DUKE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2017 with funding from Duke University Libraries https://archive.org/details/bismarckgermanun01smit BISMARCK AND GERMAN UNITY BISMARCK AND GERMAN UNITY A HISTORICAL OUTLINE BY MUNROE SMITH Doctor of Laws of Gottingen University Professor of Roman Law and Comparative Jurisprudence in Columbia University Neto gavk PUBLISHED FOR THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY LONDON: MACMILLAN & CO., Ltd. 1898 All rights reserved Copyright, 1898 By THE EVENING POST PUBLISHING COMPANY Copyright, 1898 By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY Nortoooti J. S. Cushion & Co. — Berwick & Smith Norwood Mass. U.S.A. PREFACE This sketch of Prince Bismarck’s work was published, immediately after his death, in the New York Evening Post and (in part) in The Nation. It is reprinted with little change and with few additions. It would have been easy to expand the sketch into a portly volume, — easier, in¬ deed, than it was originally to keep it within its present limits, — but it is be¬ lieved that such a summary as is here offered will be useful to those who are too busy to read many thick books, and to those who wish a more sharply outlined impression than is readily obtained from a mass of details. It will be most useful, however, if it awakens in some readers the interest in a great career which the writer has felt for a quarter of a century, and if it sets them to reading other and fuller histories. MUNROE SMITH Columbia University, September 6, 1898 v 5^9300 ttVBB Jirtfiplace. Paternal ncf aternal ancestry. Social position. Education. Life in the country. Entry into public life, 1847.| 1-4 lerman politics, 1815-48. Revolution of 1848. Pop.-) ular unity movement. Frankfort Parliament. Aus¬ tria or Prussia? Leadership offered to Prussia. Prussian refusal. Princely movement for unity, 1849-50. Erfurt Parliament. Olmiitz . . 4-11 Bismarck’s Toryism. Attitude toward the'unity move- .* ments. Envoy at Frankfort. Change of views* The Frankfort correspondence. Hostility; to Ausw tria. A German policy. Ambassador to Russia ij-18 Tlliam I. Reform of the army. Opposition of the | Diet. Bismarck ambassador to France. Bismarck minister-president, 1862. William’s distrust of Bis-* • marck. Bismarck’s management of William . ip-21 % parliamentary conflict. Foreign policy, 1862-66. Aus¬ tria. Russia. France.qji-24 the Schleswig-Holstein question. Revolt of the duchies, 1848. London conference. London prof | tocol, 1852. Danish aggression, 1863. Death of the Danish king. Dispute over the succession . 34-28 P of courses in 1863. The populaf The unpopular course. Bismarck’s de-» russia’s choice ? course. _ __ _ _ _ J cision. War with Denmark, 1864. Condominium in Schleswig-Holstein. How Austria’s play was 1 . - . ... - , , - * 5-34 59S3C0 CONTENTS viii PAGES Strained relations with Austria. Convention of Gas- tein, 1865. New dissensions. The German ques¬ tion. The war with Austria, 1866. Sadowa. Peace of Prague. Napoleon’s interference. Prussian annexations. The North German confederation. Character of the new union .... 34-40 Bismarck’s unpopularity, 1862-66. Attempt on his life. Reversal of sentiment. Bill of indemnity. Shifting of party lines.40-42 Strained relations with France. Compensation de¬ manded. Evidence of French demands secured. Use made of the evidence .... 43-46 Genesis of the Franco-German war. The Luxem¬ burg incident, 1867. Coalition against Germany. The Spanish candidacy, 1870. Bismarck’s part in the affair. His motives. Leopold’s acceptance. French demands. William’s attitude. Leopold’s withdrawal. New French demands. France dis¬ posed to retreat. Bismarck intervenes. “ Edit¬ ing” the Ems despatch. Effect of Bismarck’s action.47-57 French expectations. Attitude of South Germany. German victories. Peace of Frankfort. The Ger¬ man empire.57—61 The German parliament, 1871-90. The Centrists. The “culture conflict.” The May laws, 1873. Close of the conflict, 1887. The uses of adversity. Second attempt on Bismarck’s life. The Social Democrats. Repressive legislation. Reform leg¬ islation . .61-68 The German army. The septennate. German finances. Project of a tobacco monopoly. De¬ feat of the project. A protective tariff, 1879. A colonial policy. The Berlin conference, 1884-85. General results ....... 68-76 CONTENTS IX PAGES Foreign relations of the empire, 1871-90. France. Russia. German-Austrian alliance, 1879. The triple alliance, 1882. Secret treaty with Russia, 1884.76-80 Bismarck and the old emperor. Frederick III. Wil¬ liam II. Ministerial vs. imperial responsibility. The ordinance of 1852. The Windthorst interview. Bismarck’s enforced resignation . . . 80-85 The quarrel with the emperor. A formal reconcil¬ iation. Bismarck’s eightieth birthday. Death. Honors.86-90 Personal characteristics. Speeches. Writings. Qual¬ ities as a statesman. Political methods . . 90-94 Family.94-95 Bismarck literature.95-99 From the beginning of my career I have had but the one guiding star: By what means and in what way can I bring Germany to unity ? and in so far as this end has been attained: How can I strengthen this unity and increase it and give it such form that it shall be enduringly maintained with the free consent of all coopera¬ ting forces ? — Bismarck in the German Im¬ perial Diet, July 9, 1879 , BISMARCK AND GERMAN UNITY Otto Edward Leopold von Bismarck was born at Schonhausen in the Old Mark of Brandenburg, province of Sax¬ ony, kingdom of Prussia, April i, 1815. He came of a line of country gentle¬ men, whose main business was always the care of their estates in the Mark and in Pomerania, but who incidentally, like most Brandenburg gentlemen, served their princes in war and sometimes as diplomatists or administrative officials. The record of the family runs back to the thirteenth century, and the estate of Schonhausen has been in its posses¬ sion for more than three hundred years. On the mother’s side Bismarck came of plainer people, but among these also were servants of the state. His maternal B I Birthplace Paternal ancestry Maternal ancestry 2 BISMARCK Social position Education grandfather, Menken, was a Prussian government clerk who rose under Fred¬ erick William III to the rank of a cabinet councillor and became a trusted assistant of the great Baron Stein. The country gentlemen of Prussia held, in Bismarck’s youth, a position not unlike that of the landed gentry of Eng¬ land. They were the governing class and managed the affairs of their districts; and the country squire who developed an exceptional talent for administration passed easily and naturally from the gov¬ ernment of his neighborhood to the ad¬ ministration of the province or of the kingdom. By way of preparation for these duties and possibilities, the future landholder sometimes studied law and even entered the judicial or administra¬ tive service of the state, without neces¬ sarily intending to become either an advocate or a professional official. In accordance with this excellent usage, the young Bismarck, at the age of seventeen, was matriculated in the law faculty at BISMARCK 3 Gottingen and spent three semesters as a student in that university — but, if Gottingen traditions are to be trusted, can not be said to have studied there. At Berlin, however, where he completed his law course, he must have studied; for he passed the state examination with credit and entered the state service. After one year’s work as assistant (Aus- cultator ) in the city court of Berlin and nearly three years’ administrative service as Referendar at Aix-la-Chapelle and Pots¬ dam, he resigned his position and, at the age of twenty-four, assumed with his brother Bernhard the care of his father’s Pomeranian estates. For eight years the future chancellor of the Ger¬ man empire devoted himself to sheep¬ raising and grain-growing, relieving the monotony of his life by hard riding and occasional hard drinking, but also by hard reading and travel. In 1845 he was elected a member of the Pomeranian Diet. The death of his father, in the same year, gave him the ancestral seat Life in the country 1839-47 4 BISMARCK Entry into public life German poli¬ tics, 1815-48 of Schonhausen and carried him from Pomerania to the Mark. Here he ob¬ tained his first administrative office, that of superintendent of dikes; and here also he was elected to the provincial Diet; and when, in 1847, King Frederick William IV attempted to solve the par¬ liamentary question by collecting the representatives of the eight provinces, Bis¬ marck went to Berlin as a member of the United Diet. He was only an alternate delegate; but the proper repre¬ sentative, as it chanced, fell ill, and Bis¬ marck’s political career was opened. It was an uneasy time in Prussia and in Germany when the United Diet came together, and it was soon to be a stormy time. The German people were domi¬ nated by two aspirations, popular sover¬ eignty and national unity. That these objects were not merely distinct but also, under the conditions then existing, in¬ compatible, the people wholly failed to realize. The two ideas had gained their BISMARCK 5 hold upon the German mind in the same historic period — that of the first French revolution and the revolutionary- wars (1789-1815). The revolution had infected the Germans with the democratic fever, and the subjugation and humilia¬ tion of Germany by Napoleon had awak¬ ened a specific German patriotism and shown the necessity of national union. In the war of liberation (1813) the Ger¬ man governments, and notably the gov¬ ernment of Prussia, had appealed to both of these popular ideas. They had prom¬ ised the people liberty and unity. When the victory was won, when Napoleon was dethroned and France reduced to its pre-revolutionary boundaries, the German governments broke their pledges. Ger¬ many was organized, at the Congress of Vienna (1815), into a loose confederation of sovereign states; and in the majority of these states, including Prussia