m --v m& • ..." i : ;- V , ^ •■' V ** DUKE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY Treasure %oorn A N ANSWER T O DAVID HUME, AND OTHERS, ON THE SUBJECT O F LIBERTY and NECESSITY, PROVIDENCE, AND A FUTURE STATE. LONDON: Printed for T. Hookham, at his Cifculatii brary, New Bond-ftreet, corner of feruton firestj M DCC LXX. Mr C l to r ( 5 > A N ANSWER T O DAVID HUME, k; BEING fome time fince in company with perfons who highly praifed the EfTay on the Immutability of Truth, in anfwer to the Sceptical Opinions of Hume, I was induced to read a treatife on which men of fenfe had lavifhed fuch encomiums. Looking into it, however, I was furprifed to obferve, that inftead of reafoning, the author had merely cavilled againft his opi- nions 3 that inftead of refuting, he had B never ( 6 ) never met him in argument ; that he had eltablifhed an arbitrary tribunal of his own erection, and tried his adver- sary by laws with which he was un- acquainted. Now, as I had ever deem- ed it to be the firft law of argumenta- tion, that the refpondent fhould fhew a fallacy either in the premifes or the conclufions of his antagonift, I was vaftly difappointed at perceiving that Dr. Beattie had neglected the fyftem of Hume, and had, by declamations, at- tempted to prejudice mankind againft it, as containing do6trines pernicious to fociety. Having ever refpected Mr. Hume for his uncommon abilities, having ever loved the man for the known goodnefs of his heart, and being prepoffefled in favour of his principles, as generally coinciding with thofe of Mr. Locke, 1 fat down to take a review of his Ef- fays, ( 7 ) fays, without the leaft prejudice againfl: them. If, faid I, he can prove that I am merely an Ephemeris, let me know and be content with my humble defti- nation -, let my bark glide fmoothly through the fea of life, its fteady courfe not being impeded by the alternate tides of contrariant opinions, and let Hume pilot the vefTel into the harbour of hopelefs tranquillity, fince Dr. Beattie has proved incapable of conduc- ing her to the Fortunate Iflands. * Thus difpofed, I began to read Hume's EfTays, ftudious of truth alone, in whatever form it appeared -, but, though devoid of all prejudice againfl: him, I proceeded with caution, con- vinced by my own experience that he was an acute, and afTured by others that he was a fophiftical reafoner. Ad- * The ancients imagined them to be the habitation eftheblefled, B z vancing, ( 8 ) vancing, however, in the work, I wa$ pleafed to find that a continued chain of argument pervaded the whole, and to obferve that he laid down his prin- ciples with the utmoft clearnefs and precifion, proving them by arguments whofe genuine force difclaimed the paltry affiftance of delufion : I there- fore fpeedily began to conceive, not only that his principles were well founded, but that they were the only bafis of found reafoning on thofe fubjefts. Having paid this tribute of well-dc- ferved applaufe to the memory of a man equally cliftinguifhed by wifdom and virtue, I may now, without appre- henfion of imputed annoyance or ma- levolence, take the liberty of fuppofing (a liberty which, were he alive, he would readily allow me) that in draw- ing his conclufions, certain circum- ftances efcaped him, which ought to have ( 9 ) have been confidered in the difcufiion of fuch important queftions, and from a proper attention to which he would have deduced confequences diametri- cally oppofite to thofe which he has la- boured to eftablifh. In order to profecute the prefent dif- quifition with all poflible candor, I fhall, in the firft place, offer to the reader, a fhort extract from the prin- ciples of Mr. Hume, and, in the next, fhall attempt to fhew that different conclufions naturally flow from them. In the whole of this enquiry, I {frail treat him with that proper refpect and delicacy which fhould fubfift between friends ; fhall never carp at his terms, but inveftigate his meaning - y and fhall ftrive to give his arguments the utmoft degree of force, which they are capable of receiving. Principles ( io ) Principles laid down by Hume. This elegant and ingenious author begins his fyftem, by remarking the ftriking difference which fubfifts be- tween the firft lively effetts, excited in the mind by the prefence of fuch ob- jects as aft immediately on the fenfes, and that more faint recollection of them, which is treafured up in the me- mory ; to the former of thefe he gives the name of impreffion, (though per- ception might perhaps be more appli- cable to it) * marking the latter by the old term, Idea : in this inftance, he muft be allowed to have atted like a found * As this expreffion conveys no diftinction between the various proceffes of the mind in acquiring her no- tions of things, I fhall take the liberty of defining terras for myfelf. The action of the object on the femientex- tremiiies, may be denominated an impreffion ; the com- munication of this impreffion to the brain by the nerves, an J the effect produced then, may be called a fenfation ; and the fubfequent operation of this in the mind, may be deemed a perception. ( II ) found philofopher and a judicious cri- tic. It is abfurd to aflfert that our firft impreflions, or perceptions, are real images of furrounding obje£ts, and of courfe the term (idea) is improperly ap- plied to them : it is certain that the re- collected notion, though not fo lively, is an exaft refemblance cf the firft impreffion or perception, and confe- quently this word moft happily exprelfes it, being a likenefs to the thought, not to the thing which excited it. He then deduces the origin of our ideas from the fource of ferifation, evincing the truth of his pofition by two unanfwer- able arguments : in the firft place, however compounded they may at a tranfient view appear, they are all capable of being refolved into fuch fimple ideas as were copied from a pre- ceding feeling or fentiment 5 in the fe- cond, if you find any perfon who was deprived from his birth of any organ of fenfe, ( M ) knfe> you will perceive the impofllbility of communicating to him thofe ideas, with which the minds of men, enjoying the ufe of it, are furnifhed. He proceeds from this to confider the afibciation of our ideas, eftablifhing three principles of connexion between them, viz. refemblance, contiguity, and caufation. (A) Our author next divides