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American Statesmen 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 JOHN T. MORSE, JR. 
 
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 BOSTON AND NEW YORK 
 HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 
 ®t)E Uitaerpi&c $tegs Cambnbge 
 
Copyright, 1883 and 1898, 
 
 By JOHN T. MORSE, JR. 
 
 Copyright, 1898, 
 
 By HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN & CO. 
 
 All rights reserved. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CB-4P. PAGE 
 
 I. Youth 1 
 
 II. In the House of Burgesses ... 15 
 
 IH. In Congress 23 
 
 IV. Again in the House of Burgesses . . 36 
 
 V. Governor of Virginia 51 
 
 VI. In Congress Again 64 
 
 VH. Minister to France 70 
 
 VTH. Secretary of State. — Domestic Affairs . 87 
 
 IX. Secretary of State. — Growth of Dissensions 100 
 X. Secretary of State. — Foreign Affairs . 130 
 
 XI. In Retreat 148 
 
 XII. Vice-President 154 
 
 XHI. President : First Term. — Offices. — Callen- 
 der 186 
 
 XIV. President : First Term. — Louisiana . . 205 
 
 XV. President : First Term. — Impeachments. — 
 
 Reelection 230 
 
 XVI. President : Second Term. — Randolph’s De- 
 fection. — Burr’s Treason . . . 242 
 
 XVH. President: Second Term. — Embargo . . 255 
 
 XV ILL. At Monticello: Political Opinions . . 286 
 
 XIX. At Monticello : Personal Matters. — Death 295 
 Index . 309 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 YOUTH 
 
 Little more than a century ago a civilized na- 
 tion without an aristocracy was a pitiful spectacle 
 scarcely to be witnessed in the world. The Amer- 
 ican colonists, having brought no dukes and barons 
 with them to the rugged wilderness, fell in some 
 sort under a moral compulsion to set up an imita- 
 tion of the genuine creatures, and, as their best 
 makeshift in the emergency, they ennobled in a 
 kind of local fashion the richer Virginian planters. 
 These gentlemen were not without many qualifica- 
 tions for playing the agreeable part assigned to 
 them ; they gambled recklessly over cards and at 
 the horse-racings and cock-fightings which formed 
 their chief pleasures ; they caroused to excess at 
 taverns and at each other’s houses ; they were very 
 extravagant, very lazy, very arrogant, and fully 
 persuaded of their superiority over their fellows, 
 whom they felt it their duty and their privilege to 
 direct and govern ; they had large landed estates, 
 
2 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 ancl preserved the custom of entailing them in 
 favor of eldest sons ; they were great genealogists, 
 and steeped in family pride ; they occupied houses 
 which were very capacious and noted for unlimited 
 hospitality, but which were also ill-kept and bar- 
 ren ; they were fond of field-sports and were ad- 
 mirable horsemen ; they respected the code of 
 honor, and quarreled and let blood as gentlemen 
 should ; they were generous, courageous, and high- 
 spirited ; a few of them were liberally educated 
 and well-read. We all know that when the days 
 of trial came, the best of them were little inferior 
 to the best men whose names are to be found in 
 the history of any people in the world ; 1 though 
 when one studies the antecedents and social sur- 
 roundings whence these noble figures emerged, it 
 seems as if for once men had gathered grapes from 
 thorns and figs from thistles. 
 
 Rather upon the outskirts than actually within 
 the sacred limits of this charmed circle, Thomas 
 Jefferson was born on April 13, 1743. The first 
 American Jefferson was dimly supposed to have 
 immigrated from Snowdon, in Wales; such at 
 least was the family “ tradition ; ” while the only 
 thing certainly to be predicated concerning him is 
 that he was one of the earliest settlers, having ar- 
 rived in Virginia before the Mayflower had brought 
 
 1 It should be remembered that by good rights neither Wash- 
 ington, Jefferson, nor even Madison, before they became distin- 
 guished, would have been entitled to take rank in the exclusive 
 coterie of the best Virginian families. 
 
YOUTH 
 
 3 
 
 the first cargo of Puritans to the New England 
 coast. Peter Jefferson, the father of Thomas, gave 
 the family its first impetus on the road towards 
 worldly success. He was a man of superb phy- 
 sique, and of correspondingly vigorous intellect 
 and enterprising temper. In early life he became 
 very intimate with William Randolph of Tucka- 
 hoe ; he “ patented ” in the wilderness a thousand 
 acres of land adjoining the larger estate of Ran- 
 dolph, bought from his friend four hundred acres 
 more, paying therefor the liberal price of “ Henry 
 Weatkerbourne’s biggest bowl of arrack punch,” 
 as is jovially nominated in the deed ; and further 
 cemented the alliance by marrying William’s cousin, 
 Jane Randolph, in 1738. The distinction which 
 this infusion of patrician blood brought to the com- 
 moner Jeffersonian stream was afterwards slight- 
 ingly referred to by Thomas Jefferson, who said, 
 with a characteristic democratic sneer, that his 
 mother’s family traced “ their pedigree far back 
 in England and Scotland, to which let every one 
 ascribe the faith and merit he chooses.” 
 
 Peter Jefferson’s plantation, or more properly 
 his farm, for it seems to have been largely devoted 
 to the culture of wheat, lay on the Rivanna near 
 its junction with the James, including a large ex- 
 tent of plain and some of the lower shoulders or 
 spurs of the mountains known as the Southwest 
 Range. He named it Shadwell, after the parish 
 in London where his wife had been born ; among 
 its hills was that of Monticello, upon which in after 
 
4 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 years Thomas Jefferson built his house. Peter was 
 colonel of his county, and a member of the House 
 of Burgesses, apparently a man of rising note in 
 the colony. But in August, 1757, in the fiftieth 
 year of what seemed a singularly vigorous life, he 
 suddenly died, leaving Thomas only fourteen years 
 old, with the advantages, however, of a comforta- 
 ble property and an excellent family connection on 
 the mother’s side, so that it would be his own fault 
 if he should not prosper well in the world. 
 
 Jefferson appears to have been sensibly brought 
 up, getting as good an education as was possible in 
 Virginia and paying also due regard to his physical 
 training. He grew to Tbe a slender and sinewy, 
 or, as some preferred to say, a thin and raw-boned 
 young man, six feet two and one half inches tall, 
 with hair variously reported as red, reddish, and 
 sandy, and with eyes mixed of gray and hazel. 
 Certainly he was not handsome, and in order to 
 establish his social attractiveness his friends fall 
 back on “ his countenance, so highly expressive of 
 intelligence and benevolence,” and upon his “fluent 
 and sensible conversation ” intermingled with a 
 “ vein of pleasantry.” He is said to have improved 
 in appearance as he grew older, and to have be- 
 come “ a very good-looking man in middle age, and 
 quite a handsome old man.” 1 He was athletic, 
 fond of shooting, and a skillful and daring horse- 
 man even for a Virginian. He early developed a 
 strong taste for music, and fiddled assiduously for 
 1 Tucker’s Life of Jefferson , i. 29. 
 
YOUTH 
 
 5 
 
 many years. By his own desire he entered Wil- 
 liam and Mary College in 1760, at the age of sev- 
 enteen. He was now secure of every advantage 
 possible for a young Virginian. The college was 
 at Williamsburg, then the capital of the colony^ 
 and his relationship with the Randolphs made him 
 free of the best houses. 1 A Scotch doctor, Wil- 
 liam Small, was Professor of Mathematics and tem- 
 porarily also of Philosophy. He appears to have 
 had a happy gift of instruction, and to have fired 
 the mind of his pupil with a great zeal for learn- 
 ing. Jefferson afterward even said that the pre- 
 sence of this gentleman at the University was 
 “what probably fixed the destinies of my life.” 
 
 If we may take Jefferson’s own word for it, he 
 habitually studied, during his second collegiate 
 year, fifteen hours a day, and for his only exercise 
 ran, at twilight, a mile out of the city and back 
 again. Long afterward, in 1808, he wrote to a 
 grandson a sketch of this period of his life, com- 
 posed in his moral and didactic vein ; in it he 
 draws a beautiful picture of his own precocious 
 and unnatural virtue, and is himself obliged to 
 gaze in surprise upon one so young and yet so 
 good amid crowding temptations. Without fully 
 
 1 But one must not draw too glowing a picture of the advan- 
 tage of living in Williamsburg, which in fact was a village con- 
 taining about two hundred houses, “ one thousand souls, whites 
 and negroes,” and “ ten or twelve gentlemens families constantly 
 residing in it, besides merchants and tradesmen.” Only during 
 the winter session of the legislature it became “crowded with the 
 gentry of the country.” See Parton's Life of Jefferson, 20. 
 
6 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 sharing in this generous admiration, we must not 
 doubt that he was sufficiently studious and sensi- 
 ble, for he had a natural thirst for information, and 
 he always afterward appeared a broadly educated 
 man. His preference was for mathematics and 
 natural philosophy, studies which he deemed “ so 
 peculiarly engaging and delightful as would induce 
 every one to wish an acquaintance with them.” 
 He was fond also of classics, and indeed eschewed 
 with positive distaste no branch of study save only 
 ethics and metaphysics. At these he sneered, and 
 actually once had the courage to say that it was 
 “ lost time ” to attend lectures on moral philoso- 
 phy, since “ he who made us would have been 
 a pitiful bungler if he had made the rules of our 
 moral conduct a matter of science.” Certainly 
 morals never became in his mind one of the exact 
 sciences, and the heretical notion of his youth re- 
 mained the conviction of his mature years. He 
 appears to have read quite extensively, with sound 
 selection and liberal taste, among the acknowledged 
 classics in Greek, Latin, and English literature, 
 and to some extent also in French and Italian. 
 But novels he never fancied and rarely touched at 
 any period of his life, though not by reason of a 
 severe taste, since for a long while he was nothing 
 less than infatuated with the bombast of Ossian. 
 
 After graduation, J efferson read law in the office 
 of George Wythe, a gentleman whose genial social 
 qualities and high professional attainments are at- 
 tested by the friendly allusions of many eminent 
 
YOUTH 
 
 7 
 
 contemporaries . 1 His zeal in labor still continued, 
 and again the story is told that he habitually 
 reached the measure of fifteen hours of study 
 daily. When he was about twenty-one years old, 
 Jefferson drew up a plan of study and reading for 
 a young friend. Before eight o’clock in the morn- 
 ing this poor fellow was to devote himself to “ phy- 
 sical studies ; ” eight to twelve o’clock, law ; twelve 
 to one, politics ; afternoon, history ; “ dark to 
 .bedtime,” literature, oratory, etc., etc. Yet there 
 were cakes and ale in those days, young girls and 
 dancing at the Raleigh tavern, cards and horses ; 
 and the young Virginians had their full share of 
 all these good things. Probably the fifteen hours 
 stint, as a regular daily allowance, is fabulous. 
 With Professor Small and Mr. Wythe the young 
 student formed a “ partie carree ” at the “ pal- 
 ace ” of Francis Fauquier, then the gay, agreeable, 
 accomplished, free-thinking, gambling governor of 
 Virginia. The four habitually dined together in 
 spite of the fifteen-hour rule, and it betokens no 
 small degree of intellectual maturity on the part 
 of Jefferson, that while a mere college lad, he was 
 the selected companion of three such gentle- 
 men. Fortunately his Sound common sense pro- 
 tected him from the dangerous elements in the 
 association. 
 
 A few letters written by Jefferson at this time 
 to his friend John Page, a member of the well- 
 
 1 John Marshall read law with him, and Henry Clay was his 
 private secretary. 
 
fi 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 known Virginian family of that name and himself 
 afterward governor of Virginia, have been pre- 
 served. Without showing much brilliancy, they 
 abound in labored attempts at humor, and are 
 thickly sown with fragments from the classics and 
 simple bits of original Latinity. The chief bur- 
 den of them all is the girls, whose faces, it is to 
 be hoped, were prettier than their names, — Sukey 
 Potter, Judy Burwell, and the like. One of them, 
 “ Belinda,” as he called her, he treated in a rather 
 peculiar way. He told her that he loved her, but 
 did not desire at present to engage himself, since 
 he wished to go to Europe for an indefinite period ; 
 but he said that on his return, of course with un- 
 changed affections, he would finally and openly 
 commit himself. To this not very ardent propo- 
 sition the lady naturally said No, and soon 
 wedded another. The “ laggard in love ” wrote 
 a despairing letter or two, which fail to bring 
 tears to the reader’s eyes ; remained in comforta- 
 ble bachelorhood a few short years, and then gave 
 his hand, and doubtless also in all warmth and 
 sincerity his heart, to the young widow of Bathurst 
 Skelton. His marriage took place January 1, 
 1772. If the accounts of gallant chroniclers may 
 be trusted, the bride had every qualification which 
 can make woman attractive ; an exquisite feminine 
 beauty, grace of manners, loveliness of disposition, 
 rare cleverness, and many accomplishments. Fur- 
 thermore, her father, John Wayles, a rich lawyer, 
 considerately died about sixteen months after the 
 
YOUTH 
 
 9 
 
 marriage, and so caused a handsome addition to 
 Jefferson’s property. 
 
 Jefferson, however, had no need to marry for 
 money. Though not very rich, he was well off 
 and was rapidly multiplying his assets. At the 
 time of his marriage he had increased his patri- 
 mony so that 1900 acres had swelled by purchases 
 to 5000 acres, and thirty slaves had increased to 
 fifty-two. He was getting considerably upwards 
 of $3000 a year from his profession, 1 and $2000 
 from his farm. This made a very good income in 
 those days in Virginia. The evidence is abundant 
 that he was thrifty, industrious, and successful. 
 He seemed like one destined to accumulate wealth, 
 but he never had a fair opportunity to show his 
 capacity in this direction, since he maintained a 
 resolve not to better his fortunes while in public 
 life. 
 
 His career at the bar began in 1767, when he 
 was only twenty-four years old, and closed in 1774. . 
 If he had only been getting fairly into business 
 when he left the profession, he would have had 
 little right to complain. But apparently he had 
 stepped at once into an excellent practice, and. 
 either the chief occupation of all Virginians was 
 litigation, or else he must have enjoyed excep- 
 tional good fortune. In the first year he had 
 sixty-eight cases in the “ general court,” in the 
 next year one hundred and fifteen, in the third 
 
 1 During the seven years that he was in practice his fees aver* 
 Sged $3000 per annum. 
 
10 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 year one hundred and ninety-eight. Of causes 
 before inferior tribunals no record was kept. Yet 
 Mr. Randall tells us that he was chiefly an “ office- 
 lawyer,” for that a husky weakness of the voice 
 prevented him from becoming very successful as 
 an advocate. 
 
 The farming, though it contributed the smaller 
 fraction of his income, was the calling which 
 throughout life he loved with an inborn fondness 
 not to be quenched by all the cares and interests 
 of a public career, and his notebooks attest the 
 unresting interest which he brought to it in* all 
 times and places. A striking paper, unfortunately 
 incomplete and undated, is published in the first 
 volume of his works. “ I sometimes ask myself,” 
 he writes, “ whether my country is the better for 
 my having lived at all. ... I have been the in- 
 strument of doing the following things.” Then 
 are enumerated such matters as the disestablish- 
 ment of the state church in Virginia, the putting 
 an end to entails, the prohibition of the importa- 
 tion of slaves, also the drafting of the Declaration 
 of Independence, and in the same not very long 
 list, cheek by jowl with these momentous achieve- 
 ments, follows the importation of olive plants from 
 Marseilles into South Carolina and Georgia, and 
 of heavy upland rice from Africa into the same 
 States, in the hope that it might supersede the cul- 
 ture of the wet rice so pestilential in the summer. 
 “ The greatest service,” he comments, “ which can 
 be rendered to any country is, to add a useful 
 
YOUTH 
 
 11 
 
 plant to its culture, especially a bread grain ; next 
 in value to bread is oil.” At another time he 
 wrote : “ Those who labor in the earth are the 
 chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen peo- 
 ple, whose breasts he has made his peculiar deposit 
 for substantial and genuine virtue. . . . Corruption 
 of morals in the mass of cultivators is a phenome- 
 non of which no age or nation has furnished an 
 example. . . . Generally speaking, the proportion 
 which the aggregate of the other classes of citizens 
 bears in any state to that of the husbandmen is 
 the proportion of its unsound to its healthy parts, 
 and is a good enough barometer whereby to mea- 
 sure the degree of its corruption.” From these 
 premises he draw's the conclusion that it is an 
 error to attract artificers or mechanics from for- 
 eign parts into this country. It will be better and 
 more wholesome, he says, to leave them in their 
 European workshops, and “ carry provisions and 
 materials to workmen there, than bring them to 
 the provisions and materials, and with them their 
 manners and principles.” This would hardly pass 
 nowadays for sound political economy ; but it is an 
 excellent sample of the simple, impractical form 
 into which Jefferson’s reflections were apt to de- 
 velop when the mood of dreamy virtue was upon 
 him. During an inroad of yellow fever he found 
 “ consolation ” in the reflection that Providence 
 had so ordered things “ that most evils are the 
 means of producing some good. The yellow fever 
 will discourage the growth of great cities in our 
 
12 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 nation, and I view great cities as pestilential to 
 the morals, tlie health, and the liberties of man.” 
 Nor did wider experience of the world cause him 
 to change his views. In 1785 he wrote from 
 Paris : “ Cultivators of the earth are the most 
 valuable citizens. They are the most vigorous, the 
 most independent, the most virtuous ; and they are 
 tied to their country and wedded to its liberty and 
 interests by the most lasting bonds. ... I consider 
 the class of artificers as the panders of vice, and 
 the instruments by which the liberties of a country 
 are generally overturned.” “ Were I to indulge 
 in my own theory,” he again says, “ I should wish 
 them (the States) to practice neither commerce 
 nor navigation, but to stand with respect to Eu- 
 rope precisely on the footing of China.” 
 
 For his own personal part, Jefferson was always 
 an enthusiast in agriculture. He was never too 
 busy to find time to note the dates of the planting 
 and the ripening of his vegetables and fruits. He 
 left behind him a table enumerating thirty-seven 
 esculents, and showing the earliest date of the ap- 
 pearance of each one of them in the Washington 
 market in each of eight successive years. He had 
 ever a quick observation and a keen intelligence 
 ready for every fragment of new knowledge or hint 
 of a useful invention in the way of field work. All 
 through his busy official life, abroad and at home, 
 he appears ceaselessly to have one eye on the soil 
 and one ear open to its cultivators ; he is always 
 comparing varying methods and results, sending 
 
YOUTH 
 
 13 
 
 new seeds hither and thither, making suggestions, 
 trying experiments, till, in the presence of his en- 
 terprise and activity, one begins to think that the 
 stagnating character so commonly attributed to the 
 Virginian planters must be fabulous. For, on the 
 contrary, so far was his temperament removed from 
 the conservatism of the Anglo-Saxon race, that 
 often he seemed to take the fact that a thing had 
 never been done as a sufficient reason for doing 
 it. All his tendencies were utilitarian. Though 
 strangely devoid of any appreciation of fiction in 
 literature, yet he had a powerful imagination, 
 w r hich ranged wholly in the unromantic domain of 
 the useful, and ran riot in schemes for conferring 
 practical benefits on mankind. He betrayed the 
 same traits in agriculture and in politics. In both 
 he was often a dreamer, but his dreams concerned 
 the daily affairs of his fellow men, and his life was 
 devoted to reducing his idealities to realities. It 
 was largely this sanguine taste for novelty, this 
 dash of the imaginative element, flavoring all his 
 projects and doctrines, which made them attractive 
 to the multitude, who, finding present facts to be 
 for the most part hard and uninviting, are ever 
 prone to be pleased with propositions for variety. 
 
 Only once, under the combined influences of 
 Ossian, youth, and love, we find his fancy roving 
 in a melodramatic direction. He turns then for a 
 while from absorbing calculations of the amount of 
 work which a man can do with a one-wheeled bar- 
 row and the amount he can do with a two-wheeled 
 
14 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 barrow, tbe number and cost of the nails required 
 for a certain length of paling, the amount of lime, 
 or limestone, required for a perch of stone wall, and 
 in place of these useful computations he lays plans 
 for ornamental work. He will “ choose out for a 
 burying place some unfrequented vale in the park,” 
 wherein a bubbling brook alone shall break the 
 stillness, while around shall be “ ancient and ven- 
 erable oaks ” interspersed with “ gloomy ever- 
 greens.” In the centre shall be a “ small gothic 
 temple of antique appearance.” He will “ appro- 
 priate one half to the use of his family,” the other, 
 with an odd manifestation of Virginian hospitality, 
 to the use of “ strangers,” servants, etc. There 
 shall be “ pedestals, with urns and proper inscrip- 
 tions ” and a “ pyramid of the rough rockstone ” 
 over the “ grave of a favorite and faithful servant.” 
 There will be, of course, a grotto, “ spangled with 
 translucent pebbles and beautiful shells,” with an 
 ever-trickling stream, a mossy couch, a figure of a 
 sleeping nymph, and appropriate mottoes in Eng- 
 lish and Latin. It is needless to say that these 
 idle fancies seem never to have been seriously 
 taken in hand. More important and engrossing 
 work than the preparation of an enticing grave- 
 yard was forthwith to claim Jefferson’s attention. 
 
CHAPTER n 
 
 IN THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES 
 
 About the time when he entered college, Jeffer- 
 son made the acquaintance of Patrick Henry, then 
 a rather unprosperous, hilarious, unknown young 
 countryman, just admitted to the bar, though pro- 
 foundly ignorant of law. An intimacy sprang up 
 between them, and when Henry became a member 
 of the House of Burgesses he often shared Jeffer- 
 son’s chambers at Williamsburg. From them he 
 went, in May, 1T65, to utter that ringing speech 
 against taxation without representation which made 
 him for a time foremost among Virginian patriots. 
 In the doorway of the hall stood Jefferson, an en- 
 tranced listener, thinking that Henry spoke “as 
 Homer wrote.” The magnetic influence of this 
 brilliant friend would have transformed a more 
 loyally disposed youth than Jefferson into an arrant 
 rebel. But no influence was needed for this pur- 
 pose ; Jefferson was by nature a bold and free 
 thinker, wanting rather ballast than canvas. As 
 he watched the course of public events in those 
 years when the germs of the Revolution were swell- 
 ing and quickening in the land, all his sympathies 
 »ere warmly enlisted with the party of resistance. 
 
16 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 By the year 1768, when the advent of a new gov- 
 ernor made necessary the election of a new House 
 of Burgesses, he already craved the opportunity to 
 take an active part in affairs, and at once offered 
 himself as a candidate for Albemarle County. He 
 kept open house, distributed limitless punch, stood 
 by the polls, politely bowing to every voter who 
 named him, all according to the Virginian fashion 
 of the day, 1 and had the good fortune, by these 
 meritorious efforts, to win success. On May 11, 
 1769, he took his seat. Lord Botetourt delivered 
 his quasi-royal speech, and J eff erson drew the reso- 
 lutions constituting the basis of the reply ; but 
 afterward, being deputed to draw the reply itself, 
 he suffered the serious mortification of having his 
 document rejected. On the third day the burgesses 
 passed another batch of resolutions, so odiously like 
 a Bill of Rights that the governor, much perturbed 
 in his loyal mind, dissolved them at once. The 
 next day they eked out this brief term of service 
 by meeting in the “ Apollo,” or long room of the 
 Raleigh tavern, where eighty-eight of them, of 
 whom Jefferson was one, formed a non-importation 
 league as against British merchandise. All the 
 signers of this document were at once reelected 
 by their constituents. 
 
 In March, 1773, the burgesses again came to- 
 gether in no good humor. The destruction of the 
 Gaspee in Narragansett Bay had led to a draconic 
 act of Parliament whereby any colonist, destroying 
 
 1 See Parton’s description, in his Life of Jefferson, p. 88. 
 
IN THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES 
 
 17 
 
 so much as “the button of a mariner’s coat,” might 
 be carried to England for trial and punished with 
 death. Upon the assembling of the burgesses, Jef- 
 ferson and some five or six others, “ not thinking 
 onr old and leading members up to the point of 
 forwardness and zeal which the times required,” 
 met privately in consultation. The offspring of 
 their conference was a standing committee charged 
 to correspond with like committees which the sister 
 colonies were invited to appoint. An idle contro- 
 versy has arisen as to whether Massachusetts or 
 Virginia was first to devise this system of corre- 
 spondence. Jefferson long afterward averred that 
 Virginia was the earlier, and the evidence favors 
 the substantial correctness of his statement; for, 
 though Massachusetts had suggested the idea some 
 two years before, she had not pushed it, and the 
 suggestion, known to few, had been forgotten by 
 all. It naturally resulted from this proceeding 
 that the burgesses were at once dissolved by the 
 Earl of Dunmore. But the committee met on the 
 next day and issued their circular of invitation. 
 
 A year later, in the spring of 1774, news of the 
 Boston Port Bill came while the burgesses were 
 in session. Again Jefferson and some half dozen 
 more, feeling that “ the lead in the House on these 
 subjects [should] no longer be left with the old 
 members,” and agreeing that they “ must boldly 
 take an unequivocal stand in the line with Massa- 
 chusetts,” 1 met in secret to devise proper measures. 
 
 1 The march of events, Jefferson afterward wrote, “favored 
 
18 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 They determined to appoint a day of fasting and 
 prayer, and in the House they succeeded in carry- 
 ing a resolution to that effect. Again the gov- 
 ernor dissolved them ; again they went over to the 
 “ Apollo,” and again passed there most disloyal 
 resolutions. Among these was one requesting the 
 Committee of Correspondence to consult the other 
 colonies on the expediency of holding annually a 
 general congress ; also another, for the meeting of 
 representatives from the counties of Virginia in 
 convention at Williamsburg on August 1. The 
 freeholders of Albemarle elected Jefferson again a 
 burgess, and also a deputy to this convention. 
 
 Jefferson started to attend the meeting of the 
 convention, but upon the road was taken so ill 
 with a dysentery that he could not go on. He 
 therefore forwarded a draft of instructions, such 
 as he hoped to see given by that body to the dele- 
 gates whom it was to send to the general con- 
 gress of the colonies. One cop}*- of this document 
 was sent to Patrick Henry, who, however, “ com- 
 
 the bolder spirits of Henry, the Lees, Pages, Mason, etc., with 
 whom I went at all points. Sensible, however, of the importance 
 of unanimity among our, constituents, although we often wished 
 to have gone faster, we slackened our pace that our less ardent 
 colleagues might keep up with us ; and they on their part, differ- 
 ing nothing from us in principle, quickened their gait somewhat 
 beyond that which their prudence might, of itself, have advised, 
 and thus consolidated the phalanx which breasted the power of 
 Britain. By this harmony of the bold with the cautious, we ad- 
 vanced with our constituents, in undivided mass, and with fewer 
 examples of separation than, perhaps, existed in any other part of 
 the Union.” 
 
IN THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES 
 
 19 
 
 municated it to nobody ; ” perhaps, says Jefferson, 
 “ because be disapproved the ground taken,” per- 
 haps “because be was too lazy to read it.” An- 
 other copy was sent with better fortune to Peyton 
 Randolph, president of the convention. It was 
 laid by him upon the table, was read by the mem- 
 bers, and was so well liked that it was printed in 
 pamphlet form under the title of “A Summary 
 View of the Rights of British America ; ” in this 
 shape it was sent over to Great Britain, was there 
 “ taken up by the opposition, interpolated a little 
 by Mr. Burke,” and then extensively circulated, 
 running “ rapidly through several editions.” 
 
 Naturally that was the era of manifestoes in 
 the colonies, and many pens were busy preparing 
 documents, public and private, famous and neg- 
 lected, but nearly all sound, spirited, generalizing, 
 and declamatory. Jefferson’s instructions did not 
 wholly escape the prevalent faults, and had their 
 share of rodomontade about the rights of freemen 
 and the oppressions of monarchs. But these were 
 slight blemishes in a paper singularly radical, au- 
 dacious, and well argued. The migration of the 
 “ Saxon ancestors ” of the present English people, 
 he said, had been made “ in like manner with that 
 of the British immigrants to the American col- 
 onies.” 
 
 “ Nor was ever any claim of superiority or depend- 
 ence asserted over [the English] by that Mother Coun- 
 try from which they had migrated ; and were such a 
 claim made, it is believed his Majesty’s subjects in 
 
20 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 Great Britain have too firm a feeling of the rights de- 
 rived to them from their ancestors, to bow down the 
 sovereignty of their State before such visionary preten- 
 sions. And it is thought that no circumstance has oc- 
 curred to distinguish materially the British from the 
 Saxon emigration. America was conquered and her 
 settlements made and firmly established at the expense 
 of individuals, and not of the British public.” 
 
 This was laying the axe at the very root of the 
 tree with tolerable force ; and more blows of the 
 same sort followed. The connection undeniably 
 existing between the colonies and the mother coun- 
 try was reduced to a minimum by an ingenious 
 explanation. The emigrants, Jefferson said, had 
 “ thought proper ” to “ continue their union with 
 England ” “ by submitting themselves to the same 
 sovereign,” who was a “ central link ” or “ media- 
 tory power ” between “ the several parts of the em- 
 pire,” so that “ the relation between Great Britain 
 and these colonies was exactly the same as that of 
 England and Scotland after the accession of James 
 and until the union, and the same as her present 
 relations with Hanover, having the same executive 
 chief, but no other necessary connection.” The 
 corollary was “ that the Bi'itish Parliament has no 
 right to exercise authority over us,” and when it 
 endeavored to do so “ one free and independent 
 legislature ” took upon itself “ to suspend the pow- 
 ers of another, free and independent as itself.” 
 
 These were revolutionary words, and fell short 
 by ever so little of that direct declaration of inde- 
 
IN THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES 
 
 21 
 
 pendence which they anticipated by less than two 
 years. They would have cost Jefferson his head ' 
 had it been less inconvenient to bring him to West- 
 minster Hall, and even that inconvenience would 
 probably have been overcome had forcible opposi- 
 tion been a little longer deferred in the colonies. 
 As it was, the pamphlet “ procured him the honor 
 of having his name inserted in a long list of pro- 
 scriptions enrolled in a hill of attainder commenced 
 in one of the houses of Parliament, but suppressed 
 in embryo by the hasty step of events, which 
 warned them to be a little cautious.” 
 
 One can hardly be surprised that this Jefferson- 
 ian “ leap was too long, as yet, for the mass of 
 our citizens,” and that “ tamer sentiments were 
 preferred ” by the convention. Jefferson himself 
 frankly admitted, many years afterward, that the 
 preference was wise. But his colleagues so well 
 liked a boldness somewhat in excess of their own, 
 that six months later, in view of the chance of 
 Peyton Eandolph being called away from service 
 in the Colonial Congress, they elected Jefferson as ^ 
 a deputy to fill the vacancy in case it should occur. 
 Not many weeks later it did occur. But Jefferson 
 was detained for a short time in order to draw the 
 reply of the burgesses to the celebrated “concil- 
 iatory proposition,” or so-called “ olive branch,” 
 of Lord North. Otherwise it was “ feared that 
 Mr. Nicholas, whose mind was not yet up to the 
 mark of the times,” would undertake it. On June 
 10, 1775, the burgesses accepted Jefferson’s draft 
 
22 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 “ with long and doubtful scruples from Nicholas 
 and Mercer,” only making some slight amendments 
 which Jefferson described as “ throwing a dash of 
 cold water on it here and there, enfeebling it some- 
 what.” The day after its passage Jefferson set 
 forth to take his seat in Congress, hearing with 
 him the document, which had been anxiously ex- 
 pected by that body as being the earliest reply 
 from any colony to the ministerial proposition. Its 
 closing paragraph referred the matter for ultimate 
 action to the general congress. 
 
 # 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 IN CONGRESS 
 
 Jefferson arrived in Philadelphia on the tenth 
 day of his journey, and on June 21 became one of 
 that assembly concerning which Lord Chatham 
 truly said that its members had never been ex- 
 celled “ in solidity of reasoning, force of sagacity, 
 and wisdom of conclusion.” Jefferson, at the age 
 of thirty-two, was among the younger deputies 1 in 
 a body which, by the aid of Dr. Franklin, aged 
 seventy-one, and Edward Rutledge, aged twenty- 
 six, represented all the adult generations of the 
 country. He brought with him a considerable 
 reputation as a ready and eloquent writer, and was 
 justly expected, by his counsel, his pen, and his 
 vote, to bring substantial reinforcement to the 
 more advanced party. In debate, however, not 
 much was to be anticipated from him, for he was 
 never able to talk even moderately well in a delib- 
 erative body. Not only was his poor voice an im- 
 pediment, but he was a man who instinctively 
 abhorred contest. Daringly as he wrote, yet he 
 
 1 Not, as he himself with wonted inaccuracy says, “the young- 
 est man hut one ; ” for besides Edward Rutledge, horn in 1749, 
 there was also John Jay, bom in 1745. 
 
24 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 shrank from that contention which pitted him face 
 to face against another, though the only weapons 
 were the “ winged words ” of parliamentary argu- 
 mentation. Turmoil and confusion he detested ; 
 amid wrangling and disputing he preferred to be 
 silent ; it was in conversation, in the committee- 
 room, and preeminently when he had pen, ink, and 
 paper before him, that he amply justified his pre- 
 sence among the threescore chosen ones of the thir- 
 teen colonies. In his appropriate depai'tment he 
 quickly superseded Jay as document- writer to Con- 
 gress. 
 
 Yet his first endeavor did not point to this dis- 
 tinction. When news of the fight at Bunker’s 
 Hill arrived in Philadelphia, Congress felt obliged 
 to publish a manifesto setting before the world the 
 justification of this now bloody rebellion. Jeffer- 
 son, as a member of the committee, undertook to 
 draw the paper ; but he made it much too vigor- 
 ous for the conciliatory and anxious temper of 
 Dickinson ; so that, partly out of regard for this 
 courteous and popular gentleman, partly from a 
 politic desire not to outstrip too far the slower 
 ranks, Jefferson’s sheets were submitted to Dick- 
 inson himself for revision. Not content with mod- 
 ification, that reluctant patriot prepared an entire 
 substitute which was reported and accepted. But 
 its closing four and one half clauses were borrowed 
 from the draft of Jefferson, whose admirers think 
 that these alone save the document from being 
 altogether feeble and inadequate. Among them 
 
IN CONGRESS 
 
 25 
 
 were tlie following significant words : “We mean 
 not to dissolve that union which has so long and 
 so happily subsisted between us, and which we sin- 
 cerely wish to see restored. Necessity has not yet 
 [note the pregnant word] driven us into that de- 
 sperate measure.” 1 
 
 A month afterward Jefferson had better luck 
 with his composition. He was second on the com- 
 mittee — of which the members were chosen by 
 ballot and took rank according to the number of 
 votes received by them respectively — deputed to 
 draw the reply of Congress to Lord North’s “ con- 
 ciliatory proposition.” He based his paper on the 
 reply already drawn by him for the Virginian bur- 
 gesses, and was gratified by seeing it readily ac- 
 cepted. A few days later Congress adjourned, and 
 Jefferson resumed his seat and duties in the state 
 convention, by which he was at once reelected to 
 Congress, this time standing third on the list of 
 delegates. 
 
 Much time has been wasted in idle efforts to 
 determine precisely when and by whom the idea 
 of separation and consequent independence of the 
 
 1 The authorship of these closing paragraphs has been denied 
 to Jefferson and attributed to Dickinson. But the evidence 
 would establish only a small measure of probability in favor of 
 Dickinson, if it stood wholly uneontradicted ; and it utterly fails 
 to meet and control Jefferson’s direct assertion, made in his Auto- 
 biography, p. 11, that these words were retained from his own 
 draft. The anxiety to claim them for Dickinson shows the com- 
 parative estimation in which they are held. See Magazine of 
 Amer. Hist. viii. 514. 
 
26 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 provinces was first broached before the Colonial 
 Congress. The inquiry is useless for many rea- 
 sons, but conclusively so because all the evidence 
 which the world is ever likely to see has been 
 already adduced, and has not sufficed to remove 
 the question out of the domain of discussion. The 
 truth is that, while no intelligent man could help 
 contemplating this probable conclusion, all depre- 
 cated it, many with more of anxiety than resolu- 
 tion, but not a few with a more daring spirit. In 
 varying moods any person might have different 
 feelings on different days. In his habitual frame 
 of mind Jefferson thought separation to be daily 
 approaching, and in the near presence of so mo- 
 mentous an event he was so far grave and dubious 
 as to express a strong disinclination for it, though 
 avowedly preferring it with all its possible train of 
 woes to a continuance of the present oppression. 
 He was too thoughtful not to be a reluctant revolu- 
 tionist, but for the same reason he was sure to be 
 a determined one. His relative, John Randolph, 
 attorney-general of the colony, was a loyalist, and 
 in the summer of 1775 was about to remove to 
 England. Jefferson wrote him a friendly, serious 
 letter, suggesting some considerations which he 
 hoped that Randolph might have opportunity to 
 lay before the English government, advantageously 
 for both parties. He deprecates the present “ con- 
 tention” and the “continuance of confusion,” which 
 for him constitute, “ of all states but one , the most 
 horrid.” He says that England 
 
IN CONGRESS 
 
 27 
 
 “would be certainly unwise, by trying the event of 
 another campaign, to risk our accepting a foreign aid, 
 which perhaps may not be obtainable but on condition 
 of everlasting avulsion from Great Britain. This would 
 be thought a hard condition to those who still wish for 
 a reunion with their parent country. I am sincerely 
 one of those, and would rather be in dependence on 
 Great Britain, properly limited, than on any other nation 
 on earth, or than on no nation. But I am one of those, 
 too, who, rather than submit to the rights of legislating 
 for us assumed by the British Parliament, and which late 
 experience has shown they will so cruelly exercise, would 
 lend my hand to sink the whole island in the ocean.” 
 
 This was written August 25, 1775 ; three months 
 later he wrote, with a perceptible increase of feel- 
 ing : — 
 
 “It is an immense misfortune to the whole empire to 
 have a king of such a disposition at such a time. . . . 
 In an earlier part of this contest our petitions told him 
 that from our King there was but one appeal. The ad- 
 monition was despised and that appeal forced on us. To 
 undo his empire, he has but one truth more to learn, — 
 that, after colonies have drawn the sword, there is but 
 one step more they can take. That step is now pressed 
 upon us by the measures adopted, as if they were afraid 
 we would not take it. Believe me, dear sir, there is not 
 in the British Empire a man who more cordially loves a 
 union with Great Britain than I do. But by the God 
 that made me, I will cease to exist before I yield to 
 a connection on such terms as the British Parliament 
 proposes ; and in this I think I speak the sentiments 
 of America. We want neither inducement nor power to 
 
28 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 declare and assert a separation. It is will alone tliat is 
 wanting, and that is growing apace under the fostering 
 hand of our King. One bloody campaign will probably 
 decide, everlastingly, our future course ; and I am sorry 
 to find a bloody campaign is decided on.” 
 
 In the autumn of 1775 Jefferson was again at- 
 tending Congress in Philadelphia; early in 1776 
 he came home ; but on May 13, 1776, he was back 
 in his seat as a delegate from the Colony, soon to 
 be the State, of Virginia. Events, which ten years 
 ago had begun a sort of glacial movement, slow 
 and powerful, were now advancing fast. On this 
 side of the Atlantic, Thomas Paine had sent “ Com- 
 mon Sense ” abroad among the people, and had 
 stirred them profoundly. Since the bloodshed at 
 Lexington and Charlestown, Falmouth had been 
 burned, Norfolk bombarded, and General Wash- 
 ington, concluding triumphantly the leaguer around 
 Boston, was as open and efficient an enemy of Eng- 
 land as if he had been a Frenchman or a Spaniard. 
 
 It was time to transmute him from a rebel into 
 a foreigner. Nor had the members of Congress 
 any chance of escaping the hangman’s rope unless 
 this alteration could be accomplished for all the 
 colonists. For all prominent men, alike in mili- 
 tary and in civil life, it was now independence ox- 
 destruction. Virginia instructed her delegates to 
 move that Congress should declare “ the United 
 Colonies fi-ee and independent States,” and on 
 June 7 Richard Henry Lee offered resolutions ac- 
 cordingly. In debate upon these on June 8 and 
 
IN CONGRESS 
 
 29 
 
 10, it appeared, says Jefferson, that certain of the 
 colonies “ were not yet matured for falling from 
 the parent stem, but that they were fast advancing 
 to that state.” To give the laggards time to catch 
 up with the vanguard, further discussion was post- 
 poned imtil July 1. But to prevent loss of time, 
 when debate should be resumed, Congress on June 
 11 appointed a committee charged to prepare a 
 Declaration of Independence, so that it might be 
 ready at once when it should be wanted. The 
 members, in the order of choice by ballot, were : 
 Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Frank- 
 lin, Roger Sherman, and Robert R. Livingston. 
 
 For the last hundred years one of the first facts 
 taught to any child of American birth is, that 
 J eff erson wrote . the Declaration of Independence. 
 The original draft in his handwriting was afterward 
 deposited in the State Department. It shows two 
 or three trifling alterations, interlined in the hand- 
 writings of Franklin and Adams. Otherwise it 
 came before Congress precisely as Jefferson wrote 
 it. Many years afterward John Adams gave an 
 account of the way in which Jefferson came to be 
 the composer of this momentous document, differ- 
 ing^slightly from the story told by Jefferson. But 
 the variance is immaterial, hardly greater than any 
 experienced lawyer would expect to find between 
 the testimony of two honest witnesses to any trans- 
 action, especially when given after the lapse of 
 many years, and when one at least had no memo- 
 randa for refreshing his memory. Jefferson’s state- 
 
30 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 ment seems the better entitled to credit, and what 
 little corroboration is to be obtained for either nar- 
 rator is wholly in his favor. He says simply that 
 when the committee came together he was pressed 
 by his colleagues unanimously to undertake the 
 draft ; that he did so ; that, when he had prepared 
 it, he submitted it to Dr. Franklin and Mr. Adams, 
 separately, requesting their corrections, “ which 
 were two or three only and merely verbal,” “ inter- 
 lined in their own handwritings ; ” that the report 
 in this shape was adopted by the committee, and 
 a “ fair copy,” written out by Mr. Jefferson, was 
 then laid before Congress. 
 
 A somewhat more interesting discussion concerns 
 the question, how Jefferson came to be named first 
 on the committee, to the entire exclusion of Lee, to 
 whom, as mover of the resolution, parliamentary 
 etiquette would have assigned the chairmanship. 
 Many explanations have been given, of which some 
 at least appear the outgrowth of personal likings 
 and dislikings. It is certain that Jefferson was 
 not only preeminently fitted for the very difficult 
 task of this peculiar composition, but also that he 
 was a man without an enemy. His abstinence 
 from any active share in debate had saved him 
 from giving irritation ; and it is a truth not to be 
 concealed, that there were cabals, bickerings, heart- 
 burnings, perhaps actual enmities, among the mem- 
 bers of that famous body, which, grandly as it 
 looms up, and rightly too, in the mind’s eye, was 
 after all composed of jarring human ingredients. 
 
IN CONGRESS 
 
 31 
 
 It was well believed that there was a faction op- 
 posed to Washington, and it was generally sus- 
 pected that irascible, vain, and jealous John Adams, 
 then just rising from the ranks of the people, made 
 in this matter common cause with the aristocratic 
 Virginian Lees against their fellow countryman. 
 Adams frankly says that he himself was very un- 
 popular ; and therefore it did not help Lee to be 
 his friend. Furthermore, the anti- Washingtonians 
 were rather a clique or faction than a party, and 
 were greatly outnumbered. Jay, too, had his little 
 private pique against Lee. So it is likely enough 
 that a timely illness of Lee’s wife was a fortunate 
 excuse for passing him by, and that partly by rea- 
 son of admitted aptitude, partly because no risk 
 could be run of any interference of personal feel- 
 ings in so weighty a matter, Jefferson was placed 
 first on the committee with the natural result of 
 doing the bulk of its labor. 
 
 On July 1, pursuant to assignment, Congress, 
 in committee of the whole, resumed consideration 
 of Mr. Lee’s resolution, and carried it by the votes 
 of nine colonies. South Carolina and Pennsylvania 
 voted against it. The two delegates from Delaware 
 were divided. Those from New York said that per- 
 sonally they were in favor of it and believed their 
 constituents to be so, but they were hampered by 
 instructions drawn a twelvemonth since and strictly 
 forbidding any action obstructive of reconciliation, 
 which was then still desired. The committee re- 
 ported, and then Edward Rutledge moved an ad- 
 
32 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 journment to the next day, when his colleagues, 
 though disapproving the resolution, would prob- 
 ably join in it for the sake of unanimity. This 
 motion was carried, and on the day following the 
 South Carolinians were found to be converted ; 
 also a third member “ had come post from the 
 Delaware counties ” and caused the vote of that 
 colony to be given with the rest ; Pennsylvania 
 changed her vote ; and a few days later the con- 
 vention of New York approved the resolution, 
 “ thus supplying the void occasioned by the with- 
 drawing of her delegates from the vote.” 
 
 On the same day, July 2, the House took up Mr. 
 Jefferson’s draft of the Declaration, and debated 
 it during that and the following day and until a 
 late hour on July 4. Many verbal changes were 
 made, most of which were conducive to closer ac- 
 curacy of statement, and were improvements. Two 
 or three substantial amendments were made by the 
 omission of passages ; notably there was stricken 
 out a passage in which George III. was denounced 
 for encouraging the slave trade. It was thought 
 disingenuous to attack him for tolerating a traffic 
 conducted by Northern shipowners and sustained 
 by Southern purchasers, though it was true that 
 sundry attempts of the Southern colonies to check 
 it by legislation had been brought to naught by the 
 king’s refusal or neglect to ratify the enactments. 
 Congress also struck out the passage in which Jef- 
 ferson declared that the hiring of foreign mercena- 
 ries by the English must “ bid us renounce forever 
 
IN CONGRESS 
 
 33 
 
 these unfeeling brethren,” and cause us to “ en- 
 deavor to forget our former love for them, and 
 hold them as we hold the rest of mankind, enemies 
 in war, in peace friends.” It was thought better 
 to say nothing which could be construed as an an- 
 imadversion on the English people. No interpo- 
 lation of any consequence was made. 
 
 Jefferson had ample cause to congratulate him- 
 self upon this event of the discussion. While it 
 was in progress and his paper was undergoing 
 sharp criticism during nearly three days, he felt 
 far from cheerful. He himself spoke not a word 
 in the debate, partly, perhaps, from a sense of in- 
 capacity to hold his own in so strenuous a contest^ 
 of tongues, but also deeming it a “ duty to be . . . 
 a passive auditor of the opinions of others, more 
 impartial judges.” Dr. Franklin sat by him, and, 
 seeing him “ -writhing a little under the acrimoni- 
 ous criticisms on some of its parts,” told him, “ by 
 way of comfort,” the since famous story of the 
 sign of John Thompson, the hatter. The burden 
 of argument, from which Jefferson wisely shrank, 
 was gallantly borne by John Adams, whom Jeffer- 
 son gratefully called “ the colossus of that debate.” 
 Jefferson used afterward to take pleasure in tinge- 
 ing the real solemnity of the occasion with a color- 
 ing of the ludicrous. The debate, he said, seemed 
 as though it might run on interminably, and prob- 
 ably would have done so at a different season of 
 the year. But the weather was oppressively warm 
 and the room occupied by the deputies was hard 
 
34 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 by a stable, whence the hungry flies swarmed thick 
 and fierce, alighting on the legs of the delegates 
 and biting hard through their thin silk stockings. 
 Treason was preferable to discomfort, and the 
 members voted for the Declaration and hastened 
 to the table to sign it and escape from the horse- 
 fly. John Hancock, making his great familiar 
 signature, jestingly said that John Bull could read 
 that without spectacles ; then, becoming more seri- 
 ous, began to impi’ess on his comrades the neces- 
 sity of their “ all hanging together in this matter.” 
 “ Yes, indeed,” interrupted Franklin, “ we must 
 all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang 
 ^separately.” “ When it comes to the hanging,” 
 said Harrison, the “luxurious heavy gentleman” 
 from Virginia, to the little meagre Gerry of Mas- 
 sachusetts, “ I shall have the advantage of you ; it 
 will be all over with me, long before you have done 
 kicking in the air.” Amid such trifling, concealing 
 grave thoughts, Jefferson saw his momentous docu- 
 ment signed at the close of that summer afternoon ; 
 he had acted as undertaker for the royal colonies 
 and as midwife for the United States of America. 
 
 It is a work of supererogation to criticise a 
 paper with which seventy millions of people are 
 to-day as familiar as with the Lord’s Prayer. The 
 faults which it has are chiefly of style and are due 
 to the spirit of those times, a spirit bold, energetic, 
 sensible, independent, in action the very best, but 
 in talk and writing much too tolerant of broad and 
 high-sounding generalization. John Adams and 
 
IN CONGRESS 
 
 35 
 
 Pickering long afterward, when they had come 
 to hate Jefferson as a sort of political arch-fiend, 
 blamed it for lack of originality. Every idea in 
 it, they said, had become “ hackneyed ” and was 
 to be found in half a dozen earlier expressions of 
 public opinion. The assertion was equally true, 
 absurd, and malicious. No intelligent man could 
 suppose that the Americans had been concerned in 
 a rebellious discussion for years, and engaged in 
 actual war for months, without having fully com- 
 prehended the princqfles, the causes, and the justi- 
 fication on which their conduct was based. It was 
 preposterous to demand new discoveries in these 
 particulars. Had such been possible, they would 
 have been undesirable ; it would have been extreme 
 folly for Jefferson to open new and unsettling dis- 
 cussions at this late date. Of this charge against 
 his production Jefferson said, with perfect wisdom 
 and fairness, “ I did not consider it as any part of 
 my charge to invent new ideas altogether and to 
 offer no sentiment which had ever been expressed 
 before.” 
 
 The statement that all men are created “ equal ” 
 has been declared liable to misconstruction ; but 
 no intelligent man has ever misconstrued it, unless 
 intentionally. So the criticism may be disregarded 
 as trivial. Professor Tucker justly remarks of the 
 whole paper that it is “ consecrated in the affec- 
 tions of Americans, and praise may seem as super- 
 fluous as censure would be unavailing.” 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 AGAIN IN THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES 
 
 Jefferson was reelected to Congress on June 
 20, 1776, but declined to serve. At the time he 
 assigned as his reason “ the situation of his do- 
 mestic affairs ” and “ private causes,” into which 
 “ the delicacy of the House would not require him 
 to enter minutely.” Many years afterward he de- 
 clared a different motive : “ When I left Congress^ 
 in 1776, it was in the persuasion that our whole 
 code must be reviewed and adapted to our repub- 
 lican form of government, and now that we had 
 no negative of councils, governors, and kings, to 
 restrain us from doing right, that it should be cor- 
 rected in all its parts, with a single eye to reason 
 and the good sense of those for whose government 
 it was framed.” “ I knew that our legislation, 
 under the regal government, had many very vicious 
 points which urgently required reformation, and I 
 thought I could be of more use in forwarding that 
 work.” 
 
 The ex-colonies reorganized themselves in the 
 shape of independent states very readily. On 
 August 13, 1777, Jefferson wrote to Franklin tha r t, 
 “ with respect to the State of Virginia, . . . the 
 
AGAIN IN THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES 37 
 
 people seemed to have laid aside the monarchical, 
 and taken up the republican, government with as 
 much ease as would have attended their throwing 
 off an old and putting on a new suit of clothes, 
 w e are at present in the complete and quiet exer- 
 cise of well-organized government.” Times which 
 made this transfiguration so easy were naturally 
 ripe for other changes also? It was the era of 
 revolution, of destruction and re-creation, in orderly 
 fashion to be sure, so far as possible ; but still the 
 temper of the hour was favorable for a general 
 revision of all the established laws and forms of 
 society. The people were like a ploughed field in 
 which the political sower might scatter broadcast 
 new ideas and innovating doctrines with fair hope 
 of an early harvest. Jefferson, reformer and rad- 
 ical by nature, instinctively knew his opportunity 
 and went forth zealously to this task. Certainly 
 he cast strong and wholesome seed, and with lib- 
 eral hand, into the ready social furrows around 
 him. Much of his planting struck root at once ; 
 much more lay in the ground for a long period, so 
 that it was ten years before some of the bills intro- 
 duced by him during the two years of his service 
 were actually passed into laws ; only a little, unfor- 
 tunately, never fructified. The results of his labor 
 changed not only the surface but the fundamental 
 strata of the social and economical system of Vir- 
 ginia. Of course he did not accomplish so much 
 without assistance. George Mason, George Wythe, 
 and Madison, then a “ new member and young,” 
 
38 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 were efficient coadjutors. But they were coadjutors 
 and lieutenants only; Jefferson was the principal 
 and the leader. 
 
 On October 7, 1776, he took his seat in the 
 House of Delegates and at once was placed on 
 many committees. On October 11 he obtained 
 lea^e to bring in a bill establishing courts of jus- 
 tice throughout the new State. On the next day 
 he obtained leave to bring in a bill to enable ten- 
 ants in tail to convey entailed property in fee 
 simple. Two days later he reported a bill doing 
 away with the whole system of entail. It was an 
 audacious move. From generation to generation 
 lands and slaves — almost the only valuable kinds 
 of property in Virginia — had been handed down 
 protected against creditors, even against the very 
 extravagance of spendthrift owners ; and it was 
 largely by this means that the quasi-nobility of the 
 colony had succeeded in establishing and maintain- 
 ing itself. A great groan seemed to go up from 
 all respectable society at the terrible suggestion 
 of Jefferson, a suggestion daringly cast before an 
 Assembly thickly sprinkled with influential dele- 
 gates who were bound by family ties and self-inter- 
 est to defend the present system. Records of the 
 times fail to explain the sudden and surprising suc- 
 cess of a reform which there was every reason to 
 suppose could be carried through only very slowly 
 and by desperate contests ; we know little more 
 than the strange fact that the whole system of 
 entail in Virginia crashed to pieces almost literally 
 
AGAIN IN THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES 39 
 
 in a day, carrying with it an “ aristocracy ” some- 
 what brummagem, but the only one which has ever 
 existed in the territory now of the United States. 
 
 The cognate principle of primogeniture followed, 
 assailed by the same vigorous hand. At least, im- 
 plored Pendleton, if the eldest son may no longer 
 inherit all the lands and the slaves of his father, 
 let him take a double share. No, said Jefferson, 
 the leveler, not till he can eat a double allowance 
 of food and do a double allowance of work. So 
 an equal distribution of property was established 
 among the children of intestates ; and though any 
 one might still prefer by will an eldest son, yet 
 the effect of the law upon public opinion was so 
 great that all distinctions of this kind rapidly 
 faded away. 
 
 Thus was a great social revolution wrought in a 
 few months by one man. In his grandiose, human- 
 itarian, self -laudatory vein, Jefferson afterward 
 wrote that his purpose was, “ instead of an aris- 
 tocracy of wealth, of more harm and danger than 
 benefit to society, to make an opening for the aris- 
 tocracy of virtue and talent, which nature has 
 wisely provided for the direction of the interests 
 of society, and scattered with equal hand through 
 all its conditions.” But his brilliant triumph cost 
 him a price. That distinguished class, whose ex- 
 istence as a social caste had been forever destroyed, 
 reviled the destroyer from this time forth with 
 relentless animosity ; and, even to the second and 
 third generations, the descendants of many of these 
 
40 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 patrician families vindictively cursed the statesman 
 who had placed them on a level with the rest of 
 their countrymen. 
 
 Jefferson’s next important assault was upon the 
 Established Church. Jefferson’s religious views 
 have given no small trouble to his biographers, 
 who have been at much pains to make him out a 
 sound Christian in the teeth of many charges of 
 free-thinking. There is little evidence to show 
 what his belief was at this period of his life. Cer- 
 tainly he did not flout or openly reject Christian- 
 ity ; not improbably he had a liberal tolerance for 
 its tenets rather than any profound faith in them. 
 On August 10, 1787, in a letter of advice to his 
 young ward, Peter Carr, he dwelt upon religion at 
 much length, telling Carr to examine the question 
 independently. He added instructions so colorless 
 that they resemble the charge of a carefully impar- 
 tial judge to a jury. But in this especial matter 
 labored impartiality usually signifies a negative 
 prejudice. At least Jefferson showed that he did 
 not regard Christianity as so established a truth 
 that it was to be asserted dogmatically, and though 
 he so cautiously seeks to conceal his own bias, yet 
 one instinctively feels that this letter was not writ- 
 ten by a believer. Had he believed, in the proper 
 sense of the word, he would have been unable to 
 place a very young man midway between the two 
 doors of belief and unbelief, setting both wide 
 open, and furnishing no indication as to which led 
 to error. Yet, as any inference may possibly be 
 
AGAIN IN THE ftoUSE OF BURGESSES 41 
 
 wrong, it is perhaps safer to admit that the prob- 
 lem of his present faith or unfaith is not surely 
 soluble, and to rest content with saying — what 
 alone is now necessary — that he certainly viewed 
 with just abhorrence the mediaeval condition of 
 religious legislation in Virginia in 1777. 
 
 He set about the task of clearing away this dead 
 wood no less vigorously and extensively than he 
 had hewed at the obstructive social timbers. But, 
 strange to say, the apparently sapless limbs gave 
 the stouter resistance. He aimed at complete re- 
 ligious freedom, substantially such as now exists 
 throughout the United States ; hut he was able 
 only to induce a legislature, in which churchmen 
 largely predominated, to take some initial steps in 
 that direction. Yet the impetus which he gave, 
 refreshed by others during a few succeeding years, 
 at last brought the law-makers to the goal, so that 
 in 1786 the full length of his reform was reached 
 and his original “ bill for establishing religious 
 freedom ” was passed, with immaterial amend- 
 ments. 
 
 Here again it is to be said that Jefferson was in 
 that position in which alone he ever won success ; 
 he was the mouthpiece of multitudes too numerous 
 not to be heard, the leader of a popular movement 
 too massive to he obstructed. The majority of 
 citizens were dissenters from the established Epis- 
 copal Church, and were resolved no longer to con- , 
 tribute of their funds for its support. Jefferson 
 says that “ the first republican legislature . . • 
 
42 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 was crowded with petitions to abolish this spiritual 
 tyranny.” This fact gave him the strength that 
 he needed. He only required, but he always did 
 require, that confidence and inspiration which 
 came to him from the sense of having at his back 
 largely superior numbers : it mattered not that 
 they were ignorant, so that they were much the 
 greater number. It is impossible to imagine Jef- 
 ferson combating a popular error, controlling a 
 mistaken people, encountering a great clamor of 
 the masses. From these earliest days of his pub- 
 lic career we find him always moving and feeling 
 with the huge multitude, catching with sensitive 
 ear the deep mutterings of its will, long before the 
 inarticulate sound was intelligible to others in high 
 places, encouraged by its later and hoarser outcry, 
 gathering his force and power from its presence, 
 his incentive and persistence from its laudation. 
 
 Almost immediately after taking his seat among 
 the delegates, Jefferson had been placed at the 
 head of a committee of five, charged with the gen- 
 eral revision of all the laws of Virginia. It was 
 an enormous task, of which he did much more 
 than his just share. Some of the legislation re- 
 ferred to in the preceding pages found its place 
 in the report of this committee. Other important 
 matters, also included in the same report, can only 
 be mentioned. The seat of government was re- 
 moved from the commercial metropolis of Wil- 
 liamsburg to the small but central village of Rich- 
 mond. The like principle has since prevailed in 
 
AGAIN IN THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES 43 
 
 tlie selection of much the largest proportion of our 
 state capitals. A bill for promoting the prompt 
 naturalization of foreigners gave form to the sub- 
 sequent practice of the country in this matter, and 
 was onty blameworthy because it failed to protect 
 against a large and easy admission by checks of 
 fitness in the way of knowledge and intelligence. 
 Like much of Jefferson’s work it was too demo- 
 cratic, as if all men must be fit for all things ; 
 also, like some of his work, it was not justified by 
 his own principles declared at other times when 
 his thoughts happened to be taking a different 
 direction. A code of punishment for crime was 
 drawn up, which was a vast improvement upon 
 the merciless severity of preceding laws, but which 
 retained to an unjustifiable extent and against the 
 wishes of Jefferson the principle of retaliation. 
 An elaborate school system was also devised ; but 
 the narrow prejudice of the rich planters pre- 
 vented it from ever being fully adopted and pro- 
 perly set in working order. 
 
 As has been intimated, this mass of legislation, 
 of which only the more promiijent portions have 
 been mentioned, was not all enacted during the 
 two years of Jefferson’s presence in the House of 
 Delegates. Much of it, notably in the criminal 
 department, lay untouched for a long time ; but 
 the laws reported by Jefferson formed a sort of 
 reservoir from which the legislature drew from 
 time to time, during many following years, so 
 much as they had leisure or inclination to use. It 
 
44 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 was not until the close of the Revolutionary war 
 that leisure was found really to finish the whole 
 business. But when at last the end was reached, 
 few serious alterations had been made ; and though 
 it would be an exaggeration to assert that by 1786- 
 87 the statute-book of Virginia had become a Jef- 
 fersonian code, yet it is within the truth to say 
 that the impress of his mind was in every part of 
 the volume, and that especially the social legisla- 
 tion was due chiefly to his influence. 
 
 Only in one grave matter — gravest, indeed, of 
 all — he and a few humane and noble coadjutors 
 encountered an utter defeat, which cost Virginia a 
 great price of retribution in years thereafter. This 
 concerned negro slavery. Though Jefferson did 
 not, like his friend Wythe, emancipate his own 
 slaves, yet from his early years he had been 
 strongly opposed to slavery, as were many of the 
 best and wisest Virginians of that day. Now the 
 committee of revisers, pondering deeply on this 
 difficult problem, and having it very much in their 
 hearts to cleanse their State from a malady which 
 they foresaw must otherwise prove fatal, contented 
 themselves in the first instance with returning in 
 their report a “ mere digest of the existing laws 
 . . . without any intimation of a plan for a future 
 and genei’al emancipation. It was thought better 
 that this should be kept back, and attempted only 
 by way of amendment, whenever the bill should be 
 brought on. The principles of the amendment, 
 however, were agreed on, that is to say, the free- 
 
AGAIN IN THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES 45 
 
 dom of all born after a certain day, and deporta- 
 tion at a proper age.” But all this strategy was 
 of no avail. “ It was found that the public mind 
 would not yet bear the proposition, nor will it bear 
 it even to this day; yet,” continues Jefferson, writ- 
 ing in his autobiography in 1821 , “ the day is not 
 distant when it must bear and adopt it, or worse 
 will follow. Nothing is more certainly written in 
 the book of fate than that these people are to be 
 free.” How fortunate would it have been for Vir- 
 ginia could she have been persuaded by the words 
 spoken by her son, wise beyond his time, and by 
 his fellow prophets in this great cause ! 
 
