to be found in the 
 maneuvers and counter-maneuvers of 1833. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 PARTY STRATEGY AND NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 HE National Republican party was thor- 
 
 JL oughly discredited at the end of 1833. Its 
 leader and its principles had been rejected in the 
 preceding election, and nullification had sown the 
 seeds of suspicion between Webster’s friends and 
 those who welcomed the alliance with Calhoun. 
 In August, 1833, Niles predicted the use of “new 
 rules of action,’’ 1 and in November Adams com¬ 
 mented upon the disintegration of parties. 2 The 
 ground was therefore cleared for a new organ¬ 
 ization, but Webster’s dreams of using this op¬ 
 portunity for the organization of a party in open 
 support of nationalist ideas came to nothing in a 
 maze of political intrigues. Political necessities, 
 as in the campaign of 1832, required a coalition, 
 and expediency suggested the adoption of a new 
 name that would be free of the National Repub¬ 
 lican heritage of defeat. The Whig party was 
 born in the spring of 1834 under circumstances 
 that promised a successful future. It was not, 
 however, until after the results of the election of 
 
 1 Niles’ Register, XLV. 1. 
 
 2 Adams, Memoirs, IX. 35. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 119 
 
 1836 had been studied that the necessary step was 
 taken to recognize leaders who had the ability 
 and the willingness to appeal to the sources from 
 which the Democrats drew their strength. 
 
 The removal of the deposits and the Bank’s 
 systematic restriction of its loans for the purpose 
 of creating discontent against the administration 3 
 encouraged the opposition in a new effort at 
 organization. Fluctuation in the value of the 
 currency and difficulties in the making of loans, 
 Webster was told, argued so strongly in the in¬ 
 terest of a national bank that “a fearful revolu¬ 
 tion of opinion against General Jackson . . . 
 might be successfully organized and perhaps the 
 time has come which may shake even his baleful 
 popularity and produce a radical change in the 
 relation of parties.” 4 New England experienced 
 the full evils of the economic depression. “In this 
 land of snows,” so reads a letter from Connecti¬ 
 cut to Mangum, where the people are “cool, cal¬ 
 culating and serious,” great activity was taking- 
 place in organizing the opposition and in publish¬ 
 ing campaign material. 5 Word came to Webster 
 from central New York that the distress caused 
 by the removal was no “humbug,” and that seri¬ 
 ous changes were taking place in public opinion, 
 
 8 This topic is discussed in detail in Catterall, Second Bank, pp. 
 314-332. 
 
 * Stephen White to Webster, Boston, December 30, 1833. Van 
 Tyne, Webster Transcripts. 
 
 8 E. H. Burritt to Mangum, New Britain, March 20, 1834. 
 Mangum MSS. 
 
120 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 “especially among mercantile men. The universal 
 hurrah for Jackson has ceased, and men begin to 
 look with deep discontent at the present alarming 
 condition of the country.” 6 Niles noted that 
 prices and wages were falling, that interest rates 
 mounted to twelve and eighteen percent, and that 
 unemployment was increasing. 7 Much of the de¬ 
 pression, however, was due to temporary causes. 
 As early as December, 1833, Philip Hone, a New 
 York merchant, attributed the increasing difficul¬ 
 ties, in part, to the removal but also to the activi¬ 
 ties of speculators, who were buying stocks to the 
 value of millions for future delivery on the pros¬ 
 pect of a general decline in prices. He pointed to 
 the compromise tariff as another cause of depres¬ 
 sion. 8 Biddle was assured by Samuel Jaudon, the 
 Bank’s cashier and his trusted adviser, that the 
 tariff was largely responsible. 9 Biddle was de¬ 
 termined to make good use of prevailing condi¬ 
 tions. He wrote to the president of the branch at 
 Boston that Democrats could be persuaded to 
 abandon the administration only by “the actual 
 conviction of the existing distress of the com¬ 
 munity. Nothing but evidence of suffering 
 
 6 J. H. Ostrom to Webster, Utica, January 21, 1834. Webster 
 MSS. 
 
 7 Catterall, Second Bank, p. 326. 
 
 8 The Diary of Philip Hone, 1828-1851 (Bayard Tuckerman ed., 
 N. Y„ 1889), I. 85. 
 
 9 “We know that a great part of the present pressure arises 
 from the change in the system of duties, and other causes that 
 are temporary.” Jaudon to Biddle, March 9, 1834. Catterall, 
 Second Bank, p. 298. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 121 
 
 . . . will produce any effect in Congress.” If 
 the Bank should be induced “by too great a sensi¬ 
 tiveness” to relax its policy of restriction, “the 
 relief will itself be cited as evidence that the 
 measures of the government are not injurious 
 or oppressive, and the Bank will inevitably be 
 prostrated.” 10 
 
 However artificial the depression may have 
 been, its effects were real, and the city of New 
 York felt them keenly. Hone wrote that the 
 year 1833 had ended disastrously, that “personal 
 property has no fixed value, and sauve qni peut 
 is the maxim of the day.” 11 Conditions continued 
 unfavorable through the spring of 1834 and thus 
 aroused hope that the opposition would make a 
 good showing in the April municipal election. 
 Ordinarily of merely local importance, the charter 
 election of this year was regarded as an event of 
 national significance, since it was the first test 
 of public opinion after the beginning of the de¬ 
 pression. Early in March Clay told Hone that 
 the opposition’s one hope was in the New York 
 and Pennsylvania elections, for success there 
 would encourage the revolt of a sufficient number 
 of Jackson men in Congress to overthrow the 
 Democratic control of legislation. 12 Adams 13 and 
 
 10 Biddle to William Appleton, January 27, 1834. McGrane, 
 Biddle Correspondence, pp. 219-220. 
 
 11 Hone, Diary, I. 86. 
 
 u Ibid., I. 94. 
 
 u Ibid., I. 94. 
 
122 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 Webster 14 were of the same opinion. Since it 
 was regarded by party leaders as a first step in a 
 new campaign against Jackson, wide interest was 
 shown in the electioneering and in the results of 
 the New York election. The Intelligencer and 
 Niles commented upon the intensely partisan 
 activities there. City journals, it was said, 
 teemed with accounts of public meetings. Cart¬ 
 ers, landlords, seamen, stone cutters, tailors met 
 for the purpose of denouncing the administra¬ 
 tion. Men of all professions and from every 
 interest entered the contest. 15 Committees were 
 organized to protect party interests at the polls, 
 and it was recommended that “friends of a re¬ 
 storation close their stores and workshops that 
 they might attend the business of the elections.” 16 
 The Democrats elected their candidate for mayor 
 by a small margin, but they lost control of the 
 Council. 17 The result was hailed everywhere as 
 a significant success. 18 
 
 M Ibid., I. 98. 
 
 15 National Intelligencer, April 5, 1834. Cf. New York Daily 
 Advertiser, March 31, April 1, 1834. 
 
 10 Niles’ Register, XLVI. 82. 
 
 17 Ibid., XLVI. 115. Earlier Niles had reported that the parties 
 seemed to be engaged in a death struggle: “the public officers 
 and all their dependents, with the friends of general and state gov¬ 
 ernments on the one side—and the merchants and traders on the 
 other. Business of all sorts was nearly suspended—at 12 M. the 
 flag of the union was hoisted each day on the exchange, the 
 building was then deserted and the stores in all parts of the city 
 generally closed, that every man might go to the polls.” Ibid., 
 XLVI. pp. 100, 101. 
 
 18 According to Hone, Whig newspapers reported enthusiastic 
 celebrations, illuminations, the firing of cannons on the arrival of 
 the news in Philadelphia, Albany, Buffalo, and Baltimore. Hone, 
 Diary, I. 103. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 123 
 
 Members of the opposition first called them¬ 
 selves Whigs in the course of this exciting local 
 election. Political parties in the Jacksonian pe¬ 
 riod rarely made a purposive search for their 
 names, 19 and the name Whig has been traced to a 
 variety of sources. Most recently, Professor 
 Dixon R. Fox credits its first use to Colonel 
 Webb, editor of the New York Courier and En¬ 
 quirer, at the suggestion of Philip Hone. 20 Other 
 historians have discovered it in the campaign of 
 1832 in Maine, 21 Pennsylvania, 22 and South Caro¬ 
 lina. 23 A contemporary observer credits it to 
 Joseph Duane, a writer on the staff of the Star 
 Spangled Banner in February 1834. 24 It appears 
 from the first day of the election in the diary of 
 Philip Hone, an active member of the party, but 
 the New York Daily Advertiser used it only once 
 in its reports of the campaign and election. 25 The 
 number of these explanations, supported in each 
 case by credible evidence, casts doubt upon any 
 as the exclusive truth, and the general acceptance 
 
 19 The use of party names during the campaign of 1832 is dis¬ 
 cussed in Gammon, Campaign of 1832, pp. 155-162. 
 
 “Fox, Decline of Aristocracy, p. 367. Cf. Barnes, Memoir of 
 Thnrlow Weed, p. 48. 
 
 21 L. C. Hatch, History of Maine (1919), I. 210. 
 
 22 Mary G. Bartlett, The Chief Phases of Pennsylvania Politics 
 in the Jacksonian Period (Allentown, 1919), p. 77. The value of 
 Miss Bartlett’s monograph in this and other instances is lessened 
 by the absence of exact citations. 
 
 23 Cole, Whig Party in the South, p. 18. 
 
 “Nathan Sargent, Public Men and Events, I. 362. 
 
 20 New York Daily Advertiser, April 7, 1834. 
 
124 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 of the name in the summer of 1834 may be at¬ 
 tributed to a common appreciation of its political 
 merits. It fixed attention upon opposition to 
 Jackson rather than upon political principles as 
 the reason for the party’s existence. Moreover, 
 its associations with the struggle against the 
 power of the British Crown and with the cause 
 of the Revolutionary patriots had a sentimental 
 attraction for men who were smarting under 
 what they alleged to be an unconstitutional exer¬ 
 cise of the president’s powers. The enthusiasm 
 with which the new campaign began was evident 
 in the high ground taken by the party. Quite in 
 keeping with its alleged mission as the defender 
 of the constitution, a miniature frigate, thus 
 christened, was hauled through the streets of 
 New York during the election 26 and was later 
 taken to Philadelphia. 27 As evidence of their 
 patriotic inclinations, business men ordered flags 
 to be hoisted above the Exchange. 28 
 
 The Intelligencer forthwith interpreted the 
 Whig success in the city as a promise of a more 
 important victory in the state election of Novem¬ 
 ber. 29 Local elections in Albany, Syracuse, Au¬ 
 burn, Troy, and New Brunswick gave additional 
 encouragement. It seemed to Niles that a real 
 change had taken place “in the political opinions 
 
 28 Niles’ Register, XLVI. 116. 
 
 27 Ibid., XLVI. 130. 
 
 “Ibid., XLVI. 100, 101. 
 
 29 National Intelligencer, April 14, 1834. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 125 
 
 of the people of this state, or there is new zeal 
 to give them effect.” 30 A movement of great sig¬ 
 nificance was taking place, he believed, and its 
 momentum was being “hourly increased by the 
 new difficulties in business and the greatly in¬ 
 creased number of persons out of employment. 
 
 Undue confidence, however, was placed in the 
 political results of the depression. One of the 
 most important causes of the depression was re¬ 
 moved when the Bank abandoned its policy of 
 restriction in July, 3 ” and as the state banks had 
 profited by federal deposits the administration 
 thereby gained their support. 33 Democrats did 
 not fail to press home the charge that the national 
 bank was responsible for the depression. 34 These 
 circumstances, Hone declared in October, re¬ 
 quired that Whig nominations should be made 
 with exclusive regard to the political strength of 
 the candidates. “All personal feelings and pre¬ 
 dilections must be sacrificed for the success of 
 our party,” and “we must . . . without com¬ 
 mitting ourselves to unworthy persons, run only 
 such as will obtain the most votes. 3j The party 
 
 30 Niles’ Register, XLVI. 190. 
 
 31 Ibid., XLVI. 130. 
 
 32 Catterall, Second Bank, pp. 327, 328. 
 
 33 Hammond, Political History of New York, II. 435. 
 
 34 These charges were summarized in an address prepared by 
 the New York State Democratic Convention in September 1834. 
 Niles’ Register, XLVII. 63. 
 
 38 Hone, Diary, I. 114, 115. Whig organization, he admitted, 
 could not compare with that of their opponents. Our folks are 
 not so well drilled . . . they will think for themselves not 
 
 like them go straight forward right or wrong as they are bidden. 
 
126 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 in New York suffered from the complaint of 
 divided leadership that was chronic in its national 
 organization, and Seward’s nomination was the 
 result of a secret bargain among a few politi¬ 
 cians. 36 Nevertheless, no effort was spared to 
 elect him in order to make an auspicious begin¬ 
 ning in the national campaign. Niles reported 
 that “such doings as are now happening in New 
 York never happened before.” 37 On the eve of 
 the election, he declared that the result would be 
 the turning point in national politics, for it would 
 “decide whether the principles of General Jack- 
 son are approved and ratified by the people, and 
 whether Mr. Van Buren is to be his successor.” 38 
 
 The elation of the W higs in the spring and 
 summer proved premature. In Pennsylvania the 
 party lost two seats in Congress which the Na¬ 
 tional Republicans had controlled. 39 Seward’s 
 defeat was foreshadowed by that of James Find¬ 
 lay in Ohio, where the Democratic candidate for 
 governor was elected. 40 Optimism was further 
 chilled by a defeat in New Jersey, 41 which was 
 soon followed by a two to one vote for the Demo¬ 
 cratic candidate, William L. Marcy, in the New 
 York election. 42 Horace Greeley attributed 
 
 33 Seward, Autobiography, pp. 156, 157. 
 
 37 Niles' Register, XLVII. 69. 
 
 38 Ibid., XLVII. 116. 
 
 39 Ibid., XLVII. 118. 
 
 43 Ibid., XLVII. 138. 
 
 41 Hone, Diary, I. 113. 
 
 42 Niles’ Register, XXLVII. 116. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 127 
 
 Seward’s defeat to a return of prosperity, 43 and 
 this opinion was also expressed by Michel Cheva¬ 
 lier, a French economist then in this country on 
 an official mission: 
 
 Le retablissement des affaires industrielles a tourne 
 . . . au desavantage de l’Opposition . . . Le 
 
 commerce est prospere maintenant; la campagne d’au- 
 tomne a ete excellent; tout porte a penser que celle du 
 printemps prochain ne sera pas moins avantageuse . 44 
 
 Events had proved that Democratic strength was 
 too solidly established to be overthrown as easily 
 as the Whigs, deceived by their hopes, had 
 anticipated. 
 
 While the prospects for success in the national 
 campaign had been promising in the spring of 
 1834, the situation was reversed after the series 
 of failures in local and state elections of the sum¬ 
 mer and fall. In addition, there was a dis¬ 
 couraging absence of principles, if we except a 
 disposition to oppose Van Buren. Sectional 
 divergences inherited from the National Repub¬ 
 lican party made union in support of a single 
 candidate improbable. New England Whigs of 
 nationalist predilections named Webster as their 
 candidate; the southern wing found a leader in 
 Judge White, 45 a recent recruit from Democratic 
 
 43 Horace Greeley, Recollections of an Active Life (N. Y., 1873), 
 
 p. 112. 
 
 44 Michel Chevalier, Lettres sur I’Amerique du Nord (Bruxelles, 
 1837), pp. 269, 270. 
 
 43 Cole, Whig Party in the South, pp. 38 ff. 
 
128 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 ranks; while the party in the west hesitated be¬ 
 tween William H. Harrison and Clay. All were 
 unavailable for the leadership of a united party. 
 Webster and White could hope for little support 
 outside of their sections. Clay’s relations with 
 Calhoun and his responsibility for the compro¬ 
 mise tariff made him unacceptable to the party in 
 New England, and few anywhere had confidence 
 in him as a candidate. Oran Follett informed 
 him that he had been abandoned as a candidate. 
 
 I feel the force of what I say, and no one regrets the 
 necessity more than I do, that compels me to say you are 
 not the man on whom the friends of the country can rely 
 for the canvass of 1836. This is the secret conviction of 
 the whole National Republican party, with perhaps a few 
 exceptions. 46 
 
 The lure of the presidency was too strong for 
 Clay to abandon hope of a nomination, but in 
 the summer of 1833 he declared his reluctance to 
 accept one without assurance of certain success. 47 
 Webster’s return to the opposition 48 apparently 
 encouraged him, for he immediately sounded a 
 rallying cry for a new attack upon the adminis¬ 
 tration. 49 The political situation remaining un- 
 
 46 Follett to Clay. January 10, 1833. Follett Papers, I. 76. 
 
 47 Clay to Francis Brooke, Ashland. May 30, 1833. Colton, 
 Private Correspondence , p. 362. Cf. K. Thomas to McLean, Cin¬ 
 cinnati, August 31, 1833. McLean MSS. 
 
 48 See the preceding chapter for a discussion of this topic. 
 
 48 “I mean myself to open and push a vigorous campaign. _ It is 
 the campaign of 1777. I want aid—all the aid that can be given. 
 Clay to Brooke, Washington, December 16, 1833. Colton, Private 
 Correspondence, p. 375. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 129 
 
 favorable, by the summer of 1835 he became 
 convinced that there was no possibility for a turn 
 in public sentiment in his favor. 50 Elisha Whit¬ 
 tlesey, writing to McLean in May 1833, at¬ 
 tributed Clay’s loss of strength to the compromise 
 tariff which had made him “exceedingly unpopu¬ 
 lar in all manufacturing districts.” 51 According 
 to the New York Advertiser, a staunch opponent 
 of Jackson and a firm advocate of protection, 
 Clay was considered by “many of his former 
 friends as having in some measure abandoned 
 them, and their interests, as well as his own 
 principles.” Convinced that he must give up his 
 own presidential ambitions, Clay turned to a con¬ 
 sideration of the merits of the other candidates. 
 Webster would have no chance, he thought, 
 although his qualifications were admittedly su¬ 
 perior. 52 By September, 1835, he had decided 
 that Harrison was the most available candidate. 53 
 This decision aroused suspicion that Clay in¬ 
 tended to dominate Harrison’s administration in 
 the event of his election. A correspondent of 
 McLean declared: “If he cannot be himself 
 elected he would prefer one he could control as 
 a father his child—if not a Louisianan his 
 
 60 Clay to (?). July 14, 1835. Ibid., 393. 
 
 " Whittlesey to McLean, Canfield, Ohio, May 3, 1833. McLean 
 MSS. 
 
 r,2 New York Advertiser, July 15, 1835. 
 
 03 Clay to (?), July 14, 1835. Colton, Private Correspondence, 
 p. 394. 
 
130 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 slave.” 54 To what extent Clay aided Harrison’s 
 campaign must, in the absence of information, 
 remain uncertain, but his interest in Harrison did 
 not prevent a revival of his own ambitions in the 
 campaign of 1840. 
 
 The elimination of Clay opened the field to 
 other candidates, and McLean promptly appeared 
 again with his plan of placing himself at the head 
 of a fusion party. In December, 1833, he wrote 
 to the postmaster of New York that in his opin¬ 
 ion both parties in the West would support him. 
 He feared that “all the discipline of the party will 
 be brought to bear against me, and the entire 
 patronage of the federal government.” 55 As in 
 the campaign of 1832, he proposed to appeal to 
 the dissatisfied members of both parties. To this 
 end, the prospectus of a new journal with the 
 significant name, The Moderator, appeared in 
 the columns of the Washington Globe. Election 
 of any one of the candidates then in the field 
 would bring dissension and perhaps disunion to 
 the country. “It will therefore be both expedient 
 and necessary that these candidates yield their 
 claims to those of one enjoying the general confi¬ 
 dence of the people.” 56 That McLean was to be 
 this highly desirable candidate does not appear in 
 
 64 George Kesling to McLean, Lebanon, Ohio, August 10, 1835. 
 McLean MSS. 
 
 55 McLean to S. L. Gouverneur, Richland, Ohio, December 10, 
 1832. Gouverneur MSS. 
 
 ™ This announcement is signed by W. R. Collier, who is other¬ 
 wise unknown to fame. Washington Globe, June 28, 1833. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 131 
 
 the text of this announcement, but it is certain 
 that his name was in the writer’s mind. oT His 
 plan of appealing to members of both parties was 
 commended by friendly politicians. Arrange¬ 
 ments had been made, Whittlesey informed him, 
 for assemblies of Democrats from Pennsylvania 
 and Ohio in order to decide upon the best way of 
 bringing his name before the public. 08 Accord¬ 
 ing to Albert H. Tracy, an Anti-Masonic leader 
 in New York, only McLean could unite all ele¬ 
 ments of the opposition, and his nomination 
 should be made by men who were least objection¬ 
 able to the Democrats. 59 Thaddeus Stevens, at 
 this time an Anti-Masonic politician in Pennsyl¬ 
 vania, advised that he should first be nominated 
 by his Democratic friends. 60 For a year McLean 
 continued to count upon a fusion of the two 
 parties. Early in February, 1834, he declared 
 that his friends had refused to withdraw his 
 name because “they know that a large portion of 
 the Jackson party, if not a majority of them, are 
 willing to sustain me, and that this force united 
 with the National Republicans would make its 
 result certain.” However, he was far from con¬ 
 fident of the loyalty of his political friends in the 
 opposition. “My impression is, that they wish to 
 
 *’ N. T. Simpson to McLean, Washington, June 21, 1833. Mc¬ 
 Lean MSS. 
 
 58 Whittlesey to McLean, Canfield, September 14, 1833. Ibid. 
 
 " Tracy to McLean, New York, September 3, 1833. 
 
 “Richards to McLean, Harrisburg, January 18, 1834. Ibid. 
 
132 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 use me, at least some of them, to break up the 
 Jackson party in Ohio and Pennsylvania, in order 
 to increase the prospects of Mr. Clay or Mr. 
 Calhoun.” 61 Unfortunately for his prospects, he 
 declared himself as opposed in principle to a re¬ 
 newal of the Bank’s charter and thus alienated 
 friends in the Whig party. 62 In August, 1834, 
 Whittlesey warned him that his Democratic ad¬ 
 mirers could not be relied upon. McLean’s criti¬ 
 cism of the postal service had apparently been 
 well received in Democratic circles, but if Barry’s 
 loyalty to the administration should be put to the 
 question “you have not a friend in the House who 
 is a Jackson man that will not say aye, with a full 
 voice, and look as if he meant it.” 63 
 
 The result of the Ohio state election in the fall 
 of 1834, in which McLean had endorsed James 
 Findlay, the Whig candidate, 64 was regarded as 
 a test of McLean’s political strength. Success 
 there, in Tracy’s opinion, not only would be a 
 serious blow to Van Buren but would “go further 
 than any single event to settle the question be¬ 
 tween you and every other candidate.” Should 
 
 “ McLean to S. T. Chapman, Washington, February 27, 1834 
 Ibid. 
 
 92 Thomas Corwin to McLean, May 20, 1834. Ibid; Whittlesey 
 to McLean, Washington, June 2, 1834. Ibid; Charles Hammond 
 to Thomas Ewing, Cincinnati, March 27, 1834. Ewing MSS. 
 Library of Congress. 
 
 93 Whittlesey to McLean, Canfield, August 14, 1834. McLean 
 MSS. 
 
 94 McLean to Findlay, Washington, February 7, 1834. Torrence 
 Papers, I. Quarterly Publications of the Ohio Historical and 
 Philosophical Society. I. 81, 82. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 133 
 
 the Democratic governor be reelected, ‘'it would 
 go far to blast all our hopes in this State and 
 would be irreparably injurious to your prospects 
 throughout the country.” 65 Findlay’s defeat did 
 not prevent a nomination of McLean by the state 
 legislature, 66 but without the prestige of an initial 
 success in his own state it was, of course, coldly 
 received. In July, 1835, the Intelligencer pointed 
 out his lack of support outside of Ohio, and, in 
 any case, that the encouragement given to Mc¬ 
 Lean was intended as a “mark of respect and 
 confidence rather than a serious intention that he 
 should leave his present position in the Supreme 
 Court.” 67 When it became clear that the Whigs 
 contemplated a scheme to force the election into 
 the House,—perhaps a timely opportunity to 
 withdraw from a hopeless contest , McLean 
 refused to become involved and accordingly 
 withdrew his name in August, 1835. 68 
 
 With this action McLean ceased to play a part 
 in Whig politics during the Jacksonian period. 
 Like those of his more notable rivals, his presi¬ 
 dential aspirations were doubtless founded upon 
 personal ambitions. Adams declared that he 
 thought “of nothing but the Presidency by day 
 and dreamed of nothing else at night. 69 Due to 
 
 “ Tracy to McLean, Buffalo, May 28, 1834. McLean MSS. 
 
 86 Niles’ Register, XLVII. 138. 
 
 87 National Intelligencer, July 11, 1835. 
 
 88 McLean to Moses H. Kirby, Richland, August 31, 1835. 
 McLean MSS. 
 
 80 Adams, Memoirs, VIII. 587. 
 
134 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 the scarcity of his own letters and other evidence, 
 McLean’s attitude toward party politics must re¬ 
 main obscure, but it is clear that his interest in 
 partisan measures was distinctly less than that of 
 other leaders. His point of view resembled that 
 of Adams in that he refused to be completely 
 identified with a particular party and clung to the 
 ideal of a non-partisan administration. Seeking 
 support wherever he could find it, he opened him¬ 
 self to criticism, which was perhaps not without 
 foundation, as a scheming politician. Ready to 
 accept the aid of the opposition, he was quite 
 willing that Democratic leaders should believe 
 that he was one of themselves. In February, 
 1833, in the course of a plea for Democratic aid 
 in Pennsylvania, he declared: “Indeed, without 
 the countenance and support of this party, I have 
 never designed that they were at liberty to bring 
 me forward. Since the commencement of my 
 political life, I have acted with this party, and I 
 do not believe that any other safe basis can be 
 afforded for the federal constitution.” 70 
 
 The nullification crisis failed to realize Web¬ 
 ster’s hopes of a new party in support of na¬ 
 tionalist principles, but it helped to nominate him 
 on this platform. He was convinced, according 
 to Tracy, that the union issue would determine 
 
 70 McLean to Ingham, Washington, February 4, 1833. Van 
 Buren MSS. The presence of this letter in the Van Buren 
 manuscripts suggests that McLean’s position was of some interest 
 to Democratic leaders. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 135 
 
 the result of the next campaign, and Tracy was 
 confident that this consideration would induce 
 him to become a candidate. 71 Early in January, 
 1835, he was nominated by a group of his ad¬ 
 mirers in the Massachusetts legislature, 72 and an 
 address was prepared citing his constitutional 
 principles as the chief reason for his nomination. 
 
 It is impossible to reconcile all the differences of this 
 wide land; but there is one question in which all parts of 
 it have the same interest. Let that be made the rallying 
 point of the Whigs. Let us be for the constitution, and 
 the man who can best defend it . 73 
 
 It was clear to Webster that support of an ex¬ 
 clusively nationalist character would scarcely 
 meet the needs of a campaign. Believing that 
 useful recruits could be found among the rem¬ 
 nants of the Anti-Masonic party, 74 he seriously 
 maneuvered for their aid. 75 The party main¬ 
 tained a shadowy existence in national politics, 76 
 
 71 Tracy to Weed, Buffalo, June 10, 1833. Barnes, Memoirs of 
 Weed, p. 49. 
 
 u National Intelligencer, January 26, 1835. 
 
 73 Ibid., March 21, 1836. Webster selected the following slogan 
 for his campaign: “Our country, our country, and nothing but our 
 country.” 
 
 74 Webster to Jeremiah Mason, Washington, February 1, 1835. 
 Van Tyne, Webster Letters, p. 114. 
 
 75 In order to show that he was acting in accordance with 
 respectable precedents, Webster sought permission to publish Mar¬ 
 shall’s letters in which he had endorsed Anti-Masonry. Webster 
 to Edward E. Marshall, Washington, February 6, 1836. Ibid., p. 
 202 . 
 
 78 National Intelligencer, November 25, 1835. A make-shift con¬ 
 vention met in the summer of 1836. The New Yorker, August 
 20, 1836. 
 
136 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 while in local affairs it had a variety of experi¬ 
 ences. It remained an active force in Pennsyl¬ 
 vania as a result of local issues and of the personal 
 influence of Thaddeus Stevens. 77 In New York 78 
 and Vermont 79 its members drifted into the Whig 
 party, but in Massachusetts a division occurred, 
 one part going into the Democratic ranks. 80 Web¬ 
 ster had no objection in principle to an association 
 with them. In November, 1835, the Anti-Ma¬ 
 sonic committee of Alleghany county, Pennsyl¬ 
 vania, asked Webster to prepare a statement of 
 his position with reference to the principles of 
 that party. 81 In reply he declared that they had 
 his approval, as he understood them, and added 
 that he had endorsed the Massachusetts statute 
 against secret oaths. 82 W. W. Irwin, a member 
 of the committee, without showing it to his col- 
 
 77 McCarthy, Anti-Masonic Party, p. 461. 
 
 78 Hammond, Political Parties in New York, II. 439. Cf. Adams, 
 Memoirs, IX. 114, 115. 
 
 79 McCarthy, Anti-Masonic Party, 514. 
 
 80 Adams, Memoirs, VIII. 70, 71. Cf. The New Former, Novem¬ 
 ber 19, 1836. The Anti-Masonic party had drawn some of its 
 members from the Democrats, and this element was suspicious 
 of the efforts of Whigs to gain their support. Henry Dana Ward, 
 a leading Anti-Mason in New York, declared that their interest 
 was in votes not principles. Ward to E. Tilden, New Lebanon, 
 January 9, 1835. Van Buren MSS. Adams thought Ward to be 
 acting in Van Buren’s interest. Adams, Memoirs, IX. 170. 
 
 81 Harmar Denny to Webster, Pittsburg, November 11, 1835. 
 Webster MSS. Webster had been in sympathy with the aims of 
 Anti-Masonry since 1833. Included in a series of points prepared 
 for use on his western tour was one condemning unlawful asso¬ 
 ciations, secret oaths and all societies seeking to obtain advantages 
 not enjoyed by other citizens. Van Tyne, Webster Letters, p. 183. 
 
 82 Webster to the Anti-Masonic Committee of Alleghany County, 
 Boston, November 20, 1835. Webster MSS. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 137 
 
 leagues, returned Webster’s statement with a 
 request that his views should be stated more 
 forcefully. 83 The draft of Webster’s letter shows 
 that he then struck out the qualifying phrase and 
 instead of an approval of the Massachusetts 
 statute wrote: “It is my opinion that the future 
 administration of all such oaths should be pro¬ 
 hibited by law.” 84 Even this statement was ap¬ 
 parently not entirely satisfactory, for Webster 
 again wrote to Irwin that he could not promise to 
 appoint Anti-Masons exclusively, in the event of 
 his election, although there could be no doubt as to 
 his attitude. 85 His efforts, however, were fruit¬ 
 less, for the Anti-Masons at Harrisburg gave 
 first choice to Harrison and the second to Francis 
 Granger. 86 Webster was told that he was the 
 personal choice of most delegates but that expedi¬ 
 ency forbade his nomination. “Ah, but he was a 
 Federalist! Damning sin! Never to be forgiven! 
 But he was opposed to the war !” 87 
 
 Webster was the choice of perhaps the most 
 influential of the Whig newspapers. The Boston 
 Atlas, the New York American, and the National 
 Intelligencer, in so far as they supported a par- 
 
 83 Irwin to Webster, Pittsburg, November 27, 1835. Ibid. 
 
 84 The corrections were made in his letter of November 20. 
 
 85 Webster to Irwin, Boston, November 30, 1835. Webster's 
 Writings (National Edition), XVI. p. 260. 
 
 88 National Intelligencer, December 19, 1835. This nomination 
 was of little importance, since it was soon rejected by the Pennsyl¬ 
 vania state committee. Ibid., December 22, 1835. 
 
 87 Charles Miner to Webster, Harrisburg, December 17, 1835. 
 Webster MSS. 
 
138 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 ticular candidate, endorsed him, but he lacked the 
 qualities necessary to arouse enthusiasm. 88 It 
 was generally believed that he had few contacts 
 with the people. 89 His friends argued that his 
 superior qualifications should be recognized by 
 the support of a united party. The Intelligencer 
 despaired of republican government if the charge 
 were true that he was of a “too high order of 
 intellect, of too pure a school of politics, ever to 
 be chosen President of the United States.” 90 
 
 The growing popularity of Harrison’s can¬ 
 didacy aroused resentment among newspapers 
 devoted to Webster. Consistent with their con¬ 
 servative character, they wished to maintain the 
 standards for the presidency as they had existed 
 before the advent of Jacksonian Democracy. The 
 candidate of the Whig party, they declared, 
 should have all of the qualifications given by ex¬ 
 perience and ability. The Intelligencer cautiously 
 refrained from expressing openly an opinion as 
 regards Harrison’s merits, but its reactions were 
 clearly revealed in the clippings it printed. The 
 Pittsburg Gazette declared that his abilities were 
 not of a high order and that his name had only 
 recently been mentioned as a possible candidate. 
 