all objefis of the human intellect into relations of ideas and matters of fact. The former of thefe retain their evi- dence, independent on any matter of fact which is conformable to them ; the T/je lines referred to by capital letters are literal quotations, (A) That thefe three principles fervc to conned* ideas, will net, 1 believe, be doubted ; a piclure natu- rally leads our thoughts to the original, the mention of one apartment in a building, naturally introduces an enquiry or difcourfe concerning the other; and if we think of a wound, we can fcarcely forbear reflecting on the oain which follows it. ( 13 ) the latter are by no means afcertained in the fame manner, nor is our convic- tion of their truth fimilar to that which accompanies the foregoing. (B) In confequence, therefore, of this feeming uncertainty, with regard to matters of faft, he thinks it neceffary to enquire into the nature of that evi- dence, on which we depend for the truth of fuch things, as are beyond the prefent teftimony of our fenfes, or the records of our memory. Now all reafoning, concerning mat- ter of fa£t, feerns to be founded on the relation of caufe and effect : if there- fore we would wifli to fatisfy ourfelves concerning the nature of the evidence C afforded (BJ The contrary of every matter of faft is Mil pof- fible, becaufe it never can imply a contradi&ion, and is conceived by the mind with the fame facility and diflinftnefs, as if it were ever fo conformable to realitv, ( 14 ) afforded by the former, we muft en- quire how we arrive at the knowledge of the latter. He infills that the know- ledge of this relation is not, in any in ftance, acquired by reafoning a priori, evincing the truth of it by the moft ir- refiftible arguments : it will not, how- ever, be neceffary, at prefent, to repeat them, as all reafoning a priori, turns on the properties of things which have no real exiftence, and whofe effenee is formed by the intelleft alone. To ha- bit (C) then, we muft attribute all our conclufions (C) Cuftom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience ufeful to us, and makes us expeft for the future a fimi- lar train of events to thofe which have appeared in the pail. But here it may be proper, to remark, that though our conclufions from experience carry us beyond our memory and fenfes, and aflure us of matters of fad, which happened in the moftdiftant places and the moft remote ages ; yet fome fa£l muft always be prefent to the fenfes or memory, from which we may firft proceed in drawing thefe conclufions. A man who mould find, in a defart country, the remains of pompous buildings, would conclude that the country had, in ancient times, beta ( hi ) conclufions concerning matters of faft, enforcing the caufe from a cuftomary connexion between it and the effe£t. From this we are led to the confidera- tion of verifimilitude. All reafoning is, by Hume, divided into demonflrations, proofs, and probabilities— by proofs, meaning fuch arguments from experi- ence, as leave no room for doubt or oppofition .(D) Whene ver,therefore, the C 2 caufe been cultivated by civilized inhabitants ; but did no. thing of this nature occur to him, he could never form fuch an inference. What, then, is the conclufion of the whole matter ? a fimple one ; though it mull be confefled pretty remote from the common theories of philofophy. All belief of matter of fact, or real exig- ence, is derived from fome object prefent to the me- mory or fenfes, and a cuftomary conjunction between that and fome other object. (D) There are fome caufes which are entirely uniform and conftant in producing a particular effect, and no jnftance has ever yet been found of any failure or irregularity in their operation. Fire has ever burned, and water fuirbcated, every human creature : the pro- duction of motion by impulfe and gravity is an uni- verfal law, which has hitherto admitted of no excep- tion; ( 16 ) caufe and effe£t have been conftantly conjoined, we expeft the latter from the former with the utmoft affurance : but when, at feveral times, the former is found disjoined from the latter, we are then obliged to compare the in- ftances on the one fide and the other judging of the event according to the majority. Our author next aflerts, that there is, in no particular inftance of caufe and tion. But there are other caufes which have been found more irregular and uncertain ; nor has rhubarb proved always a purge, or opium a foporific to every perfon who has taken thefe medicines. Being determided by cuftom to transfer the pad to the future in all our in- ferences; where the paft: has been entirely regular and uniform, we expect the event with the greateft a/fur- ance, and leave no room for any contrary fuppofition. But where different effects have been found to follow from caufes which are to appearance exactly fimilar, all thofe various effects muft occur to the mind in tranf- fering the paft to the future, and enter into our con- fideration whenever we determine the probability of the event. ( *7 ) and effect in external objefts, any thing which could fuggeft the idea of power or neceffary connexion between them, (E) When we reflect on the operations of our own mind, he {hews, in like manner, that we are incapable of de- riving any fuch idea from that fource, fince the connexion between volition and voluntary motion in ourfelves, is equally the refult of experience, with that which fubfifts between caufe and effeft in every other part of nature. He alfo elucidates each pofition by a variety of inftances -, but it will not be neceffary to offer them to the reader, as the truth of each muft clearly ap- pear from what has been already ob- ferved, with refpeft to the ideas, con- cerning (E) Any quality which binds the effeft to the caufe, and renders the one an infallible confequence of the other ; we only find that the one does actually in fad follow the other» ( is ; ccrning which our reafoning; a priori, muft be exercifed. He proceeds, in the Iaft place, to en- quire into the nature of Liberty and Neceffity, eftablifhing as a principle that the conjunction between motives and voluntary adtions, is as conftant and uniform, as that between caufe and effe£l in external objefts, and that of courfe Liberty confifts in the power of a£ting or not ailing, according to the determinations of the will, which de- terminations