 Yet when one examines Jefferson’s scheme in its 
 details, its primordial destiny of failure becomes at 
 once evident. His project was as follows : All 
 negroes born of slave parents after the passing of 
 the act were to be free, but to a certain age were 
 to remain with their parents, and were “ then to 
 be brought up at the public expense to tillage, 
 arts, or sciences, according to their geniuses, till 
 the females should be eighteen and the males 
 twenty-one' vears of age, when they should be colo- 
 nized to such place as the circumstances of the 
 time should render most proper, sending them out 
 with arms, implements of household and of the 
 handicraft arts, seeds, pairs of the useful domestic 
 animals, etc.” The United States were then “to 
 declare them a free and independent people, and 
 extend to them our alliance and protection, till 
 they have acquired strength ; and to send vessels 
 
46 
 
 ' THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 at the same time to other parts of the world for an 
 equal number of white inhabitants, to induce whom 
 to migrate hither proper encouragements were to 
 be proposed.” 
 
 In the notion that such a costly and elaborate 
 scheme might be carried into effect we get a mani- 
 festation of the most dangerous weakness of Jeffer- 
 son’s mind. His visionary tendency would thus 
 often get the better of his shrewder sense, and the 
 line of demarcation between the practicable and the 
 impracticable would then become shadowy or wholly 
 obliterated for him. In palliation it can only be 
 remembered that he lived in an age of social and 
 political theorizing, and that he was a man emi- 
 nently characteristic of his era, sensitive to its in- 
 fluences and broadly reflecting its blunders not less 
 than its wisdom. 
 
 Probably even at this early date the slavery 
 problem had become insoluble. Certainly Jeffer- 
 son’s opinions concerning the two races in their 
 possible relations towards each other rendered it 
 insoluble by him. His observation had thoroughly 
 convinced him of a truth, which all white men al- 
 ways have believed and probably always will be- 
 lieve in the private depths of their hearts, that the 
 negro is inferior to the white in mental capacity. 
 Yet, if this were so, a measure of inferiority much 
 greater than any one ventured to insist upon would 
 not justify the enslavement of the black men. It 
 was from another conviction that Jefferson’s prac- 
 tical difficulty arose ; he felt sure that “ the two 
 
AGAIN IN THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES 47 
 
 races, equally free, cannot live in tlie same govern- 
 ment.” The attempt, he predicted, would “ divide 
 Virginians into parties and produce convulsions 
 winch would probably never end but in the exter- 
 mination of the one or the other race.” Perhaps 
 in this he was wrong. Yet holding these two firm 
 convictions, it is impossible to see what better plan 
 he could have adopted than that which he did 
 adopt, impossible though it was of execution. At 
 least his prescience of a condition of things at 
 which, as he said, “human nature must shudder,” 
 proves his social and political foresight. 
 
 In connection with a topic which was destined 
 soon to become so important in the history of the 
 nation, a few words may be pardoned, though they 
 carry us for a moment away from the subject of 
 the Virginian reforms. Some ten years later Jef- 
 ferson wrote a letter to his friend M. de IV arville, 
 of Paris, which the abolitionists of a subsequent 
 generation were so fond of quoting that they made 
 it widely known. Therein he says : “ The whole 
 commerce between master and slave is a perpetual 
 exercise of the most boisterous passions ; the most 
 unremitting despotism on the one part and degrad- 
 ing submissions on the other. Our children see 
 this and learn to imitate it. With the morals of 
 the people their industry also is destroyed. For in 
 a warm climate no man will labor for himself who 
 can make another labor for him.” He then adds 
 this alarming suggestion, which has been often 
 repeated since his day : “ And can the liberties of 
 
48 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 a nation be thought secure when we have removed 
 their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of 
 the people that these liberties are of the gift of 
 God? That they are not to be violated but with 
 his wrath ? Indeed, I tremble for my country when 
 I reflect that God is just ; that his justice cannot 
 sleep forever ; that, considering numbers, nature 
 and natural means only, a revolution of the wheel of 
 fortune, an exchange of situation, is among possible 
 events ; that it may become probable by super- 
 natural interference ! The Almighty has no attri- 
 bute which can take side with us iu such a contest.” 
 This letter is not only interesting as an utterance 
 of Jefferson’s views concerning slavery, but also as 
 an indication of certain of his characteristics. It 
 is an excellent instance of the way in which his 
 pen was very apt to run away with him. The 
 suggestion by a man of his religious opinions, that 
 it might be reasonably anticipated that God would 
 at some time intervene to reverse the positions of 
 the white race and the black race, shows that emo- 
 tional tendency which often led him into utterances 
 by no means fit to encounter criticism. This fan- 
 ciful efflorescence of his notion that the two races, 
 equally free, could not exist side by side, was not 
 likely seriously to alarm men of practical minds. 
 On the other hand, the letter also manifested his 
 prudence in action in sharp contrast with his ex- 
 travagance in speech. For he declined to make 
 what might prove an embarrassing commitment 
 by joining the French society for the abolition of 
 
AGAIN IN THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES 49 
 
 the slave trade ; and he gave only the very thin 
 excuse that “ the influence and information of the 
 friends of this proposition in France will be far 
 above the need of my association.” Jefferson’s en- 
 thusiasm often carried him, with an impetuous rush, 
 to the edge of personal imprudence ; but he always 
 stopped short at the line. He distinguished with 
 perfect skill and self-control between extravagant 
 words and ill-advised acts. In reviewing Jeffer- 
 son’s position as to slavery, the fair conclusion 
 seems to be that he condemned it with the zeal 
 of one who was offended by its moral evils and who 
 feared its political perils, that he was honest in 
 advising his fellow citizens to enter upon a scheme 
 of abolition, and that he would have heartily aided 
 therein, but that so long as the community re- 
 frained from this step he, as an individual, did not 
 feel called upon to go farther than an occasional 
 expression of his views. 
 
 One practical measure he did carry. Virginia, 
 while still a colony , / ' had made many efforts, ren- 
 dered futile by royal obstruction, to stop the im- 
 portation of slaves. In 1778, “in the very first 
 session held under the republican government,” Jef- 
 ferson introduced a bill for this purpose which was 
 readily passed without ojjposition. With this he 
 was much and justly pleased, saying : “ It will in 
 some measure stop the increase of this great politi- 
 cal and moral evil, while the minds of our citizens 
 may be ripening for a complete emancipation of 
 human nature.” What he meant by this vague 
 
50 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 and absurd phrase, so characteristic of his habits 
 of expression, it is not easy to say, and for the 
 moment one almost forgets the high deserts of 
 the reformer in irritation at his chatter about “ the 
 complete emancipation of human nature.’* 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 GOVERNOR OE VIRGINIA 
 
 Patrick Henry, first governor of the independ- 
 ent State of Virginia, served, by reelections, three 
 successive years, and was then, by the Constitution, 
 ineligible for another term. In January, 1779, the 
 legislature chose Jefferson to succeed him on the 
 following June 1. The honor was not greatly to 
 he coveted, yet Jefferson found a competitor for it 
 in the friend of his youth, John Page, over whom 
 he triumphed by a very few votes. The old good 
 feeling between the two contestants was very cred- 
 itably preserved throughout the political campaign, 
 and perhaps by the time Jefferson left office he 
 would have been glad if Page had been the success- 
 ful candidate, and Page might rejoice at the oppo- 
 site conclusion. For in this chapter of Jefferson’s 
 life the task of his biographers has been to encoun- 
 ter the widespread impression that his administra- 
 tion was disgracefully inefficient. Mr. Randall 
 especially has discussed this matter elaborately, 
 and his facts and arguments, when rescued drip- 
 ping from the sea of rhetoric and fine wilting in 
 which he nearly drowns them, appear to establish 
 a satisfactory defense. Yet a man in public life 
 
52 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 does not achieve a complete success when he can be 
 defended against charges of gross incompetency; 
 and the negative assertion that Jefferson did not 
 make a bad governor is by no means equivalent to 
 the positive commendation that he made a really 
 good one. The truth is that he was not fitted to 
 be a “ war governor,” and though he did as well 
 as he could, he did not do so well as some others 
 might have done. 
 
 Until very nearly the close of Henry’s third 
 term, Virginia had enjoyed a happy immuni ty 
 from invasion. Otherwise, however, she had borne 
 her full share of patriotic burdens, and it may be 
 imagined that the willing steed, spurred for three 
 years by so hard a rider as Henry, was somewhat 
 breathless and exhausted when he left the saddle. 
 So, indeed, Jefferson found it. Men, horses, and 
 food, Virginia had lavishly given ; also arms and 
 money, so far as she had been able. At last the 
 point was close at hand at which further contribu- 
 tions involved such severe suffering that they must 
 inevitably come slowly and reluctantly. Neverthe- 
 less Jefferson’s sole business was to keep the stream 
 still flowing and replenished. At first he was able 
 to do surprisingly well. When he called for re- 
 cruits for Greene’s army in the Carolinas, many 
 farmers came gallantly forward from the already 
 sorely depleted fields. By September, 1780, there 
 were not muskets for the men who were willing to 
 march ; neither a shilling in the treasury ; wagons 
 and horses could be had only by impressment, a 
 
GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA 
 
 53 
 
 hazardous pressure to put upon a people fighting 
 for freedom. But it was inevitable, and it was 
 applied to all alike ; a wagon, a pair of horses, 
 and two negro drivers were taken fi'om Governor 
 Jefferson's own farm. A month later he hopes 
 the new levies “ will be all shod,” and cannot say 
 “ what proportion will have blankets,” though he 
 is purchasing “ every one which can be found out ; 
 there is a pi’ospect of furnishing about half of 
 them with tents.” 
 
 It was a cruel blow, soon after, to learn that a 
 large proportion of these scarce and valuable sup- 
 plies were destroyed or captured, and that Corn- 
 wallis, with his face set northward, was leading 
 a victorious army towards Virginia. It was an 
 almost miraculous good fortune which checked his 
 march a short distance from the border. But in 
 the moment of apprehension Jefferson was bitterly 
 blamed for having uselessly expended Virginian 
 resoui’ces in Carolina. The accusation was grossly 
 unjust. The governor had been perfectly right in 
 sending all the men and supplies he could muster 
 to the places where the fighting was going forward. 
 How else was the war to be maintained? What 
 better course could be devised, not only for secur- 
 ing a general and ultimate success, but also for 
 keeping actual war at a distance from Virginia? 
 The blunder would have been to send meagre sup- 
 plies, and retain a still insufficient reserve at home, 
 thus allowing the English to conquer in detail. 
 
 In another matter, more in his line, Jefferson 
 
54 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 again showed good judgment. The enterprising 
 frontier fighter, General George Rogers Clarke, by 
 a bold and soldierly movement in the far north- 
 western part of the State, captured the British 
 colonel Hamilton. This officer had been accused 
 of many atrocities, and though the charges prob- 
 ably outran the truth, yet Jefferson was justified 
 in believing him a guilty man . 1 He accordingly 
 ordered the colonel and two more officers to be 
 put in irons and closely confined. The British 
 general, Phillips, protested. Jefferson referred the 
 matter to Washington, who, with much hesitation 
 and apparent reluctance, advised a mitigation of 
 the extreme severity. But the dose was whole- 
 some, and Jefferson’s stern readiness to administer 
 it had a salutary effect. He had in his keeping a 
 large number of British prisoners, including many 
 of high rank ; and his avowed purpose, thus sub- 
 stantially enforced, to repay cruelty in kind and 
 to retaliate hangings, irons, close confinement, and 
 prison ships with identical measures upon his own 
 part, undoubtedly checked the brutal tendencies of 
 too many of the English officers. 
 
 Almost the last occurrence in Virginia under 
 Governor Henry’s administration had been a Brit- 
 ish raid. A dozen vessels landed some two thou- 
 sand troops, who burned and ravaged extensively 
 
 1 Professor Tucker in his Life of Jefferson undertakes to de- 
 fend Hamilton. But his defense amounts to little or nothing 
 more than that he knew Hamilton, and thought him quite too 
 good a fellow and too much of a gentleman to have been guilty 
 cf the behavior alleged against him. 
 
GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA 
 
 55 
 
 for a few days, wholly unmolested, and then re- 
 turned as they had come. The affair was a dan- 
 gerous indication to the English of the destruction 
 which they could easily accomplish in this great 
 reservoir of supplies. Yet it was not until late in 
 October, 1780, that they repeated the enterprise. 
 On the 22d of that month news came to Governor 
 Jefferson that a fleet of sixty sail had anchored in 
 Hampton Roads ; four of the vessels were armed, 
 while transports were putting on shore a land force 
 roughly estimated at upwards of twenty-five hun- 
 dred men. This was terrible intelligence in a 
 thinly-settled country, where it must be long before 
 an adequate defensive array could be assembled. 
 Yet even men were more plentiful than muskets, 
 and Jefferson sadly wrote : “ It is mortifying to 
 suppose that a people, able and zealous to contend 
 with their enemy, should be reduced to fold their 
 arms for want of the means of defense.” Two or 
 three weeks later “ the prospect of arms ” continued 
 to be “ very bad indeed.” Moreover, in Albemarle 
 County, hard by the anchorage ground, there were 
 some four thousand prisoners of war, Burgoyne’s 
 army, who had been consigned to Virginia for safe- 
 keeping. Cornwallis, having lately defeated Gates 
 badly at Camden, was less than one hundred and 
 fifty miles from the Virginian border. A messen- 
 ger from General Leslie, the commander of the 
 invading body, was captured, having in his mouth 
 a little quid containing a note to Cornwallis indi- 
 cating a plan to unite both armies. In such imuii- 
 
56 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 nent jeopardy the State and the governor stood 
 helpless, but ultimately were saved by good fortune 
 and lack of enterprise on the part of the English. 
 The North Carolina patriots harassed Cornwallis 
 till he actually fell back to the southward. Leslie 
 lay a month in camp, making no movement, then 
 embarked and sailed away. Virginia had another 
 surprising respite. 
 
 The third time the State was to fare worse. On 
 the morning of Sunday, December 31, 1780, Jef- 
 ferson again received intelligence that a fleet of 
 twenty-seven vessels had entered Chesapeake Bay 
 on the preceding day. Whatever may have been 
 the case heretofore, it cannot be denied that he was 
 now culpably remiss. It is true that he did not 
 know that the fleet might not be French, or that 
 its destination might not be Baltimore. But he did 
 know that it certainly might be British, that its 
 destination might be Williamsburg, Petersburg, or 
 Richmond, and that in such event the best speed 
 could not collect the Virginian levies rapidly 
 enough. It was the dead of winter, not a severe 
 season in Virginia, and when the husbandman is 
 idle. It is impossible to suggest a satisfactory 
 reason why Jefferson should not, in such proba- 
 ble and instant emergency, have prepared at once 
 for the worst. He did not ; he simply dispatched 
 Genei’al Nelson, with abundant authority, to the 
 lower river counties. Then he waited. 
 
 On Tuesday morning, fifty valuable but wasted 
 hours after the first news x’eached him, he at last 
 
GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA 
 
 57 
 
 got definite information which showed him how 
 stupid he had been. The fleet was hostile and was 
 coming up the James. Then he did what he ought 
 to have done at eight o’clock A. M. of the preced- 
 ing Sunday : he ordered out forty-seven hundred 
 militiamen from the nearest counties. Further- 
 more, having at last got fairly at work, he showed 
 considerable personal energy. He got the public 
 papers and some stores and articles of value across 
 the river to a less exposed place, and he galloped 
 about the country terribly busy and excited, till he 
 killed his horse and was obliged to mount an un- 
 broken colt. Eighty-four hours he was in the sad- 
 dle. But the enemy cared little for all his prancing 
 to and fro on blooded steed or raw colt. They 
 ascended the river and entered Richmond, burned 
 and destroyed to their hearts’ content, reembarked, 
 and dropped down stream again. The militia were 
 only beginning to assemble when the British were 
 back intrenching themselves in Leslie’s deserted 
 camp. The governor returned to the devastated 
 village which constituted his capital. He had 
 shown that he was deficient in prompt decision ; in 
 a word, that he was not the man for the place and 
 the times. 
 
 The invaders seemed to be established for a long 
 stay, and with slight chance of being disturbed ; for 
 the “fatal want of arms” still continued. There 
 was not a regular soldier in the State, nor arms to 
 put in the hands of the militia. Matters were 
 nearly as bad as in North Carolina, where, Jeffer- 
 
58 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 son wrote, the Americans could be saved only by 
 the “ moderation and caution ” of their adversaries, 
 — a slender dependence indeed! It added to the 
 exasperation of the Virginians that the traitor, 
 Arnold, was in command upon their soil. Jeffer- 
 son tried to devise a scheme for kidnaping him ; 
 but it may be conceived that such a bird was not 
 to be snared by such a fowler. 
 
 For several months the British kept Virginia in 
 a state of nervous inquietude. It is easy to im- 
 agine how Jefferson, as the winter and spring crept 
 forward on leaden heels, must have counted first 
 the months, then the weeks, then even the very 
 days, which had yet to elapse before his painful 
 responsibility would reach its end. For the sec- 
 ond year of his administration would close on 
 June 1, and he had wisely resolved not to be a 
 candidate for reelection. Possibly mutterings of 
 dissatisfaction alarmed him for his success. But 
 in his autobiography he says : “ From a belief 
 that, under the pressure of the invasion under 
 which we were then laboring, the public would 
 have more confidence in a military chief, and 
 that, the military commander being invested with 
 the civil power also, both might be wielded with 
 more energy, promptitude, and effect for the de- 
 fense of the State, I resigned the administration 
 at the end of my second year.” There was some 
 talk among the discouraged Virginians, during the 
 dark days now close at hand, of setting over them- 
 selves a dictator. This classic but mistaken expe- 
 
GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA 
 
 59 
 
 client Jefferson had the good sense to oppose ; he 
 afterward said that “ the very thought alone was 
 treason against the people, was treason against 
 mankind in general.” Fortunately, his remon- 
 strances prevailed in due season. 
 
 April came and was fast passing. Only May 
 remained before the wearied governor would be 
 governor no longer. But fortune had yet one 
 more buffet to deal him at parting. In the latter 
 part of April, Cornwallis set out on a northward 
 march, and, laying waste as he advanced, came 
 into Virginia. By May 20 he was in Petersburg, 
 and the State lay at his mercy. Jefferson coidd 
 devise nothing better than to implore Washington 
 to hasten to its rescue. The legislature, which had 
 thrice already, since the year came in, fied in alarm 
 from Richmond, had been adjourned to meet on 
 May 24 at the safer village of Charlottesville, at 
 the foot of the hills on which was Monticello. It 
 was not till May 28 that a quorum came together, 
 and then they deferred from day to day the elec- 
 tion of a new governor. Jefferson’s term expired, 
 but still he had to hold over, since no successor 
 had been chosen. Things were in this condition 
 when, on June 4, the early summer sun not having 
 yet risen, a hard-ridden steed was reined up at 
 the governor’s door. The rider had galloped in 
 the night from an eastward county-town to say that 
 a small body of British cavalry under the dreaded 
 Tarlton was pushing rapidly along the road to 
 Charlottesville and Monticello ; they would prob- 
 
60 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 ably be hardly three hours behind him. In this 
 emergency Jefferson certainly showed no lack of 
 personal courage. That is to say, he was not 
 panic stricken. He did not go to Charlottesville, 
 because he wisely reflected that the members of the 
 legislature were able to run away from the town 
 without his assistance. He stayed tranquilly at 
 home, breakfasted, sent away his family, and con- 
 cealed his plate and papers, all very leisurely. In- 
 deed, he owed his escape from capture more to 
 good luck than to any intelligent precaution on his 
 own part. Had he fallen into the enemy’s hands 
 he would have been thought to have acted stu- 
 pidly. As it turned out, he did get safely away 
 into the woods, and Colonel Tarlton, disappointed 
 of his prey, had only to ride back again. But the 
 ignominious scattering of all the ruling officials of 
 the State served to fasten still another irritating, 
 though really undeserved, stigma upon Jefferson’s 
 administration. It was the more vexatious be- 
 cause he ought to have been freed several days 
 before from so much as a technical responsibility. 
 He was also then, and long afterward, made very 
 angry by imputations upon his courage, as though 
 his flight had been ignominious. It is needless to 
 say that it was not so. He could hardly have been 
 expected to stand alone in his doorway and shoot 
 at the body of dragoons. 
 
 Tarlton’s men appear to have taken nothing at 
 Jefferson’s house beyond food and drink, in which 
 refreshment even the owner himself could hardly 
 
GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA 
 
 61 
 
 have wished to stint them in that land of un- 
 questioning hospitality. Jefferson afterward said, 
 “ Tarlton behaved very genteelly with me.” But 
 at another of his farms, which fell within reach of 
 Cornwallis’s force, Jefferson fared worse. It was 
 not long since certain British commissioners, nomi- 
 nally sent on a futile errand of reconciliation, had 
 declared that the inevitable conclusion of events 
 must be that the colonies would become depend- 
 ents of the French crown, and that England de- 
 signed to make the gain of as little value to France 
 as possible. The innuendo of this announcement 
 was soon made the basis of practical operations ; 
 and the British armies, devoting themselves more 
 to devastation than to warfare, harried the country 
 upon all sides. Jefferson suffered with the rest, 
 and has left a formidable record of the pillage. 
 All his husbanded crops and one hundred and fifty 
 cattle, sheep and hogs were seized for food ; all 
 his growing crops were wantonly destroyed, and 
 all his fences were burned ; not only were his 
 many valuable horses taken, but the throats of 
 colts too young to be used were barbarously cut. 
 Thirty slaves also were carried away. “ Had this 
 been to give them freedom,” Jefferson said, Corn- 
 wallis “ would have done right ; but it was to con- 
 sign them to inevitable death from the small-pox 
 and putrid fever then raging in his camps,” as in 
 fact became their wretched fate. It is not surpris- 
 ing that in later days Jefferson cherished a bitter 
 hostility towards a nation which had not only cur- 
 
62 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 tailed his popularity and reputation among his 
 countrymen, but also attacked his property in a 
 spirit of extermination. 
 
 The censorious temper which many Virginians 
 felt towards Jefferson found open expression in 
 the legislature during the last few months of his 
 administration ; and even some preparation, though 
 just how much cannot be accurately ascertained, 
 was made for an investigation. Certain it is that 
 Mr. George Nicholas moved for an inquiry at the 
 next session, 1 and that he was by no means without 
 supporters. The prevalence of this sort of talk 
 cut Jefferson deeply, and he went out of office in a 
 very bitter frame of mind, resolved to leave for- 
 ever the public service. He only wished to return 
 to the next session of the legislature in order to 
 court the threatened inquiry. To enable him to 
 do this a member resigned, and then Albemarle 
 County paid him the handsome honor of electing 
 him one of its delegates, actually by an unani- 
 mous vote. Having taken his seat, he stated to the 
 House his wish to meet the charges lately made 
 against him. No one replied. He then read cer- 
 tain “ objections ” which had been informally fur- 
 nished to him by Nicholas, and gave his reply to 
 them. Still no one rose to assail him. It was in 
 December, 1781, and the recent surrender of Corn- 
 
 1 Jefferson afterward was on friendly terms with Nicholas, say- 
 ing that he was an able and honest man, and that this motion 
 was the blunder of an ardent youth. Nicholas also afterward 
 made the amende honorable to Jefferson. 
 
GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA 
 
 63 
 
 wallis at York town had probably softened some- 
 what the recent asperities. His friends became 
 sufficiently emboldened to offer a resolution, which 
 was readily passed, thanking him for his “ impar- 
 tial, upright, and attentive ” administration, bearing 
 testimony to his “ ability, rectitude, and integ- 
 rity,” and avowing a purpose thus to r'emove “ all 
 unmerited censure.” The closing phrase might 
 mean much or little, and the adjectives and nouns, 
 shrewdly selected, did not express exhaustive praise 
 of an administration in time of war. But the whole 
 constituted a mollifying application and an agree- 
 ment to have done with unkindly criticism. Gen- 
 eral Washington also had closed with courteous 
 words a letter, which he had lately found occasion 
 to write to Jefferson, making a sort of certificate 
 of good character. With such comfort as he could 
 find in these testimonials, Jefferson withdrew to 
 private life. He had had the misfortune to be 
 placed in a position for which he was ill adapted, 
 and in which perhaps no one could have given sat- 
 isfaction. He had merited some praise and some 
 censure, and got less of the former and more of the 
 latter than was quite just. Altogether he had had 
 decidedly hard fortune. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 IN CONGRESS AGAIN 
 
 It soon became evident that the ex-governor had 
 experienced a wound far too deep to be healed by 
 the gentle palliatives which had been consider- 
 ately, but not enthusiastically, given to him. In an 
 extremely bitter and resentful frame of mind, he 
 moodily secluded himself at home, and reiterated 
 upon every opportunity his resolve never again to 
 be drawn forth into public life. He busied himself 
 with his plantations, the education of his children, 
 and the care of his invalid wife. In the winter 
 months, early in 1782, he put the finishing touches 
 to a labor which he had begun in the preceding 
 spring, his well-known and useful “ Notes on Vir- 
 ginia.” In the spring of the same year he obsti- 
 nately refused to attend the session of the legisla- 
 ture, though he was still a member. His enemies 
 severely criticised this conduct, which his friends 
 could not easily defend ; Madison privately de- 
 plored such a display of irreconcilable temper, and 
 Monroe more openly wrote him a plain' letter of 
 rebuke. But he was not to be moved ; his only 
 reply was a reiteration of his rankling sense of 
 injury, and his obstinate purpose to have done 
 forever with the public service. 
 
IX CONGRESS AGAIN 
 
 65 
 
 Yet it is probable that a more amiable incentive 
 for such conduct mingled with his anger, though 
 he was too proud and too hurt to name it. For 
 his wife was in very ill health. In May, 1782, 
 she lay in with her sixth child, and thereafter 
 there could be no real hope of her recovery. Jef- 
 ferson was tender and assiduous in his care of her 
 as it was possible for man to be, and when at last, 
 in September, the final day came, the scene was a 
 terrible one. For three weeks after she died he 
 did not leave his room ; afterward he had recourse 
 to long - wanderings in the solitary wood-paths of 
 the mountain. His oldest daughter was his con- 
 stant companion during these weeks of intense 
 grief, of which she has left a harrowing picture, 
 showing Jefferson to have been not only affection- 
 ate but very emotional in temperament. 
 
 It is said that Mrs. Jefferson, almost in the 
 extreme moment, begged her husband never to 
 give her children a stepmother, and the pledge 
 which he then so solemnly made he ever faithfully 
 kept. Henceforth Martha, his first-born child, was 
 to hold the warmest corner in his heart. She and 
 Mary, the fourth child, were the only ones of six 
 that were born to him who lived to mature years, 
 and only Martha survived him. But the children 
 of his brother-in-law, Dabney Carr, w r ho had died 
 young and poor, had been taken into his home, 
 and remained there like his own. He was not 
 only very kind and fond towards all these young 
 people of his household, but he gave to their bring- 
 
66 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 ing up a conscientious and untiring care. 1 The 
 letters which he wrote to them, and which have 
 been reproduced with encomiums by admiring bi- 
 ographers, are always absurdly didactic, and often 
 remind the reader of the effusions of the late Mrs. 
 Barhauld, or of the virtue and wisdom enshrined 
 in the pages of “ Sanford and Merton ; ” but they 
 are kindly and indicative of a lively interest. 
 
 In September, 1776, Congress nominated Jeffer- 
 son, with Franklin and Deane, to frame a treaty 
 of alliance and commerce with France ; but he de- 
 clined the mission. In June, 1781, he was again 
 deputed to go abroad with Franklin, Adams, Jay, 
 and Laurens, to negotiate a treaty of peace ; but 
 again he pleaded personal reasons as an excuse. 
 Two months after the death of his wife news came 
 to him at the seat of his friend Colonel Cary, at 
 Ampthill, where he was nursing his own children 
 and the young Carrs through the process of inocu- 
 lation, that he had been again appointed upon the 
 same duty. The proposition came opportunely, 
 offering an activity and change of scene at once 
 
 wholesome and agreeable. He accepted, and made 
 
 * 
 
 1 The list of Jefferson’s children is as follows : Martha Jeffer- 
 son, bom September 27, 1772, married to Thomas Mann Randolph 
 on February 23, 1790, died October 10, 1836; Jane Randolph 
 Jefferson, horn April 3, 1774, died September, 1775 ; a|Son, born 
 May 28, 1777, died June 14, 1777 ; Mary (or Maria) Jefferson, 
 born August 1, 1778, married to John W. Eppes on October 13, 
 1797, and died April 17, 1804 ; a daughter, born November 3, 
 1780, died April 15, 1781 ; Lucy Elizabeth Jefferson, born May 8. 
 1782, died , 1784. 
 
IN CONGRESS AGAIN 
 
 67 
 
 ready for departure ; but tlie presence of English 
 cruisers off the coast delayed the sailing of vessels, 
 and before he could get away news came showing 
 that the negotiations were so far advanced that his 
 presence would be substantially useless. So in 
 February, 1783, he again returned home. 
 
 But another door for reentrance into public life 
 was forthwith opened. On June 6, 1783, he was 
 chosen by the Virginia legislature a member of 
 Congress, whither he repaired in November follow- 
 ing. That body had fallen into something very 
 like contempt, and many gentlemen conceived that 
 the honor, such as it was, of membership need not 
 entail the trouble of attendance. So it happened 
 that, though the treaty of peace was to be ratified 
 before a certain near date, only seven States were 
 represented, whereas the assent of nine was neces- 
 sary. Some members proposed that the seven 
 should ratify, upon the chance that Great Britain 
 would never detect the insufficiency. But this dis- 
 honorable expedient was vigorously opposed by 
 Jefferson and others. At last an urgent appeal 
 brought in some of the delinquent members ; and 
 Jefferson had the pleasure of signing the treaty 
 which established the Independence declared by 
 his document seven years before. It fell to him, 
 also, to play an important part in arranging the 
 ceremonial of Washington’s resignation. 
 
 o o 
 
 The need of an executive power more permanent 
 than this intermittent Congress led Jefferson to 
 propose a “ committee of the States,” to be com- 
 
68 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 posed of one member from each State and to re- 
 main in session during the recesses. The plan 
 was adopted, but resulted in complete failure by 
 reason of factions in the committee. He showed a 
 sounder wisdom in his criticism of Morris’s report 
 on the national finances. That gentleman, by in- 
 genious figuring, had devised a money unit which 
 was a perfectly accurate common measure between 
 the currencies of all the States. This was the 
 TlVo P ar ^ a dollar. Jefferson justly found 
 fault with a system which would make all the 
 little computations of daily life ridiculously vast 
 and complex. For example, he said, the price of a 
 loaf of bread, 2 V of a dollar, would be 72 units; 
 of a pound of butter, | of a dollar, 288 units ; of 
 a horse, worth $80, 115,200 units ; while a national 
 debt of $80,000,000 would be 115,200,000,000 
 units. To escape such palpable folly he suggested 
 the dollar as the unit. 
 
 Jefferson further had the pleasure of tendering 
 to Congress Virginia’s deed, ceding her vast north- 
 western territory to be held as the common pro- 
 perty of all the States. Directly afterward he was 
 made one of the committee charged to prepare a 
 plan for the government of this region. The re- 
 port was doubtless composed by him, sin<fe the 
 draft in the State Department is in his handwrit- 
 ing. It contains the substance of the famous Ordi- 
 nance of the Northwestern Territory. Its most 
 honorable provision is, “ that after the year 1800 
 if the Christian era, there shall be neither slavery 
 
IN CONGRESS AGAIN 
 
 69 
 
 nor involuntary servitude in any of the said States, 
 otherwise than in punishment of crimes,” etc. Yet 
 beside this humane and noble piece of statesman- 
 ship we have a glimpse of that absurd element in 
 Jefferson’s mind which his admirers sought to ex- 
 cuse by calling him a “ philosopher.” The matter 
 is small, to be sure, but suggestive. He proposed 
 as names for the several subdivisions of this ter- 
 ritory : Syl vania, Michigania, Cherronesus, Assen- 
 isippia, Metropotamia, Illinoia, Saratoga, Wash- 
 ington, Polypotamia, and Pelisipia. Fortunately 
 these wondrous classic titles have not afflicted the 
 children of our common schools. But much less 
 happily the clause prohibiting slavery was lost, 
 only six of the Northeastern and Middle States 
 voting for it. 
 
 Such were the last legislative undertakings of 
 Mr. Jefferson. On May 7, 1784, he left Congress. 
 
CHAPTER Vn 
 
 MINISTER TO FRANCE 
 
 Simultaneously with his retirement from Con- 
 gress, Jefferson was for the fourth time appointed 
 to a foreign mission. His errand was to aid Dr. 
 Franklin and John Adams in negotiating treaties 
 of commerce. He sailed from Boston July 5, 1784, 
 and arrived in Portsmouth July 30. He proceeded 
 at once to Paris, and soon established himself there 
 in a handsome house, which he afterward ex- 
 changed for one of considerable magnificence, and 
 in all respects he made arrangements for living in 
 very good style. His salary was nine thousand 
 dollars a year, and with all the aid he could get 
 from his private fortune he was hard pushed to 
 meet his expenses. His daughter Martha he placed 
 at the most fashionable and exclusive convent- 
 school in the country. 
 
 He soon found that he could do little for the 
 United States beyond representing them creditably 
 and serving as a respectable sample of the new 
 trans-Atlantic people. Nor were his duties much 
 changed when, in the following spring, the trio of 
 diplomatists was broken up by the departure of 
 Franklin for home and of John Adams for Eng- 
 
MINISTER TO FRANCE 
 
 71 
 
 land, and by his own appointment as resident min- 
 ister to Fi’ance. The unpleasant truth was that 
 the ancient monarchies of Europe knew little and 
 cared less for the parvenu republics of a distant 
 continent, and were indifferent concerning commer- 
 cial treaties with a people whose commerce was an 
 unknown and unvalued quantity. “ Lady Rock- 
 minster has took us up,” said the Begum Claver- 
 ing to Pendennis ; and very much in the same way 
 France had taken up the North American States. 
 She vouched for their respectability, treated them 
 publicly with pointed courtesy, and affably ex- 
 tended to their representatives the hospitalities of 
 her court for holding diplomatic intercourse with 
 other powers. But when these other powers, though 
 civil enough, were wholly uninterested, France 
 could not further help her proteges. Indeed, she 
 herself disappointed expectation when it came to 
 actual business. Jefferson, who had decided no- 
 tions about the advantages of free trade, was un- 
 tiring in his efforts to mitigate the severity of 
 the French regulations, and his diplomatic corre- 
 spondence with Vergennes and Montmorin fairly 
 reeks with the flavors of whale oils, salt-fish, and 
 tobacco. Yet he was able to accomplish scarcely 
 anything. 
 
 He had also to encounter the usual humiliations 
 which beset all American envoys for many years 
 by reason of the financial embarrassments of the 
 States. He lived in a hive of creditors of his na- 
 tion, who seemed resolved, if they could not extort 
 
 o 
 
72 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 from him payment of their demands, at least to 
 have their money’s worth in tormenting him. He 
 was further much irritated at being compelled to 1 
 aid in arranging, on behalf of his countrymen, 
 that disgraceful tribute which powerful civilized 
 nations were wont to pay to the corsair states of 
 Northern Africa. He strenuously urged that war 
 would be more effectual, more honorable, and in 
 the end not more costly, and he proposed to form 
 a league of commercial nations to sustain a com- 
 bined naval armament sufficient to overawe those 
 pirates in their own waters. But his spirited and 
 sensible efforts did not meet with the success which 
 they deserved. 
 
 In the early spring of 1786 another unpleasant 
 task awaited him. He was obliged to spend a few 
 weeks in London, in the hope of aiding Mr. Adams 
 in sundry commercial negotiations there pending. 
 He was presented, he says, “ as usual, to the king 
 and queen at their levees, and it was impossible 
 for anything to be more ungracious than their no- 
 tice of Mr. Adams and myself.” Also the Mar- 
 quis of Caermartlien, minister of foreign affairs, 
 was so vague and evasive as to confirm Mr. Jeffer- 
 son in his belief of the English “ aversion to have 
 anything to do with us.” Naturally he achieved 
 nothing and went away in no pleasant frame of 
 mind, carrying personal reminiscences chiefly of 
 coldness and insolence. His contempt and hatred 
 towards England, much intensified by this trip, 
 and his belief in the bitter hostility of that coun- 
 
MINISTER TO FRANCE 
 
 73 
 
 try towards the States, hereafter find frequent and 
 vigorous expression in his correspondence. 
 
 “ That nation hate us,” he wrote, “ their ministers 
 hate us, and their king more than all other men. . . . 
 Our overtures of commercial arrangements have been 
 treated with derision. ... I think their hostility to- 
 wards us is much more deeply rooted at present than 
 during the war.” 
 
 “ In spite of treaties, England is still our enemy. 
 Her hatred is deep-rooted and cordial, and nothing is 
 wanting with her but the power to wipe us and the land 
 we live in out of existence.” 
 
 The English “ do not conceive that any circumstance 
 will arise which shall render it expedient for them to 
 have any political connection with us. They think we 
 shall be glad of their commerce on their own terms. 
 There is no party in our favor here, either in power or 
 out of power. Even the opposition concur with the 
 ministry and the nation in this.” 
 
 “ I think the king, ministers, and nation are more 
 bitterly hostile to us at present than at any period of the 
 late war.” 
 
 “ The spirit of hostility to us has always existed in 
 the mind of the king, but it has now extended itself 
 through the whole mass of the people and the majority 
 in the public councils.” 
 
 “ I had never concealed . . . that I considered the 
 British as our natural enemies and as the only nation on 
 earth who wished us ill from the bottom of their souls. 
 And I am satisfied that, were our continent to be swal- 
 lowed up by the ocean, Great Britain would be in a 
 bonfire from one side to the other.” 
 
74 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 So excessive was His distrust that he even 
 “ thought the English capable of administering 
 aid to the Algerines.” 
 
 He was further profoundly incensed at the bad 
 character which persistent abuse by the English 
 press was fastening upon his country among Euro- 
 peans. “ There was,” he says, “ an enthusiasm 
 towards us all over Europe at the moment of the 
 peace. The torrent of lies published unremit- 
 tingly in every day’s London papers first made an 
 impression and produced a coolness. The republi- 
 cation of these lies in most of the papers of Eu- 
 rope . . . carried them home to the belief of every 
 mind.” The wretched credit of the States abroad 
 is, he says, “ partly owing to their real deficiencies, 
 and partly to the lies propagated by the London 
 papers, which are probably paid for by the minis- 
 ter to reconcile the people to the loss of us. No 
 paper, therefore, comes out without a dose of para- 
 graphs against America.” 
 
 This state of popular feeling in England filled 
 Jefferson with forebodings for the future. “ In a 
 country where the voice of the people influences 
 so much the measures of administration, and where 
 it coincides with the private temper of the king, 
 there is no pronouncing on future events.” f‘ A 
 like disposition [of hostility] on our part has been 
 rising for some time. . . . Our countrymen are 
 eager in their passions and enterprises and not 
 disposed to calculate their interests against these.” 
 Reflecting that the animosities “ which seize the 
 
MINISTER TO FRANCE 
 
 75 
 
 whole body of a people, and of a people too who 
 dictate their own measures, produce calamities of 
 Ions; duration,” he said that he should “ not won- 
 der to see the scenes of ancient Rome and Car- 
 thage renewed in our days.” But he consoled him- 
 self with the thought that “ we are young and 
 can survive them ; but their rotten machine must 
 ci'ush under the trial.” 
 
 Jefferson was preeminently a man of peace ; 
 he instinctively loved it, and he knew that his 
 own abilities fitted him only for peaceful scenes. 
 About the time of which we are writing he re- 
 marked that 44 the most successful war seldom 
 pays for its losses,” and throughout life he hated 
 everything which did not pay. He therefore de- 
 precated a war even with England ; yet he abomi- 
 nated her with that peculiar bitterness which is 
 seldom cherished by more combative natures, but 
 has a strange way of lurking in the obscure depths^ 
 of pacific characters. Allowing for a little excess 
 in this feeling, he was in the main perfectly right. 
 It is necessary to dip very little beneath the tran- 
 quil surface of history to find a vast reservoir of 
 evidence in corroboration of his views and justifi- 
 cation of his feelings. He read English sentiments 
 and purposes with perfect accuracy. But further, 
 besides their enmity he plainly saw that perverse 
 and obstinate dullness which was so long a marked 
 trait in their intercourse with this country. With 
 bitter justice he said : “ Our enemies (for such they 
 are in fact) have for twelve years past followed 
 
76 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 but one uniform rule, that of doing exactly the 
 contrary of what reason points out. Having early 
 during our contest observed this in the British 
 conduct, I governed myself by it in all prognos- 
 tications of their measures ; and I can say with 
 truth it never failed me but in the circumstance of 
 their making peace with us.” He further ventured 
 to say that the English “ require to be kicked 
 into common good manners.” Yet he retained 
 sufficient fairness to admit the excellence of the 
 English system of government, reserving his con- 
 demnation chiefly for the behavior of the ministry 
 and prominent men. 
 
 From this futile and exasperating English trip 
 Jefferson returned to a thoroughly congenial so- 
 ciety. If, as these Parisian years glided pleasantly 
 by, they seemed fraught with little matter of im- 
 portance for the States, and to be chiefly instru- 
 mental in promoting Jefferson’s personal grati- 
 fication, it was only because their true bearing 
 was not yet apparent. It was seed-time, and the 
 harvest was not to ripen until Jefferson should be- 
 come the leader of a powerful party in the United 
 States. Then English insolence and French cour- 
 tesy began severally to bear their appropriate 
 fruits, and the gathering of those fruits was a 
 matter of some consequence to all concerned. 
 
 Mr. Jefferson’s stay in France extended through 
 five years. When he arrived, the monarchy seemed 
 firmly established as ever ; before he left, the Bas- 
 tille had been destroyed, blood had been freely 
 
MINISTER TO FRANCE 
 
 77 
 
 spilled in tlie streets, mobs had overawed the 
 king and slain cabinet ministers. No Frenchman 
 watched events with more profound interest than 
 did Jefferson, and none had better opportunities 
 than he enjoyed for observing the gradual advance 
 of revolutionary feeling. His own predilections 
 and his natural intimacy with Lafayette brought 
 him from the outset into the society of -the liberal 
 or patriotic party. These men, moderate and rea- 
 sonable reformers and not at all identical with 
 the violent revolutionists of later stages, found in 
 him a kindred spirit, long accustomed to think 
 the thoughts which they were just beginning to 
 think, and to hold the beliefs which they were now 
 acquiring. They made of him at once an instruc- 
 tor, counselor, and sympathizing friend. They 
 recognized him as one of themselves, a specula- 
 tive thinker concerning the rights of mankind, a 
 preacher of extreme doctrines of political freedom, 
 a deviser of theories of government, a propounder 
 of vague but imposing generalizations, a condemner 
 of the fetters of practicability, in a word, by the 
 slang of that day, a “ philosopher ; ” and they 
 liked him accordingly. Upon his own part, his 
 interest in the reformation of their odious royal 
 despotism could hardly have been greater had he 
 himself been a Frenchman. He went daily to 
 Versailles to attend the debates of the National 
 Assembly. Lafayette and others sought his sug- 
 gestions. The archbishop of Bordeaux, as head 
 of a committee of the National Assembly, charged 
 
78 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 to draft tlie projet of a constitution, actually in- 
 vited him “ to attend and assist at their delibera- 
 tions.” This he wisely declined to do. But later, 
 in private conference with one or two personal 
 friends, he proposed an important step, — that 
 “ the king, in a seance royale , should come for- 
 ward with a charter of rights in his hand, to he 
 signed by himself and by every member ” of the 
 Assembly ; and he actually sketched the chief 
 heads of such a “ charter.” 
 
 If these acts seem an interference of question- 
 able propriety, yet upon the whole it must be ad- 
 mitted that he behaved with excellent discretion 
 and self-control, though the temptation to mingle 
 in affairs was rendered exceptionally great by his 
 real interest in them, by the abnormal state of po- 
 litical matters, by his friendship with Lafayette 
 and others, and by the deference which was shown 
 to him personally, indicative of the influence which 
 he might exert. Only once did he appear in dan- 
 ger of being seriously compromised, and then it 
 was through the blunder of another. Lafayette, 
 without previously consulting him, arranged that 
 six or eight discordant chiefs of different sections 
 of the liberal party in the Assembly should dine 
 at Jefferson’s house, in the hope that they might 
 reach an agreement. Jefferson was much annoyed 
 at this “ inadvertence ” on the part of his friend, 
 and waited on Count Montmorin the next morning 
 with an explanation. The count replied that 
 “ he already knew everything -which had passed, that 
 
MINISTER TO FRANCE 
 
 79 
 
 so far from taking umbrage at the use made of my house 
 on that occasion he earnestly wished I would habitually 
 assist at such conferences, being sure I should be useful 
 in moderating the warmer spirits and promoting a whole- 
 some and practicable reformation only. I told him I 
 knew too well the duties I owed to the king, to the nar 
 tion, and to my own country, to take any part in councils 
 concerning their internal government, and that I should 
 persevere with care in the character of a neutral and 
 passive spectator, with wishes only, and very sincere 
 ones, that those measures might prevail which would be 
 for the greatest good of the nation.” 
 
 It has been the fashion to say that the feelings 
 and ideas gathered by Jefferson in France consti- 
 tuted the predominant influence throughout his 
 subsequent political career. In this there is much 
 exaggeration, and towards him much injustice. 
 His character was more independent. Moreover, 
 he was a mature man when he went abroad, and 
 had been busied from early youth, alike in the way 
 of theory and practice, with the political and social 
 problems of government. The originating disposi- 
 tion and radical temper of his mind had appeared 
 from the outset, and were only confirmed, not 
 created, by his foreign experience. Neither was 
 his affection for France, nor his antipathy to Eng- 
 land, then first implanted. Both sentiments were 
 strong before he crossed the Atlantic ; they were 
 only encouraged by the pleasures of his long resi- 
 dence in the one country, and the convictions borne 
 in upon him during his brief visit to the other. 
 
80 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 His character would be ill understood if it were 
 supposed that his subsequent political career was 
 the exotic growth of French seeds, instead of being 
 developed in ordinary course from the native root. 
 He would always have been a radical, an extreme 
 democrat, a hater of England, a lover of France, a 
 sympathizer with the French revolutionists, though 
 he had never sailed out of sight of American 
 shores. The only effect of his European life was 
 to corroborate preexisting opinions, and somewhat 
 to intensify sentiments already entertained. Per- 
 haps these were naturally so strong that a counter- 
 acting influence would have been more wholesome ; 
 and this might have been experienced had he 
 remained to witness the Reign of Terror and the 
 ascendency of Robespierre. This, however, was 
 not to be. In September, 1789, he sailed for home 
 from Havre, upon what he supposed to be a short 
 leave of absence granted at his urgent request. 
 But events, as will be seen, rendered his stay at 
 home permanent. 
 
 Jefferson ought to have been a happy man when 
 he set sail on this return trip. Never did an in- 
 voluntary exile glorify, in imagination, his lost 
 home as Jefferson had been glorifying the States 
 for five years past. All the charms of Paris wele 
 to him as nothing in comparison with the merits of 
 his dear native land. “ London,” he said, “ though 
 handsomer than Paris, is not so handsome as Phil- 
 adelphia ! ” He found that, in the way of educa- 
 tion, only vice and modern languages were better 
 
MINISTER TO FRANCE 
 
 81 
 
 taught in Europe than at home ; instruction was 
 just as good at William and Mary College as at the 
 most famous seats of learning abroad ! He begged 
 Monroe to come to France, because “ it will make 
 you adore your own country, its soil, its climate, 
 its equality, liberty, laws, people, and manners.” 
 He predicted that piany Europeans would settle in 
 America, but “ no man now living will ever see 
 an instancy of an American removing to settle in 
 Europe and continuing there.” The virtues of his 
 fellow citizens he attributes to the fact that they 
 have “ been separated from their parent stock and 
 kept from contamination, either from them or the 
 other people of the old world, by the intervention 
 of so wide an ocean.” “ With all the defects of our 
 Constitution, . . . the comparison of our govern- 
 ments with those of Europe is like a comparison of 
 heaven and hell. England, like the earth, may be 
 allowed to take the intermediate station.” 
 
 To the gaze of such a patriot everything which 
 took place in his own country seemed admirable. 
 Even Shays’s insurrection in Massachusetts, which, 
 by the alarm that it spread among all thinking men, 
 contributed largely to the adoption of the new 
 Constitution, seemed to Jefferson a commendable 
 occurrence. Undeniably he talked some very bad 
 nonsense about it. 
 
 “ The commotions offer nothing threatening ; they are 
 a proof that the people have liberty enough, and I could 
 not wish them less than thej'- have. If the happiness of 
 the mass of the people can be secured at the expense of 
 
82 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 a little tempest, now and then, or even of a little blood, 
 it will be a precious purchase.” “To punish these errors 
 too severely would be to suppress the only safeguard of 
 the public liberty.” “ A little rebellion now and then is 
 a good thing, ... an observation of this truth should 
 render honest republican governors so mild in their pun- 
 ishment of rebellions as not to discourage them too much. 
 It is a medicine necessary for the sound health of govern- 
 ment.” “ Thus I calculate, — an insurrection in one of 
 thirteen States in the course of eleven years that they 
 have subsisted, amounts to one in any particular State in 
 one hundred and forty-three years, say a century and a 
 half. This would not be near as many as have happened 
 in every other government that has ever existed. So 
 that we shall have the difference between a light and a 
 heavy government as clear gain.” “ Can history pro- 
 duce an instance of rebellion so honorably conducted ? 
 . . . God forbid we should ever be twenty years without 
 such a rebellion. . . . What signify a few lives lost in a 
 century or two ? The tree of liberty must be refreshed 
 from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. 
 It is its natural manure.” 
 
 It shakes one’s faith in mankind to find a really 
 great statesman uttering such folly ! It had not 
 even the poor excuse of being caught from the 
 French revolutionists ; for the latest of these sen- 
 tences was uttered in November, 1787, when Jeffer- 
 son was more probably engaged in imparting such 
 extravagant notions to the moderate French re- 
 formers than in receiving these wild ideas from 
 them. In truth, Jefferson was recoiling too far 
 from the “ conspiracy of kings and nobles,” and 
 
MINISTER TO FRANCE 
 
 83 
 
 was east for a time into the ridiculous position of 
 advocating a “ no government ” theory. “ The 
 basis of our governments,” he said, “ being the 
 opinion of the people, the very first object should 
 be to keep that right,” — a sound postulate which 
 he makes the pedestal for a preposterous super- 
 structure ; for he adds : “Were it left to me to de- 
 cide whether we should have a government without 
 newspapers, or newspapers without a government, 
 I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the lat- 
 ter,” — the newspapers of the latter half of the 
 eighteenth century ! “ I am convinced,” he says, 
 
 “ that those societies (as the Indians) which live 
 without government enjoy in their general mass 
 an infinitely greater degree of happiness than 
 those who live under the European governments. 
 Among the former public opinion is in the place 
 of law, and restraining morals as powerfully as 
 laws ever did anywhere.” “ Societies exist under 
 three forms : . . . 1. Without government as 
 among our Indians. 2. Under governments 
 wherein the will of every one has a just influence. 
 ... 3. Under governments of force. ... It is a 
 problem not clear in my mind that the first condi- 
 tion is not the best.” One loses patience with an 
 intelligent man talking such stuff. 
 
 Jefferson’s experience abroad, in attempting to 
 form commercial treaties, had taught him the ne- 
 cessity of a closer union of the States for purposes 
 of foreign relationships ; but when the lesson of 
 Shays’s insurrection was even read backwards by 
 
84 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 him, it is easy to see that he was far from com- 
 prehending’ the domestic necessity for a much 
 firmer consolidation. “ My general plan,” he said, 
 “ would be to make the States one as to every- 
 thing connected with foreign nations, and several as 
 to everything purely domestic.” Such being his 
 opinion, it was inevitable that, when the Constitu- 
 tion of the United States was published, he found 
 much in it which seemed to him very unsound and 
 objectionable. There are in the document, he 
 said, “ things which stagger all my dispositions to 
 subscribe to what such an assembly has proposed,” 
 and his earliest criticisms were very severe. Fur- 
 ther consideration, however, the arguments of “The 
 Federalist,” and correspondence with Madison and 
 Monroe, gradually induced him to modify his 
 views. By May, 1788, he was able to say: “1 
 look forward to the general adoption of the new 
 Constitution with anxiety, as necessary for us 
 under our present circumstances.” If in many 
 particulars he was still imperfectly pleased, he was 
 only of the like sentiment with most of the zealous 
 advocates of adoption. Probably every promi- 
 nent man among the Federalists could, in his own 
 opinion, have suggested improvements. Jefferson 
 finally took the national charter as its other sup- 
 porters did, “ contented with the ground which it 
 will gain for us, and hoping that a favorable mo- 
 ment will come for correcting what is amiss in it.” 
 His earlier wish was that nine States would adopt 
 it, “in order to insure what was good in it, and 
 
MINISTER TO FRANCE 
 
 85 
 
 that the others might, by holding off, produce the 
 necessary amendments.” But later he declai'ed the 
 plan of Massachusetts to be “ far preferable,” and 
 expressed the hope that it would “ be followed by 
 those who are yet to decide.” Finally on Decem- 
 ber 4, 1788, he writes: “I have seen with infinite 
 pleasure our new Constitution accepted by eleven 
 States, not rejected by the twelfth ; and that the 
 thirteenth happens to be a State of the least im- 
 portance.” 
 
 The preceding extracts, which might be multi- 
 plied by many more of identical tenor, abundantly 
 show Jefferson’s real sentiments concerning the 
 Constitution, and refute the unfair charge after- 
 ward brought against him by his enemies, that he 
 was opposed to it. His own characteristic state- 
 ment was : “ I am not a Federalist, because I never 
 submitted the whole system of my opinions to the 
 creed of any party of men whatever, in religion, in 
 philosophy, in politics, or in anything else where I 
 was capable of thinking for myself. Such an ad- 
 diction is the last degradation of a free and moral 
 agent. If I could not go to heaven but with a 
 party, I would not go there at all. Therefore I 
 am not of the party of the Federalists. But I am 
 much farther from that of the anti-Federalists. I 
 approved, from the first moment, of the great mass 
 of what is in the new Constitution.” He then con- 
 tinues at great length to show how his objections 
 gradually gave way before argument, until a con- 
 fession of faith, too rigid to have been repeated by 
 
86 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 • 
 
 liim, could have been repeated by very few indi- 
 viduals in the States. It is probable that the Con- 
 stitution was nearer to his ideal upon the one side 
 than it was to Hamilton’s ideal upon the other. 
 The only serious objections, which he retained to 
 the end, were the absence of a bill of rights and the 
 presence of the reeligibility of the President. The 
 former real defect was promptly and wisely cured ; 
 the latter has been practically controlled by a wise 
 custom which he himself helped to inaugurate. 
 
 I 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE. DOMESTIC AFFAIRS 
 
 On October 23, 1789, Mr. Jefferson sailed from 
 Cowes, and on December 23 be was welcomed by 
 liis slaves at Monticello. At bis departure he bad 
 supposed that be was returning borne for a visit of 
 a few months only, and that he should speedily go 
 back to watch the progress of the French Revolu- 
 tion. He was now so much more interested in this 
 movement than in any other matter, that he was 
 by no means gratified to find awaiting him, upon 
 his arrival, an invitation from President Washing- 
 ton to fill the place of secretary of state. He 
 replied that he did not prefer the change, but that 
 he would be governed by the President’s wishes. 
 Washington thereupon wrote again in very urgent 
 fashion, and Madison made a visit to Monticello 
 for the express purpose of exerting his personal 
 influence.' Beneath such pressure Jefferson reluc- 
 tantly abandoned his hope of remaining abroad, 
 and accepted the secretaryship, only stipulating for 
 a few weeks for setting in order his private affairs. 
 It was not until March 21, 1790, that he arrived 
 in New York and entered upon the duties of his 
 office. 
 
88 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 In those days the cabinet consisted of only 
 four persons. John Jay had been acting tempo- 
 rarily as secretary of state, but with- the under- 
 standing that he should be made chief justice so 
 soon as a permanent secretary could be appointed ; 
 Hamilton had been made secretary of the trea- 
 sury immediately after Washington’s inauguration ; 
 about the same time Knox had been appointed 
 secretary of war, and later Edmund Randolph had 
 been made attorney-general. The great brunt of 
 the labor in the organization of public affairs had 
 fallen and still rested upon Hamilton, who had en- 
 countered the vast and complex task with magnifi- 
 cent spirit and ability. By the time that Jefferson 
 came to share in the business of government, all 
 questions concerning the foreign debt and the do- 
 mestic national debt had been disposed of by Con- 
 gress in accordance with Hamilton’s recommenda- 
 tions. But there still remained, as a bone of fierce 
 contention, the secretary’s scheme for the assump- 
 tion by the United States of the war debts of the 
 individual States ; and concerning this the opposing 
 parties had been wrought up to a pitch of exceed- 
 ing bitterness and excitement. In committee of 
 the whole in the House of Representatives the 
 assumption had been carried by thirty-one yeas tjo 
 twenty-six nays ; but when the question came to be 
 taken in the House proper the representatives from 
 North Carolina had arrived, and aided in turning 
 the scale, so that on March 29 the measure was 
 voted down. From the condition of feeling it was 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 89 
 
 evident that a serious crisis already menaced the 
 young nation. Congress met daily and adjourned 
 without transacting any business ; the hostile fac- 
 tions could not work together upon any subject, 
 and, indeed, nobody cared to think or talk of any- 
 thing save assumption. Threats of disunion were 
 heard on all sides. Hamilton contemplated the 
 emergency with profound anxiety, for the Treasury 
 Department carried within itself the fate of the 
 new government ; and upon his financiering really 
 depended the existence of a people. The momen- 
 tous struggle called forth all the resources of his 
 ingenious and fertile mind. While he kept up a 
 steady fight all along the front, he also set himself 
 to devise a flank movement, and in this manoeuvre 
 he resolved to make use of Mr. Jefferson. 
 
 It happened opportunely that the selection of a 
 site for the national capital had given rise to an 
 eager sectional division in Congress. The South- 
 ern States wanted it on the Potomac ; the Middle 
 and Eastern States wished it to be farther north. 
 The northern party had prevailed by a narrow ma- 
 jority. Now it was fortunately the case that the 
 parties in the assumption debate had divided by 
 the like sectional lines ; the Middle and Eastern 
 States were in favor of assumption ; the Southern 
 States were opposed to it ; and in this matter the 
 South had prevailed, also by a slender majority. 
 The opportunity for a bargain was obvious ; the 
 temptation to it was irresistible ; the justification 
 was sufficiently satisfactory. Hamilton accordingly 
 
90 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 resolved to buy two or three votes for his assump- 
 tion scheme at the price of the required number of 
 votes for the Potomac site. In this bit of political 
 commerce he selected Jefferson as an efficient part- 
 ner. So one day, meeting Jefferson in the street, 
 Hamilton walked with him and discussed the mat- 
 ter. He depicted the national jeopardy in woeful 
 colors, and movingly besought Jefferson to use his 
 influence with some of his friends and to save the 
 Union. Jefferson replied that he was “ really a 
 stranger to the whole subject,” but that the preser- 
 vation of the country touched him nearly, and he 
 begged Hamilton to dine with him the next day, 
 to meet one or two more whom he would invite, 
 in the hope that together they might devise some 
 acceptable “ compromise.” The dinner came off ; 
 Jefferson afterward wrote that he himself “ could 
 take no part in [the discussion] but an exhortatory 
 one,” because he was a “ stranger to the circum- 
 stances which should govern it.” But the bargain 
 was then and there struck ; and at that dinner-table 
 assumption was bought at the price of a capital on 
 the Potomac. The terms of the agreement were 
 punctually fulfilled. The requisite number of 
 votes were delivered, on both sides, and Hamilton’s 
 financial policy prevailed without mutilation. I » 
 Soon, however, Jefferson found himself deeply 
 repenting his share in this transaction. He began 
 to doubt whether assumption was really wise and 
 right, and he plainly saw that from a personal and 
 selfish point of view he had blundered seriously. 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 91 
 
 For he had greatly aided the prestige and influence 
 of one who soon became his most formidable polit- 
 ical opponent, and he had been largely efficient in 
 achieving the success of a measure which his party 
 was forthwith to single out for especial denuncia- 
 tion. When, therefore, he was pushed ere long to 
 find explanations of this compromising fellowship 
 with Hamilton, he behaved like the fox who gnaws 
 off his own leg to escape from the trap : he sacri- 
 ficed, by denial, one of the most marked of his 
 mental traits, his political astuteness ; he said that 
 he had been tricked by Hamilton, and made a dupe 
 and tool in a department of business with which 
 he was unfamiliar, that he had been “ most igno- 
 rantly and innocently made to hold the candle” for 
 the wicked game of the secretary of the treasury. 
 Such a defense seemed a bad advertisement of his 
 fitness for political leadership, and was otherwise 
 so poor and incredible that it would not have been 
 resorted to, could any other have been devised. 
 The bargain which had been made was perfectly 
 plain and simple, at least in respect of political 
 morality, and so far as this went could be ex- 
 plained and comprehended in five minutes. As 
 for the soundness of the policy of assumption, J ef- 
 fferson could have heard little else talked about 
 since his arrival at New York. He knew the bit- 
 terness of the contest concerning it, and, if he had 
 not made up his mind about it, he was rash in 
 taking sides so decisively. But even if he had 
 been rash, he was not therefore entitled to abuse 
 
92 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 Hamilton for setting forth and promoting his own 
 views . 1 The truth is not, however, buried out of 
 sight beneath his excuses and explanation of his 
 action. This truth is, that he was asked and that 
 he consented to take a part before he compre- 
 hended or even suspected the powerful formative 
 energies which ran under the surface of Hamilton’s 
 financial measures, like sine\*s beneath the skin. 
 He was, therefore, willing enough to help forward 
 a measure upon which seemed to depend the con- 
 tinuance of the Union, and of which the remoter 
 bearing and effects lay beyond his vision. A little 
 later he appreciated that Hamilton had not only 
 been handling the finances with singular technical 
 skill, but had also been so shaping all his measures 
 that they had constituted so many tonic doses 
 administered to the national government, strength- 
 ening it, confirming it in the interests of an influ- 
 ential portion of the community, and exercising 
 a powerful centralizing influence. When all this 
 dawned upon Jefferson’s understanding, he was 
 filled with horror and indignation at the share he 
 had unwittingly taken in promoting principles of 
 government which he abominated. Also he was 
 seriously irritated at the inconvenient light in which 
 he had thus been made to appear before those with 
 whom he sought political fellowship and authority. 
 Then, his eyes being at last opened, anger against 
 
 1 As evidence that Jefferson understood very well what he was 
 about, and had his own wishes in the matter, see his letter to 
 Monroe of June 20, 1790, and letter to Gilmer of June 27, 1790. 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 93 
 
 Hamilton induced him to assert that Hamilton had 
 outwitted him by taking unfair advantage of his 
 inexperience. 
 