 88 In March, 1836, the Massachusetts legislature however refused 
 to withdraw his nomination until a more convincing case could 
 be made against him. National Intelligencer, March 24, 1836. 
 
 89 He found it necessary to deny the charge that had ever said, 
 “ ‘Let Congress take care of the Rich, and the Rich will take care 
 of the Poor’.” Webster to James Brooks, Boston, August 5, 1834. 
 Webster’s Writings (National Edition), XVI. 241, 242. 
 
 80 National Intelligencer, March 24, 1836. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 139 
 
 He would never have been considered had he not 
 commanded at Tippecanoe. “The ‘hero of Tippe¬ 
 canoe’ figures as prominently as the ‘hero of New 
 Orleans’ used to be in the Jackson papers.” 91 The 
 Pittsburg Advocate refused to endorse a man of 
 second rate ability. 91 Whig success would depend, 
 according to the Philadelphia Gazette, upon 
 “Whig principles” and the “superiority of their 
 candidate”; defeat would be certain in the event 
 of Harrison’s nomination, and it refused to aid 
 the election of a “secondary man.” 92 In October 
 the Advocate asserted again that its candidate 
 was “Daniel Webster, not General or Colonel 
 Webster” and that the shallow appeal of a mili¬ 
 tary reputation was not needed to convince the 
 people of the need for a change in the adminis¬ 
 tration. Webster was “the great man of the 
 country ... we want no lesser lights—no 
 stars of the second magnitude.” 93 Harrison’s 
 nomination at various points in the West drew 
 from “Massachusetts” a trenchant letter which 
 affirmed the intention of Webster’s friends to re¬ 
 main true to his principles rather than to support 
 merely an available candidate. Men who were 
 now urging Harrison’s election, he declared, had 
 formerly denied that Jackson’s greater accom¬ 
 plishments and abilities merited the presidency. 
 “If New Orleans in all its fame of truth, should 
 
 ” Ibid., September 30, 1835. 
 
 “ Ibid., October 24, 1835. 
 
 Ibid,, October 28, 1835. 
 
140 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 furnish no civic wreath to the victor, can Tippe¬ 
 canoe supply it?” 94 These objectors to Harri¬ 
 son were men who clung to the traditions of 
 the Federalist and National Republican parties. 
 They were opposed to meeting Van Buren with a 
 candidate who had some of popular qualities of 
 Jackson, and were equally willing, according to 
 the National Gazette, to support Webster or Clay. 
 
 The friends of Mr. Webster will act, not with reference 
 simply or mainly, to his personal interests, but also for 
 the important end of obtaining a declaration in favor of a 
 powerful and experienced captain of the civil order 
 . . . in contradistinction to a vamped hero of the 
 
 military species, nominated for his supposed popularity 
 for military deeds, and who has fallen among the ‘illus¬ 
 trious obscure and inert’ during the whole time that Whig 
 battles have been fought . 95 
 
 In September, 1833, Whittlesey wrote to Web¬ 
 ster: “the National Republican party has de¬ 
 ceived itself by consulting and taking counsel 
 almost exclusively from those in the highest 
 walks of life. The rank and file men however poll 
 the votes.” 96 This consideration, he thought, 
 would be a strong point for McLean, but in fact 
 it brought Harrison into the campaign. His 
 nomination early in the spring of 1835 by a 
 group of “Democratic Republicans” in Dauphin 
 County, Pennsylvania, assembled “without re- 
 
 M Ibid., December 28, 1835. 
 
 95 National Gazette and Literary Register, November 20, 1835. 
 
 96 Whittlesey to Webster, Canfield, September 14, 1833. Webster 
 MSS. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 141 
 
 gard to former differences of opinion,” 97 had little 
 immediate effect. His increasing popularity con¬ 
 vinced the Intelligencer in September, however, 
 that he had become a serious factor. 98 The Cin¬ 
 cinnati Gazette was convinced that neither Web¬ 
 ster nor McLean could be elected and that events 
 showed Harrison to be the most promising candi¬ 
 date. ‘‘Harrison takes with the people—why then, 
 shall not the politicians adhere to him ... Mr. 
 Webster cannot be elected President—Gen. Har¬ 
 rison may be elected. South, Wbst, North, East, 
 all can support Gen. Harrison.” 99 In a letter to 
 Webster, September, 1833, Whittlesey inadver¬ 
 tently outlined the more important of Harrison’s 
 advantages as a candidate. The Whig candidate, 
 to have any chance against Van Buren, ‘‘must 
 have belonged in former days to the Democratic 
 party . . . I say this from my knowledge of 
 human nature, and the magic influence a name 
 has with the people. He must divide the Jackson 
 party, and concentrate to a considerable extent 
 the friends of Mr. Adams and Mr. Clay. 
 While this letter was unknown to Harrison poli¬ 
 ticians, their actions nevertheless were in accord¬ 
 ance with its counsel. They appealed to Demo¬ 
 cratic prejudices in behalf of their candidate, and 
 
 87 National Intelligencer, April 2, 1835. 
 
 88 Ibid., September 5, 1835. 
 
 80 Cincinnati Gazette, September 18, 1835. The editor, Charles 
 Hammond, had supported Clay in the campaign of 1832. 
 
 100 Whittlesey to Webster, Canfield, September 14, 1833. Web¬ 
 ster MSS. 
 
142 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 carefully avoided a too close association with 
 the Whig party. The convention which nomi¬ 
 nated him at Harrisburg, December, 1835, was 
 called by a self-styled Democratic Republican 
 Committee, and an address was published calling 
 upon both parties for support. “The democratic 
 supporters of the present chief magistrate, the 
 democratic Whigs, and the democratic anti¬ 
 masons may, without losing their party names or 
 giving up their party organization, be cordially 
 invited to appear.” 101 Harrison’s campaign, as 
 in 1840, largely ignored reasoned arguments 102 
 and relied upon an appeal to mob psychology. 
 ‘‘Harrison stock has reached a high premium,” 
 McLean was informed in February, 1836, 
 “‘drums, pipes and trumpets’ is the cry!” 103 
 Against these methods the more prosaic Webster 
 had little chance of success; he was “too marked 
 by intellect and independence of soul,” a corre- 
 
 101 Niles’ Register, XLIX. 176. Cf. H. R. Mueller, The Whig 
 Party in Pennsylvania (New York, 1922), p. 29. The Anti- 
 Masonic party met in Harrisburg at the same time; its candidates 
 and electoral ticket were taken over without change. National 
 Intelligencer, December 24, 1835. 
 
 102 Harrison would do well, Biddle declared, to say nothing about 
 his principles. “If General Harrison is taken up as a candidate, 
 it will be on account of the past, not the future. Let him say not 
 one single word about his principles, or his creed—let him say 
 nothing promise nothing. Let no committee—let no convention 
 —no town meeting extract from him a single word, about what 
 he thinks now, or what he will do hereafter. Let the use of pen 
 and ink be wholly forbidden, as if he were a mad poet in Bedlam.” 
 Biddle to Herman Cope, Philadelphia, August 11, 1835. McGrane, 
 Biddle Correspondence, p. 256. 
 
 103 P. C. Gallagher to McLean, Columbus, February 12, 1836 
 McLean MSS. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 143 
 
 spondent declared in the Intelligencer, “ever to 
 be a favorite with the people in these degenerate 
 days.” 104 
 
 Unconvinced by the growth of Harrison’s 
 popularity in the West, the more prominent of 
 the Webster newspapers remained loyal to him 
 until his cause was seen to be hopeless. Even 
 then the Boston Atlas, the New York American, 
 and the National Gazette of Philadelphia took 
 only a languid interest in Harrison’s fortunes. 
 The attitude of the Gazette was doubtless typical 
 of the reactions of Webster’s friends everywhere. 
 In October, 1835, it declared that Harrison could 
 not count for success upon his military career. 
 “There is no parity in the case of Harrison with 
 that of Jackson. The charm is not the same. 
 Many circumstances exist ... to lessen or de¬ 
 stroy the influence of the new candidate’s military 
 fame.” 105 When a charge was made that it pre¬ 
 ferred defeat in the approaching election to 
 success under Harrison, no ground was given, 
 and it confessed that defeat under a candidate 
 whose real strength would preserve the integrity 
 of the party was more attractive than victory 
 under a discreditable leadership. 106 Those who 
 supported Harrison were, according to the Ga¬ 
 zette, modelling their tactics upon those of the 
 
 104 National Intelligencer, December 29, 1834. 
 
 10:1 National Gasette and Literary Register, October 28, 1835. 
 
 1M Ibid., November 6, 1835. 
 
144 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 Democratic party, and this surrender to expedi¬ 
 ency was condemned. 
 
 This is a second resort to military prestige, because it 
 was so successfully tried in the case of President Jackson. 
 It is an attempt to profit by the same popular delusion in 
 order to defeat the administration party. We do not 
 think ‘the end justifies the means’: we apprehend that the 
 means would be more injurious than even the success of 
 Mr. Van Buren . 107 
 
 So low was its opinion of Harrison that it 
 declared: ‘‘Believing as we do that General Har¬ 
 rison is absolutely unfit for the office of Presi¬ 
 dent, we can never concur in recommending him 
 to it, whatever may be done by conventions.” 108 
 Henceforth the Gazette took little or no interest 
 in the campaign, and most of the newspapers that 
 had supported Webster followed its example. 
 
 There were some who, from the first, doubted 
 the ability of the party to unite upon a single 
 candidate. The diversity of sectional and fac¬ 
 tional interests was thought to be so great that 
 political parties would find it impossible to re¬ 
 main united. “The next President,” J. W. Tay¬ 
 lor predicted in September, 1833, “will be chosen 
 by the H. R. and not only the next, but a majority 
 of the future Presidents. The candidates cannot 
 be limited to two. It is probable that there will 
 not be less than four.” 109 It was with reluctance 
 
 Ibid., November 11, 1835. 
 
 108 Ibid.. November 14. 1835. 
 
 109 Taylor to McLean, Balliston, N. Y., September 19, 1833. 
 McLean MSS. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 145 
 
 that the Intelligencer at length abandoned hope 
 of unity. In a series of articles during the sum¬ 
 mer of 1835 it attempted to clarify the principles 
 of the party. Frank acknowledgment was made 
 of differences “on some minor points of politics” 
 and also in regard to a candidate. “We desire a 
 candidate who will concentrate all our suffrages; 
 and we desire what is impossible . . . Let us 
 go together if we can, but against the legitimates 
 at any rate.” 110 Later it confessed that the Whig 
 party was without a national organization; how¬ 
 ever united the various groups were within the 
 states, they had “no common understanding in 
 relation to the affairs of the general govern¬ 
 ment.” The party was so seriously divided that 
 any attempt to create union was regarded with 
 suspicion. 111 
 
 Various schemes were proposed to minimize 
 the disadvantage of divided interests and leader¬ 
 ship. The Cincinnati Gazette suggested that the 
 party might be consulted in a “primary” election 
 with a view to selecting the most acceptable can¬ 
 didate. 112 In states like Ohio, Pennsylvania, and 
 New York, where there was no clear majority 
 for either Harrison or Webster, the Concord 
 Courier advised that identical electoral lists 
 should be submitted to the voters. 113 The needs 
 
 1,0 National Intelligencer, July 1, 1835. 
 
 U1 Ibid., July 8, 1835. 
 
 1,2 Ibid., August 1, 1835. 
 
 11S Poulson's American Daily Advertiser, November 10, 1833. 
 
146 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 of the political situation, however, were more 
 clearly understood by Biddle, and his prescrip¬ 
 tion was more practicable. He was convinced 
 that a large majority of the people, not only as 
 regards numbers but also as regards men of 
 property and intelligence, were opposed to the 
 administration. Although they had been unable 
 to agree upon a single candidate, they had a com¬ 
 mon purpose and were “fixed upon several men 
 who are acceptable to the various sections.” 
 Webster should be the candidate in New Ene - - 
 land, White in the South, “and wherever in any 
 one state there is a strong opposition man—to 
 vote for him. This disease is to be treated as a 
 local disorder—apply local remedies—if General 
 Harrison will run better than anybody else in 
 Pennsylvania, by all means unite upon him.” 114 
 The Intelligencer agreed with Biddle in urging 
 the “friends of the constitution” in each state to 
 rally in support of the candidate who had the best 
 prospect of carrying it. 115 Harrison it could not 
 tolerate, and when in the winter of 1835-1836 it 
 became clear that he was the most popular candi¬ 
 date in the North and West, its interest declined. 
 Few references to politics appeared in its columns 
 from January to August, 1836, although it again 
 advised that an attempt be made to throw the 
 election into the House of Representatives. 116 
 
 Biddle to Herman Cope, Philadelphia, August 11, 1835. Mc- 
 Grane, Biddle Correspondence, pp. 255, 256. 
 
 115 National Intelligencer, November 28, 1835. 
 
 110 Ibid., August 13, 1836. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 147 
 
 Irreconcilable divisions and the resort to com 
 plicated projects designed to prevent the choice of 
 a president by a popular vote killed the enthusiasm 
 with which the Whigs had started the campaign. 
 Party journals made efforts to arouse lagging 
 spirits. Local victories were hailed as prophetic 
 of approaching success, but this optimism was of 
 questionable sincerity. Not only had the party 
 failed to agree upon a candidate, but even as re¬ 
 gards campaign issues it had in few respects 
 improved upon the position of the National Re¬ 
 publicans in the campaign of 1832. Divided by 
 sectional interests, the appearance of cooperation 
 could be maintained only by continuing a negative 
 attitude. Whig campaign arguments, as reflected 
 in the Intelligencer’s editorials and clippings, com¬ 
 prised a wide range of criticism directed against 
 the administration,—its failure to carry out 
 promised reforms, the president’s arbitrary use 
 of the veto power, the appointment of members 
 of Congress to public office, corruption in the 
 postoffice, attacks upon the Senate and judiciary, 
 the removal of the deposits and the consequent 
 failure to provide for the safety of the public 
 funds. 117 Probably few Whigs anticipated suc¬ 
 cess. Adams, though not closely identified with 
 the party, believed Van Buren s election to be as 
 certain as “any event depending upon popular 
 elections could be.” 118 McLean was informed 
 
 n1 Ibid.. November 4, 1835. 
 
 UB Adams, Memoirs, IX. 242. 
 
148 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 that the plan to force the election into the House 
 made Van Buren’s election certain, “so much are 
 the people opposed to seeing the election devolve 
 upon the House, that knowing Van to [be] the 
 strongest candidate, as lie*would be if all run, 
 that they would vote for him to prevent such an 
 occurrence.” 119 In one respect the Whig party 
 benefited by the experience of the National Re¬ 
 publicans in 1832; it made no serious effort to 
 bring the Bank issue into the campaign. 
 
 Whig divisions made inevitable Van Buren’s 
 overwhelming victory. In the South, White suc¬ 
 ceeded in carrying Georgia, where he had the aid 
 of the disgruntled elements of the Democratic 
 party, 120 and Tennessee, where Jackson’s favorit¬ 
 ism for Van Buren had aroused keen resentment. 
 The South Carolina legislature followed an inde¬ 
 pendent course and gave the state’s electoral votes 
 to Willie P. Mangum. The most promising re¬ 
 sult of the election, from the Whig point of view, 
 was the measure of Harrison’s strength in a 
 disappointing year. Without political experience 
 and in a campaign covering only a brief period, 
 he carried Ohio, Indiana, New Jersey and Ver¬ 
 mont, and lost Illinois and Pennsylvania by a 
 narrow margin. In New England, outside the 
 strongly Anti-Masonic state of Vermont, he 
 
 113 George Kesling to McLean, Lebanon, August 10, 1835. Mc¬ 
 Lean MSS. 
 
 “° U. B. Phillips, “Georgia and State Rights,” Annual Report of 
 American Historical Association (Washington, 1902), pp. 138, 139. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 149 
 
 failed to poll the normal Whig vote, not only in 
 the frontier states of Maine and New Hampshire, 
 where the Democrats were usually strong, but 
 also in Rhode Island and Connecticut. Massa¬ 
 chusetts was loyal to its first choice in casting its 
 vote for Webster. 
 
 Expediency pointed to Harrison as the logical 
 Whig candidate for the next campaign, but at 
 first it seemed probable that the party s experi¬ 
 ences from 1834 to 1836 would be repeated. Clay 
 and Webster again made an effort to keep the 
 party loyal to its traditions. As in 1834, dis¬ 
 turbed economic conditions promised to make 
 a Whig triumph so certain that the personality 
 of the nominee would have little practical im¬ 
 portance. The crisis of 1837, precipitated by 
 the specie circular and the distribution of the 
 surplus, stimulated a strong movement against 
 Van Buren’s administration. It was said again 
 that the turn of the tide would come as a result of 
 the charter election in New York City. Men like 
 Hone hoped that the people would take advantage 
 of this opportunity to express their opinion of 
 Van Buren’s “driving . . . according to the 
 Jackson plan.” 121 The city, since its prosperity 
 depended upon commerce, was especially affected 
 by prevailing hard times. Improved real estate, 
 bank stocks, railroad and canal shares had all 
 seriously depreciated in value. According to 
 
 1,1 Hone, Diary, I. 89. 
 
150 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 Hone, desirable lots at One Hundredth Street, 
 which sold for four hundred and eighty dollars 
 under normal conditions, had been purchased for 
 fifty. “The immense fortunes which we have 
 heard so much about in the days of speculation 
 have melted away like snows under an April sun. 
 No man can calculate to escape ruin. Happy is 
 he who has a little, and is free from debt.” 122 
 That these conditions favored the Whigs was 
 clear in the election of their candidate for mayor 
 by a majority of more than three thousand. 123 But 
 the fall election for the state legislature provided 
 a more decisive test of Whig strength. Chastened 
 by his disappointment under similar circum¬ 
 stances in 1834, Hone feared that “the mountain 
 of misrule in the state is too mighty to be over¬ 
 thrown by a single political convulsion. . . .” 
 The results of a victory under these conditions 
 would be decisive. “The whole United States 
 look to this election as the star to guide them on 
 to victory, and Mr. Van Buren, and his cabinet, 
 and his policy must rise or fall by its result.” 124 
 The result justified the most exaggerated Whig 
 anticipations. A Democratic majority of sixty in 
 the preceding assembly was changed to a Whig 
 majority of sixty-seven. Niles at once declared 
 this success to be “hailed by the Whigs as a 
 triumph of their principles and a certain indi- 
 
 122 Ibid., I. 250, 251. 
 
 123 Niles’ Register, LII. 113. 
 
 124 Hone, Diary, I. 277. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 151 
 
 cation of the downfall of the present administra¬ 
 tion,” 125 and the New York correspondent of the 
 Intelligencer arrogantly declared that while 
 Washington made the laws, “Rome is here! You 
 make laws on the Capotiline Hill, but we make 
 you and your principles for you.” 126 Ambrose 
 Spencer, a politician and therefore a more sober 
 observer, saw “everywhere indications of return¬ 
 ing sobriety and good sense on the part of the 
 people.” 127 
 
 The period of Whig success, however, was 
 again brief, and since the crisis had been precipi¬ 
 tated in an odd year, the trend in public opinion 
 in favor of the Whigs was not reflected in na¬ 
 tional politics. The tide turned towards the 
 Democrats in the following year with the im¬ 
 provement in economic conditions. In October, 
 1838, the Boston Atlas summarized the results of 
 recent state elections under the title “The Bulle- 
 
 U5 Niles’ Register, LIII. 117. The geographic distribution of 
 the members of the Assembly as a result of the November elec¬ 
 tion was distinctly sectional. The western half of the state, largely 
 settled by people from New England, was true to its past in 
 returning a solid Whig delegation except from Seneca county in 
 the lake district. Practically all of the river counties, including 
 New York City and Long Island, where the results of the crisis 
 were most immediately felt, gave majorities for the Whig candi¬ 
 dates. The area between these strongly Whig regions and most 
 of the northern counties, either mountainous in character or 
 undeveloped, elected Democratic members. Statistics of invested 
 capital in 1840 show much larger amounts for the Whig counties 
 than for those that returned Democratic majorities. Compedium 
 . . . from the Returns of the Sixth Census, etc., (Washington, 
 1841). 
 
 1M National Intelligencer, September 13, 1837. 
 
 Spencer to Webster, Albany, April 19, 1837. Webster MSS. 
 
152 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 tin of the Campaign.” Whig governors in Maine, 
 Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Ohio had been de¬ 
 feated. 128 Even the apparently safe state of 
 Massachusetts elected the Democratic candidate, 
 a result which was aided by his opposition to an 
 unpopular temperance law. 129 Calhoun and his 
 friends, never wholly at ease in their alliance with 
 Clay, took advantage of the sub-treasury contro¬ 
 versy to return to the more congenial associations 
 of the Democratic party. 130 Optimistic prospects 
 had again turned to ashes and dust. A welcome 
 ray of light was seen in New York where the 
 Whigs elected Seward by a safe though seriously 
 reduced majority, 131 a result that doubtless gave 
 local Whig leaders greater influence in the affairs 
 of the national party. 
 
 As a result of the return of popularity to the 
 Democratic party, a Whig success in 1840 could 
 no longer be considered a certainty, and there¬ 
 fore a careful selection of a candidate became an 
 imperative necessity. There was a tendency to 
 turn back to preceding elections, and especially 
 to that of 1836, in order to weigh the relative 
 strength of the available candidates. The Boston 
 Atlas, hitherto a staunch friend of Webster, was 
 led by these considerations to change its allegiance 
 to Harrison in the summer of 1838. According 
 
 133 National Intelligencer, October 27, 1837. 
 
 129 Niles’ Register, XLVIII. 197. 
 
 130 Cole, Whig Party in the South, pp. 46-50. 
 
 131 Greeley, Recollections, pp. 129, 130. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 153 
 
 to the account of William Schouler, historian and 
 a later owner of the Atlas, Harrison’s nomination 
 was the work of Richard Houghton, proprietor 
 at that time, and of Richard Hildreth, who wrote 
 most of the editorials in the Atlas. These men 
 decided that Webster had no prospect of being 
 nominated by the Whigs and that the choice must 
 therefore lie between Harrison and Clay. Believ¬ 
 ing, according to Schouler, that Clay’s strength 
 was largely in states which the Whigs could not 
 possibly win, they determined to unite the friends 
 of Webster and Scott in order to defeat Clay in 
 the Harrisburg convention. It was necessary 
 for success that the party descend “from the 
 forum” and take “the people by the hand.” 132 It 
 is improbable that the Atlas was responsible in 
 this degree for Harrison’s nomination, but its 
 well known position as a Webster newspaper 
 made its change in policy of notable significance. 
 In July, 1838, it prepared for a later change of 
 policy by urging that the discussion of candi¬ 
 dates be suspended until the meeting of a national 
 convention. 133 Two months later it openly came 
 out as an advocate of Harrison’s nomination. 
 This change of front was due, according to an 
 anonymous letter in the Boston Daily Advertiser, 
 to a project that would fundamentally alter the 
 character of the Whig party. 
 
 131 Frederick Hudson, Journalism in the United- States, pp. 
 392, 393. 
 
 133 National Intelligencer, July 13, 1838, quoting Boston Atlas, 
 July 13, 1838. 
 
154 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 It is now said with all the pomp and circumstance of an 
 original discovery, that the Whig party consists of aristo¬ 
 cratic and democratic members—in other words, of two 
 parties in one,—That the respective sections are of course 
 under the influence of different views, feelings and inter¬ 
 ests, of which those appertaining to the Democratic section 
 only should be consulted;— that Webster and Clay are so 
 affiliated with the aristocracy of the Whigs as to have 
 lost popularity with the Democratic and more numerous 
 and efficient division of the party . 134 
 
 Early in September the Atlas explained that 
 Harrison, of the available candidates, had the best 
 chance of carrying the states of Ohio, Pennsyl¬ 
 vania, and Indiana, and that “we . . . are of 
 the opinion that it is best to yield to a state of 
 things which it is highly improbable can be 
 changed in time for the next election.” 135 This 
 decision convinced a correspondent of the Daily 
 Advertiser that the Atlas was ready to sacrifice 
 the party’s principles. “Every step in its pro¬ 
 cedure proclaims the creed . . . that party suc¬ 
 cess, is the only measure of political virtue and 
 the only object of political action.” 136 
 
 Suspicion was at once aroused that the Atlas’ 
 change of front had Webster’s express or tacit 
 approval and that he proposed to defeat Clay by 
 this diversion. In October, 1838, Clay asserted 
 that the Atlas had at least assumed Webster’s 
 
 134 Boston Daily Advertiser and Patriot, December 27, 1838 
 Three other letters appeared by the same writer in the interest oi 
 Webster. Clay was his second choice. Ibid., December 28, 29 
 31, 1838. 
 
 136 New York American, September 19, 1838. 
 
 1M Boston Daily Advertiser and Patriot, December 3, 1838. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 155 
 
 consent, 137 and in spite of Webster’s disavowal, 
 he remained of this opinion. 138 Abbott Lawrence, 
 a wealthy Whig of Boston and a friend of 
 Clay, told Adams that Webster was working for 
 Harrison. 139 C. T. Congdon 140 and William 
 Schouler, 141 both of whom were later connected 
 with the Atlas, report a tradition in its office that 
 proof of the first editorial in which this change 
 was discussed had been read by Webster and that 
 after a first violent reaction he agreed to take no 
 public notice of it. The New York American, 
 however, claimed his authority in predicting that 
 he would remain neutral between Harrison and 
 Clay. Webster had not been in Boston at the 
 time, it claimed, and moreover he had not been 
 informed of the impending change. 1 It is clear, 
 however, that relations between Webster and 
 Clay were cool if not unfriendly and that Massa¬ 
 chusetts voted on the first ballot in the Harris¬ 
 burg convention for Harrison. In any event, an 
 opportune absence in Europe in 1839 provided a 
 convenient escape from the unpleasant necessity 
 of choosing between Harrison and Clay, and 
 while in England he withdrew his own name from 
 
 137 Clay to Francis Brooke, Ashland, October 9, 1838. Colton, 
 Private Correspondence, p. 429. 
 
 138 Clay to Brooke, Ashland, November 3, 1838. Ibid., pp. 429, 
 430. 
 
 139 Adams, Memoirs, X. 43. 
 
 110 Congdon, Reminiscences, pp. 67, 68. 
 
 141 Hudson, Journalism in the United States, p. 392. 
 
 113 New York American, September 19, 1838. 
 
156 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 consideration. 143 After Harrison's nomination, 
 Samuel Appleton wrote to Webster, who was his 
 father-in-law: “Now we have got the Clay off 
 our wheels, we shall get along.” 144 
 
 Harrison’s record in the preceding campaign 
 made him the logical choice for the nomination. 
 Such was the position taken by the Democratic 
 Republican committee of Pennsylvania. His 
 name invigorated the party everywhere. “It 
 broke the inviolability of Federal power and 
 patronage—brought victory where defeat before 
 had awaited us—added state after state to our 
 standard, and placed the destiny of the Demo¬ 
 cratic party upon the vantage ground in full view 
 of a certain triumph in 1840.” 145 Harrison’s 
 friends declared that Whig politicians had op¬ 
 posed him in 1836. According to the Albany 
 Journal, his nomination “then emanated from the 
 people, and in many portions of the Union never 
 received even the assent, much less the support, of 
 our leading politicians.” 146 The Pennsylvania 
 committee feared the lesson of the last election 
 had not been learned: “It was to be hoped that 
 the lesson taught by the last Presidential contest 
 
 143 Webster to J. P. Healy, London, June 12, 1839. Webster’s 
 Writings '(National Edition), XVI. 311. Cf. Niles’ Register, 
 LVI. 306. 
 
 144 Appleton to Webster, Boston, March 10, 1840. Van Tyne, 
 Webster Transcripts. 
 
 145 Harrison’s friends were referred to in this address as the 
 true Democracy. His defeat in 1836 was in part attributed to 
 the plan to throw the election into the House. National Intelli¬ 
 gencer, April 20, 1838. 
 
 148 Albany Evening Journal, December 13, 1839. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 15 7 
 
 would not so soon have been forgotten, and that 
 politicians would have learned to consult the 
 people, and not to control them in the choice of 
 condidates.” 147 A correspondent in the New 
 York American declared that Harrison’s friends 
 were resolved “that the people shall be heard in 
 the selection of their chief magistrate. They 
 are determined that sinister management shall not 
 deprive the people of a voice in the election of 
 their President.” 148 Harrison men were con¬ 
 vinced that the experiences of the party in 1836 
 should guide its nomination. “In that slouching 
 Whig defeat of 1836” so Greeley wrote later, 
 “lay the germ of the overwhelming Whig victory 
 of 1840.” 149 
 
 Those who were convinced that success was 
 certain under Harrison saw no reason for the 
 calling of a national convention. They insisted 
 that the people had nominated him and that 
 formal action was unnecessary. Even in the con¬ 
 servative columns of the New York American it 
 was suggested that undue delay in arranging for 
 a convention made it advisable to leave the nomi¬ 
 nation “to the decision of the people, in their 
 respective primary assemblies, in their respective 
 states.” 150 The Cleveland Herald recommended 
 
 1,7 National Intelligencer, April 20, 1838. 
 
 ui New York American, February 13, 1838. 
 
 Greeley, Recollections, p. 113. 
 
 ™New York Atnerican, February 13, 1838. 
 
158 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 “the speedy and absolute nomination of General 
 Harrison” rather than waiting for the “uncertain 
 decision of a far distant National Convention.” 151 
 The Clay faction and the friends of Webster, 
 before he withdrew from the campaign, generally 
 favored the postponement of nomination until a 
 convention should meet. This was the position of 
 the Intelligencer, acting in Clay’s interests, 152 and 
 in the interest of harmony Harrison’s friends 
 finally agreed. 153 In spite of the personal dif¬ 
 ferences between Webster and Clay, their friends 
 liked Harrison no better than they did in the 
 campaign of 1836. They still preferred either 
 Webster or Clay as representing the older type 
 of leadership. This point of view was expressed 
 by the Portland Evening Advertiser in an edi¬ 
 torial which was endorsed by several important 
 newspapers. 
 
 We believe that the Whig candidate for President must 
 succeed. It is fortunate for us that the two great men 
 we have named [Clay and Webster] occupy so prominent 
 a station, and stand so decidedly in advance of all others, 
 that one or the other must as we believe, be selected by 
 the convention, which all agree must be held. The attach- 
 
 151 National Intelligencer, November 21, 1838. 
 
 162 Ibid., April 20, 1838. In 1837 Clay suggested that the nomi¬ 
 nation should be left to a national convention. Clay to a New 
 York committee, Ashland, August 6, 1837. Colton, Private Corre¬ 
 spondence, p. 416. 
 
 This was the decision of the Ohio State Whig Committee; 
 nevertheless Harrison’s nomination was recommended. National 
 Intelligencer, June 6, 1838. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 159 
 
 ment to both is universal. Let the choice fall upon either, 
 and it rests on one ‘whom all delight to honor ’.” 154 
 
 The withdrawal of Webster’s name narrowed 
 the contest to Clay and Harrison with Winfield 
 Scott as the dark horse. After the election of 
 1836 Clay’s attitude was receptive in regard to a 
 nomination, and in 1837 he thought he would 
 again be forced into the arena. 155 A year later 
 he was convinced that his strength was increas¬ 
 ing. 156 However, the hostility of leading poli¬ 
 ticians in New York became apparent when 
 Weed in May, 1838, dissuaded the Whigs of New 
 York city from openly declaring for Clay. 157 At 
 Buffalo, while on his northern tour in the sum¬ 
 mer of 1839, he declared that he was ready to 
 withdraw if the party’s interests demanded it, 158 
 but the Intelligencer announced in October that 
 he was still in the race. 159 Definite opposition to 
 Clay developed in the pivotal state of New York 
 on two counts. In his Taylorsville speech he 
 adopted, it was charged, a hostile attitude toward 
 the anti-slavery movement. 160 He also urged co- 
 
 154 Boston Daily Advertiser, January 3, 1838. This editorial 
 was printed and endorsed by the New York American, January 3, 
 1838. 
 
 155 Clay to G. D. Prentice, Ashland, August 14, 1837. Colton, 
 Private Correspondence, p. 418. 
 
 1M Clay to Francis Brooke, Washington, April 14, 1838. Ibid.. 
 p. 426. 
 