are founded on the mo- tives. (F) The (F) For what is meant by liberty when applied to vo- luntary aftions ? furely we cannot fuppofe actions to have To little connexion with motives, inclinations, and circurnftances, that the one does not follow with a cer- tain degree of uniformity from the other, and that the one affords no inference by which we can conclude the ?xiftence of the other. By libsrty, then, we can only mean the power of acling or not a&ing according to the determinations of the will. If liberty be oppofed to neceffity, ( »9 ) The ingenious author next glides from the eftablifhment of his prin- ciples into other opinions, which he in- troduces in the following manner : I pretend not, fays he, to have obviated or removed all obje&ions to this theory* with refpedt to Liberty and Neceffity. I can forefee other objec- tions, derived from topics which have not been here treated of. — It may be faid, for inftance, that if vo- luntary aftions be fubmitted to the fame laws of neceffity with the opera- tions of matter, there is a continued chain of necefiary caufes, pre-ordained and pre-determined, reaching from the original caufe of all, to every fingle vo- lition of every human creature : no contingency any where in the uni- verfe — no indifference — no liberty a while we aft, we are, at the fame time, a6ted neceflny, and not to conflraint, it is the fame thing with chance, which is univerfally allowed to have no cxiftence. ( *° ) afted upon. The ultimate author of all our volitions is the Creator of the World, who firft beftowed motion on this immenfe machine, and placed all things in that particular pofition, whence every fubfequent event, by an inevitable neceffity, muft refult. Hu- man a&ions, therefore, either can have no moral turpitude at all, as proceed- ing from fo good a caufe ; or if they have any turpitude, they muft involve our Creator in the fame guilt, while he is acknowledged to be their ultimate caufe and author. Now as this argument tends to deny the goodnefs of God, and as he, who refufes to allow any one attribute of the Divine Nature, may with reafon be €onfidered as difowning the Deity, I fhall attempt to evince the exiftence and attributes of this auguft Being, a pofteriori, the only mode of reafoning which ( *» ) which our prefent plan admits, before I examine the conclufwenefs of it. Our experience convinces us, that all animals are of a fhort lived and perifh- able nature, and that generation con- tinually fupplies a new race to fill up the places which their parents had oc- cupied : either then this chain of beings mufl: have continued through the eternity paft, or there mult have been fome extrinfic caufe of their ex- iftence. Now I demand, in the firft place, if mankind has exifted from eternity, how comes it to pafs that we have never heard of him till within thefe few thoufand years ? How can we conceive that the fame reafon has lain intirely dormant thro' an eternity paft, which awaking at length, and without any affignable caufe from its {lumber, has, D within ( 22 ) within a few thoufand years, performed fuch wonders ? Pufh back the exiftence of our fpecies as far as the Egyptians, Perfians, Chaldeans, Chinefe, or Indi- ans, have dreamed it, flill do you make fuch an inconfiderable addition to the date of man's origin, as bears the fame proportion to an eternity paft, that a mathematical point does to the uni- verfe ? If it be faid that the world has undergone a variety of changes, fimilar to that occafioned by the deluge, which deftroyed the greater part of its inha- bitants, and reduced the remainder to the ftate of favages, equally unacquaint- ed with arts and fciences - 9 I reply that by fuch a fuppofition, the followers of Hume intirely deviate from his prin- ciples, which tie them down to ac- knowledge no event to have taken place, unlefs their own experience, or that of others perfeflly well authenti- cated, has furnifhed them with an in- flance ( 23 ) ftance of a fimilar nature. Now no hiftory, except the Jewifli, has men- tioned an univerfal, or even general de- luge, and the infpired writer of this has announced the exiftence of God with the fame authority that he has aflerted the deftru6lion of mankind ; confe- quently, if you give credit to it in the one refpeft, you are, by the fame rea- fon, bounden to believe it in the other, and if you deny the teftimony of it, there is no foundation on which you can ground your hypothefis. The reveries of natural hiftorians will little avail in the prefent difpute. The ftrata of fhells, found in feveral hills at a diftance from the fea, might perhaps, as Goldfmith imagines, have been pro- duced in the frefh water, or if that may feem a contradiction to common expe- rience, ftill do our antagonifts derive no advantage from it, fmce both reafon and obfervation conftantly Announce, D 2 that ( 24 ) that there has ever fubfifred an exact equilibrium between the fea and land y and that, if at any time the former has inundated a particular country, it has left bare a proportional part, which had been formerly fubjeci to its do- minion. Our opponents may next aflert, that barbarous nations like the Goths, Heruli and Huns, may have ravaged the earth, and have totally deftroyed every veftige of fcience -, but this fup- pofition is equally inconfiftent with the principles of Hume, fince no hiftory has mentioned an universal conqueft to have been made by any people, and confequently, as the caufe was but par- tial, the efFecls mud have been but par- tial, and fcience muft have been but partially injured. But not content with negative, hiftory furnifhes us with po- fitive proofs in contradiction to this opinion, ( *5 ) opinion, uniformly afferting, that as fcience decayed in one part, it fiourifh- ed in another -, as it declined in the Weft, it reared up its head in the Eaft; and, as it was extinguiflied by the reli- gious difputes which fubfifted between the Emperors and the Monks at Con- stantinople, it revived under the to- lerating government of the Caliphs at Bagdat. Thus it appears, that if men hav$ exifted from eternity, their reafon has lain dormant till within a few thoufand years ; that we cannot impute this effe£l to any fufficient caufe, fince hiftory warrants no general deftruftion of the human fpecies, cither by phyfical or moral agents, confequently man muft, within