and Austria, the princes retained absolute power. The people naturally lost all faith in their rulers and began to look 6 BISMARCK Revolution of March, 1848 to a popular uprising and the establish¬ ment of popular sovereignty as the only means of national unification. This con¬ nection of ideas determined the creed of both parties. As the nationalists were nearly all Liberals, and to a great extent Democrats, so, by an inevitable antithesis, nearly all the Conservatives were particu- larists, identifying the maintenance of princely power with the system of state sovereignty and German disunity. All agitation in favor of national unity was punished as treason. The paralysis of princely government in 1848 gave the Liberals an unexpected opportunity to attempt the realization of their programme: unity through liberty. The Paris insurrection and the dethrone¬ ment of Louis Philippe kindled the flame of revolution throughout Germany; and everywhere, at first, the German revolu¬ tionists achieved complete success. All the German princes who had thus far retained absolute power gave or promised constitutions; and those who had already BISMARCK 7 given constitutions appointed Liberal ministers and promised Liberal reforms. Prussia and Austria succumbed to the popular movement as completely as the little states; and Austria, the bulwark of conservatism, was threatened with de¬ struction by simultaneous insurrections in Hungary and Italy. Constitutional liberty seemed assured, and the Liberal leaders had for the moment a free field for their attempt to secure national unity. A German parliament, elected by uni¬ versal suffrage, met at Frankfort and addressed itself to the task of framing a national constitution for a new German empire. It was characteristic of the doctrinaire spirit of the movement that the central and vital point of the whole question was the last to be considered. There were in Germany two great states, either of which was stronger than all the little states together; and the prime question was: Which of these two states, Prussia or Austria, shall have the hegemony in Popular unity movement Frankfort Parliament Austria or Prussia ? 8 BISMARCK Leadership offered to Prussia the new Germany? But as neither of these states would peacefully submit to the rule of the other, the question imme¬ diately restated itself: Which of these two states is to be excluded from the new Germany? The answer could not be doubtful. Prussia was the more mod¬ ern and progressive of the two states, and in the customs union it had brought all the German states except Austria into commercial unity. The Parliament finally excluded Austria from the empire, and offered the imperial crown to Frederick William IV of Prus¬ sia. But this result was not attained until the spring of 1849. In 1848, when all the petty princes were terrorized by the revolution and the Austrian empire was struggling for existence, the scheme might conceivably have been realized. In 1849 the reaction had begun: the princes had largely recovered their cour¬ age and reestablished their power, and Austria had fought through the worst of its embarrassments. In 1849, there- BISMARCK 9 fore, the offer of the imperial crown to Frederick William IV was simply an invitation to him to mobilize his army and fight for it. The success of such a venture was doubtful; and from the Conservative point of view the stake was not worth the risk. The Liberals in the Frankfort Parliament had gained the adhesion of the Democrats and secured a majority only by making the constitution of the new empire so demo¬ cratic that the emperor would have been a mere figurehead. Frederick William of Prussia accordingly refused the impe¬ rial crown, and the revolutionary experi¬ ment was at an end. The Liberal programme had failed, as in the nature of things it was bound to fail. No con¬ federation has ever been rebuilt into a nation without the cement of blood. For Prussia, however, the recognition of its necessary hegemony by the repre¬ sentatives of the German people had a certain moral value — a value all the greater because the recognition was Prussian refusal Princely movement, for unity 1849-50. 10 BISMARCK Erfurt Parliament Olmiitz tardy and reluctant The Prussian gov¬ ernment endeavored to utilize this ad¬ vantage in 1849 and 1850 by negotiations with the North German princes. A treaty of alliance was concluded with Saxony and Hanover for a “ restricted union ”; nearly all the lesser states accepted the proposal; and a second constituent Parliament met at Erfurt in the spring of 1850. But the adhesion of Saxony and Hanover was not even half¬ hearted ; there was no heart or sincerity in it. These states were simply tempo¬ rizing with Prussia. They were really averse to the proposed union and were engaged in simultaneous negotiations with Austria. For a brief space, in 1850, Prussia and Austria seemed likely to come to blows and the German ques¬ tion to a solution. But Russia threw its whole influence and threatened to throw its whole force on the side of Austria; and Prussia, in the convention of Olmiitz, November 29, 1850, yielded every point in dispute. The old confederation was BISMARCK 11 reestablished in all its old impotence, and the Federal Diet resumed its ses¬ sions at Frankfort. What was Bismarck’s position on all these questions? Towards the constitu¬ tional movement in Prussia his attitude was one of bitter and uncompromising hostility. In the United Diet of 1847-48 he figured as a Tory of the Tories. He was more royalist than the king, and opposed every diminution of the kingly prerogatives. When in the . spring of 1848 the king promised a constitution and the United Diet passed an address of thanks, Bismarck was one of the few who voted against the address. He accepted the situation, he declared, be¬ cause he could not help it; but he was not willing to close his activity in the Diet with the lying assertion that he was thankful for what he was obliged to regard as a mistake. When the king summoned a representative assembly to frame the promised constitution, Bis- Bismarck’s Toryism 12 BISMARCK Attitude toward the unity movements marck refused to stand for election. When the king dissolved this assembly, published a constitution of his own and ordered new elections, Bismarck accepted a mandate as deputy in the new Diet; but this he did only on the personal solici¬ tation of the king. Toward the popular unity movement his attitude was that of an unfriendly critic. He approved the king’s refusal of the imperial title offered by the Frank¬ fort Parliament, because the Frankfort constitution would make the emperor “ the vassal ” of the Radicals. “ The Frankfort crown,” Bismarck said, “ may be very brilliant; but the gold which gives truth to its brilliancy is to be got¬ ten by putting the Prussian crown into the melting pot.” Bismarck sat in the Erfurt Parliament, but he saw clearly the hopelessness of its attempts and occu¬ pied himself in throwing cold water upon the enthusiasts. During the Austro-Prussian disputes of 1850 he voted with the Austrophils in the Prussian BISMARCK 13 Diet, and defended the convention of Olmiitz. When the German confederation was reestablished, Frederick William IV sent Bismarck to the Frankfort Diet as the representative of Prussia. This appoint¬ ment elicited hostile comment. The Frankfort Diet was nothing but a stand¬ ing congress of ambassadors and the appointment of a man without diplomatic training was a breach of Prussian tradi¬ tions. Upon the Prussian representative at Frankfort, moreover, rested in large meas¬ ure the defence of Prussia’s German interests, and the appointment of a pro¬ nounced friend of Austria seemed likely to result in a sacrifice of these interests. Bismarck undoubtedly owed his appoint¬ ment to his legitimist, or rather absolutist, attitude in Prussian politics. His defence of the royal prerogative had won him the confidence of the king. His attitude towards Austria made his appointment particularly suitable. After Olmiitz, it Envoy at Frankfort 1851-59 14 BISMARCK Change of views would have been absurd for Prussia to send to Frankfort an ambassador who was not persona grata to Austria. Bismarck’s appointment was no error. His attitude towards Austria resulted in no sacrifice of Prussia’s interests. His support of Austria during his parliamen¬ tary career had been dictated by party feel¬ ing. The Conservatives rightly regarded Austria as the bulwark of conservatism, and Bismarck was a thorough Conserva¬ tive. At Frankfort, however, he ceased to be a Conservative and became simply a Prussian. He found the Austrian in¬ fluence in the ascendant and saw that this influence was constantly used to thwart Prussia’s plans and injure Prussia’s pros¬ pects. Before he had been in Frankfort a year, the adroitness and the persistence with which he countered the Austrian schemes made him persona ingrata at Vienna, and repeated efforts were made in the following years to secure his recall. For this period of Bismarck’s career we possess fuller data than for any other, BISMARCK 15 because the greater part of his Frankfort correspondence, including not merely offi¬ cial despatches but private letters to the Prussian prime minister, has been given to the public. These despatches and let¬ ters are of such literary excellence as to make them one of the monuments of clas¬ sical German prose; of such intrinsic value that no history of the period can be writ¬ ten without consulting them; and they show such breadth of view and keenness of insight as fully to explain the advance¬ ment of the writer to the highest posi¬ tion in the Prussian state. The business actually transacted in the Frankfort Diet was petty and unimportant to the last degree; but Frankfort was a central point of European intrigue, and the most vital questions of European politics were touched in Bismarck’s despatches. The king and his minister-president, Manteuffel, consulted their representa¬ tive