 181 Barnes, Memoir of Weed, p. 58. 
 
 188 Niles’ Register, LVI. 346, 347. 
 
 180 National Intelligencer, October 12, 1839. 
 
 180 Niles’ Register, LVIII. 322-326. 
 
160 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 operation with the “Conservatives” 161 and thereby 
 incurred the displeasure of the Whig extremists, 
 who would consent to no association with 
 them. 162 Francis Granger, former Anti-Mason 
 and the vice-presidential candidate with Harri¬ 
 son in 1836, was one of those who believed that 
 Clay’s nomination would be fatal to the party’s 
 chances of success. “It seems to me that Mr. 
 Clay’s strongest friends feel that however just it 
 may be to give him the nomination, it would be 
 but to place a bauble above his clutch and leave 
 him in a worse position than at present.” Ac¬ 
 cording to Granger, a group of New York 
 congressmen who agreed with this conclusion 
 decided so to inform the state delegation in the 
 National Convention. 163 Clay in fact did not 
 possess qualities which were most desired by 
 Whig politicians. His protracted experience in 
 politics was not highly valued by politicians 
 who understood the prevailing confidence in the 
 
 ia A group of Democrats under the leadership of Senators 
 Rives of Virginia and Tallmadge of New York and known as 
 the “Conservatives” seceded from the party in protest against Van 
 Buren’s recommendation of the independent treasury. The New 
 York American refused to countenance an attempt to profit by 
 this split in Democratic ranks, since that would entail cooperation 
 with men who once had been Democrats. 
 
 162 Francis Granger to Weed, May 1, 1838. Barnes, Memoir of 
 Weed, pp. 57, 58. According to Henry A. Wise, later a member 
 of Tyler’s “corporal guard” and thus presumably prejudiced 
 against Clay, the latter had made certain pledges which satisfied 
 the most extreme Democrats in order to win the support of Judge 
 White Henry A. Wise, Seven Decades of the Union (Richmond, 
 1881),'pp. 167, 168. 
 
 163 Granger to Weed, Washington, November (?), 1839. 
 
 Granger MSS. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 161 
 
 capacity of ordinary men. Moreover, his ex¬ 
 perience was a positive disadvantage in that he 
 had thereby aroused much personal hostility. 
 Charles B. Penrose, an Anti-Masonic leader in 
 Pennsylvania who was to play an important part 
 in Harrison’s nomination, wrote to Biddle that 
 “his long and brilliant career in public life while 
 it furnishes much to admire is fruitful of topics 
 upon which he is vulnerable to the prejudices of 
 large masses of the people of the United 
 States.” 164 It was true that Clay, like Harrison, 
 could claim a democratic origin, but in spite of 
 his magnetic personality, he had not retained his 
 popularity with the crowd. In 1835 Adams ex¬ 
 plained this change: “Clay as you know rose upon 
 the broadest shoulders of democracy. But his 
 European expedition tinged both his principles 
 and his deportment with aristocracy, perhaps to 
 the improvement of his character, but to the loss 
 of his standing with the democracy.” 165 
 
 In accordance with the call issued by the Whig 
 congressional caucus, a move that had been sug¬ 
 gested by various state conventions, 166 the na¬ 
 tional convention met at Harrisburg, December 4, 
 1839. 167 Harrison’s friends had complained that 
 
 104 Penrose to Biddle, February 29, 1839. Biddle MSS. 
 
 M5 Adams to A. H. Everett, December 1, 1835. J. Q. Adams 
 MSS. Library of Congress. 
 
 180 Niles’ Register, LIV. 178. The Caucus called the convention 
 to meet at Harrisburg on the first Wednesday in December, 1859 
 National Intelligencer, May 15, 1838. 
 
 107 Niles’ Register, LVII. 249-252. 
 
162 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 the politicians were opposed to him; if this were 
 true at an earlier date, they had now been re¬ 
 placed by a new group devoted to his cause. In 
 his interest, the convention restricted the dis¬ 
 cussion of candidates to the various state delega¬ 
 tions and adopted the unit rule. 168 Motions were 
 introduced for these purposes by Penrose, acting 
 in Harrison’s behalf, and by Joseph Sprague, a 
 delegate from Massachusetts and a friend of 
 Webster. This interesting cooperation between 
 Harrison and Webster men and the distribution 
 of votes on the first ballot indicate clearly the 
 groups that made Harrison’s nomination possible. 
 Clay had the support of a solid South and in 
 addition the votes of Illinois, Connecticut, and 
 Rhode Island. The unit rule nullified Clay’s 
 strength in other northern states. Clay won a 
 plurality on the first ballot, but Harrison polled 
 the votes of Indiana, Ohio, Maine, and New 
 Hampshire among the states under western or 
 frontier influences. The support of Webster’s 
 friends in Massachusetts also went to him as did 
 that of the Pennsylvania delegation under the 
 influence of Anti-Masonic leaders. Holding the 
 balance of power, after casting their votes for 
 Scott on the first ballot, New York and New 
 Jersey later changed to Harrison and thus assured 
 his nomination. 169 The result was due to a com- 
 
 ,es H. R. Mueller, Whig Party in Pennsylvania, pp. 60, 61. 
 
 189 A Whig meeting in New York city drew up a statement in 
 which the charge was made that the state delegation had been 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 163 
 
 bination of the western or frontier delegations, 
 the Anti-Masons, and the friends of Webster. 
 
 Old leaders were pushed into the background. 
 In naming Harrison as its candidate, the Whig 
 party passed under the control of men whose 
 exclusive interest was a victory in 1840. Harri¬ 
 son was an admirable instrument for this pur¬ 
 pose. Even his lack of political experience was 
 not a disadvantage, as perhaps the majority of 
 votes did not consider experience essential, and 
 as he had not created enemies in old political con¬ 
 troversies. According to the anti-Van Buren 
 committee of Pennsylvania, he would not make a 
 merely sectional appeal. Born in Virginia, he 
 could claim “the love and confidence of the South,” 
 while long residence in Ohio and his eminent 
 political services had endeared him to all classes 
 in the northern and western states. In brief, 
 “his name subdues all prejudices and encounters 
 none.” 170 Chastened by the failure of the Na¬ 
 tional Republicans in 1828 and 1832 and that of 
 the Whigs in 1836, politicians were now convinced 
 that the Democrats should be fought with their 
 own weapons. Harrison in analysing the ele- 
 
 instructed for Scott by the Harrison men. By this means dele 
 cates were selected who would change to Harrison at the proper 
 fime Albany Evening Journal, August 17 1839, quoting New 
 York Courier and Enquirer, August 15, 1839. Weed relates tot 
 Harrison’s nomination was decided at a meeting between the New 
 York and Pennsylvania delegations at which it was agreed that 
 Clay could carry neither state. Weed, Autobiography, p. 431. 
 
 1,0 Nile’s Register, LVIII. pp. 190, 191. 
 
164 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 ments of his own political strength implied that 
 on this account he should be nominated. 
 
 I am amongst the oldest and most extensively known 
 of the Western pioneers. I have stood in the relation to 
 many thousand of our citizens as their commander or 
 brother soldier. Now, it so happens that almost all of 
 the pioneers and old soldiers of the West were on the side 
 of the administration, brought over to that side by their 
 attachment to General Jackson; and that attachment was 
 produced by his being himself one of the class to which it 
 was their boast to belong. He out of the way, is there any 
 difficulty in believing that they might be willing again to 
 give support to another of the same class, although of in¬ 
 ferior pretensions, rather than to anyone whose pursuits 
 and course of life had no semblance to their own . 171 
 
 The failure of the Harrisburg Convention to sub¬ 
 mit a platform with Harrison’s nomination testi¬ 
 fied to its dread of controversial topics, and it also 
 indicated that success was the single pur pose, of 
 the pa rty. All could unite~tn = the _ elfort to defeat 
 Van Buren, with the understanding that the de¬ 
 termination of the party’s program would be 
 delayed until after the election. Accordingly, the 
 Intelligencer contributed its entire strength to 
 the campaign, although it had supported Clay. 172 
 Philip Hone was one of those who had insisted 
 that the party should nominate either Clay or 
 Webster, but when he saw the enthusiasm which 
 Harrison’s nomination aroused, the lure of an 
 almost certain victory persuaded him to support 
 
 171 Harrison to J. R. Giddings, December 15, 1838. G. W. 
 Julian, The Life of J. R. Giddings (Chicago, 1892). P- 55. 
 
 na National Intelligencer, December 10, 1839. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 165 
 
 a lesser man. 173 In December, 1839, Granger 
 wrote to Weed that “Everybody’s trying to 
 smooth down the rough edges, and we shall suc¬ 
 ceed in doing it. Southern Whigs seem more 
 disposed to stick to the integrity of the party than 
 I ever knew them, and more disposed to give up 
 their peculiar, individual whims.” 174 John Tyler 
 was named as the candidate for the vice-presi¬ 
 dency as a means of attracting the dissatisfied 
 Democratic vote in the South. 
 
 The Whig party applied the lessons of its ex¬ 
 perience not only in its nomination but also in 
 -divorcing itself from the Bank issue. This issue 
 rapidly declined in favor after the disaster of 
 1832. 175 Niles frankly acknowledged that the de- 
 ~feat of Clay sealed the Bank’s fate unless a 
 change of public opinion should occur. 176 In 1834 
 Clay declared that the Bank question was a most 
 unprofitable issue and that attention should be 
 concentrated upon the President’s usurpation of 
 power. 177 Early in his career, Weed reached the 
 conclusion that support of the Bank had no 
 promise: “I was not long in discovering that it 
 
 1,3 Hone, Diary, I. pp. 393, 398. 
 
 174 Granger to Weed, Washington, December 9, 1839. Granger 
 MSS. 
 
 175 The Intelligencer was an exception. On many occasions, it 
 refused to interpret Clay’s defeat as a definite repudiation of the 
 Bank; one faction of the Democratic party was tolerant of the 
 national bank idea, and another would support the renewal of the 
 existing charter with modifications. 
 
 "'Niles’ Register, XLIII. 177. 
 
 177 Clay to Biddle. Washington, February 2, 1834. McGrane, 
 Biddle Correspondence, p. 220. 
 
166 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 was easy to enlist the laboring classes against a 
 ‘monster bank’ or ‘moneyed aristocracy’, and that 
 as a political issue, we should lose more than we 
 would gain by it. ... I steadily ignored the 
 bank issue, insisting on all proper occasions that 
 it ‘hung like a mill-stone’ about our necks.” 178 
 When Tyler in 1841 declared himself against the 
 incorporation of a national bank, Clay insisted 
 that the election of 1840 had been won on that 
 issue. He was mistaken, for it played no impor¬ 
 tant part in the campaign. The Intelligencer, 
 after the election of 1836, abandoned its per¬ 
 sistent support of the Bank and declared that it 
 was no longer an issue. 179 This attitude was 
 maintained through 1837, 180 and early in the fol¬ 
 lowing year, it stated in no uncertain terms that 
 it was hopeless to expect a new charter. ‘‘We 
 state our belief and our apprehension, that there 
 is very little probability that ... we will live 
 to witness the establishment of another Bank of 
 the United States. Such a measure will certainly 
 never be accomplished but under the influence of 
 a necessity stronger than any that now exists.” 181 
 
 178 Weed, Autobiography, pp. 371, 424. The Anti-Masonic party 
 after 1832 was willing to sacrifice the Bank in order to advance its 
 own interests. In September, 1834, the Dauphin County Conven¬ 
 tion in Pennsylvania declared that the party’s principles must 
 prevail, “let the Bank sink or swim.” McCarthy, Anti-Masonic 
 Party, p. 461. Governor Palmer of Vermont, an Anti-Mason, 
 declared in his inaugural address that he was opposed to the 
 renewal of the charter. Ibid., p. 514. 
 
 178 National Intelligencer, May 3, 1837. 
 
 180 Ibid., September 28, 1837. 
 
 181 Ibid., February 27, 1838. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 167 
 
 Whigs became exceedingly sensitive to the charge 
 that the party was irrevocably associated with the 
 Bank issue. 
 
 ‘Bank! Bank! Bank! has been the cry of alarm re¬ 
 sorted to on all occasions, by the opponents of a sound 
 currency and a safe system of finance, when argument 
 failed them, to drown the voice of common sense . . . 
 
 Before, behind, and all around us, we hear little else than 
 execrations against the Bank and Biddle, Biddle and the 
 Bank .” 182 
 
 In December, 1838, the Intelligencer declared 
 that there was “no immediate occasion for the 
 establishment of another National Bank,” 183 and 
 in August of the following year it asserted that 
 “the question of a bank is not now before the 
 country.” 184 Thereafter, the subject was given 
 scant attention in its columns. Even Clay used 
 much discretion in his references to the Bank. 
 He remarked, vaguely enough, in his Taylorsville 
 speech that the question “ ‘should be left to the 
 arbitrament of an enlightened public opinion’,” 
 and that he was ready to accept another method, 
 if one could be found, for the maintenance of a 
 sound currency. 185 
 
 Ibid., March 20, 1838. 
 
 183 Ibid., December 13, 1838. 
 
 18 ‘ Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers, I. 625. Quoting the 
 National Intelligencer, August 1, 1840. Even the Bank, which had 
 secured a state charter in Pennsylvania seems to have given up 
 hope, as in 1838 it was quite willing to affect an understanding 
 with the administration. McGrane, Biddle Correspondence, pp. 
 273, 274, 321-323, 324, 325. 
 
 185 Carl Schurz, Life of Henry Clay, (Boston, 1887), pp. 186-188. 
 
168 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 Definite issues, in fact, were at a discount in 
 the campaign of 1840. Not only did the poli¬ 
 ticians think it inexpedient to prepare a platform, 
 but steps were taken to prevent Harrison from 
 committing himself upon troublesome ques-l 
 tions. 186 Clay was ready at all times to act as the 
 Moses for his party, but even he was not certain 
 that a definite statement of principles should be 
 made. 187 Much was made of the alleged union 
 between the sword and the purse under Van 
 Buren, but the real strength of the Whig position 
 was in the general desire, caused in part by eco¬ 
 nomic disturbances, 188 for a change of adminis- 
 
 180 A committee was appointed which kept a check on his corre¬ 
 spondence. Harrison called it “my conscience keeping committee.’' 
 Harrison to James Lyon, North Bend, June 1, 1840. National 
 Intelligencer, August 29, 1840. A Democratic meeting in Pennsyl¬ 
 vania declared it to be a fundamental principle of democracy that 
 a candidate for the presidency should make a “fair, full and 
 frank exposure of his principles and of his course which he will 
 pursue if elected.” Niles’ Register, LVIII. 411. Harrison’s posi¬ 
 tion was expressed in vague and general terms in a letter to 
 Harmar Denny, December 2, 1838. Niles’ Register, LV. 360, 361^ 
 
 187 In May, *1840, Clay asked advice of Clayton as to making a 
 
 statement of issues. “Favor me . . . with an expression of 
 
 your opinion as to promulgating anything like a creed. The 
 danger is of supplying fresh aliment for demagogues. On the 
 other hand. I think, perhaps erroneously, that the Harrisburg 
 convention having omitted to publish any Address, our cause suf¬ 
 fers from the imputation of the other side that the Whigs have 
 no principles which they dare openly avow. It is a safe general 
 rule that it is best to remain silent and not act, unless you are 
 fully convinced that what you mean to say or do is right; and in 
 this instance I do not wish to depart from the rule. Unless there¬ 
 fore you and one or two other friends should think the movement 
 judicious I do not wish to make it.” Clay to Clayton, Wilming¬ 
 ton, May 29, 1840. Clayton MSS. 
 
 188 According to Weed, “The element of strength in the presi¬ 
 dential canvass was opposition to the financial policy of Mr. Van 
 Buren’s administration, a policy which paralyzed the industries of 
 the country.” Weed, Autobiography, p. 492. 
 
NEW LEADERSHIP 
 
 169 
 
 tration. 189 Van Buren lacked the hold upon the 
 people that had been Jackson’s, and he in turn 
 was denounced “not only as a graceless aristocrat 
 and a dandy, but a cunning conspirator seeking 
 the overthrow of his country’s liberties . . .” 190 
 Nathan Sargent, a contemporary observer, de¬ 
 clared that the people were not interested in 
 Harrison’s capacity; what they wanted and were 
 determined to have was “a change in the 
 government.” 191 
 
 The Whig party was organized in 1834 for the 
 specific purpose of driving out of power the men 
 who were charged with the responsibility for the 
 prevailing economic depression. However, it was 
 not at liberty to select its candidates or its issues or 
 to determine its methods, because it was the heir 
 of the National Republican party. In this inherit¬ 
 ance, among other things, was the leadership of 
 men like Webster and Clay, with their dissensions 
 and attachments to issues of doubtful popularity. 
 Adams was discarded as a result of his defeat in 
 1828, and like judgment was passed upon Clay 
 after 1832, from which he was unable to recover 
 in 1839. Webster, the last of the triumvirate, 
 was set aside in 1838. Thus the Whig party 
 repudiated its old leadership and turned to men 
 who were ready to copy Democratic methods and 
 
 180 This is the substance of a pamphlet written by Calvin Colton. 
 The Crisis of the County by “Junius.” Library of Congress. 
 
 ,00 G. W. Julian, Political Recollections, 1840-1871. (Chicago, 
 1884), I. 11. 
 
 101 Sargent, Public Men and Events, I. 110. 
 
170 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 even to go beyond them. Old issues were dis¬ 
 carded in favor of a campaign of sentimentalism. 
 This transition in the character of the Whig 
 party is implied in the Albany Journal’s reflec¬ 
 tions. 
 
 Indeed since 1825, we have never entertained any hope 
 of success. The Whig party, for three successive Presi¬ 
 dential conflicts, has been in a false position. We have 
 been forced to fight upon wrong issues. Nor have we in 
 our past campaigns, presented a united front. . . . 
 
 But all is right now. The great and powerful Whig 
 party is at last united. Every incumbrance has been 
 thrown off. 192 
 
 In the flush of success politicians were not likely 
 to regret that among these “incumbrances” were 
 the party’s ablest men and the principles for 
 which they stood. The reward was a brief tenure 
 of . power in 1841; the penalty was the disruption 
 of the party when, under Tyler, dissension became 
 active again. 
 
 m Albany Evening Journal, December 13, 1839. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 
 
 “f-T'HE political parties which I style great are 
 
 1 those which cling to principles rather than 
 to their consequences; to general, and not to 
 special cases; to ideas, and not to men .... 
 America has had great parties, but she has them 
 no longer.” 1 De Tocqueville based this opinion 
 upon his observations of American politics in 
 1831, but the appearance of the Whig party in 
 1834 in no sense lessened its pertinence. Princi¬ 
 ples had little part in the origins of the Whig 
 party. Except for occasional periods of economic 
 depression, the majority of voters were Demo¬ 
 cratic, 2 and therefore, in order to have any 
 prospect of success, the opposition to the Demo¬ 
 crats developed as an alliance of all who were 
 dissatisfied with the Democratic control of the 
 
 'Alexis C. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Cambridge, 
 1873), I. p. 226. 
 
 3 Van Buren believed that “experience had satisfactorily demon¬ 
 strated the fact that as to the two great parties which divided 
 the country the spontaneous feelings of a large majority of the 
 People were on our side; that whenever we were defeated the 
 result could be traced to specific and extraneous causes. . . 
 
 Van Buren, Autobiography, p. 222. 
 
172 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 government. 3 The addition of Anti-Masons dur¬ 
 ing and after the campaign of 1832 and of the 
 “Conservatives” 4 in 1837 brought in elements 
 that were hostile to the Bank issue. The cooper¬ 
 ation of Calhoun and Clay’s compromise of 1833 
 created differences upon the tariff. In 1834 
 Adams complained that all parties had abandoned 
 his scheme of internal improvements. 
 
 My own system of administration, which was to make 
 the national domain the inexhaustible fund for progress¬ 
 ive and unceasing internal improvement, has failed. Sys¬ 
 tematically renounced and denounced by the present Ad¬ 
 ministration, it has been undisguisedly abandoned by H. 
 Clay, ingloriously deserted by J. C. Calhoun and silently 
 given up by D. Webster. These are the opposition as¬ 
 pirants to the Presidential succession, not one of them 
 having a system of administration which he would dare 
 to avow, and at this time scarcely linked together by the 
 
 3 Whig Almanac and United States Register (N. Y., 1838), 
 
 p. 3. Cf„ Wise, Seven Decades, pp. 165-167. Adams analyzed the 
 various elements of the Whig party in December, 1835. “The op¬ 
 position to Van Buren consists 1. Of part of the Southern democ¬ 
 racy: deserters from Jacksonism in two divisions—one of Cal¬ 
 houn nullifiers, chiefly confined to South Carolina. . . . The 
 
 other of White Tennesseans. . . . They will probably unite 
 all the servile votes of the South. I mean all the votes which will 
 be biased exclusively by slave holding passions, prejudices and 
 panic. ... 2. Of western Clay Democrats or rather all Clay 
 Democrats. ... 3. The Webster federalists. All the rem¬ 
 nants of blue-light federalism have rallied together and made 
 Webster their forlorn hope. ... 4. The Pennsylvania and 
 
 perhaps the Vermont Anti-Masons ... 5. The Wolf portion 
 
 of the Pennsylvania democracy. . . . It is needless to say that 
 
 of these five parties . . . there are no two that hold any great 
 
 political principle in common. Most of them call themselves 
 Whigs, only for the sake of calling their adversaries Tories.” 
 Adams to A. H. Everett, Washington, December 1, 1835. J. Q. 
 Adams MSS. 
 
 4 The “Conservatives.” many of whom owned stock in New York 
 state banks, wished to maintain the pet bank system. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 173 
 
 brittle bond of common opposition to the unprincipled 
 absurdities of the present incumbent. 5 
 
 The American System, with its subsidiary issues, 
 accordingly was either frankly rejected or tacitly 
 adjourned to a more favorable occasion. Loyalty 
 to no definite principles or issue, except that of 
 ousting Van Buren, according to Weed in 1839, 
 was required in order to be a good Whig. ’ The 
 party, he declared, included all those who were 
 convinced that the Democrats were responsible 
 for hard times and that therefore they should be 
 driven from office. “He who thus believes from 
 the evidence presented to his mind, and acts in 
 accordance with that belief, is a Whig, no matter 
 by what name he has been or is called.” 6 
 
 Divided upon principles, the opposition had to 
 contend with other disruptive influences. This 
 study reveals the remarkable ease with which 
 political leaders changed their party ties in the 
 Jacksonian period. More concerned with the 
 interests of his section than with those of any 
 party, Calhoun first abandoned the Democrats in 
 1832 and, after a brief union with the Whigs, 
 returned to his former allegiance in 1838. Mc¬ 
 Lean repeatedly followed the will o’ the wisp of 
 a fusion party. Webster dallied in 1833 with the 
 idea of a nationalist party with himself and Jack- 
 son as its leaders. This instability was in part 
 
 8 Adams, Memoirs, IX. 160. 
 
 8 Albany Evening Journal, November 25, 1839. 
 
174 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 due to the absence of a permanent and well- 
 defined party organization and to the consequent 
 absence "of^party discipline. The ambitions of 
 leaders who could not resist the lure of the presi¬ 
 dency also contributed to the persistent confusion 
 within the opposition. Almost without exception 
 its chieftains considered ways and mean of 
 winning the Anti-Masonic nomination in 1832. 
 However, political issues played a too important 
 part to label this a period of merely personal 
 politics. When party lines were broken, as they 
 frequently were, it was usually the result of 
 differences upon political questions. 
 
 There was also danger that the party would 
 split along sectional lines. While this was a pos¬ 
 sible result of the tariff issue, 7 unity was more 
 seriously threatened by the slavery question. The 
 South was forced into a defensive position by 
 the abolition movement, and sectional solidarity, 
 already advocated against the protective tariff, 
 was thereby immensely strengthened. Abolition 
 had its origins in a humanitarian movement 
 which had no relation to parties. Nevertheless, 
 according to a Connecticut newspaper, there were 
 politicians in each party who wished to fasten 
 the responsibility for it upon their opponents. 
 “All this we regret to see. We do not believe 
 that either party, as such, have had any concern 
 in promoting the cause of the abolitionists. The 
 
 ' This of course was a contributing factor in the support which 
 the South gave to Judge White in 1836. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 
 
 175 
 
 leaders of both parties have sagacity enough to 
 see that there is nothing to be gained by such a 
 connection.” 8 When the flood of anti-slavery 
 petitions in the House of Representatives precipi¬ 
 tated the struggle over the right of petition, it 
 was clear that the slavery question endangered 
 party unity in the common purpose of defeating 
 the Democratic administration. The South im¬ 
 mediately took alarm and insisted that the federal 
 government should in no way concern itself with 
 the question. Its policy, as expressed in the gag 
 resolutions, of not allowing a hearing for the 
 petitions, was not only a tactical blunder which at 
 once involved the right of petition; but an analy¬ 
 sis of the votes upon these resolutions shows a 
 perfect sectional alignment between northern and 
 southern Whigs. 9 Northern Whigs declared on 
 
 8 National Intelligencer, October 3, 1835, quoting the Courant. 
 
 8 The first of the gag resolutions, third of a series of resolutions 
 by Pinckney of South Carolina, was adopted by the House, May 
 26, 1836, as a result of a combination of the Democratic members 
 of both sections and of the southern Whigs with only two excep¬ 
 tions. Congressional Globe, 24 Congress, 1 Session, p. 505. When 
 it was decided in the following session, January 9, 1837, to receive 
 and then to table anti-slavery petitions, the same division occurred 
 within the Whig party. On this occasion, however, northern 
 Democrats voted with the Whigs of that section in favor of 
 receiving the petitions. Ibid., 24 Congress, 2 Session, pp. 79, 80. 
 On January 18, 1837, the House returned to the policy of the 
 preceding session, that is to table the petitions by adopting the 
 Hawes resolution by a vote of almost two to one. All but eight 
 of the southern Whigs voted for it, while only three of the 
 northern wing of the party supported the resolution. House Jour¬ 
 nal, 24 Congress, 2 Session, p. 236. The sectional alignment within 
 the party appeared again in the vote which defeated the resolution 
 to censure Adams, February 9, 1837. On this issue, the northern 
 Whigs refused to act with their southern associates against him. 
 Ibid., 24 Congress. 2 Session, p. 364. When the more extreme 
 resolution for the purpose of silencing the anti-slavery agitation 
 
176 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 the floor of the House that the Democrats were 
 responsible for violating the right of petition in 
 that the gag resolutions could not have passed 
 without their practically solid support. The same 
 charge could be made, however, with equal justice 
 against the southern wing of their own party, and 
 therefore, as by common consent, Whig news¬ 
 papers gave little attention to debates in Congress 
 on the right of petition or to the slavery question 
 in general. 10 In January, 1839, the Intelligencer 
 declared that it had no intention of discussing 
 any aspect of slavery. 11 The question cut across 
 both parties, and therefore Democrats as well as 
 
 so far as the House was concerned was adopted, December 21, 
 1837, a perfect sectional division took place within the party. Not 
 a southern or a northern Whig departed from his sectional alle¬ 
 giance. Ibid., 25 Congress, 2 Session, p. 129. 
 
 10 Charles Shepard, a Democratic member of the House from 
 North Carolina, in an address to his constituents, December, 1838, 
 drew a moral from the votes on the gag resolutions. “I am far 
 from saying that all the northern Whigs are favorable to the 
 schemes of these misguided people [the Abolitionists], but Mr. 
 Van Buren having early taken ground against them, and his 
 friends in Congress having voted with the southern delegation 
 thereby incurring the hatred of the fanatics, whilst the Whigs 
 have received their thanks and praises, it is not unreasonable to 
 conclude that one party is much sounder than the other.” Niles’ 
 Register, LV. p. 341. 
 
 11 National Intelligencer, January 7, 1839. The question of the 
 disposal of the public lands also threatened the unity not only of 
 the Whig but also of the Democratic party. At first, the South 
 and the West were united against the East in favor of the pre¬ 
 emption act of 1830. Clay consistently acted with the East in 
 opposing a liberal treatment of the squatter, and in 1838 he was 
 supported by Calhoun who recommended the cession of the public 
 lands to the states. This question could not be made a party 
 issue, however, because of the greater influence of the sectional 
 interests involved. B. H. Hibbard, A History of the Public Land 
 Policies (N. Y., 1924), pp. 152-258. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 
 
 177 
 
 Whigs tacitly agreed that the question should not 
 be made a political issue. 
 
 The Whig party was constantly threatened by 
 these disruptive tendencies, but a variety of influ¬ 
 ences were also operating in the direction of a 
 real union. Jackson and Van Buren aroused an 
 intensity of dislike that often obscured minor 
 differences. The attitude of many Whigs was 
 expressed in November, 1834, in a letter from 
 Thurlow Weed to Francis Granger. He would 
 have few regrets for the failure of the party in 
 the recent New York election “if our defeats 
 were not victories for those I hate, and who ought 
 to be hated.” 12 There was a general agreement 
 that the control of the government was in danger¬ 
 ous hands and that rotation in office was under¬ 
 mining sound principles. According to a Whig 
 pamphlet, published in 1835, before Jackson’s ad¬ 
 ministration “Office was considered as a public 
 commission created for the service of the people, 
 as the state itself is constituted for their benefit. 
 The emoluments of the office were not held to be 
 the object of its creation . . . change in office 
 was deemed a misfortune. . . .” 13 Jackson had 
 departed from this wise policy in introducing the 
 practice of rotation in office. 
 
 What is this doctrine? It is, that offices are estab¬ 
 lished, not as the necessary means of administering the 
 Government, but for the support of individuals at the 
 
 “Weed to Granger, Albany, November 23, 1834. Granger MSS. 
 
 13 The Political Mirror, a Revietv of Jacksonianism (N. Y., 
 1835), pp. 6, 7. 
 
178 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 public expense, and that the incumbents are to be removed, 
 from time to time, as the people generally may partake of 
 official emolument. The immediate effect of the doctrine 
 is to awaken the cupidity of all the idle and ambitious 
 of the land; to turn them from every consideration of 
 patriotism in the formation of party attachments, and to 
 substitute for it, a blind devotion to powerful leaders. 
 It holds out the idea that all men are qualified for all 
 offices, and decries the value of experience, faithfulness 
 and skill. 14 
 
 Whigs were agreed that the quality of the new 
 office-holders was extremely low. An anonymous 
 contributor in the Intelligencer declared in one of 
 a series of commemorative articles after the death 
 of John Marshall that ‘‘men have jutted up into 
 public station to which they would no more have 
 aspired in the days of Washington than they 
 would have attempted to subvert the order of 
 nature.” 15 According to J. B. Derby, a former 
 Federalist who had supported Jackson until the 
 removal of the deposits in 1833, the Massachu¬ 
 setts Democrats “sought recruits only in the 
 kennels and gutters,” 16 and their organization ob¬ 
 tained “under Jackson . . . every lucrative 
 office in Boston in the gift of the President.” 17 
 
 Much use was made by Whigs of an alleged 
 unconstitutional extension of the executive pow¬ 
 ers. According to the Intelligencer in December, 
 1829, Jackson’s pronouncements on foreign af- 
 
 u Ibid., p. 7. 
 
 13 National Intelligencer, August 22, 1835. 
 
 19 J. B. Derby, Political Reminiscences (Boston. 1835), p. 25. 
 
 "Ibid., p. 13. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 179 
 
 fairs “sound, for a Republican President, rather 
 too imperially.” 18 The next year, in connection 
 with the Maysville Road veto, it declared that the 
 president had no power, as Jackson had alleged in 
 his veto message, to instruct Congress as to the 
 bills it should not pass. 19 After Jackson’s veto of 
 the bill to recharter the National Bank, the Intelli¬ 
 gencer protested that the president should have 
 no power to defeat the will of the people as ex¬ 
 pressed through a clear majority in both houses, 20 
 and, after the removal of the deposits, it advised 
 Congress not to pass “any appropriation or money 
 bills of any nature whatsoever, until they have 
 vindicated the rights which the Executive has 
 determined to outrage, and secured them against 
 further infraction or invasion from that 
 source.” 21 Niles declared, in regard to the Mays¬ 
 ville Road veto, that the framers of the constitu¬ 
 tion had not intended that the veto should be used 
 against bills originating in the House of Repre¬ 
 sentatives, and that in his opinion only those 
 should be vetoed that were declared unconstitu¬ 
 tional by the attorney general or by the chief 
 justice of the Supreme Court upon the presi¬ 
 dent’s request for an opinion. 22 Whig opinion as 
 to the proper relations between the president and 
 
 18 National Intelligencer, December 12, 1829. 
 
 "Ibid., June 24, 1830. 
 
 * Ibid., July 14, 1832. 
 
 21 Ibid., October 7, 1833. 
 
 “ Niles’ Register, XL. 146. 
 