thefe few thoufand years, have arifen without a caufe, or muft have been indebted to fomc other Being, for his exiftence. That ( 26 ) That the world derived its origin from the fame caufe which gave exift- encc to man, is alio perfectly evident, fmce otherwife you mull allow two felf-exiftent independent principles, one of which,notwithftanding,gives new mo- difications and qualities to the other *, which is a palpable contradiction in terms. That this Being cannot, with reafon, be deemed the foul of the world, admits * We fee nothing in this world but matter, and we prove the Deity from the abfolute neceffity there is for fuch a Being, in order to produce the effects which we perceive. We obferve certain kinds of matter to be inert, and alfo find, that by death and corruption even men may be refolved into fuch matter ; hence we fairly infer this property to be eiTenti;.l to it, and that action and knowledge are the effects of man's modification. Thefe effects we rauft afcribe to the modifier, as their caufe, fince that which is inert cannot produce action ; we muft confider knowledge and action as attributes of this modifier, for the reafon now afiigned, and of courfe muft eftablifh two Beings effentially different. Thefe muft either be independent, or one of them muft be derived from the other. But a perfect Being cannot proceed from imperfection, and therefore tfcey are tithe* independent, or God has created matter. ( V ) admits not a doubt, fince on this fup- pofition the connexion between them muft have been necefiary and eternal ; confequently all the eftefts which this mind, God, acting on this body, Mat- ter, is capable of producing, muft have taken place from an eternity paft, and of courfe mankind muft have eternally exifted, the abfurdity of which has been already evinced. Nov/ into thefe two fuppofitions may the opinions of all the philofophers, whether ancients, who never dreamed of, or moderns, who have ventured to deny, a creation, be ultimately refolvcd; the exiftence of a God, the Creator of the Univerfe, muft therefore be acknow- ledged. We need but open our eyes to be convinced of fome of the attri- butes of God ; we have already evinced that wifdom and aft ion were properties of the Deity, and this was fhewn from obfervation t 28 ) obfervation of the powers we poflefs 5 I fhall now, therefore, prove them from a contemplation of the Uriiverfe. If we examine this earth, our owrl immediate habitation, we fhall find the moft regular uniformity in her general and fpecific productions, joined to the moft pleafing variety in them, when contrafted with each other ; at one time we are amazed at the vaft objects which furround us, and the next in- ftant find ourfelves equally aftonifhed at the no lefs admirable minutenefs of creation 3 who then can reflect on this without confeffing the wifdom and power of the Author ? If we extend our inquiries to the planetary fyftem, we fhall perceive thole vaft bodies to obierve the utmoft regularity in their revolutions round the common center of attraction, the firft vifible difpenfer of life and light. But how are we loft in ( *9 ) in amazement when we find that thofe liars, which to our eyes appear as mere fparks, are in reality fo many funs ? when analogy points out that they are furrounded by their attendant worlds, and that each is furnifhed with a va- riety of creatures widely different, per- haps, in their nature and properties from thofe which our earth is obferved to fupport ? Can we then doubt that the auguft Being, who, by the energy of his will gave exiftence to fuch vaft variety of worlds, who preferves their interior ceconomy with the utmoft exaclnefs, and regulates their motions, with regard to external objects, by laws which are equally invariable with their Author, muft be poflefled both of wif- dorn and power infinite ? But if the Deity has been pleafed to afford us, a pofteriori, the moft evident proofs of fome of his attributes, he has in ap- pearance drawn, either partially or ge- £ nerally* ( 3° ) nerally, a veil over others, and denied to us the power of inveftigating them by the fenfes. Thus has it fared with the goodnefs and juftice of God : but though we have no fufficient evidence of thefe attributes, a pojleriori, I fhall now attempt to fhew, that a little re- flection offers to us a demonftration of their exiftence. Here I muft obferve that, though Hume's mode of reafoning does not al- low us to deduce any quality in the caufe, unlefs from the effect 5 yet hav- ing eftablifhed any attribute of the Deity in this manner, we may fairly infer that nothing, inconfiftent with it, can poffibly exift. The Firft Caufe of all things muft poffefs his attributes by a neceflity of nature, fmce there is no other Being from whom he could de- prive them, and of courfe he muft either be effentially benevolent or malevolent -, but ( 3i ) but Omnifcience and Omnipotence ne- ceffarily include perfect felicity in the Being who poflefles them, fince Infinite Wifdom muft point out, and Infinite Power muft enable him to attain, what- ever moft effe&ually conduces to his happinefs. If fupreme beatitude flows from thofe attributes, it alfo fuppofes them as its origin ; of courfe, therefore, where the caufe cannot be found, the efFeft cannot poffibly be fuppofed to fubfift. Hence it follows that the De- ity, though infinitely benevolent, could not communicate fupreme felicity to any being, without rendering it, at the fame time, Omnifcient and Omnipo- tent. It is, however, very certain, that if the Deity were infinitely malevolent, he could inflift perfect mifery on his creatures, without diverting himfelf, in any degree, of his fole title to the above-mentioned attributes. The Deity therefore muft be acknowledged effen- E 2 tially ( 32 ) tially benevolent, though he has not belt owed perfect felicity on his crea- tures, fince that could not be effected without rendering them Gods. Juftice is alfo connected by an abfolute necef- fity with the nature of the Deity ; for his benevolence having inclined him to give, to certain creatures, reafon, as a rule directing them to the attainment of good, and the avoidance of evil, his Omnifcience muft enable him to per- ceive each compliance with, and each infraction of it, while his Omnipotence mull render him capable of rewarding the one, and of punifhing the other : we may