 Jefferson was no financier. The shrewd good 
 sense which he had displayed in managing his own 
 business, as a planter, was superseded by an un- 
 controllable passion for theorizing when he came 
 to grapple with the great and intricate problems 
 of national finances. At times he wandered into 
 the wildest and most absurd vagaries. Thus, only 
 a few months before he took his seat in the cabinet, 
 he had been much pleased with a novel idea that 
 had struck him concerning “ a question of such 
 consequences as not only to merit decision, but place 
 also among the fundamental principles of every 
 government.” It is with some astonishment that 
 the patient reader follows through several pages of 
 guileless argument the development of this grand, 
 fundamental, newly-discovered truth, and finally 
 learns the confounding doctrine: that no public debt 
 can rightfully survive the generation which con- 
 tracts it ! The daring and original logician starts 
 with the “ self-evident ” proposition that “ the earth 
 belongs in usufruct to the living ; that the dead 
 have neither powers nor rights over it.” But, he 
 says, if a debt survives the generation which con- 
 tracts it, then the subsequent generation takes “ the 
 earth ” subject to a burden imposed by and for the 
 dead. This must needs be wrong, since it is coun- 
 ter to a “ self-evident ” premise. Assuming, he said, 
 that men come of age at twenty-one, and that the 
 
94 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 majority of those who are alive at twenty-one will 
 live thirty-four years more, it follows that a genera- 
 tion may contract debts to run thirty-four years 
 and no longer. This period he afterward reduced 
 to nineteen years ; for “ a generation consisting of 
 all ages, and which legislates by all its members 
 above the age of twenty-one years, cannot contract 
 for so long a time, because their majority will be 
 dead much sooner.” It is at once ludicrous, pitiful, 
 and alarming to hear such rubbish from an influen- 
 tial leader of the people. After listening to it one 
 is not surprised to hear that, in criticising the work 
 of one of the greatest financiers whom the world 
 has ever seen, Jefferson made but a sorry show. 
 
 Nevertheless, being profoundly unconscious of his 
 own incapacity in this department of knowledge, 
 Jefferson did not refrain from free indulgence in 
 such dangerous criticism. He was wont to say 
 that Hamilton’s financial system was designed to 
 serve as a puzzle for excluding popular understand- 
 ing and inquiry. In 1802 he wrote to Gallatin 
 concerning Hamilton : — 
 
 “ In order that he might have the entire government 
 of his machine, he determined so to complicate it as that 
 neither the President nor Congress should he able t(f 
 understand it or to control him. He succeeded in doing 
 this, not only beyond their reach, but so that he himself 
 could not unravel it. He gave to the debt in the first 
 instance, in funding it, the most artificial and mysterious 
 form he could devise. He then moulded up his appro- 
 priations of a number of scraps and remnants, many of 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 95 
 
 which were nothing at all, and applied them to different 
 objects in reversion and remainder, until the whole sys- 
 tem was involved in impenetrable fog.” 
 
 He actually reiterated this declaration so late as 
 1818 , long after the perfect practical success of 
 that renowned system had constituted its unan- 
 swerable vindication. But it is not probable that 
 he was disingenuous in his abuse, for certainly 
 Hamilton’s financiering was from the beginning, 
 and ever remained, a “puzzle” utterly insoluble for 
 Mr. Jefferson. Nevertheless he persisted in a blind 
 hatred and denunciation, eloquent enough while 
 he confined himself to generalities, but, so often 
 as he turned to more specific fault-finding, mani- 
 festing a surprising ignorance of economic prin- 
 ciples and a hopeless confusion of thought. Yet a 
 distinguishing feature of Hamilton’s system was its 
 grand, plain simplicity, not only in its broad out- 
 lines, but in matters of detail and technique. His 
 reports to Congress were lucid to a degree which 
 makes them comprehensible to a woman or a child. 
 It befell, however, very fortunately for Jefferson, 
 that he had not much fighting to do in a field in 
 which he was so little at home. By the time that 
 the antagonism between him and Hamilton had 
 become fairly developed, all the principal features 
 of Hamilton’s financial scheme, except only the 
 national bank, had become complete and adopted 
 parts of the governmental machinery. It was not 
 necessary, therefore, to encounter them with argu- 
 ment, but only to revile them in a broad way. 
 
96 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 It has been said that Washington formed his 
 cabinet with a deliberate purpose of amalgamating 
 parties by bringing together, as political comrades, 
 the two chief representatives of ojDposing opinions. 
 This erroneous statement has been sustained by 
 two other incorrect propositions, namely, (1) that 
 Jefferson was opposed to the Constitution which 
 Hamilton befriended, a theory already shown to 
 be untrue ; (2) that he and Hamilton had re- 
 spectively from the beginning established policies 
 antagonistic to each other, which is a palpable mis- 
 representation. For a while all was doubtful and 
 tentative concerning both men and measures in the 
 new government, although the outcome now appears 
 to have been so strictly in accordance with the 
 logic of circumstances, and the native bent and 
 qualities of the different individuals, that it is diffi- 
 cult not to carry back the later opinions and know- 
 ledge to a date at which neither could have existed. 
 It took some time for this logic and these qualities 
 to become apparent to the chief actors, who learned 
 each other’s ways of thinking only by degrees. 
 Meanwhile Hamilton and Jefferson met upon a 
 friendly footing, and for a time apparently enter- 
 tained no suspicion that they would not be able to 
 pursue an harmonious policy. Indeed, there hardly ( 
 were at first two parties or two systems of national 
 politics in the country. The material for forming 
 these lay ready at hand in the natural constitution 
 of men’s minds, but it still reposed like ore in the 
 mine, half unseen and wholly unshaped. There 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 97 
 
 were those who always instinctively said Nay to all 
 proposals coming - from Hamilton ; but they were 
 not an organized party, and had no defined policy 
 of their own. It was very gradually that what 
 deserved to he called a hostile school of political 
 thought was developed by the measures of the gov- 
 ernment. Only as the Hamiltonian structure grew 
 piece by piece did the design of the builder appear 
 to be much more comprehensive than had been at 
 first understood. Then it was seen that Hamilton, 
 besides substituting order for confusion, and sol- 
 vency for insolvency, had also been creating a very 
 powerful governmental machine ; then men saw 
 how deep down in the nation he had succeeded in 
 setting the foundations of the government, and 
 what extensive powers he had grasped for it by 
 construing the Constitution to his purpose. They 
 remembered that he theoretically believed in a 
 monarchical form, and they saw that he was fast 
 making this republican government not less strong 
 and centralized than a limited monarchy. Then 
 the men of democratic minds became combined 
 together through their common alarm ; and as no 
 man was more thoroughly democratic than Jeffer- 
 son, so no man was more profoundly alarmed. We 
 have but to recall his talk about the charms of 
 newspapers without a government, and about the 
 excellence of the Indian form of polity, to conceive 
 the horror with which he beheld this rapid trans- 
 formation of a federal league into a national unit. 
 No sooner did he get a notion of the ruinous course 
 
98 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 by which Hamilton was steering the ship than he 
 began to whisper warnings among the passengers, 
 to organize a species of mutiny against one who, 
 in truth, had no more exclusive right to the helm 
 than he himself had. So the period of confidence 
 between Hamilton and Jefferson endured only for 
 a limited time, and, though they remained personal 
 friends for a short while after they had become 
 political opponents, yet such accusations and per- 
 sonalities as were soon cast against each by the 
 friends and followers of the other ere long de- 
 stroyed all traces of good feeling, and thereafter 
 they distrusted and hated each other, and fought 
 and denounced each other bitterly, and believed 
 every possible ill of each other during the rest of 
 their lives. 
 
 Most unfortunately for his own good fame, Jef- 
 ferson allowed himself to be drawn by this feud 
 into the preparation of the famous “ Anas.” His 
 friends have hardly dared to undertake a defense 
 of those terrible records, and the very manner of 
 those apologies which some have ventured to pre- 
 sent has been fatal to their efficacy. The editor of 
 the congressional edition of Jefferson’s works ex- 
 cuses the insertion of these post-mortuary slanders 
 on the ground of editorial duty, and only reluc- 1 
 tantly suffers himself to become the formal agent of 
 their perpetuation. But there is no symptom that 
 Jefferson thought that it was unbecoming in him 
 to set down all the idle rumors, the slander and 
 gossip received at third and fourth hand, the mali- 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 99 
 
 cious tales of enemies, aimed at the good fame of 
 an adversary who, at least, had never dealt him an 
 unfair blow, and to leave this odious collection of 
 poisonous scraps to be published not only after the 
 death of that adversary, and so late that no sub- 
 stantial opportunity of contradictions by contem- 
 porary evidence remained, but also after his own 
 death, so that he could not be called upon to sus- 
 tain his statements, or punished for failure to do 1 
 so. It must be confessed that the compilation of 
 these unfortunate and most disreputable fragments 
 is among the meanest acts recorded by history, and 
 that it has more impaired Jefferson’s good name 
 than all the other mistakes of his life and all the 
 assaults of his enemies. Had he been able to resist 
 the temptation to seek such an ignoble revenge on 
 a dead foe, he would have lived in history as a man 
 of a far more honorable spirit than can now be 
 attributed to him. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE. — GROWTH OF DISSENSIONS 
 
 Jefferson was the most astute and successful 
 politician who has yet flourished in a country sin- 
 gularly and unfortunately prolific of this not very 
 estimable race. But he was very much, more than 
 a politician, and he added something even to the 
 essential traits of a statesman ; he was a profound 
 thinker concerning the theory of government and 
 the principles of social and political organization. 
 
 In full accord with the new spirit of his era, he was 
 a radical even among radicals, and a democrat of 
 the extreme class. He could hardly bring himself 
 to declare that the people should govern, because 
 he had a lurking notion that there should be no 
 government at all. “ The rights of man,” the 
 favorite slang phrase of the day, signified to his 
 mind an almost entire absence of governmental 
 control. His milder .opponents called him a vision- 
 ary, and the hopeless impracticability of many of 1 
 his theories almost justified the term. His more 
 bitter assailants stigmatized him as dishonest ; and 
 there certainly was an element of disingenuousness 
 in his character, a covert habit in his dealings, 
 and a carelessness concerning the truth in small 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 101 
 
 matters. But his belief in the doctrines of human 
 freedom was a pure and deep conviction, an inerad- 
 icable portion of his nature. His faith in the 
 laxest form of democracy, scarcely removed from 
 anarchy, stood to him in the place of a religion ; 
 he preached it with a fervor, intensity, and con- 
 stancy worthy of Mahomet or Wesley. It was an 
 inevitable consequence of this vehement conviction 
 that he regarded supporters of contrary principles 
 with distrust and abhorrence as wicked men, con- 
 scious promulgators of falsehood in the most im- 
 portant of all human concerns. Evil reports con- 
 cerning them seemed so intrinsically probable as 
 always to command his ready belief ; and there is 
 no evidence that he ever refused to credit any mali- 
 cious tale repeated against them, no matter how 
 tainted in its origin or progress. He was observant 
 and quick-witted, and soon appreciated the skill 
 with which Hamilton was rapidly constructing a 
 powerful centralized government. At Hamilton’s 
 back he beheld a disciplined body of able and am- 
 bitious men, some filling places of public trast and 
 power, others absorbing wealth, all in one shape 
 or another acquiring an extensive and irresistible 
 influence in the body politic and social. Jefferson 
 gazed upon this portentous growth with dread and 
 repulsion. He saw enough to induce him fearfully 
 to anticipate the destruction of human freedom in 
 the United States, and he suspected much more 
 than he saw. As he peered into the mystery of 
 the Federalist policy, the vision of monarchy took 
 
102 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 shape before his eyes and long remained with him, 
 an ever present and vivid terror. Henceforth in 
 every measure of the secretary of the treasury he 
 discerned an artful move in the monarchical game ; 
 at every social gathering of Federalists he seemed 
 to hear the whispered plots of “ Monocrats.” If 
 gentlemen, flushed with wine after dinner, made 
 statements far outrunning their sober beliefs, their 
 extravagant words were borne in exaggerated form 
 to Jefferson’s ears, were magnified by his excited 
 mind, and were stored away by him as conclusive 
 evidence of monarchical projects. The idea became 
 a monomania with him.> He wrote it to his friends; 
 he jotted it down on the scraps of paper which 
 aftei’ward were gathered together for the “ Anas ; ” 
 he mournfully bore the gossip to Washington, and 
 was not to be deterred from repeating it, though 
 the President told him that he was talking non- 
 sense. 
 
 Long afterward, looking back upon this period, 
 Jefferson declared that these dreadful monarchical 
 tendencies had been visible to him from the earliest 
 days of his arrival in New York. 
 
 “ The President,” he says, “ received me cordially, 
 and my colleagues and the whole circle of principal citi- 
 zens apparently with welcome. The courtesies of both 
 political parties, given me as a stranger newly arrived 
 among them, placed me at once in their familiar society. 
 But I cannot describe the wonder and mortification with 
 which the table conversations filled me. Politics were 
 the chief topic, and a preference of kingly over republi* 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 103 
 
 can government was evidently the favorite sentiment. 
 An apostate I could not be, nor yet a hypocrite ; and 
 I found myself, for the most part, the only advocate on 
 the republican side of the question, unless among the 
 guests there chanced to be some member of that party 
 from the legislative houses.” 
 
 These sentences linger in that debatable land, 
 somewhere in which exaggeration passes into false- 
 hood. Evidently, in looking back down the long 
 vista of nearly thirty years, Jefferson’s vision was 
 indistinct. If he had really been plunged into 
 such a chilling bath of monai’chy at once upon his 
 arrival in New York, he would have cried out 
 promptly at the sudden shock, and left contempo- 
 raneous evidence of it; whereas, in fact, some 
 time elapsed before he began to give perceptible 
 symptoms of distress at the unsound political faith 
 about him. Monarchy was doubtless spoken of in 
 a manner offensive to his democratic ears. The 
 Constitution was a compromise wholly satisfac- 
 tory to no one ; the government was undeniably 
 an experiment ; and its probable efficiency was 
 often discussed as an open question. Sentiments 
 of loyalty, pride, and affection had not had time to 
 strike deep root. But Jefferson made a mistake 
 in construing an anxious doubt as equivalent to ac- 
 tive disaffection ; and was guilty of a gross, though 
 certainly an unintentional, injustice in charging 
 the advocates of a strong system with a design of 
 changing the form of government. He was driven 
 beyond his reason by foolish terrors when he 
 
104 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 spoke of Hamilton as the enemy of the Constitu- 
 tion. Every one has long since agreed that the 
 Constitution had no other friend nearly so efficient 
 as Hamilton. No man living had better means of 
 knowledge concerning these matters than Wash- 
 ington, and no man was intellectually more capable 
 of forming a correct judgment. Yet even Jeffer- 
 son could not in his “ Anas ” set down the lan- 
 guage, which the President held to him, in shape 
 more corroborative of his views than this : “ That 
 with respect to the existing causes of uneasiness, 
 he [Washington] thought there were suspicions 
 against a particular party [Hamilton] which had 
 been carried a great deal too far. There might be 
 desires, but he did not believe there were designs, to 
 change the form of government into a monarchy ; 
 that there might be a few who wished it in the 
 higher walks of life, particularly in the great cities, 
 but that the main body of the people in the East- 
 ern States were as steadily for republicanism as in 
 the Southern.” Making ever so slight allowance 
 for refraction by reason of the transmission of 
 these words through the Jeffersonian medium, we 
 see the most inadequate basis for the vast pile of 
 Jefferson’s suspicion. 
 
 But in dealing with Jefferson’s conduct, it is not 
 the truth which must be sought so much as Jeffer- 
 son’s idea of the truth. That he had an honest 
 belief in the monarchical conspiracy, and in the 
 treasonable designs of the Hamiltonian clique, ap- 
 pears certain. Indeed, if he began with a faith 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 105 
 
 like a grain of mustard seed, lie must soon have 
 caused it to expand into a vigorous tree, so lib- 
 erally did he water it with the ceaseless iteration 
 and reiteration of his own assertions. Frequent 
 repetition of a statement assumes in time the as- 
 pect of evidence ; and what he said so often he 
 probably at last came to believe. Unquestionably 
 he induced others to believe it. For years his talk 
 was of “ monarchists ” and “ monocrats,” till the 
 reader of his letters and memoirs regards these 
 people like the sea-serpent, feels that it would be 
 incongruous if so familiar a name did not repre- 
 sent some real existence, and in a way permits the 
 fiction to he asserted into a reality. There was an 
 earnestness, or, as he himself would have said, a 
 venom, in Jefferson’s language, when he dealt with 
 this topic, indicating a force and depth of feeling 
 hardly to be adequately conveyed by description, 
 and which is so utterly inappropriate for a fable 
 that it seems sufficiently to imply truth. 
 
 If the purpose of the monarchical party was ab- 
 horrent to Jefferson, so their means appeared con- 
 sonantly base. The decision to pay in full not 
 only the principal of the domestic debt, but also 
 the arrears of interest, followed by the assumption 
 of the state indebtedness, furnished, during a year 
 and a half,, opportunities for speculation which 
 were availed of with an ardor that has not been 
 surpassed in Wall Street in our own generation. 
 Naturally those who gathered in the securities at 
 low prices were the men of capital, sagacity, and 
 
106 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 enterprise, who lived in cities, more especially resi- 
 dents in New York and Philadelphia, who could 
 best forecast congressional action. Naturally, too, 
 those who had most faith in Hamilton plunged 
 most boldly into the venture. Jefferson, there- 
 fore, and others who had taken fright at the mo- 
 narchical scarecrow, were scandalized and alarmed 
 as they saw the supporters of Hamiltonian mea- 
 sures reaping a great harvest of wealth, and conse- 
 quently of political power and social consideration. 
 They began to charge the secretai'y of the treasury 
 with winning adherents by giving opportunities of 
 growing suddenly and enormously rich. That great 
 financial system, which in a few brief months had 
 raised the United States from a condition of piti- 
 ful and ignoble bankruptcy to the status of a sol- 
 vent power in excellent credit, wore, to Jefferson's 
 suspicious eyes, the aspect of a great, complex, and 
 terribly efficient machine for building up in the 
 state the most dangerous kind of aristocratical 
 party. 
 
 His dissatisfaction was further nourished by 
 other measures ; the military establishment dis- 
 gusted him, because he abhorred every manifes- 
 tation of governmental power or control. The 
 excise seemed odious, because he thought that all i 
 branches of internal taxation ought to be left to 
 the States. But most of all the proposition for a 
 national bank appeared to bristle with objection- 
 able traits. By the time that Hamilton was pre- 
 pared to push this project, the political opei’ation 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 107 
 
 of his financial policy was fully appreciated, and 
 indeed greatly exaggerated, by Jefferson : nor was 
 it longer possible for the treasury party to coerce 
 support by declaring the existence of the Union to 
 be at stake. This bank act involved first a ques- 
 tion of law and then one of expediency. In the 
 former aspect it presented much difficulty, and 
 Washington asked for written opinions from his 
 cabinet officers. Hamilton supported it in an ar- 
 gument which is one of the most famous of our 
 state papers. Jefferson took the other side and 
 argued the legal point, which alone he understood, 
 with much force and ability. After great hesita- 
 tion Washington decided to sign the bill. He was 
 always reluctant to interfere with his secretaries 
 in their respective departments : furthermore, if he 
 was making a constitutional error it could be cor- 
 rected by the Supreme Court. In due time that tri- 
 bunal sustained the constitutionality of the bank, 
 Chief Justice Marshall delivering an opinion in 
 which he added nothing to the reasoning of Hamil- 
 ton. But though the views of Jefferson were thus 
 finally rejected, it must be acknowledged that the 
 question, regarded as one purely of law, might just 
 . as well or better have been determined the other 
 way. The issue was, whether a rigid or a liberal 
 construction should be given to the general clauses 
 of the Constitution ; and a bench of strict con- 
 structionists would have encountered no insuper- 
 able legal obstacles in the way of sustaining Jef- 
 ferson. 
 
108 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 But if tlie legal and constitutional aspects and 
 the political bearing of this measure were easily 
 within Jefferson’s comprehension, its relations to 
 the finances and business of the country were far 
 beyond his understanding. He proclaimed the 
 most ignorant theories, and talked the most absurd 
 twaddle about its mischievous introduction of pa- 
 per money, and the consequent banishment of gold 
 and silver from circulation. When the subscrip- 
 tion books were opened, he saw with melancholy ! 
 forebodings the capitalists rushing forward in such 
 eager competition that much more than the capital 
 stock was quickly subscribed. He wrote gloomily ; 
 to Monroe : “ Thus it is that we shall be paying 
 thirteen per cent, per annum for eight millions of 
 paper money, instead of having that circulation of 
 gold and silver for nothing. . . . For the paper 
 emitted from the bank, seven per cent, profits will 
 be received by the subscribers for it as bank 
 paper, . . . and six per cent, in the public paper i 
 of which it is the representative. Nor is there 
 any reason to believe that either the six millions 
 of paper or the two millions of specie deposited 
 will not be suffered to be withdrawn, and the 
 paper thrown into circulation. The cash deposited 
 by strangers for safekeeping will probably suffice 1 
 for cash demands.” He was probably ignorant 
 that such special deposits could not lawfully be 
 used by the bank at all ; and this is only a sample 
 of his general lack of knowledge in all matters of 
 business. 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 109 
 
 There is no doubt that the hank, whether consti- 
 tutional or not, was of immense advantage to the 
 country; but Jefferson could see iu it only a pro- 
 lific machine for turning out more corrupt support- 
 ers of that dangerous and designing monarchist, 
 the secretary of the treasury. Henceforth his 
 abuse- of the “ treasury party,” as he called it, re- 
 doubled ; nor did he ever modify this opinion to 
 the end of his life. In his introduction to the 
 “Anas,” in 1818, he recorded that “Hamilton was 
 not only a monarchist, hut for a monarchy bot- 
 tomed on corruption ; ” and he said that the bank 
 was designed as an “ engine of influence more per- 
 manent ” for corrupting the legislature than the 
 funding system and assumption could be. Accord- 
 ingly “ members of both houses,” he said, “ were 
 constantly kept as directors who, on every question 
 interesting to that institution or to the views of the 
 federal head, voted at the will of that head ; and, 
 together with the stockholding members, could al- 
 ways make the Federal vote that of the majority.” 
 On March 3, 1793, discussing Giles’s famous reso- 
 lutions of censure on Hamilton, he notes “the com- 
 position of the House, 1, of bank directors ; 2, 
 holders of bank stock ; 3, stock jobbers ; 4, blind 
 devotees ; 5, ignorant persons who did not compre- 
 hend them*; 6, lazy and good-humored persons, who 
 comprehended and acknowledged them, yet were 
 too lazy to examine, or unwilling to pronounce 
 censure ; the persons who knew these characters 
 foresaw that, the three first descriptions making 
 
110 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 one third of the House, the three latter would 
 make one half of the residue.” It was thus that 
 he endeavored to account for the ignominious fail- 
 ure of the anti-Federalist attempt to establish defi- 
 nite charges of dishonesty against Hamilton ; and 
 admitted his own sympathy with the blunder of 
 that unfortunate and disastrous measure. 
 
 Another thing which Jefferson beheld with hor- 
 ror was the national debt. Besides the speculation 
 which soon ended in widespread ruin, he conceived 
 that he detected a purpose on Hamilton’s part to 
 use this debt permanently, in some ingenious and 
 covert way, as a perpetual resource for corrupting 
 the legislature. The fact that a portion of it had 
 been made “deferred” for a few years, convinced 
 him that Hamilton intended never to let the people 
 pay what they owed and get clear of obligation. 
 Everybody, he said, stood in dread of the “ chickens 
 of the treasury ” and their “ many contrivances.” 
 “As the doctrine is that a public debt is a public 
 blessing, so they think a perpetual one is a perpet- 
 ual blessing, and therefore wish to make it so large 
 that we can never pay it off.” He could not be 
 induced to renounce this suspicion, even when a 
 scheme was brought forward by Hamilton to pro- 
 mote payment within a short period. No evidence 1 
 ever could persuade him that Hamilton was politi- 
 cally honest, and no lapse of time could allay his 
 prejudices. 
 
 Washington, meanwhile, watched with profound 
 concern the development of a spirit of antagonism 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 111 
 
 and distrust between his chief secretaries, and the 
 coincident organization of hostile political parties. 
 He himself, elevated to office by the whole nation, 
 was resolved to hold aloof from any party connec- 
 tions. But he could not close his ears to the cease- 
 less din of accusations, arguments, and complaints 
 which the opposing leaders insisted upon making 
 him hear. On May 23, 1792, Jefferson wrote to the 
 President a long letter “ disburdening ” himself 
 concerning a “ subject of inquietude ” almost coex- 
 tensive with the whole national affairs. He intro- 
 duced his strictures by saying “it has been urged;” 
 but soon he warmed with his work, threw off the 
 impersonality of this phrase, and openly delivered 
 his own sentiments. A public debt, he said, too 
 great to be paid before it would inevitably be in- 
 creased by new circumstances, had been “ artifi- 
 cially created by adding together the whole amount 
 of the debtor and creditor sides of accounts ; ” the 
 finances had been managed not only extravagantly 
 but so as to create “ a corrupt squadron, deciding 
 the voice of the legislature,” and manifesting “ a 
 disposition to get rid of the limitations imposed by 
 the Constitution ; ” “ that the ultimate object of all 
 this is to prepare the way for a change from the 
 present republican form of government to that of a 
 monarchy.” He was positive that “ the corruption 
 of the legislature ” would prove “ the instrument 
 for producing in future a king, lords, and com- 
 mons, or whatever else those who direct it may 
 choose.” “ The owers of the debt are in the south- 
 
112 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 ern and the holders of it in the northern division,” 
 so that a sectional distribution exists fraught with 
 imminent danger of dissolution of the Union. He 
 is so convinced that nothing save Washington’s 
 continuance in office can avert this peril, that he 
 lays aside his objections to a second term, and im- 
 plores the President not to think of retiring. 
 
 These same apprehensions he reiterated when- 
 ever occasion offered. On July 10, 1792, he urged 
 upon the President “ that the national debt was 
 unnecessarily increased, and that it had furnished 
 the means of corrupting both branches of the legis- 
 lature ; that . . . there was a considerable squad- 
 ron in both, whose votes were devoted to the paper 
 and stock-jobbing interests, . . . that on examin- 
 ing the votes of these men they would be found 
 uniformly for every treasury measure, and that as 
 most of these measures had been carried by small 
 majorities, they were carried by these very votes.” 
 
 Two or three months earlier he had told Wash- 
 ington that all existing discontents were to be at- 
 tributed to the Treasury Department : 
 
 “ that a system had there been contrived for deluging 
 the States with paper money instead of gold and silver, 
 for withdrawing our citizens from the pursuits of com- 
 merce, manufactures, building, and other branches of 
 useful industry, to occupy themselves and their capitals 
 in a species of gambling, destructive of morality, and 
 which had introduced its poison into the government 
 itself. That it was a fact . . . that particular mem- 
 bers of the legislature, while those laws were on the 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 113 
 
 carpet, had feathered their nests with paper, had then 
 voted for the laws ; . . . that they had now brought for- 
 ward a proposition far beyond any one ever yet advanced, 
 and to which the eyes of many were turned as the de- 
 cision which was to let us know whether we live under a 
 limited or an unlimited government.” 
 
 This reference bore upon that part of Hamil- 
 ton’s famous report on manufactures “ which, un- 
 der color of giving bounties for the encouragement 
 of particular manufactures,” was designed to grasp 
 for Congress control of all matters “ which they 
 should deem for the public welfare and which 
 [were] susceptible of the application of money,” 
 as certainly few matters were not. On October 1, 
 1792, he says that he told Washington : 
 
 “ That though the people were sound, there were a 
 numerous sect who had monarchy in contemplation ; 
 that the secretary of the treasury was one of these. 
 That I had heard him say that this Constitution was a 
 shilly-shally thing of mere milk and water, which could 
 not last and was only good as a step to something better. 
 That when we reflected that he had endeavored in the 
 convention to make an English Constitution of it, and 
 when, failing in that, we saw all his measures tending 
 to bring it to the same thing, it was natural for us to 
 be jealous ; and particularly when we saw that these 
 measures had established corruption in the legislature, 
 where there was a squadron devoted to the nod of the 
 Treasury, doing whatever he had directed and ready to 
 do what he should direct.” 
 
 On February 7, 1793, he again said that the ill- 
 
114 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 feeling at tlie South was due to a belief in the 
 existence “ of a corrupt squadron of voters in Con- 
 gress, at the command of the Treasury,” suf- 
 ciently numerous to make the laws the reverse of 
 what they would have been had only honest votes 
 been east. 
 
 It was seldom that Jefferson was at the trouble 
 to aim a shaft directly at any one save Hamilton ; 
 but once, May 8, 1791, he took an insidious side- 
 shot at John Adams. “ I am afraid,” he wrote to 
 Washington, “the indiscretion of a printer has 
 committed me with my friend, Mr. Adams, for 
 whom, as one of the most honest and disinterested 
 men alive, I have a cordial esteem, increased by 
 long habits of concurrence in opinion in the days 
 of his republicanism ; and even since his apostasy 
 to hereditary monarchy and nobility, though we 
 differ, we differ as friends should do.” 
 
 What he said to Washington he said and wrote 
 also to others. So early as February 4, 1791, he 
 wrote to Colonel Mason that “ it cannot be de- 
 nied that we have among us a sect who believe it 
 [the English Constitution] to contain whatever is 
 perfect in human institutions ; that the members 
 of this sect have, many of them, names and offices 
 which stand high in the estimation of our country- 
 men.” July 29, 1791, writing to Thomas Paine, 
 he speaks of a “ sect here, high in name, but small 
 in numbers,” who had been indulging a false hope 
 that the people were undergoing conversion “ to the 
 doctrine of kings, lords, and commons ; ” but he 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 115 
 
 politely adds that this delusion has been “ checked 
 at least,” and the people “ confirmed in their good 
 old faith,” by the recent publication of Paine’s 
 “ Rights of Man.” To Lafayette he writes, J une 
 16, 1792 : “ A sect has shown itself among us who 
 declare they espoused our new Constitution, not as 
 a good and sufficient thing in itself, but only as a 
 step to an English Constitution, the only thing 
 good and sufficient in itself in their eye. . . . Too 
 many of these stock-jobbers and king-jobbers have 
 come into our legislature : or, rather, too many of 
 our legislature have become stock-jobbers and king- 
 jobbers.” 
 
 During this prolonged stress of anxiety and 
 alarm, Jefferson, who was unquestionably a sincere 
 patriot and honest in his opinions, sought encour- 
 agement in such evidence of republican sentiment 
 as he could discover in the mass of the people. 
 His faith and reliance were always in numbers, 
 and in the vast bulk of the population, rather than 
 in the politicians and upper classes of society, who 
 appeared more prominently upon the surface. Ac- 
 cordingly he never missed an opportunity of drop- 
 ping his plummet into the mighty depths beneath ; 
 and if he discovered those profound currents to be 
 in accord with his own tendencies, as he always 
 expected to do, and generally did, he refreshed his 
 wearied spirit with the instinctive anticipation that 
 these would control the course of the country at no 
 distant time. Herein lay his deep wisdom ; he 
 enjoyed a political vision penetrating deeper down 
 
116 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 into the inevitable movement of popular govern- 
 ment, and farther forward into the future trend of 
 free institutions, than was possessed by any other 
 man in public life in his day. He had sound con- 
 fidence that the multitude, led by a single able 
 strategist like himself, was sure in time to outvote 
 and overpower the much smaller body of educated 
 men who understood and admired the statesman- 
 ship of Hamilton. 
 
 But concerning this confidence of Jefferson in 
 the people, which must be so constantly borne in 
 mind in order to comprehend his character, some 
 observations should be made. Not merely did he 
 appreciate and foresee their invincible power in 
 politics, but he had perfect faith in the desirability 
 of the exercise of that power ; he anticipated that 
 in this exercise the masses would always show wis- 
 dom and discrimination, that they would select the 
 most able and most honest men in the country to 
 preside over the national affairs, men like himself 
 and Mr. Madison. It was a delightful ideal of a 
 body politic which he had before his eyes, wherein 
 a huge volume of human poverty and ignorance 
 would be always pleased to recognize and set over 
 itself a few exalted individuals of lofty character 
 and distinguished intelligence. In his day it was 
 still a question how poverty and ignorance would 
 behave in politics ; and it was his firm expectation 
 that they would behave with modesty and self-ab- 
 negation. It was a kindly belief, but indicative of 
 the enthusiast. He deserves the praise of thinking 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 117 
 
 better of his fellow men than they deserve. If he 
 could see what sort of men have in fact satisfied 
 the people since his doctrines have become devel- 
 oped, he would probably greatly modify them. 
 His notion of a democratic polity had as its main 
 principle that the multitude should select the best 
 men, and, after that expectation had been once dis- 
 proved by fair and sufficient experience, he would 
 almost undoubtedly have abandoned his doctrine 
 in disappointment and indignation. But though 
 this is matter of speculation, and may be correct 
 or not, one thing at least is certain, that democracy 
 has not worked as Jefferson expected it to work, 
 and that the two generations or more, which have 
 passed away since his day, have brought forth re- 
 sults which would have astonished and shocked 
 him, if presented as the outgrowth of his teachings. 
 
 It was the custom of that period for men hold- 
 ing high official positions to contribute anonymous 
 political communications to the newspapers, — a 
 custom which, among some advantages, possessed 
 the serious disadvantage that out of it arose much 
 suspicion, ill-blood, and personal resentment. The 
 misunderstanding with John Adams, already re- 
 ferred to, had its origin in an episode of this kind, 
 wherein Jefferson made an absurd, though natural, 
 blunder. Adams's “ Discourses of Davila ” appear 
 to-day as stupid reading as one could discover iu a 
 large library; but, in the times of which we are 
 writing, several persons read them through ; and 
 readers of democratic proclivities were even more 
 
118 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 incensed than bored by them. The doctrines 
 therein proclaimed were mercilessly castigated in 
 Paine’s “ Rights of Man,” of which it so happened 
 that “ the only copy ” in the United States was 
 sent to Jefferson, with the request that, after read- 
 ing it, he would “ send it to a Mr. J. B. Smith, who 
 had asked it for his brother to reprint it.” “ Be- 
 ing an utter stranger to J. B. Smith,” says Jeffer- 
 son, “ I wrote a note to explain to him why I (a 
 stranger to him) sent him a pamphlet ; . . . and 
 to take off a little of the dryness of the note, I 
 wrote that I was glad to find it was to be reprinted ; 
 that something would at length be publicly said 
 against the political heresies which had lately 
 sprung up among us,” etc. To Jefferson’s “ great 
 astonishment,” the printer “ prefixed ” this note to 
 the volume. At once the Federalist writers settled 
 like a hive of hornets upon the unfortunate sponsor 
 of “ Tom ” Paine, and a peculiarly vigorous sting 
 was sent in by one Publicola. Jefferson hastened 
 to write two letters of explanation to John Adams, 
 deprecating any quarrel, and speaking with espe- 
 cial animosity and contempt of the mischief -making 
 Publicola. Little did he think with what a freight 
 he had laden his peaceful missives, for Publicola 
 was none other than John Adams’s son, John 1 
 Quincy Adams, whose family were very proud of 
 this early filial exploit. Such were some of the 
 perils of this darkling habit of anonymous news- 
 paper writing. Isaac had actually been made a 
 peace-offering to Abraham. 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 119 
 
 But difficulties much more grave than such com- 
 ical errors were often promoted by the newspapers 
 of the day. Shortly after Jefferson was appointed 
 secretary of state, he received from Madison a let- 
 ter commending for a clerkship one Philip Fre- 
 neau, a democratic scribbler of verses rather better 
 than most Americans could write in those days. 
 Jefferson had then no vacancy ; but a little later 
 he found a “ clerkship for foreign languages,” 
 carrying only the petty salary of “ two hundred 
 and fifty dollars a year,” but giving “ so little to 
 do as not to interefere with any other calling ” 
 which the clerk might choose to carry on. In a 
 very kind note Jefferson conferred this modest 
 position upon Freneau, and in so doing wrote the 
 first stanza in a long Iliad of troubles. For it so 
 happened that the “ other calling ” which the ill- 
 paid translating clerk selected for eking out his 
 subsistence was the editorship of a newspaper ; 
 and it further so happened that Mr. Freneau had 
 a zealous faith in the chief of his own department, 
 and a correspondingly intense aversion towards the 
 rival secretary of the treasury. Hitherto Fenno’s 
 “ Gazette ” had represented “ the Treasury ” with- 
 out an equal opponent ; but the new “ National 
 Gazette ” now sustained the Department of State 
 with not inferior ardor, with an appalling courage 
 m the use of abusive language, and with terrible 
 enterprise in preferring outrageous accusations. 
 For Freneau had not only extreme convictions, but 
 a trenchant pen. Hamilton and his friends were 
 
120 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 soon wincing beneath bis attacks ; but they pre- 
 ferred to pass by the writer as a being too insignif- 
 icant for their wrath, and to denounce his alleged 
 patron and protector, the secretary of state, in per- 
 son. He it was, they said, who insidiously fur- 
 nished material and information to the disaffected 
 and scurrilous sheet which was issued, as they chose 
 to declare, almost actually from his department. 
 He was responsible for its malicious temper, for its 
 reckless aspersions of his honorable colleagues, 
 and even of the President himself. Jefferson an- 
 grily repelled these assertions, declaring that he 
 had nothing whatsoever to do, directly or indi- 
 rectly, with the management of the paper ; but at 
 the same time he had the courage not to conceal 
 that he thought the “ Gazette ” to be in the main 
 sound in its doctrines, and doing good work. He 
 neither dismissed nor rebuked Freneau. It is rea- 
 sonable to suppose that a rebuke would have been 
 effectual ; but his obligation to give it is by no 
 means clear. His asseveration that he did not 
 interfere, even indirectly, in the conduct of the 
 sheet, derives credit from the probability that, if 
 he had interfered, he would have been sufficiently 
 wise and politic to discourage the personal attacks 
 upon Washington, which he must have seen to be 
 blunders. But in a broad and very forcible way 
 the paper advocated his views ; and in return he 
 generally spoke well of it, and was interested in its 
 success. It is difficult to say that he was positively 
 wrong in this. Possibly he occasionally “ inspired ” 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 121 
 
 it, to use the ingenious, indefinite slang of our day ; 
 but it was going too far when he was treated as a 
 responsible member of the editorial staff. Whether 
 it was becoming in him to retain in his department 
 a writer whose daily business was to defame the 
 policy and character of a colleague in the cabinet, 
 is a part of the general question, soon to be dis- 
 cussed, of the relationship which those colleagues 
 were bound, under the peculiar circumstances then 
 existing, to maintain towards each other and their 
 chief. 
 
 At last, in August, 1792, Hamilton was pro- 
 voked into coming down to the lists and himself 
 taking a hand in the fray. He descended like a 
 giant among the pygmies, and startled all by his 
 sudden apparition in the guise of “ An American.” 
 Though he thus wore his visor down, every one at 
 once knew the blows of that terrible hand. In his 
 first article he bitterly assailed Jefferson for re- 
 taining his office and at the same time continuing 
 his connection with Freneau. Further, he charged 
 Jefferson with disloyalty to the Constitution and 
 the administration. Jefferson was absent when 
 this powerful diatribe appeared ; but Freneau 
 printed an affidavit, saying that he had had no 
 negotiations with Jefferson concerning the estab- 
 lishment of his paper, and that Jefferson had never 
 controlled it in the least, or written or dictated a 
 line for it. Hamilton, in replication, contemptu- 
 ously declined to seek any other antagonist than 
 Jefferson himself. His arguments were powerful, 
 
122 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 and a great wratli inspired his pen. But defenders 
 of the secretary of state were not lacking ; and 
 Hamilton, being once in the field, had perforce to 
 lay about him among a throng of small assailants, 
 for whose destruction he cared little, while Jeffer- 
 son himself, with exasperating caution, declined to 
 be drawn into the furious arena. 
 
 Washington beheld this sudden melee with 
 extreme annoyance, and made a noble, pathetic, 
 hopeless effort to close a chasm which the forces of 
 nature herself had opened. He wrote to each sec- 
 retary a short letter of personal appeal, breathing 
 a beautiful spirit of concord and patriotism. From 
 each he received a noteworthy and characteristic 
 response, courteous and considerate towards him- 
 self, but showing plainly the impossibility of har- 
 mony between two representatives so adverse in 
 intellectual constitution. Hamilton briefly justi- 
 fied what he had done, and said that he must now 
 go through with this conflict, but that he would 
 try not to become so involved again. Jefferson 
 sent an elaborate argument, defending himself and 
 his party, and arraigning the policy and the char- 
 acter of the Federalists. The letter is such an 
 ample exposition of the anti- Federalist tenets, such 
 a forcible apologia of the writer, that it ought 1 
 not to be mutilated by excerpts ; yet it is much too 
 long for reproduction here. 
 
 J efferson began by saying that when he “ em- 
 barked in the government, it was with a determi- 
 nation to intermeddle not at all with the legislature, 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 123 
 
 and as little as possible with my co-departments.” 
 For the most part he had scrupulously observed 
 this wise resolution, though he bitterly recalled his 
 share in the assumption measure. Into this “ I 
 was duped by the secretary of the treasury, and 
 made a tool for forwarding his schemes, not then 
 sufficiently understood by me ; and of all the errors 
 of my political life this has occasioned me the 
 deepest regret.” He acknowledged that he had 
 “ utterly, in his private conversations, disapproved 
 of the system of the secretary of the treasury,” 
 which “ flowed from principles adverse to liberty, 
 and was calculated to undermine and demolish the 
 republic, by creating an influence of his depart- 
 ment over the members of the legislature.” He 
 then developed fully his favorite theory of a “ cor- 
 rupt squadron ” in Congress, whose votes could 
 always turn the scale, who were under the com- 
 mand of the secretary of the treasury, and were by 
 him used “ for the purpose of subverting, step by 
 step, the principles of the Constitution, which he 
 had so often declared to be a thing of nothing 
 which must be changed.” He complained that his 
 own abstinence from interference with the Treasury 
 Department had not been reciprocated by Hamil- 
 ton, who had repeatedly intermeddled in the for- 
 eign affairs, and always in the way of friendship 
 to England and hostility to France, a policy “ ex- 
 actly the reverse” of that of Jefferson, and, as 
 Jefferson believed, also of that of Washington. 
 He then passed to the attacks made by Hamilton, 
 
124 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 as “ An American,” in Fenno’s “ Gazette.” For 
 the charge of disloyalty to the Constitution, he de- 
 nied that he had been more an oj>ponent of the 
 Constitution than Hamilton had been, and showed 
 that his objections to it had been vindicated by the 
 subsequent adoption of amendments almost wholly 
 coextensive with his criticism ; whereas Hamilton 
 had been dissatisfied because “ it wanted a king 
 and house of lords.” Hamilton, he said, wished 
 the national debt “ never to be paid, but always to 
 be a thing wherewith to corrupt and manage the 
 legislature,” whereas he himself would like to see 
 it “ paid to-morrow.” Still harping on corruption, 
 he said : “ I have never inquired what number of 
 sons, relatives, and friends of senators, representa- 
 tives, printers, or other useful partisans, Colonel 
 Hamilton has provided for among the hundred 
 clerks of his department, the thousand excisemen 
 at his nod, and spread over the Union ; nor could 
 ever have imagined that the man who has the 
 shuffling of millions backwards and forwards from 
 paper into money, and money into paper, from 
 Europe to America, and America to Europe ; the 
 dealing out of treasury secrets among his friends 
 in what time and measure he pleases ; and who 
 never slips an occasion of making friends with his 
 means, — that such an one, I say, would have 
 brought forward a charge against me for having 
 appointed the poet Freneau a translating clerk to 
 my office, with a salary of two hundred and fifty 
 dollars a year.” He tells the story of the starting 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 125 
 
 of Freneau’s paper in a way to exculpate himself ; 
 and, concerning its subsequent conduct, says : “ I 
 : can protest, in the presence of Heaven, that I 
 i never did, by myself or any other, say a syllable, 
 ; nor attempt any kind of influence. I can further 
 protest, in the same awful Presence, that I never 
 did, by myself or any other, directly or indirectly, 
 write, dictate, or procure any one sentence or sen- 
 timent to he inserted in his or any other gazette 
 : to which my name was not affixed, or that of my 
 office.” He concluded : “ When I came into this 
 office it was with a resolution to retire from it as 
 soon as I could with decency. It pretty early ap- 
 peared to me that the proper moment would be 
 the first of those epochs at which the Constitution 
 > seems to have contemplated a periodical change or 
 renewal of the public servants. ... I look to that 
 period with the longing of a wave-worn mariner 
 who has at length the land in view, and shall count 
 the days and hours which still lie between me and 
 it.” But, he says, though he has a “ thorough dis- 
 regard for the honors and emoluments of office,” 
 he has a great value “ for the esteem of his coun- 
 trymen ; and, conscious of having merited it,” he 
 “ will not suffer his retirement to be clouded by 
 the slanders of a man whose history, from the 
 moment at which history can stoop to notice him, 
 is a tissue of machinations against the liberty of 
 the country which has not only received and given 
 him bread, but heaped its honors on his head.” 
 For himself, he declares his helief, with obvious 
 
126 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 innuendo, that the people do not regard him as 
 “ an enemy of the republic, nor an intriguer 
 against it, nor a waster of its revenue, nor prosti- 
 tutor of it to the purposes of corruption.” 
 
 The letter is a characteristic and very remarkable 
 document; it deserves to have become as famous 
 as a great speech, so plausible was it in defensive 
 argument, so imposing in denunciation, so bitter in 
 personal invective, so skillful and yet earnest in its 
 interweaving of truth with gross misrepresenta- 
 tions, so spirited at once and pathetic in its protes- 
 tations of rectitude. It contained some falsehoods, 
 yet it was honestly written. It did not induce 
 Washington to abjure Hamilton; but it proved to 
 him that each side was too much in the right to 
 yield, and that each had such an honest confidence 
 in the wickedness of the other that reconciliation 
 was hopeless ; matters had gone far beyond that 
 stage when Jefferson had the audacity to talk of 
 the moment when history could first stoop to no- 
 tice his distinguished rival, and could actually twit 
 Hamilton with having had bread “ given ” to him 
 by the country ! 
 
 Federalist historians have always lost their tem- 
 pers over this most aggravating epistle, and are 
 accustomed to compare the replies of the two secre- 
 taries vastly to Jefferson’s discredit. Hamilton, 
 they say, did not malign his opponent in private 
 correspondence with their common chief. But the 
 fact that Hamilton did not see fit to write an elab- 
 orate, argumentative, offensive and defensive let- 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 127 
 
 ter does not establish the fact that Jefferson ought 
 not to have done so. Neither, when writing, knew 
 what course the other would pursue in this respect, 
 so that no unfair advantage was taken. It may be 
 well suspected that the real cause of the Federalist 
 vexation is, that Hamilton left no corrective anti- 
 dote to Jefferson’s powerful document. In the 
 long struggle between Hamilton and Jefferson, the 
 Hamiltonians always intimated that Jefferson was 
 a darkling underhand antagonist, who would cov- 
 ertly traduce and vilify, and employ underlings to 
 take the responsibilities and encounter the perils 
 which he himself should have assumed. Thus they 
 depict him as a coutemptible and cowardly charac- 
 ter; but, as it seems, with a great exaggeration 
 of the truth, if not altogether without any truth. 
 Hamilton was by his nature a fighter, ardent, defi- 
 ant, self-confident, always ready to change blows 
 with one or with a host, half winning victory by 
 his sanguine anticipation of it. Jefferson on the 
 other hand was as non-combatant as a Quaker, 
 seldom and reluctantly entering a debate either in 
 words or in print. But his detractors were of opin- 
 ion that if he would not make a political speech, 
 he ought not to talk politics with his friends after 
 dinner ; if he would not write political articles for 
 the newspapers, he ought never to put an expres- 
 sion of political opinion into his correspondence. 
 They laid down for him an absurd rule which was 
 followed by no man in those days, or indeed in any 
 days. It does not appear that Jefferson ever con* 
 
128 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 cealed his sentiments, or that he often conciliated 
 any man in public and defamed him in private ; 
 observing these principles, he had a perfect right 
 to declare his beliefs about public men and mea- 
 sures, in conversation or in letter-writing, to any 
 person whomsoever. 
 
 So long as the department of national finances, 
 the liquidation of the national debt and provision 
 for its payment, the establishment of the bank and 
 of the mint, the arrangement of the tariff, and the 
 organization of taxes constituted the chief business 
 of the government, it was impossible for Jefferson 
 to encounter Hamilton with any hope of success. 
 For even if Hamilton’s financiering had been as 
 unsound as in fact it was sound, Jefferson was too 
 much of a novice in such matters to be able to 
 expose any errors. In other matters, also, Ham- 
 ilton enjoyed great influence and prestige induced 
 by his admirable management of his preeminently 
 important department. It was not without rea- 
 son that Jefferson complained that his colleague 
 encroached on his functions. Hamilton had the 
 mind of a ruler, and could not help placing him- 
 self substantially at the head of the nation, with 
 a policy on every subject and an unconquerable 
 habit of making that policy felt. It was not sur- 
 prising that Jefferson became irritated and discour- 
 aged ; for it was evident that he had no reasonable 
 hope of holding his own unless the struggle could 
 be transferred to some new field better suited to 
 his abilities. Fortunately for him, precisely this 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 129 
 
 movement was already going rapidly forward. Just 
 about the time when the opponents of the secre- 
 tary of the treasury had become consolidated and 
 trained by the severe lessons of repeated disasters,, 
 and when Jefferson’s position as their leader had 
 become universally admitted, questions of domestic 
 policy began to be superseded by the foreign rela- 
 tions of the United States. The new problems 
 soon took such shape that Jefferson and his follow- 
 ers regained courage. They had become an organ- 
 ized party and had assumed a good party name ; 
 known at first only in a negative way as anti- 
 Federalists, they had seized upon the monarchical 
 heresy as affording them a better designation, and 
 now signified their loyalty to the Constitution by 
 calling themselves Republicans. Their doctrine, 
 however, was properly democratic; and very soon 
 a portion of their party described itself as the 
 Democratic-Republicans, and then of this double 
 phrase the less appropriate half was lopped off and 
 the name of “ Democrats ” has ever since been per- 
 manently retained. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE. FOREIGN, AFFAIRS 
 
 It was the wild gales of the French Revolution, 
 whirling with hardly diminished fury across the 
 Atlantic, which at last filled the swelling sails of 
 the Democrats. The story of the political excite- 
 ment caused in the United States by that momen- 
 tous upheaval is a tale so much more than twice 
 told, that in this small volume it may properly be 
 treated with a brevity disproportioned to its great 
 importance. In its earlier stages the movement 
 was watched with intense and unanimous approba- 
 tion by all persons' in this country. But as events 
 went on this harmony vanished ; men of conserva- 
 tive temper and orderly instincts began to look 
 distrustfully upon anarchy, bloodshed, and that 
 miscalled equalization which was really a turning 
 upside down. Hamilton and the Federalists in- 
 clined to repudiate a sister republic of such doubt- 
 ful aspect, and to consider French republicanism 
 not much more akin to American republicanism 
 than the faithless wife in a French novel is like 
 the puritan matron of New England. Jefferson, 
 on the other hand, remained steadfast in his adhe- 
 sion to the cause of the people, even the worst and 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 131 
 
 lowest people, in a land which he loved scarcely 
 less ardently than his own. In his letters from 
 France he had vigorously' expressed his hearty ab- 
 hon-ence of the universal and hideous wretchedness 
 begotten of the monarchical system. It was now 
 impossible for him to be appalled by the most de- 
 structive storms which promised to clear the guilt- 
 laden atmosphere. With him felt the great mass 
 of the American people, who maintained a constant 
 good-will towards the revolutionists, even through 
 the massacres of September, and applauded in 
 turn Lafayette and Danton, the Girondins who 
 overthrew the old monarchy, and the J acobins who 
 overthrew the Girondins. 
 
 This extravagant ardor was early raised to the 
 frenzy point by the French declaration of war 
 against England, which country was still pro- 
 foundly hated by nine tenths of the inhabitants of 
 the United States. With mingled alarm and dis- 
 gust Hamilton and his party saw this mighty wave 
 of passion sweeping across the land, nor were they 
 reassured at beholding prominent on the top of 
 this resistless surge the secretary of state, sustained 
 in triumph by the vast force of popular numbers. 
 Jefferson, on the other hand, was naturally well 
 content ; he always understood the dynamics of 
 politics, and now while Hamilton marshaled the 
 intelligence and wealth of the country into an army 
 of political followers, unequaled in the quality of 
 its material by any party which has ever existed in 
 the country, Jefferson gazed with instinctive con- 
 
132 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 fidence over the sea of ignorant bnt countless faces 
 upturned towards himself. He knew that with 
 dull numbers at his hack he could in time out- 
 match the educated but too thin ranks of federal- 
 ism. He was quite right. In a much blinder way, 
 because he was intellectually immeasurably below 
 Jefferson, but with the same sure instinct, Andrew 
 Jackson afterward repeated the triumphs of Jeffer- 
 son by the aid of the same classes of the commu- 
 nity. So now at last, after having faithfully en- 
 dured through the disconsolate period of domestic 
 politics, the Republican leader seemed in a fair 
 way to gain the upper hand when foreign politics 
 usurped the attention of every one. Had it only 
 been a measured Gallic craze instead of absolute 
 madness that ruled the hour, he might not have 
 been obliged even to abide the interval of John 
 Adams’s incumbency, but might have been the 
 second president of the United States. 
 
 On April 4, 1793, news arrived in the United 
 States that France had proclaimed war against 
 England. Five days later Genet, the new French 
 minister, landed at Charleston. An anxious and 
 stormy period was opened for the administration 
 by these two events. The duty, which was also 
 the honest wish, of the government to maintain a 
 strict neutrality was of unusual difficulty for many 
 reasons. (1.) There were entangling treaty obli- . 
 gations towards France, which bound the United 
 States to guarantee her in the maintenance of her 
 West Indian islands in any defensive war; and 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 133 
 
 nice questions were : whether the war declared by 
 France should be considered, as she claimed, defen- 
 sive; also, whether treaties entered into with the 
 royal government were binding towards its suc- 
 cessor. (2.) Both combatants soon manifested a 
 resolution to have no neutrals ; and each, com- 
 mitting outrageous infractions of neutral rights, 
 treated any nation not taking part with it as being 
 against it. (3.) Genet cherished and carried out, 
 in the most unscrupulous and energetic way, the 
 deliberate purpose of embroiling the United States 
 with Great Britain. (4.) Very few persons in the 
 United States really had the neutral temper ; Ham- 
 ilton led an English party, Jefferson led a French 
 party, and the passions which, in those strange 
 times, set all Europe aflamei, blazed with equal fury 
 in the United States. 
 
 A cabinet meeting decided, as was inevitable, 
 that a proclamation substantially of neutrality 
 should be issued by the President. Jefferson suc- 
 ceeded in bringing about that the word “ neutral- 
 ity ” should not appear in it, so that the document 
 might not be avowedly, and in terms, what it was 
 in fact. He thought it better to hold back the 
 formal annunciation of neutrality, as a “ thing 
 worth something to the powers at war, that they 
 would bid for it, and we might reasonably ask a 
 price, the broadest privileges of neutral nations.” 
 His policy, possibly open to some criticism in point 
 of principle, was imperfectly adopted ; and the 
 paper, as it was finally issued, did not half please 
 
134 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 him. To his chagrin, he had not been permitted to 
 draft it, though it fell naturally within his depart- 
 ment, the more neutral temper of Attorney-General 
 Randolph being deemed better fitted for the task. 
 In cabinet divisions Knox always gave his vote to 
 Hamilton ; Randolph so often gave his to Jeffer- 
 son as to provoke that secretai’y extremely by his 
 unwillingness always to do so. He seemed so near 
 to the character of a thorough-going partisan, that 
 he was more hated for not being entirely so than 
 thanked for the partial allegiance which he actu- 
 ally rendered. J efferson said : “ He always con- 
 trives to agree in principle with me, but in conclu- 
 sion with the other ; ” and again : “ The fact is, 
 that he has generally given his principles to the 
 one party, and his practice to the other, the oyster 
 to one, the shell to the other. Unfortunately the 
 shell was generally the lot of his friends, the 
 French and Republicans, and the oyster of their 
 antagonists.” Hamilton thought much worse than 
 this of Randolph. But the truth is that the at- 
 torney-general was a clear-headed, dispassionate 
 adviser, of an excellent shrewdness in matters of 
 international law, and, as in the present instance, 
 much more often right than either of the extrem- 
 ists between whom he stood. The dissatisfied sec- 
 retary of state, however, wrote in disgust to Madi- 
 son : “ I dare say you will have judged from the 
 pusillanimity of the proclamation from whose pen 
 it came. A fear lest any affection should be dis- 
 covered is distinguishable enough. This base fear 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 135 
 
 will produce the very evil they wish to avoid. For 
 our constituents, seeing that the government does 
 not express their mind, perhaps rather leans the 
 other way, are coming forward to express it them- 
 selves.” 
 
 This prophecy was true enough. Before Genet 
 left Charleston he had dispatched privateers and 
 issued commissions to officers ; and the very vessel 
 in which he arrived was taking prizes in American 
 waters before he had been presented to the Presi- 
 dent. Yet, in spite of these strange doings, his 
 slow progress northward was made through exult- 
 ing and triumphant crowds, who set no bounds to 
 their French ecstasies. He was received at a civic 
 banquet in Philadelphia at which the guests sang 
 the Marseillaise, passed aroilnd the red liberty cap, 
 and hailed each other as “ citizen.” Jefferson, 
 though wisely refraining from attendance at these 
 ceremonies, watched them with perfect sympathy, 
 and with sanguine and swelling indignation against 
 Hamilton and the British party. Henceforth to 
 the abusive epithets of “ monarchists ” and “ mon- 
 ocrats ” he added those of “ Anglomaniacs ” and 
 “ Anglomen,” as conveying at least an equal mea- 
 sure of reproach. He described to Monroe with 
 pleasure, and without a woixl of reprobation, the 
 boisterous thrones which hailed the French Am- 
 buscade, when she brought in as a prize The 
 Grange, captured in flagrant defiance of interna- 
 tional law actually iftside the capes of Delaware. 
 “ I wish we may be able,” he said, “ to repress the 
 
136 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 spirit of the people within the limits of a fair 
 neutrality. In the mean time Hamilton is panic- 
 struck if we refuse our breech to every kick which 
 England may choose to give it. He is for pro- 
 claiming at once the most abject principles, such 
 as would invite and merit habitual insults ; and, 
 indeed, every inch of ground must be fought in 
 our councils to desperation, in order to hold up 
 even a sneaking neutrality ; for our votes are gen- 
 erally two and a half against one and a half,” — 
 another slap at Randolph’s even-mindedness. He 
 adds with evident satisfaction that immense bank- 
 ruptcies have taken place in England, “ the last 
 advices made them amount to eleven millions ster- 
 ling and still going on.” By like remarks the an- 
 tipathy which he entertained for the enemies of 
 France is constantly made to appear. December 
 15, 1792, he writes triumphantly : “We have just 
 received the glorious news of the Prussian army 
 being obliged to retreat, and hope it will be fol- 
 lowed by some proper catastrophe on them. This 
 news has given wry faces to our monocrats here, 
 but sincere joy to the great body of our citizens. 
 It arrived only in the afternoon of yesterday, and 
 the bells were rung, and some illuminations took 
 place in the evening.” June 28, 1793, he cheer- 
 fully anticipates that the English bankruptcies 
 will “ proceed to the length of an universal crash 
 of their paper.” England, he says, “ is emitting 
 assignats also, that is to say, exchequer bills . . . 
 not founded on land as the French assignats are, 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 137 
 
 but on pins, thread, buckles, hops, and whatever 
 else you will pawn in the exchequer of double the 
 estimated value. But we all know that five mil- 
 lions of such stuff, forced for sale on the market 
 of London where tliei’e will be neither cash nor 
 credit, will not pay storage. This paper must rest 
 then ultimately on the credit of the nation, as the 
 rest of their public paper does, and will sink with 
 that.” 
 