180 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 cabinet officers varied at different times. When 
 Jackson’s cabinet was dissolved in 1831, Niles as¬ 
 serted that “the secretaries are only as clerks of 
 the president, presumed to have no will or power 
 in themselves unless specially delegated,” 23 and in 
 1840 Clay took the opposite position in claiming 
 that they should be merely under the general 
 supervision of the president. 24 Differences also 
 appeared in regard to Jackson’s practice of ap¬ 
 pealing directly to the people. The Intelligencer 
 saw nothing to criticize in the President address¬ 
 ing the people in his message vetoing the Mays- 
 ville Road bill. “The President is responsible to 
 the People, and they have a right to pass on his 
 official acts. It is but just, therefore, that he 
 should be heard in vindication of his official 
 acts.” 25 Webster in his famous speech in New 
 York March, 1837, denied that the president was 
 in any special sense the representative of the peo¬ 
 ple ; if he were, there was no limit to the powers 
 he could claim. 26 
 
 I The position of the Whigs varied according to 
 particular circumstances, but they were consis¬ 
 tent in their vague criticism of the expansion 
 of executive power. After the National Gazette 
 abandoned its hope in 1833 of a modification of 
 
 23 Ibid., XL. 145. 
 
 u Ibid„ LVIII. 322-326. Members of the cabinet should be held 
 responsible, Clay thought, by means of impeachment. 
 
 25 National Intelligencer, June 19, 1830. 
 
 26 Webster, Writings (National Edition), XI. 210. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 
 
 181 
 
 Jackson’s Bank policy by means of Webster’s in¬ 
 fluence, it expressed the Whig point of view in 
 no uncertain terms. 
 
 Presidential power, as claimed and exercised, nullifies 
 laws and charters—is limited only by personal desire and 
 will,—and reduces the first functionaries in the depart¬ 
 ments to a subserviency as slavish and indefinite and 
 dependence as degrading and complete as any which ever 
 existed at the footstool of Asiatic despots. 27 
 
 The Senate, according to one of McLean’s corre¬ 
 spondents in May, 1834, was the single safeguard 
 against an irresponsible executive. Let it be re¬ 
 moved and what remains—an ambitious Presi¬ 
 dent with one foot upon the constitution of his 
 country, the other on the revenue—the sword of 
 state brandishing in his hands while he dictates to 
 a corrupt and crouching house the terms of its 
 precarious and slender existence. " 8 Edward 
 Everett declared in the summer of 1834 that the 
 whole force of party discipline was used by the 
 President to enforce his will upon the House. 29 
 According to Adams, the balance of power had 
 shifted from Congress to the President. 
 
 There is a tone of insolence and insult in his inter¬ 
 course with both Houses of Congress, especially since his 
 reelection, which never was witnessed between the Ex 
 ecutive and legislature before. The domineering has 
 heretofore been usually on the side of the legislative 
 
 27 National Gazette and Literary Register, November 26, 1833. 
 
 28 J. McMahon to McLean, St. Clairsville, Ohio., May 28, 1834. 
 McLean MSS. 
 
 2 " Niles’ Register, XLVI. p. 452. 
 
182 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 bodies to the Executive, and Clay has not been sparing in 
 his use of it. He is now paid in his own coin . 30 
 
 In the campaign of 1840, Harrison made use of 
 the Whig dislike of executive power as a means 
 of avoiding definite pledges. “Congress should 
 be left as much as possible untrammelled by ex¬ 
 ecutive influence,” he wrote to the Whig com¬ 
 mittee of the New York legislature, “and . . . 
 a better guarantee for a correct conduct of a chief 
 magistrate may be found in his character and the 
 course of his former life, than in pledges and 
 opinions given during the pendency of a doubtful 
 contest. . . He believed that there was no 
 constitutional justification for making the execu¬ 
 tive “a constituent branch of the legislature.” 31 
 
 Whigs were especially aroused by the alleged 
 domination of Congress, and particularly of the 
 House of Representatives, by the executive 
 department. Newspapers, pamphlets, and the 
 speeches of party leaders made this their chief 
 stock in trade. Attacking the attitude of the 
 executive in his relations with Congress, much 
 was naturally said of the necessity for the inde¬ 
 pendence of the legislative department. The at- 
 
 30 Adams, Memoirs, IX. 51. In April, 1839, the Intelligencer 
 quoted the Harrisburg Reporter, described as the Democratic 
 organ in Pennsylvania, to the effect that an amendment would be 
 submitted by the legislature removing the life tenure of the federal 
 judiciary. National Intelligencer, April 18, 1839. 
 
 31 Niles’ Register, LVIII. p. 294. “The habit,’’ he declared, “of 
 considering the individual [i. e. the President] as the source from 
 which all the measures of government should emanate is degrad¬ 
 ing to a republic and of the most dangerous tendency.” Cf. Ibid. 
 LVIX. pp. 70-71. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 
 
 183 
 
 tention devoted to this topic and the immense 
 amount of campaign material of which this is 
 the central theme persuaded older historians to 
 interpret the Whig party in the light of political 
 science by reading into it a defence of congres¬ 
 sional as opposed to presidential government. 32 It 
 was obviously the exigencies of practical politics 
 that brought the Whigs to the defense of Con¬ 
 gress against the powers of the president, rather 
 than a general agreement in support of a theory 
 of congressional government. It was not so much 
 the extension of the president’s powers that 
 aroused the anger of the Whigs as it was the 
 character and the party ties of Jackson and Van 
 Buren. The Whig defense of Congress was the 
 necessary result of the charges of executive en¬ 
 croachment. However, when an opportunity ap¬ 
 peared in 1837 for a direct issue with the Van 
 Buren administration in regard to the executive 
 control of the House, the Whig party refused to 
 take davantage of it and decided to continue its 
 policy of criticising the expansion of executive 
 power in somewhat vague terms. 
 
 Richard Fletcher, a member of the twenty-fifth 
 Congress from Boston, in the course of a speech 
 delivered in Faneuil Hall in November, 1837, de¬ 
 clared that the business of the House during the 
 
 82 J. W. Burgess, The Middle Period (N. Y., 1904), pp. 281-284. 
 Cf., William MacDonald, Jacksonian Democracy, pp. 294, 295. 1 his 
 interpretation of the Whig party appeared in a campaign pamphlet 
 by J. P. Kennedy in 1844. Defence of the Whigs, by a member of 
 the Twenty Seventh Congress (J. P. Kennedy), pp. 12, 48, 49. 
 
184 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 extra session, which had been called to deal with 
 the existing financial crisis, had been controlled 
 at every step by the heads of departments and 
 by the President. This control was exercised 
 through the committee on ways and means of 
 whose nine members only two were opposed to 
 the administration. 
 
 The committee, you imagine, look over the message, 
 see what is recommended to be done for the benefit of the 
 country; consult together as to the best measures; and 
 lay the results of their deliberations before the House. 
 
 I once entertained the same ideas; but I soon 
 found my error. . . . The chairman of the commit¬ 
 
 tee, steps up to the White House, and there receives 
 from the President or the Secretary of the Treasury, such 
 bills as they wish to have passed by the House. The 
 chairman puts the bills in his pocket, takes them to the 
 committee; without any examination the majority of the 
 committee approve them; the minority can do nothing; 
 the bills are presented to the House, and received as the 
 doings of the committee. 
 
 According to Fletcher, every important bill which 
 had been passed by Congress during the extra 
 session was framed by others than its members. 
 Representatives had become machines for the use 
 of the executive. “Executive power has become 
 a very colossus, which bestrides the land from one 
 end to the other; and, . . . if we do not over¬ 
 throw it ... it will crush liberty . . . the 
 Constitution !” 33 This speech was reported in the 
 
 33 Speech of Robert Fletcher, Fanueil Hall, November 6, 1837. 
 Pamphlet. Library of Congress. Fletcher was a minority mem¬ 
 ber of the Committee on Ways and Means. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 
 
 185 
 
 Boston Atlas, copied in part by Niles’ Register?* 
 and printed as a campaign pamphlet which was 
 given wide circulation. 35 Not long after the open¬ 
 ing of the regular session in December, 1837, the 
 majority members of the committee published a 
 reply to Fletcher in the Washington Globe, in 
 which its chairman, C. C. Cambreling, declared 
 that he had received no bills from the President 
 nor had he consulted with him, but that in accord¬ 
 ance with the practice since the beginning of the 
 government he had consulted with the heads of 
 the departments. “This is but an act of courtesy 
 to the officer who recommends a measure con¬ 
 nected with the business of his department, and 
 whose duty it is, when the law is enacted, to con¬ 
 strue and execute it.” Bills often appeared before 
 the committee in this way, but it was denied that 
 they were accepted in their original form as 
 Fletcher had charged. 36 Instead of maintaining 
 his position, Fletcher in a weak speech denied that 
 the A tlas had reported him correctly. He had not 
 intended, he declared, to launch a personal attack 
 upon the Democratic members and had wished 
 merely to criticize the majority members for con- 
 
 34 Niles' Register, LIII. 199. It also appeared in the National 
 Intelligencer, January 2, 1838. 
 
 35 C. G. Atherton, a Democratic member of the committee, 
 from New Hampshire, wrote to the editor of New Hampshire 
 Patriot December, 1837, that Fletcher’s speech had been printed 
 in nearly all of the Whig newspapers of that state and that large 
 numbers of the pamphlets had been distributed there. Niles' 
 Register, LIII. 315. 
 
 “ Congressional Globe, 25 Congress, 2 Session, p. 21. 
 
186 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 suiting with the heads of departments without the 
 knowledge of the minority. 37 The affair at once 
 attracted wide attention, 38 but the uncertain posi¬ 
 tion taken by Fletcher gave his Whig colleagues 
 an excuse to leave him to his own resources. The 
 New York American was convinced of Fletcher’s 
 sincerity in his controversy with the Atlas, but 
 declared that in his defence he had not been “suf¬ 
 ficiently clear and explicit, either as to what he 
 meant to admit, or to deny.” He had “disavowed 
 statements, which, nevertheless, he had permitted 
 to be circulated as true,” with the result that mem¬ 
 bers of the House who otherwise would have 
 hastened to his defence “could not sustain one, 
 who seemed unfaithful to himself.” 39 Fletcher 
 withdrew from the committee and thereafter 
 ceased to play an important part in Congress. In 
 March, 1838, Adams noted that Fletcher “since 
 his caucus speech in Faneuil Hall and his falter¬ 
 ing defence of it in the House, is a cipher, and 
 will drop from his seat or decline a reelection.” 40 
 Whig leaders preferred to limit themselves to a 
 
 37 Ibid., p. 22. 
 
 38 National Intelligencer, January 2, 3, 1838. Cf. Boston Daily 
 Advertiser, January 3, quoting New York Courier and Enquirer; 
 January 4, quoting Portsmouth Gazette and Salem Advertiser. 
 Boston Atlas, December 18. 1837. Niles’ Register, LIII. 119. 
 
 39 New York American, January 2, 1838. 
 
 40 Adams, Memoirs, IX. 503. In July, 1839, the Intelligencer 
 announced Fletcher’s resignation after he had been reelected. He 
 had doubtless “found the arena of the House of Representatives 
 too crowded and boisterous for his retired and deliberative habits.” 
 National Intelligencer, July 6, 1839. He was later a member of 
 the Massachusetts Supreme Court, 1848-1853. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 187 
 
 criticism of executive encroachment in general 
 terms rather than to support Fletcher’s definite 
 issue. 
 
 Common interests of more fundamental im¬ 
 portance than campaign arguments were present 
 in the Whig party. With some exceptions, nota¬ 
 bly that of the group which gained control of the 
 party in 1839-1840, it expressed in many ways 
 the conservative point of view in politics. Men 
 who were conservative by temperament either 
 abandoned politics altogether or were Whigs. 41 
 They viewed with alarm evidences of social dis¬ 
 order and waxed pessimistic as to the future 
 stability of society. The bitterness of partisan 
 struggles during the Jacksonian period resulted 
 in numerous riots, particularly on election days. 
 Street fighting occurred in New York City, Al¬ 
 bany, and Philadelphia during the municipal 
 elections of 1834. In September, 1835, Niles 
 declared: 
 
 Society seems everywhere unhinged, and the demon of 
 ‘blood and slaughter’ has been let loose upon us . . . 
 
 and [I] regret to believe also that an awful political out¬ 
 cry is to be raised to rally the ‘poor against the rich’. 
 
 . The character of our countrymen seems suddenly 
 changed, and thousands interpret the laws in their own 
 wa y—sometimes in one case, and then in another guided 
 only by their own will . 42 
 
 41 M. Chevalier, Society, Manners and Politics in the United 
 States (Boston, 1839), p. 438. 
 
 “ Niles’ Register, XLIX. 1. 
 
188 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 When Adams was asked at this time to sign a 
 petition for the abolition of capital punishment, 
 he saw in it evidence of a declining respect for 
 law. “The signs of the times are portentous. All 
 the tendencies of legislation are to the removal of 
 restrictions from the vicious and the guilty, and 
 to the exercise of all the powers of government 
 . . . by lawless assemblages of individuals.” 
 He anticipated with distinct aversion the abolition 
 of the death penalty not only in Massachusetts 
 but in all states. 43 Chevalier noted the resem¬ 
 blance between the Democratic speeches against 
 the Bank and “our Republican tirades of 1791 and 
 1792. There is the same declamatory tone, the 
 same swollen style, the same appeal to popular 
 passions. . . .” The opposition of Whigs to 
 these tendences and to the Democratic party, 
 which was charged with the responsibility for this 
 state of affairs, was a natural result of their 
 property interests. This was especially true of 
 the party in the eastern states. According to 
 Congdon, the Massachusetts Whigs “claimed all 
 the decency, refinement, wealth and cultivation of 
 the State, if not of the United States.” 44 In 
 Maine, business men were reported to have dis¬ 
 charged employees who opposed the Bank, and one 
 declared that he always gave preference to men 
 who voted for what he thought were the best 
 
 43 Adams, Memoirs, IX. 259, 260. 
 
 44 Congdon, Reminiscences, p. 60. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 
 
 189 
 
 interests of the country. 45 Few of the wealthier 
 merchants of New York City belonged to the 
 Democratic party. “The mass of large and little 
 merchants have, like a flock of sheep, gathered 
 either in the Federalist, Whig, Clay or Republi¬ 
 can folds. The Democratic merchants could have 
 easily been stored in a large Eighth Avenue rail¬ 
 road car.” 46 The Intelligencer commented upon 
 the economic character of the Whig party in New 
 York state on the eve of the election in Novem¬ 
 ber, 1834. “That a very large proportion of all 
 the voters in New York, who have any stake in 
 the national prosperity, or who have an essential 
 interest in the perpetuation of our political insti¬ 
 tutions or indeed in the preservation of social 
 order, are now numbered among the Whigs, is a 
 fact which cannot be controverted.” 47 Even 
 Whig politicians conceded that the two parties 
 were distinguished by this difference. Seward 
 wrote to Weed in April, 1835, that Van Buren 
 could not be defeated. 
 
 The people are for him. Not so much for him as for 
 the principle they suppose he represents. That principle 
 is Democracy; ... It is with them, the poor against 
 
 the rich; and it is not to be disguised, that, since the last 
 election, the array of parties has very strongly taken that 
 character. Those who felt themselves or believed them¬ 
 selves poor, have fallen off very naturally from us, and 
 
 46 Hatch, History of Maine, I. 217. 
 
 " Fox, Decline of Aristocracy, p. 426, quoting W. Barrett, Old 
 Merchants of New York, I. 81. 
 
 47 National Intelligencer, November 3, 1834. 
 
190 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 into the majority . . . while ‘the rich we have always 
 
 with us’. Our papers without being conscious of it, have 
 been gradually assuming their cause; not from choice, but 
 by way of retaliation upon the victors . 48 
 
 While the western Whigs were probably less 
 prosperous than their eastern associates, their 
 point of view in politics was doubtless similar. 
 National Republicans and Whigs, in migrating to 
 the new country, inevitably took with them their 
 political opinions, and the levelling influences of 
 the frontier could not in all cases overcome tem¬ 
 perament and family traditions. During the 
 Jacksonian period the Whig party in the South 
 had every reason to be sympathetic with the con¬ 
 servative point of view. It included, with few 
 exceptions, the slave-holding aristocracy owning 
 large plantations and numerous slaves. 49 These 
 men turned instinctively to an association with 
 
 “Seward to Weed, Auburn, April 12, 1835. Seward, Auto¬ 
 biography, pp. 257-258. The earlier struggle between Jackson and 
 the Bank naturally forced men of property interests into opposi¬ 
 tion. In April, 1834, Niles recognized one hundred and eighty- 
 three names of business houses that had signed a petition in Balti¬ 
 more urging the return of the deposits. Niles’ Register, XLVI. 
 p. 244. James Buchanan wrote to Jackson from a Pennsylvania 
 watering place in July, 1837: “It is mortifying to observe what 
 a powerful influence the Bank of the United States exerts over 
 the minds of those who consider themselves the well born and 
 well bred of the land. At this watering place, there are but few 
 who are not its advocates and who would not hail its recharter 
 by Congress as a sovereign panacea for all our political evils. 
 ... It is among the hard handed and honest farmers and 
 mechanics of the country that the opposition to this institution 
 and to a monied aristocracy prevails.” Buchanan to Jackson, Bed¬ 
 ford Springs, July 28, 1837. Works of Buchanan (J. B. Moore, 
 ed., Philadelphia, 1908), III. 256, 257. 
 
 “ Cole, Whig Party in the South, pp. 69-72. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 
 
 191 
 
 men of similarly conservative interests in the 
 North. A correspondent of the Intelligencer, 
 writing in November, 1838, urged the advantages 
 of acting with the northern Whigs. 
 
 The security of the South is in the Northern Whigs, 
 for they are the defenders of society as it is, under the 
 Constitution. They are the Conservatives in opposition 
 to the destructive principle of Locofocoism, which is for 
 levelling everything, amalgamating everything. They are 
 men who have a stake in society, and tremble over con¬ 
 vulsions. If the South now sows the Locofoco wind in 
 the North it will reap the whirlwind. . . . Law, law, 
 
 law, is the call of the Whigs .” 50 
 
 While the Whigs were influenced in their 
 political thinking by property interests, available 
 evidence does not support the theory that they 
 differed with the Democrats in the ownership of 
 personal in contrast with real property. Professor 
 Fox has demonstrated, however, that the wards of 
 New York City showing the largest assessments 
 returned consistent majorities for the National 
 Republican and Whig parties, and a similar con¬ 
 clusion was established in regard to several of the 
 smaller cities. 51 The county returns for the na¬ 
 tional elections also show that the Whigs were 
 usually more successful in developed regions. 52 
 Committed to this narrow interest, the party de¬ 
 pended upon adventitious circumstances to give 
 it a more effective appeal to the mass of voters. 
 
 80 National Intelligencer, November 21, 1838. 
 
 M Fox, Decline of Aristocracy, p. 424, 433-435. 
 
 “ See appendix for election maps. 
 
192 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 The pressure of disturbed economic conditions 
 was felt by men who had little or no property. 
 After wages fell unemployment increased, and 
 markets for farm products were injured. Hard 
 times were, therefore, the most persuasive argu¬ 
 ments for the Whig party. Seward acknowledged 
 that "this party of ours in its elements is such that 
 it cannot succeed until there is a time of popular 
 convulsion, when suffering shall make men feel, 
 and because they feel, think !” 53 This proved to be 
 true in the years of the greatest Whig activity, in 
 1834 and after 1837. The obvious association 
 between hard times and the success of the party 
 tempted those who had a material interest at 
 stake to create or to emphasize existing depres¬ 
 sion. This was done by Biddle and the Bank in 
 the spring and summer of 1834. 54 
 
 Something may be learned of the character of 
 the Whig party from the comments of its leaders 
 in regard to their opponents. Its point of view 
 was that of an almost hopeless minority. It was 
 Chevalier’s observation that, "The higher classes 
 in the United States, with some exceptions and 
 taken as a whole, have the air and attitude of the 
 vanquished; they bear the mark of defeat on their 
 front.” 55 The long tenure of power in Demo¬ 
 cratic hands changed the emphasis in political life 
 
 “ Seward to Weed, April 12, 1835. Seward, Autobiography, p. 
 258. 
 
 See above, pp. 120, 121. 
 
 “ Chevalier, Society, Manners and Politics, p. 438. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 
 
 193 
 
 from the professional and business groups to the 
 small farmer and laborer. Sir Charles Lyell, the 
 English geologist, who travelled in the United 
 States in 1845, was told by many merchants: 
 
 that the small farmers had too great an ascendency. No 
 feature, indeed, appeared to me more contrasted in the 
 political aspect of America and Great Britain than this, 
 that in the United States the democracy derives its chief 
 support from the landed interest, while the towns take the 
 more conservative side, and are often accused by the 
 landed proprietors of being too aristocratic . 56 
 
 While Lyell’s explanation of American politics 
 cannot be substantiated in detail, it indicated a 
 situation which nevertheless existed. Another 
 traveller, Alexander Mackay, who came to this 
 country in 1846-1847 but whose observations 
 were doubtless equally valid for the earlier period, 
 noted the important part played by the farmer in 
 politics. Debarred by the limitations of his en¬ 
 vironment from the accumulation of considerable 
 wealth, he satisfied his ambitions in political life. 
 Local offices were almost entirely in his control. 
 
 “Charles Lyell, A Second Visit to the United States (N. Y., 
 1849), I. 84-85. Chevalier wrote that the opinion of the educated 
 or upper classes had influenced all presidents down to Jackson and 
 had been effective in some measure in controlling Congress. “Au- 
 jourd’hui elle a completement rompu avec le President. . . . 
 
 Aujourd’hui elle n’a plus de credit que pres d’une seule des Cham- 
 bres, parce que le Senat se trouve encore compose d’ hommes, 
 qu’elle peut revendiquer comme siens a cause de leur superiorite de 
 lumiers, d’education ou de fortune . . . Le farmer et le me¬ 
 
 chanic sont les seigneurs du Nouveau-Monde: l’opinion publique, 
 c’est leur volonte . . . le President est leur elu, leur mandi- 
 
 taire; leur seurvateur . . . En un mot, l’Amerique du Nord, 
 
 c’est l’Europe la tete en bas et les pieds en haut.” Chevalier, 
 Letters sur l’ Amerique, pp. 313, 314. 
 
194 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 Once involved in politics, his vote and influence 
 became of such importance that he could not with¬ 
 draw, and his interests naturally expanded from 
 the township to county and state affairs. Wher¬ 
 ever Mackay went he found that the farmer “as 
 a duck takes to water, so does he very soon take 
 to politics,” and, moreover, he was usually well 
 informed on political matters. “I found the 
 farmers in the remotest districts, not all equally, 
 but all tolerably conversant, each man being able 
 to assign an intelligent reason for the side he took 
 and the vote which he gave.” 57 Lyell believed 
 that the effect of the Democratic appeal to the 
 artisans of the towns and cities had made it diffi¬ 
 cult if not impossible for men of wealth to achieve 
 success in politics. 
 
 During my subsequent stay in New England, I often 
 conversed with men of the working classes on the same 
 subject and invariably found that they had made up their 
 mind that it was not desirable to choose representatives 
 from the wealthiest class. ‘The rich,’ they say ‘have less 
 sympathy with our opinions and feelings; love their 
 amusements, and go shooting, fishing, and traveling; keep 
 hospitable houses, and are inaccessible when we want to 
 talk with them, at all hours, and tell them how we wish 
 them to vote.” 
 
 It was his conclusion that discrimination against 
 men of wealth in politics was the result of “the 
 desire of reducing their legislature to mere dele¬ 
 gates.” Furthermore, Lyell was informed by a 
 
 67 Alexander Mackay, The Western World (London, 1850), 
 II. 6-12. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 195 
 
 lawyer, who was probably unsympathetic with 
 contemporary changes of a democratic character: 
 
 “ 'In choosing a delegate—the people consider 
 themselves as patrons who are giving away a 
 place; and if an opulent man offers himself, they 
 are disposed to say, 'You have enough already, 
 let us help some one as good as you who is 
 poor.’ ” 58 
 
 Travellers’ opinions are usually more sweeping 
 than accurate in detail, but in this case they pro¬ 
 vide evidence of a condition which existed in 
 the western or frontier states and in the larger 
 cities. The Whig point of view was probably 
 influenced by this situation. Fear was commonly 
 expressed that the control of the government had 
 passed into incapable or dangerous hands. The 
 New Haven Palladium was alarmed by the char¬ 
 acter of the Democratic party in the New York 
 election of November, 1834. 
 
 The Tories reaped their harvest and secured all the 
 votes of all those who were termed the greatest democrats 
 because the most worthless vagabonds. In their view, the 
 respectable journeyman mechanic is a ruffleshirt and an 
 aristocrat, compared with those whose home is neither 
 ‘on the mountain wave’, nor at the mechanic’s bench, but 
 in the gutters and watch-houses of the city—those who 
 instead of attending church or reading at home are singing 
 ‘Yankee Doodle’ on Sundays at Tammany Hall and 
 ridiculing the Scriptures . 59 
 
 M Lyell, A Second Visit to the United States, I. 83. 
 
 " National Intelligencer, November 19, 1834. 
 
196 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 The Whigs of New York City agreed with the 
 Native Americans in their support of stringent 
 requirements for the naturalization of immi¬ 
 grants as a means of keeping out dangerous ele¬ 
 ments, 60 and the two parties cooperated in several 
 of the municipal elections. 61 The New York 
 American declared that it was not a party ques¬ 
 tion and that it was to the interest of all to amend 
 the federal constitution in order to “withhold 
 from all men of foreign birth, who may hereafter 
 be naturalized, all political rights.” 62 Neverthe¬ 
 less, as most of the immigrants became Democrats 
 under the able management of party leaders, 63 
 their exclusion from the franchise would weaken 
 that party and thereby serve Whig interests. 
 Whig resistance to liberal naturalization laws was 
 of course centered in New York, where the prob¬ 
 lem was most acute, but Joseph Duncan, a Demo¬ 
 cratic member from Illinois, arraigned the party 
 as a whole for its attitude upon this issue. 64 
 
 Fear of increasing radicalism was in some de¬ 
 gree justified by the appearance of the Locofoco 
 
 90 L. L. Scisco, Political Nativism in New York (N. Y., 1901), 
 p. 23. 
 
 91 Fox, Decline of Aristocracy, pp. 375, 376. 
 
 ,2 New York American (semi-weekly), July 30, 1835. Cf. Ibid., 
 June 30, 1835. 
 
 93 Hone, Diary, I. 168. Cf. A. B. Faust, The German Element 
 in the United States (N. Y„ 1909), II. 126, 127. 
 
 94 Congressional Globe, 26 Congress, 2 Session, pp. 266-273. This 
 speech is analysed in F. G. Franklin, The Legislative History of 
 Naturalisation in the United States, from the Revolution to 1861. 
 (Chicago, 1906), pp. 207-211. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 197 
 
 party in New York City as the result of division 
 in the Democratic ranks in October, 1835. This 
 party soon made common cause with the strug¬ 
 gling trade union movement in resistance to any 
 and all bank charters, in support of an exclusively 
 gold and silver currency, the extension of the 
 common school system, and the election of all 
 members of the judiciary. The Whigs of New 
 York noted with approval evidence of conserva¬ 
 tism among the majority of the Democratic 
 party, 65 but this satisfaction was short lived, for 
 the Locofocos returned to their former allegiance 
 in the fall of 1837 as a result of Van Buren’s 
 recommendation of a divorce between the govern¬ 
 ment and the pet banks. 66 Already aroused by 
 the vagaries of the radical Fanny Wright, who 
 had been lecturing in New York City, 67 Whigs 
 now declared that the Democratic party was in¬ 
 fected with the dangerous theories of the Loco¬ 
 focos. Whig newspapers replied to the charge of 
 Federalism with the assertion that the Democrats 
 were Locofocos, and the significance of this 
 
 “ F Byrdsall, The History of the Loco Foco, or Equal Rights 
 Party (N. Y., 1842), pp. 28-29. 
 
 “William Trimble, “Diverging Tendencies in the New York 
 Democracy in the Period of the Locofocos,” American Historical 
 Review, XXIV, 410-412. 
 
 87 The New York correspondent of the Intelligencer assured his 
 readers that her activities were a part of the Locofoco campaign. 
 “Fanny Wright is now lecturing on equal rights in our city. I 
 dropt in (six cents it is) to hear her last night. Man is equal, 
 woman is equal, down with banks, down with priests, down with 
 religion, down with everything, was the sum of her oration. 
 National Intelligencer, October 15, 1837. 
 
198 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 name lies in their interpretation of that move¬ 
 ment. A Locofoco was defined in a clipping 
 printed by the Intelligencer in September, 1837, 
 as a person who wished to destroy existing social 
 institutions. 
 
 A Loco Foco in the present acceptation of the term, is a 
 man not satisfied with anything that exists; but is in favor 
 of an equal distribution of property, an uprooting of the 
 institutions of the country, and the substitution of some 
 monstrous and impracticable fancy of his own in their 
 stead. He professes to be in favor of ‘Equal Rights, 
 Equal Privileges, and Equal Laws’, by which he means 
 rights, privileges, and laws, which will make him as rich, 
 as influential, and as consequential as his more indus¬ 
 trious, prudent, able, persevering and thriving neighbors, 
 without any particular talents or exertions of his own. A 
 Loco Foco wants a new Constitution; he desires that there 
 should be no credits; that all debts should be debts of 
 honor; that no man should be superior to himself; that 
 we should have no medium of exchanges but gold and 
 silver; that the whole form of society and government 
 should be changed, and that they should have the privilege 
 of concocting a better. He is a restless, unsatisfied 
 mortal; and could he have all his heart’s desire today, hr 
 would grumble tomorrow just as lustily as ever . 68 
 
 The Intelligencers New York correspondent 
 wrote a few days later that if the Locofocos were 
 allowed to return to Tammany “a terrible war is 
 to commence in all this great country between 
 European Radicalism of the worst kind and 
 American Conservatism. . . He anticipated 
 that the Democrats would lose control of New 
 
 “ National Intelligencer, September 9, 1837, quoting New York 
 Observer of Utica. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 
 
 199 
 
 York state if this occurred, “for the rich and 
 powerful men of Tammany have made Mr. Van 
 Buren all he is . . . and if he drives them fur¬ 
 ther, they will turn upon him in wrath.” Should 
 the President follow Silas Wright’s example in 
 drawing the line of “the poor against the rich,” 
 his defeat will be turned into a rout, for the 
 Democratic party in New York state was made 
 up of the “very rich and the very poor, acting 
 against the middle interests, and whenever he 
 draws off either section, he is in a great minor¬ 
 ity.” 69 Moderation was of course a character¬ 
 istic of the remarks of neither party in regard to 
 its opponents, and according to J. S. Buckingham, 
 an English traveller who was in New York state 
 during the fall election of 1838, Whig character¬ 
 izations of Democrats were especially vivid. 
 They were “atheists, infidels, agrarians, incendi¬ 
 aries, men who were without religion and honesty, 
 who desire to pull down all that was venerable in 
 the institutions of the country, to seize the prop¬ 
 erty of the rich and divide it among the poor, to 
 demolish the churches. . . .” 70 In January, 
 1838, the New York Express described a crowd 
 of Locofocos that attempted to break up a meet¬ 
 ing of conservative Democrats as, “The Slam 
 Bang fellows, and odds and ends of this big earth, 
 agrarians and Fannie Wright men in scores 
 
 ** Ibid., September 13, 1837. 
 
 70 J. S. Buckingham, America, Historical, Statistical, and Descrip¬ 
 tive (London, 1841), I. 68. 
 
200 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 began to assemble . . . with wild, fierce, 
 squally looks betokening the coming storm.” The 
 Democrats who still remained true to conservative 
 principles, it was hoped, would see “that it is not 
 with such a Buffalo herd government is to be 
 administered ... or victory won.” If this 
 “clan” should succeed in gaining control, it would 
 introduce “violence, mobism, force, terror, all the 
 anarchy and Jacobinism of the French Robespier- 
 rians. . . .” 71 According to the New York 
 American in November, 1838, the Evening Post, 
 an important Democratic newspaper, printed and 
 endorsed the address of a Locofoco meeting in 
 which the dangers of a social upheaval were 
 minimized. “ ‘Nor has our country any reason to 
 fear social disorder. Anarchy is but a state of 
 transition. The very nature of man renders so¬ 
 cial order inevitable.’ ” 72 There was danger, how¬ 
 ever, that this conservative attitude would be 
 pushed too far. As a means of demonstrating 
 that they were not without sympathy for the poor, 
 the Whigs of New York City, after the successful 
 election of 1837, collected a considerable purse for 
 the purpose of relieving their needs, and it was 
 said that the same thing was to be done in Phila¬ 
 delphia. “This is the party, who are called ‘haters 
 of the poor’—‘aristocrats’—‘rag-barons’—‘bank 
 partisans—‘oppressors of the poor .... 
 
 "New York American, January 3, 1838, quoting New York 
 Express. 
 
 n National Intelligencer. November 3, 1838. 
 