therefore, with the ftricteft rea- fen conclude that he is juft, fince no Being, even of common underftanding, would give laws to another, merely with the view of having them tranfgrefTed. Having proved certain attributes of the Divinity, a pojleriori, and having de- monftrated others, by a neceffary con- nection ( 33 ) neftion with them, I proceed now to fliew that human actions cannot be traced by a neceflary chain to the Deity as their caufe, and in order to evince it, am obliged to make fome more par- ticular inquiries, concerning the Na- ture of God, of Matter, and of the different kinds of material beings ex- ifting in this world. I have already proved the Omnifci- ence of the Deity; and it muft appear very evident to any perfon, who reflefls for a moment on this attribute, that the knowledge poffeffed by this auguft Being, of every thing, in every portion of infinite duration, muft be, both in its nature and mode of acquifition, ei- fentially different from the knowledge of man ; for he muft actually, and at every moment, comprehend each afl-ion and confequence thereof; fince if there was a fucceffion of ideas in the Divine mind, ( 34 ) mind, while one train was prefent, an- other mull be abfent> and thus the uni- verfality of his perception muft be de- ftrcyed. The Omnipotence of the Deity has been alfo evinced, but this attribute implies the power of afring on every thing in nature at the fame moment of time, otherwife he could not effect all purpofes. Infinite knowledge and energy are therefore adherences in the Divine Nature, nor can they admit any limitation, unlefs with refpeft to things, which would in- volve a contradiflion. That the Deity is not material is exceedingly appa- rent : if allowed independent prin- ciples, they cannot be the fame thing ; if God has given exiftence to matter, the Creator cannot be one entity with his creature : but waving ail this, if we can fuppofe for a moment the Di- vinity to be corporeal, from that mo- ment we (hall have two bodies pofTef- fing the fame fpace. Since God is not material, ( 35 ) material, we are obliged to oppofe to and contraft with each other, thefe two only beings exifting in the univerfe, afTerting that whatever property is found conftantly in the latter, muft ever prove incompatible with the for- mer. Now we find every thing mate- rial to be extended, to confift of folid and feparable parts, with certain paffive capacities : the Deity therefore muft not be extended, muft not confift of folid and feparable parts, and muft pof- fefs certain active energies. Such a Be~ ing then we denominate a Spirit, and though incapable of conceiving any thing of this kind, from the many ab- furdities which follow the negation of it, we with the greateft certainty in- fer its exiftence. This Being (as has been already fhewn) pofleffing an intui- tive knowledge of all things in every portion of eternity, fo far as it does not imply a contradiction ; and his in- finite C 36 ) finite power enabling him to effect whatever appears to be the objedt of his volition, he is obliged, by his per- fections, to adt in conformity with a a moral neceffity. Inert matter, on the other hand^ is in a ftate of abfolute imperfection, de- void of life, of fenfation, of energy, and receiving fuch laws as the Deity has prefcribed. Thefe laws are ever in- variably obeyed : never does impulfe fail to communicate motion in propor- tion to the momentum of the im- pelling body 3 nor does a&ion fail to produce, on every occafion, its con- trariant re-action, and thus do its de- feds compel it to conform to an ex- trinfically impofed phyfical neceflity. — i Between inert matter and man, there are found an immenfe variety of beings, gradually afcending each above the other, and exhibiting different, though almoft ( 27 ) almoft imperceptible degrees of perfec- tion. Between man and God, imagi- nation has continued the fame vifionary chain, and filled the heavens with a vaft number of intelligences, each fpe- cies fuperior to the other in endow- ments. Now, in whatever degrees thefe perfe&ions are fuperadded to all ma- terial creatures, until we pafs man, in the fame lhall we perceive them to de- viate from the unerring obedience of the caput 7?iortuum, and not conform to the purpofes for which they feem de- figned. If, for inftance, we attend to fuch things as are endued with vege- table life, we lhall find that they do not invariably obey their laws, and that certain conditions are neceffary to en- force their compliance with them : not every tree naturally fru&iferous, pro- duces fruit at the accuftomed feafon ; not every grain, when fown in the ground, pullulates into life, and gra- F tifies ( 38 ) tifies our hopes of a plenteous increafe > and thus is a contingency fubftituted for an abfolute conftraint. If we examine beings endowed with animal life, in proportion to the addi- tional perfe&ions which they poffefs, lhall we find a ftill greater infraftion of their general laws ? Inftinft was given brutes in order to direft them to proper obje&s of appetite, yet do they ibmetimes contradict nature in this moft eiiential point, and thereby bring into exiftence a variety of monfters. But inftina is not the only principle per- ceivable in thefe creatures ; for we can obferve one of an oppofite nature, which frequently contradicts it ; the former generally prompts them to the purfuit of the fame object, but expe- rience, notwithftanding, has power to Q&rre and to obviate the ne- ceffity of a firft mover, independent on matter, and to avoid the abfurdity of afTerting that life and fenfation pro- ceeded from the fenfelefs mafs, fuppofed each atom to be endued with an ani- mating principle. When he therefore announces the images conveyed by our fenfes, and the ideas in our minds to be gods, he only a<5ts in conformity with his hypothefis ; fince thefe fenfa- tions and notions were the immediate effeft of adtion m the animae, to which he gave the appellation of the Divinity. Having {hewn both the abfurdity and origin of Malebranche's do&rine, I (hall infert an extraft from Hume, in order to prove that he perfectly coin- cides with me in rejecting this opinion. " Thus, according to thefe philo- fophers, every thing is full of God. Not content with the principle that G nothing ( 46 ) nothing exifte but by his will, that no- thing pofTeffes any power but