at Frankfort upon all leading ques¬ tions of state policy; and his advice seems commonly to have been followed. The Frank¬ fort corre¬ spondence i6 BISMARCK This was notably the case during the Cri¬ mean war, when France, England and Austria sought to draw Prussia into an attitude of hostility to Russia, and Bis¬ marck convincingly maintained the ab¬ sence of any Prussian interest in the war and the impolicy of aiding Austria. Hostility to His Frankfort experiences had caused him to believe that, in the existing con¬ dition of European and German affairs, Austria was Prussia’s natural enemy. He wrote in 1856: In every century since the time of Charles V, German dualism has settled its relations by an inter¬ nal war, fought to the finish ; and in the present century also there will be no other way of setting the clock of our development at the right hour. . . . I desire to express my conviction that at no distant time we shall have to fight with Austria for our existence. And in 1859, just after the outbreak of the Italian war, he wrote that the em¬ barrassments of Austria gave Prussia an exceptional opportunity to readjust its relations to Germany; that these relations BISMARCK 17 amounted, for Prussia, to a disease; and that this disease, unless radically cured at some such favorable moment, would have to be treated, sooner or later, ferro et igni. Here is already the line of thought which led to the war of 1866 and the formation of the North German confederation; and here is also, in its first form, the famous phrase Eisen und Bint. In the following year, alluding to rumors of his own leanings toward a French alliance, he wrote to a friend: “ If I have sold myself, it is to a Teutonic and not to a Gallic devil”; and in an¬ other letter he declared that he could not see why Prussia should shrink so coyly from the idea of a representative German parliament. The letters last cited were written from St. Petersburg. Bismarck’s hostility to Austria had become so pronounced that the Prussian government, not yet pre¬ pared to accept his policy, had deemed it advisable to promote him out of Frank¬ fort and, as he himself expressed it, to A German policy Ambassador to Russia 1859-63 1 8 BISMARCK “put him on ice” on the Neva. Here he remained as Prussian ambassador for three years. William i During the latter part of Bismarck’s (l86l-88) term of service at Frankfort, King Fred¬ erick William IV had been attacked by a disease of the brain, and in 1858 his brother, Prince William, had assumed the regency. In 1861 Frederick William died, and the prince regent became king. Reform One of the chief causes of Prussia’s dis- earmy g race f u i su b m ission at Olmiitz was the imperfect condition of its army; and King William, a soldier before all things, was resolved upon a thorough reorgani- Opposition zation of “ the instrument.”j The plan of the Diet j nvo i ve( j a ser i ous increase of the budget, and this the Chamber of Deputies refused. Foreseeing an obstinate conflict, the king wavered for a time between two courses: abdication or the enforcement of the royal will in spite of the Deputies. If he chose the latter course, he needed as premier a man completely devoted to prerogative, BISMARCK 19 resolute in action and fearless of conse¬ quences ; and there was no man among his subjects who possessed these qualities in a higher degree than his ambassador at St. Petersburg. T he m inister of war, von Roon , whom the king liked and trusted above all his advisers and who was a friend of Bismarck, was persistent in urging Bismarck’s appointment. I Early in 1862 Bismarck was recalled from Rus¬ sia, apparently with a view to his becom¬ ing prime minister; but the king could not yet make up his mind and Bismarck was sent to Paris. fn the autumn of the same year von Roon telegraphed: “ The pear is ripe”; and Bismarck returned to Berlin and was a ppoi nted president of the Prussian mini Contemporary letters and memoirs pub¬ lished in the last few years have made it clear that at this time (1862) King Wil¬ liam neither liked Bismarck nor fully trusted him. The dislike was caused, in part, by Bismarck’s extreme frankness and frequent brusqueness of speech; the Bismarck ambassador to France Minister- president William's distrust of Bismarck 20 BISMARCK Bismarck's management of William distrust was not of Bismarck’s ability or loyalty but of his discretion. Under both sentiments lay, as Erich Marcks has shrewdly suggested, the natural an¬ tipathy which common sense feels toward genius. Bismarck was called to the premier¬ ship because he undertook to secure the reorganization of the army in spite of the Deputies, and because he convinced the king that this could be done with¬ out violating the constitution. It was not William’s intention to abandon the personal direction of Prussia’s general policy. In fact, however, it was Bis¬ marck’s will and not the king’s that determined Prussian action from 1862 to 1870 and German action from 1870 to 1888. This result was not reached without friction nor without occasional crises. William possessed too strong a character to accept, without resistance, plans that he only partially compre¬ hended and ventures of which he could not foresee the outcome. He was also. BISMARCK 21 with all his ambition, too conscientious a man to do what he thought wrong. Bismarck, however, had a remarkable power of lucid statement and of coercive reasoning; and when persuasion failed, he did not hesitate to break the king’s resistance by the irresistible logic of events. In many cases William doubt¬ less failed to see that the situation which constrained him had been deliberately created by his minister. There can be little question that in 1866 he as firmly believed Austria to be the aggressor as he believed France to be the aggressor in 1870. To Bismarck, William’s re¬ luctances were often troublesome; but they had for Prussia a value which Bis¬ marck did not fail to recognize: they minimized the impression of unscrupu¬ lousness which the minister’s policy was too apt to create. During the first four years of Bis¬ marck’s administration, Prussia’s internal politics were extremely simple although Parliamen¬ tary conflict 1862-66 22 BISMARCK Foreign policy 1862-66 very stormy. Each year the Deputies refused to vote the increased military appropriations. Each year the Diet was dissolved and new elections ordered. Each new election increased the anti- governmental majority. But the people, even when the agitation was hottest, con¬ tinued to pay their taxes; and the upper house, which was completely under the control of the government, voted the desired appropriations. The money was then spent by the government without authorization from the Deputies, and the army was reorganized according to the plans of the king and his minister of war. Prussia’s foreign policy during these years, on the other hand, seems very intricate and somewhat tortuous; and as far as the details are concerned it was necessarily so. Bismarck had assumed the direction of Prussia’s affairs with the intention of solving the German question by establishing the hegemony of Prussia. This could be done only after a sue- BISMARCK 23 cessful war with Austria. To assure Prussia’s triumph, Austria must remain isolated, and to that end Prussia must maintain cordial relations with France and Russia. So far, all was clear and simple; but the method by which these ends were to be attained could not be determined in advance: it depended ne¬ cessarily upon the course of events. Bis¬ marck had devoted his three years in St. Petersburg to cementing the friendly re¬ lations already existing between Russia and Prussia and had obtained assurance that Russia would not interfere again, as in 1850, in behalf of Austria.^} During his brief mission in France he seems to have convinced himself that Napoleon III would also remain neutral. As presi¬ dent of the ministry, one of his earliest acts was to conclude a liberal commercial treaty with France; and the insurrection of 1863 in Russian Poland enabled him to render useful aid to the Russian gov¬ ernment. The re-opening of the Schles¬ wig-Holstein question, in the same year, Austria Russia France 24 BISMARCK Schleswig- Holstein question touched Germany more nearly; and this question, as Bismarck handled it, led directly to the solution of the German problem. The Schleswig-Holstein question, al¬ though a complicated one, is not so unin¬ telligible as is commonly supposed. These two German duchies had long been united with Denmark; but they were not parts of Denmark, for the union was purely personal: it resulted from the fact that their dukes had become kings of Den¬ mark. The Danes naturally desired to make the union a real one. In the way of their ambition stood the facts that Holstein belonged to the German con¬ federation and that old treaties guaran¬ teed that Schleswig and Holstein should never be separated. Hence the incorpora¬ tion of Schleswig was impossible without the simultaneous incorporation of Hol¬ stein, and the incorporation of Holstein was impossible without the assent of Germany — an assent which the Danes could not BISMARCK 25 hope to obtain. This complicated state of things had already caused much trouble. In the revolutionary year of 1848 the Schles- wig-Holsteiners had risen against the Danes and attempted to establish their independence, and Germany had actively supported the movement. But when the German revolution was suppressed, the Schleswig-Holstein revolution shared its fate. The revolt of the duchies was re¬ garded by the Conservatives generally, and by the governments of Austria and Prussia in particular, simply as an insur¬ rection against constituted princely au¬ thority ; and both Prussia and Austria aided in the restoration of the duchies to their lawful sovereign. The whole question of their relation to Denmark, present and future, was discussed in London in 1852, and an attempt was made to settle it by a European