 13 Ibid., November 22, 1837. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 
 
 201 
 
 The presidential message of December, 1838, 
 in alluding to the “ ‘Anti-Republican tendencies 
 of associated wealth’ ” was interpreted by Whigs 
 as containing the germs of the most dangerous of 
 radical theories. It was conceded that Van Buren 
 perhaps intended to refer to “banking, insurance, 
 and manufacturing companies only,” but he had 
 given expression to a heresy which in its logical 
 conclusion would “stigmatise as unnatural and 
 anti-republican all notions of property, all con¬ 
 tracts, all obligations of every sort.” 74 An article 
 on “Radicalism” in the Democratic Review for 
 October, 1838, was taken as representative of the 
 administration’s point of view. The opinions 
 expressed therein were in fact tolerant of radical¬ 
 ism in general and of Locofocoism in par¬ 
 ticular. The writer asked that justice be done 
 them. Their doctrines “are generally sound, and 
 their practice, with perhaps slight exceptions, 
 would make the world happier and better.” 75 
 This position apparently contained little of a 
 revolutionary character, but the Intelligencer 
 immediately declared that it was proof that the 
 Democrats intended to make the “rich poor 
 and the poor rich, by reducing to harmony the 
 laws of nature, which they alleged to have been 
 violated by artificial and unjust distributions of 
 property. . . .” This open profession of agra- 
 
 ” Ibid., December 8, 1838. 
 
 " The United States Magazine and Democratic Review III. 
 10S, 106. 
 
202 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 rian principles was the climax of folly as well as 
 of political error. “If put into practice they would 
 break up the great deep of civil society.” 76 In 
 August, 1840, the Intelligencer pointed to the 
 efforts made by the Democratic members of the 
 Senate to change the tenure of the judiciary as an 
 example of their radicalism. It was first pro¬ 
 posed by Senator Tappan, “this trusty counsellor 
 of the President,” in December, 1838, to limit 
 members of the federal judiciary to periods rang¬ 
 ing from one to seven years, and later it was 
 proposed by another Democratic senator to make 
 these offices elective. The Democratic Review, it 
 declared, went even to greater extremes by urging 
 a term of one year with unlimited re-eligibility 
 for the presidency and also the change from an 
 appointive to an elective provision for most of the 
 offices in the executive department. 77 It is possi¬ 
 ble that the forebodings of Whig newspapers as 
 to the dangers of Democratic radicalism were not 
 entirely sincere; in any case, it was expedient to 
 stress the union between the Democratic party 
 and Locofocoism. To the charge that they were 
 the successors of the old Federalists, the Whigs 
 replied that the Democrats were Locofocos. 
 
 The radical views of Orestes A. Brownson, edi¬ 
 tor of the Boston Quarterly Review, furnished 
 the Whigs another opportunity to attribute un- 
 
 " National Intelligencer, November 14, 1838. 
 
 77 Ibid., August 22, 1840. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 
 
 20 3 
 
 sound principles to the administration. Brown- 
 son was an eccentric who established the Review 
 in 1838 as a means of expressing his ideas with¬ 
 out any constraint. “I undertake this Review 
 . . . for myself,” he declared in the first num¬ 
 ber, “not because I am certain that the public 
 wants it, but because I want it. I want it as a 
 medium through which I may say to those who 
 choose to listen to my voice, just what I wish to 
 say, and through which I may say it in my own 
 way and time. . . .” 78 He was in hearty sympa¬ 
 thy with the Chartist movement, and in an article 
 on this subject not only did he encourage the 
 leaders of the English movement, but he also ex¬ 
 pressed advanced ideas as to the existing economic 
 system in the United States. 
 
 The only enemy of the Laborer, is your employer, 
 whether he appear in the shape of a master mechanic, or 
 in the owner of a factory ... we say frankly, that, 
 if there must always be a laboring population distinct 
 from proprietors and employers we regard the slave 
 system as decidedly preferable to the system at wages . 79 
 
 Brownson insisted that he was a member of no 
 party, but the Intelligencer in August, 1840, 
 identified him as a federal office-holder and more¬ 
 over asserted that he was the recipient of a com¬ 
 fortable salary for a slight return in service. The 
 New York Evening Post, which was said to be 
 
 18 Boston Quarterly Review, I. 4. 
 
 ” These statements were quoted by a Whig pamphlet written, 
 under a pseudonym, by Calvin Colton. “Junius,” American 
 Jacobinism (N. Y., 1840). Library of Congress. 
 
204 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 close to the administration, was sympathetic in its 
 attitude and had virtually endorsed his position. 
 Its remarks in reference to radicalism were espe¬ 
 cially offensive from the Intelligencer’s point of 
 view. The Post thought that society resented too 
 quickly new ideas that questioned its “ancient 
 habits and established modes of faith.” Radicals 
 are “what the spur is to the sluggish steed. They 
 break in upon its heavy slumbers . . . and 
 impel it more quickly in the career of improve¬ 
 ment. . . . The curse of human action is, that 
 it moves too slow, is reluctant to break its ac¬ 
 customed routine, and thus goes on for ages under 
 abuses which a year might correct.” 80 While the 
 Intelligencer attributed the administration’s toler¬ 
 ance of Brownson to a desire for the radical vote, 
 Calvin Colton interpreted the Post’s position as 
 evidence of the Democratic party’s approval of 
 his ideas. 81 In fact, when the Boston Quarterly 
 Review came to the end of its brief career in 1840 
 it was merged with the Democratic Review, a 
 demonstration that the administration was not 
 unfriendly. 
 
 The federal government under the control of 
 the Democratic party, according to Whig opinion, 
 had turned towards radical democracy. Thomas 
 Hamilton, an English traveller with democratic 
 sympathies whose remarks on America were pub¬ 
 lished in 1833, reported that all intelligent men 
 
 *° National Intelligencer, August 11, 1840. 
 
 81 Junius, American Jacobinism, p. 1. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 205 
 
 with whom he had talked confessed that the spirit 
 of the constitution had changed. “It was un¬ 
 doubtedly the wish of Washington and Hamilton 
 to counterpoise, as much as circumstances would 
 permit, the rashness of democracy by the caution 
 and wisdom of an aristocracy of intelligence and 
 wealth. There is now no attempt at counter¬ 
 poise.” 82 Late in 1838, the Boston Daily Adver¬ 
 tiser declared that “the distinction between a 
 Republic and a Democracy has become dim,” and 
 that it was the policy of the Democratic party to 
 change the character of the American govern¬ 
 ment. “They have proclaimed by word and deed 
 that ‘our government is a Democracy’; until the 
 difference between regarding and confounding 
 the distinction had become the difference between 
 the Whigs and their opponents.” 83 Such was the 
 point of view taken by Calvin Colton in a pamph¬ 
 let written for the purpose of correcting some of 
 the mistaken ideas for which British travellers 
 were responsible. “American society,” he de¬ 
 clared, “has manifested two leading and opposite 
 tendencies; one towards the lowest level of de¬ 
 mocracy, and the other towards a spiritual su¬ 
 premacy.” He had no patience with the natural 
 rights theorists, and asserted that the use of 
 “liberty” in the Declaration of Independence 
 
 SJ Thomas Hamilton, Men atid Manners in America. (London, 
 1833), I. 298, 299. 
 
 83 National Intelligencer, January 8, 1839, quoting Boston Daily 
 Advertiser. 
 
206 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 meant only “representation and influence in the 
 government.” Advancement in civilization was 
 necessarily accompanied by increasing restrictions 
 upon liberty. Only the savage enjoys perfect 
 liberty. “Who, then, has liberty? and where is it 
 to be found? Who desires it? None, but the 
 vicious—none but the enemy of society.” Equal¬ 
 ity, he declared, merely meant the abolition of 
 monarchy and titles. A decisive struggle was 
 taking place in America between “a Constitutional 
 republic, as originally set up, and a radical democ¬ 
 racy. The storm of radicalism has been gather¬ 
 ing and lowering in the American sky for an age, 
 while the helm of the ship of State has, for the 
 most part, been in its hands.” 84 
 
 Brownson thought that in all organized society 
 there is a natural division between two parties. 
 One, composed of men who are benefited by 
 existing institutions, is accordingly opposed to 
 change; the other, deriving its strength from 
 those who bear the burdens of society, is the 
 party of movement and change. 85 Colton saw in 
 the conflict between American political parties a 
 struggle between those who wished to keep politi¬ 
 cal institutions as they were and men of radical 
 ideas. Substantially the same conclusion was ex¬ 
 pressed by foreign travellers who paid any atten¬ 
 tion to American politics. While they were 
 
 81 A Voice from America to England, by an American Gentle¬ 
 man (London, 1839). 
 
 86 Boston Quarterly Review, I. 123-125. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 
 
 207 
 
 agreed in general that there existed no differences 
 of opinion as to the forms of government, they 
 saw in the clash between Whigs and Democrats 
 the same differences that distinguished conserva¬ 
 tives from liberals or radicals everywhere. As 
 they saw it, this distinction was universal and 
 inevitable in politics, 86 and as they were accus¬ 
 tomed to party divisions of this character in the 
 politics of their own country, perhaps their study 
 of American political conditions was not entirely 
 impartial. They were much impressed by the 
 similarity between American parties and those of 
 Europe. De Tocqueville was of the opinion that 
 beneath a superficial influence of party leaders 
 and of opportune issues, there were more funda¬ 
 mental characteristics. “The deeper we penetrate 
 into the inmost thought of these parties, the more 
 do we perceive that the object of the one is to limit, 
 and the other to extend, the authority of the 
 people.” 87 Thomas Hamilton, having supported 
 the Reform Act of 1832, for this reason found 
 himself “quite as much a Radical in Boston and 
 very nearly so in New York, as I had been con¬ 
 sidered in England. It was soon apparent that 
 the great majority of the enlightened classes in 
 both cities, regarded any great and sudden change 
 
 88 De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I. 223. Harriet 
 Martineau, Society in America (London, 1837), I. 10-44. 
 Hamilton, Men and Manners, I. 288. Frederick von Raumer, 
 America and the American People (N. Y., 1846), pp. 270 ff. 
 Raumer was a professor in the University of Berlin. 
 
 81 De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I. 226, 227. 
 
208 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 in British institutions as pregnant with the most 
 imminent danger.” 88 A lecture tour in 1837 that 
 took him into all parts of the country gave J. S. 
 Buckingham an exceptional opportunity for the 
 study of American parties, and it is suggestive 
 that he also noticed the unsympathetic attitude of 
 the Whigs towards the liberal movement in 
 England. 
 
 They are nearly all in favor of giving wealth a more 
 open and direct influence than it now possesses, in the 
 suffrage for elections, and would be glad to exclude from 
 the electoral body all who have not some fixed amount of 
 property. They are against any changes that would in¬ 
 crease the power or influence of the people. . . . 
 
 They sympathize almost universally with the Tory party 
 in England; they think that even Lord Grey carried the 
 principles of reform too far, and would be glad to see 
 the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel restored to 
 office. . . . Nearly all the rich capitalists and merch¬ 
 
 ants belong to this party; the more wealthy tradesmen 
 also adhere to it; while the Episcopal clergy, lawyers and 
 the medical profession—in short, all who desire to rank 
 with the aristocratical or genteel portion of society, either 
 really entertain, or find it convenient to profess, Whig or 
 conservative principles, and prefer the latter name to the 
 former . 89 
 
 Harriet Martineau was told that the ‘grand 
 question of the time was, whether the people 
 should be encouraged to govern themselves, or 
 whether the wise should save them from them¬ 
 selves.’ ” 90 Although an immigrant from Bo- 
 
 88 Hamilton, Men and Manners, I. 244. 
 
 88 Buckingham, America, I. 60. 
 
 80 Martineau, Society in America, I. 22. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 
 
 209 
 
 hernia rather than a traveller, F. J. Grund’s long 
 experience as a journalist in Philadelphia gave 
 him exceptional opportunities for observing 
 American politics. He was, however, Democratic 
 in his sympathies, and therefore his assertion of 
 the essential continuity between the Federalist, 
 National Republican, and the Whig parties is 
 not of much value. It was his opinion that the 
 Whigs wished to confide “power to the compara¬ 
 tive few, and to deprive the masses of the privilege 
 of voting. They take it as a political maxim that 
 the people are unable to govern themselves, be¬ 
 cause the people are never sufficiently enlightened 
 for that purpose.” 91 The opinions of J. R. Godley 
 were formed as a result of travels in 1844, but 
 they were doubtless applicable to the conditions of 
 the earlier period. “There is a greater anxiety,” 
 he declared, “for the preservation of order and 
 tranquillity felt by the Whigs than by their op¬ 
 ponents; as being, generally speaking, a more 
 ‘substantial’ class of men . . . they are more 
 cautious but less consistent. . . .” 92 Raumer 
 was told by Whigs that behind differences upon 
 specific political questions “ ‘lie hidden . . . 
 greater dangers, which without constant effort on 
 our part would burst forth and involve us all in 
 ruin. The locofocos might finally subject all laws 
 
 ” F. J. Grund, The Americans in their Moral, Social and Politi¬ 
 cal Relations (Boston, 1837), p. 407. Grund was educated in 
 Vienna and had taught in Brazil before coming to America 
 in 1826. 
 
 "Godley, Letters from America (London, 1844), II. 110. 
 
210 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 to popular license, and abolish the right of prop¬ 
 erty. We Whigs are the conservative class; our 
 opponents the destructive.’ ” 93 
 
 Whigs were not averse to expressing the con¬ 
 servative point of view upon occasions that did 
 not commit the party upon questions of national 
 importance. In reply to the doctrines of class 
 warfare advocated by Fanny Wright and Brown- 
 son, the essential solidarity of the entire popula¬ 
 tion was insisted upon. This was the intent of 
 a resolution adopted by a Whig meeting in 
 Philadelphia: 
 
 That the interests of every class of society are so 
 intimately blended in this country, where with few excep¬ 
 tions, every rich man has once been poor, and where there 
 is scarcely a poor man who may not reasonably hope to 
 become rich, that no policy of the Government can oper¬ 
 ate to the injury or benefit of any class, without affecting 
 all others in a similar way . 94 
 
 The Intelligencer declared in September, 1834, 
 that in the more advanced sections of Maine, 
 which were “accessible to frequent mails and free 
 communication” the Whigs were gaining in 
 strength. 95 More definite statements of the atti¬ 
 tude of the Whigs towards conservatism were 
 made with reference to the question of cooperat¬ 
 ing with those Democrats who had left their party 
 
 ” 3 Raumer, America, p. 270. Mackay wrote that “the Whigs are 
 justly regarded as the conservative, the Democratic as the 
 ‘go-ahead’ party.” Mackay, Western World, p. 16. 
 
 M National Intelligencer, November 24, 1837. 
 
 >s Ibid., September 17, 1834. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 211 
 
 over the independent treasury issue and who were 
 therefore called the Conservatives. One section 
 of Whig opinion, represented by the New York 
 American, refused to have anything to do with 
 men who had been the associates of orthodox 
 Democrats. However, not all were agreed in this 
 unreceptive attitude. The New York Gazette de¬ 
 clared that “we are willing to identify ourselves 
 with Conservatism ... all we ask of the 
 honest politicians of all parties is, to join with us, 
 or permit us to join with them, in exercising a 
 conservatism that shall perpetuate our institu¬ 
 tions.” 96 The Gazette later was even more defi¬ 
 nite. “The truth is, conservatism is the principle 
 element of which our party is composed, and when 
 we find that feeling it should be cherished.” 97 
 True to their point of view, Whigs looked 
 askance at the struggling labor movement. It was 
 sharply condemned in 1838 by the New York Re¬ 
 view, 98 in an article that won the approval of the 
 American. The Review’s article had been “unan¬ 
 swerable in the indications of the injury from all 
 such unions to the parties that constitute them, 
 and to the general interests of the community; 
 they are traced also to a foreign origin, and from 
 sources whence Americans should have disdained 
 to seek instructions.” 99 When the courts decided 
 
 06 Ibid., October 30, 1839. 
 
 07 Ibid., November 18, 1839. 
 
 ““Trade Unions,” Nnv York Review, II. 1-48. 
 
 “ New York American, January 6, 1838. 
 
212 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 in 1835 in accordance with the old English law 
 that unions were conspiracies in restraint of 
 trade, Whig newspapers gave their approval. 100 
 The diary of Philip Hone throws much light upon 
 the reactions to contemporary problems and events 
 of a conservative whose interest in politics was 
 distinctly amateurish. Even Whig meetings ar¬ 
 ranged especially to attract the wage earner were 
 distinguished, according to Hone, by their moder¬ 
 ate and correct attitude. One he described as 
 “consisting principally of the most respectable 
 mechanics . . . men of character, respectabil¬ 
 ity and personal worth.” 101 In a similar descrip¬ 
 tion the writer unconsciously revealed something 
 of his own personality: “the great, the sublime, 
 the intelligent mass separated and retired with 
 decorum and dignity. Such an assembly was 
 never before seen in New York ... a solid 
 mass of faces beaming with intelligence, actuated 
 by one strong feeling, silent, attentive, decorous. 
 . . ,” 102 Some of his unctuousness perhaps 
 came from personal knowledge of the rough and 
 boisterous Democratic rallies that attracted much 
 attention in the Whig press. 
 
 Leaders of the National Republican and Whig 
 parties and considerable groups of their mem¬ 
 bers were agreed in a broad conception of the 
 powers of the federal government, except for 
 
 100 Fox, Decline of Aristocracy, pp. 390, 391. 
 
 101 Hone, Diary, I. 91. 
 
 102 Ibid., I. 93. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 
 
 213 
 
 their passing objection to the growth of presi¬ 
 dential authority, and usually in a more ambitious 
 national policy than that which the Democrats 
 approved. John Quincy Adams conceived during 
 his administration a far-reaching scheme for edu¬ 
 cational and internal development. In February, 
 1837, he wrote that “The great effort of my 
 administration was to mature into a permanent 
 and regular system the application of all the sur¬ 
 plus revenue of the Union to internal improve¬ 
 ment which at this day would have afforded high 
 wages and constant employment to hundreds of 
 thousands of labourers.” 103 He had intended, so 
 he declared in an address to his constituents in 
 1842, to use the public lands as a source of income 
 for this purpose and also for a national develop¬ 
 ment of education. 104 After Adams’ elimination 
 as a leader of his party, the tradition of a lati- 
 tudinarian policy was carried on, particularly by 
 
 103 Adams to C. W. Upshaw, Washington, February 2, 1837. 
 Adams, Degradation of the Democratic Dogma, pp. 24, 25. 
 
 104 Ibid., pp. 27, 28. In 1832 Clay discarded Adams’ plan of 
 using the proceeds from the sale of the public lands for these 
 purposes. An opportunity was seen to strengthen the case for 
 the protective tariff by distributing the surplus revenue among the 
 states. Jackson failed to sign an act for this purpose, and in 
 December, 1833, explained his action on the ground that it would 
 lead to undesirable centralization. The Democratic party favored 
 the sale of the public lands at prices that would meet the costs of 
 administration, and therefore there would be no revenue to divide. 
 At first the distribution was largely a sectional issue in that it 
 was supported by the eastern states as a means of securing a 
 share in the benefits of the public land; in 1841 it was openly 
 recognized as a policy of the Whig administration and coupled 
 with a new preemption measure in order to conciliate the West, it 
 became a law. Hibbard, Public Land Policies, pp. 173-187. 
 
214 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 Webster and his friends. Their attitude was 
 expressed by H. A. Dearborn, a Massachusetts 
 Whig. 
 
 The grand, the fixed, the only true policy of this Re¬ 
 public is, to encourage national production, in all its 
 numerous departments, and extend the lines of inter¬ 
 communication over the whole country. Nations must 
 not act like individuals. . . . The former must make 
 
 the income commensurate with the necessary expenditures. 
 It must promote intelligence and industry and therefore 
 must establish schools and seminaries of learning and 
 construct roads, canals and harbours. The question is 
 not, have we the means in hand to do all this, but is this, 
 should it be done, and if so, the means must be obtained, 
 the money must be raised. 105 ' 
 
 A storm of protest arose among Whigs in Sep¬ 
 tember, 1837, when Van Buren declared in his 
 message to Congress that people “looked to the 
 government for too much.” The Intelligencer 
 interpreted the administration’s position to the 
 effect that “government cannot interfere too little 
 with the pursuits of the people.” 106 Clay replied 
 to this position in the Senate: "We are all, people, 
 States, Union and banks, bound up and inter¬ 
 woven together, united in fortune and destiny, 
 and all entitled to the protecting care of a paternal 
 government.” 107 Although Van Buren’s decla¬ 
 ration was originally made with reference to the 
 possibility that legislation would improve the eco- 
 
 105 Dearborn to Webster, Boston, March 18, 1840. Van Tyne, 
 Webster Transcripts. 
 
 100 National Intelligencer, February 27, 1838. 
 
 1OT Sargent, Public Men and Events, II. 20. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 
 
 215 
 
 nomic situation, and was therefore justified to a 
 considerable degree, Whigs immediately attri¬ 
 buted it to the indifference of Democratic office¬ 
 holders to the sufferings of the people. 
 
 A frank acknowledgement of its conservative 
 character and an explicit statement of nationalist 
 policies would have given the Whig party a real 
 unity which it in fact did not have, but this, from 
 the point of view of practical politics, would have 
 been fatal to its prospects of success. Consider¬ 
 able numbers scattered in all sections would have 
 seceded from the party. The difficulties of the 
 Whigs in this respect were illustrated in the posi¬ 
 tion of Calhoun and his friends. After leaving 
 the Democratic party as a result of his differences 
 with Van Buren and as a consequence of the 
 nullification controversy, Calhoun went over to 
 the opposition, since it had the character of an 
 alliance which would permit the retention of 
 his sectional bias. Early in 1834 he was elated 
 by the reflection that the conservative character 
 of the northern wing was increasing southern 
 strength in councils of the party. Thousands in 
 the North, he declared, “now look to the South, 
 not only for protection against the usurpation of 
 the Executive, but also against the needy and 
 corrupt in their own section. They begin to feel 
 what I have long foreseen, that they have more to 
 fear from their own people than we from our 
 
216 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 slaves.” 108 Conservatism in social questions was 
 therefore a bond between the northern Whigs 
 and the Calhoun faction in the South. But as 
 regards definite nationalist policies there was no 
 agreement. 109 Rather than run the danger of a 
 nationalist as presidential candidate in 1840 or of 
 a leader with no definite principles and with a 
 questionable record upon the slavery question Cal¬ 
 houn returned to the Democratic ranks in 1837. 110 
 Political expediency required that causes of party 
 dissension should be kept in the background. For 
 this reason one after another of the ideas which 
 had formerly been cherished were sacrificed. 
 
 The explanation of the inconsistent position of 
 the Whig party is to be found in the changes in 
 American politics caused by the advent of Jack¬ 
 sonian democracy. “Political influence,” Cheva¬ 
 lier declared, “is, at present, entirely in the hands 
 of the . . . [American democracy] as with us 
 it is monopolized by the Middle classes.” The re¬ 
 turn to power of the upper and middle classes in 
 the United States was impossible except as a re- 
 
 108 Calhoun, to Duff Green, Fort Hill, July 27, 1837. Jameson, 
 Calhoun Correspondence, pp. 374-377. 
 
 109 In 1838 Calhoun wrote that his only hope was in the Demo¬ 
 cratic party. “As much as the party has strayed from the true 
 principles and policy of the Republican party, I believe that our 
 only recruiting ground is in their ranks. We can have no hopes 
 from that of the Nationals, or Northern Whigs. Not only their 
 acts, but their principles are opposed to us. They are consolida- 
 tionists by profession. . . .” Calhoun to D^rnall, Fort Hill, 
 October 26, 1838. Ibid., p. 409. 
 
 110 Calhoun to Duff Green, Fort Hill. July 27, 1837. Ibid., pp. 
 374-377. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 
 
 217 
 
 suit of accidental divisions in Democratic ranks 
 “when they may rally to their standard a portion 
 of the farmers and mechanics.” 111 Public opin¬ 
 ion, according to Colton, had placed a premium 
 upon the semblance of democracy. 
 
 No political party can dispense with it. . . . What¬ 
 
 ever their principles, radical or conservative, their best 
 passport is democracy. Hence, under all the rapidly suc¬ 
 ceeding changes of party names, adopted and given, which 
 have characterized the history of American politics, the 
 radicals now stand, self-styled, democratic, and the con¬ 
 servatives cannot do without it, and are forced to assume 
 
 the style of democratic republicans, democratic whigs 
 112 
 
 Under these circumstances candidates were more 
 than ever compelled to cater to popular prejudices. 
 Marryat, who was aristocratic in his point of 
 view, wrote that a candidate with whom he had 
 been talking changed his coat before going out 
 with him for fear of losing the election if he 
 appeared in formal attire. 
 
 To be popular with the majority in America, to be a 
 favorite with the people, you must first divest yourself of 
 all freedom of opinion, you must throw off all dignity, 
 you must shake hands and drink with every man you 
 meet; you must be, in fact, slovenly and dirty, in your 
 appearance, or you will be put down as an aristocrat . 113 
 
 Although Hamilton was told that experience 
 under Democratic rule had strengthened the con- 
 
 111 Chevalier, Society, Manners and Politics, p. 399. 
 
 112 Colton, Voice from America, p. 3. 
 
 113 Marryat, Diary in America. II. 69. 
 
218 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 servatism of the Whigs, they dared not express 
 this point of view when running for office. 114 . 
 
 The increasing democratic character of politics 
 resulted not only in setting aside Whig principles 
 but also in the elevation of new men to leadership 
 in the party. In New York the old aristocracy 
 of birth and of landed proprietorship no longer 
 occupied influential positions in politics by the 
 campaign of 1840. 115 Hone’s diary in this con¬ 
 nection expresses the reaction of a wealthy 
 Whig to the new conditions. A Whig rally in 
 October, 1838, chose David B. Ogden “that excel¬ 
 lent old Whig,” as its chairman, and Hone’s 
 reflections on this incident express his own re¬ 
 sentment and that of men like him at the change 
 that had taken place in the Whig party. 
 
 It is refreshing once in a while to see a relic of honest 
 political principles . . • allowed to take a prominent 
 
 part in public affairs. It is almost the only thing of its 
 kind I have seen in relation to the coming election. _ I 
 cannot recognize the name on either ticket of a leading 
 Federalist or National Republican; they are permitted to 
 work and pay money ; they must bake the loaves and catch 
 the fishes, but they get precious few for themselves . 116 
 
 Hone wished in 1839 to secure the party’s nomi¬ 
 nation for the state senate but was told by the 
 politicians that “ ‘I am a gentleman . . . and 
 no gentleman can win’. ... If they are right 
 
 114 Hamilton, Men and Manners, I. 290. 
 
 115 Fox, Decline of Aristocracy, pp. 415, 416. 
 
 1,6 Hone, Diary, I. 328, 329. 
 
EXPEDIENCY VERSUS CONSISTENCY 
 
 219 
 
 in what they say, the party is not worth sustain¬ 
 ing, better it would be that everything should go 
 back to the dunghill of Democracy and let us see 
 if something better may not spring from it.” 117 
 
 Men who had come into the party from the 
 Anti-Masons or from the Democratic ranks, and 
 others who were willing to change their methods 
 and ideas to meet the needs of the new political 
 conditions exercised a decisive influence in the 
 campaign of 1840. They were convinced that a 
 change of tactics was essential to a Whig success. 
 Such was the opinion of Thurlow Weed as early 
 as 1834. 
 
 Our party as at present organized, is doomed to fight 
 merely to be beaten. . . . The longer we fight Jack- 
 
 sonianism with our present weapons, the more it won’t 
 die! The truth is, in all this part of the State, we are in 
 the condition of the old federal party . 118 The people are 
 against us, and they won’t change in our favor so long as 
 the existing party lines are drawn. . . . With Clay, 
 
 Webster, or Calhoun, or indeed any man identified with 
 
 117 Ibid., I. 384. However, his estimate was higher of the Whig 
 members of Congress. In his opinion, Abbott Lawrence, a mem¬ 
 ber of the House from Massachusetts, was “an amiable man, and 
 a wise man, and a gentleman and thereby unsuited for the society 
 of the Robespierres, and the Marats, and the Couthnons, who con¬ 
 stitute the present majority of our modern Jacobin Club at 
 Washington; and of such men as Abbot Lawrence the Whig party 
 in that House is mainly constituted.” Ibid., II. 19. 
 
 118 The continuity of the Federalist, National Republican, and 
 Whig parties is impossible of demonstration in detail. Niles cited 
 numerous instances of Federalists joining the Democratic party. 
 Niles’ Register, XLIII. 71, 101. Ibid., XLVI. 256, 266. But the 
 similarity between the political ideas of these patries is sufficient 
 demonstration that it is a fact. 
 
220 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 the war against Jackson and in favor of the Bank, or the 
 Bank’s shadow, the game is up . 119 
 
 The nomination of an old soldier whose home 
 happened to be in a log cabin and whose opinions, 
 if he had any, caused a minimum of dissension 
 within the party was the visible evidence of the 
 change which had taken place in the Whig party. 
 In thus casting aside its older leaders and princi¬ 
 ples the party achieved a superficial unity and, 
 riding upon the wave of an emotional campaign, 
 won a temporary victory by sacrificing any 
 attempt to maintain a consistent position. 
 
 “Weed to Granger, Albany, November 23, (1834?) Granger 
 MSS. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 J ACKSONIAN Democracy not only controlled 
 the federal government in the period from 
 1828 to 1840 but it was also perhaps the most 
 important influence in shaping the character of 
 the opposition. The opposition’s chief problem, 
 whether as the National Republican or as the 
 Whig party, was the determination of ways and 
 means of regaining power. This period is, there¬ 
 fore, a unit in the history of the Whig party, in 
 which it gradually, and in some measure against 
 its will, underwent changes under the influence 
 of the dominant Democracy. Old issues and 
 methods were relegated to the background or 
 changed to serve more effectively the party’s 
 needs. Old leaders were replaced by new men 
 who had taken no conspicuous part in the past 
 ' struggles with the democratic movement and who 
 could therefore seek its support. It is the chief 
 purpose of this study to trace the process by which 
 the Whig party was shaped to suit the needs of 
 the political situation. 
 
 The brief history of the National Republican 
 party constitutes the first phase of the problem 
 because the causes of its failure go far to explain 
 the weakness of party which followed it. These 
 
222 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 causes are to be found chiefly in the leadership 
 of John Quincy Adams. Elected in 1824 with 
 the aid of many of the country’s ablest leaders, he 
 failed to create a strong party during his adminis¬ 
 tration. He displayed considerable skill as a poli¬ 
 tician in the negotiations prior to his election, but, 
 once in office, he preferred a non-partisan policy 
 and yielded with reluctance, and too late to have 
 material results, to the requests of his associates 
 for aid in the organization of a party. Most im¬ 
 portant of all was his lack of sympathy for and 
 understanding of the political significance of the 
 frontier. His defeat in 1828 eliminated him as 
 the leader of the party. 
 
 In 1829 there was a possibility of defeating 
 Jackson as the leader of the new democracy in the 
 ensuing campaign without compromising too 
 much the character of the National Republican 
 party. Three problems required solution in order 
 to attain this result: (1) organization without 
 the aid of the patronage, (2) the nomination of 
 the candidate who had the best prospect of suc¬ 
 cess, and (3) the selection of an effective cam¬ 
 paign issue. The party solved none of these 
 problems. After the failure of the congressional 
 caucus to establish itself in a position similar to 
 that of the national committees today, the party 
 was without national leadership except that which 
 was supplied by Clay and other prominent Na¬ 
 tional Republicans and by the National Intelli- 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 223 
 
 gencer. Within the several states the National 
 Republicans of New York led in the organization 
 of party machinery by reviving the scheme of 
 correspondence committees of Revolutionary 
 times. No effort was made to select from avail¬ 
 able candidates the one best qualified to lead the 
 party. Clay’s nomination was certain from the 
 beginning, and therefore no adequate attention 
 was given to John McLean whose candidacy at 
 least had the possibility of dividing the Demo¬ 
 cratic vote. Accident determined the campaign 
 issue when Biddle decided to apply for a renewal 
 of the Bank’s charter before the election. With¬ 
 out any other issue, Clay and his party made the 
 cause of the Bank their own in the hope that 
 Jackson’s hostility would be an asset, an anticipa¬ 
 tion which of course was disappointed in the 
 election of 1832. 
 
 Even before Jackson’s reelection discontent 
 appeared in regard to Clay’s leadership, and the 
 thoroughness of his defeat discredited the party. 
 Attention was centered in 1833, as a result of the 
 nullification crisis, upon questions that had no 
 relation to existing party divisions, and the situa¬ 
 tion was further confused when Clay favored a 
 compromise of the tariff question in order to gain 
 strength in the South. Aroused by Clay’s tempo¬ 
 rizing policy, Webster endorsed Jackson’s posi¬ 
 tion and considered the possibility of a party in 
 support of nationalist principles in which he 
 
224 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 would share the leadership with Jackson. He was 
 encouraged by Biddle during the summer of 1833 
 to negotiate with the administration in order to 
 moderate Jackson’s Bank policy. Cooperation 
 between Webster and Jackson was made impossi¬ 
 ble, however, by the removal of the deposits, 
 because there was no common ground between 
 them upon this question. Clay thereupon pro¬ 
 cured the election of Webster as chairman of the 
 Senate finance committee, a position in which he 
 was compelled to take a positive stand against the 
 President’s policy in the removal. 
 