 On the other hand, no acts of the French 
 shocked Jefferson's sensibilities or weakened his 
 faith. December 19, 1792, he notes with satis- 
 faction that his party are “ taking to themselves 
 the name of Jacobins, which, two months ago, was 
 fixed upon them by way of stigma.” A few days 
 later he writes, concerning the massacres com- 
 mitted by that infamous French Club, that the 
 “ struggle ” was “ necessary,” though in it “ many 
 guilty persons fell without the forms of trial, 
 and with them some innocent. These I deplore 
 as much as anybody, and shall deplore some of 
 them to the day of my death. But I deplore 
 them as I should have done had they fallen in 
 battle. It was necessary to use the arm of the 
 people, — a machine not quite so blind as balls 
 and bombs, but blind to a certain degree. . . . 
 My own affections have been deeply wounded by 
 some of the martyrs to this cause ; but rather than 
 it should have failed, I would have seen half the 
 earth desolated ; were there but an Adam and 
 Eve left in every country, and left free, it would 
 
138 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 be better tban as it now is ; ” with much more of 
 like tenor. 
 
 Yet, amid all this gratification, he was obliged, 
 with unwilling hand, to write to the French minis- 
 ter that The Grange had been unlawfully captured 
 and must be returned ; also he had to check many 
 other enterprises of that enthusiast, and to demand j 
 much reparation. Still to his credit it must be 
 said, that, however distasteful these duties were, 
 he performed them all fairly enough. On the other 
 hand, it is true that he could not bring himself to 
 express any positive indignation at one of the most 
 lawless and insulting acts ever committed towards 
 a neutral nation ; and in the many letters which 
 he was obliged to write to Genet concerning the i 
 equipment, dispatch, and subsequent conduct of 
 the Franco - American privateers, he invariably 
 used language as colorless as if he had been indit- 
 ing a treatise on international law. 
 
 When Genet presented his letters of credence, I 
 Jefferson wrote to Madison : “ It is impossible for 
 anything to be more affectionate, more magnani- 
 mous, than the purport of his mission. . . . He 
 offers everything and asks nothing.” But the 
 laggard Virginian post could hardly have brought 
 this letter to Madison’s hands before even its 
 writer would have had to reverse the last-quoted 
 sentence. For, in truth, Genet very promptly 
 made it apparent that he came to offer nothing 
 and to grasp everything ; and that his mission, 
 instead of being one of unalloyed affection and 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 139 
 
 magnanimity, was really to bring all the resources 
 of the American people to the aid of France, and 
 to transmute the neutral ports of the United States 
 into bases of naval operations against England. 
 He had a trunk full not only of blank letters of 
 marque for privateers to be unlawfully equipped 
 in our ports, but even blank commissions, naval 
 and military, for American citizens who should re- 
 cruit men to take part in the war. Nay, he even 
 dared to set up French admiralty tribunals in this 
 country, actually conferring on the French consuls 
 the power to try and condemn such prizes as the 
 French privateers should capture and bring in. 
 Jefferson was obliged to inform him that these 
 doings were all wrong and utterly intolerable. It 
 was a disagreeable duty, but If the secretary wrote 
 his letters dispassionately, he at least wrote them 
 plainly and manfully, and contented himself with 
 advancing on the French side in the cabinet such 
 arguments upon other issues as opportunity made 
 possible from time to time. For example, a most 
 urgent request was preferred by the needy revo- 
 lutionary government of France that the United 
 States would pay, in anticipation of maturity, the 
 indebtedness incurred to France during the late 
 war for American independence. In October, 
 1792, Jefferson wrote to Gouverneur Morris, then 
 minister to France, that payment must be tempo- 
 rarily suspended, “ since there is no person author- 
 ized to receive it and give us an unobjectionable 
 acquittal.” But on June 6, 1793, the republic 
 
140 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 being then established, he advised Washington: 
 “ I think it very material myself to keep alive the 
 friendly sentiments of that country as far as can 
 be done, without risking war or double payment. 
 If the installments falling due this year can be ad- 
 vanced, without incurring those dangers, I should 
 be for doing it.” 
 
 For a brief period now Jefferson felt sanguine. 
 He declared cheerfully that his sentiments were 
 “ really those of ninety-nine in a hundred of our 
 citizens ; ” that the prospects of the Anglican party 
 “have certainly not brightened;” that, except for 
 that “ little party,” which has sought a “ stepping- 
 stone to monarchy,” “ this country is entirely re- 
 publican, friends to the Constitution,” etc. Yet 
 even amid these few weeks of triumph and hope 
 the indomitable temper of the hard-fighting secre- 
 tary of the treasury harassed Jefferson with daily 
 vexations. May 13, 1793, he complains bitterly 
 that Hamilton is encroaching on his department, 
 actually proposing to instruct the collectors of cus- 
 toms to watch for infractions of neutrality by 
 French vessels, and to report them secretly to him 
 (Hamilton). To deliver the country from a “ mere 
 English neutrality,” he is obliged to rely on the fact 
 “ that the penchant of the President is not that 
 way, and, above all, the ardent spirit of our con- 
 stituents.” 
 
 But the largest cloud which darkened the pro- 
 spect was blown from a quarter to which Jefferson 
 had been looking only for floods of glorious sun- 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 141 
 
 light. From the hour when Genet first set foot 
 in the country, that restless emissary of discord 
 allowed scarcely a day to glide by without a fresh 
 indiscretion or a new breach of law. The ener- 
 getic friendliness of the secretary of state rapidly 
 changed to anxiety, and soon anxiety became anger. 
 His letters to Genet, at first so significantly dis- 
 < passionate, came soon to express genuine indigna- 
 tion and rebuke. For Jefferson could not quite 
 bring his pacific nature to the point of wishing 
 i to find his country committed to actual war, and 
 he appreciated with regret that Genet was aiming 
 at that end. Further, with his unerring political 
 sagacity, Jefferson saw plainly that Genet was so 
 recklessly contemning the laws and independence 
 of this country, that an Anglican reaction must 
 inevitably soon set in. He wrote to Monroe that 
 : Genet’s “ conduct is indefensible by the most furi- 
 ous Jacobin.” When at last the blind arrogance 
 i of the excited Frenchman led him to insult Wash- 
 ington with the threat that he himself, foreigner 
 as he was, and bound by diplomatic courtesies, 
 
 S would publicly appeal from the President to the 
 people, actually saying that he would only respect 
 the political opinions of the President till the 
 representatives should have confirmed or rejected 
 them, Jefferson’s wrath at this fatal blundering 
 could no longer be restrained. He denounced with 
 asperity the unfortunate fanatic whose boundless 
 folly was turning back the republican party in 
 its rapid march towards triumph. He admitted 
 
142 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON" 
 
 that Genet’s recall must be demanded, and indeed 
 heartily, longed to see him depart; he only begged 
 that the dismissal might not be personally insulting 
 in form. He wrote a letter to Morris, at Paris, 
 reviewing Genet’s behavior, from the landing at 
 Charleston, in language that ought to have been 
 gratifying even to the “ Anglomen.” “ If our citi- 
 zens,” he concluded, “ have not already been shed- 
 ding each other’s blood, it is not owing to the 
 moderation of Mr. Genet.” On the other hand, 
 it should be said that Genet afterward spoke very 
 severely of Jefferson, as one who had privately 
 incited and encouraged him, and afterward publicly 
 abandoned him. Probably Jefferson’s objections 
 lay not so much to the political morality as to 
 the ill-advised lack of tact which distinguished 
 the envoy’s doings. Certainly his indignation was 
 strictly limited to the individual offender, and 
 did not in the least affect his French sympathies. 
 Writing to Madison, SejDtember 1, 1793, he spoke I 
 of “ the friendly nation ” and “ the hostile one,” 
 meaning respectively France and England. He 
 was even less neutral than ever before. 
 
 Throughout the harassing alternations of hope, 
 irritation, and disappointment which filled up this 
 period of Genet’s mission, Jefferson’s conduct as a 
 statesman was upon the whole sound and praise- ' 
 worthy. He was bent upon going as far in aid of 
 France as was possible without falling into war 
 with England ; but that danger line he was honestly 
 resolved not to cross. In the cabinet meetings, 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 143 
 
 when Hamilton tossed arguments into the British 
 scale, he tossed counterbalancing arguments into 
 the French scale. The result was a set of neutral- 
 ity rides which have served as precedents for the 
 action of civilized nations ever since, and of which 
 a large proportion were asserted and justified in 
 his official letters. But his consummate political 
 tact is more interesting to the student of his char- 
 acter. This was shown most prominently by the 
 way in which he first led the French movement, 
 and then managed to stand aside for a brief period, 
 when it was no longer possible to remain in front 
 without losing his prestige and compromising his 
 right to resume his leading position at an appro- 
 priate moment. Excited as his frame of mind was 
 at this time, still he was too shrewd to make a 
 blunder in the political game. People may dispute 
 whether he was on the right side or the wrong, but 
 every one must concede his extraordinary personal 
 astuteness. He saw a considerable section of his 
 party — the leading and conspicuous section — jus- 
 tifying nearly all Genet’s lawless and foolish acts, 
 running wild in democratic clubs and fraterni- 
 zations, wearing liberty caps, and aping revolu- 
 tionary slang. To eyes less sagacious than his, 
 these extremists seemed to constitute the van of 
 the party. But Jefferson knew more correctly the 
 character of such a body and the destiny of its 
 movement. He believed that they were not leaders 
 who were going to be followed and in time over- 
 taken by the nation ; and he surely knew that they 
 
144 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 were striking a pace with which the people could 
 not keep up, and at which they themselves would 
 inevitably topple over. But while he recognized 
 these facts, he did not proclaim them ; nor did he 
 make a futile effort to check the headlong rush. 
 He had no notion of being run over by his own 
 troops, or of making himself unpopular by display- 
 ing an untimely sagacity. Though he regretted 
 to see a disaster precipitated, he well knew that 
 its mischief would not exceed a temporary delay. 
 When the disaster came, his precaution prevented 
 it from involving him. As its effect passed over, 
 the great mass of his party, remembering that he 
 had not lost his head, trusted him more implicitly 
 than ever ; while the reckless members were obliged 
 to respect his superior shrewdness, and felt grateful 
 to him for having spared them public rebukes. He 
 had pursued his usual and moderate course ; he 
 had shunned the easy mistake of cherishing dissen- 
 sions in his party and dividing it into wings ; he 
 had made no enemies ; and especially he had shown 
 that rare power of accurately appreciating the true, 
 safe, and permanent volume of a popular movement 
 which distinguishes him above all the statesmen of 
 his generation. 
 
 But in spite of the strength of the French party 
 among the people at large, and in spite of his own 
 prudence, Jefferson’s official position in the cabinet 
 remained very unpleasant. A man of his temper 
 could find little comfort in unceasing antagonism 
 with such a hard-hitting, untiring combatant as 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 145 
 
 Hamilton. His occasional victories, far too few 
 to satisfy him, were conquered by such incessant 
 and desperate . conflict as was most wearing and 
 odious to him. From such a life he longed to es- 
 cape, and few men have sought so earnestly to get 
 into office as he sought to get out of it. So early 
 as March 18, 1792, he writes to Short of an inten- 
 tion, which he describes as having been already 
 expressed, to retire at the end of Washington’s first 
 term. September 9, 1792, in the famous anti-Ham- 
 ilton letter to Washington, he repeats the remark, 
 saying : “ I look to that period with the longing of 
 a wave-worn mariner, who has at length the land 
 in view, and shall count the days and hours which 
 still lie between me and it.” He spoke more hon- 
 estly than officials often do who hold such language, 
 and it was with real reluctance that he consented 
 to remain beyond this established bound. He was 
 resolved, however, to make the delay as short as 
 possible, and on July 31, 1793, he wrote to Wash- 
 ington that “ the close of the present quarter seems 
 to be a convenient period.” But Washington’s 
 importunity almost took away his liberty of action, 
 and absolutely compelled him to stay till the end 
 of the year. Then at last he escaped, and set out 
 for Monticello with the joy of one freed from 
 prison. 
 
 Of course nothing which Jefferson could do at 
 this juncture could escape censure. He was even 
 blamed now for getting out of office as he had long 
 been blamed for remaining in it. The same people 
 
146 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 who had been stigmatizing him as the chief of an 
 opposition within the administration, obstinately 
 retaining governmental office for the exjxress pur- 
 pose of thwarting the administration policy, now 
 said that he ought not to have resigned until Ham- 
 ilton also should find it convenient to resign. They 
 declared that Washington was embarrassed by the 
 necessity for rebuilding his cabinet piecemeal ; that 
 Hamilton still had some matters in his department 
 to be completed, and Jefferson should have stayed 
 till these were finished; that then the two x'ivals 
 could properly go out together. But both charges, 
 that of improperly remaining in office and that of 
 ungenerously leaving it, were alike wholly unjust. 
 Washington, while fully cognizant of the condition 
 of affairs in his cabinet, had exerted all the pres- 
 sure which he decently could to retain Jefferson ; 
 and apart from this consideration, the existence of 
 internal dissensions in the cabinet could not put 
 Jefferson under any obligation to resign which did 
 not rest equally upon Hamilton ; for it was a fair 
 struggle between the two. Nor was it better than 
 ridiculous to expect Jefferson to withhold his own 
 resignation for an indefinite period out of complai- 
 sance for the convenience of his chief personal and 
 political enemy. How did he know that Hamilton 
 would resign at all? He was not in Hamilton’s 
 confidence, and did not trust him, nor did he deem 
 it desirable that Hamilton should remain in office. 
 It was absurd to expect him to promote such re- 
 maining. If his own resignation put a pressure on 
 
147 
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 Hamilton also to resign, it seemed to him so much 
 the better. In a word, Jefferson’s behavior was 
 thoroughly proper, and the two charges brought 
 against him by his accusers were so inconsistent 
 with each other as to be interchangeably destruc- 
 tive. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 IN RETREAT 
 
 At home on his plantations Jefferson was su- 
 premely hajrpy. “ The principles,” he said, “ on 
 which I calculated the value of life are entirely in 
 favor of my present coui’se. I return to farming 
 with an ardor which I scarcely knew in my youth, 
 and which has got the better entirely of my love of 
 study.” He puts off answering his letters, “ farmer- 
 like, till a rainy day.” He does not “ take a single 
 newspaper, nor read one a month,” and he finds 
 himself “ infinitely the happier for it.” He in- 
 dulges himself “ on one political topic only, that is, 
 in declaring to my countrymen the shameless cor- 
 ruption of a portion of the representatives to the 
 first and second Congresses, and their implicit de- 
 votion to the Treasury.” 
 
 But even without newspapers the farmer man- 
 aged to keep his knowledge and his interest fresh 
 in all matters of foreign and domestic politics. He 
 saw with regret his “ countrymen groaning under 
 the insnlts of Great Britain.” He hoped that the 
 triumphs of the French armies would “kindle the 
 wrath of the people of Europe against those who 
 have dared to embroil them in such wickedness, 
 
IN RETREAT 
 
 149 
 
 and would bring at length kings, nobles, and 
 priests to the scaffolds which they have been so 
 long deluging with human blood. I am still warm 
 whenever I think of these scoundrels, though I do 
 it as seldom as I can, preferring infinitely to con- 
 template the tranquil growth of my lucerne and 
 potatoes.” He hopes that “ some means will turn 
 up of reconciling our faith and honor with peace ” 
 with England ; and he is “ in love ” with the “ pro- 
 position of cutting off all communication with the 
 nation which has conducted itself so atrociously.” 
 When the Non-Importation Bill was lost in the 
 Senate, he testily wrote that the senatorial “ body 
 was intended as a check on the will of the repre- 
 sentatives when too hasty. They are not only that, 
 but completely so on that of the people also ; and, 
 in my opinion, are heaping coals of fire, not only 
 on their persons, but on their body as a branch of 
 the legislature.” 
 
 He had left behind him a famous report on com- 
 merce which was bitterly fought over in Congress, 
 Madison and Giles backing it against the united 
 force of the Federalists and the mercantile interest. 
 It sought to encourage trade with Fx-ance, and to 
 curtail the established business l’elations with Eng- 
 land. Jefferson’s theory was that business should 
 not be controlled by sentiment ; but he firmly be- 
 lieved that the true commercial interests of the 
 country could be better aided by a French than by 
 an English commerce. His arguments were very 
 plausible, but did not suffice 'to induce our mer- 
 
150 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 chants to undergo the labor and risk of deserting 
 familiar channels in search of new ones. The 
 resolutions based on the report only served as the 
 field for a long and obstinate battle between the 
 Gallic and the Anglican factions. 
 
 Jefferson was greatly vexed at the “denuncia- 
 tion ” of those democratic societies which had been 
 recently instituted here in imitation of the Jacobin 
 Club, and declared this persecution to be “ one of 
 the extraordinary acts of boldness of which we 
 have seen so many from the faction of monocrats.” 
 When Washington, reluctantly yielding to strong 
 pressure, included in his message an unfavorable 
 reference to these organizations, Jefferson thought 
 it “ wonderful, indeed, that the President should 
 have permitted himself to be the organ of such an 
 attack on the freedom of discussion, the freedom 
 of writing, printing, and publishing.” He was 
 watching Washington’s course with profound anx- 
 iety and some jealous distrust. For he thought 
 that the President was losing his judicial impar- 
 tiality, and changing from the head of the nation 
 to the head of a party. He lamented this pro- 
 spect, and seriously feared that the time might 
 come when Washington’s “ honesty and his politi- 
 cal errors ” might give the people a second occasion 
 to exclaim “ curse on his virtues ! they have un- 
 done his country.” 
 
 The “whiskey insurrection” in Western Penn- 
 sylvania very nearly commanded actual sympathy 
 from Jefferson. He writes to Madison, December 
 
IN RETREAT 
 
 151 
 
 28, 1794, that he is unable to see that the trans- 
 actions ‘‘have been anything more than riotous. 
 There was, indeed, a meeting to consult about a 
 separation. But to consult on a question does not 
 amount to a determination of that question in the 
 affirmative, still less to the acting on such a deter- 
 mination.” “ But,” he continues, “ we shall see, I 
 suppose, what the court lawyers, and courtly judges 
 and would-be ambassadors will make of it. The 
 excise law is an infernal one. The first error was 
 to admit it by the Constitution ; the second, to act 
 on that admission ; the third and last will be, to 
 make it the instrument of dismembering the Union, 
 and setting us all afloat to determine what part of 
 it we will adhere to”’ 
 
 It was inevitable that Jay’s treaty should seem 
 to Jefferson absolutely odious ; and in the storm 
 which it launched across the country, and which 
 threatened for a time to bring even Washington’s 
 administration into grave jeopardy, Jefferson was 
 among the most irreconcilable of the malcontents. 
 At first a “ slight notice ” of it was sufficient “ to 
 decide [his] mind against it.” As the discussion 
 grew heated, and the result seemed so important 
 and so doubtful that Hamilton, thinly disguising 
 himself as “ Camillus,” came down into the lists, 
 Jefferson became greatly agitated. He beheld with 
 dismay the “ only middling performances ” of the 
 writers on his side, and implored Madison to take 
 part. “ Hamilton,” he said, “ is really a colossus 
 to the anti-republican party ; without numbers he 
 
152 
 
 THOMAS JEFFEKSON 
 
 is an host within himself. They have got them- 
 selves into a defile, where they might be finished ; 
 but too much security will give time to his talents 
 and indefatigableness to extricate them. ... In 
 truth, when he comes forward, there is nobody but 
 yourself can meet him. . . . For God’s sake take 
 up your pen, and give a fundamental reply to Cur- 
 tius and Camillus.” True to his reluctance to be- 
 come personally involved in such conflicts, he seems 
 never to have contemplated the possibility of taking 
 his own pen in hand. 
 
 The “ execrable thing,” as he called the treaty, 
 was at last ratified, under the influence of Wash- 
 ington’s discovery of Randolph’s perfidy. But an 
 equally fierce and much more dangerous crisis was 
 created by the effort of its opponents in the House 
 of Representatives to obtain the diplomatic papers 
 concerning it, and to obstruct its fulfillment by re- 
 fusing the necessary legislation. Here again Jef- 
 ferson went heartily to the extreme length upon 
 which his party ventured. He was led to say some 
 things not nicely consistent with certain of his re- 
 cent official utterances. But the excitement was 
 so great and the political opportunity so promising, 
 that no party leader could have allowed himself to 
 be fettered by dispassionate opinions on merely 
 cognate questions of principle which had been un- 
 advisedly given by him at cabinet consultations in 
 quieter times. Yet the ultimate triumph of the 
 Federalists in these treaty disputes left Jefferson 
 cheerful under defeat. “ It has been to them,” he 
 
IN RETREAT 
 
 153 
 
 said, “ a dear-bought victory ; it has given the most 
 radical shock to their party which it has ever re- 
 ceived.” It leaves them so “ that nothing can sup- 
 port them but the colossus of the President’s merits 
 with the people ; and the moment he retires, his 
 successor, if a monocrat, will be overborne by the 
 republican sense of his constituents ; if a Repub- 
 lican, he wall of course give fair play to that sense, 
 and lead things into the channel of harmony be- 
 tween the governors and governed. In the mean 
 time, patience.” 
 
 The prospect of Republicanism was bi’ightening 
 when this shrewd judge could contemplate the pos- 
 sibility of Washington being succeeded by a pro- 
 fessor of that faith. Such, indeed, was the state 
 of feeling in the nation at large, and so much were 
 the sympathy with France and the aversion toward 
 England stimulated by hatred of the treaty, that a 
 Republican victory would have been less wonderful 
 than many things which happen in popular poli- 
 tics. The Federal party had been forcing many 
 unpopular measures, and making many enemies. 
 It was visibly losing ground ; but it did not lose 
 quite fast enough to give the Republicans control 
 of the next election. Jefferson must have “pa- 
 tience ” yet a little longer. 
 
CHAPTER XH 
 
 VICE-PRESIDENT 
 
 It should be borne in mind that at the time of 
 the third presidental election, 1, the electors were 
 still permitted to exercise some individual discre- 
 tion and independence ; 2, the votes for president 
 and vice-president were not separately cast, but 
 the person receiving the highest number of votes 
 was president, and the person receiving the next 
 highest number was vice-president. In spite of 
 the hopes of Jefferson and the fears of Adams, the 
 Federalists were abundantly able to control the 
 choice of both officers. But the lack of harmony 
 in their councils created a danger which they un- 
 dervalued and failed properly to guard against. 
 Upon the whole, Adams deserved to win in the 
 competition which existed within his own party ; 
 and after some discussion it became generally un- 
 derstood that he should be regarded as the Feder- 
 alist candidate for the first place, and that Thomas 
 Pinckney should have the second position. But 
 the Federalist party was preeminently a party of 
 leaders, and could easily have furnished at least a 
 dozen men, each abundantly fit for the presidency. 
 Among so many Adams was not so palpably and 
 
VICE-PRESIDENT 
 
 155 
 
 undeniably first that all bad to admit bis claim ; 
 on the contrary, many questioned it and many were 
 personally his enemies. In this condition of feel- 
 ing, his followers became naturally but unfortu- 
 nately suspicious that one or more of the Federalist 
 votes might be diverted from him by machinations 
 of Hamilton, or that some southern Republican, 
 more attached to his section than to his party, 
 might vote for Pinckney. In either contingency 
 Adams might, of course, have been only vice-presi- 
 dent. The Republicans, on the other hand, had 
 no such difficulties ; Jefferson was their unques- 
 tioned leader ; Madison was greatly his in ferior in 
 the science of practical poEtlcsTand Clinton, Suit, 
 
 Monroe, and Gallatin were all second-rate men. 
 
 So the Republic ans went into the colleges thor- 
 oughly unit ed, while the Federalists, distrusting 
 each othe r, sought not only a party but a partisan 
 succ ess. Some of the Adams men, to defend him 
 against the suspected hostility and schemes of 
 Pinckney’s friends, threw away their second votes. 
 The result was that Jefferson came in ahead of 
 Pinckney, and was even within four votes of beat- 
 ing Adams himself. 1 Thus by inexcusable bad 
 faith and bad management the Federalists lost the 
 second place and gravely imperiled the first. Jef- 
 ferson would have permitted no such bungling in a 
 party led by him. 
 
 December 17, 1796, Jefferson wrote to Madi- 
 
 1 Adams received 71 votes, Jefferson 68, Pinckney 59, Burr 30; 
 the rest -were scattering. 
 
156 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 son: “The first wish of my heart was, that you 
 should have been proposed for the administration 
 of the government. On your declining it, I wish 
 anybody rather than myself ; and there is nothing 
 I so anxiously hope, as that my name may come 
 out either second or third.” Ten days later he 
 wrote to Rutledge : “ My name, however, was 
 
 again brought forward without concert or expecta- 
 tion on my part ; (on my salvation I declare it.) 
 
 . . . I protest before my God that I shall from 
 the bottom of my heart rejoice at escaping. ... I 
 have no ambition to govern men ; no passion which 
 would lead me to delight to ride in a storm. . . . 
 My attachment is to my home,” etc., etc. January 
 1, 1797, he told Madison : “ No motive could have 
 induced me to undertake the first [office]. . . . 
 The second is the only office in the world about 
 which I cannot decide in my own mind, whether 
 I had rather have it or not have it.” Undoubt- 
 edly in these passages the “ lady doth protest too 
 much;” but Jefferson only behaved as nine men 
 out of ten, in like situations, always have behaved 
 and always will behave. He deprecated the idea 
 that he coveted anything so much as the lot of 
 living quietly at home ; but he took all he could 
 get once, twice, and thrice, and spent twelve years 
 at the national capital without any determined ef- 
 forts to escape. 
 
 While he played the great game of the Republi- 
 cans with consummate skill and in the best of 
 spirits, Jefferson never neglected those little affec- 
 
VICE-PRESIDENT 
 
 157 
 
 tations which win the confidence of shallow look- 
 ers-on. He now took pains to arrange that no spe- 
 cial messenger should be sent to notify him of his 
 election, but that the simple, inexpensive, eminently 
 republican means of the post-office should be em- 
 ployed. Concerning the inauguration he said : “ I 
 hope I shall be made a part of no ceremony what- 
 ever. I shall escape into the city as covertly as 
 possible. If Governor Mifflin should show any 
 symptoms of ceremony, pray contrive to parry 
 them.” He succeeded in carrying out this plan of 
 slipping as it were unobserved into office ; and 
 Adams, who had quite the contrary taste, absorbed 
 the popular attention. 
 
 Jefferson came to the vice-presidency in a cheer- 
 ful and sanguine temper. He saw plainly that 
 Hamilton was no longer to hold supreme control 
 over a united party, and Hamilton was the only 
 man among the Federalists whom he really feared. 
 Neither was he sorry to have Washing-ton also out 
 of the way, for he had long regarded Washington 
 as a Federalist, moderate, patriotic, and honest 
 indeed, but vastly more dangerous than better 
 partisans, because of his overshadowing influence. 
 June 17, 1797, he acknowledged in a letter to 
 Burr that he had “ always hoped that, the popu- 
 larity of the late President being once withdrawn 
 from active effect, the natural feelings of the peo- 
 ple towards liberty would restore the equilibrium 
 between the executive and legislative departments, 
 which had been destroyed by the superior weight 
 
158 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 and effect of that popularity.” For a few weeks 
 now he even ventured to contemplate the possi- 
 bility of harmonious relations between Mr. Adams 
 and himself, which signified, of course, that by his 
 astuteness he would achieve an influence over the 
 blunt, impetuous, and egotistical President. As 
 the best introduction to this friendliness, he had 
 quickly formed the clever design of making hatred 
 of Hamilton a bond of union between Adams and 
 himself, and he promptly set about strengthening 
 in Adams’s jealous and suspicious nature a senti- 
 ment which would put the hot-headed New Eng- 
 lander quite within his control. On December 28, 
 1796, he wrote to Adams: “It is possible, indeed, 
 that even you may be cheated of your succession by 
 a trick worthy the subtlety of your arch friend of 
 New York, who has been able to make of your 
 real friends tools for defeating their and your just 
 wishes.” From this time until they met he studi- 
 ously made the most cordial professions, and cast 
 abroad suave and pleasant remarks like decoys to 
 the very uncertain old bird whom he was hopeful 
 to lure. For a day or two after his arrival at the 
 seat of government his anticipations seemed cor- 
 rect. He came to Philadelphia on March 2, “ and 
 called instantly on Mr. Adams. . . . The next 
 morning he returned my visit. . . . He found me 
 alone in my rooms, and shutting the door himself, 
 he said he was glad to find me alone, for that he 
 wished a free conversation with me.” The “ free 
 conversation ” must have been most grateful ; for 
 
VICE-PRESIDENT 
 
 159 
 
 the President expressed his wish to avoid the im- 
 minent rupture with Prance, and to send an “ im- 
 mediate mission to the Directory.” Nay, it was 
 even “the first wish of his heart” to make Jeffer- 
 son the envoy ; but since both agreed that this was 
 impossible, Adams suggested that Gerry and Madi- 
 son, Republicans both, should be joined with Pinck- 
 ney as commissioners. Such fortune was too good 
 to last. Three days later Jefferson walked home 
 with Adams from a dinner party at General Wash- 
 ington’s house, and was obliged to say that Madi- 
 son’s refusal was positive. Thereupon Mr. Adams 
 “ immediately said that, on consultation, some ob- 
 jections to that nomination had been raised which 
 he had not contemplated ; and was going on with 
 excuses which evidently embarrassed him, when 
 . . . our road separated, . . . and we took leave ; 
 and he never after that said one word to me on 
 the subject, or ever consulted me as to any mea- 
 sures of the government.” Thus, after such fleet- 
 ins: courtesies, the President and Vice-President fell 
 permanently asunder ; and somewhat later we find 
 Jefferson wholly uninformed concerning most in- 
 teresting items of foreign diplomatic proceedings. 
 In fact, Adams came not bringing peace, but a 
 sword ; and the animosities of parties and of indi- 
 viduals have never been fiercer in this country 
 than they were during his administration. 
 
 Very soon it seemed as though a real sword 
 would be drawn in what the Republicans deemed 
 an unholy, if not quite a fratricidal, conflict with 
 
160 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 France. The Directory, crazed with Napoleon’s 
 victories, were finding causes of war against all 
 mankind. A rumor had even gained currency that 
 the failure to elect Jefferson president woxxld he 
 construed as the sufficient inducement for hostili- 
 ties against the United States. The question no 
 longer was whether this country should he driven 
 into declaring war, hut whether France would begin 
 it. She professed to consider the recent treaty 
 with England as a breach of treaties previously 
 made with herself. When Pinckney arrived to 
 succeed Monroe as minister, she insolently turned 
 him away ; she issued most exti’aordinary decrees 
 against American commerce, and committed intol- 
 erable depredations upon American shipping ; her 
 Directory dismissed Monroe with compliments to 
 himself so framed as to be also insults to the gov- 
 ernment which had recalled him, and declared that 
 no successor would be received until the United 
 States should have made a satisfactory redress of 
 grievances, though what grievances had occurred 
 was unknown. Such exasperating items of news, 
 coming in rapid succession, fired the hot temper 
 of Mr. Adams, disgusted moderate citizens, and of 
 course strengthened the party hostile to Fi'ance. 
 An extra session of Congress was convened in May, 
 and was advised by the President to create a navy, 
 to fortify harbors, and generally to prepare for 
 defensive war. The Vice-President’s party, on 
 the other hand, became anxious and despondent. 
 Things seemed to be going against them. Jeffer- 
 
VICE-PRESIDENT 
 
 161 
 
 son noted that “ the changes in the late election 
 have been unfavorable to the Republican inter- 
 est ; ” and though “ peace was the universal wish,” 
 yet he was fearful that Congress might “ now raise 
 their tone to that of the executive, and embark in 
 all the measures indicative of war, and, by taking 
 a threatening posture, provoke hostilities from the 
 opposite party.” “ War,” he said, “ is not the best 
 engine for us to resort to. Nature has given us 
 one in our commerce, which, if properly managed, 
 will be a better instrument for obliging the inter- 
 ested nations of Europe to ti'eat us with justice.” 
 He was in favor of an embargo. Further, he 
 thought that the warlike cry was “ raised by a fac- 
 tion composed of English subjects residing among 
 us, or such as are English in all their relations and 
 sentiments.” By June 17 he noted with pleasure 
 that “ Bonaparte’s victories and those on the Rhine, 
 the Austrian peace, British bankruptcy, mutiny of 
 the seamen, 1 and Mr. King’s exhortations to pacific 
 measures,” had alarmed people into more submis- 
 sive sentiments. 
 
 Adams, though naturally combative, justly felt 
 it his duty to keep the peace if possible. Accord- 
 ingly, while France still lingered in the stage of 
 threats and outrages, he appointed Gerry and Mar- 
 shall to join Pinckney in Paris as envoys extraor- 
 dinary. Jefferson earnestly implored Gerry to go. 
 He wrote : “ Peace is undoubtedly at present the 
 first object of our nation. Interest and honor are 
 
 1 The famous mutiny at the Nore. 
 
162 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 also national considerations. But interest, duly 
 weighed, is in favor of peace even at the expense 
 of spoliations past and future ; and honor cannot 
 now be an object. The insults and injuries com- 
 mitted on us by both the belligerent parties, from 
 the beginning of 1793 to this day, and still con- 
 tinuing, cannot now be wiped off by engaging in 
 war with one of them.” Nor is his old fear of 
 the monarchists banished ; “ be assured,” he says, 
 “ that if we engage in a war during our present 
 passions and our present weakness in some quar- 
 ters, our Union runs the greatest risk of not com- 
 ing out of that war in the same shape in which 
 it enters it. My reliance for our preservation is 
 on your acceptance of this mission.” Under such 
 pressure Gerry accepted, but in an evil hour for 
 himself. 
 
 Jefferson has left a gloomy picture of the times. 
 The “ present passions,” he says, were such that 
 political opponents could no longer “separate the 
 business of the state from that of society,” and 
 “ speak to each other.” “ Men who have been 
 intimate all their lives cross the street to avoid 
 meeting, and turn their heads another way lest 
 they should be obliged to touch their hats.” All 
 this, he says, is “ afflicting ” to him, since “ tran- 
 quillity is the old man’s milk.” Certainly it did 
 not advance his tranquillity that, in this summer 
 of 1797, his famous letter to Mazzei found its way 
 before the public. This had been written April 
 24, 1796, to his old friend and neighbor in Yir- 
 
VICE-PRESIDENT 
 
 163 
 
 ginia, the Italian Mazzei, then in Europe ; had 
 been translated “ from English into Italian, from 
 Italian into French, and from French into Eng- 
 lish.” In its original form its important paragraph 
 was as follows : — 
 
 “ The aspect of our politics has wonderfully changed 
 since you left us. In place of that noble love of liberty 
 and republican government which carried us trium- 
 phantly through the war, an Anglican monarchical aris- 
 tocratieal party has sprung up, whose avowed object is 
 to draw over us the substance, as they have already done 
 the forms, of the British government. The main body 
 of our citizens, however, remain true to their republican 
 principles ; the whole landed interest is republican, and 
 so is a great mass of talents. Against us are the Execu- 
 tive, the Judiciary, two out of three branches of the 
 Legislature, all the officers of the government, all who 
 want to be officers, all timid men who prefer the calm 
 of despotism to the boisterous sea of liberty, British 
 merchants, and Americans trading on British capitals, 
 speculators and holders in the banks and public funds, a 
 contrivance invented for the purpose of corruption, and 
 for assimilating us in all things to the rotten as well as 
 the sound parts of the British model. It would give 
 you a fever were I to name to you the apostates who 
 have gone over to these heresies, men who were Sam- 
 sons in the field and Solomons in the council, but who 
 have had their heads shorn by the harlot, England. In 
 short, we are likely to preserve the liberty we have ob- 
 tained, only by unremitting labors and perils. But we 
 shall preserve it ; and our mass of weight and wealth 
 on the good side is so great as to leave no danger that 
 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 164 
 
 force will ever be attempted against us. We have only 
 to awake and snap the Lilliputian cords with which they 
 have been entangling us during the first sleep which 
 succeeded our labors.” 
 
 In the shape in which this letter at last came 
 into print in the United States, the “general 
 substance,” as Jefferson admitted, remained his, 
 and only one mistake was worth correction. The 
 Federalists at once raised a howl of indignation. 
 Washington had been traduced, they said, falsely, 
 basely, perfidiously, by an apparent friend. Un- 
 questionably there was a disagreeable aspect about 
 the matter, which it would have been pleasant to 
 be able to remove, but presumably there were diffi- 
 culties in the way of a thorough removal ; at least 
 Jefferson wisely refrained from entangling expla- 
 nations . 1 Many years afterward he alleged 2 that 
 his strictures were not aimed at Washington, but 
 at the other members of the Cincinnati ; and that 
 Washington himself could not have misconstrued 
 the letter. But Federalist historians have taken 
 these tardy glosses no more kindly than the party 
 at the time took the letter. Afterward a story was 
 Circulated that Washington, with much severity, 
 called Jefferson to account, that Jefferson humbly 
 apologized or explained, but that the correspond- 
 
 t 
 
 1 See his letter to Madison of August 3, 1797 ; Works (Cong, 
 ed.), iv. 193. 
 
 2 See his letter to Van Buren of June 29, 1824, which contains 
 Jefferson’s side of this famous controversy, very carefully and 
 fully stated. Works (Cong, ed.), vii. 362. 
 
VICE-PRESIDENT 
 
 165 
 
 ence and a volume of Washington’s “ Diary ” had 
 disappeared, presumably through the aid of the 
 private secretary, Lear, -with whom Jefferson was 
 on a footing of friendship, which in this connection 
 seemed suspicious. All this Jefferson vigorously 
 denied, and even such a partisan as Mr. Hildreth 
 admits that “ the evidence of the story is wholly 
 insufficient.” Federalists then, however, and Fed- 
 eralist writers ever since, have strenuously asserted 
 that Jefferson forfeited Washington’s confidence, 
 as if this fact, if true, ought to involve a like with- 
 drawal of confidence by every one else. It has 
 always seemed to the thorough Federalist that to 
 question the perfect wisdom of W ashington in mat- 
 ters political was a sort of secular profanity, and 
 of this crime Jefferson was on some few occasions 
 guilty. Yet in the main Jefferson undoubtedly had 
 a sincere and honest reverence for Washington’s 
 character, and was not hypocritical in treating him 
 with respect and regard. Though at times he 
 deplored to his friends the use and effect of the 
 President’s influence, and though, also, he prob- 
 ably underrated Washington’s intellectual ability, 
 yet in his strictly personal behavior and relations 
 towards Washington he compares very favorably 
 even with the Federalist John Adams. Neither 
 did he leave behind him any opinions concerning 
 Washington’s mental powers nearly so derogatory 
 as those which Timothy Pickering, most stalwart 
 of Federalists, has bequeathed in his manuscripts. 
 He was further very bitterly reproached for not 
 
166 
 
 THOMAS JEFERSON 
 
 controlling or ostracizing certain notorious Repub- 
 lican writers, wlio assailed Washington with such 
 a coarse and brutal atrocity as recalls the worst 
 days of Grub Street. It was unfortunate that he 
 did not use his influence to restrain these men, or 
 that he did not venture to visit them with his per- 
 sonal disfavor. It may be fairly questioned how 
 far the head of a party can be held responsible for 
 the tail ; but Americans always have thought, and 
 always will think, that the case of Washington 
 was peculiar and deserved a rule for itself. It was 
 unpardonable to permit such gross libels as were 
 uttered concerning him, if they could be stopped ; 
 this has been the sober judgment of posterity 
 no less than of all dispassionate contemporaries ; 
 and it has always been believed that Jefferson 
 could have safely and efficiently exercised such 
 a restraining authority. In his exculpation it can 
 only be said that he was never coercive in han- 
 dling his followers, and that his policy was to allow 
 the extreme of freedom in abuse as well as in more 
 commendable matters. He himself often endured 
 malignant and false assaults in silence. Neverthe- 
 less the American people have never forgiven him 
 for standing by with apparent unconcern while 
 Washington was writhing under the villainous cal- 
 umnies of the Republican news-writers. At the 
 time the opportunity to represent that Jefferson 
 was habitually backbiting Washington, that he 
 was at last detected flagrante delicto , and that 
 there was consequent alienation between the two, 
 
VICE-PRESIDENT 
 
 167 
 
 was a useful weapon vigorously used by the Feder- 
 alists with, perhaps, as much honesty as is consid- 
 ered necessary in political controversy. 
 
 Meantime the envoys, Pinckney, Marshall, and 
 Gerry, were very ill received in Paris, or rather 
 were not diplomatically received at all. The Di- 
 rectory refused to treat imtil their own mysterious 
 grievances should have been redressed, and apolo- 
 gies made for offensive language in Mr. Adams’s 
 speech to Congress. The unfortunate trio, in- 
 dignant, harassed, and despairing, were already 
 contemplating an ignominious return from a boot- 
 less errand, when they were surprised by a visit 
 from certain private emissaries of Talleyrand. In 
 a series of interviews these go-betweens proposed 
 that the United States should make a public loan 
 to the Directory, and pay a handsome bribe into 
 the hands of Talleyrand, whereupon injuries and 
 excuses might be pretermitted, and negotiations 
 would advance prosperously. Much talk was 
 wasted on this shameless proposition which, fortu- 
 nately, came to nothing. Then at last Marshall 
 and Pinckney withdrew in disgust. Gerry fool- 
 ishly, though not altogether without some specious 
 excuse, suffered himself to be persuaded into re- 
 maining for a while alone ; an action upon his 
 part which was doubtless honestly intended, but 
 which was at best of questionable propriety, and 
 which subjected him to fierce denunciation from 
 the Federalists, who declared that he was either 
 the dupe or the willing tool of the Directory. 
 
168 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 In March, 1798, the President, in a state of 
 great irritation, announced to Congress and to the 
 country the failure of the mission. The excite- 
 ment was intense. The Federalists hurried for- 
 ward with motions for defensive preparations, and 
 for strengthening and organizing the army and 
 the navy ; they no longer admitted a possibility of 
 avoiding war. The Republicans were greatly dis- 
 turbed, but maintained a stout opposition, not ab- 
 solutely devoid of effect ; they resembled a brake 
 grating upon wheels which may be impeded, but 
 cannot be stayed. Very soon, however, the wheels 
 seemed to free themselves from all check. For in 
 response to a demand upon the President for the 
 correspondence of the envoys, the whole disgrace- 
 ful story of the proceedings at Paris was made 
 public. Only in place of the real names of the 
 go-betweens there were substituted the letters 
 X Y Z, which thereafterward gave a name to the 
 whole affair. The country burst into furious in- 
 dignation. The President, losing his head as usual 
 when the hot blood surged towards his brain, made 
 his famous and foolish assertion that no minister 
 should again be sent to France without previous 
 assurance that he should be received as the envoy 
 of a “ great, free, independent, and powerful peo- 
 ple.” The Federalists in Congress pushed through 
 one vigorous war measure after another ; the mass 
 of the people, who oscillate in the middle space 
 between the decided partisans, now went over in 
 full force to the Federal side ; the Republicans 
 
VICE-PRESIDENT 
 
 169 
 
 were discomfited and almost despairing ; some 
 field tfieir peace in temporary despair and confu- 
 sion, wfiile a few kept up tfie figfit, in the desperate 
 temper of tfie Spartans at Thermopylae. Scarcely 
 any one of either party dared to doubt that war 
 was close at hand. 
 
 Amid all this turmoil, madness, and Republican 
 demoralization, Jefferson displayed a coolness and 
 ability quite rare and admirable. Like others of 
 his way of thinking, he received at first a painful 
 shock from the X Y Z developments, but rallied 
 with superb courage and promptness. The occur- 
 rence proved to him that Talleyrand was a rascal, 
 but not that alienation was either necessary or pro- 
 per between France and the United States. For 
 Jefferson’s political faith was a profound, immuta- 
 ble conviction, not to be overthrown by isolated 
 miscarriages however unfortunate. His eternal 
 confidence in the cause of freedom and of the peo- 
 ple was never shaken by the blunders of honest 
 but wrong-headed colleagues, such as Genet had 
 been, nor by the crimes or treachery of base indi- 
 viduals like Talleyrand and the Directory. He 
 did not lose belief in principles because their pro- 
 minent advocates now and again lacked wisdom or 
 integrity. His abiding constancy proves that he 
 was not a hypocrite, time-server, and demagogue, 
 but a thorough and sincere believer in the political 
 doctrines which he publicly professed. In matters 
 of detail he was politic, not always ingenuous, not 
 rigidly truthful, not altogether incapable of subter- 
 
170 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 fuge and even of meanness. But he never in any 
 stress deserted, or even temporarily disavowed, liis 
 main principles. He never lost faith or courage. 
 Democrats might commit follies, errors, and 
 crimes, hut he stood steadfastly by democracy. 
 He did not trim his sail to every flaw on the politi- 
 cal ocean, but awaited through the longest unpro- 
 mising days, with a noble patience, the powerful 
 and steady gale which he was convinced would in 
 time carry the nation upon the true course. For 
 though a master of political craft he was not 
 merely a politician ; he was a great statesman, 
 with broad views and grand purposes, whether 
 sound or not. Periods like that through which he 
 was now passing proved these facts. While nar- 
 rower intellectual visions were filled by the ugly 
 panel of the panorama directly before them, J ef- 
 ferson said : this will soon glide into the limbo of 
 past scenes, and must not alone fasten a character 
 upon the whole spectacle ; the odiousness of this 
 special display is no reason for condemning the 
 entire show, which, as a whole, is noble and im- 
 proving. So all his efforts were aimed at gaining 
 time, and he urged a relentless opposition to all 
 measures in the way of warlike preparation. 
 
 Events justified Jefferson’s policy ; yet for the 
 time there seemed so little likelihood of such a re- 
 sult that it is difficult to say that he was right in 
 opposing all precautionary measures. The result 
 did not come about in the way that he expected. 
 Nor were his hopes of an agreeable kind ; for he 
 
VICE-PRESIDENT 
 
 171 
 
 anticipated tliat a series of French victories would 
 soon so discourage the people that they would pre- 
 fer to submit to unjust French demands rather 
 than to encounter invincible French troops. In 
 fact, the escape came not in this humiliating shape, 
 but through the different and surprising channel of 
 conciliatory advances on the part of France and an 
 extraordinary response from Mr. Adams. Talley- 
 rand, confounded by the publication of his knav- 
 ery, but too wise to fall into a rage, which would 
 have been substantially a plea of guilty, declared 
 that the whole X Y Z episode had been a huge 
 mistake. Soon he further intimated to Vans 
 Murray, the American minister at the Hague, that 
 France desired to reopen negotiations on a friendly 
 footing. The whole story is one of the most inter- 
 esting in the history of the United States, but as it 
 is also one of the most familiar, there can be no 
 excuse for appropriating any of our limited space 
 to its repetition. The result was, as every one 
 knows, that Mr. Adams, of his own motion, dis- 
 patched a new embassy to France, succeeded in 
 making a treaty and avoiding a war, and by his 
 courage, independence, and obstinacy conferred 
 upon the United States as great a good as the 
 country has ever received at the hands of a presi- 
 dent. At the same time he split the already in- 
 harmonious Federal party into two hostile divisions, 
 which for the future hated each other with that 
 peculiar virulence which marks a family feud. 
 
 During Mr. Adams’s administration the Federal- 
 
172 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 ists, besides falling into many foolish quarrels and 
 blunders, were guilty of one real political crime. 
 This was the passage, amid the French excitement, 
 of the Alien and Sedition acts, statutes probably 
 contrary to the letter and certainly grossly discord- 
 ant with the spirit of the Constitution. Under 
 the extreme provocation thus given, Jefferson’s 
 wonted coolness and sagacity deserted him, and he 
 concocted a Republican antidote far worse than 
 the Federalist poison. He drew the wicked “Ken- 
 tucky resolutions.” Intending them as a protest 
 against unconstitutional enactments, he far outran 
 the constitutional limits of the most vigorous pro- 
 test, and wrote a document which was simply revo- 
 lutionary. Even the reckless frontier legislators 
 administered a severe blood - letting to it before 
 they would pass it. Yet even in its modified form 
 it remained a foundation and sufficient precedent 
 and authority for all the subsequent secession doc- 
 trines of the Eastern States, for the nullification 
 proceedings of South Carolina, almost, if not quite, 
 for the rebellion of 1861. Reacting against ex- 
 treme oppression, Jefferson fell into the abyss of 
 what has since been regarded as treason. The 
 misfortune is attributable to his theorizing argu- 
 mentative habit of laying down abstract doctrines 
 of right and wrong in matters of government. In 
 his defense it can only be said that nullification 
 and secession appeared less heinous in his day than 
 in later times. Even Madison soon afterward 
 drew the Virginia resolutions, only a little less 
 
VICE-PRESIDENT 
 
 173 
 
 objectionable than the work of Jefferson. It is 
 indicative of the light in which such doctrines were 
 then regarded, that these proceedings did not seri- 
 ously injure either their authors or the party which 
 adopted them. 
 
 Yet when it was the other party that found 
 threats of secession convenient, Jefferson was fully 
 sensible of the folly of such schemes. In June, 
 1798, he wrote : — 
 
 “ If on a temporary superiority of one of the parties 
 the other is to resort to a scission of the Union, no federal 
 government can ever exist. If to rid ourselves of the 
 present rule of Massachusetts and Connecticut, we break 
 the Union, will the evil stop there ? Suppose the New 
 England States alone cut off, will our nature be changed ? 
 Are we not men still to the south of that, and with all 
 the passions of men ? Immediately we shall see a Penn- 
 sylvania and a Virginia party arise in the residuary con- 
 federacy, and the public mind will he distracted with 
 the same party spirit. What a game, too, will the one 
 party have in their hands by eternally threatening the 
 other that unless they do so and so they will immediately 
 join their northern neighbors ! If we reduce our Union 
 to Virginia and North Carolina, immediately the conflict 
 will he established between the representatives of these 
 two States, and they will end by breaking into their 
 simple units.” 
 
 In other words, secession was a medicine which 
 only one physician could be allowed to prescribe. 
 
 In March, 1800, both parties were already 
 eagerly forecasting the chances of the autumnal 
 
174 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 elections. Jefferson wrote: “The Federalists be- 
 gin to be very seriously alarmed about tlieir elec- 
 tion next fall. Their speeches in private, as well 
 as their public and private demeanor to me, indi- 
 cate it strongly.” After a careful discussion of 
 the chances in the doubtful States, he cautiously 
 declared his own conclusion : “ Upon the whole 
 I consider it as rather more doubtful than the 
 last election, in which I was not deceived in more 
 than a vote or two.” But he allows it to be plainly 
 read between the lines that, though stopping short 
 of actually predicting a Republican success, he is 
 really very sanguine of it. He had abundant 
 ground for stronger hopes than he expressed. 
 
 The Federalists threw aside all scruples in con- 
 ducting their campaign. A sample of the abuse 
 and falsehood in which they dealt may be seen in 
 one of the stories which they circulated concerning 
 Jefferson, charging that “ he had obtained his 
 property by fraud and robbery ; that in one in- 
 stance he had defrauded and robbed a widow and 
 fatherless children of an estate to which he was 
 executor, of ten thousand pounds sterling, by keep- 
 ing the property and paying them in money at the 
 nominal rate, when it was worth no more than 
 forty to one.” The facts were stated by Jefferson 
 to one of his friends as follows : — 
 
 “ I never was executor but in two instances, both of 
 which having taken place about the beginning of the 
 Revolution, which withdrew me immediately from all 
 private pursuits, I never meddled in either executorship. 
 
VICE-PRESIDENT 
 
 175 
 
 In one of the cases only were there a widow and chil- 
 dren. She was my sister. She retained and managed 
 the estate in her own hands, and no part of it was 
 ever in mine. In the other I was a copartner and only 
 received on a division the equal portion allotted me. 
 
 . . . Again, my property is all patrimonial, except 
 about seven or eight hundred pounds’ worth of lands, 
 purchased by myself and paid for, not to widows and 
 orphans, but to the very gentleman from whom I pur- 
 chased.” 
 
 These denials, he said, he would vouchsafe to 
 his friend, but added, “ I only pray that my letter 
 may not go out of your hands, lest it should get 
 into the newspapers, a bear-garden scene into 
 which I have made it a point to enter on no pro- 
 vocation.” He was probably the better able to 
 keep this wise resolution, because he shrewdly ap- 
 preciated that the rancor and personal malignity 
 of his opponents were a sure indication of their 
 sense of weakness and of coming defeat. The 
 party which indulges most freely in false personal 
 vituperation almost invariably finds itself beaten 
 at the polls. 
 
 This outcome grew steadily more certain as the 
 election drew nearer. The Federalists were dis- 
 heartened and fore-doomed by the internal dissen- 
 sions which split their party into factions more 
 hostile and jealous towards each other than to- 
 wards the common foe. The schism which Adams 
 had opened could not be closed, and inevitable de- 
 struction awaited a house so divided against itself. 
 
176 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 Defeat was further insured by the admirable con- 
 dition of the Republican party. It seems prob- 
 able that for some time before the autumn of 1800, 
 a fair polling of the people would have shown 
 many more voters of Republican than of Federal- 
 ist proclivities. It had been the ability and in- 
 dividual force of the Federalist leaders which had 
 enabled them to maintain the party supremacy so 
 long. But at last the Republicans had become 
 thoroughly consolidated, and now, cheered by the 
 spectacle presented by their discordant adversa- 
 ries, they were united, enthusiastic, and confident. 
 It had taken time for discipline and organization 
 to become perfectly established throughout their 
 masses, more especially because the labor had 
 fallen almost exclusively upon one man. For Jef- 
 ferson had been obliged to assume the task with 
 very little assistance. Burr alone, in New York, 
 had proved a really able political lieutenant. At 
 last, however, by tactics and policy intangible and 
 indescribable but wonderfully efficient, the im- 
 mense multitudes which constituted the Republi- 
 can raw material had been moulded into an irre- 
 sistible array, and he who had done this feat still 
 justly enjoys the reputation of being the ablest 
 political leader who has ever lived in this country. 
 The secret of Jefferson’s control of the ignorant 
 populace was undoubte dly his honest faith in 
 thenx^UKe^ instinctively felt that his profession of 
 belief in the lower two thirds of the community 
 was genuine ; in return they gave gratitude and 
 
VICE-PRESIDENT 
 
 177 
 
 confidence, and for years patiently submitted to 
 the drill, which he conducted with admirable tem- 
 per and untiring perseverance. Thus he had now 
 at length made them an invincible body, accom- 
 plishing in politics with the voters of the United 
 States very much the same thing that Napoleon 
 was doing in military matters with the untutored 
 militia of France, inspiring them with the irresisti- 
 ble spirit of victory. 
 
 This comparative condition of the two parties 
 was so well understood that no intelligent observer 
 was surprised at the result of the elections. There 
 had been some talk of the old manoeuvre of with- 
 drawing a few Federalist votes from Adams in 
 order to bring in Charles C. Pinckney ahead of 
 him ; but the leaders became aware of the peril of 
 their situation in time to shun this folly. There 
 had also been some danger that a few Republican 
 votes might be thrown away, in order to prevent 
 the occurrence of a tie between the two Republican 
 candidates. On December 15 Jefferson wrote : 
 “ Decency required that I should be so entirely 
 passive during the late contest, that I never once 
 asked whether arrangements had been made to 
 prevent so many from dropping votes intentionally 
 as might frustrate half the Republican wish ; nor 
 did I doubt, till lately, that such had been made/’ 
 In spite of this protestation, it is altogether incred- 
 ible that a party led by Jefferson would ever have 
 been permitted to lapse into so unpardonable a 
 blunder as that which had made him vice-presi< 
 
178 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 dent, especially after the palpable warning of that 
 occurrence. In fact, when the time came neither 
 party wasted any strength, and the votes of the 
 electoral colleges showed for Jefferson 73 votes, 
 for Burr 73, for Adams 65, for €!. C. Pinckney 
 64, for Jay 1. The equality between Jefferson 
 and Burr of course cast the election into the House 
 of Representatives. 
 
 A period of extreme anxiety had now to be 
 endured, scarcely more by Jefferson than by the 
 whole people of the United States. Por the politi- 
 cal composition of the House was such that the 
 Republicans could not control the choice, and the 
 Federalists, though of course still more unable 
 to do so, yet had the power by holding steadily 
 together to prevent any election whatsoever. Mo- 
 mentous as such a political crime would be, never- 
 theless many influential Federalists soon showed 
 themselves sufficiently embittered and vindictive 
 to contemplate it. “ Several of the high-flying 
 Fedei’alists,” wrote Jefferson, December 15, 1800, 
 “ have expressed their determination ... to pre- 
 vent a choice by the House of Representatives . . . 
 and let the government devolve on a president 
 of the Senate.” This threat naturally produced 
 “ great dismay and gloom on the Republican gen- 
 tlemen here, and exultation in the Federalists, who 
 openly declare they . . . will name a president of 
 the Senate pro tem. by what they say would only 
 be a stretch of the Constitution.” Some Federal- 
 ists asserted that even anarchy was preferable to 
 
VICE-PRESIDENT - 
 
 179 
 
 the success of Jefferson. December 31, Jefferson 
 wrote: “We do not see what is to be the end of 
 the present difficulty. The Federalists . . . pro- 
 pose to prevent an election in Congress, and to 
 transfer the government by an act to the chief jus- 
 tice [Jay] or secretary of state [Marshall], or to 
 let it devolve on the secretary pro tem. of the Sen- 
 ate till next December, which gives them another 
 year’s predominance and the chances of future 
 events. The Republicans propose to press for- 
 ward to an election. If they fail in this, a concert 
 between the two higher candidates may prevent 
 the dissolution of the government and danger of 
 anarchy, by an operation bungling indeed and 
 imperfect, but better than letting the legislature 
 take the nomination of the executive entirely from 
 the people.” This “ operation ” was explained, 
 after the crisis had passed, as follows : “ I have 
 been above all things solaced by the prospect 
 which opened on us in the event of a non-election 
 of a president, in which case the federal govern- 
 ment would have been in the situation of a clock 
 or watch run down. There was no idea of force, 
 nor of any occasion for it. A convention, invited 
 by the Republican members of Congress, with the 
 virtual president and vice-president, would have 
 been on the ground in eight weeks, would have 
 repaired the Constitution where it was defective, 
 and wound it up again.” It was easy for Jeffer- 
 son to write thus tranquilly and to settle a terrible 
 jeopardy by an obvious simile, after the substam 
 
180 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 tial peril had passed away and he had been occu- I 
 pying the presidential chair for upwards of a | 
 fortnight. But it was most fortunate for the coun- ] 
 try that he and his friends were not driven to this 
 “ peaceable and legitimate resoui’ce ; ” they would 
 hardly have succeeded in such an extra-constitu- j 
 tional process of national watch-winding in the j 
 teeth of the daring and vindictive men who led the j 
 powerful Federal minority. Still worse would it 
 have been for the infant nation if force had been . 
 resorted to, of which, though repudiated by Jeffer- J 
 son, there was some talk by others, in case the j 
 scheme of making Jay or Marshall president should I 
 he seriously undertaken. “ If they could have been 
 permitted,” wrote Jefferson, “ to pass a law for put- I 
 ting the government into the hands of an officer, I 
 they would certainly have prevented an election. | 
 But we thought it best to declare openly and firmly, j 
 once for all, that the day such an act passed, the { 
 Middle States would arm, and that no such usur- t 
 pation, even for a single day, should be submit- I 
 ted to. This first shook them ; and they were { 
 completely alarmed at the resource for which we < 
 declared, to wit, a convention to reorganize the 
 government and to amend it. The very word i 
 ‘ convention ’ gives them the horrors.” These let- I 
 ters present an example of the contradictions into 
 which Jefferson was constantly led by his uncon- 
 querable passion for construing facts to suit his i 
 purpose or feelings of the moment. If the threat i 
 that “ the Middle States would arm ” was so seri- 
 
VICE-PRESIDENT 
 
 181 
 
 ously made that the Federalists were overawed 
 thereby, he was not justified in complacently say- 
 ing that there was “ no idea of force nor of any 
 occasion for it.” It was his disingenuous way of 
 making any allegation which would redound to the 
 credit of his party and his political creed. 
 
 Perhaps through a fear of some of the conse- 
 quences above indicated, or perhaps by reason of a 
 revival of good sense and pati’iotic feeling among 
 the Federalist leaders, the more extravagant plans 
 were gradually superseded by a project marked by 
 nothing worse than petty malice. Before the vot- 
 ing in the House was begun, the Federalists had 
 determined to I'est content with the personal defeat 
 of Jefferson. Though the electors could not desig- 
 nate which of the two persons for whom they voted 
 they intended for president and which for vice- 
 president, yet it was perfectly well known that the 
 whole Republican party had been of one mind in 
 designing the first place for Jefferson. Indeed, for 
 this position Burr would have been by no means 
 even their second choice ; it was not without reluc- 
 tance and hesitation that they had brought them- 
 selves to give him the vice-presidency as the price 
 of his local influence. But the Federalists, of 
 course, cared not at all for these facts ; they only 
 cherished a hatred and fear of Jefferson propor- 
 tioned to the love and trust felt towards him by 
 the Republicans. To throw him out would seem 
 half a victory ; and further, many Federalists would 
 have been so much pleased to see Adams defeated, 
 
182 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 tliat they would have been almost reconciled to the 
 success of that Republican candidate who was really 
 undesired by his own party. A revenge which 
 hurt so many of those whom they disliked seemed 
 likely to tempt anti- Adams Federalists beyond their 
 strength of resistance. Happily they were stayed 
 from the immediate accomplishment of the plan 
 by the impossibility of so dividing the Republican 
 members as to effect the necessary combinations; 
 and during this fortunate delay strong influences 
 were *at work to save the party from the stigma of 
 such disgraceful conduct. Hamilton strenuously 
 and nobly exerted the great authority which he 
 still wielded ; and though at first few would listen 
 to him, yet in time his wonderful force triumphed 
 again as it had so often done in years gone by. It 
 is one of the strangest tales that history has to tell, 
 that Alexander Hamilton was a chief influence in 
 making Thomas Jefferson president of the United 
 States. In so doing, the great Federalist acted j 
 from a strict sense of duty, not from any good-will 
 towards Jefferson personally ; and perhaps this fact 
 absolved Jefferson from any duty of gratitude, 
 which certainly he never manifested in the faintest 
 degree, even in a negative way. Upon the seventh 
 day of the balloting, February 17, 1801, the long 
 anxiety, which had weighed terribly not more upon 
 Jefferson individually than upon the people of the 
 whole country, was brought to an end. The Feder- 
 alist representative from Vermont absented himself ; 
 the two Federalists from Maryland put in blank 
 
VICE-PRESIDENT 
 
 183 
 
 ballots. So ten States, a sufficient number, voted 
 for Jefferson for president. No one, as Jefferson 
 declared with some pleasure, bad changed sides ; 
 the result bad been achieved not by apostate votes 
 but by the more agreeable process of abstention. 
 The Constitution bad passed through a strain of 
 such severity as it has never but once since then 
 encountered. Recurrence of the clanger was soon 
 averted by a constitutional amendment providing 
 that the electors should designate in their ballots 
 their choice for president and for vice-president. 
 