treaty. It was then already foreseen that the union with Denmark, established by a dynastic accident, was likely to be severed in the same way. The main line of the ruling dynasty was Revolt of the duchies 1848 London conference 1852 26 BISMARCK London protocol 1852 dying out; and the succession to the Danish throne was certain to pass, sooner or later, to the Glucksburg branch of the family. But this branch derived title through the female line, and the suc¬ cession in Schleswig-Holstein was gov¬ erned by the Salic law. Schleswig- Holstein accordingly would pass, not to the Glucksburg, but to the younger Au- gustenbursr line. The London conference undertook to change all this. It decreed that Schleswig-Holstein should be per¬ manently associated with Denmark, and that the succession, both in Denmark and in the duchies, should be vested in the Glucksburg heirs. This treaty or protocol of May 8, 1852, was signed by Prussia and Austria as European powers; but it was not ratified by the German confederation nor in any way accepted by the Schleswig-Holsteiners. And the Prussian and Austrian ambas¬ sadors signed the London protocol only after, and in consideration of, a previous treaty with Denmark, by which that BISMARCK 2 7 kingdom bound itself to respect the autonomy of the Schleswig-Holsteiners and not to incorporate Schleswig. Such was the position of affairs when King Frederick VII of Denmark issued a decree (the patent of March 30, 1863) which separated Schleswig from Holstein and practically incorporated the former in the kingdom of Denmark. The German powers at once protested; and the Federal Diet, in October, ordered an “ execution ” in Holstein, i. e. voted to send troops there. On November 14 a new Danish parliament, representing Denmark and Schleswig, voted a new constitution incorporating Schleswig. On the following day Frederick VII died. His successor, Christian IX, signed the new constitution. Frederick’s death complicated the question of the special rights of Schleswig with the broader ques¬ tion of the succession in both duchies. By the London protocol Christian IX became duke of Schleswig-Holstein as well as king of Denmark. But the Danish aggression 1863 Death of the Danish king Dispute over the succession 28 BISMARCK Prussia's choice of courses in 1863 The popular course German confederation, as we have seen, had never agreed to this, nor had the Schleswig-Holsteiners. In their opinion Christian of Gllicksburg had no rights in the duchies; and when, in December, the federal execution was carried into effect by an army of 12,000 Saxons and Hanoverians, Frederick of Augustenburg was acclaimed as duke, and took up his residence at Kiel. To the Prussian government two courses were open. It could recognize the Lon¬ don protocol as still in force and compel Christian IX, as duke of Schleswig-Hol¬ stein, to observe the preliminary treaty which guaranteed Schleswig’s autonomy; or it could declare the London protocol abrogated, recognize Frederick of Augus¬ tenburg as duke and help him to gain possession of Schleswig. The public sen¬ timent of Prussia, as of the other German states, was strongly in favor of the latter course. By adopting it Bismarck would at once have become the popular leader BISMARCK 2 9 of a national movement, but he would have imperilled the real interests not only of Prussia but also of Germany. The revolutionary character of the popular programme and the violation of treaties which it required would have aroused the opposition of Europe. Prussia and the German patriots would have stood alone together, as in 1850; and, if successful against such odds, they would simply have added a new petty sovereignty to a Germany cursed already with over-many sovereignties. If, on the other hand, the Prussian government should accept the situation created by the treaties of 1852, it could indeed demand that Schleswig be not incorporated in Denmark, but if this point should be conceded, Prussia would be obliged to restore both duchies to their Danish ruler. This was what Austria desired and the German patriots dreaded. Bismarck, however, had satisfied himself that the party in power at Copen¬ hagen would accept war rather than give up the incorporation of Schleswig; and The unpopular course 30 BISMARCK Bismarck's decision war once declared, he foresaw that the prize of victory would be whatever the victor chose to make it. The Prussian cabinet accordingly announced that it recognized the treaties of 1852 as bind¬ ing, and that it demanded from Denmark nothing but the observance of those trea¬ ties — a declaration in which Austria gladly joined. The storm of protest which this action aroused in the Prussian Diet and throughout Germany was used by Bismarck to secure Austria’s support in decisive measures against Denmark, and to avert the intervention of the other European powers. “ If you do not sup¬ port the moderate measures which we deem necessary,” Bismarck said to Aus¬ tria,— “If you oppose the just and tem¬ perate course which we are pursuing,” he declared to the other powers, — “ my col¬ leagues and I will retire from the ministry. The king will then be forced to summon into power the leaders of the German revolutionary party.” For fear of worse things Austria went hand in hand with BISMARCK 31 Prussia, and Europe looked on inactive. The Danes, as Bismarck expected, re¬ fused to abrogate their new constitution, and war was declared. In February, 1864, an army of 60,000 Austrians and Prus¬ sians invaded Schleswig, and on April 18 the Prussians stormed the redoubts of Diippel. A week later representatives of the European powers met in London, agreed upon an armistice and endeavored to negotiate a treaty of peace. The nego¬ tiations were fruitless. The Danes still refused to reestablish the personal union and demanded the annexation of a por¬ tion at least of Schleswig. The war was renewed, the allies were victorious, and by the treaty of Vienna, October 30, 1864, Denmark ceded Schleswig-Holstein and the little duchy of Lauenburg to Prussia and Austria. This condominium or joint sovereignty of Prussia and Austria in the duchies was precisely what Bismarck desired. Believing that war with Austria was War with Denmark 1864 Condominium in Schleswig- Holstein 1864-66 32 BISMARCK How Aus¬ tria’s play was forced necessary for the solution of the German question, it seemed to him convenient to have a cause of war always ready; and such a relation as that now estab¬ lished in the duchies would necessarily be fruitful of causes for war. Further, when¬ ever the war should come, these duchies would be for Prussia an extremely desir¬ able addition to the stake in play. They represented a possible gain for Prussia, but no possible gain for Austria. Their posi¬ tion would make their annexation to Prussia both feasible and natural, while Austria could in no case dream of annexing them. From this point of view, Bismarck’s diplomacy was especially skilful, and the association of Austria in the enterprise was its most masterly feature. Bismarck himself declared, after the French war, that the Schleswig-Holstein campaign was the one of which, from a political point of view, he was proudest. It has often been asked, in the light of subsequent events, why Austria joined forces with Prussia. It is difficult to see BISMARCK 33 how Austria could have acted otherwise. If Bismarck had repudiated the London treaties, then indeed Austria’s course would have been clear. It could have put itself at the head of a European concert for the restraint and punishment of the Prussian law-breakers. Bismarck, however, assumed an attitude of unimpeach¬ able legality, which was also in consonance with the Austro-Prussian policy of 1850; and Austria was compelled either to act with Prussia or not to act at all. Aus¬ trian neutrality, however, would have left Prussia in complete control of the field. Prussia would have made war alone; would have annexed the duchies at its close; would have gained greatly in power and enormously in prestige. This Austria could not tolerate; and unless it were prepared, as Bismarck had already suggested, to “ transfer its centre of gravity to Ofen,” it had to go with Prussia in order to see that Prussia did not go too far. It cannot be maintained that Austria was duped; for when, at 34 BISMARCK Strained relations with Austria Convention of Gastein 1865 an early stage of the joint action, the Austrian cabinet attempted to stipulate that the duchies should be restored to Denmark unless both powers agreed upon some other disposition, Bismarck refused his assent and substituted a stipulation, which the Austrian ministry accepted, that the eventual disposition of the duchies should be determined by agreement be¬ tween the two contracting powers. The joint ownership of the duchies speedily led, as Bismarck had anticipated, to dissension. Austria was willing to turn them over to Prussia in return for compensation in Silesia. King William, however, refused to cede any portion of Silesia. Austria then espoused the cause of the Augustenburg prince. Prussia protested, and war seemed imminent in 1865. It was postponed, not so much by Bismarck’s will as by the king’s, and a temporary adjustment was reached in the convention of Gastein. By this treaty Prussia bought out Austria’s rights in BISMARCK 35 Lauenburg, and the administration of government in the two other duchies was divided, Prussia assuming control of Schleswig and Austria of Holstein. But the truce was a short one. Prussia ac¬ cused Austria of encouraging the Au- gustenburg agitation, and when, on June i, 1866, Austria submitted the Schleswig- Holstein question to the Federal Diet, Prussia declared the treaty of Gastein broken and the joint administration of the duchies reestablished. Prussian troops were accordingly sent into Holstein. Aus¬ tria pronounced this a breach of the peace; and on June 11 the Austrian rep¬ resentative in the Federal Diet proposed the mobilization against Prussia of the contingents of all the other German states. This motion was carried, June 14, by a three-fifths vote. The Prussian representative declared, in the name of his government, that this attempt to levy federal war upon a member of the con¬ federation was a breach of the funda¬ mental pact of union, and that the con- 36 BISMARCK The German question The war with Austria, 1866 federation was thereby dissolved. He added that it was the purpose of his gov¬ ernment to find for the unity of the German people a form better suited to the conditions of the age. For nearly three months, in accordance with a plan foreshadowed in his earlier letters, Bismarck had been pushing the German question to the front. He had been agitating, by circulars to all the German governments, the question of federal reform, and on April 9 he had caused a proposal to be introduced in the Federal Diet for the establishment of a German parliament on the basis of man¬ hood suffrage. Immediately after the vote of June 14, Prussia called upon the governments of Saxony, Hanover and Hesse-Cassel to join in the establishment of a new federal union. Upon their re¬ fusal Prussian troops invaded these terri¬ tories, and the war for the control of Germany began on June 16, 1866. Neither Austria nor'Trussia stood alone. Austria was supported by all the South BISMARCK 37 German states, viz. Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt, and by the more important states of North Germany, viz. Hanover, Saxony, Hesse-Cassel and Nassau. Prussia had secured the alliance of Italy by a secret treaty (April 8). In case of victory Italy was to receive Venice. The war was practically ter¬ minated by the great Prussian victory of Koniggratz or Sadowa, July 3. After Sadowa, Prussia was in a position to dic¬ tate the terms of peace. The military men wished to enter Vienna and to de¬ mand a strip of Bohemian territory. Bis¬ marck feared a joint intervention of the neutral powers and desired a speedy set¬ tlement. He also urged the impolicy of inflicting lasting wounds upon Austria’s national pride; and after a hard struggle he carried his point. Preliminaries of peace were signed at Nicolsburg, July 26, and the final treaty at Prague, August 23. Italy received Venice; Austria conveyed to Prussia its interests in Schleswig- Holstein and recognized the dissolution O Sadowa 7T Peace of Prague 38 BISMARCK Napoleon's interference Prussian an¬ nexations of the old German confederation and the creation of a new North German confed- a, eration, to be composed of the states north of the Main. North of the Main, also, Prussia was to annex such territo¬ ries as it saw fit, promising to spare Saxony. The South German states were to be permitted to form an independent confederation of their own. Austria was for ever excluded from Germany. To these arrangements Napoleon III was in fact though not ostensibly a party. It was French influence, backed by the prospect of French intervention, that se¬ cured the recognition of South German independence. In consideration of the abandonment — or rather postponement— of Prussian hegemony over South Ger¬ many, Napoleon assented to more exten¬ sive Prussian annexations in North Ger¬ many than were at first proposed. Prussia annexed Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau and the free city of Frankfort, adding four and a half millions to its population and in- BISMARCK 39 creasing its territory by a fourth. The annexation of Hanover was especially ad¬ vantageous ; it rounded out what Motley had described as “ Prussia’s wasp-waist.” All the rest of the German states north of the Main, including the kingdom of Saxony, ten duchies, seven principalities, and the free cities of Hamburg, Llibeck and Bremen, joined with Prussia in the formation of a new federal union — the North German confederation. Its con¬ stitution was draughted by Bismarck, ac¬ cepted by the governments of the single states, and submitted in 1867 to an Im¬ perial Diet chosen by manhood suffrage. After this Diet had passed it with a number of amendments, it was ratified without further amendment by the leg¬ islatures of the single states. Under its provisions the executive powers of the union were vested in a president (the king of Prussia) and a Federal Coun¬ cil consisting of appointed representatives of the different states. In this council Prussia was to have seventeen votes, Saxony The North German con¬ federation 40 BISMARCK Character of the new union. four, the larger duchies and principalities each three or two, and the smaller princi¬ palities and the free cities each one. The presidency of the council was entrusted to a chancellor, appointed by the federal president. (Bismarck, of course, became chancellor.) The legislative power was vested in the Federal Council and an Imperial Diet elected by manhood suf¬ frage. In name federal, the new union was essentially national. Its power ex¬ tended over military and naval matters; over commerce, railways, telegraphs and the post; over the entire field of judicial organization, criminal law and procedure, civil procedure and commercial law. The change from the old confederation (1815- 1866) to this new union was greater than the change from the American articles of confederation to the American consti¬ tution of 1789. In the light of these splendid achieve¬ ments, the public judgment of Bismarck underwent an immediate and complete BISMARCK 41 reversal. A few of his opponents had Bismarck’s been converted to his support by the out- ^1862-66^ come of the Danish campaign, but until the autumn of 1866 he was generally regarded as a reactionary, pure and simple. His conflict with the Prussian Chamber of Deputies had naturally intensified this impression. In his support of the army reform, in his hostility to the insurgent Poles, in his treatment of the Schleswig- Holstein question, he had defiantly an¬ tagonized German public opinion; and when it became evident that his conduct of Prussian policy was certain to produce war with Austria, he was the best hated and the best denounced man in Germany. On May 7, iSStf, he narrowly escaped Attempt on death at the hands of a fanatic named Cohen. The assassin killed himself in prison. Crowds of people visited the cell, and women covered Cohen’s body with flowers and crowns of laurel. The revulsion of feeling which followed Reversal of the Austrian war, and the sudden popu- sentiment larity of its author, were not due solely, 42 BISMARCK Bill of in¬ demnity Shifting of party lines nor even chiefly, to the vulgar admiration of success. Bismarck had realized the deepest desire of the German people. He had made Germany a nation, with a legis¬ lature resting on the broadest and most popular basis. He also made peace with the Prussian Chamber of Deputies. To the dismay of his Tory supporters, and not without a struggle with his royal mas¬ ter, he asked and received indemnity for governing without a budget, thus recog¬ nizing the rights of the Chamber and the abnormal character of his own adminis¬ tration during the period of conflict. The natural result was a complete disorganiza¬ tion of the parliamentary opposition and a general shifting of party lines. The best elements of the opposition, the Old Liberals of 1848, formed a new National Liberal group, which during the next ten years generally acted in concert with the government and, with the Conservatives, gave it a working majority both in the Prussian Diet and in the Imperial Par¬ liament. BISMARCK 43 This simplified the internal politics of Prussia and of the confederation; but the foreign relations of the new union were far from satisfactory. Napoleon, as we have seen, had thus far shown himself friendly to Prussia. He had intimated, in 1865, his willingness to conclude an offen¬ sive alliance against Austria (Prussia to reorganize Germany and France to receive payment on the left bank of the Rhine); and in spite of the rejection of this offer he had actively furthered the conclusion of the alliance between Prussia and Italy. He did not believe that Prus¬ sia was a match for Austria; he believed that his aid would still be needed, and that he would ultimately get his price. Sadowa defeated these schemes; and after Sadowa he should have seen that nothing was to be gained by negotiation. He could not or would not see this, and at once began to demand compensation for his neutrality. At Nicolsburg, in July, 1866, his ambassador, M. Benedetti, demanded a rectification of France’s east- Strained relations with France Compen¬ sations demanded 44 BISMARCK ern frontier. On August 5 the French demands were put into definite form. Prussia was to grant France the frontier of 1814, and was to obtain from Bavaria and from Hesse-Darmstadt the cession of their provinces on the left bank of the Rhine. Luxemburg was to be separated from Germany and the Prussian garrison was to be withdrawn from the fortress. 