 A temporary depression in the spring of 1834, 
 caused in part by the Bank’s restriction of credit, 
 reacted in favor of the opposition. It was at¬ 
 tributed to the administration’s war upon the 
 Bank, and, in order to make the most of the favor¬ 
 able turn of events, the opposition assumed the 
 name of Whig because of the associations of 
 that name with earlier struggles in English and 
 American history against an irresponsible execu¬ 
 tive. Confidence in an immediate success was 
 aroused by a partial victory in the New York City 
 election of April, 1834, but returning prosperity 
 in the fall removed a tangible evidence of Demo¬ 
 cratic misrule, with the result that the Whigs lost 
 what little ground they had gained. Moreover, 
 it was soon apparent that sectional divisions 
 within the party would make harmony impossible 
 in the approaching election, and in the end three 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 225 
 
 candidates were placed in the field in the vain 
 hope of forcing the election into the House of 
 Representatives. 
 
 During the campaign of 1836 the friends of 
 Clay and Webster declared that they would never 
 sacrifice old and experienced leaders in favor of 
 the practically unknown Harrison. But the elec¬ 
 tion revealed Harrison’s unexpected strength and 
 introduced a new factor in the Whig party. At 
 first an attempt was made to keep the party loyal 
 to its old leaders through movements for the 
 nomination of Webster or Clay. Webster nego¬ 
 tiated for this purpose with the survivors of the 
 Anti-Masonic party. In 1837 the party repeated 
 its experiences of 1834, when the crisis of that 
 year seemed to guarantee a certain Whig victory 
 in the next election. The Whigs as a result won 
 a series of victories in the fall of 1837, the most 
 important being the election of a large majoritv 
 in the New York Assembly. The parallel with 
 the party’s earlier experiences did not end here, 
 however, for in the following year much of the 
 ground that had been gained was lost. The party 
 elected its candidate for governor of New York 
 by a greatly reduced majority; aside from this, 
 there was little reason for confidence. Instead of 
 certain victory in 1840, therefore, Whigs had rea¬ 
 son to fear another defeat, and as a result opinion 
 turned against the nomination of either Webster 
 or Clay. Webster failed in his efforts to secure 
 
226 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 the Anti-Masonic nomination, and it was thought 
 that Clay would have no chance. An opportunity 
 was thus given to the friends of Harrison, who 
 argued that his showing in 1836 made him the 
 logical choice for the nomination. He was nomi¬ 
 nated by the Anti-Masons in 1838, and one of the 
 most influential newspapers that previously sup¬ 
 ported Webster went over to him. It was argued 
 that in order to win the election of 1840 the 
 democratic element in the party must be given 
 control. Harrison’s nomination by the Harris¬ 
 burg convention was made possible by the support 
 of the western and frontier delegates as a result 
 of a decision to copy the methods of the Demo¬ 
 cratic party. Men who had formerly declared 
 their unalterable opposition to Harrison as un¬ 
 worthy of the party now rallied to his support. 
 
 Temporary harmony was won by the sacrifice 
 of the leaders and principles of the National Re¬ 
 publican party. That this sacrifice was necessary 
 in order to achieve success was due to the char¬ 
 acter of the party as an alliance whose existence 
 was threatened by dissension upon specific politi¬ 
 cal and sectional issues. Except for the desire of 
 office, which was common to all branches of the 
 party, real union existed only in a conservative 
 point of view among the majority of its members. 
 The conservatism of the party was revealed 
 by its attitude towards radical tendencies, towards 
 the naturalization of aliens, towards the labor 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 227 
 
 movement, towards the disposal of the public 
 lands, towards the qualifications of office-holders 
 and towards the scope of the powers of the fed¬ 
 eral government. A frank expression of its con¬ 
 servative principles would have created a united 
 party, but it would have been, according to Wil¬ 
 liam Schouler, “a respectable, but never a success¬ 
 ful one.” 1 The most active of Whig politicians 
 and editors after 1836, men like Weed, Greeley, 
 Ewing of Ohio, Thaddeus Stevens, and Richard 
 Houghton of Boston, preferred success to a con¬ 
 sistent position and, therefore, influenced the 
 party to make its campaign in the form of an 
 appeal to popular emotion and, for this purpose, 
 terfopy the methods of the Democratic party. 
 
 1 Hudson, Journalism in the United States, pp. 392, 393. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 I—Unpublished Letters 
 
 Lmless otherwise stated, the following manuscripts are 
 in the possession of the Library of Congress. 
 
 J. Q. Adams MSS. A small collection, but contains a 
 useful series of letters to A. H. Everett. 
 
 James Barbour MSS. New York Public Library. An 
 important source for political conditions 
 
 Biddle MSS. This monumental collection contains 
 many letters throwing light upon political questions which 
 are not printed in Professor McGrane’s edition of the 
 Biddle Correspondence. 
 
 Clay MSS. A small but useful collection. 
 
 Clayton MSS. A valuable and little used source. 
 
 A. C. Flagg MSS. New York Public Library. Flagg 
 corresponded with many of the important Democratic 
 leaders. 
 
 Thomas Ewing MSS. Chiefly concerned, in this 
 period, with local parties in Ohio. 
 
 Gouverneur MSS. New York Public Library. 
 Gouverneur was the postmaster of New York City. 
 
 Francis Granger MSS. Useful for New York politics. 
 
 Jackson MSS. This collection, while important for 
 the Democratic point of view, has little value for the 
 purposes of this study. 
 
 William Kent MSS. Of little value for political con¬ 
 ditions. 
 
 Mangum MSS. Important for the point of view of the 
 southern Whigs. 
 
 McLean MSS. A little used and valuable source. 
 
 Van Buren MSS. Of a restricted value for this study. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 229 
 
 Van Tyne, C. H., Webster Transcripts. Typewritten 
 copies of Webster’s letters in the possession of the New 
 Hampshire Historical Society. 
 
 Webster MSS. Contains many letters of importance 
 which have not been published in the various editions of 
 Webster’s letters. 
 
 Wirt MSS. Of no value for political conditions. 
 
 II —Newspapers 
 
 Albany 
 
 Albany Argus, 1833. (D.) 
 
 Albany Evening Journal, 1838-1839. 
 
 Boston 
 
 Boston Daily Advertiser and Patriot, 1833, 1838. 
 Boston Atlas, (semi-weekly), 1836-1838. 
 
 Boston Statesman, (semi-weekly), 1833. (D.) 
 
 Cincinnati 
 
 Cincinnati Daily Gazette, 1833. 
 
 Concord, New Hampshire 
 New Hampshire Patriot, 1833. (D.) 
 
 New York 
 
 New York American, 1833, 1838. 
 
 Morning Courier and New York Enquirer, 1833. 
 
 New York Daily Advertiser, 1833-1834. 
 
 Philadelphia 
 
 Paulson’s American Daily Advertiser, 1833. 
 
 National Gazette and Literary Register, 1833. 
 
 The Pennsylvanian, 1833. (D.) 
 
 Washington 
 
 Washington Globe, 1833. (D.) 
 
 Daily National Intelligencer, 1827-1840. 
 
 United States Telegraph, 1833. 
 
230 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 III—Published Letters 
 
 Colton, Calvin, The Private Correspondence of Henry 
 Clay, New York, 1856. 
 
 Cox, Isaac J., ed., “Torrence Papers,” Quarterly Publi¬ 
 cation of the Historical and Philosophical Society of 
 Ohio, I. 65-96, II. 5-36, III. 69-120. 
 
 Ford, P. L., ed., Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 10 vols., 
 New York, 1892-1899. 
 
 Hamlin, L. Belle, ed., “Follett Papers,” Quarterly Pub¬ 
 lication of the Historical and Philosophical Society of 
 Ohio, vol. V. no. 2. 
 
 Jameson, J. Franklin, ed., “Correspondence of John C. 
 Calhoun,” Annual Report of the American Historical 
 Association, 1899, vol II. 
 
 McGrane, R. C., ed., The Correspondence of Nicholas 
 Biddle dealing with National Affairs, 1807-1844, Bos¬ 
 ton, 1919. 
 
 Moore, J. B., ed., Works of James Buchanan, 12 vols., 
 Philadelphia, 1908-1911. 
 
 Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. II., pp. 490-491. A 
 useful letter written by Clay. 
 
 Van Tyne, C. H., ed., Webster Letters, New York, 1902. 
 
 Webster, Fletcher, ed., The Private Correspondence of 
 Daniel Webster, 2 vols., Boston, 1857. 
 
 Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster (National Edi¬ 
 tion), Boston, 1903, vol. XVI. 
 
 IV— Memoirs, Reminiscences, and Contemporary 
 Interpretations 
 
 Adams, J. Q., The Memoirs of J. Q. Adams (C. F. 
 Adams, ed.,) 12 vols, Philadelphia, 1876. 
 
 [Benton, Thomas H.], Thirty Years View, or A His¬ 
 tory of the Workings of the American Government for 
 Thirty Years, from 1820 to 1850, by a Senator of 
 Thirty Years, 2 vols., New York, 1854-1856. 
 
 Byrdsall, F., The History of the Locofocos, or Equal 
 Rights Party, its movements, conventions, and proceed¬ 
 ings, New York, 1842. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 231 
 
 Congdon, C. T., Reminiscences of a Journalist, Boston, 
 1880. 
 
 Greeley, Horace, Recollections of a Busy Life, New 
 York, 1868. 
 
 Hamilton, James A., Reminiscences, New York, 1869. 
 
 Harvey, Peter, Reminiscences of Daniel Webster, Bos¬ 
 ton, 1877. 
 
 Hone, Philip, The Diary of Philip Hone, 1828-1851 
 
 (Bayard Tuckerman, ed.,) 2 vols., New York, 1889. 
 
 Julian, G. W., Political Recollections, 1840-1872, Chi¬ 
 cago, 1884. 
 
 Kendall, Amos, Autobiography of Amos Kendall (Wil¬ 
 liam S. Stickney, ed.,) Boston, 1872. 
 
 March, C. W., Reminiscences of Congress, New York, 
 1850. 
 
 Mason, Jeremiah, The Memoirs and Correspondence of 
 Jeremiah Mason, Cambridge, 1873. 
 
 Sargent, Nathan, Public Men and Events from the 
 Commencement of Mr. Monroe’s Administration in 
 1817 to the close of Mr. Fillmore’s Administration in 
 1853, 2 vols., Philadelphia, 1875. 
 
 Seward, William H., Autobiography of William H. 
 Seward, from 1801 to 1834, with a Memoir of his Life, 
 etc., (F. W. Seward, ed.,) New York, 1877. 
 
 Van Buren, Martin, “Autobiography of Martin Van 
 Buren” (J. C. Fitzpatrick, ed.,) Annual Report of the 
 American Historical Association, Washington, 1918, 
 vol. II. 
 
 Van Buren, Martin, Inquiry into the Origin and Course 
 of Political Parties in the United States (edited by his 
 sons), New York, 1867. This book was at first in¬ 
 tended as a part of his autobiography, (p. 9) but later 
 Van Buren decided to complete it as a separate study. 
 
 Weed, Thurlow, The Life of Thurlow Weed, 2 vols., 
 Boston, 1884. Vol. I. Autobiography (Flarriet A. 
 Weed, ed.) 
 
 Wise, Henry, A., Seven Decades of the Union, etc., 
 Richmond, 1881. 
 
232 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 V— Pamphlets 
 
 [Colton, Calvin], A Voice from America to England, 
 by an American Gentleman, London, 1839. 
 
 [Colton, Calvin], American Jacobinism, by “Junius,” 
 
 New York, 1840. 
 
 [Colton, Calvin], The Crisis of the Country, by 
 
 “Junius, Philadelphia, 1840. 
 
 Derby, J. B., Political Reminiscences, Boston, 1835. 
 
 Durasmont, Frances (Wright), What is the Matter, A 
 Political address as delivered in Masonic Hall, October 
 28, 1838, New York, 1838. 
 
 Speech of Richard Fletcher, Faneuil Hall, November 6, 
 1837. 
 
 Hildreth, Richard, My connection with the Atlas news¬ 
 paper, etc., Boston, 1839. 
 
 [Kennedy, J. P.], Defence of the Whigs, by a member 
 of the Twenty-Seventh Congress, 1844. 
 
 Proceedings of the Democratic Whig convention, Decem¬ 
 ber 4, 1839, for the purpose of nomination of President 
 and Vice-President. 
 
 The Political Mirror, a Review of Jacksonianism, New 
 York, 1835. 
 
 Mr. Webster's Speech on the President’s Protest, Senate, 
 May 7, 1834, Washington. 
 
 VI— Periodicals 
 
 Boston Quarterly Rezdew, 1838-1840. 
 
 The New Yorker, 1836-1840. 
 
 The New York Review, 1838. 
 
 Niles’ Register, 1824-1840. 
 
 Truth’s Advocate and Monthly Anti-Jackson Expositor, 
 
 Cincinnati, January to October, 1828. 
 
 The United States Magazine and Democratic Review, 
 
 1838-1840. 
 
 VII— Debates, Statistics, Etc. 
 
 Bradford. T. G., An Illustrated Atlas, geographical, sta¬ 
 tistical and historical, of the United States and adjacent 
 countries, Philadelphia, 1838. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 233 
 
 Congressional Globe, 23 Congress, 1 Session; 24 Con¬ 
 gress, 1 and 2 Sesions; 25 Congress, 2 Session. 
 
 House Journal, 24 Congress, 2 Session; 25 Congress, 2 
 Session. 
 
 Matthias, Benjamin, The Politician’s Register, Phila¬ 
 delphia, 1835. Library of Congress. My attention was 
 called to this, the only known source for the returns 
 by counties for the election of 1832, by Dr. C. O. 
 Paullin. 
 
 Works of Daniel Webster, Sixth edition, 6 vols., Boston, 
 1853. 
 
 Whig Almanac and United States Register, New York 
 1838-1840. 
 
 Compendium of the Enumeration of the Inhabitants and 
 Statistics of the United States, as obtained at the De¬ 
 partment of State, from the Returns of the Sixth 
 Census, etc., Washington, 1841. 
 
 VIII —Books on America by Foreign Travellers 
 
 Buckingham, J. S., America, Historical, Statistic, and 
 Descriptive, 3 vols., London, 1841. 
 
 Chevalier, Michel, Letters sur I’Amerique du Nord, 
 2 vols., Bruxelles, 1837. 
 
 Chevalier, Michel, Society, Manners and Politics in the 
 United States, Boston, 1839. 
 
 Godley, John Robert, Letters from America, 2 vols., 
 London,1844. 
 
 Grund, Francis J., The Americans, in their Moral, So¬ 
 cial, and Political Relations, Boston, 1837. 
 
 Hamilton, Thomas, Men and Manners in America, 2 
 vols., London, 1833. 
 
 Lyell, Sir Charles, A Second Visit to the United States, 
 2 vols., New York, 1849. 
 
 Mackay, Alexander, The Western World, or, Travels 
 in the United States in 1846-1847, 4 edition, 3 vols., 
 London, 1850. 
 
 Marrgat, Frederick, Diary in America, 3 vols., London, 
 1839. 
 
 Martineau, Harriet, Society in America, 3 vols., Lon¬ 
 don, 1837. 
 
234 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 Raumer, Frederick von, America and the American 
 People, New York, 1846. _ . 
 
 Tocqueville, Alexic C. de. Democracy in America, 5th 
 edition, 2 vols., Cambridge, 1873. 
 
 IX— Biographies 
 
 Appleton's Cyclopcedia of American Biography (J. G. 
 Wilson and 'John Fiske, editors), 6 vols., New York, 
 1887 
 
 Bancroft, Frederic, The Life of William H. Seward, 2 
 vols., New York, 1900. 
 
 Bassett, J. S., The Life of Andrew Jackson, 2 vols., New 
 
 York, 1911. . r _ 
 
 Colton, Calvin, The Life and Times of Henry Clay, 2 
 vols., New York, 1846. 
 
 Curtis, George T., Life of Daniel Webster, 2 vols., New 
 
 York, 1872. iono 
 
 Tulian, G. W., Life of Joshua Geddmgs, Chicago, 1892. 
 Kennedy, James P., Memoirs of the Life of William 
 Wirt, 2 vols., Philadelphia, 1860. 
 
 Lodge, H. C.. Life of Daniel Webster (American States¬ 
 men Series), Boston, 1884. 
 
 McMaster, J. B., Daniel Webster, New York, 1902. 
 Morison, Samuel E., The Life and Letters of Harrison 
 Gray Otis, Federalist, 1765-1848. 2 vols., Boston, 1913. 
 Ogg. Frederick, A., Daniel Webster (American Crisis 
 Biographies), 1914. 
 
 Parton, James, The Life of Andrew Jackson, 3 vols., 
 New York, 1861. 
 
 Schurz, Carl, Life of Clay, 2 vols., Boston, 1887. 
 Shepard, Edward M., Martin Van Buren (Amrican 
 Statesmen series), Boston, 1899. 
 
 Tyler, L. G., The Letters and Times of the Tylers, 3 
 vols., Richmond, 1884. 
 
 The Life of Thurlow Weed, 2 vols., Cambridge, 1884, vol. 
 II. Memoir of Thurlow Weed (T. W. Barnes, ed.) 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 235 
 
 X— Monographs 
 
 Adams, Henry, The Degradation of the Democratic 
 Dogma, New York, 1920. (Brooks Adams, “The 
 Heritage of Henry Adams”). 
 
 Bartlett, Mary Q., The Chief Phases of Pennsylvania 
 Politics in the Jacksonian Period, Allentown, 1919. 
 
 Bourne, Edward Q., The History of the Surplus Revenue 
 of 1837, being an account of its origin, its distribution 
 among the States, and the uses to which it was applied, 
 New York, 1885. 
 
 Catterall, R. C. H., The Second Bank of the United 
 States, Chicago, 1903. 
 
 Cole, A. C., The Whig Party in the South, Washington, 
 1913. 
 
 Darling, A. B., “Jacksonian Democracy in Massachu¬ 
 setts, 1824, 1848,” American Historical Review, XXIX. 
 271-287. 
 
 Dawson, Edgar, “Origin of the American Whig Party,” 
 The History Teacher’s Magazine, II. 160, 161. Inter¬ 
 prets the Whig party as “more nearly the Jeffersonian 
 Republican party struggling for existence in its old 
 age,” than as the Federalist party renamed. No at¬ 
 tempt is made to prove this assertion. 
 
 Faust, A. B., The German Element in the United States, 
 2 vol., New York, 1909. 
 
 Fish, C. R., The Civil Service and the Patronage, New 
 York, 1905. 
 
 Fiske, John, Essays Historical and Literary, 2 vols., 
 1902. 
 
 Fox, D. R., “The Decline of Aristocracy in the Politics 
 of New York,” Studies in History, Economics, and 
 Public Law, Columbia University, New York, 1919. 
 
 Fox, D. R., “The Economic Status of the New York 
 Whigs,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. XXIII. 
 501-518. 
 
 Franklin, F. G., The Legislative History of Naturaliza¬ 
 tion in the United States, Chicago, 1906. 
 
236 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 Gammon, S. R., “The Presidential Campaign of 1832,” 
 Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and 
 Political Science, Baltimore, 1922. 
 
 2 vols., Buffalo, 1850. 
 
 Hammond, Jabez D., The Political History of New York, 
 
 Hatch, L. C., History of Maine, 4 vols., New York, 
 1919. 
 
 Hibbard, B. N., A History of the Public Land Policies, 
 New York, 1924. 
 
 Hinsdale, Mary, A History of the President's Cabinet, 
 Ann Arbor, 1911. 
 
 Hudson, Frederick, Journalism in the United States, 
 New York, 1873. 
 
 Matthews, Lois K., The Expansion of New Enqland , 
 Boston, 1919. 
 
 McCarthy, Charles , “The Anti-Masonic Party; a 
 Study of Political Anti-Masonry in the United States,” 
 Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 
 1902, I. 
 
 Mueller, H. R., “The Whig Party in Pennsylvania,” 
 Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, Colum¬ 
 bia University, New York, 1922. 
 
 Ormsby, R. McKinley, A History of the Whig Party, 
 or Some of its Main Features, Boston, 1859. 
 
 Phillips, U. B., “Georgia and State Rights,” Annual 
 Report of the American Historical Association, 1902. 
 
 Phillips, U. B., “The Federalists in South Carolina,” 
 American Historical Review, XIV, 776-790. 
 
 Phillips, U. B., “The Southern Whigs,” Turner Essays 
 in American History, New York, 1910. 
 
 Rammelkamp, C. H., “The Election of 1824 in New 
 York,” Annual Report of the American Historical 
 Association, 1904, pp. 177-201. 
 
 Roseboom, Eugene, “Ohio in the Presidential Election 
 of 1824,” Ohio Archcelogical and Historical Quarterly, 
 XXVI, April, 1917. 
 
 Scisco, F. L., “Political Nativism in New York,” Studies 
 in History, Economics and Public Law, Columbia Uni¬ 
 versity, New York, 1901. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 237 
 
 Stan wood, Edward, A History of Presidential Elections, 
 Boston, 1884. 
 
 Streeter, Floyd A., Political Parties in Michigan, 1837- 
 1860, Lansing, 1918. 
 
 Thompson, C. M., “The Illinois Whigs before 1846,” 
 The University of Illinois Studies in Social Sciences, 
 IV., No. 1. 
 
 Trimble, William, “Diverging Tendencies in the New 
 York Democracy in the Period of the Locofocos,” 
 American Historical Review, XXIV, 396-422. 
 
 Webster, H. J., “The History of the Democratic Party 
 Organization in the Northwest, 1824-1840,” Ohio Ar¬ 
 cheological and Historical Quarterly, vol. XXIV. 
 
 Winsor, Justin, ed., The Memorial History of Boston, 
 including Suffold County, Massachusetts, 1630-1880, 4 
 vols., Boston, 1882. 
 
 Wheeler, Henry G., History of Congress, Biographical 
 and Political, comprising a History of Internal Im¬ 
 provements, 2 vols., New York, 1848. 
 
 XI— General Histories 
 
 Bowers, Claude, Party Battles in the Jacksonian Period, 
 Boston, 1922. 
 
 Burgess, J. W., The Middle Period, New York, 1904. 
 
 Channing, Edward, The History of the United States, 
 5 vols., New York. 
 
 Garrison, G. P., Westward Expansion, (American Na¬ 
 tion Series), New York, 1906. 
 
 MacDonald, William, Jacksonian Democracy, (Amer¬ 
 ican Nation Series), New York, 1906. 
 
 Macy, Jesse, Political Parties in the United States, New 
 York, 1900. 
 
 McMaster, J. B., A History of the United States, 8 vols., 
 New York, 1888-1913. 
 
 Ogg, Frederick A., The Reign of Andrew Jackson, 
 (Chronicles of America, XX), New Haven, 1919. 
 
 Ostrogorski, M., Democracy and Organisation of Politi¬ 
 cal Parties, 2 vols., London, 1902. 
 
238 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 Schouler, William, History of the United States under 
 the Constitution, 6 vols.. New York, 1880-1899. 
 
 Smith, T. C., Parties and Slavery, (American Nation 
 Series), New York, 1906. 
 
 Turner, F. J., Rise of the New West, (American Nation 
 Series), New York, 1906. 
 
 Woodburn, J. A., Political Parties and Party Problems, 
 New York, 1903. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Abolition movement, non-parti¬ 
 san in origin, 174. 
 
 Adams, Henry Degradation of 
 the Democratic Dogma, cited, 
 2, 213 235 
 
 Adams, J. Q, 30, 70, 134, 155, 
 169; political leadership, 2, 
 11, 12, 23, 24, 26, 31 n„ 
 32, 39, 222; his conserva¬ 
 tism, 4; and Jackson in 1824, 
 4, 5; campaign of 1824, 5-11; 
 quarrel with Massachusetts 
 Federalists in 1807, 8 n.; West 
 and internal improvements, 8, 
 n; patronage, 10, 11, 12, 13, 
 16, 17, agrees with J. McLean 
 on, 18; personality, 13; use of 
 money in elections, 15; cam¬ 
 paign of 1828, 26, 27; election 
 of 1828, 30; considered by 
 Anti-Masons for presidency, 
 50; attitude towards Clay, 
 1832, 67; New York City 
 charter election, 1834, 121; 
 Van Buren’s election certain, 
 147; Clay’s democracy, 161; 
 Whig leaders and internal im¬ 
 provements, 1834, 172; char¬ 
 acter of Whig party, 172 n., 
 173 n.; growth of executive 
 powers, 180, 181; Richard 
 
 Fletcher, 186, 186 n.; decline 
 in respect for law, 188; in¬ 
 ternal improvements, 213. 
 
 Adams, J. Q., MSS., cited, 161, 
 172, 228. 
 
 Albany, 124. 
 
 Albany Argus, cited, 105, 106, 
 107, 229; Washington Globe 
 and Tariff, 97. 
 
 Albany Journal, cited, 156, 163, 
 n„ 170, 229. 
 
 American System, 25, 37, 47; 
 and National Republican 
 party, 1832, 58; attitude of 
 Whig party, 173. 
 
 Anti-Masonic party, origin, 48 
 n.; relations with National 
 Republicans, 49, 49 n., 52, 53, 
 67; and Clay, 49, 50, 68; con¬ 
 siders Richard Rush and J. Q. 
 Adams for presidency, 50; 
 preference for J. McLean, 50; 
 nominates William Wirt, 51; 
 position in 1835, 135, 136; ana 
 Webster, 1835, 136, 137; 
 
 Democratic members, 136 n.; 
 Harrisburg convention, 1835, 
 137; influence in Harrisburg 
 convention, 1839, 162, 189; 
 Bank issue, 166 n.; joins 
 Whig party, 172; general de¬ 
 sire for its nomination, 1832, 
 174. 
 
 Anti-slavery, see abolition move¬ 
 ment ; Clay’s Taylorsville 
 speech, 159; petition strug¬ 
 gle, 175, 176; silence of press, 
 176. 
 
 Appleton, Samuel, 156. 
 
 Atherton, C. G., 185. 
 
 Auburn, 124. 
 
 Autobiography of Amos Ken¬ 
 dall, cited, 231. 
 
 Autobiography of Martin Van 
 Buren, (J. C. Fitzpatrick, 
 ed.), cited. 4, 72, 73, 77, 78, 
 87, 89, 102, 104, 105, 108, 109, 
 171, 231. 
 
 Autobiography of T hurl ow 
 Weed (Harriet A. Weed, 
 ed.), cited, 14, 163, 166, 168, 
 231, 234. 
 
240 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 Bailey, John, 15. 
 
 Baltimore Gazette, cited, 79. 
 
 Baltimore, National Republican 
 Convention, 1831, 57; Anti- 
 Masonic Convention, 1831, 66. 
 
 Baltimore Patriot, cited, 108. 
 
 Bancroft, Frederick, Life of 
 William H. Seward, cited, 234. 
 
 Bank issue, see removal of de¬ 
 posits; National Bank; 223; 
 National Republican Young 
 Men’s Convention, 58; re¬ 
 sponsibility for, 1832, 58-64; 
 in Congress 1831, 62; Biddle’s 
 use of money, 1833, 65; cam¬ 
 paign of 1836, 148; and Whig 
 party, 165-167; and Anti- 
 Masons, 172; and Loco-Focos, 
 197. 
 
 Barbour, James, MSS., cited, 
 26, 27 n„ 29 n„ 30, 31, 40, 
 54 n„ 67, 228. 
 
 Barnes, T. W., Memoir of 
 Thurlow Weed, cited, 60, 159, 
 234. 
 
 Barrett, W., Old Merchants of 
 New York, cited, 189. 
 
 Barry, W. T„ 132; Webster’s 
 reception in Cincinnati, 1833, 
 93. 
 
 Bartlett, Mary G., Chief Phases 
 of Pennsylvania Politics in 
 the Jacksonian Period, cited, 
 123, 235. 
 
 Bassett, J. S., Life of Andrew 
 Jackson, cited, 87 n., 234. 
 
 Benton, Thomas H., Thirty 
 Years View, cited, 230. 
 
 Biddle, Nicholas, 88, 223; re¬ 
 sponsibility for Bank issue, 
 
 1832, 58-62; use of Bank 
 
 funds to influence public opin¬ 
 ion, 65; supports Clay, 1832, 
 66; nomination, 1831, 66; 
 
 Clay and Webster, 1833, 82, 
 83, 84, 183, 224; attachment 
 to Bank, 82 n.; urges Webster 
 to confer with E. Livingston. 
 84 n.; removal of deposits, 
 
 1833, 82-89, 98; Webster’s re¬ 
 
 turn to opposition, 1833, 108, 
 110; political value of eco¬ 
 nomic depression, 1834, 120; 
 advice on Whig methods. 
 1836, 146. 
 
 Biddle MSS., cited, 61, 80, 82, 
 87, 88, 109, 110, 111, 161, 
 228. 
 
 Blair, Francis P., 8 n., 95 n. 
 
 Boston, 72, 89, 101, 112, 155, 
 178. 
 
 Boston Atlas, cited, 153, 155, 
 185, 229; supports Webster, 
 1836, 137; political results of 
 improved economic conditions, 
 1838, 151, 152; abandons 
 
 Webster for Harrison, 1838, 
 152-156. 
 
 Boston Daily Advertiser, cited, 
 43, 73 n„ 153, 205, 229; 
 charges Boston Atlas with 
 sacrificing party principles, 
 154, 155. 
 
 Boston Post, cited, 90 n. 
 
 Boston Statesman, cited, 95, 96, 
 229. 
 
 Boston Quarterly Review, cited, 
 202, 203, 204, 206, 232. 
 
 Boston Weekly Report of Pub¬ 
 lic Sales and Arrivals, cited, 
 79, 232. 
 
 Bourne, E. G., History of Sur¬ 
 plus Revenue, cited, 235. 
 
 Bowers, Claude, Party Battles 
 in the Jacksonian Period, 
 cited, 237. 
 
 Bradford, T. G., An Illustrated 
 Atlas, cited, 232. 
 
 Brooke, Francis, on Jackson’s 
 election, 30. 
 
 Brownson, Orestes A., radical 
 views, 202; on party divisions, 
 206; doctrines of class war¬ 
 fare, 210. 
 
 Buchanan, James, McLean’s 
 strength in Pennsylvania, 
 1830, 41; character of Bank 
 supporters, 190 n. 
 
INDEX 
 
 241 
 
 Buckingham, J. S., America, 
 Historical, Statistical, and 
 Descriptive, cited, 199, 208, 
 233. 
 
 Buckingham, J. S., character of 
 Whig party, 208; reaction to 
 political issues in England, 
 208. 
 
 Buffalo, 159. 
 
 “Bulletin of the Campaign,” 
 151, 152. 
 
 Burgess, J. W., Middle Period, 
 cited, 183 n., 237. 
 
 Byrdsall, F., History of the 
 Loco Foco or Equal Rights 
 Party, cited, 197, 230. 
 
 Cadwallader, Thomas, Biddle’s 
 agent in Washington, 62; re¬ 
 lations with G. McDuffie, 63. 
 
 Calhoun, J. C„ 47, 128, 132, 172; 
 Adams and Jackson in 1824, 
 5; J. McLean and patronage, 
 17, 18; and J. McLean, 40, 45, 
 46; relations with National 
 Republicans, 1832, 53-55; 
 
 strength outside South Caro¬ 
 lina, 1832, 53 ; support of Bank 
 charter, 1816, 63; relations 
 with National Republicans, 
 62, 64, 95, 100, 101; returns 
 to Democratic party, 152, 173; 
 conservatism of southern 
 Whigs, 215, 216. 
 
 Cambreling, C. C., attitude of 
 Democratic members in House 
 of Representatives on nullifi¬ 
 cation, 77 n.; replies to Fletch¬ 
 er’s charges of executive con¬ 
 trol, 185. 
 
 Camp, John G., influential 
 friend of Clay, 67. 
 
 Campaign funds, J. Q. Adams 
 solicited for use in Kentucky 
 election, 1827, 15. 
 
 Cass, Lewis, 89. 
 
 Catterall, R. C. H., Second Bank 
 of the United States, cited, 
 58, 62, 63, n., 87 n„ 119, 120, 
 125, 235. 
 
 Channing, Edward, History of 
 the United States, cited, 17 n., 
 237. 
 
 Chartist movement, Brownson’s 
 sympathy, 203. 
 
 Chevalier, Michel, Lettres sur 
 I’Amerique, cited, 127, 193, 
 233. 
 
 Chevalier, M., resemblance be¬ 
 tween Democratic speeches 
 and those of French Revolu¬ 
 tion, 188; ascendancy of the 
 farmer and mechanic, 193 n.; 
 power in hands of the masses, 
 216. 
 
 Chevalier, M„ Society, Manners 
 and Politics in the United 
 States, cited, 187, 192, 217, 
 233. 
 
 Choate, Rufus, influence to¬ 
 wards National Republican 
 unity in Boston, 1833, 92. 
 