by his conceflion, they rob nature and all created beings of every power, in order to render their dependence on the Deity more fenfible and immediate. They confider not, that by this theory, they diminifii the grandeur of thofe attri- butes which they affect fo much to ce- lebrate. It argues furely more power in the Deity to delegate a certain por- tion of it to inferior creatures, than to produce every thing by his own imme- diate volition. It argues more wifdom to contrive, at firft, the fabric of the world with fuch perfect forefight, that of itfelf, and by its own proper opera- tion, it may ferve all the purpofes of Providence, than if the great Creator were obliged, every moment, to adjuft its parts, and animate by his breath the wheels of that ftupendous ma- chine/' It ( 47 ) It is very evident from this paflage, that Mr. Hume did not confider the Deity as immediately interfering in the government of the world -, God, there- fore, mull be deemed the author of our actions ultimately, or fo far only as he has given us the power of volition and aftion, and not as he has in any fhape influenced us in either operation, fince this fuppofition would fubftitute conftraint for liberty, would render the will impertinent and motives nuga- tory. But Mr. Hume clearly perceived that the confideration of the Divinity, as the ultimate caufe and author of human aftions, would by no means prove fufficient to render him a par- taker in their criminality ; he therefore changes his expreffion afterwards, de- manding how the Deity can be the me- diate caufe of all the actions of men, without being the author of fin and moral turpitude. G z Now ( 48 ) Now here I muft obferve, that our author has not ufed the terms, mediate caufe, with his accuftomed accuracy ; and the perfon who recollects that li- berty conlifts in the power of acting, or not a£ting, according to the deter-* minations of the will, that thefe deter- minations are founded on the motives, and that thcfe motives are derived from the oppoiite principles of paflion and reafon, will clearly perceive that the Deity is only the ultimate caufe of our actions, that the choice is the immedi- ate, and the motives the mediate, caufe. But the followers of Hume may per- haps ftill affert, that, though God is not a&ually the author of evil, yet rnuft he be confidered as fuch by per- miffion. They may demand, why a Being, infinitely good and powerful, did not give exiftence to fuch creatures only as were capable of perfect freedom from natural or moral evil ? Now to gratify ( 49 ) gratify thefe gentlemen, quitting my ufual mode of reafoning, and the world of realities, I fhall venture to follow them into the fairy land of hypothefis ; but though I accompany them in this excurfion, I fhall anfvver their fuppofi- tions on fuch principles alone as are derived from a knowledge of the two kinds of beings in nature, material and fpiritual, the former of which our femes announce, and the latter is de- duced, as dijine qua non, by our reafon. Thefe creatures muft then be pure fpi- rits, fomething between fpirit and mat^ ter, intelligences fuperior to huma- nity, yet, notwithftanding, material or men : for I prefume that no perfon will fuppofe it an act of benevolence in God to have excluded all evil, by creating only fenfelefs and inert matter.. If we fuppofe them pure fpirits, we muft afcribe to them all the attributes that are eflential to fpirit. I have ( 5° ) I have already (hewn that the Deity is not extended, that he does not con- lift of parts, and that he poflefles cer- tain adive powers : I have alfo evinced that the qualities of thought, know- ledge, and action, which we perceive in ourfelves, are in us mere faculties, granted to us by God, who poflefles a knowledge of all things, not by thought but intuition 3 — who acts on every thing, not in conlequence of his will, but his energy and volition form one act. This then is the eflence of fpirit : but the eflential qualites of any thing are perfectly incapable of intenfion or remiflion, of increafe or diminution : * inch a being therefore muft be capable of knowing and acting on all things ; confequently every pure fpirit muft be a God. f I am * Effentia rei nee intenditur nee remittitur falva fubjeclo, is a maxim. * This is furriciently clear to perfons who are tolerably acquainted with metapyhiics ; but as prejudice may in- clint I am next to inquire, whether God could have entirely excluded evil, by creating beings which were interme- diate dine many men to fuppofe the human foul a fpirit, as this opinion may be faltered by Mr. Locke's definition of real EiTences, and may be confirmed by his alTertion, that we derive our idea of fpirit from a recollection on the operations of our own minds. I mall attempt to fhew that both are ill founded. Mr. Locke, in the firft place, very improperly defines real clTcnce to be that internal unknown conititution of the parts, on which the properties depend ; the real tfience of fpirit being therefore unknown, we can determine what is fpiritual by the nominal eflence alone, or that collection of pro- perties evinced by experience, and marked by a name. This great philofopher, in the next place, maintains, that by reflection we acquire a notion of fpirit ; according to which alTertion, if well founded, knowledge and ac- tion, fuch as they exifl in us, mult be properties of fpirit ; nnd as in man they are capable of increafe and diminu tion, fo would it follow that they are in fpirits, and of courfe that the latter could be limited. Now the defi- nition of a real eflence is perfectly inapplicable to un- modified matter, or the Materia Prima, and to fpirit, nor is it fuited to any thing, unlefs in a flate of genera- tion or corruption ; for inltance, inorganic matter exhi- bits no properties but extension, folidity, and gravity with fome paiiive capacities; thefe are not the con fe- quence of any arrangement of its parts, fince none has taken place, but feein to be the firlt laws of its exis- tence ( 52 ) diate between fpirit and matter. Naw it is very evident, from what has been obferved, that God cannot communi- cate tence, impofed by its Creator. It is equally abfurd when applied to fpirit, fince one of the attributes which neceflity evinces it to poffefs, is, that it does not confiH of parts ; to fuppofe, then, that the properties depend on