1 Bismarck promptly declared that the ces¬ sion of German territory could not be considered. On August 20 Benedetti de¬ clared that France would be satisfied with Saarlouis, Landau and Luxemburg; but if Prussia would help France to acquire 1 Luxemburg belonged, at this time, to the king of the Netherlands. It had formed part of the old German confederation. The fortress of Luxemburg was a federal fortress, and the Prussian garrison was stationed there in accordance with federal treaty. With the dissolution of the old confederation, Luxemburg was already practi¬ cally separated from Germany, and the reason for keep¬ ing a Prussian garrison in the fortress had disappeared. Napoleon desired that Prussia should recognize these facts and inferences, in order that the way might be clear for his acquiring Luxemburg from the king of the Netherlands. BISMARCK 45 Belgium, France would permit Prussia to incorporate South Germany in the German confederation. On August 29, Benedetti put this latter suggestion into the form of a draught treaty in his own handwriting. It has never been shown that Bismarck agreed to any of these demands; but he undoubtedly permitted the French ambassador to hope that some compensation would be conceded. “ Au moins,” as Sorel neatly says, “il y avait eu dialogue”; and it is inconceivable that Benedetti should have gone so far without considerable encouragement. Bismarck has himself admitted that he pursued a “ dilatory ” policy. His object was twofold. He desired to postpone the inevitable war with France until the Prussian military system was introduced in the annexed provinces and in the other German states; and he desired documentary evidence of the French demands. This, as we have seen, he obtained; and of the documents thus obtained he made very effective use. During the peace negotiations between Evidence of French demands secured \ V Use made of the evidence 46 BISMARCK Prussia and Bavaria in August, 1866, Bavaria appealed to Napoleon for his good offices, which Napoleon promptly granted. Bismarck met this move by exhibiting to the Bavarian minister the draught treaty of August 5, showing him that his friend the emperor of the French had asked Prussia for large portions of Bavarian and Hessian territory. The result of this revelation was the imme¬ diate conclusion, not merely of a treaty of peace, but also of a secret treaty of offen¬ sive and defensive alliance between Prus¬ sia and Bavaria (August 22). Similar treaties had already been concluded with Wiirtemberg and Baden. Equally effec¬ tive use was made of the draught treaty concerning Belgium. It was published in the London Times of July 25, 1870, a few days after the French declaration of war. The effect of this disclosure upon the public opinion of England and of Europe was all that Bismarck could desire. BISMARCK 47 The prime cause of the Franco-German war was the irritation felt by the French people at the growth of a first-class power on their eastern frontier. A long step had been taken in 1S66 towards German unity, and the completion of this move¬ ment, it was felt, would threaten the tra¬ ditional primacy of France in Europe. A secondary cause was the failure of the French government to obtain territorial compensation for the increased power of Prussia. After the unsuccessful nego¬ tiations described above, Napoleon at¬ tempted in 1867 to carry out a part at least of his programme by purchasing Luxemburg from the king of the Nether¬ lands. This attempt created great indig¬ nation among the people of Germany; and the military party at Berlin, believing that a contest with France was inevitable, wished to precipitate the war before the French army reforms, then under dis¬ cussion, were completed. Bismarck, how¬ ever, declared that “ the personal convic¬ tion of a ruler or statesman, however well Genesis of the Franco-Ger¬ man war Luxemburg incident 1867 48 BISMARCK Coalition against Germany founded, that war will eventually break out, cannot justify its promotion.” He contrived to defeat the purchase of Lux¬ emburg without giving the French gov¬ ernment any tangible grievance against Prussia. But Napoleon felt that he had again been duped, and the incident increased the tension between the two nations. A large body of Napoleon’s warmest supporters began to agitate for war against Prussia as the only means of rehabilitating the prestige of the dynasty. Negotiations were opened by Napoleon with the emperor of Austria and the king of Italy for joint action against Prussia; and although, because of the failure of the three courts to reach any satisfactory agreement on the Roman question, no formal treaty was signed, an understanding was attained early in June, 1870, that if France declared war upon Prussia and succeeded in occupying South Germany, then Austria and Italy, having gained time for mobilization by a tempo¬ rary neutrality, would also declare war BISMARCK 49 and add their forces to those of France. War, it appears, was not contemplated before 1871, for the Austrian military authorities stipulated that the declaration of war by France should be made not later than in April. The immediate occasion of the war was The Spanish the Spanish candidacy of Prince Leopold candldacy of Hohenzollern. This prince, although a Hohenzollern, was not a member of the Prussian royal house but of the South German and Catholic house of Hohenzol- lern-Sigmaringen. He was more closely connected with the imperial family of France than with the royal family of Prussia. By family compact, however, the king of Prussia was recognized as the head of the house. The Span¬ ish ministry, in search of a Catholic king, had repeatedly offered to present Leopold’s name to the Cortes — twice in 1869 and again in March, 1870 — but the offer had been declined. King William advised against the acceptance of the candidacy, and in 1869 Bismarck was of 50 BISMARCK Bismarck’s part in the affair the same mind. In 1870, however, Bis¬ marck advised acceptance. His change of opinion, he said, was due to the fact that the Spanish revolutionary govern¬ ment, unstable in 1869, had obtained in 1870 the complete control of the coun¬ try. When the third offer had been de¬ clined, Bismarck secured, through Prus¬ sian agents, a fourth offer; and in June, 1870, largely in consequence of his ad¬ vice, Leopold consented to become a can¬ didate. King William was informed of the prince’s decision and declared that he could interpose no objection. Although these negotiations were conducted quietly, they were not kept secret from Napo¬ leon. In the interest of his dynasty, the emperor would probably have preferred Leopold to the Orleanist duke de Mont- pensier, who was, in 1870, the only other prominent candidate; but he had in¬ formed Benedetti, and Benedetti had probably informed Bismarck, that the French people would not tolerate a Hohenzollern candidacy. German writ- BISMARCK 51 ers assert, however, that Bismarck did not expect serious opposition from Napo¬ leon ; and, as a further proof of his pacific intentions, they point out that he had kept open a line of retreat. This latter assertion is true. Bismarck had caused the question to be dealt with from the outset as one that in no wise concerned the Prussian state, and that concerned the king only as titular head of the Sigmaringen branch of the family. From this point of view, Leopold’s acceptance concerned only himself and Spain; and the same would be true of his withdrawal. It would in no wise compromise the dig¬ nity or lessen the prestige of Prussia. The other assertion, however, that Bis¬ marck expected no serious opposition on Napoleon’s part, is far from plausible. The facts seem to be that Bismarck pro¬ moted the candidacy with the expectation that opposition would be encountered, and planned at the same time that his candi¬ date should withdraw when the opposition had become manifest. 1 <■ \ \ 52 BISMARCK Bismarck's motives What were his motives ? In the pres¬ ent state of our information, only a con- jecturaljajiswer is possible. If we assume that Bismarck was aware of the arrange¬ ments that were making for an attack on Germany in 1871, we can see why he should desire to provoke a declaration of war in 1870 before those arrangements were perfected. He would naturally desire, further, that France should de¬ clare war under such circumstances that European public opinion would condemn its action. Prince Leopold’s candidacy would not give France a very good casus belli; and if by any chance France should declare war after Prince Leopold’s withdrawal, the situation, from the Ger¬ man point of view, would be ideal. It is perhaps improbable that Bismarck’s calculations had been pushed to this point in the spring of 1870; but he must have foreseen that Prince Leopold’s ac¬ ceptance and withdrawal would place Napoleon and his ministers in a diffi¬ cult position — a position in which it BISMARCK 53 would be easy to blunder; and we know that he had little respect for Napoleon’s capacity and still less for that of de Gra- mont, the new French minister of for¬ eign affairs. He had long since described Napoleon as une grande incapacity me- cojmue, and he had declared that Gramont was the greatest blockhead ( Dummkopf ) in Europe. When, early in July, the news of the prince’s acceptance reached Paris by way of Madrid, great indignation was mani¬ fested in the French journals and by the French government. Gramont declared the candidacy an attempt “ to reestablish the empire of Charles V.” A protest sent to Berlin elicited from an under¬ secretary (Bismarck was in Varzin) the information that Prussia had nothing to do with the candidacy. Benedetti was then instructed to proceed to Ems, where King William was taking the waters, and to ask the king to obtain from Prince Leopold a withdrawal of his acceptance. The king answered that he had no right Leopold’s acceptance French demand 54 BISMARCK William’s attitude Leopold’s withdrawal New French demands to address such a demand to the prince; but he told Benedetti that if the prince saw fit to withdraw he would approve the withdrawal. On July 12 the French government received notice, again from Madrid, that Prince Leopold’s acceptance had been withdrawn. This was regarded throughout Europe as the end of the incident. It was felt that the French government had carried its point and that there would be no war. Napoleon and his prime minister, Ollivier, expressed themselves in this sense. Bismarck, who had reached Berlin and had intended to proceed at once to Ems, decided to stay in Berlin. But Gramont, supported in this by the general feeling of Paris and of the Deputies, declared that the satis¬ faction obtained by France was inade¬ quate. He suggested to Werther, the Prussian ambassador, that King William should write an explanatory letter to the emperor; and, with Napoleon’s assent, he instructed Benedetti to obtain from the king an assurance that the candidacy BISMARCK 55 would not be renewed. On the morning of July 13 the king was asked to give such