 Federalist writers have alleged that “ terms ” 
 were made with Jefferson before his election was 
 permitted to take place. But this assertion, in- 
 tended to cast a blot upon his behavior, has the 
 most insignificant foundation, if, indeed, it has any 
 at all. He himself said, February 15, 1801, “ I 
 have declared to them unequivocally, that I would 
 not receive the government on capitulation, that I 
 would not go into it with my hands tied.” He did 
 not do so. He was not a man who could ever 
 have been induced to such a transaction. The most 
 that passed, if anything at all did really pass, was 
 a statement made by one of his friends that, if 
 elected, he did not intend to set himself to over- 
 throw all the important Federalist legislation of 
 the past twelve years, or to make a clean sweep 
 of Federalist incumbents from government offices. 
 If this exposition of his eminently proper intentions 
 brought any reassurance to the Federalists it only 
 shows how absurdly they were frightened. Jeffer- 
 
184 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 son had been through a trying ordeal in a very 
 honorable and clean-handed way ; and in obtaining 
 the presidency he got no more than he was right- 
 eously entitled to. 
 
 Burr came out as badly as Jefferson came well. 
 He had been perfectly willing to acquire the presi- 
 dency by the foul means of a Federal alliance, in 
 direct contravention of the well-known wishes of 
 his own party. A more gross betrayal of confi- 
 dence could hardly be conceived, even in political 
 life. He had made it clear that his heart was set 
 upon personal aggrandizement and not upon a Re- 
 publican success. His untrustworthiness appeared 
 the more despicable by comparison with the strictly 
 honorable conduct of Jefferson, who might have 
 excused endeavors on his own behalf upon the 
 plausible ground that he was only forwarding the 
 avowed will of the party. The antipathy with 
 which many persons had long since learned to re- 
 gard Burr now became the sentiment of all honest 
 and intelligent men in the nation. The time was 
 not far distant when he was sorely to need faithful 
 friends ; hut his conduct in these days of tempta- 
 tion had alienated all upright men. His behavior 
 was the more base because Jefferson had behaved 
 handsomely towards him throughout, and, while 
 the question was still unsettled, wrote to him that 
 “ it was to be expected that the enemy would en- 
 deavor to sow tares between us, that they might 
 divide us and our friends. Every consideration 
 satisfies me that you will be on your guard against 
 
VICE-PRESIDENT 
 
 185 
 
 this, as I assure you I am strongly.” But how- 
 ever Jefferson might deprecate quarrels in the 
 party, both on political and personal considera- 
 tions, it was not in human nature that his faith in 
 Burr should not be gravely impaired, and that his 
 private good-will towards such an unscrupulous 
 competitor shordd not be completely undermined. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 PRESIDENT : FIRST TERM. — OFFICES. — CAL- 
 LENDER 
 
 On the evening of March 3, 1801, being the last 
 day of Federalist domination in the United States, 
 the functionaries of the moribund party were busy 
 in a not very reputable way. President Adams 
 was making Federalist nominations to official po- 
 sitions, and sending them in to the Senate, which 
 was rapidly confirming them, and John Marshall, 
 secretary of state, was signing commissions with 
 zealous dispatch. The hour of midnight came 
 upon him while thus employed, and a dramatic 
 tale represents Levi Lincoln, who was to be attor- 
 ney-general under Jefferson, walking into Mar- 
 shall’s office, with Mr. Jefferson’s watch in his 
 hand, and staying this process of office-filling pre- 
 cisely at twelve o’clock, though many unsigned 
 commissions still lay on the table. This behavior 
 of the Federalists would have been unhandsome 
 enough under any circumstances, but was rendered 
 doubly so by the fact that they professed to regard 
 Jefferson as pledged not to interfere with the per- 
 sons whom he should find occupying governmental 
 posts at his accession. Adams added his own 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 187 
 
 little personal insult by driving out of Washing- 
 ton during the night, in order to avoid the specta- 
 cle of the following day. In one sense of the 
 word that spectacle was sufficiently extraordinary 
 to be worth seeing, for Jefferson had resolved that 
 no pageant should give the lie to his democratic 
 principles, and accordingly he rode on horseback, 
 clad in studiously plain clothes, without attendants, 
 to the capitol, dismounted, tied his horse to the 
 fence, and walked imceremoniously into the senate 
 chamber . 1 There he delivered his inaugural ad- 
 dress, an effusion rhetorical to excess and breath- 
 ing boundless philanthropy. One can read between 
 the lines of his declamatory harangue the conviction 
 of the speaker that his accession to office marked 
 the opening of a glorious epoch in human progress. 
 
 This careful abstinence from display marked the 
 new President's whole official career, and at times 
 was carried to an extreme which was, perhaps, 
 even more pretentious and ill-judged than was the 
 contrary fashion which he so pointedly endeavored 
 to condemn. For instance, when Mr. Merry, the 
 British minister, was to be presented, and went 
 “ in full official costume ” at the appointed day 
 and hour, in company with Mr. Madison, the sec- 
 retary of state, to the presidential mansion, he was 
 astonished by a scene which he described as fol- 
 lows : — 
 
 1 This legend is far from being sufficiently vouched for ; but 
 it has been repeated for so long a time, that it has come to be 
 accepted as a sort of truth by prescription. 
 
188 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 “ On arriving at the hall of audience we found it 
 empty, at which Mr. Madison seemed surprised, and 
 proceeded to an entry leading to the President’s study. 
 I followed him, supposing the introduction was to take 
 place in the adjoining room. At this moment Mr. Jef- 
 ferson entered the entry at the other end, and all three 
 of us were packed in this narrow space, from which, to 
 make room, I was obliged to back out. In this awkward 
 position my introduction to the President was made by 
 Mr. Madison. Mr. Jefferson’s appearance soon ex- 
 plained to me that the general circumstances of my re- 
 ception had not been accidental, but studied. I, in my 
 official costume, found myself, at the hour of reception 
 he had himself appointed, introduced to a man as the 
 President of the United States, not merely in an undress, 
 hut actually standing in slippers down at the heels, and 
 both pantaloons, coat, and underclothes indicative of utter 
 slovenliness and indifference to appearances, and in a 
 state of negligence actually studied.” 
 
 This was the ostentation of simplicity ; and 
 whether it shall be thought better than the osten- 
 tation of ceremonial is a mere question of the form 
 in which personal vanity happens to be developed, 
 though Jefferson preferred to exalt it into matter 
 of principle. But beyond being an affectation, it 
 had, in this instance at least, a serious effect ; for 
 it incensed the minister, who “ could not doubt 
 that the whole scene was prepared and intended 
 as an insult, not, perhaps, to himself personally, 
 but to the sovereign whom he represented.” Jef- 
 ferson’s object, however, was not to displease either 
 Mr. Merry or George III. ; he aimed his dress and 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 180 
 
 deportment at that section of society in which his 
 constituents were chiefly to be found, and with 
 the skill of a good actor he divined accurately the 
 taste of his audience. 
 
 "When Jefferson was vice-president he had said: 
 “The second office of the government is honor- 
 able and easy, the first is hut a splendid misery.” 
 From the foregoing anecdotes it may be conceived 
 that he succeeded in escaping the splendor, and 
 upon the misery he certainly entered in a remark- 
 ably cheerful frame of mind. He was justified in 
 doing so, since, in respect alike of the foreign and 
 domestic outlook, he had every reason to anticipate 
 a tranquil and prosperous administration. Not 
 only was his party dominant for the time, but he 
 could distinctly foresee that it was likely to retain 
 and increase its power through many years to come. 
 
 In this ruling party he was supreme ; he intended 
 that his sway should be gentle, reasonable, and 
 beneficent, but he knew that it would be none the 
 less absolute because his own moderation might 
 hold it free from the traditional evil characteristics 
 of a despotism. Beneath such genial influences his 
 philanthropic good-will towards mankind expanded 
 liberally. All his thoughts and words were of ^ 
 comprehensive love and universal benevolence. 
 
 He designed to be master of a political menagerie 
 in which Federalist lions should lie down peace- 
 fully among his flocks of Republican lambs, and 
 only a very few irredeemable “ monarchist ” snakes 
 would have to be shut up in a secure cage by them- 
 
190 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 V 
 
 selves. “ My hope,” lie said, “ is that the distinc- 
 tion will be soon lost, or, at most, that it will 
 be only of a republican and monarchist ; that the 
 body of the nation, even that part which French 
 excesses forced over to the Federal side, will rejoin 
 the Republicans, leaving only those who were pure 
 monarchists, and who will be too few to form a 
 sect.” Amid the exalted sentiments of his florid 
 inaugural address he declared that “ every differ- 
 ence of opinion is not a difference of principle. 
 We have called by different names brethren of the 
 same principle. We are all republicans — we are 
 all federalists. . . . Let us, then, with courage and 
 confidence, pursue our own federal and republican 
 principles, our attachment to our Union and repre- 
 sentative government.” 
 
 In the like spirit he sought in his private utter- 
 ances to erase all dividing lines, and to produce an 
 harmonious coalition of both parties. A fortnight 
 before his inauguration, he acknowledged that the 
 behavior of certain Federalist representatives dur- 
 ing the election must be construed as a “ decla- 
 ration of war.” “ But,” he said, “ their conduct 
 appears to have brought over to us the whole body 
 of Federalists, who, being alarmed with the danger i 
 of a dissolution of the government, had been made 
 most anxiously to wish the very administration they 
 had opposed, and to view it, when obtained, as a 
 child of their own.” A. few days later he said 
 again of the Federalists : “ These people (I always 
 exclude their leaders) are now aggregated with 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 191 
 
 us ; they look with a certain degree of affection 
 and confidence to the administration, ready to be- 
 come attached to it, if it avoids in the outset acts 
 which might revolt and throw them off. To give 
 time for a perfect consolidation" seems prudent.” 
 March 14 he says that the many citizens who had 
 been thrown into a panic by the revolutionary 
 movements in Europe had “ pretty thoroughly re 
 covered,” and “ the recovery bids fair to be com. 
 plete, and to obliterate entirely the line of party 
 division which had been so strongly drawn. Not 
 that their leaders have come over, or ever can 
 come over. But they stand at present almost with- 
 out followers.” 
 
 Jefferson was notoriously a political visionary, y 
 and this Utopia of harmony was only one am ong 
 many day-dreams. Yet it was rather an exaggera- 
 tion of the facts than an invention. For he was 
 really a shrewd observer, though with a sanguine 
 temperament ; and in the structures which his im- 
 agination reared the blocks were all actualities. 
 Thus he was now perfectly right in his predic- 
 tion that his party was destined to absorb the 
 great bulk of the nation, and to enjoy an ascend- 
 ency so complete and so long as to produce nearly 
 all the practical effects of a universal fusion of 
 opinions. If it was to the credit of his ability as 
 a statesman that he so surely foresaw this future, 
 it was no less to the credit of his heart that he 
 anticipated it in no spirit of ungenerous triumph. 
 His gratification was honorable and patriotic, with 
 
192 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 little tinge of selfishness and none of malignity. 
 His joy was for the people rather than for him- 
 self, and was really based on the establishment of 
 sound principles more than on his own elevation. 
 On August 26, 1801, he wrote : “ The moment 
 which should convince me that a healing of the 
 nation into one is impracticable would be the last 
 moment of my wishing to remain where I am.” 
 To this noble end he bent all his thoughts and 
 efforts. The mass of the Federalists, he said, 
 “ now find themselves separated from their quon- 
 dam leaders. If we can but avoid shocking their 
 feelings by unnecessary acts of severity against 
 their late friends, they will in a little time cement 
 and form one mass with us, and by these means 
 harmony and union be restored to our country, 
 which would be the greatest good we could effect.” 
 
 The indications of success in this grand en- 
 deavor were from time to time hailed by Jefferson 
 in a gladsome spirit. New England had always 
 been the stronghold of ultra Federalism, an Egyp- 
 tian realm of political darkness, according to his 
 notions. In his letter of June 1, 1798, already 
 quoted, concerning the folly of secession, 1 he had 
 written : “ Seeing that we must have somebody to 
 quarrel with, I had rather keep our New England 
 associates for that purpose than to see our bick- 
 erings transferred to others. They are circum- 
 scribed within such narrow limits, and their popu- 
 lation so full, that their numbers will ever be the 
 1 Ante, p. 173. 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 193 
 
 minority, and tliey are marked, like the Jews, with 
 such a perversity of character as to constitute, 
 from that circumstance, the natural division of 
 our parties.” But by May 3, 1801, he was noting 
 with delight symptoms of improving intelligence 
 even in this obnoxious region. “ A new subject of 
 congratulation has arisen,” he said ; “ I mean the 
 regeneration of Rhode Island. 1 hope it is the 
 beginning of that resurrection of the genuine spirit 
 of New England which rises for life eternal. Ac- 
 cording to natural order, Vermont will emerge 
 next, because least, after Rhode Island, under the 
 yoke of kierocracy.” It was the preachers of New 
 England, much accustomed to meddle in matters 
 political, whom Jefferson regarded as the most 
 dangerous enemies of sound doctrines. “ From 
 the clergy,” he declared, “ I expect no mercy. 
 They crucified their Saviour, who preached that 
 their kingdom was not of this world ; and all who 
 practice on that precept must expect the extreme 
 of their wrath. The laws of the present day with- 
 hold their hands from blood ; but lies and slan- 
 der still remain to them.” Yet, in spite of these 
 misguiding obstructionists, the time was not far 
 distant when Massachusetts herself was to become 
 for a time a Republican State. After he had been 
 president a single year J efferson was able to say : 
 “ Our majority in the House of Representatives 
 has been almost two to one ; in the Senate, eigh- 
 teen to fifteen. After another election it will be 
 of two to one in the Senate, and it would not be 
 
194 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 for the public good to have it greater. . . . The 
 candid Federalists acknowledge that their party 
 can never more raise its head.” But he wisely 
 added : “We shall now be so strong that we shall 
 certainly split again ; . . . but it must be under 
 another name ; that of Federalism is become so 
 odious that no party can rise under it.” 
 
 This result had been greatly furthered by Jef- 
 ferson’s wise moderation in the matter of remov- 
 als from office. He has been accused of having 
 planted the villainous seed which has since grown 
 into the huge wickedness of the so-called “ spoils 
 system,” but the charge is unjustifiable. The con- 
 duct of the Federalists in the matter of filling 
 offices prior to his inauguration gave him such pro- 
 vocation and excuse as would have induced many 
 men to set about an extensive proscription. He 
 did nothing of the kind, but on the contrary be- 
 haved with a liberality towards his opponents 
 which has never been rivaled by any of his suc- 
 cessors, save only John Quincy Adams, and which 
 since the evil days of Andrew Jackson would be 
 regarded as nothing less than quixotic. On Feb- 
 ruary 14, 1801, in reply to a letter concerning this 
 interesting subject, he wrote : “ No man who has 
 conducted himself according to his duties would 
 have anything to fear from me, as those who have 
 done ill would have nothing to hope, be their polit- 
 ical principles what they might. . . . The Repub- 
 licans have been excluded from all offices from the 
 first origin of the division into Republican and 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 195 
 
 Federalist. They have a reasonable claim to va- 
 cancies till they occupy their due share.” The 
 righteousness of this proposition could hardly be 
 controverted, and Jefferson was justified in expect- 
 ing the “justice and good sense of the Federal- 
 ists ” to induce them to “ concur in the fairness of 
 the position, that after they have been in the ex- 
 clusive possession of all offices from the very first 
 origin of party among us to the 3d of March at 
 nine o’clock in the night, no Republican ever ad- 
 mitted, ... it is now perfectly just that the Re- 
 publicans should come in for the vacancies which 
 may fall in, until something like an equilibrium 
 in office be restored.” 
 
 The serious question, however, was not how va- 
 cancies should be filled, but how they should be 
 created ; whether the gradual operation of deaths, 
 resignations, and expirations of terms of office 
 should be awaited, or whether numerous removals 
 should be made. Jefferson met this problem at 
 once, boldly and frankly. Removals “ must be 
 as few as possible, done gradually, and bottomed 
 on some malversation or inherent disqualification.” 
 One class only of Federalist incumbents and ap- 
 pointees was to be cleanly swept away, en masse , 
 and with unquestionable propriety. These were 
 “ the new appointments which Mr. Adams crowded 
 in with whip and spur from the 12th of December, 
 when the event of the election was known, and 
 consequently that he was making appointments not 
 for himself but for bis successor, until nine o’clock 
 
196 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 of the night at twelve o’clock of which he was to 
 go out of office. This outrage on decency should 
 not have its effect, except in the life appointments ; 
 . . . as to the others I consider the nominations as 
 nullities.” “ Official mal-conduct ” was of course 
 added as an undeniably proper cause of removal. 
 Otherwise “ good men, to whom there is no objec- 
 tion but a difference of political principle, practiced 
 on only as far as the right of a private citizen will 
 justify, are not proper subjects of removal.” The 
 only exception which Jefferson was inclined to 
 make to this rule was “ in the case of attorneys 
 and marshals.” Since the courts were “ decidedly 
 Federal and irremovable,” he believed “that Re- 
 publican attorneys and marshals, being the doors 
 of entrance into the courts, are indispensably ne- 
 cessary as a shield to the Republican part of our 
 fellow citizens which, I believe, is the main body 
 of the people.” Though it is needless to say that 
 the judiciary department was both honest and able, 
 yet there was fair ground for a Republican to en- 
 tertain this jealousy and distrust towards it. The 
 Supreme Court, by virtue of its power to construe 
 the new Constitution, was of scarcely less political 
 importance than the executive. Yet the judges of 
 all the courts of the United States, the district 
 attorneys and the marshals, almost to a man, were 
 Federalists, and undeniably, also, most of them 
 were partisans in their temper. Even a new and 
 superfluous body of judges had been recently cre- 
 ated by a Federalist Congress, and all the seats 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 197 
 
 had been filled by Mr. Adams with strong friends 
 of his own, holding of course by a life tenure. 
 Very properly this extra bench was abolished by 
 the Republican Congress shortly after Mr. Jeffer- 
 son’s accession. But the other courts could not be 
 abolished with equal propriety, and the attorney- 
 ships and marshalships could only be emptied by 
 removals. There was abundant justification for 
 Jefferson’s assertion that the Republican party 
 ought to have some foothold in the great and om- 
 nipresent department of justice. The desire to 
 base removals upon official misconduct doubtless 
 induced an extreme readiness to believe vague and 
 doubtful charges, such, for example, as the common 
 one of “ packing juries ; ” but this signified only a 
 wish to throw a cloak of decency about a transac- 
 tion not substantially blameworthy. 
 
 Upon such principles concerning offices did Jef- 
 ferson start, principles which he not only professed 
 in words but carried out in practice. In time, as 
 he came to feel a little more accustomed to exercise 
 power, and perhaps a trifle weary of resisting im- 
 portunities, he modified his views a little, but only 
 a little, for the worse. His real kindness of heart 
 made it always disagreeable to him to turn any 
 one out of office ; he spoke of it as “ a dreadful 
 operation to perform,” a “ painful operation.” He 
 suspected that “ the heaping of abuse on me per- 
 sonally has been with the design and the hope of 
 provoking me to make a general sweep of all Fed- 
 eralists out of office,” to the end that thus he might 
 
198 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 be rendered unpopular and the Federalist party 
 regain through persecution the consolidation which 
 it was so rapidly losing. “ But,” he said, “ as I 
 have carried no passion into the execution of this 
 disagreeable duty, I shall suffer none to be excited.” 
 
 ' After he had been somewhat more than two years 
 in office, he wrote : “ Some removals, to wit, six- 
 teen, to the end of our first session of Congress, 
 were made on political principles alone, in very 
 urgent cases ; and we determined to make no more 
 but for delinquency or active and bitter opposition 
 to the order of things which the public will had 
 established. On this last ground nine, were re- 
 moved from the end of the first to the end of the 
 second session of Congress ; and one since that. 
 So that sixteen [twenty-six ? ] only have been re- 
 moved in the whole for political principles, that 
 is to say, to make room for some participation 
 for the Republicans.” On May 30, 1804, he was 
 willing to state as a cause for removal, “ that the 
 patronage of public offices should no longer be 
 confided to one who uses it for active opposition 
 to the national will,” which, of course, was only a 
 clever way of describing hostility to the dominant 
 party. Yet it must be admitted that Jefferson 
 never drifted far from the honorable doctrines 
 which he first proclaimed, and that he showed great 
 courage and honesty in permitting their offices to 
 be retained by the mass of incumbents belonging 
 to a party which had rigidly proscribed Republi- 
 cans. Had positions been reversed, it is rather to 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 199 
 
 be hoped than asserted that a Federalist president 
 would have emulated this conduct of the Repub- 
 lican leader. Among the removals which Jefferson 
 did make was that of John Quincy Adams from 
 the place of commissioner of bankruptcy at Boston,, 
 The Federalists regarded this as a very petty man= 
 ifestation of personal malice ; but Jefferson after- 
 ward, in a letter to Mrs. John Adams, apparently 
 in reply to her reproaches, declared that he was 
 ignorant that Mr. Adams held the position when 
 he caused the place to be vacated. 
 
 In the important and very difficult matter of 
 selecting appointees President Jefferson acted 
 with painstaking conscientiousness. “ There is 
 nothing,” he said, “ that I am so anxious about as 
 good nominations.” “ No duty ... is more diffi- 
 cult to fulfill. The knowledge of characters pos- 
 sessed by a single individual is, of necessity, 
 limited.” Accordingly he begs friends in whom 
 he can trust to aid him with information. Some- 
 times, though apparently very seldom, he made 
 mistakes. He was severely attacked for giving 
 the collectorship of New Haven to one Samuel 
 Bishop, who was said to be grossly incapacitated 
 by old age ; but he defended the appointment with 
 very plausible justifications. We never find him 
 treating past- political services as a recommenda- 
 tion to office, and he rigorously condemned any 
 active interference in politics by the incumbents 
 of federal offices. February 2, 1801, he wrote : 
 “ One thing I will say, that as to the future, inter- 
 
200 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 ferences with elections, whether of the state or 
 general government, by officers of the latter, 
 should be deemed cause for removal ; because the 
 constitutional remedy by the elective principle be- 
 comes nothing, if it may be smothered by the 
 enormous patronage of the federal government.” 
 He afterward treated “ electioneering activity, and 
 open and industrious opposition to the principles 
 of the present government,” as among the proper 
 causes for removing Federalists from office. But 
 the rules which he enforced against Federalist 
 placemen he laid down equally against Republican 
 incumbents, and carried into effect as far probably 
 as could be fairly expected. In September, 1804, 
 he notified the secretary of the treasury that “ the 
 officers of the federal government are meddling 
 too much with the public elections. Will it be 
 best to admonish them privately or by proclama- 
 tion ? This for consideration till we meet.” 
 
 The Federalist newspapers were far from re- 
 ciprocating the generosity displayed by Jefferson 
 towards the office-holders of their party. It is to 
 this period that the pitiful story of Callender’s 
 malicious defamation belongs. This miserable fel- 
 low was a Scotchman by birth, but had been com- 
 pelled to seek refuge in this country in order to 
 escape prosecution for the contents of a pamphlet 
 which he had written concerning “ The Political 
 Progress of Great Britain.” In the United States 
 he brought his pen to the service of the Republican 
 party. At first Jefferson esteemed him an able 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 201 
 
 and useful writer ; for his assaults, though coarse, 
 were forcible ; and he was willing to say vigor- 
 ously things which persons of higher position were 
 not unwilling to have said by others on their be- 
 half. Morally he was a thoroughly low and con- 
 temptible creature, utterly devoid of any restraints 
 of honor or decency. It was he who first got upon 
 the scent of Hamilton's amour with Mrs. Rey- 
 nolds, and at once published the evidence which 
 he had dishonorably secured ; and it was he who 
 wrote the most infamous of those attacks upon 
 Washington which were, in the opinion not only 
 of contemporaries but of posterity, the preemi- 
 nently unjustifiable and unpardonable offense of 
 the new party. As his scurrility increased, his 
 ability diminished ; while of discretion he was 
 utterly void. Soon his diatribes degenerated to 
 the low level to be expected from a political hack- 
 writer who was also an habitual drunkard. Jeffer- 
 son, according to his own account, became heartily 
 disgusted with a protege who had become mis- 
 chievous as well as repulsive, and would have 
 given more to stop so impious a pen than to keep 
 it moving. Yet, whether from softness of heart, 
 as he protested, or from a secret gratification at 
 the work Callender was doing, as the Federalists 
 charged, Jefferson continued from time to time 
 to assist the wretch with small sums of money. 
 
 Under Adams’s administration Callender had the 
 good fortune to become a martyr, being one of half 
 a dozen defendants who were found guilty, impris- 
 
202 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 onecl, ancl fined under the Sedition law. Jefferson, 
 as soon as he came into office, remitted the short 
 remainder of the term of imprisonment, and caused 
 the fine to be repaid, “ by a somewhat doubtful exer- 
 cise of power,” as the Federalists very properly said. 
 But Jefferson considered the Sedition law “to be a 
 nullity, as absolute and as palpable as if Congress 
 had ordered us to fall down and worship a golden 
 image ; and that it was as much [his] duty to 
 arrest its execution in every stage as it would have 
 been to have rescued from the fiery furnace those 
 who should have been cast into it for refusing to 
 worship the image.” Despite his dread of embroil- 
 ments, Jefferson never shirked the responsibilities 
 imposed upon him by such strong convictions ; and 
 Callender now had the advantage of the President’s 
 courage, as before of his liberality. But a nature 
 more greedy than grateful only hungered for ad- 
 ditional favors. The liberated man hastened to 
 urge the President to remove the postmaster at 
 Richmond and give him the office. The postmaster 
 was a Federalist editor, but Jefferson very honor- 
 ably refused to displace him. For this behavior he 
 speedily suffered in a fashion which certainly hardly 
 encourages men in public life to be scrupulously 
 upright. Callender immediately allied himself 
 with the editorial staff of the Richmond “ Re- 
 corder,” and filled that paper, day after day, with 
 countless stories — partly his own, partly contriD 
 uted by others — derogatory to Jefferson. The 
 sheet, hitherto a petty local publication, quickly 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 203 
 
 found its way to the remotest corners of the coun- 
 try : for Callender’s characteristic onslaught was 
 of the most ignoble, but certainly of the most 
 effective, kind. He charged Jefferson with hav- 
 ing been his friend and financial assistant, and his 
 confederate in the libels upon Washington ; but 
 his chief topic was Jefferson’s private life, and his 
 many tales were scandalous and revolting to the 
 last degree. Naturally these slanders will not bear 
 repetition here ; for they were worse than mere 
 charges of simple amours. Apart from the fact 
 that no decent man would have wished to dip his 
 hands in such filth, one would think that the trans- 
 action which had instigated Callender to this con- 
 duct would have induced any Federalist editor of 
 moderately good feeling to discountenance so base 
 a revenge. At least these gentlemen might have 
 remembered that they had lately stigmatized Cal- 
 lender as a low and untrustworthy liar, when Ham- 
 ilton and Washington had been his victims. But, 
 to the discredit of the journalists of that period, it 
 must be confessed that their conduct was contrary 
 both to gratitude and to decency. Every Federalist 
 writer hastened to draw for his own use bucketful 
 after bucketful from Callender’s foul reservoir, and 
 the gossip about Jefferson’s gi-aceless debaucheries 
 was sent into every household in the United States. 
 Jefferson never undertook to deny any of these 
 narratives; and Federalist historians, from whom 
 a fairer judgment might have been expected, have 
 seen fit to treat this silence as evidence of guilt. 
 
204 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 Obviously it was not so. The President of the 
 United States could hardly stoop to give the lie 
 to a fellow like Callender, especially in such a de- 
 partment of calumny. It would be pleasanter for 
 us also to have ignored the matter ; but this was 
 scarcely possible, since the charges gravely affected 
 Jefferson’s happiness and reputation at the time, i 
 and have ever since been repeated to his discredit 
 by writers upon that period. He will probably 
 always be thought of as a man who carried licen- 
 tiousness far beyond the limit which a grateful 
 nation has tried hard to condone in the cases of 
 Franklin, Hamilton, and many another among the 
 sages and patriots even of those virtuous and simple 
 days. Nevertheless there is no sufficient and un- 
 questionable proof that Jefferson was one whit 
 worse than the majority of his compeers. Nor is 
 it probable that any one would ever have thought 
 him so, if he could have brought himself to make 
 a political removal and appointment such as in our 
 own days would be regarded as matter of course. 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 
 PRESIDENT : FIRST TERM. — LOUISIANA 
 
 Jefferson had a fair measure of respect for the 
 Constitution, — perhaps a little more than is ordi- 
 narily felt towards a common statute. He was far 
 from regarding it with a blind homage, as if it 
 were the sacred principle of the national life. This 
 was not alone attributable to the facts that tradi- 
 tion had not yet lent to it a sort of consecration, 
 and that prosperity beneath it had not endured 
 long enough to give it a reputation ; the • feeling 
 was more largely due to Jefferson’s abstract views 
 concerning government. A constitution might too 
 often have the effect of fetters upon the nation. 
 The will of the people, which had made the Con- 
 stitution, might at any time modify or abrogate it. 
 That will ought to be the ultimate rule of decision 
 in any matter sufficiently momentous to justify an 
 appeal to it. Therefore, if the will of the people 
 was with him in an unconstitutional policy which 
 he believed to be sound, Jefferson did not hesitate 
 to speak respectfully of the Constitution, and to 
 disregard it. Perhaps he is the only President of 
 the United States who has ever avowedly and with 
 premeditation carried through an important extra- 
 
206 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 constitutional measure, relying for justification 
 simply upon the wisdom of the act and the wish 
 of the nation. Such was the real character of his 
 purchase of Louisiana. 
 
 From the first moment, many years before the 
 time with which we are now dealing, when his at- 
 tention had been called to the rights of the United 
 States concerning the Mississippi River, Jefferson ji 
 had been fully alive to their vast importance. In- 
 deed his estimate of the probable traffic upon that 
 stream, and the consequent growth of New Orleans 
 as a commercial metropolis, has since appeared ex- 
 aggerated, at least in comparison with the propor- 
 tionate growth of the rest of the country. In the 
 summer of 1790 a rupture between England and 
 Spain seemed imminent, and Jefferson promptly 
 made ready to seize the opportune moment for 
 compelling a settlement of the open question of 
 navigation. Spain owned both sides of the mouth 
 of the river ; but the United States had always 
 asserted that this ownership gave the Spaniards 
 no right to close the stream to the free passage of 
 American vessels. In August, 1790, Jefferson, 
 being then secretary of state, wrote a vigorous let- 
 ter to Carmichael, the representative of the United 
 States at the court of Madrid. He directed that 
 gentleman to impress the Spanish minister “ thor- 
 oughly with the necessity of an early and even an 
 immediate settlement of this matter ; ” though “ a 
 resumption of the negotiation is not desired on our 
 part, unless he can determine, in the opening of it, 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 207 
 
 to yield tlie immediate and full enjoyment of that 
 navigation.” But if this point was to be yielded 
 in the outset, what further subject for negotiation 
 remained ? Jefferson boldly said that this further 
 subject was “ a port, where the sea and river ves- 
 sels may meet and exchange loads, and where those 
 employed about them may be safe and unmolested.” 
 There must be no dallying about this business, he 
 added, since “ it is impossible to answer for the for- 
 bearance of our Western citizens. We endeavor 
 to quiet them with an expectation of an attainment 
 of their ends by peaceable means. But should 
 they, in a moment of impatience, hazard others, there 
 is no saying how far we may he led ; for neither 
 themselves nor their rights will ever be abandoned 
 by us.” 
 
 With an admirable zeal and persistence Jeffer- 
 son pushed this demand for many months. He rap- 
 idly developed his notion concerning the port ; he 
 declared the obvious necessity that it should “ be so 
 well separated from the territories of Spain and her 
 jurisdiction as not to engender daily disputes and 
 broils between us,” such as must inevitably “ end 
 in war.” “ Nature,” he then cleverly added, “ has 
 decided what shall be the geography of that in the 
 end, whatever it might be in the beginning, by cut- 
 ting off from the adjacent countries of Florida and 
 Louisiana, and inclosing between two of its chan- 
 nels, a long and narrow slip of land, called the 
 Island of New Orleans.” He admitted that this 
 audacious proposition “ could not be hazarded to 
 
208 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 Spain in the first step ; it would be too disagree- 
 able at first view; because this island, with its 
 town, constitutes at present their principal settle- 
 ment in that part of their dominions.” But he 
 cheerfully reflected that “ reason and events may 
 by little and little familiarize them to it.” He was 
 right ; in due time “ reason and events,” having 
 had the way opened for them by the diplomatic 
 skill and pertinacity of the secretary of state, did 
 familiarize the Spanish court with this “ idea.” 
 The right of navigation was conceded by the treaty 
 of 1795, and with it a right to the free use of the \ 
 port of New Orleans upon reasonably satisfactory 
 terms for a period of three years, and thereafter- 
 ward until some other equally convenient harbor 
 should be allotted. The credit of this ultimate 
 achievement was Mr. Jefferson’s, and not the less 
 so because the treaty was not signed until he had 
 retired from office. It was really his statesman- 
 ship which had secured it, not only in spite of the 
 natural repugnance of Spain, but also in spite of 
 the obstacles indirectly thrown in his way in the 
 earlier stages by many persons in the United 
 States, who privately gave the Spanish minister to 
 understand that the country cared little about the 
 Mississippi, and would not support the secretary 
 in his demands. 
 
 It is curious to note that in the course of this 
 business there was already a faint foreshadowing 
 of that principle which many years afterwards 
 was christened with the name of Monroe. For a 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 209 
 
 brief time it was thought, not without reason, that 
 so soon as hostilities should break out between 
 England and Spain, the former power would seize 
 upon the North American possessions of the latter. 
 Jefferson wrote to Gouverneur Morris : “We wish 
 you, therefore, to intimate to them [the British 
 ministry] that we cannot be indifferent to enter- 
 prises of this kind. That we should contemplate 
 a change of neighbors with extreme uneasiness. 
 That a due balance on our borders is not less de- 
 sirable to us than a balance of power in Europe 
 has always appeared to them.” 
 
 The arrangements at last consummated in 1795 
 remained in force, working fairly well, for many 
 years. But the wiser men in the United States 
 were not so much satisfied as they were biding 
 their time to get a more permanent foothold. In 
 1802-3 the opportunity came, certainly by a very 
 peculiar introduction. So early as 1790 there had 
 been suspicions that France would like to regain 
 her possessions on the Gulf of Mexico. Thus at 
 that time Jefferson, though seeking French aid to 
 assist him in enforcing the demands of the United 
 States against Spain, had been afraid to expose 
 the full extent of his designs ; for, he said, “ it is 
 believed here that the Count de Moustier, during 
 his residence with us, conceived the project of again 
 engaging France in a colony upon our continent, 
 and that he directed his views to some of the coun- 
 try on the Mississippi, and obtained and commu- 
 nicated a good deal of matter on the subject to 
 
210 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 his court.” For some years afterward the project 
 slept, but rumors of like purport started into fresh 
 life early in 1800. Apparently these gave at first 
 little serious uneasiness, though later in the year 
 instructions were sent to the American ministers 
 at London, Paris, and Madrid to do all in their 
 power to prevent any cession of territory by Spain 
 to France. Interference, however, came too late. 
 Before the instructions reached our ministers the 
 deed had been done. On October 1, 1800, Spain 
 ceded all Louisiana to France. The treaty, how- 
 ever, was kept secret for a while, so that not until 
 the spring of 1802 did it become really known in 
 the United States as an assured fact. Jefferson 
 then was profoundly chagrined. He appreciated 
 more fully than any other public man of the day 
 the immeasurable value of that region to the 
 States ; and he was proportionately disturbed to 
 see it pass from weak into strong hands. 
 
 The vexation felt by Jefferson, in his public 
 capacity, might have been partially allayed by a 
 consolation afforded to him as an individual. For 
 the situation at least gave him an opportunity to 
 clear his character from the aspei'sions of those 
 Federalists who had so bitterly accused him of 
 loving France better than his native land. No 
 sooner did he conceive that the interests of the 
 two peoples menaced even a future clashing, than 
 he showed himself thoroughly and zealously Ameri- 
 can. Instantly his French sympathy dwindled into 
 a feeble expression of regret that France should 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 211 
 
 be transformed from a “ natural friend ” into a 
 “ natural enemy ; ” for this, he said, was the in- 
 evitable consequence of what had occurred. April 
 18, 1802, he wrote to Robert R. Livingston, min- 
 ister at Paris : — - 
 
 “ The cession of Louisiana and the Floridas by Spain 
 to France works most sorely on the United States. On 
 this subject the secretary of state has written to you 
 fully, yet I cannot forbear recurring to it personally, so 
 deep is the impression it makes on my mind. It com- 
 pletely reverses all the political relations of the United 
 States. . . . There is on the globe one single spot, the 
 possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. 
 It is New Orleans. ... It is impossible that France 
 and the United States can continue long friends, when 
 they meet in so irritable a position. ... We must be 
 very improvident if we do not begin to make arrange- 
 ments on that hypothesis. The day that France takes 
 possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to 
 restrain her forever within her low-water mark. It 
 seals the union of two nations, who, in conjunction, can 
 maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that 
 moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet 
 and nation.” 
 
 One almost discredits his own senses as he be- 
 holds Jefferson voluntarily proclaiming the banns 
 for these nuptials, which during so many years past 
 would have seemed to him worse than illicit. Yet 
 he was never more in earnest, and betrays a strik- 
 ing solemnity and depth of feeling throughout his 
 letter, while obviously writing under the . influence 
 
212 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 of an unusual excitement. Yet even beneath dis- 
 appointment lie was sanguine, and amid indigna- 
 tion lie was diplomatic. “ I should suppose,” lie 
 says, “ that all these considerations might, in some 
 proper form, be brought into view of the govern- 
 ment of France. Though stated by us it ought 
 not to give offense, because we do not bring them 
 forward as a menace, but as consequences not con- 
 trollable by us, but inevitable from the course of 
 things.” As usual he turns to time as his most 
 efficient ally. The French troops, he says, are to 
 subdue St. Domingo before they cross to receive 
 delivery of Louisiana ; and he complacently adds, 
 “ the conquest of St. Domingo will not be a short 
 work. It will take considerable time and wear 
 down a great number of soldiers.” This interval 
 he hopes to employ well in working upon the 
 French government. 
 
 But an untoward event, occurring a few months 
 after the receipt of news of the cession, was near 
 robbing Mr. Jefferson even of such slight possi- 
 bilities as might be contained in this interval. At 
 this most inopportune moment, in October, 1802, 
 the Spanish intendant at New Orleans issued an 
 edict, in direct contravention of treaty stipulations, 
 cutting short the American privilege of deposit at 
 that port. At once the hot spirit of the Western 
 country was in a wild blaze. Those pioneers who 
 kept their rifles over their fireplaces or behind then- 
 front doors ready to shoot a catamount, an Indian, 
 or each other, at a moment’s notice, now talked 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 213 
 
 fiercely of marching straight into New Orleans, and 
 making a prompt settlement with powder and lead. 
 Jefferson was much disturbed by demonstrations 
 which threatened serious interference with a plan 
 which he had conceived. War he rightly deemed 
 the last resource. A display of warlike spirit 
 might be useful to emphasize his diplomacy ; but 
 he was alarmed at the prospect of this temper 
 really bursting into action. Yet he sympathized 
 with the Western men in their wrath, and bore 
 them no grudge, though they seemed so likely to 
 derange his schemes by their uncontrollable zeal. 
 
 The persons with whom the President was really 
 vexed, and fairly enough too, it must be confessed, 
 were the Federalists. The remnant of this party 
 now for an instant imagined that they saw a chance 
 of being borne again into power by hostilities with 
 France. Careless of the interests of the country 
 as against the interests of party, they became clam- 
 orous for immediate war, Jefferson well described 
 the situation, January 13, 1803 : — 
 
 “ The agitation of the public mind ... is extreme. 
 In the Western country it is natural, and grounded on 
 honest motives. In the seaports it proceeds from a de- 
 sire for war, which increases the mercantile lottery ; in 
 the Federalists generally, and especially those of Con- 
 gress, the object is to force us into war if possible, in 
 order to derange our finances ; or, if this cannot be 
 done, to attach the Western country to them, as their 
 best friends, and thus get again into power. Remon- 
 strances, memorials, etc., are now circulating through 
 
214 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 the whole of the Western country, and signed by the 
 body of the people.” 
 
 But the small and embittered faction into which 
 the Federalist party had rapidly degenerated could 
 not beat Jefferson, intrenched in the confidence of 
 the nation, and backed by a handsome majority in 
 Congress. 
 
 In the House of Representatives this majority 
 was imperiously led by John Randolph, whose faith 
 in Jefferson was still blindly implicit. In the lat- 
 ter part of 1802 he carried the House into secret 
 session, against vehement opposition from the Fed- 
 eralists, in order to give the President an opportu- 
 nity for making certain private communications, 
 and obtaining legislation thereon. Precisely what 
 took place behind the closed doors was never fully 
 divulged ; but the substance of the whole work 
 done publicly and privately during a few weeks 
 of that winter was thoroughly satisfactory to the 
 executive. Many resolutions offered by the Fed- 
 eralists, designed at once to obstruct a peaceable 
 settlement and to win the allegiance of the West 
 by a show of angry zeal, were voted down by loyal 
 majorities. Finally, the management of the whole 
 business was left to the President, who was further 
 provided with the sum of two million dollars, to be 
 used as he should see fit. 
 
 Jefferson’s plans were by this time well under- 
 stood to be the purchase of New Orleans, and prob- 
 ably also something more on the east side of the 
 river. He had early adopted this scheme, justly 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 215 
 
 thinking that it would be cheaper, wiser, more hu- 
 mane, in every way more becoming a civilized and 
 mercantile people, to buy the fee of such territory 
 as they needed, rather than to engage in a war 
 simply for the purpose of establishing an easement 
 in an island. The two million dollars were required 
 to pave the way ; in other words, to bribe some of 
 the more influential among those virtuous legislators 
 who had succeeded the wicked monarcks of France. 
 Jefferson had already taken initial steps towards 
 this bargain through Livingston at Paris. But 
 that minister, before he had learned the executive 
 purpose, had unfortunately expressed very different 
 views of his own. He had told the French gov- 
 ernment that the United States cared not at all 
 whether their neighbor at the mouth of the Missis- 
 sippi was to be France or Spain, provided the right 
 of navigation and privileges of deposit should not 
 be interfered with. After correction, indeed, he 
 began to discuss a purchase, and in time would 
 probably have concluded it; but Jefferson, for 
 many reasons, chose to send a special emissary. 
 Apart from the point of sympathetic conviction, it 
 was desirable to make a show of energy before the 
 West and the Federalists, who had little confidence 
 in Livingston. Further, it was an uncomfortable 
 task to put into the dangerous black and white 
 of diplomatic instructions all which the President 
 wished to say. He accordingly bethought him 
 of Monroe, whose term as governor of Virginia 
 had just expired, and on February 11, 1803, he 
 
216 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 nominated that gentleman envoy-extraordinary to 
 France. The nomination was promptly confirmed, 
 in spite of the malicious suggestion of the Federal- 
 ists, who averred that it was made only to provide 
 a place for a personal and political friend, who was 
 in financial difficulties. In sundry interviews with 
 Jefferson, Monroe became fully informed as to the 
 President’s projects, and departed on his delicate 
 errand apparently without a word in writing upon 
 which he could rely, should his principal choose 
 later to disavow his doings. But Jefferson’s 
 friends always ti’usted him. 
 
 At this same point in the business Jefferson 
 manifested a mercantile cleverness of which any 
 tradesman might have been proud. He wrote to 
 Dupont de Nemours, urging him to smooth the 
 way towards settlement, and throwing out divers 
 shrewd suggestions : — 
 
 “ Our circumstances are so imperious as to admit of 
 no delay as to our course ; and the use of the Mississippi 
 is so indispensable that we cannot hesitate one moment 
 to hazard our existence for its maintenance.” This for 
 a timely hint of the “ dernier ressort.” Then he adds : 
 “ It may be said, if this object be so all-important to us, 
 why do we not offer such a sum as to insure its pur- 
 chase ? The answer is simple. We are an agricultural 
 people, poor in money and owing great debts. These 
 will be falling due by instalments for fifteen years to 
 come, and require from us the practice of a rigorous 
 economy to accomplish their payment ; and it is our 
 principle to pay to a moment whatever we have en- 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 217 
 
 gaged, and never to engage what we cannot and mean 
 not faithfully to pay. We have calculated our resources, 
 and find the sum to be moderate which they would en- 
 able us to pay, and we know from late trials that little 
 can he added to it by borrowing. The country, too, 
 which we wish to purchase, ... is a barren sand. . . . 
 We cannot, then, make anything by a sale of the land to 
 individuals. So that it is peace alone which makes it an 
 object with us, and which ought to make the cession of 
 it desirable to France.” 
 
 Could a Jew or an attorney drive a bargain 
 more skillfully? A willing but very poor pur- 
 chaser, absolutely sure to pay his notes at matur- 
 ity, shunning discord rather than seeking profit ; 
 indirect but valuable advantages to accrue to the 
 seller from the sale, in addition to the price ; an 
 unmarketable piece of property ; a misty vision of 
 war in the background ! Yet, in spite of such 
 plausible persuasions, it is not probable that Mon- 
 roe would have had much success in his negotia- 
 tions, had not European politics come opportunely 
 to his aid. Napoleon, who already exercised the 
 powers of an emperor under the title of First Con- 
 sul, had set his heart upon establishing a great 
 French colony on the North American continent. 
 Under this impulse he had laughed to scorn the 
 first proposals for a purchase of his territory. It 
 would have been easier for Monroe to buy up his 
 advisers than for those advisers to induce him to 
 abandon a favorite whim. Neither was there much 
 use in threatening the conqueror of Europe with 
 
218 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 the wrath of our trans-Alleghanian population. 
 But as Jefferson’s usual good fortune arranged it, 
 by the time Monroe arrived the short-lived peace 
 of Amiens was obviously about to be broken. On 
 the verge of extensive military operations Napo- 
 leon forgot his colonial schemes. In the contem- 
 plation of a hungry treasury he became as eager 
 to sell as the envoys were to buy. Monroe’s in- 
 structions had contemplated only a moderate pur- 
 chase, of the island and some land upon the 
 easterly side of the river, nothing more being 
 thought possible. But Napoleon’s notion now was 
 to turn liis most available assets into money with 
 all speed. He intimated that he would sell all 
 Louisiana. He asked, indeed, a great price ; but 
 where both parties are eager, trading is usually 
 rapid. Monroe had gauged Jefferson’s views with 
 perfect accuracy, and felt no fear. In a few days 
 he and Livingston closed the bargain, buying 
 Louisiana outright for sixty million livres, with 
 the stipulation that the United States should pay 
 sundry claims of its merchants against France to 
 the amount of twenty million livres more, and that 
 certain privileges should be allowed to French and 
 Spanish vessels in the port of New Orleans for 
 twelve years to come. 
 
 In their dispatches, communicating this treaty, 
 the envoys acknowledged that they had exceeded 
 their instructions, and humbly hoped that they 
 had not erred. This was literally true, but it was 
 only the letter not the spirit of their instructions 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 219 
 
 which had been overstepped. Monroe well knew 
 that he had only fulfilled Jefferson’s real wishes. 
 But since this was not apparent on the surface, the 
 Federalists afterward pretended to regard these 
 professions of the negotiators as indicating that 
 any credit there might be in the purchase was due 
 to them rather than to the President. This, how- 
 ever, was an unfair artifice, which at best could 
 amount to nothing more than saying that the 
 presidential policy had succeeded even beyond the 
 hopes of its projector. The entire credit — or dis- 
 credit, if such there were — of the achievement 
 belonged exclusively to Jefferson. 
 
 Of course fault-finding began at once. No great 
 ingenuity was needed on the part of the opposition 
 to devise the gravest objections to the transaction 
 both as a whole and in detail. The government 
 was without constitutional authority to make the 
 purchase upon terms which substantially involved 
 the speedy admission of the purchased territory, 
 in the shape of new States, to the Union. It was 
 directly contrary to the Constitution to grant pe- 
 culiar privileges in the port of New Orleans to 
 Spanish and French commerce. The boundaries 
 of Louisiana, both upon the east and upon the 
 west, were in dispute, and in time would probably 
 have to be settled by a war. Spain had insisted 
 as a condition of her own transfer that France 
 should not sell ; Spain was still in possession, and 
 might now well be expected to decline to part with 
 the property. These criticisms each and all were 
 
220 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 perfectly true ; yet they were certainly each and 
 all of very little consequence, when set against an 
 acquisition so enormously valuable in so many dif- 
 ferent ways to the United States. The practical ; 
 objections Jefferson met by practical suggestions. 
 The boundaries were doubtful, but boundaries in 
 wild lands constantly remain doubtful for many : 
 years without engendering serious hostilities. In 
 this interval, the natural growth of the United ' 
 States and the inevitable decadence of Spain upon 
 this continent would ultimately insure a peaceful 
 yielding to American demands. A little later he 
 proposed, in pursuance of this view, that the gov- 
 ernment should offer bounties to attract a large 
 body of vigorous and intelligent American colo- 
 nists into Louisiana, to the end that a population of 
 such numbers, character, and national sympathies I 
 should be established in that quarter as would dis- J 
 courage contumacious neighbors. It would have 
 been better, some said, to have bought the Floridas ,] 
 rather than Louisiana. But could not another 
 purchase be made? The American claims of 
 boundary 
 
 “ will be a subject of negotiation with Spain, and if, 
 as soon as she is at war, we push them strongly with 
 one hand, holding out a price in the other, we shall cer- 1 
 tainly obtain the Floridas, and all in good time. . . . 
 Propositions are made to exchange Louisiana, or a part i 
 of it, for the Floridas. But, as I have said, we shall 
 get the Floridas without ; and I would not give one inch 
 of the waters of the Mississippi to any nation, because I 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 221 
 
 see in a light very important to our peace the exclusive 
 ris'ht to its navigation, and the admission of no nation 
 into it but as into the Potomac or Delaware, with our 
 consent and under our police.” 
 
 Time proved the perfect truth of all this. 
 
 As for the chance of Spain refusing to deliver 
 possession to the United States, Jefferson intended 
 to have no trifling in that matter. So soon as the 
 treaty was ratified he 
 
 “ sent off orders to the Governor of the Mississippi 
 territory and General Wilkinson to move down with the 
 troops at hand to New Orleans, and receive possession 
 from M. Laussat. If he is heartily disposed to carry 
 the order of the Consul into execution, he can probably 
 command a volunteer force at New Orleans, and will 
 have the aid of ours also, if he desires it, to take the 
 possession and deliver it to us. If he is not so disposed, 
 we shall take the possession, and it will rest with the 
 government of France, hy adopting the act as their own 
 and obtaining the confirmation of Spain, to supply the 
 non-execution of their agreement to deliver and to en- 
 title themselves to the complete execution of our part of 
 the agreements.” 
 
 For the other objections of law and theory, Jef- 
 ferson was inclined to override them very cava- 
 lierly. In truth it was the only way. It was not 
 worth while to enter into a debate, predestined to 
 obvious defeat, nor to engage in argument when 
 the whole weight of logic rested with the other 
 side. The prompt vote of a silent majority was 
 the best policy. “ The less that is said about any 
 
222 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 constitutional difficulty, the better ; it will be 
 desirable for Congress to do what is necessary in 
 silence.” “ Whatever Congress shall think it ne- 
 cessary to do, should be done with as little debate 
 as possible, and particularly so far as respects the 
 constitutional difficulty.” Thus Jefferson wrote. 
 The oj)position, on the other hand, tried hard to 
 force a prolonged discussion, but with slender ef- 
 fect. The outnumbering administrationists cared 
 not to hear long lectures, designed to show only 
 that a wise act, which they had already determined 
 to do, was against the law. So the Federalist 
 speeches, though calling forth only a few replies 
 and certainly no answers, went for nothing. In 
 the Senate a powerful and delighted Republican 
 majority hastened to ratify the treaty by a vote of 
 twenty-four to seven, — ten votes more than were 
 necessary, as Jefferson triumphantly noted. In 
 the House of Representatives the overwhelming 
 ranks of the same party, under the spirited leader- 
 ship of Randolph, first made the necessary appro- 
 priations, and then provided temporarily for the 
 government of the territory by the President, even 
 giving him for the time all the powers of the late 
 Spanish monarchs, an odd position for Jefferson, 
 truly, but which he did not reject. 
 
 Thus did Jefferson accomplish a most momen- 
 tous transaction in direct contravention of all those 
 grand principles which for many years he had 
 been eloquently preaching as the political faith of 
 the great party which he had formed and led. 
 
PRESIDENT : FIRST TERM 
 
 223 
 
 "What henceforth could he and his followers say 
 about Washington’s aristocratic ceremonial at his 
 levees ; what about Hamilton’s establishment of a 
 United States Bank ; what about all the alleged 
 twistings and wrenchings of the Constitution by 
 the free-constructionists and the “ monarchists ” ? 
 Here was an act, done by the great Republican 
 doctrinaire president, utterly beyond the Constitu- 
 tion in substance and contrary to it in detail ; 
 monarchical beyond what any “ monocrat ” had 
 ever dared to dream of. There was no denying 
 these facts, at least without self-stultification. 
 John Randolph, dictating to his great majority in 
 the House, became ridiculous when he endeavored 
 to reconcile the treaty with the organic charter of 
 the United States. The plain truth was that Jef- 
 ferson had simply shattered into fragments his 
 previous theories, and every one in the United 
 States saw and knew it. In August, 1800, he had 
 declared that “ the true theory of our Constitution 
 is surely the wisest and best ; that the States are 
 independent as to everything within themselves, 
 and united as to everything respecting foreign na- 
 tions.” By this theory “ our general government 
 may be reduced to a very simple organization and 
 a very inexpensive one ; a few plain duties to be 
 performed by a few servants.” The doctrine of a 
 simple league of independent powers, devised only 
 for the specific purpose of foreign intercourse, 
 could not have been better set forth. Yet it was 
 hardly possibly to imagine a transaction more at 
 
224 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 variance with the principle of such a league than 
 was this purchase of an enormous property for the 
 common tenancy and at the common charge of the 
 political partnership. It produced a welding and 
 unifying of domestic interests to as great an ex- 
 tent as an isolated act could do. 
 
 Still more surprising is it to remember that 
 Jefferson was the chief expositor of states’ rights. 
 He declares them in the foregoing sentences ; he 
 had declared them again and again, in public and 
 private, directly and indirectly. He was the au- 
 thor of the Kentucky resolutions. But the justifi- 
 cation upon which he had relied to sustain nullifi- 
 cation and secession by Kentucky was as nothing 
 compared to the justification which he himself, by 
 this purchase, now ci’eated for nullification and 
 secession on the part of the dissatisfied Eastern 
 States. The Constitution, he had always insisted, 
 was a contract between independent parties, not 
 binding upon any one of them beyond its distinct 
 stipulations. It was not among those stipulations 
 that a majority might purchase new territory, and 
 out of it create and admit new parties to the con- 
 tract. It was the inevitable outcome of his own 
 logic that any State might now lawfully witlidi'aw 
 from the league upon this opportunity which he 
 himself had furnished. 
 
 Yet by a singular inconsistency, which, perhaps, 
 ha did not appreciate, he managed to reiterate his 
 old principles, even while he stood among the very 
 ruins into which he had prostrated them. He 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 225 
 
 actually seized this extraordinary moment for an 
 extreme assertion of the doctrine of states’ rights, 
 accompanied by some of that mawkish sentimental-, 
 ity and political rubbish which so constantly excite 
 a revulsion of feeling when one most wishes to ad- 
 mire him. The Federalists, he says, “ see in this 
 acquisition the formation of a new confederacy, 
 embracing all the waters of the Mississippi, on 
 both sides of it, and a separation of its eastern 
 waters from us.” This result he thinks improb- 
 able. But the possibility of its happening does 
 not appear to him an argument against that pur- 
 chase which may promote it. For “ the future 
 inhabitants of the Atlantic and Mississippi States 
 will be our sons. We leave them in distinct but 
 bordering establishments ; we think we see their 
 happiness in their union, and we wish it. Events 
 may prove it otherwise ; and if they see their inter- 
 est in separation, why should we take sides with 
 our Atlantic rather than our Mississippi descend- 
 ants ? It is the elder and the younger son differ- 
 ing. God bless them both, and keep them in 
 union, if it be for their good, but separate them 
 if it be better.” This is the piety of states’ rights 
 and the statesmanship of secession, very plausibly 
 put under the peculiar circumstances. He reiter- 
 ated it again with something less of holiness in his 
 language about six months later. “ Whether we 
 remain one confederacy, or form into Atlantic and 
 Mississippi confederacies, I believe not very impor- 
 tant to the happiness of either part. Those of the 
 
226 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 western confederacy will be as much our children 
 and descendants as those of the eastern,” etc. It 
 is inevitable that one pauses a moment to specu- 
 late upon the problem : what gospel J efferson would 
 have preached to the people in 1861. Would he 
 have been among those whose text was “ Let them 
 go in peace ” ? Probably not, for he would have 
 preferred inconsistency to unpopularity. 
 
 Yet these matters of argument and logic, theory 
 and consistency, may easily be dwelt upon unfairly. 
 For every one must admit -that the government 
 ought to have bought Louisiana, and must equally 
 admit that the propriety of the purchase did not 
 alone suffice to annihilate all those broad political 
 theories of the Republican party which would have 
 forbidden it. It was simply a proper case for break- 
 ing a rule without discrediting it, a case which 
 will occur under any and all rules. So far as Jef- 
 ferson personally was concerned, Destiny, that god- 
 dess who loves nothing so much as irony, had led 
 him to the point to which she so often leads the 
 profoundest statesmen and the wisest philosophers, 
 the point where the choice must be made betwixt 
 a sound abstract doctrine and a sensible act incon- 
 sistent therewith. In the dilemma Jefferson did 
 what all really great statesmen and philosophers 
 always have done and always will do in such an 
 emergency ; he turned his back upon the doctrine 
 and did the act. He preferred sound sense to 
 sound logic, and set intelligent statesmanship above 
 political consistency. Of course he laid himself 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM , 
 
 227 
 
 open to reproach and ridicule. Throughout the 
 country every Federalist throat sent forth a howl 
 of abuse against the democrat who had turned 
 autocrat ; every Federalist finger was pointed in 
 scorn at the strict constructionist who, in an in- 
 stant, had thrown overboard the whole Constitu- 
 tion. But Jefferson bore these taunts with much 
 tranquillity. He could afford to do so. If his po- 
 litical philosophy had become somewhat emaciated 
 beneath the severe treatment to which he had sub- 
 jected it, his popularity as a statesman had waxed 
 hugely fat upon the same food. “ The treaty,” he 
 said, “ has obtained nearly general approbation. 
 The Federalists spoke and voted against it ; but 
 they are now so reduced in their numbers as to be 
 nothing.” Yet he behaved really very well. He 
 did not try to carry off his lawlessness with a high 
 hand, as the applause of the people might have 
 tempted and enabled him to do. He did not en- 
 deavor to put upon the transaction any sophistical 
 gloss, which his dialectic cleverness would have 
 made easy for him, especially in the presence of a 
 well-disposed audience. But he frankly acknow- 
 ledged that the necessities of the case had com- 
 pelled him to do what was unlawful. Abjuring 
 such sophistries as the administration party in Con- 
 gress had put forth, he honestly said, even while 
 the matter was still pending : — 
 
 “ The Constitution has made no provision for our 
 holding foreign territory, still less for fiicorporating for- 
 eign nations into our Union. The executive, in seizing 
 
228 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 the fugitive occurrence which so much advances the good 
 of their country, has done an act beyond the Constitu- 
 tion. The legislature, in casting behind them meta- 
 physical subtleties, and risking themselves like faithful 
 servants, must ratify and pay for it, and throw them- 
 selves on their country for doing for them, unauthorized, 
 what we know they would have done for themselves had 
 they been in a situation to do it.” 
 
 Loatli to leave his justification solely to the wis- 
 dom of his act, he desired to be put, technically, 
 in as sound a position as possible. To this end he 
 was very anxious that there should be a formal 
 ratification by the people in the shape of a consti- 
 tutional amendment. He even drew up one, and 
 intimated to his friends in the cabinet and in Con- 
 gress that he hoped to see it put upon its passage. 
 They were less scrupulous than he, and would not 
 concern themselves much about it, so that it was 
 allowed to drop. Perhaps he was not so urgent in 
 pushing the scheme as he might have been ; but 
 at least he did not disguise his opinions and his 
 wishes, which were undeniably correct and becom- 
 ing. 
 