the unknown conftitution of parts which do not exift, mud be allowed to be a palpable contradic- tion ; and yet God muft be a fubftance, or the un- known fomething which fupports known qualities. The reader mull recoiled, that I have already fhewn knowledge and action in the Deity to be eflentially dif- ferent from thofe properties in man, though Mr. Locke, to favour his afTertion, maintains, that we have an in- tuitive knowledge of our own exiftence, a fenfative of external objects, and a demonstrative of God ; but a little reflection will evince, that our knowledge of our own exigence is derived from the fenfes ; for thefe being deftroyed, what perception of our exiftence will remain ? We may, indeed, according to the manner of reafoning ufed by Des Cartes — (I think therefore I am) obtain a demonftrative knowledge of our exiftence ; but I mail appeal to any perfon, whether it adds any force to our conviction : nay, what can be a ftronger argument againft the poffibility of our conceiving in- tuition than this, that fo great a man has confounded it with fsnfation. From this we may conclude that God and pure fpirit imply the fame thing; and of courfe, if there are two pure fpirits, there muft be two Gods -, ( 53 ) cate perfedt felicity, without granting at the fame time Omnifcience and Om- nipotence : here then would be a being, which was not God, with the eflential attributes of the Divinity. I fhall now examine the nature of intermediate material creatures, begin- ing with that fpecies which makes the neareft approaches to the qualities of inert matter. H There Gods : but exclufive of this contradiction, how could the Deity unite the contrariant principles of fpirit and matter in man, or how could he punifh the former for the defects of the latter ? But fuppofe a pure fpirit created, and at the moment of its exiftence united with matter, allowing alfo that the laws of their union prevented it from difplaying its efTential properties, Hill mull this union ceafe at death, and every pure fpi- rit then become a God. Is it not more confident with piety to fuppofe the Deity a fingle being in the univerfe, and eflentially different from all his crea- tures, than to imagine that he created a number of pure fpirits, even were this notion devoid of contra- diction, which differed from him in the degree of pofTefTing their eflential properties, but not in their effence. ( 54 ) There is fuch a creature as Man, whofe body confifts of perifhable mate- rials, and wants conftant fupplies : this body is alfo liable to various inju- ries from external objects, and is threa- tened with diffolution from every thing that furrounds it. Now to fuch a crea- ture, I afifert, that natural evil, or pofi- tive pain, is abfolutely neceffary. I fliall not, however, attempt to fhew, that man was requifite, as a link in the great chain of Plato, reaching from in- ert matter up to the throne of God, but fliall conclude, from his exiftence, that it was fit he fhould be. Were not man then, excited by the difagree- able fenfation attendant on emptinefs, to procure a fupport for his perifhable body in a few days after the creation of the fpecies, it muft have moft cer- tainly waifted to death. Were not the action of fuch external obje6ls as threaten deftruftion to us, attended with ( 55 ) with pain, we fhould leap into either the fire or the fea, with the fame indif- ference that we walk acrofs the floor. Were not indulgence in thofe things which, though not immediately deftruc- tive to life, are ftill found to be pre- judicial to health, attended with unea- finefs, we fhould fpend our fhort lives in conftant gratifications, and never arrive at the age of maturity. Pain therefore is the guardian of all human creatures 5 and were it not annexed to the reception of injuries, we could not exift even for a fingle moment; to fay, then, that men fhould live, and yet fhould be deprived of that which was neceffary to their exi Hence, is a contra- diction in terms ; and no perfon ima- gines that Omnipotence can perform things which involve this as a confe- quence. Nor could power and good- nefs infinite have excluded moral evil. H 2 t I have ( 56 ) I have already proved that man was a free agent, and have likewife fhewn in what liberty confifted; now to fup- pofe that a creature, endowed with im- perfect powers of reaibn, and folicited to aftion by very ardent paflions, fhould on every occafion reflect, in any degree, that he fhould ever form juft conclu- fions, and that he fhould ever prefer contingent and future, to certain and prefent good, muft be acknowledged an abfolute impoffibility, and confe- quently it could not have been effefted by Omnipotence. 1 am, in the lafl place, to inquire whether Omnipotence could have ex- cluded evil by creating intelligences fuperior to humanity, yet notwith- ftanding material. Now no body can avoid being acted on by others, accord- ing to the known properties of matter; pain ( 57 ) pain therefore muft, in fome degree, be neceffary to the prefervation of every material being. Nor is moral evil lefs neceffary to fuch creatures. We already obferved, that paflion was the property of every fentient being, as compofed of matter, and that in- tuition was effential to pure fpirits 5 but no creature can diveft itfelf of its effen- tial properties, and acquire thofe of an oppofite nature 5 confequently, in every material and animated being paflion muft exift, error muft take place, and moral evil muft enfue. Yet does not the neceffity of either natural or moral evil militate againft a ftate of future felicity, fince pleafure may be fo predo- minant as to render the admixture of pain merely the mean of enhancing it : what man, for inftance, would con- ceive that degree of it which attends on loofening ( 58 ) loofening the zone of a beautiful vir- gin, calculated for any purpofe but that of converting delight into rapture. The admiffion of moral evil, in a fmall degree, will not be found more incom- patible with a ftate of beatitude, fince our greateft happinefs confifts in the hope of arriving at a ftill fuperior de- gree of perfeftion ; now, did we never err, this hope would be cut off, and confequently a fource of pleafure would be dried up. It may be demanded, in the laffc place, fince evil could not be entirely avoided, why were not fuch beings only created as were capable