a pledge, and refused. He told Benedetti that this demand indicated to him a determination on the part of the French government to force a war. In the French cabinet, on the evening of the 13th, it was not felt that the king’s refusal made war necessary. Energetic remonstrances from the representatives of friendly powers had convinced Napoleon and his ministers that they had gone too far, and their feeling was in favor of ac¬ cepting the situation. On the 14th, in consequence of action taken by Bismarck the day before, they decided upon war; and on the 15 th war was declared. On the morning of the 13th, as soon as he heard of the new French demands of the 12th, Bismarck for the first time took an active part in the controversy. He explained to the English ambassador that France was obviously determined on war, and that it was now Prussia’s turn to de¬ mand explanations and assurances. He France disposed to retreat Bismarck intervenes " Editing" the Ems despatch Effect of Bismarck's action 56 BISMARCK notified Werther that his conduct in en¬ tertaining the demand for “ a letter of apology ” was disapproved, and directed him to take leave of absence on account of ill health. On the evening of the same day he received a telegraphic account of the occurrences of the morning at Ems, closing with the suggestion, on the part of the king, that the new French demand and its refusal be made public. This suggestion Bismarck carried out in the most literal fashion, omitting all details. The account thus given to the public cre¬ ated the impression that the negotiations in Ems had terminated more abruptly than was really the case. The Germans thought that King William had been insulted,—which was true, as regarded the substance of the French demand, but un¬ true as regarded the form of its presen¬ tation,— and the smouldering indignation that had been kindled by the arrogant tone of the French orators and of the French press burst into a flame of wrath. The Parisians thought that their ambas- BISMARCK 57 sador had been insulted, and demanded an immediate declaration of war. Napoleon and his ministers knew that Benedetti’s dismissal had been courteous; but they saw that peace could be preserved only by an obvious and unmistakable retreat, on their part, from the ill-considered position which they had taken on July 12. Bismarck had so utilized their mistake as to hold them to its consequences. The way in which the French minis¬ ters handled the Hohenzollern candidacy shows that they regarded it, at the out¬ set, as a favorable issue on which to force a war. If France should declare war on a distinctly German question, all Germany, they foresaw, would side with Prussia, and it would be difficult for Austria to inter¬ vene. By selecting a question which con¬ cerned only the Prussian dynasty they hoped to secure the neutrality of the South German states and the active as¬ sistance of Austria. When, after being deprived of their original grievance, they French expectations - 58 BISMARCK Attitude of South Germany nevertheless declared war, they undoubt¬ edly hoped that the French troops would secure, without serious opposition, the control of South Germany before the North German mobilization was com¬ pleted, and that Austria and Italy, in spite of the lateness of the season, would come to their aid. These hopes proved futile. In South Germany, as in the North, the war was regarded as an attack on German independence, and the South German states at once placed their armies at the disposal of the king of Prussia. The North German troops were concentrated on the Alsacian fron¬ tier with unexpected rapidity, while the French mobilization proved far slower than was anticipated. From the start France was thrown on the defensive. Partly for this reason, partly because held in check by Russia, Austria remained neutral. The king of Italy, in spite of the dissent of his ministers, desired to come to Napoleon’s aid; but the suc¬ cess of the Prussian arms was too rapid BISMARCK 59 and complete to encourage interference. Seven weeks after the declaration of war the entire force with which Napoleon took the field was destroyed, captured or shut up in besieged fortresses. After Sedan the issue of the struggle was cer¬ tain ; but the heroic obstinacy of the French people prolonged the war for six months. Preliminaries of peace were signed at Versailles, February 26, and the final treaty at Frankfort, May 10, 1871. France ceded to Germany Alsace, including Strasburg, and part of Lorraine, including Metz, — about 1,500,000 souls, — and agreed to pay a war indemnity of 5,000,000,000 francs. The most important result of this war was the_completion of German unity. In South Germany local patriotism and religious prejudice had heretofore stood in the way of union with Prussia. These obstacles were swept away in the enthu¬ siasm of this national war. In the march from the Rhine to the Seine, Bavarians, German victories Peace of Frankfort The German empire 6o BISMARCK Wurtembergers, Hessians and Prussians felt themselves, as never before, one great people. The diplomatists had only to put the stamp of law upon the accom¬ plished fact. During the winter treaties of union were concluded between the North German confederation and the South German states; and on January 18, in the hall of mirrors in Versailles, King William was proclaimed German emperor. The prophecy of Frederick William IV had come true — that the imperial crown would be won on the field of battle. The new empire, with its twenty-five states and its one territory (Alsace-Lor¬ raine), embraced, at its establishment, over 40,000,000 people, a number which has since risen, by the natural increase of population and in spite of emigration, to more than 53,000,000. Its constitution is simply a revised edition of the North German constitution of 1867. The posi¬ tion of the South German states, barring a few reserved rights, is identical with BISMARCK 6l that of the North German states. Their governments are represented in the Fed¬ eral Council and their people in the Imperial Diet. In this parliament Bismarck never The German found — nor in the light of his experi- ^g^”' ence with the Prussian Diet could he have hoped to create — a passive instru¬ ment of his or the emperor’s will. The parliament and the people behind it have always had and have constantly asserted an independent will of their own. But the people and the parliament of the new empire have not at any time offered any such blind and obstinate resistance to the realization of vital national inter¬ ests as did the Prussian deputies before 1866. The internal politics of the em¬ pire have been full of conflict; but every conflict has been fought out within the lines of the constitution, and settled by some compromise which has preserved at once the interests of the state and the liberties of the citizen. 62 BISMARCK The Centrists i The most powerful and the most troub¬ lesome element of opposition was the Ultramontane or Centre party, which had sixty-three votes in the first parliament of the empire (1871-74), and since 1874 has regularly numbered about one hundred — a little more than a fourth of the en¬ tire membership. It was ostensibly estab¬ lished to defend the liberties of the Roman Catholic church in Germany; but it was established at a time when no measure menacing those liberties had been passed or even proposed. It really represented, in the first place, the hostil¬ ity of the Roman curia to the establish¬ ment in central Europe of a powerful empire with a Protestant head; and it embodied, in the second place, a great deal of the local disaffection due to the annexations of 1866. Its leader, Windt- horst, was formerly a minister of the king of Hanover; and the malcontent Hanoverians (Guelphs) have regularly acted and voted as its allies. The out¬ spoken disloyalty of some of its mem- BISMARCK 63 bers and the systematic agitation of the Jesuits and of a portion of the regular Catholic clergy induced the imperial and state governments, first, to adopt repres¬ sive measures, and finally to attempt by law a more exact definition of the limits of religious liberty. Thus arose the so- called “ culture conflict.” Bismarck al¬ ways objected to this phrase, insisting on the essentially political character of the struggle and declaring that, as minister- president and chancellor, he was not fighting for culture but for the politi¬ cal interests of the Prussian state and the German empire. In the main the conflict was fought out in Prussia and the other single states, religious affairs not falling within the imperial jurisdic¬ tion. The resistance of the Catholic clergy to the new laws — particularly to the Prussian “May laws” of 1873 — was very bitter and obstinate. In Prussia nearly all the Catholic bishops were im¬ prisoned or expelled; and an alarming number of parishes were deprived of all "Culture conflict ’’ The May laws, 1873 6 4 BISMARCK Close of the conflict, 1887 spiritual care. The Prussian government soon found itself obliged to ask the Diet for large powers of indulgence and dis¬ pensation : in other words, for power to execute the laws or leave them unexe¬ cuted at its discretion. The death of Pius IX, January 7, 1878, and the elec¬ tion of a less combative and more politic successor, Leo XIII, facilitated the at¬ tainment of a modus vivendi; and the disru ption in 1879 and the resultant disappearance of the governmental majority caused Bis¬ marck to desire a truce. He needed Centrist support; and he secured it on the do ret des plan, sacrificing the anti¬ clerical legislation bit by bit in return for votes for governmental measures. A peace — or rather an indefinite truce — was concluded with the Roman curia in 1887. Prussia had already “revised” the greater portion of its church laws out of existence, and the Pope agreed that the government should be notified of all intended appointments to ecclesiastical of the National Liberal party BISMARCK 