 Yet it may be said that in a certain way Jeffer- 
 son had been true to his fundamental and grandest 
 principles, even in breaking those which were in a 
 sense secondary. He believed primarily in the will 
 of the people, and sought primarily the good of the 
 people. The Constitution commanded his respect, 
 because it formally expressed that will and sub- 
 stantially advanced that good. In a peculiar crisis, 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 229 
 
 where this written law seemed to lose these distinc- 
 tive characteristics, it seemed also for the time to 
 lose much of its title to obedience. It was true he 
 had no technical or definite expression of the peo- 
 ple’s will, but it would have been absurd to pretend 
 to doubt that he executed that will in acquiring 
 Louisiana upon favorable terms, by, against, or 
 outside of the Constitution. If the necessary con- 
 stitutional amendment could have been made by an 
 immediate popular vote, it would have been accom- 
 plished in a week. This is a hazardous doctrine, 
 and so was Jefferson’s action, though right, a dan- 
 gerous precedent. But certainly the history of the 
 transaction puts it beyond a question that the 
 statesman predominated over the doctrinaire in his 
 composition, though his enemies to this day assert 
 the contrary. 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 PRESIDENT : FIRST TERM. — IMPEACHMENTS. — 
 REFLECTION 
 
 Jefferson’s personal animosities were few. 
 They were limited to the small body of supposed 
 “ monocrats,” the New England clergy, and the 
 Federalist judges in the courts of the United 
 States. In all his preachings of universal bene- 
 volence and political brotherhood there must be 
 understood a tacit reservation against these three 
 classes of the community. Of these the judges 
 presented the most definite mark. It has already 
 been seen how he felt about the exclusive possession 
 of the courts by the Federalists. There is no doubt 
 that he wished, if he could not effect a radical 
 change in the judicial personnel, at least to give an 
 impressive lesson to the life-tenants of the benches. 
 The object of his first experiment was skillfully 
 selected. He seat to the Representatives a special 
 message concerning alleged shortcomings and vices 
 of Pickering of New Hampshire, judge of the Dis- 
 trict Court. Pickering was at once impeached be- 
 fore the Senate by order of the House, was found 
 guilty and removed. The Federalist senators stood 
 by him gallantly, and voted unanimously for his 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 231 
 
 acquittal. Precisely what were the merits of the 
 case, and whether Pickering was not more justly to 
 be pitied than censured, it is now difficult to say. 
 Certain it is that he has been generally represented 
 as a worthless fellow, morally and mentally ; yet 
 it seems by no means equally certain that he de- 
 serves such condemnation. It has been alleged on 
 his behalf that he was mentally unbalanced. If 
 this was the case, it was his misfortune rather than 
 his fault that he furnished an oppportunity too 
 happily available for Jefferson’s purposes. But, 
 whichever way the facts may have been, it is prob- 
 able enough that Jefferson himself acted in good 
 faith, hearing discreditable tales of his victim, and 
 not duly informed as to the true cause . 1 
 
 But this was only light practicing ; much higher 
 game was aimed at in the person of Judge Chase 
 of Maryland, a justice of the Supreme Court. He 
 was of unquestioned integrity and ability ; but he 
 was a Federalist of the extreme type, and found 
 it as impossible to keep his Federalism out of his 
 
 1 The late Andrew P. Peabody, D. D., professor at Harvard 
 University, who was familiar with the local reminiscences and 
 traditions concerning' the judge, informs me that he was a man of 
 excellent character and in the best repute in New Hampshire, 
 and that the eccentricities and improprieties which served as the 
 basis of his impeachment were only the earlier manifestations of 
 a mental aberration which soon afterward developed into unques- 
 tionable insanity. Further authorities in favor of the judge may 
 he found in William Plumer’s Life of William Plumer, edited 
 by Rev. Andrew P. Peabody, Boston, 1857, pp. 272-274 ; and in 
 Nathaniel Adams’s Annals of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, 1825, pp. 
 332-355. 
 
232 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 charges to juries as Copperfielcl says that Mr. Dick 
 did to keep King Charles’s head out of his memo- 
 rials. There is no doubt that he erred gravely in 
 this particular, and used his judicial position in a 
 manner improper even in those times, and which 
 in our day would be deemed intolerable. That he 
 was ever led to the commission of an actual in- 
 justice does not appear ; and whether his offenses 
 against official decorum, when they could not be 
 proved ever to have resulted in practical wrong, 
 ought to have been regarded as ground for im- 
 peachment, was at best doubtful. But Jefferson 
 and his friends resolved to make the trial ; in addi- 
 tion to the political advantage which success might 
 bring them, they were incensed against Chase per- 
 sonally by reason of a speech which he had lately 
 delivered to the grand jury, wherein he had very 
 soundly berated the Democratic party for having 
 repealed the Judiciary Act. However unjustifi- 
 able this tirade was, yet it made a narrow founda- 
 tion for an impeachment. Other charges were 
 therefore sought, and the Republican managers 
 went back nearly five years to the trials of Dries 
 and of Callender, at which Chase had certainly 
 shown his political bias in a manner deserving of 
 reprehension. But these were old stories ; and if 
 they were so heinous as was now alleged, at least 
 it followed that the Republicans had been guilty 
 of gross laches in not having long since made them 
 the basis of proceedings for removal. Attaching 
 them to the later causes of complaint constituted 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 233 
 
 a virtual acknowledgment of tlie insufficiency of 
 these later causes when taken by themselves. Nor 
 was there any object in gathering together many 
 improprieties, all which in conjunction might suffice 
 to show, in a general way, that the judge was unfit 
 for his office. For the question which the Senate 
 must decide was not, whether upon the whole 
 Chase was fit or unfit for his judicial position, but 
 whether upon any one of the specific charges of 
 the impeachment the evidence showed him to be a 
 guilty man. 
 
 Jefferson’s behavior in this affair was shrewd 
 and selfish. The end which he desired to attain 
 was so desirable that even a small prospect of suc- 
 cess justified the endeavor. But a defeat would 
 bring so much condemnation on the losers, and 
 there was so much chance of defeat, that he had 
 no notion of subjecting his own person and for- 
 tunes to the risk. Perhaps he felt about his pres- 
 tige in politics as great generals are entitled to 
 feel about their own lives in battle, that it was too 
 valuable to his party to he jeoparded. Certain it 
 is that he played only the part of an instigator. 
 He did not send in a message, as in the more clear 
 and wholly unimportant case of Pickering. But 
 his faithful henchman, the hot-headed Randolph, 
 equally devoid of caution and of judgment, stood 
 ready at a word from the chief to plunge into any 
 dubious fray. The signal was given to him May 
 13, 1803, through Nicholson, who was Randolph’s 
 personal friend, and acted as his chief of staff in 
 
234 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 the House of Representatives. To this gentleman 
 Jefferson wrote : “ You must have heard of the 
 extraordinary charge of Chase to the grand jury 
 at Baltimore. Ought this seditious and official 
 attack on the principles of our Constitution and 
 on the proceedings of a State to go unpunished? 
 And to whom so pointedly as yourself will the 
 public look for the necessary measures ? I ask 
 these questions for your considei'ation ; for myself 
 it is better that I should not interfere.” Accord- 
 ingly, to the end, he did not interfere ; he only 
 watched with profound interest. But he had the 
 disappointment to see the veteran judge, aided by 
 the ablest counsel in the country, prove altogether 
 too much for Randolph. As the cause proceeded, 
 he was compelled to recognize that only the most 
 merciless use of the party whip could dragoon the 
 requisite two thirds of the senators into sustaining 
 the impeachment ; and he dared not exert his in- 
 fluence in a cause which it would be so difficult to 
 justify. In silent chagrin he averted his counte- 
 nance, while Randolph met a severe defeat after 
 a very bitter contest. The administration party 
 was worsted, but its astute . leader had been exter- 
 nally so indifferent that he was not compromised 
 in the popular opinion by the blunder of his 
 friends. But he had learned the lesson and made 
 no further attempts to meddle with the bench. It 
 remained to the end an immovable obstacle in the 
 way of the complete triumph of his political theo- 
 ries. 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 235 
 
 Jefferson’s first term in the presidency was a 
 great success. This was not so much due to what 
 he had really done as to what he appeared to have 
 done. For in fact no fundamental changes had 
 been made in the system of administering the na- 
 tional affairs. A different atmosphere prevailed 
 at the capital, but it had affected rather the exter- 
 nal aspect than the inner constitution of the gov- 
 ernment. The work of the Federalist party had 
 not been undone in a single particular of any im- 
 portance. A certain relaxation was discernible, 
 a certain air of carelessness ; but except for the 
 hostility to the army and navy, little practical re- 
 sult was observable. All the great constructive 
 measures of that party remained unaltered ; the 
 governmental machinery which it had devised was 
 worked by the new hands much as it had been by 
 the old ones. In any matters of substantial im- 
 portance there was very little more real democracy 
 under the sway of the Democrats than there had 
 been under that of the Federalists. The demo- 
 crat Jefferson enjoyed and exercised a personal 
 authority infinitely greater than had been wielded 
 by the “ monocrat ” Adams. Indeed, even to this 
 day no president since Washington has ever been 
 able to dictate to Congress as Jefferson could do, 
 and upon sufficient occasion actually did. No 
 president since Washington has ever led the peo- 
 ple in such unquestioning obedience. But these 
 facts were not clearly recognized at the time. 
 Congress did not appreciate th^t it was receiving 
 
 r 
 
236 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 orders ; the people had not the slightest notion 
 that they were under control. For Jefferson never 
 used the accent of command or assumed the hear- 
 ing of a leader. His influence was singularly 
 shadowy and mysterious. He simply communi- 
 cated suggestions and opinions to this or that se- 
 lected one among those who believed in him. The 
 suggestions and opinions were followed not with 
 any consciousness of discipline, but from a true 
 feeling of admiration and confidence towards the 
 great and good statesman who seemed always to 
 speak wisely and to think virtuously ; who, at 
 least, had many times been proved to plan with 
 unrivaled astuteness for the good of his party. 
 That party had already begun to abjure the name 
 of Republicans in order to adopt exclusively that 
 of Democrats : the title has ever since been kept, 
 and the identity of the party has been preserved, 
 while its political opponents have had a variety of 
 appellations and have undergone some breaks in 
 continuity, if not some mutations of principle. 
 But it is a singular circumstance that the body 
 which had chosen to declare itself the guardian of 
 democratic principles has always from the outset 
 been peculiarly prone to fall beneath the dictation 
 of a single individual. No leader among the 
 Federalists, the Whigs, or the Republicans (the 
 present party of that name) has ever had a per- 
 sonal supremacy equal to that of Jefferson or that 
 of Andrew Jackson. The Democrats have invari- 
 ably been most powerful under the sway of a 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 237 
 
 monocrat and have always taken kindly to that 
 sway. 
 
 Jefferson was able from time to time in his first 
 four years to make a very good showing in those 
 matters of detail which were much more definite 
 and obvious than were the generalities of political 
 theories. Thus every one could see that he dressed 
 with ostentatious shabbiness on occasions when 
 dress was likely to be noticed ; every one knew 
 that the monarchical levees of Washington and 
 Adams were discontinued. It was also well known 
 that the army had been subjected to such a “ chaste 
 reformation ” that the smallest remnant only re- 
 mained. The Federalists allowed no one to forget 
 that the harbors were not properly fortified, and 
 that the navy was not kept up as it should be. 
 Like economies were practiced in all other depart- 
 ments. When the odious internal taxes were done 
 away with, and when, without them, the treasury 
 prospered wonderfully and reduced the national 
 debt with surprising rapidity, the credit for these 
 achievements was given to the economy of the ad- 
 ministration and to its able financial management. 
 Really more efficient causes were the growth and 
 prosperity of the country and the soundness of 
 the financial policy which Hamilton had inaugu- 
 rated. But Jefferson would have been more than 
 a Quixote in politics had he frankly admitted that 
 he w r as only reaping the fields which Hamilton had 
 sowed. In like manner the freedom from anxiety 
 about European complications was altogether due to 
 
238 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 causes entirely beyond the reach of Jefferson’s in- 
 fluence. But fortune had become his friend more 
 than ever before, and everything redounded to his 
 good fame and popularity . 1 The nation did not 
 concern itself too critically with the connections of 
 cause and effect, but, feeling very comfortable and 
 good-natured amid the broad visible facts of the 
 passing time, gave credit for the condition of 
 affairs to the rulers for the time being. Had not 
 ' Jefferson always preached economy, and reviled 
 the financial management of the Federalists ; and 
 now were not expenses curtailed, and taxes reduced, 
 and debts being rapidly diminished? Had not 
 Jefferson always desired peaceful relations with 
 foreign powers, and had the country been for many 
 years past so free from irritation and anxiety grow- 
 ing' out of foreign affairs? Had not Jefferson 
 
 1 Jefferson did not hesitate to claim credit for all that he plausi- 
 bly could. In April, 1802, he wrote : “ The session of the first 
 Congress convened since Republicanism has recovered its ascend- 
 ency is now drawing to a close. They will pretty completely 
 fulfill all the desires of the people. They have reduced the army 
 and navy to what is barely necessary. They are disarming execu- 
 tive patronage and preponderance by putting down one half the 
 offices of the United States which are no longer necessary. These 
 economies have enabled them to suppress all the internal taxes, 
 and still to make such provision for the payment of their public 
 debt as to discharge that in eighteen years. They have lopped off 
 a parasite limb, planted by their predecessors on their judiciary 
 body for party purposes ; they are opening the doors of hospitality 
 to fugitives from the oppression of other countries ; and we have 
 suppressed all those public forms and ceremonies which tended 
 to familiarize the public eye to the harbingers of another form of 
 government. The people are nearly all united.” 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 239 
 
 always declared that he sought unity of feeling 
 and the prevalence of universal good-will among 
 the people themselves, and had political kindliness 
 ever before permeated the nation as it did to-day ? 
 Four years of prosperity and tranquillity left little 
 room for discontent with the government. Amid 
 such influences political opposition pined and 
 almost died. The Federalist party shrank to in- 
 significant dimensions ; indeed, since it flourished 
 chiefly in a narrow locality, and was largely re- 
 cruited from those peculiar spirits who appear to 
 be by nature m alcon tents and grumblers, it seemed 
 on the verge of becoming rather a faction than a 
 party. 
 
 Such was the condition of affairs when the fifth 
 presidential election took place. At the close of 
 February, 1804, the Republican members of Con- 
 gress held a caucus and nominated Jefferson as 
 the party candidate for the presidency at the next 
 election. They also very gladly felt that they 
 could safely throw Burr overboard, and they accord- 
 ingly named George Clinton for the second place. 
 Jefferson could not bring himself to decline a sec- 
 ond term. He can hardly be seriously blamed 
 for this, though certainly he became guilty of still 
 another inconsistency, which he defended only by 
 so-called reasons which deserved the less honorable 
 name of excuses. His opinion “ originally ” had 
 been, “that the President of the United States 
 should have been elected for seven years, and be 
 forever ineligible afterwards.” But he had “ since 
 
240 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 become sensible that seven years is too long to be 
 irremovable. . . . The service for eight years, with 
 a power to remove at the end of the first four, 
 comes nearer to my principle as corrected by ex- 
 perience.” Admirable happiness of expression, 
 that might have planted envy in the breast of the 
 most subtle Jesuit ! In adherence to this principle, 
 he adds : “ I determine to withdraw at the end of 
 my second term. . . . General Washington set the 
 example of retirement at the end of eight years. I 
 shall follow it ; and a few more precedents will 
 oppose the obstacle of habit to any one after a 
 while who shall endeavor to extend his term.” So 
 much for his abstract principles. His more specific 
 motives he stated as follows : — 
 
 “ I sincerely regret that the unbounded calumnies of 
 the Federal party have obliged me to throw myself on 
 the verdict of my country for trial, my great desire hav- 
 ing been to retire, at the end of the present term, to a 
 life of tranquillity ; and it was my decided purpose when 
 I entered into office. They force my continuance. If 
 we can keep the vessel of state as steadily in her course 
 for another four years, my earthly purposes will be ac- 
 complished, and I shall be free to enjoy, as you are 
 doing, my family, my farm, and my hooks.” 
 
 So the Federalists were told that they might 
 thank their own ill-temper for the continuance of 
 their much hated opponent in the presidency. They 
 must seek such comfort as they could find in his 
 asseveration that he was very unhappy about it. 
 
 A party so large and so omnipotent as the Re- 
 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 
 
 241 
 
 publicans, or Democrats, had now become, could 
 not long remain wholly free from intestine feuds. 
 Some rifts seemed already to become visible. The 
 followers of Burr were angry at his ignominious 
 displacement ; there were dissensions in New York ; 
 and symptoms which soon ripened into ill blood 
 were discernible in Pennsylvania. Even the De- 
 mocrats in the Eastern States were getting much 
 disgusted with the Virginian ascendency. In view 
 of these hopeful facts the Federalists began to 
 cherish schemes of detaching from the main body 
 of Republicans a considerable number of malcon- 
 tents ; then an alliance, in which they would be 
 the more weighty partner, might restore them to 
 power. Jefferson was well aware of these intrigues, 
 but watched them with just contempt. Nothing 
 came of them. When the time arrived, the Repub- 
 lican party in all sections of the country voted 
 solidly and won an overwhelming victory. Even 
 Massachusetts was for once carried by them, to the 
 immense surprise and chagrin of the Federalists. 
 In the electoral colleges one hundred and sixty- 
 two votes were cast for Jefferson and Clinton ; 
 fourteen faithful Federalists gave their ballots 
 for C. C. Pinckney and Rufus King. It was a 
 glorious triumph. 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 
 PRESIDENT : SECOND TERM. — RANDOLPH’S DEFEC- 
 TION. — burr’s treason 
 
 A long life of singular good fortune, almost 
 unprecedented in a land of popular government, 
 checkered by few serious and no enduring disap- 
 pointments, found its culmination in the brilliant 
 victory of the election of 1804. Had Jefferson 
 been as wise as the prince in the fable he would 
 have been alarmed at his own fortune, and have 
 felt reluctant further to test the constancy of his 
 good Genius, knowing how difficult it is to perch 
 long upon the giddy pinnacle of supreme success. 
 Apparently he felt no such boding instinct, but 
 approached his second term with tranquil confi- 
 dence. This temper was not properly attributable 
 to personal vanity, nor to the overweening ambi- 
 tion which his detractors ascribed to him. Rather 
 it was due to his firm belief that his theories of 
 government were so founded in eternal truth that 
 success and popularity naturally attended upon him 
 as their expositor. So far as he was egotistical 
 and self-confident, he was so because he honestly 
 conceived himself to be a genuine and successful 
 benefactor of mankind. Yet some misgivings and 
 
PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM 
 
 243 
 
 self-distrust would have been more timely, for what- 
 ever were his deserts he was about to meet such 
 reverses as experience shows almost inevitably suc- 
 ceed to long-continued prosperity. 
 
 Not many days after Monroe and Livingston 
 had agreed to purchase Louisiana, war had again 
 broken out in Europe. Nor did hostilities advance 
 far before the ill effects attendant upon all those 
 Napoleonic struggles began to be experienced by 
 the United States in the too familiar shape of 
 naval outrages and lawless aggressions upon their 
 neutral commerce. Serious complaints were heard, 
 and the outlook was far from cheerful during many 
 months before Jefferson’s second inauguration. 
 Yet he obstinately maintained a sanguine temper. 
 Resolved to preserve a fair neutrality, he would 
 not doubt that his just dealing would be recipro- 
 cated, and the neutral rights of the United States 
 be respected with moderate honesty. The career 
 in which the French people had sustained Napo- 
 leon for many years past had to a great extent 
 cured Jefferson of those Gallican predilections 
 which in Washington’s day had given such an 
 unneutral bias to his feelings. Now he had been 
 for some time inclining towards England, not so 
 much with warmth of sentiment as from a respect 
 for her position as the chief obstacle in the way of 
 Bonaparte’s military despotism. Even so far back 
 as October, 1802, he had written rather bitterly to 
 Livingston : “ It is well, however, to be able to in- 
 form you generally . . . that we stand completely 
 
244 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 corrected of tlie error that either the government 
 or the nation of France has any remains of friend- 
 ship for us.” In the summer of 1803 he said : 
 “ We see . . . with great concern the position in 
 which Great Britain is placed, and should be sin- 
 cerely afflicted were any disaster to deprive man- 
 kind of the benefit of such a bulwark against 
 the torrent which has for some time been bearing 
 down all before it.” Again: “We are friendly, 
 cordially and conscientiously friendly, to England. 
 We are not hostile to France. We will be rigor- 
 ously just and sincerely friendly to both. I do not 
 believe we shall have as much to swallow from 
 them as our predecessors had.” In this spirit to- 
 wards the warring powers, Jefferson felt “ a perfect 
 horror at everything like connecting ourselves with 
 the politics of Europe.” His wish was that, while 
 the nations of the old world were fighting, the 
 United States should stand by indifferent, or at 
 least impartial, but rapidly amassing riches through 
 the abundant channel of a vast neutral commerce. 
 It was a pleasing and sufficiently honorable pro- 
 ject to gather wealth, increase, and power through 
 peace. “ The day,” he wrote, in one of his happy 
 dreamings, “ is within my time as well as yours, 
 when we may say by what laws other nations shall 
 treat us on the sea. And we will say it. In the 
 mean time we wish to let every treaty we have drop 
 off without renewal.” It was a civilized policy 
 worthy of respect. Moreover it was a sensible 
 policy. Jefferson alone understood in that time 
 
t 
 
 PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM 245 
 
 the truth, which is now more generally appreciated, 
 that by sheer growth in population, wealth, and 
 industi’y a nation gains the highest degi’ee of sub- 
 stantial power and authority. 
 
 But Jefferson’s attitude was that of a mercantile 
 Quaker seeking an amicable trade with infuriated 
 highwaymen, hardly a feasible attitude to be long 
 maintained. Rage and immediate self-interest 
 alone ruled the combatants, who were about as 
 much influenced by Mr. Jefferson’s reasonable and 
 pacific protestations as they were by the Sermon 
 on the Mount. Peace and neutrality were con- 
 temptible phrases in their ears. The British cabi- 
 net determined that the United States should either 
 become an ally of England or be plundered by 
 English cruisers. France pursued the same policy 
 so far as she could. But Jefferson, resolutely 
 bent upon tranquillity and prosperity, clung to his 
 chosen course, and persisted in protest and negoti- 
 ation. His expressions of good-will towards Eng- 
 land increased. “ No two countries upon earth,” 
 he said, “ have so many points of common interest 
 and friendship, and their rulers must be great bun- 
 glers indeed, if, with such dispositions, they break 
 them asunder.” It was cruel indeed to have only 
 violence and robbery returned for such resolute 
 amiability. But so it was ; and the battle of Tra- 
 falgar occurring October 11, 1805, and leaving 
 England supreme upon the ocean, proved a further 
 serious misfortune for the United States, who soon 
 began to suffer more intolerable injuries than any 
 which had yet been inflicted on them. 
 
246 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 Another incident in the first year of his second 
 term gave the President grave though temporary 
 annoyance. Spain, backed by France, threatened 
 to make serious trouble concerning the eastern 
 boundaries of Louisiana. Jefferson, though irri- 
 tated and ready to fight if need be, was yet suffi- 
 ciently true to his principles to prefer the peaceful 
 remedy of a purchase. On December 6, 1805, he 
 sent a private message to the House, with the de- 
 sign that it should lead up to such another appro- 
 priation as had been placed at his disposal in the 
 case of Louisiana. But to the surprise and dis- 
 comfiture of the administrationists, a report of a 
 very different tenor was made by the committee to 
 whom the message was referred ; and the chairman 
 of that committee was John Randolph. Here was 
 indeed an alarming defection ; for Randolph had 
 long been accustomed to lead the House for the 
 government. He was esteemed daring, able, and 
 influential ; and those traits, which later gave him 
 the character of a mere political free lance, had 
 not yet been fully recognized. He had carried 
 through the Louisiana measures with a contempt 
 for logic and law which proved him the best of par- 
 tisans ; he had endured castigation and defeat in 
 the Chase impeachment with a gallantry that made 
 him seem the most loyal of followers. Nqw sud- 
 denly he sprang up on the wrong side and poured 
 forth the most vituperative harangues not only 
 against the policy but even against the political 
 integrity of the President. Jefferson might well 
 
PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM 
 
 247 
 
 be taken aback by this singular behavior, for he 
 had a right to expect the same support in buying 
 the Floridas which had been accorded in buying 
 Louisiana. What, then, was to be the extent of 
 this scission, this rebellion? For a short time he 
 watched the debates in the House with anxiety. 
 But ere long the votes reassured him : only eleven 
 of the party went off under Randolph’s banner : 
 eighty-seven maintained their allegiance to the Pre- 
 sident. Evidently Randolph’s personal influence 
 had been overrated. Not all even of his eleven 
 remained faithful to him, when it appeared that 
 his purpose was not merely a difference upon this 
 single occasion but extended to a permanent oppo- 
 sition. The President took courage, and declared 
 the House to be 
 
 “ as well disposed as ever I saw one. The defection 
 of so prominent a leader threw them into dismay and 
 confusion for a moment ; but they soon rallied to their 
 own principles and let him go off with five or six fol- 
 lowers only. . . . The alarm . . . from this schism 
 has produced a rallying together and a harmony, which 
 carelessness and security had begun to endanger. On 
 the whole this little trial of the firmness of our repre- 
 sentatives in their principles . . . has added much to 
 my confidence in the stability of our government, and 
 to my conviction that, should things go wrong at any 
 time, the people will set them to rights by the peaceable 
 exercise of their elective rights.” 
 
 Characteristic sentences J J efferson presents the 
 unusual spectacle of one who grew more optimistic 
 with increasing years. 
 
248 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 Yet Randolph’s conduct, though of slight politi- 
 cal consequence, ought to have given food for re- 
 flection to the people. It was not the outgrowth 
 of selfish disappointment, but of a genuine and 
 honest dissatisfaction with the career of the admin- 
 istration. Randolph was really a purist in poli- 
 tics, as Jefferson had professed to he. He had 
 espoused Republicanism and had become the de- 
 vout disciple of Jefferson because he had believed 
 that absolute purity would prevail beneath the 
 sway of that party and its admirable leader. A 
 Republican triumph was to inaugurate a golden 
 age of virtue. He had been slow to awake from 
 this delusion and to acknowledge that his idol was 
 adopting the ways of all politicians, and that the 
 business of government was conducted now much 
 as it had been in the bad days of Federalism. In 
 the pain and anger of disillusionment, the impetu- 
 ous reformer saw no better course than to abandon 
 a chief whom he chose to regard as forsworn. His 
 criticism was not just, because the critic had set 
 up an ideal standard, and had expected more than 
 could be done. Yet there was a lesson to be 
 learned from his strictures ; it was apparent that 
 Jefferson in earlier times had found fault which 
 he had no right to find, and raised hopes which he 
 could not fulfill. He had dreamed and promised 
 probably with honesty, but he was not transmuting 
 his dreams into realities nor making his promises 
 good. In truth he could not do so ; he had tried, 
 but he had unfortunately talked about impossibili- 
 
PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM 
 
 249 
 
 ties in government so far as that science had yet 
 been developed. 
 
 In 1805-6 another disturbance arose. Aaron 
 Burr had made up his mind that treason was pre- 
 ferable to a condition of political failure. For 
 advancing the purposes of his boundless ambition 
 Burr possessed infinite audacity, a singular ca- 
 pacity for personal fascination, and great aptitude 
 for the machinery of politics. But he needed 
 much weightier qualities to enable him to cope 
 with such powerful leaders as Hamilton and Jef- 
 ferson, who both, hostile in everything else, were 
 of one mind concerning the necessity of crushing 
 him. Nor did Burr improve matters, but, to his 
 infinite surprise and chagrin, made them vastly 
 worse by the method which he took to rid himself 
 of Hamilton. He only added universal odium to 
 political disaster and financial ruin. In this state 
 of his affairs he concocted his famous scheme for 
 seating himself upon the “ throne of the Monte- 
 zurnas,” and annexing to it all the territory west 
 of the Alleghanies. While the enterprise was 
 still unchecked and the wildest rumors of its ex- 
 tent and progress were prevalent, Jefferson main- 
 tained a tranquil confidence highly creditable to 
 his good sense. He omitted no precaution, but he 
 felt no doubt as to the result. Substantially his 
 anticipations were justified by the prompt and 
 easy shattering of the meagre forces and the arrest 
 of the principal traitor. 
 
 When Burr was brought to Richmond for trial, 
 
250 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 the President took the liveliest interest in the 
 legal proceeding's. Then indeed was witnessed a 
 singular spectacle. The Federalists, forgetting 
 that the hands of the criminal were red with the 
 life-blood of that distinguished man to whom their 
 party owed at once its existence and nearly all the 
 measures upon which it could base its good repu* 
 tation, and seeing in the alleged project of Burr 
 only a scheme which, if successful, would have 
 overwhelmed in disgrace the administration of Jef- 
 ferson, now received the wretch with every demon- 
 stration of friendship and admiration. They 
 pretended to regard him as an innocent man per- 
 secuted by the President from motives of personal 
 spite. It is highly improbable that they believed 
 what they said ; but even if they did, it ill became 
 them to be upholders of Burr. Accident made it 
 likely that the punishment of a traitor would 
 gratify a private animosity which it may be ad- 
 mitted that the President must have felt, since he 
 was human. But Burr was so unquestionably 
 guilty that Jefferson, as president, was in duty 
 bound to desire his conviction, and it was impossi- 
 ble to say how far personal feeling mingled with 
 public motives. By established rules the Presi- 
 dent was entitled to the benefit of the doubt. But 
 the Federalists, while they most shamefully con- 
 doned Hamilton’s murder, gave Jefferson no benefit 
 of any doubt, preferring to pursue him with un- 
 bounded abuse. 
 
 Jefferson certainly made no secret of his opin- 
 
PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM 
 
 251 
 
 ion ; but there was no reason why he should do 
 so ; there was no danger that the naked fact that 
 he thought Burr guilty would have any undue 
 weight in a court over which Marshall was pre- 
 siding. Indeed, if any influence at all was percep- 
 tible in that tribunal, it was the influence of the 
 Federalist friends of the accused. Jefferson, of 
 course, made no effort, as he had no power, to 
 affect the conduct of the trial directly or indi- 
 rectly, save so far as that he communicated to the 
 government counsel any facts or suggestions which 
 occurred to him. But he watched the proceedings 
 closely, and certainly he had a right to be indig- 
 nant at some incidents in them. For instance, 
 Luther Martin, himself not untainted by suspicion 
 of collusion with his “ highly-respected friend,” as 
 he took pains to call Burr in open court, did not 
 hesitate to charge that the President, by “ tyranni- 
 cal orders ” “ contrary to the Constitution and the 
 laws,” had endeavored to consign “ to destruction ” 
 “ the life and property of an innocent man.” The 
 judges sat silent while the counsel uttered this and 
 more of the same sort. Then application was 
 made by the defendant’s lawyers for a subpoena 
 duces tecum to compel the President personally to 
 attend as a witness, bringing the letters and re- 
 cords of the W ar Department. The court granted 
 the request, but admitted that it had no authority 
 to enforce such a summons. This singular asser- 
 tion of a right to command not backed by a power 
 to enforce made the President angry. He was 
 
252 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 ready to send any papers which might be perti- 
 nent, but he repudiated the notion that the court 
 could properly order him to take the stand as a 
 witness. There is hardihood, if not professional 
 profanity, in questioning a decision of Marshall; 
 but it certainly seems as though the Federalist 
 rather than the judge spoke on this occasion ; and 
 if all his rulings had been as open to criticism and 
 to suspicion as was this one, he might have left a 
 less formidable reputation. 
 
 Jefferson wrote to Hay as follows : — 
 
 “ Laying down the position generally, that all persons 
 owe obedience to subpoenas, lie [Marshall] admits no 
 exception unless it can be produced in his law books. 
 . . . The Constitution enjoins his [the President’s] con- 
 stant agency in the concerns of six millions of people. 
 Is the law paramount to this, which calls on him on 
 behalf of a single one ? Let us apply the judge’s own 
 doctrine to the case of himself and his brethren. The 
 sheriff of Henrico summons him from the bench to quell 
 a riot somewhere in his county. The federal judge 
 is by the general law a part of the jjosse of the state 
 sheriff. Would the judge abandon major duties to per- 
 form lesser ones ? Again : the court of Orleans or 
 Maine commands by subpoenas the attendance of all 
 the judges of the Supreme Court. Would they abandon 
 their posts as judges, and the interests of millions com- 
 mitted to them, to serve the purposes of a single indi- 
 vidual ? The leading principle of our Constitution is 
 the independence of the Legislature, Executive, and 
 Judiciary of each other ; and none are more jealous of 
 this than the Judiciary. But would the Executive be 
 
PRESIDENT : SECOND TERM 
 
 253 
 
 independent of the Judiciary, if he were subject to the 
 commands of the latter, and to imprisonment for dis- 
 obedience, if the several courts could bandy him from 
 pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north 
 to south and east to west, and withdraw him entirely 
 from his constitutional duties ? ” 
 
 A striking exemplification of the force of this 
 argument would probably soon have been fur- 
 nished, bad not Burr escaped from a trial in Ohio 
 by forfeiting bis bonds and fleeing abroad. For 
 the President would surely have been summoned 
 to that trial also, and, if be bad obeyed the sum- 
 mons, would have been kept far from the seat of 
 government, in a then very inaccessible region, at 
 the moment when bis presence was of exceptional 
 importance at the capital, by reason of the doings 
 of British cruisers on the Virginian seacoast, and 
 of the perilous condition of our relations with Eng- 
 land. The decision of Marshall was disregarded 
 by the President, and nothing more came of it. 
 Only the Federalists used bis conduct as a further 
 support of their accusations of tyranny and in- 
 justice. 
 
 When the final result was announced, Jefferson 
 directed George Hay, of counsel for the govern- 
 ment, not to pay or dismiss any witnesses until 
 their testimony should have been taken down in 
 writing. “ These whole proceedings,” he said, 
 “ will be laid before Congress, that they may de- 
 cide whether the defect has been in the evidence 
 of guilt, or in the law, or in the application of the 
 
254 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 law, and that they may provide the proper remedy 
 for the past and the future.” He was as good as 
 his word, calling the attention of Congress to the 
 matter in his next message in language of unmis- 
 takable tenor. The result ultimately was the pas- 
 sage of some useful legislation concerning treason, 
 but of course nothing was done in relation to this 
 especial trial, or any individual engaged therein. 
 Matters of greater consequence than the punish- 
 ment of a ruined man demanded attention. 
 
CHAPTER XVn 
 
 PRESIDENT : SECOND TERM. EMBARGO 
 
 Angry clouds were rolling up thick and fast 
 from the Atlantic horizon over the benevolent head 
 of the most pacific of earthly rulers. Jefferson 
 seemed to make a modest and reasonable request 
 of the European powers when he asked only that 
 they would let the United States alone. But it 
 was a request which neither France nor England 
 had any mind to grant. Napoleon would tolerate 
 no neutrality ; Great Britain added to her natural 
 vindictiveness towards her quondam colonies a ra- 
 pacious jealousy of their growing commerce. Her 
 established purpose was to make a double gain at 
 once by confiscation and extermination, and she 
 carried out this policy with brutal insolence, in 
 defiance of international law and natural right. 
 In November, 1804, Jefferson was obliged to ad- 
 mit that even in our own harbors our vessels were 
 no longer safe from British guns. France, though 
 equally ready, was fortunately less able to commit 
 outrages. Yet the President hopefully added : 
 “ The friendly conduct of the governments, from 
 whose officers and subjects these acts have pro- 
 ceeded, in other respects and places more under 
 
256 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 their observation and control, gives us confidence 
 that our representations on this subject will have 
 been properly regarded.” A vain hope ! A year 
 passed and matters were worse rather than better. 
 In the message of December 3, 1805, Jefferson 
 could say nothing more satisfactory than that 
 
 “ our coasts have been infested and our harbors 
 watched by private armed vessels, some of them with- 
 out commissions, some with illegal commissions, others 
 with those of legal form, but committing piratical acts 
 beyond the authority of their commissions. They have 
 captured in the very entrance of our harbors, as well as 
 on the high seas, not only the vessels of our friends 
 coming to trade with us, but our own also. They have 
 carried them off under pretense of legal adjudication ; 
 but not daring to approach a court of justice, they have 
 plundered and sunk them by the way, or in obscure 
 places where no evidence could arise against them ; 
 maltreated the crews and abandoned them in boats in 
 the open sea or on desert shores without food or cover- 
 ing.” 
 
 January 17, 1806, be was further obliged to 
 send in a special message on the same irritating 
 subject, accompanied by the “ memorials of several 
 bodies of merchants in the United States.” In 
 the subsequent debates a singular alliance was 
 struck between the Federalists from the commer- 
 cial districts of New England and John Randolph, 
 with his half dozen followers, — the “ Quids ” as 
 they were called. That there was no real com- 
 munity of interest between the malcontent planter 
 
PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM 
 
 257 
 
 and the Eastern merchants may he gathered from 
 Randolph’s bold declaration that, “ if this great 
 agricultural nation is to be governed by Salem and 
 Boston, New York and Philadelphia, and Balti- 
 more and Norfolk and Charleston, let gentlemen 
 come out and say so.” Nevertheless the two 
 bodies made common cause against the adminis- 
 tration. But their strange coalition was of no 
 avail. The measure desired by the President 
 was carried by very handsome majorities in both 
 houses. It provided that after November 15, 
 1806, certain articles should not be imported from 
 the British dominions, nor, if of British manufac- 
 ture, from any other places. Mr. Jefferson, still 
 omnipotent, might well say, “ A majority of the 
 Senate means well,” and “ the House of Represent- 
 atives is as well disposed as I ever saw one.” He 
 believed in mercantile pressure, and he was al- 
 lowed to have his way. 
 
 But his way worked poorly. Less than a month 
 after this act was passed the English warship Le- 
 ander fired into an American coaster near Sandy 
 Hook and killed a man. The President ordered 
 the Leander out of American waters, and directed 
 the arrest of her commander, which of course could 
 not conveniently be made. Then, alarmed at the 
 possible effect of this very moderate display of 
 resentment, he wrote to Mr. Monroe, minister at 
 London, deprecating the anger of the newly estab- 
 lished and friendly cabinet of Mr. Fox. Public 
 sentiment, he said, “ did not permit us to do less 
 
258 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 than has been clone. It ought not to he viewed by 
 the ministry as looking towards them at all, but 
 merely as the consequences of the measures of 
 their predecessors, which their nation has called 
 on them to correct. I hope, therefore, they will 
 come to just arrangements.” Obviously Jefferson 
 had forgotten something of what he had once 
 learned concerning the British character, and did 
 not divine the antidotes appropriate to its vices. 
 It has been often said that if he had refrained 
 from his prattle about peace, reason, and right, 
 and instead thereof had hectored and swaggered 
 with a fair show of spirit at this crucial period, 
 the history of the next ten years might have been 
 changed and the war of 1812 might never have 
 been fought. Probably this would not have been 
 the case, and England would have fought in 1807, 
 1808, or 1809 as readily as in 1812. But, how- 
 ever this may be, the high-tempered course was 
 the only one of any promise at all, and, had it pre- 
 cipitated the war by a few short years, at least the 
 nation would have escaped a long and weary jour- 
 ney through a mud slough of humiliation. But it 
 is idle to talk of what might have been had Jeffer- 
 son acted differently. He could not act differently. 
 Though the people would probably have backed 
 him in a warlike policy, he could not adopt it. A 
 great statesman amid political storms, he was ut- 
 terly helpless when the clouds of war gathered. 
 He was as miserably out of place now as he had 
 been in the governorship of Virginia during the 
 
PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM 
 
 259 
 
 Revolution. He could not bring himself to enter, 
 tain any measures looking to so much as prepara- 
 tion for serious conflict. A navy remained still, 
 as it had always been, his abhorrence. His ex- 
 tremest step in that direction was to build gun- 
 boats. Every one has heard of and nearly every 
 one has laughed at these playhouse flotillas, which 
 were to he kept in sheds out of the sun and rain 
 until the enemy should appear, and were then to 
 be carted down to the water and manned by the 
 neighbors, to encounter, perhaps, the fleets and 
 crews which won the fight at Trafalgar, shattered 
 the French navy at the Nile, and battered Copen- 
 hagen to ruins. It almost seemed as though the 
 very harmlessness of the craft constituted a recom- 
 mendation to Jefferson. At least they were very 
 cheap, and he rejoiced to reckon that nearly a 
 dozen of them could be built for a hundred thou- 
 sand dollars. So he was always advising to build 
 more, while England, with all her fighting blood 
 up, inflicted outrage after outrage upon a country 
 whose ruler cherished such singular notions of 
 naval affairs. 
 
 Yet Jefferson could vapor a little at times in 
 such a qitiet private way as involved no substantial 
 responsibility. He gave vent occasionally to belli- 
 cose sentiments concerning Spain, and at some 
 moments was quite ready to fight her about the 
 Louisiana boundaries, or for the Floridas. Once 
 he said: “We begin to broach the idea that we 
 consider the whole Gulf Stream as of our waters, 
 
260 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 in which hostilities and cruising are to be frowned 
 on for the present, and prohibited so soon as either 
 consent or force will permit us. We shall never 
 permit another privateer to cruise within it, and 
 we shall forbid our harbors to national cruisers. 
 This is essential for our tranquillity and com- 
 merce.” This grandiloquence occurs in the very 
 letter in which he admits that American ships ai’e 
 fired into, and American sailors are killed with 
 impunity at the very mouths of American harbors. 
 Surely never was man more devoid of a sense of 
 humor ! 
 
 Meantime, though the British were infesting the 
 Atlantic seaboard like pirates, Jefferson’s perfect 
 faith in his own measures and the people’s equal 
 confidence in him were unshaken. The Demo- 
 crats continued to score gains in the elections, 
 until the whole country seemed on the point of 
 becoming solidly of that party. In this state of 
 affairs the ninth Congress came together on De- 
 cember 1, 1806 ; and on the next day Jefferson 
 sent in a message in which he said : “ The delays 
 ... in our negotiations with the British govern- 
 ment appear to have proceeded from causes which 
 do not forbid the expectation that during the 
 course of the session I may be enabled to lay be- 
 fore you their final issue.” Nevertheless a further 
 appropriation for more gunboats was recommended, 
 as matter of course. They were fully as good for 
 peace as for war ! 
 
 A noteworthy passage in this message, though 
 
PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM 
 
 261 
 
 an episode in the present narrative, deserves a 
 word. It appeared likely that there would soon 
 be a surplus of income over expenditures, and the 
 President said that the use to be made of that 
 surplus demanded consideration. 
 
 “ Shall we suppress the impost and give that advan- 
 tage to foreign over domestic manufactures ? On a few 
 articles of more general and necessary use the suppres- 
 sion in due season will doubtless be right, but the great 
 mass of the articles on which impost is paid is foreign 
 luxuries, purchased by those only who are rich enough 
 to afford themselves the use of them. Their patriotism 
 would certainly prefer its continuance and application 
 to the great purposes of the public education, roads, 
 rivers, canals, and such other objects of public improve- 
 ment as it may be thought proper to add to the constitu- 
 tional enumeration of federal powers.” 
 
 Here was a somersault indeed, which might well 
 confound those who remembered how Republi- 
 cans had always denounced the theory of internal 
 improvements. It helped the inconsistency not at 
 all that Jefferson admitted the necessity of a con- 
 stitutional amendment in order to render lawful 
 the expenditures which he contemplated. For his 
 party had maintained not only that such projects 
 were, but also that they ought to be, unconstitu- 
 tional. Yet now Jefferson, who had preached that 
 the Union was and ought to remain a league for 
 the sole purpose of foreign relationships, that the 
 States were and ought to remain supreme and in- 
 dependent governments in respect of all internal 
 
262 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 and domestic affairs, — Jefferson was actually 
 urging this doctrine of internal improvements, on 
 the very alleged ground that it would unify, nation- 
 alize, centralize the people and the government ! 
 “ By these operations,” he said, “ new channels of 
 communication will be opened between th& States ; 
 the lines of separation will disappear ; their in- 
 terests will be identified ; and their union cemented 
 by new and indissoluble ties.” Hamilton would 
 have had some entertaining comments for this ex- 
 traordinary politico-economical conversion to his 
 principles. 
 
 To return to foreign affairs : on December 3, 
 1806, the President sent in a special message 
 advising the “ further suspension ” of the Non- 
 importation Act, which had not yet been put in 
 force. His motive was that Mr. Fox had become 
 prime minister, and was supposed to cherish 
 friendly sentiments towards the United States. 
 The obedient majority did his bidding, encounter- 
 ing only a trifling opposition from the Federalists. 
 February 19, 1807, the President announced that 
 Monroe and Pinkney had at last succeeded in 
 coming to terms with Great Britain, though un- 
 fortunately the pleasure of the news was seriously 
 dashed by rumors that impressment was not dis- 
 posed of. Within a few days this disappointment 
 was made certain by the receipt of the treaty, 
 showing that the negotiators had followed the 
 example of Mr. Jay in taking the best they could 
 get rather than nothing. But this best seemed to 
 
PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM 
 
 263 
 
 Jefferson so bad that he would not for a moment 
 consider it. Loath to fight for the national rights, 
 at least he would not compromise them even by 
 remote inference. In negotiation he had infinite 
 courage and obstinacy. Accordingly, without com- 
 municating the treaty to the Senate, though that 
 body was then in session, he at once returned it to 
 Monroe, stating that it would not do at all, and that 
 negotiations should be resumed for a widely dif- 
 ferent conclusion. No one could find fault with 
 his opinion concerning the treaty, but the Federal- 
 ists assailed the manner of the rejection as high- 
 handed and autocratic. It had this character 
 rather in appearance than in substance ; yet such 
 an act done by John Adams would not have es- 
 caped Jefferson’s bitter animadversion. 
 
 Though Jefferson sent back the treaty, he took 
 care, at the same time, to manifest his still pacific 
 temper by exercising the discretionary power which 
 Congress had vested in him further to suspend the 
 Non-Importation Act. Unfortunately a Christian 
 and commercial disposition was hopelessly out of 
 tune with the times. The English policy was sim- 
 ple : since the Americans would not fight, they 
 were the easier objects of plunder. The French 
 principle was responsive : since the Americans are 
 to be robbed, we must share in the booty. So 
 from time to time came British Orders in Council, 
 and retaliatory French decrees dated by the victo- 
 rious Bonaparte from the conquered capitals, Ber- 
 lin and Milan. The ultimate result of all these 
 
264 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 taken together was, that substantially nothing but 
 their own coasting trade was left open to Ameri- 
 can vessels. One half the mercantile world was 
 sealed up by the British, the other half by the 
 French. Ships not complying with certain regula- 
 tions wei’e liable to capture by English cruisers ; 
 ships complying with those regulations were sub- 
 ject to seizure by French vessels ; and vice versa. 
 Nor could even the trade betwixt their own ports 
 be carried on by the citizens of the United States 
 with safety, for British vessels prowled even in 
 our home waters in search of seamen, and in a few 
 years carried off thousands of victims. Their au- 
 dacity was even such that in June, 1807, the Eng- 
 lish warship Leopard actually fired a broadside 
 into the American frigate Chesapeake, just outside 
 Hampton Roads, killing and wounding several 
 men. The Chesapeake, not prepared for action, 
 struck her colors ; the British commander boarded 
 her and carried off four sailors, American citizens, 
 three of them at least being native born. One of 
 them was forthwith hanged at Halifax. 
 
 The news of this outrage threw the nation into 
 a great rage. “ Never,” said Jefferson, “ since the 
 battle of Lexington, have I seen this country in 
 such a state of exasperation as at present.” Some 
 among the extreme Federalists of the New Eng- 
 land States, terrified at the prospect of hostilities 
 with England, justified the English commander ; 
 but most of the party were too high-spirited for 
 such conduct, and joined in the indignant outcry 
 
PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM 
 
 265 
 
 of the Republicans. “ The Federalists themselves 
 coalesce with us as to the object, although they 
 will return to their old trade of condemning every 
 step we take towards obtaining it,” said Jefferson. 
 He himself was deeply incensed, but acknowledged 
 the obligation to take no irrevocable step in the 
 heat of passion. “ Duty,” he considered, “ re- 
 quires that we do no act which shall commit Con- 
 gress in their choice between war, non-intercourse, 
 and other measures.” But he at once dispatched 
 a vessel to England to demand reparation, and 
 summoned Congress to meet in special session on 
 October 26, by which time he hoped to have a 
 reply. “ Reason,” he said, “ and the usage of 
 civilized nations require that we should give them 
 an opportunity of disavowal and reparation. Our 
 own interest, too, the very means of making war, 
 requires that we should give time to our merchants 
 to gather in their vessels and property and our 
 seamen now afloat.” It is plain that at this time 
 he anticipated war. He declared that he was 
 making “ every preparation ” for it “ which is 
 within our power,” and possibly he really thought 
 that he was getting the country into warlike shape. 
 But he was pitifully mistaken. He only got out 
 some gunboats, did some trifling work on harbor 
 fortifications, and gathered a small amount of 
 supplies. Congress afterward made some petty 
 appropriations to pay for these things. 
 
 On October 26, 1807, Congress came together. 
 In both houses a majority, even more overwhelm* 
 
266 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 ing than ever before, consisted of administration- 
 ists, a term quite as properly to be used in de- 
 scribing them as either Republicans or Democrats, 
 for they were thoroughly subject to the personal 
 influence of Jefferson. It was evident that what- 
 ever measures he should recommend would be 
 promptly carried. Yet he was content in his mes- 
 sage only to communicate the state of affairs, 
 which was already well known, and to let the de- 
 velopment of his policy await the English reply 
 concerning the Chesapeake outrage. This reply 
 did not arrive until the second week in December, 
 and then it was only learned that England would 
 send a special envoy about the matter. 
 
 A few days later, on December 18, Mr. Jeffer- 
 son sent in a brief but momentous message. The 
 communications accompanying it, he said, would 
 show “ the great and increasing dangers with 
 which our vessels, our seamen, and merchandise 
 are threatened on the high seas and elsewhere 
 from the belligerent powers of Europe ; and it 
 being of great importance to keep in safety these 
 essential resources, I deem it my duty to recom- 
 mend the subject to the consideration of Congress, 
 who will doubtless perceive all the advantages 
 which may be expected from an inhibition of the 
 departure of our vessels from the ports of the 
 United States.” It was afterwards made a serious 
 question whether or not, at the time of sending 
 this message, the President had information of the 
 British Orders in Council dated November 11, 
 
PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM 
 
 267 
 
 held back from formal issuance until November 
 17, declaring a “ paper blockade ” of all the ports 
 of France and her allies. The English ministry 
 and their friends, the American Federalists, always 
 maintained that Jefferson had no proper knowledge 
 of these Orders, and that his recommendation of 
 an embargo was a premature and unjustifiable act 
 of unfriendliness. The administrationists retorted 
 that Jefferson had the intelligence, though not in 
 official form. Keally the point, if it could be 
 made good, deserved to be disi’egarded, and could 
 have been preferred only by the immeasurable 
 insolence of Mr. Canning. The communication 
 would have been formally made if England had 
 not behaved with shameful disingenuousness. She 
 pretended to send Mr. Hose as a special emissary 
 in the Chesapeake affair, but, besides hampering 
 him with such preposterous conditions that he 
 could only disclose them and sail home again, she 
 also held back these Orders in Council until liter- 
 ally a few hours after his departure from London. 
 The honorable motive was that the United States 
 might receive and treat with him in ignorance of 
 them. It hardly became a minister, guilty of such 
 sharp practice, to complain that Mr. Jefferson had 
 been a little too ready with a demonstration of 
 unfriendliness. 
 
 So now at last the presidential policy was an- 
 nounced, — not war, but commercial pressure, an 
 embargo. The history of the brief remnant of 
 Mr. Jefferson’s administration is little else than a 
 
268 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 narrative of Federalist attacks on this measure, 
 and its defense by the administrationists. At first 
 it was surprisingly popular. In the Senate John 
 Quincy Adams not only deserted his party in order 
 to vote for it, hut said : “ The President has recom- 
 mended this measure on his high responsibility. 
 
 I would not consider, I would not deliberate, I 
 would act. Doubtless the President possesses such 
 further information as will justify the measure.” 
 The senators accepted this reason and this sugges- 
 tion. Jefferson advised; deliberation was super- 
 fluous. In a session of only four hours, behind 
 closed doors, under a suspension of the rules, the 
 bill was passed on the same day on which the 
 message was received. In the House the Federal- 
 ists kept up a debate for three days, but also with 
 closed doors. Except for this brief delay they were 
 powerless, and the bill was carried by 82 to 44. 
 The vote, however, showed that some few Republi- 
 cans had for once gone over to the Federalists and 
 the “ Quids.” 
 
 It has been pretty generally agreed in subse- 
 quent times that the embargo was a blunder. Cer- 
 tainly the world has outgrown such measures, just 
 as it has outgrown Jefferson’s amphibious gun- 
 boats. It is hard to realize that only three quarters 
 of a century ago neither of these ideas, more espe- i! 
 cially that of the embargo, had become discredited. 
 On the contrary, in 1807-8 an embargo was a 
 reputable measure of statecraft, supposed to be 
 efficient both defensively and offensively. In the 
 
PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM 
 
 269 
 
 United States especially the people had been wont 
 for more than a generation to regard it with 
 peculiar favor. So now the policy was hailed with 
 approbation by an overwhelming majority. Some 
 Federalist newspapers had cried out for it ; and 
 even many of the most influential merchants were 
 strongly in favor of it, though possibly from the 
 interested motive of wearing out their poorer com- 
 petitors. Moreover, it was supposed by all that 
 this embargo, like earlier ones, would be of reason- 
 ably short duration ; and though the Federalists 
 called attention to the fact that the present act, 
 unlike its predecessors, did not establish any limit 
 of time, yet few persons honestly feared that this 
 omission had any dangerous significance. 
 
 Jefferson argued very fairly that we should save 
 the property of our citizens, and the persons of our 
 sailors, by keeping our ships in our own harbors, 
 whereas on the high seas both merchandise and 
 men would be stolen. The device did not seem to 
 him ignoble. Moreover, since commerce was to 
 be forbidden in foreign no less than in domestic 
 bottoms, he was able to depict great numbers of 
 British merchants suffering loss and ruin, and 
 throngs of British artificers reduced to starvation 
 by the consequent curtailment of industry. Eng- 
 lish laborers, he said, could not, like Americans, 
 readily adopt new occupations ; neither had they 
 that surplus of food which our farmers enjoyed. 
 He spoke as if all Americans were farmers, and 
 gave no thought to the great seaboard population 
 
270 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 wholly dependent upon trade. If they were to be 
 hurt, he at least expected them to be kept silent 
 by patriotism, while he anticipated that the clamors 
 of the English malcontents would overawe Parlia- 
 ment and the administration. A certain amount 
 of sound reason which really lay in these argu- 
 ments, backed by the confident assent of a vast 
 majority of the nation, and soon corroborated by 
 cheering accounts from Mr. Pinkney concerning 
 the effect of the pressure in England, constituted 
 perhaps a justification for Mr. Jefferson in the 
 outset. But in order to make this justification 
 complete two things were necessary, both obviously 
 implied in the reasoning of the administrationists. 
 First : so far as the embargo was a domestic mea- 
 sure, i. e. designed to save our ships and sailors, 
 it should obviously be accompanied by vigorous 
 preparations for war, since it was absurd to regard 
 an embargo as a pei'manently saving device ; be- 
 fore long it would constitute destruction ; it could 
 only be used to save until the other means to that 
 end customary among nations could be resorted to. 
 Secondly : so far as the embargo had a foreign 
 aspect, i. e. was designed to influence British legis- 
 lation, it was properly experimental only, and, so 
 soon as the working of the experiment cleai’ly pro- 
 mised failure, it should have been abandoned. 
 
 Now in point of fact it was impossible long to 
 defend the measure in the former of these two as- 
 pects, because the lapse of time showed no serious 
 purpose to protect by sufficient forcq^the men and 
 
PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM 
 
 271 
 
 property subjected to the embargo. To save them 
 ■ by shutting them up, until preparation could be 
 made to protect them when abroad, was therefore 
 clearly not the government policy. Hence the 
 measure, if it was to be defended at all after the 
 passing of a few months, must be defended in its 
 i second or foreign character. But here, unfortu- 
 nately, it was utterly and hopelessly indefensible, 
 i The clamor had been raised, and the British gov- 
 i eminent had turned a deaf ear to it, for reasons 
 altogether too attractive to be readily rejected. 
 The merchants who were injured by the cessation 
 of the American trade would probably suffer only 
 temporarily ; at any rate they were only individ- 
 ual victims of a great national policy, destined to 
 work an immense and lasting benefit to the entire 
 shipping and mercantile interests of their country. 
 It was the established aim of the English govern- 
 ment to annihilate American commerce, which al- 
 ready threatened a dangerous rivalry with their 
 own. In ministerial eyes the embargo was a wel- 
 come and efficient aid, blindly furnished by their 
 competitor against itself. Jefferson ought to have 
 understood this, and appreciated that England 
 could play at his game longer and with much more 
 profit than the United States. For while in Eng- 
 land a few suffered, in the United States the 
 whole vast industries of shipping and commerce 
 were subjected to a process of starvation which in 
 time would result in utter destruction. The longer 
 the United States endured, the more they advanced 
 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 tlie English scheme. That scheme was a perma- 
 nent policy, whereas the United States were seek- 
 ing only an immediate, specific object, namely, a 
 recognition of their rights without enforcement by 
 war. Failing in this, as ultimately they did fail 
 in it. thev were wholly losers. Eyen succeeding 
 in it. they would sustain a serious injury, because 
 they would return much weakened to a sharp com- 
 petition. On the other hand, in any possible eyeut 
 the English must gain considerably : for every 
 set-back encountered by American commerce was 
 a positive advancement of English commerce. 
 
 It may be further remarked that if the embargo 
 accomplished nothing as against England, neither 
 did it do better as against France. That country, 
 herself little hurt by the embargo, was satisfied 
 to have it continue in force : for the permanent 
 commercial ambition of England disturbed Napo- 
 leon very little. He was content to see that for 
 the immediate present his foe was cut ofi: from 
 supplies, and subjected to a partial impoverish- 
 ment. 
 
 Unfortunately the English policy was by no 
 means intrinsically devoid of shrewdness or effi- 
 ciency. The discouragement which American mer- 
 chants endured for many years prior to the war of 
 1S1A followed by the dangers and losses encoun- 
 tered during that war. constituted the first and 
 powerful influence operating to destroy American 
 commerce. Had the mercantile and shipping in- 
 terests not been weakened by the prolonged emaci- 
 
PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM 
 
 273 
 
 ation inflicted by the home government, they might 
 have remained sufficiently powerful to keep within 
 reasonable limits that ill-advised legislation which 
 has since completed the destruction initiated by 
 Jefferson’s measures. Unintentionally he, who 
 many years before had expressed his antipathy to 
 commerce, now did it an injury from w'hich it 
 never recovered. But it was through sheer igno- 
 ranee, not in malice. 
 
 As J efferson did not see that he was serving the 
 merchants very ill, so he would not admit that he 
 was being false to his own principles. The Feder- 
 alists said that no such example of " strong gov- 
 ernment ” had ever been seen while they were in 
 power. Their embargoes had been brief and sim- 
 ple affairs in comparison with this unlimited and 
 monstrous one. But they were talking of what 
 was really matter of discretion rather than of prin- 
 ciple : for if an embargo was a lawful measure, its 
 duration in any especial case was to be determined 
 by a judgment upon the exigencies of that case. 
 The argument that, because the act creating this 
 embargo did not specify its length, therefore it did 
 not “ regulate ” but destroyed commerce, and was 
 unconstitutional, was very properly overruled by 
 the Supreme Court. But Jefferson was not true 
 to his principles, because, of his two reasons, one 
 at least was thoroughly undemocratic. The en- 
 deavor to take, care of the property and persons of 
 American citizens by shutting them up, as it were, 
 within doors, was the extremity of paternal govern* 
 
274 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 ment. It might have borne a different character 
 had it been a war measure, but within a very short 
 time every one knew that 'it was not a war mea- 
 sure, but simply an act of paternity. Jefferson 
 constantly spoke of it in this light. As such it 
 was not only undemocratic, but eminently foolish. 
 Jefferson might wisely have left to the merchants 
 the care both of their profits and of their princi- 
 pal. They were not a stupid or a helpless class, 
 and they understood their business far better than 
 he did. This argument was advanced by Quincy 
 of Massachusetts ; it could not be answered, but it 
 was disregarded. 
 
 Thus it appears that when, through Jefferson’s 
 influence, the embargo was imposed, it was not to 
 be regarded as absolutely a sound and wise mea- 
 sure. It required to be vindicated either by the 
 doing of certain things in the United States, or 
 the occurrence of certain events in England. Af- 
 ter a reasonable time those things had not been 
 done at home, and those events had not taken place 
 abroad. For the latter, Jefferson was not respon- 
 sible ; for the former, he was. For he had but to 
 say the word to Congress and he would have been 
 strictly obeyed. He was so supreme and so well 
 known to be a strong advocate of peace, that had 
 he asserted the necessity of creating a navy and 
 building fortifications, or even beginning hostili- 
 ties, these steps would have been taken at once. 
 
 Jefferson’s biographers narrate with pleasure the 
 support, at first enthusiastic and afterward patient, 
 
PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM 
 
 275 
 
 which Congress and the people yielded to the em- 
 bargo policy, as if this constituted his justification. 
 But the argument is unsatisfactory. It was Jeffer- 
 son's function to be wiser than the people, to guide 
 and instruct them ; or at least he assumed this 
 duty. Congress and the nation persevered in the 
 embargo for the same reason that they had enacted 
 and applauded it in the first instance ; and that 
 reason had been forcibly and clearly expressed in 
 Mr. Adams’s statement that his reliance was upon 
 the “ President’s responsibility.” Such also was 
 the reliance of the embargo majorities in and out 
 of Congress. Jefferson at first invited and after- 
 ward encouraged this faith. It was not until after 
 the miscarriage and unpopularity of the measure 
 had become unquestionable that he began to find 
 his “ responsibility ” irksome, and to seek to shift 
 it from his wearied shoulders. One thing, how- 
 ever, it is fair to say : when an administration 
 blunders it usually receives sound instruction from 
 the opposition; Jefferson did not. The Federal- 
 ists were even blinder than the administrationists. 
 They showed their ignorance of the true bearing 
 of the embargo by their criticisms upon it. Their 
 horizon also was bounded by the immediate injury 
 to Great Britain, and they stigmatized the mea- 
 sure as a “ sly and cunning ” endeavor to render 
 surreptitious aid to France. They were even more 
 opposed to warlike measures than were the Demo- 
 crats, and had no better advice to give than an 
 ignominious submission to all English demands. . 
 