 Cincinnati, Clay’s speech at, 
 1831, 59, 60, 61; economic 
 conditions in 1832, 65; Web¬ 
 ster dinner, 1833, 93-94. 
 
 Cincinnati Advertiser, cited, 65. 
 
 Cincinnati Daily Gazette, 229; 
 party policy after election of 
 1828, 37, 38; Webster’s co¬ 
 operation with Jackson, 81; 
 Harrison’s candidacy, 1835, 
 141. 
 
 Civil service under J. Q. Ad¬ 
 ams, 16. 
 
 Clay, Henry, 7, 8, 9, 48, 51, 52, 
 53, 75, 132. 140. 141, 153, 156, 
 164, 169, 222, 223; supports J. 
 Q. Adams, 1825, 6; party or¬ 
 ganization, 1824-1828, 12; Mc¬ 
 Lean, 16; patronage, 20; tariff 
 convention, 1827, 25 n.; pro¬ 
 tection and internal improve¬ 
 ments, 25, 32; congressional 
 caucus. 1831. 31-33; leader of 
 party, 35, 36-38, 40; popular¬ 
 ity, 38, 39; Kentucky state 
 election, 1831, 43; Anti- 
 
 Masonry, 51; amendment on 
 veto power, 56; Calhoun in 
 
242 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 1831, 53-55, 64; compromise 
 tariff and South, 64, 84, 129; 
 supported by Bank’s re¬ 
 sources, 64, 65; opposition to 
 his leadership, 1832, 66, 67; 
 and Webster, 1832, 68, 69; 
 Edward Everett, 1832, 68 n.; 
 conversation with Van Buren, 
 1849, 72 n.; nullification pro¬ 
 clamation, 76, 77; political ef¬ 
 fects of compromise tariff, 
 78; and Webster, 1833. 81, 82, 
 100, 101, 109, 112, 117; atti¬ 
 tude of Webster’s Boston 
 friends, 101; Senate commit¬ 
 tee on finance, 101-108, 224; 
 Bank leader in Senate, 109 
 n.; New York City charter 
 election, 1834. 121; New Eng¬ 
 land in 1836, 128; supports 
 Harrison, 1836, 129; desire 
 to control administration, 
 129, 130; Schouler on cen¬ 
 ters of Clay’s strength, 153; 
 Webster and Boston Atlas 
 support Harrison, 154, 155; 
 relations with Webster, 1838. 
 155; campaign of 1840, 159- 
 161; Taylorsville speech, 159, 
 160; Granger advises against 
 his nomination, 160; cooper¬ 
 ation with “Conservatives,” 
 160; first ballot at Harris¬ 
 burg convention, 1839, 162; 
 Bank issue after 1832, 165- 
 167; issues in 1840, 168, 168 
 n.; relations between presi¬ 
 dent and cabinet officers, 180; 
 on public lands, 213 n.; “a 
 paternal government,” 214. 
 
 Clay MSS., cited 49, 57. 
 
 Clayton, John M., 104, 107. 
 
 Clayton MSS., cited, 104, 168 
 n„ 228. 
 
 Cleveland Herald, cited, 158. 
 
 Cole, A. C„ Whig Party in the 
 South, cited, 24, 55, 123, 127, 
 152, 190, 235. 
 
 Colton, Calvin, 204; American 
 political institutions, 204, 205 ; 
 importance of democratic 
 habits in politics, 217. 
 
 Colton, Calvin, Life and Times 
 of Henry Clay, cited, 234. 
 
 Committee on finance, 1833, 101- 
 108, 114 n. 
 
 Committee on ways and means, 
 McDuffie, Chairman of, 59 
 n.; executive control of, 184, 
 185. 
 
 Compendium . . . from the 
 
 Returns of the Sixth Census, 
 cited, 151 n., 233. 
 
 Concord Courier, cited, 145. 
 
 Congdon, C. T., Reminiscences 
 of a Journalist, cited, 29, 155, 
 188 231 
 
 Congdon, C. T., Webster and 
 Boston Atlas, 1838, 155. 
 
 Congress, 78; power to annul 
 veto, 56; “force bill” 76, 101, 
 121, 147; independence of, 
 182; Whig defense of, 182, 
 183. 
 
 Congressional caucus, 222; Na¬ 
 tional Republican, 1832-33, 31, 
 32; campaign of 1840, 161. 
 
 Congressional Globe, cited, 102, 
 103, 104, 106, 175 n„ 185, 196 
 n„ 233. 
 
 Connecticut, 119; supports Clay 
 at Harrisburg convention, 
 1839, 162. 
 
 Connecticut Courant, cited, 175. 
 
 Conservatism, real character of 
 Whig party, 211; bond be¬ 
 tween northern Whigs and 
 Calhoun faction, 216. 
 
 “Conservatives,” Clay urges co¬ 
 operation, 160; origin, 160 n.; 
 anti-Bank element in Whig 
 party, 172. 
 
 Correspondence committees in 
 New York, 34, 35, 223. 
 
 Correspondence of J. C. Cal¬ 
 houn, (J. F. Jameson, ed.), 
 cited, 47, 53, 54, 55, 216, 230. 
 
INDEX 
 
 243 
 
 Correspondence of Nicholas 
 Biddle (R. C. McGrane, ed.), 
 cited, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 82 n., 
 83 n„ 84, 87, 88, 108, 109, 121, 
 142, 146, 165, 167 n„ 230. 
 
 Currency question, 197. 
 
 Corrupt bargain, 6, 7. 
 
 Curtis, G. T., Life of Webster, 
 cited 73 n., 78, 85, 86 n., 89 n., 
 234. 
 
 Darling, A. B., “Jacksonian 
 Democracy in Massachusetts,” 
 cited, 96, 235. 
 
 Davis, John, congressional cau¬ 
 cus, 32. 
 
 Davis, Matthew L., see “Spy in 
 Washington.” 
 
 Dawson, Edgar, “Origin of the 
 Whig Party,” cited, 235. 
 
 Dearborn, H. A., nationalist 
 policies, 214. 
 
 Degrand, P. P. F„ realignment 
 of parties, 1833, 79, 80; Jack¬ 
 son’s journey to New Eng¬ 
 land, 1833, 89, 90. 
 
 Delaware, 104. 
 
 Democratic party, dissensions 
 in, 1828, 24; under Regency, 
 33; break between Calhoun 
 and Van Buren, 53; effect of 
 nullification crisis, 70; Web¬ 
 ster and dissatisfied Demo¬ 
 crats in Pennsylvania, 1833, 
 111; divided in Boston by re¬ 
 moval of deposits, 112; un¬ 
 willingness of politicians to 
 abandon Bank issue, 116; atti¬ 
 tude towards McLean, 1834, 
 131-132; McLean’s attitude, 
 134; favorable events, 1838, 
 151, 152; J. Tyler and dissatis¬ 
 fied Democratic vote in South, 
 165; Democratic members of 
 House and gag resolutions, 
 175 n., 176 n.; influence of 
 farmers and mechanics. 192- 
 195; character of Democratic 
 party in New York state, 
 195; and Loco-Focoism. 197; 
 possible result of fusion in 
 
 New York state, 198, 199; 
 Whig characterization of 
 Democrats in 1838, 199 ; elec¬ 
 tive judiciary, 202; distinction 
 between a Republic and a 
 Democracy, 205 ; foreign trav¬ 
 ellers on party differences, 206- 
 208; and public lands, 213 n. 
 
 Derby, J. B., Democratic office 
 holders in Massachusetts, 178. 
 
 Derby, J. B., Political Reminis¬ 
 cences, cited, 178, 232. 
 
 Diary of Philip Hone, cited, 
 120, 121, 122, 125, 126, 149, 
 150, 165, 196, 212, 218, 231. • 
 
 Duane, Joseph, origin of name 
 Whig, 123. 
 
 Duncan, Joseph, arraigns Whig 
 party on naturalization policy, 
 196. 
 
 Durasmont, Frances, What ts 
 the Matter . . . ?, cited, 
 
 232. 
 
 Eaton, John H., Tennessee sena¬ 
 torial election, 105 n. 
 
 Economic conditions, as result 
 of Bank veto, 65, 66; causes 
 of depression of 1834, 119; 
 activities of speculators, 1834, 
 120; improvement, July, 1834, 
 125; results in New York 
 election, 1834, 127; crisis of 
 
 1837, 149; conditions in New 
 York City. 1837. 149; im¬ 
 provement in 1838, 151; cre¬ 
 ates desire for change of ad¬ 
 ministration, 1840, 168, 169; 
 hard times best Whig argu¬ 
 ment, 192. 
 
 Election, of 1828, 28; of 1831 in 
 Kentucky, 43, 60, 68, 69; of 
 1832, 70; New York City 
 charter election. 1834. 121, 
 
 122; in New York state, 1834. 
 126; of 1834 in Ohio, 132; of 
 1836, 148, 149; New York 
 City charter election. 1837, 
 149' 150; in New York state, 
 1837 150; in New York state, 
 
 1838, 152; of 1840, 220. 
 
244 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 England, 1SS. 
 
 Era of good feeling, 3. 
 
 Everett, A. H., asks Clay to 
 withdraw, 1832, 67, 68. 
 
 Everett, Edward, 21; corre¬ 
 spondence with J. McLean on 
 patronage, 18-20; congres¬ 
 sional caucus, 1831, 32; asks 
 Clay to withdraw, 1832, 67, 
 68; coolness towards Clay in 
 campaign of 1832, 68 n.; Jack¬ 
 son’s control of House of 
 Representatives, 181. 
 
 Ewing, Thomas, 227. 
 
 Ewing, Thomas, MSS., cited, 
 132 n., 228. 
 
 Executive powers, Whig opposi¬ 
 tion, 178 ff.; foreign affairs, 
 178, 179; control of legisla¬ 
 tion, 179, 182; veto power, 
 179; relations between presi¬ 
 dent and cabinet officers, 179, 
 180; Harrison’s use of Whig 
 opposition to avoid statement 
 of issues, 182. 
 
 Faust, A. B., German Element 
 in the United States, cited, 
 196 n„ 235. 
 
 Federalist party, persistence of 
 principles, 3, 24; divisions in 
 1824, 4; and J. Q. Adams, 4; 
 attitude of other parties, 1824, 
 20 . 
 
 Findlay, James, defeat in Ohio 
 election, 1834, 26; test of Mc¬ 
 Lean’s political strength, 1834, 
 132, 133. 
 
 Fisk, C. R., Civil Service and 
 the Patronage, cited, 16, 23, 
 235. 
 
 Fiske, John, Essays Historical 
 and Literary, cited, 235. 
 
 Flagg, A. C., MSS., cited, 22, 
 228. 
 
 Fletcher, Richard, attacks Jack¬ 
 son’s control of legislation, 
 183-187. 
 
 Floyd, John, Calhoun’s candi¬ 
 date, 1832, 55. 
 
 Follett, Oran, organization of 
 National Republican party in 
 New York, 33, 34; proposes 
 Clay’s withdrawal, 1831, 67; 
 Clay’s candidacy, 1833, 128. 
 
 “Follett Papers,” (L. Belle 
 Hamlin, ed.), cited, 34, 35, 67, 
 128, 230. 
 
 Force bill, 76. 
 
 Ford, W. C., 17 n., 18 n. 
 
 Foreign affairs, Jackson’s pro¬ 
 nouncements, 178, 179. 
 
 Fox, D. R., Decline of Aristo¬ 
 cracy in the Politics of New 
 York, cited, 3, 123, 191, 196, 
 212, 218, 235. 
 
 Fox, D. R„ “Economic Status 
 of the New York Whigs,” 
 cited, 235. 
 
 Fox, D. R., origin of name 
 Whig, 123; Whig property in¬ 
 terests, 191. 
 
 France, 84 n. 
 
 Franklin, F. G., Legislative His¬ 
 tory of Naturalisation in the 
 United States, cited, 196 n., 
 235. 
 
 Frontier, 24, 25. 
 
 Gag resolutions, 175, 176. 
 
 Gales, Joseph, 13, 21. 
 
 Gammon, S. R., Presidential 
 Campaign of 1832, cited, 12, 
 34, 50, 52, 53, 65, 123, 235. 
 
 Garrison, G. P., Westward Ex¬ 
 pansion, cited, 237. 
 
 Georgia, 61 n., 148. 
 
 Godley, J. R., differences be¬ 
 tween Whig and Democratic 
 parties, 209. 
 
 Godley, J. R., Letters from 
 America, cited, 209, 233. 
 
 Gorham, Benjamin, 91 n. 
 
 Gouveneur, S. L., 45. 
 
 Gouverneur, S. L., MSS., cited, 
 45, 228. 
 
 Granger, Francis, MSS., cited, 
 160, 165, 177, 220, 228. 
 
 Granger, Francis, 177; nomi¬ 
 nated for vice-presidency by 
 Anti-Masons, 1835, 137; 
 
INDEX 
 
 245 
 
 Clay’s nomination inadvisable, 
 1838, 160; on southern Whigs 
 in 1840, 165. 
 
 Greeley, Horace, 227; explains 
 Whig defeat in New York 
 state election, 1834, 126, 127; 
 significance of election of 
 1836, 157. 
 
 Greeley, Horace, Recollections 
 of an Active Life, cited, 127, 
 152, 231. 
 
 Green, Duff, combination be¬ 
 tween McLean and Calhoun in 
 1830, 45; Clay and Calhoun 
 in Virginia, 1831, 54; on co¬ 
 operation between Jackson 
 and Webster, 1833, 196, 198; 
 on administration’s Bank 
 policy, 1833, 113. 
 
 Grey, Charles, Lord, 208. 
 
 Grund, F. J., character of Whig 
 party, 209. 
 
 Grund, F. J., The Americans in 
 their Moral, Social and Po¬ 
 litical Relations, cited, 209, 
 233. 
 
 Grundy, Felix, 107; motion to 
 delay election of Senate com¬ 
 mittees, 1833, 103, 104; con¬ 
 ference in regard to cooper¬ 
 ation with Webster, 1833, 105. 
 
 Hamer, Thomas L., J. McLean 
 and Calhoun in 1830, 45. 
 
 Hamilton, James, Reminis¬ 
 cences, cited, 231. 
 
 Hamilton, Thomas, character 
 of Whig party, 207, 208. 
 
 Hamilton, Thomas, Men and 
 Manners in America, cited 
 205, 207, 208, 218, 233. 
 
 Hammond, Charles, 141; editor 
 of Cincinnati Gazette, 14; 
 Webster’s cooperation with 
 Jackson, 81. 
 
 Hammond, J. D„ Political His¬ 
 tory of New York, cited, 64 
 n„ 125, 136, 235. 
 
 Harrisburg Reporter, cited, 182. 
 
 Harrison, W. H., 153; minister 
 to Colombia, 23; as candidate 
 of western Whigs, 1836, 127, 
 128; Clay’s support of, 1835, 
 129; nominated by Anti-Ma¬ 
 sonic convention, 1835, 137; 
 newspaper reaction to grow¬ 
 ing popularity, 138-140, 143, 
 225; source of opposition to 
 Harrison, 1835, 140; methods 
 of politicians in campaign of 
 1836, 141, 142; Biddle’s ad¬ 
 vice, 1835, 142, 146; strength 
 in election of 1836, 148, 149, 
 225; logical candidate for 
 1840, 149, 156; Boston Atlas 
 abandons Webster, 1838, 152- 
 154; Massachusetts gives him 
 vote on first ballot at Harris¬ 
 burg Convention, 1839, 155; 
 friends charge hostility of 
 Whig politicians in 1836, 156; 
 friends oppose national con¬ 
 vention, 1838, 157; candidacy 
 opposed by friends of Clay and 
 Webster, 1838, 158, 159; co¬ 
 operation between his and 
 Webster’s friends at Harris¬ 
 burg Convention, 1839, 162; 
 elements responsible for his 
 nomination, 162, 163; advan¬ 
 tages of his candidacy, 1840, 
 163, 164; “my conscience 
 
 keeping committee,” 168 n.; 
 nomination makes union pos¬ 
 sible, 220. 
 
 Hartford Convention, 22, 75 n„ 
 93. 
 
 Harvey, Peter, Reminiscences 
 of Daniel Webster, cited, 231. 
 
 Hatch, History of Maine, cited, 
 123, 189, 236. 
 
 Hibbard, B. H., History of the 
 Public Land Policies, cited 
 176 n„ 213 n„ 236. 
 
 Hildreth, Richard, change in 
 policy of Boston Atlas, 1838, 
 153. 
 
246 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 Hildreth, Richard, My connec¬ 
 tion with the Atlas news¬ 
 paper, cited, 232. 
 
 Hill, Isaac, transportation of 
 mails, 18 n.; patronage in 
 New Hampshire, 21; Web¬ 
 ster’s support of nullification 
 proclamation, 95; Webster’s 
 reception in Boston, 1833, 96. 
 
 Hinsdale, Mary, History of the 
 President’s Cabinet, cited, 17 
 n„ 236. 
 
 Hone, Philip., explains causes 
 of economic depression, 1834, 
 119; economic condition in 
 New York City, 1834, 121; 
 advice as to Whig nomina¬ 
 tions in New York state, 1834, 
 125; on prospects in New 
 York state election, 1837, 
 150; supports Harrison, 1840, 
 164, 165. 
 
 Hopkinson, Joseph, 21, 23. 
 
 Houghton, Richard, change in 
 Boston Atlas’ policy, 1838, 
 153, 227. 
 
 House Journal, cited, 175 n., 
 176. 233. 
 
 House of Representatives, elec¬ 
 tion of 1824, 6; committee on 
 ways and means, 59; Bank 
 issue, 62; anti-slavery peti¬ 
 tions, 175; vote on gag resolu¬ 
 tions, 175 n.; Jackson’s con¬ 
 trol of, 182-183; Fletcher’s 
 charges of executive control, 
 183-187. 
 
 Hudson, Frederick, Journalism 
 in the United States, cited, 74 
 n„ 153, 155, 236. 
 
 Hunter, J„ cashier of branch 
 bank at Savannah, 61, n. 
 
 Illinois, Harrison loses by nar¬ 
 row margin, 1836, 148; Whig 
 governor defeated. 1838, 152; 
 supports Clay at Harrisburg 
 convention, 1839, 162. 
 
 Immigrants, 154; majority join 
 Democratic party, 196. 
 
 Indiana, 154; carried by Harri¬ 
 son, 1836, 148; supports Har¬ 
 rison at Harrisburg conven¬ 
 tion, 1839, 162. 
 
 Internal improvements, 54; atti¬ 
 tude of Whig leaders, 172. 
 
 Irwin, W. W., 136. 
 
 “Jack Downing,” 91, 92. 
 
 Jackson, Andrew, 1, 2, 3, 6, 37, 
 40, 41. 100, 111, 126, 132, 178, 
 179, 180, 183, 213 n„ 223; 
 democracy, 4; frontier, 25, 
 26; six militiamen, 27; crowd 
 at inaugural, 1832, 29; results 
 of election, 29, 30; on tariff, 
 
 1832, 56; internal improve¬ 
 ments, 56; real issue in 1832, 
 57; bank issue, 59, 60, 63 n.; 
 Bank veto, 64; nullification 
 policy, 71, 72; proclamation, 
 72; effect in New York, 74; 
 special message, 1833, 72; 
 Webster on Jackson’s tariff 
 policy, 1833, 77; relations 
 with Webster, 1833, 78; Web¬ 
 ster possible cabinet member, 
 83 ; Sargeant on his influence, 
 
 1833, 83; E. Livingston’s plan 
 
 to recharter bank. 87; re¬ 
 moval of deposits, 87, 88, 98; 
 Webster and the removal, 88; 
 journey to New England, 
 1833, 89-92; reception in 
 
 Philadelphia, 90; National In¬ 
 telligencer on New England 
 tour, 92; Democratic confer¬ 
 ence on cooperating with 
 Webster, 105, 106; Harrison’s 
 appeal to same sources of po¬ 
 litical strength. 164; direct 
 appeals to people, 180. 
 
 Jackson MSS., cited, 105, 228. 
 
 Jacksonian Democracy, 2, 221. 
 
 jaudon, Samuel, explains causes 
 of economic depression, 1834, 
 120 . 
 
 Jefferson, Thomas, 3. 
 
 Judiciary, involved in Whig is¬ 
 sues of 1836, 147; Loco-Focos 
 support elective terms, 197. 
 
INDEX 
 
 24 7 
 
 Julian, G. W., Life of J. R. Gid- 
 dings, cited, 164, 234. 
 
 Julian, G. W., Political Recol¬ 
 lections, cited, 169, 231. 
 
 “Junius,” A Voice from A.mer- 
 ica to England, cited, 206, 217, 
 232. 
 
 "Junius,” American Jacobinism, 
 cited, 204, 232. 
 
 “Junius,” Crisis of the Country, 
 cited, 169 n., 232. 
 
 Kennedy, J. P., Defence of the 
 Whigs, cited, 183 n., 232. 
 
 Kennedy, J. P., Memoirs of the 
 Life of William Wirt, cited, 
 SI, 52, 234. 
 
 Kent, James, possible conse¬ 
 quences of Jackson’s reelec¬ 
 tion, 74. 
 
 Kent, James, MSS., cited, 74, 
 228. 
 
 Kentucky, 24, 100; state elec¬ 
 tion of 1831, 43, 60, 68, 69. 
 
 King, Rufus, 22. 
 
 Lawrence, Abbott, Webster and 
 Harrison, 1838, 155; Hone’s 
 opinion of, 219 n. 
 
 Laws and the Facts, cited, 27. 
 
 Letcher, Robert, Clay and 
 Adams in 1824, 7. 
 
 Livingston, Edward. 84; nego¬ 
 tiations between Webster and 
 Jackson, 1833, 84; reports of 
 interview with Webster, 1833, 
 85, 86, 88; offers cabinet office 
 to Webster, 1833, 86; indis¬ 
 cretion in regard to Bank 
 charter, 87; Van Buren’s esti¬ 
 mate of, 87 n. 
 
 Loco-Foco party, 191; origin, 
 196, 197; common cause with 
 trade union movement, 197; 
 principles, 197; return to 
 Democratic party on sub¬ 
 treasury issue, 197; definition 
 of a Loco-Foco, 198. 
 
 Lodge, H. C., Life of Daniel 
 Webster, cited, 234. 
 
 Louisiana, 24, 53. 
 
 Louisville Journal, Webster’s 
 welcome in West, 1833, 93. 
 
 Lyell, Sir Charles, ascendency 
 of small farmers, 193. 
 
 Lyell, Sir Charles, Second Visit 
 to the United States, cited, 
 193, 195, 233. 
 
 MacDonald, William, Jackson¬ 
 ian Democracy, cited, 237. 
 
 Mackay, Alexander, ascendency 
 of small farmers, 193, 194; 
 character of Whig party, 
 210 n. 
 
 Mackay, Alexander, Western 
 World, cited, 194, 233. 
 
 Macy, Jesse ,. Political Parties 
 in the United States, cited, 
 237. 
 
 Maine, origin of name of Whig 
 party, 123 ; Harrison’s strength 
 in 1836, 149; supports Harri¬ 
 son at Harrisburg convention, 
 1839, 162; pressure exerted 
 by business in politics, 188, 
 189; centers of Whig strength, 
 210 . 
 
 Mangum, W. P., MSS., cited, 
 63, 114, 119, 228. 
 
 Mangum, W. P., 114, 119; re¬ 
 ceives South Carolina electoral 
 votes, 1836, 148. 
 
 March, C. W., Reminiscences 
 of Congress, cited, 73 n., 77, 
 85, 86 n. 
 
 Marcy, William L., elected gov¬ 
 ernor of New York, 1834, 126. 
 
 Marietta, economic conditions, 
 1832, 65. 
 
 Marryat, Frederick, Diary in 
 America, cited, 217, 233. 
 
 Marryat, Frederick, importance 
 of democratic habits in poli¬ 
 tics, 217. 
 
 Maryland, election of 1832, 55. 
 
 Marshall, John, 178. 
 
 Martineau, Harriet, Society in 
 America, cited, 207, 208, 233. 
 
 Mason, Jeremiah, 4, 9. 
 
248 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 “Massachusetts,” affirms loyalty 
 of Webster’s friends, 1835, 
 139. 
 
 Massachusetts Historical So¬ 
 ciety, Proceedings of, cited, 
 17 n., 18 n., 20 n., 22 n. 
 
 Massachusetts, 32, 214; Na¬ 
 tional Republicans and Anti- 
 Masons in 1832, 53; Webster’s 
 nomination by legislature, 
 1835, 135; Anti-Masonic party 
 divides, 1835, 136; casts vote 
 for Webster, 1836, 149; elec¬ 
 tion of Democratic governor, 
 1838, 153; supports Webster 
 on first ballot at Harrisburg 
 convention, 1839, 155; Demo¬ 
 cratic office-holders, 178; char¬ 
 acter of Whigs in, 188. 
 
 Matthews, Lois K., Expansion 
 of New England, cited, 236. 
 
 Matthias, Benjamin, Politician’s 
 Register, cited, 233. 
 
 Maysville road veto, 179; po¬ 
 litical results of, 56. 
 
 McCarthy, C., Anti-Masonic 
 Party, cited, 48, 52, 136, 166 
 n., 236. 
 
 McDuffie, George, Bank me¬ 
 morial, 1832, 59; influences 
 Biddle on Bank question, 62; 
 Clay and Calhoun bargain, 64. 
 
 McGrane, R. C., Bank issue and 
 slavery controversy, 62 n.; 
 Biddle and Webster, 1833, 
 84 n. 
 
 McLane, Louis, 81. 
 
 McLean, John, MSS., cited, 17, 
 18, 21 n„ 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 
 46. 59, 64. 66, 128, 129, 130, 
 131, 132, 133, 142, 144, 148, 
 181 228 
 
 McLean" John, 21, 47, 51, 129, 
 142, 147; retention as post¬ 
 master general under J. Q. 
 Adams, 16; on patronage, 16 
 n.; correspnodence with Ed¬ 
 ward Everett on patronage, 
 18-20; candidacy in campaign 
 of 1832, 40-43, 223; combina¬ 
 
 tion with Calhoun, 45-47; and 
 Anti-Masonic nomination, 66; 
 campaign of 1836, 132; esti¬ 
 mate of political career, 133, 
 134; and fusion party, 173. 
 
 McMaster, J. B., Daniel Web¬ 
 ster, cited, 93 n„ 234. 
 
 McMaster, J. B., History of the 
 United States, cited, 237. 
 
 Memoirs and Correspondence 
 of Jeremiah Mason, cited, 11, 
 231. 
 
 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, cited, 
 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. 11, 12, 16, 21, 
 23. 28, 30, 32, 33, 51, 68, 105, 
 118, 133, 136, 147, 155, 182, 
 186. 188, 230. 
 
 Metcalf. Thomas, 15. 
 
 Moderator, cited, 130. 
 
 Monroe, James, 16, 40. 
 
 Morison, S. E., Life and Letters 
 of Harrison Gray Otis, cited, 
 3, 8, 73 n„ 234. 
 
 Morning Courier and New York 
 Enquirer, cited, 74, 77 n., 79, 
 107, 163 n„ 229. 
 
 Mr. Webster’s Speech on the 
 President’s Protest, Senate, 
 May 7, 1834, cited, 232. 
 
 Mueller, H. R., Whig Party in 
 Pennsylvania, cited, 142, 162, 
 236. 
 
 National Bank, see Bank issue; 
 71, 81, 88, 106; corrupt mo¬ 
 nopoly, 66; Biddle’s interest 
 in, 82 n.; political conse¬ 
 quences of credit restriction, 
 1834, 119, 120; abandons 
 
 policy of restriction, 124; 
 seeks understanding with ad¬ 
 ministration, 167 n.; Jackson’s 
 veto, 179; business men sup¬ 
 port recharter, 190 n. 
 
 National Gazette, cited, 20. 
 
 National Gazette and Literary 
 Register, cited, 145, 229; on 
 cooperation between Webster 
 and Jackson, 1833, 98-100; 
 relations between Clay and 
 Webster, 1833, 108; affirms 
 
INDEX 
 
 249 
 
 support of Webster or Clay, 
 1835, 140; recommends party 
 primaries, 1835, 145; con¬ 
 
 demns growth of executive 
 power, 180, 181. 
 
 National Intelligencer, cited, 13 
 18, 21, 27, 28, 32, 33 n., 35, 38, 
 43, 45, 50, 63 n., 65, 73, 74, 81, 
 85, 92, 93, 106, 135, 141, 145, 
 147, 152, 153, 156, 157, 158, 
 159, 161, 168 n„ 182 n„ 185, 
 186, 189, 198, 199, 200, 203, 
 204, 205, 214, 222, 229; leader¬ 
 ship of National Republican 
 party, 36; National Republi¬ 
 can Convention, 1831, 39; 
 public opinion on Bank veto, 
 1832, 65; nullification procla¬ 
 mation, 75, 76; on Jackson’s 
 New_ England tour, 1833, 92; 
 reaction in West to Webster’s 
 tour, 1833, 93 ; New York City 
 charter election, 1834, 122, 
 124; change in public opinion, 
 1834, 124; McLean’s candi¬ 
 dacy, 1835, 133; supports 
 
 Webster, 1836, 137, 138; Har¬ 
 rison’s capacity, 138; Harri¬ 
 son’s candidacy, 1835, 141; 
 abandons hope of single Whig 
 candidate, 1835, 144, 145, 146; 
 importance of New York state 
 election, 1837, 151; supports 
 Harrison, 1840, 164; on Bank 
 issue after 1832, 165 n., 166, 
 167; silence on slavery issue, 
 1839, 176; office-holders under 
 Jackson, 178; Jackson’s pro¬ 
 nouncements on foreign af¬ 
 fairs, 178, 179; Jackson’s use 
 of veto power, 179; his direct 
 appeal to people, 180; char¬ 
 acter of Whig party in New 
 York, 1834, 189; northern 
 Whigs, the security for the 
 South, 191; character of New 
 York Democrats, 195. 
 
 National Republican Party, 2, 
 4; nucleus for, 6; J. McLean 
 and patronage, 16; centers of 
 
 strength in 1828, 24; position 
 after 1832, 30, 31; materials 
 on organization, 31 n.; con¬ 
 gressional caucus, 31, 32; 
 
 weak national organization, 
 33 ; in New York state, 33-35 ; 
 Baltimore convention, 1831, 
 35, 45, 57; National Republi¬ 
 can Young Men’s Convention, 
 
 1832, 35, 38; relations with 
 
 Anti-Masons, 1832, 51-53; 
 
 Calhoun in campaign of 1832, 
 53-55; search for an issue, 55- 
 64; nullification crisis, 70; 
 “Spy in Washington” on ef¬ 
 fect of nullification proclama¬ 
 tion, 74; division on procla¬ 
 mation, 75; effect of Jackson’s 
 New England tour, 1833, 92; 
 effect of crisis of 1833, 117; 
 discredited in 1833, 118; Mc¬ 
 Lean’s suspicions of leaders, 
 1834, 131; problems in cam¬ 
 paign of 1832, 222-223. 
 
 National Republican Young 
 Men’s Convention, 1832, state¬ 
 ment of issues, 58. 
 
 Native Americans, Whigs agree 
 on naturalization policy, 196. 
 
 Naturalization of aliens, 226. 
 
 New Brunswick, 124. 
 
 New England, 9, 21 n„ 22, 29, 
 151 n.; reception of Jackson, 
 
 1833, 89; federal patronage, 
 96; Clay’s journey to, 1833, 
 101; vote of senators on 
 Sprague’s motion, 104; eco¬ 
 nomic depression, 1834, 119; 
 Webster as candidate of 
 Whigs, 1836, 127, 146; Har¬ 
 rison’s strength in 1836, 148. 
 
 New Hampshire, Harrison’s 
 strength in, 1836, 149; sup¬ 
 ports Harrison at Harrisburg 
 convention, 1839, 162. 
 
 New Hampshire Patriot, cited, 
 18 n„ 95, 96, 113. 229. 
 
 New Jersey, 21 n.; Whig defeat 
 in, 1834. 126; carried by Har¬ 
 rison, 1836. 148; abandons 
 
250 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 Scott for Harrison at Harris¬ 
 burg convention, 1839, 162. 
 
 New York, 145, 159, 182; Na¬ 
 tional Republican state organ¬ 
 ization, 33-35, 223; Anti-Ma¬ 
 sons, 49, 52; political effects 
 of economic depression, 1834, 
 119; state election, 1834, 126; 
 Anti-Masonic party, 1835, 
 136; Whigs carry state elec¬ 
 tion, 1837, 150; elect Whig 
 governor, 1838, 152; at Har¬ 
 risburg convention, 1839, 162; 
 character of Whig party in, 
 189; character of Democrats, 
 195; Loco-Focos return to 
 Democratic party, 197; possi¬ 
 ble results of fusion, 198, 199; 
 new leadership in Whig party, 
 218. 
 