of the utmoft degree of material felicity : Now, we alreadydemonftrated that juftice formed a part of the divine efience, but juftice allows not exaltation without merit, and confequently the ftate of liberty or probation ( 59 ) probation muft precede that of angelie beatitude. This explanation of thq origin of evil, a fubjeft fo often liti-? gated and fo little underflood, will, I conceive, throw light on another topic of equal obfcurity, I mean that of pre- fcience and predeftination. The reader muft recolle6l that God has given is paffions, which impel us to what is apparently, and reafon which directs us to what is really good, leav- ing the decifion entirely to ourfelves. Now the fchoolfmen aflerted, that Om- nipotence could not make a ftick with- out two ends, a fuppofition that he could, implying a contradiction in terms - y but furely it implies no lefs to affert, that the divinity foreknows the confequences of man's voluntary ac- tions, which depend on his determina- tion between oppofite motives. The ( 6o ) The intuitive knowledge, indeed, which the Deity poffeffes of the phyfical world, and his exa£t acquaintance with the characters of all moral agents, enable him generally to determine, both how the fpecies and the individual will act; this perception is, however, ac- quired in no fhape by intuition, and, according to our comprehenfions, muft ftill retain fome fhadow of that imper- fection which prevails in the reafoning of men, when it relates to fuch a6tions as are likely to proceed from certain chara£ters and motives. But if this may feem too hardy an affertion, I fhall allow the Omnifcience of the Deity, maintaining only, that it is acquired a pofteriori, and not by intuition -, in which cafe it includes no predeflination, as proceeding from a knowledge of the charafters of men, and not in any fhape determining them. For inftance, from ( 6i ) an intimate and perfeft acquaintance with the difpofitions of moral agents, he certainly knows how each being, whofe chara6ter is formed, will aft when afiailed by particular motives j but he cannot pofitively determine what Will be the charafter of the embrio in the womb, and at beft can form but a mere accurate judgment of it, In the prefent acceptation of it, Om- hifcience means a knowledge of every thing which is to be known ; and if any perfon wifhcs to make it extend be* yond this, he muft alio defire that it ihould involve contradictions. The Deity knows by intuition whatever concerns the phyfical vVorltf, becaufe he has given it immutable laws 3 but feafon, the law of man, does not kl- way infure an exadt conformity to it. There is, of courfe, no pre-ordijiatiofi I in ( fc ) in the moral world, nor does the Divi- nity deferve praife for our good, or blame for our bad a£tions. I now proceed to Mr. Hume's laft argument againft Providence and a fu- ture ftate. Does juftice exert itfelf in this world, then it is fatisfied ; does it not, your experience does not allow you to infer it ? But muft premife a few obfeivations concerning the import of the fifft term. This expreffion in- deed is very improperly applied with refpecl to human actions, as it has been already fhewn that the Deity can- not forejfee, or cannot have an intuitive knowledge of them. But Providence is of two kinds, general and efpecial ; tic one fuppofmg laws laid down for inert matter, inftinct given to brutes, reafon to man, and an attention paid by the Deity to the good or evil ufe of the talents granted by him to rational creatures, ( 63 ) creatures, without the interference of reward or punifhment in their prefent ftate of exiftence ; the other maintain- ing that God is immediately employed in the government, both of the phyfical and moral worlds, revenging evil, and rewarding good afrions. The former is the providence of a philofopher, the latter of an old woman j nor fliall I argue againfl: it, as the fuccefsful vil- lanies of men are a too evident proof of the monftrous abfurdities attending* on the opinion. Now the former fpe- cies of providence is neceflarily con- nected with the Omnifcience of God ; fince if he were ignorant of human ac- tions at the time of performance, he muft be ignorant of things which were capable of being known, and thus is a fuperintendance clearly eftablifhed : the juftice of the divinity, and his grant of reafon to us as a law, have alfo been heretofore proved. Why then does an I 2 Omni- ( 64 ) Omnifcient and Omnipotent Being al* alow the infraction of it ? I reply, be^ caufe prevention is impoffible. Now impoffibilities are of twQ kinds ; the one implying a negation of power in the being, which is to perform it, and the other a contradiction in the thing to be effe&ed. Now to fay that a matter is impoffible in the latter fenfe, conveys net the fmalleft reflection on Omnipo- tence : but did God interfere by a fpe- cial Providence, this would be attended with a moral conflraint. Thus if the nian, who in obedience to paflion, and in contradi&ion to reafon, walked out of his door, fhould break his leg at the very firft ftep ; and if the whole of our experience, both with refpeft to our own conduct, and to that of others* informed us that punifhment immedi- ately followed each adt of difohedience to this divine law, we fhould be obliged to ( 65 ) to a£t by an extrinfically impofed mo- ral neceffity, and equally immutable with that which regulates the motions of the planets. Since then the interference of God, though effentially juft, in either re- warding or punifhing men at prefent, muft evidently be attended with a mo- ral neceffity of aftion, or of reftraint in them, it evidently follows that the ftate of recompenfe, or of punifhment, muft be in future. How this may take place, can be clearly difcerned by en- lightened divines with the eye of faith $ but unaffifted reafon can only perceive that, by obedience to her dictates, we imitate the perfe<3ions of the Deity, which oblige him to a moral neceffity of adtion ; that by fubferviency to paf- fion, we degrade ourfelves to the level of the beafts, and ultimately tend to an imita- ( 66 ) imitation of matter, adting by,a blind neceffity of nature ; that confequently* in whatever degree we have courted elevation or deprefllon, is the author of our exiilence bounden, by his juftice 5 to fecond our wifhes. FINIS ^ , |o 5Vf \ L* i W&-^.ii ■* 1 .- V. v 1 ^ , .. . -