276 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 The embargo message, it will be remembered, 
 was sent in to Congress on December 18, 1807. 
 On March 23, 1808, Jefferson wrote to Levi 
 Lincoln of Massachusetts, that “ it appears to be 
 approved, even by the Federalists of every quarter 
 except yours. The alternative was between that 
 and war, and in fact it is the last card we have to 
 play short of war.” By June 23, 1808, he wrote : 
 “ The day is not distant when that [war] will be 
 preferable to a longer continuance of the em- 
 bargo.” By August 9 we get glimpses of serious 
 popular discontent. On that day the President 
 writes to the secretary of war, in language wonder- 
 fully different from that which he had held at 
 the time of the whiskey insurrection, and with a 
 spirit that would have been better displayed to- 
 wards trans-Atlantic enemies than towards suffer- 
 ing American citizens : — 
 
 “ The Tories of Boston openly threaten insurrection 
 if their importation of flour is stopped. The next post 
 will stop it. I fear your governor is not up to the tone 
 of these parricides, and I hope, on the first symptom 
 of an open opposition of the law by force, you will fly to 
 the scene and aid in suppressing any commotion.” 
 
 Jefferson was neither awed nor instructed by 
 the loud grumbling in New England. The day 
 which in March he had described as “ not distant ” 
 gave little promise of drawing nearer. To the ma- 
 rine interest it seemed to be mysteriously estab- 
 lished in a perpetual offing ; it became in time as 
 exasperating as a mirage. 
 
PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM 
 
 277 
 
 By September, 1808, Jefferson bad become hope- 
 less of affecting the policy of England by longer 
 persistence in the embargo. Mr. Pinkney, be said, 
 inferred from a conversation with Canning that 
 the Orders might be repealed : “ but I have little 
 faith in diplomatic inferences and less in Canning’s 
 good faith.” Still the time glided on until Con- 
 gress met on November 7. The whole country 
 waited anxiously to hear what Jefferson would say 
 ;o that body ; would he declare that “ not distant ” 
 day to be at length near at hand ? would the dis- 
 appointment abroad, the discontent at home, and 
 later the loss by his party of all the New England 
 States save one at the presidential election, have 
 any weight with him ? His message was non-com- 
 mittal. He stated that he had intimated to Eng- 
 land that a withdrawal of her Orders in Council 
 would be met by a suspension of the embargo as 
 to her, whatever might be the action of France ; 
 but he admitted that the English cabinet had paid 
 no attention to this communication. In a word, 
 he acknowledged that his “ candid and liberal ex- 
 periment ” had “ failed,” and said that now it must 
 “ rest with the wisdom of Congress to decide on 
 the course best adapted ” to the existing state of af- 
 fairs. Apparently he meant to give no more advice 
 and to take no more responsibility. He plumed 
 himself a little because the embargo had “ demon- 
 strated to foreign nations the moderation and firm- 
 ness which govern our councils.” But he did not 
 add that Great Britain had watched with exas* 
 
278 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 perating complacency this patient endurance with 
 which the United States had suffered for her bene- 
 fit. Neither did he mention that when our minister 
 had made to Mr. Canning the offer to repeal the 
 embargo if England would repeal the Orders, that 
 sarcastic gentleman had replied that he should like 
 to help the Americans to get rid of the restrictions 
 which they found so very “ inconvenient,” though 
 he really could not go so far as to withdraw his 
 Orders for that purpose. Bonaparte also, with 
 practical irony, had issued a decree for the seizure 
 of all American ships found afloat, out of friend- 
 ship, he said, to the United States, to aid them in 
 preventing the escape of their vessels in contraven- 
 tion of their law. Jefferson, having no humor in 
 his composition, did not amuse Congress by repeat- 
 ing these remarks. 
 
 By refraining from uttering a word pointing 
 towards war, Jefferson made it plain enough that 
 he did not desire it. The embargo, from being a 
 temporary measure, was beginning to be embraced 
 by him as a policy of indefinite duration. The 
 result was a surprising indication of his almost 
 despotic supremacy. An enormous majority in the 
 House of Representatives adopted a series of reso- 
 lutions indorsing the continuance of the embargo. 
 In the Senate a direct resolution to repeal it re- 
 ceived only six yeas against twenty-five nays ; and 
 on December 21 that body passed a very strong en- 
 forcing bill. But it was not long before the Presi- 
 dent and administrationists got alarming evidence 
 
PRESIDENT : SECOND TERM 
 
 279 
 
 of their folly. The Massachusetts legislature con- 
 demned the enforcing bill as “ unjust, oppressive, 
 and unconstitutional, and not legally binding.” 
 Governor Trumbull of Connecticut refused to com- 
 ply with the President's requisition for militia 
 under the new act, and sent to the legislature a mes- 
 sage breathing the spirit of nullification. That 
 body, in response, passed resolutions similar to those 
 of Massachusetts. Evasions of the law were coun- 
 tenanced by public opinion, and convictions could 
 not be had before juries. Many influential Feder- 
 alists began to accustom their minds to the idea, of 
 secession, if not actually to form definite plans for 
 it. Of this menacing temper Jefferson received 
 information. Whether or not it frightened him 
 is doubtful. His conduct henceforth becomes so 
 wavering that his true sentiments cannot be accu- 
 rately ascertained. In November, 1808, he did not 
 desire a repeal. On January 14, 1809, he said 
 that the objects which the embargo was originally 
 designed to subserve were nearly attained, so that 
 the measure was “now near its term.” A few 
 days afterward a bill was passed for an extra ses- 
 sion of Congress in May next, with the design of 
 repealing the embargo on June 1, and “ then resum- 
 ing and maintaining by force our right of naviga- 
 tion.” This apparently ought to have pleased Jef- 
 ferson, if he clung to his opinion of January 14 ; 
 but it did not. He still hugged the vision of peace 
 with painful tenacity, and treated the policy of 
 hostility as men treat old-age, pushing it always a 
 
280 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 little in advance of the present clay. He moaned 
 somewhat, because the exceptional “ situation of 
 the world,” such as he declared never had been 
 before and probably never would be again, had 
 defeated his fair policy. “ If we go to war now,” 
 he complained, “ I fear we may renounce forever 
 the hope of seeing an end of our national debt. 
 If we can keep at peace eight years longer, our 
 income, liberated from debt, will be adequate to 
 any war, without new taxes or loans, and our posi- 
 tion and increasing strength will put us hors cVin- 
 sulte from any nation.” Yet it was his friend and 
 the leader of the administrationists in the House, 
 Nicholas of Virginia, who, on January 25, intro- 
 duced resolutions contemplating a repeal of the 
 embargo on June 1. An eager debate upon these 
 resulted in a breaking up and reorganizing of 
 parties and cliques which was quite kaleidoscopic. 
 The date was finally set at March 4. This vote 
 was regarded as a defeat of the administration, but 
 only in so far as it made the date of repeal earlier 
 than the contemplated date of May 1 by nearly 
 three months, — not a serious period. Yet eighteen 
 months later, partly probably in reference to this 
 vote, and partly to subsequent votes of a like tenor, 
 Jefferson wrote : “ The Federalists during their 
 short-lived ascendency have nevertheless, by forcing 
 from us the repeal of the embargo, inflicted a 
 wound on our interests which can never be cured.” 
 It looks very much as though the President did 
 not know his own mind; if he did, certainly he 
 
PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM 
 
 281 
 
 succeeded in preventing posterity from finding it 
 out. The truth is that he knew his policy to have 
 failed, yet could not abandon it. He seems to 
 have been bitterly disappointed, and a little fright- 
 ened. He was pained to see his party defeated, 
 but his chief anxiety was becoming personal, cen- 
 tring in the desire to escape from his embarrassing 
 position. He had not longed more to get out of 
 the governorship of Virginia than he now longed 
 to get out of the presidency. At times he resolved 
 not to try to make up his mind, not to do or advise 
 anything. Even in December, 1808, he said : “ I 
 have thought it right to take no part myself in 
 proposing measures, the execution of which will 
 devolve on my successor. I am, therefore, chiefly 
 an unmeddling listener to what others say.” In 
 other words, he renounced the duty of governing 
 the country for nearly three months before he was 
 lawfully relieved from it. Toward the close of 
 January he reiterated, “ I am now so near retiring 
 that I take no part in affairs beyond the expression 
 of an opinion. I think it fair that my successor 
 should now originate those measures, of which he 
 will be charged with the execution and responsi- 
 bility. . . . Five weeks more will relieve me from 
 a drudgery to which I am no longer equal.” 
 
 These protestations may be believed. Jefferson 
 appears in no degree responsible for the subse- 
 quent action of Congress in curtailing the duration 
 of that measure which had originally been his own. 
 On March 4, 1809, he was probably almost as glad 
 
282 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 to leave the presidency as eight years before he had 
 been to enter it. He was released from disappoint- 
 ment, from failure,, and from imminent humilia- 
 tion. During the closing months of his adminis- 
 tration he had presented a pitiable spectacle of a 
 ruler helplessly confounded by the miscarriage of 
 a policy. Yet his personal prestige, though dimin- 
 ished, was still immense. Probably three quarters 
 of the nation believed him the greatest, wisest, and 
 most virtuous of living statesmen. He had the 
 rare pleasure of transmitting the government to a 
 successor over whom his personal influence was 
 very great, who was in thorough political sympa- 
 thy with him, and towards whom he succeeded in 
 maintaining a personal friendliness without ex- 
 ample in the history of the country. He had even 
 to a considerable extent enjoyed the rare privilege 
 of naming that successor. It is true that Madi- 
 son was pointed out for the place by his official 
 position, his eminent services, and his abundant 
 ability ; yet at one time a strong effort was made 
 to set up Monroe as a competitor. The movement 
 made a brief show of becoming formidable. Jef- 
 ferson avowed that he would take no sides as be- 
 tween two men, each of whom he loved and trusted. 
 But Monroe entertained uncomfortable suspicions, 
 which were fostered by the malicious communica- 
 tions of persons professing to be friends to him, 
 and who certainly were enemies of the President. 
 A slight coolness ensued in spite of Jefferson’s 
 protestations, but it did not last long. Jefferson 
 
PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM 
 
 283 
 
 was the most conciliatory of men, and Monroe had 
 really no choice but to be pacified. J efferson prob- 
 ably told the truth when he sjjid that he took no 
 part for either competitor. There is no evidence 
 that he was in any way active in Madison’s behalf. 
 On the other hand, it cannot be denied that Madi- 
 son had long before been designed by him for the 
 position, that this was perfectly well understood, 
 and that the knowledge of his wishes was conclu- 
 sive. • 
 
 Jefferson had been earnestly besought by many 
 and influential bodies of citizens to become a can- 
 didate for a third term. Probably he could have 
 had the honor, had he sought it. But he declined 
 promptly and without the least wavering. He had 
 already stretched his avowed principles concern- 
 ing the duration of incumbency quite far enough ; 
 neither could he now add anything to a fame so 
 great that it could be increased more by declining 
 than by accepting further distinctions. Moreover, 
 the times began to look stormy and uncomfortable. 
 He would be sixty-five years old at the close of his 
 second term ; he had been in public life, with 
 trifling interruptions, for about forty years ; he 
 had enjoyed an amount and constancy of good for- 
 tune rare in any polity and almost unprecedented 
 in a republic. He retired with a reputation and 
 popularity hardly inferior to that of Washington. 
 He could dictate the foreign and domestic policy 
 of seven millions of free and critical people, simply 
 by virtue of the personal confidence reposed in his 
 
284 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 integrity and judgment. It is difficult to suggest 
 any other example parallel to this. No personal 
 influence of a civilian, not nourished in any degree 
 by successful war, has ever been so great and so 
 permanent over our people. In a fair measure i 
 this was deservedly the case, for with all his faults 
 Jefferson had very civilized ideas and was the true 
 friend of the commonalty. While he regarded 
 their welfare as the noblest object of government, ' 
 he did not confer benefits upon them as boons, like 
 a political charity done by superiors to inferiors. 
 He believed in them ; he esteemed their intelli- 
 gence ; he not only respected their power, but he 
 desired to see them use it, because he was firmly 
 convinced that they would use it well. He was 
 called a demagogue ; but he was not one, if that 
 word indicates disingenuousness in preaching popu- 
 lar doctrines. Jefferson had a profound and honest 
 faith in his avowed principles, expecting indeed to 
 gain by them, but only because he thought they 
 were fundamentally right and therefore sure in 
 time to prevail. He differed from the time-serving 
 politician, because he staked his individual success 
 upon the success of what he deemed intrinsically 
 right principles. He differed even from the states- 
 man who acts conscientiously upon every measure, i 
 inasmuch as, beyond devising specific measures, he 
 set forth a broad faith or religion in statesmanship, 
 making special measures only single blocks in the 
 wide pavement of his road. He was sometimes 
 insincere, often inconsistent, generally prone to 
 
PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM 
 
 285 
 
 shun hurt and danger to himself ; but from the 
 time when he began his great reforms in the Vir- 
 ginia House of Burgesses, the general tendency 
 and large lines of his purposes and policy held 
 with much steadiness in the noble direction of a 
 perfect humanitarianism. To this day the multi- 
 tude cherish and revere his memory, and in so 
 doing pay a just debt of gratitude to a friend who 
 not only served them, as many have done, but who 
 honored and respected them, as very few have 
 done. 
 
CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 AT MONTICELLO : POLITICAL OPINIONS 
 
 Jefferson’s interest in public affairs had be- 
 come a part of his nature and could not suddenly 
 cease. Accordingly in his retirement he corre- 
 sponded constantly with the new President, exer- 
 cising an authority in the Republican party not 
 altogether unlike that' which had been exercised 
 by Hamilton, in private life, over the Federalists. 
 But in time this relationship caused fault-finding, 
 and gave rise to disagreeable insinuations that 
 Madison was only the puppet of the ex-President. 
 Of course Madison was no man’s puppet, but such 
 language was so fitted to wound his feelings and 
 weaken his prestige that Jefferson, from a sense of 
 delicacy, thereafterward greatly curtailed his com- 
 munications. 
 
 A few of Jefferson’s opinions on public affairs 
 deserve to be noted. He anticipated for the new 
 administration a peaceful and prosperous career. 
 War, indeed, still hovered in his view as a possibly 
 “ less losing business than unrestricted depreda- 
 tion ; ” but in his desire to avoid it he advised, in 
 the “ present maniac state of Europe,” not to “ es- 
 timate the point of honor by the ordinary scale.” 
 
AT MONTICELLO : POLITICAL OPINIONS 287 
 
 Yet lie was against making permanent concessions 
 of principle ; and wlien a commercial treaty was in 
 prospect lie urged Madison not to allow the Eng- 
 lish to “ whip us into a treaty ” as “ they did in 
 Jay’s case and were near doing in Monroe’s.” 
 
 He indulged in a wonderful vision of territorial 
 aggrandizement. Bonaparte, lie said, — 
 
 “would give us the Floridas to withhold intercourse 
 with the residue of those [the Spanish] colonies. But 
 that is no price ; because they are ours in the first 
 moment of the first war ; and until a war they are of 
 no particular necessity to us. But, although with dif- 
 ficulty, he will consent to our receiving Cuba into our 
 Union. . . . That would be a price, and I would imme- 
 diately erect a column on the southernmost limit of Cuba 
 and inscribe on it ne plus ultra as to us in that direc- 
 tion. We should then have only to include the North 
 in our confederacy, which would be of course in the first 
 war, and we should have such an empire for liberty as 
 she has never surveyed since the creation ; and I am 
 persuaded no constitution was ever before so well calcu- 
 lated as ours for extensive empire and self-government.” 
 
 In 1809 this was tolerably gorgeous day-dream- 
 ing ! 
 
 He bad by this time so far modified his old hos- 
 tility to commerce and manufactures as to say: 
 “ An equilibrium of agriculture, manufactures, and 
 commerce is certainly become essential to our in- 
 dependence. Manufactures sufficient for our con- 
 sumption, of what we raise the raw material (and 
 no more) •, commerce sufficient to carry the surplus 
 
28S 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 produce of agriculture beyond our own consump- 
 tion, to a market for exchanging it for articles we 
 cannot raise (and no more).” 
 
 He wrote to Gallatin urging him to be persist- 
 ent in extinguishing the national debt. “ The 
 discharge of the debt,” he said, “ is vital to the 
 destinies of our government, and it hangs on Mr. 
 Madison and yourself alone. ... I had always 
 cherished the idea that you would fix on that ob- 
 ject the measure of your fame and of the gratitude 
 which our country will owe you.” He had a warm 
 regard for Gallatin, and when in the winter of 
 1810-11 attacks were made on the secretary, and 
 seams began to open in the party, Jefferson ex- 
 erted all his authority to stay the disagreement. 
 He preached conciliation eloquently, and laid down 
 a rule of adherence to party which expressed hap- 
 pily the middle course between excessive individ- 
 ual independence and a sacrifice of conscientious 
 opinion. 
 
 In the spring of 1812 Jefferson saw that war 
 was imminent. “ Our two countries,” he wrote to 
 an English friend, “ are to be at war, but not you 
 and I. And why should our two countries be at 
 war when by peace we can be so much more useful 
 to one another ? Surely the world will acquit our 
 government from having sought it. Never before 
 has there been an instance of a nation bearing so 
 much as we have borne.” This was true enough ; 
 Jefferson and Madison had carried endurance far 
 past the praiseworthy limit ; they were not account- 
 able for the blood-letting to come. 
 
AT MONTICELLO: POLITICAL OPINIONS 289 
 
 Jefferson contemplated in his usual sanguine 
 temper a war which turned out so very disas- 
 trously. He modestly hoped that we should con- 
 fine ourselves to the defense of our harbors and to 
 the conquest of the British possessions in North 
 America ! “ The acquisition of Canada,” he said, 
 
 “ this year, as far as the neighborhood of Quebec, 
 would be a mere matter of marching, and would 
 give us experience for the attack of Halifax the 
 next, and the final expulsion of England from the 
 American continent.” Of course he showed his 
 native incapacity for military affairs. “ The parti- 
 sans of England here,” he said, “ have endeavored 
 much to goad us into the folly of choosing the ocean 
 instead of the land for the theatre of war. That 
 wordd be to meet their strength with our own weak- 
 ness, instead of their weakness with our strength.” 
 Quite the reverse of this proved to be the case. 
 In spite of his utter failure to appreciate the sit- 
 uation, and his incapacity to cope with military 
 problems, he was actually “ importuned from sev- 
 eral quarters to become a candidate for the pre- 
 sidency in 1812.” So blind was the admiration of 
 his partisans ! Further, Mr. Randall also tells us, 
 “ on the authority of an intimate friend of Mr. 
 Madison, who heard the fact from his own lips,” 
 that Madison offered the position of secretary of 
 state to Jefferson. Upon this subject Jefferson 
 wrote to Duane, October 1, 1812 : “ I profess so 
 much of the Roman principle as to deem it hon- 
 orable for the general of yesterday to act as a 
 
290 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 corporal to-clay, if liis services can be useful to bis 
 country ; bolding that to be false pride which post- 
 pones the public good to any private or personal 
 considerations. But I am past service. The hand 
 of age is upon me. The decay of bodily faculties 
 apprises me that those of the mind cannot but be 
 impaired.” He continues in this melancholy strain, 
 and concludes by expressing his satisfaction that 
 he “ retains understanding enough to be sensible 
 how much of it he has lost and to avoid exposing 
 himself as a spectacle for the pity of his friends ; 
 that he has surmounted the difficult point of know- 
 ing when to retire.” This might have been only an 
 excuse, but probably it was not so ; for he was now 
 constantly harping upon the failure of his faculties. 
 
 He was glad finally to have peace concluded ; 
 he hoped that, “ having spared the pride of Eng- 
 land her formal acknowledgment of the atrocity of 
 impressment, . . . she will concur in a convention 
 for relinquishing it.” Otherwise the pacification 
 could be nothing more than a “ truce, determina- 
 ble on the first act of impressment of an American 
 citizen.” He deprecated “the maniac course of 
 hostility and hatred ” pursued by England toward 
 the United States. 
 
 “ I hope in God she will change. There is not a 
 nation on the globe with whom I have more earnestly 
 wished a friendly intercourse on equal conditions. . . . 
 I know that their creatures represent me as personally 
 an enemy to England. But fools only can believe this, 
 or those who think me a fool. I am an enemy to her 
 
AT MONTICELLO: POLITICAL OPINIONS 291 
 
 insults and injuries. I am an enemy to the flagitious 
 principles of her administration, and to those which 
 govern her conduct towards other nations. But would 
 she give to morality some place in her political code, 
 and especially would she exercise decency and, at least, 
 neutral passions towards us, there is not, I repeat it, a 
 people on earth with whom I would sacrifice so much to 
 he in friendship.” 
 
 Certainly no man was ever less prone to nourish 
 a feud than was Jefferson. He always wanted to 
 conciliate, to forgive, to restore lost or shattered 
 friendships. About this time he made up his old 
 quarrel with John Adams, and was correspond- 
 ing with him most cordially. This is only one of 
 many instances of an attractive trait in his charac- 
 ter, giving a most amiable notion of him, — yet he 
 left behind him those venomous “Anas,” among 
 the most unfortunate of all deeds of the pen. Be- 
 neath an universal good-will it is shocking to find 
 rankling a vindictiveness so relentless and so igno- 
 bly indulged. How differently should we think of 
 him, were it not for this bequest, which, like the 
 cloven foot, peeps out from beneath his apparent 
 guise of broad charity and kindliness ! 
 
 In 1820 he was profoundly disturbed by the 
 Missouri Compromise, which seemed to him preg- 
 nant with a brood of terrible retributive disasters. 
 
 “ This momentous question,” he said, “ like a fire-bell 
 in the night, awakened and filled me with terror. I 
 considered it at once as the knell of the Union. It is 
 hushed, indeed, for the moment. But this is a reprieve 
 
292 
 
 THOMAS JEFERSON 
 
 only, not a final sentence.” “The coincidence or a 
 marked principle, moral and political, with a geographi- 
 cal line, once conceived, I feared would never more be 
 obliterated from the mind ; that it would be recurring 
 on every occasion, and renewing irritations until it would 
 kindle such mutual and mortal hatred as to render sepa- 
 ration preferable to eternal discord.” 
 
 He foresaw civil war. “ Are we then to see 
 again Athenian and Lacedaemonian confedera- 
 cies? To wage another Peloponnesian war ? ” Yet 
 though he was thus correctly prescient of the 
 awful future, he was sadly blind alike to the char- 
 acter and to the result of the conflict. “ It is 
 not,” he said, “ a moral question, but one merely 
 of power. Its object is to raise a geographical 
 principle for the choice of a president, and the 
 noise will be kept up till that is effected.” The 
 moral element was still far beneath the surface, 
 and common men might not have suspected its ex- 
 istence ; but Jefferson should have done so. He 
 was not more excusable when he anticipated that 
 the North would be the section to suffer most from 
 the schism. The Northerners, he predicted, “ will 
 find the line of separation very different from their 
 36° of latitude, and as manufacturing and navi- 
 gating States they will have quarreled with their 
 bread and butter ; and I fear not that after a little 
 trial they will think better of it, and return to the 
 embraces of their natural and best friends.” Such 
 is prophecy in statesmanship. 
 
 Further, he was decidedly of the opinion that 
 
AT MONTICELLO: POLITICAL OPINIONS £93 
 
 in the compromise Congress interfered unjustifiably 
 with states’ rights. He condemned the endeavor 
 “ to regulate the condition of the different descrip- 
 tions of men composing a State. This certainly is 
 the exclusive right of eveiy State, which nothing 
 in the Constitution has taken from them and given 
 to the general government.” His views concern- 
 ing emancipation had apparently undergone little 
 change since the early days when he had concocted 
 a scheme for it, except that apparently he gave 
 greater weight now than previously to the practi- 
 cal difficulties. “ The cession of that kind of pro- 
 perty [slaves] , for so it is misnamed, is a bagatelle 
 which would not cost me a second thought, if in 
 that way a general emancipation and expatriation 
 could he effected ; and gradually and with due 
 care, I think, it might he. But as it is, we have 
 the wolf by the ears, and can neither hold him 
 nor safely let him go.” 
 
 In 1821 Jefferson had a sharp revival of his old 
 jealousy of the judiciary, and published some let- 
 ters on the subject. Later, during the administra- 
 tion of J. Q. Adams, he was also greatly annoyed 
 by the complete victory of the policy of internal 
 improvement. He now gave up this battle as 
 hopelessly lost to his side. “ The torrent of gen- 
 eral opinion ” he recognized as “ irresistible.” He 
 was very mournful about it. He could not recon- 
 cile himself to a liberal construction which seemed 
 to him a perversion of the Constitution, no matter 
 how great advantages could he gained thereby. 
 
294 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 Apparently lie was also much less tolerant of the 
 principle itself than he had been when the enter- 
 prises would have fallen beneath his own control, 
 and would have brought popularity to his own 
 administration. He suggested an absurd way of 
 preserving the sanctity of his doctrine in the ab- 
 stract, while it was being shattered to fragments 
 in practice. He drew up for the Virginia legisla- 
 ture a verbose “ Declaration and Protest,” recit- 
 ing the powerlessness of Congress in the premises, 
 and closing with an enactment in general terms, 
 whereby the State ratified and indorsed, by virtue 
 of its own supreme power and authority in such 
 matters, all the acts for internal improvements 
 which Congress should pass in the future. This 
 was silly, but Jefferson was greatly perturbed by 
 what he saw going forward. He deemed the 
 building of canals and roads with the national 
 money a breach of the national compact such as 
 might in time even justify a dissolution. For this, 
 he said, the provocation was not yet sufficient ; it 
 was “ the last resource, not to be thought of until 
 much longer and greater sufferings ; ” but it was 
 a possibility in the days to come. His alarm was 
 groundless, and his cure useless ; construction of 
 water-ways and highways could never have pro- 
 voked or justified secession. But Jefferson was 
 growing old. This is the last of his interferences 
 in public affairs which is worthy of mention. 
 
CHAPTER XIX 
 
 AT MONTICELLO : PERSONAE MATTERS. DEATH 
 
 There was a strong theatrical tinge in Jeffer- 
 son’s composition. When he retired from the 
 presidency it was to pose during his old age as the 
 “ Sage of Monticello,” the good and wise old man, 
 the benefactor of his kind, the statesman-philoso- 
 pher. He recognized that it was proper, nay, in- 
 cumbent, and even inevitable, to assume this role ; 
 he did it readily, without anxiety as to his perfect 
 success in the part, and it must be acknowledged 
 that he played it to the end very well. He at first 
 expected to be the “ hermit of Monticello ; ” but 
 he soon found that he was of that class of hermits 
 whose fame is so great among the nations that all 
 the world flocks to gaze at them, so that retreat 
 becomes a series of popular levees. The door of 
 his mansion, hospitable even beyond Virginian pre- 
 cedent, stood ever open, and the stream of visitors 
 passed ceaselessly in and out. Relatives came and 
 brought their families, fathers and mothers with 
 broods of children, and stayed for months ; friends 
 treated the generous roof -tree as their own ; people 
 of distinction or good social position claimed and 
 received briefer entertainment. All this was plea- 
 
296 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 sant, and the gratification given by such visitors 
 generally more than offset the inconveniences. 
 But it was less agreeable to have the imperfectly 
 civilized people at large behave as if Monticello 
 were the public domain where the ex-President 
 was kept always on exhibition. Every one in the 
 United States, of any enterprise, sooner or later 
 found his way to this extraordinary “ hermitage.” 
 The following amusing sketch of the household 
 occurs in a letter quoted in Randall’s Life : — 
 
 “We had persons from abroad, from all the States of 
 the Union, from every part of the State, men, women, 
 and children. In short, almost every day for at least 
 eight months of the year brought its contingent of 
 guests. People of wealth, fashion, men in office, pro- 
 fessional men, military and civil, lawyers, doctors, Pro- 
 testant clergymen, Catholic priests, members of Con- 
 gress, foreign ministers, missionaries, Indian agents, 
 tourists, travelers, artists, strangers, friends. Some 
 came from affection and respect, some from curiosity, 
 some to give or receive advice or instruction, some from 
 idleness, some because others set the example.” 
 
 The crowds actually invaded the house itself, 
 and stood in the corridors to watch Jefferson pass 
 from one room to another ; they swarmed over the 
 grounds and gaped at him as he walked beneath 
 his trees or sat on his piazza. All this was flatter- 
 ing, but it was also extremely irksome ; it too 
 closely resembled the existence of the beast in the 
 menagerie. Yet though Jefferson sometimes fled 
 from it for a few days of hiding at a distant farm, 
 
AT MONTICELLO : PERSONAL MATTERS 297 
 
 lie appears wonderfully seldom to liave been lack- 
 ing in the patient benignity which his part im- 
 posed upon him. The most impertinent had their 
 'gaze out unmolested; only a few complaints were 
 made privately to friends. 
 
 In time that came to pass which Jefferson ought 
 to have foreseen in the early stages of this fashion 
 of life. He was keeping a large and naturally a 
 very popular hotel, at which no guest ever thought 
 of paying his score. The housekeeper at times 
 had to provide fifty beds ; inevitably the detail of 
 slaves for the house and stables left few field 
 hands for productive labor ; all the produce of 
 the Monticello estate was eaten up by the guests ; 
 and of course much other food and drink had to 
 be purchased, and much wear and tear to be made 
 good. The form of entertainment was necessarily 
 simple ; yet J efferson lived in what was deemed 
 good style in that time and neighborhood. Inevi- 
 tably beneath these reducing processes his fortune 
 steadily and much too rapidly shrank. He had 
 also experienced some severe blows. For example, 
 the pre-revolutionary debt upon his wife’s estate 
 was due in England, and the story of its payment 
 was very hard, though very honorable to him. In 
 order to meet it he sold some of her lands at a 
 gold valuation, but finally got the money in paper 
 “ worth two and a half per cent, of its nominal 
 value.” This sum he deposited in the state trea- 
 sury under a statute, made during the Revolution, 
 whereby debts owing to English subjects could be 
 
298 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 paid to the State, which then assumed the indebt- 
 edness and acquitted the debtor. But after the 
 close of the war he declined to avail himself of 
 this acquittance. 
 
 “ I am desirous of arranging with you,” he wrote to 
 the creditors, “ such just and practicable conditions as 
 will ascertain to you the terms at which you will receive 
 my part of your debt, and give me the satisfaction of 
 knowing that you are contented. What the laws of 
 Virginia are or may be, will in no wise influence my 
 conduct. Substantial justice is my object, as decided by 
 reason and not by authority or compulsion. ... I am 
 ready to remove all difficulty arising from this deposit, 
 to take back to myself the demand against the State, 
 and to consider the deposit as originally made for my- 
 self and not for you.” 
 
 Thus the discharge of £3749 12s. ultimately 
 “ swept nearly half of his estate,” while he got 
 back from the state treasury so little that he was 
 wont to say, concerning the land which he had 
 parted with, that he had “ sold it for a great coat.” 
 This costly honesty appears the more creditable, 
 because Jefferson’s financial resources had been 
 much diminished by the ravages of the British 
 troops, of which the money value, says Mr. Ran- 
 dall, “ more than equaled the amount of his Brit- 
 ish debt and its interest during the war.” 
 
 Subsequently during his public life Jefferson 
 sometimes lived on his salary, sometimes exceeded 
 it, and only while he was vice-president saved any- 
 thing from it. Mr. Randall estimates his property 
 
AT MONTICELLO: PERSONAL MATTERS 299 
 
 at 1200,000 when he left the presidency, but does 
 not make it perfectly clear whether or not this 
 ought to be reduced by the deduction of some 
 indebtedness. It was a handsome amount ; but a 
 part of it consisted of his house and furniture, and 
 a very expensive library ; the remainder was lands 
 and slaves, from which, after the Monticello estate 
 and negroes had been substantially neutralized, as 
 has been above explained, the net income was far 
 from equal to the demands upon it. Times and 
 crops also often went against him. When the 
 owner of propei’ty thus invested once begins to 
 overrun his income, he enters on the road to ruin. 
 By degrees Jefferson became a poor man, and 
 indeed worse than poor, since he was involved 
 in pecuniary embarrassments. Before matters had 
 reached this stage he had sold his library to Con- 
 gress for #23,950 ; but this restorative did not long 
 check the decline. In 1819 an indorsement which 
 he had made for his friend, Wilson Cary Nicholas, 
 cost him #20,000. This blow consummated his 
 ruin. Nicholas is said to have been not blame- 
 worthy in the matter, but the victim of ill fortune ; 
 and to have been crushed at the disaster which he 
 brought upon his friend. The kindness and deli- 
 cacy with which Jefferson took especial pains to 
 treat him were remarkable, and on one or two 
 occasions were actually touching. 
 
 But debts must be paid, no matter how honored, 
 good, or distinguished is the debtor, and ex-Presi- 
 dent Jefferson occupied no better position than 
 
300 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 any other planter who was very near insolvency. 
 It was an unfavorable time for turning a large 
 landed estate into money ; and a sale in ordinary 
 fashion would leave Jefferson substantially a pau- 
 per, even if not still a debtor. To avoid this he 
 desired to resort to a device then scarcely obsolete 
 in Virginia. He petitioned the legislature for 
 leave to dispose of his property at a fair valuation 
 by lottery. By this means, he said, “ I can save 
 the house of Monticello, and a farm adjoining, to 
 end my days in and bury my bones. If not, I 
 must sell house and all here and carry my family 
 to Bedford, where I have not even a log hut to 
 put my head into.” When the proposition was 
 broached some opposition was threatened, and its 
 success was not certain. Jefferson wrote, with 
 evident humiliation : “ I perceive there are greater 
 doubts than I had apprehended, whether the legis- 
 lature will indulge my request to them. It is a 
 part of my mortification to perceive that I had so 
 far overvalued myself as to have counted on it 
 with too much confidence. I see,” he sadly adds, 
 “ in the failure of this hope, a deadly blast of all 
 my peace of mind during my remaining days.” 
 But he was spared a disappointment so severe. 
 The opposition was feeble, and the authorizing hill 
 passed both houses by very gratifying majorities. 
 The scheme, however, was not carried out. When 
 the news of it spread through the country many 
 offers of money were made. Public meetings were 
 called, and subscriptions were started in the large 
 
AT MOXTICELLO: PERSONAL MATTERS 301 
 
 cities. It seemed as though the people who, as 
 Bandall justly remarks, had literally eaten up 
 most of the ex-President’s property, would now 
 restore it to him. Jefferson had repudiated the 
 idea of a loan or gift from the state treasury, 
 saying : “ In any case I wish nothing from the 
 treasury. The pecuniary compensations I have re- 
 ceived for my services from time to time have been 
 fully to my own satisfaction.” But these offers of 
 voluntary assistance from the people he was grate- 
 fully willing to accept. “ I have spent three times 
 as much money, and given my whole life to my 
 countrymen,” he said, “ and now they nobly come 
 forward in the only way they can, to repay me and 
 save an old servant from being turned like a dog 
 out of doors.” “ No cent of this is wrung from 
 the tax-payer ; it is the pure and unsolicited offer- 
 ing of love.” 
 
 But though this liberality smoothed Jefferson’s 
 last days, it had little other effect ; for before it 
 had reached that stage at which it could com- 
 plete his relief, he died. The debts still hung over 
 his estate ; the subscriptions of course ceased ; the 
 lottery proved a failure, and the executor had to 
 dispose of all the assets. The lands brought ridi- 
 culously low prices, — three to ten dollars per acre, 
 — and the proceeds did not pay the debts. But 
 the executor himself made good the deficit, so 
 that no creditor suffered through Jefferson’s mis- 
 fortunes. 
 
 The chief interest and occupation of Jefferson’s 
 
302 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 last years were concentrated in establishing the 
 University of Virginia, of which he was made 
 rector. In this business he labored with assiduity 
 and success. But he encountered many obstacles 
 and had some unworthy mortifications. He was 
 especially vexed at the story which got abroad, 
 and which impeded his efforts not a little, that he 
 designed to give the college an anti-Christian char- 
 acter. It is needless to say that he had no such 
 purpose ; though he certainly did not intend it to 
 be in the control of any especial creed. Jeffer- 
 son’s religious opinions, both during his lifetime 
 and since his death, have given rise to much con- 
 troversy. His opponents constantly charged him 
 with infidelity, his friends as vigorously denied the 
 charge. The discussion annoyed and irritated him ; 
 but he would not put an end to it by making any 
 statement concerning his belief. It was his private 
 affair, he said with some temper, and he would not 
 aid in establishing an inquisition of conscience. 
 His grandson says that even his own family knew 
 no more than the rest of the world concerning his 
 religious opinions. One cannot but think that, had 
 he been a firm believer in Christianity, he would 
 probably not have regarded such reticence as jus- 
 tifiable, but would have felt it his duty to give to 
 the faith the weight of his influence, which he well 
 knew to be considerable. Nearly all the evidence 
 which has been collected falls into the same scale, 
 going to show that he was not a Christian in any 
 strict sense of that word. It is true that the phrase 
 
AT MONTICELLO: PERSONAL MATTERS 303 
 
 bears widely different meanings to different per- 
 sons ; but probably the most liberal admissible 
 interpretations would hardly make it apply to Jef- 
 ferson. Mr. Kandall says that he was a Christian, 
 but founds the statement on evidence which goes 
 to show only that Jefferson believed in a God or 
 Supreme Being who concerned himself about the 
 affairs of men. Of course this is by no means 
 proof, perhaps not properly even evidence, of a 
 belief in Christ. He went to church with tolerable 
 regularity ; he spoke with the utmost reverence 
 of Christ as a moral teacher ; but he carefully re- 
 frained from speaking of him as anything else 
 than a human teacher. In the most interesting 
 letter which he ever wrote on the subject he says : 
 “ I am a Christian in the only sense in which 
 he [Jesus] wished any one to be ; sincerely at- 
 tached to his doctrines in preference to all others ; 
 ascribing to himself every human excellence ; and 
 believing he never claimed any other.” He com- 
 pares Christ with Socrates and Epictetus, and says 
 that when he died at about thirty-three years of 
 age, his reason had “ not yet attained the maxi- 
 mum of its energy, nor the course of his preaching, 
 which was but of three years at most, presented 
 occasions for developing a complete system of 
 morals. Hence the doctrines which he really de- 
 li rered were defective as a whole ; and fragments 
 only of what he did deliver have come to us, muti- 
 lated, misstated, and often unintelligible.” This 
 hardly describes the Christian notion of God’s reve- 
 
304 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 lation. After such language it was not worth while 
 to add the saving clause, that “ the question of his 
 being a member of the Godhead, or in direct com- 
 munication with it, . . . is foreign to the present 
 view.” To my mind it is very clear that Jefferson 
 never believed that Christ was other than a human 
 moralist, having no peculiar inspiration or divine 
 connection, and differing from other moralists only 
 as Shakespeare differs from other dramatists, 
 namely, as greatly their superior in ability and fit- 
 ness for his function. But those admirers of Jef- 
 ferson, who themselves believe in the divinity of 
 Christ, will probably refuse to accept this view, 
 though they find themselves without sufficient evi- 
 dence conclusively to confute it. 
 
 Jefferson, in his later years, became much con- 
 cerned about the proper historical presentation of 
 his times, and of the part played by himself and 
 his party therein. He was probably the greatest 
 letter-writer who ever lived ; he always wrote freely, 
 and expressed himself vigorously. The latter part 
 of his life was made a burden by his rule to give a 
 full and sufficient answer to every civil letter which 
 he received. Inevitably he sometimes fell into in- 
 consistencies and errors, and sometimes said things 
 which he would afterward wish unsaid. At times 
 the thought of all that he had committed to paper 
 alarmed him, and he declared that “ the treacher- 
 ous practice some people have of publishing one’s 
 letters without leave ” should be made “ a peniten- 
 tiary felony.” Yet generally he regarded his own 
 
AT MONTICELLO: PERSONAL MATTERS 305 
 
 letters, “all preserved,” written between 1790 and 
 the close of his public life, as a great reservoir 
 from which correct information could be drawn by 
 posterity. He spoke with extreme acrimony of 
 Marshall’s “Life of Washington” as a purely par- 
 tisan production. He was very much disturbed at 
 the prospect of J. Q. Adams editing the writings 
 of John Adams. “ Doubtless,” he said, “ other 
 things are in preparation, unknown to us. On 
 our part we are depending on truth to make itself 
 known, while history is taking a contrary set which 
 may become too inveterate for correction.” Shortly 
 before his death he wrote to Madison : “ To myself 
 you have been a pillar of support through life. 
 Take care of me when dead.” All this anxiety 
 lest the posthumous historical literature of the Fed- 
 eralists should have an influence with posterity 
 superior to that of the Democrats, comes rather 
 queerly from one who had the “ Anas ” secretly 
 locked up in his desk. Yet his fears were justified 
 by the event ; the Federalists have to this day been 
 more successful than the Republicans in getting 
 their side forcibly and plausibly before the reading 
 public. 
 
 The weaknesses of old age crept over Jefferson 
 very gradually, as they are wont to do over sound 
 and vigorous men. He had great dread of a help- 
 less, and especially of an imbecile, senility, and 
 watched for signs of mental decay with an almost 
 morbid apprehensiveness. Certainly he suspected 
 more symptoms of this evil than really existed ; 
 
30G 
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 for though inevitably the vigor of his intellect be- 
 came impaired in his extreme years, yet the clear- 
 ness of his mind remained even until the weakness 
 of the closing hours began to deprive him of all 
 knowledge of things earthly. There is very little 
 complaining, at least in the published letters writ- 
 ten in his last years ; but there is a certain air of 
 sombreness and melancholy. He could not well 
 find fault with the career which had been allotted 
 to him ; but he could hardly recognize cheerfully 
 that his usefulness was over, his authority a thing 
 of the past, himself, while still alive, almost a char- 
 acter of history. His power had been too great to 
 be cheerfully laid down. He appears to have been 
 resigned, courageous, tranquil, and yet one gets 
 the idea that as he drifted away from active affairs 
 he was not happy, and that death must have lost 
 its terrors for him some time before it actually 
 came. The winter of 1826 found him evidently 
 fast breaking. In the middle of March he made 
 his will. In the spring we hear of him reading in 
 the Bible and the Greek tragedies ; but he was 
 not much longer able to do even this. As the 4th 
 of July, 1826, approached he was known by him- 
 self, and by all the affectionate family circle gath- 
 ered around him, to be dying. He expressed a 
 strong desire to live until that day should dawn ; 
 yet he seemed so weak, and the last laggard hours 
 moved so slowly that his friends, to whom this 
 wish of his seemed to have such a sanctity that 
 they could not bear to have him disappointed, even 
 
AT MONTICELLO : PERSONAL MATTERS 307 
 
 in the almost unconscious hour of departure, feared 
 that he would not endure so long. But life ebbed 
 slowly from that strong frame. It was nearly one 
 o’clock on that great day when he expired. John 
 Adams died at Quincy a few hours later, with the 
 words, “Thomas Jefferson still survives,” strug- 
 gling from his lips at the moment before they 
 became silent forever. The triple coincidence of 
 the two deaths and the day is more singular than 
 anything else of the kind in history. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Adams, Abigail, letter of Jefferson 
 to, concerning removal of J. Q. 
 Adams from office, 199. 
 
 Adams, John, on committee to draft 
 Declaration of Independence, 29 ; 
 his statement concerning Jefferson’s 
 authorship, 29 ; joins with the Lees 
 to oppose Washington, 31 ; leads 
 debate in favor of Declaration of 
 Independence, 33 ; criticises De- 
 claration for lack of originality, 35 ; 
 on peace commission, 66 ; commis- 
 sioned to make treaties of com- 
 merce, 70 ; minister to England, 
 70, 72 ; attacked by Jefferson as 
 a monarchist, 114; writes “Dis- 
 courses of Davila,” 117 ; has misun- 
 derstanding with Jefferson over 
 them, US ; Federalist candidate for 
 President, 154 ; his election endan- 
 gered by lack of party harmony, 
 155 ; his inauguration, 157 ; at- 
 tempts of Jefferson to win over, 
 158 ; consults with Jefferson con- 
 cerning French mission, 158, 159 ; 
 suddenly ceases to consult with 
 him, 159 ; angered at French in- 
 sults, 160 ; wishing to keep peace, 
 sends a commission, 161 ; announces 
 failure of mission, 168 ; loses his 
 head over X Y Z affair, 168 ; 
 ruins Federalist party by sending a 
 new French mission, 171 ; defeated 
 in election of 1S00, 178 ; makes 
 midnight appointments, 186 ; avoids 
 Jefferson’s inauguration, 187 ; de- 
 nounced by Jefferson for midnight 
 appointments, 195 ; his power as 
 leader inferior to that of Jefferson, 
 235 ; becomes reconciled with Jef- 
 ferson, 291 ; his remark on Jeffer- 
 son while dying, 307. 
 
 Adams, J. Q., writes, as “ Publicola,” 
 
 an attack upon Jefferson, 118 ; con« 
 duct toward office-holders com- 
 pared with that of Jefferson, 194 ; 
 turned put of office by Jefferson, 
 199 ; abandons Federalists to sup- 
 port embargo, 268 ; advises blind 
 following of Jefferson, 268 ; his ad- 
 ministration condemned by Jeffer- 
 son, 293 ; his edition of his father’s 
 works dreaded by Jefferson, 305. 
 
 Alien Act, passed, 172. 
 
 Ambuscade captures the Grange, 135. 
 
 “ Anas,” written by Jefferson, their 
 character, 98, 99, 102, 291, 305. 
 
 Arnold, Benedict, vain attempt of 
 Jefferson to kidnap, 58. 
 
 Bank, National, debate in cabinet 
 over, 107, 108. 
 
 “Belinda,” love affair of Jefferson 
 with, 8. 
 
 Bishop, Samuel, his appointment to 
 office by Jefferson criticised by 
 Federalists, 199. 
 
 Bonaparte, Napoleon, plans coloniza- 
 tion in Louisiana, 217 ; rejects 
 American offers to buy New Or- 
 leans, 217 ; abandons colonial 
 schemes and offers to sell all Lou- 
 isiana, 218 ; his career puts an 
 end to Jefferson’s French partisan- 
 ship, 243 ; issues Berlin and Milan 
 decrees, 263 ; indifferent to em- 
 bargo, 272 ; seizes American ships, 
 278. 
 
 Bordeaux, Archbishop of, invites 
 Jefferson to assist in drawing up a 
 constitution for France, 77. 
 
 Botetourt, Lord, dissolves House of 
 Burgesses, 16. 
 
 Burgesses, House of. See Legisla- 
 ture. 
 
 Burke, Edmund, emends and prints 
 
310 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Jefferson’s “ Summary View,” etc., 
 19. 
 
 Burr, Aaron, minor leader of Demo- 
 crats, 155 ; manages party in New 
 York, 176 ; receives equal vote with 
 Jefferson in election of 1800, 178 ; 
 not popular with Democrats, 181; 
 intrigues with Federalists in Con- 
 gress to be made President, 181, 
 182 ; fails and ruins his reputation, 
 184 ; contrast with Jefferson, 184, 
 185 ; magnanimous letter of Jeffer- 
 son to, 184 ; not renominated for 
 Vice-President, 239 ; anger of his 
 followers, 241 ; kills Hamilton, 249 ; 
 plots conquest in the Southwest, 
 249 ; his trial, 249-254 ; supported 
 by Federalists, 250 ; escapes trial in 
 Ohio, 253. 
 
 Burwell, Judy, flirtation of Jefferson 
 with, 8. 
 
 Caermarthen, Marquis op, his eva- 
 sive attitude toward Adams and 
 Jefferson, 72. 
 
 Callender, James T., refugee from 
 England, aided by Jefferson, 200, 
 201 ; attacks Washington and the 
 Federalists, 201 ; punished under 
 Sedition Act, 201 ; released by Jef- 
 ferson, 202 ; refused postmaster- 
 ship of Richmond by Jefferson, 202 ; 
 slanders Jefferson, 202, 203 ; ap- 
 plauded by Federalists, 203 ; action 
 of Judge Chase at his trial, 232. 
 
 Canada, its conquest looked forward 
 to by Jefferson, 287, 289. 
 
 Canning, George, tries to deceive 
 Jefferson, as to Orders in Council, 
 266 ; condemns his recommendation 
 of embargo, 267 ; makes delusive 
 and sarcastic remarks on embargo, 
 277, 278. 
 
 Carmichael, William, instructed by 
 Jefferson to secure from Spain nav- 
 igation of the Mississippi, 206. 
 
 Carr, Peter, letter of Jefferson to, on 
 religion, 40. 
 
 Carr, Dabney, his children adopted 
 by Jefferson, his brother-in-law, 65. 
 
 Cary, Colonel, entertains Jefferson, 
 
 66 . 
 
 Chase, Samuel,- character and Fed- 
 
 eralist partisanship as judge, 231, 
 232 ; impeached by Democrats, 232 ; 
 slightness of their charges, 232*233 ; 
 attack instigated by Jefferson, 233, 
 234 ; triumphant in trial before 
 Senate, 234. 
 
 Chatham, Lord, on ability of Conti- 
 nental Congress, 23. 
 
 Chesapeake, attacked by Leopard, 
 264-267. 
 
 Church establishment, attacked by 
 Jefferson, 40 ; eventually abolished, 
 41. 
 
 Civil service, Jefferson’s theory and 
 practice in its administration, 194- 
 200 . 
 
 Clarke, George Rogers, captures Colo- 
 nel Hamilton, 54. 
 
 Clay, Henry, his relations with 
 Wythe, 7. 
 
 Clinton, George, minor leader of Demo- 
 crats, not available as a presidential 
 candidate, 155 ; replaces Burr as 
 candidate for vice-presidency, 239 ; 
 elected, 241. 
 
 Committees of Correspondence, estab- 
 lished in Virginia, 17. 
 
 Constitution of the United States, 
 views of Jefferson concerning its 
 adoption, 84-86 ; attitude of Hamil- 
 ton concerning, 104, 113 ; division 
 of parties over its relation to Bank, 
 107 ; attitude of Jefferson toward, 
 125, 205 ; strained by Alien and Se- 
 dition Acts, 172 ; threatened at time 
 of election of Jefferson, 178-180 ; 
 violated in purchase of Louisiana, 
 218, 223, 227 ; justification of the act, 
 226-229 ; its amendment desired by 
 Jefferson, 228 ; its relation to Mis- 
 souri Compromise, 293 ; to inter- 
 nal improvements, 294. 
 
 Congress, Continental, proposed by 
 Virginia, 18 ; its character accord- 
 ing to Chatham, 23 ; issues mani- 
 festo after Bunker Hill, 24 ; replies 
 to Lord North, 25 ; ftfels necessity 
 for defining its status, 28 ; debates 
 independence, 28, 29 ; appoints 
 committee to draw up a Declara- 
 tion, 29 ; factions in, 30, 31 ; adopts 
 resolution of independence, 31, 32 ; 
 debates and adopts the Declaration, 
 
INDEX 
 
 311 
 
 32-34 ; decline in character in 1783, 
 67 ; ratifies treaty of peace, 67 ; 
 appoints a permanent committee of 
 States, 67, 68 ; rejects clause prohib- 
 iting slavery in new Territories, 69. 
 
 Congress of the United States, strug- 
 gle in, over assumption of state 
 debts, 88, S9 ; influenced by bargain 
 of Hamilton and Jefferson, 90 ; 
 Hamilton's bribery of, described by 
 Jefferson, 109, 111, 113 ; rejects 
 proposed non-importation from 
 England, 149 ; debates Jefferson’s 
 report on commerce, 149 ; ratifies 
 Jay treaty, 152 ; House tries to de- 
 feat it, 152 ; prepares for war with 
 France, 168; passes Alien and Sedi- 
 tion Acts, 172 ; struggle in, over 
 election of Jefferson, 17S-1S3 ; be- 
 comes overwhelmingly Democratic, 
 193 ; gives Jefferson money and au- 
 thority to purchase New Orleans, 
 214 ; ratifies purchase of Louisi- 
 ana, 222 ; impeaches Pickering, 230, 
 231 ; impeaches Chase, 232-234 ; 
 how controlled by Jefferson, 235, 
 236 ; supports Jefferson’s policy 
 toward Spain, 247 ; legislates con- 
 cerning treason, 254 ; passes non- 
 importation act, 257 ; suspends it, 
 262 ; adopts embargo, 268 ; resolves 
 to maintain it, 278 ; passes bill for 
 extra session to settle embargo, 
 279 ; finally repeals embargo, 2S0 ; 
 buys Jefferson’s library, 299. 
 
 Convention of Virginia. See Legis- 
 lature. 
 
 Cornwallis, Lord, defeats Gates at 
 Camden and threatens Virginia, 55 ; 
 forced to retreat, 56 ; plunders one 
 of Jefferson’s farms, 61 ; surren- 
 ders, 62. 
 
 Cuba, its annexation discussed by 
 Jefferson, 287. 
 
 Deane, Selas, on French mission, 66. 
 
 Declaration of Independence, its pre- 
 paration, 29 ; reasons for choice of 
 Jefferson as author, 30, 31 ; de- 
 bate over, 32-34 ; its merits and 
 defects, 34, 35. 
 
 Democratic party, its origin, 97, 115, 
 116 ; Jefferson’s theory of, 117 ; its 
 
 platform as described by Jefferson, 
 122-126 ; its organization and name, 
 129, 132 ; applauds French Revolu- 
 tion, 131 ; welcomes Genet, 135 ; 
 damaged by Genet’s excesses, 141- 
 144 ; regains favor after Jay treaty, 
 151 ; hopes success in 1796, 153 ; 
 lack of leaders in, besides Jefferson, 
 155 ; damaged by conduct of France 
 in X Y Z affair, 160, 167, 168 ; ap- 
 proves of Kentucky Resolutions, 
 172 ; confident before election of 
 1800, 176 ; organized by Jefferson, 
 176, 177 ; plans extrarconstitutional 
 means to defeat Federalist schemes, 
 180 ; pleased with Jefferson’s sim- 
 plicity, 189 ; rejoices at acquisition 
 of Louisiana, 222 ; not concerned to 
 sanction it by constitutional amend- 
 ment, 228 ; not more democratic in 
 government than Federalists, 235 ; 
 tends to obey a leader, 236 ; as- 
 sumes credit for results of Federal- 
 ist policy, 238 ; renominates Jeffer- 
 son and abandons Burr for Clinton, 
 239 ; growth of factions in, 241 ; 
 carries election of 1800, 241 ; divi- 
 sion in, caused by Randolph, 247, 
 248 ; continues to gain in elections, 
 260, 265 ; supports embargo, 274, 
 275 ; finally repeals it, 280. 
 
 Dickinson, John, writes substitute for 
 Jefferson’s manifesto of Congress 
 after Bunker Hill, 24 ; incorporates 
 some of Jefferson’s work, 25. 
 
 Diplomatic history, Genet’s mission 
 to the United States, 132-142 ; neu- 
 trality proclamation, 133, 134 ; 
 Grange episode, 135, 138 ; excesses 
 and dismissal of Genet, 140-142 ; 
 Jay treaty, 151 ; dealings with 
 France, 160 ; X Y Z affair, 167, 168, 
 171 ; relations with England, 255- 
 257 ; the Leander affair, 257 ; Mon- 
 roe’s treaty with England in 1806, 
 262 ; Leopard affair, 264, 266, 267 *, 
 negotiations respecting embargo and 
 Orders in Council, 277, 278. 
 
 Duane, William, letter of Jefferson 
 to, declining to accept office, 289. 
 
 Dunmore, Earl of, dissolves House of 
 Burgesses, 17. 
 
 Dupont de Nemours, letter of Jeffer- 
 
312 
 
 INDEX 
 
 eon to, on reasons for buying New 
 Orleans, 216. 
 
 Embargo, recommended by Jefferson, 
 266 ; criticised as premature by 
 England and Federalists, 267 ; 
 adopted by Congress, 268 ; discus- 
 sion of its value, 268-275; at first 
 strongly favored, 269 ; Jefferson’s 
 arguments for, 269 ; its effect on 
 United States, 271 ; its slight effect 
 on England, 271, 272 ; innocuous 
 to France, 272 ; inconsistent with 
 Democratic principles, 273, 274 ; 
 responsibility of Jefferson for, 274, 
 275 ; increasing violence of opposi- 
 tion to, 276, 279 ; remarks of Can- 
 ning upon, 277, 278 ; fails to influ- 
 ence England, 277 ; its possible re- 
 peal considered by Jefferson, 279 ; 
 repealed by Congress, 280 ; failure 
 as a measure of offense, 280, 281. 
 
 England, attitude toward colonies af- 
 ter Gaspge affair, 16, 17 ; its legal 
 relation to colonies, 19, 20 ; prac- 
 tices policy of ravaging colonies, 61 ; 
 mission of Adams and Jefferson to, 
 in 1786, 72 ; description of its bit- 
 terness against America by Jeffer- 
 son, 73-76 ; folly of its policy, 75, 
 76 ; its war with France, 132 ; re- 
 joicings of Jefferson at its difficul- 
 ties, 136, 161 ; retaliation against, 
 urged by Jefferson, 149 ; objections 
 of Jefferson to its possible seizure 
 of Spanish colonies, 209 ; alliance 
 with, suggested by Jefferson if 
 France hold Louisiana, 211 ; friendly 
 feeling of Jefferson for, 243, 244, 
 245 ; refuses to admit commercial 
 neutrality, 245, 255 ; commits out- 
 rages on American merchantmen, 
 255, 256, 257 ; non-importation act 
 against, adopted, 257 ; would pro- 
 bably have fought in 1807 as well as 
 1812, 258 ; Monroe’s rejected treaty 
 with, in 1807, 262 ; determines to 
 ruin American commerce, 263 ; tries 
 to deceive United States in Leopard 
 affair by holding back Orders in 
 Council, 266, 267 ; not injured but 
 nelped by embargo, 271-273, 277, 
 278 ; refuses to modify Orders in 
 
 Council, 278 ; concessions to, by 
 Madison, opposed by Jefferson, 278 ; 
 its policy toward America in 1812 
 denounced by Jefferson, 290, 291. 
 
 Entails, abolished in Virginia, 38. 
 
 Fauquier, Francis, friendship with 
 Jefferson, 7. 
 
 Federalist party, its organization by 
 Hamilton, 101 ; accused by Jeffer- 
 son of monarchical schemes, 101, 
 102, 111, 162, 163 ; absurdity of this 
 attack, 103, 104 ; accused of cor- 
 ruption, 105, 106, 109, 111, 123, 
 163 ; accuses Jefferson of cowardice 
 and backbiting, 126, 127 ; called 
 “ Anglomaniacs ” by Jefferson, 135 ; 
 damaged by Jay treaty, 151 ; said 
 by Jefferson to be upheld by "Wash- 
 ington’s influence alone, 153, 157 ; 
 nominates Adams and Pinckney, 
 154 ; fails through dissensions to 
 elect Pinckney, 155 ; abundance of 
 leaders in, 155 ; strengthened by 
 aggressive conduct of France, 160 ; 
 denounces Jefferson for Mazzei let- 
 ter, 164, 165 ; urges war with 
 France, 169 ; passes Alien and Sedi- 
 tion Acts, 172 ; slanders Jefferson 
 in presidential campaign, 174 ; de- 
 feated by dissensions, 175, 177, 178 ; 
 tries by technicality to defeat elec- 
 tion of Jefferson, 178 ; proposes 
 unconstitutional devices, 179 ; in- 
 trigues with Burr, 181, 182 ; 
 
 brought to elect Jefferson by Ham- 
 ilton, 182, 183 ; asserts that Jef- 
 ferson made pledges, 183 ; makes 
 midnight appointments, 186 ; Jeffer- 
 son’s hopes of reconciling its mem- 
 bers, 190, 191, 192 ; its members 
 not dismissed from office, as a rule, 
 by Jefferson, 194, 195 ; applauds 
 Callender’s slanders on Jefferson, 
 202, 204 ; tries to force war with 
 France on issue of Mississippi navi- 
 gation, 213, 214 ; objects to pur- 
 chase of Louisiana, 219; unable to 
 force discussion, 222 ; its attacks 
 ignored by Jefferson, 227 ; its con- 
 trol of federal courts feared by 
 Jefferson, 230 ; supports Pickering 
 and Chase when impeached, 230- 
 
INDEX 
 
 313 
 
 234 ; shrinks to a small faction, 239 ; 
 badly defeated in election of 1801, 
 241 ; supports Burr against “ perse- 
 cution ” of Jefferson, 250, 251 ; as- 
 sails Jefferson’s rejection of Mon- 
 roe’s treaty, 2G3 ; justifies English 
 in Leopard affair. 264 ; objects to 
 Jefferson's recommendation of em- 
 bargo, 267 ; opposes passage of 
 embargo, 26S ; attacks embargo as 
 tyranny, 273 ; and as anti-English, 
 275 ; plans secession, 279 ; said by 
 Jefferson to have forced repeal of 
 embargo, 2S0 ; its influence in writ- 
 ing history dreaded by Jefferson, 
 305. 
 
 Fenno’s “ Gazette,” Federalist organ, 
 119. 
 
 Financial history, adoption of Ham- 
 ilton’s measures, SS, 89 ; their char- 
 acter, 94, 95 ; their effect upon 
 people, 105, 106; speculation, 106, 
 10S, 112 ; economy and financial 
 success of Jefferson’s administra- 
 tion, 237 ; extinction of debt urged 
 by Jefferson, 28S. 
 
 Florida, its acquisition expected by 
 Jefferson, 287. 
 
 Fox, Charles James, forms a Whig 
 cabinet, 257 ; friendly attitude of 
 Jefferson toward, 257, 262. 
 