 New York American, cited, 38, 
 90 n„ 107, 154, 155, 200, 229; 
 supports Webster, 1836, 137; 
 Webster’s neutrality, 1848, 
 157; people demand Harrison, 
 1838, 157; questions need of 
 national convention, 157; on 
 Richard Fletcher’s speech, 
 186; political rights of immi¬ 
 grants, 196; refuses cooper¬ 
 ation with “Conservatives,” 
 211; labor union movement, 
 211. 
 
 New York City. 74, 124, 159, 
 189; charter election of 1834, 
 121, 122; charter election of 
 1837, 149, 150; economic con¬ 
 ditions, 1837, 149, 150; in state 
 election, 1837, 151 n. 
 
 New York Commercial Adver¬ 
 tiser, 38. 
 
 New York Daily Advertiser, 
 cited. 81, 115. 123, 129. 229. 
 New York Evening Post, cited, 
 200. 203, 204. 
 
 New York Express, description 
 of Loco Focos, 199, 200.^ 
 New York Gazette, on “con¬ 
 servatives,” 211. 
 
 New York Journal of Com¬ 
 merce, cited, 107. 
 
 New York Observer (Utica), 
 definition of a Loco-Foco, 198. 
 
 New York Review, cited, 211. 
 
 New York Standard, cited, 113. 
 
 Newspapers, support of by Na¬ 
 tional Republicans, 14, 15; 
 fund for National Republican 
 newspaper in New York, 34. 
 
 Niles’ Register, cited, 4, 32, 34, 
 49, 51, 57, 58, 60. 78, 80, 118, 
 122, 124, 126. 133, 142, 150, 
 151, 152, 159, 161, 163, 165, 
 168 n„ 176, 180, 181, 182, 185, 
 187, 190, 219. 
 
 Niles, Hezekiah, 58; motives of 
 Clay’s interest in tariff, 32; 
 attitude towards Anti-Masons, 
 49; definite statement of is¬ 
 sues, 1830, 57; on Clay’s com¬ 
 promise tariff, 1833, 78 n., 
 party confusion, 1833, 118; 
 economic depression, 1834, 
 120; New York state election, 
 1834. 126; economic condi¬ 
 
 tions in New York City, 1837, 
 150; result of New York state 
 election, 1837. 150. 151; defeat 
 of Bank, 1832, 165; president 
 and cabinet officers, 180; 
 “poor against rich,” 187. 
 North Carolina, 63 n„ 176 n. 
 Nullification movement, see nul¬ 
 lification proclamation; 69, 71, 
 73, 115, 116. 134; attitude of 
 Democrats in House of Rep¬ 
 resentatives, 77 n. 
 Nullification proclamation, effect 
 on parties, 71; “Spy in Wash¬ 
 ington” on its political effect, 
 74; Webster on Jackson’s 
 policy, 72, 73; attitude of Na¬ 
 tional Intelligencer, 75. 76; 
 Clay’s attitude, 76; and the 
 administration. 90; attitude of 
 northern Democrats, 98. 
 Ogden, David B., 218. 
 
 Ohio. 17, 42, 43; National Re¬ 
 publicans and Anti-Masons, 
 
INDEX 
 
 251 
 
 1832, 52; carried by Harrison, 
 1836, 148; Whig governor de¬ 
 feated, 1836, 152; supports 
 Harrison at Harrisburg con¬ 
 vention, 1839, 162. 
 
 Ogg, F. A., Daniel Webster, 234. 
 
 Ogg, F. A., Reign of Andrew 
 Jackson, cited, 237. 
 
 Ormsby, R. M., History of the 
 Whig Party, cited, 235. 
 
 Ostrogorski, M., Democracy 
 and Organization of Political 
 Parties, cited, 237. 
 
 Otis, H. G., and Nullification 
 Proclamation, 73 n. 
 
 Panama mission, 14. 
 
 Parton, James, Life of Andrew 
 Jackson, cited, 29, 234. 
 
 Party loyalty, weakness of, 31, 
 173, 174; lure of the presi¬ 
 dency, 174. 
 
 Party organization, see party 
 loyalty; National Republican 
 prospects in 1825, 2; disinte¬ 
 gration of Federalist party, 
 3; J. Q. Adams favors non¬ 
 partisan administration, 12; 
 National Republicans subsid¬ 
 ize newspapers, T4; Edward 
 Everett on, 18, 19. 
 
 Patronage, 2, 9, 10, 222; Web¬ 
 ster on, 12; J. McLean on, 
 16 n.; in New England, 96; 
 qualifications for office, 177, 
 178 227 
 
 Peel, Sir Robert, 208. 
 
 Pennsylvania, 23, 25, 43, 145, 
 146, 154; National Republi¬ 
 cans and Anti-Masons, 1832, 
 52; Bank shares, 63, 107; ori¬ 
 gin of name of Whig party, 
 123; election of 1834, 126; 
 McLean, 1833, 131; Anti-Ma¬ 
 sonic party in, 136; election 
 of 1836, 148; defeat of Whig 
 governor, 1838, 152; Harrison 
 committee, 156, 157; supports 
 Harrison at Harrisburg con¬ 
 vention. 1839, 162; Bank issue 
 and Anti-Masons, 166 n. 
 
 Pennsylvanian, cited, 95, 107, 
 229. 
 
 Penrose, C. B., disadvantages of 
 Clay’s nomination, 1839, 161; 
 Harrisburg convention, 1839, 
 162. 
 
 Pet banks, 197. 
 
 Philadelphia, 84, 124. 
 
 Phillips, U. B., “Federalists in 
 South Carolina,” cited, 24, 
 236. 
 
 Phillips, U. B., Georgia and 
 State Rights, cited, 148, 236. 
 
 Phillips, U. B., “The Southern 
 Whigs,” cited, 236. 
 
 Pickering, Timothy, asks Clay 
 to withdraw, 67. 
 
 Pittsburg Advocate, cited, 94; 
 on Harrison’s capacity, 1835, 
 139. 
 
 Pittsburg Democrat, cited, 95. 
 
 Pittsburg Gazette, on Harrison’s 
 ability, 138. 
 
 Pittsburg Manufacturer, cited, 
 
 / 95. 
 
 'Pleasants, J. H., 15, 45; re¬ 
 movals from office, 30; Fed¬ 
 eralists and nullification pro¬ 
 clamation, 75. 
 
 Plumer, William. 9. 
 
 Poinsett, Joel R., minister to 
 Mexico, 22. 
 
 Political Mirror, a Review of 
 Jacksonianism, cited, 177, 178, 
 232. 
 
 Porter, Peter B„ member Ad¬ 
 ams’ cabinet, 23. 
 
 Portland Advertiser, cited, 92; 
 urges nomination of either 
 Clay or Webster, 1838, 158, 
 159. 
 
 Postal service, under J. Mc¬ 
 Lean, 17, 132; involved in 
 Whig issues, 1836, 147. 
 
 Poulson’s American Daily Ad¬ 
 vertiser, cited, 79, 81, 95, 109, 
 145, 229. 
 
 Private Correspondence of 
 Henry Clay, (Calvin Colton, 
 ed.), cited, 8, 36, 50, 53, 54, 
 
252 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 55, 56. 60, 67, 68, 70, 76, 78, 
 84, 100, 108, 128, 129, 155, 158, 
 159, 230. 
 
 Private Correspondence of Dan¬ 
 iel Webster (Fletcher Web¬ 
 ster, ed.), cited, 10, 11, 12, 29, 
 36, 45, 56, 89. 
 
 Proceedings of the Democratic 
 Whig convention, 1839, cited, 
 232. 
 
 Public lands, 213 n., 227; Cal¬ 
 houn and, 54; J. Q. Adams 
 and, 213. 
 
 Public opinion, Clay’s nomina¬ 
 tion, 1832, 39. 
 
 Quarterly Journal of Eco¬ 
 nomics, cited, 25, 230. 
 
 Radicalism, danger from union 
 of Democrats and Loco-Focos, 
 198; and New York Evening 
 Post, 200, 204; Van Buren’s 
 “Anti-Republican tendencies 
 of associated wealth,” 201; 
 article in Democratic Review, 
 201; Democratic efforts to 
 make judiciary elective, 202; 
 Orestes A. Brownson and 
 Boston Quarterly Review, 202, 
 203; Calvin Colton on Amer¬ 
 ican radicalism, 206; Brown- 
 son’s doctrines of class war¬ 
 fare, 210. 
 
 Rammelkamp, C. H., “Election 
 of 1824 in New York,” cited, 
 236. 
 
 Reed, John, J. Q. Adams and 
 the Federalists, 9. 
 
 Removal of deposits, 119, 179, 
 223; Biddle and Webster’s in¬ 
 fluence with Jackson, 1833, 
 82-89; results of removal, 
 98-100, 224. 
 
 Rhode Island, National Repub¬ 
 licans and Anti-Masons, 1832, 
 53; Harrison’s strength in 
 election of 1836, 149; supports 
 Clay at Harrisburg conven¬ 
 tion, 1839, 162. 
 
 Rhode Island Republican, 50 n. 
 
 Richards, B. W., 66; McLean’s 
 political adviser, 42; advises 
 McLean to try for vice-presi¬ 
 dency with Jackson, 42. 
 
 Richmond, Van Buren in, 1829, 
 63 n. 
 
 Richmond Enquirer, 18. 
 
 Richmond Whig, 15, 30. 
 
 Roseboom, Eugene, “Ohio in 
 the Presidential Election of 
 1824,” cited, 8, 236. 
 
 Rotation in office, 177, 178. 
 
 Rush, Mrs. Richard, Washing¬ 
 ton society under Jackson, 
 29 n. 
 
 Rush, Richard, vice-presidency 
 in 1824, 10; McLean’s Anti- 
 Masonic friends, 42; consid¬ 
 ered by Anti-Masons for 
 presidency, 50. 
 
 Salem Gazette, realignment of 
 parties, 1833, 80, 81. 
 
 Sargeant, John, Clay, Calhoun 
 and the Bank, 83 n. 
 
 Sargent, Nathan, chief issue, 
 1840, 169. 
 
 Sargent, Nathan, Public Men 
 and Events, cited, 82, 123, 
 169, 214, 231. 
 
 Savannah, cashier of branch 
 bank, 61. 
 
 Schouler, William, 227; change 
 in policy of Boston Atlas, 
 1838, 152, 153, 155. 
 
 Schouler, William, History of 
 the United States, cited, 238. 
 
 Schurz, Carl, Life of Henry 
 Clay, cited, 167, 234. 
 
 Scisco, L. L., Political Nativism 
 in New York, cited, 196, 236. 
 
 Scott, Winfield, 153. 
 
 Senate, declaration by National 
 Republican Young Men’s Con¬ 
 vention, 1832, 58; and Bank 
 issue, 62, 63; election of Sen¬ 
 ate committees, 1833, 101-108, 
 110; Democratic attack as 
 issue, 1836, 147; safeguard 
 against irresponsible execu¬ 
 tive, 181. 
 
INDEX 
 
 253 
 
 Separation of powers, National 
 Republican Young Men’s Con¬ 
 vention, 1832, 58. 
 
 Seward, W. H., Autobiography, 
 cited, 30, 31, 126, 190, 192, 
 231. 
 
 Seward, W. H., results of Jack¬ 
 son’s election, 29, 30; nomina¬ 
 tion for governor of New 
 York, 1834, 126; elected, 
 
 1838, 152; people for Van 
 Buren, 189, 190; hard times 
 favors Whig party, 192. 
 
 Shepard, Charles, abolitionists 
 and Van Buren, 176 n. 
 
 Shepard, E. M., Martin Van 
 Buren, cited, 234. 
 
 Smith, T. C., Parties and Slav¬ 
 ery, cited, 238. 
 
 South, 53, 116; National Re¬ 
 publicans in 1828, 24; and J. 
 McLean’s candidacy, 1830, 43; 
 Clay’s strength, 1832, 55; 
 
 sectional unity, 55; southern 
 compromise tariff, 1833, 84; 
 southern rights, 116; White 
 and southern Whigs, 1836, 
 127, 128, 145; solid South 
 back of Clay, 1839, 162; Har¬ 
 rison, 163; attitude of south¬ 
 ern Whigs, 1840, 165; Tyler 
 and dissatisfied Democratic 
 vote, 165; southern Whigs in 
 Congress and gag resolutions, 
 175, 175 n., 176 n.; conserva¬ 
 tism of southern Whigs, 190, 
 191. 
 
 South Carolina, Calhoun’s in¬ 
 fluence, 53, 55; Bank shares, 
 63 n.; nullification movement, 
 69, 73, 75; origin of name 
 Whig, 123; gives electoral 
 votes to W. P. Mangum, 1836, 
 148. 
 
 Speech of Richard Fletcher, 
 1837, cited, 184, 232. 
 
 Spencer, Ambrose, on Jackson’s 
 reelection, 74; on New York 
 state election of 1837, 151. 
 
 Spoils system, 16, 20. 
 
 Sprague, Joseph, Harrisburg 
 convention, 1839, 162. 
 
 Sprague, Peleg, election of Sen¬ 
 ate committees, 1833, 102, 104. 
 
 “Spy in Washington,” see Mat¬ 
 thew L. Davis; 74, 74 n., 77 
 n., 79, 104. 
 
 Stan wood, Edward, History of 
 Presidential Elections, cited, 
 237. 
 
 Star Spangled Banner, 123. 
 
 123. 
 
 Stevens, Thaddeus, 227; Demo¬ 
 cratic support for McLean in 
 Pennsylvania, 1834, 131; and 
 Anti-Masonic party, 1835, 136. 
 
 Stewart, Andrew, effect of Ken¬ 
 tucky election on Clay, 1831, 
 43, 44. 
 
 Stone, W. L., editor of New 
 York Commercial Advertiser, 
 38 n. 
 
 Streeter, F. A., Political Parties 
 in Michigan, cited, 237. 
 
 Sub-treasury, Calhoun’s return 
 to Democratic party, 1838, 
 152. 
 
 Supreme Court, National Re¬ 
 publican Young Men’s Con¬ 
 vention, 1832, 58. 
 
 Syracuse, 124. 
 
 Tappan, Senator, 202. 
 
 Tariff, and internal improve¬ 
 ments, 24, 25; Clay, 1831, 54, 
 68; an issue in campaign of 
 1832, 56; “adequate tariff,” 
 32, 58, 68; Clay and Calhoun, 
 
 1832, 64; Clay’s compromise, 
 
 1833, 64, 172, 223; Webster 
 on, 70; Webster’s resolutions, 
 79; Webster and Clay, 84; 
 Washington Globe on, 1833, 
 97; sectional divisions on, 174. 
 
 Taylor, J. W.. 31 n„ 32. 
 
 Tennessee, 102, 103, 105 n. 
 
 The New Yorker, cited, 135 n. 
 
 Thompson, C. M., Illinois 
 Whigs before 1846, cited, 237. 
 
254 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 Tocqueville, Alexis de, Democ¬ 
 racy in America, cited, 171, 
 207, 213. 
 
 Tocqueville, Alexis de, on 
 American political parties, 71, 
 207. 
 
 “Torrence Papers,” (Isaac J. 
 Cox, ed.), cited, 46 n., 132, 
 230. 
 
 Tory party, in England, 208. 
 
 Tracy, Albert H., 132, Anti- 
 Masonic support of McLean, 
 50, 51; Clay’s prospects, 1832, 
 51; McLean as only hope of 
 union in, 1836, 131; Webster 
 and union issue, 134, 135. 
 
 Trade union movement, 211, 216. 
 
 Trimble, William, “Diverging 
 Tendencies in the New York 
 Democracy,” cited, 197, 237. 
 
 Troy. 124. 
 
 Truth’s Advocate and Monthly 
 Anti-Jackson Expositor, cited, 
 27, 232. 
 
 Turner, F. J., Rise of the New 
 West, cited, 7, 17. 
 
 Tyler, L. G., Letters and Times 
 of the Tylers, cited, 75, 167, 
 234. 
 
 Tyler, John, Whig nomination 
 for vice-presidency, 1839, 
 165. 
 
 United States Magazine and 
 Democratic Review, cited, 
 201, 202, 204, 232. 
 
 United States Telegraph, cited, 
 45, 93, 94, 113; on cooperation 
 between Webster and Jackson, 
 96-98. 
 
 Van Buren, Martin, 93, 126, 127, 
 132, 148, 149, 183; forces Cal¬ 
 houn out of Democratic party, 
 53; and Bank issue, 62, 63 n.; 
 distrust of Webster’s in¬ 
 tegrity, 72 n.; liking for Clay, 
 72 n.; relations between Jack- 
 son and Webster, 72 n.; opin¬ 
 ion of Webster’s and Jack¬ 
 son’s position on nullification, 
 78 n.; Clay and Calhoun and 
 
 his attitude towards Bank, 83 
 n.; estimate of E. Livingston, 
 87 n.; advises Jackson not to 
 accept Webster’s aid, 1833, 
 105; influence in Pennsyl¬ 
 vania, 111; his election in 
 1836, 148; union between 
 
 sword and purse, 168; finan¬ 
 cial policy, 168 n.; lacks Jack¬ 
 son’s popularity, 169; normal 
 Democratic majority, 171; 
 recommends divorce between 
 government and pet banks, 
 197; danger in union with 
 Loco-Focos, 199; presidential 
 message of 1838, 201; scope 
 of federal powers, 214. 
 
 Van Buren MSS., cited, 77 n., 
 94, 103, 105, 134, 136 n„ 228. 
 
 Van Tyne, C. H., Webster 
 Transcripts, cited, 4, 112, 113, 
 119, 156, 214, 229. 
 
 Vermont, National Republicans 
 and Anti-Masons in election 
 of 1832, 52; Anti-Masonic 
 party in 1835, 136; carried by 
 Harrison, 1836, 148; Bank 
 issue and Governor Palmer, 
 166 n. 
 
 Verplanck bill, 77; Webster’s 
 opposition, 78. 
 
 Von Raumer, Frederick, Amer¬ 
 ica and the American People, 
 cited, 207, 210. 234. 
 
 Von Raumer, Frederick, char¬ 
 acter of Whig party, 209, 210. 
 
 Walsh, Robert, attitude toward 
 J. Q. Adams, 20, 21, 23. 
 
 War Department, 28. 
 
 Ward, H. D., Whig interest in 
 Anti-Masonic votes, 136 n. 
 
 Warfield, H. R., 10. 
 
 Washington Globe, cited, 45, 99, 
 130. 185, 229; administration 
 and the tariff, 97. 
 
 Webb, Colonel J. W„ 123. 
 
 Webster, Daniel, 92, 119, 128, 
 142. 159, 164, 169; relations 
 with Adams in 1824, 8-11; on 
 patronage, 12; congressional 
 
INDEX 
 
 255 
 
 caucus, 1831, 32; party policy 
 after 1828, 36; Bank question, 
 62; and Clay in campaign of 
 1832, 68, 69; anticipates at¬ 
 tack on tariff, 1831, 70; urges 
 Clay to reenter Senate, 1831, 
 70; political position after 
 
 1832, 70; and Jackson, 72, 78, 
 
 95, 96, 110, 223, 224; speech 
 on proclamation, 1832, 73; on 
 Jackson’s tariff policy, 1833, 
 77, 78; tariff resolutions, 1833, 
 79; cabinet office under Jack- 
 son, 1833, 81, 86, 87; relations 
 with Clay, 1833, 81, 82, 100, 
 101; suggests conference with 
 E. Livingston, 1833, 85; 
 
 Western tour, 1833, 89, 93- 
 95; effect of Jackson’s New 
 England tour, 1833, 92; “cor¬ 
 rupt hireling of the Bank,” 
 93; result of removal of de¬ 
 posits, 98; Senate committee 
 on finance, 1833, 101; Demo¬ 
 cratic conference on cooper¬ 
 ation with him, 1833, 105; re¬ 
 turns to opposition, 1833, 106; 
 suggests consideration by 
 Congress of removal of de¬ 
 posits, 108; Bank leader in 
 Senate, 109 n.; applies for re¬ 
 newal of retainer’s fee, 1833, 
 109 n.; acknowledges Biddle’s 
 sermon, 1833, 110; dislikes 
 Clay’s censure of President, 
 
 1833, 111; dissatisfied Penn¬ 
 sylvania Democrats, 112; 
 friendly attitude of Demo¬ 
 cratic press, 113: value as ally 
 of Democratic party, 1833, 
 114; Speech on President’s 
 Protest, 115; reasons for 
 break with Jackson, 1833, 115- 
 117; differences with Clay, 
 117; fails to form nationalist 
 party, 118, 173; New York 
 City charter election, 122; 
 candidate of New England 
 Whigs, 1836, 127, 145; cam¬ 
 paign of 1836, 134-138; nomi¬ 
 
 nated by Massachusetts legis¬ 
 lature, 1835, 135; negotiations 
 with Anti-Masons, 1835, 135- 
 
 136, 225; lack of contacts with 
 people, 138; Boston Atlas 
 goes over to Harrison, 1838, 
 152-154; his part in shift, 
 154-156; relations with Clay, 
 
 1838, 155; withdraws name, 
 
 1839, 155, 156; cooperation of 
 his friends and Harrison’s at 
 Harrisburg, 1839, 162; presi¬ 
 dent as representative of peo¬ 
 ple, 180. 
 
 Webster, H. J., “History of the 
 Democratic Party Organiza¬ 
 tion in the Northwest, 1824- 
 
 1840, ” cited, 237. 
 
 Webster Letters (C. H. Van 
 Tyne ed.), cited, 21, 68, 69, 
 78, 84, 92, 135, 136, 230. 
 
 Webster MSS., cited, 14, 15, 20, 
 25, 36, 38, 105, 111, 120, 136, 
 
 137, 140, 141, 151, 229. 
 
 Webster, Noah, 3 n. 
 
 Weed, Thurlow, 227; J. Q. Ad¬ 
 ams as politician, 13; on Bank 
 issue after 1832, 165, 166; 
 definition of a Whig, 1839, 
 173; hates Democrats, 177; 
 inadequacy of old leaders and 
 old issues of Whig party, 219, 
 220 . 
 
 Wellington, Duke of, 208. 
 
 Wells, Charles, chairman of 
 Faneuil Hall meeting on nul¬ 
 lification, 73 n. 
 
 West, National Republicans in, 
 1828, 24, 25; reception of 
 Webster, 1833. 92: Harrison 
 and Clay in campaign of 1836, 
 128; Harrison in campaign of 
 1840, 163, 164; character of 
 western Whigs, 190; and pub¬ 
 lic lands, 213 n. 
 
 Western Reserve Chronicle, 
 cited, 74. 
 
 Western Times, party policy 
 after election of 1828, 37. 
 
256 
 
 ORIGINS OF THE WHIG PARTY 
 
 Wheeler, H. G., History of 
 Congress, etc., cited, 56, 237. 
 
 Whig Almanac, cited, 172, 233. 
 
 Whig party, 1, 2, 132, 171; ori¬ 
 gins of divisions within, 117; 
 favorable prospects, 1834,118; 
 effect of economic depression, 
 
 1834, 119, 224; New York 
 City charter election, 1834, 
 121, 122; origin of name, 123, 
 124, 224; local elections, 1834, 
 124, 224; divided leadership in 
 New York, 1834, 126; losses 
 in state elections, 1834, 126, 
 127; sectional divergencies, 
 127, 128.; plan to force elec¬ 
 tion into House, 1836, 133; 
 failure to agree on one candi¬ 
 date in 1836, 144. 145, 224, 
 225 ; National Intelligencer on 
 situation of Whig party, 1835, 
 144. 145; direct “primary,” 
 
 1835, 145; identical electoral 
 lists, 1835, 145; Biddle’s ad¬ 
 vice, 1835, 146; position in 
 1835, 1836, 147, 148; campaign 
 issues in 1836, 147; loyalty to 
 old leaders, 149, 225; political 
 results of crisis of 1837, 149; 
 New York City charter elec¬ 
 tion, 1837, 150; New York 
 state election, 1837, 150, 151; 
 improved economic conditions 
 and results, 1838, 151, 152, 
 225; Calhoun returns to 
 Democratic party, 1838, 152; 
 uncertain future, 152; demo¬ 
 cratic and aristocratic wings 
 of, 154; Harrison’s follow¬ 
 ing, 1838, 156; opposition to 
 national convention, 1838, 157, 
 158; convention desired by 
 Clay and Webster factions, 
 158; opposition to Harrison as 
 Whig candidate, 158, 159; 
 Harrisburg convention, 1839, 
 161-163; abandons old lead¬ 
 ers, 163, 169; experience of 
 National Republican party, 
 163; effect of Harrison’s 
 
 nomination on party unity, 
 164, 165; attitude of southern 
 Whigs, 165; Bank issue in 
 campaign of 1840, 165-167; 
 issues in 1840,168, l69j copies 
 Democratic methods, 169,170; 
 Albany Journal on character 
 of party, 1839, 170; lack of 
 principles, 171; as coalition, 
 171, 172; differences on main 
 issues, 172, 173; attitude to¬ 
 wards American System, 173; 
 Weed’s definition of a Whig, 
 1839, 173; lack of party loy¬ 
 alty, 173, 174; sectional di¬ 
 vision on tariff, 174; slavery 
 issue, 174-176; influences to¬ 
 wards union, 177 ff.; opposi¬ 
 tion to extension of executive 
 powers, 177, 187; inconsist¬ 
 ences in opposing presidential 
 power, 179, 180; congressional 
 government, 183-187; con¬ 
 servative point of view, 187 
 ff., 210, 211, 226; character of 
 Massachusetts Whigs, 188; 
 Seward on character of Whig 
 party, 189, 190; western 
 
 Whigs, JSOf property inter¬ 
 ests, 191; hard times best 
 argument, 192; charitable ac¬ 
 tivities, 200; foreign travellers 
 on party differences, 206-208; 
 nationalist policies, 212-215, 
 227; results of acknowledging 
 conservatism, 215; new lead¬ 
 ers, 218, 219; effect of Harri¬ 
 son’s nomination, 220, 226; 
 old leaders and issues set 
 aside, 221. 
 
 White, C. P., agrees to inform 
 Jackson of Webster’s views, 
 1833, 87. 
 
 White, Hugh L., election of 
 Senate committees, 1833, 102 ; 
 Jackson’s confidence in his 
 party loyalty, 1833, 103; can¬ 
 didate of southern Whigs, 1836. 
 127, 128, 146; carries Georgia 
 and Tennessee, 1836, 148. 
 
INDEX 
 
 257 
 
 White, Stephen, Webster’s posi¬ 
 tion, 1832, 69; acts as chair¬ 
 man to welcome Jackson in 
 Boston, 1833, 90, 91; effect of 
 Jackson’s removal of deposits 
 on better class of Democrats, 
 1833, 112. 
 
 Whittlesey, Elisha, J. McLean 
 and the moderates, 41; Mc¬ 
 Lean and Calhoun, 1830, 46; 
 McLean and Clay, 1830, 47, 
 48; bargain between Clay and 
 Calhoun, 64; Clay and com¬ 
 promise tariff, 1833, 129; 
 
 Democratic support of Mc¬ 
 Lean, 1833, 131; warns Mc¬ 
 Lean of attitude of Demo¬ 
 cratic leaders, 1834, 132; fail¬ 
 ure of National Republican 
 political methods, 140; Whig 
 candidate must divide Demo¬ 
 cratic party in campaign of 
 1836, 141. 
 
 Wilkins, William, 107. 
 
 Winsor, Justin, Memorial His¬ 
 tory of Boston, cited, 79 n., 
 231. 
 
 Wirt, William, MSS., cited, 229. 
 
 Wirt, William, nominated by 
 Anti-Masons, 51; readiness to 
 withdraw, 51; campaign of 
 1832, 67. 
 
 Wise, Henry A., Clay’s pledges 
 to gain Judge White’s support, 
 160 n. 
 
 Wise, Henry A., Seven Decades 
 of the Union, cited, 160 n., 
 231. 
 
 Woodburn, J. A., Political 
 Parties and Party Problems, 
 cited, 238. 
 
 Works of James Buchanan (J. 
 B. Moore, ed.), cited, 190 n., 
 230. 
 
 Works of Daniel Webster, cited, 
 233. 
 
 Wright, Fanny, 197, 197 n., 210. 
 
 Wright, Silas, criticizes Adams’ 
 disposal of patronage, 22; 
 “poor against the rich,” 199. 
 
 Writings and Speeches of Dan¬ 
 iel Webster (National Edi¬ 
 tion), cited, 11, 68, 84 n., 137, 
 138, 156, 180, 230. 
 
 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 
 (P. L. Ford, ed.), cited, 3, 
 230. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 The following maps showing the relative strength of 
 parties in the presidential elections of 1832, 1836, and 
 1840 require explanation in regard to apparent omissions 
 as well as to their significance. Although based upon 
 county returns, county lines have not been shown within 
 areas of the same political complection. Important omis¬ 
 sions appear in the map for the election of 1832 in the 
 southern states as a result of the absence of data. In 
 South Carolina the presidential electors were chosen then 
 as well as in the two later elections by the state legislature. 
 They were elected in Georgia on a state-wide ticket, but 
 the returns indicate a majority for the Jackson electors 
 of sixty to seventy-five percent. Although the vote was 
 taken by counties in Alabama and Missouri, the relative 
 unimportance of the vote in these States and their situ¬ 
 ation on the frontier explain in part the failure of con¬ 
 temporary statisticians to record their returns. The total 
 vote in Alabama was said to be approximately twenty 
 thousand, and of these the Jackson ticket was credited 
 with a majority of sixty to seventy-five percent. 1 The 
 counties in Missouri which reported numerical majorities 
 with few exceptions gave a large Democratic vote. 2 In 
 Vermont and Massachusetts the Anti-Masons ran their 
 own lists of presidential electors, but their vote has been 
 combined with that of the National Republicans as being 
 in the main sympathetic with their political aims. 
 
 A comparison of the maps for 1832 and 1836 demon¬ 
 strates, more clearly for the northern than for the south¬ 
 ern states, the succession of the Whig from the National 
 Republican party. Approval of Jackson’s policies was 
 
 ’Matthias, Benjamin, The Politician’s Register (Philadelphia, 
 1835), pp. 76ff. 
 
 1 St. Louis Republican, November 20, 1832. 
 
260 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 too pronounced in the South for the development of 
 effective National Republican strength in the election of 
 1832, except for restricted areas in Maryland, Kentucky, 
 and Louisiana. Virginia and North Carolina approved 
 his Bank policy, and the same consideration combined 
 with native-son sentiment gave to the President the over¬ 
 whelming support of all sections of Tennessee. His 
 Indian policy, yielding as it did to the constant demand 
 of the frontiersmen for more land, explains in large part 
 the absence of material National Republican strength in 
 Georgia and Alabama. In Louisiana, however, that party 
 was able to make a more creditable showing in the “sugar 
 bowl’’ where economic interest was an effective argument 
 on behalf of the protective tariff. In general, therefore, 
 and with this exception, the distinctive interests of the 
 regions of the large plantations, which led them (as Pro¬ 
 fessor Cole has shown) to the support of the Whig party 
 in later elections, did not induce them to vote for Clay in 
 the election of 1832. 
 
 In New England especially, the National Republican 
 and the Whig parties were most successful in the more 
 developed and prosperous areas. The co-incidence of 
 majorities for these parties in western New York and the 
 then far West with the location of settlements of New 
 Englanders 3 suggests a disposition on their part to carry 
 their politics with them into the new country. Not only 
 western New York, but the Western Reserve, the Mari¬ 
 etta country on the Ohio river, and those parts of Indiana 
 and Illinois which had been largely settled from this 
 source voted heavily for the National Republican and 
 Whig candidates. Local issues, however, were probably 
 contributing causes. It is to be noted also in explanation 
 of these maps that the Anti-Masons as a rule went into 
 the Whig party, but in Massachusetts, as indicated by the 
 increased Democratic vote in the election of 1836, there 
 was a temporary drift into the enemy’s camp. By 1840 
 this uncomfortable alliance seems to have been dissolved. 
 
 3 Matthews, Lois K., The Expansion of New England (Boston, 
 1919), pp. 168, 169. 
 
PRESIDENTIAL 
 
 election rrr ia32 
 National Republican majority 
 
 B 50-60% of total vote 
 60-75%of total vote 
 
 T° 
 
 over 75% oF total Vote 
 Democratic majority 
 -60°/b of total Vote 
 -75' to of total vote 
 % of total vote 
 
PRESIDENTIAL 
 ELECTION OF 1836 
 
 Whicj majority 
 50 "60% of total vote 
 60"75%of total vote 
 o\7er 75% of total Vote 
 Democratic majority 
 -60% of total Vote 
 
 gg 60-75% of total vote 
 HH over75% of total vote 
 
PRESIDENTIAL 
 ELECTION OF 1840 
 
 Whiy majority 
 
 U 50"60% of total vote ^ 
 60“75%of total vote 
 
 |] over 75% of total Vote 
 Democratic majority 
 50“60%of total Vote 
 60-75% of total vote 
 oVer75% of total vote