65 offices. But, notwithstanding this ar¬ rangement, the Centre maintained its organization and its attitude of general opposition, and Bismarck continued to traffic with its leaders whenever its sup¬ port was necessary. At the time of his dismissal the governmental reserve of pos¬ sible concessions was not yet exhausted; there was still enough anti-clerical legis¬ lation on the statute-books to carry his successor through one rather difficult leg¬ islative period. During this struggle with the church, Bismarck a second time narrowly es¬ caped assassination. On July 13, 1874, while driving in an open carriage, he was shot at by a cooper named Kull- mann. At the moment the shot was fired Bismarck had touched his hat in answer to the salutation of an acquaint¬ ance, and the ball passed between his temple and wrist. Kullmann assigned the wrongs of the church as the reason for his act. The uses of adversity Second attempt on Bismarck's life, 1874 66 BISMARCK The Social Democrats Much less powerful in parliament, but far more dangerous to the social and political order of the German empire, is the Social Democratic party. The great strength of this party in Germany — in the election of 1890 it cast nearly eleven per cent of the total vote 1 — is partly due to the idealistic character of the German mind, but mainly to the sudden passage of the German people from a system of economic restraint to an almost perfect economic liberty. This change was accomplished by a series of liberal laws enacted by the North German and Imperial Diets, abol¬ ishing nearly all restrictions upon trade and industry and giving the laborer full freedom, but exposing him also to the unchecked influence of free competition. All such transitions are of course accom¬ panied by much suffering and discon¬ tent ; and the discontent of the German 1 In 1898 the Social Democrats cast nearly 28 per cent of the total vote and carried about one-seventh of the seats in the Imperial Diet. BISMARCK 67 workingmen found expression in the Social Democratic movement. The rapid growth of the party, and the increas¬ ingly revolutionary tendency shown in the speeches and writings of its leaders, had already caused the imperial and state governments to consider the desirability of repressive legislation, when, on May 11, 1878, a workingman named Hodel, who was shown to be connected with the Social Democrats, attempted the life of the emperor. Bis¬ marck at once introduced in the Impe¬ rial Diet an anti-socialist bill of Repressive legislation great severity, intended to suppress entirely the spread of Social Democratic doc¬ trines. To the majority of the Deputies the bill seemed too great an invasion of the freedom of assembly and of the press, and its passage in the form desired by the government was refused. On June 2, a second attempt was made upon the emperor’s life by a man of university education, Dr. Nobiling. The emperor was seriously injured, and for a 68 BISMARCK time his life was thought to be in dan¬ ger. Bismarck promptly dissolved the parliament and ordered new elections. The electors supported the government, and the new parliament passed the de¬ sired measures against the socialists. The law was passed for a term of years only, but was repeatedly reenacted and remained in force until 1890. Bismarck, however, was not satisfied with repres- Reform sive measures. He believed it necessary .gislation g£ r jk e a {- roo t 0 £ £p e trouble, not, as many Conservatives desired, by abandoning the principles of economic liberty, but by bettering the position of the workingmen. In accordance with this desire, and largely through his influ¬ ence, rigid employers’ liability laws were adopted, and also a remarkable series of statutes organizing a system of compul¬ sory insurance of laborers against acci¬ dent, disease and old age. The German army During these years of conflict with the Ultramontanes and with the Social I BISMARCK 69 Democrats, Bismarck was occupied with questions even more vital to the new empire — questions that touched the cen¬ tral points of political power, the army and the treasury. It was the Prussian army that had made Germany a nation, and the maintenance of German unity was felt to depend upon the strength and efficiency of the federal army. The constitution of the empire provides that every adult German shall be held to military service, but leaves the details of army organization to be regulated by law. The Conservatives desired that this should be done by an ordinary law, not limited as to duration; while the Radi¬ cals were disposed to demand an annual regulation. As against the Radical de¬ mand, the military authorities insisted that so complex a machine as the Ger¬ man army could not be run from year to year with annual risk of parliamentary interference. Bismarck himself did not desire a permanent law, because such a law, he thought, would make any future 70 BISMARCK The sep- tennate increase of the army difficult. His atti¬ tude facilitated a compromise, viz. the periodical passage of laws fixing the strength of the peace footing for a term of years. From the outset, the term selected was seven years; and at the close of each septennate the strength of the army has been increased. In 1887 the Diet attempted to shorten the period to three years. Bismarck declared this an attempt to make the federal army “ a parliamentary army,” dissolved the Diet, January 14, 1887, and appealed to the country. The country supported the gov¬ ernment, returning a Diet in which the Radical faction lost two-thirds of its strength; and the new parliament voted a new septennate with a peace footing of nearly half a million. In 1888 it extended the time of service in the Landwehr , in¬ creasing the fighting strength of the army by 700,000 men, and enabling Germany, as Bismarck said in his great speech of Feb¬ ruary 8, 1886, to put a million men on each frontier — the western and the eastern. BISMARCK 7 1 During the first years of the new empire the imperial treasury derived i ts inc ome largely from contributions levied upon the single state s. The constitution assigned to the empire all customs duties, but under the existing tariff these duties were quite insufficient to balance the im¬ perial budget. The constitu tion also gave the empire wide powers of indirect taxa¬ tion, and D isinaick resolved tu u tifee tliis^source of supply. For such taxa¬ tion,the most av ailable objects were spirits and tobacco . An excise upon spirits would have encountered the op¬ position of the Conservative landholders, who are large producers of brandy; and no measure of financial reform could be carried without the aid of the Conserva¬ tives. Bismarck accordingly turned to tobacco, and demanded either a mono p¬ oly or a heavy taxation of the manm- facture. The monopoly was his choice . He clai med that the tobacco monopol y would nnt mer ely place the empire i n a position of financial ind ependence, but German finances Project of a tobacco monopoly 72 BISMARCK would give it a surplus to be divided among th e single states. The state s would thus be enable d to reduce greatly their direct taxes . This project, how¬ ever, found no favor in the eyes of the German Liberals. The man ufacture of tobacco is one of the most prosperous of Germany’s industries, lihd one oT~Ttre~ least concentrated. It i s carried on in ~ thousands of li ttle factories, and often as a hous e industry. AccordingIy 7 ~tKe National Liberals, who represent espe¬ cially the mid dle class, opposed the mon opoly . For a time the leaders of this party seemed inclined to support some scheme for taxing the manufacture Defeat of the of tobacco; but the opposition of their pr °j ect constituents ultimately forced them into opposition on this point also. Without Idle sup port of the National Liberals the proposed taxes could not be carried; for the Conservative and National Liberal parties constitute d the majority updrC 1 which the government had thus far depended . No feasible way of increas- BISMARCK 73 ing the imperial receipts was now left except an increase of the customs duties. This involved the abandonment of the policy which the German customs union had pursued from the outset, and to which the empire had thus far remained constant. But Germany was ready for a change. The theory of free trade had been strongly assailed . Numerous in¬ dustries were clamoring for p rotection, and t o secure a protective tariff it was necessa ry nnly f n hring a sufficient num¬ ber of industrial interests into combina¬ tion. _ " 5 uch a tariff was passed fuly iTT 1879, by a combination of the land and the iron interests. The duties imposed on breadstuffs and cattle held the Con¬ servatives firm in their allegiance to the government, and the duties on iron won the support of the Ultramontanes, this party being strongly recruited from the mining and manufacturing districts on the Rhine. The National Liberal party was temporarily disrupted. Incidentally, it is almost needless to say, this tariff A protective tariff, 1879 74 BISMARCK Colonial policy has been a source of greatly increased revenue to the empire; and since its adoption the imperial budget has been balanced without collecting contributions from the states. At present the financial mdepe ndence of the empire is further assured by a tax upon spirits” voted by the strongly governmental Diet of During the debates upon the tariff of 1879 Bismarck urged that the protection of German industries would increase not only the wealth of Germany but its popu¬ lation also, and thus doubly strengthen the country. Emigration, he argued, was due to lack of employment, and the growth of manufactures would increase the demand for labor and enable more Germans to live in Germany. But the chancellor did not expect these results from the simple imposition of protective duties. The output of the German factories could not permanently be in¬ creased without an increase of the for- UV\ck^i.W"t^ % HrivA.. VW^X