 France, mission of Jefferson to, 70, 
 76-86 ; attitude toward United 
 States after peace, 71 ; revolution 
 in, 76-78 ; connection of Jefferson 
 with, 77 ; relations to, at outbreak 
 of war between it and England, 132, 
 133 ; friendly policy of Jefferson 
 toward, 142, 148, 149 ; insolent con- 
 duct of, in Adams's administration, 
 160 ; demands satisfaction, 160 ; 
 mission of Marshall, Gerry, Pinck- 
 ney to, 161, 167, 168 ; not held by 
 Jefferson to be guilty in X Y Z 
 affair, 169, 170 ; makes overtures 
 for reconciliation, 171 ; war with, 
 avoided by Adams, 171 ; suspected 
 of intention to regain Louisiana, 
 209; gains Louisiana from Spain, 
 210 ; sells it to United States, 218 ; 
 decline of Jefferson’s sympathy for, 
 243 ; refuses to admit neutrality, 
 255, 263 ; indifferent to embargo, 
 
 272 ; confiscates American vessels, 
 278. 
 
 Franklin, Benjamin, in Continental 
 Congress, 23 ; connection with De- 
 claration of Independence, 29, 30 ; 
 consoles Jefferson during debate, 
 33 ; remark on signing Declaration, 
 34 ; letter of Jefferson to, on change 
 of government in Virginia, 36 ; on 
 foreign and peace commissions, 66, 
 70 ; leaves for America, 70 ; per- 
 sonal morality compared to Jeffer- 
 son’s, 204. 
 
 French Revolution, connection of Jef- 
 ferson with, 77-79 ; his sympathy 
 for it, 77, 79, SO, 87, 131, 137 ; ab- 
 horred by Hamiltonians, 130; ap- 
 plauded by masses in United States, 
 131. 
 
 Freneau, Philip, appointed to clerk- 
 ship by Jefferson, 119 ; establishes 
 “ National Gazette ” and attacks 
 administration, 119 ; not interfered 
 with by Jefferson, 120 ; prints affi- 
 davit that Jefferson has no connec- 
 tion with his paper, 121 ; Jefferson 
 explains his connection with, 124, 
 125. 
 
 Fries, action of Judge Chase at his 
 trial, 232. 
 
 Gallatin, Albert, letter of Jefferson 
 to, on Hamilton, 94 ; a minor leader 
 of Democrats, 155 ; urged by Jeffer- 
 son to reduce debt, 2S8 ; upheld by 
 Jefferson in 1811, 288. 
 
 Gasp^e, its burning and results, 16. 
 
 Gates, Horatio, defeated at Camden, 
 55. ^ 
 
 Genet, Edmond, arrives in America, 
 132 ; his purpose to make United 
 States aid France, 133 ; equips pri- 
 vateers, 135 ; his reception by Dem- 
 ocrats, 135 ; unwillingly rebuked 
 by Jefferson for infringing neutral- 
 ity laws, 138 ; makes extravagant 
 claims, 139 ; ignores neutrality, 139, 
 141 ; angers Jefferson by his folly, 
 141 ; his recall demanded, 142 ; ac- 
 cuses Jefferson of duplicity, 142. 
 
 George III., Jefferson’s opinion of, 
 27 ; anti-slavery attack on, in De- 
 claration of Independence, struck 
 
314 
 
 INDEX 
 
 out, 32 ; his treatment of Adams 
 and Jefferson in London, 72. 
 
 Gerry, Elbridge, signs Declaration of 
 Independence, 34 ; suggested as en- 
 voy to France by Adams, 159 ; urged 
 to go by Jefferson, 161 ; in X Y Z 
 episode, 167 ; denounced for re- 
 maining in Paris after it, 167. 
 
 Giles, W. B., his resolutions of cen- 
 sure on Hamilton approved by Jef- 
 ferson, 109, 110 ; defends Jeffer- 
 son’s report on commerce, 149. 
 
 Grange, controversy with Genet over 
 its capture, 135, 136, 138. 
 
 Greene, Gen. Nathanael, aided by Jef- 
 ferson in 1780, 52. 
 
 Gunboats, built by Jefferson, their 
 character, 259, 260. 
 
 Hamilton, Alexander, his success in 
 the cabinet, 88 ; seeks aid from Jef- 
 ferson in carrying assumption of 
 state debts, 89, 90 ; makes agree- 
 ment to trade capital for debts, 90 ; 
 later Said by Jefferson to have 
 deceived him, 91 ; his measures not 
 at first comprehended by Jefferson, 
 92 ; his financial methods called a 
 “ puzzle ” by Jefferson, 94, 95 ; his 
 schemes carried through before Jef- 
 ferson becomes hostile, 95 ; at first 
 friendly with Jefferson, 96 ; his 
 centralizing policy detected by Jef- 
 ferson, 97 ; grows personally hostile 
 to Jefferson, 98 ; called a monarch- 
 ist by Jefferson, 101, 102 ; and an 
 enemy of the Constitution, 1Q4; 
 suspected of organizing corruption, 
 106 ; argues in favor of. bank, 107 ; 
 his methods of bribery described by 
 Jefferson, 110, 111-115, 124; his 
 followers compared to Jefferson’s, 
 116; his report on manufactures, 
 113 ; alleged remarks of, on Consti- 
 tution, 113, 123 ; charged with wish- 
 ing to make debt perpetual, 110, 
 112, 124 ; annoyed at Freneau’s at- 
 tacks, 120 ; attacks Jefferson under 
 title of “An American,” 121; ac- 
 cuses him of disloyalty to Constitu- 
 tion, 121 ; refuses to notice Freneau, 
 121 ; accused of intermeddling in 
 Jefferson’s department, 123, 140; 
 
 praised by Federalists for not at- 
 tacking Jefferson to Washington, 
 126, 127 ; too strong for Jefferson 
 in cabinet, 128 ; dislikes French 
 Revolution, 130, 131 ; relies on 
 wealthy and intelligent classes, 131 ; 
 favors England, 133 ; called “ An- 
 glomaniac ” by Jefferson, 135,136; 
 as “ Camillus ” defends Jay treaty, 
 151 ; his influence dreaded by Jef- 
 ferson, 151 ; his loss of control over 
 Federalists foreseen by Jefferson, 
 157 ; exercises influence to prevent 
 election of Burr in place of Jeffer- 
 son, 182 ; exposed by Callender, 
 201, 203 ; personal morality com- 
 pared with Jefferson’s, 204 ; credit 
 for results of his financial policy 
 claimed by Jefferson, 237, 238. 
 
 Hamilton, Colonel Henry, captured 
 and put in irons by Jefferson, 54 ; 
 his release advised by Washington, 
 54. 
 
 Hancock, John, remarks on signing 
 Declaration of Independence, 34. 
 
 Harrison, Benjamin, signs Declara- 
 tion of Independence, 34. 
 
 Hay, George, counsel for government 
 in Burr treason case, 252, 253. 
 
 Henry, Patrick, his friendship with 
 Jefferson, 15 ; inspires him by his 
 eloquence, 15 ; neglects to present 
 Jefferson’s resolutions to conven- 
 tion, 18, 19 ; career as first gov- 
 ernor of Virginia, 51, 52, 54. 
 
 Impeachment, of Pickering, 230, 231 ; 
 of Chase, 231-234. 
 
 Independence, of colonies, disclaimed 
 by Jefferson, 25, 27 ; attitude of 
 public men toward it, 26 ; its pos- 
 sibility foreseen by Jefferson, 27. 
 
 Internal improvements, suggested as 
 advisable by Jefferson, 261 ; later 
 denounced by him as unconstitu- 
 tional, 294. 
 
 Jackson, Andrew, compared with Jef- 
 ferson, 132, 194. 
 
 Jacobins, name assumed by Ameri- 
 cans, 137 ; their massacres in France 
 condoned by Jefferson, 137. 
 
 Jay, John, superseded by Jefferson as 
 
INDEX 
 
 315 
 
 document writer of Congress, 24; 
 an opponent of R. H. Lee in Con- 
 gress, 31 ; on peace commission, 66 ; 
 acts as temporary secretary of state, 
 SS ; liis treaty condemned by Jeffer- 
 son, 151 ; proposed as president pro 
 tempore in 1S00 to defeat Jefferson, 
 179, 180. 
 
 Jefferson, Martha, consoles Jefferson 
 for death of his wife, 65 ; at school 
 in Paris, 70. 
 
 Jefferson, Mary, second daughter of 
 Jefferson, 65. 
 
 Jefferson, Peter, father of Thomas Jef- 
 ferson, character and career, 3,4; 
 connection with Randolph family, 
 3 ; his estates, 3 ; death, 4. 
 
 Jefferson, Thomas, birth, 2; ancestry, 
 2, 3 ; appearance in youth, 4 ; taste 
 for sport and music, 4, 5 ; studies 
 at William and Mary College, 5 ; his 
 habits of life there, 5 ; his intellec- 
 tual interests, 5, 6 ; reads law with 
 Wythe, 6, 7 ; his friends, 7 ; his 
 youthful correspondence and love 
 affairs, 7, 8 ; marries, 9 ; gains pro- 
 perty, 8, 9 ; succeeds at the bar, 9, 
 10 ; love of farming/ 10-13 ; high 
 estimate of its place In society, 10, 
 11 ; dreads cities and" artificers, 11, 
 12 ; keen observation of agriculture, 
 12 ; desires to make innovations, 
 13 ; his utilitarian imagination, 13 ; 
 youthful tendency toward roman- 
 ticism and Ossian, 13, 14 ; inti- 
 mate with Henry, 15 ; impressed by 
 Henry’s speech against Stamp Act, 
 15. 
 
 Revolutionary Leader in Virginia. 
 Elected to House of Burgesses, 16 ; 
 draws resolutions in reply to gov- 
 ernor’s speech, 16 ; signs non-impor- 
 tation agreement, 16 ; reelected, 16 ; 
 joins with radicals in appointing a 
 committee of correspondence, 17 ; 
 distrusts old leaders, 17 ; joins in 
 passing resolution to appoint fast 
 day after Boston Port Bill, 18 ; 
 elected to colonial convention, 18; 
 describes method of leadership, 
 18 n. ; his draft of instructions for 
 Virginian members of Congress not 
 approved by Henry, 19 ; birc pre- , 
 
 sented by Randolph, ^dopted, and 
 printed, 19 ; his pamphlet circu- 
 lated in England, 19 ; his radical 
 argument against parliamentary su- 
 premacy, 19, 20 ; considered a 
 
 traitor in England, 21 ; his position 
 too radical for Virginia, 21 ; elected 
 alternate delegate to Continental 
 Congress, 21 ; remains in Virginia 
 to draft reply to North’s “ concilia- 
 tory proposition,” 21, 22. 
 
 Member of Continental Congress. 
 His reputation as a writer, 23 ; not 
 a debater, 23, 24 ; supersedes Jay as 
 document-writer, 24 ; drafts mani- 
 festo after Bunker Hill, 24 ; his 
 paper revised by Dickinson, 24, 25 ; 
 writes reply of Congress to Lord 
 North’s “ conciliatory proposition,” 
 
 25 ; reelected to Congress, 25 ; fore- 
 sees but dreads independence, 26 ; 
 states his position in letter to Ran- 
 dolph, 26, 27 ; holds George III. 
 responsible for situation, 27, 28 ; 
 states reason for postponing debate 
 on Lee’s resolutions of independ- 
 ence, 29 ; elected chairman of com- 
 mittee to draft Declaration, 29 ; his 
 authorship, 29, 30 ; selected instead 
 of Lee, because of his fitness and 
 absence of enemies in Congress, 30, 
 
 31 ; sensitive during debate over 
 the Declaration, 33 ; describes pro- 
 saic reasons for closure of debate, 
 33, 34 ; charged with lack of origi- 
 nality, 35 ; his defense, 35 ; declines 
 reelection to Congress, 36. 
 
 Member of Virginia Legislature. \ 
 Desires to reform colonial govern- ) 
 l/ment, 30 ; despribes ease of change f 
 in Virginia/4>6, 37 ; importance of \ 
 his influence at this timefsT ; brings / 
 in bill to establish courts, £>$r, in- ) 
 troduces bill abolishing entail, 38/7 
 follows it witlj, one against primo-/ 
 geniture, SS^/his motives, 39 ; hatec 
 by aristocrats, 39 ; his religious at 
 titude, 40; attacks' the Establishes 
 Church, 41 ; defeated at the outset 
 succeeds eventually, 41 ; acts asV 
 representative of dissenting lower l 
 classes, 41, 42 ; his ability to detect/ 
 popular feeling, 42 ; chairman of 
 
316 
 
 INDEX 
 
 committee to revise laws of Vir- 
 ginia, 42, 43 ; proposes improved 
 naturalization, penal code, and pop- 
 ular education, 43 ; final carrying 
 out of liis proposals, 43, 44 ; opposes 
 slavery, ‘^^RTpproposes a plan for 
 emancipation and deportation, 44, 
 45 ; his ideas too visionary, 46 ; con- 
 siders free coexistence of races im- 
 possible, 46, 47, 48 ; dreads future 
 revolution, 4S ; but declines to take 
 personal steps against slavery, 48. 
 49 ; introduces bill to prohibit slave 
 trade, 49. 
 
 Governor of Virginia. Elected 
 governor over Page, 51 ; character 
 of his administration, 51, 52 ; finds 
 State exhausted, 52 ; calls for re- 
 cruits for Greene, 52 ; his property 
 impressed, 53 ; unjustly blamed for 
 sending troops South, 53 ; confines 
 Colonel Hamilton in irons, 54 ; 
 threatens retaliation of British bru- 
 tality upon prisoners, 54 ; unable 
 to procure arms for defense of 
 State, 55 ; inactive in face of threat- 
 ened invasion, 56 ; alarmed at at- 
 tack, tries in vain to assemble mili- 
 tia, 57 ; not a military success, 57 ; 
 tries to kidnap Arnold, 58 ; discour- 
 aged at situation, resolves to decline 
 reelection, 58 ; opposes plan to name 
 a dictator, 59 ; obliged to hold over 
 in default of a successor, 59 ; threat- 
 ened by Tarleton, his cool conduct, 
 59, 60 ; angered at imputation of 
 cowardice, 60 ; his farm devastated 
 by British, 61 ; threatened with le- 
 gislative investigation, 62; secures 
 election to legislature and demands 
 rehabilitation, 62 ; finally thanked 
 by resolution, 63 ; praised by Wash- 
 ington, 63 ; his actual deserts, 63 ; 
 determines to retire, 64 ; writes 
 “Notes on Virginia,” 64 ; criticised 
 for not attending legislature, 64; 
 rebuked by Madison and Monroe, 
 64 ; afflicted by death of wife, 65 ; 
 his children, 65 ; adopts children 
 of brother-in-law, 65 ; his affection 
 for them, 66 ; declines nomination 
 as envoy to France, 66 ; and also 
 place on peace commission, 66 ; ac- ' 
 
 cepts second appointment but does 
 not leave America, 67. 
 
 Member of Congress of Con feeler* 
 ation. Elected to Congress, 67 ; 
 secures ratification of treaty of 
 peace by nine States, 67 ; arranges 
 ceremonial of Washington’s resig- 
 nation, 67 ; proposes a committee 
 of States to act during recess, 67 ; 
 criticises impracticable financial 
 scheme of Morris, 68 ; presents 
 Virginia’s cession of Northwestern 
 claims, 68 ; draws report for gov- 
 ernment of Northwest, 68 ; sug- 
 gests fantastic names for new 
 States, 69. 
 
 Minister to France. Appointed to 
 aid Franklin and Adams in negotia- 
 ting treaties of commerce, 70; his 
 life in Paris, 70 ; appointed resident 
 minister, 71 ; tries to secure com- 
 mercial advantages, 71 ; irritated 
 by creditors of the United States, 
 71, 72 ; protests against payment 
 of tribute to African corsairs, 72 ; 
 makes diplomatic visit to London, 
 72 ; describes English hatred and 
 contempt for America, 73 ; angered 
 at disrepute of the States in Europe, 
 74 ; fears a renewal of war with 
 England, 74, 75 ; justice, in spite of 
 exaggeration, of his views, 75, 76 ; 
 admits ’excellence of English gov- 
 ernment, 76 ; his pleasant life in 
 France, 76 ; takes keen interest in 
 French Revolution, 77 ; friendly 
 with the liberal reformers, 77 ; re- 
 cognized as a “philosopher,” 77; 
 advises the National Assembly, 77, 
 78 ; abstains from too great inter- 
 ference, 78 ; compromised through 
 Lafayette, 78, 79 ; his political 
 views not formed in France, 79, 80 ; 
 but intensified by his experience, 
 80 ; longs for home, 80 ; idealizes 
 America in comparison with Eu- 
 rope, 81 ; approves of Shays’s rebel- 
 lion and rebellion in the abstract, 
 81, 82; writes in approval of “no 
 government,” 83 ; disapproves of 
 federal Constitution, 84 ; later ad- 
 vocates its ratification, 84, 85 ; re- 
 I joices at its adoption, 85 ; states his 
 
INDEX 
 
 317 
 
 position to be in the main favorable, 
 85, S6 ; his main objections, 86 ; 
 returns to Virginia, S7. 
 
 Secretary of State. Accepts Wash- 
 ington’s offer of secretaryship of 
 state, S7 ; enters office in 1790, 
 87 ; agrees to help Hamilton ar- 
 range a deal to save assumption of 
 state debts, 90 ; later regrets his 
 action, 90, 91 ; asserts that he was 
 outwitted by Hamilton, 91 ; untena- 
 bility of his claim of ignorance, 91, 
 92 ; yet he really fails to compre- 
 hend at the time the significance 
 of the measure, 92 ; his lack of 
 financial ability, 93 ; holds that no 
 public debt should outlast the gen- 
 eration creating it, 93, 94 ; accuses 
 Hamilton of purposely making his 
 schemes confused, 94, 95 ; his ina- 
 bility to criticise Hamilton’s mea- 
 sures specifically, 95 ; not looked 
 upon by Washington as antagonistic 
 to Hamilton, 96 ; with development 
 of Hamilton’s plans, begins to 
 dread their centralization, 97 ; or- 
 ganizes an opposition, 98 ; later 
 bitter personal relations with Ham- 
 ilton, 98 ; writes “ Anas ” to de- 
 fame memory of his enemies, 98, 
 99 ; his position as politician and 
 statesman, 100 ; an extreme demo- 
 crat, 100 ; called visionary and dis- 
 honest, 100 ; elements of*slyness in 
 his character, 100, 101 ; honesty of 
 his democracy, 101 ; abhors advo- 
 cates of strong government, 101 ; 
 dreads Hamilton as a monarchist, 
 101, 102 ; accuses entire cabinet of 
 desiring royalty, 102, 103 ; base- 
 lessness of his statement, 103 ; dis- 
 torts Washington’s defense of Ham- 
 ilton into an acknowledgment, 104 ; 
 probably deceives himself into be- 
 lieving his statements, 104, 105 ; 
 horrified at speculation caused by 
 Hamilton’s measures, 106 ; dislikes 
 military establishment and excise, 
 106 ; argues to Washington the un- 
 constitutionality of the bank, 107 ; 
 logic of his argument, 107 ; fails to 
 understand financial significance of 
 bank, 108 ; accuses Hamilton of 
 
 founding measures on corruption, 
 109 ; analyzes corrupt character of 
 Hamiltonian majority in House, 109 ; 
 sympathizes with Giles’s resolutions 
 of censure, 109, 110 ; suspects Ham- 
 ilton of trying to make national 
 debt perpetual, 110 ; writes to 
 Washington complaining of monar- 
 chical purposes of public finances, 
 111, 112 ; explains Hamilton’s 
 
 method of controlling House by a 
 corrupt squadron, 112, 113, 114 ; 
 attacks Hamilton’s report on man- 
 ufactures, 113 ; attacks Adams in 
 a letter to Washington, 114 ; de- 
 scribes monarchists to Mason, 
 Paine, and Lafayette, 114, 115 ; 
 relies on the mass of the people, 
 115 ; foresees success, 116 ; expects 
 to control the crowd, 116 ; does not 
 foresee results of democracy, 117 ; 
 involved in difficulties with Adams 
 over his introduction to Paine’s 
 “Rights of Man,” 118; tries to 
 soothe Adams, 118 ; appoints Fre- 
 neau to a clerkship, 119 ; accused by 
 Hamilton of responsibility for Fre- 
 neau’s paper, 120 ; disclaims it, but 
 approves paper, and refuses to in- 
 terfere with Freneau, 120 ; attacked 
 by Hamilton, as “ American,” 121 ; 
 exculpated by Freneau, 121 ; refuses 
 to reply, 122; replies to Washing- 
 ton’s appeal for concord, analysis of 
 his letter, 122-126 ; its honesty and 
 falsity, 126 ; accused of cowardice 
 and intrigue, 127 ; his action as nat- 
 ural and laudable as Hamilton’s, 
 127, 128 ; does not conceal senti- 
 ments, 128 ; unable to contend with 
 Hamilton in finance, 128 ; irritated 
 at Hamilton’s encroachments on his 
 field, 128 ; admitted leader of op- 
 position, 129 ; sympathizes with 
 French Revolution in spite of its 
 excesses, 130, 131 ; feels sure of vic- 
 tory on this issue over Federalists, 
 131, 132 ; wishes word “ neutrality ” 
 not employed in proclamation of 
 neutrality, 133; chagrined at Ran- 
 dolph’s drafting of proclamation, 
 134 ; angered at Randolph’s failure 
 always to uphold him, 134; com 
 
318 
 
 INDEX 
 
 demns proclamation, 134, 135 ; ap- 
 proves Genet’s behavior on arrival 
 in America, 135 ; calls Hamilton 
 “ Anglomaniac ” as well as mon- 
 archist, 135 ; rejoices in damage to 
 England, 136 ; and in success of 
 French armies, 137 ; approves of 
 Jacobins, 137 ; obliged to rebuke 
 Genet officially, 138, 139 ; rejoices 
 at terms of Genet’s commission, 
 138 ; urges prepayment of French 
 debts, 139, 140 ; rejoices at popular 
 French sympathy, 140 ; complains 
 of Hamilton’s efforts to enforce 
 neutrality, 140 ; begins to be an- 
 noyed by Genet’s actions, 141 ; 
 dreads that his excesses may cause 
 an anti-French reaction, 141 ; con- 
 demns him and agrees to demand 
 for his recall, 141, 142 ; accused by 
 Genet of duplicity, 142 ; continues 
 to favor France, 142 ; sagacity of 
 his conduct, 142 ; not more preju- 
 diced than Hamilton, 143 ; realizes 
 transitory character of Democratic 
 follies, 143 ; avoids condemning his 
 party and trusts to time, 144 ; after 
 reaction remains undamaged by any 
 errors, 144 ; weary of cabinet strife, 
 tries to resign, 145 ; persuaded by 
 Washington to delay, 145; unjustly 
 blamed for resigning, 145, 146. 
 
 In Retirement. Rejoices in re- 
 turn to farm life, 148 ; continues to 
 condemn England’s policy, 148, 149 ; 
 assails Senate for rejecting non- 
 importation bill, 149 ; his arguments 
 for preferring French to English 
 trade, 149 ; vexed at “ persecution ” 
 of democratic societies, 150 ; la- 
 ments Washington’s political errors 
 in condemning democratic clubs, 
 150 ; sympathizes with “ Whiskey 
 Insurrection,” 151 ; abhors Jay 
 treaty, 151 ; implores Madison to 
 oppose Hamilton’s “ Camillus ” pa- 
 pers, 151 ; considers Hamilton a 
 “ host in himself,” 152 ; favors at- 
 tempt to defeat Jay treaty in House, 
 152 ; feels certain that only Wash- 
 ington’s personality holds Federal- 
 ists together, 153 ; hopes for success 
 in presidential election, 153 ; Re- 
 
 publican candidate for President, 
 155 ; elected Vice-President over 
 Pinckney, 155. 
 
 Vice-President. Protests his un- 
 willingness to serve, 156 ; his osten- 
 tatious simplicity in accepting of- 
 fice, 157 ; feels sure of early success 
 of Republicans, 157 ; rejoices at 
 Washington’s withdrawal, 157 ; tries 
 to establish friendly relations with 
 Adams, 158 ; congratulates Adams 
 on defeat of Hamilton’s schemes, 
 158 ; consulted by Adams as to 
 French mission, 158, 159 ; declines 
 to go himself, 159 ; his relations 
 with Adams end abruptly, 159 ; 
 rumor that the failure to elect him 
 President would lead France to de- 
 clare war, 160 ; fears war with 
 France, 161 ; rejoices at Bonaparte’s 
 victories, 161 ; urges Gerry to go 
 on Freuch mission, 161, 162; dreads 
 monarchy as probable result of war, 
 162 ; describes political bitterness 
 of times, 162 ; his letter to Maz- 
 zei published, 162, 163 ; in it de- 
 scribes monarchical party, 163 ; de- 
 nounced by Federalists for tradu- 
 cing Washington, 164 ; denies that 
 he meant Washington, 164 ; apocry- 
 phal story of the quarrel, 164 ; does 
 not seem to have been unfair to 
 Washington, 165 ; underrates his 
 ability, 165 ; criticism of his con- 
 duct in not restraining Republican 
 newspaper attacks, 166 ; shocked at 
 X Y Z exposure, 169 ; does not lose 
 faith in France, 169 ; his honesty 
 of conviction, 169, 170 ; willing to 
 wait for time, 170 ; hopes that the 
 country will be overawed, 171 ; out- 
 raged by Alien and Sedition Acts, 
 i72^ writes Kentucky Resolutions, 
 p72 ; his position theoretical, not 
 practical, 172 ; condemns secession^ 
 173 ; expects a close election in 
 1800, 174 ; slandered during cam- 
 paign by Federalists, 174 ; his re- 
 ply, 174, 175 ; his mastery of Re- 
 publican party, 176 ; does not con- 
 template danger of a tie vote, 177, 
 178 ; his anxiety and fear of Feder- 
 alist coup d'etat , 178, 179; explains 
 
INDEX 
 
 319 
 
 what he would have done in case 
 Federalists prevented an election, 
 179 ; both threatens and repudiates 
 force, ISO ; plan of Federalists to 
 supplant him by Burr, 181 ; his 
 election secured by Hamilton, 182 ; 
 feels no gratitude, 182 ; said to 
 have made terms, 183 ; his beha- 
 vior honorable, especially toward 
 Burr, 184. 
 
 President. Supposed by Federal- 
 ists to be pledged not to turn out 
 officials, 186 ; simplicity of his in- 
 auguration, 187 ; disgusts British 
 ambassador by negligent dress, 187, 
 188; reasons for this action, 189; 
 anticipates a prosperous administra- 
 tion, 189 ; hopes by good-will to 
 break down parties, 189, 190; ex- 
 pects support from moderate Fed- 
 eralists, 190, 191, 192 ; event- 
 
 ual consummation of this wish, 
 191 ; in 1798 thinkfc New England 
 hopeless, 192 ; rejoices in Demo- 
 cratic success in New England 
 States, 193 ; antipathy toward New 
 England clergy, 193 ;’ refuses to re- 
 move all Federalists from office, 
 194 ; plans to fill vacancies with 
 Republicans, 195 ; decides upon re- 
 moval of Federalists appointed after 
 December 12, 195 ; and of Federal 
 attorneys and marshals, 196 ; dis- 
 likes turning people out of office, 
 197 ; admits only a few removals 
 for political reasons, 198 ; later de- 
 cides to remove such as “oppose 
 the national will,” 198 ; removes J. 
 Q. Adams, 199 ; his care in making 
 nominations, 199 ; condemns politi- 
 cal action of office-holders, 199, 200 ; 
 assists Callender in attacking Fed- 
 eralists, 201 ; on becoming Presi- 
 dent, pardons Callender, 202; re- 
 mits his fine on ground of unconsti- 
 tutionality of Sedition Act, 202 ; 
 refuses to remove a postmaster in 
 order to give Callender a place, 
 202 ; attacked by Callender, 203 ; 
 calumnies of Callender repeated 
 against him by Federalists, 203 ; 
 not in reality profligate, 204 ; not a 
 worshiper of the Constitution, 205 ; 
 
 his high opinion of importance of 
 Mississippi navigation, 206 ; in 1790 
 urges Carmichael to demand from 
 Spain a port at river’s mouth, 206- 
 208 ; his credit for Pinckney’s Span- 
 ish treaty, 208 ; foreshadows Mon- 
 roe doctrine in objections to Eng- 
 lish seizure of Louisiana, 209 ; sus- 
 pects French intention to regain 
 Louisiana, 209, 210 ; chagrined at 
 Spain’s cession in 1800, 210 ; writes 
 that if France holds New Orleans it 
 will cause an alliance between the 
 United States and England, 211 ; 
 directs Livingston not to menace 
 France, 212 ; sympathizes with an- 
 ger of Western men at closure of the 
 Mississippi, 213 ; annoyed at efforts 
 of Federalists to bring on war with 
 France, 213 ; receives authority 
 and money from Congress, 214 ; 
 plans to buy New Orleans and some- 
 thing more, 214 ; sends Monroe as 
 special emissary, 215 ; gives him 
 verbal instructions, 216 ; explains 
 his position to Dupont de Nemours, 
 216, 217 ; entitled to credit of en- 
 voy’s action in buying all Louisiana, 
 219; answers objections to treaty, 
 220; foresees future expansion of 
 West, 220 ; and acquisition of Flor- 
 ida, 220 ; orders forcible occupa- 
 tion of territory, 221 ; advises silence 
 regarding constitutional objections, 
 222 ; given power to govern tempo- 
 rarily, 222 ; his conduct clearly un- 
 constitutional, 222, 223 ; at variance 
 with his interpretation of the Con- 
 stitution, 223 ; and with his theory 
 of state rights, 224 ; he does not 
 perceive inconsistency, 224 ; not 
 concerned with possible secession of 
 West, 225 ; his course the only 
 statesmanlike one, 226 ; execrated 
 by Federalists, 227 ; admits uncon- 
 stitutionality of his act, 227, 228 ; 
 wishes ratification by an amend- 
 ment, 228 ; true to his political 
 principle of following the popular 
 will, 228, 229 ; personal animosities 
 toward “ monocrats,” New England 
 clergy, and Federalist judges, 230 ; 
 wishes to curb latter, 230 ; secures 
 
320 
 
 INDEX 
 
 impeachment and removal of Judge 
 Pickering, 230, 231 ; resolves to at- 
 tack Chase of Supreme Court, 231, 
 232 ; avoids taking responsibility, 
 but instigates Randolph to act, 233, 
 234 ; chagrined at failure of im- 
 peachment, 234 ; great apparent 
 success of his first term, 235; his 
 great personal influence, 235 ; skill 
 and modesty of his guidance of 
 Congress, 235, 236 ; impressiveness 
 of his absence of ceremony, 237 ; of 
 his reduction of army and navy, 
 237 ; assumes credit for results of 
 Hamilton’s policy, 237, 238 ; renom- 
 inated for presidency, 239 ; his 
 reasons for accepting a second term, 
 239, 240 ; wishes vindication, 240 ; 
 despises Federalist intrigues, 241 ; 
 reelected by overwhelming major- 
 ity, 241 ; this election the height of 
 his career, 242 ; enters office with 
 confidence, 242 ; expects to smooth 
 foreign difficulties by fair dealing, 
 
 243 ; altered attitude toward France 
 under Napoleon, 243 ; tends to 
 view England more favorably, 243, 
 
 244 ; feels horror at any connection 
 of America with European politics, 
 244 ; hopes to use commercial influ- 
 ence, 244 ; wishes friendly relations 
 with England, 245 ; wishes to settle 
 eastern boundary of Louisiana by 
 purchase, 246 ; surprised at Ran- 
 dolph’s defection, 246, 247 ; satis- 
 fied with eventual success, 247 ; his 
 inconsistency the cause of Ran- 
 dolph’s revolt, 248 ; not alarmed by 
 Burr’s scheme, 249 ; interested in 
 Burr’s trial, 250 ; accused by Fed- 
 eralists of persecuting Burr from 
 personal spite, 250 ; attacked by 
 Luther Martin, 251 ; ordered by 
 judges to testify as witness, 251 ; 
 refuses to obey the writ, 252 ; his 
 argument, 252, 253 ; orders Hay to 
 take down testimony, 253 ; submits 
 matter to Congress, 254 ; his pacific 
 attitude toward England and France, 
 255, 256 ; reports British outrages, 
 256; secures passage of Non-impor- 
 tion Act, 257 ; orders Leander out 
 of American waters, 257 ; sends 
 
 apologetic note to England, 257, 
 258 ; his lack of fitness for the situ- 
 ation, 258 ; favors building of gun- 
 boats, 259, 260 ; adopts threatening 
 tone toward Spain, 259, 260 ; con- 
 tinues to receive increased popular 
 support, 260 ; suggests a constitu- 
 tional amendment to authorize in- 
 ternal improvements, 261 ; his rea- 
 sons, 262 ; advises suspension of 
 Non-importation Act, 262, 263 ; re- 
 jects treaty of Monroe and Pinck- 
 ney, 262, 263 ; attacked for auto- 
 cratic methods, 263 ; exasperated at 
 Leopard-Chesapeake affair, 264 ; de- 
 mands reparation and prepares for 
 war, 265 ; slightness of his prepara- 
 tion, 265 ; waits for England’s reply, 
 266 ; recommends to Congress an 
 embargo, 266 ; question as to his 
 knowledge of Orders in Council, 
 266, 267 ; his policy followed blindly 
 by Congress, 268 ; his arguments 
 in favor of embargo, 269 ; expects 
 it to damage England, 269 ; over- 
 looks effects on seaboard cities, 269, 
 270 ; fails to realize that he is help- 
 ing English commerce, 271 ; dam- 
 ages commerce through ignorance, 
 not malice, 273 ; does not realize 
 inconsistency with democratic prin- 
 ciples, 273, 274 ; his supremacy over 
 Congress renders him responsible 
 for lack of war preparations, 274, 
 275 ; stupidly criticised by Federal- 
 ists, 275 ; calls embargo last step 
 before war, 276 ; urges secretary of 
 war to use force in suppressing 
 New England discontent, 276 ; real- 
 izes failure of embargo to affect 
 England, 277 ; distrusts Canning, 
 277 ; submits matter to Congress 
 and disclaims further responsibility, 
 277 ; does not report English and 
 French insults, 278 ; does not wish 
 war, but a permanent embargo, 278 ; 
 his policy overwhelmingly- indorsed 
 by Congress, 278 ; admits the near 
 end of embargo, 279 ; dreads war 
 as a danger to national prosperity, 
 280 ; considers repeal of embargo a 
 defeat, 280 ; anxious to escape from 
 situation, 281 ; seems to have abam 
 
INDEX 
 
 321 
 
 doned leadership, 281 ; glad to leave 
 presidency, 281, 2S2; continues to 
 have immense prestige, 282 ; his in- 
 fluence in choice of Madison as suc- 
 cessor, 2S2 ; his relations with Mon- 
 roe, 282, 2S3 ; declines a third term, 
 283 ; his immense popularity, 283 ; 
 a statesman, not a demagogue, 
 284 ; reasons for his hold over the 
 masses, 2S4, 2S5. 
 
 In Retirement. Continues to ad- 
 vise Madison and the party, 286; 
 later relations with Madison, 286 ; 
 anticipates peace, 2S6 ; opposes too 
 great subservience to England, 287 ; 
 looks forward to acquisition of 
 Florida, Cuba, and Canada, 287 ; 
 begins to admit usefulness of manu- 
 factures, 2S7 ; urges extinguishing 
 of national debt, 288 ; his regard for 
 Gallatin, 288 ; holds England re- 
 sponsible for war of 1812, 288 ; 
 wishes United States to attack Can- 
 ada and abandon the ocean, 289 ; 
 urged to be candidate for presi- 
 dency in 1812, 289 ; offered secre- 
 taryship of state by Madison, 289 ; 
 declines it, 290 ; rejoices at peace of 
 Ghent, 290 ; wishes friendship with 
 England, 290, 291 ; reconciled with 
 Adams, 291 ; alarmed at Missouri 
 question, 291 ; foresees a division 
 between North and South, 292 ; but 
 expects North to be defeated, 292 ; 
 condemns Missouri Compromise as 
 an infringement of state rights, 293 ; 
 sees difficulties in way of eman- 
 cipation, 293 ; his continued jeal- 
 ousy of judiciary, 293 ; opposes in- 
 ternal improvements, 293 ; suggests 
 that Virginia ratify congressional 
 acts for internal improvement, 294 ; 
 thinks this question may lead to 
 disunion, 294 ; his position as “ Sage 
 of Monticello,” 295 ; his hospitality, 
 295; mixed character of his visit- 
 ors, 296 ; endures it patiently, 297 ; 
 his estate suffers, 297 ; pays pre- 
 Revolutionary debts of his wife, 297, 
 298 ; financially ruined by Nicholas, 
 299 ; asks legislature for permission 
 to sell estate by lottery, 300 ; re- 
 fuses public aid, but receives volun- 
 
 tary private gifts, 300, 301 ; final 
 liquidation after his death, 301 ; 
 connection with University of Vir- 
 ginia, 301, 302; charged with pur- 
 pose to give it an anti-Christian 
 character, 302 ; his religious views, 
 302 ; a deist, not a trinitarian, 303, 
 304 ; anxiety concerning proper his- 
 torical presentation of his times, 
 304 ; views regarding his own cor- 
 respondence, 304 ; condemns works 
 of Marshall and J. Q. Adams, 305 ; 
 leaves his posthumous reputation 
 in hands of Madison, 305 ; his 
 dread of mental decay, 305 ; regrets 
 loss of power and influence, 306; 
 last days and death, 306, 307. 
 
 Characteristics. Affectionateness, 
 65, 66 ; business honesty, 174, 297, 
 298 ; courage, 59, 60, 202 ; discre- 
 tion, 7, 49, 68, 78, 122, 142, 164, 
 233, 249 ; disingenuousness, 98, 99, 
 100, 103, 127, 142, 166, 169, 201, 240, 
 285 ; education, 6 ; financial weak- 
 ness, 93, 95, 108, 128 ; grandilo- 
 quence, 39, 49, 187, 260 ; hospitality, 
 295, 297 ; imagination, 13, 287 ; in- 
 ventiveness, 13 ; legal ability, 7, 9, 
 107 ; literary ability, 23, 24, 34 ; 
 love of farming, 10, 11, 12, 148 ; 
 love of peace, 24, 30, 75, 118, 127, 
 144, 163, 189, 255, 279, 291 ; mili- 
 tary weakness, 51, 52-63, 289 ; mu- 
 sical taste, 4 ; morals, 6, 203, 204 ; 
 optimism, 189, 212, 242, 243, 247, 
 289 ; ostentatious simplicity, 157, 
 187, 188, 237, 295 ; oratorical weak- 
 ness, 10, 23, 24, 33 ; partisanship, 
 181, 190, 191, 200, 237, 238; pa- 
 triotism, 80, 81 ; personal appear- 
 ance, 4 ; popular insight and con- 
 trol, 41, 42, 132, 143, 176, 189, 
 191, 226, 236 ; radicalism, 15, 17,20, 
 24, 37, 79, 100 ; re ligious views , 
 40 ^ ikh _302-3 04 ; sensitiveness, 33, 
 62, 63 ; sentimentalism, 8, 13, 14, 
 225 ; shrewdness, 91, 100, 113, 156, 
 175, 216; sincerity, 100, 104, 120, 
 184, 242 ; sporting tastes, 4 ; stu- 
 diousness, 6, 7 ; theoretical hab- 
 its, 34, 46, 48, 66, 69, 77, 116, 172, 
 191. 
 
 Political Opinions. General sum* 
 
322 
 
 INDEX 
 
 mary, 284; “Anas,” 98, 291; ap- 
 pointments to office, 198-200 ; as- 
 sumption of state debt, 90-92 ; 
 bank, 10G-108 ; Burr’s treason, 249- 
 254 ; Barbary States, 72 ; causes of 
 Revolution, 27 ; centralization, 92, 
 262 ; commerce, 71, 149, 270, 2S7 ; 
 confederation, 67, 83 ; Constitution, 
 84-86, 96, 107, 124, 152, 180, 202, 
 205, 223-228, 251-253, 292; Cuban 
 annexation, 287 ; democracy, 37, 38, 
 39, 42, 43, 79, 81-83, 97, 100, 101, 
 115-117, 132, 170, 205, 228, 229, 273, 
 284 ; Democratic-Republican party, 
 143, 144, 176; disunion, 173, 225; 
 economics, 11, 12 ; education, 302 ; 
 embargo, 161, 266, 280 ; England, 
 61, 73-76, 136, 138, 148, 211, 244, 
 245, 255-278, 287-290; Federalist 
 party, 135, 136, 140, 150, 163, 174, 
 178, 189-191, 213, 227, 240, 241, 265, 
 280 ; financial policy of Hamilton, 
 91, 94, 105, 109, 110-114, 123 ; Flor- 
 ida, annexation of, 246, 259, 287 ; 
 France, 123, 133, 138, 169, 210-216, 
 244, 255, 272 ; French Revolution, 
 77, 78, 130, 131, 136, 137, 148 ; Genet 
 affair, 135-142 ; government, 83, 
 223 ; independence of colonies, 26, 
 27, 35 ; internal improvements, 261, 
 293, 294 ; Jay treaty, 151, 152 ; judi- 
 ciary, 230 If. ; Kentucky Resolu- 
 tions, 172, 224 ; Leander affair, 
 257, 258 ; Leopard and Chesapeake . 
 affair, 264, 265 ; Louisiana pur- 
 chase, 220-229 ; Mississippi naviga-, 
 tion, 206-217 ; Missouri Compro- 
 mise, 291-293 ; monarchical policy/ 
 of Federalists, 101-103, 104, 105, 109, 
 111, 113, 114, 163, 190 ; national debt, 
 93, 94, 110, 111, 288; navy, .259, 
 265 ; New England, 192, 193, 276 ; 
 non-importation, 149, 161, 257, 262, 
 263 ; Puritan clergy, 193, 230 ; rela- 
 tion of colonies to Parliament, 19- 
 20 ; religious freedom, remov- 
 als from office, 194-197, 202 ; right 
 of insurrection, 82, 151, 276; sec- 
 tionalism, 292 ; Sedition Act, 202 ; 
 Shays’s rebellion, 81 ; slavery, 32, 
 44-49, 68, 291, 292, 293 ; territorial 
 government, 68 ; Whiskey Rebel- 
 lion, 151 ; X Y Z affair, 169. 
 
 Kentucky Resolutions, drawn by 
 Jefferson, 172 ; their character, 172, 
 173. 
 
 King, Rufus, candidate for Vice- 
 President in 1804, 241. 
 
 Knox, Henry, secretary of war, 88 ; 
 follows Hamilton in cabinet, 134. 
 
 Lafayette, Marquis de, intimacy 
 with Jefferson, 77 ; seeks his advice 
 during French Revolution, 77, 78 ; 
 tries to use him to harmonize fac- 
 tions, 78 ; letter of Jefferson to, 
 on monarchists in Congress, 115. 
 
 Laurens, Henry, on peace commis- 
 sion, 16. 
 
 Laussat, French representative at 
 New Orleans, 221. 
 
 Leander, British vessel, kills an Amer- 
 ican, 257. 
 
 Lear, Tobias, said to have assisted 
 Jefferson to destroy proofs of quar- 
 rel with Washington, 165. 
 
 Lee, Richard Henry, offers resolu- 
 tions of independence, 28 ; reasons 
 for his exclusion from committee to 
 draft Declaration, 30, 31 ; member 
 of anti-Washington faction, 31. 
 
 Legislature of Virginia, engages in 
 controversy with Botetourt, 16 ; 
 forms non-importation league, 16; 
 and committee of correspondence, 
 17 ; dissolved by Dunmore, 17 ; de- 
 
 s plores Boston Port Bill and is 
 again dissolved, 17, 18 ; approves of 
 Jefferson’s “Summary View,” 18, 
 19 ; modifies and adopts Jefferson’s 
 reply to Lord North, 21, 22; in- 
 structs delegates to Congress to 
 move for independence, 28; abol- 
 ishes entails, 38 ; and primogeni- 
 ture, 39 ; disestablishes the church, 
 40, 41 ; adopts other reforms, 42, 
 43 ; rejects Jefferson’s plan of 
 emancipation, 44; prohibits impor- 
 tation of slaves, 49 ; flies from Eng- 
 lish troops, 59 ; scattered by Tarle- 
 ton, 60 ; movement in, to investi- 
 gate Jefferson’s conduct, 62 ; passes 
 resolutions of thanks, 63 ; anger of 
 Jefferson with, 64. 
 
 Leopard, attacks Chesapeake, 264-= 
 267. 
 
INDEX 
 
 323 
 
 Leslie, General, invades Virginia, 55, 
 56. 
 
 Lincoln, Levi, interrupts the “mid- 
 night appointments,” 1S6 ; letter of 
 Jefferson to, on the embargo, 276. 
 
 Livingston, Robert R., on committee 
 to prepare Declaration of Independ- 
 ence, 29 ; letter of Jefferson to, on 
 French acquisition of Louisiana, 
 211 ; instructed by Jefferson to se- 
 cure a depot on Mississippi, 215 ; 
 makes unwise admissions, 215 ; not 
 trusted by Federalists, 215; joins 
 with Monroe in agreeing to buy 
 Louisiana, 218. 
 
 Louisiana, purchase of, 206-229 ; at- 
 tempt of Jefferson to purchase New 
 Orleans, 214-217 ; intended by Na- 
 poleon for a French colony, 217 ; 
 offered by him, in need of money, 
 21S ; purchased by United States, 
 218 ; constitutional and other ob- 
 jections, 219-222 ; justification for 
 purchase, 222-229 ; troubles over 
 boundary of, 246. 
 
 Madison, James, works with Jefferson 
 in reforming Virginia law, 37 ; de- 
 plores Jefferson’s irritation under 
 criticism, 64 ; induces Jefferson to 
 favor the federal Constitution, 84 ; 
 urges him to accept office of secre- 
 tary of state, 87 ; recommends Fre- 
 neau to Jefferson for a clerkship, 
 119 ; letter of Jefferson to, on neu- 
 trality, 134 ; upholds Jefferson’s re- 
 port on commerce in Congress, 149 ; 
 letter of Jefferson to, on "Whiskey 
 Insurrection, 150 ; implored by Jef- 
 ferson to encounter Hamilton con- 
 cerning Jay treaty, 151 ; inferior 
 as leader to Jefferson, 155 ; refuses 
 Adams’s offer of French mission, 
 159 ; draws Virginia Resolutions, 
 172 ; presents Merry to Jefferson, 
 1S8 ; the natural successor of Jef- 
 ferson, 282; favored by Jefferson 
 over Monroe, 283 ; relations with 
 Jefferson in presidency, 286 ; urged 
 by Jefferson not to make conces- 
 sions to England, 287 ; his foreign 
 policy a continuation of Jefferson’s, 
 288 ; offers Jefferson position of 
 
 secretary of state, 289 ; appealed to 
 by Jefferson to defend his posthu- 
 mous reputation, 305. 
 
 Marshall, John, studies law with 
 Wythe, 7 ; follows Hamilton in up- 
 holding constitutionality of bank, 
 107 ; appointed on French mission, 
 161 ; in X Y Z affair, 167 ; proposed 
 as president pro tempore in 1S00 to 
 defeat Jefferson, 180 ; signs mid- 
 night appointments, 186 ; issues 
 subpoena to President in Burr case, 
 25 # 1 ; his opinion criticised by Jef- 
 ferson, 252, 253 ; his “ Life of 
 Washington ” condemned by Jeffer- 
 son, 305. 
 
 Martin, Luther, accuses Jefferson of 
 persecuting Burr, 251. 
 
 Mason, Colonel, letter of Jefferson to, 
 on monarchists, 114. 
 
 Mason, George, aids Jefferson in dem- 
 ocratic reform in Virginia, 37. 
 
 Mazzei, Joseph, Jefferson’s letter to, 
 162-164. 
 
 Mercer, James, in Virginia Conven- 
 tion, opposes Jefferson’s answer to 
 Lord North, 22. 
 
 Merry, Anthony, British minister, in- 
 dignant at Jefferson’s lapk of cere- 
 mony, 187, 188 ; considers it a de- 
 liberate insult to England, 188. 
 
 Mifflin, Thomas, remark of Jefferson 
 concerning, 157. 
 
 Mississippi navigation, its importance 
 early seen by Jefferson, 206 ; its ne- 
 cessity urged upon Spain, 207, 208 ; 
 acquired by Pinckney’s treaty, 208 ; 
 credit for, due to Jefferson, 208; 
 cut off by Spain, 212 ; its indispen- 
 sability urged by Jefferson upon 
 France, 216. 
 
 Missouri Compromise, considered a 
 great danger by Jefferson, 291 ; in- 
 consistent with state rights, 293. 
 
 Monroe doctrine, foreshadowed by 
 Jefferson, 208. 
 
 Monroe, James, rebukes Jefferson for 
 sulking, 64 ; advised by Jefferson to 
 visit France, 81 ; writes to Jeffer- 
 son in behalf of Constitution, 84; 
 letters of Jefferson to, 108, 135, 141 ; 
 minor leader of party, 155; suc- 
 ceeded as minister to France by 
 
324 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Pinckney, 160 ; his departure from 
 France, 160 ; governor of Virginia, 
 215 ; appointed envoy extraordinary 
 to France, 215, 216 ; instructed 
 orally by Jefferson, 216, 217 ; agrees 
 to buy all of Louisiana, 218 ; ex- 
 ceeds instructions, but understands 
 Jefferson’s wishes, 219 ; letter of 
 Jefferson to, on Leander affair, 257 ; 
 his treaty of 1806 with England re- 
 jected by Jefferson, 262, 263 ; de- 
 sires to contest presidency with 
 Madison, 282 ; angered at Jeffer- 
 son’s position, 282, 283. 
 
 Montmorin, Comte, correspondence 
 of Jefferson with, concerning com- 
 merce, 71 ; interview with Jeffer- 
 son, 78. 
 
 Morris, Gouverneur, his proposed 
 monetary unit criticised by Jeffer- 
 son, 68 ; letters of Jefferson to, 
 139, 142, 209. 
 
 Moustier, Count de, suspected by 
 Jefferson of planning to regain Lou- 
 isiana for France, 209. 
 
 Murray, William Vans, acts as inter- 
 mediary between Talleyrand and 
 United States, 171. 
 
 “National Gazette,” its establish- 
 ment, 119. See Freneau*, Philip. 
 
 Nelson, General, sent by Jefferson to 
 defend Virginia from invasion, 56. 
 
 New England, the stronghold of Fed- 
 eralist party, 192 ; dislike of Jeffer- 
 son for, 192, 193, 230 ; hopes of its 
 regeneration, 193 ; denounces em- 
 bargo, 276 ; threatens resistance, 
 279. 
 
 New Orleans, its acquisition urged by 
 Jefferson, 207, 208 ; its holder the 
 “ natural enemy ” of United States, 
 211 ; privilege of deposit at, cut off, 
 212 ; plans of Jefferson to acquire, 
 214, 215, 216. 
 
 Nicholas, George, moves an investiga- 
 tion into Jefferson’s conduct as 
 governor, 62 ; Jefferson’s relations 
 with, 62 n. 
 
 Nicholas, Wilson Cary, moves repeal 
 of embargo, 280 ; hastens Jeffer- 
 son’s financial ruin, 299 ; relations 
 of Jefferson with, 299. 
 
 Nicholas, Robert C., a conservative 
 opponent of Jefferson in Virginia 
 convention, 21 ; secures amend- 
 ment of his reply to Lord North, 
 22 . 
 
 Nicholson, Joseph, letter of Jeffer- 
 son to, suggesting impeachment of 
 Chase, 233, 234. 
 
 Non-importation, adopted in Virginia, 
 16 ; defeated in Senate in 1794, 149 ; 
 adopted against England in 1806, 
 257 ; suspended, in hopes of influ- 
 encing England, 262, 263. 
 
 North, Lord, his “Olive Branch” 
 proposition answered by Virginia, 
 21 . 
 
 Nullification. See Kentucky Resolu- 
 tions. 
 
 Page, John, early letters of Jefferson 
 to, 7 ; defeated for governor by 
 Jefferson, 51. 
 
 Paine, Thomas, writes “ Common 
 Sense,” 28 ; letter of Jefferson to, 
 114; his “Rights of Man” re- 
 printed by Jefferson, 118. 
 
 Peabody, Andrew P. , on Judge Pick- 
 ering’s character and failings, 231. 
 
 Pendleton, Edmund, argues in favor 
 of primogeniture in Virginia, 39. 
 
 Phillips, General, protests against 
 Jefferson’s treatment of Hamilton, 
 54. 
 
 Pickering, Judge John, impeached at 
 Jefferson’s suggestion, 230, 231 ; 
 discussion of justice of action, 231 
 and note. 
 
 Pickering, Timothy, criticises Decla- 
 ration of Independence for lack of 
 originality, 35 ; his low opinion of 
 Washington’s mental ability, 165. 
 
 Pinckney, C. C., suggested for French 
 mission by Adams, 159 ; rejected by 
 France, 160 ; reappointed on com- 
 mission with Gerry and Marshall, 
 161 ; in X Y Z episode, 167 ; Feder- 
 alist candidate for Vice-President 
 in 1800, 177 ; for President in 1804, 
 241. 
 
 Pinckney, Thomas, candidate for Vice- 
 President, 154 ; defeated through 
 Federalist bad faith, 155. 
 
 Pinkney, William, joins Monroe in 
 
INDEX 
 
 325 
 
 making unsuccessful treaty of 1806 
 with England, 262 ; reports effect 
 of embargo in England, 270 ; reports 
 conversation with Canning, 277. 
 
 Potter, Sukey, flirtation of Jefferson 
 with, 8. 
 
 Primogeniture, abolished in Virginia, 
 39. 
 
 Puritan clergy, hated by Jefferson, 
 193, 229. 
 
 Quincy, Josiah, his attack on the em- 
 bargo, 274. 
 
 Randall. Henry S., quoted concern- 
 ing Jefferson, 10, 51, 289, 296, 298, 
 301, 303. 
 
 Randolph, Edmund, attorney-general, 
 SS ; writes neutrality proclamation, 
 134; annoys Jefferson by failing 
 steadily to support him, 134, 136 ; 
 his real shrewdness, 134 ; action at 
 time of Jay treaty, 152. 
 
 Randolph, Jane, mother of Thomas 
 Jefferson, 3 ; her family connec- 
 tions, 3, 4. 
 
 Randolph, John, letters of Jefferson 
 to, on causes of Revolution, 26, 27. 
 
 Randolph, John, of Roanoke, leader 
 of Democrats in House of Repre- 
 sentatives, 214 ; secures grant of 
 authority to Jefferson to purchase 
 territory, 214 ; leads House to vote 
 money for purchase of Louisiana, 
 222 ; unable to reconcile purchase 
 with Constitution, 223 ; leads House 
 to impeach Chase, 233 ; defeated, 
 234 ; deserts Jefferson in House, 246 ; 
 comments of Jefferson upon him, 
 247 ; his reasons, 248 ; joins Federal- 
 ists in attacking Jefferson, 256 ; his 
 remarks on merchants’ demands, 
 257. 
 
 Randolph, Peyton, presents Jeffer- 
 son’s instructions to Virginia con- 
 vention, 19 ; succeeded by Jeffer- 
 son as delegate to Congress, 21. 
 
 Randolph, William, relations with 
 Peter Jefferson, 3. 
 
 “ Recorder,” slanders Jefferson under 
 influence of Callender, 202, 203. 
 
 Republican party. See Democratic 
 party. 
 
 Revolution, war of, foreseen by Jeffer- 
 son, 26, 27 ; its causes, 27. 
 
 Rose, George H., fruitless mission of, 
 to United States, 267. 
 
 Rutledge, Edward, youngest member 
 of Continental Congress, 23 ; moves 
 adjournment of debate on resolu- 
 tion of independence, 31. 
 
 Sedition Act, passed, 172 ; held un- 
 constitutional and void by Jeffer- 
 son, 202. 
 
 Shays’s rebellion, approved by Jeffer- 
 son, 81, 82. 
 
 Sherman, Roger, on committee to 
 draft Declaration of Independence, 
 29. 
 
 Skelton, Mrs. Bathurst, marries Jeffer- 
 son, 8 ; death, 65 ; makes Jefferson 
 promise never to marry again, 65. 
 
 Slavery, attempt to abolish in Vir- 
 ginia, 44, 45 ; emancipation and 
 colonization, 45, 46 ; opinions of 
 Jefferson concerning, 44-49, 293; 
 stoppage of slave trade,- 49; fore- 
 seen as cause of fhture civil war by 
 Jefferson, 292. 
 
 Small, William, his influence as in- 
 structor, upon Jefferson, 5, 7. 
 
 Smith, J. B., letter of Jefferson to, on 
 monarchists, causes trouble with 
 Adamses, 118. 
 
 Spain, urged by Jefferson to grant 
 navigation of Mississippi, 206 ; ad- 
 mits it by treaty of 1795, 208 ; cedes 
 Louisiana to France, 210 ; its offi- 
 cial at New Orleans closes Mis- 
 sissippi, 212 ; makes trouble over 
 boundaries of Florida, 246, 259 ; war 
 with, threatened by Jefferson, 259, 
 260. 
 
 Stamp Act, Henry’s speech against, 
 15. 
 
 State rights, declared by Jefferson, 
 172, 173, 224 ; violated by him in 
 acquisition of Louisiana, 224; yet 
 still upheld, 225 ; inconsistent with 
 Jefferson’s scheme of internal im- 
 provements, 261, 262 ; infringed by 
 Missouri Compromise, 293 ; asserted 
 by Jefferson in connection with in- 
 ternal improvements, 294. 
 
 Supreme Court, suspected by Jeffer- 
 
326 
 
 INDEX 
 
 son, 196, 229, 293 ; attacked in 
 Chase impeachment, 231-234 ; tri- 
 umphs over Jefferson, 234 ; defied 
 by him in Burr case, 251-253. 
 
 Talleyrand, demands bribes from 
 United States commissioners, 167 ; 
 considered by Jefferson to mis- 
 represent France, 169 ; makes ad- 
 vances for reconciliation, 171. 
 
 Tarleton, Sir Banastre, nearly cap- 
 tures Jefferson, 59, 60 ; does not 
 ravage Jefferson’s house, 60. 
 
 Trumbull, Jonathan, refuses to com- 
 ply with Jefferson’s requisition for 
 militia, 279. 
 
 Tucker, Professor, on Declaration of 
 Independence, 35 ; defends Colonel 
 Hamilton, 54. 
 
 University of Virginia, its estab- 
 lishment by Jefferson, 302. 
 
 Vergennes, Comte de, correspond- 
 ence cf Jefferson with, concerning 
 commerce, 71. 
 
 Virginia, aristocratic society in, 1, 2, 
 5, 39 ; the bar in, 9 ; farming in, 10, 
 12 ; elections in, 16 ; opposes par- 
 liamentary supremacy, 16-22 ; ready 
 for independence in 1776, 28 ; easy 
 transition in, from monarchy to 
 republic, 37 ; democratic reform in, 
 37-43 ; movement in, among dis- 
 senters, against Established Church, 
 41, 42; slavery in, 44, 45, 47; ad- 
 ministration of Henry as governor 
 of, 51, 52; administration of Jef- 
 ferson, 51-63 ; its exertions and 
 exhaustion under Henry, 52 ; in- 
 creased exhaustion of, in 1780, 52 ; 
 ravaged by British, 54, 55 ; invaded 
 in 1780, 56, 57 ; inefficient efforts of 
 Jefferson as governor to defend, 56, 
 57 ; dissatisfaction in, with Jeffer- 
 son, 58, 62 ; raided by Tarleton, 59- 
 61; delivered by fall of Cornwallis, 62. 
 
 Warville, Brissot de, letter of Jeffer- 
 son to, on slavery, 47, 48. 
 
 Washington, George, reduces Boston, 
 28 ; faction opposed to, in Congress, 
 31 ; advises mild treatment of Colo- 
 
 nel Hamilton, 54 ; writes compli- 
 mentary letter to Jefferson, 63; 
 his resignation, 67 ; makes Jeffer- 
 son secretary of state, 87 ; his other 
 officers, 88 ; does not recognize any 
 parties, 96 ; rejects Jefferson’s accu- 
 sations of monarchy against Ham- 
 ilton, 104 ; signs bill establishing 
 bank, 107 ; annoyed at dissensions 
 in cabinet, 110, 111 ; appealed to by 
 Jefferson to accept a second term 
 in order to defeat monarchists, 111, 
 112 ; bitterly attacked by Freneau, 
 120 ; endeavors to persuade Hamil- 
 ton and Jefferson to cease newspa- 
 per controversy, 122 ; not moved 
 by Jefferson’s attacks on Hamilton, 
 126 ; advised by Jefferson to ad- 
 vance debt payments to France, 
 140 ; reluctant to accept Jefferson’s 
 resignation, 145, 146 ; his denuncia- 
 tion of democratic societies de- 
 plored by Jefferson, 150 ; distrusted 
 by Jefferson as a possible danger to 
 country, 150; his retirement wel- 
 comed by Jefferson, 157 ; said by 
 Federalists to have been attacked by 
 Jefferson in Mazzei letter, 164 ; re- 
 puted quarrel of, with Jefferson, 164, 
 165 ; Jefferson’s opinion of, 165 ; low 
 opinion of Pickering concerning, 
 166 ; Democratic abuse of, never 
 forgiven by people, 166, 201 ; his 
 control of the people compared with 
 Jefferson’s, 235, 283. 
 
 Wayles, John, Jefferson’a father-in- 
 law, leaves him property, 8. 
 
 Whiskey Rebellion, Jefferson’s opin- 
 ion of, 150, 151. 
 
 William and Mary College, Jefferson 
 a student in, 5 ; its instruction con- 
 sidered by Jefferson equal to Eu- 
 ropean, 81. 
 
 Williamsburg in 1760, 5. 
 
 Wilkinson, General James, ordered 
 by Jefferson to take possession of 
 Louisiana, 221. 
 
 Wythe, George, studies of Jefferson 
 in office of, 6, 7 ; works for demo- 
 cratic reform in Virginia, 37 ; eman* 
 cipates his slaves, 44. 
 
 X Y Z correspondence, 168. 
 

 
 
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